# A HISTORY

OF THE

# PENINSULAR MALAYS

WITH CHAPTERS ON

# PERAK & SELANGOR

AMS PRESS
NEW YORK

PAPERS ON MALAY SUBJECTS

*Published by direction of the Government of the Federated Malay States.*

# A HISTORY

OF THE

# PENINSULAR MALAYS

WITH CHAPTERS ON

# PERAK & SELANGOR

By R. J. WILKINSON, C.M.G.,
*late of the S.S. & F.M.S. Civil Service*

THIRD EDITION: REVISED



SINGAPORE:
KELLY & WALSH, LIMITED,
30-31 Raffles Place and 194 Orchard Road.
1923.

Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data

Wilkinson, Richard James, 1867-1941.
A history of the penisular Malays, with chapters on Perak & Selangor.

Reprint of the 1923 ed. published by Kelly & Walsh, Singapore, in series: Papers on Malay subjects.
1. Malay Peninsula—History. 2. Perak—History. 3. Selangor—History. I. Title. II. Series: Papers on Malay subjects.
DS596.W47 1975 959.5'1 74-179252
ISBN 0-404-54878-4



From the edition of 1923, Singapore
First AMS edition published in 1975
Manufactured in the United States of America

AMS PRESS INC.
NEW YORK, N.Y.

## PREFACE TO 2nd EDITION.

THIS book is a revised edition of "History, Part I" published in 1908 at Kuala Lumpur in the series of "Papers on Malay Subjects." Research has added to our knowledge of early Malay history. And the last four chapters embody hitherto unpublished results of original study.

Highly technical matter relegated to appendices in the former edition has been omitted.

My friend, Dr. Winstedt has kindly seen the work through the press.

1920 R. J. W.

## PREFACE TO 3rd EDITION.

Many inaccuracies have been corrected and some new material embodied in this third edition.

August, 1923 R. J. W.

# TABLE OF CONTENTS.

## ERRATA.

Page 22 line 22: for *Revovation* read *Renovation.*

Page 30 footnote: for *Jawai* read *Jawi* and omit *the very beginning of*

Page 35 line 13: for *Tuan* read *Tuah.*

Page 37 and *passim*: for *Aladin* read *Alaedin.*

Page 66: for *Tun Hidap* (J.) read *Tun Hidaj.* (f.)

Page 66: Insert line to show that *Tun Ahmad, Paduka Raja* was a son of *Tun Isap Misai, Bendahara X.*

Page 98 line 2: for *Sunkai* read *Sungkai.*

Page 101 lines 1, 3: for *boundries* read *boundaries.*

Page 106 line 40: for *Krisan* read *Krian.*

Page 110 line 13: for *practical* read *piratical.*

# CHAPTER I.

## THE PENINSULAR ABORIGINES.

It is a matter of common knowledge that the Malays were not the first inhabitants of the Peninsula. Though they have inter-married with the aborigines and show many traces of mixed blood they have failed to absorb completely the races they supplanted. The Malay settlers kept to the rivers: at their coming the earlier races took to the mountains or the swamps. Some of the old tribes have died out; some have adopted the life of the Malays; others have retained their own language and their primitive culture, and are still to be found in many parts of British Malaya.

The Negrito aborigines, collectively known as Semang,[1] are believed to have been the first race to occupy the Peninsula. As they are closely akin to the Aetas of the Philippines and to the Mincopies of the Andamans they must at one time have covered large tracts of country from which they have since disappeared; at the present day they are mere survivals and play no part in civilised life. Slowly and surely they are dying out. Even within the last century they occupied the swampy coast districts from Trang in the north to the borders of Larut in the south; and yet at the census of 1891 only one Negrito—who, as the enumerator said, "twittered like a bird,"—was recorded from Province Wellesley, and in 1901 not one was found. Of the purest and most primitive Semang tribe[2] only 113 were enumerated at the census of 1911, most of them in territory ceded to Perak in 1909. Another similar tribe[3] numbered 661 individuals; and of a third tribe,[4] negrito by race but speaking the language of the Sakai, 681 were recorded. Other Negritoes, no doubt, are to be found in Kelantan and in Siamese Malaya, but it is

[1] Sĕmang. [2] Sĕmang Páya of Ijok and Upper Perak.
[3] Jĕher or Sakai Tanjong in Perak; Pangan in Pahang.
[4] Sakai Jĕram of the Perak River.

doubtful if the oldest race in Malaya is represented at the present time by more than 2,000 persons in all.

The culture of the Semang is very primitive. In his wildest state he cultivates nothing; he lives on the wild fruit of the jungle and on such animals as he can trap or slay. He is nomadic. His houses are mere leaf-shelters put up to screen him for the night. His communities are small; the jungle will not support a large population. Physically he is short in stature and light in build; his hair is frizzled and his colour a dark chocolate-brown. Of his religion very little is known. He seems to be free from the all-pervading horror of ghosts and of the dead that is so marked a feature of the beliefs of his neighbours; but he has faith in a future life and in an "isle of fruits" to which the departing soul wends its way. He fears thunder and lightning to such an extent that observers have credited him with a belief in some kind of Thunder-god. He is dirty in his habits and rarely uses water either for washing or travelling. His work is intermittent; he does little; he does nothing long. His most attractive quality is the cheery optimism with which he faces a life of appalling uncertainty and hardship. It is also notable that he cannot pronounce the letter *R*,[1] though his Sakai neighbours can. The Malays of Northern Malaya experience a similar difficulty and may owe it to Semang intermixture.

Incidentally it should be explained that the word Semang, like most names given by a dominant to a subject race, has come to be regarded as contemptuous. No negrito will answer to it. "We are not Semang," say the pure-blooded negritoes of Ijok, "we are Sakai of the swamps; if you want Semang you will find them on the hills behind us." "Not so," say the negritoes of the hills, "we likewise are not Semang; but if you cross the valley of the Perak river you will find Semang on the heights behind it." The traveller who follows that advice will find himself among fair non-negrito tribesmen who also repudiate the Semang name. A designa-

[1] He pronounces it as the Arabic *ghain* or modern Greek *gamma* or even as *g*.

tion that is rejected or misapplied in this way is a fruitful source of error and confusion, especially among anthropologists of the excursionist type who accept uncritically all that natives have to tell them. Paradoxical as it may sound, the man who calls himself a Sakai is usually a Semang; he is never a Sakai. That word also is contemptuous; the true Sakai will not own to it; he prefers to call himself a highlander[1] or a man of the hinterland.[2] The negrito, however, is flattered at being taken for a Sakai and accepts the name at once. Hence we get more confusion; but for practical purposes a Semang is a nomadic primitive Peninsular negrito whose numeral system stops at two.[3]

The fair wavy-haired aborigines known as the Sakai inhabit both sides of the Malayan main range from its extreme limits in the north of Perak to a point as far southward as Tanjong Malim. They are to be found also on the contiguous Kledang Hills, on Bujang Malaka, and on Gunong Benom in Pahang. There must be at least twenty thousand of these aborigines in Malaya—a very large number if allowance is made for the inhospitable character of their mountain homes. The number actually enumerated at the 1911 census was 15,527. They speak three distinct dialects or languages, and seem to represent more than one racial element, but they possess in common certain characteristics which justify their being classified together and differentiated from the other aboriginal tribes. They are fairer than their neighbours; they have a high culture; they are wavy-haired; they paint their faces; they have the same numerals[4]; they have the same system of government; they have a peculiar religion common to all three divisions of the Sakai; and they are relatively dolichocephalic.

The Northern Sakai (who are found on the main-range from Sungai Raya and the Tenom northwards) are tall, active, well-built men, who are cleanly in their habits and suffer little from the skin-diseases that afflict most aborigines. They plant tubers of several kinds,

[1] Orang Bukit. [2] Orang Darat. [3] One *nai*; two *bie*
[4] One *ne*, *nanu*; two *nar*; three *ni*.

also sugar-cane, millet and bananas. They build substantial houses of the long communal type and live in communities numbering sometimes as many as four hundred souls. They are good craftsmen, making excellent blow-pipes, elaborate quivers, powerful bows, and even iron-tipped arrows. They are less migratory than their neighbours, and their crops take longer to mature. They intermarry with strangers more readily than the Central Sakai and show signs of mixed blood, though their high standard of primitive culture makes it difficult to regard the Northern Sakai as a mere cross between the negrito and his neighbours. They numbered 6,618 at the 1911 census, and many doubtless escaped enumeration.[1] Their isolation, their remoteness, and their culture make them a mysterious but most interesting people.

The Central Sakai are less advanced. They build flimsy huts instead of large communal houses, are shorter and weaker in build than their northern neighbours, are dirty to a disgusting degree, and have only small family clearings which they abandon while the crops are ripening. One would almost suspect them of being a degraded offshoot of the higher Northern Sakai stock were it not that they seem to be the purer tribe of the two. Their facial type is unmistakable and they refuse all intermarriage with other races. They are the best-known of all the aborigines. They were numbered as 7,202 at the 1911 census; and this figure was probably near the truth.

The Sakai of Gunong Benom were assumed to be identical with those of the main range until the census of 1911 when they were found to possess a language or dialect peculiar to themselves. Little else is known about them, but they are certainly Sakai in physical type and in their customs. The number enumerated was 1,707.

All the Sakai tribes have the same political system—a confederacy of small family-communities under a

[1] The census did not include Kelantan and was not thoroughly done in Kuala Lipis district.

common patriarchal chief. All alike maintain a certain tribal isolation and communicate or trade with the outer world through the tribal messenger. All alike conceal their personal names. All believe in a vast number of spirits of disease and in a future life; and they are in the habit of leaving food and implements on the graves of their dead so as to help the soul to leave the district. The Sakai have a curious hierarchy of magicians who are associated with the tiger (the local form of lycanthropy); these magicians are not buried in the ground but are left suspended on a tree or in a hut raised above the ground so that the tiger, the wizard's familiar,[1] may tear open the body and release the soul. These curious beliefs and practices extend, however, beyond the strict boundaries of the Sakai country. So also does the belief in a Sun-god, the beneficent giver of life, heat and light. "Was he all-virtuous?"—"Well, he could hardly be called that, for he devoured his own children." This Thyestean repast had its justification,—"For if one sun is so hot how could we have stood the heat of many?"—but the Sakai question the morality of the sun's behaviour, "And so did the moon, for she fled from him so that she might save the lives of her own children, the stars. That is why the sun shines by day and the moon by night; that also is why the sun is alone and the moon is surrounded by numberless children."

In the South of the Peninsula we find two other primitive peoples who are neither Sakai nor Semang and yet speak non-Malayan languages. They are the Besisi of Selangor and Negri Sembilan, and certain Jakun tribes of Pahang.

The Besisi are unimportant numerically; only 1,409 were recorded at the census of 1911. They have mixed with other tribes and copied Malay houses and modes of life to such an extent that they would be often indistinguishable from Malays but for their language. They differ widely from the Sakai both in racial type and in religion. In their features they are almost Malayan or proto-Malayan; in religion they are agnostics. Their

[1] The familiar-spirit (*anak yang*) resides in the tiger.

funerals are unceremonious interments and they claim no knowledge of a future life. As for evil spirits, "I wish I could see them," said a Besisi, "I could then dodge them and escape all illness." Here we have the widespread theory of the ghostly origin of disease but not the horror of the supernatural generally found to go with it. The Besisi are a shy, unwarlike people who have accepted without resentment the wrongs inflicted on them by past generations of Malays. Ask any one of them for his family history and you will often be told a harrowing tale of the cold-blooded murder of some parent or relative—and you will be told it without resentment as though it were the most natural thing in the world. There is something almost uncanny in the patience with which such injuries have been borne. There is something pitiful also in the uncomplaining manner in which these tribesmen submit to the petty traders who exploit them from day to day. Except for an occasional tree-hut and a tribal pattern of quiver the Besisi has no distinctive culture of his own. He is content to wash for tin, to sell the fruit of old abandoned orchards, to collect jungle produce and to do odd jobs on the plantations of others. He has none of the shyness or suspicion that drives the Sakai to isolate his tribe from the world and to limit all intercourse to the comings and goings of a single tribal emissary. The Besisi seems almost to desire dependence on others. From the days of Mudzafar Shah of Malacca he has been exploited and persecuted. He has been absorbed into the Malay population by conversion and intermarriage, but he has never died out. He will lose his language and what is left of his culture; in time he will become a "Malay"; but he will not retreat, like the Sakai and Semang, before the advance of civilization and perish miserably when the opening-up of the country destroys the old hunting-grounds and drives their occupants further and further back into the inhospitable valleys of the interior.

We have also a number of wild tribes in the hillier portions of the coast region of Pahang and in certain

parts of the Kuala Pilah district. They speak a common language and have some peculiar beliefs as to the future life; unlike the Sakai of the mountains they use wooden blowpipes and not blowpipes of bamboo. Their numeral system includes numbers up to seven and appears to be connected with that of the old Peguan or Talaing (Mon) language. Little else is known about them. They show some kinship to the Besisi in their language, in the words that they use for numerals,[1] and in their system of government by a *batin* and *jĕnang*.

We possess fairly good specimen-vocabularies of the languages spoken by these wild tribes. A comparison of these word-lists shows that they are closely connected with each other and with certain of the Mon-Annam tongues. Similarity of vocabulary does not mean that the structure or grammar of these languages need be similar. Indeed we know that the grammar of Besisi is simple and uninflected while that of Sakai is extraordinarily complex and inflected. Of Semang grammar nothing is known. Structurally therefore Besisi is a proto-Malayan language while Sakai is Indo-Chinese or Mon-Annam. The inference to be drawn from these verbal similarities and structural differences between the various forms of speech in use among the wild tribes is that some one Mon-Annam people was at one time strong enough to force much of its vocabulary upon all the racial elements making up the population of the Peninsula. That people was not the Besisi, for the Besisi are not Indo-Chinese in their grammar, nor was it the Semang, for the negritoes are not Indo-Chinese by race. It may possibly have been the Sakai. That event takes us very far back into history, for the connection between Sakai and Mon does not include even such developments as the expansion of the numeral system beyond three. At a later date there must have been a second wave of Indo-Chinese influence to account for the Pahang "Jakun" adopting the more modern Indo-Chinese numerals up to seven. This wave seems to have been confined to the South of the Peninsula and may have

[1] One *mui*; two *'mbar*; three *'mpe*. Besisi goes no further.

been due to the settlement in Malaya of small colonies of Peguan miners. Remains of old mine-workings in Pahang indicate that some such settlements did take place.

Meanwhile the Peninsula presents us with a historical museum illustrating every grade of primitive culture. It gives us the humble negrito who has not yet learnt to till the ground and is content to wander over the country, living from hand to mouth on the products of the jungle. It gives us the same negrito after he has learnt the rudiments of art and agriculture from his Sakai neighbours. It gives us the Sakai who grows simple fruits and vegetables and is less nomadic than the negrito; for a man who plants must live some time at the same spot and find it worth his while to build a more substantial home than a mere screen-shelter for the night. It gives us the still more highly cultured Sakai of the North who lives in a large communal house, knows how to work in metal, and may reside on the same clearing for a period of three years or more. Here, however, primitive culture stops. Even the man who has learnt to plant a crop in a clearing must abandon his home when the soil begins to be exhausted. The boundary between primitive culture and civilisation cannot be said to be reached, until habitations become permanent and a comparatively small area can support a large population. That boundary is crossed when a people learn to renew the fertility of land by irrigation, by manuring, or by a proper system of rotation of crops. The Malays with their system of rice-planting—the irrigated rice, not hill rice—have crossed that boundary. But no Sakai unaided has ever done so.

# CHAPTER II.

## THE PROTO-MALAY.

In the Southern States of the Malay Peninsula, in the Riau-Lingga Archipelago, in the isle of Bangka, and in certain districts of Eastern Sumatra there are a number of primitive pagan communities who speak Malayan dialects. In British Malaya they are known by names such as Biduanda, Blandas, Mantra or Orang Benua; generically they are often described by the vague term Jakun. In the extreme south and on the islands they are styled Orang Laut, Orang Galang, Orang Sekanak, Orang Seletar, Orang Hudai. Even in Singapore itself they have hereditary chiefs[1] who owe some sort of allegiance to the Malay princes of Kampong Glam. The language of these communities is not the Malay of books: they use peculiar words and expressions; they speak with an accent of their own; and they pronounce the final *k* which the Malays suppress. None the less their language is a true Malayan speech. At one time it was thought that they were Sakai who had picked up the language of their more civilized neighbours; and their dialectic words were studied eagerly in the hope that they might afford a clue to the origin of these unclassified tribesmen. By me as by others much time has been spent in trying to find some one of these communities that retained its more ancient language. No such community was to be found. However primitive in his culture, however shy of strangers, however far removed from modern Malay influence, the Orang Laut or Biduanda tribesman invariably speaks Malay.

Slowly the student is forced to the conclusion that Malay is not an element imported from outside into the speech of these primitive peoples. It is their own. They could hardly have acquired it otherwise without assimilating some of the culture it connotes and the religion that the Malays would have insisted on imposing. Nor

[1] *e.g.* the Batin of Kalang and the Jenang of Rochor.

is it credible that each separate community should have been affected (as is the case) in the same measure and the same way, in every instance retaining the same peculiar words and borrowing the same foreign words. The tribes are Proto-Malayan; and if once this fact is accepted, it will explain much that is mysterious in Peninsular history. It will explain, for instance, why the Malay language can be traced in the Peninsula before the advent of the culture that is now associated with the Malay name. It throws much light both on etymology and history.

We need not infer that every modern Malay is a descendant of Proto-Malayan tribesmen. He comes of a mixed race. The Malays differ among themselves in physical type as much as a carthorse differs from a polo-pony. In the towns they have absorbed whole communities of foreign settlers and in the country-districts they have intermarried with the older aboriginal tribes. There is no such thing as a true Malay racial type and the expression "real Malay" must be used guardedly.

All we can say with confidence is that before the dawn of recorded history much of what is now the Malayan area was inhabited by primitive communities who spoke a language from which Malay has developed. These communities were (and in their wild state still are) very primitive. Many of them are unacquainted with agriculture and are content to live by fishing, by the chase and on the wild fruits of the jungle. Their religion is a simple animism. A Proto-Malayan tribe is seen at its best by the sea, for fish are more plentiful than game and the waters yield more than the jungle. The Orang Laut has his villages and racial customs, while the Jakun of the interior is a nomadic nondescript who does in Rome as the Romans do.

Who, then, are these Proto-Malayans and what relationship do they bear to their Indonesian and Indo-Chinese neighbours? Malay is regarded as an Indonesian language. Superficially there is little resemblance between the harsh Sakai dialects of the Mon-Annam group and the soft vocalic languages of the Indian

Archipelago. Yet there is little doubt that in the remote past a connection did exist between these two great language-groups, notably in the system of affixes and infixes that is found in both.

The Proto-Malay of the Peninsula is no follower of matriarchal theories. Tradition has it that the stream of Malay culture had its source in the Menangkabau highlands, the last Malay kingdom to accept Islam. The home of the matriarchate in the Archipelago is there.

As we shall see in a later chapter, the first great conquering Sumatran kingdom was Palembang or Sri Vijaya, of Hindu and particularly Buddhist civilization. In the seventh century it annexed the *Malayu* country, probably Jambi. In the thirteenth century Langkasuka, Trengganu, Pahang, and Kelantan were subject to its sway. Singapore was one of its colonies. In the middle of the fourteenth century A.D. the Javanese empire of Majapahit wrested its sovereignty. The superficial character of those early Sumatran settlements is shown by the fact that the wilder aborigines of the archipelago have never been completely absorbed. From Singapore Sumatran civilisation spread to Malacca, where there was already a village of Proto-Malayan "Cellates." This was after the sack of Singapore about 1360. Between that day and this the Malays have been converted to Islam and have been in constant contact with the aboriginal races of the Peninsula and with the peoples and civilisations of Arabia, India and Europe. There has been much intermarrying and much borrowing. Of the old culture of Palembang something survives in the court-ceremonial, the customs and the art of the Malays. Of the old Menangkabau culture little remains (outside Negri Sembilan), apart from legend and some details affecting the status of Malay women. Of the primitive Proto-Malayan era nothing is left to the Malay except the animism that colours his superstitions, and, we may perhaps add, the love of some remote Orang Laut ancestor for the banks of great rivers and for the life of the sea.

# CHAPTER III.

## EARLY PENINSULAR CIVILIZATION.

Although British Malaya is not destitute of old remains it is singularly poor in relics of antiquity when contrasted with Java and Cambodia, or even with the northern part of the Peninsula itself.

Ancient inscriptions have been found in Kedah, in the northern district of Province Wellesley, in the central district of Province Wellesley, and in the island of Singapore. That in Kedah has been completely deciphered; it is a Buddhist formula such as might have been written up in the cell or cave of an ascetic. That in the north of Province Wellesley was carved on a pillar that seemed to form part of a little temple; it has not been deciphered, but from the form of the written character is believed to date back to the year A.D. 400, and to be the oldest inscription in this part of the world—unless, indeed, the Kedah writing is slightly more ancient. The rock carvings at Cherok Tokun near Bukit Mertajam belong to various ages and are too worn away to be read in connected sentences; the oldest seems to go back to the fifth century and another to the sixth century A.D. Most of the monument in Singapore is no longer available for study as it was blown up by the Public Works Department to effect some harbour improvement; from a rough copy made before its destruction and a fragment now in Raffles' Museum it appears to have been in the ancient Kawi character of Sumatra or Java and to date back to the middle of the fourteenth century A.D. Another inscription, presumably of the same class, is to be seen at Pulau Karimun near Singapore.

Near Pangkalan Kĕmpas, on the Linggi river, there are a number of broken monuments which are of real interest, though they seem to be of recent date. On a curious foursided pillar there are four inscriptions, two in clear-cut Malay and two in the fainter lettering of an unknown script: below these inscriptions there is a circular hole cut right through the pillar and large

enough to permit of the passage of a man's arm. It is believed that this pillar (which has been much used for oaths and ordeals) will tighten round the arm of any man who is rash enough to swear falsely when in its clutch. There are many other fragments of carved stone that go to make up the *kĕramat* or holy place of which the inscribed pillar forms part and the Malays have invented a legend that these monuments represent the petrified property of a saint—his spoon, his sword, his buckler and the rudder of his boat. An examination of the monuments reveals the fact that they may belong to three periods. There is a tomb made of laterite blocks much worn with age and showing traces of only one inscription, faint and indecipherable as to the exact words but obviously in Arabic. The four-sided pillar is of sandstone and contains on two sides a Malay inscription to the effect that the tomb is that of Shaikh Ahmad who died in the year 872 A.H. (A.D. 1467) in the reign of Sultan Mansur Shah of Malacca. The word used for "tomb"[1] shows that Shaikh Ahmad was regarded as a saint; the hole in the pillar and its non-Malayan inscriptions are still unexplained. The other carved stones are of granite; they are now set up around the tomb and are not invested with any halo of sanctity. It is notable that the stones are carved only on one side and the "rudder" has a picture of a horse. The "sword," on which is carved the word Allah has been lately taken to be of Minangkabau type and compared with the gravestone of prince Aditiawarman at Kubor Raja in Sumatra (A.D. 1378). There is no granite rock in the vicinity of these antiquities. It is possible that the Linggi river may have flowed at one time by this low-lying spot and have rendered easier the transport of heavy stone.

At Malacca itself there is to be seen an old image of a *makâra*, a fabulous sea-animal, the vehicle of Varuna the Hindu god of the sea, an image of the type found at the Prambanan temple in Java. It is probable that this monument was in Malacca prior to the conversion of the Malays to Islam; but, of course, it is just

[1] *makam.*

possible that it was imported from Java at a later date by some Dutch lover of antiquities.

Besides these inscriptions traces of non-Malayan civilisations have been found: (1) in some curious old bronzes, resembling bells, that have been dug up at Klang in Selangor; (2) in a little bronze image of a walking Buddha that was discovered in a Tanjong Rambutan mine at a depth of some sixty feet below the surface; (3) in an old Bernam tomb constructed of granite flakes and containing some broken pottery, fragments of a bronze vessel, a stone implement of the type found in Perak, Pahang and Negri Sembilan with a cross-hatched flat surface possibly used for stamping bark cloth, an iron implement of the kind called *tulang mawas* and three cornelian beads, and (4) in the pottery and iron tools (*tulang mawas*) that are common in old mining workings. More impressive, however, than any of these small relics are the galleries, stopes and square shafts of the old mines at Selinsing in Pahang—the work of a race that must have possessed no small degree of mechanical skill. Who were the men who left these remains? If it be true (as the condition of the Selinsing workings seems to suggest) that the mines were suddenly abandoned in the midst of the work that was being done, this would lend support to the conjecture that the miners were foreign adventurers who exploited the wealth of the Peninsula and did not make the country their permanent home. The Malays say that these alien miners were "men of Siam." Is this true? People are apt to forget that the "men of Siam" of seven or eight centuries ago were the highly civilised Mon-Khmer people who preceded the modern Thai in the occupation of the valley of the Menam and claimed kinship with the great Cambodian builders of the magnificent temples of Angkor. It is probable that these early visitors were Mon and not Khmer by race, for the Cambodians themselves were not miners and the numerals still in use among the Pahang aborigines are closer to Mon than to Khmer.

The conclusion to be drawn from the traces of past culture in the Peninsula is that the southern portions of the country were visited without being occupied by

civilized races prior to the coming of the modern Malays. This conclusion would not be true of the northern states. In Kedah, Trang, Singgora and Ligor we find unmistakable marks of the existence of Buddhist kingdoms. In the ninth century an Arab voyager found Kalah-Bar, which is almost certainly Kedah, subject to Palembang. In 1250 Chau Ju Kua records that Langkasuka, Trengganu, Pahang and Kelantan were all subject to Palembang. Kedah and Langkasuka appear in a Javanese work, among the names of countries overcome by Majapahit in the great wars of the fourteenth century A.D. We may infer that the Siamese invasions of the fifteenth century put an end to the old kingdom of Langkasuka, whose name survives in the River Langkasuka of Patani, and in the fabulous land of *alang-kah suka* of folklore. Here and there in the forests of the Siamese Western States are fallen cities and temples, the relics of a civilisation that built in imperishable stone. Now and again, in the dialects, games, songs and magical formulae of the Malay kingdoms of the North we meet with strange words and expressions, the relics of an Indo-Chinese language that was not Siamese. In the same region we find a high standard of art in the *chutam* or niello-ware of Ligor. From this region also there radiate companies of strolling players, the *ma'yong, mĕndora* and *mekmulong* to the Malay South and the *wayang kun* and *lakawn* to the Siamese North. All these facts point to the past existence of powerful states and a high standard of wealth and luxury in the north of the Malay Peninsula. But these ancient kingdoms lie outside the scope of the present work. They are interesting to us only because of their influence and because of the small mining colonies they seem to have sent to the southern extremity of Malaya. The Siamese invasion killed these southern mining-settlements by crushing their parent-states, and left the territories of Perak, Johor, Malacca and Pahang a mere no-man's-land which the Malays from Sumatra could colonize without resistance.

## CHAPTER IV.

### THE COMING OF THE MALAYS.

According to a tradition accepted in all Southern Malaya the founder of the native dynasties was a prince named Sang Sapurba, son of Raja Suran, the "Ruler of the East and of the West," by his marriage with a mermaid, the daughter of the Kings of the Sea. This prince revealed himself on the hill of Siguntang, near Mount Mahameru, in the hinterland of Palembang. Two young girls who dwelt upon the hill are said to have seen a great light shining on it through the darkness of night. On ascending the hill in the morning they found that their rice-crops had been transformed—the grain into gold, the leaves into silver, the stalks into golden brass. Proceeding further they came across three young men, the eldest of whom was mounted on a silver-white bull and dressed as a king, while the two younger, his brothers, bore the sword and spear that indicated sovereign power. "Who then are you—spirits or fairies?" said the astonished girls. "Neither spirits nor fairies, but men," said one of the brothers; "we are princes of the race of the Great Alexander; we have his seal, his sword and his spear; we seek his inheritance on earth." "And what proof have you of this?" said the girls. "Let the crown I wear bear me witness if necessary," replied the eldest prince. "But what of that? Is it for naught that my coming has been marked by this crop of golden grain?" Then out of the mouth of the bull there issued a sweet-voiced herald who at once proclaimed the prince to be a king bearing the title of Sang Sapurba Trimurti Tribuana. The newly installed sovereign descended afterwards from the hill of Siguntang into the great plain watered by the Palembang river, where he married the daughter of the local chief, Demang Lebar Daun, and was accepted everywhere as ruler of the country. At a later date he is said to have crossed the central range of Sumatra into the mountains of Menangkabau, where he slew the dragon Si-Katimuna and was made king of a grateful

people and founder of the long line of princes of Menangkabau, the noblest dynasty of Malaya. Meanwhile his relative, Nila Utama, from Palembang, had crossed the sea, first to the island of Bentan, and afterwards from Bentan to the island of Temasek, on which he founded the city of Singapore. "And the city of Singapore became mighty, and its fame filled all the earth." Such, at least, is the story that is told us in the "Malay Annals."

It is easy to criticize this legend. Sapurba and Nila Utama and Baniaka are the names of heavenly nymphs whom Indra used to send down to the world to test the flesh of ascetics; the Macedonian genealogy cannot be reconciled with history, and the miraculous incidents fail to commend themselves to the sceptical historians of the present day. Textual criticism will make much of the fact that the manuscripts of the "Malay Annals" give two irreconcilable versions of the story and that a third version is recorded by the author of the *Bustânu's-Salâtin*. And yet although we need not treat the legend of Sang Sapurba as literal truth we have to give it attention. The kingdoms of Singapore and Palembang are no myth; the latter, at least, played a great part in local history. The story itself is accepted everywhere in Southern Malaya and is referred to in histories older than the "Malay Annals." The Sultans of Perak, Johor, Lingga, Trengganu and Pahang believe they are descended directly from Sang Sapurba and consequently from Alexander the Great. The Dato' Sri Nara Diraja of Perak and some other Chiefs of the same family assert their descent from the herald who came out of the mouth of the bull on that memorable morning on the slopes of Mount Siguntang Mahameru. The Sultan of Perak claims to possess the very sword[1] and seal[2] that were inherited by Sang Sapurba from his ancestor Alexander the Great. The Dato' Sri Nara Diraja of Perak is the hereditary custodian of the ancient proclamation in a forgotten tongue by which the herald installed Sang

[1] *Chura si-manjakini.*
[2] *Kayu kampit* known in Perak as *kayu gamat.*

Sapurba as ruler of the Palembang world. That form of proclamation[1] is still used (with many old-world ceremonies) at the installation of every Perak Sultan and of all his high officers of state. Last of all, the Dato' Sri Nara Diraja is the hereditary keeper of the Perak state secret. When a Sultan is installed this secret is whispered in his ear by the Dato' Sri Nara Diraja; when a new Dato' Sri Nara Diraja is installed he learns from the Sultan the secret in his turn. What relationship do these old traditions bear to the truth ?

The details of the Malay version of the Alexander legend are enough to explain its origin. A courtier once drew up a genealogy of the Sultans of Perak, from Adam downwards. I ventured to ask Sultan Idris if he remembered any of the details. "Yes," said His Highness, "Adam had two sons, Seth and Kaiomerz ; I am descended from Kaiomerz." Now Kaiomerz is the old Iranian Adam and the traditional founder of the great dynasty of the Achamenides, the reputed ancestor of Cyrus, of Xerxes, and of the Darius whom Alexander overthrew. That takes us (and the genealogist) from Adam to the days of Alexander the Great. Next, among the stories of Alexander's campaigns there was a version—still extant in the original Greek and known as the version of the Pseudo-Callisthenes—that was written by some person resident in Egypt to reconcile the Egyptians to their conquest by the great Macedonian. To do this the author represented Alexander as being the son of Nectanebo, the pretender-king of Egypt, by an intrigue with Olympias whom he deceived in the guise of Jupiter Ammon. Owing to the imaginative character of this romantic narrative the Pseudo-Callisthenes version became the favourite popular account of Alexander's life and influenced in an extraordinary degree the medieval and eastern stories of the conqueror. Persian authors accepted the version with one amendment: Alexander was represented as the son of an elder Darius[2] by a daughter of Philip and consequently as the elder brother of Darius Codomannus[3] whom he defeated.

[1] *The chiri.* [2] *Dara.* [3] *Darab.*

The war, they said, was not a national disgrace but a civil war in which the rightful Persian heir came into his own. This brought Alexander into the line of Kaiomerz. The writers went further and traced the descent of the later Sasanian kings back to Alexander and through him to Kaiomerz, the founder of the race. Once invented, the pedigree would be accepted readily in court-circles.

