How Are Taiwanese Shanghaied?

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shang•hai \ˈshaŋ-hī, shaŋ-ˈhī\
vt **shang•haied; shang•hai•ing**
1 a : to put aboard a ship by force often with the help of liquor or a drug   **b :** to put by force or threat of force into or as if into a place of detention   **2 :** to put by trickery into an undesirable position
— excerpted from *Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary*

Orientalism, as Edward Said has made clear, has created an array of images and lexicons associated with people, things, and places of the "Orient" that often bear a dismal coloration.[1] The English verb *shanghai* can be said to be one of them. The legend goes that ship captains in the nineteenth century sometimes obtained additional hands by drugging men onshore, carrying them aboard, and sailing for China before the victims regained conscious-

ness. The two definitions provided by *Merriam-Webster's Dictionary* both have negative connotations. Going to Shanghai, the verb implies, was not something to be desired.

But times have changed. No longer deemed undesirable, going to Shanghai has become a fad. As Shanghai is (re)emerging as a global city that is drawing growing attention from the West, it would not be too surprising if we find the century-old verb *shanghai* acquiring new connotations that more keenly reflect its current status. In a recent book, William S. W. Lim adds richer interpretations to the phrase *being shanghaied*: it can mean "being seduced [to] incidentally discover an imaginary paradise of tomorrow," or "being overwhelmed, misled, and conned by the virtual explosion of mythical opportunities and the get-rich-quick syndrome."[2]

In this light, this essay explores the variety of ways in which Taiwanese people are particularly shanghaied. With no intention of stigmatizing this Shining Pearl of the Orient, I use *shanghai* here as a pun. On the one hand, in its literal sense, the verb is used to refer to the "Shanghai fever" that has been observed in Taiwan since 2000. By extension, it also refers to the physical actions through which a large number of Taiwanese make their presence felt in Shanghai. On the other hand, the verb is used to convey a metaphorical meaning that conforms more to the conventional, hence somewhat Orientalist, usage, referring to an undesirable situation in which Taiwanese are caught — that is, to a subtle predicament resulting from the interplay between nationalism and global capitalism.

As a rising, or rather, reviving, global city, Shanghai is a powerful magnet that lures people with a variety of great promises and rosy dreams. Multinational companies (MNCs), entrepreneurs, and investors around the world are swarming in for the gold rush. The Taiwanese among them are no exception. However, if we consider the entangled cultural and socioeconomic relations — not to mention political rivalry — between Taiwan and Shanghai, we will find the picture rather complicated and intriguing, full of twists, paradoxes, and ironies.

Some may disagree with the use of the expression *shanghaied* in this context, as many Taiwanese went to Shanghai voluntarily. They were not "put on board by force," nor did they see Shanghai as a place of detention. However, as I shall demonstrate below, many Taiwanese businessmen went to

China in general, and Shanghai in particular, because they had few choices at home. Their wives and children followed in their steps, in an attempt to avoid "family problems" such as extramarital affairs. There are numerous stories of various kinds of betrayals and disappointments: old Taishang (Taiwanese businesspeople) shanghai new Taishang; families are shanghaied in order to live together; housewives, while enjoying better shopping and "quality of life" due to their suddenly increased purchasing power, find themselves estranged from local society; children have to adjust between conflicting institutions and ideologies at home and at school. Thus viewed, they are all shanghaied in one way or another.

These stories are filled with social, cultural, and political implications that have yet to be explored and understood. My essay, then, is a modest attempt to make a quick sketch of these multifaceted phenomena by disentangling the forces of global capitalism, the governmentality of nation-states, and the cultural logic that are intersecting with each other behind the scenes. In the first half of the essay, I sketch the contours of the picture by presenting the diversity of people who constitute and construct the Shanghai fever. In the second half, I focus on the symptoms, so to speak, of those who are shanghaied by this hype: the state and corporations, the individuals, and Taiwanese society as a collective entity. A brief reflection will be offered in conclusion.

Going to Shanghai: Fads and Trends

Shanghai Fever in Taiwan

The year 2000 marked a watershed in Taiwan's history. Chen Shuibian, nominated by the then opposition DPP (Democratic Progressive Party), beat his split pan-GMD (Guomindang) opponents to win the presidential election.[3] The significance of Chen's victory seemed apparent: not only did it end the fifty-five-year rule of the GMD on the island, it also shifted the momentum of nation-building to a great extent. Most observers and analysts believed that the ROC (Republic of China) under Chen's leadership would move toward formal, de jure independence.[4]

In the same year, a so-called Shanghai fever emerged in Taiwan, mani-

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fested in the proliferation of discourses about Shanghai in various media. The fever was presaged by the best seller *Wo de Shanghai jingyan* (*My Shanghai Experience*), by a Taiwanese businessman named Chen Bin, which went through eight printings within ten months. Following it was a flood of news reports, publications, and TV programs featuring Shanghai. At the end of 2000, "going to Shanghai" was listed as one of the "top ten commodities of the year" by *Shangye Zhoukan* (*Business Weekly*), one of the leading magazines in Taiwan.[5] The hype reached its height in 2001, during which Shanghai became the focus of almost all of the business magazines, including *Shangye Zhoukan*, *Tianxia* (*Commonwealth*), *Caixun* (*Wealth Monthly*), and *Yuanjian* (*Global Views*), appearing time and again in their cover stories, special issues, and extensive reports. A monthly magazine titled *Yiju Shanghai* (*Emigrate to Shanghai*) made its debut in both Shanghai and Taipei in November 2001. Taiwanese entertainers had their shows in Shanghai, some of which were broadcast live via satellite onto TV screens in Taiwan. All of a sudden, Shanghai became the trendiest topic in Taiwanese public culture.

The above two seemingly separate phenomena — Chen's election and the Shanghai fever — should not be seen in isolation. As I shall show below, there have been enormous tensions between globalization, nationalization, and Taiwan-China relations, while the Shanghai fever is an embodiment of these forces in full play. As *Shangye Zhoukan* suggested, Chen's election led many to worry about the possible instability of Taiwan's political future, which fueled the emerging Shanghai fever. The irony here, however, is that, whereas in the past, people moved to a place such as North America or Australia for asylum, now people were seeking shelter in the land of their supposed enemy. As Chen Bin observed in another of his books, titled *Yimin Shanghai* (*Emigrate to Shanghai*): "Among those who are buying houses in Shanghai, over half of them are doing so for fear that, should the missile be fired from the mainland, they could not stay in Taiwan. . . . Shanghai is rather far from Taiwan, and Taiwan would probably avoid attacking Shanghai. This economic megacity ought to be the safest place."[6]

Chen's statement might be an exaggeration, but it reveals how the new Shanghai fever is different from the so-called mainland fever of the late 1980s. First, the industries involved are quite different. Previous tides of mainland fever mostly involved conventional "sunset" industries such as

shoemakers and bike manufacturers. The Shanghai fever, however, involves high-tech companies and chip fabs, the information technology (IT) industry of which Taiwan has been so proud. In addition, the tertiary sector of industry is moving to Shanghai, too, ranging from real estate, security, banking, accounting, consulting firms, and insurance, to entertainment and public relations.

