

资本主义研究丛书

HISTORICAL
CAPITALISM

历史资本主义

〔美〕伊曼努尔·华勒斯坦 / 著



社会科学文献出版社

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社会科学文献出版社

图书在版编目 (CIP) 数据

历史资本主义 / (美) 伊曼努尔·华勒斯坦著; 路爱国, 丁浩金译. - 北京: 社会科学文献出版社, 1999.6
(资本主义研究丛书)
ISBN 7-80149-141-6

I. 历… II. ①伊…②路…③丁… III. 资本主义制度 - 研究 IV. D033.3

中国版本图书馆 CIP 数据核字 (1999) 第 05257 号

·资本主义研究丛书·

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责任校对: 陈志敏 同 文

责任印制: 盖永东

出版发行: 社会科学文献出版社

(北京建国门内大街 5 号 电话 65139961 邮编 100732)

网址: <http://www.ssdph.com.cn>

经 销: 新华书店总店北京发行所

排 版: 北京中文天地文化艺术有限公司

印 刷: 北京市四季青印刷厂

开 本: 850×1168 毫米 1/32 开

印 张: 7.875

字 数: 197 千字

版 次: 1999 年 6 月第 1 版 1999 年 6 月第 1 次印刷

印 数: 0001-8000

ISBN 7-80149-141-6/C·022

定价: 13.80 元

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本书正文部分由路爱国翻译，附录由丁浩金翻译。

GDF 38/09

Historical Capitalism



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Historical Capitalism

Verso, 1993

本书根据美国维索出版社 1993 年第 6 版译出

《资本主义研究丛书》出版者的话

资本主义自15世纪初萌发以来，迄今已有500多年的历史。学界一般将资本主义的发生和发展史分为四个阶段。第一个阶段是资本主义在封建社会母体内孕育、萌生、生育并最终取代封建主义的阶段，为期约300年，即从15世纪初到18世纪中叶的英国产业革命。第二个阶段是资本主义自由竞争阶段，为期约150年，即从18世纪中叶到19世纪末和20世纪初。在这个阶段中，随着资本的扩张和产业革命所导致的社会化大机器生产的突飞猛进，资本主义很快在全世界范围内确立了自己的统治地位。马克思的巨著《资本论》即是以这个阶段的资本主义为主要研究对象，给后人留下了经典性的理论分析、批判和阐释。第三个阶段是垄断资本主义阶段，为期约50年，即从世纪之交到第二次世界大战结束。在马克思主义学术界，传统上认为列宁对垄断资本主义的界定富有权威性，乃是对马克思主义的发展。第四个阶段为第二次世界大战后出现的以国家垄断为基本特征的新阶段。此外，有人还认为从70年代末和80年代初开始，随着新自由主义思潮的崛起，资本主义进入了一个更新的垄断后的阶段，但此说在学界见智见仁，争议颇多，有待事态本身的进一步发展和理论上的深化。

不言而喻，作为当今学术研究的对象，人们最为关注的当是同世人关系最为密切和直接的战后资本主义的新发展。资本主义的这个新的历史阶段以其科学技术日新月异的发展、社会生产力

的质的飞跃、社会结构的深层变动为世人所瞩目。与此相联系，资本主义世界特别是发达资本主义国家在经济、政治、社会等诸多方面出现了某些母可否认的新现象和新变革。早在 50 年代末和 60 年代初，国际学术界就以“资本主义改变了吗？”为题展开了一场热烈的大讨论。就国际学术界对当代资本主义的认识和界说而言，尽管众说纷纭，莫衷一是，但概括起来大体上可分为四大派。

一种观点认为，当代资本主义的最重大变化在于一般垄断转变为国家垄断，这是资本主义生产关系的重大调整。这种调整推动了新的科学技术革命和生产力的新的质的飞跃。但是，国家垄断资本主义实质上仍然是资本主义，以生产资料私有制为基础的资本主义生产关系与生产力之间的矛盾不仅仍然存在，而且十分错综复杂。

另一种观点则把当代资本主义称之为晚期资本主义，其特点是资本主义生产关系出现了几种新的质的变化；主要表现为：①剩余价值生产形式的改变；②体现阶级调和的某种准政治的雇佣结构；③政治体制的合法化的日益强化的需要。这些变化的结果是“合理性的危机代替了经济危机”。官僚化的过程正深入国家和社会—文化的一切领域。在这些领域里，传统的控制手段正在被逐步取消或淘汰。权力的行使越来越倾向于依靠各种管理方法、专业化和科学技术。

第三种观点认为，现代资本主义的最重大变化在于企业正在迅速发展成一种以美国传统为基础的新式制度，它将改变整个经济制度，并最终改变西方资本主义社会本身，从而形成“新资本主义”。而“新资本主义”的基本特征是民主与自由企业制度的结合。

第四种观点主要是被称为“未来学家”的部分西方学者的观点。他们认为自由主义思想和科学技术发明导致“工业文明”取

代“农业文明”。但今天在新技术革命的冲击下，自由资本主义和消费社会面临崩溃，其基本原则正在消失。资本主义的最重要的因素——财产、某些形式的自由、家庭、代议制民主和自由契约制度正趋于解体。一个代替资本主义“工业文明”的“后工业社会”、“信息社会”、“知识社会”或“第三次浪潮”、“科学社会”已经来临。

不言而喻，上述观点的划分是十分粗略的，每一派观点中由于视角和重点不同，存在着很多差别。这些观点的共同之处是承认现代资本主义在战后发生了一系列重要的变化。但以什么样的尺度和标准来衡量这样的变化，是否存在从量到质的飞跃，则由于立场、方法、视角，以及政治、社会、经济、历史背景的不同导致了分歧和差异，这是毫不足怪的。应该说，现代资本主义作为我们同时代的社会发展过程，对它的研究完全是开放的。

就中国学术界而言，对现代资本主义的研究是相对薄弱的。由于众所周知的历史原因，在很长一段时间里，资本主义被看作同社会主义根本对立的制度，是“恶”的代名词，其一切都应该否定。所以，谈不上对它作认真的研究，往往只是从经典著作中引章摘句，削足适履，把极大变化了的现实硬塞进现成的框框里。这种简单化的教条主义名曰捍卫马克思主义，实则同马克思主义的实事求是的原则完全背道而驰。

坚持马克思主义的观点，坚持历史唯物主义和辩证唯物主义的原则，归根结蒂就是要坚持实事求是。实事求是也是自中国共产党十一届三中全会以来坚持的基本路线，邓小平理论的核心和精髓。建设有中国特色的社会主义的实践要求我们善于总结经验教训，善于学习和借鉴他国的经验，其中也包括资本主义国家的一些对我们有用的经验。同时，在当代世界中，必须看到社会主义国家也处于资本主义世界经济体系的运动范围之内。尽管社会主义国家和资本主义国家之间存在着意识形态、政治和社会生活

方面的质的差异，但今日所有的国家都要参与资本主义世界经济体系的运动。要参与资本主义世界经济，就需要每个参加者都要像资本家那样对待这个市场中的其他参加者，参与合作和竞争。这样的客观需要也要求我们认真研究现代资本主义，以期收到“知己知彼，百战不殆”之效。

有位意大利的左派学者在总结西方国家的社会主义运动遭受挫折的经验教训时，曾深有感慨地说：我们生活在资本主义世界，却并不了解它。这一方面说明了违背实事求是原则的教条主义危害之烈，另一方面也启示我们，现代资本主义作为一个发展和运动过程，有其固有的动态性和复杂性。坚持实事求是原则，就必须充分掌握资料，兼听各种不同意见和观点加以分析、探讨和研究。有比较才有鉴别和科学分析。发扬真正的学术民主，倡导不同学派和观点的争鸣，乃是保障学术发展和繁荣的基本条件。本着上述精神，为了适应社会的迫切需要，我们编辑出版了这套《资本主义研究丛书》。这方面的有关著作，无论中外，只要论证有据，资料确凿，言之成理，即使是一家之说，均在本丛书收入之列，以期为我国的研究者和广大读者提供比较完整的参照，来深入了解和认识现代资本主义的面貌及其未来走向。

社会科学文献出版社

中译本前言

郑伟民 王正毅

伊曼纽尔·华勒斯坦 (Immanuel Wallerstein) 是世界体系理论的主要代表人物, 他 1930 年出生于美国纽约市, 1951 年获得美国哥伦比亚大学学士学位, 1959 年在该校获博士学位并任教于社会学系。1955~1970 年, 华勒斯坦主要从事非洲问题研究, 60 年代先后出版《非洲: 独立政治学》、《非洲: 统一政治学》等专著。1968 年他积极参与了哥伦比亚大学的改革运动。1971 年, 他赴加拿大蒙特利尔麦吉尔大学任教, 从 1976 年起, 他被聘为美国纽约州立大学宾厄姆顿分校社会学系教授, 并任该校以法国著名历史学家费尔南德·布劳代尔命名的经济、历史体系和文明研究中心 (Fernand Braudel Center for the Study of Economics, Historical Systems, and Civilizations) 主任。

1974 年, 伊·华勒斯坦出版了他的代表作《现代世界体系 (1): 16 世纪资本主义农业和欧洲世界经济的起源》 (Modern World System I: Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the European World-Economy in the Sixteenth Century), 首次从理论体系上完整地阐述了资本主义世界体系的确立和形成。之后, 他又与恩特尔·弗兰克 (Andre Gunder Frank), 特里斯·霍甫金斯 (Terence K. Hopkins), 萨米尔·阿明 (Samir Amin), 乔凡尼·阿里吉 (Giovanni Arrighi) 等人共同合作发表了一系列的有关专著和论文, 《现代世界体系》的第二卷出版于 1980 年, 副标题为《重商主义和欧洲世界经济的巩固 1600~1750 年》 (Mercantilism and

the Consolidation of the European World-Economy, 1600~1750); 1989年,《现代世界体系》的第三卷出版问世,副标题为《第二期大扩张》(The Second Era of Great Expansion),这一时期,伊·华勒斯坦等人还在自己的基地费尔南德·布劳代尔研究中心出版了颇具特色的杂志《评论》(Review),宣传自己的理论观点和主张。由于伊·华勒斯坦等人在某些方面受到马克思的理论影响,对资本主义世界体系持批判的态度,因而被西方学术界称为“新左派”。70年代中期以来,世界体系理论逐渐成为一种世界性的思潮,在发达国家和发展中国家的学术界都有一批追随者,并且在世界经济研究领域以及政治学、社会学、历史学和政治地理学等领域都产生了较为广泛的影响,1987年,伊·华勒斯坦应中国社会科学院世界经济与政治研究所的邀请来中国进行学术访问,先后在中国社会科学院、北京大学、南开大学、复旦大学等处作学术报告,并进行学术交流。1994年,伊·华勒斯坦被选为国际社会学学会主席。

《历史资本主义》一书是由两个部分组成的。第一部分书稿名为《历史资本主义》,据伊·华勒斯坦本人介绍,1980年秋天,梯也里·巴考特(Thierry Paquot)邀他为自己自己在巴黎编纂的一套丛书写一本题为《资本主义》的小册子,伊·华勒斯坦接受了这项约稿,但提出要把书名改为《历史资本主义》,在他看来,有关资本主义的论著已发表了很多,其中大部分陷入了两个误区,一种是主要采取逻辑—演绎分析,从资本主义的定义出发,分析资本主义在不同的地点和时间的发展程度,另一种是集中研究当前某个时间点上资本主义体系的所谓主要转变过程,而以前的时间点只不过被当作研究当前实际情况的虚幻陪衬,伊·华勒斯坦强调指出,一项紧迫的任务是把资本主义看作是一个历史体系,从其全部历史和独特的具体现实中加以考察。他还认为,资本主

义现实是一个统一的整体，为了避免一些人通常容易产生的从一个极端走向另一个极端的错误倾向，应该把整个统一的资本主义现实描述出来，探讨资本主义在经济、政治和文化—意识形态等各个领域的表现形式。1982年春季，伊·华勒斯坦应邀到夏威夷大学政治系讲课，他的讲稿以及讲课以后经过修改和新增加的部分遂成为他的最后书稿，并于1983年正式冠以《历史资本主义》的书名出版。

本书的第二部分是1991年11月伊·华勒斯坦访问香港中文大学时在该校伟伦讲座上所作的有关资本主义文明主题的演讲。1995年，伊·华勒斯坦把这部分讲稿纳入已出版的《历史资本主义》一书，并以《历史资本主义与资本主义文明》的书名在伦敦、纽约出版，此书问世后，引起各国学术界的高度关注，并很快被有关国家的学者译成各种文字出版，现在中文译本也已准备就绪，将在今年夏季与伊·华勒斯坦主编的《现代世界体系》（第一卷）、（第二卷）的中文译本同时出版面世，与中国的广大读者见面。

《历史资本主义》一书与百万余字的《现代世界体系》理论专著不同，它的全书不足10万字，是本小册子，但是，这本小册子却以其独有的特点吸引着世界各国的读者。首先，作者在撰写这本书稿时，是在其已形成完整的世界体系理论之后，因而此书篇幅虽小，但全书各章处处触及到作者多年研究的资本主义世界体系的主要理论观点及其始终关注的一些最敏感的现实问题和理论问题。其次，此书与一般教科书不同，不落俗套，深入浅出，主线清晰，易为读者理解，可以看作是进一步研究世界体系理论的入门书。同时，已经阅读过《现代世界体系》等专著的读者回过头来再读一读这本小册子，也有助于阅读者把握世界体系理论的一些关键问题。

为了使读者对世界体系理论有个概括的了解，现对伊·华勒斯坦的主要理论观点作一简要介绍。

世界体系理论的产生首先源于对 50、60 年代兴起的现代化理论的批判。第二次世界大战结束后，随着西欧殖民体系的瓦解和亚、非、拉新兴国家独立，从 50 年代中期起，在西方学术界出现了一股研究这些新兴国家发展和现代化的热潮。“发展”与“现代化”等问题成为这一时期欧、美学术界关注的主题。如经济学界出现了罗斯托的“经济成长阶段论”，这种理论认为，无论在西方，还是在东方，现代化的道路必须经过五个发展阶段，即传统社会、起飞准备阶段、起飞阶段、成熟阶段和高额群众消费阶段。在政治学界出现了阿尔蒙德等的政治现代化模式，即政治现代化只有模仿英国的参议院民主制和美国的总统民主制。社会学界的帕森斯主张现代化就是西方化。虽然这些发展理论的侧重点不同，但它们的共同特征是：①都以国家为分析单位，并以此为立足点进而分析国家的政治制度、经济战略和社会系统，认为发展就是单个国家和单个社会的发展；②追求一个普遍的、一般的模式，不管各个国家在历史、文化习俗、资源禀赋上有何差异，都必须遵循一个普遍的发展模式，即发展中国家只有模仿西方发达国家的政治、经济、社会结构以及文化模式，才能真正走向现代化。

这些发展理论在 60 年代末、70 年代初受到现实的强烈挑战。这主要是由于世界范围内的民族主义运动的兴起，反对霸权、反对帝国主义和新殖民主义成为这一时期的主题。二是一体化开始在部分地区出现，如欧洲经济共同体、东南亚国家联盟、石油输出国组织等，这种国家之间的联合以及共同发展的趋势，对 60 年代提出的以单一国家为研究单位的各种发展理论提出了强有力的挑战。三是美苏两个超级大国对峙的冷战格局的形成，

促使一些国家，尤其是那些小国以及刚独立的国家为了各自的发展不得不加入某一地区联合或集团联合。四是南北差距的加大，表明任何国家的发展都不是该国一国的事，每个国家都处于世界这个整体之中，国家间的任何差异都不能使单个国家完全脱离世界体系这个整体，因此，发展不只是发展中国家的事情，也是发达国家的事情，“发展”的问题是发达国家和发展中国家融合为一个整体，如果发展中国家不发展，发达国家的经济增长和发展也将受到严重制约。

与此相应，在学术领域，出现了一股强有力的反“现代化理论”、“反西方化理论”和“反欧洲中心主义”的思潮，熊比特(Joseph Schumpeter)、波拉尼、阿明等人从经济学的角度对宣扬现代化就是西方化的观点提出了挑战，指出西方的发展是以牺牲发展中国家的利益为代价的，赛义德、伯尔纳和阿明等人则从文化领域对以西方为中心观察东方的“东方主义”提出了挑战，指出西方古典文明实际上来源于非洲和亚洲。

伊·华勒斯坦早期是研究非洲问题的，在研究过程中，他认识到60年代西方现代化理论将发展看作是发展中国家单独发展的局限性，以及西方学者的现代化理论假定存在一个普遍发展模式的不可行性，正是在70年代西方出现的反“现代化理论”的背景下，华勒斯坦开始将发展中国家的事情纳入世界整体来研究。对世界整体的研究必须首先回答世界体系形成的时间和地点问题，于是他开始从欧洲世界体系的形成入手，并撰写了自己的代表作《现代世界体系》(第一卷)。尽管世界体系论者在“世界体系”形成的具体时间(16世纪还是16世纪以前)和具体地点(先在西方还是先在东方)的看法上有分歧，但所有学者在以“世界体系”而非“国家”为研究单位这一点上是一致的。

华勒斯坦把世界体系看作是一个实体，这个实体具有单一的

劳动分工和多元文化。作为一个体系，它主要涉及到如下三个方面：一是文明，二是政治帝国或其他国家体系，三是世界经济或世界经济体系。简要地说，世界体系包括政治、经济、文明三个层次。前面曾经指出，华勒斯坦在美国纽约州立大学宾汉姆顿分校创建的一个研究机构名为“费尔南德·布劳代尔研究中心：经济、历史体系和文明”，华勒斯坦为什么以法国著名历史学家布劳代尔来命名其研究中心呢？布劳代尔是驰名欧美学术界的法国年鉴学派第二代领袖。他与世界体系理论有何关系呢？这涉及到世界体系理论的思想渊源和分析方法。年鉴学派主张对全人类活动及其相互关系进行研究，布劳代尔在其著作中对以往撰写历史和社会科学研究的方法进行了猛烈的抨击，并提出了一种新的撰写历史的方法，即长时段研究方法。布劳代尔认为，过去的历史著作只注重历史“事件”的短期研究，这使得社会科学研究误入歧途。新的研究方法主要突出两个方面：一是在研究历史时，除了“短时段”研究外，应加强对历史的长时段研究；二是不但要研究政治“事件”，更要注重对日常生活的结构研究，华勒斯坦同意布劳代尔用“长时段”书写历史的方法，也同意年鉴学派主张多学科相结合进行综合研究。华勒斯坦虽非布劳代尔的直系学生，但在研究世界体系理论的思想渊源和分析方法方面受益于布劳代尔，据华勒斯坦自己介绍说，他在1971年开始写《现代世界体系》（第一卷），并将写好的章节寄给已负盛名的布劳代尔，布劳代尔随即邀请华勒斯坦去法国高等社会科学学院给学生授课，而且从1976年开始，华勒斯坦半年工作在美国，半年工作在法国。同年，华勒斯坦创建了“费尔南德·布劳代尔研究中心”，以布劳代尔命名，显示其世界体系理论与法国年鉴学派之间的关系。

世界体系理论探讨的问题很多，华勒斯坦将其归纳为十个问

题：①周期和趋势；②商品链；③霸权和竞争；④地区性和半边缘性；⑤融入和边缘化；⑥反体系运动；⑦家庭；⑧种族主义和性；⑨科学和知识；⑩地缘文化和文明。总括起来，这十个问题主要集中在世界经济体系、世界政治体系和世界文明三个层面上，下面我们就世界体系的这三个层面来概述一下世界体系理论的基本观点。

1. 单一的世界经济。世界体系的首要特征是它以单一的世界经济作为其存在的基础，这是世界体系的经济层面，也是世界体系论者集中讨论的主题，它主要涉及以下三个问题：世界体系的形成、世界体系的运作和世界体系的基本趋向。华勒斯坦概括地说，“关于近代世界体系，有三个相互不同的问题可能被提及，第一个是起源的解释，即16世纪的欧洲世界体系如何得以生存，而以前的体系为什么不能。第二个问题是这个体系一旦巩固以后是如何运行的。第三个问题是这个资本主义体系的基本趋向，以及如何解释它作为一个社会体系的最终衰退”^①。

世界体系论者几乎一致认为，世界体系最初形成于16世纪的欧洲，其主要标志是一个资本主义世界经济在西欧的形成。华勒斯坦认为，16世纪以前的欧洲是封建经济，封建经济与资本主义经济的显著区别就在于剩余转让的方式不同，在华勒斯坦看来，在世界经济形成过程中，有三件事是非常重要的：一是世界在地理规模上的扩张；二是对世界经济的不同产品和不同地区的劳动的控制方式的发展；三是相对强的国家机器的产生，这些国家随之也成为资本主义世界的核心国家，大约在16世纪的西欧，这种世界体系形成了。

^① 伊·华勒斯坦：《资本主义世界经济》，第160—161页，剑桥大学出版社，1989。

关于世界体系如何运作的问题，华勒斯坦认为，世界体系一旦建立，便围绕着两个二分法运行。一是阶级，即无产阶级和资产阶级；二是经济专业化的空间等级，即中心地区和边缘地区。而“不等价交换”和“资本积累”则是这个体系运行的动力。资本积累过程中的不等价交换不仅存在于无产阶级和资产阶级之间，而且也存在于中心地区和边缘地区之间。劳动分工一直是西方社会科学家探讨的重要课题，由此形成了著名的“比较利益学说”，主张劳动分工有利于社会进步，有利于资金分配，有利于各国财富的增长。世界体系论者也将劳动分工用于世界范围内生产关系及其结构的分析上，世界体系论者认为，世界范围内的劳动分工将世界划分为三个地带，即核心地区，半边缘地区和边缘地区，这是资本主义世界经济体系与以前的社会体系的根本不同之处。与自由主义贸易学说所主张的贸易对交换双方均有利的看法不同，华勒斯坦等人认为，资本主义世界体系所以能运转至今，其根本点在于核心地区和边缘地区之间存在着“不等价交换”。这种“不等价交换”在不同的历史时期可以通过各种机制进行，如殖民垄断贸易（东印度公司），当代跨国公司内部转换贸易，以及通过一种或多种商品交换形成世界性的市场或国家间双边或多边贸易协定等等。通过这些手段，不断形成新的中心和边缘地区。而在核心地区和边缘地区之间有一个半边缘地区，它主要指那些处于核心和边缘之间的那些地区；对邻近的核心地区而言，它呈现一种边缘化过程，但相对于邻近的边缘地区而言，它又呈现一种核心过程，譬如，今天的南非可看作是这类国家。

在世界体系理论中，“融入”和“边缘化”是另外两个重要概念，这两个概念表达了世界体系运行过程中体系内的国家和地区与体系外的国家和地区之间的相互关系，世界体系论者认为，已经进入世界体系的国家和地区有中心和外围之分，中心和外围

依靠“不等价交换”来运行。资本主义世界经济在一开始只占据全球的一部分（即西欧），因此，许多国家在19世纪以前还没有进入从16世纪开始的西欧资本主义世界体系，资本主义世界体系在16世纪的欧洲产生以后，出于资本积累的需要，便开始了向全球的地理扩张和经济掠夺。到19世纪末，西欧殖民体系已在全球建立，从而完成了近代世界体系向全球的扩张过程。

在世界体系向全球扩展过程中，资本主义世界体系和未进入世界体系的国家以及地区之间存在着一种“融入”和“边缘化”的关系，“融入”和“边缘化”是一个过程的两个方面，“融入”是指世界体系之外的国家和地区不断进入世界体系的过程，而“边缘化”则指世界体系不断包容新的国家和地区的过程。“融入”是“边缘化”的第一步。随着“边缘化”过程的深入，被边缘化的国家和地区不断地加入整个世界经济的“商品链”之中。

世界体系的周期和趋向是华勒斯坦等关心的另一重点问题，正如华勒斯坦所说的，“在某种程度上我们关心长时段社会变化，我们的兴趣主要是较长的周期，即那些平均为50~60年，通常被称作康德拉捷耶夫周期，还有更长一些（200~300年）的，有时也称为长周期（Logistics）”^①关于世界经济周期一直是经济史学家们探讨的热点问题，可说是观点不一，众说纷纭。世界体系论者关心的不是短周期，而是长周期。康德拉捷耶夫曾根据技术发明、世界市场的扩展以及资金供应的上涨来解释周期运动，认为经济周期是一种停滞和扩张相互交替的过程。罗斯托则是根据增长的动态平衡来解释周期。与上述这些解释不同，布劳代尔等人认为，以前关于周期的解释过分集中于资本积累的抽象模型

^① Report on an Intellectual Project; The Fernand Braudel Center 1976~1991, Immanuel Wallerstein, P2.

上，其实资本主义赖以运行的社会结构包括多种积累方式，而不只是资本积累。华勒斯坦等人接受了布劳代尔的观点，主张从“政治的”和“经济的”过程来解释资本主义经济周期，并认为，尽管资本主义世界体系在政治上和经济上不断出现繁荣——平衡稳定——上升——衰退这样的周期，但这个体系有三种现象是呈上升的趋向：一是加入资本主义世界经济劳动分工的区域比例上升的趋向；二是在资本主义世界经济中的主要依靠工资收入的劳动力的比例上升的趋向；三是以机器形式而出现的资本的比例上升的趋向。

2. 多重国家体系。在世界体系论者看来，世界体系的第二个特征是多重国家体系，这是世界体系的政治层面。在世界体系论者看来，国家和国家体系是资本主义世界经济的独特产物，他们由此着重探讨了国家和国家体系、霸权和国家体系、国家体系和世界经济等三个问题。在探讨国家和国家体系问题时，华勒斯坦等人指出，尽管在资本主义世界经济产生以前也存在各种政治实体，如封建帝国，但只有资本主义世界经济产生后才导致国家的产生，国家本身是权力的一种表现。在近代世界体系中，存在着两种政治，即无产阶级和资产阶级的斗争，以及资产阶级之间的斗争，国家为这些阶级控制和分配剩余价值提供了一种合法的机制。华勒斯坦等人认为，国家从来就不是一个完全独立的政治实体，它自产生起就存在于国家体系中。就像资本主义世界经济随着时间的推移不断扩展一样，作为世界经济在政治上表现的国家体系也一直在扩展。在国家体系的变化过程中，存在着两重过程：一是中心区的“中心化”过程，即在世界经济中国家在几个地区不断地垄断商品，利用国家机器在世界经济中使其利润最大化，这些国家遂成为“核心国家”；另一个过程是在边缘区的“边缘化”过程，即国家在世界经济中利用不太先进的技术和过

多的劳动力，这些国家遂成为“边缘国家”。与这种经济两极化相对应的是政治两极化，即在中心区出现了强国，而在边缘区出现了弱国，帝国主义的政治过程之所以成为可能，就是因为“不等价交换”的经济过程造成的。

在华勒斯坦看来，就如同世界经济体系在不断的周期性运行过程中会出现垄断一样，国家体系在其运行过程中也会出现周期性的变动，这个周期是一个长周期，可以称之为“霸权周期”。华勒斯坦认为，自资本主义世界体系产生以来，国家体系主要经历了三个霸权周期，产生了三个霸权国家：17世纪中期的荷兰、19世纪中期的英国和20世纪中期的美国。国家体系的霸权主要是指这样一种机制，即在所谓的大国之间的竞争中，一个大国能够在很大程度上将它在政治、经济、军事、外交，甚至文化上的原则和意愿强加于国家体系中的其他国家。上述三个霸权国家所处的历史时代不同，但它们在以下三个方面具有类似之处。第一，每个霸权国家都是先在农业—工业生产和金融领域，最后在金融领域占有优势。当在所有三个领域都占有优势时，它就获得了短暂的霸权地位。第二，每个霸权国家在其称霸时期内都奉行全球“自由主义”，反对重商主义和贸易限制。第三，霸权国家的全球军事力量的模型是相类似的，即霸权主要表现在海上（现在是海上/空中）力量。华勒斯坦强调指出，霸权虽然是以经济和军事作为基础，但不应忽视霸权的政治方面，即霸权国家如何在世界市场中发挥其政治职能。他批判了以往两种对待资本主义的态度，一种认为资本主义的特征就是生产要素的自由流动，另一种认为资本主义的特征就是国家机器不干预市场。华勒斯坦认为，资本主义的特征其实是生产要素部分流动，政治机器有选择地干预市场，霸权就是国家机器有选择地干预市场的一个例证。资本主义最根本之点就是追求无休止的资本积累，而有选择地干预的

目的就是要加速资本积累的过程，总之，霸权国家通过国家这个政治机器来为其在世界市场上获得最大利润提供垄断政治条件，这就是霸权在世界经济中的政治职能。当霸权国家将其自身的喜好强加于国家体系时，必然会遭到另一些国家的反对，因此，在国家体系中，霸权不是一种永远存在的状态，它的政治职能不是无限的。在霸权统治时期的国家体系是暂时稳定的，尽管国家体系本身并不总是处于霸权统治之下，但追求霸权地位就像经济活动中追求利润的最大化一样，是国家的目标，资本主义世界体系正是在这种经济上追求利润最大化，政治上追求霸权地位的推动下不断向前发展，并呈现出周期性的变化。

3. 作为一种文明的世界体系。世界体系的文明层面是世界体系论者另一集中探讨的问题。在华勒斯坦看来，“文明”这个词有两个非常不同的涵义，一种是与“野蛮”相对应，即文明是少一点“主动性”，在这种意义上，文明是单一的；另一种涵义则是指特殊的世界观、习惯、结构和文化，这些现象形成一种历史的整体，与其他同样的现象共存。在这种意义上，文明是多元的，是作为一种特殊性而非普遍性存在。华勒斯坦认为，当人们把文明看作是不同的习惯、结构和文化而讨论各个文明之间的关系时，应将其放在一个历史背景中来分析不同文明之间的关系。尽管在16世纪以前世界上存在着不同的文明，但自从牛顿力学产生以来，追求科学是文明的象征，这一思潮伴随着英国的工业革命以及资本主义世界经济向全球的扩展而成为一种具有普遍性的文明，这是资本主义世界体系在文明上的表现。对于那些处于边缘地区的国家，由于在政治上和经济上都处于边缘地区，因而对于核心地区所创造的这种文明很难作出有效的反应，它们往往陷入一种两难境地：拒绝接受将是一个损失，接受也是一个损失。如果拒绝接受，边缘地区就很难享受科学这种文明给世界带

来的益处。如果接受，那就意味着放弃自己以前所具有的文明。所以，在整个 19 和 20 世纪，边缘地区的国家在文明上走的是一条无所适从的“Z”字型道路。这种状况是由其在世界体系中所处的边缘地位造成的。

华勒斯坦认为，未来文明的走向有三种可能性。一是单一的世界体系被打破，形成多种历史体系，每一种历史体系有不同的劳动分工，这样，人们又将回到 16 世纪以前的世界。这种可能性不是很大；二是现在这种全球范围的历史体系转化成一种不同类型的全球范围的历史体系，这种可能性是存在的。华勒斯坦说，人们可以建构一种与以前的体系一样的充满等级、不平等和压迫的体系，也可以建构一个相对平等和民主、充满法国大革命口号的体系；三是建立一个新的体系。但是什么样的体系是最可能实现的，现在还没有一个很好的答案，因为目前还有些问题没有搞清楚。

如果说英国著名地理学家麦金德提出了东西方之间的对抗，以及核心区内部的对立，那么华勒斯坦等人的探讨方法则是把南北对抗放到了世界舞台的中央，世界体系论者的一个结论就是资本主义世界体系将会采取一种新的形式，即世界社会主义政府。这一结论显然是受马克思的影响。此外，他们在三个方面颇受马克思学说的影响：一是经济是体系的基础，华勒斯坦将之称为资本主义世界经济；二是经济活动对政治结构的影响，以及无产阶级和资产阶级矛盾在资本主义社会中的作用；三是所有的国家都将凋萎，由此华勒斯坦特别提出了社会主义政府的思想。之后他对此提法作了两点补充，一是对当前政治结构及未来政治结构不能完全肯定，因此他宁愿使用秩序（Order）一词来代替政府（Government）一词；二是他们的主张完全是一种可能性演绎，即仅是根据演绎而提出的看法。

当我们对世界体系的理论、范畴、概念和基本观点有了一定的了解之后，再来阅读《历史资本主义》一书，许多问题的来龙去脉以及历史和社会背景就比较清楚了。华勒斯坦在本书的第一部分主要论述了万物商品化；资本主义生产；积累政治学；为利益而斗争；作为鸦片的真理，理性与理性化；结论：关于进步和过渡等问题。他开宗明义地指出，资本主义首先是一个历史社会体系、资本主义一词由资本而来。历史资本主义这个历史社会体系的不同之处就在于这个历史体系中，资本的使用（投资）采取了一种特殊的方式，自我扩张成为资本使用的首要目标或首要意图。在这个体系中，只有当过去的积累被用来进行更多积累时，它才成为资“资本”。在以前的历史社会体系中，一种或多种因素还没有被“商品化”，或者还没有被充分地“商品化”，而历史资本主义则是一个普遍商品化的过程，它不仅涉及交换过程，而且涉及生产过程、分配过程，以及投资过程。这些过程以前都不是通过“市场”进行的，如今资本家为了追逐更多的资本积累，力图在经济生活所有领域中把越来越多的社会过程商品化。资本主义历史发展的冲动就是把万物商品化。由此产生了这一历史体系的两个基本矛盾：一个是资产阶级内部争夺“剩余”（马克思称之为剩余价值——作序者注）的矛盾；另一个是资产阶级和无产阶级之间的矛盾。在历史资本主义以前的历史体系中，大多数劳动力都是固定的。而在历史资本主义体系中，存在着这样一批人，他们随时可以被出价最高的人雇佣，这些在劳动力市场出卖劳动力的人就是无产者，而且愈来愈多的出卖劳动力的人被无产阶级化。但是，作者答出的结论是，历史资本主义社会体系自16世纪至今已存在400多年，令人惊异的并不是无产阶级化程度之高，而是无产阶级化程度之低，直到今天，还不能说世界经济中完全无产阶级化的劳动力已经达到50%。华勒斯坦对“无

产者”一词是否适用于个人表示怀疑，并认为在历史资本主义体系中，家庭一直是从事各种活动的经济单位，而且在家庭这个结构之下，生产劳动和非生产劳动的社会分界开始被强加到工人阶级头上。在现实中，生产劳动被定义为挣钱的工作（主要是挣工资的工作），非生产劳动则被定义为那些虽然是必需的，但却只不过是“维持生活”而不生产可供任何别人剥夺的“剩余”的活动。通常，生产（工资）劳动成为家庭中男人的任务，非生产（维持生活）劳动则成为妇女加上儿童和老人的任务。此外，生产劳动在户外的“工作场所”进行，非生产劳动在户内进行。这样，在历史资本主义体系中，挣工资的成年男人被看作“养家的人”，而从事家庭劳动的成年妇女被看作“家庭妇女”。因此，性别主义被制度化了。区分无产者家庭和半无产者家庭的主要标志是，前者主要依靠工资收入为生，这种收入须足以支持生存和再生产的最低成本；后者的工资收入在家庭总收入中不占主要地位，由于家庭中妇女、儿童和老人都在创造“剩余”，因而降低了可接受的最低工资起点，华勒斯坦指出，作为一般规律，工资劳动力的雇主都宁愿工资工人生活在半无产者而不是无产者家庭，而且透过整个历史资本主义的时空来观察全球经验现实，人们会猛然发现，在半无产者而不是无产者家庭生活的工资工人是统计的常规。

但是，要理解为什么在历史资本主义条件下无产阶级也会随着时间的推移而有所深化，就必须联系大量生产活动的商品链问题。商品链的地理方位不是随意分布的，它们从资本主义世界经济的边缘向中心或核心移动，华勒斯坦认为，讨论商品链就是讨论扩展的社会分工，在资本主义发展过程中其职能和地域都变得越来越广泛，同时也越来越等级化。生产过程结构中空间的等级化使世界经济在核心与边缘之间出现越来越深刻的两极化，它不

仅表现在分配标准上（实际收入水平、生活质量），更重要的是表现在资本积累的地点上，这个过程中至关重要的一点是暴力介入了价格决定，不平等交换是一种古老的实践，但资本主义历史体系的绝妙之处就在于它掩盖不平等交换的方式，华勒斯坦把在不平等交换中受损的一方称为“边缘”地区，而把受益的一方称为“核心”地区。随着剩余从“边缘”地区向“核心”地区转移，资本在那里积聚起来，提供了实现进一步机械化的资金，这样，既增加了核心地区生产者在现有产品上的优势，又使他们能生产出更稀缺的产品，并以此重新开始新一轮的资本积累过程，历史资本主义创造的所谓历史工资水平在世界体系的不同区域之间愈益显示出巨大差异，在书中，华勒斯坦对康德拉季耶夫提出的为期五十年的扩张与停滞交替的周期作了较为详尽的论述，在华勒斯坦看来，历史上，几乎每一个被纳入世界经济的新地区所建立的实际报酬水平都处于世界体系工资水平等级的最低一级，完全的无产者家庭在这些地区几乎不存在。华勒斯坦批判了那种把历史资本主义说成是一种“自然”体系的辩护论调，他认为这是一个明显的荒谬体系。原因是华勒斯坦相信，世界人口的大多数，无论从主观还是客观上说，物质上都不如在以往的历史体系下富裕，而且政治上也不如以前。就产品的物质分配和能源配置而言，衡量的最初结果是非常负面的。他还指出，历史资本主义体系在经历四、五百年的繁荣之后，终于进入了结构危机。

在华勒斯坦看来，政治调整的最有效的杠杆是国家组织，他特别提到国家政权对历史资本主义的运行产生了重大影响，如国家掌握的资源不仅使它能进一步积累，而且国家可以参与分配，因此，国家直接或间接地加入资本进一步积累的过程。这显示了国家在维护历史资本主义体系过程中所处的重要地位和所起的重要作用。华勒斯坦还就理性，真理、种姓制度，种族主义、科学

性文化、反体系运动中的社会主义运动和民族运动等广泛问题阐述了自己的独特见解，他说，历史体系只是历史的，它们产生出来，又最终消失，这是其内部过程的结果，而内部矛盾的加剧引起了结构危机，结构危机是大规模的，不是瞬间的。它们需要时间来充分展示全过程。他预言，历史资本主义在20世纪初进入它的结构危机，到下个世纪末（即21世纪末）的时候人们可能会看到它作为一个历史体系的完结。他说，历史资本主义的危机常常被说成是从资本主义向社会主义的过渡，但人们还不知道，一个社会主义世界秩序，即一个急剧缩小所有人之间物质生活差距和实际权力鸿沟的世界秩序，将会怎样运行。华勒斯坦不同意马克思提出的历史资本主义体系与其以前的社会历史体系相比是一个进步的看法，他认为这不是事实，历史资本主义不是代表了进步，而是代表了退步，他特别提及了无产阶级绝对贫困化的问题，认为产业工人只占世界人口的一小部分，而世界劳动力的绝大部分，即生活在农村或在农村与城市贫民区之间流动的劳动力，他们的状况比他们五百年前的祖先更糟。无论在物质还是在精神（性别主义和种族主义）方面，都存在着绝对贫困化。他一再强调，认为历史资本主义通过一个进步的资产阶级推翻一个落后的贵族统治而产生的看法是错误的，在历史资本主义条件下，工人阶级得到的少许好处从来都集中在核心地区，这种不成比例的状况至今仍是事实，由此，他得出结论说，无论对反体系运动，还是对其参与建立的政权而言，都不能按照它们是否创造了“美好社会”来进行评价，而只能看，在保证使资本主义向一个平等的社会主义世界秩序过渡的世界范围的斗争中，它们作出了多少贡献，他认为社会主义是一个能够实现的历史体系，某一天也许会在世界上建立起来，作为一个具体的历史社会主义，它应该满足最大限度地实现平等和公正的一个历史体系的最低限定条

件，它应增强人类对自身生命的控制力（民主），它解放想象力。

在本书的第二部分，华勒斯坦重点论述资本主义世界体系的另一重要层面即资本主义文明，他用替资本主义算个帐的形象方式来揭示资本主义世界体系的过渡性，他指出在资本主义文明中，分享剩余价值的人数要多得多，这个集团被称为中产阶级。他估算了一下，认为在全世界范围内，这一集团的人数大概从来没有超过世界人口的 1/7，而生活在资本主义世界经济制度中的人民中也许有多达 85% 的人，生活水平明显不会高于 500 到 1000 年前的世界劳动人口，大多数人的物质生活甚至恶化了，在谈到历史资本主义体系的未来前景时，他认为可能存在三种类型的社会格局，第一种是新封建主义；第二种可能是某种民主法西斯主义；第三种是一种更为激进的、全世界高度分散的、高度平等的世界秩序，华勒斯坦认为，这三种历史格局都是实际存在的，而历史的选择将取决于今后 50 年里我们这个世界的集体行为，他说，到 2050 年或 2100 年，当我们回头再来看资本主义文明时，我们可能会感到十分不公平，不管我们选择了那种新体系，我们可能都会觉得必须贬低那个刚刚过去的体系，即资本主义文明。

导 言

这本书的写作是由先后两项约请促成的。1980年秋天，梯也里·巴考（Thierry Paquot）约我为他在巴黎编纂的一套丛书写一本小册子，题目为《资本主义》。我回答说，原则上，我乐于从命，不过，书名要改为《历史资本主义》。

马克思主义者和其他政治左倾人士已撰写了大量有关资本主义的论著。但是，在我看来，大部分这类论著都陷入了非此即彼的两个误区。一种主要是逻辑—演绎分析，从资本主义的定义（即人们认为资本主义是什么）出发，分析资本主义在不同地点和时间的发展程度。另一种集中研究当前某个时间点上资本主义体系的所谓主要转变过程，而以前的时间点只不过被当作研究当前实际情况的虚幻陪衬。

我认为，我们面前的一项紧迫任务是把资本主义看作一个历史体系，从其全部历史和独特的具体现实中加以考察。从某种意义上说，这也正是我近年来全部研究工作所探讨的问题。因此，我给自己提出的任务是描述这一现实，指明什么在不断变化，而什么又是持久不变的。（只有如此，我们才能把整个现实归于一个单一名称之下。）

我和许多人一样，相信这个现实是一个统一的整体。但许多持这一观点的人的论证方式是攻击他人的所谓“经济主义”，或文化“理想主义”，或过分强调政治“唯意志论”因素。这类批

判的本质常常导致它们走向另一个错误的极端。我的作法是直截了当地把整个统一的现实描述出来，探讨它在经济、政治和文化——意识形态等各个领域的表现形式。

在我原则上同意写这本书后不久，夏威夷大学邀请我到该校政治系讲课。我利用这一机会写作这本书，作为1982年春季在该系讲课的讲稿。我在那里讲了本书前三章的初稿。我要感谢活跃的听众，他们提出的许多评论和批评意见，使我的表述得以大大改进。

改进之一是我补进了第四章。讲课过程中，我发现，人们极其执著地相信进步是不可避免的，而这一信念具有巨大的影响力。我同时也意识到，这个信念使我们无法理解我们面前还现实存在着不同的历史选择。因此，我决定直率地谈谈这个问题。

最后，我要提到卡尔·马克思。他是当代知识学术史和政治史上的不朽伟人。他给我们留下了概念丰富、道德向上的伟大遗产。但是，他曾说过，他不是马克思主义者。对此，我们应相信他是当真的，而不应把这句话看作一句妙语而一笑置之。