It must be admitted that between Chosroes the Great[1] who lived in the seventh century and Sang Sapurba whose son founded Singapore in the fourteenth there was a very long interval to be bridged by the Malay genealogist. He did not attempt to bridge it; he was unaware of its existence and ignored it. He linked the pedigrees that local history gave him with those that he had picked up out of books. His inventiveness met with a readier acceptance because one of the very earliest kings of Malacca had assumed the name and title of King Alexander[2].

This brings us to the sword and seal that are still shown by the Sultans of Perak as having been the property of their great Macedonian ancestor. The sword is a beautiful weapon with a hilt of gold studded with turquoises and covered with Arabic writing. It can date back hardly more than a few centuries, if we are to judge by the type of weapon and by the style of the lettering. The actual wooden seal is not extant. Preserved in the Sultan's regalia is an old silver seal engraved with the words *Sĕri Sultan Muhammad Shah dzil Allah fi'l-'alami* (the illustrious Sultan Muhammad Shah, God's shadow on Earth). But this is not the true seal of Alexander! In the handle of the silver seal there is an aperture, wherein a piece of wood is embedded. That wood has been placed there avowedly to replace the wood of the old wooden seal which has long since crumbled away. More importance perhaps may be attached to the coronation formula and to the state secret. The coronation formula is in either Sanskrit or Pali; it suffers from having

[1] *Nushirwan.* [2] *Iskandar Shah.*

been transcribed into Arabic characters that are ill-adapted for representing Sanskrit sounds. Its text—so far as it can be interpreted—reveals nothing. The state-secret is also disappointing. It professes to give the true names of the three princes who appeared on Mount Siguntang Mahameru; but those names convey no revelation to the student beyond their Indian Character. All that we need infer from the Perak regalia and installation-customs is that long before the days when the "Malay Annals" were compiled (A.D. 1612)—almost certainly as far back as the days of the old kingdom of Malacca—the Malay rulers attached importance to the possession of a seal and sword, both bearing Indian names, and to the use of an Indian installation formula and to a state secret suggesting their Indian descent. It will be necessary to revert to these points when discussing the foundation of the kingdom of Malacca.

The legend of Sang Sapurba is not limited to these details. It tells us that he first appeared at Mount Siguntang in Central Sumatra; that he then descended into the Palembang plain which was first known as Andalas and afterwards as Palembang; thence the family divided, the senior branch founding the kingdom of Menangkabau while the junior colonized Bintan and afterwards Singapore or Temasek. From the junior branch most of the Peninsular Sultans claim descent.

In its outline of events the legend approaches very closely to historical truth. In Chinese records Palembang or Sri Vijaya (the Arabic *Sarbaza* and Chinese *San-bo-tsai*) appears as a Buddhist kingdom from A.D. 600 to 1400. It sent out a colony which founded Singapore at some date between A.D. 1200 and 1350. We know also that Menangkabau was a Malay kingdom of importance before Singapore and before Malacca though not before Palembang. Malay tradition is correct enough on these points. It is also suggestively silent or inaccurate on other points. It crowds the events of a thousand years into a couple of reigns. It has not perpetuated the memory of a single reliable name or event from all Palembang and Singapore history, and shows us that

the Malacca Malays had only a vague knowledge of the countries to which they claimed to trace their origin. On the other hand the author of the "Malay Annals" writes very definitely about Pasai and even about Champa.

We now come to what the Chinese records tell us.

In the reign of the Emperor Hsiau Wu (A.D. 454—464) the kingdom of Kandali sent articles of gold and silver to China. In A.D. 502 a king of Kandali sent an envoy to China with similar gifts of value. Other missions followed in A.D. 519 and 520. Then the name passes out of history. All that these early Chinese records tell us about Kandali is that it was a Buddist kingdom on an island in the Southern sea; that its customs were those of Cambodia and Siam; that it produced flowered cloth, cotton and excellent areca-nuts, and that its kings sent letters to the Chinese Emperor congratulating him on his fervent faith in Buddha. Still, as one of these kings is reported to have compared the Chinese Emperor to a mountain covered with snow, we may take it that the accuracy of this meagre account of Kandali is not above suspicion. We may perhaps see traces of Javanese influence in the reference to "flowered cloth," as the expression suggests the painted floral designs of Java rather than the woven plaid-patterns of the Malays. The identification of Palembang with Kandali is doubtful. But in the seventh century 'Shih-li-Fosheh' or Sri Vijaya was visited by a Chinese Buddhist monk, I-Tsing. He relates that the people were Buddhists. At the time of his visit Sri Vijaya or Palembang had just conquered the "Malay" country, almost certainly Jambi. Arab geographers speak of its ruler as Maharaja.

In A.D. 905 Palembang or Sri Vijaya appears in Chinese records under the name of San-bo-tsai. In that year its ruler sent tribute to China, and received from the Emperor the proud title of "the General who pacifies distant Countries." In A.D. 960 tribute was again sent—twice. In A.D. 962 the same thing occurred. From A.D. 962 onwards we have a continuous record of tribute-bearing missions until the year 1178 when the Chinese

Emperor found this tribute too expensive a luxury to be kept up, so he "issued an edict that they should not come to court any more but make an establishment in the Fukien province." After this date the Palembang merchants ceased to be tribute-bearers and became ordinary traders—a change that caused them to disappear temporarily from official records. Tribute was, of course, merely a gift made to the Emperor in order to secure his permission to trade ; it flattered his pride and was returned to the giver in the form of titles and presents of such high value that Chinese statesmen, when economically inclined, were in the habit of protesting against the extravagance of accepting tribute. None the less the Emperor encouraged these men of Palembang, for in A.D. 1156 he declared that "when distant people feel themselves attracted by our civilising influence their discerment must be praised." One Malay envoy received the title of "the General who is attracted by Virtue," a second was called "the General who cherishes Civilising Influence," a third was named "the General who supports Obedience and cherishes Revovation."

The kings of Sri Vijaya are said to have used the Sanskrit character in their writings, and to have sealed documents with signets instead of signing them with their names. One king is mentioned (A.D. 1017) as having sent among his presents "Sanskrit books folded between boards." Their capital was a fortified city with a wall of piled bricks several miles in circumference, but the people are said to have lived in scattered villages outside the town and to have been exempt from direct taxation. In case of war "they at once select a chief to lead them, every man providing his own arms and provisions." From these Chinese records we also learn that in A.D. 1003 the Emperor sent a gift of bells to a Buddhist temple in San-bo-tsai. As regards trade, the country is recorded as producing rattans, lignum-aloes, areca-nuts, cocoanuts, rice, poultry, ivory, rhinoceros-horns, camphor and cotton-cloth. In the matter of luxuries we are told that the people made intoxicating

drinks out of cocoanut, areca-nut, and honey, that they used musical instruments (a small guitar and small drums), and that they possessed imported slaves who made music for them by stamping on the ground and singing.

Palembang between the years A.D. 600 and 1360 was a civilized and important state, owing its culture to Indian sources. Ibn Khordadzbeh writing in 846 states that 'Kilah' or Kedah was then subject to Palembang. An inscription dated A.D. 1005 found at Negapatam relates how two kings of the house of the 'Maharaja of the Mountain' erected a Buddhist building there at that date: and the younger of the two kings is described as ruler of Sri Vijaya and Kataha. An earlier inscription dated A.D. 775 has been found in Ligor telling how two rulers of Sri Vijaya, Maharajas of the house of the Mountain, at that time built a Buddhist memorial in Ligor. Chau Ju Kua writing about A.D. 1225 tells how in his day Palembang claimed suzerainty over Langkasuka, Trengganu, Pahang, Kelantan and Ceylon. The Annals of the Chola kings relate that in the eleventh century the ruler of Coromandel attacked Kedah, Langkasuka and Palembang. Palembang held sway over the whole of Sumatra, over the Malay Peninsula and even excited the hostility of the rulers of southern India. Possibly the tale of Raja Suran attacking the coast of the Malay Peninsula, which is recorded in the "Malay Annals," refers to some Chola invasion. In A.D. 1270 Palembang attacked Ceylon. What were the events that brought about the downfall of this Malayan kingdom?

The close of the thirteenth century in China saw the Mongol invasion that ended in making Kublai Khan the undisputed overlord of the whole country. That restless conqueror was not satisfied with his continental dominions; he fitted out great fleets to extend his power over the Japanese islands in the north and over the island of Java in the south. He began a period of war during which we hear nothing of trade with the States in the Southern Seas; but the advent of the Ming dynasty

(A.D. 1368) inaugurated an era of peace and commerce in which we again find mention of the State of Palembang. Great changes had taken place since the last reference to the country in A.D. 1178. Palembang had been split up into three States. We hear (A.D. 1373) of a King Tan-ma-sa-na-ho—probably the King of Temasek or Singapore. We hear also (A.D. 1374) of a King Ma-na-ha-pau-lin-pang—probably the King of Palembang. The King Tan-ma-sa-na-ho died in A.D. 1376, and his successor, Ma-la-cha-wu-li, ordered the usual envoys to go to China and was sent in return a seal and commission as King. The Chinese annalist goes on to say:

> "At that time, however, San-bo-tsai had already been conquered by Java; and the king of the country, hearing that the Emperor had appointed a king over San-bo-tsai, became very angry and sent men who waylaid and killed the imperial envoys. The Emperor did not think it right to punish him on this account. After this occurrence San-bo-tsai became gradually poorer and no tribute was brought from this country any more."

We learn in this way from Chinese records that the old kingdom of Palembang was destroyed by the Javanese in the wars that occurred between A.D. 1338 and 1365. The Chinese account is confirmed by Javanese history, by the mention of one of these wars in the "Malay Annals" as having been the cause of the destruction of Singapore, and by mention of them in the history of Pasai as having destroyed Pasai and many other settlements, Singapore, Ujong Tanah (Johore), Langkasuka, Trengganu and Pahang. These Javanese wars are a landmark in Malay history.

We have seen that colonists from Palembang had founded Singapore at some date between A.D. 1200 and A.D. 1350. This little Malay colony was established at a place which in addition to the Javanese name of *Tĕmasek* was given by its founders the honorific Sanskrit title of *Singapura*, just as Palembang had been styled *Sri Vijaya*. The settlement was destroyed by the

Javanese just before A.D. 1365. The "Malay Annals" give anecdotes about the place but tell us nothing reliable. They relate that Sang Nila Utama, the founder, was driven to the island by a storm of wind in the course of which he lost his royal crown. Stories of the same sort are told about other Malay princes to explain away their lack of royal insignia. The "Annals" give us the name of five kings of Singapore; but a list of only three are given by Shaikh Nuru'd-din Muhammad Jilani ibn Ali ibn Hasanji ibn Muhammad Hamid a'r-Raniri, author of the *Bustânu's-Sâlatin*. Both lists are unreliable since they contain Moslem names and the kings were not Moslems. There is reason to believe that they are the names of early Malacca rulers. Again the pedigree given for Singapore contains the names of men who bore the title *Tun*, a Pasai and afterwards a Malacca honorific but one that could hardly have been borne by the Hinduized Singapore princes. Other titles are not Malay but those of the victorious Javanese. The family relationships in the genealogy also invite criticism. The third king of Singapore and the fourth king, father and son, both married sisters, daughters of the Bendahara Tun Perpateh Permuka Berjajar. The fifth king, (son of the fourth) and the three grandsons of the fifth king also married sisters, daughters of Tun Perpateh Tulus, second Bendahara. This fondness for marrying aunts and great aunts is rendered the more unlikely by the fact that three Bendahara generations are made to wed six generations of princes. The author's account of the Singapore rulers must be rejected altogether.

The corroborative detail that the "Malay Annals" give to an unconvincing genealogy must also be rejected as untrue. It is made up of myths—from the opening tale about the lion which Sang Nila Utama found on the island, to the concluding stories about the attack made by the sword-fish upon the city, and about the fate of Sang Ranjuna Tapa, the traitor who betrayed the city to the Javanese and was turned into stone as a punishment for his sin. Yet in all this mythical account there is a suggestion of tragedy. The story of the sword-

fish ends with the ominous words that the blood of the boy—who saved the city and was put to death lest his cleverness should prove a public danger—rested upon the island as a curse to be wiped out in days to come. The story of Tun Jana Khatib is the tale of another deed of wrong. The last tale in the narrative is that of the injury which maddened Sang Ranjuna Tapa into treason—the cruel fate of his daughter who was publicly impaled on a suspicion of infidelity to her lover the king. More than once the annalist seems to suggest the Nemesis that waits upon deeds of oppression. In the end the Javanese came; the city was betrayed; "blood flowed like water in full inundation, and the plain of Singapore is red as with blood to this day." A curse rested on the place. In A.D. 1819, more than four centuries later, Colonel Farquhar found that not one of the people of the Settlement dared ascend Fort Canning Hill, the "forbidden hill," which was haunted by the ghosts of forgotten kings and queens. The alien settlers who now inhabit the town believe to this day that—for some reason unknown to themselves—a curse laid on the island in times long past makes it impossible to grow rice on it; rice being the staple food of the Malays. All these legends seem to suggest that the fate of the ancient settlement must have been one of appalling horror. Many Malay towns have at different times been captured, many were captured by the Javanese in that very series of campaigns, but the fall of no other city has left such memories as to cause men, four centuries later, to refuse to face the angry spectres, believed to haunt so cruelly stricken a site.

Inaccurate in detail, Malay tradition is truthful in its drift. More than fifteen hundred years ago some dynasty did establish itself in the great Palembang plain. It or its successors reigned there for nearly a thousand years, first as the kingdom of Andalas[1] (perhaps Kandali) and afterwards as Sri Vijaya or Palembang. It sent a colony to Singapore, only to perish in a war with Majapahit. The one mysterious feature in

[1] Pronounced locally as *Andalaih*.

the legend is the allusion to Mount Siguntang. Although this famous hill, which is believed by all Malays to have been the cradle of their race, is located with curious definiteness on the slopes of the great volcano Mount Dempo in the hinterland of Palembang, there is no local tradition to guide us to the spot or to suggest why that place above all others should have been singled out for special honour. Its honorific Mahameru betrays an Indian origin.

The culture of the Malay kingdoms that accepted the Palembang tradition differs completely from that of the primitive Sumatrans who have not been affected by foreign influence. Such differences could not have been brought about in any brief period of time.

# CHAPTER V.

## THE MALACCA SULTANATE.

Alone among Malayan townships Malacca is invested with romance. Her buildings are historic. Her centuries are few but full of achievement, and there is little local glory in which she does not share. By her Portuguese conquerors she was named *La Famosa*, "the Renowned;" she is linked with the memory of Camoens, d'Albuquerque, and St. Francis Xavier, and stands for all that is mediaeval and time-honoured in a country where everything else is new.

But there have been several Malaccas; and the oldest of all was a petty village of "Cellates"[1] or Orang Laut, a fishing-hamlet of no fame and no importance. There are times when it is well to be obscure and when meekness may inherit the earth; the middle of the fourteenth century was one of those periods. The greatest local power of its day, the Javanese kingdom of Majapahit decided suddenly to play a part in history and to take a memorable place among the conquering States of the Malay world. It sent out fleets which descended on the thousand-year-old kingdom of Palembang and blotted it out. It destroyed Palembang's daughter, the settlement of Singapore, with a massacre so cruel that the memory of the colony's awful fate was enough, for centuries, to deter any Malay from settling on the island. It broke the rising power of Pasai, the first seedling of Islam that was destined in a few generations to overshadow Majapahit itself. The wars of the fourteenth century A.D. effaced all that was old and historic in the Malay world. But, as for Malacca, what was there in a street of huts and a fleet of dug-outs to attract the plundering ships of Majapahit ?

---

[1] So styled by D'Albuquerque, and said to mean 'people of the Straits' (*Sĕlat*).

So Malacca was spared to become a refuge and a shelter for the homeless people of the stricken cities, men of Singapore and Palembang, of Moslem Pasai and the Buddhist North. The little aboriginal fishing-village of the thirteenth century had become a cosmopolitan trading-centre at the beginning of the fifteenth century. The town in those early days was a walled or stockaded cluster of huts upon St. Paul's Hill; and right in the heart of the place there was built a wooden godown or store in which goods were warehoused for safe-keeping pending the arrival of a trading coaster or junk. The currency was tin; the trade was in tin, resin and jungle produce. The population could hardly have exceeded a few thousands. The local chief was a Hindu by faith and bore the pretentious Indian title of *Permaisura* or king. To this day, when the casual visitor walks from the landing steps to the Stadt-house he can see on the slopes of the hill the weird *makàra* (p. 13 *supra*) the one possible relic that carries us back to Hindu times. Who was this Permaisura ? The "Malay Annals" ignore altogether the Proto-Malayan colony of Cellates or Orang Laut and give a courtlier version of the foundation of Malacca. They tell us that the fugitive king of Singapore, one Iskandar Shah, came and rested under the shadow of a tree at the mouth of the River Bertam. "What is the name of this tree ?" said the fugitive king. "Malaka," was the answer. The king liked the place and the name; and he settled there. So much for Malay romantic legend. It is inconsistent with the historical evidence. It seems probable that the Permaisura came from Singapore rather than from Moslem Pasai. That he had a strong Indo-Javanese following is evident from the fact that Indian titles and ceremonial were introduced and that practices such as cremation persisted in Malacca even after its conversion to Islam. But it is also notable that the first noble family in Malacca, the family that monopolized all the high offices of State, bore a Pasai title and was probably Muhammadan. In the end the Permaisura made his power secure by paying one or more visits to China to secure recognition from the

Emperor, and by conversion to Islam, the accepted religion of Pasai.[1] As all Malay tradition agrees in assigning the name of Muhammad Shah to the first Moslem ruler of Malacca we may assume this to have been the name and title the Permaisura adopted.

Reference has been made to the seal, the *kayu kampit*, which was shown by Sang Sapurba on Mount Saguntang as a proof of his kingly rank and which is still to be traced among the regalia of the Sultan of Perak. Had the Permaisura this seal? Probably not; for we learn from the Chinese records that in A.D. 1405 he received a seal and a yellow umbrella from the Emperor as tokens of royal power. This Chinese seal was perhaps the *kayu kampit*, of which the original wood was embedded in the silver seal, still extant, bearing the inscription: "the illustrious Sultan Muhammad Shah, God's Shadow on Earth."

The "Malay Annals" record only one side of the Permaisura's public acts. They tell us that he was the first to introduce court ceremonial among peninsular Malays; that he forbade the use of yellow to all but princes; that he prohibited the use of white umbrellas by commoners because they were more conspicuous than the royal yellow umbrella with which the Chinese Emperor had presented him; that he arranged the order of precedence at ceremonial audiences; and that he drew up rules as to court dress, the rank of ambassadors, and the installation of dignitaries. It is unlikely that Malay tradition would be wrong on these points, though they militate against the theory that the Permaisura was descended from a long line of Singapore and Palembang kings who would have had an etiquette of their own. His struggle to secure recognition points to his having been a parvenu. He was an able man with an eye to realities. He went submissively to China with his tribute of tin and jungle-produce, accepting in return raiment embroidered with dragons or unicorns, girdles of pre-

[1] And perhaps of Trengganu if a tablet of laws in Jawai characters, recently found in that state is rightly ascribed to the very beginning of the XIV century A.D.

cious stones, gold, silk, and paper-money. This is what we are told of one of his visits to the Chinese Court:

> "In 1411 the King came with his wife, son and ministers—540 persons in all. On his arrival the Emperor sent officers to receive him. He was lodged in the building of the Board of Rites; and was received in audience by the Emperor who entertained him in person whilst his wife and the others were entertained in another place. Every day, bullocks, goats and wine were sent him from the imperial buttery. The Emperor gave the king two suits of clothes embroidered with golden dragons and one suit with unicorns; furthermore, gold and silver articles, curtains, coverlets, mattresses—everything complete. His wife and his suite also got presents.
>
> "When they were going away the King was presented with a girdle with precious stones and with horses and saddles. His wife got a cap and dresses.
>
> "At the moment of starting he was entertained by the Emperor and again got a girdle with precious stones, saddled horses, 100 ounces of gold, 40,000 dollars (kwan) in paper money, 2,600 strings of cash, 300 pieces of silk gauze, 1,000 pieces of plain silk, and two pieces of silk with golden flowers."

It is not surprising that kings were willing to "pay tribute" to China.

The Permaisura Muhammad Shah died about A.D. 1414. He was succeeded by his son Iskandar Shah—the Xaquendarsa of the Portuguese and the Mukansautirsha of the Chinese records. That much seems certain. He reigned ten years and paid two visits to China, one in A.D. 1414 and the other in A.D. 1419. He was evidently a trading Sultan of the type of his father.

Iskandar Shah was succeeded by a ruler who is not mentioned by the Portuguese and who figures in Chinese records as Sri Mahala. He reigned about 20

years. It is unprofitable to speculate about mere names; but there is reason to believe that there has been confusion in the Malay records and that this prince is identical with the Paduka Sri Maharaja of the Singapore list, and that he took the name Ahmad Shah or Muhammad Shah. As he is mentioned more than once in the Chinese records, we may infer that he also was a trading prince like his father and grandfather before him.

The line of trader-princes now comes to an end. In the days of its poverty Malacca had been a village of mean huts served by humble dug-outs. The visits of the Chinese junks made it a trysting-place for the traders of the Eastern Seas. Colonies of strangers settled at the port; quarters and suburbs sprang into existence. Bandar Hilir began as a Javanese settlement; so did Kampong Upeh (Tranquerah); the Tamils and the Burmese also had quarters of their own. St. Paul's Hill was merely the citadel, the heart of Malacca, the abode of the Sultan and the Malay nobles who made up the ruling class of the town. The Sultan now ceased to attend to trade. A new generation had sprung up, eager for wealth yet averse to labour, eager for glory yet disliking the discomforts of war. The toll levied on the trade of the port enabled the ruler to send out armed bands who forced the little hamlets on the coast to bow to his authority. This created the new Malacca, the traditional golden age when its Sultan reigned over Pahang, Kampar, Siak and Indragiri. It takes us far from the ceremonial of Muhammad Shah who allowed special dignities to the envoys of Aru and Rekan "because their towns were the equals of Malacca,"—and they were villages at that!

The first Sultan of the new order of things was Raja Kasim who took the title of Mudzafar Shah. He began his reign by sending envoys to China and not going in person. It was a time of war. If the Portuguese authorities are to be trusted, he conquered Pahang, Kampar and Indragiri; Malay records say that he fought the Siamese and that it was his successor, Mansur Shah,

who extended the frontiers. After giving a good descriptive account of Pahang with its broad and shallow river, its splendid sandy beaches, its alluvial gold workings, and its huge wild cattle, the "Annals" say that its ruler was a certain Maharaja Dewa Sura, a "relative of the king of Siam." From Chinese books we learn that the country was ruled by princes who bore Sanskrit titles and who may have been either Buddhist or Hindu by religion; but the books add that the people were in the habit of sacrificing human victims to their idols of fragrant wood. The language of the ruler seems not to have been Malayan. Pahang was conquered after very little resistance, and its prince was brought captive to Malacca. Of the expeditions against the other States we possess no details.

Sultan Mudzafar Shah died about A.D. 1459 and was succeeded by his son, Raja Abdullah, who took the name of Mansur Shah. The reign of this ruler has always been regarded by his fellow-countrymen as the most glorious period of their history, for the conquests it saw and the men it produced. The accounts that we have of it are a strange picture of Malay ideals.

By A.D. 1460 the old primitive semi-aboriginal village of the Permaisura had been swept away. The new Malacca did not possess its present background of orchards and ricefields and was still only a fringe of houses along the sea and river-fronts; but the fringe had lengthened and deepened, and the character of the houses was changed. The place swarmed with adventurers from all parts of the East. In the stories about it we read of Afghan swashbucklers; Indian jockeys and mahouts; Tamil warriors who, after the manner of their kind, advanced when the enemy retreated, and retreated when the enemy advanced; and men of religion from Arabia, sometimes genuinely pious, sometimes hypocritical, and always unpopular. Such a cosmopolitan seaport town was no place for the practice of the meeker virtues. We read of a government, stern, severe and corrupt; of municipal surveyors who induced the Sultan to decree that a street must be straight, in

order that they might be bribed to certify to the straightness of what was crooked; of judges who took presents from both sides; of the election of a prime minister by the simple process of setting all the candidates in a row and letting the Sultan's mother say, "Choose Uncle Mutahir." In such a city of the strong no weak citizen could be free; every man sought a patron, the mightier the better, for it was safer to pay blackmail to one robber than to many. The greater nobles lived in walled enclosures amid the huts of their followers and slaves; there, at least, they were safe from the irresponsible bravoes who levied blackmail for themselves by claiming to come in the dreaded name of the king. At night every enclosure was bolted and barred against the intrusion of thieves, trespassers and illicit lovers; and even policing was unpopular since it exposed the patrolling officers to the risk of finding the Sultan in places where he did not wish to be seen. In this city, where every other law was broken daily, there was one rule kept inviolate: no man might raise his hand against the king.

It was a strange sentiment, this loyalty of the old Malays. A man might murder a hero or a saint, or betray a relative or friend, or abduct an innocent girl: if he did it in the interest of a royal intrigue, it was a noble act of self-sacrifice according to his ethical code. And strangest of all was the spirit in which tyranny was met. When the Sultan decreed the death of an innocent man so as to rob him of his wealth, and when the victim saw his own indignant son destroying property rather than let it reward the tyrant's iniquity, the son was reproved. "What," said the father, "is my death to be of no service to the King?" Even a protest against royal discourtesy or ingratitude had to be driven home by self-sacrifice. A great Minister of State went home and took poison because the king's door had been shut against him inadvertently. A war-minister, who had grown grey in his country's service, saw the enemy's fleet approaching and knew that his counsels had been disregarded and resistance was vain. He said little. He drew up a list of the few royal gifts that he had received in the course

of long years of public work—a plate or two of damaged porcelain and a pot or two of worn brass—and sent the list with a farewell letter of thanks to the donor. Then he set out to meet his death for a cause that he saw was lost, and a king whom he knew to be worthless. Such was ideal loyalty, as the Malays of that time understood it.

Of the great names of this period the greatest is that of Hang Tuah, the Paladin of Malay tradition. He is the hero of a well-known romance, the Hikayat Hang Tuah, which is regarded as a masterpiece of literature. His life was a chequered one. The son of a man of no importance, Hang Tuan was the best soldier of the Sultan's bodyguard. He created the position of "Laksamana," a title conferred on him in jest but dignified by his exploits into an office of leadership. He was a fighter and nothing more. Early in his career he had attracted the Sultan's notice by slaying a Javanese who had run amuck. He then became a favourite or show-soldier who followed the Sultan on his travels and was ready to take up any challenge that the warriors of rival princes might offer him. A champion of this sort, gains a rapid reputation among the people whose cause he represents; Hang Tuah became a Malay hero and a darling of Malay ladies. In his country there could be only one end to a reputation of this sort. Modern romance represents him as circumspect in his relations with the Sultan's lady-friends; but rumour at the time whispered otherwise and made trouble between him and his sovereign. The angry Mansur Shah ordered him to be put to death and had to be told afterwards that the sentence had been carried out. Really Hang Tuah's friends had hidden him away. Some years later when history had repeated itself and another of the king's show-soldiers had been trapped in an intrigue, Hang Tuah came out of hiding so as to win back the Sultan's favour by slaying the violator of the royal harem. The fight between the champions is the subject of two famous passages in Malay literature, but it makes little appeal to European taste. There can be no sympathy on our part either with Hang Tuah's opponent, the

desperate lover who slew his mistress when his intrigue was found out, or with Hang Tuah himself who was ready to kill an old friend in order to regain his master's goodwill. The final episode is even more distasteful. Hang Tuah lost his *kris* and was given time by his opponent to pick it up and to continue the combat on equal terms. The opponent then dropped his own weapon and asked for the same indulgence. Hang Tuah stabbed him. When reproached for lack of chivalry he replied that chivalry was out of place with traitors to their king.

But the name of Hang Tuah is only one of many that have been handed down to us in the "Malay Annals." Hang Jebat, Hang Kesturi, Hang Lekir, Hang Hasan, Tun Bijaya Sura, Indra Segara, Tun Bija Diraja, and a host of others have all been commemorated by an age sadly lacking in any sense of proportion. These men were the curse of their country. The policy of war and conquest initiated by Mudzafar Shah and Mansur Shah was fatal for a small trading station like Malacca. The merchants from India and China, though they continued to frequent the port, began to look upon the Sultan and his people as a mere burden on it—as indeed they were. The Sultan needed money for his pleasures, his followers, and his wars; he increased his exactions from year to year. But for the coming of the Portuguese the fate of Malacca would have been the same as that of Pasai, Samudra, Perlak and the other trading ports that enjoyed at various times a spell of prosperity as emporia in the eastern seas. Even as it was, d'Albuquerque found the foreign settlers in the city willing to rise in revolt against their Malay masters.

Sultan Mansur Shah married five wives. By a daughter of the conquered Maharaja Dewa Sura he had two sons, one of whom he designated as heir to the throne, but a murder committed by the prince in a moment of passion led to his being banished from the court and sent to rule over Pahang. By a Javanese wife the Sultan had one son, Radin Geglang, who succeeded his stepbrother as heir to the throne and was afterwards

killed whilst trying to stop a man who ran amuck. By a daughter of his chief minister, the Bendahara, the Sultan left a son, Raja Husain, who succeeded him. By a Chinese wife the Sultan left descendants who established themselves as independent princes at Jeram in Selangor. By his fifth wife, the daughter of a chief (Sri Nara Diraja), the Sultan had two daughters. The following tables shows how the kingdom of Malacca was divided up:


Tradition has it that Mansur Shah's death was as edifying as his life. He called together his ministers and confided his son Husain to their care. Then addressing Husain he warned the youth that life was only a preparation for eternity, and that a king's subjects, "the root by which he lived," would pronounce the final verdict on his reign and character.

Raja Husain took the title of Sultan Aladin Riayat Shah. This prince is said by the Portuguese to have been poisoned at the instigation of the rulers of Pahang and Indragiri. The "Malay Annals" are silent on this point.

Meanwhile the boasted loyalty of the Malays was degrading the royal caste. The self-made princes of Malacca, the Permaisura and his son, were men of business and intelligence. The conqueror-kings, Mudzafar Shah and Mansur Shah, were men of ambition. But the later kings of Malacca, born when the wealth had been acquired and the ambitions realized, were gloomy, capri-

cious and jaded tyrants who found more interest in destroying than in building up. Sultan Mahmud Shah, the last of the Malacca rulers, was a *roi fainéant*. He robbed and violated, but was wise enough to leave the work of administration to his ministers. Foremost among them was the Bendahara; next came the Bendahara's son, Tun Hasan, Minister of War; and the Laksamana Hang Nadim who commanded the fleet. Even at this distance of time when we read the cold commentaries of the Portuguese and the gossiping tolerant anecdotes of the Malay Annals we are made to feel that these three ministers were men of character: the eldest, the Bendahara, calm, self-contained, temperate and cautious; the two younger men passionate, perhaps, and hot-headed, but gifted with an energy and a persistence that is rare among men born under the sun of the equator. And Malacca needed them; for it was just when these three were at the height of their power that the town was startled by an unexpected and most ominous apparition—the first European fleet that ever sailed into its harbour. That was in August, 1509; the Admiral was the Portuguese, Diogo Lopez de Sequeira.

# CHAPTER VI.

## THE PORTUGUESE ASCENDANCY.

Bartholomew Diaz, a rough Portuguese sailor, had discovered the Cape of Good Hope in A.D. 1486 and named it the Cape of Storms from his experiences. He perished soon afterwards. Twelve years later the more fortunate Vasco de Gama rounded the Cape and made the first voyage from Europe to the eastern seas. Within ten years he had been followed by a host of gallant adventurers: Affonso d'Albuquerque, Francis d'Almeida, Tristan da Cunha, George de Mello, and George de Aguyar. In 1508 the Portuguese "empire" in the East was divided into two viceroyalties, one stretching from Mozambique to Diu, the other from Diu to Comorin. Even this was looked upon as insufficient. Two admirals were sent out to win further viceroyalties for themselves; and of these two, one, Diogo Lopez de Sequeira, was destined for Malaya.

