

British Malaya 1824-67

by L. A. MILLS

edited for reprinting,
with a bibliography of writings in English
on British Malaya, 1786-1867,
by C. M. Turnbull

and a new introductory chapter on
European influence in the Malay Peninsula,
1511-1786,
by D. K. Bassett

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Preface

Professor Mills's *British Malaya, 1824-67* was first published in 1925 as Volume III, Part II of the *Journal of the Malayan Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society* at a time when little research had been done into this period of Malayan history. Today it still remains the standard work in this field. A growing interest in Malayan history in recent years has led to an increasing demand for the book, but for a long time copies of the original issue have been unobtainable, and it is partly to satisfy this need that the work is re-issued at the present time. An equally important consideration, however, is the fact that whatever may be written by historians in the future on this period of Malayan history, Professor Mills's book will always remain of permanent interest as a most valuable and important pioneer work.

With the approval of Professor Mills, certain changes have been made in the original form of the work. The first chapter, "The English and Dutch in the East, 1579-1786", has been re-written by Dr. D. Bassett, Lecturer in History at the University of Malaya, who has added a bibliography of this chapter. Modifications have been made in Chapter II, "Penang 1786-1830" by Professor K. Tregonning, Raffles Professor of History at the University of Malaya in Singapore, in the light of his own recent research. The collection of Malay documents relating to the Naning War, which was included as an Appendix to the 1925 edition but not used in Professor Mills's text, has been omitted. A new bibliography has been substituted by the Editor. Apart from minor alterations, however, no substantial changes have been made in the last ten chapters which form the main body of the author's original research.

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1 July 1960

CONSTANCE M. TURNBULL.

20 AUG 2003

NASKAH PEMELIHARAAN
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To Sir Charles Lucas,
with grateful thanks for his unfailing
encouragement and assistance.

Author's Preface

No one who is interested in the British Empire can fail to be impressed by the fact that of the many books which appear every year on Imperial History very few deal with the Crown Colonies. While much painstaking research has been devoted to the development of the self-governing Dominions, no adequate account has yet appeared of a very large number of the Crown Colonies. This book is an attempt to supply the want so far as British Malaya is concerned, for the period 1824 to 1867. The first four chapters form an introduction giving a brief account of the earlier history of the Straits Settlements from 1786 to 1824. The principal events in this period have already been dealt with by Swettenham, Egerton, Boulger and others, so that the introduction is intended merely to summarize, and in some points to supplement, their conclusions, as for example the account of the legal and economic history of Penang and Singapore. The remaining ten chapters of the book are almost entirely based upon my own investigations.

In the matter of acknowledgements I have to express my deep sense of obligation for the assistance which I have received from Sir Charles Lucas, K.C.B., Sir Herbert Warren, K.C.V.O., Mr. C. O. Blagden, Professor Egerton, Professor Coupland, and Mr. E. M. Wrong, by their encouragement and valuable criticisms. I am also indebted to Mr. Blagden for the Appendix of Malayan documents which he discovered and translated at Malacca. They give the Naning War from the native point of view; but unfortunately they did not come into my possession until it was too late to use them in the writing of this book. I have to thank Mr. S. C. Hill, late of the Indian Educational Service, for the use of his unpublished manuscript on East Indian piracy. It is also a pleasure to acknowledge my indebtedness to Mr. Evans Lewin, the Librarian of the Royal Colonial Institute, and to Mr. Foster, the Librarian of the India Office Library, for their assistance in discovering and placing at my disposal a number of valuable documents.

L. A. MILLS.

Magdalen College, Oxford.
25, June 1924.

Abbreviations used in the Notes.

B. Pol.	Bengal Political Consultations
B. Pub.	Bengal Public Consultations
BSP	Bengal Secret and Political Consultations
I. Pol.	India Political Proceedings
IFPC	India Foreign and Political Consultations
IPFP	India Political and Foreign Proceedings
I. Pub.	India Public Proceedings
JIA	Journal of the Indian Archipelago and Eastern Asia
JMBRAS	Journal of the Malayan Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society
JRAS	Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society
JSBRAS	Journal of the Straits Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society
PP	Parliamentary Papers
SSR	Straits Settlements Records


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Francis Light taking formal possession of Pulau Pinang 'in the name of his Britannic Majesty and for the use of the Hon'able East India Company', 11 August, 1786 (see text pp. 30-31); from the engraving published by Elisha Trapaud in his *Short account of Prince of Wales Island or Pulo Penang*, London, 1788.



I

European Influence In

The Malay Peninsula 1511-1786

by D. K. Bassett.

The vagueness of the term British Malaya makes it desirable to define exactly the area to which it applies. For the purposes of this book in general it includes the present Federation of Malaya, the State of Singapore, Labuan, Brunei, Sarawak and North Borneo. As far as the present chapter is concerned, however, it is necessary to overstep the boundaries imposed by the political developments of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries because they would have had no significance between 1511 and 1786. During those years, the different European nations were primarily concerned with securing a share of the seaborne trade of Asia, and the interest that they felt in the Malay peninsula was largely derived from their desire to establish a naval base guarding the Strait of Malacca. When the Portuguese arrived on the scene in 1511, the obvious site for a fortress was Malacca itself, and Afonso de Albuquerque, the Portuguese viceroy, duly conquered the town from Sultan Mahmud; 130 years later the troops of the Dutch East India Company in their turn captured Malacca from the Portuguese and held it without interruption until 1795, when the British assumed temporary control during the Revolutionary War with France. There has been a tendency in the past to interpret the history of Malaya in terms of the respective periods of European occupation of Malacca. This approach is a very superficial one, because neither the Portuguese nor the Dutch were able, except on rare occasions, to exert any effective political control outside the town. The Portuguese, in particular, had great difficulty in maintaining their foothold in Malacca against the attacks of the Javanese, Achinese and Malays.

The division of Malayan history into three phases of European domination can, therefore, have some justification only if the Portuguese, Dutch and British in turn were able to use their naval stations either at Malacca or Penang to establish an indisputable and extensive control of local Asian commerce; it might then be said that they affected the life of the country decisively through their supremacy on the sea if not by their occupation of the land. Since the contacts of the British with the

Malay peninsula were of relatively little importance until the latter part of the eighteenth century and the cardinal principle of their policy by 1786 was the encouragement of Asian trade at Penang rather than the control of it, British activities are not our immediate concern in this chapter. Both the Portuguese and the Dutch, however, pursued policies designed to force Asian sea-borne commerce into channels that would secure a virtual monopoly of key commodities for the crown of Portugal and the Dutch East India Company respectively. The significance of these nations in the history of the Malay peninsula must be measured, if at all, in terms of the maritime supremacy they were able to establish in South East Asia in general and in the Strait of Malacca in particular.

In this respect the Portuguese can be said to have failed miserably. When they captured Malacca in 1511, thirteen years after they first appeared in the Indian Ocean, the Portuguese had already won a series of naval victories and secured a number of territorial footholds in and around the Indian Ocean. Their primary objective was to impair Mohammedan power in the Mediterranean by diverting the commerce that sustained it from the Red Sea and Persian Gulf routes to the new route they had discovered and then monopolised around the Cape of Good Hope. In order to achieve this end the Portuguese had assumed far heavier commitments than had been originally envisaged. Several towns on the Malabar coast of India were already garrisoned by soldiers sent out from Lisbon, including Goa, which Albuquerque had captured in 1510 to serve as the Portuguese capital in Asia; Socotra, at the mouth of the Red Sea, had been held by the Portuguese since 1507; and an attempt had been made to dominate the Persian Gulf in much the same way by seizing Ormuz, but this latter objective was not realised until 1515.

The conquest of Malacca, therefore, represented the logical extension of Portuguese strategy to the East Indies, but it would be misleading to imagine that the Portuguese became the automatic heirs of the commercial wealth of the defeated sultanate after the fall of Malacca. An exodus of Mohammedan merchants from Malacca to Aceh, Bantam and Brunei and a similar movement of Chinese traders to Patani on the east coast of the Malay peninsula greatly enhanced the prosperity of those ports and impoverished the royal exchequer at Malacca.¹ An attempt

1. B. Schrieke: *Indonesian Sociological Studies*, Part I, The Hague and Bandung, 1955, pp. 42-45.

by Francisco da Sa to close the other exit from the East Indies to the west by establishing a Portuguese fortress at Sunda Kalapa (Djakarta) was forestalled by the rising power of Islam in Java (1526).² Thereafter, Portuguese possessions in South East Asia outside Malacca were confined to a few small garrisons in the Spice Islands and a fort on the sandalwood-producing island of Solor. The Portuguese fort of St. John the Baptist on Ternate was acquired by negotiation in 1522, and when it was surrendered to the hostile local sultan, Baabullah, in 1575, a new Portuguese fort was erected by similar means on the rival island of Tidore.³ In Amboyna the Portuguese suffered many reverses, but were still clinging on tenaciously when the Dutch appeared on the scene in 1599; while in Solor the Portuguese remained relatively undisturbed from the time of their settlement in 1566 until Dutch forces under Apollonius Scotte expelled them in 1613.⁴

Such was the nature of the Portuguese "empire" in South East Asia: at one end of the East Indies lay the isolated and often disorderly garrisons of the Moluccas and Solor; two thousand miles to the west was the fortress of Malacca, unable to do much to assist the other outposts and often extremely hard-pressed by Achinese, Javanese or Malay attacks.⁵ The Portuguese were never in a position to enforce even a limited control of the commerce of the area and the factors of the crown contented themselves with providing a ship-load of spices and a limited quantity of sandalwood each season. Furthermore, after the opening of Portuguese trade with Japan in 1543 and the cession of Macao to Portugal by the Chinese in 1557, Portuguese energies were concentrated primarily on the lucrative interchange of Chinese silk and Japanese silver and even the once-fabulous spice trade became of secondary importance. This development did not detract from the importance of Malacca in Portuguese eyes. On the con-

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2. P.A. Tiele: "De Europeers in den Maleischen Archipel, pt.1" in *Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde van Nederlandsch-Indië*, 25, Hague, 1877, pp. 397-400.
 3. For an account of Portuguese activities in the Moluccas vide P.A. Tiele, *op. cit.*, pts. 1, 2, 3, 4, in *Bijdragen*, 25, 27, 28, (The Hague, 1877, 1879, 1880) *passim*.
 4. C.R. Boxer: *Fidalgos in the Far East, 1550-1770*, The Hague, 1948, pp. 174-177.
 5. Attacks of major importance were made on Malacca by Aceh, Johore or Japara in 1513, 1537, 1539, 1547, 1551, 1568, 1573, 1574, 1575, 1587.

trary, it enhanced it. In its voyage from Goa to Macao and Nagasaki, the Portuguese *Nao* or galleon touched at Malacca to land some of its cargo of Indian piece-goods and to pick up the local commodities which had been collected for dispatch to the Far East; the ship also touched at Malacca on the return voyage.⁶

The commercial contribution of Malacca to the Far Eastern trade, however, was far outweighed by the strategic function of the fortress in keeping the main sea-lane to China and Japan open for the passage of the *Nao*. Before the coming of the Protestant nations of Europe to Asia, the captain-major of the *Nao* could navigate the Indian Ocean and the China Sea with impunity; the only section of his course where an attack upon his vessel was likely to take place was during the voyage down Malacca Strait and in the passage through Singapore Strait and around the tip of Johore. It was the duty of the captain of Malacca to maintain local naval supremacy in those areas. According to Barretto de Resende's *Livro do Estado da India Oriental*, it was the custom for several galleys from Malacca to rendezvous with the merchant ships from Goa at Penang in May, to await those from Coromandel at Junk Ceylon in September, and to proceed to Singapore Strait at the end of the year to offer protection to the ships from the Far East.⁷ Most of the naval engagements which the Portuguese fought in Malayan waters in the sixteenth century occurred because the Achinese or the Malays operating from Kuala Kedah or Muar or Kuala Johore threatened the safety of the *Nao* or the galleons from India.⁸ On these occasions the Portuguese squadron

6. C.R. Boxer: *Fidalgos in the Far East, 1550-1770*, p. 15.

7. W.G. Maxwell: "Barretto de Resende's Account of Malacca", *JSEBRAS*, 60, 1911, p. 6.

8. Notable examples of this are the victories of d'Esá over the Achinese fleet in Kuala Kedah in 1547, and of Mathias de Albuquerque over the Siri Maharaja Lela of Aceh near Singapore in January, 1577; one might also cite the destruction of an Achinese squadron in Kedah later in 1577 and the defeat of the Achinese fleet off Changi Point in January, 1578. On occasion, Portuguese naval superiority was used to drive away competing traders from the tin ports, e.g. in Perak in 1613. Vide R.O. Winstedt: "A History of Malaya", *JMBRAS*, 13, (1), pp. 78-79; I.A. Macgregor: "A Sea Fight near Singapore in the 1570's", *JMBRAS*, 29, (3), pp. 5-19; Sir William Foster: *The Voyage of Thomas Best to the East Indies, 1612-1614*, Hakluyt Soc., London, 1934, p. 256. Similarly, Portuguese naval operations against Johore in 1586 were primarily designed to protect ships from China and the Moluccas. Vide Macgregor: "Johore Lama in the Sixteenth Century", *JMBRAS*, 28, (2), 1955, pp. 96-97, 99.

invariably emerged victorious, but the Portuguese certainly did not belittle the valour of their opponents. On the contrary, in the 1570's when an *entente* between Johore, Aceh and Japara enabled Javanese and Achinese fleets to use the Johore river as a base for attacks on Portuguese shipping and Malacca itself, and again in 1586-1587 when Johore alone took the offensive, the task of keeping the sea-lanes clear proved beyond the ability of the resident squadron at Malacca. Emergency measures had to be taken in Lisbon and Goa.⁹ These measures proved effective, but the Portuguese main fleet assumed as a result the role of a rather harrassed fire-brigade, rushing from one danger area to another — from Goa to Malacca and back to Colombo — without being able to remain long enough in one locality to ensure a decisive victory. In these circumstances, the duty of the captain of Malacca to send succour to the hard-pressed garrisons of the Moluccas was suspended. Left without reinforcements for three years, the Portuguese commandant in the Moluccas, Azambuja, was clinging desperately to his remaining foothold at Tidore, when news of the unification of the crowns of Spain and Portugal under Philip II in 1580 induced him to seek assistance from the Philippines.¹⁰

The surprising fact about the Portuguese empire is not that it ultimately collapsed under the additional pressure of Anglo-Dutch attacks in the seventeenth century, but that it survived for so long the hostility of its powerful Asian neighbours. It is not necessary to draw an exaggerated picture of fresh, clean-living Protestant seamen attacking decadent and corrupt Portuguese garrisons if this simple fact is kept in mind. Portugal was a very small and not particularly wealthy nation. Its empire in the East stretched across some thousands of miles of sea and Portuguese commitments in other parts of the world, particularly in Africa and South America, were equally heavy. The impetus of the initial Portuguese onslaught on Asia could not be maintained for long simply because existing reserves of manpower were quickly stretched to the limit to hold the lengthening chain of fortresses and

9. I.A. Macgregor: "A Sea Fight near Singapore in the 1570's" in *JMBRAS*, 29, part 3, 1956, p. 7; also "Johore Lama in the Sixteenth Century", *loc. cit.*, pp. 86-87, 96f.

10. News of the unification was brought by a ship sent from Manila by Don Gonzalo Ronquillo de Penalosa in March, 1582 but Azambuja hesitated for three months before his pride would allow him to appeal to the Spaniards. Vide P.A. Tiele: "De Europeers in den Maleischen Archipel", part 5, in *Bijdragen*, 29, The Hague, 1881, pp. 178-179.

safeguard communications between them. In South East Asia the Portuguese were largely on the defensive by 1530, by which time their ill-conceived intervention in Java and northern Sumatra had been repulsed by the sultans of Demak and Acheh respectively.¹¹ Thereafter, political or military action for its own sake, i.e. as a simple method of aggrandizement or a means of acquiring glory, lost its appeal for the more responsible officers of the government at Malacca;¹² the odds were recognised to be too heavy, and unless Portuguese commercial interests were clearly in danger, the initiative in a resort to arms invariably lay with the Asian sultanates.¹³ For the rest of the century the Portuguese were primarily concerned to hold what they had won and the fact that they succeeded in this aim is sufficient commentary on their fighting qualities; but it must be recognised that this defensive attitude inevitably reduced their significance as a political force in the life of the Malay states. The power which dominated the Malay scene and inspired the greatest fear in Malay and Portuguese hearts alike in the second half of the sixteenth century and, indeed, for the first forty years of the seventeenth century, was Acheh.¹⁴ Had

11. P.A. Tiele: "De Europeers. .", part 1, in *Bijsdragen*, 25, 1877, pp. 366-370, 384-386, 397-400.
12. It is significant that Pero de Faria, the Captain of Malacca in 1539-1542, refused to sanction the use of Portuguese troops to assist the minor kingdoms of N. Sumatra threatened by Acheh and that the Queen of Aru was compelled to turn to the Sultan of Johore for help instead.
13. Admittedly, several projects for the invasion of Acheh were drawn up in Goa in the second half of the sixteenth century, but the viceroy was never able to concentrate sufficient military and naval strength to make them a practical possibility. No Portuguese attack was made on Acheh itself after 1521, when Jorge de Brito and seventy of his men were killed in an abortive attempt to capture the city.
14. Achinese aggressiveness tended to be spasmodic, dependent on the calibre of the reigning sultan and the absence of internal dynastic disputes. All Mughayat Shah, the first of the line, consolidated his power in north Sumatra by destroying a Portuguese force at Pedir in 1522 and expelling the Portuguese garrison at Pasel in 1524. Sultan Ala'ud-din Riayat Shah al-Qahhar (1537-1568) attacked Aru in 1540 and burned part of Malacca in 1547, before relapsing into temporary inactivity after his defeats at the hands of Johore and the Portuguese respectively. He took his revenge in 1564 by devastating Johore Lama and carrying off the sultan to be put to death in Acheh — a fate which must have been equally, if not more, terrifying, to the unfortunate recipients, than the vaunted sack of Johore Lama by the Portuguese in 1587. Furthermore, it must be remembered that the Achinese were able to repeat the exploit at Batu Sawar in 1613. Achinese forces also attacked Malacca in 1568, 1573, 1575, 1615 and 1629, as well as Batu Pahat in 1570 and Johore Lama, unsuccessfully this time, in 1582.

not the sultan of Johore considered the ambition of Acheh to be so insatiable and dangerous as to preclude the possibility of an alliance with that state, there is little doubt that the Portuguese garrison at Malacca could not have survived.

The amalgamation of the monarchies of Spain and Portugal in 1580 proved a mixed blessing to the Portuguese eastern empire. For some years Philip II had been trying to suppress his rebellious subjects in the northern provinces of the Netherlands and his assumption of sovereignty over the Portuguese colonies automatically rendered those places liable to Dutch attack. The closing of the ports of the Iberian peninsula to Dutch shipping in 1594 gave the merchants of Amsterdam and other Dutch cities an added incentive to seek in Asia itself the goods they had previously bought at second hand in Lisbon or Seville. In 1596 the first Dutch fleet, fitted out by private adventurers, reached Java and was followed by many other independent expeditions, until the Hollanders attained a much-needed unity in March 1602 by forming their East India Company. This step came at an opportune moment, for the Iberians were already contemplating joint action to expel the Dutch intruder. Contrary to common belief, the struggle between the protestant and catholic powers in the East was a severe and prolonged one, in which the Dutch suffered several defeats, particularly at the hands of the capable Spanish governors of Manila.¹⁵ It was not until 1613 that the Dutch could be said to have gained the upper hand in the Spice Islands, because although the Portuguese were finally ousted from Amboyna and Tidore in 1605, a Spanish counter-attack in 1606 more than restored the position. As a matter of fact the Spaniards hung on tenaciously in the Moluccas until they withdrew of their own accord in 1663.

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15. Van Noort was defeated off Luzon by Antonio de Morga in December, 1600; Franz Wittert was defeated and killed by Juan de Silva's galleons off Playa Honda in April, 1610, and Jan Dircksz. Lam's squadron was overwhelmed at the same spot in April, 1617. The Dutch admiral van Caerden was twice captured by Spanish fleets, in September, 1608, and July, 1610. Furthermore, the successes of governor Pedro de Acuna in Tidore and Ternate in April, 1606, gravely upset Dutch plans. Vide: H.E.J. Stanley (ed): *The Philippine Islands* . . . (Hakluyt Soc.), London, 1868, pp. 149-173, 249-258; J.K.J. de Jonge: *De Opkomst van het Nederlandsch Gezag in Oost-Indie*, Hague & Amsterdam, 1865, III, pp. 67, 265-266, 270-271; C.R. Boxer: "Portuguese and Spanish Rivalry in the Far East during the 17th Century", *JRAS*, London, 1946, pp. 152-153, 157.

In the Strait of Malacca the Dutch were even less successful. Although the Portuguese suffered heavy naval losses there at the hands of Cornelis Matelieff de Jonge in 1606, Dom Martim Affonso de Castro, the viceroy of India, successfully relieved the hard-pressed garrison of Malacca. Two years later the Dutch admiral Verhoeff did not even dare to make an attack on the town. Indeed, the sultan of Johore felt himself to be so inadequately supported by the Dutch Company that he made peace with the Portuguese in October 1610. As late as 1615 there was still a considerable danger of the Dutch position in the East Indies being completely overwhelmed by a combined Hispano-Portuguese fleet which was to rendezvous at Malacca. Fortunately, two separate attacks on Malacca by Iskander Muda of Aceh (1607-1636) and the Dutch commander, Steven van der Hagen, resulted in the destruction of the four Portuguese galleons waiting there for the arrival of the main fleet from the Philippines. The death of the vigorous Spanish governor, Juan de Silva, at Malacca in April 1616 removed the most ardent exponent of the combined offensive and the Portuguese were henceforth left to work their own salvation.¹⁶ As late as 1630 Portuguese squadrons were still able to make raids against Dutch and British shipping as far south as Jambi in eastern Sumatra,¹⁷ but thereafter the Dutch could reasonably claim to have established that naval supremacy in the Strait which made possible their conquest of starving Malacca in January, 1641.¹⁸

Little has been said of the contribution of the English Company to the destruction of Portuguese power in the East because it was relatively insignificant compared to the vigorous efforts of the much more powerful Dutch Company. James Lancaster assisted the Dutch commander Spilbergen in the capture of a Portuguese galleon in

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16. C.R. Boxer; "The Affair of the Madre de Deus" in *Transactions and Proceedings of the Japan Society*, London, XXVI, 1928-1929. Also "Portuguese and Spanish Rivalry in the Far East during the 17th Century" by the same author in *JRAS*, London, 1946, pp. 152-155.
 17. P.A. Tiele & J.E. Heeres: *Bouwstoffen voor de Geschiedenis der Nederlanders in den Maleischen Archipel*, II, The Hague, 1890, pp. xxix-xxxI, 166-167, 169-172. The raid was made by Dom Nuno Alvares Botelho, who had shattered the Achinese fleet attacking Malacca in 1629. Botelho was killed during the action at Jambi.
 18. For the events leading to the fall of Malacca vide P.A. Leupe: "The Siege and Capture of Malacca from the Portuguese in 1640-1641" in *JMBRAS*, 14, part 1, 1936.

Malacca Strait in 1602,¹⁹ but two years later James I ratified a treaty of peace between England and Spain and the Englishmen in Asia were henceforth forbidden to fight the Catholic powers unless they were themselves attacked. In 1612 and 1614 the English captains Best and Downton inflicted severe defeats on two Portuguese fleets which attacked them at Swally in western India, but the victories were the result of extreme provocation rather than design. Even had the English Company not been bound by the peace treaty of 1604, it would have adhered to a policy of peaceful trade rather than one of aggression. Its resources were very meagre and for some years after the establishment of the company in 1600, the directors were primarily interested in developing English commerce over as wide an area of Asia as possible, spurred on by their anxiety to sell English woollen manufactures. By 1613 there were English factories, or trading posts, in Surat, on the Coromandel coast of India, in Sumatra, Borneo, Java, Celebes, Siam, Patani and Japan. Patani was the nearest point these early English adventurers came to the boundaries of present day Malaya and the English factory there, opened by two Dutchmen in English pay in 1612, was intended to supply commodities for the markets of Coromandel and Japan.²⁰ Unlike the Dutch, who were anxious to oust the Portuguese from Malacca, the English merchants had no particular reason to be interested in any of the Malay states and their rather slender capital was already committed to more profitable enterprizes in other parts of Asia.

The withdrawal of England from its traditional alliance with the Netherlands against Spain and Portugal after 1604 was viewed with dismay and disgust by the Dutchmen in Asia, who were not inclined to share the fruits of their victories there with a nation which they felt had basely deserted them. As the Dutch Company drove the Portuguese and Spanish garrisons from most of the coveted Spice Islands, it sought to secure a monopoly of spice cultivation for itself by concluding a series of treaties with the local Asian rulers. The validity of these

19. Sir W. Foster(ed): *The Voyages of Sir James Lancaster to Brazil and the East Indies, 1591-1603*, Hakluyt Society, London, 1940, pp. 105-108. Lancaster was the admiral of the first expedition sent by the English East India Company to Asia. He had made a previous voyage to eastern seas as a private adventurer, in the course of which he visited Penang in 1591. He was therefore in all probability the first Englishman to visit Malaya. *Op. cit.*, pp. 10, 23.
20. W.H. Moreland (ed): *Peter Floris: His Voyage to the East Indies in the 'Globe', 1611-1615*, Hakluyt Soc., London, 1934.

agreements was hotly denied by the English president at Bantam and between 1615 and 1619 the English Company made vigorous, but largely unsuccessful, attempts to resist Dutch claims in the Banda group. Relations between the servants of the two East India companies became so strained that war broke out between them in Java in December 1618, in the course of which the English suffered severe losses in ships and men, including their president, John Jourdain, who was killed in an engagement at Patani.²¹ Hostilities were finally concluded by news of an Anglo-Dutch Treaty of Defence signed in London in July, 1619, by which the companies were to combine forces to attack the Iberian powers in Asia and were to divide the spice trade between them, the English Company receiving one third of the annual crop and paying a proportionate share of fortress charges in the Spice Islands. In addition the English Company was to bear one half of the cost of maintaining the Dutch fort at Pulicat on the Coromandel coast.

This arrangement proved unsatisfactory to both parties. The Dutch governor-general, Jan Pietersz. Coen, was furious at the concessions made by his employers to the English Company, while the English factors resented being placed under Dutch jurisdiction in the new colony of Batavia. It also became apparent that English finances were incapable of meeting both their commercial needs and their military commitments under the Treaty of Defence. Early in 1623, the decision was taken to reduce English expenses by withdrawing the English factories from the Spice Islands, Japan, Siam, Patani and Pulicat. But before any further steps could be taken news reached Batavia in June, 1623, that the Dutch governor of Amboyna had seized, tortured and executed ten Englishmen on a charge of conspiring to capture the Dutch fortress there. This "Amboyna Massacre", as it came to be called, imposed a severe strain on Anglo-Dutch relations in Europe and Asia, but it is important to realise that the tragedy did no more than confirm the previous English decision to abandon as many unprofitable factories as possible. The Far Eastern factories, in particular, had

21. The best account of Anglo-Dutch rivalry in the East Indies prior to 1623 will be found in Sir W. Foster: *England's Quest of Eastern Trade*, London, 1933. For the negotiations in Europe which led to the Treaty of Defence vide: G.N. Clark & W.J.M. van Eysinga: *The Colonial Conferences between England and the Netherlands in 1618 and 1615*, 2 vols., (Bibliotheca Visseriana XV and XVII), Leiden, 1940, 1951.

been showing a loss for some time. The English merchants in Japan, Siam and Patani returned to Java during the first six months of 1624. The English survivors in the Spice Islands were likewise recalled.

In the case of the Far Eastern factories the English withdrawal was intended to be final, but the English Company hoped eventually to regain a foothold in the Spice Islands by taking possession of Pulo Run in the Bandas, which had been granted to it by the Anglo-Dutch Accord, signed in London in January, 1623.²² The Dutch directors in Amsterdam proved themselves masters of evasion during the next forty years and it was not until March, 1665, that the English Company formally took possession of Pulo Run, only to lose it almost immediately to a Dutch force in the second Anglo-Dutch war. The Dutch Company was confirmed in its conquest of the island by the treaty of Breda in 1667 and thereafter all English connection with the Spice Islands proper came to an end.

The position of the English Company in the rest of the East Indies remained much stronger after the "Amboyna Massacre" than is generally realised. In 1628 the English president and his staff at Batavia finally broke with their nominal allies, the Dutch, and returned to their old headquarters at Bantam, fifty miles to the westward. From here the president, or agent as he was called after the transfer of the presidency to Madras in 1652, continued to supervise a limited but lucrative trade throughout the archipelago. Until 1650, or thereabouts, the principal source of the English Company's pepper in the East Indies was Jambi in eastern Sumatra, where a factory was maintained until its destruction by the army of Johore in 1679. Another English pepper factory was maintained, with occasional interruptions, at Banjermasin or Martapura in southern Borneo from 1635 until 1651. Several attempts were also made to open trade relations with Indragiri and Palembang in eastern Sumatra and with Silebar and other ports on the west coast of the same island; but these ventures were not particularly promising and during the 1660's the Dutch effectively asserted their monopoly of trade in those kingdoms, with the exception of Silebar. The first really serious blow to English trade in the East

22. E.B. Sainsbury(ed): *A Calendar of the Court Minutes of the East India Company, 1635-1639*, Oxford, 1907, pp. xxx-xxxii. References to the various abortive attempts to occupy Pulo Run will be found scattered throughout the series, culminating in the final cession and loss of the island, vide op. cit., 1664-1667, Oxford, 1925, pp. ix-x, xxiii.

Indies was not struck until 1667, when the Dutch defeated the sultanate of Macassar in Celebes and expelled all other Europeans, including the English, who had been there since 1613. Finally, in 1682 Bantam itself, which had threatened to rival Batavia as a great commercial centre, fell to an invading Dutch army as the result of an internal dynastic conflict and the English factors withdrew outside Sunda Strait to Bencoolen on the west coast of Sumatra (1684).

Despite the need to draw the attention of the reader to the surprising scope and vigour of British activities in the East Indies after 1623, it is not intended to suggest that the Indonesian branch of the English Company's trade was henceforth as important as its commerce in India. On the contrary, there is little doubt that the Company would ultimately have concentrated its investments in India even had the "Amboyna Massacre" never occurred. The market for spices in Europe was very limited and the primary objective of the Company in the early years of its existence — the sale of woollen cloth and other national manufactures — was more likely to be achieved in Cambay, Coromandel or Bengal than in island South East Asia. Nevertheless, it is important to realise that it was the inherent attraction of the Indian market rather than the emergence of the Dutch Company as the dominant power in the East Indies that lured the English organization towards India and, ultimately, led it to the acquisition of a territorial dominion on the mainland. Certainly, the view that the "Massacre of Amboyna" resulted in a neat and compulsory demarcation of political and commercial spheres between the English and Dutch in Asia is a gross over-simplification. The European factors of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries did not think in such terms and they were prepared to drive their employers' trade in any corner of Asia if the opportunity offered.

Between the two main areas of English commercial activity in the seventeenth century — India, with its branches of the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf, on the one hand, and the East Indies on the other — lay the kingdoms of mainland South East Asia. In some of them, particularly Burma, Siam, Cambodia and Tongking, the English took a spasmodic interest after 1623, usually with unfortunate results.²³ The Malay peninsula attracted

23. A factory was opened at Syriam in Burma by the East India Company in 1647 but was closed down ten years later as unprofitable. Almost simultaneously an unauthorised settlement

little attention, however, and this attitude of indifference requires some explanation. The suggestion that the East India Company lacked the capital resources to undertake an expansion of trade to that area needs to be approached with caution. It is true that the thirty odd years before 1657 were the darkest the English Company ever faced. The failure of the Stuarts to give effective support to the Company against the Dutch in the six years after the Amboyna disaster almost led to the abandonment of the trade in South East Asia; the deliberate flouting of the Company's monopoly of English trade with Asia by the interlopers of Courteen's Association in and after 1636 also aroused great bitterness among the adventurers of the East India Company;²⁴ nor did the constitutional troubles in England and the subsequent outbreak of the civil war between Charles I and Parliament make capital any easier to find. Nevertheless, although the directors of the East India Company were subject to severe fits of depression, they adapted themselves to each setback in turn and their trade in Asia achieved a remarkable level of prosperity between 1636 and 1650, bearing in mind the difficulties under which it was pursued. It was not until March, 1647, when the House of Lords rejected the Company's petition for the safeguarding of its monopoly and thus threw open the door for *all* Englishmen who wished to seek wealth in the East, that the governor and deputy-governor of the Company concurred with the general body of adventurers in recommending the

which the Bantam presidency had opened at Lauweck in Cambodia in 1651 was abandoned by order of the surprised court of committees in London. Two voyages were made by the ships *Hopewell* and *Madras Merchant* from India to Siam in 1661-1663, but a permanent factory was not opened at Ayuthia until 1674. The corruption of the Company's employees and the unprofitable nature of the trade in Siam led to the abandonment of the enterprise in 1684. Finally, in 1672, a settlement was made in Tongking to supply the prospective Japan factory with silk, but English admission to Japan was refused and after trying for some years to adapt Tongkinese silk patterns to the London demand, the directors closed this factory too in 1697.

24. An account of the formation of Courteen's Association will be found in E.B. Sainsbury: *Court Minutes, 1635-1639*, p. xvi et seq. Courteen himself fled abroad bankrupt in 1645, but other merchants, led by Maurice Thomson, took his place. For the activities of the Association vide Sainsbury, *Court Minutes, 1635-1654*, Oxford, 1907-1913, *passim*, and Sir William Foster: *The English Factories in India, 1634-1654*, Oxford, 1911-1915.

complete abandonment of the trade with Asia.²⁵ Before that time the senior members of the court of committees, which supervised the affairs of the Company, had always used their influence to persuade their disgruntled associates to continue their activities in the hope of better times.

It would therefore be safer to attribute the infrequency of English ventures to the Malay states to a lack of enthusiasm, arising from the unattractiveness of the trade in that area, rather than to a lack of capital. There is considerable support for this interpretation, not only in the apparent ease with which the servants of the Company were able to find the funds to begin trade in Burma and Cambodia between 1647 and 1651, but more specifically in the fact that Philip Wylde was instructed to investigate the prospects of trade in Perak and Johore in 1647, using the nearby English factory at Acheh as a base of operations. Wylde discovered that the Queen of Acheh was not prepared to let him visit her vassal state of Perak lest it damage Achinese relations with the Dutch Company, which was then pressing for a monopoly of tin production in Perak. He therefore passed on to Johore in July 1647, but his short stay there convinced him that the severe competition of Indian and Malay merchants would give the English Company little opportunity of making a profit. The project was abandoned immediately.²⁶

Ten years later, in 1657, Oliver Cromwell at last gave to the East India Company the state support it had always sought in the shape of a new charter conceding it a monopoly of trade with Asia; this grant was renewed by the restored Charles II in April 1661, and confidence in the future of the company was never seriously shaken thereafter. In 1669 the *Little Charles* sailed from Surat bound for Kedah to purchase tin and investigate conditions in this hitherto unexplored kingdom. The results were disappointing, but the *George* sailed for the same destination in April 1670, and the Surat presidency persevered for

25. India Office, London. Court Book 20, ff. 86. 89. Minutes of the court of committees, held 17 March, 1646/47 (O.S.) and the general court held two days later. In this latter meeting, the veteran governor, William Cockayne, and deputy governor, William Methwold, concurred that it would be wise to withdraw the Company's capital from Asia in view of the lack of state support.

26. W. Foster: *English Factories in India, 1646-1650*, Oxford, 1914, pp. 168-170, 210.

about six years thereafter.²⁷ The quantity of tin obtained was negligible and the trade eventually died a natural and unlamented death. Hence even in its moments of great prosperity, the English Company evinced little serious interest in the Malay peninsula.

It was not surprising that the English Company should seek to obtain tin in its occasional ventures to the west coast of Malaya, for this metal was the only important commodity offered by those states. Unfortunately, the Dutch authorities at Batavia were equally aware of this fact and their interest in securing large quantities of tin was much greater than that of their English rivals. Immediately after the conquest of Malacca from the Portuguese in January, 1641, the Dutch Company took steps to enforce a monopoly of tin exports from the Malay peninsula in much the same fashion as it had once done with spices in the Moluccas, but by somewhat less violent means. Between 1642 and 1659, by dint of straightforward negotiation, political pressure and maritime blockade, the Dutch Company concluded treaties with Banggeri, Ujong Salang (Junk Ceylon), Kedah, Perak and Acheh by which one half, or in most cases all, the tin produced in the first four of these kingdoms was promised to the Hollanders.²⁸ Considerable quantities of tin were purchased by the Dutch Company and exported to Surat, the Netherlands or China, but the Indian merchants, who had proved so troublesome to the English factors in Johore in 1647 and in Kedah in 1669, aroused even greater fury in Dutch hearts by their blatant smuggling of most of the tin output. Not all the threats of the government at Malacca, supported by patrolling sloops in the strait, could prevent this traffic, and the situation deteriorated rather than improved as Dutch commitments in Java increased and the financial and maritime strength of the Company declined.

With the coming of the eighteenth century, European trade with China began to grow apace and tin became

27. Sir W. Foster: *English Factories in India, 1668-1669*, Oxford, 1927, pp. 25, 180, 205, 289; also Sir C. Fawcett: *op. cit.*, Vol. I, (New Series), *The Western Presidency, 1670-1677*, Oxford, 1936, pp. 188, 189, 191, 209, 218, 246, 264.

28. The texts of these treaties will be found under the headings of "Malakka" or "Malakka-Atjeh" in J.E. Heeres: *Corpus Diplomaticum Neerlandico-Indicum*, parts I & II, published in *Bijdragen tot het Taal-, Land-, en Volkenkunde van Nederlandsch-Indie*, 57 and 87, The Hague, 1907, 1931. Half of the tin of Perak was to be surrendered to Acheh, as the overlord, and half to the Dutch Company.

even more desirable as a much needed alternative to silver in the Canton import market. Although the English Company ultimately found a remedy for the irritating self-sufficiency of the Chinese in their growing desire for the opium of Bengal, the English demand for the tin of the west coast of Malaya or Banka remained a constant one in the fifty or sixty years before the founding of Penang. It was this commercial need which did much to revive the long-dormant English interest in the Malay peninsula.

For about a century after the failure of the English Company's venture in Kedah in 1669-1676, English contacts with the various kingdoms of the Malay peninsula were maintained, as far as one can tell, by the "country" trader operating from Madras or Bengal. As early as 1673 one of these gentlemen of fortune, Edward Lock, was killed during the Jambinese raid on the capital of Johore and his ship and goods were confiscated by the invaders.²⁹ Sixty odd years later, the Dutch governor of Malacca, Rogier de Laver, found himself virtually powerless to prevent the wholesale purchase of tin by English private merchants in the Linggi and Selangor rivers and in Kedah, while it is interesting to record that even in 1737 several English sea captains were carrying on trade with Trengganu.³⁰ Information on the activities of these men during the eighteenth century is very fragmentary, but there does not appear any reason to doubt that Francis Light was simply the last and the most famous of a long succession of Englishmen who maintained unofficial connections with the Malay states at a time when the East India Company had lost all interest in the peninsula.

Irritating as these incursions into their tin monopoly were to the Dutch authorities, of far greater and more immediate concern to them was the growing predominance of the Buginese in the Strait of Malacca and in the west coast states of Malaya. These redoubtable seafarers, originating from south west Celebes, had found their usual commercial enterprizes curtailed in that area

29. India Office, London. Factory Records, Java, vol. IV, ff. 101, 110-111. Bantam Agency to Company, 8 Nov., 1673 and 5 Oct., 1674. (O.S.).

30. D.K. Bassett: "Malacca in 1737" in *The Historical Annual*, No. 3, University of Malaya Historical Society, Singapore, 1957. The *Wakefield* (Capt. Henry Cleave) and the *Britain* (Capt. John Horder) passed through Malacca in that year bound from Bengal to Trengganu.

after the Dutch subjugation of Macassar in 1667. The Buginese, under the leadership of Aru Palakka, had assisted in the defeat of the Macassar sultanate because of a long-standing feud with its ruler, but the consequent Dutch monopoly of trade was as injurious to their interests as to those of the other non-Dutch merchants. For some time the Buginese found employment as auxiliary troops of the Netherlands Company, serving in western Sumatra and Java, but the more restless spirits gravitated independently to the Malay archipelago. As early as 1700 the Buginese were firmly settled in Selangor.

In 1717 they assisted the adventurer Raja Kechil in his attack on Riau, the capital of the Johore empire, as a result of which the reigning sultan, Abdul Jalil Rajat Shah, was deposed and reduced to his ancient rank of bandahara, only to be killed subsequently while fleeing to Pahang. Finally, in 1722, annoyed by the failure of Raja Kechil to reward them as expected, the Buginese transferred their support to the dead sultan's son, Raja Sulaiman, expelled Raja Kechil to Siak, and installed themselves as the power behind the throne in Riau.³¹

Every effort of the new sultan Sulaiman to assert himself against Buginese tutelage failed miserably and from their twin bases of Riau and Selangor, the Buginese, led by Daing Parani, Daing Chelak and Daing Camboja, extended their influence over most of the west coast. The Dutch government at Batavia watched this development with considerable misgiving, but could not afford to indulge in the luxury of a war. It was not until 1756 that it finally committed itself to an offensive alliance with sultan Sulaiman against the Buginese, in return for a joint monopoly of the trade of Siak and a complete monopoly of the tin produced in Selangor, Klang and Linggi.³² After two years hard fighting, the Buginese general, Daing Camboja, was compelled to seek peace at Dutch hands, but the victory proved a hollow one. The government at Batavia was not prepared to give moral support to sultan Sulaiman by establishing a garrison at Riau and in 1760 the demoralised ruler invited the Buginese to return to Riau from their new base at Linggi. Sulaiman died in August of the same year and his son died in Selangor in January, 1761, while on his way to meet Daing Camboja.

31. E. Netscher: *De Nederlanders in Djohor en Siak, 1602 tot 1865*, Batavia, 1870, pp. 50-54; R.O. Winstedt: "A History of Malaya", *JMBRAS*, 13, part 1, 1935, pp. 149-151.

32. Netscher, *op. cit.*, pp. 84-85.

With both the rulers of the Johore empire conveniently removed from the scene in a few months, it was very easy for Daing Camboja to overawe the Malays by bringing his fleet to Riau in February, 1761. A succession of sultans, usually underage, came to the throne in Riau thereafter, but Daing Camboja and his successor, Raja Haji, held the reins of government firmly for the next twenty-three years. The Dutch Company had been completely outmanoeuvred, and in 1770-1771, it watched helplessly when the Buginese browbeat the sultan of Perak and drove the sultan of Kedah out of Alor Star into Perlis.³³

It was at this juncture that Francis Light visited Kedah as the agent of the Madras firm of Jourdain, Sullivan and De Souza. The fugitive and frightened sultan had already appealed for military assistance against Selangor to the council of the East India Company at Madras, but had received nothing more tangible than expressions of friendship and esteem. In desperation, he now offered the seaport of Kuala Kedah to Light's employers if they would fulfil the role formerly expected of the Company, but they, and the association of Madras traders of which they formed part, showed little interest.³⁴ By February, 1772, the attitude of the East India Company to the sultan's proposals had undergone a definite change. Instructions had been received from the board of directors in London that an attempt was to be made to open a settlement at Aceh in northern Sumatra, but the Madras council decided, on the basis of Light's reports forwarded by Jourdain, Sullivan and De Souza, that Kedah offered greater attractions. Nevertheless, a mission, headed by Charles Desvoeux, was sent to Aceh as originally intended in February, 1772, while the Hon. Edward Monckton set out simultaneously for Kedah. Desvoeux's embassy ended in failure because of the hostility of the Achinese; Monckton might have been more fortunate but for the refusal of the East India Company to commit itself to anything more than a *defensive* alliance with Kedah. When the limitation imposed on Monckton by the Madras council became known to the sultan, who wanted a combined attack made on Selangor, he withdrew the concessions he had already made. There ceased to be any point in further negotiation. Monckton proceeded on another mission to Riau, while a very disappointed Francis Light

33. Netscher: *op. cit.*, pp. 96, 107-110, 166-169; Winstedt: *op. cit.*, pp. 154-156.

34. H.P. Clodd: *Malaya's First British Pioneer: The Life of Francis Light*, London, 1948, pp. 7-13.

retired to the island of Junk Ceylon.³⁵

Light's anxiety to obtain some sort of territorial concession in Kedah sprang largely from local considerations. He feared that a failure by the English Company to help the sultan would force him into making similar overtures to the Dutch government at Malacca, to the detriment of English trade in the Malay states. On the other hand, Light cannot have been oblivious of the much wider interests and requirements of the English East India Company, to which the missions of Monckton and Des Voeux represented only one phase of a prolonged and extensive quest. It is probable that the argument of Light which most influenced the Madras council in sending Monckton to Kedah was his suggestion to Warren Hastings that Penang would prove an excellent depot from which to secure commodities for the China trade.³⁶ As the number of English ships voyaging to Canton multiplied in the eighteenth century, the directors in London became acutely conscious of the complete lack of an adequate refitting station between Calcutta and Canton. The Company's fort at Bencoolen in western Sumatra was too far away from the regular shipping lanes to fulfil this function and the consequent English dependence on the Dutch harbours of Malacca and Batavia was both irksome and dangerous. It was also argued in some quarters that if an English settlement was established in one of the countries lying on the South China Sea, it would quickly develop into an *entrepot* at which the commodities of China, India, South East Asia and Europe could be exchanged on more favourable terms than in Canton. Such was the contention of Alexander Dalrymple, who negotiated the cession of Balambangan to the East India Company by the sultan of Sulu in 1763, but when his employers finally sent John Herbert to undertake effective occupation of the island ten years later, the project proved a failure.

In 1775 an attack by the Suluks brought the settlement at Balambangan to an abrupt end. Dalrymple's ideas lived on, however, and in 1778 Warren Hastings, then governor-general of India, suggested that an English base in Cochin-China would have all the advantages once claimed for

35. H.P. Clodd, *op. cit.*, pp. 13-23.

36. Clodd: *op. cit.*, p.7. In their letter to the directors in February, 1772, the Madras Council expressed a preference for Kedah rather than Acheh "because we conceive the great object to be the means of supplying the China market". Quoted by Clodd, *op. cit.*, p. 13.

Balambangan without any of the hazards. Unfortunately, the mission of Charles Chapman to Annam in 1778-1779 revealed a country distracted by civil war and thereafter English interest gravitated naturally from the South China Sea to Malacca Strait and the Malay peninsula.³⁷

This was not an unexpected development, because it was only in the waters around Malaya that the Company could hope to find a site for a base which would serve as an emporium for the China trade and also solve the strategic problems created by the Anglo-French struggle for supremacy in India. Victory in the several wars which raged between England and France in India after 1744 depended, particularly in the key area of the Coromandel coast, upon control of the surrounding seas. The French were in a much better position to achieve naval supremacy because of their creation of a base in Mauritius and by reason of the facilities granted to them in Aceh and Mergui. From these ports their fleets were able to reach the Coromandel coast several months before the corresponding English squadron could arrive from Bombay, whence it had to retire to avoid the severe gales which blew off the eastern coast of India in October and November. Madras fell temporarily into French hands in 1746 because of the absence of English naval support, and the town was gravely threatened again in 1759 for much the same reason.

Strenuous efforts were being made to open an English base on the eastern side of the Bay of Bengal as early as 1752, but the settlement which the Company began at Negrais off the Burmese coast proved unsatisfactory and was, in any case, destroyed by Alaungpaya's forces in 1759. Missions to Aceh and Sunda Strait also ended in failure in 1764 and 1766. A few years later, as we have already seen, Monckton and Desvoeux had no better success in their search for a site for a settlement in Kedah and Aceh. Before Warren Hastings could act upon Francis Light's suggestion that the Company should occupy Junk Ceylon, France and England were once more plunged into war (1778). The subsequent naval campaigns in the Indian Ocean indicated yet again the tactical advantages

37. The best account of the various projects advanced by Dalrymple, Hastings and Chapman, and of the motives underlying their suggestions, will be found in V.T. Harlow: *The Founding of the Second British Empire, 1763-1793*, vol. I *Discovery and Revolution*, London, 1952, chapter III, particularly pp. 70-75, 77-81, 97-102.

held by the French. The French admiral, Suffren, was able to sweep English commerce from the Bay of Bengal while his courageous but unfortunate opponent, Hughes, was refitting his storm-battered ships at Bombay — the result of staying too long on the Coromandel coast in October, 1782. The peace of Versailles in the following year averted what might have become a very serious threat to the British empire in India and Warren Hastings emerged from the war with a determination to prevent any revival of the naval supremacy so recently achieved by Suffren.³⁸

In 1784 two envoys were dispatched from Calcutta in a quest for a site suitable for a British settlement: Kinloch was sent to Acheh and Captain Thomas Forrest set out for Riau.³⁹ The mission to Acheh failed, as all the others to that kingdom had done before it, in the face of the hostility of the sultan. In Riau, on the other hand, Forrest might have expected, under normal circumstances, to find a very cordial reception. During the government of Raja Haji, who had succeeded Daing Camboja as leader of the Buginese in the Johore empire in 1777, Riau had become the centre of a very large trade in tin, smuggled from the west coast of Malaya and from Banka. British, French, Portuguese and Chinese ships which came into Riau before August carried most of the tin then available to Canton; such tin as was imported after that month was picked up later in the year by the same European vessels on their return voyage to India.⁴⁰ The Dutch authorities at Batavia and Malacca were greatly incensed by this wholesale evasion of their monopoly and the rather artificial peace which existed between the Dutch Company and Raja Haji came to an end in February, 1782, when the governor of Malacca connived at the seizure of an English East-Indiaman in Riau Bay by a French privateer. When Forrest set out for Riau early in June, 1784, Dutch attempts to blockade or land on the island had been miserably repulsed and Raja

38. The strategic considerations underlying the British search for a base are admirably dealt with by D.G.E. Hall in *A History of South East Asia*, London, 1955, pp. 421-429, and in "From Mergui to Singapore, 1686-1819" in *Journal of the Siam Society*, XLI, part 1, July, 1953, by the same author.

39. Clodd: *Malaya's First British Pioneer*, pp. 34-35; D.G.E. Hall: *History of South East Asia*, p. 429.

40. J. de Hullu; "A.E. van Braam Houckgeest's memorie over Malakka en den tinhandel aldaar (1790)", *Bijdragen tot het Taal-, Land-, en Volkenkunde van Nederlandsch-Indie*, 76, The Hague, 1920, p. 287.

Haji was besieging Malacca itself.⁴¹

Unfortunately for the Buginese and for Forrest, the Dutch garrison soon obtained help in an unexpected fashion. Alarmed by the naval weakness shown by the Dutch Company during the fourth Anglo-Dutch war (1780-1784), the government of the Netherlands dispatched six warships to Java under the command of Jacob Pieter van Braam, intending that the squadron should then proceed to the Moluccas. After Van Braam reached Batavia in March, 1784, it was decided to divert the fleet, suitably reinforced, to relieve beleaguered Malacca and on 18 June Raja Haji had to face these overwhelming odds at Teluk Ketapang. The Buginese leader and five hundred of his men were killed in the subsequent battle and the survivors fled to Riau. In August Van Braam compelled the Buginese sultan of Selangor, Ibrahim, to seek refuge in Pahang; and at the end of October, Dutch forces expelled the Buginese from Riau itself. The island was ceded to the Dutch Company by the puppet sultan, Mahmud, grandson of the dead sultan Sulaiman, on 1 November, 1784,⁴² and all hopes of establishing an English base there came to an end.

The Dutch victory caused great alarm in Calcutta, where it appeared to portend the complete domination of the best sea route to China by the Netherlands Company. The vision of Van Braam or his successor steadily extending Dutch control up the west coast of Malaya, to the exclusion of British commerce, was also one which came readily to the minds of Warren Hastings and the future governor-general, John Macpherson.⁴³ In reality, neither fear was justified by events: in June, 1785, sultan Ibrahim drove out the Dutch garrison from the fort at Kuala Selangor and re-established himself on his throne; in May, 1787, sultan Mahmud escaped from Dutch tutelage at Riau and began the organization of an anti-Dutch

41. E. Netscher: *De Nederlanders in Djohor en Siak*, pp. 170-88; a detailed account of the Dutch war with Raja Haji will be found in Sir W.E. Maxwell: "Raja Haji", *JSBRAS*, 22, 1890, pp. 172-224; pp. 188-210 of this article consist of a translation of the Malacca Diary for the year 1784 by Mrs. Isemonger.

42. E. Netscher: *op. cit.*, pp. 188-189.

43. D.G.E. Hall: *History of South East Asia*, pp. 429-30; Clodd: *op. cit.*, p. 39. The court of directors, in their instructions to the outgoing governor-general, Lord Cornwallis, in 1786, also showed a keen awareness of the dangers of Dutch domination of the Strait; vide: V.T. Harlow & F. Madden: *British Colonial Developments, 1774-1834*, Oxford, 1953, pp. 52-54.

alliance from Pahang;⁴⁴ nor was there any real danger that the enfeebled Dutch Company, which collapsed into bankruptcy in 1799, would be able to find the naval strength to threaten the sea-route to Canton via Malacca Strait in time of war. Empires usually expand on the basis of misconceptions, however, and the founding of Penang in 1786 was no exception. In February of that year, Francis Light, succumbing to the general fear of Dutch intentions, informed the acting governor-general, the Hon. John Macpherson, that he had obtained for the East India Company the cession of the island of Penang from the sultan of Kedah. In March, it was formally resolved to accept the offer and the indefatigable Light was appointed superintendent of the proposed settlement. On 11 August, 1786, having duly negotiated a final treaty with sultan Abdullah, Light hoisted the British flag at Penang, "taking possession of the island in the name of his Britannic Majesty and for the use of the Honourable East India Company".⁴⁵

44. Netscher: *op. cit.*, pp. 212-221.

45. H.P. Clodd: *Malaya's First British Pioneer*, p. 51.

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II

Penang, 1786-1830

In honour of the Prince of Wales Penang was named Prince of Wales Island; but in spite of the use of this name in all official correspondence the native name Penang persisted. It has practically dispossessed the nominal title, and is therefore used throughout this thesis except where the name Prince of Wales Island occurs in quotations from documents. The island of Penang is about 15 miles long by 9 broad, and is very hilly, the highest point being about 2,400 feet. The harbour is formed by the channel, from 2 to 5 miles in width, which separates it from the mainland of the Peninsula. Until the Company acquired Province Wellesley, the strip of territory on the mainland facing the island, in 1800 from the Sultan of Kedah, it only controlled one side of the harbour.¹

The new settlement had many difficulties to contend with, and it was peculiarly fortunate that it possessed as its first Superintendent such a man as Francis Light. A generous tribute has been paid to him by Sir George Leith, who became Governor of Penang some six years after his death when many merchants and officials who had known and worked with him were still on the island. Leith's description may therefore be taken as substantially correct, even though he himself seems never to have had any personal relations with his predecessor. "Mr. Light was extremely well qualified, by his perfect knowledge of the language, laws and customs of the Malays, to discharge the trust imposed in him. He was also well known and much respected by the principal men in the neighbouring countries, which he had long frequented as a merchant; and what, at the period, was of still greater consequence, he possessed much personal influence with the King of Quedah."²

There is a very remarkable resemblance between Francis Light and his greater successor, Sir Stamford Raffles. They were alike in their devotion to British interests, in their hatred of the Dutch, and in the liberal yet wise and firm manner in which they conducted their administration. Both had also a wide knowledge of Malayan languages and customs, and very great influence

1. Lucas, *Hist. Geog.*, I, 201.

2. Leith, *Prince of Wales Island*, 2-3.

over the natives, the result of the respect and affection inspired by their firm but just and sympathetic attitude towards them. Light's reputation has been much overshadowed by the more brilliant attainments and greater service of the founder of Singapore; but if he had not firmly established British power on the borders of the Archipelago, Sir Stamford could never have planted the flag at its very heart. It is true that Penang never attained, and never could have attained, the importance of Singapore; from its position on the Western edge of the Eastern Archipelago this was inevitable. But unless Light had taken the first step, British Malaya would never have existed. Light's truest epitaph is found in Kipling's lines,

"After me cometh the builder,
Tell him I too have known."

When Light's squadron arrived Penang was a jungle uninhabited save by a few Malays; and he at once set to work to clear a site for a town and fort. His letters show with what energy he pushed forward the task, and in a few months a small but rapidly growing settlement had arisen.³ The garrison was weak, too weak for safety, for it consisted of only one hundred newly-raised marines, absolutely untrained, fifteen artillerymen, and thirty lascars; and Light was "in hourly dread of some mischance" arising from a dispute between his troops and the turbulent Malays who came across from the mainland.⁴

Settlers arrived very fast, in spite of Dutch attempts to prevent them. On February 1, 1787, Light wrote to his friend and supporter, Andrew Ross:—

"Did not the Dutch keep a strict watch over the Malays, most of them would leave Malacca: forty of them had prepared to come in the "Drake," but were stopped by order of the (Dutch) Government; and not a man is allowed to leave Malacca without giving security he will not go to Penang The contempt and derision with which they treat this place, and the mean dirty art they use to prevent people coming here, would dishonour any but a Dutchman."⁵

The history of Penang from 1786 to 1867 fell into

3. Wright and Reid, *Malay Peninsula*, 84-5, 79.

4. *Essays on Indo-China*, Series I, Vol. 1, p. 27.

5. *Ibid.*, 29-31.

four periods. During the first of these, from 1786 to 1805, the island was a dependency of Bengal, and at least until about 1799 was more or less on trial. On several occasions it appeared not at all improbable that the settlement would be abandoned. From about 1799 to 1805 the value of Penang was recognized; and great, in some cases extravagant and ill-founded, expectations were formed of it. The culmination of this period of optimism came when in 1805 Penang was created the fourth Indian Presidency, with a large staff of officials. 1805 to 1826 may be described as the period of disillusion. The high hopes which had arisen were soon disappointed, and as in the case of Bencoolen, the Directors became more and more dissatisfied with the heavy and unremunerative expense which the settlement entailed. The foundation of Singapore in 1819 strengthened this attitude, since the commerce of Penang, and in consequence its revenues, which were derived largely from customs duties, suffered severely from the competition of the new trading centre. The third period began in 1826 when Malacca and Singapore were transferred from Bengal to the control of Penang, and for four years more the Eastern Presidency was given a chance to justify its existence. Finally however the heavy and unremunerative expenditure required by Malacca and Penang exhausted the patience of the Directors. In 1830 the Presidency was abolished, the staff of officials and the expenditure were greatly cut down, and the Straits Settlements were reduced to the rank of a Residency. For a few years longer the centre of administration remained at Penang, but the rapid growth of the trade of Singapore soon made it the principal station, and in 1832 the capital was transferred to it. During the fourth period, from 1830 to 1867, Penang and Malacca gradually sank to a position of less and less importance as compared with Singapore, until its history became almost the history of the Straits Settlements.

During the first period, from 1786 to 1805, the history of Penang fell into four main divisions:—

- (1) The long discussion as to whether it provided a suitable naval base, ending in the abortive decision that it was an excellent site for it.
- (2) The question of the terms on which Penang was ceded. This gave rise to a long and bitter controversy as to whether the Company were or were not bound to defend the Sultan of Kedah against his tyrannical suzerain, Siam.

- (3) The rapid growth of population and trade, which led to the formation of extravagant hopes regarding its suitability as a means of gaining the control of a considerable part of the commerce of the East Indian islands.
- (4) The very acute problem which was raised by the difficulty of maintaining law and order amongst a turbulent native and European population when no legally constituted courts were in existence on the island. This difficulty was not solved until the creation of the Recorder's Court in 1807.

The other questions with which the administration had to deal, the scourge of piracy and the attempt to introduce the cultivation of pepper, nutmegs and cloves, in order to render Great Britain independent of the Dutch Spice Islands, are not dealt with here, but in the chapters on Commerce and Piracy in the Straits Settlements.

It has been already pointed out that while the foundation of Penang was dictated in considerable measure by the desire to have a naval base, yet the Supreme Government⁶ was by no means convinced that the position was altogether suitable for this. Until 1796 it seems to have regarded the Andaman Islands as preferable. Furthermore the expenditure exceeded the revenue, and the Government began to doubt the wisdom of maintaining at a loss a position of whose value it was not convinced. The settlement was therefore of a somewhat tentative character, and for about eight years the advisability of transferring it to the Andamans or some other locality was seriously debated. The early volumes of the Straits Settlements Records are filled with letters on the subject, and show clearly how narrow an escape Penang had from being abandoned. Light vigorously combatted the Governorment's doubts, but his enthusiasm tended to carry him away, and subsequent events proved that many of his prophecies were incapable of fulfilment. He was on firm ground when he contended that the island had a very good harbour and was well situated as a port of call for warships or merchantmen in the China trade. He was wrong however when he claimed that Penang would soon gain a considerable share of the trade of the Archipelago, that

6. Throughout the period 1786 to 1867 the Governor-General of India in Council is constantly referred to in official despatches as the Supreme Government.

revenue would equal expenditure, and that the island would soon produce enough food not only to support its own population, but also to supply ships which called there. The Government was not convinced by his arguments, and appointed several commissions to inquire into the relative merits of Penang and the Andamans as a naval base. The reports were all strongly in favour of Penang, and their authors were as much misled as Light himself as to the unlimited possibilities of the island. The Government appears finally to have been convinced by this flood of testimony, the more so because a settlement which had been established in the Andamans in 1789 was abandoned in 1796 on account of the unhealthiness of the climate.⁷

In 1797 the strategic value of Penang was proved beyond question. The army and fleet which were assembled for the conquest of Manila made it their rendezvous. Admiral Rainier, who commanded the squadron, praised it in the highest terms for the excellent facilities which it possessed for refitting ships.⁸ The Duke of Wellington, then Colonel Wellesley, was also there in 1797, and was so greatly impressed by it that he submitted a Report on it to the Indian Government. His brother became Governor-General in 1797, and he was no doubt influenced by Wellington's opinion.⁹ By about 1800 the strategic value of Penang was realized by the Company. The Manila Expedition proved that its possession added very greatly to India's power to attack; and the subsequent naval events of the war showed that whoever held it commanded the Straits of Malacca, and therefore the trade-route to China. The Company became more and more convinced of its great value, and regarded it as the natural centre of English power in the East Indian islands.¹⁰ A striking proof of this was given after Malacca had been captured by a British force in 1795. At first the Directors prized it more highly than Penang, but when the superior strategic value of the latter was shown during the concluding years of the century, they did everything in their

7. SSR, Vol. I, Kyd's Report of 1795 and passim. *Ibid.*, 3: Despatch of Bengal Govt. to Light, Dec. 23, 1789. *Ibid.*, 4 and 5: passim. *Ibid.*, 6: Bengal Govt. to Light, July 14, 1794. Danvers, *Indian Records*, I, i, 113. JIA, IV, 651. Leith, *Prince of Wales Island*, 6, 18-21. Popham, *Prince of Wales Island*, 18-29, gives at length the reasons for the unsuitability of the Andaman and Nicobar Islands and the great superiority of Penang.

8. Wright and Reid, *Malay Peninsula*, 94.

9. *Ibid.*, 93.

10. *Ibid.*, 93-4.

power to destroy the older settlement by diverting its trade to Penang.¹¹ It is possible that the Directors were not uninfluenced by the consideration that Malacca might eventually be restored to Holland, and therefore thought it wise to make the most of their opportunity.

The new attitude towards the island was shown by the eulogistic descriptions of it in Government despatches from about 1800 onwards,¹² and by three books which were published between 1803 and 1805. Two were written by Penang officials, Captain MacAlister and Lieutenant Governor Leith, while the third was by Captain Popham. All three contended that Penang was at once an excellent centre for trade with the Archipelago, and an ideal naval base. There were abundant supplies of good timber, water and provisions, an excellent climate, and a large harbour which was perfectly safe in all weathers. Moreover the island was within easy sail of the Coromandel Coast in either monsoon and even in the worst weather.¹³ The Directors and the Admiralty became fully convinced by these arguments; and one reason for the erection of Penang into a Presidency in 1805 was the expectation that it would become an important naval base.¹⁴

The second important question in the early history of Penang was the dispute which arose as to the terms on which it was ceded by the Sultan of Kedah. Was the Company, or was it not, morally bound to defend the Sultan against his enemies, and above all Siam? The matter was of more than academic interest, because in 1821 Siam conquered Kedah and expelled the Sultan, the Company refusing to assist him. In consequence a bitter controversy arose, which raged in the Straits Settlements until about 1845. The Sultan contended that the Company had broken its word, and in this he was supported by the great majority of non-official Europeans in the Straits, and also by several important officials. Of these the most note-

11. SSR, 186: April 18, 1805.

12. e. g. Wissell's Memoir, SSR, Vol. 1: and SSR, 83, *passim* despatches of Farquhar, Lieut. Gov. of Penang to Indian Govt. in 1805.

13. Captain MacAlister, *Prince of Wales Island*, 1803, pp. 8-18, 25-32. He was stationed at Penang at least as early as 1793, and eventually became Governor. (JIA, VI, 21-24). Sir George Leith, Lieutenant Governor of Penang, *Prince of Wales Island* 1804, pp. 18-21. Captain (later Admiral) Sir Home Popham, *Prince of Wales Island*, 1805, pp. 18-31, 47-53.

14. SSR, 186: Directors' Despatch of April 18, 1805.

worthy were John Anderson, a man with a wide knowledge of Malayan affairs, Robert Fullerton, Governor of the Straits Settlements from 1826 to 1830, and above all, Sir Stamford Raffles.

On the other hand the consensus of official opinion in the Straits was that no promise of assistance had been given or implied. This view received additional weight from the adhesion of John Crawford, who after Raffles's death was the greatest English authority on Malaya. It was also held by Colonel Burney, who negotiated the Anglo-Siamese Treaty of 1826, and by Major Low, who was especially concerned with the affairs of Kedah and Siam during his official career at Penang, which extended from 1820 to 1840.

The most authoritative writer on the subject in later years, Sir Frank Swettenham, investigated the question in great detail, and fully supported Anderson's position. He held that when the Company accepted Penang it knew that the grant was made almost entirely with a view to obtaining its assistance against Burma and Siam. While the Directors refused to bind themselves to give aid in the formal treaties ceding Penang, yet by continuing to hold it they were implicitly bound to render the assistance in consideration of which it had been granted. The Company should either have assumed the moral obligation which the occupation entailed or else have evacuated the island. Swettenham stigmatised the Company's conduct as "cowardice . . . ending in a breach of faith which sullied the British name and weakened its influence with Malays for very many years."¹⁵

Swettenham has dealt with the question so fully that only a brief account of it is given here. Moreover the main point at issue was settled long before 1824, the date at which this thesis begins.¹⁶ The argument on which the

15. Swettenham, *British Malaya*, 37.

16. The best account of the question is found in Swettenham, *British Malaya*, pp. 36-54. The best statement of the case for Kedah was written in 1824 by John Anderson, Secretary to the Penang Government. He charged the Company with breach of faith and duplicity. It is valuable for its frequent and accurate quotations from the Straits Settlements Records, but apart from this must be used with caution because of its strongly partisan viewpoint. The despatches quoted are in the first few volumes of the Straits Records, and in Vols. 81 (Appendix) and 83.

The book was published under the authority of the Penang

supporters of the Company based their case was that from time immemorial Kedah had been a dependency of Bangkok. The Sultan of Kedah had therefore no right to cede Penang to England on his own authority or to refuse obedience to Siamese orders, and the destruction of his kingdom in 1821 was the fitting punishment for his contumacy to his "liege lord."¹⁷ The principal proofs of Kedah's dependence were found in the Bunga Mas, and in the forced contributions of men and money.

The Bunga Mas consisted of two ornamental plants with leaves and flowers of gold and silver, valued at about £1,000, which were sent triennially to Bangkok. Its exact significance was very differently interpreted, the Siamese and their English advocates maintaining that it was a "direct admission of suzerainty on the part of the Rajah who sent it"; while the Malay Sultans "entirely denied this" and held that it was "merely a token of alliance and friendship."¹⁸ Anderson regarded it as "a

Government, and only 100 copies were printed. Its circulation was confined to Government officials. Immediately after its appearance it was suppressed and great efforts were made to recover all the copies. At least five however escaped, of which one is now in the library of the Royal Commonwealth Society. Fullerton, the Governor of Penang, regarded the book as very useful and reliable (e.g. SSR, 96: Dec. 16, 1824), and it seems to have had much influence in leading him to adopt his strongly anti-Siamese policy. The Indian Government also spoke of the book as "very useful . . . extremely creditable" (SSR, 100: Jan. 14, 1825). The best defence of the Company is by Colonel Burney, who negotiated the Treaty with Siam in 1826 (Burney MSS., D. IX and D. XXVI, in the Royal Commonwealth Society's Library). It must however be used with caution, since it is even more partisan than Anderson's work. The same side is taken by Major Low (JIA, III, 334-36, 486-88, and 609-13): and by John Crawford, (Embassy to Siam, 447-48: *Descriptive Dictionary*, 243-45, 336, 362: *Hist. of Ind. Archipelago*, II, 404). All these authorities however, and especially Crawford, greatly weaken their case by extravagant advocacy of the most extreme Siamese claims. Crawford for example claimed every state in the Peninsula as a Siamese tributary from time immemorial, including in this list even the great Malayan Empire of Malacca, (Crawford, *Hist. Ind. Arch.* II, 404, and *Descrip. Dict.*, 243-45, 336, and B.P., Range 123. Vol. 42, pp. 101-3). Wilkinson however has confirmed the truth of the ancient tradition that Malacca was not only independent, but also severely defeated Siam (Wilkinson, *Malay Papers: History of the Peninsula*, I, 22-24, 38). Other states like Perak were always independent during the pre-British period.

17. e. g. Crawford, *Descrip. Dictionary*, 362.
18. Clifford, *In Court and Kampong*, 13.

mere interchange of civility."¹⁹ What may be called the pro-Siamese party denied this, and contended that the Bunga Mas was not merely a complimentary and free-will offering, but a "token of submission and vassalage, well-known in all the Indo-Chinese countries."²⁰

The truth appears to lie somewhere between these two extreme views. In some instances the Bunga Mas was undoubtedly an admission of vassalage: but others rather support the contention of the Malay rajas given above.²¹ Sometimes moreover motives besides that of submission actuated its despatch. Although Siam for example had long been independent of China, in 1820 the Bunga Mas was still sent triennially to Peking. The motive was the gifts received in return, and the very valuable commercial privileges thereby secured, the ambassadors, who were royal merchants, being exempt from customs duties.²² The only definite conclusion to which one can come seems to be that the exact significance of the Bunga Mas depended on the particular circumstances of each case. Its despatch was an admission of the inferiority of the sender, either feigned or real. In the instance given above of Siam and China it seems to have been purely formal and complimentary, a delicate piece of flattery which cost the Emperor of Siam nothing in actual power, but secured him substantial privileges.

In the case of Kedah, the Bunga Mas does not seem to have been sent for this reason, as Anderson contended it was.²³ The evidence of the heavy and frequent contributions of men, money and supplies seems conclusive on this point. The Sultan of Kedah was compelled to send them whenever they were demanded by Siam. He denounced them as a tyrannical breach of ancient custom, and in this he was supported by Anderson and Raffles.²⁴ This was denied by the pro-Siamese party, who held that the despatch of the Bunga Mas carried with it the obligation to fulfil these demands, which were "regulated only by the wants, and power at the time of the superior

19. Anderson, *Malay Peninsula*, 30.

20. Burney MSS. D. IX and D. XXI. JIA, III, 609-13. Low. Crawford, *Embassy to Siam*, 447-48.

21. Clifford, *In Court and Kampong*, 14.

22. Anderson, *Malay Peninsula*, 28-29.

23. *Ibid.*, 30, 54.

24. Swettenham, *British Malaya*, 50. Anderson, *Malay Peninsula*, *passim*. Lady Raffles, *Memoir*, 50.

state."²⁵ Here again the truth seems to lie between the two theories. The Bunga Mas did not, as Burney and Crawford thought, invariably carry with it the legal obligation to obey the orders of the recipient. On the other hand, it did involve this, if the receiver of the Bunga Mas were strong enough to enforce it. Whether forced contributions were made or not seems to be a fairly accurate test of whether the Bunga Mas was a mere formality, or an acknowledgement of some degree of dependence. An almost exact parallel is to be found in the feudal oath of vassalage to the German Emperors taken by the great tenants-in-chief of the Holy Roman Empire. It depended entirely on the power of each Emperor whether the oath entailed obedience to his orders or was practically an empty form. Applying the test of the forced contributions, it seems that Kedah was in some way more or less a dependency of Siam.

It remains to determine the character and extent of Siamese suzerainty. Was Kedah merely a province of Siam, and its Sultans hereditary governors appointed by Bangkok, as the Siamese asserted,²⁶ or were the Bunga Mas and the forced contributions in the nature of blackmail, paid by a weaker to a more powerful state to save itself from destruction? Here again there is the same complete divergence of opinion between the contemporary advocates and opponents of Siamese claims.²⁷ The conclusions of both parties are equally suspect because all have more or less the nature of special pleadings, emphasizing the facts which favour their side and minimising or ignoring those which do not. They are self-appointed lawyers defending their clients, not impartial judges. Moreover almost all the early writers made the mistake of applying to the relations of Siam and Kedah the same principles which govern the relations between a European power and its subject dependencies. With the exception of Raffles and, to some extent, Newbold they failed to see that there was a fundamental difference, and that analogies drawn from European international law were quite inapplicable.

Newbold put the real situation in a nutshell when he wrote: "It seems after all that the Lord of the White

25. Burney MSS., D. IX and D. XXVI.

26. Burney MSS., D. IX and XXVI.

27. Anderson, *Malay Peninsula*, 22-24, 61-62, and *passim*. Begbie *Malay Peninsula*, 2, 24-29. Crawford, *Descript. Dictionary*, 362. JIA, III, 334-36, 486-88, Low.

Elephant (Siam) has about as much original right as present power and ancient aggression can give him, and no more."²⁸ Siam was large, powerful and united as compared with the neighbouring Malay States, which were small, weak and generally divided. Individually, its soldiers appear to have been vastly inferior to the Malays as fighting men, but sheer weight of overwhelming numbers made them very formidable. Like most Asiatic monarchies from the days of Sargon and Thothmes the Great, both Siam and Burma were predatory states. They were engaged in chronic warfare to subdue one another, the conqueror of one generation being the conquered of the next. Both moreover were ambitious to extend their sway over the Malay States of the Peninsula, and as soon as either had temporarily subdued the other, the attention of its rulers was turned to its Malayan neighbours. The Malay Sultans had then to choose between sending the Bunga Mas and paying tribute, or having their territories plundered and their people decimated by all the barbarities typical of Siamese and Burmese invasions. A powerful Malay Empire, like Malacca, successfully defied attack; but Kedah, weak and from its position peculiarly open to invasion, generally submitted to the victor of the moment. The subjection thus imposed would last just so long as the suzerain had strength to enforce it, and no longer. Like all Asiatic despotisms the power of Siam and Burma waxed and waned. The decay of an Eastern empire has always been the signal for its outlying dependencies to throw off the yoke.²⁹ Kedah would then enjoy a period of independence until one or the other of the northern powers was strong enough to subdue it, when the whole process would be repeated. Hence it was that Kedah at one time would send tribute and the Bunga Mas to Siam, at another to Burma, and sometimes to both at once. Generally however it was to Siam, the more powerful and the nearer of the two northern empires. A small state which lay within easy striking distance of more powerful and predatory neighbours could not afford to take chances.³⁰

28. Newhold, *Straits of Malacca*, II, 7.

29. For very illuminating parallels to the Malayan situation v. Vincent Smith, *History of India*. Hall, *Ancient History of the Near East*. Maspero, *The Struggle of the Nations*.

30. Steuart, *Light*, 12. Burney MSS, D. XXVI. SSR, 81: Dec. 27, 1821. Anderson, *Malay Peninsula*, 42-54.

The clearest and most impartial exposition of the situation is found in two of Raffles's despatches. Referring to the Siamese claim that they had several times overrun the Peninsula, a claim unsupported by historical evidence, he wrote:—

"This they have construed into a right of conquest, which has since been repeatedly asserted . . . whenever they found themselves sufficiently strong and their neighbours sufficiently weak."³¹ In his letter of instructions to Crawford, written just before he left Singapore in 1823, Raffles dealt with the same subject at greater length.

"The policy hitherto pursued by us" [of acquiescing in and even supporting the Siamese claims] "has in my opinion been founded on erroneous principles . . . These people are of opposite manners, language, religion and general interests, and the superiority maintained by the one over the other is so remote from protection on the one side or attachment on the other, that it is but a simple exercise of capricious tyranny by the stronger party, submitted to by the weaker from the law of necessity. We have ourselves for nearly forty years been eye witnesses of the pernicious influence exercised by the Siamese over the Malayan states. During the revolution of the Siamese government these profit by its weakness, and from cultivating an intimacy with strangers, especially with ours over other European nations, they are always in a fair train of prosperity. With the settlement of the Siamese government, on the contrary, it invariably regains the exercise of its tyranny and the Malayan states are threatened, intimidated and plundered. The recent invasion of Quedah (in 1821) is a striking example in point. . . . By the independent Malay States, who may be supposed the best judges of this matter, it is important to observe that the connection of the tributary Malays with Siam is looked upon as a matter of simple compulsion . . . I must seriously recommend to your attention the contemplation of the probable event of their [the Malay States] deliverance from the yoke of Siam and your making the Supreme Government immediately informed of every event which may promise to lead to that desirable result."³²

31. Lady Raffles, *Memoir*, 49.

32. B. Pol., Range 123, Vol. 59: March 5, 1824, No. 49.

When the Company occupied Penang, Kedah was practically independent. Siam had been overrun by the Burmese in 1767, and although by 1786 it had expelled its conquerors, the war did not end until 1799. The Emperor of Siam was fully occupied with it, and had no time to spare for asserting his pretensions over the Malay states. Recovering from the Burmese invasion, Siam became more powerful perhaps than at any previous period in its history, and during the next generation attempted to compel the unwilling Malay States to abandon their independence and submit to its harsh and capricious overlordship.³³ It was in no sense of the word a reassertion of ancient legal rights, but merely an illustration of

"The good old rule, the simple plan,
That he may take who has the power,
And he shall keep who can."

Although it must be granted that in this peculiar sense Kedah was a tributary of Siam, Sir Frank Swettenham has suggested that the Company's behaviour towards Kedah is open to question.³⁴ When the Company accepted the cession of Penang in 1786, it negotiated with Kedah as an independent state, although then or soon afterwards it knew that Kedah was in some vague way a Siamese tributary. Moreover the Government of India was well aware that the principal, and in fact almost the sole, reason for which the grant was made by the Sultan, was to obtain the armed assistance of the Company. The demand for a defensive alliance was referred to the Directors, for this was contrary to Government policy, as promulgated by Pitt's India Act, which forbade the Company to enter into alliances, but an agreement was arrived at on the other demands made by the Sultan. In 1787 the Government of India decided not to make a defensive alliance with Kedah. The Directors issued similar orders in 1793, and the policy was steadfastly adhered to despite many despatches from Light urging that the Sultan's request should be granted. Light found his position exceedingly difficult and unpleasant: the

33. Anderson, *Malay Peninsula*, 14, 42-54. Crawford, *Embassy to Siam*, 401-6. Burney MSS, D. IX.

34. Swettenham, *British Malaya*, 36-54. The originals of most of the despatches quoted by Swettenham are in the *Straits Settlements Records* for 1786-1794, and in SSR, Vols. 81 (Appendix) and 83. Others are to be found in Anderson, *Malay Peninsula*, 42-46, 51-62, 71-75. V. also Aitchison, *Treaties*, I, 398-403. Burney MSS D. IX. Despatch of Lord Cornwallis, Jan. 22, 1787. JIA, III, 611-12, Low. Wright and Reid, *Malay Peninsula*, 82, 85.

Sultan continued to press for an alliance, and refused to accept a money-payment in lieu of it. But the Company, interested only in trade, refused to enter into any political commitment. The Sultan became more and more distrustful and hostile, and finally in 1791 made an abortive attempt to expel the English from Penang. Warlike measures having failed, the Sultan agreed to make a formal treaty ceding the island in return for an annual money payment and without the promise of protection for which he had so long contended. Swettenham's contention is that after the Indian Government decided in 1787 not to give assistance in case of invasion, the retention of Penang was a breach of an implied, though not a written, obligation. Logically, the refusal to form a defensive alliance should have been followed by the evacuation of the territory which had been ceded in the hope of obtaining protection. He stigmatises the conduct of the Company as follows:—

"Mr. Light, who was on the spot, could make the best of it, for, to people in Calcutta, the whole affair was of very trifling importance . . . Penang had been secured: seven years of occupation had proved its value, and shown that it could be held, without difficulty, by a small garrison against Asiatics; . . . a treaty, which said nothing about offensive or defensive alliances, had been concluded; the promises of 1785 and 1786 were forgotten or ignored; and the Sultan of Kedah might be left to settle accounts with his northern foes as soon as the conclusion of their mutual quarrels should give them time to turn attention to him.³⁵

The next important event in the relations of Penang and Kedah was the acquisition in 1800 of Province Wellesley, the tract on the Kedah mainland opposite the island. The principal reason for obtaining it was to obtain complete control of the harbour of Penang, which was merely the strait separating the island from the Malay Peninsula. A very similar case was the acquisition of Kowloon, which was obtained from China in order to gain possession of both sides of the harbour of Hongkong. It was also hoped that the acquisition would make Penang independent of Kedah for its food. The island was unable to produce nearly enough to support its population, and if the supplies from Kedah had been cut off, Penang would have been reduced to the utmost distress. It was hoped

35. Swettenham, *British Malaya*, 43, 45.

that in time sufficient rice would be raised in Province Wellesley to make Penang independent of all foreign supplies.³⁶

The Treaty ceding Province Wellesley was negotiated in 1800 by Sir George Leith, the Lieutenant-Governor of Penang. As in the Treaty of 1791 it was stipulated that provisions required for Penang could be bought in Kedah without impediment or paying duty. All previous treaties were cancelled, and there was no mention of a defensive alliance. All that the Company bound itself to do was to refuse shelter to rebels or traitors from Kedah (Article VII); and "to protect this coast from all enemies, robbers, and pirates that may attack it by sea, from North to South." (Article II). Province Wellesley was ceded to Great Britain in perpetuity, and the Company was to pay the Sultan \$10,000 a year so long as it should occupy Penang and Province Wellesley.³⁷

The omission from the Treaties of 1791 and 1800 of any reference to a defensive alliance might be regarded as the abandonment by the Sultan of an untenable claim. Burney and most of the Company's officials did look upon it in this light. Swettenham however explains that the Sultan's consent to the treaties did not mean that he was giving up what he regarded as his right. It was merely a manifestation of Malay psychology.

"If a British officer, accredited by the British Government, makes, during the progress of negotia-

36. Leith *Prince of Wales Island*, 31-33. JIA, III, 617, and IV, 12, Low.

37. Aitchison, *Treaties*, I, 401-3. The annual payment of \$10,000 was of so much importance in the subsequent relations of Penang and Kedah that an account of its previous history is given. In the letter of the Sultan of Kedah of 1786 in which he offered to cede Penang he demanded an annual subsidy of \$30,000 to recompense him for the loss of his trade-monopoly. In the reply of the Indian Government accepting the island it was stated that this request had been referred to the Directors (Aitchison, *Treaties*, I, 398-99). Between 1786 and 1791 varying amounts were paid to the Sultan by Light at different times. By the Treaty of 1791 the subsidy was fixed at \$6,000 a year (*Ibid.*, I, 400). At the same time Light promised to recommend that this amount should be increased to \$10,000 annually, as requested by the Sultan. After 1791 the Sultan received \$10,000 a year, (Leith, *Prince of Wales Island*, 5-6 and 34), although the payment was not authorised until the Treaty of 1800, when this amount was fixed as the annual subsidy for the cession of Penang and Province Wellesley together. (Aitchison, *Treaties*, I, 401). The later history of the \$10,000 is given in the chapter on Anglo-Siamese Relations.

tions with a Malay Raja, any promise on behalf of his Government, it would not occur to the Malay to doubt that such promise would be accepted, and honourably fulfilled by those who sent the envoy. Were such a promise given, and, on the strength of it, territory ceded to the British Government, the acceptance of the cession would be deemed by the Malay the acceptance of the promise, if nothing were then said or written to him, to the effect that his demand could not be complied with. If, after five years' occupation of such ceded territory, a treaty were concluded, though that treaty did not contain the fulfilment of the promise, the Malay would not consider that the British Government was thereby released from performing an engagement, on the faith of which the occupation had taken place. If such a treaty were then, or afterwards, styled "preliminary," and it were necessary to obtain sanction from a distant Government to important provisions, it is probable the Malay would be told that this particular request of his was still under consideration, and that when instructions were received from that high and distant authority, a further and permanent treaty would be concluded with him. Under these circumstances a Malay Raja, dealing with British officers, would accept their advice. Lastly, if the British having been in occupation of a strong position for five years, as the friends of a Malay Raja, proposed to conclude with him a treaty which was not all, or anything, that he could have hoped for, it is difficult to see what the Malay would gain by refusal."³⁸

The Company could have saved Kedah from the terrible fate which overtook it in 1821 at the hands of Siam by granting the Sultan "two companies of Sepoys with four six-pounder field guns."³⁹ So timid and worthless were the Siamese troops that even this would probably not have been necessary: "little else than the name of the Company will be wanted."⁴⁰ This was Light's opinion in 1787, and it was fully endorsed by Crawford and Burney in the Reports on their embassies to Siam in 1821-26.⁴¹ Swettenham is fully in agreement with them:

"Kedah was safe as long as Siam and Ava believed

38. Swettenham, *British Malaya*, 46-47.

39. *Ibid.*, 44.

40. *Ibid.*, 43.

41. v. chapter on Anglo-Siamese Relations.

that an attack on Kedah might involve a trial of conclusions with the British; but when it was publicly given out, that the assistance for which Penang had been ceded . . . would not, in fact, be given, then the fate of Kedah became a mere question of time. The cause . . . was the cowardice of the East India Company, ending in a breach of faith which sullied the British name and weakened its influence with Malays for very many years."⁴²

During these years from 1786 to 1800 the population and trade of Penang were rapidly increasing. Almost from the moment of its foundation immigrants began to settle there, and a flourishing trade sprang up. This seems to be traceable to three principal causes—the remarkable energy with which Light pushed forward the development of the settlement, the great trust the natives had in him, and the system of free trade which prevailed until 1802.⁴³ The policy of free trade was established by Acting Governor-General Macpherson when Penang was founded, to foster a rapid development of its commerce, and it was only abandoned in 1801 on the insistent demands of the Directors that customs duties should be levied to produce a revenue equal to the expenditure.⁴⁴ Light was strongly in favour of free trade, and defended it in many despatches, pointing out the success which had attended it.⁴⁵ Light and Sir John Macpherson deserve a share in the credit which has been given to Raffles as the founder of free trade in Malaya.

Within two years after the occupation of Penang its population numbered about 1,000.⁴⁶ During the following years it steadily increased, until by 1804 it had grown to 12,000.⁴⁷ The census returns are often incomplete, but a study of the available evidence reveals the same general tendencies at work as in the later history of Penang.

42. Swettenham, *British Malaya*, 37, 45-46. The subsequent history of Kedah is given in the chapter on Anglo-Siamese Relations.

43. Wright and Reid, *Malay Peninsula*, 84-85. SSR, 179, Nov. 12, 1805. Leith, *Prince of Wales Island*, 39. JIA, IV, 25, Low.

1805. B. Pub., Range 5, Vol. 11, March 15, 1800; and Vol. 13, July 10, 1800.

44. *Ibid.*, 633-34. SSR, 3, Aug. 25, 1788. *Ibid.*, 186; April 18, 1805. B. Pub., Range 5, Vol. 11, March 15, 1800; and Vol. 13, July 10, 1800.

45. e. g. SSR, 5; Dec. 7, 1792. SSR, Vol. 3; June 20, 1788: Swettenham, *British Malaya*, 54-56.

46. SSR, Vol. 3.

47. *Ibid.*, 3, 5 and 6. Leith, *Prince of Wales Island*, 29.

From the very beginning, the bulk of the population was Asiatic, the majority being Malays. Next in point of numbers came Indians, then Chinese, and finally a varying number of half the races from Burma to Celebes. The Europeans were very few, but as in Singapore they were the mainspring of the development of the island. Almost all the important merchants were British, while the artisans, many of the small traders, and the great majority of the agriculturists, were Asiatics. Both Europeans and natives were necessary for the growth of Penang's trade. Without the British commerce would have developed much more slowly, in fact the town would never have existed; but without Asiatic assistance the growth of trade would have been crippled, while agriculture would hardly have existed at all.

Of all the native races the most valuable, though not the most numerous, were the Chinese. The role they played in the early years of Penang was a remarkable forecast of the part which they later took in the development of British Malaya. Looking back over the history of the last hundred and forty years, it seems prophetic that by 1788 the number of Chinese had grown from nothing to over two-fifths of the total population.⁴⁸ One of the most striking phenomena in the history of British Malaya has been the great attraction which the justice and security of British rule has had for the Chinese, and the way in which the growth of British territory in the Peninsula and Borneo has been followed by a rapid influx of Chinese into countries where previously few of them had dared to venture.⁴⁹ It was also characteristic that by 1794 they were already regarded by the government as the "most valuable" part of the native population, because of their docility, industry and initiative.⁵⁰

The most vivid description of the diverse and kaleidoscopic character of the population is found in a letter of Dickens, the Magistrate, written to the Lieutenant-Governor of Penang on June 1, 1802.

"The greater part of this community are but sojourners for a time, so that the population of the island is continually shifting as to the

48. SSR, 3.

49. v. chapter on the Chinese in the Straits Settlements.

50. SSR, 6. Leith, *Prince of Wales Island*, 25-26, and 65. SSR, 81 (Appendix), Farquhar's Report of 1805.

individual members of whom it is composed; this population includes British subjects, foreigners, both Europeans and Americans, people of colour originally descended from European fathers and Asiatic mothers, Armenians, Parsees, Arabs, Chooliars (Indians), Malays from the Malay Peninsula, Sumatra, and the Eastern Islands, Buggeses from Borneo, Celebes and other islands in the China Seas, Burmans from Pegu, Siamese, Javanese, Chinese, with Mussulmen and Hindoos from the Company's territories in India."⁵¹

The development of trade was as rapid as the increase in population. In 1786 it was non-existent the island being an almost uninhabited jungle; but by 1789 the total value of imports and exports was Spanish \$853,592.⁵² By about 1804 the total value was \$1,418,200.⁵³ This amount does not seem impressive when compared with the phenomenal growth of Singapore; but the latter as will be shown, was unique in the Archipelago.

Analysis of the trade returns shows that Penang though to a less degree than Singapore, owed its prosperity largely to its transit trade. The manufactures of Great Britain and India were brought to it for distribution throughout the East Indian Islands, while the products of the Archipelago were collected there for transmission to India, China, and the United Kingdom. The principal imports from Britain and India were opium and piece goods (woollen, cotton, and silk cloths), steel, gunpowder, iron and china-ware. These were sold at Penang for the typical products of the Archipelago or, to use the term frequently applied to them in the Records, Straits produce, e.g. rice, tin, spices, rattans, gold-dust, ivory, ebony, and pepper. The greater part of these commodities came from the countries lying near Penang, and especially Burma, the Malay Peninsula, and Sumatra. Owing to Penang's position on the western edge of the Archipelago, its trade with the islands to the East of Sumatra and the Peninsula was comparatively small. A large and increasingly important part of the commerce of Penang was carried on by native merchants, who collected the Straits produce, and sold it in Penang, buying in exchange British and Indian manufactures.⁵⁴

51. JIA, V, 297.

52. SSR, 3.

53. Leith, *Prince of Wales Island*, 57-59.

54. SSR, I: Kyd's Report of 1795. Boulger, *Raffles*, 270-71. *Ibid.*, 5: April 5, 1793. Leith, *Prince of Wales Island*, 57-59.

Soon after the occupation of Penang attempts were made to introduce the growth of spices, so that the Company might no longer be dependent on the supplies obtained from the Dutch possessions. Light's attempts to cultivate cloves, nutmeg and cinnamon failed, but he introduced the growth of pepper, which was eventually to become of considerable importance. It is interesting to note that the first man to engage in it was a Chinese, who introduced pepper plants from Achin with money advanced to him by Light.⁵⁵ When Holland entered the war against Great Britain as an ally of the French Republic the Directors seized the opportunity for which they had long been looking. It was no longer necessary to respect Dutch susceptibilities and in 1796 and subsequent years agents of the Company were sent to the Moluccas to secure pepper, clove, nutmeg and other spice plants. Many thousands of seedlings were sent to Penang. At first they thrived, and about 1803 it seemed that the island would soon become a rival of the Moluccas.⁵⁶ Unfortunately this early success was soon followed by failure, and it was not until about 1825 that the cultivation of spices revived.⁵⁷

No sketch of the early history of Penang would be complete which did not refer to the very serious problem that arose owing to the absence until 1807 of any legally established courts or code of law. In 1788 and 1794 the Supreme Government drew up a few general rules as to the mode of trial and character of punishments to be inflicted at Penang, but did not feel itself at liberty to do more without the authorization of the Directors.⁵⁸ These regulations remained the law of the island until 1807, and owing to their defects actually impeded the administration of justice.⁵⁹ They were very vague as to the code of law to be administered and the sentences to be imposed, they left far too much to the discretion of the Superintendent of Penang, and they made British subjects practically independent of his jurisdiction.

Petty civil cases were tried by the Captains of Chinese, Malays, and Chulias (i.e. Tamils). These were prominent

55. SSR, 3: March 14, 1788. Danvers, *Indian Records*, I, 1, 112. JIA, V, 165.

56. Leith, *Prince of Wales Island*, 30, 45. B. Pub., Range V, Vols. 13 and 14. *Essays on Indo-China*, Ser. 1, Vol. I, p. 33.

57. For subsequent history of the spice cultivation v. chapter on Trade and Agriculture.

58. SSR, 3, 6. Aug. 1, 1794.

59. JIA, V, 294-300.

natives appointed by the Penang Government to assist it in maintaining law and order amongst their own countrymen. More important civil and criminal cases were tried by the Assistant of the Superintendent or, to give him the title introduced about 1800, the Lieutenant-Governor of Penang. The most serious charges, civil and criminal, were tried by the Superintendent, who had also a right to revise any sentence passed by his subordinates. Until the arrival of Dickens, a Calcutta barrister and an uncle of the novelist, who was sent as magistrate in 1800, the judges were not trained lawyers.⁶⁰

Neither English Civil nor Criminal Law was in force. In criminal cases the magistrates punished crime in a rough and ready fashion by acting in accordance with the dictates of their own common-sense, assisted by the very vague Regulations of 1794. The usual penalties were imprisonment, moderate flogging, and banishment from the island. Convicted native murderers were imprisoned pending the decision of the Bengal Government as to their sentences. In civil cases "as many systems of law were in force as there were nationalities in the Island; and all those laws again were probably tempered or modified by that law of nature, or that natural justice which appears to have been the chief guide of the European magistrate who constituted the Court of Appeal In the midst of all this confusion this much, and this much only, seems to be clear, that so far from the law of England being in force as the law of the land, its most general and elementary principles were not enforced."⁶¹ A report of Dickens, written to the Governor-General in 1803, pointed out the grave inconveniences caused by the indefinite character of the law. After describing how Penang was "governed arbitrarily, and not by fixed laws," he continued:

"The law of nature is the only law declaring crimes and respecting property which exists at Prince of Wales Island But as the law of nature gives me no precepts concerning the rights of succession or inheritance or concerning many

60. SSR, VI: Aug. 1, 1794. B. Pub., Range 4, Vol. 46: Dec. 19, 1796. JIA, V, 106, 166-67, 292. JIA, (New Series,) IV, 33.

61. JIA, (New Series) IV, 31-33. Judgment delivered in 1858 by Sir P.B. Maxwell, Chief Justice of the Straits Settlements, in *Regina vs. Willans*. A very valuable and detailed account of the legal history of the Straits Settlements. SSR, Vols. 3, 5 and 6: Jan. 25, 1794, Light to Bengal Government.

other things which are the subject of positive law, I have often been much embarrassed in the subject of my duty as judge . . . and many cases there are in which I am utterly unable to exercise jurisdiction . . . The cultivation of the island, the increase of its commerce and of its population, has made it necessary that fixed laws of property, as well as laws declaring what acts are crimes should be promulgated by due authority."⁶²

The most serious defects of the Regulations of 1794 however were that all serious cases had to be referred to Bengal, and that it left Europeans almost exempt from any jurisdiction, except for murder and "other crimes of enormity." In these cases they were sent to be tried in the Bengal courts.⁶³ The result of this immunity, as Lieutenant-Governor Leith pointed out in 1804, was that they took advantage of it to commit many nefarious actions, principally against the natives, who had no legal redress against them.⁶⁴ The same complaint is found in a despatch to the Directors written in 1805 by the Penang Council soon after the establishment of the Presidency. "The more turbulent European remains on the island free from all restraint, with the power of committing every act of injustice and irregularity towards his neighbour and the most peaceable native, having set at defiance all authority as not legally established on the island." Unless radical reforms were introduced "we venture to predict that the prosperity of this settlement cannot be permanent. It will be deserted by all orderly, and will become an asylum for the flagitious and the enemies of government and law."⁶⁵

Many similar despatches were sent, and finally in 1807 the Directors obtained Parliamentary authorisation for the establishment of a Recorder's Court at Penang. The law which was thus introduced was for both civil and criminal cases the law of England as it existed in 1807. The charter of justice directed that especially in the form of procedure of the Court, native religions and usages should be consulted so far as these were compatible with the spirit of English law.⁶⁶

62. JIA (New Series), IV, 32-34, quoted by Maxwell.

63. SSR, 6. Aug. 1, 1794. B. Pub., Range 5, Vol. 11; March 15, 1800. JIA (New Series), IV, 31-32, Maxwell.

64. Leith, *Prince of Wales Island*, 35-36.

65. SSR, 179: Nov. 12, 1875.

66. JIA (New Series), IV, 35-43, Maxwell.

With the year 1805 Penang entered on a new phase of its history. The island was then at the height of its glory: never before or since was such a brilliant future hoped from it. Penang was to be the long sought naval base in the Eastern Seas; it was to produce fabulous yields of spices; it was to become one of the greatest trade marts of Furthest Asia.⁶⁷ With high hopes the Directors raised it to the proud rank of a Presidency, the Fourth Presidency of India; and almost at once disillusion began.

The causes are not far to seek.⁶⁸ An undue depreciation had been followed by an exaggerated over-estimate of the possibilities of Penang. The first great disappointment was the discovery that it was not suitable for the proposed naval base. The harbour was excellent, but closer investigation showed that it was not practicable to construct dockyards. Moreover the trees on the island were found to be unsuitable for shipbuilding, and no good timber was to be had nearer than Burma. In 1812 the plan to make Penang a naval base was finally abandoned.⁶⁹ Trafalgar in any case had made it unnecessary.

The second great disappointment was the failure of the settlement to become a great trading-centre for the East Indian islands. Commerce increased until 1810 but thereafter remained practically stationary until 1819. Soon afterwards it began to decline from the competition of its new rival, Singapore. This was a necessary consequence of Penang's position on the western edge of the Archipelago. Native traders greatly appreciated its low duties and freedom from irksome regulations, but for the great majority this attraction was not strong enough to induce them to sail several hundred miles out of their way through the pirate-infested waters of the Straits of Malacca when other, though from the point of customs duties less attractive, ports were closer at hand. As in the early days of its history, the trade of Penang continued to be mainly with the countries in its vicinity, such as Burma, the West Coast of the Malay Peninsula, and Sumatra. Since the Company was unalterably opposed to extending its empire in the Straits, it was impossible for

67. SSR, 186: April 18, 1805. Directors' Despatch to Penang Council.

68. The history of the Penang Presidency, so far as it concerns the period after 1824, is given in greater detail in the chapters on Anglo-Siamese Relations, Trade and Agriculture, and the Civil Service.

69. SSR, 179: Nov. 12, 1805. JIA, IV, 14, 17: VI, 521-44:

trade with the Peninsula to develop as it did after Great Britain began to bring the Malay States under her control in 1874. Finally, the spice cultivation, after its initial success became almost a total failure for many years.