马克思懂得，他是19世纪的人，因此，他的眼光不可避免地受到当时社会现实的限制。而许多自封为他的弟子的人却不懂得这一点。与许多人不同，马克思懂得，一种理论的形成，只有联系到它直接或间接批判的另一种理论时才会被理解，也才会有用，并且，这种理论与建立于其他前提下、探讨不同问题的理论毫不相干。与许多人不同，马克思还懂得，在他的著作中，当他把资本主义作为一种完善的体系加以说明（这种体系从未在历史上真正存在过），同时，又来分析资本主义世界具体的日常现实时，这两者之间存在着矛盾。

因此，让我们以惟一明智的方式来对待他的著作，即：把他当作战友，从他所处的历史背景下来理解他的论述。

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一、万物商品化：资本主义生产

资本主义首先是一个历史社会体系。要了解它的起源、它的运行，或者它当前的状况，我们必须从它存在的现实中加以考察。当然，我们可以尝试把这一现实用一系列抽象说明加以概括，但是，用这类抽象概念对现实进行判断和分类是愚蠢的。因此，我认为，不如让我们来描述资本主义在实践中实际是怎样的，它作为一个体系是如何运行的，为什么它会以这种方式发展起来，以及它目前在朝什么方向发展。

资本主义一词由资本而来。因此，认为资本是资本主义的一个关键因素的假定是合理的。但什么是资本？在一种用法上，资本不过是积累的财富。但是，如果把它用在历史资本主义中，资本就具有更特有的定义。它不只是一批可供消费的货物、机器，或以货币形式表现的对物质的占有权。历史资本主义中的资本当然也指那些尚未被花费掉的过去劳动的积累。但是，如果这就是资本的全部含义，那么，一切历史体系，甚至早到居安德特人的历史体系，都可以被说成是资本主义历史体系，因为所有这些体系都拥有这类包含着过去劳动的存货。

被我们称作历史资本主义的这个历史社会体系的不同之处在于：在这个历史体系中，资本的使用（投资）采取了一种特殊方式。自我扩张成为资本使用的首要目标或首要意图。在这个体系中，只有当过去的积累被用来进行更多积累时，它才成为“资本”。我们后面还会谈到，这个过程无疑是复杂的，甚至是曲折

的。但是，正是资本持有者的这种无休止的、奇异的自顾自的目标，即积累更多的资本，以及这一资本持有者为实现这一目标而与其他人建立起来的关系，被我们称为资本主义过程。当然，这个目标并不具有排他性，其他因素也加入到生产过程中来。但是，问题在于，当出现冲突时，哪些因素会占上风？从长远来看，只要资本积累经常凌驾于其他目标之上，我们就有理由认为，我们观察到的是一个运行中的资本主义体系。

当然，一个人或一群人在任何时候都可以决定，他们要为获得更多资本而进行投资。但是，在历史上一个特定时刻之前，这些人想要成功地做到这一点从来不是容易的事。在以前的体系中，资本积累这一漫长而复杂的过程几乎总会在某一点上受阻，甚至在其基本条件已经存在的情况下也是如此，比如，少数人手中拥有或积聚了一批以前未被消费的物品。这位假定的资本家总是需要得到劳动力的使用，这就必须要有人被诱或被迫去完成这项工作。一旦得到工人，生产出产品，这些产品必须以某种方式销售出去，这就要有一个分配体系和一批具有购买这些产品的必要财力的买主。产品必须以高于卖主出售时投入的总成本价格销售出去，再进一步，这个差额还必须大于卖主维持他本身生存所需的费用。用我们现代的语言来说，就是要有利润。利润的所有者还必须保存住这些利润，以便在适当时机用来投资，随后，整个过程必须在生产这个环节上重新开始。

事实上，在现代之前，这个过程的链条（有时被称为资本的循环）很少能够完成。原因之一在于，在以前的历史社会体系中，这个链条上的许多环节被政治和道德的权威看作是非理性和/或不道德的。但是，即使没有那些有权干涉的人的直接干预，这个过程也常常由于缺少过程中的某一或某些因素不得不半途而废，这类因素包括：以货币形式积累的存货，供产品生产者使用

的劳动力，销售者网络，作为买主的消费者等等。

某一或某些因素缺少的原因是，在以前的历史社会体系中，一种或多种因素还没有被“商品化”，或者，还没有被充分地“商品化”。这个意思是说，这一过程还没有被看作可以或应该是一个通过“市场”进行交易的过程。而历史资本主义则是一个普遍商品化过程，它不仅涉及交换过程，而且涉及生产过程、分配过程，以及投资过程。这些过程在以前都不是通过“市场”进行的。再者，在追求更多资本积累的过程中，资本家总是力图在经济生活的所有领域把越来越多的社会过程加以商品化。由于资本主义是自顾自的过程，结果必然是，从本质上说，没有任何社会交易能够被排除在这个过程之外。这就是为什么我们可以说，资本主义历史发展的冲动是把万物商品化。

仅有社会过程的商品化还不够。生产过程是在复杂的商品链上互相连接的。以服装为例，这是一种典型的产品，在整个资本主义历史实践中曾广为生产和销售。要生产衣服，通常至少需要布料、线、某种机械，以及劳动力。而这每一样东西同样需要被生产出来。生产它们所需要的那些东西也同样需要被生产出来。这个商品链中的每一个次过程并不是不可避免地——甚至通常不是普遍地——已经被商品化了。的确，我们下面还会谈到，在这一链条上的一些环节还没有真正被商品化的情况下，往往可以获得更多的利润。很清楚，在这样的链条上工作的是一大批散居各地的工人，他们以某种形式得到报酬。这些报酬在帐面上表现为成本。此外，还有另一批人，他们的数量要少得多，但通常也散居各地，同时，他们通常并不以经济合伙人的身份互相联系，而作为不同的经济实体运行。这批人以某种方式分享商品链产生的最终剩余，即商品链中总生产成本与销售最终产品所实现的总收入之间的差额。

这种连接众多生产过程的商品链一旦产生，所有“资本家”的积累率就由所创造的剩余大小决定。这种剩余通常会有较大波动。但是，单个资本家的积累率则由“竞争”过程决定。那些判断更敏锐、更能控制工人，以及对由政治决定的某些市场业务有更大参与权（即通常所说的“垄断”）的人得到更高的回报。

由此产生了体系的第一个基本矛盾。当我们把所有资本家当作一个阶级看待的时候，降低生产总成本似乎符合他们的利益。但事实上，降低成本常常对一些资本家比对另一些资本家更有利。因此，一些资本家宁愿在全球总剩余较小的情况下扩大他们的份额，而不愿在全球总剩余较大的情况下接受一份较小的份额。这个体系还存在着第二个基本矛盾。随着越来越多的资本被积累起来，越来越多的过程被商品化，以及越来越多的商品被生产出来，要维持这一流动过程的一个基本条件是要有越来越多的买主。然而，降低生产成本的努力常常同时也减少了资本流通和分配，从而抑制了完成积累过程所需要的买主队伍的不断扩大。另一方面，对全球利润实行再分配以便扩大买主队伍又常常会减少全球利润额。所以，单个企业家们一方面力图让自己的企业朝一个方向发展（例如，降低劳动成本），另一方面，他们作为一个集合阶级的成员，又力图扩大整个买主的队伍（至少对一些产品生产者来说，这不可避免地导致劳动成本的增加）。

因此，资本主义经济学一直为追求积累最大化的理性动机所支配。但是，对企业家来说是合理的，对工人来说则未必是合理的。更重要的是，对作为一个集团的所有企业家来说是合理的，对个别企业家来说则未必如此。因此，仅仅谈论人人都在追求自身利益是不够的。每个人的自身利益常常推动他们相当“理性地”去从事一些相互矛盾的活动。因此，即使不把每个人对他们自身利益的看法在多大程度上被复杂的意识形态面纱所遮掩和歪

曲这一因素考虑在内，要盘算出真正的长远利益也是一件极其复杂的事情。此时，我暂且假定，历史资本主义事实上的确孕育出一个经济人，但我必须补充一句，这个人几乎不可避免会有些糊里糊涂。

但是，这同时又是减少困惑的一个“客观”条件。如果一个人，不管是由于无知、愚蠢，还是由于意识形态偏见，经常在经济判断上出错，这个人（或企业）就难以在市场上生存下来。破产一直是资本主义体系严酷的冲刷剂，它不断迫使经济行为者们大致上遵循既定常规，迫使他们的行为从整体上保证资本的进一步积累。

历史资本主义是具体的、有时间和空间界限的生产活动的统一体，无休止的资本积累是它的经济目标或“法则”，这一法则指导着基本经济活动，或在这些活动中起支配作用。这是那样一种社会体系，在它之下，那些按规则行事的人对整体而言具有如此之大的影响力，以致其他人不得不或者也照此行事，或者自取其咎。这是这样一种社会体系，在它之下，这些规则（价值规律）的范围日益扩展，强制实行这些规则的力量日益坚定，这些规则对社会结构的渗透日益深入，而这一些，都是在社会上反对这些规则的声音日益响亮，抵制行为更有组织的情况下发生的。

如果历史资本主义就像我们以上描述的这样，我们每个人都可以决定它指的是哪一个具体的、有时间和空间限制的统一体。我个人的看法是：这一历史体系起源于15世纪后期的欧洲，它在空间上不断扩张，到19世纪后期囊括了整个地球。它今天仍然囊括着整个地球。我意识到这种对时空界限的粗略描述会在许多人头脑中引起疑问。这些疑问可归为两类。第一类是实践问题。例如，16世纪时，俄国是处于欧洲世界经济之内还是之外？奥托曼帝国倒底在何时被纳入到资本主义世界体系中？我们能否

断定某国的某一内陆地区在某一特定时间是否真正被纳入到资本主义世界经济之中？这些问题都是重要的，不仅由于它们本身，还由于，当我们试图回答这些问题的时候，我们必须对历史资本主义过程进行更精确的分析。但是，对这些处于不断争论和阐述中的众多实践问题，我们在此时此处无法一一探讨。

第二类疑问涉及到我在前面提到的归纳分类法的有效性问题的。有些人认为，在私有企业家雇佣工资劳动者这一独特的社会关系在生产场所形成之前，资本主义不可能存在。还有人认为，当某一国家实现了工业国有化并宣称忠于社会主义原则时，这个国家就会由于这类举措及其所带来的后果而停止参与资本主义世界体系。这些问题不是实践问题而是理论问题。对此，我们将在讨论中加以说明。然而，用演绎法来探讨这些问题是没有意义的，因为这种讨论不会引发理性的辩论，而只会导致对立信念的冲突。因此，我们将采用启发式方法来探讨这些问题，理由是，我们的归纳分类比别的分类更有用，因为它能使我们对大家目前已知的历史现实的理解不但更容易，而且更得体。同时，它所提供的对这一现实的解释，也会使我们在当前条件下采取更有效的行动。

让我们先来看看资本主义体系实际上是如何运行的。如果说，产品生产者的目标是资本积累，这也就是说，他要生产尽可能多的某种产品，并在出售后获得最高的利润额。但他只能在“市场”的一系列经济条件的限制下行事。他的总生产（相对直接地）受到一些因素的制约，例如物质投入、劳动力、顾客、以及增加投资所需的现金。他能否通过生产赢利以及赢利多少，还要看他的“竞争对手”能否在更低售价上提供同一种产品。这里所谓竞争对手指的是与他在同一个直接而有限的地方市场（无论这个市场在具体情况下如何界定）进行实际销售的人，而不是那些在世界市场上的竞争者。他生产的扩张还要受到另一个因素的

限制，即：当他的生产扩张到一定程度时，“当地”市场上的价格会下降，以致客观上减少了他全部生产所能实现的实际总利润。

以上所谈的是客观条件的限制，不涉及特定生产者或市场上其他人所作的任何具体决策。这些限制是由具体时空条件下的整个社会过程所产生的。当然，还存在着更易受到人为操纵的限制。政府可能或已经建立各种规则，在一定程度上改变着经济选择余地，从而也改变着利润的计量。某一具体生产者可能是现存规则的受益者或受害者。某一具体生产者可能会试图说服政治当局改变其规则，从而使自己受益。

为了最大限度地提高资本积累的能力，生产者是如何进行经营的？劳动力向来是生产过程的一个核心因素，在数量方面也具有重要意义。要进行积累，生产者必须考虑到劳动力的两个不同问题：劳动力供给和劳动力成本。劳动力供给问题通常是这样界定的：在市场稳定和劳动力数量在某一时刻达到理想状态的情况下，固定的社会生产关系（某一具体生产者拥有稳定的劳动力）可能会使成本较低。但是，当产品的销售减少时，如果劳动力数量不变，就会增加生产者的实际成本。同样，如果产品销售增加而劳动力数量不变，生产者就会失去赢利机会。

从另一方面来看，劳动力变化不定对资本家也有不利之处。按照定义，劳动力变化不定是指这些劳动力不一定持续地为同一个生产者工作。因此，从生存角度讲，这些工人关心他们的报酬率，即关心拥有足够的工作时间以便抵消波动的影响，获得稳定的实际收入。这就是说，工人必须能够从工作中得到足够的收入以便维持他们没有收入时的生计。因此，对生产者来说，流动劳动力每人每小时成本比固定劳动力要高。

这是资本主义生产过程本身产生的矛盾，当出现这类矛盾

时，其结果必然是一种不稳定的历史妥协。让我们回顾一下历史。在历史资本主义以前的历史体系中，大多数（但从来不是所有的）劳动力都是固定的。在有些情况下，生产者的劳动力不过是他自己或他的家人，因此，从定义上讲是固定的。在另一些情况下，非亲缘关系的劳动力由法律和/或习惯法规则（包括各种形式的奴隶制、债务关系、农奴制、永久租佃关系等）被束缚到生产者那里。这种关系有时是终生的，有时只存在于一定期限内，而过期后有可能重续。不过，只有在重续时存在着另外的实际选择的情况下，这种时间限制才是有意义的，而现在，这类固定关系不仅对那些被一定数量劳动力束缚住的生产者造成困难，而且对其他所有生产者都造成困难，因为，很显然，这些生产者生产活动扩张的程度，依赖于不固定的劳动力的供给程度。

正如通常所描述的，这些因素形成了工资劳动制产生的基础，这就是说，存在着这样一批人，他们随时可以被出价最高的人雇佣。我们把这个过程称作劳动力市场的运行，而把出卖劳动的人称作无产者。如果我说，在历史资本主义中，劳动力在不断被无产阶级化，那么我没有说出任何新东西。这个说法不仅不新，而且毫不足奇。无产阶级化对生产者的好处早已被充分论述过了。令人惊异的并不是无产阶级化程度之高，而是无产阶级化程度之低。一个历史社会体系已经存在了至少400年，而直到今天，我们还不能说，资本主义世界经济中完全无产阶级化的劳动力已经达到了百分之五十。

当然，这个数字取决于如何衡量和衡量什么人。如果我们使用政府关于所谓经济上活跃的劳动力（主要指成年男子，即可以被正式雇佣的、支付报酬的劳动力）的官方统计数字，那么，我们会发现，工资工人在今天已经占有相当大的比重（尽管，即使在这种情况下，从世界范围内计算，其实际百分比也比大多数理

论著述所推论的要小)。但是，如果把其工作被以某种形式纳入商品链中的所有的人考虑在内，从而包括了几乎所有成年妇女，以及相当大一部分成年之前和壮年之后年龄段的人（即，少年和老年），那么，无产者的百分比就会大幅度下降。

在进行衡量之前，让我们再补充一点。从概念上讲，“无产者”一词是否适用于个人？我对此表示怀疑。在历史资本主义中，正如在以往的历史体系中一样，个人通常总是生活在相当稳定的结构组织中，共同享有日常收入和积累的资本，对此我们可以称之为家庭或户（household），家庭的界限由于个人的离聚而不断变动，但这一事实并不改变家庭作为合理计算报酬和支出单位的意义。人们要想生存下去，总会合计他们可能得到的总收入，无论其来源如何，还要评估他们必须开销的实际支出。他们首先要生存；当收入增加时，享受满意的生活方式；如果还有更多收入，则可以作为资本积累者加入到资本主义游戏中去。不论为了哪一个实际目标，家庭都一直是从事这些活动的经济单位。家庭通常是由亲缘关系联成的单位，但有时也并不是这样，或至少不是绝对如此。在多数情况下，家庭共居一处，但随着商品化的发展，这种情况有所改变。

正是在家庭这个结构之下，生产劳动和非生产劳动的社会分界开始被强加到工人阶级头上。在现实中，生产劳动被定义为挣钱的工作（主要是挣工资的工作），非生产劳动则被定义为那些虽然是必须的，但却只不过是“维持生活”的活动，因此，被说成不产生可供任何别人剥夺的“剩余”。这类工作或者完全是非商品化的，或者只是小（事实上也的确是）商品生产。各类工作的划分由附加在它们之上的不同角色的形成而固定下来。生产（工资）劳动成为家庭中男人的任务，首先是成年男人/父亲，其次是其他男人（年轻人）。非生产（维持生活）劳动则成为妇女

的任务，首先是成年妇女/母亲，其次是其他妇女，再加上儿童和老人。生产劳动在户外的“工作场所”进行，而非生产劳动在户内进行。

当然，分界线不是绝对的，但在历史资本主义条件下它变得非常清晰和具有强制性。把实际劳动按性别和年龄进行划分当然不是历史资本主义的发明。这种划分可能始终存在，即使仅仅由于对某些任务而言存在着生理前提和界限（性别、年龄）。家庭和/或户的等级结构也不是资本主义的发明。那也是很久以来就有的。

历史资本主义条件下的新东西是在分工与工作价值之间存在着相关关系。男人经常会去从事与女人不同的工作（成年人同样会去从事与儿童和老人不同的工作），但在历史资本主义之下，妇女工作（以及儿童与老人的工作）的价值遭到持续贬低，而与此同时，成年男人工作的价值却得到强调。在其他体系中，男人和女人完成不同（但通常是平等）的任务。在历史资本主义中，挣工资的成年男人被看作“养家的人”，而从事家庭劳动的成年妇女则被看作“家庭妇女”。因此，当国家统计资料开始编纂时（它本身也是资本主义体系的产物），所有养家的人都被认为是经济上活跃的劳动力，而家庭妇女则不属于这个范畴。因此，性别主义被制度化了。随着劳动价值的大分化，性别区分和歧视的法律和超法律机器便顺理成章地建立起来。

我们还要指出，儿童期/青春期延长的概念，并非由疾病或虚弱而从劳动力中“退休”的概念，也都是伴随着历史资本主义中户的结构的出现而出现的。这些现象常被看作是工作豁免，因而是“进步”的。但是，更准确地说，这实际上是把工作重新定义为非工作。更有甚者，儿童的训练活动和退休者的零碎工作还被贴上“娱乐”的标签，他们工作贡献的贬值被视为从“真正”

工作的“辛劳”中解放出来的合乎情理的发展。

作为一种意识形态，这类区分有助于确保劳动的商品化既是广泛的，又是有限的。例如，如果我们要计算一下世界经济中有多少个家庭的实际收入（或所有形式的总收入）中有一半以上来自户外的工资工作，我想，我们会为百分比之低而感到惊讶。这种情况不仅在前几个世纪是如此，就是在今天也是如此，尽管百分比可能随着资本主义世界经济的历史发展而稳定地有所提高。

我认为，要说明这种现象并不是很困难的。假定，当生产者雇佣工资劳动时，他总是宁愿少付而不愿多付报酬。无论何时何地，工资工人接受雇佣的报酬底线取决于他们终生生活于其中的家庭的类型。简单说来，以同样效率从事同样工作，生活在一个工资收入百分比较高的家庭（让我们称其为无产者家庭）中的工资工人，比生活在一个工资收入百分比较低的家庭（让我们把这种家庭称为半无产者家庭）中的工资工人要求有更高的货币报酬水准，低于这个水准，他会发现从事工资的工作显然是非理性的。

可接受的最低工资起点有所差别的原因在于生存经济学。无产者家庭主要依靠工资收入为生，这种收入必须足以支付生存和再生产的最低成本。但是，当工资在家庭总收入中不那么重要时，一个人通常可以理性地接受一份工作，尽管这份工作的报酬率低于用劳动小时衡量所应带来的实际收入，但无论如何他是挣回来一些所需的现金（其必要性常常是由法律强加的），或者，这份有工资报酬的工作能够替代报酬甚至更低的其他劳动。

在这类半无产者家庭中，那些创造其他形式实际收入的人，即，主要用于自我消费的家庭生产，或把产品拿到当地集市上销售，或两者兼而有之，不管他们是家中的其他人（任何性别和年龄），或只不过处于不同年龄段的同一些人，他们都在创造着剩

余，从而降低了可接受的最低工资起点。这样，非工资工作使某些生产者得以向他们的劳动力支付较低的报酬，从而降低成本，提高利润率。毫不足怪，作为一般规律，工资劳动力的雇主都宁愿工资工人生活在半无产者家庭而不是生活在无产者家庭。透过整个历史资本主义的时空来观察全球经验现实，我们会猛然发现，在半无产者而不是无产者家庭生活的工资工人是统计的常规。从理论层面上，我们面前的问题忽然掉转了方向，从解释无产阶级化的存在理由开始，我们转而解释为什么这个过程远未完成。我们现在需要探究更进一步的问题：为什么甚至会发生无产阶级化这一现象？

我要立即指出，把日益深化的世界无产阶级化主要归因于企业家阶层的社会政治压力是大可置疑的。恰恰相反。他们似乎有更多的动机来延缓这一过程。首先，如我们刚刚论述的，在一定地区内，大量半无产者家庭转化为无产者家庭会提高雇主支付给工资劳动力的实际最低工资水平。第二，日益深化的无产阶级化还会带来政治后果，我们在后面还会谈到，这不仅对雇主不利，而且有积累效应，从而会使一定地理经济区域的工资支付水平进一步提高。事实上，工资劳动力的雇主对无产阶级化是如此缺乏热情，以致他们除了推动性别/年龄分工之外，还以其雇佣方式以及通过他们在政治领域的影响，鼓励承认少数民族，试图把劳动力中特定的角色配置到少数民族头上，从而对他们的工作支付不同水平的实际报酬。少数民族性创造出一种文化硬壳，它巩固了半无产者家庭的结构形态。少数民族的产生还起到从政治上分化工人阶级的作用，这一事实对雇主是一份政治红利，但我认为，这不是这一过程的主要推动力。

但是，要理解为什么在历史资本主义条件下无产阶级化会随着时间的推移而有所深化，我们必须回到连结着大量生产活动的

商品链问题上来。我们必须丢掉把“市场”当作第一个生产者与最后消费者会合的场所这一简单化概念。无疑，这样的市场无论过去和现在都一直存在。但在历史资本主义中，这种市场交易只占全部交易的一小部分。多数交易是在长商品链上的两个中间生产者之间进行的。买主购买他生产过程的“投入”。卖主出卖“半成品”，即还不能马上用于个人直接消费的产品。

在“中间市场”上的价格争斗，反映了买主力图从卖主手中夺取商品链上由先前一切劳动过程所实现的一部分利润。这种争斗在一定时空条件下当然会由供求决定，但从不完全如此。首先，供求可以通过垄断限制加以操纵，这种事经常发生，并非例外。其次，卖主可以通过垂直一体化影响联结点上的价格。当“卖主”和“买主”事实上为同一个企业时，价格可以在财政和其他因素影响下任意变动，而这种价格从不表现为供求之间的相互作用。垂直一体化与“水平”垄断一样都不罕见。我们当然都熟悉这方面的一些典型事例，如16到18世纪的特许公司，19世纪的大商行，20世纪的跨国公司。这是一些全球性组织，它们力求包容特定商品链上尽可能多的环节。但是，更常见的是一些较小的、只包含几个（甚至两个）商品链环节的垂直一体化实体。我们有理由认为，历史资本主义的统计常规是垂直一体化，而不是商品链上卖主和买主彼此不同、相互对立的那种“市场”关系。

商品链的地理方位不是随意分布的。如果在地图上把它们标出来，我们就会发现，它们呈现出向心型。它们的产生点是多层次的，但目的地却汇合于少数几个地区。这就是说，它们从资本主义世界经济的边缘向中心或核心移动。人们很难否定这一经验观察。真正的问题在于为什么会是这样。讨论商品链就是讨论扩展的社会分工，在资本主义发展过程中其职能和地域都变得越来

越广泛，同时也越来越等级化。生产过程结构中空间的等级化使世界经济在核心与边缘之间出现越来越深刻的两极化，它不仅表现在分配标准上（实际收入水平、生活质量），更重要的是表现在资本积累的地点上。

起初，在这一过程开始时，地域差别还相当小，地域专业化程度也很有限。但是无论存在着什么差别（不管是由于环境的还是历史的原因），这些差别在资本主义体系内都会进一步扩大、强化和固定下来。这个过程中至关重要的一点是暴力介入了价格决定。当然，一方为改善其价格而在市场交易中使用暴力，这并不是资本主义的发明。不平等交换是一种古老的实践。资本主义这个历史体系的绝妙之处在于它掩盖不平等交换的方式。事实上，它把不平等交换掩盖得如此严密，以致即使它的公开敌人也只是在这一机制运行了500年之后，才开始系统地剖析它的真面目。

掩盖这个核心机制的关键，在于资本主义世界经济本身的结构，即，资本主义世界体系的经济领域与政治领域在表面上的分离，前者是世界范围的社会分工，其一体化生产过程的全部运行都是为了无休止的资本积累。后者由表面互相分离的主权国家组成，每个国家在其权力范围内自主进行政治决策，每个国家都备有军队来维治其统治。而在历史资本主义的现实中，几乎所有重要的商品链都超越国家边界。这不是最近的新发展。历史资本主义刚刚出现的时候就是如此。甚至，描述16世纪资本主义世界商品链的跨国状况就如同描述20世纪的情况一样真实。

不平等交换是如何实现的？让我们从市场的实际差异说起。差异的出现或是由于复杂生产过程的（暂时的）短缺，或是由于军事力量造成的人为短缺，商品在各个区域之间以下述方式流动：某一地把所拥有的较不“短缺”的货物“卖给”另一地区，

其售价比同等标价但朝相反方向流动的商品体现出更多的实际投入（成本），这样，总利润（或剩余）的一部分就从一个地区转移到另一个地区。这是核心——边缘关系。我们可以把受损的地区称作“边缘”，把获益的地区称作“核心”。这些名称实际上反映了经济运动的地理结构。

我们不难发现这一差距在历史上得以扩大的几个机制。只要商品链上任两个环节实现了“垂直一体化”，都能使更多的总剩余转移到核心。同时，随着剩余向核心的转移，资本在那里积聚起来，提供了实现进一步机械化的基金，从而，既增加了核心地区生产者在现有产品上的竞争优势，又使他们能生产出甚至更稀缺的产品，以此来重新开始这个过程。

资本在核心地区的积聚提供了建立相对强大的国家机器的财政基础和政治动机，其能力之一就是确保边缘地区的国家机器相对弱化或维持相对软弱的状态。这样，它们就能向这些国家结构施加压力，迫使它们接受甚至推动其权力范围内的进一步专业化，通过使用廉价劳动力和创造（或强化）使这些劳动力得以生存的相应的家庭结构，来降低它们在商品链等级中的地位。历史资本主义创造的所谓历史工资水平在世界体系不同区域之间愈益显示出巨大差异。

这是一个隐蔽的过程。也就是说，实际价格似乎总是在世界市场上通过非人格化经济力量基础上的谈判来决定的。在每项单独交易中，没有必要借助隐而不见（只在战争和殖民征服中才公开动用）的庞大的暴力机器来保证交换的不平等。相反，只有当现存的不平等交换水平遭到严重挑战时，暴力机器才开始起作用。一旦尖锐的政治冲突过后，世界企业家阶级便装出一副经济运行完全由供求决定的样子，而只字不提世界经济是怎样历史地达到了这个特定供求点，是什么样的暴力结构在那一刻维持了世

界劳动力工资水平和实际生活质量的“习惯”差异。

我们现在可以回到为什么甚至会出现无产阶级化这个问题上来。我们知道，每个企业主的个人利益与整个资本家阶级的集体利益之间存在着基本矛盾。从定义上说，不平等交换符合集体利益，但不符合许多人的个体利益。因之，那些其个人利益没有在某时立即得到满足的人（因为他们的赢利比不上竞争对手），总是试图作出改变以有利于自己。他们或者通过提高自己的生产效率，或者通过运用政治影响来为自己建立新的垄断优势，以便能在市场上进行更成功的竞争。

资本家之间的激烈竞争从来就是历史资本主义的一个主要特性。甚至当竞争似乎受到自愿约束时（通过卡特尔一类的安排），这也主要是由于每个竞争者认为这种约束可以使自己获得理想的利润率。在一个以无休止资本积累为基础的体系中，除非面临自我毁灭的危险，参与者不可能放弃追逐长期利润的不懈努力。

因此，垄断的实践和竞争的动机是历史资本主义的一对现实。在这种情况下，连结生产过程的模式中没有一个能够是稳定的。相反，力求改变一定时空下特有的模式，而暂不顾及这种行为对全球的影响，这样做，永远符合大多数相互竞争的企业主的利益。在“市场”对个人行为产生制约的意义上说，亚当·斯密的“看不见的手”无疑在起作用。但是，如果认为其结果是合谐的，这就完全误解了历史资本主义。

相反，经验观察还表明，其结果似乎表现为整个体系中扩张与停滞交替的周期。这些周期的波动如此重要和带有规律性，人们很难不相信它们是这一体系运行中所固有的。如果用类比的话，它们就像资本主义有机体的呼吸机制，吸进新鲜氧气，吐出毒化的废气。类比往往是危险的，但这个类比却似乎特别恰当。积存的废气是经济的无效率，如前面提到的，它通过不平等交换

过程，经常由政治力量维持下来。新鲜氧气是更有效的资源配置（更有效指的是能够进行更多积累），通过商品链的经常调整而实现。

在越来越多的企业主争相获取商品链上更有利可图的连结点过程中，投资比例出现失衡，也就是我们所说的（这种说法多少有些误导）生产过剩。这种现象每隔 50 年左右就发生一次。解决比例失衡的惟一办法向来是调整生产体系，从而使分配更加平均。听上去既合乎逻辑又简单，但其附带结果却总是巨大的。每一次调整后，经营都更集中于那些原来就最拥挤的商品链环节上。一些企业主和一些工人因而被排挤出去（包括那些为停业的企业主工作的工人，以及为进一步实现机械化以降低单位生产成本的企业主工作的工人）。这一转换也使企业主能“下放”商品链等级结构中的一部分业务，从而把资金和努力集中到商品链的创造性环节上去。这些环节由于最早提供了“较为稀缺”的投入，因而利润率较高。把等级中某些特定过程“下放”，经常导致生产在地理位置上的重新配置。地区再配置的一个主要吸引力，是生产转移到劳动力成本较低的地区。对工业移入地区来说，新建工业常常提高了劳动力中一部分人的工资水平。我们现在正经历着世界汽车工业，钢铁工业和电子工业在世界范围内的大规模重新配置。重新配置这一现象从历史资本主义产生之初就是它的组成部分。

重新改组产生出三个主要后果。第一个后果是资本主义世界体系在地理结构上不断出现调整。但是，尽管每隔 50 年左右商品链都经历一番重大调整，一个按等级制组织起来的商品链体系却被维持下来。当新生产过程出现在顶部时，另一部分生产过程就从等级结构中向下移动。不同的地理区域成为不断变动的各等级生产过程的场所。因而，一定产品具有了“产品周期”，从核

心产品开始，逐步变成边缘产品。此外，特定地区居民的相对福利水平也出现上升或者下降。但是，如果把这种位置变动称作“发展”，我们首先必须能够用事实证明，这个体系的全球性两极化有所缩小。经验证明，这种现象根本没有发生，相反，两极化在历史发展中不断扩大了。地理位置和产品的重新配置的确具有真正的周期性。

大改组还带来第二个后果。“生产过剩”这个带有误导意义的词却让我们注意到这样一个事实：这个问题始终存在，原因是在体系中某些产品缺乏足够有效的世界范围的需求。正是在这种情况下，劳动力的利益与少数企业主的出现吻合。劳动力总是力求扩大他们在剩余中所得的份额，而当体系出现经济崩溃时，他们通常受到额外的直接刺激，同时也得到一些额外的机会，来进行阶级斗争。劳动力增加实际收入最有效和最直接的方式之一是使自己的劳动力进一步商品化。他们总是力争用工资劳动来代替家庭劳动过程中那部分低收入劳动，特别是各式各样的小商品生产。无产阶级化背后的一个主要推动力是世界劳动力本身。他们通常比其自命的知识分子代言人更了解这一点：半无产者家庭比完全无产者家庭所遭受的剥削要深重得多。

在经济停滞时刻，部分地由于劳动力的政治压力，部分地由于相信生产关系的结构变化对自己比对与之竞争的其他生产业主更有利，一些生产业主在生产和政治领域联合起来，在某些地区推动一部分劳动力的进一步无产阶级化。正是通过这一过程，我们可以了解到，在长远看来无产阶级化导致资本主义世界经济利润率下降的情况下，为什么还会出现无产阶级化的扩展。

我们应该在这个背景之下来看待技术变革过程。它是历史资本主义的结果，而不是它的动力。每一次主要的技术“发明”总是，第一，创造出新的“稀缺”从而利润率高的产品；第二，减

少了劳动。这是对周期性下降阶段的反应，是利用“发明”来进一步推动资本积累的方式。这些发明无疑会经常影响到具体生产组织。在历史上它们推动了许多工作过程（工厂、生产线）的集中。但这些变化很容易被夸大。人们常常只研究物质生产任务的积聚过程，而不考虑相反的分散化过程。

当考虑到周期性改组的第三个后果时，这一点就显得尤其真实。在存在以上两个后果的条件下，出现了一个需要加以解释的矛盾现象。一方面，我们说，资本积累在分配两极化的历史过程中继续积聚，与此同时，我们又说，存在一个缓慢而稳定的无产阶级化过程，这个过程实际上使利润水平降低。对此，一个简单的解释是：第一个过程大于第二个过程。这是事实。除此之外，无产阶级化发展所导致的利润水平的下降，迄今都是由向相反方向运动的进一步机械化而绰绰有余地得到补偿。

另一个理解历史资本主义的简单经验观察是，它的地理部位随着时间的推移而稳步扩大了。这个过程变化的速度是了解历史资本主义的线索：把新地区整合到历史资本主义的社会分工中去不是一下子发生的。事实上，它周期性地出现大扩张，尽管每次扩张在范围上都受到一定限制。部分原因在于资本主义本身的技术发展。交通、通讯和武器的改进稳定地降低了把远离核心的地区整合进来的费用。然而，这个解释至多只给了我们理解这个过程的一个必要而非充分的条件。

人们曾断言，为实现资本主义生产利润而不断寻求新市场可以用来解释这一现象。但这个解释与历史事实完全不符。历史资本主义以外的地区不愿意购买它的产品，部分原因在于它们本身经济体系不“需要”这类产品，部分原因在于它们通常缺乏相应的财力去购买这些产品。当然，例外是存在的。但总的说来，是资本主义世界到外部地区去搜寻产品而不是相反。每当一个地方

被军事征服后，资本主义企业主都会抱怨那里没有真正的市场，他们通过殖民地政府来“创造品味”。

把寻找市场作为一种解释完全不能成立。一个更有说服力的解释是寻找廉价劳动力。历史上，几乎每一个被纳入世界经济的新地区所建立的实际报酬水平，都处于世界体系工资水平等级的最低一级。完全的无产者家庭在这些地区几乎不存在，它们的发展也得不到鼓励。相反，殖民地国家（以及那些处于被纳入地区的经过改组但未正式殖民化的半殖民地国家）的政策都是为推动半无产者家庭的产生而设计的，如我们已提到的，从而把工资水平维持在尽可能低的起点上。典型的国家政策包括税收机制，它迫使每个家庭都加入某种工资劳动，与此同时，对家庭成员的流动施加限制或迫使他们分离，这样，大大减少了完全无产阶级化的可能性。

让我们在分析中再加上以下观察。资本主义世界体系对新地区的整合，往往与世界经济的停滞阶段联系在一起。这就很清楚，世界体系的地理扩张，通过把注定只能达到半无产阶级化的劳动力纳入进来，对无产阶级化不断发展条件下的利润降低过程起到制约作用。这个表面上矛盾的现象消失了。无产阶级化对两极化过程的影响，至少迄今为止，通过整合过程而完全被抵销掉了。当等式的分母稳定扩张时，从整个劳动的百分比上来看，工厂式劳动的增加，比人们通常断言的要小。

我们已经花费了很多时间来描述历史资本主义在经济领域的运行。我们现在要解释为什么资本主义会作为一个社会历史体系出现。这不像通常想象的那么容易。从表面上看，历史资本主义远不像其辩护士所说的那样是一个“自然”体系，而是一个明显荒谬的体系。它进行资本积累，为的是积累更多的资本。资本家就像踏板上的白鼠，一直在快跑，为的是跑得更快。无疑，在这

个过程中，一些人活得惬意，而另一些人活得很糟。但是，他们活得究竟有多好？还能维持多久？那些活得惬意的人真的是在生活吗？

我越思考这个问题，越觉得它荒诞不经。因为我相信，世界人口的大多数，无论从主观还是客观上说，物质上都不如在以往的历史体系下富裕。而且，我还认为，他们在政治上也不如以前。这个历史体系塑造出有关进步的意识形态来进行自我辩护，它对我们的影响如此之深，以致于我们甚至难以认识到这一体系的大量历史消极面，甚至像卡尔·马克思这样的历史资本主义的顽强斗士，也充分强调了它的历史进步作用。我完全不相信这一点，除非所说的“进步”不过是指历史上较晚出现的、而它的起源能够由先它而存在的事物得到解释。全面衡量历史资本主义的正负两面可能是复杂的，关于这一点我还会谈到。但是，就产品的物质分配和能源配置而言，衡量的最初结果，在我看来，的确是非常负面的。

如果这一点成立，那么，为什么这个体系会兴起？可能，正是为了达到这一目的。把要达到一个事实上已经达到的目的用来解释一个体系的起源，还有什么比这种论证方式更有说服力呢？我知道，现代科学已经使我们不再寻求终极原因，也完全不再考虑意图（特别是，意图极难用经验事实说明）。但我们知道，现代科学和历史资本主义一直处于紧密的联盟中。因此，我们必须了解现代资本主义起源的方式问题上对科学的权威性提出置疑。因此，让我简要概括一种关于历史资本主义起源的历史解释，而不在这里展开讨论有关这一观点的经验基础。

在14和15世纪的世界里，欧洲是某种社会分工的所在地。与世界其他地区相比，就生产力而言，欧洲是下述因素的结合：它的历史体系，它有关人类知识的相对状态，它在不同地区之间

的中间地位，即，既不如一些地区先进，也不如另一些地区原始。我们都记得，来自欧洲文化经济最“先进”地区之一的马可·波罗，在他的亚洲航程中对所见所闻大为折服。

在这个时期，封建欧洲的经济领域正在经历一场从内部产生的极其重大的危机，这场危机正在动摇它的社会基础。统治阶级在大量地彼此消灭，而土地制度（其经济结构的基础）变得松散，通过重大改组，正在朝比以前平等得多的分配方向发展。还有，小农场主正在显示生产者的高效率。整个政治结构变得衰弱，政治强权者忙于进行互相残杀的争斗，从而无暇顾及压制大众日益增长的力量。天主教意识形态的调合作用正面临严峻考验，平等运动正在教会内部产生。各个方面的确处于四分五裂之中。假如欧洲继续沿着这条道路走下去，很难相信，具有高度“秩序”结构体系的中世纪封建欧洲的模式会重新巩固起来。更为可能的是，欧洲的封建社会结构将会逐渐变成一个相对平等的小生产者体系，进一步削弱贵族统治，使政治结构分散化。

这一结果是好是坏，以及对谁有利，这是一些任人推测从而意义不大的问题。但有一点是清楚的，这种前景必定令欧洲上层人物丧胆。他们感到吃惊和恐惧，尤其是看到其意识形态盔甲也在瓦解之中。可能没有人有意识地用语言表达过任何这样的意图，但是，把1650年的欧洲与1450年的欧洲相比，我们可以看出所发生的变化。到1650年，作为一种可行的社会体系，历史资本主义的基本结构建立起来并得到巩固。报酬平等化的趋势被急剧扭转了。上流阶层再次牢牢地控制了政治和意识形态。1450年的上层家庭中，有相当高的比例到1650年仍然是上层家庭。此外，如果用1900年代替1650年，我们可以发现，与1450年所做的大多数比较结果仍然是真实的。只有到20世纪时，才出现了一些向不同方向发展的意义重大的趋势。正如我们将看到

的，这表明，历史资本主义体系在经历四五百年繁荣之后，终于进入了结构危机。

没有人曾用语言表达过这个意图，但这肯定是真实情况：作为社会体系的历史资本主义的建立，显著扭转了令上层恐惧的趋势，并建立起一个能更好地为其利益服务的体系。这是非常荒谬的吗？只有对它的牺牲品而言才是如此。



二、积累政治学：为利益而斗争

初看上去，为资本积累而进行无休止的资本积累似乎是一个荒谬的社会目标。但有人为它辩护，他们常用的辩解理由是，它的目的是为了实现在远的社会福利。我们后面会谈这些社会利益在什么程度上是真实的。事实很清楚，撇开任何集体利益不谈，资本积累能使许多个人（和/或一些小集团）增加消费机会和场合。至于消费的增长是否真正改善了消费者的生活质量，这是另一个问题，在这里暂不涉及。

我们要谈的第一个问题是：哪些人获得了眼前的个人利益？似乎有理由认为，大多数人都不是等到对（集体或个人）消费所带来的长远利益或生活质量的变化进行评估之后，再来决定是否值得为眼前垂手可得的个人利益而奋斗。而事实上，这从来就是历史资本主义内部政治斗争的焦点。这也就是我们所说的历史资本主义是一个物质至上的文明的含义。

从物质上看，不仅冲在前面的人得到高额报偿，而且，顶部和底层之间物质报偿的差异很大，并在整个世界体系发展过程中日益扩大。我们已经谈到产生报酬分配两极化的经济过程。现在，我们要来讨论，在这一体系内，人们如何使尽解数使自己得到好处，同时使别人得不到同样的好处。我们还要讨论，这些分配不公过程的受害者，第一，如何在体系运行中尽可能减少自己的损失，第二，如何改变这个产生明显不公现象的体系。

在历史资本主义中，人和集团是如何进行政治斗争的？政治

就是改变权力关系，使之有利于自己，从而更改社会过程的方向。成功的政治角逐要求找到变革的杠杆，以便以最小投入得到最大好处。在历史资本主义结构中，政治调整的最有效的杠杆是国家组织，它建造了本身，是历史资本主义主要的制度成就之一。因此，绝非偶然，在现代资本主义的整个历史时期，控制国家政权，必要时征服国家政权，是政治领域中所有主要势力的核心战略目标。