In an age accustomed to the comfort of modern sea-travel it is hard to convey more than a faint idea of the hard lot of those early navigators: the leaky ships, the stifling cabins, the stale unpalatable food, the putrid water, the dirt, the crowding, the scurvy, the danger of storms, the discomfort of calms, and the anxiety of approach to an uncharted and inhospitable coast. Yet if we are to take the measure of men like d'Almeida and d'Albuquerque we must try at least to realize the task before them. Da Gama, like Columbus, was a simple sailor who staked his life upon his skill in navigation and upon the faith that was in him. The first viceroys were men of another type; they dreamed dreams and saw visions of empire in the seemingly hopeless plan of pitting the frail ships of Portugal against the untamable vastness of the Indian Ocean and against the teeming millions who inhabited its shores. D'Almeida was the apostle of sea-power. He saw that with all their apparent weakness his ships had at their mercy the commerce of whole

continents; and he preached the doctrine of a supreme navy. Affonso d'Albuquerque disagreed. He was a veteran and distinguished soldier who believed in sea-power but not in its sufficiency. He mocked at the theory of an Eastern Empire that owned no ports or docks and could not caulk a ship except by favour of an ally. He was the apostle of the naval base, sea-power resting on the shore. A man of ancient lineage, cousin to a Spanish king, himself a knight of the Order of Christ, he would not take service under Francis d'Almeida. Hence the division into two viceroyalties. Hence also the emulation that led Sequeira, a smaller man, to follow in the wake of the great viceroys. He left the Tagus with four ships on the 5th April, 1508; sailed to Cochin and borrowed a ship from the Portuguese fleet at that port; and finally on the 1st August, 1509, cast anchor in the roadstead at Malacca.

A boat put off from the shore. It asked, in the name of the Bendahara, who Sequeira was and what he wanted. Sequeira had brought a letter from King Emmanuel to the Sultan of Malacca; he asked leave to present it along with the gifts that went with such epistles. He was told to wait. His arrival was an event of the first magnitude to a small port; was it wise to begin relations of which no man could foresee the end? So doubted the Bendahara. The Sultan brushed aside the doubts. What harm could there be in reading a complimentary letter and accepting gifts that committed him to nothing? Sequeira was informed that his request was granted. He sent one of his officers, Teixeira, to deliver the letter and have the desired audience of the King. We can picture the scene: the elephant sent down from the palace to bear the envoy as an honoured guest to Court; the street-crowds who mobbed the "white Bengalis" with their inquisitiveness; and the silent staring faces of the courtiers who lined each side of the long palace-gangway up which an envoy was expected to make his way with many halts and ceremonious reverences. Teixeira was a stranger to Malay etiquette. He presented the letter and gifts with a sailor's jovial cordiality; and in a burst

of effusive friendliness he fastened a necklace round the neck of the Bendahara, as though that minister was an African chief who would glory in such tinsel. An angry murmur followed the Portuguese as he fumbled familiarly with the sacred person of the first noble in the land. "Let him alone; heed him not; he is only a mannerless boor," said the Bendahara. Teixeira's bold and blustering assurance was intensifying the nervousness, the fear of the unknown, that chilled every heart in Malacca.

The days passed. No man dared attack the strangers; yet none dared befriend them or trade with them, for who could foresee the end? The Indian merchants were anti-Portuguese to a man; they knew what trade rivalry meant. The Bendahara saw that the strangers would be less tolerant of oppression than the Indians whom they wished to supplant; in the interests of trade he preached hostility to the infidel. The warriors of the city were more discreet. They were to get the hard blows of the war, and the Bendahara the pickings of the trade; they elected to arm and wait. No one really wanted to fight. Sequeira had come for customers. He waited, hoping that the Malays would appreciate his pacific aims; but he could gain nothing by delay: it was the very thing that his rivals wanted. He grew impatient, then petulant, then menacing; the monsoon was slipping by and he could wait no more. A situation of diplomatic delicacy is always fraught with dire peril; in this case the accidental firing of an alarm-gun on a Portuguese ship led to hostilities over a petty misunderstanding. The fighting was half-hearted, but it spread. The Malays on the Portuguese ships jumped into the sea; such European sailors as were ashore were seized. Teixeira saw his error when too late. He found that he was too weak to attack the sullen angry city that had broken off all relations with him. The monsoon was dying; his ships were in need of repair; and in the end he had to sail home, having tarnished the fame of his country and left some of his luckless comrades at the mercy of their foes.

According to Malay ideas, the Bendahara was the hero of the resistance to Sequeira. He had done no

fighting; indeed he had done nothing at all; but a statesman who achieves great results by inaction is more profitable to his country than the victor of a hundred costly fights. So thought the people; so, doubtless, thought the Bendahara himself. Not so the Sultan. He realized that "Uncle Mutahir" was becoming too great a personage; he recalled many grievances against his minister. The Bendahara in past years had had so much love for a favourite daughter that he had kept the fame of her beauty from reaching the ears of his capricious and sensual master. The girl had married her cousin; and the king, when too late, had come to know. There was the ministerial wealth to be garnered, and there was this little matter of the Bendahara's daughter which had never been explained to His Highness's satisfaction. A charge of treason was brought against the minister and readily believed. It is, of course, possible that the charge was true. It is probable that the Bendahara was overthrown only after a severe conflict in which most of his family were slain. But that is not the story given in the "Malay Annals." The author was a member of the Bendahara's house and himself a later Bendahara. He puts his ancestor's case in the best light. The accuser had been suborned by a bribe—for "Gold, thou are not God, yet art thou the Almighty;"—and the Sultan was swayed by lust, for "Love knows no limitations and passion no considerations." His Highness sent two of his followers to summon the minister "to God's presence." The Bendahara bowed his head and died, rather than lift a finger in violation of the doctrine that "it is the glory of the Malay to be faithful to his ruler." The men of his household died with him; his daughter was immured in the royal harem; and his riches were dissipated in festivities at the wedding of the Sultan's daughter with the Prince of Pahang. Suddenly in the midst of this wassail the king's joy was turned to terror by another appearance of the Portuguese,—this time in overwhelming strength under the Viceroy d'Albuquerque himself.

As soon as King Emmanuel had heard of the disaster to Sequeira he had sent (March, 1510) three ships under

Diogo Mendez de Vasconcellos to avenge the defeat. These ships sailed first to India for consultation with d'Albuquerque. As the great Viceroy was too cautious a commander to weaken his forces by dispersing them in detachments, he detained Vasconcellos pending the subjugation of Goa and the organization of a naval base in India. Then when all was ready in the early summer of A.D. 1511, he set out to assail Malacca with every ship and soldier that he could muster. On the 1st July, 1511, he appeared in the roadstead with the entire army and navy of Portuguese India: nineteen ships, 800 European troops, and 600 native sepoys, all with trumpets sounding, banners waving, guns firing,—in short with every demonstration that might be expected to create a panic among the junks in the harbour and the warriors in the town.

The effect was immediate. The ships in the harbour—Chinese junks and Gujerati traders—tried to sail away; but were intercepted and brought back to their moorings with every show of friendship. They then offered to join the Viceroy in an immediate attack on the town; but d'Albuquerque elected to wait. Meanwhile the Malays and their Sultan were too dazed to act; no boat put off from the shore; no message was sent. By the following morning the Sultan had regained some of his old assurance. He sent a message to the Viceroy to welcome him, to express regret for the attack on Sequeira, and to say that he had put to death the wicked Bendahara who had instigated that attack. D'Albuquerque replied, expressing gratification at the Sultan's attitude but pointing out that the Portuguese prisoners had not been released and that until they were liberated the town would have to be regarded as an accessory to the attack on Sequeira. The Sultan was in a dilemma. He could not keep the prisoners without removing his mask of friendliness, nor could he release them without giving up his hostages for the security of the town. He tried the Bendahara's policy, and temporized. But d'Albuquerque was no Sequeira. He knew that a general attack would be the signal for a massacre of his captive

fellow-countrymen; still, risks must be taken. He succeeded in getting into communication with Ruy d'Araujo, leader of the captives and a personal friend of the Viceroy. Ruy d'Araujo advised attack, and spoke of divided counsels in the city. The Viceroy went on feeling his way. He seized some of the shipping and sent a few shots into the town. Then he waited. The hint was taken; Ruy d'Araujo was released.

The Viceroy's position was now much stronger. He asked for a heavy indemnity and for permission to establish a trading-station at Malacca. The Sultan demurred; he might have allowed the station but he was unable to find money for buying off the Portuguese. Meanwhile the war-party was gaining the upper hand in the town. It was headed by the Sultan's son Ahmad; by his son-in-law, the Prince of Pahang; and by other young bloods who knew nothing of war and were eager to learn. The Sultan himself preferred peace and quiet. These he thought he could secure by letting the war-party and the Portuguese fight the matter out; as for himself he was a peaceful Gallio who cared for none of these things. He told the Viceroy that he was a poor man anxious to be friendly with everybody but quite unable to provide the money for which he was asked.

D'Albuquerque now began to prepare for war. He knew his own mind and had a definite policy, that of substituting a Portuguese for a Malay Government while leaving the foreign traders undisturbed. He gave the Javanese and Indian leaders assurances to this effect and received their promise of neutrality in return. In the matter of local knowledge he was well served by the fact that Ruy d'Araujo and the other prisoners had spent two years in the town and had come to know the place, the language, and the foreign merchants. Still, the task before him was hard. To understand the plan of attack it is necessary to appreciate the difference between the Malacca of A.D. 1511 and the Malacca of to-day. It is often supposed that the harbour has silted up and that the conditions cannot be reproduced, but it should be remembered that the Portuguese ships were small vessels

of light draught and could lie much closer to the shore than ships of the present time. The great change that has come over the harbour is due to the shifting of the river-channel. In those days the channel turned sharply to the right after reaching the sea and had scooped out an anchorage close to the mudbanks where the houses—then as now—were thickly clustered. Disembarkation on those banks was out of the question; the key to the position was the landing-place on the solid ground at the foot of St. Paul's Hill; but unfortunately for the Portuguese this point lay beyond the covering-fire of their ships while it was exposed to the fire of every Malay building in the vicinity. The Viceroy tried to grapple with the difficulty by building a sort of armed raft or floating-battery which could work in shallow water and be moored at the river-mouth so as to silence the Malay gun-fire and cover the landing of the troops. The battery was a failure. It grounded in the wrong place, was exposed to a heavy bombardment, and was saved only by the heroism of its commander, Antonio d'Abreu, who stuck to his post though wounded grievously. At last d'Albuquerque was compelled to attack without artillery support; he sent up a strong force, rushed the landing-place, and then forced the floating-battery up to a position where it could make short work of the Malay defences. This advantage was not secured without loss; for after the first surprise of the Portuguese attack the Malays had counter-attacked in force under the prince, Ahmad, in person. They rushed up from all sides to drive the landing party into the sea and were repulsed only after the Portuguese had suffered sixty casualties. The Portuguese tried to follow up their success by attacking the mosques and houses on St. Paul's Hill; but here the Malays were under cover and their opponents in the open. The attack failed disastrously. So ended the day. The Portuguese had cleared the landing-place; and that was all.

The crowning attack took place on St. James' Day, the 24th July, 1511. The Viceroy landed troops again under cover of the guns of his floating battery; and as

soon as they landed they were attacked by a wild mob of 700 Malays and Indians under Raja Ahmad. The fight was long and furious; but though it put the Portuguese to heavy loss it could end only in one way: armour, superior weapons, discipline, everything was on the side of the invader. The Malays retreated once more to the shelter of the buildings that had served them so well on the previous day. This time d'Albuquerque advanced with more caution; he burnt the buildings as he went along. The work was slow and cruel, for the defenders shot down poisoned arrows upon the attacking Portuguese who were burdened with the weight of their armour and exhausted by the heat of the sun and by the fire and smoke from the flaming houses. Again and again, with diminishing forces, Prince Ahmad lead out his men in sudden rushes and won momentary success, only to be repulsed in the end. So too, now and again from the upper reaches of the river, the Laksamana Khoja Hasan sent down his war-canoes or fireships to take the enemy in the rear or harass his communications—all in vain. Night separated the combatants; and the Portuguese retreated to their ships, saddened by heavy losses and the knowledge that the work of destruction was only half accomplished.

They had succeeded better than they knew. When on the following day the Viceroy disembarked his men and proceeded with every precaution to attack the smoking ruins that had covered the defence of the last two days, he found no one to oppose him. Prince Ahmad and the Laksamana had retreated up the river and were awaiting attack at Pagoh, a battlefield of their own choosing. The Prince of Pahang had gone back to his own country; the fighting had lost attraction for him. The Sultan had witnessed the burning of his palace and could not be sure that his policy of lazy neutrality would have endeared him to the Viceroy; he removed his royal person beyond the reach of any marauding party of Portuguese. The aged bedridden Bendahara who had succeeded the murdered Mutahir was borne off in a litter by loving relatives, while he inveighed against the

cowardice of a generation that was not as the warriors of his youth. The Malay power was broken. The Javanese, Burmese and Indian merchants were for peace at any price; they hastened to make their submission to the Viceroy, and as an earnest of goodwill helped him to dislodge Prince Ahmad from his lair at Pagoh. The prince fled far away; a few scattered bands of outlaws represented all that was left of the Malays who had governed Malacca.

The spoils taken by the Portuguese are not exactly known. According to some authorities, the value of the plunder was 50,000 cruzados, or about £6,000; others say that this represented only the King's share of the spoil. It was said also that several thousand small cannon—either 3,000 or 8,000—were captured. Had it not been for the foreign elements in the population of Malacca, the capture of the city would have been an act of useless folly. As it was, the victory was valuable. It substituted a Portuguese for a Malay ruling class without destroying the trade-tradition of the place, and it gave the Portuguese a naval base, a trading centre and a citadel which they could hold easily against any attacks the Malays might organise.

The Viceroy could not afford to garrison Malacca with the force that had sufficed to take it. He had captured it with the whole of the available forces of Portuguese India; he left a small company under a captain. If anything were needed to show the unreality of the wealth and power ascribed by imaginative writers to old Malayan kingdoms, it would be the insignificance of the Portuguese garrisons that held their own against all attacks and even organised small punitive expeditions in reply. The loss of ten or twelve Portuguese was a disaster of the first magnitude to the captain in charge of the town and fort of Malacca. A small Portuguese reverse on the Muar—when the gallant Ruy d'Araujo was killed—enabled the Laksamana Khoja Hasan to entrench himself on the Malacca river and to "besiege" the town. This Malay chief was a man of extraordinary energy and resource. He fought the Portuguese by sea in the

narrows of the Singapore Straits; he surprised them off Cape Rachado; he harassed the town of Malacca from the upper reaches of its own river; he intrigued with the allies of the Portuguese; he even induced a Javanese fleet to threaten Malacca. This indefatigable fighter died as he lived, warring desperately against the enemies of his race. With his death and with the destruction in 1526 of the Sultan's new stronghold on the island of Bentan the Malay power was utterly destroyed. From 1511 to 1605 the Portuguese were masters of the Straits.

The history of Malacca from the date of Sequeira's expedition (A.D. 1509) to the time when it was captured by the Dutch (A.D. 1641) reads like a romance. It is associated with great names like those of Camoens and St. Francis Xavier; it is a story of desperate sieges and of gallant feats of arms. Tradition has it that once, when the garrison had fired away their last ounce of powder in a desperate battle against the Achehnese, the suspicious silence of the grim fortress was enough to terrify the enemy into flight. We are not, however, concerned with the romance of its history so much as with the political aspect. There is significance in the very titles of the officials of Malacca. The Portuguese Governor was its "captain," the heads of the native communities were "captains" too. Indeed, d'Albuquerque went so far as to appoint the Javanese headman, Utimuti Raja, his "Bendahara." The officials of the Dutch bore trading names such as "supercargoes," "merchants" or "storekeepers"; the civil servants of our own East India Company were "writers." There is no arrogance about these descriptions; they showed what their bearers were. What, then, are we to make of titles such as those of "Viceroy of Africa, Arabia and Persia" and "Viceroy of India?" They hardly represented realities; did they symbolise any national policy or ambition?

The aim of all European powers in the Far East—whether Portuguese or Dutch or English—was to capture the rich trade. Sequeira asked for permission to trade; d'Albuquerque for permission to build a fortified factory at Malacca; the East India Companies of the Dutch and

English were merely trading concerns. Yet there was this difference. The imperial idea—which the Dutch and English took centuries to develope—seems to have existed from the very first in the minds of the Portuguese. It was not the imperialism of the present day; d'Albuquerque did not seek to administer even when he claimed suzerainty; he allowed his Asiatic subjects a wide measure of self-government under their own "captains" in the very town of Malacca itself. Although he did not try to administer, he tried to dominate. The Portuguese power would brook no rival. The garrisons were small; they were not sufficient to hold any large tract of country; but the striking force at the Viceroy's disposal was sufficient to destroy any trading-port that refused to bow to Portuguese wishes or showed itself hostile. Again and again, at Kampar, in the island of Bentan, and on the shores of the Johor River Portuguese expeditions harried the fugitives from Malacca and destroyed the chance of any native settlement injuring their naval base. What they did in Malaya they did also on the shores of India and Africa. The titles of the old Portuguese viceroys were not misnomers though they did not carry the administrative significance they would bear to-day. The Portuguese fleet did really dominate the East. The weakness of this old Portuguese "Empire" lay in the fact that it could not survive the loss of sea-power. It consisted—in Asia at least—of a few naval bases that became useless as soon as the command of the sea passed to the English and Dutch. The fall of Malacca may be said to date back to A.D. 1606 when the Dutch Admiral Cornelis Matelief gained a decisive victory over the Portuguese fleet in the Straits. The doom of the town was then sealed. Portuguese pride did indeed induce the Viceroys to send expeditions to the relief of their beleaguered country-men, but as siege succeeded siege it became obvious that the fall of the fortress was only a question of time. It fell in A.D. 1641.

Let us return to the fortunes of the Malays who had fled from Malacca in A.D. 1511. The Sultan took refuge at Batu Hampar. His son, the fighter Ahmad, built a

stockade at Pagoh. As soon as the Portuguese had fortified their position at Malacca, they went up to Pagoh, attacked the stockade, killed Sang Stia (one of the best-known Malay soldiers) and drove out the rest with heavy loss. From Pagoh Prince Ahmad retreated further into the interior and joined forces with his father. He was left unmolested by the Portuguese; but there is little profit in a jungle-kingdom. The old bedridden Bendahara died in the forest and the king and his son passed on to live for a time on the hospitality of the Sultan of Pahang. When this failed them, they moved to the isle of Bentan and Prince Ahmad established himself under the title of Sultan Ahmad Shah as ruler of the village of Kopak. There he died.

The courtly "Malay Annals" tell us that this young Prince Ahmad was a man of excellent character and great generosity, but he had one fault: he had no love for his father's aged counsellors. He liked to have young men about him. The young men feasted and revelled; and when the old men came to pay their respects to the prince, they were entertained on the leavings of the young men's dinner. The aged counsellors complained to Sultan Mahmud; and the young prince died. It is implied that there was connection between these two incidents; and we are told nothing more. The prince may have been poisoned or he may have been put to death. Anyhow the old Sultan thought it discreet to assure his son's former followers that he would be as good a patron to them as his son had been. One man alone, Tun Ali Hati, would take nothing from his master's murderer, refused to attend court or do homage, and met all expostulations with the reply that he had hoped to die with Prince Ahmad in battle and was prepared to die with him as a murdered man. The old Sultan desired him to name his wishes, and he asked that he might be murdered too. He was put to death. This incident may throw light on the enigmatic wording of the "Malay Annals": "Sultan Mahmud ordered his son to be treated according to the text of the Koran, 'The

Fate of a man is fixed by Destiny; it cannot come an hour too soon or an hour too late.'"

The death of Prince Ahmad left his brother, Raja Mudzafar, heir to the throne. Raja Mudzafar came into favour at once; he was given a learned tutor, and was married to Tun Trang, daughter of Tun Fatimah by her first husband. Tun Fatimah, it may be recalled, was the daughter of the famous Bendahara Mutahir and was the lady for whose sake the Sultan was said to have slain her father. It was not long before the capricious Sultan changed his mind once more. Tun Fatimah bore him a son and desired that her son, rather than her son-in-law, should be made heir to the throne. Raja Mudzafar was brushed aside; and the infant Raja Ali was made "Sultan Muda" with the title Sultan Alaedin Riayat Shah. The Malay historian lays stress on the royal honours paid to this baby whose swaddling-clothes were of imperial yellow and whose baptismal crying was drowned by the state band. The petty court at Kopak began to attract the attention of the Portuguese. In A.D. 1526 the Viceroy Mascarenhas forced the fortified approaches at Kota Kara, and burnt Kopak itself. Once more Sultan Mahmud had to flee.

The Malay story of the fighting is instructive. It seems clear that the Sultan had lost the sympathies of his people. His commander-in-chief, the Temenggong Sri Udana, who had fought at Malacca under the warrior-prince Ahmad, turned bitterly on the selfish old ruler and reproached him with meanness and ingratitude. Sri Udana threw away his life fighting against the Portuguese as a Malay warrior might be expected to do, but he made it clear that he had nothing except contempt for his master. With the Temenggong there perished at Kota Kara Sang Aria, Sang Jaya, Sang Lela Segara, and others who had fought at Malacca. Sultan Mahmud retreated from Kopak along with his wife and favourite son under the escort of two of his chiefs, descendants of the murdered Bendahara. It is said that the two chiefs took counsel together about the man who had murdered the head of their house, and decided in the end to return

good for evil. The Sultan was a man to whom it was hard to be loyal. He had slain his most faithful ministers, murdered one son and disinherited another, and he had married his wife against her will after killing her first husband and her father and confiscating her inheritance. Yet he could still command a following. His subjects did what they could for him in the Bentan jungles; and when the coast was clear and Mascarenhas had returned to Malacca, the fugitive made his way by boat to the Sumatran coast. He was welcomed at Kampar and made ruler of the place. In A.D. 1529 he died.

He was succeeded by his son, Alaedin Riayat Shah II. History is silent as to the fate of Raja Mudzafar, Mahmud Shah's second son and elder brother of the new ruler, but Perak tradition has it that he went to Perak and was installed there as Sultan under the name of Mudzafar Shah. If true, this would show that the Sultans of Perak represent the senior—indeed the only line—of the old Malacca Sultans.




There are, however, reasons for doubting the tradition.

Sultan Alaedin Riayat Shah II did not long remain in possession of Kampar. For some unrecorded cause he abandoned the place and went to Pahang where he married the daughter of the ruler, Mansur Shah. Afterwards he left Pahang with all his followers and established himself at Johor Lama, a new settlement opened up by himself between Sungai Kerting to the south and Sungai Johor to the north. This was the foundation of the Sultanate of Johor which, at its most flourishing

period in those old days, consisted of a number of villages stretching on the river bank from Bladong in the south to Bukit Piatu in the north. Little is known about the reign of the founder of Johor; but his relations with the family of the Sultan of Pahang point to a break in the direct male line of descent connecting the old Malacca rulers with the later Sultans of Johor. The following genealogy shows the descent of the Pahang family from that of Malacca.




There had been much intermarriage between these two branches. Sultan Mansur of Pahang married his cousin, the daughter of Sultan Mahmud of Malacca; Sultan Alaedin II of Johor married Kesoma Dewi, daughter of Sultan Mansur of Pahang; and Raja Ahmad, a younger son of Sultan Muhammad of Pahang, married a daughter of Sultan Alaedin I of Malacca. Last of all, Sultan Mansur of Pahang asked that the Raja Fatimah, daughter of Sultan Alaedin II, should be given in marriage to his grandson, Raja Omar. This offer was not accepted at once. The author of the "Malay Annals" tries to explain away this suspicious delay, but admits that Raja Omar was not a true prince of Pahang. His mother was a Pahang princess, but his father's pedigree (as given in the Annals) is indefinite. In the end and as a reward for assistance given in fighting against the Portuguese, Sultan Alaedin accepted Raja Omar as his son-in-law.

When Sultan Alaedin died he was succeeded by his only son, Raja Mudzafar, who did not reign long. He died young and left no children by his recognized wife, Tun Mas Jiwa, daughter of the Temenggong Hasan.

With him the direct male line of the Johor Sultans came to an end. His only sister, the wife of Raja Omar, was the mother of an infant who was made Sultan but died in extreme youth. Raja Fatimah then secured the succession for her husband, Raja Omar, who was not a prince of the Malacca-Johor-Pahang family. The dynasty was thus broken and the title passed to a prince who was connected with Johor only by marriage and with Pahang only on the distaff side.

It is difficult to date the Sultans of this period. Sultan Mahmud of Malacca died about the year 1529, having been driven out of Bentan by the Viceroy Mascarenhas in 1526. Sultan Alaedin II, the founder of Johor, was born some years after the capture of Malacca in A.D. 1511 and was a youth at the time of his father's death in A.D. 1529. He was married in Pahang before settling at Johor, lived to A.D. 1564 and was then captured and killed by the Achehnese. Sultan Mudzafar and the infant Sultan Abdul-jalil did not long survive him; and their deaths bring us to the long reign of Raja Omar (Sultan Abdul Jalil II) who is known to have died, an old man, in A.D. 1597. Throughout this period the Portuguese were very active. They drove Sultan Mudzafar out of Johor Lama about A.D. 1550. The Sultan retired to Seluyut where a fort was built (Kota Batu) and where villages sprang up gradually on both sides of the river from Padang Rayang-Rayang to Kangkang. An attempt to settle again at Johor Lama in the reign of Abdul Jalil II was defeated by the Portuguese who burnt the old capital a second time; and on the 15th August, 1587, Don Paolo da Lima Pereira attacked and destroyed Kota Batu itself and forced back the Malays to Batu Sawar, further up the Johor River. There Sultan Abdul Jalil II died in A.D. 1597 leaving the throne to his indolent son, Raja Raden (Sultan Alaedin Riayat Shah III) in whose reign the Dutch and English first visited Johor. Raja Raden had then reversed his father's policy of aggression and was living unmolested by the Portuguese.

The "Malay Annals" contain an unsavoury story about the birth of a certain Raja Abdullah who became Sultan afterwards under the name of Abdullah Hamat (or Ma'ayat) Shah. The object of the story is to prove that this prince, the patron of the Annals, was an unacknowledge son of Sultan Mudzafar II and a direct descendant of the old Malacca kings. Of course, the faking of pedigrees is common and not confined to Malaya. The European authorities who met him at Johor and elsewhere speak of him invariably as the son of Sultan Abdul Jalil II and the brother of Sultan Aladin III. It is to be feared that the author of the "Malay Annals" was more of a courtier than a historian.

## CHAPTER VII.

### THE DUTCH ASCENDANCY.

About the end of A.D. 1602 a Dutch navigator, Jacob van Heemskerck, visited Johor and left a factor there, after satisfying himself that the factor's life was not likely to be endangered by any treaty of peace between the Malays and the Portuguese. The coming of that Dutchman led the Portuguese to blockade the river. In A.D. 1603 two Dutch ships came to Johor, drove away the Portuguese flotilla and obtained great honour in the sight of the Malays. From this time onwards the Dutch came to Johor constantly. Their factor, Jacob Buijsen, resided continuously at his station and seems to have done a good deal to turn an insignificant fishing village into a centre of trade and political influence. In this work of development he received assistance from the Sultan's brother, Raja Abdullah, who was anxious to make a definite alliance with Holland and to get lasting help against Portuguese attack. A Malay envoy was sent to Holland but died on the journey, so that no treaty was made till A.D. 1606 when Admiral Cornelis Matelief with a powerful fleet arrived in the Straits of Malacca.

The Dutch account of this expedition tells us that the old Sultan Abdul Jalil Shah had been a great fighter and had waged a long war against the Portuguese. At his death he left four sons. The eldest, the "King Yang-di-pertuan" (Aladin Riayat Shah III), was in the habit of getting up at noon and having a meal, after which he drank till he was drunk, and transacted no further business. A second son, the King of Siak, was a man of weak character who rarely visited Johor. A third, Raja Abdullah, is described as a man of about thirty-five years of age, fairly intelligent, far-sighted, quiet in disposition and a great hand at driving hard bargains. The fourth brother, Raja Laut, is depicted as "the greatest drunkard,

murderer and scoundrel of the whole family . . . All the brothers drink except Raja Abdullah; and, as the rulers are, so are the nobles in their train." Such then were the men whom Admiral Cornelis Matelief had come to succour.

On the 14th May, 1606, the Admiral arrived off the Johor river and received a friendly letter from Raja Abdullah; on the 17th May he entertained the prince on board his flagship. The interview must have been amusing for it is clear that the Dutch had come to the Straits with exaggerated ideas about the greatness of the country. On boarding the Dutch ship Raja Abdullah greeted his host cordially and presented him with a "golden kris studded with stones of little value." In welcoming the sailors to Malay waters, the Raja prolonged the compliments to such an extent that the impatient admiral tried to lead him up to business by a pointed enquiry regarding the help that might be expected from Johor if the Dutch attacked Malacca. The prince was anxious not to commit himself. He explained that he was a person of little wealth and importance, subordinate in all things to the will of his royal brother. "In short," says our angry Dutch chronicler, "all the information that we could obtain from this prince was that he was a very poor man indeed: had he been able to fight the Portuguese by himself, would he have sent to Holland for assistance?" This was unanswerable. The admiral gave up hope of obtaining armed assistance from Johor.

Nevertheless, a treaty was signed. It is the first Dutch treaty with Johor and is dated the 17th May, 1606. Its terms are interesting.

The new allies began by agreeing to capture Malacca. The city was to go to the Dutch and the adjoining territories to the Malays, but the Dutch were to have the right to take timber from the nearest Malay jungles for the needs of the town and its shipping. The leave of the future Dutch Governor of Malacca was to be obtained before any European could be permitted to land on Johor territory.

As this treaty seemed premature until Malacca had been captured, Admiral Matelief set out to execute that portion of the arrangement. He gained a decisive victory over the Portuguese fleet but failed to take the town, and gave up the enterprise as impracticable. On the 23rd September, 1606, he made an amended treaty under which a small portion of Johor territory was ceded to the Dutch as a trading station in lieu of the town and fort of Malacca, the rest of the treaty remaining as before. After this the admiral sailed away and did not return to the Malay Peninsula till October, 1607, when he visited the factory at Patani. He then found a complete change in affairs at Johor. Having lost the command of the sea the Portuguese had reversed their policy of unceasing hostility to native powers, and were prepared to make an alliance with the Sultan. The Dutch factor had fled to Java, and the admiral summed up the situation in a letter dated the 4th January, 1608: "the chief king drinks more than ever; the chiefs are on the side of the Portuguese; Raja Abdullah has no power." The Dutch East India Company had invested $10,000 at Johor and $63,000 at Patani.

Admiral Matelief could do little. As he had sent most of his ships home in view of the expected arrival of a fleet under Admiral van Caerden, he tried to induce that admiral to change his course and threaten Johor; but the admiral had sailed already from Java on his way to the Moluccas and was too far off to assist. Nothing could be done till autumn. In the end, a Dutch fleet arrived under Admiral Verhoeff to bring the Sultan to reason. Sultan Aladin Riayat Shah seems to have defended himself by the argument that he wished to be at peace with everybody, and that Dutch friendship, to be of value, should accord him permanent protection. This protection was promised by a new treaty under which the Dutch agreed to build a fort at Johor and to station two guardships there to defend the place against Portuguese attack. Having made this arrangement the admiral sailed from Johor with a letter from the Sultan begging for Dutch aid to prosecute a personal quarrel

between himself and the Raja of Patani. In fact, nothing could have been more fatuous than the policy of this Alaedin Riayat Shah. Surrounded by enemies he was content to think of the pleasures and passions of the moment, leaving graver matters to the care of his cautious brother Raja Abdullah.

In A.D. 1610 the marriage of the Sultan's son to his cousin, the daughter of the Raja of Siak, led to a change in the attitude of the fickle Alaedin Riayat Shah towards Raja Abdullah and the Dutch. The Raja of Siak, a friend of the Portuguese, became the power behind the throne of Johor. Again, as in A.D. 1608, the Dutch might have written: "the king drinks more than ever; the chiefs are on the side of the Portuguese; the Raja Abdullah has no power." But vengeance overtook the vacillating Alaedin from an unexpected quarter. On the 6th June, 1613, the Achehnese, who were at war with Malacca, made a raid on Johor, captured the capital and carried into captivity the Sultan, his brother Abdullah, the chief Malay court dignitaries and the Dutch residents in the factory. The Achehnese did not treat their prisoners harshly. The Sultan of Acheen—the well-known Iskandar Muda or Mahkota Alam—gave his sister in marriage to Raja Abdullah and even joined Alaedin in the convivial bouts so dear to the Johor princes. A reconciliation was effected. On the 25th August, 1614, Alaedin Riayat Shah III was back in his own capital, but he seems not to have learnt wisdom from his stay in Acheen. Accused of lukewarmness in helping the Achehnese in their siege of Malacca, he brought upon himself for the second time the vengeance of the great Mahkota Alam. Johor was again attacked—this time by a force which an eye-witness, Admiral Steven van der Haghen, estimated at 300 ships and from 30,000 to 40,000 men. Johor was taken, but the Sultan escaped to Bentan. Bentan was attacked next. The unfortunate Sultan received help from Malacca, but only enough to seal his destruction. He was unable now either to repel the attack of his enemies or to repudiate the charge of allying himself with the Portuguese infidel against whom Mahkota Alam

was waging religious war. Taken prisoner he died shortly afterwards; tradition has it that he was put to death by his captors.

