

(第一號)

印度總理尼赫魯在印度國大黨大會上關於印度 外交政策的演說 (節錄)

一九五三年一月十七日

INDIAN PRIME MINISTER JAWAHARLAL NEHRU'S SPEECH ON INDIAN FOREIGN POLICY AT INDIAN NATIONAL CONGRESS SESSION (EXCERPTS)

January 17, 1953

我們自己的任務已夠消磨我們所有的精力了。但是我們自己不能選擇自己的命運。自由獨立的印度不能逃避或忽視它對於世界的責任，或作為國際社會一員的責任；世界也不能忽視它，或免去它的這種責任。有着一種無可逃避的命運，使印度為環境所迫，甚至違背了它自己的願望，去接受這種命運並且努力符合它的要求。

在今日的世界裏，各國、各民族間存在着許多不和、磨擦和衝突；危險地缺乏一種均衡的局勢。我們經常面對着不祥的戰爭的魅影和日益擴張的軍備。恐懼支配着人們的思想和各國的政策，而且世界上的資源已大部分被充為準備戰爭、或從另一方面看來是反對戰爭之用。

古老的帝國在民族主義前進的浪潮下垮台了或沒落了。新的國家誕生出來並且日益壯大起來了。這種事實還不易為一般習慣於業已消逝的舊世界的人所了解或理會。他們不顧事實，而力圖與之對抗。雖明擺着帝國主義與殖民主義的命運已經註定，爭取民族自由的要求與決心是不可壓服的，若干殖民國家至今對於帝國的殘餘還死抱住不放。我們是站在那些像我們在過去所做的一樣爭取祖國獨立的人們一起。

我們的外交政策是以和一切國家維持友好關係及不干涉他國事務為基礎的。保持這一政策決不是容易的事；特別是在這時候，在世界上憎恨和互忌是如此之多，任何國家的一舉一動都會引起猜疑，保持這個政策尤其是不容易。不過，我很高興地說，我們現在和其他國家的關係是良好的。

Our own tasks are heavy enough to absorb all our energy and strength. But we cannot choose our destiny. India, free and independent, cannot escape or ignore her responsibilities to the world or as a member of the comity of nations. Nor will the world ignore her or exempt her from such responsibilities. There is something of the inevitability of destiny in the way India is compelled by circumstances even against our wishes to accept that destiny and try to live up to it.

In the world today there is much disharmony, friction and conflict between nations and races. There is a menacing lack of equilibrium. The ominous spectre of war and mounting armaments are ever before us. Fear dominates men's minds and the policies of nations and the resources of the world are disproportionately allocated to the preparation for or against war according to how one looks at it.

Old empires fell before the advancing tide of nationalism or faded away. New countries came into existence and grew in strength and power. This fact was not easily understood or appreciated by people used to the old world which had passed away. They ignored the facts and tried to struggle against them. Even now some colonial powers cling on to the remnants of their empires though it is patent that imperialism and colonialism are doomed and that urges and determination to win national freedom cannot be put down. Our place is with those who, like ourselves in the past, seek freedom of their motherland.

Our foreign policy is based on friendly relations with all countries and no interference with any. It is never easy to sustain such a policy and more especially when there is so much bitterness and mutual suspicion in the world and when every move by any one party is suspect. Nevertheless, I am happy to say that our relations with other countries are good.

我們始終認為和巴基斯坦建立並保持友好合作的關係是十分要緊的。這是對雙方有利益，並可為世界樹立一個睦鄰的榜樣，同時也是對和平本身的一個貢獻。

我們現在是處於一個所謂冷戰的時代，這種冷戰而且隨時可能發展到更為惡化的地步。在這個充滿衝突的世界中，唯有我們自身的實力才可以保證我們的安全與自由。這種實力最後又將視國家與人民的經濟情況而定。五年計劃就是對這時勢的挑戰的一個答覆，它的成敗將決定印度能否繼續存在作一個大國。

我們談論着戰爭的可能性，而事實上戰爭是正在世界各地——朝鮮、越南和其他各處——進行着。雖然從世界觀點來看這些戰爭的範圍是有限的，但確已是夠嚴重的了。

大家都知道，我們對於促進和平極為關切，我們既未曾試圖干涉別人，又從來不想擔任一個引人注目的角色。但是在過去的長時期中，我們曾不聲不響而始終如一地設法對緩和遠東緊張局勢和減輕世界戰爭威脅有所幫助。不幸的是，過去三四年中遠東所發生的重大變化還未能為很多人所充分了解，他們仍力圖保持已不復存在的舊世界的觀念。

中國出現為一個強大、統一和舉足輕重的國家，已完全改變了遠東的均勢，並在某種程度上改變了世界的均勢。中國的革命並不是突然的發展。這個革命已有將近四十年的歷史，在這時期中這個偉大的國家受盡了外國侵略與內戰的苦難。若干國家不承認中國人民政府，就是拒絕正視這一時代中一件重大和明顯的事實。這種拒絕已逐漸招致嚴重的後果。對這個新中國若不給予完全的承認，在遠東絕不可能有一個最後的解決。

在上屆聯合國大會中，我們曾以我們的名義提出一個有關朝鮮戰爭的提案。此項提案最後曾以一種大多數通過，所不幸的是蘇聯和中國兩個大國都未予接受。結果，朝鮮的僵局仍然繼續。

We have always held that it is essential to establish and maintain friendly and co-operative relations with Pakistan. This is in our mutual interest and would be an example to the world of good neighbourly relations and contribution to peace itself.

We live in an age of what is called cold war which at any moment may develop into something worse. In this world of conflict the only guarantee of our safety and our freedom is our own strength. That strength ultimately depends upon the economic condition of the country and of the people. The five-year plan is an answer to the challenge of the times and on its success depends our survival as a great nation.

We talk of the possibility of war but as a matter of fact wars are going on in various parts of the world—in Korea, in Indo-China and elsewhere. They are serious enough though from the world point of view they may be limited in scope.

As you know we have been intensely interested in the promotion of peace. We have not tried to interfere and we have no desire to play a dramatic role. But quietly and persistently for a long time past we have sought to help in some way so that the tension in the Far East might be relieved and the threat of world war might lessen. Unfortunately major changes that have taken place in the Far East during the last three or four years have not been fully appreciated yet by many people who still try to hold on to their conception of a world that no longer exists.

The emergence of China as a great, unified and vital country has completely changed the balance of power in the Far East and to some extent in the world. The revolution in China was no sudden development. That revolution had nearly forty years of history behind it during which period this great country suffered from invasion and civil war. Non-recognition by some countries of this new People's Government of China was the refusal to see one of the major and obvious facts of the age. That refusal has led step by step to grave consequences. There cannot be any final settlement in the Far East without full recognition of this New China.

During the last session of the General Assembly a Resolution was put forward on our behalf in regard to the Korean War. That Resolution was ultimately passed by a very great majority but unfortunately two great countries, China and the Soviet Union, did not accept it. And the result is that the deadlock in Korea continues.

我們的提案是想提出一個打破這種僵局的建議。它不是什麼命令，而完全是根據常被提到的日內瓦公約的。此中沒有承認戰俘的自願遣返，也不發生戰俘被詢問是否願意回家的問題。

該提案並未承認戰俘具有適用於政治難民的避難權利，也沒有提出甄別戰俘的辦法。它保證所有戰俘在一中立地區從拘留一方的看管下被釋放出來。所有規定都從這些戰俘會回到他們本國的假定出發的。事實上戰俘一經從拘留中釋放出來，遣返工作便將立即開始。

該提案並說，如有一方的個別戰俘不願從中立區回到他的本國，對他不得、也並無義務、施用武力。這是完全符合日內瓦公約的，因為公約並沒有規定可以不顧戰俘的反對，而把一個戰俘的身體送交對方。

我不願為這個提案作辯論。我們的目的是要較量法律上的細枝末節，而是要幫助達到一個解決。我們做了一番真正的努力，但是失敗了。

不過，我想我們在過去雖然失敗了，但是我們的努力還是有益的，今後或許可以導致較好的結果。就我們一方面而論，凡是促進和平的事，我們都極願為之盡力。

在大國之間進行着冷戰的時候，在非洲發展着一種極似種族戰爭的東西。南非政府的政策，就其對祖籍印度的人民而論，是為我們所反對的。這種政策愈益加深了種族歧視，並加強了一個種族對其他種族的統治。

這種運動在南非越來越普遍，非洲人為運動中的主幹。這運動是依照多年前甘地在南非當地所發明的辦法和平地進行着。

正當南非進行消極抵抗的時候，在東非又有一種很不相同的情勢在發展中。在那裏，一面是恐怖性的暴動，另一面是嚴厲而普遍的鎮壓。

非常遺憾的是，在佳尼亞有一些人採取了暴力的方法，這對於他們的事業有百害而無一利。他們

Our Resolution was meant as a proposal to show a way out of this deadlock. It was no mandate and it was based entirely on the Geneva Convention about which so much has been said. It did not recognize voluntary repatriation of the prisoners nor was there any question of the prisoners being asked whether they wish to return or decline to do so.

It did not recognize the right of asylum for the prisoners of war which applies to political refugees. There was to be no screening of prisoners. It ensured that all prisoners would be released from the custody of the detaining side and in a neutral territory. The presumption was that they would go back to their country of origin. In fact repatriation would have begun as soon as these prisoners were released from detention.

The Resolution did say that if an individual prisoner of either side refused to go over to his country from the neutral zone, force would not be used or be obliged to be used against him. This is fully in accordance with the Geneva Convention which does not lay down the obligation to lift a prisoner of war physically and put him on the other side in spite of his opposition.

I do not wish to argue about this resolution. Our purpose was not to raise legal quibbles but to help in arriving at a settlement. We made an honest attempt and we failed.

I think, however, that even though we failed then our attempt did some good and may perhaps lead to a more fruitful result later. So far as we are concerned, we shall gladly help in every effort which might lead to peace.

While there is cold war between great nations there is also something very much like race war developing in Africa. The policy of the South African Government has been opposed by us in so far as the people of India origin are concerned. That policy has progressively emphasized racial discrimination and indeed overlordship of one race over another.

The movement in South Africa has now become widespread and Africans are taking a leading part in it. It is being carried on peacefully in accordance with the technique discovered by Gandhiji in South Africa itself long years ago.

While the passive resistance is taking place in South Africa, in East Africa a very different situation has developed. On the one side there has been terroristic outrages on the other severe and widespread repression.

I am exceedingly sorry that some people in Kenya have resorted to methods of violence which can only do them harm and will not strengthen

受苦已經很久，我很能體會他們的受挫和失望的情緒，但是他們不會因採用暴力的方法而能有所成就。另一方面，一味高壓也決不能解決非洲的問題。更嚴重的危險是一種具有「種族戰爭」性質的事態將繼續發展，並將帶來災難。

我懇切希望對這些問題能有一個較有明智而積極的解決途徑。必須明白認識：任何以種族不平等或種族壓制為基礎的主義是不能被長久容忍下去的。如果一個民族企圖統治另一民族，或是一個國家企圖統治另一國家，世界上就不會有和平。

(譯自一九五三年一月十九日「印度新聞」)

their cause in any way. They have suffered long and I can understand their feeling of utter frustration and despair. But they will not achieve anything by methods of violence. On the other hand repression will never solve the problem of Africa and the grave danger is that something in the nature of a race war will develop and bring disaster in its train.

I earnestly hope that a wiser and more positive approach to these problems will be made. It must be understood quite clearly that no doctrine based on racial inequality or racial suppression can be tolerated for long. There will be no peace in the world if one race tries to dominate over another or one country over another.

(India News, January 19, 1953)

(第二號)

邁耶[●]提請法國國民議會批准「歐洲防務集團條約」 及「契約性條約」的說明(節錄)

一九五三年一月二十八日

LES PRINCIPAUX EXTRAITS D'EXPOSÉ DE RENÉ MAYER DÉPOSES AU L'ASSEMBLÉE NATIONALE, CONCERNANT LA RATIFICATION DES ACCORDS CONTRACTUELS ET DU TRAITÉ CRÉANT LA COM- MUNAUTÉ EUROPÉENNE DE DÉFENSE

28, Janvier, 1953

契約性協定、建立歐洲防務集團的條約和所附議定書和照會，構成一種不可分割的整體。契約性協定的實施是以歐洲防務集團條約的實施為條件的。它們構成一種相互聯繫的體系，其複雜性正說明了所面臨的史無前例的局勢的要求。

這種局勢不僅不符合於一種政治理想，而且也不符合於生存的需要。今後只有以大陸為規模的各種組織才能在結構已被上次大戰極度簡化了的世界生存。

在這開始締造一個使累世仇恨行將泯滅，而利益和能力行將融為一體的歐洲的時候，法國擔任了重要的一部分任務。建立煤鋼聯營集團的條約，就是由法國提議而談判簽字的。法國政府過去和現在一貫地認為這種偉大事業必須逐步推行。

● 一九五三年一月六日至同年五月二十一日任法國總理。

Accords contractuels, traité créant la Communauté européenne de défense, protocoles et lettres annexes, forment un tout indissoluble. La mise en application des accords est subordonnée à l'entrée en vigueur du traité. Ils constituent un système cohérent, dont la complexité s'explique par la nécessité de faire face à une situation sans précédent dans l'histoire.

Elle ne correspond plus seulement à un idéal politique, mais à une nécessité vitale. Seuls, les ensembles organisés à l'échelle d'un continent pourront désormais survivre dans un monde dont la structure a été terriblement simplifiée par la dernière guerre.

Dans ce début de construction d'une Europe où les antagonismes séculaires disparaîtraient et où les intérêts et les énergies seraient fusionnés, la France a pris une part prépondérante. C'est à son initiative qu'a été négocié et signé le traité créant la Communauté charbon-acier. Le gouvernement français estimait et estime toujours que, dans cette grande entreprise, il faut procéder par étapes.

因此，法國政府政策的主導思想之一是認為解決德國問題的辦法不能在歐洲以外去尋求，相反地，如果德國在歐洲得不到應有的地位，歐洲問題就不能解決。

如不把盟國與德國之間的關係正常化起來，如不確定一種政治制度，使聯邦共和國不再受戰敗國和被佔領國的待遇，而是受平等夥伴的待遇，則想在歐洲統一道路上有任何新的進展是不可能的。盟國戰略的主要目標，是要使歐洲的防綫越往東推展越好。但如果沒有聯邦共和國參加共同防務，這種目標從長遠看來是不能實現的。這是兩個一般不可爭辯的事實，而且大家已在討論從這事實中所能得出的結論。

所以儘速提請國會批准條約的問題是不可避免的；而且這問題在任何情況下都是存在的。

從這點看來，歐洲理想是滿足着一種迫切的需要，而絕不是一種空中樓閣。

有些人認為另外還有一種辦法，即由四大國締結和約來解決德國問題。

對於這個基本問題，不應存有任何猶豫和疑慮。和平恢復德國的統一，乃是全面解決歐洲問題的主要因素，而全面解決歐洲問題一向是法國和自由世界政策的目標之一。

法國政府絲毫不隱瞞在它提交的文件中，關於某些問題所提出的若干解決辦法只有在整個歐洲的和平的範疇中才能得到確定的解決。

然而應該說明的是，法國政府雖一再努力，但至今尚未能使蘇聯開始一種建設性的討論，藉以作出上述的解決辦法。現在無須引證自一九四五年以來所屢次召開的會議，在這些會議上蘇聯的外交表現對宣傳的關心遠較對獲致真正和平的真實願望為大。

這些事實證明，蘇聯政府對自己應當負責的德國和歐洲間的分裂是心滿意足的。祇有在不需要它表示談判的誠意的條件下，它才肯接受談判。

Une des idées maîtresses de la politique du gouvernement français est, en effet, qu'il n'existe pas de solution au problème allemand en dehors de l'Europe, et qu'inversement, il ne saurait y avoir d'Europe sans que l'Allemagne y trouve sa place.

Il est impossible de faire aucun progrès nouveau dans la voie de l'intégration européenne sans normaliser les relations entre Alliés et Allemands et sans définir un régime politique dans lequel la République fédérale serait traitée, non plus comme un pays vaincu et occupé, mais comme un partenaire. L'objectif primordial de la stratégie alliée, qui est de défendre l'Europe aussi loin à l'Est que possible, serait à la longue irréalisable sans contribution de la République fédérale à la défense commune. Ce sont là deux données de fait généralement incontestées, lors même que l'on discute sur les conclusions qui doivent en être tirées.

Le problème que les traités soumis à la ratification du Parlement s'efforcent de résoudre est donc inéluctable. Il demeurera posé en tout état de cause.

De ce point de vue, l'idée européenne répond à une nécessité impérieuse et n'est nullement du domaine de l'utopie.

Il existe cependant, disent certains, une autre issue, à savoir le règlement de la question allemande par la conclusion d'un traité de paix entre les quatre grandes puissances.

Sur ce point fondamental, aucune équivoque ne doit subsister. Le rétablissement pacifique de l'unité allemande est un élément essentiel d'un règlement général européen qui constitue un des objectifs de la politique française et de la politique du monde libre.

Le gouvernement français ne cherche nullement à dissimuler que, sur plusieurs points, les textes qu'il propose aujourd'hui apportent des solutions d'attente à des problèmes qui ne pourront être définitivement résolus que dans le cadre de la pacification de l'Europe dans son ensemble.

Il doit cependant constater que, en dépit de ses efforts répétés, il n'a, jusqu'à présent, pu amener l'U.R.S.S. à entamer une discussion constructive susceptible de conduire à l'élaboration d'un tel règlement. Il est à peine besoin d'évoquer les nombreuses conférences qui se sont succédé depuis 1945, conférence dans lesquelles la diplomatie soviétique s'est montrée plus soucieuse de propagande qu'animée du dessein sincère de parvenir à une détente véritable.

Ces faits démontrent que le gouvernement soviétique s'accommode fort bien de la coupure de l'Allemagne et de l'Europe, dont il est lui-même responsable. Il n'accepte de négocier qu'à la condition de ne pas avoir à faire la preuve de sa volonté d'aboutir.

它的外交行動祇有一個目標，即是阻撓目前送交各國國會的條約的批准。它拿一種德國的荒誕遠景來迷惑德國國家主義者的眼光，說德國一旦重獲它的強大地位，在東西之間又可舉足輕重。

依照蘇聯的想法武裝起來並中立化的德國，在美英軍隊放棄了的並處於俄國軍事壓力下的大陸上，顯然對於和平將構成一種經常的威脅。

如果在四國管制下暫時統一德國的建議被提出的話，則馬上要發生更大的危險。這種恢復波茨坦制度的辦法，將被標榜為走向和平解決的第一步；而實際上，這是用對奧條約談判所採用的方法，無限期地延遲和平的解決。蘇聯可不付任何實際的代價，重又找到阻止統一的機會。這將是一種真正的事實上的中立化，對德國、對歐洲都將發生致命的危險。

蘇聯認為德國問題是歐洲問題的關鍵。在提議德國中立化時，它注意的是其他中立化問題。它企圖癱瘓西歐的復興並使歐洲的防務和歐洲統一的建立均成為不可能。然而賭本是很大的，並可以想像蘇聯將不倦地進行主張德國中立化的宣傳。

因此，如不終止歐洲的分裂，要恢復德國的統一與自由是不可能的。

提請國會批准的各项協定是基於以下的基本原則。這些基本原則引導着並將繼續引導着法國政府的政策，以及其他各簽字國的政策。

對於我們遭受威脅的各國人民，只有統一才有出路，而這種統一不可能在和平解決歐洲辦法以外得到實現。

關於此點，無論蘇聯目前的態度使我們如何失望，但為獲得此項解決起見，與蘇聯重作全面談判

Son action diplomatique n'a d'autre but que d'empêcher la ratification des accords actuellement soumis aux différents Parlements en faisant miroiter, principalement aux yeux des milieux nationalistes allemands, la perspective alléchante d'une Allemagne ayant retrouvé les moyens de sa puissance et capable de jouer à nouveau un rôle d'arbitre entre l'Est et l'Ouest.

Il est clair qu'une Allemagne armée et neutralisée, suivant les conceptions soviétiques, sur un continent abandonné par les forces anglaises et américaines et soumis à la pression de la puissance militaire russe, constituerait une menace constante pour la paix.

Plus dangereuses seraient, dans l'immédiat, si elles devaient être formulées, des propositions tendant à réunifier provisoirement l'Allemagne sous le contrôle des quatre puissances. Ce retour au régime de Potsdam serait présenté comme la première étape vers un règlement de paix qui serait, en réalité, indéfiniment retardé selon les méthodes éprouvées lors de la négociation du traité autrichien. L'U.R.S.S. retrouverait ainsi la possibilité d'arrêter le processus d'intégration sans pour autant consentir aucun sacrifice réel. Il s'agirait d'une véritable neutralisation de fait, qui serait fatale aussi bien à l'Allemagne qu'à l'Europe.

L'Union soviétique considère la question allemande comme la clé du problème européen. En proposant de neutraliser l'Allemagne, elle vise à d'autres neutralisations. Elle entend paralyser le redressement de l'Europe occidentale et rendre impossible aussi bien sa défense que la constitution d'une Europe unie. L'enjeu est donc d'importance et l'on peut penser que l'Union soviétique poursuivra inlassablement sa propagande en faveur d'une Allemagne neutralisée.

Il est donc impossible de rétablir l'unité allemande dans la liberté sans mettre fin à la coupure de l'Europe.

Les accords soumis à l'approbation du Parlement reposent sur les principes fondamentaux suivants qui inspirent et continueront à inspirer la politique du gouvernement français ainsi que des autres Etats signataires.

A nos peuples menacés ne se présente donc d'issue que dans une intégration, qui ne saurait être réalisée en dehors d'un règlement pacifique européen.

Quelles que soient les déceptions que nous cause l'attitude actuelle de l'U.R.S.S. à cet égard, il est essentiel de maintenir la porte ouverte à

之門必須保持開着。這是很重要的。有一切理由相信西歐各國人民的和平結合越是加強，這種解決希望就會越濃厚。

契約性協定和歐洲防務集團條約結束佔領制度並保證聯邦共和國以夥伴身份參加西歐防務集團的建立，同時不影響蘇聯和三國間關於最後解決德國問題的相互關係。

聯邦共和國這種政治上的解決，是和它加入防務集團同時實現的。歐洲軍不可能供各國要求之用。它的建立是爲了加強西方政策的純粹防衛性質。

在佔領制度終止的同時，聯邦共和國即進入一種歐洲組織。

所以，協定具有正反兩面。協定既注意到聯邦共和國的特殊地位，同時也顧到德國統一問題和奧得—尼斯邊界問題對歐洲建設所加的負擔。該協定對於德國參加防務集團給予以必要的保障。同時它並爲一個歐洲政治組織的前途作了準備和奠下了基礎，在那樣的組織內，由於歐洲分裂而造成的事實上的不平等，將在歐洲最高統一下獲得克服。

這條約完全符合了大西洋理事會的結論，根據這結論，建立德國國家軍隊和德國參謀本部對德國、對歐洲均無好處。巴黎條約包含着重要的保證，而這項保證的原則是大西洋理事會在布魯塞爾所決定的。

如在契約性協定中列入此類條文，而不同時維持具有必要權力的盟國監督，結果必將流於純粹的形式。而這樣一個監督機構的存在，將與我們想與聯邦共和國建立的新關係不能相容。因此，法國政府曾請求並已獲得在防務集團條約內列入上述條款，保證歐洲常務委員會有必要的監督權力。這些保證如下：

la reprise de négociations générales avec l'U.R.S.S. en vue d'obtenir un tel règlement. Il y a tout lieu de croire que les chances de ce règlement augmenteront au fur et à mesure du renforcement de la coalition pacifique des peuples occidentaux.

Les accords contractuels et le traité sur la Communauté européenne de défense mettent un terme au régime d'occupation et assurent la participation de la République fédérale, en tant que partenaire, à l'édification d'une Communauté de défense de l'Europe occidentale, tout en laissant intact le domaine des relations entre l'U.R.S.S. et les trois puissances en ce qui concerne le règlement définitif du problème allemand.

Cette émancipation politique de la République fédérale s'effectue simultanément à son entrée dans une communauté de défense. L'armée européenne ne peut être mise au service de revendications nationales; sa création est de nature à renforcer le caractère entièrement défensif de la politique occidentale.

Au moment même où cesse le régime de l'occupation, la République fédérale entre dans le cadre d'une organisation européenne.

Les accords ont donc un double aspect, négatif et positif. Ils tiennent compte de la situation particulière de la République fédérale et de l'hypothèque que font peser sur la construction européenne le problème de l'unification de l'Allemagne et celui de la frontière Oder-Neisse. Ils assortissent la contribution de l'Allemagne à la défense des garanties indispensables. En même temps, ils préparent l'avenir et posent les fondations d'une organisation politique européenne dans laquelle les inégalités de fait liées au maintien de la coupure de l'Europe seront surmontées dans l'unité supérieure de l'édifice européen.

Ce traité répond pleinement aux conclusions du Conseil de l'Atlantique, d'après lesquelles il ne servirait les meilleurs intérêts ni de l'Europe ni de l'Allemagne de susciter la création d'une armée nationale allemande ou d'un état-major général allemand. Il contient les garanties essentielles dont le principe avait été arrêté à Bruxelles, compte tenu de ses conclusions.

L'inscription de clauses analogues dans les accords contractuels aurait eu un caractère purement formel si elle n'avait été accompagnée du maintien de contrôle allié doué des pouvoirs nécessaires. L'existence d'un pareil organisme eût été peu compatible avec les relations nouvelles que nous souhaitons établir avec la République fédérale. C'est pourquoi le gouvernement français a demandé et obtenu que les clauses en question fussent inscrites dans le traité de communauté, qui assure au commissariat européen les pouvoirs de contrôle nécessaires. Ces garanties sont les suivantes:

首先，統一的歐洲軍的結構本身，尤其是運輸機構的統一，使每一成員國不可能在歐洲有獨立的軍事行動。

由於第一百零七條關於統一擴充軍備計劃的規定，獨立行動尤其是不可能。這一條款使德國建立一個獨立的軍備潛力成爲不可能，並且確定了各成員國間任務的分配。第二項附件又對第一百零七條作一種補充保證，該附件規定在聯邦共和國領土上不得製造某些重要武器，特別是那些在近代戰爭中起決定性作用的武器：原子機器、電氣操縱機器、飛機。這類制度還注意到戰略上的需要，同時包含着一種相互的結合，如成員國間戰爭經濟的結合，使其中某一國家要想脫離實際上成爲不可能。對於聯邦共和國，它的脫離尤爲不可能，因爲它不掌握一個獨立的軍事工業所必需的某些主要因素。

爲了避免一切以半軍事性組織爲基礎來重建德國國家軍隊的危險，條約第十一條限制現役警察的人數和裝備，他們的任務只限於保護國內秩序。這條文的執行，由歐洲常務委員會予以保證。

最後關於兵額方面，條約允許我們於某成員國徵召人數超過定額時提出反對。

因此可以看出，上述制度有着具體的和有機的保證，而這些保證又因有一種爲德國自由接受的監察機構而更加鞏固。其他任何方式均將引起一切單純強制制度所必定引起的困難。一九一八年至一九三五年的歷史對於這種困難提供了有力的例證。

在政治上，防務集團中也沒有一個成員國向另一成員國提出要求的危險。換言之，建議中的制度實際上使有些人所恐懼的獨立軍隊和收復失地要求二者的結合成爲不可能。

此外，歐洲軍係置於大西洋最高司令部權力之下。後者是遵照着北大西洋理事會所作的指示行事

Tout d'abord la structure même de l'armée européenne intégrée, et notamment l'intégration de ses organes logistiques, rend impossible en Europe une action militaire indépendante de la part d'un des Etats membres.

L'impossibilité d'une action indépendante est renforcée par les dispositions de l'article 107 relatives au programme commun d'armement. Cet article rend impossible la constitution d'un potentiel d'armement allemand autonome et assure la répartition des tâches entre les différents Etats membres. Une garantie supplémentaire est apportée par l'annexe 2 à l'article 107, qui exclut la fabrication, sur le territoire de la République fédérale, de certains types d'armement clés, et notamment de ceux qui seraient appelés à jouer un rôle décisif dans une guerre moderne: engins atomiques, engins téléguidés, aviation. Pareil système tient compte des nécessités stratégiques et comporte en même temps une interpénétration telle des économies des guerres des Etats participants que la sécession d'un d'entre eux est, par là même, rendue pratiquement impossible. Cette impossibilité est encore accrue dans le cas de la République fédérale par le fait que celle-ci ne disposera pas de certains éléments essentiels d'une industrie d'armement autonome.

Afin d'éviter tout risque de reconstitution d'une armée nationale allemande sur la base de formations paramilitaires, l'article 11 du traité limite l'effectif et l'armement des forces de police existantes en fonction de leur mission, qui doit être exclusivement la protection de l'ordre intérieur. Le contrôle de cette clause est assuré par le commissariat européen.

Enfin, sur le plan des effectifs, le traité nous permet de nous opposer à l'accroissement des contingents levés par un Etat membre en sus des chiffres convenus.

On constate donc que le système prévu apporte des garanties concrètes et organiques, elles-mêmes renforcées par un mécanisme de contrôle librement accepté par l'Allemagne. Toute autre formule soulèverait les difficultés inhérentes à toute système purement coercitif, difficultés dont l'histoire de 1918 à 1935 a donné un exemple éloquent.

Sur le plan politique, la communauté de défense ne risque pas d'être influencée par les revendications d'un des Etats membres. Autrement dit, le système proposé rend pratiquement impossible la conjonction, redoutée par certains, entre une armée indépendante et un irrédentisme territorial.

Au surplus, l'armée européenne est placée sous l'autorité du commandement suprême atlantique, agissant conformément aux directives

的，而北大西洋理事會的任何決議不得到我們的同意是不能成立的。

這一切規定，使成員國很難破壞或違反對集團所負的義務。爲防止這類破壞條約情形發生，與歐洲防務集團條約同日簽字的三國宣言作了一個補充的保證。依照這宣言，美英政府承允把一切違反集團完整或安全的行爲，視同違反它們本國的安全。美英兩國因此和歐洲防務集團的命運緊密地結合起來，因爲它們視爲這是它們本國的利益問題。在同一宣言中，美英政府重申它們的決心，爲對集體防務有所供獻，要在大陸，包括德意志聯邦共和國在內，駐紮必要的軍隊。

最後，三國政府廢止其一九五〇年九月對聯邦共和國所提供對抗一切外來攻擊的片面保證。三國宣言用北大西洋條約組織集團的相互保證制度，如上述議定書所規定者，來代替那種片面的保證。換言之，聯邦共和國將來如要脫離集團，將受到失去西方各國的一切保證的制裁。

在法律上，這個集團顯然是周密的和完全的，但防止任何脫離集團的企圖的最好保證是在於協定保證了美英軍隊和歐洲防務集團軍隊的密切合作。

一九五二年五月二十七日聯合王國和集團成員國間所簽訂的條約構成聯合王國和防務集團之間自動互助的義務。這項文件使英國對於歐洲大陸的防務發生了從所未有的密切關係。法國政府也決心致力於爭取英國完全參加歐洲防務集團或和它密切聯繫。

今天沒有一個歐洲國家擁有足夠的領土和資源可以充分有效地獨自負起本國的防務，甚至對共同安全作均衡的貢獻也是做不到的。軍備的價錢、性質和種類的紛繁造成了此種情勢。這種情勢使西歐

données par le Conseil de l'Atlantique-Nord, où aucune décision ne peut être prise sans notre accord.

Cet ensemble de dispositions rend très difficile la rupture ou la violation par une nation membre des engagements pris envers la communauté. Une garantie supplémentaire est apportée, contre une telle rupture, par la déclaration tripartite signée le même jour que le traité instituant la communauté européenne de défense. Aux termes de cette déclaration, les gouvernements américain et britannique s'engagent à considérer toute action contre l'intégrité ou la sécurité de la communauté comme une menace contre leur propre sécurité; les Etats-Unis et la Grande-Bretagne s'associent donc étroitement au destin de la communauté européenne de défense, puisqu'ils font de son maintien une question d'intérêt national pour les Etats-Unis et la Grande-Bretagne. Par la même déclaration, les gouvernements américain et britannique réaffirment leur résolution de faire stationner sur le continent européen, y compris la République fédérale d'Allemagne, les forces nécessaires en vue de contribuer à la défense commune.

Enfin, les trois gouvernements abrogent la garantie unilatérale contre toute attaque extérieure donnée à la République fédérale en septembre 1950. La déclaration tripartite substitue à cette garantie unilatérale le système de garanties réciproques communauté-organisation du traité de l'Atlantique-Nord tel qu'il a été établi par les protocoles ci-dessus mentionnés. Autrement dit, une sécession éventuelle de la République fédérale serait sanctionnée par la perte de toute garantie des puissances occidentales.

Sur le plan juridique, l'ensemble apparaît donc cohérent et complet, mais la meilleure sauvegarde contre toute tentative de rupture de la communauté réside dans le fait que les accords assurent la coopération la plus étroite des forces anglaises et américaines avec les forces de la communauté européenne de défense.

Le traité signé le 27 mai 1952, entre le Royaume-Uni et les Etats membres de la communauté, comporte un engagement automatique d'assistance entre le Royaume-Uni et la communauté de défense. Ce texte lie la Grande-Bretagne plus étroitement qu'elle ne l'a jamais été à la défense du continent européen. Le gouvernement français n'en demeure pas moins résolu à poursuivre ses efforts en vue d'obtenir soit la pleine participation, soit une association intime de la Grande-Bretagne à la communauté de défense.

Aucune nation européenne n'a plus aujourd'hui les dimensions ou les ressources indispensables pour assurer seule sa défense dans des conditions satisfaisantes d'efficacité, ou même pour apporter à un effort de sécurité commun une

國家不得不把它們經濟的、財政的、科學的和人力的資源打通，並引導它們的軍事力量走向統一，它們的軍器和裝備趨於標準化。這種情勢要求它們在考慮和組織本國領土的防務時，應作為一個統一的軍事行動來考慮和組織它。在現代資源範圍上，西歐各國應視為不可分解的整體，其資源應融為一體。

共同計劃的實現，意味着德國工業的和財政的資源的利用。無論從物質或從道義的觀點來看，德國的經濟和德國的納稅人對歐洲防務集團如不負擔像其他大西洋國家為同一目的所供獻的一份經費，是不可容忍的。免除它這種負擔，將在歐洲引起經濟上和社會上極嚴重的不平衡。

這條約不僅能應付外來的威脅，而且又可為一個歐洲未來組織奠定基礎。關於這點，要創立一個歐洲政治集團的第三十八條具有特殊的重要性。

的確，集團條約已含有一種萌芽狀態的聯邦或邦聯組織的一切因素。歐洲常務委員會構成一種超國家的政治權力，其職權雖有限制，但是真實的。

煤鋼聯營集團和防務集團大會的建立，是使新政治集團具有真實性的重要創舉。

契約性協定序言中指明全部協定是和一個民主的和聯邦的德國簽訂的。這清楚地指出，如德國民主秩序一旦顛覆，將造成一種全新的情況，使集團的正常工作不可能進行。

正為這種理由，契約性協定中規定，如遇此類情勢發生，三國得宣告緊急狀態的存在。根據此項宣告，三國得採取一切必要措置來恢復正常情況並保證集團的工作。

contribution équilibrée. Le coût des armements, leur nature, leur diversité ont créé cette situation. Celle-ci impose aux nations de l'Europe occidentale la mise en commun de leurs moyens économiques, financiers, scientifiques, humains. Elle conduit à une intégration de leurs forces militaires, à une standardisation de leur armement et de leur équipement. Elle exige que la défense de leurs territoires soit conçue et organisée comme une opération unique. A l'échelle des moyens modernes, les pays de l'Europe occidentale doivent être considérés comme constituant un ensemble indissoluble, dont les ressources doivent être fusionnées.

La réalisation d'un programme commun implique l'utilisation des ressources allemandes, aussi bien financières qu'industrielles. Du point de vue matériel autant que moral, il serait intolérable que l'économie allemande, que le contribuable allemand ne supportent pas pour la défense commune un prélèvement fiscal égal à celui qui doit être demandé aux autres nations atlantiques pour le même but. Les en dispenser serait provoquer en Europe les déséquilibres économiques et sociaux les plus graves.

Le traité ne permet pas seulement de faire face à une menace extérieure, mais jette les bases d'une organisation future de l'Europe. A cet égard, l'article 38 revêt une importance particulière puisqu'il prévoit la création d'une communauté politique européenne.

Certes le traité de communauté contient déjà à l'état embryonnaire tous les éléments d'une organisation fédérale ou confédérale. Le commissariat européen constitue un pouvoir politique supranational, à compétence limitée mais réelle.

L'innovation capitale, appelée à donner son véritable caractère à la Communauté politique nouvelle sera donc la création d'une assemblée de la Communauté charbon-acier et de la Communauté de défense.

Le préambule des accords contractuels précise que l'ensemble des conventions est signé avec une Allemagne démocratique et fédérale. Il est clair qu'un bouleversement de l'ordre démocratique en Allemagne créerait une situation entièrement nouvelle, qui rendrait impossible le fonctionnement normal de la Communauté.

C'est d'ailleurs la raison pour laquelle les accords contractuels prévoient, dans une telle éventualité, la possibilité d'une proclamation de l'état de crise par les trois puissances. En vertu de cette proclamation, les trois puissances peuvent prendre toutes mesures nécessaires en vue de rétablir des conditions normales et d'assurer le fonctionnement de la communauté.

事實上，祇要聯邦共和國團結在西方集團內，這種規定恐不會發生作用。聯邦共和國和其他西方國家的結合本身即是德民主制度繼續存在的最好保證。反對這種統一政策最堅決的人，正是那些第二次大戰後忠於他們的參謀本部的傳統，繼續將希望建築在與東方接近的基礎上的德國國家主義份子，這的確不是偶然的。

尚有一個重要問題須要研究的，即集團內法、德的均勢問題。

我們首先應指出的是，條約的任何條款，都沒有允許任何成員國在集團內建立自己的優勢。

如果從條文以外的情況來說，祇要當對西德維持佔領制度顯得不可能、行不通並與一般利益不相符合時，均勢問題顯然就要發生。

在新的組織中，兩國間的敵對精神應代之以合作精神，因此唯有在新的組織中這種均勢最易維持。法國政府認為法國對於自身、對於它的物質和精神的資源無所懷疑，因此不怕這種合作會對自己不利。

六國之中只有法國在德國尚握有一種保留權。這種二元制度，足以保障法國的世界地位和它在大西洋公約的軍事指揮機構內的地位。

海外領土當然繼續由法國政府自己單獨管轄，法國政府有着一切必要辦法來擔負這方面的責任。

因此，法國不僅對於防衛這些領土的軍隊，同時也對於幾乎全部海軍保持着絕對的控制權。此外，並採取了一切措置，使統一的擴充軍備計劃絲毫不損害這些軍隊，以及其他成員國同樣的軍隊的需用。

En réalité, il est douteux que cette clause ait à jouer tant que la République fédérale demeurera intégrée à l'Occident. C'est, en effet, cette association même de la République fédérale aux autres nations occidentales qui constitue la meilleure garantie de l'existence du régime démocratique en Allemagne. Ce n'est certes pas un hasard que les adversaires les plus résolus de cette politique d'intégration sont certains cercles nationalistes allemands qui, fidèles à la tradition de leur grand état-major après la dernière guerre, continuent à fonder leurs espoirs sur un rapprochement avec l'Est.

Reste à examiner une question d'importance capitale, celle de l'équilibre franco-allemand au sein de la communauté.

Soulignons tout d'abord qu'aucune clause du Traité ne permet à un quelconque des Etats membres d'établir sa prépondérance à l'intérieur de la communauté.

Si l'on se place sur un autre plan que celui des textes, il est évident qu'un problème d'équilibre se pose en toute hypothèse à partir du moment où il apparaît impossible, impraticable et non conforme à l'intérêt général de maintenir l'Allemagne occidentale sous le régime d'occupation.

C'est au sein des institutions nouvelles, qui doivent substituer à l'esprit de rivalité entre les deux nations celui de la coopération, que cet équilibre apparaît le plus aisé à maintenir. Le gouvernement français estime que la France n'a pas à douter d'elle-même, de ses ressources matérielles et intellectuelles et donc n'a pas à craindre que cette coopération tourne à son désavantage.

Le dualisme au système d'après lequel la France, seule des six puissances, détient un droit réservé en Allemagne, sauvegarde la position mondiale de la France ainsi que sa situation au sein des organismes militaires directeurs du Pacte atlantique.

Les territoires d'outre-mer continuent bien entendu à relever de la seule autorité du gouvernement français qui dispose de tous les moyens nécessaires en vue de faire face à ses responsabilités à cet égard.

A cet effet, la France garde le contrôle exclusif, non seulement des troupes affectées à la défense de ces territoires, mais également de la quasi-totalité de sa flotte. Toutes dispositions sont prises, d'autre part, pour que l'existence d'un programme d'armement intégré ne compromette en rien les besoins de ces forces, ainsi que de celles des Etats associés.

這些責任無疑地需要一種很重大的補償。印度支那防務的各項問題影響着歐洲的建設，這是法國政府決心在盟國的同意下予以解決的。再者，法國在世界上所坦負的任務，應使它毫無自卑感地進入六國集團，這也是同樣確實的。

以上是在波恩和巴黎簽字的兩個條約的要點。

正如內閣總理在接受職務時的宣言內所指出的，法國政府願用附加議定書來把這兩個條約的某幾點加以明確。這些議定書應由簽字國予以討論。對於這事國會將會得到通知。

總之，若干基本要點，從現在起，不必再多所討論。我們必須建設歐洲，必須使德國參加防務，必須結束佔領狀態，必須讓可能與蘇聯談判之門敞開，以期達到歐洲問題的全面解決。

(譯自一九五三年一月二十九日法國「費加羅報」)

Sans doute l'existence de ces responsabilités comporte une très lourde contrepartie. Les problèmes que pose la défense de l'Indo-chine font à cet égard peser sur la construction européenne une hypothèque que le gouvernement français est résolu à lever d'accord avec ses alliés. Il n'en est pas moins certain que le rôle mondial joué par la France doit lui permettre d'entrer dans la Communauté des six puissances sans aucun sentiment d'infériorité.

Telles sont les données fondamentales des traités signés à Bonn et à Paris.

Ainsi que le président du Conseil l'a indiqué, dans sa déclaration d'investiture, le gouvernement français désire préciser ces traités sur certains points par des protocoles complémentaires qui devront être discutés entre les Etats signataires et dont le Parlement aura à connaître.

En résumé, certaines données fondamentales échappent dès maintenant à toute discussion. Il faut faire l'Europe, il faut faire participer l'Allemagne à la défense, il faut mettre fin au statut d'occupation, il faut laisser ouverte la possibilité d'une reprise des négociations avec l'U.R.S.S., afin de parvenir à un règlement européen général.

(Figaro le 29 Janvier, 1953)

一、英美法三外長會議

(第一號)

美、英、法三國外長華盛頓會議公報

一九五三年七月十四日

COMMUNIQUE ISSUED BY U.S., U.K. AND FRENCH FOREIGN MINISTERS AFTER THEIR CONFERENCE IN WASHINGTON

July 14, 1953

法國外長皮杜爾先生、聯合王國代理外交大臣薩利斯伯利侯爵和美國國務卿杜勒斯先生從一九五三年七月十日至十四日在華盛頓開會，共同協商。

The Foreign Minister of France, M. Georges Bidault, the Acting Foreign Secretary of the United Kingdom, the Marquess of Salisbury, and the Secretary of State of the United States, Mr. John Foster Dulles, met and consulted together at Washington from July 10 to 14, 1953.

I

在他們的協商期間，他們研究了與三國政府有關的範圍廣泛的共同問題。他們所審議的問題性質不同，但是，整個會議是出於一個主要目的，這個目的是，謀求足以滿足他們的政府與人民對和平、自由與正義所懷抱的共同希望的解決方法。他們確信，各地人民也同樣懷抱這些希望。

In the course of their consultations, they reviewed a wide range of common problems of concern to the three Governments. The topics considered have been diverse, but the entire conference has been inspired by one dominant purpose. That has been to seek solutions fulfilling the common hope of their governments and peoples for peace, freedom, and justice. They are certain that these same aspirations are shared by peoples everywhere.

三國外長深信，祇有採取建設性的行動，停止壓迫和消除不穩定的原因與衝突的根源才能夠建立堅固的和平基礎。真正要和平的人，必須設法恢復自由、希望和人類的尊嚴。外長們在他們的會議中曾為現有的問題尋找符合於這些原則的答案。

The three Ministers are convinced that solid foundations for peace can be built only by constructive action to end oppression and remove causes of instability and sources of conflict. Those who genuinely want peace must seek to restore liberty, hope, and human dignity. In their meetings the Ministers have sought answers to existing problems consistent with these principles.

導致他們關於歐洲前途問題，恢復德國統一與奧地利獨立問題，和在朝鮮及印度支那建立和平問題的結論就是這種精神。這種精神也鼓舞了他們看到東歐各國恢復真正的自由的希望。在每一種情況下，他們都曾經尋求具有滿足對自由、安全與康樂的普遍願望的最大希望的方法。他們相信，他們提出的解決辦法將有助於實現以同意為基礎的穩定，因為只有穩定才能緩和緊張局勢，才能保證有長期的和平。

This has been the spirit leading to their conclusions on the future of Europe, the restoration of German unity and of Austrian independence, and the establishment of peace in Korea and Indochina. The same spirit inspires their desire to see true liberty restored in the countries of Eastern Europe. In each case, they have sought means offering the greatest hope of satisfying the general desire for freedom, security, and well being. They believe that their proposed solutions will help to achieve that stability based on consent which alone can reduce tension and guarantee a durable peace.

三國外長懇切希望蘇聯將以同樣精神處理懸而未決的問題。蘇聯這樣做對於保障一切國家的安全的持久和平就會有所貢獻。

二

三外長重申他們決心大力執行他們的政府在北大西洋條約範疇內議定的政策。這些政策包括歐洲六國為歐洲統一而做的工作。這六個國家已經成立了煤鋼聯營集團，它們的政府並且已經簽訂了歐洲防務集團條約。

三國政府決心依照北大西洋條約，保衛它們的人民的以民主、個人自由和法治原則為基礎的自由、共同的遺產和文明。它們強調它們決心繼續進行為補救現在力量不均衡的局面所必需的共同防禦努力，從而對集體安全和維持國際和平有所貢獻。三國外長重申北大西洋聯盟是三國政府的外交和防務政策的基礎。他們同意和平前景的改進大部分是由於這個聯盟存在的原故並同意它的防禦力量必須予以維持。他們願對北大西洋理事會所做的關係重大的工作表示敬意。

三國外長正就他們已作的討論對各該國政府駐北大西洋理事會的常任代表們發出指示，使北大西洋條約組織的其他成員國得依照既定的慣例獲悉討論情況。

三

三國外長認為，應不遺餘力加強北大西洋集團範圍內的歐洲的團結，他們指出，根據法國的倡議而建立的煤鋼聯營集團，現在經營得很順利。歐洲防務集團的建立是達到同一目標的必要步驟；同時，六國政府正在進行建立歐洲政治集團的工作。他們已經注意到英國政府已經採取的或已經計劃的和這些集團建立緊密聯系的種種步驟。

因此，三國外長一致認為：

(一) 上述各歐洲集團機構將加強大西洋集

It is the earnest hope of the three Ministers that the Soviet Union will approach outstanding problems in the same spirit. In so doing the Soviet Union would contribute to a lasting peace assuring the security of all.

II

The three Foreign Ministers have reaffirmed their resolve to pursue vigorously the policies upon which their Governments have agreed within the framework of the Atlantic Treaty. These policies include the work for European unity of the six European countries which have already set up the Coal and Steel Community and whose Governments have signed the Treaty for the European Defense Community.

The three Governments are determined to safeguard, in accordance with the North Atlantic Treaty, the freedom, the common heritage and the civilization of their peoples, based on the principles of democracy, freedom of the individual and the rule of law. They have emphasized their resolve to continue the common defense effort necessary to redress the present lack of balance of power and thus to contribute to collective security and to the maintenance of international peace. The Ministers reaffirmed that the North Atlantic Alliance is fundamental to the foreign and defense policies of the three Governments. They were agreed that the improved prospects of peace were largely due to the existence of the alliance and that its defensive strength must be maintained. They wish to pay tribute to the vital work of the North Atlantic Council.

The three Ministers are instructing their Governments' Permanent Representatives to the North Atlantic Council concerning the discussions they have held in order that the other member nations of NATO may be informed in accordance with established practice.

III

Convinced that no effort should be spared to strengthen European unity within the Atlantic Community, the three Ministers have noted that the Coal and Steel Community, the result of a French initiative, is now operating successfully. The establishment of the European Defense Community constitutes a necessary step to the same goal; meanwhile the work of creating a European Political Community is being pursued by the six Governments. They have noted the steps already taken or contemplated by the British Government to establish close links with these communities.

The three Ministers were therefore agreed that:

(a) the above institutions of a European Community will strengthen the Atlantic

團，而這些機構也將因其與北大西洋集團的聯合而加強。

(二) 建立一個鞏固與安全的歐洲集團的建設性的努力是對世界和平的一項重大貢獻。因為歐洲集團是符合於各成員國和它們的人民對和平、安全和福利的長期需要的，所以應該認為歐洲集團的本身是必要的，而不應把它與目前國際緊張局勢聯系在一起。

(三) 這種集團的本質是和平的，並不是要對付任何人。保障各國的利益與安全的最好辦法莫過於消除造成歐洲糾紛的一切根源。的確，歐洲防務集團條約的規定是它的軍隊絕不會被用於侵略的保證。

(四) 歐洲集團是為結束過去的種種衝突而設的，它並不排斥任何國參加；相反，六個成員國會一再強調，歐洲的其他自由國家均可成為這個集團的成員國或與它發生聯系。

四

三國外長對重新統一德國問題也已作了進一步的考慮。最近在柏林和蘇聯佔領區內發生的嚴重事件，再度證明了這些地區的居民要求獨立的願望和爭取自由的堅強決心。

這些發展已經證實了三國外長的看法，即：按照德國人民的正當願望使德國早日重新統一，將大有助於緩和國際緊張局勢。

三國為了達到這個目的會進行了不斷的努力。它們在最近幾年中曾向蘇聯發出了好幾件包括有建設性的建議的照會，最後一次照會是在一九五二年九月二十三日發出的，但是迄今未獲答覆。這些照會是符合於德國人民看到在自由的精神中恢復統一的勢不可當的願望，這種願望最近在德國聯邦議院今年六月十日的決議[●]中也反映出來。

這一方面的早日的、有秩序的進展需要蘇聯政府的合作。

● 見本輯「德國問題」類，第六十三頁。

Community and will in turn be strengthened by association with it;

(b) those constructive efforts to build a stable, secure European Community are a major contribution toward world peace. Since the European Community corresponds to the lasting needs of its members and their peoples for peace, security and welfare, it is to be looked upon as necessary in itself and not linked up with existing international tensions.

(c) such a Community, peaceful by its very nature, is not directed against anyone. The interests and security of all countries cannot be better safeguarded than by the removal of causes of conflict in Europe. Indeed, the provisions laid down in the European Defense Community Treaty are a guarantee that its forces would never be used in the service of aggression.

(d) designed to put an end to the conflicts of the past, the European Community does not exclude any State; on the contrary, the six member-countries have repeatedly stressed that other free countries of Europe may become members of the Community or be associated with it.

IV

The three Ministers have also given further consideration to the problem of the reunification of Germany. The grave events which took place recently in Berlin and in the Soviet Zone once again gave proof of the will to independence and the indomitable determination for freedom of the inhabitants of these areas.

These developments have confirmed the view of the Ministers, that the early reunification of Germany, in accordance with the legitimate aspirations of the German population, would be a great contribution to the easing of international tension.

The three powers have made sustained efforts to reach this goal. They have, in the course of recent years addressed several notes with constructive proposals to the USSR, the last dated September 23, 1952 to which no reply has yet been received. These notes responded to the overwhelming desire of the German people to see unity reestablished in freedom, as reflected most recently by the Resolution of the German Bundestag of June 10 of this year.

An early and orderly progress in this direction requires the co-operation of the Soviet Government.

考慮到最近發生的事件使德國統一問題具有特別迫切性，三國決心再度努力以求結束德國的分裂狀態。

因此，三國政府在和德意志聯邦政府協商後已經決定，建議在今年秋初舉行法國、聯合王國、美國和蘇聯四國外長會議，直接討論能夠導向德國問題的完滿解決——即組織自由選舉和成立自由的全德政府——的最初步驟。

這個會議也將考慮締結對奧和約問題。

五

三外長研究了遠東的局勢。

三外長在研究朝鮮的情勢時，對保衛着自由世界事業的包括不屈不撓的韓國軍隊在內的聯合國軍的英勇氣概重申欽佩。他們重申，他們大力支持聯合國軍司令部爲了早日締結停戰協定而作的努力，這種努力和聯合國的目的是一致的。他們重申他們的政府爲達到這一目的而繼續努力的決定。他們同意盡一切努力，協助堅強而且經過嚴重考驗的朝鮮人在他們自己選擇的制度下和平地重新獲得統一。

他們認爲，在目前的環境之下和進一步商談之前，三國對共產黨中國的共同政策應維持不變。他們決定，如果在停戰後，共產黨在朝鮮重新發動侵略並再度威脅聯合國所維護的原則的話，他們的政府將以聯合國會員國的身份再度支持恢復和平與安全的工作。

三國外長認爲，朝鮮停戰絕不應有危及亞洲任何其他地方和平的恢復與保障的結果。他們希望，聯合國所接受的任何停戰將爲各地的和平事業的向前邁進的一步，特別是在遠東方面。

三國外長研究了目前印度支那的局勢。三外長對法蘭西聯邦兵士的英勇努力與犧牲再度表示敬意，不管這些兵士是來自法國的、還是越南的、柬埔寨的、老撾的或聯邦其他部分的。他們同意：爲

Mindful of the special urgency which recent events have given to the question of the unification of Germany, the three Powers have resolved to make a new effort to bring to an end the division of Germany.

The three Governments have therefore decided, in consultation with the German Federal Government, to propose a meeting in the early autumn of the Foreign Ministers of France, the United Kingdom, the United States of America, and the USSR to discuss directly the first steps which should lead to a satisfactory solution of the German problem, namely, the organization of free elections and the establishment of a free all-German government.

This meeting should also consider the conclusion of the Austrian Treaty.

V

The three Ministers reviewed the situation in the Far East.

In reviewing the Korean situation the three Ministers reaffirmed their admiration for the gallantry of the United Nations forces, including the indomitable forces of the Republic of Korea, defending the free world's cause. They reaffirmed their strong support of the efforts of the United Nations Command to conclude an early armistice consistent with the United Nations' aims and the determination of their governments to continue to work toward that end. They agreed to pursue every effort to assist the stouthearted and sorely tried Koreans to reunite peacefully under institutions of their own choosing.

They considered that, in existing circumstances and pending further consultation, the common policies of the three Powers towards Communist China should be maintained. They resolved that, if the Communists should renew their aggression in Korea after an armistice and again threaten the principles defended by the United Nations, their Governments would as members of the United Nations again support the restoration of peace and security.

The Foreign Ministers were of the opinion that an armistice in Korea must not result in jeopardizing the restoration or the safeguarding of peace in any other part of Asia. They hope that any armistice accepted by the United Nations would be a step forward in the cause of peace everywhere, and in particular in the Far East.

The current situation in Indochina was examined. The three Foreign Ministers paid tribute once again to the heroic efforts and sacrifices of the soldiers of the French Union, be they from France, Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos or other parts of

保衛這三個國家的獨立而抵抗侵略的共產主義的鬥爭對自由世界是十分重要的。他們就早日達成一個令人滿意的結局和早日恢復印度支那和平的各種措施交換了意見。

聯合王國與美國的外長們對於法國政府建議與柬埔寨、老撾以及越南政府分別進行討論以便完成它們的主權與獨立一事感到非常滿意。他們同意，這個倡議是走向這四個國家的自由聯合臻於完善的目標的一個最重要的、最可喜的步驟，因為自由建立的立憲政權最能保障聯邦成員國的內部安全與穩定。

他們注意到法蘭西聯邦成爲一個和諧而有伸縮性的組織體系，在這個體系之中，參與國的共同利益，可以得到保障，它們的單獨利益也可獲得協調。他們深信，法國政府的目的是要與聯邦成員國一道來使共同希望的團結臻於完美。這種團結對於爭取這三個國家的獨立的共同鬥爭獲得成功是不可缺少的，並因此對於整個東南亞的安全也具有根本重要性。

(譯自一九五三年七月二十七日美國「國務院公報」)

the Union. They agreed that the struggle in defence of the independence of these three nations against aggressive Communism is essential to the free world, and they exchanged views on various measures to hasten a satisfactory outcome and the restoration of peace in Indochina.

The Foreign Ministers of the United Kingdom and the United States noted with great satisfaction the proposal of the French Government to open discussions with each of the Governments of Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam with a view toward completing their sovereignty and independence. They agreed that this initiative was a most important and auspicious step toward perfecting a free association of these four nations, since the internal security and stability of the Associated States are best safeguarded by freely established constitutional regimes.

They noted that the French Union offers a harmonious and flexible framework within which the mutual interest of the participants may be guaranteed and their individual interests reconciled. They are convinced that the objective of the French Government is to perfect with the Associated States that mutually desirable cohesion which is indispensable to the success of the common struggle for the independence of the three states and which is therefore of fundamental importance to the security of the whole of Southeast Asia.

(The Department of State Bulletin,
July 27, 1953)

(第二號)

巴特勒[●]在下院關於英、美、法三國外長華盛頓會議的演說(節錄)

一九五三年七月二十一日

SPEECH BY R. A. BUTLER IN HOUSE OF COMMONS ON CONFERENCE OF U.K., U.S. AND FRENCH FOREIGN MINISTERS IN WASHINGTON (EXCERPTS)

July 21, 1953

三國外長申明他們的決心：如果不幸對方在停戰後再在朝鮮實行侵略，並從而威脅了聯合國所維護的原則，作為聯合國會員國的三國政府將再度支持恢復和平與安全的工作。下院或記得首相早在一九五二年初說過的話：

「如果我們所企求的停戰達到了却又被破壞，我們的答覆將是迅速的、堅決的和有效的。」這仍然是女王陛下政府所持的態度。

外長們同時認為着重指出不應由於這一停戰而危害亞洲其他地區和平的恢復與維護是明智的。三年來朝鮮戰爭成為使遠東一般情況不能有任何改進的絕對障礙。朝鮮停戰不僅其本身是極有價值的，而且也如外長們所承認的，將為世界各地和平事業的邁進一步；尤其是，它將給予我們一個機會，在擬議的政治會議中用和平方法來解決朝鮮問題，這樣就為以後解決遠東其他懸而未決的問題開闢道路。

有些議員先生們或許要求我們在停戰協定簽字後就應立即設法解決諸如中國在聯合國的代表權和聯合國的戰略禁運這一類困難的問題。下院知道得很清楚，在對中國輸出戰略物資的問題上，我們是擁護聯合國一九五一年五月的決議的，而且我們是嚴格執行這個決議，並且要繼續這樣做下去。同時，女王陛下政府的政策要發展非安全管制對象的

The three Foreign Ministers stated their resolve that if, unhappily, the other side should renew their aggression in Korea after an armistice and thus threaten the principles defended by the United Nations, their Governments would, as members of the United Nations, again support the restoration of peace and security. The House will probably recall the words used by the Prime Minister early in 1952:

"If the truce we seek is reached only to be broken our response will be prompt, resolute and effective." This still remains the attitude of Her Majesty's Government.

The Foreign Ministers also considered it prudent to emphasise that an armistice must not result in jeopardising the restoration or the safeguarding of peace in any other part of Asia. The hostilities in Korea have for three years acted as an absolute bar to any improvement in the general situation in the Far East. An armistice in Korea will not only be of the highest value of itself but, as the Foreign Ministers recognised, a step forward in the cause of peace everywhere. It will, in particular, give us an opportunity to settle the Korean question by peaceful means at the proposed political conference and thus open the way thereafter for a settlement of other outstanding problems in the Far East.

