

TUNKU ABDUL RAHMAN AND HIS ROLE IN THE BALING TALKS

A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY




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Prof Madya Dr. Nik Anuar Nik Mahmud

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Prof Madya Dr. Nik Anuar Nik Mahmud

Tunku Abdul Rahman and His Role in the Baling Talks

Author

Prof Nik Anuar Nik Mahmud

First Edition 1998

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Arkib Negara Malaysia

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PREFACE

I am glad to be able to append a preface to this splendid work by Professor Nik Anuar on the subject of the Baling Talks. The book has come out at the right time. Fifty long years have passed since the time when Emergency was declared in our country. But even now our knowledge of that era may be likened to a jigsaw puzzle with missing pieces. I acknowledge that the difficulty of access to both official and private archives has helped perpetuate the darkness which still obfuscates our understanding of that period.

All the same, a number of books have been written on the Emergency, each approaching the subject from a different angle. The conclusions in each of these may differ, and the same writer may even want to revise earlier approaches. But that is why history all about. It is far being static; it is both alive and vibrant. In this regard, I am glad to be able to say that this book is a welcome departure from earlier writings in that it sheds light on areas hitherto unchronicled in any of the works on the subject. It places the interests of the major players in the particular era of Malayan history in perspective, namely the Tunku, the British and the Communists. As an archivist, I am proud to be able to say that the originality of this book owes itself largely to the use of primary source materials, particularly those extant in the National Archives of Malaysia and the Public Record Office, London.

In the years to come, I am positive that more books will be published on the Emergency, even as records become easily accessible and many of the archives that are buried come to light. I am aware that there are many stones still to be turned, and as the Head of the National Archives of Malaysia I am glad to be able to say that we are committed to our duty to the public and the academia of rendering records more easily accessible for their use in reference and research. That we have readily taken upon ourselves the work publishing this book, and of launching it in a grand way at an exhibition on the Emergency is in itself an eloquent testimony of this commitment.

Lastly, I wish to record my appreciation to Prof Nik Anuar for his timely effort, and all those who have been involved in the production and launch of this book. To the readers, may I wish that you will not fail to imbibe the sweet nostalgia for things that are gone as you leaf through the pages of an important epoch in the life of our nation.

DATO' HABIBAH ZON
Director-General
National Archives of Malaysia

19 June 1998

FOREWORD

While working on various aspects of the Malayan Emergency during the 1900s, I became aware of the lack of any studies on the role played by the Malaysian leader, Tunku Abdul Rahman, in particular, to end the Emergency which had been an obstacle to the Federation's advance towards self-government. It was to this end that this monograph is written.

On being elected as the new President of UMNO in 1951, replacing Dato Onn bin Jaafar, the Tunku announced to his supporters his determination to achieve very early self-government in Malaya. However, the Tunku realised that so long as the Communist terrorism remained undefeated, the British Government would not grant self-government to Malaya. In early January 1955, the Tunku made a dramatic call for the granting of an amnesty to the Communist as part of a deal to bring to an end a state of emergency in Malaya. Soon after winning the 1955 Federal Election, the Tunku repeated his readiness to meet Chin Peng, the leader of the Malayan Communist Party, to the annoy of the British colonial authorities. The talk was held in Baling, Kedah on 28 and 29 December 1955. Although the talk was a failure, the Tunku was able to secure from the British an understanding that the continuance of the Emergency was not an obstacle 'in the Federation's advance towards self-government'.

I would like to take this opportunity of thanking my colleagues Prof Dato' Dr. Nik Hassan Shuhaimi and sdr. Mohd. bin Samsudin for their careful scrutiny of the next and for their valuable suggestions concerning both content and presentation. Thanks are also due to Arkib Negara Malaysia (National Archives of Malaysia) for agreeing to publish this monograph.

Nik Anuar Nik Mahmud
Jabatan Sejarah
Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia
June 1998



*Tunku Abdul Rahman
And His Role
In The Baling Amnesty Talks*

THE ALLIANCE PROPOSALS

On being elected as the new President of UMNO in 1951, Tunku Abdul Rahman announced to his supporters his determination to achieve very early self-government in Malaya. However, so long as the Communist terrorism remained undefeated, the Tunku believed that the British Government would not grant self-government to Malaya.¹ The Tunku's interpretation was based on the British Government directive to Sir Gerald Templer, on his appointment as the new High Commissioner for Malaya in 1951, which stated that "Her Majesty's Government would not lay aside the responsibility in Malaya until they are satisfied that Communist terrorism has been defeated".² The termination of the Emergency was first priority on the Alliance's platform, and it wished to try every means possible of achieving it.

It was to that end that, in early January 1955, the Tunku made a dramatic call for the granting of an amnesty to the Communists as part of a deal to bring to an end a state of emergency in Malaya.³ The Tunku's proposal envisaged that, since a more truly national form of government was about to be introduced into the Federation, the Communists could no longer assert that they were fighting against British imperialism and would be ready to give up the struggle. His proposal contemplated the granting of amnesty and the stepping-up of the campaign against the Communists if the amnesty was rejected. Dato' Sir Tan Cheng-Lock, President of the *Malayan Chinese Association (M.C.A.)* echoed at once the Tunku's sentiment, and even went further by publicly volunteering to go into the jungle to negotiate with the Communists.⁴

Public reaction to the Tunku's proposal was favourable for it held at the hope that it would lead to an end of militant communism and relieve the country of the heavy financial commitment in waging the emergency campaign. Moreover, its coincidence with the amnesty offered to the *Mau Mau* terrorists in Kenya, which was announced some weeks earlier, stimulated public interest about the prospects of similar amnesty in Malaya.

On 12 January 1955, a meeting of the UMNO-MCA Alliance, was held at Malacca to discuss the Tunku's amnesty proposal.⁵ The meeting decided "to ask the Federation Government to offer amnesty terms to Communist terrorists". The Committee decision was that "terrorists accepting the amnesty should be sent back to China or be rehabilitated and allowed to remain to be good citizens".

The Tunku's proposal was looked with askance by the British authorities. The British did not believe that, under circumstances obtaining in January

1955, the offer of an amnesty would be likely to bring in more surrenders than their current policy of encouraging the terrorists to surrender individually on the understanding that they would be fairly and humanely treated.⁶

There was also the major difficulty that any amnesty offer would have at some stage to be given a definite term. In addition there was fear that the ending of the amnesty period would result in a decline in the then flow of surrenders until confidence was again built up in the treatment of surrendered Communists under normal conditions.

In a telegram to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, the High Commissioner, Sir Donald MacGillivray, noted that:

*This would be unfortunate, particularly as we see nothing in present situation which would support the belief that an offer of amnesty at this juncture would be likely to be successful.*⁷

On 11 January 1955, Tunku Abdul Rahman met the Director of Operations, Lt. General Sir Geoffrey Bourne, in connection with the amnesty proposal.⁸ The Tunku stated that his objective in making his suggestion was not so much that the Malayan Communist Party (M.C.P.) would accept an offer of amnesty but to convince the people of Malaya that everything possible was being done. After elections he could impose a greater degree of mobilisation than was possible under the present Government. He fully realised that any direct negotiation with the Communists was out of the question. He stressed that it would not be acceptable for the Communists Party to be allowed to operate legally.

The proposal was further discussed on January 17 by the Director of Operations Committee, which comprised not only the Director of Operations and his Service Advisers, but a number of the political leaders. The Alliance was represented by Tunku Abdul Rahman and H.S. Lee.⁹ The Tunku was asked by the Committee to clarify his amnesty proposal and the eight-point arrangements for an amnesty as proposed by the UMNO-MCA Alliance meeting at Malacca. After the discussion, it was appreciated by the Tunku and H.S. Lee that an amnesty was not like an armistice, something to be negotiated with the Communists' leaders, but was a standing offer of pardon to each individual terrorist. It was also agreed that the amnesty question should not become a party matter.

Further publicity about the amnesty was also considered to be undesirable as it would adversely affect the conduct of the campaign to encourage the Communists to surrender to government. Furthermore, the Communist leaders themselves, in their clandestine news-letter, condemned the Alliance's proposal as a British intrigue, designed to cause dissension in the

Malayan Communist Party and to isolate it from public support. The Tunku consented to drop the proposal. Both accordingly welcomed a suggestion that a working party should be set up to examine all the implications of an amnesty. The findings were to be recorded for the information of the Director of Operations Committee. The composition of the working party was to be as follows: the principal Staff Officer to the Director of Operations, Secretary for Defence, a representative of the Attorney-General, Tunku Abdul Rahman, H.S.Lee of Malayan Chinese Association and V.M. Menon of Party Negara. After the meeting, the following press release was issued:

The question of an amnesty was very fully discussed in every respect at the Director of Operations Committee today. It was unanimously agreed that a general amnesty should not be offered, but that the present surrender policy, which embodies a very considerable measure of amnesty should continue, and increased efforts should be exerted to bring it to the notice of the rank and file of the terrorists, so that more may be induced to follow the lead of the 1,500 who have already surrendered. It was also agreed that the matter should be kept constantly under review so that policy can be modified if it should appear at any time that break up of the terrorist organization could be hastened by a greater or lesser measure of amnesty.¹⁰

The rejection by the Federal Government of the Alliance's proposal for an amnesty was strongly supported by the *Manchester Guardian*, a pro-British newspaper. *Manchester Guardian*, in its editorial, commented that an amnesty was appropriate where rebels had lost the desire to continue the struggle with a Government, and in return for an act of oblivion, were willing to become again law-abiding citizen. However, this was not the case in Malaya. The active members of the Malayan Communist Party accepted the amnesty only if they felt that afterwards they would be on a stronger position and not weaker one for their struggle with the government. The form of amnesty which was proposed by the Alliance seemed to envisage that the Communist would maintain their party organisation intact and would turn their acts of guerilla warfare to electioneering in a constitutional way.¹¹

The Tunku, however, was not giving way lightly to the shelving of the proposal he put forward in January for granting an amnesty to the Communist terrorist. The Alliance restated its views on the question of an amnesty in the case of its Election Manifesto issues in May, 1955. The Manifesto contained an undertaking to offer a general amnesty to the Communists in the following terms:

... To end the Emergency as soon as possible by offering a general amnesty and, if that fails, to mobilise all our resources and seek all foreign aid to increase the vigour and intensity of the fight against the terrorists.¹²



Tunku Abdul Rahman Chief Minister, Federation of Malaya accompanied by Mr David Marshall and Dato Sir Cheng Lock Tan, disceasses procedure with Mr. T. B Voice and Mr A. A Huckle



THE COMMUNISTS' NEGOTIATION OFFER

A month before the election, with the country increasingly gripped with political fever, the Malayan Communist Party took the initiative by putting forward a counter-offer to enter into negotiations for the termination of hostilities. The offer was contained in a letter written in Chinese, copies of which were sent to a number of leading personalities and organisations in the Federation of Malaya and in Singapore. The letter was signed by a representative of the "Malayan Races' Liberation Army" and dated the 1st May, and had been posted at Haadyai in Southern Thailand.¹³ None of those letter was sent direct to the High Commissioner or to any of his officers. It asked for safe conduct to enable representatives of the Headquarters of the Communist terrorists to come out to negotiate both a ceasefire and the participation of the Communist Party in the future development of the country. The letter, however, rejected the Alliance's amnesty offer.

The imminence of the Federal elections no doubt explained why the M.C.P. decided to choose to make their offer at that particular time. Furthermore, the offer was consistent with the then international Communist policy of turning from armed attack, or the threat of armed attack, to expansion by political means.¹⁴ At the second conference of the Communist and Workers' Parties of the British Commonwealth held in London in April 1954 a report entitled *Malaya Fights for Freedom* had been submitted by the exiled Lim Hong Bee that favoured, among other things, a provisional coalition People's government formed by all patriotic parties to achieve full national independence.¹⁵ In August 1954 a Malayan delegate to the Council of World Democratic Youth in Peking was quoted as saying that "they are willing to undertake peace talks to bring the Malayan war to an end..."¹⁶ By November 1954 a guerilla sheet produced in the Kedah/Penang area carried this report together with approval of the Geneva Conference on Indochina as an example of "how disputed can be solved justly by peaceful means". The British in Malaya were specifically urged to follow the French example in Indochina.

The M.C.P.'s proposal was discussed both by the Executive Council and the Director of Operations Committee. At this meeting, which was attended by Tunku Abdul Rahman and the other leaders, an unanimous decision was made to reject the M.C.P.'s proposal. In a statement issued by the Federation Government on 24 June 1955, the Government made it clear that the present surrender terms were a real and continuing measure of amnesty and made adequate provisions for those fighting in the jungle to come out if they wished to end the struggle.¹⁷ The Government believed that the "terrorist leaders" in Malaya had special reasons for wishing to call off the

shooting war. It was thought that the Communists leaders realised that they were slowly and steadily being defeated by the Security Forces and wished to concentrate their main efforts on subversion. For that purpose it was essential to them that the trained cadres should emerge from the jungle and organise subversive activities in the towns. The proposal for amnesty talks put forward by the Alliance in January was unacceptable to the Communist leaders because it did not seem likely to allow them to roam at will in the Federation, but would be faced with the alternative either a long period of detention or of deportation to China. Hence their thoughts appear to have turned to ways and means of calling off the armed struggle and at the same time retaining their liberty of action.

Reactions to this refusal by the Government were very varied. The rejection was supported by the Alliance and Party Negara. The Labour Party of Malaya, however, expressed the view that the rejection was over-hasty and that the offer should have been more fully examined. Of the Chinese newspapers, only the *Nanyang Siang Pau* had questioned the wisdom of Government's rejection. This paper argued that the offer was worthy of closer attention than it had received and that nothing could have been lost by meeting the Communists round a table to test their sincerity.¹⁸ The other Chinese newspapers, particularly those with KMT or Chinese Nationalist background, strongly supported the Government's rejection and described the peace offer as a manoeuvre to bring about the relaxation of military pressure which would facilitate the infiltration.

Having rejected the Communist's proposal, the Director of Operations Committee thought that it was necessary to take a positive step to show that the government was doing everything in its power to end the emergency. The Committee which discussed the matter at a series of meetings held in June and July decided to offer an amnesty to the Communists.¹⁹ The Committee was of the opinion that such an offer would be a timely counter-move by the Federation Government to offset the propaganda value of the Communists' negotiation proposals and to convince neutral opinion that the Government was not seeking to prolong the shooting war but were prepared to make a positive proposal to end it. Even if the hard core of the leaders would not respond, large numbers of the rank-and-file might take advantage of a formal offer of amnesty to give themselves up and escape from the privations of jungle life thus causing a split between the leaders and the rank-and-file. An all-out campaign such as by leaflets and loudspeakers aircraft was thought to be necessary to bring the offer to the attention of the terrorists.

The Committee also took into consideration the declaration made by the Alliance in their Election Manifesto that if they were successful at the Elections they would declare an amnesty. Since the expectations were that the Alliance would be the major party, it was clearly prudent that some

thoughts should be given in advance to the ways to which an amnesty offer might be made. If the Government opposed the granting of an amnesty it would play into the hands of the Communists for propaganda purposes.

The only objection to granting an amnesty, according to the Committee, was that it would presumably have to be limited in time and that when the time limit had expired the remaining terrorists would feel that the continuous surrender policy hitherto followed by the Government was terminated. It was therefore likely that following the termination of any period of amnesty there would be a drop in surrenders until confidence could be built up again.

The Director of Operations Committee concluded, however, that the advantages of offering an amnesty outweighed the possible risks and difficulties, and they considered that the offer would carry particular weight if it were made by the new Government soon after the elections.

To that end, the Committee began to draft the wording of the amnesty terms. Malcolm MacDonald, the British Commissioner-General for Southeast Asia, suggested that the terms should be designed to appeal to the rank-and-file terrorists who, not being Communists of the hardcore, had been intimidated by the Communists into taking up arms and having done so, had been forced to stay in the jungle.²⁰ Though those who surrender would not be prosecuted they would be required to demonstrate their loyalty to the Government before they would be allowed to return to their families. It involved neither negotiation with the Communists nor recognition of the Malayan Communist Party. The British Defence Committee of the Cabinet was also involved in the drafting of the terms. The Defence Committee considered that the point to be stressed was that Communists who surrendered would not be shot but that no hope should be held out that they would escape detention.²¹ Furthermore, it added that, it was essential that the hard core Communists should be detained for some time because if they were released they would cause further trouble in Malaya and if they were deported they would cause trouble in Southeast Asia. They thought that the amnesty terms should not include any reference to the possibility of helping a Communist who surrender to leave the country. It was suggested that no time limit should be inserted in the offer.

