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中国士绅：城乡关系论集 = China's Gentry: Essays in Rural-Urban Relations: 英汉对照/ 费孝通著； 赵旭东， 秦志杰译.— 北京：外语教学与研究出版社， 2011.1

ISBN 978-7-5135-0602-1

Ⅰ. (1)中…Ⅱ. (1)费… (2)赵… (3)秦…Ⅲ. (1)绅士—研究—中国—古代—英、 汉Ⅳ. (1)D691.71

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“博雅双语名家名作”出版说明

1840年鸦片战争以降，在深重的民族危机面前，中华民族精英“放眼看世界”，向世界寻求古老中国走向现代、走向世界的灵丹妙药，涌现出一大批中国主题的经典著述。我们今天阅读这些中文著述的时候，仍然深为字里行间所蕴藏的缜密的考据、深刻的学理、世界的视野和济世的情怀所感动，但往往会忽略：这些著述最初是用英文写就，我们耳熟能详的中文文本是原初英文文本的译本，这些英文作品在海外学术界和文化界同样享有崇高的声誉。

比如，林语堂的My Country and My People（《吾国与吾民》）以幽默风趣的笔调和睿智流畅的语言，将中国人的道德精神、生活情趣和中国社会文化的方方面面娓娓道来，在美国引起巨大反响——林语堂也以其中国主题系列作品赢得世界文坛的尊重，并获得诺贝尔文学奖的提名。再比如，梁思成在抗战的烽火中写就的英文版《图像中国建筑史》文稿（A Pictorial History of Chinese Architecture），经其挚友费慰梅女士（Wilma C. Fairbank）等人多年的奔走和努力，于1984年由麻省理工学院出版社（MIT Press）出版，并获得美国出版联合会颁发的“专业暨学术书籍金奖”。又比如，1939年，费孝通在伦敦政治经济学院的博士论文以Peasant Life in China—A Field Study of Country Life in the Yangtze Valley为名在英国劳特利奇书局（Routledge）出版，后以《江村经济》作为中译本书名——《江村经济》使得靠桑蚕为生的“开弦弓村”获得了世界性的声誉，成为国际社会学界研究中国农村的首选之地。

此外，一些中国主题的经典人文社科作品经海外汉学家和中国学者的如椽译笔，在英语世界也深受读者喜爱。比如，艾恺（Guy S. Alitto）将他1980年用中文访问梁漱溟的《这个世界会好吗——梁漱溟晚年口述》一书译成英文（Has Man a Future? —Dialogues with the Last Confucian），备受海内外读者关注；此类作品还有徐中约英译的梁启超著作《清代学术概论》（Intellectual Trends in the Ch'ing Period）、狄百瑞（W. T. de Bary）英译的黄宗羲著作《明夷待访录》（Waiting for the Dawn: A Plan for the Prince），等等。

有鉴于此，外研社人文社科出版分社推出“博雅双语名家名作”系列。

博雅，乃是该系列的出版立意。博雅教育（Liberal Education）早在古希腊时代就得以提倡，旨在培养具有广博知识和优雅气质的人，提高人文素质，培养健康人格，中国儒家六艺“礼、乐、射、御、书、数”亦有此功用。

双语，乃是该系列的出版形式。英汉双语对照的形式，既同时满足了英语学习者和汉语学习者通过阅读中国主题博雅读物提高英语和汉语能力的需求，又以中英双语思维、构架和写作的形式予后世学人以启迪——维特根斯坦有云：“语言的边界，乃是世界的边界”，诚哉斯言。

名家，乃是该系列的作者群体。涵盖文学、史学、哲学、政治学、经济学、考古学、人类学、建筑学等领域，皆海内外名家一时之选。

名作，乃是该系列的入选标准。系列中的各部作品都是经过时间的积淀、市场的检验和读者的鉴别而呈现的经典，正如卡尔维诺对“经典”的定义：经典并非你正在读的书，而是你正在重读的书。

胡适在《新思潮的意义》（1919年12月1日，《新青年》第7卷第1号）一文中提出了“研究问题、输入学理、整理国故、再造文明”的范式。秉着“记载人类文明、沟通世界文化”的出版理念，我们推出“博雅双语名家名作”系列，既希望能够在中国人创作的和以中国为主题的博雅英文文献领域“整理国故”，亦希望在和平发展、改革开放的新时代为“再造文明”、为“向世界说明中国”略尽绵薄之力。

外语教学与研究出版社

人文社科出版分社

编者说明

费孝通的英文著作China's Gentry 1953年由美国芝加哥大学出版社出版。该书由芝加哥大学教授罗伯特·雷德菲尔德（Robert Redfield）撰写导论，其夫人玛格丽特·帕克·雷德菲尔德（Margaret Park Redfield）对费先生的英文口述内容作了整理、修改和编辑。2009年12月，北京三联书店出版了由赵旭东、秦志杰翻译的中文版《中国士绅》。

费孝通以中国士绅为主题，恢宏广阔地勾画了农民、士绅、国家之间的结构型态，深入浅出地展现了中国传统乡村社会的权力结构和秩序维持的实践图景，现在看来仍具有重要的借鉴意义。更重要的是，费先生是希望通过这些英文文章，向西方读者表达一个中国人对中国的看法。这也是英汉对照双语版首次在国内推出的重要价值所在。

本版以英文原本与三联译本为基础——原英文版附录的六篇生活史（Life-Histories）并非费先生所作，为初版编者所加，故本书未收录；文中附图系郭光远（James K. Y. Kuo）为英文初版绘制；经译者惠允，本版对译文作了进一步修订，以期在呈现作品英文原貌的同时，便于读者对照阅读，更好地理解这一经典著作个中要义。

外语教学与研究出版社

人文社科出版分社

2011年2月

目录

INTRODUCTION

导   论

Chapter One   The Gentry and the Imperial Power

第壹章   士绅与皇权

Chapter Two   The Scholar Becomes the Official

第贰章   文人当官

Chapter Three   The Gentry and Technical Knowledge

第叁章   士绅与技术知识

Chapter Four   Basic Power Structure in Rural China

第肆章   中国乡村的基本权力结构

Chapter Five   Village, Town, and City

第伍章   村、镇与城市

Chapter Six   Rural Livelihood: Agriculture and Handicraft

第陆章   乡村生计：农业与手工业

Chapter Seven   Social Erosion in the Rural Communities

第柒章   乡土社区的社会侵蚀

EDITOR'S NOTE

编后记

译后记：逝者如斯的结构秩序

INTRODUCTION

导   论

●   I

To Western readers Hsiao-tung Fei is known as the author of a short, illuminating book on life in a Chinese village,[1] of another and more mature work on agriculture and industry in southwestern China,[2] and of a stimulating article[3] on one of the principal themes of the present book: the gentry in Chinese society. In China he is known also as a brilliant teacher, a leader and pioneer in sociological field research, and a man who has written widely, talked much, and acted fearlessly toward the solution of the immense social problems of China. After his return from London, where he took his doctorate under Bronislaw Malinowski, and during the war with Japan he joined those Chinese students and scholars who assembled to continue Chinese scientific and intellectual life in Yunnan Province. It was there that he carried on the studies that resulted in his second book. After the defeat of Japan he went back to teach in his old university, Tsinghua, in Peiping; and there (where I had come in the autumn of 1948 as a visiting professor to the same university) my wife and I resumed an old association with him.

This book is made from articles contributed by Fei to Chinese newspapers in 1947 and 1948. During that autumn of 1948 he dictated to my wife a rough translation of these articles, stopping as he did so to talk over with her the substance of the dictation and in part rewriting and enlarging the text in the course of these discussions. The work was done hastily, with enthusiasm, and in the tense anticipations of the coming of Communist control. For, while the dictation and the rewriting went on, Peiping was ringed by Communist forces, and the fall of the universities and of the city itself was expected within a very short time. In December, 1948, most of the students and many of the faculty of the university looked forward to the coming of the Communists as a relief from hardship and oppression and as new opportunity to apply intelligence to the improvement of social and political conditions in China. There was apprehension too; but, with the abundant knowledge of corruption and tyranny under the Nationalist government, the hope outweighed the apprehension. Fei, always sanguine and courageous, was then of the opinion that he could work effectively with the Communists, even though he would continue to criticize when he thought criticism was due. Like others in his university, he did not conceive the incoming government of Chinese Communists in the image of Stalinist Russia; he thought of them as Chinese like himself, as his old friends and students, whose voices he heard over the Communist radio promising all good things to the people of Peiping. So Fei spoke to us of his hope of becoming, for the Communist government, a part of "the loyal opposition." He had already fallen into the disfavor of both parties. While in Yunnan he had been threatened with arrest by the Nationalist government and was fired upon in a public meeting where he had spoken unfavorably of Chiang's regime; on the other hand, Communist voices in the North had attacked him bitterly for certain articles he had published. On the whole, however, Fei felt that his views as to developing Chinese industry and agriculture would be congenial to the interests of the new regime and that after the transition he would be able to continue to work and to speak for China. In this hope, almost a confidence, the articles here assembled were dictated.

●   一

许多西方读者都知道，费孝通写过一本关于一个中国乡村生活的书[4]，这本书篇幅虽短，但具有启蒙意义；还有一本有关中国西南部工农业方面的更为成熟的著作[5];再有就是涉及本书主题——中国士绅的那篇引人注目的文章[6]。在中国人看来，费先生还是一位睿智的师者、社会学实地研究领域的先驱和带头人，是著述广泛、善于言辞并为解决中国诸多社会问题而勇敢行动的人。他在伦敦获得博士学位，师从马林诺夫斯基。在抗日战争期间，一些中国学生和学者聚集云南，继续从事科学和学术活动，费先生回国后也加入了他们的队伍，他的第二部著作就完成于此地。日本战败后，他回到母校（即位于北平的清华大学）执教，我曾于1948年秋做过清华大学的访问学者，在那里我和夫人与他恢复了旧日的联系。

本书取材于费先生1947年至1948年间发表在中国报纸上的文章。1948年秋，费先生向我夫人翻译并口述了这些文章的大致内容，他不时停下来与我的夫人讨论口述内容的要点，并在讨论中作了某些修改和扩展。在他口述和修改这些文章的时候，共产党军队已经包围了北平。费先生怀着对共产党即将当政的强烈憧憬和满腔热情，仓促完成了这项工作。人们料想共产党将很快占领各所大学和整座城市。1948年12月，清华大学的大部分学生和许多老师都期待着共产党的到来，以求从压抑和痛苦中解脱出来，并认为这是运用聪明才智去改善中国社会和政治条件的新的机会。虽然他们也怀有恐惧，但由于已充分了解国民党政府的腐败和暴虐统治，希望还是战胜了恐惧。一向乐观而勇敢的费先生当时所持的观点是：他可以和共产党人一起有效地工作，不过，当他认为需要进行批评的时候，他会继续批评。但是，像清华大学的其他人一样，他并没有把即将到来的中国共产党的政府想象成斯大林主义俄国式的统治。在他心里，共产党人和自己一样是中国人，是他的老朋友或学生那样的人。他在收音机里听到了共产党向北平市民所作的美好承诺。所以，他告诉我们，他希望成为与共产党政府“忠诚对立”的一部分。他早已不被两党中的任一方所宠爱。在云南的时候，他曾被国民党政府以逮捕相威胁，并在一次公众集会上，因斥责蒋介石的统治而受到攻击。另一方面，北方的共产党也因他出版的某些文章而对他进行猛烈抨击。然而，总的来说，费先生认为他关于发展中国工农业的观点是符合新政权的利益的，在政权更替后，他仍能继续为中国而工作、为中国说话。这里汇集的几篇文章就是他满怀着这一近乎信心的希望口述的。

My wife and I left Peiping in December, 1948, and for more than three years now we have had no word from Fei. From others we have learned of some bare events. At about the time when Peiping fell to the Communists, Mao Tse-tung asked Fei to take charge of a research program with regard to problems of urban reconstruction, and he accepted and began the work. Fei published articles praising the "New Democracy" of China. He accepted membership on governmental boards or committees. Later he went on an expedition to study some of the remote communities of southwestern China—where he had worked during the Japanese war. Later word tells us that he has returned to Tsinghua University.

This book is published without any participation from him in its production since the days when he dictated its substance to my wife. It is evident that he prefers it so. Communication with Westerners would embarrass or endanger him; he does not write to us, and we have ceased to write to him. My wife edited the text she had transcribed, assuming considerable responsibility in changing the order of the parts, in adding references, and even in inserting phrases or whole sentences when she was sure that Fei's meaning would be served by such additions. It is to be emphasized that the book therefore is an expression of Fei's views and judgments as he was about to step over the threshold between revolutionary China and Communist China. It was written when his students (many of whom I knew) moved in an excitement of fresh opportunity to remake their country—and moved without dogma.

我和夫人1948年12月离开北平，至今三年多来我们一直没有费先生的音信。从其他人那里我们仅得到了很有限的消息。听说共产党占领北平后，毛泽东请费先生负责一个有关城市重建问题的研究项目，费先生应允并开始了工作。他发表文章赞扬中国的“新民主”，还加入了政府性质的委员会，成为其中的一员。后来，他奔赴中国西南部——那是他曾在抗日战争期间工作过的地方，在那里从事对某些偏远社区的研究。后来又有消息说，他已重返清华大学了。

自从他向我夫人口述这些文章的主旨后，这本书的形成和出版再也未经他的任何介入。很明显，他是乐于保持这样的状况的。由于与西方人接触会给他带来尴尬和危险，因而我们不再通信。我的夫人对她自己的记录进行了编辑，并且还怀着强烈的责任感对某些部分作了顺序调整，添加了注释，甚至添加了一些短语和句子——因为她相信，这样会使费先生所要表达的意思更明确。需要强调的是，本书表达了费先生将要从革命中国跨进共产主义中国时所持有的观点和看法。当他写这些文章时，他的许多学生（其中很多我都认识）已开始激动不已地并且毫无束缚地投入到重建自己国家的

Few of them had read a line of Marx. Most of them saw the Nationalist government as their oppressor, the Communists as their liberaters.

●   II

At the time he dictated a translation, Fei wanted the essays to be read by English-speaking people. Like other intelligent people of good will, he wanted China to be understood by Westerners, and he believed that he had something to say about China that was not said in other books. But, when Fei wrote the articles in the first place, he was talking to the Chinese; the present English version does not change that fact. Fei had developed a large audience for his newspaper articles; all sorts of people, mostly people neither peasants nor intellectuals, read and admired what he had to say about the problems of China. These essays, as newspaper articles, had contributed to the extension of a sense of responsibility in the Chinese people themselves to take charge of their own affairs, and to deal with them, for their own good. Thus the book provides for Westerners an unusual and valuable light on China: a Western-educated Chinese, devoted to working to solve problems of China, analyzes some aspects of these problems so as to make them clearer to his countrymen. The essays give a Chinese point of view on China. They are not written to put a good face on things, or a dark face. They are written to help the Chinese to reach understanding of their troubles. Fei is saying to his countrymen: "Look, this is what has happened to us in recent years. This is the real revolution. This is the place where our shoe pinches. Understand; then act." To Americans, accustomed to thinking of China simply as an object of our foreign policy under the assumption that what will happen in China depends on what we do rather than on what the Chinese do, this book gives fresh insight. Problems of China are here looked at by a Chinese as problems for Chinese to solve, and to solve not by taking political sides, not by joining Russia or joining America, but by reform, by Chinese, of Chinese institutions.

Of course only some of the problems of China are considered in this book. Fei examines certain aspects of the traditional social structure and certain changes that have occurred in that structure that make difficulties for China. The changes have taken place chiefly as a result of the influence of the West. The book therefore bears on that social revolution in China which underlies the overthrow of the empire, the revolutionary republican movement led by Sun Yat-sen, and the winning of political control of China by Chinese Communists. The book does help us to understand how Chinese communism won China.

新契机中去了。他们中很少人读过马克思的著作，大多数人把国民党政府看作是压迫者，而把共产党人看作是解放者。

●   二

当费先生口述这些文章的英文译文时，他是希望英语读者去阅读它。像其他具有良好愿望的知识分子一样，他希望中国能被西方读者所理解，并且相信他要讲的是一些其他书中不曾讲到的关于中国的问题。但是，当费先生最初写这些文章时，他是在与中国人对话。这一事实在此英文版本中并没有改变。费先生在报纸上发表的文章有很大的读者群，包括各种各样的人，大多数既非农民也非知识分子。他们都读过费先生讲到的中国社会问题，而且都很欣赏。这些发表在报纸上的文章唤起了中国人的责任感，使他们意识到自己的事情要由自己来解决，从而维护自己的利益。因此，对于西方读者来讲，本书包含有一种关乎中国问题的不同寻常而又价值无比的见解，这是一位受过西方教育的中国人献身于解决中国问题的事业当中，对这些问题的某些方面进行分析，以使他的同胞能够得到更清楚的认识。这些文章表达了一个中国人对中国的看法。这样做并非是在给事物贴上好坏的标签，而是帮助中国人理解他们当下所面临的困境。费先生是在对他的同胞讲：“看，这是近几年来发生在我们身上的事。这是真正的革命。这就是令我们裹足不前的所在，认识它，了解它，然后就可以有所作为。”长期以来，美国人一直认为中国只不过是美国外交政策的一个对象，中国的发展取决于美国人而非中国人怎么做。对于他们来说，这本书无疑体现了一种全新的观点。在本书中，中国人把中国的问题看作是他们自己要解决的问题，而解决这些问题并不能依靠政治上的一边倒——倒向俄罗斯或倒向美国，而要靠改革，要由中国人来改革自己的制度。

当然，本书只涉及了中国的某些问题。费先生研究了传统社会结构的某些方面以及发生在这一结构中的给中国造成困难的某些变化。这些变化的发生主要是西方影响的结果。因此，本书与中国的社会革命有关，它是以君主专制的灭亡、孙中山所领导的民主共和革命运动以及中国共产党夺取政权等历史事件为基础。本书确实可以帮助我们理解中国共产主义运动是如何赢得中国的。

●   III

As the essays were written as separate articles, the threads of common idea which hold them together are not so apparent as they might be. There are two interrelated themes: the functions of the scholar and the gentry in the traditional Chinese society and the relations of the country and the city. The first theme is uppermost in the first four essays. The gentry and the scholars must be discussed together, for the scholars were chiefly (but not entirely) derived from the gentry, and the gentry carried on their functions and enjoyed their social position by virtue of the fact that some of them were scholars. The scholars were an elite; the gentry, a social and economic class. The first essay shows how the scholars, by becoming administrative servants of the imperial power, obtained security for themselves and kinsmen. In the second essay we find an account of the history of the development of this adjustment and of how the scholars reflected upon the relationship they had come to have with the centralized authority and how they explained and justified it in their philosophies. The third essay turns on the question why China experienced no important technical development. The scholars, or intellectuals, are now examined from the point of view of the exclusive concern they had with ethical knowledge: the intellectuals had no technical knowledge; they were supported by the labor of others and were unconcerned with productive work. So the governing class lacked the kind of knowledge which would have improved the material condition of the people. In the fourth essay, as in the first two, the point of attention is the function of the scholar-official in mediating the imperial power. But now the attention is directed to that educated member of the gentry who, remaining in the local community, negotiated, in a personal and extralegal way, with the formally recognized functionary who occupied the lowest position in the official bureaucracy. This critical function, exercised by the scholar-gentry, made the imperial power workable, while yet maintaining the traditional social organization of the village. This essay develops into a discussion of the pao-chia system (at that time recently reintroduced by the Kuomintang and later abolished by the Communists) by which it was sought to make the central authority directly influential upon the local community and shows why it was doomed to failure.

●   三

由于这些文章独立成篇，其共同主题并非显而易见。文中有两条相互交错的线索：其一是传统社会中文人和士绅的作用，其二是乡村和城市之间的关系。前四篇文章主要讲第一个主题。文人和士绅要相提并论，因为文人大部分（并非全部）来自士绅，而士绅也靠他们中的某些人是文人而发挥作用和享受社会地位。文人是精英，而士绅属于社会经济阶层。第一篇文章讲述文人如何通过做官来为他们自己以及亲属赢得安全。第二篇文章描述了从文人到官员的这种调整的发展历史和文人如何看待他们与集权统治的关系以及如何以他们自己的哲学来对此加以解释和论证。第三篇文章转向了为什么中国没有经历重要的技术发展这一问题。在这里是从他们对于规范知识的独特关注的视角上而对文人或者说是知识分子作了考察。知识分子毫无技术知识，他们依靠别人的劳动，对生产活动毫不关心。所以统治阶级缺乏那种能够增进人民的物质条件的知识。与第一、第二篇文章一样，第四篇文章的关注点是士大夫在帝国的权力中作为中介的功能。但是现在的注意力指向了士绅中受过教育的人，他们仍住在地方社区当中，以私人的以及法律以外的方式，同那些正式承认的、在官府中担任最低职位的官吏打交道。文人士绅发挥的这种关键作用，使得皇权统治得以施行，并且维护了村庄的传统社会组织。这篇文章继而进一步讨论了保甲制度（该制度当时刚被国民党重新提出，后来又被共产党所废除），以此探求中央权威如何对地方社区施加直接影响，并要表明这样的做法为什么注定要失败。

In the fifth essay there is apparently a new beginning; Fei here takes up not the administrative relations but the economic relations between country and city. The scholar-gentry are not so apparent; but they are here just the same. For, while Fei is telling us that the economic relationship between city and country works to the disadvantage of the country, because the city lives off the country by taking rent and interest from the countryman without sending to the country the products it needs and could consume, we must remember that it is these same gentry who are pocketing the rent and interest and increasingly using the money to buy Western-made products instead of Chinese-made goods. Fei distinguishes several types of towns and cities and shows how each type served the interests of the gentry (and also those of the imperial power) and did not bring advantage to the peasants. Garrison town, market town, and treaty port—all provided opportunities for the economic exploitation of the country. Thus the peasant came to pay a large part of the products of this labor to maintain the gentry class, while the gentry, coming to prefer Western goods, no longer bought the products of rural handicraft and so ruined the small manufacturing which provided the peasant with a little margin over the barest subsistence.

The sixth essay develops this theme of the unsatisfactory character of the exchange between city and country and the worsening of the situation since the introduction of products manufactured in the West. And the seventh essay continues the consideration of the dislocations of the old social and economic system brought about by the influence of the West, while it returns to the theme of the scholar and his functions in Chinese society. In these last pages we see that the modern intellectual, the man educated in Western learning, does not take the place of the old intelligentsia. He does not go back to the country where he has no social position and no career. He stays in the city; so from the country is eroded away some of its best human resources. And some of the rural people, becoming poorer than ever, are also detached from the rural community and become predatory rovers or—as ever in China—rebels against the government. So only a few years before the Communists began to purge by shooting, and before the fighting in Korea, this series of essays ends, a diagnosis of immense problems, a declaration of hope that the Communists would provide leadership toward solving them.

第五篇文章显然是一个新的起点。费先生在这里不再继续探讨城乡之间的行政关系，而是论述了城乡之间的经济关系。这里没有明确提及文人士绅关系，但实际上都是存在的。费先生告诉我们说，城乡之间的经济关系给乡村带来不利影响，因为城市靠从乡村收取地租和利息而生存，但却不把乡民们所需要的以及所能够消费得起的产品提供给他们。此时我们必须记住，正是这些士绅把地租和利息装进自己的口袋，并且不断地去购买由西方而不是中国制造出来的商品。费先生把城镇分成几类，指出每一类是如何仅仅满足士绅（和皇权势力）的利益而不给乡村带来任何好处的。衙门围墙式的城、集镇以及通商口岸，都为从经济上剥削乡村提供了机会。因此，乡民们的劳动产品中很大一部分是用来供养士绅阶层，但士绅们不再购买农村的手工业产品，却转而青睐洋货，这样便毁灭了能给乡民勉强糊口的生活带来些许改善的小手工业。

第六篇文章进一步论述了城乡交换的不尽如人意以及引进洋货后这一情形的进一步恶化。第七篇文章继续论及西方影响给中国陈旧的社会经济制度造成的混乱，最后又回到文人及其在中国社会中的作用这一问题上来。在最后的这些篇幅里我们注意到，受过西方教育的现代知识分子并没有取代旧知识分子。他们没有回到既无社会地位又无事业可谈的乡村中去，而是留在城市里，因此乡村流失了一些最优秀的人力资源。一些乡民变得越来越贫困，他们脱离了乡村群体而成为流浪的强盗，或者是像中国过去一再出现过的那样，成为叛乱分子。这一系列文章收笔于共产党准备开始镇压反革命以及朝鲜战争爆发的前几年。这是一份对中国众多问题的诊断书，是希望共产党能带领人们解决这些问题的一份宣言书。

●   IV

To the Westerner the book sheds light on the recent political behavior of China and suggests that the failure of the West to prevent the party and power of Mao Tse-tung from taking control arose out of a worsening situation among the Chinese people which the party of Chiang Kai-shek did not remedy and which many Americans did not understand. Furthermore, it offers a different construction from that which is often put forward as to the benefit so far received by China from the importation of Western technology and capital.

First is borne in upon the reader the unwisdom, in the light of this analysis, of assuming that to the Chinese the central government has traditionally the meaning to Chinese which government has had to Americans and western Europeans. We have dealt with Chinese governments as though the Chinese thought they represented the Chinese people. It might have been nearer the truth if we had begun by assuming that centralized government is, traditionally, a potentially dangerous predator upon the people—"the tiger." With the revolution of Sun Yat-sen appeared governments that promised to act on behalf of the people, limiting their own power constitutionally. However, the credit of this promise, to Chinese, passed in the last decade from the Kuomintang to the Communist party. And the "people's assemblies," the innumerable committees and discussions, stimulated and guided by the Communists, gave Chinese, when the Communists took over, a sense of direct participation in government which they never experienced, and rarely thought was theirs to claim, during the long imperial period.

Second, we understand from what is brought forth in these pages how little prepared have been the Chinese people to assume leadership and carry on constructive and efficient national government. When many of us joined General Marshall in bidding the educated liberals of China to take the lead in constituting a government neither Communist nor corrupt, we did not understand the tradition of which those liberals are the heir. Since the time of Confucius at least, the educated man in China has been concerned with ethical advice (or "normative knowledge," as Fei calls it), not with political action. Indeed, as Fei makes quite plain, especially in the first and fourth essays, sound political policy in China has been to neutralize the political power of the emperor, not to control it. Do-nothingism, he says, has been the equivalent of a constitutional check on government. So the scholar, while being an administrator, had nothing to do with shaping national policy; and administrative effectiveness consisted not in technical efficiency, as in the West, but in skill in such personal negotiations as kept local affairs running not too much disturbed by demands of centralized power. An educated elite with this tradition, without any political power or experience in the formation of policy, separated from the peasantry by mode of life and class position, could hardly be expected to rescue China from the torments of civil war. For the Chinese who has a modern Western education is only the heir of the scholar-official of the long imperial period.

●   四

本书给西方读者阐明了中国近期的政治行为，并指出，西方企图阻止共产党和毛泽东政权上台的失败，是由于蒋介石的国民党没能挽救中国人民于每况愈下的处境，而对于许多美国人来说也未能理解这一危急形势。同时，对于通常认为中国受益于引进西方技术和资本的观点，本书也作出了相反的回答。

依照这一分析，读者首先认识到，如果假设对于中国人来说，传统上中央政府对中国人的意义与政府对美国人和西欧人的意义一样，这是很不智的。我们在与中国政府打交道时，总是假定中国人认为这些政府是代表中国人民的。如果我们一开始就假定，即从传统的意义上说，中央政府对人民而言，通常是潜在的危险的捕食者，是“老虎”，这也许会更接近于真实。随着孙中山的革命运动，出现了代表民众、用宪法限制自身权力的政府。不过，在中国人看来，代表民众的美名在过去的十年中由国民党转移到了共产党身上。由共产党所发动和领导的人民代表大会、不计其数的委员会和讨论，使中国人感受到，自己在共产党掌权后直接参与了政府，这是他们在漫长的帝国时代里从未经历也几乎没敢要求过的。

其次，从这些文章中我们了解到，中国人对于掌握政权、施行建设性和有效的国家统治是何等地准备不足！我们许多人加入马歇尔将军的队伍，呼吁中国受过教育的自由派领导中国，建立起一个既非共产主义的、也非腐化堕落的政府。但是我们并不了解，这些自由派实质是这些传统东西的继承人。至少是从孔子时代开始，中国受过教育的人已经和伦理教条（或者如费先生所称谓的“规范知识”）而非政治行为联系在一起。实际上，正如费先生特别在第一篇与第四篇文章中明确阐述的那样，在中国，良好的政治策略是使皇帝的政治权力自然化，而不是要去控制它。他说，“无为”成为政府体制约束的同义词。因此，作为官员的文人，在制定国家政策上无所事事；行政的效率并非像西方那样体现在技术的效率上，而是体现在为保持地方不过多地受到中央政权的干扰而进行的个人游说的技能上。一个具有这种传统的受过教育的精英，没有任何政治权力或制定政策的经验，从生活方式和阶级地位上脱离了农民身份，我们很难想象这样的人能把中国从内战的混乱中解救出来，因为受过现代西方教育的中国人也只不过是中国漫长的帝国时代的文官的传续。

The ancient system was not based on economic justice, but it worked. It worked to the degree that, except for natural catastrophes and wars, it gave the peasant a certain amount of security. His village handicrafts provided an income supplementary to that provided by his agriculture and used the labor that was not needed in slack seasons of the farmer's year. He had to support the gentry, but the scholar-official of the class he supported was useful to him in negotiating with the representatives of the imperial power to prevent the infliction of extreme hardship; and, if the peasant was both industrious and fortunate, he might live to see his son or grandson become a scholar and an official and so experience elevation in his own status. The teachings of the ancient sages reached the peasants through these scholars and redefined again and again the sense of moral purpose which peasant and gentry had in common. The Confucian non-acquisitive ideal both harmonized the peasant's ethics with his lot in life and acted as a restraint upon an imperial power otherwise without check.

If we call this regime, from a view of its politics, democratic or authoritarian, we are likely in either case to misrepresent the facts. The participation of a good many villagers in decisions as to local matters was hardly an equal participation, and the influence of the gentry on the local life was, through their economic power alone, very great. The authoritarianism of the central government was in cases and at times truly autocratic, yet that regime was in theory based on moral authority rather than force; the teachings of the Confucians made the point again and again; the fact that an ideal other than absolutism existed influenced the facts, just as the ideal of social equality between all men influences the facts in the United States.

Thus the opposition between gentry and peasantry in traditional China was held within bounds by the real economic interdependence of the two classes, by the degree of mobility between them, by the co-operation between the two in dealing with the imperial power, and by common ethical principles. What happened to this system that made in China a genuine social revolution? Fei's book is no systematic study of this question—or of any other—but it does suggest some part of the answer. The changes that occurred in China through contact with the West disrupted this system, made it unworkable, and increased the real or apparent harshness of the inequality of life-changes between gentry and peasantry. Fei assumes but does not discuss the general effects in China of that great awakening of the ill-fed, overworked two-thirds of the human race, who live chiefly in Asia, which is such an immense event of our times: the new and growing discontent of the underdog everywhere. The special effects which he puts to the fore are the importation of goods (rather than of capital) and the new learning. Fei is plainly convinced that the benefits of Western capitalistic development in China did the common people harm rather than good. As the gentry developed tastes for Western goods, while some of them found new sources for wealth in trading with the West, they came to spend their profits realized in rent or interest on Western products. The peasant lost his market for his handicrafts and often found it difficult to move to market any agricultural produce that he might be lucky enough to have left over from his domestic wants. Whether Fei's account can stand without some qualifications or not, the visitor to China in recent years cannot fail to catch some of the bitterness with which many Chinese look upon Shanghai and the other treaty ports, where live the privileged, Chinese or Western, "sucking out the wealth of the Chinese people for their own luxuries." So the war between Nationalists and Communists is seen, against this background, not as a conquest of China by a foreign power or a foreign ideology but as a civil conflict between the traditionally privileged rentier class and the rural population.

古代的体系并非基于经济的公平，但却可行，可行到如果没有自然灾害和战争，农民就可以有一定程度安全感的地步。在农闲季节，多余的劳动力从事手工业可以带来额外收入。他们必须供养士绅，但是在与帝国权力的代表人物交涉以避免厄运时，他们所供养的这一阶层中的文官对他们又是有用的。并且，如果一个农民既勤劳又幸运，他也许能在有生之年看到自己的儿子或孙子成为文人和官吏，那么，他自己的地位也会因此而提高。古代圣人的教导便是通过这些文人来传递给农民的，并且一次又一次重新界定农民和士绅都共同认可的道德目的的意义。孔子“无欲”的理想既调和了农民对于命运的伦理思想，又限制了皇权，否则皇权将毫无节制。

从政治的角度看，如果我们把这种统治叫做民主或独裁，那就可能歪曲了事实。在决定本村的事务时，众多村民的参加几乎并非平等的参与。士绅单单凭借他们在经济上的实力而对当地生活造成的影响就是相当巨大的。中央政府的威权主义有时存在，而且的确十分专制，但这种统治理论上是根基于道德权威而非武力，儒家学说曾多次指出过这一点。正是一种理想而非专制主义的存在这一事实影响到了这些现实，这与在美国人人平等的理想影响到了美国的那些现实是一样的。

因此在传统的中国，士绅和农民的对立局限在一定的范围之内：他们经济上互相依赖；在某种程度上，他们之间可以流动；在同皇权打交道时互相合作；享有共同的伦理概念。那么，这一体制发生了什么而导致了中国一场真正的社会革命？费先生并没有在书中对这一问题或任何其他问题作系统研究，但却的确暗示了部分的答案。中国在与西方接触的过程中发生的变化破坏了这种体制，使其丧失效力，并使士绅和农民之间不平等的生活差异变得更为严重。费先生没有讨论占世界人口三分之二、主要居住在亚洲、食不果腹、过度劳累的人民的伟大觉醒所带来的影响，但对此作了假设。这一觉醒是当今时代的一件大事：无处不在的被压迫者对现实新生的不满与日俱增。费先生将物品（而不是资本）的进口和新学的出现这样的特殊影响看作是首当其冲的。费先生确信，西方资本主义在中国的发展对老百姓有害无利。随着士绅们逐渐培养起对洋货的品味，当他们中的某些人在与西方贸易的过程中发现新的发财之路时，他们便会开始用收取地租和利息得来的钱去购买洋货。农民的手工业品失去了市场，并且通常很难将除自用之外有幸剩下的农产品拿到集市上去出售。无论费先生的描述是否能站得住脚，近几年到过中国的人都不难感受到某些凄凉之处，许多中国人正是带着这种凄凉来看待上海以及其他通商口岸的：在那里居住着享有特权的中国人或洋人，他们“为享受荣华富贵而榨取中国人民的财富”。因此，在这种背景下，国民党和共产党的斗争就不是被看作中国被国外的势力或意识形态所征服，而是来自传统的靠收取地租和利息生存的特权阶层和农民的内部冲突。

And more and more did the sympathies of the Chinese with modern education turn to the rural population and against the rentier class. They came to take hope that the reforms promised by Mao Tse-tung would remove some of the worst of the economic injustices of China. They saw a chance that they could use the special scientific knowledge many of them had acquired in solving the problem of how the city and country might be made mutually beneficial. They attacked the question of how industrialization of China might be wisely carried on, so that the common people might benefit. They began to see how great was their own personal and professional problem: to learn to act politically, to help make public policy in rural communities, and to work with a peasant from whom tradition had separated them.

接受现代教育的中国人，越来越同情农民而反对收取地租的阶层。他们开始寄希望于毛泽东，希望他的改革能祛除某些严重经济不平等现象。他们看到了可以用自己掌握的专门的科学知识去解决城乡互惠互利问题的那种机会。他们着力解决如何巧妙地在中国实施工业化，从而使得普通民众可以受益这一问题。他们开始发现自己个人的和职业上所面对的问题是何等地重要，那就是要学会政治上的行为方式，要帮助制定乡村社区的公共政策，还要与在传统上跟他们分离开来的农民并肩工作。

Hsiao-tung Fei, himself a member of the gentry class, at the time these essays were written was probably the leading voice among those striving to solve the problem of China with the aid of science and toward the common welfare. Through his studies and periods of residence in the West he had come to assume a position, unfamiliar to the traditional intellectual of China, that "something must be done to help." For this he and some few others in China like him were criticized by other intellectuals. Interested in American democracy and in English socialism, convinced that the people of China must assume responsibility for economic and social reform, he turned to the writing of the papers that now appear in this book partly because the suspicious Nationalist Chinese government would not allow him to carry on field research. The essays are in part an indirect criticism of the failures of the Nationalist government. Whether today Fei has the freedom he needs to speak and act in accordance with his convictions is not known to the writer of these lines. But those who know him are sure that he will continue as long as he is able to devote his energies, and to risk his life, to help the Chinese people.

●   V

The correctness of Fei's interpretations of the origins of economic and political problems in China may be open to criticism. There are other minds and other books to do this. Another aspect of the book is also open to criticism: the use and interpretation of references to classical Chinese literature. Such references occur especially in the first two essays. To me the correctness of Fei's philological and philosophical understandings is, in the general context of this work, less important than the fact that he used the Chinese classics at all. The old literati had ceased to perpetuate themselves; they are gone forever; Fei's face was turned hopefully to the Communists, whose doctrines he knew to be anti-Confucian and Marxist. Yet Fei, talking to his own people, "the plain people," elaborates and demonstrates his views with etymologies and quotations from the traditional poets and philosophers. Also he quotes Lilienthal, R. H. Tawney, and Sorokin! There is something in these pages that tells us about the forms of thought appropriate to the persuasion of literate Chinese at the turn of the revolutionary tide.

费孝通本人出身于士绅阶层，他所写的这些文章可能是那些想着民众的福利、主张依靠科学解决中国问题的人们的先声。他在西方学习和逗留期间逐渐认识到：“该做点帮忙的事情了。”这一立场对传统中国知识分子来说有些生疏，他同国内另外几个人因此遭到其他知识分子的批判。由于他对美国的民主和英国的社会主义感兴趣，认定中国人要负起经济与社会改革的责任，所以才会写下本书中所收录的文章，这里有一部分原因就是考虑到持怀疑态度的国民党政府可能不允许他去进行实地的田野研究。这些文章实际上委婉地批判了国民党政府的失败。费先生今天是否有依其信念的言行自由，本文作者不得而知，但认识费先生的人都确信，他会尽其可能继续不畏艰险、鞠躬尽瘁地帮助中国人民。

●   五

费先生对中国经济和社会问题的解释的正确性可能会引起批评意见。这是其他人和其他书要做的事了。本书的另外一个方面也许同样会遭到批评，那就是对本书所参考的中国古典文献的运用和解释方面。这些文献尤其在前两篇文章中居多。在我看来，费先生在文献学和哲学方面理解的正确性，从本书的一般脉络上来看，并不及他运用了中国经典这一事实来得重要。古代的文人学士已离我们而去，无法再永垂不朽。费先生转而憧憬共产主义，他深知共产党人的主张与儒家思想相左，他们是坚持马克思主义的。然而他引用古代诗人和哲人的语句来向他的“纯朴的人民”阐明自己的观点。他竟然还引用到了李林塞尔、理查德·亨利·托尼和索罗金！本书的字里行间向我们讲述了在革命浪潮转折时期，合乎中国文人信念的思维方式。

●   VI

Fei's seven essays are followed in this volume by six life-histories of Chinese gentry collected by Mr. Yung-teh Chow in Yunnan between 1943 and 1946. Mr. Chow has translated these into English and kindly allowed their inclusion in this book. The accounts seem to us to exhibit, in terms of the life-careers of particular individuals, some of the principal generalizations Fei offers as to the role, partly beneficial, partly predatory, of the traditional Chinese gentry. Further comment on these life-histories appears on pages 145–148.

A Chinese sociologist in this country said to my wife and me: "When a Chinese sociologist writes for Chinese, he writes very differently from the way he writes for Americans." The remark suggests something of the incompleteness with which Western social science and traditional Chinese forms of thought have become fused. It helps to explain, also, why my wife left in the text the many references to Chinese classics which Fei put there and introduced in the footnotes some explanations of some of these references. These references are entirely superfluous to the Sinologist; they are inserted to help readers who are not Sinologists to recognize the sources of some of Fei's allusions.

In the cases of Chinese who have written in English and have recorded their names with the surname in last position, we have followed this practice; in other cases we have written the names as the Chinese do: with the surname first.

My wife and I are indebted to Mr. William L. Holland and the Institute of Pacific Relations (which had previously given aid to Fei for his researches on the Chinese gentry) for guidance and encouragement in the course of the preparation of the manuscript; to Professor John K. Fairbank, Dr. Marion J. Levy, Jr., Dr. Derk Bodde, W. Lloyd Warner, and Dr. Sol Tax for their kindness in reading the work and making helpful suggestions; and to Dr. Shu-ching Lee for advice on points of Chinese language or history and in connection with the editing of the life-histories. None of the above, however, has any responsibility for the content or form of the book.

ROBERT REDFIELD

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

May 1952

●   六

本书除了费先生的七篇短论外，接下来是六篇中国士绅的生活史，由周荣德先生于1943年至1946年间在云南搜集整理。周先生已将其译成英文并惠允我加进本书中来。从这些个人生活经历的角度来说，这些描述似乎向我们展示了费先生所概括的传统士绅阶层作用的一些主要性质，其作用大可说是利弊参半。在本书的145页至148页有对这些生活史的进一步评论。［该附录部分非费孝通所作，故未收入本书——编者注］

一位中国社会学家对我和夫人说：“当一位中国社会学家为中国人写作时，他的写作风格与为美国人写作时截然不同。”这一见解暗示了西方的社会科学和中国人的传统思维方式相融合时某种程度的不完全。这也有助于解释为什么我夫人在正文中保留了费先生引用的众多中国古典文献，并在脚注中对其中一部分加以解释说明。这些引用对汉学家来讲完全多余，它们是为了帮助非汉学家的读者去认识费先生某些引述典故的出处。

对于那些曾用英文写作并以英文形式（姓氏在后）注名的中国人的姓名，我们姑且沿用这种形式。其余的名字我们仍按中国人的习惯，即姓氏在前。

在准备本书原稿的过程中，威廉·霍兰德先生和太平洋国际学会（该学会曾为费先生研究中国士绅阶层问题提供帮助）给予了我们指导和鼓励，我和夫人在此深表感激。费正清教授、小马利恩·利维博士、德克·卜德博士、劳埃德·沃纳和索尔·塔克斯博士都阅读了本书，并提出了宝贵建议；李树清博士在汉语语言和中国历史以及生活史编辑工作方面多有建议——我们在此都一并表示感谢。以上诸位对本书的内容和形式不负任何责任。

罗伯特·雷德菲尔德

1952年5月于芝加哥大学

[1] Peasant Life in China (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, Ltd.; New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., 1939).

[2] Earthbound China (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1945; London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, Ltd., 1948).

[3] "Peasantry and Gentry: An Interpretation of Chinese Social Structure and Its Changes," American Journal of Sociology, LII, No. 1 (July, 1946), 1–17.

[4] 《江村经济——中国农民的生活》，伦敦：劳特里奇与基根·保罗出版有限公司；纽约：杜冬出版公司，1939年。

[5] 《被土地束缚的中国》，芝加哥：芝加哥大学出版社，1945年；伦敦：劳特里奇与基根·保罗出版有限公司，1948年。

[6] 《农民和士绅——中国社会结构及其变迁的一种解释》，载于《美国社会学学刊》第52卷第1期，1946年7月，1—17页。

Chapter One   The Gentry and the Imperial Power

第壹章   士绅与皇权

The term "gentry," shen-shih, refers to a class of persons with a definite position and definite functions in the traditional society of China. Here, by "traditional society," is meant the period after the breakdown of feudalism and the unification of the empire under a centralized monarchical power not long before 200 B.C. The development of the gentry class has a history; only through this history can we understand its characteristics.

The class that is here called gentry is also sometimes referred to as shih ta fu, "scholar-official." Actually the gentry class, although closely linked with the group of scholar-officials, should be distinguished from it. To be born into a gentry family did not necessarily insure that one became a scholar or an official in traditional China. Under feudalism the situation was different. At that time the gap between the nobles and the commoners was great. Shih[1] and ta fu[2], although they were the bottom of the hierarchy of the ruling class, were still a part of that class and as such possessed real political power. But after the breakdown of feudalism political power was no longer portioned out but became concentrated in the person of one man, the monarch. In order to carry out his administrative functions, the monarch required assistance. This was given him by the officials. The officials then were no longer relatives or members of the ruler's own family but rather employees—the servants, or tools, of the monarch.

After the breakdown of feudalism there was another important change. The throne became the object of capture by the strong, by the hunters after power. Under feudalism, in which political power was distributed to relatives and kin, anyone not born into a noble family was a common man who had no chance of reaching the throne, of touching or even of seeing the divine paraphernalia of monarchy. No more than a woman can change into a man could a common man become royal. But, when feudalism went, anyone could become emperor. Thus political power became an object of struggle. This is illustrated by the story told by the historian Ch'ien Ssu-ma of Xiang Yu, who during the Ch'in dynasty (221–206 B.C.), in watching an imperial procession, said to his friend, "This I can seize." Since that time the struggle for political power has never ceased. Political power in the eyes of the people has become something precious to be sought after, an enterprise for large-scale entrepreneurs.

“士绅”这个词，指的是在中国传统社会中占有一定地位、发挥一定功能的一个阶层。这里所谓的“传统社会”是指临近公元前3世纪时封建制度解体之后，由中央集权一统天下的帝国时期。士绅阶层有其自身的发展历史，只有通过这一历史，我们才能了解其特征。

本书所讲的士绅阶层有时也被称为“士大夫”。实际上，虽然士绅阶层与士大夫群体紧密相连，但仍应把他们区分开来。出身于士绅家庭，并不能确保此人将来一定会成为中国传统社会中的文人或官员。在封建时代，情形便不大一样。封建时代的贵族和平民之间存在有不可逾越的鸿沟。“士”[3]和“大夫”[4]虽然处于统治阶级等级体系的最底层，但他们仍属于统治阶级的一部分，并拥有真正的政治权力。但封建制度解体后，政权不再分散，而是集中在最高统治者一人手里。为了实施管理，最高统治者需要辅佐。这种辅佐是由官吏来提供的。因此，这里的官吏不再是统治者的家族成员或亲戚，而是他的雇佣，即仆人或者统治工具。

封建制度解体后发生了另一重要的变化，皇权成为强者、权力追逐者竞相争夺的目标。在封建制度下，政权分配给统治者的亲戚和家属，出生在贵族家庭之外的人是平民，他们永远没有机会登上王位，没有机会触摸君王的神圣用具，甚至连看的机会也没有。平民要想成为皇室的成员就像女人要变成男人一样不大可能。但是，封建制度解体后，任何人都有可能成为皇帝。这样，政治权力就成为大家争夺的目标。历史学家司马迁描述过这样一个故事：秦朝（公元前221年—公元前206年）时的项羽在观看皇家列队时对他的朋友说：“彼可取而代之。”从那以后，争夺政治权力的斗争从来就没有停止过。政治权力在人们的眼里已成为竞相猎取的宝贝，要做大买卖的就干这个。

Unfortunately, since the breakdown of the feudal structure in China, political power has no longer been transmitted permanently in certain families, and up to the present no peaceful means of attaining it has ever been found. We continue to be convinced that the way to gain political power is through "taking up the stick" and fighting civil wars. Those few who emerge victorious in this struggle become emperors; the defeated become bandits. So we have had a succession of tyrants. A few people rule the mass. The nature of this despotic monarchy is not changed by the handing-on or relaying of power. In England, when a monarch was killed, monarchical power itself received a blow. Changes of monarchy led in time to a growth in the power of the people and to a government monarchic in name only. But, in China, blood flows from the people's veins, while those who attain the throne are but a few fortunate adventurers, like Liu Pang, the first emperor of the Han, who was born a lowly peasant, or Chu Yuan-chang, the founder of the Ming dynasty. When we study official versions of Chinese history, we find presented to us a continuous line of dynastic descent; but we should not forget that the authority of these rulers was continuously challenged by civil wars and unscrupulous adventurers.

To struggle for political power by violence is dangerous. If a man succeeds, he may become emperor; but, if he loses, he will be killed, and not only he himself but his whole family and clan. When he is challenging the established emperor, he is called a bandit and rebel, and the might of the army is directed against him. Moreover, the empire gained by violence may be lost by violence also. Twice in history, according to tradition, emperors tried to give up their power to other men who they thought would make better rulers. But those to whom the power was offered did not want it. They preferred to run away rather than to take on the responsibility. We do not know how far these two emperors were sincere in their desire to give up their power and to what extent this action was no more than a gesture or a piece of complicated political intrigue. There is no question of the fact, however, that in all of Chinese recorded history there is not a single case of voluntary abdication from the throne. Those abdications which did take place were forced. "The empire that was won on horseback will be lost only on horseback," as the popular saying goes.[5]

To seek to become a monarch is to risk one's life. The heir to the throne must uphold his succession. The emperor, who should be merciful, may pardon all other crimes but not the crime of attempted usurpation. That is the most terrible thing that can be attempted under heaven. To anyone who reads the records of the beginnings of the Ming dynasty, the account of tortures applied to those who menaced the throne sounds like an account of progress through hell. I was told that the models of the "eighteen hells" found in district Buddhist temples are reminiscent of what was really done in the Ming dynasty. The threat of torture was the emperor's protection. I remember once as a boy calling out in play, "I am the emperor." My grandmother stopped me at once, saying, "You must never say that." This was not superstition or overcaution on her part but a recognition of a real danger in rash speaking. According to tradition at least, emperors used to have those children killed whom fortune-tellers foretold would one day become monarchs.