Some hon. Members may urge us that, as soon as the armistice is signed, we should try to solve at once such difficult problems as Chinese representation in the United Nations and the United Nations strategic embargo. As the House is well aware, we stand by the United Nations Resolution of May, 1951, in respect of the export of strategic goods to China. What is more, we are carrying this out rigorously, and intend to continue to do so. At the same time, it is the policy of Her Majesty's Government to develop trade in goods

● 美國財政大臣，此時代理首相。

貨物的貿易。我們相信這種非戰略物資的貿易對於自由世界是有好處的。

女王陛下政府已經明白表示我們在中國代表權和戰略禁運這一類問題上的政策必須與其他聯合國會員國在停戰後適當的時機共同重加考慮，這要看遠東局勢發展如何。同時，如外長們所聲明的，我們現時的政策必須維持。我們應當決定一步一步前進。首先在停戰後必須繼以朝鮮的政治解決，然後，將來最好的希望就是在進展中的每一階段都把它結實地鞏固起來。

在白皮書中發表的公報另外還有一段是關於印度支那問題的。下院當已注意到法國政府在七月三日對印度支那聯邦各成員國所作的宣言。在這個宣言中，法國政府表示願意通過商談在法蘭西聯邦內增進各聯邦成員國的獨立與主權。在華盛頓，這一宣言為我的尊敬的朋友杜勒斯先生所熱烈歡迎。我確信今天下院也要對這一宣言表示歡迎。

在女王陛下政府方面，它曾經並將繼續對法蘭西聯邦部隊在他們的鬥爭中給予我們力所能及的一切物質援助。這一鬥爭的勝利結局對東南亞和對自由世界都是關係極其重大的事。

關於埃及我要說一些話。我的尊敬的朋友代理外交大臣也曾和杜勒斯先生討論到埃及的局勢。這些會談證實了我們和我們的美國朋友在這件事上有着很大程度的一致。特別是，會談證明了我們雙方都認為在蘇彝士運河區域保持一個有效基地對世界和平是必要的。我的尊敬的朋友曾和杜勒斯先生詳細地研討在埃及的合作下使這一點有所保證的最好方法……

以下我想談一談會議的主要和中心問題，那就是在九月間舉行關於德國和奧國問題的四國會談的建議。如果我們看一看華盛頓會議的結果，我想我們一定會同意這個會議不僅成功地建立了和鞏固了有關大國在目標和宗旨上的完全一致，而且還標誌着向緩和緊張局勢前進的重要的一步。而且——我

which are not the subject of security controls. We believe this trade in non-strategic goods is to the advantage of the free world.

Her Majesty's Government have already made clear that our policies on such subjects as Chinese representation and the strategic embargo will have to be reconsidered in concert with the other members of the United Nations at the appropriate time after an armistice, depending on how events develop in the Far East. Meanwhile, as the Foreign Ministers stated, our present policies should be maintained. We should resolve to move forward step by step. First after an armistice must come a political settlement in Korea, and then the best hope for the future will be a firm consolidation at each stage of advance.

There is one other passage in the communiqué published in the White Paper on the subject of Indo-China. The House will have taken note of the declaration made on 3rd July to the Associate States of Indo-China by the French Government. In that the latter express their willingness to promote, by negotiations, the independence and sovereignty of the Associate States within the French Union. This declaration was warmly welcomed at Washington by my noble Friend Mr. Dulles, and I feel sure the House would want to welcome it today.

Her Majesty's Government, for their part, have given and will continue to give all such material aid as lies within our resources to the French Union forces in their struggle. A successful outcome of this struggle is a matter of the utmost concern to South-East Asia and to the free world.

I want to say a word about Egypt. My noble Friend the acting Foreign Secretary also discussed with Mr. Dulles the situation in Egypt. These talks confirmed the wide measure of agreement between us and our American friends on this subject. In particular, they showed that we both consider that the maintenance of an effective base in the Suez Canal area is essential in the interests of world peace. My noble Friend discussed in detail with Mr. Dulles the best means of ensuring this with Egyptian co-operation. . . .

From now on I should like to deal with the main and central theme of the Conference, namely, the proposal for four-Power talks in September on the subject of Germany and Austria. When we look on the results of the Washington Conference, I think we must agree that it has not only successfully established and consolidated the absolute unity of aim and purpose of the great Powers involved but has also marked a notable

希望下院注意到這一點——又表現所決定的路線得到了我們北大西洋條約各盟國和德意志聯邦政府的支持。

會議也證實了我的最尊敬的朋友首相在他的五月十一日的演說中所提出的主要論點的明智。在英國和在許多其他國家很自然地引起大家的思考的第一個論點是：不應錯過任何機會——的確，應當去尋求和找出一個機會——藉直接接觸去研究莫斯科在斯大林死後有沒有任何新的思想情況。我的最尊敬的朋友的願望是要鼓勵蘇聯新領袖們爲了真正緩和緊張局勢和使國際摩擦根源有所調和或至少有所減輕可能表現的一切傾向。

首相的另一論點——這或者爲若干方面所忽視——是西方世界必須保持它的團結和實力並發展我們的安全和繼續繁榮所繫的一切制度。我特別想到北大西洋條約組織和現有的或在計劃中的各項歐洲組織、煤鋼聯營集團、歐洲防務集團和歐洲政治集團。這些機構，並非如有些人所想的，只是爲抵抗從一九四五年起發展起來的蘇聯的威脅的拱壁。它們也是——而這是更爲重要的——對現代世界要求各國，不分大小，爲和平、安全和幸福更密切地合作的答覆。

如果議員先生們翻出公報第四頁並讀一讀該頁上小節（乙），他們就會明白這一點已由華盛頓公報的措辭證實了。即使幸而能與蘇聯達成某種調和辦法，這些機構亦正如現在一樣是不可缺少的。無論如何，在我們現在面臨的情況之下，這些機構對我們的安全說是極其重要的。正是由於那些使這些機構得以建立和發展而作的犧牲和有效的與忠誠的努力才使蘇聯與西方國家之間的均勢正在恢復中，雖則我們應該記得到現在還沒有恢復過來。因爲西方國家已經表現出這樣的團結而且已經建立起它們的防禦力量，才有現在如我們大家所希望的和蘇聯領袖們舉行商談的可能性。

我還要使下院記得我的最尊敬的朋友在五月十一日那一天對於德國問題所寄予的重視，他把這個問題稱爲：「當然是歐洲最重要的問題。」他又說：

step forward towards the relaxation of tension. It is further evident—and I hope the House will notice this—that the line decided upon has the support of our North Atlantic Treaty partners and of the German Federal Government.

The Conference has also confirmed the wisdom of the main themes put forward by my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister in his speech on 11th May. The first of these themes, which naturally fired popular imagination both there and in many other countries, was that no opportunity should be missed—indeed, one should be sought and found—to explore by direct contact any new mood in Moscow after the death of Stalin. My right hon. Friend's wish was to encourage whatever tendencies the new leaders of the Soviet Union might show for a genuine relaxation in tension and for the composing, or at least easing, of sources of international friction.

Another theme of the Prime Minister's which has perhaps been overlooked in some quarters, was that the Western World must maintain its unity and strength and develop the institutions upon which our safety and continued prosperity depend. I have particularly in mind the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and the existing or projected European organisations, the Coal and Steel Community, the European Defense Community and the European Political Community. These institutions are not, as some have thought, simply a buttress against the Soviet menace as it has developed since 1945. They are also—and this is even more important—a response to the requirements of the modern world for a closer working together of nations, great and small, in the interest of peace, security and welfare.

If hon. Members will turn to page 4 of the communiqué and read subsection (b) on that page, they will see that this is borne out in the terms of the communiqué from Washington. Even if, happily, some composition with the Soviet Union could be obtained, these institutions would therefore be just as necessary as they are now. In any case, in the situation facing us they are vital to our security. It is the sacrifices and the efficient and loyal work responsible for their creation and development which are redressing, although we should remember that they have not yet redressed the balance of power between the Soviet Union, and the West. It is only because the West has shown this unity and built up its defensive strength that there is now, as we all hope, a possibility of discussion with the Soviet leaders.

I would also remind the House of the importance which my right hon. Friend attached on 11th May to the German problems, which he described as, "of course, the dominating problem in Europe." He also said:

「雖然我們很希望看到和蘇俄達成友好的解決辦法，或者即使是有改進的臨時協定，但是，我們決心絕不背棄我們已承擔的有關西德的義務……西德絕不會被犧牲或……在我們和其他北大西洋條約組織的國家與它簽訂的協定的範圍之內絕不會不再是它自己命運的主宰。」（一九五三年五月十一日正式報告，「英國議會辯論集」第五一五期）

首相也已表明他認為使有關西歐的自由與安全問題和俄國的安全獲得調和不是不可能的。我們之中凡是期望從華盛頓會談中產生廣泛的、建設性的可能性的人一定都希望這個俄國的一般安全與一切有關國家的自由與安全仍待調和的艱巨問題，決不是不能解決的問題。

我以為祇有這樣去回憶我的最尊敬的朋友在五月十一日所提出的主要目標，我們才能適當地估量最近的會議所獲致的成就。祇有這樣，我們才能估計目前關於調和動向和推行首相所倡議的調和我們與蘇聯間的極為真實與重大的爭端，而不致危害我們的偉大西方同盟的力量、繁榮和團結的前景是怎樣的。

華盛頓會談已經顯示三個西方同盟國在與蘇聯政府在不太遙遠的將來舉行高級會談的希望上同意一致。華盛頓會談使西方三個盟國對於處理因東歐自由精神的激盪所引起的新局勢的最好的辦法意見一致。它們已重申有保持甚至加強歐洲團結的發展和西方軍事防務的必要性，而且它們確認現行的三國共同對德政策的健全性，這一政策並獲得了德意志聯邦政府的支持。

我想用一兩分鐘研究一下這些對德的政策。它們可簡單地綜合為兩個項目。第一，儘速使波恩條約和歐洲防務集團條約發生效力。第二，在以九月二十三日我們的照會為最後一個的去年盟國歷次照會中所說明的唯一可能符合德國自由的基礎上，實現德國的重新統一。最近，這已由首相上月緊接在柏林及東德發生罷工和其他事件之後致德意志聯邦總理的信中重新予以明確說明了。

“Strong as is our desire to see a friendly settlement with Soviet Russia, or even an improved *modus vivendi*, we are resolved not in any way to fail in the obligations to which we have committed ourselves about Western Germany . . . which will in no way be sacrificed or . . . cease to be master of its own fortunes within the agreements we and other N.A.T.O. countries have made with them.”—(Official Report, 11th May, 1953; Vol. 515, c.894)

The Prime Minister also made it clear that he did not think it impossible to reconcile these problems concerning the freedom and safety of Western Europe with the security of Russia. All of us who look ahead for wide, constructive possibilities to arise out of the Washington talks, will hope that the immense problem still of reconciling the general security of Russia with the freedom and safety of all the nations involved is by no means an insoluble problem.

It is only, I think, by recalling in this way the major objectives that were set out by my right hon. Friend on 11th May that we can properly judge what has been achieved at the recent meeting. Only thus can we assess what are the present prospects for composing the momentum and carrying forward his initiative for composing our great and very real differences with the Soviet Union without endangering the strength, prosperity and unity of our great Western alliance.

The Washington talks have revealed agreement among the three Western Allies about the desirability of high level talks with the Soviet Government at a date not too far distant. They have enabled the three Western Allies to agree on the best way to handle the new situation created by the stirring of the spirit of freedom in Eastern Europe. They have re-affirmed the necessity for maintaining, and even strengthening, the development of European unity, and the military defences of the West, and they have confirmed the soundness of the existing tripartite policies towards Germany, which have also enjoyed the support of the German Federal Government.

I should like for a moment or two to examine these policies towards Germany. They can be briefly summed up under two heads. First, the entry into force as soon as possible of the Bonn and the European Defence Community Treaties. Secondly, the re-unification of Germany on the only possible basis consistent with German freedom, as set out in the Allied Notes of last year, culminating in our Note of 23rd September. This was most recently and clearly restated in the message sent to the German Federal Chancellor by the Prime Minister last month immediately after the strikes and other events in Berlin and East Germany.

當然，在若干方面，如對於這種會談的時間和性質以及所應包括的事項過去曾有並且現在無疑地還有某種不同的意見。甚至對於會談的主角究竟是大人物還是小人物似乎也有不同的意見。但是我要提醒下院，恢復蘇聯與西方國家之間的接觸這件事本身並非目的，而只是達到一種目的的手段，這個目的就是緩和國際緊張局勢。因此，三國外長已發出他們在九月底召開關於德奧問題會議的邀請。我們現在等待蘇聯政府的答覆。

我確信我是表白了女王陛下政府和下院的誠懇希望——而且這也是我們的美國和法國盟國及所有有關國家的人民所共有的希望——蘇聯政府會接受我們的邀請。我相信這種會談可如此進行，從而可導致具有更廣大意義的其他會談，有如首相在他的原來的提議中所建議的一個無限制的高級接觸。九月會談的用意不是代替這種進一步的討論，而是作為它的序幕，假使，如我們和我們的盟國所希望的，能有真正進展的話。

我的尊敬的朋友樞密院大臣曾在美國公開說——並在他回到英國以後也向我證實這一點——目前的建議決不排斥或會排斥這一次的會談無論在參加的人員或在討論的事項方面的擴大。我們的目的是要建立橋樑，而不是聳立障礙。下院同樣也必須記得一味前進，宛如一切障礙都不存在，很可能只會產生一種無情的和愈益增加的失望和灰心。下院想還記得首相在他的五月十一日的演說中說到如果「期望使世界的共產主義部分與非共產主義部分分裂的嚴重的、基本的爭論可以一舉而由一個廣泛的協定來解決」，這將是一個錯誤。「決不應輕視個別問題的零星解決或輕率地把它丟開。」（一九五三年五月十一日正式報告，「英國議會辯論集」第五一五期）

當然，不能說現在提議來這樣零星地解決的問題是次要的問題。歐洲的關鍵問題和西方國家與蘇聯的關係的關鍵問題是德奧問題，這在近幾週中已是愈來愈明顯了。上月的柏林及東德事件以及即將在數週後舉行的德意志聯邦選舉都使這一點絲毫無可置疑。

Of course, there have been, and no doubt still are in some quarters, certain differences of opinion about the timing of such talks, about their nature and the topics which they should cover. There appear even to be differences of opinion as to whether the protagonists are pygmies or giants. But I would remind the House that the resumption of contact between the Soviet Union and the Western Powers is not an end in itself but the means to an end, namely, the relaxation of international tension. And so the three Foreign Ministers have issued their invitation for a meeting on Germany and Austria to be held about the end of September, and we now await the answer of the Soviet Government.

I do not doubt that I am expressing the sincere hope of Her Majesty's Government, and of the House—and that this is shared by our United States and French allies, and by the peoples of all the countries concerned—that the Soviet Government will accept our invitation. I trust that these talks may be so conducted that they may lead the way to other talks of even wider import, such as the Prime Minister suggested in his original proposal for an unrestricted high level contact. These talks in September are intended not as a substitute for, but as a prelude to, such further discussions, if, as we and our allies hope, real progress can be made.

My noble Friend the Lord President of the Council stated publicly in America—and he has confirmed this to me on arrival in England—that the present proposal in no way excludes or excluded a widening of the present talks in terms either of personalities or of topics. Our aim is to build bridges and not to erect barriers. Equally the House must remember that to proceed as if no barriers exist might well only produce a cruel and mounting sense of disappointment and disillusionment. The House will recall that in his speech of 11th May the Prime Minister said that it would be a mistake to “expect that the grave, fundamental issues which divide the Communist and non-Communist parts of the world could be settled at a stroke by a single comprehensive agreement. Piecemeal solutions of individual problems should not be disdained or improvidently put aside.”—(Official Report, 11th May, 1953; Vol. 515. c. 899)

Of course, it cannot be said that the problems now suggested for such piecemeal solutions are minor problems. It has become increasingly obvious in recent weeks that the key problem in Europe and in Western relations with the Soviet Union is the problem of Germany. The events in Berlin and in East Germany last month and the Federal elections to take place in a few weeks have made this clear beyond all manner of doubt.

歷史悠久的法國安全問題、歐洲協調的復活以及美國與歐洲繼續合作的程度很可能都一樣要看德國問題如何解決而定。與蘇聯任何一級的領袖舉行的任何會議都一定要討論到德國問題。我們認為，在一九五三年已不能把德國僅僅看作是四國決定的對象——俄國人似乎還這樣想，如果我們從我們最近所得的證據即去年所交換的照會來看的話。

凡與德國有關的事與聯邦政府充分磋商，這早已成為西方同盟國的慣例，最近由於華盛頓會議的決定而發出的照會當然也是這樣辦的。但是，在和蘇聯政府解決德國問題或談判——或即使是討論——對德和約之前，必須有一個能夠談判這種和約和能夠自由決定自己的國際關係的自由的全德政府。因此，如最近盟國的照會中所正確地着重指出的，要和俄國人討論的第一個而且是必要的問題是在德國全境舉行自由選舉和組織一個自由的全德政府問題。此事一經辦到，談判對德和約、解決歐洲中心問題以及從而減輕歐洲緊張局勢，都可有真正的進展。

我還要提醒下院，我們現在所建議的——這必然是隨着我們去年九月二十三日的照會所作的建議而來的——已由德意志聯邦議院最近在六月十日由包括社會民主黨在內的各民主政黨通過的決議所認可，僅共產黨投票反對。我認為值得促起下院注意在這樣近的期間在聯邦議院內得到如此廣泛支持的五點決議。決議的五點如下：

「第一，在德國全境舉行自由選舉；第二，成立全德的自由政府；第三，與這個政府締結自由同意的和約；第四，在和約中調整一切尚待解決的領土問題；第五，保障全德政府在聯合國的基本原則和目的之範圍內有行動自由。」

這是聯邦議院的五點決議，而這五點是符合我們去年的照會中所作的建議並且符合因華盛頓會議的結果現在所提出的建議。

The age-long problem of French security, the renaissance of the Concert of Europe and the degree of continued collaboration of the United States with Europe may well alike depend on the nature of the German settlement. Any meeting with the Soviet leaders at any level must involve a discussion of the German problem. Nor in our view can Germany be treated in 1953 simply as an object of four-Power decisions, as the Russians still seem to think, if we are to judge from the last evidence we have, that is, the Notes exchanged last year.

The Western allies have long made it their practice to consult fully with the Federal Government on all matters concerning Germany and this was, of course, done in the latest Note sent as a result of the Washington decisions. But before the German problem can be settled or a peace treaty negotiated, or even discussed, with the Soviet Government, there must be a free, all-German Government, able to negotiate such a treaty and free to decide its own international relations. Therefore, as the latest allied Note rightly emphasises, the first and essential problem to be discussed with the Russians is that of free elections throughout Germany and the formation of a free all-German Government. Once this has been done real progress can be made in negotiating a German peace treaty, in resolving the central problem of Europe and thus reducing tension in Europe.

I would further remind the House that what we are now proposing—and this necessarily follows from the proposals made in our Note of 23rd September last year—has had the approval of the German Bundestag in a resolution adopted as recently as 10th June by all the democratic parties, including the S.P.D., the Communists alone having voted against it. I think it would be worthwhile reminding the House of the five points which were themselves so widely supported in the Bundestag at such a recent date. The five points of the resolution were as follows:

First, the holding of free elections in the whole of Germany; second, the establishment of a free Government for the whole of Germany; third, the conclusion of a freely agreed peace treaty with this Government; fourth, the regulation in the Peace Treaty of all territorial questions still remaining open; and fifth, the safeguarding of freedom of action for an all-German Government within the framework of the basic principles and aims of the United Nations.

Such were the five points of the Bundestag resolution, and these points conform to the proposals made in our Notes last year, and to the proposals now put forward as a result of the Washington Conference.

我們知道這一關於德國問題的談判不是一件容易的工作，但有如我的最尊敬的朋友肯特在他六月二十四日致德意志聯邦總理的信件中所說的，我們的建議——

「為實現我們關於德意志自由重新統一之共同目標提供了唯一的基礎。」

我們希望蘇維埃政府能設法和西方國家在這一基礎上進行談判。

在這裏我要放下德國問題轉而談到也列在議程上的奧地利問題。我們已在我們的照會中建議，在擬議中的四國外長會議上，也必須就對奧和約達成最後協議。這當然是一個完全不同的問題，並且應當是比德國問題容易解決得多。在這個問題上我們也是仍然等待蘇聯對我們的照會的答覆，雖然應當承認這是更近的一個照會，即六月十一日要求蘇維埃政府表示它準備簽訂什麼樣的條約的那一個照會。

如果說這個擬議中的關於德國問題的談判將是困難而複雜的，那麼對實際上數月來，的確，數年來已準備好簽字的對奧和約就不可能這樣談了。所有奧地利的朋友都同意這是在歐洲恢復信心一個重大而必要的步驟。因此，擬議的議程決不能因它範圍太狹小或只是包括些會使專家們陷入而拔不出來的細節而加以拒絕。它既包括歐洲前途的中心問題，也包括我們與蘇聯之間一個差不多已經解決而且只要有這個意願現在就可以在一個會議上解決的問題。

如果我們的邀請如我們所希望的被接受了，我們將不以過分刻板的精神來參加這個談判。西方國家同德國人民一樣要一個和約並且要盡快地有一個和約，但他們對某些基本原則是不能妥協的，因為如果沒有這些原則，與蘇聯達成的任何一般協定，無論它是怎樣好看，無論我們大家對它如何盼望，都將是一無價值的。

這些原則可用下面的話來總括——所有有關人民和國家，包括東德和東柏林的居民，應有內政上的抉擇自由和不受外來侵略的安全。

We realise that this German negotiation will not be an easy task, but, as my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister said in his message to the German Federal Chancellor on 24th June, our proposals—

“provide the only basis for achieving our common aim of a Germany re-united in freedom.”

It is our hope that the Soviet Government may see their way to negotiate with the Western Powers on this basis.

Here I will leave the German problem and come to the question of Austria, which is also on the agenda. We have suggested in our Note that final agreement should also be reached at the proposed four-Power meeting of Foreign Ministers on the Austrian Treaty. This is, of course, a completely different question, and should be much easier to solve than that of Germany. Here again, we are still awaiting the answer from the Soviet to our Note, although admittedly a more recent Note, namely, that of 11th June last, asking the Soviet Government to say what Treaty they would be prepared to sign.

If it is suggested that the proposed German negotiations will be difficult and complicated, no such suggestion can possibly be made about the Austrian Treaty, which has stood virtually ready for signature for many months and indeed years. All friends of Austria will agree that here is a vital and essential step in restoring confidence in Europe. The proposed agenda, therefore, can in no sense be rejected as unduly limited or restricted or as covering only details, in which experts may get bogged down. It covers at once the central question for the future of Europe, and also the one question between ourselves and the Soviet Union which is already almost settled and which could now be settled at one meeting, given the will to do so.

If, as we hope, our invitation is accepted, we shall not enter these talks in any unduly rigid spirit. The Western Powers, like the German people themselves, want a peace treaty and want it as soon as possible, but there are certain essential principles on which there can be no compromise and without which no general agreement with the Soviet Union, however attractive and however much we all desire it, would be worth the paper on which it is written.

These principles can be summed up in the words—internal freedom of choice and security against external aggression for all the peoples and countries concerned, including the populations of East Germany and East Berlin.

現在我要說到華盛頓會議的第二項主要的成就。我首先要提到三個外長一致同意這一成就是和實現我們與蘇聯政府進行談判的目的和為德國及奧地利問題早日取得解決的目的分不開的。這個成就當時是而且現在仍是在公報中重申我們的根本目的——和平、安全和我們人民的幸福——祇有保持和發展西方的團結一致才能取得。因此彼此同意我們應堅決地——然而不是挑釁地——走我們已經選擇的道路，這些道路現在對我們已很有好處，這就是北大西洋條約組織和通過煤鋼聯營集團與歐洲防務集團使歐洲更能緊密聯系在一起。在這個階段，我願一提一九五一年九月十四日由最尊敬的南留伊沙選區議員簽字的華盛頓宣言中的一段話，原文如下：

「三國外長聲明他們的政府的目的在於使一個民主的德國在平等的基礎上加入歐洲大陸集團，而這一集團本身將成為在不斷發展中的大西洋集團一部分。」

我們現正繼續和實現這一政策。

英國人民現在應當很清楚地看到，給予援助的想法已成過去了，因此作為一個國家我們必須準備在我們的經濟獨立的可以自豪的旗幟之下肩負起我們的巨大防務負擔。我們無論何時都歡迎人家購買我們的裝備，同時我們亦獲有一些訂貨單和一些我們可以信賴的幫助。但是在經濟和財政方面我們愈能自立，我們的影響就愈大，我們在國際議事中的發言就愈有力量。

(譯自一九五三年七月十七日——二十三日
「英國議會辯論集」第二六三期)

I turn now to the second main achievement of the Washington Conference. I would refer first to the fact that the three Foreign Ministers were agreed that it was inseparable from the achievement of our aim of negotiation with the Soviet Government and of finding an early solution for the German and Austrian problems. This was and is a re-affirmation in the communiqué that our fundamental aims—peace and security and the welfare of our peoples—can be gained only by maintaining and developing the unity and solidarity of the West. It was therefore agreed that we should all keep firmly, although unprovocatively, to the paths we have chosen, which are serving us well—the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and the closer bringing together of Europe through the Coal and Steel Community and the European Defence Community. I would recall at this stage the passage from the Washington Declaration of 14th September, 1951, signed by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Lewisham, South, which reads as follows:

“The three Foreign Ministers declare that their Governments aim at the inclusion of a democratic Germany on a basis of equality in a continental European Community which itself will form a part of a constantly developing Atlantic Community.”

We are now continuing and carrying out that policy.

It must now be clear to the British people that the mood of aid is passing away, and we must therefore prepare ourselves as a country to carry our immense defence burden under the proud flag of our own economic independence. We shall always welcome purchases of our equipment, and we have in the meantime some orders and some help on which we can rely. But the more we stand on our own economic and financial legs, the greater will be our influence and the better our voice in the counsels of the nations.

(Weekly Hansard, No. 263, 17th July-23rd July 1953)

(第三號)

美英法三國外長倫敦會議公報

一九五三年十月十八日

COMMUNIQUE ISSUED BY U.S., U.K., AND FRENCH
FOREIGN MINISTERS AFTER THEIR CONFERENCE
IN LONDON

October 18, 1953

聯合王國、法國和美國外長已經結束了它們研究目前局勢和共同問題的另一次定期會議。預定在艾登先生返任之後舉行的這一次會議已於十月十六、十七和十八三日在英國外交部舉行了。

三國外長通過了致蘇聯政府關於討論德國和奧國問題的覆照。三國政府在致蘇聯的照會中，再度邀請蘇聯參加早日舉行的外長會議。他們希望蘇聯將決定接受。他們相信，這種會議對緩和國際緊張局勢和解決歐洲主要問題將是一個具有無上價值的步驟。

三國外長研究了里雅斯特問題。他們同意堅持他們的共同努力，使該地區獲得持久的解決。

三國外長以嚴重關懷的心情注意到最近發生的一些事件，其中最激烈之一是以色列十月十四日在基比亞採取的武裝行動。根據三國外長獲得的消息，這次武裝行動已使約旦遭到嚴重的生命與財產的損失。他們追述了一九五〇年五月二十五日的確申三國政府在聯合國內外立即採取行動防止侵犯邊境或停戰綫的決心的三國宣言。他們因此共同要求安全理事會召開緊急會議，來考慮以色列與毗鄰的阿拉伯國家間的緊張局勢，特別是最近的暴力行動事件以及關於遵守和執行停戰總協定的問題。

他們研究了遠東局勢。三國政府堅決支持和鞏固朝鮮的停戰，將在執行停戰協定上繼續合作，並將繼續爭取早日召開協定所規定的政治會議，以便

The Foreign Ministers of the United Kingdom, France, and the United States have completed another of their periodic meetings to examine the current situation and common problems. The present discussions arranged to follow Mr. Eden's return, were held at the Foreign Office on October 16, 17, and 18.

The three Ministers approved the reply to the Soviet Union concerning discussions on Germany and Austria. In their Notes the three Governments have renewed their invitation to the Soviet Union to attend an early meeting of the Foreign Ministers. They hope that the Soviet Union will decide to accept. They believe that such a meeting would be an invaluable step towards a reduction of international tension and a solution of major European problems.

The Ministers examined the problem of Trieste. They agreed to persevere in their joint efforts to bring about a lasting settlement in that area.

The three Foreign Ministers noted with grave concern the recent incidents culminating in Israeli armed action of October 14 in Qibya, which, according to their information, resulted in serious loss of life and property inside Jordan. They recalled the tripartite declaration of May 25, 1950, affirming the determination of their Governments immediately to take action, within and outside the United Nations, to prevent any violation of frontiers or armistice lines. They have therefore jointly requested an urgent meeting of the Security Council to consider the tension between Israel and the neighbouring Arab States, with particular reference to recent acts of violence and to compliance with and enforcement of the general armistice agreements.

They reviewed the situation in the Far East. In their strong determination to uphold and consolidate the truce in Korea the three Governments will continue to cooperate in carrying out the armistice agreement and to work for the early convening of a political conference, as provided in the agreement, in order to achieve a peaceful settlement of the Korean question. Mr. Dulles

實現朝鮮問題的和平解決。杜勒斯先生通知他的同僚們美國政府爲了安排雙方代表會談所作的努力。

法國外交部長報告了截至目前爲止在印度支那所獲得的戰果，並且報告了法國爲實現法國七月三日的聲明而與印度支那聯邦成員國進行的談判的進展情形。三大國外長一致認爲，這個戰爭的勝利結束，對於由朝鮮停戰而開始的重建亞洲和平的工作，將是一個重要步驟。

(譯自一九五三年十月十九日倫敦「泰晤士報」)

informed his colleagues of the efforts which the United States Government is making to arrange a meeting of emissaries of each side.

The French Foreign Minister gave an account of the military results obtained thus far in Indo-China, as well as the progress made in the negotiations with the Associated States in order to carry out the French declaration of July 3. The three Ministers agreed that the successful conclusion of this war will be an essential step towards the re-establishment of peace in Asia begun by the armistice in Korea.

(The Times, London, October 19, 1953)

(第四號)

杜勒斯在「紐約先驅論壇報」座談會上關於美英法三國外長 倫敦會議的演說 (節錄)

一九五三年十月二十日

SPEECH BY JOHN FOSTER DULLES AT NEW YORK HERALD TRIBUNE FORUM CONCERNING CONFERENCE OF U.S., U.K. AND FRENCH FOREIGN MINISTERS IN LONDON (EXCERPTS)

October 20, 1953

我昨天從倫敦歸來。在倫敦，我會晤了英國的邱吉爾爵士、艾登先生和法國的皮杜爾先生。

這次會議本身就說明了自由世界各國間所作的那種努力。同自由世界的會議每次情形幾乎一樣，最初是有分歧意見的。一俟我們在十分誠摯的氣氛中專心於建設性的努力時，這些分歧意見便很快地變成不重要了。

我們考慮了德國問題。德國應該爲自己的防務以及爲歐洲的防務出一把力，原是正常的事情，但是德國的軍事力量也絕不得再度成爲一種威脅。自由世界需要德國爲一資財，但是，西方的文明絕不能再度遭受自我造成的傷害的悲劇。

於是法國人創造了一種使西歐成爲一個單一的防務與政治集團的統一的想法，德國人贊成了這個意見。這樣，在其他情形下會互相衝突的目標便由一個統一的原則解決了。這個原則正在政治方面被

I returned yesterday from a trip to London, where I met with Sir Winston Churchill and Mr. Eden of Great Britain and M. Bidault of France.

This meeting in itself illustrates the kind of effort that is being made between free world nations. As in almost every case of free world meetings, there were initial differences. These quickly fell into the background as we immersed ourselves in constructive efforts conducted in an atmosphere of complete cordiality.

We considered the problem of Germany. It is normal that Germany should contribute to its own defense and that of Europe. But also German military strength must never again become menace. The free world needs the Germans as an asset. But western civilization must never again be exposed to the tragedy of self-inflicted wounds.

So, French minds invented, and German minds endorsed, the unifying idea of making western Europe into a single defense and political community. Thus two objectives, which otherwise would clash, are resolved by a unifying

採用。作出決定的時候是臨近了。在倫敦，我們對這個歐洲計劃予以最強有力的支持。

同時，我們考慮了德國統一問題，現在，德國的東部仍舊為蘇聯所佔有。我們再次邀請蘇聯外交部長和我們舉行會議，來討論這個重要問題。我們建議在十一月九日開會。

我們的看法是：很少有幾件事情會比和蘇聯統治者舉行祇產生達成協議的幻想而無達成協議的實際的會議更為危險。因此，我們建議舉行一次討論德國問題的外長會議作為一種考驗。這可以提供對下述問題的答案，即蘇聯政府是否願意在這種條件下舉行會議，就是說以充分具體而有意義的方式對它的意圖做實際的考驗。這是目前擺在蘇聯面前的唯一方案。蘇聯對這個方案的決定正是我們現在所等待的。我們希望會得到表示同意的答覆；無論如何這個答覆將要有所表明。

的里雅斯特是一個歷史上有仇恨的地區。現在正擬訂一種足以消除這種仇恨的新的辦法。這個新辦法就是要使南斯拉夫和意大利以及北大西洋條約組織其他盟國都在一個旨在保障南歐的安全和幸福的共同戰略之下相聯合。南斯拉夫如果不和與其為鄰的北大西洋條約組織國家——土耳其、希臘、意大利——聯合起來，便不能確保其為一個獨立國家。上述國家中有些國家已經舉行過會談，希望擬訂出共同的戰略。但是，由於的里雅斯特始終是一個造成分裂和有限制作用的因素，這些會談都沒有獲得充分的結果。

南斯拉夫事實上已在管理的里雅斯特土地的一半（乙區），英國和美國則是另外一半（甲區）的佔領國，而甲區的居民以意大利人為數。因此，經過多番研究之後，我們決定把甲區的管理權交給意大利。我們認為這樣可以為最後的和平解決鋪平道路。

美國已經多方設法加強南歐，其中包括南斯拉夫在內。我們不讓我們受到不同的意見的阻礙；這種不同意見是很多的。在共同的危險當前時，我們已對更重要的團結概念予以考慮：這就是英、法、美三國在倫敦會議中所採取的觀念。我們希望意大利和南斯拉夫也將加以尊重。

我們考慮了使以色列和各鄰國關係惡化的嚴重暴力事件。聯合國曾在建立以色列國上起了主要的

principle. This principle is in the course of political adoption. Days of decision are near. In London we gave the European project our strongest backing.

At the same time we considered the unification of Germany, of which the eastern portion is still held by the Soviet Union. We again invited the Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union to meet with us, to discuss this vital matter. We suggested November 9 as a date.

It is our view that few things would be more dangerous than a meeting with Soviet rulers which produced the illusion of agreement, without the reality of agreement. Therefore we proposed as a sort of test a meeting of foreign ministers about Germany. This will provide an answer to whether the Soviet Government is willing to have a meeting on terms which will provide an actual testing of its intentions in terms sufficiently concrete to be significant. That is the single project now before the Soviets. Their decision in relation to that is what we now await. We hope that the answer will be affirmative. In any event it will be revealing.

Trieste is an area of historic bitternesses. A new concept is in the making which could bury these bitternesses. It would draw Yugoslavia together with Italy and the other NATO allies in a common strategy designed to ensure the safety and well-being of South Europe. Yugoslavia cannot be sure as an independent nation without association with its NATO neighbors—Turkey, Greece and Italy. Conversations between some of them have been taking place, in the hope of developing a common strategy. But these conversations failed of adequate results because Trieste was always a divisive and limiting factor.

Yugoslavia is already administering de facto half of the Trieste territory (Zone B). Great Britain and the United States are the occupying powers in the other half (Zone A). This zone is predominantly Italian. So, after many explorations we concluded to relinquish the administration of Zone A to Italy. We believe this will pave the way to a final peaceful solution.

The United States has sought in many ways to strengthen southern Europe, including Yugoslavia. We have not allowed ourselves to be deterred by points of disagreement, of which there are plenty. We have given priority to the higher concept of unity in the face of common peril. That is the concept which England, France and the United States embraced at London, and which we hope will be honored by both Italy and Yugoslavia.

We considered the grave incidents of violence which mar Israel's relations with its neighbors. It was the United Nations which played an essential

作用，我們認為現在顯然是要求有對聯合國所代表的人類意見予以相當尊重的觀念的時機。因此，我們同意共同要求聯合國安全理事會出面處理此事。

我們就朝鮮問題交換了意見。在朝鮮，我們現在所根據的基本原則就是維護和平。我們希望這將是一個使大家一致的原則。

一九五〇年，美國和大韓民國以及聯合國其他十五個會員國軍隊共同和武裝侵略作戰，並共同建立了弱國不應為聲勢浩大的進攻力量垂手而得的戰利品的原則。這個原則已經確立了。剩下來的就是統一朝鮮的問題了。朝鮮的分裂是不合理的。不幸在其他地方——如德國——也有同樣的不合理事情。但是，新的戰爭並不是糾正這種不合理事情的辦法。對這些事情應當耐心、堅持不渝和明智地用和平的辦法來糾正。

我們談到印度支那。美國是第一個贏得自由的殖民地，它了解印度支那各族人民的願望的。我們也了解並且贊同法國保全這個重要地區和它的各族人民不為自由的敵人所攫取的決心。

上述兩個原則一直是相互衝突的，但是現在，法國和三個聯邦成員國正擬定一種新的政治上的安排。這種安排的目的是要促使這些民族的願望得以實現，並團結他們去反對共產黨的侵略。這樣，這兩個目標將在互相支持中結合起來，而不是在敵對的衝突中結合起來。在倫敦會議中我們歡迎這種發展。這種發展雖還有困難，但也充滿着新的希望。

這些從我們上週末會議中選出來的例子說明了怎樣才可能利用將使分歧趨於消滅的新觀念來發展基於同意的結合。

(譯自一九五三年十月二十一日「紐約時報」)

part in creating the State of Israel, and we felt that this was clearly an occasion to invoke the concept of decent respect for the opinion of mankind as represented by the United Nations. So we agreed to join in asking the United Nations Security Council to take jurisdiction of this matter.

We exchanged views about Korea. There the basic principle upon which we now rest is the preservation of peace. We hope it will be a unifying principle.

In 1950 the United States joined with the Republic of Korea and with contingents from fifteen other nations of the United Nations to fight armed aggression and to establish the principle that the weak shall not be the easy prey of great offensive forces. That principle has been sustained. There remains the problem of unifying Korea. The division of Korea is wrong and, unhappily, there are similar wrongs elsewhere, as in Germany. But new war is not the way to right such wrongs. They should be made to respond to peaceful treatment applied with patience, persistence and wisdom.

We talked of Indo-China. The United States, as the first colony to win its freedom, understands the aspirations of the peoples of Indo-China. We also understand and endorse the French determination to save this important area and its peoples from being taken over by the enemies of freedom.

These two principles have been in conflict. But now a new political arrangement is being worked out by France and the Associated States. It is designed to advance the aspirations of these peoples and also rally them against Communist encroachment. Thus, the two aims would be combined in mutual support rather than in hostile conflict. In London we welcomed these developments. They are fraught with difficulty but also vibrant with new hope.

These examples, drawn from our conference of the past week-end, show how it may be possible to develop a society of consent by invoking new concepts which will put differences to rout.

(The New York Times, October 21, 1953)

(第五號)

美英法三國政府百慕大會議公報

一九五三年十二月八日

COMMUNIQUE ON BERMUDA CONFERENCE ISSUED
BY U.S., U.K. AND FRENCH GOVERNMENTS

December 8, 1953

美利堅合眾國總統、聯合王國首相和法蘭西共和國部長會議主席，由三國外交部長陪同，從一九五三年十二月四日到七日在百慕大舉行了會議。在會議上，他們討論了他們對於三國負有義務的世界許多地區的政策。會議結束時他們發表了下列的聲明：

(一)

我們的會議象徵着並證實了我們三國目標的一致。我們發現對我們所面臨的問題的分析是一致的，並且商定了解決這些問題所必需的種種措施。

我們深信，我們的聯合力量是和平與安全的最有力的保證，我們決心繼續共同努力使之臻於完善。如果侵略的危險現在表現不如以前那麼迫近的話，我們認為這應歸功於自由世界力量的日益增長和它的政策的堅定不移。

我們將繼續堅定地保持我們的團結，並繼續對那種旨在分化我們的活動保持警惕。

我們深信，各自由國家的人民，以他們所擁有的物質和道德力量，是能夠同時顧及他們的安全和他們的福利的。我們矢志為這些目標而共同努力。

(二)

北大西洋條約現在是並且將來仍然是我們共同政策的基礎。我們討論了發展我們的聯盟的防禦能力的方法。北大西洋條約組織秘書長伊斯邁勳爵曾出席參加關於這個問題的會談。

我們認為繼續不斷地發展包括德國在內的統一的歐洲，是使歐洲自由人民獲得更大的繁榮、安全和穩定的最好辦法。我們重申，歐洲防務集團是保證大西洋集團的防禦能力所必要的，它將是大西洋集團的完整的一部分。在北大西洋條約組織範圍內，歐洲防務集團將保證聯合王國和美國軍隊與歐洲防務集團軍隊在歐洲大陸上的密切和持久

The President of the United States, the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom and the President of the Council of Ministers of the French Republic, accompanied by the Foreign Ministers of the three countries, met in Bermuda from the 4th to 7th of December, 1953. At their meeting they discussed their policies regarding many parts of the world where their countries have obligations. On the conclusion of the Conference they issued the following statement:

I.

Our meetings symbolized and confirmed the unity of purpose of our three countries. We found ourselves in accord on our analysis of the problems confronting us and have agreed on various measures essential for their solution.

Confident that our united strength is the best guarantee of peace and security we are resolved to maintain our joint efforts to perfect it. If the danger of aggression now appears less imminent, we attribute this to the mounting strength of the free world and the firmness of its policies.

We shall remain resolute in maintaining our solidarity and vigilant against efforts to divide us.

With their material and moral resources we are confident that the free peoples can provide both for their security and for their well being. We dedicate ourselves to work together towards these ends.

II.

The North Atlantic Treaty is and will remain the foundation of our common policy. We discussed means of developing the defensive capacity of our Alliance. Lord Ismay, the Secretary-General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, was present at the conversations on this subject.

In the continuing development of a United Europe, including Germany, we see the best means of achieving greater prosperity, security and stability for its free peoples. We reaffirmed that the European Defence Community is needed to assure the defensive capacity of the Atlantic Community of which it will be an integral part. Within this framework it will ensure intimate and durable cooperation between the United Kingdom and United States forces and the forces of the Euro-

的合作。法國外交部長對法國政府所遇到的有關歐洲防務集團的問題曾經作了解釋。

我們不能把歐洲的目前分裂狀態看或是合理的或永久的。我們希望，在適當時期我們能找到和平的方法，使東歐各國重新在自由歐洲裏起自由國家的作用。

(三)

我們三國政府決不放過任何使世界苦惱的緊張局勢緩和，並向一切國家再次保證它們無需害怕西方的實力會被用來從事任何不正當的暴力行為的機會。反之，防止侵略的保證在適用範圍上應該是普遍的，乃是我們所遵守的聯合國組織的基本原則。

我們深信，如果我們保持強大、團結和堅定，逐漸解決久未解決的頑強問題將成爲可能的。

我們本着這種精神研究了蘇聯政府最近的照會。我們批准了我們的覆文，這件覆文應當能够使四國外長會議早日舉行。我們希望，這次會議能在德國在自由原則下重新統一和締結對奧地利國家條約上獲得進展，並從而在解決其他重大國際問題上獲得進展。

(四)

我們研究了遠東局勢。我們的政策的當前目標仍然是召開朝鮮停戰協定所規定的政治會議。這將爲達成朝鮮問題的和平解決，以及恢復遠東及東南亞的更爲正常的局面的進展提供辦法。

在印度支那方面，我們向在法蘭西聯邦內爲保衛柬埔寨、老撾和越南而戰的法國和三個印度支那聯邦成員國的軍隊致敬。我們認識到他們對保衛自由世界所作的貢獻是有極大的重要性。我們將繼續爲恢復這個地區的和平和安定而共同努力。

(五)

我們的會議增加了我們的團結，加強了我們的決心，鞏固了我們的希望。我們深信我們的共同目標並且我們的看法一致；我們將繼續堅持我們的政策，這個政策的唯一目的就是促進和保證和平。

(譯自一九五三年十二月二十一日美國「國務院公報」)

pean Defence Community on the Continent of Europe. The French Minister of Foreign Affairs explained the problems facing his Government in regard to the European Defence Community.

We cannot accept as justified or permanent the present division of Europe. Our hope is that in due course peaceful means will be found to enable the countries of Eastern Europe again to play their part as free nations in a free Europe.

III.

Our three Governments will lose no opportunity for easing the tensions that beset the world and for reassuring all nations that they have no cause to fear that the strength of the West will be invoked in any cause of wrongful violence. On the contrary it is the fundamental principle of the United Nations Organisation, which we serve, that the guarantees against aggression shall be universal in their application.

We are confident that if we remain strong, united and steadfast it will become possible gradually to solve the stubborn problems which have too long been unsettled.

In this spirit we have examined the latest note from the Soviet Government. We approved the text of our replies, which should lead to an early meeting of the four Foreign Ministers. Our hope is that this meeting will make progress towards the reunification of Germany in freedom and the conclusion of an Austrian State Treaty and thus towards the solution of other major international problems.

IV.

We reviewed the situation in the Far East. The immediate object of our policy continues to be the convening of the political conference provided for in the Korean Armistice agreement. This would provide the means for reaching a peaceful settlement of the Korean question and for making progress in restoring more normal conditions in the Far East and South East Asia.

In Indo-China we salute the valiant forces of France and of the three Associated States of Indo-China fighting within the French Union to protect the independence of Cambodia, Laos and Viet-Nam. We recognise the vital importance of their contribution to the defence of the free world. We will continue to work together to restore peace and stability in this area.

V.

Our meetings have reinforced our solidarity, strengthened our resolve, and fortified our hopes. Confident in our common purposes and united in our views we shall persevere in our policies, whose sole aim is to foster and assure peace.

(Department of State Bulletin, December 21, 1953)

(第六號)

邱吉爾在下院關於百慕大會議的演說(節錄)

一九五三年十二月十七日

SPEECH BY WINSTON CHURCHILL IN HOUSE OF COMMONS ON BERMUDA CONFERENCE (EXCERPTS)

December 17, 1953

……日前在各地，不僅在人民的心目中，而且我相信也是在他們的政府和統治者——無疑這是合乎他們的利益——的心目中，主要的願望是和平，應該召開很多的有耐心的國際會議。這些會議的目的是要去研究我們的一切共同之點和我們的許多分歧之點。我們切不可對於任何這種會議希望太大。我們必須抱着要使各國不要機械般地斷斷爭論的希望。在一切情形下，最好是以形勢的緩和而不是以報上的大字標題來衡量成敗。

無論如何，我能向下院保證百慕大會議的第一個目的是要培養英美的友誼與合作，我確信這一點是做到了。我和我的最尊敬的朋友也感覺高興的是歡迎我們的法國朋友——和皮杜爾先生是重逢，和拉尼埃先生對我來說是第一次會面。他回到法國後所作的明確的聲明很有效地消除了一些法國報紙所刊載的很多毫無根據的閒話和謠言。今天我不用再提到那些。

我必須說明白，根據我在百慕大所體會的，如果歐洲防務集團條約不經過分拖延便不會為法國所批准的話，則我在發生這種不幸的情況時所想到的另一個包括德國在內的擴大的北大西洋條約組織的辦法，大概也將遭遇很多困難——可能是致命的困難。在美國，很多人的意見是和阿登納博士一樣反對建立德國國家軍隊的，當然艾森豪威爾總統極其重視按照經過這許久的討論和拖延而訂出的計劃來成立一支歐洲軍；他自己曾對此事作出了很重要的貢獻。很明顯，如果法國不接受歐洲防務集團可能發生什麼事情，這一問題目前是不能回答的。

我認為在會議上警告我們的法國朋友將來可能發生的局勢的嚴重性是我應盡的義務。德國必須對歐洲安全作出軍事貢獻。我們無論如何不能希望一

... Now in every land the prime desire is for peace, not only in the hearts of the people but, I believe, in the hearts, as it is certainly in the interests, of their Governments and rulers, and there will have to be many patient international conferences. The object of these will be to look at all we have in common as well as at our many differences. We must not expect too much of any of these conferences. We must cherish the hope of taking the nations out of the rut of machine-made haggling. Success will in all cases best be measured by easement rather than by headlines.

At any rate I can assure the House that the first object of the Bermuda conference was to nourish Anglo-American friendship and cooperation, and I am sure that has been achieved. It was also a great pleasure to me and to my right hon. friend to welcome our French friends—to meet M. Bidault again, and for me to meet for the first time M. Laniel. His clear statement on his return to France effectively disposed of a lot of gossip and rumours, quite unfounded, which appeared in some French newspapers. I do not need to refer to that to-day.

I must make it clear from what I learned in Bermuda that if the European Defence Community were not ratified without undue delay by the French an alternative solution of a wider North Atlantic Treaty Organization including Germany, to which I had looked in this deplorable contingency, was likely to be beset by many difficulties—possibly by fatal difficulties. There are many in the United States who share Dr. Adenauer's objections to the creation of a German national army, and, of course, President Eisenhower attaches the utmost importance to the formation of a European army on lines worked out after so much discussion and delay and to which he has given such important personal service. It was evident that the question of what might happen if E.D.C. were not accepted by the French had for the time being become unanswerable.

I thought it my duty to give warning to our French friends at the conference of the gravity of the situation which might then occur. Germany must make her military contribution to the

個擁有六千萬人口的健壯而勇敢的民族在一個不穩定的歐洲無限期地沒有武裝、沒有防禦力量；我們之中無論哪一國的哪一個人，不管喜歡或不喜歡，都必須面對這些事實。

所有這些已在巴黎討論過了。杜勒斯先生已經公開說出那些在我很清楚地聽到美國的立場之後我所想到的事實。他所說的關於不得不對局勢「忍痛地重新估計」的話，我認爲是極其可怕的。我個人必須說，如果法國的安全——實在也是歐洲的安全——要依賴美國的政策，那麼應該向法國人民充分提出因放棄歐洲防務集團而發生的一切可能後果。我希望不要把這一點作爲是無關重要的事而忽略過去。這件事是極關重要的。

我必須說明，在百慕大我沒有設法使皮杜爾先生或拉尼埃先生相信歐洲防務集團的需要。他們都曾參加抗德運動而熱愛國家的人，並且他們都曾在法國議會裏爲歐洲防務集團辯護過。但是分成這許多具有錯綜信念和對立關係的政黨的法國人，是很難達成任何決定，來贊成這個可以說主要是它們自己所想出的政策；而爲了等待這一決定，西歐的更大範圍的安全已經拖延了三年多。

我在百慕大已經說得很清楚，我們在大陸上駐留我們的軍隊至少應和美國軍隊一樣久。我仍希望我們的困難會有一個很有利的解決辦法，關於我們很容易想到的各種黯淡的可能情況在我已經談到的以外，我現在不想再多談。對這些問題，人人都已充分想過或研究過，他們都能自己對這些問題來進行推測的，雖則我希望在聖誕節中他們不要祇想到這些。

我們很高興俄國終於接受我們的邀請，和我們在來年初討論德國和奧國問題。我們之間對於蘇聯政府提議這一會議應在柏林舉行一點不難同意。我們提議會議應在一月十四日開始。我們至今尚未接到對方的答覆。

我會利用這次會議的機會強調過五月十一日我在下院發表的意見，即蘇聯在吃過希特勒的苦頭後是有權利要求防止侵略的保證的。我想我已做到了使我的同事們感覺到這種政策是正常的和有好處的，雖然俄國的實力是十分強大的。我希望在柏林會議期間能出現一種辦法，使俄國有一種不是以武

safety of Europe. We cannot in any case expect a robust and valiant people of 60,000,000 to rest unarmed and defenceless in an unstable Europe for an indefinite period, and these facts have to be faced whether any of us in any country like it or not.

All this has been discussed in Paris. Mr. Foster Dulles has stated in public the facts which were in my mind after having learned very plainly what the American position was. The phrase used by him about the situation having to be "agonizingly reappraised" seems to me most formidable. I must say, personally, that when the safety of France—indeed of Europe—depends upon the policy of the United States all the possible consequences of abandoning E.D.C. should be placed squarely before the French people. I should not like it to be slurred over as a matter of little importance. It is of vital importance.

I must make it clear that at Bermuda I was not trying to convince M. Bidault or M. Laniel of the need for E.D.C. They are both ardent patriots who fought in the Resistance, and they have both argued the case for E.D.C. in the French Chamber. But the French, divided into so many parties with all their intricate convictions and rivalries, may well find it difficult to come to any decision in favour of the policy which was so largely their own idea, and in the hopes of which the wider security of western Europe has been delayed for over three years.

At Bermuda I made it clear that we should keep our troops on the Continent at least as long as the American troops. I am still hopeful of a favourable solution of our difficulties, and I do not propose now to expatiate more than I have done on the various gloomy possibilities which imagination can so readily suggest. Everyone has given enough thought and study to these matters to be able to speculate about them for themselves, although I hope that will not be their only thoughts during the Christmas festivities.

We were very glad the Russians had at last accepted our invitation to meet us to discuss the problem of Germany and Austria early in the New Year. We had no difficulty in agreeing among ourselves that this meeting should be held in Berlin, as suggested by the Soviet Government, and we suggested that it should begin on January 14. We have not so far received a reply.

I used the opportunity of the conference to emphasize the view, which I expressed here on May 11, that the Soviet Union is entitled to assurances against aggression after what she suffered at Hitler's hands. I think I was successful in impressing on my colleagues the justice and advantages of such a course, even although Russian strength is so vast. It is my hope during the Berlin meeting there may emerge some means of providing the Russians with a sense of

力為根據而是以其他事實為根據的安全感覺。全世界都需要有這種安全感。

在三國正式會議之外，我們還利用機會就僅和我們中的兩國有關的問題舉行非正式的雙方會談。有美法之間的會談，英法之間的會談以及英美之間的會談。有如應當料想得到的，我們的很多時間是用於討論目前在遠東和東南亞所發生的困難。西方國家在世界的這一地區有某些分歧，並不是一件秘密。我們會討論諸如與中國進行貿易、承認中國共產黨政府、接納中國進入聯合國等問題，當前的一些問題，甚至討論過難以處置的人物如李承晚和蔣介石的問題。

我曾討論過影響兩國的原子問題的若干事項。這些事項自從秋天美國同意和我們交換有關原子爆炸對各種目標的效果的情報之後確實有了肯定的進展。因為他們已經作了四十三次原子彈的試驗而我們只作了三次，他們對於這些問題是有豐富的知識，所以這一協議是有很大價值的。我希望這個協定將迅速實施——我可以說這一協定在百慕大已批准了，不過我想這是在這之前就已經訂立了的——我希望這個協定可以迅速實施。

我們所討論的另一重要問題是就情報事項交換消息。我們希望擴大這種交換的範圍而不致違反時常阻礙我們兩國合作的麥克馬洪法。對交換技術知識規定了限制的就是這一法律。但是，這種問題都已經進入比較鬆動的氣氛中。我們在英國已經發現的和我們的美國盟友所發現的差不多一樣多，或者，和我們同為人類的俄國人（因為他們是和我們相同的）所知道的很可能和我們兩國一樣多。

無論如何，我希望在相當時期，結果將可以看出來，它將使英國和美國在原子知識方面有更密切的、更融洽的和更有收穫的聯系。總統和我已請伍威爾勳爵和斯特勞斯海軍少將——他們是很好的朋友並且在某些方面可視為對等的人物——就英美兩國在原子方面從這一問題在大戰期中第一次出現以來的合作編纂其經過。

在這一編纂工作完成的時候，總統和我將共同

security arising from other facts than mere force. The whole world is in need of that.

Apart from the formal meeting of the three Powers we took the opportunity of holding informal bilateral talks on matters of concern only to two of us. There were talks between the Americans and the French, and between ourselves and the French, as well as talks between ourselves and the Americans. As was to be expected, much of our time was devoted to the discussion of current difficulties in the Far East and south-east Asia. It is no secret that in this part of the world there have been some divergences of policy between the western Powers. We discussed such questions as trade with China, recognition of the Chinese Communist Government, the admission of China to United Nations, current problems, and even such awkward personalities as Syngman Rhee and Chiang Kai-shek.

I discussed a number of points about the atomic problem affecting our two countries, which truly made definite progress in the autumn when the Americans agreed to exchange information with us about the effect on various targets of atomic explosions. As they have made about 43 bomb tests against our three, they have a great deal of knowledge of these matters, so that this agreement is of considerable value. I hope it will soon be put into effect—it was what I may call ratified at Bermuda, but I think it was made before—and I hope it may soon be put into effect.

The other important matter we discussed was the exchange of information on intelligence matters. We hoped to enlarge the areas over which these exchanges can take place without in any way infringing the McMahon Act, which has so often prevented co-operation between our two countries. It is this Act which sets limits to the exchange of technical information. But this is all moving into an easier atmosphere. We in Britain have already discovered almost as much as our American allies, and it is probably true that our Russian fellow mortals (because that is what they are) may well know almost as much as either of us.

At any rate I hope that results will in due course become apparent which will bring Britain and the United States into closer, more agreeable, and more fertile relationship on atomic knowledge. The President and I have asked Lord Cherwell and Admiral Strauss, who are very good friends, and might in some way be considered as opposite numbers, to prepare a record of the history of Anglo-American cooperation in the atomic field since the subject first cropped up during the war.

When this compilation is complete the President and I will consult together about publica-

磋商發表問題，發表一事當然是依照我們兩國政府的指導的。反對黨的領袖絲毫用不着擔心，因為我確信可以看到在談判中任何可以歸咎於他的錯誤——雖然議會曾有疏忽之處，且像我這樣一個欽慕罕普登曾為之死於戰場和庇姆曾為之死於斷頭台的事業的人當然想起來是很痛心的——最後並且大部分業已以他曾推進的技術活動而得到補救了。在很多方面我們還是追隨他所定的成規。

總統到達後，在我們最初的幾次談話中，有一次他告訴我他要向聯合國發表一篇關於工業或和平利用原子能的前途的新建議的演說。他給我一份這個文件，為了這一文件的草擬，美國最高級人士曾花費了很多月的心思。我請他允許我給怯威爾勳爵一閱，而杜勒斯先生已經以一份給了我的最尊敬的朋友了。

當我接到了怯威爾勳爵的報告之後——這次是略略一看，我祇能有很短的時間去看它——我即致函總統，說我歡迎他的建議，因為我認為這可以結束長時期的僵局並可提供和蘇聯舉行最高級會談的機會。我提議一兩項修改——當然不是在主題上，而是在前提和牽涉到的問題上。我和總統討論了這些修改意見，但我不知在他離開百慕大的時候作了些什麼修改。

我認為總統的這一篇演說是大戰結束以來世界史中最值得注意的事件之一。幾個星期以前，我曾向下院談到人類現在掌握有不斷發展的破壞力以及科學第一次可為和平時代帶來的幾乎無窮無盡的物質利益。當我對總統的建議——這個建議書的範圍雖是有限的，而且包含普通人看不懂的技术性的東西——加以仔細思索時，我不禁感到我們是正在走向一個可能成為人類命運中的轉捩點。

我熱切盼望蘇聯政府不會漠視在這如此黑暗和混亂中的一線光明。我確信這個建議是出於誠意和無私的善意，並且我相信和希望它依靠它自己的實力所給予它的自信心將在一定會導致擴大全世界人民的福利和減少他們的恐懼的道路上邁進。

(譯自一九五三年十二月十八日倫敦「泰晤士報」)

tion, of course, guided by our Governments. The Leader of the Opposition need not be at all concerned, because I am sure it will be shown that any error which could be attributed to him in negotiations was eventually and largely repaired by the technical activities which he promoted, in spite of the parliamentary lapses which they entailed and which, as one who admires the causes for which Hampden died in the field and Pym on the scaffold, naturally caused me painful reflection. We are in many ways following the precedents which he set.

After the President's arrival, in one of our earliest talks, he informed me of his intention to deliver a speech to the United Nations on a new proposal for the future of atomic energy for industrial or for peaceful purposes. He gave me a copy of this document, upon the compilation of which many months of American thought in the highest circles had been concentrated. I asked his permission to show it to Lord Cherwell. Mr. Dulles had already given a copy to my right hon. friend.

When I had received Lord Cherwell's report—it was at first sight, I had only a very short time to do it in—I wrote to the President saying I welcomed his proposal, as I thought it ended a long period of deadlock and might afford an opportunity for talk with the Soviets on the highest level. I suggested one or two alterations, not, of course, in the theme, but in the preliminary and surrounding matter and discussed them with the President, but I was not aware when he left Bermuda what alterations he would make.

I consider that this speech of the President's is one of the most remarkable events in world history since the end of the war. A few weeks ago I spoke to the House about the ever-increasing destructive powers which had come into human hands and the almost limitless material benefits with which science could for the first time, reward a peaceful age. As I meditated on the President's proposals, limited though they are in scope, and shrouded in technicalities for laymen, I could not help feeling that we were in the process of approaching what might prove to be a turning point in our destiny.