When the Federal Election took place on 27 July 1955, the UMNO-MCA-MIC Alliance won 51 out of the 52 elected seats in the Legislative Council.²² The High Commissioner for the Federation of Malaya, Sir Donald MacGillivray, appointed Tunku Abdul Rahman as Chief Minister in the Executive Council and accepted the recommendations put forward by Tunku Abdul Rahman for allotting the various portfolios in the Executive Council to other members and supporters of the Alliance. The Director of Operations Committee had also been reconstituted so that its civilian representatives were drawn solely from

the Alliance, as the government party. Thus the Federation Government was now in a position to take a final decision on the question of the terms and timing of the amnesty offer.

In his first public statement, the Tunku promised that his first priority would be "a swift ending" to the war and that he would offer an amnesty at the right time and with the advice of the experts.²³

The Singapore Government also endorsed the Tunku's decision to offer an amnesty to the Communists on the ground that, if successful, it would be an important step toward ending the emergency in Malaya and restoring conditions of economic prosperity in which advance in self-government and social welfare should be made.²⁴

Further discussion was later held at the Director of Operations Committee on the terms of the amnesty. Tunku Abdul Rahman proposed to make the amnesty offer as attractive as possible and recommended that the Committee should not make specific mention of the word "detention" as suggested by the British Cabinet Defence Committee.²⁵ The Tunku feared that the use of the word would adversely affect the rate of surrenders by rank and file Communists. Subsequently, it was agreed that the word "investigation" would be used instead of the word "detention".²⁶



28th December 1955
The crowd arrives from Baling



Gunong Paka 29th December 1955
The Police Escort Camp

GOVERNMENT'S DECLARATION OF AMNESTY

On September 8, 1955, the Government of the Federation of Malaya issued a declaration of amnesty to the Communist terrorist.²⁷ The Government of Singapore issued an identical offer at the same time. Tunku Abdul Rahman, as Chief Minister, now made good the offer of an amnesty but promised there would be no negotiations with the M.C.P. The terms of the amnesty were as follows:

1. Those of you who come in and surrender will not be prosecuted for any offence connected with the Emergency, which you have committed under Communist direction, either before this date or in ignorance of this declaration.
2. You may surrender now and to whom you like including to members of the public.
3. There will no general 'cease fire' but the security forces will be on alert to help those who wish to accept this offer and for this purpose local 'cease fire' will be arranged.
4. The Government will conduct investigations on those who surrender. Those who show that they genuinely intent to be loyal to the Government of Malaya and to give up their Communist activities will be helped to regain their normal position in society and be re-united with their families. As regards the remainder, restrictions will have to be placed on their liberty but if any of them wish to go the China their request will be given due consideration.²⁸

Following the declaration, an intensive publicity campaign on a hitherto unprecedented scale was launched by the Government. Alliance Ministers in the Federal Government travelled extensively up and down the country exhorting the people to call upon the Communists to lay down their arms and take advantage of the amnesty. The response from the public was good. Public demonstrations and processions were held in towns and villages.

Despite the campaign, the number of the Communists who surrendered to the authorities was poor. It was evident that the terrorists, having had ample warning of its declaration, conducted intensive anti-amnesty propaganda in their ranks and among the mass organisations, tightened discipline and warned that defection would be severely punished. Thus, it was not surprising that there was less confidence that the amnesty by itself would bring to an end to the emergency. Some critics in political circles condemned the amnesty "as being too restrictive and little more than a restatement of the surrender terms which have been in force for long period."²⁹ These critics were advocating for more realistic and liberal approach of direct negotiations with the M.C.P. to work out a settlement of the issue. Leading officials of the

Labour Party had gone further by not excluding the possibility, as part of the settlement, of recognition of the M.C.P. as a political organisation. Within the Alliance itself, there were influential elements both in the M.C.A. and the UMNO which were becoming increasingly impatient and were endeavouring to persuade the Chief Minister, Tunku Abdul Rahman, that, in spite of all his protestations and the inherent dangers, negotiation with the M.C.P. would produce quick results and thereby smoothen the path to independence.

M.C.P.'S RENEWED OFFER FOR NEGOTIATIONS

The amnesty took a new turn with a renewed offer by the Malayan Communist Party Secretary-General, Chin Peng, to negotiate with the Chief Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman.³⁰ Tunku Abdul Rahman, Sir Tan Cheng-Lock and other received by post on 24 September 1955 a cyclostyled letter, in Chinese, purporting to come from Central Committee of Malayan Communist Party, posted at Klian Intan, Perak.

The letter criticised the Alliance Government's amnesty offer as "not reasonable and impracticable" and proposed for an immediate negotiations to be conducted directly between the two parties engaged in the fighting to "achieve a cease fire and to solve the question of repealling the Emergency Regulations and of achieving independence by a peaceful means." For that reason, the writer promised to send their representatives to the UMNO-MCA-MIC Alliance Headquarters in Kuala Lumpur to discuss "details for a meeting to be held between Tunku Abdul Rahman and Sir Tan Cheng-Lock with comrade Chin Peng."

On receiving the letter, the Tunku met immediately with the High Commissioner, Sir Donald MacGillivray. During their discussion, the Tunku regarded it as essential that he should reiterate his willingness to meet with Chin Peng, and the intention was merely to clarify the amnesty terms.³¹ If not, the Tunku argued, the sincerity of his efforts to end the Emergency and bring peace that might be questioned. The Tunku agreed that a general ceasefire would be contemplated only if it became apparent that the M.C.P. would surrender under the terms of declaration of the amnesty.

While acceding to the Tunku's request, MacGillivray asked the Tunku to issue an immediate press statement of its reactions to the M.C.P.'s offer to negotiate, since press and public comment upon it was building up and silence might have been interpreted in some quarters as meaning that serious consideration was being given by the Federation Government to acceptance of it. The statement, he believed, did not in any way affect the terms of their declaration of amnesty. However, by implication, it rejected renewed offer to negotiate with the Communists.

On September 30, the Tunku made an announcement that he had agreed to meet Chin Peng but only "to clarify to him the recent declaration of amnesty."³² He would be accompanied by Tan Cheng-Lock. An official who was known to Chin Peng would be nominated as Conducting Officer to meet Chin Peng at a rendezvous in a safe area in which a local ceasefire would be arranged. If Chin Peng wished to attend such a meeting he was to write

privately to Tunku Abdul Rahman, naming the rendezvous, the time and the date for meeting. The Conducting Officer would bring him to the meeting place.

On October 1, when the Tunku was visiting Singapore for discussion with David Marshall, the Chief Minister of Singapore, a press conference took place at which the Tunku, when asked whether he would be going alone with Tan Cheng-Lock to meet Chin Peng, said that he would like David Marshall to come and would be inviting him. David Marshall, when questioned, explained that the invitation had gone from the Communists to Federation Ministers only, but that if the Communists invited him to attend, in view of Singapore's common interest in the problem, he would accept the Tunku's suggestion that he should accompany him.³³ Probably in response to the Tunku's press conference that Chin Peng, on October 4, wrote to David Marshall saying that he would welcome Marshall's presence at the meeting.

Meanwhile, on October 2, Chin Peng wrote to the Tunku suggesting that his liaison officers should meet in North Malaya to exchange on the arrangements for the meeting.

The first encounter between the liaison officers took place on October 17 at Klian Intan in North Perak to arrange details of the meeting between Chin Peng and the Chief Ministers. The Federation Government was represented by I.S. Wylie, the Deputy Commissioner of Police, and Too Joon Hing, the Assistant Minister for Education, and Chin Peng was represented by Chen Tien, the head of the M.C.P.'s Central Propaganda Department.³⁴ Chen Tien stated that the Communists proposed that the meeting with Tunku Abdul Rahman should last from two to three weeks and that they expected that the meeting zone would be cleared of Security Forces. Wylie replied that the meeting would not last longer than 48 hours, with a possible extension by 24 hours, and that the Security Forces would not be withdrawn but would be confined to base.

CLARIFICATION OR NEGOTIATIONS?

On 19 October 1955, a meeting was held at the Government House in Singapore to discuss the proposed meeting between the Tunku and Chin Peng, the Secretary-General of the Malayan Communist Party.³⁵ This meeting was attended by Sir Robert Scott, MacGillivray, Tunku Abdul Rahman, Marshall and Sir R. Black, the Governor of Singapore. During the meeting, Marshall expressed his concern about the outcome of a meeting with Chin Peng. He feared that the meeting would develop into negotiations during which demands would be made by Chin Peng and concessions in some form would be inevitable. He was certain that Chin Peng would demand an immediate ceasefire and the immediate release of all his supporters who were in detention or who might give themselves in under the terms of the amnesty and he would probably call for the repeal of the *Emergency Regulations in the Federation and the new security legislation in Singapore* and independence in the near future for Malaya. Marshall stressed that the immediate release of all persons in detention would bring serious consequences to Singapore because it would greatly reinforce Communist subversive operations. Marshall maintained that, as people's elected representative associated with the special purpose of the amnesty offer, he might be compelled to make the concession. As an alternative, he might be compelled to resign. Marshall pressed for clarification of policy in the face of the grave possibilities if there were any negotiations at all.

The Tunku appeared firmly wedded to the idea that negotiations were inevitable. He stated that he would not go to meet Chin Peng merely to clarify the terms of the amnesty. He must be able to listen to Chin Peng, to discuss his proposals and then to bring them back to the High Commissioner with his own recommendation as to whether they should or should not be adopted.³⁶ The five requests which he expected Chin Peng to make were:

1. Recognition of the Malayan Communist Party.
2. An assurance that those surrendering would not be deported.
3. An assurance that those surrendering would be allowed to play a part in the political life of country and would not be detained for more than a very short period.
4. The release of detainees.
5. The repeal of the Emergency Regulations.

The Tunku said that he would reject straightaway the demand for the recognition of the Malayan Communist Party but that he was prepared to discuss the other demands. He recognised that he would not have the authority to agree to anything at the meeting. After hearing what Chin Peng

had to say and after discussion on those points with him he would refer them to the High Commissioner as to whether it should or not be adopted.

MacGillivray emphasised that the Tunku's meeting with Chin Peng was agreed to only on the understanding that it was for the purpose of clarification of the terms of the amnesty and that there would be no negotiations. To this, the Tunku replied that the public realised that the amnesty itself would not bring an end to the emergency and were looking to the meeting to do so. The Tunku pointed out that there was growing public opinion in favour of negotiation and because of that he could not go to the meeting if he were authorised merely to explain the terms of the amnesty.

The Tunku also reminded the High Commissioner that a strong Alliance Government offered the best hope of keeping Communist subversion under control. But that the Government would not remain strong if it could not show that it was making progress towards independence. The Government would also not remain strong if he himself lost his position and had to give way to extremists within UMNO. He would also lose his position if his enemies succeeded in branding him as a "Colonial stooge". Therefore, at the meeting with Chin Peng, it was important that he appeared that he would not be acting entirely on the instructions of the British official with him at the talks. Another reason was his fear that it would tend to raise the level of the meeting to "negotiations". It would also give the Chin Peng too much "face".

Later, during his discussion with Lord Reading, Chairman of the Colonial Party Committee of the Colonial Office, who was in Singapore after attending the Bandung Conference, the Tunku made it clear that he had every intention of using every means in his power to bring the emergency to an end. The Tunku insisted that he had pledged himself in the election-campaign to do so and that, if he failed, he would at once become discredited. On the other hand, success would give the best and probably the only chance of creating a united country. Lord Reading suggested that he had only just been elected with a substantial majority and that it seemed early days to talk of being overthrown. But the Tunku insisted that his position would be fatally undermined by delay. Time was vital, argued the Tunku. People were watching closely to see whether or not he was able to redeem his pledge. His final opinion was that a military solution was no longer possible. He pointed out that the Communists, some 3,000 strong, were comfortably established in villages on the Siamese border, which they were free to cross and recross at will. Their presence increased the prosperity of the villages and was, therefore, welcome. These hide-outs were so remote and inaccessible that they could never be reached by troops. The only way to terminate the emergency was, therefore, negotiations. It was useless for him to meet Chin Peng unless he was in a position to make reasonable concessions. The terms of the amnesty were really no advance on the terms offered two years

ago. He must have a discretion to make a more reasonable offer, if the course of negotiations required it. If he were given a reasonably free hand, he could gain his objective and, once the emergency was at an end he would be free to turn his attention to the rooting out of subversive activities.

Lord Reading, in his memorandum to the Colonial Office, reminded that the Tunku was set upon holding the meeting with Chin Peng, which he compared in importance to those held at Pyongyang, Korea, and if the Tunku was not given the latitude that he wanted, it was fairly certain that he would refuse to pursue the project at all and would then publicly lay the blame for the continuance of the "emergency" upon the imperialistic obstinacy of the British Government, alleging that they were unwilling to see achieved a peace which might result in the speedy relaxation of their grip on the country.

Lord Reading also pointed out that David Marshall disliked and deeply distrusted the Tunku and was violently resentful at having been led into trap as regards his own attendance at the proposed meeting. He was still *uncertain whether he would in the end participate, if it took place, since he felt that, if he found himself unable to go all the way with the Tunku, he would be branded as no more than a "stooge" of the British and he would be seriously weakened in his relations with his own people.*

Lord Reading considered the Tunku "a very vain man" and it might be that personal vanity was an element in the policy that he was pursuing. But the main impulse, in his view, seemed to come from his desire to clear the ground of obstacles to the achievement of independence in the very near future.

The Tunku's new stance had indeed placed the Malayan Government in a dilemma. In his telegram to the Colonial Secretary, MacGillivray noted that *the Federation were faced broadly with two alternatives to insist either (a) that the meeting should be for the sole purpose of explaining the terms of the amnesty, or (b) to agree that the Chief Minister should hear what Chin Peng had to say and to discuss points with him but not to commit the British in any way to agreement on any point.*³⁷

MacGillivray was of the opinion that if the Federal authorities insisted that the meeting should be for the sole purpose of explaining the terms of the amnesty there was a real risk that the Alliance would use their "secret weapons" of resignation from Councils at all levels and thus represented to the public that the British had refused to allow the Tunku to meet Chin Peng even to hear what he had to say. It was therefore clear that the British did *not want to end the emergency, but deliberately wished to keep it alive in order to deny independence to Malaya.* There would then be a strong anti-British campaign by UMNO with consequential diminution of support given to the British in the prosecution of the emergency by the public and possible

loss of morale in the police and Malay regiment.

However, if the British Government agreed with alternative (b), MacGillivray argued that it might be that the British would not be able to agree with the Tunku and that he would resign. The Tunku could then represent to the public that he could have brought emergency to an end on terms acceptable to the public but that the British had frustrated a reasonable solution.

However, before any decision was taken, MacGillivray asked his Senior Advisers, consisting of the Chief Secretary, Attorney-General, Chief of Police and Director of Intelligence, to assess the implication of the alternative courses.³⁸ The Senior Advisers, in their report, recommended that the meeting should be allowed to proceed and the Government must not make any stand on the issue. However, every attempt should be made to confine the discussions within the terms of the Declaration of amnesty. If they were unable to persuade the Chief Minister to confine himself to a clarification of the amnesty terms, the Tunku should instead be permitted to listen to and discuss points raised by the Communists in addition to the clarification of the amnesty terms. The attention of the Chief Minister should be drawn to the importance of confining any discussion to seeking clarification and explanation of the Communist point of view without indicating his own opinion or committing himself in any way. The British authorities also should not insist on the inclusion of a British Official at the talks. The Chief Minister should, however, be encouraged to take a senior Chinese Minister to the meeting. If, on the return of the Chief Minister from such a meeting agreement could not be reached between him and the High Commissioner on any fundamental point raised at the meeting, the High Commissioner could then make a stand.