Furthermore, the people involved in this fever are significantly different. In the past, people who went to the PRC were mostly businessmen — namely, male owners and supervisors of Taiwanese small or medium enterprises (SMEs) who, to put it in Pierre Bourdieu's terms, are rich in economic capital but relatively poor in cultural capital.[7] In contrast, people involved in the Shanghai fever are rather different and much more diversified. There are high-level executives and professionals, white-collar salaried men and women, writers, journalists, artists, and so on. In short, they are people generally endowed with higher cultural capital, and a good number of them are women — including spouses.

In addition to the "gold rush" in business, there is a trend toward moving to Shanghai and/or seeking job opportunities in Shanghai. This trend is remarkable in that it opposes the trend of just a few years ago. In the past, Taiwanese people had been, in general, reluctant to work in the PRC, considering it a poor, backward place that was difficult for Taiwanese to live in. That trend has been reversed. Working and living in Shanghai is now almost a fad, as hinted at in the slogan in the debut issue of *Yiju Shanghai*: "Have you been to Shanghai lately?" (If not, you're out of date!) There have been a large number of publications, in different venues, that teach people the how-to's of surviving in Shanghai.[8] In addition, Shanghai is portrayed as a paradise of eating, drinking, fun, and pleasure (*chihewanle*) by the numerous tour books, travel magazines, and TV shows that are proliferating in Taiwan. How to read or "decode" the still proliferating discourses on Shanghai calls for a separate study, but suffice it to say that Shanghai has been presented not only as a glittering gold mine full of opportunities to make a fortune, but also as a paradise of joy and pleasure, attracting flocks of Taiwanese.

Taiwanese in Shanghai: A Paradoxical Presence

The heat of the Shanghai fever brings us across the Taiwan Strait to and up the coast to Shanghai itself. The presence of Taiwanese in Shanghai is somewhat paradoxical: they are both ubiquitous and invisible. According to official statistics, the Taiwanese are the largest immigrant group in Shanghai. The estimate, which is hard to obtain with accuracy, ranges from three hundred thousand to six hundred thousand. The Taiwanese are widely dispersed and can be found on most rungs of the social ladder — from top managers of MNCs, to business owners, shopkeepers, and salaried workers, to outlaws and flaneurs — and include large numbers of students, housewives, and pre-school children.

The complex mix represented by these people is a reflection of another recent trend. Whereas, earlier, Taiwanese businesspersons or workers came alone and were more or less "astronauts" shuttling between the mainland and Taiwan, the picture is quite different now; they either move their entire family to Shanghai or marry local people and become "indigenized." With rapid improvements of its infrastructure, Shanghai is becoming a "livable" city for Taiwanese. As one writer puts it, "The face of a modern city emerges bit by bit: elevated expressways, subways, housing for foreigners, international schools, supermarkets, convenient stores — even florists and open-shelf bookstores are gradually becoming available, bringing much of expectations for the future to foreigners."[9]

While different people come to Shanghai with different goals or dreams in mind, their experiences of the city differ significantly as well. For Taiwanese businesspeople, the market in the PRC is unimaginably huge when compared to Taiwan. Scale matters.[10] The sheer fact that China has a territory over 265 times and a population over 57 times that of Taiwan has awed not only businesspeople but also cultural elites.[11] Scale implies not only market share and profits, but a range and magnitude of influence as well. A young Taishang, who established his own business with hundreds of employees in Dongguan but lived in Shanghai, admitted: "I never imagined that I'd run a business this big. It was simply unimaginable when I was in Taiwan."[12] Speaking from a different trade, a female editor of a leading international fashion magazine echoed his comment: "Imagine that there

would be billions of people buying your products or reading your articles. If you can change the thoughts, behavior, or lifestyles of hundreds of millions of human beings, it'll become quite an achievement in human history."[13] Though a half-joking exaggeration, her remark vividly captures the global dreams that many Taiwanese seek to fulfill in Shanghai.

Whereas SMEs come to Shanghai for survival, larger companies or MNCs come to Shanghai because it is an important strategic point for their global expansion. In the 1990s, foreign investors and MNCs sent their Taiwanese employees to Shanghai because of their language and cultural capacities. Thus, there is another group called *waishang dagongzu* (employees of foreign companies), who are the representatives or high-level executives of MNCs in the region.[14] They are perhaps the most privileged Taiwanese in Shanghai. They receive lavish subsidies from their corporations for housing, children's education, and even holidays. Compared with most Taishang, they tend to have lower expectations regarding the overall environment of the PRC, do not embrace the dream of a "Great China," and hence tend to have an indifferent attitude, accompanied by a sense of superiority.[15]

There are also younger people who come to Shanghai seeking a job either in MNCs, Taiwanese businesses, or even local firms. They are mostly white-collar professionals who just got their college or postgraduate degrees. Although not always well-paid, they are willing to sacrifice the present for the future, as they are eager to grab a niche in this rapidly growing economy. Some younger people even go to schools in the PRC based on similar reasoning. Global cities, as Saskia Sassen has pointed out, are hubs of globalization, and these youngsters know this rather well.[16] What they embrace is not a Chinese dream, but a global one: "In Shanghai, you're not competing with China; you're competing with the entire world."[17] Viewing Taiwan as simply too local and too parochial, they come to Shanghai to cultivate their international visions.