Last and greatest disappointment Penang proved to be a drain upon the Indian Treasury. Before 1805 the expenses always exceeded the revenue, and after that date the annual deficit became much larger. The principal reason for this appears to have been the greatly increased number of well-paid officials who were sent to Penang after the establishment of the Presidency in 1805.⁷⁰ Attempts were made to remedy the situation by increasing the customs duties but in spite of this the annual deficit grew steadily larger.⁷¹

As in the case of Bencoolen, the Directors came to look more and more coldly upon a settlement from which they reaped nothing but a heavy annual loss. They repeatedly sent orders to the Penang Council to reduce expenditure; but despite fervent promises of economy the yearly deficit increased. During the last ten years of the Presidency, from about 1820 to 1830, the Council seem to have spent much of their time and ingenuity in trying to convince the Directors how economical they really were, and how absolutely indispensable was every item of their expenditure. The Directors for their part replied by further exhortations, and cold and sceptical questioning of the necessity of each new call upon their treasury.⁷² Finally their patience became exhausted and in 1830 they tried to gain an approximation to their desires by abolishing the Presidency and cutting down the staff of officials to a fraction of their former number. The Straits Settlements — for in 1826 Malacca and Singapore had been placed under the control of Penang — became a Residency subject to Bengal, and the Eastern Presidency ceased to exist.

70. SSR, 186: April 18, 1805.

71. SSR, 179: Nov. 12, 1805. JIA, IV, 25.

72. SSR, 1820-30, *passim*. There is hardly a volume which has not some reference to the subject, and in many it forms a large part of the contents.

III

SINGAPORE — 1819-1826.

Lord Fisher remarks in his "Memories" that the three essential qualities of a great naval officer are imagination, audacity, and the genius to disobey orders at the right moment. Without the imagination and audacity to frame conceptions upon the grand scale, and the strength of mind to carry them out in the face of his Admiral's veto, as Nelson did at Copenhagen, mere common-sense or skill in his profession will not make a seaman of the first rank. The same test holds good of statesmen, and especially perhaps of the governors of the overseas Empire. Nowhere can there be found a case more in point than the career of Sir Stamford Raffles in the East Indian Islands during the years from 1816 to 1824. Had it not been for his determined disobedience to orders in all human probability the Malay Peninsula would have become a Dutch colony.

The career of Sir Stamford Raffles is one of the most remarkable in British colonial history. He first came into prominence in 1808 when as the obscure Assistant-Secretary of the Penang Presidency he induced the Supreme Government and the Directors to reverse their policy towards Malacca. His opportunity came to him in this wise. Malacca had been in British hands since 1795, but the Company was afraid that some day it might be returned to the Dutch, since it was only held in trust for the exiled Stadtholder of the Netherlands until his rebellious subjects should restore him to his throne. In that case it might be a serious rival to Penang, since it was 240 miles nearer to the centre of the Archipelago. Acting on the advice of the Penang Council, the Supreme Government and the Directors had determined to destroy the fortifications and divert the trade of Malacca to Penang. They hoped to reduce it to an uninhabited jungle, so that it would be useless to Holland should she ever recover it.¹ In 1807 the fortifications which had been built by the Portuguese and were said to be the strongest in the East Indian islands were completely destroyed with the exception of a single gate, and great efforts were made to induce the population to migrate to Penang. This they obstinately refused to do.² In 1808 Raffles went to Malacca for the recovery of his health, and saw the folly

1. SSR, 186: April 18, 1805. Egerton, Raffles, 20-21.

2. Newbold, *Straits of Malacca*. I, 126-27.

of the British policy. He drew up a masterly report in which he pointed out that it was impossible either to persuade the inhabitants to leave, or to divert what was left of Malacca's trade to Penang. If the site were abandoned by the British, it would soon be reoccupied by some native ruler and eventually by a European power, because of the great strategic value of its position. Hence sooner or later Malacca would be re-established as a rival port to Penang, but with the vital difference that it would no longer be under British control. Raffles therefore urged that Malacca should be retained "until we are actually obliged to give it up."³ So impressed were the Government and the Directors by this report that they gave orders that the attempt to destroy Malacca should be abandoned.⁴

Raffles' action had also another and a far more important result. The Governor-General of India, Lord Minto, was much impressed by the report, and decided that the young Assistant-Secretary was a man from whom great things were to be expected. Two years later, in 1810, Minto appointed him his Agent to the Malay States, to prepare the way for the expedition which conquered Java from the Dutch and French.⁵

In 1811, at the age of thirty, he was appointed Lieutenant-Governor of Java.⁶ In four years the obscure official had become the protégé of the Governor-General, and the ruler of a much more important island than Penang. His meteoric rise gained the undying hatred of his former colleagues at Penang, and in 1819 their jealousy led them to do everything in their power to prevent the establishment of Singapore.

Raffles's government of Java, which lasted from the 18th September 1811 to the 11th March 1816 established his reputation as a great administrator. Indirectly it affected British Malaya, since it brought him into disfavour with the Supreme Government and the Directors. From the very beginning it was uncertain whether Java might not be restored to Holland. The policy which Raffles pursued with the strong approval of his patron is best expressed in the words of Lord Minto himself;—"While we are here let us do as much good as we can."⁷ In five

3. Egerton, *Raffles*, 6, 17-18. Boulger, *Raffles*, 63-75.

4. *Ibid.*, 75-76.

5. Egerton, *Raffles*, 25-37.

6. *Ibid.*, 58.

7. *Ibid.*, 59.

years Raffles attempted to perform the impossible task of sweeping away the abuses and injustices of centuries of native and Dutch misrule. Opinions differ as to the wisdom of his precipitancy and the measure of his success. Perhaps the best testimony to his wisdom is to be found in the conduct of the Dutch themselves. Despite their hatred of Raffles, they adopted most of his plans, although it took three generations to carry out the reforms which he initiated.⁸ While very beneficial to the Javanese, Raffles's governorship brought much trouble upon his own head. As long as Lord Minto lived Raffles could count upon his cordial support; but unfortunately he died in 1813, and the new Governor-General, Lord Moira (afterwards the Marquis of Hastings), was hostile to him until 1818.⁹ False charges were also brought against Raffles by General Gillespie, who commanded the troops in Java, and he was under a cloud until they were disproved in 1817.¹⁰ While however the Directors were at last convinced of the honesty of his conduct many of them were far from satisfied as to its wisdom. Raffles was animated by a burning zeal for reform which refused to be governed by considerations of profit and loss, and the Supreme Government and the Directors frequently censured him because of the heavy demands which his Javan reforms made upon the Indian treasury. Hence while they cleared his character in 1817 from all imputations of dishonesty, they reserved their opinion as to the wisdom of his actions.¹¹

Raffles's very strong dislike of the Dutch also brought him into disfavour. Throughout his career in the East this was one of the guiding motives of his policy, and as Governor of Java he tried to build up a British East Indian Empire. He was animated partly by the desire to save the natives from again suffering the cruelties of Dutch rule and also by his realization of the great wealth which the Archipelago would ultimately bring to Britain. Unfortunately Raffles's project called for immediate and heavy expenditure. In the early nineteenth century few men had his vast knowledge of the infinite possibilities of the East Indian islands, and the Directors were quite unconvinced by his arguments. They saw only the imme-

8. *Ibid.*, 50-130. Boulger, *Raffles*, 84-245; Day, *Dutch in Java*, 167-202.

9. Egerton, *Raffles*, 106, 124; Boulger, *Raffles*, 203-4.

10. Egerton, *Raffles*, 115-17, 125.

11. Egerton, *Raffles*, 115-17, 125.

diate expense, and had no desire whatever to have an empire thrust upon them. From long experience of Raffles's masterful tactics however they were uneasily aware that any mail from India might inform them that he had carried out some daring "coup," and presented them with a most unwelcome "fait accompli." The Cabinet was equally opposed to any extension of British power in the Archipelago. It must be admitted that Raffles was a most inconvenient servant for a commercial corporation and a government which only desired to maintain the "status quo" in the East Indian islands.¹²

When Java was restored to Holland in 1816 Raffles visited England, and tried to convince the Directors that the Dutch would revive their former policy of monopolizing the trade of the Archipelago. He was only partially successful, but they confirmed his appointment as Resident of Bencoolen, which Minto had given him several years before, in case Java should be restored to Holland. They also raised his rank from that of Resident to Lieutenant-Governor; and instructed him to watch and report on the conduct of the Dutch. His despatches were to be sent to the Directors in person instead of going first to the Supreme Government, the usual official channel. Raffles may therefore well have supposed that his position was more than that of a mere commercial agent; but it seems scarcely doubtful that his sanguine nature attached undue importance to encouraging words spoken in private conversation. He considered and indeed described himself as "Representative of the British Government in the Eastern Seas," a title which the Directors regarded as an unwarranted assumption of authority.¹³

From the point of view of British interests, the situation which confronted Raffles on his arrival at Bencoolen in 1818 was very serious. At the Congress of Vienna Great Britain had restored to Holland all her former possessions in the Eastern Archipelago; and the Dutch Government lost no time in re-establishing its authority. The bankrupt Netherlands East India Company had been replaced by the Government of Holland, which could command far greater resources than the Company had possessed in the later part of its existence. The object of Holland was to re-establish her former supremacy in the Archipelago, and to recover the monopoly

12. *Ibid.*, 40-44, 63-64, 118-20, 124-25, 138-39. Boulger, *Raffles*, 89-92, 155-56.

13. Egerton, *Raffles*, 143, 159-60.

of its commerce. An essential part of this policy was that the flourishing British trade which had grown up with the East Indian islands must be confined to the Dutch capital of Batavia, where it would be easy to restrict it to such limits as Holland might think desirable. All other ports in the islands must be closed to all save Dutch ships, and the British must be prevented from establishing any more settlements in the Archipelago. In fact, so far as it was possible, Holland wished to restore the conditions of the seventeenth century. It was of course impossible to use the old methods of open force, for times had changed, and Holland no longer dared to pursue the policy by which she had expelled the English in the days of the Massacre of Amboyna. It was not through her own strength that she had recovered her empire, but solely because it suited British policy to restore it. At the Congress of Vienna one of Castlereagh's principal objects had been to make Holland powerful enough to act as a barrier against a possible renewal by France of her attempts to secure the Rhine frontier. With the border states of the German Confederation Holland was Europe's first line of defence against another outbreak of "Revolutionary madness". To secure this end was even more important for Britain than for the other Great Powers, because of her age-old policy that the Low Countries must be held by a weak and friendly state. Holland's East Indian empire was restored to her to secure her good-will, and to make her sufficiently powerful to resist France. Furthermore British statesmen failed to realize the immense value of the Archipelago. It was not considered worth keeping, when weighed in the balance against the importance of Dutch friendship in Europe. Ceylon, Cape Colony, and other former Dutch possessions which were known to be of value to British trade were retained, but the East Indian islands were restored, because they seemed to be of little importance. Holland clearly understood the situation, and laid her plans accordingly. An open attempt to expel the British from the Archipelago would not be tolerated; but as long as she used more subtle methods there was not much danger of interference. Rather than drive Holland into the arms of France British statesmen were prepared to leave her a fairly free hand in the East Indian islands, and they would be far from pleased with any of the Company's agents like Raffles, who by openly opposing the Dutch threatened to cause strained relations between the two nations in Europe. The far from disinterested benevolence of British policy was Holland's strongest card, and during the next few years she played it with great

skill.

The Dutch Government sent a large fleet and army to the Archipelago, and reoccupied all the settlements of the Netherlands Company, including those which had been abandoned many years before it finally collapsed. New posts were also established on many islands which the Dutch had never formerly possessed. The old treaties with native rulers, giving Holland the monopoly of their trade, were again enforced. There were many Sultans who had never entered into such engagements with the Netherlands Company; but by more or less peaceful persuasion similar treaties were gradually secured from the majority. British ships were forbidden to visit any port in the Archipelago except Batavia, and the native praus were ordered to sail only to Dutch settlements to prevent them from trading with the Company. A large fleet of small warships was maintained to enforce these commercial regulations.¹⁴

From the date of his arrival at Bencoolen, Raffles combatted the Dutch designs in Sumatra. He was quite unsuccessful however, and only succeeded in drawing upon himself severe censures from the Directors and the Cabinet.¹⁵ It seemed that British trade with the Archipelago was doomed, but in 1819 the tide turned. The Marquis of Hastings had been hostile to Raffles during his administration of Java, but he had gradually become convinced of his ability and integrity. In October 1818 he granted Sir Stamford permission to visit Bengal and discuss the future of Bencoolen. The result of this voyage was the foundation of Singapore.¹⁶

Raffles gained the favour of Hastings and converted him to his policy for safeguarding the interests of British trade in the Archipelago. He convinced the Governor-General that the Dutch "had been actuated by a spirit of ambition, by views of boundless aggrandizement and rapacity, and by a desire to obtain the power of monopoliz-

14. Webster, *Congress of Vienna*, passim. Egerton, *Raffles*, 160. Boulger, *Raffles*, 91-92, 268-73, 319-20. Lady Raffles, *Memoir*, 304-7. Baring Gould & Bampfyde, *Sarawak*, 42. C. Assey, *On the Trade to China and the Indian Archipelago, with Observations on the Insecurity of British Interests in that Quarter*, pub. in "The Pamphleteer," XIV, 518-37, London 1819. Assey had been Secretary to the British Administration in Java, and was one of Raffles' most trusted friends, (Boulger, *Raffles*, 201, 238-39., 246).

15. Egerton, *Raffles*, 163-68. Boulger, *Raffles*, 275-76.

16. Egerton, *Raffles*, 169-70.

ing the commerce of the Eastern Archipelago, and of excluding the English from those advantages which they had long enjoyed"¹⁷ The success of this project would also "give them the entire command of the only channels for the direct trade between China and Europe."¹⁸ To defeat their aims it was decided to concede to them their pretensions in Sumatra and the exclusive control of the Straits of Sunda, and to confine British efforts to obtaining a port at the Southern entrance to the Straits of Malacca. For several years Raffles had advocated the establishment of a settlement there, to secure part of the commerce of the Archipelago, and as a port where ships in the China trade could obtain provisions and make repairs. The situation was far better than that of Penang for trade with the East Indian islands, since Prince of Wales Island was "too far from the centre of things to be an effective station," and was "so distant from the principal native ports of the Archipelago, that, under the uncertainty of the passage up the Straits, but few native vessels are induced to go there."¹⁹

On November 26, 1818, Raffles received his Instructions. He was to go first to Achin and establish British interests there in order to secure the control of the Northern entrance of the Straits of Malacca. He was then to go on and establish a post at Rhio, since this appeared to be the most suitable position for commanding the Southern entrance to the Straits, affording "the only effectual means of accomplishing the object of securing a free passage" through them. Raffles was appointed Governor-General's Agent, and was thus made independent of the Government of Penang. The proposed new settlement was also to be independent of Penang, and was to be controlled by Raffles, as Lieutenant-Governor of Bencoolen. In conclusion the Instructions strictly enjoined him to avoid all disputes with the Dutch, and not to attempt to occupy Rhio should he find on his arrival that they had already done so.²⁰ Rhio was an important native port on an island in the Rhio-Lingga Archipelago, at the Southern entrance to the Straits of Malacca, and not far distant from Singapore. It was "the principal

17. Lady Raffles, *Memoir*, 304, *Minute of Lord Hastings*, 1818.

18. Egerton, *Raffles*, 172.

19. Raffles, *Statement of Services*, 51. Lady Raffles, *Memoir*, 306-8. Egerton, *Raffles*, 162-63, 166, 171. Boulger, *Raffles*, 270-71, 295-96.

20. *Ibid.*, 271, 298-301. Egerton, *Raffles*, 172.

station of the Arab and Bugis traders on the Western side of the Archipelago."²¹

Curiously enough, on the very day on which these Instructions were signed, the Dutch secured a treaty from the helpless Sultan of Rhio by which they obtained control of the island.²² The probability of their forestalling him however had been much in Raffles's mind,²³ and on December 5, doubtless at his suggestion, additional instructions were issued authorizing him, in case the above contingency should have occurred, to negotiate with the Sultan of Johore for obtaining a site for a settlement. He was forbidden to do so however if the Dutch advanced claims, even of the slenderest, that the Sultan was their vassal.²⁴

Sir Stamford seems to have exaggerated the amount of support on which he could depend from the Governor-General. In reality Lord Hastings does not seem to have decided anything more in his own mind than that something must be done in the Straits, and that Raffles was the only man to do it. He had not given him his entire confidence, and he would have abandoned the whole enterprise at the first check, if his agent had not been too prompt and too strong for him. When Sir Stamford sailed from the Hughli in December 1818 the die was cast. He knew the hostility and vacillation of his superiors, and he strained every nerve to accomplish his task before they had time to countermand his orders.²⁵ How true was his estimate of them was shown by a despatch which Lord Hastings sent after him before he had set sail. It directed him to "desist from every attempt to form a British establishment in the Eastern Archipelago". Fortunately however Raffles carried out his mission so quickly that Singapore was occupied before the letter reached him.²⁶

Sir Stamford arrived at Penang on December 31, and found that the Dutch had already occupied Rhio. Colonel Bannerman, the Governor of Penang, was bitterly jealous of Raffles, and strongly urged him to give up the enterprise. This he refused to do, and Bannerman thereafter tried by every means in his power to make the

21. *Ibid.*, 298-301.

22. Egerton, *Raffles*, 172-73.

23. *Ibid.*, 172.

24. Bouger, *Raffles*, 301-2.

25. *Ibid.*, 297.

26. Egerton, *Raffles*, 183-84.

foundation of Singapore a failure. Curiously enough however, in one way his hostility proved of the greatest service. Raffles's orders were that he must first carry out the mission to Achin; and if this had been done, Hastings's despatch forbidding the establishment of the new post would have caught up with him before he left Sumatra. Bannerman was most insistent that the Achin mission should be postponed pending certain representations he wished to make to the Supreme Government. Raffles knew that there was no time to lose unless the British were to be forestalled at Johore as well, and he was therefore only too glad to find so excellent an excuse for pressing on with the more important part of his commission. Accordingly, on January 19, 1819 he sailed from Penang with his little squadron of six vessels.²⁷

Nine days later, on January 28, 1819, the ships anchored off the island of Singapore. Influenced by his knowledge that an important trading city had existed there until its destruction some four hundred and fifty years earlier, Sir Stamford had decided before he left Calcutta that Singapore would be the best site for his proposed settlement in case he should find on his arrival that the Dutch had forestalled him at Rhio.²⁸ The only inhabitants of the island were the Temenggong of Johore and some one hundred and fifty of his Malay followers, who gained a precarious livelihood by fishing and offering an asylum to the pirates who swarmed in the Straits of Malacca. Abdullah Munshi, a protégé of Raffles who came to Singapore a few months later, has left a very vivid and amusing account of Singapore as it was in 1819:—

"At that time no mortal dared to pass through the Straits of Singapore, jins and satans even were afraid, for that was the place the pirates made use of to sleep at and to divide their booty. There also they put to death their captives. and . . . themselves fought and killed each other in their quarrels on the division of the spoil . . . All along the beach there were hundreds of human skulls, some of them old, some fresh with the hair still remaining, some with

27. *Ibid.*, 174-75. Buckley, *Anecdotal History of Singapore*, I, 26-27.

28. Swettenham, *British Malaya*, 66-71. Egerton, *Raffles*, 176-78. Boulger, *Raffles*, 302-5, 352-62. Lady Raffles, *Memoir*, 370-71.

the teeth still sharp, and some without teeth: in fine, they were in various stages of decay. Mr. Farquhar ordered them to be collected and thrown into the sea. They were all put in sacks and thrown in accordingly."²⁹

Discovering that the Dutch had made no claim to Singapore and that the Temenggong was willing to allow an English settlement, Raffles made a Preliminary Agreement with him on January 30. It stipulated that the Company might establish a factory, and that as long as the British remained and protected the Temenggong he would not enter into relations with any other power nor allow it to settle in his country. In return he was to receive \$3,000 a year.³⁰

Despite this treaty Raffles felt that his legal title to Singapore was still insecure, since it came from the "de facto" and not the "de jure" ruler of the country. That no loophole might be left for the Dutch he decided to secure a grant of the territory from the Sultan as well. The explanation of how there came to be two rulers claiming control over Singapore is to be found in the decay of the ancient Empire of Johore. In the sixteenth century it had been a powerful state, but during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries its strength had steadily decayed. The Sultans had removed their capital from Johore City, in the present state of Johore, to Lingga. They were practically puppets in the hands of their nominal ministers, the Raja Mudas or governors of Rhio. The Raja Mudaship was the hereditary office of the princes of the Bugis merchant-pirates who had settled on the coasts of continental Johore, but more especially in the Rhio-Lingga Archipelago, during the eighteenth century. The continental dominions of the Sultans continued to form a nominal part of the Empire of Johore, and were ruled by their great officers of state, the Temenggong at Johore and the Bendahara at Pahang. Theoretically subject to the Sultan, in fact they had gradually become practically independent.

This was the situation when in 1810 Sultan Mahmud II died leaving two sons. The elder, Hussein, was his destined successor; but at the time of his father's death he was in Pahang to marry the sister of the Bendahara. During his absence the Bugis Raja Muda of Rhio, Rajah

29. *JIA*, VI, 590-91. Trans. of Hikayat Abdullah by T. Braddell
30 Buckley, *Singapore*, I, 35-38.

Jaafar, persuaded the younger son of the late Sultan, Abdulrahman, to mount the throne. Hussein had been unable to recover his rights, and had since then been living in poverty at Rhio. The Dutch treaty of 1818, by which they had obtained control of Rhio, was a revival of the former treaty of vassalage which they had imposed on Sultan Mahmud II in 1785. It was concluded with the younger brother, Abdulrahman, the "de facto" ruler of Johore, no attention being paid to the elder brother Hussein. Moreover Raffles carefully ascertained that the provisions of this treaty were confined to Rhio, and that under it the Dutch could lay no claim to Singapore. It was certain that they would oppose the British occupation of the island, and equally evident that their puppet, Abdulrahman, would refuse to confirm the Temenggong's grant of Singapore. Raffles wished to confront the Dutch with an indefeasible title in the diplomatic contest which he foresaw. In Hussein who was indisputably the lawful Sultan of Johore, he saw the means of obtaining what he wanted. Raffles saw clearly that the Temenggong was the "de facto" ruler of Singapore, although in theory only the Sultan's agent. While however Hussein's power was in practice nil, he was the "de jure" sovereign. If the Company's title to Singapore were based merely on the Temenggong's grant the Dutch might be able to overthrow it on the ground that theoretically he had no right to make the cession. But with a grant signed by both the "de facto" and the "de jure" sovereigns, the Company's title was legally unassailable. Accordingly Raffles entered into negotiations with Hussein, and had no difficulty in persuading him to come to Singapore to be installed as the rightful Sultan of Johore and receive a comfortable pension as long as he lived. In return he was to give the Company the right to build a factory on Singapore.³¹

On February 6, 1819 a treaty was signed by Raffles, Sultan Hussein, and the Temenggong. By it the Company received the right to build a factory, while the Sultan and the Temenggong agreed that so long as it should be maintained they would not form a treaty with, nor consent to the settlement in any part of their territories, of any European or American power. The Company was to pay the Sultan a yearly pension of \$5000, and the

31. Wilkinson, *Malay Papers. History of the Peninsula*, 45-66. JIA, IX, 68-69, T. Braddell. *Newbold, Straits of Malacca*, II, 47-51. Begbie, *Malayan Peninsula*, 71-79, 286-87. SSR, 142: *Minute of Fullerton* of Nov. 29, 1827. Buckley, *Singapore*, I, 22-25. Egerton, *Raffles*, 178-79. *Lady Raffles, Memoir*, 398.

Temenggong \$3000, while in addition the Temenggong should receive half of whatever dues it might be decided to levy on native vessels. Furthermore, as long as the Sultan and Temenggong resided near the Company's factory they were to be protected; but it was specifically stated that this alliance did not in any way bind the British to interfere in the internal affairs of Johore, or to maintain the Sultan's authority by force of arms.³²

On the following day, February 7, Raffles left to carry out his mission to Achin. A state so powerful in the seventeenth century that even the Dutch had to treat it with some circumspection, had dwindled to a small district at the northern end of Sumatra. Even here the Sultans were too weak to restrain their rebellious vassals, who had become virtually independent. Anarchy reigned supreme, and each petty chief did very much what seemed best in his own eyes. In Raffles's opinion Achin was falling to pieces "through the personal imbecility and political weakness of the monarch" and its break up was imminent.³³ Sir Stamford was strongly prejudiced in favour of this potentate, Alaeddin Jauhar al-Alam Shah, whom he described as of "estimable qualities . . . though perhaps weak." He appears at least to have been dissolute and imprudent. In 1815 Alam Shah had been dethroned by Syed Hussain, a wealthy Penang merchant, who at once abdicated in favour of his son. The new ruler was strongly supported by the Penang Government.³⁴ This was the situation when Raffles returned to Achin on March 14, 1819, with instructions to establish friendly relations with the Achinese ruler, and exclude Dutch influence.

He insisted that Alam Shah had learned wisdom in adversity and was supported by the majority of his people. Raffles gained the reluctant assent of the other Commissioner, Captain Coombs, to the restoration of the dethroned Sultan. He was accordingly reinstated, and the usurper pensioned by the British. Raffles was censured by the Supreme Government for the cavalier way in which he treated his fellow-Commissioner, while the treaty which he made was ratified as the "best course now to be pursued," although the only result certain to accrue from

32. Aitchison, *Treaties*, I, 424-26.

33. Raffles, *History of Java*, I, 222-23. St. John, *Indian Archipelago*, II, 71.

34. Aitchison, *Treaties*, I, 439. Lady Raffles, *Memoirs*, 396-97.

it was "the expense which is at once incurred." He was also instructed that there was to be no further interference.³⁵

By the terms of the treaty a perpetual defensive alliance was established between the Company and Achin, and a British Agent was to be received at the Court. The customs duties charged on British imports were to be "fixed and declared" and no one was to be granted a monopoly of the produce of the state. The Sultan also engaged for himself and his successors "to exclude the subjects of every other . . . power . . . from a fixed residence in his dominion," and not to negotiate, or make treaties without the knowledge and consent of Britain.³⁶

If the Company had used the opportunities given by this treaty to establish itself in Achin, it would have controlled the northern as through Singapore it dominated the Southern entrance to the Straits of Malacca. This was undoubtedly Raffles's intention.³⁷ On the other hand, having regard to the impotence of the Sultan, the strong hostility of the Achinese chiefs to foreign control, and the powerful anti-British faction in the country, it is quite conceivable that such a course might have involved the Company in a war like that which the Dutch had to wage for over thirty-three years when they attempted to conquer Achin after 1871. As it was, by the orders of the Supreme Government a policy of non-interference was followed. In 1825, Fullerton, Governor of Penang Presidency, reported that the treaty of 1819 had "been a dead letter from the day it was signed," since Sultan Alam Shah never recovered his authority, his influence, or even his respect." Power continued to remain in the hands of various chiefs who had established their independence. Fullerton declared that it would be "utterly impracticable" to establish British influence in Achin, without "in plain terms . . . subjugating the country — an alternative which it never suited British policy to resort to."³⁸ The Supreme Government agreed that Alam Shah had never had the power to fulfil his treaty obligations, while the Directors went even further and declared that they had "never approved of an intimate connection with that state."³⁹

35. Egerton, *Raffles*, 198-99; St. John, *Indian Archipelago*, II, 59.

36. Aitchison, *Treaties*, I, 441-44.

37. Swettenham, *British Malaya*, 111.

38. SSR, Vol. 100, March 21, 1825.

39. *Ibid.*, Jan. 28, 1825.

Meanwhile the "paper war" with the Dutch had begun. They appreciated as clearly as Raffles the significance of his latest move, and left no stone unturned to secure the abandonment of Singapore. Naturally the Government at Batavia could not avow the real reason for their hostility, that Sir Stamford had ruined their cherished scheme for monopolizing the trade of the East Indian islands. It was therefore decently veiled under an emphatic protest against Raffles's shameless violation of the sanctity of treaties. The Dutch contended that their treaty with Abdulrahman applied not only to Rhio, but to the whole empire of Johore. They declared that Abdulrahman was the lawful Sultan, while Hussein was merely an impostor brought forward by Raffles to give a show of legality to his nefarious actions. Finally, they accused Sir Stamford of terrorising the Temenggong and Hussein into ceding the island.⁴⁰

Raffles replied by bringing forward much evidence to prove that Hussein was the lawful Sultan, and that even apart from this Abdulrahman was not legally the ruler, since he did not possess the regalia of the Sultans of Johore, and had never been recognised by the Temenggong and the Bendahara. By the custom of Johore his coronation was invalid. Raffles also disproved the charges that he had extorted the cession of the island by force.⁴¹

Colonel Bannerman, the Governor of Penang, supported the Dutch representations. He was actuated partly by jealousy of Raffles, and in part by a well-grounded fear that Singapore would injure the prosperity of Penang. There were rumours that the Government of Batavia intended to attack Singapore and expel the British by force. Farquhar, the Resident of Singapore, appealed to Bannerman for reinforcements. The Colonel not only refused them, but even urged Farquhar to abandon the island and return to Penang. Bannerman then wrote to the Governor-General bitterly attacking Raffles, and urging that Singapore should be restored to the Dutch, its lawful owners.⁴² If the Governor of Penang had been a Dutch agent, he could not have worked more zealously for their cause.

When the protests from Batavia and Penang reached Calcutta, Lord Hastings was very angry with Raffles for

40. Egerton, *Raffles*, 181-82.

41. *Ibid.*, 182. Boulger, *Raffles*, 315-326.

42. *Ibid.*, 316-23.

involving the Company in a quarrel with Holland. He greatly regretted the occupation of Singapore; but since it was an accomplished fact he felt that immediate withdrawal was impossible. To have withdrawn would have been to admit the validity of the Dutch claims, and of this he was not convinced. He proposed that the matter should be referred to the home authorities for decision as to which power had the legal right to the island. To this the Dutch agreed.⁴³ Colonel Bannerman received a sharp rebuke from Hastings for his zealous partisanship which grievously surprised him, and resulted in the immediate despatch of the reinforcements asked for by Farquhar.⁴⁴

When the first news of the occupation of Singapore arrived in London, and the Directors and the Cabinet learned that Raffles had again involved them in a quarrel with Holland, they became thoroughly exasperated. On August 14, 1819, the Directors sent a despatch to Hastings denouncing Raffles and all his works. He was a mischievous agitator, always stirring up trouble with the Dutch, and they were inclined to consider his proceedings at Singapore an unjust violation of Holland's claims to the island. Before retaining or relinquishing Singapore however the Directors would await further explanations from Lord Hastings.⁴⁵

Ominous as this despatch appeared, it granted the one thing which Singapore required, Time. To preserve good relations with Holland, the Directors and the Cabinet might quite probably have given up an island whose commercial value was uncertain, even though they had an incontestable legal claim to it. But, as events were to show, when Singapore proved that it was the long-sought trading-centre for the East Indian Islands, they refused to surrender it. The one danger had been that in the first flush of their exasperation the Directors might have ordered it to be handed over to the Dutch. That peril had been avoided and Singapore was given the opportunity to show its worth.

From the beginning Raffles foresaw the great future of Singapore, and his letters to the Supreme Government and to his friends are an almost uncannily accurate forecast of its subsequent history. With an excellent harbour, and easily defensible, the island commanded the Southern

43. Egerton, *Raffles*, 183.

44. *Ibid.*, 189. Boulger, *Raffles*, 324-25.

45. *Ibid.*, 326-27. Egerton, *Raffles*, 191-93.

entrance to the Straits of Malacca. In the event of war it would no longer be possible for Holland to close the Straits and so destroy the trade to China. As a trading-centre the situation was preferable even to that of Rhio, since it was closer to the trade route through the Straits. "Our China trade . . . and every native vessel that sails through the Straits . . . must pass in sight of it." Henceforth British merchantmen would be independent of Malacca for obtaining shelter and refitting. Raffles also foresaw that a very large trade would be built up with the Malay Peninsula, Siam, Indo-China, and China. Most important of all however, Britain had at last secured a position which would give her a large share in the commerce of the East Indian islands. Summing up the vast significance of his move in one sentence, Raffles wrote:—

"Whether we may have the power hereafter of extending our stations, or be compelled to confine ourselves to this factory, the spell is broken, and one independent post under our flag may be sufficient to prevent the recurrence of the system of exclusive monopoly which the Dutch once exercised in these seas and would willingly re-establish."

So long as Singapore remained free from all customs and port dues, it "must eventually destroy the spell of Dutch monopoly."⁴⁶

From the very beginning, Singapore amply justified Raffles' confidence. One of his first actions after the occupation of the island was to order that commerce should be free from all customs dues.⁴⁷ As a result of this, and of the great affection which the natives had for Sir Stamford, the population and trade increased at a phenomenal rate. As soon as the news of Raffles's action reached Malacca, there was a veritable exodus of Malays to Singapore, despite the frenzied efforts of the Dutch to prevent it.⁴⁸ Besides the Malays, there soon arrived English and Scotch merchants, Bugis traders from Celebes, and the ubiquitous Chinese. By June 1819 the population already exceeded 5000, and by August 1820 it numbered between 10,000 and 12,000, the majority being Chinese.⁴⁹

46. *Ibid.*, 181. Boulger, *Raffles*, 305-6. *JRASB*, II, 175-78, 312.

47. Buckley, *Singapore*, I, 41-44.

48. Hikayat Abdullah, trans. Thomson, 116-19.

49. Lady Raffles, *Memoir*, 465.

The growth of trade was even more remarkable. On April 3, 1820 Raffles wrote that the imports and exports on native craft alone exceeded \$4,000,000 a year.⁵⁰ By the end of 1820 the Resident Farquhar reported that Singapore's trade "already far exceeds what Malacca could boast of during the most flourishing years of its long continuance in our possession."⁵¹ Early in 1821, the value of the imports and exports for the preceding two years was \$8,000,000. Of this \$5,000,000 were carried by native ships from China, Siam, and the East Indian islands. By 1822 the value of the imports and exports was \$8,568,151, and in 1823 it leaped to \$13,268,397.⁵² A third and most convincing argument for the retention of Singapore was the small cost of its administration. It amounted to only £12,000 to £14,000 a year, while the annual expense of Bencoolen was almost £100,000. Moreover by August 1820 the total cost of the administration was paid for by the revenue raised at Singapore.⁵³

The argument of phenomenal success, joined to the unwearied efforts of Raffles and his friends in England, finally won the day, and by the autumn of 1822 it was known that Singapore would not be surrendered.⁵⁴ After years of failure, Raffles had at last achieved a success which more than compensated for his previous failures.

In 1822-23 Raffles came to Singapore for the second time. His duties as Governor of Bencoolen prevented him from visiting it more frequently, and the administration had been in the hands of the Resident Farquhar, under Sir Stamford's general superintendence. His service in the East was now drawing to a close: the climate of Bencoolen had wrought havoc with his health, and he had decided to return to England by 1824 at the latest.⁵⁵ Before leaving however he wished to carry out many measures necessary for Singapore's prosperity. The amount of work which he accomplished in 1822-23 was as varied as it was colossal. Among the more important items were town-planning, drawing up rules for freedom of trade, regulations for police and general security, the

50. *Ibid.*, 444-45.

51. Boulger, *Raffles*, 328.

52. *Raffles, Statement of Services*, 56.

53. *Raffles, Statement of Services*, 67. Lady Raffles, *Memoir*, 465.

54. *Ibid.*, 445. Boulger, *Raffles*, 330.

55. *Ibid.*, 284-86, 330.

institution of a magistracy, and the formation of a code of law.⁵⁶

The most serious problem with which he had to deal was the prevailing lawlessness. The situation was much the same as that which had existed at Penang from 1786 to 1807. There were only a few officials and a mere handful of police to maintain order amongst a population composed of half the races of Eastern Asia. Moreover no courts or code of laws had been legally established. There were many murders, and robberies were constantly committed in broad daylight. In most cases the offenders were never punished.⁵⁷

Raffles therefore by Regulation III of 1823 appointed twelve Magistrates who were to be nominated yearly by the Resident from among the principal British merchants. They were to try minor civil and criminal cases under the general supervision of the Resident. More serious offences were to be tried by the Resident: but this court was never actually constituted by Raffles.⁵⁸ The code of law which he drew up was based to some extent on the principles and forms of English law; but he directed that as far as possible regard should be paid to native customs, especially in matters of religion, marriage, and inheritance. Raffles' regulations were very general in form, and left large discretionary powers to his Magistrates. They were to decide cases in accordance with their common-sense, combining with it the principles of English and native law as far as they were applicable. The legality of these regulations was later successfully challenged by Crawford, Raffles' successor, although Sir Stamford himself does not appear to have realized that he was exceeding his powers.⁵⁹ It is clear however that whether legal or no, some code of this sort was necessary to serve as a stop-gap until such time as the Company should provide a substitute.

In June 1823 Raffles left Singapore for the last time, and returned to England. He was now, as he described himself, "a little old man, all yellow and shrivelled, with his hair pretty well blanched." Three years later, in July

56. Buckley, *Singapore*, I, 78-90, 95-97, 106-7, 111-24.

57. *JIA*, VI, 596-600, "Hikayat Abdullah," trans. T. Braddell.

58. Egerton, *Raffles* 220. Buckley, *Singapore*, I, 97. *JIA*, VIII, 330-34, T. Braddell.

59. *JRASSB*, XXIV, 1-12.

1826, he was dead. The harsh treatment of the East India Company after his retirement had proved too great a shock for his enfeebled constitution, undermined by twenty years in the East.⁶⁰ He was buried in a nameless grave, of which the very site remained for many years unknown. The city which he founded is his truest memorial, and it is peculiarly fitting that his statue at Singapore should bear the inscription:—

"Si monumentum quaeris, circumspice."

After Raffles's departure Singapore was removed from the control of Bencoolen and made a dependency of the Supreme Government.⁶¹ The new Resident, who held office from 1823 to 1826, was John Crawfurd. He was one of the most famous Malayan scholars of his day, an able administrator, and a fair diplomatist. Formerly a member of the Bengal Medical Service, he had spent three years at Penang as a surgeon, and had then been one of Raffles's assistants in Java. In 1823 he had recently returned from an abortive embassy to Siam and Cochin-China. As Resident of Singapore he showed himself to be a very painstaking and capable official, and worked hard to promote its interests in every way. He fostered agriculture, combatted piracy so far as his scanty means allowed, and grappled with the prevailing lawlessness which arose from the absence of legally constituted courts. With all his good qualities Crawfurd was not popular. He lacked the easy manners and courteous demeanour which had made Raffles and Farquhar so well-liked by both Europeans and natives, and he was frugal to the point of parsimony. There is an amusing story told of him that on the occasion of a banquet given by him to celebrate the anniversary of the foundation of Singapore, the party broke up at ten because the Resident's scanty stock of wine was exhausted. Furthermore, so far as one can judge from his writings and actions, he was obstinate and dogmatic, and impervious to argument once he had made up his mind. Abdullah the Munshi, no mean judge of character, wrote of him:

"He was impatient, and of a quick temper; but in what he was engaged he did slowly and not immediately. Further, it could be perceived that he was a man of good parts, clever and profound. Yet it

60. Egerton, *Raffles*, 250-62.

61. Buckley, *Singapore*, I, 110-11.

was equally true that he was much bent down by a love for the goods of this world. His hand was not an open one, though he had no small opinion of himself. Further, his impatience prevented him from listening to long complaints As sure as there was a plaint, he would cut it short in the middle. On this account I have heard that most people murmured and were dissatisfied, feeling that they could not accept his decision with good will, but by force only."⁶²

The two most important questions with which Crawford had to deal were the negotiations for the cession of the whole island of Singapore, and the problem of maintaining law and order. Raffles's treaty of 1819 as Crawford pointed out, "amounted to little more than a permission for the formation of a British factory There was in reality no territorial cession giving a legal right of legislation. The only law which could have existed was the Malay code. The native chief was considered to be the proprietor of the land, even within the bounds of the British factory."⁶³ The cession of the island was thus necessary before the Company could legally set up courts of law. Furthermore, the Sultan and Temenggong had taken advantage of the form of the treaty to levy exactions upon native crafts coming to Singapore, on the ground that it was a Malay port subject to their laws. Many of their followers were notorious evil-doers, but it was almost impossible to punish them for their frequent crimes owing to the protection given them by the two Malay rulers. The Sultan and Temenggong also took some part in the government and in the administration of justice, a role for which they were quite unfitted by their character and ability.⁶⁴

To deal with this situation Raffles had made a Convention with the Sultan and Temenggong on June 7, 1823. The Sultan was to receive \$1500 and Temenggong \$800 a month for life. In return they gave up all right to levy dues upon native trade and to act as judges, although they were still entitled to a seat when they chose to attend. English law was henceforth to be enforced "with

62. Hikayat Abdullah, trans. Thomson, 208. Buckley, Singapore, I, 140-41, 155. Other parts of Crawford's career are dealt with in the chapters on Anglo-Siamese Relations, Trade and Agriculture, the Civil Service and the Transfer.

63. Crawford, *Embassy to Siam*, 566.

64. B. Pol., Range 12, Vol. 59, March 5, 1824. No. 48. Buckley, Singapore, I, 67-68, 160-63. BSP, Vol. 328: March 4, 1825, No. 9.

due consideration to the usages and habits of the people," special respect being paid to Malay law in cases involving religion, marriage and inheritance, when it was not contrary to "reason, humanity and justice." Finally, the whole island of Singapore and the adjacent islets were declared to be "at the entire disposal of the British Government," with the exception of land occupied by the Sultan and Temenggong.⁶⁵

Although this Convention abolished many of the unsatisfactory conditions arising from the treaty of 1819, it did not entirely meet the needs of the case. In the opinion of the Advocate General of Bengal, it failed to give an "absolute cession of the Right of Sovereignty," although there was "a near approach to it."⁶⁶ Crawford also pointed this out to the Supreme Government on January 10, 1824, and asked for permission to conclude a treaty which should place British sovereignty at Singapore beyond dispute.⁶⁷ On March 5, 1824 he received the required authorization.⁶⁸

As he had anticipated, he found "considerable difficulty" in carrying out his orders. Owing to the remarkable development of Singapore the two Malay chiefs had prospered beyond their wildest dreams. They fully realised the advantage of their position, and were determined to make as much as possible out of the surrender of their rights. Hence the Company was compelled to pay them far larger pensions than if the whole island of Singapore had been ceded in 1819.⁶⁹

Crawford's Treaty with the Sultan and Temenggong was signed on August 2, 1824. The island of Singapore "together with the adjacent seas, straits and islets" lying within a radius of ten miles were ceded "in full sovereignty and property" to the East India Company, its heirs and successors forever. By Article VIII the Malay chiefs promised that as long as they continued to draw their pensions they would not form an alliance or correspond with any foreign power whatever, without the knowledge and consent of the British. Article IX guaranteed the chiefs a "personal asylum and protection" at Singapore

65. B. Pol., Range 123, Vol. 59: March 5, 1824, No. 52.

66. *Ibid.*, No. 15.

67. Buckley, *Singapore*, I, 160-63.

68. *Ibid.*, 167.

69. *Ibid.*, 160-63, 167.

or Penang should they ever be compelled to flee from their own territories; but Article X made it clear that there was to be no offensive and defensive alliance between the Company and the rulers of Johore. By this section it was mutually agreed that neither party should be bound to interfere in the internal affairs of the other, or in any political dissensions or wars which might arise, or "to support each other by force of arms against any third party whatsoever." By Articles XI and XII the chiefs promised to do their best to suppress piracy in Johore and the Straits of Malacca, to "maintain a free and unshackled trade" in their dominions, and to admit British commerce on the terms of the most favoured nation.

In return the Company promised to pay to the Sultan \$33,200 and a pension for life of \$1,300 a month: while the Temenggong was to receive \$26,800 and \$700 a month for life. The two chiefs were to be treated "with all the honours, respect and courtesy belonging to their rank and station, whenever they may reside at or visit the Island of Singapore." By Articles VI and VII the Company agreed to pay the Sultan or his heirs \$20,000 and the Temenggong or his successors \$15,000 for all their lands and houses at Singapore, should they at any time prefer to leave it and live in some part of Johore. By Article XIV all previous Treaties and Conventions were annulled, except insofar as they conferred on the Company any right or title to the possession of Singapore and the adjacent islands.⁷⁰

Crawfurd's despatch of August 3, 1824, had several important comments on this treaty.⁷¹ In it he explained that the reason for the apparently unimportant cession of the islets near Singapore, was that they were absolutely necessary for the defence of the town, and "towards our safety from the piratical hordes that surround us, against whose incursions and depredations there would be no indemnity if we were not in the occupation of the numerous islets which lie upon the immediate coast of the principal Settlement." Piratical praus were in the habit of lurking behind these islands and capturing native traders almost within sight of the harbour.

With regard to Articles VIII, IX and X, Crawfurd wrote that the Malay rulers were quite willing to bind

70. Aitchison *Treaties*, I, 428-31.

71. BSP, Vol. 328: March. 4, 1825. No. 9.

themselves not to have relations with any other power. "Their evident desire throughout" was to persuade the Company to form an offensive and defensive alliance with them. Crawford took great pains to word the treaty in such a way as to make it clear that the Company had not in any way undertaken to assist them in their wars. There was especial need for caution at this time, since the Temenggong was involved in hostilities with the Raja Muda of Rhio and the Dutch, who were trying to seize the Carimon Islands and the present state of Johore on the plea that they belonged to Sultan Abdulrahman.⁷²

Crawford had a very low opinion of both Hussein and the Temenggong and expressed in this despatch a fervent wish that they and their disreputable followers would leave Singapore. Of this he had little hope, since they thoroughly appreciated the "repose and security which they at present enjoy." The unequivocal cession of sovereignty however had greatly simplified the problem of dealing with them: henceforth their followers would be as completely amenable to the laws as the rest of the population.

With the ratification of Crawford's treaty by the Supreme Government on March 4, 1825, the final seal of approval was set upon the Company's possession of Singapore. This was however merely a formality, since it has been shown above that as early as 1822 it had been decided to retain the island and in the Anglo-Dutch Treaty of March 1824 Holland had already withdrawn her objections to the British occupation.⁷³

The second important problem with which Crawford had to deal was the absence of any legally constituted courts at Singapore. For two reasons the Company was unable to create them. In the first place it did not obtain the rights of sovereignty over the island until the Treaty of August 2, 1824, although in the opinion of the Advocate-General of Bengal Raffles's Convention of 1823 was "a near approach to it," so that henceforth English law could "be made to operate with effect and without injustice."⁷⁴ Even after this obstacle was removed however there remained the difficulty that the cession of Singapore had not been ratified by Parliament. This

72. v. Chapter on Treaty of 1824.

73. *Ibid.*

74. P. Pol., Range, 123, Vol. 59: March 5, 1824. No. 14 and 15.

was not done until 1826, and hence it was only in 1827 that the Directors were able to establish courts of law in the settlement.⁷⁵

In an important trading-centre it was of course necessary that some form of law should be administered unless trade were to be hopelessly trammelled; and the Resident was therefore compelled to assume an authority which by law he did not possess.⁷⁶ Every decision given by him or his subordinates was technically illegal, and he was open to prosecution in the Indian courts by anyone on whom he had inflicted a penalty. Granted the justice of his decisions, there seems no doubt that in such a case the Government would have protected him by an Act of Indemnity; but to a man of Crawford's cautious disposition the situation was intolerable.

Soon after his arrival he consulted the Recorder of Penang on the legality of Raffles's Regulations. The judge's opinion confirmed Crawford's suspicions as to their illegality and to rid himself of part of his responsibility he abolished the office of magistrate created by Raffles. Since it was plainly necessary that some kind of tribunal should exist, Crawford substituted for Raffles's judiciary a Court of Requests, or small debts court, presided over by his Assistant, and the Resident's Court. This, the principal court of Singapore, decided all civil and criminal cases "on the general principles of English law," so far as local conditions and the "character and manners of the different classes of inhabitants" permitted. Crawford and his Assistant acted as joint judges.⁷⁷ Trial by jury did not yet exist at Singapore, and the procedure was very summary. The penalties inflicted were light fines or floggings, or imprisonment up to six months. The only penalty for a conviction for murder or piracy was indefinite imprisonment. From this it would appear that while the form of the courts differed from that instituted by Raffles, the law administered in them was much the same as that which he had prescribed.

As at Penang the Europeans were the most difficult class of the population to control, since they were aware of the legal weakness of the Resident's position, and the more turbulent took full advantage of it. In Crawford's

75. *Ibid.*, No. 15. *Ibid.*, Vol. 65, May 21, 1824 No. 37.

76. *Ibid.* Crawford, *Embassy to Siam*, 557.

77. *JIA*, VIII, 330-34, T. Braddell. Buckley, *Singapore*, I. 155. Crawford, *Embassy to Siam*, 557-58.

despatch to the Supreme Government of July 1, 1823, he wrote that they were "at present amenable to no authority at this place and the ill-disposed had it always in their power to set the authority of Government at defiance, and to render themselves a bane to the peaceful inhabitants. There exists no means whatever in civil cases of affording the natives any redress against them, nor in criminal cases any remedy short of sending them for trial before the Supreme Court of Calcutta."⁷⁸ The harassed Resident received little help from the Government of India. All that it could do was to advise him to make the natives pay their debts by selling their property or by occasionally imprisoning them. Europeans, however, he was recommended only to banish from Singapore.⁷⁹

Conditions remained substantially unaltered until the establishment of the Recorder's Court in 1827, although Crawford contrived to make the administration of justice more effective after the cession of Singapore by his treaty of 1824. The police force, maintained by voluntary contributions from the principal European and native inhabitants, became very efficient. About 1826 the leading merchants as well as the government officials were appointed Justices of the Peace, with power to try civil and criminal cases.⁸⁰

On March 20, 1827, the long-sought charter of justice arrived and the courts existing at Singapore were abolished. The charter was "in all essential respects" similar to that of 1807, and merely extended the jurisdiction of the Recorder's Court of Penang to Malacca, Singapore, and all present or future dependencies of the Straits Government. The court could hear civil, criminal and ecclesiastical cases, but by some unaccountable omission it did not possess Admiralty jurisdiction. Until this was granted in 1837, all captured pirates had to be sent to Calcutta for trial, with the result that often they were not tried at all. The Recorder's Court was peripatetic, two sessions of Oyer and Terminer and Gaol Delivery, and two sessions of the peace being held in each of the three settlements every year. In the intervals the Resident Councillor of each settlement tried civil and minor criminal cases. The judges of the Court were three in

78. *JIA*, VIII, 330-34, T. Braddell. *B. Pub.*, Range 11, Vol. 32: Jan. 13, 1825. Buckley, Singapore, I, 163-64.

79. *Ibid.*, 165.

80. Crawford, *Embassy to Siam*, 558.

number: the Recorder, a barrister appointed by the Crown, the Governor of the Straits Settlements, and the Resident Councillor of the town where the assize was being held. Only one of the three was a professional lawyer, and the two officials took precedence in rank over the Recorder. In each settlement there was also a Court of Requests, or small debts courts, presided over by civil servants entitled Commissioners. The Justices of the Peace continued to exist. They were nominated by the Recorder's Court, largely from the principal European inhabitants, and tried minor offences.⁸¹

A few months before the arrival of the charter Crawford was transferred to Rangoon. With his departure in 1826 the history of Singapore as a dependency of the Supreme Government came to an end, and it entered upon a new phase of its existence as part of the Penang Presidency. Only seven years after its foundation it was already clear that the island was rapidly becoming the principal British port in the Eastern Seas; and more and more the history of the Straits Settlements tended to become the story of the expansion of Singapore.

81. *Ibid.*, 559. SSR, 117: Aug. 9, 1827. SSR, 119. Dec. 27, 1827. SSR, 167: Nov. 16, 1827. SSR, 184: May 20, 1828. SSR, 194. March 20, 1827.

IV

The Anglo-Dutch Treaty Of 1824.

In the history of British Malaya few events have been of more momentous importance than the Anglo-Dutch treaty of 1824, and few have been decided with so little attention to the importance of the local interests involved. By this treaty the British Cabinet completed the work begun at the Congress of Vienna, and by further cessions of territory made it impossible to build up another British Empire in the East Indian islands.

The reason for this policy was largely the same as that which had dictated the retrocession of the Dutch possessions in the Archipelago in 1815. The Cabinet wished to make sure of Holland's friendship and support in Europe. Ministers failed to realize the value of the territories which they surrendered; and in any case they considered the loss was well repaid by the strengthening of good relations with Holland. Conditions had somewhat changed since 1815; the danger to be apprehended was not so much a fresh outbreak of "Revolutionary Madness" in France as the Holy Alliance. The policy of the French Government was becoming increasingly reactionary, and by 1824 it was a fully accredited member of the Holy Alliance. During the last years of Castlereagh's life Britain had been steadily drawing away from her late allies, and at the Congress of Verona in 1822 the breach had become irrevocable. The events of the next few years served to show the complete divergence between the policy of Britain and that of the great European monarchies.¹

Under these circumstances, the Cabinet was very anxious that the friendship of Holland should be assured. However cordial the relations between the two governments might be in Europe, there was continual friction between their agents in the East, and there was always a danger that this might estrange the two powers in Europe. The foundation of Singapore for example had greatly angered the Dutch, and Raffles's whole career in 1818-19 had on several occasions threatened to cause trouble with Holland. British hostility to the Dutch in Asia was a traditional policy, dating from the seventeenth century. Originating in the high-handed actions of the Dutch Company to secure control of the trade of the

1. Egerton, *Raffles*, 264-66. Alison Phillips, *Confederation of Europe*, pp. 58-275.

Archipelago, it had been kept alive by the commercial rivalry of the two great Companies wherever they came into contact, as in Sumatra. The records of Bencoolen and of the Dutch factories in Sumatra, for example, are full of charges and countercharges of intrigues, plots, violence, etc.² With the restoration of the Dutch East Indian Empire in 1816, and the monopolistic policy which Holland immediately reintroduced, the dormant antagonism at once sprang again into life. Almost every reference to the Dutch in the records of the Penang Presidency for the years 1818-24 shows that the Council regarded them with inveterate suspicion and hostility. The British Government decided to try and put an end to the constant friction in the East by settling all matters in dispute, and by dividing the Dutch and English spheres of influence, so that their agents would no longer come into contact. Negotiations were begun about the end of 1819, and although interrupted in 1820 by necessary reference to the East Indies they were resumed and successfully concluded in 1824.³

The treaty was signed in London on March 17, 1824, and was accompanied by an exchange of Notes, in order to define more clearly certain Articles.⁴ The territorial provisions were contained in Articles VIII to XV. Holland ceded to Britain all her factories in India, and "renounced all privileges and exemptions enjoyed or claimed in virtue of" them. In the Malay Peninsula she withdrew her objections to the occupation of Singapore, ceded to Britain the "town and fort of Malacca, and all its dependencies," and engaged "never to form any establishment in any part of the Peninsula of Malacca (the Malay Peninsula) or to conclude any treaty with any native Prince, Chief, or State therein." For their part the British ceded to Holland Bencoolen and all the Company's possessions in Sumatra, and promised that "no British settlement shall be formed on that island, nor any Treaty concluded by British authority with any native Prince, Chief, or State therein." They also engaged that they would neither make settlements nor treaties in the Carimon Islands (a small group to the South Westward of Singapore), the Rhio-Lingga Archipelago, "or on any other islands south of the Straits of Singapore." All ceded territories were to be handed over on March 8, 1825, and their inhabitants were

2. Marsden, *Memoirs of a Malayan Family*, 81-82.

3. PP Command Paper 1771, (1854), pp. 60-61, (Vol. LXXII).

4. Aitchison, *Treaties*, I, 68-73, 382-85.

to be allowed six years to dispose of their property and go wherever they chose "without let or hindrance." Article XV contained a stipulation which in later years became one of the main causes of the Malacca land problem. It provided that none of the ceded territories should be "at any time transferred to any other Power. In case of the said Possessions being abandoned by one of the present Contracting Parties, the right of occupation thereof shall immediately pass to the other." Article VI engaged that British and Dutch officials in the East should be ordered "not to form any new settlement on any of the islands in the Eastern Seas without previous authority from their respective governments in Europe." The principle underlying these provisions was that the British and Dutch spheres of influence should be separated by the cession of all territory lying within one another's spheres, and that by a mutual self-denying ordinance neither power should interfere in the area of the other. The British Cabinet hoped by this means to avoid disputes such as those for example which had arisen in 1818-19 because of the conflicting claims of Raffles and the Dutch in Sumatra.

The Treaty also attempted to settle the commercial rivalry. The general principle underlying these Articles was that while the right of Holland to control in her own interests the trade within her sphere was fully recognised, she agreed to make no attempt to monopolise the commerce of the Archipelago. She also promised never to discriminate unfairly against British trade as she had often done in the past. The two powers mutually agreed to grant each other "most favoured nation" treatment in India, Ceylon, and the Archipelago, and laid down general rules as to the amount of duty to be charged. Article III was aimed at a very common manoeuvre of both countries in hampering one another's trade. "No treaty hereafter made by either with any native power in the Eastern Seas shall contain any article tending either expressly or by the imposition of unequal duties to exclude the trade of the other party from the ports of such native power; and that if in any treaty now existing on either part any article to that effect has been admitted such article shall be abrogated upon the conclusion of the present treaty." By Article IV both powers promised that they would in no case "impede a free communication of the natives in the Eastern Archipelago with the ports of the two governments respectively, or of the subjects of the two governments with the ports belonging to native powers." By Article VII the Moluccas were expressly excluded from

these provisions, and Great Britain recognised the Dutch right to retain the monopoly of the trade with the Spice Islands. This concession was of far less importance than it would have been two centuries earlier, because the value of the spice trade with Europe was much less than it had been in the seventeenth century. The British Note accompanying the treaty contained a clear declaration of a very important principle, for it recorded "the solemn disavowal on the part of the Netherlands Government, of any design to aim either at political supremacy or at commercial monopoly in the Eastern Archipelago."

The third subject dealt with by the Treaty was Piracy. By Article V the two powers bound themselves "to concur effectually in repressing it." As will appear this agreement was more honoured in the breach than in the observance.

In the Notes which accompanied the Treaty the British and Dutch plenipotentiaries indulged in the pious hope that thenceforward there would be the most cordial friendship and cooperation between the two powers in the East. This expectation was premature by at least a generation. Traditional hatreds die hard, and no one can read the despatches of Straits officials, and especially the Singapore newspapers, without realising how strong was the dislike of the Dutch. The separation of the Dutch and British spheres however prevented the rise of territorial disputes, and thus one great cause of friction was removed. The Dutch commercial regulations however remained for many years a very sore point with both officials and civilians in the Straits Settlements. The British contention was that the Dutch evaded the articles of the Treaty, and hampered British trade with the Archipelago wherever possible. The Dutch on the other hand denied the charge, and declared that the complaints were entirely unjust. A long and at times acrimonious correspondence ensued, and continued with intervals for over twenty-five years. No attempt is made to deal with it here, for to establish the rights and wrongs of the case would require a volume as long as the present. Moreover it was not merely the trade of Singapore which suffered, and the inquiry would resolve itself into the history of the whole of British commerce with the East Indian islands. All that can be said is that the despatches on the subject scattered through the Bengal Records seem on the whole to make out a fairly strong "prima facie" case for the British charges. Rightly or wrongly, belief in Dutch duplicity and dishonesty seems

to have been a cardinal article of faith with every British merchant in the Straits.⁵

The commercial value of the Treaty to British commerce is uncertain; but on considering the relative value of the territorial cessions one returns to solid ground. Regarded purely from the point of view of British interests in the East Indian islands, there is no doubt that Britain surrendered far more than she retained. The retrocession of territory in 1815 had deprived her of the chance of building up in the Archipelago an empire which in wealth would have been a worthy second to India. There still remained however Sumatra, whose great latent resources were pointed out to the government by Raffles.⁶ Furthermore many other islands in the Archipelago were as yet unoccupied by the Dutch. Great Britain had still the opportunity to form a very large Malayan empire. Valuable as British Malaya became, a more aggressive policy in 1824 would have secured an East Indian empire of far greater importance. The opportunity was thrown away, and it never returned.

Regarding the British policy from the wider point of view, there is much to be said for it. It was important to retain the friendship of Holland, and a policy of territorial expansion in the East Indian islands might well have alienated it. Furthermore, there was a somewhat vague but by no means negligible danger that a more grasping policy would eventually have provoked dangerous jealousy on the part of the other Great Powers. Great Britain could not pursue an indiscriminate Forward Policy and run the risk of uniting the world against her.

Furthermore, the Treaty proved to be of service to Britain fifty years later. By the withdrawal of Holland

5. For a statement of the British case, v. PP Command Paper 1771, (1854), pp. 60-61, (Vol. LXXII). Earl, *Eastern Seas*, 242-50, 423-26. Moor, *Notices of the Indian Archipelago*, 5-10, 13-14, 172-4, reprint of articles otherwise unobtainable from the *Singapore Chronicle* of May 12, 1825, October and November 1827, and November 1829. Davidson, *Trade and Travel*, 88. SSR, 184: May 28, 1830, SSR 195: Directors' Letter of Sept. 30, 1829. *Public Letters to Bengal*, No. 34 of 1831—dated May 4, 1831. *Appel de la Hollande a la Justice et la Raison de la Grande Bretagne*, La Haye, 1836—a Dutch reply to the charges. B. Pub., Range 12, Vol. 68, Nos. 6 and 7 of July 10, 1832. This has no pretensions to being an exhaustive list of references to a subject which, as said above, it has not been attempted to investigate thoroughly: it merely indicates some of the sources from which material can be obtained.

6. Egerton, *Raffles*, 146-70.

from the Malay Peninsula, Great Britain found herself quite unhampered by rival European claims when, after the Treaty of Pangkor in 1874, she at last began to bring the Malay States under her control. Even if Holland had not ceded all her rights it is improbable that in the intervening half-century the whole Peninsula would have become a Dutch colony, considering her limited resources, and the extent of her commitments elsewhere in the East Indies. Having regard however to the usual Dutch policy of establishing their suzerainty over the native rulers, there seems little doubt that the same course would have been followed in the Peninsula. This indeed as will be seen, had already been done in Perak, and a few states of the Negri Sembilan. Rash though it may be to prophesy, it seems that had it not been for the Treaty of 1824 part of the Malay Peninsula would have become a Dutch colony.

The Dutch sphere in the Malay Peninsula in 1824 was confined to the Negri Sembilan, Selangor and Perak. Malacca was still, as it had been since 1641, their capital in the Malay Peninsula, but it had sadly fallen away from its ancient glory. Owing to the silting-up of the harbour and other causes, its trade had gradually declined, although there was a temporary revival from about 1779 to 1795. Its commerce suffered very severely from the foundation of Penang, and from the deliberate attempt made by the East India Company to ruin it after the British conquest of 1795. Malacca remained fairly prosperous however until 1819. The foundation of Singapore gave Malacca its death-blow, and by 1824 it retained only a fraction of its former commerce.⁷ Furthermore the former strategic value of Malacca was almost nullified. It could no longer dominate the sea-route through the Straits of Malacca, since both entrances were now commanded by Penang and Singapore. It is significant that Holland regarded the moribund station of Bencoolen as a fair exchange for Malacca and the few hundred square miles of territory known as the Malacca Territory, which surrounded it. The inheritance of the East India Company was a decayed port, a chronic deficit, a costly native war, and a land problem which defied solution for over forty years.

The Dutch trade with the Peninsula consisted mainly in tin, and the constant object of their policy was to

7. Swettenham, *British Malaya*, 18-19. v. chapter on Trade and Agriculture.

secure a monopoly of the output. Although the quantity of tin produced was far less than in the later nineteenth century, it was of considerable importance, the largest mines being in Perak.⁸ Dutch connection with Perak dated from about 1648, when they obtained from Achin, of which Perak was then a dependency, a treaty giving them the monopoly of the tin-output. The Malays of Perak refused to submit, and it was only after a generation of desultory warfare that they agreed to the Dutch monopoly in 1681. On several subsequent occasions the Malays made further vain attempts to expel the Dutch. On the conquest of Malacca in 1795 the Dutch fort in Perak surrendered to the British.⁹

The East India Company did not seek to continue the Dutch monopoly, and until 1818 Perak remained free from European control. A trade in tin grew up with Penang. On the restoration of Malacca to Holland in 1818, Timmerman Thyssen the Governor sent a mission to Perak to renew the former treaty. The Sultan refused, although far too weak to resist a Dutch attack. No attempt was made to overcome his reluctance, probably because the Government at Batavia knew that the exchange of Malacca for Bencoolen was already in contemplation.¹⁰

Selangor was also under Dutch control. It had been colonised about 1718 by Bugis pirates from Celebes, who established themselves along the coast and rivers. Making Selangor their base of operations they raided the whole West coast of the Peninsula, and the state bore a very bad reputation for piracy. In 1783 the Bugis of Rhio and Selangor made an abortive attack on Malacca, but were badly defeated. As a result, in 1786 the Dutch compelled Sultan Ibrahim of Selangor to sign a treaty which acknowledged Dutch suzerainty, gave them a monopoly of the tin, and undertook to expel all other Europeans from Selangor.¹¹

On the capture of Malacca in 1795 the Company allowed this treaty to lapse, and until 1818 Selangor was

8. JRASSB, LXVI, 64-65, Müller.

9. *Ibid.*, 65-68. *Ibid.*, X: 246-67. Wilkinson, *Malay Papers: History of the Malay Peninsula Prior to British Ascendancy*, 61-62.

10. SSR, 83. Jan. 19, 1819.

11. Wilkinson, *Malay Papers: History of the Peninsula*, 63-64. JRASSB, XXII, 321-24, W. E. Maxwell. Begbie, *Malay Peninsula*, 86-87. Anderson, *Malay Peninsula*, 32. BSP, 330: No. 12 of May 13, 1825.

entirely independent. In 1819 Governor Thyssen of Malacca compelled the Sutan to sign a treaty which was practically the same as that of 1786. Sultan Ibrahim of Selangor was now an old man but his hatred of the Dutch was as bitter as ever. He also cherished a very great liking for the British, and before accepting the Dutch demands he made a vain attempt to secure the Company's assistance against them. The Batavian Government however refused to ratify the treaty, for the same reason probably as in the case of Perak. Selangor was therefore allowed to declare itself independent.¹²

Dutch suzerainty also existed over some of the petty states of the Negri Sembilan, although there is some doubt as to the exact number of principalities affected, and the extent of their subjection. The Negri Sembilan (literally, the Nine States), formed part of the Empire of Johore, and was colonised in the sixteenth to eighteenth centuries by Malays from Menangkabau in Sumatra. The immigration seems to have been peaceful, the newcomers intermarrying to some extent with the wandering tribes of aborigines who then inhabited the country, instead of exterminating or expelling them after the usual Malay practice. By successive waves of immigration a number of petty principalities arose. During the first half of the eighteenth century the power of the Emperors of Johore steadily decayed, and their control over the Negri Sembilan appears to have been little more than nominal. They were therefore quite willing to grant titles and concessions to any chiefs who would acknowledge their supremacy. In this way the petty rulers obtained from the Emperors of Johore the recognition of their hereditary rights as Rajas of their respective states, and the insignia of their rank. The Emperors could not however confer any real power, and there were constant wars between the newly created dignitaries and rival claimants to their rank. Although Negri Sembilan means literally Nine States, the number of principalities varied at different times. Moreover there was no real confederacy, but merely a congeries of small chieftaincies.¹³

The overlordship of Johore grew steadily more nominal, and it is therefore not surprising that in 1757 the Emperor of Johore ceded to his allies the Dutch his unprofitable rights of suzerainty over Rembau. It is un-

12. *Ibid.*, SSR, 102.

13. Wilkinson, *Malay Papers: Notes on Negri Sembilan*, 6-15

certain whether the grant referred to Rembau alone, or whether, and this is more probable, it also included Sungei Ujong and several other principalities.¹⁴

The Dutch, following their usual policy in the Malay Peninsula, never attempted to conquer the Negri Sembilan. Their object was tin, not territory. Controlling as they did the sea-coast and the river-mouths they were able to enforce their monopoly pretty effectually without incurring the expense of sending large forces into an unknown and almost pathless jungle, to carry on an endless campaign with such experts at guerilla warfare as the Malays. Moreover, none of the petty rulers would gratuitously have offended the Netherlands Company.¹⁵ Rembau, being on the border of Malacca Territory, was perhaps more fully under Dutch control than the other states. In 1759 the Dutch made a treaty with Rembau, by which the state gave the Netherlands Company a monopoly of its tin, and acknowledged itself to be a dependency of Malacca.¹⁶ The Dutch appear also to have exercised the right to confirm the appointment of the nominal overlord of the Negri Sembilan, the Yamtuan.¹⁷

During the British régime, from 1795 to 1818, no attempt was made to enforce the Dutch rights. In 1818 however Governor Thyssen of Malacca renewed the Treaty of 1759 with Rembau. Batavia refused to ratify the treaty, but retained "a sort of paramount power over its chief."¹⁸ This vague suzerainty passed to the British in 1824.

In 1823 the Dutch attempted to bring under their control the part of the ancient Empire of Johore which now forms the modern state of that name. Holland's treaty of 1818 with Sultan Abdulrahman applied only to Rhio; but when Raffles produced Hussein as the lawful Sultan, the Dutch instigated Abdulrahman to wrest from Hussein the present state of Johore. This territory was the hereditary fief of the Temenggong of Johore, and he and Hussein appealed to Raffles for protection. This Sir Stamford was quite willing to grant, so far as he could

14. SSR, 102. Begbie, *Malay Peninsula*, 64. JRASSB, LXVI, 75, Müller.

15. Begbie, *Malay Peninsula*, 62.

16. *Ibid.*, 62-63. Newbold, *Straits of Malacca*, II, 437-40. BSP, 363: No. 70 of Nov. 25, 1831.

17. Wilkinson, *Negri Sembilan*, 18-22.

18. Newbold, *Straits of Malacca*, II, 439-43.

without embroiling himself with Holland; and in February 1823 he allowed the Malay chiefs to hoist the British flag in Johore, in order to ward off any attack by Abdulrahman. His reasons were that the Temenggong's "hereditary and legal" right had never hitherto been questioned, and that self-interest required it, as without the hinterland of the Peninsula Singapore was valueless.¹⁹ The Dutch protested strongly, and the Supreme Government ordered the flag to be removed, strongly censuring Raffles's conduct.²⁰ Crawford, who succeeded Raffles at Singapore in 1823, regarded Johore as entirely worthless, and after protracted discussions compelled Hussein and the Temenggong to remove the British flag. This they were most unwilling to do, and advanced the entirely untenable claim that the Treaty of 1819 ceding Singapore bound the Company to defend them.²¹ This contention was entirely false, as Article II of the Treaty expressly declared that the British were not bound to interfere in the affairs of Johore.²² Nothing however came of the Dutch manoeuvres, since by the Treaty of 1824 Continental Johore fell within the British sphere of influence.

Pahang, although nominally a part of Johore, does not appear ever to have been interfered with by the Dutch.²³ The Bendahara, the hereditary and practically independent official of the Sultan of Johore who governed Pahang, was the brother-in-law of Hussein, and at first supported him against Abdulrahman. Apparently realising the hopelessness of Hussein's prospects, he seems to have given his allegiance to Abdulrahman about 1812.²⁴ No attempt was made to make the overlordship effectual, and until 1824 the Bendahara continued to be the nominal vassal of Sultan Abdulrahman. After this date the Dutch withdrew from all participation in the affairs of the Peninsula, and since unaided Sultan Abdulrahman was quite unable to assert his supremacy, the Bendaharas of Pahang gradually abandoned even their shadow of allegiance, and assumed the position of independent sovereigns. When the British finally intervened in the affairs of Pahang, they recognised the real situation by creating the Bendahara Sultan of Pahang.²⁵

19. Buckley, *Singapore*, I, 157, B. Pol., Range 123, Vol. 65: No. 21 of May 21, 1824. *Ibid.*, No. 24 of May 21, 1824.

20. *Ibid.*, No. 21 and No. 25 of May 21, 1824.

21. *Ibid.*, May 21, 1824 and No. 23.

22. Althison, *Treaties*, I, 424.

23. JRASSB, LXVI, 74.

24. Wilkinson, *Malay Papers: Hist. of Malay Peninsula*, 66.

25. *Ibid.*, 66.

The inevitable result of the Treaty of 1824 was the dismemberment of the Empire of Johore, which was divided between Abdulrahman and Hussein. The former was known in the documents of the time as the Lingga or Rhio Sultan, because his capital was at Lingga, and he ruled over the island possessions of Johore, such as the Rhio-Lingga Archipelago, which lay within the Dutch sphere of influence. Hussein, from his residence at Singapore, was known as the Singapore Sultan. Nominally the overlord of Pahang and the present state of Johore, in point of fact he was practically an emperor without an empire, since the Temenggong and the Bendahara would not allow him to interfere with their rule. The Dutch supported their protégé in enforcing his authority over his island possessions, but they were unable to give him any assistance in dealing with Pahang and Johore, which he was quite unable to subdue without their help. They also secured for him the Carimon Islands, a group which occupied an important strategic position to the South-Westward of the Straits of Singapore. They were indisputably a possession of the Temenggong, the source indeed of much of his revenue; but they lay within the Dutch sphere, and were therefore claimed by Holland as part of Abdulrahman's sultanate. Sultan Hussein refused to give them up, but in 1827 Hussein's followers were attacked and expelled by Abdulrahman's Malays with the assistance of a Dutch force.²⁶ The Penang officials maintained an attitude of strict neutrality, partly on the ground that the Treaty ceding Singapore did not require them to aid the Malay chiefs, and partly because of the Directors' orders. Just before the annexation a despatch from the Directors arrived which declared that the Dutch could do as they chose with the Carimons, since by the Treaty the islands had come within their sphere of influence, and that the Company must not interfere.²⁷

The Treaty of 1824 radically changed the Company's relations with Achin, as settled by Raffles's treaty of 1819. During the five years which had elapsed since his mission, conditions in Achin had grown steadily worse. The restored Sultan Alam Shah never regained his authority, the central government had almost completely broken down, and the country was in a state of general anarchy.

26. BSP, 328: No. 12 of March 4, 1825. SSR, 142: Aug. 30. and Nov. 29, 1827.

27. SSR, 142: Aug. 30, and Nov. 15, 1827. SSR, 144: Feb. 1828. SSR, 173: No. 23, 1827. Despatches to Bengal, 104 Directors' Despatch of April 10, 1827. JRASSB, LXIV, 59-60.

From the day of its signature Raffles's Treaty had been "a dead letter", since the Sultan was powerless to carry it into effect. The Company had not tried to enforce its rights, since to do so would have involved an expensive war, and the conquest of the whole country. Moreover, curiously enough, Penang's trade with Achin was more flourishing than ever before, since all the independent Rajas had thrown open their ports to British trade, whereas the policy of the Sultans had been to confine it to the capital, Achin.²⁸

Raffles's treaty was referred to in the Notes interchanged when the Treaty of 1824 was concluded, and was declared to be incompatible with it, as it was designed to exclude Dutch trade from Achin. It was therefore to be replaced by a "simple arrangement for the hospitable reception of British vessels and subjects." The Dutch promised to respect the independence of Achin.²⁹

The Directors fully approved of the proposed alterations, true to their usual policy of refusing to form alliances which might involve them in Malayan wars. In a despatch to the Supreme Government they remarked that even if the Anglo-Dutch Treaty had not affected Raffles's arrangement, alterations in it would have been necessary, since "we have never approved of an intimate connection with that state." Whether a "mere commercial arrangement" should be made with Achin was left to the discretion of the Indian Government.³⁰ The Supreme Government forwarded the despatch to Penang, and left it to the discretion of the Council whether a "mere commercial arrangement" should be made or not. It was also impressed upon Penang that "our political interests in connection with Acheen have now ceased."³¹

The Penang Council decided that a commercial treaty was unnecessary, since to negotiate it with the powerless central government would be labour wasted, and to do so with the independent Rajas was unnecessary, as they had shown their entire willingness to trade freely with the British. The only danger was from Holland, whose good faith the Council strongly suspected. They feared she

28. SSR, 94: Feb. 19, 1824. SSR, 100: Jan. 28, and March 21, 1825.

29. Aitchison, *Treaties*, I, 69, 383-84.

30. SSR, 100: Aug. 4, 1824.

31. BSP, 328: No. 1 of Jan. 28, 1825.

would establish her influence in Achin and "embarrass if not put an end to" British commerce there by imposing the Dutch tariff. They therefore recommended that a sharp watch be kept on her actions.³²

The subsequent British policy towards Achin followed Penang's recommendations: after 1824 all diplomatic and political relations with Achin and the whole of Sumatra ceased, and the intercourse was purely commercial.³³ The only exception was that occasionally as in 1837 and 1844 British warships visited Achin to punish piratical rajahs and exact compensation for injuries done to traders.³⁴

On November 2, 1871, a Convention was concluded between Great Britain and Holland by which the Dutch were given a free hand in Achin in exchange for their colonies on the West Coast of Africa. By the Treaty of 1824 Holland had agreed to respect the independence of Achin; but by Article I of the Convention of 1871 the British Government promised to make no objections to the extension of the Dutch dominion in any part of Sumatra. The interests of British trade were safeguarded to some extent, for Article II stipulated that "in any native state of Sumatra that may hereafter become a Dutch dependency", British commerce should "enjoy all rights which are or may be granted to Dutch trade." But whereas hitherto British merchants had paid only the moderate Achinese customs duties, they were henceforth to be subject to the much heavier Dutch dues.³⁵ Great Britain resigned valuable trading privileges, and threw away what faint chances still remained to her of ultimately securing Achin. It will be remembered that British control of Achin had been an essential part of Raffles's policy in 1819, since together with Penang it dominated the entrance to the Straits of Malacca. The ultimate result of the Convention was that Great Britain became involved in the Ashanti War, while the Dutch entered light-heartedly upon a war for the conquest of Achin which lasted over thirty-three years.³⁶

32. SSR, 100: March 21, 1825.

33. Aitchison, *Treaties*, I, 439-40.

34. *Ibid.*, 439. Despatches to Bengal and India, 19: Jan. 4, 1839.

35. Aitchison, *Treaties*, I, 440, 450-60.

36. Cavenagh, *Reminiscences*, 340. Swettenham, *British Malaya*, 108-11.

V

The Civil Service In

The Straits Settlements, 1786-1867.

The subject of the present chapter is the Civil Service as it existed during the first eighty years of British rule in the Straits, the nature and powers of the personnel, the method of appointment and promotion, and the character of the training given to cadets. No attempt is made to deal with municipal government at Singapore, Penang and Malacca. Whether copies of the municipal records were ever sent home from the Straits is unknown. If so, they were apparently destroyed, and only a few scattered references to local government can now be found.¹

The administrative history of the Straits Settlements falls into four distinct periods. From 1786 until 1805 Penang was a Residency subject to the control of the Governor of Bengal. In 1805 the Directors constituted it the Fourth or Eastern Presidency, on an equality with the Presidencies of Bengal, Madras, Bombay, and, like them, subject to the general control of the Governor-General of India. Until 1826 Singapore and Malacca were independent of Penang. During Raffles' term of office, from 1819 to 1823, Singapore was a dependency of Bencoolen; and from 1823 to 1826 it was under the direct control of the Governor-General of India.

Malacca was also a dependency of the Supreme Government from its cession in 1824 to 1826. In 1826 they were combined with Penang in a single Presidency, the headquarters of the government remaining at Prince of Wales Island. In 1830 the Eastern Presidency was abolished, and the Straits Settlements became a Residency under the control of the Governor and Council of Bengal. The capital of the Straits remained at Penang until 1832, when it was transferred to Singapore, as the most important of the three settlements.² No further

1. Letters Received from India and Bengal, XX: May 20, 1839. B. Pub., Range 12. Vol. 69: Oct. 30, 1832. Nos. 10 and 13. B. Pub., Range 13. Vol. 27: May 2, 1838. No. 8. Ibid., Vol. 77: June 13, 1849, No. 24-26. Ibid., Vol. 78: Sept. 5, 1849, No. 9-14. Ibid., Vol. 79: Oct. 17, 1849, Nos. 3-4. Buckley, Singapore, I, 196, and a few other brief entries. PP Command Paper 3672, (1866) p. 11. (Vol. LII.)

2. Buckley, Singapore, I, 226. Despatches to Bengal, Vol. 117: July 27, 1831.

change was made until 1851, when the Straits Settlements were removed from the supervision of Bengal to that of the Governor-General of India.³ The powers hitherto exercised by Bengal were vested in the Governor of the Straits, but a study of the records seems to show that his authority remained substantially unaltered. The change was more nominal than real: British Malaya continued to be a Residency and nothing more. The difference was that instead of being a dependency of Bengal it was henceforth under the direct control of the Governor-General. The abolition of the East India Company in 1858 had no effect upon the form of administration in the Straits Settlements. They automatically passed under the control of the India Office, which replaced the Company, and remained subject to it until 1867, when they were transferred to the Colonial Office, and became a Crown Colony.

The staff at Penang during the first nineteen years of its history was exceedingly small. Captain Light, the founder of the settlement, was its first Resident. His appointment was contrary to the usual policy of the Company since he had been a merchant and not a member of the Indian Civil Service. He was selected because the island had been secured solely through his exertions, and his influence amongst the Malays made him uniquely fitted for the post. In some of the records he is referred to as the Superintendent, and in others as the Resident of Penang. He had only a single Assistant, although there were several minor members of the staff, a Storekeeper, a Beachmaster, a Writer, etc. The members of the administration formed part of the Bengal Civil Service. During this period the officials were allowed to engage in trade and both Light and his Assistant availed themselves of this permission. Captain Light frequently pointed out to the Bengal Government the undesirability of this arrangement, but said that much as he regretted it he was compelled to take advantage of it because his salary was insufficient to pay his expenses. He urged the Company to increase the salary of the Resident sufficiently to free him from this necessity, and to forbid its officials to trade.⁴ No attention was paid to his requests however until shortly after his death in 1794, when the Resident's salary was doubled, and he was forbidden to trade. At the same time his title was changed to that of Superinten-

3. Buckley, *Singapore*, II, 553. PP, Command Paper 3672. (1866), p. 12 (Vol. LII.)

4. SSR, Vols, I-VI, *passim*. JIA, IV, 652-53.

dent, and two additional Assistants were appointed.⁵ In 1798 the number of Assistants was reduced to two.⁶ No further change appears to have been made until 1800, when the title of Superintendent was changed to Lieutenant-Governor, and a new post was created, that of Secretary to the Lieutenant-Governor.⁷ At the same time the Lieutenant-Governor's powers were extended.⁸ Sir George Leith, who was selected for the post, was not a member of the Company's Civil Service. When the Directors were informed of these proceedings they approved of the administrative changes, but ordered the removal of Leith on this score.⁹ He was succeeded in 1803 by Robert Farquhar, who later became Sir Robert Farquhar, the Governor of Mauritius. Farquhar was a Madras civil servant who had been employed in the Moluccas and in the abortive attempt to establish a factory on Balamangan.¹⁰ It was probably his previous service in the Archipelago which gained for him the governorship of Penang.

Owing to the extravagant hopes which were entertained of the future of Penang, it was in 1805 elevated to the rank of a Presidency. It thereby ceased to be a dependency of Bengal and stood on an equality of rank with the three Indian Presidencies. Like them Penang was subject to the control of the Governor-General in Council or, to use the term so often applied to it in contemporary documents, the Supreme Government. Penang could not engage in war or make treaties with the native states without the permission of the Supreme Government and had to send it regular reports of its proceedings.¹¹ Since the Directors hoped that Penang would become the greatest trading centre in the East Indies, they felt that the staff of the new Presidency should be worthy of its future greatness. Accordingly, in place of the Lieutenant-Governor and three Assistants there arrived at Penang some fifty or sixty officials. There was a Governor, with three Resident Councillors to assist him, the Colonel commanding the garrison, a chaplain, Secretaries, Accountants, and a host of other convenanted civil servants from India.

5. *Ibid.* Wright & Reid, *Malay Peninsula*, 90. SSR, Vol. I and VI, Aug. 1, 1794.

6. SSR, Vol. 1.

7. *Ibid.*

8. JIA, V, 156, 166. B. Pub., Range 5, Vol. 11: March 14, 1800.

9. SSR, Vol. I.

10. JIA, V, 400.

11. Vincent Smith, *India*, 521.

There were between thirty and forty uncovenanted civil servants to fill the minor posts. The salaries of the twenty or twenty-five covenanted officials amounted to about £42,700.¹² With the additions which were from time to time made to it, this sum went far to explain why the annual account of revenue and expenditure always showed a large and increasing deficit, amounting on the average to £81,448 a year.¹³

The covenanted civil servants were most of them members of the Bengal service, although a few came from Madras, and two from Bombay. They were forbidden to trade, or, if they bought spice plantations (as at first they were encouraged to do) to sell the produce for export. The prohibition against trade was always strictly enforced in the Straits Settlements, and about 1840 the Indian Government also forbade its officials to own plantations.¹⁴

Since the Directors' hopes never materialised the number of officials was much larger than the needs of the island required. Raffles, who was himself a member of the Penang establishment from 1805 to 1811, was strongly of this opinion. He urged the Government of India to abolish the Presidency and reduce the island to the rank of a Residency with a reduced staff of officials.¹⁵ By 1816 the Directors admitted the failure of their expectations, and ordered that the expenditure at Penang be reduced.¹⁶ The Council promised to comply, but by 1829 expenses were as great as they had ever been.¹⁷ The records of the intervening years are an endless series of expostulations and excuses, the Directors and the Supreme Government urging economy, and the Penang Council explaining how hard it was trying and why it never succeeded.¹⁸

During this period only two events of importance occurred: the incorporation in the Penang Civil Service of the Bencoolen staff in 1824, and the union of the three

12. SSR, Vol. 186. April 18, 1805.

13. Braddell, *Statistics*, 35; SSR, *passim*.

14. Buckley, *Singapore*, I, 231. Anson, *About Others and Myself*, 285. SSR, Vol. 110: July 31, 1826. *Ibid.*, 194; Feb. 2, 1825. B. Pub., Range 13, Vol. 34: Aug. 19, 1840. No. 7-13.

15. JRASSB, LXXIII, 192. Buckley, *Singapore*, I, 190. Lady Raffles, *Memoir*, Appendix, 4-5, and 13-18.

16. Braddell, *Statistics*, 35.

17. *Ibid.*, 35.

18. SSR, 1816-1829., *passim*: e.g. Vol. 86: Aug. 1, 1822, and Vol. 195: March 27, 1829.

Straits Settlements in 1826. When the Company's factory of Bencoolen was ceded to Holland by the Treaty of 1824, it became necessary to provide for the officials who thus lost their employment. Of the covenanted civil servants, those who were members of the Bengal service returned to their Presidency; the remainder were incorporated in the Penang service according to their rank. This was determined by their length of service. It thus happened that some of the Company's officials who had already spent several years in the Straits suddenly saw their prospects of promotion deferred, because they were inferior to the new arrivals in point of seniority. Of the uncovenanted civil servants from Bencoolen, the more deserving were given positions in the Straits, the remainder were pensioned. Several of those who thus unexpectedly found themselves in the Straits Settlements later on played a very important part in their development.¹⁹

The incorporation of Malacca and Singapore under the government of Penang also introduced some changes into the civil service. Malacca had hitherto, since it was formally handed over by the Dutch in March 1825, been in charge of Cracroft, a Penang civil servant detached for this duty. He was responsible only to the Supreme Government.²⁰ In Singapore the whole administration had been carried on by a Resident, aided by two Assistants and two or three clerks. The Resident in 1826 was John Crawford, formerly a member of the Bengal Medical Service. He had been one of Raffles' subordinates in Java, and in 1822 had been the head of the abortive mission to Siam.²¹ His term of service in the Straits had now drawn to a close, and in 1827 he was sent as ambassador to Burma. About 1830 he retired from the Company's service, and returned to England. Throughout the remainder of his long life he was indefatigable in forwarding the interests of the Straits. He played an important part in the long and successful struggles to prevent the Directors from imposing customs duties on the trade of the Settlements, and in the agitation which resulted in the severance from the control of India in 1867.²² The

19. JRASSB, LXIV, 19-20. SSR, Vol. 102: June 30, July 21 and 29, 1825. Ibid., 105: Dec. 15, 1825. Ibid., Vols. 109, 110: *passim*. Ibid., 117: July 12, 1827. Vol. 194: Oct. 12, 1825. Despatches to Bengal, Vol. 97: Aug. 4, 1824.

20. SSR, Vol. 100: March 11, 1825.

21. Crawford, *Embassy to Siam*, 556-57.

22. v. chapter on Singapore 1819-26, *Anglo-Siamese Relations*, and the Transfer.

name of John Crawford is written large on the early history of Singapore.

To return to the events of 1826, the Directors took the opportunity of the incorporation of Singapore and Malacca in the Penang Presidency to reduce the number of official positions in the Straits. At this time there were fifteen covenanted servants in Penang alone, a number of vacancies having remained unfilled. It was directed that henceforth there should be nine at Penang, three at Singapore, two at Malacca, and four supernumeraries to fill vacancies. With the Governor this made nineteen in all. Owing to the presence of unemployed Bencoolen officials, this total was exceeded by three. It was decided however that they should remain and be given positions as vacancies occurred. The duty of the Governor was to exercise a general control over the administration, and visit each of the settlements from time to time. There were three Resident Councillors, one in charge of each town. Their actions could be vetoed by the Governor, and reference had to be made to him in all matters of importance.²³ These arrangements however lasted only four years.

The Directors had become utterly weary of a Presidency from which they reaped nothing but heavy annual deficits. Since 1826 there had been ominous hints that sweeping reductions were impending,²⁴ but when the blow fell in 1829 it surpassed Penang's most pessimistic forebodings. The Directors ordered that the Eastern Presidency should be abolished, and the Straits Settlements reduced to the rank of a Residency under the control of the government of Bengal. Whether the three towns should continue to form a single administrative unit, or should be divided into three distinct Residencies, was left to the discretion of the Governor-General. All other details were also left to be settled by him; but it was suggested that eight covenanted assisted by a few uncovenanted officials were sufficient to carry on the government.²⁵

Final arrangements were not made until November 1830. In 1829 the Governor-General, Lord Bentinck, visited the Straits Settlements, and discussed the proposed

23. SSR, Vol. 110: July 31, 1826. SSR, Vol. 125: Dec. 15, 1828. SSR, Vol. 194: Directors' Letter to Penang of Oct. 12, 1825.

24. *Ibid.*, 194: April 11, 1826: Feb. 14, 1827.

25. Despatches to Bengal, Vol. 110: April 7, 1829.

changes with the Governor, Fullerton.²⁶ After Lord Bentinck's departure there followed twenty months of correspondence between India and the Straits, before the matter was decided. It was considered that to separate the Straits Settlements would be inadvisable, and that they should form a single Residency, subject to Bengal. As the Directors had suggested, the number of covenanted civil servants was reduced to eight. Penang and Malacca were each to be in charge of a Deputy Resident, and Singapore of an official with the same powers, but with the title of First Assistant. There were also to be one Assistant at Singapore, one at Malacca, and two at Penang and Province Wellesley. Several offices were held by each official. The three civil servants at Singapore for example divided between them the duties of Superintendent of Lands, Chief of Police, Superintendent of the Convicts, Magistrate and Commissioner of the Court of Requests (the small debts court), Superintendent of Public Works, etc. They also served on the Committees which managed municipal affairs. The office of Governor of the Straits Settlements was retained, although the title was changed to Resident. As before, his duties were to supervise the administration, and to conduct foreign relations with the Malay States of the Peninsula and Sumatra. He visited the three settlements periodically, and had the right to overrule the acts of his subordinates. His headquarters remained at Penang until 1832, when the capital was removed to Singapore. Fullerton's proposal that Malacca should be made the capital was rejected.²⁷ The Resident and the Deputy-Residents retained their positions as judges, and when the Recorder went on circuit, they had the right to sit with him and hear cases. The Resident was empowered to make local regulations for the Straits Settlements, but these did not have the force of law until they had been approved by the Government of India. The principle that the civil power was supreme in the Straits, and that the officers of the garrison could not override its orders, was unaffected by the reforms. On the other hand, the Government was required not to interfere unnecessarily with military affairs. This rule

26. The Honourable Robert Fullerton was a Madras civil servant, and had been a member of Council there before becoming Governor of Penang Presidency. He was the Governor who took so prominent a part in the Anglo-Siamese negotiations of 1824-27, and in the Malacca Land Problem. In 1830 he retired to England and died in 1831. (Buckley, *Singapore*, I, 194.)

27. SSR, Vol. 133: June 30, 1830: and v. Chapter on Malacca Land Problem.

was established during the regime of Captain Light at Penang, and has ever since been one of the fundamental principles of the government of the Straits Settlements. The supreme legislative, judicial and executive authority was thus centred in the same persons. In addition to the covenanted there were also a number of uncovenanted civil servants who filled the minor posts, e.g. the Harbour-Masters, who had charge of shipping and harbour regulations, the Superintendent of Naning, etc.²⁸ Four surgeons and three Anglican chaplains were also members of the civil service.

Two years later, in 1832, the former titles of Governor and Resident Councillor were restored. When the Penang Presidency was abolished, on June 30, 1830,²⁹ it was held — erroneously it would appear — that by the abolition of the old names of Governor and Resident Councillor their legal right to serve as judges ceased, since the charter of 1826, by which the Straits' judiciary had been established, gave them the right under these titles. The Recorder could not legally try cases alone, and he had returned to England and no successor had yet been appointed. All courts except those of the magistrates were closed.³⁰ The result was chaos. No criminal or civil cases were tried, and it was no longer possible to compel anyone to pay his debts, or carry out his legal obligations. The trade of Singapore was "almost entirely suspended."³¹ The situation was so serious that on his own responsibility the First Assistant at Singapore, Murchison, tried the more important cases himself. The merchants of the city agreed to abide by his decisions, and the Government of India approved his action.³² The matter remained in this condition until 1832, when the Directors restored the former titles of Governor and

28. Despatches to Bengal, Vol. 110: April 7, 1829. Public Letters to Bengal. 1830-31: Vol. 14: Feb. 23, 1831. B. Pub., Range 12, Vol. 46: Sept. 1, 1829. Ibid., Vol. 59: April 12, 1831, Nos. 5-13. B. Pub., Range 13, Vol. 24: June 21, 1837, No. 6. PP, 1831-32, IX, 778-82 (being Vol. 1 of the Report of the Select Committee on the affairs of the East India Company) SSR, Vol. 110: July 31, 1826. SSR, Vol. 127: March 7, 8, 17, 18, 1829. Ibid., 133: April 29 and June 30, 1830. Braddell, Statistics, 36-37, Newbold, Straits of Malacca, 1, 6-7.

29. SSR, Vol. 184: June 30, 1830.

30. SSR, Vol. 133: June 30, 1830. B. Pub., Range 12, Vol. 59: March 29, 1831, Nos. 2 and 3.

31. Ibid., Vol. 56: Dec. 7, 1830, Nos. 38 and 39.

32. B. Pub., Range 12, Vol. 56: Dec. 7, 1830, Nos. 38 and 39. Ibid., Vol. 59: March 29, 1831, Nos. 2 and 3.

Resident Councillor. A new Recorder also arrived, and the regular courts were reopened.³³ The Straits Settlements remained only a Residency, but owing to this incident the titles of the chief officials were those which they had borne in the days of the Eastern Presidency.

The reforms of 1830 are of importance because the number and distribution of the civil servants determined by them remained substantially unaltered until 1867. It would seem that the reductions made in 1830 were too drastic, and that whereas before the officials had been too many, they were afterwards too few.³⁴ One of the clearest proofs of this was to be seen at Malacca, where the land problem was in no small degree due to the lack of a surveyor.³⁵

Between 1830 and 1867 the history of the civil service in the Straits resolved itself largely into a struggle between the local administration to increase, and the Government of India still further to decrease, the existing staff. In 1837 for example when Young was appointed Commissioner to settle the Malacca land problem, he was instructed to devise measures for a sweeping reduction in the number of officials. This proposal was combatted by Bonham, the Governor of the Straits, and apparently, after examination, by Young himself.³⁶ Nothing more was heard of it. A few years later, the Straits Government secured a few additional appointments. In 1844 an officer of the Madras army was made Superintendent of Convicts at Singapore, and in 1848 a similar post was created at Penang.³⁷ Since there were between 1000 and 1500 convicts in the Straits, and most of the roads and public buildings were constructed by them, the necessity for men who could devote all their time to this duty was very great.³⁸ Owing to the lack of proper survey and registration the land tenures in all three settlements had become involved in an inextricable tangle. The situation at Malacca was the worst but in all three settlements

33. *Ibid.*, Vol. 65: Feb. 14, 1832, No. 1. *Ibid.*, Vol. 67: May 1, 1832, Nos. 21-23. *Despatches to Bengal*, Vol. 117: July 27, 1831.

34. Braddell, *Statistics*, 37, B. Pub., Range 13, Vol. 65: July 28, 1847, No. 1. I. Pub., Range 188, Vol. 39: Oct. 24, 1856. Nos. 40-45.

35. v. chapter on Malacca Land Problem.

36. B. Pub., Range 13, Vol. 25: Nov. 1, 1837, No. 2. *Despatches to Bengal and India*, Vol. 28: Sept. 1, 1841, pp. 942-57.

37. Braddell, *Statistics*, 37.

38. McNair, *Prisoners Their Own Warders*, *passim*.

the services of a Government Surveyor were urgently required. After countless applications the Government of India sanctioned the creation of these posts in 1843 at Singapore, in 1846 at Penang and in 1858 at Malacca.³⁹ In 1851 a Secretary and Aide-de-Camp to the Governor was appointed.⁴⁰ In 1857 the office of Commissioner of Police was created at Singapore and Deputy Commissionerships at Penang and Malacca.⁴¹ Hitherto the duties had been performed by the Resident Councillors. Especially at Singapore the position was one of great importance owing to the activities of the Chinese secret societies, and for many years the Europeans had demanded that the office should be filled by a man who could give his whole time to the work. The first Commissioner at Singapore was Thomas Dunman, an uncovenanted civil servant who had been a member of the police since 1843, and for many years had practically controlled it. He had great influence amongst the leaders of the Chinese, and to this, coupled with his wide knowledge of their customs, his great success in dealing with gang-robberies and the activities of the *hoes* was due. Owing to their confidence in him the Chinese frequently gave him valuable information denied to others. Dunman's appointment was an exception to the Directors' general rule that important positions could be held only by members of the Covenanted service.⁴² In addition to several minor posts two further offices were created in 1858, the Chief Engineer for the Straits Settlements, and the Post Master of Singapore.⁴³ Hitherto these duties had been performed by the Superintendent of Convicts and other officials. The Chief Engineer had charge of the construction of all public works; and owing to the growth of trade the Post-Mastership required a man who could devote his whole time to the work. With these minor exceptions the number of officials in the Straits Settlements remained in 1867 the same as it had been in 1837, although the volume of work had increased manyfold.

The actual degree of independence possessed by the Government of the Straits Settlements from 1830 to 1867 is difficult to estimate. It is nowhere clearly defined, and must be deduced from a study of the records. Apparently it was very limited. The Company's form of

39. Braddell, *Statistics*, 37.

40. *Ibid.*, 37.

41. *Ibid.*, 37.

42. Buckley, *Singapore*, I, 394-97.

43. Braddell, *Statistics*, 37.

administration was highly centralised, and a detailed account of everything great and small was made to the Government of India. All matters of importance were referred to it for decision, and even in the most insignificant local affairs — such as the construction of a twenty ton gunboat for use against pirates — action was usually deferred until India's sanction had been received. This rule was strictly enforced, especially in cases where the policy proposed by the local government would increase the expenditure. Until 1864-5 the Straits Settlements had a heavy annual deficit which was met from the Indian Treasury,⁴⁴ and as the Company had derived no profit from Malaya since the cessation of its China trade in 1833, it was always unwilling to sanction proposals which seemed likely to add to the drain upon its resources. If any project involved an increase in the annual expenses, the Governors could not obtain approval for it, much less undertake it on their own initiative, unless they could show that it was of the greatest importance to the prosperity of the Straits. Most of the few problems which required to be dealt with during this period did involve directly or indirectly an increased expenditure. Hence they were usually left unsolved and handed on as a legacy to the Colonial Office, or else their solution was long delayed. Cases in point were the suppression of piracy, the Malacca land question, the extension of British power in the Malay Peninsula, and the increase of the civil service. The Governors were well aware of the Company's attitude and usually refrained from urging projects which they knew would not be sanctioned. They contented themselves with pointing out how hard they were trying to reduce the deficit and how much they were doing with the limited means at their command. During this period the problem of finance conditioned almost every action of the Straits government.

