

# TO SWIM WITH CROCODILES

*Land, Violence, and Belonging in  
South Africa, 1800–1996*



Jill E. Kelly



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LAND, VIOLENCE, AND BELONGING  
IN SOUTH AFRICA, 1800–1996

Jill E. Kelly

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Table Mountain, KwaZulu Natal, South Africa 1992/3. ©1993 Greg Marinovich. Used with permission. All rights reserved.



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*To Buyi, Thando, Phindi,  
and all those who lost parents and loved ones  
in the civil war*



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# Preface and Acknowledgments

**T**he popular isiZulu proverb “*umuntu ngumuntu ngabantu*” has it that a person is a person through other people. Here I would like to express my gratitude to the many people who contributed to my personal and intellectual development—and this book—in a multitude of ways.

I cannot thank enough those at Table Mountain who shared their lives with me. Speaking about history, land, and violence was often a difficult and emotional undertaking; your efforts are appreciated. This book comes out of so many informal conversations and formal interviews with friends, family, and strangers there. I first stayed in Maqongqo in 2007 as part of the Fulbright–Hays Zulu Group Project Abroad (GPA)—many GPA alumni who pick up this book know it well. Ntombi Gcabashe (Ma Mbongwa) opened her home and her family to me. Phindi Gcabashe provided constant companionship, both then and in all of my returns. This family and the community members who helped me with my isiZulu spoke frankly about local deaths during South Africa’s transition-era civil war before I really considered focusing my research on the topic or at Table Mountain. When I expressed an interest in returning to Maqongqo to examine women’s experience of the violence, Ma Mbongwa assured me that she would help. “This house is Inkatha,” she replied, offering her invaluable connections as the widow of one of the area’s most powerful

Inkatha leaders. I would not have known where to start without her and without Phindi. But it was not just these connections that shaped this book.

I began interviews asking women about their lives during the war, but as is the case with most oral history work, they shared what they found most important. Their insights into land and chieftaincy disputes pushed me and the project in new directions that make this book what it is. Women's knowledge permeates these pages, and gender and generation define the cosmological space that serves as the framework of the book.

Thobekile, Buyiswa, and Thandokuhle Maphumulo gave warmly of their memories and welcomed me into their lives. Thando's own quest to understand the history of Table Mountain predates mine; his knowledge and connections make this book possible.

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# Abbreviations

ANC	African National Congress
ANCYL	ANC Youth League
APC	Alan Paton Centre and Struggle Archives
AWB	Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging
AZM	American Zulu Mission
BAC	Bantu Affairs Commissioner
BAD	Department of Bantu Administration and Development
BOSS	Bureau of State Security
CAE	Center for Adult Education
CAMP	Cooperative Africana Microfilm Project
CBAC	Chief Bantu Affairs Commissioner
CCP	Central Cattle Pattern
CLRA	Communal Land Rights Act
CNC	Chief Native Commissioner
CODESA	Convention for a Democratic South Africa
COGTA	Department of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs
Contralesa	Congress of Traditional Leaders of South Africa
COSATU	Congress of South African Trade Unions

CPSA	Communist Party of South Africa
DCD	Department of Cooperation and Development
DDA	Department of Development Aid
DOI	Department of Information
DN	<i>Daily News</i>
ICJ	International Commission of Jurists
ICU	Industrial and Commercial Workers Union
IFP	Inkatha Freedom Party
ITB	Ingonyama Trust Board
JSA	James Stuart Archive
KCAL	Killie Campbell Africana Library
KDC	KwaZulu Development Corporation
KZLA	KwaZulu Legislative Assembly
KZP	KwaZulu Police
MAWU	Metal and Allied Workers Union
MDM	Mass Democratic Movement
MK	Umkhonto weSizwe (Spear of the Nation)
MP	Member of parliament
MRA	Mpumalanga Regional Authority
NAD	Native Affairs Department
NAR	National Archives Repository (Pretoria)
NM	<i>Natal Mercury</i>
NNAC	Natal Native Affairs Commission
NP	National Party
NRC	Native Representatives Council
NW	<i>Natal Witness</i>
NWE	<i>Natal Witness Echo</i>
PAR	Pietermaritzburg Archives Repository
PBAC	Pietermaritzburg Bantu Affairs Commissioner
PNC	Pietermaritzburg Native Commissioner
PWV	Pretoria/Witwatersrand/Vaal
PRD	Department of Plural Relations and Development
PTO	Permission to Occupy
SACC	South African Council of Churches
SACP	South African Communist Party
SACTU	South African Congress of Trade Unions

SADF	South African Defence Force
SAIC	South African Indian Congress
SANAC	South African Native Affairs Commission
SANT	South African Native Trust
SAP	South African Police
SDU	Self Defense Unit
SNA	Secretary for Native Affairs
TCB	Traditional Courts Bill
TLGFA	Traditional Leadership and Governance Framework Act
TRC	Truth and Reconciliation Commission
UAR	Ulundi Archives Repository
UDF	United Democratic Front
USNA	Under Secretary for Native Affairs
UWUSA	United Workers Union of South Africa
VRA	Vulindlela Regional Authority
ZNP	Zulu National Party
ZTA	Zulu Territorial Authority



# Note on Terminology

**S**cholars of South African history continue to wrestle with language. South African identifying terminology, morphology, and place names have changed over time and in some cases are still open to debate. Terms such as “Bantu,” “native,” “non-European,” and “non-white” were deployed by segregation and apartheid laws, and thus are used here only in historically specific contexts or when in quotes from oral and written sources. These, as well as “white,” “Coloured,” and “Indian,” reflect apartheid racial constructs that were wielded as instruments of surveillance and control. Classification informed every aspect of a person’s life. Despite the repeal of the Population Registration Act that bureaucratized these notions, racial categories still hold lingering salience within social consciousness. Here, “African” refers to Bantu-speaking people, while “black” refers to all people of color, as Black Consciousness activists used it. Even the label “Zulu” should be contested. As we will see in chapter 1, Natal’s Africans have not always embraced a Zulu identity. Only in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries did a diverse group of Africans begin to mobilize around Zuluness in the face of increasing discrimination and repression. Today, the term holds common currency to refer to isiZulu-speaking peoples. It is accepted as an identity by many, while others promote alternative identities.

Using isiZulu words in an English text creates numerous problems, including translations and change in orthography over time.<sup>1</sup> The English appellation “chief” is increasingly objected to because it reflects the colonial understandings of traditional authority. Traditional leaders prefer the isiZulu term “*inkosi*” (similarly “*ubukhosi*” for “chieftaincy,” “*isizwe*” for “chiefdom”). Thomas McClendon recently argued that it is more useful to conceptualize “*inkosi*” of the pre-colonial era as “lord,” because of the dignity, reciprocity, and heritability it conveys.<sup>2</sup> Today, and as early as the late 1980s when the ANC opened formal talks with chiefly leaders, “traditional authority” became the term of choice. I agree with McClendon’s argument for the accuracy of “lord” and respect the preference of contemporary traditional leaders but am faced with both theoretical and practical issues. What of the colonially appointed leaders? Can and should “*inkosi*” as “lord” be used for both the hereditary and appointed figures? While perhaps distinguishing between “*inkosi*” and “*isiphakanyiswa*” (“one who is raised up”) for the colonial period is historically accurate, should the distinction be made for other periods in this study, including the contemporary context? Labeling the hereditary as “*inkosi*” and the appointed as “chief” disregards the legitimacy many leaders who descend from appointed officials acquired among their people and ignores the fact that many traditional leaders popularly associated with hereditary status were appointed by Shaka.

I thus use “chief” and “chiefdom” not only with the qualification that no disrespect for preference is intended, but as part of an argument that it is upon us as historians to demonstrate the flexibility inherent in the institution even as colonial and apartheid rule sought to transform it. I use “*inkosi*” or “*induna*” to refer to a contemporary leader with whom I spoke. I use “headman” for the historical position indigenous to the region unless it is a reference to the colonially appointed “*induna*” who served as magisterial assistants and police during colonial rule. I use “traditional authority” in late chapters to signal the growth of consciousness around the term that continues today.

For the polities under examination, there are the many morphological changes possible for their *izibongo*. Special note should be taken regarding the people of KwaNyavu. In 1924, when the “register of tribes” was redone by the Pietermaritzburg magistrate, Chief Ngangezwe Mdluli noted his desire that his chiefdom be recognized by the chiefly family’s *isibongo*—the abakwaMdluli. Previously the register had included both abakwaMdluli and abaseNyavini (the people of Nyavu). Prior to the establishment of the Bantu Authorities boundaries, Nongalaza Mdluli expressed

the preference for amaNyavu. Still other archival documents on the same clan list them as the amaCoseni. Mdluli, Nyavu, and Mcoseli are all ancestors of the same chiefly lineage. In order not to break up the flow of writing with prefixes, I use the clan roots only. I use Mdluli in the first chapter to emphasize the clan to which people at Table Mountain *khonza'd*. Otherwise, I use Nyavu because it was used most frequently in interviews and in the press. Today, members of the Gcumisa remember their ancestor as Salimane, but Swayimane is prominent in the archives, and today, the Gcumisa region is known as KwaSwayimane.

In terms of territory, I use “KwaZulu-Natal” to refer to the modern-day province and “KwaZulu/Natal” to denote the historical region encompassing the colony and province of Natal and Zululand and the KwaZulu Bantustan.





# Prologue

When you call yourself as a Mdluli in this place, people will call you: “Mcoseli, Mbashi, Yengeza, Luyeme and Sali . . .” They say you “who swim in the pool of the crocodile but the crocodile was disinterested as it kept on winnowing air bubbles.”

—*Inkosi Sikhosiphi Mdluli, 2013*

**T**he *izithakazelo* (kinship address names, clan praises) of the Mdluli at Table Mountain, outside of Pietermaritzburg in South Africa, include remembered Mdluli ancestors and the personal praises of Tshiko “Nomsimekwana” Mdluli, the son of Mcoseli Mdluli. Nomsimekwana (d. 1901) was chief of the Nyavu at Table Mountain during the nineteenth century. Nomsimekwana itself is a praise name—the diminutive form of *insimeko*, a portion of meat prepared for roasting—that references the young Tshiko’s near fate as a cannibal’s next meal. His personal praises recall his escape from cannibals and crocodiles.<sup>1</sup>

So-called cannibal stories were plentiful in this region of southeastern Africa during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. *Amazimu*—people who eat up others—captured individuals and forced others into hiding or migration. At Nomsimekwana’s Table Mountain, *amazimu* seized his mother, Ma Mbongwa, and many of the people with whom they lived. Nomsimekwana himself was later

pressed into a long file of captives. He made several attempts to escape and once was wounded when *amazimu* pierced his calf with a spear as he tried to flee. They forced him to carry the lid to the pot in which he would be cooked. But coming upon a pool where the Mpushini flows into the Msunduze River, Nomsimekwana decided it was better to be eaten by the water's creatures than slaughtered and consumed like an animal. Nomsimekwana jumped into the pool, but evaded a dangerous hippopotamus and emerged unscathed.<sup>2</sup> *Amazimu* tales such as these are often translated as accounts of cannibalism. But the entrenching of a cannibal story in the Mdluli's praises and oral accounts is not a fascination with literal cannibals. The term "eat up" was a commonly used political idiom in nineteenth- and twentieth-century African accounts to describe the seizure of an individual or a chiefdom's people and cattle. *Amazimu* stories are cautionary tales about insecurity and the dangers of life outside of centralized authority. They contrast the order and civilization of a chiefdom or kingdom with the disorder and precarity of life outside of a politically centralized society.<sup>3</sup>

Hippopotamuses no longer live in the waterways of Table Mountain, but crocodiles do. The Mdluli *izithakazelo* have adapted to reflect this change in the region's fauna. This daring young man who would become chief and his abilities are called upon in daily life and at ceremonies, as members who share the Mdluli *isibongo* (clan name) mediate social relationships through the use of *izithakazelo*. The practice demonstrates a person's knowledge of the addressee's genealogy, but it can also serve as a record of some of the group's most important male figures, such as founders or the most accomplished members of the lineage, even when the *isibongo* (personal praises) of those figures have been forgotten. They can also describe the landscape where the group resided or the regions they traveled. In this case, they lay claim to the land where Nomsimekwana jumped into the river, now known as Nomsimekwana's pool.

The remembered history of the Nyavu chiefdom's ruling family, its ties to the land in the region of Table Mountain, and the political idiom of cannibalism are embedded in the landscape of the region and the Mdluli's *izithakazelo*. These cultural inheritances, the social and political relationships that enable security and access to land as space and place, are the themes of this book.

# Introduction

**O**n February 25, 1991, Mhlabunzima Joseph Maphumulo, the chief of the Maphumulo people at Table Mountain in Natal, South Africa, was shot dead as he pulled into the driveway of his Pietermaritzburg home. Bullets from a 9mm pistol struck him in the back and head eight times. Neighbors found him slumped at the wheel, but still alive. They rushed the chief to Northdale Hospital, but he was certified dead on arrival. Mhlabunzima was the fourth chief of the Maphumulo, a chiefdom established by the British colonial administration in 1905—a fact that his political opponents used to deride him as “only the fourth chief.” He believed his name, meaning “the earth that is heavy” or “the difficult world” in isiZulu, foretold that he would live in troubled times and have many responsibilities.<sup>1</sup> Indeed, he led his people in an era of unprecedented repression and internecine violence and lived in a changing South Africa.

South Africa’s transition from apartheid to democracy is often heralded as a miracle, both bloodless and peaceful. But as Nelson Mandela walked proudly out of Victor Verster prison in 1990 after twenty-seven years in jail, civil war wracked the nation’s townships and countryside. Over twenty thousand South Africans died in this conflict (1985–1996), more than in any other period of the struggle to overthrow apartheid. Conservative estimates suggest that the war displaced some



**FIGURE 1.** Mhlabunzima Joseph Maphumulo, date unknown.

PHOTO COURTESY OF THOBEKILE MAPHUMULO.

two hundred thousand people. The world watched with bewilderment as civil war ravaged South Africa, particularly the Pretoria/Witwatersrand/Vaal (PWV) area that is now the Gauteng province and what became the province of KwaZulu-Natal. Headlines such as “Tribal Feuds Won’t Let Up in South Africa” and “South African Political Violence Assuming Look of Tribal Conflict” dominated press coverage of the violence.<sup>2</sup> International media misconstrued the war in two significant ways. First, they characterized the war as “tribal,” suggesting a timeless ethnic feud between the Zulus and the rest of black South Africa. Second, they attributed the violence to party politics, competition between the Zulu ethnic nationalist Inkatha Freedom Party of Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi and the African National Congress (ANC) of an isiXhosa-speaking Mandela. As the conflict continued, irrefutable evidence began to emerge that the apartheid government funded Inkatha activities and provided paramilitary training to the organization as part of the state’s Cold War counterrevolutionary efforts.

KwaZulu/Natal, where Zulu fought Zulu, bore the brunt of the violence. South Africa's National Party under President P. W. Botha embarked on a decade of reform and repression in the 1980s as part of a "total strategy" to counter the "total onslaught" of international communism. Total strategy included perpetuating a low-intensity conflict designed to spread fear and internal divisions among apartheid's opposition. Tactics included forming pacts with dissatisfied elements of society, and in KwaZulu/Natal, the success of this low-intensity conflict relied upon Inkatha. While Inkatha's leader, Buthelezi, had his own ambitions and strategies, as did individuals affiliated with the organization, Inkatha became a full-fledged surrogate of the apartheid regime in an international proxy war. Inkatha-allied chiefs and Inkatha headmen hosted South African Defence Force (SADF)-trained KwaZulu soldiers known as Caprivians—after the Caprivi Strip in Namibia where they trained. Thirteen thousand of the estimated twenty thousand dead nationally came from KwaZulu/Natal alone.<sup>3</sup>

The power of Inkatha and its chiefs in rural KwaZulu/Natal forced the ANC to look for progressive isiZulu-speaking chiefs to mobilize rural constituencies. Elite, kin-based networks had long been a vital component of African political life during the twentieth century.<sup>4</sup> While the ANC had denounced the co-optation of traditional authority into the apartheid system of Bantu Authorities, it quietly maintained contact with rural elites such as Thembu King Sabata Dalindyebo. In his 1985 speech to the ANC's Second Consultative Conference in Kabwe, ANC President O. R. Tambo called for renewed efforts to build a mass democratic movement among the rural masses.<sup>5</sup> The conference decided that the ANC needed to differentiate between "puppet and patriotic traditional leaders."<sup>6</sup> By 1988, the ANC's draft constitutional guidelines identified the transformation of traditional leadership in order "to serve the interests of the people as a whole in conformity with the democratic principles embodied in the constitution."<sup>7</sup> The ANC was looking for progressive chiefs—in particular, it needed isiZulu-speaking leaders who by moving into the fold of the anti-apartheid movement could strike back at the power of not only apartheid but also Inkatha and KwaZulu amid a deadly civil war.

The ANC-in-exile worked with its allies in the United Democratic Front (UDF), the umbrella organization that led the internal liberation movement in the 1980s, to reach out to a brash and rebellious traditional leader known for his opposition to Inkatha and his efforts to end South Africa's civil war—Mhlabunzima Joseph Maphumulo. This Table Mountain leader had earned a reputation as "the peace chief," engaging in ethnic and nationalist politics but promoting political tolerance.

His pursuit of peace for a country at war attracted refugees from war-torn areas to his region. He traveled around the world to raise awareness and encourage peace. As the first president of the new Congress of Traditional Leaders of South Africa (Contralesa), an organization of traditional leaders against apartheid and an affiliate of the UDF, he sought to end the civil war and secure a place for traditional authority in post-apartheid South Africa. Mhlabunzima's turn to the UDF and ANC stood in stark contrast to the chiefs and headmen who actively worked with Caprivians and allowed Inkatha's forced recruitment campaigns among their followers. Sipiwe Thusi, an organizer for Contralesa and the UDF, remembered how Mhlabunzima's reputation attracted the UDF and the ANC. "Then they come up with the name of Maphumulo and say, 'there is Maphumulo in KwaZulu, who has been assaulted because he's not against the people themselves. He wants people to be, to do whatever they want, because those years they were trying to force people to join Inkatha. So Maphumulo was saying, 'no, no, no, we cannot force people but they must join Inkatha on their own way.'"<sup>8</sup> As Thusi suggests, Mhlabunzima had a rocky relationship with Inkatha until 1989, when he took a final step away from the ethnic nationalist movement and into the arms of the UDF/ANC after a Contralesa meeting with the ANC-in-exile in Lusaka, Zambia.

Mhlabunzima's August 1989 meeting with the ANC-in-exile reveals the complicated relationship between chiefs, white minority rule, and land in South Africa. The institution of traditional authority had been transformed by colonial and apartheid rule. During the long conquest of South Africa, the British utilized the institution of the chieftaincy to govern African populations in rural reserves, reworking localized fluid political configurations into ethnic identities and landed tribes. They had created Mhlabunzima's own chiefdom, raising up his great-grandfather Maguzu Maphumulo from homestead head to chief in 1905. Chiefs such as Maguzu became salaried servants of empire and white minority rule (see table 1 for changing salaries of chiefs under consideration),<sup>9</sup> tied to tracts of inadequate land and increasingly responsible for unpopular taxation, labor provision, and legal administration at the level of a tribe. Maguzu's son, Ndlovu Maphumulo (chief 1922–1949), governed a chiefdom under constant assault as the years between the world wars brought a renewed emphasis on this tribalization and territorial segregation—as well as forced removals. The regents for the young Mhlabunzima, Siggiza (governed 1949–1952, 1954–1961) and Khangela (governed 1961–1973), faced increasingly confrontational subjects who resisted the apartheid legislation after 1948. Apartheid's ideology of separate development came to incorporate plans for the creation of independent

**TABLE 1. Salaries of Nyavu and Maphumulo Chiefs.**

YEAR	MAPHUMULO		NYAVU	
	Population, counted by dwellings, taxpayers, or estimated people, depending on year	Chief's Salary	Population, counted by dwellings, taxpayers, or estimated people, depending on year	Chief's Salary
1895	Chieftom not yet in existence		520 (dwellings)	£10
1905	324 (dwellings)	£10	809 (dwellings)	£15
1917	850 on location; 1150 on private (est. population)	£10	1000 on location; 500 on mission; 950 on private (est. population)	£15
1933	733 (taxpayers)	£10	1014 (taxpayers)	£15
1952	857 (taxpayers)	£30 + bonus £12	1095 on location; 183 on private (taxpayers)	£36, no bonus
1955-1957	1155 (taxpayers)	£30 + bonus £12	850 on location; 183 on private; paid for 941 (taxpayers)	£36 + bonus £12
<i>1961: South Africa declared Republic, switched to Rand at R2:£1; chiefs given civil authority</i>				
1962		R96 + bonus R48		R96 + bonus R24
1963	1100 on location; 440 on private lands; paid for 1320 (taxpayers)	R96 + bonus R64	1100 on location; 250 on private; paid for 1225 (taxpayers)	R96 + bonus R40
1964		R96 + bonus R60		R96 + bonus R24
1978		R495 + R3600 KZLA MP		R495 + R3600 KZLA MP
1979		R936 chief stipend + R5040 KZLA MP + R800 Maphumulo Tribal Authority salary		R936 chief stipend + R5040 KZLA MP (unknown if Nyavu Tribal Authority paid additional salary)

Sources: See note 9 for table sources.

ethnic “homelands,” or Bantustans, under the Bantu Authorities system that tasked chiefs with implementing detested policies in sham states. Mhlabunzima (chief 1973–1991) took over the chieftaincy in the first years of the KwaZulu Bantustan and became a member of parliament in the new KwaZulu Legislative Assembly.



At the meeting with the ANC in Zambia, Mhlabunzima and the Contralesa delegates were keenly aware of this tenuous position of chiefs and the ANC's need. Mhlabunzima worried about the safety of his people in a land at war, but he was also thinking about the future of his leadership. The Contralesa delegates were deeply concerned about their own positions in a country on the brink of political transformation, given suspicions that the UDF would advocate for the abolition of the chieftaincy. Mhlabunzima wanted a guarantee that when the ANC came to power, it would recognize traditional authority. The Contralesa team returned to South Africa assured not only that the ANC recognized the role of traditional leaders in the struggle but that traditional leadership would not be eliminated in a democratic South Africa. In a joint memorandum after the meeting, the groups called upon traditional leaders to refuse to implement apartheid policies and join their followers in the struggle against white minority rule. The document recognized the profound effects of apartheid on South Africa's traditional leaders: "From leaders responsible and responsive to the people, you are being forced by the regime to become its paid agents. From being a force for unity and prosperity you are turned into perpetrators of division, poverty and want among the oppressed. The so-called homeland system, land deprivation, forced removals and the denial of basic political rights—all these and more are the anti-people policies that the white ruling clique forces the chiefs to implement on its behalf."<sup>10</sup>

The ANC and the aligned chiefs called upon a historical understanding of traditional authority and belonging in a chiefdom in which leaders governed by the people, a definition embodied by the isiZulu-language proverb "*inkosi yinkosi ngabantu*," or "a chief is a chief by the people who *khonza* him."<sup>11</sup> The practice of *ukukhonza* is one of affiliation, a social agreement that historically bound together subjects and leaders to provide land and security. But as the ANC and Contralesa acknowledged, centuries of white minority rule constrained the ability of chiefs to govern according to this contract. Colonial officials failed to recognize any limitations upon chiefs implied in the proverb. Land had long been part of the act of *ukukhonza*, but colonialism tied chiefs more firmly to territorial governance—a policy that resulted in a proliferation of land disputes. Scholars have perceived this as a revolution in power; Percy Ngonyama posited it as a transformation in which the isiZulu proverb became "*inkosi yinkosi ngendawo*," or "a chief is a chief by territory."<sup>12</sup> But this does not mean that land was never a factor in the chieftaincy before colonialism or that the expectations implied by *ukukhonza* disappeared from political memory under colonialism. Both chiefs and subjects continued to

use the practice across the nineteenth and twentieth centuries—in ways both new and old.

Mhlabunzima himself deployed the practice when he welcomed refugees from the civil war into his Maphumulo chiefdom and onto contested land. Mhlabunzima's area at Table Mountain initially remained a haven of peace as the violence raged. By October 1988, over five hundred families affiliated with both Inkatha and the UDF moved to Table Mountain from their war-torn townships. Thobile Ngcobo recalls moving after her brother was killed when the war broke out in KwaShange in 1987. Their pastor's family was from Maqongqo and told them about Mhlabunzima, so they packed all of their belongings.<sup>13</sup> Sipiwe Maphumulo remembered assisting another to become a member of the Maphumulo: "I also *khonzela*'d someone. This person was also working for the same white person. Then I introduced him to [Mhlabunzima] and they advised him to *khonzela* the chief."<sup>14</sup> These refugees *khonza*'d Mhlabunzima and recognized him as their new chief. After a "peace party" to which he welcomed leaders and supporters affiliated with Inkatha and the UDF, Mhlabunzima explained the expectation that the refugees *khonza* him:

People are not made to pay money to live in the area, but in our tradition they are expected to pay 'khonza'—a tribute to the chief—just like when they leave the area they are supposed to pay 'valelisa' to the chief they have been staying under. Few people are paying 'valelisa' these days, because they are fleeing from attacks on them . . . A goat is sufficient for 'khonza' but if a person does not have one, then a small amount of money, depending on the person's circumstances, is expected.<sup>15</sup>

Transformations to the chieftaincy over the 150 years since the British annexed Natal in 1843 might lead one to skeptically see this as a payment for land or even a bribe, as an example of what Jeff Guy has elsewhere described as a continuation of form without what had been unique dynamic content.<sup>16</sup>

But an examination of *ukukhonza* over the *longue durée* at Table Mountain reveals otherwise. This cultural inheritance enabled chiefly subjects to define belonging in a chiefdom and demand accountability, land, and—especially important in times of war—security. Those who *khonza*'d Mhlabunzima respected the man they came to see as "the peace chief" and appreciated his provision of land and safety. But those within and outside his chiefdom who desired the land onto which the refugees settled saw him as manipulative and the refugees as interlopers. Questions about who belonged to the Maphumulo chiefdom swelled around the

chief and his new followers. His opponents allied themselves with Inkatha and the Inkatha-allied Nyavu chiefdom and brought the war with the ANC to Table Mountain in 1990. The next year, the chief was assassinated—shot dead in the driveway of his home by an apartheid hit squad working with his local detractors.

Mhlabunzima's life and untimely death are so compelling because they provide just one glimpse into how people continued to use knowledge about practices rooted in South Africa's Late Iron Age<sup>17</sup> long after the onset of colonialism and apartheid. The policies of indirect rule, segregation, and separate development did put down boundaries in efforts to concretize formerly fluid polities into territorial tribes and ethnic identities, but the practice of *ukukhonza* maintained its flexibility, and membership in chiefdoms continued to be fluid even as ethnic identity expanded in the region. This is not to say that *ukukhonza* traversed the nineteenth and twentieth centuries unchanged, but to highlight how its adaptability served rural subjects in a myriad of ways to be examined in this book. During times of war and peace, it allowed rural peoples to seek out security and provided a conceptual framework for defining membership in a chiefdom, debating the responsibilities of authority, and distinguishing who had access to resources.

## Defining Authority and Defining Belonging in Times of War or Peace

*To Swim with Crocodiles* is a history of *ukukhonza*, examined through the politics of the Table Mountain region in KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa, over the *longue durée*. The book offers new perspectives on South Africa's transition-era civil war and the chieftaincy by considering how Africans relied upon and adapted cultural inheritances that governed connections between chiefs and subjects. It shows how ordinary Africans and their leaders used social and political practices rooted in the Late Iron Age to contest land, authority, and belonging, and ensure social and physical security under constraints imposed by the chieftaincy and colonial and apartheid rule. The book thus takes a broad view of politics beyond the organizational, focusing on the "politics of the people" as embodied in *ukukhonza*.<sup>18</sup> I argue that Africans at Table Mountain used the cultural inheritances of allegiance-giving and genealogical imagination despite colonial and apartheid efforts to transform such relationships to tribal ones based on territory. Genealogical imagination tied people to land and gave familial-like definitions to relationships between chiefdoms.

Rooting the study in *ukukhonza* thus challenges arguments about instrumental and constructivist causes about internal African conflicts such as those labeled “faction-fighting” and the transition-era civil war.

The book starts from the premise that Late Iron Age people organized their societies not according to tribe but according to affiliations facilitated by *ukukhonza*. The subjects of this book include some whose ancestors lived long at Table Mountain, while others moved into the region from Zululand after the advent of colonial rule or after forced removals. Their ancestors spoke variations of Southeast Bantu languages before isiZulu came to dominate the region. From the Late Iron Age through apartheid, the polities to which they affiliated themselves were heterogeneous. During the second half of the nineteenth century, they pledged allegiance to Nomsimekwana Mdluli, the young leader from Table Mountain who survived crocodiles, “cannibals,” and the era of state building (1770s–1830s) by forming similar allegiances with more powerful leaders. Or they pledged allegiance to Ngoza Majози, who moved to Natal from Zululand and allied himself to Natal’s colonial officials. He acquired cattle through his labor and built the largest chiefdom in the colony of Natal. These subjects of Nomsimekwana and Ngoza were classified by colonial officials and missionaries as the Nyavu, the Qamu, and later, as the Qamu splintered, the Mkhize, Gcumisa, and Maphumulo of Mhlabunzima’s great-grandfather, Maguzu. Far from being homogeneous polities, membership fluctuated and what it meant to be a member changed over time. Focusing on *ukukhonza* shows how local identities were constructed vis-à-vis chiefs and the land.

The body of practices examined here—*ukukhonza* and genealogical imagination—might broadly be termed “custom” or “tradition,” but these practices were and are far from static, as is often implied by those terms. These popular politics were flexible and adaptable. For this reason, Carolyn Hamilton and Simon Hall’s concept of “cultural inheritances” is preferred to convey that identities and practices could continue over time even as they were refashioned in different situations.<sup>19</sup> Practices such as *ukukhonza* must be envisioned as “living” inheritances that adapt as society changes.<sup>20</sup>

*To Swim with Crocodiles* tracks the use of these cultural inheritances by following contests over authority and land at Table Mountain over 150 years. It examines the deployment of *ukukhonza* and genealogical imagination in the making of chiefdoms and the building of relationships within and between these chiefdoms through episodes of nineteenth-century state building, colonial land disputes, so-called faction fighting, forced removals for separate development and the construction

of a dam, anti-apartheid resistance, and the transition-era civil war. The focus on the micro-level blurs chronological boundaries and the perceived sharp break between “chiefs by the people” and “chiefs by land,” showing how knowledge of practices rooted in the Late Iron Age allowed rural subjects to seek land, security, and accountability. It reveals how relationships between chiefs and their followers defined local identities and intersected with and diverged from ethnic and African national identities.

The book advances two interrelated arguments. First, Africans continued to use the cultural inheritance of *ukukhonza* to shape the relationships between chiefs and their subjects, even as those bonds were transformed by colonial and apartheid rule. Colonial and apartheid laws prevented custom from evolving as it otherwise might have, contributing to the development of the categories of “tribes” and chieftaincy. Colonial and apartheid rule changed chiefly authority by incorporating chiefs into governance and territorializing chiefly authority, the latter a process that is much more incomplete than has been generally recognized by scholars. But chiefs and their subjects could still mobilize cultural inheritances such as *ukukhonza* to inform their responses. While they continued to use *ukukhonza*, what they expected in return did adapt and vary—especially after the rise of national resistance to apartheid when the language of rights came to shape the expectations of rural Africans. During times of violence—particularly the growth of kingdoms north of the Thukela River and the transition-era civil war—this meant physical security. At other times, they demanded access to land or exemptions from public labor. As resistance to apartheid grew, they sought accountable leaders who would not implement betterment schemes or cooperate with Bantu Authorities. They made decisions about relocations and defined communities of insiders and outsiders. Intricately tied to *ukukhonza*, Africans used *ukudabuka*, a process by which one clan split into two or more units, creating new clan affiliations during the early years of colonial rule.<sup>21</sup> *Ukudabuka* produced new polities that maintained genealogical-like connections and imagined their own origin stories.

These practices contributed to a cosmology—what Christopher Lee has elsewhere called a genealogical imagination<sup>22</sup>—in which *ukukhonza* and genealogy provided the language for social and political membership, bringing to life new or reimagined relationships between peoples and with land. Here, genealogy is not always about literal kin but about one’s origins and the birth of new chiefdoms in relationship to others and the land. How and where chiefdoms began—and where chiefs were buried—mattered. Oral accounts about origins and genealogy,

deployed in colonial offices or history projects, are discourses about politics and belonging.

The theoretical framework that informs this argument is that land operated as both physical and cosmological space and a historical place.<sup>23</sup> The land that people claimed and contested with cultural inheritances needs to be envisioned as both space required for physical and spiritual security and as particular places that historically sustained groups of people. Space in this sense conveys a complex set of ideas and principles of organization. For the peoples of southeastern Africa who came under the rule of the Zulu kingdom in the early nineteenth century and later came to see themselves as ethnically Zulu, this was the cosmological space that organized society and allowed for social and agricultural reproduction. This was rooted in the homestead, in which every male homestead head, wife, and child was assigned a place in relation to each other and the ancestors. From there, homesteads connected with the chief through *ukukhonza*, and later, also, a king. This conceptual schema was visible in the physical organization of the homestead, but the arrangement was also necessary according to the logic of a moral order that enabled social reproduction and collective well-being. This spatial, cosmological order was crucial to the security of homesteads, as was the more pragmatic space within that schema, where practical activities of reproduction took place such as planting, harvesting, and herding. Space allowed for social reproduction, for Africans to expand and create new homesteads. It is in this sense that land served as space—land upon which to start homesteads, sustain themselves, and reproduce. Land as space was always needed for security, at times of peace or war.

Place, on the other hand, is more specific. Places acquire deep meaning for persons through accretion of sentiment and informed local identities. The value of place emerges out of the intimacy of human relationships.<sup>24</sup> This is particularly so for Africans who saw places as the burial sites of ancestors. Here, space is not easily exchangeable, for the particularity of space matters and contributes to order. As colonial rule marked boundaries, promoted different conceptions of land as property, and ignored women's rights to agricultural fields, chiefs embraced this territorial governance and sought ways to regain ground lost by the demarcation of white-owned land and the proliferation of chieftaincies under colonial rule. The Nyavu chiefs at Table Mountain—Nomsimekwana Mdluli and his descendants—accepted the idea of boundaries, but not the location of them. They deployed origin stories, a genealogical imagination that allowed them to argue land as the place of their ancestors, to gain access to the land as space that enabled social reproduction.

Government chiefs such as Mhlabunzima's ancestors initially lacked these same kinds of historical claims to land as place and thus called upon the *ukukhonza* relationship—because they had followers there, the boundaries should be adjusted. But as contests over the boundary between the Maphumulo and Nyavu continued over the twentieth century, the disputed land became place for the Maphumulo whose ancestors had been given access to space in the region as they fled the Zulu kingdom and as they were forced from land for the construction of a dam. In this sense, the Maphumulo deployed genealogical imagination to develop origin stories that told of the birth of the chiefdom and connected them to their neighbors and the particular place they came to inhabit.

Neither of these concepts of land can be separated from notions of security—both the physical security endangered in times of violence and the social security produced by the order of homesteads and chiefdoms that enabled familial and community well-being. Onto this multifaceted view of land were mapped—literally—the geographical understandings and political desires of the colonizing power as colonial and apartheid officials drew boundaries to bring into being their ideas of tribe.<sup>25</sup> New ways of seeing land and politics did not erase the old, but came to exist alongside them, at times overlapping and at other times coming into conflict with them.

Understanding the resilience of such knowledge provides the framework for rethinking violence. The second argument advanced is that local conflict within and between chiefdoms can be better understood as part of a longer process of negotiating relationships in which historic denial of authority and land became personal for those participating. Violence within African communities is a phenomenon more difficult to understand than African resistance to conquest, dispossession, or authoritarian rule.<sup>26</sup> Scholars tend to explain these internal conflicts, or faction fights, and the transition-era civil war in South Africa as informed by instrumental and constructivist causes.<sup>27</sup> By focusing on the local and identifying how denials of land and authority were internalized, this book complicates the narrative about South Africa's transition-era civil war as state-supported political violence and unpacks African involvement on both sides without resorting to resistance and collaboration as overly simple explanations. It shows how local political relationships and identities intersected and diverged from national politics. As Mhlabunzima welcomed refugees onto contested land at Table Mountain, a long-standing dispute over the land between Mhlabunzima's followers and their neighbors, the Nyavu, erupted into war. The Nyavu envisioned this land—land with

which they identified in oral accounts—as place long denied them by the creation of chieftaincies under colonialism. This contest between chiefdoms spread to within the Maphumulo, as members debated who belonged, who had access to resources, and what it meant to be a chief. Mhlabunzima's detractors took their complaints to KwaZulu administrators, where they found sympathetic allies—and a plan for political assassination.

The book tracks knowledge about a political practice by which allegiances were pledged, by which outsiders became insiders, and with which insiders demanded access to land, security, and accountability. In doing so, this book contributes to a recent turn in scholarship that seeks to write histories “before categories” or, as Paul Landau wrote, “before tribes,” to show how tribal classifications developed. Macrohistories grounded in African archaeology, linguistics, and knowledge can undermine the categories of analyses that underlie larger narratives.<sup>28</sup> Focusing on the micro-level shows how even as membership in a Zulu nation became a dominant identity in southeast Africa during the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries, membership in local polities continued to be fluid and contested. Only by reframing the analysis to consider these cultural inheritances can one properly assess the changes and continuities in African politics after the onset of colonial rule. Here it is important to treat the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries not merely as the prelude to colonial rule, but as an integral period that shaped the course of political change.

Attention to *ukukhonza* allows us to see how societies defined membership and therefore who had access to land and who controlled its management. Sara Berry's work has shown the significance of history in performing these claims on land; Carola Lentz's work in particular looks at the telling of firstcomer stories and oral land registries as a way Africans connected themselves to the land.<sup>29</sup> This book owes much to Berry and Lentz, intervening to show how in calling on history, both of the *longue durée* and the recent, Africans at Table Mountain deployed *ukukhonza* and different understandings of land as ordered space and historical place to access land, even as colonial and apartheid rule, development projects, and civil war transformed the relations between subjects and chiefs. A genealogical imagination enabled people to construct political origin stories out of the colonial creation of tribes and forced relocations.

As an agreement between homestead heads and leaders, *ukukhonza* also allows us to consider the internal politics of subjects, not just the relationship between the dominant and subordinate.<sup>30</sup> Within the homestead and chiefdom, gender and



generation shaped relationships. The colonial freezing of customary law failed to recognize women's rights to land, defining them as subordinates in the homestead. After the arrival of Christian missionaries in southeast Africa, conversion produced a new class of mission-educated and aspirant *amakhobwa* (believers) who at times worked with or against chiefly authority. The rise of ethnic and national politics also worked through the chieftaincy. This should bring home that identification with a chief was only one identity among others; each chapter in this book considers how chiefs, young men, *amakhobwa*, wives left behind by migrant laborers, and ethnic and African nationalists granted and contested authority and attempted to access land. These positions impacted how people selected and chose which cultural inheritances to use to meet particular challenges.

## Authority, Land, and Violence in the Literature

By examining *ukukhonza* in the *longue durée*, the book opens new vistas into some of the classic concerns of African history—the legitimacy of traditional authority, tribalization, wealth in land and people, and violence. It thus reframes how we think about the relationships between chiefs and their followers, and challenges popular notions of South Africa's transition-era civil war as fueled by tribalism or political rivalry between the ANC and the Zulu nationalist Inkatha. This book shows that privileging chiefly connections with colonial and apartheid agents obscures the continuing and complex relationships between chiefs and followers, and how Africans attempted to hold leaders accountable with cultural inheritances such as *ukukhonza*.

It has become more or less conventional wisdom that access to land in Africa is dependent on social agreements between institutions or figures of authority and their followers.<sup>31</sup> Scholarship on the “wealth in people” concept suggests that land was not a scarce commodity and thus African societies valued people more than land.<sup>32</sup> These scholars generally only trace landholding from the onset of colonial rule, when land access became scarce and Europeans introduced notions of property rights.<sup>33</sup> But these emphases ignore the political and social value Africans placed on land, or as Assan Sarr has argued, the ways in which land enabled a system of dependency that gave elites their privileged status.<sup>34</sup> Contests over resources—between firstcomers and later comers, insiders and outsiders—are actually a “phenomenon of the *longue durée*.”<sup>35</sup> Colonial rule opened new opportunities for

contesting land rights. Struggles over land were as much about power and control of people as about access to land as a factor of production.<sup>36</sup> In this recent literature on people and land, Igor Kopytoff's 1987 elucidation on insiders and outsiders has seen a resurgence as a way of understanding the production of identities that fuel such contests in Iron Age, colonial, and post-colonial settings. To describe ethnic and racial narratives as solely the outcome of colonial policies is to dismiss the agency, creativity, and preexisting practices of Africans.<sup>37</sup> Examining *ukukhonza* reveals a local political discourse by which Africans at Table Mountain defined who belonged and who had access to resources—and how they personalized denials of such resources in both colonial offices and violent contests.

Studies of succession and land disputes reveal the fluidity of the institution of traditional authority and the multiple forms of authority that chiefs and colonial officials promoted. Indigenous political structures across the continent creatively responded to colonial rule and the modernization of post-colonial states.<sup>38</sup> Naaborko Sackeyfio-Lenoch's work on the Ga chieftaincy in the port capital of Accra demonstrates the great variety of forms indirect rule took just in West Africa and thus the need for localized studies that can reveal this diversity.<sup>39</sup> On the other hand, many scholars posit the onset of colonial rule as a radical revolution in rural politics, the arrival of white minority rule as a break in which leaders ceased to be accountable to their subjects. Mahmood Mamdani's argument here is the most well-known. Mamdani contends that the incorporation of traditional authority into colonial and apartheid rule resulted in the bifurcation of the state where chiefs practiced "decentralized despotism" over rural subjects.<sup>40</sup> Indeed, studies have shown how chiefs could be murderous, corrupt, drunk, and complicit with white minority rule.<sup>41</sup> But this overwhelming focus on white manipulation of chiefs assumes that colonial bureaucratization made leaders accountable only to the state, thus obscuring how their communities experienced changes and continued to make demands. Attention to what Shula Marks called the "ambiguities of dependence" better reveals the precarious position of chiefs not only with the white state but also with their subjects.<sup>42</sup>

This book thus deepens scholarship on traditional authority that highlights the ambiguous position of chiefs, but it also asks: What pressures were their subjects putting on them that made their status so precarious? Shifting the focus from the centralized state to local areas, and from the relationship between chiefs and white states to the ties between chiefs and subjects, allows us to see that Africans continued to deploy inherited practices of affiliation and allegiance to shape

relationships with their leaders and to make decisions in moments of change. Landau's work on chiefships of the Highveld in South Africa convincingly shows how knowledge about power continued even as polities became tribes, how leadership became ritual and custom as Christians refitted ideas about authority in peasant movements. Landau illustrates transformations in consciousness where religion became the vehicle of amalgamation.<sup>43</sup> But that does not mean that Africans did not continue to use knowledge about practices that facilitated amalgamation to hold chiefly leaders accountable, even as concepts of ethnicity and tribe became the mode of administration. Indeed, the analysis here of chiefships across the Drakensburg Mountains from Landau's subjects suggests how transformations and continuities in Natal differed from the Highveld despite a shared Iron Age logic. The creation of the African reserves in Natal enabled many chiefs to remain embedded in place, and thus cultural inheritances such as *ukukhonza* continued to bind diverse people together. Even appointed chiefs or chiefs on "white farms" used genealogical imagination to claim land, promote their authority, and retain followers. There thus remains a need to consider legitimacy historically; tracking *ukukhonza* across the nineteenth and twentieth centuries allows us to see how knowledge about the practice continued, even as chiefly authority was territorialized and expectations for return adapted.

Understanding how everyday Africans contested and granted chiefly legitimacy is also critical to better understanding how colonial rule operated in the everyday lives of rural Africans. Many of the changes in Natal were part of a larger pattern across colonies on the continent in which chiefs were drawn into colonial administration to constrain spending. Colonial rule required intermediaries to bring "civilization" to Africans and extract wealth. It is now recognized that the colonial state drew its legitimacy from traditional authority. Colonial officials modeled their rule on their concept of African authoritarian governance, but in practice, African systems of authority were much more dependent on followers. This form of indirect rule was actually quite varied across time and the British empire. Localized African discourses limited colonial invention.<sup>44</sup> Studies of Natal's Theophilus Shepstone as the "Supreme Chief," Transkei magistrates as able to access magic as chiefs could, and accusations of chiefs as witches in the Northern Transvaal all suggest the fruits of rooting analysis in African frameworks.<sup>45</sup> Locating the origins and evolutions of ideas enables a history of political ideas in southeast Africa that, as Moses Ochonu has argued, "can clarify the contours of political events and practices that emanate from those ideas."<sup>46</sup> This work extends the analysis of how Africans used existing

knowledge and inherited practices to interpret and navigate change by taking a *longue durée* approach. The focus on the micro-level highlights the African ideas and processes that enabled chiefly legitimacy and shows how everyday Africans utilized these cultural inheritances across the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

In the region that is today KwaZulu-Natal, colonial rule both enshrined patriarchy at the level of chiefdom and homestead, and opened opportunities to resist it. Scholars have shown that initial British rule in Natal might better be called “limited rule,” not part of some “Shepstonian system” and only giving way to indirect rule in the wake of Shepstone’s removal from power.<sup>47</sup> The 1891 Code of Native Law appeared to make social forms concrete. The code preserved patriarchy and polygamy, but patriarchy without independent means of production and reproduction, and without land to sustain. The homestead’s ability to reproduce itself in an exchange of internally created labor power in a cycle of production and reproduction had collapsed as Africans were forced into an external economic system to survive.<sup>48</sup> An “accommodation of patriarchs” grew between male Africans and white officials in response to the accelerated movement of women—whose rights to land had been ignored in the new code of law—to cities and missions. Young men whose work as migrant laborers gave them access to cattle could bypass elders and forge their own path to becoming patriarchs, revealing their investment in the structures of patriarchy and chieftainship they appeared to be rejecting in generational struggles.<sup>49</sup> At the level of the chieftaincy, bureaucratic permissions and legal boundaries constrained the manner in which Africans could give allegiance and expect returns.

While these changes in economic systems saw an accommodation of patriarchs from above, people continued to use *ukukhonza* to make demands, shape decisions, and access resources. Colonial officials recognized the practice of personal allegiance and attempted to transform it, using the language of *ukukhonza* to describe relationships between chiefs and those who “pay [taxes] under” them, and to force these allegiances into territorial ones. Chiefs embraced territorial boundaries, but used *ukukhonza* bonds and local understandings of space and place to claim old or additional lands. Homestead heads used *ukukhonza* strategically to get out of *isibhalo* (public labor). Families used it to make decisions about relocations when forced from homes by development projects and civil war. Claims to land, authority, and membership in a chiefdom were constantly being performed and contested—as they had been prior to conquest. Both the personal allegiance of *ukukhonza* and territorial affiliations coexisted during the creation of government tribes under colonialism and the piecemeal bounding of

chiefly authority. The combination of increasing African populations and limited land granted for African occupation produced disputes over boundaries in which chiefs called upon *ukukhonza*, historical occupation of place, and genealogical imagination to increase their territory. Chiefs were not the only actors making claims and debating land and authority; their followers made denials of land and power personal in contests over land, disputes about legitimacy, and violent battles at the local and national levels. The act of *ukukhonza* enabled subjects to make demands of chiefs—demands that changed according to the time and place. It is not coincidental that these conflicts and calls upon *ukukhonza* represent moments of great insecurity—around the availability of land, the ability of a family to sustain itself physically and spiritually after forced relocations or when forced into *isibhalo*, or corporal safety in the context of war.

This insecurity and violence has been central to the history of South Africa, embedding itself into nearly every facet of South African society—from the genocide of the Cape San, to the rise and fall of African kingdoms, the South African War, the structural brutality of the apartheid regime and resistance to it, and post-apartheid crime and sexual violence. Clifton Crais has gone so far to suggest that “in some respects, modern African history is a history of violence.”<sup>50</sup> Violence as used here is understood as both physical inflictions and those assaults on human dignity and ways of life. While scholars of African history have rightly pointed out how focus on such violence served the mythmaking of white settlers and the propaganda of the apartheid state, this does not negate that severe and everyday violence shaped people’s lives at different points in African history. At each stage examined here, colonial and apartheid figures contributed to collective violence, but the effects of these administrators and policies were only one element amid complex politics. On the other hand, we must be wary that this attention to conflict obscures the ways in which Africans promoted cohesion, and that martiality was only one component of manly honor and multiple masculinities.<sup>51</sup> Focusing on *ukukhonza* here allows us to see how Africans used cultural inheritances to define insiders as well as outsiders in periods of both diplomacy and violence.

Periods of great violence bookend this study—the conflicts that built kingdoms in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries and the civil war that shaped the making of the democratic South Africa. The years in between saw smaller scale violent skirmishes within and between rural African communities. For a long time, scholars and analysts seemed reluctant to describe the violence of 1985–1996 as a war.<sup>52</sup> With at least twenty thousand dead, two hundred thousand-plus refugees, and

thousands more injured, raped, and abducted, there can be little doubt that many residents of KwaZulu-Natal and the PWV townships were actually at war. Journalists revived ideas dispelled by revisionist studies of Zulu state building—particularly that of the deadly Zulu warrior. Local studies of the war reveal the disjuncture between the local and provincial/national politics during the transition-era political violence.<sup>53</sup> Much of the scholarly literature on the war rejects monocausal explanations yet focuses on particular emphases—instrumentalist, political, and cultural factors.

Instrumentalist approaches prove the careful orchestration by the apartheid state and its surrogates who stood to gain from violence and African disunity. They highlight how elements within the security forces and state surrogates, in particular Inkatha, instigated the violence to weaken the ANC.<sup>54</sup> Closely related, the political rivalry between the ANC and Inkatha dominates the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) Report and non-academic sources.<sup>55</sup> These diverse accounts essentially argue that rival political organizations utilized violence to maximize their support in anticipation of democratic elections.<sup>56</sup> Debby Bonnin's careful analysis of one of the most brutal areas of fighting, Mpumalanga township, combines these perspectives and shows the intersection of local, regional, and national political dynamics as engines of violence.<sup>57</sup> Government support for Inkatha in a war against the ANC was further fueled by the collapse of apartheid institutions, such as the Bantustans and migrant labor hostels, and a deep recession that generated high rates of urban migration and heightened competition over land, housing, employment, and other scarce material resources.<sup>58</sup> This instrumentalist and political rivalry literature tends to obscure on-the-ground participants and their reasons for going to war.

Cultural approaches have more success in this endeavor, identifying divisions between a traditionally oriented rural Inkatha and a young, modern, and urban ANC—although this dichotomy did not always play out at Table Mountain. These studies point to the way the conflicting parties labeled their enemies according to perceived cultural differences. Jason Hickel offers the most in-depth examination of cultural differences between the warring parties. Building on Mamdani, he argues that the bifurcation of urban and rural Africans under colonial administration policies resulted in two radically disparate moral orders. Interpreting democratic transformation through their culturally particular moral paradigm in which hierarchical social relations govern for the collective well-being, rural Inkatha supporters sought to defend themselves and their worldview through violence directed against

the ANC.<sup>59</sup> Hicckel's work shows how such knowledge could inform the actions of Inkatha supporters. This book reveals how chiefs aligned with the UDF and ANC also sought to harness this social order to mobilize rural constituencies in the last years of apartheid.

The smaller, local conflicts of the colonial and apartheid era, labeled "faction fights" by white administrators and settlers, occurred in the context of particular material crisis conditions, including social dislocation and disintegration as a result of urbanization, land shortages, and natural disasters. The oversimplified and generalized term "faction fight" reflects the stereotypical belief about the inherent violence of Africans. Jabulani Sithole argues that the widespread use of the term obscures the roles of non-African players in the making of violent conflict within and between African communities. Sithole suggests the phrase *izimpi zemibango*, or wars of disputes, allows for a variety of agents, issues, and interests that must be considered in examinations of violent conflict.<sup>60</sup> These *izimpi zemibango* often erupted between chiefdoms, between wards (*izigodi*) within a chiefdom, or between factions that formed around leaders competing for the position of chief. This kind of fighting increased between the 1880s and the 1900s, and by 1905 was the second most prosecuted crime. The fighting usually reflected youthful initiative and coincided with alcohol consumption at weddings and on holidays. At the same time that the conflicts reflected growing contempt for African patriarchs, chiefs and elders also had vested interest in presenting these conflicts as the realm of youth.<sup>61</sup>

Both everyday and exceptional violence between groups cannot be simplified as resulting from social strain; there is nothing inevitable about tension erupting in violence. Jonathan Glassman shows that we must understand how narratives of past events in which ancestors were discriminated against in some way come to be reinscribed as part of deeply personal experiences and fears of ordinary people, the ways in which historical events become "remembered memories."<sup>62</sup> For members of the Nyavu at Table Mountain, the social memory of the denial of land and authority by the appointment of chiefs and the creation of government tribes became personal with each attempt of their chief to reclaim those resources. When a homestead head erected a new home on the wrong side of a boundary line, overcrowding on location land prevented a young man from establishing his own homestead, or a thoroughfare was blocked by new boundaries, the historical loss of land and chiefly authority became a contemporary affront. In this way, social tensions between insiders and outsiders, between chiefdoms, did result in violence at Table Mountain when memories and interpretations of historical denial became personal.

But this violence was not always between insiders and outsiders (in defense of one's chief) but also about defining belonging. This is most explicit in the manner in which the civil war unfolded at Table Mountain. As violence shifted from between chiefdoms to within the Maphumulo, a conflict raged over who counted as a member of the Maphumulo. But this conflict over definition can also be seen in the *izimpi zemibango*. While historians have often cast these conflicts in instrumental terms—in pursuit of resources, whether guided from above or not—this explanation obscures that the very access to resources depended on one's relationships with a chief and that subjects could deploy cultural inheritances to shape those relationships.

## Situating Table Mountain, Sources, and Methods

This book is a macrohistory of a microregion. Table Mountain (*eMkhambathini*) refers to both KwaZulu-Natal's own flat-topped mountain situated forty kilometers northeast of the provincial capital at the confluence of the Msunduze and Mngeni rivers and the larger region surrounding the mountain.<sup>63</sup> This mountain is certainly not as well-known as Cape Town's iconic Table Mountain, but to those who live in its shadow, it is no less grand. When the British extended their power in southern Africa from the neighboring Cape Colony to Natal, the people who *khonza'd* the Nyavu chief near Table Mountain consisted of some nine hundred followers. Thereafter, its population was counted by its taxpayers (under the "hut tax," in numbers of dwellings, and later under the poll tax, in number of men). By 1905, the Nyavu had over eight hundred dwellings and the Maphumulo, 324. In the 1960s, the Nyavu taxpayers counted over 1,200 and the Maphumulo 1,320. By 1990, Mhlabunzima alleged he had thirty-five thousand followers. Examining the production of knowledge at this micro-level shows, as Nancy Jacobs and Andrew Bank recently argued, "boundaries to be fuzzy, with connections across them."<sup>64</sup> Here these boundaries are temporal—the pre-colonial, colonial, apartheid, and post-apartheid periods—across which Africans continued to employ cultural inheritances from the Late Iron Age. They are also boundaries of knowledge—of what Africans knew about preexisting practices and continued to use, of what Europeans knew about African politics, and of the ways that these diverged and overlapped.

This *longue durée* history of Table Mountain, its chiefs, and their followers relies on a variety of oral and written sources. It is important to recognize at the outset of





**FIGURE 2.** Table Mountain from Maqongqo, 2010. PHOTOGRAPH BY AUTHOR.

this discussion of sources that the oral and written are not reified or concrete. No form of knowledge is exclusive; individuals use both to communicate with specific audiences and to tell better stories.<sup>65</sup> The separation between oral tradition and oral testimony is far less clear than usually assumed by scholars. Both are formed by the same process. Oral traditions are conveyed by testimony and testimonies can draw on “traditional historical perceptions.”<sup>66</sup> Just as boundaries are blurred when focusing on the micro-level, many of the oral sources considered here distort these perceived boundaries. I thus treat them as “oral accounts” to recognize these shared processes. Colonial officials and African elites recorded many of these oral accounts, which are now archived in private, provincial, and national repositories. In some cases, the same individual gave an oral testimony in one instance and in another used local amanuenses to deliver letters.

Keeping these things in mind, oral sources have served as the clearest sign of the African historiography since its inception as an academic discipline; they served their communities much longer than that. Since Jan Vansina’s early treatises on oral sources, oral methodologies have developed to incorporate critiques regarding chronology and subjectivity, requiring oral historians to critically emphasize oral

sources as both products and processes. Contradictions are as much evidence as consistencies.<sup>67</sup> Their very subjectivity offers a way to understand how Africans envision their lives and histories.

For the pre-colonial era at Table Mountain, these sources are oral accounts of Africans in conversation with colonial officials interested in the history and heritage of the Zulu and their neighbors. The research of official James Stuart (whose archived notes have been translated, ordered, and published between 1976 and 2014) serves as a wealth of information on the region of KwaZulu-Natal. As part of the “archival turn” in the South African historiography, pioneered by Carolyn Hamilton and John Wright, scholars using these sources have begun to pay close attention to the biographies and backstories of African interlocutors who played roles in the making and circulating of knowledge in the colonial era. When used in this book, oral sources are treated as discussions between officials and their interlocutors and as complex and carefully crafted accounts. To analyze the oral, one must begin with the backstory, the period before the recording of each of these traditions, and the biographies of the interlocutors. With this kind of background and biographical work, historians can investigate the limits on the processes of invention.<sup>68</sup> This allows us to draw out possible reasons why accounts were told as they were in each historical context, identify oral strategies, and discern how they might be used as evidence.

Prominent members of the Nyavu chiefdom created oral accounts of the Table Mountain region in conversation with colonial officials and educated Africans in 1863, 1894, and 1937.<sup>69</sup> Between 2010 and 2015, I participated in the creation of nearly one hundred oral histories with chiefs, headmen, men, and women at Table Mountain, and with politicians and activists whose work involved them in the region’s affairs. Because oral history texts are produced in dialogue about memory,<sup>70</sup> I critically contextualize them generally to suggest the process of these sources. The historical land disputes analyzed here continue at Table Mountain today. I adopted what Susan Geiger called “modified or directed life history” methodology to learn about each person’s life even as I sought particular information about the history of land and violence.<sup>71</sup> Opening with broad questions about a person’s background not only enabled the informant to become comfortable, it often produced the background and biographical information to contextualize their testimony. However, all knew of my central interests and had their own motivations. Some individuals invested in the ongoing conflict leaped into accounts of the past before any questions were asked. The nature of the questions asked about the

region's *longue durée* meant that these testimonies covered over one hundred years, including both experiences and events witnessed and knowledge about the region's past that individuals had heard from their parents and grandparents.

One of the limits of these oral histories comes out of the region's recent violence. While migrations chosen and forced shaped the lives of many historical and contemporary Table Mountain actors, the transition-era civil war also drastically reshaped communities. Particularly among the Maphumulo, many of the people close to the chieftaincy died during the conflict. Many others affiliated to the ANC/UDF left home for refuges across the city and its surrounds. Entire wards, such as Nyaninga, burned to the ground and have yet to be reestablished. Those who returned to Table Mountain after the end of the war sometimes found their homestead sites already reoccupied and moved to other wards where they could find land. Echibini, where some of the fiercest fighting took place on the contested piece of land, is now densely populated by Nyavu and Maphumulo members, including new residents who moved to the area after the end of the violence because of its desirable location near Pietermaritzburg. This made it difficult to track down people with generations of knowledge about the Maphumulo. Connections eventually led me to several families in Haniville, an informal settlement turned township where refugees from across KwaZulu-Natal resettled.

Turning to the documentary record for Table Mountain, glimpses of the early-nineteenth-century Nyavu leader Nomsimekwana Mdluli appear in the records of colonial administrators who knew him as the chief who was forced to carry the pot in which he was to be cooked.<sup>72</sup> His sons and grandsons gave statements to officials. Those men raised up by Shepstone and his successors—the chiefs of the Qamu, Gcumisa, and Maphumulo—were noted in the newspapers, journals, and government documents of early officials, missionaries, and settlers. The archival repositories in Pietermaritzburg, Pretoria, and Ulundi provided much of the written sources on these men and their hereditary counterparts, as well as their descendants, land, and development at Table Mountain.

Most problematic about the written documents is absence. In the files of officials obsessed with the chieftaincy and which chiefdom African homesteads belonged to, there was no discussion of chiefly affiliations during the forced removals of homesteads for the construction of the Nagle Dam. No “Permission to Occupy” certifications that made it possible for those removed to occupy closer settlements such as that on the contested strip of land at Table Mountain could be found, nor even actual documentation of removals beyond a receipt for petrol



**FIGURE 3.** Thandokuhle Maphumulo and Simanga Mkhize, pointing out boundaries of the Maphumulo chiefdom, from Nyanninga, 2014. PHOTOGRAPH BY AUTHOR.

and government trucks. Any possible files about state or local police involvement in harassment and death of Mhlabanzima no longer exist, if they ever did. The records of the 1991 provincial inquest into his unnatural death cannot be found, likely destroyed according to legislation that allows for their legal destruction.<sup>73</sup>

Despite these deficiencies, testimonies before the TRC and the records of violence monitors at the Alan Paton Centre and Struggle Archives provide us with some insight into what those absent documents might have revealed. From 1986, a network of concerned individuals, civic organizations, and the University of Natal's Centre for Adult Education (CAE) banded together to record the extent of the violence. While the apartheid state actively concealed information about the violence, CAE disseminated reliable material by analyzing nearly two hundred victim statements, vague police reports, and press clippings. Radley Keys, regional director for the Democratic Party at the time, launched Peace in Natal in 1989 to understand and help communities under siege—including those at Table Mountain.

Of course, there are other absences—perceived and real—even in those written documents that do exist. Premesh Lalu is most critical of colonial archives, arguing that “to claim that subaltern consciousness, voice or agency can be retrieved through colonial texts is to ignore the organization and representation of colonized subjects as a subordinate proposition within primary discourses.”<sup>74</sup> Colonial and apartheid officials produced these archival texts, their chronicles shaped by their race, gender, status within governmental hierarchies, and political ideologies. Officials and commissions of inquiries were often selective in who they interviewed. The words of Africans with power—most often chiefs and headmen—appear frequently in these documents and can give us insights into their own agendas, but must of course be considered critically because of their presence in a colonial and apartheid court and their own status vis-à-vis white minority rule. It is much more difficult to draw out the voices of African subjects—even more so, of African women—particularly because the colonial and apartheid form of government saw every human as a member of a homestead, whose male head should communicate through his headman or chief. And yet, read against the grain, these sources enhance our understandings of African experiences of colonial and apartheid rule, and the ideological struggles and harmonies between rulers and ruled.<sup>75</sup> To these documents I apply some of the same methods described above, attempting to understand the backstory and biography of persons documented. While the accountability of chiefs to their followers varied by time and place, as will be shown here, their testimonies about land and subjects reveal struggles with followers. In other instances, the supplementary testimonies of policemen, those arrested in disputes, or African subjects who did speak before colonial officials reveal these relationships.

While the early Nyavu chiefs presented themselves regularly before white officials, ensuring their words were archived, their descendants do fade, particularly during the civil war. In contrast, Mhlabunzima excelled at navigating various apartheid and journalistic venues. Thus, the nature of these sources is reflected in the course of this book, where Mhlabunzima achieves an almost larger-than-life place in the latter half of the book—as he did in life. Similarly, the majority of the refugees who gave victim statements and poured into the city for help were unaffiliated or ANC/UDF supporters, so there are few firsthand Inkatha statements in the records. This makes my oral history interviews with Nyavu informants particularly important in drawing out both sides of the conflict at Table Mountain.

Framing this study as a macrohistory of a microregion enables careful

comparison of contemporary oral sources with written sources and oral accounts in the archives across time. This method allows me to evaluate and derive historical information by considering the changes and consistencies in accounts of more recent generations compared with the stories of their parents and grandparents that were recorded by various colonial officials and African elites. Though there are transformations in analogies and motifs used to talk about historical events, there is remarkable uniformity among generations in speaking of their connections to land, whether it was denied them by colonialism or “given” to them when they sought refuge in the colony or during forced removals. At the same time, these oral sources—such as those about cannibals and colonial-era pensions—can be analyzed as attempts to explain complex historical values, events, and processes through fantastical stories of man-eating humans and relatable tales of chieftaincies as pension payments. The transformations in the sources—particularly around the role of the first Zulu king—reveal changing perceptions of ethnicity and the Zulu monarchy.

Second, the examination of oral sources recorded over the *longue durée* as both products and processes enables me to identify the political strategies of oral informants across time—practices that are the subject of this book. It is not only the content of the testimonies that matters, but the way in which individuals chose to convey that information. As Bethwell Ogot argues, “We have to study the way in which whole societies or segments of society have thought about themselves in relation to what they understood as their past and their knowledge of it.”<sup>76</sup> Oral informants deployed several political practices in which their history played a part in claiming land and authority. Chiefs—whether hereditary or descendants of appointed chiefs—continuously provided lists of chiefs as a staple of their hereditary claims to power. Nyavu chiefs used what Lentz has called an “oral land registry” to tie themselves to the land and claim access.<sup>77</sup> The major difference from Lentz’s oral land registries is that Nyavu tales are of denial. Followers who identified with several of the chiefdoms studied here deploy a genealogical imagination. The Nyavu tell variations of Nomsimekwana’s tale to position themselves as firstcomers at Table Mountain. The Qamu, Gcumisa, and Maphumulo too began and continue to craft origin stories about their ancestors’ ascendancy to the chieftaincy and connections to other appointed chiefs and to the land. This consideration of the flexibility of oral accounts of history and the (re)imagination of origins offers a powerful counter to the recent work on the oral traditions of southeast Africa by Elizabeth Eldredge, who problematically takes oral traditions as fact without

considering any of the critiques and methodologies developed by oral historians since the 1980s.<sup>78</sup> Acknowledging oral sources as products and processes, and cultural inheritances as flexible and adaptable, may offer a way forward in which all South Africans reimagine the future of land and belonging in rural life.

# Violence, Allegiance, and Authority in the Making of Kingdoms and Colony





# Chief by the People

## Nomsimekwana Mdluli, Security, and Authority in the Time before Tribes

The [Amanyamvu] tribe was attacked by Chaka's army, but in consequence of the difficulties of the country all their cattle were not taken. Attacks were made upon it by other petty marauders, but the Amanyamvu still retained their position. Macingwane, chief of the Amacunu, sent and demanded their allegiance; the messengers were treated civilly—but allegiance was refused . . . Matiwana, who then resided with his tribe, the Amangwana, where his son Sikali now resides, sent a similar message, and the Amanyamvu chief, Umcosele, consented, and removed with his tribe to join Matiwana.

—Nombiba, to Theophilus Shepstone during Shepstone's research for "Inhabitants of the Territory (Now the Colony of Natal), during the Time of Jobe, Father of Dingizwayo, Before the Extermination of Native Tribes by Chaka," 1864

**O**n September 8, 1863, Nombiba, a subject of Mcoseli Mdluli, thus began the history of Chief Mcoseli and his son Nomsimekwana as recorded by the Secretary for Native Affairs for the Natal Colony, Theophilus Shepstone.<sup>1</sup> The Mdluli family lived at Table Mountain with their followers when the Boers and British began to arrive in the region. Nombiba's account gives us insight into the relationships between Mdluli chiefs and the land at Table Mountain, and



**FIGURE 4.** Table Mountain from Zwartkop Road. Watersketch by George Hamilton Gordon, c. 1864. COURTESY OF PIETERMARITZBURG ARCHIVES REPOSITORY.

between Mdluli chiefs and more powerful polities in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. The mountain served as a place of security—one popular historian of the region described it as “a natural fortress of a strength and splendor far surpassing that of any man-made castle.”<sup>2</sup> But it was not only the landscape that enabled security. The political relationships of the region’s peoples also facilitated social and physical security.

The chapter opens with an examination of the long history of Iron Age relationships. An examination of the cattle-based connections that bind families and homesteads under a chief gives us a better understanding of the heterogeneous and fluid nature of the polities that existed in the region during the Late Iron Age and the formation of the increasingly centralized Ndwandwe, Mthethwa, and Zulu polities. A focus on *ukukhonza*, the paying of allegiance to a leader in return for security, enables us to see the manner in which outsiders became insiders at both the local level and the larger regional level as states emerged. Practices of genealogical imagination deployed in origin stories allowed people to reimagine these relationships and define their status within polities. This framework of *ukukhonza* and genealogical imagination gives us the context to rethink the relationships and peoples at Table Mountain. The chapter disposes of the notion of a Nyavu tribe to

focus on the alliances built at Table Mountain. Oral accounts suggest the Mdluli may not have been the first chiefs or the first people to inhabit the region. The chapter thus considers how the Mdluli established their authority through marriage and the appropriation of Majola connections to the land and ancestors.

The chapter also reveals how *ukukhonza* affiliations enabled the Mdluli chiefly family to survive the state centralization of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. When security was threatened at Table Mountain, Mcoseli Mdluli sought a more powerful chief to submit himself to in exchange for the security of his followers. After Mcoseli's death and the defeat of the chief to whom he pledged, his leaderless people experienced a time of chaos, outside of the order of chiefdoms and the expanding states. Oral accounts of this period depict it as a time in which cannibals roamed, "eating up" cattle and people. The young Nomsimekwana Mdluli and the remnants of Mcoseli's followers turned again to a greater power, this time pledging their allegiance to the Zulu king through Chief Zihlandlo Mkhize. While Nomsimekwana's allegiance to Zihlandlo brought him into the security of the Zulu kingdom, he and his father's followers remained despised marginals, serving as menials. Only after Zihlandlo's death did Nomsimekwana return to Table Mountain to take up the Mdluli chieftaincy. To attract followers, Nomsimekwana raided the cattle that enabled social reproduction and thus attracted the ire of Boer trekkers recently arrived from the Cape Colony. This chapter thus enables us to move beyond ideas about fixed identities to examine historical continuity and change in discourses of chiefly authority and belonging in a polity at Table Mountain.

## *Ukukhonza* in the Late Iron Age and Rise of States

In southern Africa and elsewhere prior to colonial rule, household making and state making were linked processes. Colonial conquest and administration intervened and worked through African domestic institutions and power.<sup>3</sup> An examination of these connected practices reveals Late Iron Age chiefdoms to be fluid polities of heterogeneous peoples, bound by cattle-based alliances—not tribes. Among Bantu-speaking peoples from west-central Africa to the Great Lakes region and southward, the "house" served as the basic level of social organization since the growth of the Bantu language five thousand years ago. Language here is not the equivalent of political identification, but indicative of the spread of ideas from west and east Africa. Bantu-speaking peoples began to settle in modern-day Limpopo,




**FIGURE 5.** Homestead seen from Itafamasi mission station.

LEWIS GROUT, *ZULU-LAND OR LIFE AMONG THE ZULU*, 1864.

South Africa, from east Africa during the fourth century. By 450 CE, Bantu speakers had expanded into what is now KwaZulu-Natal. Iron ore reserves enabled the expansion of farming along the coast belt. By the seventh century, Bantu speakers with ancestral origins in Angola settled inland from the coast.<sup>4</sup>

The Central Cattle Pattern (CCP) has been the dominant model for interpreting the southern African Iron Age from the arrival of Bantu-speaking farmers, but scholars debate its geographical and chronological dimensions. The CCP is a spatial organization of the homestead centered on the cattle kraal and men's court. During the first millennium, most houses of Southeast Bantu speakers south of the Zambezi River adhered to this model. For the Mngeni River Valley where Table Mountain sits, archaeological evidence suggests the CCP was present from the seventh century.<sup>5</sup> Applying ethnographic analogies and transformations in pottery styles, anthropologists contend the CCP is a model that represents “a socially dynamic set of relationships, a dynamic economic structure” that can demonstrate changes in identity as well as continuities.<sup>6</sup> The CCP is based on ordered oppositions: the male center versus the female periphery; the private top versus the public bottom; the



**FIGURE 6.** The Central Cattle Pattern. The abbreviation “gb” indicates granary.

ADAPTED FROM HUFFMAN, 1996: 175, 2001:20.

senior side (among isiZulu speakers, the left) versus the junior side (the right). The distinction between left and right can also be described as permanent and young, for the side not associated with the great house (*indlunkulu*) may split off to form a new homestead.

Cattle were symbolically central as the means with which the homestead reproduced itself. Adam Kuper outlined the ideas about cattle among the Southeast Bantu speakers that informed this model: Agriculture (women’s domain) was important as a source of food, but pastoral activities (men’s domain) were more prestigious and ceremonially important. There was a system of hierarchical transactions in which ancestors, rulers, and homestead heads fertilized

descendants, subjects, and wives. There was also an understanding of opposition of hot (dangerous and sterilizing) and cool (healing and fertilizing) in which cattle were cool. The transfer of bridewealth in cattle gave the husband rights over children.<sup>7</sup> Order at the homestead enabled social and agricultural reproduction; order enabled security.

Historians are much warier about the geographical and chronological dimensions of the CCP model. Archaeological evidence shows the continuity in the spatial layout but cannot easily convey any changes in the principles historically associated with it.<sup>8</sup> While some argue that chiefdoms in southern Africa date to the fifth century, has being a chief or a member of a chiefdom always meant the same thing?<sup>9</sup> Martin Hall questions the very persistence of the CCP model of the homestead across time and space based on archaeological evidence at Nqabeni in northern KwaZulu-Natal. Carolyn Hamilton and Simon Hall instead point to shared cultural logics concerning cultural inheritances and the layering of identities across the divide of Southeast Bantu speakers typically rendered as Nguni and Sotho-Tswana.<sup>10</sup> At the very least, the archaeological evidence—such as the size of court middens, the number of cattle pens, and the presence of ritual prestige items—associated with the CCP combines with historical linguistics to suggest internal political differentiation during the first millennium CE.

While patterns of political and social change cannot be more firmly traced before the mid-eighteenth century for territory east of the Drakensberg Mountains,<sup>11</sup> historical linguistic studies of southeastern Africa make clear that concepts of power were not static and that historically an individual's authority was granted by a collective. The proto-Bantu word translated by the earliest dictionary writers as chief is \*-kúmú, a derivation of the “to become honored” verb, -kúm-. Bantu speakers, however, conveyed a wide range of hereditary, ritual, and political roles played by the people named \*-kúmú. What tied these roles together was an “association between emotively powerful feelings of honor, fame, and respect on the one hand and authority over communities on the other.”<sup>12</sup> \*-kúmú as a form of authority persisted among some Southeast Bantu speakers, such as the Chopi and GiTonga, but farther south, only the role of \*-kóci remained in existence. The root \*-kóci in Savanna Bantu languages is “lion,” while among Eastern Bantu, it means “elder, married man, family head” and in Shona, “senior wife.” The original implication of these was that of a “strong or mature person, particularly (though not necessarily only?) male, having authority over a small group of kin.” Christopher Ehret shows that \*-kóci became the general term for hereditary authority among Southeast Bantu

by the third or fourth century, when larger local social units beyond the family began to take shape. He posits that chiefship enlarged its scope, metaphorically but not literally invoking the family, and became based on chiefly wealth, given the changed meaning of \*-kúm- to “to be rich” rather than “to be honored.”<sup>13</sup>

The shift in these diverse meanings of \*-kóci to “chief” among speakers of Southeast Bantu may be the linguistic accompaniment of a redefinition of chiefly power, marking the control of cattle as the catalyst in extending chiefly authority beyond single-kin arrangements. The ideological growth in the importance of cattle prompted conversion of older Nguni words and thus enables historical consideration of the change in cattle’s significance.<sup>14</sup> As Nguni speakers (a subgroup of Southeast Bantu speakers) moved from eastern Africa into southeastern Africa at about the eleventh century, they entered a heterogeneous social context with hunter-gatherers, Khoe-speaking pastoralists, and Early Iron Age agriculturalists (other Bantu speakers whom Carolan Ownby calls the Sala and connects to Shona speakers). The Sala kept and milked cattle, but do not appear to have had a strong cattle culture. The Nguni speakers brought new styles of pottery, Blackburn, and possibly ideas about power in which the \*-kóci could distinguish himself as the main cattle owner by several different social mechanisms.<sup>15</sup> In the social layering that resulted from interactions between the Sala and Nguni speakers, the Sala firstcomers with knowledge of local iron ore sources were politically marginalized—a type of distinction made clear at later archaeological sites where iron producers were bound to low, wooded country, while iron users occupied steep hilltops. Firstcomers were retained in roles that drew on relationships with the land such as metal production, rainmaking, and midwifery. The chieftainship, dependent upon a man’s wealth and largesse, was intimately tied to control of these special positions that enabled social and agricultural production. The social category *amalala*, with which some of the peoples at Table Mountain identified until the mid-twentieth century, is perhaps derived from ironworker (*ilala*) and rooted in this politicking at the Early Iron Age–Late Iron Age interface.<sup>16</sup>

One mechanism by which individuals distinguished themselves as the main cattle owners was marriage. Homesteads began with this social agreement between clans. The homestead head (*umnumzane*) married a woman from outside of his lineage in return for cattle received by the woman’s father (*ukulobola*). The transfer of cattle for wives (what might be called bridewealth, or *ilobolo*) facilitated the exchange of labor power. Jeff Guy most clearly articulated the exchange as “a social agreement dependent upon a woman’s potential to work productively and



her capacity to reproduce and thereby to found the next generation's homesteads, those of her sons, and also the households in the homesteads of the husbands of her daughters."<sup>17</sup> The new wife established a house (*indlu*) in which she and her children lived and had access to land for their sustenance. If the homestead head had resources in cattle, he could bring more wives into the homestead, who established homes in the arc pattern of the CCP. Fathers in turn received cattle for their daughters' labor power when they married. Related homesteads or lineages with recognized kinship ties made up the clan; those who traced their descent to a common ancestor shared his name as their *isibongo* (clan name). There was a gendered division of labor, with men working livestock and women in agriculture. This cycle of cattle and women's labor under the control of men, between homesteads, made up the productive and reproductive cycle that founded African societies.

There were also hierarchical exchanges—between ancestors and descendants, rulers and subjects, homestead heads and dependents—that ordered society and enabled fertility of cattle, fields, and people. *Ukukhonza* brought together homestead heads and clans under the authority of the *inkosi*. "*Inkosi*" is commonly translated from isiZulu as "chief," "king," or, especially in reference to religious beliefs, "god." While scholars have accepted the role of missionaries in using African words for "chief" and "ancestor" to indicate god, they are slower to define *inkosi* as "lord," which Thomas McClendon has suggested to better capture the status of Late Iron Age leaders without the baggage of European conceptions.<sup>18</sup> Fealty to such a lord depended upon an agreement between the leader and a homestead head.

This contract was defined by the process of *ukukhonza* (infinitive verb; *-khonza* = root), in which one pledged allegiance to a leader in return for security—protection and access to resources. Some of the earliest isiZulu missionary-linguists distorted this as a relationship of service, focusing on the submission to the exclusion of what a subject expected in return and contributing to European conceptions of chiefly despotism. As Mompoloki Bagwasi pointed out regarding Tswana proverbs, colonial officials in Botswana lacked the social and cultural knowledge to interpret appropriately the proverb "respect the chief's word," failing to see it was dependent upon another, "a chief is a chief by the people."<sup>19</sup> Other isiZulu linguists deployed an example that better stressed the pledge of allegiance as laden with expectations: "*Ngizokhonza, Nkosi; ngifake ikhanda lapha kuwe* (I have come to serve, O Chief; that I may put my head in your control)."<sup>20</sup> Bishop J. W. Colenso's dictionary included an applicative extension, *ukuzikonzela*, to consider what one might *khonza* for: to "serve for one's self, used of persons giving themselves up to the orders of a chief,

so as to obtain land, &c.”<sup>21</sup> Cattle were one means of establishing these relationships. *Ukubusa*, whereby a man performs services in exchange for a gift—usually stock—was one such means where both parties benefitted. The borrower was rewarded with milk and perhaps progeny, while the lender received better access to grazing and prestige.<sup>22</sup> A man who concentrated cattle through marriage could lend them and build up a following of people.<sup>23</sup> The testimonies of Africans in the James Stuart Archive (JSA) are replete with examples of these expectations of security—for cattle, land, food, physical safety, and fertility.<sup>24</sup> It is this social agreement that facilitated an incorporation of people that produced the polity of the chief (*isizwe*, often translated as “nation” or “chiefdom”). These agreements bounded polities—based on amalgamation and not ethnic particularity—and homesteads could break allegiance to their chief.<sup>25</sup> We should thus see Late Iron Age chiefdoms as heterogeneous, fluid polities bound by alliances.


These alliances, facilitated by marriage and the paying of tribute, did not distinguish between sacred and secular, resulting in an emphasis on social order and security. The role of ancestors cannot be confined to the domain of spirituality when they also had political importance. As Kuper argued, “[The] relation between hierarchy and the provision of resources and fertility against a return of food and labour is therefore systematic and evident, and is repeated at three levels [the homestead head, ruler, and ancestors].”<sup>26</sup> A community’s security was dependent upon this order, and homestead heads, chiefs, and kings took steps to appease ancestors and prevent violation of order. Leaders negotiated close relationships with healers—who, with connections to the land, may have been local firstcomers. They performed rituals such as the first fruit ceremony (*umkhosi*) that ensured rain and fertility and sought to control medicines that allowed them to promote themselves as the preeminent “healers of the land endowed with political, medical, and divine powers.”<sup>27</sup> Nineteenth-century Zulu kings fostered a sense of unity with the national *inkatha*, a ceremonial woven ring doctored by healers. The legitimacy of Shaka Zulu, first king of the Zulu, was founded on his success in managing a disciplined army and offering strong central authority as protection from chaos during violent times.<sup>28</sup> Chiefdoms and kingdoms provided hierarchical order. This opposition between order and chaos, violence, or anarchy was deeply rooted in the cosmological vision of oppositions described above.<sup>29</sup>

This social order also shaped access to land and resources. H. W. O. Okoth-Ogendo describes these not as property rights, but “a set of reciprocal rights and obligations that bind together and vest power in community members over land.”

The continuous performance of these rights and obligations determined who accessed and who controlled the land.<sup>30</sup> These rights were nested at the level of homestead, ward, and chiefdom. Membership in a ward or chiefdom entitled homestead heads to an area of land to build and cultivate, as well as access to communal grazing. The failure of a chief to recognize a subject's right to land could result in a loss of support. Membership in a homestead endowed women with fields to work in and young men the rights to land to inherit. New chieftainships could be established over vacant land or existing populations. Powerful chiefs could expand the territory in which they exercised authority or drive out people who threatened their authority, but in no case would it be said that a chief owned the land. Attention to *ukukhonza* allows us to see how societies defined membership and therefore who had access to land and controlled its management.

It also should be stressed that this politics of the people, those inside the chiefdom or inside the kingdom, should not be overly romanticized or simplified as “a golden age dominated by pristine village democracies”—as is sometimes done in nationalist historiographies and the memoirs and speeches of nationalist leaders.<sup>31</sup> Just as the proverb “*inkosi yinkosi ngabantu*” dictates that a chief should treat his subjects well, another suggests the limits. “*Indaba yamakhosi ayibanjelwa mlando*” (the matter of kings is not kept) implies a leader may make promises to rise to power but may forget promises once installed.<sup>32</sup> The ability to choose a leader was constricted by competition for resources and natural disasters such as drought or famine. *Ukukhonza* facilitated a political link between ruler and ruled where the ruled expected land and security, but this was still a vertical link. On the eve of colonialism, the act was marked by the payment of tribute to the ruler—in cattle, ivory, crane feathers, and monkey skins—and participation in military functions. In practice, *khonza* could govern many levels and kinds of relationships, and there was more than one path to this acquisition of people. These associations include those between a petty chief and a more powerful chief, between a chief and a paramount chief or king, between a dependent and a wealthy patron, and after the arrival of Europeans, between an African laborer and a European farmer. *Khonza* could be forced or voluntary submission, where individuals recognized a chief in return for security or chiefs submitted to more powerful chiefs to prevent military conflict.<sup>33</sup> Both diplomacy and warfare facilitated submission.