On 24 October, 1955, MacGillivray submitted the conclusion of the Senior Adviser's report to the Colonial Secretary for his consideration and sought his permission to allow the meeting to take place and that the British Government should not make a stand on an issue on which public opinion would not be on their side.³⁹ MacGillivray was convinced that it might be impossible to dissuade Tunku Abdul Rahman from his intention to have discussions with Chin Peng at his forthcoming meeting. If an attempt was made to impose unacceptable conditions on the Chief Minister for his meeting with Chin Peng, he might resign and thus placed himself in the position of being able to accuse the British Government of obstructing a course of action which could be represented as opening up a prospect of bringing an emergency to an end. He felt very strongly that the consequences of such a breach at that time would greatly weaken the British position in Malaya. Moreover, that breach would likely lead to dissension in the ranks of the alliance itself and the emergence of Malay/Chinese antagonisms, to an extent that would jeopardise the chances of establishing

a united Malaya under a strong democratic government. Such a government was the only answer, in the long run, to Communist penetration. MacGillivray argued that:

We feel that for our best is a strong Alliance Government working in harmony with us and that the chance of this would be lost if the Alliance leaders should get it into their heads that we do not wish the Emergency to end and that we are using the Emergency as an excuse to delay self-Government. Our firm opinion is therefore that the meeting must be allowed to take place and that we should not now make a stand on an issue on which public opinion would not be on our side.⁴⁰

Another way to stiffen the Tunku for the meeting would be for the British Government to make it clear by a public statement that the end of the shooting war was not regarded as a necessary condition precedent to the grant of self-government in Malaya.⁴¹ He pointed out that the Chief Minister and other members of the Alliance Party believed that the British Government would not allow any further progress towards self-government while the emergency lasted. Tunku was determined to achieve very early self-government and Alliance leaders as a whole genuinely believed that if they did they would be submerged by extremists.

Malcolm MacDonald, the former British Commissioner-General for South East Asia, also agreed with MacGillivray that the Tunku should be allowed to hold talks with Chin Peng but the Tunku must be warned in writing that Her Majesty's Government fully reserved the right to reject proposals going beyond the terms of the amnesty offer.⁴² The Tunku should be warned against the dangers of subversion for both Malaya and Singapore. The High Commissioner should also explain to the Tunku orally, as a personal view, that he would no doubt have to listen to whatever the Communists have to say but that he should be careful to avoid committing himself even to a promise to consider a Communist proposal, though he was at liberty to reject outright. MacDonald also believed that it might be of decisive value if the Colonial Secretary should be able to assure the Chief Minister that further progress towards self-government did not depend upon the ending of the shooting war. Sir R. Black, the Governor of Singapore was also of similar opinion.⁴³ However, he added that if the meeting led to discussion of points outside the amnesty terms, the Chief Ministers must return to discuss with the High Commissioner, Commissioner-General and himself as Governor of Singapore.

On 28 October, the Colonial Policy Committee at the Colonial Office discussed at length the proposed meeting between the Chief Minister and Chin Peng. The Committee advised the Secretary of State, A. Lennox-Boyd, to approve the suggestion made by the High Commissioner to allow the Tunku to hold a meeting with Chin Peng. However, it noted that every effort must be made by the High Commissioner to persuade the Tunku to

confine himself to explanation and clarification of the terms of the amnesty and that it should be pointed out that within those terms of reference there was still considerable room for manoeuvre and discussion.⁴⁴ If, despite this explanation, the Tunku still insisted that he must be prepared to listen to what Chin Peng had to say and to hold discussions with him, he should be allowed to do so. It should, however, be made clear to him that the High Commissioner's consent to the talks had been given on the definite understanding that he was not going to the meeting as a plenipotentiary with a power to agree to anything on behalf of the Federation Government but must confine himself to bring them back for further discussion with the High Commissioner and the Executive Council. The Tunku should be told that the British Government was not prepared to accept any concession on vital issues such as recognition of the Communist Party or the release of "hard-core" Communists to undertake subversive activities in the Federation. The Tunku should also be warned about the danger of allowing the terrorists to figure as heroes after an amnesty and about the danger of subversion for both Malaya and Singapore. The Committee also agreed with the High Commissioner that it would not be advisable for a senior British official to be present at the talks. The Tunku would no doubt had to be careful to avoid committing himself even to a promise to consider a Communist proposal. He was, however, at liberty to reject outright their demands.

MacGillivray was informed about the Colonial Policy Committee's recommendation by the Colonial Secretary on the 29th October 1955.⁴⁵ Regarding the High Commissioner's suggestion that it might help to stiffen Tunku if he were to make a public statement in Parliament to the effect that the British Government no longer regarded the shooting war as an obstacle on the road to self-government, the Colonial Secretary feared that a statement in those terms if made in Parliament would be misunderstood and interpreted as a retreat from the position previously held. If it would help, however, in briefing the Tunku for the meeting with Chin Peng, MacGillivray might say that he had been informed by him that, although the shooting war had not yet ended, internal security conditions had improved to such a degree that the British Government no longer regarded them as an obstacle to further progress on the road to independence. He also was prepared to send the Tunku a personal message timed to reach him shortly before the meeting.

On 1 November 1955, MacGillivray discussed with the members of the Executive Council on the nature and scope of meeting with Chin Peng.⁴⁶ MacGillivray explained that there was a considerable field for discussion within the limits of the amnesty. But he warned the Tunku that the discussions with Chin Peng on other matters, such as the repeal of the Emergency Regulations, might amount to their acknowledgement that Chin Peng had a right to a voice in policy-making and would raise the meeting to the level of negotiations on equal terms.

The Tunku reiterated his intention of doing no more than listening to what Chin Peng had to say. He would then report back to the High Commissioner. The Tunku also expressed his appreciation of the importance of not allowing the Communists to appear in the guise of victors but thought that this could be achieved by insisting that all who surrendered should be held for investigation "even if this was only for 3 days". Other Ministers said little on the subject of the meeting with Chin Peng itself, probably for fear of expressing views which might not coincide with those of the Chief Minister. But Dr. Ismail, Minister of Land and Mines, emphasized the importance that the Alliance and the people attached to ending the Emergency at the earliest possible moment. He also brought out the point that the sense of urgency was increased by the fact that the British Government? Ong Yoke Lin, Minister of Transport, went so far as to say that the effect of this condition on many people's minds was to make them feel that Chin Peng hold the key to the situation. Ismail said that he thought the British Government should then take the initiative by indicating that further progress towards self-government was not dependent upon the prior termination of the Emergency.

In view of the discussion in the Executive Council, MacGillivray urged the Secretary of State to issue a public statement that the emergency did not stand in the way of self-government.⁴⁷ With regard to the two written communications which were suggested earlier by the Secretary of State that should be made to the Chief Minister, MacGillivray feared that to put all these points to him in writing would create an atmosphere of distrust and would have the reverse of the effect desired. It might impel the Tunku to go beyond the limits set simply in order to avoid being called a "British stooge". The best arrangement might be for him, with the Director of Operations present, to have a final discussion with him just before he goes to the meeting.

MEETING WITH CHEN TIEN

The Tunku appeared to be impatient over the lack of response from the Communists to the amnesty offer and over the delay in holding the proposed high level talks with the Communist leaders. On his arrival from Kuala Lumpur from his visit to Indonesia, Tunku Abdul Rahman was questioned by the press about further measures he would take in arranging discussions with Chin Peng. The Tunku replied that he hoped there would be a letter from the Communist awaiting him in his office. There was, in fact, no such letter. On 15 November, the Tunku announced, in a broadcast over the radio, that he was not prepared to wait indefinitely for Chin Peng to respond to his invitation and that he was bound to infer from the delay a lack of sincerity on the part of the Communists to bring about an end to the hostilities.

Two days later, on the 17th November, Chen Tien, M.C.P.'s Head for Propaganda, and his guide turned up unannounced at Klian Intan in North Perak.⁴⁸ His appearance was interpreted by the public as a direct response to the Tunku's warning. Representatives of the press, who had been hanging about for weeks, were the first to meet them. Speaking in fluent English, Chen Tien denounced the amnesty offer as "unreasonable, impracticable and entirely unacceptable."⁴⁹ He then handed to the press a statement by Chin Peng in Chinese to the effect that the "masses" were hoping for peace talks at an early date and that, in spite of the activities of a "few influential warmongers and militant people", there was 'no reason to doubt the possibility of holding peace talks and reaching a reasonable agreement". Chin Peng, Chan Tien declared, demanded three conditions for the meeting: first, he wanted concrete assurances for the personal safety of Communist delegates, secondly, he wanted an agenda prepared, thirdly, he demanded that an International Peace Commission should be invited to supervise any peace agreement which might result from the meeting. Chen Tien then posted a registered letter to the Tunku.

The Tunku's first instinct was to authorise his two representatives to make immediate arrangements for a meeting between himself and Chin Peng about 9 December.⁵⁰ The High Commissioner, however, reminded the Tunku that the Chief Minister of Singapore was also concerned, and after telephoning to Marshall, Tunku Abdul Rahman agreed that the meeting with Chin Peng should not take place until after Marshall's return from London since Marshall was unwilling to put off his visit to London in order to meet Chin Peng. MacGillivray also pointed out that Chin Peng's statement mounted to an outright rejection of the amnesty terms and a renewal of the proposal to negotiate on an equal basis. In view of this statement, MacGillivray advised

the Tunku not to make arrangements for a meeting with Chin Peng which might make the public to conclude that the Government had accepted Chin Peng's rejection of the amnesty terms and his proposal for negotiations. The Tunku saw the force of the High Commissioner's argument and instructed Too Joon Hing and I.S. Wylie to make no arrangements with Chen Tien for a meeting between himself and Chin Peng but to inform Chen Tien that the purpose of such a meeting would be to explain the amnesty terms and not to enter into negotiations.

On 18 November, Too Joon Hing and I.S. Wylie met Chen Tien, who reiterated some of the points about arrangements for the meeting with Chin Peng which he raised at their first encounter in October.⁵¹ There was some discussion but no decision reached, and it was agreed that there should be a further encounter between the two sides on the 13th or the 16th December.

In a press statement issued on November 19, the Tunku announced that Too Joon Hing and I.S. Wylie had discussed with Chen Tien administrative arrangements for the meeting with Chin Peng.⁵² He also warned Chin Peng in a forceful terms that, if Chin Peng or his representatives ever again issue statements to the press, and indulge in propaganda tactics, he would refuse to meet Chen Ping or anyone else. He went on to say:

*I am not going to negotiate with or treat Chin Peng as my equal; I am going to explain the amnesty. I will listen if he proposes something to me, and I will consider it. I represent the Malayan Government, and we have all the resources to fight and beat the Communists. I want peace and I want to end this Emergency. I will end the Emergency in any case, but I don't want any more bloodshed if I can help it.*⁵³

In view of the ineffectiveness of the amnesty, the High Commissioner advised the Tunku to terminate the amnesty offer. In some localities, MacGillivray pointed out that the M.C.P. had been taking advantage of the amnesty "safe areas" to make contacts and to replenish supplies. This attitude and a Communist attack in force on a new village in the Cameron Highlands led the Government to decide that more forceful action against the Communists was necessary. On 21 November, a joint statement was issued by the Chief Minister and the Director of Operations declaring that, although surrenders would still be accepted under the amnesty, the restrictions which had placed on Security Forces action upon the declaration of the amnesty would be lifted and all the safe areas notified under the Amnesty would be cancelled from 1 December 1955.

Meanwhile, on 30 November, the High Commissioner, in his address to the Legislative Council, announced that Her Majesty's Government saw no reason to regard the continuance of the Emergency at its present level as an obstacle in the Federations's advance towards self-government.⁵⁴

MacGillivray believed that the announcement had been very well-received and would be valuable in stiffening public opinion against negotiations. In fact, the Tunku, in reply to an oral question in the Legislative Council, declared that his meeting with Chin Peng "will be neither negotiations nor peace talks". The Tunku reiterated his stand in the Legislative Council debate on 3 December 1955 that:

There would be no negotiations for peace as some people apparently believed. It was only after the offer had been made to explain the amnesty terms that some people had voiced the opinion that the Alliance Government should further negotiate peace. If we do so, it would be an admission of defeat by the Alliance Government should further negotiate peace. If we do so, it would be an admission of defeat by the Alliance Government and admission that the policy of the Communist Party is right. We are not prepared to admit that the Alliance Government had never been in a stronger position than it was today. Our armed forces are carrying the fight into deep jungle. It was, however, the wish of the Alliance Government that there should be no further loss of life or suffering and that is the reason why we are now making an all-out bid to stop further bloodshed by peaceful means.⁵⁵

In view of the Tunku's stiffening stand against negotiations, MacGillivray decided not to write a personal message to him that his consent to his being allowed to listen to Chin Peng was given on certain definite understandings fearing that it would create an atmosphere of mistrust and would have the reverse of the effect desired. What he would propose to do was to see the Tunku before he left for the meeting, handed him the letter from the Secretary of State and to wish him good luck.

On 13 December, Chen Tien reappeared at Klian Intan and met the two Government representatives.⁵⁶ The meeting took place in a tent on Kroh airstrip, which had been gazetted as a Protected Place for the purpose. The meeting lasted for three hours. The two sides discussed arrangements for the main meeting between the Chief Ministers and Chin Peng. The Government spokesmen proposed that the meeting should be held on the 28th December at Baling in Kedah. There should be a local ceasefire and that the Security Forces in the area should remain inactive. Chen Tien eventually agreed to all those proposals, subject to confirmation by Chin Peng. He referred again to the desirability of preparing an agenda, but was told that the Chief Ministers merely intended to clarify the terms of the Amnesty and listened to what Chin Peng had to say. He was told that the Tunku expected to receive a letter from Chin Peng, confirming that he would meet the Chief Ministers at the time and place proposed. Wylie, however, made it clear to Chen Tien that if Chin Peng did not turn up for a meeting on the 28th of December under the agreed arrangements, then the Amnesty would be terminated, and there would be no further question of a meeting and talks.

BALING TALKS

The talk took place in the Government English School at Baling on December 28th. It lasted more than eight hours, and was spread over two days. The M.C.P. was represented by Chin Peng, the Secretary-General, Rashid Maidin and Chen Tien, head to the M.C.P.'s Central Propaganda Department. On the other side were three elected national representatives, Tunku Abdul Rahman, Dato Tan Cheng-Lock and David Marshall.

In his opening remarks, Tunku Abdul Rahman thanked the Communists for the confidence they had shown in coming out to the meeting.⁵⁷ He reminded that his task was to explain the amnesty terms but not to stand in judgement over them. He then detailed the political changes which had been taking place in Malaya and explained that his election victory was based on the promise that "colonialism must end and that this country must be given freedom." He then mentioned the High Commissioner's announcement in the Legislative Council on 30 November that the British Government no longer considered "the continuation of the Emergency" as "an obstacle to the Federation's advance to self-government". The British Government intended to enter the London talks in January "on that understanding". Since then the UMNO Assembly had passed a very important resolution to the effect that independence for Malaya must be given by the 31 August 1957.

The Tunku then explained to Chin Peng that the objective of his Party was to bring peace to the country. But, in his opinion, there would be no way of bringing about peace other than to offer suitable amnesty terms for the surrender of the Communists. The Tunku reiterated that if the Communists accepted the amnesty "everyone would be pardoned." The Tunku then explained the amnesty terms in full. However, he added that the Government had carried out its part of the terms with regard to local ceasefire, but unfortunately the Communists on their part had continued offensive action. As a result, ceasefire arrangements had been suspended by the Government, although the Security Forces would be on alert to help those who wished to accept the amnesty offer. He understood that they had rejected those amnesty terms and would like to know the reason. The Tunku also reminded Chin Peng that he did not come at the meeting as the spokesman for the British Government was "neither as the stooge or running dog of colonialism" but as the servant of the people".

Chin Peng replied that it was because he realised that the Tunku were not "the spokesman of the British Government or the running dog of the British Government" that they were prepared to meet them at the risks of their lives.

Chin Peng explained that he had not come to the meeting to argue questions of ideology but to search for peace "so that the misery of the people can be reduced". Chin Peng pointed out that the M.C.P. rejected the amnesty offer because they did not permit Communists to "enjoy equal status so that they genuinely intended to be loyal to the Government would be "helped to regain their normal position in society." Chin Peng then reflected the past statement by the Tunku that if the M.C.P. stopped the armed struggle, then they could enjoy status so that they could fight for independence by constitutional means. But the amnesty terms did not contain such a point.