When a matter was referred to India a year or more frequently elapsed before the decision was received, because of the enormous volume of work with which the Indian administration had to deal. Owing to these delays, the interests of the Straits Settlements suffered at times; but on the whole the results were not serious. Of the problems which arose between 1826 and 1867, very few

44. *Bengal and India Public and Political Consultations*, *passim*. No small part of the despatches from the Government of the Straits Settlements to India deals with the unavailing attempts of the Straits administration to make revenue balance expenditure. Cavenagh, *Reminiscences*, 372.

were of importance, so that the injury caused by the delay in settling them was not great. The Straits Settlements had practically no foreign relations, while the population was small, only 273,231 in 1860,⁴⁵ and on the whole law-abiding. Since farming was a minor industry, agricultural problems were much more of a side-issue than in most of the Indian Residencies. Moreover there were practically no taxes, and such as existed, as for example that on opium, were most of them sold by auction to Chinese tax-farmers. The task of the Governors was to preserve law and order, to construct what roads and public buildings the limited revenue would allow, and to sell the tax-farms for as large an amount as possible. They had also to cope with piracy as far as their scanty means permitted, and to foster trade and agriculture, largely by letting the merchants take care of themselves.

In the field of foreign affairs the principal duty of the Straits administration was to watch Holland and Siam, and to report to the Government of India if they appeared to be taking unfair measures against British trade. The government of the Straits Settlement had no power to make representations itself. In emergencies however, when immediate action was clearly imperative and there was no time to await instructions from India, the Governor could act on his own responsibility. It was on this ground for example that Cavenagh justified his bombardment of Trengganu in 1862. Foreign affairs were of much less importance than they had been in 1818 to 1826. After 1827 the aggressive policy of Siam in the Peninsula was practically confined to Kelantan and Trengganu, where British trade interests were small. Even there it was much less high-handed than formerly. In the Malay Peninsula the Company was wedded to a policy of strict non-intervention, and the Governors were practically precluded from taking any steps to increase British influence or protect British merchants there. Since the Directors' attitude was well known, it was rarely that the Governors even proposed a more aggressive policy.⁴⁶

During the period 1786 to 1867 training and selection of the covenanted civil servants was very different from the system which prevails at the present day. Between 1786 and 1805 the small staff was composed partly of Bengal officials without previous experience in Malaya,

45. P.P., H. C., No. 259 of 1862, p. 55: Braddell, *Statistics*, 2.

46. v. chapter on Native Policy.

and in a few cases of men who, like Captain Light, had not formerly been employed by the Company, but were appointed because of their local knowledge. When the Penang Presidency was established in 1805 the Company decided to build up a "distinct" Straits Civil Service separate from that of India, and composed of men specially trained in local conditions who were to spend their official careers in Malaya. Ten covenanted servants were sent out as writers, the junior grade in the Company's service, and as they were promoted the vacancies in their ranks were filled by fresh appointments. Following the custom of the Company from this time onwards promotion was usually by seniority, determined by length of service. The rule however was not always strictly enforced. After 1805 the higher posts were usually no longer filled by officials detached from the Indian Presidencies, but by the promotion of civil servants who from long residence at Penang were acquainted with Malayan conditions. The four exceptions to this rule were Governors Bannerman, who opposed the foundation of Singapore in 1819, Fullerton, (1824-1830), Butterworth (1843-1855), and Cavenagh (1859-1867). Colonels Bannerman, Butterworth and Cavenagh were Indian army officers, and Fullerton, a man of unusual ability, had been a member of the Council of the Madras Presidency.⁴⁷

Civil Servants destined for the Straits received their preliminary training at the Company's college of Haileybury, which was founded in 1806. The principal subjects were Greek and Latin, Mathematics, Law, Philosophy, Political Economy, English History and Geography. Little attention was paid to Oriental studies, since the object of the course was to give a liberal education, and leave the special training until the student arrived in the East. Owing to the influence of the Directors, the standard of excellence at this period was not high.⁴⁸ Graduates of Haileybury who were sent to India were required to study Oriental languages and law at the colleges established at Bombay, Madras and Calcutta before beginning their

47. SSR, Vol. 186: April 18, 1805. *Ibid.*, Vol. 86: July 25, 1822. *Ibid.*, Vol. 94: Feb. 19, 1824. *Ibid.*, Vol. 95: Aug. 20 and 26, 1824. *Ibid.*, Vol. 99: March 10, 1825, and *passim*. *Ibid.*, Vol. 110: July 31, 1826. *Ibid.*, Vol. 194: Oct. 12, 1825. B. Pub., Range 13, Vol. 44: Oct. 9, 1843, No. 3. Anson, *About Others and Myself*, 285. Lowell, *Colonial Civil Service*, 8-9. Buckley, *Singapore*, II, 616-18, 676.

48. Lowell, *Colonial Civil Service*, 11-14.

work.⁴⁹ No similar institution existed in the Straits for the study of Malay, Siamese and Chinese, and the civil servants learned them on their own initiative in their spare time. The records do not contain much information on the subject, but it would seem that a knowledge of the languages was not compulsory, and that information regarding native laws and customs was gradually acquired in the course of their duties. The language of which a knowledge was most essential was Malay, since it was the "lingua franca" of the Straits. By 1828 however very few of the civil servants knew it.⁵⁰ Those who had studied Siamese were far fewer: indeed the only officials who spoke it appear to have been Captain Burney and Lieutenant Low, officers of the Madras army who gained a knowledge of it while stationed in the Straits.⁵¹ After 1830 a few of the officials learned Chinese, especially Bonham, Governor from 1837 to 1843, who devoted himself to the study of the Chinese language and customs.⁵² The importance of a knowledge of the languages was however recognised by the Penang Council, and at least after 1826 an effort was made to encourage their study. Absence from office during regular hours for this purpose was forbidden: but an allowance was generally made to the student for paying his "munshi", or native teacher. The examination in Malay, which was held by senior members of the civil service, embraced the subjects of Malay grammar, conversational Malay, translation from English into Malay, and Malay into English. Successful candidates were given a bonus of Rs2000 (at that time about £225). For proficiency in Chinese or Siamese the bonus was Rs3500 (about £394). The most successful candidates were appointed Translators of the native languages, and were given an increase of salary above the fixed office allowance of from about £22 to £28 a month. In some cases a much larger bonus was granted. Lieutenant Low for example was given £450 in 1824 for proficiency in Siamese.⁵³ When the Penang Presidency ceased to exist in 1830 these regulations were abolished, and no further reward was given for the study of native languages.⁵⁴ It appears uncertain whether a knowledge

49. *Ibid.*, 10. *American Historical Review*, Jan. 1899, p. 267—H. M. Stephens.

50. *SSR*, Vol. 184: April 15, 1828.

51. *Ibid.*, Vol. 94 *passim*.

52. *Amer. Hist. Review*, Jan., 1899, pp. 256-58, H. M. Stephens.

53. *SSR*, Vol. 94: *passim*. *Ibid.*, Vol. 95: July 22, 1824 *Ibid.*, Vol. 110: July 31, 1826. *Ibid.*, Vol. 119: Nov. 20 and 29, 1827. *Ibid.*, Vol. 184: April 15 and Nov. 24, 1828, and *passim*.

54. *B. Pub.*, Range 12, Vol. 56: Dec. 7, 1830, No. 13.

of them was now made compulsory, but in 1864 Sir Hercules Robinson reported that all the Indian officials in the Straits knew Malay.⁵⁵ The failure to make a knowledge of native languages compulsory was of less importance than it would otherwise have been since until about 1855 the Straits Government was mainly composed of ex-members of the old Penang and Bencoolen Civil Services, many of whom knew the Malay language well.

The survival of these officials was of great importance in the history of the Civil Service after 1830. Without their long local experience the depleted staff would have found the task of government vastly more difficult. When the Eastern Presidency was abolished in 1830 there were about twenty covenanted officials in the Straits, while the number of positions was reduced to eight. The Directors refused to allow those who were thus deprived of their posts to be transferred to the Indian Civil Service, but gave them the alternatives of retiring on pensions or of being retained in the Straits as unemployed supernumeraries. Their salaries were to be small but as vacancies occurred they would be reappointed to the Straits Civil Service. The Directors also decided that no further cadets should be sent out from England to join the Straits administration. All vacancies which should occur after the last of the supernumeraries had been reappointed were to be filled by members of the Bengal Civil Service.⁵⁶ Several of the ex-officials retired on the pensions offered, but over half preferred to remain. It thus happened that until 1855 practically all the more important positions, and until about 1845 every post, was held by former members of the Penang Civil Service.⁵⁷ As late as 1860 there was still one survivor of the old régime, W. T. Lewis, the Resident Councillor of Penang.⁵⁸ It was only about 1845 that Bengal civilians began to be appointed.

Four typical cases may be quoted as examples of how long the men trained in the Penang Civil Service continued in office in the Straits. Samuel George Bonham, who entered the Bencoolen Civil Service in 1818, was transferred to the Straits Settlements in 1824, and became Assistant Resident of Singapore. From 1837 to 1843 he

55. PP, Command Paper 3672, (1866), p. 15, (Vol. LII).

56. Despatches to Bengal, Vol. 110: April 7, 1829. PP, 1831-32, IX, p. 782 (Vol. I of Evidence on Affairs of the E. Ind. Co.)

57. Stephens, *Amer. Hist. Review*, Jan. 1899, p. 255, 262.

58. PP, (H. of C.), No. 259 of 1862, p. 19 (Vol. XL).

was Governor of the Straits Settlements. Owing to his knowledge of the Chinese language and customs he was appointed Governor of Hong Kong from 1848 to 1854. He played an important part in the early history of Hong Kong, and on his retirement was made a baronet.⁵⁹ Another example was E. A. Blundell, a graduate of the Company's college at Addiscombe, who came to the Straits as a Writer in 1820. He gradually rose in rank, becoming Resident Councillor of Malacca and Penang, and finally Governor, from 1855 to 1859.⁶⁰ Church, who was Resident Councillor of Singapore for nineteen years, from 1837 until his resignation in 1856, joined the Bencoolen Civil Service in 1815, and was transferred to the Straits in 1824.⁶¹ Samuel Garling, who entered the Bencoolen service in 1809, was transferred to the Straits in 1824. From 1833 to 1855 he was successively Resident Councillor of Malacca and Penang, and Assistant Resident at Singapore. After forty-six years' service, he retired on a pension of £250 a year.⁶²

The Madras Army also supplied the Straits with some of its ablest officials. From an early date the garrison was drawn from Madras, and a number of the officers studied Malay as a hobby. Those who became proficient were often detached from their regiments for administrative work.⁶³ Captain Burney, who made the treaty with Siam in 1826, entered the Straits service in this manner.⁶⁴ Another typical case was that of Colonel James Low, an officer of Madras Native Infantry, who joined the Penang establishment in 1818. He studied both Malay and Siamese, and was several times sent as envoy to native states in connection with Burney's mission to Siam.⁶⁵ From 1823 to 1840 he was in charge of Province Wellesley. He then became Assistant Resident at Singapore, and in 1850

59. Stephens, *Amer. Hist. Review*, Jan. 1899, p. 256, 258. SSR, Vol. 194: Oct. 12, 1825. B. Pol., Range 123, Vol. 59: March 5, 1824. No. 49. Buckley, *Singapore*, I, 383-84.

60. SSR, Vol. 94: Feb. 5, 1824. *Ibid.*, 110: Aug. 7, 1826. Buckley, *Singapore*, II, 507, 619, 666. B. Pub., Range 13, Vol. 69: April 12, 1848, No. 7-8.

61. Buckley, *Singapore*, I, 325-27. SSR, Vol. 102: June 30, 1825. *Ibid.*, Vol. 194: Oct. 12, 1825. I. Pub., Range 188, Vol. 39: Oct. 24, 1856, No. 40-49.

62. SSR, Vol. 194: Oct. 12, 1825. B. Pub., Range 13, Vol. 44: Oct. 9, 1843, No. 3. *India Financial*, Range 210, Vol. 53: June 15, 1855, No. 116.

63. Stephens, *Amer. Hist. Review*, Jan. 1899, p. 255.

64. v. Chapter on Anglo-Siamese Relations.

65. *Ibid.*

returned to Europe.⁶⁶ In 1860 six out of the nineteen members of the administration, including the Resident Councillor of Malacca were officers of the Madras Army.⁶⁷ Between 1830 and 1867 two of the Governors of the Straits Settlements were also Madras army officers, namely Colonel Butterworth, Deputy Quartermaster General of the Madras Army, who was Governor from 1843 to 1855, and Colonel Cavenagh, Governor from 1859 to 1867. Neither had had any previous experience in Malaya, since their whole careers had been spent in India. The appointments were for this reason unusual, but Butterworth and Cavenagh proved to be two of the most capable governors sent to Malaya.⁶⁸

The uncovenanted civil servants in the Straits were usually residents of Malaya employed as the Government had need of their services. The Company's rule that only the less important and less lucrative posts were open to them was on the whole observed, but on several occasions it was broken. The reason was that it was very difficult to find Covenanted servants qualified to deal with the peculiar problems of Malaya, so that the administration was compelled to use the services of local residents.⁶⁹ The rule was most completely broken in the case of W. T. Lewis, an uncovenanted official at Bencoolen from 1806 to 1824. He was transferred to the Straits, and obtained the favour of Governor Fullerton, who made him head of the Land Department at Malacca.⁷⁰ In 1840 he became Assistant at Penang, then Resident Councillor of Malacca, and finally, in 1855, Resident Councillor of Penang, one of the most important posts in the administration. Lewis held this position until he retired in 1860.⁷¹ This case appears to be unique in the early history of the Straits Settlements. Another uncovenanted official who held an important office was Dunman, who was Commissioner of Police at Singapore from 1857 to 1871, and Assistant Resident.⁷² Westerhout, a Dutch inhabitant of

66. SSR, Vol. 66: Jan. 1, 1818. B. Pub., Range 13, Vol. 34: Aug. 19, and Nov. 18, 1840. Buckley, Singapore, I, 366.

67. PP, H. of C., No. 259 of 1862, p. 19 (Vol. XL).

68. B. Pub., Range 13, Vol. 44: Oct. 9, 1843, No. 3. Buckley Singapore, II, 616-18, 678.

69. India Home Consultations. Range 187, Vol. 57: Jan. 13, 1854, No. 50-55.

70. v. Chapter on Malacca Land Problem.

71. PP, H. of C., No. 259 of 1862, p. 19 (Vol. XL). B. Pub., Range 13, Vol. 34: Sept. 18, 1840, No. 11. I. Pub., Range 188, Vol. 6: Aug. 18, 1854, No. 11. Ibid., Vol. 13: Feb. 2, 1855, No. 8.

72. I. Financial: Range 210, Vol. 53: June 15, 1855, No. 116-21. Buckley, Singapore, I, 394-97.

Malacca, was in charge of Nanning after its conquest in 1832, and in 1837 was appointed Assistant at Malacca. In each case the appointment was avowedly made because no one else could be found equally competent to undertake the work.⁷³ A fair number of other instances are to be found of uncovenanted officials holding important positions.⁷⁴ The Civil Service in British Malaya was thus, as the Governor-General of India wrote in 1859, "nearly as mixed in its material as the population which it governs."⁷⁵ The disappearance of the members of the old Penang Service did not lessen the efficiency of the government. So thoroughly had they trained their subordinates that their influence lasted long after their disappearance. In 1867 the Government was conducted by a very competent body of officials with splendid traditions of duty. Sir Hercules Robinson, who was sent to report on the conditions existing in the Settlements just before the transfer to the Colonial Office, paid high tribute to the calibre and qualifications of the Straits Civil Service.⁷⁶

Only in one respect, the absence of a separate Malayan Civil Service, did the establishment fail to meet with his approval. In 1830 the Directors had decided that in future no graduates of Haileybury should be appointed directly to the Straits, but that when vacancies occurred they should be filled by men detached from Bengal. The result did not answer their anticipations. Bengal civilians began to be appointed to Malaya about 1845. They were given subordinate positions, and it was intended to advance them to the higher offices when they had gained a knowledge of local conditions. Governor Butterworth supported the experiment, but in 1854 he informed the Government of India that it had failed. Owing to the small number of important positions the chances of promotion were very few compared with those of Bengal. Everyone therefore after a short experience wished to return to India. The requests were granted, and Butterworth predicted that this would always be the attitude "with every civil servant possessing energy and ambition." The administration lost their services just when their local experience was making them valuable.⁷⁷ The Governor-General of

73. B. Pub., Range 13, Vol. 64: June 2, 1847.

74. PP, H. of C., No. 259 of 1862, p. 19, (Vol. XL).

75. PP, H. of C., No. 259 of 1862, p. 12, (Vol. XL).

76. Stephens, *Amer. Hist. Review*, Jan. 1899, 264. PP, (3672,) 1866, p. 15, (Vol. LII).

77. B. Pub., Range 13, Vol. 65: July 28, 1847, No. 2. *Ibid.*, Vol. 66: Oct. 27, 1847. India Home Cons., Range 187, Vol. 57: Jan. 13, 1854, No. 50-55.

India, Lord Canning, in 1859 described the situation in even stronger terms. He wrote that since India "now . . . has no Chinese service in which its officers can look for advancement as they rise in standing, in truth, it has come to this, that no officer of the Indian Civil Service will willingly go to the Straits for a permanency, except in the position of governor. To be transferred there at the beginning of his career, on the understanding that he shall remain attached to the Straits throughout the whole or even the greater portion of it, would involve so large a sacrifice of prospects on the part of a young Indian Civil Servant, that he cannot reasonably be expected to make it."⁷⁸

Lord Canning also emphasized the "absolute necessity" for the Straits officials receiving a special training instead of being left to gain their knowledge in the course of their work. He described the existing system as "a positive evil." "Indian officers have no opportunity of acquiring experience of the habits or the language of either Malays or Chinese, and accordingly, when officers are sent to the Straits, they have everything to learn. The Government of India is unable to keep a close watch upon their efficiency; the field is so narrow as to afford little or no room to the Governor of the Settlements for exercising a power of selection in recommending to a vacant office; and there is consequently so complete an absence of stimulus to exertion, that it may well be doubted whether Indian civil officers sent to the Straits ever become thoroughly well qualified for or heartily interested in the duties they have to discharge. The character of the Chinese, the most important and at times a very unmanageable part of the population of the Straits Settlements, is quite different from that of any people with which Indian officers have to deal . . . (They are) the very opposite of our Indian fellow subjects."⁷⁹ Sir Hercules Robinson agreed with Lord Canning, and advised the Colonial Office that cadets should be sent out to learn the languages and customs of the Chinese and Malays, and a separate Straits Civil Service built up, composed of men specially trained in the peculiar conditions of Malaya.⁸⁰

78. PP, H. of C., No. 259 of 1862, p. 13 (Vol. XL).

79. *Ibid.*

80. PP, Command Paper 3672, (1866), p. 16, (Vol. LII)

VI

The Malacca Land Problem 1825-1884.

The most serious problem with which the Government of the Straits Settlements had to deal at Malacca was land settlement. It has been aptly described as "one long history of want of knowledge on one side, and fraud and evasion on the other."¹ In order to understand the peculiar difficulties it is necessary to describe briefly the Malay form of land-tenure, according to which the Dutch land-holders of Malacca held their estates in 1824. By the Malay code all land was the property of the Raja, who had the right

- (1) to dispose of all waste (i.e. uncultivated) lands as he chose;
- (2) to receive a percentage, usually one-tenth, of the produce of all cultivated lands;
- (3) to exact forced service from his raayats or peasantry. It was unpaid, and neither its nature nor amount was defined by Malay law.

The raayat also had certain rights which were as inalienable as those of his feudal superior.

- (1) He was usually permitted by his Raja to take up without interference as much waste land as he could cultivate. The reason for this was that the population was small, while the land area was large and covered with such heavy jungle as to be useless until it had been cleared.
- (2) He could not be ejected from his land as long as
 - (i) he rendered the forced service demanded, and paid a percentage of his produce, usually one-tenth, to his Raja;
 - (ii) he did not let his land go out of cultivation. In the case of rice fields, for example, the proprietary rights lasted as long as the area was under cultivation, and for three years thereafter; while in the case of orchards,

1. JRASSB, XIII, 100, W. E. Maxwell.

they lasted as long as any fruit tree survived as evidence that the land had formerly been cultivated. The rules for other varieties of farm-land followed the same principle. In all cases, when the land went out of cultivation the former owner ceased to have any claim to it. It then became waste land (*tanah mati*, "dead land") and could be granted by the Raja to whomsoever he chose.

It will be observed that despite the Raja's nominal right to all the land, as long as the raayat complied with the conditions under which he held it he could not be ejected.

When a Raja granted lands to a favourite — whether waste or cultivated, or both — he did not thereby surrender his own title to it, nor did he in any way interfere with the rights of the cultivators. All that he gave up to the grantee was the power to exercise the royal privileges of

- (1) disposing of all waste lands, and
- (2) collecting the tenth from the raayats.

In other words, the apparent owner of a tract of land was not a landlord in the English sense, but was really, to use the Indian term, a sort of Zemindar. He could not claim the ownership of his land — that lay with the Raja — nor dispossess his tenants; his sole right was to collect from his estates a revenue the amount of which was fixed by custom. The exact position of what one may call the Malay Zemindar is a point of the utmost importance, since this was really the status of the so-called Dutch Proprietors who in 1825 were in possession of Malacca Territory.²

The reason for this was simple: the Portuguese, and after them the Dutch, on their conquest of Malacca, simply retained the unwritten native land-tenure unchanged. In the other Dutch possessions, even in Java, the centre of their power, they consistently followed the same policy. Furthermore the Dutch archives at Malacca show that they upheld the customary rules of native land-tenure there, and did not draw up any other system of land-

2. *Ibid.*, 77-93, 105-110.

laws. About 1824 the Government of Holland considered the advisability of enacting a code of regulations which was founded in all respects upon native custom and had nothing in common with any European system. Owing to the approaching transfer of Malacca the project was dropped. From these considerations it is clear that the so-called Dutch Proprietors who in 1825 claimed to be the landlords of their estates in the English sense of the term were really nothing more than Malay Zemindars. The title to their lands remained with the Government, as the inheritor of the rights of the ancient Sultans of Malacca whom the Portuguese had expelled in 1511; and all that they had received from the Dutch Company was the right to collect and enjoy the tenth from their lands. This they did through Chinese farmers *i.e.* individuals who bought from them the right to collect it, just as they bought the opium, and other farms, in Penang and Singapore. These concessions must have been of very little value to the Dutch Proprietors owing to the restrictions upon agriculture, and it is probable that they never lived on or visited their lands. They were absentee Zemindars, taking no interest in their estates beyond trying to secure as high a price as possible for the sale of their privileges. The Proprietors undoubtedly understood their own position, although the British officials did not, and for some years they tried to deceive the Straits Government into treating them as "bona fide" owners of the soil.³ As subsequent pages show, it required much toilsome investigation of the archives of Malacca before the new administration ascertained that their real status was the one outlined above.

When the Company's officials arrived from Penang in 1825 they found that with the exception of the small state of Naning, the whole of Malacca Territory outside the limits of the town was in the possession of a few individuals, the majority of whom were Dutch, who claimed to be, not Zemindars, but the absolute owners of their property, jungle as well as cultivated land. The *raayats* they declared were merely their tenants.⁴ The "Proprietors," as they called themselves, were trying to succeed in a colossal game of bluff, trusting to British ignorance of local conditions to alter their status from that of Zemindars to absolute owners of the soil. It

3. *Ibid.*, 93-95, 148-52. *SSR*, Vol. 168-Jan. 30, 1828. Fullerton's Minute.

4. *JRASSB*, XIII, 152. *JIA*, II, 736-40, Hon. E. A. Blundell, later Governor of the Straits. *SSR*, Vol. 172, July 5, 1827.

might have been expected that since Malacca had already been held by the Company's troops from 1795 to 1818, much information would have been acquired about local conditions. The earlier occupation however had been military and of uncertain duration. The administration appears to have continued much as it had been under the Dutch Company, the British Resident not interfering or interesting himself greatly in it. The only changes seem to have been the removal of the restrictions on trade and agriculture and Lord Minto's abolition of judicial torture.⁵ The Company was therefore unable to secure any enlightenment from this source.

Governor Fullerton at once ordered an investigation to be undertaken, in order to discover whether the Proprietors' claims were true. To obtain reliable information was by no means easy. Those best qualified to explain the situation, the Proprietors themselves, were the last persons to wreck the game which they were playing; and the only other source of information, the Dutch archives at Malacca, presented many difficulties. Two centuries of neglect and white ants had utterly destroyed many of the records, while of those which survived some were almost indecipherable. To cap the climax, when the Dutch administration left Malacca it carried off part of the archives, including all the original deeds granting their lands to the Proprietors. Under these circumstances progress was slow, and between 1825 and 1827 meetings of the council held to settle the land question had several times to be postponed in order that a further investigation of the records might be made.⁶ It was not until 1828 that the matter was finally settled, and even then serious mistakes were made through ignorance.

The first important meeting held to consider the Malacca land-problem appears to have been on July 5, 1827. The discussion was summed up in an able Minute of Governor Fullerton.⁷ He pointed out that since all the original deeds granting land had been taken away by the Dutch in 1825, it was very difficult to ascertain the exact rights of the Government, the Proprietors, and the Raayats. What evidence had been obtained from the archives however contradicted the claims of the Proprietors that they were not Zemindars but absolute owners

5. JRASSB, XIII, 148.

6. *Ibid.*, 152, SSR, Vol. 168. Jan. 30, 1828 and SSR, Vol., 172, July 5, 1827.

7. SSR, Vol. 172, July 5, 1827.

of the soil. Furthermore the evidence appeared to show that the grants had been made in order to encourage certain forms of agriculture, and that the government had the right to resume uncultivated land. The Proprietors had used their privileges and neglected all their obligations, so that the Government seemed to have a legal right to take away their estates. On their part the Proprietors did not question the legality of this attitude, but contended that it was unjust since they were unaware that the possession of their land involved any liabilities — presumably because they had never taken the trouble to find out the terms of their grants, and the Dutch Government had been equally lax in enforcing them.

When an attempt was made to discover the relations existing between the Proprietors and the Raayats, confusion and contradiction became even more marked. The Proprietors claimed to be the absolute owners of their estates, both waste land and cultivated; yet in the next breath they admitted that while there was no law fixing rent the general custom was for the landlord to receive one tenth of the produce. They also admitted that as long as the tenant paid it he could not be evicted, and could sell, mortgage or bequeath his farm, or increase it by taking up waste land at will. Fullerton saw the inconsistency in such statements, and made a shrewd guess at the Proprietors' real position. He was already strongly inclined to believe that the tenth described as the usual rent, was not a land-rent at all, but a tax — the immemorial right of the Malay Raja to one-tenth of the produce of his lands. The Dutch Company, as the inheritor of this right, had granted it to the Proprietors, who were therefore, he suspected, not the absolute and unfettered owners of their land, but merely individuals who had the right to a percentage of the produce. No decision was made, however, and the question was postponed pending further investigation.

On March 7, 1827, the Resident Councillor of Malacca reported to the Penang Council that so far as he could ascertain the wording of the grants did not warrant the conclusion that they were irrevocable, as the Proprietors contended.⁸ About the same time a document was discovered in the archives which proved that Fullerton's surmise was correct, and that the "Proprietors" were not land-owners, but Zemindars. This was a proclamation

8. SSR, Vol. 116. SSR, Vol. 195, Directors' Letters to Penang, June 17, 1829.

issued by the Dutch Government in 1819, referring to one in 1773 which expressly forbade Proprietors to demand more than one-tenth of the produce from their tenants. The Council met on January 30, 1828, and agreed that the proclamation proved that the Dutch Company had given up, not the absolute right of ownership to the soil, but merely the government's right to collect from it one-tenth of the produce. The Dutch Proprietors "had no other claims upon the produce, nor upon the occupiers, not founded in abuse."

The cultivators were the real proprietors of the soil.⁹ It was therefore clear that to take over the lands would not be an act of high-handed spoliation, but would be perfectly justifiable, provided the Proprietors were compensated. That to do so was desirable, the Governor and his Council did not doubt for a moment. In the first place, the Proprietors had done nothing to encourage agriculture, and did not even take sufficient interest in their estates to collect the tenth, preferring to farm it out to Chinese. So negligent were they that they did not even know the amount which was due to them, so that in practice they received from the Chinese far less than one-tenth. "The Proprietors will neither cultivate the land themselves or allow others to do so. Few of them have ever quitted the town of Malacca or visited estates not fifteen miles distant."¹⁰ Despite the great fertility of the soil, only 5000 acres were under cultivation in the whole of Malacca Territory, and a district which could easily be self-supporting had to import over half of its grain. The Council felt persuaded that if the deadening incubus of the Proprietors were removed, agriculture would greatly increase.¹¹ The second consideration, which strongly influenced the Council, was that the Malay raayats suffered great oppression, because of the Proprietors' practice of annually auctioning the right to collect the tenth to the Chinese. The Proprietors made no attempt to protect their raayats from extortion, and the tax-collector "having only one year's interest in the country, extracts from it the most he can, and it appears . . . that moreover their services are required, and labour exacted from the tenants: in short they are kept in a state of vassalage and servitude quite inconsistent with the encouragement of cultivation. The right of levying the

9. SSR, Vol. 168. SSR, Vol. 171, Directors' Letters to Penang, Sept. 30, 1829.

10. SSR, Vol. 172, July 5, 1827.

11. *Ibid.*, Vol. 168: Jan. 30, 1828.

government rent carries with it all the real power of the state; that right vested in the Dutch proprietors, by them transferred in the mass to Chinese, has established a power and influence in that class too great even for the officers of Government to hold in check."¹²

Last, but by no means least, the Council confidently hoped that eventually as a result of the increased cultivation which they believed would follow the elimination of the Proprietors, the revenue would increase sufficiently to pay the cost of the administration of Malacca. Hitherto there had always been a heavy annual deficit, for while the expenses of government were large, only a small revenue was obtained from a decaying settlement with a rapidly decreasing trade and a stagnant agriculture.¹³

A further consideration however influenced the Governor more than any of the foregoing: he wished to make Malacca the capital of the Straits Settlements. As the former centre of Malay, Dutch and Portuguese power in the Peninsula, it had amongst Malays a prestige immeasurably greater than Penang or Singapore. The central position, within two days' sail of Singapore and four of Penang, made Malacca more suitable than either of the other two towns for the headquarters of the garrison in the Straits. "In a political point of view it is conveniently situated for combatting" the intrigues of Siam in the Malay states, and "it is besides near enough to the south end of the Straits to watch the proceedings of the Netherlands Government." Knowing that the soil of Malacca was fertile, and that eleven-twelfths of it were uncultivated, Fullerton was convinced that with "unremitting zeal and exertion" on the part of the government, agriculture would, as in India, prosper exceedingly under the security and justice of British rule. To deny the possibility of this "seems a perfect libel on British administration." Fullerton saw that with the competition of Penang and Singapore, Malacca's days as a great trading-centre were over, and that "it must look entirely to its own agricultural resources for improvement." In this it had a great advantage over the other two settlements because far more land was available for cultivation. Fullerton believed that the agriculture of Malacca could be increased to such an extent that it would not only provide sufficient revenue to cover the cost of adminis-

12. SSR, Vol. 168, Jan. 30, 1828.

13. SSR, Vol. 127, July 5, 1827. SSR, Vol. 195: Directors' Letter to Penang, June 17, 1829. SSR, 128: April 7, 1828.

tration, but would also grow enough rice to feed the whole population of the Straits Settlements. They would thus no longer be dependent for the greater part of their food upon Kedah, Sumatra, and Java, which being outside the control of the Penang Presidency, sometimes caused much distress by raising barriers against export.¹⁴ Because of very inaccurate information, Fullerton's terms to the Proprietors were too liberal, but at least his actions were not due to blind and reckless extravagance.

For all these reasons the Council decided to buy back from the Proprietors their right to levy the tenth on all cultivated lands, about 5000 of the 64,000 acres in Malacca Territory. It declined to recognize that they had any title to the Waste Land, and at once resumed possession without compensation.¹⁵ The Proprietors acquiesced in the justice of this step, and made no demands for compensation. They were also willing to sell their right to the tenth.¹⁶ Many of the titles were questionable, and a large number of the estates had grown by dubious means. Nevertheless the Council decided to treat the Proprietors generously; "the circumstance of their having been long in possession of the rights, *such as they are*, is the main argument to induce the offer of pecuniary compensation for their resumption."¹⁷ It therefore decided that the Proprietors should surrender all their rights in return for annual pensions, "the full equivalent of what they now receive . . . payable as long as the British Government shall remain in possession of Malacca."¹⁸

Lewis, the Superintendent of Lands at Malacca, was ordered to negotiate with the Proprietors. On June 13, 1828, he reported to the Council that the tenth on almost all the lands had been transferred to the Company, in return for a total annual compensation of about £1735.11.0.¹⁹ The transfer of the lands was not complete, a few small estates, amounting in all to four or five square miles, being left unredeemed because their

14. SSR, 127: July 5, 1827. SSR, 128: April 7, 1828.

15. Ibid. SSR, 168: Jan. 30, 1828.

16. Ibid.

17. Ibid.

18. Ibid.

19. SSR, 168: June 13, 1828. Probably through a copyist's error, the compensation in Lewis' Report is given as £15,370 and Rs 17,100. Both are wrong, the right amount being Rs 17,354 (B. Pub., Range 13, Vol. 42: Jan. 25, 1843, No. 1; JIA, II, 740, Blundell. Braddell, Statistics, 11, 55.

Proprietors were absent from Malacca, or legally incapable of making a contract. In 1884 they were still unredeemed.²⁰ As a temporary measure, the tenth was farmed from July to December 1828; but on December 11, 1828, the Penang Council ordered that in future it should not be farmed, but collected by the Malacca Land Department.²¹ Full information of the Government's land-policy was sent to the Directors, and in their reply they expressed themselves as "extremely glad" that the Proprietors' rights had been redeemed. They also approved the Council's proposal to manage the lands directly.²²

In the same despatch the Directors gave their approval to the code of land-laws which had been submitted to them. Pending their decision, the regulations had already been in force as a temporary measure since 1828.²³ This code, Regulation IX of 1830, was largely responsible for the creation of the Malacca land problem.²⁴ Yet in many respects the laws were admirable, and showed that the Penang Council understood Malay land-tenure. The Government was declared to have the right to one-tenth of the produce of all cultivated lands, while the raayats were also liable to the excise and to all other duties which might be established. Whether the tenth was to be paid in money or in kind was left undecided for the time. The tax of each district was to be collected by its Penghulu or headman, under the supervision of the Land Department. The Penghulus, as formerly, were to act as police and revenue officers in their districts. The Government also reserved to itself the "full and absolute right over all waste and forest lands not cleared and cultivated" within the memory of man, or twenty years, "with power to make for their future occupation . . . such terms as they see fit."

The raayat's rights over the cultivated lands were declared to be "the privilege of transfer by sale, gift, or bequest according to the will of the holder, subject always to the tenth." The Company promised not to interfere with lands already under cultivation, except that all lands left uncultivated for ten years reverted to it. A great boon was conferred upon the Malays by the provision abolishing the Company's right to forced labour, except

20. JRASSB, XIII, 164, Sir W. E. Maxwell.

21. SSR, Vol. 168: June 13, June 25, and December 11, 1828.

22. SSR, 195: Despatch of Sept. 30, 1829.

23. SSR, 168: June 25, 1828.

24. JRASSB, XIII, 153, W. E. Maxwell.

for such public necessities as repairing the roads. Henceforth payment was to be made in all such cases. Another provision declared that a complete survey was to be undertaken. Hitherto no survey appears ever to have been made. Titles describing their holdings were to be given the raayats, and these, as well as all future land-transfers, were to be registered.²⁵

The fundamental mistake of Regulation IX of 1830 was that it was an attempted compromise between two entirely different systems of land-tenure, English and Malay. The Company should have decided whether it intended to retain the ancient Malay system, or to sweep it away and replace it by English land law. The mistake is all the more strange because the Penang Council was well acquainted with Malay tenure, and knew how utterly different it was to the English system. The history of the Council's negotiations with the Proprietors, and the provisions of Regulation IX of 1830, all show this. If further proof were needed, it could be found in the Recorder's decision in 1829 in the case of *Abdullatif vs. Mohammed Leh*. The judge correctly described Malay land-tenure, mentioning every essential feature of it.²⁶ Yet the Company, while retaining Malay tenure for the lands then under cultivation, decided that for all lands disposed of after 1830 grants and leases should be issued in accordance with the forms of English law. The result of combining two utterly different systems of land-tenure was "incessant confusion."²⁷ Even if the survey contemplated by Regulation IX of 1830 had been made, the Land Department would have found its task difficult. The survey was however never carried out, owing to the sweeping reduction in the Straits Civil Service made by the reforms of 1830. In 1831 the Governor of the Straits asked that a surveyor be appointed, but in spite of representations the Government of India refused to comply until 1858.²⁸ As a result, "the old lands cultivated and liable to tenths before 1830 remained subject to the native customs, but they were not identified by registration or survey. Lands taken up and brought into cultivation after 1830, could not therefore in subsequent years

25. SSR, 168: June 25, 1828. SSR, 122: March 25, 1830, SSR, 195: Directors' Despatch of Sept. 30, 1829.

26. SSR, 171: March 24, 1830.

27. JRASSB, XIII, 153-57, W. E. Maxwell. *Public Letters to Bengal*, 1830-31, Vol. 14: June 2, 1830, and Feb. 9, 1831.

28. B. Pub., Range, 12, Vol. 59: April 12, 1831, No. 27. Braddell, *Statistics*, 37.

be distinguished from them." The raayats could always plead that they had held them prior to 1830, and the Government lacking the records of a survey, could not disprove the claim, even when it knew that it was false.²⁹

As if the situation were not complicated enough already, in 1835 the Recorder ruled that the Singapore Land Regulations of 1830 were illegal, because they were not a law for imposing taxes, the only purpose for which the Straits Government could legislate. Since the Malacca Land Regulations had been passed by the same authority, they also were illegal.³⁰ Moreover in 1834 the Recorder had ruled that the Charter of Justice of 1826 had introduced the law of England, except in certain specified cases, and had abrogated any law previously existing.³¹

The result of these two decisions may best be shown by a Minute of Governor Fullerton of May 18, 1829 which can fairly be called prophetic. Owing to the Recorder's decision the Straits Government had no power to pass new land laws; and if payment of the tenth were refused, it had to enforce it through the Recorder's Court, which acted in accordance with the rules of English law, with all its slow and cumbrous procedure. In the words of Fullerton's Minute, the case was "tried under principles that have no relation or resemblance to the local situation of the country and its inhabitants . . . The land tenures at Malacca bear no analogy or resemblance to any English tenure; yet by such they must in case of doubt be tried." Until these two hindrances were reformed it was "quite useless to attempt the realization of any revenue whatever."³²

Almost immediately the consequence feared by Fullerton began to show itself, but to a much more serious extent than he had anticipated. The reason for this was as follows. Soon after 1830 efforts were begun to induce the raayats to accept title deeds to their land drawn up in accordance with the forms of English law. A decision of the Court declared the earliest form of lease technically illegal; and the Directors ordered new leases to be prepared which satisfied the technical requirements of English law. Raayats without valid titles to their land were to

29. JRASSB, XIII, 153-57, Maxwell.

30. Ibid., 155, Maxwell. B. Pub. 1834, *passim*.

31. JRASSB, XIII, 155, Maxwell.

32. Ibid., 156-57. Document not traceable in the records.

be compelled to accept and register them.³³ Unfortunately the disallowance of the first leases by the Court had been interpreted by the ignorant raayats as meaning that henceforth they were to hold their farms rent free, or else on payment of a merely nominal amount.³⁴ Moreover about 1832-33 the Government of the Straits Settlements issued orders that the raayats of Malacca and Naning were to be induced to pay their tenths in money instead of in kind.³⁵ The conservatism of the Malays made them averse both to title deeds and money payments, since they were altogether different from anything to be found in Malay land-tenure. The principal cause of their opposition however was the intrigues of the former Dutch Proprietors, who for ten years persuaded the ignorant raayats that the Government had merely bought the farm of their privileges, and not the rights themselves. The Dutch thus preserved most of their former authority, and used it to oppose the efforts of the administration. Their manoeuvres were not discovered until in 1837 Young was appointed Commissioner to examine the affairs of the Straits Settlements.³⁶

The assertions of the Proprietors were false; but the terms of the deeds under which their lands had been redeemed in 1828 lent plausibility to their falsehoods. It will be remembered that these were to the effect that in return for an annual payment they surrendered all their rights to the Company as long as the British should retain possession of Malacca.³⁷ Incidentally this wording added yet another element to the Malacca land-problem. A few years after 1828 it was discovered that the Company could not give a full title to any of the land which it had redeemed at such a heavy loss, not even to those which were waste. There was no reasonable ground for belief that the British would ever evacuate Malacca, but owing to the phraseology of the deeds an intending purchaser could only be given a title to any lands he bought for so long as Malacca remained under British rule. The result was that capitalists were unwilling to invest their money in the settlement and for many years in spite of the richness of the soil few plantations were formed

33. *Public Letters to Bengal*, Vol. 14. June 2, 1830 and Feb. 9, 1831.

34. *Ibid.*

35. *B. Pub.*, Range 13, Vol. 2: July 22, 1833.

36. *Despatches to Bengal and India*, Vol. 28, pp. 957-60. Sept. 1, 1841.

37. *SSR*, 168: Jan. 30, 1828.

for the growth of sugar, coconuts, etc., as in Province Wellesley and Penang. Land remained undeveloped, and the prosperity and revenue of Malacca suffered.³⁸ This was not remedied until 1861.

The result of all these unfavourable conditions was that the revenue realized from the tenth, far from yielding a surplus, was always much less than the annual payment to the Proprietors. Up to 1836 the average annual loss was Rs.10,000 or about £1000.³⁹ Incessant references were made to Bengal, and the Bengal Public and Political Consultations of 1830 to 1840 record constant discussions of the subject. It is no exaggeration to say that there was scarcely a single meeting of the Bengal Council at which the affairs of the Straits were considered in which some reference was not made to the Malacca land question.

Finally in 1837 the Indian Government repealed the land laws of 1830 and appointed W. R. Young Commissioner for the Eastern Settlements, to investigate land-tenures and the general situation in the Straits Settlements.⁴⁰ Far from improving conditions at Malacca his intervention seems if anything to have made them worse. The two problems with which he had to deal were the refusal of the raayats to commute the tenth into a money payment or to accept English title-deeds to their lands, and the powerlessness of the Straits Government to compel them owing to the Court's decisions of 1834 and 1835. The alternatives before Young appeared to be to recommend either the formal enactment as law of the Malay customs for the collection of the tenth, or, if English land-tenure were desired, the grant to the Straits Government of power to deal with its recalcitrant tax payers. He did neither: he deprecated legislation and advocated reliance on patient explanation and persuasion to overcome the Malays' objections.⁴¹ Young himself appears to have used this method successfully,⁴² and it might perhaps have succeeded if he had not retained the idea of compelling the raayats at the same time to receive a title to their land drawn up in English legal terminology.

38. JIA, II, 743-4, E. A. Blundell. Braddell, *Statistics*, 55. Cavenagh, *Reminiscences*, 265.

39. Newbold, *Straits of Malacca*, I. 166-8.

40. B. Pub., Range, 13. Vol. 24: June 21, 1837, No. 8. JRASSB, XIII, 158. Despatches to India and Bengal, XXVIII, 931-6. Sept. 1, 1841.

41. *Ibid.*, 957-60.

42. *Ibid.*

"The idea started in Regulation IX of 1830 that each cultivator was to have a title deed for his holding seems to have taken complete possession of that generation of Land Revenue officials, and the object of every succeeding administration seems similarly to have been to force documents of title upon an unwilling population."⁴³

At the same time Young urged that the system which by the Directors' orders had prevailed in the Straits Settlements since 1831 of refusing to sell the land and granting it on a twenty-year lease, renewable for another thirty years, hampered the growth of agriculture. The Government of Bengal supported his representations, and in 1841-43 the Directors ordered that henceforth all lands still held by Government were to be sold outright, no annual rent being imposed.⁴⁴ At Malacca an exception was made because the cultivators were Malays, who understood only their own native land-tenure. At this settlement therefore instead of selling the Company's waste land outright, occupation was to be permitted on a perpetual tenure, subject to the payment of the tenth the amount of which was to be revised after twenty years. It was also ordered that as soon as possible the tenth should be commuted into a money payment.⁴⁵

The result of Young's recommendations was complete failure. This is shown by a report prepared for the Directors in 1843 by the Straits Government. Six years had elapsed since Young's investigation, yet only 5029 had been issued out of the 11,342 commutation papers which he had estimated to be necessary in order that all the raayats might have title deeds and might commute the tenth in kind into a money payment. The majority of the cultivators refused to accept commutation papers; and even if they should eventually do so, it was estimated that Fullerton's bargain with the Proprietors would entail a yearly loss of Rs.6,000 (about £600). Meanwhile the average annual deficit was Rs.12,000 (about £1,200), the cost of the Proprietors' pensions and of the Land Depart-

43. JRASSB, XIII. 158, W. E. Maxwell.

44. Despatches to Bengal and India, XXVIII, 957-60, 974, 993. Sept. 1, 1841; B. Pub., Range 13, Vol. 33; April 8, 1840, Nos. 14-28. B. Pub., Range 13, Vol. 42; April 26, 1843, No. 3, B. Pub., Range 13, Vol. 50; Oct. 30, 1845, No. 35.

45. Despatches to Bengal and India XXVIII, 993, Sept. 1, 1841. B. Pub., Range 13, Vol. 42; April 26, 1843, No. 3.

ment being more than double the amount of revenue collected.⁴⁶

The most vivid description of the situation was written by E. A. Blundell, who served many years at Malacca, and eventually became Governor of the Straits Settlements. Technical English legal indentures between the tenants and the East India Company were drawn up with all the precision and formality of a practising attorney in England, fixing the amount of the tenth for the ensuing twenty years.

"This legal document occupies the whole of one side of a sheet of foolscap, while the other is filled with Malayan writing purporting to be a translation of the English, but as may well be supposed, failing entirely to convey to a native reader any idea of its meaning. It requires some knowledge of law to understand the English original.....and the attempt to translate those terms into Malay has produced an utterly unintelligible jumble of words..... To secure therefore the payment (often of a few annas only per annum) the tenants (ignorant Malay peasants) were sent for in shoals to put their marks to these sheets of foolscap paper filled with writing. They naturally got alarmed and evinced the greatest reluctance to affix their signatures."

Blundell concluded by a description which was true not only of the period before 1847, the date at which he wrote, but also down to 1861.

"To overcome this reluctance and to induce a general signing throughout, seems to have been the great and almost sole object of the Land Department from that time to the present. All the ingenuity of Residents and Assistants has been exerted to this end, and all the principles of political economy have been exhausted in endeavouring to explain the advantages of the system, but in many parts without success. Threats, coaxings and explanations have been set at defiance, and an obstinate determination evinced not to sign these legal papers."⁴⁷

46. B. Pub., Range 13, Vol. 42: Jan. 25, 1843, No. 1. *Ibid.*, Vol. 50: Oct. 30, 1845, Nos. 11-37.

47. JIA, II, 741-42, E. A. Blundell.

Finally, in 1843 or 1844, the Resident punished those who refused to sign by farming the collection of their tenths to the Chinese. It will be remembered, that it was partly to do away with the farm that the lands had been redeemed in 1828.⁴⁸ This system of punishment was still in use about 1858.⁴⁹

From 1847 to 1861 the situation remained almost unchanged. In many cases no tenths were collected after about 1841.⁵⁰ In consequence to at least as late as 1853 in every year the amount of land revenue received was much less than the cost of collecting it and paying the Proprietors. Between 1842 and 1852 the yearly receipts amounted to only a few hundred pounds, being sometimes less even than the costs of collection alone, which varied from £200 to £250.⁵¹ Frequent complaints were made to India regarding the refusal of the raayats to accept titles and pay the tenth, and the inability of the Government to grant a clear title to purchasers, owing to the wording of the agreement of 1828.

The Governor of the Straits also pointed out repeatedly that a survey of Malacca was a vital necessity. It was impossible to estimate accurately the area and population of the interior, and districts existed which had never been visited by European officials.⁵² The Malays however found the situation much to their liking. Since 1830 they had brought various tracts of jungle under cultivation; but as no survey had been made, and many raayats had refused to register their holdings or accept title deeds, the Government found it impossible to prove in Court that any piece of land had been occupied since 1830, even when it knew this to be the case. Much revenue was thus lost, because while land cultivated prior to 1830 paid a fixed and unchanging tenth, holdings taken up after that date were subject to a revision of the tenth every twenty years.⁵³ The only solution of the problem was a survey of Malacca by which the status of every person claiming to have title to land should be ascertained and declared.⁵⁴

48. *Ibid.*, 742.

49. Cavenagh, *Reminiscences*, 266.

50. *Annual Report of the Administration of the Straits Settlements*, 1861-62, p. 17.

51. Braddell, *Statistics*, 11.

52. *JIA*, II, 745, E. A. Blundell. Cavenagh, *Reminiscences*, 262.

53. *JRSSB*, XIII, 161, Maxwell.

54. *Ibid.*

Finally, in 1856 the Indian Government made an attempt to remedy the situation. A surveyor was appointed at Malacca⁵⁵ and in 1861 a Land Act was passed. The measure summarily settled the ridiculous claim of the Proprietors that the Government had merely rented their privileges by vesting the land in fee simple in the Crown. Since it was believed that they were willing to sell their annuities for fair compensation, the Governor of the Straits was empowered to negotiate with them. The greater number availed themselves of this offer. In the second place the Act provided a scheme of survey and settlement, analogous to the Indian system, so as to ascertain and record the rights and liabilities of every cultivator. The surveyors were empowered to require the attendance of raayats and the production of documents, and to decide questions of title, subject to an appeal, to the courts. Other provisions of the Act divided the landholders into two classes:—

(1) Those who held their farms by Malay customary tenure were liable to the tenth in money or in kind.

(2) All other cultivators were to be treated as squatters, without legal right to their holdings, and must either pay whatever rent the Government might fix, or vacate their farms. The vexed question of the alteration of the tenth in kind to a money rent was dealt with in a clause which empowered the Government to commute the tenth to an immediate payment and an annual quit-rent. The Malacca Land Department drew up a scale of assessment for the land-tax very favourable to the raayats, which relieved them from the oppression of the Chinese farmer. Provision for the future growth of agriculture was made by empowering the Straits Government to dispose of the waste lands at its discretion, either in perpetuity or for any term of years and subject to any quit-rent agreed on with the purchasers. The Malay custom of taking up waste land and acquiring a proprietary right over it by cultivation was abolished. Every raayat however was allowed to increase his holding by obtaining from the Government waste land adjoining his farm in the ratio of one part of jungle to every four of land cultivated by him.⁵⁶

Maxwell, the leading authority on Malayan land-

55. Braddell, *Statistics*, 37.

56. *JRASSE*, XIII, 161-62, W. E. Maxwell. Braddell, *Statistics*, 55-56. Cavenagh, *Reminiscences*, 265-66.

tenures, considered that if this Act had been properly carried out by the local officials, it should have settled the land problem of Malacca satisfactorily.⁵⁷ Owing to the Malacca Land Department it did not. While a fairly good survey was made of the coastal region (about one-fourth of the settlement), no complete survey was made of the whole Territory; and on the departure of Quinton, the Surveyor-General, in 1867, systematic work in Malacca came to an end.⁵⁸ Furthermore the Land Department, undeterred by its failure in 1830-60, still tried to make the raayats sign their land-leases, although the Act distinctly aimed at making them pay their regular annual rental whether they had signed title deeds or not.⁵⁹ This of course roused the opposition of the Malays. They also resisted the application of the Act, partly from Oriental dislike of change, and partly because they believed that the new arrangement would benefit the Government and injure them. This impression Governor Cavenagh thought was "no doubt mainly caused by reports circulated by the Revenue farmers", Chinese who had profited by the old order of things.⁶⁰ Moreover, as in former years, the raayats were reluctant to abandon the tenth in kind for the payment of a fixed rent in money.⁶¹

The result of these various factors was the failure of the Act of 1861. The Malays refused to sign leases, they evaded the payment of the tenth, and they opened up new waste lands in defiance of the provisions of the Act. The situation was accurately described in a speech of Braddell at the Straits Legislative Council in 1882.

"The cultivators, finding themselves better off under the Pengulus, with whom (when they had no written titles registered in the (Land) Office, and followed by regular demands for the rent expressed in the title deed), they were able to evade payment of the tenths, still refused to take titles, and continued to occupy old lands and to open up other lands with impunity, owing to the weakness of the Land Department, which was provided with so few, and such inefficient officers, that there was no regular supervision, and when any person was found encroaching

57. JRASSB, XIII, 162.

58. JRASSB, XIII, 162, W. E. Maxwell. *Straits Settlements Administration Reports, 1860-61*, (pp. 21-22), and 1862-63 (pp. 12-13, 34.)

59. JRASSB, XIII, 162, W. E. Maxwell.

60. Cavenagh, *Reminiscences*, 266.

61. S. S. Administration Report, 1862-63, pp. 12-13, 34.

on the Crown Lands he was all ready with the excuse that the land was prescriptive tenant land."⁶²

One of the principal objects of the Act of 1861 had been to end this practice; but the failure to make a complete survey defeated this aim, since the number and extent of the holdings existing in 1861 were not ascertained. It was therefore impossible to check the encroachments on the waste lands which were made in subsequent years.

The Malacca land problem was still unsolved a quarter of a century after the passage of the Act of 1861. Sir William Maxwell's comments on the situation as it existed in 1884, the date at which he wrote, showed that from the point of view of obtaining revenue, the position of the Government was not much better than it had been in 1830. The fundamental cause of the trouble he ascribed to this, that the Malayan system of land tenure and revenue in Malacca had never been properly ascertained and codified. As a result it had always been, and in 1884 still was, more or less unworkable under English law.⁶³ The situation was still what Fullerton feared it might become when he wrote his prophetic Minute of 1829 already quoted. Owing to the absence of a survey, the condition was steadily extended over the waste lands. To quote Maxwell again.

"Though the native revenue system cannot be satisfactorily worked, for want of power to exact the tenth, the officials have been unable to oblige the people to adopt the English tenure, because lands, really only recently brought under cultivation, cannot always be proved not to be old holdings under the native tenure."⁶⁴

This concludes the history of the Malacca land problem, so far as it lies within the scope of this thesis. It was born of misconception, it lived in travail and tribulation, and it closed in failure. Consistent throughout, it was one unending chronicle of excellent intentions and faulty execution, of disappointed hopes and continual losses — the most depressing chapter in the history of British Malaya.

62. *Proceedings of the Straits Settlements Legislative Council*, 1882, p. 68.

63. *JRASB*, XIII, 166, W. E. Maxwell.

64. *Ibid.*

VII

The Naning War, 1831-32.

Apart from the perennial land problem, the Naning War was the only event of importance in the history of Malacca during the period 1824 to 1867. The episode was an egregious blunder. Hasty action based on insufficient and incorrect information led to two military expeditions whose exploits bordered on the farcical. The result was that after nine months' campaign twelve hundred Indian troops overcame a few hundred badly-armed Malays, and obtained for the Company an annual revenue of perhaps \$100 at a cost of £100,000. While the disloyal intrigues of Dutch merchants at Malacca were partly responsible for the war, an almost equal share of the blame must be borne by Fullerton, the Governor of the Straits Settlements, and Lewis, the Superintendent of Lands at Malacca.

Naning was a small inland state of about 200 square miles, between Rembau and Malacca Territory, and only about ten miles from the town of Malacca. By the census of 1829 the population was estimated at 4875 Malays, of whom some 1200 were men able to bear arms.¹ Crawford described it as "a poor unprofitable possession, for the most part covered with jungle."² It produced rice, tin and such typical Straits products as rattans, gambier and fruit. The annual revenue was about \$3,000.³

This little state was one of the first to be founded by the great influx of Malays from Menangkabau in Sumatra in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, and was one of the earliest members of the loose confederacy which later became known as the Negri Sembilan. Like its neighbours, it acknowledged the suzerainty of the Sultan of Johore.⁴ During the eighteenth century Naning became virtually independent of Johore, like the other principalities in Negri Sembilan; and in 1757 the Sultan of Johore ceded his nominal rights of suzerainty to the Dutch.⁵

Over a century earlier however Naning had become to some extent a Dutch dependency. How complete the

1. SSR., Vol. 169: Aug. 8, 1829.

2. Crawford, *Descriptive Dictionary*, 290.

3. Moor, *Notices of the Indian Archipelago*, article by Lietutenant Newbold, 246-54.

4. Wilkinson, *Malay Papers: Notes on Negri Sembilan*, 12.

5. JRASSB, LXVI, 75, Müller.

subjection was is still uncertain, owing to the ravages of time and white ants in the Dutch records at Malacca. The evidence which is available however seems to prove that it was more nominal than real. In 1643 a Dutch force invaded Naning and obtained a treaty by which the Malays bound themselves to pay a yearly tribute of one tenth of their produce. The chiefs were to come annually to Malacca to do homage, and were to accept Dutch advice in carrying on the government. Despite this treaty however, the Dutch of Malacca seem to have lived in no small dread of the "traitorous and merciless Menangkabows."⁶ In the eighteenth century the chieftainships became hereditary in the family of Abdul Said, the ruler against whom the war of 1831-32 was fought; but each chief before his accession was confirmed by the Dutch.⁷

In spite of the Dutch rights their suzerainty was apparently much more nominal in practice than in theory. The Malays bitterly resented the necessity of paying a tenth of their crops as tribute, and the Dutch found themselves unable to collect by peaceful means more than a small fraction of the full amount. They did not attempt to enforce their legal rights by conquering Naning, because they saw that no revenue which could possibly be obtained from such a small and poor state would repay the cost of a war. About 1765 the Dutch commuted the tenth to a nominal yearly tribute, of 400 gantangs or quart measures of paddy, about one thousandth of the total crops.⁸ Braddell, a Straits official who made a careful study of the Dutch records at Malacca, believed that they rarely interfered with the internal government of Naning, which was exclusively managed, even to matters of life and death, by its Malay chiefs. In support of his contention Braddell pointed out the significant fact that while the whole of Malacca Territory was granted out to the Proprietors, none of Naning was thus treated.⁹ Wilkinson agrees with Braddell's opinion of the Dutch position in Naning.¹⁰ In short, while the Dutch described Naning as part of Malacca Territory, in practice they seem to have contented themselves with a nominal suzerainty. At the same time the legal rights given to the Dutch by the

6. Begbie, *Malay Peninsula*, 51-59. Newbold, *Straits of Malacca*, I, 198-222.

7. *Ibid.*, I, 235-36. Begbie, *Malay Peninsula*, 60-62.

8. SSR, Vol. 363, Nov. 25, 1831, No. 69-70. JRASSB, XIII, 98, W. E. Maxwell.

9. JIA, (New Series) I, 198-200, T. Braddell.

10. Wilkinson, *Malay Papers: Notes on Negri Sembilan*, 26-27.

treaty of 1643 to control the administration and receive the full tenth continued to exist on paper. The mistake made by Governor Fullerton and his Council was that they failed to realize that these rights had become obsolete from long disuse, so that the Malays had forgotten that they had ever existed.

During the first British occupation of Malacca, from 1795 to 1818, Naning was regarded as part of the conquered territory but little attention was paid to it except that in 1801 a treaty was made with Abdul Said, the new Penghulu or chief of Naning, by Colonel Taylor, the British Resident at Malacca. By this engagement Naning promised that it would be faithful and obedient, would commit no act of hostility against the Company, and would trade only with Malacca. Article III distinctly affirmed the right of the British to receive a tenth of all produce, although on account of the poverty of the people it was commuted to a yearly payment of 400 gantangs of paddy, (the same tribute which the Dutch had received). This was to be paid as a token of submission when the Penghulu or one of his chiefs came to Malacca to pay his annual homage.¹¹ It was also declared that whenever the post of Penghulu became vacant, the British could either confirm the Malay candidate or appoint some other person instead. This treaty was later regarded by Governor Fullerton as a clear proof that Naning was an integral part of Malacca; but Braddell took an opposite view. He contended that it showed that "Naning was treated rather as a protected state than as part of Malacca, as the European governments in these countries do not make treaties with their own subjects."¹² The Penghulu "continued to exercise exclusive jurisdiction in Naning, even to the power of life and death as before, till 1807," when Farquhar, the British Resident at Malacca, deprived him of the power of passing the death sentence. Apart from this no change was made.¹³ There appears to be no evidence to show that the Penghulu or his chiefs came to Malacca during this period to pay their yearly homage.

Matters remained in this condition until 1827, when Governor Fullerton began his investigations into the land questions of Malacca Territory. His attention was naturally attracted to Naning, and since little was known about it he ordered Lewis, the Superintendent of Lands

11. Aitchison, *Treaties*, I, 395-96.

12. *JIA*, (New Series), I, 199, Braddell.

13. *Ibid.*, 199.

at Malacca, to make inquiries into its status and the form of land tenure prevailing there.¹⁴ Lewis was the well-intentioned evil genius of the Naning War. An examination of the Straits records from 1828 to 1831 shows that he was one of the warmest advocates of the full exercise of every British legal right in Naning. He was also stirred to indignation by the tyranny which the Penghulu practised upon his subjects, and urged British intervention to protect them. He completely misjudged the Malays' attitude for he believed that there would be no resistance, and that they would welcome liberation from their tyrant. As a matter of fact, this was the very last thing they wanted, and they fought hard to prevent it. Lewis unfortunately had great influence with the Governor, and his advice overbore the opinions of the members of the Penang Council, who opposed the rigorous enforcement of the Company's legal rights.¹⁵ The personality of Governor Fullerton seems also to have had much influence in shaping the course of the negotiation with Naning. Fullerton was a man of vigorous and determined character, who preferred an aggressive to a passive policy whenever possible. He was also something of a legalist: once he had ascertained that the Dutch had possessed certain theoretical rights, he regarded it as sufficient reason for the Company to exercise them; and he waved aside as irrelevant the fact that they had not been enforced for an indefinite period. Another factor which contributed largely to the Council's mistaken policy was insufficient information. Lewis began his investigations into the status of Naning in 1827, but his final report was not submitted until March 11, 1829.¹⁶ Meanwhile the Council had to decide on its policy by means of the partial reports which he submitted from time to time. Unfortunately his information was not only incomplete, but was also misleading. In 1831, after the war had broken out, Ibbetson, Fullerton's successor, had the Dutch records re-examined. He then found that Lewis and Fullerton had been mistaken in contending that Naning was an integral part of Malacca Territory, and was fully under British sovereignty. Fullerton's opponents on the Penang Council were shown to have been correct when they opposed the Governor's policy.¹⁷ If the facts dis-

14. SSR, Vol. 172: July 5, 1827. Fullerton's Minute. SSR, Vol. 116: Feb. 28, March 7 and March 13, 1827.

15. For Lewis' character and influence v. especially his despatches in SSR, 169, passim, and B. Pol., Range 126. Vol. 4: Oct. 23, 1829, No. 2-5.

16. SSR, 169: March 11, 1829.

17. BSP, 363: Nov. 25, 1831, No. 69-70.

covered in 1831 had come to light three years earlier, the Naning War would never have occurred.

Abdul Said, the Penghulu of Naning, was not the man to submit to the curtailment of his powers. He enjoyed the reputation of being a man of unusual sanctity, both among his own people and the Malays of the neighbouring states. Arrogant and ambitious, he exploited the veneration of the Malays, and aped the titles and practices of Mansur Shah, the great fifteenth century Sultan under whom the Empire of Malacca had reached the height of its glory.¹⁸ Furthermore Abdul Said was deceived to his own undoing by designing counsellors, some of whom were Dutch merchants of Malacca. They encouraged him to refuse the demands of the Company, persuading him that Fullerton's orders were the irresponsible actions of a subordinate official, whose superiors would never allow him to go to war. They wished to bring on a war, because of the great profit which they would make by selling stores to the troops.¹⁹

The first important discussion of the status of Naning took place at a meeting of the Penang Council on January 30, 1828. Lewis submitted a report on the Dutch archives so far as he had examined them. The irreconcilable division of opinion as to the position of Naning, which continued throughout the next three years, manifested itself at this first meeting. Garling, the Resident Councillor of Malacca, argued that the evidence, incomplete though it was, "rather favours the independence of Naning." He could see no ground on which the Company could claim the sovereignty, demand the tenth, or extend the jurisdiction of the Recorder's Court to Naning. Fullerton was convinced that Naning was as completely under British sovereignty as Malacca Territory. Far from being a tributary ruler, the Penghulu was, like the other Penghulus of Malacca Territory, a petty revenue and police officer for his own district. The Governor believed that the Company had full right to levy the tenth, and to extend to Naning the jurisdiction of the Recorder's Court. For the time being however he decided to let matters remain as they were, and to refrain from attempts to levy the tenth or assert the Court's jurisdiction.²⁰

18. Begbie, *Malay Peninsula*, 61-62, 150, 157.

19. SSR, 169: July 18, 1829. JIA, (New Series), I, 216, T. Braddell.

20. SSR, 168: Jan. 30, 1828. SSR, 130: Aug. 24, 1829.

For several months this policy was adhered to; but in July 1828 Lewis, the Superintendent of Lands at Malacca, urged that for financial reasons Naning should no longer be exempt from the tenth. The tenth levied on the crops of Malacca Territory was collected when the Malays brought their produce to the town of Malacca for sale. The crops of Naning came to the same market, and it was hard to distinguish between them. In consequence, much Malacca produce was likely to escape the tax. Furthermore he estimated the Naning tenth to be worth about \$4500 a year, a welcome addition to the revenue. He therefore advised that small pensions be given to the Penghulus and minor chiefs of Naning, to induce them to act as the Company's local revenue-officers.²¹ This despatch persuaded Fullerton to alter his Naning policy, owing to Lewis' representations that Naning could be brought under the same system of administration as Malacca Territory by amicable arrangements with the Penghulu.²² The Governor therefore directed that Lewis should levy the tenth on Naning, and that small pensions should be given to the Penghulu and Sukes (the four assistant-chiefs). In return they were to perform the duties of the other penghulus in Malacca Territory, viz., to collect the tenth and maintain order in their own districts.²³

Lewis was sent to Naning to carry out the desired arrangements. The Penghulu and the other chiefs were anxious that their jurisdiction should not be interfered with, and were strongly opposed to the tenth. Lewis held out no hopes of their prayers being granted. He discovered that the raayats were ground down by an incredible degree of tyranny and oppression, and left "persuaded that the inhabitants will quietly acquiesce in the order."²⁴ On November 10, 1828 the Straits Government approved Lewis' communications to the Penghulu.²⁵

Lewis himself was too much occupied with the Malacca land settlement to return to Naning, but he sent his agents to collect the tenth. They met with such opposition that they asked that sepoys might be sent for their

21. SSR, Vol. 168: July 24, 1828.

22. SSR, Vol. 130: Aug. 24, 1829. *Ibid.*, 184: Letters to the Directors of April 18 and May 2, 1829. B. Pol., Range 126, Vol. 4: Oct. 23, 1829, Nos. 2-5.

23. SSR, Vol. 124: Aug. 14, 1828. *Ibid.*, 168: Aug. 25, 1828.

24. *Ibid.*, 169: January, 1829. *Ibid.*, 168: Oct. 10, 1828, Lewis' Report.

25. *Ibid.*, 168: Nov. 10, 1828.

protection. There was a division of opinion in the Penang Council on the advisability of sending troops, some of the members being as before far from convinced that the Company had any right to levy the tenth. It was decided that the Land Department should try to persuade the people to pay, but should not use troops to compel them. If the Malays refused to do so, the matter was to be left in abeyance until the arrival of Fullerton at Malacca in a few weeks' time.²⁶ Braddell considered that "this delay and hesitation had a bad effect, as it inflamed the mind of the Penghulu, and laid the foundation for the resistance which was afterwards experienced."²⁷

Shortly before this time, in December 1828, an event occurred which made the Governor and Lewis still more determined to bring Naning under the complete control of Malacca. A murder was committed in Naning, and the Penghulu vindicated the ends of justice by fining the family of the victim.²⁸ The Penang Council regarded his action as illegal, since at various times the Dutch had forbidden the Penghulus of Naning to try cases of murder, and in 1807 Farquhar, the Resident of Malacca, had repeated the prohibition.²⁹ No action was taken however, because it would probably have led to further injury to the family of the murdered man, since the Company had no officials in Naning; but the Penghulu was informed that in future such cases must be tried at Malacca.³⁰

On February 2, 1829, another meeting of the Council was held to decide what policy should be adopted in view of the refusal to pay the tenth and the Penghulu's usurpation of judicial functions.³¹ The only result was to reaffirm the sharp cleavage of opinion which had already shown itself, and to make it evident that no one knew the exact relation in which Naning stood to Malacca. Both Garling and Anderson, members of Council with much greater experience of Malaya than the Governor, were inclined to believe that the records might not tell the whole story. They felt that as in many Malayan

26. *Ibid.*, 169: Jan. 6, Feb. 11, and March 11, 1829.

27. *JIA*, (New Series), I, 201, T. Braddell.

28. *SSR*, Vol. 168: Dec. 11, 1828.

29. Newbold, *Straits of Malacca*, Vol. 1, 213-14, 217-19, 225. *SSR*, 168: Dec. 11, 1828. *SSR*, 125: Dec. 30, 1828.

30. *Ibid.*, 168: Dec. 26, 1828. *B. Pol.*, Range 126, Vol. 4: Oct. 23, 1829, Nos. 2-5.

31. *SSR*, 127: Feb. 2, 1829. *Ibid.*, 169: Feb. 11, 1829. *Ibid.*, 184: Letters to Directors of April 18 and May 2, 1829.

states, the chief might possess certain customary or understood powers which had never been enshrined in a legal document, but which were none the less genuine. They doubted whether the Company had the right to levy the tenth, or to extend the jurisdiction of the Straits Court over Naning. Even if the chiefs' powers were usurped, it would appear that they had been enjoyed for about a century without interference from either the Dutch or British beyond "a trifling or merely nominal tribute." Allowance should therefore be made for the chiefs' recalcitrance, and for their objections to a policy "which would at once deprive them of all the authority hitherto possessed by them, and level them with the common stipendiary officers of police . . . in the Malacca District."

Fullerton refused to consider anything except the actual documentary evidence which Lewis had collected. From this he concluded that Naning was an integral part of Malacca Territory, entirely subject to the Company's sovereignty, and the penghulu a glorified village headman. Whatever additional powers he might be exercising were due not to "the supposed existence of certain hereditary feudal rights," but to usurpation. The Governor proposed to take away these "usurped" powers, and retain the Penghulu and his four Sukus in office as revenue collectors and constables in their own districts. Pensions might perhaps be given them by way of compensation; but if they proved disobedient, or unwilling to serve under the new conditions, they would be dismissed, and others appointed. This policy was not to be enforced immediately; but the raayats were to be informed that the Penghulu no longer possessed jurisdiction over them, and encouraged to appeal to the Courts. It could then be settled whether it was the Company or the Penghulu who possessed the rights of jurisdiction and of levying the tenth.

In March 1829 Lewis submitted the final report on his investigations of the Dutch archives, and another meeting of the Council was held. The report convinced Fullerton that his previous convictions were correct, and that his colleagues were in the wrong. He decided however to leave the existing state of affairs unaltered until the death of Abdul Said, and to refer the question of the tenth to the Directors.³² A despatch was sent detailing the difference of opinion which existed in the Council, and

32. *Ibid.*, 169: March 11, 1829.

asking the Directors to decide whether Naning was an integral part of Malacca, and therefore subject to the tenth and to the jurisdiction of the Court. In the meantime the collection of the tenth was suspended.³³

During Fullerton's visit to Malacca he summoned Abdul Said to meet him, but the Penghulu refused to come. The Governor was now forced to return to Penang to meet the Governor-General of India, the Penghulu still remaining recalcitrant.³⁴ In May Abdul Said advanced a step further in his opposition to the Government, and began covertly to impede the process of taking the census, and other attempts of the Land Department to intervene in the internal administration of Naning.³⁵ By the Governor's orders Church, the Deputy-Resident of Malacca, was sent to Naning in July 1829, with a guard of sepoy. A body of troops was also held in readiness. He was instructed to tell the Penghulu that disobedience would entail his deposition, and to insist that the census be taken. Abdul Said was to be reassured if possible that the Company had no desire to interfere with his personal liberty; but he was to be told that Naning was an integral part of Malacca, subject to the same regulations. For the time being the collection of the tenth was deferred, but no guarantee was given that this policy would be continued. Church was also instructed not to agitate the vexed question of the Court's jurisdiction, and the consequent continuance or otherwise of the chiefs' hitherto sovereign authority. He was to inform the Penghulu that the Company would not interfere needlessly in Naning, but that if it were compelled to do so he must obey.³⁶

Church's mission was on the whole satisfactory. He reported that there was reason to believe that the Penghulu's insubordination had been chiefly caused by inhabitants of Malacca, who took every opportunity of deluding him with exaggerated stories of the intentions of Government, until he became terrified, fearing that his liberty was in danger. Church believed that he had succeeded in allaying Abdul Said's fears. The Penghulu was also dissatisfied because he feared that the Recorder's Court intended to destroy his authority by taking away

33. *Ibid.*, 184: Letters to the Directors of April 18 and May 2, 1829.

34. *Ibid.*, 169: March 11 and 20, and May 18, 1829.

35. *Ibid.*, 129: May 18, 1829.

36. *Ibid.*, 169: June 22 and 25, 1829. *Ibid.*, 129: June 8 and July 7, 1829.

his judicial powers. Should this be attempted, Church anticipated resistance, since the Malays' veneration for him was so great that they would rise to a man. Temporarily however, good relations were re-established, the Government's orders were obeyed, and the census taken. So complete was the change that Church was able to travel through Naning and collect much information, which he submitted with his report.³⁷ Fullerton was unable to revisit Malacca until October 19, 1829; and by that time the efforts of the Penghulu's evil advisers had succeeded in undoing the good results of Church's mission. Abdul Said refused to come to Malacca and meet the Governor, thereby putting himself in open opposition to the Company. He also sent embassies to the adjacent states, and prepared for war. Fullerton collected an expeditionary force to invade Naning; but at the last moment he countermanded it since the dissentient members of the Council refused to agree with him. They were still unconvinced that the Penghulu was so entirely subject to the Company that his conduct warranted an invasion, and they recommended negotiations. The Governor laid the matter before the Supreme Government, expecting a reply within two months. The Indian Government however referred it to the Directors, so that almost two years elapsed before an answer was received.³⁸

The change of policy made war inevitable. The destination of the force had been well known, and when the attack was countermanded Abdul Said interpreted it as a sign of weakness. Braddell commented as follows.

"The English power had not been directly exercised in these seas for ages. It had been taken on trust, as reflected from India and very recently from Burmah; and now on the first appearance of opposition the authorities hesitated. That this hesitation arose from any cause but fear, was not considered for an instant as possible, and in consequence, . . . the Penghulu . . . became so elevated that he threw off the air of reserve and respectful assistance which he had hitherto worn."³⁹

It was not long before Abdul Said signalled his new

37. B. Pol., Range 126, Vol. 4: Oct. 23, 1829. SSR, Vol. 169: July 11 and July 18, 1829. Ibid., 130: August 18, 1829.

38. JIA (New Series), I, 203-4, T. Braddell. The original documents untraceable in the Straits Settlements and Bengal archives.

39. JIA (New Series), I, 204, T. Braddell.

attitude by openly flouting the Company. In October 1830 he seized the fruit of certain trees claimed by Inche Surin, a Malay Proprietor in Malacca Territory who had recently transferred his holding to the Government under Fullerton's land-redemption scheme of 1828. Inche Surin's holding lay outside the boundaries of Naning, and there were documents to show that Surin's ancestors had held it from at least as early as 1723. Abdul Said however claimed the particular trees and the ground on which they stood, and when the Straits Government ordered him to withdraw he refused to obey. Had the Court been sitting at the time, this open and contemptuous defiance would have at once precipitated a crisis, since when judgement had been given, the administration must have protected the officers of the court sent to evict the Penghulu's followers. As it happened however the Recorder had left for England, and no successor had yet arrived. Moreover the Directors' reply to Fullerton's despatch of 1829 had not been received, and the Penang Presidency had recently been abolished. Ibbetson, the new Governor, could not undertake so heavy a responsibility as the ejection would involve without orders from India, and therefore no active steps were taken.⁴⁰

The despatch from the Directors with instructions regarding the policy to be pursued towards Naning was not received until the following year, 1831. The Directors' letter, which was dated June 2, 1830, supported Fullerton's view that the Company possessed sovereign rights over Naning. It was therefore subject to the levy of the tenth and to the jurisdiction of the Straits Court. To avoid the possibility of war however the Directors approved Fullerton's policy of not insisting upon these rights for the time being.⁴¹

On January 17, 1831, Ibbetson wrote to the Supreme Government that it was now too late to follow the Directors' instructions to preserve peace by remitting the tenth during Abdul Said's lifetime. His successful defiance would encourage the natives of Malacca to refuse to pay the tenth, and furthermore the concession would be useless, since he had now gone too far to retreat, and had been obdurate to all the Government's overtures. Ibbetson advised that troops be sent into Naning to collect

40. *Ibid.*, 204, Begbie, *Malay Peninsula*, 160-61. B. Pol., Range 126, Vol. 27: April 2, 1831.

41. *Public Letters to Bengal, 1830-31*. Vol. 14: June 2, 1830, No. 18.

the tenth, and put an end once and for all to the Penghulu's disobedience, a course to which he believed the Malays would offer no resistance.⁴² The Supreme Government replied on April 2, 1831, giving the Governor discretion to act as he thought best.⁴³ A last unsuccessful attempt was made to persuade the Penghulu to give way but he refused all terms short of actual independence.⁴⁴

Preparations were then, in July 1831, publicly made at Malacca for the despatch of an expedition to Taboh, Abdul Said's capital. No serious resistance was anticipated. So the force consisted only of 150 sepoy, and two six-pounders drawn by bullocks. The troops were almost entirely ignorant of the topography of Naning, and were too weak to leave detachments to keep open the line of communications. Naning proved to be an undulating country covered with dense jungle except in the valleys, where the sepoy had to wade through marshes and rice-swamps. There were no roads, and only an occasional path so narrow that hours of work were required to get the guns along. The Malays followed their usual tactics of refusing a pitched battle; but harassed the column from ambush, and finally cut the line of communications. Supplies ran short, and the troops retreated to Malacca. The Malays attacked the retreating column, felling great trees across the path, and the two guns had to be spiked and abandoned.⁴⁵

The British defeat was in large part due to the assistance which the Penghulu had received from Rembau, a small state in the Negri Sembilan which lay on the borders of Naning. Abdul Said had deceived Raja Ali, its ruler, into believing that the Company intended to conquer Rembau as soon as Naning had been overcome. Accordingly Raja Ali sent his son-in-law Saiyid Shaa-ban, and several hundred Malays, to help the Penghulu.⁴⁶ So startled was the Governor of the Straits Settlements at this unexpected event that he at first believed that he was faced by a confederacy of all the neighbouring states.⁴⁷ There seems to be no evidence however that Naning was

42. B. Pol., Range 126, Vol. 27: April 2, 1831.

43. *Ibid.*

44. BSP., Vol. 362: Oct. 14, 1831, Nos. 16 and 21.

45. Begbie, *Malay Peninsula*, 162-89. BSP, 362: Oct. 14, 1831, Nos. 16 and 17.

46. *Ibid.*, No. 17. *Ibid.*, 363: Nov. 25, 1831. No. 71. Begbie, *Malaya Peninsula*, 162-79.

47. BSP, 362: Oct. 14, 1831, No. 16.

joined by any state except Rembau. Ibbetson asked for reinforcements, and for permission to form an alliance with Rembau in order to detach it from its ally.⁴⁸

This unexpected reverse also stimulated the Straits Government to further researches into the Malacca archives. The results were enlightening, but not altogether pleasant, since they showed the policy of Fullerton and Lewis had been in the wrong, while their critics Garling and Anderson had been correct. It was discovered that by about 1765 the Dutch had decided that it was too expensive to conquer Naning in order to exact the tenth, and had commuted it into a small annual tribute. When the British attempted to collect the full tenth the Malays looked on it as a breach of faith, and feared that after Naning had been conquered the same tax would be levied upon the adjacent states. As a result Rembau joined Naning in resisting the British attack.⁴⁹

When the Indian Government learned that the blunders of the Straits administration had provoked an expensive and unprofitable war, it took no pains to conceal its displeasure. Ibbetson's proposal to form an alliance with Rembau was approved and the necessary reinforcements were sent, since the Bengal Council realized that to restore British prestige the campaign had to be carried to a successful conclusion, "worthless as the object was". "We have hitherto been entirely misled by the erroneous information in those Settlements, otherwise we should never have been drawn into this useless warfare for a worthless object. We cannot now in policy recede from it without establishing our superiority."⁵⁰

From September to January the rains made campaigning impossible, and the time was spent in negotiations with Rembau. Raja Ali was finally convinced that the Company had no desire to attack him, and he realised that in the end it would win. On January 28, 1832, a treaty was made between the Company and Rembau. Mutual assurances were given that neither would attack the other, and the Company renounced whatever claims it might have had to suzerainty over Rembau by virtue of the old Dutch rights. Rembau was thus

48. BSP, 363: Nov. 25, 1831, Nos. 69-70.

49. BSP, Vol. 363: Nov. 25, 1831, Nos. 69-70.

50. *Ibid.*, Nos. 74-77. BSP, Vol. 366: June 4, 1832, Nos. 17-22. BSP Vol. 367: July 9, 1832, No. 1.

recognized as an independent sovereign state. In return Raja Ali withdrew his contingent from Naning whose force was thus reduced to about 600 men, and a few months later sent it to join the British troops.⁵¹

In March 1832 the campaign reopened. From Malacca to Taboh, the capital of Naning, was twenty-two miles, for the last twelve of which there was no road. The strategy of Colonel Herbert, who commanded the British force, was not brilliant, though it was solid and slow. He cut a road 600 feet wide all the way to Taboh, felling trees, burning the undergrowth, and filling up the swamps. The rate of advance was about three to four miles a month. The Malays rarely made a stand, contenting themselves with harassing the covering parties who were sent into the jungle to protect the pioneers and convicts engaged in cutting the road. Neither side suffered much loss. The Penghulu's force never exceeded a few hundred at most, and was greatly inferior in numbers to the invaders who had 1200 to 1400 men; but Colonel Herbert, who might perhaps be charitably described as nervous, painted gloomy pictures of his perilous condition, harassed by "prodigious numbers" of the enemy, and with his force reduced to the defensive. At the end of April Saiyid Shaaban, the son-in-law of Raja Ali, arrived with a force of Malays, and in a few weeks transformed the situation. Well-informed by his spies of the enemy's movements, he was able to capture their stockades when they were left temporarily undefended, owing to the Malays' habit of making periodical trips to their farms. In June Taboh was captured, Abdul Said and his chiefs took to flight, and the resistance of Naning collapsed.⁵² The troops were gradually withdrawn, and by April 1834 the garrison of the Straits had been reduced to the same strength as before the war.⁵³

51. Begbie, *Malay Peninsula*, 155-59. Aitchison, *Treaties*, I, 415-20. *JIA*, (New Series), 210, T. Braddell. *BSP*, Vol. 363: Nov. 25, 1831, Nos. 23, 71, and 72. *Ibid.*, 365: Feb. 20, 1832, Nos. 4-6. *Ibid.*, 366: June 4, 1832, No. 17.

52. *BSP*, Vol. 366: April 30, 1832, Nos. 1-10, 13-16. *Ibid.*, 366: June 25, 1832, No. 6. *Ibid.*, 367: July 9, 1832; Nos. 4 ff. *Ibid.*, 368: Sept. 3, 1832, No. 3. *Ibid.*, 368: Oct. 1, 1832, No. 11. Begbie, *Malay Peninsula*, 200-260. Newbold, *Straits of Malacca*, I, 195, 228-31. *JIA*, (New Series), 208-214, T. Braddell.

53. *BSP*, Vol. 369. Nov. 19, 1832, No. 6. B. Pol. Range 127, Vol. 13: April 3, 1834, No. 54 A. Newbold, *Straits of Malacca*, I, 234.

The Government was by no means anxious to retain Naning, since it was clear that the revenue would not equal the expenses for many years if ever.⁵⁴ The country was offered to Raja Ali of Rembau in return for his services, but he refused it, saying that he had enough land already and preferred to receive his reward in a more tangible form.⁵⁵ It was therefore decided to make Naning an integral part of Malacca Territory, subject to the Recorder's Court and the tenth. The offices of Penghulu and Suku were abolished, and the country was placed under a Superintendent, who was a gentleman of Dutch descent in Malacca. He was assisted by fifteen village headmen, each of whom collected the taxes and maintained law and order in his own district.⁵⁶

Abdul Said fled on the fall of Taboh to the neighbouring states, but willingly surrendered on the promise of pardon. The Company gave him a house and gardens, a pension of Rs.100 a month, and liberty to live freely in Malacca so long as he did not intrigue or try to run away.⁵⁷ By the unique expedient of involving the Company in a war which cost it £100,000 Abdul Said obtained an assured income of larger amount than he had ever had before. The Malays still regarded him with deep veneration, and the old man turned it to good account by setting up in business as a farmer, trader, and doctor. His ventures were successful, and in 1849 he died in the odour of sanctity.⁵⁸ It is said that the generous treatment of Abdul Said did more to strengthen British influence in the Malay states than the successful issue of the war.⁵⁹ Save for a small revenue which did not cover the cost of administering Naning, this was all the Company had to show for an expenditure of £100,000.⁶⁰

54. B. Pol., Range 127, Vol. 24; Sept. 13, 1824. No. 19. *Ibid.*, 29: Aug: 24, 1835 Nos. 1-3.

55. BSP, Vol. 371: Jan. 28, 1832. Nos. 2-7.

56. *Ibid.*, 2-7. Newbold. *Straits of Malacca*, I, 232-35. JIA, (New Series), I, 218, T. Braddell.

57. B. Pol., Range 127, Vol. 13: April 13, 1834, Nos. 55-56. IPFC, Range 198, Vol. 57: Oct. 27, 1849, No. 57.

58. JIA, II, 733-34. E.A. Blundell. JIA, (New Series), I, 216-17, T. Braddell.

59. *Ibid.*, 217.

60. JIA, II, 733, Blundell. Swettenham, *British Malaya*, 83.

VIII

Anglo-Siamese Relations In The Malay Peninsula, 1824-1867.

During the first quarter of the nineteenth century the Governors of Penang feared, and with reason, that a great part of the Malay Peninsula would come under the yoke of Siam. By about 1800 Siam had completely recovered from the Burmese invasion and, more powerful perhaps than at any previous period of its history, at once resumed the traditional policy of establishing its supremacy over the Malay States of the Peninsula. Over some of them, as for example Kedah, the government of Bangkok could claim a vague but undeniable right of suzerainty, based on "ancient aggression and present power."¹ Siam was also determined however to extend its authority over states like Perak and Selangor which had never been under its control. The policy of Siam was, in short, to conquer the whole Peninsula,² acting on the time-honoured principle of Asiatic monarchies that the stronger has the right to subdue the weaker power.

The East India Company was wedded to the policy of non-intervention in Malayan affairs,³ and for as long as possible it refrained from interfering with Siam's designs. The logic of events however proved too strong for it, and at last the Company with great reluctance found itself compelled to intervene. The causes of this change of policy were twofold, the Siamese conquest of Kedah in 1821, and the unfair treatment of British merchants at Bangkok.

Kedah, from its situation on the Siamese frontier, was naturally the first state to suffer from the policy of Bangkok. The Sultans were the allies of the Company, and between 1786 and 1821 they frequently complained of the heavy and — as they said — unprecedented demands for men and supplies periodically made upon them. Owing to the weakness of Kedah they were unable to resist, and they pressed for the defensive alliance which they contended the Company had promised in return for the cession

1. For an examination of the Siamese claims to Kedah v. chapter on Penang.

2. Burney MSS. D. IX. Crawford, *Embassy to Siam*, 401-6. Anderson, *Malay Peninsula*, 14 and passim.

3. v. chapter on Native Policy.

of Penang in 1786.⁴ The Supreme Government however denied that any pledge to this effect had ever been given. It felt that it could not interfere between a suzerain and a dependent state, and thereby encourage the Sultan "to renounce his vassalage." The Sultan's demands for an alliance were therefore rejected, and the Penang Council was forbidden to protect Kedah against Siam.⁵ At the same time it was authorised to negotiate with the government at Bangkok when it should judge the occasion propitious to secure a revision of the Siamese demands on Kedah "on principles of equity, with reference to the resources of the kingdom."⁶ The Council did not avail itself of this permission.⁷

In 1818 the Sultan of Kedah was compelled by Siam to conquer Perak and force it to send the Bunga Mas to Bangkok. This was an act of pure aggression, since Perak had always been entirely independent of Siam, and there was no cause of quarrel between it and Kedah. The object of the policy was to weaken both states so that they would fall an easy prey.⁸

Three years later Kedah's own turn came. As long as the government at Bangkok feared that an attack on it might involve war with the British, Kedah was safe. Once assured however that there was nothing to fear in that quarter, there was no further hesitation.⁹ The Sultan of Kedah had been remiss in sending the Bunga Mas, and he had not complied with various demands for supplies and money. He was also accused by his brother and other enemies of intriguing with Burma. The Sultan received orders to come to Bangkok and justify himself, but fearing for his life he prudently refused to obey.¹⁰ In 1821 a Siamese army made a sudden attack upon Kedah, and conquered it after a short campaign. The country was laid waste, and the atrocities committed were barbarous

4. For the history of Kedah's relations with the Company until 1800 v. chapter on Penang. Anderson, *Malay Peninsula*, 82-83. SSR, Vol. 83, the Sultan's letter to the Governor-General of India in 1810. Quoted by Swettenham, *British Malaya*, 47-52. Burney MSS., D. IX and D. XXVI.

5. *Ibid.*, SSR, 66: June 22, 1818. *Ibid.*, 83: Jan. 31, 1811.

6. *Ibid.*, 81: Feb. 25, 1814.

7. *Ibid.*, 66: June 22, 1818. *Ibid.*, 83: Sept. 21, 1818.

8. *Ibid.*, 66: June 22, 1818. JIA, IV, 108, Low. Anderson, *Malay Peninsula*, 83-85. For further proofs of Perak's independence of Siam, v. *infra*.

9. Swettenham, *British Malaya*, 45-46.

10. Aitchison, *Treaties*, I, 388. Burney MSS., D. XXVI.

to a degree. Thousands of fugitives fled to Province Wellesley, while the Sultan himself escaped to Penang.¹¹ The Siamese pursued the refugees into Province Wellesley, but the despatch of a company of sepoys sent the whole army hurrying back to Kedah.¹² The Raja of Ligor, the Siamese commander, sent an insolent letter to the Governor of Penang, demanding the surrender of the Sultan, with the veiled threat to attack the island unless he complied.¹³ The Governor firmly refused, and thereafter the Raja was much more humble in his behaviour towards the Company.¹⁴

The dethroned Sultan asked the Company to restore him, contending that it was bound to do so by the agreement under which it had secured Penang.¹⁵ The Supreme Government was willing to assist him by negotiations with Siam, but it refused to restore him by force. The Sultan was too weak to regain his throne unaided, and finding that he could expect no armed assistance from the British, he began to intrigue with Burma. The Court of Ava eagerly embraced the opportunity of wresting Kedah from its ancient enemy, and preparations were made for a combined attack on Siam by Burma, Kedah, Selangor and other Malay states. In return Kedah was to become a tributary of Ava. The Penang Government learned of these negotiations and was greatly displeased, since the Sultan had intrigued against Siam while under British protection, and also because Burma was regarded as an even less desirable neighbour than Siam. The Council sent the Raja of Ligor full information of the proposed attack.¹⁶ Owing to this disclosure and to the Anglo-Burmese war which soon afterwards broke out, nothing came of these intrigues. The only result, as will be seen, was that they still further embittered the government of Siam against the Sultan, and destroyed whatever slight chance there might have been of its restoring him to his throne.

While the restoration of the dethroned Sultan was one of the motives which led the Company to enter into political relations with Siam, this was far from being the

11. SSR, 83: Nov. 28, 1821. Anderson, *Malay Peninsula*, 4-5. 16-17.

12. *Ibid.*, 7. SSR, 83: December 1821.

13. *Ibid.*,

14. *Ibid.*,

15. *Ibid.*, Nov. 30, 1821.

16. SSR, 86: Oct. 17, 1822. *Ibid.*, 94: Feb. 5, 1824. B. Pol., Range 123, Vol. 30: Jan. 14 and Feb. 21, 1823.

most important cause. The reasons for the step were primarily economic. In the first place, the Penang Council was afraid that the Siamese conquest of Kedah would interfere with the food supply of Penang. The attempt to make the island self-supporting had failed, and it was dependent for the greater part of its food upon Kedah. The Council was always very sensitive to any change which seemed to threaten this source of supply, and it was greatly perturbed by the possibility that Siam might place obstacles in the way of obtaining food. The Malay government had been "at times forward and troublesome," but it was always "kindly disposed" and "easily dealt with." The Council seems greatly to have overrated the power of the Siamese, and it anticipated much trouble from them because, through their "insolence and haughtiness," they "could only be held in check by the strong arm of power."¹⁷

The Council also wished to secure the revision of the Siamese commercial regulations, since they greatly hampered the development of trade. The commerce of Penang with Siam began about 1817, and in 1820-21 was valued at \$207,750, an increase of almost 39% in three years. The principal import from Siam was sugar, while the most important exports were opium and piece-goods (i.e. cotton and other cloths) from India. The Penang Council rightly judged that under more favourable customs regulations the trade was capable of great expansion. In addition to the direct trade with Bangkok, Penang had an important trade in tin with Perak, Patani, Ujong Salang, and other Siamese dependencies. Siam greatly hampered the trade with Ujong Salang, the principal source of supply, and the Penang Council wished to improve conditions by sending a mission to Bangkok.¹⁸

With the permission of the Supreme Government letters and presents were sent to Bangkok in 1818 and 1819 expressing the profound veneration which affected the East India Company whenever it thought of the "Lord of the White Elephant," and diplomatically suggesting a revision of the conditions under which trade was carried on at Bangkok.¹⁹ As a result of representations from Penang the Government of India gave permission to send an envoy to Bangkok for commercial purposes

17. SSR, 81: *passim*. *Ibid.*, 83: Nov. 28, 1821.

18. *Ibid.*, 66: June 22, 1818. *Ibid.*, 83: Dec. 27, 1821.

19. *Ibid.*, Vols, 66, 81 and 83: *passim*.

only.²⁰ In 1821 Phillips, the Governor of Penang, sent to Bangkok a Singapore merchant named Morgan, ostensibly as a private trader, but really as a secret agent of the Company, to collect information and sound the Siamese ministers on the possibility of improving commercial relations. The Siamese were inordinately suspicious of Europeans, and it was felt that this mode of procedure was the least likely to awaken their hostility.²¹

At the time of Morgan's despatch the Supreme Government was preparing to send a mission to Bangkok and Cochin-China. The envoy selected was John Crawford, a member of the Bengal Medical Service who had been many years in the East Indies, and was one of the leading authorities of the day on Malayan affairs.²² The objects of the mission were primarily commercial, the political aims, such as the restoration of the Sultan of Kedah, being emphatically minor points. In his instructions to Crawford the Governor-General emphasized that the first object of the mission was to allay the "very general fear and distrust of Europeans, highly detrimental to the interests of commerce," which was "predominant" in the countries of Indo-China. Crawford was absolutely forbidden to ask for any of the privileges which had formed so important a part of the commercial treaties of the sixteenth, seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, such as the erection of forts or factories, extra-territorial jurisdiction, monopolies etc.²³ While the establishment of a good understanding was to be Crawford's principal object, he was to try and place commerce "on a defined and permanent footing, so as to expose the British traders to the least possible vexation." The Government of India wished for example to substitute a fixed and known scale of duties for the unknown and often exorbitant fees which were then levied. The Government wished to benefit not merely the trade of Penang, but also that of India and Great Britain, by reviving the extensive commerce which had existed in the seventeenth century. While it did not expect that this initial attempt would be entirely successful, it trusted that Crawford would make a begin-

20. Crawford, *Embassy to Siam*, 593.

21. SSR, 81: April 24, 1821. *Ibid.*, 83: April 24, 1821.

22. For Crawford's career v. chapters on Singapore and on the Administration.

23. Crawford, *Embassy to Siam*, Appendix B: 589-90.

ning by removing the Siamese distrust and dislike of the British.²⁴

Crawfurd was also directed to collect as much information about Siam and Cochin-China as could be obtained without alarming the Siamese.²⁵ For this purpose a surveyor and a botanist were attached to the mission. During the early part of the nineteenth century Indo-China was practically a "terra incognita," and in spite of every effort, the Supreme Government was able to supply its envoy with only the vaguest details. An incident told by Crawfurd throws a flood of light upon the ignorance regarding Indo-China which prevailed even in the best-informed circles. While at Penang he met the captain of a Siamese trading-ship, and gathered from him "more useful and practical knowledge than all he had before obtained from printed sources."²⁶

As to the restoration of the Sultan of Kedah, the Government left it entirely to Crawfurd's discretion whether the subject should be mentioned at all or not. It was impressed upon him that the improvement of commercial relations must not be jeopardised by the introduction of matters distasteful to Siam. Should he however perceive a favourable opportunity for securing the Sultan's restoration "by a friendly and unostentatious representation" he was instructed to take advantage of it.²⁷

Before sending the mission the Governor-General asked the Penang Council to inform him of the objects which it thought desirable of attainment. In its Minute the Council concurred with the Supreme Government in regarding the restoration of the Sultan of Kedah as rather a minor matter to be mooted only if Crawfurd should judge that it would not endanger the establishment of improved commercial relations. The Penang Government regarded it as much more important to obtain from Siam a recognition of the Company's right to Penang. Since the island had been ceded by Kedah, it was clear that the grant was invalid, as Kedah was a dependency of Siam, and the Sultan's action had never been confirmed by his suzerain.

24. *Letters Received from Bengal*, Vol. 86: Despatch to Directors of Nov. 23, 1821. Crawfurd, *Embassy to Siam*, 133, 589-91, 595-96.

25. *Ibid.*, 592-94.

26. *Ibid.*, 11.

27. *Ibid.*, 593-94.

The Minute emphasized however that the objects whose attainment the Council had most at heart were economic. These were the development of the growing commerce with Siam, and especially the tin trade, by the revision of the customs regulations and the continuance of the free importation of supplies from Kedah, "on which indeed the existence of this establishment almost depends."²⁸

Crawfurd's mission was almost a complete failure, apart from the fact that he obtained much information which was of great value in subsequent negotiations. He also secured a title of a sort to Penang with which he and the Supreme Government were much pleased. The reasoning by which Crawfurd convinced the Government and himself that the Company had obtained a clear title to Penang was sufficiently curious. Wherever possible, the Siamese Ministers avoided all reference to Penang, but when they were compelled to mention it they spoke of it as a British possession. Crawfurd was quite convinced that their acquiescence in the British occupation was prompted solely by the knowledge that they were powerless to prevent it. On the grounds however that the Company had for thirty-six years held undisputed possession of the island, and that the Siamese had not questioned the validity of the occupation, Crawfurd and the Supreme Government agreed that he had "established a virtual acknowledgement of our right of sovereignty in Penang."²⁹

Crawfurd tried to persuade the Siamese government to restore the Sultan of Kedah, but failed completely. The Ministers attempted to gain from him a promise that the Sultan should be handed over to them, and that the annual payment of \$10,000 for Penang and Province Wellesley should in future be made to a Siamese nominee. Crawfurd utterly refused to agree, and declared that the Company would continue to protect the Sultan and to pay him the annual subsidy of \$10,000. He also discovered that the conquest of Kedah in 1821 was due to the intrigues of the Prahklang, and of Prince Kromchiat, the leaders of the most powerful faction in Siam, in alliance with the influential Raja, or Governor, of the Siamese province of Ligor.³⁰

28. SSR, 81: Dec. 27, 1821.

29. *Ibid.*, 87: Nov. 28, 1822. B. Pol., Range 123, Vol. 27: Jan. 15, 1823. Crawfurd, *Embassy to Siam*, 160. Anderson, *Malay Peninsula*, 157.