只要仔细观察一下体系的实际运行，我们会即刻发现，即使从狭义上说，国家权力对经济过程也具有极端重要性。国家权力首要的最基本要素是领土管辖权。国家有边界。这些边界通过一国颁布法令和他国的外交承认在法律上确定下来。诚然，边界可以——而且事实上经常——引起争议，这就是说，两方（一国和他国）的法律承认发生冲突。这类分歧或通过判决，或通过武力（和其后的逐步默认）而最终得到解决。许多争端在潜在形式下可以延续很长时期，但时间上超过一代人的不多；关键在于，各方在意识形态上都始终认为，争端能够而且应该逐步得到解决。现代国家体系从概念上不能允许公开承认永久重叠管辖权。主权这一概念是建立在亚里士多德排中律基础上的。

这个哲学—法律信条把对跨越边界、进出各国的运动的控制责任固定下来。每个国家都对本国边界的货物、货币资本和劳动力的流动拥有正式管辖权。从而，每个国家都能在一定程度上影响资本主义世界经济社会分工得以运行的方式。而且，只要改变控制生产要素穿越其边界流通的规则，每个国家都能不断对机制作出调整。

我们通常以非此即彼来谈论边界控制，即或者不存在任何控制（自由贸易），或者不存在任何自由流动（闭关自守）。事实上，在多数时间内，大多数国家实行的国家政策都处于这两个极

端之间。而且，对货物、货币资本和劳动力流动的政策一直是各不相同的。一般来说，劳动力流动比货物和货币资本流动受到更大的限制。

对位于商品链某处的某个生产者来说，当他比世界市场上生产同种产品的生产者更有经济竞争力时，自由流动就合乎他的要求。但当情况不是这样时，针对生产竞争对手而设的各种边界限制会增加后者的成本，而有利于本来效率较低的生产者。根据定义，一个市场上的任何一种产品都有众多生产者，由于多数生产者的效率往往低于少数生产者，因而，存在着有一股对跨界自由流动施以重商主义限制的持续压力。但是，由于那些效率较高的少数人相对而言更富裕和更强大，因而存在着另一股持续的压力，要求开放边界，或者，更具体地说，开放某些边界。因此，第一场大斗争——它是凶残的并仍在继续进行，就是关于国家的边界政策。此外，由于任何一批生产者（尤其是那些大而有势力的生产者）都既直接受到其实物经济基础所在的国家（不一定是他们作为其公民的国家），又受到许多其他国家的边界政策的影响，因此，这些经济生产者意欲同时在几个（事实上常常在许多）国家追求政治目标的实现。认为人们应把政治活动限制在本国的概念，对那些为追求资本积累而进行资本积累的人完全是格格不入的。

当然，改变何物在何种条件下能否跨界流动的规则的—种方法，是改变现有边界线，或通过把—国完全并入另—国（统一、吞并、殖民化），或通过攫取某些领土，或通过分裂或非殖民化。边界变化直接影响到世界经济中社会分工格局这一事实，是赞成或反对某—边界变动的所有的人所考虑的问题。围绕民族的界定而进行的意识形态动员能够引起—定的边界变动，只要参加者和其他人设想出未来边界变动之后将会实行的具体国家政策，这就使民族运动立即带有了经济内容。

国家政权对历史资本主义运行产生重大影响的第二个因素，是国家拥有决定其领土管辖范围内社会生产关系管理法规的合法权利。现代国家结构为自己僭取了取消或修正一切传统关系的权利。从法律上说，除了自我限制之外，国家不承认对其立法范围的任何其他限制。即使当某些国家宪法对由宗教或自然法教义衍生的限制施以意识形态口惠时，它们仍保留了让某些由宪法指定的机构或人来解释这些教义的权利。

对劳动控制方式实行立法的权利决不仅限于理论。国家一直在使用这些权利，从而经常引起现存格局的急剧变化。在历史资本主义中，国家通过立法，废除了对工人变换工作的各种习惯性限制，进而加深了劳动力商品化。它们还把现金财政义务强加到劳动力头上，从而迫使一些工人去从事工资劳动。但是，从另一方面看，如我们上面提到的，国家通过法律行为又常常不鼓励完全无产阶级化，为此，国家或者对居住地加以限制，或者要求民族集团对其成员继续承担一定的福利义务。

国家控制生产关系，它们先把一定形式的强制劳动（奴隶劳动，公义劳动，契约劳动，等等）加以合法化，后来又从法律上加以废止。它们建立起管理工资劳动合同的规则，包括合同保证，最高和最低的相互义务。它们用法律形式规定了劳动力跨国或在国内进行地理流动的界限。

所有这些国家决策都直接考虑到对资本积累的经济影响。这一点，只要翻阅一下大量被当场记录在案的关于不同法令或行政措施选择的辩论就会很清楚。国家还经常花费大量精力对不驯服者，尤其是不驯服的劳动力，进行强化调节。工人不能无视加在他们行动上的法律限制。恰恰相反，工人造反，不管是个人还是集体，也不管是通过消极方式还是积极方式，总会招来国家机器的随时镇压。当然，有组织的工人阶级运动有时能够对镇压行为

设置一定限制，使统治规则作出某些对他们有利的修正，但是，这些运动之所以能取得这类成果，主要是由于它们能够影响国家机器的政治构成。

国家权力的第三个要素是税收权。税收完全不是历史资本主义的发明。从前的政治结构也把税收作为国家机器获得收入的源泉。但是，历史资本主义从两方面改变了税收。首先，税收变成国家收入的主要（大部分）的常规来源，从而，国家收入不再依靠利用武力对国家正式管辖区内外的个人（也包括其他国家）不时进行强征暴敛。第二，在资本主义世界经济的历史发展过程中，税收在创造或积累的总价值中的比重稳定扩大。这意味着，从对资源的控制上说，国家一直是很重要的，因为国家掌握的资源不仅使它们能进行进一步积累，而且国家参与分配，因此，国家直接或间接地加入资本进一步积累的过程。

税收是一种权力。这一权力把敌意和抵抗都集中到国家身上。国家像是恶棍的化身，攫取着他人劳动果实。但必须记住，政府之外存在着一些势力，它们大力推动实行特定类型的税收，因为这一过程或者会产生对它们有利的直接再分配，或者令政府创造出使它们经济地位得以改善的外部条件，或者使别人受罚而使自己从经济上受惠。简言之，税收权力是国家直接推动对某些集团更有利的资本积累过程的最简捷的方式之一。

迄今为止，大部分关于国家再分配权力的讨论都只涉及其均等化能力。这是福利国家的特征。但事实上，再分配这一机制更多地被用于使分配两极化而不是使实际收入趋同。除了资本主义市场运行产生的两极化之外，新的报酬两极化还通过三个主要机制在不断地被创造出来。

首先，政府能够通过税收，敛聚起大量资本，通过政府补贴，再分配给那些已经拥有大量资本的个人或团体。这些补贴通

常用一些站不住脚的公共服务为借口（主要通过对服务的过高付酬）以资助形式直接发放。补贴还通过非直接形式发放，由国家承担产品开发成本，通过产品销售赢利再来分期偿还。实际上，这只不过是在耗资巨大的开发阶段完成之时把经济活动按名义成本移交给非政府企业主而已。

第二，政府通过正式的法律和合法税收渠道敛聚起大量资本，但这些资本却变成容易到手的猎物，受到虽然非法而事实上却不受限制的对公共资金的大规模侵吞。这类偷盗公共收入以及相应的腐败的私人税收程序，历来是整个历史资本主义中私人资本积累的一个主要来源。

最后，政府通过利润私有化而使风险社会化的原则，实行有利于富人的再分配。在资本主义体系的全部历史中，风险越大，损失越重，政府越是可能参与进来防止破产，甚至偿付损失，即使单纯出于避免发生金融混乱的愿望，政府也会这么做。

反平等的再分配实践是国家权力的可耻的一面（所谓可耻，是指政府对这类行为不无难堪之感，因而总是试图加以掩盖），但与此同时，政府提供社会管理资本这一面却得到公开炫耀，被说成是政府维持历史资本主义的基本作用。

基本能源、交通、世界经济信息基础设施等对许多生产者业主集团降低成本极其重要的支出，基本上都由公共资金来开发和维持。无疑，大多数人都从这类社会管理资本中得到某些好处，但是，并非所有的人都从中得到相等的好处。拥有大量资本的人所得到的好处大大超过应得的份额，尽管他们已经从远为平等的税收体制中得到了报偿。因此，社会管理资本是为进一步的资本积累和资本积聚服务的。

最后，国家垄断着或试图垄断武装力量。警察力量主要被用来维持国内秩序（即，保证劳动力接受分配给他们的角色和报

酬)，军队却是用来使一国生产者能直接影响他国竞争者是否需要本国国家机器提供保护的机制。这个事实引出了国家权力最后一个极其重要的特征。每个国家行使权力的种类是相似的，但各个国家机器权力的大小却大不相同。国家都处于一个实际权力的等级结构中，它既不能用其官僚机构和军队的大小及内聚力来衡量，也不能用其关于自身的意识形态定义来衡量，而是以它们相对于竞争国而言，能否在自己境内不断实现积累资本的积聚的实际能力来衡量。这种实际能力包括制约敌方军事力量的能力，在国内实行优越的调节政策而阻止他国照此办理的能力，以及约束本国劳动力而破坏竞争国照此办理的能力。中期经济结果是衡量国家力量的真正标准。国家机器公然动用武力来控制国内劳动力，这种代价大而不利于稳定的作法，是国家软弱而不是国家有力量的象征。真正强大的国家机器总是能够采用各种方式，以更巧妙的机制对劳动力进行控制。

因此，国家作为最大限度进行资本积累的一个关键机制，其存在方式是多种多样的。根据资本主义的意识形态，资本主义理应是受国家机器干涉的私人企业主活动。但在现实中，这种情况从未在任何地方真正存在过。如果没有现代国家的积极作用，资本主义是否会繁荣起来？推测这个问题毫无意义。在历史资本主义中，资本家通过上面提到的种种方式，依靠它们利用国家机器的能力，来为自己争得利益。

第二个意识形态神话是国家主权。现代国家从来不是一个完全自治的政治实体。国家是作为国家体系的组成部分而发展和形成的。国家体系是国家必须在其运行的一系列规则，是国家舍此便不能生存的一系列合法化过程。从任何国家的国家机器的角度看，国家体系代表了对其实意志的约束。这些约束可见于外交活动、管理司法和合约（国际法）的正式规则，以及对如何及在

何种情况下进行战争的种种限制。所有这些约束都与关于主权的官方意识形态背道而驰。但主权从未真的被看作完全的自治。这个概念其实是用来指明，一个国家机器干涉另一个国家机器运行的合法性是受到限制的。

当然，国家体系的准则不是由同意或一致加以实施，而是根据强国的意愿和能力，首先把限制强加于弱国，而后强加于强国之间。必须谨记，国家是处于一个权力等级中的。这个等级存在本身就对国家自治设置了主要限制。整个形势有可能向国家权力完全消失这个方向倾斜发展，以致等级的上层不再是一个平台，而是一个金字塔式的尖顶。这个可能不是假定，因为军事力量的不断集中常常推动把国家体系转化成世界帝国的过程。

如果说这类努力从未在历史资本主义中得到成功，那是由于经济体系的结构基础和主要资本积累者清晰可见的利益，都与世界经济向世界帝国的转化根本对立。

首先，资本积累是这样一种竞赛，它不断促使更多的竞争者加入进来，因此，最有利可图的生产活动总会出现某些扩散。因此，任何时间内都会有许多国家试图建立使之变强的经济基础。第二，任何一国的资本积累者都利用本国的国家机器来协助自己进行资本积累，同时，他们也需要某种控制杠杆来对付本国的国家结构。因为，如果本国的国家机器变得过于强大，出于国内政治平衡的原因，它可能会不受约束地对国内要求平等的压力作出反应。为对付这种威胁，资本积累者需要通过与其他国家机器结成联盟，以包围本国国家机器相威胁。只要没有一个国家能宰制所有国家，这种威胁就可能奏效。

这些因素形成了所谓权力平衡的客观基础，这就是说，国家体系内部许多强大和中等强大的国家都总是倾向于结成联盟（必要时改变盟友），以便使任何一国都不能成功地征服所有其他国

家。

维持权力平衡的因素远不止政治意识形态，只要看看三个实例就很清楚这一点。其中，强国中的一国暂时实现了一个相对宰制他国的时期。我们可以把这种相对宰制称作霸权。这三个实例是17世纪中叶的联合省（荷兰）霸权，19世纪中叶的英国霸权，和20世纪中叶的美国霸权。

在每一种情况下，霸权都是在打败了一个军事征服的挑战者而取得的（哈布斯堡、法国、德国）。每个霸权都由“世界大战”最终确立——一场大规模的、集中于陆地的、破坏性极高的、延续30年之久的有间歇的斗争，涉及到当时所有主要军事强国。这分别为1618～1648年的30年战争，拿破仑战争（1792～1815），和发生在1914到1945年之间的20世纪的冲突，后者应被看作一场单一的长期“世界大战”。在每一种情况下，胜利者在“世界大战”之前都主要是一个海洋强国，但不得不把自己变为一个陆地大国，以便赢得这场反对一个历史上强大的陆地大国的战争，而这个陆地大国似乎正试图把世界经济变为一个世界帝国。

但是，胜利的基础却不是军事力量。经济力量是基本现实：有的国家的资本积累者在三个主要领域——农业—工业生产、商业、金融——都比所有其他国家更有竞争力。具体来说，在一个短时期内，霸权国的资本积累者比位于其他强国的竞争者效率更高，从而，甚至在其他强国的“本国”地盘上也赢得了市场。每个霸权都是短暂的。每个霸权的结束都主要是由于经济原因而不是政治—军事原因。在每个实例中，暂时的三重经济优势都撞上了资本主义现实的两块硬礁。第一，造成经济更有效的因素总会被别人复制，不是被真正的弱者，而是被中等实力者复制。对任何经济过程而言，后来者都具有不必偿还原有投资的优势。第

二，维持经济活动不中断是霸权大国的利益所在，为此，它常会通过国内再分配来收买劳工，维持和平。长此以往，这种作法导致竞争力下降，霸权随之结束。此外，霸权大国承担了战线过长的陆地和海上军事“责任”，经济负担加重，无法把军事开支维持在“世界大战”前的低水平上。

因此，对弱国和强国都发生制约作用的权力平衡不是一种可以轻易消除的政治附加现象。它植根于历史资本主义过程中资本积累本身的方式中。权力平衡也不仅仅是国家机器之间的关系，因为任何国家的国内行为者都会直接地或通过与别处行为者联盟而越界行事。因此，在评价任何一国的政治状况时，内、外区分是非常表面的，对我们理解实际政治斗争的产生帮助不大。

但是，现实中谁与谁在斗争？这并非如人们所想的那样是一个一目了然的问题，因为在历史资本主义中存在着相互矛盾的压力。最基本，在某种意义上说也是最显而易见的斗争，是这一体系最大受益者的少数人与其受害者的多数人之间的斗争。这一斗争在多种名义和多种假面下进行。当一国资本积累者与劳动力之间界线分明时，我们把这叫做资本和劳动之间的阶级斗争。阶级斗争在两个领域发生：经济领域（实际工作场所和更大范围的、杂乱的“市场”）和政治领域。很清楚，经济领域中存在着直接的、逻辑的和即刻的利益冲突。对劳动力付酬越多，留作“利润”的剩余越少。当然，这一冲突常会为较长时期、较大范围的因素所缓和。相对于体系中其他地方的劳资关系而言，特定资本积累者与其劳动力之间存在着共同利益。付给劳动力的较高报酬，在一定情况下，通过世界经济中全球现金购买力的增长，可以作为延期的利润返回到资本积累者手中。尽管如此，这些因素中没有一项能永远消除这一事实：特定剩余的分割具有零和特征，因此，矛盾必然始终存在。它不断表现为各国内部对政治权

力的竞争。

但是，由于资本积累过程导致资本在某些地理区域积聚，由于导致这一现象的不平等交换是由一个分等级的国家体系的存在造成的，以及由于国家机器拥有某些有限的力量来改变体系的运行，世界范围的资本积累者与世界范围的劳动力之间的斗争便大量表现为一些（较弱的）国家内各种集团对权力的争夺，其目的是利用国家权力反抗强国的资本积累者。只要这种情况发生，我们通常称作反对帝国主义的斗争。但这个问题也往往由于下述事实而变得模糊不清：相关两国各自的内部界限并不总是与作为整体的世界经济中的阶级斗争完全重合。对弱国的某些资本积累者和强国的部分劳动力来说，从单纯的民族意义而不是阶级—民族意义上来来界定政治问题，对他们的眼前利益更有好处。但是，如果斗争中没有阶级内容，如果不把阶级内容作为意识形态主旋律（至少是含蓄地）加以利用，便永远不可能进行“反帝”运动的广泛动员，因而，即使是有限目标也很少能够实现。

我们还发现，国家内部少数民族集团的形成过程与劳动力形成过程密切相联，大致表现了其在经济结构中的地位。因此，无论何地，只要这个问题更突出，或形势发展使生存问题一下子变得更严重，资本积累者与劳动力中受压迫更深的部分人之间的冲突，便开始采取语言—种族—文化斗争的形式，因为这些字眼直接关系到阶级成员的构成。无论何时何地，当这种情况发生时，我们通常称作种族或民族斗争。但是，正像反帝斗争一样，除非这类斗争能够动员起在获取资本主义体系剩余价值的阶级斗争中产生的思想感情，它们极少能获得成功。

但是，如果我们只注意阶级斗争——因为它是明显而基本的，我们就会看不到另外一种政治斗争，它在历史资本主义中消耗的时间和精力，至少与阶级斗争相当。资本主义体系是一个使

所有资本积累者互相争斗的体系。人们追求无休止资本积累的方式，是通过与他人竞争的经济活动来实现自己的利润，因此，每个企业主都只能是任何其他企业主变幻无常的盟友，而违者将被清除出竞争舞台。

企业主反对企业主，经济团伙反对经济团伙，一国企业主或少数民族集团反对另一国企业主或少数民族集团——这一斗争注定没有止歇。这类没有止歇的斗争之所以经常采取政治形式，正是由于国家在资本积累中发挥着核心作用。有时，国内斗争只是围绕国家机器的人事问题和国家短期政策问题。但在另一些时候，斗争围绕较大的“宪法”问题，这类问题决定了短期内斗争如何进行的规则，从而决定了这一派或那一派占上风。每当斗争具有“宪法”性质，它们就要求进行更深入的意识形态动员。在这类情况下，我们就会听到人们谈论“革命”或“大改革”，而失败的一方常常被贴上一些辱骂性（从分析角度来看是不适当的）标签。政治斗争，例如争取“民主”或“自由”，反对“封建主义”或“传统”的政治斗争，只要不是工人阶级反对资本主义的斗争，它们在本质上就是资本积累者之间为资本积累而进行的斗争。这类斗争不是“进步的”资产阶级反对反动阶层的胜利，而是资产阶级内部的斗争。

当然，使进步成为“普遍化”的意识形态口号，在政治上有它的用处。这是把阶级斗争动员与积累者内部斗争的一方联在一起的一种方式。但这种意识形态带来的好处经常像一把双刃剑，它同时释放出热情，松动着对阶级斗争强施的限制。自然，这是历史资本主义的积累者面临的难题之一。这个体系的运行迫使他们实现阶级团结，以反对劳动大众争取自身利益的努力，与此同时，他们之间还在经济和政治领域进行着不停息的斗争，这正是我们所说的体系内部的一个矛盾之处。

许多分析家注意到，除了阶级斗争之外还存在着别的斗争，这些斗争耗费掉大量的政治能量，由此，他们得出结论说，阶级分析对理解政治斗争作用不大。这是一个奇怪的推断。更合理的结论应该是，在非阶级基础上进行的政治斗争，即积累者之间为政治利益而进行的斗争，表明了积累者阶级在世界范围内进行的阶级斗争中具有很大的结构上的政治软弱性。

换一种说法，这类政治斗争是为了形成世界经济的制度结构，从而建立起一种世界市场，其运行会自然而然地有利于某些经济行为者。资本主义“市场”从来不是既定的，更不是不变的。它是创造出来的，处于不断再创造和调整中。

在任何时间内，“市场”都代表了一套规则或约束，是四大制度之间错综复杂的相互作用的结果。这四大制度是：由国家体系联结在一起的众多国家；众多的“民族”，它们或完全被承认，或正在争取得到承认（以及，包括那些亚民族，“种族集团”），它们与国家之间存在不稳定和不确定的关系；处于不断变化的职业构成之中、其觉悟程度游移不定的阶级；共享收入的单位，它们拥有共同的家庭经济，其中许多人从事多种形式的劳动，从多种来源获得收入，与阶级之间存在不稳定的关系。

在这个制度星系中不存在固定的北极星。没有“原发的”实体在这些制度中占上风，而这些制度是在资本积累者的推动下，针对劳动力抵抗剥夺其经济产品的斗争所建立的。每一种制度形式变体的界限，即它得以合法和实际维护的“权利”，在世界经济的地区与地区之间，在周期与长时序之中都各不相同。如果一个认真进行分析的人的头脑在这个制度旋涡面前感到晕眩，他只要想想，在历史资本主义中，积累者除了进一步积累没有更高的目标，而劳动力除了生存和减轻自己的负担以外也不能有更高的目标，他就能找到一条清晰的思路。一旦认识到这一点，现代世

界的政治历史就很容易理解了。

具体来说,我们可以从其复杂性中,理解历史资本主义中出现的反体系运动的迂回和经常表现出来的相互矛盾的立场。让我们从最基本的一个难题开始。历史资本主义是在一个世界经济中运行,而不是在一个世界国家中运行。甚至我们已经提到,结构压力阻碍着任何世界国家的建立。在这个体系中,我们曾强调了众多国家的重要作用,它们既是最强大的政治结构,同时其权力又是有限的。因此,对劳动力来说,改组国家代表了一条改善其他地位的最有希望的道路,但与此同时,这条道路的价值又是有限的。

我们必须先来看一下我们所说的反体系运动是什么。运动一词指的是长于瞬间的某种集体推力。当然,劳动力的自发抗议或起义在一切已知的历史体系中都发生过。这些运动充当了被压抑的愤怒得以宣泄的安全阀。有时,当运动更有效时,它们成为对剥削过程设置微小限制的机制。但一般说来,造反作为一种斗争技巧,只是在中央政权的边缘,尤其是当中央官僚体制处于解体的时候才会奏效。

历史资本主义的结构改变了某些定式。国家位于国家体系中这一事实意味着,造反或起义的影响常常很快就越过了其直接政治管辖范围。因而,所谓“外国”力量具有很强的动机来援助受到攻击的国家机器。这使造反变得更加困难。另一方面,资本积累者以及国家机器对劳动力日常生活的人侵,在历史资本主义下通常比在以前的历史体系中严重得多。无休止的资本积累不断要求改组工作组织(和地点),增加绝对劳动量,对劳动力心理—社会状态进行改造。在这个意义上,对大多数世界劳动力来说,分裂、破坏和剥削变得更加深重。总之,尽管造反获胜的可能性在客观上也许越来越小,造反的动机却加强了。

正是这种极度紧张的状态引起了历史资本主义中造反技巧的

伟大发明。这个发明就是常设组织的概念。只有在 19 世纪，我们才开始看到持续存在的、官僚化结构的两大历史形式：劳工——社会主义运动和民族运动。这两种运动使用同样的普遍语言，它主要是法国大革命的语言，即自由、平等和博爱。两种运动都用启蒙运动的意识形态包裹自己，即相信进步的不可避免性，以天赋人权为由的人类解放。两种运动都求诸未来而反对过去，求诸新事物而反对旧事物。甚至当人们召唤传统时，它也只是被看作复兴、新生的基础。

当然，两种运动各有不同的焦点，因而，在开始时其发生地点不同。劳工——社会主义运动集中于城市 and 没有土地的工薪工人（无产阶级）与他们为之工作的经济结构所有者（资产阶级）之间的冲突。这类运动认为，劳动报酬的分配极不平均，具有压迫性，是非正义的。很自然，这类运动首先出现在世界经济中拥有大量工业劳动力的部位，特别是西欧。

民族运动集中在为数众多的“被压迫民族”（由语言和/或宗教特征界定）与某政治管辖区特定统治“民族”之间的冲突。前者比后者享有少得多的政治权利、经济机会和文化表现的合法形式。这类运动认为，“权利”的分配极不平均，具有压迫性，是非正义的。很自然，这类运动首先出现在世界经济的半边缘地区，如奥匈帝国，那里的劳动力配置等级中少数民族——民族集团的不平衡分布最为明显。

一般说来，直到最近，两种运动都认为它们彼此不同，有时甚至是互相对立的。它们之间的联盟被认为具有战术性和临时性。但是，从一开始，两种运动之间在某些结构上就具有惊人的相似之处。首先，在大量辩论之后，劳工——社会主义运动和民族运动都作出了建立组织的重大决策，同时还决定，它们最重要的政治目标是夺取国家政权（甚至，在一些民族运动中，还包括

设立新国界)。第二，夺取国家政权的战略决策要求这些运动以反体系的，即革命的意识形态为基础来动员民众力量。它们反对现存体系，即历史资本主义。这些运动力求解决这一体系资本—劳动、核心—边缘结构所产生的不平等。

当然，在一个不平等的体系中，对力图改变其地位的下层集团来说，总有两条路好走。它可以力求重新构造这个体系，从而使所有集团的地位平等。或者，它只是力图在不平等分配的等级中使自己的地位上移。我们知道，反体系运动，无论它们如何集中于实现平等目标，它们总是在一开始就包含着或逐步包含了其目标不过是在现存等级中“上移”的成分运动本身对这一点也总是很清楚的。但是，运动总是倾向于从个人动机方面来讨论这个问题：纯洁心灵与背叛事业者的对立。然而，当分析到“背叛事业者”在历史上每一个运动中似乎无处不在时，人们就会从结构上而不是从动机上去寻求解答。

实际上，问题的症结可能在于把夺取政权作为运动支点的战略决策。这个战略导致两个重大后果。在动员阶段，为了实现这个目标，每次运动都被迫和那些与“反体系”无关的集团结成战术联盟。甚至在动员阶段，这类联合就修改了反体系运动本身的结构。更重要的是，在许多情况下，这个战略逐步得到成功。许多运动得到了部分甚至全部的国家权力。这些成功的运动随后面临的现实是：在资本主义世界经济中，国家的权力是有限的。它们发现，它们对权力的行使，由于受国家体系运行的制约，减弱了曾经是它们存在理由的“反体系”目标。

这个问题如此明显，人们难免要问，为什么这些运动会把自己的战略建立在这个似乎导致自我毁灭的目标之上。答案非常简单：在历史资本主义政治结构条件下，它们别无选择。更有前途的替代战略似乎并不存在。而夺取国家政权至少可以改变一下竞

争集团之间的力量平衡。这就是说，夺取政权代表了对体系的一种改革。改革的确改善了现状，但永远会付出代价，这就是：它同时增强了体系的力量。

我们是否可以把 150 多年以来的世界反体系运动的作用概括为仅仅是通过改革来巩固历史资本主义？不可以。这是由于历史资本主义的政治大于各国政治的总和。它同时也是国家体系的政治。反体系运动从一开始就不仅是单个运动，而且是集合体，虽然它们从来没有形成官僚化组织。（许多国际性组织从未包容全部运动）。任何运动，其力量的一个主要源泉，都永远是其他运动的存在。

其他运动向任何一个运动都提供着三种支持。最明显的是物质支持。这种支持是有用的，但可能意义最小。第二种是转移支持。例如，强国介入对弱国反体系运动的能力，总是取决于它眼前政治日程中其他事务的多寡。一个国家越是忙于对付当地的反体系运动，它就越没有能力去对付远处的反体系运动。第三个是集体精神层面的支持，这是最重要的。各个运动从各自的错误中互相学习，从各自的战术成功中互相鼓舞。世界运动的发展影响了世界基本政治气氛，包括对未来的期望，对可能性的看法等。

随着运动在数量上、历史上以及战术成功中的发展，它们作为一种集体现象显得更加强大，而由于它们显得更强大，它们真的就更强大。世界范围内更强大的集体力量对夺取了国家政权的运动的“修正主义”倾向产生某种制约，而这一点对历史资本主义所产生的破坏作用，大于个别成功运动夺取国家政权后对该体系所产生的全部巩固作用。

最后，还有另一个因素也开始发挥作用。随着两种反体系运动的扩展（劳工—社会主义运动从几个强国扩展到所有其他国家，民族运动从几个边缘地区扩展到所有其他地区），它们之间的区别

变得越来越模糊了。劳工—社会主义运动发现，民族主义对其动员民众和行使国家权力都是中心问题。而民族运动也发现了同样的东西。为了进行有效动员和管理，民族运动必须引进劳动力对在平等基础上实现改造的要求。随着中心问题开始不断重合，随着不同组织形式逐渐消失或者联为一体，反体系运动，特别是当它作为一个世界范围的集合体时，其力量急剧增强了。

反体系运动的力量之一，表现为它们在许多国家取得了政权。这改变了世界体系的现行政治。但这一力量同时也是一个弱点，因为这些所谓“革命后政权”继续作为历史资本主义社会分工的一部分，因此，不管愿意与否，它们都在追求无休止资本积累的无情压力下运行。其国内政治后果，是劳动力继续遭受剥削，尽管在许多情况下，剥削程度有所降低，剥削方式有所改良。这导致国内出现了与非“革命后”国家类似的紧张状态，而反过来又在这些国家内部孕育出新的反体系运动。利益的争夺，无论在这类革命后国家还是在其他地方都继续进行，因为，在资本主义世界经济框架内，资本积累规则通行于整个体系。国家结构的变化改变了积累的政治，却无力结束它。

在开头，我们没有回答下列问题：历史资本主义究竟带来什么好处？生活质量究竟有多大改变？至此，人们应该很清楚了：没有简单的答案。我们必须提出的问题是：“为了何人？”历史资本主义创造了空前的物质产品，同时也创造了空前的报酬两极化。许多人从中得到极大好处，但更多的人得到的是实际总收入和生活质量的大幅度下降。当然，两极分化具有地域性，它在某些地区似乎并不存在。这同样是利益争夺的结果。获利的地理位置时常变动，从而掩盖了两极分化的现实。但是，在历史资本主义的整个时间和空间中，无休止的资本积累就意味着实际差距持续不断的扩大。

三、作为鸦片的真理：理性与理性化

我们知道，历史资本主义的志向是普罗米修斯式的。尽管科学和技术变化是人类历史活动的常数，但是，只有在历史资本主义下，那位一直存在的普罗米修斯，用大卫·兰德斯（David Landes）的话说，才“解脱了束缚”。现在，我们对历史资本主义的这种科学性文化的基本总体看法是：它是由贵族骑士在反对“传统的”、非科学性文化力量的顽强抵抗中提出来的。在17世纪，是伽利略反对教会。在20世纪，是“现代化者”反对毛拉。在所有这些问题上，据说都是“理性”与“迷信”的对立，“自由”与“智力压迫”的对立。某些人断定，这个现象类似（甚至等同）于政治经济领域中资产阶级企业主对贵族地主的造反。

关于世界文化斗争的这个基本看法有一个隐藏的前提，即暂存性。“现代”被认为在时间上是新的，而“传统”在时间上是旧的，存在于现代之前。事实上，在某些强烈意象中，传统是反历史的，因而几乎是永恒的。这个前提是一个历史性谬误，它引起极大误解。在历史资本主义时空界限内繁荣起来的许多文化和“传统”，并不比众多的制度体系更具有原发性。它们主要由现代世界创造出来，是其意识形态支柱的一部分。当然，各种“传统”与历史资本主义以前的集团和意识形态之间存在着联系，也就是说，它们通常是在利用已有的历史和知识材料的基础上建立起来。这类跨历史联系的主张，对历史资本主义中各个集团进行政治经济斗争的凝聚力起了重要作用。但是，如果我们想要了解

这些斗争采取什么文化形式，我们不能从表面价值上看待传统，特别是，我们不能假定，“传统”真的就是传统的。

把劳动力在适当地点和尽可能低的报酬水平上创造出来，符合那些想推动资本积累的人的利益。我们已经说过，世界经济边缘经济活动的低报酬之所以可能，是由于创造了这样一类家庭，其中，工资劳动只不过是次要的收入来源。“创造”这类家庭，即它们在压力下自我构造的途径之一，是历史资本主义中社区生活的“少数民族化”。我们所说的少数民族集团，指的是一定规模的人群，相对于邻近地区另一些这类集团而言，保留给他们的是特定职业/经济角色。这种劳动力配置的外在标志，是少数民族集团独特的“文化”——其宗教、语言、“价值观”以及特有的日常行为方式。

当然，我不是说，在历史资本主义中有一个完备的种姓制度。但是，如果从广义上看待职业类别，我认为，民族性和职业/经济角色之间在历史资本主义各个时空区域都一直存在着很高的相关性。我还认为，这类劳动力配置随时间的推移而不同。当劳动力配置变化时，从集团界限和文化特征确定的意义上说，民族性也在变化。还有，当前民族劳动力的配置，与历史资本主义以前这些少数民族集团祖先的劳动方式之间几乎没有任何关联。

世界劳动力少数民族化过程产生了三个主要后果，对世界经济的运行具有重要意义。首先，它使劳动力再生产成为可能。这不是说它为这些集团的生存提供了足够的收入，而是说，它提供了足够多的各类工人，无论在家庭收入总量还是在收入形式上，使他们处于收入预期的适当水平上。此外，正是由于劳动力被民族化了，它的配置便是灵活的。少数民族性使大规模的地理和职业流动变得更容易，而不是更困难。在经济条件改变的压力下，改变劳动力配置所要求的，无非是使部分企业主带头实行地理或

职业的重新选择，并由此得到报偿。这即刻产生了一股自然“拉力”，推动少数民族集团的其他成员在世界经济中改变位置。

第二，民族化提供了一种固有的劳动力培训机制，保证了大部分职业任务社会化过程都在以民族为标准确立的家庭框架内完成，而不需要由工资工人的雇主或国家来负担成本。

第三，也许是最重要的，少数民族化固定了职业/经济角色的等级，在使“传统”合法化的外衣之下，为整个收入分配提供了一个简便的规则。

人们曾详尽探讨了第三个后果。它形成了历史资本主义最重要的支柱之一，即制度化的种族主义。我们这里所说的种族主义与以前各种历史体系中存在的恐外仇外无关。恐外仇外是指害怕“陌生人”。历史资本主义中的种族主义与“陌生人”毫不相干。恰恰相反，种族主义是强使同一经济结构内各部分劳动力互相联系的方式。种族主义是为劳动力等级化以及极不平均的报酬分配进行辩护的意识形态。我们所说的种族主义是意识形态声明与不断实践的结合，其结果是长期维持了民族性与劳动力配置之间的密切关系。意识形态声明采取的方式是断言不同集团的遗传和/或持久“文化”特征是它们在经济结构中地位不同的主要原因。但是，在与经济领域表现好坏相联系的某些特征方面，关于一些人比另一些人更“优越”的信念，总是在这些集团在劳动力中的位置确定之后——而不是在这之前——产生的。种族主义永远是事后的。有人断言，经济和政治上受压迫的人在文化上是“劣等的”。但是，不管由于何种原因，如果经济等级中的地位发生变化，社会等级中的地位也往往发生变化（当然会有所滞后，因为，总要经过一两代人才能消除原先社会化的影响）。

种族主义是为不平等辩护的综合意识形态。但远不止于此。它通过社会化过程，使各个团体适应各自在经济中的角色。反复

灌输（偏见，日常生活中的公开歧视行为）而形成的态度，被用来作为制约个人和他人自己家中和本民族团体中适当和合法行为的框架。正像性别主义一样，种族主义是一种自我压制的意识形态，它产生着预期，同时又限制着预期。

种族主义当然不只是自我压制。它还是压迫性的。它被用来控制下层集团，同时把中间集团当作世界警察体系的不拿报酬的士兵加以利用。这样，不仅政治结构的财政成本大大降低，而且，还减弱了反体系集团广泛动员人口的能力，因为种族主义从结构上使受害者反对受害者。

种族主义不是一个简单现象。在某种意义上，世界范围内存在着一条主要标准线，用来标明在世界体系整体中的身份，这就是“肤色”线。确定谁是“白人”或谁为上层当然不是生理现象。它是一种社会现象。这一点，从世界（和国家）内部由社会标准确定的“肤色线”地位的历史变化中就会看得很清楚，比如南欧人，阿拉伯人，拉丁美洲混血儿，以及东亚人等等。

肤色（或生理）是易于利用的标签，因为它天生难以掩盖。在历史资本主义起源于欧洲的条件下，历史上每逢方便时刻，它总是被利用起来。但是，当不再感到方便时，它就被放弃或修改，而另外的区别特征会受到青睐。在许多地方，识别标准从而变得相当复杂。另一个事实是，社会分工不断发展，民族/种族特征成为描绘现存社会集团界限的高度不稳定的基础。集团的兴起、消失和改变自我界限都相当容易（别人也同样容易地对这些界限持有不同看法）。然而，某一集团界限变化的反复无常，并非不符合整个集团等级结构持续存在的现实，即世界劳动力的少数民族化，事实上，它可能正是其后果。

因此，种族主义是历史资本主义的文化支柱，其智力的贫乏并不妨碍它制造出可怖的残酷。但是，由于世界反体系运动在过去

50到100年间的发展,种族主义开始遭到猛烈攻击。事实上,野蛮类型的种族主义在当前世界上正经历着非法化过程。但是,种族主义不是历史资本主义惟一的意识形态支柱。种族主义虽然对所需劳动力的创造和再生产具有重要意义,但只有劳动力的再生产,还不能充分满足资本无休止积累的需要。劳动力能否有效、持续地进行工作,取决于干部对他们的管理。干部也要被创造出来,加以社会化,并再生产出来。用来创造、社会化和再生产干部的主要意识形态不是种族主义意识形态。它是普遍主义意识形态。

普遍主义是一种认识论。它是关于什么是可知以及如何可知的一套信念。这一观点的实质是,对世界(包括物质世界和社会世界)的富有意义的、一般的表述是存在的,它们普遍并永远正确;同时,科学的目标是寻找这些普遍性表述,并在公式中剔除一切所谓主观的,即一切受历史限制的因素。

对普遍主义的信仰是历史资本主义意识形态牌楼的奠基石。普遍主义既是一种认识论,也是一种信仰。它要求人们不仅要尊敬,而且要敬畏难以捉摸然而据称是真实的真理现象。大学历来既是意识形态培训场所,又是信仰的神庙。哈佛大学把“真理”(Veritas)纹在它的校徽上。尽管人们一直在断言,人永远不能确有把握地知道真理——这据说是现代科学与中世纪西方神学的区别,但人们同时又总是宣称,寻求真理是大学存在的理由,在广义上,甚至是一切智力活动存在的理由。济慈(Keats)在为艺术辩护时告诉我们:“真就是美,美就是真”。在美国,为公民自由进行政治辩护的一个最受喜爱的说法是,真理只能是在“思想的自由市场”上相互作用的结果。

真理,作为一种文化理想,其功能犹如鸦片,并可能是现代世界惟一真正的麻醉剂。卡尔·马克思曾说,宗教是人民大众的鸦片。雷蒙·阿隆(Raymond Aron)反唇相讥,说马克思主义思

想是知识分子的鸦片。两种论断对事物都有敏锐的理解。但是，敏锐理解是真理吗？我想说的是，也许，真理才是人民大众和知识分子的真正的鸦片。当然，鸦片并非是十分恶毒的罪恶。它减轻疼痛。当人们担心与现实的冲突只会不可避免地加剧失败或衰落时，它使人们可以逃避严酷的现实。但是，尽管如此，我们大多数人并不向别人推荐鸦片。马克思和阿隆也从未这样做。鸦片在大多数国家和大多数用途上都是非法的。

我们所受的集体教育告诉我们，当真理事实上是自我理性化时，寻求真理就是一种无私的美德。寻求真理被宣称为进步的基石，从而也是幸福的基石，然而，它在许多方面与维持一个等级制的、不平等的社会结构却至少是一致的。资本主义世界经济扩张的过程，包括经济结构的边缘化，以及加入国家体系并受其制约的弱国结构的产生等，在文化层面上带来一系列后果：基督教的教化，强制推行欧洲语言，教授特定技术和道德准则，改变法律条文等。大部分这类转变都是由军事力量实现的。其余部分由“教育者”的说服加以实现，而他们的权威也最终是以军事力量作后盾的。这些复杂过程也就是我们有时所说的“西方化”，或者，更带傲慢意味的“现代化”。其合法化源泉是对分享普遍主义意识形态的果实和信仰的愿望。

在这些强制实现的文化改变背后有两个主要动机。一个是经济效率。要想使人们在经济舞台上按一定方式表演，有效的办法是教会他们所需的文化标准并清除其他的文化标准。第二个动机是政治安全。人们相信，如果边缘地区的所谓精英们“西方化”了，他们就会与自己的“民众”分离，从而，就不大可能造反，或肯定地说，更无力组织起一批追随者来进行造反。这一点被证明是一个历史性失算，但它有说服力，在短期内也的确起过作用。（第三个动机是征服者狂妄自负（hybris），我没有排除这一

点，只是没有必要把它引入文化压力的讨论，没有它，文化压力已经够沉重了。]

种族主义是在世界范围内对直接生产者进行控制的机制，而普遍主义则被用来把别国的资产阶级和世界各类中间阶层的行为纳入使生产过程实现最紧密一体化、使国家体系最顺利运行的轨道，从而推动资本积累。这就要求创造出一个世界资产阶级文化架构，它能嫁接到各种“民族”文化上。这在科学和技术上尤为重要，不过，在政治思想和社会科学领域中也同样如此。

从而，世界分工中的干部可以在其中“被同化”（这里，被动语调很重要）的一个中立、“普遍的”文化的概念，开始成为世界体系历史演进中的支柱之一。对进步以及后来对“现代化”的颂扬概括了这一套思想。它不是社会行动的真正标准，而是膜拜和加入世界上等阶层的身份象征。与知识的所谓文化狭小的宗教基础决裂而赞成知识的所谓跨文化科学基础，成为对一种尤为有害的文化帝国主义的自我辩护。它在知识解放的名义下进行统治，在怀疑主义的名义下强加于人。

对资本主义至关重要的理性化过程要求创造一个由理性化专家组成的中间阶层，例如行政管理者、技术人员、科学家、教育者。技术和社会体系的极端复杂性必然要求这个阶层具有相当规模，并随着时间的推移不断扩大。用来支持这一阶层的资金来自自由企业主和国家攫取的全球剩余。从这个基本而又非常重要的意义上说，这些干部是资产阶级的一部分，他们参与分享剩余的权利被赋予准确的意识形态形式，即 20 世纪的人力资本概念。相对而言，这些干部没有什么实际资本作为家庭遗产留传，在这种情况下，他们通过确保其子女优先受到教育来确保其地位，从而保证他们的继承权。他们优先受教育被方便地说成是成就的表现，由狭义界定的“机会均等”加以合法化。

科学性文化从而成为世界资本积累者的博爱代号。它首先被用来为他们自己的行为 and 使他们获利的差别报酬辩护。它推动了技术发明。它使采用严酷手段消除生产效益扩展障碍的做法合法化。它创造出一种进步形式，谎称它即使不立即对所有的人有好处，也会最终对所有的人有好处。