Taiwanese come to Shanghai not merely as business owners, investors, or salaried workers; they come as consumers, too. Their role as consumers is no less important than that as producers. To begin with, there are cultural affinities and historical ties that make Taiwanese consumers feel familiar, or even nostalgic. On the streets in Shanghai, they may be surprised to find the old, famous shops such as Laodafang, Maochang, Laofengxiang, and

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Xiaohuayuan — stores that they have been familiar with since their child-
hood, especially the mainlanders.[18] Moreover, as with many immigrant com-
munities around the world, cuisine is an important factor in making these
immigrants feel at home. For Taiwanese in Shanghai, there has been no
shortage of their home cuisine in recent years. They can buy Taiwanese food
in Taiwanese-run grocery stores, have banquets in Taiwanese restaurants,
and even birthday parties in Taiwanized KTV.[19] Consumerism, along with
a cosmopolitan lifestyle that Taiwanese are used to, is now flourishing in
Shanghai, making it a more livable city for Taiwanese. Department stores,
shopping malls, fancy exotic pubs, luxurious restaurants — everything is
simply bigger and shinier here. Interestingly, what makes them feel at home
are those MNCs such as McDonald's, Kentucky Fried Chicken, Carrefour,
and SOGO. Global culture indeed helps Taiwanese familiarize themselves
with this city.

Better yet, their purchasing power is tremendously increased as soon as
they get to Shanghai. The relatively low level of living expenses make these
Taiwanese suddenly rich, although their nominal income may not have
increased by much compared to what they made in Taiwan. Although the
lifestyles and experiences of these Taiwanese in Shanghai are as diverse as
their composition, there is, for most of them, a general upward mobility on
the social ladder. They can afford a rather comfortable and even luxurious
life that they could not have enjoyed in Taiwan. As one Taiwanese house-
wife put it: "You can have as many housemaids as you want. How com-
fortable it is! You can't have this kind of life in Taiwan or in the U.S." As
another one commented: "The hands of Taiwanese wives have nothing to
do except washing their own faces."[20] Even businessmen say similar things:
"In Taiwan, I worked like a janitor even though I was a boss — I had to do
everything myself. But now in Shanghai, I finally have the feeling that I am
the boss. This is the kind of life a boss should have, isn't it?"[21]

However, despite their large numbers, diverse composition, and lavish
lifestyles, Taiwanese are often invisible in Shanghai, in that they tend to
maintain a low profile. With the exception of the semiofficial Taiwanese
Business Association (Taishang xiehui) supported by the PRC government,
there is no formal organization of Taiwanese people, and community news-
papers and magazines, which are commonly found in migrant communities

elsewhere to form local solidarity, are almost absent in Shanghai, due to the tight control over the mass media. The only exception is the monthly *Yiju Shanghai*, which is financed by a Taiwanese real-estate dealer, supervised and closely censored by Chinese authorities. The contents are mostly about life and business information in Shanghai and pay almost no attention to public affairs, let alone political issues.

In one of his best-selling books, Chen Bin advises the newcomers to speak and act "as low-key as possible [while] never talking about politics."[22] In another, he uses "gray" to characterize the Taiwanese in Shanghai: gray personality, gray market, gray institutions, gray circles, and so on.[23] They can only be gray because they do not want to become too vivid or be too distinguishable from others. As a consequence, there is hardly anything that can be collectively referred to as a Taiwanese community in Shanghai. There are only gated neighborhoods and small circles loosely and unevenly connected to each other, constituted by atomized individuals with blurred faces. Their paradoxical presence — ubiquitous but invisible — leads us to the second sense of being shanghaied.

Being Shanghaied:
The Predicament of Nationalization and Globalization

The second sense of Taiwanese being shanghaied is more metaphorical or metaphysical than the physical sense discussed above. Simply put, Taiwanese are induced into a somewhat undesirable situation by two different but related forces: one is globalization, the other nationalization. Although not always contradictory to each other, these two forces are found in a most intriguing relationship in this case, as the long-time political rivalry, historical ties, and cultural affinities between Taiwan and China have made the picture rather more complicated than it would have been otherwise.

As shown above, the composition of this Shanghai fever is diverse and heterogeneous. Different people, in turn, tend to find themselves shanghaied in different ways. In what follows, I shall examine three kinds of actors or groups at different levels — namely, the state and corporations, the individuals, and Taiwanese society as a whole — who are shanghaied in various situations. Since the issues involved are too wide-ranging to be discussed

exhaustively in the limited scope of this essay, I shall focus on those that can be considered most symptomatic of being shanghaied.

The State and Corporations: State Policies versus Economic Logic

Capitalists usually need a strong state for their global expansion, and we can find no shortage of examples from the burgeoning of modern capitalism in the sixteenth century to late capitalism in the "long twentieth century."[24] In many cases, and at various stages, the interests of capitalists are by and large in accord with the interests of the nation-state. The logic of economy is thus not necessarily at odds with the logic of nation-state; instead, they go hand in hand most of the time. As Liah Greenfeld has demonstrated in her extensive historical study, the spirit of capitalism, after all, is the spirit of nationalism.[25] The same holds very true for newcomers to global capitalism, as both Taiwan and China can readily testify. The problem here, however, is that Taiwan has been in a political rivalry with China for decades, one that has intensified in recent years when the DPP government demonstrated a stronger will to build Taiwan into a new nation.

The goal of nationalism, at least for newcomers such as Taiwan, is to make the nation visible in the world in a positive way and to climb up in the pecking order of the world system. After the Republic of China was expelled from the United Nations in 1971, Taiwan reintroduced itself, neither as the Republic of China nor as Formosa, but as Taiwan — and entered the world stage through its self-touting economic miracle. But now that aura is fading away, yielding to the rising star of China, in general, and Shanghai, in particular.

Globalization and nationalization can go hand in hand, but this time it appears to be more favorable to the PRC than to the ROC.[26] To be sure, both the PRC and the ROC resort to globalization as their strategy of nation-building, but it is China now that occupies a vantage point in terms of market size and historical timing. In the early 1990s, internationalization and globalization were adopted by the Taiwanese government as a strategy of "de-sinicization" — that is, of diluting the Chineseness on Taiwan. However, when it appeared that China was becoming the largest emerging

market in the contemporary world, and that it stood between Taiwan and its goal of globalization, the picture became rather different.