The political and social changes of the eighteenth century that shaped the growth of centralized states can be more firmly traced. Cultural inheritances of cattle-based alliances were reshaped to enable control over more heterogeneous



**MAP 1.** The Delagoa Bay-Mzimkhulu River region

peoples and larger territories from the 1760s to the 1830s. Traders from across the Indian Ocean had been visiting the Mozambique coast for centuries, but the arrival of Europeans from the sixteenth century onward presented new opportunities for chiefs to exchange goods acquired by trade for cattle from the interior. Competition between chiefs prevented any one powerful kingdom from emerging, but this competition accelerated as European trade expanded.<sup>34</sup> During the first half of the eighteenth century, the people of Ndwandwe moved from south of Delagoa Bay to the region between the Phongolo and Black Mfolozi rivers (see map 1), possibly to avoid control by an expanding Tembe kingdom under Mangobe. They did not move into an empty region, and thus John Wright suggests the Ndwandwe chiefdom under Langa may have been the first to tighten chiefly control over age sets of young men (in isiZulu, *amabutho*) to establish itself in the Phongolo–Black Mfolozi region by the 1750s.<sup>35</sup> It is likely chiefs used *amabutho* to obtain ivory for trade and pursue conflict with rivals before using them to extract increased amounts of tribute (in the form of cattle and labor) from their own adherents.<sup>36</sup>

In the Phongolo–Black Mfolozi region, the Ndwandwe continued to face expansion of its neighbors, including a section of the Tembe under Mabhudu ka Mangobe, the Dlamini, and the Nyambose chiefly house of the Mthethwa. By the 1790s and early 1800s, declining trade in ivory, a small but rising trade in slaves, and the Portuguese presence at Delagoa sharpened rising competition between these polities. Zwide ka Langa turned the militarized Ndwandwe *amabutho* on neighboring chiefdoms, not just to raid their cattle and establish them as tributaries, but to destroy their ruling houses. Zwide's attack on Sobhuza of the Dlamini forced Sobhuza to flee to northwest Swaziland, abandoning followers along the way. The Mthethwa under Dingiswayo ka Jobe had established a trading relationship with the Mabhudu, and its expansion in the region south of the Mfolozi threatened Zwide's security.<sup>37</sup>

This political centralization of the Ndwandwe and Mthethwa involved new ways of structuring identities—including genealogical imagination. Submission could be accompanied by a reimagining of origins, the promotion of vague shared common origins to shore up ideological claims and set limits on what could be claimed where affiliations were not necessarily inherited but assumed. During the first stage of the Mthethwa expansion, subordinated groups were incorporated as “putative kinsfolk” of the ruling house and were encouraged to recast accounts of origins to claim relationships with the ruling line. By the end of the eighteenth century, newly subjected groups were prevented from such claims and kept

subordinate. These genealogical imaginings produced social categories within the stratified Mthethwa, and later, the Zulu.<sup>38</sup> The Ndwandwe set out to destroy the Mthethwa's growing sphere of influence, attacking, among others, the Ngwane under Matiwane near today's Vryheid. The Ndwandwe movement provoked Dingiswayo—who had assisted Shaka Zulu in seizing the tributary Zulu chiefship of Senzagakhona in 1817—into launching an attack in the late 1810s that resulted in his death. Dingiswayo's death enabled Shaka to establish himself as the most powerful leader south of the White Mfolozi. The Zulu expansion took place in two phases, in which they also drew upon genealogical imagination to distinguish between royal family and assimilated subjects, privileged subjects, and denigrated subjects such as the *amalala* mentioned above.<sup>39</sup>

## Defining Insiders and Allegiances at Table Mountain in the Late Iron Age

These linked processes of homestead and state building operated at very local levels too. Despite silences, omissions, and anachronisms in oral sources, the origin stories of peoples at Table Mountain suggest the region's history prior to Zulu state formation as a place of heterogeneous groups that absorbed newcomers and distinguished between various levels of insiders and outsiders. The promotion of Nyavu rights to land in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries via chiefly lineages has obscured the possibility that the Mdluli clan, whose patriarchs were recognized as chiefs at Table Mountain from at least the late eighteenth century, were newcomers to Table Mountain.

It is not clear from the available evidence how long a Mdluli clan lived at Table Mountain and served as chiefs.<sup>40</sup> Nombiba, a subject of Mcoseli Mdluli, is the sole source for Shepstone's 1864 claim about the Mdluli having "ancient residence" in the region. He may have made the claim to protect Mdluli influence in the region, or Shepstone may have exaggerated to promote African rights to land. Most accounts by Mdluli chiefs posit their forefathers as always having been chiefs in the region. Table 2 shows these chiefly lineages (as well as discrepancies and telegraphing) as remembered by three different Mdluli leaders in 1894, 1939, and 2013, from the earliest ancestor recalled through Nomsimekwana Mdluli who died in 1901. Of course, as official oral accounts, they must be seen as valuable reflections of "ideological struggles between the rulers and ruled in a society." One must consider

**TABLE 2. Mdluli Ancestors, according to Chiefs, Showing Discrepancies and Telegraphing**

NGANGEZWE MDLULI (1894)	SOMQUBA MDLULI (1939)	SIKHOSIPHI MDLULI (2013)
Nyavu	Mzelemu	Nyavu
Luyeme	Nyawe (Nyavu)	Luyeme
Mbongozo	Luyeme	Sali
Yengeza	Yengeza	Mcoseli
Mdluli	Mdluli	Nomsimekwana
Sali	Sali	
Mcoseli	Mcoseli	
Nomsimekana	Nomsimekwana	

that the men claiming long ancestry in the region stood to gain from doing so.<sup>41</sup> Chief Somquba Mdluli narrated his lineage to the Zulu Society in 1939 at a time when “tribes” were being territorialized, and he felt serious pressure on his authority from colonially appointed chiefdoms to his east and west. Chief Ngangezwe Mdluli gave his account as part of an 1894 petition to have a land claim reconsidered. He most passionately tied his lineage to the region:

My father Nomsimekwana has sent me to ask why he and his people are disallowed living where his father Mcoseli lived and died, where he has lived till old age and where I was born; and where Sali the father of Mcoseli lived as chief till he died; and where Mdhului the father of Sali lived as child till he died; and where Yengeza Mdluli’s father lived as chief till he died; and where Mbongozo father of Yengeza lived as Chief till he died; and Luyeme the father of Mbongozo lived as chief till he died; and where Mnyavu father of Luyeme lived as chief till he died, who as far as my father can recollect is the first chief on that locality.<sup>42</sup>

Ngangezwe’s testimony suggests that however shallow the Mdluli’s history in the region, they had established complex attachments to the land because of the production, reproduction, and burial of ancestors on it. At Table Mountain, this seems to be especially true in regard to the location of the chiefly homestead Ezimpangeleni, which Ngangezwe describes.

While Nombiba and the chiefs themselves posit Mdluli permanence in the region, contemporary oral accounts of Mdluli subjects and their chief suggest their

newcomer status. On the one hand, these contemporary accounts appear to be unreliable because they are Shaka-centric and reflect the consolidation and power of Zulu ethnicity in contemporary South Africa. But when considered within this *longue durée* history of heterogeneous polities that could absorb newcomers, they reveal the historical arrival of outsiders at Table Mountain. This resonates with that found farther north in Swaziland where other histories remained latent and embedded but not publicly exposed.<sup>43</sup> These Table Mountain accounts locate the Mdluli as newcomers from Swaziland. *Inkosi* Sikhosphi Mdluli originally hesitated to give a historical account in 2011. But he met with elders, wrote down his history, and by 2013, felt armed with knowledge of his ancestors' past. Sikhosphi connected the Mdluli at Table Mountain, Bergville, Hluhluwe, and Swaziland genealogically. Mdluli brothers, sons of a chief, left Swaziland and parted at the Thukela River. One brother, Lubele, stayed near Hluhluwe as chief. The other, Nyavu, moved on to Bergville where there are still Mdlulis, and eventually ended at Table Mountain.<sup>44</sup> Gobebulungu Mdluli, known for his knowledge of history, gave a similar account:

My grandfather used to say, the Mdluli clan is not originally from kwaZulu, but the Mdluli were originally from Swaziland. While they stayed in Swaziland, a great-grandfather used to visit the place of the Zulu while Shaka was still alive. When there were wars, they told him to choose one side because he could not be in Swaziland and the place of the Zulu. He then chose to be in the place of the Zulu and he continued staying here in the place of the Zulu . . . he was a son of a chief. I do not have his name but that is our great-grandfather. When he came here, it was obvious that he had to get a place where he would rule. So the place he was installed in was here, kwaNyavu. He has another brother who was left behind in a place call Nibela. He was also offered land because they were both from the chieftainship.<sup>45</sup>

In this way, these Mdluli men connect themselves genealogically to chiefs in Swaziland known as *tinsila* ("sweat of the king," fictive kin responsible for shielding against danger) to the Swazi kings.<sup>46</sup>

After the Mdluli's arrival, they were able to establish power over the region's existing residents, including the Majola. Mankantsolo Majola introduced himself as originating in eSinyameni, one of the wards of today's KwaNyavu. He explained that his great-grandfather, Sojuba ka Mxhakaza, lived at eSinyameni prior to the region coming under a chief. While Mankantsolo's account is a contemporary



Shaka-centered origin story for the Nyavu, it suggests firstcomers and newcomers, the paying of allegiance, and the manner in which people who *khonza*'d Mdluli chiefs established and maintained connections with the land. It was during Sojuba's time that Shaka arrived in the region three times; each time, the Majola paid allegiance to Shaka with cattle. On the third visit, Shaka brought with him Mcoseli and Nomsimekwana Mdluli. Sojuba welcomed them and they installed Nomsimekwana at a site near Labafazi. After this, Sojuba announced to local men that they would have to report to Nomsimekwana because the area now had a chief.<sup>47</sup> Here Mankantsolo describes a history in which a Nyavu polity originates with the appointment of Mdluli chiefs by Shaka and the approval of the local Majola. Another story positions Sojuba Majola as the person who asked Shaka to ensure the chiefdom's survival by taking Nomsimekwana to Zululand.<sup>48</sup> Former ward councillor Zazi Dlamini could not remember the name of the first Nyavu chief, but he remembered that the Majola originated in the region and gave safe haven to the Mdluli.<sup>49</sup> According to B. E. Mdluli, the land around Table Mountain was vacant except for the Majola, who appointed Nomsimekwana as chief when Shaka sought their opinion on the matter.<sup>50</sup> While the role of Shaka in these stories is a modern imagining of power relations influenced by the power of Zulu identities, and Nomsimekwana as the very first chief is likely fictional, the account recognizes the Majola as firstcomers, cultural custodians, and kingmakers. These accounts from Mdluli clan members and their subjects connect the polity to local place by pointing to Labafazi as the installation site of chiefs.

There is no evidence to suggest the Mdluli established power through violence, but instead, they did so through marriage and the incorporation of Majola firstcomers as connected to the land and to the ancestors. *Inkosi* Sikhosiphi claims one of his forefathers, Sali or Mcoseli, married a woman from the Majola family, and thus from Majola women came Mdluli chiefs. Upon arrival in the region, the Mdluli adopted the custom of *umgcabo*, incisions that serve as an entryway for preventative or curative medicines made by an *isangoma* (diviner) or *inyanga* (healer). Gobebulungu Mdluli thought that the Mdluli adopted the practice in order to look like the Majola or to disguise themselves after the Boers arrived. He also noted that the Mdluli in Swaziland and at Bergville do not participate in the *umgcabo* custom, implying the custom's practice originated farther south.<sup>51</sup> The significance of the practice as strengthening an individual against danger may suggest not only the appropriation of spiritual practices but also the incorporation of the firstcomer Majola healers in positions that promoted social and



**FIGURE 7.** *Inkosi* Sikhosiphi Mdluli.  
PHOTOGRAPH BY AUTHOR, 2013.

agricultural production.<sup>52</sup> The Majola provided several generations of praise poets and headmen for the Nyavu.<sup>53</sup>

While the Mdluli subjected and appropriated power from the Majola, they had other relationships of equality and possible submission. Nombiba designated the chiefs of the Nyavu and Njilo, another polity to the east of the Nyavu, as brothers who shared a common ancestor, Sali of Mdluli. While it is possible that brothers hived off from their father's homestead and came to lead chiefdoms, this can also be interpreted as a genealogical imagination of affiliation between chiefs.<sup>54</sup> The association between Mcoseli and Noqomfela of the Njilo may have existed because of their geographical proximity, but it continued when the effects of political centralization north of the Thukela interfered with daily life at Table Mountain. There is little direct evidence to suggest how and whether these smaller chiefdoms felt the presence of the Thuli paramountcy, a loose cluster of chiefdoms that dominated the coastal region between the Mngeni and Mkhomazi rivers after moving into the region circa 1770. The Thuli indirectly maintained control by dispersing homesteads headed by members of the paramount's house; these reached as far west as modern-day Pinetown, from where they established control over the Ntshangase, to the east of the Nyavu. The Thuli denigrated those they subjugated as *amazosha*, an insulting

reference to the practice of facial scarification like that practiced by the Mdluli and Majola. In the political shade of the Thuli paramountcy, Mcoseli and Noqomfela appear to have maintained relative autonomy.<sup>55</sup>

## Mdluli Allegiances during the Nineteenth Century

After 1820, Mcoseli and his followers and their neighbors under Noqomfela began to feel the direct effects of Zulu expansion and established other allegiances to ensure their security. Recent scholarship has shown that this growth of the Zulu came through a combination of diplomacy, skill in seizing opportunity, and force, rather than sheer violence. This state was a hierarchical amalgamation of discrete chiefdoms in which the name “Zulu” was reserved for those of the royal descent group. To promote political integration, they promoted the second tier as genealogically related to the Zulu under a vaguely defined category of *amaNtungwa*. Those in the third tier on the geographical margins of the kingdom were labeled as menials with terms such as “*amaLala*.” Shaka’s dominance was based on his ability to control *amabutho*, one of which disturbed life at Table Mountain. By the time of Shaka’s death in 1828, Mcoseli’s Table Mountain subjects had been incorporated into the three-tiered Zulu kingdom as members of its lowest status.

What Nombiba described as “Chaka’s army,” the iziYendane regiment, raided the interior for cattle after the Thuli, Cele, and Qwabe submitted to Shaka. The iziYendane were a regiment of Hlubi men who gave their allegiance to Shaka after Matiwane ka Masumpa destroyed the Hlubi royal house under Mthimkulu. The iziYendane raided inland from the coast as far as the confluence of the Mngeni and Msunduze rivers near Table Mountain. They took cattle and captives and broke up the peoples of the Dlanyoka, Njilo, Dlanyawo, and Ndlovini chiefs.<sup>56</sup> But the fortress-like Table Mountain enabled Mcoseli to persevere without losing all of his cattle. In several of the accounts of this attack, the raiding men were described as Zulu rather than the iziYendane. Maziwana ka Mahlabeni, whose ancestors moved into Natal with the Thuli and thus could speak to events south of the Thukela, described this attribution to the Zulus as such:

The Izinyendane, Mtetwa, amaNganga, amaPumulo, etc. were those who attacked the tribes south. They adopted a Zulu chant, and if any stranger should hear them chanting thus he would dash off and jump into a swamp or other hiding place.

These men therefore were transformed into Zulus and were regarded as such by the tribes south.<sup>57</sup>

While Mcoseli's followers survived the iziYendane attack with some of their cattle, continued raiding in the region put pressure on Mcoseli to seek security by pledging allegiance to a larger polity.<sup>58</sup> This option was one of three main strategies of survival for chiefs of smaller polities: migrate independently; remain and wait for danger to pass; or affiliate with a leader who could offer protection.<sup>59</sup> The allied leaders Mcoseli and Noqomfela went to Matiwane ka Masumpa of the Ngwane at Njasuthi. As we saw above, the Ngwane had escaped from Vryheid to the valley of the upper Thukela after an attack by the Ndwandwe. The Ngwane dispersed the Hlubi, broke up and incorporated the smaller Bhele and Zizi polities, and came to a rest near Njasuthi.<sup>60</sup>

Much of the evidence regarding why Mcoseli elected to affiliate with Matiwane rather than other growing powers in the region is questionable. Nombiba suggests Mcoseli had just refused to pay allegiance to another of Shaka's adversaries, Macingwane of the Chunu, and that it was Matiwane who sent the request. Nombiba says the Chunu were then on the upper Mzimkhulu, but Wright suggests they were not far from the Thukela near the Mvoti and pushed south toward the Mngeni and perhaps even the Msunduze. It is thus possible Mcoseli refused the Chunu and feared an attack. A. T. Bryant's derivative account contends Mcoseli would have been aware of the significant loss of cattle by Sibenya of the Njilo when Sibenya refused to render allegiance to Zihlandlo of the Mkhize.<sup>61</sup> That the attacking iziYendane regiment included peoples attacked by Matiwane may have suggested to Mcoseli Matiwane's power. Whether or not Matiwane requested Mcoseli's allegiance, Mcoseli and his followers were most likely aware of the dangers of remaining and may have been attracted to the order that was slowly returning for the Ngwane as Matiwane reestablished agricultural and livestock production.<sup>62</sup>

Mcoseli and his followers arrived to affiliate with the Ngwane at an unfortunate time. In order to access resources to provision growing numbers of regiments and eliminate potential rivals, the expanding Zulu turned southwest, attacking the Ngwane and Chunu. Matiwane and his followers migrated a second time (about 1821/1822), now over the Drakensberg.<sup>63</sup> Mcoseli elected not to follow the Ngwane. Nombiba alleged it was because the women and children under Mcoseli had not recovered, having only just arrived to *khonza* Matiwane. Exactly what unfolds at Njasuthi after Matiwane's departure is less certain. Somquba claimed that they

decided to return home because they were hungry and longing for home where they could at least plant crops.<sup>64</sup> But Nombiba suggests Matiwane may have pushed affiliated chiefs away when he suspected their designs on his crops and cattle. Matiwane sent back a force to attack Mcoseli and Noqomfela and their followers. Claims about Mcoseli's burial at Ezimpangeleni at Table Mountain exist from 1894 forward, but Nombiba told Shepstone that both Mcoseli and Noqomfela died at Njasuthi.<sup>65</sup> Mcoseli's followers were "greatly reduced" but included Mcoseli's young heir Tshiko (Nomsimekwana, then at most in his early teens).<sup>66</sup> Nombiba resided for some time near Mooi River. Others hunted at the Little Bushman's River and traded with Ogle & Co. at the mouth of the Mkhomazi River.<sup>67</sup> This episode marked the end of Noqomfela's chiefly house and a small, amalgamated group drastically different from those who left for Njasuthi.<sup>68</sup>

These survivors would then pay allegiance to the Mkhize for security, but oral tales of *amazimu*—so-called cannibals, or more aptly, those who "eat others up"—reveal the disorder that prevailed while they were chiefless. While several of the *amazimu* stories are narrated by chiefs eager to stress the significance of centralized authority and the legitimacy of hereditary rule, they resonate with not only Nombiba's account but also other non-chiefly interlocutors in the JSA. Whether or not Nomsimekwana, Nombiba, and the others actually returned to Table Mountain in between paying allegiance to the Ngwane and Mkhize, the cannibal tales take place at Table Mountain, serving to connect the people to the land at Table Mountain.

These oral accounts suggest remnants of Mcoseli and Noqomfela's followers encountered "an evil portent" after their deaths and the departure of Matiwane. *Amazimu* roamed the land. These were said to belong to the Mbambo who wandered and, finding nothing to eat, adopted the habit of eating others.<sup>69</sup> Some were caught and cooked, including the mother of the young Nomsimekwana. Others, including Nomsimekwana, found refuge in forests and caves, but they had nothing to eat and it was not long before *amazimu* surrounded them. Nomsimekwana and many others were captured, but some of the men had been away, looking for food, and thus temporarily were safe from the *amazimu*.<sup>70</sup>

Nomsimekwana joined a long file of people, some carrying pots on their heads, others the firewood that would be used to cook them. He made several attempts to escape and once was wounded when the *amazimu* pierced him with a spear as he tried to flee. But as Nomsimekwana became more troubled about his pending fate, a hippopotamus appeared in a pool of the Msunduze where the Mpushini flows

into it. He decided that it was better to be killed by the hippo than slaughtered and cooked and eaten. He threw himself into the pool and swam underwater. He heard the *amazimu*, who wondered if he had been eaten by the hippopotamus or drowned.<sup>71</sup> It was his ability to survive these deadly adventures that earned Mcoseli's young son Tshiko his praise name, Nomsimekwana.<sup>72</sup>

While hunger was a part of life for the small chiefdoms that maintained their positions in Natal, translation of "*amazimu*" provides important insights that these were not man-eating humans that arrived at Table Mountain. Bryant, an amateur historian and linguist who participated in colonial mythmaking, translated "*izimu*" (singular of *amazimu*) as "cannibal—of whom there were still some in Natal, etc., during the upheaval caused among the clans by Shaka during the early years of last century."<sup>73</sup> Knowing Bryant's penchant for misinterpretation when it comes to Shaka, we read his definition with care. But he furthers his description, "see also, look up *umzimu*," which he describes as a largely obsolete word meaning "spirit" or "evil spirit." This resonates with Somquba's description of *amazimu* as *imihlola* (strange or evil portent), an omen.<sup>74</sup> In a definition of "*intsumo*," a folktale, Bryant further suggests these are not literal cannibals. "*Intsumo*" is a "folklore story, nursery tale, as told to Native children; anything, whether action, story, or affair of an absurd, senseless, childish nature = *inGanekwane* [Bo *zimuzimu*, absurd]."<sup>75</sup> Sibusiso Nyembezi's definition of "*izimu*" is somewhat more explanatory: "*Umuntu obulala abantu abadle*" or "a person who kills people and eats or feeds on them."<sup>76</sup> The term "eat up" was commonly used in nineteenth- and twentieth-century African accounts to describe the seizure of an individual or a chiefdom's women and cattle.<sup>77</sup> It is not difficult to "understand how easily the metaphor of cannibalism came to be applied to marauders or brigands: owing no allegiance to any recognised chief, and living mainly by raiding, they came to be regarding as 'living on' their fellow men." What prevailed for the chiefless survivors during this period might be described as *ubuzimuzimu*.<sup>78</sup> At first telling, *amazimu* tales may have been stories contrasting the tribulations experienced by smaller chiefdoms on the periphery with those within the order and the civilization of the centralized authority—particularly, the Zulu kingdom.<sup>79</sup>

These *amazimu* tales shed light into expectations that result from *ukukhonza*. When individuals or polities pledged their allegiance to a chief or a more powerful chiefdom, they expected protection and order in return. To exist without a chief was to inhabit a world of *ubuzimuzimu*, chaos, and danger. The constant raiding forced Nomsimekwana and the Table Mountain survivors to submit themselves

again to another more powerful polity or risk dispersal or elimination. Perhaps under an elder member among the survivors, such as Yengqwa ka Nombotha ka Mcabangu, who appears in Somquba's account as a regent-like figure to the young Nomsimekwana, they opted to *khonza* a stronger power in Zululand.

Nombiba's account suggests that Nomsimekwana and his remaining followers planned to join Zihlandlo, chief of the Mkhize, then a powerful tributary of Shaka, while Somquba presents the decision as forced upon them when they were captured by Zihlandlo's soldiers while crossing the Thukela. Zihlandlo submitted to the Zulu without resistance and Shaka thus allowed the Mkhize to continue to expand their territory in his name. The Mkhize chief held considerable power but remained a tributary rather than an equal of Shaka. Zihlandlo's role was to control the southern border of the Zulu sphere of influence and exact resources for the benefit of the Zulu. While Shaka incorporated Zihlandlo's young men into his regiments, they were porters rather than warriors.<sup>80</sup> While Dan Wylie has argued that Zihlandlo was far from a subdued tributary, Jochen Arndt and Wright show how the Mkhize were not assimilated as those who enjoyed high status.<sup>81</sup>

While the Mkhize were themselves a tributary to the Zulu, they made clear to the young Nomsimekwana and his followers that they were subordinate to the Mkhize. Nomsimekwana and the others became menial laborers, assigned to look after children and to tend the cooking pots and the calabashes of souring milk. They noted differences in language and custom, such as *umgcabo*, between themselves and the Mkhize.<sup>82</sup> Later, when some of them would be called upon for battle, it was an extraordinary mobilization. While Arndt has shown the Cele internalized their *amaLala* status, the experience of Nomsimekwana suggests that the Mkhize originally may have refused the category and attempted to differentiate themselves from those on the periphery during Shaka's lifetime.

Shaka eventually turned on Zihlandlo, who escaped to south of Natal, after he assisted Shaka in defeating the Ndwandwe under Sikhunyana ka Zwide. The disintegration of the Ndwandwe in 1826 allowed Shaka to dominate former Ndwandwe territory north of the Black Mfolozi, encouraged opposition to Shaka's rule from the Zulu royal family, and opened the way for the Dlamini to reestablish themselves as the major power north of the Phongolo.<sup>83</sup> The young Nomsimekwana stayed north of the Thukela through the time of Shaka's 1828 campaign to north of Delagoa Bay known as *kukulela ngoqo impi*. Some who crossed the Thukela with Nomsimekwana died of fever while fighting in this campaign.<sup>84</sup> While this seemingly contradicts the fact that *Lala* menials were not used as soldiers, the campaign's naming as

*kukulela ngoqo impi* reflects that the campaign was “an extraordinary act of total mobilization” in which even invalids and people of low status (*ungoqo*) were organized. Jantshi ka Nongila described it as “*a force raked together indiscriminately from the whole male population. Even old men went out to fight.*”<sup>85</sup> This explains how some *Lala* men came to serve in Shaka’s army, whether as mat-bearers, porters, or soldiers. That same year, Shaka was assassinated. Shaka’s successor, King Dingane sent Nomsimekwana, who had not participated in the northern campaign, and his young age-mates to protect cattle at an outlying post.<sup>86</sup> Nombiba suggests that after Dingane killed Zihlandlo, Nomsimekwana left for Table Mountain. It took him three seasons to return, for he cultivated crops at Karkloof and on the Mngeni first.<sup>87</sup>

Back at Table Mountain, Nomsimekwana built a homestead at Ezimpangeleni and the remnants of his father’s followers began to re-collect under him. Nomsimekwana married Ma Ngubane and gave birth to Ngangezwe. The followers of Nomsimekwana cultivated at least two seasons before Boer trekkers in 1838 arrived under the leadership of Andries Pretorius.<sup>88</sup> In 1839, the Boers allied with Dingane’s half brother, Mpande, in a Zulu succession dispute known as “the breaking of the rope.” Nombiba suggests Mpande’s defeat of King Dingane allowed the rest of the survivors to rejoin Nomsimekwana at Table Mountain. But the land ceded by Mpande in return for Boer support against Dingane became the short-lived Republic of Natalia with its capital at Pietermaritzburg, only forty kilometers from Table Mountain. The Republican government granted land to its citizens according to the traditional Cape-Dutch fashion, though many claims remained on paper only.<sup>89</sup> Nomsimekwana now faced a new threat.

These shifting affiliations contributed to the settler myth of a vacant interior prior to the arrival of white settlers. The Republican government resolved to move by force the majority of Africans who they believed “had no right or claim to any part of the country, having only come amongst us after the emigrants had come hither.”<sup>90</sup> Nombiba’s account does not speak to this new threat, but Somquba suggests the dangers. Nomsimekwana had heard that the Boers put to death the Zondi chief, Dlaba, as punishment for raiding of Boer cattle that they had only just acquired from the Zulu.<sup>91</sup> Somquba’s account suggests that Nomsimekwana himself felt the wrath of Boers who put him in charge of small stock that fell prey to wild animals. Knowing Dlaba’s involvement with cattle raiding, it is likely that Nomsimekwana was not herding but seeking to acquire the cattle that would enable him to rebuild the Mdluli chiefdom. With the assistance of dedicated followers such as Sojuba Majola and Idi Mdluli, Nomsimekwana and Ma Ngubane escaped with their son



Ngangezwe as well as their cattle. After another Boer raid that resulted in the loss of most of his cattle, Nomsimekwana moved farther down the river or to the opposite bank of the Msunduze.<sup>92</sup>

## Conclusion

Archaeological, historical linguistic, and oral evidence that suggests the layering of identities and the varied forms of authority across southeastern Africa enable us to reconsider the nature of relationships between chiefs and subjects and between polities over a longer period of time. Rather than geographically bounded and temporally permanent chiefdoms with long-established chiefly lines, the focus must be on the act of *ukukhonza* that served to bind subjects and followers in service of security. A cultural logic governed regional politics of assimilation, incorporation, centralization, and expansion. In the centralizing polities of southeast Africa, this meant many layers of allegiance between subjects and chiefs and between weaker and stronger polities. Polities could disappear, reform, or expand based on affiliations built through *ukukhonza*. Additionally, thinking about *ukukhonza* as an act that helped to transition outsiders into insiders at local and regional scales allows us to consider different relationships between chiefs and land, as well as sources of authority beyond chiefly lineages that claim power from time immemorial. While some oral accounts suggest the long history of Mdluli chiefs in the region, the prevalence of the Majola in these should make us focus on the affiliations between clans. Through marriage and appropriation of the Majola's connection with the land, the Mdluli established chiefly authority at Table Mountain. Through relationships of submission, the Mdluli line survived the growth of states during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.

The arrival of Boer trekkers was another threat to security at Table Mountain. Growing British concern over Boer raids, as well as the threat to British strategic interests, caused the British to occupy Durban several times between 1838 and the annexation of Natal to the Cape Colony in 1843. Ngangezwe, acting for his father in an 1894 land claim in which he likely hoped to gain favor by calling upon this historical allegiance, testified that Nomsimekwana turned to the English in Durban after an attack by the Boers.<sup>93</sup> In 1899, Nomsimekwana himself repeated his feelings, telling one of Stuart's assistants that "living under the British is more preferable than living under the Zulu regime when people were killed for the slightest offence."<sup>94</sup>

Somquba claimed the British promised Nomsimekwana he could return and “that nothing whatsoever would happen to him.”<sup>95</sup> Mcoseli’s followers began to re-collect, and by 1864, Shepstone recorded that 917 followers recognized Nomsimekwana as their chief at Table Mountain.<sup>96</sup>

When Nomsimekwana formed a new affiliation with the newly arrived British authorities, he applied a local political practice to a new experience—a practice that other Africans in Natal would use to launch themselves into chiefly careers to the east and west of Nomsimekwana. As colonial officials appointed chiefs, those such as Nomsimekwana who were already leaders defended their hereditary status and called upon historical occupation of land in order to legitimize their authority with both their peoples and the colonial administration. It is to these processes we now turn.



# He Said He Wants to Be Registered as a Chief

## Hereditary Chiefs and Government Tribes, 1843–1905

[T]here was a Maphumulo man who worked in the Mngeni Court. He was given his pension but back then people were not receiving money for pensions; even soldiers were only rewarded with something but there was no money. Then white people decided to give [Maguzu] Maphumulo those people who were moved from Mhlabamakhosi to look after . . . He said he wants to be registered as a Chief. They did as he requested because after that they sent all the documents to Pretoria that shows that he is now a Chief. Nobody bothered to consult with other Chiefs. He was appointed by the white people.

—*Induna Bhekumuzi Sibiya*, 2011

In 2011, a headman of *Inkosi* Sikhosiphi Mdluli of the Nyavu, Bhekumuzi Sibiya, explained his chieftom's relationship with neighbors such as the Gcumisa, Maphumulo, and Ximba. Sibiya uses contemporary metaphors to explain colonial practices—pensions and Pretoria as the seat of administration—to describe the creation of the Maphumulo chieftaincy at Table Mountain.<sup>1</sup> Maguzu Maphumulo worked for the colonial administration from 1873, as a member of the

African police and as an induna of the court at Ndwedwe and Mngeni. In 1905, he was elevated to the position of chief by British officials.

Sibiya's account posits two types of chiefs—those of the Nyavu, who had long inhabited the land, and those given power by the white man. These two forms of leadership were integral to British governance of the region that became the Natal Colony in 1843. Across the British empire, chiefs with legitimate authority administered African populations as part of the strategy of indirect rule, designed to capitalize on existing authority structures at minimal cost to the metropole. Scholars have long recognized that indirect rule did not transfer power from the British to African rulers; as Karen Fields demonstrates, “real power issued from the ruled.”<sup>2</sup> The system peaked between the world wars, and varied in the degree of legitimacy maintained or achieved by African authorities across colonies, rural settings, and urban ports.<sup>3</sup> In Natal, it has been synonymous with Theophilus Shepstone's administration, despite scholarly attention to the label's shortcomings and retroactive application to Shepstone's rule. British policies in Natal are often described hegemonically as “the Shepstone system,” but Shepstone improvised over the colony's first thirty years. His administration is better described as a series of pragmatic actions focused on the provision of land for Africans in return for personal allegiances to Shepstone. Shepstone's flexible and personal approach gave way to indirect rule only after the 1870s.<sup>4</sup>

Both during Shepstone's tenure and after, colonial officials recognized the distinction between appointed chiefs and government tribes as a central tenet of African administration. British officials recognized men such as Nomsimekwana Mdluli as “hereditary” or “aboriginal” chiefs, implying their status came from descent and original occupation of territory in Natal. Undersecretary of Native Affairs (USNA) S. O. Samuelson explained in 1903: “There are two distinct and antagonistic forms of tribal government in the Colony, the one by hereditary Chiefs and the other by Chiefs appointed by the Government. These forms should be maintained, they are of material value in giving effect to the principle of divide and rule.”<sup>5</sup>

On the one hand, it worked. Sibiya uses the story of a chieftainship as pension to delegitimize the authority of the Nyavu's colonially appointed neighbors. As this chapter shows, while the language of pension is new, the practice of setting these two types of chiefs at odds was long used by Nyavu chiefs in attempts to access land at Table Mountain. On the other hand, while Nyavu chiefs and members use the metaphor of a pension and the label of appointed chief to delegitimize, the followers of appointed chiefs and their descendants did not acknowledge this

status as inferior. The colonial regime was not the only with the power to appoint chiefs. Appointment was also a practice of Zulu kings before it, who raised up men known for their military skills and loyalty. The descendants of appointed chiefs recognize the promotion of new chiefs as a reward for loyal service, using both the isiZulu word for pension, “*umhlalaphansi*,” and the isiZulu-ized “*impeshini*.” African subjects of appointed chiefs created their own origin stories, deploying a genealogical imagination that granted authority and connected peoples even under colonial rule.<sup>6</sup>

By tracing the proliferation of chiefdoms at Table Mountain during colonial rule, this chapter shows how chiefs, both appointed and hereditary, and their subjects relied upon cultural inheritances of genealogical imagination, land rights based upon first use, and *ukukhonza* to build and sustain chiefdoms. The chapter outlines the creation and division of what was then the largest and most powerful chiefdom in Natal, the Qamu of Ngoza Majozi. While colonial officials sought to use appointed chiefs to divide and conquer the African population, the Africans who pledged their allegiance to appointed chiefs did not always see their new leaders as collaborators with the colonial regime. While scholars have paid attention to the ways in which African men such as Ngoza built chiefdoms, African subjects also built chiefdoms by demanding accountable leaders, hereditary or appointed. When colonial officials acknowledged the split of the Qamu into three new polities—Mahoza’s Mkhize, the landless Qamu, and the Gcumisa—in 1882, they formalized a process of transferring allegiance that Ngoza’s followers had already begun. In 1905, Butsha and several homestead heads of the Gcumisa chiefdom sought to transfer their allegiance to a chief with whom they had historic ties. But after 1896, colonial ordinances required that they seek permission from the Secretary for Native Affairs to do so. In requesting to change chiefs, Butsha and the homestead heads shaped the creation of a new chiefdom by pledging allegiance to another government induna, Maguzu Maphumulo. While land at Table Mountain had henceforth been space for these Africans from Zululand to set up homesteads and live in peace, with the creation of the Maphumulo space became place granted to them by the appointment of Maguzu—an act enshrined in the stories of the chiefdom’s origins.

But increasing pressure on land and piecemeal imposition of boundaries did spark disputes between chiefdoms. An examination of conflicts between appointed chiefs, the landed Gcumisa and landless Qamu, shows how personal allegiances persisted despite attempts by colonial officials to damage those relationships


in favor of territorial jurisdiction. Africans drew on cultural inheritances such as *ukukhonza* ties to promote access to land and hold leaders accountable. The chiefs of the landless Qamu descended from Ngoza, an appointed chief, and their followers preferred to maintain *ukukhonza* relationships with Ngoza's Majozi family. The Qamu chiefs called on a genealogy that allowed them to argue their status as descendants of Ngoza, in contrast to another appointed chief who lacked these family ties. The Nyavu drew upon not only their hereditary descent, but also the principle of first use for land rights. The Nyavu deployed conceptions of land as "place," locations important to the chiefdom not only as space in which to grow, but as place with which the chiefdom had historical ties.

## Early Land and African Administration in the Colony of Natal

The majority of Africans in Natal on the eve of British annexation were people who had never left their land or who had lived in hiding during the expansion of African states and the arrival of Boer trekkers. Others had moved temporarily but returned to Natal when they felt confident to do so—as Nomsimekwana did in the aftermath of Zihlandlo's death and many others in the wake of King Dingane's 1838 loss to trekkers at Ncome.<sup>7</sup>

British annexation in 1843 was not a moment of subjugation for Natal's Africans. Conquest did not happen in a series of military battles like on the Cape's eastern frontier or in Zululand to the north—though it did incorporate violence of many kinds. Conquest was a long process, not just a prelude to colonialism.<sup>8</sup> During the formative years of the colony, Africans continued to acquire cattle, marry, and build homesteads—to socially reproduce. But Natal's colonial administration did force change in the lives of Africans. A growing body of case law and administrative practice as well as the systematic codification of African customary law after 1875 marked a new era of African administration, powered by settler desires for land and labor, which gave increasing importance to boundaries and the disintegration of the types of personal allegiance that Shepstone modeled.<sup>9</sup>

Colonial administration of Africans was intricately tied to land from the start. The movement of Africans during the expansion of the Ndwandwe, Mthethwa, and Zulu contributed to a settler myth of a vacant interior in which Africans had no rights. The arrival of Boer trekkers and other European settlers mapped new conceptions of land—trekker transhumance and British-bounded private



**MAP 2.** Colony of Natal, showing districts and locations in 1850s.

ADAPTED FROM ANDREW DUMINY AND BILL GUEST, EDs., *NATAL AND ZULULAND FROM EARLIEST TIMES TO 1910: A NEW HISTORY* (PIETERMARITZBURG: UNIVERSITY OF NATAL PRESS, 1989), 124; AND JEFF GUY, *THEOPHILUS SHEPSTONE AND THE FORGING OF NATAL: AFRICAN AUTONOMY AND SETTLER COLONIALISM IN THE MAKING OF TRADITIONAL AUTHORITY* (PIETERMARITZBURG: UNIVERSITY OF KWAZULU-NATAL PRESS, 2013).

property—onto African principles of first use and reciprocal rights. The British commissioner for Natal, Henry Cloete, drew the first boundary—the Thukela River from the sea until it met the Mzinyathi River—between the colony and the Zulu kingdom in 1843. Thereafter he distinguished between “aboriginal” Africans, native to Natal with rights to land, and “refugee” Africans, Zulus without rights to land who moved into the colony. These began to arrive in the same year as annexation,



as Africans at odds with Dingane's successor, Mpande, had already fled across the Thukela into the Mvoti region in what is known as the crossing of Mawa.<sup>10</sup>

Cloete proposed the idea of land reserved for African occupation, and Lieutenant Governor Martin West set up the first Locations Commission in 1846. The establishment of the locations took place over two decades, as claims, counterclaims, and resistance from settlers shaped their construction and the actual surveying took time. As late as 1867, only six reserves had been surveyed and transferred to the Natal Native Trust, constituted in 1864 to hold land in trust for Africans. For these reasons, the establishment of the reserves should be seen as a process, rather than an act.<sup>11</sup> This process of defining space for African occupation governed by intermediaries—chiefs and headmen—provided the basis for what would become the system of “native administration.”

Inanda Location, on which Nomsimekwana found himself resident, was proclaimed in 1847. Like the other reserves, it was not initially delineated or bounded (see map 2). The deed transferring it to the Natal Native Trust defined it according to the boundaries of surrounding white farms (themselves the subject of dispute). Surveyed and beacons in 1886 to 1887, it consisted of 211,600 acres stretching from Table Mountain in the west to the Inanda Valley north of Durban. Around Table Mountain, Inanda was already occupied by homesteads that pledged allegiance to Nomsimekwana and Africans who entered Natal from Zululand. After 1855, a 5,600-acre American Zulu Mission (AZM) station cut across the heart of Nomsimekwana's jurisdiction.<sup>12</sup> Over the next few decades, the location's numbers would increase as homesteads reproduced, Africans arrived from Zululand for work or refuge, and others relocated when evicted from newly occupied settler farms.

In addition to the locations for African populations and land for mission stations, the government made grants from the Crown to Boers and British immigrants. These farms were subject to quit-rent with the condition that cultivation would take place.<sup>13</sup> As Boers emigrated out of Natal in the wake of these land policies and the government's unwillingness to force Africans into labor, they cheaply sold their land claims to speculators, Boers who remained, or local merchants to settle debts. Nearly two million acres of Natal were divided among only 360 claimants, with leading speculators among them. These claimants and speculators sought to make good on their investments by presenting Natal as a desirable destination for immigrants. Between 1849 and 1852, some five thousand immigrants bought up land under schemes promoted by landholders. But few possessed the desire, skills, or capital necessary to make it as farmers, and many soon sold off their

claims, increasing speculation. By 1860, fifteen leading speculators controlled seven hundred thousand acres of Natal.<sup>14</sup>

An 1885 estimate suggests that over half of Natal's African population lived on these private (162,600) and Crown lands (42,000); the remainder (169,800) lived on locations.<sup>15</sup> Africans on private and Crown lands became either labor tenants compelled to provide labor to the owner of the farm or rent tenants, subject to annual charges (between £1 or £3 per dwelling in the 1880s) with no security of tenure. Africans living on private and Crown lands could claim exemption from the hut tax (7s until 1885, when it increased to 14s) and *isibhalo*, the forced labor tax on young, unmarried men meant to enlist labor for public works projects.<sup>16</sup>

Both preexisting and newly created chiefdoms that populated these lands lacked formal boundaries. Near Table Mountain, many Africans arriving in Natal settled on the Goedverwachting farm purchased by the Bishop of Natal John Colenso but in practice governed by Shepstone's induna, Ngoza Majози. Officials attempted to manage this influx of Africans into the colony. To protect its relationship with the Zulu king, the colony forbade the movement of cattle across the border. To appease settler demands for labor, it required new arrivals to serve three years of waged labor.<sup>17</sup> But despite these new colonial regulations, Ngoza's followers *khonza*'d the nascent chief and contributed to the creation of a chiefdom according to local political practices of homestead construction and *ukukhonza*.

## Africans and the Making and Unmaking of Ngoza's Qamu at Table Mountain

Nomsimekwana found his jurisdiction encroached upon by the appointment of *iziphakanyiswa*—those persons “raised up” by colonial officials—and the proliferation of “government tribes.” The colonial government recognized a number of African intermediaries, including headman (*induna*), hereditary chief (*inkosi*), government induna, and appointed chief. While the creation of new polities was a colonial strategy for governing the majority, the appointment of new chiefs and headmen was not a new practice, and Africans—both the men who became chiefs and those they governed—deployed *ukukhonza* and other cultural inheritances to navigate life in colonial Natal. Ngoza's rise to power and his chiefdom's division into four new entities is illustrative of how chiefdoms proliferated without clear boundaries over the first fifty years of colonial rule.

Appointed chiefs came to lead an estimated one-third to one-half of the African population of Natal. Many of the first *iziphakanyiswa*, such as Ngoza Majozi and Mqundane “Jantshi” Mlaba, started as servants and indunas of colonial officials and traders. Some of them served in the Natal Native Police Corps, or the Thintandaba (“in touch with affairs”), a regiment of Africans set up by Shepstone in 1848 to secure the colony. The polities of Ngoza and Mqundane were actually first known as the Thintandaba.<sup>18</sup> USNA Samuelson described the initial organization of Ngoza’s “government tribe” as a provision for offensive and defensive purposes. Shepstone and magistrates relied on these appointed chiefs to provide men during times of need, such as the 1873 Langalibalele Rebellion, during which magistrates drafted two thousand to three thousand men from under the jurisdiction of loyal chiefs. Appointed chiefs and government tribes proliferated after John W. Shepstone took over the office of the SNA in 1882. By then, of 173 chiefs recognized by the administration, ninety-nine were hereditary and seventy-four were appointed chiefs or indunas with the power of chiefs. By 1906, there were 215 chiefs. Nineteen chiefdoms had been divided between 1893 and 1906 alone.<sup>19</sup>

### Making the Qamu

For many of those who would become *iziphakanyiswa*, such as Ngoza, there was no formal appointment nor recognition of the man as “chief.” Ngoza Majozi grew up under Jobe of the Sithole during the early nineteenth century. He served as a soldier in the Zulu army during the reign of Dingane (1828–1840); he may have fought at Ncome in 1838.<sup>20</sup> During the early 1840s, possibly in association with Dingane’s defeat to Mpande, Ngoza crossed the Thukela River into Natal. Ngoza first worked as a servant for Pietermaritzburg’s butcher, Stoffel Boshoff, before attracting Theophilus Shepstone’s attention in the 1847 attack on the recalcitrant Chief Fodo in southern Natal. Ngoza then entered colonial employment as Shepstone’s induna. The position was unpaid but enabled Ngoza to amass wealth through fines, fees, and rewards in cattle. For example, Ngoza received sixty cows after the Thintandaba’s first assignment.<sup>21</sup> Lazarus Xaba, who was part of Ngoza’s forces during an 1865 expedition, explained this distribution of cattle in the local tradition of social reproduction; Shepstone “*established imizi for his adherents*” like Ngoza.<sup>22</sup> Ngoza, his brother Mfulatelwa, and Mqundane Mlaba set up their homesteads near Table Mountain. From there, Ngoza and Mqundane amassed followers. John Shepstone explained this process by which Ngoza ascended to



**FIGURE 8.** The famously reproduced “Zulu Chief Goza in full war costume and indunas.”

PHOTOGRAPH COURTESY OF KILLIE CAMPBELL AFRICANA LIBRARY AT THE UNIVERSITY OF KWAZULU-NATAL, C59-048.




**FIGURE 9.** Chief Ngoza Majози.

PHOTOGRAPH COURTESY OF KILLIE CAMPBELL AFRICANA LIBRARY AT THE UNIVERSITY OF KWAZULU-NATAL, D37-002.

a chieftaincy: “Natives came and attached themselves to Theophilus, and Ngoza behaved so well that he stuck to my brother, who allowed him to become chief induna, but such appointment was never proclaimed. But he was later on generally acknowledged as the induna.”<sup>23</sup> Following local practices of building homesteads and relationships through *ukukhonzza*, these men built up two of the largest chiefdoms in Natal—the Qamu and the Ximba. By the time of Ngoza’s death, his family and followers had come to see him as chief and asserted this status even when John Shepstone hesitated to recognize him as such.<sup>24</sup>

The men who came to *khonza* Ngoza were diverse in origin and motivation. Butsha, Mpinkulu, Tayi, Mazingela, and their families previously recognized the authority of Chief Jangeni Zondi. Several branches of the Zondi had moved from the Mvoti region to the Pietermaritzburg area during state consolidation. Until at least 1853 and at latest 1856, Jangeni lived near Table Mountain with his followers, after which he left for his home at Ngome.<sup>25</sup> His followers who stayed behind then came under the authority of Ngoza. Ngoza’s government tribe also included Mganu Maphumulo, whose son, Maguzu, would become another appointed chief. Mganu moved into the region from the area that became the Maphumulo District sometime between 1853 and 1856, possibly because of the brewing tensions in Zululand over the kingship. The family settled near the Mkabela River and *khonza*’d Ngoza. The Mkabela region became known as Estezi kwaMaphumulo after the family.<sup>26</sup> Others such as Zekandaba, a subject of Phakade, and Tokoza ka Macingwane *khonza*’d Ngoza after conflicts within their chiefdoms.<sup>27</sup>

Others streamed into the Table Mountain region to take refuge in the British colony after the 1856 Battle of Ndongakusuka, the secession dispute between King Mpande’s sons, Cetshwayo and Mbuyazi. After Mbuyazi’s defeat, his *iziGqoza* supporters—such as Sikhunyana Mathe, whose grandson heard the account—moved to Natal. Sikhunyana’s grandson explained that Shepstone told him and the *iziGqoza* refugees to settle at Estezi kwaMaphumulo—an area largely open except for those who lived near the cliffs.<sup>28</sup> Others included several of Mpande’s wives, such as Mbuyazi’s mother Monase, who while technically under the authority of Ngoza at Mbava behaved as a chief herself, and his son Mkhungo, who came to live in the protection of Bishop Colenso at Bishopstowe.<sup>29</sup> Monase remained alone, but others of Mpande’s wives later married some of Theophilus’s closest indunas, including Mqundane and Mahoiza—indicative of not only the significance of marriage to chiefdom building but also the attempts of appointed chiefs to establish connections to the Zulu royal family.<sup>30</sup> Others of the *iziGqoza* who *khonza*’d Ngoza, such



**MAP 3.** Area of interest, showing Inanda Location and neighboring white farms and mission stations occupied by Africans

as Manyosi Gcumisa, served in his amaHangu regiment.<sup>31</sup> Manyosi was an induna of the amaHangu and later, too, would be appointed chief.

Ngoza's chiefdom, the Qamu, had no boundaries. It was a collection of these heterogeneous remnants of chiefdoms and homestead heads held together by personal relationships facilitated by *ukukhonza*. His followers lived on Inanda Location, stretching north across the Mngeni River to the boundary of the reserve, as well as adjoining land owned, but not necessarily occupied, by European settlers and companies—including Goedverwaching and Onverwacht farms (see these farms adjoining the Inanda reserve on map 3). While these pieces of land were registered as European owned from the early 1850s, they were not settled by anyone other than Africans at the time. From 1855 to 1910, Goedverwaching (six thousand acres) was part of Bishop John Colenso's mission station, though the bulk of his work took place on Bishopstowe and Ekukhanyeni land. Onverwacht (3,875 acres) was held by a series of investors and its own boundaries were disputed in a series of surveys in the 1890s. Africans on two portions of Onverwacht, bought in 1857 and 1863 by Sir John Akerman as an investment, paid rent but otherwise did not experience interference on their land.<sup>32</sup> An 1897 sketch of the region shows the

greatest European presence in the region on the farms Doornhoek and Aasvogel Krans, closer to Pietermaritzburg, while African homesteads covered the other privately held land.<sup>33</sup>

In the early days of the colony when there was a certain prestige and status attached to these chiefs in favor with important officials, “government tribe” was a proud moniker, and indeed part of the Qamu referred to themselves as such as late as 1903.<sup>34</sup> Ngoza’s affiliation with Theophilus may have served to attract homestead heads who *khonza’d* the appointed chief upon their arrival in the region, but it was also his largesse—the acquisition of cattle during his work—that appealed to potential followers. In contrast, the Table Mountain AZM missionary recognized in 1852 that Nomsimekwana, while deserving of recognition for his aboriginal right to the land, was “poor in cattle, &c., has neither exercised great authority, nor seen many people come to place themselves under him as their chief.”<sup>35</sup> Ngoza’s wealth in cattle could attract followers.

### Dividing the Qamu, Creating the Gcumisa

As Ngoza’s power expanded, the chiefdom grew unwieldy, particularly after he moved his homestead north. In 1858, Theophilus asserted authority over an unyielding chief, Matshana of the Sithole in the Klip River district; he deposed Matshana and dissolved his chiefdom. He sold the territory to Ngoza, certainly as an example of the benefits of loyalty to the colonial government and a warning to those who opposed it.<sup>36</sup> Thus in 1869, Ngoza left the Mngeni Valley with a number of his followers and moved back to the Msinga area, marking the first split of his Qamu chiefdom. Ngoza died in Msinga the same year.

Before his departure north, Ngoza appointed another of Theophilus’s indunas, Mahoiza Mkhize, to manage his followers who remained behind in Natal (see the split of Ngoza’s Qamu in table 3). Mahoiza ka Mlandu started in the colonial service as a policeman and over the years became another of Theophilus’s trusted indunas. As leader of the Table Mountain Qamu, his jurisdiction had no boundaries, and his subjects lived on both location and privately owned land across the Mngeni River. Mahoiza built a homestead on the Bishopstowe mission station but traveled often for his work. He earned a reputation for being difficult and dishonest, as well as enjoying the privileges of his colonial affiliation—food, drink, and the royal women he married.<sup>37</sup> Like Ngoza, he had no formal appointment, and colonial officials often referred to him as an induna, but he gradually began to exercise the rights of a chief.

**TABLE 3.** Division of Ngoza's Qamu Chieftom in Table Mountain Region, Showing "Government Tribes" and Years of Chieftainship, 1869–1905

Ngoza Majoji (Qamu)			
<b>Mahoiza Mkhize</b> (Qamu, 1869–1892)	<b>Mfulatelwa Majoji,</b> deceased (Qamu)	<b>Manyosi Gcumisa</b> (Gcumisa, 1882–1894)	
<b>Mjiba Mkhize</b> (Qamu, 1892–1893)	<b>Mbobo Majoji</b> (landless Qamu, 1882–1884)	<b>Swayimane Gcumisa</b> (Gcumisa, 1894–1934)	
<b>Cupukumuka Mkhize</b> (Qamu Acting, 1893–1912)	<b>Nsibansiba Majoji</b> (landless Qamu, 1884–1888)	<b>Swayimane Gcumisa</b> (Gcumisa, 1894–1934)	<b>Maguzu Maphumulo</b> (Maphumulo, 1905–1922)

But colonial officials continued to renegotiate what the rights of a chief were. The 1875 Native Administration Law marked the end of the "Shepstone era" and his personal, flexible approach to provision of land for loyal Africans. Settler influence produced the new law that transferred judicial authority over Africans to a new Native High Court and made provision for a more complete codification of African laws than the case law built up previously by Shepstone and magistrates. The law was designed to replace chiefly authority with administrators of native law. The 1878 Code of Native Law reduced to writing "native law as at present administered," concentrating on the homestead as the basis of African societies and ensuring that men with authority—homestead heads, headmen, and chiefs—would continue to carry out an enormous amount of labor on behalf of the colonial government.<sup>38</sup> This end of the "Shepstone era" saw his brother John succeed to the office of SNA.

Chieftoms proliferated under John Shepstone, but this was not just a colonial initiative. Unlike Ngoza, Mahoiza did not earn the respect of his followers. His failure to recruit men for *isibhalo* or to fight in the 1879 Anglo-Zulu War (in which many of Natal's Africans served willingly for the British) can be seen as just one indication of a lack of respect for Mahoiza's authority. While *isibhalo* was widely despised and resistance to it may not in and of itself represent a lack of chiefly legitimacy, the evidence suggests Mahoiza's inability was not due to dislike of



forced labor.<sup>39</sup> Mngeni Magistrate H. C. Campbell recognized that the unchecked dislike and opposition to Mahoiza resulted in the formation of factions within the chiefdom around two leaders Manyosi Gcumisa and Mboobo Majozi. Prior to colonial rule, the possibility that a disaffected section of a chiefdom such as these might hive off was a check on chiefly rule, as chiefs sought to avoid alienating the followers that gave them authority. Under colonial rule, this process was carefully regulated, and permission from the SNA was required not only for sections to hive off, but also for individuals and homesteads to transfer allegiance. Where a request for separation was granted, a new chiefdom formed under the leadership of the person leading the request for separation or a commoner who had performed some useful service and earned such a reward. Africans continued to deploy this practice, even if it now required permission. Many of Mahoiza's followers opted to move out of the location or transfer their allegiance to other chiefs in the district. By 1880, only a small party had any personal attachment to Mahoiza. Most saw him only as a representative of Ngoza's heirs.

Mahoiza failed to meet the expectations of both his followers and colonial administrators. In addition to his inability to requisition men for *isibhalo*, he was also hopelessly in debt, given to hard drinking, and constantly being brought before the magistrate. While Mahoiza struggled in these capacities, Manyosi and Mboobo had the authority to supply men and showed a responsiveness to both colonial officials and Mahoiza's followers under them. Magistrate Campbell recognized that the disrespect of followers hurt the colonial government's ability to govern as much as the chief's, arguing that "where the power of the chief makes itself felt on the side of law and order, the tribe is more under control and easy of management than where his authority is treated with disrespect." Campbell advised that the chiefdom be split but warned that those newly uplifted should be reminded their positions were not hereditary.<sup>40</sup> John Shepstone thus recommended that Mahoiza's authority be limited and his jurisdiction be divided among these cooperative headmen.<sup>41</sup> Manyosi ka Sigobhe was another favored induna of Theophilus. Manyosi fought with Dingane in Swaziland and then with Ngoza's amaHangu regiment against Sotho cattle raiders. He supported Theophilus in some of his most important affairs, including the 1873 attack on Langalibalele's independence and the 1877 trip to Zululand to define the boundary with the newly annexed Transvaal.<sup>42</sup> Mboobo was the heir to Ngoza's brother Mfulatelwa.

Thus in 1882, Mahoiza's jurisdiction was confined to control of homesteads only on private lands; his chiefdom would later take his surname, Mkhize, as its name.

The remainder of Mahoiza's Qamu were divided between Manyosi and Mbobo. Manyosi was elevated to chief of the 450 dwellings on location and private lands that had previously been under his control as headman. His portion of the Qamu would eventually take Manyosi's surname, Gcumisa, as its name. Mbobo became chief, but by the people, not by land. He controlled three hundred dwellings on location land, but without actual control of the territory on which they sat. Officials intended that the people under Mbobo and Manyosi could intermingle peacefully.<sup>43</sup> The land on which these dwellings existed was his only land, giving him and his followers no room for expansion. (From here on, I will refer to them as the landless Qamu, to distinguish them from the Qamu at Msinga.) The division between location and private lands did begin to demarcate space, but Mahoiza had followers only on private land and his followers were intermixed with Manyosi's in that territory. Manyosi's and Mbobo's followers were also interspersed on location land with no boundaries between them.

## Contesting Land and Authority after 1880

The proliferation of chiefdoms, growth in African population, and colonial movement toward the imposition of territorial authority were all part of a transforming Natal in the 1880s. The 1879 British invasion of Zululand resulted in thirteen clearly bounded chiefdoms with agreeable chiefs north of the colony. Short-term war-related economic growth in Natal gave way to a recession that was particularly hard-hitting for African producers. Landowners raised rents and evicted tenants, who sought space on location lands and wage labor both locally and in newly opened mines in the interior. Access to land for homestead production was more critical than ever, just as legislation gradually redefined how Africans could access that space. New chiefdoms multiplied, and boundaries remained fluid or nonexistent. It became increasingly difficult for Africans to sustain independent homestead economies. The granting of self-government to Natal in 1893 and a series of environmental calamities further undermined homestead autonomy. Drought wreaked havoc on Natal between 1888 and 1893, and a series of locust invasions and rinderpest plagued the region between 1894 and 1898. Young men went to Johannesburg to work and send remittances home to buy grain.<sup>44</sup> In this context, competition and conflict over land flourished. Disputes resulted in clear demarcation of boundaries—but only in the areas under contestation.

The movement toward bounded chiefdoms continued in the 1891 Code of Native Law and became official after the granting of self-government in Natal in 1893. The 1891 Code codified conceptions (and misconceptions) of customary law. The code commanded patriarchal authority without guaranteeing women's rights in land—the means of production—and replaced local, oral flexibility with the rigid written law that magistrates had been slowly developing. It defined every African as a member of a homestead, every homestead as the responsibility of a ward headman, every headman under the authority of a chief, and every chief under the Supreme Chief (the governor). The code's emphasis on the homestead appears to be evidence for a historical continuity of the homestead as the organizing concept of African societies. But as Guy has argued, the code in fact documents the homestead's demise at a moment when it could no longer sustain itself without reliance upon wage and migrant labor.<sup>45</sup> Amendments to the code took away chiefs' civil jurisdiction over followers on private lands. Acts 13 of 1894 and 40 of 1896 amended the code in attempts to blur distinctions between appointed and hereditary chiefs, and connected chiefs more firmly to territory by declaring that Africans were subjects of whatever chief on whose side of the boundary they resided. If a boundary separated a subject from his chief, he had two years to request permission to relocate.<sup>46</sup> These acts promoted territorial allegiance over personal allegiance and sought to fundamentally change the nature of chiefly authority.

And yet—Africans did not forget the ties of *ukukhonza* or cease to use cultural inheritances such as the principles of land access and genealogical imagination. The process of turning chiefdoms into bounded entities took place unevenly across the colony, and even as it advanced, chiefs and their subjects continued to deploy these political traditions—and ideas about them—even as they did so to increase their territorial jurisdiction.

Disputes over land and authority at Table Mountain were particularly acrimonious due to the jagged landscape of Inanda Location. Its sharp inclines, cliffs, peaks, and precipices offered security in times of conflict and are beautiful to behold; they were not conducive to sustaining large-scale agriculture and increasing populations. During the 1852 Harding Commission, Theophilus used Table Mountain as an example of the difficulties of location lands reserved for Africans. "It is a mistake to suppose that these lands are universally, or even generally, healthy for grazing and stock-breeding. The whole of the Inanda Location, with inconsiderable exceptions, is not so." He pointed to "the rocks and declivities of Table Mountain" to argue that location lands could not boast the same average fertility of Natal.<sup>47</sup> Even where

acreage made land near Table Mountain seem sufficient, its mountainous landscape impacted suitability.

This section examines two long-lasting disputes at Table Mountain—one resulting from the 1882 division of Mahoiza's Qamu, and another between the Nyavu and their appointed neighbors. The records of these conflicts reveal how hereditary chiefs positioned themselves against and attempted to delegitimize their appointed counterparts in disputes over land access. Chiefs used cultural inheritances of hereditary rule and genealogical imagination, *ukukhonza*, and land rights based on first use to try to claim space for their followers. The disputes illustrate how personal allegiances flailed but continued despite an increasing emphasis on territorial rule.

## Personal Authority and Territory Disputes of the Landless Qamu

The 1882, three-way division of Mahoiza's jurisdiction triggered a series of disputes over land and authority in which subjects of the landless Qamu chiefs attempted to maintain their connections to the Majozi despite pressure to transfer allegiance. Mjiba lived all of his life at the junction of the Mkabela and Mngeni rivers. He and another homestead head, Nguqa, formerly *khonza*'d Ngoza. After the division of Ngoza's territory between Mahoiza, Manyosi, and Mbobo, the men found themselves resident on Manyosi's location land. But they preferred an allegiance with Ngoza's landless nephew Mbobo and in 1883 petitioned the SNA for permission to transfer their allegiance to Mbobo. The request is recorded as a petition to "pay taxes through" Mbobo, reflecting a colonial expression of the *ukukhonza* relationship. We cannot be certain whether Mjiba or the interpreter, R. C. A. Samuelson, chose this language or of the men's reasons for choosing a landless leader, but it is clear that the men wanted to continue their relationship with the Majozi family.<sup>48</sup> John Shepstone acquiesced to this request, but on the condition that the men—as residents on location land—would recognize Manyosi's right to call them out for *isibhalo*. Mjiba, Nguqa, and several other homestead heads thus transferred their allegiance back to Ngoza Majozi's line while continuing to reside on land recognized as under the control of Manyosi.

It must be noted that they made this decision to continue their affiliation with Mbobo at serious cost to their daily lives. John Shepstone's decision to allow Manyosi the rights of territorial jurisdiction over Mbobo's landless followers set the scene for several disputes across 1884 to 1885. While the SNA recognized the

preference of Mbobo's followers, Manyosi did not. He interfered in their lives and lands, they believed, because they refused to be placed under his control. When Manyosi ordered Nguqa to send a son for *isibhalo*, Nguqa refused. He told Magistrate Forder he "would not recognize Manyosi in any way." Mbobo died in 1884, but his brother and successor to the landless Qamu, Nsibansiba, went with Mjiba to the Mngeni magistrate to complain about Manyosi's interference on land in the region.

This complaint before the magistrate allows rare insight into how women responded to the overlapping of personal and territorial authority. The rights to one of the fields in question were held by one of the late Mbobo's wives, unnamed in the statement. Mbobo's widow had ceased to use the garden on account of its location near Ndomba and Nomfihlela, toward whom she held a grudge after they transferred their allegiance to Manyosi from her husband. She told Nsibansiba he could use the field, but when he sent men to plow the garden, Ndomba's and Nomfihlela's sons claimed the land fell under Manyosi. Manyosi himself had begun to use another garden plot Mjiba believed was his by principle of first use. These incidents shed insight into how average Africans handled the coexistence of territorial and personal allegiances. Some had begun to *khonza* the landed chief and sought to protect the benefits of doing so. Others—including women—remained so resolutely committed to personal affiliations that they held grudges or experienced harassment on account of that pledge.

SNA Henrique Shepstone (Theophilus's son who succeeded John) confirmed the coexistence of territorial and personal allegiance in Mjiba's 1884 complaint, but officials continued to prioritize territorial rule when it came to relations between the landed Gcumisa chiefs and landless Qamu. In 1885, Forder ordered Nguqa to pay under Manyosi or move—but Nsibansiba did not have land to which his followers could relocate. Forder transferred Nguqa to Manyosi's tax book, forcing the homestead head to transfer allegiance. He reported to the SNA his opinion that Nsibansiba's followers on Manyosi's land should pay under Manyosi or leave.<sup>49</sup>

Manyosi did not allow the decision, or Nsibansiba's subjects, to rest. Nsibansiba died in 1888 and Manyosi decided to strike while the landless chiefdom chose an heir. These descendants of an appointed chief held fast to the principle that the status was hereditary. Manyosi appealed to the Mngeni magistrate to take control of the land on which the late Nsibansiba's followers still lived. He expressed a concern that quarrels between the chiefdoms would continue if an unfit person succeeded Nsibansiba.<sup>50</sup> Officials did not agree to his request, holding to the original decision again, but they continued to promote his territorial rule in a fashion that enabled



**FIGURE 10.** The original photo description describes the subjects as “a group of men” and names only the front row: Sotobe, Mbozana, Mqhawe, Ncapayi, Deliweyo, and Swayimane ka Manyosi. PHOTOGRAPH COURTESY OF KILLIE CAMPBELL AFRICANA LIBRARY AT THE UNIVERSITY OF KWAZULU-NATAL, A42-020.



**FIGURE 11.** Daughter of Swayimane ka Manyosi with two women and two children.

PHOTOGRAPH COURTESY OF KILLIE CAMPBELL AFRICANA LIBRARY AT THE UNIVERSITY OF KWAZULU-NATAL, D07-113.

him to achieve his goals. In 1895 and 1899, officials refused homestead heads who professed allegiance to Mhlahlo Majozi, the new acting chief of the landless Qamu, permission to live in Inanda Location unless they agreed to become a member of Manyosi's Gcumisa. One had already set up his homestead at Mbava when the permission was denied.<sup>51</sup>

The re-surveying of Onverwacht farm caused another overlap between territorial and personal allegiances, here between the Gcumisa chiefs and the followers of Mahoiza's son and heir, Cupukumuka Mkhize. Recall that when Mahoiza's chiefdom was split into three in 1882, Africans on private lands such as Onverwacht pledged allegiance to either Manyosi Gcumisa or Mahoiza Mkhize based on personal preferences. Manyosi had jurisdiction over some private and location land, while Mahoiza only governed on private land. When Onverwacht was resurveyed, Madliliwa and several other of Cupukumuka's followers found themselves on location land rather than private and thus subject to Manyosi's call for *isibhalo*. Madliliwa refused to go out for *isibhalo* in 1894 and continued to pledge allegiance to Cupukumuka. Swayimane ka Manyosi took over the Gcumisa chieftaincy that year after the death of his father, and promptly ordered these homesteads off location land if they would not transfer allegiance. Officials agreed and told them to subject themselves to the Gcumisa chief or remove to Cupukumuka's private lands.<sup>52</sup> Africans at Table Mountain continued to show a preference for the personal allegiances of *ukukhonza*, even as colonial officials encouraged territorial jurisdiction.

Swayimane continued the efforts of his father to bring the landless Qamu followers into the Gcumisa chiefdom. Swayimane was so skilled in pressuring them that in 1902, Acting Chief Mhlahlo asked for a boundary line to end Swayimane's "campaign of contention with his neighboring chiefs and their tribes." Many homestead heads already had switched their allegiance to the landed Gcumisa chief, forced directly by officials and indirectly by the administration's refusal to recognize this section of the Qamu as a landed chieftaincy. Some homestead heads made the change when they required fresh land for planting. Swayimane reminded them they could not move on location land without changing their allegiance to him. He also harassed those who remained resolute in their ties to the Majozi chiefs—in one case, allowing an alleged madman to build a homestead next to Mhlahlo's headman, and in another, arresting a man who refused to turn out for *isibhalo*. Swayimane pursued such cases selectively; some of Mhlahlo's followers used *ukukhonza* to avoid *isibhalo*, changing their affiliation to Swayimane in return for a pass from the obligatory labor.

Mhlahlo, himself the descendant of an appointed chief, attempted to support his 1902 complaint by deploying a genealogy that traced his hereditary connection to Ngoza, in contrast to the appointment of Swayimane's father. Mhlahlo cited a genealogy from which his authority derived. His testimony is worth quoting at length, for the manner in which he lays out his heritage and attempts to delegitimize Swayimane's:

When Manyosi came to the locality in dispute, he came as a supplicant to the late Chief Ngoza, my paternal uncle, to beg for a portion of the land that he might settle there. He, Manyosi, was alone with his family. The Chief Ngoza hearkened unto Manyosi's prayer and apportioned him a piece of land, on the highlands near the Icoteni stream. In time, this man Manyosi was elevated by my father to the dignity of an Induna. Now my father (paternal uncle) Ngoza, subsequently left, with the consent of his tribe, and, accompanied by a large number of tribesmen, settled in the Msinga division, which has now become the great haven of our tribe, under the present Chief Kula, the grandson of the late Chief Ngoza. When Ngoza went north he left his induna Mahoiza in charge of the Amaqamu tribesmen, who remained behind. For some time matters remained in this state and the tribe still recognized Ngoza as its chief. Time went by and then Mbobo, the fraternal nephew of Ngoza, came to Somtsewu (Sir T. Shepstone) and made application to be appointed a chief in his own right over the section of the Amaqamu tribesmen, who were left behind by the late Ngoza. Sir T. Shepstone was pleased to appoint Mbobo. My half-brother Mbobo died and Nsibansiba was appointed in his stead. Nsibansiba also died and I was appointed to the chieftainship.

I have thus shown that I am lawful chief of the section of the Amaqamu tribe, which Ngoza left behind him when he proceeded northwards. I have given this piece of history in order to better advocate the consideration of the authorities in this my trouble, with this Chief Swayimane, who is, in very truth, but an upstart sprung from the appointment of my late uncle Ngoza's induna Manyosi . . . [and] who is as bumptious as a man can be, is snapping up the land all round him and increasing the dimensions of his tribe as fast as he can.<sup>53</sup>

Mhlahlo argued his hereditary right to land due to his kinship relations with Ngoza, in contrast to Swayimane, who was only the heir of Ngoza's headman.

Many Africans at Table Mountain respected the Majozi family and preferred to maintain their allegiance to Ngoza's descendants. But pressure from Manyosi



and Swayimane Gcumisa, and the SNA's continued aversion to recognizing Qamu land, made it difficult for Qamu followers to continue. Despite Mhlahlo's plea, USNA Samuelson only reminded Mhlahlo of all the previous decisions against such an action and warned that if his grievances continued, his followers would be forcefully transferred to Swayimane.<sup>54</sup> There would be no land for the landless Qamu at Table Mountain.

### Encroachment on Hereditary Chiefs


The ascension of appointed chiefs at Table Mountain and increase in population—as Africans moved into Natal from Zululand and onto location land when evicted from farms—caused great stress for Nomsimekwana (see table 4). Nomsimekwana was not alone in feeling cornered. In 1889, Magistrate Forder explained that many location chiefs “are becoming very jealous of any encroachment on their lands owing to their people entering locations as they are turned off private lands.”<sup>55</sup> While officials steadfastly refused to establish a boundary for the landless Qamu, other boundaries were beginning to enclose chiefdoms both hereditary and created. For chiefs like Mahoiza, whose jurisdiction had been reduced to private lands, the boundaries were those of the farms on which their people lived; even then, followers of more than one chief could intermingle on those farms. As disputes erupted on location land, colonial officials began to haphazardly lay down boundary lines and beacons to stop disputes or violent conflicts. The records of a long-standing conflict between the Nyavu and their appointed neighbors over land at the confluence of Inanda Location and the Goedverwachting and Onverwacht farms provides insight into this piecemeal creation of boundaries. Ngangezwe ka Nomsimekwana became a regular appellant in the office of colonial officials. He used his family hereditary lineage and first use of the land to make claims on places denied them.

According to Ngangezwe, appointed chiefs in the region took up residence thanks to the benevolence of his father. Nomsimekwana granted permission for Ngoza to set up his Hlahleni homestead on the Pietermaritzburg side of the Mngeni River. Others followed him and set up near Hlahleni. When Ngoza left for Msinga, the other homestead heads expressed a desire to remain under Nomsimekwana, but Mahoiza claimed the land as his. When the matter came before the SNA, the then-headman, Manyosi, gave testimony in favor of Mahoiza. Nomsimekwana appealed the decision and won, but in the meantime, Manyosi had been made a chief. He started a homestead on the land in dispute and laid claim with the SNA.<sup>56</sup>

**TABLE 4.** Estimates of Increase in Natal Population, 1852–1904.

YEAR	WHITE POPULATION	AFRICAN POPULATION
1852	7,629	112,988
1859	11,580	148,590
1862	13,990	156,061
1866	16,963	170,855
1870	17,737	257,787
1874	18,646	281,797
1880	25,271	362,477
1885	36,701	377,581
1900	64,951	794,650
1904	97,109	910,727

The year 1904 had the first enumeration of African population; prior estimates are based upon estimates of number of inhabitants in each dwelling counted for the hut tax. Source: *Natal Statistical Yearbook*, 1907.

**MAP 4.** Rough jurisdictions of chiefs in the Table Mountain region, 1882–1905

John Shepstone found in favor of Manyosi and marked the Manzamnyama Stream as the boundary line separating Gcumisa location lands from that of the neighboring Nyavu in November 1882 (see streams on map 3).<sup>57</sup>

The 1882 Manzamnyama boundary only divided the chiefdoms on the eastern side of the mountain—or at least, that was what the Nyavu contended. Less than ten years later, Manyosi built a homestead on location land near the northwestern corner of Table Mountain, near the homesteads of Nomsimekwana's followers, Magcimane, Ngulube, and Sigela (see map 4). Manyosi ordered their removal, alleging his jurisdiction over the region. In 1889, Ngangezwe appealed to the SNA on behalf of his aged father and the men whose homesteads were affected. Ngangezwe asked for a boundary and argued for the land in question to be recognized as Nyavu territory by calling on the principles of hereditary rule and first-use land rights. Ngangezwe explained: "My father is a hereditary chief over the Mcoseli or Mdluli Tribe, and was chief over the land in dispute when the Boers conquered Natal. When the British Government took Natal from the Boers my father still remained Chief and is still a Chief. The lands of said Tribe were bounded on the North by the Umgeni river; East by the Situmba ridge; West by the Samvula Hill and the Sitingeni river, which empties itself into the Mngeni."<sup>58</sup> Like Mhlahlo, Ngangezwe used the practice of hereditary descent, but he did so to position himself against appointed chiefs and connect his family to the land.

Ngangezwe also deployed the principle of first use for land rights, placing his family on the land before the arrival of Europeans, Ngoza, or any of the Africans that had moved into Natal from Zululand. He emphasized place, physical features embedded in his chiefdom's history. His testimony is the sort of "oral land registry" that Carola Lentz describes—stories of first possession that link founding ancestors and the storyteller.<sup>59</sup> Ngangezwe's statement erases any suggestion that the Mdluli might not have always lived at Table Mountain. It also asserts historical use of a large swath of land stretching from Samvula to Situmba, covering territory that at the time of his request was under appointed chiefs to his west (Gcumisa) and east (Ximba). In doing so, he made clear that the jurisdiction stolen from Nomsimekwana was greater than just the homesteads in question. The account in which he connects his family to the landscape, to place, is one of denial.<sup>60</sup>

Ngangezwe's plea of hereditary right and first use fell upon deaf ears. Henrique Shepstone went to Table Mountain and decided in favor of Manyosi. He claimed it was John's intention that the boundary stretch from the source of the Manzamnyama Stream to the beacon marking the corner where location land

met Goedverwaching and Onverwacht. He did not order the removal of Ngulube and Nomsimekwana's other people, but declared that no further Nyavu settlement should take place in the area now that jurisdiction had been decided.<sup>61</sup> There is nothing in the records of the time, but Ngangezwe would later claim that he was forced to remove his own homestead in light of this boundary decision.<sup>62</sup> The issues over this same boundary line were again raised in 1895, with the Gcumisa now under the authority of Manyosi's son, Swayimane. Swayimane complained that relations of Ngulube and Magcimane had moved into their homesteads. Magistrate Forder allowed them to remain, based on Henricque Shepstone's decision.<sup>63</sup> Even as boundaries were put down, personal allegiances persisted across them.

Despite the repeated decisions in favor of the Gcumisa, Ngangezwe appealed yet again in early 1905 that the matter be reopened. By this point, the AZM had begun to charge £3 per dwelling in annual rent on the mission reserve and some of Ngangezwe's followers wanted to relocate to location land. The denial of location land north of the Manzamnyama Stream had now become even more personal as Nyavu followers found themselves economically disadvantaged without it. Ngangezwe lamented the previous denial as an injustice done to his people. He continued to make the argument for his control of the land on first use and hereditary descent. He stressed that Manyosi had no prior right to the land. "Manyosi laid claim to the ground himself and it was given to him. I fail to understand how this could be done, seeing that in the first place he was only concerned in the matter as a witness. This is a point over which I grieve sorely."<sup>64</sup> While ultimately USNA Samuelson refused to reconsider the case on account of the earlier decisions, Mngeni Magistrate Thomas Bennett expressed sympathy with Ngangezwe on account of the Nyavu's "aboriginal" status. Bennett argued against the appointed chief, saying, "Knowing all the circumstances of the case I must say that in dealing with this matter, the fact of Ngangezwe's father Nomsimekwana and his people being one of the aboriginal tribes resident at Table Mountain at the time this territory was taken from the Dutch was not fully considered."<sup>65</sup> The Nyavu chiefs repeatedly relied on this hereditary, aboriginal status in their claims on land denied them.

## The Making of the Maphumulo

At the turn of the century, the South African War and ecological disasters engulfed the region. The war boom had created job opportunities for Africans but followed

with recession. Table Mountain had become home to three created chieftaincies that came out of Ngoza's government tribe—Mahoiza's Mkhize, the landless Qamu, and the Gcumisa—and Nomsimekwana's Nyavu. In nearly sixty years of colonial rule at Table Mountain, some Africans—like Butsha, Mpinkulu, Tayi, and Mazingela—transferred their allegiances four times. Their quest for an accountable leader would create a new “government tribe.”

Indications of lingering *ukukhonza* connections despite the promotion of territorial jurisdiction emerged in an attempt by these Gcumisa followers to transfer their allegiance from Swayimane. In March 1905, these subjects of Swayimane appeared before the Mngeni magistrate to apply for permission to transfer their allegiance from Swayimane to Chief Bambatha Zondi. Butsha, Mpinkulu, Tayi, and Mazingela represented nineteen other homestead heads of the Gcumisa chiefdom living south of the Mngeni River near Table Mountain. Like his father, Swayimane controlled homesteads on both private and location land north and south of the Mngeni. Butsha and the homestead heads complained that Swayimane arbitrarily placed strangers in their homesteads and ignored their pleas for redress. Over the last decade, several *izimpi zezigodi* (ward conflicts) broke out between Gcumisa followers north and south of the river. Perceptions then and now portrayed the river as a geographical hurdle that prevented Swayimane, who lived in a ward north of the river, from adequately governing his people south of the river. Ndela Ntshangase, a member of the Maphumulo during the 1980s, explained that the Gcumisa chiefdom was “too big, in such a way that people who were staying on the other side of the Mngeni, if they ever needed something from the Chief, it was not easy for them to get to the Chief's place because they had to cross the Mngeni River.” Johannes Goba, another Maphumulo member, suggested the chief was especially unable to reach his people during summer months when the river was high. Ntshangase puts the emphasis here on Swayimane's subjects. Maguzu and others realized that people opposite the chief's side of the Mngeni were suffering because they did not have access to the chief.<sup>66</sup> For these homestead heads, Swayimane had ceased to honor the *ukukhonza* contract.

Recall, Butsha *khonza'd* Jangeni before Jangeni left the Table Mountain region. It was this relationship that Butsha and the other Gcumisa men called upon when they sought to leave Swayimane's rule. Bambatha, the grandson of Jangeni, remembered these ties as well. He had attempted to claim these homesteads during the rule of Swayimane's father, Manyosi, but colonial officials refused him.<sup>67</sup> But Samuelson objected to Butsha's and others' applications to fall under Bambatha. Bambatha

already had the reputation of a “difficult man,” though the rebellion that took his name had not yet erupted.

While never cited by officials as an official reason for the separation, certainly they took into consideration the *izimpi zezigodi* between peoples on each side of the Mngeni River under Swayimane. According to C. P. Mathe, it was not just the river that made it difficult for Swayimane to serve his people. The conflict between sections across the river made it unsafe for those south of the river to visit the chief on its other side.<sup>68</sup> Rumors reached the SNA that Swayimane and his brother had been aware of a fight before it took place and did nothing to prevent it.<sup>69</sup> While these rumors were reported by an “Intelligence Officer,” it is likely that Maguzu Maphumulo, a member of the Gcumisa and an induna of the Mngeni Court, contributed to their spread among officials. Butsha and Ngcazi were Swayimane’s headmen on land below the Mngeni River. Aware of their desire to leave his jurisdiction, Swayimane responded in defense, alleging the matter was one of long standing and one in which he was not at fault. The people below the Mngeni refused to follow Swayimane and instead listened to Ngcazi.<sup>70</sup> The magistrate later reported that the tensions among Swayimane’s people, and between them and Swayimane, were so great he feared it was impossible for Swayimane to continue to operate as chief.<sup>71</sup>

But Samuelson was also thinking about territorial governance. The 1896 Act discouraged the residence of subjects outside of the territory of their chiefs. He argued that Butsha and the other complainants lived too far from Bambatha’s jurisdiction.<sup>72</sup> The magistrates of both Mngeni and New Hanover districts agreed with the complainants; Swayimane was partial and unjust. New Hanover Magistrate Thomas Maxwell recognized Swayimane lacked the respect of some of his followers. He attributed this to Swayimane’s status as an appointed chief, not recognizing that other appointed chiefs had earned respect in a number of ways.<sup>73</sup> Swayimane did not openly oppose the men’s transferring their allegiance but added a condition that would make it difficult for the men to do so given the crowded conditions of Inanda Location: “I have no objection to members of my tribe severing themselves from my jurisdiction, provided they remove their kraals, for if allowed to remain in occupation of their present kraal sites, it would only result in ill feeling and bloodshed.”<sup>74</sup> Swayimane had embraced territorial governance wholeheartedly; he controlled a large swath of land stretching from Pietermaritzburg to Mvoti and could do so without risk.

The magistrates decided that the unhappy applicants could relocate to Bambatha’s district or place themselves under another chief of the area in which they

resided. The Mngeni magistrate suggested the creation of a new chiefdom, for he believed that since there were “many small sections of tribes in this locality”—a reference to the many different personal allegiances that still existed—they should be grouped together under a new leader. Given the conflict within the chiefdom, dividing Swayimane’s jurisdiction at the Mngeni served as a convenient way for the colonial government to settle an ongoing dispute between the *izigodi* on each side of the river and address the complaints leveled against Swayimane.

Mngeni Magistrate Bennett and several government officials thus recommended that Maguzu, as a member of the Gcumisa working in the court, be appointed as chief of the section below the Mngeni. Maguzu ka Mganu Maphumulo was until then a “native sergeant” of the Natal Police and an induna of the Ndwedwe and Mngeni magistrates. Bennett spoke highly of Maguzu, on account of his excellent character: “He entered the services of the Govt. as policeman when this Magistracy was first established about 1873, and became Induna of the Magistrate’s Court at Ndwedwe, and subsequently about eleven years ago, was removed from Ndwedwe to this Court in the same capacity, a position he has held with great credit ever since.”<sup>75</sup> Bennett met with the homestead heads of his district under Swayimane and they unanimously agreed on the appointment of Maguzu as their chief.<sup>76</sup> On December 1, 1905, Butsha and 120 other homestead heads (forty-one on location land and eighty on private lands) in the Mngeni District transferred their allegiance from Swayimane to Maguzu. Maguzu moved his homestead from north of the Mngeni to Mhlabamakhosi. Swayimane’s jurisdiction was restricted to the 442 homesteads on location land in the New Hanover District.<sup>77</sup> The new chiefdom took Maphumulo, the surname of Maguzu, as its name and the territory became known as Mbambangalo.

When Swayimane heard of the decision to restrict his jurisdiction, he had “nothing to say as the Government have seen fit.”<sup>78</sup> But three months later, he applied to make an appearance before the SNA where he made the following statement. While restrained, his response indicates his displeasure. “I have been deprived of part of my Tribe in the Umgeni Division and it has been put under Maguzu as Chief . . . It is not for me to show disaffection or discontent at the decision of the Government—the matter is done and I have just come in to express my thanks for the Government’s decision.” The minister in return emphasized that it was neither the government nor Maguzu who had sought this, but the people.<sup>79</sup>

Butsha and ordinary African homestead heads initiated the making of the Maphumulo in 1905 when they complained about an inattentive chief. Contemporary

members of the Maphumulo see Maguzu's appointment not as a collaboration with colonialism, but as a recognition of years of employment, a position well earned. Members of the Maphumulo, in describing Maguzu's work, considered the job dangerous and Maguzu as someone able to sort problems and to be trusted.<sup>80</sup>

## Conclusion: *Induna Sibiya's Lament*

*Induna Sibiya* may have used a newer concept—the pension—in 2011 to belittle the manner in which Maguzu became chief of the Maphumulo at Table Mountain, but the practice of delegitimizing appointed chiefs was not new. In the late nineteenth century, the Nyavu chiefs Nomsimekwana and Ngangezwe promoted the practice of first use to pursue land rights and contrasted their hereditary status to that of those whose ascension came from connections to British officials.

But “hereditary” rule was more flexible than one might expect. Because descent was only one principle of authority, the appointment of new chiefs outside of chiefly lineages could come with great authority—as it did when Shaka raised up men known for their skills and loyalty. The descendants of well-respected appointed chiefs such as Ngoza positioned themselves as having superior claims to authority on account of their kinship, creating genealogies through which their power derived. So did their followers. Homestead heads continued to *khonza* Ngoza's relations, Mboobo, Nsibansiba, and Mhlahlo, even as British officials constrained their ability to honor the *ukukhonza* contract by refusing them territory. Nor was hereditary rule the only means of legitimating authority in these disputes. Knowledge of the social contract between chiefs and their followers still existed as a cultural inheritance upon which Africans drew. When Africans under Swayimane began to feel the chief was not attending to their needs—was not honoring the contract implied by *khonza*—they successfully sought to transfer their allegiance via British administrators, resulting in the creation of the Maphumulo in 1905.

After 1905, there were five chiefs at Table Mountain—Ngangezwe Mdluli, Swayimane Gcumisa, Cupukumuka Mkhize, the landless Mhlahlo Majozi, and Maguzu Maphumulo. As Ngangezwe complained about the denial of land and authority by Mahoiza, Manyosi, and Swayimane, he would also protest Maguzu's status. But the very manner in which Ngoza's chieftom splintered across location and private lands and across magisterial districts had begun to bind chiefs territorially. While Mhlahlo still suffered from a lack of clear territory, the boundaries of surveyed farms



and magisterial districts started to mark the territories of Maguzu and Swayimane. Ngangezwe's land was surrounded gradually as officials demarcated boundaries between him and his appointed neighbors after contests.