不幸的是，中国封建制度里解放出来的政权，固然不再专属一姓、万世一系了，但是到现在还没有找出一个夺取政权的和平方式。我们一说起夺取政权，就忘不了“揭竿而起”的内战手段。武力争夺的方式下，政权变成了“成则为王、败则为寇”的夺宝对象。夺来夺去，以暴易暴，总是极少数人统治着其他的人民，专制的皇权并没有在政权的传承和接替中发生任何性质上的改变。我们不像英国——杀了一个皇帝，皇权减少了一些，民权抬了一些头；赶走一个皇帝，皇权又减少了一些，民权再抬一些头；最后竟成了个挂名皇帝，取消了皇权——但是，在传统中国只有“取而代之”的故事，流的是人民的血，得到宝座的却是少数幸运的“流氓”，像下层农民出身的汉朝开国皇帝刘邦、明朝开国皇帝朱元璋等一派人物就是。在官方修撰的史籍上，固然有着一脉相承的正统；可事实上，大小规模的内战和肆无忌惮的冒险者恐怕是经常的现象，史不绝书，不断挑战着统治者的权威。

以武力争夺政权是危险的事。成固然可以称王，败则只有一死；非但一死，而且还会灭族。当他向当政的皇帝提出挑战时，他就成为寇匪或反贼，军队会冲他而来。况且，通过暴力得来的政权可能也会因暴力而丧失。历史上曾有过两次，依照传统，皇帝试图把政权让给他认为是更好的统治者的人。但是那些人并不想得到政权，他们宁可远离而不愿肩负责任。我们无从得知这两位皇帝让出政权的诚心有多大，也不清楚在何种程度上，这不过是一种姿态或是复杂的政治阴谋。但是有一个事实无法否认：中国有记载的历史中，没有一个皇帝主动退位让出皇权；曾经有过让位的例子，但那是出于被迫。常言道：马背上得天下，亦只于马背上失天下。[6]

想当君王实际上是拿生命去冒险。王位继承人肯定要保住其继承权。作为皇帝应该仁慈，他可以赦免其他所有罪行，而唯独不能对谋反篡权罪手软。谋反是天底下最可怕的事。任何读过明朝初期历史的人都知道，书中描写的对谋反分子施加的酷刑仿佛是在地狱中发生的一样。我们在城隍庙里所见到的“十八层地狱”的形象，据说是写实的，是明史的标本。酷刑的威胁便是皇帝的保护伞。记得小时候，有一次我在玩耍中大喊了一句：“我是皇帝！”祖母急忙阻止我说：“这是不能说的！”她并不是迷信，也非过于小心，而是意识到信口一句话会带来的实际的危险。至少依照传统来看，皇帝常会把那些据算命先生讲长大会做皇帝的孩子杀死。

But this threat of violence has never really given effective protection to monarchical power. As Lao-tzu says, "When one does not fear death, how is it possible to threaten a man with death?" When it is possible to gain political power through violence, the throne is tempting. Though the brutality of those in authority may silence the majority, repression will never be entirely successful. The magnitude of the stakes, an imperial power which could be used to realize any whim, could not but make the effort attractive in spite of dangers. On the one hand, there were those who were willing to gamble with their lives; on the other, there were those who submitted quietly. One may ask, then, what it was that decided on which side a man should be.

Under monarchical rule the people had only duties without rights; the emperor's word was law. If he wanted to build a great palace, an imposing tomb, or a grand canal, he ordered it done without regard for the people. If he wanted to expand the boundaries of his kingdom, he commanded his army to mobilize regardless of whether the people liked it or not. The paying of taxes, the conscription of soldiers—these were burdens for the people to accept without compensation. Those who have lived under despotic monarchical power will understand Confucius' saying, "A brutal monarch is even worse than a tiger."[7] This policy of despotism more fearful than a tiger has had a long history in China. So we say, when the tiger comes out from his cage, the frightened people escape to the Liang hills.[8]

Upon all who are unarmed, we may say, the threat of political tyranny falls with equal weight. Yet in this, too, there have always existed differences. The richer folk could afford to pay for security. In the Chinese traditional pattern conscription, for example, could be bought off. The breaking-up of a family such as is described in "Old Poem" could never have happened in a rich family.[9] Thus it was that people from this class became political adventurers.

但是，武力的威胁并没有真正有效地保护皇权。正如老子所言：“民不畏死，奈何以死惧之？”当通过暴力夺取政权成为可能时，王权就变得异常诱人。虽然统治者的暴行可以使多数人保持沉默，但压迫永远也不会完全奏效。在予取予夺的专制皇权下，政权可以用来谋取私人的幸福，社会也可以从顺逆的界限上分出敢于冒大不韪的人和不敢冒大不韪的人。那么，有人就会问了，敢与不敢这样的事情是怎样决定的呢？

在专制政权之下，人民只有义务而没有权利，皇帝的话就是法律。皇帝如果想要建造一座宏大的宫殿、巨大的陵墓，或是挖一条大运河，他不会顾及百姓，只是下令让手下人去做。如果他想开疆拓土，就会命令军队去动员，不管人民愿不愿意。赋税和兵役都是百姓难以接受的负担，并且没有任何的补偿。生活在暴虐的专制统治下的人们很容易理解孔子的“苛政猛于虎也”这句话。[10]这种比老虎更可怕的暴政在中国有很长的历史。所以我们说，这政治老虎出了栏，就会吓得人逼上梁山了。[11]

专政统治的威胁对所有手无寸铁的人来讲，其威力都是一样的，但常常也有不同。富人可以用银子来买安全。比如，古代中国的征兵制度中有用银子来代替服兵役的做法。古诗中描写的支离破碎的家庭绝不会是富人家。[12]因此恰恰是出自贫民阶层的人变成了政治上的冒险者。

The possession of riches or the lack of them was what was important for making some acquiesce and others rebel. "Man fears to be distinguished as a pig fears to be fat." When the political tiger attacks, the man who is rich will have a greater difficulty in escaping than the man without property. In such a case property becomes a burden. Propertied families developed great alertness in watching the behavior of the tiger. The poor man who has become desperate may rebel, become a bandit in the mountains, and even, in time, challenge the royal authority itself. But a man of property and family cannot easily do this. He must find some way to avoid the attack of the tiger. Unfortunately, as the old saying goes, "From the water's edge, all land is the emperor's; under the heavens all are the emperor's men." At that time travel was not easy; one could not run away to Washington or Brazil, nor was there any International Settlement in a treaty port, nor even any Hong Kong. Physically there was no escape. Perhaps this is not quite true, after all, because we know that from early times certain individuals were able to escape to Korea or Japan. But the ordinary man had to find some means of protection within the structure of society itself.

There was a weak point, however, in this centralized monarchical system. He who held power, the emperor, as I have said, could not administer the country by himself. Even though he might not wish to share his authority, he still required help in ruling and must therefore employ officials. These officials, with whom the ruling house had no ties of kinship, functioned merely as servants with administrative power but no power of policy-making. It was within the inefficiencies of this system that the ordinary man found his opportunity to carry on his private concerns.

It is true that previous to the unification of Ch'in (221 B.C.) there were attempts to establish an efficient administrative system. This was done under the influence of the Fa Chia, or Legalist, school of thought. Theoretically, the system proposed by this school of thought was a good one.[13] In order to have an efficient administration of the country, a legal basis must be established, with everyone controlled by the same law. Shang Yang, as prime minister of Ch'in, attempted to put this theory into practice. But the theory unfortunately neglected one small point. One man, the emperor, was left outside the law. And this omission destroyed the whole system of the Fa Chia.[14]

财富的占有和匮乏是导致沉默和反抗的重要原因。“人怕出名猪怕壮。”当政治猛虎出击的时候，富有者比穷人更难以逃脱灾难，这时候财富变成了负担。富贵人家善于对“老虎”察言观色，而绝望的穷人也许会揭竿而起，或是落草为寇，甚至迟早直接向皇权发起挑战。一个有家室、有财产的人不会轻易这么做，他必须设法摆脱“老虎”的攻击。不幸的是，正如古人所言：“普天之下，莫非王土；率土之滨，莫非王臣。”那时出门可不容易，不能跑到华盛顿或巴西，也不可能在任何一个通商口岸寻求国际避难，甚至也没有香港这类地方。在地理空间上是无处可逃的。但也许并不完全如此，毕竟我们知道有些人在早年就逃到了朝鲜或日本。但是，一般人只能在现有的社会体制下寻找自我保护的途径。

不过，这种集权的专制统治有一个弱点，正如我说的那样，掌握政权的皇帝，不能独自管理国家。即使他不愿意让别人分享权力，他仍需要任命官吏做助手和代理，协助其实施统治。这些官吏与皇室没有亲戚关系，如同皇帝的雇佣，他们没有立法权，只有行政管理权。在这种效率低下的制度下，普通百姓才有机会产生私欲。

在秦朝统一国家（公元前221年）以前，确实曾有些人想要建立一个富有效率的行政机构。这是受到了法家学派的思想的影响。从理论上来讲，这一学派提出的体系是好的。[15]有效率的行政机构必须是一个法制的机构，所有人都要受到同样的法律的控制。作为秦国宰相的商鞅试图要将这一理论付诸实践。可不幸的是，这一理论有一点小小的疏忽——有一个人没有被纳入法律之内，那就是天子。这留在法律之外的一个人却把法家的整个体系废黜了。[16]

Shang Yang himself lost his life on this account, for, though under the law he was able to punish the prince when he was only the heir to the throne,[17] as soon as the prince became emperor, he ordered Shang Yang killed. And the efficient system which Shang Yang himself had established prevented him from escaping.

If the highest authority were bound by law, then administrative authority would be able to cage the tiger. But in Chinese history this has never happened. As a result, the ruled, including the officials themselves, have never sought for efficiency in administration. Rather the opposite has been true. Inefficiency and parasitism, on the one hand, remoteness of imperial control and a do-nothing policy by the emperor, on the other—this has always been the ideal. Yet this ideal of government, of a "good emperor" as one who presided but did not rule, has rarely been attained. As far as the officials were concerned, the next best thing, then, could only be to protect themselves, to keep a back door open for their relatives, and to be able to use their position as a shield against the emperor's whims. To protect not only themselves but their relatives and their whole clan from the unchecked power of the monarch, and to do this not by constitutional or by legal means but by personal influence—this is what they sought. Not by challenging the emperor's authority but by coming close to him, by serving him and from this service gaining an advantage in being enabled to shift the burden of the emperor's demands onto the backs of those lower down, did the propertied class attempt to neutralize the emperor's power over them and to avoid the attack of the tiger. Groups of officials, with their relatives, formed, thus, in Chinese society a special class not affected by the laws, exempt from taxation and conscription. Nevertheless, they had no real political power.

To escape domination while approaching the source of power takes a highly developed skill. The position of the officials was not easy. As the old sayings go, "When the emperor orders your death, you must die" and "All the blame is mine; the emperor can do no wrong." If the official relaxed his efforts on behalf of the emperor, he might lose his life. When the emperor required money or labor, he must be active in meeting these demands—a task he accomplished by shifting the burden onto the backs of the people. Yet, if the burdens became too heavy for the people to bear, they might rebel, and it was then the officials who would be attacked first and who would serve as the scapegoats of the monarch.[18] The officials must be two-faced: severe toward the people and compliant toward the emperor. They must know the art of going just so far and no further in order that they might not be caught either by the fury of the emperor or by the wrath of the people. Chinese officials' life has been described as the art of maneuvering on a stormy sea. Experience through the ages was the teacher. It may be noted that in Chinese the expression, "Do not speak to me officially," does not mean the same thing as in English but rather, "Speak to me sincerely."

商鞅因此自己把命丢了，尽管在法律之下，他能够对还只是王位继承人的太子加以惩罚[19]，但是太子一当上皇帝就下令将商鞅杀掉，由商鞅自己所建立起来的高效率的体系也使他自己在劫难逃。

如果最高的权威受到了法律的约束，那么行政的权威就能够将这只老虎囚住。但是在中国的历史上，这样的事情从来没有发生过。结果，被统治者——包括官吏自己在内——从来就不追求行政上的效率。实际的情况正是与之相对立。一方面是无效率和寄生，另一方面是天高皇帝远以及皇帝的无为政策——这一直是一种理想的状态。然而这种政府的理想，即是说一位“好皇帝”应当统而不治，这样的皇帝很少有人能够做到。就官吏而言，退而求其次的办法就只能是保护他们自己，为他们的亲戚开后门，并且还能够利用他们的位置作为一种挡箭牌来抵御皇帝的变化无常。要保护的不仅是他们自己，还有他们的亲戚以及整个宗族免遭不受限制的君主权力的侵扰，而且这样做所依靠的并非是宪法或者法律的手段，而是依靠个人的影响力——这就是他们所追求的。有产阶级想要消磨掉皇帝加诸他们身上的权力，并以此来避开这只老虎的攻击，并非是靠对皇帝的权威加以挑战，而是靠亲近皇帝、为皇帝服务，从中获得的一种好处便是能够将皇帝各种要求的负担转移给比自己阶层更低者。官僚及其庇护下的亲友集团由此构成了中国社会所特有的一个不受法律影响的阶层，他们有免役免税的特权。虽然如此，但他们并没有真正的政治权力。

逃避自己想要接近的权力之源的支配，需要有高超的技能。官僚的位置并不轻松。正如古语所言：“君要臣死，臣不得不死”，还有“臣罪当诛，天王圣明”。他不能怠工而有损皇帝的利益，否则可能性命不保。当皇帝需要钱或劳力的时候，他必须特别卖力来满足这些需要，即通过把整个的政治负担转嫁到平民身上来完成这项差事。但是，一旦这种负担过重，人民无法承受之时，他们便可能起来造反，到时就是这些官僚们首当其冲地受到攻击，由此而成了国君的替罪羊。[20]官僚们必须有两套面目：对人民严酷而对皇帝顺从。他们必须要知道进退有节，适可而止，以免走了极端而惹恼了皇帝，或者是引起人民的激愤。中国官僚们的生活曾被描述为是在风云变幻的海上运筹帷幄的艺术。代代相传的经验即为人师。应该注意的是，在汉语中所说的“不要打官腔”，并非与英语字面的意思一样，而实际是在说：“跟我说实话。”

In normal times to be an official was no direct economic advantage. From the monarch's point of view, for an official to use his position to enrich himself meant corruption of the system and a diminution of his own treasure. Thus, unless a monarch were very weak, he would not tolerate such officials. An official in ordinary times would not improperly profit from the office but would leave it with "two sleeves full of wind."[21]

Why, then, should people want to be officials? The poem of T'ao Yuan-ming expresses the feelings of one such man:

Why should I be an official?

I bend my back

For only three piculs of rice

Why should I not go back to till the land?[22]

T'ao Yuan-ming was a typical unworldly poet. Yet, in spite of his talent and his interest in the things of the mind, even he had to "bend his back" and occupy an official position and withal receive only a small financial reward. Why did such a one accept this position instead of staying home where he was happy? The fact is that, if he had shown his scorn of officialdom by leaving office, he would probably by now be "a man without an arm."[23] The choice lay between "bending the back" or being disabled. The necessity for becoming an official was a little like the need for being inoculated. Just as one runs the risk of having a bad reaction to an inoculation, so in becoming an official one may risk having one's property confiscated or even one's head cut off. But, once the inoculation is over, one has gained protection. This analogy is not too apt, since from an inoculation one person becomes immune, whereas if one has been an official one can protect a whole group of people. As a result, it happened that sometimes a group would join to aid in the education of one man so as to enable him to reach officialdom. "One man rises to officialdom, then all his dogs and chickens will be promoted," is the saying.

在平常的日子里，做官并没有什么直接的经济上的好处。在皇帝看来，官员利用自己的职位来致富，不仅意味着腐化皇权所依赖的制度，而且是皇家财富的减缩。因此，除非某位皇帝软弱无能，否则，他是不会容许有这种官员存在的。处在太平盛世的官员不会不合法地从官位上捞到好处，而只会在离任时留下“两袖清风”。[24]

那么，为什么人们还想要做官呢？陶渊明的诗表达了这种感慨：

我为什么要去做官呢？

只为五斗米折腰。

我为什么不归耕田园？[25]

陶渊明是一位典型的出世诗人。尽管他富有才气，也很有风雅，但他还是“折了腰”，身居一个官位，仅仅是为了得到那么一点俸禄。为什么这样的一个人要去接受这样的一个位置，而不是呆在他所喜欢的家里呢？事实恰恰是，如果他真的表现出自己看不上官职，弃官而去，他就可能成为一位“折臂翁”了。[26]这就是说必须在“折腰”和“折臂”之间作出选择。做官的必要性有点像打防疫针。正像打防疫针要冒打了过后有不良反应的风险一样，做官就可能要冒抄家和掉脑袋的危险。但是，一旦打了针后，人就可以有免疫力了。这样的比喻略有点不贴切，因为打了防疫针，只能够使一个人自己得到免疫，而做官所能庇护的是一整群的人。结果有时就出现了一大群人资助一个人去读书，以便使他能够获得个一官半职；一人升官，鸡犬安宁。

In Chinese traditional society the clan or big family naturally constituted a group which could take action of this sort, supporting one of their members until the time when he should become a scholar and be eligible for the official examinations. Once this individual attained official honors, the whole clan could rely upon him. Without any strong person at court, it was difficult to protect one's property. Ku T'ing-lin was an official during the Ming dynasty, but, when the rule passed to the Manchus, he refused to continue in an official position, gave up traveling abroad, and shut himself up at home with his books. Yet for his own protection he was obliged to send his two nephews to the Ch'ing court to serve his enemies. This was made possible by the fact that, as we have said, Chinese officials did not share in the political power of the emperor but served their monarch by neutralizing and softening down his power rather than by supporting it. With his nephews in court, the uncle was protected even in secret rebellious activities. According to Chinese tradition, officials did not work seriously for the government, nor did they like to continue as officials for a long period. Their purpose in entering the government was to gain both immunity and wealth in this order. The Chinese officials when in office protected their relatives, but, when this duty to the family had been performed, they retired. Retirement and even a hermit's life were the ideal. In retirement there was no longer any authority to be served with watchful care, while the relatives who had gained protection from their kinsman official owed him a debt of gratitude. Now he need only enjoy his social prestige and grow fat and happy. As we say in China, "To come back to one's native soil, beautifully robed and loaded with honors, is the best thing in life."[27] Such a man will not attempt to seize power; his children will not play at being emperor. Nor will he have any idea of reforming the social system, for that system will do him no harm. Once out of the way of imperial influences, he may enjoy the economic power of a landowner.

This is the sort of man I mean by gentry. The gentry may be returned officials or the relatives of officials or simply educated landowners. In any case, they have no real political power in shaping policies and may have no direct connection with politics whatsoever, yet they do tend to have influence at court and to be immune from political exploitation. And the more fearful the ruler and the more tiger-like, the more valuable is the gentry's protective covering. In such circumstances it is difficult to survive except by attaching one's self to some big family.

在中国传统社会中，宗族和大家庭自然就构成了这样的一个团体，这个团体所做的一件事情就是供其中一员去上学，一直到他考上了功名，得了一官半职，一族人就有靠山了。若在朝廷里没有靠山，在乡间想保持财产是困难的。顾亭林是明朝的一位官员，当改朝换代成了清朝，他拒绝再任官员，深居简出，闭门读书。但是为了安全和保障，他还是不得不派两名外甥到朝廷里去侍奉他的敌人。正如我们已经说过的，这之所以可能做到，是因为中国官员不是与皇帝分享政治权力，是通过淡化和弱化而非支持其权力来服务于君主。外甥做官，保障了舅舅的安全，甚至使舅舅能安心地去下革命的种子。中国传统的官吏并不认真做官，更不想终身做官：打防疫针的人绝不以打针为乐，目的在免疫和免了疫的健康。中国的官吏在做官时庇护其亲友，做了一阵，他任务完成，就要告老还乡了，即所谓“归去来兮”那一套。退隐山林是中国人的理想。这时，上边不必再小心伺候随时可以杀他的主子，周围是感激他的亲戚街坊。此时他只需要享受他的社会声望，生活富足，心宽体胖。正如中国人所说的，“衣锦还乡是人生活中最美好的事情”。[28]他绝不冒险去觊觎政权，他的孩子都不准玩“做皇帝”的游戏。他更不想改革社会制度，因为这种社会制度对他并没有害处。一旦他脱离开皇权的限制，他就可以享受地主的经济权利。

这种人就是我所谓的“士绅”。士绅可以是退任的官僚，或是官僚的亲属，甚至可以是受过教育的地主。在任何情况下，他们都没有左右政策的实际的政治权力，可能与政治也没有任何直接的联系，可是他们常常有势力，势力就是政治免疫性。统治者越可怕，越像猛虎一样，士绅的保护性的庇护作用就越大。在此情况下，托庇于豪门才有命。

[1] Shih: "This word is often translated 'scholar,' but this is only a derived, metaphorical sense and the whole force of many passages in the Analects is lost if we do not understand that the term is a military one and means "knight.' A shih was a person entitled to go to battle in a war-chariot, in contrast with the common soldiers who followed on foot. Confucius, by a metaphor similar to those embodied in the phraseology of the Salvation Army, calls the stout-hearted defenders of his Way 'Knights'; and hence in later Chinese the term came to be applied to upholders of Confucianism and finally to scholars and literary people in general. The burden of most of the references to shih in the Analects is that the Knight of the Way needs just the same qualities of endurance and resolution as the Soldier Knight" (Arthur Waley, The Analects of Confucius [London: George Allen & Unwin, 1938], pp. 33–34).

[2] Ta fu: lower-ranking official under feudalism.

[3] “士”这个字“英文经常译成‘scholar（学者）’，这只是一个引申出的比喻义，实际上此词与军事有关，是‘骑士’的意思，如果我们不这样理解，《论语》中很多篇幅就会完全丧失意义。‘士’是可以乘战车奔赴战场的，而普通士兵只能徒步其后。孔子打了一个比方，这个比方所指的人与有着‘救世军’称号的人是相似的，孔子把英勇护卫其道的人称作‘骑士’。因此，在后来的汉语中，这个词用来指拥护孔子思想的人，最后统指文人。《论语》中大多数关乎‘士’这个字的重点都是指需要像战士中的骑士一样具有那种忍耐力和不屈不挠禀性的卫道士”。引自《论语》英文版，阿瑟·韦利译，伦敦：乔治·艾伦与昂温出版公司，1938年，第33—34页。

[4] “大夫”：封建制度下地位较低的官吏。

[5] This phrase seems to refer back to the story told of Kao-tsu, the first emperor of Han, and the Confucian scholar Lu Chia. "After his [Lu Chia's] return in 196 or 195 B.C., he is said to have quoted the Book of Odes and the Book of History to Kao-tsu, whereat the latter scolded him and said, 'I got the empire on horseback; why should I bother with the Book of Odes or the Book of History?' Lu Chia replied, 'You got it on horseback, but can you rule it from horseback?' Then he proceeded to quote cases, from ancient history, of kings who had lost their thrones through their wickedness, concluding with the Ch'in dynasty, which Kao-tsu had himself overthrown" (Pan Ku, The History of the Former Han Dynasty, trans. Homer H. Dubs [Baltimore: Waverly Press, 1938], I, 21).

[6] 此句源于汉代开国皇帝高祖与儒生陆贾的故事。“公元前196年或前195年，陆贾出使回来后，据说他对高祖引述了《诗经》和《书经》的话。高祖责备他说：我从马上得到天下，何必计较《诗经》和《书经》呢？！（乃公居马上而得之，安事《诗》、《书》！）陆贾则回答道：您可以在马上得天下，但是您能在马上治理天下吗？（马上得之，宁可以马上治之乎？）然后，他引经据典，历数古代帝王由于暴虐丢掉王位的史实，直到高祖推翻的秦朝。”引自班固《汉书》英文版，德效骞译，1938年，巴尔的摩：韦弗利出版社，第1卷，第21页。

[7] "As they [Confucius and his disciples] passed by the T'ai mountain, the attention of the travellers was arrested by a woman weeping and wailing at a grave. The sage stopped, and sent one of his followers to ask the reason of her grief. 'My husband's father,' said she, 'was killed here by a tiger, and my husband also, and now my son has met the same fate.' Being asked why she did not leave so fatal a spot, she replied that there was there no oppressive Government. 'Remember this,' said Confucius to his disciples, 'remember this, my children, oppressive government is fiercer and more feared than a tiger' " (James Legge, Life of Confucius, in Vol. I of The Chinese Classics [2d ed.; Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1895], quoted from Li Chi, pp. 67–68).

[8] The Liang hills are here a reference to the Chinese novel, Ju Hu (All Men Are Brothers), in which it is told how men of many sorts, fleeing from harsh punishments of the authorities, came to band themselves together and lived by defying the government and preying upon the rich and powerful. Stories of this sort had a very real basis in fact. In Pan Ku's History of the Former Han Dynasty we read, for example: "Ch'ên Shê was an ambitious farm boy who became one of the chiefs of a levy of men made in the present southern Honan.... In the later-summer of 209 B.C., a bad rain prevented this levy from reaching its destination on time. According to Ch'in laws, the officers and men of the levy would have been condemned to death; they accordingly conspired to rebel. As a slogan they falsely called themselves partisans of Fu-su, the displaced heir of the First Emperor, and fabricated miracles to legitimize themselves. The rebellion was not thus at first openly directed against the dynasty, but was merely the act of men driven to desperation by over-harsh laws" (I, 4).

[9] "Old Poem," translated by Arthur Waley from The Book of Songs, reads:

"At fifteen I went with the army, At fourscore I came home. On the way I met a man from the village, I asked him who there was at home. 'That over there is your house, All covered with trees and bushes.' Rabbits had run in at the dog-hole, Pheasants flew down from the beams of the roof. In the courtyard was growing some wild grain; And by the well, some wild mallows. I'll boil the grain and make porridge, I'll pluck the mallows and make soup. Soup and porridge are both cooked, But there is no one to eat them with. I went out and looked towards the cast, While tears fell and wetted my clothes." (Arthur Waley, Chinese Poems [London: George Allen & Unwin, 1946], p. 51.)

[10] “当他们（孔子和他的学生）路过泰山时，发现一个妇人在坟前哭。孔子停下脚步，让学生前去打探原因。妇人说：‘我的公公和丈夫都在这里被老虎吃掉了，如今我的儿子也没能逃脱这个厄运。’当问她为什么不离开这个不幸的地方时，妇人说这里没有官府的压迫。孔子对学生说：‘记住啊，学生们，残暴的统治比老虎更可怕。’”（孔子过泰山侧，有妇人哭于墓者而哀。夫子式而听之，使子路问之，曰：“子之哭也，壹似重有忧者。”而曰：“然。昔者吾舅死于虎，吾夫又死焉，吾子又死焉。”夫子问：“何为不去也？”曰：“无苛政。”夫子曰：“小子识之，苛政猛于虎也。）出自《礼记》，引自《中国典籍》第1卷之“孔子生平”，理雅各编译，伦敦：克拉伦登出版社，1895年，第2版，第67—68页。

[11] 梁山典故出自中国古典小说《水浒》，该书讲述了各色人等为逃避官府压迫而聚集在一起，杀富济贫，公然反对官府的故事。事实上，这类故事有深厚的现实基础。例如，班固在《汉书》中写道，陈胜（字涉）是一名有鸿鹄之志的农民，后来成为今属河南南部征募上来的兵卒的屯长……公元前209年夏末，一场大雨使得他们无法及时到达目的地。根据秦朝的法律，他们都将被处死。于是他们共谋起义大计。他们谎冒被废的皇太子扶苏的拥护者，通过编造鬼神启示来使他们的行为具有正当性。因此这一起义最初并非直接要反抗朝廷，而仅仅是一帮被严刑峻法逼上绝路的人的负隅之举。

[12] 这首古诗名为《十五从军征》，全诗如下：“十五从军征，八十始得归。道逢乡里人：‘家中有阿谁？’‘遥看是君家，松柏冢累累。’兔从狗窦入，雉从梁上飞；中庭生旅谷，井上生旅葵。舂谷持作饭，采葵持作羹；羹饭一时熟，不知贻阿谁。出门东向看，泪落沾我衣。”引自《中国诗歌》，阿瑟·韦利译，伦敦：乔治·艾伦与昂温出版公司，1946年，第51页。（参考林庚和冯沅君主编《中国历代诗歌选》［上编］，第1册，人民文学出版社，1983年，第128页。——译者注）

[13] Waley discusses the social situation in which the Legalist school rose to power under the title "The Realists," in The Way and Its Power (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1934), pp. 68–86. The Fa Chia system, in spite of its recognition of the importance of a "rule of law," and its effort toward greater efficiency in government, does not appeal to the Western liberal mind. The Book of Lord Shang, trans. J. J. Duyvendak (London: A. Probsthain, 1928), supposedly the writing of Shang Yang, otherwise known as Wei Yang or Lord Shang, expresses the extreme position of the Legalists. Duyvendak comments: "Law, having been applied theoretically only in order to enforce the observance of the standards set by natural moral law, now became the instrument for enforcing the standard set up by the state. Here came a clash between the law and moral traditions. Never had this idea of law anything to do with the codification of the conceptions of justice living in the hearts of the people; it was merely penal laws and institutions, deemed expedient for the government's centralising and imperialistic purposes; it was the expression of the state's own growing self-consciousness. It is very remarkable that, when we find the necessity for publishing the laws urged, it is not, as elsewhere, an expression of the popular wish to safeguard the people's rights and privileges for the future; on the contrary, it is government itself that desires their publication as a safeguard of its own power, as it expects that the laws will be better observed if people know exactly what punishments and non-observances will entail. Consequently, to have a deterrent effect, the laws have to be severe" (p. 81).

[14] But, according to Fung Yu-lan, the highest ideal of the Legalist school actually was that "ruler and minister, superior and inferior, noble and humble, all obey the law." Fung quotes from Han Fei-tzu, a leading Legalist: "Therefore, the intelligent ruler carries out his regulations as would Heaven and employs men as if he were a spirit. Being like Heaven, he commits no wrong, and being like a spirit, he falls into no difficulties. His shih (power) enforces his strict teachings, and nothing that he encounters resists him." Fung interprets this passage as follows: "By comparing the ruler with Heaven, Han Fei-tzu means that he acts only according to the law, fairly and impartially. That he employs men 'as if he were a spirit' means that he makes use of them according to this "method' or shu, secretly and unfathomably." The gulf between this conception of law and the conception held in the West may be one reason why the ideal of "Great Good Government" has, as Fung says, "never yet actually been attained in China" (Fang Yu-lan, A History of Chinese Philosophy, trans. Derk Bodde [Peiping: H. Vetch, 1937], I, 320–322).

[15] 韦利在《道及其力量》一书中以“实在论者”为题讨论了法家学派执掌权力的社会背景（伦敦：乔治·艾伦与昂温出版公司，1934年，第68—86页）。尽管法家的制度认识到了“法治”的重要性，并且努力使政府的运作更具效率，但这对西方倡导自由主义者来说并不具吸引力。戴闻达翻译的《商君书》英文版（伦敦：阿瑟·普罗赛因出版公司，1928年）一书，据说是由商鞅（又称卫鞅、商君）所写，它表达了法家的极端的观点。戴闻达评论道：“仅仅是为了强制人们遵守由自然道德律所建立的标准，并要在理论上贯彻的那种法律，现在则成了实施由国家所建立的标准的工具。这里就出现了法律与道德传统之间的撞击。这种法律观念与人们心中正义观念的法典化从来毫无关系，它仅仅是一种刑法和制度，并被看作是政府的中央集权和帝国统治的权宜之计而已。这是国家自己日益成长的自我意识的表达。显而易见的是，当我们发现有要颁布法律的愿望的时候，与别处不同的是，这并非是一种未来要保护人民权利和利益的民间愿望的表达；正相反，这恰恰是政府自己想要保护它自己的权力而想着要颁布法律，因为政府期望如果人民对违反法律所必须承担的惩罚有准确的了解，就会更好地遵守法律；因此，为了达到其威慑性，法律必须极为严苛。”（第81页）

[16] 照冯友兰的看法，法家的最高理想实际上是“君臣上下贵贱皆从法”。冯友兰引述著名的法家人物韩非子的话说：“故明主之行制也天，其用人也鬼。天则不非，鬼则不困，势行教严，逆而不违。”冯友兰对这一段文字有如下的解释：“‘明主之行制也天’，言其依法而行，公而无私也。‘其用人也鬼’，言其御人有术，密而不可测也。”这种法律观念与西方法律观念之间的沟壑可能就是为什么像冯友兰所说的“大治”“在中国历史中盖未尝实现”的一个原因。引自《中国哲学史》英文版，冯友兰著，德克·卜德译，北平：亨利·维奇出版公司，1937年，第1卷，第320—322页。［中文版参见冯友兰《中国哲学史》（上册），中华书局，1961年，第391—392页。——译者注］

[17] Even in this case the punishment was only indirect. "Then, the Crown Prince infringed the law. Wei Yang said: 'It is owing to the infringements by the highly-placed, that the law is not carried out. We shall apply the law to the Crown Prince; as, however, he is Your Highness's Heir, we cannot subject him to capital punishment. Let his tutor, Prince Ch'ien, be punished and his teacher, Kung-sun Chia, be branded' ” (Introduction to The Book of Lord Shang, p. 16).

[18] "We have an ancient saying that if the dragon left its water and the tiger left the mountains, even they would be insulted. Take those officers in the imperial court, they take in all sorts of humiliations and never dare protest; but when they reach their homes, they scold and beat their children and wife to give vent to their angers. Yet the officers dare not resign, just like the tigers dare not leave the mountains and the dragons the waters" (Liu Ê, A Tramp Doctor's Travelogue: A Story Laid in the Manchu Regime, trans. Lin Yi-chin and Ko Te-chun [Shanghai: Commercial Press, 1939], p. 114).

[19] 即使在这种情况下，惩罚也仅仅是间接的。“于是太子犯法。卫鞅曰：‘法之不行，自上犯之。’将法太子。太子，君嗣也，不可施刑，刑其傅公子虔，黥其师公孙贾。”引自《商君书》英文版“导论”，第16页。

[20] “所以古人说：龙若离水，虎若离山，便要受人狎侮的。即如朝廷里做官的人，无论为了甚么难，受了甚么气，只是回家来对着老婆孩子发发标，在外边决不敢发半句硬话，也是不敢离了那个官。同那虎不敢去山，龙不敢失水的道理，是一样的。”引自《老残游记》英文版，刘鹗著，林疑今、葛德顺译，上海：商务印书馆，1939年，第114页。

[21] "A poetic expression dating back to the Ming dynasty when Yu Ch'ien as a provincial official refused to follow the custom of handing out gifts exacted without payment from the populace to the dignitaries of the imperial court but instead presented himself empty-handed. The term has come to refer to officials who hold office and retire without having enriched themselves. In spite of pressures and practices to the contrary, this type of official has always been an ideal of Confucian teaching…. The China of the nineteenth century still kept green the memory of past officials who had been incorruptible. Their names were household words; stories about them had been treasured for centuries. Thus, the Ancestral Hall of the Yang family was still called the Hall of the Four Knows because of what had happened there seven centuries earlier. In A.D. 112, when a friend remonstrated with Yang Chen for leaving nothing to his sons, he replied: 'If posterity speaks of me as an incorruptible official, will that be nothing?' And when a man offered him a bribe and said: 'It is after dark and no one will know,' Yang Chen was recorded as saying: 'Not know? Why, Heaven will know, Earth will know, you will know, I will know.' There was a later Yang, Yang Ch'eng, who lived a thousand years before the time of Tao Kuang. Ordered to collect taxes during the famine, he refused, and threw himself into prison where he slept on a plank. Many other old stories of official rectitude were current" (Maurice Collis, Foreign Mud [New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1947], p. 95).

[22] "T'ao, who lived in the fourth and fifth centuries A.D., was our poet of nature par excellence. Once he served as a district magistrate. When he could not longer stand the ordeal of formality he burst out upon the occasion of the arrival of the provincial inspector, his superior, 'I cannot bow to a mean fellow from the street just for five pecks of rice.' So saying, he left his official hat hanging on the wall and went right home" (C. W. Luh, On Chinese Poetry [Peiping, 1935], p. 16).

"What folly to spend one's life like a dropped leaf

Snared under the dust of streets,

But for thirty years it was so I lived.

…

There is no dust or clatter

In the courtyard before my house.

My private rooms are quiet,

And calm with the leisure of moonlight through an open door.

For a long time I lived in a cage;

Now I have returned.

For one must return

To fulfill one's nature."

("Once More Fields and Gardens," by T'ao Yuan-ming, in Fir-Flower Tablets, translated from the Chinese by Florence Ayscough, English versions by Amy Lowell [Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1930], p. 133.)

[23] In "The Old Man with the Broken Arm (A Satire on Militarism)," ca. A.D. 809, by Po Chü-i, we read:

"Everyone says that in expeditions against the Man tribes

Of a million men who are sent out, not one returns.

I, that am old, was then twenty-four;

My name and fore-name were written down in the rolls of the Board of War.

In the depth of the night not daring to let anyone know,

I secretly took a huge stone and dashed it against my arm.

For drawing the bow and waving the banner now wholly unfit,

I knew henceforward I should not be sent to fight in Yun-nan.

Bones broken and sinews wounded could not fail to hurt;

My plan was to be rejected and sent back to my home.

My arm—broken ever since; it was sixty years ago.

One limb, although destroyed—whole body safe!

But even now on winter nights when the wind and rains blow

From evening on till day's dawn I cannot sleep for pain.

Not sleeping for pain

Is a small thing to bear,

Compared with the joy of being alive when all the rest are dead.

For otherwise, years ago, at the ford of Lu River

My body would have died and my soul hovered by the bones that no one gathered.

A ghost, I'd have wandered in Yun-nan, always looking for home.

Over the graves of ten thousand soldiers, mournfully hovering."

(From Chinese Poems, trans. Arthur Waley, pp. 129–131.)

[24] “这一诗意的表达要回溯到明朝的时候，作为省级官员的于谦拒绝同流合污，搜刮老百姓来给朝廷中的达官显贵送礼，而是两手空空前去。这一成语指的是官僚们身居官位及至退休的时候并没有使自己发财致富。尽管有来自反面的压力和做法，这种类型的官员一直是儒家教育推崇的理想典范……19世纪的中国还牢牢记着过去的一身廉洁的官员们。他们的名字家喻户晓，有关他们的故事被世代铭记珍视。因此，杨姓堂号仍旧被称作‘四知堂’，源于七个世纪以前发生的一桩逸事。在公元112年，当一位朋友指责杨震没有给他的儿子们留下任何东西时，他就回答说：‘如果子孙后代把我说成是一位清官的话，那不应该说是什么都没留下吧？’有人向他行贿时说：‘现在天色已晚，不会有人知道。’据记载杨震当时说：‘为什么没有人知道？天知、地知、你知、我知。’后来还出了个阳城，他的生活年代要早于道光朝一千多年［实际为唐代，不到一千年；见《新唐书·列传第一百一十九》——编者注］。皇帝命令他在饥荒的年代去收税，他拒绝了，并自囚于狱中，睡在狱中的一块木板上面。其他许多正直官员仗义执言的古老故事都流传至今。”引自《外来的泥土》，莫里斯·科利斯著，纽约：艾尔弗雷德·克诺夫出版公司，1947年，第95页。

[25] “陶渊明生活在公元4世纪—5世纪，他是一位优秀的崇尚自然的诗人。他曾经做过县令，但无法忍受繁文缛节的束缚。当他的上级郡监察官来巡察的时候，他的情绪一下子爆发出来，他说：‘吾不能为五斗米折腰，拳拳事乡里小人邪！’说完这样的话之后，他便挂冠归隐。”引自陆志韦著，《中国诗五讲》英文版（英文书名应为Five Lectures on Chinese Poetry——编者注），1935年，第16页。

“误落尘网中，一去三十年。……户庭无尘杂，虚室有余闲。久在樊笼里，复得返自然。”引自陶渊明诗《归园田居》，载于埃米·洛厄尔、弗洛伦丝·艾斯库合译诗集《松花笺》，波士顿：霍顿·米夫林出版集团，1930年，第133页。（可参见林庚和冯沅君主编《中国历代诗歌选》［上编］，人民文学出版社，1983年，第128页。——译者注）

[26] 白居易于公元809年在《新丰折臂翁》这首诗中写道：“皆云前后征蛮者，千万人行无一回。是时翁年二十四，兵部牒中有名字。夜深不敢使人知，偷将大石槌折臂。张弓簸旗俱不堪，从兹始免征云南。骨碎筋伤非不苦，且图拣退归乡土。此臂折来六十年，一肢虽废一身全。至今风雨阴寒夜，直到天明痛不眠。痛不眠，终不悔，且喜老身今独在。不然当时泸水头，身死魂孤骨不收。应作云南望乡鬼，万人冢上哭呦呦。”引自《中国诗歌》，韦利译，第129—131页。（中文参见《白居易诗译析》，霍松林著，黑龙江人民出版社，1981年，第152—153页。——译者注）

[27] Po Chü-i thus congratulates himself on the comforts of his life after his retirement from office:

"Lined coat, warm cap and easy felt slippers,

In the little tower, at the low window, sitting over the sunken brazier.

Body at rest, heart at peace; no need to rise early.

I wonder if the courtiers at the Western Capital know of these things or not?"

(From A Hundred and Seventy Chinese Poems, trans. Arthur Waley [New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1919], p. 239.)

[28] 白居易曾作诗来形容他辞官还乡后的舒适生活，诗中写道：“重裘暖帽宽毡履，小阁低窗深地炉。身稳心安眠未起，西京朝士得知无。”引自《中国诗歌170首》，韦利译，纽约：艾尔弗雷德·克诺夫出版公司，1919年，第239页。

Chapter Two   The Scholar Becomes the Official

第贰章   文人当官

In my first chapter I tried to analyze the position of the gentry in the political structure. My view is that, since the establishment of a central unified political power in the third century B.C., the gentry as a class have never attempted to control political power. That is, although occupying official positions, they have not exercised any decisive powers as to policy. Under the feudal system sovereignty belonged to the aristocracy; under the monarchy, to the king-emperor. The question which arises, then, is this: Why in Chinese history has there been no period in which the power of the aristocracy revived or in which a bourgeois middle class took over political power? The answer to this question leads us to a study of the political consciousness of the gentry and their attitude toward their own position. Why did they not struggle with the monarch to gain control? Why was there no movement similar to Magna Carta in England? The class who were landowners in the economic structure were gentry in the social structure. Why did they become so neutral, so negative in politics? In this chapter I shall be especially attentive to one question: What was the attitude of the gentry class toward their political position? It is true that their attitude was not cause but rather effect of the political system upon them. Nevertheless, it may be said that the attitudes of acquiescence which developed within the political system tended to reinforce the system.

Every social structure has a system of attitudes which define proper behavior and support the structure. What I am going to discuss in this chapter is the attitude of the gentry toward the monarchical power after they had come to be controlled by that power.

In the political philosophy of the traditional gentry class there was an important idea called tao-t'ung.[1] This idea took shape before the firm establishment of monarchical power and was probably necessary for its development. In my analysis I am concerned particularly with the period before the firm establishment of monarchical power when feudalism was in process of breaking down.

I am not inclined to think that this social philosophy originated in the minds of a few scholars. On the contrary, I believe that the scholars' elaboration of the system was accepted by society because it reflected a point of view which was generally shared. The function of the scholar was to formulate, to clarify, and to crystallize this point of view into a doctrine. In the period of transition between feudalism and imperialism the school of thought which reflected the philosophic trend of the times best was that of Confucius and his followers. But the Confucian school was only one of many in this period of the "hundred schools." It was only later, after the stabilization of the imperial power, that Confucianism came to be so popular and dominating. This shows, I think, that the ideology of the Confucian school represented the point of view best adapted to the Chinese imperial system.

我在第一章里试图分析士大夫在政治结构中的地位。我的观点是，自从大一统的集权政治在公元前3世纪确立之后，士大夫阶层从未试图掌握政治权力，即使做了官，也从未行使过政策决定权。在封建时代，主权属于贵族；在皇权时代，主权属于皇帝。这样就产生了一个问题，即为什么中国历史中不曾有过贵族权力复兴或中层阶级执政的政治结构？要回答这个问题，我们必须研究士大夫这个阶层的政治意识以及他们对于自己的政治地位的看法。为什么他们不去和皇帝争夺政权？为什么中国没有发生像英国宪章运动那样的政治事件？这个阶层在经济上是地主，在社会上是士绅，他们为什么对政治如此中立和消极？在本章里我想特别关注一个问题，即他们如何看待自己的政治地位。的确，他们的观点不是这种政治制度的原因，而是其结果。但是，可以说，在这种政治结构中形成的默许态度本身是一种支持这种结构的力量。

任何一种社会结构都有一套意识形态来界定正当的行为，以维持这个结构。我在本章所要讨论的是被皇权所控制的士大夫对于皇权的态度。

传统士大夫阶层的政治意识中有一个特别重要的观念是“道统”。[2]这个观念在皇权牢固确立之前已经产生，并且可能对于皇权结构的发展是必要的。在我的分析中，我特别要追溯到皇权牢固确立之前，即封建制度行将崩溃、封建和皇权交替的过渡时期。

我不愿意把这一社会意识的形成归结为出自几个思想家。相反，我认为思想家的言行能被社会所接受是因为他们反映了社会上一般的观点，他们的作用是将这一观点明白清晰地表达出来。在由封建过渡到皇权时，最能反映出这一时期趋势的是儒家。但是儒家只是当时“百家”中的一家，直到后来皇权稳固之后，儒学才开始广为传播并起主导作用。我认为这表明了儒家最能代表适合中国皇权制度的意识形态。

The conception of tao-t'ung developed from a set of social facts, of which one important element was that a class of socially important people had lost their political power. Confucian ideas, as formulated and organized into the Confucian system, following the concentration of monarchical power and the disintegration of the feudal system, underwent, it is true, an understandable process of change. And the writings we now have about Confucian ideas have been much modified by later scholars. I should like, however, to start here with the basic Confucian ideas and to try to trace their development to a later period. But, in discussing the influence of Confucius on the social history of China, we are not concerned with the question of whether the idea of tao-t'ung was that of Confucius himself but rather with the fact that this concept was selected and elaborated in his name by later scholars.

It appears to me that the development of the idea of tao-t'ung took place in Chinese traditional society because there had appeared a new type of person, the scholar-intellectual, one excluded from political authority but still possessing social prestige. Since he did not have political power, such a man could not decide political issues. Yet he might, through making known his opinions and formulating his principles, exercise a real influence. Such men did not try to control political power in their own interest but endeavored rather to put forward a set of ethical principles which should restrict the force of political power. The system of tao-t'ung which they developed came to be accepted by the gentry as the norm for their activity in politics. Eventually it came to serve the gentry not only as an ethical system but also as a protection for economic interests.

As the gentry attempted to restrict political power by ethical means, they put forward the teachings of Confucius, calling the latter the creator of tao, and a "king without a throne." And his spiritual descendants are those whom we now call master-scholars.

Legends which grew up concerning Confucius and his origins symbolize the separation of the ethical from the political line. In the early period of mythical history going back to such culture heroes as Sui Jen, the inventor of fire, and Shen Nung, who started agriculture, through the reigns of all San Huang and Wu Ti (the Three August Ones and the Five Sovereigns) through the recorded history of the feudal kings of Chou, Wen Wang, and Wu Wang,[3] one finds the tradition of ethics and politics united. The Confucian school upheld these ancient rulers as ideals. Here were men who both knew and followed the principles of right rulership. Following the rulers of Chou mentioned above, came Chou Kung, or the Duke of Chou, who, as uncle of the heir to the throne, ruled as regent. Much importance was attached to this individual by Confucius' school, because even under the feudal system he was able to attain high authority, being actually a sovereign. The regency itself was meaningful in that it symbolized the idea that, when the sovereign is unable to rule, the one who knows should take his place. Here was the beginning of the separation of the political and ethical lines. Confucius himself identified himself closely with Chou Kung. He said: "How utterly have things gone to the bad with me! It is long now indeed since I dreamed that I saw the Duke of Chou."[4] In the legend of Chou Kung there is, to be sure, not a very marked separation between the political and ethical lines, since, as uncle of the king, Chou Kung was entitled to rule as regent. But the later followers of Confucius put him next to Chou Kung in a line of descent of noted and wise leaders. Thus Chou Kung is the starting point of the political line deviating from the ethical.

“道统”这个观念有它所根据的社会事实，其中一个重要事实是一个社会重要阶层失去了政治权力。归纳和组织成为儒家体系的儒家思想，伴随着中央集权的形成和封建体制的解体，的确经历了一个可理解的变迁过程。我们现在看到的儒家思想的记录已经由后来的学者修改了许多。然而，我愿意在此从儒家的基本观点开始，试图来追溯它的发展。在讨论儒家思想对中国社会历史的影响时，我们关注的不是“道统”的观念是否出自孔子本人，而是后代的学者以他的名义选用并深化了这一概念。

在我看来，中国传统社会中“道统”观念的发展，是由于社会上产生了一类新的人物，即文人知识分子，他们被排斥于政治权力的圈子之外，但仍享有社会威望。由于没有政治权力，他们不能决定政治事务，但他们可以通过表达意见、归纳原则来产生实际的影响。他们不从占有政治权力来保障自己的利益，而是尽力提出一套伦理规范来限制政治权力的威力。“道统”的思想被士大夫接受为他们政治活动的标准。最终，它不仅仅是作为一种伦理道德体系服务于士大夫，还可以维护他们的经济利益。

当士大夫阶层要用“道统”来限制政治权力时，他们推出了孔子的学说，把他作为“道”的创始者，称他为“素王”。我们现在把那些“道统”的精神传承者叫做“师儒”。

关于孔子身世的传说象征着政统和道统的分离。从早期神话历史中的文化英雄，如火的发明者燧人氏、农业的鼻祖神农氏，传到“三皇”、“五帝”，再到有文字记载历史的封建君王周文王和周武王[5]，我们可以发现政道合一的传统。儒家把这些古老的君王奉为圭臬。这些人了解并且遵守了正确的统治原则。在上面所提到的周文王、周武王之后有一个周公，他作为王位继承人的叔叔，摄政主持国家大权。周公受到儒家推崇，因为即使在封建体制下他仍能得到最高权力，实际上是最高统治者。这种摄政统治本身意义深远，象征着这样一个观念，即在位的人如果没有能力治理天下，可以由有能力的人去代替，这是政道分离的开始。孔子把自己和周公紧紧联系在一起，他说：“甚矣吾衰也！久矣吾不复梦见周公。”[6]在关于周公的传说里，政统和道统确实没有明显的分离，因为作为王叔，周公在宗法上是有地位的。但是儒家后来的追随者在著名的英明统治者系列中把孔子列在周公之后，这样周公便成了政道分离的起点。

The separation of ethical and political lines was, according to the stories of the Confucian school, more clearly established by saying that this "king without a throne" was the descendant of an aristocratic family. Actually, his connection was rather remote. He was not at all comparable in this way to a Chou Kung. Confucius had no qualifications for attaining power through his kinship status. But myths which tried to find a source of authority for him in the feudal system persisted. According to the Shih-chi,[7] Confucius' origins were quite doubtful. He was said to be the child of an illegitimate union. His mother would not tell him where his father's tomb was, and only when his mother died did he learn from someone else where his father was buried so that he could bury his mother also in that spot. Here also is recorded the incident of a man called Chih, Baron of Lu, giving a feast to the shih, to which Confucius went also. But he met with a rebuff when a man called Yang Huo, a corrupt official, said, "The Baron invited shih (knights), not you." From this we may infer that his status as a shih was doubtful, although the shih were in the lowest rank in the feudal system. Yet such accounts are told not to demean Confucius but to raise him still higher, as when an account later on in the same book adds that Confucius was born after his mother had prayed on a hill—the implication being that Confucius was of divine, not merely mortal, origin.