但是，科学性文化远不仅是理性化。它是对所有制度结构所需要的各种干部成分进行社会化的形式。它作为一种对干部而不是直接对劳动力的共同语言，成为上流阶层进行阶级联合的手段，限制那些可能图谋一试的干部造反行为的产生和程度。此外，它是使这类干部再生产的灵活机制。它把自己归于一个今天为人们周知的“量才任用”概念，即以前所说的“职业取决于才能”（“La carrière ouverte aux talents”）。科学性文化创造出一种架构，个人在其中的流动并不威胁等级化的劳动力配置。相反，量才任用强化了等级制。最后，量才任用的运作加上科学性文化的意识形态，制造出妨碍认识历史资本主义实际运行的面纱。强调科学行为的理性，是无休止资本积累的非理性的假面具。

从表面上看，普遍主义和种族主义即使不是实际对立的两个信条，至少也像是一对奇异的伙伴。一个是开放的，另一个是封闭的；一个趋于平等化，另一个趋于两极化；一个欢迎理性对话，另一个体现偏见。但是，由于这两个信条都与历史资本主义的进化一同扩展并占据优势，我们应该更仔细地看看它们在哪些方面可能是互相一致的。

普遍主义中存在着一个蹊跷问题。它不是作为自由流动的意识形态出现，而是由在历史资本主义世界体系中掌握经济和政治权力的人鼓吹出来的。普遍主义是作为强者给弱者的一份礼物而贡献于世的。我惧怕带礼物的希腊人！（Timeo Danaos et dona ferentes!）这个礼物本身隐含着种族主义，因为它给了接受者两

个选择：接受礼物，从而承认他们在已达到的智慧等级中地位低下；拒绝接受，从而使自己得不到可能会扭转实际权力不平等局面的武器。

难怪，甚至被吸收进特权圈子的干部，对普遍主义的信息也怀有深刻的矛盾心理，从而在充作其热情的门徒与对其中的种族主义内容的厌恶而引起的文化抗拒之间摇摇不定。这种矛盾心理反映在许多文化“复兴”运动中。在世界许多区域广泛使用的复兴一词本身，就体现出矛盾心理。在谈论新生时，人们肯定了一个先前文化辉煌的时代，但同时也承认了那时文化的等而下之。新生这个词本身是从欧洲独特文化历史中复制出来的。

有人也许会想，世界劳动力对这种矛盾心理有较强的免疫力，他们从未被邀请到贵族的餐桌上进过餐。但事实上，世界劳动力的政治表达形式即反体系运动本身，就深深浸透了同样的矛盾心理。正如我们已经指出的，反体系运动给自己裹上了启蒙运动的意识形态，它本身就是普遍主义意识形态的一个主要产物。因而，这些运动给自己设下了一个从此未能摆脱的文化陷阱：它们要摧毁历史资本主义，而采用的战略和确立的中期目标却是从它们要消灭的“统治阶级的思想”中衍生出来的。

反体系运动之一的社会主义运动从一开始就致力于科学进步。为了把自己与他所斥责的“空想社会主义者”区别开来，马克思宣称他是在倡导“科学社会主义”。他的著作强调了资本主义“进步的”方面。关于社会主义将首先在最“先进的”国家产生的概念指出，这一过程将是社会主义从资本主义的进一步发展中（同时也作为它的反动）成长出来。因而，社会主义革命将效仿“资产阶级革命”并在“资产阶级革命”之后到来。后来的一些理论家甚至提出，因此，在资产阶级革命还没有出现的那些国家，社会主义者的责任是协助资产阶级革命。

第二和第三国际之间稍后出现的分歧在这个双方都同意的认识论上却没有不同意见。事实上，无论是社会民主党人还是取得政权的共产党人，都强调优先进一步发展生产资料。列宁关于“共产主义等于社会主义加电气化”的口号至今仍以大幅标语悬挂在莫斯科的街头上。无论是社会民主党人还是共产党人，只要这些运动一旦取得政权后实行斯大林“在一国内实现社会主义”的口号，这些运动必然进一步推动对全球资本积累一向至关重要的万物商品化过程。只要它们留在国家体系内——事实上它们与一切驱逐它们的企图进行斗争以便留在其中——它们就接受并进一步推动受价值规律宰制的世界现实。“社会主义新人”令人颇费猜疑地显得就像放肆的泰勒主义一样。

当然，“社会主义”意识形态是存在的，它意在拒绝启蒙运动的普遍主义，提倡世界经济边缘地区的各种“土生土长的”社会主义类型。当这些创意不是出于诡辩时，它们事实上似乎在试图不把共享收入的新家庭，而把更大的、被认为更“传统的”社区实体作为商品化过程的基本单位。总的说来，这些企图即使是认真的，它们也毫无成果。在任何情况下，世界社会主义运动的主流都通常否定这类企图，把它们说成是非社会主义的，是倒退的文化民族主义形式。

初看上去，反体系运动中的民族运动由于以独立为主要目标，似乎与普遍性意识形态不甚相干。但仔细分析一下就会发现，这只是一个假像。当然，民族主义不可避免地含有文化内容，其中某些运动主张加强民族“传统”、民族语言、通常还加上宗教遗产。但是，文化民族主义是否是对资本积累者压力的文化抵抗？事实上，文化民族主义中的两个主要因素朝相反方向发展。第一，被作为文化负载工具的单位通常是国家，而国家又是国家体系的一员。这个国家通常被授予一种“民族”文化。在几

乎每种情况下，这导致对文化继承性的严重歪曲。在几乎所有情况下，建立以国家为包装的民族文化的的主张都会在重新强调文化继承性的同时对其加以压制。在所有情况下，它都强化了国家结构，从而强化了国家体系以及作为世界体系的历史资本主义。

第二，用比较的眼光来看一下所有这些国家重新强调文化的主张，事实就很清楚：它们虽然形式不同，内容却趋于相同。虽然语言词素不同，但词汇表开始趋同。世界宗教的仪式和神学理论可能全部重新活跃起来，但它们的实际内容却比以前差别更小。科学的先驱在许多名目下又被重新发现了。简言之，文化民族主义在很大程度上是一场巨大的文字游戏。还不止于此。像“社会主义文化”一样，文化民族主义常常是现代世界普遍主义意识形态的一股主要力量，只不过它把这种意识形态奉献给世界劳动力的方式，是使后者感到更容易接受罢了。在这个意义上，反体系运动经常成为强者反对弱者的文化工具，瓦解而不是强化自己根深蒂固的抵抗根源。

反体系运动夺取国家政权这个战略所固有的矛盾，加上它们实际上接受了普遍主义认识论，对运动产生了严重后果。它们必须面对日益增长的幻想破灭现象。它们对这一现象的主要意识形态反应是再次强调历史资本主义的基本辩护词：自动的、不可避免的进步性，或者，如目前苏联流行的说法：“科学技术革命”。

从20世纪开始，“文明计划”主题〔阿诺阿·阿代尔-马莱克(Anouar Abdel - Malek)喜欢用这个词〕开始流行，并从60年代后变得越来越有影响力。对许多人来说，“内生替代”的新语言不过是普遍化文化民族主义旧主题的词语变体罢了，但对另一些人来说，这个主题中含有崭新的认识论内容。“文明计划”重新提出了是否真正存在跨越历史的真理的问题。反映历史资本主义权力现实和经济任务的一种真理形式得到繁荣并弥漫全球。我

们已经看到，这是事实。但是，这一形式的真理在多大程度上解释了这个历史体系的衰落过程，或揭示了建立于无休止资本积累之上的历史体系的真正的历史替代？这才是问题所在。

这一较新的基本文化抵抗形式具有物质基础。随着时间的推移，世界反体系运动的持续动员不断把这样一些成分吸收进来，这些成分无论在政治上还是经济上对体系的运行而言都更边缘化，不大可能甚至最终从所积累的剩余中受益。与此同时，这些运动本身持续的非神化破坏了普遍主义意识形态在运动中的再生产，因此，这些运动开始对不断质疑其理论前提的成分更加开放。与1850年到1950年间世界反体系运动的成员档案相比较，1950年以后的成员中包含了更多边缘地区的成分，更多妇女，更多少数民族集团（无论按什么标准划分），以及更多非熟练、报酬最低的那部分劳动力。这一点，无论在整个世界还是在所有国家，也无论在一般成员还是领导者方面都是如此。社会基础的这一转换，不能不改变反体系运动文化意识形态的偏好。

至此，我们描述了资本主义作为一个历史体系是如何实际运行的。但是，历史体系只能是一——历史的。它们产生出来，又最终消失，这是其内部过程的结果，在其中，内部矛盾的加剧引起结构危机。结构危机是大规模的，不是瞬间的。它们需要时间来充分展示全过程。历史资本主义在20世纪初进入它的结构危机，下世纪某个时候人们可能会看到它作为一个历史体系的完结。什么会代之而起是难以预料的问题。我们现在能够做到的是分析结构危机本身的广度和深度，努力理解体系危机正在把我们带向何方。

这一危机的第一个，可能也是最基本的表现是，我们现在已接近万物的商品化。这就是说，历史资本主义发生危机正是由于，在推动无休止的资本积累过程中，它开始接近亚当·斯密所

说的那种对人是“自然的”，但却从未历史地存在过的状态。“以一种东西与另一种东西相交换的〔人类〕倾向”已经进入从未被触及的领域和地区，而扩大商品化的压力相对来说不再受到制约。马克思把市场说成是“面纱”，它掩盖了社会生产关系。这只有在下述意义上才是正确的：与在当地直接剥削剩余相比较，非直接市场的（因而是超当地的）剥削剩余更难察觉，因此，对世界劳工而言，要从政治上与之斗争也就更困难。但是，当“市场”在一般手段——即货币——的数量基础上运行时，这就使实际剥削量不是更神秘化，而是变得更清楚可见。作为一种政治安全网，资本积累者指望的是，只有部分劳动力是这样被衡量的。只要劳动变得越来越商品化，以及家庭越来越成为商品关系的纽带，剩余的流动就会越来越清晰可见。因此，政治反抗就会越容易被动员起来，而经济结构也就会越来越成为政治动员的直接目标。资本积累者不但不试图加速无产阶级化，而且力求阻碍它。但是，他们不可能完全做到这一点，原因是，他们作为既是单个企业主又是一个阶级的成员，这样作与他们本身的利益是矛盾的。

这是一个不间断的持续过程，只要经济由无休止的资本积累所驱动，这一过程就不可能被遏止。体系可能会通过减慢某些使之精力耗尽的活动以延长其寿命，但死亡的幽影总在地平线某处显现。

资本积累者延长体系寿命的方式之一是他们在体系内建立的政治强制机制，它迫使反体系运动采用夺取国家政权这一战略，沿着建立正式组织的道路行进。它们没有其他的现实选择，但这个战略是自我限制的战略。

但是，正如我们看到的，这个战略的矛盾本身在政治层面上孕育着一个危机。它不是国家体系的危机。国家体系在维护等级

制和压制反抗运动的主要使命方面运转良好。这个政治危机是反体系运动本身的危机。当社会主义运动与民族运动之间的区别变得模糊，当越来越多的这类运动取得了国家政权（及其全部局限性），世界运动的集合体被迫重新评价它们对19世纪原始理论的态度。正像积累者在积累中的成功造就了过多的商品化以致威胁到体系生存一样，反体系运动在夺权上的成功对体系产生了过多的巩固作用，以致世界劳动力有可能不再接受这个自我限制的战略。

最后，危机也是文化危机。反体系运动的危机，对基本战略的质疑，正在导致对普遍主义意识形态前提的质疑。这出现在两个领域：在运动中，人们第一次开始认真对待寻求“文明”替代物的努力；在知识生活中，从14世纪产生的整个知识机制正慢慢地被置于怀疑之中。这种怀疑部分地也是由其成功产生的。在自然科学中，现代科学方法产生的内在过程探究似乎正在导致对作为自然科学前提的现存普遍法则提出质疑。今天，人们谈论把“暂存性”引入科学。社会科学，在一个层面上是科学的穷亲戚，在另一个层面上又是科学皇后（即顶点），其整个发展主义范式正从根本上受到公开质疑。

知识问题的重新探讨，在一方面，是内部过程和内部矛盾的产物。但它同时是同样处于危机之中的反体系运动压力的产物，后者面对应付历史资本主义结构并更有效地与之斗争的艰难任务。而历史资本主义的结构危机则是其他一切活动的起点。

历史资本主义的危机常常被说成是从资本主义向社会主义的过渡。我同意这个表达式，但它没说出多少东西。我们还不知道，一个社会主义世界秩序，即一个急剧缩小所有人之间物质生活差距和实际权力鸿沟的世界秩序，将会怎样运行。现存的自称为社会主义的国家或运动对未来提供不了多少指导意义。它们是

当前的现象，即，是历史资本主义世界体系的现象，因此，必须在这个框架下对它们进行评价。它们可能是资本主义灭亡的动因，尽管，正如我们指出的，它们很难做到这一点。未来的世界秩序将以我们难以想象、更无法预测的方式慢慢建立起来。因此，要相信它将是美好的，或者更好，这需要有一个信仰的飞跃。但是，我们已知的现实却是不好的，而且，随着历史资本主义沿着它的历史道路行进，在我看来，由于它本身的成功，它变得更糟，而不是更好。

四、结论：关于进步和过渡

如果说，存在着一个与现代世界相联系并事实上成为其中心的思想，这就是有关进步的思想。这并不是说，人人都相信进步。在法国革命前后，尤其在法国革命之后，保守主义者和自由主义者之间曾进行了一场意识形态公开大论战。在这场论战中，保守主义的立场实质上在于，它怀疑能否把欧洲和世界正在经历的变化看作是进步，或者说，进步是否是一个恰当、有用的概念。但是，我们都知道，是自由主义者最终引导了时代潮流，体现了在 19 世纪成为长期存在的资本主义世界经济的主导意识形态。

自由主义者相信进步，这不奇怪。进步的思想为封建主义向资本主义的整个过渡提供了合法依据。它使粉碎对万物商品化的最后抵抗合法化，并倾向于抹掉资本主义的一切消极方面，理由是其好处比坏处要大得多。因此，毫不奇怪，自由主义者相信进步。

奇怪的是，自由主义意识形态的对头，即反自由主义并作为被压迫工人阶级代表的马克思主义者们，也像自由主义者一样满怀热情地相信进步。无疑，这种信仰反过来又为他们的一个重要意识形态目标服务。它为世界社会主义运动提供了合法依据，理由是它体现了不可避免的历史发展趋势。此外，起用这个意识形态似乎很聪明，因为它意在利用资产阶级自由主义者自己的思想来毁灭他们。

不幸的是，看似精明并满怀热情地接受对进步的世俗信仰，

存在着两个小缺陷。进步的思想为社会主义辩护，同时也就为资本主义进行了辩护。在向无产阶级唱赞歌之前，人们很难不先颂扬一番资产阶级。在这一点上，不但马克思关于印度的著名著作提供了充分证据，《共产党宣言》也同样如此。而且，由于衡量进步的标准是唯物的（马克思主义者能够不同意这一点吗？），进步的思想就可能被用来反对一切“社会主义实验”。事实上，这正是过去50年来所发生的事。谁没有听到由于苏联生活水平低于美国而对它进行的谴责？此外，不管赫鲁晓夫如何自夸，人们没有理由相信这种差别会在今后50年内消失。

马克思主义者接受进步的进化模式是一个大陷阱，社会主义者只是在最近才开始有所察觉。这是作为资本主义世界经济结构危机一部分的意识形态危机的一个方面。

认为资本主义作为一个历史体系，对于它消灭或转化的以前的各种历史体系而言是代表了进步，这根本就不是事实。甚至当我写下这些文字时，我感到了亵渎感引起的震颤。我担心遭到天谴，因为我和我所有的同龄人一样，都是从同一个意识形态熔炉中铸造出来的，并在同样的神龛前膜拜。

分析进步的困难之一，是所有已知的衡量标准都具有片面性。人们说，科学和技术进步是不容质疑和激动人心的，这当然不假，尤其是由于大多数技术知识都是累积性的。但我们从未认真讨论过，在普遍主义意识形态横扫世界的过程中，我们失去了多少知识。或者，当我们讨论这个问题时，我们把失去的知识只不过(?)看作睿智。但是，在农业生产力和生物总体的单纯技术水平上，我们后来发现，一两个世纪（由启蒙的精英们强加到落后群众头上的过程）以前被抛弃的人类行为方法经常需要重新启用起来，因为它们事实上更有效。更重要的是，我们还在先进科学的最“前沿”发现，对那些一个世纪或五个世纪前被胜利地

抛弃掉的理论前提正在重新被树立起来。

人们说，历史资本主义改变了人类技术活动范围，人力每一投入都得到不断增加的产品数量的报偿。这当然是事实。但是，我们没有计算，被动员起来用于增加产量的人力总投入，无论从个人还是从资本主义世界经济中所有人的整体上看，也无论从单位时间还是从一生时间上看，在多大程度上是减少了，还是增加了。我们能够肯定，世界在历史资本主义下比在以前的体系中对人的压抑更轻吗？有充分的理由怀疑这一点，强制工作已变成我们本身的超我就是一个证明。

人们说，在任何以前的历史体系中，人们的物质生活都没有像在目前体系中这样舒适，或者，人们都未曾拥有过如此广泛的各类生活经历。这个说法听上去有道理，因为我们经常与我们上一辈人的生活进行比较。但是，在20世纪，人们对这一领域提出了越来越多的怀疑，例如，我们现在常说的“生活质量”问题，以及日益增长的社会反常现象、异化和精神疾病等问题。最后，还有人说，历史资本主义显著增强了人类应付各类肆虐的威胁造成伤害和死亡（《启示录》中的四骑士）及抵御无常暴力的安全系数。同样，这在微观层面上是无可反驳的（尽管最近人们重新发现了都市生活的危险）。但是，在宏观层面上这是否甚至到今天也是真实的，即使不提悬挂在我们头上的核战争达摩克利斯剑？

我认为，说世界在今天比在一千年前更自由、平等和博爱，这至少完全不是不言自明的事实。人们甚至可以论证，相反的情况倒是事实。我无意把历史资本主义以前的世界描绘成田园诗。那里不存在多少自由、平等和博爱。惟一的问题是，在这些方面，历史资本主义是代表了进步，这是代表了退步。

我要讲的不是去衡量各自的残酷程度，这将难以做到并有故

作悲哀之嫌，尽管我们没有理由对历史资本主义在这个领域的记录表示乐观。20 世纪的世界有权声称，它在这一古老艺术中显示出某种巧妙发挥的非凡才能。我也不谈日益增加和令人完全难以置信的社会浪费，那是为无休止资本积累进行竞争竞赛的后果，浪费水平可能已开始濒临不可挽救的边缘。

我宁愿谈谈物质因素，即不是有关社会未来的因素，而是资本主义世界经济实际历史时期的物质因素。我的论点既简单，也可能是大胆的。我要为甚至连教条的马克思主义者都羞于提及的马克思主义的一个命题辩护，这就是无产阶级绝对（而不是相对）贫困化问题。

我听到友好的耳语：你当然不是认真的；你指的当然是相对贫困化？产业工人的状况在今天难道不比 1800 年要好得多吗？当然，产业工人，或至少许多产业工人的状况确实如此。但是，产业工人仍然只占世界人口的一小部分。世界劳动力的绝大部分，即生活在农村或在农村与城市贫民区之间流动的劳动力，他们的状况比他们 500 年前的祖先更糟。他们吃得更差，其饮食肯定更不平衡。尽管他们比以前更可能在一岁后仍然幸存（由于保护特权阶层的社会卫生条件改善的影响），我怀疑，世界大多数人口在一岁时的预期寿命会比以前更长。我想情况可能相反。毫无疑问，他们工作得更辛苦，每天、每年、每生的工作时间都更长。由于他们如此工作而得到的总报酬更少，剥削率急剧提高了。

他们是否在政治上和社会上受到更大压迫，或在经济上受到更深的剥削？这一点比较难于分析。杰克·古第（Jack Goody）曾经说过，社会科学不掌握快乐计量仪。以前的社会体系中大多数人在其中生活的小型社区是社会控制的一种形式，肯定约束了人类选择和社会变化，在许多人看来，无疑是一种现实压迫现

象。只是由于受人类可能性狭窄眼界的限制，那些感到更满意的人才会有这种满足感。

我们都知道，历史资本主义的产生逐步减少甚至消灭了这些小型社区结构的作用。但是，替代它们的是什么？在许多地区和很长时期内，前社区结构的作用由“种植园”承担，即，通过“企业主”控制的大规模政治经济结构的压迫统治实现。资本主义世界经济的“种植园”，不管是建立在奴隶制，还是囚犯制、（强制的或契约的）分租制或工资劳动的基础上，都很难说它向“个性”提供了更大的发展余地。“种植园”可以被看作榨取剩余价值的极其有效的方式。它们在以前的人类历史上无疑也存在过，但从未如此广泛地应用在农业中。农业与采矿和大规模基础设施建设不同，从全球来看，后两者涉及的人数要少得多。

即使农业活动（即我们刚刚提到的“种植园”）的某种独裁统治形式没有替代以前那些更松散的社区结构控制，农村社区结构的解体也并不是一场“解放”运动，因为它不可避免地伴随突然出现的国家结构日益增长的控制，后者在事实上经常导致了社区结构的瓦解。国家结构越来越不愿使直接生产者处于其自主的、当地决策的过程中，因此，竭尽全力扩大劳动投入，使劳动活动专业化（从工人的立场上看，这减弱了他的谈判地位，增加了他的厌倦感）。

这还不是一切。历史资本主义发展出一个前所未有的压迫凌辱性意识形态架构，这就是我们今天所说的性别主义和种族主义。让我把话讲清楚。我们已经指出，在以前的历史体系中，无论是男人对妇女的统治地位，还是一般的恐外仇外，都是广泛甚至是普遍的现象。但是，性别主义却不仅限于男人对妇女的统治地位，而种族主义也不仅限于一般的恐外仇外。

性别主义把妇女降到非生产劳动力的范畴，一方面，强化了

要求她们所从事的实际劳动，另一方面，资本主义世界经济中的生产性劳动在人类历史上第一次成为特权合法化的基础。这是对妇女的双重凌辱。这建立起体系内难以消除的双重限制。

种族主义不是对陌生人，即处于历史体系之外的什么人的仇恨或压迫。恰恰相反，种族主义是历史体系内劳动力的分化，其目标是把受压迫的集团保留在体系内，而不是把它们驱逐出去。它为向生产性劳动支付低报酬提供了依据，尽管从定义上它首先承认获得报酬的权利。它通过把报酬最低的工作定义为向质量最低的工作所支付的报酬来达到这一目的。由于这是根据定义决定的，因此，工作质量的变化永远不如罪名形式的变化更有实效，而意识形态却声称为个人努力提供了个人升迁的报偿。这种双重限制同样是无法消除的。

性别主义和种族主义都是由“生物学”确定地位的社会过程。由于生物学在任何直接意义上都不能由社会加以改变，我们现有的这个结构似乎是：它是通过社会创造出来的，但却不能由社会来消除。当然，这在现实中不是如此。真实情况是，除非消灭创造了它们并仰仗其运行而维持着自身的整个历史体系，性别主义和种族主义的构造，无论在过去还是现在，都不能被除掉。

从而，无论在物质还是在精神（性别主义和种族主义）方面，都存在着绝对贫困化。世界经济 10% 到 15% 的上层人口与其余人口之间在剩余额消费上的“差距”在逐步扩大。我们之所以产生情况并非如此的印象是由于以下三个因素。第一，能人统治的意识形态的确使个人，甚至劳动力中某些少数民族和/或职业集团得到相当可观的升迁流动机会。但是，这是没有对世界经济的全部统计进行根本改造下出现的情况，因为个人（或亚团体）升迁流动的另一面，是低阶层规模的扩大，这是由更多的人

口被纳入世界经济或人口不同的增长率而产生的。

我们没有觉察差距扩大的第二个原因是，我们对历史和社会的分析一向集中在“中产阶级”内部，即消费的剩余超过其创造的剩余的那个占世界经济10%到15%的人口。在这个部分内，在其最上层（占不到1%的人口）与真正的“中间”部分或干部（10~15%中的其余部分）之间的确出现了相对显著的曲线拉平现象。历史资本主义以往几百年间实行的大量“进步”政治，使分享世界剩余价值的小集团之内的不平等分配稳定缩小。这个“中间”阶层为他们与占1%的最上层之间差距缩小而发出的胜利欢呼，掩盖了他们与85%的人口之间差距日益扩大的现实。

最后，还有第三个原因可以说明为什么日益扩大的差距没有成为我们集体讨论的中心内容。在过去10到20年间，由于世界反体系运动集合力量的压力，以及由于向经济渐近线的趋近，绝对的（而不是相对的）两极化过程可能减慢了。但即使在这一点上，我们也必须小心，要把它置于五百年间绝对两极化扩大的历史发展背景下看待。

对进步意识形态下产生的现实进行探讨是极其重要的，因为，不如此，我们就不能对一个历史体系过渡到另一个历史体系的问题进行明智的分析。进化的进步理论不仅认为后来的体系优于以前的体系，而且认为新的统治集团取代了以前的统治集团。因此，不仅资本主义是相对于封建主义的进步，而且，这一进步实质上是由“资产阶级”对“土地贵族”（或“封建成分”）的革命胜利所取得的。但是，如果资本主义不是进步的，那么，资产阶级革命的概念是什么意思？是否只存在惟一一个资产阶级革命，或者，它在许多伪装下发生？

我们已经提到，认为历史资本主义通过一个进步的资产阶级推翻一个落后的贵族统治而产生，这种看法是错误的。正确的基

本形象是，由于旧体系正在解体，土地贵族本身转化成资产阶级，由此产生了历史资本主义。为了防止解体朝不确定的结局发展，他们对自己施行了激进的结构改变手术，以便维持并显著扩大他们剥削直接生产者的能力。

如果这个形象是正确的，它从根本上修改了我们对于目前资本主义向社会主义、资本主义世界经济向社会主义世界秩序过渡的认识。直到现在，“无产阶级革命”多少总是以“资产阶级革命”为楷模。正如资产阶级推翻了贵族统治一样，无产阶级将推翻资产阶级，这个类比一直是世界社会主义运动战略行动的主要基石。

假如资产阶级革命没有发生过，这是否意味着无产阶级革命也没有发生或将不会发生？无论从逻辑还是从经验上看都完全不是这样。但是，这的确意味着我们必须从另外的角度来看待过渡问题。我们首先需要区别解体式变化与控制式变化，即萨米尔·阿明（Samir Amin）所说的“腐朽”与“革命”的区别，即他所说的那种在罗马崩溃时发生的（他认为现在也正在发生）“腐朽”，与那种在封建主义向资本主义转化时出现的有控制的变革之间的区别。

但这还不是全部。正如我们刚刚谈到的，有控制的变革（阿明所说的“革命”）无需是“进步的”。因此，我们必须把维持（甚至扩大）剥削劳动现实的那种结构转化，与消除或至少从根本上减少这种剥削的结构转化区别开来。这就是说，我们时代的政治问题不是历史资本主义是否会转化为另外的什么东西。这个转化必定会发生。我们时代的政治问题是，这另外的什么东西，即转化的结果，是否会与我们现有的体系在道义上根本不同，或者是否会进步的。

进步不是不可避免的。我们正在为进步而斗争。斗争不是采

取社会主义反对资本主义的形式，而是以向相对无阶级社会的过渡为一方，反对向以某种新阶级为基础的生产方式（它与历史资本主义不一样，但并不必然比它更好）过渡的另一方。

世界资产阶级面临的选择不是在维持历史资本主义与自杀之间进行。这一选择在下述两者间进行。一方面是采取“保守”立场，这将引起体系的不断瓦解，导致向一个不确定、但可能更平等的世界秩序的过渡；另一方面是采取大胆步骤取得对转化过程的控制，资产阶级为自己披上“社会主义”外衣，从而力图创造一个原样维持对世界劳动力进行剥削以有利于少数人的替代历史体系。

我们应该根据世界资产阶级可选择的这类实际政治可能性，来对世界社会主义运动以及社会主义政党已经以某种方式取得政权的国家的历史进行评价。

在进行任何评价时，首先必须记住的最重要的一点是，世界社会主义运动和一切形式的反体系运动，以及所有革命的和/或社会主义国家，其本身都是历史资本主义的产物。它们不是存在于这个历史体系之外的结构，而是从它的内部过程中分泌出来的。因此，它们反映了体系的一切矛盾和制约。它们不曾也不会是另外的样子。

它们的错误，它们的局限性，以及它们的消极后果，都是历史资本主义均势的一部分，而不属于尚不存在的、假定的历史体系，即社会主义世界秩序。革命和/或社会主义国家中存在的劳动力剥削强度，没有政治自由，性别主义和种族主义的存留等等，与其说与一个新社会制度的特性有关，不如说主要基于这样一个事实，即这些国家都继续处于资本主义世界经济的边缘和半边缘地区。在历史资本主义中，工人阶级得到的少许好处从来都集中在核心地区。这种不成比例的状况至今仍然是事实。

因此，无论对反体系运动，还是对其参与建立的政权，都不能按照它们是否创造了“美好社会”来进行评价。有意义的评价只能看：在保证使资本主义向一个平等的社会主义世界秩序过渡的世界范围的斗争中，它们作出了多少贡献。在这一点上，由于矛盾过程本身的作用，最后结果必然会比较模糊。所有正面的努力都不但产生正面后果，而且产生负面后果。在某一方面弱化了体系，在另一方面又强化了它。但两方面的作用程度并不必然是相等的！这就是全部问题所在。

无疑，反体系运动的最大贡献是在其动员阶段产生的。它们在组织造反、提高觉悟中成为解放力量。并且，通过历史经验的反馈机制，单个运动的贡献随着时间的推移而越变越大。

一旦这些运动在国家结构中掌握了政治权力，它们的表现就不那么好了，原因是，无论在运动外还是在运动内，减弱其反体系冲力的压力都以几何级数增加了。但是，这不是说，这类“改良主义”和“修正主义”的作用完全是负面的。在一定程度上，取得政权的运动不能摆脱它们意识形态的束缚，因此，它们受到革命国家内部直接生产者和国家外部反体系运动的有组织的压力。

当历史资本主义接近最充分发展程度时，即当万物商品化进一步扩大，反体系运动的世界大家庭力量增加，人类思想继续理性化时，真正的危险产生了。正是这种充分发展程度将会加速历史体系的崩溃。这个体系的繁荣只是由于它的逻辑迄今还只是部分地得到实现。正是由于它在崩溃，转化力量的潮流将显得更有吸引力，因此，后果将更难以确定。同志们，争取平等、自由、博爱的斗争是长期的，而且，斗争的场地将更集中于反体系力量本身的世界大家庭内部。

共产主义是乌托邦，即它不存在。它是我们所有宗教末世论

的体现：弥赛亚来临，基督第二次降世，涅槃。它不是一个历史前景，而是一个当代神话。相比之下，社会主义却是一个能够实现的历史体系，某一天也许会在世界上建立起来。一个自称作为向乌托邦过渡“临时”阶段的“社会主义”并不重要。重要的是一个具体的历史社会主义，它满足最大限度地实现平等和公正的一个历史体系的最低限定条件，它增强人类对自身生命的控制力（民主），它解放想象力。



附录：论资本主义文明

替资本主义算个账

当代的世界体系是资本主义的世界经济体系，它在漫长的16世纪里产生于欧洲的部分地区，随后又扩大到全球范围。历史上的资本主义作为一种历史体系来说具有一系列独一无二的特点。其中有一点很少受到人们应有注意：这一体系实际上从一开始便得到某些人的赞扬，又受到另外一些人的强烈指责。确实，当赞扬者们似乎开始变得人数众多并能畅所欲言时，资本主义已差不多发展了三个世纪。我想不起有任何其他历史体系曾得到过其众多参与者与思想家如此多的内部的、相反的评价。

有一个观念也许是这个体系所独有的，并在任何情况下都是它的独有特点之一。这个观念就是人们能够在这个体系范围内就它的善与恶，它的积极后果和消极后果算个账并进行争论（对这一争论，我将试图进行概括）。为何单单是这个特定的历史体系会引起这样旷日持久的公开论战，这件事本身就是我们所要探讨的问题。

这一争论最奇怪的部分在于概括来说存在着两种批评者，而且看来这两种人相互之间也是对立的。一种批评者严厉申斥资本主义是因为它过于平等主义，对于社会安定和社区和谐过于具有破坏性。而另一种批评者却认为历史上的资本主义是在各种利益

得到调和的神话下面的彻头彻尾的非平等主义。

人们也许会被诱导到把这些相反的批评意见理解为这样一个信号：资本主义文明的支持者掌握着中庸之道的战略中心，他们反对明显的极端立场。因而人们也许会被诱导到提出这样的问题：这会不会是由资本主义的赞扬者策动的辩论。但是他们不这么说。取而代之的是在回答那些认为僧侣统治制度具有社会秩序和谐长处的争论者时，历史资本主义的鼓吹者宣扬它的革命性和进步性，并说明它对特权有破坏作用。而对于那些把资本主义看作是一种非平等主义的制度和暴虐体制的批评者，资本主义的拥护者又宣扬它有能力确认和鼓励他们称之为个人长处的方面，并断言有差别的报酬和应得的收益特权不但有可取之处，而且可以说是不可避免的。

因而资本主义的拥护者看来同对手一样是自相矛盾的。批评者与拥护者、指责者与赞扬者双方都处于同等的极端地位，没有一方（或看来实际上没有一方）主张中庸之道。这是一个奇怪的现象，而尤其奇怪的是，这个现象一直持久不变。对所有参加者来说，把他们自己放进这样一个混乱的队伍中去能达到什么目的？这犹如有两个运动队，大家穿着同样的制服以混乱的阵形在同一场地上乱斗一气。

在这种情况下能有一个比分吗？能算一个账吗？我甚至不必问能否有个公平账，而只是问能否有个账？我想我们是没有能力说明这个问题的，除非我们先了解这样一种混乱的争斗为什么和如何有可能一直持续下来。

圣经《启示录》的四骑士：即基本需求

过去 5000 年间，人类创立了一系列的宗教，所有这些宗教都至少具有一项基本特点。它们都力图对世界上可看到的各种苦

难作出某种回应，进行某些慰藉。在基督教的意象中，这些苦难通过《启示录》中的四骑士得到了很好的概括。这四骑士是战争（即各民族或各国之间的战争），内战，饥荒，和因瘟疫、天灾或野兽而死亡。这四者是世界上最可怕的事，它们破坏了和平和喜乐。

世界上的各种宗教提供了它们所能做到的各种慰藉。但是它们这样去做是有个前提的：对于这些邪恶，不存在政治上的（即世俗的）解决办法。邪恶是不可避免的，除非一直等到存在一个救世主的时代（至少在某些宗教中情况是如此），或存在某种其他超越历史的方式。

资本主义文明异常之处在于它宣称自己有能力在历史中“超越历史”，能够解决由不可避免的邪恶带来的困境，能够在地球上创建天国，简而言之，能够克服《启示录》四骑士的威胁。从一开始，赞扬者们就提出：作为一个历史体系的资本主义最低限度能满足它所属范围内所有人的“基本需求”（这里使用的是最近几十年的术语）。

从某种意义上来说论点十分简单和直接了当。资本主义通过提高生产效率，使总体的财富大大增长。尽管这个财富的分配不平等，也足以保证每个人的所得多于其他和以往历史体系所能达到的水平。这被称为“滴漏”（Trickle down）分配理论，这种理论的本身仅仅是“看不见的手”生产理论的详细说明。正因为有了这些假设的良好后果，资本主义文明的支持者不仅认为资本主义体系有别于并优于所有其他体系，他们还同时声称这个体系是惟一“自然的”体系。

这些支持者们提出的这些观点有什么依据呢？他们说现实就是依据。看看现代世界吧。它不是比任何其他以往的世界更富有吗？技术成就不是像神话一样吗？每个人的生活不是确实更好了

吗？还有尤其要指出的是，那些看来最能充分接受和实行资本主义的国家不正就是最富有和经济上最先进的国家吗？

这种以现实进行论证的做法至今已有 200 来年，它对很多人来说极具说服力，因此应当十分认真地加以对待。它在很大程度上是依靠应用科学在历史资本主义中所起的中心作用。他们又一次利用现实作为证据，提出只有在历史资本主义的框架内，科学和技术才能真正得到繁荣，因为只有在这个体系下科学家摆脱了过去各种体系所施加给他们的限制。不过这一点反过来说也是真实的，因为企业家给科学活动所提供的直接和间接的资助最终又在物质上十足地回报了这些企业家。让我们按照四骑士相反的次序来逐个评价这些表面上很讲得通的论点吧。

资本主义文明有没有延缓（它显然不可能完全消灭）由瘟疫、天灾和野兽造成的死亡？这从最广泛的意义上来说是保健卫生问题。在 14 世纪，欧亚大陆遭受黑死病的苦难。据我们不完全估计，在受影响的地区内大约有 1/3 人口因患这种病而过早地死去。毫无疑问，这在世界历史中并不是头一次发生这种传染病，但是看来这都是已知的具有如此广泛范围的最后一次。为什么？基本上有两个理由。第一是个人受到了保护。医学知识已进展到这样的高度，使我们不但已经很好地学会如何使这些疾病避免发作（例如打预防针），而且学会一旦人们患病，如何使疾病的影响减小到最低程度。第二个理由是集体受到了保护，我们已经学会如何创造一个较好的公共保健环境，并掌握了控制疾病扩散的技术。（最早的和比较原始的这种技术之一是 quarantine^①，这个词是从黑死时期对到达拉古萨港口人员所施加的 40 天隔离期派生而来的。）

① 这个字具有“停船检疫”、“隔离”、“40 日期间”等多种含义。

有没有什么其他方面的事实能列入资本主义的账上？至少有三个现象在向相反方向活动。第一，正因为资本主义世界经济的扩大，其重要组成部分交通运输业的技术进步使寄生物基因库产生杂交而导致毁灭性后果。这一点在 1500~1700 年间横跨大洋进行贸易的时期表现得最为明显。很大比例的美洲本土生物——远超过三分之一——在这个过程中灭绝了。类似现象在大洋洲以及非洲、亚洲和欧洲的边远地区也有发生。

第二，单是过去 20 年的医学研究报告就清楚地表明：由于直接与经济技术相联系的环境变化，使得疾病的数量确实增加了，而经济技术一直是资本主义文明的重要组成部分。第三、在某种意义上，全新的疾病格局十分可能出自全球人口的急剧增长。一些人认为这正可能是新的爱滋病（以及其他身体免疫疾病）发生的主要因素。因而我们可能正处于一种骇人听闻的新型传染病就要来到的时刻。

医学的进展使一些人的生命“延长”了，但由于产生物基因的突然交换而使一些生命“永不出现”。这两者的数目我们如何进行比较？尤其是后者难以进行定量，因而目前没有很好的方法去作出这种比较。但是我们至少应该懂得这方面的评估并不简单，而且肯定不会只倾向一方。有一点很清楚：在世界体系的工业化程度较高的国家里，幼儿死亡率已经大大降低。看来南方国家的幼儿死亡率在 20 世纪也下降了，尽管这种情况究竟在世界经济停滞时期，是否如此或者只有在经济扩张时期才是如此还不太清楚。我们知道，在工业化国家中，60 岁以及更老的老年人因为医学技术的进步而在对付疫病方面比过去具有更强的生命力。以上这两个变化——幼儿死亡率的下降和满 60 岁老人生命的延长——是使平均寿命提高的主要原因，甚至也许是全部原因。不过那些活过幼儿期的人是否会比过去更能活到 60 岁还很

不清楚。新的传染病会不会改变整个数字也肯定不清楚。但是不管怎样，在与疾病作斗争方面，我们能够暂且对资本主义文明记上一笔肯定的账，尽管各个地区很不平衡。

在与饥饿作斗争方面如何呢？今天饥荒的威胁比过去年代少了吗？在过去的年代里，人类的主要问题是短期的气候变化会影响每年的收成。由于运输系统软弱无力，食品的长期储存量有限和个人的钱币储备普遍短缺，所以本地主要食品供应的任何明显减少都立即会引起严重问题。今天世界许多地方（也许是大多数地区）都在很大程度上依靠技术进步，通过预报来避免变化多端的短期气候的危害。

但是中期变化对环境状况的影响又如何呢？正是那个曾使我们得以在短期介入自然生态的技术进步，在中期上却是打乱了生态。森林的大量砍伐，大草原区域的沙漠化都不断地危害人类和破坏人类的长期食品供应，对于 20 世纪里非常突出的由化学生物污染所造成的损害，我们到目前为止还没有能力进行充分的评估。如果臭氧层进一步耗损，对生命的破坏（直接的和通过其对食品供应的影响）可能十分巨大。

因此，一方面，食品生产的总产量和生产率有了明显的增长，而另一方面分配体系却是极度扭曲。对于世界上大多数人口，尤其对处于底层的 50% 到 80% 的人口来说，这只不过是中期威胁取代短期威胁。

内战如何呢？它减少了吗？我把各个集团之间的所有暴力行动（不是两个地域上不同的国家之间或民族之间或被征服地区反抗帝国主义统治的常规战争）都包括在这个领域之内。在一定意义上，人们可以认为“内战”是资本主义世界经济的一项发明，是在资本主义体系中构成的“民族”和“国家”相互之间复杂关系的产物。由于有了这一体系，在城市地区中存在着极其混杂和

血统上接近的，在社会上被称为不同“民族”的集团。这种情况不是偶然的，而是由资本主义世界经济的内在结构所衍生的。

资本主义世界经济为了使其运行最佳化，要求人们广泛地和连续不断地迁移（包括强制的和自愿的），以便满足特定地区的劳动力需求。与此同时，世界的劳动力走向了种族化，以致在许多场合下人口可被看作是划分为若干不同的种族集团（肤色、语言、宗教或其他文化因素都可看作是这种种族划分的标记）。各个地方同一种族阶层的家庭，他们的就业和上学地点，在相互关系上无论何时都出现日益接近的趋势。当然，一些具体细节，如种族界限的确定，哪个种族集团与哪个职业阶层关系密切是不断变化的，但是分层原则是资本主义世界经济的一个持久不变的特点。这一原则既有助于降低总的劳动成本，又起着削弱国家机构合法性的推动作用。

这一种族化过程不管用什么方法算账都明显地存在着恶化的趋势。它创造了无休止斗争的结构基础，而这种斗争既有上层和下层种族阶层之间的，也有各个下层种族阶层之间的。每当在历史上占有一半时间的世界经济周期性衰退发生时，这些斗争就变得更为尖锐。斗争常常恶化到采取暴力形式，从小规模的骚乱直到灭绝种族的大屠杀。

关键因素在于世界劳动力的种族化需要一种种族主义的意识形态。这种意识形态把世界人口的很大部分划定为低等人，即劣等人种，所以这些人最终应当接受当前政治斗争和社会斗争所给他们带来的不管什么样的命运。这种“内战”在20世纪并没有随着时间的推移而减少，不管怎么说倒是变得更为暴虐，并且毁灭的人更多了。要是为我们当前的世界体系算个账，这倒是一笔很大的负债。