I fervently hope the Soviet Government will not ignore this beat of light amid so much darkness and confusion. I am sure of the sincerity and the altruistic good will by which it was inspired, and I trust and hope they will advance, with the confidence to which their own strength entitles them, along a path which certainly leads in the direction of expanding the welfare and calming the fears of the masses of the people of all the world.

(The Times, London, December 18, 1953)

二、英聯邦國家對外關係

(第一號)

邱吉爾在紐約記者招待會上關於世界局勢的談話(節錄)

一九五三年一月五日

PRESS CONFERENCE STATEMENT BY WINSTON CHURCHILL IN NEW YORK ON WORLD SITUATION (EXCERPTS)

January 5, 1953

(有人問英國是否仍然反對朝鮮戰爭可能的擴大，邱吉爾先生答稱：)

我們的確認為，美國和聯合國的軍隊想走遍這個廣大的中國是一件很可憾的事。我們認為，無限制地擴大朝鮮戰爭是一件很可憾的事。那裏不是真正的重心。同時，我們必須繼續進行和保持我們的地位。

並不是由此即謂局勢不會有任何改善。我不能確切地告訴你將來將怎樣。德國人有一句名言說得好：「樹木不會長到頂天」。

(關於「真正的重心」可能在哪裏，邱吉爾先生說：)我認為它是在西歐沿着鐵幕的邊界。可能，我因離那裏較近而有此偏見。

(關於英國的經濟問題，邱吉爾先生說：)

我們的意見很簡單。我們不要靠你們生活。我們要自己謀生。我們願意整晚不睡，製造我們善於製造而你們願意要的東西，而不是接受武器等等的施與。

但是，如果你們把大門關閉而不要任何東西，這就難以看出如何能避免目前非常不滿入意的情況了。倘若我們靠自己來維持並規定我們要實現我們充足的力量，那麼，出口貨就必須用進口貨來償付。這就是我們的要貿易不要援助的意思。這是一個明智的政策。

(譯自一九五三年一月六日「紐約時報」)

(Asked if Britain still opposed any possible widening of the Korean war, Mr. Churchill replied:)

Certainly we think it would be a great pity for the United States and the United Nations army to wander all about this vast China. We think that it would be a great pity to make an indefinite extension of the war. That is not the real center of gravity. At the same time we must go on and hold our position.

It doesn't follow that there won't be any improvement. I can't tell exactly how it will be. The Germans have a good saying: "The trees don't grow up to the sky."

(As to where "the real center of gravity" might be, Mr. Churchill said): I thought it was along the frontier of the Iron Curtain in Western Europe. May be I'm biased by being rather nearer to it.

(As to Britain's economic problems, Mr. Churchill said:)

Our view is very simple. We don't want to live on you. We want to earn our own living. We would like to sit up all night and make all kinds of things that we are very clever at making and that you would like to have instead of taking grants for arms and so forth.

But if you shut the door and won't take anything, it is difficult to see how the present very unsatisfactory situation can be avoided. If we are to pay our own way and provide we are to realize our full strength, exports must be paid for by imports. That is what we mean by trade, not aid. That is a wise policy.

(The New York Times, January 6, 1953)

(第二號)

艾森豪威爾唆使國民黨匪幫進攻中國大陸的命令在英國下院引起的辯論(節錄)

一九五三年二月五日

DEBATE IN BRITISH HOUSE OF COMMONS AROUSED BY DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER'S INSTRUCTION INCITING KUOMINTANG GANG TO ATTACK CHINA'S MAINLAND (EXCERPTS)

February 5, 1953

赫伯特·莫里遜(工黨反對黨,前外交大臣):

HERBERT MORRISON (Labor Party Opposition, formerly Foreign Secretary):

現在美國新總統宣佈了一項在政策上的重大的改變。……但是他所發表的聲明使美國對台灣的政策大有不同,因為現在可以認為雖然沒有明白說出,但幾乎是明白說出了,這是一種單面的中立化政策,就我所能看到的而言,似乎含有——我不願意用不公正,不公平或誇大的字眼——差不多是鼓勵蔣介石大力進攻大陸之意,並暗含着一種承諾而實際上是一種保證——因為這是相當明確的——即如果蔣介石發動這種進攻,美國海軍不會干涉。

必須記着,台灣蔣介石委員長部隊從美國政府那裏獲得了物資方面和其他方面的大量軍事援助。所以,可以假定,不管他們的戰鬥力如何——這一點我們不知道——現在他們的軍事裝備比杜魯門總統的政策宣佈的時候一定是大大地增強了。

因此,同偶爾進行的小規模襲擊相比,現在能夠大力進攻大陸了,而這種進攻將用美國武裝起來的部隊來進行。在這種進攻中,蔣介石委員長的部隊會有多大的成功,是一件很費推測的事。歷史沒有使我們有理由相信,或者無論如何,使我們堅信這種進攻能夠成功。但是,一個人是從不可能知道這類事情的。蔣介石將成功到甚麼程度,是頗可置疑的。

但是,其後果可能是非常重大的。首先,它造成了擴大戰爭的危險。所幸者,據我所知,前任政

But now a vital change in policy has been announced by the new President of the United States. . . . But the announcement that he has made makes an enormous difference in American policy in respect of Formosa, for now presumably, although it is not explicitly stated, it is near enough explicitly stated, that it is a one-way neutralisation, only with what appears to be, as far as I can see—I do not want to use words which are unjust or unfair or an exaggeration—almost an incitement to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek to attack the mainland in strength, with an implied undertaking, and, in fact, guarantee—it is pretty specific—that the American Navy will not interfere if such an attack is made.

It has to be remembered that Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek's forces in Formosa have received great military assistance in material and in other ways from the United States Government, so that, presumably, whatever their fighting qualities may be—that we do not know—their military equipment must be substantially greater now than it was at the time of the declaration of President Truman's policy.

Therefore, there can be an attack upon the mainland in strength as compared with occasional small raids, and that attack would be by forces which have been armed by the United States. How far the forces of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek will succeed in such an attack is a very speculative matter, and history does not justify us in the belief, or, at any rate, the firm belief, that it will be successful. But one never knows in these matters, and how far he will succeed is a matter which is open to doubt.

Nevertheless, the consequences may be considerable. First of all, it creates a risk of spread-

府和現任政府的共同政策，是我們反對在遠東或其他任何地方擴大戰爭，我們並曾積極參加防止戰爭和保衛世界和平的步驟。新的政策則有擴大戰爭的危險。

關於這件事發生了另一個重要問題。假設蔣介石陷入困難。他很可能陷入困難的。總之，他以前曾經陷入困難。我提出那種意見並無任何譏諷之意，但是這是一件事實。如果蔣介石在軍事意義上現在比過去更加強大些，中共軍隊在軍事意義上也更為強大，這大致是真的。

假設蔣介石被擊敗了，假設他的軍隊有些被包圍了，假設他的軍隊在運輸中受到共產黨中國海軍的攻擊而他陷入困難，那時美國怎麼辦？美國將要任他被擊敗而一切聽其自然呢？還是挺身而出，積極直接參加對中國大陸或對台灣與中國大陸間的海上的中國海軍採取的戰爭行動呢？

那是可能發生的局面，而美國輿論對於這種事件是容易感情用事的。我不相信美國對蔣介石的人格與能力有何深厚感情，但是我相信，美國對共產主義有一種深刻的憎恨，而這種憎恨有時引導他們採取那些或者有些過火的途徑。老天知道，我並不喜歡共產主義或共產黨組織的政策，可是當一個人考慮對具體問題應怎樣做時，還是以能保持判斷力為好。共產黨中國大陸與美國軍隊之間可能發生大的糾紛，這種危險確是有的。

美國政府對於英國輿論關於那種局面的意見，不應該存有任何幻想。如果這種局面發生了，我們應該惋惜。我們不應該認為我們能夠參加。我們應該認為這是由於新總統與他的政府的錯誤政策而引起的。我們一定要認為，如果發生軍事行動，英國軍隊捲進這種行動將是錯誤的。

還有另外一種可能。假設蔣介石軍隊對中國大陸進行封鎖並干涉和平地從事商業的英國商船。我

ing the war. Happily, it has been common policy between the late Government and this Government, to the best of our knowledge, that we have been against spreading the war in the Far East or anywhere else and we have been active participants in steps to prevent war and to protect the peace of the world. There is a risk in the new policy of spreading the war.

Another important point arises in connection with this matter. Supposing Chiang Kai-shek gets into difficulties. He may well get into difficulties. After all, he has been in difficulties before. I am not making that observation in any satirical sense, but it is a fact, and if he is stronger in the military sense now, it is probably true that the Communist forces in China are stronger in the military sense as well.

Supposing Chiang Kai-shek is defeated. Supposing some of his troops are surrounded. Suppose there is naval action by Communist China against his troops in the course of transit and he is in trouble. What is the United States to do then? Will it let him be defeated and let things take their course, or will the United States then actively participate, as the United States, directly in warlike activities against the mainland of China or against the Chinese naval forces in the sea between Formosa and the mainland of China?

That is a possible situation, and American public opinion is liable to become somewhat emotional about this matter. I do not believe that the United States is deep with affection for the personality and ability of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, but I believe that the United States has a profound emotional hatred of Communism as such, and it does sometimes lead them into courses which are, perhaps, a little exaggerated. Goodness knows, I have no liking for Communism or the policy of Communist organizations, nevertheless, it is desirable to retain one's judgment when one is considering what to do about specific things. It is a real risk that there might be major trouble between Communist mainland China and the forces of the United States.

The Government of the United States ought not to be under any illusion as to British public opinion about that situation. If it arises, we should deplore it. We should not feel that we could associate ourselves with it. We should think that it had arisen from a mistaken policy on the part of the new President and his Administration, and we should certainly take the view that it would be wrong for British forces to be involved in those operations if they should occur.

There is another possibility. Supposing the forces of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek conduct

不確實知道那種事情是否已經發生過一兩次。假設這種事情增加了。假設它成爲有計劃的了。總之，如果進行台灣與中國大陸的戰爭這一類的事情，則在陸海軍作戰過程中，封鎖不是一件意料不到的事。

我希望外交大臣告訴我們，在那種情形下，女王陛下政府將要怎麼辦？英國海軍將怎麼辦？我認爲，我們不能容忍蔣介石干涉和平的英國航運；那種航運有權受到英國海軍的積極保護。如果外交大臣肯告訴我們，假如那種可能性（那是一種真正的可能性）發生，政府的路綫與態度將如何，我是非常感激的。我們認爲，無論艾森豪威爾總統的動機是什麼，他的這一決定是充滿了不幸的可能性。事實上，它含有很大的危險。我們必須說，我們覺得已經犯了一個嚴重的錯誤。

現在我希望回到我們已經向首相提出的關於他最近訪問美國的一些問題。

但是我能否問一問，第一、首相是否同當選總統的艾森豪威爾和（或）內定的國務卿杜勒斯討論過台灣問題或有關的事項？

第二、如果首相有理由相信他們是在策劃某種這樣的政策的話，他是否要求過，在宣佈這件事情或者在最後作出這種決定之前，將同女王陛下政府進行有效的磋商？第三、如果首相的確知道美國人在策劃這樣的行動，他是否立即在海洋的彼岸通過大使館提醒外交部使得能夠通過外交途徑進行一些工作，或者使對此事有所準備？

在這些情形下，鑑於所有的可能性，我們認爲在美國行動宣佈以前，在這行動最後決定以前，應先和聯合王國政府協商。……不但因爲我們是美國的親密朋友並且也起了主要作用——我同意是遠次於美國的作用——因而有受到協商的理由，就是

a blockade against the Chinese mainland and interfere with British merchant shipping peacefully going about its business. I am not sure that that has not already happened once or twice. Supposing it increases. Supposing it becomes systematic. After all, if one is going in for something in the nature of a war between Formosa and the mainland of China, a blockade is a not unexpected thing to happen, in the course of those military and naval operations.

I should like the Foreign Secretary to tell us what, in those circumstances, Her Majesty's Government will do? What will the Royal Navy do? I submit that we cannot tolerate Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek interfering with peaceful British shipping, and that that shipping would be entitled to the active protection of the Royal Navy. I should be grateful if the Foreign Secretary would be so good as to tell us what would be the line and attitude of the Government if that possibility, which is a real possibility, should eventuate? We see that the decision of President Eisenhower, whatever the motives may have been, is a decision which is full of unpleasant possibilities. Indeed, it contains great and considerable dangers, and we must say that we feel that a grave mistake has been committed.

I now wish to return to questions which we have been putting to the Prime Minister about his recent visit to the United States.

But could I ask the Prime Minister, first, whether he discussed the question of Formosa or related matters with President-elect Eisenhower and-or with Secretary of State-elect Dulles?

Secondly, did he ask, if he had reason to believe that they were contemplating some such policy, that there would be effective consultation with Her Majesty's Government before such an announcement was made, or before such a decision was finally reached? Thirdly, if he did know that the Americans were contemplating such action, did he at once warn the Foreign Office from the other side through the Embassy, so that the diplomatic channel could get to work or prepare for it?

In all these circumstances, and in view of all the possibilities, we think that the United Kingdom Government should have been consulted before the American action was announced and before it was finally concluded. . . . Not only was there a case for consulting the United Kingdom, because we are close friends of the United States of America, and we have played a leading part—I agree, very much secondary to that of the United States—but it could be argued that there was a

所有在軍事上和聯合國積極合作的國家也有與之協商的理由。

我們反對黨的人不祇是姑息主義者。誠然，在國內和國外揭露和斥責共產黨的政策，我們一貫是積極的。但是，單靠壞脾氣與輕率的政策並不能結束戰爭。英國與歐洲的輿論將不接受那種政策的趨向；事實上，英國與歐洲輿論對於艾森豪威爾總統的行動的反應是普遍非難的。在這件事上，美國有在世界中多少有些孤立的真正危險，這對美國是沒有好處的。

外交大臣安東尼·艾登：

中立台灣海峽的問題不是一個新的問題。對外交部來講也不是新的；在前任政府期間就討論過。兩天前我在下院講話時，我向諸君敘述了我們曾就這個中立政策對前任政府與現任政府提出的正式意見。可敬的南劉易沙區議員會問及首相訪美的事實。我們曾接到非正式的代表說，新政府在某時可能採取類如修改對第七艦隊頒布的命令的行動。

我要談一談關於美國對美國第七艦隊問題的態度的其他一些事。這個問題對於他們不是一個突然發生的新的問題，像它對英國人民那樣。他們認為他們的艦隊是在向共產黨保證，當他們在朝鮮進行目前的侵略的時候，他們將不必為他們的國家的任何部份擔憂。然而這些共產黨却每天使美國軍隊和他們的盟國的軍隊，包括我們的在內蒙受生命的損失。他們的海軍這樣使用，他們認為是狂愚的。

然而，美國總統所採取的決定並不意味着嚴重的事情就必然要發生。我們不應當誇大它的意義，但是我們應當曉得美國人的感覺。可敬的先生說美國人是易為感情衝動的。我不知道這句話對他們是不是比對我們更適用？（有人回答：「更適用」）這位可敬的先生說更適用。在朝鮮戰爭中，有時有

case for consulting the nations actively associated with the United Nations military operation.

We of the Opposition are not mere appeasers. Indeed, we have been active in exposing and condemning Communist policy at home and abroad. But mere bad temper and loose policies will not end the war. British and European public opinion will not accept that trend of policy; indeed, the repercussions of British and European public opinion to the President's action are extensively critical. There is a real danger of the United States being somewhat isolated in this connection in the world, which is not good for the United States.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS, ANTHONY EDEN:

This question of the neutralisation of the Formosan Straits is not a new one, and it is not new for the Foreign Office either. It was discussed during the life of the late Administration. When I spoke to the House two days ago I gave hon. Members an account of the official representations we had made on this neutralization policy, both the late Administration and to the present one. The right hon. Member for Lewisham, South has made inquiries about the visit of my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister to the United States. We had received an unofficial indication that the new Administration might at some time take action such as an alteration in the orders to the 7th Fleet.

I want to say something else about the American attitude to this question of the United States 7th Fleet. It is not a sudden new issue to them, as it has become to the British people. It seems to them that their Fleet has been ensuring to the Communists that they will have no anxiety in any part of their country while they are carrying out their actual aggression in Korea. Yet these same Communists are daily inflicting loss of life on American troops and on those of their allies, including ours. It seems to them quixotic that their Navy should be used in this way.

However, the decision taken by the President of the United States does not mean that grave events will necessarily follow. We ought not to exaggerate its significance, but we should try to understand how the Americans feel. The right hon. Gentleman said that the Americans are emotional. I wonder whether that applies to them more than to us? (An Hon. Member: "It does.") The hon.

過一百二十五萬美國人。這是很多的人。那裏傷亡規模很大——傷亡總數為十二萬八千人。這一定影響到許多美國家庭。

可敬的先生問我一個具體題目：倘若有蔣介石的軍艦——我知道他有些——要干涉英國的航運，那會發生什麼事情呢？已經有一件這樣的事件發生過了，我們已以下院所知道的方法予以反應。賠款正在繳付，或者正在訂出關於此事的安排；也道了歉。我可以立刻告訴下院，女王陛下的船舶在他們的合法航行時是一向受到保護的。這是我國任何政府的職責與政策，這是在我們的船舶遭到干涉時，我們應當做的事，這些船舶將受到像那一隻船在事實上所受到的同樣的保護。

（譯自一九五三年二月二十日「美國新聞與世界報導」）

Gentleman says it does. There have been one and a quarter million Americans through the Korean conflict at one time or another. That is a lot of people. There have been casualties on a scale which is pretty heavy—total casualties of 128,000. That must have affected a great many American homes.

The right hon. Gentleman asked me one specific question: what would happen if any of the ships of Chiang Kai-shek—I know he has some—sought to interfere with British shipping. There has already been one such incident to which we have reacted in the way the House knows. Compensation is being paid, or some arrangements are being made about it, and apologies are being made. I can tell the House at once that Her Majesty's ships on their lawful occasions will always be protected. That is the duty and policy of any Government of this country and that is what we should do if our ships were interfered with—they would be protected as that ship was, in fact, protected.

（U.S. News & World Report, February 20, 1953）

（第三號）

加拿大外長皮爾遜在加拿大下院抨擊艾森豪威爾唆使國民黨匪幫進攻中國大陸的命令的演說（節錄）

一九五三年二月五日

SPEECH BY L. B. PEARSON, CANADIAN SECRETARY OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, AT CANADIAN HOUSE OF COMMONS CRITICIZING EISENHOWER'S INSTRUCTION INCITING KUOMINTANG GANG TO ATTACK CHINA'S MAINLAND (EXCERPTS)

February 5, 1953

……我會有機會……研究美國總統發表的聲明全文……在該聲明中，……總統宣佈修改他的前任在一九五〇年六月二十七日向第七艦隊所發佈的總統命令。該項命令是……在發生對南朝鮮的侵略性的進攻後不久發佈的，命令的性質是指示美國第七艦隊防止大陸對台灣的任何攻擊，同時也要保證台灣不得被用作進攻中國共產黨大陸的基地。

... I have had an opportunity ... of studying the text of the statement by the President of the United States. . . In that statement, . . . the President announced the modification of the Presidential order to the 7th Fleet issued by his predecessor on June 27, 1950. That order which was given, . . . shortly after the aggressive attack on South Korea, was in the nature of an instruction to the United States 7th Fleet both to prevent any attack upon Formosa from the mainland, and also to ensure that Formosa should not be used as a base of operations against the Chinese Communist mainland.

當然，該項命令是在中國共產黨部隊在朝鮮進行大規模干涉之前發佈的，其目的是使台灣中立化，以便把由於一九五〇年六月二十五日的侵略而引起的戰爭局限在朝鮮半島上。

……原先的命令是由美國政府單獨負責所採取的行動，正如最近所採取的修改總統所謂使用第七艦隊「抵禦共產黨中國」的原先命令的行動，也是由美國政府單獨負責的。然而，這並不就使這件事成爲一件與其它國家包括加拿大在內，關係不大或者僅僅有間接關係的事情。

至於加拿大政府的態度，雖然我們仍決心履行我們在朝鮮的聯合國義務，我們認爲聯合國所未會承擔的保衛台灣，不應與聯合國所已承擔的保衛朝鮮混爲一談。正如我在一九五一年五月十五日、一九五一年五月二十二日和一九五二年四月一日幾次在下院說過的，我們一貫的立場是，當朝鮮戰爭繼續進行的時候，只要可能的話，應該使這個島嶼中立化。我們的意見是，台灣的最後處理應該作爲在朝鮮戰爭停止後應該舉行的遠東問題會議上討論的一個問題；並且我們熱烈支持聯合國第五屆大會政治委員會所通過的原則聲明，該項聲明具體地規定了召開這樣一個會議。對台灣的未來的任何決定中，台灣人民的願望當然是應該首先加以考慮的。

在考慮美國政府最近所採取的這一行動可能產生的影響時，我應該強調指出，在遠東問題上，就如同在與我們兩國都有關的其它問題上一樣，加拿大與美國的基本的和長遠的目標都是一樣的，雖然有時我們在處理具體問題的方法和怎樣才能最好地來達到這些長遠目的的手段上當然可能有所不同。

當然，加拿大人民是很了解艾森豪威爾總統的，他們深深感謝他對自由世界所已經作出的貢獻，並且我可以肯定地說，他們對他的和平的與建設性的目的具有充分信心。我相信這些目的之一是終止而不是擴大朝鮮戰爭；這也是本政府，本國會和我們國家的目的，以及那些現在在朝鮮作戰的其它政府的目的。

The order was issued, of course, before the large-scale intervention by Chinese Communist forces in Korea, and its objective was to neutralize Formosa in order to limit the hostilities arising out of the aggression of June 25, 1950, on the Korean peninsula.

... the original order was an action taken on the sole responsibility of the United States Government, just as the recent action modifying it with respect to what the President has termed the employment of the 7th Fleet to "shield Communist China" was taken on the sole responsibility of the United States Government. That, however, does not make the matter one of little or merely indirect interest to other countries, including Canada.

With respect to the position of the Canadian Government, while we remain resolved to carry out our United Nations obligations in Korea, we do not think that the defence of Formosa, which has not been assumed by the United Nations, should be confused with the defence of Korea, which has. As I have mentioned on several occasions in the House, on May 15, 1951, on May 22, 1951, and on April 1, 1952, our consistent position has been that this island should be neutralized so far as that is possible, while hostilities continue in Korea. Our view has been that the final disposition of Formosa should be a subject to be discussed at a conference on Far Eastern problems which should be held when the fighting ceases in Korea; and we strongly supported the statement of principles approved by the Political Committee of the Fifth United Nations General Assembly which specifically provided for such a conference. In any decision regarding the future of Formosa, the wishes of the people there would naturally be a primary consideration.

In considering the possible effects of this recent action by the United States Government, I should emphasize that on Far Eastern issues, as on other questions in which we are both concerned, the fundamental and long-term aims of Canada and the United States are similar, although naturally we may differ on occasions in our approach to specific issues and as to how these long-term aims can best be achieved.

Canadians of course know President Eisenhower well. They feel a deep gratitude for the services he has already rendered the free world and have full confidence, I am sure, in his peaceful and constructive purposes. And I am convinced that one of these purposes—as it is the purpose of this Government and this Parliament and our country, and the purpose of the other governments who are now engaged in Korea—is to end and not to extend the Korean war.

還應該注意的是，艾森豪威爾總統在他的聲明中明白說道：「這個命令並不暗示我們有侵略意圖」。我認爲，我們也不應該以爲由於這個命令，中國國民黨軍隊就可能在不久的將來採取任何大規模進攻大陸的行動。然而，這項命令確實取消了原來命令中規定美國第七艦隊應該阻止任何這類行動的部分。

我認爲，原來的命令的確給了中國共產黨軍隊以不會遭受台灣攻擊的感覺。美國人民對這種情況越來越覺得不能接受了，因爲，中國共產黨繼續着他們在朝鮮的侵略行爲，並且就在最近還拒絕了聯合國本屆大會所通過的決議，這個決議本來可使朝鮮戰爭在可以接受的條件下結束。因此，美國政府認爲有必要採取行動以改變被認爲已經失去了它原有的理由的局面。

毫無疑問，這一改變是希望可能使更多的中國共產黨軍隊牽制在中國，因而有利於聯合國在朝鮮的作戰。如諸位議員所知道的，如果中國國民黨的出擊者或進攻部隊在他們作戰時是受到其它聯合國政府的護送和保護的話，那麼，這自然是另外一回事了。然而，根據我們所得到的情報看來，我們沒有理由認爲會有任何這類的事情發生，這類事情的後果將是很嚴重的。

當然，我們是不受華盛頓在這件事上所採取的行動的約束的，雖則我們與這件事當然是有關係的。我國政府將儘可能地密切地注意事情的發展，並在認爲情況有必要時採取適當行動來使大家知道我們的意見。同時，我認爲，對美國政府所採取的、並在包括着這樣多明智的和鼓舞我們大家的東西的艾森豪威爾的聲明中所曾宣佈的步驟，貿然就下武斷或批評的結論，是不智的，而且也是爲時過早的。

(譯自一九五三年三月加拿大「外交事務」)

It should also be noted that in his statement President Eisenhower stated clearly that "this order implies no aggressive intent on our part". Nor should we, I think, assume that because of this order any large scale operations in the near future are likely to be undertaken by Chinese Nationalist forces on the mainland. The order does, however, rescind that part of the original order by which the United States 7th Fleet would prevent any such operations.

The original order did give, I suppose, to the Communist forces in China a feeling of immunity from attack from Formosa. This has become increasingly unacceptable to the people of the United States, as the Chinese Communists have continued their aggression in Korea and only recently rejected a resolution, approved by the present United Nations General Assembly which could have ended the war there on acceptable terms. The United States Government has, therefore, found it necessary to take action to alter a situation which was considered to no longer have its original justification.

It is no doubt hoped that this change may keep more Chinese Communist forces in China and hence have an advantageous effect on United Nations operations in Korea. It would of course be another matter as hon. members will be aware, if Chinese Nationalist raiders or invading forces were escorted or protected in their operations by the armed forces of other United Nations governments. We have no reason to believe, however, on the basis of any information available to us that any such development will take place, the consequences of which would be far-reaching.

We are not of course committed by, though naturally we are concerned with, the action taken in Washington in connection with this matter. The Government will follow developments with the closest possible attention and take appropriate action to make our views known if and when the occasion so warrants. Meanwhile I think it would be unwise and premature to jump to dogmatic or critical conclusions concerning the step taken by the United States Government, and announced in a statement by President Eisenhower which contained so much that was wise and heartening to us all.

(External Affairs, March, 1953)

(第四號)

美英政治會談公報

一九五三年三月七日

COMMUNIQUE ON U.S.-BRITISH POLITICAL TALKS

March 7, 1953

除了討論經濟和財政問題之外，外交大臣艾登和國務卿杜勒斯還討論了他們二月初在倫敦會談以來的國際政局的發展。

(一) 關於蘇聯國內的發展，他們交換了意見。

(二) 關於歐洲，他們特別注意擬議中的歐洲防務集團條約的問題。美國和聯合王國政府都希望這個條約儘速得到批准，從而使大陸更加統一，這是使北大西洋條約組織發生最有效的作用所必需的。

(三) 他們也考慮了中東的情況，特別是這個區域的主要問題，並一致認為促進符合所有有關方面利益的建設性的解決是迫切需要的。

(四) 關於伊朗問題，艾登先生說，女王陛下政府決定堅持一九五三年二月二十日向摩薩台總理提出的建議。這些建議是許多次會談和詳細研究一切有關因素的結果。美國政府認為這些建議是公平合理的。美國同意：

(甲) 伊朗將仍然控制它自己的石油工業並保持它自己的石油政策。

(乙) 在不犧牲構成自由國家間國際交往之基礎的原則下處理補償問題。補償的支付完全要不妨礙伊朗經濟的恢復。

(丙) 伊朗有充分的機會來訂立協定，使它得以競爭的商業價格在世界市場上大量出售它的石油。

In addition to the discussions on economic and financial problems, the Foreign Secretary, Mr. Eden, and Secretary of State Dulles discussed the international political developments that have taken place since their conversations in London early in February.

(1) They exchanged views regarding developments in the Soviet Union.

(2) With respect to Europe, particular attention was given to the subject of the proposed treaty for a European Defense Community. Both the United States and United Kingdom Governments are concerned that the treaty be ratified as speedily as possible so as to provide further continental unity which is essential to the most effective operation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

(3) They also considered the situation in the Middle East with particular reference to the major problems in the area, and were in agreement on the urgency of furthering constructive solutions in the interest of all concerned.

(4) With respect to Iran, Mr. Eden said that Her Majesty's Government were decided to stand on the proposals presented to Prime Minister Mossadegh on Feb. 20, 1953. These proposals were the result of many conversations and careful study of all the factors involved. In the opinion of the United States Government these proposals are reasonable and fair. It agreed to:

(A) Iran would retain control of its own oil industry and of its own oil policies.

(B) The problem of compensation would be disposed of in such a way that there would be no sacrifice of the principles which form the very basis of international intercourse among free nations, and the payment of compensation would be fully compatible with the rehabilitation of Iran's economy.

(C) Iran would have full opportunity to enter into arrangements whereby it could sell its oil in substantial quantities at competitive commercial prices in world markets.

(丁) 在恢復它的石油收益以前，給伊朗以充足的款項，使它能夠應付目前財政問題。這些款項將來以石油償還。

(五) 外交大臣和國務卿也考慮了遠東的局勢。他們重申阻止運輸戰略物資到中國大陸去的重要性。艾登先生說，聯合王國女王陛下政府決定，除已經實行的管制制度以外，再：

(甲) 對聯合王國與殖民地註冊的船隻實行新的許可證制度，使非英國來源的戰略物資不能用英國船隻運到中國；

(乙) 採取其它的步驟，保證蘇聯集團或其它國家的載運戰略貨物到中國去的船隻不能在英國港口加添燃料。

美國與英國政府將共同努力請求其他從事航海與貿易的國家對阻止運輸戰略物資到中國大陸去的措施予以合作。

(六) 依照關於共同防禦的協定，美國得利用聯合王國的某些基地。雙方認可這樣的事先的諒解：在緊急時期利用這些基地必須由女王陛下政府與美國政府看當時情況共同決定。

(譯自一九五三年三月八日「紐約時報」)

(D) There would be placed at Iran's disposal sufficient funds, to be repaid in oil, to meet its immediate financial problems pending resumption of the flow of revenue from its oil industry.

(5) The two secretaries of State also considered the Far Eastern situation. They reaffirmed the importance of preventing the shipment of strategic materials to the mainland of China. Mr. Eden stated that Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, in addition to the system of controls already in force, had decided:

(A) To introduce a new system of licensing vessels registered in the United Kingdom and colonies so that strategic materials from non-British sources could not be carried to China in British ships;

(B) To take additional steps designed to ensure that no ships of the Soviet bloc or other nationality carrying strategic cargoes to China should be bunkered in a British port.

The United States and British Governments will concert their efforts to secure the cooperation of other maritime and trading nations in the measures designed to exclude the shipment of strategic materials to the mainland of China.

(6) Under arrangements made for the common defense, the United States has the use of certain bases in the United Kingdom. The prior understanding was confirmed that the use of these bases in an emergency would be a matter for joint decision by Her Majesty's Government and the United States Government in the light of the circumstances prevailing at the time.

(The New York Times, March 8, 1953)

(第五號)

美英經濟會談公報

一九五三年三月七日

COMMUNIQUE ON U.S.-BRITISH ECONOMIC TALKS

March 7, 1953

美國與聯合王國的代表今天結束了他們的討論。他們討論了採取什麼措施創立經濟與財政條件，俾自由世界的國家能够更好地憑他們自己的勤勞維生的問題。這些會談是非正式的，並且只提出雙方事先諒解對之不承擔任何義務的問題。

聯合王國代表們解釋了去年十二月倫敦聯邦總理會議所提出的建議。這些建議就是採取一些措施，通過商業途徑恢復世界經濟的平衡，並在儘可能大的地區內逐步建立有效的多邊貿易與支付制度。這些措施將要求英聯邦國家、美國、大陸西歐國家及現有國際貿易與財政機構的會員國採取行動。

兩國代表討論了要使每一國家能享受到貨幣更加自由和鞏固以及貿易和商業擴大所產生的精神上與物質上的好處，所必須創造的國內與國際方面的條件。

他們也檢查了美國全面經濟與財政情況。他們注意到了美國海外巨大防務支出，包括海外購買。

從這些會談中得出了某些結論：

兩國政府完全同意，解決自由世界的經濟問題對它的安全和幸福是極端重要的。

它們並一致認為：自由世界內部行得通的和有利的經濟體系的重要因素必須包括下列各項：

Representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom today concluded their discussions on measures for creating the economic and financial conditions under which the countries of the free world may be better able to earn their own living by their own industry. These conversations were informal and raised questions on which it was understood in advance that no commitments would be made.

The United Kingdom representatives explained the suggestions which emerged from the conference of Commonwealth Prime Ministers, held in London in December of last year, for measures which might be taken to restore balance in the world economy through the channels of commerce and to develop, by progressive stages, an effective multilateral trade and payments system over the widest possible area. These measures would involve action by the Commonwealth countries, the United States, the countries of Continental Western Europe, and the countries that are members of existing international trade and financial institutions.

The discussions covered the internal and international conditions which would have to be established in order that each country might enjoy the human and material benefits of freer and dependable currencies and a larger volume of trade and commerce.

They also included a review of the over-all economic and fiscal situation of the United States. Note was taken of the significant United States defense expenditures overseas, including off-shore purchases.

From these conversations, certain conclusions have emerged:

There is full agreement between the two governments that the solution of the economic problems of the free world is vital to its security and well being.

They also agree that the essential elements of a workable and productive economic system within the free world should include:

(甲) 健全的國內政策。無論債務國或債權國，如果沒有一個健全的國內政策為基礎，國際經濟政策就不會成功。在會談期間，美國代表表示，美國政府歡迎英聯邦各國政府在它們十二月的公報裏所表示的意圖：要實行一種為達到更自由的貨幣兌換和貿易的目的所必需的國內的財政和經濟政策。

(乙) 放寬貿易和貨幣兌換的限制。放鬆和擴充世界貿易必須包括貨幣與貿易兩方面。在財政方面，目標應當是最後使英鎊和其他貨幣可以兌換，並逐漸廢除支付上的限制。在貿易方面，目標應該是以某種方式放鬆貿易的限制和歧視，這種方式用艾森豪威爾在國情咨文裏的話說，「將承認有利可圖的、公平的世界貿易的重要性。」採取像總統的國情咨文所說明的那些措施，俾使自由世界的成員能更好地自食其力，這是對美國有利的。

(丙) 開發。債務國和債權國均應創造條件以促進國際投資和自由世界資源的健全發展。在這一方面，美國政府強調它打算鼓勵對外投資。

(丁) 組織。應該以有益的方式利用國際機構來促進這些政策的實現。

美國政府歡迎聯合王黨國在這些與大家有關的問題上表現的主動性。

兩國政府認為，有理由預料世界貿易會日益平衡和發展，多邊貿易和支付體系將恢復起來。各國政府可能用以促進這一進展的措施的性質和範圍以及採取這些措施的時機，需要進一步加以研究。

美國政府將着手並在未來的幾個月裏繼續加緊研究並回顧在這次會議上討論的一般問題，包括英聯邦經濟會議所提出的建議和可能的代替建議，以便對可能採取的具體行動方針作正確的判斷。兩國

(A) Sound Internal Policies: International economic policies cannot succeed unless they are based on sound internal policies, by debtor as well as credit countries. During the course of the conversations, the United States representatives made it clear that the Government of the United States welcomes the intention of the Commonwealth Governments, expressed in their December communiqué, to follow the internal financial and economic policies needed to achieve a freer exchange of currencies and trade.

(B) Freer Trade and Currencies: The freeing and expansion of world trade must cover currencies as well as trade. On the financial side the objective should be the eventual convertibility of sterling and other currencies and the gradual removal of restrictions on payments. On the trade side the objective should be to bring about the relaxation of trade restrictions and discriminations in a way which, in the words of President Eisenhower's State of the Union Message, "will recognize the importance of profitable and equitable world trade." It is in the interest of the United States to take such measures as are exemplified in the President's message in order that the members of the free world may the better pay their way by their own efforts.

(C) Development: The creation of conditions, both by creditor and by debtor countries, which will foster international investment and the sound development of the resources of the free world. In this connection, the government of the United States emphasized its intention to encourage the flow of investment abroad.

(D) Organization: International institutions should be constructively used to promote these policies.

The Government of the United States welcomes the initiative taken by the United Kingdom Government in connection with these problems of common concern.

The two Governments believe that there is reason to hope for continued progress toward a better balanced, growing world trade and toward the restoration of a multilateral system of trade and payments. The nature and scope of the measures which may be taken by governments to further such progress, and the timing of such measures, will require further study.

The Government of the United States will undertake, and continue over the next several months, an intensive examination and review of the general subjects discussed at the present meetings, including the suggestions resulting from the commonwealth economic conference, and possible alternative suggestions, in order to arrive at a sound judgment with respect to the specific courses

政府打算在彼此之間、和其他政府並和有關的國際組織，包括歐洲經濟合作局，作進一步的商討。

of action which might be taken. The two governments intend to have further discussions with each other, with other governments, and with the international organizations concerned, including the Organization for European Economic Cooperation.

(譯自一九五三年三月八日「紐約時報」)

(The New York Times, March 8, 1953)

(第六號)

艾登在美國對外政策協會關於英國外交政策的演說 (節錄)

一九五三年三月十二日

SPEECH BY ANTHONY EDEN AT U.S. FOREIGN POLICY ASSOCIATION ON BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY (EXCERPTS)

March 12, 1953

英國人民在爭取和平與自由的世界鬥爭中和你們一起做忠實的同志。不僅在朝鮮我們的部隊和你們並肩作戰；就是我們現在在馬來亞作戰的兵士們，我們在公海上的艦隊，我們守衛在德國、奧地利、中東以及許多其他凡我們有駐軍或和你們共同有駐軍的地方的師團或空軍都是一樣。在所有這些地點，我們正在防守着反侵略的共同戰綫。

The British people are with you as loyal comrades in the world struggle for peace and freedom. It is not only in Korea that our forces are alongside of you. So are our men now fighting in Malaya, our fleets on the high seas, our divisions and air forces on guard in Germany, in Austria, in the Middle East and in the many different places where we hold garrisons or share them with you. At all these points we are holding the common line against aggression.

我們和馬來亞的人民在那裏和共產黨敵人作戰已經幾年了。由於堅忍的努力和足智多謀的領導——並且在沉重的代價下——我們終於已經開始獲得優勢。

We and the peoples of Malaya have been fighting the Communist enemy in that country for years. By patient effort and skilled leadership—and at a heavy cost—we have at last begun to achieve a mastery over them.

因此，任何國家的貢獻，不能僅就其在任何特定戰線上的人數來判斷。我們的任務和你們的一樣，是一個世界性的任務。但是這些軍事的義務，使我們的資源、我們的財富和人力使用到最大限度。在我們的歷史上，除在兩次世界大戰時期以外，我們從來沒有負擔過這樣的重担。今天我們在防務上所花的錢一倍於一九五零年。本年我們預料防務費佔我們總預算的百分之四十。

And so it is that the contribution of any country cannot be judged by reference to numbers on any particular front. Ours, like yours, is a universal task. But these military commitments keep our resources, our wealth and man power at full stretch. Never in our history, except during two world wars, have we sustained such a burden. We are spending twice as much on defense today as we were in 1950. This year we expect it to absorb about 40 per cent of our total budget.

我們去年爲了同一目的而花費的外匯在十億美元以上。在我們武裝部隊的現役名簿上，我們有八十萬男女，並且有更多的人從事國防生產和研究。使用金屬的各種工業用在國防上的資源，如果用在出口貿易上，就足以增加出口約百分之二十。你們知道，我們是靠出口生活的，這項增加會綽有餘裕

The amount of foreign exchange which we are devoting to the same cause was over 1 billion dollars last year. We have 800,000 men and women on the active list of our armed forces, and a still larger number engaged in defense production and research. The resources devoted to defense in the metal-using industries would be enough to increase our exports by about 20 per cent if we used them for that purpose. As you

地解決我們的支付平衡問題。由此你們可以看出，我們並不是一個游手好閒的伙伴。

我知道，現在我們的遠東政策是受到一些批評。我們時常聽到的一點是關於對中國的貿易。我願意把這點講得十分清楚，因為我們的政策在各地受到各種曲解。自從朝鮮戰爭開始以來，沒有任何武器曾從英國任何領土售給共產黨中國。

在一九五一年五月，聯合國通過了對中國禁售戰略物資的決議。甚至在這以前，我們已經在聯合王國和殖民帝國禁止把一切可以稱為有戰略價值的貨物輸出到中國。列在禁運單中的有幾百種物品。將近兩年以來，英國方面從來沒有把對中國戰爭努力有戰略重要性的貨物運往中國。

大家都知道，中國大部分的供應是由陸路從蘇聯獲得的。由海路運輸的只是比較小的一部分。即使如此，我們也要確實盡一切力量防止規避我們關於禁止由海路運輸戰略物資的禁令，因此，我們經常注意可能發生的漏洞。我們最近剛剛結束了關於有關的航運問題的研究。

結果，當我在華盛頓會見杜勒斯先生（美國國務卿）的時候，我能夠告訴他，我們決定用兩項新的措施來加強我們的管制制度。在一年多以前，我們停止了把戰略貨物通過英國口岸運往中國的一切轉運。別的國家極少這樣做過。

現在，我們即將採行一種新的許可證制度，這種制度可以保證在聯合王國和殖民地登記的船隻不致載運非來自英國的戰略物資運到中國去。我們並採取更進一步的步驟，以保證載運戰略貨物赴中國的任何國籍的船隻均不得在英國口岸加添燃料。

這些辦法本身已經可以說明問題。它們並不代表一個新的政策。它們只是用來在現行制度下設法防止漏洞。我們相信這些辦法將有效地防止過去偷漏過去的極小部分的禁運物資。當然這些補充措施只有獲得其他航海和貿易國家的合作，才能充分有效。我們準備和你們一起為取得這種合作而努力。

know, we live by exports, and this increase would solve our balance of payments problem quite comfortably. So you see that we are not an idle partner.

Now our Far Eastern policy has been subject, I know, to some criticism. One of the points about which much has been heard relates to trade with China. I want to be quite clear about this because our policy has been misrepresented in all sorts of ways and places. Since the beginning of the Korean war no arms have been sold to Communist China from any British territory.

In May of 1951 the United Nations passed its resolution about the denial of strategic materials to China. Even before this, we had in the United Kingdom and in the Colonial Empire forbidden the exports to China of all those goods which could be said to possess strategic value. Some hundreds of items are in the prohibited list. No goods of strategic importance to the Chinese war effort have gone to China from British sources for nearly two years.

Everybody knows that China obtains most of her supplies overland from the Soviet Union. It is only a relatively small proportion that is shipped by sea. Even so we have to be sure that we do all we can to prevent evasion of our ban on strategic materials by sea. We are therefore constantly on the lookout for possible loopholes. We have recently concluded an examination of the shipping problems involved.

As a result, when I met Mr. Dulles (U.S. Secretary of State) in Washington, I was able to tell him that we had decided to strengthen our system of control by two further measures. More than a year ago we stopped all transit of strategic goods to China through British ports. Very few other countries have done that.

Now we are going to introduce a new system of licensing which will ensure that vessels registered in the United Kingdom and colonies do not carry strategic materials from non-British sources to China. We are also taking further steps to ensure that no ships of any nationality taking strategic cargoes to China shall be bunkered in British ports.

These measures speak for themselves. They do not represent a new policy. They are designed to stop leaks in an existing system. We are confident that they will effectively discourage and prevent the very small proportion of forbidden supplies which were getting by. But of course these additional measures can only be fully effective with the co-operation of other maritime and trading nations. We shall join with you in an effort to get this.

我不願撇開這個問題而不一提香港。香港是由英國經營努力從無人居住的一個島建立起來的一塊英國領土。在和平的時候，各國的商業機構在那裏發展；而香港是世界大貿易中心之一。今天由於有效地禁止戰略貨物運往中國，香港不能發揮它的正常經濟作用。這是人所承認的，正如我相信你們也承認香港必須生存這個事實。

我花一些時間來談這些事情，因為我知道你們是關心這些事情的。日常的問題不是容易解決的，但重要的是，你們應當瞭解我們所作所為是無懈可擊的。

使我們遇到艱鉅問題的世界的另一部分是歐洲。正如你們所知道的，那裏正在從事一種建立法德間的新關係的努力。去年我們在波恩簽訂的各項協定的首要目標，是在其他各國可以接受的條件下使西德能參與歐洲的防務。這些條約使德國重返自由的西方人民的行列。這些條約使它參加一個歐洲集團，這個歐洲集團本身便是更廣泛的大西洋集團的一部分。建立了煤鋼聯營集團並且——我們希望——即將組織歐洲防務集團的六個歐洲國家，在歐洲的歷史上正在展開新的一章。他們的公認的目標是最後發展成一個聯盟。這在現代的歐洲是一件新的事情，所以有些國家在批准上發生困難是不足為奇的。

有時有人認為，如果由英國帶頭，這些國家的國會就會比較容易批准條約。事實上我們已經這樣做了。我們一開始就支持這些計劃。我們願意它們成功，我們已經盡了我們的力量來幫助和鼓勵它們。的確，就保證而言，我們很難看出我們還能再做些什麼。我們有一系列的條約把我們和有關國家聯系起來。我只須舉出一九四七年的英法敦刻爾克條約，布魯塞爾條約，最後還有北大西洋條約。你們也是北大西洋條約締約國之一，它又是我們整個防務制度的基礎。我們並對歐洲防務集團給予許多特殊保證，當條約批准時，這些保證即行生效。凡威脅歐洲防務集團的完整或團結的事情，將被我們視為對我們自己的安全的威脅。我們還能再說些什麼呢？

I do not want to leave this subject without a mention of Hong Kong. Hong Kong is a British territory which has been built up by British enterprise from an uninhabited island. In times of peace, business concerns of all nations have flourished there, and Hong Kong has been one of the great trading centers of the world. Today owing to the effective embargo on shipments of strategic goods to China, Hong Kong cannot play its normal economic role. That is accepted, as I am sure you also accept the fact that Hong Kong must live.

I have spent some little time on these matters, because I know of your concern about them. The day-to-day problems are not easy to solve, but it is important that you should understand that the record is clear.

Another part of the world in which stubborn problems confront us is Europe. There, as you know, an attempt is being made to build up a new relationship between France and Germany. The first object of the agreements we signed in Bonn last year was to enable Western Germany to play a part in European defense on terms which were acceptable to the other countries. The treaties bring Germany back into the company of free Western peoples. They make it possible for her to enter a European community which is itself a part of the wider Atlantic community. The six European countries who have set up the Coal and Steel Community and are now, we hope, on the point of forming the European Defense Community, are opening up a new chapter in European history. Their avowed aim is to develop an eventual federation. This is something new in modern Europe. And so it is not surprising that there should be difficulties in some of the countries about ratification.

It is sometimes suggested that it would be easier for these parliaments to approve the treaties if Great Britain would take a lead. We have in fact done so. We have supported these projects from the beginning. We want them to succeed, and we have done everything we possibly can to help and encourage them. Certainly, so far as guarantees are concerned, it is hard to see what more we could do. We have a whole series of treaties binding us to the countries concerned. I need only mention the Anglo-French Treaty of Dunkirk of 1947, the Brussels Treaty, and finally, the North Atlantic Treaty, in which you also are partners, and upon which our whole defensive system rests. We have also given special assurances to the European Defense Community which will come into force when it is ratified. Anything which threatens the integrity or unity of the EDC will be regarded by us as a threat to our own security. What more can we say?

然而我們的支持不僅僅是在條約和保證中表示出來。正如你們所知道的，我們有相當大的武裝部隊駐紮在大陸上。我們打算在我們認為形勢有需要的期間把他們留駐在那裏。僅僅在幾個星期以前，我們提出了關於我們部隊和歐洲防務集團部隊的技術聯系的最廣泛的建議。我們在德國的師團，其中大部分是裝甲師團，在訓練和裝備上我們相信不亞於任何其他國家的師團。這些裝備都是在本國製造並由本國出錢的。它們和支持它們的空軍無疑地是保衛西歐不受侵略的一個主要因素。這些部隊加上你們的以及其他盟國的部隊構成一個屏障，在這個屏障後邊，一切有關防務集團和其他聯盟思想的討論獲得了發展和向前推進的時間。

現在你當已看到有一件事情我們沒有做，並且也不能做。我們不準備加入歐洲聯邦。我想你們大多數都瞭解原因何在。我們國家的生命和利益經常指引我們到較歐洲為廣闊的地界。作為英聯邦的一員，並且負有英鎊區的責任，我們不可能把我們自己併入一個單純的歐洲聯邦國家。但是除此以外，我們正在做每一件能做的事情以證明我們自己在歐洲以及在較它更為廣闊的世界舞台上是一個很好的隣居和伙伴。

在歐洲還有其他令人鼓舞的因素，我必須喚起你們的注意。其中的一個就是南斯拉夫、希臘和土耳其的關係的改善。不過，這事所表示的自由世界在戰略方面的收穫，祇有在意大利和南斯拉夫的關係也以真正諒解為基礎時，它的價值才是完全的。這件工作尚待我們去做。我給予你們的是一個關於曲折的進展情形的報告。但是，當你回顧戰後歐洲最黑暗——捷克的屈服——的時節，這畢竟是一種進展。現在雖然還有危險，但是我們已不再是沒有目的或沒有防禦的了。

我們的外交政策是否充分有效還有賴於另一因素。穩固的經濟基礎對於一個成功的外交政策是不可缺少的。同樣地，我們需要一種堅強的經濟以進行我們正在從事的防禦努力。我們必須表現我們生活方式中所包含的機會和希望。這不僅關係着我們，並且也關係着每一洲內正在注視着使今天世界分裂的巨大思想衝突的千百萬人民。

在國內，我們的內部經濟和我們的支付平衡較一年以前加強了。我們因此獲得時間來檢查一下我們的國際經濟政策的方向。我們願意實現自由世

But our support is not expressed only in treaties and assurances. We have, as you know, substantial military forces on the Continent. We intend to keep them there as long as we think the situation requires it. Only a few weeks ago we made the most comprehensive suggestions for technical association between our forces and those of the EDC. Our divisions in Germany, most of them armoured divisions, are we believe second to none in training and equipment. And it is equipment made and paid for at home. They and the air forces which support them have undoubtedly been a major factor in preserving Western Europe from aggression. Together with yours and other Allied contingents, they are a shield behind which all these discussions for the Defense Community and other federal ideas have had time to develop and go forward.

Now you will have seen that there is one thing we have not done and cannot do. We are not prepared to join a European federation. I think most of you know the reasons for that. Our life and our interests as a nation direct us constantly to horizons wider than Europe alone. As a member of the Commonwealth, and with our sterling-area responsibilities, we could not possibly merge ourselves into a purely European federal state. But short of that we are doing everything possible to prove ourselves good neighbors and partners in Europe as well as in the wider world scene.

There are other encouraging factors in Europe to which I must draw your attention. The improvement of relations between Yugoslavia, Greece and Turkey is one of them. The strategic gain which this event represents for the free world will however only be complete in its value if relations between Italy and Yugoslavia are placed on a footing of real understanding. That work is still to do. What I have given you is a record of checkered progress. But it has been progress all the same, when you look back to what was, I think, the darkest hour of postwar Europe—the subjection of Czechoslovakia. There is still danger, but we are no longer aimless nor defenseless.

Yet the full effectiveness of our foreign policy depends on another factor. Firm economic foundations are indispensable to a successful foreign policy. Equally we need a strong economy to carry the defense effort which we are all making. And we have to show the opportunity and promise inherent in our way of life. This matters not only to us but to millions in every continent who are watching the great conflict of ideas which sunders the world today.

At home our internal economy and our balance of payments are stronger than they were a year ago. We have thus gained time in which to review the direction of our international

界中更加自由的貿易和通貨制度。這是一種不能單靠我們來達到的目標。這需要英聯邦、美國和西歐共同努力。第一步是去年十一月的英聯邦經濟會議。在那次會議中我們全體同意，只有在經濟的擴張和一種更加自由的貿易與通貨制度中，才能找到有希望的未來。

第二步便是財政大臣和我上星期在華盛頓同你們的政府領袖的討論。我們被這些討論所鼓舞，並且，正如公報所示，我們之間在目標上完全一致。同樣明顯的是，我們在能夠一起做出實際上的進展以前，在大西洋兩岸的國家還需要進行很多的研究。

我們任何人要想想出為整個自由世界建立一種健全的經濟制度所需要的政策是不容易的。但是，我們大家都知道這件事是必須要做的。英聯邦已經首開其端了，這種動向必須予以維持。

(譯自一九五三年三月二十日「美國新聞與世界報導」)

economic policy. We want to bring about a system of freer trade and currencies throughout the free world. This is an objective which we cannot secure by ourselves. It will require a combined effort by the Commonwealth, the United States and Western Europe. The first step was the Commonwealth Economic Conference last November. There we all agreed that a promising future could be found only in economic expansion and in a system of freer trade and currencies.

The next step was the discussion which the Chancellor of the Exchequer and I had in Washington with the leaders of your Administration last week. We were heartened by these discussions and, as the communiqué showed, there is complete agreement between us upon objectives. It is equally clear that much study will be needed on both sides of the Atlantic before we can make practical progress together.

It will not be easy for any of us to develop the policies which will be needed if a sound economic system is to be built for the free world as a whole. But we all know that this must be done. The Commonwealth has taken the first initiative. The momentum must be maintained.

(U.S. News & World Report, March 20, 1953)

(第七號)

艾登在英國下院就中國在聯合國代表權問題答艾德禮問

一九五三年三月十七日

REPLIES TO C. R. ATTLEE BY ANTHONY EDEN IN HOUSE OF COMMONS ON QUESTION OF CHINA'S REPRESENTATION IN U.N.

March 17, 1953

艾德禮：我相信整個下院將以愉快的心情來傾聽可敬的先生為獲得與我們美國朋友間的充分諒解而作的成功的訪問，我們也認識到一個新政府當政需要過一些時候才能獲得任何具體成就，但同時我願問他，在這些討論中，他們究竟對台灣問題進行過辯論沒有，特別是關於安全理事會中的席位仍然由蔣介石的代表佔有而不是由中國真正的、有效的政府佔有這一極端反常的情況？

艾登：當然，我們很充分地討論了遠東局勢。關於安全理事會的情況，我想可敬的先生當熟

Mr. Attlee: While I am sure that the whole House will have heard with pleasure of the successful visit of the right hon. Gentleman in order to obtain a full understanding with our American friends, and while we realise that with a new Government in power it will take some time before any concrete results are obtained, I should like to ask him whether, in the course of those discussions, they debated at all the question of Formosa, and in particular the very anomalous position by which the seat on the Security Council is still held by the representative of Chiang Kai-shek instead of by the real and effective Government of China?

Mr. Eden: Of course, we discussed the Far Eastern situation very fully. As regards the position on the Security Council, I think that the

悉那種影響我們的法律情況，而那種法律情況是憲章的組成部分，不是我們所能改變的。根據那個決定，中國是安全理事會的常任理事國——沒有人能夠改變這一點——，而大會多數所承認的政府，雖然我們不承認，却是蔣介石的政府。造成空席是不可能的。那裏必須有一位中國的代表。可敬的先生搖頭了，但這是事實。不可能既不是這個又不是那個。那裏必須有一位中國的代表，而在聯合國中的多數改變他們的觀點之前，代表的情況必須仍然照舊。

艾德禮：可敬的先生曾和美國人討論過是否能採取行動以改變這種代表的情況的問題嗎？這種改變，我完全同意，是祇能由多數票來實現的。據我了解，這難道不是主要由於美國的榜樣，才仍然對台灣的這個殘餘集團予以承認，而不對中國人民的主體予以承認嗎？

艾登：說這僅僅是一個國家的意見，我不認為是對的。我曾經說過許多次，而且我想可敬的先生也會同意：現在當共產黨中國在朝鮮進行全面的侵略的時候，來建議大會承認它為應被選參加大會的國家是完全不可能的。

(譯自一九五三年三月十七日「英國議會辯論集」，第二四八期)

right hon. Gentleman will be aware of the legal position as it affects us and which is part of the Charter, which we cannot change. Under that decision, China is a permanent Member of the Security Council—nobody can change that—and the Government recognised by the majority of the Assembly, although not by us, is the Government of Chiang Kai-shek. What is impossible is to create a vacuum. There must be a representative of China. The right hon. Gentleman shakes his head, but it is a fact. It cannot be neither one nor the other. There must be a representative of China, and until the majority of the United Nations change their view, the representation must remain as it is.

Mr. Attlee: Did the right hon. Gentleman discuss with the Americans the question of whether one could not take action so that there could be a change in this representation which, I quite agree, can only be brought about by a majority vote? Is it not, as I understand it, largely due to the example of the United States of America that recognition is still given to this rump in Formosa instead of to the main body of the Chinese people?

Mr. Eden: I do not think it is right to say that it is only the opinion of one country. I have said many times, and I think the right hon. Gentleman would agree, that it would be found quite impossible now, when Communist China is acting in full aggression in Korea, to recommend to the Assembly that it should recognise her as the proper Power to elect to the Assembly.

(Weekly Hansard No. 248, 17 March 1953)

(第八號)

艾登在下院就禁運問題答議員問

一九五三年三月十八日

REPLIES BY ANTHONY EDEN IN HOUSE OF COMMONS
ON QUESTION OF EMBARGO

March 18, 1953

唐納利先生●問外交大臣，他是否擬就英美兩國爲阻止使用英國船隻載運貨物前往中國和爲阻止蘇聯集團船隻使用英國港口從事同一目的而達成的協議有所聲明？

艾登：昨天我在關於華盛頓談判的談話中已經提到這些措施。現在我們的管制是以兩種辦法來加強的。

第一，既然英國船隻不能從英國港口載運戰略物資前往中國，因此英國船隻若能從其他港口載運物資前往中國，便是不對的；因此，應該行使一九四六年國防章程所規定的現有權力，以便規定聯合王國和它的殖民地的船隻如開往中國須有許可證，該項許可證禁止將來自任何地區的載在名單中的戰略貨物運往中國。此事所需要的命令，即管制海運貿易（中國與北朝鮮）令，已經由我的可敬的朋友運輸大臣在三月十六日向議會提出了。

第二，現在正在與有關的英國領土當局擬定辦法，禁止從事載運戰略貨物前往中國的船隻在英國控制的港口加添燃料。

唐納利先生：以往的禁運是否意味祇有很少量的貨物似將受到新的政策的影響，這不是事實嗎？因此，可敬的先生是否知道這造成一般的印象，以爲這是一個可能導致對中國進行海軍封鎖的政治示威？可敬的先生能否確實保證並無任何這種意圖，以及我們不會進行任何種的海軍封鎖？

艾登：在可敬的先生提出這一點以前，我不知道我們有正在逐漸走向任何種的海軍封鎖的說

Mr. Donnelly asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether he will make a statement regarding the Anglo-American agreement to prevent the use of British ships for the carrying of goods to China and the use by ships of the Soviet bloc of British ports in carrying out the same errand.

Mr. Eden: I referred to these measures in my statement yesterday on the Washington talks. There are two ways in which our controls are being strengthened.

In the first place, since British ships cannot carry strategic materials to China from British ports, it is anomalous for them to be able to do so from other ports. Existing powers under Defence Regulation 46 are therefore to be used so as to provide that voyages of United Kingdom and colonial ships to China require a licence which will preclude the carriage to China of listed strategic goods from any source. The necessary order, Control of Trade by Sea (China and North Korea) Order, was laid before Parliament on 16th March by my right hon. Friend the Minister of Transport.

Secondly, arrangements are being worked out with the authorities in the British territories concerned to prevent ships engaged in the carriage of strategic cargoes to China from being bunkered in ports under British control.

Mr. Donnelly: Is it not a fact that the previous embargo meant that only a very small quantity of goods were likely to be involved by this new policy, and is the right hon. Gentleman aware, therefore, that the general impression is given that this is a political demonstration which may be leading to a sliding into a naval blockade against China? Can the right hon. Gentleman give a firm assurance that no intention of that kind whatever is intended, and that we will not indulge in any kind of naval blockade?

Mr. Eden: Until the hon. Gentleman suggested it I had not seen any suggestion that we were sliding into any sort of naval blockade. I

●英國工黨議員。

法。在我在美國發表的公開聲明中，我很清楚地說明這不是一個新政策。我將以這個聲明一份送給可敬的先生，希望他將一讀。這個政策只是嚴格履行我們根據聯合國在一九五一年五月通過的而為上屆政府所同意的決議我們所必須執行的政策。

(譯自一九五三年三月十八日「英國議會辯論集」，
第二四八期)

made it quite clear in my public statement in the United States, a copy of which I will send to the hon. Gentleman and I hope he will read it, that this is not a new policy. It is strictly a fulfilment of a policy which we are obliged to carry out by the United Nations Resolution of May, 1951, which the late Government agreed to.