30. SSR, 87: Nov. 28, 1822.

The most important result of Crawford's mission was the valuable information which he collected about the geography, population and resources of Siam, the character of the government, and the weakness of its power.³¹ He was much impressed by the great field which it presented for British commerce; but he pointed out that trade would be very seriously handicapped by the corrupt policy of the Ministers. European commerce to Bangkok was under the control of the Prahklang, or Minister for Trade and Foreign Affairs, of Prince Kromchiat, who soon afterwards became king, and of a group of able and unscrupulous Mohammedans, descendants of Indian immigrants. This faction was the most powerful party in the state, and made a very large profit out of the trade by such expedients as exorbitant duties whose amount varied with the wealth of the merchant, forced gifts, and open demands for bribes. Crawford stigmatised their proceedings as "most indelicate." One of their favourite practices was to compel the merchant to sell them his cargo at a very low figure, and buy Siamese goods from them at a very high price, by the simple but effective expedient of forbidding all other traders to deal with him.

This powerful faction was in charge of the negotiations with Crawford, and since his object was to put an end to the very state of affairs from which they drew such large profits, he believed that their hostility was the principal reason for the failure of his mission. After months of tedious and evasive negotiations, in the course of which Crawford was subjected to as much humiliation and disrespect as the Ministers dared to inflict on him, all that he could secure was a written promise that the (unknown) amount of the duties would not be increased, and that in future British merchants should be assisted by the benevolent exertions of the Prahklang and his satellites. In other words, traders would continue to be as much in the power of these rapacious and unscrupulous officials as in the past.³²

Crawford did not regard the presence of the Siamese in Kedah as in any way a menace to the safety of Penang, and he entirely dispelled the illusions of the strength of Siam which were held by both the Penang Council and the Supreme Government. In support of his contention

31. Crawford, *Embassy to Siam*, 309-455.

32. Crawford, *Embassy to Siam*, 133, 170-74, and *passim*. SSR, 87: B. Pol., Range 123, Vol. 36, April 3, 1823.

he gave a description of the Siamese character which was most uncomplimentary. Its truth however was vouched for by the testimony of Burney and every other Englishman of this period who was brought into contact with the Siamese. The national character was a peculiar blend of overweening vanity, suspicion, and an astonishing degree of cowardice. "To a character of venality and corruption we found superadded a remarkable degree of national vanity, yet with an extraordinary jealousy and distrust of all strangers, and especially Europeans." "Although essentially weak and pusillanimous," they were "vain and arrogant to such an extreme as to fancy themselves nothing less than the very first nation on the globe . . . It is scarcely safe even to attempt to conciliate them, and thus the most moderate policy on the part of other nations will always be in danger of being construed by them into timidity, and apprehension for their own power." Yet despite its bravado, the government secretly entertained "very serious apprehensions of the power of the English." Crawford was convinced if the Company had opposed by force the invasion of Kedah in 1821, "the fears of the Siamese Court would have induced it . . . to have withdrawn its forces from Queda (Kedah), and even forbore in future from meddling in the affairs of that state." The Siamese army was "extremely contemptible," being an undisciplined and ill-armed mob raised from a "cowardly and timid people." The fortifications of Bangkok, the centre and most vulnerable part of the empire, were "feebly and unskilfully constructed. Two small gun-brigs would destroy it."³³ The Supreme Government was strongly impressed by Crawford's report, and his views had great influence on its policy towards Siam during the following years.³⁴

From July 1822, the date at which Crawford left Bangkok, until 1824, there were no further negotiations with Siam. Several causes co-operated to bring about the despatch of the second mission in 1825. One was the desire of the Indian Government to remove the grievances of British merchants trading at Bangkok.³⁵ The outbreak of the Anglo-Burmese War in 1824 also contributed to this end. Shortly before war was declared the Supreme Government wrote to Penang pointing out how advan-

33. SSR, 87: Nov. 28, 1822. Crawford, *Embassy to Siam*, 344-46, 396-97, and *passim*.

34. B. Pol., Range 123, Vol. 27: Jan. 15, 1823. SSR, Vol. 89.

35. Moor, *Notices of the Indian Archipelago*, 222-23.

tageous it would be if Siam could be induced to declare war on its ancient enemy and thus create a diversion.³⁶ During the early stage of the campaign the troops made very slow progress, and the generals in command strongly urged the great desirability of obtaining the co-operation of a Siamese force.³⁷ In 1824 two missions were therefore sent to Ligor to persuade the Raja to send a Siamese contingent and whatever small boats he had for service on the Irrawaddy. The missions were a failure, except in so far as they cleared up a serious misconception under which the Government of Penang had been labouring. The Council had been inclined to regard the Raja of Ligor as a semi-independent ruler, and had negotiated with him as such. Lieutenant Low, one of the envoys, ascertained that he was merely a Siamese official, one of the most powerful in Siam it was true, but still unable even to let the British have the use of a single boat without authorization from Bangkok.³⁸ The Siamese refused to declare war, and by 1825 the Supreme Government no longer needed their assistance. The campaign was progressing well, and India had also come to the conclusion that Siamese troops might be "an accession of weakness" owing to their jealousy and arrogance, their inferiority to the Burmese soldiery, and their "cruel and barbarous mode of warfare." This view had been strongly urged by Crawford, the late envoy, and by the Penang Council. When therefore Burney was sent as envoy to Siam in 1825, he was instructed to tell the Siamese Ministers that while the Indian Government was quite willing that they should declare war on Burma there must be no co-operation between the two armies, and that the Siamese force must not operate in a district in which there were any British troops.³⁹

The Indian Government had by this time abandoned another idea which it had held in the opening months of the war. This was that the restoration of the ex-Sultan of Kedah and the negotiation of a favourable commercial treaty might be obtained from Siam in return for ceding to it part of the territory on the Tenasserim Coast which the Supreme Government intended to take from Burma.

36. SSR, Vol. 94: Jan. 27, 1824.

37. *Ibid.*, 96: July 28, 1824.

38. *Ibid.*, 94: April 26, 1824. *Ibid.*, 95: June 11 and 25, 1824. *Ibid.*, 96: July 28, Sept. 6, 13 and 24, and Nov. 19 1824. *Ibid.*, 98.

39. *Ibid.*, 96: May 31, July 28, Sept. 6, 13 and 24, and Nov. 19, 1824. *Ibid.*, 99: Oct. 4, 1824. *Ibid.*, 105: pp. 444-54. *Ibid.*, 102: May 13, 1825.

The Company had at first no desire to retain these conquests, and it felt that Siam might be willing to make concessions for their restoration, as they had been Siamese territory until annexed by Burma sixty years before.⁴⁰ By the time that Burney was sent as envoy to Bangkok in 1825 the Supreme Government had changed its mind, and decided not to cede any of its conquests to Siam in return for concessions. India felt that it was impossible to hand over the conquered Burmese to their barbarous enemies, and it had also realised that the Tenasserim coast was an important strategic position. The French had used it as a naval base in the eighteenth century; and the country lying on the frontiers of Burma and Siam also provided a strong base of operations against both. Since it was no longer possible to avoid relations with Siam, in case of eventualities it was well to hold a position which would menace its security.⁴¹ The Supreme Government was undecided as to which parts of its conquests should be retained. As a temporary measure they were in 1825 to 1826 placed under the control of Penang, which was ordered to organise the administration and to collect information about them. Of the Penang officials who were sent to the Tenasserim coast, several remained permanently in its administration.⁴²

While the Burmese War had caused the Supreme Government to take a much greater interest in Siam than had hitherto been the case, it seems highly improbable that the desire for Siamese assistance or for a favourable commercial treaty would have led to the despatch of the Burney mission to Bangkok in 1825. Even before India decided to send it, it had determined not to ask for a Siamese contingent; while as for obtaining a commercial treaty, Crawford's failure had brought the government to the conclusion that undue precipitation was likely to defeat its own ends. The importance of the war and the desire for commercial concessions lay in this, that they predisposed the Government of India to pay more attention to the representations of the Penang Council than would otherwise have been the case. The most important cause of the despatch of the Burney mission was that Siam's attempts to subjugate Perak and Selangor happened

40. *Ibid.*, 94: Jan. 27, 1824. *Ibid.*, 99, Nov. 19, 1824. *Ibid.*, 96: May 31, 1824.

41. *Ibid.*, 102: May 13, 1825. *BSP*, Vol. 330: May 13, 1825, No. 3. Burney MSS, C. IX.

42. *SSR*, 102: May 13, 1825: *BSP*, Vols. 341-47, *passim*.

to coincide with the arrival at Penang in August 1824 of Robert Fullerton, a Governor of decidedly different temper from his predecessors. Hitherto the Governors of the Penang Presidency had acquiesced in the Siamese claims to overlordship in Malaya. The bare official records of the proceedings of a Council are not an ideal source for evidence of character; but Governor Fullerton was a man of such strong personality that it stands out clearly even in the dry accounts of the meetings of his Council. He was able, energetic and determined, and in foreign policy his guiding principle was to protect British interests in the Malay states wherever possible. Moreover, when the orders of the Supreme Government ran counter to his plans, he was in the habit of interpreting them in a somewhat liberal spirit, so that in the end he often got his own way. Fullerton was very strongly influenced by Anderson, the leader of the anti-Siamese party at Penang — many of the Governor's despatches paraphrase or tally almost word for word with Anderson's oft-quoted pamphlet — and like him contended that Kedah was "de jure" an independent state. Fullerton set himself the task of restoring it to what he considered its legal rights, and he firmly opposed Siam's attempts to subjugate Perak and Selangor.⁴³ An incident which occurred in May and June of 1825 gives a more vivid picture of the Governor's character than pages of description. The Raja of Ligor had collected a fleet to conquer Selangor, and the Penang Council obtained some evidence — later shown to be erroneous — that he intended also to attack Penang. The town was put in a state of defence, but Fullerton was far from satisfied with such passive measures. Only the most vehement expostulations on the part of his Council induced him very reluctantly to forego his intention of sailing to Ligor and destroying the Siamese fleet before it left harbour.⁴⁴

Soon after Fullerton's arrival he wrote on October 19, 1824, a despatch to the Supreme Government which foreshadowed his Malayan policy of the next three years. He strongly advocated the restoration of the ex-Sultan of Kedah as a measure "not less supported by strict justice than by sound policy," and urged in its favour arguments which read almost like an abstract of Anderson's pamphlet. Referring to the rumours that the Raja of Ligor was

43. SSR, Aug. 1824-1827. Vols. 95-121 and 138-142, *passim*.

44. *Ibid.*, 101: May 12 and 19, 1825 and *passim*. *Ibid.*, 102: *passim*.

about to attack Selangor, the Governor insisted that it was "indispensable to the future peace and tranquillity of the Malay Peninsula" that Siam should renounce all claims to sovereignty over every Malay state south of Patani and Kedah. Its pretensions had no legal justification, for "no act of superiority whatever has been exerted over any state South-East of Kedah within the memory of man." Furthermore a Siamese conquest would "entirely destroy" the important British trade with the Peninsula. The Governor therefore urged that the Company should protect the Malay states by making representations to Siam. Should this method fail, it "might even warrant stronger measures."⁴⁵

The Supreme Government's reply to this despatch gave the key to its Malayan policy during the years 1824 to 1827. As in the past, the Indian Government was most reluctant to make a political treaty with Siam, lest the Siamese should break it and so compel the Company to go to war. The Government would greatly have preferred to continue its former policy of avoiding all political relations with Bangkok. It recognised however that this was no longer practicable since the conquest of Kedah in 1821 had brought the two empires into direct contact, and because it wished to obtain a share of the valuable Siamese trade. The Indian Government therefore desired to reconstitute Kedah as an independent or a feudatory state with clearly defined obligations under the ex-Sultan, in order to serve as a buffer kingdom between the Penang Presidency and Siam. The Government hoped that when the two empires were no longer in direct contact the danger of disputes or of being entangled in Siamese affairs would disappear. The second object of the Government was by a "moderate and reasonable" policy to obtain a commercial treaty giving a "fair share of freedom and security" to British trade in Siam. Apart from this the Supreme Government wished to avoid all relations with Siam, lest they should lead to an entirely undesirable war. For this reason Fullerton's proposal that the Company should become the protector of the Malay states met with scant favour: "we fully coincide . . . but we entertain the strongest doubts of the practicability of inducing the arrogant and haughty Court of Siam to waive pretensions . . . and we question the expediency of agitating the proposition at all."⁴⁶

45. *Ibid.*, 96: Oct. 19, 1824.

46. *Ibid.*, 99: Nov. 19, 1824.

This rebuff entirely failed to quench Fullerton's determination to protect the independence of Perak and Selangor. Perak had expelled its Siamese conquerors in 1822, mainly through the assistance of Sultan Ibrahim, the able and piratical ruler of Selangor. Ibrahim had conquered and held Perak from 1804 to 1806; and it was by the request of its Sultan that he had expelled the Siamese in 1822 and reasserted his former supremacy. The two rulers signed an agreement whereby Perak was to pay tribute to Sultan Ibrahim, and a Selangor force under Raja Hassan, a relation of Ibrahim's, was left in the country to collect the tax. Hassan began to plunder the Perak merchants; but much as the Sultan of Perak desired to be rid of him, from fear of Siam he endured him as the lesser of two evils. Meanwhile the Raja of Ligor, supported by the faction in Bangkok which Crawford had criticised so bitterly, began to make preparations for the conquest of Perak and Selangor. To secure a pretext, he forced the Sultan of Perak to sign letters asking for Siamese protection against Selangor. The weakness of Perak compelled its ruler to obey, although the last thing he wanted was to see the troops of Ligor in his country. Sultan Ibrahim of Selangor, who hated the Siamese as fervently as he admired the British, began to prepare for war, regardless of the fact that his weak and anarchical state was quite unable to resist an attack.⁴⁷

Although rumours as to the intentions of the Raja of Ligor reached Penang, the Governor did not receive reliable information about them until January 1825. He then learned that the Raja was secretly preparing a fleet to conquer Selangor and Perak.⁴⁸ Fullerton had a difficult game to play. From the Indian Government's recent despatch he knew that it would refuse to go to war to protect Perak and Selangor, and he had no authority whatever to threaten the Raja of Ligor with hostilities if he persisted in his policy.⁴⁹ Fullerton however knew that the Siamese did not know this; and he counted on their timidity and fear of the British power to prevent matters from coming to a crisis. He therefore engaged in an elaborate and completely successful game of bluff. Towards the Malay states his attitude was scrupulously cor-

47. *Ibid.*, 96: Oct. 19, 1824. *Ibid.*, 103: Anderson's Reports of Aug. 26 and Sept. 15, 1825. Newbold, *Straits of Malacca*, II, 31-32. Wilkinson, *Malay Papers: History of the Peninsula*, 63-64.

48. SSR, 99: Jan. 28, 1825.

49. *Ibid.*, 99: Nov. 19, 1824. *Ibid.*, 104: Sept. 2 and 16, 1825.

rect. He ordered Cracroft, the Resident of Malacca, to confine his relations with them "as much as possible to general expressions of good-will and friendship, and avoid every measure calculated in any way to commit the British Government to any new alliance or obligation of defence or guarantee."⁵⁰ Towards the Raja of Ligor Fullerton assumed a very different tone. He warned him that the British, as the inheritors of the old Dutch treaty-rights with Perak and Selangor, would be far from indifferent to an attack on them, and hinted darkly that an invasion might involve Siam in war with the Company.⁵¹ Finally, when in May 1825 information was received that the Raja's 300 galleys were about to sail from the Trang River, Fullerton sent the gunboats at Penang to make a feint of blockading the river mouth.⁵² This supreme effort of bluff was successful, and the fleet never left port.

Meanwhile an event had occurred which did much to convince the Indian Government of the necessity of sending a second embassy to Bangkok. This was the mission of Captain Burney to Ligor and the neighbouring Siamese provinces in January 1825. Captain Henry Burney was born about 1790, and was the nephew of the famous Fanny Burney, Madame d'Arblay. Appointed ensign in 1809 in a regiment of Bengal Native Infantry, he took part in the conquest of Java in 1810-11, and in 1811-14 was stationed at Penang with his regiment, the Twenty-fifth. He then returned to India, but in 1816 he came back to Penang, and was Military Secretary to the Governor from 1818 to 1824. He spent his leisure time in learning the Siamese language, and in collecting information about the politics and geography of the Malay Peninsula.⁵³ With one exception, he was the only official at Penang who could speak Siamese, and he also submitted to the government some maps and reports on the Malay Peninsula. The Penang Council sent him on several missions to Kedah and Ligor, and had a very high opinion of his abilities.⁵⁴ The Indian Government was also impressed by the valuable information which Burney had collected, and considered that in the event of a second mission to Bangkok, he was peculiarly fitted to act as envoy.⁵⁵

50. *Ibid.*, 100: March 11, 1825.

51. *Ibid.*, 100: Feb. 18 and 28, 1825. *Ibid.*, 101: May 24, 1825.

52. *Ibid.*, 101: May 3, 1825, and *passim*.

53. Burney MSS. *passim*.

54. SSR, 95: pp. 357-82. Burney MSS.

55. SSR, 99: Nov. 19, 1824.

Fullerton held him in high favour owing to his anti-Siamese views, and in 1825 sent him to Calcutta to advocate the despatch of a mission to Bangkok. Partly as a result of his "able and interesting reports," the India Government decided to do so, and appointed Burney himself as envoy.⁵⁶ His conduct of the negotiations was perhaps as successful as was to be expected considering the great difficulties of his situation; but it gained him the enmity of Fullerton and the anti-Siamese party at Penang. On Burney's return from Bangkok in 1826 he was bitterly attacked, and preserved amongst the Burney Manuscripts is a challenge to a duel from an official at Penang. Burney was then in India, so the challenger suggested that it would be equally convenient for both if the duel were fought at Rangoon. The Indian Government had been greatly pleased by Burney's conduct of his mission, and in 1828 it appointed him one of the Commissioners for the administration of the Tenasserim Coast.⁵⁷ Here his courage saved a British detachment from annihilation during an insurrection. Owing to his unique qualifications he was in 1830 appointed Resident at the Burmese Court. He remained there until 1837, and did valuable work in fostering the development of British trade, and investigating the history and geography of Burma.⁵⁸ In 1841, now a Lieutenant Colonel, he is found in London warmly defending the Company's Kedah policy against its critics. The Directors highly approved of his efforts, and based their attitude towards the restoration of the ex-Sultan of Kedah in 1842 largely upon his recommendations.⁵⁹

Returning to Burney's mission to Ligor in 1825, he was sent there at the request of the Indian Government to ascertain the attitude of Siam towards the Burmese war and the recent British conquests on the Tenasserim coast. He was also instructed to discover the views of the Raja of Ligor on Kedah, the negotiation of a commercial treaty with Siam, and the despatch of a mission to Bangkok. Furthermore he was to find out whether the Raja was a semi-independent ruler, or a mere official "implicitly bound and actually obeying the dictates" of his superiors.⁶⁰

56. SSR, 102: May 13, 1825.

57. *Ibid.*, 141: April 18, 1827. BSP, 354: Jan. 9, 1829.

58. *Ibid.*, 357: Jan. 8, 1831, No. 28. Burney MSS. H. Vincent Smith, India, 652.

59. Burney MSS. and v. infra.

60. SSR, Vols. 94-98 and 99: Jan. 4 and 18, 1825.

Burney entirely confirmed the report of the mission of 1824, that the Raja of Ligor was not a semi-independent chieftain, but merely an official appointed by the Emperor of Siam. His power indeed was great, but on pain of death he dared not negotiate with Europeans. The attempts of the Penang Council in previous years to restore the ex-Sultan of Kedah by negotiating with him had been doomed to failure. The only chance of success lay in dealing directly with the Emperor of Siam. Burney also confirmed Crawford's reports from Singapore that the timid and suspicious government of Siam was not yet, in January 1825, convinced that the British were really at war with Burma, much less that they had gained victories.⁶¹ This mission was of great importance in clearing the way for the preliminary negotiations which led to the treaty with Siam in 1826. It showed that the only means of securing the objects desired by the Penang Council was to deal directly with the Court of Siam. Accordingly, Fullerton urged upon the Indian Government that a mission to Bangkok was "indispensable," and that Burney was the man best fitted to conduct it. To convince the Governor-General, Burney was sent to Calcutta to lay his "valuable information" before him.⁶²

During July and August 1825 events occurred which greatly furthered Fullerton's anti-Siamese policy, and led directly to the despatch of a mission to Bangkok. Burney returned to Ligor, and entered into negotiations with the Raja. The Raja said that he had abandoned his intention of attacking Selangor by sea, but that he was determined to send 3,000 men by land to give the Sultan of Perak the assistance for which he had asked against Sultan Ibrahim. Burney adopted a firm attitude, refusing to recognise Perak as a Siamese dependency, and warning the Raja that the Company, as the inheritor of the Dutch treaty-rights, would not be "indifferent" to an attack on it or Selangor. To send the army might involve the Raja in a quarrel with the British, and on Burney's report of his conduct the issue of peace or war would probably depend. All of which was pure bluff; but the Raja was greatly impressed, and promised not to send his troops to Perak.⁶³

The final result of Burney's negotiations was a Preliminary Treaty with the Raja of Ligor which was signed

61. SSR, 99 and 100: *passim*.

62. *Ibid.*, 100: April 7, 1825, and *passim*.

63. *Ibid.*, 102: Aug. 1, 1825.

on July 31, 1825. Burney was to take the treaty to India, and if the Governor-General approved of it he was to return to Ligor and go with the Raja to Bangkok. The Preliminary Treaty was then to serve as the basis of negotiations with the Siamese Court for a settlement of all the questions at issue between the Company and Siam.

The terms of the Treaty were as follows:—

- (1) The Raja of Ligor promised that no Siamese force should go to Perak or Selangor by sea, or should settle there. The Company declared that it had "no desire to occupy Perak or to interfere with its government," and promised to remove Raja Hassan, to prevent the Sultan of Selangor from disturbing the peace of Perak, and to settle the quarrel between Selangor and Ligor.
- (2) The Company declared that it "entertained no desire to interfere with the Government of Queda." If the ex-Sultan were restored, the Penang Council promised that he should send the Bunga Mas triennially, and \$4,000 annually, to Bangkok. The Raja of Ligor promised that if the Emperor of Siam restored the Sultan, he would withdraw his opposition, and would not attack Kedah by land or sea. In this treaty, as throughout the course of his mission to Bangkok, Burney adopted the policy of trying to restore the ex-Sultan by securing the co-operation of the Raja of Ligor, the man who had been chiefly instrumental in dethroning him.
- (3) Other clauses of the treaty provided for mutual assistance in suppressing piracy, and for the negotiation of a commercial treaty at Bangkok.⁶⁴

In a despatch to the Penang Council Burney defended his departure from the Company's former policy of strict non-intervention in Malayan affairs. He pointed out that this course could no longer be followed with advantage, and predicted that interference would not entail a war with Siam or the other complications feared by the Indian

64. *Ibid.*,

Government. Future events completely confirmed Burney's forecast. "I feel convinced : . . . that such an evil (interference in the affairs of the Malay states) cannot any longer be avoided, that its inconveniences are not so great as supposed by many, and that at all events it is not to be compared with the greater evil of permitting Siam to overrun the territories of our Selangor neighbours to turn the inhabitants of them into pirates, and to disturb for many years all native trade. I certainly think and hope that the terms of this treaty cannot be very burdensome to us." To Burney's mind the great point gained by the treaty was that henceforth the Penang Council had for the first time a legal right to prevent all Siamese troops and galleys from going to Perak or Selangor. Burney also succeeded in persuading the Raja of Ligor not to insist in the treaty on a clause compelling Perak to send the Bunga Mas to Bangkok. Whether it was sent or not was left to the decision of the Sultan of Perak, Burney agreeing that the British would make no objection if he should wish to do so. Since to send the Bunga Mas was the last thing the Sultan would willingly agree to, Burney had won a very important success for the Company.⁶⁵

Fullerton considered Burney's treaty "extremely satisfactory", and at once appointed Anderson, the author of the oft-quoted pamphlet, and a strong opponent of Siamese pretensions, to settle the disputes which had arisen between Perak and Selangor as a result of Raja Hassan's depredations. It was impressed upon him that he was to act merely as a disinterested mediator, and must not commit the Company to military intervention. He was also to convince the Malay Sultans that the British did not wish to annex their territory, or to "interfere in any way with their independence."⁶⁶

Both in Perak and Selangor, Anderson was everywhere received with the greatest "joy, and I may say enthusiasm." He found that the Malays were as friendly to the British as they were hostile to the Siamese, and that they were prepared to do whatever the Penang Council might suggest in order to settle their differences and avoid a Siamese attack. The Sultan of Perak was especially cordial, and urged the Company to annex his

65. *Ibid.*,

66. *Ibid.*, 102: Aug. 3 and 6, 1825. *Ibid.*, 103: Aug. 4, 1825.

state, allowing him only a small pension. His reason was that "Perak could never be tranquil without the superintending control of a European government."⁶⁷ In such an atmosphere of general good-will, Anderson's mission was successful. He made a treaty with Selangor on August 20, 1825, by which Sultan Ibrahim promised to remove Raja Hassan immediately, and agreed never to attack Perak or to interfere in its government. The claim of Selangor to suzerainty over Perak was thus relinquished, and the Bernam River was fixed as the boundary between the two states.⁶⁸ Anderson also concluded a treaty with Perak on September 6, 1825, by which the Sultan accepted the Bernam River as the frontier, and promised never to invade Selangor or to interfere in its administration. At the same time the Sultan wrote a letter to Governor Fullerton in which he offered, if Fullerton should advise it, to send the Bunga Mas to Siam. While he considered the demand of Bangkok entirely unjust, he was willing to submit in order to escape the fate of Kedah, "for I am a very insignificant man, and am under great apprehension." The Sultan left the decision entirely to Fullerton's discretion, and he, needless to say, did not advise that the token of subjection should be sent.⁶⁹

The Raja of Ligor however had no intention of letting Perak slip from his grasp. He no longer dared openly to attack it; but within a few weeks of the signature of the treaty with Burney on July 31, 1825, he sent a small force to Perak under the guise of an embassy to assist the Sultan in his government. This was clearly an infraction of Burney's treaty, and Fullerton peremptorily demanded the recall of the embassy.⁷⁰

The Raja of Ligor made evasive replies, and continued his veiled attack on Perak. Before the question was settled despatches arrived from the Indian Government which ratified the Preliminary Treaty of July 31, 1825, approved Anderson's mission to Perak and Selangor, and announced that Captain Burney was to be sent as envoy to Bangkok. The Government doubted whether he would be much more successful than Crawford, since he was unable to bargain for concessions by offering in return part of the recent British conquests on the Tenasserim

67. *Ibid.*, 103: Aug. 26 and Sept. 15, 1825.

68. *Ibid.*, 138: Aug. 31, 1826. Aitchison, *Treaties*, I, 413-14.

69. *SSR*, 103: Sept. 15, 1825.

70. *Ibid.*, 104: Oct. 7, 1825. *Ibid.*, 105: Dec. 15 and 22, 1825.

coast. It was clearly seen that the decision not to cede them to Siam converted a possible success into a very probable failure. The Indian Government therefore instructed Burney that ostensibly the mission was to be "entirely complimentary and conciliatory," to congratulate the new Emperor on his accession to the throne, and to promote friendly relations between the two empires. The Court was in a state of "the utmost apprehension" at the rapid downfall of Burma, and it actually believed that the Company intended to extend its sway over Siam and the Malay Peninsula. It was hoped that Burney would succeed in disabusing the Ministers of this ridiculous notion.⁷¹

The other objects of the embassy were regarded as of only secondary importance, and it was left to Burney's discretion, to decide whether they should be mentioned or not. Under this head came the negotiation of a favourable commercial treaty, the restoration of the ex-Sultan of Kedah, and the safeguarding of the independence of Perak, Selangor and the other Malay states. The Indian Government was anxious to attain these objects, but since it could offer nothing in return it was not prepared to press for concessions if Siam should prove obdurate.⁷²

The instructions which Burney received from the Penang Council were by no means identical with those of the Supreme Government. Fullerton had been authorized to modify its orders in the light of his greater knowledge of local conditions, and he took full advantage of the permission. His instructions to Burney were decidedly hostile to Siam, and emphasised as the most important objects of the mission the very points which the Indian Government regarded as only secondary. The Governor held that Burney's main object was to establish the independence of all the Malay states of the Peninsula lying within the area which is to-day under British control. Siam's claims to supremacy over them were "a nullity . . . the mere assertion of a claim which the asserter never had, never could establish." Unfortunately, owing to the former policy of the Company, the Government had acknowledged the justice of Siam's pretensions in Kedah, and to some extent in Perak. So far as these two states were concerned the British case for indepen-

71. *Ibid.*, 102: May 13, 1825. *Ibid.*, 104: Sept. 2 and 16, 1825 *Ibid.*, 105: pp. 444-154. Burney MSS. D. XXVI.

72. SSR, 102: May 13, 1825.

dence was somewhat weak, and all that could be done was to try to improve their status by negotiations. Fullerton regarded the restoration of the ex-Sultan of Kedah as a matter of the utmost importance, dictated alike by expediency and honour. As for Perak, if Burney were unable to restore it to complete independence, he should try to limit the claims of Siam to the sending of the Bunga Mas. He was also instructed to prevent further Siamese aggression in the other Malay states, and to maintain their independence. Fullerton realised that only the threat of war was likely to make Siam abandon its pretensions to suzerainty over them, and from this Burney was precluded by the orders of the Indian Government. The Governor therefore suggested that perhaps it would be advisable to refrain from all mention of the other states, and to confine the negotiations to the status of Perak and Kedah. The Company had never recognised Siam's claims over the other states of the Peninsula, and to refrain from all mention of them would leave the Government's hands free to act in whatever way it chose. Fullerton anticipated that sooner or later the Company would adopt the policy which was followed after 1874, of "taking those states under our protection and effectually maintaining their independence."⁷³

Burney's negotiations at Bangkok lasted from the end of 1825 to June 1826. His despatches fully confirmed the very unfavourable picture Crawford had drawn of the Siamese character, and of the open dishonesty of the government. As in the case of Crawford's embassy, deliberate attempts were made to treat the British mission with contempt. Warned perhaps by his predecessor's experiences, Burney showed far less meekness than Crawford when exposed to these affronts, and thereby secured more honourable treatment. Burney soon found that the British victories in Burma working on the natural timidity and suspicion of the Siamese had intensified the difficulties of his task. The Ministers had an uneasy suspicion that the Indian Empire was more powerful than Siam. They feared that the Company intended to attack them, and that Burney had been sent to spy out their defences, yet at the same time they were most tenacious in maintaining every pretension of Siam. Burney was regarded with extreme suspicion, and every proposal he put forward was thought to conceal some diabolic and subtle device for the downfall of the Empire. If no

73. *Ibid.*, 103: Sept. 24, 1825.

guile could by any possibility be detected in his suggestions, this was regarded as proof conclusive that his craftiness was particularly deep. The involved and naive wording of the Burney Treaty of 1826 was due to this attitude of mind. The Siamese were so inordinately suspicious of every document written by Burney that he suggested that the Ministers should draw up the treaty in Siamese. They were much pleased with the proposal, and the English translation merely reflected all the vagueness and circumlocution of the original.⁷⁴ Burney also found that the Siamese were most anxious to obtain the British conquests on the Tenasserim coast; and it is quite possible that in return they would have abandoned some of their claims in the Malay Peninsula. The Indian Government however had deprived its envoy of this as well as of his other most potent weapon, the threat of war. He was compelled to seek for concessions when he could make neither promises nor threats in return. The hopelessness of his situation wrung from him the exclamation: "I could not wish to set my worst enemy a more difficult task than to send him to Bangkok, to negotiate matters connected with the Malay Peninsula without authority or means for employing effectual intimidation"⁷⁵

Considering the difficulties of the situation, it is remarkable that Burney achieved even a partial success. Almost the only point in his favour was the timidity of the Siamese. The recent British victories in Burma had greatly increased their dread of the power of the East India Company, and Burney played skilfully upon the fears of the Court. He hinted darkly that unless the Siamese moderated their pretensions in the Malay Peninsula they might find themselves involved in war with the British. Burney also received valuable support from the Raja of Ligor, in questions which did not affect his own interests. When however Burney's success would have meant a financial loss to himself, as in the case of the restoration of the ex-Sultan of Kedah, he secretly worked against him. While Burney was partially aware of this duplicity, it would rather seem that he placed undue confidence in his alliance with the Raja.⁷⁶

74. SSR, 138: July 10, 1826.

75. *Ibid.*, Oct. 5, 1826.

76. The above description of the difficulties of Burney's position is drawn from his despatches in SSR, 108: Dec. 22, 1825. *Ibid.*, 109: March 23, 1826. *Ibid.*, 138: June 19, July 10, and Sept. 20, 1826.

One result of the mission which the Indian Government regarded as of the greatest importance was the recovery of some Burmese who had been kidnapped by the Siamese from the British conquests on the Tenasserim coast. With infinite difficulty Burney succeeded in discovering 1,400 of the captives, whom he compelled the Siamese to restore to their homes.⁷⁷

Despite the bitter opposition of the Prahklang and his faction, Burney succeeded in obtaining a commercial treaty granting British trade somewhat more favourable terms than those secured by Crawford. Henceforth British merchants were to pay only the customary duties, and were to be free to buy and sell without any opposition from the Siamese officials.⁷⁸ Governor Fullerton's comment on the concessions unfortunately proved to be prophetic:— "They appear to be advantageous, but so little faith do I repose in their fulfilment that I scarcely think it worth while to enter into any serious discussion regarding them."⁷⁹ The engagement was "systematically violated by the Siamese."⁸⁰

Perhaps the most interesting passages in Burney's despatches from Bangkok are his accounts of the interminable negotiations over the status of Trengganu and Kelantan. The question is of special interest, because the article of the Burney Treaty which defined their position is a masterpiece of ambiguity. This was partly due to the fact already mentioned that the treaty was first drawn up in Siamese, and then translated into English; but it was also in a measure the result of Burney's deliberate policy. The states of Trengganu and Kelantan are on the east coast of the Malay Peninsula, the more northerly, Kelantan, lying immediately to the south of the Siamese frontier. Both, and especially Kelantan, the weaker of the two, were thus far more exposed to Siamese attacks than the Malay states which lay further to the south. For many years before and after the date of the Burney treaty, the government of Bangkok attempted to establish its supremacy over them. The situation resembled that

77. For references v. Note 76, and also SSR, 141; April 18, 1827.

78. Aitchison, *Treaties*, I, 469-70, 473-75.

79. SSR, 138; Sept. 20, 1826.

80. Aitchison, *Treaties*, I, 461. Crawford, *Embassy to Siam*, 304-5. Jacob, Brooke, II, 21 and 32. *Letters Received from India and Bengal*, Vol. 43: July 22, 1844. *Despatches to Bengal and India*, Vol. 47: Jan. 2, 1846. IPFC, Range 198, Vol. 24: April 22, 1848. Nos. 11-18.

in Kedah before 1821. The Sultans of both Trengganu and Kelantan sent the Bunga Mas to Bangkok, but they contended that by immemorial custom this was the only service which could be required of them, and that the periodical demands of Siam for money and supplies were illegal. This was also the view of their position taken by Raffles, Swettenham, and Cavenagh. The Sultans of both states resisted the aggression of Siam as openly as they dared; but they realised that they were too weak to defy it. At various times therefore between 1786 and 1825 they tried to form an alliance with the Company, and obtain its assistance against the Siamese. The Indian Government always refused to depart from its policy of non-intervention for the benefit of two states whose exact relation to Siam was unknown, and with whom British trade was unimportant.⁸¹ The Company knew that Siam claimed Trengganu and Kelantan as tributaries, and that the Sultans of both sent the Bunga Mas to Bangkok. It also knew that Kelantan, weaker and nearer to Siam, was more completely under its control than Trengganu. The British had been unable to find out whether the Siamese pretensions to complete supremacy were justified, or whether the two Sultans were practically independent, and sent the Bunga Mas merely as a token of respect, to ward off the attacks of a strong and predatory neighbour. Fullerton maintained that the claims of Siam were no more justified than in Kedah or Perak.⁸²

Burney himself had scant respect for the pretensions of Siam, and would have solved the problem by making offensive and defensive alliances with Trengganu and Kelantan. He was convinced that this course would not lead to war, for "the prudent government of Bangkok would pocket the affront." Since however the Indian Government would not permit this policy, he was sure that Siam could not be persuaded to abandon its claims. He believed therefore that the wisest course was to avoid all discussion of its assertions of suzerainty. The Com-

81. B. Pol., Range 123, Vol. 59: March 5, 1824, No. 49. SSR, 3: Oct. 6, 1787, Jan. 25 and Feb. 6, 1788. *Ibid.*, 81, passim. *Ibid.*, 83: Feb. 24, 1787. *Ibid.*, 86: pp. 1368-70. *Ibid.*, 87: Sept. 27, 1822. *Ibid.*, 93: July 11, 1796. Marsden, *Malay Dictionary: Praxis*, 142-46, 155-57. Clifford, *In Court and Kampong*, 21-22. Graham, *Kelantan*, 36-44. Begbie, *Malay Peninsula*, 88-90. Burney MSS. D. XIII, (gives the Siamese claims). Colonial Office List, 1920, p. 402. Swettenham, *British Malaya*, 320-23.

82. SSR, 87: Sept. 27, 1822. *Ibid.*, 103: Sept. 24, 1825. *Ibid.*, 108: Jan. 26, 1826. *Ibid.*, 138: Oct. 5, 1828. BSP 334: Dec. 9, 1825, No. 4.

pany had never admitted the validity of these claims, and was thus free to act as it chose whenever it seemed desirable. By avoiding the subject Burney would preserve its freedom of action unimpaired.⁸³

Nevertheless the question of the status of Trengganu and Kelantan was brought up during Burney's negotiations at Bangkok. The Siamese Ministers asserted that from time immemorial the two states had been contented tributaries. Burney refused to admit the validity of their claims, contending that the Bunga Mas was merely a "token of respect, friendship and awe," sent by two weak states to a powerful empire, and that Trengganu and Kelantan "had not given up their independence The English cannot admit that those Malayan states are subject to Siam in the same manner as her own provinces of Ligore and Singora (or) to the same extent as Prince of Wales Island is a possession of the English."⁸⁴ By vague threats of war Burney tried to persuade the Ministers to promise that they would not attack the two states. In return the Company would promise not to annex them, as the Siamese feared it would do, and would not prevent the Sultans from sending the Bunga Mas. Burney defended his concession of the Bunga Mas on the ground that Trengganu and Kelantan had "already submitted so much to Siamese pretensions," and particularly because he feared if he did not do so, the Court would carry out its intention of sending troops there before the Company had time to interfere.⁸⁵

After several months of negotiations Article XII of the Burney Treaty was finally evolved: "Siam shall not go and obstruct or interrupt commerce in the states of Tringano and Calantan; English merchants and subjects shall have trade and intercourse in future with the same facility and freedom as they have heretofore had; and the English shall not go and molest, attack or disturb those states upon any pretence whatever."⁸⁶ The Article raised a storm of protest at Penang. Fullerton declared that it was "so worded as to amount to the admission of the actual dependence of Tringano and Calantan on Siam," and that the phraseology was so vague that two entirely opposite meanings could be drawn from it. The British

83. SSR, 103: Sept. 19, 1825.

84. *Ibid.*, 138: July 10, 1826.

85. *Ibid.*, 109: March 23, 1826. *Ibid.*, 138: June 19 and July 10, 1826.

86. Aitchison, *Treaties*, I, 471.

might argue that it precluded Siam from any interference, "for every such interference must produce confusion and interruption of trade: it might be construed as conveying to us the right of direct interposition in case of such interference." The Siamese however might contend that the article gave them "the right of complete subjugation, so long as our trade is not interrupted." If the article could be interpreted as giving the British "the right of interposition in the event of the Siamese intermeddling in their affairs, assuming a paramount control — in short protecting them in their independence, — all is gained that we require." Under this condition, and only under this condition, Fullerton would recommend that Article XII be ratified.⁸⁷

Captain Burney in his defence contended that this was precisely what the Article did mean. Hampered as he was by the instructions of the Supreme Government, he had made the best of a difficult situation. He had himself drawn up the article, carefully wording it in such a way that while it would not arouse the suspicions of the Siamese, it nevertheless gave a valid excuse for interference with Siamese encroachments if at any time the Government should decide to take advantage of it. It would be "impossible for the Siamese to oppress those states or to molest their governments without interrupting our commerce, for the preservation of which alone it appeared to me to be our policy to interpose in favour of those states Had I admitted the complete supremacy of Siam over these states, there would have been no occasion whatever for Article XII: the other stipulations of the treaty fully provide for our commercial intercourse with all places and countries subject to the Siamese. Coupling this article then with the whole tenor of my communications with the Siamese Ministers the British Government may surely assume the construction desired by the Honourable Board, (the Penang Council), namely that the Article leaves to us the right of opposing all forcible interference of the Siamese, as also the right of direct treaty and negotiation with the Malay States, provided only that we do not go and molest, attack or disturb the present Malay Governments."⁸⁸

It was a characteristic of Governor Fullerton that when once he had made up his mind he was very unwilling

87. SSR, Vol. 138: Sept. 20, 1826.

88. SSR, Vol. 138: Oct. 5, 1828.

to change it, so when he received Burney's explanation he merely reiterated his former opinion.⁸⁹ In support of his view he pointed out that on the return journey from Bangkok Burney had informed the Sultan of Trengganu that "the British Government had not liberated him from Siamese supremacy, nor pledged itself in any manner to protect his country against Siam, to which therefore he must still pay such respect and attention as he had hitherto been accustomed to pay (i.e. send the Bunga Mas to Bangkok); but that if the Siamese interrupt trade and commercial intercourse at Trengganu, His Highness should send immediate notice to the Governor of Prince of Wales Island, who will determine what degree of interference the British Government may consistently use in favour of His Highness."⁹⁰

The comment of the Supreme Government on Article XII was guarded, but distinctly more favourable than Fullerton's. The Indian Government ratified the Article, and discussed its future policy towards Trengganu and Kelantan in terms which seem to indicate that it did not consider that the treaty had acknowledged the Siamese claims to suzerainty, and therefore precluded the British from intervening. It approved "of your having cautiously avoided to commit your government to ulterior procedures by any of your acts at Bangkok. Should the circumstances of our more intimate connection with the Malay Peninsula consequent on our establishment at Malacca or any other causes, induce any change in the views of the Home Authorities in that respect, ample opportunities may hereafter offer for extending the protection of the British Government over the states of Kelantan and Trengganu, and thereby relieving them from Siamese supremacy."⁹¹

The negotiations over the status of Perak and Kedah were long and at times acrimonious, especially where Kedah was concerned. The Raja of Ligor, the Prahklang and their faction used all their influence to prevent the Emperor from giving way to Burney's representations.⁹² The Siamese Ministers made no claim to suzerainty over Selangor; but they insisted that the Sultan of Perak desired nothing so much as to send the Bunga Mas to Bangkok. They pro-

89. *Ibid.*: 179, Oct. 5, 1826.

90. *Ibid.*: Sept. 20, 1826.

91. *SSR*, Vol. 141: April 18, 1841.

92. *Ibid.*, 109: March 23, 1826. *Ibid.*, 138: June 19 and Sept. 20, 1826.

posed that the Company should adhere to the Preliminary Treaty of July 31, 1825, and protect Perak from all attacks by Selangor. In return the Siamese would not send an army to Perak, but merely embassies to "settle and instruct the chief of Perak, and give him a title and great presents, in the same manner as the other countries subject to Siam."⁹³ Burney was well aware that the requests of the Sultan of Perak for Siamese assistance had been made as a result of the threats of the Raja of Ligor, and he therefore firmly opposed any form of Siamese interference, direct or indirect. He took up the position that the British, as the inheritors of the Dutch treaty rights, could not allow the Siamese to intervene in Perak, and had the right to protect it.⁹⁴ Burney's case was greatly strengthened by a very valuable piece of information which he discovered after his arrival at Bangkok. Through some strange lapse into truthfulness the Prahklang and his friends admitted that the Sultan of Perak had been entirely correct in his contention that before the conquest by Kedah in 1818 Siam had no "right or claim whatever" in Perak.⁹⁵ While the East India Company was prepared to respect time-honoured rights of suzerainty, it was in no way bound to recognise mere aggression without a shred of legal justification to support it — especially when the invaders had been expelled four years after the conquest.

The status of Perak was finally settled, "after several hours' very warm discussion," by Article XIV of the treaty. At first glance it seemed to concede a great part of the Siamese demands; but Burney knew that the concessions were more apparent than real. He was sure that the desire of the Sultan of Perak to sever all connection with Bangkok, warmly supported as it would be by Governor Fullerton, would change his seeming surrender into a victory for Malayan independence.⁹⁶ The terms of the Article were as follows. Siam promised not to "go and molest, attack or disturb" Perak or Selangor, while the Company gave the same undertaking as regards Perak, and bound itself not to allow Selangor to attack it. The Company also promised not to interfere should the Raja of Ligor or the Sultan of Perak desire to send to each other diplomatic missions of forty or fifty men.

93. *Ibid.*, 109: March 23, 1826. *Ibid.*, 138: June 19, 1826.

94. *Ibid.*, 109: March 23, 1826. *Ibid.*, 138: June 19 and Sept. 20, 1826.

95. *Ibid.*, 109: March 23, 1826. *Ibid.*, 138: June 19, 1826.

96. *Ibid.*, 138: Sept. 20, 1826.

Furthermore, "the Siamese and English mutually engage that the Raja of Perak shall govern his country according to his own will. Should he desire to send the gold and silver flowers [the Bunga Mas] to Siam as heretofore, the English will not prevent his doing as he may desire."⁹⁷

This success was some compensation for Burney's complete failure to secure the withdrawal of the Siamese garrison from Kedah, or the restoration of the ex-Sultan. The influence of the Raja of Ligor and his faction contributed largely to Burney's defeat; but even apart from this the Emperor and all his advisers were implacably hostile to the deposed ruler, because of his intrigues with Burma. Furthermore, Burney was unable to offer the Siamese the territory which they coveted on the Tenasserim coast, and he was compelled to rely on the feeble weapons of argument and persuasion. For several weeks he persisted in his attempts to restore the Malay government of Kedah; but he at last desisted on the realisation that while he might succeed he could do so only at the price of failing in all the other objects of his mission, and of preventing the establishment of cordial relations between Siam and the Company. The Government of India regarded the restoration of the Sultan as a matter of only minor importance, and Burney did not feel justified in jeopardising for its sake objects which the Supreme Government was more anxious to attain.⁹⁸ Article XIII of the treaty, which determined the status of Kedah, was therefore a complete victory for Siam. Its terms were as follows:—

"The Siamese engage to the English that the Siamese shall remain in Quedah, and take proper care of that country and of its people; the inhabitants of Prince of Wales Island and of Quedah shall have trade and intercourse as heretofore; the Siamese shall levy no duty upon stock and provisions . . . which the inhabitants of Prince of Wales Island or ships there may have occasion to purchase in Quedah, and the Siamese . . . shall levy fair and proper Import and Export duties. The English engage to the Siamese that the English do not desire to take possession of Quedah, that they will not attack or disturb it, nor permit the former governor of Quedah (the

97. Aitchison, *Treaties*, I, 471-72.

98. SSR., 109: March 23, 1826. *Ibid.*, 138: June 19, July 10, Sept. 20 and Oct. 5, 1826. Burney MSS, D. XIII.

ex-Sultan) or any of his followers to attack, disturb or injure in any manner the territory of Quedah, or any other territory subject to Siam."

Lastly, the Company pledged itself not to allow the ex-Sultan to live in Penang, Province Wellesley, Perak, Selangor or Burma.⁹⁹

Article XIII safeguarded Penang's indispensable need of obtaining supplies from Kedah, and secured some guarantee of good government for the Malays. The agreement that the Company should control the Sultan's place of residence was not unreasonable, since he, a British pensioner, used Penang as a base from which to stir up revolt in Kedah, and the Siamese firmly believed that he was assisted in so doing by the Company.¹⁰⁰ The removal of the Sultan was therefore necessary to prevent the abuse of British protection and to promote friendly relations with the government of Bangkok. So far it would seem that Burney was justified in submitting to the inevitable. It is difficult however to find any justification for his promise, not merely that the Company would abandon the cause of an ancient ally, but that it would actually aid the Siamese to prevent him from regaining his kingdom. Burney defended his conduct on the plea that the clause merely required the Company's assistance if the ex-Sultan tried to regain Kedah while living in British territory, and not if he did so while residing on foreign soil.¹⁰¹ The plain wording of Article XIII seems entirely to contradict this construction, and as will be seen the Government acted on this assumption.

Article XIII raised a storm of protest at Penang. Fullerton dwelt on the gross unfairness of the pledge to prevent an ancient ally from regaining his kingdom, and censured Burney for relying so greatly upon the Raja of Ligor, his most determined enemy. The Governor concluded by expressing his regret that the mission to Bangkok had ever been entrusted to a man so unfitted for the charge.¹⁰² During 1826 and 1827 bitter attacks were made upon Burney in the press of Penang and Singapore, some at least of the articles being written by officials at

99. Aitchison, *Treaties*, 1, 471.

100. Burney MSS, D. IX.

101. *Ibid.*

102. SSR, 138: Sept. 20 and Oct. 5, 1826.

Penang.¹⁰³ The Supreme Government however ratified Article XIII as well as the other sections of the treaty, and ordered that the ex-Sultan should be persuaded to go to Malacca.¹⁰⁴

Shortly after Burney's return from Bangkok in 1826 two events occurred which finally established the independence of Perak. These were the Low Mission and the Kurau River incident. During the year which had elapsed since the signature of the Preliminary Treaty of July 31, 1825, the Raja of Ligor had consistently violated his engagement not to interfere in Perak by sending embassies and detachments of troops there. Ostensibly they were to "assist" the Sultan in his government; in point of fact they were to intimidate him into sending the Bunga Mas to Bangkok. The Sultan appealed to Penang for protection, and Fullerton made strong but unavailing protests to the Raja of Ligor.¹⁰⁵ By September 1826 it was evident that the Siamese Court had no intention of observing Article XIV of Burney's treaty by which the Sultan was to be left free to decide whether he would send the Bunga Mas or not. No open attack would be made, but by covert interference the unwilling Sultan would in all probability be intimidated into professing his willingness to be a Siamese tributary. In September 1826 the Governor sent Captain Low with forty sepoy and a small warship as envoy to Perak. Low was instructed to explain to the Sultan that by the terms of the treaty he need not be tributary to Siam unless he so desired; and to advise him to write a letter declaring his wish to be independent. The Sultan was to be assured that he might "rely on the assistance of the British in expelling any Siamese who may proceed to Perak, and resisting any interference with his government." Captain Low was also instructed to inquire into the objects and actions of the various Siamese bands which had been appearing and disappearing in Perak, and if any were still present, to "warn them to depart forthwith." Low was empowered merely to make an inquiry into the condition of Perak, and to promise the Sultan that he could rely on the Company's support in case of Siamese

103. SSR, 1826-27, *passim*; Burney MSS, *passim*; and Moor, *Notices of Indian Archipelago*, 222.

104. SSR, 141: April 18, 1827.

105. *Ibid.*, 108: Jan. 27, Sept. 20 and Sept. 28, 1826. *Ibid.*, 138: June 1 and Sept. 20, 1826. *Ibid.*, 139: Nov. 13, Nov. 29, Dec. 7, and Dec. 18, 1826.

aggression.¹⁰⁶

Captain Low however was a member of the anti-Siamese party at Penang, and he interpreted his instructions in a broad and catholic spirit. To be more precise, he exceeded them in a thoroughgoing fashion which drew down upon himself the horrified rebuke of the Governor-General of India. On his arrival in Perak Low found that British interference was urgently needed if the independence of the state was to be preserved. In defiance of treaty obligations the Raja of Ligor had sent detachments of troops and "embassies" to Perak which had treated the state as a conquered country, and had deprived the Sultan of most of his power. Moreover the Raja had bribed the heir-apparent and many of the principal Malay nobles to oppose the Sultan and support Siamese designs. The Sultan himself was altogether unwilling to be a tributary of Bangkok; but he dared not make use of the rights conferred upon him by Burney's treaty unless he could count upon British support to avert from his country the fate of Kedah. He was keenly desirous of a British alliance, and was determined to be loyal to the Company if only it would protect him. The Sultan put himself entirely in Low's hands, trusted him implicitly, and without hesitation did whatever he advised.¹⁰⁷

Low's measures were as thorough as they were efficacious. For the moment there was no fear of complications with Siam, since the three hundred Siamese troops who were in Perak hastily returned to Ligor as soon as they learned of his arrival. Low was therefore free to turn his attention to the heir-apparent and the other traitorous Malay nobles. By his advice the Sultan deprived them of all power, and appointed loyal Malays in their stead. It was clear however that as soon as Low and his sepoy's withdrew the Raja of Ligor's forces would return and restore the Siamese faction to office. The only way to prevent this was to make a treaty promising the Sultan that the Company would support him in such an event. The Sultan received Low's suggestion with enthusiasm, since alliance with the British was precisely what he had been seeking for almost ten years.¹⁰⁸

106. *Ibid.*, 138: Sept. 20, 1826.

107. *Ibid.*, 139: Nov. 2, 1826. *Ibid.*, 141, Aug. 23, 1827. *JIA.* IV, 116 and 499.

108. *SSR*, 139: Nov. 2, 1826.

The terms of the treaty, which was signed on October 18, 1826, were as follows:—

(1) The Sultan promised never to have any communication with Siam, Ligor, Selangor or any other Malay state on political affairs or on the administration of Perak. He also agreed not to support any of his subjects who might league themselves with these states so as to cause disturbance in Perak.

(2) "Henceforth and forever" the Sultan would send neither the Bunga Mas nor any other form of tribute to any of the above states; and he would not permit embassies from them even to enter Perak if their object was political. Furthermore no party from these states should ever be allowed to enter Perak "should its strength even consist of no more than thirty men." If "such parties or armaments" arrived, or if the above-mentioned states allied themselves with the Sultan's subjects to disturb his rule, he would rely, "as he now relies and in all future times will rely, on the friendly aid and protection of the . . . Company . . . to be manifested in such a manner and by such means as may to them seem most expedient."

(3) "If His Majesty . . . will faithfully adhere to and perform all and each of the stipulations contained in this engagement . . . then His Majesty shall receive the assistance of the British in expelling from his country any Siamese or Malays as above stated, who . . . may at any time enter the Perak Country with political views or for the purpose of interfering in any way with the government of His Majesty." If however the Sultan failed to perform any part of the treaty, "the obligation on the British to protect him or assist him against his enemies shall cease."

(4) Anderson's commercial and political treaty of 1825 was confirmed, and it was made clear that the prohibition against entering Perak did not apply to "bona fide" traders. Merchants of every country could trade unmolested in Perak provided they did not interfere in its affairs.

The treaty was to be perpetual, and the Sultan insisted on inscribing on it that he had signed voluntarily and "with great satisfaction."¹⁰⁹

109. Aitchison, *Treaties*, I, 408-11.

Governor Fullerton received the report of his envoy's mission with mixed feelings. It was clear that Low had flagrantly violated his instructions, for by no conceivable effort of the imagination could they be held to cover his drastic remodelling of the administration of Perak, and above all his treaty of alliance. In defiance of the repeated orders of the Supreme Government he had committed the Company to interference in the internal affairs of a Malay state, and to the possibility — most unlikely though it was — of war with Siam. On the other hand Low's investigations had conclusively proved that the Siamese had assented to the article in Burney's treaty regarding Perak because they believed that the Company's desire to preserve the independence of the state would be defeated by the "underhand" policy which the Raja of Ligor was even then pursuing. Unauthorised though Low's actions had been, the Governor believed they had checkmated the manoeuvres of Siam. The Penang Council had not the power to confirm the treaty, and it was therefore referred to the Governor-General.¹¹⁰ Reading between the lines of Fullerton's despatch, one feels that he felt much more satisfaction at his envoy's proceedings than he permitted to appear in the Council minutes: it was a bold stroke entirely after his own heart. Most certainly the Governor's next step showed no disapproval. He sent the Raja of Ligor a letter, phrased with careful vagueness, warning him that further interference in Perak in defiance of the Burney treaty might lead to war with Great Britain.¹¹¹

Before the decision of the Government of India was received the Kurau River incident occurred. The Kurau was a river in Perak some ten leagues south of Penang, which for several years had been the headquarters of a band of about one hundred Malay pirates under Nakhoda (Captain) Udin. He had been denounced as a pirate in 1822 by the Raja of Ligor; but soon afterwards the two formed an alliance. Udin was allowed to pursue his piratical raids unmolested, and was furthermore appointed by the Raja Governor of the Kurau River District. In return Udin aided his patron in his efforts to destroy the independence of Perak. The Sultan of Perak was powerless to expel Udin; and by 1826 the pirate had grown so bold that he made almost nightly raids into Penang harbour and kidnapped many British subjects whom he

110. SSR, 139: Nov. 13, 1826.

111. *Ibid.*

sold as slaves. The situation became intolerable, and with the cordial assent of the Sultan of Perak Fullerton sent Low and a force of sepoys to destroy Udin's stronghold. The position was captured, Udin and many of his men being taken prisoners. Since the court at Penang did not possess Admiralty jurisdiction, it was not competent to try him, and he was accordingly sent to the Raja of Ligor with a polite request that he should be put on trial there.¹¹²

The Raja quite failed to see the humour of the situation. Indeed, he was very seriously annoyed, and when in June 1827 Burney came to Ligor to exchange the ratified copies of the treaty of 1826 with Siam, he complained bitterly of the attack on Udin as a violation of Siamese territorial rights. He contended that the Kurau was part of Kedah, and not of Perak, denied that Udin was a pirate, and also attacked Low's treaty with Perak in 1826 as a piece of sharp practice. Burney persuaded him to let the Penang Council decide whether the Kurau River was in Perak or Kedah; but he joined the Raja in the protest which he sent to the Governor-General.¹¹³ It is difficult to understand Burney's conduct in this matter. Before he was sent to Bangkok in 1825, and even during the greater part of the time he was there, he was a strong opponent of Siam's claims in Malaya. After his return from Bangkok in 1826 however he became one of the leading members of the pro-Siamese faction in the Straits Settlements. He seems also to have developed a sentimental weakness for his quondam enemy, the Raja of Ligor, and supported him as vehemently as he had condemned him before 1826. In the present instance Burney wrote a despatch to the Government of India bitterly attacking the policy of the Penang Council, and representing the Raja as an upright and persecuted exponent of the sanctity of treaty obligations. The policy of the Penang Council in Perak was covertly attacked as involving the Company in "unprofitable, expensive and embarrassing" intervention in Malayan affairs; while Low had been guilty of "questionable proceedings." Burney also agreed with the Raja that Udin was not a pirate, and that the Kurau was in Siamese territory.¹¹⁴

112. *Ibid.*, 139: Nov. 2, Nov. 13, and Dec. 18, 1826. *Ibid.*, 141: Feb. 8, March 7, March 28, April 18, and May 1827. *Ibid.*, 184: Oct. 21, 1827.

113. *Ibid.*, 141: June, 1827.

114. *Ibid.*, 141: Aug. 16, 1827.

The Government of India was convinced by Burney's despatch that the Penang Council had been entirely in the wrong, and its irritation was not diminished by the occurrence of the Kurau River incident so soon after Low's mission to Perak. The Penang Council was informed that it had exceeded its powers in interfering in Perak without the previous consent of the Supreme Government, and was sharply warned that the action must not be repeated. The strictures passed upon the conduct of the Council were as nothing compared with those lavished upon Captain Low. In his mission to Perak he had greatly exceeded his instructions, he had given just cause of offence to Siam, and had made a treaty which involved the Company in Malayan affairs "to an extent which was never contemplated or desired." To complete his work of destroying Siam's authority in Perak he had invented the charge of piracy against Udin, a Siamese official, and had invaded Siamese territory in order to crush him. Pending a fuller investigation of his conduct Low was suspended from all political employment.¹¹⁵

Fullerton's reply to this fulmination was a judicious compound of self-justification and humble abasement before the hand which chastised him. He explained that he had believed the Burney treaty gave him the right to intervene in Perak for the preservation of its independence without previous reference to the Supreme Government. In future however he would take no action without the permission of the Indian Government, no matter what policy the Raja of Ligor might pursue. Low's disregard of his instructions was defended on the ground that his drastic action alone could have preserved the independence of Perak against the "underhanded" intrigues of the Raja of Ligor. As to the Kurau River incident, Fullerton firmly denied that it had any political significance, or that it was an invasion of Siamese territory. He overwhelmed the Supreme Government with a flood of testimony proving that Udin was a pirate and that the Kurau was in the territory of Perak. Carrying the war into Burney's camp, Fullerton showed by lengthy quotations from that officer's reports that in 1825 he had advocated the very policy which Low had carried out in 1826. Moreover the Governor proved that the destruction of Udin's fort had been decided on because of

^{115.} *Ibid.*, 141: April 18 and Aug. 16, 1827. *Ibid.*, 142: Sept. 6, 1827.

Burney's own statements. Fullerton produced a map and a report which Burney had submitted about 1824 proving that the Krian River was the boundary between Kedah and Perak, and that the Kurau lay in the territory of Perak. Burney's charges were not merely exaggerated and inconsistent; but in his blind devotion to his friend the Raja he had deliberately made statements which he knew to be false.¹¹⁶

While waiting for the Government of India's reply, Fullerton sent a letter to the Raja of Ligor informing him that the Penang Council had conclusive proof of Udin's piracy, and that the Kurau was within Perak territory. The matter therefore could not be discussed.¹¹⁷ Apparently this despatch had the desired effect, since no more seems to have been heard from the Raja on the question.

The incident was closed by a despatch from the Government of India on November 16, 1827. The Supreme Government was "entirely satisfied" that Udin was a pirate, and that the Penang Council had believed the Kurau River was within the territory of Perak. The destruction of Udin's stronghold had clearly no political significance, and the Government revoked the censures passed upon Captain Low, and his suspension from political employment. If the Raja of Ligor still persisted in his contentions, he should be compelled to disprove Perak's long admitted right to the Kurau River.¹¹⁸

No mention was made in this despatch of Low's treaty with Perak in 1826, and search amongst the documents of the period has failed to disclose any proof that it was ratified. Fullerton declared that he had no power to confirm it, and all the despatches of the Supreme Government, far from ratifying it, condemned it as unauthorised and undesirable. Yet in 1844 and 1853, when the Sultans of Perak appealed to the Company for assistance on the ground of Low's treaty, both the Government of India and the Directors regarded the treaty as binding. In 1844 the request of the Sultan was granted; and although aid was refused in 1853, the reason given by the Governor-General was that the terms of the *existing* treaty did not

116. *Ibid.*, 141: July 26, Aug. 23, Aug. 29, and Sept. 13, 1827.
Ibid., 142: Sept. 13, Sept. 20, Oct. 15, Oct. 25, and Nov. 6, 1827
Ibid., 184: Oct. 21, 1827.

117. *Ibid.*, 141: July 18, 1827.

118. *Ibid.*, 173: Nov. 16, 1827.

require British intervention in that particular case.¹¹⁹ No other treaty was made with Perak during the intervening period, and it must be presumed therefore that Low's treaty was accepted by the Government of India as binding. The point is of some interest because the authority under which Governor Sir Andrew Clarke granted the request of the Perak chiefs for British intervention in 1874 was Low's treaty.¹²⁰

After the Kurau River incident Siam made no further attempt to destroy the independence of Perak. Fullerton and Low had done their work so thoroughly that it never needed to be repeated. Fettered though they were by the orders of the Supreme Government, with no weapons save Siamese timidity and British prestige, they saved Perak from the fate of Kedah, and brought to an end the southward advance of the Siamese Empire on the West Coast of the Peninsula. "Perak instead of Salangore thus became the barrier to their further advance . . . in this quarter."¹²¹

After 1827 the relations between the Company and Siam became much less strained than they had been in the preceding four years. The Siamese abandoned their attempts to subdue the Malay states on the West Coast, and resigned themselves to maintaining their position in Kedah. This proved to be far from easy, for the Malays hated their conquerors, and frequent revolts occurred which were suppressed with British assistance. On the East Coast the Siamese continued their aggressive policy in Kelantan and Trengganu. The Government of the Straits Settlements opposed them so far as it could; but the refusal of the Supreme Government to intervene in the affairs of these two states prevented a repetition of Fullerton's policy in Perak. Apart from perennial trade disputes, little occurred to disturb the harmony of British and Siamese relations until the bombardment of Trengganu in 1862.

The article of Burney's treaty concerning Kedah proved a great source of trouble to the Government of the Straits Settlements. The Government of India ordered that in conformity with its terms the ex-Sultan should

119. *Despatches to India and Bengal*, Vol. 43: pp. 632-33. *IPFC Range 200*, Vol. 41: Nov. 4, 1853, Nos. 99-102.

120. *Treaties Affecting the Malay States*, p. 19.

121. *BSP*, 369: Nov. 19, 1832, No. 2.

be persuaded to go to Malacca, where a house and land would be given him. He refused however to leave Penang, and declined to bind himself never to attack Kedah or Siam. Moreover he intrigued against the Siamese in Kedah, and the Raja of Ligor demanded the fulfilment of the treaty. By December 1827 the patience of the Council was exhausted, and the ex-Sultan's yearly pension of \$10,000 was stopped until such time as he should obey. Although he was reduced to the utmost poverty, he refused to give way. Finally in 1831, when a revolt occurred in Kedah, the Straits Government compelled him to go to Malacca by the threat to remove him by force if he would not leave voluntarily.¹²² In 1832 the Governor-General restored the Sultan's original pension of \$10,000 with full arrears.¹²³

The removal of the ex-Sultan was the least of the troubles which the Siamese conquest brought upon the Government of the Straits Settlements. After 1821 there was a constant series of attacks on the Siamese garrisons by bands of exiles from Kedah. They were joined by many professional pirates, who combined a little fighting against the Siamese with a great deal of looting and piracy. The invariable result of these attacks was that the Siamese continued to remain in Kedah, and that Penang's trade suffered even more severely from pirates than was normally the case. The Government of the Straits was convinced that the Malays could never recover Kedah unaided, and regarded their attempts solely in the light of vexatious interferences with commerce.¹²⁴

In 1831 a very serious revolt occurred. Three thousand Malay refugees who were living in Province Wellesley crossed the frontier, and drove the Siamese out of Kedah. The rebels were joined by hundreds of Malays from Penang and Province Wellesley, and most of their

122. SSR, 130: Nov. 6, 1828. *Ibid.*, 132: Jan. 30, 1830. *Ibid.*, 133: May 31 and June 23, 1830. *Ibid.*, 138: Sept. 20, and Sept. 28, 1826. *Ibid.*, 141 and 142: *passim*, and especially Vol. 142, Sept. 6, Sept. 13, Oct. 4, Nov. 29, Dec. 17, and Dec. 27, 1827. *Ibid.*, 144: Feb. 29 and No. 19, 1828 and *passim*. *Ibid.*, 184: Penang Despatches to the Directors dated Oct. 21, 1827; Oct. 24, 1828; April 21, 1829, and Feb. 13, 1830. B. Pol., Range 126, Vol., 24: Jan. 28, 1831, Nos. 2 and 3. *Ibid.*, Vol. 31: July 22, 1831, Nos. 43-46. *Ibid.*, Vol. 75: Oct. 31, 1833, Nos. 15-23 and 26.

123. SSR, 184: June 30, 1830. BSP, Vol. 366: June 25, 1832, Nos. 1-5.

124. SSR, 145: February, March, May and July 1829.

supplies were sent by sympathisers at Penang. Outside Government circles the whole population of the Straits Settlements, European as well as native, sympathised strongly with the Malays, and aided them so far as possible. The attack came as a complete surprise to both the British and the Siamese governments, for although the plans for the rising were made at Penang, and were known to hundreds of Malays, not one betrayed them. The police and some of the European merchants were also involved in the conspiracy of silence.¹²⁵

Throughout the rebellion the Government of the Straits Settlements showed itself most friendly to the Siamese, and very hostile to the Malays. As soon as the Governor, Ibbetson, learned of the rising he ordered the gunboats and warships at Penang to blockade the Kedah coast and prevent the rebels from receiving further assistance from Penang. The ships were also ordered to attack the rebel praus, and to treat as pirates any of their leaders who might be captured.¹²⁶ So completely did Ibbetson sympathise with Siam that he was actually indignant at the Malays for attempting to recover their country, and at the ex-Sultan for not betraying the plot.¹²⁷ The Government of India did not altogether approve of Ibbetson's measures, and declared that the Burney Treaty did not require armed co-operation with Siam. The Governor should have confined his efforts to preventing the rebels from securing supplies from Penang.¹²⁸ The revolt lasted from April till October 1831, when the Siamese finally reconquered the country. The Company's blockade of the Kedah coast contributed largely to this result, since one of the principal reasons for the collapse of the revolt was the cutting off of supplies from Penang.¹²⁹

Five years later, in 1836, the Straits Government was again compelled to assist the Siamese. The ex-Sultan had received permission to leave Malacca for a visit to Deli in Sumatra, on his promise to go directly thither

125. BSP, Vol. 366: June 4, 1832, Nos. 11-12. B. Pol., Range 126, Vol. 29: June 3, 1831, Nos. 30-32. *Ibid.*, Vol. 31: July 22, 1831, Nos. 43-46.

126. *Ibid.*, BSP, Vol. 362: Oct. 14, 1831, No. 22. BSP, Vol. 366: June 4, 1832, No. 12. Begbie, *Malay Peninsula*, 129-30.

127. B. Pol., Range 126, Vol. 31: July 22, 1831, Nos. 43-46.

128. *Ibid.*, Vol. 33: Sept. 9, 1831, No. 2.

129. BSP, 363: Nov. 25, 1831: No. 81. Begbie, *Malay Peninsula*, 129-30. JIA, IV, 363-66.

and return the same way. Instead he went to Bruas, in Perak, and began to collect a fleet for the invasion of Kedah. There was no doubt as to his intention, and the Siamese called upon the Company to fulfil the terms of the Burney treaty. After vain attempts had been made to persuade the ex-Sultan to go either to Deli or Malacca, two warships were sent to Bruas to bring him back by force if necessary. The Malays resisted, but after a brief resistance their fleet was destroyed, and the ex-Sultan captured and sent to Malacca. As a punishment his pension of \$10,000 was reduced to \$6,000 a year, the full amount not being restored until 1841.¹³⁰

In 1838 another rebellion broke out in Kedah. A force of Malays entered the country from British territory, and for the second time expelled the Siamese. As in 1831, the supplies and many of the invaders came from Penang and Province Wellesley. The natives in the Straits Settlements and the majority of the Europeans who were not officials sympathised with the rebels and assisted them. The Government of the Straits, holding itself bound by the Burney treaty, at once blockaded the Kedah coast. The British warships did not attack the Malays, but by preventing the arrival of arms and reinforcements from Penang they contributed largely to the failure of the rebellion. The Directors and the Government of India entirely approved of the action of the Straits Government. In 1839 the Siamese reconquered Kedah and drove out the rebels.¹³¹

The failure of this insurrection convinced the old Sultan that he could never regain his Kingdom by force. So in 1841 he sent Tunku Dye (Daik?), his eldest son, to Bangkok, to beg for pardon and reinstatement. Bonham, the Governor of the Straits Settlements, was very

130. B. Pol., Range 127, Vol. 32: April 7, 1836, No. 6. B. Pol., Range 195. Vol. 61: Aug. 16, 1841, Nos. 15-16. I. Pol., Range 194, Vol. 39: June 5, 1837, Nos. 41-45. Despatches from India and Bengal, Vol. 13: Oct. 20, 1837. Despatches to India and Bengal, Vol. 10: Jan. 30, 1837. *Ibid.*, 14: Nov. 15, 1837. *Ibid.*, 16: June 6, 1838. *Ibid.*, 19: Feb. 6, 1839. *Ibid.*, 25: Dec. 23, 1840.

131. India Pol., Range 195, Vol. 8: Feb. 6, 1839, Nos. 17-21. *Ibid.*, Vol. 10: Feb. 27, 1839, Nos. 64-66. *Ibid.*, Vol. 15: April 24, 1839, Nos. 48-54. Letters Received from India and Bengal, Vol. 18: Dec. 31, 1838. *Ibid.*, Vol. 20: May 20, 1839. *Ibid.*, 21: July 24, 1829. *Ibid.*, 17: Sept. 15, 1838. Despatches to India and Bengal, Vol. 23: June 2, 1840. Burney MSS., D. IX and D. X. JIA, III, 617: IV, 26, 371-77. Osborn, Quedah, 22-33, 153-55, 217-19, 317-21, 346-59, and chapters XII and XIII *passim*.

sceptical of success; but with the approval of the Supreme Government he gave Tunku Dye (Daik?) a letter to the Prahlklang. In it he urged that the Sultan should be restored to his throne, and warned the Siamese that the Company had grown weary of bolstering up their power in Kedah. Should another revolt occur, the Straits Government had been ordered not to assist in its suppression.¹³² The old Sultan's petition was made at a propitious moment. The Emperor of Siam had at last learned that there was no profit to be obtained from governing as a Siamese province a distant state whose inhabitants were resolved not to submit to alien rule. The experiment had been tried for twenty years, and the only result had been a constant series of rebellions in which the prosperity of Kedah had been ruined. Had the Raja of Ligor been alive the decision might have been different, but the Sultan's implacable enemy was now dead. In 1842 the Emperor of Siam accepted the Sultan's submission, removed the Siamese officials from Kedah, and restored to him the greater part of his former kingdom. To lessen his power however the remainder was formed into two new states under Malay rulers over whom he had no control. The Sultan asked the Company to form an alliance with him, pledging them to maintain him on the throne. The Directors refused his request, being greatly influenced in the matter by the adverse opinion of Colonel Burney, the negotiator of the treaty of 1826.¹³³

The Government hoped that it was at last freed from Kedah entanglements, but it was soon undeceived. In 1843 the Sultan seized the Krian District of Perak, claiming it as part of his Kingdom. The Sultan of Perak prepared for war, and demanded British assistance under the terms of Low's treaty of 1826. The Government acknowledged the validity of his claim; but persuaded him not to commence hostilities until the effect of negotiations had been tried. The Sultan of Kedah refused to give way, even when in 1844 his annual pension was taken away from him. Finally, in 1848, the Governor of the Straits Settlements compelled him to restore the Krian District to Perak by the threat that otherwise his troops

132. I. Pol., Range 195, Vol. 61: Aug. 23, 1841, Nos. 6-7.

133. Letters Received from India and Bengal, Vol. 34: July 4, 1842. Despatches to India and Bengal, Vol. 33: Dec. 30, 1842. *Ibid.*, Vol. 40: July 17, 1844. Burney MSS, D.X.

would be expelled by force.¹³⁴ The annual pension of \$10,000 was then restored.¹³⁵ Until 1909 Kedah remained a Siamese dependency ruled by the descendants of the restored Sultan. By the Treaty of Bangkok in 1909 Siam renounced its rights of suzerainty; and the state became a British dependency.¹³⁶

The cordiality which characterised British and Siamese relations in Kedah after 1827 was less marked in Trengganu and Kelantan. From the date of the Burney treaty until the end of the century Siam lost no opportunity of trying to reduce the two states to subjection. Kelantan, weaker than Trengganu and nearer to its powerful enemy, suffered more severely than its neighbours. By 1836 it was described by Newbold, the Malayan authority, as nominally independent but "now almost succumbed to the Siamese yoke."¹³⁷ The Government of Bangkok gradually established strong influence there, and the appointment in 1902 of a Commissioner to "advise" the Sultan was in many ways merely the recognition of an existing state of affairs. Trengganu was more fortunate; its Sultans resisted the covert attacks of the Siamese as firmly as they dared, and succeeded in preventing them from attaining the influence which they gained in Kelantan.¹³⁸ Apart from the triennial despatch of the Bunga Mas to Bangkok, the overlordship of Siam was practically nominal.¹³⁹

The Government of the Straits Settlements opposed the designs of Siam as far as it was possible to do so, and at the same time obeyed the orders of the Indian Government not to interfere in the affairs of the Malay States. The Straits officials sympathised with the desire of Trengganu and Kelantan to preserve their independence; and they also feared that the establishment of Siam's supremacy would destroy the growing trade of Singapore with the two states. Until 1862 no incident of importance occurred. The Siamese made no open at-

134. *Letters Received from India and Bengal*, Vol. 43: July 22, 1844. *Ibid.*, Vol. 52: Nov. 7, 1846. *Ibid.*, Vol. 59: Aug. 7, 1848. *Despatches to India and Bengal*, Vol. 43: March 19, 1845. *Ibid.*, Vol. 60: Feb. 21, 1849. *IPFP*, Range 196, Vol. 48: March 23, 1844, Nos. 50-54. *Ibid.*, Range 198, Vol. 23: April 14, 1848, Nos. 14-31.

135. *Ibid.*, Vol. 57: Oct. 27, 1849, Nos. 60-63.

136. *Ibid.*, 388 and 398.

137. Newbold, *Straits of Malacca*, 11, 65.

138. Swettenham, *British Malaya*, 316-23. Graham, *Kelantan*, 38-54.

139. *Colonial Office List*, 1920, p. 402.

tacks on the independence of Trengganu and Kelantan, but tried to gain their ends by intrigue. The Government of the Straits Settlements kept a suspicious eye upon their proceedings; but it was forced to content itself with reporting the course of events to the Government of India.¹⁴⁰

In 1862 Siam abandoned its policy of obscure manoeuvring in favour of a scarcely disguised attempt to obtain control of Trengganu and possibly Pahang as well. The ultimate cause of the incident was the death in 1858 of the Bendahara of Pahang. He left two sons to fight for the inheritance, and almost immediately civil war broke out between the elder, who became Bendahara, and the younger Wan Ahmad. Neither side did much harm to the other, but between them they wrought havoc with the growing British trade in Pahang. The Singapore merchants complained, and the Governor of the Straits Settlements, Colonel Cavenagh, offered to mediate between the two brothers. The Bendahara agreed, and promised to allow Wan Ahmad whatever pension Cavenagh might name. Ahmad refused the amount offered, and the war continued until about July 1861 his forces were driven out of Pahang by his brother.¹⁴¹

At this point Siam appeared upon the scene. Shortly before the Dutch had deposed and banished the Sultan of Lingga because of his incurable propensity for intriguing. The Sultan was the descendant of Sultan Abdulrahman of Johore, whose career was described in the chapter on the foundation of Singapore. By virtue of his descent the banished Sultan declared himself to be the rightful ruler of Pahang and Johore. This claim the British Government refused to recognise, since it challenged the basic principle of the Anglo-Dutch treaty of 1824, the division of the Empire of Johore into British and Dutch spheres.¹⁴² Eventually the banished Sultan went to Bangkok, and the Siamese Ministers saw in him a fit instrument for their designs. They had determined to depose the Sultan of Trengganu, because he firmly refused to do homage in person at Bangkok, or to acknowledge the supremacy of Siam except by the customary gift of the Bunga Mas. It was decided to instal the

140. BSP, Vol. 369: Nov. 19, 1832, Nos. 2-3 B. Pub., Range 13, Vol. 43: June 19, 1843, No. 18.

141. PP, (H. of C.), No. 541 of 1863, pp. 1-3, 6-11, (Vol. XLIII).

142. *Ibid.*, 3, 24-25.

Sultan of Lingga in his place. Wan Ahmad had also come to Bangkok, and seems to have reached an understanding with the Siamese. Cavenagh received information of the Ministers' intentions, and asked the British Consul at Bangkok, Sir Robert Schomburgk, to investigate the matter.¹⁴³ By this time, July 1862, the Sultan had been taken to Trengganu on a Siamese warship. He was apparently accompanied by Wan Ahmad, and a small fleet of praus. Schomburgk was assured by the Siamese that the Sultan's departure had no political significance: he merely wished to visit his aged mother in Trengganu, and the Emperor of Siam, touched by this display of filial affection, had given him a warship to make the journey.¹⁴⁴ Although Schomburgk and Cavenagh had to accept this explanation, they both took the liberty of doubting its truth.¹⁴⁵ For one thing, the Sultan's arrival synchronised suspiciously with the appearance in Trengganu of three Siamese warships on which were the Crown Prince and the Chief Minister of Siam. Cavenagh had learned of their intended visit, and sent the "Hooghly," a small gunboat, to watch them. When the Siamese squadron found her at Trengganu the Prince and the Minister decided not to land, but went on to Singapore.¹⁴⁶ Wan Ahmad began to prepare for another attack on his brother. In this he was assisted by the Sultan of Lingga, who, Cavenagh suspected, had been the real instigator of the attacks on Pahang. The Sultan of Trengganu also assisted Ahmad by allowing him to gather arms and recruits, and prepare his forces in Trengganu.¹⁴⁷

Colonel Cavenagh viewed this twofold design against Pahang and Trengganu in the gravest light. He was convinced that Siam intended to use the Sultan of Lingga and Wan Ahmad as tools to bring both states under the control of Bangkok. The success of this policy would do great injury to British trade; and even if Wan Ahmad's attempt on Pahang should in the end fail, the renewal of civil war with the Bendahara would be harmful to the commerce of Singapore. Cavenagh was therefore convinced that he had the right to intervene in Pahang, as he had done in the preceding war, and the more so as the Siamese themselves advanced no pretensions to supremacy over it. With Trengganu the case was some-

143. *Ibid.*, 2-3, 5.

144. *Ibid.*, 2-3, 14-16.

145. *Ibid.*, 14-16.

146. *Ibid.*, 2-3, 5-6.

147. *Ibid.*, 3, 16, and 26.

what different, for there was no doubt that the state was to some extent a Siamese tributary. The Governor believed however that he had the right to intervene in order to preserve its independence, on the grounds that its subjection was practically nominal, and that the aggressive policy of Siam must inevitably do great harm to British trade. These reasons he set forth in his despatches to the Indian Government.

In a despatch of July 19, 1861, he spoke of the rumours which had reached him of the Siamese intentions as follows:— "The exact position with reference to the authorities at Bangkok is not very clearly defined by the treaty of 1826, but I believe there can be no doubt they do acknowledge themselves to a certain extent as tributaries." This Cavenagh considered was proved by a statement made to him by the Sultan of Trengganu that every thirty months the Bunga Mas and presents of camphor, cloth, etc., were sent to Bangkok in return for gifts of equal value. Nevertheless the Governor believed the dependence to be so nominal that from the legal point of view it was negligible, for he continued:—

"By Article X of the above-quoted treaty it is evident that neither Trengganu nor Kelantan have ever been considered as Siamese provinces, whilst from Article XII it is equally evident that the Siamese Kings are precluded from adopting any measure with regard to those states that might lead to any interruption of our commerce. That the measure stated to be now in contemplation would have that effect is, I conceive, beyond a doubt, for the ex-Sultan of Lingga is an intriguing, restless character, banished by the Dutch from their territories owing to his being concerned in some conspiracy, who would almost immediately upon his resumption of power endeavour to extend his influence over the neighbouring native states and thus create a feeling prejudicial to our interests. Moreover it is not to be imagined that the Sultan (of Trengganu) would yield his post without a struggle, and the whole country would in all probability be soon involved in a civil war to the utter prostration of our trade, which is now of considerable value, and provided peace and quietness can be maintained is likely to increase. For general reasons of policy it is also apparently advisable that we should as far as practicable prevent any interference (by Siam) in the affairs of countries so in-

timately connected with the British possessions as Trengganu and Kelantan."¹⁴⁸

Cavenagh believed that India was not prepared "to recognise the right of Siam to exercise over the two above mentioned states, a protectorate of this nature under any circumstances."¹⁴⁹ The contents of this despatch were approved by the Supreme Government.¹⁵⁰

The Governor's attitude towards Siam's pretensions was still more clearly shown in a Report which he forwarded to the Government of India in 1862.

"Trengganu is an independent principality the ruler of which, as is often customary with weak Oriental states, dispatches a periodical embassy with presents to his powerful neighbour, the King of Siam; but he has never acknowledged obedience to the latter, and has always refused to do him personal homage. When the Treaty of 1826 was concluded the independence of Trengganu and the adjoining state of Kelantan was mutually guaranteed by Article XII he (the Sultan) has, at all times, been recognised as an independent chief."¹⁵¹

From July till October 1862 Cavenagh and Schomburgk made unsuccessful attempts to persuade the Siamese to remove the Sultan of Lingga and Wan Ahmad from Trengganu. Meanwhile Ahmad again invaded Pahang, apparently at the instigation of the Sultan of Lingga.¹⁵² On October 23, 1862, the Government of India approved of Cavenagh's action in asking Schomburgk to call upon the Siamese to remove Ahmad and the Sultan of Lingga from Trengganu.¹⁵³ About the same time, Schomburgk informed Cavenagh that the Siamese had at last consented to remove the Sultan.¹⁵⁴ In his reply Cavenagh wrote that if the disturbances in Pahang continued he would, in accordance with the Governor-General's instructions, take whatever measures seemed necessary to protect British interests and maintain peace in the Peninsula.¹⁵⁵

148. *Ibid.*, 3, 4.

149. *Ibid.*, 14.

150. *Ibid.*, 1-3.

151. Swettenham, *British Malaya*, 321-22.

152. PP, (H. of C.) No. 541 of 1863, pp. 17-21, (Vol. XLIII).

153. *Ibid.*, 21-22.

154. *Ibid.*, 22-23.

155. *Ibid.*, 23-24.

Barely a month later it became necessary to carry the threat into execution. The time of the North-East monsoon was rapidly approaching, when from the high surf it would be impossible to make a landing at any harbour on the East Coast of the Peninsula. The Siamese kept evading the fulfilment of their promise, and made no attempt to equip a warship for the voyage to Trengganu. It appeared that they were deliberately postponing action so that it would be impossible to carry out their pledge until the change of the monsoons in April 1863. In the meantime the Sultan of Lingga and Wan Ahmad would have several months in which to carry out their plans.¹⁵⁶ About the end of October 1862 the Singapore Chamber of Commerce complained to Cavenagh that their Pahang trade was at a standstill owing to a fresh invasion by Wan Ahmad, which was openly supported by the Sultan of Lingga and Trengganu. They also pointed out that the change in the monsoons would occur in eight or ten days, and begged him to act speedily.¹⁵⁷ Cavenagh satisfied himself of the truth of their information about the monsoons, and then being convinced by the despatches from Bangkok that the Siamese intended to take no steps until the weather made effective action impossible, he determined that drastic measures were necessary. A warship was sent to Trengganu with orders to bombard the port and blockade it unless within twenty-four hours after its arrival the Sultan of Trengganu handed over the Sultan of Lingga for conveyance to Bangkok, and promised that no further assistance should be given to Wan Ahmad.¹⁵⁸ The Sultan of Trengganu refused to give way, and his fort was accordingly shelled, the town and its population being spared. The Sultan of Lingga escaped into the country, and although the coast was blockaded for some weeks he was not surrendered.¹⁵⁹ Cavenagh's actions were approved by the Government of India.¹⁶⁰

While the bombardment failed in its immediate objects, it ultimately produced the effect which Cavenagh had desired. The Siamese Government sent a warship to Trengganu on November 25, with the obvious result that as the monsoon had changed the Sultan of Lingga could

156. *Ibid.*, 27-33.

157. *Ibid.*, 27-31.

158. *Ibid.*, 27, 30-33.

159. *Ibid.*, 34-40.

160. *Ibid.*, 1-3.

not be taken off.¹⁶¹ The Siamese also sent letters to the British Government, claiming Kelantan and Trengganu as tributaries, and protesting at the bombardment as a violation of their territorial rights.¹⁶² But despite their complaints, in March 1863 they removed the Sultan of Lingga from Trengganu, and sent him back to Siam.¹⁶³ Thereafter he ceased to trouble the peace of the Peninsula. A few years later his ally, Wan Ahmad, became Bendahara of Pahang on the death of his brother, without any objections being raised on the part of the British Government.¹⁶⁴

The bombardment of Trengganu gave rise to two debates in the House of Commons, and on the whole Cavenagh's conduct was condemned.¹⁶⁵ In Trengganu however his firmness had excellent results. Soon after the incident was closed the Chief Minister of Siam visited Cavenagh at Singapore, and vainly tried to obtain from him an admission of Siam's rights of suzerainty over Trengganu. Cavenagh also refused to use the Government of Bangkok as an intermediary in any communications which he might in future find it necessary to make to the Sultan of Trengganu.¹⁶⁶ After this date Siam made no further overt attempts to destroy the independence of the state; and although threats and intrigues were lavishly employed, they proved unavailing. In 1909, when Trengganu was transferred to the British sphere of influence, its independence was still substantially unimpaired.¹⁶⁷

Looking back over the history of Anglo-Siamese relations in Malaya during the nineteenth century, there is one salient fact which impresses itself with irresistible force. It is to the British Government alone, and more especially to the Government of the Straits Settlements, that the Malay States of the Peninsula owe the preservation of their independence. In 1821 it seemed inevitable that the greater part of the Peninsula at least would sooner or later fall under the control of Siam.

161. *Ibid.*, 49.

162. *Ibid.*, 46, 48, 68-69.

163. *Ibid.*, 78. *Straits Settlements Administration Report*, 1862-63, p. 30.

167. Swettenham, *British Malaya*, 322-23.

164. Buckley, *Singapore*, II, 693-94.

165. *Hansard*. Series III, Vol. 172, pp. 586-91, July 10, 1863.

166. Cavenagh, *Reminiscences*, 308.

The Malay States, weak and divided, were powerless to avert the fate of Kedah. That this catastrophe was averted was due almost entirely to the Government of the Straits Settlements. The Directors and the Indian Government were but little interested in the fate of Malaya; and the policy of Fullerton and his successors found only censure or half-hearted support. Yet though the odds were against them, the members of the Straits Civil Service persisted in their policy, and by 1867 the danger was nearly past. Kedah had fallen, Kelantan, and to some extent Trengganu, were still menaced; but the greater part of the Malay Peninsula was saved.

IX

The Malayan Policy of The East India Company, 1786-1867.

During the eighty-one years that the Straits Settlements were under the control of India, the Government wherever possible followed a policy of strict non-intervention in the affairs of the Malay States. Not only was the increase of British territory forbidden, but all attempts to form political treaties were regarded with strong disapproval. It was feared that alliances might finally compel the Company to intervene in the affairs of the native states, and that it would become involved in the constant wars which by 1874 had brought nearly every state of the Peninsula to a condition of anarchy. India was also afraid that alliances with the Malay Sultans might lead to war with Siam. British relations with the Peninsula were almost entirely commercial. On the few occasions in which intervention occurred it was due either to treaty obligations, or to attacks on British interests so flagrant that they could not be permitted.

The reason for the Company's policy was that its interests in Malaya were purely commercial. The Straits Settlements were regarded, not as the nucleus of a Malayan Empire, but solely as trading centres; and the Directors were more than content that their territorial responsibilities were practically limited to the land upon which the towns were built. This attitude was much strengthened by the Company's loss of its monopoly of the China trade in 1833. Hitherto the Straits Settlements had been valuable to it as depots where the products of the Archipelago were collected for transmission to the Company's factories in Canton. Henceforth they ceased to be a source of direct profit, and were maintained by the Company at considerable annual loss, for the benefit of British trade. The Indian Government derived no benefit from them except indirectly, through the increase of Indian trade with the Straits Settlements.

During the whole period between 1786 and 1867 the Malay States of the Peninsula were hard at work committing political "hara-kiri." The process had begun at a much earlier date; but during the nineteenth century it became greatly accelerated. There were constant wars between the different Sultans, and the states were also weakened by frequent civil wars between rival claimants

to the throne. The power of the Sultans decayed, till even petty rajas were able to set themselves up as independent local rulers, free to plunder and fight pretty much at will. Piracy flourished, and trade declined. In many ways the condition of the Peninsula was very much like that of England during the reign of Stephen. In the Malay States, as in mediaeval England, the organization of society was feudal, the relation of the Malay rajas towards their Sultan strongly resembling that of the Norman barons towards the king. With the breakdown of the central government, the vassals seized the opportunity to establish themselves in a position of local independence at the expense of their weaker neighbours and the peasantry. No man's life and property were safe unless he were strong enough to defend them. The career of Geoffrey de Mandeville had many parallels in nineteenth century Malaya. Throughout the Peninsula, from Siam on the north to the Straits Settlements on the south, there was only one state where anarchy was not the order of the day. In Johore peace was maintained owing to the scantiness of the population and the British control over the Sultan and Temenggong. The other states were torn asunder by the convulsions of a dying feudalism.¹

From 1844 onwards the Singapore newspapers frequently referred to the decay of the Malay States, and gave vivid pictures of the state of anarchy and semi-barbarism into which they were sinking.² Their testimony perhaps may be somewhat suspect, since they advocated the development of British trade with the Peninsula, either by annexing the Malay states or else by governing them by means of advice tendered to the Sultans — an interesting forecast of the Residential System which developed after 1874.³ The despatches of the Straits Government frequently contained similar descriptions. In 1841 for example Governor Bonham reported to the Government of Bengal that "the Malay States on the Peninsula . . . from some cause or other appear to be crumbling away into entire insignificance."⁴ In 1847 a valuable account was written by E. A. Blundell, the Resident Councillor of Malacca, who had spent twenty-five

1. Wilkinson, *Malay Papers: History of the Peninsula*. Swettenham, *British Malaya*, 113-32; *The Real Malay*, passim; *Malay Sketches*, passim. Clifford, *East Coast Etchings*, 3-10; *In Court and Kampong*, passim; *East Coast Etchings*, passim.

2. Buckley, *Singapore*, II, 421-22, 503, 575, 584-85.

3. *Ibid.*, 575.

4. *I. Pol.*, Range 195., Vol. 61: Aug. 23, 1841, No. 6.

years in the Straits.

"The petty states surrounding (Malacca) are all of them in a sad state of anarchy and disorder, without any settled government, and enjoying no protection of either person or property. The chiefs . . . are needy and rapacious, ready to sell themselves to any party that will purchase the use of their name and influence; and the people are wretchedly poor and enjoy no means of bettering their condition, for though the countries are as fertile as Malacca, and some, if not all of them, still more abounding in mineral products, yet such is the state of insecurity and lawlessness among them that but very little can be done to benefit by such resources. We have ourselves in our wisdom tended greatly towards this result by an apparent exhibition of liberality We have withdrawn from all interference of any kind with these countries. . . . The policy of withdrawal from all interference with the neighbouring petty states is extremely doubtful. They are fast becoming little more than the receptacles of the lawless and evil disposed, whose sole means of livelihood will be plunder and robbing, obliging us, in the end, for the safety of our own people, to take possession of the country, the very object we sought to avoid by our withdrawal and subsequent exhibition of liberality. One very injurious effect of this refraining from the exercise of our influence and control is the complete stoppage of the overland trade which once existed with Pahang and other states in the Gulf of Siam. Pahang is tolerably flourishing But between Malacca and Pahang there lie two or three of those petty Malayan states which being little better than a refuge for idle and dissipated Malays, the intercourse between the two countries is entirely precluded. Pahang is well known to be rich in both tin and gold."⁵

In 1849 Governor Butterworth submitted a long report to Bengal which showed how completely the Negri Sembilan was given over to anarchy and misrule as the result of constant wars.⁶

5. JIA, II, 752-54, E. A. Blundell.

6. IPFP, Range 198, Vol. 41: Jan. 13. 1839, Nos. 21-22.

The Company's policy of non-intervention dated from the earliest years of British rule in the Straits. It will be remembered that Captain Light was strictly forbidden to involve the Company in the affairs of the native states, and was for this reason forbidden to assist Kedah against Siam. The appeals of Perak and Trengganu for defensive alliances were likewise rejected.⁷ Although the aggressive designs of Siam finally compelled the Company to intervene in order to safeguard British trade, it did so with extreme reluctance, and took great care to safeguard itself from any obligation to defend the Malay states against Siam. The severe censures passed upon Captain Low for his treaty with Perak in 1826, and indeed the whole history of Anglo-Siamese relations in the Malay Peninsula are convincing proofs that the policy of non-intervention was followed wherever possible.

During the 30 years which followed the Burney Treaty the same principle was adhered to. In 1832 for example a treaty was made with Rembau by which the Company voluntarily renounced all the rights inherited from the Dutch to a monopoly of the tin and to suzerainty.⁸ The same year the Government of Bengal sent the following instructions to Governor Ibbetson regarding the Naning War which was then in progress:—"It cannot be too strongly impressed on your mind that extension of territory at Malacca is no point of our policy, and that such an extension as might tend to involve us in further contests is greatly to be deprecated."⁹ A still more striking instance occurred in 1833 when the boundary between Malacca Territory and the tiny state of Johol (in the Negri Sembilan) was being delimited. Between the two lay a debatable land which had formerly been claimed by both. It contained rich mines of tin and gold, including Mount Ophir, famous for its veins of gold. Governor Ibbetson regarded the frontier delimitation as an excellent opportunity for showing "that accessions of territory and encroachments upon their rights is the furthest from our views and intentions." Although the chief of Johol had made no demand for this territory — indeed he appears to have offered to resign it to the Company — the Governor with the approval of the Bengal Government resigned any claims the British might have to it, and included it within the area of

7. B. Pub., Range 4, Vol. 48: Aug. 22, 1796.

8. v. Chapter on the Naning War.

9. BSP, Vol. 366: June 4, 1832, Nos. 17-22.

Johol.¹⁰ During the same year the Linggi War broke out. Saiyid Shaaban, Yamtuan Muda of Rembau, wished to conquer Inche Katas the petty chief of Linggi, near Malacca territory, who controlled important tin-mines. Some of the Chinese merchants of Malacca were interested in these mines, and their trade suffered greatly because of the war, and because Shaaban levied a heavy duty on tin coming down the Linggi River. Ibbetson refused to interfere, in spite of the loud outcry of the Chinese, whose complaints were echoed by the Singapore press. He reported the case to Calcutta, and the Government entirely agreed with him that it was quite impossible to intervene in a quarrel between two independent chiefs, even though British merchants suffered severely from its effects.¹¹ Saiyid Shaaban was defeated, and he and his father-in-law Raja Ali, the ruler of Rembau, were in 1835 forced to seek refuge in Malacca. They were given shelter, but when they asked for British aid to reinstate them it was refused, although their alliance had been of great assistance in the Naning War. There was no breach of faith, because the British treaty made with them in 1832 did not require the Company to assist them. Since treaty obligations were not involved, Governor Ibbetson felt himself bound by the Bengal Government's orders not to interfere unless to do so meant a breach of treaty engagements. The Supreme Government approved of his action, and directed that no assistance whatever was to be given the exiles, since if granted it was almost certain to involve the Company in future entanglements.¹² For many years Saiyid Shaaban lived in Malacca on a pension from the Company, until 1847 when a faction in Rembau invited him to resume his former position. Governor Butterworth allowed Shaaban to accept, but told him that by so doing he would forfeit his pension, and compel the Straits Government to inform all the adjacent states that his attempt was not made with British support. The Company could not permit the neighbouring Sultans to think that it was trying to interfere in the affairs of a native state, even in the interests of a man who had rendered such great services as Syed Shaaban. The Governor's attitude received the approval of the Supreme Government.¹³

10. BSP, Vol. 376: Sept. 5, 1833, Nos. 1-3. B. Pol. Range 126, Vol. 75: Oct. 31, 1833. JIA, II, 753, E. A. Blundell. Aitchison, *Treaties*, I, 421-22.

11. BSP, Vol. 377: Dec. 5, 1833, Nos. 1-3.

12. B. Pol., Range 127, Vol. 29: Aug. 24, 1835, Nos. 4-6.

13. IPFP, Range 198, Vol. 5: Dec. 11, 1847. Nos. 19-29.

Two years later, in 1849, Governor Butterworth submitted a long report on the anarchy and misrule which were rampant in the Negri Sembilan. The country was ravaged by constant wars, the ruling chieftains were penniless and powerless, and the states were given over to the struggles of "a number of needy, desperate, petty chieftains," who claimed complete independence. They were imposing many illegal exactions on British trade, and the Governor's ire was especially roused by the impudence of a freebooting raja who had built a stockade at Sempang, on the Linggi river, bordering on Malacca territory. He was a mere robber and pirate, and was able to maintain himself at Sempang solely because his nominal suzerain was too weak to expel him. Like a mediaeval robber baron, he had established himself on a river which was the sole water route to Sungei Ujong, from which Malacca drew much of its supply of tin; and he levied toll on all traders who passed. The British merchants were loud in their complaints. The Governor had seen the stockade, and pronounced it to be a ramshackle affair of palm-logs which a few round shot would knock into a heap of ruins. Yet his hands were tied by the policy of non-intervention. Since the Sultan was powerless, Blundell, the Resident Councillor at Malacca, urged that the Straits Government should try to end the ceaseless wars by offering to mediate between the Malacca chieftains. Butterworth asked the Bengal Government to sanction this suggestion, but frankly admitted that he was very sceptical of its utility. When the Straits administration was forbidden to use the threat of force, how would it be expected, he plaintively asked, that "we can exert effectually over the barbarous rule of a number of needy, desperate, petty chieftains an influence unbounded, but altogether dissociated with fear or dread?" Personally, he was a believer in the efficacy of action rather than moral suasion, and he asked that if Lebai Kulup, the robber baron of Sempang, declined to mend his ways, the Straits Government might be authorized to expel him by force.¹⁴ The Supreme Government refused to sanction Butterworth's request, and declared that it was opposed to any attempts to gain wide influence in the Negri Sembilan. British interference was to be confined "within very narrow limits," and no proceedings likely to lead to war with a Malay state were to be undertaken without the previous consent of India.¹⁵

14. *IPFP*, Range 198, Vol. 41: Jan. 13, 1849. Nos. 21-22.