最后再看一下战争本身。国家之间以及民族之间的战争看来

在所有历史体系下都是存在的，因为自从有历史记录以来便一直存在战争。十分明显，战争不是现代世界体系所特有的现象。另一方面，资本主义文明的技术成就在这里又一次表现出它的有利有弊。广岛一颗炸弹所杀死的人数比当代以前时期全部战争的死亡人数还要多。亚历山大大帝横扫中东时造成的破坏也不能与波斯湾战争对伊拉克和科威特所造成的破坏相比。

最后，我们必须充分考虑世界体系物质财富的两极分化现象。如果我们说的物质财富是指所有商品化的和可以商品化的物品，那么物质财富确实大大地增长了，尽管这种经济“增长”是靠大量消耗某些初级天然物资取得的。而且能参加这些剩余价值分配的人数按人口比例计算远高于以前的任何历史体系，在1500年以前存在过的各种历史体系中，几乎始终有着一个富裕的或较富裕的阶层。但是在1500年以前，这个阶层的规模非常小。用数字来表示，我们也许可以说占人口的百分之一，虽然在某些情况下百分比也许会更高些。

在资本主义文明中，分享剩余价值的人数要多得多。这个集团被称为中产阶级。他们是一个极其重要的阶层。但是如果夸大他们的人数，那就大错特错了。在全世界范围内，这一集团的人数大概从来没有超过世界人口的七分之一。可以肯定的是，这些“中产阶级”中的许多人都集中在某些地区，因而在资本主义世界经济的核心国家中，他们也许成为公民中的大多数。确实，在一国政治边界范围内中产阶级的高度集中，在今天已是核心地区的明显特点。但是在全世界，这个百分比要低得多。生活在资本主义世界经济制度中的人民中也许有多达85%的人，其生活水平明显不会高于500年到1000年前的世界劳动人口。人们确实可以说，他们之中的许多人，甚至大多数人的物质生活恶化了。总之，他们确实工作得非常辛苦，仅仅为的是要攒钱；他们也许

吃得少了，但是他们肯定会购买更多的东西。

那么，资本主义文明已经打败了《启示录》中的四骑士吗？至多只是部分地，而且是非常不平衡地打败了。然而直到目前，我们只是从数量上来讨论问题。我们必须同样地从质量上来进行讨论。以下是通常在“生活质量”标题下进行争论的所有问题。

个人生活的质量

首先是物质生活的质量。这就要在生存的“基本需求”以外谈及舒适和各种消费。这里的情景也是多种多样。我们这个世纪的“消费者社会”当然是与科学及其新发明分不开的。我们拥有以往文明所梦想不到的各种东西：电力、电话、广播和电视、室内水管、电冰箱和空调机、汽车，这里只列举今天最普及和最常见的品名。在1500年，即使是一本书也是非凡的奢侈品。

然而要再次提出，我们也知道分配是异常不平等的。大多数美国家庭拥有一辆小轿车；中国或印度极少的家庭能同样如此（虽然他们之中的大多数可能买得起一台收音机），要是一个农村的集体财产能有一辆汽车就很好了。从绝对水平来说，即使是最贫困阶层所拥有的上面提到的物品或许也比他们的先辈更多，尽管底层与上层之间的相对差距不仅巨大，而且还在不断扩大。然而这并不能断定绝对曲线是条直线向上的线。对于底层50~80%人口的曲线来说，也许在达到顶部后会面临这样的可能性：他们的绝对曲线可能会再次向下。

当我们转向资本主义文明最值得令人注意的发明之一——旅游时，情况甚至更为严重。在以往的历史体系中不存在这样的概念：人们（即使是有钱有势的人）可以摆脱提供收入的工作，把一部分时光用于旅游、观光和享受娱乐，因为这不是人们通常生活活动方式的一部分。可是起源于现代初期的少数贵族的体育运

动，到20世纪后期已成为全世界中产阶层平常期望的事情，这种情况之所以可能，当然同样是由于技术进步。但是要注意两件事。在世界人口中能参加一次长途旅游的人数至多只占5~10%。可是即使是这个人数也已对蹂躏性旅游负担的内在承受力施加了重大压力，以致使具有最高品质的旅游目标本身的存在处于危险之中。如果存在超负荷的话，旅游就具有深度的破坏性。今天已经存在超负荷现象，可是目前的情况是有80%的世界人口仍然被排斥在参加的行列之外，如果人数要扩大的话，旅游点的保护就只能通过某种正规的限额分配制度来进行，在这种情况下个人方面的利益将明显下降。

在有关舒适和满足各种个人物质消费的争论中，存在着大量不同的对立评价。批评资本主义文明的人指出：占世界人口七分之一的那些人的生活与全世界居住在城市贫民窟里和农村贫困地区的那些人的生活之间存在着巨大差距。两者的反差很引人注目，甚至令人震惊。为资本主义文明辩护的人认为差距只是相对的，从绝对意义上来说全世界的穷人生活好于500年前的穷人。我一直认为，有关绝对差距的论证本身是一个经验主义争论的课题。这里有个道德问题，即这个日益扩大的差距是否只因为是相对的便应该接受。拥护者的答复是认为差距看来不再在扩大，而且可能很快会缩小。

资本主义文明的拥护者还认为尽管有关个人舒适和种种消费的情景很复杂，但资本主义文明确实具有一个优点：它在全世界创建了教育机构，而且这些机构是以几何级数增长的。他们认为这种增长取得了效果，使得每个个人都能更好发挥他们的潜力，其中一些人通过展示自己的才能得以跨越阶级的障碍。

普及正规教育这个概念本身就是资本主义世界经济的一个产物（比较晚的产物）。教育机构的逐步扩大使得学生在学校上学

的时间延长，并且使全世界人口中入学的群体多样化。至今大约已经有两个世纪教育机构一直在增加，但是，1945年以后增加得尤其迅速。今天实际上在任何政权统治下面，对于所有男孩来说，以及对大数政权下面的所有女孩来说，初等教育已经比较普及。至少在理论上是如此。中等教育和高等教育也同时有了扩大，虽然规模较小。

人们说提高教育程度意味着增加获得较高级职位的就业机会。当然，相对而言这是真实的。这就是说，在受教育的年限与所得收入之间有着高度的相连关系。但是作为绝对化的断言，这却是很令人怀疑的。教育机构的扩大已经直接导致对就业者教育程度要求的不断提高。因而，在1990年完成小学教育的人可能只适合于从事1890年没有受过正规教育的人所做的同一工作。

教育机构大量增加的一个重要后果是一大群相似年龄的人在白天时间去家庭和居住处以外的工作场所。整个这个年龄层的人不仅不能为他们的家庭赚得收入，相反地，即使不必支付学费也花去了家庭很大一部分收入。这样，家庭便被追参加多少有点冠冕堂皇的被称为“人力资本”的投资。在世界体系中，对大多数家庭来说，得到的利益能超过花费吗？

普及教育的第二个重要后果是多重“人生阶段”概念的发展和确立，并且各自得到实现。在以往的历史体系下，人的一生是个工作和参与社会的漫长周期。这两方面都在开头有个短促的完全依赖的时期，在末尾也有一个（如果总共只有一次的话）依赖程度高的短促时期。现在我们要作为非劳动力、部分受抚养的儿童而经历一个较长的时期。这个漫长的童年要按照学校制度划分成若干单位：幼儿在幼儿园；真正的童年在小学；青少年在中学；成熟的青年受大学教育；现在对年轻的成年人还要额外增加高级的大学培训和（或）头几年专职工作。上述时期以后又要继

续进一步进行年龄分组：成熟的成年，第三年龄段，现在甚至有第四年龄段。当然对于妇女来说，在成熟的成年时期所起的作用倾向于与男子不同。

把人生在社会上划分为多个阶段据说有个很大的好处：每个阶段可得到专门的关照和调整，因而有可能更好地发挥人的潜能。毫无疑问，这在一定程度上是对的。但是应当注意到，在这一好处存在的同时有一个较大的缺点：现在成熟成年人的年龄范围比过去窄得多。使得所有在此范围以外的男性成熟成年人都被排斥于充分参与获得权力和物质利益之外。在共同平等地渡过人生各阶段的保护伞下，我们已经建立了一种十分牢固的曲线年龄等级制度，而且这种制度大概比以往历史体系中的不太复杂的年龄等级制度更为重要。

然而根本的问题是，这种教育以及在多大程度上具有教育性质，即能否回复到它原有的词源，教育能在多大程度上引导眼光狭隘的人们走向具有更为广阔的视野。基本假设是：从本地以家庭为基础参加社会活动所得的知识和价值准则本质上是狭隘的，但是正规教育提供了识字、算数、经验性知识和分析的技能。这就使接受教育者得以超越其狭隘的局限性，而与一些博学多才的人分享他们所掌握的人类普遍的潜力，尤其是他们本身的潜力。

不过自从正规教育得到广泛发展以来，一直存在着批评意见。批评者提出了本地的或者全国的每个特定方面的“失败”情况。他们总是认为恰恰是这个“引导人们”从眼光狭隘走向具有较宽广的视野（有些人称之为真理，另外一些人称之为对多样化事物的灵敏度）的功能事实上并没有产生。那么从已经发生的事实来看，所提出的论点有多大说服力呢？教育肯定没有减少“内战”现象：教育可能确实使“内战”加强了，甚至成为助长它的主要源泉。大多数父母把教育看作是他们子女经济方面的迫切需

要，要求子女能快步跟上，正规教育为就业提出的不断提高的要求。但是大多数上学的人把学校看作是个负担和把他们排斥在工作岗位之外。我们能绝对肯定孩子们的这一评价是那么不合理吗？

群体生活的质量

资本主义文明的拥护者声称我们这个社会生活结构具有两个至高无上的优点：普遍主义（universalism）和民主，这两者正在得到贯彻，至少是已有许诺要实施。这方面又一次有批评者提出完全相反的论点。他们指出正是上面提到的两个方面的欠缺是资本主义文明的最大缺点。同替资本主义算其他的账一样，判断取决于由谁和用什么来衡量。普遍主义是什么？它包括许多领域。普遍主义认为存在着合理的、客观的、永恒的，因而是普遍的真理。今天我们称之为科学。普遍主义也认为存在着决定普遍伦理的某种自然规律，因而对于某些社会常规是所有人都应当接受和遵守的。今天我们称之为人权。普遍主义相信在决定适当分配劳动力职位方面存在着客观的能力胜任标准，今天我们称之为量才任用。正是这个普遍主义的科学、人权和量才任用三重奏，成为资本主义文明拥护者的骄傲。人们由此可知为何科学会受到如此重视，为何科学已经成为实际上的世俗宗教，其真理是由惟一能真正掌握普遍知识的牧师向垂死的人启示的。现代科学是现代技术的基础，而正是现代技术对于取得以下假设的成就是有功绩的：今天的世界既能满足人类的基本需求，又提高了个人生活的质量。对科学的这种信仰反映出对资本主义积累无限扩大可能性的信心，不过它只是反映出这方面的信心，而不是信心的基础。

作为不屈不挠探索普遍规律的科学观，即我们可称之为培根—牛顿式的科学观一直占据着统治地位。至今大约已有 500 年。

但是，从19世纪后期开始，这一科学观在科学界内部受到严重的挑战，而且在过去20年间，这一挑战势力有了相当大的增长。这一挑战采取了“新科学”的形式，在这种“新科学”的正常状态概念中包含着极不平衡的模糊体系和开放体系，并且还渗透了耗散结构。这种耗散结构导致分叉，走向根本无法预料（然而却是有条有理）的方向。

对于我们算的账来说，“新科学”所提出的基本问题是500年来哪些科学方面的问题没有被提出，哪些科学上的风险一直没有被触及。这里提出了这样的问题：由谁决定怎样的科学上的风险是值得尝试的，以及从世界权力结构来看会有什么样的后果。例如人们想知道，要是在科学上能更加全面考虑的话，我们目前生态方面的困境（这是资本主义企业家只重视成本费用的直接后果），即使不能统统避免，是否本来至少可以减轻，因为从科学上全盘考虑就会把对于耗散结构和不可避免的分叉的研究作为中心问题来分析，而不是把这种体系性质的困境贬低为本身可以在技术上得到解决的外界障碍范畴。

提出问题就是要回答问题，因为它表明所谓的普遍主义科学一直是狭隘的和排他主义的，尽管主张的是相反的东西。因此，要是我们对这种科学的成就算一下账，我们就必须不单单衡量它所能创造出来的技术，而且要衡量出它所错过的和没有能跟上的另一方面。我们要大力表白的不仅是荣誉，而且还有谴责。今后30年的科学活动，可能使我们对过去的500年会有一个更加冷静的评价。

即使不是真理，那么至少有自由吧？不是资本主义文明向全世界头一次提供了蒸蒸日上的普遍适用的自由模式吗？人权在法律上和道德上占有优先地位的概念本身，不就是当代世界的一项发明吗？毫无疑问正是如此。主张生来便拥有人权的立场从其普

遍适用和现世方面来看，的确比以往世界各种宗教的立场有了很大的进步。资本主义文明在给这种立场以合法地位并进一步使其扩散方面，可以说是有不小功劳的。

然而我们知道，在世界的现实生活中人权是非常欠缺的。确实在以往的历史体系下很少有人权来装扮门面的，而今天所有的政治实体都声称自己是人权的保卫者。但是大赦国际组织能够毫无困难地把全球各地侵犯人权的事件列出很长的清单。是否人权宣言只不过是邪恶的伪善者向善良的人演出的把戏？

也许有人会认为在世界上某些地区的人权看来要比另外一些地区好些。毫无疑问这是对的，但是即使在问题明显比较少的国家里，在国内一些地区和阶层中也仍然存在着人权经常遭受侵犯的情况。世界各国的移民常被剥夺人权，这是众所周知的。在目前的世界体系中，移民在世界人口中的比例不是在降低而是在不断提高。

既然我们承认我们能够提出一系列有关人权的观察报告，其中情况有好有坏，那么这能证明什么呢？在这方面很容易能看到存在这样的一种相互关系：比较富的强国，侵犯人权的事较少（或不太明显）；比较穷的弱国，侵犯人权的事较多。对于这种相互关系，人们可以有两种对立的看法。一些人认为这证明国家越是“资本主义化”人权就越被人接受，当然反过来也是一样。但是另外一些人认为这又一次证明资本主义的优点集中在世界某个地区，而它的负效应集中在其他地区。他们把这件事本身看作是资本主义历史发展的结果，因而认为人权确实不具有普遍的价值，而只是一种带有特权性质的奖赏。

由于普遍的科学和普遍的人权都存在问题，资本主义拥护者时常转而提出他们最有力的论点——普遍的职位分配，即量才任用。在资本主义文明的神话中，据说在以前的所有历史体系中个

人一生下来，他们的地位便确定了；只有在历史资本主义制度下才按照个人的长处来分配职位，法国大革命便宣称“事业是对天才开放的”。

我们又一次必须仔细地将神话和现实进行比较。要说在以往历史体系中不存在个人社会上的发迹，那是不真实的。这种情况总是存在的。还有，贵族阶层在不断地转换（很大程度上是通过武力），那是到处都有的，对此我们如何看待呢？宗教机构也总是把才干与社会地位的上升结合起来的（在这种情况下当然不是通过武力）。诚然，甚至通过市场来发迹同样到处都有，尽管并不是通常的事。

资本主义文明的不同之处有两点。第一，量才任用被宣传成一种官方的善行，而不仅仅是事实上的存在。因此这方面文化的价值准则是不同的。第二，有可能晋升的人数占世界人口的百分比提高了。但是尽管比例提高了，量才任用制下能晋升的仍是非常少的少数，因为量才任用制是虚假的普遍主义，它宣称机会是普遍的，可是按照定义来看，它只有在不普遍的情况下才有意义。量才任用制从本质上来说是精英主义的。

不仅如此，我们必须去考察那些贯彻量才任用制的机构实际上究竟是在多大程度上是根据才能来作出决定的。这使我们又回到教育机构的评分问题。他们是真正完全根据才能来分等级的吗？当然，他们能够用分数来使才能定量化。但是由于计分是由当地人按照当地选定的标准在当地作出的，所以这种分数的可比性是令人怀疑的。对于量才任用的计分，也许人们至多只能说它能很容易地区分出一小批十分杰出的人和完全不够格的人，但是对于余下的很大一批介乎两者之间的人来说，计分法并不是可靠的评定方法。然而从职位的结构来看，占80%的中等合格者中间至多只有1/4的人能获得高报酬的职位，而选择是必须作出

的，并且有明显的证据表明：在这种情况下家庭社会地位的因素起着重大作用。因此，制度化的量才任用制帮助了少数人，使他们得以获得应得的职位，而在其他制度下他们也许会被排斥掉。但是这个制度使更多的人，得以在量才任用的掩护下依靠家庭社会地位获得职位。

一些人声称的资本主义文明的第二个主要优点是：它培育了民主制度，并使其兴旺发达。让我们给民主制度下个十分简单的定义：它是在平等的基础上最大限度地参与所有各级的决策。因而，“一人一票”已成为民主国家结构的一个象征，尽管这件事本身只是民主参与的第一步。民主制度的基本动力是平等主义，反动力有两个：谋取特权和谋取有才能者在位。这两种反动力导致等级制度。

存在两种而不是一种反动力，说明在解释现实方面有着深刻的鸿沟。资本主义文明的拥护者认为它是历史上头一个结束特权等级的制度。当然，他们也认为才能方面的等级制度一直存在而且需要保留下来。例如婴儿是不允许与其父母讲平等的。批评者指责资本主义文明是个大骗局。他们指出：特权等级伪装成才能方面的等级；一些在社会有限范围内也许是合理的等级（如婴儿的社会自治权问题），被广泛地和不适当地应用于范围广泛得多的工作和社区场合。而实际上在这些场合中本是应当遵循民主（即平等）准则的。这里我们能看到有关量才任用制的争论与有关民主的争论之间的联系。

如果我们要对历史资本主义算个总账，我们必须考虑到存在于世界体系中社会各个方面的总体情况；要从才能方面需要（反对特权需要）的角度，从各方面评估决策的等级制度确实是正当的或是不正当的程度；并且将对于我们当前世界体系的评估总结，同对以往历史体系的评估总结，进行对应的比较。这是一项

令人感到害怕的任务。有利于有关历史资本主义具有更多民主这一说法的主要论点，是政治选举制度的普及。不过另一方面，有些人时常对形式上的参政权是否具有实质性意义表示怀疑。但是即使不理睬这一些，反对通过资本主义文明实现民主化的人也着重指出：随着选举制度的兴起，当代世界的公有制却同时在衰落。他们认为两者相比失多于得。

这促使我们来讨论异化问题。正是在这一点上，批评资本主义文明的保守派和激进派会师了。前面提到过一种说法，认为正规教育的优点在于充分发挥潜力，而异化正是其反面。异化指的是我们变得疏远自己，疏远自己的“本性”，也即不能发挥我们自己的潜力。批评资本主义文明的保守派和激进派都集中指责商品化，尤其是，（但不是惟一的）指责劳动力商品化极其违背人性。

对于资本主义文明的拥护者来说，这是不能与当代世界实际物质利益相比的神秘主义。他们怀疑是否可能有什么有效的办法，去使异化的概念具体化，然而在批评者看来似乎很容易使它具体化。他们提到了当代社会多种形式的、深刻的精神病和社会心理毛病。我们的衡量方法又一次表现出不足。我们了解我们自己历史体系下的疾病情况。我们对其他历史体系下发生的疯病情况也稍有所了解。可是我们没有作好将它们进行比较的准备。然而尽管如此，我们能够指出以下三点。第一，我们体系中的疯病，或者说毛病的形式多种多样。第二，在这些精神方面的问题与我们历史体系的特有社会结构之间有着某些明显的联系。第三，看来在我们的体系下，这些精神方面的问题正与日俱增。这第三点也许只是加紧对现实——例如对随机性城市暴力行为——进行社会监察的结果。但是根据确切的统计数字，似乎某些部分，如吸毒现象的确在增加。

我们也不应该忘掉树木。物质世界中的天然美景为人类创造了不少乐趣。商品化已经不可避免地导致了天然美景的重大破坏。当然，也许更好的美景已经创造出来。但是这另外一类美景的本身是商品化的，因此不像树木那样可供更多的人观赏，人工美景主要是属于少数人的。

对谁有利，和为何会有争论？

现在我们能够转向核算总账。是的，现在已有可能提出一个看法，至少是个定性的看法。从上述争论可以明显看出，情况不是一面倒的。那么能否从概括赞成意见和反对意见中得出一条主线呢？我想是可以的。我首先假设所有在历史上出现的体系都是体现特权等级的体系，而且从来未曾有过黄金年代。因而问题不是在好的与坏的历史体系之间进行选择，而是在较好的与较坏的体系之间进行挑选。资本主义文明与先前的历史体系相比，究竟是较好还是较坏？（我暂时先不谈未来的体系会较好或较坏，或者也许将会较好或较坏）。

看来对我来说惟一恰当的回答是：要看它对谁来说？有一点是清楚的，就是在历史资本主义制度下，特权阶层的人数占整个人口的百分比有了明显的提高。对这些人来说，他们认识的世界从整个来说比以前同样阶层的人所认识的世界更好。他们在物质上以及在健康、生活的机会方面肯定会更好，而且不会受到卑劣的统治集团所施加的专横压制。至于他们在精神上是否变得更好，那要看是哪些问题，但是也许不会变得更坏。

但是对于另一头占世界人口 50% 到 85% 的不享有特权的人来说，他们所了解的世界几乎可以肯定地说坏于以前与他们处于同样地位的人。尽管有技术变革，看来他们在物质生活上更坏了。同时由于政府机构的权力比过去更为广泛，而且工作更有效

率，他们在实质上（不是在形式上）所受的专横的压制不是少了而是更多了。他们还在承受各种精神病，并在“内战”破坏方面先受到冲击。

资本主义文明造成了一个两极分化的世界和一个继续不断分化的世界，那么何以它能长久不衰呢？这正是公众有关资本主义优缺点讨论所要解决的问题所在。这一体系能保持这么久是因为人们希望能通过不断改革最终使差距消除。争论本身就使这一期望增大。争论中提出的资本主义优点使一些人相信这一体系能带来许多长期利益，而讨论其缺点使许多人感到可通过有效地组织起来进行政治改革。资本主义文明不仅取得了成功，而且最重要的是具有引诱力，甚至连其受害者和反对者也受到诱惑。

但是如果你和我都相信所有的历史体系毫无例外地只具有有限的生命，最终必然要让位于其他后继的体系，你就必须假设我们这个体系不可能永远稳固不倒。谈完这个题目，我们要接下来转而探讨资本主义文明的未来展望。

未来前景

资本主义文明已到达了它生命的秋天。正如我们所知道的那样，秋天是个美好的季节，至少在资本主义文明诞生的地区是如此。经过了春暖花开的春天和绿叶葱葱的夏天以后，我们到了秋天这个收获季节。但是秋天也是树木落叶的季节。我们知道秋天有很多欢乐，我们也知道这时必须准备应付严冬，即周期的结束，也就是一个历史体系的末期。

要是我们希望了解一个体系如何走向尽头，我们必须看一看它的矛盾，因为所有历史体系（其实是所有体系）都有内在的矛盾。正因为如此，它们的生命是有限的。我将讨论三个基本矛盾，正是这些矛盾日益增长的压力决定了历史资本主义的未来前景。这三个矛盾是：积累的困境、政治合法性的困境和地缘文化论的困境，每种困境都是从体系一开头便存在了；每种矛盾都已到达了矛盾再也不能控制的程度，也就是说，在这个程度上，要为维持这体系正常运转而进行必要的调整时，就将付出过高的代价，以致无法使体系达到暂时的平稳。

积累的困境

资本无休无止的积累是资本主义文明得以存在的原因，也是它的中心活动。我们在对它进行算账时已经知道：资本主义取得的成就是它引以自傲、认为有理的一个方面。但是它的矛盾和困境是怎样的呢？

基本的压力在于使利润最大限度化，所以也就是使积累最大限度化，这要求将生产达到相对垄断的程度。垄断的程度愈高，获得生产总成本与有效销售价格之间大差额的可能性便愈大。所

以，所有的资本家都寻求垄断。然而，高额利润很吸引人，其他人也都总是要寻求进入他们所能够挤进的市场的。所以垄断招致了同时打破垄断和高额利润的竞争。但是每当高额利润的来源减少时，资本家就会单独地和集体地寻找新的高额利润来源，也就是寻找使生产部门垄断化的新办法。这种垄断的需求及其本身的自我破坏性之间的紧张关系，说明了资本主义经济活动的周期性，也说明了在资本主义世界经济中在高度垄断的核心产品和高度竞争的周边产品之间会出现基本轴向分工的原因。

市场上从来没有实现过经济垄断。市场在骨子里就是反垄断的。一个生产者比其他人所拥有的优势总是暂时的，因为其他生产者都总能在以后仿制出那些曾给他带来优势的产品。出现这种情况是由于所有生产者都需要在斗争中作为积累源头生存下去。然而依靠市场机制来长期进行大规模的积累是决不可能的，所以所有生产者必须在市场之外寻找能使他们取得成功的路子。他们求助于两个机构：国家（十分具体的机构）和“习俗”（完全没有定形但是却很实在的机构）。

国家能为生产者做些什么？主要是两件事。国家能创造走向销售垄断化的条件。它还能创造走向独家采购生产要素的条件。要做到这件事的最简单的办法是正式立法。但是正式立法有两个限制。一是只适用于进行立法的国家边界之内，而真正的市场却存在于整个世界经济体系之中。二是国家会受到反对这种立法的许多政治上的压力。这种压力来自被排斥在外的企业家和所有其经济地位会受到这些立法损害的非生产者集团。因为这些原因，很少有完全采用立法措施的。立法措施作为长期积累资本的机制来说是低效率的，以往在所谓的（现在多半是）前社会主义国家中的情况就是如此。更常见的办法是由国家有选择地，而且往往是间接地干预市场。国家首先是以国对国的方式，尤其是以强国

对弱国的方式进行干预，强行以优惠条件进入对方市场，最重要的是防止失去进入弱国市场的机会，而同时又使弱国的竞争者难以模仿高效率的生产。国家干预的第二种方式是通过预算，财政和再分配的决策使某些领域的生产者得益，以对付所有各种竞争。国家干预的第三种方式是预防生产要素（尤其是劳动力）的卖方对抗某些生产者的独家采购垄断地位。

国家的具体行为是经常变化的，因为世界市场的情况在经常变化，国际体系中力量的对比在经常变化，各国内部的政治情况也在经常变化。由于国家的行为在特定的变化中可能使生产者得益或受损，各类生产者对于本国政府的态度也在经常变化。但是一些有势力的生产者争取国家加强他们在市场上地位的努力，以及争取国家对这种要求作出积极反应的努力倒是恒定不变的。要不是资本主义世界经济中经常出现上述情况，资本主义文明是绝不会得到繁荣发展的。

然而生产者不仅依靠国家，而且也依靠“习俗”。正如我指出过的，习俗是无定形的，但并不因而成为无足轻重的。习俗也包括通过创造品味来创造市场。广告和推销很明显是习俗的构成部分，但只是它的一小部分。在500年近代历史中建立和逐步完善的社会化机构培育和整个价值体系，体现这一价值体系的成形因素才构成它的大部分。当我们谈到现存的“消费社会”时所指的正是这个大框架。想获取某些种类（而不是其他类）物品的需求是资本主义文明的一种创造。这种需求是被保证从一系列其他的制度得到广泛支持的。在此基础上，一定领域的生产者能够展开自己的论点，以说服大批买主去购买特定种类的产品。毫无疑问，这在建立相对垄断的能力方面是个关键因素。

习俗还以其他一些更为微妙的方式起作用。在语言和文化方

面已经建立起广泛的渠道，使得特定的经济集团之间更容易打交道，而并不是单单根据市场的合理性来决定与谁打交道，资本主义世界经济中的实际业务在很大程度上（超过了我们承认的程度）取决于社区和家庭之间、亲近和信任之间的联系。由于在一定限度内这能减少业务费用，所以从市场角度看是合理的，可是这个限度很容易地被经常超过，这样便走向生产的“习以为常”的垄断化，而不是由市场考虑来决定。

我们说过，总会有竞争来打破垄断。但是为了做到这一点，竞争者也不能单纯依靠市场，因为市场已经被国家和习俗操纵来反对竞争。潜在的竞争者通常必须采取行动去改变国家和改变习俗。他们采取的办法是：利用一些国家反对另外一些国家；或在国内建立政治联盟以改变国家的政策；或参与社会的活动，部分地通过改变当前的情趣爱好，部分地通过抨击更为基本的价值前提，以改变社会对习俗行为和预期行为的看法。

因而，有关积累的政治斗争是一场持久战，它已导致了曾保证世界经济全面增长的垄断的削弱。尽管垄断的削弱过程非常缓慢，竞争程度的一再提高已经导致利润的缩减和我们称之为康德拉季耶夫第二阶段的长期停滞。每当发生一次经济停滞时，体系便失去平衡。为了使体系重新开始扩展从而有能力保证资本得到无休止的积累，作出某些调整是必须的。

可能有三种标准的调整都有助于提高总的利润水平，从而为世界经济的重新扩展奠定基础。人们能够寻求降低有竞争力的产品生产成本；人们能够为有竞争力的产品寻找新的买主；人们能够寻求生产那些垄断化程度较高但仍有广大市场的新产品。每当发生全球性利润缩减时，都会作出这三种调整。

降低生产成本的一个办法是减少投入费用。尽管这样做可能增加某个生产者的利润，但是它可能降低另外某个生产者的利

润。从全球来说，利润的变化很小。降低生产成本的更有效的办法是降低人工费用——通过进一步的机械化、通过变更法律或习俗使实际工资下降、或通过把生产转移到人工费用较低的地区。这些战术行得通的话，他们就能降低人工费用。

然而，这些战术是与另一种提高利润（即使不谈利润率）的方法，即增加有效需求的方法相矛盾的。为了增加有效需求，全球对于劳工投入的报酬总水平必须提高而不是下降。如何能协调这两种需求呢？在历史上只存在过一种办法，即通过地域分离。当世界体系中经济形势比较有利的地区采取政治措施以某种方式提高有效需求（提高工资水平，社会福利水平或国家控制的再分配水平）时，在世界体系的其他地区中却采取在低工资水平上增加生产者数目的措施。后者采取两种主要形式：将以土地为基础的农村劳动者转变为比较城市化的、部分终生依靠工资为生的工人；扩大世界经济的范围，把那些过去曾经时常只能大体上糊口的农村生产者纳入世界劳动力的队伍。

恢复利润水平的第三种（也是宣扬得最多的）办法当然是通过技术变革，也就是创造能够成为垄断化高利润营业中心的新的所谓先导产品。这也要求国家进行相当多的干预和重建“习俗”以保证垄断。没有这一些，富于想象力的企业家的努力，看来是没有什么用的。

从积累的这一困境模式，即垄断化的不断反复，导致因竞争加剧而使利润缩减，以及通过反作用行动而使利润水平恢复（因而恢复平衡），我们能够找到对无限期进行有效调整的限制吗？这种限制在连续不断的技术革新领域也许是不存在的，虽然这些新产品可能使生物圈的生态平衡趋于严重失调。限制似乎更有可能在日益增长的有效需求领域中找到，因为它所要求的政治行动从长期来说会以其他方式损害盈利能力。这将是我们要讨论的下

一个困境。

正是在第一种调整机制中，即扩大低工资的劳动力部分，我们看到了三者之中的最强有力的制约。这个过程存在着两种内在的限制：世界经济所能包括的新地区，看来在这方面我们已经达到最大限度；把以土地为基础的农村劳动力转变为部分终生依靠工资为生的城市工人的劳动力储备枯竭程度，在这方面我们在不久的将来便将接近最大限度。我们能不能用城市边缘人口（世界人口中增长得很快的部分）的后备军来代替以土地为基础的农村劳动者后备军呢？也许可能，但是城市边缘人口的劳动者对于国家合法地位的威胁要远比以土地为基础的农村工人大得多。

很明显，积累的困境直接把我们引入政治机构合法性的困境，它也许是资本主义文明的一个更为致命的弱点。

政治合法性的困境

资本主义文明合法性的困境是显而易见的。所有历史体系要生存下去，就要给这个体系的骨干分子以报酬。所有以往的历史体系也都要使物质报酬差、社会地位低的人口中的大多数群众就范。为了做到这一点，通常使用的办法是同时采用暴力和信念——相信统治者是神圣的，也相信等级制度不可避免。

在若干世纪里（大致在 15 世纪后期与 18 世纪末之间），资本主义文明认为它可以利用古代的合法性模式。这是主要通过绝对君主制建立中央集权国家和建立国际体系的时期。这是造就胜利者和在国际体系内建立各国等级制度的时期。这一制度下的骨干分子因与正在取得胜利的国家结构建立紧密联系而获得报酬。我们已经看到对于企业家来说，得到强有力的国家机构的支持是何等重要。这些国家确实曾得到骨干分子的支持。

然而，正如 150 年来人们曾经一再分析的那样，资本主义文明正在破坏那个曾经保证人民大众相对顺从的信念系统。唯科学主义（与技术革新的要求相联系），国家结构的行政机构化（为提高积累过程的效率所需）和大量人口有系统的迁移（为了满足资本家生产活动不断发展的劳动力需求）三者的结合要求政治文化有个大规模的革新。法国大革命便是这种革新的催化剂。它的影响是使得大众主观观念成为历史资本主义政治制度新的道德依据。

这样一来，为难之处就成为如何在继续酬劳骨干分子的同时，又能设法保证绝大多数人民的忠诚，因为人民在理论上已成为政治合法性的主人。在 19 世纪，这个难题表现为资本主义世界经济的核心国家（当时主要在西欧和北美）中如何把工人阶级和骨干分子吸收到国家结构中去的问题。这件事构成难题是因为当时的绝对剩余价值水平有限，如果给工人阶级的报酬过高便会严重影响给骨干分子的报酬。这就是所谓的阶级斗争，这种斗争事实上从历史上来说已成功地得到遏制。

一方面对骨干分子允诺给予越来越多的报酬，另一方面因工人阶级对国家的忠诚而要给他们补偿，于是采取了分给后者以一小块馅饼的调和办法。这样做不致于威胁资本的积累（也许通过扩大世界的有效需求甚至事实上可使积累扩大），而且还带来希望。这一小块馅饼会随着资本积累的扩大而逐步变大。

这种解决办法是一种调整模式，从短期来看解决了问题，但从长期看反而使它加剧，因为要实现工人阶级不断增大份额的希望，压力就会不断地产生。不过在 19 世纪，调整机制运行得出奇地好，在那个时期里，核心国家的工人阶级有两条增加报酬的途径：一条是在政治上参加选举的道路，即缓慢地但又不断地扩大参政权；另一条是国家强制实施的再分配道路，即缓慢地但又

不断地扩大社会立法和社会福利或福利国家。与此同时，还产生了得到社会保障的希望，这不仅体现在占统治地位的自由主义意识形态之中，而且体现在想象中的各种社会主义意识形态之中。

到1914年，我们看到了结果——核心国家的工人阶级与他们各自的国家很好地结合成一体，变得既有爱国主义，又有改革精神。这种解决办法事实上并没有妨碍骨干分子大大提高其本身收入的能力，因为它是在这样的框架条件下进行的：全世界的积累总额大量增加，而且对于我们今天称之为“南方”的地区和剥削大大增加。

第一次世界大战削弱了核心国家对南方的政治控制。国民的政治一体化于是对于世界体系的稳定运行来说变得具有关键意义。19世纪在核心国家消失的政治合法性的难题，在20世纪又重新在全世界出现。问题仍然是如何既向骨干分子提供不断增长的报酬，又能向群众（现在是全世界的群众）提供一小部分馅饼和改良主义的希望，这种解决办法就是我们所谓的威尔逊主义，它提出要在全世界范围内重复做那些先前在核心国家内部曾经做过的事情。威尔逊主义提出与参政权相类似的民族自决（国际结构内部所有国家的政治平等，就相当于一个国家内部所有公民的自治平等）。威尔逊主义也提出通过开发援助以帮助不发达国家发展经济的概念，这类似于社会立法和福利国家（即世界层次上的福利国家）。

这种调整看来最初进行得很顺利，整个第三世界在1945~1965年民族解放运动期间经过政治上的非殖民主义化和夺取权力而达到顶点。然而与19世纪的调整不同，20世纪的调整并没有得到，也无法得到资本主义世界经济在地理上进一步扩张的支持。所以到了1970年前后，全世界再分配中所能给予这一体系骨干分子的剩余价值份额达到了极限，再进一步就会产生严重的

负面影响。从那时起，威尔逊主义一直在退却。从那以后，世界经济处于非常正常的下降和停滞时期，于是我们从积累困境的角度所讨论过的所有通常的调整过程都出现了。但是这个世界体系为维持民族—国家合法性的需要而进行调整的能力已呈现出强弩之末的讯号。

因而我们在19世纪70年代和80年代看到接连发生下列过程：南方先前的民族解放运动，过去的社会主义集团的共产党，甚至于核心国家的凯恩斯主义和社会民主主义在政治上都失败了。这些运动原先经过一个世纪的奋斗而真正掌握了政权，这时因不再得到群众的支持而最终垮台。但是民众的不再支持也表明他们已放弃对改良主义的希望，这样便减少了国家制度的一种凝聚力，实际上就减少了国家制度的民众合法性。然而如果这些国家不再有合法性，它们就不能够遏制住政治斗争。从资本主义世界体系的观点来看，左派战略的这种失败是一场灾难，因为远非革命的典型左派战略对资本主义文明来说一直是起着融合作用的粘合剂。

地缘文化论的困境

资本主义文明也是围绕着一个过去从未占过统治地位的地缘文化命题建立起来的，这个命题是：个人作为所谓历史主体的中心作用。个人主义代表一种困难的选择，因为它是一把双刃剑。一方面，资本主义文明强调个人的首创精神，利用自身利益的意识来作为使这个制度繁荣和支撑的动力，普罗米修斯神话鼓励、奖赏和肯定了个人（不仅是企业家，而且有工人阶级）的努力，从而最大限度地提高了效率，激发起人们的想象力。实际上普罗米修斯神话所做到的还不只是这些（尽管人们很少注意到这点），它也促成了由个人组成的正规政治组织的概念，包括自相矛盾地

创立和大大地扩展反制度运动本身。因而，人们断定：即使是反对个人主义的社会意识，也要依靠集合个人的能力和个人对这种社会行动有效性的信心。这样正如我们所看到的那样，结果形成了整体社会的希望，从而成为维护世界体系的关键。

然而个人主义还有着另一方面，这就是地缘文化论会存在困境的原因。个人主义助长了一种所有人反对所有人的特别剧烈的竞争，因为它肯定不单是少数精英的竞争，而且是整个人类的竞争。不仅如此，在逻辑上这是无限制的竞争。事实上当代哲学和社会科学的许多论述都集中在探讨这种赤裸裸的自我追求在社会上扩散后对集体和个人造成的危害。

对资本主义文明来说，问题一开始便是如何协调已经成为历史主体的个人的正反两方面的后果。当然保守的思想家总是提出警告，认为灾难即将来临，社会主义的理论家也是如此，尽管实际上无论是保守的或者是社会主义的思想家很久以来都没有想同地缘文化论进行直接的斗争。确切地说，他们是迁就这种论调而寻求使之转为己用。

那么矛盾要靠什么机制来遏制呢？进行遏制时靠的是同时强调和同时追随两个相反的主题，在它们之间反复来回摆动。这两个强调的主题即做法，就是一边是普遍主义，另一边是种族主义—性别主义。这些都是资本主义文明的精品。他们看起来是对立的，但是实际上完全是互补的。正因为这两者之间存在着奇怪的和不确定的联系，资本主义文明得以控制个人作为历史主体的地缘文化论困境。

普遍主义的实质是什么？在理论上它的含义是人类在道义上都是平等的。它不仅认为所有的人都享有相同的天赋人权，而且认为人类的行为存在着我们能够查明并进行分析的普遍原则。所以普遍主义对于反映人的特权或某些集团的人自称天生比别人优

越的任何表现都不以为然。

种族主义和性别主义的实质正好相反。它们认为并不是所有人生来具有相同的人权，而是要按照生物上或文化上一定的等级进行排列的。这种等级决定了他们的权利和特权，以及他们在集体工作过程中的地位。这一情况可从以下事实中得到说明和证实：某些集团的人的表现生来就与其他一些人不同，比他们优越。

过去 500 年间，资本主义文明最不寻常的事实是对这两个主题的信仰程度以及它们在社会实践中的贯彻程度一直在加强，两者始终是并驾齐驱地或一前一后地发展。一方有所发展的话，另一方同样有所发展。如果我们回归到个人主义的两面性——个人主义既能激发活力、首创性和想象力，也造成所有人反对所有人的无限制争斗——就能看到这两种做法（普遍主义和种族主义—性别主义）是如何从地缘文化论所包含的矛盾所产生的破坏平衡的影响中产生，又如何反过来抑制这种影响的范围。

一方面，普遍主义使人们得出结论，认为矛盾不是真的，因为无限制的斗争事实上激发了首创精神，所以任何特权，作为在所有人都具有同等参与条件下表现优异的结果，是正当的。这一论点在 20 世纪被尊称为量才任用制，在资本主义积累过程中处于高位的人就是以它作为他们应得地位的依据的。

另一方面，种族主义—性别主义则提供了解释，为什么那些处于底层的人会跌到下面去。尽管机会对他们来说是有的，可是他们表现出缺乏首创精神。他们在所有人反对所有人的无限制的斗争中失败了，因为他们天生（如果不是因为生物遗传的话，至少也是由于文化原因）没有能力把事情做得更好。再回到我们有关算账的讨论，普遍主义为作为胜方的少数人找到解释和正当理由，而种族主义—性别主义则为作为负方的多数人找到解释和正

当理由。

这两种做法是相互制约的，人们总是有可能利用一方去反对另一方，可利用种族主义—性别主义去防止普遍主义向平等主义方向走得过远；利用普遍主义可防止种族主义—性别主义向种族等级制度方向走得过远，从而避免对资本主义积累过程所必需的劳动力流动的阻碍。以上就是我们所说的反复来回摆动的含义。

但是这种来回摆动受到来自对国家不断增长的需求的约束，而且从本质上说这些需求是不可能得到满足的，因而严重的积累困境会导致严重的政治合法性困境。结果是要求实现普遍主义的潜在平等主义的压力空前增大，而要求实现种族主义—性别主义的、与种姓等级制度相类似的潜在非平等主义压力也空前增大。

事实上这两种做法远没有相互制约，反而是相互排斥的，彼此越离越远。我们从有关我们教育制度文化内涵的讨论（已走向表面化）中可以看到这一情况。教育制度是推销地缘文化论的主体之一。如果学校遵循普遍主义原则，那么这是某个特殊集团，即全世界的上层集团的普遍主义吗？但是如果学校要遵循“多元文化”原则，我们是否还要促进那种在教育制度理论上要加以克服的文化分裂呢？如果个人是历史的主体，我们不是应该按照个人的才能来提供机会吗？但是如果个人是历史的主体，我们不是应当重新给一些来自下层的个人以机会吗？这些人是由于要在客观上把工作做好而在社会上被剥夺了机会的。这场辩论已日益成为聋子之间的对话，然而双方在政治上和文化上都已日益活跃起来。