根据儒家的传说，孔子这位“素王”乃贵族之后，由此道统和政统的分离才较为明确地建立起来。实际上，孔子与贵族的联系很远，在这一点上他完全无法与周公相比，他没有资格从血统的身份上得到任何权力。但是，试图为他找到在封建体制下的权威根源的传说经久不绝。《史记》[8]对孔子的出身非常怀疑，据说他是“野合”的产物。他的母亲不把父亲的墓地所在告诉他，直到母亲死后，他才从别人那里得知，使父母得以合葬。这里还记载了鲁国贵族季氏招待士的一件事：“季氏飨士，孔子与往。阳虎绌曰：‘季氏飨士，非敢飨子也。’”这表明当时人们对孔子“士”的身份也很怀疑，尽管“士”只位列封建制度的底层。但这些描写不是贬低而是提高了孔子。《史记》又有“祷于尼丘得孔子”，暗示孔子由神所授，不是凡人出身。

The importance of all these myths was not so much to establish the origins of Confucius as to set up divine authority for the ethical line which he represented. Thus, if Confucius derived his power not through his kinship with a feudal lord but from divine sources, his spiritual throne must be as high as the actual kingly throne. So from Confucius there derived a line of important and authoritative figures of those who followed the tao-t'ung. These people might lack political power, but in the society about them they were as important as the actual monarchs in that they ruled the people by ethical and social influence.

The separation of political power from ethical power is one of the fundamental ideas in Confucian philosophy and is also an important factor in the Chinese power structure. It may be compared to the separation of church and state in the West but is not exactly the same. Theoretically, when Jesus said, "Render unto Caesar those things which are Caesar's," he recognized a duality of power. When the priests asked Jesus what authority he had in doing the things he did, he countered with, "The baptism of John, whence was it? From heaven or of men?" And the priests were in doubt what to reply and at last answered Jesus, "We cannot tell." And he said to them, "Neither tell I you by what authority I do these things."[9]

We see clearly that to Christ there were two possible sources of power, worldly and divine. But these two powers were not on the same level. Rather, one was subordinate to the other. So in European medieval history worldly power submitted to divine power, monarchical power submitted to religious power. When, in a later period, these two powers became separate as the powers of church and state, the civil rights of the people came to be recognized. In Western political thinking it came to be accepted that the power which does not come from heaven could come only from the people, the common man. So long as the monarch derived his authority from his divine origin, he might slight the popular will. But once the throne was separated from the church, and it was recognized that the king's power was secular, it was quite natural that the people should be allowed to have their say and to share in government. It seems to me that in the Western political system power was never entirely independent and self-justified but was always based on an authority derived from either divine or popular sources. The situation in China was somewhat different.

In China, Confucius also recognized a duality of power, but for him the two systems were not in the same order. One was not necessarily subordinate to the other; rather they were seen to be parallel. In China political power was like Caesar's, but the other type of power, in contrast to the West, was not viewed as having a divine origin. Some people think that Confucianism is a system of religion, yet it recognizes no supernatural force. This is not the only way, however, in which it may be distinguished from Western religions. Another aspect of Confucianism in which it differs from the West is its relation to action. Jesus Christ was using his power in the same domain to control human affairs. As a result of this conflict, one power became subordinate to the other. But the Confucian tao-t'ung stands not for action but for the upholding of a standard or norm which defines the Way of a good emperor (and a good citizen). It is one thing whether the monarch acts according to the Way or not. It is another whether we have made clear the Way to be a good ruler. Christ made clear the good and wanted action toward that good. But Confucianism is divided into two parts: (1) the knowing what is good and (2) the doing what is good. Thus the man who knows what is good does not necessarily have an obligation to carry it out. In fact, he may not be able to do so, since what he is able to do depends upon his social position. So we have the differentiation into separate categories of the scholar who knows and the monarch who does. The following quotation explains the psychology of Confucius. Confucius said to his student: "Hui, the poem says that tigers and wild beasts are running wild in the fields. Is my Way wrong? Why should I become so poor?"

这些神话的作用不单是确立孔子的身世，更多的是为他代表的道统建立神话权威。这样，既然孔子不是从贵族血统中而是从神那里获得权力，那么他的地位就会和实际的王位一样高。因此，从孔子后出现了一系列重要和权威的人物追随道统，他们可能缺乏政治权力，但在他们所处的社会中，他们和实际的君王一样重要，因为他们用道德和社会的影响来统治人民。

政统和道统的分离是儒家理论的基础理念之一，也是中国权力结构中的一个重要事实，这和西方的政治和宗教的分离相似但又不完全相同。在理论上，当耶稣说“恺撒的归恺撒”时，他也是认识到了权力的双重系统。当牧师责问耶稣他仗着什么权柄做这些事时，耶稣反问他们：“约翰的洗礼是从天上来的，是从人间来的？”牧师很疑惑，不知如何回答，最后他们说：“我们不能告诉你。”耶稣对他们说：“我也不告诉你们我仗着什么权柄做这些事。”[10]

我们可以清楚地看到，在耶稣眼里有两个可能的权力来源：一个来自人间，一个来自上天。这两种权力并不在同一层次上，前者从属于后者。在欧洲中世纪的历史中，来自人间的权力降服在天上的权力之下，皇权降服在宗教权力之下。后来政教分离时，人民的权力开始抬头。西方政治思想中公认的是，权力不从天上来就得从人间来，人间即是民间。只要君王的权力来自上天，他就可能忽视民间的意愿。但是一旦政教分离，君王的权力被认定为世俗的，人们自然应该享有发言权和政治权利。在我看来，西方的政治体制权力从未完全独立和自我证成，而总是以来自上天或民间的权威为基础。这与中国的情况有所不同。

在中国，孔子也认识到了权力的双重系统，但是在他看来这两个系统并不在一个层次上，一个不必从属于另一个，而是互相平行。在中国，政治权力如同恺撒的权力，但另一种权力与西方不同，不被视为来自上天。有些人认为儒家思想是宗教体系，只是它没有认可超自然的力量，然而这不是与西方宗教区分的唯一途径。儒家思想与西方不同的另一方面是与人类行为的关系。耶稣用他在同一领域（即人间）的权力来控制人间的事。这种冲突的结果是一种权力降服另一种。但是儒家的道统不代表行为，而是提出一个好的君王（和好的平民）应当怎样做的规范。君王按不按“理”做是一回事，有没有弄清一个好的统治者的“理”是另一回事。耶稣明确了好的规范，希望人的行为朝着好的规范去做。但是儒家思想分成了两部分：（1）知道什么是善的以及（2）履行这种善。因此，一个知道如何是好的规范的人，并没有义务一定要遵照去做，实际上他也许不能去做，因为他的行为由他的社会地位来决定。所以我们要在概念范畴上作出区分：文人学者在知，而君主则是在行。下面的引述解释了儒家的心理学。孔子对他的学生说：“回，诗云‘匪兕匪虎，率彼旷野’。吾道非邪，吾何为于此？”

Then the student Yen Hui answered: "The Way of my master is very great—the world cannot accept it. But, my master, try to carry out your Way. If others don't accept you, it shows that you are a gentleman. If we don't work out the Way for doing things, that is our shame. If those who have the power don't follow the right Way, that is their shame."

Then Confucius smiled and said: "You are right. If you were rich, I should become your secretary."[11]

This quotation explains how even in a world in which brute beasts are running wild it is still possible for scholars to work out the Way. For the tao, or Way, is detached from worldly events. The Way can be perfected irrespective of actual happenings in the world. To make this Way effective, to practice it, is not the duty of a man who is not in a position to do so; in other words, of the man without political power. The man who has control of political power may administer his affairs according to the Way or may utterly disregard it. Those who are not in his position of authority may themselves maintain the Way, and they may "push it and try to make it work," so that the Way will be followed by the man who controls the country. But they must not try to usurp the position of the man in power. What Confucius means when he speaks of "push it and make it work" is simply the use of persuasion. Confucius never assumes the authority assumed by Christ. As a result, in the Chinese scheme, the political line is active, the ethical line passive. Those who follow the ethical line will behave according to the popular saying:

颜回回答说：“夫子之道至大，故天下莫能容。虽然，夫子推而行之，不容何病，不容然后见君子！夫道之不修也，是吾丑也。夫道既已大修而不用，是有国者之丑也。不容何病，不容然后见君子！”

孔子欣然而笑曰：“有是哉颜氏之子！使尔多财，吾为尔宰。”[12]

这一段引文说明，即使在“匪兕匪虎，率彼旷野”的乱世，道还是可以“既已大修”的，因为道与事是分开的，道是可以离事而修的。用道于事，并不是“不在其位”的人的责任，换言之，并不是没有政治权力的人的责任。有国者可以用道来管理事务，也可以彻底无视道。“不在其位”的人可能自行维持道，“推而行之”，以使有国者来遵守道。但是他们不能有篡夺有国者地位的企图。孔子所讲的“推而行之”只不过是游说。孔子从来也没有取得过基督耶稣所取得的权柄。结果，在中国的制度中，政统是积极主动的，而道统是消极被动的。那些追随道统的人则将：

When wanted, then go; When set aside; then hide.[13]

To employ and to discharge belongs to the man who has power; to work or to hide is the role of the man who has the Way. According to this system, there will be no conflict. From the point of view of the person who upholds the norms, practical politics may sometimes coincide with the norm and sometimes not. One may distinguish those nations which have tao and those which have not. Yao and Shun are examples of those who ruled the nation according to the tao.[14] Yü and T'ang are other examples. So also monarchical power may lose its Way, and, when this occurs, the man who knows it, and through this knowledge possesses it, should guard it and keep it safe from harm. Such a man must work hard to cultivate himself so that the norms will not disappear entirely. But he will have no idea of trying to correct the conduct of the monarch. This, then, is the Confucian view: the one who knows should be ready to present his views when asked but when not asked should keep them hidden. These scholar-masters do not desert the Way in time of difficulty, but only when the monarch in his behavior approaches the Way will they come forth and act as officials.

The Master said, "Be of unwavering good faith, love learning, if attacked be ready to die for the good Way. Do not enter a State that pursues dangerous courses, nor stay in one where the people have rebelled. When the Way prevails under Heaven, then show yourself; when it does not prevail, then hide. When the Way prevails in your own land, count it a disgrace to be needy and obscure; when the Way does not prevail in your land, then count it a disgrace to be rich and honoured."

"A gentleman indeed is Ch'u Po Yü. When the Way prevailed in his land, he served the State; but when the Way ceased to prevail, he knew how to 'wrap it up and hide it in the folds of his dress.'”[15]

The real problem, then, is the link between the political and the ethical lines. The ideal of the Confucian school was that of the kingly Way—wang-tao—in which both political and ethical lines coincided. But how could that ideal be realized? Here we find the conflict in Confucius' ideas. Since he had been brought up under a feudal system, he valued a social order of this sort, one in which a stable society was ruled according to well-established traditions. The feudal tradition prevented him from breaking the connection between the political line and kinship; the static ideal made him abhor social changes. This is the first point to be noted with regard to Confucius' attitude. He took for granted the political system and did not wish it to be changed. At the same time, he was living when the system was actually disintegrating; men in a certain position no longer behaved according to the norm set up for them. To meet this difficulty, Confucius detached the norms from actual practice and set them up as an ideal type of behavior which was not to be deviated from. In this he was very stubborn and persistent. The student Tzu-kung said to him: "The Master's teachings are too great for the people, and that is why the world cannot accept them. Why don't you come down a little from your heights?"

用之则行，

舍之则藏。[16]

用舍是有权者决定的，行藏是有道者采取的。依照这种体系，就不会有矛盾。在持执规范的人看来，实际的政治有时合于规范，有时则不合，于是可以分出“邦有道”和“邦无道”。尧舜是有道的例子[17]，禹汤亦同。皇权可以失道，此时明道、有道者可以维护道，使之不受侵害。这样的人必须勤于修身，以使道不会完全消失，但他们并不会有修正皇权的想法。因此，根据孔子的看法，明白规范的人可以在被用的时候把道摆出来，不被用的时候把道藏好。当皇权和道分离时，这些师儒退而守；皇权和道接近时，师儒出而仕。

孔子说：“笃信好学，守死善道。危邦不入，乱邦不居。天下有道则见，无道则隐。邦有道，贫且贱焉，耻也；邦无道，富且贵，耻也。”

“君子哉蘧伯玉！邦有道，则仕，邦无道，则可卷而怀之。”[18]

因此，真正的问题是政统和道统的连接。师儒的理想是“王道”，王道是政统加道统。怎样实现这种理想呢？这里我们看到了孔子思想的矛盾。他在封建制度下长大，关注这种社会秩序，这是一个按照建立完好的传统来统治的静态社会。封建传统阻止他打破政统和血统的联系，静态的理想使他厌恶社会结构的改变。这是在考虑孔子的态度时首先要注意到的。他把政统看成是既成的，不希望有所改变。同时，他生活在道统正在分解的时代，人们不再遵循既成的规范来做事。为解决这一困难，孔子将规范和实际行为划分开来，把规范立为不可背离的理想的行为方式。在这一点上，孔子很固执并锲而不舍。他的学生子贡对他说：“夫子之道至大也，故天下莫能容夫子。夫子盖少贬焉？”

Confucius replied: "Ah Ssu, a good farmer plants the field but cannot guarantee the harvest, and a good artisan can do a skillful job, but he cannot guarantee to please his customers. Now you are not interested in cultivating yourselves, but are only interested in being accepted by the people. I am afraid you are not setting the highest standard for yourself."[19]

We may wonder how, in such a case, the norms are ever to be brought into close contact with reality. It seems that this must depend largely on chance, since, on the one hand, one is bound to wait with patience and, on the other, to retire and let others seek one out. But Confucius did express himself on this matter of chance. The student Tzu-kung said: "Suppose one has a lovely jewel, should one wrap it up, put it in a box and keep it, or try to get the best price one can for it?"

The Master said: "Sell it! Most certainly sell it! I myself am one who is waiting for an offer."[20]

Confucius actually did go about and offer his services to more than seventy lords. The following quotation makes this point even more clear. When Confucius was fifty years old, Kung-San Po-niu started a rebellion against Baron Huan in the city of Pi. Baron Huan sent for Confucius, and Confucius was eager to go. He said: "The kings Wen and Wu rose to power from the small cities of Feng and K'ao and finally established the empire of Chou. Pi, I know, is a small place, but perhaps I may try." But Confucius' student, Tzu-lu, was displeased and tried to dissuade him from going. Confucius said, "Since the Baron asks to see me, he must have a plan in his mind, and if he would put me in power, we might achieve something resembling the work of Emperor P'ing."[21] But after all he did not go. Confucius felt the urge to be employed, and, when he was, he endeavored to carry out good projects. At the age of fifty-six he was pleased when in a certain principality he was made chief minister. His disciples said to him, "I hear that a gentleman is not afraid at the sight of disaster and not delighted at success."

孔子曰：“赐，良农能稼而不能为穑；良工能巧而不能为顺；君子能修其道，纲而纪之，统而理之，而不能为容。今尔不修尔道而求为容。赐，而志不远矣！”[22]

在这种情况下，我们也许会问，规范如何与现实紧密连接呢？似乎很大程度上是要靠机会，一方面是耐心等待，另一方面是退出，让别人来寻求。不过，孔子在等待机会这一点上表达得很清楚——子贡曰：“有美玉于斯，韫椟而藏诸？求善贾而沽诸？”

子曰：“沽之哉，沽之哉，我待贾者也。”[23]

实际上，孔子的确周游列国，曾“干七十余君”，下面的引述表达得更清楚：“……孔子年五十。公山不狃以费畔季氏，使人召孔子。孔子循道弥久，温温无所试，莫能己用，曰：‘盖周文武起丰镐而王，今费虽小，傥庶几乎！’欲往。子路不说，止孔子。孔子曰：‘夫召我者岂徙哉？如用我，其为东周乎！’”[24]但最终他还是没有成行。孔子是很想做事的，而且当有人用他时，他努力施行善举：“孔子年五十六，由大司寇行摄相事，有喜色。门人曰：‘闻君子祸至不惧，福至不喜。’

"Is that so?" remarked Confucius. "Is it not said that one is happy because he rises to a position above the common people?" But he stayed in office only about three months, during which time he had executed a minister who opposed him. But it was said that during the time of his office there was no cheating in the markets, men and women did not walk together, people did not take things which belonged to others, and there was no litigation.

But, although Confucius waited patiently, he had little real chance to enter politics. Even when he did get his chance, there was no assurance that his way of merging ethics with politics would be continued. So at last Confucius left Lu and said, "How free I am. I can now spend my life in a leisurely way." Yet he still felt disheartened at times, saying, "The Way makes no progress. I shall get upon a raft and float out to sea."[25] Actually, as far as a practical career was concerned, he had accomplished nothing. But we may imagine that if he had had a chance to remain in office for three years, as he wished, he might have accomplished some of the great results he had hoped for. Yet, in such a case, Confucius' death might have been like those of Tu Ming-tu and Shun Hua, two officials who attained high office but were later killed by their lords. When this news came to Confucius, he sighed. He was standing at the time near a stream and said: "How beautiful is the water! Eternally it flows! Fate has decreed that I should not cross this river."

"What do you mean?" asked Tzu-kung, coming forward.

And Confucius replied, "Tu Ming-tu and Shun Hua were good ministers of Chin. Before Baron Chien Chao got into power, he said that he would insist on taking these two men, should he get into power, and now that he is in power, he has killed them. I have heard that when people disembowel embryos or kill the young, the unicorn refuses to appear in the countryside, and that when people dry up a pond in order to catch fish, the dragon refuses to bring the yin and yang principles into harmony (resulting in famine and flood),[26] and that when people snatch birds' nests and break birds' eggs, the phoenix refuses to come. Why? Because a gentleman avoids those who kill their own kind. If even the birds and beasts avoid the unrighteous, how much more should I do the same?"[27]

These remarks show Confucius' recognition of the difficulty of applying his Way in practical politics. Let me quote another passage from the Shih-chi. The lords of Lu had a hunting party and caught a strange animal which Confucius declared was a unicorn. Then Confucius said: "This is the end of it all. There is no one in this world who understands me."

“孔子曰：‘有是言也。不曰“乐其以贵下人乎”？’于是诛鲁大夫乱政者少正卯。与闻国政三月，粥羔豚者弗饰贾；男女行者别于涂；涂不拾遗；四方之客至乎邑者不求有司……”

但是尽管孔子耐心等待，他真正与闻政事的机会并不多，即使有机会，也不能确保他的政道结合能继续下去。最后他还是离开了鲁国，感慨“优哉游哉，维以卒岁”，然而他仍时感沮丧，说“道不行，乘桴浮于海”。[28]实际上，从现实业绩来讲，他什么也没有达成。但是我们设想，如果他真的像他希望的那样“三年有成”，他也许会如愿取得一些不错的成就。不过，如果这样，他的结局就如同窦鸣犊和舜华了——他们两人做到很高的官位，但最终还是被统治者所杀。孔子得知后怅然叹息：“美哉水，洋洋乎？丘之不济此，命也夫？”

“子贡趋而进曰：‘敢问何谓也!'

“孔子曰：‘窦鸣犊，舜华，晋国之贤大夫也。赵简子未得志之时，须此两人而后从政；及其已得志，杀之乃从政。丘闻之也，刳胎杀夭则麒麟不至郊，竭泽涸渔则蛟龙不合阴阳[29]，覆巢毁卵则凤凰不翔。何则？君子讳伤其类也。夫鸟兽之于不义也尚知辟之，而况乎丘哉！’”[30]

这番话表明孔子认识到将他的“理”用于实际政治的困难。我再引用《史记》中的一段：“及西狩见麟，曰：‘吾道穷矣。’喟然叹曰：‘莫知我夫?'

His disciple Tzu-kung said, "Why do you say that there is no one who understands you?"

And Confucius said, "I don't blame Heaven, and I don't blame mankind. All I try to do is my best to acquire knowledge and to aim for a higher ideal. Perhaps Heaven is the only one who understands me! Po-yi and Shu-ch'i were two sages who loved their ideals and their self-respect! (These persons and the following were famous scholars living as recluses.) Liu-hsia Hui and Shao-lien lowered their ideals and lost their self-respect. Yu-chung and Yi-yi remained active and outspoken, but their conduct was clean and they had good judgment. But I am different from all of them. I will insist on nothing." Then he added: "A gentleman will suffer pain to die without having lived up to his name. My Way will not be carried out. What can I do to explain myself to those who come after?"[31] He chose to compile the book of Spring and Autumn Annals from historical sources.

The Spring and Autumn Annals is a Chinese grammar of politics. It reveals the norms of good government but does not necessarily give any practical advice for realizing them. From this work one may learn the tao, or Way, which runs side by side but does not merge with practical politics. The title given to Confucius of a "king without a throne," that is, a king without any political position, makes clear this peculiarly Chinese concept.

If the ethical line cannot control the political line, though scholars may repeatedly criticize the government as not acting according to the tao, in actual everyday politics the emperor, or the man who possesses political power, will not feel shame and will disregard them. In a state which is misgoverned, in which the scholar folds up his norm and hides it in his bosom, what happens to the people? Scholars may say, as Confucius once did, "If Heaven will not destroy this work what harm can my enemy do to me?" But Confucius also said, "Heaven may destroy this work, and those who come later will never again have a chance to learn the Way." Scholars may die, for they are men of this world, not of another. How can they hide when the imperial power rules the entire land? The imperial power may burn the books and bury the scholars alive.[32] It may kill students because of some writing which injures the emperor. It may block the ethical line entirely for a time. Confucius was not able to solve this difficulty, namely, that, living together in the same world, the two lines, ethical and political, cannot let each other alone. Although the ethical line of the scholars may be willing not to struggle against the political line, the political line can, and often does, suppress the ethical.

“子贡曰：‘何为莫知子?'

“子曰：‘不怨天，不尤人，下学而上达，知我者其天乎！’‘不降其志，不辱其身，伯夷、叔齐乎！’谓‘柳下惠、少连降志辱身矣’。谓‘虞仲、夷逸隐居放言，行中清，废中权’。‘我则异于是，无可不无可。’子曰：‘弗乎，弗乎！君子病没世而名不称焉。吾道不行矣，吾何以自见于后世哉?'[33]，乃因史记作春秋……”

《春秋》是一部中国政治的典范。它揭示了好的统治的规范，但没有对其实施提出实际的建议。我们可从中学到“道”或“理”，与政平行，二者没有统一。孔子的尊号是“素王”，就是没有政治地位的王，这是中国政治概念中的特色。

如果道统不能控制政统，尽管推崇道统的人不停地斥责有国者失道，但在日常政治活动中，帝王或是掌握政治权力的人并不觉得可耻且置之不理。邦无道时，师儒们固然不妨把道卷而怀之，可是那些百姓怎么样呢？正像孔子曾经说过的那样，师儒们可以说：“天之未丧斯文也，匡人其如予何？”但是孔子还说：“天之将丧斯文也，后死者不得与于斯文也。”师儒们终将死去，因为他们是地球上的生命，不是其他星球上的。当皇权控制整个国土的时候，他们怎么能隐藏起来呢？皇权可以“焚书坑儒”[34]，可以兴文字狱，可以在一个时期内完全阻碍道统。孔子无法解决这一矛盾，即只要在同一个世界上，道统和政统实际上是无法各行其是的。尽管道统不与政统相争，但实际上，政统可以而且的确常常压迫道统。

When this happens, what can scholars do? The positive way to meet this dilemma is, as was done in the West, to conquer the imperial power and subordinate practical politics to the socially accepted norms. But positive measures of this sort are not in accordance with the feudal tradition, and we find very little in Chinese history of this sort of positive resistance. Another line was taken.

When Confucius appealed to Heaven, that Heaven was an indifferent abstraction which would not interfere with worldly events.[35] But when the ethical line of the scholars was suppressed by the emperors to such a degree that there was no possibility of their gaining any power in politics, they tried to convert Heaven into a really active force. Confucian tao has no inherent power. It cannot do things, for doing things is the emperor's task. In the Han dynasty, however, the conception of a realistic God who would interfere in human affairs gradually took shape. Tung Chung-shu (179?–104? B.C.), a scholar of the Han dynasty, interpreted the Spring and Autumn Annals in such a way as to threaten the royal power with heavenly anger. In a statement addressed to the emperor Wu he said: "Your servant, in reading the Spring and Autumn Annals, has come to see that, in this work done by previous generations, there is presented a relation between Heaven and Man. I realize the awfulness of this relation. When a nation loses its tao, Heaven will first warn the people by famines and disasters. If the emperor does not look back upon himself to criticize himself, then Heaven will warn him by portents. If he still does not change his way, then he will court real disaster. This shows the benevolence of Heaven, which wishes to stop disturbances in the world."

In Tung's formula Heaven comes first, the emperor second, the scholars third, and, at the bottom, the people. Following this formula, the emperor should no longer be repressive but should be awed and restrained by the behavior of Heaven. But the question is: Since Heaven expresses approval or disapproval through natural phenomena, who knows the meaning of the heavenly signs? Who is able to interpret these signs but the scholar? Thus Tung really emphasizes the importance of the scholar, in that he alone could interpret Heaven. The first part of this conception was different from the usual Confucian point of view and especially that developed by Mencius, according to which the will of Heaven is to be expressed in the will of the people. According to this new idea, scholars should interpret the will of Heaven as expressed in natural phenomena. It was not an attempt to control political power democratically but rather, indirectly, through religion. The role of the scholar was simply to help the monarch to meet Heaven's demands; and the punishment of the emperor, if it came, would be through natural disasters and not by the people. Theoretically, monarchical power was thus subordinated to religious power, and the scholar given a position of some independence. In other words, the scholar's ethical line was no longer to be held down by the political line of the emperor.

那么这时师儒们该怎么办呢？积极的出路是依照西方的做法，制约皇权，把政统压迫在社会公认的道统之下，但这与封建传统不合，在中国历史中很少有这种积极的反抗，他们采取的是另一种方式。

孔子呼天，这个天是空洞的，即使有知也不干涉人事。[36]可是当道统被帝王压迫得无法翻身、完全丧失政治权力的时候，他们试图请天来干涉人事，以发挥其实际的积极作用。孔子的道统没有权柄，不能做事，因为做事是帝王的任务。但在汉代，一个可以干涉人事的现实的“天”逐渐成型。汉代的师儒董仲舒（约公元前179—公元前104年）在对《春秋》的解释中用上天的愤怒来吓唬皇权。他对汉武帝说：“臣谨案春秋之中，视前世已行之事，以观天人相与之际，甚可畏也。国家将有失道之败，而天乃先出灾害以谴告之，不知自省，又出怪异以警惧之，尚不知变，而伤败乃至。以此见天心之仁爱人君而欲止其乱也。”

在董仲舒的公式里，上是天，中是皇，次是儒，末是民。根据他的公式，皇权不再处于压迫别人的地位而应敬畏上天，受上天的限制。但问题是，既然上天通过自然现象来表达赞赏或责备，那谁能明白这些天相符兆的意义呢？除了师儒，还有谁能解读这些符兆呢？董仲舒就这样实际强调了师儒的重要性，即只有师儒能解释天意。这个概念的前一部分与儒家通常的观点有所不同，特别是与孟子所发展的“天意表达于民意”的观点不同。根据这种新观点，师儒应该通过自然现象来解释天意，这不是试图通过民主的方式来限制政权，而是间接通过宗教。师儒不过是帮着皇权去应天。天要降刑罚于君主时，不经由民众而是通过自然灾害。理论上，皇权就这样屈服于宗教的力量，师儒被赋予了一定独立的地位。换句话说，师儒的道统不再为皇帝的政统所压制。

If Tung Chung-shu had advanced a step further, perhaps he might have gone so far as eventually to transform the scholar from an interpreter of Heaven into a priest. Then the scholar-priests might have formed an organized church, which, with divine sanction, might have been strong enough to check the unlimited monarchical power. If this had taken place, we might have had in China something similar to the relations between church and state in the West. But when this theory came to challenge the supremacy of the monarchical power, it was suppressed at once. Tung Chung-shu developed a theory of omens and could even predict natural disasters from the yin and the yang. "When you want rain," he said, "stop the yang and open the yin. If you want the rain to stop, reverse the process. Practice this throughout the nation, and it will not fail." Once in Liao-tung, a hall in the tomb of the emperor caught fire. Tung interpreted this to mean that the emperor had done something wrong. A friend of his called Yen Chu-fu, who knew of this and who was jealous of Tung, stole the writings which made clear this interpretation and showed them to the emperor. The emperor called together all the scholars and showed the writings to them. A student of Tung's called Lu, who did not know the writings were his master's, said it was all "nonsense." Then the emperor was relieved. He put Tung into prison and condemned him to death. Later Tung was pardoned but never again dared to interpret in this way.

The theory of heavenly anger expressed through portents did not succeed in controlling monarchical power. But it encouraged the people in that it destroyed the theory of imperial absolutism. If Heaven dislikes the ruler, then the ruler must be changed. During the Han dynasty, and afterward, whenever there were social disturbances, this theory was used to justify the rebellion of the people. But, although as a popularly accepted theory it might be a justification for revolt, it did not change the nature of the imperial power.

At the same period as Tung, under the Han emperor Wu, there was another scholar who had also studied the Spring and Autumn Annals, namely, Hung Kung-sun. This man, who took part in the persecution and exile of Tung, presents another form of adjustment to the imperial power. That is, to become an official and serve the emperor. Orthodox Confucianism scorned Hung Kung-sun because he sold out the spirit of Confucianism, the keeping of the tao. An old scholar, ninety years of age, Yuan Ku-sun, who had retired because he would not modify his opinions to please the emperor, looked askance at Kung-sun, and said: "You, Kung-sun, should say what you have learned. You should not bend your teaching to please the world." This meant that it was the duty of the scholar to hold to the ethical line and not to be an opportunist. Kung-sun had come of humble origins; he had been a jailer and at one time had even herded pigs. Yet he came to be prime minister, the first who had reached this position without being related to the emperor. He thus, very well, saw the advantage of selling out the ethical line to the emperor and of subordinating the Confucian norms to the monarchical power. Actually, unless one retired from the world entirely, there were, practically speaking, only two alternatives: either to subordinate ethical power to political power or to become unpopular. Yuan Ku-sun, the old scholar, and Tung Chung-shu did not submit and were exiled. But Hung Kung-sun submitted and became prime minister.

如果董仲舒再进一步，也许会最终把解释天意的师儒发展成宗教的牧师。然后这些牧师型的师儒可以组织成教会，获得上帝的认可，也许会发展到可以控制无限制的皇权。如果这样，中国就会有像西方那样的政教关系。但是当这种理论开始向皇权的至高无上发出挑战时，就立刻被镇压下去了。董仲舒发展了灾异论，甚至能通过阴阳来预言自然灾害。他说：“求雨，闭诸阳，纵诸阴，其止雨反是；行之一国，未尝不得所欲。”“先是辽东高庙、长陵高园殿灾，仲舒居家推说其意，草稿未上，主父偃候仲舒，私见，嫉之，窃其书而奏焉。上召视诸儒，仲舒弟子吕步舒不知其师书，以为大愚。于是下仲舒吏，当死，诏赦之。仲舒遂不敢复言灾异。”

通过自然征兆来表达上天之怒的灾异论，虽没有获得控制皇权的成功，但它鼓励了民间百姓，因为它打破了皇权的绝对性——如果上天厌恶皇帝，皇权就要改统。于是在汉代期间以及之后，每一次社会暴动，都用这种理论来正名。虽然这种被民间广泛接受的理论成了造反改统的根据，但它没有改变皇权的性质。

在汉武帝时代，与董仲舒同一时期的还有一个研究《春秋》的儒家公孙弘，他是参与迫害和流放董仲舒的阴谋家，提出了另一种适应皇权的方式，那就是做官侍奉皇帝。正统的儒林谴责公孙弘出卖了孔子卫道的传统。不肯修改自己的想法以迁就皇权的九旬老人辕固生，罢归的时候，公孙弘侧目而视固。固曰：“公孙子务正学以言，无曲学以阿世！”这表明师儒有着维持道统的责任，不能投机。公孙弘出身卑微，做过狱吏，甚至牧过猪，但却被封为宰相，成为第一个与皇帝没有关系而达到此地位的人。因此他非常清楚地看到出卖道统、牺牲儒家规范而屈服于皇权的好处。其实除非一个人完全脱离尘世，否则实际地说，只有两个选择：一是政统征服道统，一是失宠于上。老儒生辕固生、董仲舒不肯屈服，被放逐了；公孙弘屈服了，做到宰相。

As prime minister, Kung-sun advocated the principle that monarchy should rule the people through the scholars of his ilk. He said: "The leopard, the wild horse, the untamed ox, all wild beasts and birds are difficult to control. But, when they are domesticated, they may be used for human purposes. To bend wood takes less than a day. Gold and other metals can be melted in less than a month. A man who has a mind of his own and can judge the good from the bad, advantage from disadvantage, must be more difficult to handle than animals, birds, wood, or metal. But in a year's time he too may be molded." Kung-sun developed the technique of how to serve the emperor as a good official as follows: Each morning, when there is a conference, he will present the choices of action to the emperor and let him make his selection. He will not argue or insist upon anything. Then the emperor will see that he is discreet and understanding and that he knows administrative work and is an expert scholar. The emperor will be glad to have him near him. When the emperor grants him an audience, and he finds that they are not in agreement, he will not argue but will go back and find someone else to mediate. This man will present the case first to the emperor, Kung-sun following him. For this tactful approach the emperor will be very pleased with him. Moreover, even when a conference of ministers has decided a matter, the man who is wise will not speak according to the agreement but will fit in with the emperor's mood.

For following the latter precept, Kung-sun was attacked by other officials. They said: "This man is most treacherous and unfeeling. He turns his face against his friends. He suggests the idea himself first and then abandons it; he isn't loyal." The emperor asked Kung-sun if this were true. He replied: "Those who understand me will think that I am loyal. Those who do not understand me will think that I am not."

作为宰相，公孙弘主张由皇权利用他这类的师儒来统治人民。他说：“夫虎豹马牛，禽兽之不可制者也，及其教驯服习之，至可牵持驾服，唯人之从。臣闻揉曲木者不累日，销金石者不累月，夫人之于利害好恶，岂比禽兽木石之类哉？期年而变……”公孙弘总结了一套“做官”“事上”的技巧：“每朝会议，开陈其端，使人主自择，不肯面折庭争。于是上察其行慎厚，辩论有余，习文法吏事，缘饰以儒术，上说之……弘奏事有所不可，不肯庭辩。常与主爵都尉汲黯请间，黯先发之，弘推其后，上常说，所言皆听，以此日益亲贵。尝与公卿约议，至上前，皆背其约以顺上指。

“汲黯庭诘弘曰：‘齐人多诈而无情，始为与臣等建此议，今皆背之，不忠。’上问弘，弘谢曰：‘夫知臣者以臣为忠，不知臣者以臣为不忠。’……

Another critic of Kung-sun said: "Hung Kung-sun has a high position among the top men. His salary is very high, but still he affects cotton gowns. That is not honest. He gives the impression of being modest and frugal when he really is not. Kung-sun started from a lowly position but in only a few years has climbed so far that he has become a minister and a lord. Outwardly his personality seems that of a temperate and hospitable man. He has built a guest house and filled it with guests whom he invites to participate in his work. While he himself takes only one piece of meat, they are entertained lavishly, and even his family neglected on their account. But, in spite of all this outward good will, inwardly he is jealous of everyone. He makes up to those officials who are not on good terms with him and then finds some way to hurt them. He killed Yen Chu-fu and exiled Tung Chung-shu. These are his plots."

From these old quotations we can see that here was a man without principles, one who merely tried to follow the emperor's whims, did not keep his word, sold out his friends, and formed his own party to help maintain his high position in the government.[37] This is a type of official which has often been seen in China.

Following the example of Hung Kung-sun, the ethical line which had been maintained by Confucius and his followers no longer was the norm. Scholars took to supporting monarchical power. This transformation was completed in the person of one Han Yü who, though considering himself directly descended from the ethical line, converted his position not into that of a critic but into a way of showing the emperor's tolerance. Han Yü was a man without academic honors, a hermit, but the emperor liked his conduct so well that he took him out of obscurity and created for him the office of imperial censor, an official who should tell the emperor what was wrong throughout his domain. His role was to convince the world at large that in the court people were allowed to speak freely and honestly, to make it evident that the emperor did not confer rewards unjustly, and to show that the emperor had the great virtue of being willing to follow suggestions disagreeable to him.[38] This, it was thought, would make the "people in the caves," the common people, "put on their finery and come to court to tell their wants." And this would make the emperor approach in virtue Yao and Shun, and his name would go down in history for ever and aye.

Han Yü no longer asked whether the imperial power followed the tao or not. To him this was no longer a problem, for he believed that the political line must be the same as the ethical. The emperor could do no wrong. Moreover, the emperor had the obligation to use the scholars, and the scholars, in turn, had the obligation to present themselves in court. His reasoning went thus: "In ancient times scholars were sorry for one another if one or another of them went as long as three months without being in office. Such a one, leaving his own country, would go to bear gifts to the court of another lord. He would feel so anxious to find an opportunity to serve in government that, if he could not find a job in Lu, he would go to Ch'i, if not in Ch'i, he would go to Sung and Chien [Cheng?].... But now we have a centralized government. Within the four seas there is but one rule. If a man is to leave, he must go live with savage tribes, leaving behind the country of his father and mother. The scholar who wishes to practice his tao must do so at court or else go off to the wilds. In the mountains and forests he can do nothing but cultivate himself; this is a way out only for those who care very little for the world, not for those who care for people."

“汲黯曰：‘弘位在三公，奉禄甚多，然为布被，此诈也。’……弘自见为举首，起徒步，数年至宰相封侯，于是起客馆，开东阁以延贤人，与参谋议。弘身食一肉，脱粟饭，故人宾客仰衣食，奉禄皆以给之，家无所余。然其性意忌，外宽内深。诸常与弘有隙，无近远，虽阳与善，后竟报其过。杀主父偃，徙董仲舒胶西，皆弘力也。”

从以上引述中我们可以看出，这是一个没有原则、揣摩上意、不守信用、出卖朋友、沽名钓誉、阴结私党以维持高位的人。[39]这是中国常见的官僚类型。

从公孙弘所开创的官僚路线上，孔子及其追随者所维持的道统已不再是规范，而是支持皇权的工具。这个转变由韩愈最终完成。他虽自认是直承道统的人物，但他把诤谏的意义解释成为皇帝获取美誉的手段。他说：“夫阳子本以布衣隐于蓬蒿之下。主上嘉其行谊，擢在此位。官以谏为名，诚宜有以奉其职。使四方后世知朝廷有直言骨鲠之臣，天子有不僭赏从谏如流之美。[40]庶岩穴之士闻而慕之。束带结发，愿进于阙下而伸其辞说，致吾君于尧舜，熙鸿号于无穷也。”

韩愈不再问皇权是否合于道。对他来讲这已不再是问题，因为他相信政统即是道统，皇帝不会做错事。而且，皇帝有责任起用士人，士人也有责任自荐于朝廷。他的理由是这样的：“古之士，三月不仕则相吊。故出疆必载贽，然所以重于自进者，以其于周不可，则去之鲁。于鲁不可，则去之齐。于齐不可，则去之宋，之郑，之秦，之楚也。今天下一君，四海一国，舍乎此则彝狄矣。去父母之邦矣。故士之行道者，不得于朝，则山林而已矣。山林者，士之所独善自养，而不忧天下者之所能安也。如有忧天下之心，则不能矣。”

From Han Yü on, Chinese scholars ceased to bother themselves about whether the emperor was good or not. Their function as scholars they now saw was to uphold the emperor. As people who simply read the orders of the emperor, they became caricatures of the real scholar.

Thus the relation between the scholar and political power changed in the course of history. In the beginning they were separated from practical politics; they were regarded as maintainers of the ethical way but not as positively effective in government. In the process of concentration of monarchical power this same class was unable to protect its own interest; its members turned to religious sanctions in the hope that divine authority, in controlling the monarch, would at the same time offer them protection. But the divine sanctions were not effective, and thus the only alternatives came to be either to rebel or to surrender. Since the scholar class were never in any sense revolutionary, they chose the latter course, becoming officials. And they even degraded themselves by becoming utterly subservient to the emperor. This is the historical process which determined the later position of the gentry in the social structure. They did not themselves attempt to take over political power but found security by subordinating themselves to the mercy of the imperial court. In the power structure of traditional China the gentry were a distinctly noncombative element.

自韩愈起，中国之士不再议论皇帝的是非。在他们眼中，作为士，他们的作用是侍奉皇帝，他们成了只不过是诵读圣谕的所谓的师儒。

于是，师儒和政权的关系在历史过程中有所演变。最初他们从政统里分离出来，被看作是不能主动影响政事的卫道者。在皇权不断集中的过程中，这个阶层不能维护自己的利益，他们转向依靠宗教的约束力，希望神的力量可以制约皇权，并同时保护他们。但这并没有奏效，于是除了反抗只有屈服。士大夫阶层从来都不是一个革命的阶层，他们选择了后者，即成为官僚，他们甚至降为彻底臣服于皇帝之流。这段历史过程决定了士绅在政治结构中的地位。他们本身并不想夺取政权，只是屈服于政权来谋得安全。在传统中国的权力结构中，士绅显然是没有斗志的那部分。

[1] Tao-t'ung, literally "tao-series," "tao-succession," "tao-transmission," in usage something like "the orthodox transmission of the tao or Way." The Chung Yung, or Doctrine of the Mean, defines the Confucian tao as follows: " “ 'The Universal Way for all under Heaven is five-fold, and the (virtues) by means of which it is practiced, are three. There are the relations of ruler and subject, father and son, husband and wife, elder and younger brother, and of friend and friend: these five constitute the universal Way for all. Wisdom (chih), human-heartedness (jen) and fortitude (yung): these three are universal virtues for all. That whereby they are practiced is one. Some are born and know it; some study and so know it; some through painful difficulties come to know it. But the result of their knowing is one' " (quoted by Fung Yu-lan, A History of Chinese Philosophy, trans. Derk Bodde [Peiping: H. Vetch, 1937], I, 373).

Han Yu of the T'ang dynasty (768–824), in his essay On the Nature of the Tao, wrote: "What I will call the Tao is not what has hitherto been called the tao by the Taoists and the Buddhists. Yao transmitted the tao to Shun. Shun transmitted it to Yü. Yü transmitted it to Wen, Wu, and the Duke of Chou. Wen, Wu, and the Duke of Chou transmitted it to Confucius, and Confucius transmitted it to Mencius. After Mencius, it was no longer transmitted."

[2] “道统”这个词的字面意思是指“道的系列”、“道的接续”、“道的传递”，在用法上类似于“道的正统传递”。《中庸》把儒道界定如下：“天下之达道五，所以行之者三，曰，君臣也，父子也，夫妇也，昆弟也，朋友之交也。五者，天下之达道也。知仁勇三者，天下之达德也，所以行之者一也。或生而知之，或学而知之，或困而知之，及其知之一也。或安而行之，或利而行之，或勉强而行之，及其成功一也。子曰：‘好学近乎知，力行近乎仁，知耻近乎勇。’知斯三者，则知所以修身。知所以修身，则知所以治人。知所以治人，则知所以治天下国家矣。”引自《中国哲学史》英文版，冯友兰著，德克·卜德译，北平：亨利·维奇出版公司，1937年，第1卷，第373页。（中文版参见冯友兰《中国哲学史》，北京： 中华书局，1961年，第450—451页。——译者注）

唐朝的韩愈（768—824）在《原道》中这样写道：“尧以是传之舜，舜以是传之禹，禹以是传之汤，汤以是传之文、武、周公，文、武、周公传之孔子，孔子传之孟轲。轲之死，不得其传焉。”

[3] The three rulers, Yao, Shun, and Yü, the great models of virtue in Confucian tradition, are the first to be mentioned by the Shu Ching, or Book of History, most ancient of Chinese documents. There is some difference of opinion as to whether Yao and Shun, among these at least semi-historical figures, are to be included with the "Five Sovereigns," or whether they ruled later as Sheng or Divine Sages. Granet says: "The three first of the Five Sovereigns, Huang-ti, Chuan-hsü, and Kao-hsin, figure in the works connected with the Confucian traditions, but have a philosophic rather than an historical character. The Book of History, attributed to Confucius, only mentioned the two last, Yao and Shun…. In making the history of the Sovereigns and of the Three August Ones precede that of the royal dynasties, the learned men of China set out to paint a picture of an halcyon age when, with human characteristics, perfect virtue rules. The heroic figures of the early age in China preserve, however, a number of mythical features. In Yao and Shun... the effacement of these features is nearly completed" (Marcel Granet, Chinese Civilization [New York: Barnes & Noble, 1951], p. 9).

[4] Arthur Waley, The Analects of Confucius (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1938), Book VII, No. 5, p. 123.

[5] 尧、舜、禹这三位统治者是儒家传统伟大的道德典范，最初是在中国最古老的文献典籍《书经》中提到的。像尧和舜这样半虚构的历史人物是否包括在五帝之内，还有他们后来是否算圣人治世——这些问题都存在着观点上的分歧。葛兰言说：“五帝的前三位——黄帝、颛顼和高辛——都是出现在与儒家传统相关的著作中的人物，但是他们都有着一种哲学的而非历史的特征。据说为孔子所著的《书经》中只提到后面两个，即尧和舜……通过将“三皇五帝”的历史置于皇家王朝之前，中国的文人学者着手绘制出一幅太平年代的图景，其时富有人性特征的完美品德居统治地位。然而，中国早期的英雄人物都保留有许多神话的特征。在尧和舜身上……这些特征近乎完全地消失了。”引自《中华文明》，葛兰言著，纽约：巴恩斯与诺布尔公司，1951年，第9页。

[6] 引自《论语》英文版，阿瑟·韦利译，伦敦：乔治·艾伦与昂温出版公司，1938年，第7篇，第5章，第123页。（原文参见《论语正义》，刘宝楠著，中华书局，1990年，第256页。——译者注）

[7] Shih-chi, written by Ssu-ma Ch'ien, father of Chinese historians (145–85? B.C.). Book XLVII contains a life of Confucius. See The Wisdom of Confucius, edited and translated with notes by Lin Yutang (New York: Modern Library, 1943), pp. 48–91.

[8] 《史记》一书为中国的历史学家之父司马迁（约公元前145—前85?）所著。《史记》第47卷中包含有一篇孔子的生平。参见林语堂的编译注释本《孔子的智慧》英文版，纽约：“现代图书馆丛书”版，1943年，第48—91页。

[9] Matt. 21: 23–27.

[10] 《马太福音》21章23—27节。

[11] "Tzu-kung came out and Yen Hui went in, and Confucius said, 'Ah, Hui, it is said in the Book of Songs, "Neither buffaloes, nor tigers, they wander in the desert." Are my teachings wrong? How is it that I find myself now in this situation?' And Yen Hui replied, 'The Master's teachings are so great. That is why the world cannot accept them. However, you should just do your best to spread the ideas. What do you care if they are not accepted? The fact that your teachings are not accepted shows that you are a true gentleman. If the truth is not cultivated, the shame is ours; but if we have already strenuously cultivated the teachings of a moral order, and they are not accepted by the people, it is the shame of those in power. What do you care if you are not accepted? The very fact that you are not accepted shows that you are a true gentleman.' And Confucius was pleased and said smilingly, 'Is that so? Oh, son of Yen, if you were a rich man, I would be your butler!' " (Lin Yutang, op. cit., pp. 74–75). (This episode is apocryphal.)

[12] “子贡出去而颜回进来，孔子说：‘颜回，据《诗经》上说，不是犀牛也不是老虎，却疲于奔命在空旷的原野。这是我的教学有了什么错误之处吗？我为什么沦落到这个地步？’颜回接着回答说：‘老师的教育如此地伟大，这正是为什么这个世界不能接受这些的原因。然而，您应该继续尽全力来传播自己的观念。如果这些观念不被接受，您又何必管它呢？您的教育不被接受这样的事实不正表明您是一位真正的君子吗？如果真理没有得到培育，那么这就是我们的羞愧了。但是如果我们已经含辛茹苦地培育了一种道德秩序的教化，而它们并不为人民所接受，这便是那些掌握权力的人的羞辱了。假使人们不接受您，您又何必在乎呢？人们不接受您这一事实本身就表明了您是一位真正的君子。’孔夫子心里非常高兴，面带笑容地说：‘是这样的吗？颜家的孩子，如果你是一位富人，我愿是你的一位管家。’”参见《孔子的智慧》英文版，林语堂著，第74—75页。这一情节广为流传，但其真实性存疑。

[13] Waley, Analects, Book VII, No. 10, p. 124.

[14] See n. 1, p. 34.