15. *Ibid.*, No. 36.

In 1853 the Sultan of Perak was dethroned by a rival. Both invoked British aid, and the request was referred to India. The Supreme Government forbade intervention since the Sultan's fall was the result of his vices and his incapacity to govern, and Low's Treaty of 1826 contained no provision binding the Company to interfere in such a case. The Straits Government was empowered to offer its mediation, but it was warned to be most careful not to commit the Company to support either faction.¹⁶ Butterworth accordingly proffered his services as mediator. They were refused, and in 1854 Perak was still in a state of anarchy as a result of the war. The Governor decided not to renew his offer, but to wait until the Malays asked him to settle the quarrel, because he was "perfectly convinced" of the inexpediency of taking an active part in the internal affairs of the Malay states except when it was absolutely unavoidable. The Supreme Government in its reply commended the soundness of his views on Malay policy.¹⁷

Although as a rule, the East India Company adhered strictly to a policy of non-intervention, cases occasionally arose when interference was unavoidable. The reasons which were held to justify this course were the invasion of British territory, the ill-treatment of British subjects, and treaty obligations. In 1826 for example the Temenggong or chief of Muar (a small dependency of Johore on the border of Malacca) occupied some ninety square miles of Malacca Territory on the River Kesang, adjoining Muar. He claimed it as rightfully part of his own state; but the Government after careful inquiry decided that it belonged to the Company. Lengthy negotiations followed, but every attempt to persuade the chieftain to evacuate the territory failed. A company of sepoys was accordingly moved against him, and the raja was given the alternatives of voluntary retirement or expulsion. He chose the former and the incident was closed.¹⁸

Interference to obtain redress for injuries inflicted on British subjects generally occurred when pirates were given shelter by native rulers.¹⁹ The imposition of illegal

16. IPFP, Range 200, Vol. 41: Nov. 4, 1853, Nos. 99-102.

17. IPFP, Range 200, Vol. 50: Jan. 20, 1854, Nos. 95-98.

18. SSR, Vol. 122: March, 10, 1828. SSR, Vol. 123: July 21, Aug. 27, 1828. SSR, Vol. 168: Jan. 30, June 25, Sept. 6, Oct. 27, 1828.

19. v. chapters on Piracy and Rajah Brooke.

exactions upon British merchants (usually it would seem, Chinese), occasionally brought about the Government's interference. In 1860 for instance Governor Cavenagh made successful representations to the states of Rembau and Sungei Ujong to secure the removal of illegal exactions which were inflicting losses upon Malacca's trade.²⁰ In 1862 a somewhat similar incident occurred in the Larut district of Perak. This proved to be the beginning of the disturbances which twelve years later brought about permanent British intervention in that state. On this occasion, to collect the sums awarded to Chinese merchants who were British subjects as redress for their losses, Cavenagh was compelled to blockade the Larut River until the amounts were paid.²¹ In the same year occurred the bombardment of Trengganu. The motives were partly to protect British trade, but in the main to checkmate Siamese aggression.²² About the same time Governor Cavenagh found it necessary to take the Temenggong of Johore and his son Abubakar to task for punishing natives who were British subjects according to Malayan law. He told them that he "could not permit British subjects to be at the mercy of the caprice of any native chief," since "there was no regularity or certainty about judicial proceedings in Johore." Abubakar showed a strong desire to comply with the Governor's orders: he released his prisoners and promised to draw up a code of laws which he would submit to Cavenagh's inspection.²³ Colonel Cavenagh's Malayan policy however cannot be regarded as typical of that pursued before 1867. He was much more inclined than any of his predecessors except Fullerton to take strong measures for the protection of British trade or checking Siamese aggression. In many ways the Colonel's vigorous policy was more nearly allied to that adopted after 1873 under Sir Andrew Clarke than to the traditional policy of non-intervention.

On several occasions the Company intervened because of its treaty obligations. It aided the Siamese to crush the Malay revolts in Kedah, because of its supposed obligations under the Burney treaty of 1826. In 1844-1848 it compelled Kedah to restore the Krian District to Perak, because the British were required to give assistance in such a contingency by the terms of Low's treaty.²⁴

20. Straits Settlements Administration Report, 1860-61, pp. 18-19.

21. *Ibid.*, 1861-62: p. 34.

22. v. chapter on Anglo-Siamese Relations.

23. Cavenagh, *Reminiscences*, 313.

24. v. chapter on Anglo-Siamese Relations.

A study of the Malayan policy of the East India Company would be incomplete without some account of the negotiations between the Sultan and Temenggong of Johore, which resulted in the final disappearance of the ancient dynasty, and the elevation of a new reigning house, in the person of the grandfather of the present Sultan.²⁵

It will be remembered that the treaties of 1819 and 1824 ceding Singapore were signed by both Sultan Hussein and the Temenggong of Johore. The signature of the Temenggong was necessary because while in theory he was merely the Sultan's deputy, with the decay of the central government he had become practically an independent ruler, holding his position by hereditary right. While however he was the "de facto" sovereign of Singapore and the present state of Johore, the "de jure" ruler was his nominal suzerain, Sultan Hussein. In point of fact Hussein — poor, almost friendless, and ousted from his throne by his younger brother — was quite unable to enforce his theoretical rights. His signature was obtained in order that no loophole might be left for an attack on the legality of the cession of Singapore, on the ground that the Temenggong had given away what theoretically he had no power to grant.

Both Raffles and Crawford clearly grasped the real positions of the Sultan and Temenggong, and understood that Hussein was merely a figurehead, all real power being with the Temenggong. Thus Raffles, in describing the negotiations of the Preliminary Agreement of January 30, 1819, made with the Temenggong before Hussein's arrival, wrote:— "As the land was the property of the Temenggong we did not hesitate to treat for the occupation of the port."²⁶ Crawford's dispatch to the Supreme Government of August 3, 1824 spoke of the Temenggong as a "virtually independent chief," and continued that in drawing up the treaty of 1824 he had "received the Sultan as possessing the right of paramount dominion, and the Temenggong as not only virtually exercising the powers of government, but being, like other Asiatic sovereigns, 'de facto' the real proprietor of the soil."²⁷ Exception may be taken to the description of one who theoretically was merely a high Court official as "being like other

25. Swettenham, *British Malaya*, 85-101, treats this subject fully.

26. Lady Raffles, *Memoir*, 398.

27. *BSP*, Vol. 328: March 4, 1825, No. 9.

Asiatic sovereigns." Both Raffles and Crawford however diagnosed the situation with perfect accuracy: it was the story of the "faineant" Merovingians and the Mayors of the Palace in a Malayan setting.

In 1825 the Temenggong died, and his son succeeded to his office. Although the treaties ceding Singapore did not require the Company to pay any pension to the descendants of the Sultan and the Temenggong, it allowed the new Temenggong a pension of \$350 a month, because his father had lived to enjoy his subsidy so short a time.²⁸ Sultan Hussein lived until 1835, but his manner of life was so extravagant that his family were left at his death in very straitened circumstances. He had never possessed more than the shadow of power, and even this died with him. His son Ali was left with nothing save a small income, many debts, and an unimpeachable claim to an empty title. The Sultan's heirs petitioned for a pension, and Governor Murchison advised that \$350 a month be allotted them, since they were destitute.²⁹ The Government of Bengal granted a pension of \$250 a month, an amount which in 1840 was increased to \$350.³⁰

At the time of Hussein's death his son Ali was too young to apply for the Government's recognition of his title as Sultan. Garling, the Resident Councillor of Malacca, strongly recommended that it should be granted to him; but he was opposed by Governor Murchison on the ground that he considered it "desirable to allow the family to merge as quickly as possible into untitled stipendiaries. The late Sultan was never recognised by the Malay States as Sultan of Johore, and enjoyed neither revenue nor political sway in that country. He was pronounced Sultan by the British; but it was for a particular object, and no reason now exists for the recognition of a mere titular prince." The Government of Bengal in its reply made no reference to the question, and nothing was done in the matter.³¹

As Ali grew older he began to petition the Company to recognise him as Sultan, and finally in 1840 a pro-

28. SSR, Vol. 112: Nov. 25, 1826. B. Ppl., Range 126, Vol. 34: Sept. 23, 1831, No. 27.

29. B. Pol., Range 127, Vol. 31: March 8, 1836, Nos. 2-3.

30. Ibid., No. 4. B. Pub., Range 13, Vol. 64: June 2, 1847, Nos. 59-63.

31. B. Pol., Range 127, Vol. 31: March 8, 1836, No. 2. IPFP, Range 197, Vol. 53: Jan. 23, 1847, No. 5.

clamation was issued to the effect that Ali "is looked upon by the British Government in every respect as the successor of his late father, and entitled to all the property granted to the late Sultan by the East India Company" at Singapore.³² The meaning of this proclamation was decidedly ambiguous, although on the face of it it would seem as though the Company thereby recognised Ali as Sultan. Church, the Resident Councillor of Singapore at this time, declared that it was issued principally to establish Ali's claim to the late Sultan's property, so that the younger members of his family could not appropriate it.³³ The Recorder's Court in 1843 also decided that it "does not necessarily import" his recognition as Sultan, and "can scarcely be construed into more than an acquiescence in the defendant's claim to the piece of ground specified."³⁴

Hitherto the recognition of Ali as Sultan of Johore would have brought him no increase in income, the country being practically deserted and producing hardly any revenue. Between 1835 and 1840 however the failure of the spice plantations on the island of Singapore caused many of the Chinese to migrate across the Strait of Johore. Here they established pepper plantations, so that the country at last began to produce a revenue. The opium farmer of Singapore offered the Temenggong \$300 a month for the opium farm of Johore.³⁵ Ali was very poor and threatened with imprisonment for debt, so that it became of great moment to him to obtain recognition as Sultan and a share of the revenue.

He was however fighting an uphill battle. The Temenggong controlled Johore, and when the Sultan attempted to assert his rights there his followers were expelled by force. Moreover even Ali's few friends among the officials admitted that he was far from being an estimable character, and was in every way much inferior to his rival. Indolent, weak-willed and somewhat feeble-minded, he was a striking contrast to the energetic, clever and active Temenggong. The Temenggong had all his life associated with the European merchants of Singapore, and had won their liking, so that their powerful influence was behind him in the struggle. Last, and most important of all, he had the warm support of Colonel But-

32. *IPFP*, Range 197, Vol. 53: Jan. 23, 1847, No. 3.

33. *Ibid.*

34. *Ibid.*, No. 8.

35. *Ibid.*, No. 3.

terworth, the Governor, and of Church, the Resident Councillor at Singapore. The Governor was in his favour partly because he considered him so infinitely superior to his opponent, but principally on account of the very real assistance which he had rendered in the suppression of piracy. In former years the Temenggong had been strongly suspected of secretly protecting pirates; but of late he had zealously co-operated in the work of destroying them.³⁶

When in 1847 Ali again petitioned the Government of Bengal to be recognised as Sultan, Butterworth's report on his request was far from favourable. He did not actually advise against it, but he gave a long account of Ali and the Temenggong, and showed that Ali was a thoroughly undesirable person to have as Sultan. Sultan Hussein had never been more than a mere figurehead set up by Raffles to secure an indefeasible title to Singapore, while the Temenggong had been "the chief, I may say the only, negotiator." Moreover ever since 1819 the control of Johore had lain with the Temenggong. Finally Butterworth pointed out that to instal Ali as Sultan would be an expense to the Company. His existing pension being insufficient to maintain the state necessary for such a rank, it would have to be increased, and there would also be the cost of the ceremonies of the installation, which the Government would have to defray.³⁷

Ali's petition was regarded by the Company solely from the point of view of expediency; and since no advantage would have followed from his installation, his request was refused. The Supreme Government replied to Butterworth's despatch as follows:—"Unless in your opinion some political advantages would be likely to accrue from such ceremony, His Excellency in Council is not disposed to it."³⁸ The question was reported to the Directors who concurred in the decision of India. They remarked:—"Unless compelled by some positive engagement we see no reason for your acknowledging a successor to this merely titular dignity."³⁹

36. *Ibid.*, No. 5. B. Pub., Range 13, Vol. 64: April 7, 1847, No. 7. *Ibid.*, Vol. 73: Dec. 13, 1848, Nos. 93-94. I. Pol., Range 199, Vol. 3: April 19, 1850: Nos. 221-25. Read, Play and Politics, 14-15. IPFP, Range 199, Vol. 73: Aug. 6, 1852, Nos. 178-84.

37. IPFP, Range 197, Vol. 53: Jan. 23, 1847, Nos. 2-8.

38. *Ibid.*, No. 9.

39. Despatches to Bengal and India, Vol. 60: Feb. 21, 1849, p. 614.

For several years nothing more was heard of the matter. In 1852 however Butterworth went on leave of absence for two years, and Blundell became Acting Governor. He was far more in sympathy with Ali than his superior, and when he appealed to him for aid against the Temenggong, who was preventing him from securing any share in the revenue of Johore, Blundell on July 20, 1852 attempted to persuade the Indian Government to instal him as Sultan. He admitted that on grounds of expediency it would be advisable to refuse the request, but strongly urged Ali's claims for reasons of justice.

"I cannot deny that it seems better for our interests that the rule over the country of Johore should remain as at present, wholly in the hands of the Temenggong (He) is undoubtedly superior to the young Sultan in the capacity to govern the country in subservience to British interests I agree with the Resident Councillor (Church) in thinking that much confusion and trouble may ensue from recognizing him as the Sultan, but still I am impressed with the injustice of disregarding the claims of the son of the Prince from whom we obtained the island of Singapore, simply because it is less troublesome and perhaps more advantageous to us that the rule should continue in the hands of a subordinate officer."⁴⁰

The Indian Government in its reply dismissed Blundell's contention that justice demanded British intervention on the ground that the Treaties of 1819 and 1824 did not bind the Company to interfere in the internal affairs of Johore. On grounds of expediency it was clear from Blundell's own despatch that intervention "might tend to involve the Supreme Government in . . . internal dissensions," and it therefore determined "to allow matters to remain as they are now."⁴¹

Despite this rebuff Blundell returned to the charge with a despatch dated January 14, 1853. He induced Ali and the Temenggong to agree to a compromise. Ali was to promise never to interfere in the affairs of Johore, and to leave its government entirely in the hands of the Temenggong. In return the Temenggong was to instal him as Sultan, and to pay him half the revenues of the

40. IPFP, Range 199, Vol. 73: Aug. 6, 1852, Nos. 178-83.

41. *Ibid.*, No. 184.

country. The amount was fixed at \$300 a month for three years, after which time it was to be revised. The Indian Government was asked to confirm this arrangement solely on the grounds of justice, since from motives of expediency there were no reasons which could be urged.⁴²

The Indian Government was much annoyed at Blundell's action, and in its reply of March 4, 1853 it took him sharply to task for his "meddling measures.... directly in the face of its instructions not to interfere." If however the Temenggong "should be willing to purchase entire sovereignty by a sacrifice of revenue in favour of the Sultan I conceive the measure would be a beneficial one to all parties."⁴³

In spite of this grudging assent Blundell made no attempt to carry the arrangement into effect during the brief remainder of his period of office. In 1854 Governor Butterworth returned and instead of a friend Ali now found an opponent at the head of the administration. Negotiations were recommenced, and by December 22, 1854 a second agreement was arrived at, much more unfavourable to Ali than the former one. Ali appears to have consented because he felt that he must either take what was offered, or go without anything. Moreover he was in such extreme poverty that an immediate settlement was essential for him. The terms of the agreement were that Ali was to promise that he and his heirs would never interfere in the affairs of Johore. In return he was to be installed as Sultan, and his successors were also to receive the title. The Temenggong was to pay him \$5000 at once, and \$500 a month in perpetuity, while the district of Muar in Johore was to be given to Ali and his heirs. The territory was of small value, but was prized by him because some of his ancestors were buried there. It is somewhat astonishing that in his despatch reporting this agreement Butterworth spoke of these terms as those sanctioned by India when Blundell proposed them in the previous year. As a matter of fact, they were entirely different. In Butterworth's agreement the monthly pension was never to be increased, while in that of 1853 it was to be revised after three years. This was a change of the utmost importance, since the revenues of Johore were rapidly increasing. The

42. *Ibid.*, Range 200, Vol. 29: May 27, 1853, No. 161.

43. *Ibid.*, Nos. 162-63.

whole tone of the despatch shows however that the Governor's guiding principle was to make the terms as favourable to the Temenggong as possible.⁴⁴ The Indian Government sanctioned Butterworth's projected agreement.⁴⁵ On March 10, 1855, a treaty embodying the foregoing terms was signed, and Ali was formally installed as Sultan — an empty honour, since by the agreement the full sovereignty over it had been ceded to the Temenggong and his heirs for ever.⁴⁶

The final extinction of the old reigning house of Johore occurred on the death of Sultan Ali in 1877. Sir Archibald Anson, the Lieutenant-Governor of the Straits and a firm friend of Abubakar, Temenggong of Johore, was then Acting Governor of the Settlements. He at once placed Muar under the control of Abubakar, pending the Colonial Office's decision. His action was confirmed, although with some reluctance, and thus the ancient line of the Emperors of Johore which had once ruled over almost the whole of British Malaya, was deprived of the last shred of territory in the Peninsula.⁴⁷ Moreover the descendants of Sultan Ali never received the title of Sultan, although the Treaty of 1855 had promised that this rank and the territory of Muar should be held by them. His son and grandson were known simply as "Tunku", a title of princely rank not necessarily implying sovereignty.⁴⁸ Meanwhile in 1868, the Temenggong was raised to the rank of "Maharajah of the State and Territory of Johore" by the British Government.⁴⁹ As some compensation for the loss of Muar, Sir William Robinson, the new Governor, in 1877 induced Abubakar to raise the pension from \$500 to \$1250 a month.⁵⁰

The Company's interference in the affairs of Johore was not inconsistent with its policy of non-intervention, although at first sight it might appear so. The proximity of Johore to Singapore, and the presence of the two chieftains with their Malay followers in the city itself,

44. Read, *Play and Politics*, 15-18. IPFP, Range 201, Vol. 14: Jan. 19, 1855, Nos. 285-93. IPFP, Range 200, Vol. 52: Feb. 10, 1854, Nos. 178-83.

45. *Ibid.*, No. 294. IPFP, Range 201. Vol. 20: April 27, 1855, Nos. 164-68.

46. Aitchison, *Treaties*, I, 432-33.

47. Anson, *About Others and Myself*, 353, 356-57. Read, *Play and Politics*, 18-19.

48. Swettenham, *British Malaya*, 101.

49. *Ibid.*, 101, and 114. Read, *Play and Politics*, 23.

50. *Ibid.*, 19-23. Swettenham, *British Malaya*, 101.

meant that war between them would have immediate effects upon its trade. The despatches which have been quoted above frequently referred to the bitterness of the feud between the two factions, and the probability that it would end in bloodshed. Altogether apart from the considerations of justice which so influenced Blundell it was very natural that the Straits Government should be anxious to settle a dispute which contained the seeds of much future trouble. Since moreover both chieftains lived in Singapore, and drew a large part — in Ali's case, the whole — of their incomes from the Company's pensions, they were much more amenable to the Government's control than the Sultans of the other Malay States.

Of the wisdom of the Company's Malayan policy it is difficult to speak with certainty. The ease with which British control was established after 1874 is too apt to lead critics to forget that warfare in an unmapped and almost pathless jungle against an enemy expert in guerilla fighting was much more difficult in the days of muzzle-loading cannon and the Brown Bess than when it became a case of sword and musket against the Martini Henry and modern artillery. Even so the experience of Rajah Brooke in Sarawak shows that the Directors greatly overrated the risk and expense of a forward policy. A certain amount of fighting would have been inevitable; but there seems no reason to suppose that it would have been very serious. Half the battle had already been won; the British had established what may be described as a moral predominance over the Malays. The Malay rulers felt themselves "checked and to some extent overawed by the presence of a race the extent of whose pervasion they cannot estimate, and whose civilization they cannot expect ever to attain to or even to imitate."⁵¹ Regarding the question solely from the point of view of the Indian Government there was however much to be said for its attitude: the policy of non-intervention was the natural course to adopt towards a region in which it was so little interested as the Malay Peninsula.

51. *JIA*, III, 606, Colonel Low in 1847.

X

Trade and Agriculture In British Malaya.

The Straits Settlements throughout their history were the most important centre of British trade with Further Asia. No local manufactures of importance existed, with the exception of the sago and (for some time after 1867) the tapioca factories; and agriculture was always a minor, though not unimportant industry. The Straits Settlements were essentially centres of exchange, and grew wealthy by their transit trade. Their prosperity was the result of two causes, their situation on the great trade route through the Straits of Malacca, and their system of free trade. The manufactures of Europe and India were brought to the Straits Settlements, and above all to Singapore, for transhipment to China, or for distribution throughout Indo-China and the East Indian islands. Conversely, they were the great depot where the products of Siam, the Malay Peninsula, and the Archipelago were collected, to be sent to Great Britain, India and China. The history of the Straits Settlements is in its essence the expansion of their commerce from Burma to Australia and from Java to China.

Agriculture before 1867 was of much less importance than it has since become through the formation of rubber plantations in the Peninsula. During the earlier period it was largely confined to the cultivation of spices and gambier, although there was a large amount of rice-farming in Province Wellesley and Malacca. There were also some sugar and coconut plantations. About 1803 the Directors hoped to make of Penang a second Moluccas, and so render themselves independent of the Spice Islands. For a few years the prospects were most encouraging.¹ Pepper was the staple product, the average annual output until about 1810 being some 4,000,000 pounds while in quality it was superior to that of any other part of the East Indies.² The price obtainable decreased however, and the industry was gradually abandoned. By 1835 the amount produced had sunk to about 266,600 pounds, and by 1847 the growth of pepper had become unimportant.³ The same lack of success attended the early attempts to grow

1. v. chapter on Penang.

2. Low, *A Dissertation on the Agriculture of Penang, Singapore and Malacca*, p. 40. Crawford, *History of the Indian Archipelago*, II, 359.

3. Low, *Dissertation on Penang*, 40; *JIA*, IV, 378, Low.

cloves and nutmegs — principally, it would appear, because the planters were ignorant of the proper methods of cultivation.⁴ By 1818 the industry had in great measure been abandoned, and until about 1833 only a single planter, Brown of Glugor, made any serious attempts to continue the cultivation.⁵ The refusal of the Company until 1841-45 to sell lands in perpetuity, or grant them on long leases, also hampered cultivation greatly. Spice cultivation required a heavy initial outlay, and since it was many years before the plants began to bear, capitalists were unwilling to spend large sums of money on lands which they could only obtain on short leases.⁶ By 1833 Brown's efforts were at last successful, and there was an immediate and marked increase in the number of plantations.⁷ By 1847 nutmegs and cloves had become the staple product of Penang. This continued until 1860 when a blight fell upon the spice plants. At this time half the island was covered with spice plantations: but in a few years the greater part of the trees were killed by disease.⁸

The growth of sugar began in Province Wellesley during the thirties of the last century, but did not become important until 1846. The change was due to the reduction of the duty on Penang sugar imported into England to the same amount as that levied on sugar grown in Bengal. The granting of land in perpetuity instead of on lease, referred to above, also fostered the growth of the industry. From this time the area under sugar cultivation steadily increased.⁹

The history of spice cultivation at Malacca can be dismissed in a few words: there was none. The Malacca land question proved itself to be a veritable Old Man of the Sea, and successfully strangled every attempt to foster agriculture. In spite of the excellence of the soil, Malacca did not even produce sufficient rice to feed its

4. Low, *Dissertation on Penang*, 16-17.

5. *Ibid.*, 19-20; SSR, Vol. 67. Braddell, *Statistics of the British Possessions in the Straits of Malacca*, 12.

6. *Despatches to India and Bengal*, Vol. 28. Sept. 1. 1841. B. Pub., Range 13, Vol. 33, April 8, 1840, No. 14-28. - *Ibid.*, Vol. 50: Oct. 30, 1845, No. 35. Newbold, *Straits of Malacca*, I. 270-72.

7. Braddell, *Statistics*, 13. Low, *Dissertation on Penang*, 19-21.

8. *Straits Settlements Annual Report*, 1860-61, p. 20. *Ibid.*, 1861-62, p. 36. Braddell, *Statistics*, 13. PP (H., of C.) No. 259 of 1862 p. 56 (Vol. XL).

9. *Ibid.*, 13. JIA, IV, 378, Low. JIA, II, 141, Balestier.

own population. It exported only a few coconuts and a little fruit.¹⁰

In Singapore the cultivation of cloves, nutmegs and sugar was a complete failure, although for many years pepper and gambier yielded large returns. As early as 1824 Governor John Crawfurd, the encyclopaedic oracle on all matters Malayan, had predicted that this would be the case, since the soil, while well suited to the pepper plant, was unsuitable for the more valuable spices.¹¹ His warnings were unheeded, and for over a generation much labour and money were wasted in the growth of cloves, nutmegs and sugar. Spice cultivation had been introduced by Raffles in 1819, and for about twenty-five years the prospects of success appeared hopeful. Until 1841-45 the Company's land laws hindered cultivation as at Penang; but even after they were amended the natural unsuitability of the soil was an obstacle which no legislation could overcome. By 1847 the growth of cloves and nutmegs had failed. The sugar plantations also were never of much importance.¹²

Gambier and pepper however were for many years cultivated with much success. There were many large plantations which, as at Penang, were entirely owned and worked by Chinese. It may be questioned however whether they were not in the long run an evil. Their sole object being to make money as rapidly as possible, they made no attempt to manure the soil, and in a few years exhausted its richness. As soon as their plantations became unproductive they abandoned them, moved further into the jungle, and recommenced the same process. Large areas on the island thus relapsed into wilderness, and could never again be used without a heavy expenditure to restore the soil. By 1840 the natural richness of the island had already begun to wane, and the Chinese planters in growing numbers abandoned it for the neighbouring mainland of Johore, where they commenced the same method of agriculture.¹³ By 1860 only some 40 square

10. v. chapter on the Malacca Land-Problem. *JIA*, II, 144-45. 745: IV, 379. Crawfurd, *Descriptive Dictionary*, 239-40.

11. Crawfurd, *Embassy to Slam*, 534. *JIA*, III, 508-10.

12. Newbold, *Straits of Malacca*, I, 269-72. Buckley, *Singapore*, I, 306. *Despatches to India and Bengal*, Vol. 28: Sept. 1, 1841. *B. Pub.*, Range 13, Vol. 33; April 8, 1840 Nos. 14-28. *Ibid.*, Vol. 50: Oct. 30, 1845, No. 35. Braddell, *Statistics*, 16-18. *JIA*, II, 145-50, Balestier. *JIA*, III, 509-10. *JIA*, IV, 102, Thomson.

13. Low, *Dissertation on Penang*, 40-41. *JIA* II, 145, Balestier. Buckley, *Singapore*, I, 307, 335-37, 353, 362, 400, 405-6; II, 431, 487.

miles out of an available area of about 225 were under cultivation, and the amount of pepper and gambier produced had greatly decreased.¹⁴

The trade of Penang between 1786 and 1819 in the end proved as great a disappointment to the Directors as the cultivation of spices. After the British conquest of Malacca and other Dutch possessions in 1795, and above all when with the capture of Java in 1811 the empire of Holland was annihilated, Penang had the most favourable of opportunities to show whether it could become as its panegyrists averred the trading centre of the Archipelago. In this it failed signally. From 1786 to 1810 indeed commerce increased rapidly; but from 1810 to 1821 it remained practically stationary. In 1821 the value of its trade was \$6,000,000, about one seventh of that of Singapore in 1854, thirty-five years after its foundation.¹⁵

The reason for the Directors' disappointment was not far to seek. Penang lay on the western edge of the Eastern Archipelago, hundreds of miles from its centre. Moreover the Straits of Malacca swarmed with pirates, who did immense damage to the small and ill-armed praus (native craft). Furthermore Penang had two rivals whose position was much superior, Malacca, which lay 280 miles to the south eastward, and Rhio, the great Bugis port near Singapore. The disadvantages more than counterbalanced the points in Penang's favour. These were the Malays' strong dislike of the Dutch and preference for the British, and the great attraction of the low customs duties at Penang as compared with the heavy dues levied at Dutch ports. The majority of the praus from the eastern part of the Archipelago stopped at Rhio or Malacca, and only a comparatively small number made the long and dangerous journey to Penang. Apart from them, and a small but flourishing trade with Siam and China, the bulk of Penang's commerce was with the countries in its immediate neighbourhood. These were Burma, the western coast of the Malay Peninsula, and above all Achin and the petty states of Northern Sumatra.

14. Braddell, *Statistics*, 7, 16. Newbold, *Straits of Malacca*, I, 270.

15. SSR, 102: July 16, 1825. Braddell, *Statistics*, 6. The commercial year in the Straits Settlements was from May 1 to April 30, (*Earl, Eastern Seas*, 418), and all annual trade returns quoted in this chapter are based on this system of reckoning.

In 1867 Northern Sumatra was still the most important market, British and Indian manufactures being exchanged for pepper. Northern Sumatra was in 1824 the most important pepper-producing country in the world, its output being about 58% of the total amount.¹⁶ Raffles saw the position clearly, and pointed out again and again that the position of Penang was an insuperable obstacle; the only way to obtain an important share of the trade of the East Indian Islands was to establish a post near the southern entrance of the Straits of Malacca.¹⁷

The occupation of Singapore marked the beginning of a new chapter in the history of British trade with the Archipelago. Although fluctuations inevitably occurred, from the date of its foundation there was on the whole a steady and phenomenal increase in the volume of commerce. The hostility of Holland, the partial closing of many markets, as for example in Indo-China owing to the French conquests, these and many other obstacles were powerless to impede its progress. The growth of Singapore's trade has few parallels in the history of commerce.

The secret of its prosperity lies primarily in its position. At the Southern entrance of the Straits of Malacca, the island was designed by nature to be the centre of trade for the Malay Peninsula, Sumatra, and the islands to the eastwards. Within easy sail of Siam, Indo-China, and China, and lying on the shortest trade-route from Europe and India to the Far East, Singapore inevitably became the centre where the merchants of Europe and the Orient came to exchange their manufactures for the products of the Archipelago. Singapore's position by itself, however, would not have sufficed. Its trade would have been far smaller had it been burdened with the heavy dues and vexatious regulations which in 1819 were in force in every Dutch port. The Bugis of Celebes, the principal traders of the East Indian islands, would scarcely have sailed hundreds of miles out of their course for the privilege of paying heavy duties when so many Dutch ports lay at their very doors. Sir Stamford Raffles foresaw that a town where commerce was untaxed and harbour regulations were almost non-existent would prove an irresistible

16. Crawford, *Embassy to Siam*, 423.

17. Leith, *Prince of Wales Island*, 47-48. Crawford, *Embassy to Siam*, 549. Lady Raffles, *Memoir*, 306-8. JIA, IV, 113. Low. Boulger, *Raffles*, 270-1, 295-96. Raffles, *Statement of Services*, 51. SSR, 100: March 21, 1825.

attraction. His policy was soon justified: merchants flocked to Singapore from every part of the Archipelago and the Far East, and every effort of the Dutch to prevent them proved unavailing. By 1824-25 the total value of the exports and imports had already risen to \$13,519,137, more than twice the trade of Penang, and eight times that of Malacca.¹⁸ The merchants of Singapore, Chinese as well as European, always regarded free trade as the palladium of their city, and firmly, and on the whole successfully, resisted the periodical attempts of the Company to tamper with it. To its continuance, and to their spirit of daring enterprise, they owed their continued prosperity.

Almost an immediate result of the foundation of Singapore was that the trade of Penang and Malacca began rapidly to decline. Writing in 1830 Governor Fullerton reported that Singapore had "annihilated" the declining trade of Malacca, and "bade fair to annihilate that of Penang also."¹⁹ While the Governor was unduly pessimistic, the annual trade-returns show that he had good cause for uneasiness.

From 1819 to 1821 the trade of Penang was apparently unaffected by Singapore, the value of the imports and exports in 1822 about \$6,500,000 being the highest yet attained.²⁰ In 1823 however the decline began and by July 1825 Penang's commerce had decreased to \$5,265,902.²¹ The trade for the following year, 1825-26, showed a further decrease of over \$300,000, the total value being only \$4,964,141.²² In subsequent years the decline became more rapid than before, until in 1830 the trade of Penang amounted to only about \$3,149,151 or £708,559.²³ This was little more than half what it had been in 1821.

The decline of Penang's commerce was the inevitable result of the superior situation of Singapore. An analysis of the trade returns shows that after 1822 Singapore had captured almost all of the older settlement's trade except with Northern Sumatra and the West coast of

18. Crawford, *Embassy to Siam*, 537.

19. SSR, 133: April 29, 1830.

20. Braddell, *Statistics*, 6. SSR, 102: July 16, 1825.

21. *Ibid.*

22. SSR, 114.

23. Braddell, *Statistics*, 6.

the Malay Peninsula — in short, the territory which lay much nearer to Penang than to Singapore. Even here the competition of Singapore was very keen. Penang also retained an important trade with China, apparently because the island served as a depot for the collection of pepper, tin, birds nests, etc, from the adjacent countries, and it was found more convenient to ship the produce directly to China than to forward it to Singapore for transmission from there. But with these exceptions the trade of Penang had almost ceased to exist. Over three-quarters of its commerce with Siam had passed into the hands of Singapore, and apart from an insignificant amount of trade with Java, Penang had lost almost the whole of its former commerce with the islands east of the Straits of Malacca. Even in the trade area remaining to it Penang was becoming to some extent a commercial dependency of Singapore. The ships from Europe which formerly stopped there went on to Singapore without calling at Penang; and a large part of the European manufactures required for its trade no longer came to it directly, but were taken to Singapore, and sent back from there.²⁴

The remedy proposed by the Penang Council to restore the trade of Penang was to destroy the freedom of trade at Singapore, by extending to it the customs duties levied at Penang. The Council also urged that the same course should be followed at Malacca, which had also been a free port since its transfer to the Company.²⁵ The Directors consented, but the friends of Singapore in England brought up the matter in Parliament. The Cabinet not only forbade the imposition of customs duties, but also ordered the abolition of those at Penang.²⁶ With much chagrin the Directors obeyed, and in 1827 Penang became a free port.²⁷ Thus the unexpected result of the attempt to fetter the trade of Singapore was to establish free trade throughout the Straits Settlements.

If the effect of Singapore's competition on Penang was serious, upon Malacca it was disastrous. The town

24. SSR, 102: July 16, 1825. SSR, 105: Dec. 17, 1825, SSR, 114: SSR, 133: April 29, 1830.

25. SSR, 86: Aug. 1 and 29, 1822. *Ibid.*, 102: July 16, 1825. *Ibid.*, 184: Feb. 1, 1826 and Jan. 25, 1827.

26. Crawford, *Embassy to Siam*, 24. PP, (H. of C.) No. 254 of 1857-58, pp. 5-7. (Vol. XLIII).

27. SSR, 112: Nov. 23, 1826. *Ibid.*, 184: Jan. 25 and Nov. 6, 1827.

had already suffered severely from the occupation of Penang, which had deprived it of its trade to the westward. A second blow had been struck during the first British occupation, when a partially successful attempt was made to destroy the town and divert its trade to Penang. Furthermore the harbour of Malacca was rapidly silting up. The foundation of Singapore however was a far more serious blow than any of the foregoing. By its position 120 miles to the south east of Malacca the new settlement had exactly the same advantage over Malacca which that port had formerly held over Penang. Within a few years Malacca lost forever the whole of its commerce with the Archipelago and China. With rival ports on both sides, the trade of the ancient city became almost entirely confined to the neighbouring states of the Malay Peninsula and Sumatra. Malacca also retained a small direct trade with India and China; but on the whole it became a mere depot where the produce of the adjacent countries was collected for transmission to Penang and above all Singapore.²⁸

Most of the trade returns for the early nineteenth century seem to have perished, but enough remain to show how complete was Malacca's downfall. In 1779 it was still very prosperous; but in 1826 its commerce had fallen to \$1,037,649, or about £200,000.²⁹ In 1829 its trade reached its lowest point, with a total value of £133,067.³⁰ Fullerton scarcely exaggerated when in 1830 he wrote that through the competition of Singapore its already declining commerce had been "annihilated."³¹ As early as 1828 Governor Fullerton saw that its days as a great trading centre were over, and that henceforth it must depend upon its agricultural resources. His attempts to develop them were defeated by the Malacca Land Problem.³² The city sank rapidly into a state of stagnation, a picturesque back-water to which the wealthy Chinese merchants of Singapore retired to spend their declining years.

The remarkable growth of trade in the Straits

28. SSR, 172: July 5, 1827. SSR, 133: April 29, 1830. Crawford, *Descriptive Dictionary*, 240. Newbold, *Straits of Malacca*, I, 145-50. JIA, II, 749-50, Blundell.

29. *Ibid.*, 749. SSR, 172, July 5, 1827.

30. Braddell, *Statistics*, 6.

31. SSR, 133: April 29, 1830.

32. v. chapter on Malacca Land Problem.

Settlements during the period 1825 to 1864 is shown by the following table.³³

<i>Year</i>	<i>Penang</i>	<i>Singapore</i>	<i>Malacca</i>	<i>Total</i>
1825	£1,114,614	£ 2,610,440	£318,426	£ 4,043,480
1830	£ 708,559	£ 3,948,784	£141,205	£ 4,798,548
1840	£1,475,759	£ 5,851,924	[No data]	£ 7,327,683
1850	£1,644,931	£ 5,637,287	£439,175	£ 7,721,393
1859	£3,530,000	£10,371,300	£920,000	£14,821,300
1864	£4,496,205	£13,252,175	£821,698	£18,570,080

The trade of Penang reached its lowest ebb in 1830, but after this date it rapidly recovered until it attained to about the same amount as in 1819. It then remained practically stationary until 1843. Thereafter commerce steadily increased, although to a far less degree than at Singapore, until by 1857 it was more than double what it had been in 1819. The trade area of Penang continued to be limited to the West coast of the Malay Peninsula, Northern Sumatra, Siam, Burma, and to a small extent, Java, China, and Borneo. The increase of trade after 1843 was the result of developing trade with the markets which Penang had retained after 1819, and was not due to acquiring any new fields of expansion. The most important area from which Straits produce, and especially pepper, was obtained, was Achin, and the states of Northern Sumatra. That the rate of increase was much slower than it became after British intervention in the Malay States was largely due to the anarchic condition of the Peninsula, and to the very hampering effect upon trade of the Company's policy of non-intervention in Malayan affairs even to protect British merchants.

Penang continued to be what it had already become by 1830, a local trading-centre where the produce of the adjacent countries was exchanged for the manufactures of

33. The figures for the years 1825, 1830, 1840 and 1850 are taken from Braddell, *Statistics*, p. 6; for 1859 from PP. (H. of C.) No. 259 of 1862, p. 44; for 1864 from the *Tabular Statement of the Trade of the Straits Settlements*, 1864-65, pp. 1-131. The figures for 1864 have been converted from rupees to pounds sterling at the then exchange value of two shillings to the rupee. Many of the trade reports for the period are missing from the India Office archives; and of those which can be found, not all classify trade under the same headings. Trade between the three Straits Settlements, for example, is sometimes omitted, sometimes included in the trade returns for each city, or at times put down in a lump sum so that it is impossible to apportion it among the three Settlements.

Great Britain and India. Commerce with China recovered and became an important branch of the island's trade. The centre of the opium traffic had shifted to Singapore; but large quantities of silks and other goods from China were imported and exchanged for Straits produce. Straits produce was the trade term for the typical products of the East Indian islands and the Malay Peninsula, such as pepper and other spices, gambier, tin, camphor, beeswax, coffee, ebony, antimony from Borneo, tortoise-shell, beche-de-mer, birds' nests, rattans, gold-dust, pearls, sandal-wood. It is an interesting fact that an important part of the island's trade with China was composed of sea slugs, birds' nests, and similar delicacies. To some extent Penang was a commercial dependency of Singapore; a great part of its trade was not carried on directly, but through the medium of Singapore. Much of the Straits produce which it collected was not sent directly to Great Britain, India, and China, but was shipped to Singapore and forwarded from there. Similarly a great deal of the British and Indian manufactures which it required did not come to it by direct shipment, but was sent first to Singapore, and then transmitted to Penang.³⁴

The trade of Malacca remained in a moribund condition until 1843. It then began to increase, and by 1865 was over six times as large as in 1829. No new markets were obtained, and the trade area of Malacca continued to be confined almost entirely to the neighbouring states of the Malay Peninsula and the opposite coast of Sumatra. The trade with the Peninsula should have been far larger than it was, especially since from October to April the monsoons prevented vessels from calling at the ports on the East coast. The anarchic condition of the Malay states however had almost closed the ancient overland trade-routes. Malacca had very little direct trade with China or India, and practically none with Great Britain, the supplies of British and Indian manufactures which it required coming to some extent from Penang, but in the main from Singapore. The Straits produce collected at

34. SSR, 133: April 29, 1830. B. Pub., Range 13, Vol. 25: Nov. 1, 1837, Nos. 2-6. Ibid., Vol. 28: No. 9. Ibid., Vol. 36: May 5, 1841, Nos. 3-4. Ibid., Vol. 64: April 7, 1847, No. 7. Ibid., Vol. 54: Aug. 27, 1845, No. 13. B. Pub., Range 14, Vol. 15: Sept. 10, 1851, Nos. 48-48E. Straits Settlements Annual Report, 1860-61, pp. 31-33. Ibid., 1861-62, Appendix, xvii. Tabular Statement of Straits Settlements' Trade, 1864-65, pp. 1-131. Davidson, Trade and Travel, 98. Newbold, Straits of Malacca, I, 342-50. PP, (H. of C.,) No. 259 of 1862, p. 44. (Vol. XL). Braddell, Statistics, 6.

Malacca was not sent directly to its destination, but was forwarded to Penang and Singapore for shipment. To a greater degree than Penang, Malacca was an outpost, a commercial dependency of Singapore.³⁵

The trade of Singapore overshadowed that of Penang and Malacca so completely that a description of the commerce of the Straits Settlements is apt to assign to the two other ports even less importance than they deserved. The Straits Government of the period behaved in similar fashion: after a few pages devoted to Penang and Malacca, officials hastened to plunge into folios of description of the marvellous growth of Singapore. So great was their enthusiasm that even reports of imports and exports read like paeans of praise. The Government of India itself, little given as it was to regard the Straits Settlements in a roseate light, joined in the chorus, soberly and with reserve, in general, as befitted its dignity. At times however the Governor-General and his Council were carried away by some astounding leap forward, and became almost lyrical in their satisfaction.

From 1825 to 1867 Singapore was the centre of the British commerce with the East Indies, and, with Canton and Hongkong, the headquarters of the trade with China. The bulk of its import and export trade was with Great Britain and India, while the commerce with China was a good second. The principal imports from Britain were cotton and woollen cloths, "piece goods" as they were called, iron, and manufactured articles. From India came opium (one of the most important items of trade), Indian cloths, etc. Part of the imports from India and Great Britain were intended for the China trade. From Singapore they were either carried to their destination by European vessels from India, "country ships" as they were called, or were sold to the Chinese junks which every year came to the port in large numbers. The goods from Great Britain and India which were intended for the trade with the Archipelago were sold at Singapore to the native merchants who carried them far and wide over the East Indian islands, and in return brought back Straits produce. Few European vessels engaged in trade in the Archipelago itself. The exports of Singapore consisted of imports from China, such as tea, silks and cassia, and Straits produce, collected from every part of

35. JIA, II, 749-54, Blundell. Braddell, *Statistics*, 6. v. references to Note 34.

the East Indian islands, Half to two-thirds were sent to Great Britain and India. The amount of trade with Continental Europe and the United States was small but increasing. The exports were the same as to Great Britain and India, while the imports were principally wines, piece goods, steel and iron.

Next to the commerce with Great Britain and India, and rivalling it in importance, came the trade with China. For a thousand years or more Chinese junks had made regular voyages to the East Indies, and they very quickly appreciated the importance of Singapore. The island rapidly became the greatest trading centre in the Archipelago, and by 1860 its commerce amounted to £10,371,300, while that of the whole Dutch East Indian Empire was only £14,300,000.³⁶ Moreover it was free from the duties and regulations of the Dutch ports. To it therefore they resorted in ever-increasing numbers, exchanging their cargoes of silk and tea for Straits produce, opium and British manufactures.

In addition to the trade with China, the basis of Singapore's prosperity was its trade with the East Indian islands and the Malay Peninsula. Each year hundreds of praus thronged the harbour, drawn from every part of the Archipelago, from Sumatra to New Guinea. The Dutch hampered this trade so far as they were able, especially in Sumatra; but despite all their efforts the native merchants preferred to risk long voyages through the pirate-infested waters of the Archipelago rather than take their wares to a Dutch harbour. Even when Holland finally brought herself to sacrifice revenue and created free ports she was unable to do more than capture part of the trade of the islands near them. Rhio, the old Bugis trading-centre near Singapore, was made a free port in 1834, but the move was a complete failure. The harbour remained almost deserted, and what little trade the island possessed was mainly with Singapore. Macassar in Celebes, which was created a free port in 1847, diverted to itself a considerable amount of trade from the south-eastern part of the Archipelago, but this was more than atoned for by gains elsewhere. It may be observed in passing that the returns of trade with Borneo show a sudden and remarkably large increase after 1840, and thus bear eloquent testimony to the results of Rajah Brooke's work in Sarawak and against the Borneo pirates.

36. PP, (H. of C.), No. 259 of 1862, p. 44. (Vol. XL).

Java and the other Dutch islands were one of the most important markets of Singapore. Holland restricted the commerce in many ways, and frequent complaints were made that in seeking to hamper it she was breaking the Treaty of 1824. In spite of all her efforts however the trade with the Dutch colonies was always one of the most valuable branches of Singapore's commerce. The principal imports from them were European manufactures, tin, and Straits produce, while the exports were British and Chinese piece goods in very large quantities, opium, silk, iron, etc.

Singapore also carried on a very flourishing trade with Siam, and, to a lesser degree, Cochin-China. The exports were British manufactures, opium, and Straits produce, while the imports were rice, ivory, salt, and most important of all, sugar. Towards the end of this period the French conquests greatly curtailed the trade with Cochin-China.³⁷

Owing to the subsequent extension of British power over the Malay Peninsula, special interest attaches to the commercial relations which existed at this period between the Straits Settlements and the hinterland. The trade was of far less importance than it became after British intervention began in 1874. Penang had a valuable trade with the West coast of the Peninsula, while Singapore had a small trade with the West, and an increasing commerce with the East coast. From 1825 to 1865 Singapore's East coast trade grew steadily in value, although it does not seem ever to have exceeded about £400,000 a year or 4% of the total commerce. The trade was due to the energy of native traders, especially Chinese, and was carried on in small native vessels. British and Indian piece goods, iron and opium were exchanged for Straits pro-

37. SSR, Vol. 133: April 29, 1830. PP, (H. of C.) No. 644 of 1830, pp. 311-12, and 353 (Vol. V). PP, (H. of C.), No. 259 of 1862 p. 44. (Vol. XL). B. Pub., Range 13. Vol. 25: Nov. 1, 1837, Nos. 2-6. Ibid., Vol. 28: No. 9. Ibid., Vol. 36: May 5, 1841, Nos. 3-4. Ibid., Vol. 54: Aug. 27, 1845, No. 13. Ibid., Vol. 64: April 7, 1847, Nos. 7-11: April 28, 1847, Nos. 15-21. B. Pub., Range 14, Vol. 15: Sept. 10, 1851, Nos. 48-48 E. Straits Settlements Annual Report, 1860-61, pp. 61-63. Ibid., 1861-62, p. 40. Tabular Statement of Straits Settlements Trade, 1864-65, pp. 1-131. Crawford, Embassy to Siam, 539, 543. Newbold, Straits of Malacca, I, 290-364, 369. Moniteur des Indes Orientales, 1848-49, Vol. II, Pt. II, 28-29. Ibid., 1846-47, I, 307-8. Cameron, Malayan India, 175-86. 193. Davidson Trade and Travel, 74-75. Begbie, Malay Peninsula, 315-40. Crawford, History of the Indian Archipelago, II, 503-21.

duce, especially gold-dust and tin. The greater part of the trade was with Pahang, where there were large colonies of Chinese miners. Up to 1836, and to a lesser degree for about twenty years thereafter, the trade with the East coast suffered severely at the hands of Malay, Chinese and Lanun pirates, against whom the small and ill-armed trading praus could make only a poor defence.³⁸

The question of how much was known in the Straits Settlements during this period of the resources of the Peninsula is of great importance. One of the principal reasons for the agitation which led to the severance from the control of India in 1867 was the strong dissatisfaction aroused by the Government's Malayan policy which greatly hampered trade with the hinterland. It is clear that while very little was known of the interior, it was realized that the Peninsula was exceedingly rich in natural resources, and that trade was capable of almost indefinite expansion. The existing commerce, small as it was, furnished ample proof of this. Furthermore the evidence from this source was supported by the information collected between 1820 and 1860 by officials and merchants in the Settlements. The investigations of Sir Stamford Raffles first aroused interest in the Peninsula. His example inspired others, and in the generation which followed his departure from the Straits several valuable works were written on the subject. The most important was Lieutenant Newbold's **Straits of Malacca**, a most painstaking compilation of all the information which he acquired during the years he served with his regiment in the Straits, either from personal investigation or the reports of natives. During the thirties and forties Newbold was the standard authority on the Malay Peninsula, and was frequently quoted by the Straits Government in its despatches. John Crawford, the ex-Resident of Singapore, wrote several very valuable books dealing in part with the Peninsula. During the forties and fifties there appeared a very excellent review, the **Journal of the Indian Archipelago** edited by J. R. Logan. It is a mine of information on all matters relating to the Peninsula, and was supported by the Straits Government, the contribu-

38. B. Pub., Range 12, Vol. 58: Feb. 1, 1831, No. 6. B. Pub., Range 13, Vol. 3: Aug. 19, 1833, No. 2. Ibid., Vol. 54: Aug. 27, 1845, No. 13. Ibid., Vol. 64: April 7, 1847, Nos. 7-11. v. also references in **Bengal Public Consultations and Straits Settlements Reports** in Note 37. Newbold, **Straits of Malacca**, I, 354 and passim, II, 55-57. v. chapter on Piracy.

tors including many of the leading officials in the Straits. While it is difficult to estimate how widely these works were read, it seems clear that the information which they contained was generally known. Much of it was supplied by the merchants of the Straits; and the local newspapers helped to diffuse it by publishing extracts.

On reading these works, the salient fact which emerges is how little was known of the Peninsula, and yet at the same time how important the information was. Fairly accurate information was obtainable regarding the coasts and a belt of land extending a few miles inland; but the interior was practically a "terra incognita." Nevertheless it was clearly realized how rich a field the Peninsula was for commercial expansion. The merchants of the Straits Settlements were well aware that it was "a great magazine of tin, incomparably the greatest on the globe."³⁹ Pahang was believed to have large gold deposits, iron and coal had also been found in various places, and it was known that the soil of the Peninsula was well adapted for plantations of sugar, rice, etc. In short, the inhabitants of the Straits Settlements saw clearly that their Peninsular trade could be vastly expanded if the Indian government would intervene and put an end to the anarchy in the Malay States.⁴⁰

In concluding the account of the commerce of Singapore, a description of the type of vessels employed is of interest, if only as a record of conditions which have long since passed away. The steamship did not reach the Straits Settlements until 1845, and until then much of Singapore's trade with China, and practically the whole of that with the Archipelago, was carried on by vessels owned and manned by Asiatics. Every year when the north-east monsoon began to blow in November, the junks sailed from China on their annual voyage to Singapore, and arrived at the port after a passage of twenty to forty days. Not only the merchants on board, but also the officers and crew, had each a stock of merchandise to dispose of. The junks did not leave until the winds

39. Crawford, *Descriptive Dictionary*, 254.

40. *Ibid.*, 195, 254-55, 435-36. Newbold, *Straits of Malacca*, I, 399-418, 424-31 and *passim*. Begbie, *Malay Peninsula*, 291, 387-427. Anderson, *Malay Peninsula*, 117-204. Moor, *Notices of the Indian Archipelago*, 24-54, 72-83. Clifford, *Further India*, 323-30. Swettenham, *British Malaya*, 112-113. *JIA*, II, 102-6; IV, 497-504; and *passim*. *JRASSB*, I, 2-4, 10, 52-57. *B. Pub.*, Range 13, Vol. 55: Oct. 17, 1845, Nos. 5-11.

changed and the south-west monsoon began to blow, so that nearly eight months might be spent in making a single voyage to and from China.⁴¹ By about 1840 the number of junks which came annually to Singapore was between 150 and 250, of from 50 to 700 tons burden. The largest junks were 1200 tons, the same size as the best ships of the East India Company in 1820.⁴² The competition of steamers proved fatal to the junks, as to European sailing ships. By 1847 the number had already declined, and by 1865 it is said to have decreased to fifty.⁴³

The fleets of the Bugis have followed the Chinese junks into oblivion. Before the days of steamships, Singapore's trade with the East Indian islands was very largely carried on by small native craft, varying in size from a few tons up to sixty. Many races were engaged in the traffic, but the most important were the Bugis of Celebes. The Phoenicians of the Archipelago, their ships were found on every sea, and colonies were established in all the important ports. Skilful and daring sailors, they were noted for their courage, and in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries Bugis mercenaries were often employed by the British and Dutch East India Companies. In spite of their bravery and seamanship the Bugis, strangely enough, did not as a rule take to piracy, at least in the nineteenth century. Every year they came to Singapore to buy British piece goods, opium, iron, etc., in exchange for the Straits produce they had collected. It was largely owing to the Bugis that British manufactures were so widely disseminated throughout the East Indian islands. In 1828 the number of Bugis praus which came annually to Singapore was over 100, and by 1840 it had increased to about 200. As steamers became more and more extensively used in the Archipelago the fleets of the Bugis gradually dwindled away.⁴⁴

41. Buckley, *Singapore*, I, 323. Newbold, *Straits of Malacca*, I, 352.

42. Davidson, *Trade and Travel*, 53-55; Crawford, *History of the Indian Archipelago*, II, 280.

43. J. D. Ross, *Capital of a Little Empire*, 48. Buckley, *Singapore*, II, 723. B. Pub., Range 13, Vol. 64: April 7, 1847, No. 11. Mundy, Brooke, II, 340. Cameron, *Malayan India*, 40.

44. Crawford, *Embassy to Siam*, 543, 549. Lady Raffles, *Memoir*, Appendix, 10. Moor, *Notices of the Indian Archipelago*, 15, 41-43, 73-74. Earl, *Eastern Seas*, 327, 338-39, 389-91, 427, 430-31. Buckley, *Singapore*, I, 320, 324; II, 579. Wilkes, *Exploring Expedition*, V, 424-25. Davidson, *Trade and Travel*, 56-58. Cameron, *Malayan India*, 44. Ross, *Capital of a Little Empire*, 47, 48, 51. Newbold, *Straits of Malacca*, I, 356-57.

XI

The Chinese In British Malaya.

No account of the Straits Settlements could be complete which ignored the great part that the Chinese have played in their development. It is no exaggeration to say that the prosperity of British Malaya is based upon the labour of the Chinese. The Europeans, never more than a handful, have been almost without exception officials, merchants, planters, sea-captains, or professional men. In other words, they have been the brains, the guiding and impelling force, in the development of the colony. Unaided however they could never have created the prosperity and wealth which the Straits came to enjoy. British Malaya was in the main the product of British initiative and Chinese labour. In 1925 a third of the mines were worked by Chinese, the plantations depended on them for much of their labour while the artisans, small tradesmen, and the employees of the great merchants were on the whole Chinese. It is not in these subordinate positions alone however that they were found. Many professional men, and a large number of the wealthiest, most energetic and most influential merchants were of the same race. The Chinese can claim no small share of the credit for creating British Malaya.

Exaggerated as this description may seem, it is borne out by the testimony of every administrator of importance in the history of the Straits Settlements. Captain Light considered the Chinese to be "the most valuable part of our inhabitants."¹ Crawford reported to the Government of Bengal that the Chinese "form not only the largest, but the most industrious and useful portion of the Asiatic part of the population."² He considered them to be "next to Europeans, and indeed in many respects before them, the most active and valuable agents in developing the resources of the Peninsula."³ Newbold regarded them as "by far the most useful class in the Straits Settlements."⁴ Sir Frank Swettenham held that "their energy and enterprise have made the Malay States what they are to-day."⁵ And finally, Sir Charles Lucas considered that it was "impossible to overestimate the importance of their share in the development of the Straits."⁶

1. SSR, 6.

2. B. Pol., Range 123, Vol. 65: May 21, 1824, No. 26.

3. Crawford, *Descriptive Dictionary*, 96.

4. Newbold, *Straits of Malacca*, I, 8.

5. Swettenham, *British Malaya*, 232.

6. Lucas, *Historical Geography*, I, 219.

The reason for this is very simple: the Malays could not be induced to undertake hard and continuous work. As one writer uncharitably put it, they were "the most incorrigible loafers on the face of the earth."⁷ It is true that being a maritime people, with an inborn aptitude for seamanship, the Malays formed the greater part of the crews of the Country ships. This however was almost the only calling in which they proved satisfactory, apart from intermittent work on their own farms or as fishermen. For all the other requirements of a great commercial and agricultural colony they were useless.⁸ As in all tropical countries, it was impossible to use Europeans as manual workers, and recourse was therefore had to the Indians and the Chinese.

The role which the Indian played in the development of British Malaya was not a small one, but his contribution was far less important than that of the Chinese. Although many Indians are found in Singapore, the greater number have always been confined to Penang and Province Wellesley. In a lesser degree they have filled the same positions as the Chinese, the vast majority being servants, clerks, boatmen, artisans, petty traders and agricultural labourers. In all these callings however the Chinese have been better workmen and commanded higher wages. Moreover few Indians showed the characteristic Chinese energy and ability. It is significant that Straits officials whose early training had been received in India, and who were rather predisposed to favour the Indian, always rated the Chinese as a much more valuable class of immigrant.⁹

How completely the Straits Settlements depended upon Chinese labour is shown by the following quotation. "The Chinese are everything: they are actors, acrobats, artists, musicians, chemists and druggists, clerks, cashiers, engineers, architects, surveyors, missionaries, priests, doctors, school-masters, lodging-house keepers, butchers, pork-sellers, cultivators of pepper and gambier, cake-sellers, cart and hackney carriage owners, cloth hawkers, distillers of spirits, eating-house keepers, fishmongers, fruit-sellers, ferrymen, grass-sellers, hawkers, merchants and agents, oil-sellers, opium shopkeepers, pawn-brokers,

7. Ireland, *Eastern Tropics*, 137.

8. Cameron, *Malayan India*, 134-35, 139. Lucas, *Historical Geography*, I, 219-20.

9. Lucas, *Hist. Geog.* I, 219. Crawford, *Hist. of Ind. Arch.* I, 133-34. *Embassy to Siam* 20. PP, (H. of C.,) No. 644 of 1830, p. 297, (Vol. V, Pt. I.)

pig-dealers, and poulterers. They are rice-dealers, ship-chandlers, shop-keepers, general dealers, spirit shop keepers, servants, timber-dealers, tobacconists, vegetable sellers, planters, market-gardeners, labourers, bakers, millers, barbers, blacksmiths, boatmen, book-binders, boot and shoe-makers, brick-makers, carpenters, cabinet makers, carriage builders, cartwrights, cart and hackney carriage drivers, charcoal burners and sellers, coffinmakers, confectioners, contractors and builders, coopers, engine-drivers, and firemen, fishermen, goldsmiths, gunsmiths and locksmiths, limeburners, masons and bricklayers, mat, kajang and basket makers, oil manufacturers, and miners. To which we may add painters, paper lantern makers, porters, pea-grinders, printers, sago, sugar and gambier manufacturers, sawyers, seamen, ship and boat builders, soap boilers, stone cutters, sugar boilers, tailors, tanners, tin smiths and braziers, umbrella makers, undertakers and tomb-builders, watch-makers, water-carriers, wood cutters and sellers, wood and ivory carvers, fortune-tellers, grocers, beggars, idle vagabonds or "samsengs" and thieves."¹⁰

The extension of British power over the Malay States after 1874 was at once followed by a great increase in the number of Chinese there, until they were to be found in every part of the Peninsula. The passing years did not diminish their importance: they became more numerous, more indispensable, and more influential than ever. It is said that nearly the whole internal trade of British Malaya was in their hands.¹¹ They worked and owned part of the mines, they included many of the leading shop-keepers, and they supplied the bulk of the artisans, mechanics, petty shop-keepers, and a large percentage of the agricultural labourers.¹² In Sarawak, the Chinese were equally important in the development of the country, although of course their work was on a much smaller scale. The second Rajah, the successor of Sir James Brooke, said of them that "without the Chinese we can do nothing."¹³

Nothing is more characteristic of the history of the Chinese in the Straits Settlements than the frequency with which the penniless immigrant of a generation ago has become the respected and influential merchant prince of to-day. This tendency was not confined to British

10. Vaughan, *Chinese*, 16.

11. T.T. Soon, in *Noctes Orientalas*, 195-96.

12. *Ibid.*, 197. Lucas, *Historical Geography*, I, 219.

13. Baring-Gould & Bampfylde, *Sarawak*, 426.

Maalya, but was found also in Burma, Hongkong, British Columbia, and California — wherever in fact the Chinese enjoyed just government and protection. Many indeed from ill-fortune, gambling, or opium-smoking, after years of hard work filled paupers' graves; but a surprisingly large number achieved remarkable success. The explanation was to be found in the almost inhuman industry and the talent for business which are national characteristics. The average emigrant from China was a penniless labourer who had been allured by tales of the great riches to be won in Malaya. His ambition was to work hard for a few years, save a little money, and then return to his own home. The Chinese was a "bird of passage:" he did not regard the East Indies as his adopted country, but merely as a place of exile to which grinding poverty had driven him. Very often he had not sufficient money to pay his passage on the junk which took him to Penang or Singapore, and it was advanced to him by the captain. When such a junk arrived at the Straits the Chinese plantation and mine owners who wished to obtain labourers came on board, and the captain sold them the services of the coolies whose passage he had paid. The newcomers or sinkhehs, were then bound to work for their employer for one year, receiving in return board and lodging and a very small wage. This was the system which prevailed until after 1867 and naturally it afforded opportunities for oppressing the immigrant. The Straits Government took great pains to prevent this by supervising the proceedings, and making sure that the new arrivals were not unfairly treated. At the conclusion of their year of service the sinkhehs became their own masters, and scattered all over the Peninsula and the adjacent islands. Gradually they earned money, a part of which was regularly sent to their relatives in China. Many of the coolies finally attained their ambition: with a few thousand dollars, the fruit of years of hard work and frugal living, they returned home to live among their own people. A large number however remained in the Straits Settlements. Many were too poor to leave, others too successful. After a few years the poverty-stricken labourer — if he escaped ruin at the gambling-table or the opium-den, and did not cross the path of the pirates or of some rapacious Raja — had earned a few hundred dollars. He might then become the owner of a pepper-plantation or a tin-mine, or he might invest his little savings in trade. Frequently he fared forth into the anarchy-ridden Peninsula or the dangerous waters of the Archipelago. Between predatory Rajas on land and Lanun pirates at sea it would be hard to say which course was

the less perilous. Impelled however by their longing for wealth, thousands of Chinese faced the risk. Many found a nameless grave, while others gained a fortune. As their resources increased their ambitions grew, until amongst the wealthiest merchants of Singapore and Penang there were many who had landed on the docks with little beyond a threadbare coat and trousers of blue cotton. Gradually too the wealthy Chinese abandoned the idea of returning to China, and came to look upon the Straits Settlements as their home. In the course of years a new class sprang up, the Straits Babas, as they were called. In 1865 this evolution was still apparently in its infancy. The movement was no doubt accelerated as the first generation died out and the sons — frequently the children of Malay mothers, born and brought up in the Settlements — succeeded to their fathers' businesses.¹⁴ The same tendency is observable in Sarawak,¹⁵ and in cities like Vancouver and San Francisco where there has for years been a large Chinese population.

Although on the whole law-abiding the Chinese had two characteristics — a passion for gambling and for forming secret societies — which frequently brought them into collision with the Straits Government. A love of gambling seems to be ingrained in the race, and the mere fact that it was forbidden in the Straits Settlements appeared to them to be no reason why they should abstain from it. Attempts were continually made to evade the law, and often they were successful.¹⁶ Moreover during the first forty years or so of the existence of Singapore, it was afflicted by a constant series of Chinese gang-robberies. Bands of from twenty to one hundred made frequent attacks at night on native and sometimes isolated European houses. The thieves were not very brave, and a determined resistance often frightened them away; but on many occasions they were successful, and for years the police were unable to prevent these attacks.¹⁷

14. JIA, II, 284-89. Seah Eu Chin. JIA, (New Series) IV, 52, Sir Benson Maxwell. SSN, Vol. 115: Jan. 11, 1827. Cameron, *Malayan India*, 139-40. Buckley, *Singapore*, II, 658-60, 677. Vaughan, *Chinese*, 4, 5, 7-9, 11. 15. Newbold, *Straits of Malacca*, I, 11-12. Crawford, *Descriptive Dictionary*, 98.

15. Baring-Gould & Bampfylde, *Sarawak*, 426.

16. Cavenagh, *Reminiscences*, 256. *Straits Settlements Administration Report*, 1860-61, 3-11. Buckley, *Singapore*, *passim*.

17. Cameron, *Malayan India*, 262-65. Thomson, *Life in the Far East*, 203-5. Buckley, *Singapore*, I, 213-14, 224, 235-36, 274,

Gambling and robbery however faded into insignificance when compared with the activities of the secret societies. Although as a rule the respectable Chinese were not members, the whole of Chinese society in the Straits was permeated by these covert and often dangerous organizations. This state of affairs was not confined to British Malaya: in Sarawak, the Dutch East Indies, and in China itself the same conditions existed. A genius for combination was a predominant characteristic of the Chinese: from one point of view China itself might almost be regarded as a congeries of associations for agriculture or commerce. The villages formed agricultural societies in which each man had his part, so that farming might be more efficiently carried on; and merchants united in associations for trade. Benevolent societies to provide for needy members and ensure their decent burial were also very numerous. It need therefore cause no surprise that societies were formed which, despite their ostensibly benevolent purposes, might be described with fair accuracy as the Pirates and Robbers Co-operative Association. Many of them tried to be an "imperium in imperio," to enjoy the benefits of British rule and at the same time ignore any laws which did not suit their convenience. Moreover the societies were often bitterly hostile to one another, and their rivalries periodically culminated in bloody street-fights in which dozens of Chinese were sometimes killed. It is noteworthy however that on these occasions no attempt was made to attack Europeans unless they interfered to stop the fighting. The rival mobs would suspend operations and allow them to pass through their midst unscathed.¹⁸

Before dealing with the secret societies, it is necessary to refer to a peculiar form of protest indulged in by the Straits Chinese when they wished to obtain redress for grievances. If for example a law were passed which they did not understand, or of which they disapproved, they would close their shops and take to breaking one another's heads. Even on these occasions Europeans were very rarely molested, and the few exceptions appear to have been caused by the over-zealous attempts of the police and Volunteers to stop the fighting. These manoeuvres seem to have been merely a unique and forcible means of calling attention to grievances. It more or less corresponded to writing to the "Times." There is evidence

374-75, 385- II, 407, 424, 443-46, 470. B. Pub., Range 12, Vol. 59, April 12, 1831. *Ibid.*, Vol. 60: Oct. 30, 1832, Nos. 9 and 10.

18. Vaughan, *Chinese*, 97. Read, *Play and Politics*, 114.

however to show that the secret societies played an important part in instigating and organising these riots of protest. When explanations were given to the Chinese, or their grievance was redressed, the rioting ceased. In these cases the Government often found the services of the leading Chinese, men highly respected and with wide influence amongst their fellow countrymen, of the greatest service.¹⁹

The genuine hué riots in Singapore were of two kinds, those between the rival branches of the Thian Tai Hoey and the quarrels of the kongsis. Most of the Chinese in the Straits came from the maritime provinces of China where the inhabitants were notorious for their turbulence. A large number of the immigrants were criminals, the lowest and worst class of Canton and other cities.²⁰ Furthermore the people of the different provinces, and sometimes of the districts of the same province, hated one another bitterly, and for generations had carried on bloody feuds. The inhabitants of each province moreover were united in kongsis, or associations. These were mutual benefit societies intended to assist needy members, carry out various religious rites, give aid in all disputes, etc. Unfortunately the Chinese who migrated to the Straits carried their ancestral feuds with them as well as their kongsis. Turbulent, often criminal, and well-organized, every condition was favourable for carrying on in Penang or Singapore the quarrels in which they had engaged at home. Many of the riots in the Straits and notably the ten days' riot of 1854, the most bloody of all, in which 400 Chinese were killed, were really provincial faction fights. The kongsis cut across the lines of the other secret societies, the branches of the Thian Tai Hoey, which accepted members from every part of China. Many Chinese belonged to both organisations, so that those who were brothers in the Thian Tai Society cut one another's throats with great zest as members of rival provincial kongsis.²¹

The most dangerous, as it was the best known of all the secret societies in the Straits, was the Thian Tai Hoey. It was known by various names, the White Lotus,

19. Buckley, *Singapore*, II, 644. Cameron, *Malayan India*, 268-70. *American Historical Review*, Jan. 1899, p. 261, H. M. Stephens.

20. B. Pub., Range 13, Vol. 53: May 14, 1845, No. 3. *JRSSR*, I, 66; and III, 10, Pickering. *Ibid.*, XXI, 26-27, Treacher, Vaughan, *Chinese. Read, Play and Politics*, 108-9.

21. Cameron, *Malayan India*, 141-44, 265. Vaughan, *Chinese*,

the Heaven and Earth or Hung League and the Triad Society. Its history is wrapped in obscurity, since it very successfully preserved secrecy by killing traitors and indiscreet seekers after information. The investigations of Schlegel and Pickering however, based on documents seized by the Dutch and British police, enable one to form a sufficiently accurate idea of it. The Triad Society originated in China, perhaps early in the Christian era, and in its ritual and teachings had many resemblances to freemasonry. It was not a provincial organization like the kongsi, but drew its members from every part of China. For many centuries it appears to have been a praiseworthy Society, following its motto of "Obey Heaven and Act Righteously." It taught that all members were brothers, and must always aid and do good to one another. When however the last native dynasty, the Ming, was overthrown by the Manchus, the Tartar invaders of the seventeenth century, the Triad Society became in addition a revolutionary organization. In its ritual and practice a new motto took its place beside the former lofty concept: "Destroy the Tsings (the Manchus), restore the Mings." For over two centuries the Triad Society worked zealously to this end. Its lodges were organized on military lines, under the supreme control of five Grand Masters, and several rebellions were engineered. They were crushed, but one at least, the great Taiping Revolt of 1849, shook the Manchu power to its foundations. The Emperors replied by persecuting the Society with great vigour: the penalty for being a member was death. Under these circumstances it is perhaps not surprising that the Triad Society degenerated. The old ritual with its exhortations to a righteous life was retained, but practice fell far short of theory. The Hung League became "a band of rebels and robbers that seemed to have lost every notion of the proper spirit of its association."²²

The Triad Society in the Straits Settlements retained the worst, and but few of the better features of the degenerate parent organization. How early it appeared in the East Indies is unknown, but in the nineteenth century it was spread broadcast over British Malaya, Sarawak, and the Dutch possessions. Wherever the Chinese coolie came the Hung League followed. It was divided into local lodges each under its Master and Generals, while all

95, 98-99, 107, 109. JRASSB, XXI, 26-27, Treacher. I. Pub., Range 188, Vol. 3: June 16, 1854, No. 54.

22. Schlegel, *Thian Ti Hwui*, Intro., xli-xi, 2-6. JRASSB, I, 64-65, Pickering.

were affiliated with the headquarters in China. Where possible the lodge, with its elaborate buildings and defences, was erected in some inaccessible tract of jungle, and guards were stationed to keep off intruders. When this could not be done the meetings were held in the homes of the Lodge Masters.

In the Straits Settlements the patriotic motive of the League — the overthrow of the Manchus — could find no expression, and the Hoey therefore became a mutual benefit society of a peculiar kind. The age-old ritual with its exhortations to brotherly love and works of righteousness was retained, and the Thian Tai Hoey did much good work in settling disputes between members and giving them assistance when necessary. A large number of the members however were Chinese criminals of the lowest class, and the headmen were often unscrupulous. Many of the Chinese pirates and robbers who infested Singapore belonged to the League. The ritual contained an elaborate code of passwords whereby the other members could avoid molestations if they chanced upon their lodge brethren in the discharge of their professional duties.

The greatest emphasis was laid upon the solidarity of the order. Members were forbidden under severe penalties to submit their disputes to a court of justice: all quarrels were to be decided by the headmen of the lodge. Chinese who were not members but who had a dispute with a "brother" were also compelled to resort to the same tribunal. The statutes of the lodges contained elaborate provisions designed to defeat the ends of justice. When a member had committed a crime all other members were required to co-operate in his defence. Witnesses against him were bribed not to appear, and if necessary murdered; if the criminal had to fly the country his escape was provided for, while if he were fined, the amount was paid by the Society. Members were also forbidden to give any assistance whatever to the police, and were required to take part whenever a riot was determined on. The penalties for breaking these and the other laws were merciless floggings, mutilation and death.

The method by which new members was enrolled was equally criminal. The Triad Society was regarded with terror by the Chinese — for example blackmail collected from the brothels and small shop-keepers was a regular part of its income in the Straits — and there were very

few who dared to disobey its orders. When a sinkheh or newly arrived coolie came to British Malaya, and the local headmen wished him to become a member, he was ordered to join the Society on pain of death. If he refused, he was executed. Abdullah Munshi, the protégé of Raffles, who in disguise attended a meeting of the Hoey about 1825 saw one man who remained obdurate beheaded.²³

The secrecy of the society was no mere fiction: up to about 1860 very little was known of its procedure, and still less of its actual members. One principal reason for this was that before 1867 very few officials in the Straits Settlements could speak Chinese, or were intimately acquainted with their customs. Abdullah gleaned some information at the risk of his life, and the police from time to time secured a little more; but it was not until Schlegel's book, based on documents seized by the Dutch police, was published in 1866 that the governments obtained much authoritative knowledge of it. No assistance could be obtained from Chinese who were not members, for to them it was an impalpable, ever-present menace. A man's own brother might be a member and he would never know it. The laws of the Society were no idle enactments: how many times their penalties were inflicted will never be known. It is certain however that for many years after 1819 the bodies of Chinese were found in Singapore and Penang with the mark of the Triad Society neatly carved upon them. The murderers were very rarely caught. Chinese who had suffered from the League dared not give evidence against it, or even complain of wrongs inflicted upon them. There are cases noted in the Straits records where Chinese who had been robbed and nearly killed by members of the Society refused to prosecute so that the culprits escaped scot free.²⁴ English law, Pickering declared, proved to be ill-adapted for such a situation; and the Indian Government refused to follow the example of the Dutch and Spaniards by giving the police and the courts extraordinary powers to deal with the hoeys.²⁵

As the century advanced the original Triad Society in the Straits became divided into about a dozen different hoeys, all offshoots of the parent organization, but bitterly hostile to one another. Their strength was unknown: in

23. JIA, VI, 550.

24. e. g. SSR, Vol. 133, May 31, and June 8, 1830.

25. JRASSB, III, 11, Pickering. Schlegel, *Thian Ti Hwui*, xl.

some cases it was a few hundreds, in others it extended into thousands. Periodically the feuds between the rival hoeys found vent in faction fights; and for a few hours or days the streets of British cities were filled with howling mobs of armed men. Eventually the police would subdue the rioters, bury the corpses, and all would be quiet — till the next time.

The aim of the headmen of the societies was to create an "imperium in imperio," to enjoy all the benefits of life in a British settlement, and at the same time be free to do as they chose, and govern the Chinese as they pleased, without any interference. In fact, they wished to ignore the constituted government altogether. As a rule they were prosperous and eminently respectable individuals who took no overt part in proceedings, but gave their orders and left it to their gangs of ruffians to carry them out. Whatever happened, they had an unimpeachable alibi. It was an intolerable situation, yet one which it was extraordinarily difficult to alter.²⁶

The problem of the Chinese secret societies arose only a few years after the foundation of Penang. In 1799 several of them were already established there, and giving trouble to the Resident; while as time advanced the question became more serious. Daring robberies, frequent murders, constant interference with the course of justice, all were traced to the hoeys. And there the matter ended: it was known that powerful and criminal associations were at work; but to convict the members or seriously to hamper their activities was usually found impossible. Then, from about 1846 to 1885, came a series of riots in Penang, Malacca, and Singapore. In all there were about twelve serious outbreaks. Some of them assumed very large proportions, as for example the kongsi riots at Singapore in 1854, when 400 Chinese were killed, and for ten days the whole island was the scene of pitched battles between the rival factions. The police finally subdued the rioters and no attack was made upon the European quarter of the city. How serious the situation

26. The account of the Thian Tai Hué is based upon the following sources: SSR, Vol. 101: May-June 1825, *passim*. *Ibid.*, 129: July 7, 1829. *Ibid.*, 132: Jan. 26, 1830. Schlegel, *Thian Ti Hwui*, 20-180. JRASSB, I, 63-66: III, 1-6, 11. Pickering, *Vaughan, Chinese*, 94-108. JIA, VI, 545-54. Abdullah Munshi, *Low, Dissertation on Prince of Wales Island*, 245-47. Thomson, *Life in the Far East*, 203-5. Newbold, *Straits of Malacca*, I, 12-14. Cavenagh, *Reminiscences*, 256. Buckley, *Singapore*, II, 537, 569-70. St. John, *Brooke*, 291.

might have become was shown in Sarawak in 1857. In that year the local branch of the Triad Society terrorized the whole Chinese population of 4000 into revolting, sacked the capital, and nearly murdered Raja Brooke and his staff. The Hoey had been encouraged to rise by the belief that the Raja was in disgrace with the British Government, and that no retribution would follow his murder. In their mad venture however the Chinese had quite failed to take into account the Orang Laut, the Sea-Dayaks who had now become the faithful allies of the Raja. In a few days they were assailed by 10,000 of the dreaded ex-pirates, and a mere handful of the rebels escaped into Dutch territory.²⁷ As the number of Chinese in the Straits increased the riots became bloodier and more frequent.²⁸

Colonel Cavenagh, the Governor of the Straits from 1859 to 1867, managed to abate the Singapore riots by a very ingenious device. It was known though it could not be proved that these fights were always engineered by the Lodge Masters of the societies, and therefore, whenever one broke out, these headmen were sworn in as special constables. They were sent out to patrol the streets, with a guard of police to see that they did not weary in well-doing. Most of these gentlemen were portly and well-nourished, accustomed to an easy life, and by no means in training to enjoy hours of walking in hot streets under a blazing sun. So after a brief taste of this unwonted exercise the riot would suddenly come to an end.²⁹

The problem of dealing with the societies was not finally solved until their suppression in 1889, during the governorship of Sir Cecil Smith. Fourteen years before that time it had been deemed impossible to destroy the

27. St. John, Brooke, 291-95, 312-13. Mundy, Brooke, I, 289. Keppel, Macander, II, 126. McDougall, Sarawak, 129-56. Baring-Gould and Bampfylde, Sarawak, 185-91.

28. SSR, Vol. 101: May-June, 1825, *passim*. *Ibid.*, 129: July 7, 1829. *Ibid.*, 132: Jan. 26, 1830. *Ibid.*, 133: May 31 and June 8, 1830. I. Pub., Range 188, Vol. 3: June 16, 1854, Nos. 50-57. *Ibid.*, Vol. 4: July 21, 1854, Nos. 40-41. Buckley, Singapore, I, 365-66, 386; II, 443-46, 463-64, 537, 542-46, 569-70, 584-95, 706. JIA, III, 617, Low. Read, Play and Politics, 91-104. Straits Settlements Administration Report, 1860-61, 3-11. *Ibid.*, 1861-62, p. 3. *Ibid.*, 1862-63, pp. 2, 3, 10. Anson, About Others and Myself, 278-83.

29. Cavenagh, Reminiscences, 256. Read, Play and Politics, 105-6. Straits Settlements Administration Report, 1861-62, 3. *Ibid.*, 1862-63, p. 2. Vaughan, Chinese, 106.

hoeys,³⁰ and it was therefore decided to bring them under the control of the Government. In 1877 a new branch of the administration, the Chinese Protectorate, was formed, with officials well acquainted with the Chinese language and customs. The Government was very fortunate in securing as the first head of the department W. A. Pickering who not only knew the Chinese well, but also had their confidence to a remarkable degree. To his influence the rapid success of the Chinese Protectorate was due: so great was his prestige that the Chinese called it the "Pek-ki-lin," i.e. Pickering.³¹ The duties of the department were to protect the Chinese from any injustice, and by explaining to them the meaning of new laws by which they felt themselves aggrieved, to prevent the former riots of protest. The secret societies were compelled to give a list of their members, and afford information as to their actions. Strict surveillance was kept over their proceedings: Pickering himself for example sometimes attended lodge meetings. The hoeys were no longer protected by the abysmal ignorance of the administration and its inability to secure information. In a few years their power for ill had greatly diminished, and the evil practices which had formerly characterized them were largely abandoned. By 1878 members of the same hoeys dared to appear as witnesses in the law courts against one another, and offenders were handed over to the police by their Lodge Master. The hoeys and kongsis became of real assistance to the authorities in keeping the Chinese under control. Pickering considered that by 1878 the headmen honestly tried to prevent their men from breaking the laws and thus involving them in trouble with the Government. The presidents of the rival lodges also co-operated with one another, and settled thousands of petty disputes which would otherwise have encumbered the work of the law-courts. They also prevented many riots from becoming serious.³²

Apart from the hoeys and from gambling however the Chinese were a remarkably law-abiding and peaceful race, easy to control. They did not run amok or make treacherous attacks like the Malays, or assault Europeans and indulge in religious riots like the Hindus and Moham-medans in India. They paid their taxes, and attended to their own affairs. Schlegel put the whole case in a

30. Schegel, *Thian Ti Hwui*, xi, and 6. JRASSB, III, 10, Pickering.

31. JRASSB, XLII, 144-45.

32. JRASSB, I. 64: III, 1. 6, 9-17. Vaughan, *Chinese*, 106-7.

nutshell when he wrote: "Whenever due regard is paid to the prejudices of the nation, and when care is taken to explain to them the necessity or expediency of a new law or regulation, the Chinese, the most reasonable and cool of all Eastern races, will remain at ease, and the existence of their secret society will not endanger in the least their quietness."³³ So far as gambling and their hoeys were concerned the Chinese did indeed offend grievously against the law; but they regarded these matters as their own private concerns, and looked upon the interference of Government as merely another inexplicable trait of the Western barbarians among whom their lot was cast. The Chinese formed two-thirds of the population of the Straits Settlements; but they were never a menace to their security. It is a fact of the utmost significance that during the worst riots the bulk of the garrison at Singapore was usually left in barracks: the Governors realised that the danger to Europeans was slight, and that only the police were required to restore order. It is true that if the reins of authority were relaxed the Chinese were apt to get out of hand, but even then they confined themselves to fighting amongst themselves. A comment passed by the Governor General of India on the riots of 1854 aptly described the whole attitude of the Chinese towards the British Government: "There was in this peculiar case an outrageous violation of all laws, with little if any resistance to constituted authority."³⁴

In concluding one cannot forbear from commenting upon the strong partiality which the Chinese have shown for British rule. The date of their first arrival in the East Indies is unknown, although it is probable that they visited trading-posts established there — on the Isthmus of Kra, for example — over a thousand years before Penang was founded. Long before the arrival of the Portuguese, their junks carried on regular intercourse with Malacca, Johore, Kelantan and Pahang.³⁵ Their number in the East Indies was probably small; in 1830 Crawford estimated that there were only about 255,000.³⁶

33. Schlegel, *Thian Ti Hwui*, xi.

34. *I. Pub.*, Range 188, Vol. 3: June 16, 1854, No. 56. Cavenagh, *Reminiscences*, 255. St. John, Brooke, 313. *JRASSB*, XXI, 25-27, Treacher. Ireland, *Eastern Tropics*, 137. Read, *Play and Politics*, 114.

35. Groeneveldt in *Essays on Indo-China*, series II, Vol. I, 126-262.

36. *PP*, (H. of C.), No. 644 of 1830, p. 297, (Vol. V).

The establishment of the Straits Settlements was immediately followed by a great influx of Chinese. They keenly appreciated the security, justice and freedom from molestation which they enjoyed in British territory. This seems to be proved by a study of the history of Chinese immigration in the Malay Peninsula. In the hinterland of the Peninsula wealth could often be gained much more quickly; — there was practically no tin or gold within British territory for example — but the merchant and the miner were never sure when they might lose not only their savings, but even life itself. For this reason few of them settled permanently in the native states before 1874: and although many went there as traders or miners, they did so with the intention of remaining only a few years. As a rule moreover they formed little settlements at the tin-mines or the native ports, and did not venture to live alone among the Malays. Even so, a large number were killed. These small colonies were found in almost every state of the Peninsula, most of the trade and mining of the country being in their hands.³⁷ Their number is unknown, but all the evidence seems to show that it was not large. Crawford in 1830 estimated it as 40,000;³⁸ a few years later Colonel Low, a reliable authority, put it at 15,000 or 20,000.³⁹ In both cases the figures were based on information obtained from native traders.

When compared with the number in the Straits Settlements at that time, the difference is almost startling. In the whole of the peninsula, the Chinese were about 20,000, perhaps one tenth of the diminishing Malay population; in the tiny Straits Settlements only a few hundred square miles in area, they were far more numerous than all the other races put together, and increased by thousands every year. The number in the Malay States did not increase in anything like the same proportion. The following table shows the number of Europeans, Chinese, Malays, and Indians, the most important races in the Straits Settlements, between 1817 and 1860.

37. JIA, IX, 117. JRASSB, XV, 10, 32, Swettenham. Crawford, *History of the Indian Archipelago*, I, 137. *Descriptive Dictionary*, 97, 195. Moor, *Notices of the Indian Archipelago*, 77-78. Begbie, *Malay Peninsula*, 291. Newbold, *Straits of Malacca*, passim, and I, 10; II, 56, 169. St. John, *Life in the Far East*, II, 314-15. Graham, *Kelantan*, 102-4. Earl, *Eastern Seas*, 429.

38. PP, (H. of C.), No. 644 of 1830, p. 297, (Vol. V, Pt. I).

39. Low, *Dissertation on Prince of Wales Island*, 128, 167.

Singapore	Malays.	Europeans.	Indians.	Chinese	Total Pop.
1819-20	?	?	?	3,000	5,000(40)
1830—	5,173	92	1,913	6,555	16,634(41)
1840—	9,032	167	3,159	17,179	39,681(42)
1850—	12,206	360	6,261	27,988	59,043(43)
1860—	10,888	2,445	12,971	50,043	80,792(44)

Penang.

1818—	12,190	?	8,197	7,858	35,000(45)
1830—	11,943	1,877	8,858	8,963	33,959(46)
1842—	18,442	1,180	9,681	9,715	40,499(46)
1851—	16,570	347	7,840	15,457	43,143(46)
1860—	18,887	1,995	10,618	28,018	59,956(46)

Province Wellesley.

1820—	5,399	?	338	325	6,185(46)
1833—	41,702	?	1,087	2,259	45,953(46)
1844—	44,271	107	1,815	4,107	51,509(46)
1851—	53,010	?	1,913	8,731	64,801(46)
1860—	52,836	76	3,514	8,204	64,816(46)

Malacca

1817—	13,988	1,667	2,986	1,006	19,627(46)
1829—	19,765	265	2,830	4,797	30,164(47)
1842—	32,622	2,544	3,258	6,882	46,097(48)
1852—	48,226	2,283	1,191	10,608	62,514(48)
1860—	53,554	2,648	1,026	10,039	67,267(48)

40. Lady Raffles, *Memoir*, Appendix, 10. Newbold, *Straits of Malacca*, I, 279.

41. *Ibid.*, 283.

42. B. Pub., Range 13, Vol. 42; Jan. 25, 1843, No. 2.

43. JIA, IV, 106.

44. PP, (H. of C.), No. 259 of 1862, p. 56, (Vol. XL).

45. SSR, Vol. 67: Oct. 7, 1818.

46. Braddell, *Statistics*, 2.

47. SSR, Vol. 169, Nov. 3, 1829.

48. Braddell, *Statistics*, 2. Many of the census reports are missing from the archives. The figures for Europeans are also unreliable, Eurasians being sometimes included. There were never more than a few hundred Europeans at each Settlement.

It will be observed that in both Penang and Singapore the Chinese formed the bulk of the population; and that it was only at Malacca and Province Wellesley, agricultural districts with a large number of Malay raayats, that they were in a minority. The final proof of this contention that — to paraphrase the proverb — the Chinese followed the flag, is shown by this, that as soon as British power was extended over the Western Malay states, thousands of Chinese poured into them until in a generation, from being a small minority they formed about two-thirds of the total population.⁴⁹

The testimony of the Chinese themselves bears out the truth of this theory. So free from irksome restrictions was British rule that they almost forgot they were in a foreign country, and looked upon Penang and Singapore as Chinese cities, the administration of which was left in British hands.⁵⁰ With no desire to assume the wearisome task of governing themselves, and indifferent to who ruled them so long as their business was not interfered with, they regarded the British as inexplicable philanthropists who for some quite undiscoverable motive took all the burdens of administration off their shoulders, and left them at full liberty to make as much money as they chose.⁵¹

Before 1874 the greatest desire of the Chinese was that Great Britain should extend her rule over the whole Peninsula, and so enable them to make yet more money in perfect safety.⁵² When the Treaty of Pangkor was being drawn up in 1874 a headman of one of the kongsis in Perak was heard to exclaim:— "When the British flag is seen over Perak and Larut, every Chinaman will go down on his knees and bless God."⁵³ One does not associate religion with the chief of a secret society, but if the words are apocryphal the sentiment is probably genuine. Whether the Chinese felt any democratic fervour at the thought of British liberty is dubious, but that they appreciated its solid advantages is beyond doubt: Their

49. Colonial Office List, 1922 397-410.

50. JRASSB, XXVIII, 49, Kruyt.

51. Lucas, *British Empire*, 194.

52. Cavenagh, *Reminiscences*, 298. Maxwell, *Malay Conquests*, 110. JRASSB, XIX, 114.

53. *Ibid.*, XXVIII, 31, Kruyt.

attitude may perhaps be summed up in the words of a Penang boatman:— "Empress good: coolie get money — keep it."⁵⁴

54. Bird, *Golden Chersonese*, 255.

XII

Piracy And The Straits Settlements.

No feature in the history of British Malaya has so impressed the popular mind as piracy. Mention a Malay to the average person and he at once conjures up a picture of a treacherous, blood-thirsty ruffian armed with a long wavy "kris." His favourite occupation was piracy, varied occasionally by running amok; and Europeans sailed the Eastern seas at the peril of their lives.

This conception is very far wide of the mark. It is true that one hundred years ago piracy was rampant throughout the Archipelago, and hundreds of ships were sunk. The vessels which suffered however were almost always the praus or native trading boats; European ships were rarely molested.

The explanation of this is simple. The pirate was first and foremost a man of business: he wanted plunder and slaves, and preferred to win them with as little risk as possible. His vessel was generally a small low galley, while his guns were usually clumsy and of no great size. European merchantmen were many times his tonnage, much higher out of the water, and heavily armed. Moreover they always put up a desperate resistance. The pirates knew that an attack on a merchantman meant a heavy death-roll with no certainty of capture at the end of it. Such a prize was worth many native praus; but the pirates wanted plunder, and not hard knocks. A European ship was rarely attacked unless she were wrecked, or becalmed, or surprised in harbour. If the wind failed her off a pirate coast a fleet would gather as if by magic and then, unless a favourable breeze sprang up, her fate was usually sealed. The pirates would overpower her by weight of numbers, and would usually carry her by boarding after a long battle, when they were sure from the silence of her guns that she had no powder left. Many ships were also captured in native ports when the crew were off their guard, by pirates who had come aboard disguised as merchants. Apart from these cases however European vessels were rarely attacked unless they were so small as to promise an easy capture. Malay praus and the smaller Chinese junks were the ships usually attacked. In many cases their size was not greater than that of a large pirate galley, they were not well armed,

and their crews rarely resisted so well as Europeans.¹

From this it must not be concluded that the pirates were cowards: there are far too many instances of the desperate courage with which they fought when escape was impossible. Moreover they frequently attacked small European warships, and on several occasions captured Spanish and Dutch gunboats; while more than one British and Dutch war-schooner barely made good her escape.² Out of many cases two typical instances may be quoted. In 1807 the small British sloop of war "Victor," 18 guns and 114 men, met three large Lanun pirates off the Java coast at sunset and ordered them to come alongside her. They obeyed, and a small guard of sailors was placed on two of them while their crews and cargo were being transferred to the war-ship. The Lanuns had been disarmed and about 120 brought on board when it was noticed that the third prau was beginning to draw away. A stern-gun on the "Victor" was fired at her, sparks from the discharge ignited a large heap of loose powder from one of the captured praus which had been thrown on the deck nearby. The whole stern of the warship was blown up, and the ship caught fire. The sailors guarding the Lanuns on the "Victor" dropped their muskets and sprang for the hoses. The pirates promptly seized the muskets and their own weapons, which were lying on the deck, and fell upon the crew. At the same time the Lanuns still on the two captured galleys overpowered the prize-crews and then began to climb on board the warship. Seeing what was going on the third galley rowed back and opened fire. For the next thirty minutes the British had a very busy time of it, putting out the fire, working the guns, and trying to clear their decks of the pirates. There was a desperate hand-to-hand fight, cutlass and clubbed musket against spear and kris. At last the pirates were driven overboard, leaving 80 dead or "in a most mangled state" on the decks. The "Victor" lost nearly 30 killed or mortally wounded. One of the praus was sunk, the other two escaped. The "Victor" had so many casualties and was so severely damaged that she seems to have lost all interest in Lanuns, and instead came limping into port for repairs.³ The second instance

1. JIA, III, 256-60, S. St. John. JIA, III, 581-88, 629-36; IV, 45-53, 144-162, 400-10, 617-28, 734-46. Anon. B. Pub., Range 13; Vol. 14: Sept. 23, 1835, No. 9. B. Pub., Range 12, Vol. 58; Feb. 1, 1831, No. 12. B. Pub., Range 123, Vol. 59; March 5, 1824, No. 49.

2. JIA, III, 256-59, S. St. John.

3. United Service Journal, Part. III, Sept. 1835, pp. 38-39.

was the defeat of a squadron of eleven Balanini galleys by the H. C.⁴ steamer "Nemesis" in 1847. The Balanini galleys were long, low open boats, something like the Viking ships, and carried 350 men in all. They were returning home after a successful voyage around Borneo when their ill-fortune brought them across the track of the "Nemesis," 103 men and four heavy guns. It was the first time the Balanini had seen a steamship, and they tried to escape. The steamer overhauled them, and the pirates took up their position in a bay close to shore. The action began at one in the afternoon, and for five hours the "Nemesis" steamed slowly up and down their line, pouring in broadsides of grape and canister at only two hundred yards range. Captain Mundy, who heard the story from the officers of the "Nemesis" wrote that the pirates fought with splendid courage. Eventually, six of their galleys beat off a boat attack supported by the steamer's fire and about 9 p.m. escaped in the gathering dusk. Five were taken, and the six which got away had been so battered that three foundered before they reached home.⁵

Malay piracy — to use a well-known but somewhat misleading term — was in 1825 a wide-spread and very honourable calling. It was the profession not merely of outlaws, but of merchants, noblemen, and even Sultans. Its origin is lost in antiquity, but there is evidence that before the arrival of the Portuguese in the East it was a recognised thing for needy rajas to replenish their treasury by piratical raids.⁶ The geography of the East Indian islands is so peculiarly suitable for piracy that the surprising thing would have been if it had not existed. The whole of the vast Archipelago is a maze of islands divided by straits and gulfs, some of them of great size, and others so narrow as to be barely navigable. The coasts are lined with dense mangrove swamps, through which innumerable creeks and rivers afford easy passage into the interior. A more suitable field of operations cannot be conceived. The Malays were a race of skilled seamen and while their boats were rather crude, the numberless islands offered secure refuge in case of storms. The mangrove swamps and rivers, and the countless intricate passages between the islands served alike as hiding-

4. H.C. i.e. "Honourable Company's," the letters always prefixed to the names of ships in the East India Company's navy.

5. Mundy, Brooke, II, 359-67. For other evidence of the pirates' courage v. JIA, III, 252, St. John.

6. v. Sejarah Malayu, passim.

places while waiting for their prey and safe refuges in case of defeat. The seas of the Archipelago abound in shoals and reefs close inshore, and while the pirate galleys, always light in draught and knowing every foot of the way, negotiated them and disappeared in the creeks and swamps, their heavy European pursuers either ran aground or found the water so shallow that they had to give up the chase. Once the pirate had reached the shelter of the swamps he was safe, for the warship's boats soon lost all trace of him in the maze of waterways. Little help was to be had from the inhabitants of the country, since most of them were pirates when occasion served.⁷ An interesting comparison can be drawn between the Malays and the Greeks of the Homeric period. In each case the same geographical features — an archipelago abounding in good harbours and safe lurking places — produced the same result.

The advent of Europeans probably gave a great impetus to piracy. The subject has never been properly investigated, but it is known that the Portuguese, and above all the Dutch, totally disorganized the very flourishing native commerce which had existed for centuries. In order to gain a monopoly, the Dutch forbade many of the islands to carry on any trade while others were allowed to bring their merchandise only to certain ports. By this means many Malays must have been ruined. The rajas too lost a large part of their revenues, for then as later the chiefs were merchants as well as rulers. It was natural that a race of seamen should try to make good their losses by a means so congenial to their adventurous dispositions.⁸ By the nineteenth Century there were few rajas who did not covertly support the pirates, and give them arms and shelter in return for a share of their plunder, "so that a pirate prau is too commonly more welcome in their harbours than a fair trader." Many went further, and openly sent piratical fleets to sea.⁹ Another contributing factor was the universal decay of the Malay governments, which by 1825 was going on with alarming rapidity. Even if the Sultan wished to check piracy, he was often too feeble to do so. The petty chief of a few river-villages set up

7. Keppel, *Macander*, I, 281. Temminck, *Possessions Néerlandaises*, II, 225. Crawford, *Descriptive Dictionary*, 353 and v. *infra*.

8. *JIA*, II (New Series), 328-35. Lady Raffles, *Memoir of Raffles*, Appendix 10.

9. Keppel, *Macander*, I, 282-83. *Ibid.*, 48. Hill, *MSS S.* 811. Crawford, *Descriptive Dictionary*, 254.

as an independent ruler and his suzerain was too weak to control him. To keep up his train of ragged followers required money, and since a Malay was too proud and indolent to work hard, revenue was obtained by the easy means of piracy.¹⁰

So deeply engrained was piracy in the native character that any sea-coast Malay would engage in it if the opportunity seemed favourable. The ordinary Malay trader was merchant and pirate by turns, as opportunity served.¹¹ In this as in so many other respects the semi-feudal conditions prevailing in Malaya in the nineteenth century strongly resembled those of Europe in the Middle Ages. There is a very interesting parallel between the native merchants of the Archipelago and the English, French and Flemish traders of the Channel ports six hundred years ago. No stigma attached to the career of piracy: it was an honourable profession, hallowed by antiquity¹² and patronized by the bluest blood of the East Indian islands. The native attitude towards it was perfectly expressed by the views of Datu Laut, an important Lanun chieftain of North West Borneo about 1850. "In his own view he was no criminal; his ancestors from generation to generation had followed the same profession. In fact, the Lanuns consider cruising as the most honourable of professions, the only one which a gentleman and a chief could pursue, and would be deeply offended if told that they were but robbers on a larger scale Notwithstanding his profession, Laut was a gentleman."¹³ Precisely the sentiments which one would have expected from a Norman baron of the reign of Stephen.