(Weekly Hansard No. 248, 18 March 1953)

(第九號)

邱吉爾在下院關於英國外交政策的演說

一九五三年五月十一日

SPEECH BY WINSTON CHURCHILL IN HOUSE OF COMMONS ON BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY

May 11, 1953

讓我首先從事實方面來談一談目前在我們面前現出來的一些迅速發展的景象。當然，我們的當前的目的是締結朝鮮停戰協定。我非常懷疑在目前是否能夠對統一朝鮮問題達成協議。北朝鮮人和南朝鮮人已經互相造成可怕的傷害，但是，即令雙方都留在它們現在所在的地方停火，並設法以朝鮮軍隊來代替在朝鮮的外國軍隊——即令祇有此事發生，時間可能再次證明是一服良藥，對於一個瘡痍滿目的國家在獲得恢復繁榮的機會和在修復確是可怕的損害上獲得幫助時尤其是如此，因此，我連暫時的停戰或停火都是非常滿意的。

我們大家都希望在板門店解決關於戰俘問題的爭執。奇怪的是這個問題存在了這麼久。現在祇有一個重要的問題，就是不能並且不應不顧戰俘的意志而將他強迫遣返。這個問題引起了許多月的煩厭討論，但是現在已經不再是一個障礙了。關於交換戰俘的條件問題，實際上已縮小為不再涉及任何原則上的分歧的條款了。目前剩下的是方法和程序問題。雙方已經作了許多讓步，聯合國代表自己至少提出了半打的代替辦法。

很明顯的，假如共方在任何時候願像在通情理的人之間那樣達成協議，問題就可以立即或幾乎可

Let me, first of all, touch factually upon some of the more rapidly moving scenes as they present themselves to us at this moment. Our immediate aim, of course, is the conclusion of a truce in Korea. I doubt very much whether there could be any agreement at the present time on a united Korea. Terrible injuries have been done to each other by the North and South Koreans, but, even if both sides only stood still where they are now, ceased fire and tried to replace the foreign troops in the country by Korean forces—even if only that happened, time might once more prove to be a healer, especially in ravaged countries when given a revival of prosperity and help in repairing the really fearful damage. Therefore, I should be very content with even a truce or a cease-fire for the moment.

We all desire a settlement of the prisoners of war dispute at Panmunjom. The wonder is that it has been kept alive so long. There is only one vital point, namely, that a prisoner of war cannot and should not be forcibly repatriated against his will. That issue has involved many months of wearisome discussion, but it is now no longer an obstacle. The question of the conditions governing the exchange of prisoners has really been reduced to terms which no longer involve any difference of principle. All that now remains is methods and procedure. Both sides have made numerous concessions, and the United Nations representatives have themselves suggested at least half-a-dozen alternatives.

It is obvious that, if at any time, there is a wish among the Communists to reach an agreement as between rational human beings, the

以立即解決。有一點也是已經弄明白了，弄得很明白了，即假如沒有解決問題的願望，是能夠提出無休止的、無窮盡的主張來的。就我們而論，我們願意接受這個意見，就是由瑞士、或瑞典、或印度或巴基斯坦來擔負以正直的方式處理四五萬怕回家的戰俘的工作。

現在共方提出了一個建議，就是由波蘭、捷克斯洛伐克、瑞士、瑞典和印度這五個國家共同處理這個問題。這牽涉到很複雜的問題，但同時把所有有關戰俘應從他們現在的戰俘營中移往遙遠的國家去的要求是放棄了。我必須提醒下院，像我已經提醒過好幾次的一樣，美國作為聯合國的委任國家，在鮮血與錢財方面擔負了二十分之十九。這不是一個我們有權利或責任作出決定的問題。但是，我們有義務在不與我們偉大的盟國分道揚鑣的情形下，遇有機會坦白而清楚地提出我們的意見。我的確覺得需要對這個新建議予以耐心與同情的研究。我不知道目前有任何理由以為這個新建議不能成為協議的基礎，祇要這是共產黨本着誠摯的精神而提出的。

最近數週來，我們十分焦急地注視印度支那情形的惡化。我很高興地說，就我所有的情報看來，那裏的局勢已經不如一度所認為的那樣嚴重了，而且由於法國人所採取的措施，加之雨季接近或到來，可能有數月的平靜。我應當說我認為——我冒昧提出我的意見——越盟部隊或他們的徵糧部隊向暹羅邊境突然前進，不應當使我們得出這是蘇聯策動的、與蘇聯政府的新態度不一致的一種行動的結論。可能不幸是這樣，但也很可能是因為當地的情況與衝動所引起的，也可能是由於許多個月以前擬定的而現在可能已經改變了的計劃所引起的。我們至少不應該過急地得出不利的結論。

現在我來談談埃及問題，這是離開我們活動場所近得多的問題。我覺得很可以追溯最近連續發生的事件經過。在撤出阿巴丹不到一個星期，埃及的華夫脫黨政府就宣佈他們將單方——片面地，如果你願意這樣說的話——廢除一九三六年的條約，這個條約在目前的形式下無論如何一直到一九五六年都是有效的。他們很可能沒有認識到這種行動會

matter could be instantly, or almost instantly, settled. It has also been made plain—abundantly plain—that, if there is no wish to settle, endless and inexhaustible variants can be proposed. So far as we are concerned, we readily accepted the idea that Switzerland or Sweden or India or Pakistan should take over the task of handling in an honourable manner the 40,000 or 50,000 prisoners who fear to go home.

Now, a proposal has been made by the Communists that five Powers—Poland, Czechoslovakia, Switzerland, Sweden and India—shall all deal together with the problem. This involves much complication, but, at the same time, the claim that all the prisoners concerned shall be moved from their present camps to other distant countries has been dropped. I must remind the House, as I have done several times, that the United States, as mandatory for the United Nations, has borne nineteen-twentieths of the burden in blood and treasure. The matter is not one which we have either the right or the responsibility to decide, but it is our duty, without separating ourselves from our great ally, to express our opinion frankly and plainly to them as occasion offers. I certainly feel that this new proposal requires patient and sympathetic examination, and there is no reason known to me at present to assume that it may not form the basis of an agreement, provided always that it is put forward by the Communists in a spirit of sincerity.

During the last few weeks, we have watched with much anxiety the deterioration of the position in Indo-China. I am glad to say that, so far as my information goes, it is less serious than was at one time assumed, and that the measures taken by the French, together with the approach, or, indeed, the arrival, of the rainy season, will probably give a lull of several months. I ought to say that, in my opinion—I am venturing to offer my opinion—the sudden advance of elements of the Viet-minh forces, or their foraging parties, towards the Siamese frontier ought not to lead us to conclude that it is a Soviet-inspired move inconsistent with the new attitude of the Soviet Government. This may unhappily prove to be the case, but also it might well have arisen from local circumstances and impulses, and from plans made many months ago and now, perhaps, reversed. We should at least not be over hasty in drawing a conclusion in an adverse sense.

Now I come to Egypt, a long way nearer to our scenes of activity, and here I think it will be well to trace the recent sequence of events. Within a week of the evacuation of Abadan, the Wafd Government of Egypt announced that they would repudiate onesidedly—unilaterally, if you prefer it—the Treaty of 1936 which remains valid in its present form until at any rate 1956. It may

使他們無論在法律上、國際上或一般道德上處於怎樣軟弱不利的地位。毫無疑問，我們保持一個遭到背信棄義的行動之辱的國家所應有的法律上的優勢。

當十八個月前發生了這種情況的時候，當時的首相——現在的反對黨領袖——和當時的外交大臣，雖然正值選舉，還是向運河區的英國軍隊發出了嚴厲的命令，要他們自衛並從事準備保護英國平民，免遭暴行和屠殺。有一種游擊戰立即爆發。這就是一九五一年十月二十五日我們開始負責時所接手的情況。

到了一九五二年一月底，對我們的軍隊——這些軍隊會根據並依照我們完全贊同的前政府的決定而大大加強了——的這些攻擊以在伊士美利亞的一件相當粗暴的事件而告終。在開羅曾發生了一些驚人的暴徒暗殺事件，但是戰鬥則停止了。在去年七月底，埃及陸軍的一個軍官和他的一幫軍隊夥伴趕走了國王法魯克，而不根據任何的選舉基礎，使自己成為或被捧為埃及的獨裁者。自從那時以後，大權便落在這個軍事集團的手裏。

獨裁制度不利之點之一是獨裁者常受到別人的指揮；他對別人所作的事，別人常常也可能以同樣的事來回敬他。隨後在埃及有了一段緊張時期，在這個時期中，新獨裁者和他的同志發現通過大家都知道的「從英國人身上弄出來」的辦法來得到儘可能多的民心是有好處的或必要的。大約在上月即四月初以前，這種辦法只是限於舌戰。上月以來，發生了一些小規模的引起一些人命損失的暴力行動。

在去年十一月，納吉布將軍和開羅的當權的軍事集團要求我們開始就撤出運河區和撤出完全是由我們在戰時和戰後出錢建設的很重要的而且花錢很多的基地的問題進行談判。我們很願意以友好的方式和納吉布將軍或他的代表討論整個形勢。自然，我們並不希望無限期維持八萬人，每年花費五千多萬英鎊來履行大部分由英國負擔的而且單獨負擔的保障自由國家在中東的利益並維護蘇彝士運河國際航綫的責任。

如果能够訂出可以同意的安排，使後一種工作以及切實維持戰略基地的工作能依與埃及達成的協

well be that they did not realise what a weak position that put them in juridically and internationally, and, indeed, in common decency. We undoubtedly retain the legal advantages which go to a nation affronted by an act of bad faith.

When this happened 18 months ago, the then Prime Minister, now Leader of the Opposition, and the then Foreign Secretary, although in the midst of the election, gave very stiff orders to the British troops on the Canal to defend themselves and make preparations to protect British civilians from outrage and massacre. A kind of guerilla war immediately broke out, and this is what we inherited when, on 25th October, 1951, we became responsible.

By the end of January, 1952, these attacks upon our Forces, which had been heavily strengthened under the decision and in accordance with the decisions of the late Government, with which we were in full accord, were brought to an end by a rather rough episode in Ismailia. There were some shocking mob murders in Cairo, but there was no more fighting. At the end of July of last year an officer of the Egyptian Army, with a band of military associates, expelled King Farouk and made himself, or was made, without any electoral foundation, dictator of Egypt. Power has since rested with the military junta.

One of the disadvantages of dictatorship is that the dictator is often dictated to by others, and what he did to others may often be done back again to him. There has followed a period of tension in Egypt during which the new dictator and his comrades have found it convenient, or necessary, to gain as much popularity as possible by the well-known process of "taking it out of the British." This process was confined to wordy warfare until about the beginning of last month, April, since when a number of minor acts of violence causing the loss of several lives has taken place.

In November of last year, General Neguib and the ruling junta in Cairo asked us to begin negotiations with them on our evacuation of the Canal Zone and of the important and very costly base which has been established there wholly at our expense during and after the war. We were quite ready to talk over the whole position with General Neguib or his representatives, in a friendly manner. Naturally, we do not wish to keep indefinitely 80,000 men at a cost of, it might be, over £50 million a year discharging the duty which has largely fallen upon us, and us alone, of safeguarding the interests of the free nations in the Middle East, and also of preserving the international waterway of the Suez Canal.

If agreeable arrangements can be made to enable this latter service and also the solid maintenance of the strategic base to be discharged by

議來執行，這將意味着大量節省我們的人力和金錢。請讓我指出，這並不是英國的帝國主義或殖民的事業，而是爲了與北大西洋條約組織的每一個成員國——從北角直到高加索——和東方與中東國家直接有關的目的的。

在一九五一年廢棄一九三六年的條約的是埃及的君主政權，而在去年十一月要求舉行會議的是埃及的獨裁政權。我們不同意廢除這個條約，但是我們甘心情願地同意了舉行會議。不過，我們認爲在與埃及代表舉行會議之前，最好先與世界的主要國家——美國——就保衛我所說的這些國際目標上不可少的最低條件取得諒解。

這些條件一方面完全尊重埃及的主權，同時必須使這種基地能保持一旦有第三次世界大戰，如有必要的話，即可以迅速在中東各地發生有效的作用的情況。在與杜魯門政府下的美國軍事與文職當局進行了縝密的和徹底的討論後，我們對於必要的條件得出了結論。

我不打算在今天下午詳談這些條件。祇這樣說一下就夠了，即：如果這些條件被誠心誠意地接受，它們可使英國在運河區的部隊從八萬人減少到這個數目的很小一部分。那裏只留下一些技術人員，在取得埃及的君主政權、共和政權、寡頭政權或獨裁政權或任何可能出現的政權的善意下執行任務。

我們曾和杜魯門先生政府商定，我們應該共同行動執行這個政策。總統選舉後，當艾森豪威爾總統執政後，整個問題又經研究。今天下午我沒有受權說明所達成的協議的形式。但是，在三月，我們向埃及建議，英國代表與美國代表應該與他們會談，討論局勢。然而埃及人却不希望同時跟我們兩國會商，美國就聽從了他們的願望，同時還準備好如果納吉布邀請他們，他們就隨時準備參加討論。

因此，我們英國人在兩禮拜以前即在四月二十七日與埃及方面舉行會議。一些時以前，我們想要求史陵元帥和我們的大使一道說明我們的立場——這大半是軍事技術問題，但是由於他需要留在澳大利亞，致使我們必須派遣另外一位軍事權威來代替

agreement with Egypt, it would mean a great saving of our men and money. This, let me point out, is not an Imperialist or Colonial enterprise by the British, but it is for purposes with which every member of N.A.T.O. from the North Cape to the Caucasus and also the countries of the East and Middle East are directly concerned.

It was the Egyptian monarchy which, in 1951, denounced the 1936 Treaty, and it was the Egyptian dictatorship which in November last sought the Conference. We have not accepted the repudiation of the Treaty, but we have willingly agreed to the Conference. However, before meeting the Egyptian delegates, we thought it better to come to an understanding between the United States as the leading world Power about the indispensable minimum conditions for preserving these international objects I have described.

These conditions, while fully respecting Egyptian sovereignty, must enable the base to be maintained in such a condition that in the event of a Third World War it could, if needed, function effectively in good time throughout the Middle East. After careful and thorough discussions with the American authorities, both military and civil, under the Truman Administration, we reached conclusions on the necessary conditions.

I do not propose to describe in detail this afternoon these conditions. Suffice it to say that if accepted in good faith they would render possible the reduction of the British Forces in the Canal Zone from 80,000 to a small fraction of that number. There would be left technical personnel discharging their functions with the good will of the Egyptian monarchy, republic, oligarchy, dictatorship, or whatever it may turn out to be.

It was agreed with Mr. Truman's Administration that we should act together to carry forward this policy. When, after the Presidential election, President Eisenhower came into power all this matter was reviewed. I am not authorised to state this afternoon the form of agreement which was reached. In March, however, we proposed to the Egyptians that the British and United States delegates should meet them and discuss the position. The Egyptians, however, did not wish to meet us both together in the discussion, and the United States deferred to their wish while holding themselves ready at any time to join the discussions if invited by Neguib.

We, the British, therefore went into conference with the Egyptians on 27th April, a fortnight ago. We had intended some time ago to ask Field Marshal Slim to join with our Ambassador in presenting our case, which is largely military technique. His need to be in Australia made it necessary for us to substitute another military autho-

他。我們認為羅伯遜將軍是一個具有最高專門知識的代表而且他在負責中東方面和以前負責德屬英佔區的行政工作中，獲得了各種政治經驗。談判是在這種情況下開始的。

讓我再重複一遍，我們並沒有要求這種談判。我們是依從埃及要求談判的願望。他們當時要求舉行這種談判，而他們現在——引今天報紙上所載的納吉布將軍憤激的話——却洗手不幹了。在這裏，讓我說，我至今並沒有和納吉布將軍有過個人通信，如今天早上某些報紙所說的那樣。女王陛下政府或它的代表團也沒有提出任何屬於最後通牒性質的東西。這種憤激之詞更可能是希望說給今天抵達開羅的杜勒斯先生聽而發出的。

如果在任何時候，埃及人希望重開談判，我們是願意的；如果他們願意恢復和我們也和美國的談判，那就更好了。同時，就我所看到的，我們不需採取行動。當然，如果最近幾個月不斷發展的誇口的威脅性的演說（有些甚至是在最近幾小時發表的）變為行動，而我們駐在運河區的部隊又成了破壞分子甚至埃及軍隊——這支現由人數異常之多的納粹教官和參謀人員協助和訓練的軍隊——再度攻擊的目標，以及我們的士兵被殺害，我們除自衛外，別無他法——我很遺憾要向下院這樣說，但我們必須應付事實。我已聽說，我們完全有力量這樣做而不需要美國或任何旁人的物質上的援助。我們希望談判將恢復，同時我們可以抱着出於忍耐和有力量鎮靜態度來等待局勢的發展。

現在我講到歐洲主要的形勢。最主的問題當然是德國問題。假如美國在德國停戰後接受了我們的意見，西方盟國不會在與蘇聯就有關佔領敵人領土問題——當然，佔領德國的問題不過是其中一部分——的許多分歧獲致協議以前，從它們軍隊已經抵達的前綫撤退到議定的佔領綫上。我們的意見沒有被接受，三個戰勝國之間還沒有商妥總的解決辦法，就把德國的一大片土地交給蘇聯佔領。

ity. In General Robertson we have found a representative of the highest professional knowledge and of varied political experience in the administration both of the Middle East and earlier of the British Zone in Germany. It was in these circumstances that negotiations began.

We did not, let me repeat, seek these negotiations. We complied with the Egyptian desire for them. They asked for them and they have now—to quote the violent outpourings of General Neguib reported in today's newspapers—washed their hands of them. Let me here say that I have hitherto had no personal communication with General Neguib, as is stated in some newspapers this morning, and nothing in the nature of an ultimatum has come from Her Majesty's Government or their delegation. It is more likely that the outburst springs from a desire to impress Mr. Foster Dulles, who has arrived in Cairo today.

If, at any time, the Egyptians wish to renew the discussions we are willing, and if they would renew them both with us and with the United States, that would be still better. In the meanwhile, no action so far as I can see is called upon from us. Of course, if the boastful and threatening speeches of which there has been a spate in the last few months, and, in some instances, even in the last few hours, were to be translated into action and our troops in the Canal Zone were to be the object of renewed attacks by saboteurs or even by the Egyptian Army, which is being aided and trained by Nazi instructors and staff officers in unusual numbers, and our soldiers were being killed, we should have no choice—I am sorry to say this to the House, but we must face facts—but to defend ourselves. I am advised that we are entirely capable of doing this without requiring any physical assistance from the United States or anyone else. Our hope is that negotiations will be resumed. In the meanwhile, we may await the development of events with the composure which follows from the combination of patience with strength.

I come now to the main position in Europe. The dominating problem is, of course, Germany. If our advice had been taken by the United States after the Armistice with Germany, the Western allies would not have withdrawn from the front line which their armies had reached to the agreed occupation lines unless and until agreement had been reached with Soviet Russia on the many points of difference about the occupation of enemy territories, of which the occupation of the German Zones was, of course, only a part. Our view was not accepted and a wide area of Germany was handed over to Soviet occupation without any general settlement among the three victorious Powers.

在中斷過的波茨坦會議——可敬的反對黨領袖會以兩種不同的身分參加這個會議，這是我完全感到滿意的，至少就第一次的身分說來是如此——之後，斯大林的俄國對西方盟國採取了極為敵視的政策。斯大林在很早的一個階段就感到遭到已故的貝文的堅韌態度的抵抗；貝文發動了並集中了民主的情緒，堅決反對蘇俄這個野心勃勃的新運動。八年來，一切悲慘而重大的事件冷酷地接踵而來。結果，巨大的、可怕的德國問題以完全不同的形式出現了。

佔德國四分之一以上的人口和三分之一的土地的德國東部淪於很大的苦難和蕭條，並且有了一支超過十萬人的強大的、武裝精良、由蘇聯組織起來的共產黨德國軍隊。德波邊界問題是波茨坦會議特別留待一般性的和約解決的問題。說得溫和一點，和約現在好像並不比那時更接近協議。

我們以及美國和法國已經和西德建立了一種新的、值得稱道的關係。女王陛下政府的政策就是在精神和在文字上最忠誠地遵守我們和西德所訂的協定。阿登納博士很可以說是俾斯麥時代以來最明智的德國政治家。我很欽佩他用以應付他不斷遭遇到的複雜、多變、不定和無法預測的情況的堅忍、勇氣、鎮定和技巧。雖然我們很希望看到和蘇俄達成友好的解決辦法，或者即使是有改進的臨時協定，但是，我們決心絕不背棄我們已承擔的有關西德的義務。阿登納博士將在數日內來訪問我們，我們一定將向他保證說，西德絕不會被犧牲——我特別鄭重地選用這幾個字——或者說它在我們和其他北大西洋條約組織的國家與它簽訂的協定的範圍之內絕不會不再是它自己的命運的主宰。

現在還有法國。正如我幾年來一直主張的，除非將由來已久的條頓人和高魯人之間的不和擱起來，西歐的安全與自由便沒有希望。自從我在瑞士蘇黎世要求法國與德國攜手並把德國帶回歐洲大家庭以來，已經過了七年。自那時以後，我們有了很大的進展。這些進展有些無疑是由於抵抗蘇聯的巨大軍事力量的刺激而來的，但是，有許多也是由於統一歐洲這個使人鼓舞的、不可征服的事業。我們有

After the interrupted Potsdam Conference, which the right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition attended in two different capacities—with my entire contentment, at any rate so far as his first capacity was concerned—the Russia of Stalin took a very hostile line to the Western allies. Stalin found himself resisted from a very early stage by the firmness and tenacity of the late Ernest Bevin, who marshalled and rallied democratic sentiment strongly against this new movement of Russian Soviet ambitions. All the tragic and tremendous events of the last eight years followed in remorseless succession. As the result, the immense and formidable problem of Germany now presents itself in an entirely different form.

The East of Germany—more than one-quarter of her population and one-third of her territory, has fallen into great misery and depression and has a powerful and well armed, Soviet-organised, Communist German, military force of over 100,000 men. The question of the German-Polish frontier was specifically reserved at Potsdam for the general peace treaty which, to put it mildly, seems no nearer now than it was then.

We, with the United States, and France, have entered into a new and remarkable relationship with Western Germany. The policy of Her Majesty's Government is to adhere most faithfully in the spirit as well as in the letter to our agreements with Western Germany. Dr. Adenauer may well be deemed the wisest German statesman since the days of Bismarck. I have greatly admired the perseverance, courage, composure and skill with which he has faced the complex, changing, uncertain and unpredictable situations with which he has been ceaselessly confronted. Strong as is our desire to see a friendly settlement with Soviet Russia, or even an improved *modus vivendi*, we are resolved not in any way to fail in the obligations to which we have committed ourselves about Western Germany. Dr. Adenauer is visiting us here in a few days, and we shall certainly assure him that Western Germany will in no way be sacrificed or—I pick these words with special care—cease to be master of its own fortunes within the agreements we and other N.A.T.O. countries have made with them.

Then there is France. As I have urged for several years, there is no hope for the safety and freedom of Western Europe except by the laying aside forever of the ancient feud between the Teuton and the Gaul. It is seven years since, at Zurich, I appealed to France to take Germany by the hand and lead her back into the European family. We have made great progress since then. Some of it has been due no doubt to the spur to resist the enormous military strength of Soviet Russia, but much is also due to the inspiring and

斯特拉斯堡和它所代表的一切。隨着歲月的前進，我們有不倦地加強它的活力和權威的責任。

我們現在有歐洲經濟合作組織，它在鞏固歐洲國家的物質力量與統一觀念上已經做了很多有益的工作。我們有歐洲支付同盟；還有歐洲煤鋼聯營集團，我相信我們在這個機構中有觀察員。最後，我們有或誠摯地希望不久就會有拖延那末久而又是那末迫切需要的歐洲防務集團。這個集團將成爲我們逐步發展的北大西洋條約組織的一個主要的組成部分。

法國的軍事地位是很可以使英語世界嚴重焦慮的。這主要地並不是因爲它對於歐洲的影響，因爲不管我們在那裏的命運如何，我們是站在一起的。主要地不是因爲這一點，而是因爲它對於法國在他們要保衛的遙遠地區的地位和政策的影響。

美國人要求法國人將印度支那問題提交聯合國，在聯合國裏目前可能獲得有利的表決。但是，我根據自己的觀察的了解，法國人遲疑不肯這樣作，因爲他們知道，從此以後他們在印度支那的制度將受聯合國的不斷的調查。由於聯合國大多數會員國都沒有殖民地，他們易於對有殖民地的國家採取比較置身事外的意見，因此，法國遲遲不肯使用聯合國機構。

但是，法國如果要保全法蘭西聯邦的權威和生命而不與聯合國發生任何聯系，肯定地，它應當自己採取更有效的步驟。現在，如果法國人有像工黨政府在英國建立的軍事制度——我可以稱之爲「辛威爾制度」——即實行兩年的兵役制並有權把服國民兵役的或被徵入伍的士兵派遣到歐洲以外去的話，我相信他們在維持他們在印度支那的地位上所遇到的困難就會小得多；並且也應該和他們的盟國一道發展一支強大得多的軍隊以保衛他們自己的國土。他們迄今沒有認爲他們能採取這種軍事措施，這也使他們遭到很大的困難。

我們處在什麼地位呢？我們不是歐洲防務集團的成員國，我們也不打算參加歐洲聯邦系統。我們覺得我們與兩者都有一種特殊的關係。這種關係可以用一個前置詞「和」而不是「屬於」來表達。我

unconquerable cause of United Europe. We have Strasbourg and all that it stands for, and it is our duty to fortify its vitality and authority tirelessly as the years roll on.

We have the Organization for European Economic Co-operation, which has done such beneficent work in consolidating the material strength and sense of unity of European countries; we have the European Payments Union and there is also the European Coal and Steel Community, on which I believe we have observers. Finally, we have, or rather we sincerely hope before long to have, the European Defence Community, so long delayed but also so intensely needed. This will form an essential component of a progressively developing North Atlantic Organization.

The military position of France is one which may well, however, cause serious anxiety in the English-speaking world. This is not mainly because of its effect in Europe—since whatever our fate there we are in the line together; it is not mainly because of that—it is rather because of its effect on the French position and policy in the far-reaching regions they are seeking to defend.

The Americans invite the French to bring their case in Indo-China before U.N.O. where probably a favourable vote at the moment could be found. The French, as I understand from my own observation, hesitate to do so because they know that thereafter their system in Indo-China would be brought under the continuous survey of U.N.O. As most of the members of U.N.O. have no colonies they are apt to take a rather detached view about those who have. Hence the French hesitation to invoke the machinery of U.N.O.

But surely if France wishes to preserve the authority and life of the French Union without any associations with U.N.O. she should take more effective steps herself. If, today, the French had the same military system that the Socialist Government set up in Great Britain—what I may call the Shinwell system—namely, two years' military service and the power to send National Service men or conscripts abroad beyond Europe, they would, I believe, have had much less difficulty in maintaining their positions in Indo-China and could also have developed a far stronger army in defence of their own soil in line with their allies. The fact that they have hitherto found themselves unable to take these kinds of military measures has exposed them to great difficulty.

Where do we stand? We are not members of the European Defence Community, nor do we intend to be merged in a Federal European system. We feel we have a special relation to both. This can be expressed by prepositions, by the preposition "with" but not "of"—we are with them, but

們和他們在一起，但是並不屬於他們。我們有我們自己的聯邦和帝國。法國的焦慮之一，是恐怕德國——即使是像現在那樣分裂——强大到在統一的歐洲或歐洲防務集團內超過法國。我確信，如果他們要使自己變得更强大些，他們是可以做很多事情的。但是，無論如何，作為法國的一個將近五十年的積極的朋友，我始終相信我們的命運是一致的。

的確，自從戰爭結束以來，我們已經在北大西洋條約組織和歐洲防務集團各種協定中，在敦刻爾克條約和布魯塞爾條約中，五次保證要盡我們最大的力量來協助保衛法國以防侵略進攻。五次保證已够多了，而且這種保證不是由於任何政黨的決定，而是得到英國全國普遍同意的。我們也宣佈我們對加強歐洲防務集團的力量和整體性的永久的關心。我們已提議與它的組織和它的軍隊建立密切的聯繫。這應該可以恢復均勢並消除對西德將在聯合組織裏佔壓倒優勢的恐懼。

現在讓我用一點時間來談談我們在歐洲防務集團裏的作用的細節。我們接受了我們自己和歐洲防務集團之間有一種特別密切的關係的原則。預期歐洲防務集團條約行將實施，我們已經和這個集團的成員國擬定在軍事方面和政治方面均為必要的措施。在軍事方面，我們將確使我們的軍隊和歐洲防務集團軍隊之間有有效和繼續的合作。在空軍方面，我們也準備在歐洲空軍完全建立時與它們交換軍官從事指揮和訓練，並以許多其他方式進行合作。陸軍與海軍之間也將有密切聯繫。在政治方面，我們意欲不斷地和誠懇地就共同有關的問題與它們磋商。這是我們的政策，也是我們前任的政策。

我還覺得必須從另外一個角度來正式談一談我們至今已做了的事情。我們派了我們最龐大的軍隊與法國人一起駐紮在大陸上。我們擁有在易北河和萊茵河之間的最強大的裝甲部隊。我們使我們所有的空軍有密切聯繫。我們已經把我們駐在歐洲大陸的軍隊交給北大西洋軍總司令李奇微將軍指揮。一旦戰爭爆發，他在按照戰略上的需要，甚至戰術上的需要進行像在最近和前一次的世界大戰中我們曾有過的合理的磋商以後，可以調動我們的軍隊。

not of them. We have our own Commonwealth and Empire. One of the anxieties of France is lest Germany, even partitioned as she is now, will be so strong that France will be outweighed in United Europe or in the European Defence Community. I am sure they could do a lot, if they chose to make themselves stronger. But, anyhow, I have always believed, as an active friend of France for nearly 50 years, that our fortunes lie together.

Certainly we have, since the end of the war, guaranteed five times under the various N.A.T.O. and E.D.C. agreements, under the Dunkirk Treaty and the Brussels Treaty, to help to the utmost of our strength defend France against aggressive attack. Quite a lot—five times; and not as a result of any party decisions, but with the general assent of the British nation. We also declared our abiding interest in building up the strength and integrity of the European Defence Community. We have offered close links with its institutions and its forces. This ought to restore the balance and remove fears that Western Germany will preponderate in the combined organization.

Let me, if I may, go into some detail for a few moments on our part in the European Defence Community. We accept the principle that there is a specially close relationship between ourselves and the E.D.C. In anticipation of the coming into effect of the E.D.C. Treaty we are already working out with the members of the Community the measures that will be necessary, both on the military and on the political side. On the military side we will ensure effective and continuous co-operation between our forces and those of E.D.C. In the air we shall be ready when the European Air Force is fully established to exchange officers for command and training and to co-operate in many other ways. There will also be close association between the armies and the navies. On the political side we intend to consult constantly and earnestly about problems of common concern. That is our policy as it was the policy of our predecessors.

I feel bound also to place on record from another angle what we have done so far. We have stationed our largest military force with the French on the Continent. We have the strongest armoured force which exists between the Elbe and the Rhine. We have very intimately associated all our air forces. We have placed our troops in Europe under the command of General Ridgway, the N.A.T.O. Commander-in-Chief. And should war come he can move our divisions about, after reasonable consultations such as we had in the late and preceding world wars, in accordance with strategic requirements or even tactical requirements.

那末，除了我們完全參加歐洲軍組織之外，我們還有什麼可貢獻的呢？我們對他們已經盡了最大的力量。我們依照最高司令的命令與它們並肩作戰。在大陸上我們與他們同舟共濟。我們在我們自己的島嶼上沒有一個整師的軍隊。在我所知道的或閱歷過的時代裏，從來沒有一個國家會冒這樣的危險；從來也沒有一個國家會因這樣做而這樣很少為人所提到。

我們將繼續充分地、和積極地參加西歐與北大西洋聯盟在政治上、軍事上和經濟上聯系的計劃。我想，這是我們對歐洲防務集團的態度的一個十分穩健的和合理的說明。

我或者已經以坦白的態度——我認爲我對法國的長期友誼使我有權這樣做——談過法國問題。然而我不能離開法國問題而不重申我們對法國的生命和名譽的忠誠。在好幾個世紀中，法國曾經是我們的敵人，但在我們兩國都經歷的最艱苦的鬥爭中，它是我們的盟國。誰也不應該忘記法國在第一次世界大戰中所作的光榮而可怕的犧牲。那時，法國的人口經常是三千九百萬，但是它損失了它的人民中最優秀的二百萬人。我們看到法國的實力和影響的每一恢復都感到很高興。我以他們在英國的最老的朋友的資格，冒昧地向他們提出的一切忠告，都是出於我對他們在歐洲的光榮和文化中所起的作用的敬佩。

我在這些地圖上移動——因爲在一個人的心中是一定要這樣做的。當我們考慮到歐洲的安全時，我們一定不要忽視去年最重要的一項發展——南斯拉夫、希臘和土耳其之間的新的關係。這些國家都在歐洲前綫的右翼，它們的協定大大地加強了盟國的整個防務體系。它對中東的防務也起了非常有利的影響。

土耳其包括在北大西洋條約組織國家之內，對阿拉伯國家以及一般的回教世界自然有重要的影響。我們相信，阿拉伯國家的智慧可以引導它們和西方盟國發生愈益密切的聯系；它們與西方盟國有着許多共同利益和共同安全的關係。

以色列國是中東的另一個最重要的因素。自從一九一七年鮑爾宣言發表以來，我一直是猶太復國主義事業的忠實支持者。自然，當這個緊張而複雜的猶太社會中的極端派對我們的官兵犯下令人震驚的罪行時，我曾經有過很痛苦的時期。但是，當我們回顧他們在建立國家、開墾沙漠、容納單是來

What more is there, then, that we could give, apart from completely merging ourselves with the European military organisation? We do our best for them. We fight with them under the orders of the Supreme Commander. On the Continent we share their fate. We have not got a divisional formation in our own island. No nation has even run such risks in times which I have read about or lived through, and no nation has even received such little recognition for it.

We shall continue to play a full and active part in plans for the political, military and economic association of Western Europe with the North Atlantic Alliance. There is, I think, a perfectly sober and reasonable statement of our position in regard to the European Defence Community.

I cannot, however, leave French problems, about which I have perhaps spoken with a frankness which I think my long friendship entitles me to do, without reaffirming our devotion to the life and fame of France. France was our enemy for centuries but our ally in the worst struggles we have either of us endured. No one should ever forget the glorious but fearful sacrifices made by France in the First World War when, with her then static population of 39 million, she suffered the loss of two million of the flower of her race. We rejoice to see every revival of French strength and influence, and all the counsel which I venture to offer them as their oldest friend in Britain, springs from my admiration for the part they have played in the glory and the culture of Europe.

I move over these maps—because that is what one has to do in one's mind. When we consider the security of Europe we must not overlook a most important development in the last year—the new relationship between Yugoslavia, Greece and Turkey. These nations are on the right flank of the front in Europe, and their agreement greatly strengthens the whole system of allied defence. It also has reactions on the defence of the Middle East which are highly beneficial.

The inclusion of Turkey among the N.A.T.O. Powers has, of course, an important influence upon the Arab States and generally with the Moslem world. We trust that the wisdom of the Arab States may lead them to ever closer association with the Western allies, with whom they have so many ties of common interest and mutual security.

Another most important factor in the Middle East is the State of Israel. Ever since the Balfour Declaration of 1917 I have been a faithful supporter of the Zionist cause. I have, of course, had periods of deep pain when shocking crimes were committed against our officers and men by the extreme factions in this intense and complex Jewish community. But when I look back over

自歐洲的受到恐怖之迫的五十多萬難民的工作時，我感到英國有責任使他們受到公道的待遇以及使歷屆英國政府對他們提出的保證得到履行。

幸運的是他們組成了利凡得的最好的軍隊，並且有如下院所記得的，在四年前他們勝利地擊退了他們的隣國和埃及對他們的聯合進攻。極不幸的是，以色列和與它的命運息息相關的阿拉伯國家之間尚未媾和。我們決不會在對世界這個地區的飛機供應方面做出使以色列處於不公平的不利地位的事情。

我們熱誠地希望阿拉伯難民問題會受到繼續的注意，以色列與約旦之間所發生的不幸的和特別不合時機的糾紛會結束而對雙方都有利。三十多年以前，我與這些國家的利益與成立有很多的關係，我相信它們如果像好隣居一樣地共處，它們會對彼此都有很大的幫助。

我曾經極希望阿卜杜拉國王和魏茲曼先生——我認識的和非常敬重的兩個人——能夠聚在一起，但是一個死了，另一個被暗殺了。但是，堅忍與睦隣的政策是任何人都不能指摘的政策。因此，我希望並且相信阿拉伯國家會與以色列媾和，並衷心地企望，使這個歷史悠久的民族有一個家園——在那裏他們生活在他們的祖先的土地上——的偉大的猶太復國主義思想最後終會獲得豐滿的結果。

自從上次我們辯論外交問題以來所發生的最重要的事情，當然是斯大林逝世後蘇聯地區內，特別是克里姆林宮內的態度和——如我們大家都希望的——情緒的改變。在下院中我們兩邊都深切注視這件事。女王陛下政府的政策是盡它的力之所及的一切方法避免做出或說出任何足以阻礙可能正在產生的良好的反應的事，並歡迎改善我們和蘇聯的關係的每一種跡象。

蘇聯新政府的一連串的友好姿態使我們得到鼓舞。到目前為止，這些姿態表現在不再做我們一向沒有對他們做過的事情。因此，很難找到一件足以

the work they have done in building up a nation, in reclaiming the desert, in receiving more than half a million refugees hunted by terror from Europe alone, I feel that it is the duty of Britain to see that they get fair play and that the pledges made to them by successive British Governments are fulfilled.

Fortunately for them they have formed the best Army in the Levant and, as the House will remember, they successfully repulsed the combined attack which was made upon them by their neighbours and Egypt four years ago. It is very unfortunate that no peace has been made between them and the Arab States, with whom their fortunes are interwoven. Nothing that we shall do in the supply of aircraft to this part of the world will be allowed to place Israel at an unfair disadvantage.

We earnestly hope that the problem of Arab refugees will receive continuous attention and that the unfortunate and, particularly, peculiarly untimely, bickering which has broken out between Israel and Jordan will be brought to an end with mutual advantage to both sides. I had a lot to do with the interests and the formation of both these States more than 30 years ago, and I believe that they have both great services to render each other by living together as good neighbours.

I had hoped very much that King Abdullah and Mr. Weizmann—two men I knew and honoured greatly—might have come together, but death has removed one and assassination the other. But perseverance and good neighbourliness is not a policy with which anyone can find fault. Therefore, I hope and trust that the Arab States will come to peace with Israel, and I earnestly pray that the great Zionist conception of a home for this historic people, where they live on the land of their ancestors, may eventually receive its full fruition.

The supreme event which has occurred since we last had a debate on foreign affairs is, of course, the change of attitude and, as we all hope, of mood which has taken place in the Soviet domains and particularly in the Kremlin since the death of Stalin. We, on both sides of the House, have watched this with profound attention. It is the policy of Her Majesty's Government to avoid by every means in their power doing anything or saying anything which could check any favourable reaction that may be taking place and to welcome every sign of improvement in our relations with Russia.

We have been encouraged by a series of amicable gestures on the part of the new Soviet Government. These have so far taken the form of leaving off doing things which we have not been doing to them. It is, therefore, difficult to

配合他們的行動的具體事實。但是，假使能夠舉出任何這樣事實的話，女王陛下政府一定將急切而同情地加以研究。關於這一點，我現在冒昧地作出一般的觀察，我希望大家對這種觀察將以容忍和寬恕的態度加以研究。

我認為若以為除非每一個問題都獲得解決，否則不能與蘇聯解決任何問題，這種想法是錯誤的。解決兩三起我們的困難問題對於每個愛好和平國家將是一種重要的收穫。譬如朝鮮和平問題、締結對奧和約問題——這些都可以導致今後幾年中我們的關係的緩和，而緩和本身又可以為所有國家和每一個大陸的安全和繁榮開闢新的希望。

因此，我認為如果努力把事情計劃太詳細並期望使世界的共產主義部分與非共產主義部分分裂的嚴重的、基本的爭論可以一舉而由一個廣泛的協定來解決，這將是一個錯誤。決不應輕視個別問題的零星解決或輕率地把它丟開。如果每一方有一個時間都找一些彼此都能同意而不是不能同意的事去做，這一定是沒有害處的。

最重要的是：如果在國際政策上取得普遍解決的自然願望阻止了俄國內部可能正在發生的任何自發的、健康的發展，那是可悲的事。我認為內部的一些表現與情緒的顯然改變是比在外面發生的事情還要重要得多與有意義得多。我極希望，在北大西洋條約組織國家提出的外交政策中不要有任何東西彷彿不理睬或不重視俄國情緒可能有的深刻的變動。

我們都希望，俄國人民應該在世界事務中取得他們應有的重要的地位，而不必為他們自己的安全擔憂。我並不認為使俄國的安全與西歐的自由與安全相協調的巨大問題是不能解決的。老實說，如果聯合國組織具有它的締造者希望它具有的那種權威與性質，這個問題早就可以解決了。

我曾想到一九二五年的洛迦諾條約。這是我們在兩次世界大戰之間的時期內所達到的最高點。我在那時擔任財政大臣，所以非常了解這事。這個條約是基於一個簡單的規定，那就是：如果德國進攻法國，我們應該幫助法國；如果法國進攻德國，我們應該幫助德國。

find specific cases with which to match their actions. If, however, any such cases can be cited they will certainly be examined by Her Majesty's Government with urgency and sympathy. On this subject I will now, however, venture to make some general observations which, I hope, will be studied with tolerance and indulgence.

It would, I think, be a mistake to assume that nothing can be settled with Soviet Russia unless or until everything is settled. A settlement of two or three of our difficulties would be an important gain to every peace-loving country. For instance, peace in Korea, the conclusion of an Austrian Treaty—these might lead to an easement in our relations for the next few years, which might in itself open new prospects to the security and prosperity of all nations and every continent.

Therefore, I think it would be a mistake to try to map things out too much in detail and expect that the grave, fundamental issues which divide the Communist and non-Communist parts of the world could be settled at a stroke by a single comprehensive agreement. Piecemeal solutions of individual problems should not be disdained or improvidently put aside. It certainly would do no harm if, for a while, each side looked about for things to do which would be agreeable instead of being disagreeable to each other.

Above all, it would be a pity if the natural desire to reach a general settlement of international policy were to impede any spontaneous and healthy evolution which may be taking place inside Russia. I have regarded some of the internal manifestations and the apparent change of mood as far more important and significant than what has happened outside. I am anxious that nothing in the presentation of foreign policy by the N.A.T.O. Powers should, as it were, supersede or take the emphasis out of what may be a profound movement of Russian feeling.

We all desire that the Russian people should take the high place in world affairs which is their due without feeling anxiety about their own security. I do not believe that the immense problem of reconciling the security of Russia with the freedom and safety of Western Europe is insoluble. Indeed, if the United Nations Organization had the authority and character for which its creators hoped, it would be solved already.

The Locarno Treaty of 1925 has been in my mind. It was the highest point we reached between the wars. As Chancellor of the Exchequer in those days I was closely acquainted with it. It was based upon the simple provision that if Germany attacked France we should stand with the French, and if France attacked Germany we should stand with the Germans.

今天的情況，不論從規模和因素上來說，都大不相同，但是，我有一種感覺，即在以鞏固歐洲和平作為實現人類和平的關鍵為首要志願的人們的心目中，促成洛迦諾條約的主導思想在德國和俄國之間很可能發生作用。俄國有權對下述問題感到放心，即：在人類力量所能安排的範圍內，希特勒進攻的恐怖事件不會重演而且波蘭將永遠是一個友好的國家與緩衝國家，雖然不是——我相信——一個傀儡國家。

我冒昧地再向下院宣讀一下我恰在整八年之前——一九四五年四月二十九日——致斯大林先生的一封信中的一封電報中的幾句話：

「在瞻望將來——那時你和你所統治的國家，加上許多其他國家的共產黨，都將站在一方面，而團結在英語國家週圍的國家和它們的成員國或自治領將站在另一方面——的時候，人並不感到舒服。它們的爭吵顯然將使整個世界粉碎，而我們這些與這種情況有關的雙方領導人將愧對歷史。甚至雙方進入長期的猜忌、彼此攻訐和實行敵對政策時期，也將成爲一種阻撓一切偉大發展的災難，而這種發展是爲了廣大羣衆的繁榮，它是祇能靠我們三國團結才能得到的。我希望在我這次向你傾心而談中，不會有任何措辭會無意地冒犯你。假如有的話，請告訴我。但是我要求你，我的朋友斯大林，不要忽視在各種問題上正在產生的意見分歧，你可能認爲這些問題對我們是微不足道的，但是，它們却說明了英語民主國家看待生活的方法。」

我今天對這個問題的感覺還是完全一樣的。

我必須說明：儘管世界事務已陷入動蕩不安和混亂的狀態中，但是，我認爲大國間的最高級會議應舉行而勿再拖延。這種會議不應有繁重的或硬性的議程，也不應被導入由大批專家和官員們熱烈爭辯的、廣泛而複雜的技術細節的錯綜境地。這種會議應儘可能地限於最少數的國家和人員參加。這種會議應採取某種程度的非正式的方式舉行，但是應該具有較大程度的秘密性和與外間隔離。很可能在這次會議上不會達成具體的協定，但是參加會議的人們可能會有一種共同感覺，即：他們或許能作出一些比使人類——包括他們自己在內——分裂略勝一籌的事情。

例如，他們可能爲這樣一種思想所吸引——艾森豪威爾總統自己就表現如此，而「真理報」也未

The scene today, its scale and its factors, is widely different, and yet I have a feeling that the master thought which animated Locarno might well play its part between Germany and Russia in the minds of those whose prime ambition it is to consolidate the peace of Europe as the key to the peace of mankind. Russia has a right to feel assured that as far as human arrangements can run the terrible events of the Hitler invasion will never be repeated, and that Poland will remain a friendly Power and a buffer, though not, I trust, a puppet State.

I venture to read to the House again some words which I wrote exactly eight years ago, 29th April, 1945, in a telegram I sent to Mr. Stalin:

"There is not much comfort"

I said,

"in looking into a future where you and the countries you dominate, plus the Communist Parties in many other States, are all drawn up on one side, and those who rally to the English speaking nations and their associates or Dominions are on the other. It is quite obvious that their quarrel would tear the world to pieces, and that all of us leading men on either side who had anything to do with that would be shamed before history. Even embarking on a long period of suspicions, of abuse and counter-abuse, and of opposing policies would be a disaster hampering the great developments of world prosperity for the masses which are attainable only by our trinity. I hope there is no word or phrase in this outpouring of my heart to you which unwittingly gives offence. If so, let me know. But do not, I beg you, my friend Stalin, underestimate the divergencies which are opening about matters which you may think are small to us but which are symbolic of the way the English-speaking democracies look at life."

I feel exactly the same about it today.

I must make it plain that, in spite of all the uncertainties and confusion in which world affairs are plunged, I believe that a conference on the highest level should take place between the leading Powers without long delay. This conference should not be overhung by a ponderous or rigid agenda, or led into mazes and jungles of technical details, zealously contested by hoards of experts and officials drawn up in vast, cumbersome array. The conference should be confined to the smallest number of Powers and persons possible. It should meet with a measure of informality and a still greater measure of privacy and seclusion. It might well be that no hard-faced agreements would be reached, but there might be a general feeling among those gathered together that they might do something better than tear the human race, including themselves, into bits.

For instance, they might be attracted, as President Eisenhower has shown himself to be, and as "Pravda" does not challenge, by the idea

加以反詰——就是讓全人類的疲勞的勞苦大眾進入一個他們從來沒有達到、甚至從來沒有夢想過的幸福的、公平的、享受福利與閒暇以及充滿着無害的人生樂趣的難得階段。

我只說這種情況可能產生。我不明白爲什麼會有人對這樣的嘗試感到害怕。如果各國佔領導地位的人物不下決心爭取對人類所會提供的最偉大的目標和榮譽，那末，現在掌握着決定權的人們將要負起充滿劫運的責任。從最壞的方面來想，參加會議的人可以建立更多的密切聯系。從最樂觀方面來想，我們可能獲得一代的和平。

我現在已就我今天所看到的和我所感覺到的世界形勢作完了報告。承蒙下院對我予以很大的重視，我深表感謝。我希望我提出了一些想法，這些想法可能促成和平並幫助使這疲憊的世界得到一些比較溫和的微風。但是，在我結束這篇演說之前，我還有一件事要說，如果我不說出這件事情，那末，我冒昧提出的那些希望都將成爲泡影。朋友和盟國之間對於某些特殊問題或對於我們應該採取的關於評價的一般尺度和分寸無論有什麼分歧的意見，有一件事情却顯得特別單純和有力。如果這件事成功，那末，對任何希望都是可以寬恕的；如果這件事不成功，那末，一切事情都將成爲泡影。

目前當是自由國家鬆弛它們的團結和準備的最有致命之虞的關頭。若不能盡我們所有的力量來維持我們的防禦努力，那將使歐洲和亞洲的一切導致和平的有益傾向陷於無用。若由於意見分歧或局部利益而我們自己陷於分裂，或鬆弛我們的共同努力，那將使可能出現在人類面前的新希望永久消失，從而相反地導致他們陷於普遍的毀滅與奴役。團結一致、提高警惕和忠實是希望能在其上存在的唯一基礎。

(譯自一九五三年五月十一日「英國議會辯論集」第二五五期)

of letting the weary, toiling masses of mankind enter upon the best spell of good fortune, fair play, well-being, leisure and harmless happiness that has ever been within their reach or even within their dreams.

I only say that this might happen, and I do not see why anyone should be frightened at having a try for it. If there is not at the summit of the nations the will to win the greatest prize and the greatest honour ever offered to mankind, doom-laden responsibility will fall upon those who now possess the power to decide. At the worst the participants in the meeting would have established more intimate contacts. At the best we might have a generation of peace.

I have now finished my survey of the world scene as I see it and as I feel about it today. I express my thanks to the House for the great consideration with which I have been treated. I hope I have contributed a few thoughts which may make for peace and help a gentler breeze to blow upon this weary earth. But there is one thing I have to say before I end, and without it all the hopes I have ventured to indulge would be utterly vain. Whatever differences of opinion may be between friends and allies about particular problems or the general scale of values and sense of proportion which we should adopt, there is one fact which stands out overwhelmingly in its simplicity and force. If it is made good every hope is pardonable. If it is not made good all hopes fall together.

This would be the most fatal moment for the free nations to relax their comradeship and preparations. To fail to maintain our defence effort up to the limit of our strength would be to paralyse every beneficial tendency towards peace both in Europe and in Asia. For us to become divided among ourselves because of divergencies of opinion or local interests, or to slacken our combined efforts would be to end for ever such new hope as may have broken upon mankind and lead instead to their general ruin and enslavement. Unity, vigilance and fidelity are the only foundations upon which hope can live.

(Weekly Hansard No. 255, 11 May 1953)

(第十號)

艾德禮在下院支持舉行大國會議抨擊美國外交政策的演說 (節錄)

一九五三年五月十二日

SPEECH BY C. R. ATTLEE IN HOUSE OF COMMONS
SUPPORTING BIG-POWER TALKS AND ATTACKING
U.S. POLICY (EXCERPTS)

May 12, 1953

我傾向於同意首相所說的，最重要的事或許是俄國對內政策的改變。今天，我在「泰晤士報」上看到引自「真理報」的一段話，標題為「集體領導」。現在似乎確與斯大林的專制政治不同，並且這件事還證實了我們許多人過去所持有的意見，即斯大林實際上是俄國政策的主宰。今天，無論如何都有些不同，似乎有集合許多人的意見的情形。

我非常同意首相的另一點，即：

「決不應輕視個別問題的零星解決或輕率地把它丟開。」(一九五三年五月十一日正式報告，「英國議會辯論集」，第五一五期。)

企圖達到一個過於廣泛的目標是一種很大的危險。當木材在河裏擁塞時，人們開始必須取出一根木頭，或一捆或兩捆木頭，希望整堆木材因而能移動。在這裏，我們特別希望以建立更密切的人與人之間的關係為目的。我不知道這位可敬的先生或女王陛下政府的其他人員曾否會過馬林科夫先生。據我所知，我沒有和他見過面。我所認識的俄國的領袖們現在只限於莫洛托夫先生、維辛斯基先生和卡岡諾維奇先生。我們所要得到的是更多的了解；我們對他們，和他們對我們的了解。假如我們能建立人與人之間的關係以消除蘇聯關於英國的某些神話，那將是一件很好的事。

首相提出的使我感到是明智的另一點是：一個人不應該以為世界上的一切糾紛都是由共產黨發動的。我對共產國際的活動是不抱幻想的，但事實是在世界上也有其他的運動。首相引了越盟攻擊老撾的例子。無疑地，蘇俄有一種為了他自己的目的而支持每一民族主義運動的政策，但這並不意味

I am inclined to agree with the Prime Minister that perhaps the most significant thing has been the change in internal policy in Russia. I notice today in "The Times" a quotation from "Pravda" which was headed "Collective Leadership." There does seem to be a definite departure from the autocracy of Stalin, and it rather confirms the view that many of us held that Stalin was, in fact, the master of Russian policy. Today, there is, at all events, something different, something more like a collecting of the voices of a number of men.

A further point on which I am very much in agreement with the Prime Minister is that

"piecemeal solutions of individual problems should not be disdained or improvidently put aside."—(Official Report, 11th May, 1953; Vol. 515, c. 399.)

There is a great danger in trying to go out with a too-wide objective. When the logs are jammed in the river one must begin by extricating a single log, or one or two logs, in the hope that thereby the whole mass may move. Particularly, here, we want to aim to get closer personal relationships. I do not know whether the right hon. Gentleman or other Members of Her Majesty's Government have ever met Mr. Malenkov. I have not, to my knowledge. My knowledge of the leaders of Russia is confined now to Mr. Molotov, Mr. Vyshinsky and Mr. Kaganovitch. What we want to get is greater understanding, by us of them and by them of us. It would be a great thing if we could get personal relations which would dissipate some of the Soviet mythology about Britain.

Another point by the Prime Minister which struck me as wise was that one should not assume that all the troubles of the world are due to Communist initiative. I have no illusions as to the activities of the Comintern, but the fact is that there are other movements in the world as well. The Prime Minister cited the case of the Viet Minh attack in Laos. No doubt there is a policy

着沒有真正的民族主義運動。我們必須考慮是否在印度支那、埃及、阿拉伯、或在非洲等地否是有這種民族主義運動。把這一切都諉之於蘇聯的陰謀實在是將問題完全簡單化了。在美國有這樣的意見，在英國某些人也傾向於這種看法。另一方面，在英國及其他國家，有人傾向於將我們一切的困難都諉之於美國的政策。這也是一種錯誤。

關於美國和美國的政策是值得說幾句話的。我希望我的話不會有所冒犯。我希望不會有人說我在某一方面是反對美國人。在美國我有許多朋友，並且我與杜魯門總統及他的顧問曾經非常和諧地一起工作過。我很知道除在戰時外美國為世界所做的一切。我也不願攻擊美國憲法。我只是要講一些似乎不常為人所了解的事實。讓我用一個對比來開始敘述。

首相來下議院並報告他的政策。這是英國政府的政策。假如他願意的話，他可以使下院表決支持這個政策；或者，在對這個政策的辯論中，他可以以得到兩黨大多數的支持為滿足。那個政策是政府的政策，並將由部長和官員執行。看看另一方面，艾森豪威爾總統發表了一篇偉大的演說。這是總統的演說。他代表政府講話，但在美國，權力是由政府與國會所分有。舉例來說，政府可能希望為軍備或其他目的花多少萬元的錢，但國會可能將它削減多少萬元。政府可能願意鼓勵我們向美國的出口，但像大約瑟夫水閘的事件一樣，某些勢力破壞了政府的政策。

因此，美國政府實際上不是他們自己國家的真正主宰。讓我們記住，美國國會仍然是由主要代表聯邦中某一州的利益的人們所組成的。壓力集團與利益集團是非常強大的，而且美國政府不如我們政府統一。艾森豪威爾總統發表一篇演說，沒有多久，國務卿杜勒斯先生又發表一篇演說，而那篇演說我認為彈着很不同的一種調子；我們的確有時發現財政部執行一種政策，國務院執行另一種政策，五角大樓也許又執行一種政策。

whereby Soviet Russia, for its own purposes, supports every nationalist movements, but that does not mean that there are no genuine nationalist movements of which we have to take account whether they are in Indo-China, Egypt, Arabia or, for that matter in Africa. It really is an overall simplifying of the problem to put it all down to Soviet intrigue. There is a body of opinion in the United States and some in this country that tend to do just that thing. On the other hand, there are people in this country and elsewhere who tend to put down all our troubles to American policy. That, too, is a mistake.

It is worth while saying a few words about the United States and about American policy. I hope they will cause no offence. I hope that no one will suggest that I am in any way anti-American. I have very many friends in America and I worked in great harmony with President Truman and his advisers. I am very conscious of all that the Americans have done for the world, besides in the war. Nor do I wish to attack the American Constitution. I merely want to state some facts which do not always seem to be apprehended. Let me begin with a contrast.

The Prime Minister comes to the House and states his policy. It is the policy of the Government. He can, if he wishes, get a vote in this House in support of it or he can, as in this debate, be satisfied with the great measure of support on both sides. That policy is Government policy and will be carried out by Ministers and by officials. Look on the other side, President Eisenhower makes a great speech. It is the President's speech. He speaks for the Administration, but in America power is divided between the Administration and Congress. For instance, the Administration may desire to spend so many millions in support whether of armaments or some other object, but Congress may cut it down by several millions of dollars. The Administration may wish to encourage our export to the United States but, as in the case of the Chief Joseph Dam, influences frustrate the Administration's policy.

Therefore, the Government in America are not really master in their own house. Let us remember, too, that Congress is still made up of people who primarily represent the interests of a particular State in the Union. Pressure groups and interests are very strong and, further, the American Administration seems to be less integrated than ours. President Eisenhower makes a speech; shortly thereafter the Secretary of State Mr. Dulles makes a speech, which, I thought, struck rather a different note. We do find on occasions that there is one policy being run by the Treasury, another by the State Department, and perhaps another by the Pentagon.

還有一點，美國的傳統似乎給予他們的海外代表的自由行動大於我們給予我們的代表的自由，而指示則較少。以我們的參謀長與戰地司令官的關係和美國參謀長與他們的在戰地的將軍之間的關係來比較，我們發現也是這樣的。我不是在抱怨。這正是美國的傳統。因此，我們發現哈利遜將軍在板門店談判中，似乎按照自己的意思發表意見，並且甚至發表一篇廣播演說。我們要面對這些事實。

世界局勢的事實之一是：美國憲法是為了一個孤立主義的國家而制定的。美國人過去不希望同歐洲發生任何關係。有許多年他們實際上沒有外交政策。但我不認為這種情形特別適合於美國已成為世界上最強的國家而且必須從事領導的時代。我決不是批評美國人或美國憲法。我是在盡量說明事實。因為我認為人們常常被誤解，而且也因為我們不了解美國憲法而有誤會和失望。

在第二次世界大戰期間，羅斯福總統表現他是一個非常偉大的人。他也是一個非常偉大的政治家，他設法「使」國會符合他的願望。我認為杜魯門總統很巧妙地利用兩個偉大的參議員，范登堡參議員和康納利參議員，來支持他自己。但是人們有時發現國會牽制政府。因而人們有時奇怪，到底誰的權力更大些，是總統還是麥卡錫參議員。首相說獨裁的缺點之一是獨裁者往往受到別人的指揮。美國民主制度的缺點之一是有時難於找到實際的權力由誰掌握。因此，一個人應根據這些事實而看我們的一些問題。這一切是與朝鮮談判的形勢有些關係的。

據我所有的消息，或許我是錯的，中國人是希望解決的。我相信美國政府是希望解決的。談判是掌握在代表聯合國的美國司令部手中。但在美國有些人不希望解決。也應面對這種事實。有人希望對中國和對共產主義全體進行全面戰爭，而且還有蔣介石國會活動幫的強烈影響。

因此，我有一天曾向首相建議，在這些談判

A further point seems that the American tradition is to give their representatives overseas a freer hand than we give ours, and less direction. We found rather the same in the relationship, as compared with our chiefs of staffs and our commanders in the field, between the American chiefs of staffs and their generals in the field. I am not complaining. It is just the American tradition. Therefore, we find that General Harrison, in the Panmunjon negotiations, seems to make observations on his own, right off his own bat, and even makes a broadcast. One wants to face these facts.