Personal allegiances survived even as territorial authority expanded. At the turn of the century, the South African War brought home to settlers and officials in both the Cape and Natal the need for a unified policy on African administration, an answer to the persistent "native question." African resistance against a new poll tax in 1906 and the need to make African policy uniform in the new Union of South Africa would mark a new colonial assault on personal forms of authority. It is to this renewed emphasis on territorial jurisdiction in the wake of the *impi yamakhanda* (war of the heads) that we now turn, when contests over land and authority spilled out of the colonial office into violent conflicts at Table Mountain.

# The Violence of Young Men, Forced Removals, and Betterment



# Ngangezwe Claims to Be a Hereditary Chief

Organizing Authority by Wards and War, 1905–1930

At the bottom of all these fights is that Ngangezwe claims to be an hereditary chief and as such claims that the tribes of Mdepa, Swayimane, and myself should be under his control. At the time of my appointment he came and asked the Magistrate to give him that portion of Swayimane's tribe, over which I am now chief. But he does not make his claim openly but allows his people to go about with the idea that their chief is a more important one than any other by reason of his birth.

—Magazu Maphumulo, statement given to Assistant Mngeni Magistrate H. Von Gerard, 1913

**A**t the turn of the century in Natal, personal and territorial allegiance coexisted. Chiefdoms were not fully bounded. Even as piecemeal boundaries were laid down by colonial officials and the divisions between location and private lands suggested borders, followers of the Mkhize, Gcumisa, Maphumulo, landless Qamu, and Nyavu chiefs intermingled at Table Mountain and contested land. The newly created Maphumulo chiefdom began to give meaning to their territory beyond the space it granted them; it became place as they named it and envisioned it as their own. While previous colonial legislation had pushed for

the disintegration of personal authority, the policy was taken up with fervor in the wake of the 1906 *impi yamakhandu* (the war of the heads, more popularly known as Bambatha's Rebellion). The appointed chiefs Maguzu and Swayimane embraced territorial jurisdiction of this space and place, asking for the clear definition of their lands just as the South African Native Affairs Commission (SANAC) decided such delineations—in the form of a ward system—were necessary.

Between 1910 and the 1930s, the newly self-governing Union of South Africa, incorporating the Cape and Natal colonies and Transvaal and Orange Free State republics, pursued territorial segregation policies. African administration policies were not unified across the new nation; land and the “native question” remained preeminent issues. But the growing power of white agriculture caused administrators of African affairs to backtrack on the ward system, which was never fully implemented in Natal where Africans continued to live on white-owned land. In the wake of the 1913 Land Act and the growth of commercial farming in the interwar years, increased evictions from private lands contributed to the overpopulation of the reserves and competition over land.

Tensions at Table Mountain and across Natal grew—not just between the chiefs, but also between the young men of their chiefdoms—as evictions from private lands pushed Africans into locations. In the resulting contests, Maguzu expressed a willingness to give up the personal ties of *ukukhonza* in favor of boundaries around the territory that the Maphumulo named Mbambangalo to articulate the birth of their chiefdom in a space turned into place. The accounts of this naming operate as a genealogical imagining of Maphumulo origins and their relation to the Gcumisa from which they separated. But the implementation of territorial authority across the colony was uneven. In 1913 and 1917, tensions ignited into violence as subjects of Ngangezwe ka Nomsimekwana attacked the Maphumulo in response to insults against their chief and their masculinity. This violent response reveals the strength of personal allegiances among the Nyavu, who, informed by ideas about first-use land rights, personalized denials of land and authority resulting from the encroachment of appointed chiefs. Ngangezwe continued to dispute boundaries before officials based on hereditary rule and first-use land rights, and in the 1920s, built an alliance with local *amakholwa* to purchase the land in question. Both chiefs and their followers participated in this contest for land and authority.

## Segregation, Land, and Authority in the Union

In the wake of the South African War, British High Commissioner Alfred Milner established SANAC to construct a unified policy for the administration of Africans in anticipation of the Union. SANAC's 1905 report was the first official articulation of segregation, theorizing the relationship between territory and citizenship when it recommended "differential sovereignty over fundamentally divided territory."<sup>1</sup> Segregation as a national political program attempted to systemize relations of authority and entrench white supremacy. Segregation grew out of the principle that African rights to land were conditional on the sacrifice of citizenship and that Africans were to develop separately under the guidance of whites. The report recommended "tribalism" as the foundation for the administration of Africans on land set aside for African occupation. These essentials outlined by SANAC had far-reaching implications and found expression in early Union legislation. But segregation was not a unified ideological package. As a national program, it remained largely undeveloped until after the First World War, when an increase in black protest brought the "native question" back to the fore.<sup>2</sup>

The same year that SANAC released its report, the Natal legislature passed a poll tax on unmarried men aged eighteen years and older. The legislation was the final straw for Africans—economically and spiritually. They already paid taxes on dogs, dwellings, and marriage, and a man's ability to independently sustain social reproduction was being curtailed by attempts to force him into farm and mine labor. When called upon to pay, many young men with a foot in both the homestead and colonial society refused, igniting a revolt between February and July 1906 known to settlers as Bambatha's Rebellion and to rebels as *impi yamakhandu*. Natal officials responded with force, seizing thousands of cattle, torching villages, and killing more than three thousand Africans—in contrast to fewer than thirty settler deaths.<sup>3</sup> Most chiefs in Natal acquiesced to the poll tax. Only twenty-five out of 321 chiefs openly supported the rebellion and most of those twenty-five were from the Thukela region.<sup>4</sup> Colonial officials deposed and put to death rebel chiefs and exiled the Zulu Paramount Chief Dinuzulu. At the local level, considerable changes resulted from the deaths and depositions of chiefs and division of chiefdoms as subjects of rebel chiefs were forced to switch allegiances.

In the wake of the rebellion, the governor of Natal appointed the Natal Native Affairs Commission (NNAC) to inquire into the entirety of African administration. Authorities believed that continued personal allegiances and the "tribal mixup" of

followers of various chiefs contributed to the extent of the rebellion as men moved across the colony to converge for strengthening rituals. The 1906–1907 report of the NNAC envisioned the gradual weaning of Africans from tribalism as an ideal policy, but in the meantime recommended the termination of personal allegiances and the implementation of territorial governance.<sup>5</sup> Act No. 1 of 1909 embodied some of the recommendations of the NNAC. It more clearly defined the powers of the Supreme Chief, the new district commissioners, and magistrates to make administration by white officials more personal.<sup>6</sup> The administration of subjects by their chiefs would be made less personal; the resultant ward system was designed to territorially bound chiefdoms, once and for all, and end the intermingling of followers of different chiefs. Initially, the scheme was deployed in areas known for their unwieldiness, such as the Lower Tugela and Maphumulo divisions, where it was first introduced in 1908.<sup>7</sup> Unlike with regulations on territorial governance of the 1890s, homestead heads who saw their allegiances changed by the imposition of boundaries did not have the option to relocate to maintain existing chiefly relationships. But the ward system proved difficult to administer and was never fully implemented. It failed to achieve the desired effects of bounding territory as Africans relocated after farm evictions, particularly in the wake of the 1913 Land Act, carrying with them personal allegiances of *ukukhonza*.

The Union's 1913 Land Act was an interim measure to maintain existing land occupation and ownership. It recognized dispossession that had already occurred by delineating the boundaries of the reserves, set up a commission to define land to be set aside for Africans (scheduled areas), and forbade African purchase of land outside of these areas. The territory included in the Land Act amounted to 11.1 million morgen, roughly 7 percent of South Africa (including the lands of African kingdoms).<sup>8</sup> While the act is often ascribed responsibility for all manners of dispossession, its greatest initial impact was to undermine black tenancy on white-owned land by forbidding sharecropping and cash rental agreements by Africans on land outside scheduled areas and forcing labor tenancy.<sup>9</sup> While an exemption delayed the actual implementation of anti-squatting regulations, some farmers forced Africans off their land.

The Union government accepted that the initial land scheduled for African reserves by the act was inadequate for all of the people expected to live there and appointed the 1916 Beaumont Commission to recommend additional land that could be acquired. The commission proposed an additional seven million hectares for African reserves but few farmers were willing to part with land and

the recommendations were shelved. Later, local committees scaled down the proposals and the government accepted the new 1918 recommendations but passed no legislation. In 1919, Jan Smuts succeeded Louis Botha as prime minister; during his ministry, debate flourished over the possible use of Crown lands for Africans and changes in the buying rules. A 1923 Statement on the Natives Land Act assured white South Africans their land would not be expropriated and reminded Africans they would have to buy or lease land to access additional territory. Even after the election of the National Party's J. B. M. Hertzog in 1924, the policy of allowing Africans to buy land continued.<sup>10</sup>

The segregation of land was intertwined with how Native Affairs Department (NAD) officials understood African communities as based upon gendered homesteads and in which male-headed homesteads could access land through tribal structures. The advent of the Union had brought together three distinct Departments of Native Affairs with varying structures, ideologies, and statutes that governed them. Until Hertzog's election in 1924, the NAD was "a politically weak and administratively fragmented arm of the state."<sup>11</sup> Smuts's Native Affairs Act (1920) ensured political segregation, setting up "tribal councils" for the administration of the reserves and advisory councils for Africans in urban areas, both under the authority of the NAD and the prime minister. A 1923 reorganization that left the department considerably weaker forced it to more closely align its objectives with segregationist discourse gaining ground. This realignment marked a shift from the paternalism of its earlier years—when liberals saw an eventual weaning of Africans away from tribalism—to an increasing commitment to retribalization of African life. The NAD drafted the 1927 Native Administration Act to centralize the NAD and reassert its effectiveness. The act attempted to reconstitute the authority of African chiefs and headmen. The act made the governor general the "Supreme Chief" of all Africans outside the Cape (a feature harking back to administration policies of Natal), granting him the power to govern the reserves by proclamation. It recognized "native law and custom," established commissioner courts in which native commissioners were invested with criminal jurisdiction, and gave the NAD power to control movement of Africans and curb dissent.<sup>12</sup> This more uniform system bolstered the power of chiefs in the reserves—the governor general could grant them rights to administer customary law—but also made them responsible for paying taxes of the people under their jurisdiction. NAD now played a more regulatory role, able to discipline chiefs and relocate communities to fit the government's retribalization efforts, a strategy that gained traction among NAD officials through the 1920s.



In the face of the intensification of measures designed to restrict African mobility and prosperity, a group of influential elite African men began to organize and protest the loss of their rights. During the first decade of the twentieth century, several African initiatives such as the Natal Native Congress of John Dube and the South African Native Congress and Native Vigilance Association of the Cape emerged and then came together in a call for a national African political organization. By 1912, the South African Native National Congress was launched with an African nationalist message in opposition to segregation. The movement, later renamed the African National Congress (1923), provided for an upper house of chiefs despite tensions between the political philosophy of the Western-educated elite and the chieftainship. During the 1920s, it was the Industrial and Commercial Workers Union (ICU) that most strenuously resisted segregation in its entirety.<sup>13</sup>

## Land, Place, and the Ward System after the 1906 Rebellion

At Table Mountain, local residents experienced these segregationist land and administration policies as high rents, labor tenancy agreements, evictions from farms now occupied by white owners, and overcrowding on location land. Some chiefs embraced territorial jurisdiction, but the manner in which people saw land in the region as granted to them, or denied them, shaped conversations and disputes about how to define authority.

In December 1905, Maguzu Maphumulo became the chief of the newly established Maphumulo chiefdom in the shadow of Table Mountain. He relocated his homestead from Estezi kwaMaphumulo, the region near the Mkabela Stream in the New Hanover District that was named after his family who moved there in the 1850s. While that land had begun as space for Mganu's family, its naming turned that land into place for both those Maphumulo who remained there and those who moved south of the Mngeni River. As Mganu's son moved south to take up a chiefship, so too did the land on which the members of the new Maphumulo chiefdom begin to accrue meaning beyond the space afforded. Land that had begun as space on which they settled after war-related migrations turned into a place of their own when it was named Mbambangalo. One man displaced from the region described the stories about the place name as *izaga*, proverbs or sayings.<sup>14</sup> These naming stories reveal the ways that members of the chiefdoms understood the creation of the Maphumulo chiefdom and territorialization of authority. Maphumulo members named the

place to reflect their ties to the land; for their Nyavu and Gcumisa neighbors, this naming marked the opposite—a denial of territory.


Literally, this place name, Mbambangalo, means “to hold (*bamba*) the arm (*ingalo*),” referring to chiefs holding their arms across the Mngeni to administer the region. But the nature of this hand-holding varied by chiefdom. For members of the Maphumulo, the naming represents a creation story, the giving of territory to their new chief. Maguzu’s great-great-grandson, *Inkosi* Nhlakanipho Maphumulo, and several of his headmen concurred in their interpretations of *bamba ingalo*. They related that after receiving the chieftaincy, Maguzu had said, “Let us hold on to one another’s arm, showing that we understand each other and can stay together well.” Bangingi Maphumulo, a former regent of the Maphumulo, said that this referred to the various wards that fell within Mbambangalo.<sup>15</sup> However, another Maphumulo headman contended that the place was called Mbambangalo because Maguzu was asked to help Swayimane govern the people across the Mngeni River. *Induna* Amos Ndlela cited the many *izimpi zezigodi* and Swayimane’s inability to mediate such conflicts. He explained that Swayimane gave Maguzu the chieftaincy “because he wanted him to help look after this place, meaning Chief Maphumulo was assisting Chief Gcumisa.”<sup>16</sup> Nkanyiso Ndlovu, a young man raised in Mbambangalo, tells a slightly different version of the story where the help of Maguzu was not welcomed by Swayimane—who favored the *isigodi* above the Mngeni River over the *isigodi* below. Ndlovu alleges the government gave Maguzu the *isigodi* below in an effort to mediate where Swayimane could not, or rather, would not: “I can say that they call this area Mbambangalo because they said Maguzu must hold Gcumisa’s arm across the river, although he, Gcumisa, was saying that he would not grasp it. Maguzu held Gcumisa’s arm and that is how the place got named Mbambangalo.”<sup>17</sup> For Butsha and the members of the new Maphumulo who instigated their breakaway from the Gcumisa, the division—whether agreed upon or not—meant that the quarrels across the river would end and security follow.

While these Maphumulo definitions of Mbambangalo tie them to place, Gcumisa and Nyavu explanations highlight their loss of land and authority in the region. *Inkosi* Nkosiyesizwe Gcumisa described it as a willing forfeiture: “That place is called Mbambangalo. Mbambangalo belongs to Salimane’s [Swayimane’s] chiefdom. The Maphumulo moved out from here in 1905. They said he [Maguzu] must hold Gcumisa’s arm, then they named the chiefdom and he signed. Chief Salimane [Swayimane] signed it over to Chief Maguzu.” *Induna* Bhekumuzi Sibiya of the Nyavu explained how Mbambangalo passed from the Nyavu to the Gcumisa

and then the Maphumulo: “Nyavu gave those people the place . . . Swayimane was holding Nyavu’s arm . . . Maphumulos came from Swayimane.”<sup>18</sup> A. N. Ndlovu, another member of the Nyavu, skipped the Gcumisa link described by Sibiya, but also stressed the loss of land and authority: “Maphumulos are staying in Nyavu’s place. The place is called Mbambangalo because they said Maphumulo must hold Nomsimekwana’s arm.”<sup>19</sup>

While the land of Mbambangalo was acquiring meaning for the Maphumulo, they were not the only people resident in the region. Intermingled on the private and location lands south of the Mngeni River were people who still pledged allegiance to the Nyavu, the landless chief Mhlahlo Majozi, and chiefs Cupukumuka Mkhize and Mafahleni Zuma of the Nxamalala (see this intermingling in table 5 and map 5). According to the 1905 Annual Report of the Native Affairs Department, Ngangezwe had 817 counted dwellings under his jurisdiction across three districts, with 248 on location land, 259 on the Table Mountain Mission Reserve, and 150 on private lands. Cupukumuka had 1,156 dwellings across five districts—all on private lands. The landless Mhlahlo had 462 dwellings across three districts, with the majority (439) on private lands.<sup>20</sup>

But the 1906 rebellion of African taxpayers solidified colonial officials’ certainty of the need for bounded chiefdoms restricted to wards or districts. The discussions of territorial authority at the NNAC did not operate in a vacuum. Chiefs were aware and some actually requested territorial governance, especially those who governed Africans living on privately owned lands.<sup>21</sup> The continued shortage of land for African settlement contributed to these requests; in 1906, there were thirty-nine hereditary and thirty-seven appointed chiefs living on land owned by whites.<sup>22</sup> At Table Mountain, Maguzu, Swayimane, Ngangezwe, Cupukumuka, and Mhlahlo all had followers living on white land. Giving evidence before the 1906–1907 NNAC, chiefs in the Mngeni magistracy complained about the size of the locations and their inability to provide for followers or promote their status without additional access to land. Laduma, chief of the Mpumuza in the Zwartkop location west of Pietermaritzburg, explained that his people had a different notion of land than that espoused by Europeans; they had their own practices of agriculture and decision-making.<sup>23</sup> Swayimane expressed concern about the state of Africans such as himself and his followers, who were forced to pay rents as high as £3 to £5, making it difficult for them to stay on top of rent and taxes, leading to evictions and relocations from one farm to the next. Moving into the reserves occurred at the expense and inconvenience of people in the locations and would make new



**MAP 5.** Colony of Natal, showing chief's jurisdictions across districts, 1905.

ADAPTED FROM BENEDICT CARTON, *BLOOD FROM YOUR CHILDREN: THE COLONIAL ORIGINS OF GENERATIONAL CONFLICT IN SOUTH AFRICA* (CHARLOTTESVILLE: UNIVERSITY PRESS OF VIRGINIA, 2000).

residents subject to *isibhalo*.<sup>24</sup> And permission to move into the reserves increasingly required the transfer of allegiance to the chief tied to that land rather than the chief of one's personal allegiance.

Maguzu had requested territorial jurisdiction prior to its first formal implementation. In April 1906, in the midst of the rebellion, Maguzu recommended territorial

TABLE 5. Distribution of Subjects by Division, 1895–1905

CHIEF (CHIEFDOM)	YEAR	NUMBER OF COUNTED DWELLINGS IN EACH DIVISION										TOTAL	SALARY (£)
		MNGENI	CAMPERDOWN	LRD	IMPENDHLE	NEW HANOVER	IPOLELA	UNDERBERG	IXOPO				
Cupukumuka Mkhize (Mkhize/Qamu) Mngeni	1895–1896	502	<i>Didn't exist</i>	117	13	327				959	15		
	1905	684	45	125	17	285				1156	15		
Nngangezwe Mdluli (Nyavu) Mngeni	1895–1896	505	<i>Didn't exist</i>			15				520	10		
	1905	582	219			16				817	15		
Maguzu Maphumulo (Maphumulo) Mngeni	1905	324								324	10		
	1895–1896	240				1104				1344	15		
Swayimane (Gcumisa) New Hanover	1905	0				1328				1328	15		
	1895–1896	204		787	114	41	54			2000	20		
Mafahleni Zuma (Nxamalala) Impendhle	1905	301		1078	1207	65	22	31		2704	20		
	1895–1896	757	<i>Didn't exist</i>				133		47	957	15		
Mdepa Maba (Ximba) Camperdown	1905	57	902				97		90	1146	15		
	1895–1896	316	<i>Didn't exist</i>			60				367	10		
Mhlahlo Majozi (Landless Qamu) Camperdown	1905	281	150			31				462	10		

Source: List of Native Chiefs, and their Tribes in the Colony to Whom Salary is Paid, as compiled from the Hut Tax Returns, 1895–6, PAR, SNA I/17291; Native Affairs Department, Annual Report, 1905.

governance for his chiefdom to the Mngeni magistrate. Maguzu was what the colonial government saw as a loyal chief. When the government deposed Bambatha Zondi in February 1906 for resisting the introduction of the poll tax, the SNA rewarded Maguzu for his fidelity. The SNA transferred Bambatha's followers in the Mngeni division (nine homesteads, twenty-one dwellings) to Maguzu and his followers in the New Hanover and Lion's River districts to Chief Mveli of the Fuze.<sup>25</sup> In his request for territorial definition, Maguzu explained that five homesteads under Mhlahlo (landless Qamu) and one or two under Mafahleni (of the Nxamalala) and Cupukumuka (Mkhize) mixed within his followers on private lands. Maguzu justified the request in light of frequent fighting and the disregard of his authority by followers of other chiefs. He also acknowledged that if this recommendation were accepted, he would lose eighteen homesteads currently under his authority. He described the region in question, stretching from the main road to Greytown and the Mngeni River on the north to the southern road to Table Mountain from Pietermaritzburg—thereby claiming an enormous swath of land. Mngeni Magistrate Bennett agreed with Maguzu but felt the timing inappropriate (perhaps on account of the rebellion).<sup>26</sup>

While officials were not prepared to implement the ward system and fully demarcate boundaries in Maguzu's Mbambangalo, boundaries were being defined—but they were not necessarily boundaries around chiefdoms. In 1907, the European agent of Onverwacht, still not home to any white agriculture, fenced the farm, thereby bounding Africans on it—including followers of Maguzu and Sidumo Mkhize—from other members of their chiefdoms. In the wake of the rebellion, officials held fast to the Mngeni River as the dividing line between Maguzu's and Swayimane's jurisdictions when several subjects of Swayimane on Onverwacht north of the river requested permission to transfer their allegiance to Maguzu on account of Swayimane's interference in their lives. USNA S. O. Samuelson and New Hanover Magistrate H. W. Boast agreed that the natural boundary between the New Hanover and Mngeni districts should remain the border between the chiefs; only if the applicants relocated across the border could they become subjects of Maguzu.<sup>27</sup> Samuelson revisited Maguzu's request in 1908, again asking Bennett's opinion on the feasibility of adopting the ward system in the Mngeni District.<sup>28</sup>

In 1911, Swayimane also made a statement to the new commissioner about his interest in seeing the ward system introduced to the New Hanover District where his people lived on farms occupied by followers of Ngangezwe, Laduma, Cupukumuka, and Mhlahlo. While Swayimane had not discussed the ward system with these leaders, he had conferred with Maguzu and they agreed on its desirability. Swayimane

believed that constant quarreling over land resulted from the intermixing.<sup>29</sup> Despite this interest on the part of chiefs, by the eve of the 1913 Land Act, the ward system had only been introduced selectively to the coast.

The ward system proved difficult to implement because of evictions from white-owned farms. Despite the exemption in the 1913 Land Act designed to delay the actual implementation of anti-squatting regulations, farmers began to force Africans off their land. As Africans were evicted from farms, their movement contributed to the continuation of personal allegiance across ward boundaries. Thus, the chief native commissioner (CNC) advised caution when it came to the creation of wards, recommending the implementation of the system in Mvoti and New Hanover divisions as test cases for the scheme's suitability. But by 1920, the CNC expressed concerns, advising against clear boundaries where Africans still lived on land with European owners. Writing to the New Hanover magistrate, he recommended a far from formal system: "I would, however, suggest to you, for the purposes of better control, to more or less identify certain areas with the various chiefs without actually demarcating hard and fast ward boundaries."<sup>30</sup>

While many European farms initially had absentee landowners, by the 1920s this was no longer the case—at Table Mountain or elsewhere in Natal. The interwar period saw the growth of commercial agriculture and industrialization in South Africa, as well as the peak of labor tenancy; by the late 1920s, this included a boom in export commodities produced in the Natal Midlands that struggled to rebound after the Great Depression.<sup>31</sup> Settlers brought more farms into production, terminated rent tenancies, and required African tenants to enter into labor tenancy in which they rendered at least ninety days of service in return for land. Thomas McClendon has described the relationship between labor tenants and white farmers as another form of *ukukhonza*, but Africans on the farms at Table Mountain still recognized the authority of their various chiefs at the same time that they paid rental fees or gave labor as part of tenancy requirements.<sup>32</sup> George Moe, a former magistrate, bought Goedverwachting in 1910 and began farming it in 1913.<sup>33</sup> He told the Natal Natives Land Commission in 1918 that he had no shortage of labor, being surrounded by the reserves. He charged £3 per dwelling—compared to 14s across the border on the location—and had sixty-five homesteads on the farm (124 dwellings). He required Africans to dip their cattle, allowing them to use his dip tank in return for *helekelela*, a practice of lending assistance on short projects that required many hands. He attributed the growth in their cattle, from ninety head to three hundred between 1913 and 1918, to his supervision.<sup>34</sup>

This growth of European farming in the area resulted in a number of evictions of Africans who *khonza'd* Maguzu, Swayimane, and Ngangezwe. In 1913, a farmer (possibly Moe; the records do not make it clear) took Quva Zondi, a follower of Maguzu, and Saulkutshelwa Mathe and Hxalata Magubane, followers of Swayimane, to court for failure to pay rent and forced them from the land. Quva Zondi pleaded for an extension with the CNC because there was no room in Maguzu's location.<sup>35</sup> In 1915, another of Maguzu's followers, Mkongelwa, was evicted from the nearby Bishopstowe farm where his father had established a homestead with the permission of the late Bishop J. W. Colenso. Mkongelwa thrived at Bishopstowe, planting wattles and selling them every few years. He lamented leaving his wattles for congested location land. While he identified as one of Maguzu's followers, he intended to "go and see some of the distant Chiefs who may find room for me."<sup>36</sup> In 1918, Moe ejected a number of Africans from Goedverwachting. When they failed to leave in a timely fashion, the Mngeni magistrate pressured them to take their cattle into the neighboring location.<sup>37</sup> Some Nyavu followers continued to work as labor tenants on the farm after Moe sold it in 1919 to Nicholas P. H. Ferreira. M. A. Shange, a Nyavu elder, recalled their eventual ejection by Ignatius Ferreira, the eldest Ferreira son who took over the farm after his father's 1923 death: "But then Naartjies [Ignatius] fired all of them; some went to work in Durban and Johannesburg. Many people built their houses under those cliffs and some moved to the underdeveloped areas."<sup>38</sup> M. A. Mkhize's grandfather refused to go; Ferreira brought out the police to force him off the land.<sup>39</sup>

A similar process of eviction occurred on Onverwacht. In 1920, Robert Mattison bought the three pieces of Onverwacht farm and a portion of Aasvogel Krans, on which followers of Swayimane and Maguzu's son Ndlovu resided and paid rent, and began commercial farming activities. He started a wattle plantation and a citrus orchard. Mattison immediately evicted thirty-five homestead heads. Maguzu's headmen complained the evicted families had nowhere to go with so little room on location land. The magistrate callously recommended they work together to buy a farm.<sup>40</sup> Balothi Goge, who grew up on the land owned by Mattison, remembered being evicted from the area known as Estingeni. "There we were under Bob's farm. Then we were moved from that farm to Maqongqo because Bob wanted to have more grazing land for his cattle . . . he said the place was to become a cattle grazing ground." Goge's father moved to another part of Onverwacht, now known as Maqongqo. He and many others living there worked on Mattison's farm as labor tenants—tending livestock and transporting wattle



to town for sale. They dipped their cattle at his tank and, when they could afford it, bought cattle from him.<sup>41</sup>

On the farms closer to town, evictions brought trouble for the successors of Cupukumuka and Mhlahlo, whose followers were spread across districts and largely resident on private lands. In 1912, Cupukumuka's regency ended in favor of the heir, Sidumo Mkhize. That year, the Mkhize subjects were partitioned by district and put under new chiefs in Impendle and New Hanover. In the Camperdown District, officials raised up Maplankwe Majozi to restore the chiefly house of the landless Majozi, seen to be dying after so many sickly young heirs and a series of acting chiefs. Sidumo's Camperdown followers were amalgamated with the Qamu under Maplankwe. Sidumo maintained control only over his followers in the Mngeni and Lion's River districts.<sup>42</sup> Both Sidumo and Maplankwe suffered from a lack of land. Sidumo was resident on private lands himself and was constantly negotiating his tenure and expensive rent rates, moving from one farm to another in the former Bishopstowe area in a series of evictions. He feared the gradual loss of followers who sought lower rents and greater control over their stock numbers by changing their affiliations.<sup>43</sup> And yet Sidumo and Maplankwe still maintained a number of followers. Maplankwe was a regular supplicant of the magistrate, requesting location land for his subjects. These evictions and the landless state of the Mkhize and Qamu chiefs meant that even as some Africans changed allegiances to access land, others continued to carry personal allegiances across boundaries.

## Armed and Educated Men in the Defining of Authority and Boundaries

The overcrowding of Inanda Location as those forced off white farms moved into the reserves contributed to further contestation over authority and competition for scarce land. But increasingly, these conflicts took the form of violent skirmishes between the young men of the chiefdoms involved. It is much easier to ascertain how the chiefs interpreted the fighting; they were often called before the magistrate to explain. Both Maguzu and Swayimane attested to tensions over access to territory when they requested boundaries for their chiefdoms in 1906 and 1911. It is not surprising that leaders might promote their authority by describing the dedication of their followers. It is much more difficult to uncover why individuals affiliated with those chiefs would resort to violence. But there are hints in the

same records of why Nyavu, Maphumulo, and Gcumisa followers assaulted their neighbors, as police testimony and those charged with violence spoke to motives. In both cases in which violence erupted, in 1913 and 1917, followers of the Nyavu chief Ngangezwe initiated the attacks—citing insults against themselves and their leader as causation. But in at least one averted conflict, the Maphumulo and Gcumisa intended revenge. They had made personal the contests over territory and chiefly authority. Other Nyavu followers—the *amakhotha* associated with Table Mountain Mission Reserve—sought to assist in the acquisition of land by allying with the chief to raise funds for the purchase of Goedverwachting.

Several times during this period the colonial administration investigated the alleged arming of the Gcumisa. In June 1906, a “loyal chief living at Table Mountain,” likely Ngangezwe, informed the magistrate that Swayimane had ordered his people to assemble at his homestead. The unnamed loyal chief did not know the purpose of the meeting but considered it worthy of note given the disturbances in the Maphumulo and Lower Thukela divisions associated with *impi yamakhanda*.<sup>44</sup> In 1912, the acting CNC again scrutinized the Gcumisa, convinced that Swayimane ordered an arming to take sides in conflict between the followers of Maguzu and Ngangezwe. All of the men and women interviewed during the investigation reported that Swayimane had called for men to hunt cane rats from his gardens.<sup>45</sup> But despite these claims, the administration had every reason to suspect Swayimane’s men were arming to assist the Maphumulo against the Nyavu. The months that elapsed between the initial reporting and the investigation certainly enabled the Gcumisa men and women the time necessary to agree on the story they provided to officials.

There is significant evidence of an alliance between Maguzu and Swayimane. In July 1913, a Nyavu follower, Ngwenya Zondi, demanded a meeting with the CNC. Ngwenya reported a long list of unnatural deaths and assaults. While it is not clear from the nature of the interview notes, it appears Ngwenya attributed the violence to Maguzu’s and Swayimane’s followers, and the perpetrators’ acquittal to the chiefs’ lackluster governance. Ngwenya complained that the followers of Maguzu and Swayimane insulted the masculinity of Nyavu members, calling them women and denigrating their chief by comparing him to Shaka. Recall, Ngangezwe’s father had traversed Natal as a young man, his family killed and followers dispersed, during the expansion of the Zulu kingdom. To name their chief “Shaka,” the perceived source of the chiefdom’s trouble, particularly offended. Honor was an indisputable part of local masculinity.<sup>46</sup> Ngwenya expressed concern that the Nyavu were wedged

between two new chiefdoms who refused to allow Nyavu access to the city through their territories. He worried: “Maguzu is doing his best to get the other chiefs to work against Ngangezwe; he has Swayimane, Mdepa [Mlaba of the Ximba], and Cupukumuka on his side.” The appointed chiefs and their heirs surrounded the Nyavu.<sup>47</sup> While Ngwenya may have had a personal conflict with Maguzu (he alluded to false accusations against him), much of what he reported again came to the CNC’s attention in the wake of violent conflicts between the three chiefdoms later that year.

At a wedding at KwaNyavu four months later, young male supporters of Ngangezwe attacked Maphumulo and Gcumisa spectators. Many of the characteristics of the November 1913 conflict match other *izimpi zemibango* across Natal. The youth carried out the brunt of the violence. The men had been drinking heavily during the festivities. The conflict took place on a weekend when migrant laborers were home for weekend visits. Officials recognized the punishments administered would do little to prevent further violent clashes.<sup>48</sup>

In the aftermath, the chiefs and officials testified to years of strain between Maguzu/Swayimane and Ngangezwe. Assistant Magistrate von Gerard reported that no evidence of “inter-tribal enmity” emerged when he tried the case, but the statements of the chiefs in the days afterwards suggest otherwise. Maguzu blamed the conflict on Ngangezwe and his people. He claimed that when Ngangezwe’s people attended weddings in his ward, no violence occurred. But when his own people attended the wedding at KwaNyavu in November, one of Ngangezwe’s headmen told the boys to attack Maguzu’s men as they had no right to be there. Maguzu called attention to the same division that Ngwenya had described—one between Ngangezwe and the appointed chiefs. Since his appointment, Maguzu had always known Ngangezwe to be in a state of conflict with the late Mdepa (Ximba), the late Cupukumuka (Mkhize), and the late Mhlahlo (landless Qamu)—all appointed chiefs or the heirs of appointed chiefs. Maguzu also testified to several other instances of conflict or near-conflict over the previous years. Chiefly authority was at the center of the friction. He told the CNC:

At the bottom of all these fights is that Ngangezwe claims to be an hereditary chief and as such claims that the tribes of Mdepa, Swayimane, and myself should be under his control. At the time of my appointment he came and asked the Magistrate (Mr. Bennett) to give him that portion of Swayimane’s tribe, over which I am now chief. But he does not make his claim openly but allows his people to

go about with the idea that their chief is a more important one than any other by reason of his birth.<sup>49</sup>

While Maguzu, as chief, had his own reasons for promoting his status with his people to officials, when combined with Ngwenya Zondi's earlier complaints, the testimonies suggest the Maphumulo chief's interpretation is credible.

Maguzu's statement suggests that Nyavu members had taken the encroachment on Ngangezwe's authority personally. By calling into question their masculinity, the Maphumulo reminded them of the hindrances to establishing their own homesteads without access to land denied to their chief by the encroachment of appointed chiefs. They valued Ngangezwe's hereditary descent and saw that as a vital component of legitimacy that appointed chiefs lacked. This encroachment also impacted their mobility, requiring them to travel through the territory of neighboring chiefs. Migrant labor was increasingly important as a way to establish homesteads without the consent of their fathers.

Within a month of the wedding conflict, on Christmas Day 1913, two African police constables observed an armed *impi* of over eight hundred of Maguzu's and Swayimane's men moving toward Ngangezwe's area with the intention of cutting off migrant laborers from KwaNyavu en route to Pietermaritzburg at the end of weekend visits. Ngangezwe's men had been warned of the *impi* and took a longer route back into the city to work. Conflict was thus avoided, but the presence of such a large armed group so close to Pietermaritzburg alarmed CNC R. H. Addison. He ordered the three chiefs to come before him in the city, and on January 13, 1914, Ngangezwe, Maguzu, Swayimane, and a number of their headmen appeared at the Mngeni Court.

All three chiefs denied any prior knowledge of the Christmas Day incident and testified to years of fighting and their own efforts to keep peace. In what seems like a well-rehearsed performance, Maguzu and Swayimane blamed Ngangezwe; Ngangezwe blamed Maguzu and Swayimane.<sup>50</sup> One arrested Maphumulo man explained that the *impi* departed under the cover of darkness so Maguzu would not know about their activities. But the report of the African policemen suggests the arrested Maphumulo man knew well he should not acknowledge the chief's involvement. According to the African constable, the *impi* sang "*inkosi isibizela abelungu ungatsho* (the chief has called us out for the white men don't tell anybody)" (original CNC translation).<sup>51</sup> The men's militant chant may date to earlier martial efforts against settlers, such as *impi yamakhanda*, or may be an adaption of a

labor-recruiting song. Its deployment suggests—whatever their objective, white men or their Nyavu neighbors—that they were acting on behalf of their leader, defending the legitimacy of their chief.

Maguzu argued that none of his men were among the armed men, and that Ngwenya—the Nyavu follower who had six months earlier complained about Maguzu’s authority—organized the Nyavu. Swayimane contended the tensions dated to his father’s appointment and the original 1882 boundary dispute between his father Manyosi and Nomsimekwana. The feud between Swayimane’s and Ngangezwe’s people carried on since. To illustrate his lack of ill will toward any other chiefs, Swayimane said if he held such feelings, they would be toward Maguzu, to whom a portion of his people had been given. But he believed he was on perfectly friendly terms with the other chiefs, though Ngangezwe would not meet them to reconcile.

Ngangezwe gave testimony that helps us understand why his followers may have developed feelings that their chief was more legitimate. Ngangezwe called upon history and reminded those present of his lineage.<sup>52</sup> According to the official scribe, Ngangezwe “denied that his father [Nomsimekwana] was ever subject to Ngoza, as had been stated by Swayimane. His father was a hereditary chief, and he had held that position since before the English came here.” He repeated the now-familiar account of how territory had been taken away from the Nyavu: “His father, he said, when Ngoza left, only claimed a piece of land which he had allowed Ngoza to settle on as a friendly act. Ngoza had said that he was cut off from his gardens whenever the river was full. Swayimane’s father, Manyosi, supported his father Nomsimekwana. Subsequently Manyosi turned round and repudiated all he had said. Ngangezwe’s kraal was moved.” Ngangezwe defended himself by reminding those present of his loss of territory and his hereditary status. This reminder of status was also a response to the complaints Ngwenya had already registered with the CNC. The Nyavu chief decried the rumors spread by Maguzu about his authority to the court officials. He complained that Maguzu’s people called him a second Shaka because he wanted to conquer everyone around him, when in fact he was claiming land that had long been held by his ancestors. Ngangezwe denied taunting Maguzu as just an appointed chief and complained that Maguzu’s *impi* had closed off the road to town—another slight that made the denial of land personal for his followers working in town. The conflict over Ngangezwe’s men using the road through Maguzu’s territory would continue for nearly a decade.<sup>53</sup>

In late 1914, the dispute over the contested boundary line at the northwestern

corner of Table Mountain reemerged. Both Maguzu and Ngangezwe attempted to control the boundary by exploiting the coexistence of personal and territorial allegiances. Maguzu complained that Mali, one of Ngangezwe's followers, breached the previously defined boundary. Assistant Magistrate von Gerard visited the site while in the area for tax collection the following year. Von Gerard believed the 1889 boundary, while clear on paper, in practice was an imaginary line of no assistance to people in the region. The magistrate found only followers of Maguzu on Onverwacht farm and followers of Ngangezwe on Goedverwaching; to him, this represented a tacit boundary between the chiefdoms that could be extended to a path leading up the mountain to more clearly define the line. Von Gerard discussed it with the chiefs, but CNC R. H. Addison preferred to maintain the existing boundary through the erection of additional beacons. Before any further action was taken, Ngangezwe ordered another homestead head, Rulumeni, to remove from what he considered to be his territory in the same locale. In October 1915, Addison and von Gerard went out to the area in question in hopes of finalizing the dispute. Ignoring the deeper problems—of the denial of territory and authority felt by Ngangezwe and his followers, and the presence of both of personal and territorial authorities—the pair laid down beacons according to the line decided in 1889.<sup>54</sup>

The beacons did little, however, to quell the dispute between people of the two chiefdoms. Within two years, another conflict broke out at a December 1917 wedding at the homestead of Sibindi on the Onverwacht farm. Pietermaritzburg Magistrate Frank Foxon, who knew Maguzu well from their time working together, reported that the wedding between Mjijwana ka Sibindi (Maguzu) and the sister of Msolwa ka Maralarala (Ngangezwe) ended in disarray when Ngangezwe's people numbering nearly two hundred attacked about one hundred of Maguzu's men. Hayeyana ka Jazi (Maguzu) died and several others of Maguzu's men were injured. One hundred of Ngangezwe's men were charged for the death and violence, out of which twelve were convicted of culpable homicide and fined £20. Thirty-four others pled guilty to the violence and were sentenced to fines of £5. Magistrate Foxon recommended that Ngangezwe's stipend be disallowed on account of "the careless manner in which he has controlled his tribe."<sup>55</sup>

Repeatedly turned down and scolded by the administration for these conflicts and his efforts to access land through the magistrate's office, Ngangezwe sought other ways to bring the land in question under his authority. In 1921, Ngangezwe allied himself with local *amakhobwa* to purchase land at Table Mountain. He announced his intent to purchase the neighboring farm Goedverwaching from

Nicholas Ferreira on behalf of the Nyavu. Recall that Ferreira bought Goedverwaching from Moe in 1919 and evicted a number of the African tenants still resident on the farm after Moe's evictions. Ngangezwe, who seems to have been on good terms with Ferreira despite the evictions, approached him to purchase the farm in 1921.<sup>56</sup> Ngangezwe informed Ferreira of his interest in the land as one "owned by the forefathers of this chief."<sup>57</sup>

As early as 1880, chiefs had begun to consider the purchase of land in an attempt to provide for adherents. Mqawe bought nine thousand acres in Inanda for the Qadi; others deposited money with agents and missionaries to save for purchase of Crown lands. A marked increase in African-owned land in Pietermaritzburg County between 1878 and 1890 arose from purchases of Crown lands by chiefs.<sup>58</sup> But a tightening of conditions under which Crown lands were sold and the growing power of the farming community made it more difficult for non-*amakhobwa* to purchase or retain land. While the Land Act of 1913 prohibited the transfer of lands outside the reserves to Africans, an exemption clause allowed the government flexibility in dealing with overcrowding in the scheduled areas, and Africans continued to buy land even after the election of Hertzog in 1924. Several of the Table Mountain chiefs were keenly aware of the legislative changes and involved themselves briefly in the Natal Native Congress.<sup>59</sup>

The right to purchase land could be offered to select Africans or small partnerships, as well as "tribal entities who have been living in such areas for considerable periods, or who are living under tribal conditions on private farms on rent-paying terms."<sup>60</sup> The buyer would be required to accept the transfer of purchased property in the name of the minister of native affairs to be held in trust for the chiefdom. Between 1913 and 1936, Africans bought at least 3,200 farms and lots.<sup>61</sup> Chiefs in Sekhukhuneland established a levy in 1922 to buy back their land, piece by piece.<sup>62</sup> In line with these policies, Ferreira's advocates first contacted the CNC to seek approval. Ngangezwe sent several headmen and local *ikhobwa* Christian Gwamanda to spearhead the negotiations with the Mngeni magistrate and Ferreira. Ferreira agreed to sell the six thousand acres of farmland to the Nyavu at £3 per acre and was willing to accept an initial payment of £10,000 cash with two later installments of £4,000 in 1922 and 1923—a not-uncommon arrangement for African land purchases of this era.

Despite the magistrate's confidence in Gwamanda, whom he described as "an educated native who has a very good idea of business requirements," he expressed concern about the Nyavu's capability to raise adequate funds. Over the course

of the next several months, Christian Gwamanda managed to raise £400 and William Gwamanda, another £465 that Ferreira held for them. While these sums are small in comparison to the farm's price, they reflect a significant effort on the part of Ngangezwe, Nyavu educated elite, and any number of Nyavu making small contributions. When the Nyavu had failed to raise the initial £10,000 by the proposed date, Ferreira and the Nyavu agreed to the sale of a portion of the farm. But the CNC informed the Gwamandas he would not recommend an exemption for the sale of a portion of the farm, only the farm in its entirety.<sup>63</sup> The Nyavu chief refunded the money his followers had contributed toward the purchase, but Ngangezwe and his son Somquba continued to personally save for the land. They endeavored for several years to purchase the farm, depositing small sums with officials—some of which went missing.<sup>64</sup>

Ngangezwe also attempted to change the boundary again in 1928; when he failed, he attempted to reclaim land and authority with the erection of a fence. Ngangezwe did not dispute that there should be a boundary, but that the line was incorrect. Ngangezwe claimed the boundary should start at the source of the Nonzila Stream, an assertion that would extend his territory significantly and give all of the top of Table Mountain to the Nyavu (see both streams on map 3 in chapter 2).<sup>65</sup> At the same time, Ngangezwe was even more persistent with letters to the Camperdown magistrate regarding land under the Ximba that he argued was the birthplace of the Nyavu ancestors. In the correspondence between the Camperdown native commissioner and the CNC, the Camperdown official attributed Ngangezwe's persistence to his very old age and suggested Ngangezwe was "constantly turning back to the days of his youth before the present tribal boundaries were laid down."<sup>66</sup> The officials in Pietermaritzburg and Camperdown agreed the matter could not be reopened and went out to point out the beacons and boundary yet again. They also refused Ngangezwe permission to erect a fence across the top of Table Mountain to separate Nyavu cattle from that of the Maphumulo.<sup>67</sup>

Nyavu chiefs and their armed and educated followers took varied action to access the land of their ancestors and shore up the authority due to hereditary chiefs across the 1910s and 1920s. Ngangezwe contested land by calling upon the personal allegiances of his followers across boundary lines of location and private lands, working with local educated elites to negotiate the purchase of a neighboring farm, and erecting fences across the top of Table Mountain. But he was not alone in seeking to rectify the denial of land and authority. For many young men of his chieftom, this denial became personal as the routes that carried them to work and



the status of homestead head were cut off by created chiefdoms. As Nyavu territory grew crowded with Africans evicted from private farms, the young men worried about their access to land and saw that of the Maphumulo as land denied to them and their leader. They responded to insults against their chief and masculinity by embracing their chief's hereditary rule as a superior form of legitimacy, twice initiating violent conflict with the Maphumulo and Gcumisa during the 1910s.

## Conclusion

Cultural inheritances of first-use land rights, personal allegiance, and genealogical imagination continued to inform the relationships between chiefs and subjects and between chiefdoms even in this time of increased pressure on land and the ties of *ukukhonza*. The territorialization of authority remained an important component of government policy during the first three decades of the twentieth century, but its actual implementation was varied and sometimes resisted. With the appointment of Maguzu as the first chief of the colonially created Maphumulo chiefdom in 1905, Maphumulo followers named the land Mbambangalo to reflect their origins and their ties to the territory. Their neighbors saw this connection of the territory to the new chiefdom as a denial of land and authority. But even as the Mngeni River separated the Maphumulo from the Gcumisa, followers of several chiefs continued to live intermixed on the land. In the wake of the 1906 *impi yamakhandu*, colonial officials saw this “tribal mixup” as an impediment to governance and control. The initiation of the ward system in the Lower Tugela District, though, did not suggest that this scheme was the solution and the system was only partially implemented across the Natal—even as some chiefs such as Maguzu requested it. The 1913 Land Act and the increase in white commercial agriculture during the interwar years—and accompanying farm evictions—meant continued movement of Africans across ward and district boundaries where they carried their chiefly affiliations. The new presence of white farmers on Onverwacht and Goedverwachting forced some local Africans into labor tenancy or into the neighboring Inanda Location.

But in the 1910s and 1920s, chiefs were not the only people who contested land and authority. In violent conflicts in the 1910s, followers of the hereditary Nyavu chief made clear they had taken personally the denial of land and authority. In response to insults to their chief, evictions from nearby white-owned farms, and struggles to use routes to work through the lands of appointed chiefs, Nyavu men

attacked Maphumulo followers at weddings. On at least one occasion, Maphumulo men sought revenge as they sang about their chief calling them out to fight. The *amakholwa* also formed alliances with their chiefs to access land. In 1921, the Gwamanda brothers of the Table Mountain Mission Reserve worked with Ngangezwe in an attempt to raise funds to purchase neighboring territories they perceived as the land of their ancestors.

Nyavu attempts to access Goedverwaching as the land of their ancestors did not end with their failed purchase. The same farm became the center of a land exchange facilitated by the NAD in the 1930s for the construction of a dam at Table Mountain. As Nyavu, Maphumulo, and Gcumisa followers were forcefully removed from Inanda Location to make way for the dam, they shaped the territorialization of authority that NAD officials sought. It is to this land exchange and forced removal that we now turn.



# They Refuse to Go to Other Chiefs' Areas

## The Nagle Dam and Forced Removals, 1930–1950

*Abantu bacinene kakhulu kulendawo yami kanti futhi abatandi ukuya kwamanye amakosi noma besuswa emapulazeni aba abakwami.* (People are very much crowded in my area and although some of them are being ejected from farms they refuse to go to other Chiefs' areas.)

—Somquba Mdluli, to Pietermaritzburg Native Commissioner, 1937

**F**arm evictions and the nature of migrant labor meant that people carried expectations of *ukukhonza* relationships across boundaries. At times, they felt compelled to transfer these allegiances; at other times, they chose to do so to improve their lives in one way or another. Transferring allegiances did not erase knowledge about earlier relationships or how they could be used. After 1935, these personal relationships shaped how people at Table Mountain responded to forced removals to make way for the construction of a dam.

Relocation, removal, and resettlement are terms most often associated with the overall policy of state-sponsored removals of the apartheid era. But for the people at Table Mountain, these words earned significance over a decade earlier with the negotiations for a dam on the Mngeni River in Inanda Location. Piecemeal

acquisition of land for the water scheme to supply the city of Durban and the 1936 Natives Trust and Land Act shaped the boundaries of the chiefdoms already contesting territory. Construction of the dam forced Maphumulo, Nyavu, and Gcumisa homesteads from land that they identified as places of their ancestors or as places awarded to them, onto newly purchased South African Native Trust (SANT) farms. These followers contributed to the territorialization of chiefly authority when they made decisions about where to relocate.

From the commencement of negotiations for the land transfer in 1935, the Nyavu chief recognized a new opportunity to bring the disputed territory into his jurisdiction and sought to settle his people on the farm he had earlier tried to purchase. But the unfolding of the dam's construction gave preference to the Gcumisa and Maphumulo. Another clash broke out between the chiefdoms in 1937, just as forced removals from Inanda Location began. The removals took place between 1937 and 1950. They contributed to the territorialization of authority, but also to a sense of possession of the land. Those of the Maphumulo and Gcumisa denied land by the construction of the dam came to see newly purchased South African Native Trust farms as given to them—a sense of place that would be reflected in all subsequent accounts of history in the region. But beyond the new creation of place as the Maphumulo moved, the relocation created a firm sense of boundaries—those of the farms on which they now lived—and saw the implementation of betterment planning. The denial was not only of land, but of the freedom to work the land and arrange the homestead according to their own concepts.

## Union Land and Administration Policies under Hertzog

After 1924, Prime Minister J. B. M. Hertzog of the National Party began to focus on segregation as the major political program for a unified white South Africa. Hertzog first introduced his “Native Bills” in 1926, but the bills did not become law until 1936. Hertzog insisted upon the interdependence of the bills to procure the abolition of the Cape franchise. Historian Saul Dubow argued that in the interim, white liberals sought to “soften the impact of segregation” through compromises while African leaders, “trapped by the acute need for land and struggling to defend traditional resources, found themselves forced to trade their claims to political citizenship for a greater share of their territorial birthright.”<sup>21</sup> The decade it took to pass the Representation of Natives Act and the 1936 Land Act saw the coming

together of white South Africa on the issue of the “native question,” even as the opposition of the ANC and ICU solidified.<sup>2</sup> The Representation of Natives Act, the most controversial of Hertzog’s Native Bills, removed ten thousand African and Coloured voters from the common roll. This abolition of the Cape franchise was critical to establishing a uniform policy of land segregation throughout the Union; the earlier Land Act had been declared illegal in the Cape as long as the franchise existed.<sup>3</sup>

While these negotiations that led to the passing of Hertzog’s Native Bills took place, the minister for native affairs appointed the Native Economic Commission to report upon the economic and social condition of Africans, particularly in urban areas. The 1932 Native Economic Commission Report stressed a need for the economic development of the reserves as a solution for the continued “native question.” Segregationists drew upon the report to support their claim that the reserves should be the home of Africans where they could develop “along their own lines.”<sup>4</sup> The commission established the reserves as the center of African economic problems, despite the fact that by 1930, the reserves contained less than half of the total African population and only a small proportion were not engaged in some way with the “European” economy.<sup>5</sup> The report argued that African reserves were overstocked and eroded as a consequence of bad farming. The commission promoted the conservation of the land and a program to teach Africans how to use land sustainably. Conservationism was a deeply rooted element of thinking about land in southern Africa. While agricultural planning originally grew out of concern for the difficulties of settler farming, by the 1930s and 1940s, criticism transferred to African cultivation and stockholding. Recognizable erosion, different in degree by region, contributed to a perceived threat to the future of agrarian production. Conservationist interventions were ignorant, insensitive, and transformative when it came to existing rural social relationships.<sup>6</sup> Adam Ashforth argued that the commission made development of the reserves “a caveat on the state’s legitimacy: a responsibility to be discharged in constructing the structures of political power that make exploitation of African labour-power possible.” But it was not funding that would save the reserves; it was agricultural training.<sup>7</sup>

The size and state of the reserves were the target of the second Hertzog Native Bill, the 1936 Natives Trust and Land Act. This act enabled the completion of the spatial segregation envisioned by the 1913 Land Act. The 1936 land law created a legal body known as the South African Native Trust (SANT) (later the South African Bantu Trust and South African Development Trust) in which the ownership of

African reserves was vested. The act enabled the trust to buy another 7.25 million morgen of land to rent to Africans, thereby making it even more difficult for Africans themselves to buy land. The 1936 Act formalized the recommendations of the 1918 proposals to add land to that scheduled for African use, though in practice, the addition of land was slow and ineffectual. Many of the farms within the release areas were overpopulated and overstocked at the time of purchase. It still had a limited land goal, representing only 12 percent of the land for 70 percent of the population.<sup>8</sup> Newly acquired trust land was to be used to relieve pressure and enable remedial activities on location land. The act also sought to address Africans still living outside of the scheduled and released areas—on white-owned farms—but the elimination of these practices was constrained by a requirement to find new land in a scheduled or released area for those displaced. The act hastened the removal of “black spots”—land owned or occupied by Africans in white areas—excluded from scheduled areas.

Central to the new land act and the future of segregation was betterment planning—the development of the reserves. Betterment refers to government attempts to combat erosion, conserve the environment, and improve agricultural production in areas reserved for Africans. The 1936 Land Act empowered the trust to adopt measures to stabilize and reclaim reserve land, and a 1939 proclamation regarding “Control of and Improvement of Livestock in Native Areas” gave power to the NAD to define “betterment areas” on trust-owned land. In any proclaimed betterment area, the NAD could count stock numbers and cull surplus animals. Initially, betterment work started only where requested, in select reserves in Ciskei and Transkei, and on the trust farms where consent was not required before implementation.<sup>9</sup> Betterment was taken up with greater alacrity after the Second World War, when Secretary for Native Affairs D. L. Smit declared a “New Era of Reclamation” in 1945. If the pre-war approach focused on halting erosion and stock farming, the post-war plans envisioned agricultural viability. Rural populations would be divided between full-time farmers and full-time wage laborers, of whom the latter would be relocated into “rural villages.” Proclamation 116 of 1949 gave authorities considerably greater powers to realize the new plans, including more severe punitive measures against resisters and the ability to recruit any adult male to implement betterment works—in other words, the power to force labor. Actual change in mission on the ground did not begin until the 1950s.<sup>10</sup> While the forced shifting of entire villages would take place under apartheid betterment schemes,<sup>11</sup> the Mngeni water project provided NAD officials with the opportunity to implement

betterment planning among the Africans already being relocated onto newly acquired trust farms.

The implementation of betterment was limited during the Second World War, but it was met with resistance where and when it was applied. Opposition to Hertzog's Native Bills coalesced in the specially constituted All-African Convention in 1935. By then, the ANC had lost its predominance of African politics and Congress participated in the convention alongside delegates from African, Coloured, and Indian political organizations.<sup>12</sup> During the war, the ANC reorganized under Alfred Xuma and began to work with other organizations such as the Indian National Congress, while young ANC members such as Anton Lembede, Peter Mda, Oliver Tambo, Nelson Mandela, and Walter Sisulu formed the ANC Youth League to push for more openly defiant protests. While elite, rural, kin-based networks were a vital part of national politics and the ANC was embarking on a program of change, the national organization was largely uninvolved in popular rural resistance during the 1940s.<sup>13</sup>

During this first phase of rural resistance to betterment, the major grievances surrounded the culling of cattle. As discussed earlier, cattle operated as more than a means of accumulating wealth. While the world in which cattle could be exchanged for women's labor power declined, cattle were still the means with which families cemented relationships in marriage and individuals gained political clients through cattle lending. Cattle provided access to milk, manure (which served many household and agricultural purposes), draft labor, and meat. People also resisted the system of stock sales, which set low prices, and the blanket assessment of stock to be culled in which the poorest stood to lose the most. Apart from culling, the demarcation of blocks of arable land often meant a loss of land for farmers who had rights to more territory before the division of land. All families were expected to farm from the same amount of land, no matter how many people were dependent upon that plot. This was especially troublesome for polygamous homesteads, where every wife expected access to an area of land for cultivation. Others complained that those unable to pay taxes received smaller portions of land. Chiefs also felt aggrieved by betterment schemes because their authority, based upon ability to grant such resources, was undermined not only by general lack but also by the presence of agricultural officers who now attempted to govern such allocations. The power to allot land had in effect been transferred to white officials. These changes mobilized rural peoples. In Zoutpansberg, people organized under Alpheus Malivha, a member of the Communist Party of South



Africa (CPSA), removed the demarcation beacons, and marched in the nearby town chanting “down with land redivision” after Malivha was tried for inciting the resistance. In Witziehoek, those opposed—many of them migrant laborers with some knowledge of African nationalist and CPSA ideas—tore down fencing and freed cattle from impoundment. In the Eastern Cape, the Kongo—an affiliate of the All-African Convention—organized to replace their chief, who they said had betrayed them when he accepted the betterment scheme.<sup>14</sup> It is in this highly charged context of increasing constraints on land tenure that the construction of a dam at Table Mountain needs to be examined.

## Negotiating Access to Land: The Construction of Nagle Dam

Negotiations began in 1935 for the placement of a dam on the Mngeni River in Inanda Location to supply water to Durban. The Durban Corporation (the municipality) had undertaken a similar project in the 1920s on the Mlaas River. Durban Waterworks Act 24 of 1921 granted that compensation for land expropriated could be provided through the transfer of other land. The bill and land exchange undertaken for the Shongweni Water Works on the Mlaas River would be replicated for the Mngeni scheme.<sup>15</sup>

From the first phase of the Mngeni water project—later to be called the Nagle Dam—the development interfered in the daily lives of the residents of the region, disrupting agriculture and prompting fears of removal. Immediately, the Durban authorities sent in surveyors and engineers. The city council anticipated no resistance from local residents, given the opportunity for local wage labor created by the project. But complaints did begin to circulate when the surveyors marked a road through Chief Ndlovu Maphumulo’s territory without discussing purpose or compensation, and surveyors prematurely informed members of the Gcumisa they would have to move. Local residents encouraged the construction of the road, given the area’s inaccessibility to vehicular transport. Ndlovu himself first objected, as Maphumulo gardens would be disturbed by the road, but when his people approached him to urge no obstacles to the construction and waived their own rights to compensation, the chief acquiesced. Because of the rocky and hilly nature of the area, the planned road construction was expensive and the corporation sought to share the costs with NAD before abandoning the project for another road farther east, stretching from the N<sub>3</sub>, a national road. In 1936, NAD



**FIGURE 12.** Panorama of Nagle Dam, 2016. PHOTOGRAPH FROM WIKI COMMONS (LANDYZA).



**FIGURE 13.** Nagle Dam wall, 2016. PHOTOGRAPH FROM WIKI COMMONS (LANDYZA).

contributed famine relief funds to construct the road and alleviate the effects of drought that plagued Natal that year.<sup>16</sup>


More critically, the construction of the dam itself required 4,725 acres of Inanda Location. In order to prevent soil erosion, straying cattle, or proximate contamination of the dam, the corporation negotiated an exchange of land that would remove location residents onto farms purchased for the SANT. Durban Corporation identified two farms neighboring Inanda Location whose owner, Robert Mattison, was willing to sell (see map 6). Chief Native Commissioner H. C.

Lugg recommended the land transfer; Mattison's farmland was more fertile than the location land the Africans currently occupied. He believed the relocation to be so desirable that they might waive their rights to compensation.<sup>17</sup>

While Lugg believed these residents would desire the productive land, the project met with local opposition. Lugg had not accounted for people's attachment to the existing land. During 1936, court messengers delivered the first notices to remove. Chief Matshikiyana Gcumisa (Swayimane died in 1934) and twenty homestead heads called on the New Hanover District magistrate to demand an explanation. They asked not to be moved from their homes and land. The New Hanover native commissioner believed he was safe in saying that every person served notice dissented from the proposed undertaking.<sup>18</sup>

Neighboring white farmers also complained, vehemently objecting to the encroachment of Africans on their boundaries if removed to Mattison's land. Unlike the affected Africans, the white farmers could utilize their elected representatives to lodge their opposition to the proposed waterworks bill—forcing the state to respond. Farmers on Doornhoek, Goedverwachting, and other subdivisions of Aasvogel Krans worked through Member of Parliament William John O'Brien to voice their concerns. They demanded a white superintendent be placed on the portion of Aasvogel Krans to be sold and that Aasvogel Krans remain a buffer land (for grazing only) between the white farms and location land. They additionally demanded fences at no cost to them despite the Fencing Act of 1912, which required that landowners pay half the cost of the fencing.

They also proposed an alternative land transfer. Concerned that land to become SANT land divided the petitioners, they suggested the corporation instead purchase Goedverwachting, now occupied by Ferreira's widow, Christina G. Leslie, and her adult children. Leslie expressed apprehensions that her family was already "surrounded by native location" and the planned transfer would expose more of their boundaries to African neighbors. To move the project forward, the corporation agreed to meet some of the white farmers' demands. They would pay the salary of a "trusted native induna" to live on and police a buffer piece of the farm, and would pay for and maintain the fence. The NAD also planned to appoint an additional superintendent and agricultural officer to oversee the new farm and adjoining location.<sup>19</sup> With these agreements, the Durban Waterworks (Private) Act passed through parliament in 1937 and enabled the Durban Corporation to move forward with the £1,572,000 project to store 5.3 billion gallons of water, providing Durban with thirty million gallons of water per day.<sup>20</sup>



MAP 6. Transfer of land and forced removals for Nagle Dam project, 1937–1950

These negotiations caught the attention of the Nyavu chief, whose father and grandfather had long claimed the land in question as the place of their ancestors. When Somquba, Ngangezwe's son who became Nyavu chief in 1931, heard about Leslie's willingness to sell Goedverwachting, he asked the Pietermaritzburg commissioner to put the farm under his jurisdiction. Somquba recognized his own inability to purchase the land without adequate funds but attempted to access it in another way. He opened his January 1937 request by pointing out that the overcrowding in his territory was due to the dedication of his followers to the Nyavu chiefdom: "*Abantu bacinene kakhulu kulendawo yami kanti futhi abatandi ukuya kwamanye amakosi noma besuswa emapulazeni aba abakwami.* (People are very much crowded in my area and although some of them are being ejected from farms they refuse to go to other Chiefs' areas.)" [Original magisterial translation].<sup>21</sup> Somquba argued

that his people had long lived on the land in question—this was the farm from which many of his followers had been evicted when Ferreira had bought the land. The Pietermaritzburg native commissioner recommended Somquba's proposal and promised to pass the application to the NAD when it considered the future of the farm.

That members of the chiefdom did not trust that the farm would come to them this way was evidenced in another letter to the native commissioner from Q. A. Hlangwana. Hlangwana, who may have been resident on the farm or at least working with the Ferreira family (as evidenced by the letter's return address), pledged a £550 deposit and arranged with Ferreira's widow to pay the balance in installments and with interest. Hlangwana explained his interest in the farm: "[There] are many people [who] have no places of building their kraals and I too . . . I have no place of rest in the world." He understood that Somquba had requested to settle the farm but doubted that was sufficient, comparing the situation to marriage without *ilobolo*. He knew his deposit was meager, but expressed the unfairness that a white person could purchase a farm on loan but Africans could not.<sup>22</sup> Hlangwana was not alone in making these kinds of complaints about the lack of public mortgages and high interest rates on private loans; Africans regularly petitioned the state regarding their inability to borrow money from public sources such as the Land and Agricultural Bank of South Africa upon which white South Africans relied.<sup>23</sup>

In the midst of these developments, another fight broke out between young men of the Nyavu and Maphumulo chiefdoms at a wedding at the homestead of Mpokwane Qwabe (a Maphumulo subject) in July 1937. Discrepancies in reports made it difficult for officials to understand the causes and course of the clash. According to Chief Ndlovu, young Nyavu men appeared at the wedding uninvited—an aberration, he alleged, as the peoples had ceased attending one another's weddings due to the long-standing ill feelings between the chiefdoms. Sandhlana Wanda, a Maphumulo elder, died in the fight. Several others were injured by sticks, stones, and assegais. Sixty men were arrested and another thirty put under investigation. The Pietermaritzburg native commissioner could not believe the outnumbered twenty-eight visitors from KwaNyavu had started the fight, but he did note that they had arrived at the wedding armed with assegais. Somquba reported—like his father before him—that the conflict was long-standing, but Somquba's headman, Msolwa, disagreed. Msolwa thought that the groups were on friendly terms and that visits were frequently paid. Both parties alleged the other commenced the throwing

of stones that precipitated Wanda's death.<sup>24</sup> There is little detail in the two-page report to suggest specific causes of the conflict, but it should be considered that the effects of evictions, the 1936 drought, and the uncertainty and disruptions to everyday life accompanying the negotiations for the Mngeni scheme brought to the surface the ongoing conflict between the Maphumulo and Nyavu. For over two years, the people of the region waited and watched as the water project changed their landscape and threatened their removal.

Violent conflict over territory and allegiances was not always between chiefdoms during this period; identification as a member of a chiefdom was only one identity among many.<sup>25</sup> In late 1938, the oQweQweni and eSinyameni sections of the Nyavu contested a boundary within the chiefdom when an *izimpi zezigodi* nearly broke out at a wedding. As Somquba explained in his request for Goedverwaching, when Ferreira evicted the majority of Africans from Goedverwaching, those who pledged allegiance to the Nyavu chief moved into the crowded reserve. Many of those Nyavu on the farm considered themselves part of the eSinyameni section of the chiefdom. According to Somquba and members of the oQweQweni, when the evictees crossed the boundary fence between the farm and the reserve, they also crossed the border into oQweQweni territory. Somquba ordered them to become oQweQweni. But the members of eSinyameni argued that their ward extended into the reserve and thus was not extinguished when they lost access to the farm. This boundary dispute turned violent when young oQweQweni men refused to allow eSinyameni youth to attend a wedding unless they became oQweQweni. Over one hundred young men were involved in the contest, but the intervention of police and headmen attending the wedding prevented serious consequences. The conflict carried over the next day, when four men were injured. A week later, the Pietermaritzburg and Camperdown native commissioners—convinced the boundary was within the reserve—went to Table Mountain to demarcate a line between the wards. As with conflicts between chiefdoms, they determined that any Nyavu who found themselves on a different side of the boundary should transfer their affiliation or move. The eSinyameni faction did not agree with the decision and hired legal representation to submit a petition to the CNC to reconsider, but the CNC refused. In January 1939, the eSinyameni faction's resistance to transferring allegiance to the oQweQweni headman forced Native Commissioner Boast to again give the ultimatum: Change allegiances or move.<sup>26</sup> Ward allegiances were layered with allegiances to a chief.

## Planning Forced Removals and Betterment

Amid these stresses and conflicts, Durban Mayor Fleming Johnston broke ground at the dam on December 8, 1937. With the project officially underway, NAD officials planned the forced resettlement on the new farms according to the betterment ideas of “rational land-use planning” promulgated by South African planners as the only feasible solution to overstocking and land degradation. The 1938 plan for the Onverwacht and Aasvogel Krans Trust farms identified 133 Maphumulo, Gcumisa, and Nyavu homesteads to be moved from Inanda Location to make way for the dam reservoir, aqueduct, and road. There were already twenty-six homesteads, including 114 humans and 1,246 cattle, on Onverwacht and Aasvogel Krans. Agricultural Officer Norton recommended the farm carry no more than one thousand people and one thousand cattle, but estimated that when the removal was complete, there would already be nine hundred people and 1,500 cattle. Given the large number of livestock and the location of arable land only along the Mngeni River, he recommended communal plowing and dairying projects, separated residential areas, and the reduction of cattle.<sup>27</sup>

This betterment plan for Onverwacht and Aasvogel Krans made clear that the farms could not sustain the number of people to be relocated. Additionally, the pending ejection of Africans (including Mankonto Majozi of the landless Qamu) from Dadelfontein farm to the east of Table Mountain forced NAD officials to purchase additional land.<sup>28</sup> Extensive negotiations took place between the NAD, the Land Affairs Department, and the various owners of subsections of Goedverwaching. The property was not situated in a released area (land set aside by the 1936 Trust and Land Act to be purchased by the trust for African occupation), but was adjacent to Inanda Location and thus eligible for purchase.<sup>29</sup> The Ferreira family, who had offered the farm to the Nyavu and the NAD previously, sold the majority of the farm to the trust in 1948, but elected to keep one thousand acres of the best agricultural land wedged between Onverwacht and the sold portion of the farm (see map 6). This retention of this land marked an important development for the area, as the implementation of apartheid and Bantu Authorities would define chiefs’ jurisdiction around this stretch of desirable land.


The planned removal of residents from the Inanda Location to Onverwacht, Aasvogel Krans, and Goedverwaching resulted in a number of anomalies and legal difficulties. Onverwacht was not a scheduled piece of land according to the 1936 Trust and Land Act; therefore, when the first wave of people moved onto

Onverwacht in 1940, they would be legally subject to rental fees. But the SNA believed it would be unfair to call upon the new residents to pay the fees on account of their compulsory relocation for a public works project. He recommended that Onverwacht and Aasvogel Krans be treated as location land, thus exempting both new and old residents on the farm from rent. All would continue to pay taxes.<sup>30</sup> But when Goedverwaching transferred to the trust in 1948, the former labor tenants resident on the land became rent payers. NAD officials expressed concern that difficulties would arise between the old and new residents on Goedverwaching if those in the second wave of displacees were exempt from rent. Hesitant to volunteer the loss of rental fees that would result in exemption of all Goedverwaching residents, the officials eventually acquiesced given that “the settlement of Natives on Onverwacht and Goedverwaching is not to be compared with that on the ordinary Trust farm—the residents on them are or will be persons arbitrarily moved from the location for public purposes and the drastic changes in their mode of occupation should not be made harsher by an increase in their financial liabilities.”<sup>31</sup> While in fact there was nothing more arbitrary about this removal (this relocation was planned and forced, just as any other), the chief native commissioner thus recommended the three farms be added to the list of scheduled land so that all residents could be exempt from rental fees. The old and new residents on Onverwacht, Aasvogel Krans, and Goedverwaching would live on the trust farms as if resident on Inanda Location.

With the legal difficulties settled and the anticipated completion of the dam, the planning of the Goedverwaching remnant and the removal took on a new level of urgency throughout 1949. Agricultural Officer Tidbury’s 1948 plan for the farm identified thirty-three homesteads, 230 cattle, and 320 small livestock already on the farm—former labor tenants (see figure 14). Tidbury despaired that despite the size of the farm, only four hundred arable acres remained when the Ferreiras opted to keep the most desirable portion of the farm, a flat plateau suitable for agriculture. He thus estimated the carrying capacity of the farm for cattle to be only 834 units and recommended the elimination of all small stock and donkeys.<sup>32</sup>

The actual forced removals of African homesteads for the construction of the dam took place in stages between 1937 and 1950 and were accompanied by the implementation of these betterment plans. During this process, African laborers—under the watchful eyes of the agricultural officer—transformed the farms to help the land sustain the new population. In 1938, Assistant Agricultural Overseer Karg moved into the Mattison homestead to oversee the rehabilitation of the farms. He initially focused on the maintenance of the existing orchard and





wattle plantation. Durban Corporation fenced the boundaries between the new trust farms and neighboring white-owned property.<sup>33</sup> By 1948, protective works had begun on Onverwacht to help prevent soil erosion, and stock had been reduced to conform with carrying capacity.<sup>34</sup> Changes were restricted to the southern side of the Mngeni River. Members of the Gcumisa removed to the north of the river forced laborers off the land with assegais and firearms.<sup>35</sup> Work began on Goedverwaching in 1950. The developments included the construction of training and contour banks to protect arable lands from erosion and the beaoning of these into three-acre allotments. Residential areas were divided into one-acre sites. Fencing circumscribed agricultural and grazing lands, as well as the new boundary between Goedverwaching trust farm and the strip of Goedverwaching kept by the Ferreiras. A new road enabled access to the lower portion of the farm without destroying grazing land. A new dip tank, better located near the road and grazing sites, was constructed. Two African rangers were employed to oversee the farm.<sup>36</sup>

Resistance to these betterment changes at Table Mountain was minimal at this point, possibly due to the preexisting stresses of the forced removals. But that local residents did not welcome cattle culling measures was made clear. Goge Balothi, a young boy at the time, remembers when the white agricultural overseer, whom the locals called Mqangabhodwe (possibly officer Karg, most likely because he was tall and lanky like the tall, jointed *Panicum proliferum* grass after which he was nicknamed), came to manage the trust farm. Balothi's father worked as a labor tenant for Mattison and then for Mqangabhodwe. Mqangabhodwe came with tractors to divide the land into plots and ordered the culling of cattle. "Mqangabhodwe informed our fathers that they were supposed to get rid of some of their cattle so that each person must be left with five because they had too much livestock. They refused to do what Mqangabhodwe wanted them to do but in the end they did as they were told. They cut their livestock to that certain amount, even my father did that."<sup>37</sup>

By the time the removals were completed in 1951, the land had been transformed. This impacted how trust farm residents, old and new, could use the space they now occupied—where they located their homesteads, grazed their cattle, and grew crops.

**FIGURE 14 (opposite).** Betterment Plan for Goedverwaching, showing residential, arable, and grazing areas, 1948. PHOTOGRAPH COURTESY OF NATIONAL ARCHIVES REPOSITORY, NTS 3244, 814/307.

## Removals, Allegiances, and the Territorialization of Authority

While the records regarding land negotiations and betterment planning document these processes in detail, they do not speak to the removals themselves or show how individual sites were allocated. The oral testimonies of several who relocated, or whose families relocated, suggest people made decisions based on the availability of land and their existing chiefly allegiances. The disruptions and stresses of displacement are compounded in cases of forced resettlement by the feeling of powerlessness arising out of compulsion.<sup>38</sup> The ability to plan a move and choose the time of leaving affects the ability of those resettled to recover from the move.<sup>39</sup> Resettlement, whether voluntary or compulsory, and its consequences are often analyzed according to a broad range of predictable responses because the stress of relocation limits the coping responses of those displaced. Anthropologists Thayer Scudder and Elizabeth Colsen systemize the early stages of this process according to the planning phase, in which the government organizes the removal, and the transition stage, in which the communities become involved and actually move. During the transition phase, people adopt a conservative stance to reduce stress. They cope by falling back on the range of adaptive strategies with which they are familiar.<sup>40</sup> However, different categories—male, female, elder, youth, impoverished, etc.—within the group to remove also affect how individuals experience the resettlement.

While residents along the Mngeni had long been aware of the pending relocation—since the start of negotiations in 1935—notices to remove did not always specify dates by which to do so, contributing to an inability to plan far in advance. Choosing which sites on the trust farms or electing to relocate onto location land may have enabled those ejected from the dam site some degree of control over their displacement. In seeking out coping strategies, they relied upon the cultural inheritance of *ukukhonza*. As people moved to make way for the dam, commitment to existing personal allegiances contributed to the territorialization of chiefly authority.

The initial removals of homesteads took place to make way for the road, reservoir, and aqueduct. Construction on the road to the dam from the N3 had begun months earlier and largely required land under use for agriculture. Those affected by the road construction, nearly two hundred homesteads, were compensated at £3 per dwelling and £1 per quarter acre of field. A few homesteads were relocated short distances from their existing sites to make way for the throughway. Although at this stage all involved initially agreed to the recommended compensation, several

homestead heads later contested the amounts based on trees or dwellings they believed had been overlooked. Local Africans employed for the road excavation work at 2s per day with food, quarters, beer, and Saturday meat almost immediately downed tools and demanded more money. The men continued to refuse work and the contractor replaced them with workers from Durban at 1/8s per day.<sup>41</sup> Those not in the way of the reservoir and aqueduct were not forced from the dam site until the end of the project.

There is little in the records to suggest how people moved if they were impacted by the construction of the reservoir and aqueduct. A 1959 reclamation report for Onverwacht suggests the removals onto this farm, purchased and planned prior to Goedverwaching, took place in a haphazard fashion, with no oversight over where families relocated. Those who moved onto Onverwacht built homesteads on residential sites of their choice—and some outside of the residential areas.<sup>42</sup> One Maphumulo headman, Amos Ndlela, grew up in Estingeni on Onverwacht and stressed his father's freedom to move as he pleased: "When whites [Bob Mattison] left the place where the school is at [Onverwacht], they said our fathers can choose any places to stay because they were leaving."<sup>43</sup> Ndlela's father relocated to Estingeni, from which Africans had been evicted when Mattison bought the farm.

The last stage of removal, the largest numbering eighty-five homesteads, took place in mid-1950 and is better documented. While the relocations involved people under Maphumulo, Gcumisa, and Mdluli chiefs, the records suggest officials worked primarily through Acting Chief Sigciza Maphumulo to effect the removal of the last residents at the dam site—possibly because he was the only chief to be relocated—and that he was of great assistance. Ndlovu Maphumulo died in 1949. Native affairs officials considered his heir, Funizwe, too immature to take over the chieftaincy and appointed Sigciza as *ibambabukhosi* (a regent, one expected to carry out the duties of office on behalf of the heir) in his stead.<sup>44</sup> At the same time, the reputation of the new acting Gcumisa chief may have factored into the nature of the removal. Chief Matshikiyana Gcumisa died in 1943 and NAD officials felt the chieftom was in a state of disorder under Acting Chief Folweni Gcumisa. Folweni was first warned regarding his administration in 1946; an official inquiry in 1949 resulted in his dismissal in March 1950. A headman governed the chieftom until July, when Muziwempi Gcumisa was appointed as acting chief for the heir, Kufakwezwe.<sup>45</sup>

Sigciza requested the Durban Corporation pay those slated for removal in advance so they could meet all necessary expenses. He negotiated lorries to aid his

people in the move. The NAD agricultural section provided a three-ton truck and the NAD advanced funds for the petrol, oil, and driver's wages for the relocation a distance of six miles. Sigciza's role in securing transportation and early payment may have influenced some not originally affiliated with him to move onto the new farm south of the Mngeni into his jurisdiction—particularly any Gcumisa subject frustrated with the disorder of Folweni—though the native commissioner's requisition on his behalf makes clear the representation was on behalf of Sigciza and “his people who are moving with him.”<sup>46</sup>

That personal affiliations of *ukukhonza* shaped the decisions of those relocated emerged in oral accounts when people described the places to which they and their families had moved. Sigciza built his new homestead on Goedverwachting, and the heir Funizwe and his family chose land on Onverwacht south of the Mngeni River. Bongumuzi Mbhele, born in 1953 at KwaNonzila (an area near the Nonzila Stream and 1882 boundary between the Maphumulo and Nyavu), remembers learning about the removal: “I heard that people were moved from Mhlabamakhosi next to the Mngeni because white people came to build a dam—in such a way that they even put a wire fence up to separate people from the dam. In that matter, some people moved to a place called Mbava and others moved to Ezinembeni.”<sup>47</sup> Phumzile Mathonsi, a young woman at the time of the removal, recalls: “White people moved us to Nyaninga because they said we would mess with the water if we continued staying next to the dam.”<sup>48</sup> Fihlizwe Zondi, a Nyavu elder and one of the few Nyavu to address the removal, explained it thus:

They would move them to underdeveloped areas, as you see now we are staying under the cliffs. The big part of KwaSwayimane belongs to us, such as the Nagle Dam part. The Nagle Dam belongs to the Nyavu. But then they split it and part of it belongs to KwaSwayimane. When white people came to build the dam, they moved people who stayed over there. So those people were moved; some went to Mbambangalo because that area was already offered to Maguzu [Maphumulo] . . . So after all that removal of people, some of them came to build their houses at KwaNyavu.<sup>49</sup>

All of these individuals identify places of relocation not only on the trust farms, but also on Inanda Location.

The Mngeni River, cutting through the farms, remained the dividing boundary between the Pietermaritzburg and New Hanover districts and between the territory

of the Maphumulo and Gcumisa chiefs. Mbava was situated on Inanda Location, north of the Mngeni and in Gcumisa jurisdiction. Ezinembeni, Nyanninga, and Maqongqo were on Onverwacht and Aasvogel Krans. Sigciza oversaw the relocation of Maphumulo followers onto these farms south of the Mngeni into his territory, particularly into Ezinembeni and Maqongqo. While there is no archival evidence suggesting the acting Gcumisa chief directed Gcumisa followers onto the small portion of Onverwacht north of the river, Mbhele's testimony suggests that some chose to move onto crowded location land at Mbava to maintain connections with the Gcumisa chiefly line.<sup>50</sup> The CNC confirmed this preference of Gcumisa followers when he refused Goedverwachting as an alternate to Onverwacht early in the land negotiation stages. He acknowledged that to move Gcumisa homesteads south of the river would require them to transfer allegiance: "It was almost impossible to accommodate one chief's people on one side of the river without calling on them to become members of other tribes."<sup>51</sup> Zondi's testimony also describes how the Nyavu homesteads forced to remove opted to move into the crowded location, rather than on the farm where they would have to transfer allegiance. These movements would reduce intermingling and contribute to territorialized authority, though in areas such as Nyanninga—where the ward seemingly encompassed both sides of the river—the jurisdiction was unclear. Several Gcumisa and Maphumulo men remembered conflict in the region as late as the 1970s over which chief controlled the ward.<sup>52</sup>

By August 1951, the relocations from the dam site were complete. The forced removals onto these fenced farms bounded the Maphumulo chiefdom for the first time. Their boundary had already been marked between the Gcumisa and Nyavu on location land—the Nonzila Stream and Mngeni River. Combined with the fenced farms, these borders circumscribed the chiefdom. Simanga Mkhize was born at Mhlabamakhosi at the site of the Nagle Dam. He was a young man at the time, but recognized this transformation:

At the time we stayed at Mhlabamakhosi there above the Mngeni River. We moved away from there because they wanted to build the dam. We stayed on top and they built the dam at the bottom. They said they have to clean the water, so all the houses above were supposed to move to Ferreira's farm, Mr. Ferreira, Naartjies [Igantius] Ferreira. They showed those farms, the other was Bob Mattison's farm. Bob's farm was right there by Msunduzi, then goes around up to Saduma's sugarcane field, Nkanyezini . . . those farms were boundaries.<sup>53</sup>

Those who moved contributed to the territorialization of authority, as did this implicit bounding of the Maphumulo chief's jurisdiction.

While these individual decisions to move to Mbava, KwaNyavu, and the trust farms may have given the relocatees some sense of power over the nature of the removal, the flooding and fencing of their former homes and lands was ultimately a forced alienation. The construction of the dam with the forced removal was what human geographer Yi-Fu Tuan describes as an “untoward event” that intrudes on human lives and commands attention.<sup>54</sup> The dam became a marker of time for many, who in oral history interviews told time before and after its existence.<sup>55</sup> The relocation involved an exchange of space that white officials saw as more than equitable. Those removed experienced physical, spatial transformations as a result of the exchange and betterment planning.

But there were social alterations unaccounted for by white officials in the exchange. Some of the people removed were now disconnected from land in which they had buried their ancestors—this may have been only parents or grandparents, for some had moved into the regions after that advent of colonial rule, but alienating nonetheless. This denial of land to which they were historically connected made those removed feel the trust farms had been given to them. Both men and women had knowledge about how new wards were named to reflect the removal. Ndoda Gwala, a headman for several Maphumulo regents and chiefs, asserted: “When they removed [Chief] Ndlovu [Maphumulo] they bought him land for his chiefdom.”<sup>56</sup> Siphwiwe Maphumulo agreed that the government bought the two farms for “Maguzu’s clan” and “Mbambangalo residents.”<sup>57</sup> As the Maphumulo followers had earlier named Mbambangalo, they also named their new land. One current headman explained how the Maqongqo ward came to be named: “Baba Myeza was staying there [at Onverwacht where the labor tenants lived while the farm was under Mattison’s control] and then he moved to the bush in Nyaninga *isigodi* there at the Mngeni because everyone was allowed to build houses anywhere. His name remained there because his name was Maqongqo and the place was named after him, Maqongqo Myeza.”<sup>58</sup> Fikelephi Sibisi, whose father moved from the dam site when he was young, moved onto Onverwacht. She explained: “They moved to a place called Ezinembeni; this place was called Ezinembeni because there were numbers.”<sup>59</sup> Sibisi describes how they named the ward after the numbered concrete beacons that marked off residential and arable plots. The Maphumulo that moved onto Onverwacht and Goedverwachting named their new space, making it a place

of their own. In future contests over land in the region, this exchange of land for the dam made many Maphumulo members feel the land had been given to them.

While Maphumulo members today identify the farms as being given to them in return for land at the dam, Gcumisa and Nyavu also see the dam site as stolen territory. *Inkosi* Prince Gcumisa saw the land exchange as unfair. “Nagle Dam is under Swayimane’s chiefdom. It was taken from Chief Matshikiyana but we never got any payment for the dam.” Gcumisa elder Muzingaye Gcumisa expressed suspicion about the loss: “We have no idea what exactly happened when they built Mngeni Dam.”<sup>60</sup> The Nyavu saw the exchange as just another denial of the land they lost by the creation of the Gcumisa and Maphumulo chiefdoms.<sup>61</sup> Few Nyavu interviewees spoke to personal or family memories of the removal as Maphumulo followers did. This is likely because fewer Nyavu were relocated, with the concentration of the chiefdom living farther east and south. The encroachment upon their territory had already occurred.