Incidentally it may be observed that the "Malay Annals." though dated A.D. 1612, refer to "the late Sultan Alaedin Riayat Shah who died in Acheen." This reference shows that the book was revised some years later than 1612. It is to be regretted that the Malay historian should have confined his work to the records of the past and given no account of the stirring incidents in which he as Bendahara must have played a prominent part.

Sultan Alaedin Riayat Shah III was followed by his brother, Raja Abdullah, who took the title of Sultan Abdullah Maayat (or Hammat) Shah. The new ruler possessed many good qualities and enjoyed the advantage of being married to a sister of Mahkota Alam, but he was unfortunate in the fact that his brother-in-law would brook no rival power. Sultan Abdullah led the wandering existence of a pretender. In A.D. 1623 he was driven out of the isle of Lingga by an Achehnese force. In A.D. 1634 the Dutch records speak of Pahang and Johor as portions of the Achehnese kingdom. No Dutch ships visited Abdullah during his Sultanate though he had been a friend of the Dutch; no factors were ever stationed at his court. Probably one of the most deserving of Malay rulers he was also one of the most unfortunate—a mere claimant to authority which the Achehnese would not allow him to exert. He died on the small isle of Tambelan about the year 1637.

He was succeeded—if indeed we can use such a term when he left so little for others to inherit—by his nephew Sultan Abdul Jalil III, son of the Sultan Alaedin who had perished in Acheen. The Achehnese power was waning. Iskandar Muda or Mahkota Alam, the most powerful and ambitious of the rulers of Acheen, was dead; his authority had passed into the hands of women. His death gave a new lease of life to the Malay states he had conquered. In A.D. 1639 the Dutch made overtures to Johor to secure native auxiliaries for the siege of Malacca. They had command of the sea, but needed

carriers, supplies, transport of all sorts, and irregular troops to help in hemming in the Portuguese. Sultan Abdul Jalil gave assistance though not all that the Dutch had expected. The fortress was taken A.D. 1641.

Though the military commanders at Malacca were dissatisfied with the help given by their Malay allies, the Dutch civil authorities did their best to show gratitude to Johor and courtesy to its ruler. They arranged a peace between Johor and Acheen and did what they could to restore the country to its position as the premier Malay State. We hear of various complimentary missions being exchanged between the Malays and Batavia without much practical result. Malacca had, in fact, superseded Johor. The Dutch no longer needed stations such as the old trading factory of Batu Sawar had been. Johor had no industries, no trade, no productive hinterland. It was bound to decline. Sultan Abdul Jalil lived long enough to see calamity overwhelm his country. A quarrel with the Sultan of Jambi led in A.D. 1673 to a war in which Johor was plundered and burnt and its aged ruler driven into exile. The death of the old Sultan—who did not long survive the shock of the destruction of his capital—brought to an end the direct line of the second Johor dynasty.

He was succeeded by a cousin, a Pahang prince, who took the name of Sultan Ibrahim Shah. The new ruler's energy infused fresh life into the little State; he established himself at Riau in order to carry on the war against Jambi more effectively than from Johor Lama; he allied himself with the Dutch, and for a time succeeded in regaining what his predecessor had lost. But he did not live long. On the 16th February, 1685, he died, leaving an only son who was at once placed on the throne under the title of Sultan Mahmud Shah. As the new ruler was a boy his mother became regent, but she allowed all power to be vested in the Bendahara Paduka Raja, the loyal and able minister of her late husband, the successful Sultan Ibrahim. She acted wisely in this. Peace was assured; the traditional friendship with Holland was kept up by the Bendahara;

internal troubles were avoided. Unfortunately the Bendahara died, and his headstrong ward took the government into his own hands. In A.D. 1691 we hear of him as ruling from Johor. This Sultan, Mahmud Shah II, the last prince of his race, is the most perverse and tragic figure in Malay history. He was said to be the victim of one of those terrible ghostly visitants, a Malay vampire, the spirit of a woman dead in childbirth and full of vengeance against the cause of her death. He is accused by Malay traditions from all parts of the Peninsula of having slain in the most fiendish manner those of his wives who had the misfortune to become pregnant. Probably he was mad; but no form of madness could have been more dangerous to a prince in his position. The frail life of this insane and hated Sultan was all that stood between any bold conspirator and the thrones of Johor, Pahang and Lingga. The end came in A.D. 1699. As the young ruler was being carried to mosque at Kota Tinggi on the shoulders of one of his retainers, he was stabbed to death. With his death the "line of Alexander the Great" disappears from Malay history.

In the records of this long line of petty rulers what impresses the student most is the curiously personal character of Malay sovereignty. In Europe, where all the continent is divided up under different rulers, there is no place for a fallen king except as a subject. In the thinly populated Malay world it was otherwise. So long as a fugitive prince could induce a few followers to share his lot he might always hope to find some unoccupied valley or river in which to maintain an empty title and a miniature court. The wandering fugitive Raja Abdullah (A.D. 1615–1637) whose movements cannot be traced and the date of whose death is uncertain is described in books as a king,—"Sultan Abdullah Ma'ayat Shah, the glory of his land and of his time." He was a prince by birth. Royalty was a matter of caste. Royalty could be conferred, as the Chinese Emperor conferred it on the Permaisura, or as Sultan Mansur divided up his kingdom between his sons, or as a Sultan creates a "Junior Sultan" (Sultan Muda or Yamtuan

Muda), or as the British may be said to have created the Sultanates of Johor, Pahang and Kelantan. But Malay popular feeling is against the powerful *de facto* ruler who assumes that power confers rank. Such a man is a worm who aspires to be a dragon. Should a bad harvest or a murrain or other misfortune overtake the subjects of an upstart ruler, all Malaya would explain the fact as the work of the Nemesis[1] that punishes any outrage on the majesty of kings. Names darken truth. The Dutch when they negotiated their treaty with the Sultan of Acheen found, too late, that he was a ruler in rank and not in authority. The sympathy lavished on the "dispossessed" royal house of Kampong Glam was based on a similar misconception. The hostility displayed to the Mantri of Larut, to Sultan Ismail of Perak, and for many years to the Maharaja of Johor was due to similar misunderstandings. Royal rank meant prestige, position, influence, the things that may lead to power. Royal rank was a great thing in Malay eyes and explains the faked pedigrees, the insistence on petty family details, and the long discussions on trivial issues of court etiquette. But the student of Malay life who mistakes rank for power will not fail to discover as Admiral Matelief discovered, that a Malay "prince" is often an *orang miskin*, a very poor person indeed.

Sultan Mahmud, the last of the old dynasty, was assassinated at Kota Tinggi. The date of his death is given in a Bugis chronicle as the 8th Rabi'-ul-awwal, A. H. 1111, a Thursday, in the forenoon. The assassin was one Megat Sri Rama. Tradition has it that Megat Sri Rama's wife had eaten a slice of jackfruit belonging to the Sultan and that the Sultan had ordered her to be cut open and the piece of jackfruit taken out of her body. The story supplies motive enough for the assassination, but it tells us also that the Bendahara and the Temenggong were privy to it and that another Chief, Dato' Sri Bijaya Diwangsa, was too loyal to be suborned. This last chief was got out of the way by being put to death, the Bendahara having falsely certified that it was

[1] *Daulat = tulah* (Ar.).

by the Sultan's order; and the Sultan was deprived of the one man who might have interfered with the plans of the conspirators. The description of the murder is full of miraculous detail. When the Sultan arrived on the shoulders of his attendant at the gate of the mosque-court, Sri Rama stepped forward and did obeisance, "Your servant is committing treason." After saying this he slashed at the ruler's head with his chopper causing the "white" blood of royalty to gush out "like cocoanut milk." The Sultan asked his carrier to let him get down but the man ran away and was stopped only by being wounded. The Sultan fell with him and was stabbed by Megat Sri Rama in the ribs as he lay on the ground; he succeeded in rising and throwing his *kris* at the murderer who was wounded in the toe and crippled. The wounded sovereign was carried into the mosque where he died. He was buried at Kota Tinggi. The situation of his tomb was a place called Sungai Damar Makam Tauhid. Megat Sri Rama was not put to death. He lived for four years in continuous torment from the agony of his wounds, which refused to heal owing to his treason. So runs the story, as related by the Bendahara's enemies.

The murder of the Sultan left no heir to the throne. The Bendahara succeeded him.

In their anxiety to represent the present Malay Sultans as descendants of Alexander the Great some genealogies represent this Bendahara as the uncle or other near relative of the murdered Sultan. It is extremely probable that he bore some close relationship to the ruler as the Sultans of Malacca and Johor married almost habitually into the family of the Bendaharas, but for reasons of state Malacca royalty never allowed any of their daughters to marry commoners. It is therefore most unlikely that the new dynasty was descended in any way from the old. The long family histories of the "Malay Annals" do not record one instance of a Bendahara having married a Malacca princess.

At the same time the house of the Bendahara was ancient and dated back in a succession of high offices to the foundation of Malacca itself. We may infer from

the titles of the earliest Bendaharas (Tun Perpateh) that the family was of Sumatran origin. The Permaisura Muhammad Shah married the daughter of the first Bendahara whose personal title *Sĕri Wak Raja* is said by the Annals to have been due to this connection[1]. This explanation will not stand etymological criticism. The second and third Bendaharas died in the reign of Sultan Mudzafar Shah. The fourth Bendahara was the son of the third, and was the first to take the title of Bendahara Paduka Raja. He is interesting in connection with Negri Sembilan history as having been at one time "Penghulu" of Klang. His sister married Sultan Mudzafar Shah, who divorced her and gave her to his favourite minister Sri Nara Diraja in order to reconcile that minister with her brother, the Bendahara:—by this second marriage she became the mother of Tun Mutahir and Tun Tahir who perished in A.D. 1511. This fourth Bendahara was long-lived: he served four Sultans and died early in the reign of Mahmud Shah. Tradition has it that on his deathbed he predicted the greatness, the arrogance, and the terrible fate of his nephews, Tun Tahir and Tun Mutahir. He was succeeded by his brother, Tun Perpateh Puteh, known as Bendahara Puteh, who did not occupy the position long and is remembered only for his eccentricities. The sixth Bendahara was his sister's son, the Tun Mutahir already referred to: he was the powerful and able minister who opposed Sequeira and perished owing to the Sultan's lust for his money and for his daughter, Tun Fatimah. He was succeeded by an old and bedridden son of the fourth Bendahara. This was the man who was borne away in a litter from the burning town of Malacca and perished in the hardships of the flight to Pahang: he was known as the Bendahara Lubok Batu, from the place of his death. His son, Tun Khoja Ahmad became the eighth Bendahara. He in his turn was succeeded by his grandson, Tun Biajid, ninth Bendahara, who is known as the Johor Bendahara because he was concerned in the founding and progress of that settle-

[1] *Wak* = uncle; but this puts a colloquial Malay word into the Skt. title, *Sĕriwa*.

ment. His successor, Tun Isap Misai, the tenth Bendahara, was known as "the old," because of his long life. He lived till late in the reign of Abdul Jalil II (who died in A.D. 1587), and was succeeded by his grandson, Tun Sri Lanang, author or inspirer of the "Malay Annals." He is known as "the Bendahara who went to Acheen" because he followed his ruler into captivity in A.D. 1613 and 1615.

The following tentative table will give some idea of the descent of the family up to A.D. 1640.




From this point onwards we lose that river of genealogical gossip, the "Malay Annals," but we know of three

more Bendaharas at least between A.D. 1640 and 1699. One was the "Bendahara Sekudai" who belonged to the same generation as Tun Anum and Tun Jinal and was probably the fourteenth Bendahara; another was the Bendahara Sri Maharaja "Padang Saujana" Abdul Majid, the father of the usurper of A.D. 1699; and the third was the Bendahara Paduka Raja who served under Sultan Ibrahim and was the real regent during the minority of the mad Sultan Mahmud. In A.D. 1699 the prime minister was the Bendahara Sri Maharaja Abdul Jalil who made himself Sultan under the designation of Abdul Jalil Riayat Shah.

The history of the years between A.D. 1700 and 1720 is obscure because we have two versions coming from conflicting sources and written under the stress of great passions. One is the "Malay" version written by a partisan of Raja Kechil (Sultan Abdul Jalil Rahmat Shah), a Sumatran adventurer who was for a time ruler of Johor and Riau. The other is the "Bugis" version written by a partisan of Raja Kechil's enemies (the Bugis Chiefs) and their puppet ruler Sulaiman Badru'l-alam Shah. Of course the two versions are quite irreconcilable in spirit and in detail.

A few facts stand out clearly. It is certain that the self-made Sultan Abdul Jalil IV was an amiable and religious man who had difficulty in keeping peace among his own immediate relatives. He bought them off by giving them dignities and authority: one brother, Tun Mahmud, was made Yamtuan Muda; another, Tun Mutahir, became Temenggong; another, Tun Abdul Jamal, became Bendahara; another, Zainu'l-abidin, was made Sultan of Trengganu; two more received minor titles as Laksamana and Engku Sewa Raja. So far so good. But the next generation threatened to be equally troublesome. The Sultan's son Sulaiman, born after his father's accession to the throne, claimed superiority over the elder sons who were born when their father was Bendahara. This dispute led to no recorded result; but Malay histories would not refer to it if it was a mere academic discussion.

About A.D. 1717 a Sumatran adventurer named Raja Kechil seized Johor and reduced Abdul Jalil IV to his old position as Bendahara. Details of this strange *coup d'état* are lacking. It is clear that Abdul Jalil's brother, the Yamtuan Muda Mahmud, died fighting after having slain some of his own wives and children, so we can hardly suppose that the revolution was peaceful. Both our versions agree as to this *amok* of the Raja Muda. Both agree also as to a curious conspiracy in which Raja Kechil's wife was kidnapped. But the circumstances are obscure.

It seems that Raja Kechil had been anxious to secure his position as Sultan by marrying into the family of his predecessor, the deposed Abdul Jalil IV. He asked for the hand of Tengku Tengah, the ex-Sultan's second daughter. Tengku Tengah affected modesty or reluctance; and the Sultan then asked for her younger sister Tengku Kamariah (Tengku Bongsu) in her place. So much is certain. It is also certain that Tengku Tengah considered that she had been slighted and determined to avenge herself on her sister and her sister's husband.

It was just about this time that some Bugis ships appeared at Johor. Their appearance gave encouragement to the enemies of Raja Kechil who thought that with the aid of the strangers they might succeed in driving the Sumatrans out of the country. Tengku Sulaiman, son of the ex-Sultan, headed these malcontents. But the Bugis were taking no risks; it paid them to be on the stronger side. The Malay story goes that while Tengku Sulaiman was arguing and the Bugis Chief Daeng Perani was expressing dissent, the blinds of the palace were suddenly drawn up and the maiden Tengku Tengah appeared at the door. She made a personal appeal to Daeng Perani. She told him of the slight that had been put upon her and she offered to follow him anywhere and do his will if he would but avenge her on her brother-in-law. Her appeal was successful. She then went to the Sultan's palace and enticed away her sister, Tengku Kamariah, while the Sultan was at prayers. Once outside the palace enclosure, Tengku

Kamariah, was seized, put on board a ship, and carried off to Pahang. The ex-Sultan, Tengku Tengah and Tengku Sulaiman fled to Pahang with her.

It is difficult to see what part Daeng Perani played in this kidnapping of the Sultan's wife or why Tengku Tengah should have thought it necessary to secure his aid at such a price. The Bugis story is that the abduction occurred in the absence of the Bugis ships, but it hints at some connection between Daeng Perani and Tengku Tengah prior to their formal marriage in A.D. 1722. Nor is it easy to see what advantage the ex-Sultan and his son could have hoped to secure by kidnapping Tengku Kamariah. It is probable that we do not know the whole truth; that the attack on the Sultan was more violent in character; and that the flight or seizure of his wife was a mere incident in a series of graver events. Raja Kechil sent one of his chiefs, the Laksamana, to pursue the fugitives. Both versions agree in saying that he came up with them at Kuala Pahang, slew the ex-Sultan and carried Tengku Tengah and Tengku Kamariah back to Johor. Tengku Sulaiman escaped. The Malay story says that the Laksamana enticed the ex-Sultan to return and slew him as he was saying his prayers after embarking. The body was landed and buried on shore; and the ex-Sultan has come to be known to fame as *Marhum Kuala Pahang*.

After this revolution Raja Kechil thought it prudent to leave Johor and establish himself at Riau. We are told that he put it to his chiefs that a place like Johor, where one King had been murdered and another conspired against, was bound to be under a curse. The courtiers said that nothing could be truer. The court was moved accordingly to Riau. At Riau Raja Kechil was subject (A.H. 1134) to a serious attack by the Bugis adventurer; it is not quite clear whether Riau was captured by the Bugis and retaken by Raja Kechil or whether the attack was unsuccessful from the first. Anyhow Tengku Sulaiman deserted to the Bugis camp and entered into an alliance with them, but they had to retire to Selangor in the end. Using Selangor as a base the

Bugis then tried to subjugate Linggi. The chiefs at Linggi appealed to Raja Kechil to sail to their assistance if he wished to save that part of his territories. Raja Kechil went to Linggi and drove away the Bugis fleet that was blockading the river; but while he was celebrating his success his enemies saw their chance, sailed to Riau, surprised and captured it before Raja Kechil could return. They then installed Tengku Sulaiman as titular ruler of Riau and Johor. That was in A.D. 1721.

This success was followed in A.D. 1722 by a series of installations and marriages. Tengku Sulaiman was proclaimed Sultan under the title of Sulaiman Badru'l-alam Shah. He was to be the "Great King," *Yang di-pĕrtuan Bĕsar*. As the Bugis chiefs put it: "the *Yang di-pĕrtuan Bĕsar* is to occupy the position of a woman only; he is to be fed when we choose to feed him; but the *Yamtuan Muda* is to be in the position of a husband, his will is always to prevail." Whether this is a correct description of the position of a Malay husband is neither here nor there; it was a fair definition of the authority of the Yamtuan Muda. The Yamtuan Muda was to be chosen from among the Bugis Chiefs; the choice fell on Daeng Marewa, Klana Jaya Putra, the eldest of the brothers. He took the name of Sultan Aladin Shah. Daeng Marewa is said to have married Che' Ayu, widow of the murdered Sultan Mahmud; Daeng Chelak married Tengku Mandak, sister of Sultan Sulaiman; Daeng Perani married Tengku Tengah; Daeng Sasuru married Tun Kechil, daughter of the former Malay Yamtuan Muda Mahmud; and Daeng Mengato married Tun Kechil's sister, Tun Imah. An old Bugis Chief, Daeng Manompo, seems to have objected to his exclusion from a share in the spoil; so he took the title of Raja Tua and the style of "Sultan Ibrahim Shah," and married the aged Tun Tipah, aunt of Sultan Sulaiman.

In the meantime Raja Kechil had established himself at Siak whence he continued with varying fortune to fight the Bugis. In a sense he had came to be regarded as a national champion. Malay tradition, with a wealth of miraculous detail, represents him as having been born a

posthumous son of the misogynist Sultan Mahmud who was murdered at Kota Tinggi. It tells us that his mother was a lady of the palace, named Enche' Apong, daughter of the Laksamana. It explains that the royal child was smuggled out of Johor as an infant and delivered over to the care of the Batin of Singapore who passed him on to the Temenggong of Muar. As a boy he came once to Johor in the suite of the Temenggong of Muar and betrayed his identity by being able to play about his father's tomb without being struck with the sudden sickness that attacks the presumptuous. Having to flee again, he was handed over under the pseudonym Tun Bujang to the care of a Sumatran, Nakhoda Malim, who took him to Jambi. From Jambi the boy went to Pagar Ruyong where the Sultan of Menangkabau's wife saw through his disguise and brought him up as her own son. After various adventures at the palace, Tun Bujang went travelling through Sumatra and entered the service of the Sultan of Lamabang. He served this ruler for a long time, accompanying him on one occasion as far as Johor and being one of his followers when the Sultan made himself ruler of Palembang, through the help of the Dutch. As soon as the Palembang war was over, Tun Bujang migrated to the Rawa country. There he settled down and married a daughter of the Dipati of Batu Kuching. After his wife had borne him a son (Raja Alam) Tun Bujang wandered off again to Jambi where he entered the service of a local Sultan and was wounded severely in the thigh by a matchlock-bullet. Then he found his way back to Menangkabu where the Sultan gave him the name of Raja Kechil and advised him to avenge his father and seek fame and fortune in the Peninsula. With the aid of men from Menangkabau he acted on the Sultan's advice and succeeded in making himself master of Johor. His only serious opponent was the Yamtuan Muda; the Sultan (and the people generally) accepted him at once on his proving his genealogy by turning the sea into fresh water.

It is certain that Raja Kechil was not a posthumous son of Sultan Mahmud. Dutch records make it clear

that the Raja was a man of about 53 years of age when he seized the throne of Johor in A.D. 1717, and that he was an extremely old man in A.D. 1745, just before his death. The story of his adventures suggests a life crowded with more incident than would have been possible between his alleged birth in A.D. 1700 and his conquest of Johor in A.D. 1717 as a veteran warrior and the father of a son. Stripped of fantastic detail the story of Tun Bujang may be a fair biography of the real Raja Kechil, the Sumatran adventurer, who refers to himself occasionally, even in the Malay story, as the son of a king of Siak. Certainly he did rule Siak and was a mighty man of valour in his time. The Bugis pirates were formidable antagonists for the Malays of those days, and Raja Kechil was the only man who held his own against them. He defeated them repeatedly. It is related of him that on one occasion when taken by surprise in his house at Siak, wounded and forced to swim the river, dragging a court officer, his Panglima Dalam, after him, he returned to the attack at once and swam the river again with followers he had collected, promising a reward to the man who would be the first to find a kerchief which he said he was going back to recover. He recovered it himself. His wife, Tengku Kamariah, also was a woman of spirit. When the Bugis seized Riau, she became their prisoner. Daeng Chelak wanted her to cast off her husband and marry him. Pressure was brought to bear on her to accept this offer. "Yes," said she, "I shall accept it; but I have the right to name the bridal gift. He must get me the head of Raja Kechil, my husband." Daeng Chelak gave up his suit. Raja Kechil in his turn begged her brother, Sultan Sulaiman, to let her go back to him. The younger Bugis chiefs demurred. The old Daeng Manompo reproached them with want of chivalry. Tengku Kamariah cut the discussion short, "Tell my husband that, if he wants me so much, he should come and carry me off by force of arms." In A.D. 1727 Raja Kechil made a descent on Riau and rescued his wife by his prowess. In A.D. 1728 he returned to the attack with

the help of Palembang troops but was repulsed. In A.D. 1729 the Bugis attacked him in his own capital in Siak; it was now their turn to be defeated. These years from A.D. 1723 onwards are a long record of petty wars.

The history of this period (A.D. 1721–1728) is involved. Raja Kechil left two sons: Raja Alam, by his Sumatran wife; and Raja Muhammad (known as Raja Buang) by Tengku Kamariah. The latter claimed the allegiance of Raja Kechil's Malay followers; the former, of his Sumatrans. Their dissensions lost them Siak. In the meantime their Malay rival, Sultan Sulaiman, was not prospering at Riau. His Bugis friends "fed him only when they chose to feed him;" so he left his Sultanate and fled to Kampar in A.D. 1723. He had to be induced to come back, for the Bugis did not want to see all the Malays united in hostility against them. He remained a puppet, but was treated with more respect and "fed oftener," as the treaty would have expressed it.

The policy of the Dutch, so far as their general unwillingness to interfere allowed of any policy, was that of supporting the Malays against the restless and piratical Bugis. It was a difficult policy, this assistance of the weak against the strong, but it proved successful in the end. Looking at it in the light of results we can compare two similar situations, one in 1756 and the other in 1784, and notice the difference in treatment. On both occasions, Malacca was attacked.

On the first occasion the Dutch, after repelling the attack on their fortress, allied themselves with the Malays (Sultan Sulaiman, his son the Tengku Besar, and his son-in-law the Sultan of Trengganu) and forced the Bugis to come to terms (A.D. 1757) and to acknowledge the Sultan of Johor as their lawful sovereign. This plan did not work well. Sultan Sulaiman had difficulty in enforcing his authority. To make matters worse, his death (20th August, 1760) occurred at a time when his eldest son, the Tengku Besar, was on a mission to the

Bugis princes of Linggi and Selangor. If Malay records are to be believed, the Bugis chief Daeng Kamboja was not a man to waste an opportunity. He poisoned the Tengku Besar (who had assumed the title of Abdul Jalil Muadzam Shah), and then took his body, with every manifestation of grief, back to Riau to be buried. At the burial he proclaimed the Tengku Besar's young son Sultan of Johor under the title of Sultan Ahmad Riayat Shah, but he also nominated himself to be regent. When the unhappy boy king was a little older and seemed likely to take the Government into his own hands, he, too, was poisoned so as to allow a mere child, his brother, to be made Sultan and prolong the duration of the regency. The Dutch plan of securing Malay ascendancy had failed; the Bugis were stronger than ever.

On the second occasion (when Raja Haji attacked Malacca in 1784) the Dutch, after repelling the attack and killing the Bugis chief, followed up their success by driving the Bugis out of Riau and recognising the young Malay Sultan Mahmud Riayat Shah as the ruler of Johor. But on this occasion they felt that they could not trust any native dynasty to maintain peace. They made a treaty with the Sultan and stationed a Resident with a small Dutch garrison at Riau. This plan did not work very well at first; it pleased neither the Bugis nor the Malay chiefs. The fifth Bugis Yamtuan Muda attacked Riau; the Malay Sultan fled from his capital to get up a coalition against the Dutch; even the Ilanun pirates made an assault upon the place. In time, however, when the various chiefs came to recognise that the glories of independence were not sufficient compensation for losing the creature-comforts of security and peace, both the Malay Mahmud Shah and the Bugis Yamtuan Muda settled down definitely at Riau and accepted the part of dependent princes.

The following table shows the line of the Bugis holders of the title of Yamtuan Muda up to A.D. 1833:

Upu Tanderi Burong
(a Bugis chief)

| Daeng Perani<br>d. 1723 | Daeng Marewa<br>(1st Yamtuan Muda)<br>d. 1728 | Daeng Chelak<br>(2nd Yamtuan Muda)<br>d. 1745 |
|---|---|---|
| Daeng Kemboja<br>(3rd Yamtuan Muda)<br>d. 1777 | | Raja Haji<br>(4th Yamtuan Muda)<br>d. 1784 |
| Raja Ali<br>(5th Yamtuan Muda)<br>d. 1805 | | Raja Jafar<br>(6th Yamtuan Muda)<br>d. 1832 |
| | | Tengku Abdur-Rahman<br>(7th Yamtuan Muda)<br>d. 1844 |
| | | Tengku Muhammad<br>(8th Yamtuan Muda) |

There is a Riau genealogy which makes Daeng Pali the second Yamtuan Muda and the father of Raja Haji, and another account merely states that Raja Haji was a member of the Bugis house, whose father held a high position in Johor.

The following table shows their contemporaries of the Malay line of Johor Sultans:

Abdul Jalil Riayat Shah
(d. 1719 (circ.))

Sulaiman Badru'l-alam Shah
(d. 1760)

Abdul Jalil Muadzam Shah
(d. 1760)

| Ahmad Riayat Shah<br>(d. 1770 (circ.)) | Mahmud Riayat Shah<br>(d. 1810 (circ.)) |
|---|---|
| | Sultan Husain<br>(of Singapore<br>d. 1835) |
| | Sultan<br>Abdur-Rahman<br>(of Lingga) |

Sultan Mahmud Riayat Shah of Johor died about A.D. 1810 leaving two sons, Tengku Husain (the elder) and Tengku Abdur-Rahman. The latter was proclaimed

Sultan by the Bugis Yamtuan Muda of Riau. Neither of these two sons was born of a royal mother; and Sultan Mahmud's principal wife (who was of royal descent but childless) favoured Tengku Husain. It is not clear why Husain was passed over in favour of his younger brother. Certainly the latter was absent at the time of his father's death and could not have complied with the rule that a Sultan must be present at his predecessor's obsequies; but this explanation does not seem to have been put forward to account for the supersession. It may have been due to an arbitrary abuse of power on the part of the Yamtuan Muda; or it may be that Tengku Abdur-Rahman was put forward honestly as the more capable ruler. Anyhow no serious protest was made, even by Tengku Husain. Sultan Abdur-Rahman was recognized both by the English and Dutch and lived in amity with his dispossessed elder brother until A.D. 1819 when Sir Stamford Raffles decided to question the validity of the Sultan's right to the throne.

# CHAPTER VIII.

## SINGAPORE, JOHORE AND MUAR.

After the massacre of Amboyna in A.D. 1623 England's influence in the Malay Archipelago was small. Her factories at Bantam and Batavia practically ceased to exist in A.D. 1682 though the former was not abolished formally till 1817. Attempts to establish trade with Borneo met with little success. In Sumatra more was done. Factories were set up intermittently at Acheen, Tiku, Priaman and other parts; and in A.D. 1684 after the withdrawal from Java a more permanent settlement was made at Fort York near Bencoolen. The name was changed to Fort Marlborough in A.D. 1714; and the settlement was even made an Indian presidency from A.D. 1763 to 1800. It is doubtful if these Sumatran forts and factories ever paid their way.

In A.D. 1786 Captain Light obtained a cession of the island of Penang from the Sultan of Kedah in return for a perpetual annuity of $6,000. Ten years later it was made a penal settlement. After four years as a penal settlement it was extended by the acquisition of most of Province Wellesley. In A.D. 1805 Penang was raised to the position of a Presidency and a full Governor (Mr. Dundas) was appointed to it.

In the suite of Governor Dundas there arrived an Assistant Secretary to the Penang Government named Stamford Raffles. This officer devoted himself assiduously to the study of the Malay language and came to the front in connection with a report against a proposal to abandon the settlement of Malacca (which had been taken from the Dutch in A.D. 1795) and to transfer the population to Penang. A few years later he accompanied Lord Minto's expedition and was present at the military operations that resulted in the conquest of Java. The high opinion with which he inspired Lord Minto led to his being made Lieutenant Governor of Java. On the retrocession of Java after the treaty of A.D. 1814 Sir

Stamford (as he then was) was made Lieutenant Governor of Bencoolen and Agent for the Governor-General in the Eastern Seas. It was in this latter capacity that he came in A.D. 1818 to be seeking a permanent settlement for the maintenance of British trade in the Eastern Archipelago.

In A.D. 1818 Malacca had just been given back to the Dutch who were, of course, anxious to maintain a monopoly of trade. To combat this monopoly the British ex-Resident of Malacca, Major Farquhar, favoured the establishment of a post in the Karimon Islands and entered into negotiations with the Sultan of Johor and Lingga (Abdur-Rahman) and with the Yamtuan Muda (Jafar) of Riau. The former replied on the 11th August, 1818:

> "I make known to my friend that I have received his letter by his secretary[1] acquainting me with his arrival. I am extremely glad to have an opportunity of a personal interview with my friend, but no matters of business have been yet pertained to me, all being transacted by my father the Raja Muda of Riau. But to meet my friend is a great pleasure, as it is a sign of his friendship and regard for me."

On the 20th August the Yamtuan Muda wrote a friendly letter to Major Farquhar; and on the 25th September he wrote, "with respect to my friend's wish about the Karimon Islands, it is agreeable to me."

Major Farquhar's wish about the Karimon Islands was not agreeable to Sir Stamford Raffles. The masterful Agent of the Governor General elected to make the settlement at Singapore; and as he was unable to obtain what he wanted from the Yamtuan Muda and the Sultan, he set up a Sultan of his own. He induced Tengku Husain, Sultan Abdur-Rahman's elder brother, to meet him at Singapore and to enter into a treaty. A further signatory of this treaty was the Temenggong, the feudal chief, *de facto* local ruler, who was actually resident at Singapore when the first treaty was made.

[1] *Juru tulis.*

Writing on the 21st October, 1827, Sultan Husain gave the following account of what he had understood by the treaty:

> "It was the English Company which raised me to the rank of Sultan. . . . For when the Company elevated me to my present rank and made a treaty it was stated in the engagement that the Sultan should remain quiet and amuse himself, that the Sultan should not trouble himself about any affairs whatever, and that all business should be carried on by the Company and Temenggong Abdur-Rahman."