By 1825 piracy had become so firmly established that it could truly be described as "a great and blighting curse," "a very formidable and frightful system," "an evil so extensive and formidable that it can be put down by the strong hand alone".¹⁴ From Penang to New Guinea, and from Java to the Philippines, fleets of galleys scoured the seas in search of plunder and slaves. As with the Mediterranean pirates whom Pompey crushed, captives were as valuable a prize as merchandise. In Sulu, Brunei,

10. Low, Penang, 216. W.E. Maxwell, *Piracy in Straits of Malacca in Ocean Highways*, Jan. 1873, pp. 312-14.

11. W. E. Maxwell, *Ocean Highways*, Jan. 1873, pp. 312-14. Lady Raffles, *Memoir*, 48. Templer, *Brooke's Letters*, I, 277, and v. *infra*.

12. B. Pub., Range, 13, Vol. 14. Sept. 23, 1835, No. 9.

13. Hunter, *Adventures of a Naval Officer*, 83.

14. JIA, III, 252, 257, 260, S. St. John.

Sumatra and other places were great depots where the pirates sold their loot and bought supplies.¹⁵

By far the most formidable were the Lanuns of Mindanao, in the Philippines, the dreaded "Pirates of the Lagoon." The Balanini, who lived in a cluster of islands in the Sulu Sea, were almost equally dangerous. They appear to have been less numerous and warlike, and for this reason their ravages were not so extensive. With this qualification the following description is equally true of both races. The Lanuns lived on a large lagoon-like bay on the island of Mindanao, surrounded by impenetrable mangrove-swamps, pierced by numerous runways over which their galleys could be drawn to escape pursuers. The lagoon was defended by many heavy batteries, and there were also a large number of slips for the construction of galleys. Raffles estimated the number of their warriors at 10,000. The Lanuns also had settlements in North West Borneo, at Tantoli in Celebes, in Sulu and at Indragiri in Sumatra, at the southern end of the Straits of Malacca.

Their boats were long and narrow, propelled by oars and sails, and very swift. Attached to each fleet were often a number of light, fast spy-boats, to scour the seas and bring back news of approaching prizes. The galleys varied from 40 to 100 tons burden and carried from 40 to 60 men. The crew was protected by a breastwork of thick planks, and at times by a deck of split rattans. Their largest galleys were often over 100 feet long, and carried 150 men. Admiral Hunter, who accompanied the Lanuns on a cruise in 1847 disguised as a Malay, wrote that the flagship on which he sailed was 95 feet long, with 90 oars, double-banked. She had 56 fighting men, and was armed with twelve *lelas* (a light gun of native manufacture, more noisy than effective), and a Spanish eighteen-pounder.¹⁶ Each galley was armed in somewhat similar fashion, and also carried muskets, swords, spears, and shields. The oars were rowed by captives, who were treated with great cruelty. They were fed principally on rotten rice and bad water, and when worn out were thrown over-board. They were forced to row for hours at a time, and when they became exhausted the Lanuns kept them awake by rubbing cayenne pepper into their eyes.

15. *Ibid.*, 258. Forrest, *Voyage to New Guinea*, 303. Keppel, *Macander*, I, 284. v. *infra*.

16. Hunter, *Adventures of a Naval Officer*, 60.

The Lanuns had several hundred galleys, and sent out fleets every year under the command of an Admiral. Each ship had a captain and three officers, and the loot was divided according to a recognised scale. As a rule the fleets sailed first to Tampassuk, their principal settlement in North-West Borneo. There they divided into squadrons, which between them covered the whole of the Eastern seas. Some circumnavigated Borneo and visited Celebes and New Guinea; others ravaged the coasts of Bengal and Java; yet others sailed to the East coast of the Malay Peninsula and the Gulf of Siam; while every year, in August, September and October, the "pirates' wind" brought Lanun squadrons to the Straits of Malacca. There they lay in wait for the praus sailing to Singapore, and did immense damage. The Rhio-Lingga Archipelago was ravaged with mathematical regularity, and until about 1835 Lanun squadrons sailing through the Straits of Malacca visited Penang and Kedah. Their ships were even met as far to the north as Rangoon. These cruises often lasted several years, and the pirates carried them out according to a definite schedule, visiting each part of the East Indies at a recognised time. So thoroughly was this the case that the Government in its reports referred as a matter of course to the events of the Lanun season. The Philippines, which lay nearest to Mindanao, perhaps suffered even more severely than other parts of the Archipelago. Since 1589 the Spaniards had fought a number of wars with the Lanuns and had generally got the worst of it. They claimed suzerainty however over them, apparently on the ground that Spain had formally annexed them, and therefore "ipso dicto" they were conquered. The Lanuns unfortunately declined to see the logic of this position, and having great contempt for the Spaniards, constantly raided even into the harbour of Manila itself.

The damage done by the Lanuns and Balanini was incalculable. To estimate it is impossible, since they acted on the principle of "*spurlos versenkt*." A prau would disappear. Perhaps years later one of the crew might escape from slavery and eventually tell his tale in Batavia or Singapore; but in most cases not a single soul of the whole ship's company would ever be seen again. Villages near the coast were also raided, and all the inhabitants killed or carried into slavery. Whole islands in the Rhio-Lingga Archipelago were depopulated in this way. Like all the other pirates, the Lanuns avoided European merchantmen and warships, although quite a few traders,

especially Spaniards, fell victims to them. They had the utmost contempt for the Dutch gunboats which protected the coasts of Borneo, Java and the other possessions of Holland. They seem rather to have enjoyed a fight with them, and captured a fair number. As late as 1844, Sambas, the principal Dutch port in Western Borneo, was constantly blockaded by Lanun squadrons.

Had the Balanini and Lanuns made common cause with the Malay pirates they would have been even more of a menace than they actually were. Fortunately however they were the bitter enemies of the pirates of the Rhio-Lingga Archipelago, the head-quarters of Malay piracy. So intense was their hatred that if either were attacking a merchantman and these rivals hove in sight, the trader was abandoned while the pirates hastened to engage one another.¹⁷

Near Mindanao lies a cluster of islands known as the Sulu Archipelago. Sulu, the principal town, was a line of houses straggling along the shores of a harbour. This was the commercial headquarters of the Lanuns and Balanini, the greatest slave-mart and thieves' market in the whole East Indian islands. Here the pirate fleets returned after their long cruises to sell their slaves and booty and buy supplies from the Chinese and Bugis merchants who came to it. A few venturesome Europeans also traded there. There appears to be some doubt as to whether the Sulus actually engaged in piracy themselves, or whether they merely aided and profited by their friends and allies the Lanuns. The best authorities seem to argue that the latter was the case. Hunt, who made a long report on the Sulus to Raffles in 1815, lived for six months on the islands. He contrived to win the friendship of the leading Datus, or chiefs, and had excellent opportunities for gaining information. He re-

17. JIA, S. St. John, 251-54. JIA, III, 581-88; 629-36. IV, 45-53; 144-62; 400-10; 617-28; 734-46. Anon. S. St. John, *Life in the Forests of the Far East*, I, 239; II, 239-40. Lady Raffles, *Memoir*, 63. Crawford, *Descriptive Dictionary*, 214, 354-55. Belcher, *Cruise of the Samarang*, I, 135-45, 262-70, and *passim*. H. St. John, *Indian Archipelago*, II, 111-12, 116-33, 136-42. Hunter, *Adventures of a Naval Officer*, 60, and *passim*. Moor, *Notices of the Indian Archipelago*, 98. Command Paper (1351) of 1851, pp. 12-18, Vol. LVI, Part 1. Brooke's report on Piracy endorsed by Keppel in the highest terms (Keppel), *Dido*, II, 134-51 (ed. of 1847). J. Hunt, "Report on Sulu, 1815," *Malayan Miscellanies*, I, 73-83. Earl, *Eastern Seas*, 312-14. SSR, Vol. 159, Jan. 30, 1829. Long and valuable report by Presgrave, Resident Councillor of Singapore, B. Pub., Range 13, Vol. 14: Sept. 23, 1835, Nos. 6-13. Command Paper [1976] of 1854-55, pp. 142-50. (Vol. XXIX).

ported that the Sulus were arrant cowards, and while refraining from piracy themselves, equipped the Lanun squadrons, receiving in return 25 per cent of the booty. Sulu "is the nucleus of all the piratical hordes in the seas, the heart's blood that nourishes the whole, and sets in motion its most distant members." Hunt gave a very graphic picture of the keen activity which prevailed in this den of thieves. "Not a day passes without the arrival or departure of at least twelve to fifteen praus." During the six months he was there he heard of the capture of twenty-seven or twenty-eight ships, including a Spanish brig, the kidnapping of 1000 natives from the Philippines, and sundry murders and minor piracies.¹⁸

After the Lanuns and Balanini the most important pirates were the Malays. Formerly they had been the most dreaded pirates of the Archipelago; but in the nineteenth century they had sadly degenerated from the lofty tradition of their ancestors.¹⁹ The great centres of Malay piracy were within the Dutch sphere of influence. They were the Carimon Islands, the Rhio-Lingga Archipelago near the Southern entrance of the Straits of Malacca, and Galang. Galang, an island to the South of the Straits of Singapore, was a miniature Sulu, the Malays' principal market for the sale of slaves and booty. Pirate settlements were also scattered all along the Sumatran coast as far as Achin, and in every state of the Peninsula from Trengganu on the East to Kedah on the West.

The Lingga Sultan (the Dutch protégé who ruled the island portion of the Empire of Johore) was strongly suspected both by the Dutch and British of tacitly encouraging piracy, even if he did not share in the spoils. His great court officials openly supported it, equipping the Malay fleets in return for 100 per cent profit on their outlay. The Sultans of the different states of Sumatra and the Peninsula also aided, the pirates in return for a share of their booty, the most notorious offender in the British sphere being the Bugis Sultan of Selangor. The Singapore Sultan, Raffles's nominee, and the Temenggong of Johore were strongly suspected both by British and Dutch officials of being deeply implicated. This was the Temenggong who in 1843-48 rendered great services to the British in suppressing piracy, and was warmly

18. *Malayan Miscellanies* J. Hunt, Report to Raffles on Sulu, 1815. I. 16-83. Moor, *Notices of the Indian Archipelago*, Appendix, 30-5. Dalrymple, *Oriental Repertory*, I, 499-577. Hunter, *Adventures of a Naval Officer*, 224-26.

19. Crawford, *Descriptive Dictionary*, 354.

defended by Governor Butterworth against the aspersions cast upon his character. Possibly he was a much maligned man, perhaps he had seen the error of his ways; in the thirties at any rate officials and merchants alike strongly suspected him, although they could never obtain definite proof.

There seems some reason to believe that pirate praus were fitted out in Singapore itself, and that many pirates were accustomed to visit it when not engaged in professional duties. Little could be done to prevent this, as Singapore was a free port, and had not the elaborate system of registration and control which enabled the Dutch officials to ascertain fairly accurately the real character of trading praus. It is probable that arms and supplies were sometimes obtained at Singapore, and that the pirates had spies in the port who sent them information when a rich prize was about to sail. Many respectable traders moreover could not resist the temptation to capture another prau if they saw a favourable opportunity. Since the cargo was then sold as their own, and no inconvenient witnesses were left, it was very difficult to convict them of piracy.

It was believed that the Malay pirates had between 300 and 400 praus. Their boats were smaller and usually carried fewer men than the Lanun galleys; but they were sufficiently powerful to overcome most native traders except the large Chinese junks. The praus were generally of from six to twenty tons, propelled by oars and sails and armed with *lepas* (native cannon), or swivel-guns, usually of small calibre, muskets, swords, and spears. The crews varied from thirty or less to eighty or a hundred; and each vessel was under the command of a *Panglima* (fighting-man) and two mates. The spoil was divided between the crew and the Raja who had lent money to finance the cruise according to a recognised schedule. The galleys were extremely fast, and attached to each squadron were a number of smaller and faster spy-boats carrying only a few men apiece. The Malay praus were less dangerous than the Lanun galleys, and the Malays themselves were neither so brave nor so daring as the "Pirates of the Lagoon."

Occasionally a warship would burn a few Malay villages, or would happen upon a pirate squadron too far off-shore to make good its escape. Such incidents however did little more than give a pleasurable zest to

a very profitable occupation. The Malays carried on their piracy in accordance with a well-arranged schedule. A few months were spent in fishing and repairing the galleys; but when the season of favourable winds arrived, each island and river sent out its ships. In squadrons of ten to twenty praus they cruised along the whole coast of the Malay Peninsula from Trengganu to Kedah, and also visited Bangka and Java. The Dinding Islands, in the Straits of Malacca, were a favourite resort.

Penang received annual attention from the date of its foundation, and the pirates built villages on the neighbouring islands, and in Kedah and Perak. Penang's trade suffered severely, and in 1826 raids were still frequently made into the harbour at night to capture prisoners for sale at Galang. As late as 1830 the pirate squadrons on their return home from their annual cruise were accustomed to sail through the middle of the harbour, between Penang and Province Wellesley. It saved them the trouble of rowing around the island.

The foundation of Singapore eventually caused the downfall of the Malay pirates, but for many years it actually increased their prosperity. The island was so conveniently situated in the midst of their settlements that no long and toilsome voyages were necessary before they reached the scene of operations; and the warships at the disposal of the Straits Government were so few and ineffective that they could afford little protection to the trading praus. Native traders generally sailed by themselves, or in groups of three or four, so that they were easily overpowered by the pirates, whose squadrons were made up of ten or twenty, and sometimes double that number of praus. Large fleets of Malay, Balanini and Lanun pirates swarmed in the Straits, or lay in wait at Point Rumenia and other places close to Singapore. As late as 1835 attacks were actually made by daylight on boats plying between the shore and ships lying at anchor at the mouth of the harbour. Many vessels were captured when barely out of sight of the town. The native merchants suffered immense loss, and the situation grew steadily worse as the years passed. Many praus were afraid to visit Singapore because of the danger; and by 1830 the Straits Government seriously feared that the native trade must eventually become extinct.²⁰ A Malay

20. SSR, Vol. 111: Sept. 8, 1826. SSR, Vol. 125: Nov. 3, 1828. SSR, Vol. 159: Jan. 20, 1829. B. Pub., Range 12, Vol. 55: Oct. 19, 1830, Nos. 2-9. B. Pub., Range 12, Vol. 58: Feb. 1, 1831,

of Singapore could not. "set out on a voyage to the back of the Island (of Singapore) . . . without risk of being robbed and killed."²¹

After about 1840 the native trade of the Straits Settlements began to suffer from a new enemy, the Chinese. Before this date only isolated cases occurred; but at the very time when the Lanun and Malay pirates were being suppressed, the attacks of the Chinese rapidly increased. While they usually confined their operations to their own coast or to the Gulf of Siam, they were frequently met with as far South as the neighbourhood of Singapore. After 1860 their attacks gradually ceased.

The Chinese were more dangerous to native traders than the Malays or Lanuns, although in point of courage they were much inferior. Their ships were much larger, however, and carried heavier guns and stronger crews. The typical pirate junk was from 70 to 150 tons, with anything up to 25 cannon, and 100 to 200 men. Their largest boats were of 200 tons. Many renegade European seamen served as gunners and officers, whereas with scarcely a single exception the Lanun and Malay galleys were manned entirely by natives. Owing to these advantages the Chinese captured not only native traders, but even many European vessels.²²

The suppression of Chinese piracy belongs to the history of Hongkong rather than to that of the Straits Settlements. Although the coast of China had been notorious for piracy from time immemorial, it was not until the nineteenth century that European governments paid much attention to it. The change was due to the increase of their commerce with the Orient. Great Britain was the power mainly responsible for the suppression of Chinese piracy. Her trade with China was much larger than that of any other nation, and the commerce of

Nos. 3-21. *Ibid.*, Vol. 59, April 12, 1831, No. 6. *B. Pub.*, Range 13. Vol. 14: Sept. 23, 1835, Nos. 6-13. *B. Pub.*, Range 13, Vol. 20: Oct. 19, 1836, No. 40. *Moniteur des Indes Orientales*, 1846-47, Vol. I, 195-97, 231, 268-76, 330. De Groot. *Lady Raffles, Memoir*, 48. Begbie. *Malay Peninsula*, 263-68, 273. *JIA*, II, 315-25, Horsfield: 622*, J. R. Logan. *Ibid.*, III, 581-85, Anon. Moor. *Notices of the Indian Archipelago*, 243, 259, 272. Anderson. *Malay Peninsula*, 174-75. Wilkinson. *Malay Papers: History of the Peninsula*, 64. Osborn. *Quedah*, 86. Earl. *Eastern Seas*, 384-85.

21. *JIA*, III, 464, Anon.

22. *Chinese Repository*, III, 68-82. Crawford. *Descriptive Dictionary*, 355. *IPFC*, Range 200, Vol. 40: Oct. 7, 1853, Nos. 137-42, and v. references to Note 23.

Hongkong suffered severely from Chinese pirates in the early years of its history. Fleets of from 20 to 100 junks infested the neighbouring waters. From about 1849 onwards the British China squadron made constant expeditions against the pirates and destroyed several hundred vessels. Owing to these attacks Chinese piracy was finally suppressed. With the destruction of the pirates' fortresses and fleets their squadrons gradually ceased to appear in the waters of the Archipelago.²³

Piracy was also carried on in many other parts of the Archipelago, the Moluccas, Celebes and New Guinea, for example. The West coast of Borneo was notorious in the early part of the nineteenth century. By 1835 however Holland had brought under her control Sambas and all the other West Coast states except Brunel, and within her sphere piracy was practically at an end.²⁴ The natives of these islands confined their operations largely to their own neighbourhood, and their depredations affected British trade only in a minor degree. The principal sufferer from them was Holland, so that in a history of the Straits Settlements they can be ignored. During the period 1824 to 1867 the five races of pirates with whom the British came in contact were the Lanuns, the Balanini, the Malays, the Chinese, and the Sea-Dayaks of Brunel in North West Borneo. The latter were local pirates of a peculiarly dangerous kind, and are dealt with in the chapter on the work of Rajah Brooke.

Some difference of opinion exists whether the Bugis of Celebes were pirates during the nineteenth century. At an earlier date they certainly were so, and Crawford considered that they still practised it.²⁵ His opinion is supported by a few isolated cases in the Straits Settlements archives, and by the account of Dalton, an Englishman who spent some time in their settlements on the

23. PP., (H. of C.) No. 739 of 1850, p. 2. (Vol. LV). PP., (H. of C.) No. 449 of 1851, pp. 2-3. (Vol. LVI, pt. 1.. Chinese Repository, passim, and especially I, 159, 248, 391; III, 62-68; IV, 522; V, 338, 384; X, 291, 516; XI, 184; XII, 56, 355; XV, 326, 400; XVI, 208, 462, 509, 514; XVII, 320, 372, 544, 651; XVIII, 558-60, 611-13, XIX, 162-65. Temminck, *Possessions Néerlandaises*, II, 443-44. Hunter, *Earlier Adventures*, 130, 138. Hill MSS. S. 29, 865, 901-33. Keppel, *A Sailor's Life*, II, 114.

24. Crawford, *Descriptive Dictionary*, 354. H. St. John, *Indian Archipelago*, passim. Temminck, *Possessions Néerlandaises*, III, 67, 241-43. Moor, *Notices of the Indian Archipelago*, 23-28, 101.

25. Crawford, *Descriptive Dictionary*, 75.

Eastern coast of Borneo in 1828-29.²⁶ Crawford however was speaking from hearsay, and the government of the Straits after examination of Dalton appears rather to have doubted the truth of his story.²⁷ Furthermore the various books written by Europeans living in the East Indian islands never spoke of the Bugis as pirates. Moreover, Earl, who from his various voyages in the Archipelago, knew them well, warmly defended them against the charge.²⁸ From the evidence which is available it would seem that during the period 1824 to 1867 the Bugis did not engage in piracy. Instead they devoted themselves to trade, and were the most important native merchants in the whole East Indian islands.²⁹

Until after 1835 the total suppression of piracy was regarded by many well-informed authorities as impossible. In spite of every effort, it was actually on the increase. Yet within twenty five years, between 1835 and 1860, Malay piracy was almost ended, while even the Lanuns and Balanini were far less of a scourge than they had been. The problem was solved by two means — the use of steamships and the repeated destruction of the pirate strongholds. In the days of sailing ships the suppression of piracy was almost impossible, for ships of the line, frigates, etc., were of little use. Their great height and towering masts made them visible long before they sighted the long, low galleys of their quarry, and sent every pirate for miles scurrying for shelter amongst the islands and swamps. Only if they chanced upon a prau too far from land to reach it had they much chance of capturing it. Even then, if the wind fell, the galley often escaped by rowing, while the men-of-wars' boats were left toiling hopelessly astern. On many occasions the pirates attacked and plundered traders in full view of a warship, helplessly becalmed and unable to assist. As to the small, swift gunboats which were used extensively by Spain, Holland and Great Britain, in too many cases they seem to have been ornamental incompetents. They had sails, and occasionally oars, and were armed with one or two heavy guns. The crews were generally natives — sometimes ex-pirates — although the captain was often a European. In proportion to their number and cost they were singularly ineffective, because their native crews

26. Moor, *Notices of the Indian Archipelago*, 15-29.

27. B. Pub., Range 12, Vol. 58: Feb. 1, 1831, Nos. 3, 4, 24-26.

28. Earl, *Eastern Seas*, 389-91.

29. *Ibid.* Crawford, *Descriptive Dictionary*, 75. v. chapter on Trade.

could not be depended on to fight well³⁰

With the advent of the steamship in 1833-37 a new era began, for it was small and inconspicuous, and no longer at the mercy of a favourable wind. Within a few years there was a marked decline in the number of piracies committed. Brooke expressed the situation exactly when he wrote:— "A small steamer . . . would do more towards the suppression of piracy than half-a-dozen sloops of war."³¹

It was also found essential to exercise a steady, remorseless pressure upon the pirates by constantly destroying their strongholds and ravaging their country. The sinking of a few praus, or the occasional burning of a village, had no lasting effects. The houses — built of palm-logs and branches — could be rebuilt almost as quickly as they were burned; and when the pirates found that a repetition of the offence brought no renewal of the punishment, they soon recovered their old audacity. When however a recurrence of piracy brought repeated and wholesale destruction upon them they soon decided that freebooting was too dangerous to be continued. A perfect example of the application of this principle was the success of Brooke and the British navy in destroying Lanun and Sea-Dayak piracy in Borneo.³² With all his humanity Rajah Brooke was convinced that the suppression of piracy could be brought about "only by steadily acting against every pirate hold. Without a continued and determined series of operations of this sort, it is my conviction that even the most sanguinary and fatal onslaughts will achieve nothing beyond a present and temporary good. The impression on the native mind is not sufficiently lasting. Their old impulses and habits return with fresh force; they forget their heavy retribution; and in two or three years the memory of them is almost entirely effaced. Till piracy be completely suppressed, there must be no relaxation."³³ "When these communities lose more than they gain by piracy, and feel

30. It is difficult to give exact references for this opinion, but it is the general impression which one obtains from the countless reports in the *Straits Settlements Records*, the *Bengal Public and Political Consultations*, and the works of Keppel, Brooke, De Groot, etc., e.g. Osborn, *Quedah*, 20. *JIA*, IV, 160-61, 401-2, Anon.

31. PP., Borneo, 1846, *A Selection from Papers Relating to Borneo*, p. 61.

32. v. chapter on Brooke, and for the statement of the principle, De Groot, *Moniteur des Indes*, 1846-47, I, 271-276.

33. Keppel, *Dido*, II, 230.

piracy is like sitting on a barrel of gunpowder with a lighted match in the hand; then, and then only, they will discontinue it. Heretofore the efforts to put down piracy have been desultory and ineffective."³⁴

The suppression of piracy in the East Indian islands was due to the British, Dutch and Spanish. The Spaniards may be dismissed in a few words. Their efforts were confined to protecting the Philippines against the Lanuns, a task in which they were fairly successful.³⁵ They also scored several notable successes. In 1848 they expelled the Balanini from their islands although this victory was to a considerable extent nullified by the fact that many of them went elsewhere and for many years continued their raids.³⁶

A few years later the Spaniards captured Sulu, and thereupon announced that they had conquered the whole Sulu Archipelago. In point of fact their conquest appears to have been limited practically to the town itself, since the Sultan and his followers retreated to the hills, and for many years continued their resistance. As late as about 1880 the Spanish soldiers did not dare to stray outside the walls of their fortress. It was however a great blow to the Lanuns that they no longer possessed a trading-centre where they could sell their booty and obtain supplies. Gradually moreover the Spaniards extended their sway over the Sulu Archipelago and Mindanao and the Lanun raids dwindled away into insignificance.³⁷

The work of the Dutch was much more important, and on the whole they seem to have done more towards the suppression of piracy in the East Indian islands than any other nation. Their efforts were directed mainly towards the protection of their own commerce, a duty which they performed much more systematically and efficiently than the British.³⁸ They had always far more warships in the Archipelago than Great Britain. Between 1819 and 1830 the Government of the Straits Settlements had only a few gunboats and schooners, with occasionally a larger ship from the Company's or the Royal navy. Between 1830 and 1840 the Straits marine was

34. Templer, *Brooke's Letters*, II, 110.

35. Keppel, *Life*, II, 108.

36. *IPFC*, Range 198, Vol. 32: Aug. 12, 1848, No. 204, B. Pub., Range 13, Vol. 69: April 12, 1848, No. 22, and v. *infra*.

37. St. John, *Life in the Far East*, II, 242. *JRASSB*, XXI, 96, Treacher. Pryer, *Decade in Borneo*, 113, 120.

38. Keppel, *Life*, II, 108. *SSR*, 159: Jan. 20, 1829.

increased: a steamship was sent out in 1837, and ships from the China squadron made periodical cruises. In 1841 the British Government finally realised that piracy could only be put down if warships made regular instead of occasional voyages in the Archipelago. From this time at least one and sometimes several men-of-war were stationed there, along with one or more of the Company's steamships. There were occasions however when these ships had to be withdrawn for service in China, and the Straits Settlements were left with only a few gunboats to protect their trade.³⁹ Dutch commerce on the other hand was always protected by a large flotilla of gunboats and small schooners which patrolled the coasts of their possessions, as well as by a powerful squadron of larger vessels. In 1848 for example when the British had about two steamers and two sailing ships in the Archipelago the Dutch had nine of the former and twenty-four of the latter.⁴⁰

The reasons for the disparity between the fleets of Great Britain and Holland are easy to understand. The East India Company was unwilling to incur heavy expense for a settlement from which after 1833 it derived no revenue. The Royal Navy had so many calls upon it that it could not spare enough ships to police a distant and by no means the most important field of British interests. Holland on the contrary had few colonial possessions of importance outside the East Indian islands, and it was therefore natural that the greater part of her navy on overseas service should be concentrated there. Considering the vast extent of her empire in the Archipelago, the astonishing thing is not that she had so many warships, but so few.

The Dutch methods for combatting piracy were four in number. They kept up a fairly regular patrol of their coasts, and sometimes protected *praus* by forming them into convoys under a guard of warships. They compelled native rulers to sign treaties promising not to give aid to pirates; but they found that it was far easier to obtain these agreements than to compel their observance. The Dutch also enforced an elaborate code of regulations prescribing the size, build, armament and crews of *praus*, to prevent pirates from masquerading as traders. Lastly,

39. *American Historical Review*, Jan. 1899, pp. 256, 260-61. H. M. Stephens, v. *infra*.

40. *Moniteur des Indes*, 1846-47, Vol. I, 240, 267, 319. De Groot. *Ibid.*, 1848-49, II, Pt. II, p. 1.

the Dutch made periodical although somewhat desultory expeditions against the pirate settlements within the limits of their empire. They rarely attacked piratical areas outside their own sphere of influence. Especially before 1843 the number of expeditions made by Holland greatly exceeded those of the British. By these means piracy was gradually put down in Celebes, the Moluccas, Dutch Borneo, the Rhio-Lingga Archipelago, and Sumatra. In the two last-mentioned places a large share of the credit belongs to the British.⁴¹ There was however never any effectual co-operation between the British and Dutch navies, although the Treaty of 1824 had intended that they should work together. Despite several efforts to carry it out there was no common plan of operations, and the British and Dutch attacks on the pirates were independent of one another.⁴²

Great Britain was entirely responsible for the destruction of piracy in the Malay Peninsula, while she also deserves a very large share of the credit for its suppression in the Rhio-Lingga Archipelago and the Sumatran states bordering on the Straits of Malacca. Through the efforts of Brooke and the navy Sea-Dayak piracy in Brunei was entirely put down, and the Lanuns of North-West Borneo were driven out and reduced to insignificance. Moreover such heavy punishment was inflicted upon roving squadrons of Lanuns and Balanini that they gave up cruising near the Malay Peninsula. And finally, Great Britain, far more than any other nation, was responsible for the suppression of Chinese piracy.

In 1835 however no one could have foreseen that within a generation piracy would sink into insignificance. The Straits of Malacca swarmed with pirates, Malay, Lanun and Balanini, and their fleets infested the waters near Malacca, Singapore and Penang. There were pirates in fleets and in single praus, pirates in big hundred-oared galleys, pirates in small galleys, pirates in row-boats, and solitary pirates in tiny skiffs. The great pirate mart at Galang did a flourishing trade in booty and captives, many of whom had been kidnapped from Penang. The

41. *Moniteur des Indes Orientales*, 1846-47: Vol. I, 159-61, 196-204, 230-41, 319-20, 330; De Groot. *Ibid.*, 1847-48: I, 15, 32-43, De Groot. *JIA*, III, 629-36; IV, 45-53; 144-62; 400-10; 617-28, 734-46, Anon. St. John, *Indian Archipelago*, II, 186-88, 195, 204, 213. *SSR*, 132; Feb. 13, 1830. *B. Pub.*, Range 13, Vol. 44: Dec. 4, 1843. Nos. 11-13.

42. Keppel, *Maecander*, I, 252-53. *Moniteur des Indes Orientales*, 1846-47: I, 235, 238, De Groot.

southern part of Province Wellesley was uninhabited because no man dared to live there lest he should be captured and sold into slavery. Praus were constantly taken almost within sight of port, and the pirates were very rarely captured. In 1826, for example, the Resident Councillor of Singapore reported that he received "constant accounts" of the loss of trading praus. "The shores and islands between this and Malacca are infested with piratical praus as soon as a native sail appears they assail their prey, which is seldom able to make any effectual resistance."⁴³ The records of Penang and Malacca are full of similar reports.⁴⁴

The Government of the Straits Settlements was quite unable to protect native trade or, except in very rare cases, to capture the pirates, owing to the ridiculous inadequacy of its naval force. In 1824 the largest warship at Penang was a small schooner, the "Jessy," unfit for further service, and the Council therefore asked the Supreme Government to send it a warship and four gunboats.⁴⁵ The gunboats did not arrive for over a year.⁴⁶ The experiment was made at Singapore in 1826 of arming a few fast praus, but the attempt to check piracy by this means was a failure.⁴⁷ The H. C. Cruiser "Hastings" was stationed in the Straits from 1826 to 1828, when it was replaced until 1831 by the yacht "Nereide."⁴⁸ The records make no mention of any captures made by these vessels. In 1831 the Straits Settlements had only three small ships for the protection of trade, the largest, the schooner "Zephyr," being only 84 tons.⁴⁹ The Straits

43. SSR, 111: Sept. 8, 1826.

44. SSR, 67: Oct. 7, 1818. *Ibid.*, 77: Nov. 16, 1820. *Ibid.*, 83: Sept. 21, 1818. *Ibid.*, 86: July 11 and Aug. 29, 1822. *Ibid.*, 94: April 15 and May 27, 1824. *Ibid.*, 95: June 14, 1824. *Ibid.*, 96: Dec. 16, 1824. *Ibid.*, 99: Jan. 12, Feb. 16, March 5, March 15, 1825. *Ibid.*, 101: May 5, 1825. *Ibid.*, 102: June and July 29, 1825. *Ibid.*, 104: Oct. 19, 1825. *Ibid.*, 105: Dec. 10, 1825. *Ibid.*, 108: Feb. 2, March and April 21, 1826. *Ibid.*, 111: Sept. 14, 1826. *Ibid.*, 112: Dec. 4, 1826. *Ibid.*, 115: Jan. 2 and Jan. 17, 1827. *Ibid.*, 118: Sept. 20, 1827. *Ibid.*, 119: Nov. 15, 1827. *Ibid.*, 144: Sept. 3, 1828 and passim. *Ibid.*, 157: Aug. 30, Sept. 3, and Dec. 11, 1828. *Ibid.*, 169: March 11, 1829. *Ibid.*, 184: April 21, 1829. *B. Pol.*, Range 123, Vol. 59: March 5, 1824. No. 49. The above are only a few of the entries in the Straits Settlements Records referring to piracy during this period.

45. B.S.P., Nov. 19, 1824.

46. SSR, 100: Jan. 28, 1825. *Ibid.*, 112: Sept. 21, 1826. *Ibid.*, 123: July 21, 1828.

47. SSR, 112: Dec. 7, 1826. *Ibid.*, 195: June 17, 1829.

48. *Ibid.*, 112: Sept. 21, 1826. *B. Pub.*, Range 12, Vol. 37: July 31, 1828. *Ibid.*, Vol. 59: April 12, 1831, No. 6.

49. *Ibid.*

Government in its despatches to India frankly admitted its powerlessness. In 1828 for example it spoke of the marine as "totally inefficient" for the protection of trade.⁵⁰ In 1830 Murchison, the Resident Councillor of Singapore, pointed out that the navy in the Straits had always been too weak to do more than protect the harbours and the waters immediately adjacent.⁵¹

The most striking characteristic of the despatches of the Straits Government before about 1835 is their tone of hopelessness. It was taken for granted that to extirpate piracy, or even effectually to check it, was utterly hopeless except at an expense which the Company would never sanction. Piracy was rapidly increasing, and by 1829 the Straits Government was afraid that the native trade of Singapore would eventually become extinct, because praus would be afraid to take the risk of sailing to it. The seven years between 1828 and 1835 were the zenith of Malay and Lanun piracy in the Straits of Malacca.⁵²

Before dealing with the attacks on the pirates between 1830 and 1840 reference must be made to the occupation of the Dinding Islands in 1826. The district now known collectively as The Dindings is composed of Pangkor and some smaller islands in the Straits of Malacca, and a tract of land on the mainland of Perak opposite. The islands had long been notorious as "the chief haunt of all the pirates who come from the Southward," and a favourite hiding-place while waiting for their prey.⁵³ The nominal ruler, the Sultan of Perak, was powerless to suppress the pirates, who were doing great damage to his trade, and in 1826 he voluntarily offered to cede the islands to the Company. He asked it to place a garrison there, and drive out the pirates. The Burney Treaty with Siam had established Perak as an independent state and there was no question as to the Sultan's right to grant the territory. The Company therefore accepted his offer, but no British force was stationed on the islands until after the Treaty of Pangkor in 1874.⁵⁴

50. SSR., 157: Sept. 3, 1828.

51. B. Pub., Range 12, Vol. 55: Oct. 19, 1830, Nos. 2-9.

52. SSR., 157: Sept. 3, 1828. *Ibid.*, 159: Jan. 20, 1829. B. Pub., Range 12, Vol. 55: Oct. 19, 1830, Nos. 2-9. *Ibid.*, Vol. 59: April 12, 1831, No. 6.

53. SSR., 83: passim. *Ibid.*, 103: Sept. 15, 1825. *Ibid.*, 108: April 10 and 21, 1826. *Ibid.*, 139: Nov. 2, 1826.

54. *Ibid.*, 103: Sept. 15, 1825. *Ibid.*, 139: Nov. 2 and 13, 1826. Aitchison, *Treaties*, 1, 407.

In 1830 the British navy at last appeared in Malayan waters. H.M.S. "Southampton" cruised in the Straits of Malacca, and her boats together with the Straits gunboat "Diamond" routed a fleet of some thirty pirate praus after several hours fighting.⁵⁵ In 1833 H.M.S. "Harrier" destroyed a notorious pirate settlement at Durian, an island south of the Straits of Singapore.⁵⁶ With these two exceptions no effective measures were taken by the government until 1835. In 1831 the Bugis merchants of Singapore complained to the Resident Councillor of the supineness of the Company, as compared with Holland, pointing out that a fleet of twenty-two large galleys, then cruising off the Johore coast, had in a few days captured seven praus. They informed him that unless there were a change of policy they would be compelled to abandon their voyages to Singapore.⁵⁷ The records for 1832 are full of accounts of praus being captured. In August of that year pirates chased a trading prau into the very entrance of Singapore harbour.⁵⁸ The Chinese of Singapore suffered some heavy losses, and in May 1832 the government allowed them to fit out at their own expense four large boats to attack the pirates lurking outside the harbour. They succeeded in sinking a pirate prau.⁵⁹

In 1833 the same conditions prevailed. Pirate fleets roamed the seas with impunity, and twenty of their praus, meeting the Company's gunboat "Hawk" near Penang, attacked and forced it to retreat.⁶⁰ The most amazing event of the year occurred in April. A small fleet of Chinese traders, carrying a cargo valued at over \$200,000, was blockaded by pirates at Pahang. The Government at Singapore had no ship available to assist them, and the Chinese escaped only by good luck, and the assistance of a Malay ruler.⁶¹ In consequence of this event the Chinese merchants of Singapore petitioned the Company to afford them effectual protection. They pointed out that they had built up a valuable trade, worth over \$1,000,000 a year, with the East Coast of the Malay Peninsula, with the result that they were affording a very comfortable and regular income to some forty or fifty pirate galleys who preyed upon it with impunity.

55. B. Pub., Range 12, Vol. 58: Feb. 1, 1831. No. 3. JIA, IV, 144-45. Anon.

56. One Hundred Years of Singapore, I, 293, G. E. Brooke.

57. JIA, IV, 146, Anon.

58. Ibid., 147.

59. Ibid., 147. B. Pub., Range 13, Vol. 3. Aug. 19, 1833, No. 2.

60. JIA, IV, 152, Anon.

61. B. Pub., Range 13, Vol. 3: Aug. 19, 1833, No. 2.

The Chinese estimated their annual loss at \$15,000 to \$20,000.⁶² During 1834 conditions remained unaltered; but in 1835 a new series of remonstrances finally roused the Indian Government to action. Petitions were submitted to Parliament and to the Supreme Government by the European and Chinese merchants of Singapore, and the Bengal Chamber of Commerce, urging that effective measures should be taken against piracy. Of late years it had increased rapidly, and it "threatened the extinction of the native maritime trade of the Eastern Settlements," on which the prosperity of Singapore "in great measure" depended. The Singapore petitions also asked that Admiralty jurisdiction should be given to the Recorder's Court. Bonham, the Governor of the Straits Settlements, strongly supported the petitions.⁶³

The lack of Admiralty jurisdiction prevented the Straits Court from trying prisoners accused of piracy, so that they had to be sent to Calcutta for trial, together with the necessary witnesses. In practice the result was that men charged with this crime were often released because it was not within the competency of the Straits Recorder to deal with them. Even when sent to Calcutta they frequently escaped from lack of evidence, because many of the witnesses were poor native traders who could not afford so expensive a journey.⁶⁴ The question was referred to the Directors, and in 1837 they secured the passage of an Act of Parliament granting Admiralty jurisdiction to the Recorder's Court.⁶⁵

Meanwhile the petitions submitted in 1835 resulted in the despatch of H.M.S. "Andromache," Captain Chads, to the Straits of Malacca. In 1836 the Supreme Government appointed Chads and Bonham, the Governor of the Straits Settlements, joint Commissioners for the suppression of Malay piracy. They were given very extensive powers, and the Straits marine — increased by three new gunboats — was placed under their control. Two other warships, H.M.S. "Wolf" and "Raleigh," were also sent to the Straits and did good work. During 1836 the ships

62. *Ibid.*

63. *Ibid.*, Vol. 13: June 24, 1835, Nos. 10-17. *Ibid.*, Vol. 14: Sept. 23, 1835, Nos. 6-13.

64. JIA, IV, 160. Letters Received from India and Bengal, Vol. 4: Sept. 2, 1835. B. Pub., Range 12, Vol. 58: Feb. 1, 1831, No. 12. B. Pub., Range 13, Vol. 13: June 24, 1835, Nos. 10-17. *Ibid.*, Vol. 14: Aug. 3, and Sept. 23, 1835.

65. *Ibid.*, Vol. 15: Sept. 23, 1835, No. 13. Despatches to India and Bengal, Vol. 10: March 3, 1837.

cruised in the Straits of Malacca and along the East coast of the Peninsula, and destroyed many pirate settlements both in the British and Dutch spheres of influence, including the notorious trading-centre on Galang Island. Chads also defeated several pirate squadrons with very heavy loss by disguising his ships as traders, and thus inducing the Malays to attack him. Malay piracy received a blow from which it never recovered.⁶⁶

H.M.S. "Wolf" remained in the Straits from 1836 to 1838, and inflicted heavy losses upon the pirates. Much of her success was due to her habit of disguising herself as a trader carrying tropical animals. To quote one of her officers:— "Baboons flew playfully at your legs, a loathsome orang-outang, . . . crawled up to shake hands . . . pigs and peccaries, sheep, fowls, a honey bear, and a black panther" made her "a perfect floating menagerie."⁶⁷ During 1837 and 1839 the Dutch were also very active in the Rhio-Lingga Archipelago and other islands near Singapore.⁶⁸

The Government of India decided in 1837 permanently to increase the naval force in the Straits, so that the pirates might not forget the lesson taught them in 1836. Until conditions improved so far as to warrant a reduction, it was to consist of two ships of the royal navy and five gunboats. The Supreme Government also decided to station in the Straits the "Diana," a small steamer of 168 tons. Her speed was five knots an hour, and she carried two nine-pounder guns and twenty-five men.⁶⁹ The despatch of the "Diana" was due to the strong representations of the Straits Government and the Admiral commanding the Indian Squadron. They were at one in asserting that piracy could never be suppressed by sailing-ships and gunboats, and that the only effective weapon against it was the steamer.⁷⁰ The arrival of the steam-

66. Letters Received from India and Bengal, Vol. 8: Aug. 3. 1836. *Ibid.*, 11: May 31, 1837. Despatches to India and Bengal, Vol. 19: Jan. 4, 1839. B. Pub., Range 13, Vol. 20: Oct. 19, 1836, Nos. 6-10. JIA, IV, 404-9, Anon. James, A Midshipman in Search of Promotion, 261-66.

67. *Ibid.*, 261-66. Buckley, Singapore, I, 280. One Hundred Years of Singapore, I, 296, Brooke.

68. JIA, IV, 619, 625, Anon.

69. Letters Received from India and Bengal, Vol. 11: May 31, 1837. Buckley, Singapore, I, 281. B. Pub., Range 13, Vol. 22: March 1, 1837, Nos. 6A and 6B.

70. *Ibid.*, Vol. 17: Jan. 27, 1836, Nos. 1-2: and Feb. 3, 1836, Nos. 3-4. *Ibid.*, Vol. 18: April 27 and May 1, 1836, No. 1. *Ibid.*, Vol. 19: July 6, 1836, No. 14.

ship in the East Indian islands was a turning-point in the history of piracy. The advent of a vessel which was independent of favourable winds destroyed the galleys' comparative immunity, and in a few years many even of the Lanuns gave up piracy.⁷¹

The first engagement of the "Diana" in 1837 was a painful surprise for the pirates. Six Lanun galleys were plundering a Chinese junk off the Trengganu coast when they sighted her. Never having seen a steamer, they decided from her smoke that she was a sailing ship on fire, and bore down on her at full speed, anticipating an easy capture. To their horror, the "Diana" came up to them *against the wind*, and then, suddenly stopping opposite each prau, poured in her broadsides at pistol-shot range. One prau was sunk, 90 Lanuns were killed, 150 wounded, and 30 taken. The other five galleys escaped in a shattered condition, "baling out apparently nothing but blood, and . . . scarce a man at the oars." Three of them foundered before they reached home.⁷²

As a result of the navy's attacks from 1836 to 1839, and especially of Chads' cruise of 1836 and the "Diana's" fight of 1837, piracy in the Straits greatly decreased for several years. Very few praus were attacked, and the native traders had never been so safe.⁷³ About 1843 there was a recrudescence of Malay and Lanun piracy in the Straits of Malacca and along the East coast of the Peninsula. It continued until 1849, and many trading-praus were captured, some of them very close to Singapore. Conditions however never became nearly as serious as they had been before 1836.⁷⁴ The Government of the Straits Settlements, with the assistance of the China squadron and the Temenggong of Johore, managed to cope with the situation fairly well. It was greatly hampered however because the fleet was unable to spare sufficient ships to police so wide an area.⁷⁵ Gradually Malay piracy waned under the British and Dutch attacks,

71. Hunter, *Adventures of a Naval Officer*, 84-85, 93-94 and v. infra.

72. Osborn, *Quedah*, 20-21. JIA, IV, 620-21, Anon.

73. *Ibid.*, 626-27. B. Pub., Range 13, Vol. 25: Nov. 1, 1837, No. 3. Command Paper [1976] of 1854-55, p. 150 (Vol. XXIX).

74. JIA, IV, 735-38, Anon. JIA, VI, 470-87, J. T. Thomson, PP, Command Paper [1976] of 1854-55, p. 150 (Vol. XXIX). B. Pub., Range 13, Vol. 43: June 19, 1843, No. 18.

75. *Ibid.*, Vol. 54: Aug. 27, 1845, Nos. 12-13.

and after 1849 it dwindled into insignificance.⁷⁶

For many years however piracy continued to exist on a petty scale in the neighbourhood of the Straits Settlements. It usually took the form of attacks by a few Malays on row-boats or small praus, although occasionally a junk or a fairly large prau was taken.⁷⁷ Such incidents grew steadily rarer, even though the Straits marine was not really effective. Sailing were not replaced by steam gunboats until 1861. Moreover the "Hooghly," the largest steamer, was very old and frequently disabled, as her boilers were nearly worn out. She was quite unable to catch a fast pirate galley. In 1862 she was replaced by a more powerful iron steamship, the "Pluto".⁷⁸ The Straits marine was much improved by the addition about the same time of a new steam gunboat, the "Avon," a large and fairly fast ship with twenty and sixty four pounder guns.⁷⁹ The most notorious instance of Malay piracy after this was the Selangor incident in 1871 which led to British intervention in the state.⁸⁰ In 1884 and 1909 Chinese merchantmen were attacked by Malay pirates near Singapore.⁸¹ Speaking broadly however, one may say that Malay piracy was extinct by the end of the nineteenth century.

In addition to crushing Malay piracy the British navy also made many attacks on the Lanuns and Balanini. During the thirties their fleets suffered heavy losses, as for example in the "Diana's" engagement of 1837; but until 1845 no serious attempt was made to attack their settlements. In 1845 and 1846 the British navy, assisted by Rajah Brooke and his Malays, destroyed the Lanun settlements in North-West Borneo, and piracy there came to an end. This result was achieved very largely through

76. B. Pub., Range 13, Vol. 64: April 7, 1847, No. 7. IPFP, Range 200, Vol. 40: Oct. 7, 1853, Nos. 137-42. Ibid., Vol. 59: April 28, 1854, No. 182. Ocean Highways, Jan. 1873, pp. 312-14, W. E. Maxwell.

77. Cameron, *Malayan India*, 30. McNair, *Convicts Their own Warders*, 120-22. Straits Settlements Administration Report, 1860-61, pp. 1-2. Ibid., 1861-62, pp. 25 and 30. Ibid., 1862-63, pp. 6, 22, and 26.

78. Ibid., 1861-62, p. 25. Ibid., 1862-63, p. 22. PP, (H. of C.), No. 259 of 1862, p. 67 (Vol. XL). Cameron, *Malayan India*, 251-52.

79. Hill MSS, § 942.

80. Swettenham, *British Malaya*, 115. Anson, *About Others and Myself*, 306-11.

81. *One Hundred Years of Singapore*, I, 299, Brooke.

the terror inspired by the steamships.⁸² In 1847 the H. C. steamer "Nemesis" inflicted a very severe defeat on a Balanini squadron near Labuan. The pirates suffered so heavily that for fifteen years they carefully avoided the coast of Brunei.⁸³ The Dutch were also very active at this time in destroying Lanun settlements; and the Spaniards dealt the Lanuns and Balanini two heavy blows by the capture of Sulu and the Balanini islands in 1848 and 1851.⁸⁴

The Lanuns and Balanini continued their annual cruises for many years after 1851, but their power gradually decreased until they sank into insignificance. Their decline was due partly to the growth of Spanish power, but in much larger degree to the terror inspired by steamships.⁸⁵ By 1854 the Straits Settlements had for some years been almost free from Lanun attacks. Soon afterwards the names of both the Lanuns and Balanini disappeared forever from the Straits records. In 1862 there occurred what proved to be almost the last fight between the British and the Lanuns. A squadron returning home from a successful cruise on the East coast of the Malay Peninsula rashly ventured into Sarawak waters. It was attacked and almost wiped out off Bintulu in Brunei by Rajah Brooke's tiny steam gunboat after a desperate fight in which the pirates showed all their ancient courage.⁸⁶ Long after the Straits Settlements were free from their ravages the Dutch, and especially the Spaniards, were compelled to send periodical expeditions against the Lanuns and Balanini.⁸⁷

When the British North Borneo Company was founded, its officials discovered that Lanun and Balanini colonies had been established on the East coast of Borneo. Tunku, the principal settlement, was founded by Lanuns from North-West Borneo after the destruction of their strongholds there by the British navy in 1845 and 1846.⁸⁸ The pirates had only a shadow of their former power, but in

82. PP, Command Paper [1421] of 1851, p. 320, (Vol. XXXIV). Hunter, *Adventures*, 84-85, 93-94, and *passim*. v. chapter on Rajah Brooke and Borneo Piracy for a fuller account.

83. IPFC, Range 198, Vol. 2: Oct. 23, 1847, Nos. 74-79. St. John, Brooke, 121. A description of the battle was given in the opening pages of this chapter.

84. JIA, V, 382, Anon. St. John, *Life in the Far East*, II, 242.

85. *Ibid.*, I, 292; II, 235, 240. ...

86. McDougall, *Sarawak*, 204-14. (London), *Times*, July 16 1862.

87. Baring-Gould & Bampfylde, *Sarawak*, 277-78.

88. *Ibid.*, 124.

1878 they still carried on raids against the natives of Borneo and the Philippines. Tunku was destroyed by H. M. S. "Kestrel" in 1879, and in 1886 two villages were bombarded by a British warship because of various small acts of piracy. As a result of this punishment and the firm rule of the Borneo Company, the last embers of Lanun and Balanini piracy in the island were stamped out. By the combined efforts of the British, Dutch and Spaniards the most famous pirates of the Archipelago were at last compelled to abandon their raids.⁸⁹

At the very time when Malay and Lanun piracy was coming to an end, the Chinese pirates suddenly rose into prominence. The worst period seems to have been from about 1848 to 1855, although attacks were made until the seventies. The principal sufferers were junks from Cochin-China; and from the inadequacy of its marine the Government of the Straits Settlements could do little to protect them. The main theatre of Chinese operations was the Gulf of Siam, although many vessels were captured near Singapore. The attacks gradually died away as the China squadron destroyed the fleets and fortresses of the pirates in China.⁹⁰

No one who studies the history of piracy in the East Indian islands can fail to be impressed by its resemblance to that of the Barbary coast. In each case piracy was fostered by a peculiarly favourable environment. How important this influence was in the development of piracy in the Archipelago has already been shown. The coast of North Africa was equally suitable. It is a "series of natural harbours, often backed by lagoons which offer every facility for escape." There are "endless creeks, shallow harbours and lagoons where the Corsairs' galleys (which never drew more than six feet of water) could take refuge," and much of the coast is protected by shifting sand-banks.⁹¹ Moreover in both cases the pirates' country lay alongside some of the most important of the world's trade-routes.

In Africa as in the Eastern Archipelago the actions of European nations greatly stimulated the piracy which

89. *Ibid.*, 278. JRASSB, XXI, 96-101, 112, Treacher. Pryer, *Decade in Borneo*, 9, 14, 31, 31-42, 55, and *passim*.

90. IPFC, Range 200, Vol. 40: Oct. 7, 1853, Nos. 137-42. *Ibid.*, Vol. 59: April 28, 1854, Nos. 180-87. IPFC, Range 201, Vol. 29: Sept. 14, 1855, Nos. 86-97. *One Hundred Years of Singapore*, I, 297, Brooke. JIA, VI, 470-84, Thomson.

91. Lane-Poole, *Barbary Corsairs*, 16-21, 186-91.

already existed. What the destruction of the native trade-routes was to the Malays, the expulsion of the Moors from Spain was to the Corsairs. The pirates of Northern Africa were not a very serious menace until their numbers were greatly increased towards the end of the fifteenth century by a swarm of refugees from Spain, filled with a burning sense of their wrongs, and determined to avenge the cruelties they had suffered at Christian hands.⁹² The Corsairs also resembled the pirates of the Archipelago in that they were slavers as much as robbers: one of the principal objects of their cruises was to make captives for the slave markets. With the possible exception of the Lanuns however none of the East Indian pirates seem to have treated their slaves with such callous cruelty as the Moors.⁹³ The last point of resemblance is that in both cases neither the ships nor the forts of the pirates were very formidable to European warships. They were a terror only to merchantmen.⁹⁴

Apart from these points of similarity however the two races of pirates were radically different. Except in rare cases the Malays and Lanuns were never a menace to European merchantmen; while the Corsairs were the terror of every trader that passed their harbours. The reason for this was threefold, the assistance of Turkey, the encouragement of the great European powers, and the use of European renegades. From about 1518, when Charles V began to make serious attempts to crush them, until 1571 the Barbary Corsairs were under the protection of Turkey. The Janissaries, the flower of the Sultan's army, were sent to sail on their raids, and the pirate galleys formed part of the Turkish navy. Barbarossa and the other great leaders of the pirates commanded the whole Turkish fleet, and assisted the Sultans in their campaigns. Until the battle of Lepanto in 1571 the Turkish fleet had the command of the Mediterranean; and the Corsairs were protected and enabled to grow strong in the early years of their power when they could most easily have been crushed.⁹⁵

Lepanto deprived the pirates of this protection, and they ceased to be robbers on the grand scale. The great powers of Europe could easily have crushed them; yet in

92. Playfair, *Scourge of Christendom*, 1-3. Lane-Poole, *Barbary Corsairs*, 7-13, 22-27.

93. Playfair, *Scourge of Christendom*, 6, 20, and *passim*.

94. *Ibid.*, 8-13, and *passim*.

95. *Ibid.*, *passim*. Lane-Poole, *Corsairs*, 13-181. Currey, *Sea Wolves of the Mediterranean*, 177-78.

the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries their ravages were more extensive than ever before. Hundreds of European merchantmen and thousands of captives fell into their hands, the Mediterranean seaboard was constantly pillaged, and even villages in England and Ireland were destroyed. The pirates arrogated to themselves the right to war on every nation of Europe which did not buy their forbearance by tribute. Moreover they constantly broke the treaties which they were bribed to sign, and renewed their ravages. Yet apart from a few sporadic attacks never pushed home, the great powers replied by fresh gifts of money, new treaties, and more stores and munitions. The truth was that England, France and the other powers found the Corsairs too useful as a means of injuring one another's trade to allow them to be destroyed. While attempting to buy immunity for their own merchants by lavish gifts, they were constantly trying to bribe the pirates to attack their rivals.⁹⁶ The position was rather like that of Turkey and the Concert of Europe, when the attempts to secure just government for the Sultans' Christian subjects failed because the mutual jealousy and distrust of the great powers made effective action impossible.

Finally, much of the power of the Corsairs was due to their employment of Christian renegades. Their gunners, many of the commanders of their galleys, and some even of their rulers, were renegades. Renegades generally guided them on their voyages, and formed the most daring part of their crews. In 1630 there were 8000 in Algiers alone. The abandonment of the galley for the sailing-ship at the beginning of the seventeenth century was due to a Fleming, Simon Dander, who taught the pirates how to build ships on the European model. Owing to the great superiority of their new type of vessel the Corsairs were able to extend their cruises into the Atlantic, and ravage the coasts of England and Ireland.⁹⁷

The Malays and Lanuns on the contrary had none of these advantages. No European power protected or assisted them with arms and money as a means of injuring its rivals' trade. That they flourished so long was due not to the encouragement but to the indifference of Europe. Moreover the pirates of the Archipelago were

96. Playfair, *Scourge of Christendom*, 4-6, 34-55. Lane-Poole, *Barbary Corsairs*, 182. Taffarel, *L'Algérie*, 30-33, and *passim*.

97. Playfair, *Scourge of Christendom*, 4, 20, 53. Lane-Poole, *Barbary Corsairs*, 200-1, 224-34.

not joined by European renegades. There appears to be only one case, in 1820, when a European commanded a Malay squadron, and even here there is no certain proof, but merely strong suspicion.⁹⁸ The Malays and Lanuns were therefore greatly inferior to the Corsairs in their types of vessel, their armament, and their skill in gunnery. For these reasons they were rarely a danger to European merchantmen, but only to the ill-armed native trading praus. So far as enthusiasm for their chosen profession went, the pirates of the Archipelago were fully the equals of the Corsairs. Had circumstances been favourable, they might have been as great a scourge to Europeans as the Moors: it was their misfortune, and not their fault, that they were comparatively innocuous.

98. Hill, *Episodes of Piracy*, S 25.

XIII

Rajah Brooke of Sarawak and The Suppression of Piracy in Brunei.

No history of the Straits Settlements would be complete which did not refer to the work accomplished by Sir James Brooke in Sarawak. In 1839 the North-West coast of Borneo was one of the most notorious pirate strongholds in the whole Archipelago; by 1850 their power was broken, and by 1860 even the Lanuns gave the coasts of Brunei a wide berth. To Rajah Brooke, far more than to anyone else, belongs the credit for this great achievement.

Brunei, the scene of his success, was a decadent Malayan state in the North-West part of Borneo. When the Portuguese first visited it in the sixteenth century it was a large and powerful kingdom; but in the course of three hundred years it had decayed until its power was but a shadow, and only a fraction of its former territory remained. At the present day its area has decreased to a small district surrounding Brunei town, the capital; but in 1839 it included the present state of Sarawak. The population was composed of several elements. There were first the Malays, a small minority, but the dominant race, comprising the Sultan, his nobles, and their followers, who lived either in the capital, Brunei town, or near the mouths of the rivers. The mass of the population was of a somewhat different race, and had been conquered by the Malayan invaders. It was divided into several tribes, the Kayans, very numerous and warlike, the Dayaks, and others. The Dayaks were of two kinds, Land and Sea Dayaks. The inhabitants of Sarawak were in the main land Dayaks, a kindly and unwarlike race, not much given to fighting, though not without somewhat of a predilection for head-hunting. The Sea Dayaks, or Orang Laut, were of altogether different calibre. Their villages were near Sarawak, on the banks of the Batang Lupar, Serebas, and Kaluka Rivers. They were excellent seamen, pirates to a man, and notorious all along the West Coast of Borneo for their fearlessness and ferocity. Between the Orang Laut and Brunei town on the Rajang and Igan Rivers lived several peaceful Dayak tribes who manufactured sago in the intervals between the raids of the Sea Dayaks. Northwards of

Brunei town the country was a stronghold of the Lanun pirates, who had fortified towns at Tampassuk, Pandassan, and other places.

The whole state was nominally under the government of the Sultans of Brunei, but in point of fact their dependencies were rapidly slipping from their grasp. The rule of the Malays was as weak as it was cruel and oppressive; individually brave, they were unable to prevent their state from crumbling to pieces before their eyes. Rajah Brooke's "Journals" show that when he first went to Sarawak he hoped to revivify the ancient dynasty of Brunei, but after many attempts he discovered that the task was hopeless. The Malay nobles appear to have divided their time between intrigue and dissipation at Brunei town, and the oppression of their Dayak subjects, the Land Dayaks, be it well understood; no one had courage enough to tyrannize over the Orang Laut.

The oppression to which the Land Dayaks were subjected would be incredible if it were not attested by the accounts of such unimpeachable eye-witnesses as Spenser St. John, Sir Hugh Low, and Admiral Keppel. A Malay noble for example would send a bar of iron or some other article worth a few dollars to a Dayak village and compel the inhabitants to buy it for ten times its value. If they were unable to pay the price, he and his followers would sack the village and carry off the young men and women as slaves. It also frequently happened that a Malay would see a Dayak boat which he fancied, and, if he did not carry it off at once, would put a mark on it as a sign that it was his. Very often four or five marks would be set on a boat before some Malay would take it away with him. The Dayak owner was then compelled to visit all the other Malays who had placed their mark on his boat, and pay each of them its full value to recompense them for their disappointment.¹

Besides plundering the Dayaks, the Malays also engaged in piracy. About 1800 Brunei town was so notorious for this that the former flourishing trade with English merchantmen ceased altogether, since several

1. The above account is drawn from the following sources:—Mundy, *Journals of Rajah Brooke*, passim. St. John, *Life in the Forests of the Far East*, passim and especially II, 106, 245-79, 292-304. Brooke, *Vindication*, II, 49-50. Baring-Gould & Bampfyld, *Sarawak*, 54-58. Sir Hugh Low, *Sarawak*, 189-90 and passim. Templer, *Private Letters of Sir James Brooke*, passim. Keppel, *Expedition to Borneo of H. M. S. "Dido,"* II, 203 and passim.

large ships had been taken and their crews murdered. The cessation of this trade in the end helped to bring about the downfall of Brunei, since the Malays had been greatly enriched by it. In 1839 the more far-sighted nobles were therefore anxious to renew it. By this time Brunei town itself had given up actual piracy, but the Sultans and their Datus (Malay nobles) protected pirates and received a share of their plunder. The town was a harbour of refuge where the pirate praus came to sell their slaves and booty, and to buy supplies.² Other parts of Brunei however more than made up for the backsliding of the capital. The Lanuns sent out squadrons from their fortified bases on the north-west and northern coasts and ravaged the seas for hundreds of miles. These Lanuns were immigrants from the great pirate stronghold on Mindanao in the Philippines, and were in league with their kinsmen.³

Another race which played an important rôle in Borneo piracy was the Arab. The Malays have always shown great veneration for the Arabs, since it was from them that they received Mohammedanism. This, joined with their mental superiority to the Malays and Dayaks, gave them great ascendancy over the natives of the Archipelago. While there were no Arab colonies in Borneo, quite a few individuals had established themselves amongst the Lanuns and the Sea-Dayaks, and combined with great success the rôles of holy men, pirate chieftains, and slavers. Typical of the class were Sharif Osman of Marudu Bay, and Sharifs Mular, Sahap and Masahor in the Orang Laut country. Frequently the Arabs did not lead the pirate raids in person, but confined themselves to the safer task of building strongly fortified towns, from which they sent out fleets manned by their Malayan or Sea-Dayak followers. When the squadrons returned after a successful cruise, the Arab Sharifs took a goodly share of the profits. The influence of the Arabs upon the Malays was denounced by authorities like Brooke, St. John, Low, and Raffles as most pernicious. They prostituted their intellectual superiority and the superstitious veneration in which they were held to foster in

2. Rancee of Sarawak, *My Life in Sarawak*, xvii. Low, *Sarawak*, 128. JIA, II, 512. J. R. Logan. J. Hunt, "Report on Borneo to Raffles", *Malayan Miscellanies*, I, 37-58.

3. Mundy, Brooke, II, 189-96. Low, *Sarawak*, 128-29. S. St. John, *Life in the Far East*, I 239. II, 239-40. H. St. John, *Indian Archipelago*, II, 132, 136-42. Earl, *Eastern Seas*, 312-15. PP, (H. of C.), No. 55 of 1852-53, pp. 2-9, (Vol. LXI).

their followers their inborn love of piracy.⁴

The piratical tribes with whom Brooke was brought most closely in contact were the Sea Dayaks, whose villages were scattered along the banks of the Batang Lupar, Sadong, Serebas and Kaluka Rivers. When in 1849 the Radical Party in Great Britain opened its attack upon Rajah Brooke, it contended that these notorious marauders were peaceable farmers and fishermen, of inoffensive and lovable disposition. In point of fact, the evidence of their depredations fills many stout volumes; and it was only from force of circumstances and not through any fault of their own that they were not as great a scourge as the Lanuns. Originally they had been agriculturists who differed from the Land Dayaks only in their stronger partiality for human heads, and because they were so brave and warlike that to oppress them was out of the question. It therefore appealed to the Malays and the Arab Sharifs as an excellent idea that such splendid fighting material should be diverted from the toilsome and comparatively unproductive work of farming to piracy for the benefit of their mentors. So apt were the Orang Laut that in a short time they were the scourge of the West coast of Borneo. They became excellent seamen, and their naturally blood-thirsty instincts were greatly stimulated. The Malays and Arabs found their passion for heads of the utmost service, for when a capture was made the Orang Laut were quite content to leave all the booty to their leaders and take as their share the heads of the slain or of any captives too weak to be sold as slaves.

When Brooke arrived in Sarawak they were at the height of their power. They were divided into two tribes, the Séribas and Sekarran, and could put into the field 20,000 warriors, armed with spears, long heavy swords with a razor-like edge, and large shields ornamented with dyed human hair. Trained to the sea from infancy, they were adept at managing their small craft. In rough weather, when their boats were almost filled with water, they were accustomed to leap overboard and, clinging to the gunwale with one hand, swim until the storm was over. Their galleys were long and low, propelled with oars and sails, and extraordinarily swift. They were made

4. Low, *Sarawak*, 123-25, 191. Baring-Gould & Bampfylde, *Sarawak*, 52. Mundy, *Brooke*, I, 362-66, 370-77. St. John, *Brooke*, 160-61. Eari, *Eastern Seas*, 66-69. Keppel, *Dido*, II, 145 (1847 ed.) Moor, *Notices of the Indian Archipelago*, 31.

of long planks lashed together, so that when hard pressed by men-of-war's boats, they could run ashore and quickly cutting the lashings, carry them away piecemeal into the jungle, to be put together again at leisure. Since the boats of the Orang Laut were frailer than the big Lanun galleys, and hence less adapted for long sea-voyages, they confined their depredations to the Borneo coasts, and did not wander far afield, although at times they allied themselves with the Lanuns. For this reason also the Orang Laut did not attack European merchantmen but confined their attention to native trading-praus. The Sea-Dayaks also laboured under the great disadvantage that they had no fire-arms, and were somewhat afraid of them. The towns of the Arab Sharifs however were provided with cannon and muskets and the Malays who usually accompanied the Orang Laut expeditions took their fire-arms with them. Under these circumstances the character of the Sea Dayaks was far better known to the Dutch than to the British Government. At the inquiry held on Brooke's attacks upon them in 1854 a Dutch naval officer gave most important testimony regarding their ravages on the Dutch possessions on the West coast of Borneo.⁵

Such was the situation in Brunei when in 1839 James Brooke sailed into the Sarawak River with his small schooner, the "Royalist," and a crew of some twenty picked Englishmen. Brooke had come to the East to fulfil the dream of his life, a voyage of exploration and scientific research in the Archipelago.⁶ The visit to Borneo was only an incident in his travels, and if anyone had told him that in less than twenty years he would be the ruler of the greater part of Brunei, he would have scouted the idea as preposterous.

Sarawak at this time was in revolt against the Sultan of Brunei. So unprecedented had been the tyranny of Makota, the Sultan's governor of the province, that he

5. Low, *Sarawak*, 165-194, 221-25. Baring-Gould & Bampfylde, *Sarawak*, 52-54. Earl, *Eastern Seas*, 312-14. Mundy, *Brooke*, I, 297-316, 351, 362-66, 370-77. Keppel, *Maeander*, I, 126-134, 201. St. John, *Life in the Far East*, I, 67: II, 239. St. John, *Brooke*, 154-56, 159-211. Hunter, *Earlier Adventures of a Naval Officer*, 38 ff., 90, 160, 148-234. *The Borneo Question*, 12-14. PP, Command Paper [1197] of 1850, pp. 4-12, (LV); Command Paper [1976] of 1854-55, (XXIX), the report of the Commission of Inquiry, 1854, which conclusively proved that the Sea Dayaks were pirates. PP, (H. of C.), No. 4 of 1852-53, pp. 3-7, (Vol. LXI). JIA, III, 254-55, S. St. John. *Moniteur des Indes Orientales*, 1847-48, I, 20, De Groot.

6. Templer, *Private Letters of Sir James Brooke*, I, 4-9, 11-14, 16-33, 76-77, 80.

had actually succeeded in uniting against him the Land Dayaks and their hereditary enemies the Malays. Pangeran Muda Hashim, the Regent of Brunei, had been sent to suppress the rebellion, but owing to the cowardice and incapacity of his officers he had completely failed. The war promised to drag on indefinitely, and meanwhile Hashim's enemies at the capital were undermining his influence with Omar, the incapable and almost imbecile Sultan. Muda Hashim was therefore anxious to return to Brunei town as quickly as possible. He welcomed Brooke warmly and a strong friendship quickly grew up between them. While somewhat weak, Hashim had many excellent qualities. His treatment of the Dayaks was comparatively just, and he wished to suppress piracy, and to re-establish trade with the British. With proper guidance he would have made a satisfactory ruler; and his claim to the throne was as good as the Sultan's. In point of character he was infinitely preferable to Omar, whose guiding principles were plunder, women, and dissipation. Moreover the Sultan was as weak as he was worthless, and always followed the advice of his latest councillor. His most congenial advisers were Hashim's enemies, who, led by Pangeran Usop, were the patrons of piracy and the slave trade, and were notorious even in Brunei for their oppression of the Dayaks.⁷

After a few months Brooke sailed to Celebes, but in 1840 he returned to Sarawak. Hashim had become convinced that the rebellion could only be suppressed by Brooke's assistance, and in return he offered him the Governorship of Sarawak. Brooke accepted, not from any hope of personal gain, but solely because he saw in the offer an opportunity of ending the intolerable oppression of the Dayaks. He suppressed the revolt, and treated the Malays and Dayaks with such kindness and justice that in a few months he completely won their allegiance. Makota, the Governor of Sarawak whose oppression had caused the revolt, and a notorious patron of the pirates, saw that Brooke's appointment would ruin his opportunities for extortion, and therefore persuaded Hashim to put off installing him in office. Several months thus elapsed, until finally Makota made a futile attempt to poison Brooke. The Rajah cleared his ship for action, and demanded that Hashim should fulfil his promise. The Dayaks, and the majority of the Malays at once joined

7. St. John, *Brooke*, 13-26. Keppel, *Cruise of the Maeander*, II, 117. Brooke, *Vindication*, 39. Baring-Gould & Bampfylde, *Sarawak*, 65-69. Low, *Sarawak*, 106-9.

Brooke; and Muda Hashim proclaimed him Governor of Sarawak, on September 24, 1841. In 1842 the Sultan confirmed his appointment.⁸

When the English Radicals attacked Rajah Brooke in 1849 they accused him of being an unscrupulous adventurer, who extorted from a powerless Sultan the rule of a rich province in order to amass wealth by exploiting the natives. To anyone who has studied the history of Brooke's career the charge is so grotesque as to seem unworthy of refutation. It has been denied, not only by the Rajah's followers, but also by authorities of such unimpeachable integrity as Low, St. John, and Swettenham.⁹ Nothing however proves the falsity of the accusation so completely as the bare facts of Brooke's administration. An adventurer who wished to grow wealthy would not impoverish himself by spending the greater part of his small fortune in restoring prosperity to a poverty-stricken country, while consistently refusing to enrich himself by exploiting its resources. Rajah Brooke obtained the Governorship of Sarawak from no desire for power or wealth, but solely in order to rescue the inhabitants from intolerable oppression. He never fell short of his high ideal, and his whole life is a triumphant refutation of the charges levelled against him.

The history of Rajah Brooke's rule in Sarawak lies outside the scope of this thesis. Suffice it to say that for twenty-five years his life was one long battle against Brunei misrule. Gradually he restored order and prosperity in Sarawak, and built up his system of administration. He won the enthusiastic devotion of his Malays and Dayaks; and the inhabitants of the other provinces of Brunei sent embassies begging him to extend his rule over them. Brooke was eager to put an end to piracy and the tyranny of the Malay nobles; and the Sultan for his part was quite willing to extend his province. The Malay Governors of his dependencies had made themselves practically independent, and only sent him tribute when the spirit moved them. Sultan Omar cared nothing for the misrule of Dayaks; but he keenly appreciated a governor who kept his word and regularly sent him the tribute agreed on. So the area of Sarawak gradually increased, until by 1860 it extended from Cape Tanjong

8. *Templer, Brooke's Letters*, I, 93-103, 116-18. Mundy, *Brooke*, I, 177-271. St. John, *Brooke*, 27-71.

9. *Ibid.*, *passim*. Low, *Sarawak*, 93-123. Swettenham, *preface*, p. vii, in *My Life in Sarawak* by the Ranees of Sarawak.

Datu to beyond Cape Tanjong Sirik.¹⁰

Soon after 1840 Brooke began his attempt to interest the British Government in Brunei. His own means were insufficient to destroy piracy and restore prosperity in Sarawak, without continuing the extortionate taxes of the Malays, and this he refused to do. Still less was he able unaided to put an end to the appalling misrule in Brunei. Furthermore, to establish British influence in Brunei would not only benefit British trade, since the country was rich in natural resources, but it would strike a blow at Holland. Like most other Englishmen in the Eastern Archipelago the Rajah thoroughly detested the Dutch because of their harsh treatment of the natives, and their constant attempts to monopolise the trade of the island. Brunei was the only native state in Borneo which was still independent, and the Dutch had for long been casting longing eyes upon it. So far they had found no excuse for intervention; but the anarchy and misrule which was rapidly converting the country into a congeries of piratical principalities was certain to give them their opportunity within a very short time. Moreover excellent coal had been discovered in Brunei and Labuan, an island off the north-west coast of Brunei, near the capital; and Britain needed a coaling station for the China squadron, and for steamships in the China trade. The situation of Labuan, almost on the trade-route to China and in a central position, 707 miles from Singapore, and 1009 from Hongkong, made it peculiarly suitable. The influence which Brooke had obtained in Brunei was so great that he could obtain for the British Government whatever it wanted. The Sultan was too weak to prevent his governors from setting up as independent chiefs, and was willing to cede large tracts of territory in return for a small payment and British protection.

Brooke therefore urged the British government to proclaim a protectorate over Brunei and Sarawak and annex Labuan. While he would have preferred to be retained as Governor of Sarawak, he offered to allow his own province to be annexed without any post being given him. Far from wishing to destroy the power of the Sultan he wished to preserve and revivify it, and sweep away misrule by means of a British Resident who should

10. St. John, *Life in the Forests of the Far East*, II, 289-304. Low, *Sarawak*, 110-12, and *passim*. Mundy, *Brooke*, I, 324, 357. Templer, *Brooke's Letters*, vols. I and II, *passim*. Brooke, *Vindication*, 49-50. Baring-Gould and Bampfylde, *Sarawak*, 110-11. St. John, *Brooke*, preface, xv.

advise the Sultan, as was done in the Malay States of the Peninsula after 1874. In this connection it is of interest to note that the Residential System by which the British Government later controlled the Sultans of the Malay States was greatly influenced by the form of administration evolved in Sarawak by Rajah Brooke. Sir Hugh Low, who in 1877 was appointed Resident of Perak, formerly served under Brooke; and the methods of government which he adopted were modelled very largely upon those of the Rajah.¹¹ The instrument whom Brooke designated for the regeneration of Brunei was his faithful friend the Regent, Muda Hashim. Properly controlled, he could be depended on to suppress misrule, put down piracy, and foster trade. Not that Brooke advocated the deposition of Sultan Omar: provided he ceased to protect pirates and gave up oppressing his subjects, it was better that he should be left undisturbed. But Omar's two sons were both illegitimate, and Hashim's claim to the throne was as good as his master's. There was every reason why he should succeed Omar either on his death or sooner, if ever it became necessary to depose him.¹² The murder of Hashim and all his supporters by Sultan Omar in 1845 ruined the plan, since it left no one who had the desire and the ability to reform the government. The decay of Brunei therefore went on faster than ever.

Through the medium of his friends and relatives in London Brooke laid his proposals before the Cabinet. About 1842 he was introduced to Wise, an able but as events proved unscrupulous man of business in London. Wise cared nothing whatever for Brooke's humanitarian projects; but he saw clearly the great financial profit which he could make by exploiting Brunei. For some years he successfully deceived Brooke as to his real motives, and gained his entire confidence. In the end this alliance nearly ruined the Rajah, for when he discovered Wise's real intentions he severed connections with him. In revenge Wise by his slanders did much to instigate the Radical attack on Brooke.¹³ Between 1842 and 1846 however, as the Rajah's London agent, he seems to have done much useful work in interesting the public in

11. St. John: Brooke, preface, xv.

12. Keppel, Dido, II, 159-61. Mundy, Brooke, I, 275-76, 312-13, 323, 339-44, 356, 373, 380-82; II, 25-26. Templer, Brooke's Letters, I, 137, 171, 224, 227. PP, A Selection from the Papers Relating to Borneo, 1846: 1-6, 9-16, 27-28, 31-38, 43-48, 51-54, 72-77. Brooke, Letter from Borneo, 6-40.

13. Templer, Brooke's Letters, II, 172-207, and Vols. I and II, *passim*.

Brooke's projects, and in persuading the Cabinet to annex Labuan.

The Government was very unwilling to accept Brooke's proposals — it rather inclined to the belief that to lose colonies was more blessed than to obtain them — but it was anxious to secure the coal, if it were proved to be of good quality. Negotiations were carried on for several years until the Cabinet was finally convinced by the reports of officers sent to inspect Labuan that the island would be valuable both as a coaling-station and as a centre for trade with Brunei and the Sulu Archipelago. By 1846 the Government had decided to accept Sultan Omar's offer of 1844 to cede Labuan and give a concession to work the Brunei coal-field. The formal offer, together with a request that the British would suppress piracy, had been made through Brooke's influence. At the same time it was decided not to proclaim a protectorate over Sarawak and Brunei, nor to interfere in any way with the Sultan's government.¹⁴

Meanwhile in 1844 Muda Hashim had been re-established in his rightful position in Brunei town as Regent. The following year he defeated an attack by the piratical faction of the Malay nobles, led by Pangeran Usop, who was captured and executed. Usop was the Sultan's favourite, and was notorious even in Brunei for his plundering of the Dayaks, and his protection of pirates. He had also enslaved two shipwrecked British lascars. At last it seemed that Brooke's policy was near to success. Only a few months later the unbelievable happened. One night early in 1846 by the Sultan's orders the homes of Muda Hashim, his brother Badrudin, and all their friends and relations were attacked. With hardly a single exception the whole of his party was wiped out. With them fell all hope of reforming Brunei through its native rulers.¹⁵ St. John considered that Brooke was mistaken in believing that the murders were caused by Hashim's fidelity to him and by his resolve to put down piracy: the real reason was that the Regent was seen to be aiming at the throne. Therefore the Sultan's advisers, "a set of scoundrels inferior to none in villainy," together with the remains of the piratical faction, persuaded him to

14. *PP, Borneo*, 1846, 7, 16, 54-55 64-65, 84. *PP*, (H. of C.), No. 266 of 1852-53, pp. 15-17, (Vol. LXI). Belcher, *Voyage of the Samarang*, I, 176-77, 186. Brooke, *Vindication*, 40-42.

15. Brooke, *Vindication*, 42-45. *PP*, (H. of C.), No. 81 of 1852-53, pp. 1-3, (Vol. LXI).

destroy Hashim and his party root and branch.¹⁶

The Sultan also attempted to murder Brooke, and to capture by treachery a British naval officer, Admiral Cochrane, whose squadron, with Brooke on board, had sailed for Brunei town. While filled with indignation at the massacre, the Admiral felt that if it were purely a palace conspiracy he could not interfere, since Omar was an independent ruler. If however he had broken his agreement with the British Government made in 1844, then the situation was changed.¹⁷ On arriving at the mouth of the river on which Brunei town is built a message was sent to the Sultan asking him if he meant to adhere to his engagements. He replied with studied discourtesy; and after waiting several days the fleet ascended the river to the capital, first informing the Sultan that there would be no attack unless he began it. Omar had strongly fortified the town, and opened fire on the leading ships. After a short but hot fight, Brunei was taken, and the Sultan fled to the country. The Admiral now sailed for China, leaving Captain Mundy to effect a settlement. It was decided to let the Sultan retain his throne, and he returned to the capital. He made a treaty with Brooke ceding him Sarawak in perpetuity with full rights of sovereignty, without the payment of the annual tribute hitherto sent.

Soon afterwards Palmerston's despatch to Brooke arrived, instructing him to accept the offer of Labuan and make a commercial treaty. Treaties were accordingly made in 1846 ceding Labuan and pledging the Sultan to do all in his power to suppress piracy and the slave-trade, and to protect shipwrecked crews from pillage or enslavement. Most favoured nation treatment was granted to British commerce. The Sultan also promised never to alienate any part of his dominions to any foreign power without the consent of the British Government.¹⁸ The subsequent history of Labuan is not given, since its government was entirely separate from that of the Straits Settlements until 1905.

Brooke now returned to England where he found

16. St. John, Brooke, 106-12. Templer, Brooke's Letters, II, 133-35, 137-41.

17. St. John, Brooke, 42ff. Mundy, Brooke, II, 87-94, PP. (H. of C.), No. 266 of 1852-53, pp. 10-14. (Vol. LXI).

18. PP, Command Paper [1014], 1849, pp. 3-6, (Vol. LVI). St. John, Brooke, 114-118. Brooke, Vindication, 45. Mundy, Brooke, 112, 314, 324-25. Baring-Gould & Bampfylde, Sarawak, 121-26.

himself fêted and lionised. He was knighted, and appointed Governor of Labuan, and Commissioner and Consul-General to the Sultan and independent chiefs of Borneo. He found however that the administration of Sarawak left him no time properly to carry out his duties at Labuan, and he resigned his post as Governor in 1852. In 1854 he also resigned the Consul-Generalship.¹⁹

The annexation of Labuan, and indeed the whole of Brooke's career evoked strong remonstrances from Holland. In 1845-46 there was an exchange of somewhat pungent notes between the British and Dutch Governments. After attacking Brooke as an intriguer who was interfering in Holland's preserves, the Dutch went on to contend that the British actions in Brunei were a breach of the Treaty of 1824. In support of their charges they advanced an interpretation of the Treaty which meant that wherever Holland had a post, however small, on any island in the Archipelago, the British must not establish themselves in any other state of the island, even though it were independent. Since the Dutch had stations on almost every island of importance, their claims would practically have confined the British to the Malay Peninsula. The British Government warmly defended Brooke against the attacks, and denied that by any conceivable ingenuity could this interpretation of the Treaty be read into it. The Cabinet also seized the favourable opportunity to remind Holland of her continual violations of the commercial provisions of the Treaty. A long list of her transgressions was appended, and it was suggested that greater respect for treaty obligations would go far to improve the relations of the two powers.²⁰

During the years in which Brooke was trying to establish British influence in Brunei, he was also carrying on active warfare against the Orang Laut and the Lanuns. The Sea Dayaks had long been accustomed to make raids on Sarawak, and at first they quite failed to understand why the appointment of an English Governor should interfere with their habits. For a time they continued to ravage his province as of old. Brooke made careful inquiries as to their character from "Nakhodas" (captains of native traders), fishermen, and others; and from their evidence and from what he saw with his own eyes in

19. *Ibid.*, 130-31. Templer, *Brooke's Letters*, II, 306-7. St. John, *Brooke*, 242. PP, (H. of C.), No. 343 of 1850, p. 2, (XXXIII).

20. PP, Command Paper [1771] of 1854, pp. 35-65, Vol. LXXII).

Sarawak he became convinced that both tribes of the Orang Laut, the Seribas and the Sekarrans, were, as a Dutch official later described them, "the scourge and terror of the West Coast".²¹

Brooke's first step was to free his own province from their attacks. On several occasions when they raided Sarawak he pursued them with a handful of his faithful Malays. Some of the pirates were killed, and others who were captured were tried and executed. After a few experiences of this sort the Sea Dayaks gave Sarawak a wide berth; but Brooke's resources were too limited to make them abandon piracy altogether. The Rajah soon saw that this could only be brought about by means of the British navy.²²

Meanwhile the Sea Dayaks were preparing to attack him. The leaders of the plot were four Arab Sharifs, Sahap, Japar, Mular, and Masahor. They were the Sultan's Governors of the Orang Laut, and at the same time the principal pirate chiefs and slavers in the country. Pangeran Usop, the Sultan's favourite minister, who was executed by Muda Hashim in 1845, was secretly in league with them. They had also been joined by Makota, the ex-Governor of Sarawak whose oppression had caused the rebellion there, and whom Brooke had driven out of the province in 1843.²³ The threatened attack never materialised, because of the events about to be described.

In 1843 a new chapter began in the history of Borneo piracy. The Governor of the Straits Settlements had complained of the numerous attacks on Singapore praus made off the Brunei Coast, and Captain Keppel, H. M. S. "Dido," sailed to investigate.²⁴ He called at Sarawak and met Brooke. From this meeting arose a warm friendship which lasted until the end of the Rajah's life. Brooke told Keppel of the enormities of the Seribas and Sekarran Dayaks, and asked him to attack them. Before doing so the Captain carefully assured himself that they were pirates. "I made every necessary inquiry I collected such a mass of testimony from numerous person of various nations," both native and English, "as left no doubt whatever of the extensive and systematic depredation

21. Templer, *Brooke's Letters*, I, 74, 131, 161, 172-73. Mundy, *Brooke*, I, 297-316.

22. Templer, *Brooke's Letters*, I, 180, 193-95, 197, 219; II, 28.

23. *Ibid.*, I, 194, 197, 216-19. Mundy, *Brooke*, I, 362-66, 370-77. Baring-Gould & Bampfyde, *Sarawak*, 74-87.

24. Keppel, *Dido*, 20.

carried on by these pirates."²⁵ Furthermore before taking action Keppel referred the matter to Muda Hashim, the Regent of Brunei, who in reply wrote him a letter describing the piratical character of the Seribas and Sekarran and asking him to punish them.²⁶ A similar letter was obtained by Keppel from Hashim before his attack on the Sekarran in 1844.²⁷ These details are of importance since as will be seen a few years later Hume, Cobden and others said that the attack had been made without preliminary investigation, merely on Brooke's allegations.

Finally convinced, Keppel sailed to the rivers occupied by the Seribas Dayaks, accompanied by Brooke and a flotilla manned by the Sarawak Malays. The Seribas had considered their strongholds impregnable, but the British captured them and ascending their rivers for one hundred miles ravaged the country. Keppel had intended to continue his work by defeating the Sekarran; but the "Dido" was ordered to China.²⁸ In 1844 however he was back again, and with Brooke's Malay auxiliaries sailed to attack the Sekarran. They were, if possible, more blood-thirsty than the Seribas and were led by Sharif Sahap, the most powerful and dangerous of the local Arab chiefs. The same success attended the expedition. The pirates' strongholds were destroyed, their country ravaged, and Sahap's power was broken. Soon afterwards he died of a broken heart.²⁹

The complete success of Keppel's two expeditions terrified the pirates, and for almost three years their raids greatly diminished in number. Both Brooke and Keppel warned the Government however that a single lesson was not enough permanently to discourage them, and that a steamship should be sent to the coast periodically to punish any recrudescence of piracy. If this step were taken the Sea Dayaks would realize that the good old days were gone forever; if not, Keppel's work would have to be done all over again. The advice was not followed, with

25. Keppel, *Maander*, I, 133.

26. Keppel, *Dido*, 295-96. St. John, *Brooke*, 165.

27. *Ibid.*, 167-68.

28. PP, (H. of C.), No. 4 of 1852-53, pp. 3-7. (Vol. LXI). Templer, *Brooke's Letters*, I, 257, 262, 277; II, 216-19. Keppel, *Dido*, 296-97, 308-40.

29. Templer, *Brooke's Letters*, II, 26-27. Baring-Gould and Bampfyde, *Sarawak*, 103-9. PP, Command Paper [1351] of 1851, pp. 3-8 (Vol. LVI, pt. 1). PP, (H. of C.), No. 4 of 1852-53, pp. 8-11, (Vol. LXI).

the result that the prediction was absolutely fulfilled. As the Orang Laut found that their tentative expeditions did not bring a British warship into their rivers they grew bold again, and by 1847-48 Sea Dayak piracy had assumed appalling proportions. The work of 1843-44 had to be repeated, and it was not until the crushing defeat of their united fleets at Batang Maru in 1849 that Orang Laut piracy finally came to an end.³⁰

In 1845 the navy turned its attention to the Lanun settlements on the North-West coast. Admiral Cochrane and his squadron attacked Sharif Osman of Marudu Bay, an Arab who was one of the principal leaders of the Lanuns in Borneo. He had enslaved a number of British Indians, and boasted that the whole China squadron was powerless against him. He was also the ally of Usop, and had been threatening Muda Hashim and the Sultan with vengeance for daring to pledge themselves to oppose piracy. On arriving at Marudu Bay it was discovered that the position was a very strong one. The harbour was defended by two forts mounting heavy guns and a floating battery, while across the entrance was stretched a double boom of large logs bolted together by iron plates and a heavy ship's cable. The channel was too shallow for even the light steamers, and the attack was made by nine small gunboats and fifteen rowboats from the warships, carrying 550 men in all. The boats rowed to the boom, and under a heavy fire attempted to cut it through with axes. For fifty minutes it resisted every effort, and eight or nine of the British were killed or mortally wounded. At last an opening was made, and soon a column of black smoke announced to the watchers in the fleet that Marudu had fallen. The pirates' losses were very heavy, many sharifs and Lanun chiefs being killed. Amongst the number was Sharif Osman. The fall of Marudu was the heaviest blow which had yet been struck at Borneo piracy. The pirates were filled with consternation, for they saw that their most impregnable strongholds were powerless against a British attack.³¹

30. PP. (H. of C.), No. 122 of 1850, pp. 5-7, (Vol. LV). PP. Command Paper [1351] of 1851, pp. 7, 9-10, 18-19, (LVI pt. 1); PP. (H. of C.), No. 4 of 1852-53, p. 11, (Vol. LXI). Baring-Gould & Bampfylde, *Sarawak*, 109, 131-34. Templer, *Brooke's Letters*, II, 47, 102-6, 127, 141, 159-60.

31. Keppel, *Dido*, II, 146-49, 165, 172-76. Templer, *Brooke's Letters*, II, 84-86. St. John, *Brooke*, 103. PP. (H. of C.), No. 266 of 1852-53, pp. 2-9, (LXI). Mundy, *Brooke*, II, 14-15, 17-18, 201-5.

The following year, 1846, after the capture of Brunei town already described, Admiral Cochrane and his squadron sailed to China, destroying on their way Tampassuk and Pandassan, two of the principal Lanun settlements on the North West coast, as well as several other Lanun villages and a number of pirate praus.³² The Admiral left Captain Mundy, H. M. S. "Iris", to complete the work of crushing the Lanuns. Haji Saman, one of the leaders of the piratical faction in Brunei town, had fortified himself in the Mambakut River; and after several days' fighting Mundy entirely destroyed his forts and villages.³³ So successfully did Mundy do his work that every Lanun settlement on the North-West coast was abandoned. The pirates never returned but took refuge at Tunku, on the North-East coast of Borneo, where for many years they remained unmolested.³⁴

Borneo piracy had almost run its course. Only one step remained to be taken: a final blow had to be struck against the Sea Dayaks. It was not until 1849 however that Brooke, despite all his efforts, could secure the aid of a British warship. The China Squadron, as Admiral Cochrane pointed out to the Admiralty, was far too small to carry out properly all the duties required of it, and could not spare a ship for service in Borneo.³⁵ The result was that by 1847 the piratical faction among the Seribas and Sekarran Dayaks had overcome the anti-piracy party which Brooke had succeeded in building up after Keppel's attacks in 1843 and 1844. From 1847 to June 1849 there was a great recrudescence of piracy: St. John described the destruction wrought as "appalling;"³⁶ and the Sultan of Brunei asked Brooke to attack the Sea Dayaks because of their ravages.³⁷ Accordingly he with his Malays and the boats of the H. C. Steamer "Nemesis" raided the Sea Dayaks' country early in 1849, and for a time checked their piracy.³⁸ A grossly false account of this expedition, published in a Singapore newspaper, was copied by the London "Daily News," and marked the beginning of the Radical attack on Brooke. So small a force was quite unable to break the power of the Orang Laut; and on August 25, 1849, Brooke finally persuaded

32. *Ibid.*, II, 189-200, 210-11.

33. *Ibid.*, I, 213-30.

34. *Ibid.*, II, 245-52. Baring-Gould & Bampfylde, 123.

35. *PP.* (H. of C.), No. 266 of 1852-3, p. 12, (Vol. LXI).

36. Baring-Gould & Bampfylde, *Sarawak*, 131-34. Keppel, *Maander*, I, 137-42. St. John, *Brooke*, 170-71.

37. *Ibid.*, 170-71.

38. Keppel, *Maander*, I, 143-44.

Admiral Collier to send Commander Farquhar, H.M.S. "Albatross," to Sarawak. H.M.S. "Royalist," and the East India Company's steamers "Nemesis" and "Semiramis" also took part in the expedition.³⁹

The squadron sailed to the Sea Dayak country and cast anchor at Batang Maru. It was known that a very large fleet, manned by about 4000 Orang Laut and Malays and having on board most of the principal chiefs, was at sea on a piratical cruise, and would soon return. To reach their homes the Sea Dayaks must enter the rivers at Batang Maru, and the British decided to lie in ambush for them. The steamship "Nemesis" was to prevent the pirates escaping by sea, while the boats of the warships and Brooke's natives blocked the mouths of the rivers. The Rajah's followers were 2500 in number — mainly respectable traders, fishermen etc., who had suffered severely at the hands of the Orang Laut — manning 74 war-canoes. It was a very neat trap, and the enemy walked — or rather paddled — straight into it.

The pirate fleet arrived at night, and never suspected the presence of the British until it was fired on. After a few minutes' hesitation it rowed at the boats guarding the rivers, but failed to force a passage through them. The "Nemesis" had now come up and opened fire; and the light Dayak canoes were riddled without being able to make any effective reply. There were only four small cannon in the pirate fleet, although each prau had a few muskets. The Orang Laut soon saw that their position was desperate, and most of them drove their canoes ashore and escaped into the jungle. One division however tried to get away by sea. The "Nemesis" caught up to it and, passing slowly down the line, poured a broadside of grape and canister into each prau in turn. In a few minutes the squadron was a hopeless wreck. Then, turning, the warship drove right over the mass of sinking boats and struggling men. The scene as the Dayaks were caught up and pounded to a pulp in the steamer's paddle-wheels was terrible.

Daybreak saw the bay and the shores covered with battered praus, shields, spears, and the bodies of the fallen. In the jungle were found the bodies, horribly mutilated, of several women captured during the late raid and murdered by the pirates in the anger of their defeat. The British saw that 3000 of the pirates were trapped

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on a peninsula, and that by occupying its narrow neck they could all be destroyed. Although pressed to do this Brooke refused, and allowed them to escape: he hoped that the lesson was already severe enough to cure their love of piracy, and he wished to avoid shedding blood unnecessarily. Out of the entire fleet of over one hundred "bangkongs" or war-boats only six had escaped, while of the 4000 pirates between 300 and 500 had been killed. Including those who subsequently died of hunger in the jungle while making their way home, their total loss was only 800. However, to drive home the lesson the expedition ascended the rivers, destroyed the Sēribas and Sēkarran villages, and ravaged the country far and wide. Lord Palmerston fully approved of the whole affair.⁴⁰

Batang Maru "killed Sea-Dayak piracy." The Sēribas and Sēkarran at once made submission to Brooke, and promised to abandon piracy. The chiefs who were friendly to him and opposed to piracy returned to power. Never again did an Orang Laut fleet sail forth to ravage the seas; and in a few years the SeaDayaks had become peaceful traders, and were numbered amongst Brooke's most faithful subjects. For a time indeed a minority wished to revive piracy, and made several attacks on the peace party. Brooke however built forts on the rivers to support his friends, and prevent the malcontents from sailing down-stream to the ocean. Technically this action was illegal, since the SeaDayak country was outside Sarawak; but the Sultan of Brunei gladly ceded it to Brooke for half its surplus revenue on his return from England in 1853. Between 1850 and 1860 there was desultory fighting between Brooke's government and the piratical faction. By about 1860 even this was at an end, and the Orang Lant abandoned piracy forever.⁴¹

The battle of Batang Maru practically closed the history of piracy in Borneo. Roving squadrons of Lanuns and Balanini visited the West coast from time to time until 1870; but they were so severely dealt with by the Sarawak gunboats that it was only very rarely that they

40. Baring-Gould & Bampfylde, *Sarawak*, 135-37. Keppel, *Maeander*, I, 147-79. St. John, *Brooke*, 178-92, 196. Templer, *Brooke's Letters*, II, 280, 282-84. PP, (H. of C.), No. 4 of 1852-53, pp. 12-15, (Vol. LXI). PP, Command Paper [1599], 1852-53, p. 3, (LXI).

41. St. John, *Brooke*, 204, 213, 226-27, 250-53, 263-69. Keppel, *Maeander*, II, 5, 33-39, 47-48. *Brooke, Ten Years in Sarawak*, I, xi-xii. Templer, *Brooke's Letters*, II, 248-49, 253. PP, Command Paper [1599], 1852-53, p. 32, (LXI).

dared to appear. On the East coast of Borneo, far outside Rajah Brooke's dominions, piracy was occasionally carried on, as late as about 1880. Finally Tunku (the settlement formed by the Lanuns of Tampassuk and Pandassan when they were driven from the North-West Coast by Admiral Cochrane in 1846) was destroyed by H. M. S. "Kestrel" in 1879 because it had been guilty of several piratical raids.⁴² The man who far more than any other deserved the credit for the destruction of piracy in Borneo was Sir James Brooke. He it was who first brought it prominently before the British people; and it was due to his untiring persistence that warships were finally sent to destroy it. Captain Mundy, who knew Brunei well, considered that more important even than Brooke's destruction of piracy was his complete success in putting an end by 1847 to the practice of enslaving all shipwrecked sailors.⁴³

The Straits Settlements benefitted from the destruction of Borneo piracy in two ways. The native trade of Singapore was freed from marauders who had levied a heavy toll upon it⁴⁴ and a new and valuable field of commerce was opened to the merchants of Singapore in Sarawak and Brunei. Practically the whole of Sarawak's import and export trade was with Singapore; and it grew in value from almost nothing in 1842 to \$574,097 in 1860.⁴⁵

The immediate result of Batang Maru was a violent attack on Brooke by the English Radical party. For five or six years they strove by every means in their power to ruin him; and although in the end he was completely exonerated, the anxiety caused by this disgraceful persecution helped to break down his health and shortened his life. The real instigator of the whole shameful episode was Henry Wise, Brooke's discredited agent. Able, plausible and unscrupulous, he had become Brooke's agent in 1842 that he might use his reputation for integrity and self-sacrifice to enrich himself. His ultimate intention was to form a company, buy out Brooke's interest in Sarawak, and then retain him as a cloak against all suspicion while he exploited the natives for his own gain. Some years elapsed before the Rajah, trustful and

42. Baring-Gould & Bampfylde, *Sarawak*, 267-78.

43. Mundy, *Brooke*, II, 368-70.

44. PP, Command Paper [1976], 1854-55, passim, (XXIX).

45. Keppel, *Macander*, II, 32-33. St. John, *Life in the Far East*, II, 289-92. Baring-Gould & Bampfylde, *Sarawak*, 149, 429.

no man of business, began to see through his agent's designs. Perfectly willing that Wise should make a fair profit in return for his services, he had allowed him to form a company with the monopoly of the Sarawak antimony and the Brunei coal fields. Gradually however he began to grow suspicious. The evidence accumulated that to obtain capital Wise was publishing in London wildly exaggerated accounts of the ease with which fortunes could be made in Sarawak. To Brooke's expostulations he always replied with the advice "to shut my eyes, say nothing, and see what God will send me." He promised to make Brooke 'the wealthiest commoner in England.' The Rajah had no desire for money gained by wilful misrepresentation; and he was determined that the company should not be a repetition of the South Sea Bubble. He also found that under Wise's management he had apparently suffered a personal loss of £8,000 or £10,000; yet his agent refused to give a clear explanation of how he managed his employer's affairs. In August 1848 Brooke ordered Wise to give a full explanation to Cameron, his lawyer. He refused to do so, and his connection with the Rajah therefore ceased. From this time Wise became Brooke's open enemy, and in the battle of Batang Maru he saw his opportunity.⁴⁶

Convincing proof of Wise's dishonesty was given in 1853. Angered by his persistent attacks, Brooke prosecuted for fraud the Eastern Archipelago Company, which Wise had founded in 1847, and of which he was the managing director. The Courts found them guilty of "gross fraud," "a gross abuse and misnomer of the privileges conferred by the charter."⁴⁷ The charter was cancelled, and the company ceased to exist. The offence of which they were proved guilty was that when they possessed a capital of only £5,000 and a mine purchased on credit which they themselves valued at £46,000, they certified to the Board of Trade that they had £50,000 of paid up capital. Commenting on "this flagrant act of delinquency" in its editorials, the "Times" wrote:— "Obtaining the benefit of the charter by such falsehoods is nothing less than swindling, and the issuing of so grossly false a certificate little less than perjury."⁴⁸

46. *Templer, Brooke's Letters*, Vols. I and II *passim*, and especially II, 172-207, 224-25, 264-66, and III 2-3, 19-20. Jacob, *Brooke*, II, 3-5, 7. St. John, *Brooke*, 125, 234-36. Baring-Gould & Bampfylde, *Sarawak*, 139-40.