## Conclusion

The construction of the Nagle Dam, the resultant forced removals, and accompanying betterment planning changed the daily lives of Table Mountain’s residents. The removals, more than any previous boundaries or policies, contributed to the territorialization of chiefly authority and changed how they could live within that space. Those who moved south of the dam site would *khonza* the Maphumulo chief, whether they had before or not. But those moved also used knowledge about chiefly allegiances to make decisions about where to move. Accounts suggest that some chose to move onto location land at Mbava to stay under the rule of the Gcumisa and others moved into Ngangezwe’s location land to maintain their allegiance with the Nyavu chief. For the first time, the Maphumulo chiefdom was now firmly circumscribed. Their boundaries had already been marked on location land with the Gcumisa and Nyavu; now the fences of the newly purchased Goedverwaching and Onverwacht farms completed the process. The implementation of betterment schemes—the culling of cattle, the contouring of land, and the allocation of separate sites for grazing, agriculture, and residency—contributed to a sense of loss of their former freedom to organize their lives as they pleased on location land. But at the same time, this loss made the Maphumulo feel the trust farms had



been given to them in return—they named the wards Maqongqo and Ezinembeni to mark this change.

But this Maphumulo connection to their new territory was not uncontested. The Nyavu chief Somquba attempted to claim Goedverwachting—the same farm his father had attempted to purchase a decade earlier—to settle his own followers who refused to move to areas outside of his jurisdiction. The tensions caused by overcrowding on the location and the transfer of land that many considered their own certainly contributed to a violent conflict between the Nyavu and Maphumulo in 1937.

As the South African government transitioned into the apartheid era, many at Table Mountain had already rebuilt or had begun to remake their homesteads on Onverwacht and Goedverwachting and the overcrowded location. The imposition of apartheid would bring further interference in their daily lives with additional land planning, formalized boundaries, and the reorganization of chiefdoms as tribal authorities. The territorialization of authority that implicitly bounded people during the removal became complete with the legal proclamation of boundaries when tribal authorities were established at Table Mountain in the 1950s.

# He Said He Wanted the Tribe to Decide

## Boundaries and Betterment, 1948–1971

The Chief [Bangubukhosi Mdluli] stated that it was not for him to decide whether the tribe was opposed to Tribal Authorities or in favour. He said that he wanted the tribe to decide.

—Pietermaritzburg Bantu Affairs Commissioner C. C. Mynhardt, report on the Manyavu Tribal Authority to Chief Bantu Affairs Commissioner V.P. Ahrens, 1962

**T**he desire to maintain personal ties of *ukukhonza* contributed to the territorialization of authority at Table Mountain—a process that was concretized with the implementation of Bantu Authorities in the 1950s. In early 1955, the Maphumulo regent Siggiza Maphumulo and Nyavu chief Nongalaza Mdluli and their headmen elected to accept the apartheid system of Bantu Authorities. But over the next twenty years, the chiefs and regents of these communities failed to implement the system and its policies as rural resistance spread both locally and across the country.

People's attitudes to Bantu Authorities and the responsible chiefs changed over time and depended on not only one's status in the community but also on the particular tenets of the system being enforced. As Native Affairs officials committed to a new wave of betterment projects as part of Bantu Authorities, the forced

removal of Maphumulo members onto agriculturally planned trust farms—places made their own by the land exchange—shaped how they saw new interventions into their daily lives. They believed this interference broke the promises made to them during the relocation. Their neighbors, the Nyavu, more fiercely resisted the efforts to start betterment schemes on reserve land. This opposition was not to development in general, but to particular components of betterment planning that forced labor upon men and women, redesigned access to land, and threatened the health of herds. This opposition drew Table Mountain residents into national struggles against white minority rule, more so than in any of the earlier African political movements. They began to connect their local struggles against free labor and stock regulations to national campaigns against pass laws and exorbitant taxes. Africans still used knowledge about *ukukhonza* to demand accountability, but the language of expectations was transforming. Increasingly, rural subjects expected chiefs to respect their rights and to join them in resistance to apartheid. While the territorialization of chiefly authority had been completed, the resistance of women at Table Mountain acted as a check on the Maphumulo and Nyavu chiefs.

## Bantu Authorities: African Administration during Apartheid

In 1948, the National Party (NP) of D. F. Malan won the election with campaign promises of apartheid—separate development for so-called racial groups. An increase in African urbanization accompanied the post-war expansion of South African manufacturing and industrialization. The NP won a narrow election, elected by white South Africans threatened by African competition in the city and angered about the loss of control over African farm workers. Building on segregationist policies with a greater degree of ideological fervor, the NP built a political system that intruded on every aspect of African life with concepts of separate development of African “nations” in ways that earlier segregation did not. Legislation such as the Prohibition of Mixed Marriages, Immorality Act, Population Registration Act, Group Areas Act, Bantu Education Act, and Reservation of Separate Amenities Act transformed the lives of Africans. South African society was divided according to rigid categories of white, Coloured, Indian, and Native/Bantu—the latter further divided into ten separate “tribes” or “nations.”

Apartheid was forged through a series of struggles within and beyond the state in several phases—not according to a single grand plan.<sup>1</sup> The 1948 election

did not mark a decisive break from the past; significant continuities between segregation and apartheid can be seen in a number of central themes that came to define apartheid, including urban labor controls, planned urban locations, and the conversion of reserves into Bantustans. While significant changes in these policies did occur, they were spread out across the 1950s and introduced inconsistently thereafter. The most arresting feature of apartheid was its dispersal into everyday life. Sociologist Ivan Evans aptly wrote, “After 1948, virtually every aspect of [African] lives was subjected to the intrusive hands of clerks, bureaucrats, and administrators of one sort or another.”<sup>2</sup>

Native administrators after 1948 moved away from the paternalist and gradualist ethos of the segregation years and came to dominate apartheid policy. The urgency of the so-called “Native question” brought about by increasing African urbanization enabled the Native Affairs Department (NAD), hitherto less prestigious or developed, to dominate the design of apartheid policies. The NAD grew in importance and size, including two assistant ministers appointed in 1951 (no comparable positions existed elsewhere in government). The NAD usurped control of African housing, labor, and the reserves from other departments, setting the stage for the NAD to become a “state within a state.”<sup>3</sup> The department also reorganized in 1954 into a highly centralized structure with subdivisions, new managerial positions, and lines of communication to connect the new system. While never completely successful in centralizing power, the department was markedly more authoritarian than during the segregation years when the local “man on the spot” often held control.<sup>4</sup> In 1958, the NAD split into two departments, the Department of Bantu Administration and Development (BAD) and the Department of Bantu Education.<sup>5</sup>

The NAD initially pursued a “practical” attitude to apartheid that postponed fully separate development for future generations. Only in the 1960s did the department fully launch the program of social engineering that sought to deny Africans citizenship and (re)tribalize them—forcefully removing them to ethnicized Bantustans (the reserves). During this second phase of apartheid, the BAD turned to the development of the reserves as a central component of establishing separate “nations” and preventing further African urbanization. The major impetus for the restructuring of these urban policies was the escalation of African resistance in the townships that peaked in 1960 after the Sharpeville massacre, in which police opened fire on peaceful protestors.<sup>6</sup>

While officials had planned trust farms prior to apartheid, the development of the reserves had been neglected prior to the 1960s due to conflict within

Afrikanerdom over the findings of the Tomlinson Commission for Socio-Economic Development of the Bantu Areas of South Africa. NAD appointed the Tomlinson Commission in 1950 to create a plan for the rehabilitation of the reserves that could enable separate development. In 1954, the NAD announced a new system of betterment operating in three phases: stabilization of the soil, reclamation of natural resources, and rehabilitation (the achievement of a self-sufficient farming class by removing non-farmers from arable land). Later that year, the Tomlinson Commission tabled its report that focused government attention on the last of those stages, rehabilitation. The commission recognized that agriculture was part of the wider “native question” and advocated for a transformation of the reserves into modern economies capable of constraining African urbanization. Its report explained the failures of previous agricultural programs by pointing to the lack of arable land and African attitudes toward land and livestock. The commission accepted separate development, and its land-use plan proposal was quite similar to the existing betterment schemes, providing for residential units divided into plots, arable lands divided into units, and common grazing grounds. But unlike the previous betterment system, the commission recommended a more rigorous division of rural populations into landless groups and “progressive farmers.” The number of families settled as farmers should not exceed the number of viable “economic farming units.” The notion of an economic unit entailed that a family should have access to an amount of arable land and grazing that would provide it with a minimum annual income of £60. Viable agriculture could be achieved by removing surplus peoples into rural villages or “closer settlements.” The report recommended the freehold title to the land and provision of credit, market facilities, and agricultural extension staff to assist farmers, and the development of secondary and tertiary industries to employ those settled in rural villages.<sup>7</sup> Such ambitious plans were part of a growing commitment to “development” and post-war confidence in colonial and apartheid ability to plan and direct African societies in southern Africa.<sup>8</sup>

Apartheid pragmatists expressed concern about the impingement of the reserves on Afrikaner businesspersons, white workers, and white farmers.<sup>9</sup> White farmer opposition to competition from peasant farmers, as well as the extension of reserve lands and government commitment to the administration of rural populations through existing “tribal structures,” resulted in a lack of dedication to the reserves on the part of NAD. The proposals of the commission were only partially implemented and funding for items crucial to the success of the recommended

rural villages—industry—was withheld. The native affairs minister aimed merely to confine the African population “surplus” to the labor needs of white areas. Additionally, land acquisition enabled by the 1936 Natives Trust and Land Act took place at a sluggish rate. In practice, locations were still divided into residential, arable, and grazing areas, but no people were to be removed. This meant that few families received enough land to farm and graze stock. Land unsuitable for cultivation was removed from use. The commission had not considered what would happen with families who received half units and reverted to migrant labor.<sup>10</sup> Despite the limited implementation of the Tomlinson Commission’s recommendations, Chris de Wet estimates that from the 1950s onward, at least three million Africans were moved as part of villagization schemes.<sup>11</sup> While the removals have not been concretely quantified, in scale, these localized removals within the reserves were greater than any other type under the apartheid era.<sup>12</sup>

Economic viability and reclamation were sacrificed in the interests of the new system of African administration, Bantu Authorities.<sup>13</sup> The Bantu Authorities Act of 1951 promised to grant Africans greater authority in an illusion of decentralization and false autonomy. It tied chiefs to a failing economic development system where their people had no economic prospects in the reserves and few chances of entering the urban labor market.<sup>14</sup> The division of South Africa into African and white spheres was further fragmented into “tribal sovereignties.” The act made provision for three levels of administration for Africans at the tribal, regional, and territorial levels. Tribal authorities consisted of a chief with councilors; they were granted administrative, executive, and judicial powers. A chief could appoint half of his council, subject to state approval, while the state nominated the other half. Regional authorities exercised control over two or more areas with tribal authorities, and governed the establishment and maintenance of educational and health institutions, public works, and agricultural and stock affairs. The highest tier—territorial authorities—governed over two or more regional authorities. These held the same powers as regional authorities but also powers relating to the administration of Africans as prescribed by law.<sup>15</sup> What Minister for Native Affairs Hendrik Verwoerd called an imitation of “traditional tribal democracy” was widely recognized as a farce.<sup>16</sup> The Bantu Authorities system emphasized retribalization—ethnic fragmentation—over racial division.

One year after the election of the NP, the ANC Youth League voted in a new president more sympathetic to their calls for mass action, James Moroka. The ANC adopted a Programme of Action to challenge apartheid. A National Day of Protest

in 1950 and the 1952 Defiance Campaign relied upon cooperation of the ANC, South African Indian Congress (SAIC), and African People's Organization in organized mass rallies and stay-at-homes. In 1955, delegates from the ANC, the SAIC, the white Congress of Democrats, and the Coloured People's Congress met in a Congress of the People to discuss the Freedom Charter, which called for a nonracial society in which the land should be shared among those who work it. The government responded to opposition with repression. The Suppression of Communism Act defined any action aimed at bringing change to the Union by promotion of disorder as communism; the Public Safety Act enabled the government to declare a state of emergency and suspend all laws. The 1956 Treason Trial kept many leaders of organized opposition out of commission. At Sharpeville in 1960, police killed sixty-nine peaceful demonstrators protesting pass laws. The government declared a state of emergency and outlawed the ANC and the breakaway Pan Africanist Congress that had begun the anti-pass campaign. In South Africa's rural areas, like its settler state sibling Rhodesia and other British colonies in Africa, state intervention in the countryside via development schemes fueled rural participation in anticolonial struggles. While initial rural resistance in the 1930s and 1940s was directed solely at betterment, the new phase of resistance to betterment was combined with these larger national protests against apartheid. This rural resistance helped inspire a small group of men and women centered around Nelson Mandela and several ANC-tied Communist allies to move the struggle towards violence and launch Umkhonto weSizwe (MK).<sup>17</sup>

Chiefs, tied to despised betterment programs through Bantu Authorities, found themselves in precarious situations. In some cases, chiefs continued to attempt to serve the interests of their people as best they could under the new system. Rural resentment was not always transferred to the institution of chieftainship itself, but toward corrupt chiefs and councilors.<sup>18</sup> Rural African populations resented the turning of chiefs into a network of puppets to implement unpopular apartheid laws. Across South Africa, a range of responses by chiefs and to chiefly authority emerged in rural resistance movements. The Lingangele movement in the Witsieshoek reserve attempted to maintain the integrity of the chieftaincy, even when they rejected the chief for his unwillingness to resist Bantu Authorities. In Dinokana of the Tswana reserves, the deposed Chief Moiloa acted more akin to the chiefs examined here, treading a cautious path.<sup>19</sup> Sensitive to public feeling but aware of their precarious positions, these leaders neither eagerly cooperated nor openly resisted. They recognized the potential for their dismissal by the apartheid government or rejection by their people, the former of which resulted from Chief Albert Luthuli's support for the ANC and the latter of which occurred in Mpondoland and

Xhalanga.<sup>20</sup> Luthuli, elected to the chieftaincy of the Groutville mission community in 1935, became president of the Natal ANC in 1951 and oversaw organization of the 1952 Defiance Campaign in Natal. While the chief native commissioner believed Luthuli's involvement in the campaign contradicted his role as chief and dismissed him, Luthuli attributed his membership in the ANC to the chieftaincy: "I was in Congress not in spite of being a chief, but partly, anyway, *because* of the things to which chieftainship opened my eyes." His followers, too, proclaimed they desired their chief to be in the ANC.<sup>21</sup> He became the national president of the ANC.

## Compulsion and Desire: Consultation and Development at Table Mountain

Recent historical work on development in Africa in the post-war era suggests the need to pay close attention to the ideology and context that shape particular projects.<sup>22</sup> As NAD officials doubled down on betterment to develop the reserves, stem African urbanization, and implement the separate development of ethnicized African "nations," African responses to the intertwined Bantu Authorities system and betterment planning were nuanced and changed over time. Regents, whose governance of chiefdoms was far from secure, felt particularly compelled to adopt apartheid policy. The headmen and homestead heads who shaped the decisions of their chiefs and regents announced desires for educational and economic opportunities. Those who had already experienced the effects of betterment on the trust farms made clear their rejection of stock culling, fencing, and residential site planning.

To convince African leaders to cooperate with Bantu Authorities, the NAD undertook a rigorous propaganda campaign that was received with mixed reactions. Even before the creation of its Information Service Department in 1952, the NAD embarked on a series of conferences for chiefs and headmen under the banner of "Promotion of Efficiency of Chiefs and Headmen." In Natal in February 1951, the NAD staged a four-day conference in Eshowe where officials lectured nearly fifty chiefs on agricultural matters, hygiene, and law. Speeches played on the perceived fears and desires of the chiefs concerning loss of status and control, as well as on aspirations for education. Writing of the chiefs' response to the first conferences in Natal, Melmoth Native Commissioner O. C. Oftebro believed the attendees were keen to commence agricultural projects in their areas but were in need of the department's financial assistance to acquire tractors.<sup>23</sup> While Oftebro sensed



the chiefs' openness, they would not have missed the air of compulsion that permeated the conferences.<sup>24</sup> The NAD used another conference at Eshowe in a more explicit attempt to coopt chiefs to Bantu Authorities. Eiselen invited all Zulu chiefs to a special conference in December 1951 where he extolled the virtues of the new administration system. Despite Eiselen's propaganda and speeches about the potential for modernization, the chiefs did not bite. Some delayed, deferring decision until they had discussed the matter with their people, while others raised more critical questions about stock culling, the labor bureau, and payment for authority members. While the chiefs failed to eagerly sign onto the project, they did praise Eiselen's announcement that Cyprian Zulu would finally be recognized by the government as the paramount chief of the Zulus—an acknowledgment denied to his father and grandfather and surely planned to encourage Zulu cooperation.<sup>25</sup> This acknowledgment might also have been in response to the recent loss of the Natal ANC presidency by the more conservative A. W. G. Champion to Luthuli.<sup>26</sup> After the creation of the Information Service Department in 1952, a team toured the country to visit with chiefs and prepare for the establishment of tribal authorities.<sup>27</sup> By 1954, the conferences represented an intensification of NAD efforts to force Africans to capitulate, focusing exclusively on the Bantu Authorities, Bantu Education, and closer settlements.

Although neglected in practice, the idea of the economic farming unit continued to play an important ideological role in propaganda that touted development. At each of these conferences and in their propagandistic publications such as *Bantu* and the African-language serials such as the isiZulu *Inthuthuko* and *Izindaba*, officials promoted concepts of the "progressive farmer," the "progressive chief," and individuals who should get training, irrigation, and capital input to help their agricultural efforts. The content of "progressive" and "development" advocated by the apartheid state differed from African ideas. By the 1980s, many Africans saw "progressive chiefs" as those who resisted apartheid. "Development" in the form of education, roads, and amenities was welcomed at Table Mountain, but the manner in which betterment planning forced labor, dipping, culling, and redivision of the land was not.

While the NAD's Information Service team toured the country, regulations for tribal authorities were promulgated in May 1953 and local NAD officials took up the task of convincing chiefdoms to establish tribal authorities. The extent to which the Bantu Authorities Act even required this consultation and approval via tribal resolution has been the subject of much consideration, particularly around

Mangosuthu Buthelezi, whose status rose with the implementation of Bantu Authorities.<sup>28</sup> The act provided that its implementation could only be preceded by consultation with the people. On the other hand, the atmosphere of compulsion at the conferences and the later ascendancy of C. B. Young in the NAD saw the displacement of Eiselen's propaganda in favor of authoritarian tactics.<sup>29</sup>

At Table Mountain, Pietermaritzburg Native Commissioner C. J. D. Nel, who commenced the position in 1955, undertook this consultation. The Maphumulo chiefdom was then divided over the appointment of a regent to act for the minor heir. Funizwe Maphumulo had taken over as chief from the regent Sigciza Maphumulo in 1952 but died of tuberculosis two years later. There would be no debate over an heir, as Funizwe had only one wife, Ma Mdlalose, and two young sons, Mhlabunzima and Kwenzokuhle.<sup>30</sup> But a contentious debate did ensue over who would act as regent for Mhlabunzima, only four at the time.

This contest needs to be considered in some depth, because it made the chosen regent more vulnerable to pressure from apartheid officials and because several of those involved played central roles in the chiefdom outside of this dispute. Headmen, Maphumulo members, and then Pietermaritzburg Native Commissioner F. de Souza gathered in late 1954 to nominate a regent. Factions formed around two nominees, Baniangi Maphumulo and the previous regent Sigciza. *Umndeni* (family) member Mpini Maphumulo and headman Lugagadu Ntuli first nominated Baniangi, whom they described as the highest-ranking of three brothers of the late Funizwe. Several others spoke in favor of Baniangi, born out of wedlock to Ma Mnyeni and Chief Ndlovu Maphumulo and given to Ndlovu's childless second wife Ma Ntuli to raise as her own.

But several others objected to the *umndeni's* nomination of Baniangi. Those who spoke against Baniangi's nomination did so vehemently and for several reasons. They protested because the *umndeni* had not consulted them but also because they believed Baniangi was ineligible for the position, given his ancestry. Zofa Gumede positioned himself as a member of the chiefdom versus those of the "Maphumulo family" who had made the decision without consulting them. Headman Muziwakhe Mhlangu explained why they believed Baniangi's nomination was unusual: "I say it is strange that a man who is the son of a woman who was not even married to the late Chief Ndhlovu should be appointed as Regent . . . The majority of the tribe say that the present Acting Chief Sigciza is the right man to be appointed as Regent during the minority of Funizwe's heir." De Souza took a vote and the *umndeni*, headmen, and Maphumulo members present voted in favor of Baniangi by a narrow margin of

sixty-five to sixty-two. De Souza stated that Sigciza would act until the government approved Baniŋgi's nomination and warned against conflict that might erupt on account of the decision.<sup>31</sup>

De Souza recommended Baniŋgi's appointment to the chief native commissioner. Sigciza was nearly seventy years old and not likely to survive the duration of the heir's adolescence. Baniŋgi was then twenty-nine, married, gainfully employed in Pietermaritzburg, and maintaining Funizwe's family. Ma Mdlalose herself expressed her favor for Baniŋgi.<sup>32</sup> Only five years earlier, Ndlovu's wives had fervently objected to Sigciza's nomination, and the zeal with which some backed Baniŋgi suggests the family still held ill feelings toward Sigciza. Because the record does not reflect the names of all who voted, it cannot be known for certain whether the count reflected the division that Zofa Gumede claimed, one between the *umndeni* and chiefdom. But three of those who spoke in favor of Baniŋgi were of the Maphumulo *isibongo* (surname).<sup>33</sup>

Despite both the *umndeni* and native commissioner's recommendation, Secretary of Native Affairs T. F. Coertze would not recommend Baniŋgi's appointment on such a narrow margin of votes. The potential for conflict between the factions was a great concern of the officials involved. When Baniŋgi appeared before the new Native Commissioner Nel in January 1955 to ask for advice regarding his claim to the regency, Nel advised Baniŋgi to drop the claim on account of his heritage. Nel claimed it was "unknown in Native Law and Custom" that an illegitimate son could oust other lawful claimants, explaining that Baniŋgi had not been included when Ndlovu listed his heirs prior to his death.<sup>34</sup> Two weeks later, Baniŋgi returned to Nel's office to abandon his claim. He told Nel he would support Sigciza's appointment and asked that a meeting of headmen be called so he could make the announcement. At the February 1955 meeting, Baniŋgi informed them of his withdrawal and most threw their support behind Sigciza. One of Baniŋgi's original supporters, headman Seni Mlaba, agreed to as well but remained adamant that the widows of Ndlovu and Funizwe be informed first. Those headmen who wished to consult the people and those who expressed concern that doing so would cause bloodshed debated the matter, but Nel concluded that since all had agreed to support Sigciza, the appointment would be recommended.<sup>35</sup>

Before the meeting was closed, Nel took the opportunity to introduce the Bantu Authorities Act. As with earlier legislation that allowed for the manipulation of chiefly authority, the act enabled NAD officials to reward or demote those who did not cooperate. But as the regent Sigciza considered the Maphumulo chiefdom's

position on Bantu Authorities, he faced a new level of coercion. He likely witnessed the propaganda and cooption at the December 1951 conference and could not have missed the wave of depositions taking place across the country.<sup>36</sup> By February 1955, the *New Age* reported that chiefs who opposed the culling of stock had been deposed or banished.<sup>37</sup> Between 1950 and 1956, a total of eight chiefs, four acting chiefs, forty headmen, and six acting headmen were deposed. Between 1955 and 1958, thirty-eight chiefs and headmen were deposed and three deported.<sup>38</sup> Many activists opposed to Bantu Authorities were banished to Natal and Zululand.<sup>39</sup> Given the fresh contestation of his regency, Sigciza's position was far more dependent on the government than the hereditary heir for whom he acted. When Nel introduced Bantu Authorities, Sigciza may have felt particularly compelled to cooperate on account of this contestation.

While Sigciza may have felt pressure to cooperate, the NAD minutes of the Maphumulo meetings on Bantu Authorities in February and March 1955 suggest that he ultimately had the support of at least some of his followers. The regent, headmen, and sixty-five homestead heads also may have bought into some of the department's propaganda—they wanted the promised development. But they were clear at the meeting about those forms of development that they desired. A month after Nel first broached the subject to the Maphumulo, the chiefdom held a meeting with him, Agricultural Officer I. R. Matheson, and Bantu Education Inspector F. B. Oscroft to finalize Sigciza's appointment and to consider the establishment of a tribal authority.

The experience of forced relocation and betterment planning during the construction of the Nagle Dam shaped the reaction of Maphumulo members to the proposed implementation of Bantu Authorities. While the construction of the dam introduced a major development project to Table Mountain, it was not one from which local residents benefited. The construction of the roads to and from the dam improved the mobility of Table Mountain residents, but the betterment planning that accompanied the dam project brought the culling of stock and a redivision of access to land. The presence of the Ferreira farm (the strip of Goedverwachting retained by the Ferreira family when they sold the remnant to the trust) intersecting Maphumulo trust land enabled residents to see firsthand the discrepancies in agricultural policies regarding white and black farmers. Many headmen and other homestead heads present had questions and comments, most important of which were grievances about the restriction of cattle and support for a local school. Their testimonies suggest a declining reliance on the subsistence farming that betterment

would promote. Bedi Mthembu complained: “Our cattle [are] not allowed on the Trust Farm—yet Mr. Ferreira has the right to bring stock on his farm. If I buy any of his stock, I am refused permission to take them onto Trust farms.” Khonzo Madlala also complained about stock regulations and expressed his desire to buy land and start a butchery or plantation. James Msweli stressed the need for another school, because fencing on the trust farm prevented some from attending. Those members of the Maphumulo present expressly stated their support for development—they wanted roads, businesses, commercial farms, and education for their children. But they also made clear that they opposed agricultural projects that limited their ability to farm as they pleased. Sigciza concluded the meeting by declaring: “We want a tribal authority to go into our domestic affairs.”<sup>40</sup> Those present unanimously accepted the act and charged Sigciza to appoint councilors. Sigciza may have felt pressure to cooperate, but the extent to which headmen and Maphumulo members expressed their support was tied to development—even as they made clear the components of development that they opposed. As several expressed the need for schools, roads, and businesses, their support for the act came from a belief that a tribal authority might bring improvement to their community.

Across the Manzamnyama Stream and the fence marking Inanda Location, educational desires also drove the Nyavu acceptance of a tribal authority. In the same month as the meeting with the Maphumulo, Nel, Ocroft, and a Mr. Skinner met with the elderly Nyavu Chief Nongalaza Mdluli, several headmen, Table Mountain Mission board members, and nearly one hundred other homestead heads representing different Nyavu wards. Unlike Sigciza, Nongalaza did not attend any of the propagandistic conferences.<sup>41</sup> Nel’s notes from the meeting reflect less of an open discussion than that recorded for the Maphumulo. Having not yet experienced the effects of betterment, the Nyavu present did not connect Bantu Authorities with the culling of stock as their neighbors did. Headman Robert Mdluli told those present that education of children was the first priority. They had heard rumors about the shortcomings of Bantu Education but told the local missionaries they would accept the new act. Solomon Dlamini asked how they might replace a teacher, suggesting that the state of missionary education on the reserve, one of the smallest and most neglected American Zulu missions, may have influenced the decision to accept Bantu Education and Authorities.<sup>42</sup> Nongalaza expressed his own favor and another concluded they did not want to be left behind.<sup>43</sup> The Maphumulo and Nyavu were two of the earliest Natal chiefdoms to establish Bantu Authorities.

## The Bounding of Chiefdoms and Division of the Overcrowded Land

The creation of the Maphumulo and Nyavu Tribal Authorities marked the complete bounding of the chiefdoms, but not necessarily the end of the expectations that resulted from *ukukhonzisa*. In addition to concrete boundaries, the tribal authorities brought new betterment plans for the trust farms Onverwacht and Goedverwachting. These saw the purchase of additional land in the region for African settlement, but this territory was given to neither tribal authority and was envisioned for the construction of a “Bantu village” into which surplus peoples could be moved.


The formal establishment of the authorities had been delayed until a point-by-point description of land under each chiefdom could be obtained for the official announcement in the government gazette and it could be decided in which district the proposed authorities would fall.<sup>44</sup> By 1956, only thirty-two tribal authorities had been officially proclaimed across the country (none in KwaZulu/Natal)—less than 6 percent of chiefs and headmen. By the time Paramount Chief Cyprian Zulu accepted Bantu Authorities in April 1957, only sixteen tribal authorities had been established in KwaZulu/Natal.<sup>45</sup> In December 1957, Cyprian convened a meeting of chiefs at Nongoma to witness the inauguration of his Usuthu Tribal Authority.<sup>46</sup> Only seventy-two of Natal’s 288 chiefs attended. Deputy Chairman of the Native Affairs Commission M. de Wet Nel presented the paramount chief with £1,000 for the tribal council to be formed, a safe, and a bull. Those attending reacted with anger when de Wet Nel was presented with a Zulu shield and assegai. A group of women refused to sing when asked to do so; “they could not sing, they said, when *their rights* had just been sold for £1,000, a bull and a safe” (my emphasis). Others left after speeches, refusing to partake in feasting and “muttering and expectorating vigorously to show their disgust.”<sup>47</sup> Formalizing the agreed-upon establishment of the Nyavu and Maphumulo Tribal Authorities would serve—like Cyprian—as an exemplary precedent for other “wait and see” Zulu chiefdoms to follow.

The Nyavu and Maphumulo Tribal Authorities were officially promulgated in July 1957. The gazetting of the Nyavu and Maphumulo Tribal Authorities marked another important transformation to the land. For the first time, the borders of the chiefdom were legally defined. The Maphumulo area included the SANT-owned remnant of Goedverwachting, the SANT-owned portion of Onverwacht and Aasvogel Krans on the Pietermaritzburg side of the Mngeni River boundary between the Pietermaritzburg and New Hanover magisterial districts, and the small portion of

Inanda Location marked by the earlier boundary decision at the Manzamnyama Stream near the corner of Table Mountain. The Nyavu area encompassed the whole of the Table Mountain Mission Reserve (excluding the American Zulu Mission glebe in the mission reserve) and the portion of the Inanda Location bounded by the Mngeni and Msunduze rivers (see map 7). The Maphumulo could appoint twelve to eighteen councilors and the Nyavu nine to fifteen.<sup>48</sup>

But the legal definition of the chiefly boundaries was not the only change to the land at Table Mountain during the early apartheid era. While the initial meetings approving the adoption of Bantu Authorities at Table Mountain documented local desire for development, they were specific forms of development wanted by the chiefdoms. The fusion of Bantu Authorities with betterment planning was not the development envisioned by members of the chiefdoms. At Table Mountain in 1959, a committee set out the rehabilitation scheme for Onverwacht and Aasvogel Krans trust farms. Their report identified the successes of the initial round of protective work in halting erosion but recognized opportunities to improve on the haphazard settlement and agriculture. The fourteen-page plan in many ways resembled the initial plan for Onverwacht, dividing the farm into residential, agricultural, and grazing allotments. But the changes in betterment policy since the initial plans saw an additional division of arable land into ninety-seven economic units for the 198 families living there. In an ideal situation, poor farmers from among the 198 families would be removed to Bantu villages while those skilled in farming would receive full allotments of arable land. Tidbury had previously recommended the purchase of the Ferreras' portions of the Goedverwachting farm for the establishment of a rural township to house non-farmers, but until the land was acquired, there was no place to which these could be relocated. The plan thus divided the available economic units among the families, with the intention of allocating full portions to the "best farmers" and partial portions to the rest. The "worst farmers" would be weeded out and full allotments built up for the former category. The scheme detailed plans for a dairy project, a grazing system, and crop rotation. Those settled on the farm were expected to provide free labor for the erection of fences around the newly redivided arable areas. But the report also recognized obstacles, relating the mood of the peoples on the farm as one of simultaneous agreement and entitlement.

The exchange of trust land for the Nagle Dam project created not only a sense of possession among the Maphumulo, but also the belief that they would not be interfered with again. The moved families resented any intrusion into their lives and the way they had done things on the location prior to removal. As NAD



**MAP 7.** Tribal Authority boundaries at Table Mountain, 1957

officials acknowledged, they “were led to understand that the change over would in no way deprive them of the privileges and mode of life which they had always enjoyed in the location. In other words that the farm would virtually form part of the location.” The Gcumisa showed open hostility toward any development of Onverwacht. They armed themselves against the construction of anti-erosion banks on the New Hanover side of the farm.<sup>49</sup> Goge Balothi recalls the tension when those north of the Mngeni refused betterment planning. “Mqangabhodwe [the NAD agricultural officer] went there [north of the Mngeni] with police and soldiers . . . they were fighting but the white man was also stubborn and he had support from the police and soldiers.”<sup>50</sup> The Gcumisa reduced their stock only when made to do so and only acquiesced to anti-erosion works in 1957. The Onverwacht betterment committee identified the new Maphumulo Tribal Authority as responsible for the




construction and maintenance of all development works in the area, the control of stock—including culling—and the management of grazing and crop rotation.<sup>51</sup>

All of these interferences resented by the people were now the responsibility of their chiefs and tribal authority councilors. A. D. McKay, in the 1959 issue of *Bantu* magazine, explained that it would be the purview of the authority to choose which homesteads could access arable land and which could not: “Since the leaders of the people are in the best position to determine who is who among the farming families, it is desirable that the tribal authority undertake or assist in carrying out the selection process envisaged above [where the most promising farmers get largest units of arable land and ‘bad farmers’ get moved to villages].”<sup>52</sup> Chiefs and tribal councils would have the power to take away access to arable land from certain homestead heads but could offer them little in return. The expected free labor would fall disproportionately upon women whose husbands were migrant laborers.

During the new stage of planning for Onverwacht, overcrowding was of great concern. Despite the purchase of the large Goedverwaching remnant to add to Onverwacht and Aasvogel Krans, population continued to outstrip available land at Table Mountain as sons sought to break away and establish their own homesteads in the region. The neighboring Inanda Location was also grossly congested.<sup>53</sup> Between 1935 and 1955, the number of Maphumulo taxpayers grew from 729 to 1,150 and the Nyavu from 1,014 to 1,340.<sup>54</sup> Such overcrowding was not limited to the Table Mountain region; Tom Lodge notes that between 1955 and 1969, the average population density in the reserves rose from sixty persons per square mile to 110.<sup>55</sup> During the initial phases of the planning, Tidbury recommended the purchase of the Ferréiras’ subdivisions of Goedverwaching to establish a Bantu village to accommodate the growing population and to sort out the farmer from the non-farmer. Negotiations began to buy Goedverwaching portions D, 5, and 6 (see map 8).<sup>56</sup>

Apartheid planners had no shortage of modernizing schemes for this strip of Goedverwaching and scarcity of land available for Africans resulted in conflict over how best to use it. The trust hoped to establish the recommended Bantu village, but additional needs arose. Silt buildup from overcrowding and overgrazing in the region shortened the expected life of the Nagle Dam. The new scheme adopted by the city in 1959 required that those already relocated onto Onverwacht would now be moved again for a second dam. But by 1960, Durban Corporation had abandoned the second Table Mountain project in favor of the Midmar Dam on the Mngeni River to the northwest of Pietermaritzburg. Africans in the region would only be affected by the new aqueduct to carry the water from Midmar to Durban. These



**MAP 8.** Trust acquisition of land at Table Mountain, 1961–1984

disturbances would be significantly less, as the burying of the piping would only temporarily disturb arable land.<sup>57</sup>

When the second Table Mountain dam project fell through, the trust acquired the 1,100 acres of Goedverwachting subdivisions.<sup>58</sup> BAD officials did not initially discuss the jurisdiction of this newly acquired terrain. Envisioned as a Bantu village site, they did not consider the need for chiefly authority on the strip of land dividing the new Maphumulo Tribal Authority. Proclamation R188/1969 reaffirmed the ownership of reserve land in the trust and placed all trust land under the control of Bantu Affairs Commissioners. While commissioners were obliged to consult chiefs and headmen, the proclamation effectively took away chiefly control of land allocation. The proclamation, as Peter Delius argues, was a “powerful statement of the extent to which official forms of tenure had departed from the logic and practice

of land tenure in African societies prior to colonial incorporation.”<sup>59</sup> Despite the shortage of land for African settlement, the BAD did not immediately settle the farm strip or allow the surrounding peoples to expand there.

While Simanga Mkhize first recognized the implicit bounding of the chiefdom during the forced removals onto formerly white farms less than a decade earlier, the gazetting of the tribal authority boundaries gave a legal definition to the chiefly authority of the Maphumulo and Nyavu that would long be referenced by apartheid and post-apartheid officials as evidence in contests over land. The purchase of the remaining strip of Goedverwaching for the settlement of additional Africans *after* the delineation of tribal authority boundaries only fueled additional conflicts over land and authority. A desirable strip of farmland, under the authority of no white farmer or chief, now divided the Maphumulo chiefdom and adjoined the lands of the Nyavu. And just as this land became the object of desire, chiefs became intricately tied to development policies that their followers deeply resented.

## Women’s Resistance, Inactive Authorities, and Chiefly Accountability

With the bounding of the tribal authorities, in the eyes of NAD officials, the transition to territorial authority was complete. Chiefs and their followers could not claim they did not know these boundaries. While this is an important milestone in the definition of authority, it did not erase knowledge about *ukukhonza* and the expectations of personal allegiances. The resistance of the women whose “rights had been sold” and refused to sing at the 1957 establishment of Cyprian’s Usuthu Tribal Authority was just a hint of what was to come at both local and national levels. The coupling of Bantu Authorities with betterment tied chiefs to the unpopular rehabilitation of their territory. While the Maphumulo and Gcumisa trust farms had been originally planned and transformed as part of the Nagle Dam project, Africans there—particularly the women—resisted any further changes to the land they had come to identify as their own as a result of the forced relocations. Unlike the trust farms, Inanda Location had not been planned for conservation prior to the implementation of Bantu Authorities. Resistance on the part of Nyavu and Gcumisa members would prevent it from being transformed by betterment schemes.

The nature and scope of resistance against betterment projects were shaped by developments in the national struggle against apartheid. Since the Nyavu and

Maphumulo agreed to the establishment of tribal authorities in 1955, South Africa's countryside had rebelled. Once the apartheid state began to consolidate its policies on African administration and land rehabilitation, decades of resentment exploded into violent uprisings.<sup>60</sup> The rebellion also erupted at Table Mountain, where the tribal authorities came to exist largely on paper rather than in practice. As local women revolted against apartheid policies that burdened their daily lives, the Nyavu leaders, Nongalaza and Bangubukhosi Mdluli, began to vacillate in their cooperation with betterment and Bantu Authorities schemes.

By 1961, the Pietermaritzburg district had successfully established seven tribal authorities, compared to the neighboring Camperdown and New Hanover districts that had established none. But Pietermaritzburg Bantu Affairs Commissioner (BAC) Bowen recognized that these did nothing to justify their existence without his labor.<sup>61</sup> The BAC completed all of the financial estimates for each of the authorities himself and then struggled to get the chiefs to sign the forms.<sup>62</sup> The chiefs' hesitation came in the wake of rural rebellions. In 1959, at Table Mountain and across Natal, women initiated unrest that put pressure on their chiefly leaders. The year saw a recession and an increase in rural taxation. Resistance began in urban Cato Manor on June 17, 1959. Cato Manor women marched on a beer hall, chased out the men, and destroyed the alcohol. The women identified the beer halls as an imposition on their socioeconomic well-being. These institutions disrupted women's role as beer brewers and deprived women of the money that men might contribute to the family's survival. The riots spread across Durban and instigated a beer boycott.

By early August, the rebellion spread to Pietermaritzburg, where women marched on the Native Administration Department and the beer halls, as well as in the rural areas where they destroyed the dipping tanks. Natal's geography, with rural reserves scattered throughout the province near towns, enabled weekly traffic between the urban and rural and therefore the spread of the resistance. Less clear is the exact role of the ANC in influencing Table Mountain chiefs or women. In one group interview with Maphumulo followers, the participants fiercely debated the role of the ANC in fomenting the resistance.<sup>63</sup> Elsewhere, migrant laborers made connections between the ANC and rural areas.<sup>64</sup> While it is clear that the ANC did not propose the resistance, a June 26, 1959, Freedom Day rally<sup>65</sup> organized by the Congress Alliance in Durban may have allowed women attending to connect their own grievances to larger national issues and to other struggling rural residents. Nearly fifty thousand people gathered at the stadium, and many women and rural

people attended.<sup>66</sup> A little over a month later, women in the countryside revolted. By November, *Drum* estimated that twenty thousand participated in the women's resistance and nearly one thousand were convicted on various charges.<sup>67</sup>

Just as urban women identified urban beer halls as detrimental to their socio-economic well-being, rural women saw the dipping tanks as the symbol of apartheid interventions into their lives. Involving people in their "own development" was not just ideological, but also cheap. Headmen became responsible for identifying workers to erect fences and strip grass—free labor.<sup>68</sup> The tanks represented an additional labor burden for the women whose husbands worked as migrant laborers. Women were responsible for keeping the tanks full, for no pay, and in their husbands' absence, for seeing that cattle were dipped.<sup>69</sup> The androcentrism of betterment schemes, which envisioned economic units with male heads, was typical of colonial development planning throughout Africa.<sup>70</sup> Both the plans themselves and the male agricultural officers responsible for implementing them ignored the ways in which women bore the brunt of labor. In many places, a direct connection was made between the tanks and the betterment schemes—and not just because of women's additional labor. Where people refused to present their cattle for counting and possible culling, the authorities counted stock at the dip tanks. Natal saw some 75 percent of the cattle dipping tanks destroyed.<sup>71</sup> Women attacked these symbols of betterment and protested meetings designed to consider the plans.<sup>72</sup>

At Table Mountain and in the vicinity, the women's complaints were similar. It is important to note here that while the press largely used a much broader "Table Mountain," context suggests this refers to the more active Nyavu women. This may have been because Maphumulo followers on the trust farms had already experienced the effects of betterment planning, while Nyavu members on Inanda Location could still resist its implementation. The betterment schemes would not bring improvement to their lives, only further difficulties that were compounded by shortages of employment, the difficulties of migrant labor, and high taxes. One of Nongalaza's wives, Ma Ndlovu, led the Nyavu women's resistance both in the city and at home.<sup>73</sup> On August 10, 1959, women interfered with the work of the dip tank inspector, a Mr. Mdluli, and chased away the cows.<sup>74</sup> On August 14, two busloads of women took their protest into the city where they planned to meet their Edendale compatriots. Two Congress attorneys met them to warn that the Edendale women had already been arrested for possession of dangerous weapons, so the Table Mountain women disposed of their arms.<sup>75</sup> They marched to the men's hostel in East Street and chased away the men drinking at the Berg Street beer hall.<sup>76</sup> The

women then proceeded to the police station, where they forced the release of the imprisoned Edendale women. During the course of the next several days, nearly two hundred Table Mountain women attacked the dipping tanks, destroying at least one and filling the others with trees and stones. Twenty women were arrested, and four were later tried and found guilty.<sup>77</sup> The frustration that forced them to destroy the tanks emerged in an interview with one woman—likely a member of the Gcumisa—from the neighboring New Hanover district. She explained: “We did not intend to destroy the dipping tank. We were really writing a letter to the authorities which they could read. If we had written an ordinary letter you would not have replied.” They feared starvation in the reserves more than imprisonment.<sup>78</sup> On August 19, the Table Mountain women joined women from Cato Ridge, Fredville, and Hammarsdale in a march to the Camperdown native commissioner’s office. The group’s spokeswoman, Violet Ndlovu, told *New Age* that the women did not carry weapons as they “had received news that Chief Luthuli and Congress were against armed demonstrations.” Despite the peaceful nature of their delegation, the police met the six hundred women with tear gas and batons.<sup>79</sup> The rebellion continued in the coming weeks as men and women across Pietermaritzburg destroyed buildings associated with apartheid and attacked its representatives. The women’s protests heightened political consciousness and drew in their husbands, embittered by their wives’ arrest and perhaps shamed by women’s leadership.<sup>80</sup>

## Chiefly Accountability

At Table Mountain, even after regional and national resistance died down, chiefs failed to implement Bantu Authorities projects. The women’s resistance undoubtedly began to influence the chiefs of the Nyavu and Maphumulo, particularly after the deaths of Nongalaza Mdluli in 1960 and Regent Siggiza Maphumulo in 1961. That one of Nongalaza’s wives led the local women in rebellion suggests that he felt pressure not only from the chieftom, but also within his homestead. While we might go so far as to say the chief tacitly condoned the rebellion, we should not assume that Ma Ndlovu acted with her husband’s approval. Nongalaza led the Nyavu between 1940 and 1960, and, in the years prior to his acceptance of Bantu Authorities, was far from what NAD authorities considered an ideal or pliable chief.<sup>81</sup> But at the least, he oversaw the establishment of the Nyavu Tribal Authority. After Nongalaza’s death, Bangubukhosi became chief of the Nyavu.<sup>82</sup>

The Nyavu Tribal Authority functions came to a standstill when the twenty-seven-year-old Bangubukhosi took over in late 1960. The new authority did little on its own. A 1961 account by the Pietermaritzburg BAC indicated complete failure: No secretary had been appointed, there was no income, and the men refused to pay the £1 per person one-time levy that had been approved under Nongalaza.<sup>83</sup> After his appointment, Bangubukhosi performed cooperation with officials. In June 1961, he asked BAC Victor P. Ahrens to explain again Bantu Authorities to the still-suspicious members of his chiefdom. Those present at Ahrens's meeting agreed to oblige but in practice delayed. Over the next several years, cooperation was anything but forthcoming. In 1962, the Pietermaritzburg BAC C. C. Mynhardt explained how those opposed tried to position the creation of the tribal authority as done without their consent: "I have respectfully stressed the point that a Tribal Authority has been established in respect of the Manyavu Tribe. The tribesmen agree, however, that the late chief Nongalaza Mdluli agreed to tribal authorities without consulting the tribe and without their knowledge." When Bangubukhosi announced, "It was not for him to decide whether the tribe was opposed," Mynhardt began to suspect that Bangubukhosi opposed the system but was too weak to announce it. Bangubukhosi refused to sign several years' worth of the annual financial estimates for the Nyavu Tribal Authority because he would not go against his people. Aware that there had been at least some support expressed at the initial Nyavu meeting that approved the authority, Mynhardt believed that the shift against the system came as a result of opposition to local betterment projects.<sup>84</sup> Indeed, the women's destruction of the dipping tanks should have confirmed his suspicions. Additionally, in 1964, Chief Manzolwandle Mlaba of the neighboring Ximba complained that people opposed to Bantu Authorities and rehabilitation left his area to settle under Bangubukhosi. Manzolwandle described a situation where, when his followers could not hold him accountable, they left his jurisdiction. The former members of the Ximba transferred allegiance to Bangubukhosi because the Nyavu chief only minimally acknowledged Bantu Authorities and his area had no rehabilitation projects.<sup>85</sup> The BAC dismissed Bangubukhosi as disinterested and lacking prestige among his own people, failing to see that Bangubukhosi's lack of participation actually resulted from the opposition of his followers.

BAC officials employed both the carrot and the stick in efforts to gain Bangubukhosi's cooperation, but by 1964, Bowen considered recommending the chief's suspension. Bowen withdrew the authority's ability to collect dog tax independently

and deposited any amounts collected directly into the trust account, though the revenue from dog tax collection was virtually nonexistent until Bowen oversaw the employment of a more reliable collector. On the other hand, also in 1964, Bowen sought to give the chief more authority when he encouraged the conferment of criminal jurisdiction to the leader, a tenet of Bantu Authorities designed to give more power to the chiefs. He hoped the increase in revenue from court fees might persuade the chief to comply.<sup>86</sup> Bowen further recommended that the monies received by the trust from the sale of sand in Bangubukhosi's jurisdiction be paid into the Nyavu account so the people could see the fruit of their labor. While BAD granted criminal jurisdiction, it refused to turn over the sand funds, insisting that all monies deposited from BAD could only be in the form of a grant for specific development projects. Bowen lamented the decision and felt local opposition continued for this very reason, admitting that people saw no real benefits of the tribal authority.<sup>87</sup>

That Bangubukhosi's people successfully pressured their chief to resist betterment projects for several more years is suggested in a May 1967 issue of *Izindaba*. In a photograph in the magazine, Bangubukhosi appears reading *Intuthuko* (another government serial on development), flanked by African employees of the Department of Information. The propagandistic caption—aimed at isiZulu speakers—suggests Bangubukhosi was a model “progressive chief,” introducing his people to development projects by showing the department's films at his home.<sup>88</sup> But in the context of Bowen's complaints three years earlier, we can recognize the editor's spin. Bangubukhosi's people still had not accepted betterment schemes. Their chief would cooperate with BAD efforts to change their minds, but he would not implement such projects without their consent.

Among the Maphumulo, their residency largely on trust land with an empty swath of land dividing the chiefdom shaped their engagement with Bantu Authorities in the wake of the resistance. The recent relocations, as well as business and family pressures, influenced the ambiguous responses of the new regent, Khangela Maphumulo. Those moved came to see the land as given to them and believed that they would not be deprived of the privileges and way of life they previously enjoyed. While officials planned the trust farms again in 1959, the records do not reflect the extent to which this plan was ever carried out. But Maphumulo resistance to betterment schemes was tied to these relocations and the division of the Maphumulo territory by the much-desired thousand-acre strip of land. Those Maphumulo who had been relocated to the trust farms resented the implementation of betterment



regulations and constantly reminded officials that they had been promised their status would not change when they moved from the location. While they complied with stock reductions, they complained bitterly. In the wake of Tidbury's 1959 report that recommended the creation of residential areas, the chief BAC recommended not asking this "difficult crowd" to move again for betterment purposes.<sup>89</sup>

While the chief BAC warned against removals for betterment purposes, he also acknowledged the increasing frustrations of the Maphumulo with continued interference in their lives. In late 1959, before the cancellation of the second dam project, Ahrens served notice to the local chiefs whose people would be affected, including the Gcumisa, Maphumulo, and to a lesser extent, the Nyavu. Those who had already been relocated to Onverwacht would be inundated by water in the second dam. While Ahrens expressed relief that their opposition "does not appear to be as strong as might have been expected," his further comments suggest that those to be affected felt quite despondent. "Although the Natives concerned do not relish the idea of being moved, the consensus of opinion (after the position had been fully explained) was to the effect that *all that they could do in the circumstances* was to lodge a protest which was done via the notices which had been served on them" (my emphasis).<sup>90</sup>

The new dam and various phases of betterment contributed to Maphumulo aggravation. When Sigciza died in 1961, the new and younger regent was faced with increasingly hostile followers. The Maphumulo nominated Khangela, age twenty-nine, to act as regent, certainly aware his claim to the regency would be honored before that of Baningi, given the earlier dispute.<sup>91</sup> But Khangela steadily lost the support of the Maphumulo *umndeni*. Upon appointment, Khangela dismissed all of the previous tribal authority councilors but for two.<sup>92</sup> Like Sigciza before him, Khangela was initially cooperative with rehabilitation and tribal authority activities, earning an initial increase in his annual bonus in 1963.<sup>93</sup> Like the Nyavu, the Maphumulo showed meager dog tax collection and thus little revenue in initial years.<sup>94</sup> Over the years, Khangela's cooperation declined, as did his bonus.

Despite not having jurisdiction over land allocation, Khangela began to assign residential sites on arable and grazing land, as well as on the Goedverwaching strip planned for a Bantu village. He allocated these sites to not only his own followers, but others from across Natal being evicted from farms. He argued that he "was instructed to look after it [the Goedverwaching strip] and that he could regard it as an integral part of his area until it was required by the Department for other purposes."<sup>95</sup> By 1970, the BAC was certain it was Khangela who encouraged

resistance to betterment and the Xhosa-speaking Bantu Agricultural Assistant Edward Mafakadolo.

Bantu agricultural assistants were often despised as outsiders and agents of apartheid.<sup>96</sup> Mafakadolo was assigned to the area in 1968. He policed betterment regulations, particularly the culling of small stock, a directive that Khangela had never enforced. Mafakadolo was also responsible for ensuring that settlement was undertaken according to the betterment schemes for the farms. Mafakadolo thus put an end to the payment of fees, or as one councilor described them, bribes, for sites on the portion of Goedverwaching planned for a Bantu village.<sup>97</sup>

The BAC believed that these rehabilitation efforts agitated the Maphumulo people and the official allocation of sites—residential and business—angered the regent, councilors, and headmen who could no longer control (or possibly abuse) the distribution of land. Despite overcrowding, the BAD had granted no local peoples permission to move onto the newly purchased Goedverwaching strip. BAD did begin to allocate land for the Maphumulo courthouse in 1969 and took applications for business sites. By the 1960s, business licenses were almost exclusively granted in the reserves.<sup>98</sup> This tension came to a head in December 1969 when Bellina Dlomo, an applicant for a beer hall on the site, accused Mafakadolo of prejudicing her request. Dlomo's sons attacked him with iron-shod sticks and she threatened to burn down his home.<sup>99</sup> While BAD officials saw the attack as originating from Khangela's opposition to the ranger's presence, Simanga Mkhize remembers significant competition between aspiring businesspersons that precipitated the assault. Mafakadolo supported the application of one of the regent's relatives, C. J. Maphumulo, over Dlomo's.<sup>100</sup>

The Dlomos' attack on Mafakadolo should not be seen as a single incident of violence resultant from a personal dispute. Men such as Mafakadolo, the Bantu Affairs rangers, were often the target of resistance to betterment schemes because of the role they played policing the activities of residents and traditional leaders on the trust farms. It is significant that another of the men who gave testimony against Khangela in the investigation into the attack on Mafakadolo was a BAD ranger. In Sekhukhuneland, attacks on rangers occurred after the deportation of Godfrey Sekhukhune in 1957 and others who had condemned Bantu Authorities and betterment.<sup>101</sup> In 1959, a BAD ranger was killed in the Ciskei and his body chopped into pieces.<sup>102</sup> Because another Bantu agricultural assistant had recently been shot in Msinga, Agricultural Officer Olivier transferred Mafakadolo to the Zwartkop Location in fear for his safety. But BAD officials agreed Mafakadolo would have to

return after Khangela had been warned so the department did not lose face. Chief BAC F. W. C. Aveling made Khangela responsible for the safety of Mafakadolo and warned that “as a government appointed [regent] it is expected of him to lend full support to government policy and assist the Bantu Agricultural Assistant in his area at all times,” reminding Khangela his regency depended upon BAD support. Aveling further ordered the Pietermaritzburg BAC to collect statements in the event that the chief did not repent and the department needed to depose him.<sup>103</sup>

While Khangela's failure to implement betterment policies put him at odds with BAD, he was also on the outs with some headmen and *umndeni* members who had elected him regent. In December 1970, BAC K. G. Harvey opened an investigation based on reports of dissension among the councilors, headmen, and *umndeni*. While Khangela suggested his inability to enforce betterment was due to a lack of cooperation, the headmen and councilors made allegations against Khangela, including those described above regarding the chief's opposition to Mafakadolo and rehabilitation. Khangela had dismissed several of his councilors without consulting the BAC. One of the ousted men, Aaron Mkhize, made a statement against the chief during the investigation of the Mafakadolo incident. That Mkhize supported Mafakadolo may be an indication that he was one of the government-appointed councilors and that Khangela was attempting to surround himself by nongovernment councilors. Several *umndeni* members also complained in private that the regent neglected his duties to the heir and his mother, who was so persistent in her complaints that the BAC issued her with pauper rations.<sup>104</sup> The *umndeni* believed it was time for the heir to take control, even though Mhlabunzima did not yet meet the BAD age and marital requirements. Khangela refused to resign and Chief BAC J. J. van der Watt instructed the Pietermaritzburg BAC to initiate an inquiry that would enable Khangela's deposal.<sup>105</sup> The department could then appoint the pliable young heir, a former student of Bhekuzulu College, a Bantu Education institution for the sons of chiefs and headmen. The same year, the Zululand Territorial Authority came into being after similar debates about chiefly support for the last tier of Bantu Authorities. During his twelve years as regent, Khangela carefully navigated pressure from BAD officials, local business interests, and *umndeni* members, but ultimately failed to keep all of his followers confident that he was looking out for their interests when he supported a member of the *umndeni* instead of his subjects.

The success of these varied forms of resistance can be measured by the limited implementation of development projects. Natal officials undertook early work

on regional trust farms such as Onverwacht and Goedverwachting and later on locations in Natal such as Zwartkop and Mlaas. They could not on Inanda Location, where the uncooperative Gcumisa lived on nearly seven-tenths of location acreage and the resistant Nyavu and ambivalent Maphumulo occupied the remainder.<sup>106</sup> When state funding was made available for the erection of tribal authority courtrooms in 1968–1970, the BAC filled out applications for Maphumulo and Nyavu courtrooms, but there is no evidence beyond the chiefs' signatures to suggest that either chief or their people felt strongly about it.<sup>107</sup>

But when it came to that which the people requested—schooling—changes did occur. The same year the Nyavu initially agreed to the establishment of a tribal authority, the NAD created a trust account “to secure the funds of the [Nyavu] Tribal Authority until such time as the tribe are able to control their own funds.”<sup>108</sup> Members of the chieftom initially failed to pay the £1 one-time levy approved by Nongalaza for the construction of a secondary school and other tribal authorities programs. But their resistance was likely on account of the price and the swell of resistance, rather than for the purpose. By 1964, the Nyavu had formed a school board and began to work with the American Zulu Mission Board to build new primary and secondary schools on the mission reserve.<sup>109</sup> The Maphumulo set up a school board and Bantu Education Inspector Oscroft instigated efforts for the construction of Maqongqo Primary School on Onverwacht.<sup>110</sup>

## Conclusion

The establishment of tribal authorities completed the bounding of chiefly authority, legally tying chiefs to particular parcels of land, if not in practice. For the Nyavu, this meant a defining of their territory that denied them surrounding land that they long contested as theirs, including Onverwacht and Goedverwachting. For the Maphumulo, their defined territory included largely trust-owned land onto which they had only recently been forcefully removed. This greatly shaped how they received Bantu Authorities. They had named the land and saw it as theirs to reside upon without any further interferences. By the time they agreed to implement a tribal authority, betterment had already transformed the land. The SANT purchase of additional parcels of Goedverwachting—an empty, desirable strip of land that now divided the Maphumulo chieftom and its tribal authority—after the definition of the chieftom's boundaries would further shape the development of the chieftom.

The creation of tribal authorities at Table Mountain also gave rise to new expectations—voiced in the language of rights and development—on the part of chiefly subjects. In accepting Bantu Authorities, they made clear that development was desirable—but they also defined the kinds of development they hoped to see implemented. Despite rumors regarding the quality of Bantu education, Nyavu and Maphumulo followers demanded schools for their children. While they fiercely resisted the betterment schemes to which Bantu Authorities had tied their chiefs, they supported efforts of their new school boards to apply for land and erect primary and secondary schools.

Betterment plans could not address the issues of African agriculture without acknowledging the sources of these problems in apartheid politics. As women resisted the extra labor burdens of betterment, they began to connect their grievances to these national apartheid policies. Depositions across the country prevented most chiefs from fully entering the orbit of African national politics, but they could not fully cooperate as long as their subjects demanded rights. As apartheid officials heavily policed resistance and sought to develop the latter stages of the Bantu Authorities system, chiefs would be drawn away from their followers and into the ethnic nationalist politics of the KwaZulu Bantustan after 1971.

# Only the Fourth Chief

## Ethnic Politics and Land Jurisdiction, 1971–1988

[Mhlabunzima] continued saying, these six things I have already built now, does that not give me permission to take over this land? Then they said, actually there is no way we could stop you from taking this land. Then the place falls back to him which is why he had courage to give people sites at Echibini.

—Japhet Madlala, 2013

In September 1973, the young Mhlabunzima Joseph Maphumulo was installed as chief of the Maphumulo Tribal Authority. He became active in the new KwaZulu Legislative Assembly (KZLA), the third tier of the Bantu Authorities system and the government purportedly in charge of isiZulu-speaking Africans. Mhlabunzima was young, comparatively well educated among chiefs, and ambitious—an aspiring member of the new class of Bantustan administrators. He briefly studied at the Bhekuzulu College for the Sons of Chiefs and Headmen, where he overlapped with the heir to the Zulu kingdom, Goodwill Zwelithini Zulu. Mhlabunzima used *ukukhonza* and these local and regional networks of education and governance in his efforts to develop his territory at Table Mountain. During early implementation of Bantu Authorities and renewed plans for betterment at

Table Mountain in the 1950s and 1960s, subjects of Bangubukhosi Mdluli and the regents for Mhlabunzima resisted tenets of development that reorganized their lives and burdened them. Mhlabunzima promoted a different kind of development. He set out to acquire the newly purchased trust land—the strip of Goedverwaching farm—and to provide health care, electricity, and water to his people. As Madlala suggested above, he began to build on the land as one way to claim the territory. But as much as Mhlabunzima used his position in the KZLA to assist him in these endeavors, his alliance with the royal family against the chief minister of KwaZulu, Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi, threatened his ability to do so. Mhlabunzima's anti-Buthelezi stance earned him the reputation of a rogue chief. Buthelezi's supporters launched a verbal attack on the chief, deriding him as “only the fourth chief” of a colonially created chieftaincy, and a physical assault outside of the legislative assembly in 1983 that rendered the chief unconscious.

Mhlabunzima was not the only one working to acquire the one thousand acres of trust land. The trust moved away from the plan for a Bantu village to relocate surplus peoples removed during betterment and toward the establishment of a closer settlement where those forcefully removed from farms across Natal could be relocated in a rural township. “Closer settlement” is the official term used to describe land intended for the resettlement of African people on location or trust land that was for residential purposes only. Closer settlements normally fell under the authority of the trust with no chiefly involvement. But both Mhlabunzima and Bangubukhosi eyed the fertile, empty land and made moves to incorporate it into their jurisdiction. Bangubukhosi penned letters and sent delegations to Ulundi to remind the government of his chieftom's historical precedent in this place of his ancestors. Mhlabunzima developed the land and, in every request for jurisdiction over the territory, reminded officials of the sense of place the Maphumulo felt about the entirety of Goedverwaching as space given to them in return for the Nagle Dam. These very local struggles emerged in a regional and national context in which apartheid intelligence agents infiltrated Bantustan politics and Buthelezi moved from a suspected ally of the ANC-in-exile to a potential proxy in a counter-revolutionary war. The contest over the farm renewed attention to the language and practice of *ukukhonza* as Africans at Table Mountain defined insiders and outsiders and called upon connections to land.

## Separate Development and Bantustan Independence

While the rural resistance described in the previous chapter certainly contributed to the slow rolling out of three-tiered system of Bantu Authorities—by 1966, only 107 of the 282 government-recognized polities in Natal had established tribal authorities and only twelve regional authorities functioned—thereafter the state began to gain momentum. By November 1969, there were 202 tribal authorities and seventeen regional authorities.<sup>1</sup> The death of the Zulu Paramount Chief Cyprian Bhekuzulu in 1968 made way for an internal power struggle in KwaZulu between the regent Prince Israel Mcwayizeni of the Zulu royal family, acting for Prince Goodwill Zwelithini, and Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi over who would lead the Zulu Territorial Authority.

The 1959 Promotion of Bantu Self-Government Act extended the three-tiered Bantu Authorities system with the promise of self-government and independence for African “national units” known as Bantustans. With this and subsequent actions, the Department of Bantu Administration and Development (BAD) embarked on more drastic measures to reduce the urbanized African population. The commitment to separate development, now defined as “multi-nationalism” and “ethnic self-determination,” was an ideological attempt to legitimize the denial of the franchise to Africans.<sup>2</sup> Over the next several decades, BAD restyled itself according to this mission, becoming the Department of Plural Relations and Development (PRD) in 1978, the Department of Cooperation and Development (DCD) in 1979, and the Department of Development Aid (DDA) in 1986.<sup>3</sup> With these redefinitions, apartheid officials attempted to move away from a discourse of race and segregation toward one of modernity and separate development.

The plan for ten separate African “nations,” each with its own “ethnic homeland,” only gradually developed. The 1970 Homeland Citizenship Act and the 1971 Homeland Constitution Act imposed Bantustan citizenship on all Africans, even those who never visited their supposed homelands. The apartheid state intended that this ethnic loyalty replace national political aspirations. However, it took twenty-five years for the first of the territorial authorities to opt for independence, the highest level of self-government. Transkei (1976), Bophuthatswana (1977), Venda (1979), and Ciskei (1981) were the only four to do so. This Bantustan project stimulated and entrenched ethnic divisions and created a new class of Bantustan administrators.

The project also required forced relocations on an unprecedented scale. The state intensified urban pass controls, thereby expelling the unemployed from



urban areas, and removed so-called squatters from “unauthorized” areas. Forced removals of so-called “black spots” also began in earnest. These Africans deemed “surplus” were obliged to resettle in the already overcrowded Bantustans and in newly created townships. The Surplus People Project conservatively estimated 3.5 million people were removed between 1960 and 1983, but this number does not include the majority of people affected by influx control in the urban areas or the number of people moved within the Bantustans for betterment planning.<sup>4</sup>

While each ethnically defined Bantustan was intended to “develop along its own lines,” these scattered entities were the legacy of the reserve system and thus lacked the ability to attract Africans from the cities or even sustain the people already living there. Central to the project was a four-part plan for land consolidation. In 1975, the minister of BAD set out to define areas that could be released to add to the Bantustans, clear “black spots,” excise “poorly situated Bantu reserves” (land desirable for whites), and consolidate the scattered areas.<sup>5</sup> But as with the 1936 Land Act attempts to increase land for Africans, the consolidation process would be slow. The Bantustan purportedly developed for the envisioned Zulu nation rejected independence due to frustration over the apartheid government’s unwillingness to fast-track land consolidation. KwaZulu consisted of forty-eight pieces of land broken up by white farming areas, rural towns, and cities of Natal province.

It was within this shifting context that a meeting of isiZulu-speaking chiefs in 1970 decided upon the establishment of the Zulu Territorial Authority (ZTA).<sup>6</sup> Intended as a transitional body toward full independence, the ZTA consisted of chiefs or representatives of the twenty-two regional authorities, an elected executive officer (who had to be a chief), and five other executive councilors. At the inaugural meeting of the ZTA, Chief Buthelezi was elected the chief executive officer, Prince Clement Zulu as chairperson of the ZTA, and Chief Charles Hlengwa as the deputy chairperson. Buthelezi used this platform to rise to the leadership of conservative black politics not only in the region, but also at the national and international stages.<sup>7</sup>

To consolidate his power, Buthelezi sidelined the royal family in Bantustan structures. The ZTA hotly debated a constitution for the first stage of self-government in 1972. The draft retained the Zulu king as a member of the legislative assembly, but Buthelezi and other executive councilors insisted that his role should be limited to that of a figurehead removed from party politics. Royalists such as Clement—operating with the support of the apartheid government—wanted an executive monarch such as the Swazi king. Buthelezi was not always the choice of

the apartheid government to lead the Zulu Bantustan. His initial ties to the ANC meant that BAD officials kept a close eye on the chief, even after it supported him in a succession dispute for the Buthelezi chieftaincy.<sup>8</sup> While the ANC loudly denounced Bantu Authorities and cooperative chiefs, its leaders quietly maintained contact with rural elites such as Thembu King Sabata Dalindyebo and Buthelezi.<sup>9</sup> Awareness of this tentative connection with the ANC meant that in the early 1970s, the state initially chose to work instead with the more openly collaborative royal family.

Tensions between Buthelezi and the royal family, particularly Paramount Chief Cyprian Bhekuzulu's brothers, Israel Mcwayizeni and Clement, started soon after the death of Cyprian in 1968. Buthelezi criticized Israel, the regent, and Israel backed Hlengwa for the position of chief minister. The royal family excluded Buthelezi from the installation of Zwelithini in December 1971, and the rift continued despite attempts at rapprochement.<sup>10</sup> At the coronation, Israel announced the formation of a royal council, designed as a group of advisers for the king, with Israel as its chair. Thereafter, rumors abounded that this apartheid-supported Royal Council sought the removal of Buthelezi.<sup>11</sup>

In the debate over the ZTA constitution, Clement stepped down as chairman and Buthelezi won out. On April 1, 1972, the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly (KZLA) was established. The KZLA included only a personal representative of the king, three chiefs appointed by each of the twenty-two regional authorities, and fifty-five elected members.<sup>12</sup> The king's status became ceremonial, a personification of the unity of the Zulu nation. The KZLA had limited legislative and executive powers, excluding the ability to establish townships, appoint and dismiss chiefs, and create educational syllabi—powers that accompanied the second stage of self-government. The constitution provided for elections, but the KZLA's insistence upon KwaZulu citizenship certificates (as opposed to the hated reference books of apartheid) delayed voting. The second phase of self-government was granted in 1977, after the February 1978 elections were announced. This postponement served as a means of buying time for Buthelezi to ensure control in the conflict with the king.<sup>13</sup>

The royal family members sidelined in the creation of the KZLA supported the creation of political organizations in opposition to Buthelezi. They affiliated with the state and later with a Zulu petty bourgeoisie disgruntled with white business interference in KwaZulu. The young chief of the Maphumulo too would become involved in this power struggle, commencing nearly two decades of conflict—within the Maphumulo over the political affiliation of their chief and between Mhlabunzima and Inkatha-affiliated chiefs.

## Chiefly Affiliations and Ethnic Nationalist Alliances

Chiefs from the Table Mountain region were drawn into the KZLA through their tribal authorities and the Vulindlela Regional Authority (VRA). The VRA was established in 1960, incorporating the tribal authorities of the Pietermaritzburg and Camperdown districts; it would later split into the Vulindlela and Mpumalanga Regional Authorities (MRA). Like its tribal authority precedents, the VRA initially did little without the efforts of the district BACS. While Bangubukhosi Mdluli failed to introduce betterment schemes and initially to fully cooperate with the workings of the Nyavu Tribal Authority, he became involved with the VRA. Neither Bangubukhosi nor the regent for Mhlabunzima was part of the VRA delegation sent to Ulundi to discuss the establishment of the ZTA, but Bangubukhosi became a member of parliament (MP) for the VRA during the KZLA's first term. While Khangela Maphumulo attempted to delay turning over the chieftaincy to the young heir Mhlabunzima, he did so in 1973. Mhlabunzima became an MP in 1974 and chair of the MRA in 1975. Bangubukhosi was a comparatively quiet MP, but Mhlabunzima thrust himself into the midst of the divide between Buthelezi and the Zulu king. Both chiefs used their connections with KwaZulu to claim the Goedverwaching strip on their borders, but Mhlabunzima's ability to do so was constrained by his alliance with the Zulu king in the conflict between Buthelezi and Zwelithini over control of KwaZulu.

By the time Mhlabunzima became chief, a number of "king's parties" promoted by the Zulu princes and the apartheid regime had emerged to undermine Buthelezi by supporting executive power for the king. This cooperation enabled Buthelezi to shore up his own support by linking the opposition to the apartheid regime.<sup>14</sup> The first of these, the Zulu National Party (ZNP), was founded in 1972 by editor and businessman Lloyd Ndaba with the promise of securing executive powers for the king.<sup>15</sup> Ndaba attacked Buthelezi in his pro-apartheid journal, *Africa South*, in 1971.<sup>16</sup> Ndaba claimed the support of Israel and Clement, but they denied the assertion.<sup>17</sup> Buthelezi discredited Ndaba by linking the ZNP to the apartheid government. He alleged that the Department of Information's (DOI) Bureau for State Security (BOSS) or the Special Branch of the South African Police (SAP) financed the party and that apartheid's commissioner general for KwaZulu, Henri Torlage, helped Ndaba campaign. The ZNP ultimately proved little threat to Buthelezi because it had no legislative presence, though the challenge may have deepened Buthelezi's conviction to hold off elections until assured of power.<sup>18</sup>

The royalist/Buthelezi divide deepened in 1972–1973 during the Natal labor

unrest. In 1973, the largest strikes in South Africa since World War II sent over one hundred thousand workers into the streets. Because the apartheid government had effectively suppressed the South African Council of Trade Unions in the 1960s, these strikes marked a major turning point for resistance in South Africa. In January 1973, Coronation Brick Works invited the king to speak to striking workers. But the king's speech had no effect upon the work stoppage. Buthelezi believed the king had been exploited and attacked the Zulu Royal Council for allowing it. He forced the king to dissolve the council to protect himself from controversial and political involvement.<sup>19</sup>

The same year, the DOI helped to found a second royalist party to challenge Buthelezi.<sup>20</sup> Hlengwa, the first deputy chairperson of the ZTA and second chairperson of the KZLA, formed Umkhonto ka Shaka (Spear of Shaka) to honor traditional institutions in a democratic government under the king. The party's constitution suggested a willingness for independence with statements that the organization would "do everything in its power to promote the interests of the Zulu nation so that it could proudly take its rightful place amongst the nations of the world."<sup>21</sup> When criticism of Hlengwa emerged in the press, the DOI attempted to manage his image, publishing a glowing background story on the politician in its isiZulu magazine, *Izindaba*, and tried to quell the spread of news that Zwelithini dismissed the party.<sup>22</sup> Buthelezi produced deposit slips given to him by an Umkhonto defector proving BOSS financing of the party. The defector made an affidavit to the SAP that gave a detailed account of the formation of the party by members of the royal family, DOI, and a BOSS official.<sup>23</sup> Buthelezi then maneuvered Hlengwa's ousting from the KZLA.<sup>24</sup> That not all the members of the party were aware of its state support is suggested in a letter from member Chief A. N. Ngcobo asking BAD officials whether chiefs and their people could legally join KwaZulu political parties and whether doing so would jeopardize their positions within KwaZulu.<sup>25</sup>

In response to these threats to his control, Buthelezi forbade political parties prior to independence—but built his own. As early as 1972, Buthelezi began to reference an early twentieth-century Zulu nationalist movement, Inkatha ka Zulu (1924–1933), in the KZLA. In 1973, Buthelezi distributed its 1928 constitution to KZLA members. Buthelezi received support from the exiled ANC for the formation of an organization to develop Zulu national consciousness and pride on the condition that it be open to all Africans.<sup>26</sup> In March 1975, KwaZulu leaders launched Inkatha Yakwa Zulu, later renamed Inkatha Yenkululeko Yesziwe to reflect its national ambitions. With the name "Inkatha," Buthelezi evoked not only the prior Zulu movement, but

also a deep-rooted cultural sentiment among the Zulu people. *Inkatha* is a sacred coil, created with grass from the royal homestead, dirt from the king's body, and herbs known only to the royal herbal doctors, which symbolizes the unity of the Zulu people. While Buthelezi regularly emphasized the organization as a cultural movement rather than a political party, Inkatha became entwined with Bantustan administration such that political party more aptly describes its nature even before it became an official party after the unbanning of the liberation movements in 1990.

The exact relationship of Inkatha to the KZLA was deliberated when Buthelezi introduced the movement to the assembly. The first Inkatha constitution included a clause stipulating that should any decision of the Inkatha Central Committee conflict with the decision of the KZLA Cabinet, the decision of the Central Committee would prevail. After a KZLA debate, the clause was amended so the KZLA Cabinet would be required to "consider seriously" the views of the Central Committee before arriving at a final decision. The KZLA passed the amended Inkatha constitution unanimously, thus binding assembly members to it. This constitution also stipulated that only Inkatha members could stand for election and made the president of Inkatha the chief minister of KwaZulu. It made the king, chiefs, and heads of all regional authorities patrons of the movement, placing upon them the responsibility for building the organization's membership.<sup>27</sup>

The forced affiliation between chiefs and Inkatha and the continued sidelining of the Zulu king drew Mhlabunzima into ethnic nationalist politics and ultimately threatened his ability to develop the contested land at Table Mountain. His early participation in the KZLA gave no evidence of the impending confrontation with Buthelezi, though he was absent the day the assembly debated the Inkatha constitution. Shortly after Inkatha's formation in 1975, Mhlabunzima became involved in the founding of the Inala Party, named after King Zwelithini's regiment. Formed by several members of the royal family and businessmen, and initially with the blessing of the king, the group opposed several aspects of the Inkatha constitution, such as the article that required a chief to be a patron of the movement, as well as KZLA encouragement of tripartite businesses (tripcos) that enabled white investment in the Bantustan. According to Mhlabunzima, the party was only formed "in principle" because they had neither a constitution nor funds.<sup>28</sup> Buthelezi was incensed by Mhlabunzima's December 31 letter in the isiZulu newspaper *Ilanga* explaining the formation of the party and denouncing Inkatha for the "total destruction of the King's dignity."<sup>29</sup> Buthelezi associated the new political organization with apartheid agents, as he had with previous parties.

Buthelezi set out to curtail the party and its perceived founder—Mhlabunzima. Buthelezi called special meetings of the Inkatha National Council and the KZLA in January 1976 to address the participation of the king in politics and the creation of parties. The National Council resolved that the “King is above politics” and his involvement need be only through consultation with Inkatha. Any person contravening the constitution with regard to the king could be penalized. It furthered that there was no need for political parties.<sup>30</sup> At the special session of the KZLA, Buthelezi and Chairman Chief V. Mbhele queried Mhlabunzima at length about his participation in the meetings to form the party. Mhlabunzima responded often with humor and sarcasm, further angering the assembly, and another Inala supporter outlined his belief that the king deserved executive powers.<sup>31</sup> Zwelithini capitulated to Buthelezi’s demand that he withhold himself from politics, signaling Buthelezi’s emergence as unrivaled leader of KwaZulu.<sup>32</sup> Buthelezi then instigated an inquiry into Mhlabunzima’s conduct according to the KwaZulu Chiefs and Headmen Act of 1974.<sup>33</sup> Its findings were presented to the cabinet in January 1978, on the eve of the Mpumalanga elections. The inquiry found Mhlabunzima guilty of involving the king in politics. He was also charged with, but found not guilty of, taking part in activities that aimed to overthrow the Bantustan government.<sup>34</sup> The KwaZulu cabinet suspended Mhlabunzima as chief, MP, and MRA chair for two years.<sup>35</sup>

Mhlabunzima’s involvement with the party is now remembered as a principled stance against Inkatha and the denial of authority to the Zulu king.<sup>36</sup> But like the previous royalist parties, Inala may have been infiltrated or promoted by the apartheid state. According to a statement made by Mhlabunzima in late 1976 on file with the DCD—that he later backtracked on when he was under investigation for involving the king in politics—he was first invited to a gathering to discuss the formation of a political party by Prince Clement. Mhlabunzima said those present voted him to chair the December 1975 meeting at the Ndaleneni home of Chief Mbhele. In addition to the king, Clement, Mhlabunzima, and Mbhele, those present included businessmen, friends of the king, high-level members of KwaZulu and Inkatha, and possibly an apartheid agent, Joseph Madlala. According to *Ilanga’s* informants, the king was present but he sat in silence during the six-hour gathering. The men criticized tripcos and the Inkatha constitution and discussed the eventual need for an opposition party. Mhlabunzima, twenty-seven at the time, made it clear in his statement that he was not criticizing the policy of separate development—certainly said to protect himself—but that of the Inkatha movement that had allowed its

leader to become a dictator. He further alleged that Inkatha had the aims of the banned ANC.<sup>37</sup>

While it is difficult to pinpoint Mhlabunzima's motivations at this point, his education and business networks certainly played a part in the chief's decision to throw in his lot with Inala. Clement and Zwelithini, the latter of whom Mhlabunzima knew from his time at Bhekuzulu College and considered a friend, could have influenced him. Bhekuzulu College for the Sons of Chiefs and Headmen was established to prepare "future traditional leaders for active participation in local and territorial government and development administration, but also to introduce them to western civilization."<sup>38</sup> Educational institutions played key roles in the creation of regionally rooted elite networks.<sup>39</sup> Zwelithini and the royal family may have drawn upon these networks to garner support against Buthelezi. Mhlabunzima was also a budding businessman, as evidenced by his later applications for a general store and a shopping center, the latter to be funded by the KwaZulu Development Corporation (KDC).<sup>40</sup> Zulu traders threatened by the expansion of white capital into KwaZulu with tripcos found political allies with the royalists, traditionalists, and the central state, who all saw the king as a rallying point against Buthelezi and Inkatha's total control.<sup>41</sup> Mhlabunzima, present in the assembly during several of the debates over Hlengwa's loyalty, told Ernst Langner he supported Inala because Inkatha "allowed no scope for differences of opinion."<sup>42</sup> The extent to which followers and founders of these royalist parties were aware of state involvement is hard to ascertain, but Buthelezi continued to wield this as evidence against opponents.<sup>43</sup> Mhlabunzima then, and again in the late 1980s, would describe the method as "something that Buthelezi uses to attack someone that he does not like."<sup>44</sup>

Despite Buthelezi's canvassing against him and his suspension, Mhlabunzima was a popular regional leader. He won in Mpumalanga in the 1978 elections, the sole independent candidate to win a seat in the KZLA. Of the fifty-five elected seats, only twenty-seven were contested, of which Inkatha won all but Mpumalanga.<sup>45</sup> Given his suspension, the MRA replaced him. The Maphumulo *umndeni* met and nominated Mhlabunzima's younger brother, Kwenzokuhle, to act as chief during the suspension. The Mpumalanga Magistrate G. C. Pitcher acknowledged the decision would be unpopular. In his report, Pitcher does not elaborate on the potential origins of opposition, but he does attach a list of persons present at the meeting where the decision was made. Two men with whom the decision would have been unpopular, Banningi and Mdingi Maphumulo, were not present.<sup>46</sup> Bangubukhosi replaced Mhlabunzima as chair of the MRA.<sup>47</sup>



**FIGURE 15.** The young Mhlabunzima Maphumulo (*left*) and Thamsanqa Mkhize at Bhekuzulu College, 1967 or 1968. PHOTOGRAPH COURTESY OF THOBEKILE MAPHUMULO.



**FIGURE 16.** Mhlabunzima (*third row, left*) at a KwaZulu Legislative Assembly session at Bhekuzulu College, prior to October 1983. PHOTOGRAPH COURTESY OF ULUNDI ARCHIVES REPOSITORY.



Mhlabunzima fought his suspension at the High Court, applying for a review of the magistrate's findings. In late 1979, the High Court overturned the verdict, by which time the duration of the suspension had nearly finished. Mhlabunzima applied for remuneration for lost pay, claiming suffering due to the loss of occupation for two years. Indicative of what an involved KZLA MP and RA chair might earn, in 1979, Mhlabunzima earned an R936 per year KwaZulu stipend as chief, an R800 per year salary from the Maphumulo TA, and R5,040 per year as a KZLA MP. On top of this, he earned income as the chair of the MRA and as a member of the Mpumalanga Licensing Board. The normal term of his chairmanship (five years, 1975–1980) had concluded, so he did not regain the position. Despite initial confusion over whether he could return to the KZLA (he had been replaced by Chief N. Ntshangase), Mhlabunzima was reinstated as an MP during 1980.<sup>48</sup>

The conflict between Mhlabunzima and Buthelezi did not end with his suspension, as several members of the Maphumulo turned to KwaZulu in an attempt to oust their chief. During the chief's suspension, headman Mshoki Gcabashe formed the Mbambangalo branch of Inkatha.<sup>49</sup> Upon reinstatement as chief in early 1980, Mhlabunzima banned Inkatha meetings after Gcabashe failed to seek his permission to hold a meeting. When Buthelezi announced his intention to speak at an Inkatha rally in Mbambangalo, Mhlabunzima ordered his people to boycott and called a rival meeting. He claimed the Inkatha officials' disrespect created a rift among his followers.<sup>50</sup> In Mhlabunzima's first session back in the KZLA, Buthelezi rebuked him for this activity and for attacking Inkatha in the press. Buthelezi read the letter from Mhlabunzima to *Ilanga* in which the chief claimed Inkatha had made the king a puppet. Buthelezi declared the letter was an assault on the king and commoners.<sup>51</sup>

During the same session, Buthelezi also read a letter from members of the Maphumulo that revealed divisions within the Maphumulo. Mshoki Gcabashe, Bangingi and Mdingi Maphumulo, and several other men who would later become prominent local Inkatha leaders had penned the letter. They accused Mhlabunzima of instigating conflict between the people and KwaZulu, selling land at exorbitant prices, allowing homes to be built on grazing and arable land, and misuse of Maphumulo funds.<sup>52</sup> The Minister of Justice Celani Mthethwa and Chief Calalakubo Khawula of the Mzumbe District joined the attack, chiding Mhlabunzima for his lack of respect as a young chief and again alleging that he cooperated with apartheid. Mthethwa, clearly aware of the Maphumulo chiefdom's history, told the KZLA that Mhlabunzima needed to remember his place.

He should remember that the history of his chieftainship is very short. He is only the fourth chief. His grandfather got this chieftainship simply because he was a policeman in the service of the White Government. He was paid by means of a portion of the Swayimane land at Gcumisa. I think that one of the reasons why he is deviating as he says he does not want independence but wants to remain Pretoria's slave, is that the history of his chieftainship originated in a payment. He then thinks, when he hears it being said that because of the loyalty of his grandfather to the Police Force he obtained the chieftainship, therefore if he is loyal to Pretoria, he too may be given this country.<sup>53</sup>

This use of the Zulu past to draw support and achieve political gains was an important tactic for Buthelezi.<sup>54</sup> While Buthelezi often referred to his own ancestry as a way of presenting himself as the traditional heir to the prime minister position, here other Inkatha members used Mhlabunzima's ancestry as a way to discredit his authority. Mhlabunzima briefly defended himself and his grandfather but absented himself from the KZLA upon learning that his car had been stolen. In further attacks, the minister of works not so subtly implied that his car might have been paid for through extortion or collaboration.<sup>55</sup>

It is hard to determine the veracity of the letter's claims, given its authorship by members of the Maphumulo allied with Inkatha who would spend the next decade attempting to claim the chieftaincy. These would not be the last allegations of corruption against Mhlabunzima, but those from within his chiefdom came from political competitors working with Inkatha to discredit him. Misuse of tribal accounts is a possibility, especially since the implementation of Bantu Authorities required that fees previously paid to chiefs and headmen formed the basis of tribal authority accounts—thus resulting in most cases in a decrease in income.<sup>56</sup> The Maphumulo Tribal Authority paid Mhlabunzima a stipend on top of his government stipend, and if funds were being abused, it is difficult to say whether Mhlabunzima was the source. The chief had nice clothes and a car; a neighboring white farmer once recalled him buying cattle with a trunk full of cash.<sup>57</sup> But the chief dabbled in business, professional sports, and horse racing, and a later inquiry into misuse of Maphumulo funds cleared Mhlabunzima and suggested that headmen were pocketing fees.