He was, however, well aware that he was doing a dangerous thing in accepting the titular dignity of a Sultan. Both he and the Temenggong wrote at once to the Raja Muda of Riau and to the Dutch authorities apologizing for what had been done and explaining (quite falsely) that it had been done under duress. The Dutch made immediate use of this explanation in their protest against the validity of the treaty; so the Sultan and the Temenggong on the 1st March, 1819, sent a letter to Major Farquhar, Resident of Singapore:

> "We make known to our friend, Major Farquhar, Resident of Singapore, in reply to his enquiry of us whether or no any letter had been sent by us to the Dutch Governor of Malacca or any subject of the Government of Malacca or to the Raja Muda of Riau asserting that the English had made a factory at Singapore without our consent and by force on their part. It is true we sent a letter to Mr. A. Kock and one to the Raja Muda of Riau saying that the English had come and made a factory at Singapore by force and not with our will; but we wrote so in our letter because we were afraid of the Dutch punishing us at a future period; but in truth and from our hearts, God and His Prophet Mohammed are our witnesses that by His favour the English formed a factory at Singapore and that with our sincere will and consent we received the English Company to dwell

and establish a factory there. Moreover when our friend Sir T. Stamford Raffles came to Kuala Singapura and wanted to land his men and stores it was all with our permission and that of Sultan Husain Mohammed, and he then landed his men and stores. To certify the truth of what we have now said we have both affixed our seals to this paper."

The first treaty was made in A.D. 1819. It ceded only a small tract of the island. A second treaty made a cession of the whole island; and an agreement with Holland in A.D. 1824 brought about recognition of the validity of this cession. The new settlement increased gradually in importance owing to the natural advantages of its position and to its being a free port (which Penang was not). It became the administrative centre of the Straits Settlements in A.D. 1837.

We must return to the Malay Chiefs. The Temenggong Abdur-Rahman died on the 8th December, 1825. Sultan Husain died in 1835[1]. The pensions for which they had ceded Singapore died with them. Tengku Ali, son of Sultan Husain, was not recognised at first as heir to the Sultanate, and remained for many years in a state of poverty and for all his life in a condition of debt. In the meantime pressure was brought to bear on Governors and other officials to do something for the son of the Sultan who had ceded Singapore to the British. It was difficult to do anything. To give the son a revenue from Singapore funds was a step that would not have commended itself to the East India Company as the settlement did not pay. To give him any actual authority would have been to trench on the feudal rights of the Temenggong who was slowly developing Johor. Governor Butterworth ended by taking up Tengku Ali's case and put pressure on the Temenggong to cede some portion at least of his dominions to Sultan Ali. The Temenggong resisted stoutly this attempt of the Governor to be generous at the expense of others. On one occasion

[1] 10th Jamadi'l-awal 1251 A.H.

when Wan Abubakar[1], the young son of the Temenggong, was being browbeaten by Colonel Butterworth, he replied boldly that if the Government insisted on their acknowledging Tengku Ali as Sultan they could not help but do so; of their own free will they would not do so; and he added, pointing to a policeman at the door, "If Your Excellency insists on making even that policeman our Sultan, we should have to submit." In the end they signed the treaty of A.D. 1855. They gave Tengku Ali the district of Muar to govern as Sultan of Muar; and they agreed to pay him and his family $5,000 down and $500 per mensem in perpetuity. In return they received his formal renunciation of all claims over Johor itself.

This concession to the divine right of kings did not make for good government in Muar. Sultan Ali was an absentee ruler who was more concerned with meeting the claims of his creditors than with exercising the authority he possessed. He sold concessions for whatever they would fetch, sometimes selling the same right to more than one person. His debts meanwhile were mounting up. In the early sixties he owed over $150,000. He had borrowed originally $58,600; he had become liable for interest on those debts to the extent of $188,760; and he had paid to account $102,000. He was no financier, as these figures will show. He died on Malacca territory on the 23rd June, 1877. Even in death he worked evil to his country. He left Muar by will to a younger son, Tengku Mahmud, rather than to his elder son Tengku Alam, and thus sowed the seeds of a civil war which was ended only by the British Government stepping in and holding a formal election to discover the wishes of the Muar Chiefs. Those Chiefs elected as their ruler the Maharaja of Johor. The annual pension to Sultan Ali's descendants was increased; the territory of Muar was handed over to Johor; and the matter ended, save for the troubles caused by Sultan Ali's concessions and for the claims that continue to be made, even now, on behalf of the "dispossessed" family of the Sultans of Singapore.

[1] Afterwards Sultan of Johor.

Temenggong Ibrahim died on the 31st January, 1862, and was succeeded by his son Che' Wan Abubakar who at a later date assumed the title of Maharaja and in 1886 of Sultan of Johor. Sultan Abubakar died while in London in 1895 and was succeeded by his son, Sultan Ibrahim, the present ruler. Officially the line of the Temenggongs of Johor goes back in the direct male line to a son or brother of Sultan Abdul Jalil IV who succeeded the murdered Sultan Mahmud of Kota Tinggi in A.D. 1699. The following is the pedigree as given by the late Sultan Abubakar:




There are, however, certain doubtful features about this pedigree. It is probable that these families are descended from a brother, not a son, of Sultan Abdul Jalil, as they would otherwise have borne the royal title of Tengku. It is certain that the Pahang Bendaharas bore even in the early part of the nineteenth century the Malay title of Tun while the later Temenggongs bore the

Bugis title of Daeng. The following is, perhaps, a more correct version.




The following genealogy gives the principal names of the Singapore-Lingga families:



# CHAPTER IX.

## EARLY PERAK HISTORY.

All Perak tradition points to Bruas as the original seat of Malay rule in that State. Tradition is supported by history in so far that the "Malay Annals" speak of Bruas as having been a powerful kingdom before the Malays settled in Malacca. Geography also supports legend; for, if the great estuary known as the Dindings river was once an outlet of the Perak, Bruas must have occupied an ideal situation for the capital of the State. But the river has silted up, the modern village of Bruas[1] is many miles to seaward of the old site, and the fame of the district has long since passed away. A few old legends linger about the tombstones that mark the spot where the ancient capital once stood. The lost town, so runs the story, was so large that it took a cat three months to do the circuit of the roofs. The water-jars were so huge that ladders had to be used to get at their contents, while, as for the serpents—even a Bruas Malay apologises for the stories about them. These snakes, it appears, used to stand on their tails and fall with killing weight on the unwary passer-by. Then there are the local names. One Bruas locality, *Kota*, or "the Fort," is so placed that it can be explained only on the supposition that the ricefields of Dendang were once a harbour as tradition says they were. *Pintu Gĕrbang* or "the Main Gate" is a little pass a mile away and is said to have been once a fort or blockhouse. *Tanah Gĕndang* or "the drumming ground," a place where the soil sounds hollow, is associated with great caverns; but no one dare excavate there. Interesting also are the Malay predictions about the future of Bruas. It is prophesied that Bruas will be the last province of Perak to be developed, and that, when developed, it will excel all the rest in its wealth and its prosperity. Anyone who knows the splendid tract of country that lies behind the Perak river

[1] Pengkalan Baharu on the Bruas River.

and the Dindings will see no improbability in the old prophecy on which the scattered inhabitants of Bruas rest their hopes of its future.

Of the names of the old kings of Bruas and of the deeds that they achieved local tradition can tell nothing. The earliest heroes of Perak belong to the coming of the ancestors of the present dynasty of Sultans. There are many versions of these legends, versions that differ curiously in certain details while closely agreeing in others, and the general impression they leave is the belief that courtiers have been trying to introduce dynastic questions into the genuine folklore of the country. The dynastic features vary; the folklore remains the same.

Here we have to fall back upon that invaluable source of information, the "Malay Annals." The annals tell us Bruas had so far declined in authority by the year A.D. 1500 that its king did homage to Sultan Mahmud of Malacca in return for help against Manjong a petty rival village, and was given the title of Tun Aria Bijaya Diraja; also that Tun Isap Berakah a grandson of the Paduka Tuan of Malacca married a relative of this petty ruler, and became by her the father of the Bendahara who founded Johor. The published texts then say no more about Bruas. But there is in the Library of the Royal Asiatic Society, London, a manuscript copy of the "Annals" from the Raffles' collection, which gives an almost entirely variant version of all that follows chapter 34 in the texts. It tells how after the conquest of Malacca in 1511 Tun Aria Bijaya Diraja, who was a relative of the wife of the Paduka Tuan, angered Sultan Mahmud by neglecting to pay homage any more, and how the Paduka Tuan went to Manjong and brought the recalcitrant princeling before his overlord. It adds that the diplomatic Paduka Tuan married his son, Tun Mahmud or Dato' Lekar, to Tun Mah, daughter of this ruler of Bruas, and gave the bridegroom Selangor to rule, and how later Tun Mahmud sailed down from Selangor and escorted Sultan Mahmud to his last refuge, Kampar (p. 52 supra), getting for reward the title of Sri Agar Raja. After relating that Sultan Alaedin Riayat Shah succeeded[1]

[1] *i.e.* in A.D. 1529.

Sultan Mahmud, it records with noticeable abruptness how the chiefs drove out (—his elder brother—) the "Raja Muda," even "before the rice in his pot was cooked", along with his wife, Tun Trang, a niece of Tun Narawangsa, and his son, Mansur Shah, and how the royal exile fled first to Siak and then to (?) Kang (or perhaps Klang), whence a Manjong trader Si-Tumi carried him to Perak, where he became Sultan Mudzaffar Shah. It relates how there was in Selangor a Sri Agar Diraja who had married Raja Siti, daughter of the Sultan of Kedah, and whom Mudzaffar Shah made Bendahara of Perak, thus offending Sultan Alaedin Riayat Shah (*obiit* A.D. 1564):—it does not make it clear if Sri Agar Diraja is the same title as Sri Agar Raja though it seems likely as the upshot would show its holder was of the house of the Bendaharas of Johor. Tun Pikrama uncle of Tun Trang, was deputed to fetch the new Perak Bendahara and went to Perak "upstream to Lebohan Jong," where the offending Bendahara annoyed him by sending "rice in a pot and curry in a bamboo." Finally the Bendahara Paduka Tuan himself brought the culprit down to Johor. This story, like the others in this manuscript version, wears the convincing air of realism that marks the vivid literary style of the whole of the "Malay Annals." It leads one to the conclusion that Malacca's relations with Bruas merged without break into relations with Perak; unconciously it perhaps explains the origin of a title, Sri Agar Diraja, that obtained in Perak till its last holder was hanged for the murder of Mr. Birch, and it gives a reason for Perak's claim to suzerainty over Selangor. But the new material still conveys an impression that it was the ancestors of the Bendahara who wrote the "Malay Annals" and not their princely masters, who were anxious for power in the hinterland and for princesses for commoner sons who could not intermarry with Malacca royalty. It corroborates but adds nothing to the Perak legend of a shadowy Mudzaffar Shah who had an exact historical counterpart nearly a hundred years later.

Perak accounts relate that Sultan Mansur Shah, son and successor to this Mudzaffar Shah on the Perak

throne, "died" and his family was carried captive to Acheen, where his eldest son became Sultan. But the list of Achehnese rulers in the *Bustanu's-Salatin* records that it was Sultan Alaedin Mansur Shah, ruler of Acheen from 1579 till he was murdered in A.D. 1585, who was a Perak prince, the son of a Sultan Ahmad of Perak. Acheen, therefore, corroborates the claim that there was a Perak dynasty in the XVI century. A Sultan Ahmad Taju'd-din figures as the first ruler of Perak in one list of Sultans and as the third in another. One Perak account says that he was known as Marhum Muda after death and had a brother known after death as the "Prince who died on the Riverbank." And the printed "Malay Annals" tell us that a daughter of the Bendahara who founded Johor between A.D. 1529 and 1564 married a Perak prince, Raja Muhammad, called the "Prince on the Riverbank," and that she was grand-aunt to Raja Sulong who became the authentic XVII century Sultan Mudzaffar Shah of Perak.

There are several conflicting genealogies of the early rulers of Perak. The following list has the interest of being accepted by the Perak Court:



It is unfortunate that repeated Achehnese invasions and some internal dissensions have left no reliable evidence of the XVI century history of Perak but only a few tangled genealogies and stories attaching to regalia and legendary graves. Even Perak's fine XVIII century history, the *Misa Melayu*, is silent over this early period.

A sister of the wife of the "Prince on the Riverbank" married Tun Isap Misai, the "old Dato' Bendahara" (who died shortly before A.D. 1587), and had a son Tun Jahid who went to Perak and a daughter, Tun Kechil, wife of a Raja Mahmud (said in Perak to have been of Siak descent), whose son Raja Sulong was carried to Acheen by Sultan Mughal and by him made ruler of Perak with the title of Sultan Mudzaffar Shah. The "Annals" add, that "he married a Perak *putĕri* and had a son, Sultan Mansur Shah, ruler of Perak *now*." The "Annals" purport to have been written about A.D. 1612 but Mahkota 'Alam's adopted son, a Pahang prince, Sultan Mughal ruled Acheen from January 1637 till A.D. 1641, so that the references to Mudzaffar Shah and Mansur Shah must have been interpolated. The genealogy of the Bendahara goes to show that this authentic Sultan Mudzaffar Shah of Perak was a first cousin of Tun Sri Lanang, author of the "Malay Annals."

The suspicious features in the story of the apocryphal XVI century counterpart of this ruler of Perak now stand revealed. That shadowy personage, too, was a Mudzaffar Shah, the eldest son of a Mahmud, who also came to Perak by way of Siak, and he, too, was an exile from his country and the father of a Mansur Shah! But he was of the blood royal of Malacca!

The "Malay Annals" relate that in the first half of the XVII century the rulers of Perak employed as their own Bendaharas, members of the great house of their kinsmen, the Bendaharas of Johor, and mention a Tun Mai as a contemporary Bendahara of Perak. A Perak tradition tells us that one Tun Saban was the last of the house to hold the office. On behalf of a rightful heir to the Perak throne he took up arms against a usurper.

The war ended badly for Tun Saban who was killed by a soldier of fortune named Megat Terawis. From this

time and for several generations the family of Megat Terawis held the high position of Bendahara in Perak.


The whole period was one of war and turbulence. In A.D. 1650 the Dutch opened a factory on the Perak River; in A.D. 1651 the factory was destroyed and its inmates massacred. Hamilton, writing in A.D. 1727, speaks of Perak as "properly a part of the kingdom of Johor, but the people are intractable and rebellious, and the government anarchical. Their religion is a sort of heterodox Muhammadanism. The country produces more tin than any in India, but the inhabitants are so treacherous, faithless and bloody that no European nation can keep factories there with safety. The Dutch tried it once, and the first year had their factory cut off. They then settled on Pulau Dinding, but about the year 1690 that factory was also cut off." In justice to the Malays it should be added that the Dutch treated the selling of tin to anyone but themselves as a serious offence and even as a *casus belli*. It is not surprising that their factories were "cut off."

It is possible that the civil wars of this period are responsible for the confusion in the genealogies. It seems certain that one Sultan, Iskandar Shah, *Marhum Bĕsar Aulia'llah*, reigned for a fair period of time (the exaggeration of tradition put it at 111 years) before and after A.D. 1700. The character assigned him by his posthumous title (God's Great Saint) suggests that he was somewhat unsuited for the warring age in which he lived. We hear of wars with Acheen in which the Bendahara Garang distinguished himself. We know

also that the Bugis Chief, Klana Jaya Putra, first Yamtuan Muda of Riau, (*ob.* 1728) invaded Perak in the reign of Alaedin Shah, the eldest son and successor of "God's Great Saint." To this we may add that about A.D. 1757 the Dutch were able to establish a factory at Tanjong Putus on the Perak River. They sent a mission to Mudzaffar Shah about A.D. 1764 and made a treaty with his successor, Muhammad Shah, in A.D. 1765.

The following is a conjectural genealogy of the Sultans for this period:

Mahmud Iskandar Shah
(reigning about 1700 A.D.)

| Alaedin Riayat Shah (reigning about A.D. 1725) | Mudzaffar Shah (reigning in A.D. 1764) | Muhammad Shah (reigning in A.D. 1765 |
|---|---|---|

The next Sultan, Iskandar Dzu'l-Karnain, known posthumously as *Marhum Kahar* because of his masterful character, is regarded by all Perak Malays as a great figure in their history. There was peace in his time and trade in tin with the Dutch factory at Tanjong Putus. He was famous for the comparative splendour of his court, for his attention to court-ceremonies, for his rules as to precedence among Perak chiefs, and (above all) for having deprived the family of Mĕgat Terawis of the position and authority of Bendahara. There is no reason to doubt the story of this deprivation though the tradition errs in detail. The story goes that Sultan Iskandar suddenly bethought himself that Perak ought not to have a commoner as its prime minister when there were so many young princes for whom no employment could be found. He therefore directed his Bendahara, Megat Pendia, to build him a palace at Pulau Indra Sakti, and so worried that minister with contradictory instructions and undeserved censures that the unfortunate man tendered his resignation in order to prove that no other Bendahara could do the work better than he. The Sultan promptly appointed his own brother, Raja Alaedin, to be Bendahara and expressed himself perfectly satisfied with the house that Raja Alaedin built. There are reasons

to doubt this story. The tradition of a certain Saiyid family makes it clear that a favourite of Sultan Iskandar, Saiyid Abubakar, was for a time Bendahara and was dispossessed in favour of Raja Alaedin.

The classification of the Perak chiefs is also assigned to Sultan Iskandar Dzu'l-Karnain.

The Sultan kept for his own family the dignities and revenues of the three highest posts in the State: those of Sultan, Raja Muda and Bendahara. He assigned the premier position among the commoners to the son of the last "Megat" Bendahara with the title of Orang Kaya Bĕsar. The next place he gave to the Temenggong, a very high officer of state. The next place (Mantĕri) he gave to the Saiyid, his favourite, from whom he was taking away the position of Bendahara. These three commoners and the Bendahara became the *Orang Bĕsar Empat* or *Orang Empat di-Balai*, the Four Great Officers of State.

Next after "the Four" he placed "the Eight," [the *Orang Bĕsar Dĕlapan* or *Hulubalang*[1] *Dĕlapan*]—all but one of whom are now territorial chiefs. The most powerful of these chiefs claimed direct descent from *Tun Saban*, the old opponent of Sultan Malik Shah.

After "the Eight" he placed "the Sixteen" minor chiefs, a list that varied in its composition from time to time but was always headed by the Dato' Srī Maharaja Lela, a man of Bugis descent, feudal chief of Sayong on the Perak River.

This classification of the Perak chiefs survives to the present time and has more than an academic interest. But the fortunes of the Perak families have varied greatly as the following account will show.

The family of Megat Terawis, whose members were Bendaharas to A.D. 1770 and were consoled with other dignities by Sultan Iskandar, has now lost all its titles. It still survives at Kota Lama and its members are very numerous. Its best known member at present is Megat Osman, now secretary to the Majlis Ugama in Kelantan.

[1] *Hulubalang* in Acheen means a territorial chief. It does not bear that meaning in British Malaya outside Perak.


The family of Tun Saban held many titles in its various branches, notably in a line of chiefs who bore successively the title of Sri Narawangsa but are no longer important; and in another line, who still bear the title of Sri Adika Raja.




The ancient family of the Dato' Penglima Kinta is also associated with that of Tun Saban though the con-

nection is obscure. At an early date it divided into two branches each of which took it in turn to provide the bearer of the title. A further division does so now.




The Kinta mines brought much wealth to this family after the British Protectorate allowed of their being developed by Chinese labour.

The family that owned the title of Dato' Panglima Bukit Gantang lost its importance nearly a century ago. The last of the line were:




The seventh Panglima distinguished himself in the wars with Kedah early in the nineteenth century. This family also claimed descent from Tun Saban.

The family of the Dato' Sri Maharaja Lela is Bugis and dates back to the wars between the Bugis Klana Jaya Putra (ob. 1728) and Sultan Aladin of Perak. The settlement at Bandar is said to be of Bugis origin, and the village of Sayong must have a strong Bugis element.

This Bugis family now holds both the old title of Dato' Sri Maharaja Lela and the higher title of Temenggong.

Daeng Selili, First Dato' Sri Maharaja Lela
Sri Maharaja Lela Osman
Sri Maharaja Lela Uda Tahir
Paduka Raja Pandok Usoh
Temenggong Mat Arif
Temenggong Wan Husain — Temenggong Wan Hasan
Wan Abdul Jalil

Some romance attaches to the family of the Arab favourite whom Sultan Iskandar made Bendahara and Mantri. Saiyid Husin al-Faradz (claiming to be a descendant of the Prophet in the twenty-fifth generation)[1], son of the Saint Jamâlu'llah al-Hadziri, was the first of the family to come to Perak. His descendant in the fifth generation (the thirtieth from the Prophet) was Saiyid Jalaludin, known as To' Tambak, a man of distinction who gave his daughter in marriage to Sultan Iskandar.

Saiyid Jalaludin, To' Tambak
Saiyid Abubakar (Bendahara Mantri) — Saiyid Hasan (Mantri di-Bota)
Saiyid Shamsu'd-din (Mantri Chĕgar Galah)
Saiyid Pandak Ahmad — Saiyid Hitam Besar
Saiyid Mahmud (Orang Kaya Besar)
Saiyid Muhammad
Saiyid Uthman
Saiyid Musa (of Chĕgar Galah)

The family has now lost its wealth and titles. The last member to bear the title of Orang Kaya Besar was Saiyid Jafar, in quite recent times.

[1] The full genealogy is printed by Dr. Winstedt in J.R.A.S., S.B., No. 79. The family was a princely house in Hadramaut.

Sultan Iskandar was succeeded by his brother, Raja Samsu, who took the title of Mahmud Shah. The one event recorded of his reign is his bestowal of the title of Sultan on the Bugis Raja Lumu (Sultan Salehu'd-din Shah) of Selangor. This must have been about A.D. 1780. It was the practice of the early Selangor Sultans to go to Perak to receive their titles; and even when the present ruler was installed a deputation (consisting of the Raja Muda, the Dato' Sri Adika Raja and the Dato' Stia) attended the ceremony as representatives of the senior State.

The reign of Sultan Mahmud was followed by a period of decline ending in the Kedah wars that marked the close of the long reign of Sultan Ahmad-din Shah. This decline must have been due largely to the abandonment of the Dutch factory at Tanjong Putus and the cessation of the remunerative tin trade. Perak sank lower and lower. It is true that the struggle between the Perak and Kedah Malays was not altogether one-sided, that Che' Alang Idin is reported to have gained successes at Bukit Berapit (and was made Panglima Bukit Gantang for his services), and that the higher tile of Temenggong went to the descendants of Daeng Selili for similar prowess. But the fact that the older holders were superseded is in itself evidence that things had not been going well. Che' Alang Idin, it is said, could muster only twelve muskets in all and made up for his lack of firearms by getting to close quarters under cover of the night. With forces such as these no lasting success could be achieved. Writing to the Governor of Penang on the 26th July, 1819, the Sultan of Kedah, Ahmad Taju'd-din Halim Shah, makes the following assertions:

> "It is true I attacked the Perak country and conquered it; and the King as well as the Raja Muda and Raja Bendahara transferred the government of the country to me. I directed my agents who were on the spot to supersede the old King and invest the Raja Muda, his son, with the chief authority, and at the same time to appoint the Raja Bendahara the Raja Muda or successor; but they begged me to permit them to retain their

> names and titles during the lifetime of the old king, and that the old king should cease to exercise any authority or be admitted to these councils. To this proposal I assented; and consequently Perak and its dependencies were placed under the rule of the Raja Muda and Raja Bendahara jointly, subject to my superintendence and control. The Raja Muda, though not bearing the title, exercises all the functions of a tributary sovereign."

The subject of this letter was a proposal by the British Government that the Dinding Island (Pulau Pangkor) should be ceded to Great Britain. The Sultan of Kedah demurred to the cession because he was "apprehensive of giving offence to the King of Siam." He also stated that "the Kedah country is tributary to Siam."

Just about this time the "old King," Sultan Ahmaddin Shah of Perak, died. He was succeeded by Abdul Malik Mansur Shah who in his reply to the Governor of Penang about the cession of Pangkor (22nd August, 1819) makes no mention of Kedah. He says simply:

> "We cannot at present give any decided reply; because we understand that it is customary for the Company to pay tribute wherever they hoist their colours or form a settlement; and no mention is made in our friend's letter of any subsidy, money or allowance."

The matter was then dropped. This Sultan, Abdul Malik Mansur Shah, did not reign long; the ruler of Perak in A.D. 1826 was his son Abdullah Muadzam Shah. In the meantime the question of the ruler of Perak's subjection to the Kedah Sultan had been settled by the Siamese driving the latter out of his country in A.D. 1821. The Siamese, and not Kedah, had now become the menace to the independence of Perak and were putting forward a claim to their form of tribute, the *bunga mas*, and to all the vague rights of suzerainty that such a tribute involved. Sultan Abdullah was placed in a dilemma. In September, 1826, he referred the question to the British authorities. In October he said he would not send the *bunga mas*. In the following year (1827)

he thought better of it and decided to pay the tribute. But by this time his case had been taken up by the British Government; and the "Burney Treaty" between Great Britain and Siam laid down definitely that Perak was an independent state.

The last letter from Sultan Abdullah of Perak to the British Government was written in A.D. 1830. The first from his successor, Shahabudin Shah is dated the 26th June, 1831. The following table shows the Sultans of Perak during the nineteenth century and at the beginning of the twentieth:




Nothing of importance occurred during the reigns of Sultans Shahabudin and Abdullah Muhammad Shah. It was, however, about this time that the Chinese "discovered" Perak. Small bands of Chinese miners began to visit the country with a view to exploiting its mineral wealth. They suffered severely from the prevailing misgovernment and from the tolls levied by the numerous

petty chiefs on the rivers. The earliest Chinese settlement in Perak proper was at Sunkai where the miners tried to give themselves some measure of protection by mounting a big gun to overawe the local Malays. When an attack did come, the gun burst and the Chinese fled. But a Malay chief reaped a rich reward whenever he was enlightened enough to assist the Chinese and to limit his exactions to what the industry could afford to pay. The history of all the leading Malay States from A.D. 1850 to 1875 is the record of their attempts to deal with the problem of the Chinese miner.

# CHAPTER X.

## LARUT.

The district of Larut (with its subdistricts of Krian, Matang and Selama) lies outside the valley of the Perak River. A narrow tract of country, situated between the Perak watershed and the sea, it may be said to have come only within the sphere of influence of the older river-state. Prior to the nineteenth century Larut had been virtually a no-man's-land; for the Malay who loves the banks of great streams saw little to attract him in the desolate swamp-country by the coast. Of the principal Perak territorial chiefs only one, the Panglima Bukit Gantang, had any footing in Larut at all; and he was simply a warden of the marches guarding the pass that gave access to a large and isolated district. Indeed we have seen that Panglima Alang Idin could muster only twelve muskets at Bukit Gantang to resist the Kedah invaders. But the British acquisition of Province Wellesley had the effect of drawing attention more and more to the possibilities of the adjacent districts under Perak rule. We hear in Penang official correspondence of Che' Alang Idin as ruling at Bukit Gantang in A.D. 1827 and of a certain Isma Yatim as "Sri Rama Maharaja" of Larut. We hear of a certain Che' Man as headman of Pondok Tanjong, and (A.D. 1828) of Tun Jana Pahlawan as headman at Kurau. The district was beginning to attract settlers. Politically, Larut was in Perak but not of it; it was destined to owe its population and prosperity to people from beyond the borders of the state.

The first man to see the great possibilities of Larut was a certain Long Jafar. This Jafar was not (as is usually believed) a shrewd trader from Penang or Province Wellesley, but a Perak-born Malay, son of a minor chief, the Dato' Paduka, and grandson of another petty chief, a Dato' Johan. As his brother had married a daughter of the Panglima Bukit Gantang, Long Jafar came to settle near the present township of Taipeng. When he

first arived he found that there were only three Chinese to be exploited in the whole territory of Larut; but after the discovery of some rich mining land he succeeded in attracting many more adventurers to the place. His first mines were at *Kĕlian Pauh*, where the Taipeng gaol now stands. At a later date an elephant that was being used by the miners escaped into the Kamunting jungles and when recaptured was found to be covered with mud rich in tin. The prospecting done by this elephant led to a rush to Kamunting—to the "new mines," or *Kĕlian* Baharu as the place came to be called.

There is a Malay proverb to the effect that a man need not forget his own interests when working for the State. Long Jafar acted up to this rule. Beginning as a mere representative of the Sultan he bought from his master one after another the various sources of revenue in the province. In 1850 he obtained his first title to Larut; he received it from the Raja Muda Ngah Ali and the leading chiefs of Perak. The document runs:

> "Che' Long Jafar has opened up one of the provinces of Perak called Larut and all its rivers to make tin-mines; this he has done by his own diligence and at his own expense. We express our entire approval of the diligence he has bestowed and the expense he has incurred in Larut, and his children shall receive the district as their own property. . . . What is written in this deed can never be annulled by anyone."

In 1856 the then reigning Sultan (Jafar) confirmed the Raja Muda's grant. In 1857 Long Jafar died and was succeeded (after a brief interval) by his son, Che' Ngah Ibrahim, who applied at once to the Sultan for recognition and was granted powers even greater than those his father had possessed. The new deed—dated the 30th November, 1857, and bearing the seals of the Sultan, the Raja Muda and the Raja Bendahara—contains the following passages:

> "Be it known that after due deliberation with our princes and chiefs, we bestow a province of this country of Perak upon Ngah Ibrahim bin Jafar to be governed by him and to become his property.

Moreover, we make known the boundries of that dependency to be as follows: from Larut to Krian and Bagan Tiang—these are the boundries that make up the province of Larut. . . .

"Now we confirm Long Jafar's son's Government; and this cannot be revoked—whether he (Ngah Ibrahim) does well or wickedly—by anyone who may hold the sovereignty of Perak.

"Therefore we endow Ngah Ibrahim with the power of legislation and give him authority to correspond and to settle matters with other countries and with the British Government without reference to us three (the Sultan, Raja Muda and Bĕndahara) or to anyone who may hold sovereignty in Perak."

Up to now we have been dealing with titular or official authority. But the Chinese miners themselves played a very important if informal part in the real government of Larut. They were immigrants from many different districts, and were divided by their clannish ideals of patriotism into as many warring elements. In time these elements formed themselves into coalitions, one representing four and the other five of the Chinese districts from which the miners came. Given Chinese clannishness and the party-spirit engendered by their masonic societies, any petty quarrel between the men of two rival villages had in it the seeds of a clan-fight, a general riot or even civil war. It is a hard task to follow the trail of the truth through the maze of the Larut disturbances, but it is lightened somewhat if we keep as closely as possible to the main line of cleavage, that between the "Four Districts"[1] who were members of the Ghi Hin Triad Society and the "Five Districts"[2] who belonged to the Hai San and Toa Peh Kong organizations.

In 1862 the mines at Klian Pauh[3] were being worked by Hai San men under a leader named Chang Keng Kwi while the Kamunting mines a few miles away were the scene of the labours of Ghi Hin men under So Ah Chiang.

[1] Si-Kuan. [2] Go-Kuan. [3] Now Taipeng.

Separation made, of course, for peace. But it chanced that some Ghi Hin men were staying temporarily at Klian Pauh and that one of them was imprudent enough to get mixed up in a brawl in the local gaming-saloon. At once there arose the party cry, "Kill, kill these interlopers"; and fourteen unhappy wretches were seized and locked up for the night in the lodge of the Hai San Society. Mercy did not come with the morning. The unfortunate men were led out to slaughter and a sharpened bamboo was thrust into each man's throat so that his life-blood might spurt through to dye the banners of the lodge. One man only of the fourteen lived to tell the tale at Kamunting. Kamunting was in a ferment at once. Any luckless Klian Pauh miner who happened to be passing through the village was lynched on the spot; and a sort of tribal war broke out between the two villages. Both sides, of course, appealed to Che' Ngah Ibrahim, the head of the district.

Che' Ngah Ibrahim was an opportunist. As soon as he saw that the Hai-San men (who had begun the disturbances) were the stronger party he threw in his lot with them, put to death So Ah Chiang, and drove the Ghi Hin men out of Larut. The dispossessed miners then appealed to the British Government.

Colonel Cavenagh, Governor of the Straits, did not disregard the appeal. After making the necessary enquiries he sent a ship of war to the Perak coast to proffer a claim for $17,117 damages. When payment was not made, he ordered a blockade of the coast. The Sultan did not like this. He could neither pay nor force the Larut chief to pay. He could only implore Che' Ngah Ibrahim to be reasonable. Che' Ngah Ibrahim offered to pay if it was made worth his while. He also had been suffering from the blockade and was prepared to yield, but he asked for a further concession of authority. The Sultan was ready to grant it. Che' Ngah Ibrahim paid the money in May, 1862, and received the powers of a Sultan's Deputy:

> "The wishes and laws of Ngah Ibrahim are our own laws also: let everyone understand this and not dispute the laws of Ngah Ibrahim bin Jafar."