From the DPP-led state's point of view, greater economic integration with China implies a decrease of political autonomy from the PRC. Moreover, the investment of Taiwanese business in the PRC is considered harmful to Taiwan's collective interests, in that it not only reduces job opportunities and depletes capital in Taiwan, but also helps the PRC build up its economic muscle. To put it in the words of a proindependence newspaper, these Taiwanese are helping Taiwan's enemy by fostering China's strengths.[27]

To many Taiwanese firms and businesspeople, however, it is not solely a personal preference that leads them to China. Instead, driven by a larger structure of global capitalism, they are, in a sense, forced to go. In defense of his "marching west" in defiance of state policies, Chen Bin stated: "I'm just an owner of an SME in a conventional industry. . . . The trade that I've been devoted to for decades can no longer survive in Taiwan. Operators of small firms like me receive neither care from the government nor benefit from the policy. . . . Under the pressures of the environment, I had no better choice but marching west [to Shanghai]."[28]

Indeed, under the impact of global commodity chains, post-Fordist modes of production, and flexible accumulation of late capitalism, going to China (Shanghai) has become not so much a voluntary choice as an imperative.[29] This applies not only to SMEs, but also to larger enterprises. Leading Taiwanese corporations such as Formosa Plastics or the Acer Group, along with hi-tech firms in the IT industry, have marched to Shanghai for the deployment of their global expansion. As one high-level executive put it, "Your business will die sooner or later if you merely insist on [staying in] Taiwan."[30]

During the GMD rule in the 1990s, President Li Denghui (Lee Tenghui) adopted a "patience over haste" policy to cool the heat of cross-Strait economic expansion. The succeeding DPP government generally has followed a similar policy, but only to find itself in a tricky dilemma. If Taiwan embraces the dream of globalization — which, at the current stage, implies opening the door to increasing engagement with the PRC — there is a risk that Taiwan will gradually lose its autonomy in both the economic and,

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eventually, political arenas. However, if Taiwan is to maintain its political autonomy through the ongoing nation-building project, which entails a nearly closed-door policy toward China, it may run the risk of being marginalized in the game of global capitalism.

Subjectively, the state has no intention of encouraging Taiwanese businesses to invest in China; objectively, the ROC government can hardly lend their hands to its citizens in the PRC, as the latter simply does not recognize the former as a counterpart. But at any rate, the old policy of "patience over haste" is facing harsh criticisms, as the pressures are building up. As Chen Bin said: "Let's put it bluntly: Taiwanese are just like 'stateless people,' especially when they are in China. They are left forlorn with absolutely no protector to fall back on. The financial tools and other social resources that you're used to are completely useless here. Not only does the Taiwanese government not come to help, but they send you occasional warnings and advice that really get on your nerves, making you unable to concentrate on fighting for your business."[31]

The conflict of interest between the state and corporations manifested itself in the so-called three links (*santong*). *Three links* is shorthand for overall direct links between the two sides of the Strait, including direct trade (*tongshang*), direct mail (*tongyou*), and direct transportation (*tonghang*). Since the ROC then regarded the PRC as virtually an enemy state, it was reluctant to open up the three links for security and other reasons. However, due to the rapidly increasing interaction across the Strait, the demand for *santong* became more and more pressing in the last years of the DPP administration. As a compromise, the government implemented the "small three links" (*xiaosantong*) on the outlying islands of Jinmen and Mazu. Although an ad hoc arrangement for direct flights was made during the Lunar New Year in 2005, the prospect of the overall opening up of the three links was in limbo until the new GMD administration eventually inked a deal with the PRC in November 2008 to open the links in the following month. When speaking of the three links, almost all Taiwanese in Shanghai were unanimously in favor of a more open policy, insisting that the ROC government should permit the three links as soon as possible. One Taiwanese spouse complained: "Why should we spend five hours or even a whole day transferring when it

takes merely one and a half hours by direct flight [between Shanghai and Taipei]? It's a stupid policy that wastes our precious time and money."[32]

Behind the controversy lies an irony: the reluctance of the DPP government to open up the three links, in effect, led to an increase in the numbers of people leaving Taiwan for Shanghai. The reason is simple: the costs of traveling and being separate were simply too high for those families involved. Indeed, the establishment of the three links was regarded as the panacea for family problems, particularly with regard to the so-called *ernai* (literally, "second wife"), a slang term for extramarital affairs.[33] One Taishang commented: "If the government opens up the three links, I'd move back to Taiwan immediately. I'll work like a commuter."[34]

Although the Shanghai fever was induced by seemingly irresistible and irreversible economic logic, it has, nevertheless, turned out to be overheated and overromanticized. Behind the rosy pictures are numerous broken dreams and miserable stories. Just two years after they published consecutive issues stirring up the Shanghai fever, *Shangye Zhoukan* made the "Great Retreat from Shanghai" their cover story on July 8, 2002. Many Taishang were literally shanghaied by local authorities, who promised special favors to lure investment but failed to follow through once the money flowed in. In many cases, going to Shanghai left no way to return. Many Taishang went bankrupt but were reluctant to return to Taiwan for various reasons; some of them have become "Taiwanese flux" (Tailiu).[35] One failed Taishang lamented: "What haven't I tried? To run a company, it could hardly survive. To be a professional manager, I'm fired once being used up. After struggling for so many years, the only thing I'm looking for is to have peaceful days. I'd be satisfied if I could have money to keep my body and soul together."[36]

Even in the preface of a book promoting Shanghai, Deng Kunyan, a renowned Taiwanese architect in Shanghai, discouraged his fellow Taiwanese from coming: "I have no heart to see my fellow countrymen swarm recklessly to Shanghai like blind salmons, knowing nothing about the fate of their future."[37]

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Individuals: Citizenship, Identities, and Loyalty

On the individual level, due to the long-standing rivalry between the ROC and the PRC, questions surrounding citizenship, identities, and loyalty are immediate concerns, as numerous stories demonstrate:[38]

- A third-grade schoolboy was previously taught in Taiwan that the GMD was "us," but after moving to Shanghai with his parents, he was taught at school that "our army was so brave to beat the GMD to win the final victory." He got quite confused: which army is "ours"?

- A general manager of a company was formerly a professional officer in the ROC army. After retirement, he became a Taishang and started doing business with those "communist bandits" (*gongfei*) whom he once vowed to exterminate.

- A second-generation mainlander, whose father was from Shanghai, feels alienated in Shanghai even though she is supposed to be a "home returnee." "They call me 'Taiwanese compatriot' (*Taibao*) and treat me as an outsider." However, when she is back in Taiwan, people call her "mainlander," which, too, implies an outsider not native to Taiwan. "I'm floating duckweed anyway; I have no roots," she shrugged.

The "state effects" of governmentality and disciplinary power can best be observed in tangible practices by individuals in their daily lives, of which education, a profound concern to most Taiwanese parents in Shanghai, is one of the best sites for investigation.[39] Education in modern society is, in effect, a powerful mechanism for social reproduction for the nation-state. Due to political rivalry, however, the two states on the two sides of the Strait are promoting contradictory ideologies and conflicting loyalties instead of bridging the gap.