[15] Waley, Analects, Book VIII, No. 13, p. 135, and Book XV, No. 6, p. 194.

[16] 《论语》英文版，韦利译，第7篇，第10章，第124页。

[17] 见注释1，第34页（本书注释18，第183页）。

[18] 《论语》英文版，韦利译，第8篇，第13章，第135页以及第15篇，第6章，第 194页。

[19] Lin Yutang, op. cit., p. 74.

[20] Waley, Analects, Book IX, No. 12, p. 141.

[21] Life of Confucius, from the Shih-chi (Lin Yutang, op. cit., p. 56).

[22] 林语堂，《孔子的智慧》，第74页。

[23] 《论语》英文版，韦利译，第9篇，第12章，第141页。

[24] “孔子世家”，载《史记》（见林语堂《孔子的智慧》，第56页）。

[25] Waley, Analects, Book V, No. 6, p. 108.

[26] "Yang, the positive principle, is associated with all that is bright, beneficent, active, masculine: symbolized by Heaven and the Sun. Yin, the negative principle, with darkness, passivity, the feminine in nature: symbolized by the Earth and Water.

"The Yang is said to transform, the Yin to unite. By these processes they brought into being the five essences, water, fire, wood, metal, and earth….

"In no sphere of Chinese life and thought can the Yang and Yin be lost sight of. Their nearest Western parallel is what we call 'the mysterious causes underlying the operations of Providence' " (G. Willoughby-Meade, Chinese Ghouls and Goblins [New York: Frederick A. Stokes, n.d.], p. 4).

"In Zoroastrianism, Darkness is essentially evil; the principle of Light, essentially good. The fundamental conception of yin and yang is quite different. They are two interdependent and complementary facets of existence and the aim of yin-yang philosophers was not the triumph of light, but the attainment in human life of perfect balance between the two principles" (Arthur Waley, The Way and Its Power [London: George Allen & Unwin, 1934], p. 112).

[27] Lin Yutang, op. cit., p. 68. (This is another apocryphal incident.)

[28] 《论语》英文版，韦利译，第5篇，第6章，第108页。

[29] “阳，指正向的特性，它是与所有明亮、仁慈、积极、阳性的东西相联系，并以天和太阳作为象征。阴，指负向的特性，具有黑暗、被动和阴性的本质，以土地和水作为象征。

“阴阳转换而成一体。通过这样的过程而产生出水、火、木、金和土这五行来……

“在中国人的生活和思想中，阴阳无处不在。与西方最为接近的看法是我们所谓的‘天道运行背后的神秘原因’（《中国的食尸鬼和小鬼》，杰拉德·威洛比–米德著，纽约：弗雷德里克·斯托克斯公司，无出版年月，第4页）。

“在拜火教中，黑暗实质上就是恶，对光明的信念实质上就是善。在阴和阳的基本概念上存在有相当的差异。它们是指存在的两个相互独立和互补的方面，而且阴阳哲学家的目标并非是获取光明，而是要在人的生活中达到这两种特性的完美平衡（《道及其力量》，阿瑟·韦利著，伦敦：乔治·艾伦与昂温出版公司，1934年，第112页）。

[30] 林语堂，《孔子的智慧》，第68页。（这是另一个广为流传但真实性存疑的情节。）

[31] Fei's translation. See Lin Yutang, op. cit., pp. 86–87. The significance of catching the unicorn was that, although this creature in itself symbolized the coming-to-power of a sage and of general peace and prosperity, the fact that in this case the unicorn had been hunted down was rather the sign of something unusually disastrous, in this case of the death of the great scholar Confucius. Fei's repetition of the tradition that Confucius composed the Spring and Autumn Annals would be repudiated by most scholars.

[32] These events took place under the harsh Ch'in empire, in 213–212 B.C., as a means of enforcing intellectual conformity. All books throughout the empire, with certain important exceptions, were collected by the government and burned, and over 460 scholars were allegedly buried alive.

[33] 费孝通的翻译。见林语堂《孔子的智慧》，第86—87页。捕获麒麟的意义在于，尽管这一动物本身象征了一位圣人即将拥有权力以及普遍的安定和繁荣，但在这个例子中这只麒麟被捕获的事实，更可能是某种极为不幸的象征，暗指大学问家孔子的逝世。费孝通这里所重复的孔子编《春秋》的传统，可能是为大多数学者所拒斥的。

[34] 这些事件发生在严酷的秦朝，公元前213年—公元前212年之间，作为一种强行统一思想的手段。除了特定重要的著作之外，整个国家的所有书籍都被政府收缴上来烧毁，据说有460多位儒生被活埋。

[35] The substance of this and the following paragraphs as set out here by Fei would be disputed by many scholars in certain respects. That Heaven to Confucius was an indifferent abstraction is not the view of others (cf. Fung Yu-lan, op. cit., I, 58: "For Confucius, Heaven was a purposeful supreme being"). Second, it is more widely thought that the theory of the Will of Heaven here attributed to Tung Chang-shu antedates him by almost a thousand years (see the chapter on this subject in Herrlee G. Creel, The Birth of China [New York: Reynall & Hitchcock, 1937]).

[36] 费孝通在这里和下面几段中陈述的要义，在某些方面而言，许多学者会有异议。有的学者并不认为对孔子来说，天是漠不关心的抽象概念（参见冯友兰《中国哲学史》英文版，第1卷，58页：“孔子之所谓天，乃一有意志之上帝”）。再者，更为广泛的看法是认为这里说成是董仲舒的有关天的意志的理论早于他的时代近千年（参见顾立雅《中国的诞生》一书中相关章节，纽约：雷纳尔与希契科克公司，1937年）。

[37] But Dubs says: "Kung-sun Hung proved to be admirable in personal conduct, able in disputation, capable in legal matters, and an ornament to scholarship" (Introduction to Pan Ku's The History of the Former Han Dynasty, trans. Homer H. Dubs [Baltimore: Waverly Press, 1938], II, 23). For discussion of the reign of the emperor Wu and his attitude toward Confucianists see also Herrlee G. Creel, Confucius, the Man and the Myth (New York: John Day Co., 1949), pp. 233–243.

[38] "Since the fourteenth century, there has existed a definite organization known as the Censorate, the members of which, who are called the 'ears' and 'eyes' of the sovereign, make it their business to report adversely upon any course adopted by the Government in the name of the Emperor, or by any individual statesman, which seems to call for disapproval. The reproving Censor is nominally entitled to complete immunity from punishment; but in practice, he knows that he cannot count too much upon either justice or mercy. If he concludes that his words will be unforgivable, he hands in his memorial, and draws public attention forthwith by committing suicide on the spot" (H. A. Giles, The Civilization of China [New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1911], pp. 158–159).

[39] 但是，德效骞说：“公孙弘在个人行为上是令人敬佩的，他善于辩论，长于法律事务，学问笃实”（引自班固《汉书》英文版“导论”，德效骞译，巴尔的摩：韦弗利出版社，1938年，第2卷，第23页）。关于汉武帝统治及其对儒家的态度的讨论亦可参见《孔子其人及其神话》，顾立雅著，纽约：约翰·戴出版公司，1949年，第233—243页。

[40] “自14世纪以来就存在有一个所谓监督审查的固定机构，这一机构的成员被称为是统治者的‘耳’‘目’。这些人的工作就是挑刺，不论是对本着皇帝之名的政府行为，还是对似乎会招致异议的个人政客之举。挑刺的巡查官名义上享有完全的豁免权；但实际上，他知道他不能够对公正和宽恕有太多的期望。如果他断定自己的言辞是不可宽恕的话，他会递上自己的请愿书，并立刻在众目睽睽之下当场自杀。”引自《中国的文明》，翟理思著，纽约：亨利·霍尔特公司，1911年，第158—159页。

Chapter Three   The Gentry and Technical Knowledge

第叁章   士绅与技术知识

The Chinese term for "intelligentsia," chih-shih fen-tzu, "they who know," indicates that in Chinese society there was a differentiation based on wisdom. The questions arise: What kind of wisdom was it upon which this social differentiation was based? What was the mechanism by means of which it was monopolized by one class in society? We should like to ask further: How did this class maintain its position in the traditional scheme, and what changes are taking place in it through contact with the West?

The characteristic of the members of this class has always been not only that they knew something but that they had a special kind of knowledge. What this special knowledge or wisdom was is made clear in Confucius' work. The word chih has a restricted meaning. For example, the student Fan Ch'ih asked Confucius about the meaning of the word chih. Confucius said, "He who devotes himself to securing for his subjects what it is right they should have, who, by respect for the Spirits, keeps them at a distance, may be termed wise."[1] Confucius also said: "There may well be those who can do without knowledge; but I for my part, am certainly not one of them. To hear much, to pick out what is good and follow it, to see much, and take due note of it, is the lower of the two kinds of knowledge."[2]

From these quotations it is clear that Confucius did not use the word "knowledge" to mean merely cognition but implied knowledge of the right thing. Again, when Fan Ch'ih asked what it meant to be wise, the Master said, "Know men." Fan Ch'ih did not quite understand. The Master said, "By raising the straight and putting them on top of the crooked, one can make the crooked straight."[3] Confucius described the process of knowledge as, first, perception—the gathering of information—but, following upon this, the drawing of distinctions and the making of a choice. Knowledge is more than mere gathering of information, since it involves choice, and this choice is based on the ability to distinguish the good from the bad. Knowledge in this restricted sense, and based on a standard or norm, is designated by the word "straight." When you know what is straight, you must act upon it. And by so doing you will make the crooked straight. Thus Confucius explains the word chih as wisdom or knowledge of right behavior. Those who work for the people and those who respect the spirits are the people who know what they ought to do, and they are therefore "those who know." To know in this sense is not only to be intelligent but also to be virtuous. Knowledge of this sort goes with jên[4] and courage. The wise man not only is an intellectual but also knows the Way, the norm, the things he ought to do.

汉语里的“知识分子”一词暗示，中国社会在“知识”上发生了分化。问题是，什么样的知识能成为社会分化的基础呢？社会中的某一阶级是利用何种机制来独占知识的呢？我们还能进一步问，这一阶级怎样在传统社会结构中维持他们的地位，在与西方的接触中发生了怎样的变化？

这个阶级成员的特点是他们不仅“知”，而且有一定的专门知识。这种专门知识在孔子的著作中讲述得很清楚。“知”字有严格的意义。例如孔子的学生樊迟“问知”，“子曰：‘务民之义，敬鬼神而远之，可谓知矣。’”[5]孔子还说：“盖有不知而作之者，我无是也。多闻，择其善者而从之；多见而识之；知之次也。”[6]

这里我们看到，孔子所谓的“知”，显然不单是“知道了”，而是指“懂得正确的道理”。樊迟再次“问知”，“子曰：‘知人。’樊迟未达。子曰：‘举直错诸枉，能使枉者直。’”[7]孔子说明了知识的过程：首先是闻、见，即搜集信息，接下来是择、识。由于“知”不仅仅是信息的搜集，而且包括选择，这就要以分辨是非的能力为基础。这一狭义的知基于一定的行为标准，而这标准即为“直”。知了之后，还要遵循去做，对人还要“使直”。孔子把标准行为的规范解释为知，那些对民能“务本”、对神能“敬之”的人就可以算是知了。知在这里不仅指聪明智慧，还指高尚道德，可以和“仁”[8]、“勇”并称。知者不仅是聪明人，还是明道理的人，道理就是规范。

We can differentiate knowledge into two categories: first, understanding of the nature of the physical world and, second, understanding of what constitutes right conduct. In the Confucian classics chih refers to the second type of knowledge. Confucius even believed that the man who knew the moral norms did not necessarily need to know about nature. In fact, he was himself represented as that sort of man whose "four limbs are unaccustomed to toil" who "cannot distinguish the five kinds of grains."[9] Fan Ch'ih asked the Master to teach him about farming. The Master said, "You had much better consult some old farmer." He asked to be taught about gardening. The Master said, "You had much better go to some old vegetable gardener." When Fan Ch'ih had gone out, the Master said: "Fan is no gentleman! If those above them love ritual, then among the common people none will care to be disrespectful. If those above them love right, then among the common people none will dare to be disobedient. If those above them love good faith, then among the common people none will dare to depart from the facts. If a gentleman is like that, the common people will flock to him from all sides with their babies strapped to their backs. What need has he to practice farming?"[10] This quotation explains that, to Confucius, a knowledge of nature was not so important and also shows his conception of his own social position. Men such as he are at the top; the ordinary people are at the bottom. The people must work on the land, but those at the top need only acquire and keep the respect of the people through upholding the li[11]—justice and faith. The man who knows about the norms of conduct need not work for his living.

In Mencius this social structure becomes still clearer. A man called Ch'en Hsiang spoke to Mencius about Hsü Hsing's idea that a worthy prince would till the land with the people. But Mencius did not agree with him and put forward arguments to show that a division of labor was both natural and right.

When Ch'en Hsiang saw Hsü Hsing, he was greatly pleased with him, and, abandoning entirely whatever he had learned, became his disciple. Having an interview with Mencius, he related to him with approbation the words of Hsü Hsing to the following effect: "The prince of T'ung is indeed a worthy prince. He has not yet heard, however, the real doctrines of antiquity. Now, wise and able princes should cultivate the ground equally and along with their people, and eat the fruit of their labour. They should prepare their own meals, morning and evening, while at the same time they carry on their government. But now, the prince of T'ung has his granaries, treasuries, and arsenals, which is an oppressing of the people to nourish himself. How can he be deemed a real worthy prince?"

我们可以把“知”分成两类：一是知道物质世界的特征，即自然知识；二是知道正确的行为如何构成，即规范知识。儒家作品中的“知”指的是第二类，孔子甚至认为懂得规范知识的人不必有自然知识，实际上他自己就代表了那种“四体不勤，五谷不分”[12]的人。“樊迟请学稼。子曰：‘吾不如老农。’请学为圃，曰：‘吾不如老圃。’樊迟出。子曰：‘小人哉，樊须也！上好礼，则民莫敢不敬；上好义，则民莫敢不服；上好信，则民莫敢不用情。夫如是，则四方之民襁负其子而至矣，焉用稼？’”[13]这段话说明，自然知识对于孔子是不太重要的，还表明了他对于自己社会地位的概念。像他这样的人是在上的，“民”在最下层。民必须种田，而在上的人只需高举“礼”[14]——即义、信——来获得和维持民的敬服。懂得行为规范的人不必亲自劳作。

孟子把这种社会结构说得更清楚。有一个叫陈相的人在孟子面前宣传许行的“贤者与民并耕而食”的主张，但孟子不同意，认为劳动分工既是自然的又是正确的。

“陈相见许行而大悦，尽弃其学而学焉。陈相见孟子，道许行之言曰：‘滕君则诚贤君也；虽然，未闻道也。贤者与民并耕而食，饔飧而治。今也滕有仓廪府库，则是厉民而以自养也，恶得贤?'

Mencius said, "I suppose that Hsü Hsing sows grain and eats the produce. Is it not so?" "It is so," was the answer. "I suppose also, he weaves cloth, and wears his own manufacture. Is it not so?" "No. Hsü wears clothes of haircloth." "Does he wear a cap?" "He wears a cap." "What kind of a cap?" "A plain cap." "Is it woven by himself?" "No. He gets it in exchange for grain!" "Why does Hsü cook his food in boilers and earthenware pans, and does he plough with an iron share?" "Yes." "Does he make those articles himself?" "No. He gets them in exchange for grain."

Mencius then said, "The getting of those various articles in exchange for grain is not oppressive to the potter and the founder, and the potter and the founder in their turn, in exchanging their various articles for grain, are not oppressive to the husbandman. How should such a thing be supposed? And moreover, why does not Hsü act the potter and founder, supplying himself with the articles which he uses solely from his own establishment? Why does he go confusedly dealing and exchanging with the handicraftsmen? Why does he not spare himself so much trouble?" Ch'en Hsiang replied, "The business of the handicraftsman can by no means be carried along with the business of husbandry."

Mencius resumed, "Then, is it the government of the kingdom which alone can be carried on along with the practice of husbandry? Great men have their proper business, and little men have their proper business…. Hence, there is the saying, 'Some labour with their minds, and some labour with their strength. Those who labour with their minds govern others; those who labour with their strength are governed by others. Those who are governed by others support them; those who govern others are supported by them.' This is a principle universally recognized."[15]

We may see here how a recognition of the obvious need for an economic division of labor was used to support class distinctions and to justify the privileges of the ruling class. But I quote the two passages given above in this context to show the difference in attitude under the traditional system toward knowledge of the natural world and ethical knowledge. Knowledge of the natural world was knowledge for production and belonged to farmers, craftsmen, and others who depended upon it for earning their living. Ethical knowledge, on the other hand, was an instrument in the possession of those who used their minds to rule the people. To rule others means that one is superior and should be able to be maintained by others, if not exploit them. Because such men do not deal with the material world, they form the habit of "not using their four limbs" and "not distinguishing the five grains." It is this which Confucius suggests by his question as to why he should till the land.

“孟子曰：‘许子必种粟而后食乎？’曰：‘然。’‘许子必织布而后衣乎？’曰：‘否；许子衣褐。’‘许子冠乎？’曰：‘冠。’曰：‘奚冠？’曰：‘冠素。’曰：‘自织之与？’曰：‘否；以粟易之。’曰：‘许子奚为不自织？’曰：‘害于耕。’曰：‘许子以釜甑爨，以铁耕乎？’曰：‘然。’‘自为之与？’曰：‘否；以粟易之。’

“‘以粟易械器者，不为厉陶冶；陶冶亦以其械器易粟者，岂为厉农夫哉？且许子何不为陶冶，舍皆取诸其宫中而用之？ 何为纷纷然与百工交易？何许子之不惮烦？’曰：‘百工之事固不可耕且为也。’

“然则治天下独可耕且为与？有大人之事，有小人之事。……故曰，或劳心，或劳力；劳心者治人，劳力者治于人；治于人者食人，治人者食于人，天下之通义也。”[16]

这里我们可以看到，对劳动的经济划分的必要性的认识是如何被用来支持阶级划分和为统治阶级的特权辩解的。但我引用以上两段话是要表明传统制度下对自然知识和规范知识的不同态度。自然知识是生产知识，属于农民、手工业者和其他以生产为生的人；而规范知识是劳心者统治人民的工具。统治别人意味着高于别人，可以“食于人”，如果不是剥削人的话。他们自己不参与生产，养成了“四体不勤，五谷不分”的习惯，孔子“焉用稼”的问题正式表达了这层意思。

Although Mencius laid down the distinction discussed above as a universal principle, he did not explain why those who work with the mind, those who possess ethical knowledge, should stand above the people and rule them and be entitled to be supported by them.[17]

This leads us to the question: How did the intelligentsia acquire their social position? Much of their authority was derived from the nature of the knowledge they possessed, a knowledge not, as we have seen, of practical affairs but of something other, of recognized social value.

In order to satisfy the basic needs of existence, such as food, clothing, and shelter, we must use material goods and have some real acquaintance with the world about us. We must know how to deal with material objects in the right way. For instance, the knowledge that friction will produce fire was an early-discovered principle and an important addition to civilized knowledge. But one cannot make fire simply by rubbing something together. The knowledge of how to make fire must include a knowledge of what materials to use and of how long friction of these materials must be maintained. Only under certain conditions is the principle of making fire through friction realized. A technique prescribes a definite procedure by which one reaches certain desired consequences, and a knowledge and proper use of it determine whether one achieves the desired result or not. But in human life we do not use techniques for their own sake but rather as a means toward an end. We make a fire in order to cook, to warm a house, or to worship the gods. Thus making a fire brings not only the problem of how but also of when, where, and by whom to make what kind of fire. Making a fire is not an isolated activity but part of a social institution. And social institutions always involve not only efficiency but also values. The problem is whether we ought or ought not to make the fire. This is part of what Confucius called the li. Thus the same action may be right in certain contexts and not right in others. When someone asked Confucius if Kuan Chung knew about the li, he said: "Only the ruler of a State may build a screen to mask his gate; but Kuan had such a screen. Only the ruler of a State, when meeting another ruler, may use cupmounds; but Kuan used one. If even Kuan is to be cited as a expert in ritual, who is not an expert in ritual?"[18] That which decides what we ought to do is not the technique but a norm of conduct.

In dealing with nature, it is a question of doing what is practically right. If we work according to principles inherent in nature itself, we will reach our desired end. If we do not do so, we will not succeed in making the fire burn. Thus no extra authority is needed to reinforce knowledge of the natural world. If one does not act according to social norms, the consequences may be bad for society as a whole, if not for the individual himself. To protect the common good, we need sanctions which will make the nonconformist respect the norms. In this way, we turn ought to be into dare not do so. Social sanctions require authority from society at large. But this authority cannot be given to everyone; society must delegate someone to be its agent. In China such persons have been those whom we referred to above as "the men who know."

虽然孟子把以上的社会分化说成是“天下之通义”，但他没有解释为什么那些“劳心者”、那些掌握规范知识的人可以在上、可以治人、可以食于人。[19]

这使我们不禁要问：知识分子是怎样获得他们的社会地位的？他们的地位大部分是从他们所拥有的知识的性质引出的。正如我们所看到的，这种知识不是指实际事务的知识，而是另外一种对社会价值的认识。

为满足衣食住行基本生活的需要，我们必须利用自然的物资，与所处的自然世界发生真正的联系。我们必须懂得如何用正确的方式来与物资打交道。例如，摩擦生火是人类很早懂得的原理，也是对文明知识很重要的补充，但不是随意把东西摩擦一下就可以生火的。生火知识的内容包括用什么东西、怎样摩擦、摩擦多久等，只有在一定的条件下才能实现摩擦生火的原则。技术规定了在一定程序下会得到一定的效果，而知识及其正确运用可以决定是否能达到预期的结果。但在人类生活中，我们不是为用技术而用技术，而通常是为达到某个目的。生火是为了煮饭、取暖、敬神，因此生火不仅仅是如何生火的问题，还包括生火的时间、地点、由谁来生火和生何种火。生火不是孤立的行为，而是社会制度中的一部分，而社会制度经常不仅涉及有效性，而且涉及价值观念。问题是我们是否应该生火。这是孔子所谓的“礼”的一部分。因此，同一个活动在某些情况下就可能是应当的，而在另外的情况下就可能是不应当的。有人问孔子，管仲是否懂得礼呢？他说：“邦君树塞门，管氏亦树塞门。邦君为两君之好，有反坫，管氏亦有反坫。管氏而知礼，孰不知礼？”[20]决定我们应该做什么的不是技术而是行为规范。

与自然打交道时，问题在于区分正确与否。如果我们遵循自然规则，就能达到目的；如果不遵循，就不能达到目的，就生不出火。我们不需要另外的力量来使人们遵循自然知识。一个人不遵守社会规范，即使不会危害他自己，却可能会给整个社会带来危害。为了保护大家的利益，我们必须对不守规范的人加以制裁，这样就把“应该做”转变为“不敢做”。制裁需要来自社会共同意志的权威的支持，但是权威不能给大家，只能授予若干人来做大家的代理。在中国，这种人就是前面我们提到的“知者”。

In a static society those norms of conduct which are developed through and accumulated by practical experience are usually effective directives for a successful life. Their effectiveness is their raison d’être and their justification for their support by social authority. In such a society the other side of the coin is the fact of willing conformity by the majority, because conformity to these norms of conduct gives satisfaction in daily life. Norms of conduct in a stable society are traditions handed down over the years, crystallized experience in dealing with the world. Confucius achieved his social authority not so much from his own wisdom or learning as from his profound knowledge of the traditional way. In a stable, traditionally organized society a man does not need to question, to rationalize, or to justify. What he needs to do is to find out what the custom is. When Confucius speaks of "finding out," he is not seeking to explore something new but to rediscover the past.[21] In a society in which historic traditions have the only real validity influence lies not with the innovators but with those who can guide along established paths. As apprentices learn their techniques from their masters, so the common people depend upon the students of traditional values to teach them the way in which they must go. And these teachers are those who possess social authority and prestige.

Social authority is, however, different from political power. I emphasized the fact that the Chinese gentry did not possess real political power. In fact, in China, political power has always been quite different from social authority. Political power is attained by violence and imposes the relationship of conqueror to conquered, while social authority is a rule of society over the individual which is based on consent and common understanding, Confucius' school hoped that political power and social authority might be made to coincide. When a ruler rules his country by political power alone, he will be called a despot, or pa. When political power and social authority coincide, he will be called a king, or wang. In actual fact, in the history of China, the combination has never been achieved. Confucius was revered as a "king without a throne," su wang, a man with social authority but without political power. The result of having two parallel sources of authority meant that, in Chinese society, order was established on two different levels. The daily life of the masses was regulated by social authority, while political authority was usually confined to the activity of the yamen.[22] The court, except in the case of a few tyrants, did not interfere in the going concern of society. In general, a good monarch collected a definite amount of taxes and left the people alone.

在一个静态的社会中，从实际经验里发展、积累得来的规范通常是社会共同生活有效的指导。规范对于社会生活的功效是它存在的理由，也是受到社会权威支持的理由。这种社会的另一面是大多数人民的悦服，因为服从于这些行为规范可以带来日常生活的满足。行为规范在稳定的社会中成了多年的传统和处世的经验。孔子获得其社会权威更多是因为他对传统的深刻理解而不是他自己的聪明或学识。在稳定的传统社会里，人们不必去推究“为什么”的问题，他只需找出传统的做法就可以了。孔子谈“发现”时，他不是指去探索新的东西，而是去重新发现过去。[23]在一个只有历史传统才具有真正有效性的社会中，影响不在于改革者，而在于那些沿着已有的道路指引人们的人。正像学徒向师傅学手艺一样，人们依靠知道传统价值的人来教授他们必须要走的路。这些知道传统的人具有社会的威望。

然而，社会权威和政权是不同的。我曾强调过中国的士大夫并不真正掌握政权这一事实。实际上，在中国，政权和社会权威经常是迥异的。政权通过武力获得，是征服者与被征服者的关系；社会权威则是社会对个人的控制力，基于认可和共同的理解。儒家希望政权和社会权威相合，当统治者只用政权来统治国家时，被称为霸道，二者相合时称为王道。事实上，在中国的历史中，二者从没有相合过。孔子被尊称为“素王”，一个有社会权威而没有政治权力的人。两种权力并行于天下的结果意味着，在中国历史中，秩序建立在两个不同的层次上：民众的日常生活由社会权威来规定，衙门[24]里则是政权的统治。除了少数的暴君，皇权是不干涉民众生活的。一般说来，一个好的帝王在额定的赋役之外不去干预民众。

In a simple society the norms of conduct are known to most of the people and are not specialized knowledge. Anyone may follow the norms and receive recognition. A student of Confucius’, Tzu-hsia, once said: "A man who treats his betters as betters wears an air of respect, who in serving father and mother knows how to put his whole strength, who in the service of his prince will lay down his life, who in intercourse with friends is true to his word—others may say of him that he still lacks education, but I for my part should certainly call him an educated man."[25] The reason for the lack of special qualifications for the person who knows the norms is that for most of the people ethical or normative knowledge is accessible. In a simple society this kind of knowledge is handed down orally and learned by repetition. Confucius used the word "exercise" in writing of acting upon knowledge gained by hearing rather than by the study of books. Literacy had not yet become so all-important. It is said of Confucius that, "when the Master entered the Grand Temple, he asked questions about everything there. Someone said, 'Do not tell me that this son of a villager from Tsou is expert in matters of ritual. When he went to the Grand Temple, he had asked about everything.' The Master, hearing of this said, 'Just so! Such is the ritual.' "[26] And when the disciple Tzu-kung asked, "Why was K'ung Wên-tzu called Wên ('The Cultured')?" the Master said, "Because he was diligent and so fond of learning that he was not ashamed to pick up knowledge even from his inferiors."[27]

But, when life becomes more complicated, the transmission of norms of conduct can no longer depend entirely on oral transmission. There come to be different versions, and the decision which is right requires verification through the study of documents. Confucius said, "How can we talk about the ritual of the Hsia? The State of Ch'i supplies no adequate evidence. How can we talk about the ritual of Yin? The State of Sung supplies no adequate evidence. For there is a lack both of documents and of learned men."[28] When ethical values are no longer transmitted by word of mouth but mainly through written documents, they no longer are accessible to everyone, and literacy becomes very important. Then there develops a special group of people who know how to read books—the chih-shih fen-tzu, or intelligentsia.[29]

在简单的社会里，行为规范被大多数人所认识，它并不是特殊的知识，任何人都可以遵循它和享受传统的权威。孔子的弟子子夏曰：“贤贤易色；事父母，能竭其力；事君，能致其身；与朋友交，言而有信。虽曰未学，吾必谓之学矣。”[30]懂得规范的人没有特殊资格是因为大多数人都有和这种知识接触的机会。在简单的社会里，这种知识是在世代间口口相传、人人相习的。孔子用“习”字来说明通过“闻”而不是通过书本知识来行事。那时文字并不很重要。据说孔子“入太庙，每事问”。有人就说：“孰谓鄹人之子知礼乎？入太庙，每事问。”孔子听说后就说：“是礼也。”[31]而当弟子子贡问“孔文子何以谓之‘文’也”，孔子回答说：“敏而好学，不耻下问，是以谓之‘文’也。”[32]

但是，当生活变得更复杂时，行为规范就不能再完全依靠口口相传了，规范发生了派别的出入，正确的决定要通过对文献的研究而得到证实。子曰：“夏礼，吾能言之，杞不足征也；殷礼，吾能言之，宋不足征也。文献不足故也。足，则吾能征之矣。”[33]当社会价值不再以口口相传而是通过文献时，就不是每个人都可以得到的，文字也就变得很重要，这样就有了能够识字读书的特殊人物，称之为“知识分子”。[34]

At the folk level in traditional China there has always been an oral literature.[35] Classical literature, the only literature officially recognized, which developed from the writing-down of sacred rituals and songs, systems of divination, dynastic histories and genealogies, remained always something apart from the common man. Official historical records of the teachings of the sages may serve to instruct but are of little practical value to the struggling farmer. Not only is the content of what was written difficult to grasp, but the (classical) written language itself is quite distinct from common speech. And since the very structure of the written language differs from spoken, even a literate man who can speak well will not necessarily be a good writer. Literary composition cannot be picked up but requires great application. The pictorial characters are hard to learn, and, if one does not use them constantly, one forgets them. In an economy of scarcity very few can enjoy sufficient leisure to learn.[36] Agriculture is the main occupation of China. Farmers engaged in the work of the fields expend their energies in long hours of grinding labor and enjoy small incomes. Such men cannot hope for long periods of leisure. As I described the situation in Earthbound China, production and leisure are mutually exclusive; unless one can be supported by others who produce, one cannot leave manual labor. Thus those who have leisure must be big landholders, so big that they can live entirely on their rents. In this way the class of people who are trained in an understanding of values is limited to an economic group who do not represent the interests of the common people.

Mencius said that those who use their minds should be supported by those who use their labor. It appears to me true that only those who are supported by someone else can enjoy literary work. But this does not mean that all those who are supported by others and do not work with their hands necessarily are capable or willing to work with their minds. Those who are privileged to be supported by others have no need to learn technical knowledge, but they also need not learn norms of conduct; they may merely live parasitically. However, in this case, their privileged position may not be secure. Privilege must be supported by some force, either by political power maintained by physical force or by social authority. The class of people who enter officialdom not only can afford to become educated but must do so in order to acquire prestige.

传统中国的乡土社会常常是有语无文的。[37]从神礼、神歌、占卜、朝代史和家谱等的记载发展起来的经典文学是唯一得到官方认可的文献，常常远离普通人民。官家史书记载的圣人之言也许可以引导人们怎样做人，但通常对于贫苦的农民没有实际意义。不仅是所写的内容难以理解，典籍所用文字也与普通口语的说法明显不同。由于文言文的句法与白话不同，即使一个口才很好的文人也不一定会作好文。写文章不是能轻易学会的，需要格外努力。象形字很难学会，如果不经常用，又会忘掉。在匮乏经济时期，很少人有足够的闲暇来学习。[38]中国以农业为主，农民在田地里长时间劳作，只能获得很少的收入，这些人不可能有长期的闲暇时间。正如我在《被土地束缚的中国》中描写的：生产和闲暇互相排斥；除非一个人能得到生产者的供养，否则他不能脱离劳作。因此，那些有闲暇的人一定是大地主，大到能靠收租为生。因此受教育的人局限在一个经济群体中，他们不代表普通人民的利益。

孟子说“劳心者食于人”，只有靠别人来供养的人才能读书写文。但这并不是说不劳力者一定能够或愿意劳心，那些靠着特权享受别人供养的人不但不必去学习技术知识，也不必学习社会规范，他们可以只过着寄生的生活。然而，在这种情况下，他们的特权也许不安全，特权必须要靠力量——暴力政权或社会权威——来支持。官僚阶层不仅有条件读书，而且为获得特权也有读书的需要。

The prestige of literacy combined with the power of political authority to support a privileged class distinguished from the laboring class by their higher economic position, their greater opportunity for education, and resultant greater social authority, and, last but not least, their separation from all practical technical knowledge.

As I have shown above, technical knowledge should be related to ethical values. But, once the knowledge of values became so closely linked with literacy that it became the monopoly of one class, it became separated from technology. And, once this link was broken, technological development was arrested. I have said that knowledge of the natural world must be incorporated into a social institution to become "useful," that is, a technique which improves the life of the people. If, however, the governing class, who are responsible for the life of the people, completely lack technical knowledge, they will not be able to order human affairs by technical means. For example, if those who "do not move their four limbs and who cannot distinguish the five grains" have the power of deciding techniques of land cultivation, they will not be willing or able to improve production by introducing improved techniques which may disturb existing traditional ways. Progress in modern techniques comes only when the producers themselves have the power to decide. Once this power is separated from the real producer, technical improvements will cease.

In Chinese traditional society the intelligentsia have been a class without technical knowledge. They monopolized authority based on the wisdom of the past, spent time on literature, and tried to express themselves through art. Chinese literary language is very inapt to express scientific or technical knowledge. This indicates that, in the traditional scheme, the vested interests had no wish to improve production but thought only of consolidating privilege. Their main task was the perpetuating of established norms in order to set up a guide for conventional behavior. A man who sees the world only through human relations is inclined to be conservative, because in human relations the end is always mutual adjustment. And an adjusted equilibrium can only be founded on a stable and unchanging relation between man and nature. On the other hand, from the purely technical point of view, there are hardly any limits to man's control of nature. In emphasizing technical progress, one plunges into a struggle in which man's control over nature becomes ever changing, ever more efficient. Yet these technical changes may lead to conflict between man and man. The Chinese intelligentsia viewed the world humanistically. Lacking technical knowledge, they could not appreciate technical progress. And they saw no reason to wish to change man's relations to man.

靠知识的特权和政治权力共同支持的特权阶层，以他们较高的经济地位、更多的教育机会和由此而得到的更大的社会权威以及与一切实用技术知识的分离而区别于劳动阶层。

如我在上面所说的，技术知识应该和规范知识相关联。但是当规范知识和文字一旦结合而成了某一阶层的独占品时，它就和技术知识分离了，这样一分离，技术也就停顿了。我已说过自然知识一定要通过社会才能被应用而成为有用的技术，改善人民的生活。如果对人民生活负责的统治阶级完全缺乏技术知识，他们就不能通过技术手段来管理人民。比如说，那些“四体不勤、五谷不分”的人如果有着决定怎样应用耕种技术的权力的话，他们将不愿或不能通过引进更好的技术以改善生产，因为这可能扰乱既有的传统方法。现代技术的进步是生产者取得了决定社会规范的权力之后的事。一旦这权力脱离了真正的生产者，技术的进步也立刻停顿。

在中国传统社会，知识阶级是一个没有技术知识的阶级，他们独占以历史的智慧为基础的权威，在文字上下工夫，在艺技上求表现。中国文字非常不适合表达科学或技术知识。这表明在传统社会结构中，既得利益的阶级的兴趣不在提高生产，而在于巩固既得的特权。他们主要的任务是为建立传统行为的指导而维持已有的规范。一个眼里只有人与人关系的人不免是保守的，因为人与人的关系的最终结果常常是互相协调。调整的均衡只能建立在人与自然稳定不变的关系基础上。另一方面，单从技术的角度出发，人类对自然的控制几乎没有限制。在强调技术进步的同时，人对自然的控制也随之不断改变，变得更为有效。然而技术的变化也许会导致人与人之间的冲突。中国的知识分子从人和人的关系看待世界，由于缺乏技术知识，他们就不会赞赏技术进步，看不出任何意图改变人与人关系的理由来。

[1] Arthur Waley, The Analects of Confucius (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1938), Book VI, No. 20, p. 120.

[2] Ibid., Book VII, No. 27, pp. 128–129.

[3] Ibid., Book XII, No. 22, p. 169.

[4] Referring to jên, "man," and continuing to show its relation to jên, "goodness," Waley says: "This word, in the earliest Chinese, means freemen, men of the tribe, as opposed to min, 'subjects,' 'the common people.' The same word, written with a slight modification, means 'good' in the most general sense of the word, that is to say, 'possessing the qualities of one's tribe.’... Finally, when the old distinction between jên and min, freemen and subjects, was forgotten, the jên became a word for human beings, the adjective jên came to be understood in the sense 'human' as opposed to 'animal,' and to be applied to conduct worthy of a man, as distinct from the behaviour of mere beasts.

"Of this last sense (human, not brutal) there is not a trace in the Analects. ... Jên, in the Analects, means 'good' in an extremely wide and general sense.... It is a sublime moral attitude, a transcendental perfection attained to by legendary heroes such as Po I, but not by any living or historic person. It appears indeed that jên is a mystic entity not merely analogous to but in certain sayings practically identical with the Tao of the Quietists. Like Tao, it is contrasted with 'knowledge.' Knowledge is active and frets itself away. Goodness is passive and therefore eternal as the hills. Confucius can point the Way to Goodness, can tell 'the workman how to sharpen his tools,' can speak of things 'that are near to Goodness.' But it is only once, in a chapter showing every sign of lateness, that anything approaching a definition of Goodness is given" (ibid., Introduction, pp. 27–29).

[5] 《论语》英文版，阿瑟·韦利译，伦敦：乔治·艾伦与昂温出版公司，1938年，第6篇，第20章，第120页。

[6] 同上书，第7篇，第27章，第128—129页。

[7] 同上书，第12篇，第22章，第169页。

[8] 指“人”，韦利继续说明其与“仁”的关系：“这个字在中国古文字中意思是指自由人、部落里的人，与‘民’、‘平民’相对。在写法上略有些改变的同样一个字（仁），意思是最广义的‘善’，即是说‘具有其所属部落的属性特征’……当‘人’与‘民’之间这种古老的区分最终被遗忘之后，‘人’这个字就用来指人类，形容词意义上的‘人’这个字是从与动物相对立的‘人类’这个意义上来理解的，并被用以指涉符合人的德性的行为，与单纯的兽类行为区分开来。

“对于后面的这个含义（即人性而非兽性），在《论语》中无法找到任何出处。……在《论语》一书中，‘仁’意味着极为广义上的和普遍意义上的‘善’。……这是一种崇高的道德态度，这是由像伯夷这样的传奇式英雄而不是由活着的或历史上的人物所达到的一种超越的完美。‘仁’似乎确实是一种神秘的存在，它不仅类似于，而且在某些表述中几乎等同于寂静主义者所持守的‘道’。与‘道’一样，它是与‘知识’相对立的。知识是积极的，因而逐渐消磨。善则是被动的，有如高山一样恒久。孔子能够指出达到善的道路，能够告诉‘工’如何‘利其器’，能够告诫弟子‘亲仁’。但是《论语》中仅有一次在明显比较后期的一章中近乎给出了‘善’的定义。”同上书，导论部分，第27—29页。

[9] Analects of Confucius, free translation by Fei. "The five grains are paddy, millet, panicled millet, wheat, and pulse" (James Legge, The Works of Mencius in The Chinese Classics [2d ed.; Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1895], II, 251 n.).

[10] Waley, Analects, Book XIII, No. 4, p. 172. See Legge's version of the Confucian analects for a somewhat different translation. Although somewhat less literal than Legge, Waley's text of the Analects has been employed as being closer to Fei's usage. For example, Fei uses the term "gentleman," as does Waley, rather than "superior man," "man of the higher type," "wise man," as do Legge and Soothill.

[11] Li: "Ceremonials, customary morality, mores, rites, rules of good manners, proper conduct, propriety" (Fung Yu-lan, A History of Chinese Philosophy, trans. Derk Bodde [Peiping: H. Vetch, 1937], I, 439).

[12] 见《论语》，费孝通自译。“五谷是指稻、黍、稷、麦、菽也。”引自《中国典籍》第2卷《孟子选集》，理雅各编译，第2版，牛津：克拉伦登出版社，1895年，第251页注释。

[13] 引自《论语》英文版，韦利译，第13篇，第4章，第172页。另可参见理雅各对儒家语录的翻译，译法稍有不同。尽管不如理雅各在字面上忠于原文，但是韦利的《论语》译本更近于费孝通所使用的含义。比如，对“君子”的译法，费孝通和韦利一样译为gentleman，而不是像理雅各和苏慧廉那样译成superior man、man of the higher type和wise man。

[14] “礼”是指“庆典、习俗道德、风气、仪式、良好的行为举止和礼仪”。引自《中国哲学史》英文版，冯友兰著，德克·卜德译，北平：亨利·维奇出版公司，1937年，第1卷，第439页。

[15] Legge, op. cit., Vol. II, Book III, Part I, chap. iv, pp. 247–250.

[16] 引自《中国典籍》第2卷《孟子选集》，理雅各编译，第3篇上，第4章，第247—250页。（中文可参考《孟子译注》，杨伯峻译注，中华书局，1962年，第123—124页。——译者注）

[17] Mencius did say: "The Minister of Agriculture taught the people to sow and reap, cultivating the five kinds of grain. When the five kinds of grain were brought to maturity, the people all obtained a subsistence. But men possess a moral nature; and if they were well-fed, warmly clad, and comfortably lodged, without being at the same time taught, they become almost like the beasts. This was a subject of anxious solicitude to the sage Shun, and he appointed Hsieh to be the Minister of Instruction, to teach the relations of humanity:—how, between father and son, there should be affection; between sovereign and minister, righteousness; between husband and wife, attention to their separate functions; between old and young, a proper order; and between friends, fidelity. The highly meritorious sovereign said to him, 'Encourage them; lead them on; rectify them; straighten them; help them; give them wings:—thus causing them to become possessors of themselves. Then follow this up by stimulating them, and conferring benefits on them.' When the sages were exercising their solicitude for the people in this way, had they leisure to cultivate the ground?" (ibid., Book III, Part I, chap. iv, pp. 251–252).

[18] Waley, Analects, Book III, No. 22, pp. 99–100.

[19] 孟子的确说：“后稷教民稼穑，树艺五谷；五谷熟而民人育。人之有道也，饱食、暖衣、逸居而无教，则近于禽兽。圣人有忧之，使契为司徒，教以人伦，——父子有亲，君臣有义，夫妇有别，长幼有序，朋友有信。放动曰：‘劳之来之，匡之直之，辅之翼之，使自得之，又从而振德之。’圣人之忧民如此，而暇耕乎？”引自理雅各编译《孟子选集》，第3篇上，第4章，第251—252页。（中文可参考《孟子译注》，杨伯峻译注，中华书局，1962年，第125页。——译者注）

[20] 引自《论语》英文版，韦利译，第3篇，第22章，第99—100页。

[21] "The Master said, 'I for my part am not one of those who have innate knowledge. I am simply one who loves the past and who is diligent in investigating it' " (ibid., Book VII, No. 19, p. 127).

[22] Yamen: The habitat of or the official and private residence of a mandarin, i.e., the bureaucracy itself.

[23] 子曰：“我非生而知之者，好古，敏以求之者也。”同上书，第7篇，第19章，第127页。（参见《孟子正义》，刘宝楠著，中华书局，第271页。——译者注）

[24] “衙门”：官员办公和居住的处所，即指官府。

[25] Wiley, Analects, Book I, No. 7, pp. 84–85.

[26] Ibid., Book III, No. 15, pp. 97–98.

[27] Ibid., Book V, No. 14, p. 110.

[28] Ibid., Book III, No. 9, p. 96.

[29] Giles wrote of the China of 1911: "The Chinese, recognizing the extraordinary results which have been brought about, silently and invisibly, by the operation of written symbols, have gradually come to invest these symbols with a spirituality arousing a feeling somewhat akin to worship. A piece of paper on which a single word has once been written or printed, becomes something other than paper with a black mark on it. It may not be lightly tossed about, still less trampled under foot; it should be reverently destroyed by fire, here again used as a medium of transmission to the great Beyond; and thus its spiritual essence will return to those from whom it originally came. In the streets of a Chinese city, and occasionally along a frequented highway, may be seen small ornamental structures into which odd bits of paper may be thrown and burnt, thus preventing a desecration so painful to the Chinese mind; and it has often been urged against foreigners that because they are so careless as to what becomes of their written and printed paper, the matter contained in foreign documents and books must obviously be of no great value" (H. A. Giles, The Civilization of China [New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1911], pp. 231–232).

[30] 引自《论语》英文版，韦利译，第1篇，第7章，第84—85页。

[31] 同上书，第3篇，第15章，第97—98页。（参见《孟子正义》，刘宝楠著，中华书局，第104页。——译者注）

[32] 同上书，第5篇，第14章，第110页。（参见《孟子正义》，中华书局，第188页。——译者注）

[33] 同上书，第3篇，第9章，第96页。（参见《孟子正义》，中华书局，第91—92页。——译者注）

[34] 翟理斯在谈到1911年的中国时写道：“中国人认识到了由书写符号的运用而无声无形引起的超乎寻常的后果，并逐渐赋予这些象征符号以某种灵性，由此而激发出一种近乎崇拜的情感来。在一张纸上面一旦写上或者是印上一个单字的话，那这张纸就不再是写有黑字的纸了。不能随便摇晃它，更不能踩在脚下；应该满怀敬意地焚毁，这样做还是将其当作向苍天传递消息的媒介——如此则其灵性的本质还会返回其最初由来之处。在中国城市的街道上，以及偶尔在人来人往的道路旁，会看到小小的略加装饰的建筑物，人们会将各样的小纸片投进去烧掉，以免亵渎神灵——这对于中国人来说是十分令人痛苦的事。并且这一点也常被用来反对外国人，因为他们对写下的和印刷的字纸毫不在意，记载在外国人的档案和书籍中的内容显而易见就没有什么太大价值了。”引自《中国的文明》，翟理斯著，纽约：亨利·霍尔特公司，1911年，第231—232页。

[35] "So long as men seek illusion, the story-teller will remain a feature of Chinese life, invited to wealthy homes to amuse those of the 'inner chamber,' welcome in the village tea-shops on the summer evenings where he is the peasants' living book of history, drawing his audience at fairs and wringing hard-earned coppers from the pockets of the crowds by the same device our up-to-date magazines use for serial stories, demanding a new outlay for a new installment. The story-tellers belong to an organization. Novices sometimes start their careers under an experienced teller of tales, but, usually, in the old days, they were unsuccessful students" (Juliet Bredon and Igor Mitrophanow, The Moon Year [Shanghai: Kelly & Walsh, 1927], pp. 152–153). Even fairly recently, during the war with Japan, the management of a factory in Free China hired an old-fashioned story-teller to tell stories of "The Chinese Robin Hood." This was entertaining for the less sophisticated local workers, but the nonlocal workers did not care for it (Kuo-heng Shih, China Enters the Machine Age, ed. and trans. Hsiao-tung Fei and Francis L. K. Hsu [Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1944], p. 110).

[36] "The 'bridge of learning' is a long one. From the primary school to the upper grades of the middle school takes nine years. And during these nine years parents must pay not only for the food but also for the other expenses of their children…. Moreover, while the children are in school, they cannot help on the family farm. This means that only the rich can afford to send their children to school. The young men of the poorer houses can have no chance to pass over this bridge; so they must find another way out. None of those from the middle, poor, and landless classes, who left the village, had had a middle-school education. Among the ten persons who went out from the rich houses of the village, seven of them had received a middle-school education" (Hsiao-tung Fei and Chih-i Chang, Earthbound China [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1945], p. 274).

[37] “只要人们还追求幻想，说书人就仍是中国人生活的一个侧面，他们会被富人家请去娱乐那些所谓的‘内眷’，他们会在夏季夜晚乡间的茶馆里受到人们的欢迎，在那里他们成了农民生活的历史书。说书人在集市上吸引观众的方法与今天时兴的杂志所使用的连载故事的方法一样——人们花钱来听讲一回新故事，以此来挣观众口袋里的几个辛苦钱。说书的人都属于某个组织。有时初学者会在一位有经验的说书人的带领下学艺，但在过去，这类学生大多不会成功”（引自《中国风俗节日记》，裴丽珠、伊戈尔·米特罗法诺著，上海：别发印书局，1927年，第152—153页）。甚至到了最近的抗日战争期间，在自由中国管理工厂还会雇老式说书人来讲‘中国罗宾汉’（指《水浒》中的梁山好汉——译者注）的故事。这些故事是用来娱乐较为单纯的当地工人的，而外地工人对此并不大感兴趣（引自《中国进入机器时代》，史国衡著，费孝通和许烺光编译，剑桥：哈佛大学出版社，1944年，第110页）。

[38] “‘学习之桥’历时漫长。从小学到中学的高年级要九年的时间。在这九年当中，家长必须负担的不仅仅是他们孩子的伙食费用，还要负担其他方面的费用……更进一步说，当孩子在学校里的时候，他们不能在自家农田里帮忙。这便意味着只有富人能够负担得起送孩子上学。贫困户的男孩子就没有机会跨越这座桥梁了；因此他们要寻求其他的道路出来。出村的人中，来自中农、贫农和雇农家庭的没有一个人受过中学教育，而十位富家子弟中就有七个人受过中学的教育。”引自《被土地束缚的中国》，费孝通、张之毅著，芝加哥：芝加哥大学出版社，1945年，第274页。

Chapter Four   Basic Power Structure in Rural China

第肆章   中国乡村的基本权力结构

●   THE DO-NOTHING POLICY OF THE IMPERIAL POWER

A centralized political system has had a long history in China. Since the time (221 B.C.) when the First Emperor abolished feudalism and created the provinces and districts, local officials theoretically have always been appointed by the central government, the custom being that local men should not be named as local officials. It would appear from this that the Chinese political system was one controlled completely from the top, one in which the people were entirely passive and in which local interests had no voice. If this had been really true, the Chinese political system would have been the most authoritarian known to man. Yet it is obvious that, unless the people were completely enslaved, a centralized control of this sort would be very difficult to maintain, particularly in a huge country in which the system of communications was not comparable to that of the Roman Empire, for example, and which was without many strong garrisons. Any political regime which wishes to maintain itself for long, if it cannot win the active support of the people, must at least gain their tolerance. In other words, the political system cannot be developed on a single track from the top downward. Under any kind of political rule the people's opinion cannot entirely be ignored. This means that there must be, in some way, a parallel track from the bottom up. A sound system which will endure must thus be "double track." This is clearly seen in modern democratic institutions, but in fact it may also be traced in the so-called absolutistic governments. When under this sort of rule the track from the bottom up is broken, we have a tyrant, and the result is disaster. The fact that in China, even under the absolutistic system, despotic tyrants have not always ruled indicates that there has been some informal type of track by means of which the people's opinion has penetrated to the top levels.