This was in December, 1863. By the end of March, 1864, he had been granted the title of *Orang Kaya Mantri*, a title of the highest rank in Perak, and received a written document recognising him as ruler of the whole country from the Krian river in the north to the Bruas river in the south.

> "We give the government of the aforesaid entire country to the Orang Kaya Mantri, whether he acts well or ill, with all its subjects and its soldiers, its lands and its waters, its timber, its plants and rattans, its *damar*, its shells, its mines, its hills and its mountains, and all the immigrants who dwell thereon, whether they be Chinese or Dutch—with power to frame laws and to admit men to the Muhammadan religion, to kill, to fine and to pardon and (as our representative) to give in marriage the guardianless. . . . If any man makes disturbances or disowns the Mantri's authority, he commits a sin against God against Muhammad and against Us."

From this time forward Che' Ngah Ibrahim was the actual ruler of Larut. If he had been of royal birth, he might have been accepted by all as an independent prince, but the lack of this essential condition prejudiced his claim to sovereignty. Among Europeans at least he was known as the "Raja of Larut" or as the "Mantri of Larut." Among Malays his office gave him a right to the designation of *tĕngku*, a title given generally to royalty, but in Perak to the highest commoner chiefs. His seal suggested his pretensions. In short his position was one which an able man might have converted in time into a Sultanate; but for the moment it exposed its holder to the feelings of jealousy and hatred that dog the upstart and the *nouveau riche*.

Ngah Ibrahim was not quite equal to the opportunities that had come his way. He was a man of ability and ambition; he built a road, maintained a small police force, and made some slight effort to govern the country on European lines, while at the same time he strove to earn popularity among his own countrymen by entertaining all comers lavishly at his home near Bukit Gantang. A

Malay himself, it was natural that he should overvalue the applause and support of the Malays while he underrated the strength and intelligence of the Chinese. He knew that the miners could have no political ambitions in a desolate country which they visited only for money-making. He misread the lesson of A.D. 1862 into thinking that even if clan-fights arose they must end in the destruction of one or other party and the further assertion of Malay predominance. Drawing a large revenue (some $200,000 a year or more) from his dominion over Larut he was content to maintain his authority with a force of not more than 40 constables and to leave his Chinese subjects to govern themselves through their own masonic lodges. They lived unmolested in their mining-camps; he was content to hold the toll-stations on the coast and levy duty on all produce that went in or out.

The conditions of life in the mining-camps were discreditable to all concerned. The death rate was about fifty per cent. per annum; it was heaviest among coolies engaged in clearing the jungle or in opening up new mines. High rates of profit attracted others to fill vacancies; but those rates were misleading. The mine-owners received as royalty in kind a large percentage of the tin mined by the coolies, bought the rest of the tin at rates below the market-price, supplied the coolies with the necessaries of life at a very high figure, and owned the opium saloons and gambling dens in which the coolies' surplus gains were dissipated. The coolies perished, but the mine-owners became wealthy men and soon left the hard life of Larut for the amenities of Chinese society in Penang. The local control of the mines passed from the wealthy owners to impecunious and irresponsible relatives and attorneys who were bent on becoming rich in their turn.

At the time of the troubles of A.D. 1862 the leading Hai-San Chinese at Klian Pauh was Chang Keng Kwi; and the Ghi Hin leader who succeeded So Ah Chiang at Kamunting was Ho Ghi Siu. Ten years later both these leaders were wealthy residents of Penang; and their mines were managed by their attorneys. Li Ah Kun, Ghi Siu's attorney, was accused of an intrigue with the

wife of a near relative of Ah Kwi. This scandal was the more dangerous because it came to light at a time when the passions of both sides were being inflamed by a boundary dispute. Ah Kwi's men seized Li Ah Kun and the accused lady, placed each of them in one of the curious crate-like baskets used by Chinese for the transport of pigs; and, after marching them about for some time in this ignominious guise, ended up by submerging the pair in the waters of a disused alluvial mine and holding them there till life was extinct. This outrage caused Ho Ghi Siu's men to take up arms at once. The elders of the great lodges intervened. To avoid the losses entailed by clan-fights a system of arbitration had been set up; and it was agreed that a sum of $2,000 should be paid by instalments as compensation to the heirs of Li Ah Kun. The first instalment was paid. Before the second instalment could be paid a further dispute had arisen and had led to riots. There was now a small civil war in Larut.

The Hai-San miners at this time outnumbered the Ghi Hin in the proportion of nearly two to one. In the riots of A.D. 1862 they had driven their opponents out of the country; and since that time they had always been supported by the Mantri as they were the stronger side. The Ghi Hin miners had taken the lesson to heart. Numerically the weaker, they had prepared for war by laying in supplies of munitions and engaging professional fighting men. These men made a bold attack upon the over-confident Hai-San miners, drove them out of their camps, and hustled them into the Mantri's fort at Matang.

The Mantri was in a dilemma. He had supported the Hai-San men since 1862 in the belief that their superior numbers made them the stronger party. He found now that he had backed the wrong side. He had the mortification of seeing the Larut mines, the source of his revenues, in the hands of enemies; and he wrote at once to Sir Harry Ord, the Governor of the Straits, to explain that he had permitted the ingress of professional fighters because he understood that they were to be used for fighting only the miners, but that they had proved

to be "bad men" who were prepared to fight anybody and had even attacked his own Malay police. In the meantime he engaged (at a cost of $15,000) junks and other transport to take the Hai-San refugees to Penang. As soon as he had got rid of their embarrassing presence he began to make overtures to the victorious Ghi Hin. It was a matter of indifference to him which side was the winner, so long as he continued to receive the revenues of Larut.

As soon as the Hai-San miners reached a haven of safety in Penang, they began to petition Governor Ord for redress. Governor Ord sent the petitions to the Mantri, and expressed the hope that "His friend" would do what was right in the matter. "His friend" was not in a position to do anything. When all was said and done, the Hai-San miners had brought expulsion on themselves; it takes two sides to make a riot, and their side was not the weaker side. Some non-committal answer had to be sent, so the Mantri replied by saying that the petitioners' statements were untrue. Sir Harry Ord in his turn pointed out to the Hai-San men that Larut lay outside his jurisdiction and that the British Government had no right to interfere.

It was a weak line to take. The passions aroused by blood-shed and civil war cannot be calmed by legal quibbles or by a policy of *laisser faire*. The Hai-San miners in Penang turned from the written to the unwritten law and began to buy arms and ammunition with a view to the reconquest of their property. They even attempted the life of their chief enemy, the Ghi Hin leader Ho Ghi Siu, at his Penang residence. It was now the turn of the Mantri and of Ho Ghi Siu to appeal to the British Government against the policy of *laisser faire*. They begged Sir Harry Ord and the Acting Lieutenant-Governor to put an end to the conspiracies against the peace of Larut. To add to the confusion, Raja Muda Abdullah of Perak, who claimed to be the rightful Sultan, came to Penang and began to intrigue against the Mantri's authoriy. He went so far as to sell the revenues of Krisan to a needy Eurasian named Bacon and to engage lawyers to defend the validity of

his concessions. The policy of legal quibbles had now to be abandoned. Mr. Campbell,[1] the Acting Lieutenant-Governor, interviewed Raja Abdullah and Bacon and warned them that any raid on Krian would be regarded as piratical and might bring them to a dishonourable death. But such threats were insufficient to deal with the Hai-San armaments. The Hai-San lawyers brought a bogus action for debt against the Mantri and seized his warship under an order of the court, at the very moment when the Hai-San junks set sail. The acting Lieutenant-Governor could do nothing to stop them. He followed the little armada with his seven marine policemen; but as the junks cleared for action and "seemed very determined," he did not like to take the responsibility of violent measures. He returned to Penang and let the miners fight it out. By the time that the order of court had done its work and the Mantri's steamer had been released, the Hai-San junks had reached Larut and were taking full advantage of the opportunities their legal advisers had put in their way.

When the Hai-San junks first arrived off the coast the Ghi Hin leaders had left their mining-camps and were at Matang discussing the appointment of a *Capitan China*. For the moment their men were leaderless and could offer no adequate resistance to the well-organized surprise attack that was being made upon them. Some hundreds perished in the fighting; several hundred more died of exposure or privation in the jungle. All the Ghi-Hin women fell into the hands of their enemies. A few preferred suicide to dishonour; the rest were divided up between the Hai-San headmen and the Mantri's chiefs, for the Mantri had taken up once more his old policy of siding with the victors.

The influx of wounded and ruined fugitives and the fate of their womenfolk roused the Ghi Hin faction in Penang to passionate wrath. Reconciliation was impossible. There was no serious appeal to the Governor this time; the Ghi Hin leader, Ho Ghi Siu, simply bought up junks and enlisted fighting-men with a view to

[1] Afterwards Sir George W. R. Campbell.

beating his opponents at their own game. In December, 1872, he raided the Larut coast and seized Matang itself. That was as far as he could go. The strength of the Hai San miners and the difficult character of the country made it impossible for him to reconquer the mines. He then changed his methods. He began to blockade the coast. No tin could be exported; no food could be imported. Early in January the "Fair Malacca," a small vessel flying the British flag, was fired at by the Ghi Hin junks and forbidden to enter the Larut river. As no blockade by such lawless belligerents could be regarded as legal, the senior naval officer (Captain Denison) was called upon as "a policeman of the seas" to seize the junks that had been guilty of this "piratical attack" on the "Fair Malacca." On entering the Larut river he found a number of vessels fully manned and armed, with boarding-nets in readiness and with stinkpots at their mastheads. Their crews described themselves merely as Ho Ghi Siu's men. No resistance was offered when Captain Denison seized two junks which were recognized as having taken part in the "attack," and nothing was said by way of protest except a request that the same treatment might be meted out by Captain Denison to Hai San men also.

The seizure of these junks did not end the blockade but it changed its character. The Ghi Hin leaders or war-canoes, each manned by twenty or twenty five abandoned junk-warfare for the use of long war-boats men. These boats could escape with ease from any cutter or war-junk or heavy steam-launch; their range of action was great owing to their light draught and the length of the inland waterways; and their powers of offence were serious when they were massed in any numbers in a tortuous and narrow tidal river. The war became a river-war. The coast of Larut is a maze of interlaced tidal creeks and rivers, which enabled the boats to raid the sugar-plantations and fishing-villages as well as the mines, to spread the area of disturbance, and to interfere still further with the Hai San food-supplies. Distress was acute both among the Hai San men in the mines and among the Ghi Hin men in the

boats, who in their turn were being denied access to the sea. The actual bloodshed was not great as the fighting-men were out for loot rather than for slaughter; still, there is evidence to show that once at least a war-boat was seen to be carrying a ghastly cargo of newly-severed human heads.

Early in the year 1873 the Mantri had come to the conclusion that Larut was not a safe place of residence. He moved to the lower reaches of the Krian river (which then formed the boundry between the Colony and Perak); and to make escape into Colonial territory still easier, he lived in a boat. There he found that his Malay rival, Raja Abdullah, was in the same plight. The Chinese leaders had ceased to pay for legal whitewash, *de-jure* rights, and the help of Malay Chiefs who possessed no real authority. So the two Malay rivals determined to throw in their lot together. The Mantri recognized Abdullah as Sultan, while Abdullah recognized the Mantri. A paper, signed by "Sultan" Abdullah and his Laksamana, contained the following passage:

> "We acknowledge and confirm the Orang Kaya Mantri, even as before so during our reign, to hold for ever the Government of Larut and its dependencies. This cannot be changed."

But they fell out again a few weeks later.

The period from February to August, 1873, was one of serious anxiety to the British authorities. River warfare was going on; raids were common; the fighting was coming closer and closer to the British border. The roving bands were beginning to attach themselves to individual leaders or to plunder indiscriminately without any leader at all. It was ceasing to be a question of "Ghi Hin" or "Hai San": a band of miscellaneous ruffians flying a red flag with a white border would be recognized as "Koh Bu An's men"; a black flag with a red border indicated that they were "Ho Ghi Siu's men"; and so on. Other bands were openly piratical. Clan-fights and fights on a small scale between the partisans of Chinese "towkays" began to take place in Penang itself and were assisted by a close alliance between certain local lawyers and the Larut belligerents. Con-

victions were hard to obtain in a country where false witnesses could be suborned and witnesses of truth terrified into silence. The lawers could always give the whole piratical struggle a coating of legal whitewash by securing for the marauders the patronage of some *de-jure* Malay Chief. If a Cantonese professional freebooter happened to be caught plundering a trading-junk, the capture was usually followed by a lawyer's letter saying that the freebooter was a soldier employed by the "Sultan" (Abdullah) or by "the Raja" (the Mantri), as the case might be. Indeed at a later date the captain of one of Her Majesty's ships found a Penang solicitor living in a practical stockade on the Larut river, and expressed very bluntly his disbelief of the lawyer's assurance that he was there for the sake of amusement.

In August, 1873, the fear of Chinese civil war in Penang forced Lieutenant Governor Anson to take action. On the 10th August he called a meeting of rival leaders at his office. There were present: the Mantri, Raja Abdullah, Ho Ghi Siu (Ghi Hin), and Chang Ah Kwi (Hai San), besides Captain Grant of the "Midge" and Tengku Dzia-u'd-din, Regent of Selangor. The Lieutenant-Governor induced both parties to consent to an armistice pending arbitration by himself. But it was one thing to agree in Penang to an armistice, and quite another matter to get the Larut belligerents to lay down their arms. The only member of the conference who was prepared to attempt the impossible was Raja Abdullah who had nothing to lose and whose assurances were taken too seriously. He started at once for Larut on board H.M.S. "Midge," and issued the following proclamation:

> "Having signed an agreement with the Tengku Mantri of Larut, yesterday the 10th day of August, 1873, in the presence of the Honorable Colonel Anson, Lieutenant-Governor of Penang; Tengku Dzia-u'd-din, Viceroy of Selangor; Commander Grant of H.M.S. Midge; Ho Ghi Siu; Sayid Zin; Chang Ah Kwi; Tengku Yusuf; and others;—to the effect that we intend to put an end to the hostilities that are at present going on at Larut, I

hereby order you the Headmen of the Sin-Neng, Teo-Chiu and Hui-Chiu factions, with your armed junks and boats to come out of the rivers and creeks of Larut with all possible despatch, and come and anchor close to H.M.S. 'Midge' now anchored outside the Larut River. If you fail to obey this order you must take the consequences. Again, if you have disputes to settle, the headmen and towkays of either faction can go to Penang and refer the disputes to the Lieutenant-Governor. Lastly I order that all your headmen and towkays who are now at Larut will come on board the 'Midge' and meet me."

Raja Abdullah had counted on the help of Ho Ghi Siu, whose word was law in Ghi Hin circles. Ho Ghi Siu was in no mood to support his "chief"; he gave every one the slip and stayed behind in Penang. Raja Abdullah made excuses but was afraid to admit his weakness. He went unwillingly to Larut, refused to land lest his "followers" should fire on him, and declined to authorize any attempt to force a passage into the river. Though the "Midge" was accompanied by two steamers full of rice for the starving miners, the whole flotilla had to return to Penang with its mission unfulfilled. The Ghi Hin men refused to lay down their arms.

On the 14th August Captain Grant returned to Penang and reported what had happened. Raja Abdullah wrote as follows to Colonel Anson:

"We inform our friend that we went to Larut in the 'Midge,' accompanied by the Mantri. We wished to put a stop to the Chinese disturbances at Larut, but the towkays and headmen did not go with us; moreover at the time we met our friend we stated that if those headmen did not go with us we should be unable to settle the disturbances.

At the present time we are not well enough to meet our friend. When we have recovered we will come and meet our friend."

The failure of this attempt to settle matters by arbitration put Ho Ghi Siu and his Ghi Hin associates

in the wrong. Colonel Anson turned to the other side, telegraphed to Governor Ord (who left at once for Penang), and authorized the Mantri to recruit Indian troops and to employ Captain Speedy of the Penang police for service in Larut. Of course Raja Abdullah was furious. On the 21st August he wrote two letters protesting against the employment of British subjects in Perak and deposing the Mantri from all his offices.

> "How often have we told the Mantri to step in and end the disturbances created by these Chinese? But the Chinese go on making trouble, and the Mantri will not hearken to our advice. He has left Larut and is now living in Penang where he hatches deep-laid schemes aiming at dominion over all Perak. Larut is become a waste; and as for Ngah Ibrahim bin Jafar, a native of Perak and a slave of my father's and of mine, great indeed is his sin towards us. He is a traitor to us and does not do allegiance to Perak. Moreover he calls himself *Těngku*, which means that he is the son of a great Raja; and he has made himself a larger seal, putting on it *Paduka Sěri Maharaja Ibrahim bin Jafar Mantěri Perak*, which is a great crime under the customary law of Perak. Now therefore from Wednesday the 21st August, 1873, we annul all the powers that he has received from former Sultans and the powers that he has received from us, and all his titles. Never again may he hold sway in any province of Perak."

When Governor Ord arrived at Penang he answered this letter by inviting Raja Abdullah to a conference on Larut affairs. The Raja wrote in reply, "We also would like very much to meet our friend; but we are unable to do so this time as we are suffering from a slight sickness; so we send our Panglima Besar along with our lawyer to the meeting." But the Governor had no wish to meet these gentlemen.

On the 3rd September Sir Henry Ord took the decisive step of recognizing the Mantri as the independent ruler of Larut and of throwing the whole weight of

British support on the side of that chief and of the Hai-San Chinese.

> "As I am satisfied, from the various documents which the Orang Kaya Mantri has produced, that he is the lawful ruler of Larut and, as such, independent of the Sultan or any authority in Perak he will now be recognized by the Government as the independent ruler of Larut."

This decision was conveyed to the Mantri in a letter dated the 5th September, 1873, and was repeated in an ambiguous way in the Legislative Council on the 9th September. The Governor also repealed in the Mantri's favour the proclamation forbidding the export of arms and ammunition to Larut.

The dependence of Larut on Perak meant divided authority, rival leaders and a continuance of civil war. Sir Harry Ord hoped to restore order in Larut by depriving the recalcitrant Ghi Hin party of its supplies of arms and ammunition and by permitting the Mantri to recruit troops and buy military stores. The plan was good in a limited way. Its success could not be immediate, and it failed to remove the real grievances of the Ghi Hin whose mines and women-folk were to be left in the possession of those very doubtful guardians of law and order the Hai-San miners and the Mantri.

The disturbances continued. On the 12th and 13th September Malay vessels were plundered and their sailors killed. On the 15th September Captain Grant of the "Midge" was proceeding up the Larut river in his gig, followed by a small Malay schooner, when he was attacked by two Ghi Hin warboats. The Malay at the schooner's tiller left his post at the first sign of danger and allowed his vessel to fly up into the wind and to run aground. While the naval men were trying to get the schooner off the mudbank they were subjected to a heavy fire and returned to the "Midge" with two young officers wounded. The "Midge" then returned to Penang.

In the meantime Raja Abdullah and his Ghi Hin friends had not been idle. On the 15th September some of the latter succeeded in blowing up the Mantri's private residence at Penang, wounding five men and killing a

policeman. On the 17th September Raja Abdullah wrote to say that some Ghi Hin men had been unlucky enough to wound two British officers of the "Midge" while defending themselves against a piratical attack by the Mantri, and he asked that vengeance might be taken on the Mantri as the real culprit. But in spite of this explanation and of the outcries of the Ghi Hin lawyer, the "Midge" and the "Thalia" shelled the stockades at Selinsing, captured two junks and a longboat, and inflicted serious losses on the "pirates." In the course of this engagement Raja Abdullah suddenly appeared on the scene in a steamer; he also was captured and taken back to Penang. On that same day a small Malay trader was attacked by warboats; six of the crew were killed or wounded and the sum of $544 was carried off. On the 29th September Captain Speedy (who had been recruiting Sikhs and buying guns for the Mantri) sailed for Larut with a flotilla of two steamers and fifteen small sailing-craft to convey arms, munitions and stores to the Hai San miners of Larut. The position of the Ghi Hin miners now became more desperate; but they fought with the courage of despair, and the piracies continued. Lieutenant-Governor Anson kept complaining that the Mantri and Captain Speedy were more intent on working the mines than on suppressing piracy; the Mantri replied that he was strong enough to hold the mines but not to put an end to the warboats. Matters were in this state when Governor Ord left the country and Sir Andrew Clarke succeeded him. The Ghi Hin men had not been hunted down, but they were being blockaded and starved. To seaward lay the British gunboats; to landward were Captain Speedy and his Sikhs. The end was merely a question of time.

# CHAPTER XI.

## THE PANGKOR TREATY.

In a previous chapter we have traced the history of Perak proper as far as the reign of Sultan Abdullah Muhammad Shah in whose days the Chinese miners first began to settle in Perak. He died before A.D. 1850. He was succeeded by Sultan Jafar Muadzam Shah whose reign is important because of the powers conferred by him on the first ruler of Larut. Sultan Jafar was succeeded (A.H. 1282) by his second cousin and son-in-law, Raja Ali, who took the title of Sultan Ali al-Mukamal Inayat Shah. This was about A.D. 1866. He died on the 25th May, 1871, at Sayong.

It is the general rule that a Perak Sultan shall be succeeded by the Raja Muda, but the following formalities have to be complied with. The Bendahara or Prime Minister takes possession of the regalia of the deceased ruler and administers the government *ad interim*. At the expiration of seven days he sends or heads a deputation to the Raja Muda inviting him as heir-presumptive to attend the obsequies and be installed as Sultan. Incidentally it should be added that the presence and proclamation of the new Sultan are essential features of the burial ceremonies of the old.

In accordance with these rules the Raja Bendahara Ismail at the death of Sultan Ali invited Raja Muda Abdullah, son of Sultan Jafar and brother-in-law of Sultan Ali, to attend the obsequies at Sayong. The Raja Muda hesitated to go as he feared that he might be attacked and murdered by a family rival, Raja Yusuf, at Senggang on the way up the river. While he was trying to make up his mind for departure, his wife, Raja Tipah, sister of the late Sultan, was abducted by a Selangor Malay, Raja Daud. There are different versions of this incident; but it seems certain that there had been a bitter quarrel between husband and wife on the subject of the former's unwillingness to proceed to Sayong. Raja Daud fled down the Perak river with the princess "like a thief in

the night," but news of his exploit had preceded him and the Laksamana with a battery of guns was in wait for his ship at Durian Sabatang. Raja Daud tied himself to Raja Tipah and defied the Laksamana to fire. The Laksamana hesitated to shed the "white blood" of one of his country's royalties; and the fugitives escaped. The incident did Raja Abdullah no good, and added to his reluctance to go to Sayong. After forty days waiting with the body of their late king still unburied, the chief of Perak lost patience. They installed the Bendahara, Raja Ismail, an old man who was not expected to live long, as Sultan, and then dispersed to their homes. The new ruler took the title of Ismail Mu'abidin Shah and was accepted as ruler by the chiefs, by the British Government and even by the Raja Muda whom he had supplanted. It was only at a later date when Raja Abdullah's financial difficulties led him to sell concessions as "Sultan," that concessionaires, their counsel, and other interested parties began to cast doubts upon the validity of Ismail's Sultanate. When that time came, the British Government sought relief from embarrassment by declining to recognize either party. There was no question of any violent usurpation of the throne by Ismail. He was not the rightful heir, it is true, nor was he even a prince of Perak in the direct male line; still he had done his duty by the heir and had been put on the throne with the full consent of chiefs and people. He was the *de-facto* ruler and Abdullah was only a claimant at the time when Sir Harry Ord left the Straits and was succeeded by Sir Andrew Clarke. The change of Governors happened, however, to coincide with a change of policy on the part of the Colonial Office.

When in A.D. 1868 Sir Harry Ord had made a treaty with Kedah, the Colonial Office, while not disapproving of the treaty itself, laid down decisively for the instruction of its administrators that "it would generally be undesirable that a Governor should enter into negotiations with native rulers, still less that he should conclude any agreement with them, except in pursuance of an object or policy considered and approved by Her Majesty's Government." These instructions are logical

enough. But the "policy considered and approved by Her Majesty's Government" in the days of Sir Harry Ord was one of the strictest non-intervention. When, in July, 1872, a number of Malacca traders sent a petition to the Government about the losses to which they were being put by the Selangor disturbances, they received the following reply:

> "It is the policy of Her Majesty's Government not to interfere in the affairs of these countries except where it becomes necessary for the suppression of piracy or the punishment of aggression on our people or territories, and if traders, prompted by the prospect of large gains, choose to run the risk of placing their persons and property in the jeopardy that they are aware attends them in these countries under present circumstances, it is impossible for the Government to be answerable for their protection or that of their property."

This answer was formally approved by Lord Kimberley in December, 1872. The same rule of absolute neutrality was laid down once more for the Governor's guidance in a despatch dated the 5th July, 1873. From that date, however, there are indications of a change of policy. Writing to Mr. Seymour Clarke on the 5th August, 1873, the Colonial Office qualified its assertion of neutrality by stating that it had hitherto been the practice of the British Government not to interfere in the internal affairs of the Native States. In a despatch to the Governor, six weeks later, on the 20th September, 1873, the policy of non-intervention was avowedly given up.

> "Her Majesty's Government have, it need hardly be said, no desire to interfere in the internal affairs of the Malay States; but, looking to the long and intimate connection between them and the British Government. . . . Her Majesty's Government find it incumbent to employ such influence as they possess with the native princes to rescue, if possible, these fertile and productive countries from the ruin which must befall them if the present disorders continue unchecked.

> "I have to request that you will carefully ascertain, as far as you are able, the actual condition of affairs in each State and that you will report to me whether there are in your opinion any steps which can properly be taken by the Colonial Government to promote the restoration of peace and order and to secure protection to trade and commerce with the native territories. I should wish you, especially, to consider whether it would be advisable to appoint a British officer to reside in any of the States. Such an appointment could, of course, only be made with the full consent of the native Government, and the expenses connected with it would have to be defrayed by the Government of the Straits Settlements."

It seems clear, therefore, that in August, 1873, the Secretary of State had been contemplating a change of policy and that in September, 1873, that change became an accomplished fact. If the abandonment of the old neutral attitude is to be ascribed to the representations of any Governor, it must have been due to the counsels of Sir Harry Ord. But as Sir Harry Ord was on the point of retiring, the orders of the Colonial Office were not directed to him (though he was still in office) but to the Governor-designate, Sir Andrew Clarke, who happened to be in England when this all-important despatch was written. Not that the counsels of Governors could have been sufficient in themselves to have brought about so great a change, had they not been aided by the course of events. In the year 1873 Larut was being torn in two by rival secret societies; Perak proper was in a state of anarchy; Selangor was in the throes of civil war; even in the Negri Sembilan there were serious disturbances. The whole Peninsula, as Sir Harry Ord pointed out, was in the hands of the lawless and the turbulent.

The policy of inaction that had been pursued between 1867 and 1873 must have been very galling to an administrator of the masterful temperament of Governor Ord. Local feeling was all in favour of intervention. In February, 1869, when Raja Yusuf laid his claim to the throne of Perak before the Straits authorities, the

Colonial Secretary (Colonel Macpherson) openly expressed to the Governor his regret that it was not possible to take advantage of the opportunity and govern the country through a British nominee. In 1871 a committee (of which Major McNair was a member) definitely proposed that Residents should be sent to the Native States. In 1872, Sir George W. R. Campbell, when acting as Lieutenant-Governor of Penang, wrote in a similar strain:

> "I speak with diffidence, being so new to this portion of the East, but I think it is worth consideration whether the appointment under the British Government of a British Resident or Political Agent for certain of the Malay States would not, as in India, have a markedly beneficial effect. Such Resident or Political Agent would need to be an officer of some position and standing and a man of good judgment and good personal manner, and he should, of course, have a thorough knowledge of the Malay language. . . . In India, in many a native-ruled State, it is marvellous what work a single well-selected British officer has effected in such matters as roads, schools, and police—even within the compass of a few years."

These quotations will make it plain that the introduction of the residential system into the Malay States was not the result of any sudden inspiration on the part of a new Governor. It was brought about by the course of events and by the advocacy of many Colonial officials—Sir Harry Ord, Colonels Anson and Macpherson, Major McNair and Sir George Campbell, among others. Sir Andrew Clarke's connection with it was fortuitous. Before leaving England he had been told what to do. He landed at Singapore in November, 1873, and signed the Pangkor Treaty in January, 1874. But there were many possibly ways of intervening in Perak affairs; and Sir Andrew Clarke must be judged by the line that he elected to take—his reversal of Sir Harry Ord's policy towards the Mantri, his recognition of Raja Muda Abdullah as Sultan, his choice of Mr. Birch as Resident, and his guidance of Mr. Birch's line of action.

It is probable that Sir Andrew Clarke did not know at the time of the Pangkor treaty that his predecessor had recognized the Mantri as the independent ruler of Larut. The papers on the subject were in Penang and were forwarded to him on the 23rd January, 1874, after the treaty had been signed. Sir Harry Ord's statement in the Singapore Council had not been sufficiently explicit. Sir Harry had regarded the Larut troubles as a Penang matter and had been guided largely by the advice of Lieutenant Governor Anson; Sir Andrew Clarke, as a newcomer, was influenced by Singapore counsellors, especially by Mr. Braddell who had never been to Larut and had only an imperfect acquaintance with the facts. The new Governor had been instructed and advised to introduce the residential system, but he had not been told how to do it. He seized the first chance that presented itself. Raja Abdullah, after his capture by the men of the "Midge" and the "Thalia," had found his way to Singapore. He was a discredited man; and his rival, the Mantri, was the recognized ruler of Larut. Raja Abdullah was ready to agree to the residential system or indeed to any other system that would secure his own advancement. Mr. W. H. Read, a member of Council, took him to Sir Andrew Clarke and induced him to express in writing his willingness to receive a Resident at his "court." This was the opening that Sir Andrew had desired. He took up Raja Abdullah's cause, thinking—on the facts actually before him—that it would be a fair compromise if Raja Abdullah recognized the Mantri as Mantri, and the Mantri recognized the Raja as Sultan. Of course, it was not a fair compromise. The British Government had already recognized the Mantri as the independent ruler of Larut; and the Mantri demurred to being regarded as his rival's subordinate. Sir Andrew Clarke and Mr. Braddell, unaware of this recognition and in all good faith, regarded the Mantri as an obstinate and recalcitrant individual who was making unnecessary difficulties and putting forward indefensible pretensions. Mr. Braddell's journal of the Pangkor negotiations has to be read in the light of what was known to the Governor and to himself, and not in the

light of the true facts. Thus when Mr. Braddell says that the Mantri was obliged to admit that he had no right to the title of *tĕngku* Mr. Braddell could not possibly have been aware that the Perak use of the title was not the Singapore use, and that previous Mantris had been styled *tĕngku* long before the time of Ibrahim bin Jafar. What the Mantri may have admitted was that he was not a *tĕngku* in its Singapore meaning, "the son of a prince."

In the end every Perak chief present at Pangkor was led, *nolens volens*, to sign the treaty, to accept Abdullah as Sultan and to agree to the presence of a British Resident "whose advice must be asked and acted upon on all questions other than those touching Malay religion and custom." These words are the key of the system that was then introduced into Perak and has since been put in force with excellent results in all the Federated Malay States. The Resident is an administrator rather than an adviser. But the introduction of such a system into the disorderly and anarchical Malay States was a matter that called for the selection of Residents of tact, ability and patience. For the moment a diplomat was needed. The all-important position of Resident of Perak was not filled up at once. Captain Speedy, who had been in the Mantri's service and was well acquainted with local conditions, was appointed Assistant Resident only. He was instructed to see to the immediate and complete disarmament of the Larut Chinese and the destruction of their stockades. In this work he was assisted by three Commissioners, one of whom (Mr. Pickering) had exceptional knowledge of Chinese affairs. These officers were able to report on the 23rd February that they had disarmed and destroyed every stockade in the country, that they had rescued 45 Chinese women who had been captured in the disturbances, and that they had induced the rival Chinese factions to agree to a definite partition of the mines. Peace was restored. The Chinese, tired with fighting, welcomed the restoration of law and order; but the Commissioners complained of their treatment at the hands of the Mantri who was dissatisfied with the subordinate position he had been made to accept.