This conflict within his chiefdom and pressure from his church caused Mhlabunzima to waver in his resistance to Inkatha. Several weeks later, in the same KZLA session, MP Simon Chonco—who by that point had earned a reputation as a

Buthelezi yes-man—made a motion to punish instigators in royalist plots to involve the king in politics. Mhlabunzima surprisingly supported the motion. He apologized to the KZLA for his involvement with the king and promised future cooperation to ensure unity. He agreed to invite the minister of justice to Mbambangalo to launch the Inkatha branch.<sup>58</sup> Mhlabunzima's change of face was likely for the purpose of self-preservation rather than ideological conversion. Instrumental to his apology was the Reverend Amos K. Shembe of the Church of the amaNazaretha. In May 1980, Amos excommunicated Mhlabunzima, a devout follower who grew up attending the Nazaretha temple in Edendale, until he repaired relations with KwaZulu.<sup>59</sup> With both his people and church pressuring him to improve relations with Buthelezi and the KZLA, Mhlabunzima acquiesced.

While Mhlabunzima apologized, he did not maintain the peace for long. While campaigning for the second KwaZulu elections in 1983, Mhlabunzima had an altercation with Chonco at a meeting in Maqongqo. Mhlabunzima believed that Chonco was forcing people to join Inkatha. In the conflict, Mhlabunzima pulled the chair out from under Chonco, sending the MP to the floor.<sup>60</sup> Mhlabunzima won in Mpumalanga, one of only four constituencies where independent candidates contested the election. He was also reelected as the chairman of the MRA.<sup>61</sup> During the first session of the new KZLA in October, at the new parliament building, Chonco and Chief Khawula launched a corporal attack on Mhlabunzima. Members of the KwaZulu police and a massive crowd watched as he was beaten unconscious for his renewed refusal to join Inkatha and the affront to Chonco. In the KZLA, Buthelezi again accused Mhlabunzima of working for the National Intelligence Service and of unleashing violence against Inkatha during the elections in Mpumalanga. Buthelezi explained the attack on Mhlabunzima, contending, "Whoever challenges me does not challenge me as Mangosuthu Gatsha Buthelezi but in fact challenges the people, and the people will deal with them."<sup>62</sup> While Mhlabunzima recovered in the hospital, he sent H. D. Gumede to represent him in the KZLA, refusing the forced affiliation with Inkatha.

## Insiders and Outsiders in the Settlement of the Goedverwachting Strip

When Chief Minister Buthelezi read a letter at the KZLA session in 1980 from Maphumulo members complaining about Mhlabunzima's provision of sites on grazing

and agricultural lands at exorbitant prices, he was touching on a much larger issue than just the allegation of corruption. The population of the Table Mountain region was increasing, but the land available for African settlement did not—especially as living patterns became more regimented by the betterment-mandated grazing and agricultural grounds. The vicinity of a thousand acres of trust-owned arable land only increased the frustrations of the Maphumulo and Nyavu. While Mhlabunzima was particularly active in attempts to bring this contested piece of Goedverwaching farm under his own jurisdiction, even during his suspension, the Nyavu, KwaZulu government, and apartheid officials all had stakes in the dispute over the trust farm. The settling of the farm strip reveals the return of the discourse of *ukukhonza*—the manner in which Africans at Table Mountain defined insiders and outsiders—and how people envisioned their connections to the land.

At Table Mountain, no development had been made on the Bantu village planned for the strip of Goedverwaching purchased between 1961 and 1968, but debate about its jurisdiction had already begun. At first, BAD prioritized resettlement in these villages according to betterment needs. People already living on trust farms but with no access to arable land were first to be relocated into Bantu villages, as were people resident in “black spots” and labor tenants given notice to quit.<sup>63</sup> While the initial plans for the Goedverwaching Bantu village assumed no chiefly control over the proposed settlement, this began to change as early as 1963. Pietermaritzburg BAC Oltmann and Agricultural Officer I. R. Matheson sought to amend the boundaries of the Maphumulo Tribal Authority after finding an error in the legal boundaries during the land sale. Oltmann wrote to the CBAC F. O. S. de Souza to inquire whether there was any reason the strip should not be included in the Maphumulo Tribal Authority boundaries. Oltmann felt that even if they established the village, those settled would “have to pay allegiance (‘konza’) to the Chief of the Maphumulo.”<sup>64</sup> But settlement could not commence on the strip until officials addressed concerns about the availability of water.<sup>65</sup>

By the time officials began to actually implement plans for the Goedverwaching strip in 1977, government land priorities had changed, opening a new avenue of debate about the farm’s jurisdiction. Despite the overcrowding of the surrounding land, the new priority for the Goedverwaching strip was the relocation of those forcefully removed elsewhere into a “relocation closer settlement.” Despite the absence of urban infrastructure and employment, as well as the distance from urban and metropolitan centers, no agricultural land was attached to closer settlements. People removed from “black spots” and white farms were relocated

to these settlements and given only temporary accommodation, often tents or tiny corrugated iron shacks called fletcraft, and were expected to build their own permanent houses.<sup>66</sup> The Goedverwachting closer settlement would be for relocated peoples, not for the relief of Onverwacht and the Goedverwachting remnant as once intended by the betterment plan for the farms.

Prior to the establishment of the closer settlement, permission for locals to utilize the Goedverwachting strip of land was limited. BAD granted a Permission to Occupy (PTO) to the Maphumulo Tribal Authority to construct their courthouse and a secondary school on this strip of Goedverwachting during 1975. Mhlabunzima was allowed to build his own homestead on the property, moving from his late father's homestead on Onverwacht.<sup>67</sup> These permissions combined with Maphumulo knowledge of the land exchange for the Nagle Dam to convince them that "the land was bound to be added to their tribal area eventually."<sup>68</sup>

As DCD officials planned the introduction of outsiders to Table Mountain on the closer settlement, Khangela and then Mhlabunzima were actually allocating new sites to both locals and newcomers. Across the border from the closer settlement on Onverwacht and Aasvogel Krans, Mhlabunzima settled 213 homesteads formerly under other chiefs on arable and grazing lands, including the Aasvogel Krans buffer zone between the Maphumulo and neighboring white farmers. Despite the 1969 proclamation that wrested control of land allocation from chiefs, chiefs continued to provide land without BAD oversight. Some of the people who went to Mhlabunzima for land left farms in the Mshwati area (in the New Hanover District) where they were born. Both men and women recalled how their families moved to Table Mountain. Tholi Hlela remembered: "My brothers went to work in Pietermaritzburg. When they went to Pietermaritzburg they met people from Maqongqo who told them that there were a lot of sites in Maqongqo. My brothers told my father that they had found a place in Maqongqo . . . We sold some of our cattle and some of them were loaded on a truck when we moved to here."<sup>69</sup> Ntombinazi Zakwe married into the Hlela family; her brothers-in-law worked as labor tenants, for six months at a time, but did not want to work for low wages any longer.<sup>70</sup> Labor tenants supplied their labor to the landowner for part of the year (often called *isithupha* to denote six months of work) as a form of rent in exchange for land. In 1964, the 1936 Land Act was amended to abolish the tenancy system, but the practice continued in Natal until 1980. Surplus People Project interviews suggest that the poor conditions of labor tenancy caused many tenants to willingly leave the farms.<sup>71</sup> For the Hlelas, it was better to try anew than continue to work for harsh employers earning low

wages. Manini Mbokozi, who also moved from the Mshwathi area, complained about the rent: “I moved there from Mshwathi because there where we were staying we had to pay rent [literally, tax] on the farm. Then I decided to come and look for a place in Maqongqo in the place of the chief [Mhlabunzima] there.” Manini’s family joined the Maphumulo but recognized that they were newcomers to the chiefdom.<sup>72</sup>


While those who wanted access to rural land without rent appreciated Mhlabunzima’s provision of sites, complaints from the neighboring farmers ensued. The Baynesdrift Farmers’ Association sent their grievances to the Ministry level, prompting local officials to react. The farmers protested the theft of livestock and produce, damage to fencing, and the gathering of firewood. When the PRD proposed the closer settlement, Natal PRD Chief Commissioner Dreyer hoped that the homesteads in the buffer zone could be relocated to the Goedverwaching closer settlement.<sup>73</sup>

Maphumulo Acting Chief Kwenzokuhle and the Maphumulo councilors began to use their knowledge about the land exchange for the dam and the language of insiders, outsiders, and *ukukhonza* to claim the strip as Maphumulo territory. After PRD officials appeared at the farm in mid-1979 to demarcate four hundred sites for the closer settlement, Kwenzokuhle and Mhlabunzima made frequent trips to the Mpumalanga magistrate to make their case. Not only did they believe that the strip of land was to be turned over to them, they expressed worry about the relocation of “strangers who are not subjects of their chief” to the land dividing their community. They did not oppose the settlement of outsiders, but they opposed the settlement of people who would not become members of the Maphumulo. They did not want any other chiefs to be settled there—a clear reference to the still-landless chiefs Sipiwe Majosi, whom the trust had in mind when it purchased the farm nearly two decades earlier, and Nqamula Mkhize, who had implemented a levy to try to buy the farm for his chiefdom.<sup>74</sup> They told the Natal chief commissioner that they needed at least half of the sites in the settlement because “hundreds of tribe members have reached adulthood and got married who could not live with their fathers anymore, and that [Mhlabunzima] wanted at least half of the plots to give to these people.” While officials higher up refused to acknowledge that the Maphumulo had any claim to the Goedverwaching strip, Kwenzokuhle and his councilors convinced Magistrate Pitcher with their case. Pitcher argued on behalf of the Maphumulo that if outsiders were relocated to the village site without their consent, it could only give rise to a very unpleasant situation.<sup>75</sup> But other officials did not want to lose control of the site allocation on the settlement.

DCD officials would not acknowledge that the Goedverwaching strip was owed to the Maphumulo but eventually began to concede that Mhlabunzima should be involved, especially as KwaZulu began to pressure their offices to transfer the land to KwaZulu. Despite the tension between Buthelezi and Mhlabunzima, the slow pace of land consolidation remained central to Buthelezi's criticisms of the state. He did not pass up the opportunity to add land to KwaZulu, which could result from granting the farm to the Maphumulo.<sup>76</sup> DCD officials did not oppose eventual transfer of the property to KwaZulu but balked at the idea of losing control over the closer settlement. The DCD desperately needed land to resettle people forcefully removed from across the Camperdown, New Hanover, Pietermaritzburg, and Richmond districts. The water shortage had prevented prior settlement (an irony given the purchase of the land in relation to the Nagle Dam project), but no other land was available in the district. Given the urgency, Chief Commissioner H. J. Backer granted permission for the relocation to begin and ordered four hundred fletcraft shacks to be sent to the settlement. He recommended that the people to be resettled on Goedverwaching *khonza* to the Maphumulo chief.<sup>77</sup>

By January 1980, an understanding was emerging that those relocated would *khonza* Mhlabunzima.<sup>78</sup> By then, twenty-one families had already been relocated to the closer settlement (see this settlement on map 9). Five families were moved from Mandisa (near Richmond) and another sixteen from Robin Mattison's farm on Greytown Road. Some of these families arrived by the infamous "GG" trucks, known as such because of the registration plate numbers "GG" denoting state transport. These families carried building materials from their old homes, but the settlement needed poles so that the new residents could build permanent dwellings. DCD Commissioner for Pietermaritzburg Muggleston requested that latrines urgently be sent from storage as at least twenty more families would arrive later that month. By the end of 1982, the DCD had relocated 120 families to the settlement.<sup>79</sup> Those relocated were issued PTOS and were expected to pay rent for their sites on the trust farm.<sup>80</sup>

Government officials paid close attention to the development of the closer settlement due to increasing pressure from nongovernmental organizations and the local Natal press. By the time DCD relocated the 120 families to the Goedverwaching settlement, the department felt intense scrutiny from these groups. The Natal chief commissioner bemoaned the manner in which activists celebrated "any conceivable grievance that can be unearthed in the closer settlements" in attempts to discredit the department and the state. The commissioner laid out a plan for settlements that



**MAP 9.** Goedverwaching closer settlement and KwaZulu Boundaries, 1986

he believed would improve the image of the department and these sites, central to which was the establishment of community councils and trust accounts so the community could be managed by an authority of its choice.<sup>81</sup>

Mhlabunzima used this community council to help consolidate his control of the contested strip. Initially, DCD officials failed to stir up support for a community council at the settlement. In 1984, Mqnath Rodgers Maphanga became the new ranger, the DCD's man on the ground whose primary responsibility was to ensure that no new persons took up residence on the land without permission from the Pietermaritzburg commissioner. Maphanga did his job well, as the number of families resettled remained at 130 until after his death. By 1987, a small local committee empowered to hear residents' complaints had formed. While the DCD planned for it to report directly to its office, at least one of the men registered to



the committee, Nyanga Maphumulo, was closely affiliated with Mhlabunzima and likely part of Mhlabunzima's attempt to claim the territory as his own. When Maphanga died in 1987, the committee chair Frazer Mfamoza Zimu attempted to take his place.<sup>82</sup>

Mhlabunzima also began to stake his claim on the land with development projects that the state failed to provide. Pressure against forced removals influenced Pretoria's May 1982 order that no further settlement could take place until the shortage of water at the site could be addressed.<sup>83</sup> Desperate for the land to settle more evictees, DCD officials drilled boreholes and introduced hand pumps, but by October 1982, only one still worked. The situation was made worse as Maphumulo outside of the settlement also used this water pump.<sup>84</sup> In 1985, Mhlabunzima attempted to manipulate the water shortage to the Maphumulo's advantage. In a request to have the land turned over to him, Mhlabunzima reported the tribal authority had made a representation to the Mngeni Water Board for the laying of a pipeline.<sup>85</sup> If the government could not provide the residents with water, the chief would. Because the Baynesdrift farmers' complaints continued throughout 1984 and 1985, DCD officials recommended the transfer of a portion or all of the strip to the Maphumulo. They echoed Natal Chief Commissioner Dreyer's earlier recommendation that transfer of jurisdiction to the Maphumulo Tribal Authority might temporarily absorb the increasing population and quell the concerns of the neighboring white farmers.<sup>86</sup>

Despite the tensions, Mhlabunzima also worked with KwaZulu on several public works projects on the trust-governed land without first consulting Natal's DCD officials. KwaZulu desired the speedy transfer of the farm to KwaZulu and thus began to invest. Major apartheid state investments helped Bantustan revenues increase fourfold during the first half of the 1970s, from around R120 million to R520 million, and they continued to grow afterward.<sup>87</sup> At Table Mountain, these funds enabled a clinic, a secondary school, employment projects, a new home for the agricultural officer, and the provision of water. KwaZulu provided R600,000 toward a joint Mngeni Water Board–KwaZulu project to lay pipeline to supply some ten thousand people in Mhlabunzima's area.<sup>88</sup> When KwaZulu approved finances for the construction of the clinic, the Mpumalanga magistrate, an Edendale Hospital representative, and the senior agricultural officer consulted with the local authorities. They chose a site near the Maphumulo courthouse and the chief's homestead because of its location between the two halves of the Maphumulo territory. A contractor was already on site to begin the construction when DCD was alerted;

DCD granted the PTO in 1981 because the site they had chosen for a clinic in the closer settlement had no water but this one could be serviced by water available to the courthouse.<sup>89</sup> Furthering the confusion over the jurisdiction of the settlement, DCD in Pretoria granted KwaZulu's request to construct the Mbambangalo High School, which opened in 1981, without consulting the Natal chief commissioner.<sup>90</sup>

The business and church sites in the settlement began to fill. One of the first PTOs granted for a business site was to Zimu, the chair of the Goedverwaching community council. Mhlabunzima proposed the construction of a trading center that would include a post office, bank, filling station, supermarket, restaurant, dry-cleaning depot, furniture store, clothing outlet, herbalist, shoemaker, dress-maker, and a craft shop. It would be funded by a loan from the KDC. He retained a company to initiate a project for the supply of electricity to the strip of land. The Pietermaritzburg commissioner supported the project in principle but ultimately denied the application because he wanted the trust land for settlement purposes.<sup>91</sup> Mhlabunzima later successfully applied for permission to build a general store and tearoom.<sup>92</sup>

This portion of the Goedverwaching strip was quickly becoming the center of the Maphumulo community and its chief took actions to ensure his jurisdiction over it. The Mbambangalo Secondary School and the clinic, named after the first Maphumulo chief Maguzu, only furthered the Maphumulo feeling that the land belonged to them. While KwaZulu certainly had its own land consolidation in mind when approving projects on the land, an expedient relationship began to emerge between Mhlabunzima and his former adversary, Buthelezi. The two chiefs reconciled in November 1984 when the two men met unplanned during a KZLA caucus. According to Mhlabunzima, Buthelezi apologized for the 1983 assault; Mhlabunzima in turn apologized for blaming Buthelezi. To demonstrate his commitment to their peace, Mhlabunzima accompanied Buthelezi to a rally in Soweto.<sup>93</sup> This alliance may have given Mhlabunzima the upper hand in developing the strip of Goedverwaching, especially when compared to his neighbor Bangubukhosi Mdluli, who remained relatively uninvolved in Bantustan politics. Mhlabunzima invited Buthelezi to officially open the new courthouse and the Maguzu Clinic in December 1987, surely hoping to keep him on his side in efforts to have the trust farm turned over to the Maphumulo. The same month, Mhlabunzima parroted the Inkatha line in a letter to the *Natal Witness's* "My View" column.<sup>94</sup> In a complete break from his Inala days, Mhlabunzima began to publicly identify as an "Inkatha man" to consolidate control over the Goedverwaching strip.

Mhlabunzima's peace with Buthelezi reveals not only the contingency of chiefly legitimacy, but the increasing connection between chiefs and desirable development. During Buthelezi's visit to Mbambangalo, the leader praised the Maphumulo as a people who knew the meaning of "putting differences aside and joining with your Zulu brothers and sisters wherever they may be for the sake of your community." He commended Mhlabunzima for the hard work done to bring the clinic there despite attempts by the commissioner of Pietermaritzburg to prevent it because it was not on KwaZulu land. In a stark contrast from just seven years earlier when members of the KZLA attacked the Maphumulo chieftaincy as a shallow lineage allied to imperial powers, Buthelezi paid tribute to Mhlabunzima with Maphumulo *izithakazelo* (clan praises), Mashimane, saying, "It was the present *inkosi*, *Inkosi* M.J. Maphumulo who introduced the idea of having a clinic in the area . . . What an example of leadership the Inkosi has demonstrated to all of us. We pay tribute to you, Mashimane, for this quality of leadership, which does credit to the line of Maphumulo leaders from whom you are descended."<sup>95</sup> Mhlabunzima was no longer "only the fourth chief." He was now Mashimane, a model chief with a history, and a modern leader responsible for development.

This connection between chiefs and development was also in stark contrast to just three decades earlier. Here the emphasis is on development as desired by chiefly subjects. Nyavu subjects protested agricultural development that put the burden of labor upon them and forced their chief to equivocate in his cooperation with Bantu Authorities. But here Mhlabunzima worked to provide health care, water, and electricity—development that bolstered his legitimacy among followers and also contributed to the sense that the land belonged to the Maphumulo. One woman recalled the late chief's efforts fondly: "Even today we are still grieving for the way he treated us. He used to say, he wants to build urban houses for us and put water; he even put in a huge water pipe to distribute to all the houses in Maqongqo."<sup>96</sup>

Japhet Madlala, the son of a man who served as Mhlabunzima's deputy chief, explained how Mhlabunzima's work to bring development to the Goedverwaching strip made the Maphumulo feel the land would be turned over to them:

When he finished building his house, he then requested for a school nearby his place on Naartjies' place [reference to the Ferreira family that sold the strip to the trust] . . . Then they gave him the school . . . he built the school on Naartjies farm land. Then he requested to dip his cattle or the tribe's cattle in the same dip that belonged to Naartjies. . . . He then said, can I please have a clinic next to my home? Indeed, they built the clinic. Then after that he asked for a tribal court. They built

the tribal court. He then asked for an agricultural house. He received it. Then after all that he said: my house, Mbambangalo School, the community dipping tank, the clinic, courthouse and the agricultural house. He continued saying, these six things I have already built now, does that not give me permission to take over this land? Then they said, actually there is no way we could stop you from taking this land. Then the place falls back to him which is why he had courage to give people sites at eChibini.<sup>97</sup>

Madlala's account also suggests how Mhlabunzima then turned to granting sites on the strip, independently of the DCD.

After the death of Ranger Maphanga in 1986, Mhlabunzima began to allocate sites across the road from the closer settlement on the trust farm. The district representative of home affairs visited the disputed land in April 1987 and found that already four homes had been constructed on the trust land opposite the closer settlement. Mhlabunzima's headman Msongelwa Mkhize had been "selling residential sites" for R200.<sup>98</sup> The sites had been marked out by tractors and were four times the size of the closer settlement plots. The chief had also given permission for the cutting of trees on the farm to make way for a power line, a right that he did not have, given his lack of jurisdiction. The Mpumalanga magistrate suspected that the chief had begun to allocate sites in order to preempt the conflict over the jurisdiction of the farm.<sup>99</sup> While the magistrate considered Mhlabunzima's actions illegal, members of his chieftom saw them otherwise. Balothi Goge saw Mhlabunzima's views on land allocation as progressive: "When Mhlabunzima started to rule over this land he said we have to take our IDs and register our own plot because everyone must have a stake in that land and not to call the place the chief's land."<sup>100</sup> Another woman saw her *khonza* fee for a site near Mhlabunzima's on the Goedverwaching strip as the equivalent of a title deed: "I was lucky at the time because they said those who want titles must buy them. I bought a title with R25 and I still have it now."<sup>101</sup>

But as DCD began to change its stance on Mhlabunzima's control of the Goedverwaching strip, so too did KwaZulu. Proclamation 232/1986 announced the transfer of trust-owned land to the Bantustan government, including Aasvogel Krans, Onverwacht, and the Goedverwaching remnant. But KwaZulu refused to accept the contested strip of Goedverwaching D, 5, and 6 until the water and "tribal problems" were sorted.<sup>102</sup> The "tribal problems" to which KwaZulu referred were other competing claims over the Goedverwaching strip between the Maphumulo and Nyavu Tribal Authorities.

After a period of relative quiet, the Nyavu had begun to make their own claims on the trust farm. In 1982, Bangubukhosi applied to rebuild the Nyavu's Gcina school on the trust farm but the department refused permission. At the time, Natal Chief Commissioner Backer sympathized with the Nyavu's need but argued: "Although funds are not available at this stage for settlement of squatters the situation could improve. . . . Land, however, cannot be enlarged and therefore the reason for turning down the Tribal Authorities [*sic*] application."<sup>103</sup> The Nyavu Tribal Authority's application for the Gcina school site suggested the Nyavu may have recognized the strip was to be turned over to the Maphumulo. Attached to the application was a letter of approval from Mhlabunzima stating that he had no objection to the proposed school site.<sup>104</sup> It is difficult to say whether Bangubukhosi did accept Mhlabunzima's control of the land or if he expediently put aside his own claim to the land to provide a much-needed school. Recall from that education had been identified as one of the chiefdom's reasons for initially accepting Bantu Authorities. The latter may be possible, because in 1986, Bangubukhosi tried to claim the land for his chiefdom.

When Bangubukhosi heard about the transfer of the farms to KwaZulu, the Nyavu Tribal Authority sent a letter to the Mpumalanga magistrate requesting not only the trust-governed portion of Goedverwaching, but rather the entire farm, as well as Onverwacht. Just as his father and his grandfather had done before him, Bangubukhosi argued that the Nyavu claim on the farms stemmed from their historical occupation of place—connecting his claim to his hereditary rule and the burial place of his ancestors. In English, Bangubukhosi's secretary wrote, "These farms are illustrated under Manyavu Tribe before they were taken by the land owners of these farms. Therefore the Manyavu Tribe kindly require for this portion to rebelong [*sic*] to them as it was previously. They have also heard that they are also their forfathers [*sic*] tombs which a[re] lying in this portion."<sup>105</sup> While Bangubukhosi rarely spoke out in the KZLA, he sent a delegation to Ulundi on the land matter but found no resolution.<sup>106</sup> While KwaZulu initially backed the Maphumulo Tribal Authority's request for the land to be incorporated into their jurisdiction, as the Nyavu began to assert their claim, the Bantustan refused to accept the property. Even as Buthelezi opened the Maphumulo courthouse and clinic, KwaZulu wanted the land but did not want the accompanying problems.

While officials from Natal offices and the magistrate increasingly expressed support for the transfer of the strip to the Maphumulo Territorial Authority, no documents acknowledge any official permission given by Pretoria for the trust farm residents to *khonza* to Mhlabunzima. In practice, some residents did begin to pay

their respects to the chief, but not all. Albertina Ndimande arrived at the closer settlement from Hammarsdale sometime after the 1981–1982 relocations when she chose to join her brother so her stepchildren could go to school in Maqongqo. She called the site *Emijondolo* because the people were still living in shacks after their relocation. She knew that they “were not of the Nyavu or of Mhlabunzima but [that they] stayed in a small piece of land there.” While she recognized they were not formally subjects of the Nyavu or Maphumulo, she remembered attending meetings where Mhlabunzima spoke and that he “was helping everybody.”<sup>107</sup>

In the wake of devastating floods in the Msunduze floodplain in 1987, several Nyavu families moved across the boundary onto the trust farm. None of current Nyavu members spoken to could recall a crossing of boundaries—likely because they see the land as falling under their territory. Maphumulo subjects differed on whether they paid *khonza* to Mhlabunzima. Simanga Mkhize, a member of the Maphumulo who worked for the KwaZulu government’s agricultural office, suggested that they did, enabling them access to the land. He said that the paying of *khonza* enabled the Nyavu to build Mcoseli school and Mathondo Ngcobo to start a shop at Echibini. But they later started to claim the area belonged to the Nyavu.<sup>108</sup> Baningi Maphumulo, a contested member of the Maphumulo *umndeni* who later became regent, recalled: “Mhlabunzima gave a place to Zululiyaduma, Somtsalo and others to build their home. After they were settled, they wanted to break the law, they said the place was theirs.”<sup>109</sup> Mhlabunzima, convinced of his jurisdiction over the land, complained to the Mpumalanga magistrate that the Nyavu had encroached “onto land which has been regarded as land allocated by the Government to the Maphumulo Tribal Authority for control by such authority and settlement thereon of members of the Maphumulo Tribe or persons paying allegiance to the Tribe.”<sup>110</sup>

DDA officials sought to end these “tribal problems” so they could turn the land over to KwaZulu. It was clear no future settlement would be done, given the increased resistance to forced relocations. Prior to the flooding, DDA Regional Representative D. Varty attempted to end the dispute with a response to Bangubukhosi’s repeated queries about the jurisdiction of the farms. Varty sent the Nyavu chief a copy of the original government gazette that delineated the boundaries of the Maphumulo and Nyavu Tribal Authorities. Onverwacht and the remnant of Goedverwaching were legally the territory of the Maphumulo.<sup>111</sup>

Mpumalanga Magistrate Webber used the same logic when he visited Table Mountain after the flooding to meet with those contesting the land. Mhlabunzima, senior headman Ndoda Gwala, deputy chief Albert Madlala, and several other

headmen were present for the Maphumulo. Bangubukhosi was not present for the Nyavu, but his Tribal Secretary Mtolo was, as were several TA councilors and subjects. Webber's November 1988 meeting notes suggested that all knew the boundary, but the Nyavu believed the farms to have been given erroneously to the Maphumulo when the dam was built: "There is feeling among members of the Manyavu Tribe, however, that all this Trust farm formed part of the Manyavu area before the White man subdivided it into farms for Whites." In his report to KwaZulu on the conflict, Webber cited the gazetted tribal boundaries to conclude that the Nyavu had no legal claim to Onverwacht or Goedverwaching. What is less clear is whether Webber's understanding of "Goedverwaching" included the latter purchased strip of Goedverwaching. In one numbered point, the magistrate stated, "There is therefore no question in my mind of any doubt about which Tribal Authority according to statute is legally in control of *any of the Trust farm Goedverwacht [sic]*, namely the Maphumulo Tribal Authority who were moved on to land purchased as compensation for land transferred to the Durban Corporation" (my emphasis). In the next numbered point, he listed the subsequently purchased portions of Goedverwaching, before closing that the land in dispute was that on which the new Maphumulo courthouse and clinic were opened.<sup>112</sup> It is not clear whether "any of the Trust farm" included the later added strip.

Whether or not Webber believed the strip of trust farm to be under the jurisdiction of the Maphumulo, the proclamations outlining the boundaries of the tribal authority were never amended to include the strip of trust farm, so to this day there remains no legal evidence that it falls under the territory of either.<sup>113</sup> However, Fred Kockett, a reporter for the *Natal Witness* who followed the Table Mountain region closely, and members of the Maphumulo later cited this visit of Webber to the contested land as evidence that the government acknowledged Mhlabunzima's jurisdiction.<sup>114</sup> At no point during these disputes did the government officials actually acknowledge Bangubukhosi's assertion that the land given to the Maphumulo was not the government's to give.

## Conclusion

In the contest over the settling of the Goedverwaching strip, several discourses swirled about who had rights to the land and how history enabled those rights. Mhlabunzima and Bangubukhosi became involved in the KZLA and ethnic

nationalist politics, despite their chiefdoms' earlier resistance to Bantu Authorities. The administration of segmented land was a central concern of the nascent KwaZulu Bantustan who sought land consolidation prior to independence for the Zulu. But DCD also desperately needed land to resettle forcefully removed families across Natal, resulting in a struggle between the Bantustan, apartheid development officials, and the two chiefs and their followers.

The experiences of colonial land dispossession and forced removals shaped how the Nyavu and Maphumulo claimed the contested farm. The Maphumulo desired land for their own population increase, especially as they encroached on the buffer land between them and the neighboring white farmers. They saw the one-thousand-acre strip of Goedverwachting as a place promised to them in the exchange of land for the Nagle Dam project. Mhlabunzima began to allocate residential sites there as a way to claim it as a Maphumulo place. His ability to use his KZLA position to claim the land was initially strained by his anti-Inkatha stance and his alliance with his ambitious classmate, King Zwelithini. By the mid-1980s, he put aside his conflict with Buthelezi to work with KwaZulu, who wanted the territory as part of Bantustan consolidation, to provide health care and education. He promised services to those forcefully relocated there if they would *khonza* him. In the midst of this contestation, the Nyavu requested that the DCD and KwaZulu recognize their rights to the land on account of their hereditary status and historical occupation of place lost in colonization.

As Buthelezi consolidated his control over the Bantustan, sidelining the Zulu king, he increasingly appeared to the apartheid regime as a leader with whom it could work. While for some chiefs and their subjects Buthelezi's Inkatha initially represented a link with the underground ANC, by 1979 that relationship had ended publicly. Buthelezi had once criticized Mhlabunzima as an apartheid agent, but he was becoming one himself. Mhlabunzima's 1983 concern about Inkatha's use of force in local mobilization efforts proved true. Inkatha recruitment campaigns became increasingly violent in the wake of the 1983 formation of the United Democratic Front as an umbrella organization for groups against apartheid. By 1985, Inkatha chiefs and headmen were at the center of a struggle for power in a region on the brink of civil war.





# Civil War in South Africa



# Because My People Are in the MDM, I Have to Be with Them

## Ethnic and African Nationalist Politics during Civil War, 1983–1990

In South Africa, the institution of chiefs was regarded as an extension of the regime. So most people regarded chiefs as surrogates of the government, but not every chief was like that. A group of progressive chiefs, whose ideas were opposed to the policy of apartheid, decided in 1987 to form CONTRALESA. This was to clearly demonstrate their objection to apartheid . . . One has to move with the people. If one is leading people who are progressive I think it is right and proper to be also progressive as a leader. Because my people are in the M[ass Democratic Movement], I have to be with them.

—Mhlabunzima Maphumulo in *Sechaba*, 1990

In late 1988, Mhlabunzima estimated that some five hundred families—refugees from political violence—had moved to Table Mountain and *khonza'd* him for access to land and security. South Africa's transition to democracy is often heralded as a bloodless miracle, but the nation was actually at war for over a decade before Nelson Mandela's election as president. As violence erupted across KwaZulu/Natal, the Maphumulo chief offered a refuge by allocating sites on the contested Goedverwaching strip to those fleeing the war. The nature of the dam

land exchange and Mhlabunzima's development projects led the Maphumulo to believe that this space was the place of the Maphumulo. Those *khonza*'ing the chief became members of the Maphumulo. Mhlabunzima felt responsibility as a traditional leader to end the war and to provide security. He promoted political tolerance, welcoming both Inkatha- and United Democratic Front (UDF)-affiliated refugees to his chiefdom, and began public efforts to quell the region's violence.

While Mhlabunzima had previously made peace with Buthelezi and Inkatha in his attempts to acquire the contested acreage at Table Mountain, his declaration of political tolerance and provision of safety led many to see the man as "the peace chief" and his territory at Table Mountain as a "haven of peace." This growing public profile of "the peace chief" caught the attention of national organizers working with the ANC and the UDF—an umbrella structure of grassroots anti-apartheid organizations formed in 1983. The liberation movement was looking for anti-apartheid chiefs. "Progressive" came to describe anti-apartheid "traditional leaders" rather than the progressivism implied by the apartheid government and its manipulated "chiefs." The UDF sent recruiters to Natal in early 1989, where they convinced Mhlabunzima to join the national struggle against apartheid as a member of the newly founded Congress of Traditional Leaders of South Africa (Contralesa). Mhlabunzima had come to believe that Inkatha recruitment campaigns fueled the violence and that he should support his followers in the Mass Democratic Movement (MDM) against apartheid.

This chapter reveals how refugees and chiefs used *ukukhonza* to navigate the war. Conservative estimates suggest at least twenty thousand deaths, thirteen thousand of which occurred in KwaZulu/Natal, between 1985 and 1996. Thousands more were wounded, raped, or abducted, and many disappeared.<sup>1</sup> Suggestive of the scale of violence in the region compared to that in the rest of South Africa, close to half of all statements reporting gross human rights abuses to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) came from KwaZulu/Natal. These violations ranged from incarceration, assault, arson, and destruction of property to politically motivated killings.<sup>2</sup> Scholarship on this war explains the violence in political and cultural terms, the divide between a young, urban, and democratic ANC/UDF and a rural, traditionalist Inkatha supported by the apartheid regime and international capitalism.<sup>3</sup> Jason Hickel demonstrates the motives informing the political affiliations of isiZulu-speaking migrant laborers who allied with Inkatha and fought to protect an idealized sense of the homestead and hierarchical order.<sup>4</sup> This suggests only those migrants affiliated with Inkatha relied upon such knowledge to make

decisions. But cultural inheritances influenced the political motivations of rural peoples across the political divide, and a disjuncture existed between local and national understandings of the war.

## Total Strategy, the Third Force, and Civil War

South Africa's civil war unfolded in the context of national repression against the liberation movement and a global Cold War. The National Party under President P. W. Botha embarked on a decade of reform and repression in the 1980s. Strategically calculated policy innovations aimed to win public support and international legitimacy for apartheid, and heightened security strove to curb the country's increasingly radical popular resistance in the wake of the 1976 Soweto uprising. The centerpiece of Botha's reform efforts was the creation of a new constitution in 1983 in which separate parliaments would represent whites, Asians, and Coloureds, while Bantustan legislative assemblies continued to represent black South Africans. This Tricameral Parliament proposal galvanized black opposition under the banner of the UDF. The UDF brought together grassroots civic, religious, sport, student, and worker groups opposed to Botha's constitutional reforms. UDF leaders initially sought to avoid an outright affiliation with the banned ANC, but in practice, many leaders were ANC members, and the strategies and tactics of the ANC influenced the UDF's character.<sup>5</sup>

Botha's government enacted repressive measures against anti-apartheid resistance as part of a "total strategy" to counter a perceived "total onslaught" of international communism. Botha declared that the South Africa Communist Party (SACP), an ally of the ANC against apartheid, was actually using the ANC as a front for communist penetration, comparing the situation to Mozambique and Angola, where Marxist governments accompanied independence. All radical opposition was put down as "furthering the aims of communism" as South Africa set out on a campaign of low-intensity conflict. Botha, who was formerly the minister of defense, built the prior minor cabinet of State Security Council into a massive security apparatus that implemented infrastructure projects and social programs to "win hearts and minds," identified local activists so the security police could apprehend them, and executed a covert operation of dirty tricks and lethal violence. This low-intensity conflict pursued by the regime was characterized by nonconventional methods of warfare to spread fear, insecurity, and internal divisions among the

opposition. Cost-efficient and less internationally visible than conventional war, low-intensity conflict effected repression through bannings, detentions, assassinations, kidnappings, and torture. South Africa deployed this warfare both internally and externally, the latter in wars of destabilization in Mozambique, Angola, and Namibia to protect the buffer ring of white states and limit the external threat of the ANC in southern Africa.<sup>6</sup>

South Africa's "total strategy" included forming pacts with dissatisfied elements of society, and in KwaZulu/Natal, the success of low-intensity conflict relied upon Inkatha. While Buthelezi had his own ambitions and strategies, as did individuals affiliated with the organization, Inkatha became a full-fledged surrogate of the apartheid regime in an international proxy war. The organization accepted military training from the SADF, and South African and American funding for political rallies and Inkatha's trade union, the United Workers Union of South Africa (UWUSA). Buthelezi spoke of Inkatha as founded upon the "principle of nonviolence" and projected the organization as the inheritor of the ANC's mantle inside the country, but the two parties fell out after an October 1979 meeting in London in which Buthelezi sought to promote his own legitimacy.<sup>7</sup> By this time, KwaZulu leaders perceived Inkatha as the only legitimate liberation movement and became increasingly intolerant of differing political opinions. KwaZulu began to rely upon armed regiments in altercations with political opponents. After 1980, Inkatha began training youth at its paramilitary camp Mandleni/Matleng in KwaZulu and armed Inkatha supporters began to patrol the KwaZulu-administered townships.<sup>8</sup> In 1985, the South African Minister of Defense Magnus Malan approved a contra-mobilization program of paramilitary training for Inkatha to deploy against the UDF and ANC. Malan's approval warned of the special cover-up measures that would necessarily accompany such a program.<sup>9</sup> While South Africa's apartheid presidents would later feign ignorance, Investigative Task Unit Head Howard Varney's submission to the TRC showed approval came from "the highest level" of the apartheid government.<sup>10</sup>

This paramilitary training for Inkatha in 1986, known as Operation Marion, enabled the deployment of armed and trained soldiers under the guise of KwaZulu Police (KZP) across KwaZulu, where they served as security and personal henchmen for local Inkatha leaders, chiefs, and headmen who were increasingly seen as warlords.<sup>11</sup> The SADF trained these two hundred Inkatha supporters in the Caprivi Strip in Namibia—then under South African control—in the use of Soviet weapons, heavy artillery, and explosives, as well as techniques to avoid arrest or interrogation.

The TRC found these soldiers, known as Caprivians, responsible for many of the most infamous and deadly incidents in the civil war.<sup>12</sup>

No one moment marks the start of the war in KwaZulu/Natal. Sporadic violent incidents took place as early as the 1980 announcement of plans to transfer Pietermaritzburg's townships and freehold areas to KwaZulu and Inkatha suppression of student boycotts in Durban. The 1983 launch of the UDF meant organized internal opposition to Inkatha and an intensification in school boycotts and protests against rent and transport increases. Community-based struggles became linked with ANC-underground activities.<sup>13</sup> By 1985, violent clashes had grown into larger scale battles, particularly in the Durban townships. The 1985 murder of UDF leader and attorney Victoria Mxenge by a Security Branch hit squad (her husband Griffiths was similarly assassinated in 1980) marked a turning point for Durban. Inkatha leader Thomas Shabalala and KZLA MP Winnington Sabelo led an attack on mourners at Victoria's funeral in Umlazi, killing seventeen and injuring twenty others. In the greater Pietermaritzburg region, a BTR-SARMCOL rubber factory workers' strike to get recognition for the Metal and Allied Workers Union (MAWU) in mid-1985 sparked the onset of wider conflict. BTR-SARMCOL dismissed 970 striking members and Buthelezi called on Inkatha to resist the stay-away in support of the workers. The next year, Inkatha bussed in supporters for a rally in Mphophomeni, where virtually all of the UDF-aligned community was now unemployed. On leaving the halls, Inkatha members assaulted residents and damaged property. Caprivian Vela Mchunu and eight other Inkatha members kidnapped and murdered four MAWU members, setting in motion a lengthy period of deadly conflict. BTR-SARMCOL replaced the striking workers with Inkatha's UWUSA members.<sup>14</sup>

By 1987, violence spiraled across the KwaZulu/Natal region, escalating into a struggle for control of the townships. Pietermaritzburg and the surrounding Midlands were at war. Inkatha embarked on compulsory recruitment campaigns in the face of increasing UDF popularity. The September 1987 floods in Pietermaritzburg that forced some Nyavu residents onto the contested land at Table Mountain also may have contributed to the violence, as the flood damage and corruption in the distribution of flood relief led to anger at Inkatha and KwaZulu structures.<sup>15</sup> Civic organizations formed in the townships under the ambit of the UDF and youth set up self-defense units (SDUs) in response to the attacks. While some have sought to explain this large-scale social movement of comrades, or *amaqabane*, in terms of youth finding their way amidst unemployment and the breakdown of social norms,



these men and women saw themselves as soldiers of the liberation movement.<sup>16</sup> The ANC underground and Umkhonto weSizwe (MK) units actively participated in the mobilization of SDUs, giving crash courses in political education and weaponry to enable the SDUs to defend their communities.<sup>17</sup>

A cycle of vicious violence erupted with each side accusing the other of instigation. The violence spread to nearly every Pietermaritzburg township. The climate of political intolerance raged unabated, especially after the 1988 release from Robben Island of ANC veteran Harry Gwala, who, despite a debilitating motor neuron disease, threw himself into the mobilization of counterattacks.<sup>18</sup> Reporter Matthew Kentridge described the violence's reach: "Every road, ditch, yard, river, house and hillside is a war zone."<sup>19</sup> These places became politically territorialized and "no-go areas" emerged as the UDF and Inkatha fought for dominance. Some neighborhoods were renamed to reflect local and international sites in the anti-colonial struggle; Imbali's Harewood became Ulundi, signifying it as an Inkatha stronghold, and Dambuza took on the name Maputo after the then anti-apartheid-friendly city. People were killed for being in the wrong place. Life for local people became a daily struggle against life-threatening danger and insecurity.

That Inkatha served as an apartheid proxy in this war does not explain why individuals and communities allied themselves with the party. Inkatha collaboration and use of force in the war caused many to see the organization and its leaders as illegitimate authorities propped up by apartheid, but others fiercely supported the movement. Particularly for migrant laborers and rural peoples who fought for Inkatha, the organization represented a defense of a moral order "that sees kinship hierarchies in homesteads as essential to the ritual processes" that provide the conditions for collective well-being. Inkatha followers rejected the ANC's version of democracy that recognized all individuals as equal in favor of an order that recognized hierarchies.<sup>20</sup> But chiefly hierarchies could, and were, also used by ANC- and UDF-affiliated chiefs and their followers to promote order and the incorporation of traditional authority in the coming new South Africa.<sup>21</sup>

And a new South Africa was on the horizon. The brutality of the civil war made news headlines worldwide, giving international anti-apartheid movements, including divestment campaigns, momentum with immediate effect. After the 1985 State of Emergency, one of the biggest lenders, Chase Manhattan Bank of New York, stopped rolling over its loans (\$500 million) to South Africa and recalled its credit. Other banks began to withdraw, the rand began falling, and big business began to plan its exit, undermining P. W. Botha's assurances of South African economic

stability.<sup>22</sup> South Africa was in crisis and Mhlabunzima Maphumulo sought to restore order.

## Allegiance and the Making of the “Peace Chief”

It is difficult to determine the exact number of people made refugees by the war, particularly because some returned home when violence abated while others were more permanent. By mid-1989, when the war began to spread toward the rural areas, there were at least ten thousand permanent refugees and another ten to fifteen thousand temporary ones in the Natal Midlands.<sup>23</sup> Some lived with employers or sympathetic white, Coloured, and Indian friends in the city. In some places, the refugee movement reflected the geographical pattern of violence, such as in Edendale where radical refugees relocated and forced Inkatha supporters out.<sup>24</sup> At Table Mountain from July 1989, the Nyavu chiefdom was embroiled in violent conflict on their eastern boundary with the Ximba. To the Nyavu’s west, Mhlabunzima openly promoted political tolerance and sought to organize peace efforts in the region. Initially, Mhlabunzima’s Mbambangalo remained quiet, earning a reputation as a “haven of peace.”

Some of the people fleeing from the Pietermaritzburg war began to flock to Mhlabunzima for security. Many of these refugees settled in the area that came to be known as Echibini on the disputed strip of Goedverwachting. Some moved very early in the violence and were able to take with them furniture and housing materials. Thobile Ngcobo recalls moving after her brother was killed when the war broke out in KwaShange in 1987. After the same men threatened her father, the family decided it was time to leave. Their pastor’s family was from Maqongqo, so they packed all of their belongings. Pastor Ngcobo allowed them to stay on his family’s agricultural land at Ezinembeni until they got permission began to build their new home.<sup>25</sup> A coworker told Phyllis Ngubane’s husband about Mhlabunzima and they asked him for land when the violence erupted in Sweetwaters; headman Norman Gumede allocated them a site on the contested land.<sup>26</sup> Siphwiwe Maphumulo remembered assisting someone to become a member of the Maphumulo: “I also *khonzela*’d someone. I worked at Mooi River. This person was also working for the same white person. Then I introduced him to the chief and they advised him to *khonzela* the chief. You had to *khonzela inkosi*, that fee used to be called the *khonza* fee. The chief wrote the receipt and sent us

to the [Tribal] Secretary.”<sup>27</sup> In October 1988, Mhlabunzima estimated that some five hundred families had already taken refuge at Table Mountain, camping at his courthouse and paying *khonza* for access to their own piece of land. By April 1989, he claimed ten thousand refugees and the presence of Inkatha recruiters. In the beginning, they were largely Inkatha-supporting refugees, but later influxes brought unaffiliated and UDF-aligned families.<sup>28</sup>

Mhlabunzima welcomed all, as long as they understood the necessity of political tolerance. Behind the scenes, Mhlabunzima was moving away from Inkatha and into the Mass Democratic Movement, but he continued to promote political impartiality as a way to ensure security. In interviews, many of his subjects described his pleas that people keep politics “in their homes.” Zinsizwa Dlomo said:

He said I am not discriminating against anyone in my place in regards to organizations. Anyone can choose his or her suitable organization but they must keep that in their house because we do not want this place to be like the places that you ran away from . . . He called that meeting after he welcomed outsiders. He said, I am welcoming you in my place because I do not want to see you sleeping in the bushes.<sup>29</sup>

In April 1989, Mhlabunzima refused Inkatha officials from Imbali and Inadi access to his followers. Fearful of the violence spreading to his area, he forbade recruitment campaigns in his area.<sup>30</sup>

But the strain on resources became significant with the influx of newcomers, and Mhlabunzima used the situation to raise awareness about land issues. The DDA had stopped resettling people on the Goedverwaching strip of land due to the water shortage. Mhlabunzima initiated a water project, but it was not yet complete when refugees began to arrive. The steady influx of newcomers also put stress on transportation, and Mhlabunzima pressured the local businessman whose family ran the bus line, C. J. Maphumulo, to address the problem. While Mhlabunzima allocated sites and presented the land as his own territory, there should be no doubt that he knew settling people who *khonza*’d him there helped to legitimate his claim on the land. He told the press about the process of *khonza* and the need for more land: “More keep on coming, but I do not have enough land.”<sup>31</sup> He further explained the expectation that the refugees *khonza* him to take up permanent residence. “People are not made to pay money to live in the area, but in our tradition they are expected to pay ‘*khonza*’—a tribute to the chief—just like when they leave the area



**FIGURE 17.** Inkatha and UDF guests at Mhlabunzima's peace party, 1988.

PHOTOGRAPH SUPPLIED BY THE ALAN PATON CENTRE AND STRUGGLE ARCHIVES AND USED WITH PERMISSION OF THE WITNESS.

they are supposed to pay 'valelisa' to the chief they have been staying under." He admitted that the state of war prevented many from paying the *valelisa* fee. He also explained that *khonza* could range from a goat to a small sum of money, dependent on the person's circumstances.<sup>32</sup>

While members of the Maphumulo alerted friends and family in search of security about Mhlabunzima's haven of peace, the chief was also involved in several public initiatives to end the violence that contributed to his reputation as the peace chief. In August 1988, Mhlabunzima convened a meeting of clergymen, Inkatha members, and representatives of the Edendale Crisis Committee with the assistance of Inkatha member Ben Jele, but senior Inkatha officials ignored the meeting.<sup>33</sup> In October, a month before Mpumalanga Magistrate Peter Webber visited the trust farm in an attempt to sort out the land dispute, Maphumulo threw a "peace party" at his court to celebrate his fifteen-year reign as chief and the calm that had

prevailed there under his rule. Peace party attendees included Mpumalanga Mayor Roger Sishi, Magistrate Webber, and both “traditional stick-wielding warriors and young *maqabane* (comrades) displaced from the violence-torn Pietermaritzburg townships.” Speakers Jele and COSATU regional coordinator Bheki Ngidi attributed the lack of violence during Mhlabunzima’s rule to his neutrality. The chief described his success, “I have to accommodate every member of my tribe irrespective of their political allegiance, be it UDF, Cosatu, Inkatha, or Azapo. I will not tolerate people who go house to house forcing others to join their organization.”<sup>34</sup> Mhlabunzima also spearheaded peace efforts in the war-torn Mpumalanga township where he had been chairman of the Mpumalanga Regional Authority. Violence was rampant in the township since the murder of Victoria Mxenge.<sup>35</sup> By 1989, Mpumalanga had the reputation as the most unstable area in the province. Mhlabunzima attempted to arrange meetings where residents could air their grievances with senior police officials regarding the actions of *kitkonstabels* (special constables), whom many recognized were the source of much of the violence.<sup>36</sup>

Mhlabunzima’s awareness of the plight of his new followers and his former constituency in Mpumalanga drove the chief to advocate for a judicial commission of inquiry into the violence. Throughout 1988, Anglican Bishop of Natal Michael Nuttall, the *Natal Witness* newspapers, COSATU, the Progressive Federal Party, and several local religious and civic organizations unsuccessfully advocated for such a commission.<sup>37</sup> Mhlabunzima joined their call, dedicating himself to understanding the violence. He utilized his education and connections to undertake hundreds of interviews and extensive reading, so he could record what he believed to be the common perceptions of his people concerning what he then recognized as civil war. He explained the reasons behind his quest, telling the press he believed that “a chief is a shield for his people, protecting them at all times ‘like an umbrella’ and that violence increased when chiefs took sides and the people lost that umbrella.”<sup>38</sup> He felt it was his duty as chief to bring peace and channeled his research into a petition—full of charts illustrating the scale of the violence as recorded by the violence monitors at the Centre for Adult Education at the University of Natal-Pietermaritzburg—to Botha.<sup>39</sup> On April 7, 1989, Maphumulo and Pietermaritzburg Lawyers for Human Rights advocates Ann Skelton, Pat Stillwell, and Jules Browde handed the petition to Botha’s representatives at his residence in Cape Town. “We sat drinking tea out of delicate cups whilst we waited and waited. Eventually Botha sent out one of his male secretaries to tell us he had received the petition and he would consider it,” Skelton remembered.<sup>40</sup> Upon their return to Natal, Mhlabunzima

began to criticize Inkatha openly in the press, pointing to the movement as the instigator of the violence.<sup>41</sup>

While Mhlabunzima's followers, old and new, took refuge in his haven of peace in a region at war, his neutral stance faced serious opposition from the chiefs who lost followers to the peace chief, as well as Buthelezi and the KZLA. At the peace gathering, Maphumulo told the press about opposition he faced from other chiefs of Pietermaritzburg who "do not like what I am doing and say I must not accept any UDF members in my community." After the meeting, Mhlabunzima received multiple threats on his life and rumors about a hit squad stationed at KwaSwayimane—where KZLA MP Psychology Ndlovu was beginning to earn a reputation as an Inkatha strongman—began to circulate. Callers to the chief threatened that he would die like his friend, the Ximba chief, Msinga Mlaba, who had been assassinated by Caprivians earlier that year for his UDF connections. In light of these threats, the Maphumulo Tribal Authority arranged for young men who had played soccer for Mhlabunzima to drive him and serve as bodyguards for the chief.<sup>42</sup>

The KZLA called Mhlabunzima to appear to answer for his behavior, and Buthelezi began to attack him in the KZLA and press. Buthelezi claimed Mhlabunzima had been interfering in the Gcumisa's affairs, again suggesting the link between Inkatha and Mhlabunzima's Gcumisa neighbors. Buthelezi threatened him with another investigation under the KwaZulu Chiefs and Headmen Act should he fail to attend the KZLA's call. Mhlabunzima refused. He alleged, "I know they and the chief minister want me deposed for not towing the Inkatha line."<sup>43</sup> After Mhlabunzima went to Cape Town to advocate for a judicial commission of inquiry into the violence, the KZLA then spent nearly three days berating the chief and his petition. Buthelezi grasped on to technicalities to invalidate Mhlabunzima's petition without revealing himself as against such an investigation. While Mpumalanga town council supported Mhlabunzima's petition, Mhlabunzima had left his chairmanship of the MRA in anticipation of a bursary to study development abroad. Buthelezi alleged that Mhlabunzima's direct plea to Botha should have gone through KwaZulu. So soon after Buthelezi had praised Mhlabunzima as "Mashimane," he reminded the KZLA of Mhlabunzima's Inala betrayal of the king and alleged the chief was part of a plot to infiltrate Natal's traditional leaders.<sup>44</sup> Buthelezi met with South African Minister of Law and Order Adrian Vlok to discuss the violence, after which Vlok announced that Botha had refused Mhlabunzima's petition. Mhlabunzima felt certain the government's decision had been influenced by Buthelezi.<sup>45</sup>

## Because My People Are in the MDM

When Buthelezi alleged Mhlabunzima was part of a plot to infiltrate traditional leadership in Natal, he was not far off the mark. Several months earlier, Mhlabunzima had begun to meet with recruiters from a new organization committed to uniting traditional leaders against apartheid—a nascent body in desperate need of chiefs in KwaZulu/Natal to challenge the power of Buthelezi and Inkatha. Despite the brokered peace with Buthelezi between 1984 and 1988, Mhlabunzima's reputation as an independent chief who promoted political tolerance brought him to the attention of national ANC and UDF activists and then into the purview of the Mass Democratic Movement against apartheid. The "peace chief" continued to promote an end to the violence, but himself became increasingly affiliated with the ANC and UDF willing to arm the chief and his people in self-defense.

Contralesa emerged in 1987 from a relationship between the Ndzundza royal family in KwaNdebele and the UDF. From its formation in 1983, the UDF had failed to develop a coherent strategy toward rural issues and the institution of the chieftaincy beyond calls for abolition of the Bantustans and the return of the land. Chiefs were generally equated with Bantustan structures and believed to be a dying institution. But when the Ndzundza royal family joined their followers in protests against proposed KwaNdebele independence in 1986, UDF activists in the region such as Peter Mokaba, R. S. Ndou, and Richard Mathubi (then also an underground ANC operative) recognized the opportunity to develop rural alliances. A 1987 UDF "rural report" concluded that traditional authority was both an institution against which people could be mobilized and a possibly expedient alliance.<sup>46</sup> The latter proved to be effective. The UDF activists identified possible allies when traditional leaders such as Prince Klaas Makhosana Mahlangu fled into urban areas during the anti-independence movement. Mokaba approached the ANC and UDF with a proposal to form a body of traditional leaders comprising men and women like Mahlangu who had signaled their disillusionment with apartheid. The anti-apartheid activists assisted thirty-eight chiefs and subchiefs from KwaNdebele and Moutse in the launch of an organization of traditional leaders against apartheid. Several of these leaders met with the ANC in exile in 1988.<sup>47</sup> Membership was open to all traditional leaders, including members of royal families and the children and wives of traditional leaders.

While ANC and UDF activists were central to recruitment, so too were the education and Bantustan networks of chiefs. According to then-national organizer

for Contralesa Siphwe Thusi, ANC Head of International Affairs Johnny Makhathini identified four leaders from the KwaZulu/Natal region as potential members, including Mhlabunzima, Chief Elphas Molefe, the anti-apartheid attorney Kwenza Mlaba (a family member of the assassinated Chief Msinga), and the banned UDF co-president Archie Gumede. Both chiefs were known to Makhathini on account of their earlier resistance to Inkatha in the KZLA. Mathubi remembered, "We went as far as KwaZulu and found Maphumulo . . . he was recruited by us."<sup>48</sup> The same Bhekuzulu College network that had previously brought Mhlabunzima and the Zulu king together also shaped the recruitment of chiefs in KwaZulu/Natal. Thusi explained: "They know other chiefs that they were with at school so they will give names, they will phone them. Others were scared so it was difficult. People come [to recommend] ones they knew that they would go public, those were people like Mhlabunzima, Molefe, Mlaba and others who were very militant."<sup>49</sup> Joining Contralesa in KwaZulu would invite the wrath of a well-armed Inkatha, and there was real concern that a police informer was present at one of the informal efforts to recruit Mhlabunzima in Natal.<sup>50</sup> Mhlabunzima later said that he joined Contralesa, despite the danger, because he believed that "one has to move with the people. If one is leading people who are progressive I think it is right and proper to be also progressive as a leader. Because my people are in the MDM, I have to be with them."<sup>51</sup>


While Contralesa attempted to make clear its neutrality to protect its members and recruit others, the organization was ideologically aligned with the ANC and from its launch cooperated closely with the UDF. The involvement of the South African Youth Congress in the launch gave rise to suspicions that the organization might abolish the chieftaincy; thus, many felt strongly about the need to promote Contralesa as an unaffiliated organization. At the first meeting of Contralesa national representatives in June 1989, the members elected Mhlabunzima as president and Phatekile Holomisa as vice-president. The latter had been recruited by the ANC for his legal abilities. Thereafter a power struggle would grow between the two chiefs.<sup>52</sup> At this meeting, a letter was read from UDF president Albertina Sisulu, written after a visit to her husband Walter Sisulu at Pollsmoor Prison, encouraging Contralesa to meet with the ANC.<sup>53</sup> Those present resolved to hold consultations with progressive organizations but to promote themselves as unaffiliated to ensure support from a wider range of chiefs. Mhlabunzima explained at the meeting that it was "imperative to know what the ANC had in store for chiefs" in a democratic South Africa. Funded by the Swedish government after an introduction from the ANC, the Contralesa delegation embarked for Lusaka two months later.<sup>54</sup>



This pilgrimage to Lusaka had become a feature of internal politics for ANC supporters, critics, and opponents in the late 1980s. These visits, from businessmen, students, trade unionists, the parliamentary opposition, and others, became routine for the ANC as early as 1985 due to an undeclared relaxation of travel restrictions by the apartheid government and Zambia's willingness to receive ANC guests without formalities. One estimate suggests there were at least one hundred ANC meetings with South African delegations between 1985 and 1990.<sup>55</sup> In Lusaka, the Contralesa leaders met with some of the most powerful men in exile. The ANC delegation included representatives from the ANC, MK, the SACP, and the South African Congress of Trade Unions (SACTU), including Acting ANC President Alfred Nzo, ANC National Executive Council member Steve Tshwete, Chris Hani, Joe Slovo, Jacob Zuma, and Joe Nkadimeng, among others. For many South Africans, meeting these men would inspire awe and signs of deference. But at this consultation, the ANC delegates found themselves at a loss as to how to relate to the chiefs.

*"Ukhuluma neNkosi, Hani, khuleka,"* Mhlabunzima jokingly reminded the MK leader who ardently believed the institution of chieftainship was undemocratic. "You are talking to a chief, Hani, show respect." The traditional leaders consistently asserted their position, referring to the ANC's most powerful men as commoners. Maphumulo teased Tshwete that the latter may yet need the chief: "You might be thrown out of here [Zambia] and come begging for a site at Maqongqo, Tshwete."<sup>56</sup> Chiefs have authority and they control the land, Mhlabunzima reminded the ANC.

Mhlabunzima's jest conveyed truth; Tshwete and the ANC did need the chiefs. While the ANC had long denounced the cooption of chiefs in the Bantu Authorities system, ANC President O. R. Tambo called for renewed efforts to build a democratic movement among the rural masses in a 1985 speech to the ANC's Second Consultative Conference in Kabwe. Tambo lamented that the ANC did not do enough to shape the growth of Inkatha.<sup>57</sup> The conference decided that the ANC needed to differentiate between "puppet and patriotic traditional leaders."<sup>58</sup> By 1988, the ANC's draft constitutional guidelines identified the transformation of traditional leadership in order "to serve the interests of the people as a whole in conformity with the democratic principles embodied in the constitution."<sup>59</sup> Having watched the situation in Mozambique, where the counterrevolutionary RENAMO mobilized rural support through traditional authority, the ANC was looking for progressive chiefs, particularly from KwaZulu/Natal, where Inkatha dominated the politics of traditional leadership.<sup>60</sup> In the midst of the civil war, the ANC recognized that the Zulu leaders moving into Contralesa and the fold of the MDM struck back at the



**FIGURE 18.** Mhlabunzima (*second from left*) with Steve Tshwete, Alfred Nzo, and Chris Hani in Lusaka in August 1989.

PHOTOGRAPH SUPPLIED BY THE ALAN PATON CENTRE AND STRUGGLE ARCHIVES AND USED WITH PERMISSION OF *THE WITNESS*.

power of not only apartheid but, in particular, Inkatha and KwaZulu. The Contralesa meeting in Lusaka ended with an agreement that not only recognized the role of traditional leadership in resisting apartheid but also promised a place for chiefs in a democratic South Africa. A joint memorandum called upon chiefs to be leaders “by the people” who *khonza* them.<sup>61</sup>

Aware of hit squad threats to the chiefs and expecting confrontation with Buthelezi and leaders in Ciskei, Bophuthatswana, and Venda, Mhlabunzima and the Contralesa chiefs in Natal also used the meeting with ANC and MK leaders to protect themselves and their followers. Zibuse Mlaba—the Ximba regent who took over after the assassination of his brother Msinga in 1988—asked MK Commander Joe Modise to deploy people to assist them. An MK member known as Dumi was sent to protect Zibuse and Mhlabunzima.<sup>62</sup> Later, the two chiefs identified local young men such as Mzamo Thabani Mlaba to be sent to the Transkei Bantustan for military training. After Bantu Holomisa, a Transkei Defence Force brigadier, overthrew the Transkei government in 1987 and lent his support to the liberation movement, the Bantustan developed into an ANC stronghold. The Transkei served as a transit point for ANC exiles returning to South Africa and MK cadres trained SDUS there.<sup>63</sup> Zibuse recalled:

I asked [Modise] to deploy people to our area because I knew what would happen. He did that, they came underground and stayed here and there in the area. That

is how we managed to defend ourselves. We took some to train in Transkei; Maphumulo had a very good connection there, Mhlabunzima did. We took some to Bantu Holomisa; he was a general underground then. The government didn't know he worked with us; they were trained, armed, and then sent back.<sup>64</sup>

Thusi described these as self-defense mechanisms for chiefs who joined Contralesa.<sup>65</sup> These SDUs protected Mhlabunzima as he traversed South Africa's Bantustans to mobilize leaders and organize rallies.

Mhlabunzima's presidency of Contralesa further enflamed his conflict with Buthelezi. The peace chief arranged a meeting with his school friend Zwelithini but failed to attend when the king scheduled the meeting in Ulundi—a source of anxiety for Mhlabunzima on account of his assault there only four years earlier.<sup>66</sup> Thusi and the attorneys Mlaba and Gumede left Mhlabunzima out of their visit to Buthelezi to introduce the new organization—they did not want the chief minister to say he was not consulted.<sup>67</sup> In the wake of these meetings, Buthelezi and King Zwelethini went on the offensive, attacking Mhlabunzima at a meeting of Zulu chiefs and in the press. Buthelezi called efforts to organize Contralesa in Natal “an attempt to thrust the spear into the very heart of Zulu unity.” He criticized Mhlabunzima for keeping company with revolutionaries and chastised him for attempting to recruit the king and turn him against Buthelezi. He concluded the chiefs must “close ranks and to rejoice in our unity and to tell Inkosi Maphumulo to go to hell.”<sup>68</sup> The king, now firmly allied with Buthelezi, also instructed the chiefs: “Let the *amakhosi* of kwaZulu now speak finally and let us bury *Inkosi* Maphumulo in yesterday's problems. Let us make him totally irrelevant for the future.”<sup>69</sup> The chiefs thus resolved to isolate any leaders connected to Contralesa. Subsequently, Elphas Molefe was suspended by the KZLA for “sowing Zulu disunity.”<sup>70</sup> Mhlabunzima was no longer an MP or he too likely would have been expelled. King Zwelethini met with Ciskeian delegates to speak out against Contralesa. The conflict deepened as Prince Israel Mcwayizeni Zulu, the former regent still at odds with Buthelezi, joined Contralesa.<sup>71</sup>

As president of Contralesa, Mhlabunzima began to build a national reputation and he continued his regional efforts to promote peace in war-torn Natal. The violence propelled the chief to place his British-sponsored trip to study community development at the University of Manchester on hold so he could continue to work toward a cessation of the conflict. When President Botha resigned after a stroke, Mhlabunzima requested a meeting with the new president F. W. de Klerk



**FIGURE 19.** Mhlabunzima with Dali Mpofu, Winnie Mandela, and possibly Elphas Molefe at Contralesa/MDM rally, 1989. PHOTOGRAPH COURTESY OF THOBEKILE MAPHUMULO.

to discuss the war, and he helped to organize the local Contralesa/MDM rally to welcome newly released ANC leaders.<sup>72</sup> On December 3, 1989, Mhlabunzima took the stage at Edendale Ecumenical Centre, a building at the heart of the resistance struggle in Edendale, with Winnie Mandela and Molefe. Police used force to break up the gathering that spilled out of the building, resulting in several injuries and one fatality.<sup>73</sup> The next month, a Contralesa delegation including Mhlabunzima, Prince Israel, Thusi, and Alfred Ndlovu met with Minister of Law and Order Adrian Vlok to discuss a judicial inquiry into the violence. The Contralesa representatives walked out of the meeting, discouraged that Inkatha had been invited. “We feel it is not right and proper for us to be sitting here with them, Inkatha, giving them credibility,” said Mhlabunzima.<sup>74</sup>

Mhlabunzima continued to believe that traditional authority was responsible for the maintenance of order. Where Mhlabunzima had failed alone to initiate a commission of inquiry into the violence, with Contralesa he succeeded. At the meeting where he was elected president, he gave a report on the ongoing violence in the Pietermaritzburg region in which he explained the relationship between

chiefs and security: “While we are not responsible for the external factors that systematically create social disorder, internally it is our responsibility to do everything we can to solve the problem.”<sup>75</sup> Mhlabunzima mandated advocate Robert S. Douglas to investigate and report on the reasons behind the inefficiency of law enforcement in relation to the ongoing violence.<sup>76</sup> The South African Council of Churches (SACC) sponsored the commission by way of bridge funding, with the expectation that Contralesa would repay the SACC at a later date. Phatekile Holomisa suggests Mhlabunzima brokered this deal without consulting the executive of Contralesa, a possibility given a later disagreement between Douglas and Contralesa over untimely payments.<sup>77</sup> The commission opened at Pietermaritzburg’s Ubunye House on December 5, 1989, as workers returned to work from a stay-away to mourn recent deaths in Hammarsdale. Zibuse Mlaba gave testimony about his brother’s assassination, and witnesses from across the Natal Midlands testified to fatal shootings of schoolchildren by white policemen, forced recruitment by Inkatha, and the corruption of town councilors, before moving to Durban to focus on violence in the townships.<sup>78</sup> As the press ran headlines such as “Forced Inkatha recruitment to blame,” Buthelezi threatened to sue Douglas for defamation, forcing Douglas to defend his impartiality.<sup>79</sup>

As the world watched Mandela walk free and his country burn, Mhlabunzima felt compelled to take his findings about the cause of the violence international. At the end of March 1990, he flew to Geneva with Douglas to present an interim report of the commission to the International Commission of Jurists (ICJ). Based on the testimonies of nearly one hundred witnesses, the report identified Inkatha as perpetrators of the violence. While Inkatha continued to cry partiality, the report convinced the ICJ that the South African government encouraged the violence and it sent a “Signposts to Peace” mission to Natal in August. Mhlabunzima held a press conference in London in which he affirmed that Contralesa would not work with Buthelezi, turning the chief minister’s tactic of labeling opposition as collaboration against him. Mhlabunzima alleged Inkatha funding “comes from the South African regime.”<sup>80</sup>

The commission never came to an official close, possibly on account of financial irregularities and an escalation in violence.<sup>81</sup> As the commission moved to Durban, the civil war spread to Mhlabunzima’s Table Mountain and erupted west of the city in the Seven Days War. With this surge in the violence, Mhlabunzima turned to much more local matters upon his return from Europe. In the meantime, the commission flailed and Mhlabunzima failed to attend national Contralesa meetings.

In August, the Contralesa General Council suspended Mhlabunzima's presidency for this failure (a perhaps insensitive charge, given the violence directed at his family and people in the previous six months), his practice of taking unilateral decisions, and his failure to abide by the executive committee's decisions. Contralesa resolved to take legal action for the recovery of R120,000 donated to Contralesa by a Swedish donor that Maphumulo deposited into an unauthorized account in Pietermaritzburg.<sup>82</sup> On account of the war, Mhlabunzima never appeared before Contralesa to explain any irregularities. His estate file reveals a R100,000 fixed deposit made into his First National Bank account six months prior to a September 1990 maturation date, suggesting the Contralesa funds were redirected to this account. Given the building power struggle between Mhlabunzima and Phatekile and Mhlabunzima's need to pay Douglas—which may not have been approved by Contralesa—it is difficult to prove intent.<sup>83</sup> Contralesa members from Natal insist Mhlabunzima was never demoted and that corruption allegations emerged out of this leadership conflict.<sup>84</sup> As a new organization with limited funding, this sort of political and financial struggle could have impacted Contralesa's ability to further fund the commission, and the raging war made it more dangerous than ever to give testimony.

## Conflict within the Maphumulo

Mhlabunzima proclaimed his move into the Mass Democratic Movement as one in which a chief followed his people into national politics. While many members of the Maphumulo, old and new, supported his entry into the MDM, others within and without his chieftdom did not. While those who *khonza*'d the peace chief appreciated the refuge, those leaders who had lost subjects to Mhlabunzima were angry. With the peace party, commission of inquiry, and his presidency of Contralesa, the chief called attention to himself and his haven of peace. Inkatha and KZLA leaders and well-positioned members of the Maphumulo began to cooperate in sidelining the peace chief.

When Mhlabunzima prohibited the Inkatha recruitment drive in his area, he brought into the open a long-standing conflict between him and others within the Maphumulo *umndeni* who disapproved of Mhlabunzima's rule. It is worthwhile to consider the brief biographies of these dissenters to reveal their own ambitions that fueled an internal conflict within the Maphumulo. These include Thomas

Mshoki Gcabashe, a headman who initiated the formation of an Inkatha branch in Mbambangalo during Mhlabunzima's suspension and served as a local informant to KwaZulu.<sup>85</sup> Mdingi Nzuzi/Maphumulo, the son of an unmarried Maphumulo woman favored by the former regent Khangela, positioned himself as a potential candidate for the chieftaincy. Mdingi was displeased when members of the Maphumulo asserted that Mdingi's illegitimate heritage did not entitle him to be a member of the *umndeni*. The Bantu Affairs Commissioner K. G. Harvey believed that Mdingi had been so disappointed by his relegation that he may have threatened one of the councilors who had objected to his *umndeni* status.<sup>86</sup> Norman "Dotsheni" Gumede was a resident on the closer settlement who had been dismissed as a tribal authority councilor. Moses Zondi had been the tribal authority secretary prior to being charged with misappropriation of funds for a local work project.

These internal dissidents with a history of ambition and menacing behavior began to work with Inkatha at the local and KwaZulu levels to depose Mhlabunzima. Mdingi reached out to neighbors in KwaSwayimane, where Chief Nkosiyesizwe Gcumisa allowed Inkatha activity and Psychology Ndlovu orchestrated violence against Inkatha opponents. Sipiwe Maphumulo, a descendant of Mganu whose family stayed at KwaSwayimane when the region was split between the Gcumisa and Maphumulo chiefs, remembered being at a Gcumisa meeting when Mdingi was present: "Mdingi stood up and said—now I am talking about something that I never mentioned before—he said 'I do not know who can help me to kill this dog,' referring to Mhlabunzima . . . They were so upset when they discovered that I heard what they said."<sup>87</sup> In September 1989, Inkatha members from KwaSwayimane went to Maphumulo schools to force residents to attend a meeting called by Nkosiyesizwe. At that meeting, Nkosiyesizwe warned that those refusing to join Inkatha should leave the area.<sup>88</sup> After this meeting, Mhlabunzima's "tribe decided that the above named persons must be removed from the area" and Mhlabunzima informed the men about the decision against them.<sup>89</sup> Mhlabunzima interpreted the meeting as political canvassing due to the invitation of Psychology. The decision to ostracize the men involved was thus in line with Mhlabunzima's practice of refusing political meetings in Mbambangalo in order to maintain peace.

About the same time, Mdingi, Gumede, and Zondi went to Ulundi and alleged that Mhlabunzima had misappropriated Maphumulo Tribal Authority funds. The men alleged that Mhlabunzima had pocketed payments for sites on the trust-controlled portion of Goedverwachting and mismanaged funds for a KwaZulu work scheme. KwaZulu launched an investigation under the auspices of the Mpumalanga

magistrate on January 12, 1990, but could not find evidence of Mhlabunzima's fault. According to the investigative report by a Mr. Nyandu, the site fees had not been deposited into the Maphumulo account, but Mhlabunzima had not signed any of the receipts. Gumede and headman Alfred Madlala signed them. Mhlabunzima, when he met with Nyandu at the magistrate's office, countered that Gumede had run off with the fees. Nyandu further found that allegations regarding Mhlabunzima's misuse of the work funds were without foundation. Ultimately, Nyandu stated, "The problem is that, with due respect Sir, our informants are not reliable, they seem to be working for recognition in anticipation of *Inkosi* Maphumulo's discharge. Mr. Mdingi Maphumulo is claiming *ubukhosi* [the chieftaincy]. Mr Gumede hopes to be a Senior *Induna* when Mdingi is appointed as *Inkosi*. Mr Zondi is trying to cover-up for the money misappropriated by him [in the work project]."<sup>90</sup>

These attempts to find Maphumulo guilty of misconduct must be seen in the context of the manipulation of chiefly authority by Buthelezi and KwaZulu. Such manipulation was previously the domain of the colonial, segregation, and early apartheid governments. With the creation of KwaZulu and the founding of Inkatha, some of this manipulative power shifted to the Bantustan government. As the demise of Bantustan rule became more certain, the exploitation of chiefly authority intensified in the 1980s and early 1990s. Troublesome chiefs continued to be targeted. Inkatha's Caprivians under Daluxolo Luthuli assassinated Ximba Chief Msinga Mlaba in 1988 for "educating people with ANC policy and information."<sup>91</sup> After the launch of Contralesa in 1989, Inkatha endeavors to delegitimize progressive chiefs intensified. Inkatha supporters attacked the home of Prince Israel Zulu after he publicly joined Contralesa. Immediately after the meeting at which Buthelezi and Zwelethini attacked Contralesa and Mhlabunzima as a "spear into the heart of Zulu unity," the KZLA suspended Contralesa member Molefe. While an inquiry into Molefe's authority found him guilty on two charges of conducting himself in a "disgraceful and improper manner as an appointed *Inkosi*" and one charge of disobeying the "lawful order of the Chief Minister by refusing to attend a meeting with the Cabinet," Contralesa chiefs and the wider public recognized that Molefe had been targeted for "sowing Zulu disunity."<sup>92</sup> The delay between Molefe's inquiry and the nature of the improper behaviors (several of which were suspect) suggests that Molefe's political affiliation was the impetus for the suspension. While some of Mhlabunzima's followers requested the investigation, KwaZulu was equally eager to find evidence to justify action against Mhlabunzima. It is likely that similar endeavors were made in the case of Molefe—only there, Buthelezi succeeded.



Given KwaZulu's antagonism toward Mhlabunzima and its success in eliminating and ostracizing other progressive chiefs, Nyandu's failure to find evidence for abuse of office was surely met with scorn by Buthelezi. Buthelezi would have to find other means to remove the peace chief.

## Conclusion

Civil war ravaged KwaZulu/Natal during the last decade of apartheid. Awareness grew of an apartheid link with Inkatha and the role this alliance played in fomenting the conflict. While chiefs affiliated with Inkatha were considered warlords in the eyes of ANC and UDF activists, to their followers, their legitimacy rested in their defense of a moral order based on homesteads and hierarchies. On the other hand, the chiefs that affiliated themselves with Contralesa began to enjoy an alternative form of authority as they moved into African nationalist politics. Chiefs and subjects could also use cultural inheritances such as *ukukhonzisa* to navigate the violence. Mhlabunzima used knowledge about the relationship between chiefs and subjects, arguing it was the responsibility of chiefs to not only provide order and security, but to follow the will of their people. He felt that "if one is leading people who are progressive I think it is right and proper to be also progressive as a leader." So when the war broke out, Mhlabunzima sought to identify the causes of the violence and bring it to an end. In the meantime, he would offer security to his people by promoting political tolerance. Refugees from the violence also used this knowledge, abandoning chiefs who allowed disorder to flourish in their war-torn areas. These refugees were willing to *khonzisa* a new chief in return for access to land and security.

While Mhlabunzima believed steadfastly in the need to provide peace, he also stood to benefit from the expansion of his new subjects on contested land. He settled at least five hundred families onto the disputed strip of Goedverwachting still claimed by the Nyavu into 1988. Mhlabunzima treated the contested land as falling within his territory. His prior entreaties to white officials, his development projects, and the history of the land exchange for the dam led him to believe it fell under his jurisdiction. But he certainly also knew that having subjects who had *khonzisa'd* him resident on the land would strengthen his claim to the land.

While Mhlabunzima had a long and shaky history with Inkatha and KwaZulu, the violence that sent people to his haven of peace forced him to finally define that relationship as one of opposition. His research on the war and the commission of

inquiry suggested that Inkatha recruitment was to blame. He promoted political tolerance to provide security, but he began to follow his subjects—old and new—into the Mass Democratic Movement against apartheid. The ANC and UDF found an isiZulu-speaking chief ready to resist—and risk his life. Even as he promoted peace and tolerance, providing security also meant arming his people in the midst of war. Through his Contralesa connections, Mhlabunzima sent young men to the Transkei to train with MK—a defensive mechanism necessary not only for the chief, but also for his people. While his territory remained violence-free throughout 1989, when the Nyavu were at war with the Ximba, that would all change in 1990 when the Nyavu turned their attention west, to the Maphumulo and the contested territory. During the sitting of the Contralesa commission of inquiry into the violence in Natal, Mhlabunzima's haven of peace burst into flames.



# They Were Worried about the Way Our Chief Was Managing His Nation

Land, Authority, and Belonging, 1990–1996

There were old men who tried mediating the war. They tried to talk to the chief because they were worried about the way our chief was taking care of his nation. They even told him that he would not live to see his grandchildren if he kept on doing what he was doing. He relocated to town and that is where he got assassinated . . . our chief was not safe in this place or in town because Maqongqo residents assassinated him. They followed him.

—Ningi Xulu, 2011

**O**n January 26, 1990, violence came to Mhlabunzima's haven of peace. A week later, South African President F. W. de Klerk announced the unbanning of the ANC and the other liberation movements. Exiles began to return home and negotiations commenced for the planning of a new South Africa. A year later, the peace chief was dead. Several attempts kill to Mhlabunzima initially failed, but the spiraling violence forced Mhlabunzima and his supporters from their homes and into another sort of exile, making them refugees in the country of their birth. On February 25, 1991, a hit squad composed of Caprivians and KwaZulu Bureau of Special Intelligence Police finally succeeded in removing the chief from

power—they assassinated him. But as Ningi Xulu suggests, these men were not alone—some subjects of Mhlabunzima contested his leadership.

Intricately tied to the war was this contest over Mhlabunzima's authority—a competition that could not be separated from the long history of land and authority disputes in the Table Mountain region. The war at Table Mountain began as a war between the Nyavu and the Maphumulo, a conflict in which Bangubukhosi Mdluli's subjects allied themselves with Inkatha to claim the territory Mhlabunzima had developed and used to welcome refugees from the war who had *khonza'd* him. But Mhlabunzima's chieftdom was divided. The same Maphumulo men who had attempted to depose Mhlabunzima in 1989 were seen working with the Nyavu and directing the initial attack on Echibini where the refugees lived. This influx of new subjects led some to suggest that ANC supporters had moved into the region and caused tensions as youth disrespected elders and transportation and water became scarce. But a closer analysis suggests much more complex explanations that reflect the ongoing conflict over land and a contestation over belonging in the Maphumulo.

The testimonies regarding the war's spread to Table Mountain reveal both the parallels and disjunctures between the conflict at the local and national levels, as well as the ways that historical denials of land and authority became personal for those who picked up arms. Even as members of the Nyavu and Maphumulo allied themselves with Inkatha and the national liberation movement under the ANC, individuals pointed to the existing land dispute as the origin of the conflict. Few denied the conflict as one involving Inkatha and the ANC, but they did highlight how those parties came to represent something different at the local level. But the existing land dispute did not just spontaneously erupt into violence. The movement of people in the wake of the 1987 floods in the Msunduze River Valley and the influx of refugees from the violence caused increasing competition over Table Mountain's resources, including the preexisting water shortage (Mhlabunzima's water project was scheduled to begin in April 1990). Inkatha ally and Mbambangalo businessman C. J. Maphumulo's family controlled local bussing but could not handle the user surge. Maphumulo youth had begun to boycott his shop. *Ukukhonza* provided the space for members of the Maphumulo, old and new, to contest ideas about who belonged to the Maphumulo, who was entitled to land and security, and what it meant to be a chief.

## Negotiations for a New South Africa and the End of Apartheid

The civil war raged as international sanctions against apartheid devastated the South African economy. Businessmen became fierce critics of Botha's policies (as did the far-right, who loathed the president's reforms) and as early as 1985 began to meet with the ANC in exile. In 1988, talks began between a government committee, including the minister of justice, prison officials, and the head of the National Intelligence Service, and the imprisoned Nelson Mandela. Botha joined the discussions in July 1989, a month before being forced out of office by his critics within the National Party (NP). F. W. de Klerk became president and announced the lifting of banning orders on the ANC, SACP, Pan Africanist Congress, and thirty-one other organizations at the opening of parliament on February 2, 1990. Talks between the de Klerk government and the ANC followed. In September 1991, the major players signed the National Peace Accord to prepare the way for the Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA), even as the regime continued to supply covert support to Inkatha. Officials hoped that such a strategy would enable the NP to negotiate from a position of power.

Even as these parties negotiated for a democratic South Africa, civil war raged across KwaZulu/Natal and spread to the Pretoria/Witwatersrand/Vaal (PWV) area, now part of Gauteng province. A state of emergency remained in force in KwaZulu/Natal, and by December 1990, the International Commission of Jurists (ICJ) delegation that visited South Africa after meeting with Mhlabunzima estimated there were at least fifty thousand refugees.<sup>1</sup> Another international observer estimated between two hundred thousand and five hundred thousand refugees in KwaZulu/Natal between 1985 and 1994.<sup>2</sup> In July 1990, Inkatha announced its transformation into a national political party, the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP), and its intention to mobilize support in the PWV region. The violence began there the day after an Inkatha rally in Sebokeng on July 22, 1990, when police escorted Inkatha supporters to a Sebokeng hostel where they attacked. Between 1990 and 1992, 112 massacres occurred in the PWV region. In 1992, an armed force of Inkatha supporters from KwaMadlala hostel killed forty-six in the PWV township of Boipatong while security forces failed to intervene. Local circumstances played a major role in the PWV violence, due to simmering tensions between migrant workers living in prison-like hostels and permanent residents of the adjacent townships and settlements. Township rent boycotts, apartheid reforms, and ANC plans for the conversion of hostels alienated migrant laborers, for whom

the hostels represented an economic opportunity to protect the order of their rural homestead lifestyles. This dramatically changed the relationship between hostel dwellers and township residents and sparked large-scale attacks and counterattacks. Conflict erupted between hostel dwellers and the surrounding townships, resulting in unprecedented numbers of deaths in Alexandra, Phola Park, and Kathlehong.<sup>3</sup> Throughout, de Klerk insisted upon MK's disbandment as a necessary condition for constitutional negotiations and the ANC refused to be left unprotected should the talks fail.

The war in KwaZulu/Natal and the PWV area was not the only violence destabilizing the country. From March 1990, the Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging (AWB), an organization of conservative Afrikaners that consciously adopted swastika-like emblems, launched a campaign of shootings and bombings against black and white opponents of apartheid—targeting the ANC, NP politicians, mosques, synagogues, black trade unions, and anti-apartheid newspapers. This threat from the right forced de Klerk to call a referendum of white voters in 1992 to secure support for the negotiations for a new constitution.

This multifaceted violence plagued the negotiation process and threatened the first elections in 1994, rising and falling at key moments in the negotiation process that suited the NP.<sup>4</sup> Throughout, Buthelezi proved difficult to work with. CODESA I began in December 1991 to create the framework for a new constitution. Buthelezi demanded separate delegations for Inkatha, the KwaZulu Bantustan, and the Zulu king. Buthelezi argued that the king represented traditional authority, sparking Contralesa's call for inclusion—setting the stage for a contest over the institution's place in the new constitution. KwaZulu and Bophuthatswana refused to sign a declaration of intent outlining the principles of a new South Africa. After the Boipatong massacre in 1992, the ANC suspended negotiations, leading to the end of CODESA II. Mandela criticized de Klerk for resisting majority rule and fostering the war between the ANC and Inkatha. The ANC, SACP, and the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) embarked on a campaign of mass action, including a march on Ciskei's capital where brigadier Oupa Gqozo's troops opened fire on the marchers and killed twenty-nine. A government commission, chaired by Richard Goldstone, uncovered evidence of the state's use of covert forces to destabilize the ANC. This internal war and the mounting evidence of state violence—through the police, military, and surrogates such as Inkatha—forced de Klerk toward majority rule. Negotiations renewed in August 1992. The resultant Record of Understanding was a dramatic victory for the ANC—setting an election date of no later than April

1994—but Inkatha announced its withdrawal and formed an alliance of Bantustan leaders.<sup>5</sup> A consensus began to build in the Multi-Party Negotiating Forum when the assassination of much-loved SACP and MK leader Chris Hani plunged the country into crisis in April 1993.