To this the Tunku retorted that the amnesty specifically declared that Communists who gave up communism and showed that they genuinely intended to be loyal to the government would be "helped to regain their normal position in society". First, however, the Communists would have to show their loyalty to Malaya. In his view, simply to be anti-British was not sufficient to show that one was loyal to Malaya. The Tunku pointed out that the Malayan people regarded the Communist activities as something entirely foreign to the Malayan way of life. They regarded the Communist Party as belonging to a power outside the country and considered that its members gave allegiance to that foreign country and not Malaya.

During the second session, the discussion revolved on the question of loyalty to Malaya and recognition of the Malayan Communist Party. Chin Peng asked the Tunku to explain the actual meaning of "loyalty to Malaya." The Tunku stated that one of the things the Malayan people expected was that the Communist should give up their Communist activities. Loyalty to Malaya would include acceptance of the position of the Rulers and agreement to uphold their dignity. Dato Sir Tan Cheng-Lock added that if a man wanted to live in Malaya, he should assume the responsibilities and duties of a good citizen. David Marshall defined loyalty as "loyalty to the government of the day, and loyalty to the constitutional processes in bringing about such changes for the welfare of the people."

The talk then turned to the question of the recognition of the Malayan Communist Party. Chin Peng asked the Tunku whether the giving up of Communist activities meant the dissolution of the Malayan Communist Party. The Tunku answered in affirmation. Chin Peng stressed the point that, as a member of the Malayan Communist Party, they were not prepared to be forced by others to give up that ideology, but wished to put their ideology to the people to decide, if that was possible. The Tunku retorted that if the Malayan Communist Party was allowed to take part in free election, the people would choose the Alliance. The Tunku continued that the Communist and Malayan ideologies were not the same. The Malayan people preferred their own way of life, and the Communists must accept the way of life accepted by the majority. Chin Peng admitted that during the last few year

political progress had been made in Malaya and it was because of that he believed that the time had come when the Communist should come to the meeting with sincerity in the hope that they could solve their problems. However, he reiterated that he could not accept the amnesty conditions as they were then, because those conditions required them to dissolve the Malayan Communist Party. When asked by Chin Peng on what other means the emergency could be ended, the Tunku replied that Chin Peng and the members of the Malayan Communist Party must give up their communist activities and prove themselves loyal to the country.

Chin Peng did not give up. He did not see why since they were Communists they could "declare to the people that we are Communists. We do not wish to join other political parties and then do our scheming or intrigues. That is why we want this question of recognition of the M.C.P. to be solved."

Then Tunku said that he was not asking Communists to give their ideology - "one's ideology is what one believes in" - but their activities were something quite different.

The Tunku reiterated that the Federal Government was not prepared to recognise the Malayan Communist Party because Communist activities had been associated with murder, with atrocities, with acts of violence of every kind. Furthermore, the Malayan Communist Party was composed of very few nationals. Chin Peng then took the point on whether the difference was because most of the members of the Malayan Communist Party in Malaya were Chinese. David Marshall replied that as far as Singapore was concerned that had nothing to do with it. The point was that the Communist were exercising violence. The Tunku added that in Malaya the situation was different because the Malays felt that the Communists owned their allegiance to Communist China.

Chin Peng put one more question before another adjournment. Was it necessary for any decisions made at the meeting to be approved by the British Government? The Tunku replied: "If I decide and Mr. Marshall agrees with me that will be all."

The next session started at 6.30 p.m. and lasted until 8.05 p.m. Chin Peng returned with fresh vigour to the question of recognition of his party. One of several gambits turned on the question of whether his party would be accepted if its members were confined to federal citizens. "No", answered Tunku.


The talk turned to other aspects, such as the detention of surrendered terrorists for purposes of interrogation and investigation. The Tunku explained that investigation would be carried out very speedily. "We want to

extract a promise from you that you will not carry on your activities; which we say are not loyal to Malaya and are prejudicial to the interests of Malaya and Malaysians. We will want you to sign a declaration to that effect”.

Chin Peng refused to accept this, declaring that for the “dignity of man” if this principle was insisted upon, then they would have to carry on with the struggle. This brought a question from Marshall, “Forgive me for asking, but what are you struggling for?” for Chin Peng solemnly replied, “It is very simple to just for the dignity of man.” Marshall exclaimed that using deed of violence to enforce their views on a population that does want them was hardly compatible with the dignity of man. Chin Peng admitted that their outlook on this question was quite different and he was prepared to argue on it.

It was at this point that the talk really broke down. Chin Peng came back time and again to the points on which the Communists insisted: recognition of the M.C.P, no detention, no investigation and no restriction on their movements after surrender. The Tunku made it clear that after investigations and the removal of restriction on freedom those Communists who remained in Malaya could join recognized political parties and to take part in politics, but they would not be allowed to form a Communist Party under another name. At the end of the session, Marshall pleaded with them to try and consider the question soberly and to remember that there must be some sacrifice on their part. The Chief Ministers informed Chin Peng that they would be prepared to meet again on the following morning.

The delegations met again at 10.30 the next morning, but from the very beginning Chin Peng resolutely rode his cardinal theme of political recognition of his party and freedom for members. For Chin Peng, the purpose of investigation implied surrender and was unacceptable. He considered it as humiliation: “If you demand our surrender we would prefer to fight to the last man”. The Tunku replied that some surrender was inevitable. “... if you do not come out to surrender, we would rather not accept you in our society. If you want to have peace in this country, one side must give in either we give in to you or you give in to us.” The Tunku stressed that he was not prepared to allow a situation where Malaya might be divided as had happened in the case of Korea and Vietnam. Malaya was too small and he had, therefore, to be frank with them and say that it was they who must surrender. The Chief Ministers, before leaving, then appealed to Chin Peng to think of the general welfare of the people and informed them that if, in the near future, the Communists were prepared to show any change of attitude, they would not consider their pride in coming to meet them again. Within an hour, Chin Peng and his colleagues were whirled back to Klian Intan. The next day he joined his bodyguard and disappeared in the direction of South Thailand.



BALING TOWN

The Malayan Chinese Association slogan reads "All the peoples of Malaya wish the talks will be a complete success."



The Meeting Room

WITHDRAWAL OF AMNESTY OFFER

Following the talks, the Tunku decided to withdraw the amnesty on 8 February 1956, five months after it had been offered. He stated that he would not be willing to meet the Communists again unless they indicated before hand their desire to see him with a view to making "a complete surrender." He said that the Communists had made it clear to him that their ideology and that of himself and his party could not exist side by side. Therefore, the war must be intensified until one or the other gave in... I have every confidence that the people of Malaya will give their fullest support and co-operation to the action I have taken."⁵⁸

Despite the failure of the Baling talks, the M.C.P. made every efforts to resume a resumption of peace talks with the Malayan Government but was to no avail. A few weeks after the Baling talks, Tan Siew Sin received a letter from Chen Tien, requesting a resumption of peace talks and the repeal of the Emergency Regulations. This request was immediately rejected by the Chief Minister and instead, discussions began in the new Emergency Operations Council to intensify the 'People's War' against the guerillas. In July 1957, a few weeks away from independence, the M.C.P. made a desperate attempt for peace talks. The M.C.P. had suggested the following conditions for a negotiated peace; its members should be given privileges enjoyed by citizens: they should have freedom to participate in election and stand as candidates; and there should be a guarantee that political as well as armed members of the M.C.P. would not be punished. The Tunku, however, did not respond to the M.C.P.'s proposal.

On 31 August 1957 Malaya achieved her Independence with Tunku Abdul Rahman as the Prime Minister. With the achievement of independence, there was a marked increase in the M.C.P.'s peace proposals and in November 1957, after a direct proposal from Chin Peng, Tunku Abdul Rahman agreed to a preliminary meeting. The border town of Kroh was chosen as a site for possible talks. However, Chin Peng, did not accept the principle of surrender. As a result, the talks failed to take place. Since then the M.C.P. strength began to decline. The Malayan Government increased its military activities to suppress the M.C.P. and by 1960 they were forced to retire to the border with its dwindling strength. Finally on 31 July 1960, the Malayan Government declared the ending of the twelve-year emergency. There continued to be minor incidents, but the communists were no more a threat. They in fact had lost their reason for insurrection, Malaya had achieved independence and was no more under British control.

NOTES

- 1 Extract from Political Report (P.M.R.), 4/1952.
- 2 MacGillivray to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, 25 October 1955, D1091/72, FO371/116941.
- 3 *Malay Mail*, 6 January 1955.
- 4 *Ibid*, 9 January 1955.
- 5 Federation of Malaya to The Secretary of State for the Colonies, 19 January 1955, CO1030/22.
- 6 Federation of Malaya: Detention, Deportation and Rehabilitation Policy in High Commissioner to Secretary of State for the Colonies, 25 May 1955. FO371/116939.
- 7 Federation of Malaya to The Secretary of State for the Colonies, 13 January 1955, CO1022/22.
- 8 *Ibid*.
- 9 Federation of Malaya to The Secretary of State for the Colonies, 19 January 1955, CO1020/22.
- 10 Federation of Malaya to The Secretary of State for the Colonies, 17 January 1955, CO1030/22.
- 11 *Manchester Guardian*, 9 February 1955.
- 12 See, *The Road to Independence, An Alliance Platform for the Federal Elections*, Alliance National Council, Kuala Lumpur, 1955.
- 13 *Malaya: Negotiation offer by the Malayan Communist Terrorist*, Commonwealth Relations Office, 22 July 1955, FO371/116940.
- 14 See, *Captured Malayan Communist Party Documents*, Southeast Asia Department, Foreign Office, 27 November 1953, FZ1016/9/G, CO1030/232.
- 15 Anthony Short, *The Communist Insurrection in Malaya, 1948-1960*, Frederick Miller Limited, London, 1975, p. 459.
- 16 *Ibid*.
- 17 *Malaya: Negotiation Offer by the Malayan Communist Terrorist*. Commonwealth Relations Office, 22 July 1955. FO371/116940.
- 18 Monthly Political Reports for May 1955, CO1030/245.
- 19 The Question of Offering an Amnesty to the Communists in Malaya, FED 12/360/05, FO371/116940.
- 20 Malcolm MacDonald to Foreign Office, 21 August 1955, FO371/116939.
- 21 Extract from COS(55) 617 Meeting held on 26 July 1955 on Malaya, FO371/116940.
- 22 Zainal Abidin b. Abd. Wahid (Peny). *Sejarah Malaysia Sepintas Lalu*, Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka, Kuala Lumpur, 1972. p. 172.

- 23 MacGillivray to The Secretary of State for the Colonies, 19 August 1955, FO371/116940.
- 24 MacDonald to Foreign Office, 21 May 1955, FO371/116940.
- 25 MacGillivray to The Secretary of State for the Colonies, 19 August 1955, FO371/116940.
- 26 *Ibid.*
- 27 See, *Memorandum from the Chief Minister and Minister for Internal and Security*, No. 386/17/56, 30 April 1956. CO1030/30.
- 28 *Ibid.*
- 29 High Commissioner, Malaya to The Secretary of State for the Colonies, 10 October, 1955, CO1020/245.
- 30 MacGillivray to The Secretary of State for the Colonies, 29 September 1955, FO371/116941.
- 31 MacGillivray to The Secretary of State for the Colonies, 30 September 1955, FO371/116941.
- 32 MacGillivray to The Secretary of State for the Colonies, 30 September 1955, FO371/116941.
- 33 MALAYA: Monthly Emergency and Political Report 15th October to 15th November 1955. CO1030/247.
- 34 *Ibid.*
- 35 Singapore to The Secretary of State for the Colonies, 17 October 1955, FO371/116941.
- 36 MacGillivray to The Secretary of State for the Colonies, 24 October 1955, FO371/116941.
- 37 *Ibid.*
- 38 MacGillivray to The Secretary of State for the Colonies, 24 October 1955, D1091/69A, FO371/116941.
- 39 *Ibid.*
- 40 *Ibid.*
- 41 MacGillivray to The Secretary of State for the Colonies, 25 October 1955, FO371/116941.
- 42 Commissioner-General for the U.K. in Southeast Asia to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, 23 October 1955, CO1030/27.
- 43 Sir R. Black to The Secretary of State for the Colonies, 29 October 1955, FO371/116941.

- 44 The Secretary of State for the Colonies to High Commissioner, Malaya, 29 October 1955, FO371/116941.
- 45 *Ibid.*
- 46 MacGillivray to The Secretary of State for the Colonies, 18 November 1955, FO371/116941.
- 47 *Ibid.*
- 48 MacGillivray to The Secretary of State for the Colonies, 18 November 1955, FO371/116941.
- 49 Malaya: Monthly Emergency and Political Report, 15th November to 15th December 1955, FED 111/161/01, CO1030/247.
- 50 MacGillivray to The Secretary of State for the Colonies, 18 1955, FO371/116941.
- 51 Malaya: Monthly Political Report for November, 1955 in High Commissioner, Malaya to The Secretary of State for the Colonies, 8 November 1955. CO1030/245.
- 52 Malaya: Emergency and Political Report 15th November to 15th December 1955, CO1030/247.
- 53 *Ibid.*
- 54 MacGillivray to Sir John Martin (CO), 1 December 1955, CO1030/27.
- 55 *Ibid*
- 56 Malaya: Monthly Emergency and Political Report 15th November to 15th December 1955, CO1030/247.
- 57 The Baling Meeting: Verbatim Record of the Baling, Talks taken from tape Recording, CO1030/31.
- 58 MacGillivray to The Secretary of State for the Colonies, 15 March 1956, CO1030/22.

2

Selected Documents

DOCUMENT I:

Translation of a letter from Ng Heng, Representative of the Supreme Command MCP

In accordance with the orders of the Supreme Command Headquarters regarding the problem of ending the war and achieving independence in Malaya by negotiation, I issue the following statement:-

The one and only object of our struggle is a peaceful, democratic and independent Malaya. If only this is possible, we are willing always to strive by peaceful means, to achieve the aforesaid objective. It goes without saying that the achievement of independence in Malaya through peaceful means would be beneficial not only to the Malayan people but to the British Government and the British people as well.

However, it must be pointed out that up till now, the British Government, under various pretexts, is still continuing its colonial rule. It has maintained an indifferent attitude over the resolutions of the Afro-Asian Conference regarding the rights and self-determination of the people, and matters concerning the peoples of protected territories. At present, there is a common basic characteristic in the constitutional system prevailing in Singapore and the defence, foreign affairs and finance. The British Governor or High Commissioner has the power to veto the laws passed by the Legislative Council. Foreign troops have the right to be stationed throughout the whole of Malaya. Moreover, they have the right to establish and to enlarge military bases in various parts of Malaya, which are only used for the benefit of foreign countries. If this state of affairs is not rectified, Malaya will never achieve independence and democratic freedom, and the rights of the people will not be reliably safeguarded. Hence, there is a possibility that, in the interests of foreign countries, Malaya may be dragged into a war of Asians killing Asians - the people will have to pay the grievous price of a war, which they have no right to question, and which does not further personal interests. These facts cannot be concealed by the partial election, or the full election in the future, of members of the Legislative Council.

In order to strive for peace and to achieve independence in Malaya, it is imperative that, firstly, the war must be ended, the Emergency Regulations must be abolished and the democratic freedom and rights of the people must be safe-guarded, to enable a general national election to be carried out in a peaceful and democratic atmosphere.

All the various political parties, guilds and associations, and the people of

various communities and walks of life of Malaya, who are sincerely and truthfully striving for independence, regardless of the various strata to which they belong, their stand in respect of independence or their demeanour in the past, can and should be united together to vigorously strive for the achievement of their common objective of ending the war and achieving independence in Malaya, by peaceful means.

Hence, we are of the opinion that the representatives of various political parties, guilds, associations and communities should endeavour to hold a round table conference at an early date, to discuss thoroughly the problems of ending the war and achieving peace and independence in Malaya with the object of reaching unanimous agreement, conforming with the actual state of affairs of Malaya. Such an agreement will definitely expedite the ending of the war, and the achievement of peace and independence of Malaya - it will be a major contribution towards a policy conforming with the personal benefits of the various strata of people throughout the country.