The revenue of Larut in the palmy days of the Mantri had been about $18,000 a month, of which $15,000 had been collected in the form of royalty and export duty on tin. The revenue from tin in March, 1874, the first month of the new régime, amounted to $1,338 only. The estimated expenditure for the Larut establishments (exclusive of buildings, public works, lauches and other special expenditure) was put by Captain Speedy at $3,000 per month. By May the revenue had reached $3,217 with the promise of a still greater increase as soon as the removal of the over-burden enabled the rich tin-deposits to be tapped in the deeper mines. By the end of the year the financial position of Larut was satisfactory. Much trouble, however, was caused through attempts made by Sultan Abdullah to levy revenue in the district otherwise than through the ordinary official channels, and it was not till November, 1874, that the appointment of a Resident for all Perak made it possible to raise revenue and attempt administration in the valley of the Perak River itself. The Resident selected for this task was Mr. James Wheeler Woodford Birch, Colonial Secretary of the Straits Settlements.

# CHAPTER XII.

## THE PERAK WAR.

It is not clear (from the published correspondence) that the appointment of Mr. Birch to be the first Resident of Perak was due to the initiative of Sir Andrew Clarke. We can only infer it. Mr. Birch had been a keen supporter of the Pangkor policy and could be trusted to carry out loyally the ideas of his Chief. He was an able and energetic officer who had been trained in Ceylon and possessed great administrative experience. During his stay in Perak he kept a full and very frank diary; and as a copy of this diary was sent by him from time to time to the Governor and to Mr. Braddell (Secretary for Malay affairs) we may assume that the line of policy taken was approved in essential particulars by the authorities at Singapore. Mr. Birch knew no Malay and had not been employed in diplomatic negotiations with Peninsular Sultans; but Mr. Braddell, the expert adviser in these matters, had laid down that "it only requires that the wishes of Government should be made known to the native rulers to secure implicit obedience." Given that this view was correct and that the selection of Raja Abdullah as Sultan was justified, Perak needed an administrator and not a diplomat; and Mr. Birch's energy and past record had marked him out as the most capable administrator in the service of the Straits government. He left Penang for his new post on the 30th October, 1874, and reached the Sultan's home at Batak Rabit a few days later.

Ex-Sultan Abdullah died only in 1922. He paid dearly for any faults he may have committed in his youth. His weaknesses stand recorded in Mr. Birch's diary in language too free to be printed. It will be sufficient to say that in a published despatch to the Secretary of State on the Pangkor Treaty Sir Andrew Clarke had expressed his confidence in Raja Abdullah though he had been warned against him; and in an enclosure to that despatch Mr. Braddell had described the Raja as "more than ordinarily sharp and intelligent." To some extent

they stood sponsors for his conduct. Mr. Birch made no secret of his own views. From the day he met the Sultan at Batak Rabit he disparaged him and reported what he thought to the Governor and to Mr. Braddell. But all three held the view that the Sultan's character mattered little; indeed they saw in his weakness a source of assistance to their policy. Writing four days after his arrival in Perak Mr. Birch wrote, "I see that nothing but decision is necessary with these people." Again, some fifteen days later, he wrote:

> "Firmness will, I trust, do it all; and with him (Abdullah) one must be firm and even peremptory. God help a country left to a man like that, unadvised by sound counsellors! I very often despair when I think of him; but he will only be a puppet and, I believe, do all that one advises."

These are not the words of a diplomat. If the Resident had been expected to work smoothly with the Sultan, the words would not have been written or the Resident would have been recalled.

The task before the Resident was one of great difficulty. Now that the event has taught us wisdom it is easy to point out what should have been done; Mr. Birch had no such guide. He found himself face to face with a system of administration and of finance to which his past experience had shown him no counterpart. Again and again he had to ask himself where he was to turn for revenue. The Sultan had a toll-station at the mouth of the Perak River; this brought the Sultan $10,000 a year and two chiefs $1,000 each. But in the interior there were many more toll-stations where the minor chiefs levied dues of their own and killed most of the trade with their exactions. The existing customs revenue might pay Mr. Birch's salary, but it left nothing for the Sultan or the general administration of the country. The revenue from opium, spirits and gambling was a perquisite of the Raja Muda and would not be surrendered willingly without a *quid pro quo*. The Bendahara had certain tolls and a capitation-tax. All the minor chiefs had small perquisites of their own, privileges that meant much to them but were not convertible readily into cash. The one

valuable perquisite every chief possessed, that of exacting forced labour from his people, was a right which a humane government did not care to enforce. The introduction of new taxes meant discontent, resistance to the tax-collector, and a possible rising. Finance lies at the heart of all administration; and Mr. Birch found himself from the first in a position of almost hopeless financial difficulty.

His procedure, as we can now see, was imprudent. He refused to discuss administrative matters with any one but the Sultan. By this refusal he cut himself off from valuable sources of information and arrived at his decisions on imperfect data. Grievances were brushed aside where enquiry would have avoided misunderstandings. The Pangkor treaty, for instance, fixed a Dindings boundary at "Bukit Segari as laid down in chart sheet No. 1, Straits of Malacca." As it happened, the Bukit Segari of the chart was not the real Bukit Segari but a hill known as Bukit Sunting Baloh, some ten miles inland. The Malays knew nothing of the mistake in the chart and complained that the boundary was being fixed in the wrong place. Mr. Birch would not go into the matter. Again, he imagined that Krian was not included in the Mantri's territories. The Mantri claimed Krian and referred the Resident to documents filed with the Governor. Mr. Birch noted the references, but made no enquiries and gave the Mantri no satisfaction. Worst of all was his attitude to the hereditary revenues of the chiefs, which he regarded as mere blackmail. Even in the first month of his service as Resident he said to Ex-Sultan Ismail:—

> "I would tell the chiefs of Perak that . . . . we would not allow any of them to levy taxes in their own names but must have the revenue all collected at proper and stated places and by a fixed method and in the name of the Sultan only; and if they chose to attempt to take taxes, or rather levy blackmail, on their own account, the result would be that we should stop it by force . . . On the whole the interview was a very satisfactory one."

In January, 1875, the Resident attempted a diplomatic *coup* by inducing various Perak chiefs to assemble at Blanja and bring about a reconciliation between Sultan Abdullah and Ex-Sultan Ismail. The description of this meeting is best given in Mr. Birch's own words:

> "*January 5.* A lovely morning . . . I sent round to all the Chiefs and saw the Bendahara, and we arranged for 10 a.m. The Sultan and the Bendahara were not awake at 9 a.m., and I sent again to them. At last we got them to move about 12. As soon as I saw them move I sent for them to come and wait. I had the place very well arranged under the circumstances: two chairs with yellow damask for the Sultan and Ex-Sultan; Yusuf[1] on one side and Usman[2] on the other; then myself and Bacon[3]; then Talbot[4] and Mr. Nanta[5]; and then all the Datus sitting on carpets in front. I went in front of Abdullah and took him up to Ismail. The 'old' man came forward with both hands out but Abdullah never took them; and he then in a most polite and kind manner pointed to him a chair and begged him to sit down. He then called the Bendahara Usman and put him in the next chair to him, first referring to me as to where he should sit. I then called Yusuf who stood behind Ismail to sit next to Abdullah; and as soon as I did so he came, and Ismail desired him to sit there. Ismail then asked me if the Datus should sit down, and we all took our seats. Ismail said a few nice kind words to Abdullah, and he looked at him and just bent his head but nothing more. Ismail then called the Datu Bandar who knelt and kissed his hand; then Datu Sagor; then Raja Mahkota. The Mantri whom I saw coming up with the Datus across the sand managed to keep out and went away to the Mosque. The Temenggong who had come from Kinta never showed. The Maharaja Lela who had got expenses and

[1] Raja Yusuf, a claimant of the Sultanate: afterwards Sultan Yusuf of Perak. [2] The Bendahara. [3] Mr. Birch's clerk interpreter. [4] Mr. A. P. Talbot of the Straits Settlements service. [5] A Dutch-planter.

sworn on my hand that he would sign the treaty, kept away and said he had a boil. Several others who had accompanied Abdullah, Rajas and sons of Datus, came and kissed Ismail's hand. Then there was an awful pause. Abdullah looked very sulky. Ismail made several attempts at conversation with him but to no effect. I then said that speaking in the Governor's name I would wish to express our congratulations at this meeting in the presence of so many Chiefs—that I noted the absence of three who were here, and of Panglima Kinta whom I had hoped to see, and I regretted the absence also of Sri Maharaja Lela, but he had sent his son to represent him, and in those they must remember I included all the living Chiefs of Perak as far as we could get reliably the names, for we only knew reliably of two out of the sixteen alive, six out of the "Eight," and three out of the "Four." That it was many years since such a meeting had taken place—not even at Sultan Ali's funeral—and I hoped it was the beginning of good days for the country of Perak—that I should not any longer see the constant quarrels and bickerings that had been now for some years troubling Perak where no justice had reigned and nothing but might had prevailed. I dilated a little on their fine country, and I assured them, once the Chinese and Europeans felt that peace prevailed and protection for their lives and property existed, they would flock in for purposes of mining and of agriculture, that all this would raise the revenue of the country, and that I felt quite sure the Governor would have great pleasure in writing to the Queen's Government that at last the two Sultans had met and that every hope now existed of peace in Perak. To this, Ismail said *bagitu*[1]; Abdullah never spoke. After another long pause in which I made every sign I could to Abdullah—and so did Bacon and the Munshi—to speak to Ismail and to Yusuf, while he would take no

[1] "That is so."

notice but smile, the Munshi asked permission to say a few words, which I gave, as did Ismail, and he prayed for the Queen, the Governor, for me, Sultan Ismail and Sultan Abdullah, and for blessing on the reconciliation and the meeting; and three times all the people gave their Amen in the usual way. Again a pause—which Ismail broke by getting into conversation with one Datu or the other, and I then carried it on generally for some time on padi-cultivation, in which all joined but Abdullah. I brought Yusuf in by addressing him and spoke to him two or three times. Ismail then sent for Abdullah's son who lives with Ismail but who has been lately with the Bendahara, and he kept it up lively, child as he is, about cocks and cock-fighting principally, and the women who nurse him. Then I tried the effect of cigars, and syrup and water,—improved a little; oranges and biscuits carried it on; but Yusuf who must have noticed my signs to Abdullah to speak to him, at last told me he was going to leave as he was hot and tired, and went out . . . . After making every effort on my part, Bacon's, and Munshi's and Ismail's—who gladly and in a very nice manner helped, I saw nothing could be done, and as we had been there three hours I took my leave with civil speeches, and hoped the friendly intercourse now begun would get stronger every day by interchange of visits."

Sultan Abdullah had received $5,000 for his expenses in attending this meeting. It proved a failure. There was no reconcilition; Raja Ismail would not surrender the regalia; and Sultan Abdullah could not be formally installed. No additional chiefs signed the Pangkor Treaty. Mr. Birch tried to force one of them, the Maharaja Lela, to sign, but the Maharaja Lela fled. Ismail himself made various excuses for not signing, and made it quite obvious to the Resident that the feeling of the chiefs was opposed to anything that might strengthen the hands of the British government in its attempt to rule Perak.

After this failure Mr. Birch expected trouble. He sent for Sikhs from Larut and for a gunboat to overawe the people. But such precautions were unnecessary. The chiefs were anxious to avoid hostilities; they wanted to negotiate. They were simply adopting a policy of passive resistance to the view that "it only requires that the wishes of Government should be made known to the native rulers to secure implicit obedience." Mr. Birch would not negotiate. He clung to his belief in firmness and decision, and refused to discuss matters except with the Sultan. This created a deadlock. The semi-independent feudal chiefs were not going to leave their most important interests in the hands of Sultan Abdullah.

In the meantime the Resident's hand was being forced financially. There was no land-tax; there was no poll-tax; there were no Malay "farms" or monopolies. What local revenues there were did not amount to much when set off against the heavy cost of an administration on European lines. The Resident had to meet the cost of his own salary, his transport, the allowances to certain chiefs, the pay of his Sikh guard and the pay of his police. He was compelled to be cautious, almost niggardly in fact, in his offers to the Chiefs and he had at the same time to talk about new taxes such as a poll-tax or hut-tax (*hasil kĕlamin*) on all the ryots of the country. Such a suggestion was not popular. The chiefs did not object to taxation, but they resented the money going to others. Nor did the object of the expenditure meet with the approval of the Perak Malays. A corporal and his police in a Malay village were so many rivals to the local headman and his satellities. The police were disliked as strangers and upstarts, while the headman was looked up to by hereditary right. The machinery of Government was being duplicated, and the new machinery seemed worse than the old. Humility is not always a prominent virtue in an Asiatic constable, nor do his footsteps keep necessarily to the paths of uprightness.

The Resident struggled on. He set about the construction of headquarters or of a sort of official capital at Bandar Baharu on the Perak River; and he secured

from Penang Chinese some good tenders for the Perak revenue farms. But the Sultan also was raising revenue by methods of his own. Expostulation being fruitless Mr. Birch went to see the Governor and brought back a severe letter of reproof addressed to Sultan Abdullah by Sir Andrew Clarke. This did not make for harmony. He then tried to induce Ex-Sultan Ismail to visit Singapore, but the Ex-Sultan refused to go.

There is no doubt that the Resident was a strong personality, a capable administrator and a most energetic man. He is still remembered and admired by those of his Malay followers who survive in Perak. But he was exasperated by the passive resistance of the chiefs. Even as far back as January, 1875, after a tirade against the Sultan, Mr. Birch entered in his diary, "I wish to goodness for my own sake and for peace of the country Ismail was the Sultan." This outburst, excusable enough in its way, was a reflection on the Pangkor policy, and it had to be expunged from the diary.

Meanwhile fresh difficulties were arising over the custom of debt-slavery in Perak. The custom was, of course, iniquitous, especially in the case of women who were generally expected to clothe themselves and pay off their debts by earning money through prostitution. But it was an ancient Perak custom with which Mr. Birch had no treaty-right to interfere. His natural detestation of slavery led him to give shelter and assistance to runaway slaves; and it is to be feared that his Malay policemen took advantage of his practice and enticed away some slaves for their own purposes. Much as we can sympathize with the Resident's views, we can also understand the sense of injury felt by the owner of a slave who saw her stolen and could obtain no redress. The slave-owners were usually wealthy men, chiefs, the very men whom Mr. Birch was depriving of their hereditary feudal revenues on the ground that all taxation should go to the State. The feeling against him became still more bitter.

In May things had come to such a pass that the Sultan was induced to send to Sir Andrew Clarke a deputation of protest against the Resident's acts. The head

of this deputation was Raja Dris, afterwards Sultan of Perak[1]. He was to ask for the following concessions.

(i) that Mr. Birch should not act on his own responsibility but should obtain the Sultan's consent to all he did;

(ii) that he should leave the chiefs in possession of their shares of the taxation of the country; and

(iii) that he should not harbour slaves who fled from their masters.

The delegates arrived in Singapore at an awkward moment. Sir Andrew Clarke was still in the country but had just handed over the Governorship to Sir William Jervois. He was not pleased with the Sultan's action, received the delegates coldly, and wrote a strongly-worded letter of rebuke to Sultan Abdullah, speaking of himself as "the Governor who lifted you out of your misery and sorrow, giving you position and honour." The delegates returned to Perak with the feeling that it was useless to appeal to Singapore. Indeed it is doubtful if they ever got beyond the barest preliminaries of a discussion with Sir Andrew Clarke. The policy laid down by that Governor in his despatch on the Pangkor Treaty can be summed up in his words: "The Malays, like every other rude Eastern nation, require to be treated much more like children, and to be taught." The inspiration was that of the Secretary for Malay Affairs.

Of course the Resident came to learn that the deputation had been sent. The following entries in the diary written at this time throw a strange light upon the Pangkor policy:—

> "I have explained to him (the Sultan) over and over again that he is not fit to govern; and he *is* as unfit a man as you could anywhere pick out . . . In fact I have no doubt whatever that, were a plebiscite taken to-morrow, it would be in favour of Ismail, . . . and were the Chiefs called on again as a body to record their sentiments, they would make Ismail Sultan."

[1] The late Sultan Idris, G.C.M.G., G.C.V.O.

Nevertheless the young Sultan, whatever his motives, was fighting the battle of the chiefs in this matter and was not earning unpopularity. Thriftless as he was, he had the whole country on his side on certain issues. The Resident did not know this:

> "Again I say (11th May) if the plebiscite were taken and the chiefs consulted, all would go with Ismail; and Ismail would, I am sure, beforehand pledge himself to go with the British and act by the advice of the British Resident . . . I have waited, as patiently as any man could wait, for signs of improvement; but none come.
>
> "Before he (the Sultan) went (8th June) I had a good deal of talk to him and told him a good deal of wholesome truth and that if he did not take care he would soon be put off the throne by the British government. He said that he was ready to do as he was told, but he was afraid of the To' Bandar and the Laksamana . . . In the evening we had a very long talk that the Sultan would take no advice and would do nothing, and that we could not and would not stand this much longer, that a revenue must be raised for the country, and the Shahbandar and Matamata and the Sultan could not be allowed to go on squeezing as they were doing and levying the only taxes in the country."

The Resident's attitude can be understood. It was essential that the country should pay its way. It was not possible to encourage the output of tin in the interior, if the tin had to pay duty at intervals of ten miles or so to all the chiefs who owned toll-stations on the Perak River. In the Resident's desire to collect all the revenue himself the chiefs saw only that they were being robbed of their feudal dues. Doubtless a bargain might have been struck. But the Resident was not going to commit himself to offers of a speculative character; he wanted to know what he could afford to pay before he agreed to pay anything. In the meantime the cost of his establishments was very heavy and left him no margin for paying political pensions to a large number of petty chiefs. The

solution seemed to be that the Resident's will should be made to prevail by force, and that subsequent events would justify the strong action taken and reconcile the people to what had been done.

In June Mr. Birch presented the Sultan with a definite Order regulating taxation and requested him to sign it. The Sultan asked for time. Mr. Birch gave him till the 20th July to make up his mind. In the meantime the Resident visited Larut, explored various rivers, ascended the mountains behind Taipeng, and returned to Bandar Baharu by way of Gunong Pondok and Kuala Kangsar. It was on this journey that he first met with armed resistance. At Kota Lama a number of Malays armed with muskets and spears refused to allow him to land on the bank of their river. They added that they obeyed only their feudal chief, knew nothing of the Sultan, and cared nothing for his orders. It was a suggestive incident.

After his arrival at Bandar Baharu Mr. Birch asked the Sultan once more to sign the Order about taxation. The Sultan refused, though he expressed his willingness to make a number of small concessions. Matters were now at a deadlock.

It was about this time that a famous meeting of Malay chiefs was held to consider the situation; and there is little doubt that some of the more fiery spirits, such as the Maharaja Lela, discussed or suggested the assassination of the Resident as a way out of their difficulties. The Sultan was present. Did he countenance the idea? Did he desire the assassination? A Malay judge once said of a doubtful case, "When the evidence is obscure, the reasons for my decision also must be somewhat obscure." Everything in this case turns on the exact words used both by the Sultan and the Maharaja Lela. Even a direct statement that a man's death is desirable does not necessarily mean instigation to murder. In one place in his diary Mr. Birch had written, "The best thing that could happen to the country would be his (the Sultan's) death." There was no question of any *arrière pensée* in this statement. Mr. Birch was a man of the world, an old and successful

administrator. The Sultan was young and impetuous. It is hard to say where instigation exactly begins.

A little later the Sultan took a further step. One of the subsequent charges against him was that he had "sent off a boat to Pasir Panjang to fetch the Raja Kechil Muda and his son, Raja Ahmad, to conduct a *main bĕrhantu*[1] in his presence," and that the object of the performance was connected in some way with the murder of Mr. Birch. Mr. Plunket, who conducted the enquiry into these charges, had only a vague idea of what a *bĕrhantu* was. He described it as "a superstitious performance which the Perak people have learnt from the Sakais or wild men of the interior for looking into the future by calling up spirits and questioning them; . . . On this occasion in all seriousness the Sultan sent for Raja Kechil Muda and his son (as skilled persons in such performances) to conduct a *main bĕrhantu* as a preliminary ceremony to carrying out the conspiracy, already formed against Mr. Birch's life . . . The performances on the first and second nights were merely preliminary introductions to what was to follow; but on the third night Sultan Abdullah, having been possessed by seven spirits in succession, spoke out and declared that Mr. Birch would be dead in a month." Such was Mr. Plunket's interpretation of the incident though his account is not borne out fully by the evidence. The performance took place at Batak Rabit on or about the 24th August, 1875. The evidence makes it clear that the wizards at this great *bĕrhantu* were the Raja Kechil Muda and his son, Raja Ahmad. "On this night," said one witness, "the devils asked to be paid; and Raja Kechil Muda replied that the devils would be paid with a boat-load of offerings when Mr. Birch was dead. One of the Sultan's devils declared that the devil which would kill Mr. Birch resided at Kuala Perak." Another witness testified as follows: "Raja Ahmad said that he would call up Mr. Birch's spirit for $100. The Sultan agreed to pay this sum . . . Raja Ahmad said that what the Sulan wanted was being done. The Sultan

[1] An invocation of evil spirits for assistance in some enterprise.

said, 'Will what I want happen?' Raja Ahmad said, 'It will.'" Another eye-witness described "the performance which took place. At its conclusion Raja Ahmad said to Sultan Abdullah, 'Now I have done for Mr. Birch, but I won't do it properly unless you pay me.' Sultan Abdullah replied, 'I will pay you without fail, if you can only get Mr. Birch out of Bandar Baharu.'" The evidence works up to the conclusion that the Sultan wanted to destroy Mr. Birch by sorcery. Although the eye-witnesses were very reluctant to talk about what had happened, the general drift of their evidence was that the wizards were the Raja Kechil Muda and his son, that the fee was $100, that the spirits invoked were the *jin kĕr-ajaan* or divinites of the State, and that the hope was that these mighty spirits would wreck Birch's launch off Kuala Perak and drown him in the sea.

These incidents speak for themselves. They show plainly the illwill against which Mr. Birch had to contend in his efforts to force his policy upon Perak. He had many admirers even among the Malays themselves, but he owed them to his personality and not to his policy. He had friends, doubtless, among the poor whom he had befriended; but the chiefs to a man were against him. He knew little Malay; and he had been advised from the first that a policy of firmness was what was wanted. Sir William Jervois, the Governor, came to his aid in September and interviewed Sultan Abdullah, Ex-Sultan Ismail, Raja Yusuf, and most of the chiefs. Sultan Ismail offered to concede all that was desired if only the British would make him Sultan of Perak. Raja Yusuf expressed a wish that the British should take over the entire administration of the country and give him and the other princes suitable incomes. Sultan Abdullah was made desperate by these defections. He feared that he would be deposed or that an even worse fate would overtake him; and he made proposals for armed resistance by his followers and even for an attack on the Governor and his party. He was, however, given another chance. The Governor had decided to accept Raja Yusuf's advice. On the 30th September Mr. Birch presented the Sultan with a sort of ultimatum asking him to hand over the

entire administration of the country to the British and to accept definite pensions for himself, Raja Yusuf and Raja Dris. In the event of the Sultan refusing, the Resident was authorized to present a similar letter to Raja Yusuf offering him the Sultanate on the same terms. Sultan Abdullah yielded at once on all points.

The Sultan was not displeased at the turn affairs had taken. He had secured $2,000 a month and a promise that all slaves would be returned. He was afraid only of what the feudal chiefs might say to this betrayal of their interests. Mr. Birch gave him no time for explanations; on October 2nd the proclamation of the new order of things was submitted to the Sultan for signature. Sultan Abdullah signed, though angered at the haste with which everything was done. Mr. Birch pushed on. He had aranged with Sir William Jervois that a force of sepoys was to be stationed at Kuala Kangsar, a small body of European troops at Bandar Baharu, and a gunboat on the lower reaches of the Perak river. This show of force was expected to overawe the country. But the Resident would not wait for the troops to arrive. He sent down the proclamations to Singapore to be printed for immediate distribution; and as soon as the copies arrived he began posting them at the various villages on the Perak River. The crisis had come; and the force to maintain order was not there.

At this juncture another unfortunate incident took place. Mr. Birch had agreed to respect debt-slavery and to return run-away slaves pending an exhaustive enquiry which would doubtless have put an end to the abuses of the system. But it is one thing to consent to slavery and another thing to enforce it in concrete cases. Two slaves of the Sultan and a slave-mistress of the Shahbandar fled to the Residency for protection against their masters. Under his agreement Mr. Birch was bound to hand them back. At that moment he had two European guests in the house. One of these, the captain of a ship, expressed strong views about the iniquity of handing over defenceless women to cruel masters who would punish them the more severely for having absconded. Mr. Birch tried to compromise with his duty. When the

emissaries of the Sultan came, he told them that he had seen no runaway slaves but that he was prepared to let the Residency be searched for the fugitives if the Sultan desired it. The Sultan was too polite or too timid to make the search more than a mere form. The slaves were not found. They were then given by Mr. Birch the chance of escaping, disguised as fishermen, in a boat in tow of the Residency launch; and so they were able to reach British territory at Pangkor. The women had been saved; and the letter of the treaty had been complied with.

But the Sultan and the Shahbandar did not take the Resident's view of the matter. They saw in the action taken an evasion of the treaty. Was any promise reliable? Were even the political pensions safe? The escape of these slaves added seriously to the unrest and dissaisfaction prevailing in Perak.

When Mr. Birch set about posting up the printed proclamations, he was warned that there would be trouble with the chiefs whose revenues were being taken away. He was warned especially against the Maharaja Lela. But he was a man of great personal courage, and he believed in courage. He told the Malays that he was an old man who had only a short span of life to lose and that he did not fear death. On the night of the 1st November he stopped at Pasir Salak, moored his boat near the Maharaja Lela's own house, and slept in the boat. The Maharaja Lela had built a stockade and had been loud in his menaces against the British Government, but he had not committed himself to more than a threat to take action if proclamations were posted in his village. He made no move against the Resident, hoping perhaps that the Resident would abstain from posting the objectionable documents. But that was not the Resident's way. It is clear that Mr. Birch expected no serious trouble for he allowed his companion, Lieutenant Abbott, to leave him and go out shooting on the opposite bank of the river. He himself rose early, had a conversation with a local chief (the Dato' Sagor), and then went off to bathe while his interpreter, Mat Arshad, posted up the proclamations. There was a hubbub at once. The Malays tore each pro-

clamation down as it was posted up. Mat Arshad persisted and even struck a bystander. Blows followed words; in the end the interpreter was stabbed, and an infuriated crowd rushed at the bath-house where the Resident was. The Sikh sentry was taken by surprise and made no attempt to guard his master. A spear was thrust through the thin thatch partition, and Mr. Birch was seen to fall into the water. He rose to the surface, was slashed at with a sword, and then sank finally. The Resident had been murdered and the Perak war begun. It should be added that Mr. Birch had allowed for the possibility of trouble arising through the posting of the proclamations and had intended to desist rather than provoke a conflict. He had given instructions to that effect to his Sikhs. But the Resident's unfortunate absence at the critical moment and the obstinacy of Mat Arshad had upset all these intentions.

Lieutenant Abbott was fired upon from both banks of the river as he made his way down to Bandar Baharu. He had been previously warned by the Dato' Sagor that Mr. Birch had been murdered. Lieutenant Abbott put Bandar Baharu into a state of defence and was soon joined by Mr. Swettenham[1] who had run the gauntlet down river from Kuala Kangsar, and by Sultan Abdullah and his men. Reinforcements came up later in the form of a detachment of European troops and some officers and police. An unsuccessful attack was made on Pasir Salak on the 7th November; Captain Innes, R.E., being killed and two officers wounded. More reinforcements came; and a further attack on Pasir Salak on the 16th November ended in the destruction of the Maharaja Lela's stockade and the burning of his village. A similar fate overtook the village of the Dato' Sagor. By the end of the month the British forces in Perak had attained quite imposing dimensions under General Colborne and Brigadier-General Ross; and all serious resistance was impossible.

The Perak war is a story of occasional punitive expeditions and of the pursuit of fugitive chiefs such as Ex-Sultan Ismail, the Maharaja Lela, and the Dato' Sagor. All were captured in the end. The details of the operations are of interest only to students of guerilla warfare, but the state of affairs they brought about is worth noting. They made

[1] Now Sir Frank Swettenham, ex-Governor of the Straits Settlements.

administration still more difficult. Mr. J. G. Davidson, who had succeeded Birch as Resident of Perak, found the country bankrupt in its finances. Within the armed camps he was a nonentity beside the Generals; outside the armed camps the whole people was sullenly hostile. He could not afford to go on paying troops to overawe the country, yet the departure of the troops might mean a return to anarchy. And the troops could not stay there indefinitely. In September 1876 it was proposed to replace the troops by a strong police force. On the 25th September the Resident (Mr. Davidson) wrote :—

> "We are to have a police-force about 800 strong for Perak and Larut to be composed partly of Sikhs and the greater part of Malays. The Headquarters will be here (Kuala Kangsar) where the officer in charge will reside. There will be an assistant and two European Inspectors in Larut, a European Inspector or other officer in Kinta, and another Inspector at Bandar Baharu. These are all the European officers proposed with the exception of one at Kuala Kangsar to drill and take immediate charge of the men there."

But there was a difficulty. On the 4th October Mr. Davidson wrote :—

> "I believe it has been resolved to raise a police-force for Perak, but it does not seem at all settled where the money is to come from, and this is the slight difficulty that blocks the way."

Mr. Davidson had every reason to be alarmed. Finance is the foundation of all government. The need of revenue had forced Mr. Birch to take the measures which had brought about the Perak war. The new Resident had to face all the difficulties that had overwhelmed his predecessor and the further difficulty created by the need of maintaining a strong force to overawe the country. In the end he resigned the service and retired from a very unpleasant position.

He was succeeded, early in 1877, by Mr. Low—afterwards Sir Hugh Low—the real author of the prosperity of Perak and incidentally of the other Malay States. The policy of this great Resident is worthy of the most careful

study as an example of sound administration; yet Sir Hugh has never had (at the hands of writers on British Malaya) the full meed of honour that is his due.

Sir Hugh Low was confronted with all the revenue-difficulties of Mr. Birch, with a heavy debt caused by the war, with the need of replacing the military forces by a costly constabulary, and with a discontented population under many turbulent leaders. His position seemed almost hopeless. He began by laying down as an axiom that any attempt to govern a people by overawing them was unsound on financial grounds if on no others. He reduced the cost of the police by giving police duties to native headmen and relieving many villages of their police-stations. He settled the question of the feudal revenues of the chiefs by making them local headmen and giving them a substantial percentage of all Government dues collected by them in their districts. He secured a very useful addition to the revenue by substituting a definite land-tax for the indefinite right possessed by the State to the forced labour of its people. He created a State Council of leading men whom he consulted on all important issues; and he took the views of the people before appointing a local chief. He had the satisfaction of seeing the Perak debt paid off in a few years and the abolition of debt-slavery by the end of 1883. Students of administration will find much to interest them in other details of his policy such as his introduction of cultivation-clauses and building-clauses into land-tenure; his system of dealing with water-rights, forests and revenue-farms; and his policy of economic development by means of roads and railways. He was a very great administrator, but we are concerned with his policy only so far as it throws light on the errors that led to the Perak war. This is purely a Malay history and not a treatise on government.

The Perak war removed from the country all the leading figures of the preceding years. The Maharaja Lela and the Dato' Sagor were hanged at Matang; Sultan Abdullah and his principal followers were banished to the Seychelles; Ex-Sultan Ismail died in exile in Johor; the Mantri was banished. Malay history proper ends with them.

# CHAPTER XIII.

## SELANGOR.

The first Bugis settlements in Selangor were made by a chief named Daeng Lakani, whose authority afterwards passed (by inheritance through the female line) to Raja Lumu, son of Daeng Chelak, second Yamtuan Muda of Riau. Raja Lumu began to rule Selangor about the year 1743 under the protection of his famous cousin Daeng Kamboja. At a later date he sought and obtained his own installation as Sultan at the hands of Sultan Mahmud of Perak under the name of Salehu'-din Shah. This was probably after the death of Daeng Kamboja when Raja Lumu's brother, Raja Haji, became fourth Yamtuan Muda of Riau. Sultan Salehu'd-din died shortly afterwards and was succeeded by his son, Raja Brahim, who took the title of Sultan Ibrahim Shah. In this connection it should be mentioned that the Selangor crown is conferred by Perak ; and that at the installation of the present ruler Perak was represented by the Raja Muda, the Dato' Stia and the Dato' Sri Adika Raja. Earlier Selangor Sultans had visited Perak personally for the purpose of being installed.

Sultan Ibrahim Shah married his cousin, the daughter of Raja Haji, Yamtuan Muda of Riau. He followed his father-in-law in the latter's famous attack on Malacca in 1784 which ended so disastrously for both parties in the death of Raja Haji by a stray shot and in the blowing up of a Dutch frigate in some unexplained way. After the siege Sultan Ibrahim returned to his own country and maintained a desultory war against the Dutch till 1786 when he signed a treaty of peace and commerce. He lived for forty years more, dying late in A.D. 1826. His last years were troubled by the menace of a Siamese attack ; and the British had to exercise great pressure at Bangkok to avert an attack upon "a very aged sovereign who could muster a fighting force of some 500 men only."