One of the facts of the world situation is that the American Constitution was framed for an isolationist State. Americans did not want to have anything to do with Europe. For many years they had practically no foreign policy, but I do not think that that situation is particularly well suited to a time when America has become the strongest State in the world and has to give a lead. I am not in any way criticising the Americans or the Constitution. I am endeavouring to state facts, because I think that people often are misled and there are misunderstandings and disappointments because we do not understand the American Constitution.

During the Second World War, President Roosevelt showed himself a very great man. He was also a very great politician and he managed to "work in" Congress to his desires. I think that President Truman very skilfully used to buttress himself with two great Senators, Senator Vandenberg and Senator Connally. But sometimes one finds that Congress takes the bit between its teeth and one sometimes wonders who is the more powerful, the President or Senator McCarthy. The Prime Minister said that one of the disadvantages of dictatorship is that the dictator is often dictated to by others. One of the disadvantages of the American system of democracy is that it is sometimes hard to find where effective power lies. Therefore, I think that it is in the light of these facts that one should look at some of our problems. All this has some reference to the position of the negotiations in Korea.

All my information is, though I may be wrong, that the Chinese want a settlement. I believe that the United States Administration want a settlement. The negotiations are in the hands of the American command on behalf of the United Nations. But there are elements in the United States that do not want a settlement. It is just as well to face that fact. There are people who want an all-out war with China and against Communism in general, and there is the strong influence of the Chiang Kai-shek lobby.

I suggested, therefore, the other day to the Prime Minister that in these negotiations it would

中，假如有其他聯合國有關國家的顧問參加就很好了。我這樣說並不是因為我不信任美國人，而是因為我相信這樣會加強美國政府的力量。美國是聯合國的發言人，而我相信，即使在這些談判中，假如有聯合國其他有關會員國出席，這是會有用處的。我知道這是一個主要由軍方決定的問題，但我確信，如我們大家所希望的，在當前的關於停戰的談判結束時，進一步的解決辦法不應完全由美國一手包辦。

我很知道美國在朝鮮作了最大的犧牲。但我同樣也知道，假如它把持一切，它就會遭到無法分辯的責難，因為有一種傾向說：「這是美國的政策而不是聯合國的政策。」我不得不說我最近爲了這些談判的拖延而感到不安。首相說得很對，原則已同意了，但在我看來，還有許多討價還價。我知道中國人已作了相當的討價還價。但我在「泰晤士」報上看到哈利遜將軍最近提出的問題，依我看來，在接受我們大家所同意的印度提出的廣泛輪廓方面，中國人在一個長時期後，確實已有很大的邁進。

我不認爲這些其他問題——關於應選擇哪五個國家和應由誰來控制等問題——不應是真正使這些談判拖延的原因。美國人在這些談判中已表現了很大的耐心。我認爲，在開始時此事的處理應掌握在美國手裏是不可避免的。但我認爲在這個階段，談判一經結束，爲了全世界和美國的利益，這些事情應移交給聯合國的一個集體機構去處理。

現在我要談到中國。我不相信中國僅是俄國手中的傀儡。我認爲它採用它的有所不同的共產主義；我現在比以前更加確信，一俟侵略停止，中國應取得它在安全理事會中應有的地位。這確實是歷史的諷刺之一，即羅斯福總統不顧我們的見解而堅持中國爲一個大國。它那時不是大國。那時它是因內爭而分裂的蔣介石的搖搖欲墜的國家，然而它却被放在安全理事會的位子上。但是現在，在一個不同的政府之下，它看來正在發展成爲一個很有力的

be well if there were other advisers from other United Nations States concerned. I did so not because I am distrustful of the Americans, but because I believe that it would strengthen the hands of the American Administration. America is the spokesman of the United Nations and I believe that even in these negotiations it would be useful if there were present other members of the United Nations concerned. I know that this is a matter very largely for the military, but I am quite sure that when, as we all hope, these immediate negotiations for an armistice are concluded, further settlement should not be left exclusively in American hands.

I am well aware that America has made far the biggest sacrifices in Korea; but I am also well aware that she lays herself open to unjustifiable blame if she keeps everything in her own hands, because there is a tendency to say, "This is American policy and not United Nations policy." I am bound to say that I have been disturbed lately at the hanging on of these negotiations. The Prime Minister said rightly that principles have been agreed, but it seems to me that there is a good deal of haggling. I know that the Chinese did any amount of haggling, but I saw in "The Times" General Harrison's last questions and it seems to me that the Chinese have gone a very long way indeed, after a long time, in accepting the broad outline of the Indian initiative which we all approve.

I do not think that these other matters—questions of which of the five Powers should be chosen and who should be in control, and so on—are really matters which ought to hang up these negotiations. The American have shown great patience in these negotiations. I think that it was inevitable at the start that the conduct of this affair should be in the hands of the United States, but I believe that at this stage, as soon as the negotiations are concluded, it will be for the benefit of the world and of the United States that these things should pass to a collective organ of U.N.O.

I turn now to China. I do not believe that China is a mere puppet in the hands of Russia. I think that she will wear her Communism with a difference; but I am more certain than ever that, as soon as aggression has been halted, China should take her rightful place on the Security Council. It is really one of the ironies of history that President Roosevelt, against our view, rather pressed that China was a great Power. She was not then. She was the rather ramshackle Power of Chiang Kai-shek torn with dissension, yet she was put in a position on the Security Council. But now, under a different Government, she seems to be evolving as a pretty effective Power. She is entitled to be

國家。它有權爲五大國之一，並且我不認爲應當拒不給予它的地位。

首相（邱吉爾爵士）：可是，不能在實際戰鬥正在進行的時候。

艾德禮：不，在停戰後不久。

中國的和平對我們有着切身的利益。我們增加對美國的貿易的希望，由於最近的事態而大大減少了。我們可以希望這種態度會有改變；但是目前不太有希望。「要貿易、不要援助」看來並未爲美國所接受。我們常常被迫不和中國進行貿易，即使是和戰爭很少關係的貨物。如果我們被限制起來，不能有效地和美國進行貿易，對中國斷絕關係，再加上鐵幕的種種困難，我們就不能生存。因此，中國問題的解決對我們有着不亞於任何人的切身的利害關係；而我相信我們的美國朋友是會承認這一點的。現在和美國就停戰後如何解決這些問題進行開誠佈公的商談，已非爲時過早了。

現在有不同的看法。我爲這件事看過杜魯門總統，並且我們曾非常全面地討論過台灣以及其他一切問題。我們發現我們不得不共同認爲在有些問題上有不同的意見；但我認爲一俟可能，我們應該討論這些問題並努力澄清它們。我的可敬的朋友阿斯頓區議員（懷阿特先生）就印度支那的形勢發表了一篇有力的演說，而且首相說——如我已經指出的——他認爲，如果以爲印度支那目前的形勢祇是中國與俄國的一種陰謀，那是不聰明的。我確認爲任何使印度支那問題成爲聯合國的問題的企圖將會在聯合國中引起巨大的分裂，而對我們最嚴重的是將因而產生英聯邦的分裂。

我最近會見了許多從亞洲國家來的人士。不管對或不對，他們都持有這樣的見解，即由起源而言，越盟主要是一種反對法國殖民主義的叛亂。當然，越盟接受了中國人或任何別人的支持，正如中國接受俄國的幫助一樣。但是，如果以爲印度支那人希望成爲中國的衛星國，那是與世界那一部分地區的整個歷史背道而馳的。

法國在認識這個民族主義運動方面是太緩慢了。我不是在責備法國人，因爲他們在戰爭中失去戰鬥力，而在重建他們的地位和或者在了解正在亞洲發展的新的力量方面有極困難的工作。但是我不認爲這件事一度曾有能夠解決的可能性，而胡志明今天或許已是印度支那（即越南）的一部分的

one of the Big Five and I do not think that her place should be denied to her.

The Prime Minister (Sir Winston Churchill): Not while the actual fighting is going on, though!

Mr. Attlee: No, soon after the armistice.

We have a very vital interest in peace in China. Our hopes of increasing our trade with the United States have been greatly lessened by recent events. We may hope that the attitude will change; it is not too hopeful just now. "Trade; not aid" does not seem to have been accepted over there. We are constantly pressed not to trade with China, even in goods which are very remotely connected with war effort. We cannot survive if we are to be restricted, unable to trade effectively with the United States, cut off from China and with all the difficulties of the Iron Curtain. We, therefore, have as vital an interest as anybody in the settlement of this China affair, and I am sure that our American friends will recognise this. It is not too soon for heart-to-heart talks to take place with the United States on how these matters are to be settled after the armistice.

There are different views. I saw President Truman on this matter and we discussed very fully the question of Formosa and all the rest, and we found that we had to agree to differ on points; but I think we should discuss those points as soon as possible and try to clear them up. My hon. Friend the Member for Aston (Mr. Wyatt) made a very powerful speech on the position of Indo-China and the Prime Minister, as I have already noted, said he thought it was unwise to assume that the present position in Indo-China was just a matter of Chinese or Russian intrigue. I am certain that any attempt to make the Indo-Chinese affair into a U.N.O. matter would cause a great split in the United Nations and, what is even more serious for us, a split in the Commonwealth.

I recently met a large number of people from Asian countries. Rightly or wrongly, they all took the view that in its origin Viet Minh was very largely a revolt against French colonialism. Viet Minh, naturally, accepts support from the Chinese or anybody else, just as China accepts help from Russia, but it would be quite contrary to the whole history of that part of the world to assume that the Indo-Chinese want to become satellites of China.

France was slow in recognizing this nationalist movement. I am not blaming the French, because they were knocked out of the war and had a very difficult task in rebuilding their position and, perhaps, in understanding the new forces which were moving in Asia, but I cannot help think that there was a possibility, at one time, that this business could have been settled and

總理——正如我們在過去與其意見不一致的某些其他人現在在英聯邦中成為總理的一樣。重要的是法國應該承認事態的邏輯。我的可敬的朋友南德爾柏區議員（諾埃爾·貝克先生）面對這個問題充分發揮意見。在事實上，他談到首相演說中談到的許多問題，他說殖民主義已屬於過去的時代。無疑地，在亞洲就是這樣。

that Ho Chi Minh might today have been a Prime Minister in a part of Indo-China—Viet Nam—just as some other people with whom we have disagreed in the past are now Prime Ministers in the British Commonwealth. It is essential that the French should accept the logic of events. My right hon. Friend the Member for Derby, South (Mr. Noel-Baker) made a very full point on that; in fact, he covered a very large number of the points in the Prime Minister's speech. He said that colonialism belongs to a past age. It undoubtedly does in Asia.

（譯自一九五三年五月八日—十四日「英國議會辯論集」，第二五五期）

(Weekly Hansard No. 255, 8th May-14th May 1953)

（第十—號）

英國代理首相巴特勒在下院就中國在聯合國代表權及禁運問題答議員問（節錄）

一九五三年七月三十日

BRITISH ACTING PRIME MINISTER R. A. BUTLER'S REPLIES TO MEMBERS IN HOUSE OF COMMONS ON CHINA'S REPRESENTATION IN U.N. AND EMBARGO (EXCERPTS)

July 30, 1953

財政大臣（巴特勒）：

The Chancellor of the Exchequer
(Mr. R. A. Butler):

我要進一步敘述女王陛下政府的態度。政府對中國在聯合國的代表權問題的意見曾經一再表明，我想扼要地綜述一下；這是外交大臣，可敬的華里克和萊明頓的議員（艾登）在一九五二年六月十八日所說的話，他說：

I want further to describe the attitude of Her Majesty's Government. The Government's views on this question of Chinese representation in the United Nations have been stated from time to time and I should like to give this resume of them; and these were the words of the Foreign Secretary, the right hon. Member for Warwick and Leamington (Mr. Eden) on 18th June, 1952, when he said:

「我完全同意我的前任在去年六月所講的話，我或許可以引用原文」——（一九五二年六月十八日正式報告，「英國議會辯論集」第五〇二期，第一一八三欄）

“I am in complete agreement with my predecessor's observations of last June, which I may, perhaps quote.”—(Official Report, 18th June, 1952; Vol. 502, c. 1183.)

他於是引用了可敬的南劉易沙的議員（摩里遜）在一九五一年六月二十七日所說的下列一段話：

He then quoted the words of the right hon. Member for Lewisham, South, on 27th June, 1951, as follows:

「女王陛下政府……相信……中央人民政府應在聯合國中代表中國。然而，鑒於該政府堅持與憲章宗旨和原則不符的行為，女王陛下政府認為，

“His Majesty's Government . . . believe that . . . the Central People's Government should represent China in the United Nations. In view, however, of that Government's persistence in be-

這個問題的審議應予延遲」。(一九五一年六月二十七日正式報告，「英國議會辯論集」第四八九期，第一三七一欄)

我可以進一步談這個問題，因為那個聲明是在停戰協定簽字以前發表的。我願贊同外交大臣的聲明背後的精神，並且說，今天我所能補充的祇是我們希望並且相信：解決這一問題以及其他問題的日子已因停戰而挪近了。

關於對華貿易說幾句話。可敬的先生說，他並不希望我們立即取消封鎖。我和政府對於對華貿易的態度曾經屢次表明過。我們的政策是基於對戰略物資供應的禁運；而只有和其他採取同樣的戰略管制的國家合作，才能對這項政策作任何改變。而且，停戰協定已經簽字，聯合國即將開會以及政治會議將要舉行的這個事實意味着這一態度，像我前面所提到的另一態度一樣，是可變更的；如果出現了一種能夠設想應該對此態度加以改變的局勢，那麼，我們將準備考慮這個問題。同時，我們的政策則是：當這個政策還存在的時候，嚴格地執行這個我們同意的政策；其次，我們的任務是發展非戰略物資的貿易。這不僅是從國際的觀點看，對我國有利的，而且，我可以同意，從經濟觀點來看，也是對我國有着深切利害關係的。

(譯自一九五三年七月二十四日—三十一日
「英國議會辯論集」，第二六四期)

haviour which is inconsistent with the purposes and principles of the Charter, it appears to His Majesty's Government that consideration of this question should be postponed." (Official Report, 27th June, 1951; Vol. 489, c. 1371.)

I can take that matter further, because that statement was made before the armistice was signed. I should like to endorse the spirit behind that statement made by the Foreign Secretary and say that the accretion or addition which I can make to it today is that we hope and trust that the day for settling this and other problems will have been brought nearer by the armistice.

A word about trade with China. The right hon. Gentleman said he did not wish us to lift the blockade at once. My attitude and the attitude of the Government towards trade with China has frequently been stated. Our policy is based on the embargo on the supply of strategic good, and any change in this policy can be made only in cooperation with other Governments which maintain similar strategic controls. Again, the fact that an armistice has been signed, that the United Nations is meeting and that the Political Conference is coming on means that this attitude, like the other which I mentioned, is open, and if a situation arises when it can be envisaged that it should be altered, then we shall be ready to consider that matter. At the same time it is our policy to carry out strictly, while it is in being, this policy which we have agreed upon, and secondly it is our duty to develop trade in non-strategic materials. That is not only in the interests of the country from the international point of view, but I can endorse it as being vital in the interests of the country from the economic point of view.

(Weekly Hansard No. 264, 24th July-31st
July 1953)

(第十二號)

美澳新理事會第二次會議最後公報

一九五三年九月十日

FINAL COMMUNIQUE OF SECOND MEETING OF
ANZUS COUNCIL

September 10, 1953

由澳大利亞、新西蘭、美國締結的安全條約●所建立的美澳新理事會今天在華盛頓結束了為期兩天的會議。外交部長理查德·格·凱西代表澳大利亞；外交部長特·克利夫頓·韋伯代表新西蘭；國務卿約翰·福斯特·杜勒斯代表美國。

(中略參加會議其他代表人員名單)

會議結束時理事會發表了下列聲明：

本理事會予三國外交部長以對實施美澳新安全條約問題進行定期共同協商並討論與他們自己國家有關係的問題的機會。基於這個條約的美澳新盟國的總目標是在政治和軍事上加強它們政府間的關係，並為它們的共同防務尋求最有效的方法。

在這次會議上，部長們再度肯定了這個條約的防禦性質。他們表明了他們的政府的決心，即：美澳新三國對於維護太平洋地區的和平與安全應該發揮充分作用。但他們沒有作出決定，也沒有達成會直接影響自由世界其他國家利益的任何協議，而祇是很詳細地討論了世界的一般局勢，特別討論了受到共產帝國主義威脅的地區。

理事會在討論中研究了太平洋上具體有關三國安全的局勢。理事會特別注意到共產黨侵略已引起公開戰爭的地區。理事會特別考慮了朝鮮和印度支那的局勢。每一部長都發表了他的政府的意見，認

The Anzus Council, established by the Security Treaty between Australia, New Zealand, and the United States, concluded its 2-day meeting in Washington today. The Right Honorable Richard G. Casey, Minister for External Affairs, represented Australia; the Honorable T. Clifton Webb, Minister of External Affairs, represented New Zealand; and the Honorable John Foster Dulles, Secretary of State, represented the United States of America.

(List of other participants omitted)

At the conclusion of the meeting the Council issued the following statement:

The Council affords the Foreign Ministers of the three Governments the opportunity to consult together periodically in regard to the implementation of the ANZUS Security Treaty and to discuss various matters of interest and concern to their countries. It is the over-all objective of the ANZUS partners, building on the foundation of the Treaty, to strengthen the relationships between their Governments at both the political and military levels and to seek the most effective means of providing for their common defense.

At this meeting the Ministers again affirmed the defensive nature of the Treaty. They expressed the determination of their Governments that ANZUS shall play its full part in the maintenance of peace and security in the Pacific. They took, however, no decisions and reached no agreements directly affecting the interests of the other nations of the free world, but discussed in considerable detail the general world situation with specific reference to areas under threat from Communist imperialism.

In its deliberations the Council surveyed situations in the Pacific specifically affecting the security of the three countries. It took special note of those areas in which Communist aggression has led to outright hostilities. In particular the Council considered the situation in Korea and in Indo-China. Each Minister expressed the view of his Government that under present circumstances no question of the recognition of Communist China

● 見附錄。

為在目前情況下，不能考慮承認共產黨中國或接納它的代表參加聯合國的問題。

理事會審查了軍事代表們的報告，這些軍事代表是在去年第一次會議上任命的，他們的任務是向理事會就實施條約問題的軍事方面提供意見。軍事代表們於一九五二年九月舉行了第一次會議，上星期在珍珠港結束了第二次會議。理事會滿意地注意到軍事代表們在執行他們的任務中獲得的進展。理事會認為，他們的報告清楚表明，把代表們在過去一年建立的密切合作繼續下去的重要性。

理事會曾依照條約第八條的規定，考慮了理事會的責任。這一條授權理事會和其他國家及區域組織建立協商關係。理事會研究了它本身和其他太平洋地區的現有防務安排之間的關係，考慮了澳、新、美三國在為該地區發展更廣泛的集體安全制度這個問題上所處的地位。理事會確實表明準備考慮足以增強這一地區的防務的任何措施。然而，理事會也一致認為：企圖擴大理事會的成員，不會對這個目的有直接和實際上的幫助。

理事會注意到下述事實：三國政府已各自和其他國家發生了關係，並且負有責任。理事會承認其他各國在太平洋的重要利益。澳新美條約是這個地區的各國為着加強共同安全的許多安排中的一種。美國和菲律賓簽訂了共同安全條約，它和朝鮮也草簽了同樣的條約。它和日本訂有安全條約，和在台灣的中國國民黨政府有防務上的諒解。而作為英聯邦成員的澳大利亞及新西蘭，和大不列顛及其他英聯邦國家也都有最密切的關聯。所有這些安排和關係一起構成對任何可能的侵略者的一種莊嚴的警告。它們也表現着太平洋地區的正在增長的持久和平的基礎。

(譯自一九五三年九月廿八日美國「國務院公報」)

or of the admission of its representatives to the United Nations would be entertained.

The Council examined reports from the Military Representatives, who were appointed at its first meeting last year to advise the Council concerning the military aspects of the implementation of the Treaty. The Military Representatives held their first meeting in September 1952 and concluded another meeting at Pearl Harbor last week. The Council noted with satisfaction the progress made by the Military Representatives in the carrying out of their responsibilities. It found that their reports demonstrated clearly the importance of continuing the close cooperation established by the Representatives during the past year.

The Council considered its responsibilities in the light of Article VIII of the Treaty, which authorizes it to establish consultative relationships with other states and regional organizations. It reviewed its own position vis-a-vis other existing defense arrangements in the Pacific and considered the place of ANZUS in the development of a broader collective security system for the area. The Council affirmed its readiness to consider any measure which would strengthen the defense of the area. It unanimously concluded, however, that to attempt to enlarge its membership would not contribute directly and materially to this end.

The Council noted the fact that each of the three Governments already has other relationships and responsibilities. It recognized the important interests of other countries in the Pacific. The ANZUS Treaty is one of a number of arrangements for the furtherance of security among the nations of the area. The United States is a partner in a mutual security pact with the Philippines and has initialed such a pact with Korea. It has a Security Treaty with Japan and has defense understandings with the National Government of China in Formosa. Then again, Australia and New Zealand as members of the British Commonwealth, have the closest ties with Great Britain and the other Commonwealth nations. All these arrangements and relationship constitute together a solemn warning to any potential aggressor and represent the growing foundation for lasting peace in the Pacific.

(The Department of State Bulletin,
September 28, 1953)

附 錄

美 澳 新 安 全 條 約

一九五一年九月一日

APPENDIX:

SECURITY TREATY BETWEEN NEW ZEALAND,
AUSTRALIA AND THE UNITED STATES

September 1, 1951

本條約締約國

重申它們對聯合國憲章的宗旨與原則的信念以及與各國人民及各國政府和平相處的願望，並希望加強太平洋地區的和平結構，

注意到美國已有在菲律賓駐紮軍隊的協定，並在琉球駐有軍隊和負有行政責任，而且在對日和約生效後也要在日本境內及周圍駐紮軍隊以協助保持日本地區的和平與安全，

認識到澳大利亞與新西蘭作為英聯邦的成員國在太平洋地區內外均有軍事義務，

願公開並正式宣布它們的團結心，使任何潛在的侵略者都不會發生以為它們之中任何一國在太平洋區孤立無援的錯覺，並

願在太平洋地區更廣泛的區域安全體系發展以前，進一步配合他們的建立集體防務以保持和平與安全的努力，

因此宣佈並同意下列各條：

第一條

締約國承擔按照聯合國憲章的規定，以和平方法解決可能牽連它們的任何國際爭端，俾免危及國際和平、安全及正義，並在它們的國際關係上不以與聯合國宗旨不符的任何方式使用威脅或武力。

The parties to this treaty,

Reaffirming their faith in the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and their desire to live in peace with all peoples and all Governments, and desiring to strengthen the fabric of peace in the Pacific area,

Noting that the United States already has arrangements pursuant to which its armed forces are stationed in the Philippines, and has armed forces and administrative responsibilities in the Ryukyus, and upon the coming into force of the Japanese peace treaty may also station armed forces in and about Japan to assist in the preservation of peace and security in the Japan Area,

Recognizing that Australia and New Zealand as members of the British Commonwealth of Nations have military obligations outside as well as within the Pacific Area,

Desiring to declare publicly and formally their sense of unity, so that no potential aggressor could be under the illusion that any of them stand alone in the Pacific Area, and

Desiring further to coordinate their efforts for collective defence for the preservation of peace and security pending the development of a more comprehensive system of regional security in the Pacific Area,

Therefore declare and agree as follows:

Article I

The parties undertake, as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations, to settle any international disputes in which they may be involved by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered and to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.

第二條

爲了更有效地實現本條約的目標，締約國將單獨地和共同地用繼續的和有效的自助和互助的辦法來保持及發展它們單獨及集體的抵抗武裝攻擊的能力。

第三條

當締約國任何一國認爲締約國任何一國的領土完整、政治獨立或安全在太平洋受到威脅時，締約國應共同進行協商。

第四條

每一締約國都認爲在太平洋地區對任何一締約國的武裝攻擊都將危及它自己的和平與安全，並宣佈它將按照它的憲法程序採取行動，應付共同的危險。

任何此種武裝攻擊和因此而採取的一切措施，應立即報告聯合國安全理事會。當安全理事會已採取恢復和保持國際和平與安全所必需的措施時，這一切措施應即停止。

第五條

爲了第四條的目的，對任何一締約國的武裝進攻，應認爲包括對任何一締約國的本土或它在太平洋上所管轄的島嶼領土，或它在太平洋上的武裝部隊，公有船隻或飛機的武裝進攻。

第六條

本條約不影響而且也不得解釋爲影響締約國在聯合國憲章下所有的權利和義務或聯合國維持國際和平和安全的責任。

第七條

因此締約國設立一個由它們的外交部長或其助理組成的理事會，考慮本條約的實施問題。理事會之組織方式應以能隨時舉行會議爲準。

第八條

在太平洋地區更廣泛的區域安全體系發展與聯合國訂出更有效的維持國際和平與安全的方法以前，依照第七條而設立的理事會有權和太平洋地區

Article II

In order more effectively to achieve the objective of this Treaty the Parties separately and jointly by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack.

Article III

The Parties will consult together whenever in the opinion of any of them the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened in the Pacific.

Article IV

Each Party recognizes that an armed attack in the Pacific Area on any of the Parties would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes.

Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall be immediately reported to the Security Council of the United Nations. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.

Article V

For the purpose of Article 4, an armed attack on any of the Parties is deemed to include an armed attack on the metropolitan territory of any of the Parties, or on the island territories under its jurisdiction in the Pacific or on its armed forces, public vessels or aircraft in the Pacific.

Article VI

This Treaty does not affect and shall not be interpreted as affecting in any way the rights and obligations of the Parties under the Charter of the United Nations or the responsibility of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security.

Article VII

The Parties hereby establish a Council, consisting of their Foreign Ministers or their Deputies, to consider matters concerning the implementation of this Treaty. The Council should be so organized as to be able to meet at any time.

Article VIII

Pending the development of a more comprehensive system of regional security in the Pacific Area and the development by the United Nations of more effective means to maintain international peace and security, the Council established by

能够促進本條約的目的並能對該地區安全有所貢獻的國家、區域組織、國家集團或其他當局，保持協商的關係。

第九條

本條約應由締約國分別按照它們的憲法程序批准之。批准書應儘速交由澳大利亞政府保管，澳大利亞政府將於此種批准書交存後通知其他各簽字國。一俟簽字國的批准書都已交存，本條約即行生效。

第十條

本條約無限期有效。任何締約國在通知澳大利亞政府後一年，即可不再為按第七條規定所設立的理事會的理事國。澳大利亞政府將此項通知交存一事告知其他締約國政府。

第十一條

本條約以英文作成，將存在澳大利亞政府檔案庫中。經簽證無誤的條約副本將由澳大利亞政府送交其他每一簽字國政府。

下列簽字全權代表在本條約上簽字以昭信守。

一九五一年九月一日訂於舊金山。

(譯自「美國對外關係文獻」第八卷，一九五一年)

Article 7, is authorized to maintain a consultative relationship with States, Regional Organizations, Associations of States or other authorities in the Pacific Area in a position to further the purposes of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of that Area.

Article IX

This Treaty shall be ratified by the Parties in accordance with their respective constitutional processes. The instruments of ratification shall be deposited as soon as possible with the Government of Australia, which will notify each of the other signatories of such deposit. The Treaty shall enter into force as soon as the ratifications of the signatories have been deposited.

Article X

This Treaty shall remain in force indefinitely. Any Party may cease to be a member of the Council established by Article 7 one year after notice has been given to the Government of Australia which will inform the Governments of the other Parties of the deposit of such notice.

Article XI

This Treaty in the English language shall be deposited in the Archives of the Government of Australia. Duly certified copies thereof will be transmitted by that Government to the Governments of each of the other signatories.

In WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned plenipotentiaries have signed this treaty.

DONE at the city of San Francisco this first day of September, 1951.

(Documents on American Foreign Relations, Vol. XIII, 1951)

(第十三號)

艾登在英國保守黨年會上贊同召開四大國會議以緩和國際緊張局勢的演說(節錄)

一九五三年十月八日

SPEECH BY ANTHONY EDEN AT ANNUAL CONFERENCE OF BRITISH CONSERVATIVE PARTY IN FAVOUR OF FOUR-POWER TALKS FOR RELAXATION OF INTERNATIONAL TENSION (EXCERPTS)

October 8, 1953

任何讀過首相演說的人都會看出，首相是多麼慎重，以免引起任何假的希望。別的人就沒有這樣慎重。還有更可惋惜的事。如果你們讀一下某些評論後，你們將會覺得最高級的四國會議是一種神奇的方案，而祇有美國人阻止我們這樣做。那當然是最無聊的看法。如果有人有這種看法，他最好研究一下蘇聯最近對三國照會的答覆。這個答覆表明它不同意舉行任何一級的會議。這是一個複雜而否定的文件，我相信我們將馬上對它提出明確而肯定的答覆，因為我們這一方面確實希望召開這個關於德國問題的四大國會議。

我們將用一切可能的辦法來緩和國際緊張局勢，從最高級的四大國會議一直到極細小問題的談判。我們在進行這種工作時必須要有耐心與毅力，如果我們的盟國偶然與我們意見不同，我們不應該責罵它們。祇有一項條件是我們必須通用的。我們決不可用自己的行動損及北大西洋條約組織的團結，因為我們的生存就靠這個組織。沒有北大西洋條約組織就沒有安全。有些人有忘了這一點的危險。

一方面，歐洲局勢比六個月以前更有希望了。我應該說，歐洲防務集團的機會要比過去的一些時候好得多了。這對於歐洲的前途是具有決定性的重要意義的。這項計劃的擬訂者應歸功於法國。的確，再想不出使德國在西方的防務中發揮其作用的更好的辦法了。我們需要德國的貢獻，而且德國也應當負起它的一部分負擔。

我們是要使德國與西方緊密並日益增加地合作

Anyone who reads the Prime Minister's speech will see how careful he was not to raise false hopes. Others have not been so careful. More is the pity. To read some comments you would think that a four-Power meeting at the highest level was some magic formula which only the Americans prevent us from enjoying. Of course that is the greatest nonsense. If anyone holds such views they need only read the last Soviet reply to the three-Power Note. It shows no agreement for a meeting at any level. It is an involved and negative document to which I trust we shall speedily return a clear and positive reply, because for our part we really do want this four-Power meeting on Germany.

We shall pursue all the methods open to us to reduce international tension, from a four-Power meeting at the highest level to the negotiation of even the smallest issues. And we must do so with patience and perseverance, and we should not abuse our allies if they do not happen to agree with our views. There is only one test that we must apply. We must not by any of our actions injure the unity of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, because on N.A.T.O. our very survival depends. No N.A.T.O., no security. Some people are in danger of forgetting this.

In one respect the European scene is more promising than it was six months ago. I should judge that the chances for the European Defence Community are better than they have been for some time past, and that is of decisive importance for the future of Europe. The credit for the authorship of the scheme belongs to France, but it is certainly true that no better arrangements could be contrived to enable Germany to play her part in the defence of the west. We need a German contribution, and it is proper that Germany should bear her share of the burden.

Do we want to bring Germany into intimate and growing collaboration with the west, or do

呢？還是希望把它排除出去，並且像一位前工黨大臣以前在斯特拉斯堡事實上向德國所說的那樣呢？這位工黨大臣說，德國必須成爲歐洲中心的政治真空。我確信，後一建議是不現實的並且是危險的。恰恰相反，我們必須盡力使德國感覺到在共同努力和誠懇地和西方合作的基礎上，在重建歐洲中它應起一分作用。這種努力可能成功，也可能不成功。但確實的一點是：如果我們拒絕這樣作的話，三十年代的歷史就會逐行逐章地重演出來。

不要忘記，歐洲防務集團意味着德國在北大西洋條約組織內受到歐洲共同控制的歐洲共同組織的明確保證下提供它的貢獻；而我們都是北大西洋條約組織的成員。我希望這個計劃連同它的詳密的控制和保障制度不久就會實行。歐洲防務集團對今天上午在這裏發言的人以及蘇聯、法國和中歐懼怕德國軍事冒險復活的人提供了最好的保證。我還不知道有更好的能使這類事情不再發生的辦法。如果任何人有更好的計劃或更有效的保障辦法的話，那麼就請他宣佈吧。

我們的政策並沒有改變。我們的第一個目標是保持西方聯盟的團結和實力，因爲這是使蘇聯的頑強態度任何軟化的重要原因。

第二，我們決心使我們的聯盟保持防禦性質，不進行挑釁行動，並利用一切可能的機會來解決困難與爭端。這就是我們的政策。這個政策有舉行看來是切合實際與有益的任何會談或會議的餘地。

當然其中也有向蘇聯保證我們並不威脅它的安全的餘地。我們正在這方面進行工作，以便看出用什麼方式來提供這種保證。我想會研究出一些辦法來的。在同時，雖然蘇聯做了令人沮喪的反應，但是，我們將堅持耐心努力，以便對使東西方陷入分裂的各項問題得以進行談判——這些問題就是：歐洲的德國與奧地利問題和遠東的朝鮮問題。因此，我們是堅決反對侵略的，但是在任何一級上舉行討論與達成協議的門戶始終是洞開着的。

(譯自一九五三年十月九日倫敦「泰晤士報」)

we want to thrust her away and tell her, as a Socialist ex-Minister virtually told her at Strasbourg the other day, that she must be a political vacuum in the centre of Europe? I am sure that this last suggestion is both unrealistic and dangerous. On the contrary, we must do all we can to make Germany feel that, on the basis of joint effort and a sincere partnership with the west, she has a part to play in rebuilding Europe. Such an attempt may or may not succeed, but this is quite certain: if we refuse to make that effort the story of the 1930's will be repeated line by line and chapter by chapter.

Do not forget that E.D.C. means a German contribution under specific guarantees in a joint European organization under joint European control within N.A.T.O., of which we are members. I pray that the scheme may soon come into operation with all its elaborate system of checks and safeguards. The E.D.C. is the best guarantee to those who spoke here this morning, and to others in France, Russia, and Central Europe, who fear a resurgence of German military adventure. I know no better way of ensuring that such things will not come to pass. If anyone has a better plan or a more effective safeguard, let him declare it.

Our policy has not changed. Our first aim is to maintain the unity and strength of the western alliance because it is that which has been mainly responsible for any softening there has been in Soviet intransigence.

Secondly, we are determined to keep our alliance defensive in character, to indulge in no provocation, and to take advantage of every opportunity to settle difficulties and solve disputes. That is our policy. There is room in it for any meeting or conference which seems to be practicable or profitable.

There is certainly room in it for assurances to the Soviets that we do not threaten their security. We are working on that to see in what form such assurances might be given, and I think that something can be worked out. In the meantime, in spite of discouraging replies from the Soviet Union, we shall persevere in our efforts to get talks going again on the main issues which divide the east from the west, that is, on Germany and Austria in Europe, and the Korean problem in the Far East. We are, therefore, firm against aggression, but the door is always open to discussion and agreement at any level.

(The Times, London, October 9, 1953)

(第十四號)

邱吉爾在保守黨年會上關於世界局勢的演說(節錄)

一九五三年十月十日

SPEECH BY WINSTON CHURCHILL AT ANNUAL CONFERENCE OF CONSERVATIVE PARTY ON WORLD SITUATION (EXCERPTS)

October 10, 1953

無疑地，有些工黨政客們希望藉指摘與嘲弄美國並挑起對新德國的仇恨而贏得人心。

當然，與美國維持不斷加強的友誼關係是極端重要的。如果違反了德國的意志而使它不必要地變成英國和自由世界的敵人那也是一件大不幸的事。大約在四年以前我就說過，沒有德國的軍事幫助，西歐決不能抵抗蘇聯。艾德禮先生指責稱那種說法是不負責任的。但在一年以後，他和他的同僚便使他們自己以及我們全體受到關於歐洲防務安排的約束，其中包括要建立十二個德國師。

我們從我們的前任承繼了這些與英國信用攸關的安排與保證，而在他們之中有某些人，因為他們不當政，就認為他們有權不管他們過去所做的事和他們已使我們受到的約束的地位。

目前在歐洲的蘇聯軍隊，即使不把它們的僕從國家的軍隊計算在內，已相等於西方盟國全部軍隊的四倍。若削弱我們建立西方防務的努力，那實在將是一種不智之舉。若使我們這個負擔很重的島嶼，對美國和對阿登納正在建立的新德國採取不同情的態度而同時却仍然受工黨簽訂的、答應保衛不能自衛的歐洲友邦的條約的束縛，那簡直是發瘋。

我確信，工黨政府所採取的、在當時為我們所支持的、現在又正在被女王陛下政府堅持沉着地實行着的決定，乃是渡過這個憂慮不安的可怕時期而

There are, no doubt, some Socialist politicians who hope to win popularity both by carping and sneering at the United States and by raising hostility to the new Germany.

Of course, it is vital to maintain ever-strengthening ties of friendship with the United States. It would also be a disaster if Germany were needlessly made an enemy of Britain and the free world against her will. It is nearly four years ago since I said that western Europe could never be defended against Soviet Russia without German military aid. Mr. Attlee denounced that statement as irresponsible. But a year later he and his colleagues committed themselves and all of us to the arrangements for European defence which involved the creation of 12 German divisions.

We inherited these arrangements and pledges, which involve British good faith, from our predecessors, the very men who, some of them because they are not in office, think they are entitled to cast aside the work that they have done and the position to which they have committed us.

At the present time, the Soviet armies in Europe, even without their satellites, are four times as strong as all the western allies put together. It would indeed be an act of unwisdom to weaken our efforts to build up a western defence. It would be madness to make our heavily burdened island take up an attitude which, if not hostile, was, at any rate, unsympathetic both to the United States and to the new Germany which Dr. Adenauer is building, and yet remain bound by the treaties which the Socialists have made to defend friendly European Powers who are incapable of maintaining themselves alone.

I am sure that the decisions taken by the Socialist Government, which were supported by us at the time and are now being carried forward steadfastly and soberly by her Majesty's Government, constitute the best chance—and indeed, I

不致引起世界災難的最好的辦法——我的確認為這是很好的辦法。

無論如何，我們要忠實地遵守這些決定，並且要盡我們最大的努力來贊助組織有一支強大的德國部隊參加的歐洲軍。我們像美國人一樣，將繼續在歐駐紮軍隊，藉以恢復法國與我們的德國盟國之間的均勢。

如果法國人不通過歐洲防務集團條約，那末，我們為慎重起見，沒有其他選擇，只得同意某種新的辦法，通過重新安排北大西洋條約組織的軍隊，使德國的力量與我們西方盟國結合在一起。

在這件事情上我有一生的經驗，並且我認為現在我所說的每一句話都是給予我們以保證世界和平的發展最好的機會。

五個月以前，在五月十一日我曾在下院發表過演說。從那時起我一直沒有發言。在我的政治生涯中，保持這樣長時間的沉默這還是第一次。我當時的要求很小。我對俄國並沒有抱有很大的或令人興奮的希望。我認為在主要有關國家的領袖間親自舉行友誼的非正式會談，或許會有益，不大會有害處的。做出一件好事就可能導致第二件好事。

這一要求不高並無奢望的方案作為女王陛下政府的政策而宣佈後，在全世界引起了很大的注意。雖然我們未能說服我們的可靠的盟友們採取我所建議的這種形式的計劃，但沒有人可以說，這個計劃已完了。

我仍舊認為，各國的領袖應該能夠聚首一堂，進行會談，而不要在容易衝動的羣衆面前，故作姿態，也不要動員大批專家來列舉困難和反對意見。讓我們來看看，除了我們彼此互相殘殺之外——這個我們當然能做到——是否還有更好的辦法。

誠如艾登先生與薩利斯伯利勳爵在星期四所告訴你們的，女王陛下政府仍然認為我們應該堅持設法舉行這樣一種各國政府首腦會議。英國、歐洲和北大西洋條約組織同盟的利益不是使蘇聯反對德國，或使德國反對蘇聯，而是設法使它們雙方都感覺到，儘管它們之間存有嫌隙和分歧意見，但仍能安然相處。

我們若要在所有這些問題上起明確的作用，我們的任務就是要利用我所認為的我們對德國和蘇聯

think it a good chance—of getting through this awful period of anxiety without a world catastrophe.

We, at any rate, are going to adhere faithfully to them and do our utmost to promote the formation of the European Army with a strong contingent of Germans in it. We, like the Americans, shall maintain our forces in Europe, thus restoring the French balance of equality with our German associate.

If E.D.C. should not be adopted by the French, we shall have no choice in prudence but to fall in with some new arrangement which will join the strength of Germany to the western allies through some rearrangement of the forces of N.A.T.O.

I have a life of experience in the matter and I feel that every word I am now saying gives us the best chance of securing the peaceful development of the world.

Five months ago, on May 11, I made a speech in the House of Commons. I have not spoken since. This is the first time in my political life that I have kept quiet for so long. I asked for very little. I held out no glittering or exciting hopes about Russia. I thought that friendly, informal, personal talks between the leading figures in the countries mainly involved might do good and could not easily do much harm, and that one good thing might lead to another.

This humble, modest plan, announced as the policy of her Majesty's Government, raised a considerable stir all over the place, and though we have not yet been able to persuade our trusted allies to adopt it in the form I suggested, no one can say it is dead.

I still think that the leading men of the various nations ought to be able to meet together without trying to cut attitudes before excitable publics or using regiments of experts to marshal all the difficulties and objections, and let us try to see whether there is not something better for us all than tearing and blasting each other to pieces, which we can certainly do.

Her Majesty's Government, as Mr. Eden and Lord Salisbury told you on Thursday, still believe that we should persevere in seeking such a meeting between the heads of Governments. The interest of Britain, of Europe, and of the N.A.T.O. alliance is not to play Russia against Germany or Germany against Russia, but to make them both feel that they can live in safety with each other in spite of their grievous problems and differences.

For us to have a very definite part in all this, our duty is to use what I believe is our growing

的雙方日益增加的影響來消除他們彼此可能懷有的任何不安心理。

我個人歡迎德國回到世界大國之列。作為一生大部分時間消磨在指揮戰爭反對他們或準備戰爭反對他們的我，如果有什麼話能對德國人民說，我願勸他們記住下面有名的格言：「自由的代價就是永恆的警惕」。我們也一定不要忘記這點。

在那同一篇的演說中，我曾談及洛迦諾條約的主導思想，我的意思當然是指這樣的一個計劃即：大家都將反對侵略者——不管這個侵略者是誰，同時協助被侵略者——不管它是大國或小國。這也不過就是設立聯合國所要從事的目的。有人對我們說，洛迦諾條約是失敗了，它沒有能夠防止戰爭。這是有充分理由的，因為美國沒有參加這個條約。要是美國在第一次世界大戰以前或在兩次戰爭之間採取了同樣的關懷態度，作出同樣的努力和犧牲，來維護和平和保衛自由，像我認為它現在——真要謝天謝地——正在做的那樣的話，那麼，第一次大戰也許就決不會發生，而第二次大戰就當然不會發生了。只要有它的巨大的援助，我就可肯定地相信，將不會發生第三次大戰。

(譯自一九五三年十月十二日倫敦「泰晤士報」)

influence, both with Germany and with Russia, to relieve them of any anxiety they may feel about each other.

Personally I welcome Germany back among the great Powers of the world. If there were one message which I could give the German people, as one a large part of whose life has been spent in conducting war against them or preparing to do so, I would urge them to remember the famous maxim: "The price of freedom is eternal vigilance." We must not forget that, either.

When, in this same speech, I spoke about the master thought of Locarno, I meant, of course, the plan of everybody going against the aggressor, whoever he may be, and helping the victim, large or small. That is no more than the United Nations were set up to do. We are told that the Locarno Treaty failed and did not prevent the war. There was a very good reason for that. The United States was not in it. Had the United States taken before the First World War or between the wars the same interest and made the same exertions and sacrifices to preserve peace and uphold freedom which, I thank God, she is doing now, there might never have been a first war and there would certainly never have been a second. With her mighty aid I have a sure hope that there will not be a third.

(The Times, London, October 12, 1953)

(第十五號)

邱吉爾在下院關於外交問題的演說(節錄)

一九五三年十一月三日

SPEECH BY WINSTON CHURCHILL IN HOUSE OF COMMONS ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS (EXCERPTS)

November 3, 1953

拿今天外交情況與兩年前的情況相比，我覺得目前的情況已沒有兩年前那樣可怕，但是比兩年前更難對付。在工黨政府執政的時候已經形成的問題是十分清楚明確的。重整軍備的計劃正在大力推行；朝鮮戰爭仍然在進行中；艾森豪威爾將軍正在重新組織西歐的力量；緊張和危機的感覺充滿了空間。當時的工黨政府獲得了反對黨（保守黨）的全力支持，和我們的美國盟邦一起積極努力，應付蘇聯的威脅。

這種時局的主要輪廓一直在保持着，英國的目的並未因政府改換而變弱。然而，也曾發生了若干重要的事件，這些事件不管是正確地也好或錯誤地也好掩蓋了，而且也可能是真正的改變了這種局勢的嚴重性。朝鮮的戰鬥已由戰壕轉移到會議桌上來了，下院還不知道這種難以對付而糾纏的談判會產生些什麼結果；但是，不論朝鮮戰爭引起怎樣的結果，有一件世界上的大事是顯著的：美國已再度成爲一個擁有強大武裝的國家了。

第二件世界大事是斯大林的逝世和另一個政權在克里姆林宮掌握了政權。我要談一談的正是這兩件大事中的第二件。自從這件事發生以來已差不多有八個月了。到處有人在問，今天仍舊有人在這樣問：斯大林時代的終止是否導致了蘇聯政策的改變？是否會有一個新的面貌？我不敢要求下院議員或在議院外能聽到我的發言的人，對這些不可知的事作出肯定的結論。也很可能俄國各地的廣大人民現在極大部分既是受過教育的，他們的性格與看法有了很大的變化，他們的注意力已從對外侵略轉向國內生活的改善。

這可能是也可能不是一個不正確的判斷。如果我們不放鬆警惕，不讓我們的實力再度受到削減，

Comparing the outlook in foreign affairs to-day with that of two years ago, I thought it was less formidable but more baffling. The issues, as they had shaped themselves in the days of the Labour Government, were clear cut. The rearmament programme was getting into its stride. The war in Korea was still raging. General Eisenhower was reorganizing western European strength. A feeling of crescendo and of crisis filled the air. The Socialist Government, with the full support of the Conservative Opposition, were marching with our American allies in a vehement effort to meet the Soviet menace.

The main structure of this position was maintained and there had been no weakening in British purpose as the result of a change of Government. Nevertheless, certain important events had happened which, rightly or wrongly, had somewhat veiled, and, it might be, actually modified the harshness of the scene. The fighting in Korea had shifted from the trenches to the tables. The House did not know yet what would emerge from these stubborn and tangled discussions, but whatever else came or did not come, as the result of the Korean war, one major world fact was outstanding: the United States had become again a heavily armed nation.

The second world event was the death of Stalin and the assumption of power by a different régime in the Kremlin. It is on the second of these two prodigious events that I wish to dwell. Nearly eight months have passed since it occurred. Everywhere the question was, and still is, asked: Did the end of the Stalin epoch lead to a change in Soviet policy? Is there a new look? I should not venture to ask the House, or any outside our doors to whom my words have access, to adopt positive conclusions on these mysteries. It may well be that there have been far-reaching changes in the temper and the outlook of the immense populations, now so largely literate, who inhabit all the Russias and that their mind has turned to internal betterment rather than external aggression.

This may or may not be a right judgment and we can afford, if vigilance is not relaxed and

我們可以懷着有希望的心情——我相信這是有益的心情——來等待着事態的發展。強大的國家與強有力的政府的行動唯一的真正可靠的指導，是對它們認為是它們自己的利益的事物的正確估計。用這個標準來判斷，我就有了寬慰之感。我研究了一下在巨大的美國的掩護下，我們自己的實力與歐洲的實力後，我感到做下述的結論，不是不合理的或危險的：國內繁榮——而不是對外的侵略——不但是俄國各族人民衷心的願望，而且也是他們的統治者的長期利益。

就是由於這樣的思想情況，六個月以前，我想：如果主要國家和有關政府的首腦們跟俄國的新領袖們會會面並彼此認識和建立個人關係是一件好事。彼此認識和個人關係已經常肯定地證明是有好處而沒有妨礙的。我現在還是希望這種會面對國際接觸可能有益；從另一方面看，人們絕不可忽視這種四大國會議結果有使現有僵局更形惡化的危險。如果以為有可能一下子通盤解決存在於東方、也存在於西方，存在於德國以及所有附庸國家的一切重大問題，那肯定是愚不可及的。我們不見得會以個人會談——不管是多麼友好的——使這些問題獲得滿意的解決，和把這些問題作為世界的大兇大險的事而予以平息的。毫無疑問，時間是需要的——需要比我們這裏的某些人可能料想的更多的時間。

當然，我向艾森豪威爾總統保持有密切的聯繫，而且我希望在百慕大我們能夠把這個問題整個地談一談，但是遺憾的是由於非我的能力所能控制的情況使我未能這樣做。我們現在希望舉行四國外長會議，我們誠懇地希望這一會議不久即可舉行。假使這個會議取得了些進展，則這些進展本身又可能會導致雙方進一步的努力。我們相信不久蘇聯對我們和解性的邀請會給以同意的答覆。

我已經談到了過去兩年內發生的兩件重要的大事，但是還有第三件大事，雖然這件事發生在過去，然而由於這件事情在目前這個時期有了驚人的發展，所以我還是可以把它看作為一件新出現的事情。這是一件比其他事情都重要的大事，我指的是原子戰爭和氫彈的迅速不斷的發展。這些可怕的科學發明在每個有思想的人的心上投下了陰影，不過我仍然相信，我們這樣想是對的：緊張局面已經有了緩和，另一次戰爭的或然性已經減少，或者至少

strength is not suffered again to dwindle, to await events in a hopeful, and, I trust, in a helpful mood. The only really sure guide to the actions of mighty nations and powerful Governments is a correct estimate of what they consider to be their own interests. Applying this test I feel a sense of reassurance. Studying our own strength and that of Europe under the massive American shield I do not feel it unreasonable or dangerous to conclude that internal prosperity rather than external conquest is not only the deep desire of the Russian peoples but also the long interest of their rulers.

It was in this state of mind that six months ago I thought it would be a good thing if the heads of the principal States and Governments concerned could meet the new leaders of Russia and establish that personal acquaintance and relationship which had certainly often proved a help rather than a hindrance. I still hope that such a meeting will have a useful place in international contacts. On the other hand, one must not overlook the risk of such a four-Power conference ending in a still worse deadlock than exists now, and it certainly would be most foolish to imagine that there is any chance of making straight away a general settlement of all the cruel problems that exist in the east as well as in the west, and that exist in Germany and in all the satellite countries. We are not likely to get them satisfactorily dealt with and laid to rest as great dangers and evils in the world by personal meetings, however friendly. Time will undoubtedly be needed; more time than some of us are likely to see.

I am, of course, in close touch with President Eisenhower and my hope was that at Bermuda we might have had a talk about it all. I was sorry to be prevented by conditions beyond my control. We are at present looking forward to the four-Power conference of Foreign Secretaries and we earnestly hope that it will take place soon. If it leads to improvements these themselves might again lead to further efforts on both sides. We trust we shall soon have a favourable answer to our conciliatory invitation to the Soviets.

I have mentioned two dominant events that have happened in the last two years, but there is a third which, although it happened before, has developed so prodigiously in this period that I can treat it as if it were a novel apparition. It is in an event which overshadows the others. I mean the rapid and ceaseless development of atomic warfare and the hydrogen bomb. These fearful scientific discoveries cast their shadows on every thoughtful mind, but nevertheless I believe that we are justified in feeling that there has been a diminution of tension and that the

變得遙遠些了。儘管人類過去從未掌握過的毀滅性武器仍在不斷發展，我還是要這樣說。確實，我有時有一種奇怪的想法：這些東西的毀滅性也許會給人類帶來全然預見不到的安全。

也許這條規律將發現新的用場；也許當毀滅性武器發展到使每一個人能殺死每一個別人的時候，就根本不會有人要殺人了。無論如何，似乎可以大胆地這樣說：如果戰爭以交戰雙方遭受到他們所最懼怕的事而開始——現在無疑地就是這樣——這種戰爭爆發的可能性，比因野心家貪圖舊時代那種動人的戰利品而發生的那種戰爭的可能性要小一些。

我在下院提出了這種安慰人心的想法，但同時我要小心地講清楚，我們唯一的希望只能產生於無懈的警惕。……

(譯自一九五三年十一月四日倫敦「泰晤士報」)

probabilities of another world war have diminished or at least become more remote. I say this in spite of the continual growth of weapons of destruction such as have never fallen before into the hands of human beings. Indeed, I have sometimes the odd thought that the annihilating character of these agencies may bring an utterly unforeseeable security to mankind.

It may be that this rule will find a novel application and that when the advance of destructive weapons enables every one to kill everybody else no one will want to kill anyone at all. At any rate, it seems pretty safe to say that a war which begins by both sides suffering what they dread most—and that is undoubtedly the case now—is less likely to occur than one which dangles the lurid prizes of former ages before ambitious eyes.

I offer this comforting idea to the House, taking care to make it clear at the same time that our only hope can spring from untiring vigilance.

(The Times, London, November 4, 1953)

(第十六號)

艾登在下院關於外交政策的演說(節錄)

一九五三年十一月五日

SPEECH BY ANTHONY EDEN IN HOUSE OF COMMONS ON FOREIGN POLICY (EXCERPTS)

November 5, 1953

我們有我們的聯邦家庭，這個家庭仍然是世界上真正國際合作的卓越榜樣。我們有西方自由人民的同盟。我們有北大西洋條約。這個條約與已故的貝文先生的名字是永遠分不開的；這個條約使我們在國際事務中有一個發生作用的聯盟和一個聯合防務的強有力的體系。我們首要的任務是加強和發展這個聯盟，使它在我們人民心目中保持活潑蓬勃，並且提防一切分裂和離間的活動。

現在主要的問題是東方與西方之間的關係，而遠東是各地區中最危險的一個。當朝鮮戰爭達到最高峯的時候，很少人感到有把握戰爭的火燄可以局限於那個蒙難的小國境內，而結果竟能如此，這是

We had our Commonwealth family, still the most remarkable example of true international cooperation in the world. We had the alliance of free peoples in the west. We had the North Atlantic Treaty, with which the late Mr. Bevin's name would always be linked, which provided us with a working alliance in world affairs, as well as a powerful system of joint defence. Our first duty was to strengthen and develop that alliance, to keep it fresh and vigorous in the minds of our people, and to guard it against all efforts of disruption and disunity.

The main issue now was the relations between east and west, and the Far East was the most dangerous of all the spheres. When the Korean war was at its height few would have felt certain that the flames could be contained within the boundaries of that small and afflicted country,

一件很大的成就而對世界和平是一大大切實勝利。美國已決心盡其力所能及防止戰爭再起，我們也經常在許多國家的首都進行活動，來鞏固已經獲得的成就。在當前執拗的爭議中，有一些原則是我們所必須堅持的。每一個戰俘是否回家，應得自由選擇，但不應將戰俘無限期拘留。在板門店政治會議裏，聯合國發言人迪安先生表現了令人欽佩的既耐心而又堅定的態度。可以相信這種態度是會獲致效果的。因為朝鮮問題一旦得到解決，他們可以進而更大地緩和遠東的緊張局勢，而這對大家是一種多大的寬慰。

女王陛下政府的政策是努力和中國建立和平關係，中國政策的改變將首先得到我們的歡迎。使和西方世界接觸的道路暢通當然是對中國本身有利的。我們當願幫忙它這樣做，但是這是假定中國永遠放棄侵略鄰邦的政策。

剩下的中心問題——只有蘇維埃政府能回答這個問題——是：東方與西方之間能否有更鬆動的關係？我們對蘇維埃的意向知道些什麼？我們已知在斯大林統治下蘇維埃的努力大部分集中於準備戰爭。他們時刻準備利用非蘇維埃世界的弱點，暗中破壞、滲入、推翻任何比較弱的國家。聯合國中的團結與實力政策給予這種行動以一種日益有效的抵禦。這是一個成功的政策，它成為歐洲的堤防，保持了和平。現在這種情況有沒有改變呢？如果改變了，是如何改變呢？或者俄國的新統治者早已認識到斯大林驅策蘇聯人民過甚，提高生活水平將使生產方面有更好的效果。發展農業和生產更多的消費品的新計劃會給與人民更好的生活條件，他盼望這個計劃能夠實現。

和自由世界的緊張關係曾經有過緩和，但是很難發現任何跡象說明蘇維埃政府已改變了它根本敵視西方國家的政策。它的宣傳是仍舊和從前一樣；而且，鐵幕後面正在發生的事情，也不能令人樂觀。對東德放鬆管制的政策在斯大林死後曾有一些

and that they had been was a notable achievement, and a solid gain for the peace of the world. The United States were determined to do all in their power to prevent hostilities breaking out again, and we, too, were constantly at work in many capitals to consolidate what had been gained. In the stubborn disputations now going on there were certain principles to which we must hold. Each prisoner must have a free choice of whether to go home or not but prisoners should not be held indefinitely in detention. In the political conferences in Panmunjom, Mr. Dean, the spokesman of the United Nations, was showing an admirable combination of patience and firmness which it was trusted would bear fruit, because once a Korean settlement was achieved they could move on to the wider relaxation of tension in the Far East, and what a relief that would be to all.

It was the policy of Her Majesty's Government to work for peaceful relations with China, and we should be the first to welcome a reversal of Chinese policy. It must surely be in China's own interest to keep open the lines of contact with the western world. We should be ready to help her to do so, but this assumed that the policy of Chinese aggression against a neighbour was for all time abandoned.

The central question remaining—and only the Soviet Government could answer it—was: Can there be easier relations between east and west? What did we know of Soviet intentions? We knew that under Stalin Soviet effort was largely concentrated on preparedness for war. They were everready to exploit weakness in a non-Soviet world, to undermine, to penetrate, to overthrow any weaker brethren. The policy of unity and strength among the United Nations provided an increasingly effective barrier against these movements. It had been a successful policy; it had held the dykes in Europe, and it had kept the peace. Had the position changed now, and, if so, how? Perhaps the new rulers of Russia had realized that Stalin drove the Soviet people too hard and that higher standards of living would give better results in production. The new programme for developing agriculture and producing more consumer goods promised better conditions for the people, and he hoped it would be fulfilled.

There had been some relaxation of tension with the free world, but it was hard to find any sign that the Soviet Government had modified its fundamental hostility to the western nations. Its propaganda continued just as before. Nor was it encouraging to see what was happening behind the iron curtain. The policy of lighter control in eastern Germany, of which there was some evidence after the death of Stalin, had been

表現，這種政策業已放棄而我們目前所看到的是在波蘭施行壓迫的新時期。

英國政府將繼續希望和注視對方的回心轉意和使緊張局勢緩和的任何機會。與此同時，我們別無他法，惟有堅持進行我們生存所賴的防務安排。

英國曾提出保證擁護歐洲防務集團。待歐洲防務集團開始活動時，我們和它所發生的實際工作關係即可證明我們的意向。六個國家將發現我們的合作是在不正式加入的情況下儘我們所能做到的那樣密切。

英國政府曾經多次表明擁護關於歐洲防務集團的思想。對於通過歐洲防務集團，以其許多保障規定和集體機構，德國可以對歐洲防務作出最能為人接受的貢獻也沒有任何爭論。雖然防務問題是很重要的，但是，這還不祇是一個防務問題。

在將來屬於北大西洋條約組織範圍之內的歐洲防務集團，德國將和我們一起參加許多關於西方自由世界的工作與將來的討論。這豈不是一件好事嗎？否則在歐洲中心德國就是一種真空，它有一支國家軍隊有可能投向那出價最高的國家。

有人會相信無論我們做什麼決定，德國都將無限期地保持無武裝的狀態嗎？我們與其犯了兩次大戰之間所犯的那一切的錯誤，還不如解決這種情況，這難道不好嗎？我們必須設法團結西方國家的大家庭，使德國加入這個大家庭。

(譯自一九五三年十一月六日倫敦「泰晤士報」)

abandoned and we now saw a new period of oppression in Poland.

The British Government would continue to hope and watch for a change of heart and for any opportunity of relaxing tension. Meanwhile, we had no option but to persevere with our defensive arrangements upon which our very life depended.

This country had given pledges to support the European Defence Community. The proof of our intention would be in the practical working relationship which we should have with it when it was in operation. Six countries would find that our partnership was as close as anything we could devise short of actual membership.

The British Government had many times made it clear that they supported the conception of E.D.C., nor was there any dispute that through E.D.C., with its many safeguards and collective machinery, Germany could most acceptably contribute to the defence of Europe. This was much more than a question of defence, important as that was.