The war continued up to the holding of the national elections on April 26, 1994, and in the new province of KwaZulu-Natal, through the national election up until the first local government elections in 1996. In March 1994, ANC security guards opened fire on marching Inkatha supporters in Johannesburg, killing nineteen. In Bophuthatswana, Constand Viljoen, the AWB, and South African military and police forces planned to reinstate Bantustan leader Lucas Mangope, who had been overthrown by forces sympathetic to the ANC. The AWB went on a killing spree that ended when anti-Mangope Bophuthatswana troops stopped the attackers and put them to death. The debacle convinced the Conservative Party to participate, but Inkatha remained a dangerous outlier. The need to bring the party in drove the ANC and NP to compromise, but Inkatha rejected even those proposals. The ANC and NP decided to go ahead without it. A state of emergency was declared in Natal and troops were mobilized to secure the province. One week before the election, Inkatha decided to contest the election. A series of bombs, bomb threats, and shooting sprees marred the voting, but overall, voting was peaceful.<sup>6</sup> Ultimately, 19.5 million people turned out to vote. The ANC received nearly 63 percent of the national vote, the NP 20 percent, and Inkatha 10.5 percent. Inkatha won 50 percent of the vote in KwaZulu-Natal, giving it control of the province.<sup>7</sup>

While Inkatha won a majority in KwaZulu-Natal, the war between the ANC and IFP did not end. Two thousand died in political violence in KwaZulu-Natal between 1994 and 2000.<sup>8</sup> In one of the most appalling instances, an IFP chief in Shobashobane arranged an attack that resulted in the deaths of eighteen ANC youth on Christmas Day in 1995. This continued violence and the demands of traditional leaders—many associated with Inkatha and increasingly Contralesa—delayed the first local elections in KwaZulu-Natal originally scheduled for 1995. The local elections took place in July 1996, seven months later than in other provinces, after three postponements. Political leaders participated in a peace process that led them to declare the political conflict over.




## Fighting for Echibini in Natal's Haven of Peace

At Table Mountain, residents of “Natal’s haven of peace” began to fear the spread of the war several months before its arrival. The stream of new residents and the nature of migrant labor brought news not only of the war, but also greater knowledge of party politics. The spark that launched the war was an attack on Mhlabunzima’s followers by police in collusion with local Inkatha leaders. But as more and more Mbambangalo and KwaNyavu residents became embroiled in the conflict, it became clear that they were “fighting for Echibini,” the ward on the contested strip of Goedverwaching farm.

The war had already begun in many rural areas in 1989, but the residents of Table Mountain began to feel its effects after a 1989 Mpumalanga Regional Authority meeting where Inkatha’s Chief Calalakubo Khawula asked attendees to welcome recruitment campaigns in each chiefdom. Ximba Regent Zibuse Mlaba remembers that Caprivian Commissar Daluxolo Luthuli attempted to remain in the shadows—suggesting the involvement of Caprivians assigned to the contra-mobilization squad in the Table Mountain region. Zibuse’s followers refused the request—they rightfully believed Inkatha responsible for the 1988 murder of their chief, Msinga.<sup>9</sup> Some among the Nyavu initially also sought to resist, but Inkatha targeted several in the chiefdom with intimidation.<sup>10</sup> Thereafter, violence in the rural areas spread. Across the Mngeni River from the Nyavu and Maphumulo, in KwaSwayimane, violence went hand-in-hand with Inkatha recruitment drives under KwaZulu MP Psychology Ndlovu starting in July 1989.<sup>11</sup>

Many KwaNyavu residents recall that they were already at war with the Ximba before the fighting began with the Maphumulo. This conflict between the Nyavu and the Ximba—which took root in July 1989—aligns much more closely with more traditional explanation of the war as one between UDF/ANC-affiliated youth and Inkatha elders. *Inkosi* Sikhosphi Mdluli recalls that many youth from the nearby Hammarsdale township began to attend school at Ngangezwe High School in KwaNyavu. They would hold late-night meetings and *toyi-toyi* (a militant march that mimicked soldiers). Thereafter, people were labeled Inkatha or UDF/ANC based upon their participation in these meetings. One young boy whose father had refused him permission to attend identified his father as an obstacle. The youth who went to attack him met an armed group of elders before fleeing to KwaXimba.<sup>12</sup> One Nyavu elder remembered: “In KwaNyavu the fighting was started by the youth and Chief Mlaba. We discovered that there are ANC children here who flee to Mlaba and they



**FIGURE 20.** Chief Bangubukhosi Mdluli, Brigadier Gerrit Viljoen, and Ximba Regent Zibuse Mlaba, 1989. PHOTOGRAPH SUPPLIED BY THE ALAN PATON CENTRE AND STRUGGLE ARCHIVES AND USED WITH PERMISSION OF *THE WITNESS*.

came back here killing people who were Inkatha members; then the chiefs started fighting too. So that means this area is dominated by Inkatha and KwaXimba is dominated by ANC, which was the course of violence between Chief Mlaba and us. While we were still shocked about that, then Chief Maphumulo started fighting against us.<sup>13</sup> Some suggested this was not a coincidence, but that the Maphumulo and Ximba were allies, intent on eliminating the Nyavu.<sup>14</sup> Peace efforts that included Regent Zibuse, Chief Bangubukhosi Mdluli, and the SAP initially provided a short respite starting in October 1989, despite Inkatha instruction to Bangubukhosi not to become involved in any such pacts. The peace ultimately failed when violence resumed in December. By the end of the year, thirty-nine had died in six months of fighting and nearly one hundred homes were destroyed in the conflict between the Nyavu and Ximba.<sup>15</sup>

In late January 1990, the war erupted in Echibini and Esinyameni, the Nyavu ward bordering Echibini. How the violence began there depends on who is speaking; it is easiest to uncover the interpretations of those who supported Mhlabunzima. His existing relationship with the press provided him with a platform to voice

his understanding and experience. When the violence broke out, he phoned the press from his courthouse to alert them. Days later, he filed an interdict against Bangabukhosi, the SAP, and the minister of law and order as had been advised during the Contralesa commission of inquiry. Mhlabunzima's supporters who fled to the city gave victim statements to violence monitors. Reporters did speak with Inkatha leaders and members from KwaNyavu, but the words of the "peace chief" dominated their stories. As the violence unfolded, increasingly Mshoki Gcabashe spoke with the media.

Throughout the war, the South African Police Riot Unit 8 cooperated with Inkatha leaders in Mbambangalo and KwaNyavu such as Mshoki, Ngane Zimu, and Mathondo Ngcobo. The Pietermaritzburg-based Riot Unit 8 had already gained notoriety during the late 1980s for active collusion with Inkatha. The unit included *kitkonstabels*, or special constables known as "instant police" because of their quick training by the SAP in 1988. The three hundred *kitkonstabels* trained at Koeberg were all Inkatha supporters and included 130 of the Caprivians. The TRC found that the unit assaulted and killed UDF members and guarded the homes of Inkatha leaders.<sup>16</sup> Most of the reports and affidavits from within the Maphumulo cite attacks by *kitkonstabels* and police attempts to disarm neutral and UDF/ANC residents. The TRC testimony of police officer William Basil Harrington of Riot Unit 8 reveals how they supported the Nyavu while stationed at Echibini:

We were there to prevent Chief Maphumulo's people launching an attack on the other area. Whilst we were having our braai and drinking beer [with Nyavu members] an Inkatha group came around the hillside [from KwaNyavu] unseen and launched a new attack on the ANC area. We were assured by the group that were providing the meat and the beer that they were Inkatha people and we had nothing to fear regarding the attack.<sup>17</sup>

While there is some suggestion that sporadic violent episodes took place prior, the war erupted over the weekend of Friday, January 26, through Monday, January 29. On Friday, Mhlabunzima's deputy chief, Albert Madlala, and councilor Simanga Mkhize spotted Mshoki with Riot Unit 8 police and *kitkonstabels* on their way to Echibini, pointing out homes for attack. Over the course of the next three days, the *kitkonstabels* assaulted people in Echibini and the area known as *Emijondolo* (the place of the shacks), including those who had been boycotting the shop owned by Inkatha-affiliated C. J. Maphumulo. Headman Bhekuyise Maphumulo witnessed

two white constables and several *kitkonstabels* tie a tube around the face of a youth and assault him.<sup>18</sup> *Kitkonstabels* Bheki Phethas and Bheki Buthelezi camped at the home of Tobias Mdlalose, an Inkatha member in Mbambangalo, from where they launched attacks on “comrades.”<sup>19</sup> Several homes were burned, at least one person died, schools closed, and Mhlabunzima’s anxious subjects began to flock to the courthouse for security.<sup>20</sup>

On Monday, January 29, the violence exploded into full-scale war as three hundred to six hundred heavily armed men from KwaNyavu invaded Echibini, burning homes and attacking residents. Theni Ngcoya recalls seeing the crowd chase her eldest son over a cliff before she ran with her other children toward Mhlabunzima’s homestead. From there, she watched her home burn.<sup>21</sup> The Nyavu men gathered at Mathondo Ngcobo’s beer hall in KwaNyavu while Mhlabunzima went to the Bishopstowe police station to discuss the possibility of a meeting with the police and Bangubukhosi. During his absence, the Nyavu launched a second attack, killing one person and destroying at least ten homes. It was alleged that Mathondo and *kitkonstabel* Bheki Phethas were transporting the Nyavu men to attack homes.<sup>22</sup> Mathondo maintained that the Nyavu had not raided Echibini but that forty men had retaliated after the burning of several KwaNyavu homes and the looting of his shop. Ambrose Mweli, an Inkatha-affiliated Nyavu man, reported his home had been petrol bombed by UDF youth from Maqongqo and that *amaqabane* had been stopping buses and taxis and blocking delivery vans from supplying KwaNyavu.<sup>23</sup>

Mhlabunzima’s followers fled to his court, expecting security from their leader. Mhlabunzima returned from the police station to find approximately three thousand to four thousand of his people gathered at the Maphumulo court.<sup>24</sup> Indeed, Eunice Dladla remembers that upon seeing the smoke and hearing gunshots, she and others ran to *enkoseni* (the place of the chief).<sup>25</sup> Ngenzeni Mbambo and her family also ran to *enkosini* where Mhlabunzima advised them to find family with whom they could stay.<sup>26</sup> Hundreds fled to the city to seek assistance from churches, COSATU, and the Midlands Democratic Party under Radley Keys, known for his efforts to quell the violence.<sup>27</sup> A contingent of Maphumulo youth, calling themselves comrades, set up roadblocks to defend the area but were comparatively ill-equipped with sticks and spears. Cycles of attack and retaliation engulfed the region throughout the week. Daily police “unrest reports” gave little detail on the unfolding conflict beyond listing casualties and infrastructural damage, such as “one dead,” “twelve houses burnt,” or “man, boy die.”



**FIGURE 21.** Young *amaqaqabane* at Table Mountain, 1990. PHOTOGRAPH COURTESY OF THE WITNESS.

On Friday, February 2, as de Klerk made the historic announcement releasing political prisoners and unbanning the liberation movements, the Nyavu attacked again, this time focusing on the Maphumulo homestead on the contested land and the area around it where some Maphumulo subjects still camped for security. One of Mhlabunzima's wives, Gay, was at home with their children when the Nyavu set her home alight. Several of the Maphumulo who had sought refuge at the chief's place alleged the Nyavu, under Mathondo Ngcobo, worked in concert with the police. The press did not report it, but one victim statement suggests Gay attempted to fight back, shooting a *kitkonstabel* and a white police officer who had turned on a gas canister in her home.<sup>28</sup>

Over the course of the weekend, thousands fled Mbambangalo for Pietermaritzburg, where they found shelter at the Sawubona Youth Trust and the COSATU house in the city center. The city council struggled to come to terms with the refugees. On Friday, February 9, a delegation of refugees visited Maqongqo but deemed it unsafe to return. The Pietermaritzburg City Council saw the refugees as a threat to public health, and the Mount Michael Health Committee threatened legal action against the Youth Trust for contravening the Squatter Act and the town planning scheme. The city only agreed to establish a refugee camp at Mason's Mill on Edendale Road when the city's medical officer intervened. On February 12, 1990, the day after Nelson Mandela's release from prison, the Table Mountain refugees from Sawubona and COSATU house moved into tents at Mason's Mill.<sup>29</sup>

As the refugees worried over their fate, Mhlabunzima was on the move, promoting peace and undertaking Contralesa work. He traveled to the Transkei, Johannesburg, and Lusaka with Contralesa, back to Mbambangalo, and then to Sweden to meet with the Swedish foreign minister to fundraise for Contralesa and convince the ICJ to investigate the violence. During his stop back in Maqongqo, Mhlabunzima called a meeting at the court for residents, violence monitors, and the Mpumalanga magistrate to discuss the situation. A plan was set in motion for the installation of SADF troops and the return of the refugees. After two weeks in tents at Mason's Mill, the last of the refugees at the camp returned to Maqongqo under the direction of the SADF. These eighty people, largely children and women whose husbands were away at work, lost their homes during the violence of the previous month. They moved into tents provided by the Department of Development Aid that they erected at Mhlabunzima's court.<sup>30</sup>

While Mhlabunzima was abroad, on March 3, a group of Nyavu men again attacked the area around his homestead. The less-than-a-week old tent camp was

destroyed. The refugees fled back to Mason's Mill and COSATU house. One newspaper article printed a litany of the casualties: four elderly men dead, several people injured, thirteen houses and a shop gutted, at least ten other houses damaged, two dogs stabbed, two cars burned out, two KwaZulu buses damaged, and the court damaged.<sup>31</sup> Fleeing residents lamented the absence of the SADF unit they had been reassured would protect them.<sup>32</sup> Mshoki organized meetings for those Mbambangalo residents who remained behind to discuss the violence and began to make calls for Mhlabunzima, who he argued was the cause of the conflict, to be removed.<sup>33</sup>

Following the early March outbreak, sporadic attacks on homes and individuals occurred in the region, but the Nyavu men also participated in violence across the city and its western environs. A busload of armed men emptied into the lower end of the city and stabbed one man and threatened a garage owner. Police confiscated weapons and arrested another group of Nyavu men the same day for trespassing in East Street.<sup>34</sup> *Inkosi* Sikhosiphi Mdluli, a young man at the time, explained the move as one based on their need to access shops; the stores at Table Mountain had been looted or destroyed in the violence or were guarded by Maphumulo youth.

So we had to take buses and go to Pietermaritzburg because we could not go to the shops . . . We then went to fight in Pietermaritzburg and we could not differentiate between people from Imbali Township and Maphumulo. Then we decided to fight with everyone in Pietermaritzburg, and they all moved away and it was obvious that we moved everything. The town was clear and we were able to go to the shops.<sup>35</sup>

There were also reports that the police bussed in Nyavu fighters for the Seven Days War.<sup>36</sup> The Seven Days War is the name given to conflict that ravaged the greater Edendale region from March 25 to March 31. The war began as a result of several explosive factors: the existing state collusion and prevalence of violence, the incitement to action by Buthelezi at a meeting of chiefs in Ulundi on March 23 to March 24, and the stoning of buses from Vulindlela as they traveled through Edendale where non-Inkatha youth had taken refuge. On March 25, exactly one month after a welcome rally for Nelson Mandela at King's Park stadium, Inkatha held a rally, funded by the security police, at the same venue. Buses returning to Vulindlela from the rally passed through Edendale, and what followed has since been largely disputed. Some alleged youth stoned the passing buses, while others alleged Inkatha supporters alighted from the buses and chased people at Edendale's



**FIGURE 22.** Women and children whose tents were destroyed in the March 1990 attacks.

PHOTOGRAPH COURTESY OF RADLEY KEYS PRIVATE PAPERS.

Qokololo stadium. From there, war ensued. The police and army, present in full force, did nothing to stop the carnage and provided logistical support for Inkatha combatants. Large lorries ferried in platoons of armed men—allegedly including men from KwaNyavu.<sup>37</sup> No individual from KwaNyavu interviewed knew—or would admit to knowing—anything about this attack.

On March 29, the day after the Nyavu were alleged to be involved in the Seven Days War, they launched another attack on the area around the Maphumulo court and Mhlabunzima's scorched homestead where remaining refugees stayed. Over the next ten days, reports by the Crisis Committee revealed increasing numbers of deaths, injuries, burning homes, and police partisanship. At least fourteen died during the weekend alone. When Radley Keys and a news team visited Maqongqo on April 5, they found the area nearly deserted. The attackers boasted, "Yes! We



are Manyavus! We will kill the comrades if we find them here. We are going to take over the chieftainship."<sup>38</sup> The reports suggested that the Nyavu continued to be assisted from within Maqongqo from a camp near C. J. Maphumulo's bottle store. During this time, Mhlabunzima was abroad presenting the interim report of the Douglas Commission to the ICJ. Threats abounded that he would be killed upon his return.<sup>39</sup> The violence continued into April as the Nyavu and Inkatha-affiliated Maphumulo worked to weed out any remaining supporters of Mhlabunzima and used this as opportunity to plunder. Regiments of men were repeatedly reported at C. J. Maphumulo's bottle store and at the Nonzila store, where the owner had arranged a truck full of weapons.<sup>40</sup>

At Mason's Mill, the refugees from Table Mountain began to lose hope. The police raided the camp for weapons, prompting fears of helplessness in the event of an Inkatha attack. The Midlands Crisis Relief Committee and Mhlabunzima held a meeting at the camp in early May in an attempt to get the refugees to return to Table Mountain for a meeting with Bishopstowe police. But the refugees hesitated and expressed concern that the chief, with his travels abroad, had abandoned them in their time of need.<sup>41</sup> On June 6, some of the refugees—an estimated one thousand—moved back home under the watchful eyes of two armed Nyavu groups at C. J. Maphumulo's store. For many, the joy of returning home overcame the scenes of destruction they encountered. Deputy chief Albert Madlala expressed his relief: "Being at Maqongqo is like I am at home . . . I felt like I was in exile there [at Mason's Mill]. Now I am back home. The day will come when I will go back to my house and try to rebuild."<sup>42</sup> Mhlabunzima oversaw the loading of municipal and SADF-supplied vehicles at Mason's Mill and announced his own plans to return.<sup>43</sup>

But the winter months of June and July continued to be a dangerous struggle for the returned refugees. The refugees built temporary accommodation, erecting tents around the court and confined themselves to that area for fear of attack. They suffered constant harassment at the hands of Inkatha, SAP, and SADF members. C. J. Maphumulo refused to sell at his shop to the returned residents, and the International Red Cross stopped food deliveries on account of the volatile situation. Volunteers required SADF escorts to take in supplies and negotiated with the Department of Development Aid to supply water trucks when the refugees began to run out of water and could not leave the camp to resupply.<sup>44</sup> Assaults often took place at bus and taxi stops. Police regularly raided the camp at the court for weapons, leaving the residents with a sense of defenselessness. Small groups of refugees began to pour back into the city, but the city refused to accommodate

them again. By July 23, 1990, only one hundred of the returned refugees remained.<sup>45</sup> From July until the end of October, large-scale attacks on Mbambangalo ceased. Few of Mhlabunzima's supporters remained behind to be targeted, and those who stayed attempted to hide their support. The country's attention had turned to the Reef where Inkatha bussed in supporters to agitate.

These months were also dangerous for Mhlabunzima. On June 10, an ambush on his car killed brothers Alson and Nelson Kunene and injured Edendale businessman and UDF supporter Deda Hlophe. The attempt on his life only failed because he caught a taxi when the car failed to arrive on time. Mhlabunzima alleged that the KwaZulu government ordered his assassination and sent an Mpumalanga-based hit squad, including Caprivians Daluxolo Luthuli and Sbu Bhengu, to complete the mission.<sup>46</sup> In Durban in July, police chased Mhlabunzima and his MK bodyguard before detaining them.<sup>47</sup> In August, Contralesa suspended Mhlabunzima from the presidency despite the protests of its representatives from the Natal region. After a community/Inkatha meeting at the end of October, new attacks were launched on the chief and his family.<sup>48</sup> By the end of November, conflict had returned to Table Mountain in full force.

As the violence escalated in the Table Mountain region, Mhlabunzima's words turned from peace to arms and self-defense. Certainly, his firsthand experience of the government's unwillingness to enforce law and order and the police/*kitkonstabel* attacks on his followers influenced this strategic shift. Mhlabunzima's travels with Contralesa served to promote peace and bolster the organization, but it is likely the chief was also working to provide security. Shortly after the first outbreak of violence, rumors began to circulate that he had fled, seeking asylum in the Transkei. Mhlabunzima later condemned the rumors. "There is simply no way that I would abandon my people now as they need me. Under no circumstances would I go to Transkei, this is my home and it [is] here I intend to die if I have to."<sup>49</sup> Mhlabunzima had traveled to the Transkei on Saturday, February 3, allegedly on Contralesa business. But it is also likely that he used this trip to activate some of the Transkei connections he and Zibuse established while in Lusaka. When asked by a reporter what would happen if the attacking Nyavu did not vacate his land, Mhlabunzima responded: "I need not spell it out to them. I mean the writing is on the wall."<sup>50</sup> On Monday, February 5, he made an impassioned plea for peace in Natal at a press conference in Johannesburg. But he acknowledged that it was becoming increasingly more difficult to continue with peace proposals.<sup>51</sup> His relationship with ANC and SACP regional leader Harry Gwala, who had a reputation as a militant



**FIGURE 23.** Mhlabunzima inspects his car after an attempt on his life in 1990 that resulted in the deaths of Alson and Nelson Kunene. PHOTOGRAPH COURTESY OF THE WITNESS.

and uncompromising cadre and with whom he planned the launch of the Table Mountain ANC branch, also may have bolstered the chief's militarism. The two often shared platforms at rallies and press conferences and expressed skepticism at continued peace talks. "The only realistic, meaningful and long-term solution

to this problem is to arm the people in self-defence,” Mhlabunzima told the ANC on one of his Contralesa trips to London.<sup>52</sup>

Indeed, arms did begin to move in and out of Mhlabunzima’s territory. Interviewees affiliated with Mhlabunzima and the ANC at Table Mountain were firm that they had little assistance in obtaining weapons and that they would pool funds to acquire guns legally—as the ANC suggested SDUs should—but only handguns were available legally and licenses for these were often refused. While it is likely that community members took up collections to purchase weapons for defense, as they did elsewhere, there is evidence that suggests the presence of arms in Mbambangalo in a quantity that goes well beyond individual ownership or communal defense. Thula Simpson identified systematic smuggling of arms into Natal from Maputo and at least one foiled attempt to bring them in from the Transkei.<sup>53</sup> Midlands Crisis Relief Committee volunteer Tim Houghton recalled unknowingly transporting an ammunition cache out of Mbambangalo in June 1990 when he gave a ride to a group of comrades staying near the chief’s court to a meeting in Edendale. An SADF roadblock stopped Houghton and the comrades on their way down the windy road from Maqongqo to search their car.

For 15 minutes, I watched flabbergasted as the beautiful but ruthlessly efficient hound unearthed over 2000 rounds of assorted ammunition from behind the seats and under the carpets. At the end of it, I just stood there, staring at the gleaming pile of brass in utter amazement. While I had been running around with Thami, rounding up the rest of our passengers, others in the camp must have stashed the ammo in the car . . . There had obviously been more to this mission all along than getting the comrades to a meeting.<sup>54</sup>

Other evidence also suggests the circulation of weapons among ANC affiliates. One of the Natal Midlands-area ANC/MK underground units, commanded by Dumezweni Zimu and composed of Nhlanhla Nicholas Ngcobo, Fisokwakhe Michael Dlamini, Robert Msizeni Madlala, and Musa Gwala, clandestinely provided assistance to areas under siege. Gwala was arrested for his work in the Table Mountain and KwaSwayimane region from 1990.<sup>55</sup> Albert Sbangeliso Maseko, an ANC supporter and TRC amnesty applicant from KwaSwayimane, testified in 1999 that he received weapons from a “Baba Madlala” in Maqongqo. It is unclear whether this is a reference to Mhlabunzima’s deputy Albert Madlala or to Robert Msizeni Madlala of the ANC/MK unit.<sup>56</sup> There is no evidence to corroborate, but one confidential

source wondered whether Mhlabunzima promoted his area as a peaceful, neutral zone in order to provide cover for the presence of these underground operatives and their arms caches.

By the end of November 1990, conflict had returned to Table Mountain in full force. Attacks were again directed at the chief's homestead after the ANC announced it would launch a Table Mountain branch on December 16 at the court. Mhlabunzima cautioned that anyone who wanted to join must do so voluntarily and emphasized that those scared should remain at home. Inkatha expressed serious reservations on account of the existing tensions and Mhlabunzima threatened legal action against Buthelezi after Mshoki allegedly led a group of KZP into Mhlabunzima's home, where the men confiscated licensed weapons and captured fourteen people who had been staying at the chief's home.<sup>57</sup> Deaths, injuries, burning homes, and allegations of police and military partisanship saw in the new year in Mbambangalo. Both Mhlabunzima and the Maqongqo Inkatha Freedom Party organized separate meetings to discuss the ongoing violence.<sup>58</sup>

On February 25, 1991, a hit squad including Caprivian Phumlani Mshengu and the KZP assassinated Mhlabunzima as he pulled into the driveway of his rented home in Pietermaritzburg. Like many of his people who fled to refugee camps and other safe havens, he found that life in the shadow of Table Mountain had become simply too dangerous. He and his family moved into a house at 95 Havelock Road in a gray area of the city where he was closer to his subjects at Mason's Mill and COSATU house. On the night of his death, he was returning home after a parent meeting at Clarendon Primary School—where one of his children became one of the first African pupils to attend in early 1991. He usually drove with a bodyguard due to previous attempts on his life, but that evening he was alone, an irregularity that led some to suspect bodyguard Jabulani Dennis Hudla was a police informant. One man who often guarded the chief and wished to remain anonymous remembered: "He was with Jabulani and Dumisani [MK bodyguard]. I was not with them because I started working at the time. Dumisani suggested sleeping at Havelock but Jabulani said they must go and then the chief was left alone."<sup>59</sup> His assassination so soon after a January 29, 1991, ceasefire agreement between the ANC and Inkatha at the Royal Hotel in Durban sparked fears that the nascent peace talks would halt. The Jwili chief in Dundee, Mzomdanza Mpungose, was killed the same day. Contralesa's Natal publicity secretary, Siphwe Thusi, expressed little surprise at Mhlabunzima's death and said that numerous chiefs were aware their names were on a hit list.<sup>60</sup>

In the wake of Mhlabunzima's assassination, the ANC embraced the chief as a

struggle hero and organized a mass political funeral. The chief's memorial service and funeral embodied what Belindi Bozzoli describes as the "political theatre" of the end of apartheid. These ceremonial rituals became the arena for the formation of African identities and sites of mobilization in the struggle against oppression.<sup>61</sup> Two thousand sympathizers gathered at a March 7 memorial service at Edendale's Lay Ecumenical Centre with representatives from the ANC, Contralesa, and COSATU. On March 10, thousands attended the funeral at Wadley stadium. ANC Youth League (ANCYL) President Peter Mokaba called upon the youth to take up the chief's spear and join MK. The SACP's Blade Nzimande declared, "Maphumulo laid down his life so as to attain the aims of the Freedom Charter. Those of us who continue to live must fight on with his spear until the objectives of the Freedom Charter are realised."<sup>62</sup> From the mass funeral, a cavalcade of cars and buses traveled to Maqongqo to bury the late chief. Family members and mourners found a crowd of Inkatha supporters awaiting them at the bottle store near the route to the shell of Mhlabunzima's homestead. Happiness Memela recalled that Jacob Zuma, Chris Hani, and Tokyo Sexwale were there, and that during the salute of the late chief, Hani leapt upon the grave.<sup>63</sup>

The ANC also pushed for a high-profile inquiry into the assassination after Siphso Madlala confessed to being a member of the hit squad that murdered him. Just days after his death, a man claiming to be a state intelligence agent with information about the chief's death phoned the *Natal Witness Echo*. Two months later, in late April 1991, Siphso Madlala walked into the paper's office and confessed to the murder. Madlala claimed that he had operated as part of a five-man team acting on the orders of the Security Branch of the SAP and SADF Military Police based at Natal Command. *Witness* reporter Lakela Kaunda, who had earlier traveled to Lusaka with Mhlabunzima, sat down with Madlala for an interview in which he detailed the events leading up to the assassination.<sup>64</sup> Madlala's claims sparked a high-profile investigation, or, more accurately, a state cover-up of counterrevolutionary activities at the highest levels.

Individuals with reputations for obfuscation oversaw the investigation. The SAP Commissioner General Johan van der Merwe announced a special team headed by Major General Ronnie van der Westhuizen, also known as "General Fix-It."<sup>65</sup> Many in the ANC, opposition Democratic Party, and the press expressed disbelief that a police investigation would carry the weight of a judicial enquiry.<sup>66</sup> Indeed, van der Westhuizen announced that he had completed the investigation only days after arriving in Natal and without speaking with Madlala. Police began to discredit

Madlala, labeling him an unreliable police informer, and on April 30 announced that Van der Westhuizen's investigations had revealed no evidence to substantiate Madlala's claims.<sup>67</sup> But evidence for such collusion mounted throughout mid-1991 with regular revelations of such cooperation in the press.<sup>68</sup> In the midst of these exposés, the province set up a formal inquest to investigate Mhlabunzima's assassination. The inquest was riddled with inconsistencies and it quickly became clear that the state was defending itself. In the end, the judge found that "persons unknown" murdered the chief.<sup>69</sup>

Mhlabunzima's death did not end the war at Table Mountain—but now the violence raged within the Maphumulo chiefdom as factions struggled to promote a regent. Factions emerged around Mhlabunzima's younger brother, Kwenzokuhle, who had served as acting chief during Mhlabunzima's suspension, and Baningi Maphumulo, the illegitimate son of Chief Ndlovu who earlier had been denied the regency on account of this heritage. Supporters of Kwenzokuhle within and outside the *umndeni* were targeted for attack. *Umndeni* member Dinzy Jack Maphumulo was killed in a shootout in March 1991. Kwenzokuhle reported police harassment after being called to the Alexandra Police Station.<sup>70</sup> Unknown gunmen shot and killed Acting Chief Albert Madlala. Police alleged that his death occurred during a botched robbery attempt and charged the dying man with attempted armed robbery.<sup>71</sup> Madlala had been a close confidant of Maphumulo during his lifetime and had joined both the ANC and Contralesa. After the chief's death, Madlala worked in earnest with Peace in Natal as this nonprofit attempted to negotiate peace.<sup>72</sup> Madlala's son Japhet was adamant that Albert Madlala "was not beaten for the ANC but beaten for Mhlabunzima" and said that Madlala had earned the support of many local youth.<sup>73</sup>

KwaZulu officials wanted to appoint a regent sympathetic to Inkatha, especially as Table Mountain Inkatha officials were killed, one by one. Baningi's supporters included Mdingi Maphumulo, the Gcabashe brothers, and the former Regent Khangela. Mdingi Maphumulo was killed sometime in the midst of this contest, preventing him from making the claim he had earlier positioned himself for. Sabelo Gcabashe was seriously wounded as he drove near his home in Maqongqo on December 15, 1991. Three bullets struck him as men with AK-47s opened fire on his car. Two days later, Mshoki Gcabashe was killed in a manner almost identical to the assassination of Mhlabunzima. In April 1992, Nyaninga Inkatha chairman Tobias Mdlalose and his daughter were killed in an ambush. The assailants used a variety of 9mm pistols, R1 rifles, shotguns, and petrol bombs. Later that month,

John Khanyile, Inkatha chairman of Enkanyezeni, was assassinated at a bus stop. In June, Mdlalose's son Skumbuzo was shot and seriously wounded, and in September, Enkanyezeni Inkatha Branch Secretary Bheki Shelembe was also shot at a bus stop by occupants of a passing vehicle armed with AK-47s and shotguns.<sup>74</sup> An IFP press statement after Shelembe's death alleged that this assassination "yet again provides continuing evidence of ANC hit-squad activity in Natal and the existence of a systematic pattern of elimination against IFP leadership and members."<sup>75</sup> The systematic nature in which these leaders were taken out and the automatic weapons used to do so lend credence to allegations of the presence of trained *amaqabane* and the availability of arms in Mbambangalo.

A week after the murder of Acting Chief Madlala and eighteen months after the assassination of Mhlabunzima, the KwaZulu Cabinet adopted a resolution appointing Baniangi Maphumulo as regent. Its memorandum recommending the appointment recognized the division within the *umndeni* and attempted to discredit Kwenzokuhle's claim to the regency on account of his "anti-government" affiliations. The report acknowledged that Baniangi was an illegitimate son of the late Chief Ndlovu, but did not allude to the fact that he had previously been overlooked for the position on account of this heritage.<sup>76</sup> Peace in Natal members working in Mbambangalo doubted Baniangi's ability to control his council and believed that Sabelo Gcabashe actually made the decisions.<sup>77</sup> Khanyisile Maphumulo, an aunt of Mhlabunzima who sought refuge at Baniangi's home, remembers the regent being visited by Bangubukhosi, suggesting the alliance continued.<sup>78</sup>

With the appointment of Baniangi, the dynamics of the Table Mountain violence descended into a cycle of revenge killings. The violence garnered national attention after three 1993 massacres. These were the most brutal episodes of war at Table Mountain. In the Mboyi Massacre, a trained SDU opened fired on a truck said to be owned by Inkatha leader Christopher Sipiwe Zondi and killed six children and wounded another six, including relatives of Inkatha leader Bernard Mkhize. The event shocked the nation. A furious Archbishop Desmond Tutu, who visited the massacre site as part of a delegation of South African Council of Churches leaders, described the event as the "diabolical work of the devil."<sup>79</sup> Nhlanhla Radebe, a local violence monitor, led the delegation to visit the victims' families and remembers his concern. "When we got there, it was clear that people were armed and there was going to be some kind of retaliation . . . they were very, very antagonistic. Philip Powell was there."<sup>80</sup> Philip Powell had become known as a notorious gunrunner for Inkatha. A former intelligence officer turned Inkatha member, Powell was assisted



by Eugene de Kock in the supplying and training of Inkatha at Mlaba camp.<sup>81</sup> Armed by Powell, Inkatha men retaliated in what became known as the Nkanyezeni massacre. They opened fire on a kombi that they believed carried ANC supporters, but many of the dead included Inkatha members or non-affiliated residents.<sup>82</sup> The massacres continued when, on March 8, 1993, gunmen attacked a bus of ANC supporters from KwaSwayimane en route to the Pietermaritzburg court hearing of those arrested in connection with the Mboyi massacre. Four more were killed and sixteen were wounded.<sup>83</sup> Buthelezi attended the burial of the Mboyi children, while Mandela attended the funeral of two KwaSwayimane ANC members. The next day, the IFP buried five more of the Nkanyezeni victims whose families had asked for their assistance.<sup>84</sup> Violence continued, not only at Table Mountain, but across KwaZulu/Natal through the first national elections in 1994 until the delayed local government elections took place in 1996.

## The Contest over Land, Authority, and Belonging at Table Mountain

The apartheid state's collaboration with Inkatha sparked the war at Table Mountain when *kitkonstabels* arrived to assist Inkatha leaders from KwaNyavu and Mbambangalo. But this partnership does not explain why members of the Nyavu and Maphumulo participated. The subjects of the Nyavu chief took to arms to defend a chiefdom whose leader's authority had been denied by appointed chiefs to his east and west, whose land had been occupied by created chiefdoms. But the cooperation of some within the Maphumulo with Inkatha and the Nyavu reveals that the civil war should be seen not only as emanating from political competition or some long-standing feud between chiefdoms. For many involved in violence, either as instigators, foot soldiers, or victims, the conflict raged to define authority and belonging. What did it mean to be a chief? For whom did the chief rule? Who had rights to the land? To security? Who belonged to the Maphumulo?

The Nyavu identified their conflict with the Ximba as one between elders and youth, Inkatha and UDF/ANC, but they did not apply the same explanation to their war with the Maphumulo. Members of the Nyavu personalized the loss of space and place envisioned as theirs, a feeling accentuated by the arrival of new Maphumulo members throughout the 1980s. The war over the jurisdiction of Goedverwachting cannot be separated from this. As Mhlabunzima proclaimed the strip of trust farm

as part of his jurisdiction and settled the land with his new followers, members of the Nyavu took this denial of land personally. This land continued to be important in Nyavu thought as both space to occupy—particularly in the wake of floods when many needed to move upland out of the river valley—and the place of their ancestors, their birth, that had been denied them. Nyavu *Induna* Bhekumuzi Sibiya attributed the war to this expansion of the Maphumulo chiefdom on the contested land: “Mhlabunzima started the violence . . . He said he wants to take over this place.” Sibiya remembered how they would wake in the morning to find new houses where there had been none the previous evening. Suddenly, “now there are people asking us who we are. That was confusing to us because we were born from this place.”<sup>85</sup> Another Nyavu elder saw the alliance between the Mlaba and Maphumulo against the Nyavu as a continuation of a century of land dispossession and the assault on the Mdluli chiefs’ authority by appointed chiefs. “They wanted to forcefully take *lelizwe lakaNyavu* [this land of Nyavu]. They discussed how they should finish the nation of Nyavu then divide this land among one another.”<sup>86</sup> Vanizama Nzama suggested the Nyavu felt trapped, surrounded by the appointed chiefs Mlaba and Maphumulo: “We were blocked in here. We could not go anywhere. We were still fighting for Nyavu land that was taken by the oppressors. We fought very much for this our land of the Nyavu.”<sup>87</sup> One young Nyavu man believed this overlap of the land dispute with politics was a shrewd orchestration of Mhlabunzima: “He was too clever; he changed the land dispute and called it a political war. He said IFP members are beating him because he is a member of the ANC . . . it was not a war between IFP and ANC. It was a land dispute.”<sup>88</sup>

For Mhlabunzima and some members of the Maphumulo, the encroachment of Nyavu subjects relocating in the wake of the 1987 floods signaled a breach of place promised them in the Nagle Dam project and recently defined. Mhlabunzima himself was keenly aware of Inkatha disapproval of his Contralesa and UDF affiliations—but still contended that the manner in which the Table Mountain conflict with the Nyavu unfolded was directly related to the struggle over the strip of Goedverwagting. Immediately after the outbreak of the violence, Mhlabunzima explained the conflict as directly connected to his jurisdiction of the land. “The Manyavu are trying to claim for themselves a portion of our land which was a trust farm called Goedverwagting [*sic*], which was officially handed over to us,” the chief said.<sup>89</sup> Mhlabunzima requested that the police “tell the Manyavus to vacate our land, those that have encroached. If they can do that peace is sure to be restored.”<sup>90</sup> Maphumulo headmen and Inkatha members Baningi Maphumulo

and Bernard Mkhize specifically cited this movement of the Nyavu into Echibini as the genesis of the war at Table Mountain. Baningi explained the benevolence of the Maphumulo. “The war started due to a land dispute . . . That place was called Echibini. Those [Nyavu] people were fighting us after our chief gave them a place to stay. They came to Echibini after suffering in their places, but after they settled we started to not see eye-to-eye.” Mkhize went on to say, “We tried to sit down with them and talk sense in such a way. We had boundaries but we ended up disputing the boundaries.” He dated the conflict to the 1950s when the farm was bought from Ferreira for the Maphumulo, fusing the piecemeal purchase of Goedverwaching into one transaction. This conflation may reflect an error in memory or may speak to the Maphumulo’s interpretation that the land was always intended for them.<sup>91</sup> In these statements, Mhlabunzima and elder Maphumulo members, themselves affiliated with Inkatha, deploy an understanding of the land as the place of the Maphumulo, intended for them as part of the Nagle Dam project and finally recognized as theirs.

While Mhlabunzima envisioned the land as falling under his jurisdiction and the refugees as new subjects, not all members of the Maphumulo agreed. Those within the Maphumulo struggled to define who belonged to the chieftom—leading some Maphumulo to work with Inkatha and the Nyavu. This contest over defining membership and the chief’s authority is revealed in several Mbambangalo meetings where attendees expressed dissatisfaction with Mhlabunzima’s leadership. After more than a month of conflict at Table Mountain, a meeting at the Maqongqo bottle store owned by Inkatha supporter and *umndeni* member C. J. Maphumulo called on the KwaZulu government to remove Mhlabunzima from the chieftaincy. Mshoki Gcabashe reported to the *Natal Witness* that the meeting attendees concluded that the trouble in Table Mountain began when Mhlabunzima set up a training camp at his court in November 1989 “designed to turn youths into *amaqabane*.” Mhoski and the men in attendance saw the refugees at Echibini not as new members of the Maphumulo, but as outsiders and instigators. Mshoki claimed to be speaking in his personal capacity, despite being the chairman of the local Inkatha branch. He said people attending the meeting complained that the violence over the Goedverwaching farm, or Echibini, at the end of January was caused by *amaqabane* who attacked those at the farm because they refused to become *amaqabane* too.<sup>92</sup> In April, the Inkatha-owned *Ilanga* reported on another meeting of people from Nyaninga and Maqongqo organized to express dissatisfaction with Mhlabunzima.<sup>93</sup>

Mshoki again called into question the support of Maphumulo's leadership in June, when KwaZulu called an election to test the chief's support. Mhlabunzima saw the election as an attempt by the chief minister to oust him. Buthelezi dismissed the chief's allegations and contended "members of the Maphumulo, who are not necessarily Inkatha members, appear to have lost confidence in [Chief] Maphumulo." Mhlabunzima, who said that he was quite prepared to test his support, alleged the election fell through because Inkatha supporters first agreed that the voting could take place at his court but later objected to the venue and canceled. Mshoki alleged Mhlabunzima failed to show.<sup>94</sup>

This debate over belonging and the chief's authority is best revealed in the language of these publicized conflicts. In late October, Mshoki again served as a press spokesperson, declaring that Mhlabunzima must leave Maqongqo because "he is not wanted by his people." Mshoki alleged that people had fled to the city because of the violence, not because they were supporters of the chief. Mshoki welcomed them back but warned that Mhlabunzima should stay away. He made a thinly veiled threat: "I want to warn Maphumulo. If he has troubles or problems it should not be easy for him to use Inkatha's name because we have not touched him yet. If his people beat him it will not help him to blame Inkatha."<sup>95</sup> Mhlabunzima, on the other hand, believed that he enjoyed the support of his people. "When my home was burned by Inkatha, about 70 percent of my people vacated the area."<sup>96</sup> These conceptions of the Maphumulo, "his people," and "my people" are central to understanding the civil war within Mbambangalo.

Two days after Mhlabunzima's assassination, Buthelezi released an Mbambangalo Tribal Authority memorandum to the press that points to this debate over belonging and the significance of land, Mhlabunzima's politics, and his leadership. The release was certainly strategic, designed to deflect any blaming of Inkatha for the chief's death by pointing to the community rift. But that does not mean Buthelezi fabricated those divisions; contemporary press and oral history interviews also speak to the disagreements among the Maphumulo. Ningi Xulu remembered how some of the elders "rebuked the chief because they were worried about the way our chief was managing his nation. They even told him that he would not live to see his grandchildren if he kept on doing what he was doing."<sup>97</sup> Attributed to "Residents of Maqongqo Area (Mbambangalo Tribal Authority)," the memo has no clear author or composition date. While the memo itself puts forth that "most of the people who are party to this memorandum, though not necessary all, are members of the IFP or subscribe to its principles," the meeting at which it was alleged to have

been composed was an Inkatha meeting held on February 11, 1991, after many of Mhlabunzima's supporters had fled to the city.<sup>98</sup> It is probable that Mshoki was involved in its creation, as much of the rhetoric is similar to his language usage in the contemporary press.

Despite these ambiguities, the memo is especially important for the insight it provides regarding insiders and outsiders. The memorandum contended that violence began when

some newcomers, under the leadership of our chief Mhlabunzima Maphumulo, came into our area, he (Chief Maphumulo) instigated a conflict with neighboring Chief Mdluli, so as to provide the newcomers with land already occupied by Chief Mdluli's people. The majority of the indigenous residents, i.e. Chief Maphumulo's people, opposed this. They saw it would automatically lead to a serious faction fight between the two tribes. Residents who opposed Maphumulo's plan were immediately targeted for attack by those favouring it. A lot of violence thus occurred within the Mbambangalo tribal area which ended up in Chief Maphumulo fleeing the area.<sup>99</sup>

The memo claims that Inkatha members supported the memorandum but then highlights the conflict over the strip of Goedverwaching rather than political violence. The author makes clear that those who support the memorandum believed the land in question was Nyavu land rather than that of the Maphumulo, an interpretation necessary for an alliance with the Inkatha-affiliated Nyavu chief. But a clear distinction is made between "tribal residents" and "Maphumulo's comrades." The memo reveals:

The tribal residents reported a long time ago that the troublemakers are not indogeneously [*sic*] from the area and that they are all comrades brought in by Chief Maphumulo from areas like Dambuza, Edendale etc, to suppress tribal residents. Residents have continually pointed out that if the security forces instruct these comrades to return to their original places, peace can prevail in the area.

While the timing of the memorandum's release was certainly coordinated to alleviate any suspicions about the role of Inkatha in Mhlabunzima's death, the attention to divisions within the Maphumulo surrounding land and the new subjects cannot be ignored.

Central to understanding the war, Mhlabunzima's death, and the contestation over land and chiefly authority at Table Mountain is the definition of the Maphumulo and chiefly legitimacy. Here, belonging and chiefly authority are a process, constantly under negotiation between and within chiefdoms. Local leaders employed claims to "the people" in need of further examination. Mshoki's reference to Maphumulo's followers as "his people," Mhlabunzima's use of "my people," and the memories of Mbambangalo residents suggest different understandings of membership in the Maphumulo and of chiefly authority.

Focusing on the social contract of *ukukhonza*, the language Mhlabunzima himself used to welcome refugees from the war onto contested land, enables an examination of the culturally defined meanings and process of membership. The narrative that pits Inkatha-allied Nyavu against the UDF/ANC-allied Maphumulo contains assumptions about homogeneous "communities" or chiefdoms, void of internal divisions.<sup>100</sup> This conceals the changes and conflicts within these chiefdoms and local explanations for the violence. Exactly because these entities are not static or timeless, it enables us to analyze the social units at Table Mountain in a manner that allows for the movement and change that accompanied relocation during colonialism, segregation, apartheid, and the transition-era civil war.

In particular, the historical influx into Echibini of refugees during the war and those forcefully removed earlier in the 1980s prior to the outbreak of the Table Mountain violence called into question the makeup of the Maphumulo chiefdom. Who did the chief consider to be members of the Maphumulo? What did the other local leaders mean when they called on the Maphumulo? And what of the people who moved onto the contested land? The cultural inheritance of *ukukhonza* allowed people to define not only this membership, but also land access, and chiefly legitimacy—the qualities of leadership admired by the chief's followers, the people that made the chief a chief.

Mhlabunzima considered all of the people in his territory as "my people," especially as he expected that those fleeing from the political violence elsewhere *khonza* in order to access land. Recall the allegations of his misuse of those *khonza* site fees, as well as his comments to the press when he first began to welcome the refugees: "People are not made to pay money to live in the area, but in our tradition they are expected to pay '*khonza*'—a tribute to the chief."<sup>101</sup> *Ukukhonza* was the basis on which relations between political heads and subjects were founded. When he sought to promote peace and political tolerance among his people, Mhlabunzima spoke to both the refugees and the existing members of

the chiefdom. When he sought to provide security, he did so for Maphumulo, old and new, telling them to conceal their political affiliations and directing them to shelter in the city.

Members of the Maphumulo—both those new in the 1980s and those who already pledged allegiance to Mhlabunzima and his predecessors—recognized the provision of security as a key part of that personal relationship. Mhlabunzima's authority stemmed, in part, from his efforts to keep people safe. Mantombi Goba, who moved to Maqongqo for her marriage well before the violence, believed his welcoming of the refugees onto the land made him a good leader:

Mhlabunzima bought the place [Goedverwachting strip] and the white man showed them the boundary. When Mhlabunzima put those people who ran away from their places, then [the Nyavu] said “Mhlabunzima is a comrade; he is together with Mandela.” But he put these people in his own place. The people of KwaNyavu refused to welcome people who left their places because of the war; they are all still alive. Mhlabunzima was a great chief because he was able to welcome people who suffered from their places.<sup>102</sup>

Phyllis Ngubane, who moved to Echibini from Sweetwaters when the war began there, explained how Mhlabunzima instructed his followers who remained behind when others fled to protect themselves in the war over the land:

Mhlabunzima said those who are staying behind in Maqongqo must do what Mdluli's people said. He said this when he was leaving Maqongqo. He said this to protect his own place from being taking by Chief Mdluli, but he never come back. He passed on where he was hiding. Where I am staying [in Echibini] it is a boundary . . . This boundary is separating Maphumulo and Mdluli. They fought a lot for this place because they usually say this is Naartjies's [Ignatius Ferreira] farm . . . Chief Mdluli was fighting for this place because even now a lot of my neighbours are from Chief Mdluli's place.<sup>103</sup>

These women attest to the role of land and the influx of new members of the Maphumulo in fueling the violence. Muzi Zondi, who fled the Ezibhaneni ward of Mbambangalo during the war, explained how he and his wife connected their safety to Mhlabunzima. “When the chief died, we thought he was going to make a difference, or mediate the fighting, because we would run away and come back.

We gave up when they killed him. We then ran off and never looked back."<sup>104</sup> These were Maphumulo subjects for whom Mhlabunzima represented security.

Mshoki Gcabashe opposed the settlement of these refugees and did not include them in his definition of the Maphumulo. He frequently described them as *amaqabane*, despite the number of Inkatha-affiliated families that moved into the region at the same time. When he alleged that Maphumulo's followers wanted the chief to leave, he was referring only to those prior to the influx of outsiders. When he organized meetings to oust Mhlabunzima, those members of the Maphumulo in attendance would have been only those who remained behind when so many of Mhlabunzima's supporters fled to town. Mshoki maintained that Mhlabunzima's only local supporters were the youth that Mhlabunzima had brought in from other areas to prop up his flailing support. Gcabashe argued that Mhlabunzima "recruits the youths from outside and uses them to burn houses and kill other people."<sup>105</sup> While Inkatha often attributed community violence to outsiders, in this case, Mshoki could point to newcomers.<sup>106</sup>

## Conclusion

The arrival of Inkatha-allied South African Police in early 1990 sparked the war at Table Mountain, but this political conflict alone does not explain what drove members of the Nyavu and Maphumulo to pick up arms against their neighbors. National politics—the war between an apartheid-supported Inkatha and the ANC/UDF—enabled the supply of arms and police impartiality. But the ongoing conflict over land between chiefdoms in which discourses of belonging and chiefly legitimacy were being debated and defined gave many a stake in the violence. Many proclaimed to the press and in interviews that they were fighting for the disputed Goedverwachting strip of land, and the affiliations between a faction of the Maphumulo with the Nyavu and Inkatha reveal divisions within the Maphumulo over belonging in a chiefdom. Belonging defined who had access to land and who could expect security from the chief.

The authority of this militant "peace chief" and the composition of "his people" were highly contested by Table Mountain residents of both chiefdoms. While Inkatha's surrogate status for the apartheid state makes it easy to dismiss its claims, evidence suggests that many affiliated with Inkatha not because the organization represented apartheid but because it allowed them to contest local access to land.



This access to land was dependent upon the meaning of chiefly authority and who belonged in a chiefdom. The Inkatha/Mbambangalo community meetings and memorandums served to contest not only Mhlabunzima's authority, but what it meant to honor the social contract. The composition of Mhlabunzima's chiefdom, the Maphumulo, varied based on when and who was making claims on "the people." Mhlabunzima considered the refugees who had *khonza*'d to be new members of the Maphumulo and sought to be in the Mass Democratic Movement "with the people." On the other hand, headman and Inkatha leader Mshoki Gcabashe and his followers sought to define the Maphumulo by land, as only those people on the land when the tribal authority was legally defined. When Mhlabunzima deployed notions of "the people," he imagined his subjects as reflected in the proverb "*inkosi yinkosi ngabantu*," a chief is a chief because of the people who *khonza* him. But Mshoki's use of "the people" reflected the idea of a chiefdom as territorially bound, a chief is a chief because of his territory. And for the Nyavu, the Maphumulo's colonial origins and encroachment onto their territory represented a denial of land and chiefly authority made personal.

# Conclusion

But if you can record this information, that if they don't work on Nyavu and Mbambangalo boundary we will always fight. We will die but our children would remain.

—M. A. Shange, 2014

**M**hlabunzima's trip to Lusaka with the delegation of Contralesa leaders in 1989 was a defining moment for the relationship between the ANC and traditional leaders—a concretization of a tenuous partnership. The resultant memorandum laid out a future in which traditional leaders could expect to participate in a new South Africa. Mhlabunzima's development of land at Table Mountain, his pledge of peace, and belief in the power of traditional authority as a protective "umbrella for the people" seemed to represent the promise of a flexible institution that could throw off the yokes of colonial and apartheid rule and occupy a place in the new South Africa in line with democratic principles. We might see his untimely death as the denial of that promise.

The Contralesa that emerged in the wake of Mhlabunzima's assassination continued his mission to ensure a place for traditional authority in the new South Africa, but its vision for the institution lacked the flexibility or constraints

that *ukukhonza* provided. After Mhlabunzima's death, *Inkosi* Phatekile Holomisa consolidated control over Contralesa in an internal struggle, serving as president for over two decades (1991–2013).<sup>1</sup> Phatekile became a negotiator for the Transkei delegation in the Convention for a Democratic South Africa Multi-Party Negotiations (1991–1993)—and not as a representative of Contralesa, which was not invited into the negotiations until 1993. Mhlabunzima had perceived the chieftaincy as an institution of the people and believed that chiefs needed to follow the will of their followers—as he had in his move into the Mass Democratic Movement. But as J. C. Myers has argued, Holomisa understood the chieftaincy to be a “position from which to lead the people” and thought that chiefs were in the best position to articulate the direction of customary law and communal land in the new South Africa.<sup>2</sup>

In this book, I have used *ukukhonza* as a lens to explore the history of the relationship between chiefs, subjects, and land. While traditional leaders and tribalization served as the bedrock of indirect rule and the other parasitic forms of colonial governance, the cultural inheritance of *ukukhonza* provided a framework for Africans to shape their relationships with their leaders and to define insiders and outsiders. Focusing on *ukukhonza* reveals that even as authority was territorialized and chiefs were made instruments of colonial and apartheid rule, people retained knowledge about personal allegiances and the accompanying expectations that they used to hold leaders accountable and make decisions. The memory of the notion that a chief ruled by the people meant chiefs could not simply act as they, or their colonial overlords, pleased. During the growth of states in southeastern Africa, men pledged themselves to more powerful chiefs to ensure their security. In the colonial era, Africans at Table Mountain used these allegiances to navigate required public labor and to break away from unresponsive chiefs. At times, these personal allegiances sparked violence. Young men initiated small conflicts with their neighbors over threats to their chief that they had personalized when their paths to work were blocked by the subjects of neighboring chiefs. During forced removals for the construction of the Nagle Dam, people used knowledge about these allegiances to make decisions about where to move, at times choosing more crowded areas that would enable them to maintain chiefly relationships. In doing so, African subjects themselves contributed to the territorialization of chiefly authority. During later forced removals and civil war, *ukukhonza* provided the language in which chiefs and their subjects defined—and debated—membership.

At the same time, the identification with a chief facilitated by *ukukhonza* was only one relationship among others that people embraced. Migrations, both

chosen and forced, meant people carried knowledge of their chiefly connections and those of their ancestors across boundary lines and into the territory of other leaders. These chiefly subjects also identified with national and regional political parties, with a growing sense of Zuluness, as members of homesteads and families, genders, and races. When women found themselves burdened with the labor associated with betterment planning, the agricultural developments to be implemented and overseen by chiefs, they destroyed dip tanks and sent a clear message to authorities—both apartheid officials and their chiefs. Chiefs who embraced the system lost followers to those who resisted or attempted to walk the fine line between defiance and cooperation. When the transition-era civil war broke out at Table Mountain, political party identities overlapped with and diverged from chiefly allegiances. The Nyavu armed themselves with Inkatha weapons to reclaim land and the Maphumulo divided, allying themselves with Mhlabunzima and the UDF/ANC or Inkatha, over who belonged and had rights to access land and security.

As South Africa transitioned into democracy, the relationship between the ANC and traditional leaders initially faltered. While the IFP refused to participate in the negotiations (they argued about the proposed method of representation), they did exert influence on the process as violence wracked the countryside and the IFP threatened to boycott the first democratic elections in 1994. Despite the previous deadly conflict between Inkatha and Contralesa, the two organizations began to find common ground around the preservation of their perceptions of traditional authority and customary law. Traditional leaders worked through Contralesa to ensure the institution would be recognized and protected through the inclusion of a constitutional principle. The IFP only agreed to participate in the elections once the ANC and NP agreed to guarantee the recognition of the Zulu monarchy. King Zwelithini began to distance himself from Buthelezi after this promise. But Contralesa and the IFP felt betrayed by the lack of definition of the institution's powers and responded with hostility; in KwaZulu-Natal, they delayed the scheduled 1995 local government elections. Debate surrounded whether chiefs or elected municipal councils should be the primary level of local government in rural areas. Traditional leaders resisted the extension of elected local government into jurisdictions they envisioned as their own. During this time, progressive members of the ANC, women's groups, and other civic groups forced the ANC to rein in the demands of traditional leaders.<sup>3</sup>

This common ground between the IFP and Contralesa did not prevent Holomisa from serving the ANC as a member of parliament (1994–present), a position from

which he criticized the party for not going far enough in addressing the concerns of traditional leaders. Contralesa became an influential lobby group, especially with a number of traditional leaders such as Holomisa serving as ANC MPs. The 1997 establishment of the National House of Traditional Leaders provided these leaders with salary supplements and opportunities to consult with government.<sup>4</sup> J. Michael Williams's work clearly shows the initial disjuncture between government vision of separate political legitimacy for local government and traditional authority and that on the ground of leaders and communities who had come to see traditional authority as an institution capable of local government. The 1998 Local Government White Paper made clear elected councilors would be responsible for service delivery and development; these were not the prerogative of chiefs.<sup>5</sup> The state failed to acknowledge how chiefs had become involved in development—both desired and resisted—during apartheid and that some chiefs, such as Mhlabunzima, had already begun to roll out service delivery in their regions both through regional authorities and on their own initiative. The provision of desired development was the responsibility of traditional leaders in the eyes of chiefs and parts of their communities.

Traditional leaders thus became a powerful lobby for provincial and national legislation that has since contributed to the gradual increase in the power of traditional authority, often in ways that remove the accountability of *ukukhonza*. As the new government sought to repeal the 1927 Native Administration Act and 1951 Bantu Authorities Act, traditional leaders demanded new laws to reassert their status. In 1994, the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly—under the control of the IFP—passed a bill that guaranteed all former KwaZulu land would be held in trust by the Zulu king through the Ingonyama Trust Board (ITB), making it impossible for land to be alienated without the agreement of the king. Traditional leaders opposed to their functions as outlined in the White Paper continued to threaten a boycott of local elections in 2000, preceding which the ANC created the Joint Technical Committee to address their concerns. Legislation was amended to allow traditional leaders more participation in local government, but they remained hostile. After the 2000 local elections and full implementation of permanent local government institutions, the ANC promised a constitutional amendment that would more clearly define the relationship between local government and traditional authority. Instead, the ANC moved forward with legislation. In 2003, the Traditional Leadership and Governance Framework Act (TLGFA) was passed to “restore the integrity and legitimacy of the institution of traditional leadership in line with customary law and

practices.<sup>6</sup> Its stated purpose was to specify the functions of traditional leaders but also to transform it in line with democratic institutions—as the ANC had called for since the 1989 meeting in Lusaka. The law renamed tribal authorities as traditional councils but required them to comply with new requirements that they consist of 40 percent elected members and one-third women. The TLGFA accepted the tribal authority boundaries and opened the way for additional legislation defining the role of councils and leaders. Instead of recognizing traditional authority and customary law as flexible, changing institutions, the TLGFA ultimately undermined living customary law—a reflection of a weak party's cooperation with traditional leaders desirous of more power and ownership of rural land.

Other government efforts to increase the power of traditional leaders and councils have failed for now. The 2004 Communal Land Rights Act (CLRA) gave traditional councils the power to administer rural land and represent traditional communities as owners—but was struck down in 2010 by the Constitutional Court. Under the CLRA, councils would have had control over land, even that of groups with title deeds. This centralization of power enabled chiefs to override family- and village-level decisions. The Constitutional Court found the legislation unlawful due to inadequate legislative processes leading to its passing. Another proposed law, the Traditional Courts Bill (TCB), put forth in 2008 and 2011, sought to give traditional councils more power—effectively putting them on equal footing with that of a Magistrate's Court with the power to summon, impose punishments, and, perhaps most troubling, the power to revoke people's rights to land and community membership.<sup>7</sup> The vocal resistance of women—some of the most vulnerable under the new bills—and work of the Land and Accountability Research Centre (formerly the Rural Women's Action Research Programme of the Centre for Law and Society) caused the bill to lapse in parliament without sufficient support. At the time of writing, the Communal Land Tenure Policy is under discussion, a more nuanced policy that still fails to uphold the rights of rural people. Concern exists that a new TCB will soon be introduced. New laws at the provincial levels also shape these rural power dynamics. These bills entrench boundaries and practices developed under colonialism and apartheid.

But this is also a reciprocal relationship, this one between the ANC and traditional authority. Scholars argue the reluctance, or inability, of post-colonial African states to govern rural areas, and thus they rely upon traditional leadership as did colonial and apartheid states.<sup>8</sup> The most recent evidence of the reciprocity between the ruling party and traditional leadership is the declaration by the Zulu

King Goodwill Zwelithini that the ITB would grant title deeds to households on their land in rural KwaZulu-Natal. The announcement came in the wake of the 2016 Constitutional Court finding that President Jacob Zuma must pay back public money spent on unnecessary upgrades to his homestead in Nkandla on ITB land. While one might interpret the pronouncement as a positive gesture, for it will give title holders collateral, questions are yet to be answered about the costs of surveying and registering land and whether the titlehold system will secure family and individual land rights without depriving access to common property.<sup>9</sup> Many are concerned the lengthy process will be abused for the benefit of Zuma.<sup>10</sup>

As this book suggests, even during colonialism and apartheid, people used cultural inheritances such as *ukukhonza* to seek accountability, land, and the kinds of development they desired. Post-apartheid legislation has failed to protect the rights of rural people to demand such, focusing instead on the chief–state relations at the local level. While individuals can appeal customary law decisions, there are no institutional mechanisms for a community to appeal when chiefs fail to consult or incorporate community desires. Thus, Williams argues that debates over the chieftaincy since 1994 are about “how to utilize the chieftaincy to help facilitate the state formation process in post-apartheid South Africa,” and are “more reactive than transformative.”<sup>11</sup> While the language of democracy—rights, electoral rules, and processes—has supplied rural people with another way to demand more representation and accountability at the level of the chieftaincy, and in some cases, to actually participate more, the onus is still on local communities and their leaders to adapt.<sup>12</sup> With this post-apartheid legislation, traditional leaders coopt the new state; those individuals who choose such now have more power and are less accountable than ever before. This is particularly acute in rural areas of the country wealthy in minerals and resources, where leaders sign backroom deals with mining companies without proper consultation with community members or without ensuring benefits to all.

If *ukukhonza* has receded from the national and provincial policies of the new South Africa, how has it fared at Table Mountain? First, one must be informed of the changes there. Mhlabunzima’s family had largely dispersed after the destruction of his homestead. His first wife, Thobekile, and their three children moved to her family home in Dambuza—a forced relocation the family refers to as their exile. From Mhlabunzima’s death, the Inkatha-allied regent, Banningi Maphumulo, governed the chiefdom but made no effort to reach out to the family and provide for the heir as is expected of one in his position. Instead, those

allies that Mhlabunzima had relied upon during his chieftaincy assisted them. The Ximba regent, Zibuse Mlaba, ensured the children got to and from school and gave them pocket money. One of Mhlabunzima's friends and bodyguards, Zensizwa Dlomo, continued to look in on the family from time to time. Over a decade after the family's fleeing, *Induna* Bernard Mkhize—allied with Inkatha during the war—traced the family and asked Mhlabunzima's eldest son and heir to return to Mbambangalo and accept his position. This was a surprising turn of events, as Mkhize was the Inkatha leader in Mboyi who lost family in the Mboyi massacre and was suspected of supplying arms for a revenge attack.<sup>13</sup> Thandokuhle Maphumulo explained, "The word that Mkhize used was to say *ubukhosi* belongs to Maphumulo and the rightful person should have it. It should not be based on political affiliation or anything of that sort. So they were generally very welcoming and some of them were bitter of course, as you can imagine, but it was okay."<sup>14</sup> In 2004, Nhlakanipho Maphumulo became the then-youngest chief in KwaZulu-Natal. In the 2006 local elections, Thobekile became the ANC deputy mayor, and later, the mayor, of Mkhambathini District Municipality under which the Maphumulo and Nyavu chiefdoms fall. This relationship seems to facilitate an unusual amount of cooperation between traditional governance and the state—in Mbambangalo at least, where residents fondly call her Ma Meya (Ma Mayor). In KwaNyavu, a regent governed after the death of Bangubukhosi Mdluli until Nyangayezizwe Mdluli came of age; Nyangayezizwe's younger brother, Sikhosiphi, succeeded to the chieftaincy after his brother's unexpected death.

These young leaders govern their chiefdoms in a time of relative peace, but wounds of the civil war still mark the land. Some areas—beautiful scenes to the unknowing—remain uninhabited with no trace of the homes and lives that occupied them prior to the civil war only twenty years ago. Individuals can point out neighbors who looted their livestock or were responsible for family injuries or deaths. Some who had fled during the violence returned and rebuilt their homes. But many others did not and now live across KwaZulu-Natal, including in a new township, Haniville—named after MK leader Chris Hani, who had mourned at the funeral of their deceased leader—on the road between the city and Table Mountain that was recently renamed in honor of the peace chief. Some people had hoped to return but found their sites occupied. Others did not want to return. Still others, who have never before lived at Table Mountain, moved into the region because of the availability of land on the contested strip as betterment restrictions fell away, making way for homes on former agricultural and grazing land. A new



tombstone, installed by the ANC in 2014, indicates Mhlabunzima's burial spot near the Maphumulo court. Another memorial, also recently erected, marks the place on Maphumulo land where the Nyavu believe their ancestor Mcoseli, Nomsimekwana's father, is buried.

This new gravestone is just one indication of the continued contestation of the land, the use of history and (re)imagined origin stories to claim the land, and the overlap between territorial and personal allegiances. The Nyavu placing of Mcoseli's grave coincides with the reopening of land claims in 2014—a process that might accept such a memorial as evidence for prior occupation. On the strip of Goedverwaching, the personal allegiances between chiefs and subjects continue as people who call themselves followers of both the Maphumulo and Nyavu chiefs live side by side. Two headmen, one for the Nyavu and one for the Maphumulo, serve the contested ward. While all are committed to peace, several of the Maphumulo and Nyavu elders expressed concern that the land dispute simmers beneath the surface and that neither the government nor their young chiefs do anything to solve the issue. In one discussion on the topic, Nyavu elders were adamant that we need not conceal their identities or their beliefs: "But if you can record this information, that if they don't work on Nyavu and Mbambangalo boundary we will always fight. We will die but our children would remain."<sup>15</sup> Ndoda Gwala, the former *indunenkulu* (chief headman) for the Maphumulo regents Sichiza and Khangela, bypassed *Inkosi* Nkhlanipho and went to the ITB in 2010 to complain about inaction on the contested land.<sup>16</sup> These men warn that if a decision is not made about the jurisdiction of the contested strip, once and for all, violence will return. Their declaration of such reveals their acceptance of territorial authority, but like those that came before them, they hope to redefine their territory by calling on personal allegiances to chiefs.

But as headmen and aspirant headmen—some believe Ndoda Gwala, at least, is angling to become the *indunenkulu* again—they have much to gain from the definition of the jurisdiction being decided. *Khonza* fees are skyrocketing, especially for larger pieces of land, and increasingly are more payment for access to land than ever before. Many identify the headmen, not the chiefs, as the source of this issue. One former Cooperative Governance and Traditional Authority (COGTA) official felt the land dispute mattered more to these headmen than it did the residents, and those I spoke with tended to express little concern that their neighbors considered themselves subjects of this chief or that. What mattered more to them was the cost. Patrick Zondi, a supporter of Mhlabunzima who fled the area during the war,

explained: “The painful thing that is happening now is that, when people want to go back to their places they can’t. They find their homestead occupied by other people . . . Then when you decide to return to your place, you will find it occupied by someone else. Then they will give you a place under the cliffs and you have to pay R1500. When I went back there, I had to pay R750 but it was not my choice to leave the place. They even sold back to me my own farm; I had to buy my own thing.” Zondi spoke lovingly of the leader lost, but also of personal allegiances to chiefs complicated by a commercialization of land where people pay not only for access but now also the annual lease fee to the ITB.<sup>17</sup>

The former COGTA official admitted the dilemma surrounding territorial and personal allegiances at Table Mountain and acknowledged its connection to larger post-apartheid problems with land and defining the place of chiefly authority in the young democracy. Issues of rural jurisdiction are intricately tied up with development, service delivery, and skyrocketing site fees. Traditional leaders and their councils, on behalf of the Zulu king, govern the land at Table Mountain formerly under the KwaZulu Bantustan—Inanda Location and the farms included in the legal definitions of the local tribal authorities. But the contested strip of Goedverwaching remains outside of the jurisdiction of either the Maphumulo or Nyavu chief. In its 2009–2010 Development Plan, Mkhambathini Municipality budgeted for rural housing in Maqongqo and Mbambangalo, including several hundred homes in Echibini on the contested strip of land. To access a home under this project, a signature from a chief is required. But both chiefs refused to sign because of the dispute, forcing the ITB to sign on the applicants’ behalf.<sup>18</sup> Unless a land claim is lodged, there is no body or individual empowered to decide this jurisdiction. The Nhlapho Commission and provincial Commission on Traditional Leadership Disputes and Claims investigate kingship claims and succession disputes, but not necessarily land or boundary disputes. Even if a land claim is submitted, the case would likely not warrant much attention because the decision would not result in the transfer of additional land to the ITB.

But perhaps most complicated of all is how to make such a decision. To grant jurisdiction of the disputed Goedverwaching strip to the Nyavu would recognize a historical claim to the land that ignores all that has happened in the region during the last 150 years—not to mention that historical evidence for Nyavu control is far from clear cut. To turn the land over to the Maphumulo would be to prioritize colonial, segregation, and apartheid understandings of land and community membership. How can officials grant jurisdiction to one, the other,

or both, in a way that acknowledges this complicated past? Should they establish a boundary—and a boundary appears to be required not only by the government to enable orderly development and service delivery, but also by these elders that warn of violence—when people claiming allegiance to both the Nyavu and Maphumulo dot the contested land and envision it as their own? To define the jurisdiction of the farm with a boundary line that might force some to move or change allegiances would continue to prioritize the territorially bound authority associated with colonial rule and apartheid. But that an official expressed concern that a boundary could not be drawn down the middle because of the scattering of Maphumulo and Nyavu followers suggests that at least this government representative recognizes the continued existence of personal allegiance as means of membership in a chiefdom.<sup>19</sup>

And so the same strategies that chiefs and subjects deployed to claim land during the colonial and apartheid eras remain important even as the powers of traditional leaders grow. The Nyavu continue to deploy their origin story, their presence in the region prior to the arrival of Europeans, and a sense of the land as the place of their ancestors to claim the land—now putting down a gravestone as evidence. The oral accounts of Nomsimekwana's travails have been adapted to center on the Zulu king, a genealogical reimagination not unlike that deployed during the construction of the Zulu kingdom. But in the intervening century and a half since Mcoseli's death and Nomsimekwana's rule, successive governments established and recognized the Maphumulo chiefdom, and Maphumulo followers consider their leader no less legitimate for his colonial heritage. While the Maphumulo lacked an initial "firstcomer" story to tie themselves to the land, they developed a sense of right to the land by creating their own origin stories. Mbambangalo became the name of the place given to their ancestor Maguzu in 1905—a reward now interpreted as a pension. The trust-owned farms—including the contested strip—became the place given to them when forced off Inanda Location for the creation of the Nagle Dam.

The future of land rights and traditional authority in South Africa remains in flux, highly contested at local, regional, and national levels. The protests before and after the 2016 local government elections reveal that many voters do not find their elected ward councilors any more accountable than chiefs or headmen. Remembering the accountability and flexibility embedded in the *ukukhonza* relationship is crucial for ensuring traditional authority operates in line with the values of the constitution. While there is no simple answer to these complicated

issues, acknowledging a cultural inheritance in which chiefs and their followers engaged with authority, debating and reimagining it, and the multiple ways that people gave meaning to land may offer a way forward in which all South Africans can reimagine land and the chieftaincy.



# Notes

## Note on Terminology

1. For more on this, see Adrian Koopman, *Zulu Names* (Pietermaritzburg: University of Natal, 1999), 113; Koopman, "Some Notes on the Morphology of Zulu Clan Names," *South African Journal of African Languages* 10, no. 4 (1990): 333–37; Carolyn Hamilton and Nessa Leibhammer, "Orthographic and Name Notes," in *Tribing and Untribing the Archive*, vol. 1, ed. Carolyn Hamilton and Nessa Leibhammer (University of KwaZulu-Natal Press, 2016), 11.
2. Thomas McClendon, *White Chief, Black Lords: Shepstone and the Colonial State in Natal, South Africa, 1845–1878* (Rochester: University of Rochester Press, 2010), 18.

## Prologue

1. A. T. Bryant suggests "Nomsimekwana" comes from a praise name, "himSimeko yakwaShulwa; humKandi wemiTi yeziNyanga, wa-kanda imiTi kaMafunda kaLujojana (they are the meat-skewers of Shulwa's; he is the medicine-pounder for the doctors, he pounded the medicines for Mafunda, son of Lujojana)." It is not clear where Bryant got this evidence, though as John Wright has argued, Bryant's *Olden Times* is largely derived from Theophilus Shepstone's "Historic Sketches" and also relied upon James Stuart's readers. I found no reference to this praise in either. James Stuart, *Uvusezakithi* (London:

- Longmans, 1926), KCAL; A. T. Bryant, *Olden Times in Zululand and Natal, Containing Earlier Political History of the Eastern-Nguni Clans* (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1929), 558. John Wright, "A.T. Bryant and 'The Wars of Shaka,'" *History in Africa* 18 (1991): 409–25.
2. Somquba Mdluli to Zulu Society, PAR, A1381, IV/5/1.
  3. Carolyn Hamilton, *Terrific Majesty: The Powers of Shaka Zulu and the Limits of Historical Invention* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998), 211–12.

### Introduction

1. Ann Skelton, correspondence with the author, February 8, 2011.
2. Christopher S. Wren, "Tribal Feuds Won't Let Up in South Africa," *New York Times*, February 25, 1990; Roger Thurow, "South African Political Violence Assuming Look of Tribal Conflict," *Wall Street Journal*, August 20, 1990.
3. Mary de Haas, "Violence in Natal and Zululand: The 1980s," in *The Road to Democracy in South Africa*, vol. 6, 1990–1996, by South African Democracy Education Trust (Pretoria: Unisa Press, 2013), 95.
4. Timothy Gibbs, *Mandela's Kinsmen: Nationalist Elites and Apartheid's First Bantustan* (Johannesburg: Jacana, 2014).
5. O. R. Tambo, "Political Report by Oliver Tambo on the National Executive Committee to the National Consultative Conference of the African National Congress," June 17, 1985, <http://www.anc.org.za>.
6. ANC, "Second National Consultative Conference: Report, Main Decisions and Recommendations," 1985, <http://www.anc.org.za>.
7. "Constitutional Guidelines for a Democratic South Africa," in *From Protest to Challenge: A Documentary History of African Politics in South Africa, 1882–1990*, vol. 6: *Challenge and Victory, 1980–1990*, ed. Gail M. Gerhart and Clive L. Glaser (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2010), 656.
8. Zibuse Mlaba, interview by author and Thandokuhle Maphumulo, Pietermaritzburg, June 5, 2014.
9. Sources: for 1895: List of Native Chiefs, and their Tribes in the Colony to Whom Salary is Paid, as compiled from the Hut Tax Returns, 1895–6, PAR, SNA I/1/291. For 1905: Native Affairs Department, *Annual Report*, 1905. For 1917: Stipends of Native Chiefs, Magisterial Division of Pietermaritzburg for the Quarter ending 31/12/1917, PAR, 1/PMB 3/1/1/2/1. For 1933: N. J. Van Warmelo, *A Preliminary Survey of the Bantu Tribes of South Africa* (Pretoria: Government Printer, 1935). For 1950s–1960s: Kapteins en hoofmanne Mapumula stam, NAR, BAO 5/363, F54/1524/5 and Kapteins en hoofmanne Mdhhluli stam, NAR, BAO

- 5/364, 54/1524/9. For 1978-1979: Regsadministrasie en prosedures. Hofgedinge teen dept amptenare en ander instansies. M. Maphumulo teen Hoofmin van KwaZulu Reg. en 'n ander, NAR, SON 836, D10/3/9/2/969.
10. ANC and Contralesa, Congress of Traditional Chiefs and the ANC's Appeal to All Traditional Leaders of South Africa, <http://www.anc.org.za>.
  11. The proverb is found in other Bantu languages, including isiXhosa, isiSwati, and isiNdebele (*inkosi yinkosi ngabantu*), Setswana (*kgosi ke kgosi ka batho*), and Sesotho (*morena ke morena ke batho*). C. L. S. Nyembezi argues that ordinary statements become proverbs when people accept them as clever expression of some truth. They both reflect experiences and serve to instruct, thus making them a useful means of studying people. C. L. S. Nyembezi, *Zulu Proverbs*, rev. ed. (Johannesburg: Witwatersrand University Press, 1990), xi–xii.
  12. Jeff Guy, *Theophilus Shepstone and the Forging of Natal: African Autonomy and Settler Colonialism in the Making of Traditional Authority* (Pietermaritzburg: University of KwaZulu-Natal Press, 2013), 31; Percy Ngonyama, "Bounding Chiefly Authority in Colonial Natal," in *Ekhaya: The Politics of Home in KwaZulu-Natal*, ed. Meghan Healy-Clancy and Jason Hickel (Pietermaritzburg: University of KwaZulu-Natal Press, 2014), 83–106.
  13. Thobile Ngcobo, interview by author and Thandeka Majola, Mbubu, January 17, 2011.
  14. Sipiwe Maphumulo, family interview by author, Thandeka Majola, and Thandokuhle Maphumulo, July 24, 2013.
  15. "Maqongqo Chief to Ask for More Land to Accommodate Refugees," *Natal Witness (NW)*, October 13, 1988.
  16. Guy, *Theophilus Shepstone and the Forging of Natal*, 526. See also Steven Feierman, *Peasant Intellectuals: Anthropology and History in Tanzania* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1990).
  17. Archaeologists recognize "Iron Age" as a European import but also use it as a convenient shorthand to indicate a complete social system. Late Iron Age encompasses much of the second millennium CE. Raevin Jimenez, "Rites of Reproduction: Gender, Generation and Political Economic Transformation among Nguni-speakers of Southern Africa, 8th–19th Century CE" (PhD diss., Northwestern University, 2017). Simon Hall, "Farming Communities of the Second Millennium: Internal Frontiers, Identity, Continuity and Change," in *The Cambridge History of South Africa*, ed. Carolyn Hamilton, Bernard Mbenga, and Robert Ross, vol. 1 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 113.
  18. "Politics of the people" here is of course inspired by subaltern studies that stress the politics of actors outside of colonial authorities or indigenous elites. Ranajit Guha, ed., *Subaltern Studies: Writings on South Asian History and Society*, vol. 1 (Oxford: Oxford



- University Press, 1982), 4.
19. This stance is also influenced by the work on Zulu identities that posits Zuluness as a malleable resource. Benedict Carton, John Laband, and Jabulani Sithole, *Zulu Identities: Being Zulu, Past and Present* (Pietermaritzburg: University of KwaZulu-Natal Press, 2008); Paul Landau, *Popular Politics in the History of South Africa, 1400–1948* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010); Carolyn Hamilton and Simon Hall, “Reading across the Divides: Commentary on the Political Co-Presence of Disparate Identities in Two Regions of South Africa in the Late Eighteenth and Early Nineteenth Centuries,” *Journal of Southern African Studies* 38, no. 2 (June 2012): 281–90.
  20. “Living” comes from historical and legal scholarship on customary law that seeks to understand how colonialism and apartheid stagnated customary law or how traditional institutions might adapt in post-apartheid South Africa. Martin Chanock, *The Making of South African Legal Culture, 1902–1936: Fear, Favour, and Prejudice* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001); Thomas McClendon, “Coercion and Conversation: African Voices in the Making of Customary Law in Natal,” in *The Culture of Power in Southern Africa: Essays on State Formation and the Political Imagination*, ed. Clifton Crais (Portsmouth: Heinemann, 2003), 49–64; Ben Cousins, “Characterising ‘Communal’ Tenure: Nested Systems and Flexible Boundaries,” in *Land, Power and Custom: Controversies Generated by South Africa’s Communal Land Rights Act*, ed. Aninka Claassens and Ben Cousins (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2008), 109–37.
  21. “*Ukudabuka*” literally means to “tear off or asunder; to rend” and is used figuratively as “to originate,” describing the process by which people trace their origins. Jacob Ludwig Döhne, *A Zulu-Kafir Dictionary* (Cape Town: G. J. Pike, 1857), 56–57; Carolyn Hamilton, “Restructuring within the Zulu Royal House: Clan Splitting and the Consolidation of Zulu Royal Power,” in *Culture and the Commonplace: Anthropological Essays in Honour of David Hammond-Tooke*, ed. P. A. McAllister (Johannesburg: Witwatersrand University Press, 1997), 90.
  22. Lee uses the expression to focus on how multiracial peoples used such imagination to stress connections rather than differences in colonial kinships. Christopher J. Lee, *Unreasonable Histories: Nativism, Multiracial Lives, and the Genealogical Imagination in British Africa* (Durham: Duke University Press Books, 2014), 17.
  23. Here I draw upon human geographer Yi-Fu Tuan’s theorization of “space and place” to reconsider African land use. Yi-Fu Tuan, *Space and Place: The Perspective of Experience* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1977).
  24. Tuan, *Space and Place*, 140–54.
  25. Thongchai Winichakul’s work on Siam shows how modern, Western discourses of

- mapping displaced indigenous knowledge of political space. That is not the case here, where even as British ideas were embraced, African knowledge about land and how to access it in its multiple forms persisted. Thongchai Winichakul, *Siam Mapped: A History of the Geo-Body of a Nation* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1994), 129.
26. William Beinart, "Political and Collective Violence in Southern African Historiography," *Journal of Southern African Studies* 18, no. 3 (1988); Jonathon Glassman, *War of Words, War of Stones Racial Thought and Violence in Colonial Zanzibar* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2011).
  27. Gerhard Maré and Georgina Hamilton, *Appetite for Power: Buthelezi's Inkatha and South Africa* (Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1987); Anthony Minnaar, ed., *Patterns of Violence: Case Studies of Conflict in Natal* (Pretoria: Human Sciences Research Council, 1992); Mike Morris and Doug Hindson, "South Africa: Political Violence, Reform and Reconstruction," *Review of African Political Economy* 19, no. 53 (1992): 43–59; Thembisa Waetjen, *Workers and Warriors: Masculinity and the Struggle for Nation in South Africa* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2004).
  28. Steven Feierman, "Colonizers, Scholars and the Creation of Invisible Histories," in *Beyond the Cultural Turn: New Directions in the Study of Society and Culture*, ed. Victoria E. Bonnell and Lynn Hunt (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999), 182–216; Landau, *Popular Politics*. Others who successfully embed conquest and its effects in the pre-colonial include Jonathon Glassman, *Feasts and Riot: Revelry, Rebellion, and Popular Consciousness on the Swahili Coast, 1856–1888* (Portsmouth: Heinemann, 1995); Kairn A. Klieman, "The Pygmies Were Our Compass": *Bantu and Batwa in the History of West Central Africa, Early Times to C. 1900 CE* (Portsmouth: Heinemann, 2003); David L. Schoenbrun, "Conjuring the Modern in Africa: Durability and Rupture in Histories of Public Healing between the Great Lakes of East Africa," *The American Historical Review* 111, no. 5 (2006): 1403–39; Emily Lynn Osborn, *Our New Husbands Are Here: Households, Gender, and Politics in a West African State from the Slave Trade to Colonial Rule* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2011); Jeff Guy, *Theophilus Shepstone and the Forging of Natal: African Autonomy and Settler Colonialism in the Making of Traditional Authority* (Pietermaritzburg: University of KwaZulu-Natal Press, 2013); Naaborko Sackeyfio-Lenoch, *The Politics of Chieftaincy: Authority and Property in Colonial Ghana, 1920–1950* (Rochester: University of Rochester Press, 2014).
  29. Bruce Berman and John Lonsdale, *Unhappy Valley: Conflict in Kenya & Africa* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 1992); Sara Berry, *Chiefs Know Their Boundaries: Essays on Property, Power, and the Past in Asante, 1896–1996* (Portsmouth: Heinemann, 2000); Peter Delius, *The Land Belongs to Us: The Pedi Polity, the Boers, and the British in the Nineteenth-Century*

- Transvaal* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984); Steven Feierman, *Peasant Intellectuals: Anthropology and History in Tanzania* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1990); Carola Lentz, *Land, Mobility, and Belonging in West Africa* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2013); Christian Lund, *Local Politics and the Dynamics of Property in Africa* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008).
30. Belinda Bozzoli, "Class, Community and Ideology in the Evolution of South African Society," in *Class, Community, and Conflict: South African Perspectives* (Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1987), 1–43; Sherry B. Ortner, "Resistance and the Problem of Ethnographic Refusal," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 37, no. 1 (January 1, 1995): 176–77.
  31. Berry, *Chiefs Know Their Boundaries*; Paul Bjerck, "The Allocation of Land as a Historical Discourse of Political Authority in Tanzania," *International Journal of African Historical Studies* 46, no 2 (2013): 255–82; Peter Delius, "Contested Terrain: Land Rights and Chieftly Power in Historical Perspective," in *Land, Power and Custom: Controversies Generated by South Africa's Communal Land Rights Act*, ed. Aninka Claassens and Ben Cousins (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2008), 211–371; Steven Feierman, *Peasant Intellectuals: Anthropology and History in Tanzania* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1990); Kristine Juul and Christian Lund, eds., *Negotiating Property in Africa* (Portsmouth: Heinemann, 2002); Deborah James, *Gaining Ground? "Rights" and "Property" in South African Land Reform* (New York: Routledge, 2007).
  32. Suzanne Miers and Igor Kopytoff, introduction to *Slavery in Africa: Historical and Anthropological Perspectives*, ed. Suzanne Miers and Igor Kopytoff (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1977), 3–81; Martin Klein, ed., *Peasants in Africa: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives* (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1980); Jane I. Guyer and Samuel M. Eno Belinga, "Wealth in People as Wealth in Knowledge: Accumulation and Composition in Equatorial Africa," *Journal of African History* 36, no. 1 (March 1995): 91–120; John K. Thornton, *Africa and Africans in the Making of the Atlantic World, 1400–1800* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).
  33. Jean Comaroff and John L. Comaroff, *Of Revelation and Revolution: The Dialectics of Modernity on a South African Frontier*, vol. 2 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997); Sara Berry, *No Condition Is Permanent: The Social Dynamics of Agrarian Change in Sub-Saharan Africa* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1993); Berry, *Chiefs Know Their Boundaries*.
  34. Assan Sarr, *Islam, Power, and Dependency in the Gambia River Basin: The Politics of Land Control, 1790–1940* (Rochester: University of Rochester Press, 2016). See also Lentz, *Land, Mobility and Belonging in West Africa*; Parker Shipton, *Mortgaging the Ancestors: Ideologies of Attachment in Africa* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009).