We would manifest a positive and co-operative disposition towards this conference. It is without doubt that, due to various races having their own special problems, and various differences in political outlook, there certainly will be many discrepancies and disagreements in the opinions of persons attending this conference. But, as all will have the same objective, should all manifest an attitude of mutual understanding and respect for each other, and seek out the views common to all, and permit differences of outlook to be discussed in a democratic spirit, a unanimous agreement on major important problems will definitely be reached at the conference. In this respect, the success of the Afro-Asian Conference and the successful negotiation between the Governments of China and Indonesia on the question of dual nationality have set good examples for the peoples of Malaya.

The amnesty proposal put up by the Alliance leaders of the UMNO, MCA and MIC is not satisfactory to us. In order to end this warfare early, and to show our sincerity in this matter, we are willing to compromise by holding negotiations on the basis of this proposal with the British Government and come to a reasonable agreement. At the same time, we are willing to have discussions with the UMNO, MCA and MIC and any other political parties which support the ending of the present warfare by negotiation.

We must point out that any attempt to intrigue and force people to surrender is completely unreasonable and illusive. The present situation is this: It is almost seven years now since the Emergency started, and in spite of the thousands of methods adopted by the British Government to liquidate us, it has failed to do so, and neither has it defeated us in war, because we are supported by the great masses of people, and hence we will never be

defeated in this war. With regard to this points, Mr. Lyttelton, the former Secretary for Colonial Affairs had to use the term "possible" in his speech to British Rubber Manufacturers' Association on 24th March last year. "It is possible that we will never achieve complete victory". The complete victory which he referred to is similar to the victory in Europe and the victory over Japan. We confidently believe that the situation within and without Malaya is daily favouring the independence of Malaya, and that the time-factor is favourable towards the people of Malaya and is unfavourable to the colonial rulers who insist on continuing colonial rule.

With regard to the holding of meetings in the jungle, especially in making arrangements for the first meeting, as this would cause difficulty and inconvenience to both parties, we are willing to send our representative to Kuala Lumpur to make arrangements for the meeting, provided that the British Government will guarantee us the safe conduct of our representative to Kuala Lumpur to make arrangements for the meeting, as this would cause difficulty and inconvenience to both parties, we are willing to send our representative to Kuala Lumpur to make arrangements for the meeting, provided that the British Government will guarantee us the safe conduct of our representative. If the British Government agrees to direct negotiation or allows the responsible political parties to have discussions with us, you can inform me at any time through the radio or through the Press. On receipt of your notice, I will start on my journey (to Kuala Lumpur) immediately.

On our side, the door to negotiation in the past, present and future is always open. We are now making one big step forward. For this reason, whether negotiations materialise or not solely depends on the attitude of the British Government.

Signed: Ng Heng
Representative of the Supreme Command
Headquarters of the Malayan Racial Liberation Army.
Dated: 1.5. 1955

Source : Arkib Negara Malaysia

DOCUMENT II

Statement by the Government of the Federation of Malaya on the M.C.P's negotiation offer

1. The Government's attention has been drawn to a letter received by representatives of certain interests in the Federation purporting to come from *Supreme Command Headquarters of the Communist terrorists*.
2. The full text of the letter is attached [see Document 1].
3. As will be seen, the letter makes certain proposals for negotiating an end to Communist terrorism in the Federation. The Government has no doubt that these proposals come from the leaders of Communist terrorism. It has considered them and, on the unanimous advice of the Director of Operations Committee, issues the following statement:-
4. The letter claims that the terrorists have not been defeated. The facts are that they have suffered severe defeat in Pahang, and their organisation has been split in two and no longer has control over its various branches. Defections from their ranks are occurring almost daily throughout the Federation. They realize full well that, weakened in numbers and spirit, they cannot gain their object by the continuation of terrorist methods and of their so-called armed struggle.
5. Consequently, by sending this letter they hope to change their tactics by exploiting the natural desire of the people for peace and to persuade them to relax the fight against Communism. It is a typical Communist "peace offensive". The ultimate aim of Communism remains unchanged. It is to overthrow as early as possible whatever established Government may be in power and to substitute for it a Communist regime. We all know that this is not the way to freedom. The Communists view with distaste the forthcoming elections and the move to self-government by elected representation. It seems they want now, before the recognised national political parties have contested the elections, to suspend temporarily the Communist armed struggle and to revert to other forms of subversion, whilst keeping themselves free to renew their terrorism when it suits them. *This letter is therefore a last-minute attempt to spread confusion and uncertainty amongst the political parties. They who have fought and committed countless atrocities against the people of Malaya without regard to race or creed, now pose as the purveyors of peace.*

6. We have seen these sudden shifts in Communist policy before and we shall not be misled by this one. We have not forgotten the chaos the Communists attempted to bring about between 1945 and 1948.
7. Knowing the true purpose of the Communist offer and these motives which underlie it, the Government rejects it absolutely and has no intention of negotiating with the Communist terrorists.
8. If the Communists genuinely wish to end the Emergency they can do this today. Liberal terms of surrender are already offered to them and are known to all, as is being demonstrated by many who are taking advantage of them. They are aware that no one who has voluntarily surrendered since July 1949 has been tried on a capital charge but that they have been fairly dealt with and well-treated. Furthermore, as stated on the 17th January, Government keeps the surrender policy under constant review so that it can be modified at any time if it should appear that a greater or lesser measure of amnesty would hasten the end of terrorism.
9. While reaffirming its desire for peace, the Government will not accept the Cinnycust type of peace. The responsibility of the Government is to ensure that conditions exist in Malaya which will enable its people to move forward towards independence without the fear of Communist domination in any form.

24th June, 1955.

Source : Arkib Negara Malaysia

DOCUMENT III

THE BALING MEETING: NARRATIVE OF EVENTS

24th December 1955

0900 hours Work began to prepare the Meeting site and Combined Headquarters was formed.

28th December 1955

0900 hours The Chief Ministers of the Federation of Malaya and Singapore left KULIM with an escort from 15/19 Hussars. They were followed by Dato Sir Cheng Lock Tan and further cars carrying their private secretaries.

0950 hours The conducting officer, Mr. J.L.H. Davis, with an escort from 2 Police Field Force, met two Communist messengers, identified as Chen Tian and Lee Chin Hee at the agreed contact point. They informed him that Chin Peng was on his way with his bodyguard but might not reach the contact point until approximately 1200 hours.

1032 hours A further Communist messenger approach the contact point with the information that Chin Peng was approaching and might arrive about 1040 hours.
On this information the Conducting Officer moved forward to the edge of GUNONG PAKU to meet Chin Peng.

1044 hours The Chief Ministers, Dato Sir Cheng Lock Tan and their secretaries reached BALING and were conducted to the District Officer's residence.
On being informed that Chin Peng would be late at the contact point the Chief Ministers decided to hold a short, informal press conference in the guard text at the entrance to the Protected Place.

Subsequently the Chief Ministers decided that the

Meeting should begin at 1415 hours. Meanwhile they were shown the Meeting Room and an adjustment of seating was made to accommodate their private secretaries in the Meeting Room. The Chief Ministers then visited the accommodation allotted to the Communists and expressed satisfaction with the arrangements made. The Chief Minister's party then launched in the District Officer's residence.

1104 hours An unidentified number of Communists were seen approaching the contact point.

1116 hours Chin Peng, Chen Tian, Abdul Rashid and three other Communists left by car, under police escort, from the contact point for BALING. The three other Communists were subsequently identified as Lee Chin Hee, Tan Kwee Cheng and Sanip.

1230 hours Chin Peng's party arrived at BALING and were conducted by Mr. Davis to the house allotted to them. They expressed satisfaction with their accommodation and feeding arrangements but asked for a set of under-clothing each, a tin of tobacco and a tin of cigarettes to be bought for them, for which they offered to pay. Because there was not time for them to cook rice they asked for bread, which was supplied.

Meanwhile arrangements had been satisfactorily concluded on GUNONG PAKU for the Communist bodyguard to make camp and receive the rations prepared for them. All details were agreed except that they refused to have a telephone line laid between their camp and the Police escort; however a further contact was agreed for 29th December and a password arranged.

1420 hours The Chief Ministers and Dato Sir Cheng Lock Tan were conducted to the Meeting Room. Chin Peng, Chen Tian and Abdul Rashid were then brought in by Mr. Davis and formerly introduced. The Press photographers were then allowed to enter the Meeting Room. On their withdrawal the interpreters, stenographers and private secretaries entered the room and were introduced.

- 1430 hours The First Session of the Meeting commenced.
- 1530 hours A break was made to enable a new team of stenographers to take over. Coffee was served but the Communist were served, at their request, with orange squash and soda.
- The Second Session of the Meeting then Immediately commenced.
- 1745 hours The Meeting adjourned until 1830 hours and the Chief Minister's party were served with tea in the District Officer's residence.
- A press statement, prepared during this adjournment was issued at 1925 hours.
- 1830 hours The Meeting reassembled and the Third Session commenced at 1840 hours.
- 1900 hours approx The Communists having become suspicious of the microphones of the recording apparatus were allowed to see the recording room. They appeared satisfied.
- 2005 hours The Meeting adjourned until 1000 hours 29th December (this time was subsequently changed to 1030 hours). The Chief Minister's party left shortly afterwards for KULIM, escorted by 15/19 Hussars.
- Work began on the transcript of the first day's Meeting.
- A press statement, prepared at the conclusion of the Third Session, was issued at 2255 hours.

29th December 1955

- 0700 hours An Army Staff Officer left by car for KULIM bearing the transcript of the first day's Meeting. Copies were handed the Chief Ministers, Federation of Malaya and Dato Sir Cheng Lock Tan. Further copies were taken to the RAF Station BUTTERWORTH and flown down to KUALA LUMPUR for HE, the High Commissioner, the Federation of Malaya; the Direc-

tor of Operations and his Principal Staff Officer. Mr. David Marshall's copy was flown on to SINGAPORE for delivery to HE, the Governor.

- 0830 hours The Chief Minister's party, with their escorts, left KULIM for BALING.
- 0945 hours At Chin Peng's request two messengers (Lee Chin Hee and Tan Kwee Cheng) were returned. under Police escort, to the contact point and subsequently rejoined the Communist bodyguard.
- 1018 hours The Chief Minister's party arrived at BALING.
- 1050 hours The Fourth Session of the Meeting commenced, preceded by another session of Press photography.
- 1150 hours A joint document, in the handwriting of Mr. David Marshall, amended by Chen Tian, was sent out from the Meeting and a press statement incorporating this document was issued at 1200 hours.
- 1248 hours The Meeting concluded.
A further press statement was then prepared and was issued at 1355 hours.
- 1405 hours Having lunched at the District Officer's residence the Chief Minister drove to the Press Centre in BALING Town and held a brief press conference.
- 1400 hours Chin Peng's party left BALING under police escort, for the contact point.
- 1425 hours The Chief Minister's party left the Press Centre in BALING, under escort of 15/19 Hussars, for KROH airstrip where they aplaned, at 1500 hours, in two Beavers, for KUALA LUMPUR.
- 1521 hours Chin Peng's party arrived at the contact point but decided to remain with the 2 Police Field Force escort overnight.
- 1550 hours Two Communist messengers arrived at 2 Police Field Force escort camp and returned to the jungle to prepare for Chin Peng's reception next morning.

30th December 1955

- 0830 hours An Army Staff Officer left BALING padang by helicopter for KUALA LUMPUR to deliver the transcript of the second day's meeting.
- 1000 hours Two Communist messengers arrived at 2 Police Field Force escort camp.
- 1000 hours Chin Peng's party left 2 Police Field Force escort camp to rejoin his bodyguard and begin withdrawal to his headquarters.
- 1400 hours Combined HQ at the Meeting site closed down and detachments started to withdraw. The BALING site was finally vacated at first light on 31st December 1955.

Source : Arkib Negara Malaysia



28th December 1955
The journey from Klian Intan to Baling



10.44 a.m , 28th December 1955.
The Chief Ministers arrive



The crowd on the approach to the Protected Place

DOCUMENT IV

THE BALING MEETING: RECORD OF THE MEETING

FIRST DAY

- T: Will you please explain that I will talk in English. Are they agreeable?
- C. Yes.
- T. Do they want me to open the talk first, or would they like to?
- C. I think it is better for the Federation Chief Minister to talk first.
- T. In the first place, I want to thank them for the confidence they have shown in coming out to meet me. They must remember that I am not standing here in judgement over them. I am here to talk to them, to explain to them. With me are the Chief Minister of Singapore, Mr. David Marshall, and Sir Cheng Lock Tan, who is a political leader and my colleague.

They have been in the jungle fighting for what they call independence and a lot of things have taken place in the politics of this country - a lot of changes have taken place. The first important change is that there have been free elections in the country. The results of the free elections are: Mr. David Marshall has been elected the Chief Minister of Singapore by the Labour Party; and Dato Sir Cheng Lock Tan and I joined together to contest the elections and we won. This is just repeating what you already know. Our victory was based on one big promise we made to the people; that one big promise made to the people was responsible for our victory and perhaps our victory is without parallel in any free election in the world. That one big promise which we made was that colonialism must end and that this country must be given freedom - that was the promise we made.

Then at the last Federal elections the High Commissioner made an important announcement; he said that self-government will be given to Malaya despite the Emergency. That assurance he gave on behalf of the British Government. In view of that assurance the UMNO Assembly which was recently held - it finished the day before yesterday - passed a very important resolution to the effect that independence for Malaya

must be given by the 31st August 1957, and I have no doubt in my mind whatsoever that we shall possible, achieve this aim and that there will be no conditions attached to that independence. The words "if possible" were included as a result of an amendment to the resolution that I introduced myself and the resolution now reads "if possible by 31 August 1957". My only reason for introducing this amendment was to allow for a smooth handover. We have asked for the appointment of an Independent Commission - a commission whose members will be appointed from outside this country - to try to work out a constitution for this country. This Independent Commission must take time, because the work before it is rather involved and difficult. There are in this country people who are immigrants, people who are lived here for generations and people who are the indigenous people of this country, all these types of people are living together in this country today. Therefore, it must take time to prepare a constitution that will be agreeable to them all.

There is also another important matter which people ought to consider - that is the position of the Malay Rulers. I said in the course of my speech that the Alliance - UMNO, MCA, MIC - are strong enough to be able to demand immediate independence. The only reason why we have not done so is, as I have explained, that there are so many important matters arising out of this independence that it is necessary to take time. I am leaving on the 1st January, 1956 for England, to take part in round-table talks with the British Government. I have no doubt that the talks will produce results and will be successful.

Before my Party came into power - they must have heard it as it was in the papers - I said that I wanted to bring peace to this country and I really meant it. But in my opinion there is no way of bringing about peace other than to offer suitable terms for the surrender of the Communist Party against whom the Government is fighting today. Chin Peng must know their position in respect of this Government. They have been, in the view of the Federation Government, fighting the lawful authority - that is, the Government of the Federation of Malaya. That is the position. For that reason there have been laws passed whereby any communist captured could be sentenced to death and so on, because the Government regarded the insurgents as having committed treason against the Government. So, therefore, these Special Regulations were passed to deal with the disturbances in this country. According to these Emergency Regulations - you know the important ones - those captured could be sentenced to death, those in sympathy with the insurgents are to be detained for an indefinite period and it is not likely that they will be released until the Emergency ends. Also while the Emergency last the Emergency will last.

I, and my colleague, on my right and on my left - and the rest of the people of Malaya want to see the end of the trouble so that we can declare independence and make the country peaceful, happy and prosperous. Malaya included Singapore for this purpose; that is why, as you know, Mr. Marshall is here to take part in the talk; and Dato Sir Cheng Lock Tan, my partner and colleague and founder of the Alliance, is here for the same reason. In view of the disturbances in this country, the atrocities being committed, in view of the laws that are in existence to deal with these disturbances I cannot do more than to say that if they accept the amnesty everyone will be pardoned - that is the main theme of the Amnesty. Instead of prosecuting anybody who surrenders under the terms of the Amnesty we promise him safety, and that promise, as I have said, I guarantee with my own life. You may consider the terms not too liberal, but it is up to you to tell me what part of the terms you think unreasonable, or hard and strict, so that my partners and I will be able to consider them. You will see that according to these terms those who come in and surrender will not be prosecuted for any offences connected with the Emergency - any offence committed under Communist direction either before the date of the declaration of this Amnesty or in ignorance of the existence of this Amnesty. You may surrender how and to whom you like including members of the public. There will be no general cease-fire, but the Security Forces will be on the alert to help those who wish to accept this offer, and for this purpose local cease-fire will be arranged. We carried out this part of our promise and ordered cease-fire on all fronts. Unfortunately they on their part continued offensive action, a recent example is the Khea Farm outrage. As a result the cease-fire arrangement was suspended on our side.