In the Chinese traditional political system there have been two lines of defense which prevented an absolute monarchy from becoming intolerably tyrannical. The first defense was Chinese political philosophy, the theory of do-nothingness. Years of experience shaped this. In Chinese history there has been little theory or practice to encourage political power to interfere with the social life of the people. It is true that the realistic and materialistic Legalistic Han Fei-tzu (ca. 280–233 B.C.) did advocate reforms in the government to strengthen it and to make the nation rich. He and his followers worked out the Legalist theory of rule by law. But in the eyes of traditional scholars throughout Chinese history, Han Fei-tzu has been poorly regarded, and his tragic end[1] has been pointed out as a warning to those who would have liked to follow the same path. Two other well-known reformers, Wang Mang in the Han dynasty (who usurped the throne A.D. 9–23), and Wang An-shih (1021–1086) in the Sung dynasty, wished the government to carry out social reforms and were against the do-nothing policy. But both failed. It may be said by those who sympathized with them that they were prevented by reactionaries from attaining their goals. And yet none of these reformers went so far as to attempt to restrict the monarchical power by law. Nor did any of them make any effort to learn whether their reforms would be acceptable to the people either in whole or in part. In fact, there was no evidence that the policy they urged upon the government, coincided in any way with the people's desires.[2] The policy of maintaining the monarchical power unrestricted and enforcing the government's will upon the people naturally resulted in conflict with the latter. In the political history of the West the tendency has been increasingly to give up the responsibility for, and control of, political power to the people. In China political policy throughout the ages has been rather to neutralize political power in such a way that the people did not become restless (while the few would-be reformers of this system have tended toward more authoritarianism than those whom they opposed). Do-nothingism is a way of dealing with political problems which is different from the positive check of a constitutional government but which serves as the "first defense" against political absolutism.[3]

●   皇权的无为政策

中央集权制度在中国有着漫长的历史。自公元前221年秦始皇废封建、置郡县以来，原则上地方官吏都由中央政府来任命，当地人通常不能在当地为官。以此看来，似乎中国的政治体制是完全受上面控制的，人民是完全被动的，地方利益无法保障。如果确是这样，那中国的政治体制也成了最专制的方式。但显而易见的是，如果人民不被完全奴役，这种集权统治就很难维持，尤其在这样一个交通系统无法与比如罗马帝国相比且缺乏足够牢固要塞的大国。任何想长久维持的政权，如果不能赢得人民积极的支持，至少也要得到他们的容忍。换句话说，政治体制不能简单地沿着自上而下的轨道运行，在任何政治统治下，人民的意见都不能完全被忽视。这就意味着，在某种方式上，必须要有自下而上的一个平行轨道。因此，一个可以长时间维持的良好的体制将是“双重轨道”，这在现代民主制度下显而易见，在专制政治的实际运行中也是如此。在这种统治下，当自下而上的轨道被破坏时，就有了暴君，于是悲剧就发生了。事实是，在中国，即使在专制统治下，也并不完全是暴君统治，这一事实表明人民的意见通过某种非正式的轨道向上传达。

在中国传统政治体制下，有两道防线使专制的皇帝不致过于暴虐。第一道防线是中国政治哲学——无为主义，这是从长年的经验里累积而成。在中国历史上，很少有理论或实践鼓励政权去干扰人民的社会生活。主张现实主义和唯物主义的法家代表人物韩非子（约公元前280年—公元前233年）确实曾倡议改革来加强政府统治、富裕国家。他和他的追随者提出了法治的法家学说。但是在中国历史上传统学者的眼里，韩非子并未受到尊重，他悲惨的结局[4]被认为是给想要重蹈其覆辙者敲响了警钟。另外两位知名的改革者是汉代的王莽（他在公元9年—23年篡夺了皇位）和宋代的王安石（1021—1086），他们希望政府实行社会改革，反对无为政策。但两人都失败了。那些同情他们的人可以说，是反动分子的阻挠使他们未能如愿。但是，没有一位改革者胆敢以法来限制皇权，也没有改革者花费精力来研究，他们的改革是否完全或部分地被人民所接受。其实，没有证据显示，他们推行的政策是否符合人们的意愿。[5]维护皇权的无限制性和加强政府对人民的控制就自然导致了与后者的冲突。西洋的政治史是加强对权力的控制，使它逐渐向民意负责。而在中国长时间以来的政治政策是软禁权力，以使人民不会感到不安（那些在此种体制下的少数未来改革者们比他们与之对着干的那些人更倾向于威权主义）。无为主义是一种解决政治问题的方法。这一方法与宪法政府的积极制约不同，但却是针对政治专制主义的“第一道防线”。[6]

We recognize now that such a system is not effective in modern life, since we depend upon central governmental power to take action with regard to those things which concern the people as a whole. But in economically self-sufficient communities it is not necessary to employ authority beyond that found in the local community. Constitutional government is a modern achievement. Before it developed in the West, political power was there as elsewhere restricted by traditional morality, in this case reinforced by the supernatural authority of the church.[7] And we may note that the American constitution, which was drafted before industrial development had taken place, had the point of view that the best government is the one which governs least. In China, men had recourse not to legal but to ideological restrictions upon the absolute power of the monarch. It was probably due to the influence of Confucian ideology that the abuse of political power was to some extent lessened.

现在，我们意识到这种制度在现代生活中不起什么作用，因为在面临与全体人民密切相关的事务时，我们依靠中央政府采取措施。但是在经济自给自足的社会中，没有必要再动用除地方权力机构之外的其他权力。宪法政府是现代的成就。它在西方发展之前，那里的政治权力如同其他任何地方一样，受到传统道德的约束，在西方即得到教会超自然权威的强化。[8]而且我们会注意到，在工业发展之前起草的美国宪法认为，“最少管事的政府是最好的政府”。在中国，人们不求助于法律，而是寄望于对绝对皇权的意识形态上的制约。可能正是受儒家意识形态的影响，在某种程度上政府权力的滥用才有所减轻。

●   THE POLITICAL TRACK FROM THE BOTTOM UP

In this section I do not wish to emphasize the first line of defense, however, but rather the second. In our traditional politics, on the one hand, we restricted political power by ideology and, on the other, restricted the sphere of the administrative system. We somehow managed to "hang up" the centralized power so that it did not reach to the ground, since the officials sent by the central government stopped at the district yamen. Ordinarily, students of Chinese administration have paid little attention to the connection between the hsien (district) government and the gate of each house. But, in fact, this connection was both extremely interesting and important in that it was the meeting point of the powerful central authorities and the local self-governing community. Only by understanding this meeting point can we know how the Chinese traditional system actually worked.

Let us start with the district yamen. I have said that the officials sent by the central government stopped at the district because, formerly, we did not recognize any political unit below the hsien. The head of the hsien, who represented the emperor, was called the "parent-official," or fu-mu kuan. He was supposed to maintain an intimate relationship with the people, but, in fact, the office of this lao-yeh was as high as the sky—so high, indeed, that no ordinary person could reach up to it. Nor was the yamen a place in which any common person could enter freely. But between the parent-officials and the children-common people existed intermediaries. Those who made the actual contact between the yamen and the people, the ruler and the ruled, were the servants of the officials. These official servants (ya-i) occupied one of the lowest positions in the Chinese social scale; they were deprived of most of their civil rights, and their sons were not allowed to take the examinations. It is a significant point in the Chinese power structure that these men who were in the position of most easily abused power should have been held so low. If society had not suppressed them by despising them and depriving them of a decent social position, they might have become as fearful as wolves. But with no hope of ascending in the social scale, even if they abused their power, they still would not be too formidable.[9]

Under a political system that upholds the do-nothing policy, the local officials will have very little work. So history shows us many officials spending much of their time in leisurely expeditions or in developing their literary talents. Their job was merely to collect taxes and to act as judges.

●   由下而上的政治轨道

不过，这一节将强调第二道防线上的权力制约，而不是第一道防线。在我们传统的政治生活中，一方面我们用思想约束政治权力，另一方面又去限制行政体系的范围。这是把集权的中央悬空起来，不使它进入与人民日常生活相关的地方公益范围之中。中央派遣的官员到县级为止，不再下去了。一般研究传统中国行政机构的人很少注意到从县衙门到每家大门之间的一段情形，其实这一段是最有趣的，同时也是最重要的，因为这是强大的中央政权与自治的社区之间的结合点。只有对这个结合点有很好的了解，我们才能理解中国的传统体制实际是如何运作的。

我们先从衙门说起。我谈到由中央派遣的官员只存在于县级以上，因为以前在县级以下我们不认可政府部门的存在。知县代表着皇帝，被称为“父母官”，他应与群众保持亲密关系，但这位老爷的衙门像天一样高得让普通老百姓难以接近。衙门也不是一般人都能随便进入的。但是，在父母官和其子民之间有着一些往来接头的人。那些保持衙门与民众之间、治人者与治于人者之间联系的人是官僚的奴仆们。这些衙役在中国的社会中居于最低的阶层之中，他们被剥夺了大多数的公权，他们的儿子不得参加科举考试。最容易滥用权力的人被置于如此低的地位，这也是中国权力体系中十分重要的一点。如果社会没有通过轻视他们、剥夺他们优越的社会地位的方式压制他们的话，他们可能就会像犬狼一样可怕。在没有提高社会地位可能的情况下，即使他们滥用权力，他们仍然不至过于令人惧怕。[10]

在倡导无为政策的政治体制中，地方官没有什么工作可做。所以，从历史上我们可以了解到许多在这种职务任内花大把时间游山玩水或培育自身文学才能的例子。他们的工作只是收税和断案。

So far as the latter occupation went, there was not much to do, because the ideal was to have no litigation. The duty of governmental servants was to keep order among the people, to collect money, and to conscript labor when needed. If the district ordinances had applied to each and every household, it would have meant that the hsien was actually a basic unit of administration. But in fact this was not true. District orders did not come to the various households but to the local self-governing unit (called, in Yunnan, the "public family," or kung-chia). I speak of this type of organization as a "self-governing unit" because it was organized by local people to look out for the public affairs of the community. Public affairs included problems of irrigation, self-defense, mediation in personal disputes, mutual aid, recreation, and religious activities. In China such things are local community affairs, and, according to the tradition still preserved, they are not an affair of government but are managed by the local community under the leadership of the better-educated and wealthier family heads. Practical affairs such as might come up in dealing with irrigation, for example, might be dealt with by nonscholarly responsible individuals; but the more scholarly would generally have greater prestige in the making of decisions.[11]

But besides deciding local public affairs, another important function of the kung-chia was to represent the people in their dealings with the government. With good reason I have separated these two functions—the self-governing and the dealing with the central government. The responsible leaders of the kung-chia organization kept clear of any official dealings with the yamen. Instead, there were special individuals who represented the community in their dealings with the government. These people were called shang-yao (the term used locally in Yunnan). As I said before, in the de jure political system, there was no recognized track from the bottom up, the emperor being absolute. To reject an order of the emperor thus was a crime. Nevertheless, the fact that the emperor had ordered it was not in real life a guaranty that the people would accept it. Therefore, in actual practice, there had to be a means for communicating with the people and discovering their sentiments. The servant of the government brought the orders not to the kung-chia but to the shang-yao. The shang-yao, whose office was filled in turn by members of the community, was in a particularly awkward spot because he had no real power or influence in the community but merely served as the terminus of the track from the top down. After he had received an order from the government, he in turn reported to the head of the kung-chia. The latter then talked the matter over with other leaders of the gentry in the teashop, and if he, along with the others, decided that the order was unacceptable, he rejected it and turned it back to the shang-yao. This unfortunate in turn must again communicate with the yamen and receive the brunt of official annoyance due to his lack of success. But in this way the "face" of the emperor would have been saved, since the refusal to comply was not direct but merely indicated in a roundabout fashion. Meanwhile, informal negotiations would be carried on. The leaders of the local community, whose status as gentry placed them on a footing of equality with officialdom, would make a friendly call upon the district official in the course of which they discussed the governmental order. If no agreement resulted from these negotiations of local gentry and local government officials, the local gentry would be inclined to get their friends and relatives in town to take the matter up with the higher levels of the bureaucracy, in time, perhaps, working up to the very top. Eventually, an agreement of some sort would be reached, the central government would change its order, and things would settle down again.

就是第二项工作也没有多少事，他们的准则是最好没有诉讼。政府工作人员的任务是维持人们的正常秩序、收钱以及在需要时征集劳力。如果县政府的命令下达到每个家庭，那才真正意味着县是一个基本的行政单位。但事实并非如此。县的命令并不直接到达各家各户，而是发到地方的自治团体（在云南被称为是“公家”的那一类组织）。我称这一组织为“自治团体”，因为它是由当地人民组织以管理社区公共事务，如水利、自卫、调解、互助、娱乐、宗教等。在中国，这些是地方的公务，在依旧活着的传统里，它们并非政府的事务，而是以受到过良好教育、较为富裕家庭的家长为首，由地方社区来管理的。像灌溉这样的实务，可能由没有学问的人来负责，但有学问的人通常在作决定方面有更高的声望。[12]

但是，除处理地方上的公共事务之外，公家另外一个重要的作用就是在与政府打交道时代表人民。我有足够的理由将此二种功能——自治与代表政府——分离开来。公家负责人不沾手与衙门发生的官方关系，而是有特定人物代表社区与政府打交道，这些人被称为“乡约”（此为云南土语）。如我所言，在法定的政治体系中，并不承认自下而上的轨道，皇帝是绝对的，因此违背皇帝的旨意就是犯罪。但是在实际生活中，谁也不敢保证自上而下的命令一定是人民乐于接受的。因此，在实际的运作中，必须有与人们交流以及了解他们的意愿的途径。官府的衙役并不是把命令传达到公家，而是传达到乡约那里。乡约由社区成员轮流担任，其身份尤其尴尬，因为他在社区没有实权或影响，只不过是权力从上至下轨道的终点。他在接到政府命令后，相应地向公家的管事汇报，后者在茶馆里与士绅中的其他头面人物商讨，如果他与其他管事觉得命令难以接受，他可以拒绝并退回给乡约。这倒霉的乡约必须再次通报衙门，并且由于办事不力，还会成为官家的“出气筒”。不过，这样皇帝的“脸面”就保住了，因为这种违抗并非是直接的，而仅仅是以一种迂回的方式来表明。另一方面，非正式的协商也开始了。地方的管事以其与官位相当的士绅地位去拜会地方官，就政府指令一事进行协商。如果达不成协议，地方的管事就会委托镇上的亲戚朋友，再往上层活动，到地方官上司那里去交涉，有时可能会上至最高当局。最后某种协议达成了，中央政府就会自行修改命令，事情再次得到解决。

According to this system, the local leader did not come into contact with the despised governmental petty servants. If the self-governing unit had been an actual part of the de jure administration, however, the track from the bottom up would have been blocked. The official in charge of the yamen could not have a free discussion with subordinates in office but only with those outside the bureaucracy and his social equals. In the Ch'ing dynasty (1644–1911) a man who had passed the district examination could call on the local official, using his own card. Besides this privilege of a scholar, he was also protected from corporal punishment, unless his degree were first taken away. And this latter act was in the power not of the district official but only of the local education official. Such people who were able to deal with the governmental officials are those who were called gentry.

I hope I have made certain points clear in this somewhat simplified account. (1) In the traditional Chinese power structure there were two different layers: on the top, the central government; at the bottom, the local governing unit whose leaders were the gentry class. (2) There was a de facto limit to the authority of the central government. Local affairs, managed in the community by the gentry, were hardly interfered with by the central authorities. (3) Legally there was only one track—from the top down—along which passed imperial orders. But in actual practice, by the use of intermediaries such as the government servants and a locally chosen shang-yao or functionary of the same type, unreasonable orders might be turned back. This influence from the bottom up is not usually recognized in discussions of the formal governmental institutions of China, but it was effective nevertheless. (4) The mechanism of bringing influences to bear from the bottom upward was worked through the informal pressure of the gentry upon their relatives in office and out or upon friends who had taken the same examinations. By this means influence could be brought to bear sometimes even upon the emperor himself. (5) The self-governing organization so called arose from the practical needs of the community. The power of this group was not derived from the central imperial power but came from the local people themselves. When the central authority collected only a limited amount of taxes and of conscripts, the people would be likely to feel that "Heaven is high, the emperor is far away." But the necessity for maintaining some contact between centralized and local authorities meant that the local gentry always tended to have strategic and leading positions in the local organization."[13]

依照这种体制，地方管事不与被鄙视、不起眼的政府差人接头，因为如果自治团体成了法定行政机构里的一级，从下到上的轨道就被阻塞了。负责衙门的官员不能与属下胥吏自由交谈，只可与官僚体制之外的人或与他社会地位相仿的人讨论。在清代（1644—1911），中举的人可以用自己的帖子拜会地方官员。除了这种文人的特权外，除非他的头衔被取消，他还可以免受皮肉之刑。举人的功名县官无权取消，而只有地方教育官员才有此权力。那些可以与政府官员打交道的人被称作士绅。

我希望我已经在上述有些简短的叙述中阐明了几点：（1）在中国传统的权力体系中存在两个层次——上层有中央政府，下层有以士绅阶层作为管事的自治团体。（2）中央政府的权威事实上是受限的。由士绅管理的地方事务一般不受中央权威的干扰。（3）从法律上来讲，只有一条自上而下的传达皇帝命令的途径。但是在实际运作中，不合理的命令可以通过官府衙役、地方选择的乡约或其他此类的媒介人物而被打回。在讨论中国正式的政府制度时，通常没有认识到这种自下而上的影响，但无论如何它是有效力的。（4）自下而上传递影响的机制是由士绅的从政或不从政的亲属或参加同批考试的朋友的非正式压力来实现的。通过这种方式，影响甚至可以直达皇帝本人那里。（5）所谓的自治团体是由当地人民实际需要中产生的，而且享受着地方人民所授予的权力，不受中央干涉。当中央政权只征收一部分有限的赋税和劳役时，当地百姓可能会有“天高皇帝远”的感觉。但是保持中央和地方政府之间联系的重要性意味着，士绅通常会在当地组织中拥有决策和管事的地位。[14]

●   THE BREAKDOWN OF THE LOCAL SELF-GOVERNING GROUP

In describing the power structure above, the term "inefficiency" was not derogatory. Actually the need for efficiency did not arise, in that the affairs which directly concerned the people were carried on outside the formal government. The work of local self-governing groups followed local needs and conformed to local attitudes. Occasionally, the local organization attempted to regulate life in minute detail. For example, in a certain village in Yunnan, if a married couple did not produce children, they would be symbolically beaten and even fined a small amount. Traditional and religious actions were maintained by the local organization. Thus, a do-nothing emperor might enjoy high peace and order under the heavens during his reign because the local organizations throughout the country kept things going. Since the imperial power demanded only two things—taxes and conscripts from the people—the existence of inefficient, poetry-writing officials was, in a sense, a blessing. But such a system could work only in an economy which was to a high degree self-sufficient. When intervillage affairs developed, such as large-scale irrigation or other public works projects, or warfare was initiated, an inefficient centralized government was a bad thing. This point is easy to see. The development of Chinese economy increased the work of the central government. Theoretically, no changes were needed in the government itself, since we already had a highly developed centralized political system; we required only more efficiency in its working. It is true that since, legally, the power of the central government was unlimited, increasing its efficiency might break down the first line of defense against a tyrannical authority. But since the do-nothing policy was, after all, a very negative means of restricting power, a means indeed which could hardly be maintained in a modern society, its decline could hardly be regretted. The damage which occurred to the second line of defense, the highly developed local self-government system, when the supposedly more efficient pao-chia system was introduced (or, rather reintroduced) was another matter, however.

●   地方自治团体的崩溃

在上文对权力结构的描述中，“无能”不是个恶名。实际上，并没有出现对“效率”的要求，因为与人民利益直接相关的事务在正式的政府之外得到执行。地方自治团体迎合当地需要，满足地方上的要求。偶尔，地方政府也试图管理琐碎小事。比如，在云南有一个村庄，如果已婚夫妇没有生育，他们会受到象征性的责打，甚至还要被少量罚款。地方自治组织还管理传统的宗教性活动。因此，皇帝无为而能天下治的原因是有着无数这类地方团体到处在勤修民政。既然皇权只向人民索要赋税和劳力这两样东西，效率低下、舞文弄墨的官员的存在从一定意义上说也是人民的一种福气。但这种机制只有在一个高度自给自足的经济中才行得通。当有村际事务，像大型灌溉或其他公共项目或公益事务启动以及出现战事时，无能的中央政府就成了一件坏事。这一点容易看出来。中国经济的发展使中央政府的工作增加。理论上讲，政府本身没有改变的必要，因为我们已经有一个高度发展的中央集权的政治体制。我们只需要有更高的工作效率。从法律上来讲，中央政府的权力可以大到无限，因此提高政府效率确实可能破坏防止权力被滥用的第一道防线。不过，对于无为主义的防线的溃决，我们不必加以惋惜，毕竟，这本是十分消极的限制权力的办法，几乎不适用于现代社会。但当效率更高的保甲制度引入进来（或者说重新引入）之后，对第二条防线的破坏，即对高度发展的地方自治机制的破坏，就是另一回事了。

The pao-chia system[15] has brought the political track from the top down to the gate of every household and, in fact, as a state of policing, has even entered every house door. The introduction of the pao-chia system was for reason. In the old traditional system governmental administration was handicapped by its lack of thoroughness, the fact that it only went halfway in carrying out orders. It seemed it would be much more efficient for the government to deal directly with the people instead of having to have everything pass through the local organization. Moreover, when the pao-chia system came into force in the 1930’s, it was intended that it should, in time, take up the function of self-government, so that, as the recognized track from the bottom up, there might be built up a system of really democratic representation. But the latter result has never been realized. The pao-chia system has certain defects which make it unsuited to a democratic system of representation. According to pao-chia, the people were to be organized, with slight variations, in uniform numerical groups. But such units did not necessarily coincide with actual social groups. The size of a community is determined by historical and social forces; we cannot add members to a family or to a local community and have them fit in. By instituting the principle of uniformity in the pao-chia system—this was actually worked out only for convenience in administration and especially for dealing with conscription—the principle of local self-government has been weakened. Often a community will be divided into several chia, while several unrelated units may be combined in one pao, the result being much confusion. In fact, there now came into existence two overlapping systems: one, the pao-chia, imposed from the top; the other, the natural local organization, which had now become illegal, and these two systems tended to come into conflict.

保甲制度[16]是把自上而下的政治轨道筑到每家的门前，实际上是把国家的警察制度这条轨道延长到了各家门内。保甲制度有它推行的原因。在旧的传统制度中，政府管理缺乏彻底性，政令执行半途而废，自上而下的轨道因而受阻。似乎政府直接与人民打交道比事事经当地组织效率要高得多。另外，当保甲制度在20世纪30年代得到实行的时候，人们期望它迟早能够起到自治政府的作用，以便在这一公认的基层上行轨道上可以建立真正的民主代表体制。然而，后一结果从未得以实现。保甲制度有一些缺点使其不适于一种代表制的民主制度。在保甲制度下，人们被组织成略有差别的按数目统一排列的群体单位。但是，这些单位并不与实际存在的社会群体等同。社区的规模是由历史和社会力量决定的；我们不能人为地向一个家庭或社区增加成员并使其成为其中的一员。通过推行保甲制度的统一性——这只是为了管理上的方便，特别是管理征募事务——地方自治的原则被弱化。通常一个社区被分成许多“甲”，几个互不联系的单位又被合并为一个“保”，其结果是一片混乱。实际上是存在着两个重叠的体制：一是上面强制实行的保甲制度，另一个是现属非法的自然形成的地方组织；这两者之间很容易发生冲突。

●   TEARING UP THE DOUBLE TRACK

The first serious problem over which conflict developed was the selecting of the head of the pao-chia, the pao-tsun. The pao-chia was an administrative system which executed orders from above, but at the same time it was the legally recognized organization for directing local public affairs. Under the traditional system the carrying-out of this double function was shared by three different groups: the servants of the government; the shang-yao, or local representative and intermediary; and the leaders among the local gentry. Now that these three were all combined in one man, the pao-tsun, it was assumed that the orders of the central government would be accepted by the people, as always, and carried out by them. But practical difficulties arose at once as the result of the new system. First of all, those people of the community who possessed prestige have usually been unwilling to accept the job of pao-tsun. As local gentry, if they wished to preserve their equal status with officialdom, they could not accept a place in the system which would make them lower in status and unable to negotiate but only to accept orders from those above. As a mediator, in fact, the function of the pao-tsun was only equivalent to that of a shang-yao. Yet the pao-tsun and the shang-yao are actually not at all the same. The shang-yao has no power, while the pao-tsun is legally upon the same level as the local leaders, with the right to keep the public funds and to manage local affairs. The difficulty is that the functions of mediator and of administrator have become confused. An energetic pao-tsun is likely to come into conflict with the local gentry, and in this conflict there will be no longer any bridge between governmental and local interests. A local leader of the gentry who accepts the post of pao-tsun as being in his own interest and a position of authority will find that actually his situation has changed for the worse, in that he can no longer reject any order from above. Thus the local community has become a dead end in the political system. The people now have no way to express themselves against the central authority, and, when the situation becomes intolerable, the only way out is to rebel.

The pao-chia system, thus, not only has disrupted the traditional community organization but has also hampered the developing life of the people. It has destroyed the safety valve of the traditional political system. Nor has the new structure of the pao-chia effectively taken over the work of the traditional self-governing organization. The net result has simply been to outlaw the old system so that it can no longer work openly. Deadlock, inefficiency, and even the disruption of the basic administrative machinery have been the results.

●   双轨的拆除

导致冲突的第一个严重问题发生在保甲头领即保长的人选上。保甲是一个执行上级命令的行政机构，同时它也是法律认可的指导地方公共事务的组织。在传统体制下，这两种职能由三种人物分担，他们是衙门里的差人、地方上充当代表和媒介人物的乡约以及地方士绅的领袖管事。当三者集中于保长一人之身时，人们以为中央政府的命令会像以往一样被人们接受并得到执行，但随之新制度即刻出现了实际的问题。首先，社区中有声望的人通常不愿接受保长之职。作为当地乡绅，他们更愿保留与官僚同等的地位，而不愿接受社会地位降低，使其不得与官僚平等磋商而只能接受上级命令的结局。其实，保长作为媒介人物的地位相当于乡约。不过保长和乡约又不完全相同。乡约没有权力，保长与地方官员有同等的权力并可以保留公产及管理当地的事务。问题在于，接头人物和管理人物的职能被人们混淆。工作积极的保长易与当地士绅发生矛盾冲突，而在冲突中政府利益和地方利益之间的桥梁也不复存在。为了自己利益接受保长之职而处于管事地位的乡绅会发现，自己实际上处在一种更不利的境地——他们再难抗拒来自上面的政令。这样，地方社区成为了政治体制的一个死角。人们没有其他途径表示他们对中央政府的不同意见，当情况变得难以忍受时，他们只有起来造反。

因此，保甲制度不仅扰乱了传统的社区组织，而且还阻碍了人们生活的发展。它还破坏了传统政治制度的安全阀。保甲制度这种新的体制也没有有效地替代传统的自治组织。最终的结果是将旧的制度置于法律的保护范围之外，使其不能公开活动。僵持、低效甚至对基本管理机制的破坏就是由此而带来的后果。

The extension of the track from the top down was intended to facilitate the execution of governmental orders. Though it is true that through the pao-chia system a more centralized administration has been realized, greater efficiency has resulted in form only, since, when there is a deadlock at the bottom, orders tend not to be carried out actually. In the more efficient collection of taxes and of conscripts, the new system has achieved something, it is true. But in all projects of local reconstruction or increase of production, all that is accomplished is the placing of the orders in the files of the pao-chia. In fact, it has become generally accepted that this storing of documents is one of the main functions of the pao-chia. Under such conditions even a good man in the office of the pao-tsun has little chance of bringing about any practical measures of social reform.

下行轨道的延伸是为了协助政府命令的实施。虽然通过保甲体制达到了一个更集权化管理的目的，但是由此产生的只有低效，因为在下层存在着僵持的状态，政令很难得到真正的执行。在征税和征募劳役的过程中，这种体制确实取得了更高效的结果。但在所有的地方重建项目或增产活动中，保甲制度做到的只是把有关政令收在保公所文件里。其实，现在大家都认为保存档案成了保甲的一项主要功能。在这种条件下，即使是个能人，身居保正之位也没有什么机会实现任何社会变革的实际举措。

[1] Han Fei-tzu, slandered and unable to plead his case, ended his life by taking the poison sent him by his slanderers, according to Ssu-ma Ch'ien's Historical Records (see The Complete Works of Han Fei Tzu, trans. W. K. Liao [London: A. Probsthain, 1939], I, xxii-xxix).

[2] See chap. i, n. 6.

[3] " 'But it is a pity that a talented person like yon is unwilling to serve the government. Those who are not talented wish to become officials but those who are, only wish to escape it. This is indeed a most regretful matter.'

" 'You are not right,' argued Lao-ts'an. 'It is a matter of no importance whether the common clay wish to become officials or not. The regretful thing lies in the fact that the talented wish to get such posts. As you can see, Mr. Yu is a talented person, but he is too hasty—hasty for promotion, for becoming a big shot. Therefore, he has not hesitated to do many harmful and unreasonable things in order that he may get results. It is unfortunate that his so-called good administration is known far and wide. Don't you think that in a few years he will be promoted, and be still more harmful to society? If he presides over a prefecture, the prefecture would be injured. If he governs a province, the province would suffer, and if he rule the country, the country would be ruined. Therefore, I put to you this question, whether it would be better for the talented to become government officials, or the non-talented?' ” (Liu Ê, A Tramp Doctor's Travelogue, trans. Lin Yi-chin and Ko Te-shun [Shanghai: Commercial Press, 1939], p. 78).

[4] 据司马迁的《史记》记载，韩非子受到诽谤，无以辩驳，因服诽谤他的人送来的毒药而死。见《韩非子全集》英文版，廖文魁翻译，伦敦：阿瑟·普罗赛因公司，1939年，第一卷，xxii—xxix页。

[5] 见第一章注释6（本书注释9，第178页）。

[6] “阁下如此宏材大略，不出来做点事情，实在可惜。无才者抵死要做宫，有才者抵死不做官，此正是天地间第一憾事！

老残道：‘不然。我说无才的要做官很不要紧，正坏在有才的要做官。你想，这个玉大尊不是个有才的吗？只为过于要做官，且急于做大官，所以伤天害理的做到这样。而且政声又如此其好，怕不数年之间就要方面兼圻的吗。官愈大，害愈甚：守一府则一府伤，抚一省则一省残，宰天下则天下死！由此看来，请教还是有才的做官害大，还是无才的做官害大呢？”引自《老残游记》英文版，刘鹗著，林疑今、葛德顺译，上海：商务印书馆，1939年，第78页。

[7] The author seems to be referring to the situation in medieval Europe, neglecting the fact that the bases for the concept of law and of constitutional government in the West are to be found in the formularization of laws, which approached a written constitution in fifth-century Greece and which was later expanded and developed by the Romans. In traditional China the limitations on the power of the monarch, or of his representative, seem never to have been derived from a concept of justice defined by law, written or unwritten.

[8] 作者似指中世纪欧洲的情况，不过忽视了西方法律和宪法政府的概念发源于法律的形成时期，即公元前5世纪希腊成文宪法的制定以及后来罗马人对此的发展。在中国古代，对皇权或其代表的权力的限制的做法，似乎从来都不是衍生自成文或不成文的法律所界定的正义概念。

[9] The typical ya-i would be a man with a little education but not enough to enable him to get ahead. Being literate, he would not want to sink to manual labor.

[10] 一般的衙役通常是受过一点点教育但算不上出类拔萃的人。因为受过教育，他不会情愿沦于从事普通劳动之列。

[11] Lu Hsien, in a short story entitled "Divorce," satirized the role of the gentry in deciding village disputes. A girl wishes to leave her husband and refuses to accept the advice of her relatives. So a member of the local gentry, Squire Seventh, is brought in. The girl thinks, "Those who know the classics and are men of justice must always defend the oppressed." Squire Seventh's authority is urged upon her with the words, "Squire Seventh is a man of wisdom and learning, very different from us villagers, with a knowledge of what is right…. Here is a fact which will not escape Squire Seventh's notice, for those who know the classics and wisdom know everything...." In the end the girl is forced to accept Squire Seventh's obviously biased decision.

[12] 鲁迅在一篇名为《离婚》的短篇小说中，讽刺了士绅在处理乡村纠纷中的角色。一位女子想离开她的丈夫，又不愿听亲戚们的劝导。于是当地的一位乡绅七大人出来劝解。这位女子想：“读经书的一定是有正义感的人，他会帮受害者讲公道话。”七大人的权威促使她说出这样的话：“七大人是知书识理，顶明白的。不像我们乡下人。……这也逃不出七大人的明鉴，知书识理的人什么都知道……”最后那个女子不得不屈从于七大人带有明显偏袒的裁决。

[13] Fei wrote of the village of Kai-hsien-kung, south of Lake Tai, in 1939: "The basis of the headmanship lies in public recognition and support in the leadership in community affairs, and in being the representative of the community against the outside world. Chen started his career as a school-master and Chou as an assistant in the silk factory. Their service and ability have given them authority and prestige. In the village there are few who are literate and still less who are at the same time willing to take up the responsibility without economic reward. Young men of ambition are not satisfied with the position: it is considered by the two middle-school graduates I met in the village as sterile and hopeless. Thus the range for the selection of village heads is not very large.

"Although they have no direct economic reward, they enjoy prestige and presents from the persons who have received services from them. For example, they are respected by the people, and can call the generation senior to them, except their own near kin, by their personal names without adding any relationship term. This cannot be done by an ordinary person.

"Village heads are always accessible, because they are known to every villager, and a stranger will be received by them immediately. The visitor will be impressed by their heavy burden of work. They help the people to read and to write letters and other documents, to make the calculations required in the local credit system, to manage marriage ceremonies, to arbitrate in social disputes, and to look after public property. They are responsible for the system of self-defence, for the management of public funds, and for the transmission and execution of administrative orders from the higher government. They take an active part in introducing beneficial measures such as industrial reform into the village" (Peasant Life in China [New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., 1939], pp. 108–109 and 106).

[14] 费孝通在1939年记述了太湖南岸一个叫开弦弓的村子：“当村头领的基础在于，不论他们代表社区面向外界时，或是他们在领导社区的事务中，都能得到公众的承认和支持。。陈先生从做学校校长起家，周先生则是做一个丝绸厂的助手。他们的服务和才干使得他们获得了权威和声望。在村子里没几个有文化的人，能不计经济报酬而自愿承担责任的人更少。有报负的年轻人对此职位又看不上——我在村里遇到的两个中学毕业生认为，这是一个枯燥无味且无发展前途的位置。故而，村正人选的选择余地并不大。

“虽然他们没有直接经济收入，但是他们享有很高的声望，接受曾得到他们帮助者的馈赠。比如，他们会受到人们的尊敬，对比他们年长辈分高的一代，除其近亲属外，可以直呼其名而不加表明关系的称谓。这也是一般人所不能做的。

“村正是易于接近的，因为村民都认识他们，外来的生人能很快地得到村正的接待。来访者会对他们庞大的工作量感到吃惊。他们帮助人们读写信件和其他文书，按照当地借贷规则算账，主持结婚典礼，仲裁社会纠纷，管理公共财产。他们要负责地方保安，管理公共基金，传达和执行上级政府的行政命令。他们积极地采取各种有利于本村的措施，村里的蚕丝工业改革就是一例。”引自《江村经济——中国农民的生活》，纽约：杜冬出版公司，1939年，第108—109页和第106页。

[15] The pao-chia, under which ten households, the members of which were held to be mutually responsible for one another's behavior, were grouped in a chia, ten chia forming a pao, was more or less in force in China from 1932 until recently, when the Communists, on taking over the government, abolished it. It had been first instituted in 1069 or 1070 by the famous statesman Wang An-Shih. According to Fei's Peasant Life in China, the pao-chia system was introduced for military purposes, in order to register and organize the people more effectively against the Communists. Yang says: "Since the revival (a supposed revival of an older system of social control) of the pao-chia system, each family must post on the top of the front door, a card bearing the name, age, sex, kinship status, and occupation of the family members…. The government has recently initiated the pao-chia system but the villagers do not, except very rarely, comply with it. They would not report that a son of their neighbour was involved in anything wrong. This reluctance is largely due to the traditional relations between neighbours, which make it very hard for one villager to report another's bad behaviour to a government authority or an outsider. It is also due to the fact that the system was primarily adopted for eliminating politically undesirable persons, especially those who have been accused of being communists, and often a person in disfavour with the political authorities may be on good terms with his fellow villagers" (Martin Yang, A Chinese Village, Taitov, Shangtung Province [New York: Columbia University Press, 1945], pp. 9 and 150).

[16] 保甲制度是指由十户组成一“甲”，一甲的成员对相互的行为负责；十甲组成一“保”。这种保甲制度在中国或多或少地起作用是从1932年开始。当共产党推翻了原政府之后，就将此制度废除了。这一制度最初是在1069年或1070年由著名的政治家王安石建立起来的。照费孝通所著《江村经济——中国农民的生活》一书来看，引入这一保甲制度是基于军事的考虑，为的是对人民进行登记和组织，以此来更有效地阻止当时共产党的发展。杨懋春说：“保甲制度恢复（据称为一种社会控制的旧制度的恢复）之后，每一户家庭都要在自家的大门的门楣上贴上一张卡片，上面写着家庭成员的姓名、年龄、性别、亲属状况和职业……政府最近开始实行保甲制度，但是除了极少数的人，村民并不照此遵守。他们不会举报某个邻居家的儿子犯了什么过错这样的事情。这种不情愿主要是源于传统上的邻里关系，这种关系的存在使得一个村民很难做到向某个政府或是一个外人报告村里另外一个人所做的坏事情；另外还源于这样的事实，那就是之所以采纳这一制度，主要是由于政府要消灭政治上的异己分子，特别是那些被指控为‘赤化分子’的人，而通常对政治当局不满的人可能与其村民同乡关系很好。”引自《一个中国村庄——山东台头》英文版，杨懋春著，纽约：哥伦比亚大学出版社，1945年，第9页和第150页。

Chapter Five   Village, Town, and City

第伍章   村、镇与城市

Having discussed the place of the gentry in the political structure of China, I now turn to their place in the economic order. But, in order to understand this, we must first make clear the difference in form between rural and urban communities and the nature of the economic and other relationships which hold them together. Five types of concentration of population may be recognized: the village, the walled or garrison town, the temporary market, the market town, and the treaty port.

●   POPULATION AND URBAN COMMUNITIES

What do we mean by "urban" as applied to a community? This question is difficult to answer. In the United States the Bureau of the Census calls a community of 2,500 people or more a city; and a community in which the incorporated area has a population of 50,000 and the outlying suburbs a population density of 150 per square mile is termed a metropolitan area. But not all sociologists agree to this standard. In fact, there exists no absolute generally accepted standard. Mark Jefferson, for example, calls a city an area with a population of 10,000 per square mile, while, for Walter F. Willcox, 1,000 individuals per square mile is enough to enable him to designate the area as a city.[1] Although these men disagree as to the numbers to be used, both use population density as the criterion for differentiating rural and urban areas. This is possible because in the United States a dense population is always organized into a city. But in China the situation is different. For instance, in my native province of Kiangsu the average population density is over 500 per square mile; in Shantung it is 615; in Chekiang, 657; and in some parts of these provinces it is more, even, than 6,000 persons per square mile.[2] If we applied Willcox's criterion, this whole area should be called a city. But to do so would be simply to abandon common sense. If we accept the notion that different standards must be adopted for the situation in China, which is so different from that in the United States, the question arises: What sort of standard, then, shall we use? It is clear that the density of population alone is insufficient for differentiating rural from urban communities.

In studying urban and rural communities from the point of view of population, the emphasis should be laid not upon quantity or density but rather upon distribution. We see that, as economic life develops among human beings, the population begins to concentrate at certain points which seem like nuclei of cells. The nuclear concentration in an area may be called urban; the area surrounding it, rural. Inevitably, there will be a difference in population density related to the process of concentration in the nucleus and in the area surrounding it. But we cannot pick this or that number of persons per square mile as a basis for distinguishing communities at different stages of economic development. Assuming a high density of population, our main problem is to analyze why the population concentrates in a few spots.

在讨论了士绅在中国政治结构中的地位之后，下面我们来看一下他们在经济秩序中的地位。但是，要理解这一点，我们先要认清城乡社区形式的差别以及把城乡结合在一起的经济和其他关系的本质。我们可以看到人口聚集的五种类型：村、衙门围墙式的城、临时集市、镇和通商口岸。

●   人口与城市社区

怎样的社区才能算是一个“城”呢？这个问题很难回答。美国人口局规定2500人以上聚居的地方称作“城”；市区人口超过5万，近郊区域的人口密度为每平方英里150人以上的社区，称作“都会”。但是，并不是所有社会学者都同意这个标准。实际上，没有绝对的被广泛认可的标准。例如，马克·杰斐逊就认为，人口密度在每平方英里1万人以上才能称作城市，而沃尔特·弗朗西斯·威尔科克斯则认为每平方英里有1000人已足以称为一个城市。[3]虽然他们在数量问题上意见不一，但都把人口密度作为划分城乡的标准，这种做法是可行的，因为在美国人口密集的地方往往就会建成一个城市。中国的情况则有所不同，例如在我的家乡江苏省，平均人口密度为每平方英里超过500人，山东为615人，浙江为657人，在这些省的某些地方，人口密度甚至超过每平方英里6000人。[4]如果采用威尔科克斯的标准，这些都可以叫做城市社区了，这显然与常识不符。如果我们认同说情况与美国截然不同的中国要有一套不同的标准的话，那么问题是：我们应该用哪一种标准呢？很明显，仅人口密度不足以区分城市和乡村社区。

从人口角度来研究城乡社区时，重点应放在人口的分布上而不是数量或密度上。我们认识到，随着人类经济生活的发展，一个区域里会产生若干人口密集的中心地点，像是细胞中产生了核心。一个区域的核心就是“城”，核心的外围人口密度较低的地方是“乡”。在人口聚集过程中，核心和外围区域在人口密度上不可避免地会产生差别，但是我们不能以每平方英里的这个或那个人数作为区分不同经济发展阶段的社区的基础。假设一个地区人口密度高，我们的主要问题是分析为什么人口会聚集在少数几个地点上。

In self-sufficient economies, whether nomadic or agricultural, each unit may live by itself, and its population may be dispersed over an area. There is no economic necessity for a nucleus, and, even if individuals come together, there is no economic differentiation. In cultivating the land, for practical reasons, if for no other, we should expect to find farmers settled on their own land so as to be near their work and to have their produce close at hand. This is what we call the dispersed type of agriculture, which is the usual thing in America.[5] But in China, except for a few places, such as the hilly areas of Szechwan, the situation is quite different. Chinese farmers live not in isolation but close together in villages. Two factors, the kinship organization and the need for mutual protection, are important in particular in bringing this about. Where, as in China, brothers inherit their father's land equally, all tend to remain together upon the land. If there is any free land near by, the family may spread out, and in the course of several generations a clan village may be developed. The fact of kinship keeps people living together in the same locality. Moreover, it is true that, although the lengthening of the distance between farms and living quarters is disadvantageous from an economic standpoint, living together in one place has great advantages from the point of view of security. Farming communities are easily invaded, and the best way to be safe is for the farmers to concentrate their families and produce in one place which is easier to protect and which may be inclosed with some sort of wall. A concentration of farm families of this sort we call a village.

The emphasis on defense appears from the very construction of the farmhouses themselves. In the mountains and hilly areas villages are smaller, and there may appear scattered homesteads with their own walled inclosures like primitive fortresses. Or, if structures of this sort are lacking, we will see that in the outer walls there are no windows, so that the house looks entirely inward. In larger villages we often find a central walled-in place to which the people can retire when necessary and where they can store their produce in case of an attack from outside. Even in more peaceful and orderly spots like Kiangsu, which we call Paradise, where river transport is more important than roads, the river will be blocked with a wooden gate every evening or in case of emergency. But here the form of the houses is modified, and windows are open to the street.

在自给自足的经济中，无论是游牧还是农业，每个生活单位都可以独立生存，人口可能在一个区域上散布开来。没有什么经济需求促使人口聚集，即使个体聚集在一起，也不会存在经济上的差等。以耕种土地而言，如果不考虑其他而只考虑实际的原因，农民最好是住在他所经营的土地上，便于耕种和收获。这就是所谓的散居式的农业，在美国极常见。[6]但在中国，除了几个地方，如四川的山区，其他地方就很少有了。中国的农民不是各自独居的，而是聚居在村落里。这种模式的形成有两个特别重要的原因，就是亲属的联系和互相保护的需要。在中国，兄弟平均继承父亲的土地，他们都希望共同生活在这片土地上。如果周围还有闲散的土地，家庭就会开垦扩展土地，几代之后就可以发展成一个小的同姓村落。亲属的联系也使他们住在同一个地方。另外，土地和居住地点间距离上的增大在经济上的确是不利的，但是这种聚居在安全上却是大为有利的。农业社区很容易遭到侵略，农民获得安全的最佳方式是将他们的家庭集中起来，在一个地方从事生产工作，这样更容易保护，周围可以围上墙。这种农户的聚居点我们称作“村”。

从农舍的建筑本身就可以看出对防卫的重视。山区的村落较小，分散的农家建筑带有围墙，像是原始的堡垒。或者，如果建筑不是这种结构，我们会看到外墙上是没有窗户的，整座房子完全是向内的。大一些的村落里有的在中心区域还筑造了围墙，必要时居民可以撤退到围墙之内去，每家的农产品也可以储存在这里以备受外来侵略时用。即使在较为安定、秩序较好、水运比陆运更为重要的地区，比如被称作天堂的江苏，每晚或在紧急情况时，河道都要以木门隔断。但是这里的建筑样式有所改变，窗户朝向街道。

Whatever the variation in form and whatever the size, as an assemblage of self-sufficient units, without a differentiation of function or division of labor among its members, we may recognize it as a village or rural community rather than as a town or urban center. The village, then, may be seen as one type of organization. The towns of China, on the other hand, are not all of one type but vary according to their function.

●   THE WALLED OR GARRISON TOWN: A POLITICAL CENTER

An important type of urban center is the walled town or ch'eng. The original meaning of this word is "wall," "inclosure," or "defense work." Constructions for defense may vary in size and quality. Sometimes they are built for a single family; sometimes for a village. But, when the word ch'eng is used, it designates a wall or defensive construction on a larger scale, one built to protect a political center. To make a wall of this sort is a big enterprise which cannot be accomplished by private means alone; it must be a public work shared in by the people over a large area. Both political power and political purpose are needed to construct this kind of large wall.

A ch'eng, then, is an instrument of the ruling classes in a political system where power resides in force. The ch'eng is the symbol of power and also a necessary tool for the maintenance of power. As a result, the location of a ch'eng is usually chosen with its political and military uses in mind. In the places where the representative of the monarch was used to stay there had to be a wall to protect him. Every hsien had to have a ch'eng where the representative of the emperor resided. Sometimes, however, when a hsien could not afford to build a ch'eng, the representatives of several hsien would concentrate in one ch'eng. In other words, the ch'eng existed in order to protect the yamen (the bureaucracy). And the existence of the ch'eng clearly illustrates the theory expounded in previous chapters that, in China, monarchical power needed always to be vigilant and on the defensive.

作为一种自给自足的生活单位的聚居，无论其在形式和大小上如何变化，只要成员之间没有功能上的区位分化和劳动分工，我们就把它认作是村或乡村社区，而不是镇或城的中心。村落可以看作是一种组织。另一方面，中国的镇不止有一种，而是根据功能的不同而在类型上也有所不同。

●   衙门围墙式的城：一个政治中心

一种重要的城市中心类型就是有围墙的城镇或者说“城”，这个字最初的含义是指“城墙”、“包围”或“防御工事”。防御工事可以在大小或质量上有所不同，有时一家，有时一村。但是称作“城”时，则指较大规模的城墙或防御工事，它所保卫的是一个政治中心。建造这样一个大的城墙工事不是私家所能单独完成的。这必是一个公共的工事，由较大区域的人民共同负担。这种大的城墙工事是要凭借政治权力和政治目的才能修建的。

因此，在一个依靠武力来统治的政治体系中，城墙是统治阶级的保护工具。城是权力的象征，是维护权力的必要工具。所以，城的地点经常是依照政治和军事的需要而定的。在皇权代表的驻扎地点必然要有一个保卫设施的城。每一个县在皇帝的代表知县住的地方要有一个城。如果有的县不能单独建造城的话，几个县的政府有时合住在一个城里。换句话说，城是为了保护“衙门”（官署）的。城的存在清楚地表明了前面讲过的理论，即在中国，皇权常常需要保持警惕和自我保护。

In Yunnan we see that, in building a walled city, the custom is ordinarily to build the wall partly on a hilltop and partly on the plain because this type of construction is easier to defend. If built on flat ground, a moat, called a ch'ih ("pond") or huang ("ditch") was dug about it. (By extension, the guard who rules the district in the spirit world, who is a counterpart of the magistrate who rules this world, was called a ch'eng huang.) It is clear that the wall and the moat have symbolized a seat of authority far back in Chinese history. Within the walled inclosure, even in cities such as Peking and Nanking, there was usually a large amount of cultivable land which in case of siege even in these days has often been useful for providing perishable foodstuffs. The ideal city, from the traditional point of view, was a self-sufficient castle. And even now the government may, in emergencies, order the gates of a city to be closed. Recently, even before martial law was established in Peking, the city gates were closed every evening at seven o'clock.