35. Lentz, *Land, Mobility, and Belonging in West Africa*, 9–10.
36. Berry, *Chiefs Know Their Boundaries*, xix.
37. Igor Kopytoff, “The Internal African Frontier: The Making of African Political Culture,” in *The African Frontier: The Reproduction of Traditional African Societies* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1987), 3–84; Glassman, *Feasts and Riot*; Hamilton and Hall, “Reading across the Divides”; Lentz, *Land, Mobility, and Belonging in West Africa*; Moses E. Ochonu, *Colonialism by Proxy: Hausa Imperial Agents and Middle Belt Consciousness in Nigeria* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2014).
38. Philip Bonner, *Kings, Commoners, and Concessionaires: The Evolution and Dissolution of the Nineteenth-Century Swazi State* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983); Delius, *The Land Belongs to Us*; Marshall S. Clough, *Fighting Two Sides: Kenyan Chiefs and Politicians, 1918–1940* (Niwot: University Press of Colorado, 1990); Elizabeth A. Eldredge, *A South African Kingdom: The Pursuit of Security in Nineteenth-Century Lesotho* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993); John Lambert, *Betrayed Trust: Africans and the State in Colonial Natal* (Scottsville: University of Natal Press, 1995); Olufemi Vaughan, *Nigerian Chiefs: Traditional Power in Modern Politics, 1890s–1990s* (Rochester: University of Rochester Press, 2000); Berry, *Chiefs Know Their Boundaries*; Richard Rathbone, *Nkrumah & the Chiefs: The Politics of Chieftaincy in Ghana, 1951–60* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2000); Clifton Crais, *The Politics of Evil: Magic, State Power and the Political Imagination in South Africa* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002); Sackeyfio-Lenoch, *The Politics of Chieftaincy*.
39. Sackeyfio-Lenoch, *The Politics of Chieftaincy*.
40. Mahmood Mamdani, *Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late Colonialism* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996).
41. For example, see Carton, *Blood from Your Children*; Timothy Lane, “Witchcraft, Chiefs, and the State in the Northern Transvaal, 1900–1930,” in *The Culture of Power in Southern Africa: Essays on State Formation and the Political Imagination*, ed. Clifton C. Crais (Portsmouth: Heinemann, 2003), 121–49; Jabulani Sithole, “Neither Communists nor Saboteurs: KwaZulu Bantustan Politics,” in *The Road to Democracy in South Africa*, vol. 2, 1970–1980, by South African Democracy Education Trust (Pretoria: Unisa Press, 2006), 805–45.
42. Shula Marks, *The Ambiguities of Dependence in South Africa: Class, Nationalism, and the State in Twentieth-Century Natal* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986). Scholars looking at the resiliency of the chieftaincy in the post-apartheid period have given much more attention to this. See, for instance, Jo Beall and Mduduzi Nkonyama, “Indigenous Institutions, Traditional Leaders and Elite Coalitions for Development: The

- Case of Greater Durban, South Africa," *African Centre for Cities: Crisis States Working Papers Series No. 2* (2009); J. Michael Williams, *Chieftaincy, the State, and Democracy: Political Legitimacy in Post-Apartheid South Africa* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2010); Mario Krämer, "Neither Despotic nor Civil: The Legitimacy of Chieftaincy in Its Relationship with the ANC and the State in KwaZulu-Natal (South Africa)," *Journal of Modern African Studies* 54, no. 1 (March 2016): 117–43.
43. Landau, *Popular Politics*.
  44. Karen E. Fields, *Revival and Rebellion in Colonial Central Africa* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985); Carolyn Hamilton, *Terrific Majesty: The Powers of Shaka Zulu and the Limits of Historical Invention* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998); Thomas Spear, "Neo-Traditionalism and the Limits of Invention in British Colonial Africa," *Journal of African History* 44, no. 1 (2003): 3–27; Thomas McClendon, *White Chief, Black Lords: Shepstone and the Colonial State in Natal, South Africa, 1845–1878* (Rochester: University of Rochester Press, 2010). On intermediaries beyond the chieftaincy, see Benjamin Lawrance, Emily Lynn Osborn, and Richard Roberts, *Intermediaries, Interpreters, and Clerks: African Employees in the Making of Colonial Africa* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2006); Michelle Moyd, *Violent Intermediaries African Soldiers, Conquest, and Everyday Colonialism in German East Africa* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2014).
  45. There is a disparity in the literature on whether Shepstone modeled his governance on Shaka as authoritarian or the hierarchical order of looser chiefdoms of Natal. Hamilton, *Terrific Majesty*; Crais, *The Politics of Evil*; Lane, "Witchcraft, Chiefs, and the State in the Northern Transvaal, 1900–1930"; Sean Redding, *Sorcery and Sovereignty: Taxation, Power, and Rebellion in South Africa, 1880–1963* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2006); McClendon, *White Chief, Black Lords*; Guy, *Theophilus Shepstone and the Forging of Natal*.
  46. Ochonou, *Colonialism by Proxy*, x.
  47. McClendon, *White Chief, Black Lords*, 7; Guy, *Theophilus Shepstone and the Forging of Natal*, 6–7.
  48. Guy, *Theophilus Shepstone and the Forging of Natal*, 526.
  49. Jeff Guy, "An Accommodation of Patriarchs: Theophilus Shepstone and the Foundations of the System of Native Administration in Natal" (paper presented at Colloquium: Masculinities in Southern Africa, University of Natal-Durban, 1997); Carton, *Blood from Your Children*; Thomas McClendon, *Genders and Generations Apart: Labor Tenants and Customary Law in Segregation-Era South Africa, 1920s to 1940s* (Portsmouth: Heinemann, 2002); Michael Mahoney, *The Other Zulus: The Spread of Zulu Ethnicity in Colonial South Africa* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2012).
  50. Clifton Crais, *Poverty, War, and Violence in South Africa* (Cambridge: Cambridge

- University Press, 2011), 17, 26.
51. Benedict Carton and Robert Morrell, "Zulu Masculinities, Warrior Culture and Stick Fighting: Reassessing Male Violence and Virtue in South Africa," *Journal of Southern African Studies* 38, no. 1 (2012): 31–53; Mahoney, *The Other Zulus*.
  52. Matthew Kentridge, *An Unofficial War: Inside the Conflict in Pietermaritzburg* (Cape Town: David Philip Publishers, 1990), 14–17; Steven Collins, "'Things Fall Apart': The Culture of Violence Becomes Entrenched," in *Patterns of Violence: Case Studies of Conflict in Natal*, ed. Anthony Minnaar (Pretoria: Human Sciences Research Council, 1992), 95.
  53. Mario Krämer, *Violence as Routine: Transformations of Local-Level Politics and the Disjunction between Centre and Periphery in KwaZulu-Natal* (South Africa) (Cologne: Rudiger Koppe, 2007); Gary Kynoch, "Reassessing Transition Violence: Voices from South Africa's Township Wars, 1990–4," *African Affairs* 112, no. 447 (2013): 283–303; Philip Bonner and Vusi Ndima, "The Roots of Violence and Martial Zuluness on the East Rand," in *Zulu Identities: Being Zulu, Past and Present*, ed. Benedict Carton, John Laband, and Jabulani Sithole (Pietermaritzburg: University of KwaZulu-Natal Press, 2008), 363–82.
  54. Morris Szeftel, "Manoeuvres of War in South Africa," *Review of African Political Economy* 18, no. 51 (1991): 63–76; Ran Greenstein, ed., *The Role of Political Violence in South Africa's Democratisation* (Johannesburg: Community Agency for Social Enquiry, 2003); James Sanders, *Apartheid's Friends: The Rise and Fall of South Africa's Secret Service* (London: John Murray, 2006); Bernard Magubane, "The Collapse of the Garrison State," in *The Road to Democracy in South Africa*, vol. 4, 1980–1990, by South African Democracy Education Trust (Pretoria: Unisa Press, 2010), 1621–46; Laurence Piper and Brian Morrow, *To Serve and Protect: The Inkathagate Scandal* (Pretoria: Unisa Press, 2010); Jabulani Sithole, "The Inkatha Freedom Party and the Multiparty Negotiations," in *The Road to Democracy in South Africa*, vol. 6, 1990–1996, by South African Democracy Education Trust (Pretoria: Unisa Press, 2013), 837–75.
  55. Greg Marinovich and João Silva, *The Bang-Bang Club: Snapshots from a Hidden War* (New York: Basic Books, 2000); Bill Berkeley, *The Graves Are Not Yet Full: Race, Tribe and Power in the Heart of Africa* (New York: Basic Books, 2001); South Africa Truth and Reconciliation Commission, *Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa Report*, vol. 6 (London: Macmillan, 2003).
  56. Nkosinathi Gwala, "Political Violence and the Struggle for Control in Pietermaritzburg," *Journal of Southern African Studies* 15, no. 3 (1989): 506–24; Michael Sutcliffe and Paul Wellings, "Inkatha versus the Rest: Black Opposition to Inkatha in Durban's African Townships," *African Affairs* 87, no. 348 (1988): 325–60; Adrian Guelke, "Interpretations of Political Violence during South Africa's Transition," *Politikon* 27, no. 2 (2000): 239–54.

- Anthea Jeffery's work on political competition is unreliable, based on selective evidence. John Aitchison, review of Anthea Jeffery's *The Natal Story*, copy in author's possession. Anthea Jeffery, *The Natal Story: Sixteen Years of Conflict* (Johannesburg: South African Institute of Race Relations, 1997); Anthea Jeffery, *People's War: New Light on the Struggle for South Africa* (Johannesburg: Jonathan Ball, 2009).
57. Debby Bonnin, "Space, Place and Identity: Political Violence in Mpumalanga Township, KwaZulu-Natal, 1987–1993" (PhD dissertation, University of Witwatersrand, 2007).
  58. Mike Morris and Doug Hindson, "South Africa: Political Violence, Reform and Reconstruction," *Review of African Political Economy* 19, no. 53 (1992): 43–59; Lauren Segal, "The Human Face of Violence: Hostel Dwellers Speak," *Journal of Southern African Studies* 18, no. 1 (1992): 190–231; Rupert Taylor and Mark Shaw, "The Natal Conflict," in *Restructuring South Africa*, ed. John D. Brewer (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994), 32–52; Glen S. Elder, "Malevolent Traditions: Hostel Violence and the Procreational Geography of Apartheid," *Journal of Southern African Studies* 29, no. 4 (2003): 921–35.
  59. Heribert Adam and Kagila Moodley, "Political Violence, 'Tribalism,' and Inkatha," *Journal of Modern African Studies* 30, no. 3 (1992): 485–510; Philippe Denis, Radikobo Ntsimane, and Thomas Cannell, *Indians Versus Russians: An Oral History of Political Violence in Nxamalala (1987–1993)* (Dorpspruit: Cluster Publications, 2010), 22–25; Jason Hicckel, *Democracy as Death: The Moral Order of Anti-Liberal Politics in South Africa* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2015). This cultural approach often also considers political violence as a product of a crisis of masculinity related to the long-term decline of African patriarchal power and generational tensions between juniors and elders. Catherine Campbell, "Learning to Kill: Masculinity, the Family and Violence in Natal," *Journal of Southern African Studies* 18, no. 3 (1992): 614–28; Thokozani Xaba, "Masculinity and Its Malcontents: The Confrontation between 'Struggle Masculinity' and 'Post-Struggle Masculinity' (1900–1997)," in *Changing Men in Southern Africa*, ed. Robert Morrell (Pietermaritzburg: University of Natal Press, 2001), 105–24; Mxolisi Mchunu, "Culture Change, Zulu Masculinity and Intergenerational Conflict in the Context of Civil War in Pietermaritzburg (1987–1991)," in *From Boys to Men: Social Constructions of Masculinity in Contemporary Society*, ed. T. Shefer, K. Ratele, A. Strebel, N. Shabalala, and R. Buikema (Cape Town: Juta & Company, 2007), 225–40; Waetjen, *Workers and Warriors*.
  60. Jonathan Clegg, "Ukubuyisa Isidumbu—Bringing Back the Body: An Examination into the Ideology of Vengeance in the Msinga and Mpofana Rural Locations, 1882–1944," in *Working Papers in Southern African Studies*, ed. Philip Bonner, vol. 2 (Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1981), 164–98; Jabulani Sithole, "Land, Officials, Chiefs and Commoners in the Izimpi Zemibango in the Umlazi Location of the Pinetown District in the Context of

- Natal's Changing Political Economy, 1920–1936" (MA thesis, University of Natal, 1998); Mahoney, *The Other Zulus*.
61. Mahoney, *The Other Zulus*, 97–105; Carton, *Blood from Your Children*, 61–62.
  62. Glassman, *Feasts and Riot*, 19–20.
  63. The isiZulu name for the region is the locative form of the noun *umkhambathi*, the Paperback Acacia tree dominant in the area. Adrian Koopman, *Zulu Names* (Pietermaritzburg: University of Natal, 1999), 140.
  64. Andrew Bank and Nancy Jacobs, "Introduction: The Micro-Politics of Knowledge Production in Southern Africa," *Kronos* 41, no. 1 (2015): 41.
  65. David William Cohen, Stephan Miescher, and Luise White, "Introduction: Voices, Words, and African History," in *African Words, African Voices: Critical Practices in Oral History*, ed. Luise White, Stephan Miescher, and David William Cohen (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2001), 14. See also Leroy Vail and Landeg White, *Power and the Praise Poem: Southern African Voices in History* (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1991).
  66. Carolyn Hamilton, "Ideology and Oral Traditions: Listening to the Voices 'From Below,'" *History in Africa* 14 (1987): 68–69.
  67. Jan Vansina, *Oral Tradition: A Study in Historical Methodology* (Chicago: Aldine Pub. Co., 1965); David P. Henige, *The Chronology of Oral Tradition: Quest for a Chimera* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1974), 11; Jan Vansina, *Oral Tradition as History* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1985); Cohen, Miescher, and White, "Introduction: Voices, Words, and African History."
  68. Hamilton, *Terrific Majesty*; Carolyn Hamilton, "Backstory, Biography, and the Life of the James Stuart Archive," *History in Africa* 38, no. 1 (2011): 319–41; John Wright, "A.T. Bryant and 'The Wars of Shaka,'" *History in Africa* 18 (1991): 409–25; John Wright, "Ndukwana kaMbengwana as an Interlocutor on the History of the Zulu Kingdom, 1897–1903," *History in Africa* 38, no. 1 (2011): 343–68; John Wright, "A.T. Bryant and the 'Lala,'" *Journal of Southern African Studies* 38, no. 2 (June 2012): 355–68; John Wright, "Socwatsha kaPhaphu, James Stuart, and Their Conversations on the Past, 1897–1922," *Kronos* 41, no. 1 (2015): 142–65.
  69. I have considered the backstories and biographies of Table Mountain interlocutors in "Nomsimekwana's Tale: An Amalala Oral Tradition in 20th Century Claims on Land & Zululness" (paper presented at *Izithunguthu: Southern African Pasts before the Colonial Era, Their Archives and Their Ongoing Present/Presence*, Cape Town, South Africa, July 2015).
  70. Alessandro Portelli, *The Text and the Voice: Writing, Speaking, and Democracy in American*



- Literature* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994); Paul Richard Thompson, *The Voice of the Past: Oral History* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000); Sean Field, *Oral History, Community and Displacement: Imagining Memories in Post-Apartheid South Africa* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012).
71. Susan Geiger, *TANU Women: Gender and Culture in the Making of Tanganyikan Nationalism, 1955–1965* (Portsmouth: Heinemann, 1997). For more on my oral history methodology, see Jill E. Kelly, “‘Women Were Not Supposed to Fight’: The Gendered Uses of Martial and Moral Zuluness during *uDlame*, 1990–1994,” in *Gendering Ethnicity in African Women’s Lives*, ed. Jan Bender Shetler (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2015), 178–205.
  72. The isiZulu version in Stuart’s *UVusezakithi* is derived at least in part from Nombiba’s oral account given to Shepstone and published in the *Annals of Natal*. James Stuart, “*uNomsimekwana ubanjwa amazimu*,” in *UVusezakithi* (New York: Longmans, Green and Co., Ltd., 1926), Killie Campbell Africana Library (KCAL); Theophilus Shepstone, “Historic Sketch of the Tribes Anciently Inhabiting the Colony of Natal—As at Present Bounded—and Zululand,” *Report and Proceedings. Cape of Good Hope Commission on Native Laws and Customs. January 1883* (Cape Town: W.A. Richards & Sons, Government Printers, 1883), appendix I, 418; H. C. Lugg, *Historic Natal and Zululand, Containing a Series of Short Sketches of the Historical Spots* (Pietermaritzburg: Shuter & Shooter, 1949), 46.
  73. The records of magisterial inquests can be legally destroyed after a number of years. While I had hoped the Maphumulo inquest might have survived because it was undertaken at the provincial level, officials at the High Court insist they would have been destroyed after ten years. On other destructions, legal and illegal, see Michelle Pickover, “Ideology versus Professionalism: The Destruction of Archives and the Role of the Archivist,” *South African Historical Journal* 31, no. 1 (1994): 352–58; Verne Harris and Christopher Merrett, “Toward a Culture of Transparency: Public Rights of Access to Official Records in South Africa,” *The American Archivist* 57, no. 4 (1994): 680–92.
  74. Premesh Lalu, “The Grammar of Domination and the Subjection of Agency: Colonial Texts and Modes of Evidence,” *History and Theory* 39, no. 4 (2000): 68.
  75. Hamilton, “Ideology and Oral Traditions”; Ann Laura Stoler, “Rethinking Colonial Categories: European Communities and the Boundaries of Rule,” *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 31, no. 1 (1989): 134–61; Thomas Spear, “New Approaches to Documentary Sources,” in *Sources and Methods in African History: Spoken, Written, Unearthed*, ed. Toyin Falola and Christian Jennings (Rochester: University of Rochester Press, 2004), 169–72.

76. Bethwell A. Ogot, "The Construction of Luo Identity and History," in *African Words, African Voices: Critical Practices in Oral History*, ed. Luise White, Stephan Miescher, and David William Cohen (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2001), 32.
77. Lentz, *Land, Mobility, and Belonging in West Africa*.
78. Elizabeth A. Eldredge, *The Creation of the Zulu Kingdom, 1815–1828: War, Shaka, and the Consolidation of Power* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014); Elizabeth A. Eldredge, *Kingdoms and Chiefdoms of Southeastern Africa: Oral Traditions and History, 1400–1830* (Rochester: University of Rochester Press, 2015).

### **Chapter 1. Chief by the People: Nomsimekwana Mdluli, Security, and Authority in the Time before Tribes**

1. "Inhabitants of the Territory (Now the Colony of Natal), during the Time of Jobe, Father of Dingizwayo, before the Extermination of Native Tribes by Chaka, Enclosure No. 1 in Lieutenant-Governor Scott's Dispatch No. 12, February 26, 1864," in John Bird, *The Annals of Natal, 1495–1845* (Pietermaritzburg: P. Davis & Sons, 1888). I have considered the backstories and biographies of Table Mountain interlocutors in "Nomsimekwana's Tale: An Amalala Oral Tradition in 20th Century Claims on Land & Zuluness" (paper presented at *Izithunguthu: Southern African Pasts before the Colonial Era, Their Archives and Their Ongoing Present/Presence*, Cape Town, South Africa, July 2015).
2. Thomas Victor Bulpin, *Natal and the Zulu Country* (Cape Town: Books of Africa, 1966), 12–13.
3. Emily Lynn Osborn, *Our New Husbands Are Here: Households, Gender, and Politics in a West African State from the Slave Trade to Colonial Rule* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2011); Meghan Healy-Clancy and Jason Hickel, *Ekhaya: The Politics of Home in KwaZulu-Natal* (Pietermaritzburg: University of KwaZulu-Natal Press, 2014).
4. Gavin Whitelaw, "A Brief Archaeology of Precolonial Farming in KwaZulu-Natal," in *Zulu Identities: Being Zulu, Past and Present*, ed. Benedict Carton, John Laband, and Jabulani Sithole (Pietermaritzburg: University of KwaZulu-Natal Press, 2008), 47–61.
5. The KwaGandaGanda site is farther west than most of the (coastal) KwaZulu-Natal archaeological sites, twenty miles east from Table Mountain. Gavin Whitelaw, "KwaGandaganda: Settlement Patterns in the Natal Early Iron Age," *Natal Museum Journal of Humanities* 6 (1994): 54.
6. Gavin Whitelaw, "Economy and Cosmology in the Iron Age of KwaZulu-Natal" (PhD dissertation, University of Witwatersrand, 2016), 31.
7. Adam Kuper, *Wives for Cattle: Bridewealth and Marriage in Southern Africa* (Boston:

- Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1982), 21–22.
8. The historical linguistic work of Raevin Jimenez convincingly calls into question some of the central claims of the CCP model. She demonstrates changes that CCP obscures, particularly regarding local innovations, gender, and generation. Raevin Jimenez, “Rites of Reproduction: Gender, Generation and Political Economic Transformation among Nguni-speakers of Southern Africa, 8th–19th Century CE” (PhD diss., Northwestern University, 2017). On the debate, John Parkington and Simon Hall, “The Appearance of Food Production in Southern Africa 1,000 to 2,000 Years Ago,” in *The Cambridge History of South Africa*, vol. 1, *From Early Times to 1885*, ed. Carolyn Hamilton, Bernard K. Mbenga, and Robert Ross (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 63–111.
  9. T. M. Evers and W. D. Hammond-Tooke, “The Emergence of South African Chiefdoms: An Archaeological Perspective,” *African Studies* 45, no. 1 (January 1986): 37–41.
  10. Martin Hall, “The Myth of the Zulu Homestead: Archaeology and Ethnography,” *Africa: Journal of the International African Institute* 54, no. 1 (1984): 65–79; Carolyn Hamilton and Simon Hall, “Reading across the Divides: Commentary on the Political Co-Presence of Disparate Identities in Two Regions of South Africa in the Late Eighteenth and Early Nineteenth Centuries,” *Journal of Southern African Studies* 38, no. 2 (June 2012): 281–90.
  11. John Wright, “Turbulent Times: Political Transformations in the North and East, 1760s–1830s,” in *Cambridge History of South Africa*, vol. 1, *From Early Times to 1885*, ed. Carolyn Hamilton (New York: Cambridge, 2010), 219.
  12. Kathryn M. de Luna, “Affect and Society in Precolonial Africa,” *The International Journal of African Historical Studies* 46, no. 1 (2013): 138–39; Jan Vansina, *Paths in the Rainforests toward a History of Political Tradition in Equatorial Africa* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1990), 274–75; Christopher Ehret, *An African Classical Age: Eastern and Southern Africa in World History 1000 BC to AD 400* (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2001), 147; Kairn A. Klieman, *“The Pygmies Were Our Compass”: Bantu and Batwa in the History of West Central Africa, Early Times to C. 1900 CE* (Portsmouth: Heinemann, 2003), 75; David Lee Schoenbrun, *A Green Place, a Good Place: Agrarian Change, Gender, and Social Identity in the Great Lakes Region to the 15th Century* (Portsmouth: Heinemann, 1998), 108; John Iliffe, *Honour in African History* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004).
  13. Ehret, *An African Classical Age*, 148–49, 251.
  14. Carolan Postma Ownby, “Early Nguni History: The Linguistic Evidence and Its Correlation with Archaeology and Oral Tradition (South Africa)” (PhD dissertation, University of California, Los Angeles, 1985), 117–20.
  15. Ownby sees no evidence of a cattle culture in the Sala vocabulary. Evidence for a later

- ideological change regarding cattle is suggested in the presence of cattle figurines at Moor Park sites, the growth in number of animals, and a change in husbandry where more mature animals begin to appear in Late Iron Age (suggesting their worth beyond food). Evers and Hammond-Tooke, "The Emergence of South African Chiefdoms," 148–49; Ownby, "Early Nguni History," 91–97.
16. Whitelaw, "Economy and Cosmology in the Iron Age of KwaZulu-Natal," 126–38.
  17. Jeff Guy, *Theophilus Shepstone and the Forging of Natal: African Autonomy and Settler Colonialism in the Making of Traditional Authority* (Pietermaritzburg: University of KwaZulu-Natal Press, 2013), 30.
  18. Thomas McClendon, *White Chief, Black Lords: Shepstone and the Colonial State in Natal, South Africa, 1845–1878* (Rochester: University of Rochester Press, 2010).
  19. Mompoloki Bagwasi, "Use of Setswana Proverbs in Botswana English," in *The Linguistic Typology and Representation of African Languages* (Trenton: Africa World Press, 2003), 332–33.
  20. C. M. Doke, D. M. Malcom, J. M. A. Sikakana, and B. W. Vilakazi, *English-Zulu, Zulu-English Dictionary*, 1st combined ed. (Johannesburg: Witwatersrand University Press, 2008), 404. A. T. Bryant translates the same example, "that I may put in my head (i.e., find protection and shelter) here under you." A. T. Bryant, *A Zulu-English Dictionary* (Pinetown: The Mariannhill Mission Press, 1905), 317–18; John William Colenso, *Zulu-English Dictionary*, 4th ed. (Pietermaritzburg: P. Davis & Co., 1861), 235–36.
  21. Colenso, *Zulu-English Dictionary*, 236.
  22. Monica Wilson, *Reaction to Conquest: Effects of Contact with Europeans on the Pondo of South Africa* (London: H. Milford, 1936), 135–39; W. D. Hammond-Tooke, *Command or Consensus: The Development of Transkeian Local Government* (Cape Town: D. Philip, 1975), 29.
  23. It should be noted that in one incidence, an informant described this *ukubusa* relationship as a friendship (*ubuhlobo*) made by speaking, suggesting another component rarely considered. Wilson, *Reaction to Conquest*, 137.
  24. Many speak to the distribution of cattle during King Shaka's ascension as an attraction. Mahaya ka Nongqabana offers one such example; he recalled that Pondo chiefs were told: "Follow [Shaka] and there will be cattle. *Follow him* and there will peace." Colin de B. Webb and John Wright, eds., *The James Stuart Archive of Recorded Oral Evidence Relating to the History of the Zulu and Neighbouring Peoples*, vol. 2 (Pietermaritzburg: University of Natal Press, 1979), 110–11.
  25. In the 1980s, Chief Mhlabunzima mentioned a fee to be paid upon such a breaking of allegiance, but it is unclear whether the practice precedes colonial rule or whether it

- was simply commodified by British law. J. W. Colenso defines *ukuwalelisa* as a “fee paid to a chief on leaving his tribe, under British rule.” Bryant, *A Zulu–English Dictionary*, 675; Colenso, *Zulu–English Dictionary*, 638.
26. Kuper, *Wives for Cattle*, 14–17; Paul Landau, *Popular Politics in the History of South Africa, 1400–1948* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 20.
  27. Karen Flint, *Healing Traditions: African Medicine, Cultural Exchange, and Competition in South Africa, 1820–1948* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2008), 73.
  28. Carolyn Hamilton, *Terrific Majesty: The Powers of Shaka Zulu and the Limits of Historical Invention* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998).
  29. Adam Kuper, “Cannibals, Beasts and Twins,” in *South Africa and the Anthropologist* (New York: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1987), 167–96.
  30. H. W. O. Okoth-Ogendo, “The Nature of Land Rights under Indigenous Law in Africa,” in *Land, Power and Custom: Controversies Generated by South Africa’s Communal Land Rights Act*, ed. Aninka Claassens and Ben Cousins (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2008), 100.
  31. S. J. Ndlovu-Gatsheni, “Inkosi Yinkosi Ngabantu: An Interrogation of Governance in Precolonial Africa—the Case of the Ndebele of Zimbabwe,” *Southern African Humanities* 20, no. 2 (2008): 375–97.
  32. C. L. S. Nyembezi, *Zulu Proverbs*, rev. ed. (Johannesburg: Witwatersrand University Press, 1990), 124.
  33. Baleni ka Silwana described how the Zulu kingdom expanded when others *khonza’d* after seeing the Zulu’s wealth in cattle. Colin de B. Webb and John Wright, eds., *The James Stuart Archive of Recorded Oral Evidence Relating to the History of the Zulu and Neighbouring Peoples*, vol. 1 (Pietermaritzburg: University of Natal Press, 1976), 21. Lunguza ka Mpukane felt *ukukhonza* was a necessity in order to ensure the security of one’s home. Webb and Wright, *James Stuart Archive*, vol. 1, 308.
  34. Norman Etherington, *The Great Treks: The Transformation of Southern Africa, 1815–1854* (New York: Longman, 2001), 31.
  35. A redirection that Raevin Jimenez suggests has precedents dating from the thirteenth century (Jimenez, “Rites of Reproduction,” 183). John Wright, “Rediscovering the Ndwandwe Kingdom,” in *Five Hundred Years Rediscovered: Southern African Precedents and Prospects*, ed. Natalie Swanepoel, Amanda Esterhuysen, and Philip Bonner (Johannesburg: Wits University Press, 2008), 225.
  36. Wright, “Turbulent Times,” 221.
  37. Carolyn Hamilton, “Ideology, Oral Traditions and the Struggle for Power in the Early Zulu Kingdom” (MA thesis, University of Witwatersrand, 1985); Wright, “Rediscovering the Ndwandwe Kingdom.”

38. John Wright and Carolyn Hamilton, "Ethnicity and Political Change before 1840," in *Political Economy and Identities in KwaZulu-Natal: Historical and Social Perspectives*, ed. Robert Morrell and Georgina Hamilton (Durban: Indicator Press, 1996), 15–32; Wright, "Turbulent Times," 222–24.
39. Carolyn Hamilton, "Restructuring within the Zulu Royal House: Clan Splitting and the Consolidation of Zulu Royal Power," in *Culture and the Commonplace: Anthropological Essays in Honour of David Hammond-Tooke*, ed. P. A. McAllister (Johannesburg: Witwatersrand University Press, 1997), 85–113; Carolyn Hamilton, "Political Centralisation and the Making of Social Categories East of the Drakensberg in the Late Eighteenth and Early Nineteenth Centuries," *Journal of Southern African Studies* 38, no. 2 (June 2012): 291–300.
40. I do not subscribe to the methodology that you can roughly ascribe dates by generations. Beyond general critiques, Hamilton's work on the Mthethwa and Zulu suggest deliberate distortions of oral accounts others use for determining chronology. David P. Henige, *The Chronology of Oral Tradition: Quest for a Chimera* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1974); Hamilton, "Restructuring within the Zulu Royal House"; Hamilton, "Political Centralisation."
41. Carolyn Hamilton, "Ideology and Oral Traditions: Listening to the Voices 'From Below,'" *History in Africa* 14 (1987): 67–86.
42. Petition of Ngangezwe ka Nomsimekwana respecting land dispute between Umdepa and Nomsimekwana, Pietermaritzburg Archives Repository (hereafter PAR), Secretary for Native Affairs (hereafter SNA), 1/1/180, 39/1894.
43. Philip Bonner, "Swazi Oral Tradition and Northern Nguni Historical Archaeology," in *Five Hundred Years Rediscovered: Southern African Precedents and Prospects*, ed. Natalie Swanepoel, Amanda Esterhuysen, and Philip Bonner (Johannesburg: Wits University Press, 2008), 239–56.
44. Inkosi Sikhosiphi Mdluli, interview with author and Thandeka Majola, KwaNyavu, July 17, 2013.
45. Gobebulungu Mdluli, interview with author and Thandeka Majola, Pietermaritzburg, July 22, 2013.
46. Much further research is required into these connections, but they are beyond the scope of this book. It is interesting to consider that most *izithakazelo* of the Mdluli at Table Mountain start with Nyavu, perhaps a reference to the Mdluli in Swaziland whose *tinanatelo* include a line "*netinyawo yakhe*." Is this alleged Nyavu ancestor a morphing of the siSwati praise? Wits Historical Papers, Swazi Oral History Project, A15 Mdluli.
47. Inkosi Sikhosiphi Mdluli introduced me to Majola as one of the community elders that

- might know the chiefdom's history. He had no concern that Majola might share a history of Nomsimekwana as first chief that contradicts his own interpretation of Nyavu history. In a later interview with another community elder, Majola attempted to interrupt an account that he thought countered his own Majola-centered history. Majola implied that the chief confirmed his account. Mankantsolo Majola, interview with author and Thandeka Majola, KwaNyavu, June 6, 2014; M. A. Shange, interview with author and Thandeka Majola, KwaNyavu, June 18, 2014.
48. Mfungelwa Mdluli, interview with author and Thandeka Majola, KwaNyavu, August 7, 2011.
  49. Zazi Dlamini, interview with author and Thandeka Majola, Mkhambathini, June 21, 2011.
  50. B. E. Mdluli, interview with author and Thandeka Majola, KwaNyavu, July 22, 2013.
  51. Gobebulungu Mdluli.
  52. On *umgcabo*, see Joseph Shooter, *The Kafirs of Natal and the Zulu Country* (New York: Negro Universities Press, 1969), 87; Axel-Ivar Berglund, *Zulu Thought-Patterns and Symbolism* (London: C. Hurst, 1976), 311; Frank Jolles and Stephen Jolles, "Zulu Ritual Immunisation in Perspective," *Africa* 70, no. 2 (2000): 229–48.
  53. My efforts to interview the *imbongi* in 2015 were frustrated by internal politicking.
  54. A. T. Bryant claims these two are related to Sibenya ka Sali, the chief of another Njilo group, and that the three polities make one clan or tribe. Given the derivative nature of Bryant's account, it is possible that he is partaking of his own genealogical imagination or simply repeating the affiliations listed by Nombiba to Shepstone. Sibenya, Noqomfela, and the Njilo are absent from contemporary accounts, perhaps because, as Bryant suggests, Sibenya and Noqomfela's chiefly lines ceased to exist. A. T. Bryant, *Olden Times in Zululand and Natal, Containing Earlier Political History of the Eastern-Nguni Clans* (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1929), 556; John Wright, "A.T. Bryant and 'The Wars of Shaka,'" *History in Africa* 18 (1991): 409–25. Accounts on Amanyamvu and Amanjilo in Bird, *The Annals of Natal*, 137–40.
  55. John Wright, "The Thuli and Cele Paramountcies in the Coastlands of Natal, C. 1770–C. 1820," *Southern African Humanities* 21 (2009): 177–94.
  56. John Wright, "The Dynamics of Power and Conflict in the Thukela-Mzimkhulu Region in the Late 18th and Early 19th Centuries: A Critical Reconstruction" (PhD dissertation, University of Witwatersrand, 1989), 217, 264–65; Elizabeth A. Eldredge, *Kingdoms and Chiefdoms of Southeastern Africa: Oral Traditions and History, 1400–1830* (Rochester: University of Rochester Press, 2015), 336.
  57. Maziyana ka Mahlabeni, in Webb and Wright, *James Stuart Archive*, vol. 2, 296.
  58. Strictly speaking the pledging of allegiance brought the royal house (rather than

- the people as a whole) into that to which it pledged. Carolyn Hamilton, "Political Centralisation and the Making of Social Categories East of the Drakensberg in the Late Eighteenth and Early Nineteenth Centuries," *Journal of Southern African Studies* 38, no. 2 (June 2012): 291–300.
59. Wright, "The Dynamics of Power and Conflict," 272.
  60. Wright posits the Hlubi breakup in the late 1810s; Eldredge argues 1821. As Wright has shown, the Ngwane movement was as much as successful escape as expulsion. While the Ndwandwe were more concerned with eliminating threats than acquiring any more tributaries at this point, Matiwane may have elected not to submit for fear of his life, given Ndwandwe killing of other chiefs. Wright, "Dynamics of Power," 210–13; Etherington, *The Great Treks*, 89–91; Eldredge, *Kingdoms and Chiefdoms*, 336.
  61. "Inhabitants of the Territory," in Bird, *The Annals of Natal*, 137; Wright, "The Dynamics of Power and Conflict," 245; Bryant, *Olden Times*, 410.
  62. Wright, "The Dynamics of Power," 222.
  63. Wright, "The Dynamics of Power," 284.
  64. Somquba Mdluli to Zulu Society, PAR, A1381, IV/5/1.
  65. "Inhabitants of the Territory," in Bird, *The Annals of Natal*, 137–39; Petition of Ngangezwe, SNA 1/1/180, 39/1894; and any of my interviews with Nyavu, 2011–2015.
  66. Nomsimekwana was likely born circa 1808. In 1899, Stuart estimated him to be between eighty and ninety years old. Nomsimekwana told Stuart's assistant Qalizwe that he was one of the *udibi* (mat-bearers) of the Impiyakhe, which he explains was because the *udibi* were known as "Tshaka's *impi*." He connects the Impiyakhe with the iziNyosi, a Zulu regiment formed by Shaka under another name in 1828 of young cadets born circa 1808 called back from the Balule campaign to protect Shaka. Dingane sent the iziNyosi to round up royal cattle in the south after Shaka's death to protect them from the Mpondo. This pairs well with Somquba's oral account that claims the young Nomsimekwana spent time herding calves "at Mpiyake." Dan Wylie and Elizabeth Eldredge suggest the Impiyakhe may have been one of Zihlandlo's regiments "poured" into Shaka's regiments. Qalizwe, quoted in Colin de B. Webb and John Wright, eds., *The James Stuart Archive of Recorded Oral Evidence Relating to the History of the Zulu and Neighbouring Peoples*, vol. 5 (Pietermaritzburg: University of Natal Press, 2001), 228; Tununu in Colin de B. Webb and John Wright, eds., *The James Stuart Archive of Recorded Oral Evidence Relating to the History of the Zulu and Neighbouring Peoples*, vol. 6 (Pietermaritzburg: University of KwaZulu-Natal Press, 2014), 253–54; John Laband, *Rope of Sand: The Rise and Fall of the Zulu Kingdom in the Nineteenth Century* (Johannesburg: Jonathan Ball, 1995), 50; Dan Wylie, *Myth of Iron: Shaka in History* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2006), 273; John



- Laband, *Historical Dictionary of the Zulu Wars* (Lanham: Scarecrow Press, 2009), 208; Elizabeth A. Eldredge, *The Creation of the Zulu Kingdom, 1815–1828: War, Shaka, and the Consolidation of Power* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 133, 266.
67. Evidence of J. L. Döhne in Native Commission, *Proceedings of the Commission Appointed to Inquire into the Past and Present State of the Kafir in the District of Natal*, part 4 (Pietermaritzburg: J. Archbell and Son, 1853), 12; Bryant, *Olden Times*, 558.
68. Accounts on Amanyamvu and Amanjilo in Bird, *The Annals of Natal*, 137–40.
69. On Mbambo as a generic term, see Hamilton, “Ideology, Oral Traditions and the Struggle,” 269–70; Wright, “The Dynamics of Power,” 314–16. The Nombiba/Shepstone and Stuart accounts name *amazimu* as Dunge, Mdava, and Kanywayo.
70. Somquba to Zulu Society.
71. Contemporary oral accounts about Nomsimekwana suggest he swam with crocodiles, an unsurprising transformation given the disappearance of hippos from the region and continued presence of crocodiles. Sikhosiphi Mdluli interview; Somquba to Zulu Society.
72. Bryant suggests “Nomsimekwana” comes from a praise name *imiSimeko yakwaShulwa* (they are the meat-skewers of Shulwa). It is not clear from where he got this evidence, though as Hamilton and Wright point out, the account is largely derived from Shepstone’s “Historic Sketches” and Stuart’s readers. I found no reference to “*imiSimeko yakwaShulwa*” in either.
73. Bryant, *A Zulu–English Dictionary*, 729.
74. Somquba to Zulu Society.
75. Bryant, *A Zulu–English Dictionary*, 655.
76. C. L. S. Nyembezi, *AZ: Isichazimazwi Sanamuhla Nangomuso* (Pietermaritzburg: Reach Out Publishers, 1992), 555.
77. Peter Delius, *The Land Belongs to Us: The Pedi Polity, the Boers, and the British in the Nineteenth-Century Transvaal* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), 24; Hamilton, *Terrific Majesty*; Etherington, *The Great Treks*.
78. Robert Papini, ed., *Nomsimekwana of Emkambathini (Table Mountain, KwaZulu)*, Durban Local History Museums Educational Pamphlet Series 2 (Durban: Durban Local History Museums, 1999), 39.
79. Hamilton, *Terrific Majesty*, 211–12.
80. Wright, “The Dynamics of Power,” 232–36.
81. Hamilton, “Ideology, Oral Traditions and the Struggle,” 269–70; Wright, “The Dynamics of Power,” 314–16; Wylie, *Myth of Iron*, 195; Jochen S. Arndt, “The Emergence of a Language-Based Discourse of Social Identity in Southeast Africa, 1817–1828” (Southern African Historical Society Biennial Conference, Stellenbosch, 2015).

82. Somquba to Zulu Society.
83. Wright, "Rediscovering the Ndwandwe Kingdom," 233; Eldredge, *The Creation of the Zulu Kingdom*, 158–65.
84. Somquba to Zulu Society; "Inhabitants of the Territory," in Bird, *The Annals of Natal*, 139; Elizabeth Eldredge, "Shaka's Military Expeditions: Survival and Mortality from Shaka's Impis," in *The Power of Doubt: Essays in Honor of David Henige*, ed. Paul Landau (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2011), 227. Melapi ka Magaye confirms that many died of malaria. Colin de B. Webb and John Wright, eds., *The James Stuart Archive of Recorded Oral Evidence Relating to the History of the Zulu and Neighbouring Peoples*, vol. 3 (Pietermaritzburg: University of Natal Press, 1982), 83, 88.
85. Italics original in Jantshi ka Nongila, in Webb and Wright, *James Stuart Archive*, vol. 1, 187; Eldredge, "Shaka's Military Expeditions: Survival and Mortality from Shaka's Impis," 238n110.
86. Somquba suggested Nomsimekwana went to the "Chief's place, Mpiyakhe, at Nhlonhlweni" to do so. Given the above discussion of the Mpiyakhe/iziNyosi regiments, he may have been sent to be a mat-bearer or to protect the cattle from a Mpondo raid. Eldredge, *The Creation of the Zulu Kingdom*, 133.
87. Somquba to Zulu Society; "Inhabitants of the Territory" in Bird, *The Annals of Natal*, 137–39; Shepstone Papers 89, 122–25.
88. Somquba to Zulu Society; Petition of Ngangezwe.
89. A. J. Christopher, "Colonial Land Policy in Natal," *Annals of the Association of American Geographers* 61, no. 3 (1971): 565.
90. Cited in David Welsh, *The Roots of Segregation: Native Policy in Colonial Natal, 1845–1910* (Cape Town: Oxford University Press, 1971), 11.
91. Somquba said that Dlabá had sold Boer cattle under his watch, but Mqaikana ka Yenge of the Zondi, born about the time of Piet Retief's death by Zulu king Dingane, made clear Dlabá's trespass was cattle raiding undertaken by his subjects. Mqaikana in Colin de B. Webb and John Wright, eds., *The James Stuart Archive of Recorded Oral Evidence Relating to the History of the Zulu and Neighbouring Peoples*, vol. 4 (Pietermaritzburg: University of Natal Press, 1986), 2.
92. Somquba attested Nomsimekwana returned to stay among the Mkhize, then at Mtebele, perhaps an anachronistic reference to Zihlandlo's time in the Transkei prior to his 1828 death. Somquba to Zulu Society; Petition of Ngangezwe; Döhne in *Proceedings of the Commission*.
93. Petition of Ngangezwe.
94. Qalizwe, in Webb and Wright, *James Stuart Archive*, vol. 5, 228.

95. Somquba to Zulu Society.
96. Bird, *The Annals of Natal*, 139.

## Chapter 2. He Said He Wants to Be Registered as a Chief: Hereditary Chiefs and Government Tribes, 1843–1905

1. It also conflates historical events, such as suggesting that the first Maphumulo chief's appointment (1905) occurred after forced removals from Mhlabamakhosi (1930s) and describing the appointment as emanating from Pretoria, which was then part of the South African Republic and unconnected with African administration in Natal.
2. Karen E. Fields, *Revival and Rebellion in Colonial Central Africa* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985), 30–32.
3. Marshall S. Clough, *Fighting Two Sides: Kenyan Chiefs and Politicians, 1918–1940* (Niwot: University Press of Colorado, 1990); Sara Berry, *Chiefs Know Their Boundaries: Essays on Property, Power, and the Past in Asante, 1896–1996* (Portsmouth: Heinemann, 2000); Olufemi Vaughan, *Nigerian Chiefs: Traditional Power in Modern Politics, 1890s–1990s* (Rochester: University of Rochester Press, 2000); Naaborko Sackeyfio-Lenoch, *The Politics of Chieftaincy: Authority and Property in Colonial Ghana, 1920–1950* (Rochester: University of Rochester Press, 2014).
4. David Welsh, *The Roots of Segregation: Native Policy in Colonial Natal, 1845–1910* (Cape Town: Oxford University Press, 1971); Norman Etherington, "The 'Shepstone System' in the Colony of Natal and Beyond the Borders," in *Natal and Zululand: From Earliest Times to 1910* (Pietermaritzburg: University of Natal Press, 1989); Carolyn Hamilton, *Terrific Majesty: The Powers of Shaka Zulu and the Limits of Historical Invention* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998); Thomas McClendon, *White Chief, Black Lords: Shepstone and the Colonial State in Natal, South Africa, 1845–1878* (Rochester: University of Rochester Press, 2010); Jeff Guy, *Theophilus Shepstone and the Forging of Natal: African Autonomy and Settler Colonialism in the Making of Traditional Authority* (Pietermaritzburg: University of KwaZulu-Natal Press, 2013).
5. Under-Secretary for Native Affairs report on chiefdoms, June 15, 1903, PAR, SNA 1/4/12, 96/1903.
6. This use of "genealogical imagination" is inspired by Christopher Lee's work. Christopher J. Lee, *Unreasonable Histories: Nativism, Multiracial Lives, and the Genealogical Imagination in British Africa* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2014).
7. Guy, *Theophilus Shepstone and the Forging of Natal*, 40.
8. Clifton Crais, *Poverty, War, and Violence in South Africa* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011).

9. Guy, *Theophilus Shepstone and the Forging of Natal*; Norman Etherington, "Jeff Guy's Theophilus Shepstone: A Study in Character," *Transformation* 90 (2016): 51–80.
10. Named for Mpande's aunt who fled after Mpande murdered his brother Cucu. "Crossing of Mawa" is often used to mark time.
11. Inanda Location Beacons, PAR, SNA I/1/100, 1887/551; Edgar Harry Brookes and Nathan Hurwitz, *The Native Reserves of Natal*, Natal Regional Survey 7 (Cape Town: Oxford University Press, 1957), 5–9; Guy, *Theophilus Shepstone and the Forging of Natal*, 113–14.
12. After 1855, 174,000 acres of land were set aside for mission reserves. The Table Mountain station was one of the smallest of twenty mission reserves at the time of 1885 Native Mission Reserve Commission. It was poor and at a considerable distance from other AZM stations. After the assignment of a Zulu preacher, Simungu Shibe, activities in the congregation became central in the rise of the Zulu Congregational Church. Report of Native Mission Reserve, October 20, 1886, PAR, NCP 8/3/25; Robert J. Houle, *Making African Christianity: Africans Reimagining Their Faith in Colonial Southern Africa* (Bethlehem: Lehigh University Press, 2011), chap. 6.
13. In the quit-rent tenure system, a farm was not initially subject to survey but the holder's name was registered. At first, quit-rent farms were subject to fifteen-year leases but later were held in perpetuity. Robert Ababelton, "The Colonial Lands of Natal," *The Economic Journal* 16, no. 3 (1906): 455–61.
14. By the end of 1843, it was estimated that only 365 trekker families remained; by 1847 only sixty. Henry Slater, "Land, Labour and Capital in Natal: The Natal Land and Colonisation Company 1860–1948," *Journal of African History* 16, no. 2 (1975): 258–83.
15. W. H. Mercer and A. E. Collins, *The Dominions Office and Colonial Office List 1899*, vol. 38 (London: Harrison and Sons, 1899), 191.
16. Keletso Atkins, *The Moon Is Dead! Give Us Our Money!: The Cultural Origins of an African Work Ethic, Natal, South Africa, 1843–1900* (Portsmouth: Heinemann, 1993), 53; Norman Etherington, Patrick Harries, and Bernard K. Mbenga, "From Colonial Hegemonies to Imperial Conquest, 1840–1880," in *The Cambridge History of South Africa*, vol. 1, *From Early Times to 1885*, ed. Carolyn Hamilton, Bernard K. Mbenga, and Robert Ross (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 360; Slater, *Land, Labour and Capital in Natal*, 273.
17. Atkins, *The Moon Is Dead! Give Us Our Money!*, 17–22.
18. There is confusion about whether the Thintandaba and the Natal Native Corps are the same. Henrique Shepstone told James Stuart they were different, that the Corps came earlier and were fewer in number, but other research on the colony suggests their connection. SNA I/1/23; A. T. Bryant, *A Zulu–English Dictionary* (Pinetown: The

- Mariannhill Mission Press, 1905), 760; Guy, *Theophilus Shepstone and the Forging of Natal*, 121–22.
19. John Shepstone had also suggested the chiefs appointed in the partitioning of the Zulu kingdom in 1879, in some case appointing outsiders and inferior lineages. John Lambert, *Betrayed Trust: Africans and the State in Colonial Natal* (Scottsville: University of Natal Press, 1995), 33, 168; Jeff Guy, *The Destruction of the Zulu Kingdom: The Civil War in Zululand, 1879–1884* (Pietermaritzburg: University of Natal Press, 1979), 71.
  20. See Ngoza's account of his years as a soldier, "Indaba kaNgoza," in *Izindatyana zaBantu kanye nezindaba zas'eNatal*, by Church of England (Natal: May & Davis, 1859); Sifiso Mxolisi Ndlovu, "The Changing African Perceptions of King Dingane in Historical Literature: A Case Study in the Construction of Knowledge in 19th and 20th Century South African History" (PhD dissertation, University of Witwatersrand, 2001), 55–60.
  21. John Shepstone in Colin de B. Webb and John Wright, eds., *The James Stuart Archive of Recorded Oral Evidence Relating to the History of the Zulu and Neighbouring Peoples*, vol. 5 (Pietermaritzburg: University of Natal Press, 2001): 275.
  22. Original italics to denote translation. Lazarus Xaba, in Colin de B. Webb and John Wright, eds., *The James Stuart Archive of Recorded Oral Evidence Relating to the History of the Zulu and Neighbouring Peoples*, vol. 6 (Pietermaritzburg: University of KwaZulu-Natal Press, 2014), 321–26.
  23. Shepstone, *James Stuart Archive*, vol. 5, 275.
  24. Guy, *Theophilus Shepstone and the Forging of Natal*, 469.
  25. Mqaikana ka Yenge and Sende ka Hlunguhlungu in Colin de B. Webb and John Wright, eds., *The James Stuart Archive of Recorded Oral Evidence Relating to the History of the Zulu and Neighbouring Peoples*, vol. 4 (Pietermaritzburg: University of Natal Press, 1986); *Proceedings of the Commission Appointed to Inquire into the Past and Present State of the Kafir in the District of Natal*, part 6 (Pietermaritzburg: J. Archbell and Son, 1853), 9; Paul Thompson, "Reconciling Recent Oral Traditions with Old Documents: Bambatha and His Family," in *Culture: Memory and Trauma: Proceedings of the Third Annual National Oral History Conference* (Pretoria: University of South Africa, 2013).
  26. Attitude of Chief Swayimane to his tribe, PAR, SNA I/1/318, 670/1905.
  27. Magididi ka Nobebe, in Colin de B. Webb and John Wright, eds., *The James Stuart Archive of Recorded Oral Evidence Relating to the History of the Zulu and Neighbouring Peoples*, vol. 2 (Pietermaritzburg: University of Natal Press, 1979), 87–89.
  28. C. P. Mathe, interview with author and Thandeka Majola, eStingeni, June 19, 2014.
  29. Etherington, "Jeff Guy's Theophilus Shepstone," 62.
  30. Mathe interview; Socwatsha ka Papu, *James Stuart Archive*, vol. 6, 91–93; Xubu ka Luduzo,

- James Stuart Archive*, vol. 6, 377.
31. Xaba, *James Stuart Archive*, vol. 6, 327.
  32. Onverwacht was initially granted to Adolph Coqui, one of the two largest landowners in Natal at the time. Akerman bought the farm and several others, but had a pharmacy business in town and was involved in politics rather than agriculture. Cedric Akerman, *History of the Akerman Family* (1993), KCAL, John William Akerman Papers, 5; Land Registers for Onverwacht No. 1225, Aasvogel Krans No. 1226, and Goedverwaching No. 1349, Pietermaritzburg Deeds Registry, Department of Rural Development and Land Reform; Slater, "Land, Labour and Capital in Natal," 263. On Onverwacht's disputed boundaries, see PAR, SNA I/1/95, 1553/1894.
  33. Pietermaritzburg from Sketch by Captain C. B. Fitz Henry, 7th Hussars, 1897, PAR, M3/748.
  34. Shula Marks, *Reluctant Rebellion: The 1906–8 Disturbances in Natal* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1970), 322.
  35. Evidence of J. L. Döhne in Native Commission, *Proceedings of the Commission Appointed to Inquire into the Past and Present State of the Kafir in the District of Natal*, part 4 (Pietermaritzburg: J. Archbell and Son, 1853), 13.
  36. McClendon, *White Chief, Black Lords*, 72.
  37. His exaggerated 1873 report that he had been humiliated and stripped by the Hlubi precipitated the order for a colonial assault on Langalibalele. During the Langalibalele trial, Bishop Colenso and other Hlubi residents of Colenso's mission station who knew Mahoiza well provided evidence that Mahoiza had lied. But Theophilus respected him and contended Mahoiza and the other messenger had "behaved with wonderful pluck and propriety." Jeff Guy, *The View Across the River: Harriette Colenso and the Zulu Struggle against Imperialism* (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2002), 38–40; John Wright and Andrew Manson, *The Hlubi Chieftdom in Zululand-Natal: A History* (Ladysmith, South Africa: Ladysmith Historical Society, 1983), 56–62; McClendon, *White Chief, Black Lords*, 82–99.
  38. Guy, *Theophilus Shepstone and the Forging of Natal*, 449–58; Norman Etherington, *Preachers, Peasants, and Politics in Southeast Africa, 1835–1880* (London: Royal Historical Society, 1978), 15.
  39. On the widespread hatred for *isibhalo*, which paid far less than other wage labor, see Atkins, *The Moon Is Dead! Give Us Our Money!* On Natal Africans in the Anglo-Zulu War, see Paul Thompson, *The Natal Native Contingent in the Anglo-Zulu War, 1879* (Pietermaritzburg: University of Natal Press, 1997).
  40. RM Mngeni, Minute paper, Unsatisfactory condition of the Amaqanya Tribe, January 26,

- 1880, PAR, SNA I/1/36, 54/1880.
41. USNA Report: RM Mngeni reports noncompliance of Chief Mahoiza, March 24, 1882, PAR, SNA I/1/53, 124/82.
  42. Xaba, *James Stuart Archive*, vol. 6, 327.
  43. Secretary for Native Affairs, Manyosi to be head of natives in location, July 14, 1882, PAR, SNA I/1/54, 1882/272; Application of Chief Manyosi, PAR, SNA I/1/112, 1889/68; Statement of Acting Chief Mhlahlo, June 16, 1903, PAR, SNA I/1/298, 3846/1902. It should also be noted that even after Mahoiza's jurisdiction was restricted to a smaller territory, his offenses continued as he illegally sold and loaned guns without permits and sent his son rather than an official witness to act at a wedding. See PAR, SNA I/1/70 and 1/1/78. On Gcumisa name change, see application of the Chief Swayimane to have his tribal name altered from "Qamu" to "Gcumisa," PAR, SNA I/1/267, 2711/1897.
  44. Lambert, *Betrayed Trust*, 143–46.
  45. Guy, *Theophilus Shepstone and the Forging of Natal*, 522–25.
  46. R. L. Hitchins and G. W. Sweeney, eds., *Statutes of Natal: Compilation of the Statutes of the Colony of Natal from the Years 1845 to 1899*, vol. 2 (Pietermaritzburg: P. Davis & Sons, 1901), sec. "Natives (In General)," 45–46.
  47. *Proceedings of the Commission Appointed to Inquire into the Past and Present State of the Kafir in the District of Natal*, part 6 (Pietermaritzburg: J. Archbell and Son, 1853), 63.
  48. This contradicts John Lambert's assertion that Ngoza's chiefdom disintegrated after his death. While the chiefdom may have split, many of Ngoza's followers sought to retain connections to the late leader. Lambert, *Betrayed Trust*, 28.
  49. Minute paper and statements of Chief Nsibansiba and Mjiba and Chief Manyosi, PAR, SNA I/1/81, 1885/168.
  50. Application of Chief Manyosi, January 14, 1889, PAR, SNA I/1/112, 1889/68.
  51. Minute paper, SNA, November 18, 1902, PAR, SNA I/1/298, 3846/1902.
  52. Statement of Madhliwa, PAR, SNA I/1/190, 1023/1894; Minute paper, Resident Magistrate New Hanover, April 10, 1895, SNA I/1/201, 467/1895.
  53. Statement of Mhlahlo, Chief of the Amaqamu Tribe, Mngeni Division, June 16, 1903, PAR, SNA I/1/298, 3846/1902.
  54. Umfuyana, headman in charge of Chief Mhlahlo's section of the Amaqamu complains of attitude assumed by Chief Swayimane ka Manyosi towards Mhlahlo's people, PAR, SNA I/1/298, 3846/1902.
  55. RM Mngeni Forder to SNA, September 14, 1889, PAR, SNA I/1/117, 870/89.
  56. Petition of Ngangezwe, August 21, 1889, PAR, SNA I/1/117, 870/89.
  57. Memorandum, John Shepstone, November 20, 1882, PAR, SNA I/1/56, 1882/450.

58. Petition of Ngangezwe.
59. Carola Lentz, *Land, Mobility, and Belonging in West Africa* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2013), 4.
60. In fact, beyond the scope of this book, Nomsimekwana and Ngangezwe were involved in similar contests with the Ximba chiefs in which they also relied upon the principle of first use and the place of their ancestors.
61. Minute paper, R. C. Samuelson, 1889–1890; Minute paper, The Chief Manyosi complains of encroachments on his land by Nomsimekwana, November 1, 1888, both PAR, SNA I/1/117, 870/1889.
62. Interview of CNC with Ngangezwe, Maguzu, and Swayimane, January 13, 1914, PAR. CNC 149. 2086/1913; Statement of Ngangezwe, December 18, 1928, 2/PMB 3/1/1/1/1, 2/17/16/1920.
63. Resident magistrate, Mngeni, application for previous correspondence relative to land dispute between late Chief Manyosi and Chief Nomsimekwana, February 5, 1895, PAR, SNA I/1/197, 169/1895.
64. Statement of Ngangezwe to SNA, May 3, 1905, PAR, SNA I/1/320, 1051/1905.
65. Minute paper, Mngeni resident Magistrate, June 8, 1905, SNA I/1/320. 1051/1905.
66. Ndela Ntshangase, interview with author and Thandeka Majola, Pietermaritzburg, April 15, 2011; Johannes and Mantombi Goba, interview with author and Thandeka Majola, Haniville, May 27, 2011.
67. Statement of Swayimane ka Manyosi, April 17, 1905, PAR, SNA I/1/320.
68. Mathe interview.
69. Report of intelligence officer No. 1, November 12, 1904, PAR, SNA I/4/13, 69/1904.
70. Statement of Swayimane ka Manyosi. April 17, 1905.
71. Report of the Magistrate Mngeni division, July 5, 1905, PAR, SNA I/1/318, 1905/670.
72. Magistrate Mngeni to USNA, March 16, 1905 and USNA to Magistrate Mngeni, March 21, 1905, SNA I/1/318, 1905/670.
73. Magistrate New Hanover to USNA, October 3, 1905, SNA I/1/318, 1905/670.
74. Statement of Swayimane ka Manyosi, April 17, 1905.
75. Magistrate Mngeni to USNA, August 22, 1905, SNA I/1/318 1905/670.
76. Magistrate Mngeni to USNA, September 6, 1905, SNA I/1/318 1905/670.
77. Order by His Excellency the Governor, November 13, 1905, SNA I/1/318, 1905/670.
78. Minutes, Native Affairs Department, February 5, 1906, SNA I/1/318, 1905/670.
79. Minutes, Native Affairs Department, March 1, 1906, PAR, SNA I/1/337.
80. Simanga Mkhize, interview with author, Thandeka Majola, and Thandokuhle Maphumulo, KwaXimba, June 1, 2014; Banningi Maphumulo and Bernard Mkhize,



interview with author and Thandeka Majola, Mbambangalo, January 31, 2011; Ndoda Gwala, interview with author and Thandeka Majola, Maqongqo, July 10, 2013.

### Chapter 3. Ngangezwe Claims to Be a Hereditary Chief: Organizing Authority by Wards and War, 1905–1930

1. Adam Ashforth, *The Politics of Official Discourse in Twentieth-Century South Africa* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), 53.
2. Saul Dubow, *Racial Segregation and the Origins of Apartheid in South Africa, 1919–36* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1989).
3. Shula Marks, *Reluctant Rebellion: The 1906–8 Disturbances in Natal* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1970); Benedict Carton, *Blood from Your Children: The Colonial Origins of Generational Conflict in South Africa* (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 2000); Jeff Guy, *The Maphumulo Uprising: War, Law and Ritual in the Zulu Rebellion* (Pietermaritzburg: University of Natal Press, 2005); Michael Mahoney, *The Other Zulus: The Spread of Zulu Ethnicity in Colonial South Africa* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2012).
4. Carton, *Blood from Your Children*, III.
5. Natal Native Affairs Commission, *Report of the Native Affairs Commission, 1906–1907* (Pietermaritzburg: P. Davis & Sons, 1907), 18–19.
6. Marks, *Reluctant Rebellion*, 342.
7. The Lower Tugela District had earlier seen the implementation of bounded chiefdoms on private lands. Mduduzi Percival Ngonyama, "Redefining Amakhosi Authority from 'Personal to Territorial': An Historical Analysis of the Limitations of Colonial Boundaries on African Socio-Political Relations in Natal's Maphumulo/Lower Thukela Region, 1890–1910" (MA thesis, University of KwaZulu-Natal, 2012), 88–102.
8. Harvey Feinberg, *Our Land, Our Life, Our Future: Black South African Challenges to Territorial Segregation, 1913–1948* (Pretoria: Unisa Press, 2015), 21; William Beinart and Peter Delius, "The Natives Land Act of 1913: A Template but Not a Turning Point," in *Land Divided, Land Restored; Land Reform in South Africa for the 21st Century*, ed. Ben Cousins and Cheryl Walker (Auckland Park: Jacana, 2015), 24.
9. Beinart and Delius, "The Natives Land Act of 1913," 25.
10. Feinberg, *Our Land, Our Life, Our Future*, 53–54.
11. Dubow, *Racial Segregation and the Origins of Apartheid in South Africa, 1919–36*, 11–12.
12. This meant the transfer of magistracies from the Department of Justice to the NAD, a change resented by Justice and magistrates. Dubow, *Racial Segregation*, chap. 3.
13. Peter Walshe, *The Rise of African Nationalism in South Africa: The African National*

- Congress, 1912–1952* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971); Helen Bradford, *A Taste of Freedom: The ICU in Rural South Africa, 1924–1930* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987); Peter Limb, *The ANC's Early Years: Nation, Class and Place in South Africa before 1940* (Pretoria: Unisa Press, 2010).
14. Bernard Ngidi, interview with author and Thandeka Majola, Edendale, May 5, 2011.
  15. *Inkosi Nhlakanipho Maphumulo*, interview with author and Thandeka Majola, Mbambangalo, January 27, 2011; Baningi Maphumulo and Bernard Mkhize, interview with author and Thandeka Majola, Mbambangalo, January 31, 2011.
  16. Mazipho Amos Ndlela, B. A. Msomi, Bongumuzi Mbhele, and Mfikiseni Khumalo, interview with author and Thandeka Majola, Mbambangalo, February 17, 2011.
  17. Nkanyiso Ndlovu, interview with author and Thandeka Majola, Mbambangalo, April 8, 2011.
  18. *Inkosi Nkosiyesizwe Gcumisa*, interview with author and Thandeka Majola, KwaSwayimane, June 24, 2014; Bhukumuzi Sibiyi, interview with author and Thadneka Majola, Mkhambathini, August 9, 2011.
  19. A. N. Ndlovu, interview with author and Thandeka Majola, Mkhambathini, August 4, 2011.
  20. Department of Native Affairs, Colony of Natal, *Annual Report* (Pietermaritzburg: Times Printing and Publishing Company, Ltd., 1906).
  21. Ngonyama, "Redefining Amakhosi Authority," 105.
  22. David Welsh, *The Roots of Segregation: Native Policy in Colonial Natal, 1845–1910* (Cape Town: Oxford University Press, 1971), 279.
  23. Natal, *Evidence: Native Affairs Commission of 1906–1907* (Pietermaritzburg: P. Davis & Sons, Government Printers, 1907), 702–3.
  24. Natal, *Evidence: Native Affairs Commission of 1906–1907*, 859–60.
  25. During the disturbances, Mveli promptly reported his followers' refusal to pay the poll tax and hunted out the rebels with zeal. As the regent for the Fuze heir, Mveli used the rebellion to rid himself of dissidents and prove his support to the colonial government given his dependency on the administration for his status. It is less clear whether Maguzu was as active a supporter as Mveli or whether he benefited solely by profession of allegiance. He did visit the magistrate in the wake of the hanging of Mjongo, one of the leading rebels, to express his satisfaction. Acting Chief Mveli and Chief Maguzu express their satisfaction of the execution of Mjongo, October 10, 1906, PAR, SNA I/1/352, 3388/1906; Moses Muziwandile Hadebe, "A Contextualization and Examination of the Impi Yamakhanda (1906 Uprising) as Reported by J. L. Dube in Ilanga Lase Natal, with Special Focus on Dube's Attitude to Dinuzulu as Indicated in His Reportage on the Treason Trial of Dinuzulu" (MA thesis, University of Natal, 2003), 68; Marks, *Reluctant*

- Rebellion*, 324. For the numbers transferred, see 1905 Native Affairs Report, 132.
26. Chief Maguzu asks that his district be defined, April 26, 1906, PAR, SNA I/1/340, 1906/1302.
  27. R. F. Morcom to SNA, March 1, 1907, PAR, SNA I/1/364, 1907/624.
  28. USNA to Mngeni magistrate, August 2, 1908, PAR, SNA I/1/340, 1906/1302.
  29. Statement by the Chief Swayimane ka Manyosi, September 28, 1911, PAR, CNC 36, 2287/1911.
  30. Cited in Nkonyama, "Redefining Amakhosi Authority," 112.
  31. Thomas McClendon, *Genders and Generations Apart: Labor Tenants and Customary Law in Segregation-Era South Africa, 1920s to 1940s* (Portsmouth: Heinemann, 2002), 20–21.
  32. McClendon, *Genders and Generations Apart*, 16.
  33. The property and other Church of Natal-owned properties transferred in 1910 as a result of the Church Properties Act IX of 1910. The act reintegrated the land of Bishop J. W. Colenso's breakaway Church of England in Natal with the Church of the Province of South Africa. The act was a measure to end the schism in the Anglican Church, but the sale of these farms, including Goedverwachting, certainly was also to spite Harriette Colenso, a vociferous defender of the Zulu who would be evicted from the Bishopstowe residence with the sale. Land Register for Goedverwachting No. 1349, Deeds Registry, Department of Rural Development and Land Reform, KwaZulu-Natal Province. Shula Marks, "Harriette Colenso and the Zulus, 1874–1913," *Journal of African History* 4, no. 3 (January 1, 1963): 404–5; Jeff Guy, *The View Across the River: Harriette Colenso and the Zulu Struggle against Imperialism* (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2002), 446–47.
  34. George Moe to Magistrate Mngeni, September 1, 1915, PAR, CNC 213, 1915/1075; Union of South Africa, *Minutes of Evidence of the Natal Natives Land Committee* (Cape Town: Cape Times Limited, Government Printers, 1918), 288, <http://catalog.hathitrust.org/Record/007703860>.
  35. Interview with Quva Zondi, Saulkutshelwa Mate and Hxalata Magubane on the subject of their ejection from private lands, June 12, 1913, PAR, CNC 126, 1913/940.
  36. Interview, Mkongelwa Zimu ka Dhlivelo of Chief Maguzu, June 29, 1915, PAR, CNC 209, 837/1915.
  37. Additional Magistrate Mngeni to Magistrate Mngeni, August 1, 1918, PAR, CNC 341, 1918/3247.
  38. M. A. Shange, interview with author and Thandeka Majola, KwaNyavu, June 18, 2014.
  39. M. A. Mkhize, interview with author and Thandeka Majola, KwaNyavu, June 18, 2014. Mkhize's testimony suggests this may have been the time when many of the Mkhize

- chiefs' subjects were kicked off the land.
40. Mngeni magistrate to CNC Natal, February 25, 1920, UAR, COGTA 147, N1/1/3(35) 3.
  41. Balothi Goge, interview with author and Thandeka Majola, Mbambangalo, March 4, 2011.
  42. Acting SNA to Acting CNC Natal, April 2, 1912, PAR, 1/CPD 3/2/2/5.
  43. Statement of Chief Sidumo, October 24, 1921, PAR, 1/PMB 3/1/1/2/11, 25/15.
  44. It seems unlikely the loyal chief would be Maguzu, given the government suspicion that Swayimane was arming his men to assist Maguzu. Several contemporary interviews suggest the Nyavu chief was sympathetic to the rebellion (and therefore not loyal to the British) but this appears to be misremembered. There is no other evidence for Ngangezwe's participation in the revolt. Minute paper, USNA, June 30, 1906, PAR, SNA 1/1/344; Mfungelwa Mdluli, interview with author and Thandeka Majola, KwaNyavu, August 7, 2011; M. A. Shange interview.
  45. Minute paper, Acting CNC, March 20, 1912, PAR, CNC 68, 493/1912.
  46. Mxolisi Mchunu, "Culture Change, Zulu Masculinity and Intergenerational Conflict in the Context of Civil War in Pietermaritzburg (1987–1991)," in *From Boys to Men: Social Constructions of Masculinity in Contemporary Society*, ed. T. Shefer, K. Ratele, A. Strelbel, N. Shabalala, and R. Buikema (Cape Town: Juta & Company, 2007); Benedict Carton and Robert Morrell, "Zulu Masculinities, Warrior Culture and Stick Fighting: Reassessing Male Violence and Virtue in South Africa," *Journal of Southern African Studies* 38, no. 1 (2012): 31–53.
  47. Interview with Ngwenya Zondi, July 3, 1913, PAR, CNC 129, 1913/1131.
  48. Correspondence between Mngeni magistrate and CNC, December 1913, PAR, 1/PMB 3/1/1/1/2, MC405/1913.
  49. Statement of Maguzu Maphumulo, December 4, 1913, PAR, CNC 149. 2086/1913.
  50. Interview of CNC with Ngangezwe, Maguzu, and Swayimane, January 13, 1914, PAR, CNC 149, 2086/1913.
  51. Statement of Native Constable Lutilunye, December 27, 1913. 1/PMB 3/1/1/1/2 MC446/13/11.
  52. For similar cases, see Sara Berry's argument about Asante chiefly power derived from production of history, calling upon historical precedent. Sara Berry, *Chiefs Know Their Boundaries: Essays on Property, Power, and the Past in Asante, 1896–1996* (Portsmouth: Heinemann, 2000), 8.
  53. Interview of CNC with Ngangezwe, Maguzu, and Swayimane, January 13, 1914.
  54. CNC Natal to SNA, October 22, 1915, NAR, NTS 369, 2053/15/F.123A5; Mngeni Magistrate to CNC, August 11, 1915, PAR, CNC 188, 1914/1731.
  55. Mngeni magistrate to CNC, December 18, 1917, 1/PMB 3/1/1/1/2. MC405/1913.

56. Several people attested to the good relations between the Ferreiras and the neighboring peoples. One farmer from the region suggested that one of the sons of N. P. H. Ferreira, Ignatius (known as Naartjies to local Africans), “wasn’t a white man” because he would spend his weekends with Africans, “staying with whoever would take him.” Notes from interview with Neil Raw, July 16, 2013.
57. Mssrs. Harry Silburn & Co to CNC, March 9, 1921, PAR, 2/PMB 3/1/1/2/4, 2/14/20.
58. John Lambert, *Betrayed Trust: Africans and the State in Colonial Natal* (Scottsville: University of Natal Press, 1995), 73–79.
59. In 1912, Maguzu sent a representative to a meeting to hear the updates of Native Congress President John Dube. *Ilanga LaseNatal*, April 12, 1912. In 1920, Maguzu, Swayimane, Mhlola, and Ngangezwe all gave testimony at an NNC meeting about passes. *Ilanga LaseNatal*, February 20, 1920.
60. Feinberg, *Our Land, Our Life, Our Future*, 49–50.
61. Feinberg, *Our Land, Our Life, Our Future*, 21.
62. Peter Delius, *A Lion Amongst the Cattle: Reconstruction and Resistance in the Northern Transvaal* (Portsmouth: Heinemann, 1996), 18, 27.
63. Correspondence between Mngeni magistrate and CNC, April–August, 1921, PAR, 2/PMB 3/1/1/2/4, 2/14/20.
64. In 1931, Ngangezwe’s son deposited £180 with Acting Native Commissioner Henry Francis Fynn (a descendant of the trader Henry Francis Fynn), but in 1932, no officials could find it despite Somquba’s presentation of a note from Fynn acknowledging the deposit. CNC to Mngeni NC, March 26, 1930, 2/PMB 3/1/1/2/4, 2/14/20.
65. Statement of Ngangezwe, December 18, 1928, PAR, CNC 188, 1914/1731.
66. Camperdown magistrate to CNC, February 5, 1929, PAR, 1/CPD 3/2/2/, 2/1/2/3/1.
67. Pietermaritzburg Additional NC to CNC, January 22, 1930, PAR, 2/PMB 3/1/1/1/, 2/17/16/1920.

#### **Chapter 4. They Refuse to Go to Other Chiefs’ Areas: The Nagle Dam and Forced Removals, 1930–1950**

1. Saul Dubow, *Racial Segregation and the Origins of Apartheid in South Africa, 1919–36* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1989), 133.
2. Peter Walshe, *The Rise of African Nationalism in South Africa: The African National Congress, 1912–1952* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971); Helen Bradford, *A Taste of Freedom: The ICU in Rural South Africa, 1924–1930* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987); Peter Limb, *The ANC’s Early Years: Nation, Class and Place in South Africa before 1940* (Pretoria: Unisa Press, 2010).

3. They would be allowed to vote for three white representatives for parliament as part of the Native Representatives Council (NRC), a merely advisory body reporting to the Secretary for Native Affairs. Dubow, *Racial Segregation and the Origins of Apartheid*, 132.
4. Adam Ashforth, *The Politics of Official Discourse in Twentieth-Century South Africa* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), 73.
5. Ashforth, *The Politics of Official Discourse in Twentieth-Century South Africa*, 81.
6. William Beinart, "Soil Erosion, Conservationism and Ideas about Development: A Southern African Exploration, 1900–1960," *Journal of Southern African Studies* 11, no. 1 (October 1, 1984): 52–83.
7. Ashforth, *The Politics of Official Discourse in Twentieth-Century South Africa*, 92.
8. Laurine Platzky, Cheryl Walker, and Surplus People Project, *The Surplus People: Forced Removals in South Africa* (Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1985), 87–92; Harvey Feinberg, *Our Land, Our Life, Our Future: Black South African Challenges to Territorial Segregation, 1913–1948* (Pretoria: Unisa Press, 2015), 59.
9. C. J. De Wet, *Moving Together, Drifting Apart: Betterment Planning and Villagisation in a South African Homeland* (Johannesburg: Witwatersrand University Press, 1995), 41.
10. De Wet, *Moving Together, Drifting Apart*, 43–44; Joanne Yawitch, *Betterment: The Myth of Homeland Agriculture* (Johannesburg: SA Institute of Race Relations, 1982).
11. For instance, see Ivan Thomas Evans, *Bureaucracy and Race: Native Administration in South Africa* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997), 255; John Sharp, "Relocation and the Problem of Survival in Qwaqwa: A Report from the Field," *Social Dynamics* 8, no. 2 (1982): 11–29; De Wet, *Moving Together, Drifting Apart*; Laura Evans, "Resettlement and the Making of the Ciskei Bantustan, South Africa, c. 1960–1976," *Journal of Southern African Studies* 40, no. 1 (2014): 21–40.
12. Walshe, *The Rise of African Nationalism in South Africa*, 119.
13. Noor Nieftagodien, "Popular Movements, Contentious Spaces and the ANC, 1943–1956," in *One Hundred Years of the ANC: Debating Liberation Histories Today*, ed. Arianna Lissoni, Jon Soske, Natasha Erlank, Noor Nieftagodien, and Omar Badsha (Johannesburg: Wits University Press, 2012), 135–62; Timothy Gibbs, *Mandela's Kinsmen: Nationalist Elites & Apartheid's First Bantustan* (Johannesburg: Jacana, 2014).
14. I. B. Tabata, *The Rehabilitation Scheme: The New Fraud* (Cape Town: All African Convention Committee, 1945); Baruch Hirson, "Rural Revolt in South Africa, 1937–1951," *Collected Seminar Papers, Institute of Commonwealth Studies* 21 (1977): 115–32; William Beinart and Colin Bundy, "State Intervention and Rural Resistance: The Transkei, 1900–1965," in *Peasants in Africa: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives*, ed. Martin Klein (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1980), 271–315; Beinart, "Soil Erosion, Conservationism

- and Ideas about Development”; Thiathu Nmutanzhela, *Ploughing Amongst the Stones: The Story of “Betterment” in the Zoutpansberg, 1939–1944* (Randburg: Ravan Press, 1999); Siphamandla Zondi, “Peasant Struggles of the 1950s: gaMatlala and Zeerust,” in *The Road to Democracy in South Africa*, vol. 1, 1960–1970, ed. South African Democracy Education Trust (Cape Town: Zebra Press, 2004), 147–75.
15. Correspondence between Durban Corporation, PNC, and SNA on Mlazi water scheme, 1920–1922, NAR, NTS 7900, 3/337, Part 1, folio 7–75.
  16. Under famine relief efforts, local males were paid £1.5 per month to construct the road connecting the Table Mountain Road to B. A. MacDonnell’s store near the Mngeni River. Due to the famine, the store’s supply was a critical matter and MacDonnell volunteered to oversee the construction because of the benefits to him as the shop owner. The Durban Corporation lent expertise and equipment. The road construction was plagued with hindrances as the Africans downed tools to demand meals and the initial funds expired. When additional funds became available, the pay was at a lower scale of 25s per month, and MacDonnell refused to oversee the project any longer. Correspondence between NAD Engineer, PNC, and MacDonnell, May–November 1936, PAR, 2/PMB, 3/1/1/2/32.
  17. Correspondence between officials of SNA, CNC, and Durban Corporation, August 1935–October 1936, NAR, NTS 7900, 3/337, Part 1, folio 118–48.
  18. New Hanover Magistrate to CNC, January 9, 1937, PAR, CNC39A, 28/68.
  19. C. Edmunds to MP John O’Brien, January 14, 1937; CNC to SNA, January 27, 1937; Edmunds to O’Brien, January 29, 1937; Notes of Parliament Committee on Durban Waterworks Bill, February 2, 1937, NAR, NTS 7900, 3/337 Part 1, folio 167–68 and 175–88. There are ample records covering the placement of an agricultural overseer, improvements to the existing homestead for the overseer’s occupation, repairs to the irrigation system to water the existing citrus orchard that they would not trust to Africans’ care, and the establishment of a nursery plot to try out various grasses seeds procured at the most recent Pietermaritzburg Agricultural Show. See NAR, NTS 3383, 2528/307; NTS 6992, 250/321.
  20. For dates, costs, and land transfer, see NAR, NTS 7900, 3/337, Part 1. For water estimates, see Durban Irrigation Department to Pretoria Irrigation Department, June 10, 1938, PAR, CNC40A, 28/68, folio 330–31.
  21. Chief Somquba to PNC, January 30, 1937, PAR, 2/PMB 3/1/1/2/4.
  22. Q. A. Hlangwana to CNC, June 20, 1937, PAR, 2/PMB 3/1/1/2/4.
  23. A 1927 draft amendment bill designed to follow up the 1913 Land Act would have created a Natives Land Purchase and Advances Fund, but the amendment was ultimately

- scrapped in favor of the 1936 Native Trust and Land Act. Feinberg, *Our Land, Our Life, Our Future*, 63, 109.
24. PNC to CNC, July 29, 1037, PAR, 2/PMB 3/1/1/2/4, 2/14/2020.
  25. Some, such as a conflict within the Maphumulo in 1914, appeared to officials to be little beyond “drunken brawls” with minor injuries. With only brief reports, it is difficult to draw alternative conclusions. PNC to CNC, September 24, 1914, PAR, CNC 184, 1486/1914.
  26. Notes of interview with Chief Somquba Mdluli, October 17, 1938; Notes of Mdluli meeting, November 18, 1938; PNC to CNC, December 19, 1938, PAR, 1/CPD 3/2/2/3, 2/1/2/3/1.
  27. Senior Agricultural Officer to Assistant Director of Agriculture, August 3, 1938, NAR, NTS 3383, 2528/307, folio 4–6.
  28. Recommendation for purchase, approved July 18, 1941, NAR, NTS 3243, 814/307.
  29. Approval was required for lists of improvements, land valuation, offers to purchase, offers to counter, and so on. Correspondence wove back and forth from the chief native commissioner to the secretary for native affairs to the Board of Land Affairs. Scholars often note that acquisition of land after the 1936 Act was slow and ineffectual, evidenced here in the level of bureaucracy, farmers’ resistance to sale, and the continued desperate need for additional land for African settlement. Platzky, Walker, and Surplus People Project, *The Surplus People*.
  30. Reclamation report of the “Ad Hoc” committee on Onverwacht, March 23, 1959, NAR, NTS 10261, 47/423(8).
  31. Correspondence between PNC, CNC, and SNA, February 1949–March 1950, NAR, NTS 3244, 814/307, folio 159–72.
  32. Goedverwachting settlement report, November 15, 1948; Agricultural officer to PNC, July 7, 1947, NAR, NTS 3244, 814/307, folio 101–2 and 154.
  33. Correspondence between Assistant Director Native Agriculture, CNC, and SNA, 1938–1939, NAR, NTS 3383, 2528/307, folio 12–35.
  34. Reclamation report on Onverwacht, NTS 10261; 1949 completion report, NAR, NTS 10259, 47/423.
  35. Reclamation report on Onverwacht, NTS 10261. Members of the Gcumisa continued to refuse betterment schemes on location land and complained about their access to agricultural and grazing areas after their forced relocation into residential areas on the northern portion of Onverwacht well into the 1960s. A series of irresponsible and unaccountable chiefs meant that resistance occasionally bypassed the chief all together, such as in 1962, when Dick Mzilawazinkomo Zamantiza Majola hired attorney Michael Friedman to articulate Gcumisa land complaints to the Durban Corporation and Bantu



- Affairs Commissioner. Correspondence between Friedman, Durban Corporation, and BAC, February–October 1962, NAR, NTS 3383, 2528/307. On chiefs, see NAR, BAO 4896, F54/1458/5 and NAR, BAO 5/79, F54/1458/1.
36. Completion report, Goedverwachting, 1950, and Agricultural Officer to PNC, August 24, 1951, NAR, NTS 10259, 47/423.
  37. Goge Balothi, interview with author and Thandeka Majola, Mbambangalo, March 4, 2011; For the translation of *mqangabhodwe*, see Clement M. Doke and B. W. Vilakazi, *Zulu–English Dictionary* (Johannesburg: Witwatersrand University Press, 1964), 688. On the naming of employers and coworkers by African employees, see Adrian Koopman, *Zulu Names* (Pietermaritzburg: University of Natal, 1999), 66–67.
  38. Michael M. Cernea and World Bank, eds., *Putting People First: Sociological Variables in Rural Development*, 2nd ed. and expanded (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), 197.
  39. Sharp, “Relocation and the Problem of Survival in Qwaqwa.”
  40. Thayer Scudder and Elizabeth Colson, “From Welfare to Development: A Conceptual Framework for the Analysis of Dislocated People,” in *Involuntary Migration and Resettlement*, ed. Art Hansen and Anthony Oliver-Smith (Boulder: Westview Press, 1982), 274.
  41. New Hanover NC to CNC, September 1, 1939; J. Niko to CNC February 7, 1938; Camperdown NC to CNC, February 1, 1938; J. Niko to CNC, January 7, 1938, PAR, CNC 40A, 28/68.
  42. Reclamation report on Onverwacht, NTS 10261.
  43. Mazipho Amos Ndlela, B.A. Msomi, Bongumuzi Mbhele, and Mfikiseni Khumalo, interview with author and Thandeka Majola, Mbambangalo, February 15, 2011.
  44. It is important here to consider Ndlovu’s successor—the *ibambabukhosi*—as the contest over the regency involves individuals who shape life at Table Mountain in later decades. No male children of Ndlovu’s chief wife or his *ikohwa* wife (second wife, of the left-hand dwelling) survived. Ndlovu thus associated his third wife with his chiefly house and their son Funizwe became the heir. The Maphumulo requested Funizwe succeed his father, but the Pietermaritzburg native commissioner felt the young man (only twenty-one or twenty-two at the time) was not yet mature enough to lead and the Secretary for Native Affairs denied approval. Headmen then nominated Sigciza Maphumulo (a grandson of Maguzu and uncle to Funizwe, though at various times he was described by officials as a brother of Funizwe) to act as *ibambabukhosi* until Funizwe could be appointed. Ndlovu’s widows obtained the services of an attorney to oppose Sigciza’s nomination on account of ill-feeling between him and their late husband, but the headmen and other Maphumulos requested him regardless. The chief native commissioner and Secretary

- for Native Affairs approved. Statement of Ndlovu Maphumulo, November 7, 1940, and Correspondence between PNC, CNC, and SNA, April–July 1949, NAR, BAO 5/363, F54/1524/5, folio 15–22.
45. See correspondence in NAR, NTS 293, 359/53.
  46. PNC to CNC, May 6, 1950, NAR, NTS 3244, 814/307, Part 1, folio 171–73.
  47. Ndlela, Msomi, Mbhele, and Khumalo interview. Others also attest to moving from Mhlabamakhosi to Ezinembeni. Fikelephi Sibisi, interview with author and Thandeka Majola, Haniville, June 16, 2011.
  48. Phumzile Mathonsi, interview with author and Thandeka Majola, Echibini, June 21, 2011.
  49. Fihlizwe Zondi, interview with author and Thandeka Majola, KwaNyavu, July 12, 2015.
  50. Correspondence on the construction of the Shongweni Dam suggests a pattern where Africans recognized that removals forced them “to sacrifice their tribal allegiance in order to find room in other locations.” CNC to SNA, April 8, 1924, NAR, NTS 7900, 3/337, folio 88–89.
  51. “Umgeni Valley Water Scheme: Removal of Natives to New Area,” January 28, 1937, PAR. CNC 39A 28/68.
  52. I was unable to find any archival documentation on these conflicts. Anonymous, interview with author and Thandeka Majola, Nagle Dam, June 28, 2014; Simanga Mkhize, interview with author and Thandeka Majola, KwaXimba, June 18, 2014.
  53. Simanga Mkhize interview.
  54. Yi-Fu Tuan, *Space and Place: The Perspective of Experience* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1977), 131.
  55. See, for example, Phumzile Mathonsi, interview with author and Thandeka Majola, Echibini, June 21, 2011.
  56. Ndoda Gwala and Baningi Maphumulo, interview with author and Thandeka Majola, Maqongqo, July 10, 2013.
  57. Sphiwe Maphumulo and other members of Maphumulo family, group interview with author, Thandeka Majola, and Thandokuhle Maphumulo, Maqongqo, July 24, 2013.
  58. Ndlela, Msomi, Mbhele, and Khumalo interview.
  59. Sibisi interview.
  60. *Inkosi* Nkosiyesizwe Gcumisa, interview with author and Thandeka Majola, KwaSwayimane, June 24, 2016; Muzingaye Gcumisa, interview with author and Thandeka Majola, KwaSwayimane, June 26, 2014.
  61. Bhekumuzi Sibiya, interview with author and Thandeka Majola, Mkhambathini, August 9, 2011.