According to Malay custom a Sultan's sons by a royal wife take precedence of his sons by inferior wives. For

purposes of succession the former are fully legitimate and the latter are not, though all alike are legitimate in our sense of the word and take the title of raja. Sultan Ibrahim's only son by his royal wife died in infancy ; and the succession went, *faute de mieux*, to an "illegitimate" son Raja Muhammad. This son enjoyed a long reign, from 1826 to 1858, but he was a weak ruler and allowed his kingdom to be split up for all intents and purposes into five petty States : Langat, Klang, Bernam, Lukut and Selangor proper. Of these five divisions Lukut was the wealthiest and most important. Its ruler, Raja Jumaat (son of a Riau prince, Raja Jafar, and son-in-law of Sultan Muhammad) was an administrator of unusual capacity. A second Riau Raja, Raja Dollah, brother of Raja Jumaat, also married a daughter of the Sultan and was given Klang as her dowry.

Sultan Muhammad died in A.D. 1858 leaving a legitimate son, Raja Muda Mahmud, who was a mere boy and unable to assert his right to the succession. The ruler left also some "illegitimate" sons, notably Raja Sulaiman (whose son, Raja Mahdi, afterwards came into prominence) and Raja Laut. Raja Jumaat of Lukut was all-powerful in Selangor at the time. He could not succeed to the throne himself as he belonged to the Riau and not to the Selangor branch of the family but he could and did force in 1859 the election of his own candidate, Raja Abdu'l-Samad, nephew and son-in-law of Sultan Muhammad. This selection was accepted half-heartedly by the people. The following table shows the pedigree at this stage :



Sultan Abdu'l-Samad seems not to have been installed in a formal manner by the Sultan of Perak but his title was never the subject of dispute.

In 1860, a year after Abdu'l-Samad's accession, Selangor was visited by a British mission headed by Captain Macpherson, Resident Councillor of Malacca. Captain Macpherson reported that the new ruler was "an opium-smoker and a debauchee," that his son, Raja Musa, was "an ill-looking lad of about 15 years of age," that the disinherited boy Raja Muda Mahmud was "a very intelligent and interesting boy of probably twelve years of age," and finally that a murrain had killed most of the Selangor buffaloes, throwing the rice-fields out of cultivation and threatening to drive the people to lawlessness as a result of destitution. Of Lukut the Resident Councillor spoke in very different terms :

> "The contrast between Lukut and Selangor is very striking ; indeed the former can well bear comparison with any European Settlement ; and it is equally striking and gratifying in the midst of a dense jungle to come suddenly upon the footprints of advanced civilisation. The roads are well formed and macadamized ; the (as yet) only street of China town is uniformly built of brick and tiled roof, kept scrupulously clean and well-drained ; the godowns on the river's bank are large and massively built, and both the people and the place have an air of contentment and prosperity . . . The Police Peons are dressed similarly to ours in Malacca, and the arrangements in the Police Station which I inspected are perfect. An object of much interest to me was the Gambling Farm ; it is a large square building and there are Police Peons stationed at each of the four doors. No Malay is permitted to enter, and the punishment of a Malay man caught in the act of gambling is severe. Although crowded with players the most perfect order and quiet reigned throughout and those who lost their money displayed no symptoms of excitement or violence. Raja Jumaat's house is situated upon a hill which he is strongly fortifying ; and a carriage-road, winding

around, leads to the top . . . Prisoners in chains were employed upon the work."

It may be added that after the Sungai Ujong massacres of 1860 the refugees were received with the greatest kindness by Raja Jumaat, who went so for as to send gong-beaters into the jungle to guide any stray fugitive who might have lost his way.

The next seven years were disastrous years for Selangor. The able and liberal-minded Raja Jumaat died, leaving authority to his two sons Raja Bot and Raja Yahya whose capacity for government may be measured by the fact that the revenue fell at once from $15,000 a month to $500 a month. Raja Jumaat's brother Raja Dollah was driven out of Klang by Raja Mahdi, grandson of Sultan Muhammad, an event which led to serious disturbances at a later date.

In 1867 Tengku Dziyau'd-din, brother of the reigning Sultan of Kedah, married Sultan Abdu'l-Samad's daughter and came to settle in Selangor. He had been brought up among Europeans and had experience of good government. When in 1868 his father-in-law enquired of him what he proposed to do for a livelihood, Tengku Dziyau'd-din expressed preference for administrative work and received the following *kuasa* or power of attorney from the Sultan :—

"In the year 1285 of the Hegira of the Prophet on whom be the peace and blessing of God Most High, on the 5th day of the month Rabi'-al-awal, on Wednesday,—now, of a truth, on that day, We, Sultan Abdu'l-Samad bin Tengku Abdullah, occupier of the throne of Selangor the Seat of Rejoicing, do give a declaration to Tengku Dziyau'd-din, son of the late Sultan Zainu'r-Rashid, who has become Our own son. And now we declare to all the princes and nobles and subjects who come under the jurisdiction of Our country that we give up the country with its dependencies to Our son, Tengku Dziyau'd-din, to govern and to develope for Us and for Our sons, viz., Raja Musa, Raja Kahar, and Raja Yakub, and for all the inhabitants of the country also, so that they may receive justice in all matters. And Our son, Tengku

> Dziyau'd-din is empowered to do whatever may be effectual towards fostering Our country and causing profit to us. No person may oppose Our son's proceedings. And now we confirm as to this place, Langat, that it is Our gift to Our Son, Tengku Dziyau'd-din to be the place where he may carry on Our business as aforesaid. This is all."

The meaning of this curious document was that Tengku Dziyau'd-din should try his prentice hand at administering the Langat district on his father-in-law's behalf. If he could make administration pay, it would be an excellent thing both for himself and for the Sultan and his family, who would expect a fair share of the profit. But the wording of the document went even further and enabled the Tengku's English supporters to style him the "Viceroy," and his Malay followers to style him the *wakil* or *wakil mutallak* of the Sultan over the whole country. Not that he had many supporters in Selangor. The Sultan's sons soon became jealous of their brother-in-law; and the provincial magnates, Raja Bot of Lukut, Raja Itam of Bernam and Raja Mahdi of Klang, were very bitter against the new favourite whose foreign birth and novel methods of government outraged their conservative and patriotic instincts.

Towards the end of 1869 Tengku Dziyau'-d-din visited Kedah and induced a number of his fellow-countrymen to throw in their lot with him and come to Selangor as his followers. On his way back he stopped at Klang. There Raja Ismail, son of the dispossessed Raja Dollah, begged him to intervene in the local quarrel and to restore to Raja Dollah's family some of the property of which Mahdi had deprived them. Tengku Dziyau'd-din tried to intercede with Raja Mahdi. The Raja refused to see him, insulted him as an intriguing interloper, and accused him of acting under a foreign *kuasa* which the Sultan had never signed. Raja Mahdi was a Malay warrior of the old school, the best representative of all that was piratical and reactionary in Selangor. Needless to say, a conflict broke out at once between him and the well-meaning and liberal-minded mediator, Tengku Dziyau'd-din.

At that time it seemed as though the struggle could have only one ending. Raja Mahdi was renowned for his courage

and was at the head of all that the Malays considered the chivalry of Selangor. The "Viceroy" was an unpopular foreigner with a following of foreigners and no allies except such local Malays as had been the victims of Raja Mahdi's past exploits. But the foreigner was a reticent dogged man with a fund of perseverance that none of his rivals possessed. He sat down before his enemy's fort at Klang, stopped its supplies and ruined its trade with the interior. He did not attempt to carry it by assault but simply threatened it and worried it for eighteen weary months. The theatrical valour of Raja Mahdi was no match for such persistence ; money ran out ; stores ran out ; followers deserted him. At last Klang was evacuated, and Tengku Dziyau'd-din was master of Klang, Langat and Kuala Selangor.

Raja Mahdi then retreated to Kuala Selangor and began to menace the strong fort which the Dutch had built and the Sultan was holding at the mouth of the river. The Viceroy induced the Sultan to send his eldest son, Raja Musa, to take charge of the district. As Raja Musa proved neither a competent nor a trustworthy officer the Viceroy thought it prudent to send him powerful re-inforcements under Saiyid Mashhur and Raja Mahmud. Saiyid Mashhur was the son of an Arab from Pontianak and had married a Selangor lady of the highest rank. He went to Kuala Selangor and took charge of the fort under Raja Musa. While so employed he received news that his brother had been killed at Langat in circumstances that led him to believe that Raja Yakub, son of the Sultan and full brother to the wife of Tengku Dziyau'd-din, was responsible for that brother's death. The Saiyid at once went over to Raja Mahdi along with Raja Mahmud and all his followers. Raja Musa however was not ousted from his titular authority. He was the Sultan's eldest and only "legitimate" son, heir to the throne, weak in counsel and vacillating but respected for his fervent show of religion ; lastly "he interfered with nobody." He remained at Kuala Selangor as a merely titular ruler.

About this time a number of Chinese suspected of coming from Kuala Selangor were guilty of a gross act of piracy in the Malacca Straits. The plunder of a junk and

the slaughter of 34 persons (many of them women and children) called for very serious enquiry, with the result that H.M.S. "Rinaldo" and the Colonial steamer "Pluto" were despatched to Kuala Selangor to confer with the local authorities for the apprehension of the guilty parties. No hostile measures seem to have been contemplated against the fort itself. Unfortunately for the negotiations Saiyid Mashhur sent a very curt and unsatisfactory reply to the letter addressed to Raja Musa on whose behalf he was garrisoning the fort; in fact he refused even to go on board the "Pluto" as he was no plenipotentiary and could settle nothing. It was felt in a vague way that something was necessary to vindicate British prestige after this rebuff. The "Rinaldo" was lying outside the estuary but the "Pluto" had entered the river towing boats full of blue-jackets. Two parties were accordingly sent ashore: one under Lieutenant Stopford and Mr. A. M. Skinner to visit the fort, the other under Lieutenant Maude to search the villages on the opposite bank. It is not clear what useful purpose could be effected by these proceedings if resistance were to be offered; it was assumed in fact that no resistance was to be expected. The party under Lieutenant Stopford reached the fort only to find it fully manned and Saiyid Mashhur standing at its open gateway. The Saiyid, a picturesque theatrical figure with his long hair and warrior's coat of bright colours, delivered an excited harangue and ended by shutting the gate before Mr. Skinner's face. While Mr. Skinner and Lieutenant Stopford were discussing what the next step should be, they heard firing on the opposite bank and returned hurriedly to the "Pluto" to see what help they could bring to their colleagues. Meanwhile the other landing-party had met a raja who was understood to be either Raja Mahdi or Raja Mahmud. He shook hands with Lieutenant Maude and accompanied him as far as the boats but demurred to going any further. Lieutenant Maude told him that he would be compelled to visit the ship. Fire was at once opened on the blue-jackets by the raja's followers and the raja himself found a refuge in the jungle. One blue-jacket was killed; Lieutenant Maude and five men were wounded. The "Pluto" could do nothing. She steamed out of the river and then went on to Penang

conveying the wounded (for there was no surgeon on the "Rinaldo") and a telegram of explanation to the Admiralty saying that the men had been injured in an attack by pirates during which "the Malays acted with their usual treachery." This skirmish took place on the 3rd July, 1871. On the following day the "Rinaldo" shelled the fort with tremendous effect, driving Saiyid Mashhur and his followers into the jungle. When the Malays saw that the place was no longer tenable, a Malay chief is said to have cut the throat of an innocent girl and scattered her blood over the guns that he was forced to abandon. Her body was left on a large slab of stone before the main gate of the fort, a slab which is still shown as "the Stone of Sacrifice," because the murder was understood at the time to represent the blood-offering of a human victim as a prayer for victory. More probably the poor girl was killed in order that her vengeful spirit should haunt the guns of the fort and make them a curse and a danger to the men in whose hands they were about to fall.

It was considered unwise to hold the State of Selangor responsible for these hostilities. Raja Mahdi, Raja Mahmud and Saiyid Mashhur were rebels against the Viceroy as well as assailants of the British Government; and Raja Mahdi's reported death in the skirmish with the blue-jackets on the 3rd July (a report that proved afterwards to be groundless) was looked upon as the only redeeming feature of a very unsatisfactory episode. Meanwhile Kuala Selangor was handed over to the charge of Tengku Dziyau'd-din who garrisoned it with 100 Sikhs and some 30 or 40 Kedah Malays. Within a fortnight of the first encounter a mission from Singapore headed by the Colonial Secretary (Mr. J. W. W. Birch) visited the disturbed districts. Kuala Selangor was found to be friendly and peaceable as regards the ryots under the Viceroy's rule, but there was evidence that Raja Mahmud was lurking in the immediate neighbourhood. At Klang Raja Musa joined the "Rinaldo" very pleased at having escaped from his *soi-disant* followers, Raja Mahdi and his gang. At Kuala Langat Mr. Birch and Tengku Dziyau'd-din had several interviews with the Sultan himself. The Viceroy's *kuasa* was read out; and the Sultan was asked to affirm its genuineness. He admitted

it at once. He was then asked to confirm and renew publicly the powers he had confided to Tengku Dziyau'd-din. Here it became evident that there was a strong party in the palace hostile to the Viceroy. The Sultan produced a new document conferring his powers on a council consisting of Tengku Dziyau'd-din and others, including the Viceroy's determined enemies Raja Bot and Raja Yahya of Lukut. This document was rejected at once. The Sultan then explained that it was all one to him ; and he proceeded to re-nominate the Tengku as *Wakil Yamtuan*, Viceroy or sole regent. The Viceroy sat through the interviews with stolid impassivity, showing neither pleasure nor disappointment at the turn affairs were taking. He made a most favourable impression on Mr. Birch, who left him with the assurance of the full support of the British Government in his efforts to introduce peace and order into Selangor.

An eye-witness described the Sultan during these years of civil war as a man who out of sheer indolence refused to interfere in public affairs and elected to play the part of an easy-going tolerant philospher. He had tried to settle the Klang dispute by giving Raja Ismail and Raja Mahdi weapons saying " You are both young and can fight it out ; " and had refused to express an opinion on piracy because " It is a matter for the boys, my sons ; I take no part in it myself." In the same spirit he was vehement in his friendliness for the British Government, giving two fine ivory tusks as a present for the Queen ; surrendering five Chinese pirates and the pig-tail of a sixth (" as evidence that he is dead ") to please the Governor ; and issuing a notice that " Raja Mahdi, Saiyid Mashhur and Raja Mahmud are really evil persons, the ruin of their country,"—all by way of pleasing Tengku Dziyau'd-din. And, of course, he was equally whole-hearted in his attempts to please the freebooters who could hardly be expected to bear him malice for being called " evil persons," when every one knew the emptiness of such sorry epithets. His son Yakub created an unfavourable impression as the type of a lawless cruel chief who would exercise power ruthlessly, but he was attached in his way to Tengku Dziyau'd-din. The second son, Raja Kahar, whose reputation was even

worse, cut a better figure owing to his air of careless bonhomie. Raja Musa, the eldest son and heir, was described as a wild-looking person of a religious turn of mind.

Tengku Dziyau'd-din at this time had two Europeans in his service and was prepared to employ more. After the Langat interview in July, 1871, he drew up hopeful estimates of revenue and expenditure showing an annual income of $165,350 against an outlay of only $74,522. His military force consisted of two European officers, 21 non-commissioned officers, 180 Indian Sepoys and 200 Kedah auxiliaries. His navy was made up of one small steamer, the "Telegraph." He even engaged a road-engineer (Mr. Calcott) for opening up the Damansara-Kuala Lumpur road. But so long as Raja Mahdi and his freebooters remained at large there was a serious element of uncertainty about all estimates of Selangor revenue.

In November the trouble broke out. Raja Musa, the Sultan's eldest son, had built a stockade on the Selangor River on the pretext that he needed protection against Raja Madhi's followers. As soon as the stockade was built he began levying toll on all vessels and interfering with the Viceroy's revenues. The position of Raja Musa as heir to the throne made Tengku Dziyau'd-din unwilling to drive him into open enmity. Saiyid Mashhur next appeared in Ulu Selangor. The Viceroy's representative in the district was a Johor Malay of high rank, Che Wan Abdu'r-Rahman, whose loyalty was certain. Tengku Dziyau'd-din tried to send him help and supplies by the hand of Raja Kahar, son of the Sultan; Raja Kahar betrayed his master and gave the supplies to Saiyid Mashhur who succeeded in capturing Che' Wan Abdu'r-Rahman. But Kuala Selangor itself remained safe. It was defended by a loyal European officer named Pennefather with a strong force of Sepoys; and Raja Yakub who was in charge of the district, though incompetent, was not disloyal to the Viceroy. But this incompetence in itself was serious enough. The blockade was rendered ineffective, and supplies kept reaching Saiyid Mashhur from the sea in spite of the forts at Kuala Selangor. Raja Yakub and Pennefather did not co-operate at all satis-

factorily with the result that the former abandoned his post and returned to Langat.

At this time Tengku Dziyau'd-din was in undisputed possession of the whole coast from Kuala Selangor to Jugra and had strong garrisons under European officers at Klang, Kuala Lumpur and Kuala Selangor. None the less his position was critical. He had no loyal Malay followers except his own Kedah men and the two Klang princes, Ismail and Abdu'r-Rahman, who were personal enemies of Raja Mahdi. In Ulu Selangor Saiyid Mashhur, using Perak and Bernam as his supply bases, was waging open and successful war against him. Raja Bot, the ruler of Lukut, and Raja Itam the ruler of Bernam were covert enemies. The States of Sungai Ujong and Perak were not at war openly with the Viceroy but they harboured and supported his foes. Raja Mahdi took advantage of the opportunity to plan a fresh attack of a most dangerous character upon Selangor. He got together at Bengkalis in Sumatra a small fleet of four vessels with arms, money, and munitions of war. Then he recruited followers, asked for the help of the Siak princes, and boasted that he had the help of the Klana of Sungai Ujong and the Maharaja of Johor. A certain white ship in his possession was said to have been given him as a personal gift by the Maharaja. News of these proceedings soon reached Tengku Dziyau'd-din who sent his most trusted agent, Saiyid Zin, to Singapore and thence to Sumatra with an official letter from the Colonial Government to the Dutch authorities at Bengkalis. The Dutch acted with energy, seizing the Raja's ships, money, munitions of war and forcing him to flee from the country. For the moment the storm-cloud seemed to have passed.

Raja Mahdi's next step was one of unusual boldness, not to say impudence. He appeared in Singapore itself and claimed redress against the Dutch Government. It must be remembered that the Maharaja of Johor, if not Raja Mahdi's friend, was at least the enemy of Tengku Dziyau'd-din. So, too, in a sense, was the Attorney General, Mr. Braddell, who had strong legitimist views. As soon as Raja Madhi set foot in Singapore, the question of his treatment was referred to Mr. Braddell for consideration in all its branches. It would have been thought that short shrift

would have been meted out to the author of the civil wars and piracies that had devastated Selangor, a man who was reputed to have disobeyed the orders of the "Rinaldo" and to have fired on its blue-jackets and who had been reported to the Admiralty for a "piratical attack" in which "the Malays acted with their usual treachery." Vigorous action at this stage would have saved hundreds of lives. But the hand of the executive was paralysed by technicalities of legal procedure. It was remembered that no evidence could be produced that Raja Mahdi, though notoriously the leader of the Kuala Selangor Malays, had been present in person at the attack on the "Rinaldo's" men. His record, and the massing of ships, munitions, and men at Bengkalis were no positive proof that he might not have abandoned the trade of a pirate for the more honest vocation of a dealer in arms and gunpowder. Last of all, even if Raja Mahdi was all that he was represented to be, it was considered that we "should not interfere with legitimate warlike operations carried on without prejudice to the interests of neutrals." In fact a reaction had set in, at Singapore. The Viceroy was represented as a Kedah interloper; and Saiyid Zin's disreputable past had been raked up to discredit his subsequent record. Still, Raja Mahdi thought it safer to move over to Johor.

The controversy took a new phase. The Maharaja of Johor came forward and gave the strongest personal assurances that he believed Raja Mahdi to have no hostile designs against Selangor. Mr. Braddell expressed indignation at the very possibility of the Maharaja's word not being taken as against that of Saiyad Zin. Who was Saiyid Zin to venture to pit his word against that of the Maharaja of Johor? Mr. C. J. Irving, the official supporter of Tengku Dziyau'd-din, replied angrily that it was not a question of any man's word or any man's character except that of Raja Mahdi, a jungle prince, who was "little better than a treacherous lying savage;" adding, "I would trust Raja Mahdi just as far as I could control him and not a step further." But the assurances of the Maharaja and of the Attorney-General carried the day, and Governor Sir Harry Ord expressed his belief that Raja Mahdi had not

committed himself to any designs against the peace of Selangor. This was in May, 1872.

The Maharaja went a step further and suggested the supersession of Tengku Dziyau'd-din as Viceroy of Selangor proper, and the transference of his power to Raja Musa, the Sultan's eldest son. Sir Harry Ord, as an "honest broker," saw the Viceroy and obtained from him an offer to pay Raja Mahdi a fixed allowance of $350 per mensem if the latter would remain in Johor. The Governor tried to induce Raja Mahdi to settle down peaceably, but the Raja refused. Sir Harry Ord then withdrew his belief in Raja Mahdi's innocent intentions and expressed no surprise when that freebooter-chief gave the lie to all the Maharaja's and Mr. Braddell's assurances and raided Selangor once more.

Raja Mahdi escaped from Johor in July August, 1872, and went to Linggi ; thence through Sungai Ujong (where many of his followers such as Raja Laut and Raja Mahmud were enjoying the Klana's hospitality) to the Langat districts of Selangor. His arrival led at once to an insurrection. Saiyid Mashhur and his friends came down the Selangor river and surprised Kuala Selangor, killing one European officer and 52 Indian sepoys. The whole of that district fell into his hands. He then raided the central districts and cut off the Kuala Lumpur garrison, consisting of two European officers and over 80 Sepoys, from their base on the coast. The Viceroy was left with Klang only. But in the meanwhile the allies he had secured from Pahang began to cross the borders and to seize the passes. They opened communications with the Kuala Lumpur garrison and advised its commander, Hagen, to join forces with them by advancing towards the Bentong pass. Hagen seems, however, to have mistrusted them.

Early in October, 1872, the Kuala Lumpur garrison, having been reduced to serious straits (probably for lack of provisions) decided to evacuate the place and cut a way through the enemy to a place of safety. Hagen could have either joined the Pahang force or retreated towards the coast ; he elected to do the latter. It was a fatal choice. His guide, a Chinese woodcutter, misled him completely. Hagen seems to have made two attempts to break out. His first attempt was made along the Pataling road and

ended in failure through bad guidance; he was glad to be able to get back safely to Kuala Lumpur again. His second attempt ended in utter disaster. The enemy having now been made aware of the probable course of his retirement had entrenched themselves at Pataling and were in a position to cut off Hagen's retreat. There was a sharp engagement between the two forces; Cavalieri, the second in command, was killed along with some 20 sepoys; Hagen and some forty more were taken prisoners and lodged in the fort; thirty fugitives seem to have succeeded in making their way by devious paths to the coast. The fate of the prisoners was tragic. The head of the fallen Cavalieri was cut off and carried in triumph to the fort to be shown to the unfortunate Hagen as an earnest of the fate in store for him. Hagen was slaughtered publicly as a beast is slaughtered [1], the throat being cut and the victim left to bleed to death, this kind of execution being selected because of its ignominious animal character. The heads of Hagen and Cavalieri were then borne round the town of Kuala Lumpur in triumph to the sound of the beating of gongs and finally were stuck over the gates of the fort. The other prisoners also were slaughtered probably in the same way. Altogether 2 European officers, 8 European or Eurasian non-commissioned officers, and 56 native sepoys perished at Kuala Lumpur, or (counting the losses at Kuala Selangor) 119 men in all. After the victory the Malay leader sent triumphant letters to his friends to describe the pleasure [2] it gave him to treat Europeans in the way he had treated Hagen.

These incidents did not affect the ultimate result. Imam Prang Rasul with 17 minor Pahang chiefs and some 2,000 followers swarmed over the passes from Bentong into the Kuala Lumpur district. The Orang Kaya Lipis seized the passes into Ulu Selangor. The Pahang Bendahara himself remained in reserve at Bentong with a strong following to re-inforce the invaders in case of need. Within a month of the death of Hagen the Pahang men were threatening Kuala Lumpur. On the 18th November they captured Pataling where the To' Engku Klang and the

[1] *Sĕmbĕleh.* [2] *Sĕdap.*

Tengku Panglima Raja (father of Raja Mahmud) had been entrenched. Among the spoils captured was a letter addressed to the To' Engku Klang by the Sultan himself under the Selangor State seal, instructing the To' Engku to assist Raja Mahdi against the Viceroy. Raja Asal's fort at Ulu Klang was the next to fall, its defenders fleeing towards Ulu Selangor where they were cut up by another Pahang force. But it was many months before the war was ended. The fall of Kuala Lumpur was reported in March, 1873, and of Kuala Selangor on November 8th of the same year. This last capture (in which Saiyid Mashhur himself was taken prisoner) put an end to open warfare, but Raja Mahdi and his fugitive chiefs found shelter and protection in Perak and Sungai Ujong and even in Selangor itself with the magnates at Langat, Lukut and Bernam.

Throughout this war the Viceroy had been forced to contend against difficulties of another character as well. He endeavoured to stop blockade-running and smuggling by patrolling the coast with his ship, the "Telegraph," but the Sultan issued "permits" and "passes" to the smugglers to enable them to pursue their nefarious calling. The Viceroy protested. Sultan Abdu'l-Samad, with his usual bonhomie, declared that he would issue no more passes; and that if he did issue passes, no one need pay any attention to them. Armed with this declaration Tengku Dziyau'd-din in January, 1873, seized a ship, the "Sri Malacca," the owner of which (one Tan Ken Hoon) had been warned both by the Lieutenant-Governor of Malacca and by the Selangor authorities that this fate would overtake his vessel if he persisted in his disregard of the Selangor shipping rules. Tan Keng Hoon appealed to the Governor against this seizure, claiming that the Selangor Sultan had authorized him to act as he had done; he obtained no sympathy in view of the fact that he had been expressly cautioned against the course he had pursued. Morally of course he had no case. In April, however, he applied for a warrant against the Viceroy Dziyau'd-din for piracy. The matter was referred to the Attorney-General, Mr. Braddell, who ruled that the Viceroy's authority did not extend to the high seas and that he had been guilty of piracy in seizing the Sri Malacca. Sir Harry Ord pointed out at once that the

seizure had taken place in the Langat River. Mr. Braddell replied that this point was immaterial as piracy could take place anywhere; the Viceroy was only the agent of the Sultan; and the Sultan's "passes" and "permits" overrode anything he might do or order. Practically this decision turned the Selangor filibusters (who had no trouble about securing the Sultan's all-embracing patronage) into honest men, and made a "pirate of any one who tried to maintain law and order on the Selangor Coast. But when it came to action, the opinions of the Attorney-General could effect very little. Magistrates had no jurisdiction; and even if they issued warrants people in Selangor paid no attention to them. Tan Kim Hoon was persuaded in the end to send a petition to the Legislative Council. The procedure as to this petition led to much correspondence, but on the 22nd September it was laid on the Council table. There the matter ended; for while these technicalities continued to be discussed by people interested in academic questions an event took place which revealed the Sultan's court in a new light and diverted all attention to the grim realities of Selangor life.

At 1 p.m. on the 16th November, 1873, a Malacca trading vessel with three Chinese passengers and a crew of six Malays, sailed from Langat for Malacca. At 2 p.m. the vessel anchored at the mouth of the river within hail of a fort in the occupation of Raja Yakub, third son of the Sultan. At 5 p.m. two boats with about twenty Malays came and took up a position near this vessel, saying that they were waiting for nightfall to go out fishing. Shortly after six o'clock as the captain was sitting down to his evening meal the two boats opened fire killing the captain and some of the crew. The vessel was then rushed by a boarding-party, and the survivors were either stabbed or driven into the water. Three of the men who were forced overboard were speared or stabbed as they swam about, but a fourth had slipped quietly in and had taken up his position near the rudder where he was not easily seen. As it grew darker and the pirates' attention was absorbed by their loot the unfortunate man swimming some way under water succeeded in getting under the lee of the river bank and making his way to the landing-stage of the fort.

Trembling with fear and immersed to the neck in the stream he clung to a post and waited to see what would happen. He saw the two boats leave with the plundered vessel in tow and proceed up river, passing within a few feet of where he lay hidden under the jetty. A watcher from the fort hailed them and asked them for the news. They said that all had gone well except that one man was still unaccounted for; and that they were taking the loot to Raja Yakub. Some time later during the night they returned to the fort, entering it by means of the landing-stage to which the one survivor was clinging. After this escape he realized that the fort was no haven of safety and that it would be better to trust to the tender mercies of the nearest trading-ship. It happened to be a Bugis boat from the Sumatra coast. He swam out to it and threw himself upon the mercy of the crew. "What is all that talking over there?" said the men in the fort. "It is a man from the ship that has been attacked," said the Bugis men; "we will surrender him to you in the morning." On the morrow he was surrendered; but the Bugis men refused to lose sight of him till he had been handed over to the Sultan himself. Meanwhile so much publicity had been given to the incident that the murder of the fugitive could not have been hushed up and would have compromised irretrievably the highest in the land. The man was hidden away. But news of his whereabouts filtered through to his friends in Malacca; they came to Langat in seach of him and he had to be let go. Once in Malacca he told his tale, but did not in his first account at least commit the imprudence of mentioning Raja Yakub's connection with the case.

It chanced that Admiral Sir C. Shadwell with four ships of the fleet was in Malayan water at this time. It happened that a new Governor, Sir Andrew Clarke, had arrived with instructions, as we have seen, to initiate the "residential" policy. Two Commissioners, Mr. J. G. Davidson and Major J. F. A. McNair, proceeded to Langat with the fleet to enquire into the case. Eight men were charged with piracy, the judges being Tengku Dziyau'd-din, Dato' Aru, Penghulu Dagang of Langat, and a Chinese named See Ah Keng. After a careful trial extending over three days seven men

were sentenced to be killed by the *kris* and spear, according to Malay custom. They were executed the following morning, the 16th February, 1874, on a piece of rising ground behind the stockade.

A prudent verdict, the equivalent of "Not proven," was brought in as regards the connection of Raja Yakub with the case, but there was little doubt of his complicity. One local witness testified openly to that complicity; the survivor himself had heard the pirates say that they were taking the plunder to the Raja; the fort was Raja Yakub's, the accused men were his followers, and the plundered vessel was found near his house.

It is interesting to note that, although the pirates had been arrested on British soil and could have been tried in the Colony, it was thought inexpedient to send them before a British Court. The casuistry of local law would probably have secured their acquittal on some technical issue of jurisdiction or otherwise. This brought about the paradoxical decision that a miscarriage of justice could only be avoided by sending the men to be tried by a judge whom the Attorney-General had just pronounced to be a pirate. Paradoxical as it was, no one can question its wisdom.

It was felt also that the execution of seven unhappy wretches, all of them followers of Raja Yakub, was no solution of the difficult Selangor question. The Sultan's responsibility for his misgovernment had to be brought home; and this was done by his being called upon to pay $5,000 compensation for the piracy, a sum which he promptly handed over in slabs of tin. He also accepted a Resident in Mr. J. G. Davidson, an old friend and supporter of Tengku Dziyau'd-din. But even this was felt to fall short of what was wanted. The nest of pirates at Kuala Langat had to be rendered innocuous. Even while the Governor, the Admiral and the fleet were at Kuala Langat, it was popularly rumoured that Raja Mahdi, Raja Mahmud and the other freebooters were living under the Sultan's protection in the palace itself. Sultan Abdu'l-Samad agreed to withdraw that protection and to allow a British Assistant Resident to reside at Langat and watch events. Mr. (afterwards Sir Frank) Swettenham was the first officer to act in this post. The action of the British Government in the

other States had left no refuge for the marauding followers of Raja Mahdi, and by degrees they all came in. Raja Mahmud and Saiyid Mashhur fought on the British side in the Perak war. Raja Mahdi himself did not long survive the Selangor troubles and died of consumption. His supporters accepted the administration of their country by British officers with none of the hostility that marked the introduction of the "residential system" into Perak, Sungai Ujong, Negri Sembilan, and Pahang. The history of Selangor since the 17th February, 1874, has been a record of unbroken peace and uninterrupted prosperity.