历史体系的危机

让我们把三件事放在一起。资本主义文明是在矛盾中发展起来的。这并不奇怪；所有的历史体系都有矛盾。在历史资本主义

的情况下，存在着三种主要矛盾，这一点我已经简单谈过。每种矛盾在历史上都受到了调整机制的遏制，但这些调整机制每次都变得很紧张。我们可以说，这些积累的压力意味着当代的世界体系正在接近，也许已经处于一场体系性的危机之中。

一场体系性的危机是指体系已经达到了一个分叉点，或者已经达到一系列分叉点的第一个点。当体系走到远离平衡点时就达到分叉点，在分叉点上就有可能采取多种方案，而不是单一的方案，以解决不稳定的问题。对于在这一点上的体系，我们可以考虑在各种可能性之间进行选择。这种选择既取决于体系的历史，也取决于体系内部结构以外的各种因素的直接影晌程度。我们把这些外部因素称之为体系方面的“杂音”(noise)。当体系运转正常时，“杂音”可忽略不计。但是在远离平衡点的情况下，“杂音”的随机变化就由于不平衡的巨大增长而具有放大效应。于是行动处于混乱状态的体系就会十分急剧地以主观上不可预测的方式来重新改组，从而导致出现新型的秩序。在这样的情况下，通常能够遇到的交叉点不是一个而是有一联串，一直要到一个新的体系，即一个具有长期相对平衡性的新结构建立时为止，这时又能处于具有决定性的稳定状态。新出现的体系也许更为复杂；但不管怎样它是与旧的体系不同的。

这个普遍程式适用于所有的体系，包括从物理化学体系到生物体系，一直到社会体系。如果我们把它应用到我们当前关心的问题上去，即应用于资本主义文明的未来前景，我们能够把形势归纳如下。资本主义世界经济一直是个相对稳定的历史体系，即至今已经按照一定的规律运行了大约 500 年。我们已经试着为它算了账，指出了为维持它的平衡而需要进行的调整过程所受到的各种压力。我们提出了这一体系为何正在达到或已经达到分叉点的原因。看来我们正处于可能要延续大约 50 多年的分叉点连续

出现过程的中途。我们可以肯定将会出现某种新的历史秩序，但是我们不能肯定这种秩序将会是怎样的。

具体地说，我们可以把1968年的世界革命作为第一个分叉点，它延续下去一直到包括1989年所谓的共产主义垮台时为止，那是第二个分叉点。对于1968年世界革命，各地有多种表述方法，当然我们认为它是对资本主义文明及其当前的主要支撑结构，即美国在世界体系中的霸权（苏联与它勾结在一起）的一种反抗。我们还认为它是对所有老的反制度运动——西方的社会民主党、社会主义集团的共产党、第三世界的民族解放运动——的否定，这些运动因效率低下而失败，而更糟的是它们实际上起着使现行世界体系合法化的作用。

对1968年的革命者来说，改良主义、启蒙价值观和信赖作为政治变革工具的国家结构，三者是相同的，他们都加以反对。1968年革命者的反文化旗帜并不像人们常说的那样更多地是对个人主义的一般肯定；它其实是对追求个人自我完善的一种具体的肯定和对相反地追求自我中心消费主义的一种具体的否定。

1968年全世界发生的许多事件具有起始分叉点的典型形式。社会情绪的动荡曾经极其强烈。这些事件造成了裂痕，一直在资本主义文明中起稳定作用的国家结构的全面合法性，第一次明显地遭到破坏。当然，1968年革命的具体要求部分地通过调整国家的社会政策得到满足，但有一部分遭到了当局的压制。调整工作在资本主义世界经济的中心地区中进行得比在边缘国家中更为频繁，而在社会主义国家中进行得最少。正好相反，在勃列日涅夫的经济停滞情况下，1968年的要求受到了明显的厄制。边缘地区调整工作做得较少的原因是世界积累过程留给它们的灵活余地很小。它们的国家机构在康德拉季耶夫第二阶段中遇到财政紧缩的严重困难，因此无法用出钱的办法去平息抗议。不仅如此，

这些掌权的政府一般来说还正是属于反制度运动的，因而这些运动通常没有给政府的政策施加什么压力。

这些政府一个接着一个垮台，而且由于油价下跌、债务纠纷和贸易条件下降等原因而被迫接受国际货币基金的监护（从而失去国家的合法权利）。这些政府中最后垮台的是东欧的共产政权，现在它们也步了第三世界国家的后尘。因此，1989年象征着一连串分叉点的第二个点。从表面看起来，1989年与1968年很不相同，实际上两者的主调是一样的：争取通过政府领导的改良主义道路以便在世界体系中获得平等地位的幻想破灭了。

共产主义的崩溃对于资本主义文明稳定性的打击甚至比1968年事件更大。以前一些人可以把某些反制度运动的失败归罪于模仿苏联模式的不足，所以存在着内在的弱点。可是连苏联模式也垮台了，而且是由内部的幻想破灭所造成的，社会向前平稳变革的可能性似乎就变得非常遥远了。对列宁主义的失望实际上是对中间派自由主义的失望。各个前共产主义国家都被列入世界体系的非中心地区范畴，现在也只有在这点上理解上，它们又重新一体化了。这第二个分叉点的特点是它带来了一系列政府的解体，但是没有造成1918年以后和1948年以后那样的民族主义非殖民化的乐观（并起稳定作用的）效应。寻求自决的威尔逊主义也许还没有完全丧失其力量，但是肯定已经失去其魅力。

那么资本主义文明正在走向何处呢？一方面，资本主义世界经济将坚定地沿着老路前进——重新建立日本（也许是同美国合作）和西欧这两个主要积累极点。由于它们的作用，我们到21世纪初将会看到全世界的生产将在新垄断化生产部门的基础上出现进一步的巨大扩展。然而由于世界后备劳动力的减少，不能肯定它们是否将会有能力保持与以前同样高的积累率。

这一扩展将必然使报酬和社会结构进一步两极化。前面我们

已经谈过为什么这会给政治的合法性施加难以忍受的压力。因而我们正在进入一个有着大量局部的、地区性的和世界性的动乱时期，一个麻烦丛生的时期。这个时期比起 20 世纪德、美的世界大战以及随后发生的民族解放战争来，更加缺乏规律，所以更难于控制。

对于政治合法性的压力加重和没有能力克服困境，正在使人们对于进步的信念趋于瓦解，而这种对进步的信念是能对地缘文化论的矛盾起到制约作用的。既然人们不再相信全能的个人是历史的主体，他们就会寻求集团的保护。于是产生了新的地缘文化主题：“认同”的主题，这是用一个非常难以捉摸的被称为“文化”（更精确地说是“各种文化”）的外壳包装起来的认同。但是这一新的主题只是为地缘文化论制造了一个新的困境。一方面，要求认同多种身份就是要求所有“各种文化”的平等。另一方面它要求承认所有“各种文化”的特殊性，所以又默认了等级制度。由于人们会在这两种互相对立的论点之间不断改变立场，具有“各种文化”的集团的界限将会不断地重新划分。但是“文化”这一概念本身却是建立在假设这些界限是稳定不变的基础之上的。

这样我们可预期到处会出现爆炸性局面。那些在“文化”上看来被排斥在当前特权以外的人们将会转向三种政治机制，以便从政治上摆脱集团的不平等地位。一种机制是培育激进的变型。第二种机制是建立拥有战斗力强的大型部队。第三种是个人超越文化的界限，通过个人在“文化上的”地位的上升来逃避。上述机制没有一种是新的，它们在过去都从属于由国家指导的、寻求国家权力作为通向改革之路的改良主义革命或假革命。个人的群体力量现在被集体主义的特殊力量所替代。

在今后的 25~50 年间，我们看来会在南方和北方见到各种

不同形式的动乱。在南方，整个 20 世纪里曾风行一时的民族解放运动也许将不再存在。不管是好是坏，它们已经起到了它们的历史作用。很少人会相信它们还能进一步起作用。取而代之的是我们将会看到过去 20 年里风云突起的三种选择方式。我称它们为霍梅尼方式、萨达姆·侯赛因方式和“船民”方式。从资本主义文明平衡的角度来看，它们都起着同样的不安定的作用。

霍梅尼方式是种激进的变型方式，它从整体上集体拒绝按照世界体系的规律来行动。当拥有足够集体资源的、足够大的集团采纳这一方式时，它就能对体系的平衡提出难以应付的挑战。这种情况偶尔发生也许是能够对付的，尽管会造成许多困难。但是多处同时爆发的话将会造成巨大破坏。

萨达姆·侯赛因方式大不相同，但是同样难于应付。这是一条致力于建立高度军事化大国的道路，实际上是企图准备同北方开战。这不是一件容易去做的事，而且经过波斯湾战争以后，似乎北方国家很容易地加以对付。不过我们不要被表面形象所迷惑。当这一方式成为越来越多的国家政策时，要遏制它就会越来越困难。事实上我们必须注意到，即使在伊拉克，全面的军事败北也不是以永久性地结束萨达姆·侯赛因方式。

最后还有“船民”方式。这是大量家庭不屈不挠地向较富裕的地区非法移居，从南方逃往北方，船民可以被遣返，但困难不小，而且还会再来。我们可以预计在今后 25~50 年间，将会有许多人在这南北移居中取得成功，由于物质条件和人口的双重现实差距，使得北方国家的任何政策都不大可能在阻止人员流动方面取得重大成效。

那么在经济上仍然活跃的北方将会发生什么情况呢？记得我们曾经预测国家结构（甚至包括北方的国家结构）的效率会有下降。随着人口平衡情况的改变，在资本主义世界经济的核心地区

将大量出现“内部第三世界”的现象。今天北美存在着最大的南方分遣队。西欧正在逐步赶上。甚至在北方各国中建立有最坚强的法律和文化壁垒的日本，这一现象也正在开始。

由国家结构削弱而引起的人口结构变化，将反过来进一步削弱国家结构，社会动乱在核心地区将再一次成为正常现象。过去20年间对于这一点曾经进行过许多讨论，并被错误地说成是犯罪增加。我们将要看到的是内战增加。这是骚乱时期的面貌。人们已经开始争取得到保护，可是国家没有能力提供保护。一个原因是国家没有钱；另一个原因是缺少人民的认同。我们将看到代之而起的是提供保护的私人军队和警察机构的不断扩大。这些军队和警察将是由各种文化集团、生产企业、地方社区、宗教团体、当然还有犯罪组织所雇佣的。这不应当被说成是无政府主义；它是命中注定的混乱。

这将会得出什么结果？从混乱中会出现新秩序。我们无法了解确切的情况，但有一件事是可以肯定的。资本主义将成为过去，它的特定的历史体系将不再存在。除此以外我们所能说的最多是勾划出几条可能的历史轨迹，也就是说用粗笔勾划一下，至于制度的细节是完全无法预料的。

从世界体系的历史来看，似乎可能存在三种类型的社会格局。第一种是新封建主义，它会以远为平衡得多的形式重新出现骚乱时期的局面——一个主权多方分割、存在大量自给自足地区和本地等级制度的世界。这种情况可能与维持（但是也许不是进一步提高）当前较高的技术水平相共存，无限度的资本积累不再能成为这种体系的主要动力，但是它肯定是一个非平等主义的体系。它的合法性来自何处？大概要靠回复到相信自然等级制度吧！

第二种格局可能是某种民主法西斯主义。这种格局会像种姓


等级制度那样将世界划分为两个阶层，上层也许要占世界人口的1/5。在这一阶层内部，可能有着高度平等的分配。在这样一个内部利益一致的庞大集团的基础上，他们可能有力量使其余80%的人处于完全无力反抗的劳动无产阶级的地位。希特勒的新世界秩序就具有这一构想。它失败了，但那是因为当时把上层的范围限定得过于狭窄。

第三种格局可能是一种更为激进的、全世界高度分散的、高度平等的世界秩序。似乎这在三者之中最富有乌托邦色彩，但是一定不能把它排除在外。这种世界秩序在过去几个世纪里许多知识分子的思考中曾经有过影子，现在我们政治上的日益成熟和技术水平的提高使得这种世界秩序成为可行，尽管不能完全肯定。它要求在消费支出上接受一定的实际限制。但是它并不只是意味贫困的社会化，要不然它在政治上是不可能实现的。

还存在其他可能性吗？当然存在。重要的是要认识到所有三种历史格局都是实际存在的，而历史的选择取决于今后50年里我们这个世界的集体行为。不管选择哪种格局，它都不会是历史的结束，而是实际意义上的开始。人类的社会世界按宇宙时间来计算仍然非常年轻。

到2050年或2100年，当我们回头再来看资本主义文明时，我们会怎么想呢？我们可能会感到十分不公平。不管我们选择了哪种新体系，我们可能都会觉得必须贬低那个刚刚过去的体系，即资本主义文明，我们将会强调它的邪恶而忽视它取得的成就。到了3000年，我们可能会回忆它，认为它是人类历史上的一次吸引人的演习——一次特殊和异常时期的演习，但可能是向更为平等的世界过渡的漫长历史中的一个重要时刻；或者它在本质上是一种不稳定的人类剥削形式，在它以后，世界便回复到较为稳定的形式。荣耀就这样消失了！

Introduction



This book had its immediate origin in two successive requests. In the autumn of 1980, Thierry Paquot invited me to write a short book for a series he was editing in Paris. He suggested as my topic 'Capitalism'. I replied that I was, in principle, willing to do it, but that I wished my topic to be 'Historical Capitalism'.

I felt that much had been written about capitalism by Marxists and others on the political left, but that most of these books suffered from one of two faults. One variety were basically logico-deductive analyses, starting from definitions of what capitalism was thought to be in essence, and then seeing how far it had developed in various places and times. A second variety concentrated on presumed major transformations of the capitalist system as of some recent point in time, in which the whole earlier point of time served as a mythologized foil against which to treat the empirical reality of the present.

What seemed urgent to me, a task to which in a sense the whole corpus of my recent work has been addressed, was to see capitalism as a historical system, over the whole of its history and in concrete unique reality. I, therefore, set myself the task of describing this reality, of delineating precisely what was always changing and what had not changed at all (such that we could denote the entire reality under one name).

I believe, like many others, that this reality is an integrated whole. But many who assert this view argue it in the form of an attack on others for their alleged 'economism' or their cultural 'idealism' or their over-emphasis on political, 'voluntaristic' factors. Such critiques, almost by their nature, tend to fall by rebound into the sin opposite to the one they are attacking. I have therefore tried to present quite straightforwardly the overall integrated reality, treating successively its expression in the economic, political, and cultural-ideological arenas.

Shortly after I agreed in principle to do this book, I received an invitation from the Department of Political Science at the University of Hawaii to give a series of lectures. I seized the opportunity to write this book as those lectures, given in the spring of 1982. The first version of the first three chapters was presented in Hawaii, and I am grateful to my lively audience for their many comments and criticisms which enabled me to improve the presentation considerably.

One improvement I made was to add the fourth chapter. I realized in the course of the lectures that one problem of exposition persisted: the enormous subterranean strength of the faith in inevitable progress. I realized too that this faith vitiated our understanding of the real historical alternatives before us. I, therefore, decided to address the question directly.

Finally, let me say a word about Karl Marx. He was a monumental figure in modern intellectual and political history. He has bequeathed us a great legacy which is conceptually rich and morally inspiring. When he said, however, that he was not a Marxist, we should take him seriously and not shrug this aside as a *bon mot*.

He knew, as many of his self-proclaimed disciples often do not, that he was a man of the nineteenth century, whose vision was inevitably circumscribed by that social reality. He knew, as many do not, that a theoretical formulation is only understandable and usable in relation to the alternative formulation it is explicitly or implicitly attacking; and that it is entirely irrelevant vis-à-vis formulations about other problems based on other premisses. He knew, as many do not, that there was a tension in the presentation of his work between the exposition of capitalism as a perfected system (which had never in fact existed historically) and the analysis of the concrete day-to-day reality of the capitalist world.

Let us, therefore, use his writings in the only sensible way—that of a comrade in the struggle who knew as much as he knew.

1.

**The Commodification of
Everything:
Production of Capital**



Capitalism is first and foremost a historical social system. To understand its origins, its workings, or its current prospects, we have to look at its existing reality. We may of course attempt to summarize that reality in a set of abstract statements, but it would be foolish to use such abstractions to judge and classify the reality. I propose therefore instead to try to describe what capitalism has actually been like in practice, how it has functioned as a system, why it has developed in the ways it has, and where it is presently heading.

The word capitalism is derived from capital. It would be legitimate therefore to presume that capital is a key element in capitalism. But what is capital? In one usage, it is merely accumulated wealth. But when used in the context of historical capitalism it has a more specific definition. It is not just the stock of consumable goods, machinery, or authorized claims to material things in the form of money. Capital in historical capitalism does of course continue to refer to those accumulations of the efforts of past labour which have not yet been expended; but if this were all, then all historical systems back to those of Neanderthal man could be said to have been capitalist, since they all had some such accumulated stocks that incarnated past labour.

What distinguishes the historical social system we are calling historical capitalism is that in this historical system capital

came to be used (invested) in a very special way. It came to be used with the primary objective or intent of self-expansion. In this system, past accumulations were 'capital' only to the extent they were used to accumulate more of the same. The process was no doubt complex, even sinuous, as we shall see. But it was this relentless and curiously self-regarding goal of the holder of capital, the accumulation of still more capital, and the relations this holder of capital had therefore to establish with other persons in order to achieve this goal, which we denominate as capitalist. To be sure, this object was not exclusive. Other considerations intruded upon the production process. Still, the question is, in case of conflict, which considerations tended to prevail? Whenever, over time, it was the accumulation of capital that regularly took priority over alternative objectives, we are justified in saying that we are observing a capitalist system in operation.

An individual or a group of individuals might of course decide at any time that they would like to invest capital with the objective of acquiring still more capital. But, before a certain moment in historical time, it had never been easy for such individuals to do this successfully. In previous systems, the long and complex process of the accumulation of capital was almost always blocked at one or another point, even in those cases where its initial condition—the ownership, or amalgamation, of a stock of previously unconsumed goods in the hands of a few—existed. Our putative capitalist always needed to obtain the use of labour, which meant there had to be persons who could be lured or compelled to do such work. Once workers were obtained and goods produced, these goods had to be marketed in some way, which meant there had to be both a system of distribution and a group of buyers with the wherewithal to purchase the goods. The goods had to be sold

at a price that was greater than the total costs (as of the point of sale) incurred by the seller, and, furthermore, this margin of difference had to be more than the seller needed for his own subsistence. There had, in our modern language, to be a profit. The owner of the profit then had to be able to retain it until a reasonable opportunity occurred to invest it, whereupon the whole process had to renew itself at the point of production.

In fact, before modern times, this chain of processes (sometimes called the circuit of capital) was seldom completed. For one thing, many of the links in the chain were considered, in previous historical social systems, to be irrational and/or immoral by the holders of political and moral authority. But even in the absence of direct interference by those who had the power to interfere, the process was usually aborted by the non-availability of one or more elements of the process—the accumulated stock in a money form, the labour-power to be utilized by the producer, the network of distributors, the consumers who were purchasers.

One or more elements were missing because, in previous historical social systems, one or more of these elements was not 'commodified' or was insufficiently 'commodified'. What this means is that the process was not considered one that could or should be transacted through a 'market'. Historical capitalism involved therefore the widespread commodification of processes—not merely exchange processes, but production processes, distribution processes, and investment processes—that had previously been conducted other than via a 'market'. And, in the course of seeking to accumulate more and more capital, capitalists have sought to commodify more and more of these social processes in all spheres of economic life. Since capitalism is a self-regarding process, it follows that

no social transaction has been intrinsically exempt from possible inclusion. That is why we may say that the historical development of capitalism has involved the thrust towards the commodification of everything.

Nor has it been enough to commodify the social processes. Production processes were linked to one another in complex commodity chains. For example, consider a typical product that has been widely produced and sold throughout the historical experience of capitalism, an item of clothing. To produce an item of clothing, one typically needs at the very least cloth, thread, some kind of machinery, and labour-power. But each of these items in turn has to be produced. And the items that go into their production in turn have also to be produced. It was not inevitable—it was not even common—that every subprocess in this commodity chain was commodified. Indeed, as we shall see, profit is often greater when not all links in the chain are in fact commodified. What is clear is that, in such a chain, there is a very large and dispersed set of workers who are receiving some sort of remuneration which registers on the balance-sheet as costs. There is also a far smaller, but also usually dispersed, set of persons (who are furthermore usually not united as economic partners but operate as distinct economic entities), who share in some way in the ultimate margin that exists in the commodity chain between the total costs of production of the chain and the total income realized by the disposal of the final product.

Once there were such commodity chains linking multiple production processes, it is clear that the rate of accumulation for all the 'capitalists' put together became a function of how wide a margin could be created, in a situation where this margin could fluctuate considerably. The rate of accumulation for particular capitalists, however, was a function of a process of

'competition', with higher rewards going to those who had greater perspicacity of judgement, greater ability to control their work-force, and greater access to politically-decided constraints on particular market operations (known generically as 'monopolies').

This created a first elementary contradiction in the system. While the interest of all capitalists, taken as a class, seemed to be to reduce all costs of production, these reductions in fact frequently favoured particular capitalists against others, and some therefore preferred to increase their share of a smaller global margin rather than accept a smaller share of a larger global margin. Furthermore, there was a second fundamental contradiction in the system. As more and more capital was accumulated, more and more processes commodified, and more and more commodities produced, one of the key requirements to maintain the flow was that there be more and more purchasers. However, at the same time, efforts to reduce the costs of production often reduced the flow and distribution of money, and thus inhibited the steady expansion of purchasers, needed to complete the process of accumulation. On the other hand, redistributions of global profit in ways that could have expanded the network of purchasers often reduced the global margin of profit. Hence individual entrepreneurs found themselves pushing in one direction for their own enterprises (for example, by reducing their own labour costs), while simultaneously pushing (as members of a collective class) to increase the overall network of purchasers (which inevitably involved, for some producers at least, an increase in labour costs).

The economics of capitalism has thus been governed by the rational intent to maximize accumulation. But what was rational for the entrepreneurs was not necessarily rational for the workers. And even more important, what was rational for all

entrepreneurs as a collective group was not necessarily rational for any given entrepreneur. It is therefore not enough to say that everyone was pursuing their own interests. Each person's own interests often pushed them, quite 'rationally', to engage in contradictory activities. The calculation of real long-term interest thereby became exceedingly complex, even if we ignore, at present, the degree to which everyone's perceptions of their own interests was clouded over and distorted by complex ideological veils. For the moment, I provisionally assume that historical capitalism did in fact breed a *homo economicus*, but I am adding that he was almost inevitably a bit confused.

This is however one 'objective' constraint which limited the confusion. If a given individual constantly made errors in economic judgement, whether because of ignorance, fatuity, or ideological prejudice, this individual (firm) tended not to survive in the market. Bankruptcy has been the harsh cleansing fluid of the capitalist system, constantly forcing all economic actors to keep more or less to the well-trodden rut, pressuring them to act in such a way that collectively there has been even further accumulation of capital.

Historical capitalism, is, thus, that concrete, time-bounded, space-bounded integrated locus of productive activities within which the endless accumulation of capital has been the economic objective or 'law' that has governed or prevailed in fundamental economic activity. It is that social system in which those who have operated by such rules have had such great impact on the whole as to create conditions wherein the others have been forced to conform to the patterns or to suffer the consequences. It is that social system in which the scope of these rules (the law of value) has grown ever wider, the enforcers of these rules ever more intransigent, the penetration of these rules into the social fabric ever greater, even while

social opposition to these rules has grown ever louder and more organized.

Using this description of what one means by historical capitalism, each of us can determine to which concrete, time-bounded, space-bounded integrated locus this refers. My own view is that the genesis of this historical system is located in late-fifteenth-century Europe, that the system expanded in space over time to cover the entire globe by the late nineteenth century, and that it still today covers the entire globe. I realize that such a cursory delineation of the time-space boundaries evokes doubts in many minds. These doubts are however of two different kinds. First, empirical doubts. Was Russia inside or outside the European world-economy in the sixteenth century? Exactly when was the Ottoman Empire incorporated into the capitalist world-system? Can we consider a given interior zone of a given state at a given time as truly 'integrated' into the capitalist world-economy? These questions are important, both in themselves, and because in attempting to answer them we are forced to make more precise our analyses of the processes of historical capitalism. But this is neither the moment nor place to address these numerous empirical queries that are under continuing debate and elaboration.

The second kind of doubt is that which addresses the very utility of the inductive classification I have just suggested. There are those who refuse to accept that capitalism can ever be said to exist unless there is a specific form of social relation in the workplace, that of a private entrepreneur employing wage-labourers. There are those who wish to say that when a given state has nationalized its industries and proclaimed its allegiance to socialist doctrines, it has, by those acts and as a result of their consequences, ended the participation of that state in the capitalist world-system. These are not empirical

queries but theoretical ones, and we shall try to address them in the course of this discussion. Addressing them deductively would be pointless however as it would lead not to a rational debate, but merely to a clash of opposing faiths. We shall therefore address them heuristically, arguing that our inductive classification is more useful than alternative ones, because it comprehends more easily and elegantly what we collectively know at present about historical reality, and because it affords us an interpretation of this reality which enables us to act more efficaciously on the present.

Let us therefore look at how the capitalist system actually has functioned. To say that a producer's objective is the accumulation of capital is to say that he will seek to produce as much of a given good as possible and offer it for sale at the highest profit margin to him. He will do this however within a series of economic constraints which exist, as we say, 'in the market'. His total production is perforce limited by the (relatively immediate) availability of such things as material inputs, a work-force, customers, and access to cash to expand his investment base. The amount he can profitably produce and the profit margin he can claim is also limited by the ability of his 'competitors' to offer the same item at lower sales prices; not in this case competitors anywhere in the world market, but those located in the same immediate, more circumscribed local markets in which he actually sells (however this market be defined in a given instance). The expansion of his production will also be constrained by the degree to which his expanded production will create such a price-reducing effect in the 'local' market as to actually reduce the real total profit realized on his total production.

These are all objective constraints, meaning they exist in the absence of any particular set of decisions by a given producer

or by others active in the market. These constraints are the consequence of the total social process that exists in a concrete time and place. There are always in addition of course other constraints, more open to manipulation. Governments may adopt, may already have adopted, various rules which in some way transform economic options and therefore the calculus of profit. A given producer may be the beneficiary or the victim of existing rules. A given producer may seek to persuade political authorities to change their rules in his favour.

How have producers operated so as to maximize their ability to accumulate capital? Labour-power has always been a central and quantitatively significant element in the production-process. The producer seeking to accumulate is concerned with two different aspects of labour-power: its availability and its cost. The problem of availability has usually been posed in the following manner: social relations of production that were fixed (a stable work-force for a given producer) might be low-cost if the market were stable and the size of his work-force optimal for a given time. But if the market for the product declined, the fact that the work-force was fixed would increase its real cost for the producer. And should the market for the product increase, the fact that the work-force was fixed would make it impossible for the producer to take advantage of the profit opportunities.

On the other hand, variable work-forces also had disadvantages for the capitalists. Variable work-forces were by definition work-forces that were not necessarily continuously working for the same producer. Such workers must therefore, in terms of survival, have been concerned with their rate of remuneration in terms of a time-span long enough to level out variations in real income. That is, workers had to be able to make enough from the employment to cover periods when

they did not receive remuneration. Consequently, variable work-forces often cost producers more per hour per individual than fixed work-forces.

When we have a contradiction, and we have one here in the very heart of the capitalist production process, we can be sure that the result will be a historically uneasy compromise. Let us review what in fact happened. In historical systems preceding historical capitalism, most (never all) work-forces were fixed. In some cases, the producer's work-force was only himself or his family, hence by definition fixed. In some cases, a non kin-related work-force was bonded to a particular producer through various legal and/or customary regulations (including various forms of slavery, debt bondage, serfdom, permanent tenancy arrangements, etc.). Sometimes the bonding was lifetime. Sometimes it was for limited periods, with an option of renewal; but such time-limitation was only meaningful if realistic alternatives existed at the moment of renewal. Now the fixity of these arrangements posed problems not only for the particular producers to whom a given work-force was bonded. It posed problems to all other producers as well, since obviously other producers could only expand their activities to the extent that there existed available, non-fixed work-forces.

These considerations formed the basis, as has so often been described, of the rise of the institution of wage-labour, wherein a group of persons existed who were permanently available for employment, more or less to the highest bidder. We refer to this process as the operation of a labour market, and to the persons who sell their labour as proletarians. I do not tell you anything novel to say that, in historical capitalism, there has been increasing proletarianization of the work-force. The statement is not only not novel; it is not in the least surprising. The advantages to producers of the process of pro-

letarianization have been amply documented. What is surprising is not that there has been so much proletarianization, but that there has been so little. Four hundred years at least into the existence of a historical social system, the amount of fully proletarianized labour in the capitalist world-economy today cannot be said to total even fifty per cent.

To be sure this statistic is a function of how you measure it and whom you are measuring. If we use official government statistics on the so-called economically active labour-force, primarily adult males who make themselves formally available for remunerated labour, we may find that the percentage of wage-workers is said today to be reasonably high (although even then, when calculated world-wide, the actual percentage is smaller than most theoretical statements presume). If however we consider all persons whose work is incorporated in one way or another into the commodity chains—thus embracing virtually all adult women, and a very large proportion of persons at the pre-adult and post-prime adulthood age range (that is, the young and the old) as well—then our percentage of proletarians drastically drops.

Let us furthermore take one additional step before we do our measuring. Is it conceptually useful to apply the label 'proletarian' to an individual? I doubt it. Under historical capitalism, as under previous historical systems, individuals have tended to live their lives within the framework of relatively stable structures which share a common fund of current income and accumulated capital, which we may call households. The fact that the boundaries of these households are constantly changing by the entries and exits of individuals does not make these households less the unit of rational calculation in terms of remuneration and expenditure. People who wish to survive count all their potential income, from no mat-

ter what source, and assess it in terms of the real expenditures they must make. They seek minimally to survive; then with more income, to enjoy a life-style which they find satisfying; and ultimately, with still more, to enter the capitalist game as accumulators of capital. For all real purposes, it is the household that has been the economic unit that has engaged in these activities. This household has usually been a kin-related unit, but sometimes not or, at least, not exclusively. This household has for the most part been co-residential, but less so as commodification proceeded.

It is in the context of such a household structure that a social distinction between productive and unproductive work began to be imposed on the working classes. De facto, productive work came to be defined as money-earning work (primarily wage-earning work), and non-productive work as work that, albeit very necessary, was merely 'subsistence' activity and therefore was said to produce no 'surplus' which anyone else could possibly appropriate. This work was either totally non-commodified or involved petty (but then truly petty) commodity production. The differentiation between kinds of work was anchored by creating specific roles attached to them. Productive (wage) labour became the task primarily of the adult male/father and secondarily of other (younger) adult males in the household. Non-productive (subsistence) labour became the task primarily of the adult female/mother and secondarily of other females, plus the children and the elderly. Productive labour was done outside the household in the 'work place'. Non-productive labour was done inside the household.

The lines of division were not absolute, to be sure, but they became under historical capitalism quite clear and compelling.

A division of real labour by gender and age was not of course an invention of historical capitalism. It has probably always existed, if only because for some tasks there are biological prerequisites and limitations (of gender, but also of age). Nor was a hierarchical family and/or household structure an invention of capitalism. That too had long existed.

What was new under historical capitalism was the correlation of division of labour and valuation of work. Men may often have done different work from women (and adults different work from children and the elderly), but under historical capitalism there has been a steady devaluation of the work of women (and of the young and old), and a corresponding emphasis on the value of the adult male's work. Whereas in other systems men and women did specified (but normally equal) tasks, under historical capitalism the adult male wage-earner was classified as the 'breadwinner', and the adult female home-worker as the 'housewife.' Thus when national statistics began to be compiled, itself a product of a capitalist system, all breadwinners were considered members of the economically active labour-force, but no housewives were. Thus was sexism institutionalized. The legal and paralegal apparatus of gender distinction and discrimination followed quite logically in the wake of this basic differential valuation of labour.

We may note here that the concepts of extended childhood/adolescence and of a 'retirement' from the work-force not linked to illness or frailty have been also specific concomitants of the emerging household structures of historical capitalism. They have often been viewed as 'progressive' exemptions from work. They may however be more accurately viewed as redefinitions of work as non-work. Insult has been

added to injury by labelling children's training activities and the miscellaneous tasks of retired adults as somehow 'fun', and the devaluation of their work contributions as the reasonable counterpart of their release from the 'drudgery' of 'real' work.

As an ideology, these distinctions helped ensure that the commodification of labour was extensive but at the same time limited. For example, if we were to calculate how many households in the world-economy have obtained more than fifty per cent of their real income (or total revenue in all forms) from wage-work outside the household, I think we would be quickly amazed by the lowness of the percentage; this is the case not only in earlier centuries but even today, although the percentage has probably been steadily growing over the historical development of the capitalist world-economy.

How can we account for this? I don't think it's very difficult. On the assumption that a producer employing wage-labour would prefer to pay less rather than more, always and everywhere, the lowness of the level at which wage-workers could afford to accept employment has been a function of the kind of households in which the wage-workers have been located throughout their life-spans. Put very simply, for identical work at identical levels of efficiency, the wage-worker located in a household with a high percentage of wage income (let us call this a proletarian household) had had a higher monetary threshold below which he would have found it manifestly irrational for him to do wage work than a wage-worker located in a household that has a low percentage of wage income (let us call this a semi-proletarian household).

The reason for this difference of what we might call the minimum-acceptable-wage threshold has to do with the eco-

nomics of survival. Where a proletarian household depended primarily upon wage-income, then that had to cover the minimal costs of survival and reproduction. However, when wages formed a less important segment of total household income, it would often be rational for an individual to accept employment at a rate of remuneration which contributed less than its proportionate share (in terms of hours worked) of real income—whilst nevertheless resulting in the earning of necessary liquid cash (the necessity frequently being legally imposed)—or else involved the substitution of this wage-remunerated work for labour in still less remunerative tasks.

What happened then in such semi-proletarian households is that those who were producing other forms of real income—that is, basically household production for self-consumption, or sale in a local market, or of course both—whether these were other persons in the household (of any sex or age) or the same person at other moments of his life-span, were creating surpluses which lowered the minimum-acceptable-wage threshold. In this way, non-wage work permitted some producers to remunerate their work-force at lower rates, thereby reducing their cost of production and increasing their profit margins. No wonder then, as a general rule, that any employer of wage-labour would prefer to have his wage-workers located in semi-proletarian rather than in proletarian households. If we now look at global empirical reality throughout the time-space of historical capitalism, we suddenly discover that the location of wage-workers in semi-proletarian rather than in proletarian households has been the statistical norm. Intellectually, our problem suddenly gets turned upside down. From explaining the reasons for the existence of proletarianization, we have moved to explaining why the process was so incomplete. We now have to go even further—

why has proletarianization proceeded at all?

Let me say immediately that it is very doubtful that increasing world proletarianization can be attributed primarily to the socio-political pressures of entrepreneurial strata. Quite the contrary. It would seem they have had many motives to drag their feet. First of all, as we have just argued, the transformation of a significant number of semi-proletarian households into proletarian households in a given zone tended to raise the real minimum-wage-level, paid by the employers of wage-labour. Secondly, increased proletarianization had political consequences, as we shall discuss later, which were both negative for the employers and also cumulative, thereby eventually increasing still further the levels of wage-payments in given geographico-economic zones. Indeed, so much were employers of wage-labour unenthusiastic about proletarianization that, in addition to fostering the gender/age division of labour, they also encouraged, in their employment patterns and through their influence in the political arena, recognition of defined ethnic groups, seeking to link them to specific allocated roles in the labour-force, with different levels of real remuneration for their work. Ethnicity created a cultural crust which consolidated the patterns of semi-proletarian household structures. That the emergence of such ethnicity also played a politically-divisive role for the working classes has been a political bonus for the employers but not, I think, the prime mover in this process.

Before however we can understand how there has come to be any increase at all in proletarianization over time in historical capitalism, we have to return to the issue of the commodity chains in which the multiple specific production activities are located. We must rid ourselves of the simplistic

image that the 'market' is a place where initial producer and ultimate consumer meet. No doubt there are and always have been such market-places. But in historical capitalism, such market-place transactions have constituted a small percentage of the whole. Most transactions have involved exchange between two intermediate producers located on a long commodity chain. The purchaser was purchasing an 'input' for his production process. The seller was selling a 'semi-finished product', semi-finished that is in terms of its ultimate use in direct individual consumption.

The struggle over price in these 'intermediate markets' represented an effort by the buyer to wrest from the seller a proportion of the profit realized from all prior labour processes throughout the commodity chain. This struggle to be sure was determined at particular space-time nexuses by supply and demand, but never uniquely. In the first place, of course, supply and demand can be manipulated through monopolistic constraints, which have been commonplace rather than exceptional. Secondly, the seller can affect the price at the nexus through vertical integration. Whenever the 'seller' and the 'buyer' were in fact ultimately the same firm, the price could be arbitrarily juggled in terms of fiscal and other considerations, but such a price never represented the interplay of supply and demand. Vertical integration, just like the 'horizontal' monopoly, has not been rare. We are of course familiar with its most spectacular instances: the chartered companies of the sixteenth to eighteenth centuries, the great merchant houses of the nineteenth, the transnational corporations of the twentieth. These were global structures seeking to encompass as many links in a particular commodity chain as possible. But smaller instances of vertical integration, covering only a few

(even two) links in a chain, have been even more widespread. It seems reasonable to argue that vertical integration has been the statistical norm of historical capitalism rather than those 'market' nexuses in commodity chains in which seller and buyer were truly distinct and antagonistic.

Now commodity chains have not been random in their geographical directions. Were they all plotted on maps, we would notice that they have been centripetal in form. Their points of origin have been manifold, but their points of destination have tended to converge in a few areas. That is to say, they have tended to move from the peripheries of the capitalist world-economy to the centres or cores. It is hard to contest this as an empirical observation. The real question is why this has been so. To talk of commodity chains means to talk of an extended social division of labour which, in the course of capitalism's historical development, has become more and more functionally and geographically extensive, and simultaneously more and more hierarchical. This hierarchization of space in the structure of productive processes has led to an ever greater polarization between the core and peripheral zones of the world-economy, not only in terms of distributive criteria (real income levels, quality of life) but even more importantly in the loci of the accumulation of capital.

Initially, as this process began, the spatial differentials were rather small, and the degree of spatial specialization limited. Within the capitalist system, however, whatever differentials existed (whether for ecological or historical reasons) were exaggerated, reinforced, and encrusted. What was crucial in this process was the intrusion of force into the determination of price. To be sure, the use of force by one party in a market transaction in order to improve his price was no invention of

capitalism. Unequal exchange is an ancient practice. What was remarkable about capitalism as a historical system was the way in which this unequal exchange could be hidden; indeed, hidden so well that it is only after five hundred years of the operation of this mechanism that even the avowed opponents of the system have begun to unveil it systematically.

The key to hiding this central mechanism lay in the very structure of the capitalist world-economy, the seeming separation in the capitalist world-system of the economic arena (a world-wide social division of labour with integrated production processes all operating for the endless accumulation of capital) and the political arena (consisting ostensibly of separate sovereign states, each with autonomous responsibility for political decisions within its jurisdiction, and each disposing of armed forces to sustain its authority). In the real world of historical capitalism, almost all commodity chains of any importance have traversed these state frontiers. This is not a recent innovation. It has been true from the very beginning of historical capitalism. Moreover, the transnationality of commodity chains is as descriptively true of the sixteenth-century capitalist world as of the twentieth-century.

How did this unequal exchange work? Starting with any real differential in the market, occurring because of either the (temporary) scarcity of a complex production process, or artificial scarcities created *manu militari*, commodities moved between zones in such a way that the area with the less 'scarce' item 'sold' its items to the other area at a price that incarnated more real input (cost) than an equally-priced item moving in the opposite direction. What really happened is that there was a transfer of part of the total profit (or surplus) being produced from one zone to another. Such a relationship is that of core-

ness-peripherality. By extension, we can call the losing zone a 'periphery' and the gaining zone a 'core'. These names in fact reflect the geographical structure of the economic flows.

We find immediately several mechanisms that historically have increased the disparity. Whenever a 'vertical integration' of any two links on a commodity chain occurred, it was possible to shift an even larger segment of the total surplus towards the core than had previously been possible. Also, the shift of surplus towards the core concentrated capital there and made available disproportionate funds for further mechanization, both allowing producers in core zones to gain additional competitive advantages in existing products and permitting them to create ever new rare products with which to renew the process.

The concentration of capital in core zones created both the fiscal base and the political motivation to create relatively strong state-machineries, among whose many capacities was that of ensuring that the state machineries of peripheral zones became or remained relatively weaker. They could thereby pressure these state-structures to accept, even promote, greater specialization in their jurisdiction in tasks lower down the hierarchy of commodity chains, utilizing lower-paid work-forces and creating (reinforcing) the relevant household structures to permit such work-forces to survive. Thus did historical capitalism actually create the so-called historical levels of wages which have become so dramatically divergent in different zones of the world-system.

We say this process is hidden. By that we mean that actual prices always seemed to be negotiated in a world market on the basis of impersonal economic forces. The enormous apparatus of latent force (openly used sporadically in wars and

colonization) has not had to be invoked in each separate transaction to ensure that the exchange was unequal. Rather, the apparatus of force came into play only when there were significant challenges to an existing level of unequal exchange. Once the acute political conflict was past, the world's entrepreneurial classes could pretend that the economy was operating solely by considerations of supply and demand, without acknowledging how the world-economy had historically arrived at a particular point of supply and demand, and what structures of force were sustaining at that very moment the 'customary' differentials in levels of wages and of the real quality of life of the world's work-forces.

We may now return to the question of why there has been any proletarianization at all. Let us remember the fundamental contradiction between the individual interest of each entrepreneur and the collective interest of all capitalist classes. Unequal exchange by definition served these collective interests but not many individual interests. It follows that those whose interests were not immediately served at any given time (because they gained less than their competitors) constantly tried to alter things in their favour. They tried, that is, to compete more successfully in the market, either by making their own production more efficient, or by using political influence to create a new monopolistic advantage for themselves.

Acute competition among capitalists has always been one of the *differentia specifica* of historical capitalism. Even when it seemed to be voluntarily restrained (by cartel-like arrangements), this was primarily because each competitor thought that such restraint optimized his own margins. In a system predicated on the endless accumulation of capital, no participant could afford to drop this enduring thrust towards long-

run profitability except at the risk of self-destruction.

Thus monopolistic practice and competitive motivation have been a paired reality of historical capitalism. In such circumstances, it is evident that no specific pattern linking the productive processes could be stable. Quite the contrary: it would always be in the interests of a large number of competing entrepreneurs to try to alter the specific pattern of given time-places without short-term concern for the global impact of such behaviour. Adam Smith's 'unseen hand' unquestionably operated, in the sense that the 'market' set constraints on individual behaviour, but it would be a very curious reading of historical capitalism that suggested that the outcome has been harmony.

Rather, the outcome has seemed, once again as an empirical observation, to be an alternating cycle of expansions and stagnations in the system as a whole. These cycles have involved fluctuations of such significance and regularity that it is hard not to believe that they are intrinsic to the workings of the system. They seem, if the analogy be permitted, to be the breathing mechanism of the capitalist organism, inhaling the purifying oxygen and exhaling poisonous waste. Analogies are always dangerous but this one seems particularly apt. The wastes that accumulated were the economic inefficiencies that recurrently got politically encrusted through the process of unequal exchange described above. The purifying oxygen was the more efficient allocation of resources (more efficient in terms of permitting further accumulation of capital) which the regular restructuring of the commodity chains permitted.