In E.D.C., within the N.A.T.O. framework as it would be, Germany would be taking part with us in many discussions and deliberations concerning the work and the future of the free western world. Would not that be a good thing? The alternative was to see Germany a vacuum in the centre of Europe with a national army, perhaps giving herself to the highest bidder.

Did anybody believe that Germany was going to remain unarmed indefinitely, whatever decision we took? Had we not better face it instead of making all the mistakes we made between the two wars? We must try to draw the western family of nations together and to bring Germany into that family.

(The Times, London, November 6, 1953)

(第十七號)

加拿大外長皮爾遜抨擊美國亞洲政策的文章[●]

一九五三年十二月

ARTICLE BY L. B. PEARSON, CANADIAN SECRETARY
FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CRITICIZING U.S. POLICY
IN ASIA

December, 1953

我以為目前對西方反對共產帝國主義大聯盟的目的和政策的一致性的最大威脅是在於遠東。這種威脅產生於對亞洲共產主義威脅的範圍與性質以及應付這種威脅所應採取的措施看法的不同。如果這些分歧繼續下去並且加深的話，它們可能對第二次世界大戰結束後發展出來的合作造成嚴重的損害，這種合作不但表現在聯合國中密切的工作關係上，也表現在像北大西洋條約組織和美澳新防務公約這類爲了集體行動而組織起來的一些機構中。

不但如此，在這些分歧中，往往是美國站在一邊，而西歐和英聯邦國家的政府站在另一邊。這種結果使加拿大人感到特別焦慮，使任何人都感到不安，除非他是一個可能的侵略者。

當國際共產主義的陰謀以軍事侵略的形式表現出來的時候——在朝鮮或者在亞洲其他地方——在應該採取什麼態度的問題上我們之間沒有爭執；我們接受聯合國憲章規定的集體抵抗和集體援助的義務，雖然在不同國家和不同地區之間執行這種義務的方式可能不得不有所不同。

譬如拿朝鮮問題來說，在宣布北朝鮮爲侵略者這件事上，美國在聯合國中起了果敢和重要的帶頭作用，並且在抵抗這一侵略中，除了南朝鮮外，美國承担了絕大部分的負擔。朝鮮戰爭的損失和戰爭所帶來的悲慘事情深深地影響了美國人的心理和思想。一九一四年以來曾經歷過不祇一次而且是巨大的流血和戰爭痛苦的其他國家應該都記得這種情況。

另一方面，不應忘記，如果某些國家只派遣了少量的部隊到朝鮮去，那是因爲這些國家由於在第

The greatest threat at the moment to the unity of purpose and policy of the Western grand alliance against Communist imperialism and aggression lies, I think, in the Far East. It arises out of differences of viewpoint over the scope and nature of the menace of communism in Asia and the measures which should be taken to meet it. If these differences persist and deepen, they may cause serious damage to the cooperation which has developed since the war and which has expressed itself not only in a close working relationship within the United Nations, but in such agencies for collective action as NATO and ANZUS (the Australian-New Zealand-US defense pact).

Furthermore, these differences often find the United States on one side and the governments of Western Europe and the British Commonwealth of Nations on the other—a result which causes special anxiety to a Canadian, but which should give no comfort to anyone except a potential aggressor.

There is no dispute between us over the attitude we should adopt when the international Communist conspiracy expresses itself in the form of military aggression—in Korea or elsewhere in Asia. We accept the obligation of collective resistance and assistance under the Charter of the United Nations, even though the manner in which that obligation is discharged may have to vary, both as between states and between areas.

In Korea, for instance, the United States took a bold and essential lead at the United Nations in having North Korea branded as the aggressor, and has borne by far the major non-Korean share of resistance to that aggression. The losses and the tragedies of the Korean War have made a strong impact on the American heart and mind. Other countries who have since 1914 experienced more than once and in full measure the bloodshed and misery of war should remember this.

On the other hand, it should not be forgotten that if some countries have sent only small con-

● 本文原載一九五三年十二月美國「世界」雜誌上。

二次世界大戰中受了損失和破壞——它們遭受到的損失和破壞遠比我們這個大陸上所遭受的要大——所以今天仍舊很弱；同時，我們也不應忘記，它們之中也有些捲入了它們自己的反對共產主義侵略和掠奪的軍事行動。如果要使我們的聯盟不受到不利的影響的話，對這問題互相諒解是重要的。

朝鮮的侵略現在已被遏止，戰爭已經停止，停戰協定已經簽字，但是，朝鮮局勢還存在着許多問題，特別對那些把朝鮮的作戰當作是歷史上第一次國際警察行動的聯合國會員國而言。

首先的一個問題是如何把朝鮮停戰變為和平這一個複雜而有爆炸性的問題。在這個問題上，美國和它的朋友之間已經有了分歧意見，特別是在和平會議的成員問題上。這種分歧是一種老老實實的分歧，經過事先充分協商，即使不能消除也是能夠縮小至最低限度的，但是，相反地，這個分歧竟令發展成爲——使人看來像是——一個重大危機。盟國的外交在這裏失敗了，或者無寧說，沒有好好地試用外交來解決分歧。希望我們從這件事情上吸取教訓。

如果朝鮮停戰破裂或無限期延長的話，對我們的聯盟說可能還會有甚至更爲嚴重的問題。美國政府懷疑共產黨的誠意——這是可以理解的——它已經取得了盟國的同意，發表一個希望會防止侵略再起的宣言。這個宣言莊嚴地警告：如果侵略再起，將有迅速和堅決的抵抗；並且聲稱，如果發生這種情況，把軍事行動限制在朝鮮境內也許是不可能的。

所有其他有軍隊在朝鮮的政府都同意了這個「警告宣言」，但是，有些政府在同意時却很不安，這並不是秘密。這種不安的產生是由於懼怕停戰可能被共產黨或曾激烈反對過停戰的大韓民國政府所破壞。也有人擔心可能產生一種隱藏有新的侵略的種籽的情況。這兩種情勢中的任何一種都可能會使我們的聯盟遇到這個「警告宣言」中所未考慮到的嚴重問題。我們怎麼能預防這些不幸的發展或者如果發生了這些不幸的情況，怎樣保證行動一致呢？

首先，如果中國和北朝鮮實行明白無疑的新的侵略的話，美國應該能夠信賴它的朋友一定支持它。在另一方面，應該了解，只有在聯合國決定新的侵略確實發生後，才會給予這種支持。再者，必須使南朝鮮政府相信，破壞朝鮮停戰或破壞和平會議——如果朝鮮和平會議舉行的話——對南朝鮮政

tingents to Korea, those countries are still weak from the losses and devastation of World War II, far greater than anything this continent suffered; and that some of them are also involved in their own military operations against Communist aggression and banditry. Mutual understanding is essential here if the alliance is not to be poisoned.

The Korean aggression has now been checked. The fighting has stopped. An armistice has been signed. But the situation is heavy with problems; especially for those members of the United Nations who have made the Korean operation the first international police action in history.

There is, first, the complex and explosive problem of converting the armistice into a peace. Already there have been divergent views between the United States and its friends on this issue, more particularly over the composition of the peace conference. This was an honest difference which, by adequate prior consultation, could have been minimized if not removed. Instead, it was allowed to develop into—and made to look like—a major crisis. Allied diplomacy failed here; or rather it was not given a fair trial. It is to be hoped that we have learned the lesson of this episode.

There may be even more serious problems for the alliance if the armistice breaks down or is indefinitely prolonged. The United States Government, understandably doubtful of the Communists' good faith, has secured allied agreement for a declaration which, it is hoped, will prevent renewed aggression. It gives a solemn warning of speedy and firm resistance if such aggression occurs, and adds that should this happen, it might be impossible to limit action to Korea itself.

This "warning declaration" was agreed to by all the other Governments with forces in Korea, but it is no secret that the agreement was given, in some cases, uneasily. This uneasiness arose over fears that the armistice might be broken either by the Communists or by the Government of the Republic of Korea, which has violently opposed it. There was also concern lest a situation be created in which the origins of the new aggression might be concealed. Either contingency would impose a severe strain on the alliance, not contemplated by the "warning declaration." How can we guard against these untoward developments or ensure unity of action if they occur?

In the first place, the United States should be able to count on its friends if a clear-cut and new aggression from China and North Korea were committed. On the other hand, it should be understood that such support would only be forthcoming if the United Nations had decided that a new aggression had in fact taken place. Also, the Government of South Korea must be

府都是有百害而無一利的。最後，應該講得十分明白，我們在朝鮮的目標是擊敗侵略，而不是用武力強使這個國家統一。如果對這最後一點有任何懷疑的話，在遠東的合作一定將極端困難，如果不是不可能的話。

是的，用政治手段把朝鮮統一為一個民主自由的國家依然是聯合國的目標；不過，任何聯合國會員國用軍事手段來幫助促成朝鮮統一的義務，並不比在德國統一的問題上所承擔的更大。

這樣說來，我們在朝鮮的聯盟就有了危險，然而，更大的危險可能發生在我們所應該採取的不僅反對共產黨的軍事侵略，而且也反對共產主義本身，並且反對遠東的共產黨政府的政策上。

在對共產黨中國的問題上，這已是一個眼前急待解決的問題了。應該承認它或是排斥它？和它貿易或是不和它貿易？是和平共處或是不共戴天？這不只是一個對中國的問題，而是一個對整個亞洲共產主義的性質與意義的看法不同的問題。在這個問題上，中國又是我們有不一致的危險的最好例子。

某些政府，包括聯合王國在內，已經承認了北京共產黨政府。它們着重地聲稱，這並不表示它們贊成共產主義，而只是承認這一事實：北京政權現在有效地控制了中國大陸，硬不承認這一點是無用的。由於承認了北京政權，便指責這些政府是「姑息」——這個名詞所包含的感情成分愈來愈多，而意義則變得愈來愈少了——這對於自由世界在亞洲問題上的合作事業是無益的。

在目前的情況下，正式承認共產黨中國可能是不智的和不適當的，但是如果說這種承認是不道德的，這種論點則將意味着——假使我們要想按邏輯辦事的話——對任何共產黨政府的承認都是不道德的，因而都不應予以承認，或者已經承認了的，都應該撤銷承認。進一步發揮這一論點，那麼我們就應該把自己同每一個共產黨政府完全隔離起來，並承認，只要共產黨政府存在一天，和它們的長期衝突就一天不可避免。舉例來說，我們不應該同中國共產黨在朝鮮或任何別的政治會議上討論政治問題，但是碰巧我們却同意這樣作了。

convinced that it has nothing to gain and everything to lose by sabotaging either the armistice or the Korean peace conference, if and when it takes place. Finally, it should be made quite clear that our objective in Korea is to defeat aggression, and not to impose unity on that country by force. Any doubt on this latter point would certainly make cooperation in the Far East extremely difficult if not impossible.

It is true that the unification of a free and democratic Korea by political means remains a United Nations objective. There is, however, no greater obligation on any member of the United Nations to help bring this about by military means than exists in the issue of German unification.

There are dangers, then, to our coalition in Korea. Greater dangers, however, may arise from the policy we should adopt, not merely against Communist military aggression but against communism itself, and Communist governments, in the Far East.

This problem becomes immediate and compelling in the case of Red China. Should there be recognition or exclusion, trade or no trade, co-existence or implacable hostility? The problem is even deeper and wider than China. It is concerned with differing views about the nature and meaning of Asian communism in general. Here again, however, China provides the best illustration of the danger of disunity.

Certain governments, including the United Kingdom, have recognized the Communist Government in Peking. This, they emphatically claim, does not indicate any approval of communism on their part. It is merely recognition of the fact that the Peking regime is now in effective control of continental China and that it is idle to pretend otherwise. To accuse governments, because of this recognition, of "appeasement"—a word which is now becoming charged with more and more emotion and less and less meaning—does no service to the cause of cooperation by the free world in Asian matters.

It may be unwise and inexpedient in the present circumstances to give formal recognition to Communist China, but to argue that such recognition is immoral would mean, if we are to be logical, that recognition of any Communist government is immoral and should not be given, or if already given, should be withdrawn. To carry the argument farther, we should isolate ourselves completely from every Communist government and accept the inevitability of permanent conflict as long as that government survives. We should not, for instance, discuss political questions with the Chinese Communists at a Korean or any other political conference—something, incidentally, we have already agreed to do.

同樣「強硬」觀點表現在這樣一些言論裏，這些言論說，同共產黨中國不應有任何種類的貿易，如果接納北京政府入聯合國，美國就應該永久退出聯合國。假若這些觀點變成爲美國的政策的話，在亞洲要同其他國家合作就很困難了。

這種立場立刻提出了兩個問題：北京政權實際上是不是國際共產主義陰謀中堅決的和固定的一員呢？還是它是受忠實的馬列主義共產黨人所指揮和控制的一種運動，而這種運動的最大的力量是來自民族的感情和它的人民擺脫貧困、饑饉、剝削和絕望（共產黨與工人黨情報局利用這種情況是十分成功的，特別是在亞洲）的迫切願望？

在美國許多方面的人士都強調第一種看法，即認爲中國共產主義是極端的「共產黨與工人黨情報局」的觀念，聯盟中其他一些國家的意見則傾向於後一種看法，即強調這一政權的民族和社會的基礎。對這個問題看法不同，結果便產生了不同的政策，而不同的政策可能危及在亞洲的合作。

第一種看法主張採取軍事對抗；對任何看來是遲疑不決和妥協的辦法都感到不耐煩；對那些反共首領和反共集團不管是否受到和應否受到人民的支持都一概加以支持。

具體地說，這種看法包含了這種意思，即我們的政策應該是把台灣中國國民政府當作一個在適當的時候會推翻北京政權的政府，而用各種可能的辦法予以加強和援助。這種看法的假定是：受共產黨暴政迫害、壓迫和因共產黨的暴政而幻想破滅的中國人民，一旦理解到國內的騷動能夠受到外力的援助的時候，他們會奮起加入前來拯救他們的軍隊中去的。

但是，要在這個基礎上訂出對中國的一致政策是困難的。老實說來，這就意味着宣告，除全面戰爭外——甚至冒這種戰爭的危險——用一切行動積極地和固定不移地不僅反對共產主義的侵略，而且也反對中國共產主義。

另外一個觀念是那麼絕對的，它也可能使我們的聯盟分裂，如果把中國所發生的一切事情解釋爲土地革命，民族主義的高漲加上社會經濟改革，認爲其所以與莫斯科結成聯盟，主要是因爲美國的不妥協地反對中國的主張。中國的廣大羣衆雖然對大米可能比對馬克思遠有興趣，雖然他們可能接受任

The same "tough" viewpoint is expressed in statements to the effect that there should be no trade of any kind with Communist China, and that if the Peking government is ever admitted to the United Nations, the United States should walk out, and for good. If these views became US policy, cooperation in Asia with other countries would be hard to achieve.

Such a stand at once poses two questions: Is the Peking regime, in fact, a firm and fixed element in the international Communist conspiracy? Or is it a movement, directed and controlled by loyal Marxist-Leninist Communists, but deriving its greatest strength from national feeling and from the passionate desire of its people to escape from poverty and starvation, exploitation and hopelessness—conditions the Cominform has so successfully exploited, especially in Asia?

The emphasis in many quarters in the United States is on the first, the extreme "Cominform" concept of Chinese communism. Opinion in certain other countries of the coalition tends to stress the second, the national and social basis of the regime. These different approaches to the problem result in different policies, which may jeopardize cooperation in Asia.

The first approach counsels militant counter-action; impatience with any course that seems to temporize or compromise; support for any anti-Communist leader or group, regardless of whether it has—or deserves—popular support.

Specifically, it implies that our policy should be to strengthen and assist the Chinese Nationalist government on Formosa in every possible way as the one which in due course will overthrow the Peking regime. The assumption is that once the Chinese people, persecuted, oppressed and disillusioned by Communist tyranny, realize that unrest inside the country can be supported by strength from outside, they will rise and join the armies which come to their rescue.

It will, however, be difficult to work out any united policy toward China on this basis. It means, frankly, a declaration of active and fixed hostility, with all action short of general war, and even at the risk of such war, not only against Communist aggression, but also against Chinese communism.

The other, the more qualified concept, can also split the alliance apart if it is interpreted to mean that all that has happened in China is an agrarian revolution, a surge of nationalism, joined with social and economic reform and allied to Moscow mainly because of the intransigent opposition of the United States. While the Chinese masses may well be far more interested in

何答應給他們以土地、食糧和房屋的政府，但是，漠視這些動盪、這些情緒至少在目前是被國際共產主義的力量用來從事於暴力和革命以達到反動的、侵略的和對和平有害的目的這一事實，那是不現實到危險的自欺欺人的程度了。

根據受外國的剝削和封建壓迫這一背景來了解亞洲共產主義——我們應該這樣來看它——是一回事，但這並不意味着目前我們應該把一個曾在朝鮮進行侵略而至今尚未表示對和平與民主的解決朝鮮或其他亞洲問題的辦法願意有所貢獻的政權，當作是一個願意遵守聯合國憲章的原則的國家而歡迎進入到國際社會中來。

那麼，在因我們對遠東問題看法不同而引起的即將到來的考驗面前，要使我們的聯盟保持堅強、統一，應該怎麼辦呢？

首先，西歐的國家和英聯邦成員國必須感謝美國人民在抵抗中國共產黨軍隊在朝鮮的侵略上所付出的重大犧牲，並決心在共產黨再實行侵略時，要採用任何適當的手段一勞永逸地予以擊敗。爲了這個目的，我們必須願意在聯合國之下把我們的力量同美國的力量聯合起來，以保證這種手段真正是集體的，不然，美國可能被迫在亞洲採取孤立的行動。但是，孤立正如和平一樣，是不可分割的，在西歐行動一致而在亞洲行動不一致是不可能的。

但是，如果我們要這樣地一齊努力，如果要避免孤立，我們聯盟中的其他的國家對美國亞洲政策的目標就必須要有信心，並且對實現這些目標的方法也必須要有信心。

鼓舞這種信心和使這種合作牢固而有效的政策的基礎應該是什麼呢？

我們不應和共產黨侵略妥協；但這並不意味着我們應該認定每一個反殖民的、民族主義的或者革命的運動都是蘇聯共產黨製造和指揮的；我們同樣也不應該假定，耐心和同情能使每一個亞洲共產黨領袖變成鐵托。

rice than in Marx, and may acquiesce in any government which promises them land and food and shelter, it is unrealistic to the point of dangerous self-deception to ignore the fact that these stirrings, these passions, have, for the time being at least, been harnessed to violence and revolution by the forces of international communism for purposes which are reactionary, aggressive and prejudicial to peace.

To understand the meaning of Asian communism, to place it, as we should, against the background of foreign exploitation and feudal oppression, is one thing. But it does not mean that at this time we should welcome into the international community, as a state willing to abide by the principles of the United Nations Charter, a regime which has committed aggression in Korea and has yet to show that it is willing to contribute to a peaceful and democratic solution of the Korean or other Asian problems.

What, then, should be done to keep the alliance strong and united as it faces the coming test provided by our different approaches to Far Eastern problems?

In the first place, the Western European nations and the members of the Commonwealth must appreciate that the American people have made great sacrifices in resisting aggression in Korea against Chinese Communist armies, and are determined that this Communist aggression, if repeated, must be defeated once and for all by whatever measures are adequate for the purpose. To this end, we must be willing to merge our own strength with that of the United States under the United Nations, thus ensuring that these measures are genuinely collective. Otherwise, the United States may be driven to isolated action in Asia. But isolation, like peace, is indivisible. There cannot be unity of action in Western Europe and disunity in Asia.

If, however, we are to work together in this way, and if isolation is to be avoided, the other members of the alliance must have confidence in the objectives of American policy in Asia and confidence also in the methods by which those objectives can be realized.

What should be the basis of a policy which will inspire this confidence and make this cooperation firm and effective?

We must not compromise with Communist aggression. This does not mean, however, that we should assume that every anti-colonial, nationalist or revolutionary movement is Russian Communist in origin and direction, any more than we should assume that with patience and sympathy every Asian Communist leader can be turned into a Tito.

我們必須避免基於感情而不是基於智慧，基於短時期而不是基於長遠的考慮而採取僵硬的和不能伸縮的立場。

我們必須使亞洲人民相信，民主對於個人的好處大於共產黨暴政所能希望給個人帶來的好處。我們有許多辦法可做到這點，就是通過我們自己國內建設性的政策，通過互相幫助的計劃，同時也通過消滅這種印象，即西方盟國在東方祇是和那些不能滿足正在覺醒的人民大眾要求變革的願望的政權和社會相結合。

我們在亞洲的政策必須不僅是一個祇反對共產主義的政策，它必須是建設性的政策。我們不應該祇是對反對共產主義的才給予援助。

亞洲新國家有大得足以使西方的政治家們望而生畏的問題。這些國家在文明藝術方面可能是古老的，在古代文化方面也可能是豐富的，但是作為政治的單位而言，它們則是新的國家，它們當前的問題是在幾年之內建立起一個團結的、牢固的和能使那些除痛苦與貧困外別無所知的億萬人民有良好生活的國家社會。

我們認為像印度之類的國家，對我們說來是在共產帝國主義的力量和自由民主的力量之間的殊死的鬥爭中是採取「中立主義」的。當我們對這種「中立主義」有不耐煩的傾向時，我們應該記住這一點。對那些忙於爭取自治和發展經濟的人們來說，這種鬥爭可能看來不是這麼簡單；這些人中有千百萬在饑餓的不斷威脅下生活，他們認為饑餓和奴役是比馬克思主義更壞的敵人，這是可以原諒的。

我們應該承認，新的力量——經濟的、社會的和民族的——在亞洲正在起着作用。即今在莫斯科未曾有過共產主義革命，這種力量也會以令人不安的方式爆發出來。我們不能夠逆轉這種力量，我們在西方的人忽略這些力量，會使我們遭到危險。

在共產主義已經能夠掌握這種新的力量的地方，比如在中國，我們既不應由於主觀的願望而無視這種局勢的危險，也不應用輕率 and 挑釁的政策來增加這些危險。再者，我們若使反對革命的運動——反對革命的運動在本國內可以發展，過去在中國常常這樣發生過——與外來的干涉和援助相結合，結果可能會加強而不是削弱共產黨政權。

最後，在政策的基本原則上取得一致還不够，我們還必須集體地應用這些基本原則。這祇有通過密切和繼續不斷的磋商才能做得好；磋商不能祇是

We must avoid taking up rigid and inflexible positions based on emotion rather than intelligence, on short term rather than long term considerations.

We must convince the Asian peoples that democracy can do more for the individual than Communist tyranny can ever hope to. We can do this in many ways, by constructive policies in our own countries, by plans for mutual aid, and also by removing the impression that the Western allies are, in the East, associated only with regimes and societies that do not meet the desire for change of the awakening masses.

Our policy in Asia must be more than a policy of mere opposition to communism. It must be constructive; and anti-communism should not be the only claim to our assistance.

The new Asian countries have problems of a magnitude that would stagger a Western statesman. These countries may be old in the arts of civilization and steeped in ancient culture, but as political entities they are new and are faced with the problem of building in a few years cohesive and stable national societies which will provide a good life for hundreds of millions who have known little but distress and want.

We should remember this when we tend to get impatient at what we consider to be the "neutralism" of a country like India in what is to us a desperate conflict between the forces of Communist imperialism and free democracy. The conflict may not seem so simple to people who are preoccupied with the struggle for self-government and economic progress, millions of whom live under the recurring threat of starvation and who may be pardoned for thinking that hunger and servitude are worse enemies than Marxism.

We should recognize that new forces—economic, social and national—are at work in Asia, forces that would have erupted in disturbing ways even if there had never been a Communist revolution in Moscow. We cannot reverse these forces. We in the West ignore them at our peril.

Where communism has been able to take over these new forces, as in China, we should neither blind ourselves to the dangers of the situation by wishful thinking nor increase those dangers by rash and provocative policies. Furthermore, by associating counter-revolution—which can develop indigenously, as it has so often done before in China—with foreign intervention and foreign assistance, we may strengthen rather than weaken Communist regimes.

Finally, it is not enough to agree on basic principles of policy. We must apply them collectively. This can be done effectively only if there is close and continuous consultation, which means

在緊急的氣氛中爲了要在最後的一剎那間做出決定而舉行特別會議。一方面，必須要有聰明的、穩當的、耐心的和不爲羣衆一時情感衝動所左右的領導，另一方面，必須要有忠實的和堅強的支持。

假若我們採取並執行這些政策的原則和集體行動的話，我們自由人民的大聯盟就能夠應付我們聯盟在亞洲所面臨的困難的考驗，我們將能夠在和平中，如同在戰爭中一樣，表明自由人民的合作是有一種奴隸社會絕不可能獲得的力量。

(譯自一九五三年十二月號美國「世界」雜誌)

more than *ad hoc* meetings to reach last minute decisions in an atmosphere of crisis. On the one hand there must be wise, steady and patient leadership, not swayed by every gust of popular passion, and, on the other, loyal and firm support.

If we adopt and carry out these principles of policy and collective action, our grand alliance of free peoples will be able to meet the test of the difficulties that face it in Asia. We shall be able to show in peace, as we have in war, that there is a strength in the cooperation of free men that slave societies can never achieve.

(World, December 1953)

(第十八號)

英國外交副大臣勞埃德就承認中華人民共和國及中國在聯合國代表權問題答「新聞周刊」記者問

一九五三年十二月二十一日

BRITISH MINISTER OF STATE SELWYN LLOYD'S REPLY TO CORRESPONDENT OF "NEWSWEEK" ON RECOGNITION OF PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA AND HER REPRESENTATION IN U.N.

December 21, 1953

問：中國怎麼樣？你對於某些美國高級人士的認爲中國是一個比俄國更大的長期威脅的看法意見如何？

答：我懷疑有任何人能夠估量俄國共產主義和中國共產主義的危險的比較。我所確信的一點是：不應付中央人民政府是中國的有效政府這一事實，將是一個錯誤。承認這一事實並不意味着我們贊成中國共產黨。按照英國的觀點，一個國家承認另一個國家，並不含有贊成之意。你和一個國家的關係越壞，就越需要通過正常的外交途徑來處理你們之間的事務。

由於同樣理由，我們認爲最後應當接納共產黨中國進入聯合國。在當前的爭端上，逼迫他們到國際論壇中來公開表示態度，是肯定有好處的。

英國政府對接納共產黨中國進入聯合國一事看法是，在朝鮮還僅有停戰期間，這樣作是不適當的。當和平意圖已得到若干證明，例如在朝鮮政治

How about China? What is your view of the opinion held in some high American quarters that China is a greater long-term menace than Russia?

I doubt if anyone can assess the relative dangers of Russian and Chinese Communism. What I am sure of is that it would be a mistake not to face that fact that the Central People's Government is the effective government of China. To admit that does not mean that we approve of the Chinese Communists. Recognition of one state by another, in the British view, does not mean approval. The worse your relations are with a country the more need there is for normal diplomatic channels to handle the business between you.

For the same reason we believe that eventually Communist China should be admitted to the United Nations. There is positive advantage in forcing them out into the open in the international forum on the issues of the day.

The British Government's view on the admission of Communist China to the United Nations is that it is inappropriate so long as there is only an armistice in Korea. When some evidence of peaceful intentions has been given, for example

會議上有順利的進展時，我們說這種情況就必須予以考慮了。

我們覺得必須應付這一事實，如果你把一個統治幾億亞洲人的政府永遠排斥在外，聯合國就不能是一個世界組織。簡單的說，我們並不認為承認一個政府或接納一個政府進入聯合國，是對良好品行的報酬。

如果沒有一次世界大戰，中國共產黨政府是不能用武力加以摧毀的。外國的敵視態度常常是加強一個政府對該國人民的控制的最好方法。消除中國境內的共產主義的方法，乃是讓中國人民的良知逐漸重新得勢。如果中國和世界其他國家有正常接觸，這是更可能實現的。

(譯自一九五三年十二月二十一日美國「新聞周刊」)

by successful progress in the Korean political conference, we say that the situation must be considered.

We feel that the fact must be faced that the United Nations cannot be a world organization if you exclude permanently a government ruling several hundred million Asians. To put it shortly, we do not regard recognition of a government or admission to the United Nations as a reward for good conduct.

The Communist government of China could not be destroyed by force of arms without a world war. Foreign hostility is often the best way to cement the hold of a government upon the people of its country. The way to get rid of Communism in China is for the good sense of the Chinese people gradually to reassert itself. That is more likely to happen if China has normal contacts with the rest of the world.

(*Newsweek*, December 21, 1953)

三、法國對外關係

(第一號)

皮杜爾[●]在修訂法薩條約會議上關於薩爾問題的演說

一九五三年二月十一日

LE DISCOURS DE GEORGES BIDAULT PRONONCÉ À LA CONFÉRENCE POUR LA REVISION DES CONVENTIONS FRANCO-SARROISES AU SUJET DU PROBLÈME DE LA SARRE

le 11 février 1953

經驗現在毫不含糊地表明了法國與薩爾經濟聯盟的必要性。這個聯盟成爲法國對薩爾政策的基礎。在歐洲各種機構能爲歐洲全體人民創立一個經濟體系與共同的貨幣以前，所有我們兩國的關係現在及將來都是以這個聯盟爲基礎的。這個經濟聯盟不僅遠不會排斥薩爾在政治上的自治，並還會因各國自由機構的發展而產生良好的結果。薩爾居民對這個政策的擁護使我們有義務堅持這些目標，決不因在解決一些技術問題上所發生的不可避免的困難和障礙而停止不前。

自從一九五〇年開始談判以來，在歐洲和世界範圍內已經發生了不少事件，這些事件嚴重地改變了我們前幾次會議時所展開的前景。歐洲國家爲了在經濟方面逐步實現統一而作的努力已經獲得重要的成就，特別是法國所創議的「歐洲煤鋼聯營」的建立。一俟歐洲煤鋼聯營開始發生作用，它對歐洲各國的經濟不可能不發生巨大的影響。這個對歐洲建設必不可少的工作所必然產生的後果是消除過去足以妨礙德法合作的一切障礙。也是考慮到這一點，法國政府在去年自動地提出了要給薩爾一個歐洲性質的地位。法國認爲，這種辦法既能維護目前的一切利益，又能保證薩爾的前途和安定，看來在實際上是最恰當的。當然，使我們感到遺憾的是，我們的建議至今尚未爲所有有關方面所接受。法國政府將在這方面作繼續不懈的努力，一如它在國民

L'expérience a maintenant fait apparaître sans équivoque possible la nécessité de l'union économique entre nos deux pays. Cette union reste pour la France la base de sa politique en Sarre. C'est sur elle, aussi longtemps que n'existeront pas des institutions européennes capables de donner à l'ensemble des peuples d'Europe un cadre économique et monétaire commun, que sont et demeurent fondés les rapports de nos pays. Cette union économique, bien loin d'exclure l'autonomie politique de la Sarre, trouve son corollaire dans le développement des institutions libres du pays. L'approbation donnée par la population sarroise à cette politique nous crée le devoir de persévérer dans les mêmes objectifs, sans nous laisser arrêter par les obstacles ou les difficultés que suscite inévitablement le règlement des problèmes techniques.

Depuis les négociations de 1950, bien des événements se sont en effet produits, sur le plan européen et mondial, qui ont sérieusement modifié la perspective dans laquelle s'étaient déroulées nos précédentes conversations. Les efforts déployés par les nations européennes pour réaliser progressivement leur unité sur le plan économique ont, d'ores et déjà, abouti à des résultats importants, notamment par la constitution de la C.E.C.A. dont la France a été l'initiatrice et qui, à mesure qu'elle sera mise en œuvre, ne saurait manquer de produire de vastes conséquences sur l'économie des divers pays européens. Cette œuvre indispensable à la construction de l'Europe doit avoir corollaire l'élimination de tous les obstacles qui ont pu dans le passé nuire à la coopération de la France et de l'Allemagne. Aussi bien est-ce dans ce souci que le gouvernement français a, l'an dernier, spontanément proposé de donner à la Sarre un statut

● 法國外交部長。

議會中努力使人瞭解政府的意圖是要達到確定薩爾的歐洲性質的地位；而確定薩爾的歐洲性質的地位是批准巴黎和波恩協定的先決條件。法國政府也強烈地希望上述地位能許以薩爾勃魯根為歐洲領導機構的所在地。選擇你們的首都是曾經被提議過的。

(譯自一九五三年二月十一日法國「世界報」)

européen. Une telle formule lui paraissait en effet la plus propre, en sauvegardant tous les intérêts en présence, à assurer l'avenir et la stabilité de votre pays. Nous regrettons, certes, que nos propositions n'aient pu jusqu'ici aboutir à l'accord de toutes les parties intéressées. Le gouvernement français ne s'en attachera pas moins à poursuivre à l'avenir ses efforts dans ce sens, ainsi qu'il s'y est d'ailleurs engagé devant l'Assemblée nationale lorsqu'il a fait connaître son intention de parvenir à la définition d'un statut européen de la Sarre, condition préalable à l'approbation des accords de Bonn et de Paris. Il espère aussi vivement que ce statut permettra de désigner Sarrebruck comme siège des organismes directeurs de l'Europe pour lesquels le choix de votre capitale avait été proposé.

(Le Monde, 11 février 1953)

(第二號)

戴高樂對新聞記者發表的關於反對歐洲軍的聲明

一九五三年二月二十五日

LA DÉCLARATION FAITE PAR LE GÉNÉRAL DE GAULLE À LA CONFÉRENCE DE PRESSE CONTRE L'ARMÉE EUROPÉENNE

le 25 février 1953

今天在一提到法國國防時，便有一種相當離奇的氣氛和無法形容的憂慮籠罩着我們的國家。法國目前處境的特點是民族極為消沉，國家地位極不穩定。正是在這個時候，有一幫人就促使法國政府接受所謂「歐洲軍」。在這種情況下，由於民族的本能，我們察覺到國家主權是被放棄了，而這種放棄可能是確定不可改變的。這一幫人把他們所進行的工作的實質隱蔽到今天，但為使輿論廣泛地加以接受，他們使用了一切官方的和半官方的宣傳，利用了金錢和外國的支援，利用了自暴自棄的心理、幻想和無知，仍企圖使法國人淪為一個在軍事上和政治上一任外國支配的工具。在目前的國際情況下，這就使法國民族的整個存在發生了危險。這種危險到了這樣的程度，使法蘭西聯邦可能遭到致命的創傷，並妨礙了一個真正的歐洲統一的產生。

Quelle atmosphère étrange, quel malaise indéfinissable, pèsent aujourd'hui sur notre pays dès qu'on évoque sa défense! C'est que, dans la situation où se trouve actuellement la France, et qui est caractérisée par une profonde dépression nationale et par l'inconsistance extrême de l'Etat, une certaine équipe est à l'œuvre pour faire admettre aux pouvoirs publics ce qu'elle appelle l'armée européenne, et où l'instinct nationale aperçoit un renoncement qui pourrait être définitif. Ayant su jusqu'à présent cacher en quoi consistait réellement son ouvrage, mais utilisant pour obtenir l'acceptation diffuse de l'opinion tous les concours de la propagande officielle et officieuse, de celle aussi de l'argent, de celle encore de l'étranger, exploitant l'esprit d'abandon, l'illusion et l'ignorance, cette équipe poursuit une entreprise qui aurait pour aboutissement de réduire le peuple français à l'état d'un instrument militairement et politiquement soumis à la discrétion des autres. Cela, dans une conjoncture internationale où toute la substance de ce peuple est en jeu. Cela, dans des conditions telles que l'Union française recevrait une blessure qui pourrait être mortelle, et que serait empêchée de naître une véritable unité européenne.

爲了很好地衡量這個計劃的所謂的「價值」，我們肯定地說，這個計劃所倚靠的四點基礎沒有一點是和事實相符的。首先，他們說應建立歐洲軍，然而他們所提出的軍隊絕對不是歐洲軍。他們又說：應該保證使法國能獲得美國的强大援助而又不損害法國的獨立，然而條約規定要我們服從美國的戰略，而對保衛法國則毫無保證。他們又說：六國應建立足能負起共同防務，特別是法國防務責任的超國家機構，然而以這些機構的性質和組織來說，它們本身絕對够不上負起此項防務的責任。最後他們說：問題在於阻止德國重建它的軍事力量。然而且不說對於這位要與之聯合的夥伴尚且表示這麼公然的懷疑——僅這一點就足以證明這種聯合已是多麼的荒謬，還說所謂歐洲軍條約能够武裝德國人而不致把德國武裝起來，那更是絕對的荒謬。恰恰相反，十分清楚的是：這個條約與美國現行政策配合的結果，會直接促成德國在歐洲的政治和軍事的霸權。

我剛剛說過，把這個軍隊稱爲「歐洲」軍，實在是一個騙人的名稱。要建立歐洲軍，即歐洲的軍隊，就必須首先使歐洲在政治、經濟、財政、行政上，尤其在道德上結成一個整體；而且，這個整體必須具有足够的活力，必須是已經確立並被人所承認，俾能得到它的人民的天生的忠誠擁護和執行它自己的政策，以便於危急情況發生時，就有千百萬人願爲它而効死。試問現在是這個情況嗎？沒有一個認真的人敢回答說：「是」……

美國的一個戰略工具

即使把歐洲設想爲一個國家或一個民族，若要建立歐洲軍，就必須歐洲本身能支配自己的軍隊。然而條約所要建立的所謂歐洲軍，却是在組織上自動地、單獨地交給了北大西洋軍總司令指揮。這就是說，如果不是玩弄字眼的話，那就是交給美國駐歐洲的總司令指揮，這事實上就是成爲美國戰略工具之一了。

若要建立歐洲軍，即歐洲的軍隊，歐洲本身應保證它的軍隊擁有海空軍支援、對外交通、溝通海外屬地的交通綫、給養與裝備的資源。這是歐洲軍要能自己行動所必須具備的條件，否則在我們這個時代中，這支軍隊祇能直接依賴於擁有上述一切條

Pour bien mesurer quelle est, si l'on peut dire, la "valeur" du projet, constatons qu'il repose sur quatre affirmations dont aucune n'est conforme à la vérité. On dit d'abord: il s'agit de faire une armée européenne. Or l'armée que l'on propose ne l'est absolument pas. On dit aussi: il s'agit d'assurer à la France un puissant concours américain sans compromettre son indépendance. Or le traité nous subordonne à la stratégie américaine sans nous garantir aucunement que la France serait défendue. On dit encore: il s'agit pour les Six, d'établir des institutions supranationales qui puissent répondre de la défense commune, en particulier de la nôtre. Or ces institutions seraient, de par leur nature et de par leur organisation, absolument hors d'état d'assurer par elles-mêmes cette défense. On dit enfin: il s'agit d'empêcher l'Allemagne de rebâtir sa puissance militaire. Or, outre que cette méfiance affichée à l'égard d'un partenaire avec lequel on prétend se fonder démontre à elle seule l'absurdité de la fusion, il est absolument faux que le traité d'armée soi-disant européenne doive réarmer les Allemands sans réarmer en même temps l'Allemagne. Il est par contre très clair que ce traité, combiné avec l'actuelle politique américaine, mène directement à l'hégémonie militaire et politique du Reich en Europe.

Je viens de dire que le nom donné l'armée dite "européenne" est un titre fallacieux. Pour qu'il y ait l'armée européenne, c'est-à-dire l'armée de l'Europe, il faut d'abord que l'Europe existe en tant qu'entité politique, économique, financière, administrative et, par-dessus tout, morale; que cette entité soit assez vivante, établie, reconnue, pour obtenir le loyalisme congénital de ses sujets, pour avoir une politique qui lui soit propre et pour que, le cas échéant, des millions d'hommes veuillent mourir pour elle. Est-ce le cas? Pas un homme sérieux n'oserait répondre: oui...

Un des instruments de la stratégie américaine

Mais à supposer même que l'Europe existât comme Etat et comme nation il faudrait, pour qu'il y ait l'armée européenne, que l'Europe disposât de son armée. Or, cette armée dite "européenne" que le traité prétend bâtir, il la remet pour l'emploi, organiquement, automatiquement, uniquement, au commandant en chef atlantique, c'est-à-dire, pour peu qu'on veuille bien ne pas jouer sur les mots, au commandant en chef américain en Europe, ce qui en fait l'un des instruments d'une stratégie américaine.

Pour qu'il y ait l'armée européenne, l'armée de l'Europe, il faut encore que l'Europe assure elle-même à son armée les appuis navals et aériens, les communications extérieures, les prolongements outre-mer, les sources de ravitaillement, d'équipement, qui lui sont nécessaires pour agir par elle-même et sans lesquels, à notre époque, cette armée

件的外國。然而，歐洲軍條約的安排，恰恰是要建立並宣佈這樣一種依賴性。所謂歐洲軍，實際上並不包括任何重型兵艦、任何遠距離的飛機、任何海外領土；至於供給歐洲軍的武器，其製造和分配也須按照美國總司令的計劃進行。

簡而言之，歐洲軍條約企圖在「歐洲軍」的名稱下建立的軍事工具根本沒有使用這個名義的權利。在政治上，這只是為國家主權的喪失作掩飾。在軍事上，這只是由某些國家替美國戰略提供兵員。在道義上，這只是給議員們的良心一個金蟬脫殼之計，以便他們能批准條約。這也是一種模糊人們視聽並使人聊以自慰的假話，使被麻痺了的輿論接受。在今天等於屈辱，在明天等於災難的一種東西，就像過去的馬奇諾防綫、洛迦諾公約、慕尼黑協定以及拿貝當元帥作盾牌那樣。

似乎我有必要指出歐洲軍條約是怎樣把在任何時期、在任何情況下、任何國家，任何政府所從未授予任何將軍的有關法國命運的類似於自由決定的權力交給北大西洋軍總司令的。實際上這是最主要的一點，但在研究條約時，人們常常把它忽略了。

當戰爭發生時，在事態的演變中，這種辦法就瞞不過人了。那時，法國政府將發現它完全不能過問法國本身的防務了。

對外國戰略的依賴

比方說，假如總司令由於他的錯誤或無能，把他的軍隊，包括法軍在內，帶入災難，以致法國一蹶不振，他對法國將不負任何責任。法國任何一個政權都沒有任何辦法，也沒有任何權利在還來得及的時候把他撤換，更談不到對他的過失給予處分；甚至連把我們的軍隊從他手中抽出來也不可能。假使總司令為了祇有他自己知道的理由決定法國全部或一部分地方連法國自己的兵都不准防守，那麼就祇能不防守了。我認為上述可能發生的事情決不是想入非非的，而且還祇會在法國發生。事實上，參加所謂「歐洲」軍的各成員國中，荷蘭和比利時的軍隊基本上屬於北部戰場，在那裏，它們的兵士在英國人的指揮下可以直接捍衛自己的國家。另一方面，意大利的軍隊屬於地中海戰場，那裏，意大利的軍隊也可以很好地防衛着意大利。然而中部戰

ne peut être que sous la dépendance directe d'une puissance étrangère disposant, elle, de tout cela. Or le traité combine les choses de telle sorte que, précisément, cette dépendance s'impose et même qu'elle soit proclamée. L'armée dite européenne ne doit englober en effet aucun navire important, aucun avion à grand rayon d'action, aucun territoire d'outre-mer, et les armées qui lui sont fournies, fabriquées, affectées, qu'en conformité du plan du commandant en chef américain.

Bref, l'instrument militaire que le traité prétend constituer sous le nom d'armée européenne n'a aucun droit à ce nom-là. Politiquement il ne s'agit que du camouflage de l'abdication nationale. Militairement il ne s'agit que de contingents fournis par certains pays à la stratégie américaine. Moralement il ne s'agit que d'un alibi offert à la conscience des parlementaires pour obtenir qu'ils ratifient le traité et d'une espèce de fiction confuse et rassurante destinée à faire accepter par l'opinion chloroformée ce qui équivaut aujourd'hui à un abaissement et, demain, à un désastre, comme on le fit naguère pour la ligne Maginot, Locarno, Munich, le bouclier du maréchal.

Il me paraît nécessaire de préciser comment le traité attribue au commandant en chef atlantique, en ce qui concerne le destin de la France, des droits quasi discrétionnaires tels en tout cas qu'à aucune époque, dans aucun pays, aucun gouvernement n'en a jamais concédé à aucun de ses généraux. C'est là en effet un point essentiel et que souvent, dans l'étude du traité, on paraît mal discerner.

En temps de guerre, dans le drame des événements, il n'y aurait pas d'astuces qui tiennent, et le gouvernement français se trouverait totalement exclu de la défense de la France.

Sous la dépendance d'une stratégie étrangère

Supposons par exemple que par erreur ou incapacité le commandant en chef mène ses forces, y compris celles de la France, à un désastre où la France succombe: il ne porterait devant la France aucune responsabilité. Aucun pouvoir français n'aurait le moyen, ni même le droit, de le remplacer par un autre quand il en serait encore temps, a fortiori de sanctionner sa faute, ne fût-ce qu'en lui retirant nos troupes. Supposons que pour des raisons qui n'appartiennent qu'à lui-même le commandant en chef décide que la France, en tout ou en partie, ne sera pas défendue, même par les soldats de la France: eh bien! elle ne le sera pas. J'observe qu'une telle éventualité n'a rien d'in vraisemblable et ne risquerait d'ailleurs de se produire que pour la France seulement. En effet parmi les Etats participant à l'armée dite "européenne" les forces de la Hollande et de la Belgique appartiennent essentiellement au théâtre d'opérations du Nord, ou, sous les ordres d'un

場主要將是由德國和法國提供軍隊，再加上若干美軍，所有軍隊直接由美國總司令指揮。戰事顯然將在德國進行。如果戰事不利，有一切理由可以相信總司令將把他的部隊，包括法國部隊在內，儘速撤退到外圍地帶，即英國、西班牙、意大利、北非等地。這樣，法國就不被保衛了，而法國政府對此將毫無辦法。

我祈求每個法國人來衡量一下上述國家主權的喪失所達到的程度。把我們在北大西洋條約名義下已經毫無真實代價交出來的一切，加上別人企圖要我們在所謂歐洲軍名義下交出來的一切，結果就使我們祇能聽任外國戰略的擺佈了；而上述戰略有可能隨時與我們敵對的利益發生矛盾。在任何時候，特別是在現時，誰能對於一個聯合組織的內部經常存在着的矛盾熟視無睹呢？美國對和平、戰爭、歐洲、亞洲和非洲的事務的觀點（這些都是時常在變的）可能會和我們大不相同，並會使我們所有的一切和所代表的一切發生問題，誰又能對此熟視無睹呢？這是很自然的。美國總是美國。誰能責備它呢？但是爲什麼法國不能是法國呢？

如果在上次大戰期間……

如果在上次大戰期間，從一九四〇年到一九四五年，法國的戰鬥和解放政府也曾屈從於類似的制度，如果在它所參加的聯盟中，它竟沒有保有最後支配法國軍隊的權利和手段，如果它不能使用自己的軍隊以堅持最低限度的立場，那麼，柯尼格就不能守住皮爾—哈根，許溫就不可能在意大利發生衆所週知的作用，勒克萊克就不會克復費贊，也不會在需要時進軍巴黎，塔西尼就不可能保衛阿爾薩斯省，也不可能越過萊茵河和多瑙河，拉爾米那就不可能殲滅大西洋的袋形地帶，道伊揚就不可能守住湯特和勃里厄兩鎮，遠征軍也永不可能向印度支那出發。以上所述不過是一些軍事上的插話，我還沒有講到當時我們和聯軍間在政治上所發生的許多重大困難，而我們所以能克服這些困難，全靠我們始終保持了一些雖然是很微薄的但是終究是自己的

Britannique, leurs soldats défendraient directement leurs pays. D'autre part l'Italie appartient au théâtre de la Méditerranée, où les divisions italiennes défendraient tout bonnement l'Italie. Mais sur le théâtre du Centre il y aurait essentiellement les forces fournies par l'Allemagne, les forces fournies par la France et quelques forces américaines, le tout sous les ordres directs du commandant en chef américain. La bataille serait évidemment livrée en Allemagne. Si elle était malheureuse, il y a toutes raisons de croire que le commandant en chef replierait le plus vite possible ses unités, y compris les unités françaises, sur les zones périphériques: Angleterre, Espagne, Italie, Afrique du Nord. La France ne serait pas défendue, et le gouvernement français n'y pourrait absolument rien.

J'adjure chaque Français de mesurer le degré de cette abdication. La combinaison de tout ce que nous avons déjà livré sans contrepartie réelle au titre du traité de l'Atlantique nord avec tout ce qu'on tâche de nous faire livrer au titre de l'armée dite européenne, nous met à la discrétion d'une stratégie étrangère. Mais celle-ci peut à tout moment se trouver en contradiction avec nos intérêts rivaux. Qui donc ignore qu'en tout temps, et surtout par le temps qui court, une coalition comporte forcément dans son sein de constantes oppositions? Qui donc ignore que les conceptions américaines — d'ailleurs changeantes — quant à la paix, à la guerre, aux affaires européennes, asiatiques, africaines, peuvent différer profondément des nôtres et mettre en question tout ce que nous avons et tout ce que nous sommes? Cela est tout naturel. L'Amérique est l'Amérique. On ne saurait l'en blâmer. Mais pourquoi la France ne serait-elle pas la France?

Si pendant le dernier conflit

Si pendant le dernier conflit, de 1940 à 1945, le gouvernement français de la guerre et de la libération s'était plié à un pareil régime; si, dans la coalition dont il faisait partie, il n'avait pas gardé le droit et le moyen de disposer des troupes françaises en dernier ressort et ne s'en était pas servi pour imposer l'indispensable, Koenig n'aurait pas été à Bir-Hakeim, Juin n'aurait pas joué en Italie le rôle que l'on sait, Leclerc n'aurait pas pris le Fezzan et n'aurait pas été lancé quand il le fallait sur Paris, de Lattre n'aurait pas défendu l'Alsace ni passé le Rhin et le Danube, Larminat n'aurait pas réduit les poches de l'Atlantique, Doyen ne se serait pas assuré de Tende et de La Brigue, le corps expéditionnaire ne serait jamais parti pour l'Indochine. Encore ne cite-je là que des épisodes militaires sans évoquer les multiples et grosses difficultés politiques survenues entre nos alliés et nous, et que nous n'avons surmontées que parce que nos

力量。我們知道假使不是這樣，法國在解放時所建立的政府必定是一個不折不扣的「佔領區盟國軍政府」，換句話說就是一個外國政府……

的確，在所謂「歐洲」軍和它的美國統帥之間條約規定有稱為防務集團的「機構」的這些東西。條約第二章在這方面提出了一個建議的輪廓；根據這些建議應該人為地建立起一個技術專政機構，這個機構既沒有任何基礎，又沒有任何信用，也沒有任何責任。……

條約規定一個常務委員會，委員由六國政府任命，這些委員根據條約立刻有義務變為無國籍的人，並有權控制任命他們而却無權撤換他們的政府。稱之為技術專政機構，難道不是十分恰當嗎？此外還有一個沒有實權的大會，每年祇開會一個月，而其主要作用只是給那班忠誠的議員們幾個領厚俸的職位而已。此外，還有一個由六國外長組成的理事會，它只能在一致同意下才能作出重要的決議；這樣它就不可能作出任何決議，或許它根本沒有什麼東西要作決定。根據條約，這六個部長本人也是一樣，有義務在他們共同開會之際忘掉自己的國家。因此，例如代表法國政府的部長在防務集團開會的地方如薩爾勃魯根、盧森堡或梵蒂岡就變成無國籍人，而一進入聖·多明尼加路[●]時又恢復為法國人了。最後還有一個法庭，它應該駕乎一切法律、風俗、宗教和家庭之上來宣佈法律。但這是什麼法律呢？用誰的名義來宣佈呢？

總之，很明顯，這樣的機構是任意設置的，它並無任何羣衆基礎，沒有信用，沒有根據，在總司令面前是無足輕重的，而這個總司令指揮戰爭却受到一個政府的全力支持，這個政府就是一個最強大的和最具有國家性質的政府，即美國政府。的確，在此時期，這個機構將逐漸走入歧途，將設置無數職位，建立一套開支浩大和完全多餘的機構，而某些人將從中得到他們所盤算的東西。

走向建立德國的霸權

至於說到軍事工具，根據條約第三章，應該建立所謂「歐洲軍」，我們很容易預見到實際上將會產生怎樣的結果。

● 在巴黎，為法國國防部所在的街名。

propres moyens, si réduits fussent-ils alors, continueraient de nous appartenir. Sait-on que s'il en avait été autrement le gouvernement qui serait établi en France à la libération aurait été ni plus ni moins l'A.M.G.O.T., c'est-à-dire un gouvernement étranger. . . .

Il est vrai qu'entre l'armée qualifiée d'"européenne" et son chef américain le traité semble interposer ce qu'il appelle les "institutions" de la Communauté. Le titre II expose à cet égard un magma de dispositions au sortir desquelles doit être artificiellement créé une technocratie qui, n'ayant ni base, ni crédit, ni responsabilités. . . .

Il y a le commissariat, formé de commissaires nommés par les six gouvernements et qui aussitôt ont de par le traité l'obligation de devenir apatrides et le droit de contrôler ceux-là mêmes qui les ont nommés et qui n'ont plus le droit de les révoquer. N'est-ce pas là très exactement ce qu'on appelle une technocratie? Il y a ensuite l'Assemblée, dépourvue de pouvoirs réels et qui ne siège qu'un mois par an, mais dont le rôle essentiel est d'offrir des fauteuils propitiatoires à des parlementaires dévoués. Il y a encore le conseil, formé de six ministres appartenant aux six Etats et dont toute décision importante doit être prise à l'unanimité, ce qui revient à faire en sorte qu'ils n'en prennent jamais aucune, sauf peut-être celle de ne rien décider. Ces six ministres, eux aussi, ont en vertu du traité le devoir d'oublier leur pays dès lors qu'ils siègent ensemble. C'est ainsi par exemple que le ministre délégué par le gouvernement français deviendra apatride là où siègera la Communauté: à Sarrebruck, à Luxembourg ou au Vatican, et sera censé redevenir patriote en rentrant Rue Saint-Dominique. Il y a enfin la Cour, qui devra dire le droit par-dessus les lois, les mœurs, les autels et les foyers. Mais quel droit? Au nom de qui?

Au total il est évident que de pareilles institutions, édifiées dans l'arbitraire, sans aucune base populaire, sans crédit, sans justification, ne pèseront pas lourd en face du commandement en chef, qui mènera les batailles et que soutiendra de tout son poids un gouvernement demeuré, lui, plus fort et plus national que jamais: le gouvernement américain. Il est vrai qu'en attendant on aura donné le change, créé d'innombrables emplois, monté une machinerie coûteuse et superfétatoire où certains trouveront leur compte.

Vers l'hégémonie allemande

Quant à l'instrument militaire qui, au sortir du titre III, doit constituer l'armée dite "européenne", il est aisé de prévoir à quoi il va pratiquement aboutir.

我再說一遍，如照條約規定把法國成分和德國成分混在一起時，德國成分總是居於上風的。我們所有的海外領土以及這些領土上的一切軍事資源均不屬於歐洲軍。但是，因為我們必須保護它們，並且我們應該貢獻出由法國本土調來的人員和軍隊，因為我們必須保持海軍，因為我們正進行着印度支那戰爭，因為在未來的十五年中德國達到服役年齡的青年人數將要比法國多三分之一強，因此我們將不可能向所謂「歐洲軍」提供和西德相等的人力。如果德國在條約所規定的五十年的期限到期以前有一天獲得統一，這將如何呢？在歐洲建立儘量多的師既有它的用途，美國又急欲儘量撤回其軍隊，從今天起，寫在紙上的所有限制將不能發生任何價值。簡而言之，短期內「歐洲軍」中主要的兵衆將是德國人了。

必須補充指出，歐洲軍的德國成分將由一個與蘇聯直接接觸的德國所提供；而德國是具有有一個巨大的民族野心，即要收復普魯士、薩克森，並且毫無疑問地還有許多其他野心。這種「遏制」認定的敵人的傾向和美國的傾向湊合得如此巧妙，以致於美國必然要使德國成分在美國控制下的混合組織內部不斷發展並由美國任意武裝。

我們清楚地了解爲什麼在六國中德國總理最熱中於所謂「歐洲軍」。原來德國不僅可以從中獲得平等的權利，而且還有獲得德國軍事霸權的可能。這種霸權的遠景是使德國終有一天驅使西方國家進行一次二十世紀的十字軍戰爭。德國代表團今天在羅馬所採取的態度和語調對於將來的事情已經說得很清楚了。我沒有責備德國總理的意思。他利用別人目前不一致的看法和不耐煩的情緒，來玩他認爲是對他的國家最有利的把戲。而且我極端相信法德和解的必要性，因此不願無端地對我們東方各鄰國說些冒犯它們的話。但是歷史上的若干回憶，加上歐洲所從來沒有過的重大事變中積累起來的經驗，使我想到並使我說，確實有必要讓德國加入到西方國家中來。對於這一點我親自宣佈過也提供過各種方法，當時砲聲幾乎剛剛從第三帝國的廢墟上沉寂下來，同時法國也僅僅開始清除自己所受到的破壞。但是從歐洲的利益出發，我認爲即使從德國人民的

Je répète que dans le mélange de l'élément français et de l'élément allemand, tel que le prévoit le traité, c'est l'élément allemand qui forcément prendra le dessus. En effet tous nos territoires d'outre-mer avec les ressources militaires qu'ils comportent sont exclus de l'armée européenne. Mais, comme il nous faudra les défendre et que nous devons leur consacrer des cadres et des troupes venus de la métropole, comme nous devons conserver une marine, comme nous menons la guerre d'Indochine, comme pendant les prochaines quinze années les jeunes classes allemandes seront d'un bon tiers plus nombreuses que les nôtres, nous n'aurons pas la possibilité de livrer à l'armée dite "européenne" les mêmes moyens humains que l'Allemagne occidentale. Que serait-ce si le Reich refaisait un jour son unité avant l'expiration des cinquante ans que doit durer le traité? Dès aujourd'hui les limitations qu'on écrit sur le papier ne sauraient rien valoir devant l'utilité de mettre sur pied en Europe le plus possible d'unités et devant la hâte montrée par les Etats-Unis de ramener chez eux au plus tôt le plus possible de leurs soldats. Bref, dans l'armée dite "européenne" la masse principale sera allemande à bref délai.

Il faut ajouter que l'élément allemand sera fourni par une Allemagne au contact direct des Soviets et possédée d'une grande ambition nationale, celle de recouvrer la Prusse, la Saxe et, sans doute ensuite, bien autre chose. Ces tendances au "refoulement" de l'adversaire désigné coïncident trop bien avec celles qui emportent l'Amérique pour que celle-ci s'abstienne de pousser au développement de l'élément allemand à l'intérieur d'un mélange placé sous sa coupe et qu'elle armerait à son gré.

On comprend bien pourquoi parmi les Six c'est le chancelier du Reich qui tient le plus à l'armée dite "européenne". Il en tire en effet non seulement l'égalité des droits, mais encore la probabilité de l'hégémonie militaire allemande, laquelle ouvre la perspective d'un Reich menant un jour l'Occident à la croisade du XXe siècle. Déjà l'attitude et le ton que prend aujourd'hui même à Rome une délégation allemande en disent assez long sur ce que sera la suite. Je n'aurai garde d'en blâmer le chancelier. Il joue ce qu'il croit être le meilleur jeu pour son pays en profitant de l'inconsistance actuelle des vues et des impatiences des autres. D'ailleurs je suis trop convaincu de la nécessité d'une entente franco-allemande pour tenir à l'égard de nos voisins de l'Est des propos qui seraient gratuitement désobligeants. Mais quelques réflexions sur l'histoire, jointes à une expérience accumulée au cours du plus grand drame qu'ait jamais vécu l'Ancien Monde, me font penser et me font dire ceci: il faut certes faire le nécessaire pour que l'Allemagne soit

利益出發，一切和德國發生關係的人民的命運不應該取決於德國的衝動，而這種衝動常常是無止境的。

假使德國成為六國的歐洲的領導者、鼓舞者和表率，而六國中的法國却是頹喪不振的並和法蘭西聯邦脫離，那麼德國將會有一天再次擇取重大冒險的道路，這似乎是無庸置疑的了。當德國開始行動的時候，它的方向可能會首先指向東方。它也可能指向西方，如果我們考慮到克里姆林轉變的能力和德國未來的領導者的心目中有一天會產生的想法的話。無論按照哪個假定，一個偏促於本土並連自己的軍隊都不能支配的法國，祇能是一個玩具而已。總之，人們可以懷疑到「歐洲軍就是和平」這一口號會事先就寫在歷史的謊言欄裏。

不，這個條約是不能，也不應該為法國人所接受。我可以肯定地說，很多法國人，和我一樣，絕不承認任何人——我清楚地說：任何一個人——有權把法國人民置於外國的支配下而國家不能過問。法國目前的政府並不是為履行上述一切而被選舉出來，被人接受和被人服從的。為了組織對付蘇聯威脅的歐洲防務，並使這種防務具有它所應該有的內容，就是說成為整個自由世界防務的一部分，就要做些別的事情。這就應該由法國來表示意志和說話了。但是首先法國應該站起來！

聯盟而不是合併

蘇聯的威脅促使歐洲自由的人民共同組織他們的防務。這個防務必須與整個自由世界的防務聯系起來，而不應把它用隔牆隔離開。這些戰略上的必要性聯系着——因為這是一切所繫——使歐洲走向統一的一切理由。

但是，我們應該以聯盟來代替一個不可忍受和不切合實際的合併。為了追求渺茫的幻想，我們已經浪費了多少年月。讓我們從進行歐洲自由國家的聯盟開始吧。把這種聯盟組織起來。必須有一個領導，那就是一個有組織的和定期開會的集合各國政府領袖的理事會。此外還須有一個工作和執行的機

incorporée à l'Occident. Je l'ai moi-même proclamé et j'en ai offert les moyens alors que le canon venait à peine de se taire sur les ruines du IIIe Reich et que la France commençait seulement à déblayer les siennes. Mais dans l'intérêt de l'Europe et même, je le crois, dans l'intérêt du peuple allemand, il ne faut pas que l'Allemagne soit mise à même de faire dépendre de ses impulsions, trop souvent démesurées, le sort des peuples qui lui sont associés.