To avoid these problems, international schools are the top choice for Taiwanese parents when it comes to education. However, not all Taiwanese families can afford the expensive costs of international schools, while the curricula of these schools may not suit Taiwanese students well. To cater to these needs, a less expensive *Taishang xuexiao* (Taiwan Businessman's School, referred to as "Taishang School" hereafter) was collectively founded

by some Taiwanese businesspeople as an alternative, in which most materials and textbooks, including teachers and staff, are from Taiwan. However, due to apparent ideological reasons, all the textbooks and materials used in the Taishang School have to be censored by the PRC authority before they can be used. Anything referring to the ROC, including its national title, flag, chronicles, and symbols, is either crossed out or cut from the textbook.

As a consequence, not all Taiwanese parents view the Taishang School with the same enthusiasm. A mother of two children told me firmly: "I won't let my kids go to the Taishang School. There are too many taboos in the class. You cannot teach this, you cannot teach that, and even the textbooks are blotted out here and there due to censorship. This will have a profound impact on the development of a child's personality. My kids will get schizophrenia if they go to this kind of school."[40]

Some parents send their children to local public schools, as most ordinary PRC citizens do with their children; they would rather become "localized" if they plan to stay in China for a lengthy period of time. There are some other considerations, too. Foreseeing China's rising role in the future, these parents calculate that, if their children can become more familiar with the local people and PRC national affairs, they will later be in an advantageous position to take the lead either in their family enterprises or in other trades.

But there is a problem concerning political loyalty, too. "My boy salutes the national flag of the PRC, but when he sees our flag [of the ROC], he becomes very hostile," a Taishang father said. He shrugged and continued: "They have to learn communist doctrine in the school. But I think it's OK. We all grew up under the GMD's education of the 'Three People's Principles,' but now we're doing fine, aren't we?"[41]

For ideological reasons, the government in Taiwan does not recognize diplomas of the PRC. This becomes a serious problem to those who receive higher education in China, as their credentials would become useless if they returned to Taiwan for a job. Some of them are worried, but some are not. A Taiwanese consultant who got an MBA in Beijing and now works in an MNC in Shanghai commented: "Only those who want to become public functionaries should care. For us, we don't give a damn. Most companies, even Taiwanese ones, recognize the PRC diplomas."[42]

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Many students are affected, nonetheless. For instance, a majority of Taiwanese students in Shanghai are studying Chinese medicine, but their diploma will not qualify them to get a license to practice in Taiwan after graduation. There is a Taisheng lianhehui (United Association of Taiwanese Students), which, again, is not supposed to be legal in the PRC, that makes collective efforts to push the ROC government to recognize their diplomas.

Willingly or not, Taiwanese in Shanghai find themselves involved in a tug-of-war of nationalism between the two sides of the Strait. Not unlike "fragments of the nation," as characterized by Partha Chatterjee, they lie in the interstices of two competing and rivaling nation-states.[43] In terms of citizenship and/or nationality, Taiwanese can be said to be more flexible than what Aihwa Ong has characterized as "flexible citizenship" since there is a gray area concerning their citizenship.[44] However, although Taiwanese in the mainland can collude with, or take tactical advantage of, the current disciplinary system of nation-states on the two sides of the Strait from time to time, they cannot really elude, redefine, or even overcome the disciplining as highlighted by Ong and Donald Nonini.[45] Most of the time they are caught in a dilemma.

In their pioneering study of transnationalism, Linda Basch and her colleagues find that transnationals are often deemed heroes of nation-building of their homeland by providing support to their home countries. More often than not, transnational entrepreneurs are backed up by their home government.[46] This, however, is not seen in the case of Taishang on the mainland. Their business and investments have not gained support from the Taiwanese government; on the contrary, they have sometimes become scapegoats. Taiwanese settlers in Shanghai face a questioning of their loyalty. They are harshly criticized in proindependence media such as *Ziyou shibao* (*Liberty Times*) or by proindependence writers who accuse them of being traitors, selling out Taiwan. Some charge them with being egotistical individuals who rediscovered lost privileges in Shanghai.[47]

In response, most Taiwanese in Shanghai dismissed the nation-building efforts by the DPP government, as they regarded it as narrow-minded, closed-door, self-satisfied parochialism. A Taiwanese restaurant owner in Shanghai said poignantly: "They [the PRC] are eager to globalize themselves, but how about us? We are indulged in so-called 'localization' or

'indigenization'; it is nothing less than closing the door and self-proclaiming the emperor."[48]

As we can see, the nation-building project of the PRC is read, or mis-read, as an attempt at open-minded "globalization." Some Taiwanese in Shanghai present themselves as "cosmopolitans" who care little about either side; however, their presence in Shanghai has lent a great deal to the PRC for its nationalist propaganda. The PRC intensively uses these Taiwanese businesspeople and students as a tool for their "united front" (*tongzhan*) for reunification, as they contribute economic, human, and even symbolic capi-tal to the building of the nation, all of which are then to be incorporated into the grand narrative of Chinese nationalism. With an explicit goal to "push unification forward through business" (*yi shang cu tong*), the PRC has passed a number of special laws and policies to encourage investments from Taiwanese businessmen.

There is another twist to the story, however. While a majority of Taiwan-ese in Shanghai are against Taiwan's independence, when it comes to their personal rights or privileges, they complain that the Taiwanese government is not taking care of its citizens, presuming that Taiwan should be a state that can protect its citizens in China by dealing with the PRC on equal terms. While one writer lamented a sense of loss for not being taken care of by the ROC government,[49] Chen Bin put it more bluntly: "Taiwanese businesspeople in Shanghai are neither fish, flesh, nor fowl. We are only like orphans [with no motherland]."[50]

Society: Nostalgia and Collective Anxieties

Historically, there have been ties and parallels of various sorts between Shanghai and Taiwan (Taipei), as they both emerged from what can be justifiably called "colonial modernity."[51] The emergence and the forma-tion of modernity in the two locales have been closely intertwined with the arrival of colonialism. In Taiwan, Japanese colonization—a colonialism of an Oriental, or rather, Orientalist, sort—played a key role in the forma-tion of modernity in social, cultural, and political life; in Shanghai, it was through the mediation of those foreigners in the French and the Interna-tional Settlements that modern urban life was introduced to contemporary