And then in the fifth paragraph of the Amnesty Declaration it says that the Government will conduct an investigation on those who surrender. Naturally such an investigation is necessary - in all wars where there has been peace you have got to conduct an investigation on those who surrender - but those who show that they genuinely intend to be loyal to the Government of Malaya and to give up their Communist activities will be helped to regain their normal position in society and will be given the opportunity to be united with their families. It is intended to place restrictions on their liberty for some period. On the other hand, if any of them wish to go back to China or in fact to whatsoever countries they belong - their request will be given due consideration.

I understand they have rejected these terms. For what reason I would be glad to hear from them. Perhaps my colleague and friend Mr David Marshall, might care to address them? Dato Sir Cheng Lock Tan, would you like to add anything? Has what I said has been all right?

M. Well, as far as I am concerned, it has been a campaign of hate that has corroded our civic life, a campaign of violence, brutality and atrocities that has achieved nothing except misery of the people. We understand that there are some genuine nationalist in the movement. I distinguish between nationalists and those who seek to make us a colony of a foreign ideology. To those nationalist I say they must find out, become convinced that the constitutional peaceful methods the rest of the country have been pursuing are the methods along which their welfare lies, and that violence can only breed violence and misery. They themselves must have seen that they are out of step completely in this age, when people talk of co-existence and non-violence. To those nationalist I say:

"You are welcome back to the healthy stream of constitutional progress with your fellow citizens. We will forgive your past delusions and errors, if you yourselves are now conscious that along that path only misery for the people lies, and are prepared to come in and live in peace with the rest of the population."

The Federation has suffered a great deal more than Singapore from these communist brutalities. But Singapore has suffered as well. I ask for an end to this campaign of hate and violence, and for all good men to join together in the formation of a democratic nation. If that spirit can be accepted, all else is detail and should be easily worked out.

T: There is another matter which I would like to add, that I do not come here as the spokesman for the British Government, neither am I the stooge or running dog of colonialism. I am the servant of the people and I represent the people who have elected me to power, and I do genuinely seek peace for this country, Mr. Marshall and I wish to make it clear that you are free to say what you like, we will not mind.

C: First and foremost, I wish to say that it is precisely because we realise that you are not the spokesman of the British Government and are not the running dog of the British Government, the stooge of the British Government, that we have come out to meet you at the risk of our lives. I am not exaggerating when I say that we came out at the risk of our lives, because the present situation shows that the British armed forces are still in a superior position even though the cease-fire agreement will stand for ten days after the meeting. The British armed forces possess more modern equipments and therefore are still in the superior position.

I am not coming here to argue question of ideology, but if questions of peace are to be discussed, we are fully prepared to do so. Peace is the common demand of all people. We also hope that peace will be realised

early so that the misery of the people can be reduced. War is war. War will certainly bring misery to the people and will also bring hatred. If I remember correctly, Mr. Nehru made a speech when he passed through Penang at the end of the last year. In that speech he said that violence will only bring about misery and bring about horrors. We agreed with him on this point. Even though the war was still going on at that time, we paid very much attention to his speech.

It seems to me that it is not necessary to discuss now who is responsible for the present war in Malaya and who is to be held responsible for the miseries that have been brought about. The reason why we reject the Amnesty offer is very simple, because the conditions offered in this Amnesty Declaration differ little from the existing surrender terms, but we are prepared to discuss this question. In the Amnesty terms the principle is to disregard past behavior and this shows a conciliatory spirit with which we agree. It is because of this that we have said in the past that we are prepared to discuss ways and means to end the present war on the principle of this conciliatory spirit. We also recognise the efforts made by the Tunku and Dato Sir Cheng Lock Tan to bring the war to an end, and we have mentioned this in our statements before.

T: Well, I did say that in the course of my various speeches that I want you to come out, so that we could fight together for independence for Malaya by constitutional means and I intended that sentiments to be conveyed here under paragraph (5) which says:

"Those who show that they genuinely intend to be loyal to the Government of Malaya and give up their Communist activities will be helped to regain their normal position in society." That is the point. Once they have regained their normal position in society, there will no be difference between us, or between anybody. We will be the same. But first you have got to convince us that you will be loyal to Malaya. To be just anti-British does not suffice to indicate that one is loyal to Malaya. Therefore as I said just now, you have to prove that this is the country to which you really owe allegiance; that this is the country in which you wish to live and in which you wish to die and for this country you are prepared to die like we are - that is the point. The position is this: that today the people in Malaya, one and all, regard the communist activities as something entirely foreign to the Malayan way of life. They regard the communist party as belonging to a power outside this country and consider its members give allegiance to that foreign country and not to Malaya. Therefore, it is necessary for you to prove and to convince the people that it is not so, that your duty, your loyalty, your love, your everything belong to this country. That is the position; that is why I said in this letter "those who show that they genuinely intend to be loyal to the Govern-

ment of Malaya and to give up their communist activities will be helped to regain their normal position in society". Once you have joined this society, taken your place in society, as I said before, there is no difference between you, I or anybody else.

You said just now that the Amnesty terms are no different from the surrender terms. There is this difference - the pardon which we promise those who surrender. Before the Amnesty they were liable to be prosecuted, that is not so under the Amnesty as this gives absolute pardon for any crime which may have been committed in ignorance of the Amnesty. There is also this difference. The surrender terms were made by the Government of Malaya, the Amnesty was made by the representatives of the people. It was unfortunate, however, that the first leaflet flown into the jungle bore the signature of General Bourne. This was done because originally we wanted to convince the communists that General Bourne, who is in charge of operations, had agreed with me in offering the Amnesty showing that it did not come from me alone but had been supported by the Director of Operations. I did sign afterwards. If you like to ask or talk about these terms you should do so and we will be prepared to listen.

(Note: Meeting broke off for ten minutes for refreshments and so on)



Press photographers' session before the meeting



The Communist side at the meeting Rashid Maidin, Chin Peng, Chen Tien

2nd SESSION

- T. Shall we continue? Dato would you like to say something?
- D. As the M.C.P. consists mostly of Chinese, it is the Chinese community who have suffered most in the last eight years of the Emergency and therefore as Chinese we particularly wish that there will be peace and an end to this war. We hope at this meeting to put forward propositions which will end the Emergency. There is no hope of the M.C.P. winning. Why waste money unnecessarily on the Emergency, there is no point in that. The vast majority of the people of this country are not in favour of the communists because they are not working for a prosperous Malaya and communism sets class against class and causes disorder. The other reason is that communism is distasteful because it causes violence. What we want in this country is peaceful co-operation and co-existence for us all and this can be obtained if you will come out of the jungle and become peaceful citizens and be loyal to this country. We want this Emergency to end so that there will be peace in Malaya. Communism is like a disease sucking out the blood of Malaya and will cause the ruin of the country.
- T. I read with interest the manifesto of the Communist Party which was delivered to me through Mr. Too Joon Hing and I find that it is quite good. That is what everybody is aiming at today - peaceful government and administration of this country.
- D. On the basis of that manifesto there is no quarrel between the M.C.P. and the people, the continuance of the Emergency is a sheer waste.
- T. You mention in the manifesto fundamental freedoms - freedom of speech, freedom of movement, human rights. We have accepted that too and we are carrying all that out. As to the Malay language being the national language of the Federation, we are carrying out that too and we are also glad that other nationalities are being encouraged to study the language. As regards the opening up of land that is being done. Government is permitting the opening up of virgin land to enable people to cultivate it. All these things are being done. I read through the manifesto and I can't see very much difference between theirs and ours.

Now talking about the Amnesty, what have you to say?

- C. May I have two points cleared? One is about "loyalty to Malaya". May I know the actual meaning of "loyalty to Malaya"?
- T. Well, one of the things the Malayan people expect is that while you live in Malaya you must give up your communist activities - activities such as are being carried out today. The Chief Minister, Singapore, regards all the subversive activities in Singapore as very detrimental to Malaya, such as the strikes and so on that are taking place in Singapore. When strikes are legal we allow that, but strikes for something that is illegal that is different. Strikes are being carried out today by people who declare them for no other reason except out of sheer spite.

There is another matter which is accepted by the communists:- that they don't like bosses. One cannot help being born into a class, one cannot help being born rich, one cannot help being born lucky in business and making money, but I admit that people born rich or who have made money in business, should have part of their money distributed for the welfare of the country. We are doing this by income tax and other taxation and all the taxation realised is used for the building of schools, etc. This system is better than that advocated by the Communists. They may not like the institution of Rulers in a government, but to us they do no harm. They are decorations of the country and they do help to keep steady the different elements in their States. The majority of the population in this country are Malays and they have no difficulty in recognising the Rulers as the Heads of their religion in their States. The Alliance is prepared to uphold the prestige of the Rulers as Heads of their States. They will become constitutional Rulers in that they will be more like figure heads. Their position will be such that they will not get mixed up in politics or in the administration. They will be debarred from direct administration or control over political matters, for which the Government with its elected members is responsible. Let me say that in the manifesto which I read just now, it says nothing about the Rulers. The Rulers of Malaya are not rich; they have not amassed wealth like the Indian Rajas. They are paid just enough allowance to live and maintain their dignity. Nevertheless to Malays, they are very important. They are the guardians of our religion, they are guardians of our customs and adat; they are a constant reminder as to how we should behave. Therefore, one of the ingredients of loyalty is that we should uphold the dignity of the Rulers.

- D. If a man wants to live in Malaya he should assume that responsibilities and duties of a good citizen.
- M. It seems to me that this is a rather sterile discussion. We are really here to find out to what extent we can achieve an end to the violence which

they themselves admit has led to misery for the people. The people want peace and prosperity for the whole of Malaya. As to the question of loyalty, as I understand it, loyalty is respect for the people's welfare, respect for the individual personality, harmony and harmonious relations between the races and effort to achieve the common good by constitutional means, loyalty to the Government of the day and loyalty to the constitutional processes in bringing about such changes which we sincerely believe are for the welfare of the people. Not hatred or violence, they are not part of democracy. Absolute dedication to the welfare of the country not seeking to make it a province of another foreign ideology, but absolute dedication to this country itself and to the people.

Having said that, may I suggest that we discuss in detail the Amnesty terms themselves. They have started off by saying, that they did not want to discuss ideology, nor is it my intention to discuss ideology. I am discussing merely the methods by which they seek to achieve their ideology and am trying to point out that their methods can only bring about misery. I am glad to see that they admit it. So let us get away from ideology and consider the actual position.

We believe, the Singapore Government believes and join wholeheartedly with Tunku Abdul Rahman in believing that the Amnesty terms are honourable. They give an opportunity to the dedicated nationalists to come back to the main stream of healthy public life and to assist us in promoting a great nation. Malaya has a tremendous international status if we can keep racial harmony and democratic processes. Now within that context and in the light of term 5, just what is it the Amnesty seeks? Firstly, put down their bullets and firearms and come back and seek harmonious relations, away from hatred.

- C. I still wish to clear certain points. May I know whether the giving up of communist activities means the dissolution of the M.C.P.?
- T. Yes, more or less. Giving up communist activities means they have to dissolve the Communist Party.
- C. On the Government side, may I know whether there are any constructive suggestions?
- T. I have no other suggestion except to say that they come out and take their place in society.
- M. I agree with that. I have defended a lot of Communists and I recognise their courage, their sincerity and their dedication. But what I abhor is that

this courage, this strength of human energy which they have, should be utilised for the evil ends of hatred and violence, creating disorder, chaos, bitterness, misery. I say, we are on the threshold of nationhood and I join the Tunku wholeheartedly in saying that I sincerely believe that we are on the point of achieving independence. We need all decent men who are true Malaysians to put their shoulders to the wheel of our common aim for a far more glorious future that we can ever conceive, because this is not only a rich territory, it is in a magnificent position to join East and West - and they can do their share as human beings in this process. Their activities have indeed been a setback to our economic development. Let us have an end to this. You say you are right. Very well, I think you are wrong. But the point is, you must see that today your way is definitely wrong, you are out of step and you are merely delaying the progress of the people. Put down your arms, hand them in and accept these terms.

Now I would again stress that you are wrong as far as Singapore is concerned. Communism has been associated so strongly with brutality, with violence with hatred, that it is anathema and we cannot recognise the Communist Party as such, but if in the days to come, as part of the people, you seek to form your party at some future date - whether you call it Communist or otherwise - that will be for the Government of the day to consider. But let me say now for the people of Singapore and in respect of the Government of Singapore, we will not recognise the Communist Party at present, because it has been far too long associated with the activities that all humanity abhors.

- M. Now, what have you got to say?
- C. Mr. Marshall, if I make too hasty a statement, I hope you will pardon me.
- M. Please, I have been indulging in them myself. Go right ahead.
- C. The Singapore Government is a popularly elected Government. If the Singapore Government will follow the wishes of the electorate, if the Government of Singapore has control over internal security problems, if the Singapore Government has absolute power, then the question of recognising the M.C.P. is not of importance at all, because that question will be decided by the electorate. On the point of recognition of the M.C.P. I believe that not all the electorate, not the majority of the electorate are on the side of Government.

(Translator explains about translation difficulties)

- M. You can answer him that in a democracy, the people speak through

Government, and he has had his answer. I don't know where he gets his belief from.

- C. I think there is the Australian example.
- M. I don't understand.
- C. Yes, because in Australia it has been a question whether or not Communism or the Communist Party is lawful and that problem has been brought up in Australia. In their elections there has been a question of recognition or otherwise of the Communist Party in Australia.
- T. That may be so. The point is that between the Australian Government and the Communist Party there has been no fighting, but in this country you will see that the Communists are fighting the elected Government. We are still fighting and how can you ask us to recognise the Communist Party.
- C. Actually speaking, in the past the Government with whom we fought, against whom we fought, was not an elected Government.
- M. This year, it is.
- T. That is why we have offered them Amnesty. You will perhaps remember that it was a year back when Dato Cheng Lock Tan himself said, in backing me up in the movement to bring about peace in this country, that we were quite prepared to go into the jungle. You see it seems to me that fighting the Communists today in this country plainly requires a lot of money, but that is a matter which involves the Commonwealth very much because we need money to fight this war. Money has come from the Commonwealth countries and from all our other resources. It is our desire that we don't want any more trouble in this country.
- C. I fully realise this point.
- D. Why not stop fighting?
- C. The point is this, as a member of the M.C.P. we still believe in our ideology. We will never allow ourselves to be forced by others to give up this ideology, but wish to put our ideology to the people to decide, if that is possible. Now the Government request us to give up this ideology.

As a citizen, of course, we have obligations, but at the same time we

must have freedom of thought, the right of freedom of thought, but the Government's point is that they don't want this.

T. The point is, we have declared in the Alliance manifesto that we uphold with all the power that is in us - that everybody should have freedom of speech, freedom of thought, freedom of action, freedom of social relations and one other freedom - that is the 5 freedoms. We give that undertaking freely. They say they want the people to decide whether or not to accept their ideology or accept ours. Now, speaking for myself, I have no doubt whatsoever that if they be allowed to take part in free elections, the people would choose our system.

D. Yes, I know that too. I agree.

T. Therefore I say that perhaps their ideology and ours are not quite the same. The people like our way of life - the Malayan way of life that is theirs, and although, in the future the trend of thought may change to the left - their way of life and their ideology, it certainly will not at the moment and they must be prepared to accept this position and give in to the way of life accepted by the majority.

There are quite a number of Communists in Malaya today rubbing shoulders with me but they do not know the meaning of Communism. However, they do know the genuine desire of the people to have our present form of Government which is the most suitable for them. Many members of the Council express themselves in very strong terms - communistic terms. You probably heard about the debates and words used in the Singapore Legislative Council. To the ordinary man in the street this indicated that they are communists. You probably heard the same Communist terms used by the Chief Minister ... (Interpreter: Mr. Marshall?) Yes, Mr. Marshall. But they are not Communists. It would be very difficult to find out whether they are Communists or not, but their ideology is not communistic. That is what I feel is the state of affairs that exists today.