What seems to have happened every fifty years or so is that in the efforts of more and more entrepreneurs to gain for themselves the more profitable nexuses of commodity chains,

disproportions of investment occurred such that we speak, somewhat misleadingly, of overproduction. The only solution to these disproportions has been a shakedown of the productive system, resulting in a more even distribution. This sounds logical and simple, but its fall-out has always been massive. It has meant each time further concentration of operations in those links in the commodity chains which have been most clogged. This has involved the elimination of both some entrepreneurs and some workers (those who worked for entrepreneurs who went out of business and also those who worked for others who further mechanized in order to reduce the costs of unit production). Such a shift also enabled entrepreneurs to 'demote' operations in the hierarchy of the commodity chain, thereby enabling them to devote investment funds and effort to innovative links in the commodity chains which, because initially offering 'scarcer' inputs, were more profitable. 'Demotion' of particular processes on the hierarchical scale also often led to geographical relocation in part. Such geographical relocation found a major attraction in the move to a lower labour-cost area, though from the point of view of the area into which the industry has moved the new industry usually involved an increase in the wage-level for some segments of the work-force. We are living through precisely such a massive world-wide relocation right now of the world's automobile, steel, and electronics industries. This phenomenon of relocation has been part and parcel of historical capitalism from the outset.

There have been three major consequences of these reshuffles. One is the constant geographical restructuring itself of the capitalist world-system. Nonetheless, although commodity chains have been significantly restructured every fifty

years or so, a system of hierarchically-organized commodity chains has been retained. Particular production processes have moved down the hierarchy, as new ones are inserted at the top. And particular geographic zones have housed ever-shifting hierarchical levels of processes. Thus, given products have had 'product cycles', starting off as core products and eventually becoming peripheral products. Furthermore, given loci have moved up or down, in terms of comparative well-being of their inhabitants. But to call such reshuffles 'development', we would first have to demonstrate a reduction of the global polarization of the system. Empirically, this simply does not seem to have happened; rather polarization has historically increased. These geographical and product relocations then may be said to have been truly cyclical.

However, there was a second, quite different consequence of the reshufflings. Our misleading word, 'overproduction', does call attention to the fact that the immediate dilemma has always operated through the absence of sufficient worldwide effective demand for some key products of the system. It is in this situation that the interests of the work-forces coincided with the interests of a minority of entrepreneurs. Work-forces have always sought to increase their share of the surplus, and moments of economic breakdown of the system have often provided both extra immediate incentive and some extra opportunity to pursue their class struggles. One of the most effective and immediate ways for work-forces to increase real income has been the further commodification of their own labour. They have often sought to substitute wage-labour for those parts of the household production processes which have brought in low amounts of real income, in particular for various kinds of petty commodity production. One of the major forces behind proletarianization has been the world's work-forces themselves. They have understood, often better

than their self-proclaimed intellectual spokesmen, how much greater the exploitation is in semi-proletarian than in more fully-proletarianized households.

It is at moments of stagnation that some owner-producers, in part responding to political pressure from the work-forces, in part believing that structural changes in the relations of production would benefit them vis-à-vis competing owner producers, have joined forces, both in the production and political arenas, to push for the further proletarianization of a limited segment of the work-force, somewhere. It is this process which gives us the major clue as to why there has been any increase in proletarianization at all, given that proletarianization has in the long term led to reduced profit levels in the capitalist world-economy.

It is in this context that we should consider the process of technological change which has been less the motor than the consequence of historical capitalism. Each major technological 'innovation' has been primarily the creation of new 'scarce' products, as such highly profitable, and secondarily of labour-reducing processes. They were responses to the downturns in the cycles, ways of appropriating the 'inventions' to further the process of capital accumulation. These innovations no doubt frequently affected the actual organization of production. They pushed historically towards the centralization of many work processes (the factory, the assembly line). But it is easy to exaggerate how much change there has been. Processes of concentration of physical production tasks have frequently been investigated without regard to counteracting decentralization processes.

This is especially true if we put into the picture the third consequence of the cyclical reshuffling. Notice that, given the two consequences already mentioned, we have a seeming paradox to explain. On the one hand, we spoke of the continuous

concentration of capital accumulation in historical polarization of distribution. Simultaneously, however, we spoke of a slow, but nonetheless steady, process of proletarianization which, we argued, actually has reduced profit levels. One easy resolution would be to say the first process is simply greater than the second, which is true. But in addition the decrease in profit levels occasioned by increased proletarianization has hitherto been more than compensated by a further mechanism moving in the opposite direction.

Another easy empirical observation to make about historical capitalism is that its geographical situs has grown steadily larger over time. Once again, the pace of the process offers the best clue to its explanation. The incorporation of new zones into the social division of labour of historical capitalism did not occur all at once. It in fact occurred in periodic spurts, although each successive expansion seemed to be limited in scope. Undoubtedly part of the explanation lies in the very technological development of historical capitalism itself. Improvements in transport, communications, and armaments made it steadily less expensive to incorporate regions further and further from the core zones. But this explanation at best gives us a necessary but not sufficient condition for the process.

It has sometimes been asserted that the explanation lies in the constant search for new markets in which to realize the profits of capitalist production. This explanation however simply does not accord with the historical facts. Areas external to historical capitalism have on the whole been reluctant purchasers of its products, in part because they didn't 'need' them in terms of their own economic system and in part because they often lacked the relevant wherewithal to purchase them. To be sure there were exceptions. But by and large it was the

capitalist world that sought out the products of the external arena and not the other way around. Whenever particular loci were militarily conquered, capitalist entrepreneurs regularly complained of the absence of real markets there and operated through colonial governments to 'create tastes'.

The search for markets as an explanation simply does not hold. A much more plausible explanation is the search for low-cost labour forces. It is historically the case that virtually every new zone incorporated into the world-economy established levels of real remuneration which were at the bottom of the world-system's hierarchy of wage-levels. They had virtually no fully proletarian households and were not at all encouraged to develop them. On the contrary, the policies of the colonial states (and of the restructured semi-colonial states in those incorporated zones that were not formally colonized) seemed designed precisely to promote the emergence of the very semi-proletarian household which, as we have seen, made possible the lowest possible wage-level threshold. Typical state policies involved combining taxation mechanisms, which forced every household to engage in some wage-labour, with restrictions on movement or forced separation of household members, which reduced considerably the possibility of full proletarianization.

If we add to this analysis the observation that new incorporations into the world-system of capitalism tended to correlate with phases of stagnation in the world-economy, it becomes clear that geographical expansion of the world-system served to counterbalance the profit-reducing process of increased proletarianization, by incorporating new workforces destined to be semi-proletarianized. The seeming paradox has disappeared. The impact of proletarianization on the process of polarization has been matched, perhaps more

than matched, at least hitherto, by the impact of incorporations. And factory-like work processes as a percentage of the whole have expanded less than is usually asserted, given the steadily expanding denominator of the equation.

We have spent much time on delineating how historical capitalism has operated in the narrowly economic arena. We are now ready to explain why capitalism emerged as a historical social system. This is not as easy as is often thought. On the face of it, far from being a 'natural' system, as some apologists have tried to argue, historical capitalism is a patently absurd one. One accumulates capital in order to accumulate more capital. Capitalists are like white mice on a treadmill, running ever faster in order to run still faster. In the process, no doubt, some people live well, but others live miserably; and how well, and for how long, do those who live well live?

The more I have reflected upon it the more absurd it has seemed to me. Not only do I believe that the vast majority of the populations of the world are objectively and subjectively less well-off materially than in previous historical systems but, as we shall see, I think it can be argued that they have been politically less well off also. So imbued are we all by the self-justifying ideology of progress which this historical system has fashioned, that we find it difficult even to recognize the vast historical negatives of this system. Even so stalwart a denouncer of historical capitalism as Karl Marx laid great emphasis on its historically progressive role. I do not believe this at all, unless by 'progressive' one simply means that which is historically later and whose origins can be explained by something that preceded it. The balance-sheet of historical capitalism, to which I shall return, is perhaps complex, but the initial calculus in terms of material distribution of goods and allocation of energies is in my view very negative indeed.

If this is so, why did such a system arise? Perhaps, precisely

to achieve this end. What could be more plausible than a line of reasoning which argues that the explanation of the origin of a system was to achieve an end that has in fact been achieved? I know that modern science has turned us from the search for final causes and from all considerations of intentionality (especially since they are so inherently difficult to demonstrate empirically). But modern science and historical capitalism have been in close alliance as we know; thus, we must suspect the authority of science on precisely this question: the modality of knowing the origins of modern capitalism. Let me therefore simply outline a historical explanation of the origins of historical capitalism without attempting to develop here the empirical base for such an argument.

In the world of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, Europe was the locus of a social division of labour which, in comparison with other areas of the world, was, in terms of the forces of production, the cohesion of its historical system, and its relative state of human knowledge, an in-between zone—neither as advanced as some areas nor as primitive as others. Marco Polo, we must remember, coming from one of the most culturally and economically ‘advanced’ subregions of Europe, was quite overwhelmed with what he encountered on his Asian voyages.

The economic arena of feudal Europe was going through a very fundamental, internally generated, crisis in this period that was shaking its social foundations. Its ruling classes were destroying each other at a great rate, while its land-system (the basis of its economic structure) was coming loose, with considerable reorganization moving in the direction of a far more egalitarian distribution than had been the norm. Furthermore, small peasant farmers were demonstrating great efficiency as producers. The political structures were in general getting weaker and their preoccupation with the internecine

struggles of the politically powerful meant that little time was left for repressing the growing strength of the masses of the population. The ideological cement of Catholicism was under great strain and egalitarian movements were being born in the very bosom of the Church. Things were indeed falling apart. Had Europe continued on the path along which it was going, it is difficult to believe that the patterns of medieval feudal Europe with its highly structured system of 'orders' could have been reconsolidated. Far more probable is that the European feudal social structure would have evolved towards a system of relatively equal small-scale producers, further flattening out the aristocracies and decentralizing the political structures.

Whether this would have been good or bad, and for whom, is a matter of speculation and of little interest. But it is clear that the prospect must have appalled Europe's upper strata—appalled and frightened them, especially as they felt their ideological armour was disintegrating too. Without suggesting that anyone consciously verbalized any such attempt, we can see by comparing the Europe of 1650 with 1450 that the following things had occurred. By 1650, the basic structures of historical capitalism as a viable social system had been established and consolidated. The trend towards egalitarianization of reward had been drastically reversed. The upper strata were once again in firm control politically and ideologically. There was a reasonably high level of continuity between the families that had been high strata in 1450 and those that were high strata in 1650. Furthermore, if one substituted 1900 for 1650, one would find that most of the comparisons with 1450 still hold true. It is only in the twentieth century that there are some significant trends in a different direction, a sign as we shall see that the historical system of capitalism has,

after four to five hundred years of flourishing, finally come into structural crisis.

No one may have verbalized the intent, but it certainly seems to have been the case that the creation of historical capitalism as a social system dramatically reversed a trend that the upper strata feared, and established in its place one that served their interests even better. Is that so absurd? Only to those who were its victims.

2.
The Politics
of Accumulation:
Struggle for Benefits

The endless accumulation of capital for its own sake may seem *prima facie* to be a socially absurd objective. It has had however its defenders, who usually justified it by the long-term social benefits in which it purported to result. We shall discuss later the degree to which these social benefits are real. Quite aside however from any collective benefits it is clear that the amassing of capital affords the opportunity and the occasion for much increased consumption by many individuals (and/or small groups). Whether increased consumption actually improves the quality of life of the consumers is another question and one we shall also postpone.

The first question we shall address is: who gets the immediate individual benefits? It seems reasonable to assert that most people have not waited upon evaluations of *long-term* benefits or the quality of life resulting from such consumption (either for the collectivity or for the individuals) to decide that it is worthwhile to struggle for the immediate individual benefits that were so obviously available. Indeed this has been the central focus of political struggle within historical capitalism. This is in fact what we mean when we say that historical capitalism is a materialist civilization.

In material terms, not only have the rewards been great to those who have come out ahead, but the differentials in material rewards between the top and the bottom have been

great and growing greater over time in the world-system taken as a whole. We have already discussed the economic processes that accounted for this polarization of distribution of reward. We should now turn our attention to how people have manoeuvred within such an economic system to get the advantages for themselves and thereby deny them to others. We should also look at how those who were the victims of such maldistribution manoeuvred, first of all to minimize their losses in the operation of the system, and secondly to transform this system which was responsible for such manifest injustices.

How in historical capitalism did people, groups of people, conduct their political struggles? Politics is about changing power relations in a direction more favourable to one's interests and thereby redirecting social processes. Its successful pursuit requires finding levers of change that permit the most advantage for the least input. The structure of historical capitalism has been such that the most effective levers of political adjustment were the state-structures, whose very construction was itself, as we have seen, one of the central institutional achievements of historical capitalism. It is thus no accident that the control of state power, the conquest of state power if necessary, has been the central strategic objective of all the major actors in the political arena throughout the history of modern capitalism.

The crucial importance of state power for economic processes, even if defined very narrowly is striking the moment one looks closely at how the system actually operated. The first and most elementary element of state power was territorial jurisdiction. States had boundaries. These boundaries were juridically determined, partly by statutory proclamation

on the part of the state in question, partly by diplomatic recognition on the part of other states. To be sure, boundaries could be, and regularly were, contested; that is, the juridical recognitions coming from the two sources (the state itself and other states) were conflicting. Such differences were ultimately resolved either by adjudication or by force (and a resulting eventual acquiescence). Many disputes endured a latent form for very long periods, though very few such disputes survived more than a generation. What is crucial was the continuing ideological presumption on everyone's part that such disputes could and would be resolved eventually. What was conceptually impermissible in the modern state-system was an explicit recognition of permanent overlapping jurisdictions. Sovereignty as a concept was based on the Aristotelian law of the excluded middle.

This philosophical-juridical doctrine made it possible to fix responsibility for the control of movement across frontiers, in and out of given states. Each state had formal jurisdiction over its own frontiers of the movement of goods, money-capital, and labour-power. Hence each state could affect to some degree the modalities by which the social division of labour of the capitalist world-economy operated. Furthermore, each state could constantly adjust these mechanisms simply by changing the rules governing the flow of the factors of production across its own frontiers.

We normally discuss such frontier controls in terms of the antinomy between total absence of controls (free trade) and total absence of free movement (autarky). In fact, for most countries and for most moments of time, state policy has lain in practice between these two extremes. Furthermore, the policies have been quite specifically different for the movement

of goods, of money-capital, and of labour-power. In general, the movement of labour-power has been more restricted than the movement of goods and of money-capital.

From the point of view of a given producer located somewhere on a commodity chain, freedom of movement was desirable whilst this producer was economically competitive with other producers of the same goods in the world market. But when this was not the case, various boundary constraints against rival producers could raise the latter's costs and benefit an otherwise less efficient producer. Since, by definition, in a market in which there were multiple producers of any given good, a majority would be less efficient than a minority, there has existed a constant pressure for mercantilist constraints on free movement across frontiers. Since however the minority who were more efficient were relatively wealthy and powerful, there has been a constant counter-pressure to open frontiers, or more specifically, to open some frontiers. Hence the first great struggle—a ferocious and continuing one—has been over the frontier policy of states. Since furthermore any given set of producers (but particularly big and powerful ones) were directly affected by the state frontier policies of not only the states in which their economic base was physically located (which may or may not have been the ones of which they were citizens) but also those of many other states, given economic producers have been interested in pursuing political objectives simultaneously in several, indeed often in very many, states. The concept that one ought to restrict one's political involvement to one's own state was deeply antithetical to those who were pursuing the accumulation of capital for its own sake.

One way, of course, to affect the rules about what may or may not cross frontiers, and under what terms, was to change

the actual frontiers—through total incorporation by one state of another (unification, *Anschluss*, colonization), through seizure of some territory, through secession or decolonization. The fact that frontier changes have had immediate impacts on the patterns of the social division of labour in the world-economy has been central to the considerations of all those who favoured or opposed particular frontier changes. The fact that ideological mobilizations around the definition of nations could make more, or less, possible certain specific frontier changes has given immediate economic content to nationalist movements, insofar as participants and others presumed the likelihood of specific state policies following upon the projected frontier changes.

The second element of state power of fundamental concern to the operations of historical capitalism was the legal right of states to determine the rules governing the social relations of production within their territorial jurisdiction. Modern state-structures arrogated to themselves this right to revoke or amend any customary set of relations. As a matter of law the states recognized no constraints on their legislative scope other than those that were self-imposed. Even where particular state constitutions paid ideological lip service to constraints deriving from religious or natural law doctrines, they reserved to some constitutionally-defined body or person the right to interpret these doctrines.

This right to legislate the modes of labour control was by no means merely theoretical. States have regularly used these rights, often in ways that involved radical transformations of existing patterns. As we would expect, in historical capitalism, states have legislated in ways that increased the commodification of labour power, by abolishing various kinds of customary constraint on the movement of workers from one

kind of employment to another. They furthermore imposed on the work-force fiscal cash obligations which often forced certain workers to engage in wage-labour. But, on the other hand, as we have already seen, the states by their legal actions often also discouraged full-fledged proletarianization by imposing residential limitations or insisting that the kin group retain certain kinds of welfare obligations to its members.

The states controlled the relations of production. They first legalized, later outlawed, particular forms of coerced labour (slavery, public labour obligations, indenture, etc.). They created rules governing wage-labour contracts, including guarantees of the contract, and minimum and maximum reciprocal obligations. They decreed the limits of the geographical mobility of the labour force, not only across their frontiers but within them.

All these state decisions were taken with direct reference to the economic implications for the accumulation of capital. This can be easily verified by going through the enormous number of debates, recorded as they occurred, over alternative statutory or administrative choices. Furthermore, the states have regularly spent considerable energy in enforcing their regulations against recalcitrant groups, most particularly recalcitrant work-forces. Workers were seldom left free to ignore legal constraints on their actions. Quite the contrary—worker rebellion, individual or collective, passive or active, has usually brought forth a ready repressive response from the state-machineries. To be sure, organized working-class movements were able, in time, to set certain limitations to repressive activity, as well as ensure that the governing rules were modified somewhat in their favour, but such movements obtained these results largely by their ability to affect the political composition of the state-machineries.

A third element in the power of the states has been the power to tax. Taxation was by no means an invention of historical capitalism; previous political structures also used taxation as a source of revenue for the state-machineries. But historical capitalism transformed taxation in two ways. Taxation became the main (indeed overwhelming) regular source of state revenue, as opposed to state revenue deriving from irregular requisition by force from persons inside or outside the formal jurisdiction of the state (including requisition from other states). Secondly, taxation has been a steadily expanding phenomenon over the historical development of the capitalist world-economy as a percentage of total value created or accumulated. This has meant that the states have been important in terms of the resources they controlled, because the resources not only permitted them to further the accumulation of capital but were also themselves distributed and thereby entered directly or indirectly into the further accumulation of capital.

Taxation was a power which focused hostility and resistance upon the state-structure itself, as a sort of disincarnated villain, which was seen as appropriating the fruits of the labours of others. What must always be borne in mind is that there were forces outside the government pushing for particular taxations because the process would either result in direct redistribution to them, or permit the government to create external economies which would improve their economic position, or penalize others in ways that would be economically favourable to the first group. In short, the power to tax was one of the most immediate ways in which the state directly assisted the process of the accumulation of capital in favour of some groups rather than others.

The redistributive powers of the state have been discussed for the most part only in terms of their equalization potential.

This is the theme of the welfare state. But redistribution has in fact been far more widely used as a mechanism to polarize distribution than to make real incomes converge. There are three main mechanisms that have increased the polarization of rewards *over and above* that polarization already resulting from the ongoing operations of the capitalist market.

Governments first of all have been able to amass, through the taxation process, large sums of capital which they have redistributed to persons or groups, already large holders of capital, through official subsidies. These subsidies have taken the form of outright grants, usually on thin excuses of public service (involving essentially overpayments for services). But they have also taken the less direct form of the state bearing the costs of product development which could presumably be amortized by later profitable sales, only to turn over the economic activity to non-governmental entrepreneurs at nominal cost at precisely the point of completion of the costly developmental phase.

Secondly, governments have been able to amass large sums of capital through formally legal and often legitimated channels of taxation which have then becoming sitting ducks for large-scale illegitimate but *de facto* unconstrained abscondings of public funds. Such theft of public revenues as well as the correlate corrupt private taxation procedures have been a major source of private accumulation of capital throughout historical capitalism.

Finally, governments have redistributed to the wealthy by utilizing the principle of the individualization of profit but the socialization of risk. Over the whole history of the capitalist system, the larger the risk—and the losses—the more likely it has been for governments to step in to prevent bankruptcies

and even to restitute losses if only because of the financial turmoil they wished to avoid.

While these practices of anti-egalitarian redistribution have been the shameful side of state power (shameful in the sense that governments were somewhat embarrassed about these activities and sought to keep them hidden), the provision of social overhead capital by governments has been openly flaunted, and indeed advocated as an essential role of the state in the maintenance of historical capitalism.

Expenditures crucial to the reduction of costs of multiple groups of owner-producers—that is, the basic energy, transport, and informational infrastructure of the world-economy—have largely been developed and supported by public funds. While it has no doubt been the case that most persons have derived *some* benefit from such social overhead capital, it has not been the case that all have derived equal benefit. The advantage has accrued disproportionately to those already large holders of capital while being paid out of a far more egalitarian system of taxation. Hence social overhead capital construction has served to further the accumulation of capital and its concentration.

Finally, states have monopolized, or sought to monopolize, armed force. While police forces were geared largely to the maintenance of internal order (that is, the acceptance by the work force of their allotted roles and rewards), armies have been mechanisms whereby producers in one state have been able to affect directly the possibilities that their competitors located in other states have had to invoke the protective covering of their own state-machineries. This is fact brings us to the last feature of state power which has been crucial. While the kinds of power each state has exercised have been similar, the

degree of power given state-machineries have had has varied enormously. States have been located in a hierarchy of effective power which can be measured neither by the size and coherence of their bureaucracies and armies nor by their ideological formulations about themselves but by their effective capacities over time to further the concentration of accumulated capital within their frontiers as against those rival states. This effective capacity has involved the ability to constrain hostile military forces; the ability to enact advantageous regulations at home and to prevent other states from doing the same; and the ability to constrain their own work forces and to undermine the capacity of rivals to do as well. The true measurement of their strength is in the medium-term economic outcome. The overt use of force by the state-machinery to control the internal work force, a costly and destabilizing technique, is more often the sign of its weakness than its strength. Truly strong state-machineries have been able, by one means or another, to control their work-forces by subtler mechanisms.

Thus there are many different ways in which the state has been a crucial mechanism for the maximal accumulation of capital. According to its ideology, capitalism was supposed to involve the activity of private entrepreneurs freed from the interference of state-machineries. In practice, however, this has never been really true anywhere. It is idle to speculate whether capitalism could have flourished without the active role of the modern state. In historical capitalism, capitalists relied upon their ability to utilize state-machineries to their advantage in the various ways we have outlined.

A second ideological myth has been that of state sovereignty. The modern state was never a completely autonomous political entity. The states developed and were shaped as in-

tegral parts of an interstate system, which was a set of rules within which the states had to operate and a set of legitimizations without which states could not survive. From the point of view of the state-machineries of any given state, the interstate system represented constraints on its will. These were to be found in the practices of diplomacy, in the formal rules governing jurisdictions and contracts (international law), and in the limits on how and under what circumstances warfare might be conducted. All of these constraints ran counter to the official ideology of sovereignty. Sovereignty however was never really intended to mean total autonomy. The concept was rather meant to indicate that there existed limits on the legitimacy of interference by one state-machinery in the operations of another.

The rules of the interstate system were of course not enforced by consent or consensus, but by the willingness and the ability of the stronger states to impose these restrictions, first upon the weaker states, and second upon each other. The states, remember, were located in a hierarchy of power. The very existence of this hierarchy provided the major limitation on the autonomy of states. To be sure, the overall situation could tip towards the disappearance of the power of the states altogether to the extent that the hierarchy was constructed with a pyramidal peak rather than a plateau at the top. This possibility was not hypothetical as the dynamic of the concentration of military power led to recurrent thrusts to transform the interstate system into a world-empire.

If such thrusts never succeeded in historical capitalism, it was because the structural base of the economic system and the clearly-perceived interests of the major accumulators of capital were fundamentally opposed to a transformation of the world-economy into a world-empire.

First of all, the accumulation of capital was a game in which there was constant incentive for competitive entry, and thus there was always some dispersion of the most profitable productive activities. Hence at any time numerous states tended to have an economic base that made them relatively strong. Secondly, accumulators of capital in any given state utilized their own state structures to assist them in the accumulation of capital, but they also needed some lever of control *against* their own state-structures. For if their state-machinery became too strong, it might, for reasons of internal political equilibrium, feel free to respond to internal egalitarian pressures. Against this threat, accumulators of capital needed the threat of circumventing their own state-machinery by making alliances with other state-machineries. This threat was only possible as long as no one state dominated the whole.

These considerations formed the objective basis of the so-called balance of power, by which we mean that the numerous strong and medium-strong states in the interstate system at any given time have tended to maintain alliances (of if need be, shift them) so that no single state could successfully conquer all the others.

That the balance of power was maintained by more than political ideology can be seen if we look at the three instances in which one of the strong states achieved temporarily a period of relative dominance over the others—a relative dominance that we may call hegemony. The three instances are the hegemony of the United Provinces (Netherlands) in the mid-seventeenth century, that of Great Britain in the mid-nineteenth, and that of the United States in the mid-twentieth.

In each case, hegemony came after the defeat of a military pretender to conquest (the Hapsburgs, France, Germany). Each hegemony was sealed by a 'world war'—a massive, land-

centred, highly destructive, thirty-year-long intermittent struggle involving all the major military powers of the time. These were respectively the Thirty Years' War of 1618-48, the Napoleonic Wars (1792-1815), and the twentieth-century conflicts between 1914 and 1945 which should properly be conceived as a single long 'world war'. It is to be noted that, in each case, the victor had been primarily a maritime power prior to 'world war', but had transformed itself into a land power in order to win this war against a historically strong land power which seemed to be trying to transform the world-economy into a world-empire.

The basis of the victory was not however military. The primary reality was economic: the ability of accumulators of capital located in the particular states to outcompete all others in all three major economic spheres—agro-industrial production, commerce, and finance. Specifically, for brief periods, the accumulators of capital in the hegemonic state were more efficient than their competitors located in other strong states, and thus won markets even within the latter's 'home' areas. Each of these hegemonies was brief. Each came to an end largely for economic reasons more than for politico-military reasons. In each case, the temporary triple economic advantage came up against two hard rocks of capitalist reality. First, the factors that made for greater economic efficiency could always be copied by others—not by the truly weak but those who had medium strength—and latecomers to any given economic process tend to have the advantage of not having to amortize older stock. Secondly, the hegemonic power had every interest in maintaining uninterrupted economic activity and therefore tended to buy labour peace with internal redistribution. Over time, this led to reduced competitiveness thereby ending hegemony. In addition, the conversion of the hegemonic power to

one with far-flung land and maritime military 'responsibilities' involved a growing economic burden on the hegemonic state, thus undoing its pre-'world war' low level expenditure on the military.

Hence, the balance of power—constraining both the weak states and the strong—was not a political epiphenomenon which could be easily undone. It was rooted in the very ways in which capital was accumulated in historical capitalism. Nor was the balance of power merely a relationship between state-machineries, because the internal actors within any given state regularly acted beyond their own boundaries either directly or via alliances with actors elsewhere. Therefore, in assessing the politics of any given state, the internal/external distinction is quite formal and it is not too helpful to our understanding of how the political struggles actually occurred.

But who in fact was struggling with whom? This is not as obvious a question as one might think, because of the contradictory pressures within historical capitalism. The most elementary struggle, and in some ways the most obvious, was that between the small group of great beneficiaries of the system and the large group of its victims. This struggle goes by many names and under many guises. Whenever the lines have been drawn fairly clearly between the accumulators of capital and their work force within any given state, we have tended to call this a class struggle between capital and labour. Such class struggles took place in two locales—the economic arena (both at the locus of actual work and in the larger amorphous 'market') and the political arena. It is clear that in the economic arena there has been a direct, logical, and immediate conflict of interests. The larger the remuneration of the workforce the less surplus was left as 'profit'. To be sure, this conflict has been often softened by longer-term, larger-scale con-

siderations. Both the particular accumulator of capital and his work-force shared interests against other pairings elsewhere in the system. And greater remuneration to work-forces could under certain circumstances return to the accumulators of capital as deferred profit, via the increased global cash purchasing power in the world-economy. Nonetheless, none of these other considerations could ever eliminate the fact that the division of a given surplus was a zero-sum, and thus the tension has been perforce a continuing one. It has therefore found continuing expression in competition for political power within the various states.

Since, however, as we know, the process of the accumulation of capital has led to its concentration in some geographic zones, since the unequal exchange which accounts for this has been made possible by the existence of an interstate system containing a hierarchy of states, and since state-machineries have some limited power to alter the operations of the system, the struggle between worldwide accumulators of capital and the worldwide work-force has found considerable expression too in the efforts of various groups to come to power within given (weaker) states in order to utilize state power against accumulators of capital located in stronger states. Whenever this has occurred, we have tended to speak of anti-imperialist struggles. No doubt, here too, the question was often obscured by the fact that the lines internal to each of the two states involved did not always coincide perfectly with the underlying thrust of the class struggle in the world-economy as a whole. Some accumulators of capital in the weaker state and some elements of the work-force in the stronger found short-term advantages in defining the political issues in purely national rather than in class-national terms. But great mobilizational thrusts of 'anti-imperialist' movements were never

possible, and therefore even limited objectives were seldom achieved, if the class content of the struggle were not there and used, at least implicitly, as an ideological theme.

We have noted also that the process of ethnic-group formation was integrally linked with that of labour-force formation in given states, serving as a rough code of position in the economic structures. Therefore, wherever this has occurred more sharply or circumstances have forced more acute short-term pressures on survival, the conflict between the accumulators of capital and the more oppressed segments of the work-force have tended to take the form of linguistic-racial-cultural struggles, since such descriptors have a high correlation with class membership. Wherever and whenever this has occurred, we have tended to talk of ethnic or nationality struggles. Exactly, however, as in the case of the anti-imperialist struggles, these struggles were rarely successful unless they were able to mobilize the sentiments that emerged out of the underlying class struggle for the appropriation of the surplus produced within the capitalist system.

Nonetheless, if we pay attention only to the class struggle, because it is both obvious and fundamental, we shall lose from view another political struggle that has absorbed at least as much time and energy in historical capitalism. For the capitalist system is a system that has pitted all accumulators of capital against one another. Since the mode by which one pursued the endless accumulation of capital was that of realizing the profits coming from economic activity against the competitive efforts of others, no individual entrepreneur could ever be more than the fickle ally of any other entrepreneur, on pain of being eliminated from the competitive scene altogether.

Entrepreneur against entrepreneur, economic sector against economic sector, the entrepreneurs located in one state, or

ethnic group, against those in another—the struggle has been by definition ceaseless. And this ceaseless struggle has constantly taken a political form, precisely because of the central role of the states in the accumulation of capital. Sometimes these struggles within states have merely been over personnel in the state-machineries and short-run state policies. Sometimes, however, they have been over larger ‘constitutional’ issues which determine the rules governing the conduct of shorter-run struggles, and thus the likelihood of one faction or another prevailing. Whenever these struggles were ‘constitutional’ in nature, they required greater ideological mobilization. In these cases, we heard talk of ‘revolutions’ and ‘great reforms’ and the losing sides were often given opprobrious (but analytically inappropriate) labels. To the extent that the political struggles for, say, ‘democracy’ or ‘liberty’ against ‘feudalism’ or ‘tradition’ have not been struggles of the working classes against capitalism, they have been essentially struggles among the accumulators of capital for the accumulation of capital. Such struggles were not the triumph of a ‘progressive’ bourgeoisie against reactionary strata but *intra-bourgeois* struggles.

Of course, using ‘universalizing’ ideological slogans about progress has been politically useful. It has been a way of associating class struggle mobilization to one side of intra-accumulator struggles. But such ideological advantage has often been a double-edged sword, unleashing passions and weakening repressive restraints in the class struggle. This was of course one of the ongoing dilemmas of the accumulators of capital in historical capitalism. They were forced by the operations of the system to act in class solidarity with one another against the efforts of the work-force to pursue its contrary interests, but simultaneously to fight each other ceaselessly in

both the economic and political arenas. This is exactly what we mean by a contradiction within the system.

Many analysts, noticing that there are struggles other than class struggles which absorb much of the total political energy expended, have concluded that class analysis is of dubious relevance to the understanding of political struggle. This is a curious inference. It would seem more sensible to conclude that these non-class-based political struggles, that is, struggles among accumulators for political advantage, are evidence of a severe structural political weakness in the accumulator class in its ongoing worldwide class struggle.

These political struggles can be rephrased as struggles to shape the institutional structures of the capitalist world-economy so as to construct the kind of world market whose operation would automatically favour particular economic actors. The capitalist 'market' was never a given, and even less a constant. It was a creation that was regularly recreated and adjusted.

At any given time, the 'market' represented a set of rules or constraints resulting from the complex interplay of four major sets of institutions: the multiple states linked in an interstate system; the multiple 'nations', whether fully recognized or struggling for such public definition (and including those sub-nations, the 'ethnic groups'), in uneasy and uncertain relation to the states; the classes, in evolving occupational contour and in oscillating degrees of consciousness; and the income-pooling units engaged in common householding, combining multiple persons engaged in multiple forms of labour and obtaining income from multiple sources, in uneasy relationship to the classes.

There were no fixed lodestars in this constellation of institutional forces. There were no 'primordial' entities that tended

to prevail against the institutional forms pressed for by the accumulators of capital in tandem with, and in opposition to, the struggle of the work-force to resist appropriation of their economic product. The boundaries of each variant of an institutional form, the 'rights' which it was legally and de facto able to sustain, varied from zone to zone of the world-economy, over both cyclical and secular time. If the careful analyst's head reels in regarding this institutional vortex, he can steer a clear path by remembering that in historical capitalism accumulators had no higher object than further accumulation, and that work-forces could therefore have no higher object than survival and reducing their burden. Once that is remembered, one is able to make a great deal of sense out of the political history of the modern world.

In particular, one can begin to appreciate in their complexity the circumlocutory and often paradoxical or contradictory positions of the anti-systemic movements that emerged in historical capitalism. Let us begin with the most elementary dilemma of all. Historical capitalism has operated within a world-economy but not within a world-state. Quite the contrary. As we have seen, structural pressures militated against any construction of a world-state. Within this system, we have underlined the crucial role of the multiple states—at once the most powerful political structures, and yet of limited power. Hence restructuring given states represented for work-forces at one and the same time the most promising path of improving their position, and a path of limited value.

We must begin by looking at what we might mean by an anti-systemic movement. The word movement implies some collective thrust of a more than momentary nature. In fact, of course, somewhat spontaneous protests or uprisings of work-forces have occurred in all known historical systems. They

have served as safety-valves for pent-up anger; or sometimes, somewhat more effectively, as mechanisms that have set minor limits to exploitative process. But generally speaking, rebellion as a technique has worked only at the margins of central authority, particularly when central bureaucracies were in phases of disintegration.

The structure of historical capitalism changed some of these givens. The fact that states were located in an interstate system meant that the repercussions of rebellions or uprisings were felt, often quite rapidly, beyond the confines of the immediate political jurisdiction within which they occurred. So-called 'outside' forces therefore had strong motives to come to the aid of assailed state-machineries. This made rebellions more difficult. On the other hand, the intrusion of the accumulators of capital, and hence of state-machineries, into the daily life of the work-forces was far more intensive in general under historical capitalism than under previous historical systems. The endless accumulation of capital led to repeated pressures to restructure the organization (and location) of work, to increase the amount of absolute labour, and to bring about the psycho-social reconstruction of the work-forces. In this sense, for most of the world's work-forces, the disruption, the discombobulation, and the exploitation was even greater. At the same time, the social disruption undermined placatory modes of socialization. All in all, therefore, the motivations to rebel were strengthened, despite the fact that the possibilities of success were perhaps objectively lessened.

It was this extra strain which led to the great innovation in the technology of rebellion that was developed in historical capitalism. This innovation was the concept of permanent organization. It is only in the nineteenth century that we

begin to see the creation of continuing, bureaucratized structures in their two great historical variants: labour-socialist movements, and nationalist movements. Both kinds of movement talked a universal language—essentially that of the French Revolution: liberty, equality, and fraternity. Both kinds of movement clothed themselves in the ideology of the Enlightenment—the inevitability of progress, that is human emancipation justified by inherent human rights. Both kinds of movement appealed to the future against the past, the new against the old. Even when tradition was invoked, it was as the basis of a renaissance, a rebirth.

Each of the two kinds of movement had, it is true, a different focus, and hence at first a different locus. The labour-socialist movements focused on the conflicts between the urban, landless, wage workers (the proletariat) and the owners of the economic structures in which they worked (the bourgeoisie). These movements insisted that the allocation of reward for work was fundamentally inegalitarian, oppressive, and unjust. It was natural that such movements should first emerge in those parts of the world-economy that had a significant industrial work-force—in particular, in western Europe.

The nationalist movements focused on the conflicts between the numerous 'oppressed peoples' (defined in terms of linguistic and/or religious characteristics) and the particular dominant 'peoples' of a given political jurisdiction, the former having far fewer political rights, economic opportunities, and legitimate forms of cultural expression than the latter. These movements insisted that the allocation of 'rights' was fundamentally inegalitarian, oppressive, and unjust. It was natural that such movements should first emerge in those semiperipheral regions of the world-economy, like the Austro-

Hungarian Empire, where the uneven assignment of ethno-national groups in the hierarchy of labour-force allocation was most obvious.

In general, up until quite recently, these two kinds of movement considered themselves very different from, sometimes even antagonistic to, the other. Alliances between them were seen as tactical and temporary. Yet from the beginning, it is striking the degree to which both kinds of movement shared certain structural similarities. In the first place, after considerable debate, both labour-socialist and nationalist movements made the basic decision to become organizations and the concurrent decision that their most important political objective was the seizure of state power (even when, in the case of some nationalist movements, this involved the creation of new state boundaries). Secondly, the decision on the strategy—the seizure of state power—required that these movements mobilize popular forces on the basis of an anti-systemic, that is, revolutionary, ideology. They were against the existing system—historical capitalism—which was built on the basic capital-labour, core-periphery structured inequalities that the movements were seeking to overcome.

Of course, in an unequal system, there are always two ways in which a low-ranking group can seek to get out of its low rank. It can seek to restructure the system such that all have equal rank. Or it can seek simply to move itself into a higher rank in the unequal distribution. As we know, anti-systemic movements, no matter how much they focused on egalitarian objectives, always included elements whose objective, initially or eventually, was merely to be 'upwardly mobile' within the existing hierarchy. The movements themselves have always been aware of this too. They have however tended to discuss this problem in terms of individual motivations: the pure of heart versus the betrayers of the cause. But when on analysis

the 'betrayers of the cause' seem omnipresent in every particular instance of the movements as they have historically developed, one is led to look for structural rather than motivational explanations.

The key to the problem may in fact lie in the basic strategic decision to make the seizure of state power the pivot of the movement's activities. The strategy had two fundamental consequences. In the phase of mobilization, it pushed each movement towards entering into tactical alliances with groups that were in no way 'anti-systemic' in order to reach its strategic objective. These alliances modified the structure of the anti-systemic movements themselves, even in the mobilization stage. Even more importantly, the strategy eventually succeeded in many cases. Many of the movements achieved partial or even total state power. These successful movements were then confronted with the realities of the limitations of state power within the capitalist world-economy. They found that they were constrained by the functioning of the interstate system to exercise their power in ways that muted the 'anti-systemic' objectives that were their *raison d'être*.

This seems so obvious that one must then wonder why the movements based their strategy on such a seemingly self-defeating objective. The answer was quite simple: given the political structure of historical capitalism, they had little choice. There seemed to be no more promising alternative strategy. The seizure of state power at least promised to change the balance of power between contending groups somewhat. That is to say, the seizure of power represented a *reform* of the system. The reforms in fact did improve the situation, but always at the price of also strengthening the system.

Can we therefore summarize the work of the world's anti-systemic movements for over one hundred and fifty years as simply the strengthening of historical capitalism via refor-

mism? No, but that is because the politics of historical capitalism was more than the politics of the various states. It has been the politics of the interstate system as well. The anti-systemic movements existed from the beginning not only individually but also as a collective whole, albeit never bureaucratically organized. (The multiple internationals have never included the totality of these movements.) A key factor in the strength of any given movement has always been the existence of other movements.

Other movements have provided any given movement with three kinds of support. The most obvious is material; helpful, but perhaps of least significance. A second is diversionary support. The ability of a given strong state to intervene against an anti-systemic movement located in a weaker state, for example, was always a function of how many other things were on its immediate political agenda. The more a given state was preoccupied with a local anti-systemic movement, the less ability it had to be occupied with a faraway anti-systemic movement. The third and most fundamental support is at the level of collective mentalities. Movements learned from each other's errors and were encouraged by each other's tactical successes. And the efforts of the movements worldwide affected the basic worldwide political ambience—the expectations, the analysis of possibilities.

As the movements grew in number, in history, and in tactical successes, they seemed stronger as a collective phenomenon, and because they seemed stronger they were. The greater collective strength worldwide served as a check on 'revisionist' tendencies of movements in state power—no more, but no less, than that—and this has been greater in its effect on undermining the political stability of historical capitalism than the sum of the system-strengthening effects of the seizure of state power by successive individual movements.

Finally, one other factor has come into play. As the two varieties of anti-systemic movements have spread (the labour-socialist movements from a few strong states to all others, the nationalist movements from a few peripheral zones to everywhere else), the distinction between the two kinds of movement has become increasingly blurred. Labour-socialist movements have found that nationalist themes were central to their mobilization efforts and their exercise of state power. But nationalist movements have discovered the inverse. In order to mobilize effectively and govern, they had to canalize the concerns of the work-force for egalitarian restructuring. As the themes began to overlap heavily and the distinctive organizational formats tended to disappear or coalesce into a single structure, the strength of anti-systemic movements, especially as a worldwide collective whole, was dramatically increased.

One of the strengths of the anti-systemic movements is that they have come to power in a large number of states. This has changed the ongoing politics of the world-system. But this strength has also been a weakness, since the so-called post-revolutionary regimes continue to function as part of the social division of labour of historical capitalism. They have thereby operated, willy nilly, under the relentless pressures of the drive for the endless accumulation of capital. The political consequence internally has been the continued exploitation of the labour-force, if in a reduced and ameliorated form in many instances. This has led to internal tensions paralleling those found in states that were not 'post-revolutionary', and this in turn has bred the emergence of new anti-systemic movements within these states. The struggle for the benefits has been going on both within these post-revolutionary states and everywhere else, because, within the framework of the capitalist world-economy, the imperatives of accumulation have operated *throughout* the system. Changes in state structures have

altered the politics of accumulation; they have not yet been able to end them.