China and finally turned the treaty port into a renowned cosmopolis in the 1930s.[52] In addition to the parallels in terms of colonial modernity, there were historical ties between the two locales as well. During the colonial period, many Taiwanese cultural and political elites, along with business-men, went to Shanghai to engage in a variety of activities. In 1949 when the Chinese civil war was reaching an end, the GMD's last troops retreated from Shanghai, carrying thousands of Chinese refugees who later found themselves identified as so-called mainlanders in Taiwan. Entrepreneurs from Shanghai moved their enterprises to Taiwan to start new careers, most notably the Yuandong (Far East) Group. Small shops resumed their business in the streets of Taipei, including restaurateurs and chefs, drapers and tailors, watchmakers, opticians, grocers, and so on. Just as there is a "little Taipei" now in Shanghai, there was a neighborhood sometimes referred to as "little Shanghai" in Taipei in the 1950s. In terms of popular culture and literature, two of the most influential writers, Bai Xianyong and Zhang Ailing (Eileen Chang), wrote extensively about the city. Shanghai, indeed, is no stranger to the Taiwanese cultural imaginary.

It thus comes as no surprise that, in the Shanghai fever since the late 1990s, Shanghai was presented both in nostalgic terms and as a rising global city full of promise. These two are quite different but related to each other. The nostalgic image of Shanghai in the 1930s is in fact a projection of its global modernity in the future.[53] But this is nostalgia of a past that most Taiwanese nowadays have never had and is thus reminiscent of what Fredric Jameson has called "nostalgia for the present."[54] Shanghai, as a treaty port under multinational colonialism, has a fascinating past as an international and cosmopolitan city, the type of megalopolis that Taipei has strived to become but has not yet been able to achieve. In this sense, we may well call the Shanghai fever a kind of nostalgia for the future, but not without another twist: the reemergence of Shanghai on the global stage is, in particular, a threat to Taipei (Taiwan); it has already declared that Taipei is no match for her.

Taiwan drew attention from the world as a successful Newly Industrialized Country (NIC), characterized as one of the four "little dragons" in East Asia. For a long time, Taiwanese identity has been based on the so-called economic miracle, as it was one of the defining features by which Taiwanese

could distinguish themselves, with pride, from the PRC. However, as the PRC has caught up economically, there has been a rising anxiety within Taiwanese society. In fact, in the eyes of many, Shanghai, characterized as "the megalopolis that one should not be absent from in the twenty-first century," is already a more globalized and cosmopolitan city than Taipei. Quoting Deng Kunyan, one writer asserts: "If you don't have a job in Shanghai, you're not qualified to be a first-class Chinese (*huaren*) in the twenty-first century."[55]

Within Taiwanese society, there also has been a deep anxiety about being left out in the grand narrative of globalization or being marginalized in the game of global capitalism. Foreign investors and MNCs moved their regional offices from Taipei to Shanghai, viewing the latter as a better strategic point from which to compete in the rapidly growing Chinese market. Taiwanese business also moved to the mainland; the SMEs are doing so to keep their head above water; the larger corporations for the deployment of their global strategy. A deep fear has also emerged that there will be a serious brain drain, in addition to the depletion of capital and business opportunities, eventually leading to a "hollowing out" in Taiwan — that Taiwan will eventually become a desert island.[56]

Indeed, the rise of China in both political and economic realms has had a profound impact on Taiwan's identity politics. Accompanying the Shanghai fever has been a Shanghai anxiety. The discrepancies in economic growth rates, along with the asymmetric political power, have fueled deeply rooted worries. The heat of the Shanghai fever has caused self-reflexive debates and criticisms in the intellectual circles in Taiwan. The most significant one is a session of the Cultural Critique Forum organized by the Cultural Studies Association in Taiwan (CSATW), with the theme "Emigration, Gold Rush, and the Shanghai Dream?" ("Yimin, taojin, Shanghai meng?")[57] In this forum, scholars and cultural critics from different fields expressed their deep concerns about the Shanghai fever in Taiwan. After a sentimental opening, the leadoff speaker, Hu Qingfang, lamented the "Shanghai complex": "When faced with Shanghai, Taiwanese do not know how to behave themselves, because we still don't know what relations we have had with them; or, put another way, we have not decided what kind of relation we are to maintain with them, because we haven't decided yet who we are." Hu, a

female columnist who has often written about Shanghai, made a poignant observation that is worth quoting at some length:

> Taiwanese living in Shanghai are somewhat like Americans in Europe during the nineteenth century. On the one hand, Taiwanese find themselves surrounded by a cultural imprint that they have been familiar with since childhood, some of them even admiring it. They are intoxicated by the aura of the city. On the other hand, they want to maintain a certain degree of independence, trying to keep themselves out of the business while not being swayed by historical illusions. *The hesitance of Taiwanese when facing Shanghai stems from the fact that, in terms of culture, it's rather easy to cross the boundaries, but in terms of political differences, they are caught in a dilemma*. The historical situation of Taiwanese society is much thornier than the U.S. in the nineteenth century. The U.S. had at least established itself as a nation-state by then, but Taiwan's national status is still in limbo, in the state of a split. (italics in original)

During the discussion, a commentator described the fast-booming skyscrapers in Shanghai as looking quite "intimidating." But intimidating to whom, and in what sense? Hu's comments seemed to provide clues: "If you have a chance to live there for two months like me, [you'll know why I question] who is colonizing whom? I lived there for merely a couple months and I feel that I'm almost colonized!"

Note that Hu uses the verb *colonized* (*beizhimin*), a strong word that has rich symbolic meanings. People only speak of *colonizing* when there are asymmetrical power relations between two different cultures, societies, or polities. As Qiu Guiling has made clear, there are two kinds of anxieties: the first is an anxiety regarding identity, of belonging; the second is an anxiety about Taiwan when witnessing the rise of China. Though different, these two kinds of anxiety may reinforce each other. Again, to put it in Hu's words, "all in all, the debate about Shanghai means nothing less than a search for self by the Taiwanese themselves."

Conclusion

In the above, I have examined the two senses of Taiwanese being shanghaied by analyzing how different people and groups, including the state, corporations, individuals, and society as a whole, are induced into undesirable situations in various ways. With a modest aim and a limited scope, I do not claim to have provided a comprehensive analysis of the multifaceted phenomena surrounding the Shanghai fever, nor do I claim to cover all aspects and issues involved. Through the exploratory investigation above, nonetheless, we find all these extraordinary experiences adding up to a bizarre and paradoxical mixture of romanticized business ventures, pursuits of better personal lives, ambiguous citizenships, conflicting nation-building projects, and a somewhat nostalgic projection of, along with deep anxieties about, Taiwan's future and self-identity.