C. Of course, we realise that during the last year political progress has been made in Malaya and we have all heard the election speeches made by the Chief Ministers of Singapore and the Federation during their electioneering campaign, I personally heard the speech made by Mr. Marshall over Radio Malaya. That was rather strong. I believe if such a speech had been made a few years ago I am sure he would have been charged with sedition. But because of the progress that has been made in the political field recently, we believe that the time has come when we should co-operate with you to achieve our aim, and to end the Emergency.

- T. That is why we are very keen to have their cooperation to obtain an end to the Emergency.
- C. We came here with sincerity in the hope that we can solve our problem, this problem. I have made it quite clear just now that we cannot accept the Amnesty conditions as they are now, because these conditions require us to dissolve the Communist Party. On this issue I want to request the Ministers of both countries to tell us whether or not there is any further grounds for discussion.
- T. No. If you are returning to the question of whether we are prepared to recognise the Communist Party - No. I don't think we will. Have you any other points? If you would like to have time to think, we can adjourn for half an hour or one hour.
- M. If they want time, they can have it.
- C. The question which I brought out just now is the primary question, the most important question.
- M. Is it suggested that if the Communist Party is not recognised, they intend to continue to subject the peoples of both territories to this hatred and violence which can bring no good to anybody?
- C. It is a difficult question. We do not mean to say that if the Communist Party is not recognised the Emergency will be carried on, - that we are to blame.
- M. What does he mean? What else does it mean?
- C. The statement presents some difficulty. Did you mean just now that if the Communist Party is not recognised and the Emergency is to be carried on with the resultant sufferings to the people, that we are to blame?
- M. It is a simple question. Just because the Party will not be recognised, you are proposing to subject the two Governments of the territories and the people of the two territories to continued miseries through violence and hatred, violence and hatred which you yourselves admit can produce no worth while results. Is Communism so tied up with violence and hatred that it must be continued even when it becomes injurious to Communism? We cannot believe it. You have seen 8 years of struggle - what has happened to you - misery for yourselves as well as for the people, misery for your own colleagues and your friends. I have seen

them. They believed and they suffered - for what? What have they achieved?

- C. Now I reiterate once more that if the Emergency is to be continued the blame should not be thrown only on one party or on one side. Of course we realise that war brings misery and sufferings. The question is: With what means can we end the Emergency or war?
- T.Give up. Prove yourself loyal to this country absorb yourself into society like everybody else. That is the only way.
- C. But does that mean that we should swear to the Government that are going to give up our ideology?
- T. No, not ideology - it is their activities which I mentioned. One's ideology is what one thinks, what one believes in. Activities are different. Especially activities to enforce the acceptance of one's ideology.
- C. Does that mean then that if we are prepared not to achieve our aims by violent means or by force, then we will be recognised?
- T. No, When you come out and you surrender, your ideology and your beliefs are your own business.
- C. This is a simple question, let us be frank. We can adopt a certain measure, a certain method. For example, we will preserve our Communist Party, but will join forces with the Alliance - I mean join the Alliance. Then will not the Alliance blame us for over-throwing the Government through subversive activities? I mean if we do it that way, we are not frank, we are not sincere.

Another way is that we are Communists. We do not wish to join other political parties and then to do our scheming or intrigues. That is why we want this question of the recognition of the M.C.P. to be solved.

- T. As I said earlier, in this country the trend of modern thought would not accept the recognition of the Communist Party. Of course, when I say "we" I am referring to my Party. But what is going to happen later on I don't know - that is not my business. The Country will not accept Communism because communist activities have been associated with murder, with atrocities, with acts of violence of every kind. That is why, therefore, we cannot recognise it.
- C. The question of recognising or otherwise of the Communist Party perhaps is not to be decided by the Alliance alone - we wish you to clarify

this matter. We want to know, we wish you to clarify whether or not the Alliance is the final authority for saying whether the Communist Party will be recognised or not.

- T. At the moment, the Alliance is the Government of the country, - this was not so before. I said this just now. I did indirectly refer to the people this question of recognition and the way I did it was to ask the people to say whether they accepted the Amnesty terms which I issued or whether they did not accept them. If they did accept them they were to hold demonstrations everywhere, if they did not then no demonstrations were to be held. The results were that they held demonstrations which, perhaps in the history of Malaya, have been unparalleled. In Kulim, where I was once District Officer they have even gone further. Instead of parading in the streets like other places, they made placards and so on, and they marched right into the jungle and came across two communist camps. They went out unarmed and plastered slogans all over the camps. In the camps there were provisions and other things. They took nothing away. They only recovered one wrist watch which they took away as a souvenir just to prove that they had gone into a communist camp. If they want the wrist watch back, that can be got back for them. Therefore, I don't speak for myself at all. I have no hatred, no bitterness against any party or against anybody. But my responsibility and my duty is to the people who elected me into power. That is all. I have worked hard since I was appointed President of the UMNO to join together all the nationalities of the country and have formed the Alliance. Before the Alliance, before the Chinese and the Malays came together, you probably know that four villages in Kedah were burnt down by Malays and a few Chinese slaughtered because a Communist there had killed a Malay, with the result that they took revenge on innocent people. It is true. That happened in Kulimin Kedah near Gua Chempadak. It happened just before the Alliance was formed, and now because of the work that I have carried out, there has been no incident of that kind at all. And that is why I say many things can be done peacefully if only one is sincere. I fell certain that the Alliance is growing strong and I believe very strongly that one should always be at peace with one's neighbour (M. Hear, hear). And because of that conviction the first thing I did when I took over the leadership of UMNO was to bring the Chinese and the Malays together, bring the Indians and Malays and Chinese together more and more. And now I want to bring peace to all the people of Malaya. There is room in this country - there is wealth, there is riches, there is everything, there is no reason at all why we should be fighting, why we should be killing one another, why we should destroy all the good things of life. That is my ideology. That is all I have got to say.


Shall we postpone for one hour? We are all tired.

- M. It seems to me, Mr. Chin Peng that we have spoken frankly.
- T. Mr. Reese, we break off for about half an hour.
- M. Could we have another 5 minutes Tunku?

Maybe we can have the answer now to a primary question. It is important to you. As you say, you are a Communist, there is no reason why we should force you to change your line. But it has been made clear to you that the Government of the Federation and of Singapore are not prepared to recognise the Communist Party. Now, is there any purpose in continuing these discussions. It is a fair question. Please reply with frankness.

- C. May I make one more point clear. The matters discussed in this house - are such matters to be approved by the British Government.
- T. If I decide, and Mr. Marshall agrees with me, that will be all.
- M. The British Government, of course, may disagree with the course of action, but as far as we are concerned, we take our own decisions.
- T. Shall we adjourn for half an hour.

(Adjourn till 6.30 p.m.)



The Chief Minister, Federation of Malaya, leaves the Meeting Room at the end of the second session, accompanied by Che Yaacob and Lt Col J. H. Penrose MC

As soon as the ^{cession} ^{is}
 announcement of the
 Federation obtains complete
 control of internal security
 and legal armed forces
 we will end hostilities, lay
 down our arms and disband
 our forces. It does not amount
 to accept the present amnesty
 terms.

29th December 1955

The document prepared by Mr. David Marshall and amended by Chen Tien

THIRD SESSION

- T. Just now, we ended by saying that we would not recognise the Malayan Communist Party. That point has been made clear. Is there anything else?
- C. I want to raise a few questions. Let us set a side for a moment the question of recognition of the Communist Party. What we want to know is: what did Mr. Marshall mean when he said that if the Emergency or war. When Mr. Marshall said that did he mean it as an ultimatum?
- T. What Mr. Marshall said was ...
- M. Tunku, I said that we have made it clear that we have no intention of recognising the M.C.P. That is absolute ... I think that is correct, Tunku? That is not an ultimatum. I do not know what he means by ultimatum, but there is no question of our changing our minds. I take it that is correct Tunku?
- T. Would you put up a case? I do not follow.
- C. The question is that before we adjourned this afternoon, Mr. Marshall made it clear that it is definite the Government would not recognise the Party, and Mr. Marshall continued to ask; "Is it necessary to continue" ...
- M. I did not say that. I said that was the position; so far as the three of us are concerned. We have decided not to recognise the Communist Party and if to you it was a "sine qua non" I asked you whether it served any useful purpose to continue. Chin Peng said that this was a primary question - this is a frank question and you have a frank reply. I think if you accept the position we can proceed to any other matters you may wish to raise. If you are not prepared to accept ...
- C. If that is not an ultimatum we can continue to discuss other questions.
- M. I do not like to use that word, Chin Peng. The Tunku himself made it quite clear that there will be no question of recognising the Communist Party. That is final. If you are prepared to accept that we can continue the

discussion. If you are not prepared to accept it, the matter is closed.
(To Tunku) You accept that?

- T. Yes. Are you prepared to discuss?
- C. We are ready to discuss this question late on, and not now. But we are not prepared to accept that principle.
- M. We have discussed it for three hours and we have not taken a decision. Let us be quite frank - let us not fool ourselves about this.
- T. I would like to hear what you have to say further.
- C. We would prefer to discuss the question of recognising the Communist Party later.
- T. As you like, we will continue. You feel you want to discuss some other things first. We would like to hear what is in your mind.
- M. That is fair enough.
- C. In that case, we will discuss it later on.
- T. All right - carry on.
- C. May I know if the British Government has given full guarantee for independence to Malaya.
- T. Yes, that is what I said just now:- They have given that assurance to the Council, the Legislative Council. On this point, for which we are struggling in a constitutional way, they have assured us that we will get independence.
- C. Is that a full assurance?
- T. If I do not get independence, my party will kick me out ... The UMNO General Assembly passed a resolution calling for independence by 31st August, 1957, if possible, and the constitutional commission will examine all the issues connected with the transfer of power.
- C. Does it imply by the transfer of power the transfer of internal security to the elected Government?
- T. Yes. That is one of the things which I am going to England to do. That I will get first, before independence.

- C. You mentioned that if we continue with the armed struggle it will not set back the progress towards independence. In what way does it become a setback?
- T. It is no setback as I said to you earlier. There is no setback at all. But if you continue the Emergency, movement of the people will be restricted in certain areas, men will be detained in detention camps and there will be food restrictions in certain areas and it will cause a lot of trouble to the people.
- T. But it will not cause any setback to our main aim at all. We will proceed as we have planned we would. The only thing is you will be fighting an elected Government - that is the thing. And as I said before, the people will be moved from one area, resettled in another area, and will lose their homes and the lands which they have cultivated, and things like that and for the sake of the people I wish to end the Emergency.
- C. We want to find out whether there is someone listening in at this meeting, and if that is the case, I wish you to invite them also to attend this meeting and discuss it openly.
- T. I cannot see anybody else?
- C. What is the use of those loudspeakers?
- T. It is for recording ...
- M. It is quite open.
- T. They fear there is somebody else a party to this meeting who have come to hear what is said. They are nervous of this thing here. They think there is some other party perhaps who is in this building and that if that is so they should be invited to come in and talk, that is right in this room. But as I say, it is not so. It is only a recording to check the work of those people (the stennographers).

NOTE; Chen Tien then leaves the conference room escorted by Mr. D.P. Rees, and inspects the ante-room and then returns.

- T. Are you satisfied: We are checking up to see where they (the stenographers) go wrong. If they go wrong a check can be made with the tape recorder. Everything we say - you say, Mr. Marshall says, Sir Cheng Lock says, and I say - will be recorded, so that at any time if you want to check what you may have said, thinking in fact that you may not have said it at all, you are welcome to check it.

- C. I want to beg your pardon, but it seems to me that everywhere the British are listening to me.
- T. That is for security reasons I represent the people and I want to take back everything that happened here to the people.
- C. Now, we can come back to the first question about recognition of the Malayan Communist Party I would like you to explain it more completely.
- T. I don't know what I can add. Malaya is unlike Indonesia; in Indonesia there has been no trouble between the Communists and Government, and the Communist are allowed to take part in politics openly. In fact, the Communists in Indonesia are Indonesians themselves. On the other hand there are Chinese subjects, subjects of China today who are communists because they are subjects of Communist China. It is an interesting thing but when I went to Indonesia recently, I saw flags being flown by the communists in shop houses. There were also Indonesian flags; Chinese Nationalist flags they were flown by Chiang Kai Shek's men; and next door communist flags, they were flown by subjects of Communist China. But in Indonesia the communists are different. They are different from the Chinese communists. They are Indonesians belonging to the Indonesian Communist Party. Whether the Chinese Communists help them financially or help them in any way at all I do not know. In addition, at a meeting I attended there were all parties present, communists, nationalists, all parties. They were all Indonesian people. You know, when they talk they don't seem to have any identity of interests as between Chinese communists and Indonesian Communists, they are all Indonesians and they have helped Indonesia to fight the Dutch and free Indonesian from Dutch rule. They are, in fact, Indonesians. There has been no clash of any kind between the Indonesian Nationalist Party and other Indonesian parties. They are just part of the Indonesian political setup of the day. Now as to recognition, Indonesia recognises them all.

In India, the same thing - there is trouble. Probably, Mr. Marshall can tell you that Mr. Nehru is rather worried about certain activities in India. In this morning's paper, if you would like to read it ...

- M. I think they might like to read it. This is in today's paper gentlemen.

"Mr. Nehru ticks off Reds. They are clinging to outmoded theories and slogans of the past. The Indian Prime Minister, Mr. Nehru, yesterday made his first attack on Indian Communists since the visit of the Soviet leaders, calling them "reactionaires clinging to out-moded theories." He said they had shut their minds and spent all their time and energy

learning a few slogans of the past and appeared quite unable to appreciate what was hapening in India today.” There is a lot of interesting news following: you might like to read them.

- T. You can read the news now.
- C. We heard this over the radio last night.
- T. That is the position in India. India recognises the Communist Parry and Mr. Nehru seems troubled by its activities. On the other hand in Malaya as you kno yourselves, there has been fighting even since the Federal elections. An attempt has been made by your coming here to try to end this trouble, but to ask us to recognise you as a party so that you can disperse throughout the country to organise your communist activities, naturally you must understand that the people of this country would not accept that. Some of the people have lost their husbands, some have lost their sons; and those, are the backbone of my Party - therefore, to ask me to recognise the Communist Party or Mr. Marshall or Sir Cheng Lock for that matter, would not be fair and we cannot do it. I would like to be quite frank. I say, if you like to come out and you want to take your place in society, you are welcome to do so, but you must not take part in any Communistic activities - as explained just now. What may happen in the future I cannot say. That is for the people to say. After you have shown your worth, after you have shown your loyalty to Malaya in the same way as the Indonesian communists have shown, the things may change. But that is for the future. But now I am speaking for the people of today.
- C. You have mentioned about the Indonesian parties and also of the loyalty of the Communist Party in Malaya. Do you mean that it is because most of the members of the Communist Party in Malaya are Chinese
- T. Yes ...
- M. No not all of them. May I answer about Singapore. Never, that has nothing to do with it. It is because you have exercised violence against the people of Singapore and against the Government of Singapore - we have an elected Government - that we say that your activities are traitorous and on behalf of the people of Singapore, 76% of whom are Chinese, I strongly resent the suggestion that because you have a large Chinese element, that is why we consider your ideology or your activities traitorous. That has nothing to do with it.
- C. I would like to give an opinion.

- T. I might say it is true in some respects. For instance, the Malays feel rather that the communists owe allegiance to China because as you yourselves said, there are more than 90% Chinese in your Party. Out of that 90% how many would be eligible for Federal citizenship, how many would want to be Federal citizens? How many Malays are in your party: how many Indians are in your party, how many Eurasians? How many who make up your party are in your party to enable you to call yourself the Nationalist Party of this country? It is for that reason the Malays - I feel very strongly on this myself - think that you identify yourselves with China.
- C. Allow me to ask: if we organise our party in such a way, that we only allowed Federal Citizens or those who are happy to become Federal citizens to join the Communist Party ...?
- T. That may be later on. But you have got to prove your loyalty to the country first. But what will happen thereafter I cannot say. It may happen afterwards, but for the moment I say NO. I want to be quite frank with you. I don't want to mislead you. I must tell you the truth because the purpose of this meeting is to make this clear - we want to bring peace and an end to this trouble. We want you to know exactly what your position will be so that you can then make up your mind to accept the terms or not. There is no point in misleading you by saying, 'you do this, or you do that' and then we keep something down in our hearts. We don't intend to do that, that is not our way of doing things. I want to be frank with you. You have got to decide for yourselves.
- C. Suppose we assent to your suggestion, i.e. no recognition of the Malayan Communist Party and we come out from the jungle, what will be our position. Could you explain it more completely?
- T. Yes, the intention is this. The intention is that you will be held for investigation. As in many cases in war, when peace is declared and one side gives in, the other side must examine those who give in first, must investigate them, and it is necessary to detain them for a certain period in order to carry out this investigation. Again we must remember that in Malaya there is a slight difference. It is not a case of two countries at war, then there may not be detailed investigation, but in this case, in Malaya, there must be, because you are going to live here. Therefore, it is necessary to carry out an investigation in order to ascertain whether you are going to continue your activities or whether you are going to stop all these activities, which we consider at the moment as anti-Malayan. That is the true position.