Initially, we postponed the questions: how real have been the benefits in historical capitalism? how great has been the change in the quality of life? It should be clear now that there is no simple answer. 'For whom?', we must ask. Historical capitalism has involved a monumental creation of material goods, but also a monumental polarization of reward. Many have benefited enormously, but many more have known a substantial reduction in their real total incomes and in the quality of their lives. The polarization has of course also been spatial, and hence it has seemed in some areas not to exist. That too has been the consequence of a struggle for the benefits. The geography of benefit has frequently shifted, thus masking the reality of polarization. But over the whole of the time-space zone encompassed by historical capitalism, the endless accumulation of capital has meant the incessant widening of the real gap.

3.

**Truth as Opiate:
Rationality
and Rationalization**

Historical capitalism has been, we know, Promethean in its aspirations. Although scientific and technological change has been a constant of human historical activity, it is only with historical capitalism that Prometheus, always there, has been 'unbound', in David Landes's phrase. The basic collective image we now have of this scientific culture of historical capitalism is that it was propounded by noble knights against the staunch resistance of the forces of 'traditional', non-scientific culture. In the seventeenth century, it was Galileo against the Church; in the twentieth, the 'modernizer' against the mullah. At all points, it was said to have been 'rationality' versus 'superstition', and 'freedom' versus 'intellectual oppression'. This was presumed to be parallel to (even identical with) the revolt in the arena of the political economy of the bourgeois entrepreneur against the aristocratic landlord.

This basic image of a worldwide cultural struggle has had a hidden premiss, namely one about temporality. 'Modernity' was assumed to be temporally new, whereas 'tradition' was temporally old and prior to modernity; indeed, in some strong versions of the imagery, tradition was ahistorical and therefore virtually eternal. This premiss was historically false and therefore fundamentally misleading. The multiple cultures, the multiple 'traditions' that have flourished within the time-space boundaries of historical capitalism, have been no more

primordial than the multiple institutional frameworks. They are largely the creation of the modern world, part of its ideological scaffolding. Links of the various 'traditions' to groups and ideologies that predate historical capitalism have existed, of course, in the sense that they have often been constructed using some historical and intellectual materials already existent. Furthermore, the assertion of such transhistorical links has played an important role in the cohesiveness of groups in their politico-economic struggles within historical capitalism. But, if we wish to understand the cultural forms these struggles take, we cannot afford to take 'traditions' at their face value, and in particular we cannot afford to assume that 'traditions' are in fact traditional.

It was in the interests of those who wished to facilitate the accumulation of capital, that work-forces be created in the right places and at the lowest possible levels of remuneration. We have already discussed how the lower rates of pay for peripheral economic activities in the world-economy were made possible by the creation of households in which wage labour played a minority role as a source of income. One way in which such households were 'created', that is, pressured to structure themselves, was the 'ethnicization' of community life in historical capitalism. What we mean by 'ethnic groups' are sizeable groups of people to whom were reserved certain occupational/economic roles in relation to other such groups living in geographic proximity. The outward symbolization of such labour-force allocation was the distinctive 'culture' of the ethnic group—its religion, its language, its 'values', its particular set of everyday behaviour patterns.

Of course, I am not suggesting that there was anything like a perfect caste system in historical capitalism. But, provided

we keep our occupational categories sufficiently broad, I am suggesting that there is, and always has been, a rather high correlation between ethnicity and occupation/economic role throughout the various time-space zones of historical capitalism. I am further suggesting that these labour-force allocations have varied over time, and that as they varied, so did ethnicity—in terms of the boundaries and defining cultural features of the group, and further that there is almost no correlation between present-day ethnic labour-force allocation and the patterns of the purported ancestors of present-day ethnic groups in periods prior to historical capitalism.

The ethnicization of the world work-force has had three main consequences that have been important for the functioning of the world-economy. First of all, it has made possible the reproduction of the work-force, not in the sense of providing sufficient income for the survival of groups but in the sense of providing sufficient workers in each category at appropriate levels of income expectations in terms both of total amounts and of the forms the household income would take. Furthermore, precisely because the work-force was ethnicized, its allocation was flexible. Large-scale geographical and occupational mobility has been made easier, not more difficult, by ethnicity. Under the pressure of changing economic conditions, all that was required to change work-force allocation was for some enterprising individuals to take the lead in geographical or occupational resettlement, and to be rewarded for it; this promptly exerted a natural 'pull' on other members of the ethnic group to transfer their locations in the world-economy.

Secondly, ethnicization has provided an in-built training mechanism of the work-force, ensuring that a large part of the

socialization in occupational tasks would be done within the framework of ethnically-defined households and not at the cost of either employers of wage-workers, or the states.

Thirdly, and probably most important, ethnicization has encrusted ranking of occupational/economic roles, providing an easy code for overall income distribution—clothed with the legitimization of 'tradition'.

It is this third consequence that has been elaborated in greatest detail and has formed one of the most significant pillars of historical capitalism, institutional racism. What we mean by racism has little to do with the xenophobia that existed in various prior historical systems. Xenophobia was literally fear of the 'stranger'. Racism within historical capitalism had nothing to do with 'strangers'. Quite the contrary. Racism was the mode by which various segments of the work-force within the same economic structure were constrained to relate to each other. Racism was the ideological justification for the hierarchization of the work-force and its highly unequal distributions of reward. What we mean by racism is that set of ideological statements combined with that set of continuing practices which have had the consequence of maintaining a high correlation of ethnicity and work-force allocation over time. The ideological statements have been in the form of allegations that genetic and/or long-lasting 'cultural' traits of various groups are the major cause of differential allocation to positions in the economic structures. However, the beliefs that certain groups were 'superior' to others in certain characteristics relevant to performance in the economic arena always came into being after, rather than before, the location of these groups in the work-force. Racism has always been post hoc. It has been asserted that those who have been economically and politically oppressed are culturally

'inferior'. If, for any reason, the locus in the economic hierarchy changed, the locus in the social hierarchy tended to follow (with some lag, to be sure, since it always took a generation or two to eradicate the effect of previous socialization).

Racism has served as an overall ideology justifying inequality. But it has been much more. It has served to socialize groups into their own role in the economy. The attitudes inculcated (the prejudices, the overtly discriminatory behaviour in everyday life) served to establish the framework of appropriate and legitimate behaviour for oneself and for others in one's own household and ethnic group. Racism, just like sexism, functioned as a self-suppressive ideology, fashioning expectations and limiting them.

Racism was certainly not only self-suppressive; it was oppressive. It served to keep low-ranking groups in line, and utilize middle-ranking groups as the unpaid soldiers of the world police system. In this way, not only were the financial costs of the political structures reduced significantly, but the ability of anti-systemic groups to mobilize wide populations was rendered more difficult, since racism structurally set victims against victims.

Racism was not a simple phenomenon. There was in a sense a basic world-wide fault line, marking off relative status in the world-system as a whole. This was the 'colour' line. What was 'white' or upper stratum has of course been a social and not a physiological phenomenon, as should be evident by the historically-shifting position, in worldwide (and national) socially-defined 'colour lines', of such groups as southern Europeans, Arabs, Latin American mestizos, and East Asians.

Colour (or physiology) was an easy tag to utilize, since it is inherently hard to disguise, and, insofar as it has been historically convenient, given the origins of historical capitalism in

Europe, it has been utilized. But whenever it was not convenient, it has been discarded or modified in favour of other identifying characteristics. In many particular places, the sets of identifiers have thus become quite complex. When one considers the additional fact that the social division of labour was constantly evolving, ethnic/racial identification turned out to be a highly unstable basis for delineating the boundaries of the existing social groups. Groups came and went and changed their self-definitions with considerable ease (and were perceived by others as having different boundaries with equal ease). But the volatility of any given group's boundaries was not inconsistent with, indeed was probably a function of, the persistence of an overall hierarchy of groups, that is, the ethnicization of the world work-force.

Racism has thus been a cultural pillar of historical capitalism. Its intellectual vacuity has not prevented it from unleashing terrible cruelties. Nonetheless, given the rise of the world's anti-systemic movements in the past fifty to one hundred years, it has recently been under sharp attack. Indeed, today racism in its crude variants is undergoing some delegitimization at the world level. Racism, however, has not been the only ideological pillar of historical capitalism. Racism has been of greatest importance in construction and reproduction of appropriate work forces. Their reproduction nonetheless was insufficient to permit the endless accumulation of capital. Work-forces could not be expected to perform efficiently and continuously unless they were managed by cadres. Cadres too have had to be created, socialized, reproduced. The primary ideology that operated to create, socialize, and reproduce them was not the ideology of racism. It was that of universalism.

Universalism is an epistemology. It is a set of beliefs about what is knowable and how it can be known. The essence of

this view is that there exist meaningful general statements about the world—the physical world, the social world—that are universally and permanently true, and that the object of science is the search for these general statements in a form that eliminates all so-called subjective, that is, all historically-constrained, elements from its formulation.

The belief in universalism has been the keystone of the ideological arch of historical capitalism. Universalism is a faith, as well as an epistemology. It requires not merely respect but reverence for the elusive but allegedly real phenomenon of truth. The universities have been both the workshops of the ideology and the temples of the faith. Harvard emblazons *Veritas* on its escutcheon. While it has always been asserted that one could never know truth definitively—this is what is supposed to distinguish modern science from medieval Western theology—it was also constantly asserted that the search for truth was the *raison d'être* of the university, and more widely of all intellectual activity. Keats, to justify art, told us that 'truth is beauty, beauty truth.' In the United States, a favourite political justification of civil liberties is that truth can only be known as a result of the interplay that occurs in the 'free market-place of ideas'.

Truth as a cultural ideal has functioned as an opiate, perhaps the only serious opiate of the modern world. Karl Marx said that religion was the opiate of the masses. Raymond Aron retorted that Marxist ideas were in turn the opiate of the intellectuals. There is perspicacity in both these polemical thrusts. But is perspicacity truth? I wish to suggest that perhaps truth has been the real opiate, of both the masses and the intellectuals. Opiates, to be sure, are not unremittingly evil. They ease pain. They enable people to escape from hard realities when they fear that confrontation with reality can only precipitate inevitable loss or decline. But nonetheless most of

us do not recommend opiates. Neither Marx nor Raymond Aron did. In most states and for most purposes they are illegal.

Our collective education has taught us that the search for truth is a disinterested virtue when in fact it is a self-interested rationalization. The search for truth, proclaimed as the cornerstone of progress, and therefore of well-being, has been at the very least consonant with the maintenance of a hierarchical, unequal social structure in a number of specific respects. The processes involved in the expansion of the capitalist world-economy—the peripheralization of economic structures, the creation of weak state structures participating in and constrained by an interstate system—involved a number of pressures at the level of culture: Christian proselytization; the imposition of European language; instruction in specific technologies and mores; changes in the legal codes. Many of these changes were made *manu militari*. Others were achieved by the persuasion of ‘educators’, whose authority was ultimately backed by military force. That is that complex of processes we sometimes label ‘westernization’, or even more arrogantly ‘modernization’, and which was legitimated by the desirability of sharing both the fruits of and faith in the ideology of universalism.

There were two main motives behind these enforced cultural changes. One was economic efficiency. If given persons were expected to perform in given ways in the economic arenas, it was efficient both to teach them the requisite cultural norms and to eradicate competing cultural norms. The second was political security. It was believed that if the so-called elites of peripheral areas were ‘westernized’, they would be separated from their ‘masses’, and hence less likely to revolt—certainly less able to organize a following for revolts. This turned out to be a monumental miscalculation,

but it was plausible and did work for a while. (A third motive was *hybris* on the part of the conquerors. I do not discount it, but it is not necessary to invoke it in order to account for the cultural pressures, which would have been just as great in its absence.)

Whereas racism served as a mechanism of world-wide control of direct producers, universalism served to direct the activities of the bourgeoisie of other states and various middle strata world-wide into channels that would maximize the close integration of production processes and the smooth operation of the interstate system, thereby facilitating the accumulation of capital. This required the creation of a world bourgeois cultural framework that could be grafted onto 'national' variations. This was particularly important in terms of science and technology, but also in the realm of political ideas and the social sciences.

The concept of a neutral 'universal' culture to which the cadres of the world division of labour would be 'assimilated' (the passive voice being important here) hence came to serve as one of the pillars of the world-system as it historically evolved. The exaltation of progress, and later of 'modernization', summarized this set of ideas, which served less as true norms of social action than as status-symbols of obeisance and of participation in the world's upper strata. The break from the supposedly culturally-narrow religious bases of knowledge in favour of supposedly trans-cultural scientific bases of knowledge served as the self-justification of a particularly pernicious form of cultural imperialism. It dominated in the name of intellectual liberation; it imposed in the name of scepticism.

The process of rationalization central to capitalism has required the creation of an intermediate stratum comprising the specialists of this rationalization, as administrators, technicians, scientists, educators. The very complexity of not only

the technology but the social system has made it essential that this stratum be large and, over time, expanding. The funds that have been used to support it have been drawn from the global surplus, as extracted through entrepreneurs and states. In this elementary but fundamental sense these cadres have therefore been part of the bourgeoisie whose claim to participation in the sharing-out of the surplus has been given precise ideological form in the twentieth-century concept of human capital. Having relatively little real capital to transmit as the heritage of their household, such cadres have sought to guarantee succession by securing preferential access for their children to the educational channels which guarantee position. This preferential access has been conveniently presented as achievement, supposedly legitimated by a narrowly-defined 'equality of opportunity'.

Scientific culture thus became the fraternal code of the world's accumulators of capital. It served first of all to justify both their own activities and the differential rewards from which they benefited. It promoted technological innovation. It legitimated the harsh elimination of barriers to the expansion of productive efficiencies. It generated a form of progress that would be of benefit to all—if not immediately then eventually.

Scientific culture was more however than a mere rationalization. It was a form of socialization of the diverse elements that were the cadres of all the institutional structures that were needed. As a language common to cadres but not directly to the labour-force, it became also a means of class cohesion for the upper stratum, limiting the prospects or extent of rebellious activity on the part of cadres who might be so tempted. Furthermore, it was a flexible mechanism for the reproduction of these cadres. It lent itself to the concept known today as 'meritocracy', previously 'la carrière ouverte aux

talents'. Scientific culture created a framework within which individual mobility was possible without threatening hierarchical work-force allocation. On the contrary, meritocracy reinforced hierarchy. Finally, meritocracy as an operation and scientific culture as an ideology created veils that hindered perception of the underlying operations of historical capitalism. The great emphasis on the rationality of scientific activity was the mask of the irrationality of endless accumulation.

Universalism and racism may seem on the surface strange bedfellows, if not virtually antithetical doctrines—one open, the other closed; one equalizing, the other polarizing; one inviting rational discourse, the other incarnating prejudice. Yet, since these two doctrines have spread and prevailed concomitantly with the evolution of historical capitalism, we should look more closely at the ways in which they may have been compatible.

There was a catch to universalism. It did not make its way as a free-floating ideology but as one propagated by those who held economic and political power in the world-system of historical capitalism. Universalism was offered to the world as a gift of the powerful to the weak. *Timeo Danaos et dona ferentes!* The gift itself harboured racism, for it gave the recipient two choices: accept the gift, thereby acknowledging that one was low on the hierarchy of achieved wisdom; refuse the gift, thereby denying oneself weapons that could reverse the unequal real power situation.

It is not strange that even the cadres who were being co-opted into privilege were deeply ambivalent about the message of universalism, vacillating between enthusiastic discipleship and a cultural rejection brought on by repugnance for racist assumptions. This ambivalence was expressed in the multiple movements of cultural 'renaissance'. The very word renaissance, which was widely used in many zones of the world,

itself incarnated the ambivalence. By speaking of rebirth, one affirmed an era of prior cultural glory but one also acknowledged a cultural inferiority as of that moment. The word rebirth was itself copied from the specific cultural history of Europe.

One might have thought that the world's work-forces were more immune from this ambivalence, never having been invited to sup at the lord's table. In fact, however, the political expressions of the world's work-forces, the anti-systemic movements, have themselves been deeply imbued with the same ambivalence. The anti-systemic movements, as we have already remarked, clothed themselves in the ideology of the Enlightenment, itself a prime product of universalist ideology. They thereby lay for themselves the cultural trap in which they have remained ever since: seeking to undermine historical capitalism, using strategies and setting medium-term objectives that derived from the very 'ideas of the ruling classes' they sought to destroy.

The socialist variant of anti-systemic movements was, from the outset, committed to scientific progress. Marx, wishing to distinguish himself from others he denounced as 'utopians', asserted that he was advocating 'scientific socialism'. His writings laid emphasis on the ways in which capitalism was 'progressive'. The concept that socialism would come first in the most 'advanced' countries suggested a process whereby socialism would grow out of (as well as in reaction to) the further advancement of capitalism. The socialist revolution would thus emulate *and come after* the 'bourgeois revolution'. Some later theorists even argued that it was therefore the duty of socialists to assist in the bourgeois revolution in those countries in which it had not yet occurred.

The later differences between the Second and Third Internationals did not involve a disagreement over this epistemo-

logy, which both shared. Indeed, both Social-Democrats and Communists in power have tended to give great priority to the further development of the means of production. Lenin's slogan that 'Communism equals socialism plus electricity' still hangs today in enormous banners on the streets of Moscow. Insofar as these movements, once in power—Social-Democrats and Communists alike—implemented Stalin's slogans of 'socialism in one country', they thereby necessarily furthered the process of the commodification of everything that has been so essential to the global accumulation of capital. Insofar as they remained within the interstate system—indeed struggled to remain within it against all attempts to oust them—they accepted and furthered the world-wide reality of the dominance of the law of value. 'Socialist man' looked suspiciously like Taylorism run wild.

There have been of course 'socialist' ideologies which have purported to reject the universalism of the Enlightenment, and have advocated various 'indigenous' varieties of socialism for peripheral zones of the world-economy. To the extent that these formulations were more than mere rhetoric, they seemed to be de facto attempts to use as a base unit of the process of commodification not the new households that share income but larger communal entities that were, it was argued, more 'traditional'. By and large, these attempts, when serious, turned out to be fruitless. In any case, the mainstream of world socialist movements tended to denounce these attempts as non-socialist, as forms of a retrograde cultural nationalism.

At first view, the nationalist variety of anti-systemic movements, by the very centrality of their separatist themes, seemed less beholden to the ideology of universalism. A closer look, however, belies this impression. Certainly, nationalism inevitably had a cultural component, in which particular movements argued for the reinforcement of national 'tradi-

tions', a national language, often a religious heritage. But was cultural nationalism cultural resistance to the pressures of the accumulators of capital? In fact, two major elements of cultural nationalism moved in opposite directions. First, the unit chosen as the vehicle to contain the culture tended to be the state that was a member of the interstate system. It was most often this state that was invested with a 'national' culture. In virtually every case, this involved a distortion of cultural continuities, frequently very severe. In almost all cases, the assertion of a state-encased national culture inevitably involved as much suppression of continuities as reassertion of them. In all cases, it reinforced the state structures, and thus the interstate system, and historical capitalism as a world-system.

Secondly, a comparative look at the cultural reassertions among all these states makes clear that while they varied in form, they tended to be identical in content. The morphemes of the languages differed but the vocabulary list began to converge. The rituals and theologies of the world's religions might all have been reinvigorated but they began to be less different in actual content than previously. And the antecedents of scientificity were rediscovered under many different names. In short, much of cultural nationalism has been a gigantic charade. More than that, cultural nationalism like 'socialist culture' has often been a major stalwart of the universalist ideology of the modern world, purveying it to the world's work-forces in ways they found more palatable. In this sense, the anti-systemic movements have often served as the cultural intermediaries of the powerful to the weak, vitiating rather than crystallizing their deep-rooted sources of resistance.

The contradictions inherent in the state-seizure strategy of anti-systemic movements combined with their tacit acceptance of the universalist epistemology has had serious consequences for these movements. They have had to deal increasingly with the phenomenon of disillusionment, to which their major ideological response has been the reaffirmation of the central justification of historical capitalism: the automatic and inevitable quality of progress, or as it is now popular to say in the USSR the 'scientific-technological revolution'.

Beginning in the twentieth century, and with increasing vehemence since the 1960's, the theme of the 'civilizational project', as Anouar Abdel-Malek likes to call it, has begun to gain strength. While for many the new language of 'endogenous alternatives' has served as merely a verbal variant of old universalizing cultural nationalist themes, for others there is genuinely new epistemological content in the theme. The 'civilizational project' has reopened the question of whether transhistorical truths really exist. A form of truth, which reflected the power realities and economic imperatives of historical capitalism, has flourished and permeated the globe. That is true, as we have seen. But how much light does this form of truth shed upon the process of decline of this historical system, or on the existence of real historical alternatives to historical system based on the endless accumulation of capital? Therein lies the question.

This newer form of fundamental cultural resistance has a material base. The successive mobilizations of the world's anti-systemic movements have increasingly over time recruited elements economically and politically more marginal to the functioning of the system and less likely to profit, even eventually, from the accumulated surplus. At the same time, the

successive demythologizations of these movements themselves have undermined the reproduction of universalist ideology within them, and the movements have thus begun to be open to more and more of these elements who have questioned ever more of their premisses. Compared with the profile of the membership of the world's anti-systemic movements from 1850 to 1950, their profile from 1950 onwards contained more from peripheral zones, more women, more from 'minority' groups (however defined), and more of the work-force towards the unskilled, lowest-paid end of the scale. This was true both in the world as a whole and within all the states, both in the membership and in the leadership. Such a shift in social base could not but alter the cultural-ideological predilections of the world's anti-systemic movements.

We have tried thus far to describe how capitalism has in fact operated as a historical system. Historical systems however are just that—historical. They come into existence and eventually go out of existence, the consequence of internal processes in which the exacerbation of the internal contradictions lead to a structural crisis. Structural crises are massive, not momentary. They take time to play themselves out. Historical capitalism entered into its structural crisis in the early twentieth century and will probably see its demise as a historical system sometime in the next century. What will follow is hazardous to predict. What we can do now is analyze the dimensions of the structural crisis itself and try to preceive the directions in which the systemic crisis is taking us.

The first and probably most fundamental aspect of this crisis is that we are now close to the commodification of everything. That is, historical capitalism is in crisis precisely because, in pursuing the endless accumulation of capital, it is beginning to approximate that state of being Adam Smith as-

serted was 'natural' to man but which has *never* historically existed. The 'propensity [of humanity] to truck, barter, and exchange one thing for another' has entered into domains and zones previously untouched, and the pressure to expand commodification is relatively unchecked. Marx spoke of the market as being a 'veil' that hid the social relations of production. This was only true in the sense that, in comparison with direct local appropriation of surplus, indirect market (and therefore extra-local) appropriation of surplus was harder to discern and thus more difficult to combat politically for the world's work-force. The 'market' however operated in the quantitative terms of a general measure, money, and this clarified rather than mystified how much was actually being appropriated. What the accumulators of capital have counted on as a political safety-net is that only part of the labour has been so measured. Insofar as more and more labour is commodified, and householding becomes more and more a nexus of commodity relations, the flow of surplus becomes more and more visible. The political counterpressures thereby become more and more mobilized, and the structure of the economy more and more a direct target of the mobilization. The accumulators of capital, far from seeking to speed up proletarianization, try to retard it. But they cannot do so entirely, because of the contradictions of their own interests, being both individual entrepreneur and members of a class.

This is a steady, ceaseless process, impossible to contain as long as the economy driven by the endless accumulation of capital. The system may prolong its life by slowing down some of the activities which are wearing it out, but death always looms somewhere on the horizon.

One of the ways in which the accumulators of capital have prolonged the system is the political constraints they have

built into it, which have forced anti-systemic movements along the paths of the creation of formal organizations using a strategy of seizure of state power. They had no real choice, but the strategy was a self-limiting one.

However, as we have seen, the contradictions of this strategy have themselves bred a crisis at the political level. This is not a crisis of the interstate system, which is still functioning very well in its primary mission to maintain hierarchy and contain opposition movements. The political crisis is the crisis of the anti-systemic movements themselves. As the distinction between socialist and nationalist movements begins to blur, and as more and more of these movements achieve state power (with all its limitations), the worldwide collectivity of movements has forced upon it a reassessment of all its pieties deriving from the original analyses of the nineteenth century. As the success of accumulators in accumulating has created too much commodification which threatens the system as such, so the success of the anti-systemic movements in seizing power has created too much reinforcement of the system which threatens to break through the acceptance by the world's work-forces of this self-limiting strategy.

Finally, the crisis is cultural. The crisis of the anti-systemic movements, the questioning of basic strategy, is leading to a questioning of the premisses of universalist ideology. This is going on in two arenas: the movements where the search for 'civilizational' alternatives is for the first time being taken seriously; and intellectual life, where the whole intellectual apparatus which came into being from the fourteenth century on is being slowly placed in doubt. In part, once again, this doubt is the product of its success. In the physical sciences, the internal processes of enquiry generated by modern scientific method seem to be leading to the questioning of the existing

of the universal laws which were its premiss. Today there is talk of inserting 'temporality' into science. In the social sciences, a poor relation at one level, but the queen (that is, the culmination) of the sciences at another level, the whole developmentalist paradigm is today being explicitly questioned at its heart.

The re-opening of intellectual issues is on the one hand therefore the product of internal success and internal contradictions. But it is also the product of the pressures of the movements, themselves in crisis, to be able to cope with, fight more effectively against, the structures of historical capitalism, whose crisis is the starting-point of all other activity.

The crisis of historical capitalism is often spoken of as the transition from capitalism to socialism. I agree with the formula, but it does not say much. We do not know yet how a socialist world order, one that radically narrows the gap of material well-being and disparity of real power between all persons, would operate. Existing states or movements which call themselves socialist offer little guide to the future. They are phenomena of the present, that is of the historical capitalist world-system, and must be evaluated within that framework. They may be agents of the demise of capitalism, though hardly uniformly so, as we have indicated. But the future world order will construct itself slowly, in ways we can barely imagine, never mind predict. It is therefore somewhat a leap of faith to believe that it will be good, or even better. But what we have we know has not been good, and as historical capitalism has proceeded on its historical path, it has in my view—by its very success—got worse, not better.

4.

**Conclusion:
On Progress and
Transitions**



If there is one idea which is associated with the modern world, is indeed its centrepiece, it is that of progress. That is not to say that everyone has believed in progress. In the great public ideological debate between conservatives and liberals, which partly preceded, but more especially followed, the French Revolution, the essence of the conservative position lay in doubt that the changes that Europe and the world were undergoing could be considered progress, or indeed that progress was a relevant and meaningful concept. Nevertheless, as we know, it was the liberals who heralded the age and incarnated what would become in the nineteenth century the dominant ideology of the long-existing capitalist world-economy.

It is not surprising that liberals believed in progress. The idea of progress justified the entire transition from feudalism to capitalism. It legitimated the breaking of the remaining opposition to the commodification of everything, and it tended to wipe away all the negatives of capitalism on the grounds that the benefits outweighed, by far, the harm. It is not at all surprising, therefore, that liberals believed in progress.

What is surprising is that their ideological opponents, the Marxists—the anti-liberals, the representatives of the oppressed working classes—believed in progress with at least as much passion as the liberals. No doubt, this belief served an important ideological purpose for them in turn. It justified the activities of the world socialist movement on the grounds that it

incarnated the inevitable trend of historical development. Furthermore, it seemed very clever to propound this ideology, in that it purported to use the very ideas of bourgeois liberals to confound them.

There were unfortunately two minor shortcomings with the seemingly astute and certainly enthusiastic embrace of this secular faith in progress. While the idea of progress justified socialism, it justified capitalism too. One could hardly sing hosannas to the proletariat without offering prior praise to the bourgeoisie. Marx's famous writings on India offered ample evidence of this, but so indeed did the *Communist Manifesto*. Furthermore, the measure of progress being materialist (and could Marxists not assent to this?), the idea of progress could be turned, and has been turned in the past fifty years, against all the 'experiments in socialism'. Who has not heard the condemnations of the USSR on the grounds that its standard of living is below that of the USA? Furthermore, despite Krushchev's boasts, there is little reason to believe that this disparity will cease to exist fifty years from now.

The Marxist embrace of an evolutionary model of progress has been an enormous trap, which socialists have begun to suspect only recently, as one element in the ideological crisis that has been part of the overall structural crisis of the capitalist world-economy.

It is simply not true that capitalism as a historical system has represented progress over the various previous historical systems that it destroyed or transformed. Even as I write this, I feel the tremour that accompanies the sense of blasphemy. I fear the wrath of the gods, for I have been moulded in the same ideological forge as all my compeers and have worshipped at the same shrines.

One of the problems in analyzing progress is the one-sidedness of all measures proposed. It is said that scientific and tech-

nological progress is unquestionable and breathtaking, which is surely true, especially insofar as most technical knowledge is cumulative. But we never seriously discuss how much knowledge we have lost in the world-wide sweep of the ideology of universalism. Or if we do, we categorize such lost knowledge as mere (?) wisdom. Yet, at the simple technical levels of agricultural productivity and biological wholeness, we have been discovering of late that methods of human action discarded a century or two ago (a process enforced by enlightened elites upon backward masses) often need to be revived because they turn out to be more, not less, efficacious. More importantly, we are discovering at the very 'frontiers' of advanced science the tentative reinsertion of premisses triumphantly discarded a century, or five centuries, ago.

It is said that historical capitalism has transformed the mechanical outreach of humanity. Each input of human energy has been rewarded with steadily greater outputs of products, which is surely true as well. But we do not calculate to what degree this has meant that humanity has reduced or increased the total inputs of energy that individuals separately, or all people within the capitalist world-economy collectively, have been called upon to invest, whether per unit of time or per lifetime. Can we be so sure that the world is less burdensome under historical capitalism than under prior systems? There is ample reason to doubt this, as is attested by the incorporation within our very superegos of the compulsion to work.

It is said that under no previous historical system did people live as comfortable a material life or have such a range of alternative life-experiences at their disposal as in this present system. Once again, this assertion rings true, is revealed by those comparisons we regularly make with the lives of our immediate ancestors. Still, doubts in this domain have grown

steadily throughout the twentieth century, as our now frequent references to 'quality of life' and mounting concern with anomie, alienation, and psychic maladies indicate. Finally it is said that historical capitalism has brought a massive increase in the margin of human safety—against hurt and death from endemic dangers (the four horsemen of the Apocalypse) and against erratic violence. Once again this is incontestable at a micro level (despite the recently rediscovered dangers of urban life). But has this really been true at a macro level, even up to now, and even omitting the Damoclean sword of nuclear war?

It is, let me say, at the very least by no means self-evident that there is more liberty, equality, and fraternity in the world today than there was one thousand years ago. One might arguably suggest that the opposite is true. I seek to paint no idyll of the worlds before historical capitalism. They were worlds of little liberty, little equality, and little fraternity. The only question is whether historical capitalism represented progress in these regards, or regression.

I do not speak of a measure of comparative cruelties. This would be hard to devise, lugubrious also, although there is little reason to be sanguine about the record of historical capitalism in this arena. The world of the twentieth century can lay claim to have exhibited some unusual talents of refinement in these ancient arts. Nor do I speak of the mounting and truly incredible social waste that has been the result of the competitive race for the endless accumulation of capital, a level of waste that may begin to border on the irreparable.

I rather wish to rest my case on material considerations, not those of the social future but those of the actual historical period of the capitalist world-economy. The argument is simple if audacious. I wish to defend the one Marxist proposition

which even orthodox Marxists tend to bury in shame, the thesis of the absolute (not relative) immiseration of the proletariat.

I hear the friendly whispers. Surely you can't be serious; surely you mean relative immiseration? Is not the industrial worker strikingly better off today than in 1800? The industrial worker, yes, or at least many industrial workers. But industrial workers still comprise a relatively small part of the world's population. The overwhelming proportion of the world's work-forces, who live in rural zones or move between them and urban slums, are worse off than their ancestors five hundred years ago. They eat less well, and certainly have a less balanced diet. Although they are more likely to survive the first year of life (because of the effect of social hygiene undertaken to protect the privileged), I doubt that the life prospects of the majority of the world's population *as of age one* are greater than previously; I suspect the opposite is true. They unquestionably work harder—more hours per day, per year, per lifetime. And since they do this for less total reward, the rate of exploitation has escalated very sharply.

Are they politically and socially more oppressed or more exploited economically? This is harder to analyze. As Jack Goody once said, social science possesses no euphorimeters. The small communities within which most people led their lives in prior historical systems involved a form of social control which certainly constrained human choice and social variability. It no doubt appeared to many as a phenomenon of active oppression. The others, who were more satisfied, paid for their content with a narrow vision of human possibility.

The construction of historical capitalism has involved, as we all know, the steady diminution, even the total elimination, of the role of these small community structures. But what has

taken their place? In many areas, and for long periods, the prior role of the community structures has been assumed by 'plantations', that is, by the oppressive control of large-scale politico-economic structures controlled by 'entrepreneurs'. The 'plantations' of the capitalist world-economy—whether based on slavery, imprisonment, share-cropping (forced or contractual), or wage-labour—can scarcely be said to have provided more leeway for 'individuality'. The 'plantations' can be considered an exceptionally effective mode of extracting surplus-value. No doubt they existed before in human history, but never before were they used as extensively for agricultural production—as distinct from mining and the construction of large-scale infrastructure, both of which, however, have tended to involve many fewer people in global terms.

Even where one form or another of direct authoritarian control of agricultural activity (what we have just labelled 'plantations') was not substituted for the prior laxer community structures of control, the disintegration of the community structures in rural zones was not experienced as a 'liberation', since it was inevitably accompanied, indeed frequently directly caused, by a constantly growing control by the emergent state structures which increasingly have been unwilling to leave the direct producer to his autonomous, local decision-making processes. The thrust has all been in the direction of forcing an increase in labour-input and in the specialization of this labour activity (which, from the point of view of the worker, weakened his negotiating position and increased his ennui).

Nor was this all. Historical capitalism developed an ideological framework of oppressive humiliation which had never previously existed, and which today we called sexism and racism. Let me be clear. Both the dominant position of men

over women and generalized xenophobia were widespread, virtually universal, in prior historical systems, as we have already noted. But sexism was more than the dominant position of men over women, and racism more than generalized xenophobia.

Sexism was the relegation of women to the realm of non-productive labour, doubly humiliating in that the actual labour required of them was if anything intensified, and in that productive labour became in the capitalist world-economy, for the first time in human history, the basis of the legitimation of privilege. This set up a double bind which has been intractable within the system.

Racism was not hatred or oppression of a stranger, of someone outside the historical system. Quite the contrary, racism was the stratification of the work-force inside the historical system, whose object was to keep the oppressed groups inside the system, not expel them. It created the justification of low reward for productive labour, despite its primacy in the definition of the right to reward. It did this by defining work with the lowest remuneration as remuneration for the lowest-quality work. Since this was done *ex definitio*, no change in the quality of work could ever do more than change the form of the accusation, yet the ideology proclaimed the offer of a reward of individual mobility for individual effort. This double bind was equally intractable.

Both sexism and racism were social processes in which 'biology' defined position. Since biology was in any immediate sense unchangeable socially, we had seemingly a structure that was socially-created but was not amenable to social dismantling. This was of course not really so. What is true is that the structuring of sexism and racism could not and

cannot be dismantled without dismantling the entire historical system which created them and which has been maintained in critical ways by their operation.

Hence, in both material and psychic terms (sexism and racism), there was absolute immiseration. This meant of course that there has been a growing 'gap' in the consumption of the surplus between the upper ten to fifteen per cent of the population in the capitalist world-economy and the rest. Our impression that this was not so has been based on three facts. First, the ideology of meritocracy has truly functioned to make possible considerable individual mobility, even the mobility of specific ethnic and/or occupational groups in the work-force. This occurred however without transforming fundamentally the overall statistics of the world-economy, since individual (or subgroup) mobility was countered by an increase in the size of the lower stratum, either by incorporating new populations into the world-economy or by differential demographic rates of growth.

The second reason why we haven't observed the growing gap is that our historical and social science analyses have concentrated on what has been happening within the 'middle classes'—that is, to that ten to fifteen per cent of the population of the world-economy who consumed more surplus than they themselves produced. *Within this sector* there really has been a relatively dramatic flattening of the curve between the very top (less than one per cent of the total population) and the truly 'middle' segments, or cadres (the rest of the ten to fifteen per cent). A good deal of the 'progressive' politics of the past several hundred years of historical capitalism has resulted in the steady diminution of the unequal distribution of world surplus-value among that small group who have shared in it. The shouts of triumph of this 'middle' sector

over the reduction of their gap with the upper one per cent have masked the realities of the growing gap between them and the other eighty-five per cent .

Finally, there is a third reason why the phenomenon of the growing gap has not been central to our collective discussions. It is possible that, within the past ten to twenty years, under the pressure of the collective strength of the world's anti-systemic movements, and the approach to the economic asymptotes, there may have been a slowing down of absolute, though not of relative, polarization. Even this should be asserted with caution, and placed within the context of a five hundred years historical development of increased absolute polarization.

It is crucial to discuss the realities that have accompanied the ideology of progress because, unless we do that, we cannot intelligently approach the analysis of transitions from one historical system to another. The theory of evolutionary progress involved not merely the assumption that the later system was better than the earlier but also the assumption that some new dominant group replaced a prior dominant group. Hence, not only was capitalism progress over feudalism but this progress was essentially achieved by the triumph, the revolutionary triumph, of the 'bourgeoisie' over the 'landed aristocracy' (or 'feudal elements'). But if capitalism was not progressive, what is the meaning of the concept of the bourgeois revolution? Was there a single bourgeois revolution, or did it appear in multiple guises?

We have already argued that the image of historical capitalism having arisen via the overthrow of a backward aristocracy by a progressive bourgeoisie is wrong. Instead, the correct basic image is that historical capitalism was brought into existence by a landed aristocracy which transformed itself into a

bourgeoisie because the old system was disintegrating. Rather than let the disintegration continue to uncertain ends, they engaged in radical structural surgery themselves in order to maintain *and significantly expand* their ability to exploit the direct producers.

If this new image is correct however, it radically amends our perception of the present transition from capitalism to socialism, from a capitalist world-economy to a social world-order. Up to now, the 'proletarian revolution' has been modelled, more or less, on the 'bourgeois revolution'. As the bourgeoisie overthrew the aristocracy, so the proletariat would overthrow the bourgeoisie. This analogy has been the fundamental building-block of the strategic action of the world socialist movement.

If there was no bourgeois revolution, does that mean there has been or will be no proletarian revolution? Not at all, logically or empirically. But it does mean we have to approach the subject of transitions differently. We need first to distinguish between change through disintegration and controlled change, what Samir Amin has called the distinction between 'decadence' and 'revolution', between the kind of 'decadence' which he asserts occurred with the fall of Rome (and is, he says, occurring now) and that more controlled change which occurred when going from feudalism to capitalism.

But this is not all. For the controlled changes (Amin's 'revolutions') need not be 'progressive', as we have just argued. Therefore, we must distinguish between the kind of structural transformation that would leave in place (even increase) the realities of the exploitation of labour, and one that would undo this kind of exploitation or at least radically reduce it. What this means is that the political issue of our times is not whether there will be a transition from historical capitalism to

something else. That is as certain as we can be about such things. The political issue of our times is whether this something else, the outcome of the transition, will be morally fundamentally different from what we have now, will be progress.

Progress is not inevitable. We are struggling for it. And the form the struggle is taking is not that of socialism versus capitalism, but that of a transition to a relatively classless society versus a transition to some new class-based mode of production (different from historical capitalism but not necessarily better).

The choice for the world bourgeoisie is not between maintaining historical capitalism and suicide. It is between on the one hand a 'conservative' stance, which would result in the continued disintegration of the system and its resultant transformation into an uncertain but probably more egalitarian world order; and, on the other hand, a bold attempt to seize control of the process of transition, in which the bourgeoisie itself would assume 'socialist' clothing, and seek to create thereby an alternative historical system which would leave intact the process of exploitation of the world's work-force, to the benefit of a minority.

It is in the light of these real political alternatives open to the world bourgeoisie that we should assess the history of both the world socialist movement and those states where socialist parties have come to power in one form or another.

The first and most important thing to remember in any such assessment is that the world socialist movement, indeed all forms of anti-systemic movements, as well as all revolutionary and/or socialist states, have themselves been integral products of historical capitalism. They were not structures external to the historical system but the excretion of processes

internal to it. Hence they have reflected all the contradictions and constraints of the system. They could not and cannot do otherwise.

Their faults, their limitations, their negative effects are part of the balance-sheet of historical capitalism, not of a hypothetical historical system, of a socialist world-order, that does not yet exist. The intensity of the exploitation of labour in revolutionary and/or socialist states, the denial of political freedoms, the persistence of sexism and racism all have to do far more with the fact that these states continue to be located in peripheral and semi-peripheral zones of the capitalist world-economy than with the properties peculiar to a new social system. The few crumbs that have existed in historical capitalism for the working classes have always been concentrated in core areas. This is still disproportionately true.

The assessment of both the anti-systemic movements and the regimes which they have had a hand in creating cannot therefore be evaluated in terms of the 'good societies' they have or have not created. They can only be sensibly evaluated by asking how much they have contributed to the world-wide struggle to ensure that the transition from capitalism is towards an egalitarian socialist world-order. Here the accounting is necessarily more ambiguous, because of the workings of the contradictory processes themselves. All positive thrusts involve negative as well as positive consequences. Each weakening of the system in one way strengthens it in others. But not necessarily to equal degrees! The whole question is there.

There is no doubt that the greatest contribution of the anti-systemic movements has occurred in their mobilizing phases. Organizing rebellion, transforming consciousness, they have been liberating forces; and the contributions of individual

movements here have become greater over time, through a feedback mechanism of historical learning.

Once such movements have assumed political power in state structures, they have done less well, because the pressures on them to mute their anti-systemic thrusts, from both without and within the movements, have increased geometrically. Nevertheless, this has not meant a totally negative balance-sheet for such 'reformism' and 'revisionism'. The movements in power have been to some extent the political prisoners of their ideology and hence subject to organized pressure from the direct producers within the revolutionary state and from the anti-systemic movements outside it.

The real danger occurs precisely now, as historical capitalism approaches its most complete unfolding—the further extension of the commodification of everything, the growing strength of the world family of anti-systemic movements, the continued rationalizing of human thought. It is this complete unfolding that will hasten the collapse of the historical system, which has thrived because its logic has hitherto been only partially realized. And precisely while and because it is collapsing, the bandwagon of the forces of transition will seem ever more attractive, and *therefore* the outcome will be ever less certain. The struggle for liberty, equality, and fraternity is protracted, comrades, and the locus of the struggle will be ever more inside the worldwide family of anti-systemic forces themselves.

Communism is Utopia, that is nowhere. It is the avatar of all our religious eschatologies: the coming of the Messiah, the second coming of Christ, nirvana. It is not a historical prospect, but a current mythology. Socialism, by contrast, is a realizable historical system which may one day be instituted in the world. There is no interest in a 'socialism' that claims to

be a 'temporary' moment of transition towards Utopia. There is interest only in a concretely historical socialism, one that meets the minimum defining characteristics of a historical system that maximizes equality and equity, one that increases humanity's control over its own life (democracy), and liberates the imagination.