Although the ch'eng symbolized security, the population within the walls might not necessarily be greater than in communities outside. In fact, in Yunnan it is common to find the walled towns smaller in size than the adjacent villages. Yet the well-protected area of the town had its attractions for certain people. To be a rich man, or even one just a little well-to-do, has never been safe in China, as we said before. Owing to the low cost of labor, landowners need not be very wealthy in order to be freed from the necessity for working their own lands, and in such a case they might feel moved to rent out their land and move to the walled town. Riches obtained from exploitation need to be protected by political power, and governmental authority might be used, when necessary, to collect rent for absentee owners. In Yunnan a troop of soldiers was, at one time, sent to collect rents.[7] As previously described, the landowners tend to maintain a close personal relationship with the bureaucracy. And it was this combination of officialdom and landed gentry which gave the walled or garrison town its special character.

For the use of the dwellers in the walled town there developed handicraft industries. The greater the concentration of landowners as well as of wealth, the greater the development of craftsmen and the more skilled and varied the types of things produced. The silver of Chengtu, the embroidery of Soochow, the silk of Hangchow, and the cloisonné of Peking are all examples of art handicrafts which attained a high degree of development. In centers of this sort a more far-reaching trade in the local specialty as well as in local country products, such as fur or herbs, might grow up. But the walled town was not typically a trading center, nor did it serve to supply the needs of the peasant population. Luxury goods of the sort mentioned above were not within the reach of the country people living on an economy of bare subsistence. The craftsmen who lived in the walled towns, such as the tailor (who occupied a place at the front gate of a big house and served as gateman as well), the carpenters, the dispensers of drugs and tonics, the silversmiths, and all the others did not serve the villagers but rather the landlords, somewhat as the artists and craftsmen in the Middle Ages served their lords. Economic activity in these fortified centers of administration, then, was based not on an exchange of goods between producers but on the purchasing power of consumers who gained their wealth largely from exploitative relationships with the country.[8]

在云南，我们看到，建造县城的通常做法是一半在山丘上，一半在平地里，以易于防守。如果建在平地里，沿城要掘一道环城的水道，叫“池”（有水的城池）或“隍”（无水的城池）。（由此延伸，在神灵世界中控制这一地区的守卫者，就是与现实世界中的县令平起平坐者，叫“城隍”。）很明显，城和池是久远的中国历史上的权力之位的象征。在城墙内，即使是在北京和南京这样的大城市内，也通常有一些可以耕种的土地，万一城市被围困，这些田地可以供给居民不易储藏的食品，即使到今天也是如此。依照传统的观点，理想的“城”是一个能自给自足的堡垒。即使在今天，遇有危急情况，官府也要下令关上城门。最近，即使在北京的军事管制实行以前，城门每晚都是七点钟关闭的。

虽然城象征着安全，但城区的人口并不一定要比外面社区的人口多。实际上，云南有许多县城比邻近的村子要小，但是，有着良好防御工事的城区有它吸引人口的力量。像我们前面讲过的那样，在中国，一个富有的人或稍有些财富的人从来都是不安全的。由于劳动成本很低，地主不必非常富有就可摆脱耕种土地之累，在这种情况下，他可能更愿意把土地租出去，然后搬到城里去住。剥削而来的财富需要得到政权的保护，必要时用政治权威来为不在当地的地主收租。在云南，一队士兵曾被派去收租。[9]像前面所描述的那样，地主希望与官僚保持密切的私人关系，正是官僚与地主阶级的这种联合使得围墙式的城镇有其特色。

为了城里居民的需要，手工业发展起来。地主集中的数量越多，积累的财富越多，手工艺从业者也就越多，这类手工业品的种类也越多，手艺也越精细。成都的银器、苏州的刺绣、杭州的丝绸和北京的景泰蓝都是手工业高度发展的例子。在这类中心地区，各地的土特产如毛皮或药草等影响更加深远的贸易也可能发展起来。但是城并不是一个典型的贸易中心，也不为农民提供生活用品。上面所列的那些奢侈的消费品不是生活在拮据经济状况下的农民所能购买的。生活在城里的手工业者，如裁缝（在大户人家的前门占一块地，也同时充当门房）、木匠、卖药的、银匠以及其他人，他们并不为农民服务，而是为地主服务，有点儿像中世纪时为他们的主人服务的艺匠。这些行政防御中心地区的经济活动，并不以生产者之间的商品交换为基础，而是以主要通过剥削农民而获得财富的消费者的购买力为基础。[10]

Besides their money from rents, landowners derived income from investing their capital in pawnshops, in the loaning-out of money at high rates, and in rice shops. Once I asked a resident of a walled town about how much moneylending went on there and was told by him that everyone in town engaged in this activity. He probably merely meant that most of the townsfolk did so. And the poor country people who come to borrow money will usually be forced to sell their land eventually in order to pay their debts.[11]

The investment of the rice-shop owner may be increased through speculation as well as through merely buying and selling rice. He will then buy rice when the price is low and keep it to sell when the price is higher. In a number of places the rice shop had still another function—that of husking the rice, either, as in former times, by means of machinery run by water power or, as at present, by crude-oil or electric power. (But in the villages of the interior, in particular, we may still see the villagers husking their rice by pounding it.)

In general, this type of town was not conducive to the development of either industry or commerce, and that which did exist, for the most part, served the wealthy classes who had taken up their residence there for political or security reasons.

●   MARKETS AND TOWNS DEVELOPED FROM TRADE

Self-sufficiency was highly developed in the rural economy of China, but it was not complete. Some of the necessities of life of the villagers came from exchange with other villagers and some from the outside. So we do find trading activities in the rural areas, and this is another factor in the concentration of population. We may distinguish, as centers of trade, temporary markets from market towns.

地主除了从地租获得收入之外，还利用他的资本从事典当、高利贷、米行等经济活动，以此来增加收入。我在一个县城里调查放高利贷的情况时，一位朋友就告诉我：“城里这些人全是放债的。”这句话并非完全是事实，他可能只是说放债的人很多罢了。那些贫穷的乡下人来此借债最终不得不把地卖掉来还债。[12]

而米行老板的投资可以通过投机和单纯的米的买卖来获得丰厚回报。他在米价低时买进，等到米价高时再卖出。在许多地方，米行还有另外一个功能，就是碾米，以前是利用水力，现在则用柴油机或电机。（但特别是在内地的乡村，我们仍可见到人们是用舂米的方式。）

总的说来，这种城对于工业和商业的发展都无益，即使是实际存在的工商业，很大程度上也是为那些由于政治和安全的考虑而居住于此的富有阶层服务的。

●   由贸易发展而来的集市和镇

在中国，乡村经济自给程度很高但不完全，有些农民所需的必需品是从别村或外界交换而来。所以我们在乡村也能见到贸易活动，这是人口集中的另一个因素。作为贸易中心，我们可以把临时性的“集市”与“镇”区分开来。

In interior China temporary markets are still common. These have names which vary with the locality and which indicate that they are a local development rather than something imposed from the top and alike throughout the country as the ch'eng. The terms for temporary market refer to places where producers exchange goods among themselves.[13] Since the producers cannot engage in trade every day, this kind of market usually takes place only every few days (in Yunnan the common practice is to hold a market every six days). On market day the villagers bring to the market the things they wish to sell and bring back, at the end of the day, what they have bought in exchange. The size of the market varies according to the area which it covers, large markets having sometimes more than ten thousand people. On the Dragon Day, Sheep Day, or Dog Day markets in Yunnan, when one stands on the top of a hill and looks down, there appears to be a sea of human beings moving back and forth like waves. People are so crowded together that their shoulders touch, and it is hard to move. But the crowd does not last long. At sunset they will be leaving, and by evening the place will be empty.

Markets of this temporary nature do not represent a community. The term "market" refers merely to a location which has been selected for its convenience in communication. Usually it must be a large open space, often the open area near a temple, where people are apt to gather. Where trading is more developed, markets of this sort become more frequent. Gradually around the big open space will spring up small storehouses for the merchants who buy up local products and transport them to other places as well as teahouses for those who wish to sit and rest. As the demand grows for more supplies from outside, what is brought in by the peddlers will not be enough. In time a store may be established close to the market center, and eventually there will develop a permanent community which we call a market town, or shih.

In the Lake Tai area, where communication by water is much quicker than by land, this type of town has had more chance to develop. As described in Peasant Life in China, a so-called "agent boat" buys things for the villagers, each boat roughly serving about a hundred households. By using the morning to go to town and the afternoon to come back, a boat of this sort can cover quite an area. In town there are usually hundreds of these agent boats, supplying tens of thousands of rural families. The stores in town have special arrangements with one or more boats for their supplies, and thus, by having access to such a large number of consumers, a large commercial center may be maintained. But in the interior of China, where communication is difficult, towns of this sort are very few.

在中国内地，临时性的集市仍旧非常普遍。各地方的名称不同，意味着它们是在地方上发展起来的，而不是像“城”一样由上面推行、遍及全国。临时集市是指生产者之间相互交换的场合[14]，由于生产者不能每天都从事贸易活动，因此这样的集市每隔几天才有一次（云南通常是六天一次）。赶市的那一天，各村的乡民提着他们要卖的东西上街，赶集日结束时再带回交换所得的东西。各地集市大小各不相同，大的集市有时会有上万人。在云南的龙街、羊街和狗街，站在山坡上往下看，人山人海，来来往往的人群就像起伏的波浪。人群太过拥挤，接踵摩肩，连前行都很困难。但拥挤的人群并不会持续很长时间，太阳落山时，他们先后离去，到了晚上就没有人了。

临时的集市不代表社区，它不过是一个交通方便的地点。一般来说，它必须是一片开阔的空地，附近有庙，易于人们聚集。随着贸易的发展，这种集市变得越来越频繁。渐渐地，在空地周围出现了贩运商品的小型栈房和供人休息的茶舍。随着对外界商品需求的增长，贩运商人运来的商品已不够用。一段时间后可能就会在靠近集市中心的地方出现囤积商品的仓库，最后发展成为永久的社区，我们不妨将此叫做“镇”，或者“市”。

在水运比陆运快捷的太湖流域，镇尤其易于发展。像我在《江村经济——中国农民的生活》一书中所描述的那样，有一种为村民买东西的“代理航船”，每只航船代理一百多户农家。它们每天一早从村子驶出，下午回来，能为很大一片区域提供服务。在镇上，常常有几百只船为几万农家办货。镇里的商店和个别的船只维持着专门的供应关系，有了这样大的消费区域，大的商业中心可能得以维持下去。但是在交通不便的内地，这种镇是很少的。

Market and garrison towns can be differentiated not only theoretically but also by mere inspection. In Yunnan their aspects are very different. Around Kunming, which is a big walled city, there are six or seven temporary markets. It is true that Kunming has recently also become a commercial center, but it has not developed through rural consumption. On the main street of Kunming there are department stores selling foreign goods and merchants selling gold. Those who buy here are mostly city dwellers or traders from various other towns. Very few villagers come to buy things directly from these shops. They buy the things they need from the markets which surround the city walls.

We may take another example of a small garrison town of Yunnan in which there is only one main street inside the town walls. On this street are several teashops, a barbershop, and a shop with miscellaneous drygoods and sweets. Outside the walls, a fifteen-minute walk away, is the Dragon Day market. Though within easy reach of the town, it is quite distinct from it. The town represents a political center in which, the chief interest being security, the location chosen was a hillside, which is easier to defend. The latter, developing through trade, selected a position at a crossroads, which makes it easily accessible to the villagers round about. In the Lake Tai area in my own native district, Wukiang, the garrison town is much smaller and less prosperous than the nearby market towns, such as Chen-tse. In the Ch'ing dynasty this garrison town contained two district governments, but, besides the governmental yamens, it had mainly private residences and only one main street. Here one sees clearly the difference in function between garrison and market town.

It is true that these two types of town do have certain similarities, since the market town is also the place where landowners gather. When they live in an economic center, they have more opportunity to make commercial use of the capital which they have accumulated from the land. But, according to traditional standards, the landlord who engaged in trade occupied a lower position than did the landlord who was an official in the ch'eng. However, as this tradition has been gradually breaking down, a high position in the market town is often a step toward a high position in a garrison town. In the market town, where the shops are the center of the community, there are also small industries and handicrafts developed to serve the community itself and for export to rural areas. In this way the two types of town also resemble each other.

市镇和城不但在概念上可以区分，事实上也是常常分开的。在云南这种情形可以看得很清楚。昆明这个大城的附近就围绕着六七个临时集市。当然昆明最近已发展成一个商业中心，但它不是通过乡村的消费而发展起来的。昆明的主要街道上有卖洋货的百货公司和金店，从这里买东西的人多数是城里的居民和从别的镇来的商人，只有很少的村民直接从这些店铺里买东西。他们是从环绕着城墙的集市上买自己所需要的东西。

我们可以举云南的另一个衙门围墙式的小城为例，其城墙内只有一条主要街道。这条街上有几家茶舍、一家理发店和一家干货糖果店。在城外，步行十五分钟就是龙街，虽然与城相隔不远，但却截然不同。城代表了政治中心，以安全为主要目的，地点选在山坡上，易于防守；而集市由贸易发展而来，地点选在十字路口，便于附近的村民往来。以太湖流域的情形说，我的故乡吴江县的县城远不及附近的震泽等市镇大和发达。在清朝，两个县政府同在这个县城里，但是除了政府衙门之外，主要是私人住户，只有一条主要的街。由此我们可以清楚地看出城和市镇的不同功能来。

城和市镇确实有着一些相似之处，因为市镇也是地主们蚁集之所。当他们居住在经济中心时，就有更多的机会把从地里得来的钱财用作商业目的。但是，根据传统的标准，做生意的地主比在城里的官僚地主地位要低。然而，随着这个传统渐渐被打破，镇上的高位往往意味着离城里的高位更迈近了一步［参照费孝通著《乡土中国与乡土重建》，原意为“镇的地位事实已有超过了县城的”（台北：风云时代出版公司，1993年，第136页）——编者注］。在镇上，店铺成为社区的中心，随之发展了一些小型的工业和手工业来为社区服务，并向乡村地区出售产品，在这方面很类似于城。

But even though these two types of towns do tend to overlap and are sometimes even combined into one community, it seems worth while to try to differentiate them conceptually, the garrison town as the seat of traditional bureaucratic authority and the wealthy gentry, the market town as a link between the peasants' local industry and more highly developed commerce and manufacturing.

●   THE TREATY PORT

We come, then, to the last type of concentration of population—the treaty port. I should like to make clear here that the Chinese modern city which developed from the treaty port not only differs from the traditional town, either of the market-town or of the garrison-town type, but also differs notably from the modern metropolitan city in the West. Those who advocate urbanization in China usually take the position that a city such as Shanghai is similar to New York and London. Such a conclusion is most misleading, because there is a real and very essential difference between Chinese cities and Western metropolises. Metropolitan cities like New York and London may be viewed as nerve centers for a wide economic area. The development of the center indicates the development of the hinterland, since they are bound up together. Through this relationship the economic division of labor of the different areas is facilitated. But Shanghai is different. It is not the center of an economically independent area but rather is a treaty port which was forced open by political agreement. It is a gateway to an economically underdeveloped continent, opened toward the Occident, rather than a city which, like New York or London, grew up through the economic development of its own hinterland. Shanghai and other treaty ports are the result of the impact of economies at different levels. Thus Shanghai originally was only a small fishing village occupying an insignificant position in the traditional economy. Since it has become a gate to the interior, it has entirely changed and has prospered mightily.

But its prosperity does not mean the prosperity of the hinterland, because it represents not a mutual development but rather the establishment of a superior economic force working its way toward a dominance of a less-well-developed area. The fact that treaty ports like Shanghai had for a long period a special political position as foreign settlements where Chinese power could not reach was no accident, since economically they were also separate from Chinese economy. On the one hand, they were a gate by means of which foreign goods could come in; on the other, they served as ratholes for dribbling away Chinese wealth. When I call the treaty ports "economic ratholes," I mean that they were fundamentally similar to the garrison towns, a community of consumers and not of producers. I may be challenged on this point by those who point out that commerce is mutual benefit and that the importation of foreign goods must be balanced by the export of other goods or that otherwise trade will stop. This may apply to New York, but it does not apply to Shanghai. To be sure, there are exports from Shanghai, not only Chinese raw materials but also silver and gold, when other goods are not enough to make a balance of trade. But these goods are not produced in Shanghai or in the industrial areas near by. They are raw materials from the countryside. If Shanghai played the role of connecting foreign consumers with their own producers, it might claim a status similar to that of New York or London. But the fact is that the producers of goods for export do not get back an equal value in imports. The Shanghai people collect the raw materials and sell them to foreign countries and then themselves consume the foreign goods which come in as imports. This relationship is quite similar to the traditional system in the garrison town, which I described above.

即使城和镇互相交错，甚至有时会联合成一个社区，但是把它们从概念上区分开来似乎仍很必要：城是传统官僚地主和富有士绅的基座，镇是联系乡村工业和更为发达的商业与制造业的纽带。

●   通商口岸

现在我们讨论最后一种人口聚居的形式——通商口岸。应该认清的是，从通商口岸发展而来的中国现代城市不仅与传统的镇或县城有所不同，也与现代西方大都市有着明显的区别。那些提倡在中国实行都市化的人常常认为上海与纽约、伦敦相似，这是一个很大的误导，因为中国的城市与西方的都市有着真正的和本质的区别。纽约和伦敦这样的大都市可以看作是一个大的经济区域的神经中枢。中心地区的发展预示了内地的发展，因为它们连成一体，通过这种联系促进了不同地区劳动的经济分工。但上海不同，它不是一个经济自立区域的中心，而是由于政治协议而被迫开放的口岸。它是通向经济不发达的内陆地区的大门，向着西方开放，而不是像纽约和伦敦那样通过自身内地的发展而发达起来的。上海和其他通商口岸是不同层次的经济影响的结果。上海起初只是一个小渔村，在传统经济中的地位无足轻重，但自从成了内地对外开放的大门之后，它发生了巨变并极度繁荣起来。

但是上海的繁荣并不意味着内地的繁荣，因为它并不代表共同发展，而是一种高级经济力量的确立，以逐步支配欠发达的地区。像上海这样的通商口岸，很长时间以来都占据着特殊的政治地位，它们是外国人的居住地，不受中国的控制，这一事实并非偶然，因为从经济上来讲，它们也是与中国的经济相脱离的。一方面，它们是外国商品得以进入中国的大门；另一方面，它们也是中国财富外流的老鼠洞。我把通商口岸称作“经济鼠洞”，是指它们根本上是与县城相似的，是消费者的社区，而不是生产者的社区。那些认为商业是互利行为，进口与出口要达到平衡，否则贸易就会停止的人也许会对这一点提出疑问，对于纽约也许是这样，而上海则不同。可以确定，上海有出口商品，包括国产的原材料、金和银等，而其他商品不足以达到贸易上的平衡。但是这些商品都不是在上海或附近的工业区生产的，它们是来自农村的原材料。如果上海可以使外国人来消费中国产品，那么它或许可以与纽约或伦敦获得相似的地位。但事实却是，出口商品的生产者不能从进口商品中获得同等的价值。上海人收集原材料出口到国外，而自己消费进口商品，这种关系与我上面所提到的县城里的传统体制非常相似。

But there is a difference between the treaty port and the traditional garrison town. In the latter, goods are consumed which are produced in the local area or at least near by, while, in the treaty port, the goods consumed are largely those imported from foreign countries. The treaty port itself, as a great center of foreign influence, is very effective in bringing about the substitution of foreign goods for those produced at home. So we find a new class of wealth and influence in China—the comprador.[15] Part of the foreign goods pass into the towns of the interior, but the main market remains the treaty port or the international settlements. Because of the relative political freedom in these places, they collect all those people who feel they cannot stay in the interior, and, in fact, they become "Grand Hotels" for refugees of all sorts. In calling them "Grand Hotels," I am referring to the fact that most of those who enter the settlements bring with them money to spend. The source of this money is not the treaty port itself but is in the rural areas round about. Straws of various sizes thrust into the rural areas suck out the wealth of China into these ports. It is quite obvious that such an industrially undeveloped metropolis as Shanghai, with a huge population next in size to New York and London, cannot have a self-sufficient economy but depends for its income upon the countryside.[16] As such, it is a garrison town and a community of dependent consumers and parasites rather than a highly developed city of the modern type.

但通商口岸与传统的县城有一点不同，后者的商品在其生产地或至少是附近地区消费，而在通商口岸，消费品大多是来自国外的进口商品。通商口岸本身作为受外国影响的一个巨大中心，在买进本国产品的国外替代品时是非常有效的。所以我们在中国又发现了一个有财富、有影响的阶层，即买办阶层。[17]一部分外国商品进入到内陆城镇，但主要市场仍是在通商口岸或外国人的居住地。由于这些地区的政治相对自由，这里聚集了所有自认为不能呆在内地的人，实际上成了各种难民的“大旅馆”，这样称呼是因为大部分人都带着钱来到这里消费，这些钱并不来自通商口岸，而是来自附近的乡村。乡村的财富如同被粗细不一的吸管不断吸出，涌入这些通商口岸。显而易见，上海这样一个工业不发达的都市，拥有仅次于纽约和伦敦的人口，不能自给自足，而要靠来自乡村的收入。[18]这样看来，它只是一个县城，一个依靠别人的消费者和寄生虫聚集的社区，而不是一个现代的高度发展的都市。

Modern metropolises are the products of industrialization. A country which has not been industrialized cannot have urban centers like New York or London. The treaty port brought about the invasion of an industrialized economy into an economically inferior area, where a simple economy still prevailed. This created a peculiar community which should not be classed with modern urban centers. In order to understand the nature of such a community, we need more research than has so far been done.

现代都市是工业化的结果。一个非工业化国家不会有纽约或伦敦这样的城市中心。通商口岸带来了工业化经济对简单经济仍占主导地位的不发达地区的入侵，这就产生了一种不应该归入现代城市中心的特殊社区。为了理解这一社区的特征，我们现在所作的研究还远远不够。

[1] Walter F. Willcox, Studies in American Demography (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1940), chap. vi, "Density of Population: Urban and Rural," p. 117. The Mark Jefferson reference has not been found.

[2] China has never had a real census. Rather, population has been computed for purposes of taxation and compulsory labor on the basis of not very accurate estimates. However, from 1932 to 1937, seven experimental censuses, confined to one hsien (district) each, in the case of six, and part of a hsien for the seventh, were taken. These hsien were scattered through five provinces, three in Kiangsu, and one each in Hopeh, Shantung, Chekiang, and Fukien (Tâ Chen, Population in Modern China [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1946]).

[3] 参见《美国人口研究》，沃尔特·弗朗西斯·威尔科克斯著，纽约伊萨卡：康奈尔大学出版社，1940年，第6章“人口密度：城市和乡村”，第117页。马克·杰斐逊的参考文献出处未知。

[4] 中国从未有过真正的人口统计。为了赋税和徭役的目的，才在非常不精确的估计的基础上计算人口数量。但是，1932年至1937年期间，做了7次实验性的人口统计，其中6次是限于一个县内，第7次是一个县的局部地区。这些县分散在5个省，3个在江苏省，其余分别在湖北、山东、浙江和福建。参见《现代中国人口》，陈达著， 芝加哥：芝加哥大学出版社，1946年。

[5] The dispersed farms of America are the exception, of course. Throughout the world old farming populations tend to cluster their houses into villages and go out to their fields.

[6] 美国分散的农场当然是例外。全世界传统的农业人口都往往是聚居在村子里而到村外面去耕作。

[7] "Landlords of big estates establish their own rent-collecting bureaus, and petty landlords pool their claims with them…. At the end of October, the bureau will inform each tenant of the amount of rent that should be paid that year. The information is forwarded by special agents. These agents are employed by the bureau, and have been entrusted with police power by the district government" (Hsiao-tung Fei, Peasant Life in China [New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., 1939], p. 188).

[8] Compare with Pirenne's description of medieval towns of Europe during the period of closed domestic economy: "As can be easily seen, the burgs were, above all, military establishments.... In case of war, its inhabitants found there a refuge; in time of peace, there they repaired to take part in the assemblies of justice, or to pay off the prestations to which they were subject. Nevertheless, the burg did not show the slightest urban character.... Neither commerce nor industry was possible or even conceivable in such an environment. It produced nothing of itself, lived by revenues from the surrounding country, and had no other economic role than that of a simple consumer" (Henri Pirenne, Mediaeval Cities [Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1925], pp. 75 and 76).

[9] “大地主建立了自己的收租机构，小地主与他们合伙……到10月底，收租机构会来通知每个佃户当年应该交纳的地租数目。这件事会由专门的代理人来传达。这些代理人由机构雇佣，并由当地政府授予他们以警察一般的权力。”引自《江村经济——中国农民的生活》，费孝通著，纽约：杜冬出版公司，1939年，第188页。

[10] 与皮朗所描述的封闭经济时期欧洲中世纪的城镇相比：“显而易见，城镇首先是军事设施……战争爆发时，居民把它当作一个避难所，和平时期在此参加公众正义集会，或还清他们在这里所借的贷款。但是，城镇没有显示出丝毫的城市特征……在这种环境下，任何商业或工业都是不可能的，甚至是不可想象的。它不生产任何东西，依靠从周围的农村获得的税收来维持，除了作为一个单纯的消费者之外，没有任何经济上的作用。”引自《中世纪的城市》，亨利·皮朗著，普林斯顿：普林斯顿大学出版社，1925年，第75、76页。

[11] D. K. Lieu, in his recent China's Economic Stabilisation and Reconstruction [New Brunswick, N. J.: Rutgers University Press, 1948], does not quite agree with Fei's picture of the typical landlord. "While there are landlords who exploit tenants, the worst kind of exploiters, both of tenants and small farmers, are the professional money lenders…. In some sample studies made before the war, the rate of interest charged by these rural Shylocks was from 50 to 100 per cent per annum, or many times the rate on bank loans in the cities, which was from 10 to 15 per cent before the war.... While miserly landlords often lend money to their tenants on the same terms as the money lenders, they are comparatively few. It is to their interest to keep the tenants from being unduly burdened with debt, which would affect the latter's work on the farm, and thus also affect the rent to be collected, especially if it is on a share-cropping basis. Besides, the landlords, particularly the larger ones, have their social standing, and would not like to be regarded as belonging to the same class as the money lender…. In some cases, however, landlords may lend to independent farmers, with the object of obtaining possession of their land, since these farmers, when they are heavily burdened with debt, are usually compelled to sell their land for debt settlement; but such scheming landlords are not very common" (pp. 42–43).

[12] 刘大钧在他最近出版的《中国的经济稳定与重建》（新泽西新布朗斯维克：鲁特格斯大学出版社，1948年）一书中，不太赞同费先生对典型地主的描述：“虽然地主剥削佃户，但是剥削佃户和小农户最厉害的是那些职业的放贷者……在战前做的一些案例分析中，这些农村的‘夏洛克’们收取的年利息一般是50%—100%，比城里银行10%—15%的战前利息高出很多倍……虽然吝啬的地主经常以与放高利贷者相同的条件借钱给佃户，这样的人相对很少。避免让佃户背上过重的债务也符合地主的利益，因为那样会影响佃户种地，因而影响收租，特别是在共同耕种的情形下更是如此。而且，地主——尤其是较大的地主——有一定的社会地位，不愿意与放高利贷的人混为一谈……在有些情况下，地主可能把钱借给自耕农，目的是想占有他们的土地。因为当这些农民债务累累时，他们经常被迫卖地来偿还债务。但是这种狡诈的地主并不多见”（第42—43页）。

[13] "The intimate relation between the periodic market and local production, which is overwhelmingly agricultural, is shown in the monthly sales record for livestock for the year 1932 in central market Sun-chia-chen. Sales fluctuations correspond entirely to the local agricultural calendar.... During the sowing season, fertiliser, hoes, plows, and other market implements connected with the work of the season are sold widely on markets. In harvest seasons, the markets are abundantly supplied with sickles, ropes for bundling stalks, screens and mats for threshing grains. Immediately after harvest, when farm work is in a temporary lag, markets are alive with cardboards for making shoes, cotton yarns and shuttles and other weaving supplies, silk threads and other sewing articles....

"Among the total traders of eleven markets, in one market day, 69.8 per cent of them came to sell their own service and products, both agricultural and handicraft....

"Inquiry into thirty-seven farm families shows that thirty-three rely entirely upon the periodic markets for disposing of their agricultural products; and only four, whose farms are larger than the rest, sell about 25 per cent of their grains directly to merchants…. Products of home industry such as hand loomed cloth, home-made shoes and sewing materials, depend on the market as the sole outlet" (Ching-kun Yang, A North China Local Market Economy: A Summary of a Study of Periodic Markets in Chowping Hsien, Shantung [New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1945], pp. 10–11).

[14] “中心集市孙家镇1932年每月牲畜买卖的记录表明了定期集市与当地产品（主要是农产品）的密切关系。买卖的波动与当地的农业节气完全吻合。……在播种季节，肥料、锄头、犁以及其他与播种有关的用具在集市上广泛出售。在收获季节，集市上则大量供应镰刀、捆庄稼的绳子、筛子和打谷用的席子。收获季节刚过，到了农闲季节，集市上又出现了做鞋用的纸板、棉纱、梭子和其他纺织用品、丝线和其他缝纫物品……

“在11个集市的所有商人中，一天内有 69.8%的人出售自己的劳动或产品，包括农产品和手工业品……

“对37户农家的调查表明，有33户完全依靠定期集市来处置他们的农产品；只有4户拥有较多农田的人把25%的粮食直接卖给商人。……家庭工业产品例如手织布、自制的鞋和手工缝制的物件只能依靠集市出售。”引自《华北的地方集市经济：山东邹平县定期集市研究》，杨庆堃著，纽约：太平洋国际学会，1945年，第10—11页。

[15] "I possess no sufficient data on the family background of those who form the first line of contact with Western traders, but I strongly suspect that those 'secondhand foreigners,' were, at least for the early period, recruited from the outcasts of the traditional structure, who had lost their positions and sought their fortune by illegal means. Treaty ports are open to them. If they find regular employment in the community, such as servants or interpreters in a foreign concern, they gradually become compradors, or first-boys; if they fail, they form gangs. They live in, and take advantage of, the margin of cultural contact. They are half-caste in culture, bilingual in speech, and morally unstable. They are unscrupulous, pecuniary, individualistic, and agnostic, not only in religion, but in cultural values" (Hsiao-tung Fei, "Peasantry and Gentry," American Journal of Sociology, LII [July, 1946], 14).

[16] Compare this with the imperialism of ancient Rome. "All this brilliant expansion of urban civilisation had in it the seeds of its own decline. It was an external and superficial development, like that of Modern European civilisation in the East, or in the eighteenth century Russia. It was imposed from above, and was never completely assimilated by the subject populations. It was essentially the civilisation of a leisured class, the urban bourgeoisie and their dependents, and though the process of urbanisation promoted the advance of civilisation, it also involved a vast increase of unproductive expenditure and a growing strain on the resources of the empire. As Professor Rostovtzeff has said, every new city meant the creation of a new hive of drones" (Christopher Dawson, The Making of Europe [London: Sheed & Ward, 1932], p. 12).

[17] “对于那些与西方商人直接接触的人，我没有关于他们家庭背景的足够材料，但我可以充分地料想，那些‘二手洋人’，至少在初期，主要是来自被传统社会排斥的人群，他们在社会中已经丧失了地位，试图通过非法手段捞取利益。通商口岸对他们开放。如果他们在社区里找到正常的工作，例如给洋人当差或当翻译，他们就逐渐变成了买办；如果找不到工作，他们就组成帮会。他们生活在文化接触的边缘，同时也在利用这个边缘。他们在文化上处于中间地带，操两种语言，道德上处于不稳定状态。不仅在宗教上，而且在文化价值上，他们都肆无忌惮，推崇金钱、个人主义和不可知论。”引自费孝通，《农民与士绅》，载于《美国社会学学刊》第52卷，1946年7月，第14页。

[18] 以此与古代罗马的帝国主义相比较。“所有这些明智的城市文明的扩张都埋有自取毁灭的种子。这是一种外部和表面的发展，像东方或18世纪俄罗斯的现代欧洲文明。这是由上层强压下来的，从未被下级百姓完全吸收。它本质上是有闲阶级、城市资产阶级及其仆从的文明，虽然都市化进程促进了文明的进步，但是它也导致了非生产性花费的大量提高以及帝国资源吃紧的不断升级。正如罗斯托夫教授所说，每一个新的城市都意味着创造出一个新的蜂巢。”引自《欧洲的诞生》，克里斯托弗·唐森著，伦敦：席德与沃德出版社，1932年，第12页。

Chapter Six   Rural Livelihood: Agriculture and Handicraft

第陆章   乡村生计：农业与手工业

With regard to the relationship in China between rural and urban areas, there are two distinct points of view, the first holding that rural and urban areas complement each other and are mutually beneficial, the second maintaining quite the reverse—that they are antagonistic.

Theoretically, of course, rural and urban communities are necessarily related integral parts of the whole country. Villages are the places where the agricultural products necessary for the subsistence of the country are produced, while those who stay in the city are not engaged in agriculture and depend upon a food supply from the country. Thus the urban communities are markets for the village produce, and the more developed the market, the higher will be the value of the food consumed and the more profit will result for the villages. Urban centers are also industrial centers for which raw materials such as soybeans, tung oil, cotton, and tobacco may be produced in the rural areas. These raw materials for industry sometimes have an even higher value than the foodstuffs produced and are then a cash crop. When modern industry develops in the city, its hinterland has the opportunity to develop crops of this sort according to the nature of the soil and other conditions. On the other hand, industrial products, manufactured goods over and above those needed for supplying the urban dwellers, will for the most part go to the countryside. Thus, there will be a constant exchange of raw materials and food for manufactured goods, a type of rural-urban trade which raises the standard of living for both sides.

The theory of the complementary nature of countryside and city is one generally accepted. Thus, if the Chinese standard of living is to be raised, the strengthening of urban-rural economic relations is of paramount importance. Most Chinese are still living in rural areas and are engaged in agriculture. To increase the income of these people, it is important to expand their exports to the cities and also to develop Chinese industry in the cities so as to enlarge the market for rural products.

But, judging from recent Chinese history, the development of the Chinese city seems not to have promoted rural prosperity. On the contrary, the rise of modern Chinese cities has been paralleled by the decline in Chinese rural economy. In the first few years of the last war with the Japanese, when most of the modern coastal cities were occupied and economic relations between rural and urban areas were cut off by blockade, a period of recovery, if not of prosperity, appeared in the Chinese villages. This seems to prove that the relation between urban and rural areas in China is to the disadvantage of the latter. If this view is correct, then, for the sake of the Chinese rural population, the lighter the connection between country and city, the better for the country.

关于中国乡村和都市的关系，有两种明显的观点：一种认为乡村和都市互补互利；另一种则恰恰相反，认为二者相敌对。

当然，在理论上，一个国家的乡村和都市本是相关的一体。乡村是国家生存所需的农产品的生产基地，生活在都市的人不从事农业，依靠来自乡下的食物供给。这样城市社区就成了农产品的市场，市场越发达，粮食的价值就越高，乡村也就获利越多。都市还是工业中心，工业原材料如大豆、桐油、棉花和烟草等在乡村产出。这些工业原料有时比乡村产的食物价值更高，于是被称为经济作物。随着城市现代工业的发展，其内陆地区可以根据土壤性质和其他条件等因地制宜发展这类作物。另一方面，都市里的工业制造品除了供给市民外，剩余的大部分都流入了乡村，这样便有了工业制造品和乡村的粮食及原材料的持续交换，这是一种使双方生活水平都能得到提高的城乡间的贸易。

城乡互补的理论基本能被接受。因此，如果要提高中国人民的生活水平，那么加强城乡经济联系是首要的。大多数中国人仍生活在乡村，以农业为生，要增加他们的收入，就要增大对都市的农产品输出，并发展都市工业以扩大农产品市场。

但是从最近的中国历史来看，中国都市的发展似乎并没有促进乡村的繁荣。相反，都市兴起和乡村经济衰落并行。在抗日战争最初几年，大多数现代沿海都市被占领，城乡经济联系被封锁、中断，而中国乡村有一度的喘息（如果不说是繁荣）。这像是证明了在中国城乡之间的联系对乡村是不利的。如果这种观点正确，那么对乡村人口来说，城乡联系越少，对乡村越有利。

To me there is truth in both these points of view. The first theory applies to economic relationships in a normal situation; the latter, to the present situation in China. Let us analyze the rural economy on the basis of which the relationship which should have provided prosperity for both sides has failed and has even caused disaster in the villages.

●   DISTRIBUTION OF LAND AND THE WELFARE OF THE PEOPLE

When one comes to examine the economic decline of the country, what strikes one most forcefully is the system by which tenant farming is carried on. When a man has no land of his own and rents land from others, he generally has to give at least one-half of his main crop to the landlord as rent. Is such a rent high? Let us see what this amounts to in relation to total income. I shall take one village as an example. In Kiang-ts'un, a village near Lake Tai midway between Nanking and Shanghai, the average area cultivated by each peasant family is 8.5 mow, which is equivalent to 1.29 English acres. The average production of rice is forty bushels per acre, each bushel weighing 67 pounds, a rich harvest in China. Thus every peasant family in good times will produce on the average about 51.6 bushels of rice. The average size of a farm family is 4.1, which, referring to the consumption of food, is equivalent to 2.9 adult males (according to the Atwater scale, which has been adjusted by us). On the average, every male adult eats 7 bushels of rice, or 470 pounds, while an average family will consume 20.3 bushels of rice. Subtracting the quantity consumed from the total amount produced gives us 31.3 bushels. Now in case the land is rented rather than owned, the normal rent will amount to one-half the total, or 25.8 bushels. After paying the rent and reserving the amount needed to feed the family, there will be no more than 5.5 bushels of rice left. We may presume the value of supplementary products, including handicrafts, to be equivalent to about 10 bushels of rice. Thus, after the rice is eaten and the rent paid, what the family can spend amounts to about the value of 15.5 bushels of rice. Is this enough to live on, assuming that the items of general expenditure for a Chinese farmer are proportionately as follows: 42.5 per cent for rice, 42.5 per cent for other expenses, and 15 per cent for agricultural reinvestment? According to this, a family probably needs the amount of money equivalent to the value of 20.5 bushels of rice for other expenditures besides that employed for basic subsistence. If a family has no other income besides that from the farm, it will probably lack the value of 12.9 bushels of rice.[1] In order for such a family to survive, it must either find other sources of income or go into debt.

对于我来讲，上述两种观点都有其正确性。第一种理论适用于正常情况下的经济关系；第二种适用于中国目前的情形。本应为双方都带来繁荣的城乡关系失败了，甚至在乡村引起了灾难。让我们以此为基础来研究一下这种乡村经济。

●   分田与人民的福利

研究乡村经济的衰退时，最能引人注意的一点是租种土地的制度。当一个人自己没有土地而是从别人那里租地时，他一般要拿出收成的一半来交租。这样的租金高吗？我们来看一下它与全部收入的关系。我以一个村子为例。在江苏南京和上海之间太湖流域的一个村子里，每个农户耕种的土地平均为8.5亩，相当于1.29英亩。平均每英亩可产大米40蒲式耳，1蒲式耳相当于67磅，这在中国算是收成很好了。所以，年景好的时候，平均每个农户的大米产量是51.6蒲式耳。每户平均人口为4.1人，平均消耗粮食相当于2.9个成年男子的消耗量（依阿特沃特能量价值体系标准修正后折合）。每个成年男子平均消费7蒲式耳或470磅米，每户平均消费20.3蒲式耳米。从全部收成中减去消费的数量之后，还剩31.3蒲式耳米。现在假设土地是租来的而非自有的，地租一般是收成的一半，即25.8蒲式耳米。除去地租和一家口的粮食之外，至多仅剩5.5蒲式耳米。我们可以假定一下其他作物产量的价值，包括手工艺品，大致相当于10蒲式耳米。这样，除去地租和消费的粮食以外，每个家庭可以花费的大约相当于15.5蒲式耳米的价值。假定一个中国农民的各项花费比例是42.5%用于吃饭，42.5%用于其他消费，15%用于农业投资，那么这个数目够用吗？这样看来，除了基本生存费用外，一个农户还需要相当于20.5蒲式耳米的钱用作其他消费［参照费孝通著《乡土中国与乡土重建》，此数据应为28.4蒲式耳（1993年，第187页）——编者注］。如果一户人家除了从地里获得的收入以外再无其他收入，那么他们大约缺少价值相当于12.9蒲式耳米的家用。[2]这样一个家庭如果要生存下去，只能是要么寻找其他收入来源，要么负债。

It is true that, if the farm is somewhat larger, the surplus after the farmer has paid his rent will be somewhat increased. But not only is the amount of land available for cultivation restricted but under present farming techniques the area of the farms is limited to that amount of land which the farm families themselves can cultivate. In an analysis made by us in some villages in Yunnan of the problem of farm labor in the busy seasons of the year, it was found that husband and wife by themselves could cultivate only 3 mow of land. In other words, if they wished to run a larger farm, they must either hire help or exchange their labor for extra help in the busy season. The amount of land cultivated thus depends not only on availability but also on the labor force. Generally speaking, the area which a family can cultivate by themselves cannot exceed by very much the amount cultivated by the average farmer of Kiang-ts'un.[3] Landlords who own comparatively large areas of land are not able to cultivate the land by themselves but usually split the land up into small pieces which they rent out to tenants. Thus, from the point of view of management, the problem is not so much one of redistribution of land as of improved techniques of cultivation and of organization.

Actually, even an equable distribution of land among all the inhabitants of a village would not in most cases increase the area of the average farm by very much. Compared to areas farmed in the West, even the amounts of land held by so-called "wealthy landlords" tend to be insignificant.[4] A redistribution of land would not relieve the pressure of population upon the resources provided by agriculture. The need to decrease the population of the rural areas would remain in force.[5] Yet it would be a mistake to think that, because the redistribution of lands would not increase the area of the farms by very much, owning their own land would contribute nothing to the welfare of the people. According to my statement above, if the farmers of Kiang-ts'un did not need to pay rent, they probably could live fairly well on what they themselves produced. The value of the harvest and of handicrafts together being equivalent to 61.6 bushels of rice, this would allow 20.3 bushels of rice for food, 20.3 bushels for consumer's goods, and 8.4 bushels for agricultural reinvestment. And this would allow them the minimum standard of well-being described by the phrase, "not hungry, nor freezing."

如果农田面积大一些，那么交租后剩余的粮食的确就会多一些。但是不仅可耕种土地的面积有限，而且在目前的农业技术下，农村家庭自身耕种土地的能力也有限。我们在对云南乡村在农忙季节的劳动力问题的分析中发现，夫妇两人只能耕种三亩地。换句话说，如果他们想种更多的地，在农忙季节，他们只能或雇佣别人，或交换劳动来获得帮手。因此耕种土地的数量不仅取决于可耕地数量，还取决于劳动力的组织。一般来讲，一个农户自己所能耕种的土地面积，不会大大超过江苏农民的平均水平。[6]具有相对而言大面积耕地的地主自己不能耕种，经常把地分成小块租给别人种。这样从管理的角度讲，就不仅仅有土地再分配的问题，更有提高耕种和组织技术的问题。

实际上，即使在村民之间平均分配土地，通常农户平均耕种的土地面积也不会增加太多。比起西方国家的耕地，即使是所谓的“大地主”所拥有的土地面积也是微不足道的。[7]土地的重新分配不会减轻农业资源的人口压力。减少农村人口的需求依然有效。[8]但是认为由于土地再分配不能使农户耕种面积增加多少，所以拥有自己的土地对于农民的生活质量并没有益处的观点是错误的。根据我前面讲到的，如果江苏农民不必交地租，那么地里的收成也许就可以让他们生活得很好。收获的粮食和手工艺品的价值加起来相当于61.6蒲式耳米，其中20.3蒲式耳米用于食物，20.3蒲式耳米用于消费品，8.4蒲式耳米用于农业投资，这样农民的生活就能达到小康的最低水准，即“不饥不寒”。

●   RURAL LIVELIHOOD—HANDICRAFTS AND AGRICULTURE

If the foregoing analysis is correct, tenant farmers cannot rely upon the products of their land alone for maintaining even a minimum standard of living. But tenant farming has existed in China for a long time. Why did not the problems connected with it become really serious until about twenty or thirty years ago? I believe that difficulties in rural economy did exist from very early times but that, in the traditional rural livelihood, there was a factor which prevented serious conflict between landlord and tenant. This factor was the rural industry or handicrafts, mentioned before as a supplement to farm incomes. China has never been a purely agricultural nation. As far back as the time of Mencius, the peasants were being urged to plant mulberry bushes at their homesteads for the production of silk.[9] China's early lack of interest in commercial relations with the West rested partly upon her self-sufficiency in producing both raw materials and finished products for the necessities of life. These necessities were not produced in large-scale manufactories, to be sure, but were scattered throughout numerous villages. Besides the specialized products of certain regions, such as the raw silk known to the English as tsatlee, which came from a small district near Lake Tai, the tea of Lung Ching, and the china of Ching-te-chen, widespread rural industries,[10] such as cotton-spinning, were carried on by many farm families very largely within the home. In my youth I helped my grandmother spin cloth, and among my mother's marriage gifts there was a spinning wheel. The fact that these manufactures were scattered among the various families was probably an obstacle in the way of improving them but an important fact in the traditional livelihood of China. The additional income from such family industries gave the farmers who had insufficient land to support them enough to live on.

Let us return to the problem of the small size of the average Chinese farm. We may say that the direct cause of this is that the rural population is too large. Why is this so? Some people may regard this as a foolish question in that they think that the growth of population is a biological rather than a social phenomenon. Or, again, they may see the basic cause of overpopulation in the value placed by traditional Confucianism on a large family. But from the point of view of labor requirements there is, as I indicated above, still another answer to this question. Rural activities are quite seasonal. The farmer's busy time, when more labor is needed to get the work done, alternates with the farmer's slack time. The difference between the amount of labor needed for the busy time and the slack time is great. Actually, the number of people in the village is just enough, with present techniques of cultivation, to enable the people to cultivate their farms at the periods of special activity. Thus, from the point of view of agricultural production, the population of the Chinese rural districts is not too large. In fact, during the latter part of the Sino-Japanese War there was a shortage of labor in a number of villages. Not only were many men conscripted but some fled their homes to avoid conscription. Unless there is an improvement in agricultural techniques, the population of the rural districts is not likely to increase. And yet there are certainly too many people to permit all to enjoy a good standard of living. Even though agriculture demands a large labor force for short periods, there remains about two-thirds of the year when there is no work for the extra laborers. As a result, there is periodic unemployment. We are "spreading out over a year all the labor which is needed for just the busy time."

●   乡村生计——手工业和农业

如果前面的分析是正确的，那么佃户就不能仅仅依靠地里的收成来维持哪怕最低的生活水平。但是，佃户在中国有着漫长的历史，为什么有关佃户的问题直到二三十年前才变得特别严重起来呢？我认为乡村经济的艰难的确在早期就已存在，但是在传统的乡村生活中，有一种因素防止了地主和佃农之间矛盾的恶化，这个因素就是乡土工业——乡村的工业和手工业，就是前面讲到的农业的附加收入。中国从来都不是一个纯粹的农业国。早在孟子时代，农民被要求在他们的宅地附近种上桑树以养蚕织丝。[11]中国早期对发展与西方的商业联系缺乏兴趣，部分原因是在原材料和生活必需的制成品方面实现了自给自足。可以肯定的是，这些必需品不是产自大型的制造厂，而是分散于无以计数的村子里。除了某些地区的特产外，如太湖附近某一小地方的生丝（英语中称为tsatlee“辑里丝”）、龙井茶、景德镇的瓷器，广泛分布的乡村工业[12]——如纺纱业——大部分是由很多农户在家里完成的。我年轻的时候曾帮祖母纺过纱，而我母亲的嫁妆中就有个织布机。制造工业分散在家庭里可能阻碍了生产技术的提高，但这却是中国传统生计中的一个重要事实。从家庭工业中得到的额外收入使得土地不足的农家足以生存下来。

让我们回到农民的平均耕地面积小这一问题上来。我们可能会说直接原因是乡村人口太多。为什么会这样呢？有些人会认为这是个愚蠢的问题，因为他们觉得这是一个生物学的而非社会的现象。或者他们又会认为，人口过多的基本原因是受了传统儒家大家庭观念的影响。但是从劳动力需求的角度来讲，正像我前面提到的，这个问题还有另一个答案。农作活动很具有季节性，农忙农闲互相交替，忙时需要更多的劳动力来完成工作。两个时期需要的劳动力差别很大。实际上，根据目前的耕作技术，乡村的人数刚刚够应付特定时期的耕种活动。这样，从农业生产来讲，中国乡村地区的人口数量并不太大。实际上，在抗战后期，有些村子还缺乏劳动力。很多男人参加了军队，还有人为逃避参军而离开了家。除非有农业技术上的改进，农村人口不易增多［参照费孝通著《乡土中国与乡土重建》，应为“否则农村人口不易减少”（1993年，第190页）——编者注］。不过，要使每个人都能过上好生活，目前的人口当然就太多了。虽然农业在短期内需要大量的劳动力，多余劳动力一年中仍有三分之二的时间无事可做。于是就有了阶段性的失业。这就是“养工一年，用在农忙”。

In the past this extra labor occupied itself with handicrafts. Rural industry, co-operating with agriculture and sharing with agriculture its source of labor, was able to maintain the local economy in a healthy state. In this case, even though the landlord took his half of the produce of the land, there would still be no unrest among the people. Those who are critical of the part played by the landlord may regard the existence of the rural handicrafts as affording simply an opportunity for the landlord to squeeze more from his tenants. But, from the point of view of economics, there was a genuinely organic adjustment of agricultural techniques, the demand for labor, the size of the population, the area of the farms, the rural handicrafts, the amount of rent, and the rights of the landlords. So long as such an adjustment gave the people a standard of living which was "not starving, nor freezing," traditional Chinese society could be maintained. Any economic system which did not maintain such a minimum standard could not have endured.