Que le Reich, devenu le guide, l'animateur, le modèle, d'une Europe réduite aux Six, parmi lesquels une France déprimée, dégoûtée et séparée de l'Union française, doit prendre un jour, encore une fois, la route des grandes aventures, cela ne semble pas douteux. Peut-être sera-ce vers l'Est qu'alors l'Allemagne dirigera d'abord sa marche. Peut-être sera-ce vers l'Ouest, si l'on tient compte des capacités de retournement du Kremlin et de ce qui peut se passer un jour ou l'autre dans l'esprit des futurs dirigeants du Reich. Dans l'une et l'autre hypothèse la France, réduite à sa métropole et ne disposant même pas de ses enfants sous les armes, ne serait plus qu'un jouet. En tout cas on peut redouter que le slogan "L'armée européenne c'est la paix" ne soit à inscrire d'avance au tableau de l'histoire dans la colonne des mensonges.

Non, ce traité ne peut, ne doit pas être accepté par le peuple français. Beaucoup de Français, j'en suis sûr, comme moi-même, ne reconnaissent à personne, je dis bien à personne, le droit de les subordonner, de les livrer à l'étranger sans aucun recours national. Ce n'est pas pour faire cela que les actuels pouvoirs publics sont élus, acceptés, subis. Pour organiser la défense de l'Europe face à la menace soviétique, faire de cette défense ce qu'elle doit être, c'est-à-dire une part de la défense du monde libre tout entier, il y a autre chose à faire. C'est à la France qu'il appartient de le vouloir et de le dire. Mais d'abord qu'elle se mette debout!

Confédération et non fusion

La menace soviétique impose aux peuples libres de l'Europe d'organiser en commun leur défense. Cette défense, il faut qu'elle se conjugue avec celle du monde libre tout entier et non pas qu'elle en soit séparée par des cloisonnements. Ces nécessités stratégiques rejoignent — car tout se tient — toutes les raisons qu'à l'Europe de marcher vers l'unité. . . .

Mais, au lieu d'une fusion intolérable et impraticable, pratiquons l'association. En poursuivant des chimères on a déjà perdu des années. Commençons par faire l'alliance des Etats libres de l'Europe. Cette alliance, organisons-la. Il y faut une direction: ce sera le conseil des chefs de gouvernements réunis d'une manière organique et périodique. A cette direction il faut un instru-

構，如聯合參謀部，如果有人願意設立委員會也可以，但這個委員會不得自命為主權者。此外應確定計劃，供給資源，分配指揮權。再就是統一所有的後勤，如：地面建築、交通、給養、武器製造等等。

每一國家帶着它所有的一切資源和所屬的領土一起加入聯盟。大家同意當他們中間某一個國家受到攻擊時，大家即出兵還擊。大家也承允在理事會的同意下，對未來的敵人進行戰爭。最後，歐洲聯盟爲了歐洲的防務而和其他大國特別和美國進行合作，就由理事會來安排。

我不明白爲什麼英國拒絕參加這樣組成的聯盟並在聯盟中起一個顯然是十分重大的作用。如果事情能這樣進行而且與美國締結了條約，我認爲才有必要把西德介紹到歐洲聯盟中來。而且，不僅僅是法國本土而是整個法蘭西聯邦和它的一切資源加入到這個聯盟中去才能保證聯盟內部的平衡。的確，這意味着在我們一方面必須做好法蘭西聯邦的工作。

在上述聯盟的基礎上，必須建立一個邦聯，就是說建立一個共同的組織。各國在不失去其本來軀體、靈魂、面目的情況下，把戰略、經濟和文化方面的一部分主權委託給這個組織。

但必須給這個邦聯一個有羣衆擁護和民主的基礎；它是由人民建立的。並且還應該向人民要求這樣做。第一階段應該是在有關各國內同時組織一個廣泛的公民投票，而且從這個廣泛的公民投票中將要產生一個巨大的力量，來支持那些擁護歐洲集團並願對於鐵幕那邊的所有極權國家採取堅強肯定的立場的人們。

我的主張是：邦聯的機構應包括各國內閣總理組成的理事會和一個普選出來的大會，以及一個代表各參與國家區域的、經濟的、文化的、道義的真實情況的人組成的大會。最後還有一個法庭，法庭中終身職的法官應從法官中選任之。

這樣才使歐洲各國的人民生活在經常的和有組織的合作中。容待時間和事情的發展來促成其他的事業。我深信歐洲人民會進行這個事業的。因爲除非發生不測之禍，歐洲是會走向統一，這樣，它就是朝着歷史的方向前進。

(詳自一九五三年二月二十七日法國「世界報」)

ment de travail et d'exécution: ce sera l'état-major combiné, si l'on veut le commissariat, mais un commissariat qui n'aura pas le front de se proclamer souverain. Ainsi seront arrêtés les plans, fournis les moyens, répartis les commandements. Ainsi seront fusionnés tous les services qui doivent l'être: infrastructure, communications, ravitaillement, fabrications d'armements, etc., etc.

Chacun entre dans l'alliance avec tous les moyens dont il dispose et tous les territoires dont il a la charge. L'engagement est pris par tous de se tenir pour attaqués si l'un d'eux est attaqué. Chacun s'engage également à n'entamer d'hostilités contre l'éventuel adversaire que si le conseil est d'accord. Enfin la coopération de l'alliance européenne avec d'autres puissances, notamment avec l'Amérique, pour la défense de l'Europe est réglée par le conseil.

Je ne vois pas pourquoi la Grande-Bretagne refuserait de faire partie d'une coalition ainsi comprise et où elle jouerait évidemment un rôle très considérable. Cela étant, et dès lors que subsiste le pacte avec l'Amérique, je tiens pour nécessaire que l'Allemagne de l'Ouest soit introduite dans l'alliance européenne. D'ailleurs le fait que c'est l'Union française tout entière avec tous ses moyens, et non pas la seule métropole qui en ferait partie, assurerait l'équilibre interne de l'alliance. Il est vrai que cela implique que de notre côté on fasse l'Union française elle-même.

Sur la base de cette alliance il faut bâtir une confédération, c'est-à-dire un organisme commun auquel les divers Etats, sans perdre leur corps, leur âme, leur figure, délèguent une part de leur souveraineté en matière stratégique, économique, culturelle.

Mais à cette confédération on doit donner une base populaire et démocratique. Ce sont les peuples qui ont à la créer. Encore faut-il leur demander. La première étape doit être un vaste référendum organisé simultanément dans tous les pays intéressés. Il y aura là au surplus une grande force pour appuyer ceux qui veulent la communauté et une affirmation puissante vis-à-vis des Etats totalitaires au delà du rideau de fer.

Mon opinion est que les institutions confédérales doivent comporter le conseil des premiers ministres, une assemblée procédant du suffrage universel et une autre représentant les réalités régionales, économiques, intellectuelles, morales, des Etats participants; enfin une cour, dont les membres, inamovibles, seront choisis parmi des magistrats.

Ainsi se mettront à vivre en coopération régulière et organisée les peuples de l'Europe. Le temps et les événements auront à faire ensuite le reste. Je crois bien qu'ils le feront parce qu'à moins de catastrophes en marchant vers l'unité l'Europe marche dans le sens de l'histoire.

(Le Monde, 27 février 1953)

(第三號)

邁耶[●]在美國俱樂部關於法國外交及經濟政策的演說(節錄)

一九五三年三月十九日

LE DISCOURS DE M. RENÉ MAYER PRONONCÉ AU
AMERICAN CLUB SUR LA POLITIQUE ÉTRANGÈRE ET
LA POLITIQUE ÉCONOMIQUE FRANÇAISES (EXTRAITS)

le 19 mars 1953

從財政上指責擴軍[●]

法國並不以為國際形勢使我們可以鬆弛我們的警惕和努力，但它認為強令大西洋條約國家作超過它們實際財力的努力是不合理的……

歐洲防務集團

自然，必須待各國議會按照各該國憲法的規定對這一條約表示意見。法國議會俟時機到來時，將會負起它的責任。法國政府已經負起了它自己的責任。它是贊成該條約的；它沒有替換的政策。法國政府將依照我請求授權時的演說中所指出的以及與我所作的諾言相符合的一些條件，在議會和全國面前為這個條約辯護。

這些條件主要是簽訂一些議定書，以便使我們盟國間所訂立的條約中某些重要規定明確。

法國不應該由於對條約本文的狹義解釋而使自己在明天不能有效地履行一切國際義務，這就是說，它要同時應付籠罩在自由世界的一些威脅，這些威脅不僅存在於歐洲，而且也存在於別處，特別是在遠東。

印度支那戰爭

(法國實際上無意在越南放下武器。)而且美國的輿論是了解這一鬥爭的性質和重要性的。在這條同一戰綫的兩端——朝鮮與印度支那——為着同一事業而鬥爭和犧牲的人們之間正在建立着真正的團結。

Les charges financières du réarmement

La France n'estime pas que la situation internationale justifie un relâchement de notre vigilance ni de notre effort, mais elle considère qu'il serait déraisonnable d'imposer aux Etats membres du pacte atlantique un effort excédant leurs capacités financières constatées. . . .

La Communauté européenne de défense

Il appartient bien entendu, à chaque Parlement de se prononcer sur ce traité selon les règles constitutionnelles de chaque Etat. Le Parlement français prendra le moment venu ses responsabilités. Mon gouvernement a pris les siennes. Il est en faveur du traité. Il n'a pas de politique de rechange. Il le défendra donc devant le Parlement et devant le pays dans les conditions que j'ai indiquées dans ma déclaration d'investiture et conformément aux engagements que j'ai pris.

Ces conditions visent notamment la conclusion de protocoles destinés à préciser l'accord de nos partenaires sur certaines dispositions importantes du traité.

La France ne doit pas, du fait d'une interprétation restrictive des textes, se trouver demain dans l'impossibilité d'exercer effectivement toutes ses responsabilités internationales, c'est-à-dire de faire face simultanément aux menaces qui pèsent sur le monde libre non seulement en Europe, mais ailleurs aussi, notamment en Extrême-Orient.

La guerre d'Indochine

(La France en effet n'a pas l'intention de déposer les armes en Indochine.) L'opinion américaine a d'ailleurs compris le caractère et la portée de ce combat. Une véritable solidarité est en train de s'établir entre les hommes qui, en Corée et en Indochine, aux deux extrémités d'un même front, luttent et tombent pour la même cause.

● 法國總理。

● 本篇小標題係原文所有。

英國也正在馬來亞勇敢地對抗着共產黨的滲入。因為我們過分關懷法蘭西聯邦的完整，所以不能了解也不能贊同英國對於維持它與聯邦各國間特別關係的重視。我們的老盟邦之所以選擇在新秩序建立以前，繼續置身於歐洲防務集團之外，是由於它是更好的判斷者的原因，而我們從來沒有想到拿來責備它的。

至於法國，它應該把歐洲的責任和全世界的責任結合在一起。它準備並要求在歐洲集團中担負起它的任務，但同時不放棄由於在非洲與亞洲履行的責任所產生的權利和義務。

英國是一個島國，它主張在日前祇與歐洲集團保持一些簡單的聯系。可能終有那麼一天會到來的，用皮杜爾的話來說，那時，「地理對於歷史的影響」消失了，英倫海峽不復存在，英國就會担負起它在歐洲所應担負的任務，它不能拒絕歐洲對它有所指望的權利。

貨幣兌換問題

即將召開的歐洲經濟合作組織會議使我們有機會在動身以前與艾登和巴特勒兩位先生再度在巴黎會晤，殊感快慰。這次會談將成為我們與華盛頓和渥太華的會談，以及美國、加拿大和歐洲國家為研究目前匯兌情況所產生的各種問題而即將進行磋商的有利的前奏。

阻止通貨膨脹的鬥爭

各債務國家，首先是法國，應該靠它們自己的力量來增加個別和集體的支付能力。法國政府決心在採取必要措施以防止或擊退經濟衰落的同時，繼續與通貨膨脹作鬥爭的理由就在於此。它仍堅決地倚靠歐洲經濟合作組織和歐洲支付同盟的理由就在於此。所有足以損害上述組織的作用和存在的政策，也將同樣地給予煤鋼聯營以嚴重的打擊。這種政策對於把西歐各國的經濟制度逐漸結合在共同市

La Grande-Bretagne, elle aussi, fait courageusement face en Malaisie à l'infiltration communiste. Nous sommes trop attachés à l'intégrité de l'Union française pour ne pas comprendre et approuver l'importance que la Grande-Bretagne accorde au maintien des liens particuliers qui existent entre elle et les autres membres du Commonwealth. Si notre vieille alliée a choisi de demeurer jusqu'à nouvel ordre en dehors de la Communauté européenne de défense, c'est pour des raisons dont elle est le meilleur juge et dont nous ne songerons jamais à lui faire grief.

La France doit, quant à elle, combiner une vocation européenne et une vocation mondiale. Elle prend et demande à prendre ses dispositions pour jouer son rôle dans la Communauté européenne sans renoncer aux droits et aux devoirs qui résultent pour elle des responsabilités qu'elle exerce en Afrique et en Asie.

La Grande-Bretagne, insulaire, s'en tient pour le moment à une simple association avec la Communauté européenne. Un jour viendra peut-être où, pour reprendre une expression de M. Georges Bidault, le temps ayant effacé "le crédit ouvert par la géographie à l'histoire", il n'y aura plus de Channel, et où la Grande-Bretagne tiendra à jouer le rôle qui lui revient dans une Europe à laquelle elle ne peut refuser le droit de compter sur elle.

La Convertibilité des monnaies

Nous sommes très heureux que la prochaine réunion de l'O.E.C.E. nous fournisse l'occasion d'avoir à Paris, avec M. Eden et M. Butler, avant notre départ, de nouveaux entretiens. Ceux-ci préluèderont très utilement à nos conversations de Washington et d'Ottawa et aux consultations qui devront avoir lieu entre les Etats-Unis, le Canada et les pays européennes, en vue d'étudier les problèmes que pose la situation présente des échanges.

La lutte contre l'inflation

Les pays débiteurs, et la France en premier lieu, doivent faire ce qui dépend d'eux pour accroître leur solvabilité individuelle et collective. C'est pourquoi mon gouvernement est résolu, tout en prenant les précautions nécessaires pour prévenir ou combattre une récession économique, à continuer la lutte contre l'inflation. C'est pourquoi également il demeure fermement attaché à l'organisation européenne de coopération économique et à l'Union européenne des paiements. Toute politique qui aurait pour effet de compromettre le fonctionnement ou l'existence de ces institutions porterait également un coup sérieux à la Communauté du charbon et de l'acier. Elle serait de mauvais augure pour l'avenir de ces projets ambitieux, mais raisonnables, qui tendent à réunir progressivement dans un marché commun les

場內的雄心勃勃的然而合理的這種計劃，是一種不祥之兆。

美國資本在法蘭西聯邦內的投資

至於債權國家，比我更有權威的人已經為它們指出應走的道路，我來提供意見，無疑地對它們是不會合適的。我在此只能重複美國總統的話，並援引他的建議：修改關稅規則以消除有礙貿易的手續，鼓勵私人資本在外國投資的發展，使外國工業為防務而服務，輸入大宗原料。以上是我完全贊同的綱領，法國政府對此也將予以支持，特別是在法蘭西聯邦領土內創造有利於美國資本投資的條件。

(譯自一九五三年三月二十日法國「世界報」)

systemes économiques nationaux de l'Europe occidentale.

L'investissement des capitaux américains dans l'Union française

Quant aux pays créanciers, je serais sans doute mal venu à leur donner des conseils si des voix plus autorisées que la mienne ne leur avaient déjà tracé la route à suivre. Je ne puis mieux faire que reprendre ici les propos du président des Etats-Unis d'Amérique et citer ses propres recommandations: réviser les réglementations douanières en vue d'éliminer les procédures qui font obstacle au commerce, encourager le développement des investissements privés à l'étranger, faire travailler pour la défense les industries étrangères, importer des quantités accrues de matière premières. Voilà un programme auquel je souscris pleinement et auquel mon gouvernement apportera son concours, notamment en créant des conditions favorables aux investissements des capitaux américains dans les territoires de l'Union française.

(Le Monde, 20 mars 1953)

(第四號)

邁耶[●]在美國全國新聞俱樂部關於法國外交政策的演說(節錄)

一九五三年三月二十七日

SPEECH BY RENÉ MAYER AT NATIONAL PRESS CLUB, U.S.A., ON FRENCH FOREIGN POLICY (EXCERPTS)

March 27, 1953

我很自豪地說，我一向是堅決擁護大西洋聯盟的人。大西洋條約在我看來是對集體不安全的普遍情緒的反應，而這種情緒是起源於舊金山憲章的四大創始國之間的意見一致的破裂，起源於因此而產生的聯合國組織的軟弱無力，以及因為在安全理事會中濫用否決權，致使安全理事會不能保障和平與集體安全。

I am proud to say that I have always been a firm advocate of the Atlantic alliance. To me the Atlantic pact responds to a wide-spread feeling of collective insecurity, a feeling that stems from the breakdown of the agreement among the four great founding powers of the San Francisco Charter, from the resulting weakness in the organization of the United Nations, and from the abuse of the veto power in the Security Council which is thus rendered incapable of assuring peace and collective security.

的確，我肯定地認為：北大西洋條約組織的各成員國合起來擁有足以使它們成爲一個不可戰勝的聯盟的資源，但須它們能有效地組織和利用這些資源。這就是說，從現在起，在分配共同防務的負擔時，不使任何參加國在軍事上須作出超過它

Indeed, I am positive that the member nations of NATO command an aggregate of resources that makes them an invincible coalition, provided they can organize to utilize those resources effectively. This means that from now on they must have the wisdom necessary to divide the burdens of the

● 法國總理。

的經濟能力的努力，北大西洋條約組織各成員國必須具有要做到這一層所必需的智慧。借用艾森豪威爾總統國情咨文裏一句恰當的話來講，「假設不顧我們的經濟能力而聚積軍事力量，那就會使我們防禦了一種災禍而招致另一種災禍。」

去年在渥太華舉行的北大西洋條約組織理事會的會議上，包括我在內的法國代表團曾特別邀請三個「智囊」來作了一件有益的工作。他們製訂了一個適應於本集團財政能力的、具體的軍事計劃。現在，北大西洋條約組織的任務，就在於使這個計劃合乎目前的情況。

爲了這個目的，北大西洋條約理事會將於四月二十三日在巴黎開會。法國政府希望這次會議將獲得具體的結果，就是說，這次會議能夠確定一個建立軍事力量的精確計劃。這個計劃一方面要考慮到防禦的需要，一方面也要考慮到我們大家都必須面對的經濟上和財政上殘酷的現實。

在實行每年把大西洋集團的軍事上的需要和它的經濟能力拿來對比的程序時，北大西洋條約組織決不可以忽視下列事實，即：結束冷戰不是我們所能完全控制的事。因此，我們就必須堅決地應付須作長期防禦努力的可能性。

從長遠的觀點來看，我們必須實事求是地去考慮對方所掌握的潛在資源的重要性。這些資源是很豐富的，而蘇聯的領袖們將動員這些資源去增強他們的軍事力量，那也是我們深信不疑的。如果自由世界希望它們的優勢最後能發生作用的話，那末，它們也就必須使用它們所能支配的一切未經開發的資源。

可是，我必須十分坦白地說：截至目前為止，並沒有真正有步驟地進行發展我們的聯盟所必需的某些原料的生產。

例如，法國在它的海外領土的地下，就蘊藏有無數的原料。缺乏這些原料，可能會有一天使各盟國感到問題嚴重；但由於缺少資本，這些原料却没有充分開發。我過去曾經說過，現在我再說一次：我的政府準備盡力設法去吸引爲開發這些資源所必需的投資。

common defense among themselves in such a way as not to expose any one of the participating states to a military effort that would exceed its economic capabilities. To quote the apt words of President Eisenhower in his message on the State of the Union, "to amass our military power without regard to our economic capacities would be to defend ourselves against one kind of disaster by inviting another."

The three "wise men" last year performed useful work which they had been especially invited to undertake by the French delegation, to which I belonged, at the meeting of the NATO Council in Ottawa. They laid down a specific military program adapted to the financial capabilities of the community. It is now the task of the NATO organization to keep this program up to date.

The North Atlantic Treaty Council will meet in Paris for this purpose April 23. The French Government hopes that this meeting will yield concrete results, that is, that it will be possible to define a precise program of military build-up, a program which will take into account at the same time both defense requirements and the hard economic and financial facts with which we all have to live.

In following the procedure each year of bringing face to face the military needs and the economic capabilities of the Atlantic community, NATO must not lose sight of the fact that it is not within our sole control to put an end to the cold war and that we must, therefore, resolutely face the possibility of a prolonged defense effort.

From the long range point of view it is essential that we take realistic account of the importance of the latent resources that are at the disposal of our opponents. Those resources are considerable, and we can be sure that the Soviet leaders will mobilize them in aid of their military might. If the free world wishes its superiority to tell in the long run, it, too, must draw upon all the unexploited resources at its command.

Now, I must say, speaking quite frankly, that so far nothing really systematic has been done to develop the production of certain raw materials that are necessary to our coalition.

France, for instance, possesses under the surface of her overseas territories numerous reserves of raw materials, the lack of which may one day be serious for the Allied powers and which, for want of capital, are insufficiently developed. I have said before, and I say it again now, that my Government is ready to do everything in its power to attract the investment that is indispensable to the mobilization of these resources.

顯然，大西洋集團的經濟和軍事的力量大部分要看歐洲的經濟與政治的組織如何。為此，法國政府始終是忠實地依附於這些為促進歐洲各國經濟合作而建立的機構。

由於同一理由，法國政府將以驚惶的心情看待任何足以削弱歐洲經濟合作組織和歐洲支付同盟的建議。在這方面，法國從來不以使它自己限於國際法傳統觀念所提供的可能辦法為滿意。法國曾貫徹了一種創造性的思想，這種思想在一個範圍有限但却有決定性的戰線上具有真正的革命性的意義。

你們一定已經看到，我所指的是舒曼計劃。這個計劃是規定在一個目前已經在施行中的條約之內的。煤的單一市場已告建立；在最近的將來，還要有一個鋼的單一市場。

在盧森堡，目前有一個以讓·摩納為首的超國家機構。這個機構的管轄權及於西歐的大部分。在這個機構內，並駐有代表你們政府和英國政府的正式外交使節。

這個超國家機構已經在執行突破古老的歷史疆界範圍的權力。它的預算和它的法定特權使它成爲一個新政權，這個新政權的所管的事雖是有限的，但所伸展到的地理區域却幾乎是與西歐一樣地廣闊。它與組成十九世紀與二十世紀分裂的歐洲的國家完全相等。

舒曼計劃之所以成功，是因為它經得起局勢的考驗。雖然有些人可能對該計劃會影響到某些特殊利益引爲遺憾；但是，誰也不能否認，該計劃在實際上已經行之有效了。

當法國政府發起那個以簽訂建立歐洲防務集團的條約爲結果的會談時，法國政府曾本着同樣實事求是的精神提出普利文計劃。目前，歐洲防務集團條約已提交有關各國政府的議會，以便根據各國特定的憲法程序而予以批准。

我所領導的政府在他組成時就立即將該條約提交法國立法機構的兩院。自然，這是批准條約必

Clearly, the economic and military strength of the Atlantic community depends in large part on the economic and political organization of Europe. For that reason, the French Government is, as always, faithfully attached to those institutions which are created to further the economic cooperation of the nations of Europe.

For that same reason, the French Government would view with alarm any proposal that might weaken the Organization for European Economic Cooperation and the European Payments Union. In this area, France has never been satisfied to restrict herself to the possibilities offered by the traditional concepts of international law. She has carried through a creative idea which, along a limited but decisive front, has a truly revolutionary significance.

You will already have recognized that I am referring to the Schuman plan, which has been embodied in a treaty that now has become a working reality. A single market for coal has already been created and in the near future there will be a single market for steel.

In Luxembourg there exists today a Supranational Authority, headed by Jean Monnet, which has a jurisdiction covering most of Western Europe and to which are attached regular diplomatic missions representing your Government and that of Great Britain.

This supranational authority is already exercising powers that overflow the limits of ancient historic frontiers. Its budget and its statutory privileges make it a new power which, with its restricted subject matter, but stretching over a geographic area almost as wide as Western Europe, is fully equal to the states that make up the fragmented Europe of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

The Schuman plan is a success because it meets the test of events. While some may deplore the consequences that it may bring to certain special interests, no one can deny that it has begun to work effectively in practice.

The same realistic spirit led the French Government to put forward the Pleven plan, when it initiated the discussions that have resulted in the signature of the treaty establishing the European Defense Community. At present the E.D.C. treaty is before the parliaments of the governments concerned for their approval, according to the particular constitutional procedures in each state.

The Government over which I preside has immediately upon its formation submitted the treaty to the Chambers of the French Legislature.

須採取的第一步。法國立法機構的兩院現在正在研究這個條約。

你們在美國既然極力遵守你們自己的憲法程序，那就一定會了解：在像你們和我們這樣的民主政府之中，行政部門並不能預斷立法部門的最後決定。我可以向你們絕對保證：我的政府將繼續履行我就職時所承擔的義務，即我的政府將支持歐洲防務集團條約，並一俟我在就職演說裏所列舉的條件得到滿足後，我的政府即將請求法國議會批准上述條約。

我可以向你們重提一下，這些條件特別是關於簽訂旨在澄清各締約國對條約的某些重要條款的了解的幾項議定書。這些議定書是以一個十分簡單的想法為基礎的。我們有決心不讓歐洲防務集團變成一個玩弄漂亮文字的純理論的和抽象的組織。我們希望建立一個真正的防禦制度，俾一旦發生戰爭，這個制度得以順利地保衛歐洲和保護自由世界的行動，來證實它的能力。

我相信：我們所有參加這個條約的伙伴們歸根到底必然同樣具有這種實事求是的看法。在我來華盛頓的前夕，我的政府本着這個精神所提出的一切議定書，都已為巴黎會議的臨時委員會所接受。這些議定書現已提交簽約的各國政府。我有種種理由希望這些議定書將在短期內獲得同意。

就法國而言，一個有效的歐洲防務組織就是一個使法國能夠不祇是在歐洲，而且在世界其餘地方，尤其在印度支那，履行它對自由世界的責任的組織。

在世界的那一地區，法國深信，未來將證明它的不倦的努力是正當的。如果想知道共產黨敵人究竟已被阻滯到什麼程度，你們祇要回想一下，越盟領袖胡志明曾經莊嚴地預諾，他要在一九五〇年聖誕節進入河內。越盟的衰落，在經濟戰綫上由於它的通貨的崩潰表現出來了，在政治戰綫上由於人民團結並擁護我們所保衛的事業的程度表現出來了。

不過，鬥爭仍在繼續中。並且，因為我們大家都了解到我在這裏講話是極為坦率的，因此我不妨

That, of course, was the first step that had to be taken on the way to ratification. The Chambers of the French Legislature now have the treaty under study.

You in the United States, with your strong attachment to your own constitutional procedures, will surely understand that in democratic governments like yours and ours, the Executive branch is not in position to prejudge the final decision of the legislative branch. I can give you a categorical assurance that my Government will continue to fulfill the commitments made at the time I assumed office—that it will support the E.C.D. treaty and that it will request its approval by the French Parliament just as soon as the conditions have been satisfied that I stipulated in my inaugural address.

These conditions, I may remind you, particularly concern the conclusion of protocols intended to clarify the understanding of the contracting parties on certain important provisions of the treaty. The protocols are based on a very simple idea. We are determined that the E.D.C. shall not become merely a theoretical and abstract construction of more or less happily worded tests. We wish to create a true system of defense which on D-Day would be capable of proving itself in action by assuring the successful defense of Europe and the protection of the free world.

I am confident that this realistic point of view will, in the last analysis, be shared by all our partners in the treaty. All the protocols that my Government proposed in this spirit were on the eve of my departure for Washington accepted by the Interim Committee of the conference of Paris. They are now in the hands of the Governments that have signed the treaty. I have every reason to hope that they will be approved in short order.

For France, an effective organization of European defense is an organization that puts France in position to fulfil her duty toward the free world, not only in Europe, but also in the rest of the world, and especially in Indo-China.

In that part of the world, France is deeply convinced that the future will vindicate the unremitting devotion of its efforts. To realize how much the Communist enemy has been slowed down you have only to recall that Ho Chi Minh, the leader of Vietminh, solemnly promised that he would be in Hanoi by Christmas, 1950. The decline of the Vietminh is shown on the economic front by the collapse of its currency and on the political front by the extent of popular support that has rallied to the cause we are defending.

Nevertheless, the struggle continues; and, since it is understood between us that I am speaking here in perfect candor, let me point out to you

向你們指出，雖然我對於你們的評論的客觀態度和智慧表示敬佩，但是就我所知，我們在印度支那的鬥爭的性質的各個方面，還沒有都被充分了解。

關於印度支那，甚至在法國報紙中都有所謂「骯髒戰爭」、「殖民戰爭」、「被遺忘的戰爭」的說法。最近，它又被稱為「七年戰爭」。唉！我不能否認這個特別的形容詞。但是，我自己在願意向你們提出一個新的名稱：「被誤解的戰爭」。

我這些話並不是對在座的諸位博聞廣見的先生說的，但是有多少美國人知道，在印度支那，在兩個陣營中，雙方目前都有四十萬以上的作戰人員呢？我知道在朝鮮有更多的士兵被牽入在內，但是，印度支那戰爭畢竟是一個真正重要的戰爭，一場「主要的戰爭」。

有多少美國人——甚至，如果我可以這樣說的話，諸位先生中又有多少人——知道，法國最高司令部擁有確實證據，證明越盟最近攻勢的目標不是東京三角洲而是湄公河呢？越盟的戰略行動我們已經能夠予以挫敗，這種戰略行動以前是，並且現在仍然是，以向暹羅灣方向的進擊來切斷我們的軍隊。它的目的顯然是把通往印度的路上的最前面的堡壘泰國和緬甸置於國際共產主義控制的範圍內。

我們對於這種計劃的懷疑是由下述事實所證實了，即北京（北平）共產黨政權最近曾成立了一個所謂「雲南傣族自治政府」。中國共產黨人顯然意圖使這個新的政治怪物成爲一種磁極，把老撾人、暹羅人和中國與印度支那的泰族人集合成一體。

因此，顯然越盟目前在印度支那的主要目標不祇是東京灣而且是暹羅灣和通往印度的道路。法國和越南軍隊在稻田裏和高原上所進行的戰爭不祇是爲了保護印度支那使它免受顛覆，而且是爲了保護整個東南亞。

最後有一點我應該向你們指出，但是，我必須慎重選擇我的措詞，因爲對這樣嚴重的一件事情，不應該有所誤解。

我指的是朝鮮戰爭和印度支那戰爭間的類似之處。我已經說過，你我兩國在朝鮮與印度支那作戰

that, while I pay my respects to the objectivity and the wisdom of your commentaries, the character of our struggle in Indo-China is not yet, so far as I can tell, fully understood in all its aspects.

There has been talk in connection with Indo-China even in the French press about the "dirty war," the "colonial war," the "forgotten war." More recently, it has been described as the "seven-year war," and, alas, I cannot repudiate that particular epithet. But I myself should now like to propose to you a new name: the "misunderstood war."

I am not addressing these remarks to you enlightened gentlemen before me; but how many Americans know that in Indo-China, in each of the two camps, there are today more than 400,000 combatants? I know that in Korea even greater masses of men are involved; but the Indo-Chinese war is, nevertheless, a truly important war, a "major war."

How many Americans—even, if I may say so, how many even of you gentlemen—are aware that the French High Command has positive proof that the target of last offensive of the Vietminh was not the Tonkin delta but the Mekong River? The strategic maneuver of the Vietminh, which we have been able to frustrate, was, and continues to be, to split our forces by thrusting toward the Gulf of Siam. Its goal obviously is to bring within the reach of international communism the countries of Thailand and Burma, the first bastions on the road to India.

Our suspicion of this plan is confirmed by the fact that the Communist regime in Peking (Peiping) has recently created a so-called "autonomous government of the Thai Nationalities of Yunnan." This new political monstrosity is obviously intended by the Chinese Communists to become a magnetic pole to attract Laotians, Siamese, and the Thai tribes of China and Indo-China into one group.

It is apparent, therefore, that in Indo-China the major objective of the Vietminh at this moment is not simply the Gulf of Tonkin but also the Gulf of Siam and the approaches to India. The battles being waged by French and Vietnamese troops in the rice paddies and on the plateaus are serving not merely to protect Indo-China against subversion but to protect the whole of Southeast Asia.

There is one final point I should make to you, but I shall have to choose my words with great care, because on so grave a matter there must be no misunderstanding.

I refer to the analogy between the war in Korea and the war in Indo-China. I have said already that the soldiers of your country and mine,

和死亡的士兵們是在同一戰綫的兩端上作戰，爲同一的事業而鬥爭和犧牲。在這一點上說，意大利戰役的兩個偉大的老戰士克拉克將軍和許溫元帥最近在遠東的會見，對於我們所有的人顯然是有象徵意義的。

但是，真正說來，印度支那戰爭並不是真的可以和目前任何其他戰爭相提並論的。越南政府和我們的政府必須在東京，印度支那的極北部，守住一條綿延不斷的戰綫。在主要戰綫後方的廣大地區中，它們必須對付游擊戰。最後，和最重要地，它們必須把膽怯和猶豫的人集合在它們這一邊，這意味着它們必須確保廣大地區的安全，在這些地區中已經建立的政權仍然必須預料到零星的恐怖事件的爆發。

上述這些問題不能夠用在其他地方和其他環境下的朝鮮得到成功的辦法來解決，這是理所當然的。但是，在朝鮮和印度支那兩地，基本的問題是如何獲得組織在他們自己的國家軍隊中的當地人民的援助。我們確信，我們能夠把我們各自的軍事參謀人員在朝鮮和印度支那所獲得的經驗匯總在一起，以便對我們大家都有好處。法國政府誠懇要求我們在遠東的戰略和方法要密切地配合。

(譯自一九五三年三月二十八日「紐約時報」)

who are fighting and dying in Korea and in Indo-China, are engaged at the two extremities of the same battle front, struggling and sacrificing for the same cause. In this connection, the recent meeting in the Far East between those two great veterans of the Italian campaign, Gen. Mark W. Clark and Marshal Juin, appears symbolic to all of us.

But in truth, the Indo-Chinese war is not really comparable to any other war today. The Vietnamese Government and our own must maintain a continuous front in Tonkin, the most northern sector of Indo-China. In vast areas behind the main battle lines they must cope with guerrilla warfare. Finally, and above all, they must rally to their side the timid and the hesitant, which means that they have to assure the safety of extensive regions in which the established power must still expect sporadic outbreaks of terrorism.

It stands to reason that such problems as these cannot be solved by methods which in other places and in other circumstances have succeeded in Korea. However, in both Korea and in Indo-China, the essential problem is to enlist the aid of local populations organized in their own national armies. We are convinced that we can pool the experience gained in Korea and in Indo-China by our respective military staffs to the common advantage of us all. The French Government calls earnestly for a close co-ordination of our strategy and our methods in the Far East.

(The New York Times, March 28, 1953)

(第五號)

美法會談公報

一九五三年三月二十八日

COMMUNIQUE ON U.S.-FRANCE DISCUSSIONS

March 28, 1953

(一) 美國和法國代表在華盛頓會談，對兩國政府在歐洲、遠東及近東所面臨的包羅甚廣的問題作了仔細的研究之後，已於今日結束。美國和法國的基本政策仍將永遠是和平，因此，這次討論集中於研究一些對於有戰爭的地方如何獲致和平以及有威脅存在的地方如何鞏固和平的措施。

(二) 雙方同意：除非有確實的材料足以證明相反的情況，蘇聯內部最近的發展，仍未改變自由世界所面臨的威脅的基本性質。兩國代表一致同意：必須同心協力，以便在遠東擊敗共產黨的侵略，在西方加強自由國家的防務。他們仍舊確信：唯一一切自由國家作建設性的努力，方能獲致並維持真正的和平。

(三) 人們認識到，共產黨在遠東的侵略行動顯然是屬於同一類型的。因此，當印度支那戰爭的全部重擔落在法蘭西聯邦（包括印度支那聯邦成員國在內）的軍隊身上時，而且同樣地，當美國在朝鮮肩負着最沉重的負擔時，如果不充分認識到這兩個戰爭的互相依賴性就不可能成功地進行這兩個戰爭。這反轉來也需要兩國政府之間繼續進行經常的外交上的和軍事上的磋商。

法國政府重申它的決心，要盡全力來增加在印度支那的法國及印度支那聯邦成員國軍隊的效能，以期消滅有組織的共產黨軍隊並使法蘭西聯邦內自由聯合的聯邦成員國——柬埔寨、老撾和越南——獲得和平與繁榮。越南及柬埔寨兩國大使曾出席參加這一階段的討論。

這次會議也順便繼續討論了駐印度支那最高司令部所擬就的在該地區進行軍事行動的計劃。這些

1. Representatives of the United States and France, meeting in Washington, today concluded a detailed review of a wide range of problems which face both governments in Europe, the Far East and the Near East. Peace will always remain the basic policy of the United States and France. The discussions, therefore, centered on measures for obtaining peace where there is fighting and for consolidating peace where threats exist.

2. It was agreed, in the absence of any tangible proof to the contrary, that recent developments in the Soviet Union had not changed the basic nature of the threat confronting the free world. The representatives of both countries were in full agreement on the necessity of concerting their efforts so as to defeat Communist aggression in the Far East and to strengthen the defenses of the free countries in the West. They remain convinced that true peace can be achieved and maintained only by constructive efforts of all free nations.

3. It was recognized that Communist aggressive moves in the Far East obviously are parts of the same pattern. Therefore, while the full burden of the fighting in Indochina falls on the forces of the French Union including those of the Associated States, and similarly the United States bears the heaviest burden in Korea, the prosecution of these operations cannot be successfully carried out without full recognition of their interdependence. This in turn requires the continuation of frequent diplomatic and military consultation between the two Governments.

The French Government reasserted its resolve to do its utmost to increase the effectiveness of the French and Associated States forces in Indochina, with a view to destroying the organized Communist forces and to bringing peace and prosperity to her free associates within the French Union, Cambodia, Laos and Viet-Nam. The Ambassadors of Viet-Nam and Cambodia were present and participated in this phase of the discussions.

Advantage was taken of this meeting to continue discussion of plans prepared by the High Command in Indochina for military action there. These plans are being developed with a view to

計劃是以在印度支那取得勝利為目的而擬訂的，這些計劃並經徹底研究以決定如何以及至何種程度美國能以物資及財政的支援助其實現。

顯然，聯合國在朝鮮所可能達成的任何停戰，將使人產生這種希望，即它將向和平邁進的一步。然而，兩國政府的看法是：如果中國共產黨政權利用這個停戰來在遠東其他地方從事侵略戰爭的話，這種行動對於在世界上獲致和平的努力將會有嚴重的後果，並且，它和朝鮮任何停戰所根據的諒解也將會發生直接抵觸。

(四) 兩國政府重申對於它們與自由世界其他各國一起對那些施行危及世界和平與安全的政策的國家實行統制戰略物資的運輸一事之共同關心。雙方政府承允繼續採取為達到此目的的行動。

法國政府為了要使聯合國大會一九五一年五月十八日的決議[●]的實施更為有效起見，擬採取必要措施，以

(甲) 禁止運送戰略物資至共產黨中國的船隻加煤，及

(乙) 禁止法國船隻將戰略物資運往共產黨中國港口。

兩國政府，將與其他各有關政府合作，經常審查對共產黨中國禁運物品的清單，以便將那些日後顯示出戰略性質的貨物包括進去。

(五) 兩國政府在討論歐洲地區的問題時認識到，允許德國對歐洲防務作出軍事貢獻並且通過契約性協定來代替現在對德佔領的制度，這是迫切需要的。兩國政府同意：必須儘快成立歐洲防務集團，這個集團將促進法國與德國間的真誠合作，從而有利於大西洋集團並增進歐洲的安全和團結。

兩國代表團滿意地注意到，歐洲防務集團臨時

achieving success in Indochina and are being given intensive study so as to determine how and to what extent the United States may be able to contribute materiel and financial support to their achievement.

Obviously any armistice which might be concluded in Korea by the United Nations would be entered into in the hope that it would be a step toward peace. It was the view of both Governments, however, that should the Chinese Communist regime take advantage of such an armistice to pursue aggressive war elsewhere in the Far East, such action would have the most serious consequences for the efforts to bring about peace in the world and would conflict directly with the understanding on which any armistice in Korea would rest.

4. The two Governments reaffirmed their common interest in controlling together with other nations of the free world the movement of strategic materials to nations whose policies jeopardize the peace and security of the free world. Both Governments undertook to continue action toward that end.

In order to render more effective the application of the United Nations General Assembly resolution of May 18, 1951, the French Government intends to take the measures necessary to prevent

a) the bunkering of ships carrying to Communist China cargoes of strategic materials, and

b) the transportation by French ships of cargoes of strategic character to ports of Communist China.

The two Governments in cooperation with other interested Governments will keep under constant review the list of items embargoed to Communist China in order to include goods whose strategic character will have been demonstrated.

5. In their discussions on the European area, the two Governments recognized the continuing urgent need to permit a German military contribution to the defense of Europe and through the Contractual Agreements replace the present occupation regime of Germany. Both Governments agreed on the necessity of the establishment, with minimum delay, of the European Defense Community, which will promote sincere cooperation between France and Germany and thus serve the interests of the Atlantic Community as well as advance the security and unity of Europe.

The two delegations noted with satisfaction

● 見「和平解決朝鮮問題參考文件集」，第二卷，第四〇四頁。

委員會對於解釋條約的議定書業已達成協議。法國代表方面預計他們的政府是會予以接受的。

雙方認識到，使條約獲得批准的這一重要步驟，將使臨時委員會對條約生效之前的技術準備工作能迅速進展，並因而確保一俟條約批准之後，就能獲得條約的利益。

雙方認識到解決薩爾問題的重要性。雙方同意這問題應在下述基礎上盡速覓致解決，即在符合歐洲防務集團和歐洲煤鋼聯營集團的原則的條件下使薩爾具有一個歐洲的地位。法國代表團詳細解釋了爲什麼他們認爲在批准歐洲防務集團條約之前必須法德兩國對此問題的解決取得協議。

(六) 法國代表團解釋了法國實施它在歐洲和遠東的防務計劃一事對法國的經濟和預算的意義。

(七) 兩國代表團認識到，歐洲防務集團必須在大西洋集團不斷的發展的情形下組織起來。

因此，它們對於增進北大西洋條約組織的效能的工作，極爲重視。

這個一般性的問題，以及軍事需要和經濟能力的基本平衡問題，將於四月二十三日在巴黎召開的下一期北大西洋理事會會議上再度加以審議。

(八) 法國加入歐洲集團，絲毫不改變它在歐洲以外的利益與責任。根據聯合國憲章特別反映的兩國在世界上的地位，美法兩國政府在將來需要時，一如過去一樣，將在一般問題上彼此協商。

(九) 在經濟和財政問題上亦互相交換了意見。

討論並包括對預算的情況和前途的審查，以及對美國和法國的經濟發展的研究。

the agreement by the Interim Committee of the European Defense Community on the protocols interpretative to the Treaty. For their part the representatives of France foresaw their acceptance by their Government.

It was recognized that this important step toward ratification of the Treaty would enable rapid progress in the Interim Committee on the technical steps preparatory to the Treaty coming into force and thereby ensure that its benefits would be secured as soon as possible after ratification.

The importance of settlement of the question of the Saar was recognized and it was agreed that this should be sought at the earliest opportunity on a basis which would provide a European status for the Saar conforming to the principles of the European Defense and the Coal and Steel Communities. The French delegation explained in detail the reasons which, in its view, justify and render necessary a Franco-German agreement on such a settlement prior to ratification of the European Defense Community Treaty.

6. The French delegation explained the economic and budgetary implications for France of carrying out her defense programs in Europe as well as in the Far East.

7. The two delegations recognized that the European Defense Community is to be constituted within a constantly developing Atlantic Community.

Therefore they place great importance upon efforts to improve the effectiveness of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

This general question as well as that of the essential balance between military necessities and economic possibilities will again be considered during the next meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Paris on April 23.

8. The participation by France in the European Community alters in no way her interests and responsibilities outside of Europe. In the light of the world position of both nations, which is reflected in particular in the Charter of the United Nations, the United States Government and the Government of France will consult with one another on general problems as occasion demands in the future as in the past.

9. An exchange of views was also held on economic and financial question.

The discussions included a survey of the budgetary position and outlook as well as a review of economic developments in the United States and in France.

法國代表們扼要地敘述了他們對歐洲經濟合作組織最近在巴黎舉行的關於促進世界貿易的平衡和擴大，以及貨幣兌換、多邊貿易和多邊支付等問題的會談的意見。雙方同意：促進這方面的進步的步驟將由美國、歐洲經濟合作組織的各會員國以及其他各國再加研究。

(譯自一九五三年四月六日美國「國務院公報」)

The French representatives outlined their views on the recent talks at the Organization for European Economic Cooperation in Paris concerning progress toward better balanced and expanding world trade, and the objective of convertibility of currencies and multilateral trade and payments. It was agreed that steps to advance this progress would require further study by the United States, the member countries of the Organization for European Economic Cooperation and other governments.

(The Department of State Bulletin, April 6, 1953)

(第六號)

皮杜爾關於和平共處問題的演說[●] (節錄)

一九五三年四月二十三日

LE DISCOURS DE GEORGES BIDAULT AU SUJET DE LA QUESTION DE COEXISTENCE (EXTRAITS)

le 23 avril 1953

有必要證實的是：實際情況比這些聲明中所指出的更難令人滿意。我們未曾自問究竟我們東方的夥伴是否真誠，應不應該相信蘇聯的政策在轉變中。我們只是把真實情形記錄下來。國際氣氛的改善不是一個信仰問題。

自從艾森豪威爾總統以他的勇氣和明智而發表的著名演說剛改善了大國間的關係以後，各國人民的和平願望已不可能再受人愚弄了。

因此，我覺得我們的態度應該這樣，即：好像絕對相信東方國家在西方國家裏的朋友們所傳達的東方國家的意圖，從而以此來對待東方國家。另一方面，在我們之間應以現有的契約團結起來，上述契約的實行已為極端重要；我們並須用足以令人矜式的堅決的意志和嚴肅精神，繼續完成在危急時我們共同商定了的各項防禦措施。照目前世界不安的情況而言，沒有絲毫跡象顯露出這種防禦措施已經終結。因此，不應忽略任何可能性；對任何建議不應不理；對任何犧牲不應沒有補償和代價。不幸，

Il est nécessaire de constater que les faits sont beaucoup moins satisfaisants que les déclarations qui les annoncent. Nous n'avons pas à nous demander si nos partenaires de l'Est sont sincères, nous n'avons pas à nous demander s'il faut croire à une transformation de la politique soviétique. Nous avons seulement à enregistrer les réalités. L'amélioration du climat international n'est pas une affaire de foi.

Depuis que le noble discours du président Eisenhower vient de modifier, par son courage et par sa clarté, les rapports entre les grands partenaires du monde, il n'est plus possible de décevoir la volonté pacifique des peuples.

C'est pourquoi il me semble que notre attitude devrait être celle-ci: nous comporter avec les puissances de l'Est comme si nous croyions absolument à ce que leurs amis dans les pays de l'Ouest rapportent de leurs intentions. Et d'autre part, entre nous, réunis par un contrat qui demeure et dont l'application est plus que jamais essentielle, poursuivre avec une volonté et une rigueur exemplaires l'accomplissement des mesures de défense que nous avons arrêtées en commun en des temps de péril, dont aucun signe qui soit à la mesure des inquiétudes du monde n'a démontré qu'ils avaient pris fin. Donc aucune possibilité ne sera oubliée, aucune ouverture ne sera sans réponse, aucun sacrifice ne sera sans récompense, sans contrepartie. Nous n'en sommes mal-

● 皮杜爾為法國外交部長。此篇演說係在招待北大西洋條約組織締約國外長的午宴宴會上發表。

現在我們祇是在開始階段。我們不應該掩飾極大的憂慮的存在。

可是，如果印度支那的衝突隨着朝鮮談判的恢復而恢復，這是不能容忍的。結束了一個戰場而又另闢一個戰場，即使和平戰士也要說，這不是走向和平。

老撾在一段長期和光榮的歷史過程中，從未與任何人尋過釁。今天，獨立與和平的老撾却受到越盟的侵略。不幾天以後，却宣佈說這是人民寮國。這類喜劇早已不再能使人發笑了。這裏我要重提的是：我們對這事件的判斷是以一九三三年二月六日蘇聯代表團在日內瓦提出的侵略者定義的建議為依據的。蘇聯代表團建議的內容法蘭西共和國政府一直認為是很好的。

有人說這是東南亞的一件特殊事件：我們都知道所有這一切事情都是由一位樂隊指揮或合唱班的指揮在那裏操縱的。

為了使締結光榮的朝鮮停戰協定一事不會形成騙局，艾森豪威爾總統指出停止對印度支那的安全進行一切直接或間接的攻擊是一個必須有的前途，他這樣聲明是符合於常情的要求，我們也明白把這結肯定起來是重建亞洲和平的一個重要和有益的因種因素。

德國問題是東西方一切爭論的主要成份。

法國政府對此問題所採取的立場是絕對明確的。和平恢復德國的統一是歐洲問題全盤解決的不可缺的因素；它也是法國和自由世界政策的一個主要目標。波恩條約●第七條規定西方三大國應努力與蘇聯締結全德和約，由德國與它過去的敵國自由談判的理由就在於此。某些人看到法國宣稱要結束德國的分裂狀態而感到驚奇。然而這是很明顯的：任令德國永久分裂是不啻任令歐洲永久分裂。

● 契約性協定內容摘要見本輯「德國問題」類，第十四頁。

heureusement qu'au début. Il ne faut pas se dissimuler qu'une grande incertitude persiste.

Cependant il ne serait pas tolérable que la reprise des négociations en Corée s'accompagne de la reprise des hostilités en Indochine. Ce n'est pas aller vers la paix, même s'il se trouve des combattants de la paix pour le dire, que de fermer un théâtre d'opérations pour en ouvrir un autre.

Or il se trouve aujourd'hui que le Laos, pays indépendant et pacifique, qui au cours d'une longue et noble histoire n'a jamais cherché noise à personne, se trouve envahi par le Vietminh. Avec plusieurs jours de retard il a bien été proclamé qu'il s'agissait de Laotiens populaires. Ce genre de comédie a depuis longtemps cessé de faire rire l'univers. Je voudrais répéter ici que notre jugement en cette affaire s'appuie sur la proposition de définition de l'agresseur que fit à Genève le 6 février 1933 la délégation soviétique dans les termes que le gouvernement de la République n'a jamais cessé de trouver excellents.

On dira que c'est une affaire particulière du Sud-Est asiatique: nous savons tous qu'il y a un chef d'orchestre ou une équipe de maîtrise qui commande quelque part.

Et quand le président Eisenhower ajoute, comme perspective nécessaire pour que la conclusion d'un armistice honorable en Corée ne soit pas une duperie, la fin de toute attaque directe et indirecte contre la sécurité de l'Indochine, il promulgue les exigences du bon sens, et nous savons que cette affirmation de solidarité est un élément essentiel et salutaire du rétablissement de la paix en Asie.

Le problème allemand est un élément essentiel de toute discussion entre l'Est et l'Ouest.

La position du gouvernement français sur ce point est absolument claire. Le rétablissement pacifique de l'unité allemande est un élément indispensable d'un règlement général européen, qui constitue un des principaux objectifs de la politique française et de la politique du monde libre. C'est pourquoi les accords de Bonn prévoient dans leur article 7 que les trois puissances occidentales s'efforceront de conclure avec l'U.R.S.S. un règlement de paix pour l'ensemble de l'Allemagne, librement négocié entre l'Allemagne et ses anciens ennemis. Certains se sont étonnés de voir la France proclamer qu'elle souhaite mettre un terme à la coupure de l'Allemagne. Il est pourtant évident que se résigner à la coupure définitive de l'Allemagne c'est se résigner à la divisions permanente de l'Europe.

三年多以來，西方三大國曾一再向蘇聯建議組織自由選舉，俾便成立一個可能參與和約起草工作的德國政府，但我們未能對基本原則取得協議；這個基本原則是德國的統一應建立在自由的基礎上。否則，德國統一的恢復不僅不能對國際形勢的緩和有所貢獻，相反的，將使國際形勢更趨嚴重，並且會帶來新的不安全與不穩定的因素。

因此也應該讓新的德國政府自己決定是否應加入歐洲機構。

十分明顯，德國問題在歐洲之外就不能獲得解決，反過來說，若德國在歐洲內沒有它的地位也就無歐洲之可言。

這兩個論點也說明了蘇聯的政策。蘇聯比任何國家都更瞭解，德國是歐洲問題的中心，並宣稱該問題也是西方一切矛盾的癥結。

分裂德國是控制歐洲的一個手段，就是說使歐洲處於動盪不安和軟弱無力的狀態之中。對於這種動盪不安的局面所以延長的情形今天我不想多加解釋。

一個既武裝而又中立的德國是由別人提出而我們沒有參與的奇特建議。根據這個建議，德國將會迅速地受到極危險的誘惑。

把一個具有德國那樣力量的國家中立化，是一個欺人的觀念。這不啻要「拍賣」一個大國。不管這個大國政府的罪行如何，也不能這樣任人宰割。

中立政策無可避免地會導致合縱連橫的政策。那麼，衝突的危機就會由於一個冒昧的企圖而加深。宣傳中的抨擊是很巧妙的，其中有一種妨害我們努力的說法是：冷戰是由重新武裝開始的，並說祇要中立化的德國恢復統一，就可以像變幻術似的一下子解決了所有的問題。

事實上，在一個統一的歐洲範圍之內實行重新武裝德國的計劃是一九五〇年秋季才開始的，而「冷戰」則開始於一九四七年。

必須很好加以證實的是：德國的分裂是歐洲和世界分裂的結果。這是惡化的結果而不是惡化的原因。

Depuis plus de trois ans les puissances occidentales ont saisi l'U.R.S.S. de propositions répétées relatives à l'organisation d'élections libres en vue de former un gouvernement allemand susceptible de participer à l'élaboration d'un traité de paix. Nous ne pouvons transiger sur le principe fondamental, selon lequel l'unité allemande doit être rétablie dans la liberté. S'il en était autrement le rétablissement de l'unité allemande, loin de contribuer à la détente, constituerait une aggravation de la situation internationale et apporterait un nouvel élément d'insécurité et d'instabilité.

Il faudrait aussi, que le nouveau gouvernement allemand puisse décider lui-même s'il adhère ou non aux organismes européens.

Il n'existe pas de toute évidence de solution au problème allemand en dehors de l'Europe, et, inversement, il ne saurait y avoir d'Europe sans que l'Allemagne y trouve sa place.

Ces deux données expliquent aussi la politique de l'U.R.S.S. L'Union soviétique sait mieux que quiconque que l'Allemagne est au cœur du problème européen et proclame qu'elle est aussi le noeud des contradictions de l'Occident.

La division de l'Allemagne est un moyen de tenir l'Europe, c'est-à-dire de la maintenir en état d'incertitude, donc de faiblesse. Je ne souhaite pas expliquer aujourd'hui les conditions dans lesquelles cette incertitude fut prolongée.

Quant à une Allemagne armée et neutralisée, suivant des suggestions singulières auxquelles nous n'avons pas de part, elle serait très vite exposée aux plus dangereuses tentations.

La neutralisation d'un pays disposant d'un potentiel aussi important que le sien est une conception fallacieuse qui reviendrait à mettre aux enchères un grand pays qui, quels qu'aient pu être les crimes de ses gouvernements, ne saurait être ainsi mis à l'encan.

La politique de neutralité conduit inévitablement à la politique de bascule. Ainsi les risques de conflit s'accroîtraient d'une tentative hasardée. Une des critiques, fort habiles, de la propagande qui met en cause notre effort a été d'avancer que le réarmement était à l'origine de la guerre froide, et qu'il suffirait de rétablir l'unité d'une Allemagne neutralisée pour résoudre tous les problèmes d'un coup de baguette magique.

En fait le projet de réarmement des Allemands dans une Europe intégrée date de l'automne 1950, et la guerre froide dure depuis 1947.

Il faut bien constater que la coupure de l'Allemagne est une conséquence de la division de l'Europe et du monde. C'est l'effet, non la cause du mal.

若要在自由的基礎上恢復德國的統一，就必須結束歐洲的分裂狀態。

明顯地，現在是恢復關於對奧和約的談判來逐漸取消這種分裂狀態的時刻了。上述解決辦法首先為奧國人民所十分歡迎，也是為歐洲所十分歡迎的。

這一個由於世界分裂而陷入僵局的問題，也許是以一國為範圍的問題中最容易解決的一個；如果這個問題都能解決，那末，也許這就是第一個能夠使我們認為將要發生真正的轉機的因素。

肯定地提出來的問題是在原則上相矛盾的兩種制度和和平共處的問題。幾十年來共處是肯定了，但無人相信這種肯定是出乎誠意的。事實上有好幾種共處的方式：如馬與騎士、獄吏與囚徒、獵物與獵人間的共處方式。

問題既不是一個辯證的問題，也不是一個理論的問題，而是在於別人是否接受不進行征服這一點，不然就無共處可言了。

我們也相信和平共處是可能的，共處不一定在西方會使情況惡化，而在東方便是一種手段或一種步驟。在和平中共處意味着不安情緒的消失；共處有別於爭取喘息時間。

共處事實上就是共同相處，也就是承認別人的存在。和平不是建立在「不能容忍」的基礎上的。幾十年前蘇聯僅受到西方事實上的承認。誰也沒有忘記這個時期，這是我們知道的。

我們曾在一個記憶猶新的戰鬥中共處。如果不是由於狂熱和壓制阻撓了善良意願的道路，則偉大事業的建立是當已可能。在締造這種偉大事業時全世界人民都有他們的一份，例如把原子能發展成為有利於和平的事業，製訂一個為全人類謀福利的發展計劃，這既不是自私的，也不是空想的計劃。一個偉大的任務等待着一切有善良意志的人們。這個運動會使一心為了將來的人們間的合作減少困難。如果說這是一個夢的話，這樣的夢也是一個美麗的夢。我們要為地球上所有的人們共同來做一些事情，是否要毀滅明天或使明天更兄弟般地友好，更合乎正義，這就祇靠我們自己來選擇了。

(譯自一九五三年四月二十四日法國「世界報」)

Pour rétablir l'unité allemande dans la liberté il faudra mettre fin à la coupure de l'Europe.

L'occasion se présente précisément d'atténuer cette coupure grâce à une reprise des négociations sur le traité autrichien. Un tel règlement est éminemment souhaitable pour le peuple autrichien d'abord, et aussi pour l'Europe.

Si ce problème, le moins difficile peut-être parmi ceux de dimension nationale, que la division du monde laisse en suspens, pouvait être résolu ce serait un premier élément permettant de penser qu'un changement véritable peut intervenir.

Le problème posé est en définitive celui de la coexistence pacifique de deux régimes qui sont contradictoires en leur principe. Voilà des décades que cette coexistence est affirmée sans que personne ait jamais été convaincu que l'affirmation soit sincère. Il y a en effet plusieurs modes de coexistence: le cheval et le cavalier, le géôlier et le prisonnier, le gibier et le chasseur, coexistent.

Le problème n'est pas un problème de dialectique ni de théorie. Il s'agit de savoir si on accepte de ne pas conquérir, sans quoi il n'y a plus de coexistence.