47. *The Queen on the Prosecution of Sir James Brooke, Against the Eastern Archipelago Company*. London, 1853.

48. (London) *Times*, June 28 and July 21, 1852.

One of the most convincing proofs of the falsity of Wise's charges is the fact that while he had become Brooke's secret enemy as early as 1846, in consequence of his discovery that the Rajah had begun to distrust him, as long as he hoped to make a fortune by his assistance he concealed his anger, and continued to laud him in public, the while he slandered him to his friends. Moreover, although Wise had paid a long visit to Sarawak and Brunei in 1844, the year of Keppel's second expedition against the Sea Dayaks, it was only in 1849, when his hopes of exploiting Brunei had been shattered, that he suddenly discovered that the Orang Laut were not pirates.⁴⁹

The attack on Brooke in 1849 began in Singapore. In that city there was a needy journalist, Robert Woods, the editor of a struggling newspaper, the "Straits Times." Although it was never proved that he was Wise's agent, it seems clear either that this was the case, or that his motive was to increase his circulation. A cryptic remark which he made in 1861 may be taken either way:— "Well, it has not done him any harm after all, and it has educated my boys."⁵⁰ This much at least is certain, that from 1849 to 1854 he led the anti-Brooke faction in Singapore, and published virulent attacks on the Rajah in his paper. In 1849 he printed a flagrantly false account of the first expedition against the Orang Laut in that year, accusing the force of having committed many atrocities.⁵¹

The account was copied by the London "Daily News" on June 25, 1849. It declared that the Sea Dayaks were not pirates but merely head hunters, and that the expedition had been made in revenge for a head hunting raid. There were gory details of the head hunting activities of Brooke's native auxiliaries, who were accused of committing "atrocities at which human nature shudders." Crookshanks, one of the Rajah's officers, was declared to have wantonly killed an unarmed and helpless old man.⁵² On the following day the "News" returned to the attack with an editorial insinuating that Brooke had falsely accused the Orang Laut of piracy, and that he had collected his native force by promising

49. Baring-Gould & Bampfylde, *Sarawak*, 124-25. Jacob, *Brooke*, 718. *PP*, *Borneo*, 1846: pp. 64-76.

50. Buckley, *Singapore*, II, 438, 601, 604.

51. *Ibid.*, II, 601. *PP*, *Command Paper* [1976], 1854-55, pp. 213-15, 440-43, (XXIX); *PP*, (H. of C.), No. 339 of 1852, *passim*, (Vol. XXXI).

52. (London) *Daily News*; June 25, 1849.

them all the heads they could collect. By this means he secured "fifty praus crammed with valiant head-smokers, rallied under . . . the missionary of the head-smoking faith."⁵³

Joseph Hume apparently knew nothing of the Sea Dayaks until he read these accounts. Scenting iniquity in the far off marches of the Empire, he cast about for some one who could enlighten him as to the criminality of Rajah Brooke, and found him in — Henry Wise. "By garbled extracts, by untrue reports, by means which I know not, he managed to obtain the confidence of obstinate old Joseph Hume, who dearly loved a grievance Hume may be called a libeller by profession, who began his career by making his fortune in the East India Company's service in a very few years — a remarkable achievement; and who afterwards when in parliament brought himself into notoriety by attacking three prominent officials."⁵⁴

Soon afterwards the news of Batang Maru arrived in England, and the attack on the Rajah began in earnest both in the press and in Parliament, where Hume repeatedly demanded an inquiry. The "Spectator" and the "Daily News" bitterly denounced Brooke, while the "Times" defended him. The Peace Society and the Aborigines' Protection Society joined in the hue and cry. Cobden, Sidney Herbert and Gladstone supported Hume. The Rajah's enemies denied that the Sea Dayaks were pirates: they were merely gentle savages exercising their legal right of waging war on the cruel head hunters of Sarawak. Their only offence was that they opposed Brooke's ambition to annex their country; for this reason he had slaughtered them and invented the charge of piracy to conceal his crime. The Rajah and his allies in the navy were denounced as murderers, butchers of inoffensive head hunters engaged in the legitimate exercise of "inter-tribal warfare." Brooke was defended by Palmerston, Grey, Ellesmere, Drummond, Captains Keppel and Mundy, and a dozen others, but without the slightest effect. Hume and his party refused to be convinced, and the controversy raged with unabated violence for five

53. (London) *Daily News*, June 26, 1849.

54. St. John, Brooke, xiii, and 236. PP, Command Paper [1537], 1852, p. 2, (XXXI). PP, Command Paper [1538], 1852, p. 22, (XXXI).

years.⁵⁵

The passion aroused was reflected in Singapore. The newspapers teemed with letters and articles, the "Free Press" defending and the "Straits Times" attacking the Rajah. Everyone was Brooke or anti-Brooke: questions of trade in the Chamber of Commerce were decided by Brooke or anti-Brooke majorities.⁵⁶ The Rajah visited the city in 1851, and remarked that: "It is the abiding-place at present of hatred, malice and all uncharitableness."⁵⁷

The public was inundated with pamphlets full of virulent and hysterical abuse of Brooke. To examine their charges in detail would serve no good end, for they were conclusively disproved by the Royal Commission of 1854, which established the piratical character of the Sea Dayaks.⁵⁸ The pamphlets are of interest however as an example of the absurdities which well-intentioned but ignorant humanitarians can produce when they refuse to pay any attention to the case for the defence, and insist on acting in accordance with their own preconceived opinions. Without exception they substituted insinuation and falsification for proofs, and mistook hysterical invective for argument. A very favourite expedient was to publish excerpts from Brooke's Journals without any reference to their context. On anyone who knew nothing whatever of Brunei the effect was very convincing. Omit to mention that the government of Brunei was unspeakably tyrannical, that Pangerans Usop and Makota were the chief offenders, and the Sultan little better; suppress all reference to the great benefits which the Rajah's rule had brought; and finally make no allowance for the undoubted fact that stern measures are sometimes unavoidable in dealing with savages — then the actions of Brooke can be made to look very black indeed. He had seized Sarawak by violence, and driven out the chivalrous and high-minded Governor Makota because he objected; and he had then tried to place his tool Muda Hashim on the

55. PP, (H. of C.), No. 456 of 1850, p. 1, (LV), Letter of Wise to Lord John Russell of Nov. 26, 1849, attacking Brooke for the battle of Batang Maru. Morley, Cobden, II, 55-56. (London) Daily News, Aug. 9, 1850. Letter of Hume. St. John, Brooke; 211-12, 214-15, 217, 220, 236. Baring-Gould & Bampfylde, Sarawak, 140. Keppel, Macander, I, 182-272. Jacob, Brooke, II, 1-211.

56. Ibid., 77.

57. Keppel, Macander, II, 131.

58. PP, Command Paper [1976], 1854-55, passim, (XXIX).

throne of Brunei. When the Sultan murdered him, as he had a perfect right to do, Brooke persuaded the navy to bombard his capital, a flagrantly illegal action. Brooke's whole career in Brunei was an attempt to make himself the ruler of the country, so that he might exploit its resources. He invented the charge of piracy against the inoffensive Sea Dayaks because they and their leaders, the "magnanimous Sharifs," were high-souled lovers of freedom who scorned to come under his yoke. Even Hume could not deny that their fleets sometimes raided their neighbours; but this was explained away as mere "legitimate inter-tribal warfare." All the evidence proving Orang Laut piracy was dismissed as false. The Admiralty Court of Singapore for example had adjudged them guilty of piracy in 1849;⁵⁹ but its decision was rejected as a judicial mockery.

Another characteristic of the pamphlets was their inability to realise that nineteenth century England was ages apart from Brunei, whose stage of development was in many respects that of twelfth century Europe. They never understood that until the pirates had received drastic punishment, peaceful measures were only interpreted as a sign of weakness. When sunk praus and burning villages had taught them that piracy did not pay, then, and only then, could gentler measures be efficaciously employed. The success of these very tactics with the Orang Laut after 1849 is a case in point; and the same lesson is taught by the whole history of piracy in the Archipelago. The pamphleteers without exception also failed to realise that in dealing with piratical savages it was not always possible to adhere to the strict letter of the law. A favourite complaint was that the Orang Laut had never attacked a British merchantman, so that even if they were pirates the British navy had no right to molest them, since this contingency had not been provided for in the Admiralty's official instructions governing the suppression of piracy. Presumably the murder of helpless native traders did not matter, so long as the letter of the law remained unbroken. Or again, at Batang Maru, the pirates were not formally summoned to surrender before the battle began. How four thousand ferocious pirates who made a violent attack on the fleet almost as soon as they discovered its presence were to be summoned to surrender at dead of night, these arm-chair critics did not explain.

59. PP, Command Paper [1197], 1850, pp. 5-9, (Vol. LV).

Before closing, one cannot refrain from quoting a few typical specimens of the gems of argument, or invective — in most cases the terms seem to have been regarded as synonymous — in these pamphlets. A certain gentleman who concealed himself under the safe anonymity of W. N. abounded in such phrases as the "recent bloody butchery" — "pharisaical Rajah," "mission of blood," "naval executioners," "horrible and disgusting destruction of human life." Of Batang Maru he wrote: "The lowest computation given (of the slain — 300) makes one shudder." How the death of 500 pirates out of 4000 engaged in the battle can be described as a "pitiless and ruthless slaughter," is rather hard to see. However, readers were assured that the action was an "inhuman battue," "pitiless to an extreme," and "repugnant to all Christian principle." Perhaps the palm for intemperance of language may be awarded to a pamphlet published in 1850 by the Aborigines' Protection Society. From beginning to end it was written in a tone of the most violent hostility to Brooke, and assumed the attitude not of a judicial critic, but of a bitter partisan. The opening paragraph ran as follows. "We use the word *massacre* with a full knowledge of its import. It means *murder* ... and we use it, because it is the only word we can use ... Another blood-bedabbled page has been added to our crime-stained colonial history. Once more have Christianity and Civilization been foully calumniated ... The red slander, reeking from its unholy fount, has ascended high up into the blue heavens ... War and his hideous and obscene allies are stalking abroad."⁶⁰

Brooke's enemies brought strong pressure to bear on the government for the appointment of a Royal Commission to investigate his actions. Hume, strongly supported by other members of the Radical party, and by the Peace Society and the Aborigines' Protection Society, organised deputations and wrote interminable letters to the Cabinet demanding an investigation.⁶¹ Cobden bitterly attacked the Rajah in a speech at Birmingham in

60. W. N., *A Naval Execution*. Foggo, Brooke, Chamerozow, *Borneo Facts vs. Borneo Fallacies*. *Aborigines Friend*, March 1850, p. 387; April 1850, pp. 409-10; June, 1850, pp. 19-22. *Colonial Intelligencer*, March, 1851, p. 173; Jan. 1850, pp. 337-68. Joseph Hume, pamphlet 1852, also published in PP, Command Paper [1599], 1852-53, pp. 23-31, (LXI).

61. PP, Command Paper [1538], 1852, pp. 2-53, (Vol. XXI). *Aborigines Friend*, Jan. 1850, p. 336; March 1850, p. 400; and June 1850, pp. 19-22. *Colonial Intelligencer*, April 1851, p. 185.

1850.⁶² Supported by Bright and Cobden, Hume attacked Brooke in Parliament in 1850 and 1851, and pressed for the appointment of a Royal Commission. His charges were entirely disproved by Brooke's supporters; and in closing the debate in 1851, Lord Palmerston declared that he had seldom seen accusations so effectively answered, and that he "must denounce these charges as malignant and persevering persecutions of an honourable man." The two motions for an inquiry were lost by majorities of 140 and 211.⁶³

In 1851 a sad accident befell Burns, one of Hume's favourite authorities anent the virtue of the inoffensive Sea Dayaks. Burns had gone out to Brunei in 1845 to make a fortune. The Sultan and his nobles were soon complaining bitterly to Brooke about his gross discourtesy, and his cheating and oppressing the natives. Furthermore, "he wishes to take people's wives; whether they like it or not, he takes people's wives." The Rajah was much angered and succeeded in putting a stop to Burns's method of amassing wealth by exploiting the natives. In revenge Burns joined Wise in his attack, and zealously devoted himself to proving that Brunei pirates were not pirates, but harmless and kindly children of Nature. Unfortunately the gentle children of Nature aforesaid were singularly unappreciative of his good offices. A band of them boarded his schooner disguised as merchants, stabbed Burns to death with some of his crew, and captured the ship and Burns's native mistress.⁶⁴

Joseph Hume was a man upon whom argument was wasted, and despite the refutation of his charges, he persisted in his demand for a Commission of Inquiry. Captain Keppel has left a description which fits him to perfection. "There will always be some peculiarly constituted minds, fortified by a sort of moral gutta serena, through which neither preconceived opinion can evaporate, nor a deluge, even, of new evidence effect an entrance."⁶⁵

At last, in 1854, Hume succeeded. The Aberdeen Coalition Ministry had come into power in 1853, but its

62. (London), *Times*, Nov. 29, 1850.

63. *Hansard*, Ser. 3, Vol. 108: Feb. 11, 1850. *Ibid.*, 109: March 21, 1850. *Ibid.*, 111: May 23, 1850. *Ibid.*, 112: July 12, 1850. *Ibid.*, 118: July 10, 1851.

64. *PP*, (H. of C.), Nos. 55 and 249 of 1852-53, *passim*, (LXI). *PP*, Command Papers [1462] and [1536], 1852, *passim*, (XXXI). St. John. Brooke, 238-39.

65. Keppel, *Maeander*, I, 124.

tenure of office was insecure. Its Radical supporters had to be placated, and so Brooke was thrown to them as a peace-sop. In 1854 a Royal Commission of Inquiry was appointed to investigate the charges against him.⁶⁶

The inquiry was held at Singapore in September and October 1854 by two officials of the East India Company, Prinsep and Devereux. The result was a complete triumph for Sir James Brooke. Witness after witness, both European and native, testified to countless acts of piracy committed by the Seribas and Sekarran Dayaks. Woods, the leader of the anti-Brooke faction in Singapore, was allowed by Prinsep to act as a sort of prosecuting attorney; but although he was a skilful lawyer his cross-examination failed to shake their evidence. Last of all came the crowning proof. Boudriot, for five years a Dutch official of importance in Borneo, happened to be passing through Singapore, and heard of the inquiry. The Government of Holland was bitterly hostile to Brooke; but in the name of justice and fair play Boudriot voluntarily came forward as his defender. Quoting from his own personal knowledge and from the information in the Dutch official records he proved that the Orang Laut were pirates, the "scourge and terror of the coast." The Commissioners unanimously agreed that the charge of piracy was fully proven, and that the theory of "legitimate inter-tribal warfare" was ridiculous. As to the loss of life at Batang Maru, and the subsequent ravaging of the country, Devereux considered that "there does not appear any reasonable ground for sympathy with a race of indiscriminate murderers." The inquiry also completely disproved another favourite charge of the Radicals, that the Rajah had used his position as a British official to further his interests as a private trader. There was not a shred of evidence that he had engaged in trade after his appointment as Governor of Labuan in 1847.⁶⁷

"Now is the winter of our discontent
Made glorious summer by that blockhead Hume,
And all the clouds which lowered about our house
In the dull bosom of the Blue Books buried."⁶⁸

66. St. John, Brooke, 241-42. PP, Command Paper 1771, (1854), pp. 2-4, and passim, (Vol. LXXII).

67. PP, Command Paper [1976] 1854-55, passim, (XXIX). IPFC, Range 200, Vol. 68: Aug. 11, 1854, No. 29-34. IPFC, Range 201, Vol. 31: Oct. 19, 1855, No. 1. St. John, Brooke, 270-73. Jacob, Brooke, II, 178-79.

68. *Ibid.*, 181.

Brooke's enemies in England received the news of his vindication in the spirit which was to be expected of them. Hume unfortunately had not lived to see his failure; but the "Aborigines' Friend" proved that his mantle had fallen upon its shoulders. It tried by insinuations to show that the Rajah was guilty of the charges which the Royal Commission had just disproved, and concluded with a few remarks on "Borneo massacres," "revolting butchering," and the statement that nothing could ever "obliterate the indelible stain of a deed which disgraces the proud civilization of the Anglo-Saxon race."⁶⁹ Comment is needless. The whole miserable episode was typical of that extraordinary type of mind, peculiar it would seem to the Anglo-Saxon race, which is pre-disposed to believe that an Englishman abroad is naturally prone to acts of violence and injustice.

Unfortunately the attack on Brooke produced consequences which could not be allayed by the findings of a Royal Commission. The Admiralty in 1853 ordered that henceforth its instructions of 1844 must be stringently obeyed. These were that no warship should seize a vessel for piracy unless it had "within view attacked some British vessel," or unless there were "such proof . . . as would satisfy a Court of Admiralty."⁷⁰ The hands of British officers were tied, and for some years there was a recrudescence of piracy.⁷¹ In Sarawak itself the Radical attack produced a belief that Brooke was in disgrace with his government, and that no action of his enemies would bring upon them retribution from the British navy. This was one of the principal causes which led to the revolt of the Chinese secret society in 1857, and to the attempted rising of a few discontented Malay chiefs in 1859. The Chinese rebels burned Kuching, the capital of Sarawak, and murdered many natives and Europeans before they were conquered. Amongst Rajah Brooke's most faithful supporters were the Seribas and Sekarran Sea Dayaks, whom only eight years before he had punished so severely at Batang Maru.⁷²

69. *Aborigines Friend*, 1855, pp. 39-43.

70. PP, Command Paper [1771], 1854, pp. 33-34, (Vol. LXXII).

71. Baring-Gould & Bampfylde, *Sarawak*, 268.

72. *Ibid.*, 152. St. John, *Brooke*, 253, 258-60, 278, 286. McDougall, *Sarawak*, 182.

XIV

The Transfer.

The year 1867 marked the end of an epoch in the history of the Straits Settlements. The transfer of the Colony from the India to the Colonial Office was more than a mere departmental change; it was the inauguration of a policy which in many respects differed materially from that pursued under the old regime. After 1867 much greater attention was paid to the needs of the Straits Settlements than had been the case when they were only a distant Residency of the Indian Empire. An immediate result of the transfer was the creation of a distinct Malayan Civil Service. A few years later the Colonial Office adopted the policy of intervention in the Malay States.

The transfer was brought about after several years of agitation in the Straits Settlements, which had become very dissatisfied with the results of Indian Government. In this movement Singapore played by far the most important part. In all the records connected with the question there are scarcely any references to Penang or Malacca. The number of grievances was legion, but they may be briefly summarized as follows:—

(1) The Straits Settlements were so far away from India and their problems were so totally dissimilar, that the Government at Calcutta failed to understand and rapidly deal with local needs. Moreover since the loss of the monopoly of the Chinese trade in 1833 the Indian Government took very little interest in the Straits, and refused to consider the reasonable wishes of the population. The "Times" expressed the Straits Settlements' point of view to a nicety when it wrote in 1858:— "What has Singapore to do with India? It carries on a larger trade with China than with India. The true idea of the settlement, colony, or by whatever name it may be called, is as the centre and citadel of British power in the Eastern Seas, the great house of call between Great Britain and China. It is from this point chiefly that the ceaseless intrigues of the Dutch to exclude us altogether from the Indian Archipelago can be defeated."¹ No one who has

1. *Times*, April 23, 1858, p. 9., Buckley, *Singapore*, II, 474-76, 529-30, 595-96, 636, quotes editorials from the Singapore newspapers accusing the Indian Government of ignorance and indifference towards the problems of the Straits Settlements.

read the books, the newspapers and the official records of the Straits Settlements between 1820 and 1867 can avoid the conviction that merchants and officials alike felt that the three Settlements had an importance out of all proportion to their area and population. They were not merely a third-rate Residency in an isolated quarter of the Indian Empire, but the keystone of British commercial supremacy in Further Asia. The mistakes of the Indian Government did not merely injure the Straits; they were also a blow to the prosperity of Great Britain.

(2) The Indian Government had altogether neglected Raffles's advice to extend the sphere of British influence in Malaya. On every hand the Dutch, the French and the Spaniards were carrying out an aggressive policy, seizing all available territory, and shutting out British trade from it. Meanwhile the Supreme Government clung tenaciously to its policy of strict non-intervention, so that Great Britain's interests suffered and her influence declined.

(3) It was also a very sore point with the Straits merchants that the Settlements were made a dumping-ground for Indian convicts of the worst type. This complaint was not altogether just, for the colony owed some at least of its prosperity to the roads and buildings constructed by them free of charge.² As in Australia however what was once hailed as a blessing was in the end regarded as a burning grievance. The Settlements also complained that they were overburdened with troops, with a quite disproportionate number of field officers, and that they were made to pay for both troops and convicts.

(4) The Europeans objected strongly to the government's being entirely in the hands of the officials and demanded the establishment of a Legislative Council some of whose members should be elected by the people.³

Although the agitation which brought about the transfer only began in 1855, the genesis of the movement must be sought at a far earlier date. For many years there had been smouldering discontent which imperceptibly gained strength until it burst forth in the demand for severance from the control of India. The Company's pro-Siamese policy towards the exiled Sultan of Kedah had

2. McNair, *Prisoners Their Own Warders*.

3. PP. (H. of C.), No. 259 of 1862, pp. 3-6, (Vol. XL). Singapore Petition of Sept. 15, 1857: the most comprehensive account of the Straits' grievances.

been bitterly opposed by the non-official British population in the Straits; and the half-hearted measures taken to combat piracy were for years a standing grievance.⁴ By 1854 however these causes of resentment survived only as a memory of former grievances. Moreover they were minor matters, and never aroused so much ill-feeling as other policies of the Company which were equally at variance with the wishes of the population, and affected its interests far more intimately.

Of these one of the most important was the Company's policy towards the native states of the Malay Peninsula. This grievance had steadily increased in magnitude as a result of the growth of Dutch and French power in Further Asia. Holland was gradually adopting a more liberal commercial policy based on free trade principles, in Macassar for example. Combined with the extension of her empire this was interfering to an increasing degree with British trade in areas where the merchants of the Straits had been supreme for more than a generation. The French too were laying the foundations of their empire in Cochin-China, and were excluding British commerce from a former market. It was therefore natural that the merchants of the Straits Settlements sought to redress the balance by developing their trade with the Malay Peninsula. Although this trade was small, it was sufficiently valuable to show that properly developed it would become of great importance.⁵ Moreover the Peninsula lay within the British sphere of influence, so that there was no possibility of British merchants being driven out by any European power. As early as 1844 the newspapers of Singapore advocated the annexation of the Malay States; and in subsequent years the same course was proposed on several occasions.⁶ The policy of the Indian Government however was unalterably opposed to annexation, or even to interference in the affairs of the native states.⁷ Since the Peninsula was by this time rapidly sinking into the state of hopeless anarchy from which it only recovered after the British intervention of 1874,⁸ it was obvious that commerce could not flourish unless traders were protected from the exactions of any petty raja who chose to despoil them. The Straits merchants bitterly resented India's policy, and in 1857 it

4. v. chapters on Siam and Piracy.

5. Buckley, *Singapore*, II, 575, 584.

6. *Ibid.*, 421-22, 503, 575, 584-85.

7. v. chapter on Native Policy.

8. *Ibid.* Buckley, *Singapore*, II, 584.

formed one of the principal reasons advanced for the transfer.⁹

An equally important grievance and, as it happened, the immediate cause of the agitation for the transfer, was the attempt of the Indian Government to impose taxes on the ports, and in various ways to interfere with the freedom of trade. No one who has studied the records of the period 1820-1867 can fail to be impressed by the universality of the conviction that free trade, and free trade alone, was the palladium of prosperity in the Straits. Merchants, professional men, and officials with scarcely an exception, all held that the slightest interference with this principle would have the gravest effects upon commerce. The lesson of Sir Stamford Raffles had been well learnt. It was never forgotten that the miraculous growth of Singapore was above all due to the freedom of its trade from all taxes and restrictions. The Straits Settlements never failed to resent most bitterly the slightest hint of imposing taxes on commerce, and the agitation of 1857 was the result of the various attempts of India to do so during 1855 and 1856.

This was not the first time that the Company had made the attempt. As early as 1826 the Directors wished to levy small duties on the trade of Singapore, contending that it was unjust that the Company should have to bear the whole cost of administration, when it did not have the monopoly of the trade. The proposal excited much opposition in England however, and it was vetoed by the Board of Control.¹⁰ From 1833 to 1836 another attempt was made to impose taxes to defray the cost of protecting Singapore's trade against piracy. The merchants petitioned Parliament against the measure, and positive orders were sent from England forbidding it.¹¹ In 1852 the Indian Government imposed tonnage duties on European and native craft to cover the cost of maintaining a light-house near Singapore. This evoked strong protests, and soon afterwards the act was amended so that the dues were restricted to European ships.¹²

Three years later the Supreme Government passed

9. PP. (H. of C.), No. 259 of 1862, pp. 3-6, (Vol. XL).

10. PP. (H. of C.), No. 254 of 1857-58, pp. 5-7, (Vol. XLIII).

11. Buckley, *Singapore*, II, 639. B. Pub., Range 12, Vol. 72: March 8, 1831, No. 9A. *Ibid.*, Range 13, Vol. 13: June 24, 1835, Nos. 10-17. *Ibid.*, Vol. 15: Nov. 11, 1835: Nos. 3-4 *Letters Received from Bengal*, Vol. 122: Aug. 19, 1833.

12. Buckley, *Singapore*, II, 565-66.

two laws which brought the smouldering resentment in the Straits to a head. These were the Currency Act of 1855, and the imposition of port dues in 1856. Of these two measures the latter was the less important and is dealt with first. Towards the end of 1855 the Indian Government proposed to levy port dues on the Straits Settlements, to defray the cost of light-houses, buoys, jetties, etc. Its intention became known at Singapore in 1856 and vigorous protests were made to England. The matter was at once taken up by the Old Singaporeans in London, headed by John Crawfurd, the Resident of Singapore from 1823 to 1826. In Singapore's frequent conflicts with the Company, the Old Singaporeans filled the role of Napoleon's Old Guard. They retained a warm affection for the city where they had spent the best years of their lives, and whenever it was urging some cause in England it was always the Old Singaporeans who headed the fray, or when all seemed lost, made a final and often successful attack on the enemy — the East India Company. In this case their intervention, supporting the petition to Parliament from Singapore, was successful. They interviewed the Board of Control, and the Directors sent out instructions to the Government of India forbidding this interference with the free trade of the Straits.¹³

The dispute evoked a comment from one of the Singapore papers which is significant as it shows the light in which these constant disputes had caused the Indian Government to be regarded at Singapore. "Statesmen of all parties in England have ever recognised the importance of maintaining in all its integrity the system on which Singapore is conducted (absolute free trade). . . . Our immediate rulers in India however have never been able to regard the Settlement of Singapore through any other medium than a revenue one; and whenever therefore there has been an excess of expenditure over receipts, whether arising from ordinary sources of disbursement or from measures required for the protection of trade, they have frowned upon the unfortunate place, and the one sole remedy propounded . . . is the imposition of duties on the trade."¹⁴

In such an atmosphere of suspicion and hostility the Currency Act of 1855 was like a spark in a powder maga-

13. *Ibid.*, 638-39. I. Pub., Range 188, Vol. 21: Oct. 5, 1855, Nos. 12 & 13. *Ibid.*, Vol. 24: Dec. 7, 1855, Nos. 3 & 4. PP. (H. of C.), Nos. 322 of 1857, Session 2, *passim* (Vol. XXIX).

14. Buckley, *Singapore*, II, 639.

zine. At first sight the terms of this enactment, Act XVII of 1855, appear innocent enough; but great was the commotion which they caused. They did not interfere with the use of the silver dollar and the copper cent, the universal currency of the Straits; but they declared that the Indian pice was henceforth to be legal tender in the Settlements, not merely for fractions of the rupee, but also for the subdivisions of the dollar. Hereafter also only pice, and not cents, were to be minted by the Company.¹⁵ It was unnecessary to declare the rupee legal tender in the Straits, since this had been done by Act XVII of 1835, which had never been repealed.¹⁶ The merchants of Singapore protested strongly, declaring that the measure would be most injurious to their trade.

In order to understand their criticisms, which were entirely justified, it is necessary briefly to investigate the currency of the East Indies. Since the days of the Portuguese the coins most widely in use, and most readily accepted by the natives, were the silver dollar (varying in value at different times from four shillings and sixpence to three shillings and sixpence), and the copper cent (roughly equivalent to a halfpenny). All attempts of the Dutch to supplant it by their own coinage had failed hopelessly in face of the firm conservatism of the Malays, who declined to accept unfamiliar looking coins. India had already tried to substitute its rupee coinage on several occasions between 1820 and 1855, but with complete lack of success. Nominally the rupee was the only legal tender in the Straits Settlements, and all government accounts were kept in rupees. Apart from this the rupee was practically ignored by the whole population of the Straits, and the dollar remained the most universal form of currency in the Archipelago.¹⁷ In 1864 Sir Hercules Robinson condemned the attempts to introduce the rupee which he said had completely failed, and advised that the dollar should be made the sole legal currency of the Straits Settlements.¹⁸

The Directors for their part had a natural desire to enforce a uniform system of coinage throughout the whole

15. *I. Pub.*, Range 188, Vol. 18: July 13, 1855, Nos. 10 and 11. *PP*, (H. of C.), No. 152 of 1857-58, pp. 1-13 (Vol. XLIII).

16. *Ibid.*

17. *SSR*, 65: Jan. 15 and March 27, 1818. *Ibid.*, 87: Nov. 14, 1822. *Ibid.*, 100: April 7 and 26, 1825. *Ibid.*, 105: Dec. 15, 1825. *Ibid.*, 193: Aug. 4, 1824. *Ibid.*, *Financial*: Range 211, Vol. 15. July 25, 1856, No. 96.

18. *PP*, Command Paper [3672] 1866, p. 18, (Vol. LII).

of their empire. When the rupee was willingly accepted in every part of India, they failed to see why an exception should be made in favour of a small and little-known Residency whose expenses so far exceeded its revenue that it was a constant and heavy drain on their finances. What the Directors quite failed to realize was that conditions were so totally dissimilar that the imposition of the rupee upon the Straits Settlements would have had disastrous effects upon their trade.

In 1847 the Supreme Government had for the moment accepted the inevitable by passing Act XI of 1847, which declared copper cents to be the only legal copper currency of the Settlements. This compromise appears to have worked well. Legally the rupee was the only silver coin current, but by force of custom the silver dollar alone was in circulation. Both by custom and by the Act of 1847 the cent and its fractions were the only legal copper coins. The only thing which the Straits Settlements still desired was that the Company should recognize the position of the dollar by declaring it legal tender, and establish a mint for its coinage.¹⁹

Their satisfaction was rudely shattered by the Currency Act of 1855. Ostensibly its provisions did not interfere with the existing dollar currency; they merely made the anna and pice legal tender for fractions of the dollar as well as of the rupee.²⁰ In a letter to Governor Blundell in 1856 the Supreme Government wrote that the intention of the Act was not to provoke a conflict between the two monetary systems and drive the dollar out of circulation, but merely to provide a legal copper currency for the Straits.²¹ Lord Granville, defending the Act in the House of Lords, said that the Cabinet although doubtful of its advisability had sanctioned it as an experiment, which would be repealed if it proved a failure.²²

The people of the Straits Settlements however were quite unconvinced by these professions: they saw in the Act the thin end of the wedge, the opening move in an insidious attempt to replace the dollar by the rupee. When the Government's intentions first became known, and before the bill was passed, a public meeting of protest was

19. Buckley, *Singapore*, II, 596. PP, (H. of C.), No. 152 of 1857-58, pp. 10-11, (Vol. XLIII).

20. I. Pub., Range 188, Vol. 18; July 13, 1855, Nos. 10 and 11. PP, (H. of C.), No. 152 of 1857-58, pp. 1-13, (XLIII).

21. *India Financial*, Range 211, Vol. 15: July 25, 1856, No. 97.

22. *Hansard*, Ser. III, Vol. CXLI, pp. 1247-51, April 21, 1856.

held in Singapore on October 13, 1854. Petitions were drawn up and forwarded to the Legislative Council of India and to Parliament, pointing out that two systems of coinage so dissimilar could not exist side by side, and that the attempt to force a rupee coinage upon the Straits would injure trade very seriously.²³ A few months later, at the spring assizes of 1855, the Singapore Grand Jury presented as a public nuisance "the partial interference that has already been effected by the Government with the established currency of this Settlement and with the greater and more serious changes contemplated in the Draft Act which has lately appeared", (i.e. the bill which was afterwards passed as Act XVII of 1855). It charged the Government with trying to force the Indian currency into circulation, and predicted that it would prove a serious blow to trade, and "singularly oppressive to the poorer classes."²⁴ On June 1, 1855, another meeting of protest was held, and a further petition against the proposal was sent to India.²⁵ It arrived too late, since on May 29 the bill had become law.²⁶

When the news arrived at Singapore, there was great indignation at the neglect of its wishes. On August 11, 1855 a public meeting was held at which nearly every European in the town was present. The intention was to discuss the Currency Act; but the meeting proved to be of far greater significance than its promoters had intended. It marked the beginning of the agitation for the transfer from the control of India.²⁷ A resolution was proposed and carried; "That by the passing of the Act XVII of 1855 this meeting is forced into the painful conviction that the Legislative Council of India, in treating with utter disregard the remonstrances of the inhabitants, have shewn that they are neither to be moved by any prospect of doing good, nor restrained by the certainty of doing evil, to the Straits Settlements, and that it is therefore the bounden duty of this community to use every exertion and to resort to every means within its reach to obtain relief from the mischievous measures already enacted, and to escape from the infliction of others of the same nature, more comprehensive and still

23. Buckley, *Singapore*, II, 597-98.

24. *L. Pub.*, Range 188, Vol. 15: April 27, 1855. No. 43.

25. *Ibid.*, Vol. 18: July 13, 1855, No. 13.

26. *Ibid.*, No. 14.

27. Buckley, *Singapore*, II, 623. As in the case of most of the other public meetings held in the Straits, no reference to it can be found in the India Office Archives.

more hurtful."²⁸ From this time onward popular sentiment grew steadily more in favour of severance from India.

Meanwhile the agitation against the Currency Act increased in strength. The Old Singaporeans in England rallied as usual for the fray, and headed by their veteran leader, John Crawford, waited upon the Board of Control, and went far to convert its President. Singapore continued to support their efforts by fresh petitions to Parliament and to British Chambers of Commerce connected with the Straits.²⁹ By the middle of 1856 it was clear that the Act had failed. Blundell, the Governor of the Straits, was an advocate of the rupee currency; but in his report to the Government of India he admitted that after a year's trial of the Act, "its effect hitherto has been a nullity, and will remain so as long as cents continue in sufficient abundance."³⁰ As a result of this discouraging report, and of the strong opposition aroused in the Straits and in England, the Company abandoned its attempts to introduce the Indian coinage. Reversing its instructions of 1853 that all payments by or to government, *e.g.* the payment of taxes, must be made in rupees, in 1857 it ordered the complete resumption of the use of the dollar in all government transactions.³¹

Meanwhile the sentiment in favour of severance from the control of India had increased in strength. In July 1856 at a public meeting called to protest against the Currency Act, a resolution was introduced to petition Parliament to make the Straits Settlements a Crown Colony. The proposal was carried by a majority, but was subsequently withdrawn.³² In January 1857 a meeting which had been called to consider some riots amongst the Chinese which had recently occurred, developed into a discussion of the advisability of transferring the Settlements to the direct rule of the Crown.³³ A few weeks later the Indian Mutiny broke out, and although the sepoy regiments in the Straits remained loyal, the war finally brought matters to a head. The merchants of Calcutta had petitioned that the government of India should be transferred from

28. *Ibid.*, 623-24.

29. *Ibid.*, 598, *Ind. Financial*, Range 211, Vol. 17: Sept. 12, 1856, Nos. 23-27.

30. *Ind. Financial*, Range 211, Vol. 15; July 25, 1856, No. 96.

31. Buckley, *Singapore*, II, 597, 563.

32. *Ibid.*, 636.

33. *Ibid.*, 644-45.

the Company to the Crown; and on September 15, 1857 a general meeting was held at Singapore to consider the advisability of taking a similar step.³⁴ Opinion was unanimously in favour, and a petition was drawn up and sent to Parliament.³⁵ A summary of it has already been given at the beginning of this chapter.

Lord Bury, presented the petition in the House of Commons on April 13, 1858, and in an able speech pleaded the justice of the demand, and the neglect and ignorance of the East India Company. Other members followed, some supporting the petition and others defending the Company from the charges brought against it. Even those who were favourable to the Company showed no great hostility to the demand for the transfer.³⁶ Once more the Old Singaporeans brought all their influence to bear. Their leader, John Crawford, deserves a large share of the credit for the final success of the petition. On July 22, 1858, he presented a long and valuable Memorandum to Lord Stanley, the Secretary of State for India, and also circulated it amongst the members of Parliament. His arguments were in large measure a repetition of those in the petition.³⁷

The India Office was strongly impressed by the justice of Singapore's case, and on March 1, 1859, Lord Stanley wrote to Lord Canning the Governor General of India, asking whether it would not be advisable to transfer the Straits Settlements to the Colonial Office. He pointed out that since India had lost the monopoly of the China trade the Straits Settlements had ceased to be of much value to it; while their relations with China had become much more intimate than with India. One sentence of Lord Stanley's letter summed up the situation very accurately. "It can scarcely be urged that there are any reasons, geographical, political, or otherwise, why the Straits Settlements should continue to be governed and controlled from India."³⁸

34. *Ibid.*, 755.

35. *PP.* (H. of C.), No. 259 of 1862, pp. 3-6, (Vol. XL). The papers relating to the transfer are scattered through the archives of the Colonial, India and War Offices; but for convenience of reference the citations in this chapter are made where possible from the two parliamentary papers in which they are contained.

36. *Hansard*, Ser. 3, Vol. CXLIX. pp. 986-96, April 13, 1858.

37. *PP.* (H. of C.), No. 259 of 1862, pp. 6-8 (Vol. XL.)

38. *PP.* (H. of C.), No. 259 of 1862, p. 9 (Vol. XL.).

Lord Canning replied on November 7, 1859, in a very able Minute which greatly influenced the Home Government. He strongly urged the transfer to the Colonial Office for the following reasons. (1) The Straits Settlements were far removed from the sphere of India's interests now that it no longer had any commercial relations with China. Moreover the Supreme Government was not competent to deal with the affairs of a colony the conditions of which differed so widely in every respect from those of India; and the Governor-General had few opportunities of gaining a correct knowledge of its needs by visiting it, or by meeting Straits officials.

(2) The Indian Government found almost insuperable difficulty in providing competent officials for the Straits Civil Service. It had no means of training them to deal with the peculiar problems of the Chinese and Malays, so that they had to learn their duties after assuming office. The prospects of promotion were also so poor that it was impossible to find Indian civil servants who were willing to remain permanently in the Settlements.³⁹

(3) In case of war, India would be powerless to defend the Straits against a strong hostile fleet and the safety of both India and the Settlements depended on the British navy.

(4) Lord Canning then dealt with the objection which had been raised to the transfer on the ground that it would involve a heavy drain on the Imperial Treasury, to make good the yearly deficit in the Straits' budget. He pointed out that the growth of trade had brought with it a steady and phenomenally rapid increase of revenue, while the expenditure had grown in a much smaller degree. He gave it as his opinion that this process would continue, so that in a short time the revenue would equal the expenses.⁴⁰ On February 7, 1860, Sir Charles Wood, the Secretary of State for India, forwarded Canning's Minute to the Colonial Office with a covering letter to the effect that he entirely concurred in it.⁴¹

The transfer had now been agreed upon in principle by the two departments most immediately concerned, and it only remained to arrange the details. What at first

39. For a fuller account v. chapter on Civil Service.

40. PP, (H. of C.), 259 of 1862, pp. 12-15, (Vol. XL).

41. *Ibid.*, 25.

sight appeared a simple matter turned out to be exceedingly difficult. The War Office and the Treasury were drawn into the negotiations, and for the next seven years the four departments were busily engaged in inundating one another with endless demands and counter-demands until at times the whole problem appeared hopeless of solution. The Transfer proved to be as many-headed as Hercules' Hydra, and with an equal facility for growing new heads to replace any which were lopped off after many weary strokes of the pen. To detail at length the course of these complicated negotiations would be as involved as it would be uninformative, and only a summary is therefore given.

Late in 1859 the India Office had sanctioned the construction with funds from the Indian Treasury of the Tanglin Barracks at Singapore; and in 1860 it began to demand that since the Imperial Government would reap the sole benefit from them, the cost of their erection should be refunded. The Colonial Office refused to pay for the half-finished barracks, on the ground that the India Office had begun their construction after it knew that the transfer was probable. The Treasury also opposed repayment because it would have been at its expense. Many months elapsed during which the three departments exchanged letters, or varied proceedings by compiling memoranda for one another's use. The War Office soon added its quota to the flood of correspondence. It was by no means assured that the Singapore garrison was sufficient for the city's defence, and until this matter was satisfactorily settled, it refused to assent to the transfer. The force which would have contented the War Office would have been so expensive as greatly to increase the annual deficit in the Straits' budget. This would have to be made good by the Treasury, so it refused to consent to the transfer until assured that the Straits could pay for their own defences, and not be a burden on the British exchequer. At the same time another complication was introduced by the India Office. It demanded that the Colonial Office should make itself responsible for the public debt of the Settlements. This public debt consisted largely of loans made to the Straits Settlements from the funds of minors and suitors of the Company, which had been entrusted to it for investment. The debt had arisen in the following manner. To avoid the inconvenience of drawing drafts upon the Indian Treasury to make good the annual deficits the Directors had ordered that the deficits should be covered by loans made to the Straits in

the form of bonds bearing interest at 4 per cent. The Colonial Office regarded the public debt as a debt of the Indian Government, since the amount had been lent by its orders to save itself from inconvenience, and therefore refused to make itself liable for it. The India Office declined to agree, and by 1863 the negotiations had come to a deadlock.⁴²

Meanwhile Singapore was not idle. It sent many petitions to Parliament in which it laboured to prove that the revenue of the Straits Settlements was amply sufficient to cover expenses, so that the Imperial Treasury would not have to provide annual subsidies. On January 1, 1863, the Government of India imposed Stamp Duties upon the Settlements, to hasten the transfer by making the revenue balance the expenses. The tax was very productive, and the petitions urged that its favourable result should be sufficient to allay the fears of the Imperial Treasury.⁴³ The Old Singaporeans were also active. They organized deputations to wait upon members of the Cabinet, and inundated them with reams of statistics proving that the Straits were self-supporting.⁴⁴ John Crawford did especially useful service, and his memoranda appear to have had great influence with the Colonial Secretary.⁴⁵

In 1863 an attempt was made to end the deadlock by appointing a Commission to inquire into the advisability of transferring the Straits Settlements to the Colonial Office. The members were three in number, an engineer officer chosen by the War Office, a member of the government of Singapore nominated by the India Office, and a member of the Colonial Civil Service. The Colonial Office appointed Sir Hercules Robinson, the Governor of Hong Kong, who was about to return to Hong Kong from leave in England. The Commission was ordered especially to investigate the state of the fortifications and barracks at Singapore, the probable cost of their completion, and the number and character of the garrison required for the Straits.⁴⁶ The Treasury impressed upon Sir Hercules Robinson that the primary object of the inquiry was to determine whether the Straits Settlements could defray

42. *Ibid.*, 24-25, 28-39, 70-75. PP, Command Paper [3672] of 1866, p. 19, (Vol. LII).

43. *Ibid.*, 3-4. Buckley, *Singapore*, II, 773.

44. *Ibid.*, 768 and 771.

45. PP, (H. of C.) No. 259 of 1862, pp. 6-9, 44-53, (Vol. XL)

46. PP, Command Paper [3672] of 1866 pp. 8-9, (Vol. LII).

their own expenses without involving any charge upon it. He was informed that under no circumstances would the Government sanction any contribution towards its revenues.⁴⁷

Sir Hercules Robinson, the principal member of the Commission, arrived at Singapore on December 4, 1863, and remained there several weeks. In his report he strongly advocated the transfer and considered that the local revenues were amply sufficient to meet all legitimate calls upon them. The Public Debt had been used as a means to diminish the annual deficits which otherwise the Indian Government must have paid; and he therefore considered that it was an Indian liability. "The Straits Settlements could not with fairness, I think, be now asked to refund the amount, any more than they could be expected to repay the deficits of former years." He regarded the annual deficits as the result of unfairly charging the Straits with various items of expenditure which ought to have been defrayed by India, such as the cost of maintaining the convicts sent there from the three Presidencies. If this practice were reversed, the revenues, greatly increased by the Stamp Act of 1863, would more than cover the expenses, so that there would be no charge on the Imperial Treasury.⁴⁸

The Colonial Office agreed with Sir Hercules' conclusions; and the War Office also accepted with a few alterations the Commission's plan for the defence of the Straits.⁴⁹ The Treasury still opposed the transfer. It held that the estimate of the future surplus of revenue over expenditure given by the report, about £10,000, was so small, that it demanded assurances that if necessary the revenue could be increased so that the Imperial Treasury would not have to make good any deficits.⁵⁰ Accordingly, on September 19, 1864 and February 1, 1865, Crawford and other Singaporeans in London sent memoranda to the Colonial Office demonstrating with a wealth of statistics that Singapore's revenue would so increase with expanding trade that the Treasury's fears were groundless.⁵¹

At length the interminable negotiations were drawing towards a close. In March 1865 the India Office, with

47. *Ibid.*, 9.

48. *Ibid.*, 9, 19.

49. *Ibid.*, 26, 28-29.

50. *Ibid.*, 27-28.

51. *Ibid.*, 30-35.

the approval of the Treasury, finally accepted the Colonial Secretary's proposal that the Colonial Office was never to be called upon to repay the Public Debt to India.⁵² Meanwhile however the War Office had decided that a larger garrison was necessary; and it was not until April 21, 1866, that it agreed to accept the amount of £50,000 a year proposed by the Colonial Office as the annual contribution of the Straits Settlements towards the cost of their defence. The full cost of the garrison was £70,000 but it was felt that since part of the troops were maintained in the Straits for Imperial purposes it would be unfair to compel the colony to pay for them.⁵³ The objections of the War and India Offices had now been silenced; but the Treasury was still in the field. It discovered that the £50,000 for defence did not cover such items as the cost of transport, stores etc. and on May 12, 1866, it demanded that the Straits Settlements' contribution towards their defence should be £59,300 a year.⁵⁴ The Colonial Office consented, on the condition that the amount should be revised after five years.⁵⁵ To this the Treasury agreed, and on June 2, 1866, it consented to the transfer of the Straits Settlements to the Colonial Office.⁵⁶ On August 10, 1866, an Act was passed to transfer the Straits Settlements from the control of the India to the Colonial Office; and on April 1, 1867, the Indian Government formally transferred the Straits Settlements to the Crown.⁵⁷

British Malaya owes a debt of gratitude to the East India Company. It is true that the prosperity to which it had attained in 1867 was in large measure due to the unaided enterprise of the inhabitants. It is true also that the policy of the Company was often timorous and short-sighted, and that from ignorance and absorption in the affairs of India it made serious mistakes. But it should not be forgotten that through its Malayan policy a great part of the Malay Peninsula was saved from falling into the hands of Siam; and that the Company established an able and just administration under which the Straits Settlements were free to build up their trade unhampered. While it is easy to condemn the Company for parsimony, it was not a little thing that for thirty-four years, from 1833 to 1867, the Indian Government

52. *Ibid.*, 36-38.

53. *Ibid.*, 36, 44-47.

54. *Ibid.*, 48-49.

55. *Ibid.*, 50.

56. *Ibid.*, 51.

57. Buckley, *Singapore*, II, 780.

supported a constant drain upon its finances to maintain a colony from which it derived no profit, and which paid hardly a penny in taxes. The history of the East India Company in the Straits Settlements is the story of a great trust, well and faithfully guarded.

**Bibliography of writings in English on British Malaya¹,
1786—1867.**

by C. M. Turnbull

**A. RECORDS OF THE GOVERNMENT OF
THE STRAITS SETTLEMENTS,
preserved in Raffles Library, Singapore.**

These records comprise the correspondence of the Governors of the Straits Settlements with the Directors of the East India Company in London and with the Government of India in Calcutta, together with correspondence between the Governors and Resident Councillors, other officials, private individuals and non-Government organisations in the Straits Settlements prior to 1867. Although the authorities in the Straits Settlements were supposed to send copies of all internal papers to the Government of India, in practice information was sometimes not passed on to Calcutta, and the Singapore archives therefore provide some useful material which is not to be found in India or in London. Unfortunately unsystematic filing and storage, added to the hazards of climate and the ravages of insects, have led to the loss or destruction of entire volumes of papers and the illegibility of much that remains, while further gaps result from Governors removing many official papers as their personal property.

For the period prior to the abolition of the Penang Presidency in 1830 the following series are relevant:—

- Series A *Penang, Singapore and Malacca Consultations*, 1806-30. 70 vols.
- Series B *Penang Despatches to London*, 1805-30. 10 vols.
- Series C *London Letters to Penang*, 1810-29. 6 vols.
- Series D *Penang Despatches to India*, 1800-26. 11 vols.
- Series E *India Letters to Penang*, 1804-31. 4 vols.
- Series H *Penang: Letters and Orders in Council*, 1817-25. 14 vols.
- Series I *Penang: Miscellaneous Letters*, 1806-30. 41 vols.
- Series J *Penang: Old Indices to Records*, 1806-30. 18 vols.
- Series K *Penang: Miscellaneous*, 1805-29. 18 vols.
- Series L *Raffles' Administration*, 1814-23. 20 vols.

1. The term 'Malaya' refers here to the Malay Peninsula and Archipelago.

- Series M *Singapore: Letters to and from Bengal*, 1823-61. 12 vols.
 Series N *Singapore: Resident's Diary*, 1827-29. 6 vols.
 Series O *Malacca: Resident's Diary*, 1826-29. 4 vols.

For the period after 1830 the following series are the most useful and the best preserved:

- Series R *Governor's Despatches to Bengal*, 1831-67. 47 vols. (with no enclosures).
 Series S *Bengal Letters to Governor*, 1830-66. 35 vols. (containing enclosures).
 Series U *Governor's Letters to Resident Councillors*, 1831-67. 51 vols. (with no enclosures).
 Series V *Miscellaneous Letters from the Governor*, 1824-67. 45 vols. (with no enclosures).
 Series W *Miscellaneous Letters to the Governor*, 1830-66. 57 vols. (containing enclosures).

The series V and W consist of correspondence between the Governor and officials other than the Resident Councillors, as well as between the Governor and private individuals and organisations.

There are other supplementary series in which many volumes are missing or are in poor condition:

- Series F *Letters from Native Rulers to the Governor*, 1817-37, and 1865-74. 7 vols.
 Series G *Governor's Letters to Native Rulers*, 1817-31; 1841-45; 1850-73. 7 vols.
 Series P *Commissioner Young's Land Records*, 1837-39. 5 vols.
 Series Q *Singapore: Miscellaneous*, 1826-73. 11 vols.
 Series T *Governor's Letters to and from Madras*, 1847-63. 5 vols.
 Series X *Governor's Diary*, 1852-66. 62 vols. This diary is not a commentary or narrative, but consists of summaries of letters written and received by the Governor, together with particulars of action taken on this correspondence. The original letters or copies are normally to be found in other series.
 Series Y *Government House: Miscellaneous*, 1860-67. 4 vols.
 Series Z *Governor's Letters to Singapore*, 1827-64. 42 vols.

Of the following series only a few volumes survive:

- Series AA *Letters from the Resident Councillor of Singapore to Governor, 1828-67.* 54 vols.
- Series BB *Singapore: Miscellaneous In, 1823-66.* 136 vols.
- Series CC *Singapore: Miscellaneous Out, 1825-67.* 52 vols.
- Series DD *Letters from Resident Councillor of Penang to Governor, 1833-66.* 43 vols.
- Series EE *Letters from Resident Councillor of Malacca to Governor, 1830-66.* 36 vols.
- Series FF *Straits Settlements: Miscellaneous, 1855-74.* 20 vols.

The earliest volumes of correspondence of the Straits Settlements Government as a Crown Colony contain material pertinent to the Transfer of the Settlements from the India Office:

- Series C.O.D. *Colonial Office Despatches to Governor, 1867 onwards.* (Including enclosures).
- Series C.O.D./C *Colonial Office Despatches (Confidential) to Governor, 1867 onwards.* (Including enclosures).
- Series G.D. *Governor's Despatches to Colonial Office, 1867 onwards.* (Without enclosures).
- Series G.D./C *Governor's Despatches (Confidential) to Colonial Office, 1867 onwards.* (Without enclosures).

B. RECORDS OF THE EAST INDIA COMPANY AND THE INDIA OFFICE,

preserved in the India Office Library;
Commonwealth Relations Office, London.

East India Company Records

Straits Settlements Factory Records, 1786-1800;
1805-1830.

Directors' Despatches to Bengal. Volumes 86-124
cover the period 1820-1833.

Directors' Despatches to India and Bengal, January 1834-September 1858. 116 vols. (Including original drafts and minutes).

Board's Collections, 1824-58. These Collections con-

sist of the material collected for the Board of Control in London to deal with despatches. Most of the Collections which concern the internal administration of the Straits Settlements have been destroyed. For a complete list of the Collections relating to the external relations of the Straits Settlements with the Peninsula and the Archipelago, see N. Tarling's Bibliography pp. 215-218, in his "British Policy in the Malay Peninsula and Archipelago, 1824-71." *JMBRAS*, 1957, XXX, (3).

Letters received from India and Bengal, June 1834-December 1858. 131 vols.

India Public Proceedings, 1830-67.

India Political Proceedings, 1830-67.

India Political and Foreign Proceedings, 1830-67.

India Secret Proceedings, 1830-67.

India Financial Consultations, 1830-67.

India Home Consultations, 1830-67.

The volumes of *Bengal Consultations*, (*Public, Political, and Secret and Political*), also contain references to the Straits Settlements in the period 1800-55, but the records in this series prior to 1830 are duplicated in the *Straits Settlements Factory Records*, while those for the period 1830-55 are duplicated in the *India Proceedings* listed above. After 1855 there are almost no references to the Straits Settlements in the *Bengal Consultations*.

Secret Correspondence, 1819-67:-

Board's Drafts of Secret Letters and Despatches to India.

Secret Letters received from Bengal.

Enclosures to Secret Letters received from Bengal and India. The *Secret Correspondence* concerning the Straits Settlements deals largely with external relations. For further details of this series see Tarling, *JMBRAS*, 1957, XXX, (3), page 218.

Personal Records, 1794-1841. 20 vols. This series contains much miscellaneous information, including reports on individuals who were connected with the Straits Settlements.

Miscellaneous Letters, Judicial Department, 1837-79. 15 vols. The first fourteen volumes cover the period up to 1867, and among much other miscellaneous

material they contain correspondence on petitions presented to Parliament about the administration of justice.

Dutch Records, Series A, 1819-24. 31 vols. This series contains information about Raffles's administration in Bencoolen and Anglo-Dutch relations prior to the 1824 Treaty.

India Office Correspondence, 1858-67:—

Political Despatches to India, 10 vols.
Collections to Political Despatches to India, 83 vols.
Judicial and Legislative Despatches to India, 10 vols.
Collections to Judicial Despatches to India, 40 vols.
Judicial Letters from India, 11 vols.
Financial Despatches to India, 9 vols.
Collections to Financial Despatches to India, 58 vols.
Financial Letters and Enclosures received from India.
 (A continuation of a series of financial letters received by the Directors from India, beginning in 1854).
Letters to India on Finances, 9 vols.

**C. RECORDS OF THE SUPREME GOVERNMENT OF INDIA,
 preserved in Calcutta, New Delhi and Madras.**

No detailed survey has yet been made of the substantial holdings of records relating to the Malayan settlements in the archives of Calcutta, New Delhi and Madras, and the following is consequently only a rough guide.

Most of the Government of India papers concerning the Straits Settlements, 1830-51, during the time when the Settlements were administered by the Presidency of Bengal, are to be found in the Archives of West Bengal, Calcutta.

Material relating to the Straits Settlements in the records of the Government of India after 1851, when the Straits were transferred to the direct rule of the Supreme Government, is mainly to be found in the National Archives of India, New Delhi, in the following series:—

<i>Home Department Consultations</i> (Public)	{	These Consultations appear in separate files, not in bound volumes, and can be traced in the Home Dept. or Foreign Dept. Index.
<i>Home Department Consultations</i> (Judicial)		
<i>Home Department Consultations</i> (Education)		
<i>Foreign Department Consultations</i>		

Malacca Proceedings, 1852-60. 4 vols. These consist of narratives of proceedings of the Straits Government in the Foreign and Miscellaneous Departments.

Narratives of proceedings of the Straits Government, 1851-59. These are narratives of proceedings in all departments.

Papers relating to military affairs in the Straits Settlements prior to 1867 are mainly to be found in the archives in Madras.

D. COLONIAL OFFICE RECORDS preserved at the Public Record Office, London.

C.O. 273 Series. *Straits Settlements, Original Correspondence.*

This series starts officially in 1867 when the Straits Settlements were transferred to the Colonial Office, but the first sixteen volumes, covering the period to the end of 1867, contain many papers transferred from the India Office from 1859 onwards, some of them relating as far back as 1838. The volumes also contain the Colonial Office copies of the correspondence concerning the Straits Settlements Transfer negotiations from 1862 onwards.

C.O. 144 Series. *Labuan, Original Correspondence.*

The Labuan series contains proposals concerning Sarawak as well as papers about Labuan itself. The first Colonial Office records raising the question of the Transfer of the Straits Settlements were also put in the Labuan

files and are to be found in volumes 144/16 — 144/20. All correspondence on the Straits Settlements after 1862 was transferred to the Straits Settlements Series, C.O. 273.

E. FOREIGN OFFICE RECORDS,

preserved at the Public Record Office, London.

F.O. 12 Series. *Borneo*, 1842-75.

F.O. 37 Series. *Holland and the Netherlands*, 1816-74.

F.O. 71 Series. *Sulu*, 1849-72.

F.O. 97 Series. *Miscellaneous*.

For further details of Foreign Office records relating to the Archipelago in this period, see Tarling, *JMBRAS*, 1957, XXX, (3), page 219, and G. Irwin, *Nineteenth Century Borneo: a Study in Diplomatic Rivalry*, 's-Gravenhage and Singapore, 1955, pp. 223-224.

F. WAR OFFICE RECORDS,

preserved at the Public Record Office, London.

W.O. 33 Series. Most of the records in this series deal with the period after the Transfer, but volumes W.O. 33/15 — 33/32 inclusive, covering the period 1865-78, contain much information which relates also to pre-Transfer days.

G. BRITISH PARLIAMENTARY RECORDS

Hansard's Parliamentary Debates.

Parliamentary Papers. For a complete list of the debates and Parliamentary papers relating to the external affairs of the Malay Peninsula and the Archipelago in the period 1824-71, see Tarling, *JMBRAS*, 1957, XXX, (3), pp. 219-222.

H. INDIAN LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY RECORDS

Proceedings of the Legislative Council of India, (First Series), 1854-61. 7 vols. Copies of these Pro-

ceedings are now very rare. The India Office Library set is incomplete, but there is an intact series in the British Museum.

Proceedings of the Legislative Council of India (Second Series), from 1862. The first six volumes cover the period 1862-67.

I. OFFICIAL REPORTS AND PUBLISHED PAPERS

Straits Settlements Government

Annual Reports on the Administration of the Straits Settlements, 1857-67. A complete set is available in the India Office Library, and another in the Public Record Office files C.O. 275/1 and C.O. 275/2, *Straits Settlements Sessional Papers*. Only the reports for 1861/2 and 1862/3 are available in Raffles Library, Singapore.

Proceedings of an investigation made by the Governor into charges against the Penang Police, October 1859. Singapore, 1859. 32 pp. + 27 pp. Appendices.

Straits Settlements Commerce and Shipping, 1844-58; 1863-66. 18 vols. No volumes for 1859-62 can at present be traced, but the figures for 1860-62 can be found in the *Annual Reports on the Administration of the Straits Settlements*.

Straits Settlements Government Gazette. Singapore, from 1858.

Tabular statements of the commerce of Singapore during the years 1823/24 to 1839/40 inclusive. Singapore, 1842. Compiled for the Straits Settlements Government by C.P. Holloway.

Tabular statement of commerce and shipping of Singapore during the years 1840-44. Singapore, 1845. Compiled for the Straits Settlements Government by C.P. Holloway.

Treaties and Engagements entered into or affecting the native states of the Malay Peninsula. Published by authority, Singapore, 1889. xix + 189 pp. This collection includes treaties made before the Transfer as well as engagements made

after 1867, and is prefaced by a report drawn up by Cavenagh in 1860 on treaties made prior to that date.

British Government

Correspondence respecting the policy of the Netherlands Government in the Eastern Seas as affecting British commerce, 1824-67. Confidential, printed for the use of the Foreign Office, London, December, 1869.

J. NEWSPAPERS

The newspapers of the Straits Settlements provide a very valuable source of information for the period up to 1867, particularly after the censorship laws were repealed in 1835. They are useful for gauging public opinion at a time when there was no Legislative Council in the Straits, and they contain verbatim reports of discussions held and resolutions passed at public meetings. They also record speeches made by Governors, Recorders, other officials, lawyers and merchants; verbatim accounts of charges made by the Recorders to Grand Juries and the Presentments of the Juries in reply; memoranda circulated privately to Members of the British Parliament and to Chambers of Commerce in Britain; reports of interviews with British politicians; and much other material, both factual and comment, which does not appear in official records and is not to be found elsewhere.

It is difficult to trace some of the early newspapers of the Straits Settlements, but the following holdings are available:—

Penang Gazette. Penang, 1838 + Successor to the *Prince of Wales Island Gazette*, 1833-38. The British Museum holdings begin only in 1871, and the following copies of issues prior to 1867, housed in Raffles Library, Singapore, are the only ones believed to exist today: 1838-39, 1844, 1847, 1849-50, 1852, 1856, 1861, 1863. Articles and editorials from the *Penang Gazette* were, however, reprinted each week in the contemporary

Singapore newspapers, many of which have survived.

Prince of Wales Island Gazette. Penang, 1806-27.
The India Office Library has a complete holding.

Prince of Wales Island Gazette. Penang, 1833-38.
Renamed the *Penang Gazette* in 1838. A few issues for 1833 are available in Raffles Library.

Singapore Chronicle (and Commercial Register and Advertiser). Singapore, 1824-37. The India Office Library holds issues 1827-35. The British Museum has copies 1827-33. Raffles Library has issues for 1831, and 1833-37. No copies of the *Chronicle* prior to 1827 are available.

Singapore Free Press (and Mercantile Advertiser). First series, Singapore 1835-69. A weekly paper with a monthly overland summary edition. The Straits Times Office, Singapore, has the most complete holding, 1835-64, but most of these volumes are in poor condition. Raffles Library has the following issues: 1837, 1840-41, 1846, 1849, 1851-60, 1862-66. The British Museum has copies of the *Overland Free Press* for 1847 but has no other holdings of the first series of the *Free Press*. The India Office Library has no copies.

Straits Times (and Commercial Journal). Singapore, 1845 +
Bi-weekly from 1847 and daily from 1858, with a monthly overland edition. There are no issues in legible condition in the Straits Times Office, Singapore, for the period before 1867. Raffles Library has the following copies relating to this period: 1845-46, 1849-59, 1861-63. The first holdings of the British Museum date from February 1868. The India Office Library has no holdings.

Several London newspapers gave space to Straits

Settlements affairs and to the Malay Archipelago in this period, notably:—

London and China Telegraph. This newspaper had a regular column on the Straits Settlements. The British Museum has complete holdings from 26th November, 1859.

(London) *Times.* Useful particularly for comments on Government policy in British Malaya.

The newspapers in India in this period often carried articles on the Malayan settlements, the Peninsula and the Archipelago, notably:—

Bengal Hurkaru. Calcutta.

The India Office Library has holdings of issues, 1822-1866.

Englishman. Calcutta.

The India Office Library has holdings of issues, 1834-1930.

Friend of India. Serampore.

The India Office Library has holdings of issues of the *Friend of India*, (Weekly), 1835-1914.

K. PRIVATE PAPERS IN MANUSCRIPT

Bentinck Papers. Papers of Lord William Bentinck in the Portland Collection, Nottingham University Library.

As Governor General of India, 1828-35, Bentinck was responsible for the abolition of the Penang Presidency in 1830, and visited Penang in 1829.

Burney Manuscripts. Journal kept by Colonel Henry Burney of his life in Burma, 1830-32. The journal, in the author's own handwriting, was deposited with the Royal Colonial Institute, (now the Royal Commonwealth Society) in 1921, but has never been published.

In the early 1820s Burney was sent on various diplomatic missions to the Malay states connected with Siam; in 1825 he went to Bangkok as envoy of the

Government of India and negotiated the Treaty of 1826. After serving in Tenasserim, he was sent in 1830 as British Resident to Ava where he remained until 1838.

Cardwell Papers. Semi-official papers of Edward Cardwell, (1813-86). The papers are housed in the Public Record Office, London, in the series P.R.O. 30/48.

Cardwell was Secretary of State for the Colonies 1864-66, during part of the Transfer negotiations.

Vol. 40, (Box 6): Cardwell's correspondence with Lord Carnarvon (the succeeding Colonial Secretary) in 1866.

Vol. 45, (Box 7): Colonial Miscellaneous papers, 1864-66.

Carnarvon Papers. Semi-official papers of Henry Howard Molyneux Herbert, 4th Earl of Carnarvon, (1831-90). This collection is to be found in the Public Record Office, P.R.O. 30/6.

Carnarvon succeeded Cardwell as Secretary of State for the Colonies, June 1866 - December 1868, during which time the Transfer of the Straits Settlements to the Colonial Office was effected. Most of the Carnarvon Papers refer to Carnarvon's public life after 1867, but additional items 132-140, (as yet unbound and unindexed), which were deposited in the Public Record Office in 1959, relate to his period as Colonial Secretary 1866-68.

Cavenagh Papers. Four volumes of personal diaries kept by Colonel Orfeur Cavenagh during his term of office as Governor of the Straits Settlements, 1859-67. These are in the possession of his grandson, Major Orfeur Cavenagh of Victoria, British Columbia, and are not at present open to public inspection.

Elgin Papers. Semi-official papers of James Bruce, 8th Earl of Elgin, (1811-63). These papers are kept in the India Office Library in the Series MS. Eur. F83, and relate to the period when Elgin was Governor General of India, 1862-63. The following are relevant to the Malayan Peninsula and the Archipelago:- F 83/17 Governor General to Miscellaneous correspondents.

F 83/24 Miscellaneous correspondents to Governor General.

F 83/25 Sarawak Papers.

Gladstone Papers. Semi-official papers of W.E. Gladstone, housed in the British Museum. Although Gladstone as Chancellor of the Exchequer 1859-65, and Leader of the House of Commons, 1865-66, was involved personally in the Transfer negotiations, these papers are only of peripheral interest regarding the Straits Settlements. The following volumes are relevant:

- 44096-7 XI & XII Correspondence with G. Arbuthnot, Treasury, 1853-65.
- 44107 XVII Correspondence with Sir Frederic Rogers, 1840-89.
- 44118 XXXIII Correspondence with Edward Cardwell, 1845-68.
- 44184 XCIX Correspondence with Sir Charles Wood, 1839-69.
- 44192 CVII Correspondence with G.A. Hamilton, Treasury, 1859-69.
- 44224-5 CXXXIX-CXLIV Correspondence with Lord Kimberley, 1859-80.

Halifax Papers (i) Official and semi-official letters written by Sir Charles Wood, 1st Viscount Halifax. (1800-85). These are kept in twenty-two bound volumes in the India Office Library and relate to the period June 1859 to February 1866 when Wood was Secretary of State for India.

(ii) Wood-Cavenagh correspondence. Letters about the Straits Settlements, 1864-66, sent to Sir Charles Wood by Colonel Cavenagh. This bundle of letters is housed in the India Office Library and is uncatalogued.

Jardine Matheson Archives. Deposited in the Cambridge University Library. For details of these papers see Michael Greenberg, *British Trade and the opening of China, 1800-42*, Cambridge, 1951, page 226.

Lawrence Papers. Semi-official papers of Sir John Lawrence, (1811-79). Housed in the India Office Library. These papers refer to the period when Lawrence was Governor General of India, 1863-69.

There are scattered references to the Straits Settlements in the 1st series, Vols. 4, 6, 8, 15 and 18.

Palmer, John. *The private letter books of John Palmer*. Kept in the Bodleian Library, Oxford, English MSS Section. John Palmer, (1766-1836), the most influential Calcutta merchant of his day, travelled in the Straits and in Java where he had substantial business interests. No thorough study has yet been made of these letter books. For further information see C.E. Wurtzburg, *JMBRAS*, 1949, XXII, (1), pp. 182-183.

L. COLLECTIONS OF DOCUMENTS, STATISTICS AND LETTERS.

Aitchison, Sir C. *Collection of Treaties, Engagements and Sunnuds*. Volume 1. Calcutta, 1862. New edition. 1931.

Baker, A.C. "Anglo-Dutch relations in the East at the beginning of the 19th century." *JSBRAS*, 1913, 64, pp. 1-68.

Braddell, Thomas. "Notices of Penang." *JIA*, 1850, IV, pp. 629-644; pp. 645-663. *JIA*, 1851, V, pp. 1-14; pp. 93-119; pp. 155-172; pp. 189-210; pp. 292-305; pp. 354-366; pp. 400-429. *JIA*, 1852, VI, pp. 18-32; pp. 83-93; pp. 143-172; pp. 218-238; pp. 521-544; pp. 618-635. *JIA*, 1857-58, II (New Series), pp. 182-203. These *Notices* consist of official documents of early Penang formerly kept in the Government archives in Malaya, of which many have now disappeared.

Braddell, Thomas. "Notices of Singapore." *JIA*, 1853, VII, pp. 325-357. *JIA*, 1854, VIII, pp. 97-111; pp. 329-348; pp. 403-419. *JIA*, 1855, IX, pp. 53-65; pp. 442-482. These *Notices*, like the *Notices of Penang*, consist of official documents which Braddell collected in order to write a history of the early years of the Straits Settlements which was in fact never produced.

Braddell, Thomas. *Statistics of the British possessions in the Straits of Malacca; with explanatory notes*. Penang, 1861. 56 pp. Drawn up to support the claim of those agitating for Transfer that the Straits Settlements would not be a burden on the Colonial Office.

- Brooke, Sir James. *The Private Letters of Sir James Brooke, Rajah of Sarawak, narrating the facts of his life from 1838 to the present time.* (Ed.) J.C. Templer. London, 1853. 3 vols., 320, 327 and 341 pp. Templer was a close personal friend of Brooke and published this correspondence to refute the accusations against Brooke made by Hume and his supporters.
- Brooke, Sir James. *Rajah Brooke and Baroness Burdett Coutts.* (Ed.) E. Owen Rutter. London, 1935. 317 pp. Letters from Brooke to Miss Angela (later Baroness) Burdett Coutts.
- Burkill, I.H. "William Jack's Letters to Nathaniel Wallich, 1819-21," *JSBRAS*, 1916, 73, pp. 147-268. Letters copied from the records of the Royal Botanic Gardens, Calcutta. Raffles chose William Jack in 1818 to carry out botanical research in the Straits Settlements. Although these letters are mainly on botanical subjects they throw incidental light on other matters of more general interest.
- Burney Papers.* Five volumes, printed by order of the Committee of the Vajiranana National Library, Bangkok, 1910-1914. The MSS of these papers are housed in the India Office Library. Volume I contains papers relating to Burney's Mission to Siam in 1825-26 and the series ends with James Low's *Retrospect of British Policy from the period of the first establishment of Penang, 1786-1839*, written in April, 1842.
- Cowan, C.D. (Ed.) "Early Penang and the Rise of Singapore, 1805-1832." *JMBRAS*, 1950, XXIII, (2), 210 pp. A collection of documents from manuscript records of the Straits Settlements Government kept in Raffles Library, Singapore.
- Danvers, R.W. *Letters from India and China during the years 1854 to 1858.* London, 1898. ix + 214 pp. Danvers went to India as a military cadet in 1854. His letters contain descriptions of Singapore which he visited en route to China, where he was killed in 1858.
- Gibson-Hill, C.A. (Ed.) "Documents relating to John Clunies Ross, Alexander Hare and the early history of the settlement on the Cocos-Keeling islands." *JMBRAS*, 1952, XXV, (4), 306 pp.

- Gillespie/Raffles. *Charges preferred by Major General Gillespie against T.S. Raffles, Esq., Lt. Gov. of Java, with Mr. Raffles's defence.* Privately printed for Raffles, 1814.
- Johore. *Correspondence of the Rajah of Johore and the Governor concerning the jurisdiction over Tanjong Putri.* Singapore, 1865. 88 pp.
- Kyshe, J.W.N. *Chronological Table and Index of the Acts and Ordinances in force in the Colony of the Straits Settlements, 1835-92.* 2nd edition, Singapore, 1893. 371 pp.
- Maxwell, W.G. and Gibson, W.S. *Treaties and Engagements affecting the Malay states and Borneo.* London, 1924. viii + 276 pp.
- Prinsep, H.T. *Twelve Tables: being the inter-exchange of the Government currency at the British Settlements in the Straits of Malacca.* Malacca, 1833. 43 pp.
- Straits Settlements. *Papers and Correspondence relating to the Land Revenue Administration of the Straits Settlements, 1823-37.* Singapore, 1884.
- Wallich, Nathaniel. "Letters of Nathaniel Wallich relating to the establishment of Botanical Gardens in Singapore." (Ed.) J.R. Hanitsch. *JSBRAS*, 1913. 65, pp. 39-48. These letters concern the original gardens started in 1822 and abandoned in 1829.
- Ward, T.M. and Grant, J.P. *Official papers on the medical statistics and topography of Malacca and Prince of Wales Island, and on the prevailing diseases of the Tenasserim coast.* Government Press, Penang, 1830.
- Wise, Henry. *Selection from papers relating to Borneo and proceedings at Sarawak of James Brooke, Esq., now agent for the British Government in Borneo.* London, 1844-46.

M. PERIODICALS

The most useful periodicals relating to British Malaya in this period are:—

Asiatic Researches. Calcutta, 1788-1839. 20 vols.
Transactions of the Asiatic Society of Bengal founded in Calcutta in 1784. Pirated editions appeared in England from 1806.

British Malaya. London, 1926-51.
The Magazine of the Association of British Malaya. After 1951 known as *Malaya*. This journal has many articles on early and mid-19th century Malaya, but as all of them are very short and most are based entirely on readily available secondary sources, very few are listed separately in this Bibliography.

Calcutta Review. Calcutta, 1844-1912. (First series).
This journal contains a few articles on the Straits Settlements and has many useful contributions on contemporary Indian affairs which had important bearing on British Malaya. Eleven volumes of *Selections from the Calcutta Review* were published, 1881-84.

Chinese Repository. Canton and Hongkong, 1832-51.
A journal of semi-missionary character concentrating upon China, but with useful articles on Chinese piracy, secret societies, travels in the Archipelago, and many matters relating to the Straits Settlements, particularly education.

Colonial Intelligencer or Aborigines Friend. London, 1847-51. (First series). 3 vols.
Comprising the transactions of the British and Foreign Aborigines Protection Society. The first series of the journal contained violent attacks upon Sir James Brooke and his campaign to suppress piracy.

Indo-Chinese Gleaner. Malacca, 1818-21. 3 vols.

Journal of Eastern Asia. Singapore, 1875.
Only one number was published; the papers for the second issue were put towards the first volumes of the *Journal of the Straits Branch, Royal Asiatic Society*.

Journal of the Indian Archipelago and Eastern Asia. Singapore, 1847-59. 12 vols.
Edited by James Richardson Logan, F.R.S. and com-

monly known as *Logan's Journal*. Logan's particular interest was in physical geography and ethnology, but his *Journal* contained many valuable articles on the history of the Settlements and contemporary problems, with collections of early official documents of which the originals have now disappeared.

Journal of the Malayan Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society. Singapore, 1923 +
Successor to the *Journal of the Straits Branch, Royal Asiatic Society*.

Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland. London, 1834 +

Journal of the Straits Branch, Royal Asiatic Society. Singapore, 1878-1922. 86 vols.
From 1923 known as the *Journal of the Malayan Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society*. Four volumes of *Notes and Queries* were issued with the *Journal* 1885-87.

Journal of the South Seas Society. Singapore, 1940 +
Primarily devoted to the activities of the Chinese in Southeast Asia. Articles in Chinese and English.

Malaya. London, 1952 +
Successor to *British Malaya*.

Malaya in History. Singapore, 1957 +
Successor to the *Malayan Historical Journal*.

Malayan Historical Journal. Singapore, 1954-56.
From 1957 known as *Malaya in History*.

Malayan Miscellanies. Bencoolen, Sumatra, 1820-22. 3 vols.
Two volumes of miscellaneous material were published in 1820 and 1822, the other volume (issued in 1821) being the *Proceedings of the Agricultural Society of Sumatra*.

Memoirs of the Raffles Museum. Singapore, 1955 +

Singapore Review and Monthly Magazine. Singapore, 1861-62. (Ed.) E. A. Edgerton.
The journal started ambitiously as a monthly production but after the first three months became a quarterly issue. At the beginning of 1862 the title was changed

to *Singapore Review and Straits Magazine*, but it appears to have ceased production after 1862. The magazine is an odd mixture of fiction, poems, reprints of newspaper articles, official information and snippets of comment. It contains no outstanding original articles, but there is much useful information in short notices which cannot all be listed in this Bibliography.

The most useful articles relating to this period appearing in these and other journals are listed separately in the following sections under the names of their authors. Where the author is not known, the articles are listed under the name of the periodical concerned.

N. BIBLIOGRAPHIES

American Institute of Pacific Relations. *Books on South-east Asia: a select Bibliography*. Revised edition by W.L. Holland. New York, 1959. 62 pp. The first edition was issued by J.F. Embree in 1950, and revised by Bruno Lasker in 1956.

Bibliography of Asian Studies. An annual bibliography appearing at the end of the *Journal of Asian Studies* from 1956 onwards: successor to the *Far Eastern Bibliography* published in the *Far Eastern Quarterly* up to 1955.

"Catalogue of Church Records, Malacca, 1642-1898." *JMBRAS*, 1937, XV, (1), pp. 1-24. A reprint of a copy made by T.J. Hardy of the Malacca Church Records and printed by the Straits Settlements Government, Singapore, 1899, 22 pp.

Cheeseman, H.R. *Bibliography of Malaya: a classified list of books wholly or partly in English relating to the Federation of Malaya and Singapore*. Published by the British Association of Malaya. London, 1959. xi + 234 pp.

Daniel, Padma. "A descriptive catalogue of the books relating to Malaysia in the Raffles Museum and Library." *JMBRAS*, 1941, XIX, (3), pp. 1-125.

Dennys, N.B. "A Contribution to Malayan Bibliography." *JSBRAS*, June 1880, 5, pp. 69-123; and *JSBRAS*, December 1880, 6, pp. 225-272.

Dennys, N.B. "Index to the Journal of the Indian Archipelago." *JSBRAS*, 1886, 18, pp. 335-344.

Embree, J.F. and Dotson, L.O. *Bibliography of the Peoples and Cultures of Mainland Southeast Asia*. New Haven, 1950. xii + 820 pp. This bibliography covers the materials written in the principal western languages on Southeast Asia, but excludes Malaya which was intended to be incorporated in R. Kennedy's *Bibliography of Indonesian People and Cultures*.

Far Eastern Bibliography. An annual bibliography including Malaya and Southeast Asia which appeared at the end of the *Far Eastern Quarterly* up to 1955.

Hobbs, C. *South East Asia: an annotated Bibliography of Selected Reference sources*. Library of Congress, Orientalia Division, Washington, 1952. 163 pp.

Kennedy, R. *Bibliography of Indonesian Peoples and Culture*. New Haven, 1945. Revised edition 1955, 2 volumes. Continuous pagination, xxvii + 663 pp. This bibliography refers mainly to the Archipelago, not to the Malayan Peninsula.

Leyh, S.G.H. *Early Records of the Government of the Straits Settlements in the Colonial Secretary's Library, Singapore*. Singapore, 1928. ii + 25 pp. An index to the manuscript records of the Straits Settlements Government prior to 1867, examined and classified by Dr. G.S. Brooke in 1919. These volumes have since been transferred to Raffles Library, Singapore.

Library of Congress, Orientalia Division, Washington. *Southern Asia Publications in Western languages*. A quarterly accessions list, 1952 +

Parliamentary Papers (East India). *Annual Lists and General Index of the Parliamentary Papers relating to the East Indies published during the years 1801-1907 inclusive*. London, 1909. xlvii + 194 pp.

Royal Empire Society. *Subject Catalogue of the Library of the Royal Empire Society* (now the Royal Commonwealth Society). Vol. IV. London, 1937. 812 pp.

School of Oriental and African Studies, University of

cumulated list of periodical articles. May 1954-April London. *The Far East and Southeast Asia: a* 1955; May 1955-April 1956; May 1956-April 1957; May 1957-April 1958; May 1958-April 1959.

Sherborn, C. Davies. "A Bibliography of Malaya, January 1888-June 1894." A series of bibliographies appearing in the *JSBRAS*, 1890, 22, pp. 349-428; 1891, 24, pp. 121-164; 1894, 26, pp. 219-266; 1894, 27, pp. 135-175; 1896, 29, pp. 33-72.

Tan Soo Chye. "Straits Settlements Records: a brief outline of the records in Raffles Library, Singapore." *JMBRAS*, 1949, XXII, (1), pp. 187-188.

O. UNPUBLISHED DISSERTATIONS

Cowan, C.D. *The Origins of British Control in Malaya, 1867-78.* Ph.D. thesis, University of London, 1956. To be published by Oxford University Press in 1961.

Tregonning, K.G.P. *The founding and development of Penang, 1786-1826.* Ph.D. thesis, University of Malaya, 1958. To be published.

Wong Lin Ken. *A Study of the trade of Singapore, 1819-1869.* M.A. thesis, University of Malaya, 1955. To be published by the Malayan Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society.

P. THE INDIAN BACKGROUND

Although the East India Company (and later the India Office) administered dependencies in the Malayan Peninsula and the Archipelago up to 1867, and although for a quarter of a century Penang constituted the Fourth Presidency of India, both modern and contemporary works on Indian history make little or no mention of Indian interests in Malaysia in this period. However, in the absence of books on Malaya which relate the area to its Indian setting at this time, it is still necessary to turn to books devoted purely to Indian history for any account of the background which affected British Malaya for more than half of the 19th century.

The Cambridge History of India, Volume VI, Cambridge, 1832, of which the first section is devoted to a

study of administration in India from 1818 to 1858, provides the best and most comprehensive account of administrative changes in this period and in the years immediately following the dissolution of the Company; while Percival Spear's 'India in the British Period', forming Part III of the 1958 edition of Vincent Smith's *Oxford History of India*, although dealing only briefly with those Indian affairs most closely concerning British Malaya, is excellent on the other interests of the Indian Government having indirect bearing on the Straits Settlements.

Several histories of India were written in the early and mid-19th century before or about the time of the Transfer of the Straits Settlements to the Colonial Office, for example: Peter Auber, *The Rise and Progress of the British Power in India*, 2 vols., London, 1837; Edward Thornton, *The History of the British Empire in India*, 6 vols., London, 1841-45; H.H. Wilson, *The History of British India from 1805 to 1835*, 3 vols., London, 1845-48, a continuation of Mill's *History of British India to 1805*, of which Wilson brought out the 4th edition in 6 volumes in 1840; Henry Beveridge, *A Comprehensive History of India*, 3 vols., London, 1865; J.G. Marshman, *History of India*, 2 vols., Serampore, 1867-68. Auber describes the abolition of the Penang Presidency. The others deal very briefly — and in the case of Thornton inaccurately — with the Malayan settlements, but are sometimes of interest for the extremely detailed accounts of what was then very recent Indian history; in particular the rule of Bentinck and — in the case of Beveridge and Marshman — the Governor Generalship of Dalhousie, which were the two administrations of greatest significance to the Straits Settlements.

The best studies of the constitutional history of the time are A. Berriedale Keith, *Constitutional History of India*, London, 1937, and Sir Courtenay Ilbert, *The Government of India: a brief historical survey of Parliamentary legislation relating to India*, Oxford, 1922, 144 pp. (a reprint of the first chapter of his *The Government of India*, 3rd edition, 1915). For administration, see Sir John Strachey, *India: its Administration and Progress*, 1st edition, London, 1888; 4th edition, revised by Sir Thomas Holderness, London, 1911, xxiv + 567 pp. Eric Stokes, *The Utilitarians in India*, Oxford, 1959, xvi + 350 pp. is a most stimulating study of the application of political theory to administration in India in the 19th century.

The organisation and administration of the East India Company in the early 19th century are admirably

covered in modern works, particularly: C.H. Phillips, *The East India Company, 1784-1834*, Manchester, 1940, vii + 374 pp., and B.B. Misra, *The Central Administration of the East India Company, 1773-1834*, Manchester, 1959, xii + 476 pp. Of contemporary works the most useful are Peter Auber, *An Analysis of the Constitution of the East India Company and of the laws passed by Parliament for the government of their affairs at home and abroad*, London, 1826, lxxii + 804 pp.; Sir John Kaye, *The Administration of the East India Company: a history of Indian progress*, London, 1853, x + 712 pp, a very fair and careful study of the Company, of which Kaye was an official; and Arthur Mills, *India in 1858*, London, 1858, xv + 303 pp., which gives a good summary of contemporary administration with documents and laws.

William H. Morley, *The Administration of Justice in British India*, etc., London and Calcutta, 1858, viii + 357 pp. provides a useful background to judicial administration in India, although dealing only briefly with the judicial machinery in the Straits Settlements. Herbert Cowell, *The History and Constitution of the courts and legislative authorities in India*, 1st published 1872, 5th edition Calcutta and London, 1905, xi + 214 pp. is relevant to the Straits Settlements which had no legislative authority of their own under the Indian regime.

Economic questions were of the greatest importance to the Straits Settlements during this period. For the economic history of India in general see Romesh Dutt, *The Economic History of India under early British rule*, 1st published 1902, 8th impression London, 1956, (dealing with the period 1757-1837); Romesh Dutt, *Economic History of India in the Victorian Age*, 1st published 1903, 8th impression London, 1956. The question of currency which was of such vital concern to British Malaya is discussed by Sir J.C. Coyajee, *The Indian Currency System, 1835-1926*, Madras, 1930, xviii + 326 pp. Finance is covered by P. Banerjea in *Indian Finance in the days of the Company*, London, 1928, x + 392 pp., and *A History of Indian Taxation*, London, 1930, ix + 541 pp. Amal Tripathi, *Trade and Finance in the Bengal Presidency, 1793-1833*, Calcutta, 1956, xiii + 289 pp. contains points of interest for trade in the Straits Settlements.

For the Civil Service as a whole see L.S.S. O'Malley, *The Indian Civil Service, 1601-1930*, London, 1931, xiv + 310 pp., and Sir Edward Blunt, *The I.C.S.*, London, 1937, xiii + 292 pp.

The question of freedom for the Press under the East India Company was of importance in their Malayan settlements. Useful background studies are Ralph E. Turner, *The Relations of James Silk Buckingham with the East India Company, 1818-1836*, Pittsburgh, 1930, 145 pp., and Ram Nihore Chaturvedi, "The Press before the Mutiny," *Journal of Indian History*, 1938, 17, pp. 360-379.

The Company's navy is dealt with at length in C.R. Low, *History of the Indian Navy, 1613-1863*, 2 vols., London, 1877, xx + 541 pp. and vi + 596 pp., while H.W. Richmond, *The Navy in India, 1763-1783*, London, 1931, 432 pp., is useful for the naval background immediately prior to the founding of Penang. For the Company's merchant service see Sir Evan Cotton, *East Indiamen: the East India Company's Maritime Service*, (Ed.) Sir Charles Fawcett, London 1949, 218 pp.

The standard biographies of Lord William Bentinck and Lord Dalhousie, the two Governors General whose rule had the greatest effect in the Malayan settlements, are Sir Demetrius Boulger, *Lord William Bentinck*, Oxford, 1892, 208 pp., and Sir William Lee-Warner's comprehensive work, *The Life of the Marquis of Dalhousie*, London, 1904, 2 vols, xix + 446 pp., and xi + 450 pp. See too Sir John Kaye, "Lord William Bentinck's Administration," *Calcutta Review*, 1844, I, No. 2, pp. 337-371.

Pamphlets and books written in attack or defence of the Company are legion, and the debate is pertinent to the study of Indian rule in the Malayan settlements. For the controversy about the time of the 1833 Charter Act, see particularly: *Proceedings of the public meeting on the India and China trade, held in the Sessions Room Liverpool, 29th January 1829*, Liverpool, 1829, 47 pp., arguing for the abolition of the Company's trade monopoly; Sir James Fitzjames Stephen, "India — the foundation of Government," *Nineteenth Century*, October 1833; No. 80, pp. 541-568; Edward Thornton, *India, its State and Prospects*, London, 1835, xx + 354 pp.; and the articles of John Crawford (which are listed with the rest of Crawford's writings in Section R of this bibliography.)

For the debate in 1853, see H. T. Prinsep, *India Question in 1853*, London, 1853, 111 pp., (a reasonable view but in favour of the Company of which Prinsep was a Director); John Dickinson, *India: its Government under a Bureaucracy*, London, 1853, 209 pp. (a violent attack upon

the Company's government); George Campbell, *India as it may be: an outline of a proposed government and policy*, London, 1853, xxv + 438 pp.

The controversy in 1858 was of special importance to the Straits Settlements since the petition from Singapore for separation from India was presented in that year. For a defence of the Company's rule and achievements, see John Stuart Mill, *Memorandum on the improvements in the administration of justice during the last thirty years*, etc., London, 1858, 129 pp. For the opposite view see R.J.R. Campbell, *India: its Government, misgovernment and future, considered in an address to the Lords and Commons of Great Britain*, London, 1858, 44 pp. (Campbell was a Member of Parliament who had lived for twenty five years in India). Many articles on the administration of the Company and its problems in the final decades are to be found also in the *Calcutta Review*, first issued in 1844.

On the administration of the India Office in its early years there is not such a wealth of material. Sir Malcolm Seton, *The India Office*, London and New York, 1926, 299 pp. is informative on the beginnings of the Office. Algernon West, *Sir Charles Wood's Administration of Indian Affairs from 1859 to 1866*, London, 1867, viii + 179 pp. is of particular interest since Wood was Secretary of State for India throughout almost the whole period of the negotiations for the transfer of the Straits Settlements to the Colonial Office.

For documents relating to India at this time see G. Anderson and M. Subedar, *The last days of the Company: a source book of Indian history, 1818-58*, 2 vols., London, New York and Bombay, 1918 and 1921; A.C. Banerjee, *Indian Constitutional Documents, 1757-1939*, 3 vols., 2nd edition Calcutta, 1848-49, particularly Volume I, (1757-1858), and the early sections of Volume II, (1858-1917); Ramsay Muir, *The Making of British India, 1756-1858: described in a series of despatches, treaties, statutes and other documents*, etc., Manchester, 1917, xiv + 398 pp.; and the semi-official, *The Law relating to India and the East India Company*, London, 1840, 2nd extended edition 1841. This work contains all the Acts of Parliament relating to India up to the close of the 1839/40 Session, Charters, Government of India Acts, and Letters Patent of the Courts of Justice in India.

The Dictionary of Indian Biography, (Ed.) C.E. Buckland, London, 1906, gives particulars of a few of the

officials connected with the Straits Settlements but not listed in the *Dictionary of National Biography*.

Q. COLONIAL AND ECONOMIC BACKGROUND

Colonial policy

Although prior to 1867 Labuan was the only settlement in the Malayan Peninsula or Archipelago to be ruled as a Crown colony, the history of the whole region was vitally affected by British colonial and economic policy.

The most comprehensive study of colonial policy in this period is *The Cambridge History of the British Empire, Volume II*, (The growth of the New Empire, 1783-1870), Cambridge, 1940. The early chapters of *The Cambridge History of the British Empire, Volume III*, Cambridge, 1959, are useful for the 1860s, although the volume deals primarily with the period 1870-1919. *The Cambridge History of the British Empire, Volume V*, (The Indian Empire, 1858-1918), Cambridge, 1932, is also Volume VI of *The Cambridge History of India*, listed above, page 347. For general background to the period see E.L. Woodward, *The Age of Reform, 1815-70*, Oxford, 1938; and the *New Cambridge Modern History, Vol. X*, (The Zenith of European Power, 1830-1870), Cambridge, 1960.

Henry L. Hall, *The Colonial Office: a history*, London, 1937, xii + 296 pp. provides a valuable study of the Colonial Office throughout this period, while J.C. Beaglehole, "The Colonial Office, 1782-1854", *Historical Studies: Australia and New Zealand*, 1941, I, is useful for the time before the separation of the Colonial and War Offices.

The most useful general studies of colonial theory at this time are C.A. Bodelsen, *Studies in Mid-Victorian Imperialism*, Copenhagen, 1924, 226 pp., and K.E. Knorr, *British Colonial Theories, 1570-1850*, Toronto, 1944. See also the opening chapter of A.P. Thornton, *The Imperial Idea and its Enemies*, London, 1959, xiv + 370 pp.

For the late 18th century the best study is V. Harlow, *The Founding of the Second British Empire, 1763-1793, Vol. I*, London, 1952, viii + 664 pp.; for the mid-19th century, see W.P. Morrell, *British Colonial Policy in the*

Age of Peel and Russell, Oxford, 1930, 554 pp., and Paul Knaplund, *James Stephen and the British Colonial System, 1813-47*, Madison, 1933, 315 pp.; for the later period Paul Knaplund, *Gladstone and Britain's Imperial Policy*, London, 1927, 256 pp.

For constitutional development G.R. Mellor, *British Imperial Trusteeship, 1783-1850*, London, 1951, 499 pp., has some bearing although concerned in the main with self-governing territories. Of more relevance is Martin Wight, *The Development of the Legislative Council, 1606-1945*, London, 1946, 187 pp.

The standard biographies of the Duke of Newcastle, (Secretary of State for the Colonies, 1859-64) and the Earl of Carnarvon, (Secretary of State for the Colonies, 1866-68), both of whom were concerned with the negotiations for the transfer of the Straits Settlements to the Colonial Office, contain little of direct interest to British Malaya, but show the main problems of their periods of office: John Martineau, *Henry Pelham, 5th Duke of Newcastle, 1811-1864* London, 1908, xi + 345 pp.; Sir Arthur Hardinge, *The Fourth Earl of Carnarvon, 1831-90*, London, 1925, 3 vols.

Despite the much criticised apathy about colonial affairs in the mid-19th century, writings on colonial matters were extensive. Comprehensive descriptions of the colonial empire and colonial resources were given in Robert M. Martin, *Statistics of the Colonies of the British Empire*, London, 1839, 602 pp. + 304 pp. appendices; and of colonial constitutional history by Arthur Mills, *Colonial Constitutions: an outline of the constitutional history and existing government of the British dependencies*, etc., London, 1856, lxxi + 399 pp. (Mills was Chairman of the Parliamentary Committee appointed in 1861 to investigate Colonial military expenditure).

Several of the 19th century discussions on colonial policy are of outstanding importance, notably Herman Merivale, *Lectures on Colonisation and Colonies: delivered before the University of Oxford in 1839, 1840, and 1841*. Reprinted London, 1861, with a new preface by Merivale; new impression, London, 1928, xiv + 685 pp. Merivale, who delivered these lectures 'as Professor of Political Economy at Oxford, later held the office of Assistant Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies in 1847 and Permanent Under-Secretary from 1848 until 1859 when

he became Permanent Under-Secretary of State for India. His preface to the 1861 edition of his *Lectures* thus contains his opinions on colonisation after twelve years of experience in the Colonial Office. Merivale was personally involved in the negotiations to transfer the Straits Settlements to the Colonial Office.

Also of importance is Earl Grey's, *The Colonial Policy of Lord John Russell's Administration*, London, 1853, 2 vols., 473 and 414 pp., and of even greater interest Sir Charles Adderley, *Review of the Colonial Policy of Lord John Russell's Administration by Earl Grey, 1853, and of subsequent colonial history*, London, 1869, 423 pp., which together with his *Letter to the Right Hon. Benjamin Disraeli, M.P. on the present relation of England with the colonies*, London, 1861, 68 pp., gives a fair picture of Adderley's colonial views. With Edward Wakefield, Adderley helped to found the Colonial Reform Society in 1849 for the purpose of promoting colonial self-government and to the end of his life remained convinced of the folly of acquiring dependent territories. It was with the greatest reluctance, therefore, that he undertook the Straits Transfer Bill as one of his first duties as Under-Secretary for the Colonies, an office which he held from 1866 to 1868.

Other interesting contributions to the discussions on colonial policy in the mid-19th century are to be found in J.A. Roebuck *The Colonies of England*, etc., London, 1849, 248 pp.; John Stuart Mill, *Considerations on Representative Government*, 1st published 1861, latest edition in J.S. Mill, *On Liberty*, etc., Oxford, 1946, pp. 145-423, (containing a section on Mill's theory of colonial administration); Arthur Mills, "Our Colonial Policy," *Contemporary Review*, May 1869, pp. 216-239; and "Our Colonial System," *Quarterly Review*, 1863, CXIV, pp. 125-151, Anon.

The military background, which was of considerable importance, particularly in the discussion on the Straits Transfer, can be gained from the Hon. J.W. Fortescue, *A History of the British Army*, 13 vols. in 14, London, 1902-30, particularly Vols. XI, XII and XIII covering the period 1815-70. Extracts from the evidence taken before the Parliamentary Select Committee on colonial military expenditure in 1861, which was of such importance for the Straits Settlements indirectly, are given as an appendix in Sir Charles Adderley, *Letter to the Right Hon. Benjamin Disraeli*, etc., cited above.

For documents on colonial policy, see V. Harlow and F. Madden, *British Colonial Developments, 1774-1834*, London, 1953, 619 pp., and K.N. Bell and W.P. Morrell, *Select Documents on British Colonial Policy, 1830-60*, Oxford, 1928, xlix + 610 pp.

Economic policy

Books and articles on British policy directly concerning trade with China, India and the Eastern Archipelago are included in the general bibliography on British Malaya in the sections to follow, but other more general works of economic history are very useful as background studies.

The economic aspect of colonial policy is well covered in L.C.A. Knowles, *The Economic Development of the British Overseas Empire*, 1st edition 1924, 2nd revised edition London, 1928, of which Volume I deals with the Empire as a whole and the British tropical possessions; R.L. Schuyler, *The Fall of the Old Colonial System; a study in British Free Trade, 1770-1870*, London, 1945, vii + 344 pp.; C.R. Fay, *Imperial economy and its place in the formulation of economic doctrine, 1600-1932*, Oxford, 1934, 151 pp.; John Gallagher and R. Robinson, "The Imperialism of Free Trade," *Economic History Review*, 1953, VI (Second series), pp. 1-15.

For contemporary works on commerce see J.R. McCulloch, *A Dictionary of Commerce*, new edition, London, 1854, 2 vols.; and the last three volumes of W.S. Lindsay, *History of Merchant Shipping and Commerce*, 4 vols., London, 1874-76.