As it has been pointed out, Taiwan has been, for a long time, in a neither/nor status—it is neither a state, nor a nonstate; neither China, nor non-China.[58] If we may pursue the line of inquiry a little further, then the next question to be raised is: who, or what, shanghaied Taiwan, anyway?

I have discussed structural forces such as nationalism and global capitalism, but there is another force worth exploring a little further. The logic of power in world politics entails another sense in which Taiwan has been shanghaied: in this sense, by strong powers in world politics. Rather than delving into another analysis, let me conclude with a quotation from a Taiwanese real-estate dealer whom I interviewed in his office during my fieldwork in Shanghai. When speaking of cross-Strait relations, he suddenly raised his voice and made a rather sarcastic analogy: "Why do you bother to ask me about unification and independence? It's not our issue. Taiwan's genetic father is China, its foster father Japan, and Godfather the U.S. Whether Taiwan will be unified or become independent, you have to ask its three fathers first. If the three of them cannot reach an agreement, why bother to ask me? It's useless anyway."[59]

By characterizing Taiwanese as shanghaied, I am not suggesting that Taiwanese can be nothing more than passive victims. As a matter of fact, there have been attempts to interpret Taiwan's ambiguous status of being a quasi-nation/quasi-state in progressive rather than passive terms. It has

been argued, for instance, that Taiwan can be called the first postmodern nation or postnation in the world in that, while acting like a nation-state, Taiwan has survived well in the interstices of the international system without being fully granted a recognized status as a nation-state, therewith defying conventional wisdom that regards the nation-state as a prerequisite in the modern world.[60] Given the unfavorable environments both inside and outside the island, indeed, few in the 1950s or 1960s foresaw that Taiwan could have faired this well with such conspicuous vibrancy — first and foremost economically and later politically and socioculturally — in the ensuing few decades, earning itself reputations of miracles of various sorts. Following the line of its seemingly miraculous traces, one may well believe that, being shanghaied notwithstanding, there is room, albeit limited, for Taiwan (and Taiwanese) to maneuver. The interstices where those ironies, twists, and paradoxes take place may further create a crack in the current system, thus opening up a space yet unknown to us. The robustness of Taiwanese migrants in Shanghai (and in the PRC in general) of resisting nation-building projects on both sides of the Taiwan Strait has suggested to us such possibilities. If, as is widely held nowadays, we are indeed moving from a national to a postnational era, in which alternatives to the nation-state as imagined communities are burgeoning, then the existence of Taiwan as an anomaly of quasi-nation/quasi-state in the global politicoeconomic system may well be seen as a precedent of the many possible metamorphoses of the nation-state in the future. Thus viewed, Taiwan's collective schizophrenia — experienced by my informants in Shanghai and diagnosed by a best-selling writer — is perhaps symptomatic of the dawn of a new era.[61]

Notes

to improve the arguments of the paper, for which I am most grateful. Thanks are also extended to Christopher Lupke and Scott Wilbur for helping me polish the final version of the paper. It must be noted that the research and the draft of this paper were done before March 2008 when Ma Ying-jeou won the presidential election to bring the GMD back to power. Since Ma's current administration differs significantly from the preceding DPP (as well as the pre-2000 GMD) administration in terms of cross-strait policies, this essay has been revised to a certain extent to reflect such change.

1. Edward W. Said, *Orientalism* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1978).
2. William Siew-wai Lim, *Have You Been Shanghaied: Culture and Urbanism in Glocalized Shanghai* (Singapore: Asian Urban Lab, 2004), 2.
3. To follow the policy of *positions*, Chinese names and characters are romanized in pinyin. All translations are mine.
4. As is widely known, nomenclature has been one of the central problems in Taiwan's nationalist politics. In this essay, I use *Taiwanese government* and *ROC government* interchangeably, depending on the context. The same applies to the use of *China* and *the PRC*.
5. "Tebie qihua: 2000 nian 10 da fengyun shangpin" ("Special Report: Top Ten Commodities of the Year 2000"), *Shangye Zhoukan*, January 1, 2001, 98.
6. Chen Bin, *Yimin Shanghai: Wo de Taiwan jingyan yu Shanghaipai zuofeng* (*Emigrate to Shanghai: My Taiwanese Experience and Shanghai Styles*) (Taipei: Shangxun Wenhua, 2000), 2.
7. Pierre Bourdieu, *Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste* (Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press, 1984).
8. A quick look at some of these titles suffices to illustrate the point: Yanran, *Ba jia bandao Shanghai qu* (*Move Your Home to Shanghai*) (Taipei: Shenghuo Qingbao Meiti, 2001); Chen, *Yimin Shanghai*; Jinbi, *Keju Shanghai: Shanghai shenghuo mianmianguan* (*Sojourning in Shanghai: Life in Shanghai from Different Perspectives*) (Taipei: Shangxun Wenhua, 2001); Milan, *Shanghai zenme dai a?* (*How to Get Around in Shanghai?*) (Taipei: Lianjing, 2003); Liao Hemin, *Shanghai anjia 100 wen* (*One Hundred Questions about Settling Down in Shanghai*) (Taipei: Maitian, 2003).
9. Jinbi, *Keju Shanghai,* 31.
10. The importance of scale in the shaping of nationalism has often been underestimated in current discussions of nations and nationalism. For some insightful observations and analyses on how scale has shaped the course of nationalism in a crucial fashion, see Tom Nairn, *Faces of Nationalism* (London: Verso, 1997), esp. 133–49.
11. The estimates are based on official statistics provided by both the ROC and the PRC as of the end of 2004 when the "Shanghai fever" can be said to have been just over its peak. The population of the ROC was 22,689,122 at that time (www.ris.gov.tw/ch4/static/st20–1.xls, accessed December 2, 2006), whereas that of the PRC was around 1,299,880,000 (www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/2005/indexch.htm, accessed December 2, 2006). In terms of territory, the land area of the PRC is around 9,600,000 square kilometers (www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/

ndsj/2005/html/A0102c.htm, accessed December 2, 2006), whereas that of the ROC is 36,188 (www.ris.gov.tw/ch4/static/st1−1−9512.xls). Although the PRC claims sovereignty over Taiwan, the above official statistics include neither Taiwan, nor Hong Kong and Macao; by the same token, the official statistics of the ROC do not include the mainland.