Nous croyons nous aussi que la coexistence pacifique est possible, non pas certes une coexistence qui serait à l'Occident un pis-aller et à l'Orient une manœuvre et une étape. La coexistence dans la paix signifie l'absence d'inquiétude: elle est autre chose qu'un répit.

Coexister c'est en réalité exister ensemble, c'est reconnaître l'existence d'autrui. La paix ne se fonde pas sur l'intolérance. Il y a quelques décades l'Union soviétique n'était reconnue à l'Ouest que comme un fait. Personne n'a oublié cette époque, nous le savons.

Nous avons coexisté dans un combat dont nous n'avons pas perdu la mémoire. Si le fanatisme et la contrainte ne venaient pas au travers de la route des bonnes volontés de grandes œuvres deviendraient possibles, à l'édification desquelles tous les peuples auraient leur part. Développer l'énergie atomique pour la paix, faire un plan d'expansion pour l'humanité entière, ne sont pas des projets égoïstes ni chimériques. Une tâche immense attend les hommes de bonne volonté. Le mouvement devrait rendre moins difficile la collaboration de ceux qui ont de l'avenir dans l'esprit. Si c'est un rêve c'est un beau rêve. Il y a quelque chose à faire en commun pour tous sur une terre qu'il dépend seulement de nous de détruire demain ou de rendre demain pour tous plus fraternelle et plus juste.

(Le Monde, 24 avril 1953)

(第七號)

拉尼埃[●] 要求授權組閣的演說 (節錄)

一九五三年六月二十六日

LA DÉCLARATION D'INVESTITURE DE M. JOSEPH LANIEL (EXTRAITS)

le 26 juin 1953

在百慕大會議的前夕，法國的外交政策並不是要臨時訂的政策，而是以繼續忠實於我們的大西洋聯盟為其特色的。

議會於時機成熟時，勢必對歐洲防務集團條約草案表明立場，就是說：在薩爾問題的解決獲得保證、解釋性的議定書獲得簽訂，並在與英國正在進行的談判達成協議之後。

參照從今天到那時候的事態發展，議會將自由地負起自己的責任，如同政府將負起其責任一樣。

關於歐洲政治機構的計劃，現在正由政府加以研究，日後將提交議會。

法國對於四國會議或三國會議的計劃已經數度表明態度。

我國願意抓住任何一個認真的機會來改善國際氣氛，並願意與任何一個切實證明其善意的人進行商談，這可以說是無庸重複的了。

爲了保衛印度支那聯邦成員國的獨立和爲了自由人民的共同事業而由法國單獨擔負的責任，是過於沉重了。

這個問題將在百慕大會議上提出。

印度支那聯邦成員國的人民祇有當強大的國民軍保證了其領土的防務以後，才會充分體會到他們的獨立。目前印度支那聯邦成員國中存在着政治上的不安定。我們的義務將是在互相充分諒解的精神下，將這種不安定的情緒迅速清除。

提到印度支那，我不能不以議會全體名義向在那裏作戰的部隊的忘我精神和英勇氣概致敬。

A la veille de la conférence des Bermudes, notre politique extérieure n'est pas une politique à improviser. Elle continue à être caractérisée par la fidélité à notre alliance atlantique.

Le Parlement aura à se prononcer sur le projet de Communauté européenne de défense le jour venu, c'est-à-dire après la certitude obtenue d'un règlement de la question sarroise, la signature des protocoles interprétatifs et la conclusion d'accords en cours avec la Grande-Bretagne.

Il prendra librement ses responsabilités, comme le gouvernement prendra les siennes, compte tenu de l'évolution des faits d'ici cette date.

En ce qui concerne le projet d'autorité politique européenne, il est à l'étude du gouvernement. Il sera soumis à l'Assemblée.

La France a eu plusieurs fois l'occasion de définir sa position à l'égard des projets de conférence à quatre ou de conférence à trois.

Il est à peine besoin de répéter que notre pays est prêt à saisir toute chance sérieuse d'améliorer le climat international et à recourir aux conversations avec un interlocuteur qui aurait donné des preuves tangibles de sa bonne volonté.

La charge que la France assume pour la défense de l'indépendance des Etats associés, et pour la cause commune des peuples libres, est trop lourde pour elle seule.

La question sera posée à la conférence des Bermudes.

Les peuples des Etats associés n'auront pleinement le sentiment de leur indépendance que lorsqu'une grande armée nationale assurera la défense de leur territoire. Il existe un malaise politique. Notre devoir sera de le dissiper rapidement dans un esprit de pleine compréhension mutuelle.

Je ne saurais parler de l'Indochine sans saluer, en votre nom à tous, l'abnégation et l'héroïsme des troupes qui combattent là-bas.

● 法國總理。

對於這個血腥的戰爭，誰敢在這個講台上說，一旦出現了可能性而自己預備盡一切力量來加以結束？不論是在朝鮮停戰協定簽字後接着進行的談判中，或是通過其他一切經各印度支那聯邦成員國政府同意後舉行的談判，我國政府將不懈地謀求結束這個戰爭的可能性。

Cette guerre sanglante, qui donc oserait dire à cette tribune qu'il n'appliquerait pas toute son énergie à y mettre fin si la possibilité s'en offrait? Cette possibilité, mon gouvernement s'emploiera inlassablement à la rechercher, que ce soit au cours des négociations qui suivraient la signature d'un armistice en Corée ou par toute autre négociation menée en accord avec les gouvernements des Etats associés.

(譯自一九五三年六月二十七日法國「世界報」)

(Le Monde, 27 juin 1953)

(第八號)

戴高樂在記者招待會上關於與蘇聯和平協商的聲明（節錄）

一九五三年十一月十二日

LA DÉCLARATION DU GÉNÉRAL DE GAULE À LA CONFÉRENCE DE PRESSE AU SUJET D'ENTENTE PACIFIQUE AVEC L'UNION SOVIÉTIQUE (EXTRAITS)

le 12 novembre 1953

自從共產黨加入戰鬥並形成一種威脅以後，情形就變了，至少在美國方面是如此。美國認識到它在德黑蘭、雅爾塔、波茨坦所犯的錯誤，因此建議在馬歇爾計劃和北大西洋條約的名義下結成經濟和軍事的同盟。

Et, dès lors que ces communistes entraient en ligne et se dressaient comme une menace, la perspective changeait, du moins en ce qui concerne les Etats-Unis d'Amérique. Ceux-ci, reconnaissant alors leurs fautes, leurs erreurs de Téhéran, d'Yalta, de Potsdam, sont venus proposer leur alliance économique et militaire sous les vocables de plan Marshall et du pacte de l'Atlantique nord.

接受這種同盟，組織這種同盟是好的。因為我們已經受到了威脅，但是這種同盟應當是一種真正的同盟。可是，由於我們政權不健全，這種同盟却成了一種保護制度。

Cette alliance, il était bon de l'accepter, de la faire, parce que nous étions menacés, mais il fallait qu'elle fût une alliance. L'inconsistance de notre régime a fait en somme qu'elle soit une espèce de protectorat.

我們至少有保護人對我們保護的一些保證嗎？一點也沒有。因為沒有任何東西可以強使美國在歐洲保持一定數量的軍隊；沒有任何東西使美國在必要時增援它已經駐在歐洲的軍隊；當美國要保護其他地方，例如要保護它自己的領土的時候，也沒有任何東西使它有義務來保護我們的領土。

Avons-nous du moins la garantie que ce protecteur nous protégera? Pas du tout. Car rien n'impose aux Etats-Unis d'entretenir en Europe des forces déterminées; rien ne les oblige à renforcer éventuellement les forces qu'ils y ont mises, et rien ne les engage à défendre notre territoire s'il leur convient d'en défendre un autre: par exemple tout simplement le leur. . . .

現在是恢復自己的控制力的時候了。第一項任務是探尋與蘇維埃世界有否成立協議的可能性，而法國是完全有資格來探尋這種可能性的。

Il est temps de se ressaisir. Le premier devoir est de rechercher s'il y a ou non un arrangement possible avec le monde des Soviets, et la France est parfaitement qualifiée pour cette recherche.

同時，我剛才已說過，歐洲應當以建立歐洲邦聯的方法來完成它的防禦任務。在這個歐洲邦聯中

En même temps il faut que l'Europe complète ses moyens de défense par l'établissement de la confédération européenne dont j'ai parlé

德國將有它的地位，英國也應當參加。同時與美國同盟應當這樣改弦易轍來進行，即：首先應符合於我國的獨立，其次也應符合於我國在歐洲、非洲、亞洲的大國地位。

答記者問

問：您說過應當與蘇維埃世界商談，並說法國尤其有資格這樣做，您是否願意把您對這問題的想
法明確一下？

答：據我所知，法國在莫斯科、華沙、布拉格、布達佩斯、布加勒斯特、索非亞都有大使。反過來說，蘇聯、波蘭、捷克斯洛伐克、匈牙利、羅馬尼亞、保加利亞也有大使駐在法國。

在另一方面，在德國威脅的假設下，法國一直是俄國的盟國。

最後，法國是目前唯一有軍隊仍在與共產黨部隊作戰的世界大國。

這些就是法國特別有資格進行或接受商談的理由。

這當然應了解為不是引起情緒激動和宣傳的聳人聽聞的會議，而是通過慎重的和準確的積極外交途徑進行的商談。

(譯自一九五三年十一月十四日法國「世界報」)

tout à l'heure, où l'Allemagne trouvera sa place et dont la Grande-Bretagne doit faire partie. Il faut aussi que l'alliance américaine soit reprise de manière à l'accorder d'abord avec notre indépendance, et puis également avec notre situation de puissance européenne, africaine et asiatique.

Les réponses aux questions des journalistes

Question: Vous avez parlé du devoir de converser avec le monde soviétique et du fait que la France est particulièrement qualifiée pour le faire. Voudriez-vous préciser votre pensée à ce sujet?

Réponse: La France a, que je sache, des ambassadeurs à Moscou, à Varsovie, à Prague, à Budapest, à Bucarest, à Sofia. Inversement, des ambassadeurs russe, polonais, tchèque, hongrois, roumain, bulgare, sont accrédités chez elle.

D'autre part la France est toujours l'alliée de la Russie dans l'hypothèse d'une menace allemande.

Enfin la France est la seule puissance du monde dont l'armée combatte en ce moment contre les forces communistes.

Voilà les raisons qui qualifient particulièrement la France pour entamer ou accepter des conversations.

Il doit s'agir bien entendu non pas de conférences spectaculaires, menées à grand renfort d'émotions et de propagande, mais de conversations par la voie discrète et précise d'une diplomatie active.

(Le Monde, le 14 novembre 1953)

(第九號)

皮杜爾[●] 在法國國民議會關於外交政策的演說(節錄)

一九五三年十一月二十日

SPEECH BY GEORGES BIDAULT AT FRENCH
NATIONAL ASSEMBLY ON FOREIGN POLICY
(EXCERPTS)

November 20, 1953

美國的保證

舉例：美國的駐兵

國民議會在一九五二年二月的議事日程上強調需要一個「保證，這種保證的兌現方法是在表明爲必要的時期內在大陸上保持充分的美英部隊。」

既然談到這點，我可以更無拘束地說明由於美國計劃撤退駐歐美軍所引起的激昂情緒，這種撤退將會在歐洲防務集團的掩飾之下來實行。結論可能是：如果我們要留住美國人，我們就得反對歐洲防務集團。

但是關於問題的本質，我們必須說明美國的地位的演變。

溫斯頓·邱吉爾爵士在他的「大戰回憶錄」中追述了已故羅斯福總統在雅爾塔說的話，說明問題的開端。邱吉爾寫道：羅斯福「在這首次會議中發表了一個重要聲明。他強調指出：美國願意採取一切合理的措施來維護和平，但是不願意長期在距本國五千公里以外的歐洲駐紮一支大軍。因此，美國的佔領將以兩年爲限。」

我們業已遠超過了這個期限。一九五〇年以來，歐洲集團的計劃在美國輿論中已進展到一種程度，足證美國是一個善於接受新思想的國家。

● 法國外交部長。

AMERICAN GUARANTIES

Example: the American presence.

In its order of the day of February, 1952, the National Assembly placed the accent on the need for a "guaranty materialized by the maintenance for as long as may appear necessary, of sufficient American and British forces on the Continent."

Having said that, I am all the more free to mention the emotion that was aroused by American plans for the withdrawal of American troops stationed in Europe, a withdrawal that would be carried out under cover of the European Defense Community. A conclusion could be: if we want to keep the Americans, let us reject the European Defense Community.

But on the substance of the question, the evolution of the American position must be underlined.

The war memoirs of Sir Winston Churchill indicate the point of departure by recalling what (the late) President Roosevelt said at Yalta: "Roosevelt," writes Sir Winston Churchill, "had in the course of this first meeting made an important declaration. He had underlined that the United States would take all reasonable measures to preserve peace, without, however, going as far as maintaining permanently in Europe a large army which would thus be 5,000 kilometers away from its own country; American occupation would therefore be limited to two years."

We have gone beyond that, and since 1950 the project of a European Community has progressed in American opinion to a point worthy of a country which is receptive to new ideas.

很清楚，將德國部隊併入歐洲防務集團，無論如何，在現在或過去祇能是意味着一種增添的力量，而不是代替的力量。我們在這方面已得到公開的保證。

德國的中立化

建議來代替防務集團的辦法是些什麼呢？

把德國中立化嗎？顯然那是抵消了它參加共同防務的作用，甚至是抵消了它答應參加共同防務的作用。

而且，這將強迫大西洋集團的軍隊撤離德國。這樣劇烈地改變我們一向要求「儘可能推向東方」的戰略，哪能不導致重大的退却呢？人們能很容易想像到：德國的「中立化」以及依照蘇聯一九五二年三月十日提出最近又重提的德國重新武裝的辦法[●]，是把萊茵河邊界暴露在外，並實際上導致放棄大陸本身。

另外一個代替辦法是大西洋式的辦法，讓德國在大西洋組織的範圍內重新武裝起來，以便參加歐洲的防務。

那麼，關於德國在軍事上參加歐洲防務問題，我們的——為德聯邦政府所贊同的——保證又怎樣呢？

條約的限制條款

這裏，需要再一次注意巴黎條約的限制條款：現役兵額的限制、部隊後勤供應的合併、共同軍備計劃、第一〇七條所預見的有關「戰略暴露」區域及開列的武器的限制，這些武器包括：原子、化學及生物武器、長距離武器、定向飛彈、埋伏地雷、小型防禦艦隻以外的軍艦。在附在條約後的一封信中，聯邦共和國總理以德意志聯邦共和國的名義聲明：他的政府不認為這項條款適用於德國是含有歧視之意。

關於德國在大西洋條約體系中重新武裝，我們發現有什麼限制呢？

● 指蘇聯政府一九五二年三月十日對德和約草案；該草案於一九五三年八月十五日蘇聯致美、英、法三國照會時再度附送。草案全文見本輯「德國問題」類，第八十一頁。

It is clear that the integration of German forces in the European Defense Community can and could mean in any event but an addition and not a substitution. We have received public assurances in this respect.

NEUTRALIZATION OF GERMANY

What are the solutions proposed as a substitute to the Defense Community?

The neutralization of Germany? Evidently that is the negotiation[sic] of its participation in the common defense, even of its commitment to that participation.

Furthermore, it involves the compulsory departure from Germany of the Atlantic forces. This revolution in a strategy that we have always called for "as far East as possible," what retreat does it not risk to involve? One can easily imagine it: the "neutralization" of Germany and, according to the Soviet formula of March 10, 1952, recently renewed of a rearmed Germany, leaves uncovered the Rhine frontier and leads practically to the abandonment of the Continent itself.

Another substitute formula: the Atlantic solution. Germany participating in the European defense by rearming within the frame of the Atlantic organization.

But then what becomes of the guaranties we want, in agreement with the federal government, in regard to German military participation?

LIMITING CLAUSES OF TREATY

Once again it is necessary here to note the limiting clauses of the Treaty of Paris: limitation of the effectives, integration of the logistic support of the forces, common armament program, restrictions foreseen in Article 107 concerning the "strategically exposed" regions and relating to the weapons listed which include: the atomic, chemical and biological weapons, long-range weapons, guided missiles, booby trap mines, warships other than the small defensive vessels. In a letter annexed to the treaty, the Chancellor of the Federal Republic, in the name of the German Federal Republic, has declared that his government does not consider the application to Germany of that article as discriminatory.

What restrictions do we find in regard to German rearmament within the Atlantic context?

在大西洋條約體系中，各國權利平等的意義是可以自由發展力量，可直接談判外國在武器和裝備方面的援助，不禁止在某些地區製造某些東西。

並且，也沒有任何東西阻止大西洋組織的成員國在北大西洋條約組織以外成立師團。

歐洲防務集團則規定了一個限制，德國祇能在這限制以內活動。如果我們超出這個限制，那麼要想支持一種對各國的地理形勢所加的特殊限制將是辦不到的。

因此，這就不是一個在我們所關心的大西洋組織的保證和歐洲防務集團的保證二者之間選擇其一的問題，而是要在歐洲防務集團條約的保證和沒有保證二者之間選擇其一的問題。

我還要加一句——雖然前面已說過——德國以完全的資格加入大西洋條約，就意味着聯邦政府有權對於應否在德國駐紮軍隊的問題有發言權。這就是說，法國東部安全的鑰匙將要握在龐大的德國參謀本部的手裏。

國民議會一九五二年二月十九日的議事日程中事實上包括了下列的建議：「允許德國參加歐洲防務集團問題決不可以和它加入大西洋組織問題連在一起。」議會至少對於這個代替辦法已經表明了自己的態度。

拒絕的後果

我們尚未開始辯論批准問題，但是，現在就想一想不批准的後果如何，為時也不為過早。

在這種情況下，德國重新武裝的問題仍然存在。

我們勢將要同強硬的代表重新舉行談判。我們是否能夠保持像第一〇七條中所包括的不允許德國製造某些產品的規定呢？運氣好或許可以，但我不主張冒這個險。

這話也同樣適用於和歐洲防務集團條約相聯繫的波恩協定。難道人們不相信聯邦共和國最關心的事情將是取消它在這兩個條約中所承諾的限制嗎？（在波恩協定中）。

換句話說，聯邦共和國在舉行新談判中，將不受任何束縛，並且當然不會再接受限制。

In the Atlantic context, equality of rights signifies the free development of forces, the direct negotiation of foreign aid for armament and equipment, the absence of bans for certain manufactures in certain zones.

Furthermore, nothing prevents the states members of the Atlantic organization from forming divisions outside of NATO.

The European Defense Community establishes a limitation: the only one in which Germany can move. If we go outside of this, it is vain to pretend to back particular restrictions on the geographic situation of the different countries.

It is not therefore a question of choosing between the guaranties, in which we are interested, of the Atlantic organization and those of the European Defense Community, but between the guaranties of the European Defense Community treaty and the absence of guaranties.

I will add, having previously said so, that the full entry of Germany into the Atlantic pact would mean that the federal government would have a voice in whether troops should be stationed in Germany; that is to say that the keys of French security in the East would be in the hands of a large German general staff.

The order of the day of the National Assembly of Feb. 19, 1952, as a matter of fact includes this recommendation: "In no case is the admission of Germany to the European Defense Community linked to its entry into the Atlantic organization." On this substitute solution at least, the Assembly has already pronounced itself.

CONSEQUENCES OF A REFUSAL

We have not yet reached the debate on ratification. It is not too soon, however, to reflect on the consequences of a negative decision.

In this case the problem of German rearmament would remain.

There would be fresh negotiations with tough negotiators. Would we be in a position to maintain dispositions like those contained in Article 107 which do not permit Germany to manufacture certain products. Perhaps with a little luck. I do not advise running the risk.

The same remark goes for the Bonn accords which are linked to the treaty on the European Defense Community. Cannot one believe that the principal concern of the Federal Republic will be to do away with the restrictions to which it had to consent in these two treaties? (of the Bonn accords.)

In other words, from these fresh negotiations, the Federal Republic would come out free of all ties and would, of course, accept no limitation.

這個事實沒有被注意或者它被當做無關緊要而略過去了。但是說來容易，做起來就不那麼容易。

實際上，必須在歐洲防務集團和如有些人所同意的，讓德國以一個主權國家資格並擁有一支國家軍隊加入大西洋條約，二者之間選擇其一。德國軍隊規模大小將視聯邦共和國的財力而定，而這種軍隊會很快地使德國為所欲為。

德國加入大西洋條約這件事，確是不能強迫法國接受的。在這問題上我們擁有否決權。阻止歐洲防務集團的組成，阻止德國加入北大西洋的組織，甚至阻止其他的事情都是在我們法律權限以內的。

但是，由於我們使用我們全部權力的結果，我們可能無法阻止因歐洲防務集團的失敗而造成的大西洋同盟本身的危機。

不是六國的政策

下述論據往往用來證明需要有一個政治集團：沒有共同政策就不能夠有共同軍隊。歐洲防務集團條約規定，制定這種政策之權應該交給一個新的集團。這樣的說法是符合於習慣上所稱的「政治集團」一詞的。

以上的考慮業已表明，建立一個名副其實的歐洲聯邦——即一個管理它的成員國的國際關係的主權當局——至少在目前是不可能的。

新的工具

聯合起來並不是、也不能夠是意味着用條約建立起一個新的主權，它祇是意味着創立一種新的、有效的防禦工具，並逐漸地為建立一個較大的經濟組織創造條件，沒有這種組織，國家的經濟將注定要死氣沉沉和萎靡不振。

我們不會考慮在歐洲大陸上建立一個忽視下列兩個基本現實的組織；這兩個基本現實就是：法蘭西聯邦，以及法國不僅是，甚至不能主要是一個歐

This fact has passed without mention or as being insignificant. But it is less easy to act than to speak.

In reality, it is necessary to choose between the European Defense Community and the entry, accepted by some, into the Atlantic pact of a sovereign Germany with a national army, the size of which would depend alone on the financial possibilities of the Federal Republic, and which would quickly put it in a position of doing what it wanted.

Certainly the entry of Germany into the Atlantic pact cannot be imposed on France. We have a right of veto in this case. It is within our juridical power to prevent the formation of the European Defense Community, to prevent the entry of Germany into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and even to prevent other things.

But it is possible that as a result of the use we might make of all our powers we would not be able to prevent the failure of the EDC from opening up a crisis in the Atlantic alliance itself.

NOT POLICY OF 6 STATES

The necessity of a political community is sometimes justified by the following argument: there can be no common army without a common policy. The definition of this policy, which is provided for in the EDC, should be entrusted to a new community. This presentation of the matter is in line with the phrase, consecrated by usage of "political community."

These considerations already suggest that a European federation in the proper sense of the term, that is a sovereign authority controlling the international relations of its member states, is not within the domain of possibility, at least for the present.

NEW INSTRUMENT

To unite does not and cannot mean to set up by treaty a new sovereignty, but to forge a new and efficient instrument of defense and to create progressively the conditions for a larger economic organization, without which national economies would be condemned to stagnation and decline...

There can be no question of us building an edifice on the European continent which would ignore the two fundamental realities, the French Union, and the fact that France is not solely, and

洲的國家。因此，我們不考慮可能危及——那怕祇是一時地危及——法國海外領土及法蘭西集團內成員國的利益的解決辦法。

在這一點上我必須斬釘截鐵地這樣說。建立這個集團的條約的規定必須完全保證法蘭西聯邦的完整、團結和利益，因此，當然也包括：共和國的完整、團結與利益以及組成共和國的人民的權利。……

而且，我幾乎無須指出，為法蘭西共和國的不可分割的原則在我看來是無形的。我甚至也可以說，法蘭西聯邦的不可分割性也是如此；就是說，我決心不忽視印度支那聯邦成員國，不僅是不忽視摩洛哥和突尼斯而已。既然已經說明了這一點，就可以明白，當法國政府現在簽訂或過去簽訂條約時，它是代表整個共和國的，甚至有時也可以代表法蘭西聯邦，假若聯邦的主管機構授權給它的話。但是，這決不包含這些條約的各款必然適用於法蘭西共和國或法蘭西聯邦的所有領土。……

集團的觀念

六國外長給政治集團下了下述的定義，法國政府對這個定義曾表示完全同意：

「將建立一個由主權國家組成的集團，這個集團將行使現有的條約所規定的或將來的條約所可能規定的超國家的職務，以謀各自的及共同的利益。……」

不必再多談，便已能夠從這個定義中得出下述原則：政治集團的成員國都是「主權國家」，即各國在一切事項上都有最後決定之權。其次，政治集團不是一個具有一般權限的國家，而是一個具有特殊的、有限的、專門化的權限的政治機構……它並不是聯邦……也不是邦聯……而是一個新型的國家的聯合……

諸位先生，我剛才約略談過這個政策，和關於它的困難、努力和希望。這個政策的繼續執行是依靠着兩個支柱，即大西洋條約和歐洲的基礎。

cannot even be principally, a European power. We therefore set aside all solutions which would risk jeopardizing, were it only for a time, the interests of overseas France and the states grouped within the French ensemble.

On this point I shall be categorical. It is indispensable that the provisions of the treaty creating the community should be such as to safeguard completely the integrity, cohesion and the interests of the French Union, and, therefore, of course, those of the Republic, as well as the rights of the persons who compose them. . .

Furthermore, I need hardly say that the principle of the indivisibility of the French Republic is for me intangible. I would even say that of the indivisibility of the French Union, that is to say that I am resolved not to ignore the Associated States of Indo-China, no more than Morocco and Tunisia. That said, it is clear that when the French government signs, or has signed, treaties, it does it in the name of the Republic as a whole, and may even do so, on occasions in the name of the French Union if the competent bodies of the Union authorize it. But this does in no way imply that the clauses of these treaties should necessarily be applied in all the territories of the French Republic or the Union. . .

IDEA OF COMMUNITY

The six Foreign Ministers gave the following definition of the political community, to which the French government gave complete agreement:

“There shall be created a community of sovereign states which in the interest of each and all shall exercise super-national functions defined by existing treaties or which might result from future treaties. . .”

Without going further it is already possible to deduce from this definition the following principles: the member states of the political community are *sovereign states*, that is, each will be empowered to have the last word in all matters; secondly, the political community will not be a state, having general competence, but a political body having special, limited and “specialized” competences. . . It will not be a federation of states . . . nor a confederation of states . . . but an association of states of a novel type. . .

The continuity of the policy which I have just outlined, Messieurs, with its difficulties, its efforts and its hopes, rests on two pillars: the Atlantic pact and the European foundation.

這個政策是依照防務、經濟、勞工、社會進步及文化等主要方面對我們提出的組織上的需要而制訂的；它籲請西方團結起來，自由的人民團結起來。

問題在於要知道：我們是否不論有什麼保證都不讓德國參加這個集團而預備改變政策呢？

已經想到的唯一的政策改變，就是要把各種的支持辦法取消，而這最後將以西歐的中立代替西歐的防務。

這個轉變的辦法是建立在一種前提上，這個前提可以綜簡述如下：蘇聯並不構成對自由世界的威脅，而且它的政策有了極大的修正；建立更多的師是沒有用處的，因為無論如何它也不夠和蘇聯陸軍抗衡；因此，就需要覓取和蘇聯直接諒解的條件。

所有這一切——人們還說——並不等於取消同盟條約，難道你們忘記了法蘇條約嗎？

法蘇條約

恰恰相反，我有許多理由要記住它，我甚至還要重讀一下它的序言：

「兩國政府……

「深信：一旦獲得勝利之後，要把和平重建在穩固的基礎之上並於將來恆久保持，必須兩國之間以及與一切聯合國家密切合作，這是生存的條件；

「兩國決意彼此合作，以建立一個國際安全體系，這種體系將允許以有效方法維持普遍和平並保證各民族間的關係和諧地發展起來……」

這個條約簽訂的日期是一九四四年十二月十日。

一九四五年二月在我們沒有參加的雅爾塔會議上，斯大林祇是在極度勉強之下才同意了法國參加對德管制。

在一九四五年倫敦會議上，蘇聯代表團要想不讓我們參加對於中歐和平問題的辯論。

魯爾問題呢？蘇聯所以考慮我們的建議，祇是因為它看到其中有機會可以把它的勢力擴大到易北河的界線以外。

This policy is conceived in accordance with the organizational necessities which are presented to us on all the vital planes: defense, economy, labor and social progress, and culture. It solicits the solidarity of the West and the solidarity of the free peoples.

The question is to know whether, by refusing to associate Germany with it, whatever may be the guaranties, we envisage a change of policy.

The only one that has been thought up entails the overthrow of the supports, and it ends with the replacement of Western Europe's defense by its neutralization.

This formula of a switch is established on premises that may be thus summed up: the Soviet Union does not constitute a danger for the free world, and, moreover, there is a radical modification in its policy; it is useless to create more divisions, which, in any case, will be insufficient to counter-balance the Russian Army; it is therefore necessary to seek the conditions of an understanding directly with the U.S.S.R.

All that, it is added, is not a renouncement of alliances—have you forgotten the Franco-Soviet pact?

FRANCO-SOVIET PACT

On the contrary, I have every reason for remembering it. I am even going to reread its preamble:

“The two governments. . .

“Convinced that once victory is won, the re-establishment of peace on a stable basis and its maintenance for a durable future call, as a condition of existence, for close collaboration between themselves and with all the United Nations.

“Being determined to collaborate in order to create an international system of security which will permit the effective maintenance of general peace and guarantee the harmonious development of relations between peoples. . .”

The pact is dated Dec. 10, 1944.

In February, 1945, the Yalta conference, at which we were not present: Stalin accepts the participation of France in the control of Germany only with great reluctance.

September, 1945, the London conference: the Soviet delegation tries to exclude us from the debates on peace in Central Europe.

The question of the Ruhr? The U.S.S.R. takes our proposals into consideration only because it sees therein an opportunity to extend its influence past the limits of the Elbe.

在薩爾問題上，它拒絕支持我們。

你們可以看到，就蘇聯的支持而論——我很遺憾地提到這點——這就是一九四五年到一九四七年間這個條約發展的情況。

蘇聯的合作

下面是在這同一時期內蘇聯和盟國合作尋求安全體系的情形：

一九四六年四月，貝爾納斯先生向蘇俄提出了一個保證德國廢除軍備和解除武裝的條約。

莫洛托夫先生拒絕了這個建議。

一九四七年四月，馬歇爾將軍重新提出了這個建議，將擬議的條約的期限延長為四十年。這又遭到了拒絕。蘇聯不要集體保證，而要維持萊茵公告中所規定的對德國內政的干涉。

一九四七年七月，馬歇爾計劃提供了一個選擇贊成或反對歐洲和世界的團結的機會，但莫洛托夫說：「不」。

因此，諸位先生，在蘇聯的心目中法蘇條約似乎是够沒有價值的了。它沒有能阻止蘇聯在歐洲，正如它在全世界一樣採取它的行動，而對一九四四年所建立的關係並未給予任何特殊的注意。

這是不是說我們就有足够的理由使我們擺脫這個條約呢？

不廢棄條約

這不是我們政府的態度。政府認為即使這個條約沒有發揮所希望的效力，我們仍應尊重它。政府始終聲明這點，今天又加以重申。

十二月十日的條約對我們有些什麼約束呢？

一件是（第二條）：「不與希特勒政府或為繼續或支持德國侵略政策而在德國成立之任何政府或當局締結停戰協定或和平協定。」

這義務是我們一直遵守的，將來仍繼續加以遵守。

另外一件事（第三條）：「在現在對德戰爭結束後，共同採取一切必要措施以消除任何來自德國之新威脅，並阻止使德國有可能從事新侵略企圖之任何行動。」

For the Saar, it refuses to give us its support.

There you have, as far as Soviet support is concerned—and I regret to note it—the development of the pact in the years 1945-1947.

SOVIET COLLABORATION

And here, during the same period, is what Soviet collaboration has been with the Allies in their quest for a system of security:

In April, 1946, Mr. Byrnes offered Soviet Russia a treaty guaranteeing the demilitarization and disarmament of Germany.

Mr. Molotov rejected the proposal.

In April, 1947, Gen. Marshall renewed this offer, extending the duration of the proposed treaty to 40 years. This was met by a new refusal: to a collective guaranty, the U.S.S.R. preferred to maintain the interference in Germany's internal affairs which was provided for at Potsdam.

July, 1947: the Marshall plan provided the opportunity to choose for or against the unity of Europe and the world. Molotov said no.

Thus, Messieurs, the Franco-Russian pact appears to have little enough value in the opinion of the Soviet Union. It has not prevented the latter from developing its action in Europe, as in the whole world, without any particular regard to the bonds established in 1944.

Is that enough to justify us in dissociating ourselves from this pact?

WON'T DROP PACT

That is not the position of the government. The government considers that the pact, even though it has not produced the effects hoped for, should be respected. It has always affirmed this; it reaffirms it today.

What are we bound to by the treaty of Dec. 10?

For one thing (Article 2): "Not to sign an armistice or a peace agreement with the Hitlerian government or with any other government or authority created in Germany for the purpose of prolonging or supporting the German policy of aggression."

This engagement has been kept by us. It will continue to be in the future.

For another thing (Article 3): "At the end of the present conflict with Germany, to take, in common accord, all measures necessary to eliminate any new threat coming from Germany, and to oppose any initiative of a nature to make possible a new attempt of aggression on its part."

一九四五年我們採取了一切必要的措施來消除任何新的威脅。我們是在共同一致之下採取這些措施的，當共同一致被破壞後，我們仍保持着這些措施。我們一點也沒有放棄「阻止使德國有可能從事新侵略企圖之任何行動」的義務。相反地，我們曾建議一種重新武裝的形式，而在我們看來這種形式是唯一適於阻止任何這種性質的行動的形式。

蘇聯政府似乎沒有被我們的對這問題所提出的理由所動。

但是，在這方面，我們至少和其他任何人是一樣值得的。我們想起了過去關於直接或間接侵略的一些談判。我們知道，凡是撤了兵的或空虛的地區都會吸引各式各樣的侵略。

我們準備來談一談蘇聯的安全問題。我們對於這問題經常是念念在心的。我們對它是負有責任的。我們並沒有忘記俄國人民的英勇、他們的巨大犧牲或他們的合法權利。我們僅僅是認為這種安全不應在毀滅我們自己安全的基礎上去尋覓。

誰避免接觸？

是我們設法避免與蘇聯政府接觸嗎？

去年七月十五日與蘇聯政府舉行四大國會議的邀請是在我們的倡議之下發出的。這個邀請第一次遭到拒絕，它的希望是：在討論那些迫切問題之前，還迫切地需要談談別的。我們努力記住了這個特別的觀點。我們通知蘇聯政府：德國問題的一切方面，包括歐洲安全問題在內，都可以審議。

這次努力又失敗了。我們可能從這裏面得到些什麼結論呢？從蘇聯的舉止中我們是否能夠看到希望談判的意思，除非按照祇有三加二等於五的條件之下進行呢？有沒有想到其他的會談的方法，如法蘇雙邊會談呢？這不是不可能的。

但是，假如雙邊會談的意思是指一種把我們和我們盟國孤立起來的會談，其目的和結果將是使我們和盟國分離，而建立一個代替目前正在形成的歐洲集團和已有的西方集團的法蘇集團的話，那麼我們說，這樣的一個會談是與和平的利益不相符的，並且法蘇條約也不是以這種精神締結的。

In 1945, we took all measures necessary to eliminate any new threat. We took them in common accord, and, when the common accord was broken, we maintained the measures. We have nowise abandoned the engagement to "oppose any initiative of a nature to make possible a new attempt of aggression on the part of Germany." On the contrary, we proposed the form of rearmament which appeared to us to be the only one fitted to prevent any initiative of this nature.

The Soviet government did not seem to be moved by our arguments in this regard.

But, in this field, we are at least as well posted as anybody else, and we recall certain past negotiations on aggression, direct and indirect, and we know that evacuated or empty zones are the ones that attract aggression in all its forms.

As for the security of the U.S.S.R., we are ready to talk about it. We have always borne it in mind. We are committed to it, and we have not forgotten the bravery, the immense sacrifices or the legitimate rights of the Russian people. We merely think that this security should not seek a foundation on the destruction of our own.

WHO AVOIDS CONTACT?

Are we the ones who are trying to avoid contact with the Soviet government?

It was on our initiative that, on last July 15, an invitation was sent out for a four-power conference with the government of the U.S.S.R. This invitation was refused a first time for the motive that before speaking of the urgent problems it was urgent to speak of the others. We tried to bear this special point of view in mind, and we let it be known to the Soviet government that all aspects of the German problem, including the question of security in Europe, could be examined.

This attempt failed in its turn. What conclusions could we draw from that? In the Soviet behavior, could the desire be seen to confer otherwise than in conditions in which three and two can only make five? Was a conversation of another kind thought of, a bilateral Franco-Soviet conversation? That is not an impossibility.

But, if by that is understood a conversation which would isolate us from our allies, whose purpose and result would be to separate us from them, to establish—in the place of the European community now being elaborated and the existing Western community—a Franco-Soviet community, we say that such a conversation does not conform with the interests of peace and that the Franco-Soviet pact was not concluded in that spirit.

俄國的索價

我們從蘇聯接到的最後的答覆或許構成了多年來莫斯科發出的最消極的一個答覆。它大意這樣告訴我們：「祇有當你們已經事先摧毀了你們的聯盟的基礎並同時摧毀了你們的安全的基礎的時候，我們才和你們談。」一個分裂的和毫無防禦的西歐，便是俄國所要求的進行談判的代價。這個代價甚至在還沒有坐到會議桌上就提出了。

這種措辭的令人吃驚之處，是在於它酷似蘇聯代表團一九五一年在玫瑰宮會議中所說的話。那時，負責準備四強會議議程的西方代表們接受了他們的蘇聯同僚們的全部要求。然後，葛羅米柯先生提出了一個新的要求而使會議歸於失敗。根據這個新要求，西方國家要接受關於大西洋條約及美國基地的討論。這就是說，西方國家要允許對它們自己的防禦政策進行控訴。

馬林科夫先生在他一九五三年十一月三日的照會中又重述了斯大林元帥在一九五二年所提的要求。

斯大林的原則

當人們注意到蘇聯在有關德國問題的其他重要點上——拒絕自由選舉，要求不經選舉而由指派組成臨時政府——的態度，並無改變的時候，人們會問在那兒才會發現它的根本的政治上的變化。人們記得蘇聯內部會發生變化，但是，似乎正是由於這種內部變化不定，才使莫斯科政府在國際上採取更強硬的態度。

我覺得，祇要蘇聯的政策仍繼續建立在斯大林的原則之上，則去研究蘇聯政策的基本意義似乎是多餘的。我們知道，這個原則就是「分化資本主義世界」。這是很清楚地寫出來的。我們必須記住，不相信獨裁者們用書本形式宣佈的鬥爭的意義，要付出多大的代價。

全世界的共產黨都把自己扮成民族主權的最堅強的擁護者，並不是偶然的。在法國所用的策略是利用像「滾回去」及德法世仇之類的民族主義心理。在策略家們的心目中，下一論調是不重要的。

同時在德國，他們也試圖用恢復統一、統一獨立的軍隊的完全主權——這種空中樓閣幾乎是中立主義所蒙蓋不住的——來復活德國的民族主義。民

RUSSIA'S PRICE

That last reply that we received from the Soviet Union probably constitutes the most negative that has come to us from Moscow for years. "We will only talk to you," it says to us in substance, "when you have destroyed beforehand the bases of your union at the same time as those of your security." A disunited and defenseless Western Europe is the price Russia asks to confer, and even before sitting down at the table.

What is striking in this language is its complete similarity to that spoken by the Soviet delegation in 1951 at the conference in the Palais Rose. At this period, the Western delegates who were to draw up the agenda for a four-power conference accepted the entire list of their Soviet colleague's demands. Mr. Gromyko then brought about the failure of the meeting by presenting a new demand, by which the Western powers would accept a discussion of the Atlantic pact and the American bases—that is, they would allow their own defense policy to be accused.

Mr. Malenkov restated in his note of Nov. 3, 1953, what Marshal Stalin demanded in 1952.

STALINIAN DOGMA

When one notes that on the other essential points concerning Germany—the refusal of free elections, the demand for the constitution of an appointed, not an elected, provisional government—the attitude of the Soviet Union has not changed, one wonders where the radical political modification is to be found. One remembers interior changes. But it seems that the very uncertainty of this internal evolution has caused the Moscow government further to stiffen its international attitude.

It seems superfluous to me to examine the fundamental meaning of Soviet policy so long as it remains based on the Stalinian dogma. We know that this dogma is "division of the capitalistic world." It is clearly written out, and we must remember what it costs to disbelieve dictators when they announce the meaning of the struggle in book form.

It is not accidentally that the Communist parties all over the world are showing themselves to be the strongest champions of national sovereignties. The tactics in France is to play on nationalist reflexes of the "go home" type and the hereditary enemy. And in the eyes of the tacticians, the second theme is not the essential.

An effort is made at the same time to revive nationalism in Germany by the mirage of recovered unity, of the total sovereignty of the army, one and independent—a mirage which is scarcely

族主義在萊茵河兩岸復活的結果，受損失的是歐洲，得到勝利的是共產主義。

難道還要我們說明這種主張的基本弱點嗎？它一方面侈談德國統一，而另一方面却無意放棄在做爲鐵幕門鎖的東德的地位。柏林事件以後發生的事情，在這方面是有充分的說服性的。據稱爲比歐洲防務集團更爲可取的德國國家軍隊建立的結果，祇能是一九三九年九月的重演。

不和東方站在一邊

先生們，儘管許多希望遭到破滅，但我們仍決心保持一切爲了共同利益而應該保持的蘇聯過去的好處。

但是放棄大西洋團結和歐洲，而到別處去尋找一直得不到的支持，把我們和蘇維埃社會主義共和國聯盟、中華人民共和國、中歐和東歐的民主國家聯合在一起，採用一種把世界導向我們的自由與文明的觀念所拒絕的命運的政策嗎？我們說不。至少我們不能如此。

(譯自一九五三年十一月二十三日「紐約先驅論壇報」，巴黎版)

veiled by a neutrality cause. In this revival on both sides of the Rhine there is a loser: Europe; a winner: Communism.

Need we mention the radical weakness of this position, which consists of talking continuously of German unity while having no intention of abandoning the position in East Germany, padlock of the Iron Curtain? What followed the events in Berlin is in this respect sufficiently eloquent. And the German national army, which is held as being preferable to a European Defense Community, can only end in a repetition of September, 1939.

WON'T SIDE WITH EAST

Gentlemen, we are resolved, despite the failure of many hopes, to preserve in the Soviet past all that should be preserved in the interest of all.

But to give up Atlantic solidarity and Europe, to seek elsewhere the support that has constantly failed, and to associate ourselves with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the popular republic of China, the democracies of Central and Eastern Europe, with a policy which seeks to lead the world to a destiny which we refuse in the name of our conceptions of freedom and civilization? We say no. At least, not us.

(New York Herald Tribune, Paris Edition, November 23, 1953)

(第十號)

拉尼埃[●] 在國民議會辯論外交政策時發表的演說 (節錄)

一九五三年十一月二十四日

LA DÉCLARATION DE M. JOSEPH LANIEL PENDANT LE DÉBAT SUR LA POLITIQUE ÉTRANGÈRE A L'ASSEMBLÉE NATIONALE (EXTRAITS)

le 24 novembre 1953

百慕大會議是在努力與蘇聯重行取得接觸而毫無結果的翌日才舉行的，這個失敗並不是舉行百慕大會議的決定性的原因，但是，它着重指出了這次會議的用處。

從最近莫斯科的照會中可以看出：如果我們不放棄西歐的任何性質的有效防禦，我們就沒有任何機會看到克里姆林宮會接受我們的談判的建議。這個要求是不能接受的。這一點，我們已向蘇聯說明，但我們也向蘇聯說過——我們在百慕大也不會

La rencontre des Bermudes vient au lendemain d'un effort infructueux pour reprendre contact avec l'U.R.S.S. Cet échec n'est pas la raison déterminante de la rencontre, mais il en souligne l'utilité.

Il ressort de la dernière note de Moscou qu'à moins de renoncer à toute espèce de défense efficace de l'Europe de l'Ouest il ne nous restait aucune chance de voir le Kremlin accepter nos offres de discussion. Cette exigence était inacceptable: nous l'avons dit à l'U.R.S.S., mais nous lui avons dit aussi—et nous ne l'oublierons pas

● 法國總理。

忘記的——即：我們的邀請是不會撤回的。我們深信就德國和奧地利問題舉行談判，應為更廣泛的協議鋪平道路。

為什麼我們的合理而且堅定的立場竟未被了解呢？我們既不會無限制地重新武裝德國——這是為我們所拒絕的——也不會從事旨在把德國和歐洲分裂為二的行動——我們明確地保留着重新統一的立場。我們確信與蘇聯談判是可能的。這一直是法國政策的目標，但是，要談判必須雙方都表示有此願望，並同意談判一個或數個問題。這將是我們在百慕大所採取的立場。此外，法國拒絕放棄業已進行和業已取得的一切成果。

印度支那戰爭是使法國追求談判的一個主要理由。法國希望儘早結束這個戰爭；在三個國家中，祇有法國一國尚在流血，而且這個戰爭和擴大它在歐洲所承擔的軍事上的任務是不相容的。在百慕大會議上政府將體現議會十月二十八日所表示的願望：「用一切可能辦法通過談判謀取亞洲的全面和平。」

朝鮮停戰協定證明了結束武裝衝突是可能的。朝鮮停戰應該作為全面審查遠東爭端問題的起點……與人民中國取得接觸的機會，將因朝鮮政治會議而打開。因此，政府決定用一切可能的方法來促成這一會議的召開。法國政府將在與英美兩國會談的過程中提出這一觀點……

法國政府早已着重指出朝鮮事件和印度支那事件的相互依賴性。北大西洋條約組織各成員國遠在一九五二年十二月十六日通過的決議中就認可了這種看法，該決議稱：「印度支那戰爭和朝鮮戰爭是同一個戰爭的兩面。」

因此今天可以這樣想：關於印度支那戰爭的會談是能夠與朝鮮的停戰相配合的；與北京政府和解的政策是可以考慮的，但條件是：應在朝鮮政治會議上，或在擴大的會議上，或在一個平行的會議上來審查這個問題。

aux Bermudes—que notre invitation n'était pas retirée, convaincus que nous sommes que des négociations sur l'Allemagne et l'Autriche doivent préparer la voie à un accord plus large.

Pourquoi notre position raisonnable et ferme ne serait-elle pas comprise? Nous ne nous lançons pas dans un réarmement illimité de l'Allemagne—nous le refusons—ni dans une entreprise destinée à couper en deux l'Allemagne et l'Europe—nous avons expressément réservé le cas de la réunification. Nous sommes convaincus qu'une conversation avec l'U.R.S.S. est possible—elle demeure l'objectif de notre politique, mais pour converser il faut en manifester le désir réciproque et convenir d'un ou de plusieurs objets de négociation. Telle sera notre position aux Bermudes, la France refusant d'ailleurs d'abandonner ce qui a été entrepris et qui a déjà porté ses fruits.

La guerre d'Indochine est pour la France une raison majeure de se préoccuper de négociation. Elle souhaite mettre fin le plus tôt possible à cette lutte où elle est la seule des Trois à répandre son sang et qui s'oppose à l'extension de son rôle militaire en Europe. Aux Bermudes le gouvernement s'inspirera du vœu exprimé le 28 octobre par l'Assemblée de voir «tout mettre en œuvre pour aboutir par la négociation à la pacification générale de l'Asie».

L'armistice de Corée a prouvé qu'il était possible d'arrêter un conflit armé. Il devrait pouvoir servir de point de départ à un examen général des questions en litige en Extrême-Orient... Des chances de prise de contact avec la Chine populaire seront ouvertes à la conférence de Corée. Le gouvernement est donc décidé à favoriser la réunion de cette conférence dans toute la mesure du possible; il fera valoir ce point de vue au cours de ses conversations avec les puissances anglo-saxonnes...

L'interdépendance des affaires de Corée et d'Indochine a été soulignée depuis longtemps par le gouvernement français. Dès le 16 décembre 1952 les pays de l'O.T.A.N. ont entériné cette thèse en adoptant une résolution reconnaissant «que les conflits d'Indochine et de Corée ne sont que deux aspects d'un seul et même combat».

Il est donc permis de penser aujourd'hui qu'à l'armistice en Corée peuvent correspondre des conversations sur le conflit d'Indochine. Une politique de détente avec le gouvernement de Pékin peut-être envisagée, mais à des conditions dont l'examen serait abordé soit à la conférence politique coréenne même, soit dans une conférence élargie, soit dans une conférence parallèle.

自然，如果我們放鬆了軍事上的努力，這對於尋求談判的可能性將是不利的；恰恰相反，祇有使對方充分認識到印度支那聯邦成員國和援助它們的各國具有對武力決不讓步的決心，達成談判的機會就更大。但是，我重複說明——因為我在別的場合中已經說過了——我們所追求的目標，並不是要敵人無條件投降，我們準備從明天起，在與印度支那聯邦成員國協議下，來研究敵方可能提出的合理的「停火」建議。

在結束這點時，我要再度說明：印度支那戰爭之所以尚未獲得解決，不能歸咎於法國，而應歸咎於敵方——不幸這個敵方是受到一些自稱為法國政黨的支持的。

首先議會曾指出歐洲條約的批准是以薩爾問題的解決為先決條件。外國某些人士覺得這個條件是討價還價的意思，如果不是拖延的藉口，然而，這是法國的利益和歐洲事業得以繼續推行所必需的。

因之，在政府要求議會批准這些條約之前——這些條約將消除我們希望忘記的過去，並將主要的權力交還德國，允許德國重新參加自由國家的大家庭。我們必須而且應當從德國獲得最明確的保證，保證它不利用得到的權力來侵犯法國在薩爾的利益。這些利益的合法性是已被我們盟國所承認的。

而且法國利益和歐洲利益是連接在一起的。大家知道每次歐洲組織的努力都是因為薩爾問題而遭遇阻礙。大家知道在煤鋼聯營集團條約締結時所遭遇的困難，這些困難昨天還拖延了歐洲委員會的若干進行中專約的簽訂。大家知道，每一次為了要撤開薩爾問題所形成的阻礙，人們曾經需要而且現在還需要在法律上要些什麼把戲。實際上上面講的那些文件還不過是走向歐洲統一的所有初步的文件而已。

Il va de soi que la recherche d'une possibilité de négociation serait mal servie par un relâchement de notre effort militaire. Bien au contraire nos démarches auront d'autant plus de chances d'aboutir que la partie adverse sentira mieux la détermination des Etats associés et de ceux qui les assistent de ne pas céder à la force. Mais je répète—car je l'ai déjà dit en d'autres occasions—que le but que nous poursuivons n'est pas la capitulation inconditionnelle de l'ennemi et que nous serions prêts dès demain, en accord avec les Etats associés, à étudier des propositions raisonnables de «cessez le feu» qui nous seraient transmises par l'adversaire.

En terminant sur ce point je tiens à affirmer une fois de plus que ce n'est pas à la France qu'est imputable l'absence de règlement du conflit indo-chinois, mais à ses adversaires, hélas! soutenus par des partis qui se disent français.

En premier lieu l'Assemblée avait subordonné la ratification des accords européens au règlement préalable du problème sarrois. A l'étranger certains ont cru déceler dans cette condition un esprit de marchandage sinon une excuse dilatoire. Or il s'agit d'une nécessité pour les intérêts de la France et pour la poursuite de l'œuvre européenne.

Avant que le gouvernement demande au Parlement d'autoriser la ratification d'accords qui, effaçant un passé que nous souhaitons oublier, rendent à l'Allemagne l'essentiel de ses pouvoirs et lui permettent de reprendre place dans la communauté des nations libres, il est donc nécessaire et juste que nous obtenions de l'Allemagne l'engagement le plus explicite de ne pas utiliser ces pouvoirs pour mettre en cause en Sarre les intérêts de la France, dont nos alliés ont reconnu la légitimité.

Aussi bien les intérêts de la France rejoignent ceux de l'Europe. On sait tous les obstacles auxquels se heurtent à chaque fois, du fait du problème sarrois, tous les efforts d'organisation européenne. On sait les difficultés qui ont pesé sur la conclusion du traité instituant la Communauté du charbon et de l'acier, celles qui retardaient hier encore la signature de certaines conventions en instance devant le Conseil de l'Europe, et à quels artifices juridiques il a fallu ou il faut recourir pour lever en chaque cas l'hypothèse sarroise. Encore ne s'agit-il là que de textes marquant les toutes premières étapes vers l'unité européenne.

在百慕大會議前夕，我們必須尋求消除法國和德國間在薩爾問題上所發生的世世代代的摩擦。百慕大會議能提供使新的精神獲得勝利的機會，此種新的精神在超國家機構形成前就會有所表現。如果相反地德國政府在表示意見前就一味拖延，那麼，歐洲防務集團怎麼不會因此而遲延產生呢？

我可向你們保證，我將在百慕大採取和在這個講壇上所說的一樣明確的立場。

關於英國與歐洲防務集團的關係問題，目前談判進展得很順利，我們希望在以後數次會談中迅速得出結果……

最好不要使歐洲輿論產生這樣一種印象：建立歐洲防務集團的目標祇是在於接替駐防大陸上的英美軍隊。歐洲防務集團條約祇是附屬於北大西洋條約範圍內的一個構成部分。

在這個條約範圍內，我們將要求在保證實現歐洲最初的若干步驟所必需的數年中，不會看到盟軍撤退或削減的危險。要是沒有盟軍，歐洲在長時期內還缺少最低限度需要的安全。

(譯自一九五三年十一月二十六日法國「世界報」)

Il serait indispensable que nous ne cherchions pas à éliminer d'abord ce sujet de friction perpétuelle entre la France et l'Allemagne qu'est la Sarre à la veille de négociations qui peuvent donner l'occasion de faire triompher un esprit nouveau, un esprit nouveau qui aura ainsi fait ses preuves avant de recevoir la consécration d'une institution supranationale. Si au contraire le gouvernement allemand atermoyait avant de se prononcer, comment la Communauté de défense européenne ne tarderait-elle pas, elle aussi, à naître?

Je puis vous assurer que cette position sera définie aux Bermudes aussi nettement qu'à cette tribune.

An sujet d'un accord avec la Grande-Bretagne touchant les relations avec la C.E.D., sa négociation est en bonne voie. Nous espérons en hâter l'issue au cours des prochains entretiens...

Il serait souhaitable en effet de ne pas laisser naître l'impression dans l'opinion publique européenne que l'institution de la C.E.D. n'a d'autre but que de permettre la relève des forces anglo-américaines en stationnement sur le continent. La C.E.D. ne sera qu'un élément qui s'inscrira et s'articulera au sein du pacte atlantique.

Dans le cadre de ce pacte, nous demanderons que l'Europe, pendant les années nécessaires pour assurer ses premiers pas, ne soit pas exposée au risque de voir disparaître ou s'amenuiser les forces alliées, sans lesquelles elle manquerait longtemps encore du minimum nécessaire de sécurité.

(Le Monde, le 26 novembre 1953)

四、的里雅斯特問題

(第一號)

美英兩國政府關於的里雅斯特問題的公報

一九五三年十月八日

U.S.-BRITISH COMMUNIQUE ON TRIESTE QUESTION

October 8, 1953

美國政府和聯合王國政府均異常關切地注視意大利和南斯拉夫兩國間的關係最近因的里雅斯特自由區未來地位的爭端而惡化。

第二次世界大戰結束以來，英美兩國根據對意和約的規定，對自由區甲區實行共同管理。同樣地，南斯拉夫政府繼續負責管理乙區。

上述的責任純粹是暫時的，從未考慮這些責任應當成爲永久的。由於人所周知的理由，與和約的其他簽字國家達成關於建立和約規定的自由區的永久制度的協議已證明爲不可能。

美國政府和聯合王國政府因而遇到和約所未考慮到的情況，以後曾數度從事斡旋，希望促進意大利和南斯拉夫以和解來解決爭端。不幸未能找到雙方所能接受的解決辦法。而且，意大利和南斯拉夫最近提出的建議均爲彼此所拒絕。

在此種情形下，兩國政府認爲除結束目前使人不滿的情勢外，別無其他辦法。兩國政府不準備繼續擔負管理甲區的責任。因此，兩國政府決定結束盟國軍政府，撤退兩國軍隊，同時由於考慮到甲區以意大利人爲主的性質，放棄了對該區的行政權，把它移交給意大利政府。兩國政府期望現在所採取的措施將導致這個問題的最後和平解決。

The Government of the United States and United Kingdom have viewed with great concern the recent deterioration in the relations between Italy and Yugoslavia which has resulted from the dispute over the future of the Free Territory of Trieste.

Since the conclusion of the second World War, the two Governments have jointly exercised the administration of Zone A of the territory under the terms of the Italian peace treaty. Similarly, the Yugoslav Government has continued to be responsible for the administration of Zone B.

These responsibilities were to be purely temporary and it was never envisaged that they should become permanent. For reasons that are well known, it proved impossible to reach agreement with the other signatories of the peace treaty for setting up the permanent régime for the Free Territory provided for in the treaty.

The Governments of the United States and the United Kingdom, who were thus faced with a situation not contemplated in the treaty, subsequently employed their good offices on frequent occasions in the hope of promoting a settlement by conciliation between Italy and Yugoslavia. Unfortunately it was not possible to find a solution acceptable to both sides. Moreover, the recent proposals put forward by Italy and Yugoslavia have been reciprocally rejected.

In these circumstances, the two governments see no alternative but to bring the present unsatisfactory situation to an end. They are no longer prepared to maintain responsibility for the administration of zone A. They have therefore decided to terminate the Allied Military Government, to withdraw their troops, and having in mind the predominantly Italian character of Zone A to relinquish the administration of that zone to the Italian Government. The two governments expect that the measures being taken will lead to a final peaceful solution.

兩國政府堅信，這一步驟將有助於促進使近幾年來擾亂意大利和南斯拉夫兩國關係的情勢的穩定。兩國政府相信這一步驟將為意大利和南斯拉夫間的友好而有益的合作提供基礎，這對西歐安全和有關兩國的利益均屬同等重要。

軍隊的撤退和行政權的同時移交將儘速實行，其日期將在適當時公布之。

(譯自一九五三年十月九日「紐約時報」)

It is the firm belief of the two governments that this step will contribute to stabilization of a situation which has disturbed Italo-Yugoslav relations during recent years. They trust that it will provide the basis for friendly and fruitful cooperation between Italy and Yugoslavia, which is as important to the security of Western Europe as it is to the interests of the two countries concerned.

The withdrawal of troops and the simultaneous transfer of administrative authority will take place at the earliest practicable date, which will be announced in due course.

(The New York Times, October 9, 1953)

(第二號)

南斯拉夫政府爲抗議美英關於的里雅斯特問題的片面決定致美英政府的照會

一九五三年十月九日

NOTE FROM YUGOSLAV GOVERNMENT TO U.S. AND BRITISH GOVERNMENTS PROTESTING AGAINST THEIR UNILATERAL DECISION ON TRIESTE QUESTION

October 9, 1953

關於美國政府和聯合王國政府一九五三年十月八日的來文，南斯拉夫聯邦人民共和區政府謹通知上述政府如下：

美利堅合衆國政府和聯合王國政府撤消英美對的里雅斯特自由區甲區的行政權並將該區行政權交給意大利共和國的決定，是一種片面違反一九四七年的對意和約的行爲，而且是對一個在一九四一年曾對南斯拉夫犯有侵略行爲和在軸心國家方面作戰的國家有利的。

此外，將甲區交給意大利這件事本身，就是一件不公正而危險的行爲。

這是不公正的，因爲它將各種族雜居的一塊土地交給意大利共和國。根據盟國軍政府一九五〇年的估計，這塊土地除了二十三萬九千名說意大利話的居民外，還住有六萬三千名斯羅文人 和克羅地人。應該記住：說意大利話的居民完全住在的里雅斯特市區和米爾支小鎮，其餘的土地上則全是斯羅

In connection with the communication forwarded from the Governments of the United States and the United Kingdom on the 8th of October, 1953, the Government of the Federated People's Republic of Yugoslavia have the honor to communicate to the mentioned Governments the following:

The decision of the Governments of the United States of America and the United Kingdom on the abolishment of the Anglo-American administration of Zone A of the Free Territory of Trieste, as well as the ceding of the same administration to the Republic of Italy, means a unilateral violation of the treaty of peace with Italy of 1947, and that to the benefit of a power which in 1941 committed aggression against Yugoslavia and waged war on the side of the Axis powers.

The handing over of Zone A to Italy is, besides, by itself an unjust and dangerous act.

It is unjust because it hands over to the Italian Republic a territory which is ethnically mixed. On that territory live, according to the estimates of the Allied Military Administration in 1950, besides the 239,000 Italian-speaking population, 63,000 Slovenes and Croats. It should be borne in mind that the Italian-speaking populace lives exclusively in the city of Trieste and the