There are useful chapters on foreign and colonial trade in Sir John Clapham, *An Economic History of Modern Britain: the Early Railway Age, 1820-50*, Cambridge, 1930, and Clapham, *An Economic History of Modern Britain: Free Trade and Steel, 1850-86*, Cambridge, 1932. See also L.H. Jenks, *The Migration of British capital to 1875*, 1st published New York and London, 1927, reissued London, 1938, 442 pp; A. Redford, *Manchester Merchants and Foreign Trade, Volume I, 1794-1858*, Manchester, 1934, ix + 251 pp., *Volume II, 1850-1939*, Manchester, 1956, xii + 307. pp; G.S. Graham "The Ascendancy of the Sailing Ship, 1950-55", *Economic History Review*, 1956, IX, (Second series), (1), pp. 74-88. For official policy see Lucy Brown, *The Board of Trade and the Free Trade Movement, 1830-42*, Oxford, 1958, 245 pp. Nathan A. Pelcovitz, *Old China Hands at the Foreign*

Office, New York, 1948, 349 pp. is an interesting study of commercial pressure groups and official British policy, although a little late in period and of only indirect interest for British Malaya.

For the influence of leading statesmen upon commercial and colonial policy the most useful studies are: John Morley, *The Life of Richard Cobden*, London, 1881, 2 vols.; the first two volumes of John Morley, *Life of Gladstone*, London, 1903, 3 vols.; W.F. Monypenny and G. E. Buckle, *The Life of Benjamin Disraeli, Earl of Beaconsfield*, 6 vols., London, 1910-20, particularly Volume IV dealing with the period 1855-68.

R. PRINTED CONTEMPORARY ACCOUNTS

This section includes contemporary books, articles, pamphlets and reports; modern translations of contemporary works; early histories; and several eye-witness accounts written after 1867 but useful as an indication of conditions before that time.

Abdullah, Haji, (Haji Abdullah of Trengganu). "A Fragment of the History of Trengganu and Kelantan." *JSSRAS*, 1916, 72, pp. 3-23. Romanised text and English translation by H. Marriott. The story describes the struggle between Kelantan and Trengganu 1770-1835, and was written in 1876 when Haji Abdullah was Court historian in Trengganu.

Abdullah bin Abdul Kadir, Munshi. Abdullah bin Abdul Kadir, commonly known as Munshi Abdullah, was born in Malacca in 1795 and became Secretary to Raffles whom he greatly admired. He settled in Singapore in 1823 and died in 1852. In his later years he wrote his autobiography, the *Hikayat Abdullah*, of which there are a number of English translations in whole or in part.

The most useful complete version is: "The Hikayat Abdullah," translation and commentary by A.H. Hill, *JMBRAS*, 1955, XXVIII, (3), 345 pp. The *Hikayat* was also translated by the Rev. W.G. Shellabear, *The Autobiography of Munshi Abdullah*, Singapore, 1918, vi + 146 pp.

J.T. Thomson, *Translations from the Hikayat Abdullah bin Abdul Kadir, Munshi*, London, 1874, 507

pp., is interesting for Thomson's comments. He was Abdullah's pupil and considered to be a good Malay scholar in his day. Thomson claimed that Abdullah asked him to translate the *Hikayat* in 1846 when the former was Government Surveyor in Singapore, but his version differs from that of other translators.

Many excerpts of the *Hikayat Abdullah* have been translated, notably his account of a voyage from Singapore to Kelantan in 1838: Rev. B.P. Keasberry, "The journal of a voyage from Singapore to Kelantan," *Journal of Eastern Asia*, 1875, I, (1), pp. 104-109; A.E. Coope, *The Voyage of Abdullah*, Singapore 1949, ix + 73 pp.

Thomas Braddell translated several sections for *Logan's Journal*: "Concerning the Tan Tae Hoey in Singapore," *JIA*, 1852, VI, pp. 545-555; "Concerning Colonel Farquhar's going to look for a place to establish a settlement," *JIA*, 1852, VI, pp. 585-604; "The commencement of Abdullah's Schooling," *JIA*, 1852, VI, pp. 643-652.

A.H. Hill has translated the description of Malacca fort: "Munshi Abdullah's account of the Malacca Fort," *JMBRAS*, 1950, XXIII, (1), pp. 84-99. Short extracts have been translated by H.R. Cheeseman for *Malaya*: "An Elephant Drive," *Malaya*, 1952, I, (2), pp. 45-46; "The Demolition of Malacca Fort," *Malaya*, 1953, II, (2), pp. 99-102.

Abeel, David. *Journal of a residence in China and the neighbouring countries from 1829 to 1833*. New York, 1834. 398 pp. Abeel was a missionary who visited Singapore several times during these years.

Anderson, John. *Of the political and commercial relations of the Government of Prince of Wales Island with the states on the East coast of Sumatra, from Diamond Point to Siack, containing a brief account of the several missions to these states, trade, produce, duties, etc.* Penang, 1824. 52 pp. A report written for the Penang authorities by Anderson who was Secretary to Government.

Anderson, John. *Observations on the Restoration of Banca and Malacca to the Dutch as affecting the Tin trade and General Commerce of Penang, etc.* Penang, 1824.

- Anderson, John. *Political and Commercial Considerations relative to the Malayan Peninsula and the British Settlements in the Straits of Malacca*. Penang, 1824. 391 pp. Anderson had a very strong anti-Siamese bias and the book has therefore to be used with some caution. Only one hundred copies were printed and they were withdrawn and suppressed by the Company. The Editor of the *Singapore Chronicle* obtained a copy, however, which he published in the newspaper in 1835. Logan reprinted the work from this version, *JIA*, 1854, VIII, pp. 134-157; pp. 266-284; pp. 365-372. *JIA*, 1856, I (New series), pp. 299-315.
- Anderson, John. *Mission to the East coast of Sumatra in 1823, including historical and descriptive sketches of Sumatra*. London, 1826. xxiii + 424 pp. An account of a mission on which Anderson was sent by the Government of Penang to make commercial treaties with E. Sumatran States. Review article: *Quarterly Review*, 1826, XXXIV, pp. 99-110.
- Anderson, John. *Acheen and the ports on the North and East coasts of Sumatra, with incidental notices of the Trade in the Eastern Seas and the aggressions of the Dutch*. London, 1840. 240 pp. This work was published to induce the Government to extend British influence in the Malayan Peninsula and the Archipelago and to take over the Straits Settlements as a Crown Colony.
- Anderson, John. "On the Administration of justice in the British Settlements in the Straits of Malacca, and the Government of Penang, Singapore and Malacca," *Asiatic Journal*, 1840, Vols. XXXI, pp. 175-184, 249-258; XXXII, pp. 132-139.
- Anson, Major Gen. Sir Archibald. *About Others and Myself, 1745-1920*. London 1920. xii + 398 pp. Anson came out to Penang as Lt. Governor in 1867 and his book contains a description of the Straits administration as it existed at the time of the Transfer.
- Asiatic Journal (and Monthly Register)*. "Modified Liberty of the Press", *Asiatic Journal*, 1820, Vol. IX, pp. 610-611. Concerning the raising of restrictions on the press in Bengal in August 1819.

Asiatic Journal, etc. Claridge's Presentment to the Grand Jury of Singapore, 16th February 1829, reprinted in *Asiatic Journal*, 1829, XXVIII, pp. 355-357. Page 357 also gives the population figures for Singapore in 1829.

Asiatic Journal, etc. "The Recorder's Court at Penang," *Asiatic Journal*, 1832, (new series), VII, pp. 73-81. Commentary on the quarrel between the Recorder and the Governor with Fullerton's charges against Claridge.

Assey, Charles. *On the Trade to China and the Indian Archipelago, with observations on the insecurity of British interests in that quarter*. London, 1819. Also in the *Pamphleteer*, 1819, XIV, pp. 518-537.

Balestier, J. "View of the State of Agriculture in the British Possessions in the Straits of Malacca." *JIA*, 1848, II, pp. 139-150. Balestier was for many years American Consul in Singapore. He owned a large estate and experimented unsuccessfully with the large scale growing of sugar.

Baumgarten, F.L. "Agriculture in Malacca." *JIA*, 1849, III, pp. 707-723.

Begbie, P.J. *The Malayan Peninsula; embracing its history, manners and customs of the inhabitants, politics, natural history, etc. from its earliest records*. Madras, 1834. xxxvi + 523 pp. Begbie gives a long account of the Naning War during which he was in command of the artillery on the first expedition in August 1831, and gives a picture of Singapore which he visited briefly in 1832. To describe the Dutch regime at Malacca, he used Dutch records which have since disappeared. The *Singapore Chronicle*, which gave long extracts of the work in its issues of 1835, criticised Begbie's accuracy. The book is of value, however, and this unfavourable review stemmed largely from the personal opposition of the Editor of the *Chronicle* to the Government's policy in the Naning War.

Beighton, Rev. Thomas. "Penang: description of the island, its population, etc. Chinese missions, their establishment, progress and present state." *Chinese Repository*, 1834, III, No. 5, pp. 221-230. Beighton was senior member of the Mission in Penang.

Belcher, Captain Sir Edward, R.N. *Narrative of the cruise of H.M.S. Sulphur*. London, 1843. 2 vols.

Belcher, Capt. Sir Edward, R.N. *Narrative of the Voyage of H.M.S. Samarang, during the years 1843-46*. London, 1848. 2 vols., 358 and 574 pp. Published under authority of the Admiralty: Belcher was commander of the Expedition employed to survey the islands of the Eastern Archipelago.

"Bengal Civilian". *De Zieke Reiziger: or Rambles in Java and the Straits in 1852*. London and Calcutta, 1853. xii + 139 pp. Diary of a brief visit paid to the Straits Settlements and Java in 1852 by an East India Company official on convalescent leave from Bengal.

Bennet, Rev. G. See Tyerman (Rev. D), and Bennet, (Rev. G.), page 400.

Bennett, G. *Wanderings in New South Wales, Batavia, Pedir Coast, Singapore and China, 1832-34*. London, 1834. 2 vols. Primarily an account of botanical matters but with some general information. Volume II contains a description of Singapore.

Berncastle, J. *A Voyage to China*. London, 1850. 2 vols. xviii + 294 pp., and xii + 284 pp. Volume II contains an account of Singapore which Berncastle visited in June 1849.

Bethune, Captain C.D., R.N. "Notes on part of the West coast of Borneo." *Journal of the Royal Geographical Society*, 1846, XVI, pp. 294-304.

Bickmore, A.S. *Travels in the East Indian Archipelago*. London, 1868. 560 pp. Bickmore's chief object in making this journey was to collect shells at Amboyna. The account of his travels contains a favourable but brief description of Singapore, which he visited in May 1866.

Bird, Isabella L. (Mrs. Bishop). *The Golden Chersonese and the Way Thither*. London and New York, 1883. 483 pp. Isabella Bishop visited the Straits Settlements and the Malay states several years after the Transfer, but her descriptions are a useful indication of conditions before that time.

- Blundell, E.A. "Notices of the History and Present Condition of Malacca." *JIA*, 1848, II, pp. 726-754. Blundell was at that time Resident Councillor of Malacca. He became Governor of the Straits Settlements 1855-59.
- Bookworm. *Penang in the Past*. Penang, 1925. 225 pp. Reprint of articles written for the *Penang Gazette* concerning Penang from 1786 to 1803.
- Borie, Abbé P.H.D. *An account of the aborigines of the Malay Peninsula and of the other tribes at present inhabiting it*. Singapore, 1863. 79 pp. Translated from two letters written to the *Straits Times* dated 1st November 1857 and 26th April 1863 by the French Missionary, Father Borie, who was stationed at Malacca.
- Borneo. *The Borneo Question*. Singapore, 1854. A reprint of the evidence produced at Singapore before the Commissioners investigating the charges against Sir James Brooke, taken largely from the *Singapore Free Press*.
- Boucher, F. *The Indian Archipelago: a concise account of the principal islands and places of the Indian Archipelago*. London, 1857. 115 pp.
- Bowring, Sir John. *The Kingdom and people of Siam, with a narrative of the mission to that country in 1855*. London, 1857. 2 vols., x + 482; vi + 446 pp.
- Braddell, Thomas. *Notices of Penang*. See under Section L, Braddell, Thomas, page 340. Thomas Braddell was at that time Police Magistrate in Penang. As an uncovenanted civil servant his chances of promotion to senior posts were slight and he later left Government service to study law. He returned to Singapore in 1862 and built up a flourishing legal practice before being appointed first Attorney General of the new Crown Colony of the Straits Settlements in 1867. For Braddell's translations of the *Hikayat Abdul-lah*, see above page 357.
- Braddell, Thomas. "Notes of a Trip to the Interior from Malacca." *JIA*, 1853, VII, pp. 73-104. An account of an expedition to Mt. Ophir made by Braddell in 1853.
- Braddell, Thomas. *Notices of Singapore*. See Section L, page 340.

- Braddell, Thomas. "Notes to Illustrate the Genealogy of the Malayan Royal Families." *JIA*, 1855, IX, pp. 66-70. This includes a note to illustrate the table of the later rulers of Johore.
- Braddell, Thomas. "Notes on the Chinese in the Straits." *JIA*, 1855, IX, pp. 109-124.
- Braddell, Thomas. "Notes Illustrative of the Life and Services of Sir Stamford Raffles." *JIA*, 1855, IX, pp. 306-324.
- Braddell, Thomas. "Notes on Malacca." *JIA*, 1856, I (New Series), pp. 43-65.
- Braddell, Thomas. "Gambling and Opium Smoking in the Straits of Malacca." *JIA*, 1856, I (New Series), pp. 66-83.
- Braddell, Thomas. "Notes on Naning, with a brief notice on the Naning War." *JIA*, 1856, I (New Series), pp. 194-232.
- Braddell, Thomas. "Map of Malacca, with notes." *JIA*, 1856, I (New Series), pp. 296-298.
- Braddell, Thomas. "The Sultan of Johore." *JIA*, 1857-58, II (New Series), pp. 46*-67.
- Braddell, Thomas. *Singapore and the Straits Settlements described; and the arrangements for the future government of these possessions considered as distinct from the general question of the Government of India under the East India Company*, Penang, 1858. Published in support of the Transfer with data and information regarding resources, and suggestions as to the future form of Government.
- Braddell, Thomas. *Statistics of the British possessions in the Straits of Malacca; with explanatory notes*. Penang, 1861. See Section L. page 340.
- Brooke, Charles. *Ten Years in Sarawak*. London, 1866. 2 vols., 373 and 344 pp. Charles Brooke was then Rajah Muda of Sarawak. Sir James Brooke commended this book as a truthful account of his nephew's work to bring order among the Dyaks and suppress piracy.

- Brooke, Sir James. "Notices of a proposed Expedition to Borneo and the Indian Archipelago." *Journal of the Royal Geographical Society*, 1838, VIII, pp. 443-448.
- Brooke, Sir James. *A Letter from Borneo with Notices of the Country and its Inhabitants*. London, 1842. 40 pp. A letter written for publication to obtain popular support for Sarawak.
- Brooke, Sir James. *A Vindication of his Character and Proceedings in reply to the statements privately printed and circulated by Joseph Hume, M.P.* Addressed to Henry Drummond, M.P. Privately printed for Sir James Brooke, London, 1853. 64 pp.
- Brooke, Capt. John Brooke. *A Statement regarding Sarawak*. Privately printed, 1863. 34 pp. Captain John Brooke Brooke was Rajah Brooke's nephew and at that time Rajah Muda of Sarawak. His uncle left him in charge of Sarawak in 1858 but after a quarrel between them on personal and political grounds, Sir James returned to Kuching in 1863 to resume the administration.
- Bruijn, P.G. de. "Trade in the Straits of Malacca in 1785. A Memorandum by P.G. de Bruijn, Governor of Malacca." Translated from the Dutch by Brian Harrison. *JMBRAS*, 1953, XXVI, (1), pp. 56-62.
- Bunyon, C.J. *Memoirs of Francis Thomas McDougall, sometime Bishop of Labuan and Sarawak and of Harriette his wife*. London, 1889. v + 368 pp. Bunyon was Harriette McDougall's brother. See also under McDougall, Harriette, page 384.
- Calcutta Review*. "Annual Report of the Administration of the Straits Settlements: a commentary," *Calcutta Review*, 1861, LXXIII, pp. 35-65; reprinted in *Singapore Review and Straits Magazine*, 1862, II, (2), pp. 137-140.
- Cameron, John. *Our Tropical Possessions in Malayan India; being a descriptive account of Singapore, Penang, Province Wellesley and Malacca, their peoples, products, commerce and government*. London, 1865. ix + 408 pp. Cameron was at that time Editor of the *Straits Times*, and wrote the book to spread information in England about the Settlements which were expected to become a Crown Colony very soon.

It gives a valuable and balanced picture of life and politics in the Settlements prior to the Transfer, in many respects favourable to the Government of India.

Cavenagh, Colonel (later Major-General Sir) Orfeur. *Report on the Progress of the Straits Settlements, 1859/60 to 1866/67*. Singapore, 1867. 16 pp. This was not an official report but was composed by Cavenagh to list his achievements as Governor of the Straits Settlements, 1859-67, and circulated to the Colonial Office and to most colonies. Copies are to be found in the Public Record Office in the C.O. 273 files; in Raffles Library in Volume 18 of the series *Books published in the Straits Settlements*, and as *Straits Settlements Pamphlet No. 2* in the Colonial Office Library, London.

Cavenagh, Major Gen. Sir Orfeur. *Reminiscences of an Indian Official*. London, 1884. xi + 372 pp. Although Cavenagh gives an eye witness account of the Straits in the period 1859-67 and the book is useful in providing an insight into his character, the work is disappointing since he does not discuss the major political issues or personalities of the time.

Chamerovzow, Louis A. *Borneo Facts versus Borneo Fallacies: an Inquiry into the alleged piracies of the Dyaks of Serebas and Sakarran*. London, 1851. 64 pp. A violent attack upon Sir James Brooke.

Chinese Repository. "Chinese pirates." *Chinese Rep.*, 1834, III, No. 2, pp. 62-83.

Chinese Repository. "Religious Intelligence, including a description of the progress of the new religious school at Malacca." *Chinese Rep.*, 1834, III, No. 3, pp. 138-139.

Chinese Repository. "First report of the benevolent institution or Christian school for all nations opened at Malacca in March 1834." *Chinese Rep.*, 1835, IV, No. 8, pp. 389-390.

Chinese Repository. "Clanship among the Chinese, etc." *Chinese Rep.*, 1836, IV, No. 9, pp. 411-415.

Chinese Repository: "Recent piracies in the Pacific Ocean, in the Chinese Sea and in the Indian Archipelago, with a brief notice of the present means of sup-

pressing them." *Chinese Rep.*, 1836, IV, No. 11, pp. 518-52.

Chinese Repository. "Singapore Institution; its origin and design, with a description of its three departments." *Chinese Rep.*, 1836, IV, No. 11, pp. 524-528.

Chinese Repository. "European periodicals beyond the Ganges." *Chinese Rep.*, 1836, V, No. 4, pp. 145-160. *The Prince of Wales Island Gazette*, *Malacca Observer*, *Singapore Chronicle* and *Singapore Free Press* are included in this survey.

Chinese Repository. "Schools at Singapore. The Second Report of the Singapore Schools for 1835 to 1836." *Chinese Rep.*, 1836 V, No. 5, pp. 237-238.

Chinese Repository. "Education, the defects of the institutions for educating the Chinese." *Chinese Rep.*, 1837, VI, No. 2, pp. 96-99. Concerning Chinese education in the Straits Settlements.

Chinese Repository. "The Straits of Singapore: criminal courts and trial by jury; secret associations; tenure of lands; Agricultural and Horticultural Society." *Chinese Rep.*, 1837, VI, No. 3, pp. 153-160.

Chinese Repository. "Horsburgh Lighthouse." *Chinese Rep.*, 1838, VI, No. 11, pp. 544-548.

Chinese Repository. "Notices of the city of Borneo and its inhabitants, made during the voyage of the American brig *Himmaleh* in the Indian Archipelago in 1837." *Chinese Rep.*, 1839, VII, pp. 121-136; pp. 177-193.

Chinese Repository. "Benevolent Societies." *Chinese Rep.*, 1841, X, No. 1. pp. 52-54. The Singapore Institution, Free School and Anglo-Chinese College are included in this survey.

Chinese Repository. "Navigation of the China Seas." *Chinese Rep.*, 1846, XV, No. 2, pp. 98-104. Regarding the Horsburgh Lighthouse.

Claridge, Sir John Thomas. *A statement relating to the appointment of Sir John Thomas Claridge to the Recordship of Prince of Wales Island, Singapore and Malacca; and his dismissal on 9th March 1832.* London, 1835, 108 pp.

Court, M.H. *An exposition of the relations of the British Government with the Sultan and State of Palembang, and the designs of the Netherlands Government upon that country; with descriptive accounts and maps of Palembang and the Island of Banca*. London, 1821. viii + 259 pp. Major Court, had been Resident at the court of Palembang and Resident and Commandant of Banca during the British occupation.

Crane, T.O. "Remarks on the cultivation of cotton in Singapore." *JIA*, 1851, V, pp. 120-124.

Crawfurd, John. *History of the Indian Archipelago*. Edinburgh, 1820. 3 vols. 520, 563 and 554. pp. A very carefully compiled work. Raffles's attack upon the book as faulty and inaccurate, stemmed probably from resentment at Crawfurd's criticism of Raffles' own *History of Java*. Review article: *Quarterly Review*, 1822, XXVIII, pp. 111-133.

Crawfurd was born in Scotland in 1783, trained as a doctor and joined the East India Company in 1803. After five years in India he was transferred to Penang, served with Raffles in Java, and in 1821 was sent by the Government of India on a mission to Siam and Cochin China. Despite the enmity between him and Raffles which was acute during their days in Java, Crawfurd was appointed Resident of Singapore in 1823. He relinquished this appointment in 1826 and in 1827 was sent by the Governor General on a mission to Ava. After this he returned to England and devoted the rest of his long life to writing books and pamphlets, attacking the monopoly of the East India Company, and presenting the views of the merchants of Bengal and of the Straits Settlements to the British Government. He played a very prominent part in ensuring the success of the movement to transfer the Settlements to the Colonial Office and became first President of the Straits Settlements Association, founded a few months before his death in 1868.

Crawfurd, John. *Journal of an Embassy from the Governor General of India to the Courts of Siam and Cochin China: exhibiting a view of the actual state of those kingdoms*. London, 1828. vii + 598 pp. Crawfurd's account of the Mission which he led in 1821. He includes a description of Singapore in the early months of 1822.

- Crawfurd, John. *Journal of an Embassy from the Governor General of India to the Court of Ava in the year 1827*. London, 1829. 516 pp. + 89 pp. Appendices. Review article: *Quarterly Review*, 1829, XLI, pp. 27-53.
- Crawfurd, John. *A view of the Present State and Future Prospects of the Free Trade and Colonisation of India*. London, 1828. 124 pp. Crawfurd was a strong advocate of throwing India open to free trade and European settlement.
- Crawfurd, John. *The Chinese Monopoly Examined*. London, 1830. 96 pp. An attack upon the East India Company's monopoly of the China trade.
- Crawfurd, John. *Letters from British settlers in the interior of India, descriptive of their own condition and that of the native inhabitants under the government of the East India Company, (with notes)*. London, 1831. vii + 98 pp. Crawfurd was acting as agent for the merchants of Bengal in protest against the Company's policy.
- Crawfurd, John. *Remarks on Crawfurd's letters from British settlers in the interior of India*. Calcutta, 1832. 40 pp. Reprint of articles originally appearing in the *India Gazette* on 2nd and 8th May, 1832.
- Crawfurd, John. *Notes on the Settlement or Colonisation of British Subjects in India, with an appendix of proofs and illustrations*. London, 1833. 52 pp. This was written to arouse the interest of British merchants and manufacturers in the settlement of Europeans in India.
- Crawfurd, John. *Taxes on Knowledge: a financial and historical view of the taxes which impede the education of the people*. London, 1836, 63 pp.
- Crawfurd, John. *Notes on the Indian Act No. 11 of 1836: from its unpopular character commonly called the Black Act*. London, 1838. 7 pp. A protest against the Act giving Indian judges the power to try cases involving British people.
- Crawfurd, John. *An Appeal from the Inhabitants of British India to the Justice of the people of England*.

- A popular enquiry into the operation of the system of taxation in British India.* London, 1839. 35 pp.
- Crawfurd, John. "Agriculture of Singapore." *JIA*, 1849, III, pp. 508-511. Reprint of an article in the *Singapore Chronicle* of 1824. As early as 1824 Crawfurd had been pessimistic about the agricultural prospects of Singapore and experience was to justify his forecast.
- Crawfurd, John. *A Grammar and Dictionary of the Malay language, with a preliminary dissertation.* London, 1852. 2 vols. ccxci + 84; 208 + 201 pp.
- Crawfurd, John. "A Sketch of the Geography of Borneo." *Journal of the Royal Geographical Society*, 1853, XXIII, pp. 69-86.
- Crawfurd, John. *A Descriptive Dictionary of the Indian Islands and Adjacent Countries.* London, 1856. 459 pp. Review Article: *JIA*, 1856, I (New Series), pp. 291-295.
- Crawfurd, John. *Memorandum on the British Settlements in the Straits of Malacca.* London, 1858. 8 pp. A pamphlet submitted to the Secretary of State for the Colonies supporting the case for the Transfer of the Settlements to the Colonial Office.
- Crawfurd Papers. *A Collection of official records regarding the mission of Dr. John Crawfurd sent to Siam by the Government of India in the year 1821.* Printed by order of the Vijiranana National Library, Bangkok, 1915. xi + 108 pp.
- Crookewit, Dr. H. "Tin Mines of Malacca." *JIA*, 1854, VIII, pp. 112-133. This is the translation of an extract from a report written in 1850 for the Netherlands India Government and published in the *Tijdschrift voor Nederlandsch Indie*, November 1851, No. 11.
- Crookshank, A.C. "Sir James Brooke's Expedition against the Sarebas pirates." *JIA*, 1849, III, pp. 276*-277*. Crookshank was one of Brooke's officials.
- D'Almeida, Dr. José. "Gutta Percha." *JIA*, 1847, I, p. 78. Dr. José d'Almeida, a Portuguese ship's surgeon, settled in Singapore in 1825. With his brother, he founded a firm which at the time of Dr. Jose's death

in 1850 was one of the biggest concerns in Singapore. He was also interested in agriculture and experimented with the cultivation of fruit, spices, coffee, sugar, cotton and coconuts. One of the first to realise the commercial possibilities of gutta percha, he took specimens to England which he presented to the Royal Society of Arts in London in 1843.

D'Almeida, W.B. *Life in Java*. London, 1864. A contemporary account but of little value.

D'Almeida, W.B. "Geography of Perak and selangor and a brief sketch of some of the adjacent Malay States." *Journal of the Royal Geographical Society*, 1876, XLVI, pp. 357-380.

Dalrymple, Alexander. *Oriental Repertory*. London, 2 vols., 1793 and 1808. Several articles were reprinted in *Miscellaneous Papers relating to Indo-China*, (Ed.) R. Rost, 1st Series, 2 vols., London, 1886; 2nd Series, 2 vols., London, 1887. See particularly "First formation and progressive improvement of the Establishment at Poolo Peenang." *Oriental Repertory*, II, pp. 583-600. Reprinted in *Misc. Papers relating to Indo-China*, I (1st Series), 1886, pp. 26-37.

Daly, D.D. "Surveys and explorations in the native states of the Malay Peninsula, 1875-82." *Proceedings of the Royal Geographical Society*, 1882, pp. 393-412.

Davidson, G.F. "Plan proposed for importing Chinese mechanics and labourers from Singapore to New South Wales." *Chinese Repository*, 1837, VI, (6), pp. 299-300.

Davidson, G.F. *Trade and Travel in the Far East: or Recollections of Twenty One Years passed in Java, Singapore, Australia and China*. London, 1846. x + 312 pp. Davidson first came to the East in 1823 to work as a merchant in Java, and later as merchant and sea-going trader travelling between Singapore, Calcutta, Australia and Hongkong. He wrote these sketches from memory while on his voyage from Hongkong to England in 1844 on retirement and the book is not therefore completely accurate. The *Straits Times*, 23rd May 1846, however, commended the accuracy of his description of Singapore. Review article: *Quarterly Review*, June 1846, Vol. 78, pp. 1-23. A reprint of the excerpt on Bencoolen, 1828-30,

appears in *Memoirs of Raffles Museum*, No. 4, 1957, Appendix V, pp. 209-213.

Davis, Capt. C.E. "Climate of Singapore". *Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal*, 1833, II, pp. 428-431. Reprinted in *Miscellaneous papers relating to Indo-China*, 1886, Vol. I, pp. 215-218. Temperature and pressure readings taken between 1820 and 1824.

Dennys, N.B. *A Descriptive Dictionary of British Malaya*. London, 1894. 423 pp.

Doty, E. and Pohlman, W.J. "Tour in Borneo from Sambas through Montrado to Pontianak . . . during the autumn of 1838." *Chinese Repository*, 1840, VIII, pp. 283-310.

Doyle, Patrick. *Tin Mining in Larut*. London, 1879. 32 pp. with maps and drawings. A useful eye witness description which also throws some light on conditions prior to British intervention.

Duclos-Legrís, Charles. "The Journal of a Frenchman in Malayan Waters, 1804." Translated by C.N. Parkinson. *JMBRAS*, 1952, XXV, (1), pp. 68-93. This is an extract from Duclos-Legrís's *Journal of the Marengo*, of which the manuscript is kept in the National Maritime Museum, Greenwich. Duclos-Legrís was an officer on the *Marengo*, the flagship of Admiral Durand Linois during his campaign in the Indian Ocean. The extract translated covers the period from 27th January to 1st April 1804 and describes the battle of Pulo Aur.

Duncan, Walter Scott. *Singapore Sixty Years Ago. The Journal of Walter Scott Duncan, February-June 1824*. Singapore, 1883. 22 pp. First printed in the *Straits Times* in 1883.

Earl, George Windsor. "Narrative of a voyage from Singapore to the West coast of Borneo in the Schooner *Stamford* in the year 1834." *JRAS*, 1836, III, pp. 1-24. Earl first visited Singapore as a trader in 1833. After many years at sea, he settled in Singapore as a Law Agent in 1846, joining Government service in 1857 as Police Magistrate. He served in Penang and Province Wellesley from 1859 until his death in 1865.

Earl, George Windsor. *The Eastern Seas; or Voyages and Adventures in the Indian Archipelago in 1832-33-34*;

also an Account of the present state of Singapore, with observations on the commercial resources of the Archipelago. London, 1837. xii + 461 pp. This work contains a good account of piracy, but the trade figures and other statistics are inaccurate and unreliable.

Earl, George Windsor. "Sketch of the Island of Borneo." *JRAS*, 1837, IV, pp. 174-186.

Earl, George Windsor. "The Trading Ports of the Indian Archipelago." *JIA*, 1850, IV, pp. 238-251; pp. 380-399; pp. 483-495; pp. 530-551.

Earl, George Windsor. "On the Culture of Cotton in the Straits Settlements." *JIA*, 1850, IV, pp. 720-727. *JIA*, 1851, V, pp. 69-73.

Earl, George Windsor. "Steam Routes through the Indian Archipelago: established, proposed and prospective." *JIA*, 1851, V, pp. 441-450; pp. 489-497; pp. 613-624; pp. 671-676.

Earl, George Windsor. "Contributions to the Physical Geography of South Eastern Asia and Australia." *JIA*, 1852, VI, pp. 243-277. *JIA*, 1857-58, II (New Series), pp. 278-286. This includes a final section on the influence of geography on the progress of European colonisation.

Earl, George Windsor. *Topography and Itinerary of Province Wellesley*. Penang, 1861. 33 pp.

Elgin, James 8th Earl of. See under Oliphant, L., and Walrond, T., pages 390 and 401 below.

Elwes, Robert. *A sketcher's tour round the world*. 2nd edition. London, 1854. xii + 411 pp. Elwes toured the world on a sightseeing trip 1848-50, visiting South and North America, Hawaii, Australia, Hongkong, Macao, and spending a few days in Singapore and Penang in April 1850. He did not visit the East Indian Archipelago and his book is of slight interest on Malaysia.

Farquhar, William. "The Establishment of Singapore." *Asiatic Journal and Monthly Register*, May 1830, II, pp. 140-142.

- Favre, Abbé P. *An Account of the Wild Tribes inhabiting the Malayan Peninsula, Sumatra, and a few neighbouring islands; with a Journey in Johore and a Journey in the Minangkabau states of the Malayan Peninsula.* Paris, 1865. 189 pp. Favre was a missionary working in Malacca. The account was first published in three separate parts: *JIA*, 1848, II, pp. 237-282; *JIA*, 1849, III, pp. 50-64; *JIA*, 1849, III, pp. 153-161.
- Finlayson, George. *The Mission to Siam and Hué, the Capital of Cochin China, in the year 1821-22. From the journal of the late George Finlayson, Esq., surgeon and naturalist to the Mission. With a memoir of the author by Sir Thomas Stamford Raffles, F.R.S.* London, 1826. Review article: *Quarterly Review*, December 1825, pp. 104-133. Finlayson accompanied Crawford on this Mission, and his account differs in some respects from Crawford's.
- Foggo, George. *The Adventures of Sir James Brooke, K.C.B., Rajah of Sarawak, "Sovereign de facto of Borneo Proper", late Governor of Labuan.* London, 1853, 46 pp. One of the attacks on Brooke.
- Forbes, Lt. F.E. *Five years in China, from 1842 to 1847; with an account of the Occupation of the Islands of Labuan and Borneo by Her Majesty's Forces.* London, 1848. 405 pp.
- Forrest, Captain Thomas. *A Voyage from Calcutta to the Mergui Archipelago; also an account of the Islands Jan Sylau, Pulo Pinang and the Port of Queda; the present state of Acheen and directions for sailing thence to Fort Marlborough; etc.* London and Edinburgh, 1792. (xvi), x + 141 pp. Forrest was attached to the East India Company's Marine. He was appointed to the West Sumatra station in 1770 and travelled extensively in Southeast Asian waters.
- Gibson, Walter M. *Sketches in the East Indian Archipelago.* New York, 1855. xiv + 495 pp. Gibson, an American sea captain, described his imprisonment for over a year by the Dutch authorities at Weltevreden in Java, 1851-3.
- Gladstone, W.E. "Piracy in Borneo and the operations of July 1849". *Contemporary Review*, 1877, pp. 181-98.
- Gray, Charles. "Journal of a route overland from Malacca to Pahang across the Malayan Peninsula," *JIA*, 1852,

VI, pp. 369-75. Taken from the *Malacca Observer*, 27th February 1827. Gray, the first Englishman to cross the Peninsula, made this journey in 1826, with the object of bartering opium for gold dust. He died of fever just over three weeks after his return to Malacca.

Guthrie, Alexander, (and others). *Statement presented to His Grace the Duke of Newcastle, Principal Secretary of State for the Colonies, regarding the British possessions in the Straits of Malacca*. London, 1861. 31 pp. The writers were former Straits merchants who set out to prove in this memorandum that the Straits Settlements would not be a financial burden if they were transferred to the Colonial Office. The document was printed in the Parliamentary Papers on the Transfer question Parl. Papers (H. of C.), 1862, XL, (259), pp. 635-651. Reprinted with commentary in *Singapore Review and Monthly Magazine*, 1861, I, (4-6), pp. 225-244. pp. 285-292.

Gutzlaff, Rev. Charles. "On the Secret Triad Society of China, chiefly from papers belonging to the Society found at Hongkong." *JRAS*, 1845, VIII, pp. 361-367.

Hall, Captain Basil. *Narrative of a voyage to Java, China and the great Loo Choo Island*, etc. 1st edition, London, 1840. 81 pp. Hall, an officer of the Royal Navy, described his voyage in the ship which escorted Amherst to China in 1816.

Hall, Captain Basil. *Fragments of Voyages and Travels*. Reprinted London 1842. 3 volumes in one. 165 + 160 + 169 pp.

Hall, Captain Basil. *Travels in India, Ceylon and Borneo*. Edited with a biographical introduction by H.G. Rawlinson. London, 1931. Comprising selections from the *Fragments of Voyages and Travels*.

Hamilton, Walter. *The East-India Gazeteer*, etc. London, 1828. 2 vols., xv + 684 pp; and 770 pp.

Harris, Townsend. *The Complete Journal of Townsend Harris*. Ed. M.E. Cosenza. New York, 1930. 616 pp. Townsend Harris, the first American Consul General and Minister to Japan, was in Penang from April to May 1855 and again from January to

April 1856, spending a few days in Singapore in April 1856.

Hakim, Wa. "The Landing of Raffles in Singapore." *JSBRAS*, 1882, 10, pp. 285-286. Hakim was about fifteen years old when Raffles came to Singapore, and was probably the only eye witness still living in 1882. His account differs from Munshi Abdullah's, and his accuracy was challenged by W.H. Read, *JSBRAS*, 1883, 12, pp. 282-283.

Harvey, W.S. "Note on the N.W. coast of Borneo from Pulo Labuan to the entrance of Malulu Bay." *Journal of the Royal Geographical Society*, 1846, XVI, pp. 292-294.

Hervey, D.F.A. "Rembau" *JSBRAS*, 1884, 13, pp. 241-258. Hervey was the first cadet to be appointed under the new colonial regime in 1867. In his early years he visited many parts of the Peninsula and was able therefore to give first hand descriptions of the Malay states as they were at the time of British intervention.

Hervey, D.F.A. "Achin Piracy." *JMBRAS*, 1927, V, (2), pp. 316-323. Copy of a report drawn up by Hervey in 1868 about an expedition which he made to Kerti in Sumatra in that year to enquire into piracy against the Penang ship *Good Fortune*.

Horsburgh, James. *Memoirs: comprising the navigation to and from China by the China Sea and through the various Straits and Channels in the Indian Archipelago*. London, 1805. vi + 168 pp. Horsburgh was Hydrographer to the East India Company. In acknowledgement of his services to navigation in Southeast Asia, the merchants of Canton, together with the Straits merchants and the East India Company, erected Horsburgh Lighthouse east of Singapore in his memory. The lighthouse was completed in 1851.

Horsburgh, James. *India Directory, or Directions for sailing to and from the East Indies, China, New Holland, Cape of Good Hope, Brazil*. London, 1817. 5th edition, London, 1841. 2 vols. xxxiv + 683 pp., and 815 pp.

Hovell-Thurlow, Hon. T.J. *The Company and the Crown*. Edinburgh and London, 1866. 309 pp. Contains a description of Penang and Singapore at that date.

- Howison, James. "Some Account of the Elastic Gum Vine of Prince of Wales Island and of experiments made on the milky juices which it produces: with hints respecting the useful purposes to which it may be applied." *Asiatic Researches*, V, pp. 157-165. London edition, 1807. Reprinted in *Misc. Papers on Indo-China*, 1st series, 1886, Vol. I, pp. 55-60.
- Howison, John. *European colonies in various parts of the world viewed in their social, moral and physical condition*. London, 1834. 2 vols. 430 and 460 pp. Howison belonged to the service of the East India Company in Bombay. In his second volume he described European settlement in India and dealt with problems of colonisation.
- Hume, Joseph. *A Letter to the Right Honourable the Earl of Malmesbury . . . relative to the proceedings of Sir James Brooke, K.C.B. . . . in Borneo*. Printed for the author, London 1853. An attack upon Brooke.
- Hunt, J. "Sketch of Borneo, or Pulo Kalamantan." *Malayan Miscellanies*, Bencoolen, 1820, I, (8).
- Hunter, Captain Charles, R.N. *The adventures of a naval officer*. (Ed.) Sir Spenser St. John. London, 1905. vi + 283 + 32 pp. An account of Lanun piracy in the late 1840s.
- Hunter, Captain Charles, R. N. *The earlier adventures of a naval officer*. (Ed.) Sir Spenser St. John. London, 1906. viii + 296 + 32 pp.
- Hunter, William. "Remarks on the species of pepper which are found on Prince of Wales Island." *Asiatic Researches*, IX, pp. 383-393. London edition, 1809. Reprinted in *Misc. Papers on Indo-China*, (1st series), 1886, I, pp. 76-83.
- Indo-China. *Miscellaneous Papers relating to Indo-China. Reprinted for the Straits Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society from Dalrymple's Oriental Repertory, Asiatic Researches and the Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal*. (Ed.) R. Rost. London, 1886. 2 vols. xii + 318, and 309 pp.
- Indo-China. *Miscellaneous Papers relating to Indo-China and the Indian Archipelago. Second Series. Re-*

printed for the Straits Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society from the Journals of the Royal Asiatic, Bengal Asiatic and Royal Geographical Societies, the Transactions and Journal of the Asiatic Society of Batavia and the Malayan Miscellanies. (Ed.) R. Rost, London, 1887. 2 vols. viii + 307, and 313 pp.

Irving, Benjamin Atkinson. *The commerce of India: being a view of the routes successively taken by the Commerce between Europe and the East, and of the political effects produced by the several changes.* London, 1858. 271 pp.

Jackson, Louis. "Census of Singapore for November — December 1849." *JIA*, 1850, IV, p. 107. A statement provided by Jackson as Assistant Resident, 23rd January 1850.

Jacob, Gertrude L. *The Raja of Sarawak: an account of Sir James Brooke given chiefly through letters and journals.* London, 1876. 2 vols. 379 and 393 pp. A detailed and well-documented work.

James, Commander Henry. *Life of Commander Henry James R.N., or a Midshipman in Search of Promotion.* (Ed., Lt. E.G. Festing, R.N.) London, 1899. viii + 302 pp. Commander James's journal contains a fairly brief description of his service as First Lieutenant on H.M.S. *Wolf*, which was employed in the suppression of piracy in Malayan waters in 1836-37.

Jennings, W.R., Presgrave, E. and Lumsdaine, Dr. James. "Report on the population, etc., of the town and suburbs of Marlborough." *Proceedings of the Agricultural Society of Sumatra*, 1821, I, (The 2nd volume of the *Malayan Miscellanies*). Reprinted in *Memoirs of Raffles Museum*, No. 4, 1957: Appendix II, pp. 166-181.

Johnson, J. *The Oriental Voyager; or Descriptive Sketches and Cursory Remarks on a Voyage to India and China in H.M.S. Caroline, performed in the years 1803-4-5-6.* London, 1807. xvi + 388 pp. Johnson was a Royal Navy surgeon.

Journal of the Indian Archipelago and Eastern Asia. "Annual Remittances by Chinese immigrants to their families in China." *JIA*, 1847, I, pp. 35-37.

Journal of the Indian Archipelago, etc. "Area of the

Indian Archipelago and of the Islands claimed by the Netherlands." *JIA*, 1848, II, pp. 176-181. Tables taken from the *Moniteur des Indes, Orientales et Occidentales*, edited by Baron Melvill van Carnbee, officer of the Netherlands Indies Service who had made surveys of the Archipelago. These were reproduced in the *Journ. Indian Archipelago* to show how large a portion of the Archipelago was claimed by the Dutch.

Journal of the Indian Archipelago, etc. "Mahommedanism in the Indian Archipelago." *JIA*, 1849, III, pp. 457-463.

Journal of the Indian Archipelago, etc. "Malay amoks and piracies." *JIA*, 1849, III, pp. 463-467.

Journal of the Indian Archipelago, etc. "Destruction of the fleet of the Sarebas and Sakarran pirates by the expedition from Sarawak on the night of 31st July 1849." *JIA*, 1849, III, pp. 589-593.

Journal of the Indian Archipelago, etc. "A Trip to Mount Ophir." *JIA*, 1852, VI, pp. 636-642. A reprint of an anonymous article from the *Singapore Free Press* describing a trip made in January, 1840.

Journal of the Indian Archipelago, etc. "Journal kept on Board a Cruiser in the Indian Archipelago in 1846." *JIA*, 1854, VIII, pp. 175-199. Anonymous. A description of visits made by one of the East India Company's steamers in 1846 to hitherto unknown Dyak and Malay villages on the Borneo coast. There are also descriptions of Trengganu and Kelantan at the time.

Journal of the Indian Archipelago, etc. "Translation of the Malayan Laws of the Principality of Johore." *JIA*, 1855, IX, pp. 71-95.

Jukes, J.B. *Narrative of the Surveying Voyage of H.M.S. Fly*. London, 1847. 2 vols., 423 and 362 pp. Jukes was a naturalist on this expedition which visited the Torres Straits, New Guinea and other islands of the Eastern Archipelago, 1842-46. The ship called at Singapore which Jukes describes briefly. Review articles: *Quarterly Review*, 1847, LXXXI, pp. 465-492. *Blackwood's Edinburgh Magazine*, 1847, LXII, No. 385, pp. 514-533.

Keppel, Capt. (later Admiral) the Hon. (Sir) Henry. *The Expedition to Borneo of H.M.S. Dido for the Suppression of Piracy: with extracts from the Journal of James Brooke*. London, 1845. 3rd edition, London 1847. 2 vols., 429 and 315 pp. Review articles: *Quarterly Review*, 1846, LXXVIII, pp. 1-23. *JIA*, 1853, VII, pp. 247-260. The 3rd edition contained an additional chapter by Walter K. Kelly describing Admiral Sir Thomas Cochrane's expedition to Borneo. The British Museum has a copy of the very rare 1845 edition, autographed by Henry Wise: Memo, suppressed 10th September, 1845.

Keppel was a friend and great admirer of Sir James Brooke, with whom he co-operated in the suppression of piracy in Borneo in the 1840s. He first came to Malaya during the Naning War in 1831 and spent much of his service in Southeast Asia and the China station until 1869 when he returned to England on promotion to the rank of Admiral.

Keppel, Captain, the Hon. Henry. *A visit to the Indian Archipelago in Her Majesty's ship Maeander*. London, 1853. 2 vols. 301 and 286 pp. Keppel commanded the *Maeander* on her voyage in 1848. The book was dedicated to Sir James Brooke, and much of it is a vindication of his proceedings. Review article: *JIA*, 1853, VII, pp. 247-259.

Keppel, Admiral the Hon. Sir Henry. *A Sailor's Life under Four Sovereigns*. London, 1899. 3 vols., 340, 339 and 350 pp. Keppel's autobiography in journal form.

Kirby, John Roberts. "An Essex Sailor." *JMBRAS*, 1959, XXXII, (1). (now printing). (Ed.) Dato Sir Roland Braddell. Extracts from the journal of Dato Sir Roland Braddell's grandfather who lived 1819-1906. Going to sea at the age of 14, Kirby made seven voyages from England to India, China and Australia, of which he kept a record entitled *My Life's Log*.

Knaggs, Walter. "A visit to Perak." *Journal of Eastern Asia*, 1875, I, (1), pp. 26-32.

Kops, G.F. de Bruyn. "Sketch of the Rhio-Lingga Archipelago." *JIA*, 1855, IX, pp. 96-108. Translated from the *Naturkundig Tijdschrift voor Nederlandsch Indie*.

Lay, G. Tradescant. *Notes made during the voyage of the 'Himmaleh' in the Malayan Archipelago.* New York, 1839. xv + 295 pp. Comprising Volume II of *The Claims of Japan and Malaysia upon Christendom.* An American expedition of two ships was dispatched in 1836, one to Japan and the other to the Eastern Archipelago, to investigate prospects for trade and missionary activity.

Leicester, Stephen. *Straits Law Reports: being a report of cases decided in the Supreme Court of the Straits Settlements: Penang, Singapore and Malacca.* Penang, 1877. ix + 661 pp. Leicester was chief clerk to the Police Magistrate in Penang.

Leith, Sir George. *A Short Account of the Settlement. Produce and Commerce of Prince of Wales Island.* London, 1804. 71 pp. Leith was Lieutenant Governor of Penang from 1800 to 1803.

Lennon, Capt. W.C. "Journal of a Voyage through the Straits of Malacca on an Expedition to the Molucca Islands (under the command of Admiral Rainier), with some account of those islands at the time of their falling into our hands and likewise suggestions relative to their future better management in case of being retained in our permanent possession." *JMBRAS*, 1881, 7, pp. 51-74. Contributed by W.E. Maxwell. Lennon was principal engineer and secretary to the expedition of 1795-96. Maxwell copied the sections relating to the Malacca Straits from the original papers which are housed in the India Office Library.

Leyden, Dr. John. *The poetical remains of the late Dr. John Leyden.* See under Morton, Rev. James, page 388.

Light, Francis. "A Letter from Captain Light to Lord Cornwallis, dated 20th June 1788." *JMBRAS*, 1938, XVI, (1), pp. 115-122. Contributed by C.E. Wurtzburg.

Light, Francis. "A brief account of the several countries surrounding Prince of Wales Island, with their productions." *JMBRAS*, 1938, XVI, (1), pp. 123-128. A report written by Light, and sent by Cornwallis to Dundas, 7th January, 1789. Communicated to *JMBRAS*, by C.E. Wurtzburg.

Little, Dr. Robert. "On the habitual use of opium in

Singapore." *JIA*, 1848, II, pp. 1-79. Dr. Little arrived in Singapore in 1840 and for many years had a private medical practice there. He was also interested in farming, carried out considerable research into the causes of disease in nutmeg trees and was one of the first men to appreciate the potential value of gutta percha. In 1867 he was nominated as one of the first group of unofficial members of the Legislative Council, and died in London in 1888.

Little, Dr. Robert. "An Essay on Coral Reefs as the Cause of Blakan Mati Fever and of the fevers in various parts of the East." *JIA*, 1848, II, pp. 449-494; pp. 571-602. *JIA*, 1849, III, pp. 413-444. Little's theory attributing malaria to gases emitted from coral gained many followers. From the beginning some readers were doubtful, however, and Logan gave space to the controversy. *JIA*, 1849, III, pp. 690-706. *JIA*, 1850, IV, pp. 85-101; pp. 607-616; pp. 704-719.

Little, Dr. Robert. "Opium Smoking." *JIA*, 1849, III, pp. 454-457.

Little, Dr. Robert. "Diseases of the Nutmeg Tree." *JIA*, 1849, III, pp. 678-681.

Logan, J.R. "Journal of an Excursion from Singapur to Malacca and Pinang." *Journal of the Royal Geographical Society*, 1846, XVI, pp. 303-331, describing a visit from Singapore to Malacca and Penang in March 1845. Reprinted in *Miscellaneous Papers on Indo-China*, Second Series, I, 1887, pp. 1-20.

James Richardson Logan, (1819-1869), came to the Straits Settlements in 1839. He lived in Penang until 1842 when he went to Singapore as a law agent, returning in 1853 to Penang, where he died in 1869. In addition to his legal practice, he also became Editor of the *Penang Gazette*, the only newspaper of any standing in Penang. Abraham Logan, his elder brother, was Editor of the *Singapore Free Press* from 1845 until 1865, so that together they exerted a powerful influence on public opinion throughout the crucial years of agitation against the East India Company's rule. James Richardson Logan was a man of wide scientific and ethnographic interests, and his most lasting claim to fame is as Editor of the much respected *Journal of the Indian Archipelago and Eastern Asia*.

- Logan, J. R. "The Present Condition of the Indian Archipelago." *JIA*, 1847, I, pp. 1-21. Although primarily concerned with geography and population, the article also discusses piracy, the slave trade and government.
- Logan, J. R. "The Laws of the Indian Archipelago and Eastern Asia." *JIA*, 1847, I, pp. 321-326.
- Logan, J. R. "Sketch of the Physical Geography and geology of the Malay Peninsula." *JIA*, 1848, II, pp. 83-138.
- Logan, J. R. "Borneo: Notices of European intercourse with Borneo Proper prior to the establishment of Singapore in 1819." *JIA*, 1848, II, pp. 498-512.
- Logan, J. R. "Traces of the Origin of the Malay Kingdom of Borneo Proper, with Notices of its condition when first discovered by Europeans and at later periods." *JIA*, 1848, II, pp. 513-527.
- Logan, J. R. "Range of the Gutta Taban Collectors and present amount of imports into Singapore." *JIA*, 1848, II, pp. 529-533.
- Logan, J. R. "The probable effects on the Climate of Penang of the continued destruction of its hill jungles." *JIA*, 1848, II, pp. 534-536.
- Logan, J. R. "Notices of Chinese Intercourse with Borneo Proper prior to the establishment of Singapore in 1819." *JIA*, 1848, II, pp. 611-615.
- Logan, J. R. "Journal of a voyage to the Eastern coast and islands of Johore." *JIA*, 1848, II, pp. 616-624. Logan made this voyage in September 1847 in the Governor's gunboat.
- Logan, J. R. "Five Days in Naning, with a walk to the foot of Gunong Data in Rambau." *JIA*, 1849, III, pp. 24-41; pp. 278*-287*, pp. 402-412; pp. 489-493. An expedition made by Logan in February 1847.
- Logan, J. R. "The Manners and Customs of the Malays." *JIA*, 1849, III, pp. 274-284. *JIA*, 1850, IV, pp. 433-435.
- Logan, J. R. "Sago." *JIA*, 1849, III, pp. 288*-313*.

- Logan, J. R. "Revenue, Expenses and Trade of Rhio." *JIA*, 1849, III, p. 385. A statement from Temminck's *Possessions Neerlandaises*, II, p. 110, inserted as a contrast with the figures of Singapore.
- Logan, J. R. "The Piracy and Slave Trade of the Indian Archipelago." *JIA*, 1849, III, pp. 581-588; pp. 629-636. *JIA*, 1850, IV, pp. 45-52; pp. 144-162; pp. 400-410; pp. 617-628; pp. 734-746. *JIA*, 1851, V, pp. 374-382. An introduction and collection of writings of the previous thirty years, taken chiefly from the Singapore newspapers and the *Moniteur des Indes Orientales*.
- Logan, J. R. "A Boat Voyage from Singapore to Penang." *JIA*, 1850, IV, pp. 753-760.
- Logan, J. R. "Notes at Penang, Kedah, etc." *JIA*, 1851, V, pp. 53-65. Information collected by Logan on his trip in September 1850.
- Logan, J. R. "Cinnamon Cultivation in the Straits of Malacca." *JIA*, 1851, V, pp. 650-658.
- Logan, J. R. (Ed.) "Raffles and the Indian Archipelago." *JIA*, 1856, I (New Series), pp. 266-290.
- Logan, J. R. "Notice of Mr. Crawford's Descriptive Dictionary." *JIA*, 1856, I (New Series), pp. 291-295.
- Logan, J. R. "Plan for a Volunteer Police in the Muda District, Province Wellesley, submitted to Government by the late J.R. Logan in 1867." *JSBRAS*, 1885, 16, pp. 173-202. Logan drew up this scheme in 1867 and the paper was printed in Penang in 1868 but not published. The plan was never enforced, but the paper gives a useful and reliable description of the composition of society in Penang and Province Wellesley at the time of the Transfer.
- Low, C. R. *History of the Indian Navy, 1613-1863*. London, 1877. 2 vols. xx + 541 pp. and vi + 596 pp.
- Low, Hugh. *Sarawak: its Inhabitants and Productions*. London, 1848. xxiv + 416 pp. Low dedicated this work to Sir James Brooke, under whom he served in Sarawak for two and a half years. The book which he wrote while he was in Labuan as Colonial Secretary, using detailed notes prepared in his Sarawak days, is

a useful work since Low probably had a more intimate knowledge of Sarawak than any other Englishman then living. Review article: *Quarterly Review*, 1848, LXXXII, pp. 340-359.

Low, Capt. (later Lt. Col.) James. "Observations on the Geological appearances and general features of portions of the Malayan Peninsula, and of the countries lying betwixt it and 18° north latitude." *Asiatic Researches*, 1833, XVIII, pp. 128-162. Reprinted in *Miscellaneous Papers relating to Indo-China*, 1886, Vol. I, pp. 179-201.

Low, Capt. James. *A dissertation on the soil and agriculture of the British settlement of Penang or Prince of Wales island in the Straits of Malacca, including Province Wellesley on the Malaya Peninsula; with brief references to the Settlements of Singapore and Malacca, and accompanied by incidental observations on various subjects of local interest in these Straits.* Singapore, 1836. v + 321 pp. Most of these papers appeared in the *Prince of Wales Island Gazette* before 1835. Low was an officer in the Madras army and at that time in charge of Province Wellesley.

Low, Capt. James. "History of Tenasserim." *JRAS*, 1836, III, pp. 25-54; pp. 287-336.

Low, Major James. *Extracts from an unpublished journal of a residence at Singapore during part of 1840 and 1841.* A series of articles which appeared each week in the *Singapore Free Press* 1841-42. A valuable account, not printed elsewhere. Dr. C.A. Gibson-Hill is preparing an annotated edition of these extracts, for printing in the *Journal of the Malayan Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society*, together with J.T. Thomson's agricultural notices in his "General report on the residency of Singapore, etc.," *JIA*, 1849, III and *JIA*, 1850, IV. To be printed under the title *Singapore in the 1840s*.

Low, Lt. Col. James. "An account of the origin and progress of the British Colonies in the Straits of Malacca." *JIA*, 1849, III, pp. 559-617. *JIA*, 1850, IV, pp. 11-26; pp. 106-118, pp. 360-379. Governor Butterworth gave Low access to the Government records to compile this account.

Low, Lt. Col. James. "The Semang and Sakai Tribes

- of the Malay Peninsula." *JIA*, 1850, IV, pp. 424-432.
- Low, Lt. Col. James. "Observations on Perak." *JIA*, 1850, IV, pp. 497-504.
- Low, Lt. Col. James. "Notes on the Progress of the Nutmeg Cultivation and Trade from the early part of the 17th century to the present day." *JIA*, 1851, V, pp. 470-487.
- Lumsdaine, Dr. James. "Report on the Cultivation of Spices at Bencoolen, 1819-20." *Proceedings of the Agricultural Society of Sumatra*, 1821, I. (Second volume of the *Malayan Miscellanies*). Reprinted in the *Memoirs of Raffles Museum*, No. 4, 1957, Appendix, pp. 181-195.
- Lumsdaine, Dr. James. See also under Jennings (W.R.), Presgrave (E.), and Lumsdaine (Dr. James), page 376.
- Macalister, Capt. Norman. *Historical Memoir relative to Prince of Wales Island in the Straits of Malacca and its importance, political and commercial*. London, 1803. 38 pp. Macalister, formerly commander of the artillery in Penang, where he had served for ten years, submitted this memoir to the East India Company, the British Government and Parliament to urge the claims of Penang as a potential naval base.
- Macdonald, Captain D. *A Narrative of the early life and services of Captain D. Macdonald, I.N., embracing an unbroken period of twenty two years*. Weymouth, 1830. 303 pp. Taken from Macdonald's journal and some official documents. Macdonald, who joined the Indian Navy in 1799, visited Penang with Home Popham and later accompanied Raffles on the Java expedition in 1811. The book contains a good deal on Java under the British administration.
- McDougall, Harriette. *Letters from Sarawak*. First published 1854. Reprinted London, 1924. 125 pp. Mrs. McDougall and her missionary husband went out to Sarawak at Brooke's request in 1847. They lived there for twenty years and in 1854 McDougall was made 1st Bishop of Labuan and Sarawak. These letters were written by Harriette McDougall to her son in England between 1848 and 1851.

London, c. 1882. iv + 250 pp. A slight book but useful for the eyewitness description of the destruction of Kuching by the Chinese settlers in 1857.

Macgowan, D. J. "Note on the Maritime Malays." *JIA*, 1850, IV, pp. 687-691.

McMahon, T. W. R. *My Reminiscences of a picnic party at Penang in the year 1869*. Calcutta, 1871.

McNair, Major J. F. A. *Perak and the Malays: Sarong and Kris*. London, 1878. xi + 454 pp. McNair was employed by the East India Company as an unconvicted official to superintend the convicts of Singapore. In 1867 he became Colonial Engineer and Surveyor General, and later served as Chief Commissioner in Perak after the murder of Birch.

McNair, Major J.F.A., and Bayliss, W.D. *Prisoners Their Own Warders: a record of the convict prison at Singapore in the Straits Settlements, established 1825, discontinued 1873; together with a cursory history of the convict establishment at Bencoolen, Penang and Malacca from the year 1797*. London, 1899. xvi + 191 pp.

MacPherson, Capt. R. "Narrative of a Trip to Dok in the Muar Territory." *JIA*, 1857-8, II (New Series), pp. 295-300. MacPherson, later Resident Councillor of Singapore and first Colonial Secretary, undertook this journey in September 1857.

Malcolm, Howard. *Travels in South Eastern Asia, embracing Hindustan, Malaya, Siam and China, etc.* London, 1839. 2 vols. xi + 324 pp., and viii + 364 pp. 2nd edition, Boston, 1839. 2 volumes in one. 272 + 321 pp. Malcolm, an American missionary, spent just over a month in Singapore in April/May 1837. The book was a "best seller," particularly in America where it ran to ten editions within fifteen years.

Man, Colonel Henry. *Supplement to correspondence relating to the comparative merits of British and native administration in India*. Published by the Government of India, Calcutta 1868. 7 pp. A letter from Colonel Man, (Resident Councillor of Penang till 1867) to the Secretary to the Government of India.

Marryat, Frank S. *Borneo and the Indian Archipelago*.

London, 1848, viii + 232 pp. Marryat had been a midshipman in the H.M.S. *Samarang*.

Marsden, William. *The History of Sumatra: containing an account of government, laws, customs and manners of the native inhabitants, with a description of the natural productions, and relation of the ancient political state of that island*. First published 1783. 3rd edition, London, 1811. viii + 479 + 8 pp.

Marsden, William. *A Grammar of the Malayan language, with an introduction and praxis*. London, 1812. 225 pp. The Praxis contains letters, (with translations), of correspondence between Light and some of the Malay rulers.

Marsden, William. *A brief memoir of the life and writings of the late William Marsden written by himself; with notes from his correspondence*. (Ed.) Elizabeth W. Marsden. London, 1838. vii + 101 pp. This memoir appears to have been written in 1828 and was found among Marsden's papers after his death.

Martin, Robert M. *The British Colonies: their history, extent, condition and resources*. London and New York, 1850. 6 vols. Volume 5, (ii + 564 pp.) on British India. Volume 6, (ii + 171 pp.) on Ceylon, the East Indies and the Mediterranean Settlements.

Maxwell, Sir Benson. "The Law of England in Penang, Malacca and Singapore." *JIA*, 1859, III (New Series), pp. 26-55. Maxwell came to the Straits Settlements as Recorder of Penang in 1855. In 1866 he was promoted to be Recorder of Singapore and in 1867 appointed first Chief Justice of the new Colony of the Straits Settlements. He retired in 1871.

Maxwell, Sir Benson. *An Introduction to the duties of Police Magistrates in the Settlement of Prince of Wales Island, Singapore and Malacca*. Penang, 1866. xiv + 289 pp.

Maxwell, Sir Benson. *Our Malay Conquests*. London, 1878. 124 pp.

Maxwell, W. E. "A Journey on foot to the Patani frontier in 1876, (being a journal kept during an expedition undertaken to capture Datoh Maharaja Lela of

- Perak." *JSBRAS*, 1882, 9, pp. 1-67. William Edward Maxwell, the second son of Sir Benson Maxwell, came to Penang to work for his father in 1865. He had a distinguished career, rising to be Colonial Secretary of the Straits Settlements in 1892 and Acting Governor in 1893. In 1894 he left the Straits to become Governor of the Gold Coast and died in 1897.
- Maxwell, W. E. "The Law and Customs of the Malays with reference to the tenure of land." *JSBRAS*, 1884, 13, pp. 75-220.
- Maxwell, W. E. "The Law Relating to slavery among the Malays." *JSBRAS*, 1890, No. 22, pp. 247-297.
- Maxwell, W. E. "The Ruling Family of Selangor." *JSBRAS*, 1890, No. 22, pp. 321-324.
- Medhurst, W. *A Voyage to the East coast of Malaya*. Singapore, 1828.
- Milburn, William. *Oriental Commerce; or the East Indian Trader's Complete Guide*. London, 1813. 2 vols., 413 581 pp. Much of this work was taken from earlier writers without always being brought up to date. Of greater value is the Second edition, extensively revised by Thomas Thornton in 1825. See under Thornton, page 399.
- Milne, Dr. "Some account of a secret association in China entitled the Triad Society. By the late Dr. Milne, Principal of the Anglo-Chinese College," *Chinese Repository*, February 1845, XIV, (2), pp. 59-69.
- Money, J. W. B. *Java, or How to Manage a Colony, showing a practical solution of the questions now affecting British India*. London, 1861. 2 vols., 331 and 311 pp. A vindication of the Dutch culture system and criticism of British rule in India in the light of dangers revealed by the Mutiny. Review article: *Singapore Review and Straits Magazine*, 1862, II, (1), pp. 69-72, and 1862, II, (2), pp. 105-108.
- Mongkut, King of Siam. "English correspondence of King Mongkut." *Journ. Siam Society*, 1927, XXI, (1), pp. 1-35. *Journ. Siam Society*, 1927, XXI, (2), pp. 127-177. *Journ. Siam Society*, 1928, XXII, (1), pp. 1-18. The correspondence, which covers the period 1851-68, includes letters to Governors and merchants

in the Straits Settlements, and to the British Government.

Moor, J. H. *Notices of the Indian Archipelago and adjacent countries: being a collection of papers relating to Borneo, Celebes, Bali, Java, Sumatra, Nias, the Philippine Islands, Sulus, Siam, Cochin China, Malayan Peninsula etc.* Part I. Singapore, 1837. 393 pp. The second part was never published. Moor came to Malacca in 1826. He opened the Malacca Free School, and was founder and editor of the *Malacca Observer*, issued from 1826 to 1829. He came to Singapore in 1830 and worked as a schoolmaster and Editor of the *Singapore Chronicle*. The *Notices* were largely reprints of newspaper articles. Moor intended to produce a second volume but the great expense of producing the first and the small demand for the book involved him in such financial loss that the project was never continued. The work is invaluable since much of the evidence on which the articles was written and many of the original articles themselves have since disappeared.

Morton, Rev. James. *The poetical remains of the late Dr. John Leyden with memoirs of his life.* London, 1819. xcii + 415 pp.

Mundy, Capt. Rodney. *Narrative of Events in Borneo and Celebes down to the occupation of Labuan: from the Journals of James Brooke: together with a narrative of the operations of H.M.S. Iris.* London, 1848. 2 vols., 385 + 395 pp. Review article: *Quarterly Review*, 1848, LXXXIII, pp. 340-359. Mundy took a prominent part in the suppression of piracy in Borneo and his account supplements Keppel's books. The account of the Buginese states in Celebes is the first such description in English.

"W.N." *Borneo: Remarks on a recent "naval execution"* London, 1850. 47 pp. This pamphlet, written in January 1850, was one of the earliest attacks upon Brooke's action against the Borneo pirates in July 1849.

Nahuijs, Colonel. "Extracts from the Letters of Col. Nahuijs." (Trans.) H.E. Miller. *JMBRAS*, 1941, XIX, (2), pp. 169-209. Letters from Bencoolen, Penang and Bengal, 1823-34. The letter from Bencoolen is reprinted as "Bencoolen in 1823," *Memoirs*

of the *Raffles Museum*, No. 4, 1957, Appendix IV, pp. 196-209.

Napier, William. *Independence of the judges in the Straits Settlements and observations on judicial independence in the colonies generally*. London, n.d. 26 pp. This pamphlet was published in 1869 or 1870. Napier was President of the Straits Settlements Association, which was attempting to retain under colonial rule the same degree of independence for the Judges of the Straits which had prevailed under the administration of the Indian Government.

Neubronner, T. "The Tin Mines of Malacca." *JIA*, 1847, I, pp. 77-78.

Newbold, Lieutenant (later Captain) T.J. *Political and Statistical Account of the British Settlements in the Straits of Malacca*. London, 1839. 2 vols., 495 and 508 pp. Newbold had served in the Straits Settlements as a Lieutenant in the Madras Light Infantry. His detailed book was the standard work in the 19th century on Malacca and the Naning War, although it was criticised harshly by contemporary reviewers in the *Singapore Free Press*, 9th July and 16th July 1840, as inaccurate in details of personal observation and reliable only in the many passages taken from more careful authors.

Newbold, T. J. "Account of Sungei Ujong, one of the states in the interior of Malacca." *Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal*, 1835, IV, p. 583.

Newbold, Lieutenant T.J. and Wilson, Maj. Gen. "The Chinese Secret Triad Society of the Tien Ti Hueh." *JRAS*, 1840, VI, pp. 120-158.

Newbold, Captain T.J. "Biographical Memoir of Captain T.J. Newbold, 23rd Madras Light Infantry." *JSBRAS* 1887, No. 19, pp. 142-149. Obituary notices from Indian newspapers in June 1850. Contributed to the *JSBRAS* by W.E. Maxwell.

Norris, George. *Singapore Thirty Years Ago*. Singapore, 1878. 18 pp. A paper read at a meeting of the Mutual Improvement Society on 15th July 1878.

O'Brien, H.A. "Jelevu." *JSBRAS*, 1885, No. 14, pp. 337-343. A history of the constitution of Jelevu prior to

1884 based on Malay Sources, and observations on the state of Jelebu in 1885.

O'Brien, H.A., (Ed.) "An Old Minute by Sir Stamford Raffles," JSBRAS, No. 24, 1891. See under Raffles, Sir T. Stamford, page 393.

Oliphant, L. *Narrative of the Earl of Elgin's Mission to China and Japan in the years 1857, 1858, 1859.* Edinburgh and London, 1859. 2 vols. Contains a description of Penang and Singapore in June 1857, when Elgin visited the Settlements en route to China, and stopped in Singapore to divert his troops to Calcutta to help suppress the Mutiny.

Ong Tae Hae. *The Chinaman abroad: or a desultory account of the Malay Archipelago, particularly of Java.* Translated by W. H. Medhurst. Shanghai, 1849. xv + 80 pp. An account of a journey made by a Chinese scholar in the Dutch East Indies, 1783-93.

Osborn, Capt. Sherard, R. N. *Quedah; or Stray Leaves from a Journal in Malayan Waters.* London, 1857. xvi + 360 pp. Osborn took part in the suppression of the Kedah revolt of 1838.

Osborn, Capt. Sherard. *My Journal in Malayan Waters; or the Blockade of Kedah.* London and New York, 1861. xvi + 360 pp. This is in fact the second edition of *Quedah; or Stray Leaves*, etc., The book was renamed since the term "Quedah" was unfamiliar in England.

Osborn, Capt. Sherard. *Quedah; a cruise in Japanese waters; the fight on the Peiho.* London, 1865. xvi + 535 pp.

Osborne, Alick. *Notes on the present state and prospects of society in New South Wales with an historical, statistical, and topographical account of Manilla and Singapore.* London, 1833. 96 pp.

Oxley, Dr. Thomas. "Gutta Percha." *JIA*, 1847, I, pp. 22-29. Dr. Thomas Oxley was Senior Government Surgeon in Singapore from 1846 until he left the Straits in 1857. He was interested in agriculture, owned one of the largest and best-kept nutmeg plan-

tations in Singapore at that time, and was one of the first people to urge the development of gutta percha.

Oxley, Dr. Thomas. "Some Account of the Nutmeg and its cultivation." *JIA*, 1848, II, pp. 641-660.

Oxley, Dr. Thomas. "Malay Amoks." *JIA*, 1849, III, pp. 532-533.

Oxley, Dr. Thomas. "A Trip to the Moar." *JIA*, 1850, IV, pp. 348-358. Oxley made this journey to Muar territory in March 1850.

Phipps, John. *A guide to the commerce of Bengal for the use of merchants, shipowners, commanders, officers, pursers and others resorting to the East Indies; containing a view of the shipping and external commerce of Bengal*. Calcutta, 1823. 508 pp.

Phipps, John. *A practical treatise on the China and Eastern trade: comprising the commerce of Great Britain and India, particularly Bengal and Singapore, with China and the eastern islands*. Calcutta, 1835. 404 pp.

Phipps, John. *A collection of papers relating to ship-building in India, etc.* Calcutta, 1840. xviii + 264 + xlviii pp.

Pickering, W. A. "The Chinese in the Straits of Malacca," *Fraser's Magazine*, October 1876. Pickering, the first Protector of Chinese in the Straits Settlements, came to Singapore in 1871 and retired in 1889.

Pickering, W. A. "Chinese Secret Societies," part 1, *JSBRAS*, 1878, 1, pp. 63-84. Part 2, *JSBRAS*, 1879, 3, pp. 1-18.

Pickering, W. A. *Early History: Protected Malay States and Mekong Treaty: the Malay Peninsula*. Woking, 1896. 38 pp. Reprint of articles in the *Imperial and Asiatic Quarterly Review*, January and April 1896. Also to be found as Straits Settlements Pamphlet No. 14, Colonial Office Library.

Popham, Sir Home. *A Description of Prince of Wales Island in the Straits of Malacca, with its real and probable advantages and sources to recommend it*

as a marine establishment. London, 1805. 72 pp. Popham called at Penang in 1791 and was much impressed with its harbour.

Presgrave, E. See under Jennings (W.R.), Presgrave (E.), and Lumsdaine (Dr. James), page 376.

Quarterly Review. "Borneo: Eastern Archipelago." *Quarterly Rev.* 1846, LXXVIII, No. 155, pp. 1-23. Composite review article of Keppel's *Expedition to Borneo of H.M.S. "Dido"*, Rev. Brereton's *An Address, with a proposal for the foundation of a church . . . at Sarawak*, etc., G. F. Davidson's *Trade and Travel in the Far East*; and George Windsor Earl's *Enterprise in Tropical Australia*.

Quarterly Review. "Captain Blackwood's Voyage and Survey." *Quarterly Rev.*, 1847, LXXXI, pp. 468-500. A review of Jukes's *Narrative of the Surveying Voyage of H.M.S. "Fly."*

Quarterly Review. "Borneo and Celebes." *Quarterly Rev.*, 1848, LXXXII, pp. 340-359. Review article of Mundy's *Narrative of Events in Borneo and Celebes*, etc. and Low's *Sarawak*, etc.

Quarterly Review. "The Eastern Archipelago." *Quarterly Rev.*, April 1862, CXI, pp. 483-516. Review article of Crawfurd's *Dictionary*, Money's *On Java*, Horace St. John's *Indian Archipelago*, etc.

Raffles, Lady Sophia. *Memoir of the Life and Public Services of Sir Thomas Stamford Raffles: particularly in the Government of Java 1811-1816, and of Bencoolen and its dependencies, 1817-24; with details of the Commerce and Resources of the Eastern Archipelago and Selections from his Correspondence.* London, 1830. xvii + 723 pp. + 100 pp. Appendix and Index. New edition, London 1835. 2 vols. Review articles: *Quarterly Review*, 1830, XLII, pp. 405-450. *Asiatic Journal*, 1830, I (New Series), pp. 295-309.

Raffles, Sir Stamford. "On the tin of the island of Banka", *Transactions of the Royal Geological Society of Cornwall*, Vol. III, 1814.

Raffles, Sir. T. Stamford. *Substance of a minute recorded by the Hon. Thomas Stamford Raffles . . . on the 11th February 1814; on the introduction of an im-*

proved system of internal management and the establishment of a land rental on the island of Java, etc. London, 1814. 293 pp.

Raffles, Sir T. Stamford. *The memorial of the Hon. Thomas Stamford Raffles to the Hon. the Court of Directors of the East India Company.* London, 1816. 51 pp.

Raffles, Sir T. Stamford. *The History of Java.* London, 1817. 2 vols. 536 pp., and 332 pp. + 179 pp. Appendices. Review article: *Edinburgh Review*, 1819, XXXI, pp. 395-413, (by John Crawfurd).

Raffles, Sir T. Stamford. *Statement of the services of Sir Stamford Raffles.* London November 1824. 73 pp.

Raffles, Sir T. Stamford. "Sir Thomas Stamford Raffles, 1781-1826." *Gentlemen's Magazine*, July 1826, pp. 77-86. An obituary notice.

Raffles, Sir. T. Stamford. "The Founding of Singapore." *JSBRAS*, 1878, 2, pp. 175-182. Copy of a letter from Raffles to Colonel Addenbrooke dated Singapore, 10th June 1819 and presented to Raffles Museum in 1878.

Raffles, Sir T. Stamford. "The Maritime Code of the Malays." *JSBRAS*, 1879, 3, pp. 62-84; pp. 143-144.^o *JSBRAS*, 1879, 4, pp. 1-20. A corrected version of a translation made by Raffles of the more important passages of the Malacca Maritime Code with additional notes by Raffles himself. Raffles published a slightly different (and more correct) version of this translation in *Asiatic Researches*, London, 1809. The inferior version appeared anonymously as a series of papers in the *Malacca Weekly Register* from 9th January to 3rd September 1840. In 1877 D.F.A. Hervey had a few copies printed privately of the Code as it appeared in the *Malacca Weekly Register*. It is presumed that the Editor of the *Weekly Register* used an uncorrected draft of Raffles's translation.

Raffles, Sir T. Stamford. "An Old Minute by Sir Stamford Raffles." (Ed.) H.A. O'Brien. *JSBRAS*, 1891, 24, pp. 1-12. A Proclamation and Minute by Raffles dated June 1823, giving instructions concerning the appointment of magistrates and administration of the law in early Singapore.

Read, W. H. (Ed.) *Singapore water supply: copies of sundry papers and letters relative to the supply of water to the town of Singapore taken from Municipal and other records, 1859-79.* Singapore, 1879. 37 pp.

William Henry Read, (1819-1909), who arrived in Singapore in 1841, played a prominent part in politics, commercial and social life. He led the agitation in Singapore for the Transfer of the Straits Settlements to the Colonial Office, and after 1867 became the first Unofficial Member in the new Legislative Council. He retired to England in 1887 but continued his interest in the Straits until his death.

Read, W.H. *Play and Politics: Reminiscences of Malaya. By an Old Resident.* London, 1901. 178 pp. This book is a collection of stories designed originally to amuse Read's young nephews and nieces. Written towards the close of his long life, it contains much that is trivial and inaccurate, and is a disappointing legacy of a man who had been so influential in mid-nineteenth century Singapore.

Ritchie, L. *The British World in the East: a guide historical, moral and commercial to India, Australia, South Africa and the other possessions or connections of Great Britain in the Eastern and Southern Seas.* London, 1847. 2 vols., 500 and 512 pp.

Ross, John Dill. *The Capital of a Little Empire: a descriptive study of a British Crown Colony in the Far East; Singapore and the Straits Settlements.* Singapore, 1898. 71 pp. A reprint from articles in the *Singapore Free Press*. This booklet appears as Pamphlet No. 16 in the Straits Settlements Pamphlet collection in the Colonial Office Library.

Ross, John Dill. *Sixty Years: Life and Adventure in the Far East.* First edition, London, 1911. 2nd edition 1912. 2 vols. xv + 364 pp. and xi + 411 pp.

Rost, R. (Ed.) *Miscellaneous Papers relating to Indo-China, 1886 and 1887.* See under Indo-China, Miscellaneous Papers, page 375.

St. John, Horace. *The Indian Archipelago: its History and Present State.* London, 1853. 2 vols. 393 and 359 pp. Horace St. John was the brother of Spenser St. John who lived for many years in Borneo.

Horace St. John's work is based on a careful study of books and papers, including the *Journal of the Indian Archipelago* and the *Singapore Free Press*. In his second volume he describes the state of Borneo as it then was, and gives a useful account of piracy. He has little to say about the Straits Settlements. Review article: *Eclectic Review*, June 1853, pp. 677-694.

- St. John, (later Sir) Spenser. "Piracy in the Indian Archipelago." *JIA*, 1849, III, pp. 251-260. St. John became Secretary to Sir James Brooke in Sarawak in 1848. He was appointed British Consul-General in Borneo in 1855 and served also in Labuan.
- St. John, (later Sir) Spenser. "The Population of the Indian Archipelago." *JIA*, 1849, III, pp. 379-384.
- St. John, Sir Spenser. *Life in the Forests of the Far East*. London, 1862. 2 vols. 400 and 420 pp. This work deals with Borneo and Sulu and is based on St. John's own diaries and those of Hugh Low.
- St. John, Sir Spenser. "Observations on the N.W. coast of Borneo." *Journal of the Royal Geographical Society*, 1862, XXXII, pp. 217-34.
- St. John, Sir Spenser. *The Life of Sir James Brooke (from his personal papers and correspondence)*. Edinburgh and London, 1879. xi + 406 pp. A very painstaking account, sympathetic to Brooke and written eleven years after his death.
- St. John, Sir Spenser. *Rajah Brooke: the Englishman as ruler of an Eastern state*. London, 1899. xxiv + 302 pp.
- Salmond, Capt. F. "Diary of a Journey across the island of Sumatra from Fort Marlborough to Palembang in 1818." *Malayan Miscellanies*, 1822, III, Item 3. Reprinted in *Memoirs of the Raffles Museum*, No. 4, 1957, as Appendix I, pp. 159-166.
- Schlegel, Gustave. *Thian Ti Hwui: the Hung League*. Batavia, 1866. 253 pp. Schlegel was Chinese interpreter to the Netherlands Indies Government. This work was based on Chinese books of laws, statutes, secret society oaths, etc., captured at Padang in Sumatra in 1863, together with much other informa-

tion gathered in Java, and Milne's work on the Triad. The first account in English of the origins and history of the Triad in China.

Scott, James. "The Settlement of Penang: by James Scott." (Ed.) K.J. Fielding. *JMBRAS*, 1955, XXVIII, (1), pp. 37-51. Scott's despatch to Dundas December 1794.

"Scrutator." *Borneo Revelations: a series of letters on the Sereban and Sakarran Dyaks and the Rajah Brooke*. Singapore, 1850. v + 58 pp. A collection of letters written to the *Straits Times* by "Scrutator" October — December 1850 denouncing Brooke's campaign against the Dyaks. Published by the Straits Times Press, with the demand for a public enquiry.

Seah U Chin. "The Chinese in Singapore: general sketch of the numbers, tribes and avocations of the Chinese in Singapore." *JIA*, 1848, II, pp. 283-89. These are answers given by Seah U Chin to questions put by Dr. Oxley. Seah U Chin, who came to Singapore from Swatow in 1823 and died there in 1883, made a fortune in gambier and was reputed to be one of the most powerful Chinese in Singapore. In 1850 he headed the deputation of Chinese merchants who waited on Lord Dalhousie.

Singapore. *Defences of Singapore*. Singapore, 1885. 57 pp. A series of articles reprinted from the *Singapore Free Press*.

Singapore Review and Monthly Magazine, 1861. *Singapore Review and Straits Magazine*, 1862. There are many small notices and short articles containing information of interest. The most important article is a reprint of Peter Lund Simmonds' "The Trade and Commerce of the Eastern Archipelago," *Singapore Review and Monthly Magazine*, 1861, I, (4) - (6), pp. 301-326. See also the following:- "Chinese Protestant Catechists," *Singapore Review* etc., 1861, I, (1) pp. 44-45. "Great Britain in the Eastern Archipelago," *Singapore Review*, etc., 1861, I, (2) pp. 131-134. "Local matters: the Straits Settlements must become an independent colony," *Singapore Review*, etc. 1861, I, (3), pp. 197-198. "The Straits Transfer question," *Ibid*, p. 199. "Water supply for Singapore", *Singapore Review*, etc., 1861, I, (4) - (6), pp. 361-366. "The farewell Entertainment to Sir James Brooke, K.C.B., Rajah of

Sarawak", *Singapore Review*, etc., 1862, II, (1), pp. 4-12. "Cocoanut Cultivation", *Singapore Review*, etc., 1862, II, (1), pp. 25-26. "The Transfer of the Straits Settlements", *Singapore Review*, etc., 1862, II, (1), p. 84. "Singapore as an agricultural colony", *Singapore Review*, etc., 1862, (2), pp. 144-147.

Smith, G. H. "Abstract of a paper on opium smoking in Penang." *Chinese Repository*, 1842, XI, (11), pp. 587-591. Smith was a surgeon in Penang. This extract is taken from an article he contributed to *Johnson's Medico-Chirurgical Review*, April 1842.

Stockdale, J. *Sketches, civil and military of the island of Java and its immediate dependencies: comprising interesting details of Batavia*, etc. London, 1811. 406 pp.

Straits Settlements Pamphlets. A collection of various pamphlets on the Straits Settlements gathered into one volume in the Colonial Office Library. The pamphlets are listed separately under authors' names in this Bibliography.

Stronach, Rev. Alexander. "A general view of what are regarded by the Chinese as objects of worship." *JIA*, 1848, II, pp. 349-352. Written in Amoy in April 1848.

Swettenham, (later Sir) Frank. "Some account of the Independent Native States of the Malay Peninsula," Part 1. *JSBRAS*, 1880, 6, pp. 161-202. Part 1 deals with the period up to June 1875.

Sir Frank Athelstane Swettenham, (1850-1946), who came to the Straits Settlements as a cadet in 1870, was sent on a mission to Perak in 1874, appointed Resident General of the Federated Malay States in 1896 and Governor of the Straits Settlements in 1901. He retired in 1904.

Swettenham, (Sir) Frank. *Malay Sketches*. London 1895. Sketches and stories of Malay life as observed by Swettenham. Useful for a picture of the Malay states before the spread of British influence.

Swettenham, Sir Frank. *British Malaya: an account of the origin and progress of British influence in Malaya*. London, 1907. Latest revised edition, London, 1948. 354 pp.

Swettenham, Sir Frank. "Sir Frank Swettenham's Perak Journals, 1874-1876." (Ed.) C. D. Cowan. *JMBRAS*, 1951, XXIV, (4), 148 pp.

Symes, Michael. *An account of an Embassy to the Kingdom of Ava, sent by the Governor General of India in the year 1795*. London, 1800. xxiii + 503 pp.

Symes, Michael. *Michael Symes: Journal of his Second Embassy to the Court of Ava in 1802*. (Ed.) D. G. E. Hall. London, 1955. vi + 270 pp.

Templer, J. C. (Ed.) *The Private Letters of Sir James Brooke, etc.* London, 1853. See under Brooke, Sir James, section L, page 341.

Thomson, J. *The Straits of Malacca, Indo-China and China; or Ten Years Travels, Adventures and Residence abroad*. London, 1875. xv + 546 pp. Thomson first left England for the East in 1862. His main purpose in writing this book was to describe China and the need for opening up her trade, but the first three chapters concern the Straits.

Thomson, J. Turnbull. "General report on the residency of Singapore, drawn up principally with a view of illustrating its agricultural statistics." *JIA*, 1849, III, pp. 618-628; pp. 744-755. *JIA*, 1850, IV, pp. 27-41; pp. 102-106; pp. 134-143; pp. 206-219. Thomson was an uncovenanted official of the East India Company and a bitter critic of its Covenanted Service. As Government Surveyor in the Straits Settlements from 1841 to 1854, he was responsible for the construction of many of Singapore's buildings, including the Horsburgh Lighthouse.

Thomson, J. Turnbull. "Description of the Eastern coast of Johore and Pahang, and adjacent islands." *JIA*, 1851, V, pp. 85-92; pp. 136-154.

Thomson, J. Turnbull. "Account of the Horsburgh Lighthouse." *JIA*, 1852, VI, pp. 376-498.

Thomson, J. Turnbull. *The Water supply of Singapore*. Singapore, 1853.

Thomson, J. Turnbull. *Some Glimpses into Life in the Far East*. London, 1864. xi + 332 pp. A vivid if cynical picture of social life in the 1830s and 1840s.

Thomson, J. Turnbull. *Sequel to Some Glimpses into Life in the Far East*. London, 1865. xli + 313 pp.

Thomson, J. Turnbull. *Translations from the Hikayat Abdullah bin Abdul Kadir, Munshi*. See under Abdullah, Munshi, pages 356-357.

Thomson, J. Turnbull. "A Sketch of the Career of the the late James Richardson Logan of Penang and Singapore." *JSBRAS*, 1881, 7, pp. 75-81.

Thorn, Major William. *Memoir of the conquest of Java; with the subsequent operations of the British forces in the Oriental Archipelago. To which is subjoined a statistical and historical sketch of Java, etc.* London, 1815. xxiv + 369 pp.

Thornton, Edward. *Gazeteer of the territories under the Government of the East India Company*. London, 1858. 1015 pp.

Thornton, Thomas. (Ed.) *Milburn's Oriental Commerce, or the East Indian Traders' Complete Guide*. 2nd edition revised extensively. London, 1825. Extract on "Singapore, 1823-24" in *Memoirs of the Raffles Museum*, No. 4, Appendix VI, pp. 213-220.

Tomlin, J. *Missionary Journal and letters written during eleven years residence and travels amongst the Chinese, Siamese, Javanese, Khassias and other nations*. London, 1844. xxiv + 384 pp.

Topping, Michael. "Some account of Kedah." *JIA*, 1850, IV, pp. 42-44. Derived chiefly from information of Francis Light. Reprinted in *Miscellaneous Papers relating to Indo-China*, I, 1886, 1st series, pp. 1-4.

Train, G. F. *The Merchant Abroad*. London, 1857. Letters from an American merchant who visited Singapore in December 1855.

Trapaud, Elisha. *A short Account of the Prince of Wales' Island or Pulo Penang in the East Indies*. London, 1788. 34 pp., with engravings of early Penang. Trapaud, a Captain in the Madras Engineers, was impressed with the potentialities of Penang as a trading centre and a British base.

Travers, Thomas Otho. "The Journal of Thomas Otho Travers, 1813-1830." (Ed.) John Bastin. *Memoirs of Raffles Museum*, No. 4, 1957, pp. 1-156. Extracts from the journal of Travers who was A.D.C. to Raffles in Java.

Tyerman, Rev. D., and Bennet, Rev. G. *Voyages and travels round the world*. London, 1840. Visits to missionary settlements, including Singapore, in the late 1830s. Review: *Asiatic Journal*, 1831, V, (New Series), pp. 199-206.

United Service Journal, and *Naval and Military Magazine*. "Oriental Pirates." *United Service Journal*, etc., September 1835, pp. 31-42.

United Service Journal, etc. "A Midshipman's Reminiscences." *United Service Journal*, 1835, XIX, (3), pp. 358-362; *United Service Journal*, 1836, XX, (1), pp. 73-84, 217-223, 355-360, 490-497. Only the last section on "The Malays of the Indian Archipelago" is directly applicable.

United Service Journal, etc. "The Malay Pirates; with a sketch of their system and territory." *United Service Journal*, April 1837, pp. 458-465.

United Service Journal, etc. "Colonisation of the Eastern Archipelago." *United Service Journal*, July 1837, pp. 328-335.

Urmston, Sir James Brabazon. *Observations on the China trade and on the importance and advantages of removing it from Canton to some other part of the coast of that Empire*. London, 1833, vii + 149 pp. Urmston was formerly President of the East India Company's factory in Canton.

Vaughan, J. D. "Notes on the Chinese of Penang." *JIA*, 1854, VIII, pp. 1-27. Vaughan joined the Bengal Marine in 1842 as a midshipman and served in China during the First Opium War. After the War he took part in the campaign to suppress piracy in the China Seas and Borneo, was appointed commander of the East India Company's steamer in the Straits Settlements and later became Superintendent of Police at Penang. In 1856 he became Master Attendant of Singapore, and from 1861 to 1869 was Assistant Magistrate of Singapore. He then retired to study

law and practised as a lawyer in the Straits until his death in 1891.

Vaughan, J. D. "Notes on the Malays of Penang and Province Wellesley." *JIA*, 1857-58, II (New Series), pp. 115-175.

Vaughan, J. D. *The Manners and Customs of the Chinese of the Straits Settlements*. Singapore, 1879. 119 pp. An expansion of his paper in the *Journal of the Indian Archipelago* in 1854, listed above. Vaughan was favourably impressed with the Chinese as settlers.

Wallace, Captain Alexander. *Piratical Seizure of the Brig "Admiral Trowbridge" by part of her crew while lying at anchor off the island of Sooloo, August 21st 1807*, London, n.d. 28 pp. The narrative first appeared in the *Prince of Wales Island Gazette*, January 1808.

Wallace, Alfred Russell. "On the Physical Geography of the Malay Archipelago." *Journal of the Royal Geographical Society*, 1863, XXXIII, pp. 217-234.

Wallace, Alfred Russell. *The Malay Archipelago: a narrative of travel with studies of man and nature*. London, 1869. 653 pp. Wallace returned to England from his expedition in 1862. The work describes Singapore as seen during several visits made between 1854 and 1862, and also gives a description of Malacca and Mount Ophir.

Walrond, T. *Letters and Journals of James, 8th Earl of Elgin*. London, 1872. xii + 467 pp. Elgin stayed in Singapore in 1857 when as leader of the expedition to China he decided to divert his troops to help quell the Indian Mutiny.

Ward, T. "Short Sketch of the geology of Pulo Pinang and the neighbouring islands." *Asiatic Researches*, 1833, XVIII, (2), pp. 149-168. Reprinted in *Miscellaneous Papers relating to Indo-China*, 1886. Vol. I, pp. 201-215.

Wathen, J. *Journal of a voyage in 1811 and 1812 to Madras and China in the H.C.S. "The Hope," Captain James Pendergrass*. London, 1814. xx + 246 pp. Containing a description of Penang.

Watson, Lt. Thomas. "Journal of a tour in the Island of Java." *Asiatic Journal and Monthly Register*, 1816, I.

Welsh, Col. James. *Military Reminiscences extracted from a journal of nearly forty years' active service in the East Indies*. London, 1830. 2 vols. 354 and 347 pp. Colonel Welsh joined the Madras Regiment in 1791. His book contains a description of Penang and Malacca which he visited in 1818 en route for China.

Westerhout, J. B. "Notes on Malacca." *JIA*, 1848, II, pp. 171-173. Westerhout was at that time Assistant Resident Councillor of Malacca.

Wilkes, Admiral Charles. *Narrative of the United States Exploring Expedition during the years 1838, 1839, 1840, 1841, 1842*. First published Philadelphia, 1845, in 5 volumes. New edition, London, 1852, 2 vols. x + 318 pp., xii + 326 pp. Wilkes, who was in command of this American expedition to the Eastern Archipelago, gives descriptions which are often wildly exaggerated and the inaccuracy of his account of Singapore was attacked in *Singapore Free Press*, 22nd October 1846.

Wilkie, Lt. Col. "British Colonies considered as Military Posts." *United Service Journal*, June 1841, pp. 204-218. The latter half of this article concerns Penang and Malacca.

Wray, Leonard. *The practical sugar planter; a complete account of the cultivation and manufacture of the sugar cane, according to the latest and most improved processes. Describing and comparing the different systems pursued in the East and West Indies and the Straits of Malacca, and the relative expenses and advantages attendant upon each: being the result of 16 years' experience as a sugar planter in those countries*. London, 1848. 318 pp.

Yap Ah Loy. "English translation of extracts from a record made in Chinese by Yap Ah Loy relating to the Wars in Selangor before the year 1874." *Journal of the South Seas Society*, 1957, XIII, (1), pp. 1-13. Yap Ah Loy came to Malaya about 1854 and died in Kuala Lumpur in 1885. As Captain China in Kuala Lumpur, he was the most influential Selangor Chinese of his day.

Yvan, Dr. *Six Months among the Malays and a year in China*. London, 1855. 368 pp. Almost half the book

is devoted to descriptions of Malacca, Singapore and Penang, but consists of wildly incredible travellers' tales. Buckley gives a scathing review in his *Anecdotal History*, II, p. 469.

S. OTHER PRINTED WORKS.

Allen, G. C., and Donnithorne, A. G. *Western Enterprise in Indonesia and Malaya: a study in Economic Development*. New York and London, 1957. 321 pp.

Aspinall, A. *Cornwallis in Bengal....The Administrative and Judicial reforms of Lord Cornwallis in Bengal, together with accounts of the commercial expansion of the East India Company, 1786-1793, and of the foundation of Penang, 1786-1793*. Manchester, 1931. xv + 210 pp.

Baker, A. C. *Anglo-Dutch relations in the East at the beginning of the 19th century*. See under Baker, A.C., Section L, page 340.

Baring-Gould, S., and Bampfylde, C.A. *A History of Sarawak under its Two White Rajahs, 1839-1908*. London, 1909. 464 pp. Bampfylde was at one time Resident of Sarawak and a friend of Charles Brooke who handed over all his correspondence to him to produce this book in collaboration with Baring-Gould.

Barnes, Warren D. "Singapore Old Straits and New Harbour." *JSBRAS*, 1911, 60, pp. 25-34.

Bartley, W. "The Population of Singapore in 1819." *JMBRAS*, 1933, XI, (2), page 177.

Bastin, John. "Sir Stamford Raffles's and John Crawfurd's ideas of colonising the Malay Archipelago." *JMBRAS*, 1953, XXVI, (1), pp. 81-85.

Bastin, John. "Stamford Raffles and Napoleon." *Malaya*, 1952, I, (11), pp. 39-41.

Bastin, John. "Malayan Portraits: Sir Stamford Raffles." *Malaya*, 1953, II, (5), pp. 273-274.

Bastin, John. *Raffles's ideas on the Land rent System in Java*. 's-Gravenhage, Netherlands, 1954. xii + 193 pp.

- Bastin, John. "Raffles and British Policy in the Indian Archipelago, 1811-1816." *JMBRAS*, 1954, XXVII, (1), pp. 84-119.
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- Blake, George. *The Ben Line: the History of William Thomson & Co. of Leith and Edinburgh, and of the ships owned and managed by them, 1825-1955*. London, 1956. 222 pp.
- Blake, George. *B.I. Centenary, 1856-1956*. London, 1956. 272 pp. A history of the British India Steam Navigation Company.
- Blythe, W. L. "Historical sketch of Chinese Labour in Malaya." *JMBRAS*, 1947, XX, (1), pp. 64-114. Written in 1941, this article gives a concise comprehensive account up to 1940. Reprinted as a pamphlet, Singapore 1953, 38 pp.
- Bogaars, George. "The effect of the opening of the Suez Canal on the trade and development of Singapore." *JMBRAS*, 1955, XXVIII, (1), pp. 99-143.
- Bogaars, George. "The Tanjong Pagar Dock Company, 1864-1905." *Memoirs of the Raffles Museum*, No. 3, 1956, pp. 117-266.
- Boulger, (Sir) Demetrius C. *The Life of Sir Stamford Raffles*, London, 1897. xv + 403 pp.
- Braddell, (later Dato Sir) Roland. *The Law of the Straits Settlements: a Commentary*. 1st published, 2 vols., Singapore, 1915. 2nd edition, 2 vols, Singapore, 1931 and 1932, xiv + 354, and xxx + 608 pp.
- Braddell, (Dato Sir) Roland. *The Lights of Singapore*. London, 1934. Latest edition 1947. 205 pp. Mainly about 20th century Malaya, but the penultimate chapter concerns the disputes over the administration of justice early in the 19th century.
- Braddell, Dato Sir Roland. (Ed.) *An Essex Sailor*, 1959. See under Kirby, John Roberts, page 378.

Braddell, (Dato Sir Roland). See also under Makepeace (W.), Brooke (G.S.), and Braddell (R. St. J.), (Eds.), page 415.

Brooke, G. S. See under Makepeace (W), Brooke (G.S.), and Braddell (R. St. J.), (Eds.), page 415.

Brooke, Sylvia, Ranees of Sarawak. *The Three White Rajas*. London, 1939. 304 pp.

Buckley, C.B. *An Anecdotal History of Old Times in Singapore; from the foundation of the Settlement under the Hon. the East India Company on February 6th 1819 to the Transfer to the Colonial Office as part of the Colonial Possessions of the Crown on April 1st 1867*. Singapore, 1902. 2 vols. 812 pp. (continuous pagination). Buckley came to Singapore in 1864 on the advice of W. H. Read. In 1884 he refounded the *Singapore Free Press*, which had ceased publication in 1869, and from that time until he gave the paper up in 1887, Buckley printed articles on the early history of Singapore prior to 1856, largely taken from the early files of the *Free Press*. When he decided to publish these in book form and to bring the story up to 1867, he altered the originals in the the light of comments from W. H. Read, James Guthrie, and others. Relying thus on the memory and prejudice of old men, Buckley's book contains more inaccuracies than his original newspaper articles, and his judgment must be accepted with caution as a friend and supporter of Read. The book suffers too from Buckley's decision not to quote his references. For a review of Buckley's *Anecdotal History*, see C. A. Gibson-Hill, *JMBRAS*, 1954. XXVII, (1), pp. 235-243.

Bucknill, J. A. "Observations upon the coinage struck for the British East India Company's settlement of Penang or Prince of Wales Island, 1786-1828." *Journal and Proceedings of the Asiatic Society of Bengal*, 1924, XX (New Series), (4), pp. 1-38. Reprinted as Numismatic Supplement No. XXXVIII (for 1924), Article No. 247. "Supplementary observation upon the coinage, etc." *Journal and Proceedings of the Asiatic Society of Bengal*, 1925, XXI (New Series), pp. 23-32.

Burkill, I. H. (Ed.) *William Jack's Letters to Nathaniel Wallich, 1819-21*, 1916. See under Burkill, I. H. (Ed.), Section L, page 341.

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