### Chapter 5. He Said He Wanted the Tribe to Decide: Boundaries and Betterment, 1948–1971

1. Deborah Posel, *The Making of Apartheid, 1948–1961: Conflict and Compromise* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991).
2. Ivan Thomas Evans, *Bureaucracy and Race: Native Administration in South Africa* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997), 1.
3. Posel, *The Making of Apartheid*, 63–64.
4. Evans, *Bureaucracy and Race*, 16.
5. From here, I will use both NAD and BAD, depending on the year in question. When the NAD became BAD, native commissioners became Bantu Administration Commissioners (BAC) and the South African Native Trust became the South African Bantu Trust.
6. Posel, *The Making of Apartheid*, 228–46.
7. C. J. De Wet, *Moving Together, Drifting Apart: Betterment Planning and Villagisation in a South African Homeland* (Johannesburg: Witwatersrand University Press, 1995), 45–51.
8. William Beinart, “Soil Erosion, Conservationism and Ideas about Development: A Southern African Exploration, 1900–1960,” *Journal of Southern African Studies* 11, no. 1 (1984): 79.
9. Evans, *Bureaucracy and Race*, 224.
10. Posel, *The Making of Apartheid*, 71, 240–41; De Wet, *Moving Together, Drifting Apart*, 45–51; Laurine Platzky, Cheryl Walker, and Surplus People Project, *The Surplus People: Forced Removals in South Africa* (Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1985); Fred T. Hendricks, “Loose Planning and Rapid Resettlement: The Politics of Conservation and Control in Transkei, South Africa, 1950–1970,” *Journal of Southern African Studies* 15, no. 2 (1989): 306–25.
11. De Wet, *Moving Together, Drifting Apart*, 28.
12. William Beinart, “Beyond ‘Homelands’: Some Ideas about the History of African Rural Areas in South Africa,” *South African Historical Journal* 64, no. 1 (2012): 16.
13. Hendricks, “Loose Planning and Rapid Resettlement,” 312.
14. Evans, *Bureaucracy and Race*, 244.
15. Mzala (Jabulani Nxumalo), *Gatsha Buthelezi: Chief with a Double Agenda* (Zed Books, 1988), 48–50.
16. Gerhard Maré and Georgina Hamilton, *Appetite for Power: Buthelezi’s Inkatha and South Africa* (Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1987); Lungisile Ntsebeza, *Democracy Compromised: Chiefs and the Politics of the Land in South Africa* (Leiden: Brill, 2005); D. A. Kotzé, *African Politics in South Africa, 1964–1974: Parties and Issues* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1975); Evans, *Bureaucracy and Race*.

17. Beinart, "Soil Erosion, Conservationism and Ideas about Development." Paul Landau, "The ANC, MK, and 'The Turn to Violence' (1960–1962)," *South African Historical Journal* 64, no. 3 (2012): 538–63.
18. Peter Delius, "Contested Terrain: Land Rights and Chiefly Power in Historical Perspective," in *Land, Power and Custom: Controversies Generated by South Africa's Communal Land Rights Act*, ed. Aninka Claassens and Ben Cousins (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2008), 211–37.
19. Tom Lodge, *Black Politics in South Africa Since 1945* (New York: Longman, 1983), 268–79.
20. Jabulani Sithole, "Neither Communists nor Saboteurs: KwaZulu Bantustan Politics," in *The Road to Democracy in South Africa*, vol. 2, 1970–1980, by South African Democracy Education Trust (Pretoria: Unisa Press, 2006), 808–9; Lodge, *Black Politics in South Africa*, 279–82; Ntsebeza, *Democracy Compromised*.
21. Albert Luthuli, *Let My People Go* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1962), 122–24.
22. Marc Epprecht, "This Matter of Women Is Getting Very Bad": *Gender, Development and Politics in Colonial Lesotho* (Pietermaritzburg: University of Natal Press, 2000); Priya Lal, "Self-Reliance and the State: The Multiple Meanings of Development in Early Post-Colonial Tanzania," *Africa: The Journal of the International African Institute* 82, no. 2 (2012): 212–34.
23. NC Melmoth to CNC, September 6, 1952, NAR, NTS 18, 48/1/1 Part 1.
24. Robert McIntosh, "State Policies in Rural South Africa c. 1948–c. 1960: Bantu Authorities, Policy Formation and Local Responses" (PhD thesis, University of London, 1999), 146–48.
25. Cyprian's uncle, Mshiyeni, had been recognized as the "acting paramount chief" during his regency on account of his obliging attitudes. NAD officials undertook similar acknowledgments of paramountcy among the Pedi and Rharhabe and in the Ciskei. McIntosh, 151; Peter Delius, *A Lion Amongst the Cattle* (Portsmouth: Heinemann), 80; L. Ntsebeza et al., "Resistance and Repression in the Bantustans Part 1: Transkei and Ciskei," in *The Road to Democracy in South Africa*, vol. 2, 1970–1980, by South African Democracy Education Trust (Pretoria: Unisa Press, 2006), 761.
26. Anna Kolberg Buverud, "The King and the Honeybirds: Cyprian Bhekuzulu kaSolomon, Zulu Nationalism and the Implementation of the Bantu Authorities System in Zululand, 1948–1957" (PhD thesis, University of Oslo, 2007).
27. McIntosh, "State Policies in Rural South Africa," 144.
28. Mzala, *Gatsha Buthelezi*; Ben Temkin, *Buthelezi: A Biography* (London: Frank Cass, 2003); Jabulani Sithole, "Neither Communists nor Saboteurs: KwaZulu Bantustan Politics," in *The Road to Democracy in South Africa*, vol. 2, 1970–1980, by South African Democracy Education Trust (Pretoria: Unisa Press, 2006), 805–45.

29. McIntosh, "State Policies in Rural South Africa," 144–67.
30. Correspondence between PNC and CNC, April–May 1954, NAR, BAO 5/363, F54/1524/5.
31. Minutes of meeting on appointment of acting chief during minority of the heir to the late Chief Funizwe, October 7, 1954, BAO 5/363, F54/1524/5.
32. PNC to CNC, October 12, 1954, BAO 5/363, F54/1524/5.
33. Minutes of meeting on appointment of acting Chief Siciza Mapumulo, February 2, 1955, BAO 5/363, F54/1524/5.
34. Minutes of PNC meeting with Baniangi Maphumulo, January 8, 1955, BAO 5/363, F54/1524/5.
35. Minutes of meeting on appointment of acting Chief Siciza Mapumulo, February 2, 1955, BAO 5/363, F54/1524/5.
36. The attendance list suggests Sigciza may have attended Eiselen's speech with Funizwe. NTS 18, 48/1/1 Part 1.
37. "Govt Aims to Make Chiefs 'Spies, Police, Tax Collectors,'" *New Age*, February 24, 1955.
38. McIntosh, "State Policies in Rural South Africa," 167.
39. Sithole, "Neither Communists nor Saboteurs," 808; Saleem Badat, *The Forgotten People Political Banishment under Apartheid* (Leiden: Brill, 2013), chap. 4.
40. Minutes of meeting with Maphumulo at Onverwacht farm, March 14, 1955, NAR, NTS 8900, 211/362(5).
41. It appears that the Nyavu chief was not invited to the conferences but for the February 1954 one, where he was noted absent. His age and health may have prevented him from traveling. NTS 18, 48/1/1 Part 1.
42. The status of the Table Mountain mission's relationship with the American Zulu Mission has not been examined here, but evidence suggests that the Mission Advisory Board was more or less defunct. The station's connections with the American Zulu Mission was strained in the late nineteenth/early twentieth centuries when the congregation declared itself all but independent. Robert J. Houle, *Making African Christianity: Africans Reimagining Their Faith in Colonial Southern Africa* (Bethlehem: Lehigh University Press, 2011).
43. Minutes of meeting with Nyavu at Thuthuka Store, March 9, 1955, NAR, NTS 8991, 211/362(9).
44. NAD memorandum on Pietermaritzburg District, May 1956, NAR, NTS 8989, 211/362.
45. "A Great Historical Occasion," *Bantu*, June 1957; McIntosh, "State Policies in Rural South Africa," 154.
46. For reasons why Cyprian may have ultimately capitulated, see Buverud, "The King and the Honeybirds."

47. "Zulu Tribe Shows Its Anger," *New Age*, December 12, 1957. Government coverage of the event related that the ceremony closed with song and mentions no such dissent. "Toon dat ons manne is," *Bantu*, Pretoria: Information Service (January 1958): 5–15.
48. Government gazette 975/1957; Definition of the areas of certain tribes and establishment of Bantu Tribal Authorities, NAR, NTS 8991, 211/362(9); Minute of the office of the prime minister establishing Maphumulo and Nyavu Tribal Authorities, NAR, URU 3672, 1215.
49. Reclamation report for Onverwacht, March 23, 1959, NAR, NTS 10261, 47/423(8).
50. Balothi Goge, interview with author and Thandeka Majola, Mbambangalo, April 3, 2011.
51. Reclamation report for Onverwacht.
52. A. D. McKay, "Planning for Reclamation and Settlement of Bantu Areas in Natal and Zululand," *Bantu*, Pretoria: Information Service (January 1959): 51.
53. PNC to SNA, June 18, 1958, NAR, NTS 3244, 814/307, Part 2.
54. N. J. Van Warmelo, *A Preliminary Survey of the Bantu Tribes of South Africa* (Pretoria: Government Printer, 1935); PNC to CNC, March 15, 1955, NAR, NTS 8900, 211/362(5); PNC to CNC, March 12, 1955, NAR, NTS 8991, 22/362(9).
55. Charles Simkins, "Agricultural Production in the African Reserves of South Africa, 1918–1969," *Journal of Southern African Studies* 7, no. 2 (1981): 271; Lodge, *Black Politics in South Africa*, 266.
56. PNC to chief agricultural officer, January 21, 1958, NTS 3244, 814/307 Part 2.
57. Durban Engineer's Department to CBAC, March 29, 1962, NAR, NTS 7900, 3/337.
58. For correspondence on topic, see Land Affairs files, NAR, LDE-N 931, 12200/412; LDE-N 971, 12200/860; LDE-N 971, 12200/861; and Land Register for Goedverwachting No. 1349, Deeds Registry, Department of Rural Development and Land Reform, KwaZulu-Natal.
59. Delius, "Contested Terrain," 233.
60. Siphamandla Zondi, "Peasant Struggles of the 1950s: gaMatlala and Zeerust," in *The Road to Democracy in South Africa*, vol. 1, 1960–1970, by South African Democracy Education Trust (Cape Town: Zebra Press, 2004), 147–75.
61. Correspondence between R. A. Bowen and T. F. Coertzee (informally and officially), January–February 1965, NAR, BAO 5/87, 53/1524.
62. PBAC to CBAC, June 15, 1962; BAO 13/1022, J76/97/1524/7, NAR, NTS 8991, 211/362(9)(A).
63. The fierce debate clearly reflected the current political alliances of the participants, with staunch ANC supporters declaring Congress initiation of the resistance. Z. Dlomo, N. Gwala, S. Maphumulo, T. Maphumulo, and D. Ntuli, interview with author, Thandeka Majola, and Thandokuhle Maphumulo, Maqongqo, July 24, 2013.
64. Peter Delius, "Sebatagomo: Migrant Organization, the ANC and the Sekhukhuneland Revolt," *Journal of Southern African Studies* 15, no. 4 (1989): 581–615; Zondi, "Peasant

- Struggles of the 1950s"; Ari Sitas, "The Moving Black Forest of Africa: The Mpondo Rebellion, Migrancy and Black Worker Consciousness in KwaZulu-Natal," in *Rural Resistance in South Africa: The Mpondo Revolts after Fifty Years*, ed. Thembele Kepe and Lungisile Ntsebeza (Leiden: Brill, 2011), 165–87. For a fictional account highlighting migrant connections, see Laurretta Ngcobo, *And They Didn't Die: A Novel* (New York: Braziller, 1991).
65. Ian Edwards and Cheryl Walker date the meeting to June 27; Joanne Yawitch cites July 27. A July 2, 1959, *New Age* article suggests the rally was actually on Freedom Day, June 26. "How June 26 was Celebrated," *New Age*, July 2, 1959; Iain Edwards, "Mkhumbane Our Home: African Shantytown Society in Cato Manor Farm 1946–1960" (PhD dissertation, University of Natal, Durban, 1989); Cheryl Walker, *Women and Resistance in South Africa* (London: Onyx Press, 1982); Joanne Yawitch, "Natal 1959—The Women's Protests" (Conference on the History of Opposition in South Africa, University of the Witwatersrand, 1978).
  66. Yawitch, "Natal 1959"; Walker, *Women and Resistance in South Africa*, 233.
  67. "Trouble in Natal," *Drum*, October 1959.
  68. Hendricks, "Loose Planning and Rapid Resettlement," 320–21.
  69. Leo Kuper, "Rights and Riots in Natal," *Africa South* 4, no. 2 (March 1960): 20–26.
  70. Epprecht, "This Matter of Women Is Getting Very Bad", 153.
  71. Bill Freund, "Confrontation and Social Change: Natal and the Forging of Apartheid, 1949–1972," in *Political Economy and Identities in KwaZulu-Natal*, ed. Robert Morrell (Durban: Indicator Press, 1996), 129–30.
  72. M. P. Naicker, "People's Upsurge in Natal," *New Age*, August 6, 1959; Bernard Magubane et al., "The Turn to Armed Struggle," in *The Road to Democracy in South Africa*, vol. 1, 1960–1970, by South African Democracy Education Trust (Cape Town: Zebra Press, 2004), 53–146.
  73. Inkosi Sikhosiphi Mdluli, interview with author and Thandeka Majola, KwaNyavu, July 17, 2013.
  74. "Bahlawulile omame baseMkhambathini," *Ilanga Lase Natal*, November 21, 1959.
  75. M. P. Naicker, "People's Revolt in Natal," *New Age*, August 20, 1959.
  76. "Kubuyekwezwa uthuthuva eMgungundlovu," *Ilanga Lase Natal*, August 29, 1959.
  77. "Abalahlwe icala lokubhidliza idiphu," *Ilanga Lase Natal*, August 22, 1959; "Indaba yamadiphu eMkhambathini," *Ilanga Lase Natal* August 22, 1959; M. P. Naicker, "We'd Rather Die Than Give In," *New Age*, August 27, 1959.
  78. Naicker, "People's Revolt in Natal."
  79. M. P. Naicker, "Batons, Gas Used on Women in Natal," *New Age*, September 3, 1959.

80. At a later 1959 Congress Alliance meeting in Durban that sought to harness the women's power, the gathering broke out in the song "Unzima Lomthwalo Sifuna Madoda." "The Burden Is Heavy, We Need the Men," *New Age*, September 10, 1959.
81. Correspondence between Camperdown NC and CNC, June 1948–1955, NAR, BAO 5/364, F54/1524/9.
82. PBAC to CBAC, September 22, 1960, BAO 5/364, F54/1524/9.
83. PBAC to CBAC, December 12, 1961, NAR, NTS 9013, 228/362.
84. PBAC to CBAC, June 15, 1962, NTS 8991, 211/362(9)(A).
85. PBAC to CBAC, July 28, 1964, BAO 5/364, F54/1524/9.
86. PBAC to CBAC, March 24, 1964, BAO 13/1022, J76/97/1524/7.
87. Correspondence between PBAC and CBAC, March–May 1964, BAO 13/1022, J76/97/1524/7.
88. "Nansi inkosi ethuthukayo," *Izindaba*, May 1967, National Library of South Africa.
89. CBAC to secretary, BAD, October 6, 1959, NTS 10261, 47/423(8).
90. PBAC to CBAC, December 29, 1959, NTS 7900, 3/337 Part 4.
91. Minutes of the meeting of the Maphumulo, September 20, 1961, BAO 5/363, F54/1524/5.
92. PBAC to CBAC, April 27, 1964, NAR, BAO 5/88, F53/1524/5.
93. PBAC to CBAC on bonus for acting Chief Khangela, 1963–1966, BAO 5/363, F54/1524/5.
94. PBAC to CBAC, April 17, 1967, BAO 13/1022, J76/97/1524/3.
95. PBAC to CBAC, May 2, 1968, UAR, Pietermaritzburg Magistrate and Commissioner 15, N2/7/3(35)1.
96. McIntosh, "State Policies in Rural South Africa," 162.
97. Statement of Aaron Mkhize, January 5, 1970, BAO 5/363, F54/1524/5.
98. Anne Kelk Mager and Maanda Mulaudzi, "Popular Responses to Apartheid: 1948–c. 1975," in *The Cambridge History of South Africa*, vol. 2, 1885–1994 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 383.
99. Correspondence between CBAC, assistant CBAC, and PBAC, January–February 1970, BAO 5/363, F54/1524/5.
100. Not surprisingly for a representative of a government obsessed with ethnicity, the assistant BAC mentioned that Mafakadolo's ethnicity may have played a factor in the disturbances. None of the witness statements attest to such. No record of the applications could be found in the Pietermaritzburg magisterial records, but C. J. Maphumulo did come to operate a beer hall on the Goedverwachting strip. Simanga Mkhize, interview with author and Thandeka Majola, KwaXimba, June 30, 2014.
101. Delius, "Sebatakgomo," 611–12.
102. "Two Govt. Supporters Murdered in Transkei," *New Age*, April 9, 1959.



103. Correspondence between CBAC, assistant CBAC, and PBAC, January–February 1970.
104. PBAC to CBAC, December 22, 1970, BAO 5/363, F54/1524/5.
105. The records indicate no inquiry ever took place but during the interim administration of the Maphumulo transferred to the Mpumalanga magistracy. This is gleaned from the BAD correspondence about the succession. During fieldwork, I was unable to fully access the records of the Mpumalanga magistrate, which are not held at the Archive Repositories but were transferred from the magistrate to the offices of the Department of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs. CBAC to PBAC, February 24, 1971, BAO 5/363, F54/1524/5.
106. On acreage and Gcumisa predominance, see NAR, NTS 293, 359/53.
107. Manyavu Tribal Authority, application for a site, April 21, 1969, NAR, BAO 1/2246, 49/1524/31/1; Maphumulo Tribal Authority, application for a site, November 11, 1968, BAO 1/2246, D49/1524/10/1.
108. PNC to SNA Account Section, September 3, 1955, NAR, NTS 11166, 211/362(9).
109. Proclamation of a levy of a special rate on the Manyavu Tribe, NAR, URU 3969, 2634; PBAC to CBAC, December 12, 1961, NAR, NTS 9013, 228/362; “Isicelo saseTable Mountain seClinic neSecondary,” *Ilanga laseNatal*, March 21, 1964; Ngangezwe Secondary School, NAR, BAO 1/2011, D48/1524/13/1.
110. Application for a School Site at Magongqo [*sic*] on the Farm Onverwacht: Table Mountain School Board, NAR, NTS 668, 2002/108.

## Chapter 6. Only the Fourth Chief: Ethnic Politics and Land Jurisdiction, 1971–1988

1. Gerhard Maré and Georgina Hamilton, *Appetite for Power: Buthelezi's Inkatha and South Africa* (Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1987), 36; Jabulani Sithole, “Neither Communists nor Saboteurs: KwaZulu Bantustan Politics,” in *The Road to Democracy in South Africa*, vol. 2, 1970–1980, by South African Democracy Education Trust (Pretoria: Unisa Press, 2006), 811–13.
2. Deborah Posel, *The Making of Apartheid, 1948–1961: Conflict and Compromise* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991), 228–31.
3. After the 1978 change, “African” replaced “Bantu” to describe black South Africans. The South African Bantu Trust became the South African Development Trust. Officials formerly called “commissioners” became “regional representatives.” Throughout, I use titles appropriate for the year.
4. Laurine Platzky, Cheryl Walker, and Surplus People Project, *The Surplus People: Forced Removals in South Africa* (Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1985), 9.

5. Platzky, Walker, and Surplus People Project, *The Surplus People*, 125.
6. Efforts to establish the Zulu Bantustan in the 1960s were frustrated by official uncertainty about the unifying power of Cyprian Bhekuzulu and whether more than one Bantustan would be needed to reflect historical political divides in the KwaZulu/Natal region. Ashley Parcells, "Zulus or Zulu Speakers?: History, Ethnicity, and the Boundaries of a 'Zulustan,' 1960–1963" (paper presented at the African Studies Association Annual Meeting, Washington, DC, December 2016).
7. Sithole, "Neither Communists nor Saboteurs," 806.
8. KwaZulu Wetgewende Vergadering. Politieke Strominge en Persoonlikhede, NAR, BAO, 8/419, 1974–1980.
9. Mzala, *Gatsha Buthelezi: Chief with a Double Agenda* (Zed Books, 1988), 122–23.
10. "Rain Brought the Mud . . . Politicians Did the Mud-Slinging," *Drum*, January 1, 1972, 23–28; Ben Temkin, *Buthelezi: A Biography* (London: Frank Cass, 2003), 124–25.
11. "Rain Brought the Mud"; D. A. Kotzé, *African Politics in South Africa, 1964–1974: Parties and Issues* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1975), 56.
12. Muriel Horrell, *The African Homelands of South Africa* (Johannesburg: South African Institute of Race Relations, 1973), 54; Maré and Hamilton, *Appetite for Power*, 41–42; Temkin, *Buthelezi*, 127–31; Robert Thabo Sabela, "KwaZulu Legislative Assembly" (MA thesis, University of Zululand, 1989), 25–26.
13. KwaZulu Executive Council Meeting, November 21, 1974, NAR, BAO 12/652, R218/5; Sithole, "Neither Communists nor Saboteurs," 827.
14. Roger Southall, "Buthelezi, Inkatha and the Politics of Compromise," *African Affairs* 80, no. 321 (1981): 459; Sithole, "Neither Communists nor Saboteurs."
15. Several places claim Ndaba was a former information officer of the BAD, but never with any evidence. In this example, Ndaba would not answer any personal questions so the reporter gave Ndaba's background on what s/he already knew. "Mix-Up in the Party," *Drum*, March 22, 1972, 14–17.
16. His journal should not be confused with that of the same name edited by Ronald Segal (1956 and 1960).
17. "Mix-Up in the Party"; Kotzé, *African Politics in South Africa*, 54; Mzala, *Chief with a Double Agenda*, 89–90.
18. Sithole, "Neither Communists nor Saboteurs," 828; Mzala, *Chief with a Double Agenda*, 90.
19. KZLA Verbatim Report, 3(1), May 1973, 77–80, APC, PCI26/1/1; Temkin, *Buthelezi*, 144–45.
20. Former intelligence agent Martin Dolincheck disclosed that BOSS established Umkhonto to deliberately discredit it and thereby boost Buthelezi. Dolincheck was implicated in the assassination of activist Rick Turner. He defected to the ANC in 1986 after an attempted

- coup in Seychelles. Peter Stiff, *Warfare by Other Means: South Africa in the 1980s and 1990s* (Alberton: Galago Publishers, 2001), 17–74; James Sanders, *Apartheid's Friends: The Rise and Fall of South Africa's Secret Service* (London: John Murray, 2006), 376; Laurence Piper and Brian Morrow, *To Serve and Protect: The Inkathagate Scandal* (Pretoria: Unisa Press, 2010), xv.
21. Constitution, Umkhonto ka Shaka, NAR, BAO 12/652, R218/5.
  22. "Chief Charles Hlengwa forms a new political party" (translated copy), BAO 12/652, R218/5.
  23. Mzala, *Chief with a Double Agenda*, 91; Ernst Johann Langner, "The Founding and Development of Inkatha Yenkululeko Yesizwe" (MA thesis, University of South Africa, 1983), 53.
  24. KZLA Verbatim Report, 2 (special), January 1973, APC, PCI26/1/1; KZLA Verbatim Report, 4(2), May 1974, PCI26/1/1; Director, Homeland Affairs to secretary, March 2, 1974, NAR, BAO 8/419, X218/3/1.
  25. Chief Alpheus Ngcobo to minister of Bantu administration, December 13, 1973, NAR, BAO 12/652, R218/5.
  26. Buthelezi would exploit this ANC link for years to come. Temkin, *Buthelezi*, 141; Mzala, *Chief with a Double Agenda*, 122–28.
  27. Maré and Hamilton, *Appetite for Power*, 59–60.
  28. Langner, "The Founding and Development of Inkatha," 169–71.
  29. News of the new party and its nighttime Ndaleni meeting made front-page headlines in *Ilanga* for several weeks and sparked letters of support for Buthelezi. "uChief Maphumulo uchaza azokwenza," *Ilanga*, December 31, 1975.
  30. KZLA Verbatim Report of the KZLA, 7 (Special) (January 1976), 972–75, APC, PCI26/1/1.
  31. Verbatim Report of the KZLA, 7 (Special), 999–1016.
  32. Verbatim Report of the KZLA, 7 (Special), 1034–37.
  33. Record of the proceedings into the conduction of Chief Mhlabunzima Joseph Maphumulo, Enquiry in Terms of Section 11(1) of KwaZulu Act No 8 of 1974, NAR, SON 836, D10/3/9/2/969.
  34. KwaZulu Government Department of Chief Minister and Finance, memorandum to the cabinet: misconduct: Chief Mhlabunzima Maphumulo, January 12, 1978, NAR, BAO 5/363, F54/1524/5.
  35. Resolutions adopted by the cabinet of the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly, January 24, 1978, UAR, Ex-KwaZulu Cabinet Memos and Minutes, 1978.
  36. Thobekile Maphumulo, interview with author and Thandeka Majola, Mhkambathini, February 8, 2011; Zinsizwa Dlomo, interview with author, Thandeka Majola, and

- Thandokuhle Maphumulo, Eastwood, July 24, 2013; and Siphwe Thusi, interview with author, Johannesburg, July 2, 2014.
37. "Inkosi yamaZulu eqembini elisha," *Ilanga*, December 12, 1975; Statement of Mhlabunzima Joseph Maphumulo, December 15, 1976, NAR, SON 836, D10/3/9/2/969.
  38. Simon Mbokazi, "The Role of Bhekuzulu College in the Training of Chiefs and Headmen in KwaZulu," *Africanus* 7, no. 1–2 (1977): 21–32.
  39. Timothy Gibbs, *Mandela's Kinsmen: Nationalist Elites & Apartheid's First Bantustan* (Johannesburg: Jacana, 2014).
  40. The KDC was a KZLA development agency through which KwaZulu made loans. Application for a site: Mhlabunzima Joseph Maphumulo, PAR, DDA 397, (36)N2/4/3/8.
  41. Maré and Hamilton, *Appetite for Power*, 108–13.
  42. Langner, "The Founding and Development of Inkatha," 169–71.
  43. Sithole, "Neither Communists nor Saboteurs," 832.
  44. "Contralesa Chief Hits Back," *New African*, November 26, 1989; Maphumulo in Langner, "The Founding and Development of Inkatha," 171.
  45. South African Institute of Race Relations, *Survey of Race Relations in South Africa 1978* (Johannesburg: South African Institute of Race Relations, 1979), 291–92.
  46. KwaZulu Government Service, appointment of Kwenzokuhle Hamilton Maphumulo, BAO 5/363, F54/1524/5; Memo to the Chief Minister on Chief Mhlabunzima Maphumulo: Suspension, April 6, 1978, UAR, Ex-KwaZulu Cabinet Memos and Minutes, 1978; Resolutions of cabinet adopted at meeting on August 22, 1978, UAR, Ex-KwaZulu Cabinet Memos and Minutes, 1978.
  47. KwaZulu government service to the cabinet, Chief Mhlabunzima Maphumulo, 1980, NAR, SON 836, D10/3/9/2/969.
  48. KwaZulu government service to the cabinet, Chief Mhlabunzima Maphumulo.
  49. "Rebel Chief Bans Inkatha Gathering," *Sunday Post*, March 16, 1980.
  50. "Chief Hits Back at Gatsha for Inkatha Rally Attack," *Rand Daily Mail*, April 21, 1980.
  51. KZLA Verbatim Report, 18(3) (April–May 1980), 64–69, PCI26/1/1.
  52. KZLA Verbatim Report, 18(3), 115–17.
  53. KZLA Verbatim Report, 18(3), 191–206.
  54. Maré and Hamilton, *Appetite for Power*; Daphna Golan, "Inkatha and Its Use of the Zulu Past," *History in Africa* 18 (1991): 113–26; Thembisa Waetjen, *Workers and Warriors: Masculinity and the Struggle for Nation in South Africa* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2004).
  55. KZLA Verbatim Report, 18(3), 191–206.
  56. Pietermaritzburg BAC to CBAC, April 15, 1959, NAR, UAR, COGTA 74, N11/1/2(35).

57. Field notes, conversation with Neil Raw, July 16, 2013.
58. KZLA Verbatim Report, 20(3) (May–June 1980), 1153–61, APC, PC126/1/1.
59. “Rebel Chief Bows to Inkatha,” *NWE*, August 14, 1980.
60. “Chief Whip ‘Floored,’” *NWE*, August 18, 1983; “Stones Fly in Poll Flight,” *NWE*, September, 8, 1983; Khaba Mkhize, “Inkatha Disunity—MPs Accused,” *NWE*, August 25, 1983.
61. Biographical file on Mhlabunzima Maphumulo, CAMP, Karis–Gerhart Collection, Reel 92.
62. KZLA Verbatim Report, 30(1) (October 1983), APC, PC126/1/1.
63. Robert McIntosh, “State Policies in Rural South Africa c. 1948–c. 1960: Bantu Authorities, Policy Formation and Local Responses” (PhD dissertation, School of Oriental and Asian Studies, University of London, 1999), 191.
64. CBAC to PBAC, April 5, 1963, UAR, COGTA 147, N11/1/3/1(35)10.
65. CBAC to PBAC, November 6, 1969, UAR, Pietermaritzburg 15, N2/7/3(35)G1.
66. Surplus People Project, *Forced Removals in South Africa*, vol. 4, *Natal* (Cape Town: Surplus People Project, 1983), xii and 61.
67. Regional director to CBAC, December 14, 1977, NAR, BAO 20/550, H128/15/2016/14. Funds were made available for all tribal authorities to construct courthouses as early as 1964, but NAD would not disperse grants until authorities raised matching funds. By 1967, the Maphumulo TA had collected no matching funds and the CBAC recommended the authority build a smaller courthouse with the R900 grant. No evidence exists to suggest the court was built prior to 1975, when the Permission to Occupy for the court and Maphumulo’s homestead was granted. CBAC to PBAC, November 2, 1967, NAR, BAO 13/1022, J76/97/1524/3.
68. Mpumalanga magistrate to department of chief minister, May 4, 1979, PAR, DDA 383, (36)N2/7/3/8.
69. Tholi Hlela, interview with author and Thandeka Majola, Mbambangalo, March 25, 2011.
70. Ntombinazi Zakwe, interview with author and Thandeka Majola, Mbambangalo, March 25, 2011.
71. Platzky, Walker, and Surplus People Project, *The Surplus People*, 30–32.
72. Maningi and Zabazendoda Mbokazi, interview with author and Thandeka Majola, Haniville, June 21, 2011.
73. The trust purchased Raw’s Sub A of Goedverwaching from his estate in 1984, but complaints from the Baynesdrift farmers continued for years. Notes of a phone call from Mpumalanga magistrate, August 30, 1978, PAR, DDA 383, (36)N2/7/3/8; Regional director to PBAC, PAR, DDA 383, (36)N2/7/3/8; Land Register for Goedverwaching 1349, Deeds Registry, Department of Rural Development and Land Reform, KwaZulu-Natal.

74. Abasembo tribe to Pietermaritzburg DCD commissioner, May 15, 1984, PAR, DDA 390, (36)N1/1/3/3.
75. Mpumalanga magistrate to department of chief minister, May 4, 1979, PAR, DDA 383 (36)N2/7/3/8.
76. KZLA Verbatim Report, 8(2) (May 1976).
77. Chief commissioner Natal, memorandum, October 17, 1979, PAR, DDA 383, (36)N2/7/3/8.
78. Chief commissioner Natal to secretary cooperation and development, January 23, 1980, PAR, DDA 383, (36)N2/7/3/8.
79. Commissioner DCD to Natal chief commissioner, January 28, 1980, PAR, DDA 383, (36)N2/11/3; Motivering, Goedverwachting, Pietermaritzburg, DDA 386, (36)N2/11/3.
80. Chief commissioner Pietermaritzburg, notes, n.d., PAR, DDA 383, (36)N2/7/3/8.
81. Natal chief commissioner to Director DCD, December 5, 1980, PAR, BAO 5/363, F54/1524/5.
82. Correspondence between M.P. Pretorius and D. Varty, July–November 1987, PAR, DDA 393. (36)N2/11/3.
83. Director DCD to chief commissioner Natal, May 24, 1982, PAR, DDA 386, (36)N2/11/3.
84. Pietermaritzburg commissioner to chief commissioner Natal, October 19, 1982, PAR, DDA 386, (36)N2/11/3.
85. Chief Maphumulo to Pietermaritzburg commissioner, December 2, 1985, PAR, DDA 391 (36)N2/7/2.
86. DCD commissioner to Natal chief commissioner, February 19, 1985, NAR, BAO 5/88, F53/1524/5.
87. William Beinart, "Beyond 'Homelands': Some Ideas about the History of African Rural Areas in South Africa," *South African Historical Journal* 64, no. 1 (2012): 13.
88. Lakela Khaunda, "Tap Water Plan for Table Mountain," *NWE*, August 1989, Thobekile Maphumulo Papers.
89. The nearest hospital for Africans was forty kilometers away in Edendale and this trip would take three buses for the Goedverwachting residents to get there, an expense few could afford. Pietermaritzburg commissioner DCD to chief commissioner DCD Natal, October 22, 1980, PAR, DDA 383, (36)N2/7/3/8; Mpumalanga magistrate to Pietermaritzburg commissioner DCD, PAR, DDA 386 (36)N2/11/3.
90. Pietermaritzburg commissioner DCD to chief commissioner DCD Natal, October 7, 1981, PAR, DDA 386 (36)N2/11.
91. Chief commissioner Natal DCD to director general DCD, July 27, 1981, PAR, DDA 389, (36)N2/7/2.
92. Regional representative, Natal DDA, to district representative, Pietermaritzburg, June 5, 1986, PAR, DDA 397, (36)N2/4/3/8.

93. Khaba Mkhize, "Chiefs Make Peace," *NWE*, November 22, 1984.
94. Mhlabunzima Maphumulo, "My View: Apartheid's to Blame," *NW*, December 15, 1987.
95. Buthelezi, official opening of the Maphumulo administration offices and courthouse and the Maguzu clinic, December 11, 1987, APC, PCI26/2/1/15.
96. Eunice Dladla, interview with author and Thandeka Majola, Mbambangalo, March 7, 2011.
97. Japhet Madlala, interview with author and Thandokuhule Maphumulo, Pietermaritzburg, July 25, 2013.
98. Oral history interviews suggest Mkhize was not the only headman allocating sites; several also mention Dotsheni Gwala and Albert Madlala and that the fee was never as high as R200.
99. District representative Department of Home Affairs to Magistrate Mpumalanga, April 15, 1987; Magistrate Mpumalanga to District Representative Department of Home Affairs, May 15, 1987, COGTA, copies in author's possession.
100. Balothi Goge, interview with author and Thandeka Majola, Mbambangalo, March 4, 2011.
101. Mantombi Manyoni, interview with author and Thandeka Majola, Haniville, August 8, 2011.
102. R232/1986. Government gazette No.10560, Vol 258. December 24, 1986; Notes, D. Varty to M.P. Pretorius, April 22, 1987, PAR, DDA 393, (36)N2/11/3.
103. Chief commissioner Natal to commissioner Pietermaritzburg, July 4, 1983, PAR, DDA 386, (36)N2/11/3.
104. Chief Maphumulo memorandum, October 22, 1982, PAR, DDA 386, (36)N2/11/3.
105. Bangubukhosi Mdluli to Mpumalanga magistrate, November 29, 1986, COGTA, copy in author's possession.
106. Bangubukhosi Mdluli to Mpumalanga magistrate, April 7, 1987, PAR, DDA 393, (36) N2/11/3.
107. Albertina Ndimande, interview with author and Thandeka Majola, Haniville, June 21, 2011.
108. Simanga Mkhize, interview with author and Thandeka Majola, KwaXimba, June 18, 2014.
109. Baningi Maphumulo and Bernard Mkhize, interview with author and Thandeka Majola, Mbambangalo, January 31, 2011.
110. Mpumalanga magistrate to the secretary, Department of Interior, November 25, 1988, COGTA, copy in author's possession.
111. Regional representative Natal, to Chief Mdluli, August 10, 1987, PAR, DDA 393, (36) N2/11/3.
112. Mpumalanga magistrate to the secretary, Department of Interior.

113. Fields notes from meeting with Bhekani L. Shabalala, general manager, traditional affairs branch, COGTA, Pietermaritzburg, August 3, 2011.
114. Fred Kockett, "Maqongqo: Looking for Answers in the Ashes," *NW*, March 1990; *Inkosi Nhlakanipho Maphumulo*, interview with author and Thandeka Majola, Mbambangalo, January 27, 2011.

### **Chapter 7. Because My People Are in the MDM, I Have to Be with Them: Ethnic and African Nationalist Politics during Civil War, 1983–1990**

1. Mary de Haas, "Violence in Natal and Zululand: The 1980s," in *The Road to Democracy in South Africa*, vol. 6, 1990–1996, by South African Democracy Education Trust (Pretoria: Unisa Press, 2013), 95.
2. Truth and Reconciliation Commission, *The Report of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission*, vol. 3, *Regional Profiles* (London: Macmillan, 1999), 157–58.
3. Gerhard Maré and Georgina Hamilton, *Appetite for Power: Buthelezi's Inkatha and South Africa* (Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1987); Mike Morris and Doug Hindson, "South Africa: Political Violence, Reform and Reconstruction," *Review of African Political Economy* 19, no. 53 (1992): 43–59; Gerhard Maré, *Brothers Born of Warrior Blood: Politics and Ethnicity in South Africa* (Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1992); Anthony Minnaar, ed., *Patterns of Violence: Case Studies of Conflict in Natal* (Pretoria: Human Sciences Research Council, 1992); Lauren Segal, "The Human Face of Violence: Hostel Dwellers Speak," *Journal of Southern African Studies* 18, no. 1 (1992): 190–231; Ari Sitas, "The Making of the 'Comrades' Movement in Natal, 1985–91," *Journal of Southern African Studies* 18, no. 3 (1992): 629–41; Thembisa Waetjen, *Workers and Warriors: Masculinity and the Struggle for Nation in South Africa* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2004); Mario Krämer, *Violence as Routine: Transformations of Local-Level Politics and the Disjunction between Centre and Periphery in KwaZulu-Natal (South Africa)* (Cologne: Rüdiger Köppe, 2007); Laurence Piper and Brian Morrow, *To Serve and Protect: The Inkathagate Scandal* (Pretoria: Unisa Press, 2010); Jabulani Sithole, "The Inkatha Freedom Party and the Multiparty Negotiations," in *The Road to Democracy in South Africa*, vol. 6, 1990–1996, by South African Democracy Education Trust (Pretoria: Unisa Press, 2013), 837–75; John Aitchison, *Numbering the Dead: The Course and Pattern of Political Violence in the Natal Midlands, 1987–1989* (Pietermaritzburg: Natal Society Foundation, 2015).
4. Jason Hickel, *Democracy as Death: The Moral Order of Anti-Liberal Politics in South Africa* (Oakland: University of California Press, 2015).
5. Jeremy Seekings, *The UDF: A History of the United Democratic Front in South Africa, 1983–1991* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2000); Bernard Magubane, "The Crisis of the



- Garrison State,” in *The Road to Democracy in South Africa*, vol. 4, 1980–1990, by South African Democracy Education Trust (Pretoria: Unisa Press, 2010), 48–49.
6. Jackie Dugard, “Low-Intensity Conflict,” in *The Role of Political Violence in South Africa’s Democratisation*, ed. Ran Greenstein (Johannesburg: Community Agency for Social Enquiry, 2003), 18–20.
  7. Mzala (Jabulani Nxumalo), *Gatsha Buthelezi: Chief with a Double Agenda* (London: Zed Books, 1988), 127; Ben Temkin, *Buthelezi: A Biography* (London: Frank Cass, 1976), 207–8.
  8. Jabulani Sithole, “Neither Communists nor Saboteurs: KwaZulu Bantustan Politics,” in *The Road to Democracy in South Africa*, vol. 2, 1970–1980, by South African Democracy Education Trust (Pretoria: Unisa Press, 2006), 840.
  9. Howard Varney, “The Caprivi Trainees,” submission to the Human Rights Violation Committee of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, August 4, 1997, <http://www.justice.gov.za/trc/hrvtrans/submit/caprivi.htm>.
  10. Truth and Reconciliation Commission, *The Report of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission*, vol. 6 (Cape Town: Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 2003), 582–83; Piper and Morrow, *To Serve and Protect*.
  11. These local leaders became notorious for their ruthless manipulation of land and resources and complex systems of patronage and clientalism. Much has been made about whether to apply the term “warlord” to these strongmen, an ideological concern about stereotypes of inherently violent African men. But the term long has been used loosely to designate “a local military commander who has acquired some civil powers and uses them by force” and has historically been used in a vast array of situations, including China in the 1910s. The term incorporates a wide variability of types in South Africa, from the urban town councilor, to rural traditional leaders, hitmen, and squatterlords. More problematically, the term in South Africa is too often applied to Inkatha-allied men in opposition to leaders of ANC/UDF-allied youth organizations when there was also a vulnerability of local ANC leaders to warlord tendencies. Colin Darch, “Are There Warlords in Provincial Mozambique? Questions of the Social Base of MNR Banditry,” *Review of African Political Economy* 45/46 (1989): 34–49; Morris Szeftel, “Editorial: Warlords and Problems of Democracy in Africa,” *Review of African Political Economy* 45/46 (1989): 3–6; Matthew Kentridge, *An Unofficial War: Inside the Conflict in Pietermaritzburg* (Cape Town: David Philip Publishers, 1990); Anthony Minnaar, “Undisputed Kings’: Warlordism in Natal,” in *Patterns of Violence: Case Studies of Conflict in Natal* (Pretoria: Human Sciences Research Council, 1992), 61–94; Morris and Hindson, “South Africa”; William Reno, *Warlord Politics and African States* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998).

12. Truth and Reconciliation Commission, *The Report of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission*, vol. 3, *Regional Profiles* (Cape Town: Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 1999), 219–28.
13. Jabulani Sithole, “The ANC Underground, Armed Actions and Popular Resistance in Pietermaritzburg and the Surrounding Natal Midlands Townships,” in *The Road to Democracy in South Africa*, vol. 4, 1980–1990, by South African Democracy Education Trust (Pretoria: Unisa Press, 2010), 224.
14. *Report of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission*, vol. 3, 238–39.
15. Nkosinathi Gwala, “Political Violence and the Struggle for Control in Pietermaritzburg,” *Journal of Southern African Studies* 15, no. 3 (1989): 506–24; Aitchison, *Numbering the Dead*.
16. Sitas, “The Making of the ‘Comrades.’”
17. Sithole, “The ANC Underground,” 261–69.
18. The TRC found that Gwala functioned as a self-styled ANC warlord, facilitating a climate in which gross human rights violations could take place. *Report of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission*, vol. 3, 214–15.
19. Kentridge, *An Unofficial War*, 18.
20. Hickel, *Democracy as Death*, 3.
21. The chapter focuses on the actions of Mhlabunzima and his followers, for the Nyavu were initially embroiled in the war on their eastern boundaries with the Ximba. The Nyavu chief and his followers had not ceased to see the entire region as the place of their ancestors denied to them by colonial and apartheid rule, and in 1989 claimed the land lost to them by the Ximba (actions outside of the scope of this book). Only in early 1990 did the Nyavu begin to use the civil war as a way to contest the land onto which Mhlabunzima began to settle refugees who had *khonza’d* him.
22. Bernard Magubane, “The Collapse of the Garrison State,” in *The Road to Democracy in South Africa*, vol. 4, 1980–1990, by South African Democracy Education Trust (Pretoria: Unisa Press, 2010), 1630.
23. There was also a contemporary debate about calling the people forced from their homes “refugees” versus “internally displaced people.” The violence was described as “unrest” rather than “war”; therefore, there could not be “refugees” that might require institutional support from the local government. Wendy Leeb, “Death, Devastation, and Destruction—Refugees in Natal,” n.d., APC, PC14/2/5/2; Aitchison, *Numbering the Dead*, 76.
24. Aitchison, *Numbering the Dead*, 110.
25. Thobile Ngcobo, interview with author and Thandeka Majola, Mbubu, January 17, 2011.

26. Phyllis Ngubane, interview with author and Thandeka Majola, Mbambangalo, May 26, 2011.
27. Siphwe Maphumulo, group interview with author, Thandeka Majola, and Thandokuhle Maphumulo, Mbambangalo, July 24, 2013.
28. "Maqongqo Chief to Ask for More Land to Accommodate Refugees," *NW*, August 9, 1989; Aitchison, *Numbering the Dead*, 34.
29. Zinsizwa Dlomo, interview with author, Thandeka Majola, and Thandokuhle Maphumulo, Eastwood, July 24, 2013.
30. Lakela Kaunda, "Inkatha 'Recruitment' Drive in Maqongqo Worries Chief," *NWE*, April 6, 1989.
31. "Maphumulo—the 'Peacemaker,'" *New African*, April 17, 1989; "Maqongqo Chief to Ask for More Land to Accommodate Refugees," *NW*, October 13, 1988; "Local Chief Offers Refuge to All on a Non-political Basis," *NWE*, October 13, 1988.
32. "Maqongqo Chief to Ask for More Land to Accommodate Refugees," *NW*, October 13, 1988.
33. "New Peace Initiative for City's Townships," *NW*, August 9, 1988; Wyndham Hartley, "The Resurgence of Violence," *NW*, August 12, 1988.
34. Fred Kockett, "Cosatu, Inkatha Leaders Meet at Chief's Party," *NW*, October 10, 1988.
35. On Mpumalanga, see Debby Bonnin, "Space, Place and Identity: Political Violence in Mpumalanga Township, KwaZulu-Natal, 1987–1993" (PhD dissertation, University of Witwatersrand, 2007).
36. "Meeting over Violence Postponed," *NM*, October 22, 1988; "Mpumalanga Meeting on Violence," *NW*, November 16, 1988; Khaba Mkhize, "Mpumalanga Magistrate Flees Home after Death Threat," *NWE*, June 15, 1989.
37. "Unrest Inquiry Refused," *NW*, March 4, 1989; Bryan Pearson, "Collusion Claim: Pressure Grows," *NW*, March 31, 1989.
38. Quraish Patel, "Rebel Chief," *ST*, April 16, 1989. Maphumulo's use of "umbrella" is particularly interesting given his connection with the amaNazaretha church, where black umbrellas became part of the Shembe uniform.
39. Petition to State President from Mhlabunzima Maphumulo, April 7, 1989, in KZLA Verbatim Report, 5(2), April 1989.
40. Ann Skelton, correspondence with the author, February 8, 2011.
41. Quraish Patel, "Natal Midlands Townships in Middle of 'Bloody Civil War,'" *ST*, April 9, 1989.
42. "Local Chief Offers Refuge to All" and "Death Threats Force Chief Maphumulo to Hire Guards," *NWE*, October 27, 1988; Anonymous, interview with author and Thandokuhle

- Maphumulo, Eastwood, June 17, 2014; Bheki Radebe, interview with Liz Timbs, Pietermaritzburg, July 23, 2014.
43. Fred Kockett, "Chief Fears Buthelezi May Strip Him of His Title," *NW*, November 23, 1988; "Death Threats"; Verbatim Report of the First Session of the Fifth KwaZulu Legislative Assembly, April 7, 1989.
  44. "Chief Maphumulo's Authority Questioned," *DN*, April 11, 1989; "No KwaZulu Members Back Chief's Appeal," *NW*, April 15, 1989; "Maphumulo—the 'Peacemaker,'" *New African*, April 17, 1989. For Buthelezi's point-by-point rebuttal and KZLA critique of the petition, see Verbatim Report of the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly, Vol. 51, April 10–13, 1989.
  45. Lakela Kaunda, "No Response to Chief's Petition on Natal Violence," *NWE*, April 13, 1989; "Peacekeeper Not Surprised at Attack," *NW*, April 19, 1989.
  46. Ineke van Kessel, *Beyond Our Wildest Dreams: The United Democratic Front and the Transformation of South Africa* (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 2000), 76–85.
  47. Van Kessel, *Beyond Our Wildest Dreams*, 83; Paul Holden and Sello Mathabatha, "The Politics of Resistance: 1948–1990," in *Mpumalanga: History and Heritage* (Scottsville: University of KwaZulu-Natal Press, 2007), 427–29.
  48. Cited in Gregory Houston, "The ANC's Internal Underground Political Work in the 1980s," in *The Road to Democracy in South Africa*, vol. 4, 1980–1990, by South African Democracy Education Trust (Pretoria: Unisa Press, 2010), 182.
  49. Despite its Bantu Education mission, that the alumni of Bhekuzulu turned against the apartheid regime should not be surprising. The school was riven by resistance after 1976. Sphiwe Thusi, interview with author, Johannesburg, July 1, 2014; Jill E. Kelly, "Bantustan Biography: The Making of a 'Rebel Chief' in KwaZulu, 1973–1991" (paper presented at African Studies Association Annual Meeting, Washington, DC, December 2016).
  50. Jabulani Sithole, correspondence with the author, 2011.
  51. "Interview with Chief Maphumulo."
  52. Timothy Gibbs, *Mandela's Kinsmen: Nationalist Elites & Apartheid's First Bantustan* (Johannesburg: Jacana, 2014), 161.
  53. Minutes of the Meeting to Elect Interim Committee, Nkosi S. P. Holomisa, *A Double-Edged Sword: A Quest for a Place in the African Sun: Archival Records on the Formation and Missions of the Congress of Traditional Leaders of South Africa* (Cape Town: Real African Publishers, 2011), 4–13.
  54. Interim Committee Meeting: Laying Down Policies and Procedures of Contralesa, June 24, 1989, Johannesburg Hotel; Meetings with Regional Chiefs: A Report: Contralesa meeting with Ciskeian Chiefs at Horseshoe Motel on November 12, 1989, in Holomisa, *A Double-Edged Sword*, 5–13; Tor Sellström, *Sweden and National Liberation in Southern*

- Africa*, vol. 2 (Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, 2002), 743.
55. Hugh MacMillan, *The Lusaka Years: The ANC in Exile in Zambia, 1963–1994*, 2013, 204–17.
  56. This event depicted from two undated newspaper clippings in the private collection of Thobekile Maphumulo. Kaunda, “ANC Delegates Forget Protocol When They Meet the Amakhosi,” *NWE*; Kaunda, “Traditional Leaders Have a Role in the Struggle.”
  57. O. R. Tambo, Political Report on the National Executive Committee to the National Consultative Conference of the African National Congress, June 17, 1985, Kabwe, Zambia, <http://www.anc.org.za>.
  58. ANC, Second National Consultative Conference: Report, Main Decisions and Recommendations, 1985, <http://www.anc.org.za>.
  59. ANC, Constitutional Guidelines for a Democratic South Africa, Lusaka, August 1988, in Gail M. Gerhart and Clive L. Glaser, *From Protest to Challenge: A Documentary History of African Politics in South Africa, 1882–1990*, vol. 6, *Challenge and Victory, 1980–1990* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2010), 656.
  60. Jason Conrad Myers, *Indirect Rule in South Africa: Tradition, Modernity, and the Costuming of Political Power* (Rochester: University of Rochester Press, 2008), 68.
  61. “KwaZulu: Who Else Cannot Support Them?,” *Mayibuye* 6, 1989. ANC and Contralesa, Congress of Traditional Chiefs and the ANC’s Appeal to All Traditional Leaders of South Africa, <http://www.anc.org.za>.
  62. Sources do not agree on whether this was Dumezweni Zimu, who was recruited by Bheki Mlangeni at the University of Witwatersrand and was sent to Natal, where he worked with Harry Gwala and Siphoc Gabashe—both of whom knew Mhlabunzima through Contralesa/UDF. On Dumezweni, Sithole, “The ANC Underground.”
  63. Mzamo Thabani Mlaba, amnesty testimony to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Durban, November 30, 1998, [http://www.justice.gov.za/trc/amntrans%5C1998/9811241202\\_dbn\\_981130db.htm](http://www.justice.gov.za/trc/amntrans%5C1998/9811241202_dbn_981130db.htm); Gibbs, *Mandela’s Kinsmen*, 131–50; Tim Gibbs, “Chris Hani’s ‘Country Bumpkins’: Regional Networks in the African National Congress Underground, 1974–1994,” *Journal of Southern African Studies* 37, no. 4 (2011): 689; Thula Simpson, *Umkhonto We Sizwe: The ANC’s Armed Struggle* (Cape Town: Penguin Random House South Africa, 2016), 475–78.
  64. Zibuse Mlaba, interview with author and Thandokuhle Maphumulo, Pietermaritzburg, June 5, 2014.
  65. Thusi interview.
  66. “Chief Maphumulo’s Absence at Meeting Angers King,” *NWE*, September 21, 1989.
  67. Thusi interview.
  68. Address by Mangosuthu G. Buthelezi at meeting with the *amakhosi* of KwaZulu, Ulundi,

- September 14, 1989, APC, PCI26/2/1/17; Carmel Rickard, "Buthelezi Blasts the Chief Who Brought Peace," *WM*, September 15–21, 1989.
69. Carmel Rickard, "Me Go to Hell? Hell No, Says Contralesa's Defiant Maphumulo," *WM*, October 6, 1989.
  70. Chief Molefe attributed tension to not only his Contralesa membership, but also to "ethnic hostility" because Molefe claimed his people were not "ethnic Zulus," but descendants of Basothos who had fought against the Zulu in the Anglo-Zulu War. Fred Kockett, "Regional Peace Talks Put on Hold by Inkatha," *NW*, September 25, 1989; "Suspension Challenged," *NW*, October 7, 1989; Carmel Rickard, "Contralesa Chief Stripped of Title by Buthelezi to Take Court Action," *NW*, October 19, 1989; *Survey of Race Relations in South Africa 1979* (Johannesburg: South African Institute of Race Relations, 1980), 323.
  71. "Contralesa under Fire from Zulu King Again," *NW*, November 22, 1989; Carmel Rickard, "Congress Wins More Members," *WM*, October 6, 1989; Carmel Rickard, "Home of Zulu Prince Attacked by Arsonists," *NW*, November 15, 1989; "Contralesa Chief Hits Back," *NA*, November 20, 1989.
  72. Sam Sole, "Man of Peace," *ST*, October 8, 1989; Khaba Mkhize, "Mandela Message Prepared for Contralesa Rally," *NWE*, November 30, 1989.
  73. "DDA Explains Why Contralesa Had to Pay for Hire of Stadium," *NWE*, December 21, 1989; Christelle de Jager, "Man Killed as Police Break Up Edendale Rally," *NW*, December 4, 1989; Nicola Cunningham-Brown, "Organisers Say Rally Violence Unnecessary," *NM*, December 5, 1989.
  74. "Contralesa Walk out of Vlok Peace Talks," *DN*, January 25, 1990.
  75. Report on On-going Violence by Chief Maphumulo, June 11, 1989, in Holomisa, *A Double-Edged Sword*, 10.
  76. "Chiefs Set up Commission of Inquiry into Killings," *NW*, December 2, 1989.
  77. Inkosi Phatekile Holomisa, interview with author, Mthatha, July 10, 2015; R.S. Douglas to Pat Pillay & Company, February 8, 1990, Thobekile Maphumulo Private Papers.
  78. "Mpumalanga Peace 'Not Permanent,'" *DN*, December 13, 1989; "Former Inkatha Man Gives Evidence," *DN*, December 15, 1989; "Lecturer Explains Natal Violence," *DN*, February 8, 1990; "Violence Started with Squatters," *DN*, February 22, 1990; "Claims Made at Douglas Inquiry Denied," *DN*, February 22, 1990; "Woman Tells Commission How Violence Erupted," *DN*, March 2, 1990.
  79. R. S. Douglas to J. Friedman, n.d., Thobekile Maphumulo Private Papers.
  80. "Natal Violence Focus in Geneva," *NM*, March 23, 1990; "Contralesa: Talks with Buthelezi 'Doubtful.'" *NW*, April 9, 1990; "Inkatha Responds to Contralesa," *NW*, April 10, 1990;

- Heidi Gibson, "International Commission of Jurists to Probe Natal Violence," *NWE*, April 12, 1990; Mzala, "The Violence in Natal," *NW*, May 3, 1990; International Commission of Jurists, *Signposts to Peace: An Independent Survey of the Violence in Natal, South Africa* (Geneva: International Commission of Jurists, 1990).
81. Douglas wrote to Buthelezi in 1991 about the commission's premature end, cryptically suggesting intrigue that Buthelezi would want to know. While all accounts of the 1989–1990 commission suggest Douglas's impartiality, the International Freedom Foundation, an apartheid-funded international organization close to Inkatha, appointed him in 1992 to investigate human rights abuses by the ANC and SACP in exile. It is unclear whether Douglas knew this, but the IFF was a pro-capitalist lobby with board members such as U.S. Senator Jesse Helms and British MP George Gardiner, created by the SA Military Intelligence to campaign against the ANC. R. S. Douglas to Buthelezi, April 4, 1991, UAR, Ex-KwaZulu Cabinet Memos and Minutes, 1990; Philip van Niekerk, "How Apartheid Conned the West," *The Observer*, July 16, 1995; C. D. Schutte, Ian Liebenberg, and Anthony Minnaar, *The Hidden Hand: Covert Operations in South Africa* (Pretoria: Human Sciences Research Council, 1998), 341; Paul Trewhela, *Inside Quatro: Uncovering the Exile History of the ANC and SWAPO* (Auckland Park: Jacana Media, 2009), 83–86.
  82. Press Statement on the National Conference of Contralesa, September 1990 and First National Executive Committee Meeting of Contralesa held at the Contralesa Offices on October 27, 1990, in Holomisa, *A Double-Edged Sword*, 28–32; Sellström, *Sweden and National Liberation in Southern Africa*, 2:749.
  83. In the wake of his assassination, the money was distributed to his family. Phatekile Holomisa suggested the organization dropped the matter to emphasize his role in the anti-apartheid struggle. Estate file of Mhlabunzima Joseph Maphumulo, Mpumalanga Magistrate, 12/5/2, 110/91; Holomisa interview.
  84. Mlaba interview; Thusi interview.
  85. Zodumo Dlomo in group interview, July 24, 2013.
  86. PBAC to CBAC, March 11, 1970, PAR, BAO 5/363, F54/1524/5.
  87. Siphwe Maphumulo in group interview.
  88. "Eviction by Inkatha Chief Feared," *NW*, September 30, 1989.
  89. It is difficult to tell from the quoted sources who was part of this decision attributed to "tribe" here. Several interviewed suggested that Mhlabunzima was holding a meeting for the chieftdom when he heard of the Ndlovu meeting at the school. Report on the alleged misappropriation of public funds: Maphumulo tribal area, n.d., UAR, Ex-KwaZulu Cabinet Agenda and Minutes, 1990; field notes, June 30, 2014; Siphwe Maphumulo in group interview.

90. Report on the alleged misappropriation of public funds: Maphumulo tribal area.
91. Bheka Ntshangase, "Brave Enough to Build Bridges through Dialogue: The Case of Chief Zibuse Mlaba," The Synergos Institute (2003); Jo Beall and Mduzuzi Ngonyama, "Indigenous Institutions, Traditional Leaders and Elite Coalitions for Development: The Case of Greater Durban, South Africa," *African Centre for Cities: Crisis States Working Papers Series No. 2* (2009).
92. Molefe received notice to attend a KwaZulu cabinet meeting in April 1989. Given his Contralesa membership and the assassination of his ANC/UDF-affiliated son, Sechaba Thobang Molefe, the chief chose not to attend. While there is no doubt of Molefe's guilt regarding one of the charges, a second charge of improper behavior was more complicated and was no doubt pursued on account of Buthelezi's vendetta against Contralesa-affiliated chiefs. Original emphasis. Inquiry proceedings into a charge of misconduct against Inkosi Elphas Molefe, April–July, 1990, UAR, Ex-KwaZulu Cabinet Memos and Minutes, 1990; Memorandum to the cabinet from the department of the chief minister, misconduct inquiry: Inkosi Elphas Molefe, October 29, 1990; "Nquthu Chief Suspended from Duty," *NW*, September 21, 1989; "Suspension Challenged," *NW*, October 7, 1989; Rickard, "Contralesa Chief Stripped of Title by Buthelezi to Take Court Action," *NW*, October 25, 1989.

## **Chapter 8. They Were Worried about the Way Our Chief Was Managing His Nation: Land, Authority, and Belonging, 1990–1996**

1. International Commission of Jurists, *Signposts to Peace: An Independent Survey of the Violence in Natal, South Africa* (Geneva: International Commission of Jurists, 1990), 4.
2. Eduardo Mariño, *KwaZulu-Natal Emergency: The 1994 Emergency in KwaZulu-Natal, Republic of South Africa: Statements & Observations from the International Observer to the Emergency* (Johannesburg: E. Mariño, 1994), 14.
3. Truth and Reconciliation Commission, *The Report of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission*, vol. 3, *Regional Profiles* (London: Macmillan, 1999); Lauren Segal, "The Human Face of Violence: Hostel Dwellers Speak," *Journal of Southern African Studies* 18, no. 1 (1992): 190–231; Jason Hickel, *Democracy as Death: The Moral Order of Anti-Liberal Politics in South Africa* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2015).
4. David Everatt, "Analysing Political Violence on the Reef, 1990–1994," in *The Role of Political Violence in South Africa's Democratisation*, ed. Ran Greenstein (Johannesburg: Community Agency for Social Enquiry, 2003), 101.
5. Bernard Magubane, "The Beginning of the End: The Garrison State Is Finally Dismantled," in *The Road to Democracy in South Africa*, vol. 6, 1990–1996 (Pretoria: Unisa



- Press, 2013), 1406–12.
6. Peter Harris, *Birth: The Conspiracy to Stop the '94 Election* (Cape Town: Umuzi, 2010), 166–67, 173, 209–13.
  7. The late decision of Inkatha to participate resulted in large irregularities in parts of KwaZulu-Natal with illegal polling stations, inadequate observation, and threats to existing observers. The Independent Electoral Commission was said to “negotiate a result” in response. An Inkatha-controlled KwaZulu-Natal was “an acceptable price to pay for a legitimate election outcome.” Morris Szeftel, “Negotiated Elections’ in South Africa, 1994,” *Review of African Political Economy* 21, no. 61 (1994): 469; Harris, *Birth*.
  8. Rupert Taylor, “Justice Denied: Political Violence in KwaZulu-Natal after 1994,” *African Affairs* 101, no. 405 (2002): 473.
  9. At the TRC in 1998, Daluxolo Luthuli testified that KwaZulu Police Captain Khanyile and the Caprivian stationed at KwaXimba were responsible for the death of Msinga Mlaba. Daluxolo Luthuli, amnesty testimony to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Durban, April 7, 1998, <http://www.justice.gov.za/trc/amntrans/durban/dbn1.htm>.
  10. Zibuse Mlaba, interview with author and Thandokuhle Maphumulo, Pietermaritzburg, June 5, 2014.
  11. John Aitchison, *Numbering the Dead: The Course and Pattern of Political Violence in the Natal Midlands, 1987–1989* (Pietermaritzburg: Natal Society Foundation, 2015), 60.
  12. Inkosi Sikhosiphi Mdluli, interview with author and Thandeka Majola, KwaNyavu, July 17, 2013.
  13. Fihlizwe Zondi, interview with author and Thandeka Majola, KwaNyavu, July 12, 2015.
  14. M. A. Mkhize, interview with author and Thandeka Majola, KwaNyavu, June 18, 2014.
  15. Aitchison, *Numbering the Dead*, 90.
  16. Truth and Reconciliation Commission, *TRC Report*, 3: Regional Profiles: 194–98.
  17. William Basil Harrington, testimony to the Human Rights Violations Committee of Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Pietermaritzburg, November 20, 1996, [http://www.justice.gov.za/trc/hrvtrans/hrvpmb/pmb7\\_1.htm](http://www.justice.gov.za/trc/hrvtrans/hrvpmb/pmb7_1.htm).
  18. Affidavit of Chief Mhlabunzima Maphumulo, February 1, 1990, Case No. 280/90 in the Supreme Court of South Africa Natal Provincial Division in the matter between Chief Mhlabunzima Maphumulo and the minister of law and order, the commissioner of South African Police, and Chief Bangubukhosi Mdluli.
  19. Bhunu Dladla, May 14, 1990, APC, PC11, PCCC Statement Sheet 144.
  20. “Violence Forces Closure of School,” *NW*, January 29, 1990.
  21. Theni Ngcoya, interview with author and Thandeka Majola, Haniville, May 27, 2011.
  22. Maphumulo affidavit; Fred Kockott, “Fighting Comes to Peace Area,” *NW*, January 31,

- 1990; Thulani Mthethwa, May 14, 1990, APC, PCII.
23. Kockott, "Fighting Comes to Peace Area."
  24. Maphumulo affidavit.
  25. Eunice Dladla, interview with author and Thandeka Majola, Mbambangalo, March 7, 2011.
  26. Ngenzeni Mbambo, interview with author and Thandeka Majola, Haniville, August 8, 2011.
  27. "Hundreds Flee as Mob Rampages through Table Mountain Area," *NW*, January 30, 1990.
  28. Bongwiwe Zondi, April 30, 1990, APC, PCII, PCCC Statement Sheet 59; Bongani Isaac Mkhize, April 30, 1990, Statement Sheet 57.
  29. Fred Kockott, "Refugee Camps Set Up in City," *NW*, February 12, 1990.
  30. "Chief Has Not Fled Table Mountain," *NW*, February 6, 1990; Prakash Naidoo, "Bring in the Troops," *ST*, February 18, 1990; "SADF Oversees Return of Refugees," *NW*, February 28, 1990.
  31. Christelle de Jager, "Returning Refugees Attacked, 4 Die," *NW*, March 5, 1990.
  32. "The Human Agony of Maqongqo," *NWE*, March 8, 1990; "SADF Oversees Return of Refugees."
  33. "Chief Blamed for Violence," *NW*, March 13, 1990.
  34. Fred Kockott, "Busload of Armed Men Prowls East End of City," *NW*, March 8, 1990; "Armed Groups Bring Violence into Town," *NWE*, March 8, 1990.
  35. *Inkosi* Sikhosiphi Mdluli interview.
  36. Father Tim Smith, testimony to the Human Rights Violations Committee of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Pietermaritzburg, November 18–21, 1996, accessed January 20, 2011, [http://www.justice.gov.za/trc/hrvtrans/hrvpmb/pmb7\\_11.htm](http://www.justice.gov.za/trc/hrvtrans/hrvpmb/pmb7_11.htm); "Mr. Ndlela—Ashdown," in *Faith in Turmoil: The Seven Days War*, ed. Lou Levine (Pietermaritzburg: Pietermaritzburg Agency for Christian Social Awareness, 1999), 59.
  37. John Aitchison, "KwaZulu-Natal: The Pre-Election Wars of the 1990s," in *The Role of Political Violence in South Africa's Democratisation*, ed. Ran Greenstein (Johannesburg: Community Agency for Social Enquiry, 2003); Jabulani Sithole, "The ANC Underground, Armed Actions and Popular Resistance in Pietermaritzburg and the Surrounding Natal Midlands Townships," in *The Road to Democracy in South Africa*, vol. 4, 1980–1990, by South African Democracy Education Trust (Pretoria: Unisa Press, 2010).
  38. Fred Kockott, "14 Killed as Fighting Hits Table Mountain," *NW*, April 4, 1990.
  39. Report of the 24-Hour Monitoring Committee, Report 2, April 1–7, 1990, APC, PCII.
  40. Report of the 24-Hour Monitoring Committee, Reports 3–6, April 8–May 5, 1990, APC, PCII.

41. Natal Black Sash, "Minutes of the Midlands Crisis Relief Committee," May 7, 1990, APC, PC4/1/2/5.
42. Nomusa Cembali, "A Tense Homecoming," *NWE*, June 14, 1990.
43. "KZT Move Hampers Refugee Return," *NW*, June 7, 1990.
44. Report of the 24-Hour Monitoring Committee, Reports 13–14, June 17–30, APC, PC11.
45. Isabel Koch, "City Closes Its Doors to Refugees," *NW*, July 19, 1990; Nomusa Cembali, "Maqongqo Residents Pour Back," *NWE*, July 26, 1990.
46. Heidi Gibson, "Hit Squad Was Sent to Kill Me—Chief," *NWE*, June 14, 1990.
47. Mhlabunzima was released; the MK man was not. Mhlabunzima reported that the MK man had been identified by an *askari* (a former ANC/MK member turned apartheid agent). The same weekend, an *askari* arrested Charles Ndaba "Zwelakhe" of the Natal Machinery of MK. It is hard to say whether this is the same incident. "Chief Held after Car Chase," *NW*, July 10, 1990; Thula Simpson, *Umkhonto We Sizwe: The ANC's Armed Struggle* (Cape Town: Penguin Random House South Africa, 2016), 467–68.
48. Lakela Kaunda, "Inkatha Group Fires Shots at Chief Maphumulo's Home," *NWE*, November 1, 1990; Lakela Kaunda, "Chief's Mother Kicked, Claim," *NWE*, November 29, 1990; Craig Urquhart, "Violence Flares in Table Mountain," *NW*, December 1, 1990; Craig Urquhart, "Table Mountain Clashes: 7 Dead," *NW*, December 3, 1990.
49. "Chief Has Not Fled Table Mountain," *NW*, February 6, 1990; Naidoo, "Bring in the Troops," *ST*, February 18, 1990.
50. Kockott, "Fighting Comes to Peace Area."
51. Contralesa, Press Release by Chief Mhlabunzima Maphumulo, President of Contralesa, n.d., SAHA, AL2431, UDF Collection, Box 20, 1.22.2.
52. Mzala (Jabulani Nxumalo), "Opinion: The Violence in Natal," *NW*, May 3, 1990.
53. The ANC submissions to the TRC seem hesitant to acknowledge any formal connections between MK, ANC, and the Transkei Defence Force, as indicated in their response to the TRC questions on the topic. African National Congress, "Further Submissions and Responses by the African National Congress to Questions Raised by the Commission for Truth and Reconciliation," submission to the Human Rights Violation Committee of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, May 12, 1997, <http://www.justice.gov.za/trc/hrvtrans/submit/anc2.htm>; Simpson, *Umkhonto We Sizwe*, 478–79, 496.
54. Tim Houghton, "Guns and Posers at Table Mountain," *NW*, October 31, 2008.
55. Jabulani Sithole, "The African National Congress in Natal, 1990–1994," in *The Road to Democracy in South Africa*, vol. 6, 1990–1996 (Pretoria: Unisa Press, 2013), 249.
56. Maseko testified Madlala gave him the weapons and that Mroxegu Mathe, who succeeded Madlala as ANC leader, gave the order to attack Thulani Mkhize. During

- cross examination, there was some confusion as to who gave the order and an advocate concluded that Mathe did not give the order. The amnesty decision states Mathe gave both the weapons and the order. Albert Sbangeliso Maseko, amnesty testimony to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Durban, November 17, 1999, [http://www.justice.gov.za/trc/amntrans/1999/99111518\\_dbn\\_991117db.htm](http://www.justice.gov.za/trc/amntrans/1999/99111518_dbn_991117db.htm).
57. Heidi Gibson, "Maphumulo Accuses SADF of One-sidedness," *NWE*, December 6, 1990; "ANC to Launch Table Mountain Branch on Sunday," *NWE*, December 13, 1990; "ANC Branch to Open in Table Mountain," *NW*, December 14, 1990; "Maphumulo Attack: ANC Takes Action," *NW*, December 18, 1990.
  58. "Cops Accused of Fueling Conflict," *NA*, January 24, 1991; Lakela Kaunda, "Police Blamed for 'Fuelling Conflict,'" *NWE*, January 24, 1991; Lakela Kaunda, "Maphumulo Calls for Meeting on Sunday," *NW*, January 31, 1991; "Maphumulo Shot At," *NW*, February 6, 1991; "Violence at Table Mountain," *NW*, February 20, 1991; Inkatha Freedom Party, Press Release, February 10, 1991, APC, PC126/3/11.
  59. Hudla was shot and killed on the eve of the inquest into Mhlabunzima's assassination. The court suspected that this assassination was meant as a threat to potential witnesses, even though Hudla had not been subpoenaed. The elimination of people involved in political assassinations was identified by some ANC activists as a pattern of hit squad activity in kZN. Uncooperative witnesses and the tampering of evidence rendered investigations into Hudla's death futile. Sipiwe Thusi, interview with author, Johannesburg, July 1, 2014; Anonymous, interview with author and Thandokuhle Maphumulo, Eastwood, June 17, 2014; Zibuse Mlaba, interview with author and Thandokuhle Maphumulo, Pietermaritzburg, June 5, 2014; "Maphumulo's Driver Killed on Eve of Inquest," *NW*, August 15, 1991; Khaba Mkhize, "Chief's Slain Friend to Be Buried This Weekend," *NWE*, August 22, 1991; "Case 'Damaged by Unhelpful Witnesses and Lawyers,'" *NW*, September 5, 1991.
  60. Carmel Rickard and Craig Urquhart, "Natal Chiefs Fear Hit List," *NW*, February 27, 1991.
  61. Belinda Bozzoli, *Theatres of Struggle and the End of Apartheid* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2004); Daniel Magaziner, *The Law and the Prophets: Black Consciousness in South Africa, 1968-1977* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2010).
  62. "Natal Chiefs Fear Hit List"; Frazer Mtshali, "Maphumulo's Killers Spotted," *New African*, February 28, 1991; "Murdered Chief's Funeral on Sunday," *DN*, March 7, 1991; "Chief's Killers 'Will Not Be Found,'" *NW*, March 8, 1991; "All 'Young Comrades' Urged to Join Umkhonto weSizwe," *DN*, March 11, 1991; Sonya Schoeman, "MK Call to Arms at Chief's Funeral," *NW*, March 11, 1991; Frazer Mtshali, "Pick Up His Spear," *New African*, March 14, 1991; "Grieving Widow Speaks Out," *New African*, March 14, 1991; Khaba Mkhize,

- "Why Not a Bounty for the Sake of Justice?" *NWE*, March 14, 1991; Lakela Kaunda, "Maphumulo's Burial Marked by Tension," *NWE*, March 14, 1991; "Still No News about Maphumulo's Killers," *NWE*, March 14, 1991.
63. Thobekile Maphumulo, interview with author and Thandeka Majola, Mkhambathini, February 8, 2011; Ngenzeni Mbambo and Happiness Memela interview.
64. Lakela Kaunda, "Maphumulo Assassin Comes Clean," *NW*, April 26, 1991.
65. By 1991, Van der Westhuizen had earned a reputation for cover-ups or less-than zealous investigations of police complicity. He was first dubbed "General Fix-It" after he attempted to abort a murder investigation against a security policeman in 1988. He was involved with *witdoeke* vigilantes (known for wearing *witdoeke*, or white cloths, to mark their membership in the vigilante group) in the Western Cape as well as cover-ups during the Harms Commission of Inquiry into Political Killings and the Trust Feed massacre. General van der Merwe later applied for amnesty for the bombings of COSATU and Khotso houses. Jacques Pauw, *Into the Heart of Darkness: Confessions of Apartheid's Assassins* (Johannesburg: J. Ball, 1997), 85.
66. Chris Whitfield, "Hit Squad Outcry," *NM*, April 27, 1991; "Death Squads Still Wiping Out Opponents of Apartheid," *DN*, April 27, 1991; "Clear This Up Fast," *NM*, April 27, 1991; "Allegation," *NW*, April 27, 1991.
67. Vasantha Angamuthu, "My Job Is Now Complete, Says General," *ST*, April 28, 1991; "ANC-Govt Deal Over Madlala's Safety—Claim," *NW*, April 29, 1991; "Madlala an Informer, Says Vlok Spokesman," *NW*, April 30, 1991; "Police Find No Evidence to Back Siphon Madlala's 'Hit Squad' Claims," *NM*, May 1, 1991; Craig Urquhart, "Maphumulo: Dramatic Claim," *NW*, May 1, 1991; Lakela Kaunda, "No Evidence to Back Claims, Say Police," *NWE*, May 2, 1991.
68. This included the confessions of retired Army General Nico Basson regarding arms and propaganda and the Inkathagate scandal that revealed state funding for Inkatha and UWUSA rallies. Morris Szeftel, "Manoeuvres of War in South Africa," *Review of African Political Economy*, no. 51 (1991): 74; Ivor Powell, "Aspects of Propaganda Operations," in *The Hidden Hand: Covert Operations in South Africa*, by C. D. Schutte, Ian Liebenberg, and Anthony Minnaar, 2nd ed. (Pretoria: Human Sciences Research Council, 1998), 335–41; Laurence Piper and Brian Morrow, *To Serve and Protect: The Inkathagate Scandal* (Pretoria: Unisa Press, 2010).
69. Jill E. Kelly, "'Persons Unknown' and the Killing of the Peace Chief: The State, Inkatha, and Local Involvement in the Assassination of Mhlabunzima Maphumulo" (paper presented at the African Studies Association Annual Meeting, Indianapolis, IN, November 2014); Catherine Payze, "The Elimination of Political Opponents: The Maphumulo Assassination," in *Patterns of Violence: Case Studies of Conflict in Natal*, ed.

- Anthony Minnaar (Pretoria: Human Sciences Research Council, 1992), 247–58.
70. “Stepfather Murdered,” *NM*, March 26, 1991; “Maphumulo Snr Killed,” *NW*, March 26, 1991; “Police Taking Sides—Late Chief’s Brother,” *NWE*, April 18, 1991; Craig Urquhart, “Maphumulo: Dramatic Claim,” *NW*, May 1, 1991.
  71. Minutes of Peace in Natal board meeting, June 30, 1993, Radley Keys Private Papers.
  72. Maseko to the TRC.
  73. Japhet Madlala, interview with author and Thandeka Majola, Pietermaritzburg, August 8, 2011.
  74. “Inkatha Leader Wounded in Ambush,” *DN*, December 17, 1991; Thombi Gcabashe, interview with author and Thandeka Majola, Mbambangalo, January 27, 2011; “Inkatha Leader Is Gunned Down in his Car,” *DN*, December 18, 1991;
  75. Press statement issued by Ed Tillet, IFP Information Centre, September 9, 1992, APC, PC126/3/11.
  76. Memorandum to the cabinet from the department of the chief minister: Appointment of *Ibambabukhosi*: Maphumulo Tribe: Mpumalanga District, July 2, 1992, UAR, Ex-KwaZulu Cabinet Memos and Minutes, 1992.
  77. Minutes of Peace in Natal meeting, April 14, 1992, Radley Keys Private Papers.
  78. Khanyisile Maphumulo, interview with author and Thandeka Majola, Echibini, June 21, 2011.
  79. “Madness: Something Has Gone Wrong,” *ST*, July 7, 1993; “Clergy Visit Murder Scene,” *DN*, March 5, 1993; “Local Leaders to Blame for Murders,” *NW*, March 5, 1993; Aaron Zibuse Zulu, amnesty testimony to Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Durban, June 24, 1999, [http://www.justice.gov.za/trc/amntrans%5C1999/99062124\\_dbn\\_990624db.htm](http://www.justice.gov.za/trc/amntrans%5C1999/99062124_dbn_990624db.htm).
  80. Nhlanhla Radebe, interview with author, Pietermaritzburg, March 31, 2011.
  81. Xhawulani Thulasizwe Ngcobo testified that Philip Powell delivered weapons to Bernard Mkhize, Tswalinye Ntombela, and Bongani Phethwa, all local KwaNyavu/Mbambangalo Inkatha leaders. Ngcobo gave no concrete dates, but the weapons had been delivered prior to the 1992 events about which Ngcobo was testifying. Xhawulani Thulasizwe Ngcobo, amnesty testimony to Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Pietermaritzburg, November 29, 1999, [http://www.justice.gov.za/trc/amntrans/1999/9911291203\\_pmb\\_991129pm.htm](http://www.justice.gov.za/trc/amntrans/1999/9911291203_pmb_991129pm.htm); Pauw, *Into the Heart of Darkness*, 131–32.
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# Glossary (isiZulu–English)

**amaqabane:** comrades

**amazimu** (*singular, izimu*): people who “eat up” others

**ibambabukhosi** (**ibamba** *for short*): regent

**ibutho** (*plural, amabutho*): regiment, organized by age

**ikholwa** (*plural, amakholwa*): believer; African Christian convert

**ilala** (*plural, amalala*): classification of second-class subjects in Zulu kingdom

**imijondolo:** shacks

**impi:** army, battle

**impi yamakhanda:** war of the heads, or poll tax rebellion of 1906

**induna** (*plural, izinduna*): an officer or official, headman

**indunenkulu:** principal official (head *induna*)

**inkosi** (*plural, amakhosi*): chief

**isibhalo:** public labor

**isibongo** (*plural, izibongo*): lineage or clan name; praise name

**isigodi** (*plural, izigodi*): district, ward

**isiphakanyiswa** (*plural, iziphakanyiswa*): one who has been raised up

**isizwe:** chiefdom, nation

**iziGqoza:** supporters of Mbuyazi in the secession dispute between King Mpande's sons

**izimpi zemibango:** wars of dispute

**izimpi zezigodi:** section wars

**izithakazelo** (*plural*): kinship address names, clan praises

**ubukhosi:** chieftaincy

**ubuzimuzimu:** often translated as cannibalism; more accurately, absence of social order

**ukudabuka:** to tear off; to rend; to originate

**ukukhonza:** to pay allegiance to

**ukuvalalisa:** to take one's leave

**umgcabo:** practice of ritual skin incisions for vaccination/protection

**umndeni:** family, most often used here to refer to relatives of the chief serving in advisory role

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