●   THE TRADITIONAL MECHANISM OUT OF GEAR

During the last one hundred years the traditional mechanism or organic adjustment mentioned above has begun to break down. How did the breakup begin? I should say that the one important gear broken was that of the rural handicrafts. Other parts, such as agricultural technique, size of population, farm area, amount of rent collected, and the rights of the landlord, have remained relatively unchanged. Following the decline in rural industry, the traditional adjustment which had maintained a minimum standard of decent living for the peasants no longer functioned.

过去，剩余劳动力从事乡土工业。与农业配合并与其分享劳动力资源的乡土工业，能够保持地方经济的健康状态。在这种情况下，即使地主拿走一半收成，农民并不感到不安。那些对地主的作用持批判态度的人也许会认为，乡土工业的存在只是给地主提供了进一步榨取佃户的机会。但是从经济的角度来看，农业技术、劳动力需求、人口数量、耕地面积、乡土工业、地租多少和地主权利等因素是一个真正有机的配合。只要这种配合能使人们过上“不饥不寒”的生活，传统的中国社会就能维持。任何一种无法维持这种最低限度民生的经济制度都不能长久。

●   传统机制的脱栓

在过去的上百年中，传统机制或前面提到的有机配合开始破坏。这种破坏是如何开始的呢？应该说，一个重要的脱栓齿轮就是乡土工业。其他的部分，如农业技术、人口数量、耕地面积、地租多少以及地主的权利，相对都没有什么变化。随着乡土工业的衰退，曾经维持农民最低生活水平的传统的有机配合已不再起作用。

It is easy to see that the decline in rural industries was the result of competition with Western, highly mechanized industries, since with their large-scale production they were able to decrease costs and improve the quality of their products. "Local products" became the synonym for inferior. How could the homemade goods compete with the handsome, cheap, and often even more durable foreign goods? The fact that the market for handicrafts was taken over by foreign goods gave to those who could afford to buy them a higher standard of living while at the same time it created unemployment in numerous villages. The ruin and poverty which followed the decline in rural industries resulted from a purely impersonal force against which there was no way to rebel or to defend one's self. If a countrywoman who has spun some cloth cannot find anyone to buy from her, whom can she blame? She will simply sigh and cease to spin. She will have to put all her hopes on the harvest from the land. But when the earth must bear the expense for the whole family, the difficulties which result from the traditional system of landholding and rental come sharply to the fore. The landlord has not lost the right of collecting rents, and, moreover, the rents have not even been reduced. In the traditional society landlords are not producers; they are "fed by others." In a changed situation they do not lower their demands. On the contrary, stimulated by the influx of imported goods, they have raised their standard of living and consume more than ever before. They will not easily give up the income they derive from rents. But when they go to the country to collect these rents, they find that their tenants are no longer so docile. How can they be? If they pay their rent, they will be faced by famine. If they are to maintain their very lives, there must be conflict between them and the landlords. The landlords, on the other hand, do not understand why the attitude of their tenants has changed. The unwillingness of the tenants to pay the established rental seems to them quite unreasonable. But in the eyes of the tenants the landlord who comes to collect their last grain of rice becomes a sort of devil who bears folk away to death. The fact is that noiselessly and invisibly the invading foreign industries have dislocated the traditional mechanism by doing away with the rural handicrafts, which, unbeknown to the landlords, all this time enabled them to enjoy their special privilege.

The force dislodging the rural industries is both powerful and deeply penetrating. Behind it are big battleships and guns, the "imperialism" of well-organized industrialized countries. The traditional handicraft worker who is also a farmer lives in scattered villages, belongs to no organization, and has no power of modern science to help him. It is an ironic fact that the power and the influence of the landlords are very weak compared to those of foreign industrialism. But the landlord is near at hand, and, in order to live, the peasant must resist him. Thus the land problem of China becomes more difficult day by day.

显而易见，乡土工业的衰退是与西方高度机械化工业竞争的结果，因为机械化大生产可以降低成本和提高产品质量。“地方货”成了次等品的代名词。家庭制品怎么能与漂亮、便宜而通常又更耐用的洋货相比呢？手工业品的市场被洋货市场代替，这提高了那些买得起洋货的人的生活水平，同时也产生了大量的失业农民。乡土工业衰落后的没落和贫困，纯粹是由非个人的力量所造成的，农民无法与之对抗或者是自我保护。如果一个织土布的农妇找不到买布的人，那么她能怪谁呢？她只能叹息，停止织布，完全指望田地的收成。但是，当田地要负担整个家庭的花销时，那些在占有土地和收取地租的传统体制中出现的问题就会变得非常尖锐。地主没有丧失收取地租的权利，而且地租甚至也没有降低。在传统社会中，地主不是生产者，他们“食于人”，在变化了的形势下，他们没有降低要求。相反，在大量涌入的进口货的刺激下，他们的生活水平有所提高，消费也随之前所未有地提高了。他们不会轻易放弃从出租的田地中获得的收益。但是，当他们到乡村去收租的时候，发现佃户不像以前那么温顺了。他们又怎么能温顺呢？如果交出地租，就面临着饥荒；要维持自身的生计，就肯定会与地主发生矛盾。另一方面，地主并不明白为什么佃户的态度改变了，佃户不愿交早已定好的租金对他们来讲毫无道理。但是，在佃户的眼里，来收他们最后一粒米的地主，就像是置人于死地的魔鬼。事实是，外国工业的入侵，通过抑制乡土工业，在无形之中毫无声息地扰乱了传统的运作机制。地主自己并不知道，一直以来是乡土工业使他们得以享受特权。

驱逐乡村工业的力量既有力又深入，它的背后是战舰和枪炮，是组织良好的工业国家的“帝国主义”。传统的手工业者是居住在分散的村子里的农民，不属于任何组织，也得不到现代科学的帮助。比起外国产业制度的威力，地主的力量和影响是太微弱了，这是一个具有讽刺意味的事实。但是，地主近在咫尺，为了生存，农民只能起来反抗他。这样中国的土地问题就变得一天比一天严重。

●   THE REASONABLE WAY OUT FOR THE LANDLORD CLASS

"Not starving, nor freezing" is, we must confess, a minimum standard of living for the people. Since the right of man to live is recognized, the right to struggle for such a living standard ought to be recognized as just and reasonable. This is the fundamental basis of the doctrine of "people's livelihood." But China is being constantly drained of her wealth. Her original industrial productivity, far from making the country people well-to-do, has made them "rather poor," and from rather poor the descent has been to "very poor," and from very poor to the lowest depths of poverty. Since the prosperity of the country has been eroded away in this way, it is not strange that the peasants are demanding their right to have back as high a standard of living as that which they had formerly.

Under such conditions, if we cannot revive our declining industries, those of the landlord class who have been depending upon income from rents must sooner or later be attacked and then eliminated. Landlords who cannot themselves cultivate the land can only rent their land out to others. Yet this piece of land will not feed both the landlord and his tenant at one and the same time. The landlord cannot find a way to eliminate the tenant and get income directly from the land, but the tenant can cultivate the land without the assistance of the landlord. Therefore, in a struggle between landlord and tenant, the tenant will probably win. Since the tenant system in China is not built up on the basis of a surplus of produce from the land but rather is supported by the surplus income derived from rural industries, rural industries really determine the basic rents for land and, in fact, the future of the landlord class. It is true that the use of oppressive measures may for a short time bring about "forced agreements." But to employ force means additional expense at the moment and, moreover, leads to bitter and unlimited resistance in the future. Rent seizures do not offer a permanent solution.

●   地主阶级的合理出路

我们必须承认，“不饥不寒”是人民最低的生活标准。由于人拥有生存权，那么于情于理同样应该有争取这种最低生活标准的权利，这是“民生”主义的根本所在。但是中国一直消耗着财富，最初的工业生产力远不能使乡村的人民过上小康生活，反而使得人民“比较贫困”，后来就变成了“非常贫困”，最后降至最低点。由于乡村的繁荣就此受到侵蚀，所以农民要求过上以前那样的生活是不足为怪的。

在这种条件下，如果我们不使正在衰退的工业得到复苏，那么以收取地租为生的地主阶级最终要受到打击甚至毁灭。那些自己不能耕种土地的地主只能把地租给别人去种，然而一块地不能同时养活地主和佃户。没有佃户，地主就没有办法直接从地里获得收益，而佃户则可以不靠地主的帮助来耕种土地。因此，在佃户与地主的斗争中，佃户可能获胜。由于中国的租地体制不是建立在农业收入过剩的基础上，而是建立在来自乡土工业的额外收入的基础上，乡土工业实际决定了基本地租，事实上也决定了地主阶级的未来。利用强迫措施确实可以在短期内达到“被迫的同意”的结果，但是利用武力意味着当时将产生额外的费用，而且会引起将来强烈和无限的反抗。夺取地租不是永久的解决方法。

From the landlords' point of view the reasonable way out should not be to take action which will only hasten their own ruin but to try to adjust themselves to the changed circumstances and find some means of livelihood other than merely living on rents. If they had wished to continue in the old way, it would have been well to have struggled against the invasion of foreign industries in the very beginning. For their own protection, the landlord class, who are in such a critical situation, should give up the right of collecting rents from the peasants. Only in this way can the country as a whole gain the support of the peasants and their co-operation in overcoming the present economic crisis. The farsighted policy of Sun Yat-sen that "every cultivator should have his own piece of land" is the reasonable solution.

But the goal of Chinese rehabilitation should also be the reconstruction of her industries. And, in order to build up national industries, we must rebuild rural industries, so that our peasants, who make up 80 per cent of the population, can have a share in an improved standard of living. It is true that the destruction which is the result of civil war has made more difficult an increase in productivity. Yet the effort to rebuild industry must be made. The Chinese have endured and can continue to endure suffering, but simple endurance seems hardly to be a reasonable ideal.

We see now how the development of modern cities with their flow of imported foreign goods, on the one hand, and large-scale manufacture of articles of daily necessity, on the other, has deprived the countryside of an important source of income. It is true that, if the growth of these modern cities had stimulated prosperity for agriculture by creating a greater demand for rural products and thus raising their price, it might have compensated rural industries for the injuries done to them. But unfortunately things have not worked out this way. It is true that the increase in population in the large cities has increased the demand for foodstuffs, but the farmer does not get more for his produce, since, owing to the very poor system of communications, it has been found cheaper to import food from foreign countries than to buy it locally.[13] Modern transportation in China seems mainly to connect consuming centers. Railroads connecting large cities parallel ancient lines of communication along the rivers rather than supplementing them, while rather primitive means of transport for the most part tend to connect rural and urban areas. Moreover, there is no direct connection between the modern city and the village, since the traditional town serves as a middleman.

对地主阶级来讲，理想的出路并不是要采取武力——那只会加速他们的灭亡，而是试着调整自己适应变化的环境，寻求收取地租以外的谋生手段。如果他们曾经希望依照旧方式继续下去，那么也许从一开始就应该抵制外国工业的入侵。为了保护自己，处于这种关键形势下的地主阶级，应该放弃向农民收取地租的权利。只有这样，整个乡土才能得到农民的支持以及通过互相合作来克服目前的经济困难。“耕者有其田”，孙中山这一富有远见的主张是合理的解决方法。

但是，中国复兴的目标还应该包括工业的复兴。为了建立民族工业，我们必须重建乡土工业，让占总人口80%的农民也能够分享生活水平的提高。虽然内战的破坏的确使得生产力难以提高，但仍要努力重建工业。中国人民一直在忍耐并能继续忍耐，但是仅仅耐苦似乎远不是合理的理想。

我们现在可以看出，随着外国商品的涌入以及日常用品的大规模生产而发展起来的现代都市是如何剥夺了乡村的一项重要收入来源。的确，如果这些现代都市的发展，通过促进农产品需求的增长并进而提高产品价格，而刺激了农业的繁荣，也许会对乡土工业所受损害有所补偿，但不幸的是，事实并非如此。大城市人口的增加扩大了对食品的需求，但是农民并没有从农产品中得到更多利益，因为由于交通不便，人们发现从国外进口商品比从当地买更为便宜。[14]中国的现代交通似乎主要是把消费中心连接起来，连接大城市的铁路与古代沿河的交通路线平行，而不是对其进行补充，而城乡之间大多还是靠相当原始的交通工具相联系。而且，现代都市和乡村之间并不直接相连，因为传统的镇充当了它们之间的中介。

Here live in idleness the unproductive landowners who formerly bought manufactured goods from the countryside but now prefer Western-made goods. Garnering in the rural products as payment for rent or interest on loans, they send them to the city in exchange for foreign goods of which the country people catch never a glimpse or, if they do see them, are unable to purchase. Instead of having an expanding economy, life for the countryside is deteriorating, and the common folk are forced to cut down on the bare necessities of life. Under the present system any profits to be made from farm products will accrue to the middleman or speculator rather than to the producer, and the countryside continues to support those who consume modern manufactured goods, the rentier class, without gaining any benefit from modern industrialism for itself. It is true that the villagers have little use for such things as toothbrushes and tooth paste, foreign coffee or preserves, or ready-made foreign-style clothing, but they could make use, for example, of better tools of all sorts, seeds, fertilizers, blankets, warm knitted underwear, and leather shoes.

From this analysis we can see that, to some extent always, but even more at present, urban centers and rural areas are antagonistic to each other. And, if there is no great change in the future, this antagonism will continue; that is, the rural areas will continue to be at an economic disadvantage. Under these circumstances the severing of rural and urban relations is good for the villages but very bad for the cities. Knowing this, we can understand why during the recent war with the Japanese the villages in the interior of China had a period of prosperity and why Chinese rural co-operatives developed so quickly. This also explains why the Communist-controlled areas have not worried about the severing of rural-urban relations and the dislocation of Chinese town economy during the civil war. Taking the last one hundred years, Chinese cities and large towns have not achieved a sound productive base. They have been largely distributing centers for foreign goods. Although foreign goods have not reached rural areas in any large quantity, this has drained the wealth of the country, since the foreign goods gained by exchange are consumed in the towns in place of local handicrafts. But when the relations between the townsfolk and villagers are cut off so that the townsfolk's sources of income are stopped, the importation of foreign goods must stop unless funds are obtained through relief or loans of various sorts. This cannot continue indefinitely.

镇上居住着闲散而不事生产的地主，他们先前从农村购得手工商品，现在则转向西方的商品。他们把当地租或高利贷利息收来的农产品储存起来，拿到城市交换外国商品，这些洋货农民见都没见过一眼，即使见了也根本买不起。因此，经济没有扩展，农民的生活正在恶化，他们不得不降低最低生活消费。在目前的体制下，从农产品中获得的任何利益，都会进入中间人或投机者的腰包，农民无从获利，乡村仍支撑着消费现代工业品的食利阶层，但自身却不能从现代工业中得到任何益处。牙刷、牙膏、咖啡、加工食品和做好的洋式服装确实对农民没有多大用处，但是他们可以使用各类更好的工具、种子、肥料、毯子、保暖内衣和皮鞋。

从以上的分析我们可以看出，在某种程度上，城市和乡村常常互相敌对，目前尤甚。如果将来没有巨大变化，这种敌对将会持续下去，也就是说，乡村仍旧会处在经济上的不利地位。在这种情况下，切断城乡联系对乡村有利而对城市有害。这样我们就能理解，为什么在最近的抗日战争时期，中国内地的一些乡村有过繁荣阶段，以及为什么乡村合作社会飞速发展。这也说明了为什么共产党占领的地区不担忧城乡联系的割断及内战时城镇经济的混乱。最近一百年来，中国的城市和大镇没有建立一个坚实的生产基础，只是外国商品的分发地。虽然洋货没有大量到达乡村，但已经攫取了乡村的财富，因为交换而来的洋货在城镇的消费代替了对当地手工业品的消费。当城镇居民和农民的联系被割断以至于城镇居民的收入来源停止时，如果没有各种救济或贷款资金，就要停止外国商品进口。这不会无限地持续下去。

●   THE GROWING GAP BETWEEN RURAL AND URBAN AREAS

Ever since the building of railways connecting the northern and southern parts of China, the separation of the three river basins as natural areas has gradually lessened. It is hard to believe that China will ever again be divided into north and south. But the separation between urban and rural areas which has developed during the last one hundred years has become a new source of cleavage. During the war with Japan, Chinese troops practiced guerrilla warfare, occupying the interior and leaving rail lines and key points in the enemy's hands. Guerrilla tactics of this sort have an economic basis, as we have shown above. But, as a result of these wartime tactics, economic relations between town and country have become more and more disrupted. From a short-term view of the situation, the countryside is not suffering, since once the rural people are cut off from the towns much of their produce will be kept from moving out, and, as a result, they will have enough food to live on. This does not seem a very good way out, however. Once the rural areas are detached from the urban centers, they must rely entirely upon themselves. Self-sufficiency leads to security of a sort, but the price paid is the lowering of the standard of living and a return to a more primitive way of life. This does not seem to be the right solution for Chinese economic problems. Although the decision of the villages to rely wholly upon themselves will not actually decrease very much their already extremely low standard of living, it creates for the towns and cities which have lost their hinterland a very critical situation indeed. We must recognize that Chinese villagers tend to prefer the alternative of lowering their standard of living by self-sufficiency to that of keeping up relations with the town in that this latter means that they will be exploited by the townspeople and still have little chance to raise their standard of living.

The industry and the commerce of the modern cities are not supported by the consuming power of the rural producers. The markets for modern manufactured goods are among city and town dwellers, and the purchasing power of these people depends largely on income derived from the countryside in the form of rent and interest. The separation of the country from the town directly threatens those city dwellers who live on their income from the country and affects the traditional organization of town economy. In order to continue to maintain the traditional relations of town and country, it becomes necessary, then, for the rentier class to break the blockade, even if by force. And this, I understand, is one of the real causes for the present civil war, a war in which the traditional privileged class is fighting against the people who refuse to carry on their traditional obligations. As the conflict goes on, the antagonism which has accumulated for centuries becomes fiercer, and it seems that, unless there is a real change in Chinese economic structure, the proper relation between town and city cannot be established.

●   城乡差别的不断扩大

自从连接中国南北的铁路建成后，作为自然区域的三大河流流域的划分逐渐削弱，很难相信中国还会分成南北两方。但是近百年来城乡的分离，已经成为一种新的分裂。抗战时期，中国军队打游击战占领内陆地区，把铁路线和主要地点留给敌人。这种游击战术有一个经济的基础，正如我们前面讲到的。但是，这种战术的结果是导致城乡关系变得越来越混乱。短期来看，乡村并没有受苦，因为一旦乡村与城镇中断关系，很多农产品就不再运走，农民也就有了足够的食物来生存下去。但是，这看起来并不是一个好的解决办法。一旦城乡分离，他们必须要完全依靠自己。自给自足可以达到一种安全，但代价却是生活水平的降低和回到更为原始的生活中去，这似乎不是解决中国经济问题的正确方法。虽然乡村完全依赖自给的决定不会骤然降低他们业已很低的生活水平，却使已经失去腹地的市镇及城市的处境很危急。我们必须认识到，中国乡村侧重于自给自足，即使乡村居民降低生活水平也不愿意与城镇保持联系，因为这样就意味着他们要受城镇居民的剥削，同样没有提高生活水平的机会。

现代城市的工商业不是依赖农业生产者的消费能力。现代商品的消费市场是城镇居民，而这些居民的消费能力很大程度上要依靠以地租或利息形式从乡村所获得的收入。城乡分离直接威胁着这些从乡村获得收入并赖以为生的人，也影响了城镇经济的传统结构。为了继续保持城乡的传统关系，食利阶层有必要甚至利用武力来打通障碍。我认为这是目前内战的真正原因之一，这场内战是传统的特权阶层与拒绝执行传统义务的人们之间的斗争。随着矛盾的继续，积聚了几个世纪的敌对形势变得越来越激烈，好像中国经济结构不发生真正的变化，城乡的正常关系就不能建立起来。

Chinese economy cannot afford to stay in a situation which means bankruptcy of the town, the reduction of the village to more primitive conditions, and, taken as a whole, the decline of Chinese economy. The question is: How can urban-rural relations be restored? The direction which this restoration should take is quite clear: an effort should be made to realize the principle mentioned earlier—that rural and urban areas should mutually supplement each other in production and consumption. But to achieve this end is more difficult than to conceive it. Essentially the problem is how to change towns and cities into productive centers which can maintain themselves without continually exploiting the villages. From the point of view of the rural areas, the problem is how to increase their incomes either by developing rural industry or by developing specialized agricultural cash crops. City and village are equally important; they should work together. But the initiative in making changes must come from the city. It is most essential that the character of the traditional town be changed from a group of parasitic consumers into a productive community in which the people can find some other source of income than that derived from the high rents for land and exorbitant interest on loans. In other words, the main issue is land reform.

中国经济不能处于城镇破产、乡村生活倒退、总之是经济衰退的状态中。问题是：怎样恢复城乡关系呢？复原的方向很明确，即努力实现前面讲过的原则——城乡在生产和消费上的互补，但是达到这一目的比构思这一目的要难得多。根本问题是如何将市镇和城市转变成可以维持自己的生产中心而不用去剥削乡村。对于乡村来讲，问题是如何通过发展乡土工业或专门的经济作物来增加收入。乡村和城市同等重要，应该携手合作，但是变革的动力必须来自城市。最为根本的是，传统城镇的特点应从一群寄生的消费者转变为一个生产社区，人们从中可以找到除了收取高地租和高利息以外的其他收入来源。换句话说，主要的问题还是在于土地改革。

[1] See the comparative material on family budgets in three villages of Yunnan and the village of Kiang-ts'un in Hsiao-tung Fei and Chih-i Chang, Earthbound China (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1945), pp. 84–108 and 297–302. The explanation of the apparent discrepancy appearing in the figure “12.9” may lie in an assumption that part of the supplementary products are consumed by the family.

[2] 参阅前引费孝通、张之毅所著《被土地束缚的中国》（芝加哥：芝加哥大学出版社，1945年）一书中关于云南三村和江苏开弦弓村的家庭费用的相关资料，第84—108页和第297—302 页。12.9这个数字存在明显出入，原因可能是假设一部分副产品由农家自己消费了。

[3] Ibid., chap. xiii, "Farm Labor," pp. 141–149.

[4] Li Tso-chow, in a paper on "The Big Landlords of Wei-Hsien, Shantung," republished in Institute of Pacific Relations, Agrarian China [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1938], reports one family as owning 8,000 mow of land (or about 4,000 acres) by local standards of measurement; 24,000 by the official standard mow of China (pp. 15–17). In this same volume, Wu Sho-peng, in "Land Concentration in Northern Kiansu," reports landowners holding 10,000–20,000 mow (pp. 11–14). Yet the "lord" or rich man of the Yunnan village described by Fei in Earthbound China (pp. 278 and 296) became a rich enough man to build a large temple and large house by having acquired 300 mow of land. Merchants who are reported to have acquired "huge amounts of land" have bought up 300–500 mow.

[5] "The fundamental fact, it is urged, is of a terrible simplicity. It is that the population of China is too large to be supported by existing resources" (R. H. Tawney, Land and Labour in China [London: George Allen & Unwin, 1932], p. 103).

[6] 同上书，第8章“农业劳动”，第141—149页。

[7] 李索州在一篇关于《山东潍县的大地主》的论文中讲到，根据当地的测算标准，一户农家拥有8000亩地（或4000英亩），而根据官方的测算，每户拥有2.4万亩（载于《农业中国》，太平洋国际学会再版，芝加哥：芝加哥大学出版社，1938年，第15—17页）。在这本文集中，吴少朋在《苏北的土地集中》一文中讲到，地主拥有1万—2万亩的土地（第11—14页）。但是费孝通在《被土地束缚的中国》中描写道，云南乡村的地主或富豪拥有300亩地就足以建造一座大的寺庙和房子（第278和296页）。据说获得了“大量土地”的富商是指买了300—500亩地的人。

[8] “要强调的这一基本事实极为简单，即中国的人口太多，而现有资源又无法支撑他们。”引自《中国的土地和劳工》，理查德·亨利·托尼著，伦敦：乔治·艾伦与昂温出版公司，1932年，第103页。

[9] "Let mulberry trees be planted about the homesteads with their five mau, and persons of fifty years may be clothed with silk" (James Legge, The Works of Mencius in The Chinese Classics [2d ed.; Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1895], Vol. II, Part I, chap. iii, p. 13).

[10] Peasant Life in China discusses the importance of the silk industry in Kaihsienkung; Earthbound China gives an analysis of the economic role of the cottage industries of basketmaking and weaving and the larger-scale papermaking manufacture in villages of Yunnan.

[11] “五亩之宅，树之以桑，五十者可以衣帛矣。”引自《中国典籍》第2卷《孟子选集》，理雅各编译，牛津：克拉伦登出版社，1895年，第2版，［第1卷］上，第3章，第13页。

[12] 在《江村经济——中国农民的生活》一书中论及了开弦弓村的丝绸业的重要性；而《被土地束缚的中国》一书分析了云南乡村棉纺织业和大规模造纸业的经济作用。

[13] In 1928 an American commercial attaché wrote: "China grows enough wheat to keep all the flour mills in the country running at full capacity throughout the year, but only a fraction of this wheat can be gotten to the flour mills sufficiently cheaply to make it profitable for the mills to buy it....

"Even were the Shensi farmer to present his wheat to any of these Chinese flour mills, they could not afford to take it, so long as they would be obliged to pay the transportation costs in getting the wheat to their mills. They could, in all cases, better afford to go to the Dakota farmer and buy his wheat at the prevailing American market price and transport it a thousand miles across the Pacific, and several hundred miles up an interior waterway in China than to take the Shensi farmer's wheat as a gift" (Julean Arnold, Some Bigger Issues in China's Problems [Shanghai: Commercial Press, 1928], p. 1). This situation has hardly been improved in recent times, especially with the damage done to rolling stock by wartime destruction.

[14] 1928年一名美国使馆商务专员写道：“中国产出的小麦足以让全国的磨面机全年满负荷运转，但是只有一部分价格便宜、磨面厂买进后有利可图的小麦进入到面粉加工厂里来……

“即使陕西农民打算把小麦送到磨面厂，只要运输费用由厂主来出，磨面厂也收不起。无论如何，他们宁愿以美国的市场价去买达科他州农民种的小麦，然后跨过数千英里的太平洋，再沿几百英里国内水路运回来，也不愿接受白白赠送的陕西农民种的小麦”（《中国问题的几大方面》，安立德著，上海：商务印书馆，1928年，第1页）。这种情况近些年来并未得到很大改观，尤其是战争对交通运输损害很大。

Chapter Seven   Social Erosion in the Rural Communities

第柒章   乡土社区的社会侵蚀

●   EROSION: OF LAND AND OF MAN

Lilienthal, in his book on the TVA in America (Democracy on the March), uses the term "mining" to describe the methods of growing cotton on the played-out farmlands of the South, methods by which for the sake of a single crop the wealth of the soil was taken out and its riches exhausted. Even the addition of chemical fertilizers could not combat the evil effects of soil erosion accelerated by floods—floods at least in part directly due to the decrease in cover crops, deforestation, and the resulting lack of organic matter in the soil to make it hold water. It was through this sort of erosion that the soil of the Tennessee Valley, originally quite fertile, became barren and unproductive. Lilienthal's project for the TVA was to restore the organic equilibrium of nature, so that man should no longer attempt to defy nature but to understand and co-operate with her, and should bring it about that the river, whose floods had been a yearly threat, should now be harnessed for the service of man.

If I mention the TVA here, it is not so much in order to make clear Lilienthal's ideas as to draw an analogy between physical erosion of land as described by Lilienthal and the social process which is going on in China today. In China today we are interested in promoting the principles of soil conservation. But we shall also do well to extend this concept to rural life in general, that is, to the conservation and encouragement of talents and human resources. In considering the TVA experiment, it has become clearer to me that Chinese agriculture is not only a matter of techniques but also a system of customs, institutions, morality, and leadership which, in the past at least, worked together to maintain the life of China. But in the last one hundred years it seems to me there has been at work a process of social erosion suggesting that which went on in the Tennessee Valley. As a result have come poverty, illness, oppression, and suffering. In the traditional organization of society it appears we had a system under which most of the people could manage to live. It is true that standards of living were very low and that life was not without its hazards and disturbances. Yet there was achieved a stable organization of society in which most people did not starve and did not suffer excessively. This traditional way of life was built upon an economy which carefully served the land and preserved the fertility of mother-earth so that people could continue to live upon the land without destroying its richness. The Chinese attitude was not one of the exploitation of resources but rather of companionship with and adaptation to nature. From what I understand of Lilienthal's work, he seems to have been working toward a goal very close to the Chinese conception.

●   对土地和人的侵蚀

李林塞尔在他有关美国TVA计划（田纳西河流域管理局——译者注）的著作（《行进中的民主》）中，用“采矿”一词来描述业已贫瘠的南方农场的种棉方法：为使棉花生长良好，耗尽了土地的养料。即使增施化学肥料，也敌不过洪水加速侵蚀土地的恶劣后果。造成洪水的直接原因至少部分是由于地表植物减少，森林砍伐，导致土壤中有机成分缺乏，使得水土无法保持。正是由于这种侵蚀，田纳西河流域曾经肥沃的土地变得贫瘠，少有产出。李林塞尔的TVA计划意在恢复自然生态平衡，于是人们不应再试图违抗自然，而应理解和与自然合作，并且应该治理好每年洪灾泛滥的河流，造福人民。

我在此谈TVA计划，并不是为了把李林塞尔的观点弄清楚，而是为了在他所描述的土地的物理侵蚀和中国今天正在经历的社会进程之间找到可类比之处。今天的中国对于改善土壤保持倍感兴趣，但我们还应该把这一概念推广到整个农村生活中去，即要对才智和人力资源给予维护和鼓励。在研究TVA计划时，我更清楚地认识到，中国的农业不仅是技术问题，还是传统、社会结构、道德及统治的问题，这些因素至少在过去共同维持了中国的生活。我认为近百年来，似乎存在与田纳西河流域类似的社会侵蚀，其后果是贫穷、疾病、压迫和苦难。在传统社会结构中，好像存在着一个大多数人都可以生存的体制。虽然生活水平很低，人们仍有可能遭受危险和骚乱，但却有一个稳定的社会结构，多数人不受饥饿和其他方面的过分煎熬。这种传统生活方式建立在人民悉心保护土地，保持养分，以便可以继续以土地为生且不破坏其肥力的经济之上。中国人的观念不是剥夺资源，而是追随和顺从自然。以我对李林塞尔的工作的理解，他所为之努力的目标与中国人的观念似是很接近的。

Any visitor who has had an opportunity to observe the life of a Chinese countryman cannot but perceive his close bonds with the soil. He carefully uses those things which grow from the land and then as carefully turns them back to the land. In this way human life is not a process of exploiting the earth but only a link in the organic circulation. And the fact that, when life has left a body, the corpse goes into the soil is a source of comfort. It seems there is a close bond between man and the land. This is doubtless one reason why it is so important for a man, when he comes to die, to go back to his own native spot, the place from whence he came. The stream of life of which everyone is a part flows parallel with the life of the earth, which has its own life.

In the folk society man and the land are linked by strong bonds of sentiment—an attachment called, in Chinese, the sang ("mulberry") and the tzu ("catalpa"), a name derived from the two varieties of trees (sang and tzu) traditionally in ancient China planted near the house.[1] Men, it is suggested, are like plants that take their nourishment from the land. But when the springtime of their growth is past and they come to the fall of life, they must return to the land, just as leaves of a plant fall and come in time to nourish its roots. Such a conception, in recognizing genuine ties between man and nature, emphasizes the fundamental unity of life. But when carried to extremes an attachment of this sort may appear unreasonable and even absurd, as, for example, when overseas Chinese laborers work day and night to send back money, penny by penny, and leave as their dying command that their coffins be transported from afar back to their native spot. This kind of yearning to return even after death can hardly be appreciated by the West. But in Chinese traditional culture such a feeling is of supreme importance. Among my own forefathers there was one man who passed a high examination and was sent by the government to Yunnan to supervise the salt-mining industry. At that time Yunnan was a far frontier and, moreover, dangerous on account of the prevalence of malaria. In fact, my ancestor contracted malaria and died soon after his arrival. He had a younger brother who, when he heard the news, made up his mind to go to Yunnan and bring back the coffin of his brother. After working for several years to save up enough money for the trip, he set out, struggled through all kinds of difficulties in wild mountain country, and at last succeeded in having the coffin carried home. To accomplish this task, which to modern minds would appear quite unnecessary, he not only sacrificed his career, since he gave up his chance to take the government examinations, but even risked his life. In our family chronicle this exploit is written up as though it were the one really big thing which had been done in the family.

任何一个有机会观察乡村生活的人都不会不发觉，农民与土地有着紧密的关系。他们小心利用土地上长出的东西，又很仔细地将其返回土地。如此看来，人类生活并不是一个掠夺地力的过程，而是这有机循环中的一环。当生命离开身躯，尸体还要入土为安。人与土地之间似存在着一种紧密联系。这无疑解释了为什么人们快死时对回归故里一事这么看重，在什么地方出生，就要回到什么地方去。每个人都是生命长河的一部分，与土地自己的生命之流平行。

人和土地在乡土社会中有着强烈的情感联系，即一种桑梓情谊，“桑”和“梓”是古代人们种在家门口的两种树。[2]这使人想到，人同植物一样从地里吸取养料。当生命的春季过去、秋季到来时，他们必然要回归大地，正如落叶归根，滋养土地。这样的观念承认人与自然的真正纽带，强调了生命的根本统一。但是如果走向极端，这种情感可能变得无理甚至荒谬，比如，海外的华侨终日劳作，把钱一分一分攒起来寄回家里，死了也要大老远地把棺材运回家乡安葬，这种甚至连死后也要万本归原的愿望是西方人难以理解的，而在我们传统文化中却看得比什么都重要。我自己就有一个老祖，中了举，派到云南去监管采盐业。那时，云南是远疆，又有瘴气弥漫，相当危险。我那位老祖就受了瘴气的感染，到那里没多久就去世了。他的弟弟听到他的死讯后，决定去云南将哥哥的灵柩运回来。在辛苦数年攒足了路费后，弟弟出发了，穿过荒山老林，历尽艰辛，终于成功把棺材运回家乡。为了完成这项在现代人看来多此一举的使命，他不仅放弃了参加科举考试的机会，牺牲了自己的前途，还冒了生命危险。在我们的家谱上，此举被大书特书，仿佛是历代事业中最伟大的一项。

It seems to me that one does not understand what the underlying feeling here is if one does not see that this strong sense of the importance of kinship ties is extended to a symbolic kinship between man and the earth. Better not to leave one's own place, but, if one goes, one must come back. Coming back from Europe in the steerage during the war, I met Chinese peddlers who had been living for years in France selling a certain type of jade. They could speak nothing but Chinese and had taken no part in the life of this foreign land. Instead they had struggled to save every penny they could in order to send it home where their relatives put it into the building of fine houses. When the Nazis dosed the borders, they risked their very lives to see that the money got out, and now, old and worn out, they were going home, not to enjoy life but merely to die.

From the peasant's first act of the morning in collecting manure from the streets to the putting of a coffin in the ground, all is part of the same big cycle of nature and of man's attachment to the soil. And it is the strength of this relationship which to my mind has maintained Chinese culture throughout the years. I hope, however, the reader will not misunderstand me as advocating this type of attitude. I wish merely to emphasize the existence of this spirit in Chinese life and particularly in relation to the changes now taking place—changes which I call the process of "social erosion."

Among country children in my native area one of the most common names is Ah-kên ("The Root"). Man has roots. Individuals are like the branches of a tree which has grown up from its roots and which depends for its well-being on the strength of these same roots. For man the roots are the society from which he gets his material well-being and his education; they are the family, the village, the region, and the nation. These roots are something like what Lilienthal refers to in American life as "grass roots." From the point of view of society, whether human or plant, that which is taken away must eventually be returned. If basic elements are taken away by a "mining" process, then after a certain length of time the community will become bankrupt. The cycle of giving and taking away may become very complicated. The TVA represents the more complicated, the Chinese farm the simpler, form of the process.

在我看来，如果人们看不到对这种血统重要性的强烈感情已延伸到了人与土地的象征性亲缘关系，就不能理解其潜在的感受。人最好不要离开自己的乡土，如果要离开，就必须要回来。战时我乘坐最差舱位从欧洲回来时，遇到了一些曾在法国居住多年、以贩卖某种玉石为生的中国小贩。他们只会讲汉语，从未融入异乡的生活；相反，他们拼命攒下每一分钱，为的是寄回家里让亲属盖好房子。纳粹党封锁边境之后，他们冒着生命危险以保证钱安全寄出。现在，他们老了，精力耗尽了，踏上了归途，不是去享受生活，只是等待死亡的降临。

从农民清早上街拾粪，到送棺材入土，都是自然界同一个大循环中的一部分，也是人与土地的关系的一部分。在我看来，正是这种人地关系的力量支撑着这历久未衰的中国文化。不过，我希望读者不会误以为我在提倡这种拾粪运柩的人生态度，我只是想强调这种精神在国人生命中的存在，尤其是有关现在正在发生的变革，我把这种变革叫做“社会损蚀”。

在我的老家，农村孩子最常见的名字是“阿根”。人也有根，个人不过是根上长出的枝叶，生命之树的茂盛有赖于根。对于人来讲，根是他从中获得生长资料和教育文化的社会：小之一家一村，大之一乡一国。这些根类似于李林塞尔所指的美国生活中的“草根”。从社会的角度来看，无论是人还是植物，取之于一地的必须回之于一地。如果基本要素被“采矿般”地挖掘走了，那么一段时间之后，这个地方必会荒芜。供给和消耗的循环可能变得非常复杂。TVA计划代表这一过程较为复杂的形式，而中国农田是较为简单的。

The greater and more highly developed the cycle, the higher the standards of living; but, simple or complex, it must still remain a cycle of reciprocal action. The mining process is suicidal, for, though it may give returns for a while, eventually it exhausts all available resources, and the mining town becomes a ghost town. Thus it is clear a healthy community can survive only when it can draw adequate nourishment from its environment.

●   THE DESERTERS—RURAL BOYS WHO DO NOT COME BACK HOME

In our traditional culture the men of talent were spread throughout the local communities. Recently I analyzed with Professor Quentin Pan the source of origin of nine hundred and fifteen scholars who passed the high-ranking imperial examinations (those above provincial rank). The distribution was as follows: 52.5 per cent came from the Chinese traditional town, 41.16 from rural areas, and 6.34 from intermediate small towns. If we divide the series according to provinces, the percentage from rural areas surpasses that from urban areas for four provinces in North China: Shantung, Anhwei, Shansi, and Honan. These statistics show that even in this field of activity, which requires long literary training, half of the students were at this time from rural areas. Still more significant is the question whether their fathers had literary degrees or not. This turns out to be about the same for rural as for urban areas, the ratio in the city being 68 to 33 and in the country 64 to 36 (the larger number applies to those whose fathers did have degrees).

This shows that, in China, men of ability and learning were not concentrated to a very large extent in the city as they are in the countries of the West. According to Sorokin's theory, in the West, unless a man becomes a city dweller, he will have no chance to rise.[3] But, in China, the tradition of "the leaves going back to the roots" seems to have helped to maintain the high quality of the rural population. People who attained high social honors still did not forget their place of origin and, when they were old at least, would come back and would do their best to make use of the prestige and advantages gained outside for the benefit of their home community. Thus, having one distinguished man in an area might lead to there being more, since this man would help others to get a start. Able men formerly did not leave their grass roots permanently. As a result not only did intellectual men share in the life of the countryside but they also helped to encourage others in the same region.

循环越大，程度越高，人民的生活水平就越高。但是，无论复杂与否，必须保持一种互惠行为的循环。采矿式的消耗是自杀性的，虽然一时会带来回报，但最终会耗尽所有可利用的资源，一个有着丰富矿藏的镇会变成死镇。因此，很明显，一个健康的社区只有从环境中获得适当的养料，才能生存下去。

●   逃亡者——不回家的乡村子弟

在我们的传统文化中，人才是分散在地方上的。最近潘光旦先生和我一同分析了915个通过了（乡试以上）科举考试的读书人（清朝贡生、举人和进士）的出身。他们的地域分布如下：52.5%出自城市，41.16%出自乡村，另有 6.34%出自介于城乡之间的市镇。如果再按省份来分，乡村百分比超过城市百分比的有山东、安徽、山西、河南四个北方省份。这些数字表明，即使需要很长时间文字训练才能考中的人才，竟有一半是从乡村出来的。更值得注意的是，我们所分析的人物中父亲已有功名和父亲没有功名的比例，城乡之间几乎相等，城市的比率是68∶33，乡村是64∶36（大数代表父亲已考取功名的人）。

以上事实表明，中国有才能和学问的人不像西方国家那样主要集中在城市。根据索罗金的理论，在西方，除非一个人变成城里人，否则不会有出人头地的机会。[4]但在中国，落叶归根的传统似乎为乡土社会保持着人才。即使飞黄腾达的人也不会忘记故土，至少是年老的时候，他们就会回来，利用自己在外面获得的声望和有利条件为家乡谋福利。这样，一地有了一个成名的人物，接下来就会人才辈出，因为这个人会帮助其他人成才，所谓“开了风气”。在以前，有能力的人不会永远脱离他们的“草根”。结果不仅是知识分子参与乡村的生活，而且还会鼓励当地的其他人参与。

Now the situation is quite changed. At the present time those whom the community supported in their youth no longer return in order to become useful to it. Recently we said goodbye to a number of college graduates who were threatened with unemployment. One of their teachers was urging them to go back to their own birthplace. All agreed that in principle this would be a good thing to do but said that, speaking realistically, they could not go back. And actually I do not know of one case where a graduate has returned to his own community. Instead they either managed finally to squeeze into positions in the city or remained unemployed, living with the help of friends. They were unable to go back to their homes not only because they felt unwilling to do so but because it would have been impractical for them to try to live there. At the time that they had left their homes there seems to have been some force from outside which pushed them out. Their parents, brothers, and other relatives had done their best to help them realize their dream of going to the city. In order that they might do so, some families even sold land or borrowed money. Yet, when the young people came to graduate from college, they were apt to find that these several years of absence had severed their links with the home community. In the country there are no jobs for college graduates. It is not so much that in the modern college the student may have learned Western science or technology as that he has become accustomed to a new way of life and to a system of ideas quite different from that found in the country. The change is enough to make him conscious of the fact that he is different. So the college graduate of today feels that in the country there is no one to talk with, no one who understands him, and he often even feels alienated from his own kin. If he does go back, he will not find a suitable job where he can apply the knowledge he gained in college, since Chinese colleges are not preparing men to work in rural areas. What he will have learned in the university is usually knowledge imported from the West. It is true that knowledge should have no national boundaries and that the need in present-day China to modernize quickly must be met by the introduction of Western knowledge. Modern knowledge must provide the plan for the reform of the traditional system in the rural areas. But the point is that the students who have been trained in the universities have usually failed to find a bridge by means of which they might bring over and apply their knowledge to their own communities. Without such a bridge, modern knowledge is ineffectually hanging in the air. And as a result the countryside, which is constantly sending forth its children, is losing both money and men.

现在情况则有所不同。目前，那些在青年时期曾受到过乡土社区培育的人已不再回去为其所用。最近有很多大学毕业生找不到工作，有一位老师劝他们回家乡去，他们原则上都能接受，但又非常现实地说他们回不去了。事实上我也没听说有一个人回去的。他们宁可待在城市里，费劲心思谋个职位，或无处供职，靠朋友资助为生。他们回不了家，这不仅是因为他们不愿，也是因为回家生活已经很不现实。在没有离乡之前，好像有一种外在的力量在推他们出来，他们的父母、兄弟和其他亲人也为他们想尽办法实现离乡的梦，有的甚至变卖田地或背负债务。当他们大学毕业时，他们发现几年的离乡生活已把他们同乡土的关系割断了。乡村没有大学毕业生的工作。这不仅仅是因为他们在学校学到了西方现代科技知识，更因为他们已经适应了那种与乡村生活截然不同的新的生活方式和观念，这一变化已足以使他觉得自己已有异于乡村人了。所以，今天的大学生毕业回到乡村后无人交流，没有人理解他，他自己竟然经常觉得被家人疏远了。即使他回到家乡，也找不到合适的工作，学校里学来的知识没有用武之地，因为中国的大学并不培养去乡村工作的人才。从大学里学到的东西常常是来自西方的知识。知识不应分国籍，我们也应该快速现代化，要现代化就要引入西方知识。现代知识必须提供乡村传统制度改良的方案。但问题是大学生无法找到一座桥梁能把他学到的东西介绍和运用到自己的家乡农村中去。没有这样的桥梁，现代知识只能徒劳地悬在空中。结果是不断输出子弟的乡村同时丧失了金钱和人才。

This holds true not only for most Chinese university students but also for the middle-school students. In Yunnan I studied a village near a walled town. A short distance from the village was an agricultural school. This village depended for its livelihood upon market gardening. The village gardeners used to point to the school farm and laugh, saying, "The teachers and students in that school plant their cabbages like flowers. That doesn't pay." On the other hand, the teachers, who had been trained in modern methods of agriculture, told us that the cabbages grown by the villagers could be improved, and they even demonstrated to us improved varieties. There was truth on both sides. Unfortunately the students when they left school would not be able to continue using modern techniques or experimental methods, since their families neither could afford nor did they wish to do so. There seems to be an unbridged gap between the school and the farmer. The farmer is not prepared to learn from the school. As a result the graduates of this agricultural school either became teachers in the primary grades or entered the military academy to become officers, or some of them did nothing at all and simply spent their time loafing around the district town. Parents who send their children to school believe, according to the traditional idea, that education will give promotion to a higher social level. But they are not rich enough to enable their children to complete the education which is necessary to permit a young man to take a job in the big cities. On the other hand, for young men who have passed a number of years in being educated, to go back to working in the fields would be a disgrace in which the family would share. So they are caught and are unable to go forward or back. It seems that during the last few decades the army and party (Kuomintang) organizations have attracted people of this sort; this explains to a certain extent, I believe, modern Chinese Fascistic tendencies. It reminds one of the situation in Japan before the war, where young men from rural areas frustrated in other careers became part of the political and military machine and developed extremist ideas which sometimes even led to irresponsible attempts to seize power. Formerly, the traditional educational system took care of such people by enabling them to come up for examinations, the passing of which gave some official status and enabled them to achieve satisfactory social positions in the community as petty gentry. Moreover, they might keep on working and hope to pass a higher examination. But changes in the present educational system and the gap between the modernized city and education in the interior now all combine to frustrate their ambitions.

不仅大学生，中学生也是如此。我曾对云南一个县城附近的村子作过研究。村子不远有个农业学校。这个村子依靠市场园艺业营生。村里的菜农常指着学校的农场笑着说：“学校的老师和学生种菜像是种花，那可挣不到钱。”另一方面，受过现代农业种植技术培训的老师则告诉我们，乡下人种的菜大可以改进，甚至向我们展示改良的品种。实际上他们各有道理。不幸的是，学生离开校园后无法再运用现代技术和实验方法，因为家里没有本钱也不愿意让他们这么做。学校和农场之间好像有一条无法逾越的鸿沟。乡下人不想向学校学习，结果，这个学校的毕业生有的当了小学教员，有些转入军校当军官，有些就什么都不干，只是在县城附近闲逛鬼混。送孩子上学的父母依照传统观念认为，上了学就能提高社会地位，但是他们的经济条件又不允许让孩子完成能在大都市工作的必要学业。另一方面，这些年轻人认为，受过多年教育之后又回到家乡种地，对自己、对家庭都不体面，所以他们进退两难。似乎最近几十年来，参军和加入国民党吸引着这些年轻人，我认为这在某种程度上为现代中国的法西斯倾向提供了注解。这使人联想起战前日本的情形：一些在其他职业中遭到失败的乡村年轻人变成政治和军事机器的一部分，产生了极端主义观念，甚至导致不负责任地攫取权力。在过去，传统的教育制度给这些人提供关照，让他们通过考试来做官、成为小士绅，从而在社区里获得更高的社会地位。他们也许还会继续努力来通过更高级的考试。但是目前教育制度的变化和现代都市与内地教育之间的鸿沟共同破灭了他们的理想。

College graduates have more chance for employment in the city than do the graduates of the middle schools, to be sure, but even for them the problem is essentially similar. In the first place, there is little opportunity for them to reform the traditional ways of doing things by using the modern methods in which they have been trained, and, second, since there is no way for them to earn a living through productive activities, they must do so by striving for power and influence in the political field. Thus in a poor community there is always the burden of maintaining a huge number of political appointees in administrative offices. This explains some of the inefficiency of our administration. Thus I am afraid that the present educational system has not successfully carried out its function of modernizing China but on the contrary has drained off the sons of the well-to-do farming class from the country and brought them to town without providing them with useful employment there. This I call the "process of social erosion."