12. Field note, October 18, 2003.

13. Interview with S-Y02, October 25, 2003. To keep anonymity, all interviewees are referred to by coded numbers. All interviews were done by the author in Shanghai.

14. During my interview with an MNC representative, I was told that in the American Chamber of Commerce in Shanghai, Taiwanese constitute the majority of the representatives of American companies.

15. Jinbi, *Keju Shanghai*, 32.

16. Saskia Sassen, *The Global City: New York, London, Tokyo* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1991).

17. Interview with S-Y03, October 19, 2003.

18. Jinbi, *Keju Shanghai*, 114−15.

19. KTV is shorthand of "Karaoke TV," which refers to Taiwanese-style Karaoke parlors.

20. *Shangye Zhoukan*, December 11, 2000, 113.

21. Interview with S-X01, October 20, 2003.

22. Chen Bin, *Wo de Shanghai jingyan: Cong lüyou, touzi dao dingju dalu de zhanshou celüe* (*My Shanghai Experience: Strategies for Travel, Investments, and Settling Down in the Mainland*) (Taipei: Shangxun Wenhua, 2000), 68−69.

23. Chen Bin, *Yimin Shanghai*, 255.

24. See Immanuel Wallerstein, *The Modern World System: Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the European World-Economy in the Sixteenth Century* (New York: Academic Press, 1974); Giovanni Arrighi, *The Long Twentieth Century* (New York: Verso, 1994).

25. Liah Greenfeld, *The Spirit of Capitalism: Nationalism and Economic Growth* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001).

26. See Horng-luen Wang, "Rethinking the Global and the National: Reflections on National Imaginations in Taiwan," *Theory, Culture, and Society* 17 (2000): 93−117.

27. *Ziyou shibao*, June 14, 2001, 15.

28. Chen Bin, *Wo de Shanghai jingyan*, 6−7.

29. See Gary Gereffi and Miguel Korzeniewicz, eds., *Commodity Chains and Global Capitalism* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1994); David Harvey, *The Condition of Postmodernity: An Enquiry into the Origins of Cultural Change* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1989); Ash Amin, *Post-Fordism: A Reader* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994).

30. *Shangye Zhoukan*, December 11, 2000, 82.

31. Chen Bin, *Wo de Shanghai jingyan*, 84.

32. Interview with S-W01, October 28, 2003.

33. Chen Bin, *Yimin Shanghai*, 126.

34. Interview with S-Z02, October 16, 2003.

35. *Tailiu*, or *Taiwanese mangliu*, is a new term derived from mangliu (literally "blind flux"), which refers to laborers aimlessly flowing from rural areas to large cities in China. By extension, *Tailiu* refers to those jobless Taiwanese who wander around in Shanghai or other cities seeking jobs.

36. Chen Wanyu, *Gongzuo zai Shanghai* (*Working in Shanghai*) (Taipei: Jingdian Chuanxun, 2001), 60.

37. Yanran, *Ba jia bandao Shanghai qu*, 3.

38. The three cases discussed are drawn from *Shangye Zhoukan*, December 11, 2000, 111–15.

39. Timothy Mitchell, "Society, Economy, and the State Effect," in *State/Culture: State Formation after the Cultural Turn*, ed. George Steinmetz (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999), 76–97.

40. Interview with S-Z02, October 16, 2003.

41. Ibid.

42. Interview with S-Z01, October 16, 2003.

43. Partha Chatterjee, *The Nation and Its Fragments: Colonial and Post-Colonial Histories* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993). To be sure, there are arguably two (nation-)states but three kinds of nationalisms: Taiwanese nationalism, ROC nationalism, and PRC nationalism. Although this issue raises a crucial ambiguity, in order to keep my analysis simple and clear, I shall not go into the details of the nuances between these three.

44. Aihwa Ong, *Flexible Citizenship: The Cultural Logics of Transnationality* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1999).

45. Aihwa Ong and Donald M. Nonini, eds., *Ungrounded Empires: The Cultural Politics of Modern Chinese Transnationalism* (New York: Routledge, 1997).

46. Linda Basch, Nina Glick Schiller, Cristina Szanton Blanc, *Nations Unbound: Transnational Projects, Postcolonial Predicaments, Deterritorialized Nation-States* (Langhorne, PA: Gordon and Breach, 1994).

47. Qiu Guiling, "Shiluo de tequan zai Shanghai zhaodedao" ("Lost Privileges Can Be Found in Shanghai"), *Zhongguo shibao*, June 23, 2001.

48. Interview S-L01, October 15, 2003.

49. Jinbi, *Keju Shanghai*, 105.

50. Chen, *Wo de Shanghai jingyan*, 59.

51. Tani Barlow, ed., *Formations of Colonial Modernity in East Asia* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1997).

52. For a more detailed discussion, see Leo Ou-fan Lee, *Shanghai Modern: The Flowering of a New Urban Culture in China, 1930–1945* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999).

53. Michelle Tsung-Yi Huang, *Walking between Slums and Skyscrapers: Illusions of Open Space in Hong Kong, Tokyo, and Shanghai* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2004); see also Lee, *Shanghai Modern*.

54. Fredric Jameson, *Postmodernism, or, The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1991), 279–96.

55. Yanran, *Ba jia bandao Shanghai qu*, 9.

56. *Shangye Zhoukan*, August 12, 2002.

57. The full text of the transcript can be accessed at www.ncu.edu.tw/~eng/csa/journal/journal _forum_7.htm. All subsequent quotations from this forum are from this Web site, accessed April 28, 2004.

58. Horng-luen Wang, "Regulating Transnational Flows of People: An Institutional Analysis of Passports and Visas as a Regime of Mobility," *Identities: Global Studies in Culture and Power* 11 (2004): 351–76.

59. Interview with S-Z04, October 17, 2003.

60. Allen Chun, "Democracy as Hegemony, Globalization as Indigenization, or the 'Culture' in Taiwanese National Politics," *Journal of Asian and African Studies* 35 (2000): 7–27; Christopher Hughes, *Taiwan and Chinese Nationalism: National Identity and Status in International Society* (New York: Routledge, 1997), 95–128.

61. Long Yingtai, "Wushi nian lai jiaguo: wo kan Taiwan de wenhua jingshen fenliezheng" ("Fifty Years of the Country: Taiwan's Schizophrenia in My View"), *Zhongguo shibao*, July 10–12, 2003.