●   THE PARASITIC LAYER

Some may think that modernization always implies urbanization. Modern civilization is the product of the city, and the city population must of necessity come from the country, since the city cannot replace itself. In the country the able man does not have a chance to develop his abilities, but, once he comes to the city, he finds opportunities for developing them. In this sense the city is the place where human capabilities may be realized. Potential talents of the countryside, we may say, can be developed only through the process of urbanization. But this principle does not hold entirely for China. I mentioned above Lilienthal's work. From what he says I suspect that this principle is not always true for America either. Especially in the south of the United States there seems to have been going on a somewhat similar process of social erosion. As in China, the process of organic circulation has been disrupted, and men and wealth have been constantly drained away. The TVA, as I understand it, aims, by introducing modern knowledge, to restore this circulation and, by creating the bridge I spoke of above, to restore prosperity. To create a bridge, there is needed not only knowledge of modern techniques but a utilization of the human element in such a way that those who have received a modern education will be able to go back and serve their own communities. Without such a bridge, the development of the city will cause a dislocation of the social mechanism.

在城市里，大学生当然比中学生有更多的就业机会，但即使对大学生来讲，问题基本上仍是相似的。首先，他们几乎没有机会利用学过的现代方法改革传统的行为方式。其次，他们不能通过生产活动来谋生，只能通过在政治领域获得权力和影响。因此贫穷的社区常常要背上养活大批政客的负担，这也部分解释了为什么我们的管理低效。所以，现在的教育制度恐怕没有发挥使中国实现现代化的作用，反而使小康农家的子弟流入城市，但城市又不能为他们提供有价值的就业。我称此为“社会损蚀过程”。

●   寄生阶层

也许有人认为现代化总是意味着都市化。现代文明是都市的产物，都市人口必然来自乡村，因为都市人口无法自我补充。人才在乡村没有发展的机会，但是到了城市后，他就有机会自我发展。从这个意义上讲，城市是发挥才能的地方。可以说，乡村潜在的人才只有在都市化进程中才能得到发展，但是中国又不完全如此。我在前面提到过李林塞尔的计划。从他的话中，我猜想这一原则在美国也不是永远正确，特别是在美国南方，发生着与中国相似的社会损蚀。在中国，有机循环受到破坏，人力和财富被不断地掠夺。我理解，TVA计划的目标是通过引进现代知识来恢复这一循环，通过搭一座我前面讲到的桥来恢复繁荣。建一座桥，不仅需要现代技术，还需要人力因素，即那些接受现代教育的人回归本土为社区服务。没有这样的桥，城市的发展将引起社会机制的混乱。

At present the growth of great urban centers is like a tumor from which China is suffering. The economic aspects of the unfavorable relations between city and country I explained in the foregoing chapter. Here I merely wish to add a cultural perspective to the picture. It is not correct to my mind to take the modern city as representing Western civilization and the rural areas as representing the traditional Chinese civilization. In my opinion the modern Chinese city is the product of the contact between East and West. Those individuals who, through contact with Western culture, have changed their way of life and their way of thinking will not find themselves able any longer to live in the country. Some portion of them will be taken in by newly developing urban enterprises. But, since such enterprises are limited in number, there will be sure to be some who are left out to roam about without being attached to anything. Thus there develops a new type of person, one who avoids productive work in either city or country but rather goes in for seizing political power. This new type of person is both directly and indirectly recruited from the country. Before the contact with the West, the examination system would have taken care of these people, and they would have continued to live in the country or small towns as gentry. Being versed in the classical Confucian philosophy, they performed the function of the "man who knows." It is true indeed that such men were parasitic in so far as they derived their support from the working people, living mainly as they did on their rent from land. But, since they continued to live in the country, there was at least no large outgo of wealth from the countryside.

If in Chinese modern cities industrial enterprises might be quickly developed, the elements that have been taken in from the countryside might find their proper place. Although the countryside would then still suffer from a certain measure of "erosion," this would be compensated for by the prosperity of the city. And, like TVA in America, China might be enabled to turn back benefits from the city to the country. If this were so, the situation in China would be very different. Unfortunately China is still in the status of a semicolony. Large-scale industrial development is not feasible. The essence of Western civilization, industrialism, has not been really introduced as yet. What has been brought in is the superstructure of the more superficial elements of this civilization, including the desire for material comforts and satisfactions. But there has not been constructed as yet the material foundation on the basis of which these things would make sense. This lack of foundation creates a special class of people who live superficially in Western culture but without a traditional base from either the West or the East. These are both the victims and the directors of China's tragedy.

目前大都市化正成为中国的疾患。我在前一章节从经济角度讲过不尽如人意的城乡关系，现在只想加上文化角度。如果说现代都市代表着西方文明，乡村社区代表着传统中国文明，我认为这一观点是不正确的。我认为，中国的现代都市是东西方接触的结果。那些通过接触西方文化改变了生活和思维方式的人发现，他们自己再也不能生活在乡村了。他们中的一部分被新发展的都市企业吸收。但是由于这样的企业数量有限，必然有一部分人游离于任何组织之外。这样就产生了一类新人，他们既不在城市也不在乡村从事生产活动，而是追求政治权力。这类新人直接或间接来自乡村。在与西方接触之前，科举制度吸住了这些人，使得他们可以作为士绅在乡村或县城生存下去。他们精通传统儒家哲学的教育，执行身为“知者”的社会任务。这类人确实是一种寄生的人，因为他们是从劳动人民那里得到给养，靠收取地租来生活。但是，由于他们继续生活在乡村，所以至少财富没有大规模外流。

如果中国都市里的生产事业发展得快，从乡村吸收来的人可能会找到合适的位置。虽然乡村仍在某种程度上遭受着“损蚀”，但会被城市的繁荣所补偿。像美国的TVA计划那样，中国也许能够把利益从城市返回到乡村。果真如此，中国的情况就大不一样了。不幸的是，中国仍处在半殖民地的地位，大规模的产业发展不大可行。西方文明的本质——工业主义还没有被真正地引进，引进的是其表面或上层的因素，包括对物质享受和满足的渴望，但是还没有建立起能使这些变得有意义的物质基础。这种基础的缺乏制造了一个表面上生活在西方文化中，但又没有东西方传统基础的特殊阶层。他们是中国悲剧中的主角和导演。

●   BENEATH THE FLOOD

Erosion of land takes place when the land is bare of grass and tree cover and thus not able to hold water. Then floods follow and bring disaster to the people. Social erosion has a similar effect, causing an exodus of the population. In the process of social erosion, at first only the top layers are carried away, those economically well-to-do and better educated who no longer choose to remain. But, as both wealthy and able men are washed away in this fashion, the pressure of city industry continues with this fact to press the country people still further down into poverty. Well-to-do people who remain become poorer. And the really poor can no longer remain but must desert the land. Movement away thus comes from both upper and lower levels, leaving behind only the middle class of peasants.

As for the elements mentioned above who are left outside of productive work, they tend to form a new class of organized parasites. Since villagers are both naive and not very well organized, they may easily become the prey of such people. When I was in a village one time a roving individual came and tried to blackmail my landlord, because, he said, my landlord's son, who had left military school, was a deserter. Actually the boy had done nothing wrong, and the man was simply trying to work a racket. I said to this man, "You come from the country yourself. How would you like it if someone like you came to your village and tried to bully and blackmail the people there?" He could not find an answer. I felt that the man himself was rather pathetic, a dislocated drifting individual. But it is people such as this who have aroused the hatred of the peasants. The lot of the conscript is a hard one also. The government takes all the able-bodied men from the country and enlists them. But, when these men are discharged, no one pays any attention to them. Country people say that those who have gone as soldiers will never return to farming. Once enlisted, they become disorganized and are no longer accustomed to obedience but rather to looting and other wild behavior. Thus conscription accelerates the processes of social erosion. The banks are broken and a flood results: in this case, peasant revolt. The disorganization of life, economic, political, and moral, has confronted China with needs for new leadership and reform.

●   在洪流的冲洗下

当土地缺乏植被不能保持水分时，就会发生土地的损蚀，接着就会有洪水的到来，给人们带来灾难。社会损蚀具有相似的后果，造成人口大量流亡。在社会损蚀的过程中，起初只有最顶层的人离开，他们在经济上比较富裕，受过较好的教育，不愿意继续留在乡村。但是由于富有和有能力的人都离开乡村，加上都市工业势力的压迫，使得乡村开始变得贫困。小康之家降为穷户，而穷户再也支撑不住，开始离乡。这样的转变发生在贫富两极，中间阶层则足以维持。

我们在前面曾经讲到不从事生产活动的人，他们试图组成一个新的有组织的寄生阶层。由于村民单纯幼稚，又缺乏良好的组织，他们轻易就会成为这一阶层的牺牲品。有一次我在一个村子时，一个游手好闲的人想敲诈我的房东，他说房东离开军校的儿子是个逃兵。实际上房东的儿子并没做什么坏事，那个人只不过想找碴捣乱。我对他说：“你不也是来自乡村吗？如果有人像你这样到你的乡村去敲诈，你觉得怎样？”他无言以对。我觉得他自己很可怜，是一个被命运抛弃的人。但是正是这样的人引起了农民的仇恨。参军入伍也是一个艰难的问题。政府把所有身强力壮的人都征去当兵，退伍时却没有一个人来关心他们。乡下人说那些去当兵的人永远也不会再回来种地。入伍之后，他们变得涣散不羁，不再循规蹈矩，而沉沦于抢劫掠夺等野蛮行径。征兵因而加速了社会损蚀的进程。农民如决堤的洪流般起来反抗。中国面临着生活、经济、政治、道德的混乱，她需要新的领导和改革。

[1] According to the Book of Poetry one should revere the sang and the tzu because they symbolized parental and even ancestral ties. Since then the phrase has come to stand for a man's attachment to his own region and particularly to his own homestead.

[2] 据《诗经》记载，人们应该尊敬桑和梓，因为它们象征着与父辈甚至是祖辈的联系。从那时起，“桑梓”开始指代一个人对他的家乡——尤其是他的家园的眷恋之情。

[3] Pitirim A. Sorokin, Social Mobility (Microfilm Collection, University of Chicago Library, 1927).

[4] 《社会流动》，彼蒂里姆·索罗金著，微缩版，芝加哥大学图书馆，1927年。

EDITOR'S NOTE

To most thoughtful and dispassionate Chinese it seemed, especially in the postwar years 1946–1949, that the new leadership and reform for which they had been looking for so many years could not come from the repressive and discredited right but (because there was no effective "vital center") from the left. Yet, though it is obvious that Fei was looking forward to Communist "liberation," the leadership and the doctrine were to be Chinese in origin rather than either Russian or Western. The following sentences from a lecture delivered by Fei in 1947 at the London School of Economics present the point of view of the Chinese patriot who hoped for co-operation rather than domination by any outsiders in the solving of China's problems.

"If, in advancing to the present stage of technological development, the West had achieved a new order—that is, an integrated social system—the problem in the East would be simpler. All we would need to do is to learn to transplant the new form across the ocean. There would be difficulties, but if the new order offered greater material advancement as well as social satisfaction and happiness, reluctance would be only a matter of unfamiliarity, which could be overcome by better instruction.... The defect of Confucianism in denying the importance of man and nature relationship is apparent in our inability to cope with modern Western civilization. But the one-sided emphasis [of the West] on material advancement without due consideration of a corresponding development in social relations is equally dangerous. It is therefore clear that the process of social change in China should not be a mere transplantation of Western culture but should imply a reorganization of social structure in conformity with the inherited spirit of harmony and integration. The question of how these two developments can be made to keep pace with one another is essential for the solution of the present chaotic state of affairs in China, which is manifested in grave economic and political disturbances. These disturbances are primarily symptoms of a process of change without a definite aim. Unless China is to perish, we have to find our own solution from our inheritance of experience over thousands of years...."

编后记

对于多数有思想、没有偏见的中国人来说，尤其是在战后的1946年—1949年，他们多年来一直寻求的新的领导体制和改革不可能是来自因采取镇压手段而丧失信誉的右派，而是来自“左派”（因为不存在一个实际的“生命中枢”）。然而，虽然费先生明显地是在盼望着共产主义的“解放”，但是这种领导的体制和主张从根源上是中国式的，而不是俄国或西方式的。以下一段话引自费先生1947年在伦敦经济学院的演讲，这代表了这位爱国者希望通过合作而不是由外人主宰来解决中国问题的观点：

“如果在技术发展到当今阶段之时，西方就已经达到一种新秩序，即实现了一种统一的社会体系，那么东方的问题就会简单一些——我们只需把新的方式跨大洋移植过来。当然困难也会存在，但是如果这种新秩序提供了更大的物质进步以及社会满足和幸福的话，那么不情愿也只是由于不熟悉罢了，这可以通过进一步引导来解决……儒家否认人与自然关系的重要性，这一缺陷在我们与西方现代文明交锋时的无力中明显地表现出来。但是单方面强调（西方的）物质发达，而对社会关系的相应发展缺乏应有的考虑同样是危险的。因此，中国社会变迁的进程不该是西方文化的简单移植，而应该隐含着对一种与和谐统一的内在精神相适应的社会结构的重组。这两种发展如何才能达到步调一致，对于解决目前中国的混乱状态——表现为严重的经济和政治混乱——是最为基本的。这些混乱主要是没有明确目标的社会变迁过程的征兆。要使中国不灭亡，我们必须要从几千年历史传承的经验中寻找我们自己的出路……”

译后记：逝者如斯的结构秩序

赵旭东

一

在65年以前，也就是1946年，美国极有影响的《美国社会学学刊》（American Journal of Sociology）登载了当时在云南大学任社会学教授的费孝通先生题为“农民与士绅：中国社会结构及其变迁的一种解释”的长达17页的论文。[1]这应该算是晚出的英文版《中国士绅》（China's Gentry）的节缩本，而后者又可以说是费先生基于长期田野工作凝缩而成的对于中国社会整体结构与功能运作机制的总结性论断。尽管此文通篇没有一个注释和文献征引，但读过之后，你不会觉得这是在云里雾里地调侃，而是实实在在地思考，思考那时中国社会所面临的危机以及转型时期可能的道路选择。

确实，这篇用英文写作并且主要是写给西方人阅读的文字，其核心内容在中文世界里并不陌生，其中许多论点和语汇，在他后来出版的《乡土重建》、《乡土中国》中，还有他与历史学家吴晗合编的《皇权与绅权》中，一样都能够读到。[2]到了1953年，由美国著名人类学家雷德菲尔德（Robert Redfield）作序[3],由其夫人玛格丽特编辑的《中国士绅》在英语世界出版。[4]这本书在出版之后，便一直是英语世界中国乡村社会结构及其变迁这一领域中必定要被引用的参考文献。

有关社会精英人物的研究，向来是诸多学科的研究焦点，包括社会学、人类学、政治学以及历史学等。费孝通先生的《中国士绅》一书是从社会人类学的研究视角，以他在江苏和云南几个村落的田野调查为基础而写成的。关于这几个村子的情况，费先生之前曾有《江村经济——中国农民的生活》（Peasant Life in China）和《被土地束缚的中国》（Earthbound China）这两本田野报告先后在1939年和1945年以英文出版，并且后来都有了中文版。[5]唯独由美国著名社会学家、芝加哥学派的奠基人罗伯特·帕克（Robert Park）的女儿玛格丽特依据费孝通英文口述修订和编辑的这本《中国士绅》尚未见汉语版的发行。几年前三联书店的编辑舒伟先生、后来是薛松奎先生同我商量翻译此书的事宜，我犹豫了一下，最终还是接受下来了，并邀秦志杰女士与我一同翻译。

之所以接受这一任务，是因为当年三联书店欲以这本书来为费先生祝贺九十华诞，而我作为费先生的学生义不容辞应该担当这一翻译工作。之所以犹豫了一下，是因为以前读书的时候曾经读到过这本书的英文版，并做了些笔记，但一直不曾动过翻译的念头。而这样做完全是由于自己深知这本书虽然短小，但要真正翻译成汉语却并非易事。

后来真的翻译起来情况也确实如此。这本书是玛格丽特女士20世纪40年代末来中国，在费先生当时所在的清华大学听了先生的英文口述之后，回美国重新编辑整理完成的，其中还加入了几十条注释。费先生的那几篇文章大略可以在中文版《皇权与绅权》和《乡土重建》这两本书中读到，但费先生当时并非是完全照着他最初写的汉语原文来逐字逐句口述翻译的。正像她的丈夫也就是著名人类学家雷德菲尔德所说，玛格丽特进行了仔细的编辑，又添加了一些内容，从而使文意前后更加连贯，成为一个整体，并希望借此能够使费先生的意思更清楚地传达给英语世界的人们。

这些本来是一个编辑应该做的事情，不需要太多的说明。奈何我们又要将此英文的翻译和编辑后的文字回译成中文，这里就出现了以哪个版本为依据翻译的问题了。最初是想将费先生原来的文字原封不动地拿来用，但发现和英文版的文字虽然意思上接近，细节上还是有些出入的。比如英文版第80页在谈地方官的工作时写道："Their job was merely to collect taxes and to act as judges."[6]费先生在《乡土重建》一书中对此则写道：“他们的任务不过于收税和收粮，处理民间诉讼。”[7]还有英文版是说："On the Dragon Day, Sheep Day, or Dog Day markets in Yunnan…"[8]，而费先生的原文则是：“昆明附近的龙街、狗街、羊街等都是这种大街子……”[9]前一个例子中，英文少了“收粮”这一信息；而在后一个例子中，云南地方性的集市名称“街”这个字在英文版里就见不到了。这种中英文的不对应一直是困扰我们翻译的一个难题。后来我自己给自己找到了一条理由，以为应该忠实于英文的翻译，把一个美国人对一位中国学者的文字的理解再重新翻回到中文中来，由此可以看出文化翻译的可能与困难所在。

有了这样的思路之后，译稿很快就完成了，这里的原则就是基本上以英文为基础重新将其翻译成中文，有些带有本土意味的词汇还是要参阅费先生的中文原文。另外，对费先生忠实翻译自己原话的部分，则尽量用费先生自己的语式和词汇，因而在译文中会见到有些文字是引自费先生上面两本书中的原话，只是作了一些文字上的改动，以便使前后文字顺畅自然。

二

首先需要指出的是，这些文字虽然都是费先生六十多年前写下的，但现在读来依旧耐人寻味。费先生在六十多年前对西方现代化带给中国乡村生活的“损蚀”（可参阅《乡土重建》中“损蚀冲洗下的乡土”一文），在今天变得越来越明显了。一位朋友近日从文学家沈从文先生的老家凤凰城回来说，那里的唐朝古镇已经在被现代化的高楼大厦所侵蚀，时时都有被吞噬的危险，正如去那里写生的一些画家对他所说的，真是“来一次少一次了”。这种悲哀在费先生的文字中似乎到处都可以捕捉到。

在上个世纪之初，中国人选择了现代化的道路，并以一种乌托邦式的想象，希望现代化能够给贫困的中国带来生机。但是我们为这种现代化付出的代价应该说也是极为惨重的，至少对乡村生活是这样的，并且还在一直地为此付出代价。偏执于现代化道路的人或许会讥笑说，这样的伤感太有些怀旧主义的味道。但我要真正辩解的是，一个文化有权利保留它自己存在的样态，虽然这种保留因为文化霸权的逻辑而最终是不可能的，但是“乡愁”之类的宣泄途径依旧是不可少的，否则真不知有多少人会因为此种郁闷而遁入歧途。

谈到有关中国士绅的问题，费先生的观察应该是极为敏锐的，他看到了中国士绅阶层对所谓绅权的滥用以及作为乡土社会精英的士绅与皇权之间的微妙关系。但是，这个社会离开下层士绅的“绅权”又是难以进行上下顺畅沟通的。传统时代的士绅阶层在城乡之间、皇帝与民间社会之间起着不可多得的纽带作用。正是士绅这种角色的不可替代性，使得他们变得更为危险。

近日读早期中国社会学家陶孟和在上世纪20年代写下的文字，看到他对上述类似观点的提醒也是颇为值得注意的。虽然他是在谈论中国的“士”这个阶层的问题，但“士绅”也不过是“士”的转化形式而已。恰如其所说：

士向来是中国最高的阶级，因为他是帮着帝王从事政治活动的。士是中国的贵族，但是因为他是无产的贵族，所以是极危险的阶级。但是一方面因为他们所住的地方是物质文明极不发达的中国，所有的人大概都是一般的困穷，用不着物质的奢侈的炫耀，又一方面我们古代的圣贤所垂示的告诫，所奖励的美德又都是节俭廉洁一类的行为，所以以先无产阶级的士还是政治组织上的中坚，他们在政治上的功劳也不为小的。他们虽然赶不上柏拉图的理想的“哲学家的治者”那样的舍己奉公，他们在中国社会总算是一种高尚的阶级。一旦物质文明侵入中国，古圣先贤的经典逐渐失了束缚人心的势力，这个士的阶级就变成最危险的分子。世上有许多人谈起共产主义与无政府主义就色变的，但是他们不知道如果将政权交给这士的阶级或者让他参与，那个危险要比共产主义与无政府主义还要厉害的多。因为无论是共产主义还是无政府主义到底还是有组织的，还是一律施行的。至于士的阶级当权的时候，他们劫夺人民的产业，——但是专肥了他们自己，他们自己实在是无政府，——但是强迫人民承认他们是有政府。士的阶级不能独立生活，是要靠着人吃饭的。他们不能像农人那样耐劳的工作，他们只靠着他们的文笔，口舌与诡诈的手段为寄生的生活。他们现在既然肯做“猪仔”肯做军阀的奴隶，将来也就肯去做外国的奴隶。因为这样做奴隶是他们唯一的生存——并且有时是致富——的方法。但是我们学校里还不断的造士的阶级呢！[10]

我想即使在今天，也许重复费先生的那句话还是有必要的，那就是：“传统的中国并未消逝。”在这里，也许我更想强调的是，传统并非单单是浮现在表面上的东西，因而就不单单是衣着饮食之类，而是潜在于日常生活中的社会结构，这种结构并非一朝一夕就能够养成，因而要瓦解它，也并非像画画写字那样一蹴而就。

三

大凡谈论中国社会，大概不能不述及中国的农民；而谈论农民，当然也就离不开谈论把这些农民组织起来的乡村精英。过去称这些精英人物为“缙绅”、“老爷”、“东家”之类。中国曾经有一个时期，国家试图构建起一种追求人人平等的理想国，但终究因为没有实际的效率而宣告失败。随之而来的就是鼓励精英分子发挥作用的社会发展政策，着实使得生产力发生了巨变，精英与平民开始分出高低上下，既有的农民—士绅—国家的结构模型再一次得到凸显。农民在分配到自己名下的土地上耕作，通过村干部向国家交纳税款。这些村干部一方面不属于是国家的正式干部，另一方面也很少有被转变成为国家正式干部的机会。这些人应该是扮演着传统中国社会中士绅的角色，一方面以自己积累的财富以及一部分从农民的劳作中获取的租金来供养自己相对悠闲的生活，另一方面因为土生土长的缘故，又由于亲属关系的纽带，而使得他们有意对农民自身的利益给予地方性的保护。在这个意义上，国家的政策在任何时候都不会原封不动地被接受，甚至有时政策到了下面只能变成是一纸空文。[11]村干部作为乡土精英的这种过滤屏障作用是不能够不去考虑的。

农业社会不同于部落社会的一个最大特点就是，前者是一家一户依附于一块有限面积的土地上进行精耕细作，而后者则是分散于大片土地上依靠相互合作的狩猎和采集来维持生活。依附于土地以及散布于山林，这显然构成了两种不同的生活方式。大略说来，前者是个体主义的，而后者则是团体主义的。对于前者，大概不需要太大范围的合作，单单依靠自己的劳作便能够实现衣食无忧。孟子描述过的那种“老死不相往来”的农民社会大概都应该属于这个范围。因而从本性上讲，这是一个不需要组织的自由散漫的社会。古代文字中，常常将这些人说成是“野人”，这个词并不带有后来附加上去的含有种族主义的那种负面含义，而是在真实地描述这个社会里一般性的特征，这种特征是相对于城市以及皇族的“文”而界定的。所谓的文野之别，很大的一部分含义说的是不大劳作的统治者与天天在泥土里刨食的农民之间的区分。这种区分或者说结构关系在中国社会也许是最为基本的，也就是费先生在那篇文字中所说的农民与士绅的关系。

但是要维系这样一种文和野的区分，一种意识形态的建构显然是不可或缺的，这就是借用一种家族主义的意识形态来压制个体主义的天性。不过这种建构显然获得了相当大的成功，从汉代独尊儒术以后，这种意识形态便牢固地建立起来并能够持久地存在。在这种意识形态之下，儒家文化的再生产变成士绅阶层过着悠闲生活的合法性基础。他们一般通过有一段时间充任国家的官僚所获得的俸禄来购置田地，等到退职还乡，便依靠地租来维持一种不劳而获的悠闲生活。明清史料中，许多官宦多以在任置办田地、终老衣锦还乡为荣。他们在日常杂务之外，最乐于做的事情就是吟诗、作赋、写文章，这些活动都是农民自己做不来的，不过他们会鼓励自己的子女用心于此，如有一天，他们中的某位子弟登科高就，自然也就成为那个悠闲阶层中的一员，不用再去土里刨食地劳作了。因而传统农家的读书子弟，多不用下地种田，并被认为这是理所当然，甚至一丁点的力气活也不用自己劳神，由旁人代为料理，唯恐笨重的体力会玷污了圣洁的脑力。在这种文化中，劳动被看成是等而下之人才干的事情。我的祖母就曾经对我回忆说，她自己是浙江乡下的童养媳，而我的六祖父是一位读书人，每次从乡下进城读书，书和必要的用具多由我祖母用担子挑着送去城里。当然这种情况已经有了改变，不过显然不是结构上的改变，而是形式的改变。农民有了一些钱总会希望把子女送出去学习，进入好的学校，受到良好的教育，最终还是希望以此换得一个悠闲阶层一员的身份。最近听朋友们讲，北京、上海这样的大都市都有许许多多陪孩子读书的母亲，她们要么是单身一人，要么是下岗失业，她们全部的希望都寄托在城市里读大学的孩子身上，母以子荣，希望一旦孩子毕业找到一份理想的工作脱离开农村或小城市，自己的人生价值也就能因此得到体现。

在这种社会结构中，人员显然是保持流动的。不论哪个时代，都有一些农民改头换面，成为不用自己下地劳动、专营儒家正统或者今天的现代科技的士绅或社会精英。[12]这种结构显然又是极为稳定的，因为它为所有个体主义的不满提供了一个社会宣泄的孔道，借助这一孔道，作为个体的农民将不满转化成为一种渴望，并将这种渴望在他们子女一辈的身上传递式地得到实现。以前有一个误解，认为“不孝有三，无后为大”，因而没有生育子嗣，或许就是一个有家庭的人最大的不幸了，但实际的情况恰恰可能是有许多人并无子嗣，但这些人一样可以在村子里有威信，遗憾虽有，但并没有觉得对不起祖先。他们应付这种教化的办法显然有许多，比如收养、过继之类。[13]对他们而言，最为沉重的心理负担莫过于子女读书不成，不仅白花了银子，而且更重要的是，他们自己希望后代能够离开土地的渴望也因此而破灭了。在这个意义上，所有的社会组织都会被调动起来以服务于这样一种被广泛接受的意识形态。

另一方面，悠闲的士绅阶层如果想维护其依靠地租不劳而获的悠闲生活，必须要依靠一种联合，没有这种联合，他的生活便没有了保障。以前学术界总以为，中国农民是家族主义的，每个人生来就融入到一个家族组织中。现在看来，这种家族主义，显然是一种由社会精英来操纵的意识形态建构，它不是建立在生物血缘的基础上，而是建立在文化意识形态基础上。最近有些学者开始反省中国的亲属制度，认为这是一种费孝通先生所说的社会组织，而不单单是一种血亲和姻亲的联系，因而，许多宗族中姓氏根本不同也就容易被人理解了。[14]它被发明出来并得到日积月累的实践，所要达到的目的仅仅在于维持这个中间层次人员的生存。

而且“族”、“家族”以及“宗族”之类的社会组织，其根本的功能不是单一地把同姓或者把同一地区的人口组织起来，而是仅仅在于维持一个族自身的优越地位。而维持这种优越地位的根本在于有历史学家何炳棣所说的“杰出的新血”，也就是族中要有新的杰出人物成为新的士大夫，而整个家族的意识形态也会积极地鼓励这方面杰出人物的涌现，即何氏家族中的前辈所用心总结出来的法则：

越是自己本房或本支经济或文化条件较好，越是本人读书上进，越易受到族内的重视与资助。族的目的在制造“成功者”，在这点上传统与现代家族政策上并无二致。[15]

或许我们今天觉得，这个中间阶层实在可恶，因为他们不劳而获或者一劳永逸，希望铲除掉这些人——结果会是怎么样呢？费先生写文章的年代恰好给他思考这种状况提供了一个绝好的机会。当时，也就是上世纪40年代，中西方的接触不仅仅是差异性文化之间的碰撞，而且还是现代性的工业化与传统社会生产方式之间的碰撞，碰撞的结果是，中国的乡村社会受到了损蚀，洋货取代土货，曾经存在的乡绅与农民之间的结构性平衡关系一夜之间被打破，许多士绅的后代进城以后也大多不愿再返回到自己的乡村中去，乡村与国家之间成为面对面的交往而没有原来的以乡绅阶层为主体的缓冲地带。费先生曾经用水土流失来作类似的比喻，因为大洪水或者人为的原因，土壤中的营养成分被冲刷到河流里，顺水漂流融入大海里，结果造成陆地上水土流失，土壤贫瘠。在费先生看来，乡村社会在面对现代文明时，情况也是一样的。当一些悠闲的文化精英渐渐离开一个养育他的社会环境时，一方面他自己失去了自我发育的土壤，另一方面，原来的社会也因此失去了既有的平衡，一种和谐的文化生态也就被打破了。

四

中国自古相沿的政治结构从来都是皇权与绅权共存，同时又相互抑制，此消彼涨。占据皇权的人为数极少，说得狭义一点，为皇帝一个人所独占，说得广义一点，是为皇族所共享。他们大多是因为把自己神圣化为“真龙天子”而获得理所当然的合法性，并支配着皇族血统以外的其他人。他们很大程度上是一种象征意义的存在，他们不是依靠辛勤的工作来获得其他人的认可，而是依靠经营象征性的符号来实现，比如古代帝王的封禅以及祭祀祖庙的活动。单单一个封号、一处题诗甚至一次求雨仪式，就可以让一方的百姓得到安抚，这就是位居皇位的人每天最需要做的事情。

皇帝以下的臣民就不同了。整日在旷野里劳作的是那些拿不到功名的普通百姓，他们依赖土地并从土地里收获粮食，并拿出一部分的收入作为税赋上缴国家，用以养活皇帝和他的大臣们。他们的名称曾经被称作“野”、“氓”和“庶”，现在则被称为“农民”。在只具有象征意义的皇帝和作为实际生产者的农民之间就是为皇帝办事情的各类各级的官员们，这是一个很特殊的阶层，在位的时候是国家的官员，不在位的时候就衣锦还乡，成为地方上的乡绅。[16]这些在位与不在位的官员构成了一个特殊的利益集团，他们因为是国家的实际办事人员，办事的效率全由他们自己来操纵，甚至皇权也约束不了他们，反过来他们可以通过对天命的不断强调而限制皇权的蔓延。在这个君臣共治的结构中，表面上做大臣的官员要绝对服从于皇帝的命令，但实际上这些官员不仅仅是行政体系中的一员，而且还是正统意识形态的界说者、教化者。他们常常会以不合正统的礼法和道德为由对皇帝的发号施令置之不理，并以此来约束皇权的过度膨胀。对此政治结构，历史学家许倬云有清晰的概括：

中国的政治权力，因其注重德行而导致中国官僚组织发展为具有独特势力的政治因子，足可与君权相抗衡。政治权力遂常在强制型与名分型二端之间动荡。君权每欲逞威肆志，儒家化的臣僚则每以德行约束，以名分之故自制不过分压倒君权。表演于实际政治斗争上，则为君主挟其恩悻、外戚与宦寺构成轩轾的一端，内外臣工则依仗行政权力构成轩轾的另一端。[17]

中国的政治多与这两个集团的相互制衡有关联。皇帝马上得天下，真正的治理还要依靠那些饱读儒家经典的士大夫。因此之故，皇帝往往被架空，仅仅成为一个国家一体的象征，皇帝再有能力，再有抱负，离开这些掌管着实际权力的士大夫，或者得不到他们的承认，最终也只能落个一事无成的下场。聪明的皇帝多会采取无为而治的省事做法，任由士大夫去玩弄权力。权力玩弄久了，派系的关系网因资源争夺而出现混乱的秩序，没有办法摆平的时候，皇帝会借助天子这一所有派系都认可的唯一权威，找出几个士大夫，拉出去斩首，以儆效尤。结果，乱子大多会得到摆平，皇帝还可以因此不费吹灰之力就得到一大笔的没收资产充入国库。难怪清代嘉庆年间民间有“和绅一倒，嘉庆吃饱”的谚语，擅权营私、富可敌国的官员，在一定意义上可以说是皇帝私存的银行，需要的时候把这座银行的锁头砸碎了，财富也就流进了皇帝的腰包。

在此意义上，中国的政治又是一种治乱的模式，一乱一治恰恰是这个社会得以稳固存在并有一定发展的根基。皇帝和士大夫之间是这样一种共同治理的关系，作为统治者，他们和在野的非正式的民间社会亦有此制约关系存在，不会任由民间社会自由发展，干涉是经常性的。这种干涉可以采取多种形式，但不外武力和教化这两端。民间总试图秉持乡野散漫的作风，不肯与这种干涉主义相合作，任其宰割，结果抵制也就随处可见。抵制的方式当然也因应着压制而有多种形式，但亦不外揭竿而起的直接反抗到隐秘的地下活动这两端。

皇权得到认可依靠的是士大夫阶层以道德正统来加以衡量的论证，但是具有合法性基础的皇权往往又可以任由其意愿地对士大夫阶层进行宰割，所谓“伴君如伴虎”，说不定什么时候虎就要吃人，做官员的也就缺少了一份安全感。皇帝和士大夫的生存空间常常被他们自己界定为文化并与城市生活联系在一起，而城市以外的乡村就是蛮野的地方，大部分没有读过书或者没有通过国家科举考试的人都住在这样的没有清晰轮廓、漫无边际的旷野之中。但是，这两个领域又是紧密地联系在一起的，连接的纽带就是通过了国家某一级科举考试但是因为种种原因不能够入朝为官的乡绅，他们是文明与教化的代言人。如果说西方的社区共同体是依靠牧师的布道而统一在一起，那么在中国的乡村，这些乡绅就承担起教化子民的布道牧师的角色了。

五

中国的士绅阶层看起来是一体的，但实际却分化得很厉害。作为官僚的政治精英是一种人，而作为在乡的地主则是另外一种人，这中间还有等级上的差异，尽管他们中间也有不同形式的联系。官员们退休也会回到地方上去，成为跟在乡地主一样的地方精英。[18]差不多是在19世纪，英国的外交官和传教士们开始用“中国士绅”（the Chinese gentry）来描述这些从衙门退下来到地方上以及通过科举考试留在地方上的有着潜在政治影响力的精英，把他们看作是一个社会群体。[19]

在这些英国人的眼中，那些地方精英跟英国的没有世袭的爵位但又并非平民的在乡地主阶级有着可以类比之处。尽管他们这样来作类比，但是欧洲人实际上“发现”，中国这些所谓士绅常常是顽固不化、极为保守，对于外在的世界更是充耳不闻，并且刚愎自用。这些认识都建立在这些士绅阶层对于所有门户开放政策一味的反对上面。[20]费孝通先生对此一群体也有过这样的概括：

在中国传统社会，知识阶级是一个没有技术知识的阶级，他们独占以历史的智慧为基础的权威，在文字上下工夫，在艺技上求表现。中国文字非常不适合表达科学或技术知识。这表明在传统社会结构中，既得利益的阶级的兴趣不在提高生产，而在于巩固既得的特权。他们主要的任务是为建立传统行为的指导而维持已有的规范。一个眼里只有人与人关系的人不免是保守的，因为人与人的关系的最终结果常常是互相协调。调整的均衡只能建立在人与自然稳定不变的关系基础上。另一方面，单从技术的角度出发，人类对自然的控制几乎没有限制。在强调技术进步的同时，人对自然的控制也随之不断改变，变得更为有效。然而技术的变化也许会导致人与人之间的冲突。中国的知识分子从人和人的关系看待世界，由于缺乏技术知识，他们就不会赞赏技术进步，看不出任何意图改变人与人关系的理由来。[21]

包括文人在内的整个知识分子阶层都可以归纳到这士绅的概念下面，并笼统地把他们归纳为没有等差的一群人。这种印象自19世纪中叶即已经开始形成，并一直在影响着后来的人对于这一阶层的人的认知。过去的秀才、举人和士大夫，现在的大学生、博士和国家干部都应该属于这样的范畴之列了。这样推算上去，可以一直推算到汉代建立之初的公元前206年。这样，中国作为一个士绅的社会，至少也存在有2200多年了。[22]作为一个群体，士绅阶层是脱离手工劳动和技术知识的，对于专业化的训练嗤之以鼻，顽固地坚持着儒家伦理的价值观念，并以此来稳固地保护着他们在社会中的优越地位，这也使得他们成为技术现代化以及经济发展的最大的阻碍力量。[23]

但是不能不意识到，这士绅阶层既是顽固的儒家伦理的维护者，同时也是鼓动民众、恢复社会正统秩序的发动者。[24]在西方人的眼中，他们顽冥不化，但是换一个角度，他们又是那样地坚不可摧，任何强烈的外来力量都无法使他们退缩下来成为其他意识形态的俘虏。

六

今天这种状况是否得到改善了呢？我想一个不用争辩的事实就是，改革已经让所有的人受益，农民也不例外。他们开始自由自在地在自己承包的土地上从事劳作，随着工业化在乡村的开展，农民的副业收入也大幅度地增加了，新的富裕户逐渐在乡村社区中承担起组织农民的责任，并能够在必要的时候为本乡本土的乡亲谋求公共利益上的保护。但不可否认，这些保护者已经不再是在野的士绅，或者说在野的士绅不再退回到乡村里，不再承担地方组织的领导者的重任。乡村社会的政治牢牢地把持在各种各样的财富精英以及善于权术的政治精英手中，他们不再像既有的以礼治进行教化的士绅那样只要衣食无忧，便不思进取，终日沉浸于琴棋书画之类的传统文化活动。

这些新的精英大多有类似西方工业化资本家的发家史，从一穷二白到腰缠万贯，都是用他们自己夜以继日的辛苦以及瞄准时机的大干而逐渐累积起来的。他们大多会因此而参与村落选举，把村民不喜欢的领导选下去而由他们来继任，结果他们上任后，多半又会重蹈覆辙，玩弄财富和政治于鼓掌之间，老百姓照样得不到实惠，久了一样会遭到乡里乡亲们的反对。我自己曾经在白洋淀附近调查过一个水区村落中精英人物的成长历史。在那个我称之为兆村的水中央的村子中，活跃着一些靠塑料袋加工而发家致富的村落精英。他们有了大笔的金钱之后，最乐于从事的就是乡村的公共事业，比如修路以及捐助贫困户，由此而聚拢人心，并逐渐通过选举的正常途径掌控村庄事务。当他们一旦掌握住这村落的领导权之后，往往都会以此来换取更大的经济利益，比如用极为低廉的价格承包到大片的芦苇田，一定就是30年以上的承包期限，再之后是把自己的厂房从狭小的村中移到自己的承包地上，盖上永久性的厂房。这样的精英人物已经不再是费先生所界定的上通下达的地方士绅，而是转变成为了以国家身份为庇护的专门攫取村民集体利益的地方一霸，而这样的精英即使是在今天也是很难立足脚跟的。最近，我听一起在那里调查的一位朋友说，由这些新的精英所组成的村落领导集体已经被全部撤消职务，这样的后果显然也是在预料之中的。

如果说过去的士绅的存在有其文化的合法性，今天乡村精英存在的合法性就不是文化的而是经济的。去农村访问，农民会对你说，某某人当上了村长，就是因为他有钱。我想，农民在讲这些话时，更多的意思并非是反对有钱人的存在，有哪一个农民不想自己有一天也能够腰缠万贯呢？他们暗下所要表达的实际是，这些有钱的掌权人并不能够真正地为农民争取利益，而是想着如何将政治权力转化成为商业资本，进而再把商业资本兑换成为更大的政治权力，如我在白洋淀所遇到的那些精英们一样。他们从来也不悠闲，从来也不会以孔孟之道训导乡邻，他们更多的心思都是用在如何让自己的财富越滚越庞大。传统士绅的悠闲生活，对他们而言已经变得毫无吸引力，反倒是终日埋头赚钱的资本家多是他们效仿和学习的榜样。

如果说上世纪40年代或者更早，中国乡村的士绅阶层已经开始受到损蚀而瓦解的话，那么经过这60多年的发展，士绅阶层已经消失殆尽，这不是社会精英的缺失，而是一种士绅文化的衰落，因为生长这种文化的土壤已经干枯而不复存在了。随之，由这种文化孕育出来的一种农民与士绅以及国家之间的稳定而平和的结构秩序也在渐渐地逝去。一方面，农民并不能够安心地在自己的土地上劳作，因为当他们发现，辛苦一年，卖出的粮食或者收获的果实不仅不能够抵消自己全部的投入，甚至于连吃饭都成问题的时候，他们劳动的热情自然就会大为降低；另一方面，当他们发现，自己并没有足够的钱来供养孩子读书，进而使他们离开乡村、摆脱土地的束缚的时候，他们就只能以绝望来面对自己的生活世界了。

一句话，结构可以带来一种秩序，这种秩序依靠一种意识形态而得到稳固，并经过长久时间的运作实施而使其极为稳固。这种稳固也很容易因为抽掉一些最为核心的要素而变得异常不稳定。这种不稳定是秩序的不稳定，也必然是社会的不稳定。

这种警钟是值得敲响的，在今天的社会里，我们应该对作为“士”的知识分子的社会责任有些深刻的思考。如果说以前知识分子的齐家、治国、平天下的使命感转化成了今天的仅仅是用知识去生产金钱的作为，那也许就真的是我们文化的悲哀了！不过，这或许只是我的误读或误解，当然也可以说是我的胡思乱想。

七

本书由于许多原因未能在费先生九十华诞的时候出版，一拖就想着会在先生九十五大寿的时候奉献给他老人家。但是在我即将校对完成的那天早晨，也就是2005年4月25日传来噩耗，说费先生已经于前一天晚上10点38分离开了这个他热爱并且作出杰出贡献的社会，悲痛之余我写下这样一个帖子转发给我的朋友们：

尊敬的费孝通教授于零五年四月二十四日晚不幸病逝，享年九十五岁。作为中国社会学的先驱者以及新时代社会学的开拓者和引路人，我们不仅为其对于中国社会的敏锐的思考所折服，而且也为其宽容博大的胸怀所感染。哀痛之极，泣不成声，回首往事，历历在目。愿天下受其学养恩惠者，目送先生魂归故里。

费先生生前曾经把自己怀念故人的文集起名为《逝者如斯》，人去如流水，能够留下来的仅仅是先生的音容笑貌以及那顺畅并透漏着刚毅的文字。就人而言，逝者如斯，就事而言，如斯逝者。先生过去了，先生笔下的中国社会也在发生着深层次的改变，这改变的结果，很少有人能够知晓，因而探索也仅仅刚刚开始。但是先生分析中国社会的方法依然有效，不会随之而消逝，薪火相传，延续这样的方法，传承并光大先生治学的理路，这也许是学生辈对老师辈最为深切怀念的最为有意义的表达。

最后，应该感谢我的挚友和同乡蔡国先先生在初稿翻译中所做的一些协助性翻译和查找注释的工作。另外就注释的一些问题我曾经求教于刘援朝、麻国庆、孙珉、赵丙祥等诸位先生，在此一并表示感谢。

本书中文版2009年在北京三联书店首次出版后，2010年恰逢费先生百年诞辰，经由费孝通先生的家人推荐，又荣幸地被外研社选为用以纪念费孝通百年诞辰的英汉对照版的中文译本，在此向费宗惠女士和张荣华先生表示由衷的感谢。在对原有版本进行再次审校的过程中，责任编辑易璐女士做了大量细致的工作，我的研究生齐钊同学在中间承担了大量的联络工作，并对出版社提出的各种疑问和我一起逐章作了再一次的校订和查漏补缺的工作，在这里对他们的帮助表示由衷的感激。是为记。

2005年4月26日

初稿写于北京西二旗寓所

2005年10月13日

修改于中国农大社会学系办公室

2011年1月14日

修订于农大群舍

[1] 参阅：Hsiao-Tung Fei, 1946, "Peasantry and Gentry: An Interpretation of Chinese Social Structure and Its Changes," American Journal of Sociology, LII, No. 1 (July), 1-17.

[2] 参阅：费孝通，《乡土重建》，上海：观察社，1948年；费孝通，《乡土中国》，上海：观察社，1948年；吴晗、费孝通，《皇权与绅权》，天津：天津人民出版社，1988年。

[3] 汉语文献中很少有雷德菲尔德跟费孝通关系的描述，最近读到一位美国人类学家弗雷德·艾甘（Fred Eggan）在总结上世纪战后到70年代以前的国际人类学发展时，对于中国只顺带提到两句话，一句是有关马林诺夫斯基和拉德克里夫—布朗对于中国社会与文化人类学的早期影响，另一句就是有关雷德菲尔德与费孝通之间学术联系的描述。他说战后雷氏与费孝通有学术上的合作，他们试图要从人类学的视角来研究中国文明，研究的经费是由福特基金会提供，但是后来由于众所周知的原因而中断了（参阅：Fred Eggan, 1979, "Developments in Social and Cultural Anthropology: A Western Perspective." In Stein Rokkan, ed., 1979, A Quarter Century of International Social Science: Papers and Reports on Developments 1952-1977, New Delhi: Concept Publishing Company, 29-47, 34.）。这样看来，雷氏为费先生的这本小册子写序就是顺理成章的了，这本小册子应该是他们合作研究的一部分成果。但是对于艾甘本人，笔者所知无几，属于孤证，有待进一步的研究。

[4] 费孝通先生自己的记述是这样的：“……其中一部分文章，曾于1949年在北平口授雷德菲尔德夫人，她回国后编成China's Gentry一书，1952年在美国芝加哥大学出版社出版。”（参阅：费孝通，“学术简述”，载于《费孝通选集》，1—8，天津：天津人民出版社，1988年，第5页。）实际出版的时间是1953年，雷德菲尔德的导言写于1952年5月。

[5] 前一本是直接从英文翻译而来：费孝通，《江村经济——中国农民的生活》（戴可景译），南京：江苏人民出版社，1986年。后一本不是直接从英文翻译过来，但是却是英文写作的基础，也就是两本出版的（《禄村农田》、《易村手工业》）和一本没有出版的（《玉村农业和商业》）调查报告在半个世纪以后的合刊：费孝通，《云南三村》，天津：天津人民出版社，1990年。

[6] Fei Hsiao-tung, 1953, China's Gentry: Essays in Rural-Urban Relations, rev., ed., Margaret Park Redfield ed., Chicago: Chicago University Press, p. 80.

[7] 费孝通，《乡土重建》，上海：观察社，1948年，第47页。

[8] Fei Hsiao-tung, 1953, China's Gentry: Essays in Rural-Urban Relations, p. 101.

[9] 费孝通，《乡土重建》，1948年，第30页。

[10] 陶孟和，《孟和文存》，上海：上海亚东图书馆，1935年，第17—19页。

[11] 拙著《权力与公正》中曾经提供过一个有关计划生育具体实施过程中的例子，说明了国家的计划生育政策在我所调查的河北李村被曲解的过程。村里为每一位育龄妇女准备了一张“育龄妇女明白纸”，实际就是关于育龄妇女的登记表，但是所填的内容并非真实的内容，而是以符合国家计划生育政策为准则，并要每一位妇女牢记在心。参阅：赵旭东，《权力与公正——乡土社会的纠纷解决与权威多元》，天津：天津古籍出版社，2003年，第261页。

[12] 关于这一点最为值得阅读的研究性著作要数何炳棣先生的英文著作《明清社会史》：Ho Ping-ti, 1962, The Ladders of Success in Imperial China, New York: Columbia University Press.

[13] 这方面已有专书发表，可进一步参阅：沃特纳（Ann Waltner），《烟火接续——明清的收继与亲族关系》，曹南来译，侯旭东校，杭州：浙江人民出版社。

[14] 这方面以台湾人类学家陈奕麟的工作最为卓著，参阅其新著：Allen Chun, 2000, Unstructuring Chinese Society: The Fictions of Colonial Practice and the Changing Realities of "Land" in the New Territories of Hong Kong, Amsterdam: Harwood Academic Publishers.

[15] 何炳棣，《读史阅世六十年》，桂林：广西师范大学出版社，2005年，第25页。

[16] 费孝通，《乡土中国》，北京：三联书店，1985年。

[17] 许倬云，《求古编》，台北：联经出版事业公司，1982年，第14—15页。

[18] Joseph W. Esherick & Mary Backus Rankin, 1990, ed., Chinese Local Elites Patterns of Dominance, The University of California Press.

[19] “绅士”、“士绅”、“乡绅”都曾经用来指中国社会结构中皇权以下的统治阶层，但是不同的学者在使用上的意义有所不同。关于这方面的文献回顾可以参阅：徐茂明，《江南士绅与江南社会（1368—1911年）》，北京：商务印书馆，2004年，第13—23页。

[20] Joseph W. Esherick & Mary Backus Rankin, 1990, ed., Chinese Local Elites Patterns of Dominance, The University of California Press, p. 2.

[21] Fei Hsiao-tung, 1953, China's Gentry: Essays in Rural-Urban Relations, Margaret Park Redfield ed., Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, p. 74.

[22] Joseph W. Esherick & Mary Backus Rankin, 1990, ed., Chinese Local Elites Patterns of Dominance, p. 3.

[23] 同上。

[24] 史景迁最近的研究从另外一个侧面说明了中华帝国时代的文人是如何受到有所作为的皇权的严密的监视的。那些文人在雍正这样的统治者眼中就是大逆不道的反叛者和皇权的觊觎者。参阅：史景迁，《皇帝与秀才——皇权游戏中的文人悲剧》，邱辛晔译，上海：上海远东出版社，2005年。