- M. I think I would like to add to that for myself that if you or any of your colleagues can appreciate independence under a democratic system, the welfare of the people, and you are prepared to come in wholeheartedly, Singapore would welcome you.
- C. But we do not want to be welcomed like prisoners by being detained in prison.
- T. You will not be detained in prison. There will be special camps for you where you can be lodged in order to enable us to check on you. You will not be detained like other people where a trial will be held in order to pass judgment on you. It will only be an investigation to find out whether you are going to be loyal to this country or whether you are going to carry out subversive activities or other activities in order to enforce your ideology. In the past you have shown that you have this ideology, and because it is not accepted, you enforce it by violence. In some cases innocent people have been dragged out, slaughtered and killed. All those acts of brutality and hatred, we do not want; we do not like them. We do not want it done that way. Assuming that you come out and become members of the public, you might feel there were people against whom you wanted to take revenge; you might go into his house and slaughter him in cold blood. With all these possibilities, if I were to allow them to happen, I would be denounced by the people as an irresponsible public leader for having allowed that sort of thing to happen in order to bring about peace. "What sort of peace"? they would ask. Peace one way but trouble the other way. Therefore, it is necessary to find out first.
- C. We also want to point out frankly that we do not want to fight the people, but if we come out and it is necessary to hold investigations and detention is necessary, then we must ask what will be the length of detention.
- T. I will tell you this much about detention. The length of detention will only be for as long as is necessary to carry out the investigation. It will not be detention under the Emergency Regulations where people are detained indefinitely but we will have to hold you somewhere. The investigation will probably be carried out very speedily. The position of those detained today is different - they are detained under the Emergency Regulations. But when there is no more trouble, when the Emergency ends, they will not be held under those Regulations any more. Your detention will be different, we will take you to a special place, get committees of enquiry to go there straightaway, to deal with the matter and make the investigations. We want to extract a promise from you that you will not carry on your activities, which we say are not loyal

to Malaya and are prejudicial to the interests of Malaya and Malaysians. We will want you to sign a declaration to that effect. We will also want to know what you want to do when you come back to society.

- M. May I add one word? Those who are released will be assisted to settle in society and every opportunity will be given to them. At the present moment they are aware that any person who wants to return to China may do so and should any of those persons who surrender want to go to China, every facility will be given to them. I myself, give my personal undertaking that they will be treated in a manner compatible with the dignity of human beings and afforded every facility and assistance, if they so wish.
- T. I want to add this too - that under the terms of the Amnesty those who surrender will be helped to rehabilitate themselves in society. The general public could say that although these people fight the Government, yet Government helps them until they get jobs, Government pays them, while we who have asked for assistance because we have helped to fight the Communists, we are not compensated in any way. Why should Government help the Communists? My answer is that because these people have been living in the jungle, they have had no chance to get themselves acquainted with the conditions in the country, therefore, it is not fair to expect them as soon as they come out, to be able to obtain employment. The other thing is that perhaps people will not like to employ them. Nobody will employ them because they think of them as mischief-makers. An employer may think that if he employs this man there will be mischief, there will be trouble within his organisation, within his company or within his business and for that reason the Government considers it is necessary to help them, to allow these people to find regular employment, professions, and to try to get them settled in business and that sort of thing. We have got a place for these people at Kemendore. We put them there, help them, give them land, give them seeds, cattle and in the case of Chinese, pigs, chickens and so on to rear. Quite a number are very happy indeed. They have made a home for themselves there, and in most cases they have refused to leave the place. That is good. Something like that would be valuable to the Communists, that is to those who surrender. But do not think that what I mean by detention is that as soon as they surrender we will put them inside and forget about them. That is not human. My other worry is that the people detained in detention camps today under the Emergency Regulations have got to give up their Communist ideologies too, because they are in a way actively connected with your movement.

- C. I think that the question of assistance is of secondary importance. The most important question is this question of restriction of freedom. That is a question of principle.
- T. There will not be much restriction. There will be no restriction of movement except for the first few months when you may have to report where you are.
- C. I want to speak frankly on this point, I cannot accept it.
- T. You must realise our position, our predicament, we cannot allow you to go free just like that. It would be all very well if nothing untoward were to happen, but we have got to protect ourselves and make sure that nothing does happen. On the other hand, if it does happen despite what we propose to do, it cannot be helped, but nobody can accuse us of having been careless and of not having taken proper precautions. In your personal case perhaps it is all right, but can you vouch for the others?
- C. For the dignity of man, if this principle is insisted upon then we can only carry on with the struggle.
- T. It is up to you. As I said there would be restriction on movement for a certain period of time, but not after you have shown yourselves to be like the others, then restriction of movement will be removed. You will be free to go wherever you like. But we have got to take precautions just to be sure.
- C. We do not want to boast about ourselves, but although we are comparatively weak in strength, we are quite confident we can carry on the struggle, even for a long period.
- T. It is up to you.
- M. But Mr. Chan Tian, forgive me asking but what are you struggling for?
- C. It is very simple - just for the dignity of man.
- M. Yes, but
- C. You cannot get success in the battlefield and you cannot force us to give up.
- M. Of course not. But you see, you are speaking of the dignity of man. Surely it is not compatible with the dignity of man that you should use

deeds of violence to enforce your views on the population that does not want them - that is the crux of it. You speak of this struggle, but you yourselves appreciate that it results only in misery. You yourselves speak of peace, you claim loyalty to this country. Where is the dignity of man? You are making yourselves suffer indignities and miseries in the jungle with its disease and its lack of a lot of the essentials of human life. You recognise that you are also making the rest of the population suffer indignity. Where is the real dignity of man? There must be sacrifices for the dignity of man. And we are asking you to sacrifice for the dignity of man and for the welfare of Malaya as a whole.

- C. Since our outlook on this question is quite different, we are not prepared to argue on this question but we just express what we feel on this question.
- M. What question?
- C. About the dignity of man.
- M. But surely the dignity of man is a common thing we all understand. Would you consider it compatible with the dignity of man if you were to come out and we were to give you immediate passage overseas?
- C. Not every one of us, as I said before, will go abroad. That means to say that we would admit that the Communist party in Malaya is liquidated. But it is not. The Communist Party will never be liquidated.
- M. No. But you must admit that with your methods of achieving your aims, you have not got the result that you desire, you have got only misery for all. So the methods have been proved wrong.
- C. I am not prepared to argue on this question. But since you continue to mention it, I have to point out frankly that we know our struggle has produced certain effects. For example, the British now have to make certain concessions to the people of Malaya.
- M. You really believe that?
- C. It is not, of course, our struggle which has been the only cause for these concessions.
- M. You really believe that your struggle contributed to these concessions?
- C. Yes.

- M. Do you? Well, I would like to put it to you this way. You say that you have the welfare of Malaya at heart - or do you? I say, if you have the welfare of Malaya at heart, what are you prepared to sacrifice for the welfare of Malaya?
- C. First of all, fight for the independence of Malaya.
- M. I say: What are you prepared to sacrifice to bring peace to Malaya?
- C. Sacrifices should be made by all sides, not one side.
- M. Well, I am asking you for your side.
- C. This we can discuss. If we were to come out, we will be detained. That is unrealistic, of course we are not prepared to surrender to this Government. While we are in the jungle, we are free. Why should we come out to be detained?
- M. I have known the Tunku for some time, and I think you have shown by coming here a certain confidence in us. There is genuine goodwill between the two Governments. There is a desire to bring an end to this struggle. The question of detention is rather a question of investigation. Those who are prepared to forego completely their communist activities can come into the main stream. The others will be given the opportunity to go overseas. It is a question of having faith in our goodwill.
- C. We understand the goodwill of both the Government, that is why we have come here. We understand that an explanation of the amnesty terms implies certain revision of these terms and because of this we came out this morning. If that is not the case, then our understanding is wrong. In other words, you do not want us to come out at all.
- T. It is up to you to tell me where you want the terms amended. That is why I said it is up to you - for you to say. You have asked for my explanation and I have explained the position. If you think any particular part of it is wrong, it is for you to say.
- C. We asked for clarification of one point - that is already finalised - the restriction of freedom after we come out. Another question is recognition of the Communist Party. In our opinion, it is a waste of time to continue the discussion insisting on the terms as are now laid down in that direction. I am not trying to talk tough, but I am just explaining what I think. I hope that you will not take offence.
- T. No, no, I am here to listen to what you have to say and am prepared for

you to talk frankly in just the same way that I would like to talk to you frankly.

- C. Under the present political situation, we feel that it is possible for us to achieve independence by constitutional means, and it is for this reason that we are ready to stop the war on reasonable terms, but not on terms you lay down here.
- T. What is your reason for refusing these terms?
- C. There is no other way for us to choose - therefore we have to continue the struggle.
- T. What for instance do you think are reasonable terms?
- C. No restriction of movement.
- T. No restriction of movement - that means you say: "I accept peace". As soon as you say that and I say I agree, then everybody comes out, they do what they like - that is, all come out how they like, where they like and go where they like.
- C. Of course there is in addition the people who wish to go back to China.
- M. How many of them are there?
- C. We do not know now.
- M. Because in respect of that I would be ready to call it quits, to say we do not wish to have them here if they do not want to remain here. We will be glad to assist them to go.
- C. The second point - if the Communist Party is not recognised now, members of the Communist Party should be allowed to take part in political activities.
- M. You mean that if they are free, they can join "X" Political Party of "Y" Political Party, any existing Political Party?
- C. Not necessarily. For the present, there are many people organising new parties - perhaps we could organise a new party.
- M. What you really mean is: those who are free can join any political party other than a Communist Party?

- T. No, he means if they are not recognised, if the Communist Party is not recognised and they come out, they are free to organise their own political party.
- M. Free to organise what?
- T. To organise a new political party. They don't say a Communist one.
- C. Not necessarily a Communist Party but maybe another sort of party.
- M. Look, you are a frank man. You just told us so. You know the people will not recognise the Communist Party so you propose to call it the People's Party and have the same principles. Is that talking frankly?
- C. I think I am also very frank, if I tell you that in future our members will join, say, the Labour Front.
- M. That is a help (Laughter). It is an accepted fact as far as Singapore is concerned that you are free to join any political party. That is clear. But I would also like to make it clear that there can be no question of the Communist Party forming a political party under another name calling it whatever you like. Certainly you have shown your ability, and when you are free, I hope you will take part, take part actively, in politics for the welfare of the people in a democratic way. As far as Singapore is concerned, we welcome that.
- C. At the present moment, I think this is a compromise on our part, because we cannot advance in any other way to carry on our activities since the Malayan Communist Party is not recognised.
- M. Are you saying frankly that you want to carry on Communist political activities under the camouflage of another name?
- C. It is not a camouflage. It is just like - (you just take an example) - we want to wear an overcoat, but we are not allowed to do so; so we have to wear a singlet.
- M. May I say I appreciate your frankness.
- M. Those are your two points: have you any others? One was no restriction of movement.
- C. No detention, no investigation.
- M. The other is freedom to join or form any political party, freedom to join

any political party.

- C. May I say, freedom to join or form a political party.
- M. It seems Chin Peng understands English very well. The first point is unrealistic. I do not think there will be much difficulty about the second. But I do ask you to reconsider that first point realistically. Basically the true facts must take into account your position vis-a-vis the people, and however proud you may be of your record, do try to seem it from the eyes of the people, the large mass of people who have suffered. In the light of that, may I suggest that you consider that tonight and resume our discussion tomorrow, because (Tunku, I don't know how you feel on the first point) as far as I can see ... to me it is completely out.
- C. Excuse me, you say that the first point is unrealistic. The second point?
- T. The second point follows on what I said earlier. Once you are free to join society, you are free and can form whatever party ...
- M. You can join the P.A.P. if you like (Laughter).
- T. Yes.
- C. I think it is more important for you to consider your reply.
- T. I can reply now. As I have said, as far as restriction of movement is concerned we must have it. The other one, once you are free you are free to do what you like.
- M. You have the full rights of a citizen then - I mean the second point naturally follows. If you want to you could form an agricultural Party or whatever you like under the law, if your objects are lawful, and as far as most of your manifesto is concerned, except for the second last paragraph your objects seem to be perfectly in order.
- T. Do you want to see us further tomorrow, because tonight Dato Cheng Lock is not very well. He is rather tired; we are tired too; we want to rest. If you want to see us tomorrow, we will be here. You want to see us? You want to see Mr. Marshall, Dato Cheng Lock? We will all meet tomorrow at 10 a.m.
- M. I would plead with you to try and consider that question soberly. There must be some sacrifice on your part on this question. You are already sacrificing today if I may point out. You are going through a lot of difficulties which in the normal course a human being does not suffer.

When you speak of the dignity of man ...


(?)Just a moment please.

- M. So would you consider that point again realistically. We are prepared to be reasonable, but that is, as you put it, 'unacceptable to use'.
- T. I think we are going to adjourn now. Dato Sir Cheng Lock is tired out. We will come back tomorrow.

(Meeting adjourns to 29.12.55)



The Conducting Officer, Mr J.L.H Davis CBE, DSO accompanies Chin Peng's party to the third session



The Government side at the third session



Coming up for the third session

FOURTH SESSION

- T. Shall we begin? Yesterday, the discussion revolved around three points. First, recognition of the Communist Party. We have told you in no uncertain terms that we would not agree to recognition of the Communist Party. Next is detention. On this point you said you would not want to be detained or investigated. But I think I have explained to you (although I do not know whether you understood it or not), that the period of detention would be only for as long as is necessary to hold the investigation, no longer than that. I think I have explained to you the difference between the detention which you understand and the detention which we propose in the case of surrendered Communists. Correctly speaking, it is not detention at all; we intend to hold you for investigation. You, I understand, do not agree with that. You propose that as soon as agreement is reached whereby there shall be peace, you should then be allowed to come out and go wherever you like, freely. To that, we cannot agree for the reasons which I explained yesterday.

Then again, you suggested that there should be no investigation held to ascertain whether you are loyal or not. We feel that investigation or an inquiry, if you like the term better that "investigation" must be held. Investigation does rather suggest investigation into all you past acts. What we aim to do exactly is to ascertain whether you want to be loyal citizens of the country or not. For that reason I would rather call it an "inquiry".

Then there was the third point, which was suggested by you and amplified by the Chief Minister, Singapore. For those of you who wish to go to China, or for that matter to any other country, we could be pleased to help you to go. For those people I don't think an investigation would be necessary at all. All we need to know from them is where they want to go. Then arrangements will be made for their passage and pocket money will be given to them - enough to see that they are well looked after in that country.

I reiterate again that only those persons who want to stay in Malaya and make their homes in this country will be investigated.

We have only two hours this morning because I have got to go back and pack my things to go to England, so I hope we can come to some

agreement on these points, and I think it would be better to come straight to the point without beating about the bush.

I appreciate that you have got to obtain the best possible terms before you can agree to surrender, and I understand that attitude. So I would like to hear what you have to say.

- C. If the conditions as laid down cannot be changed, then I am not empowered to accept them.
- T. How can they be? As I say, they cannot be so changed that we give up investigation - that would be absolutely wrong.
- C. There is no need for me to repeat what I said just now. What I have said just now is very, very clear.
- M. I think we have cleared one point - that those who are free can take part in political activities. But we must have investigation and perhaps they would like to discuss the question of duration of this investigation, accepting the principle that is something which the people will require, then I think this line of thought might be fruitfully discussed.
- C. This is a question of principle. I am not empowered to discuss this principle. My answer in this matter is very plain.

Since we have only a short time available, I wish to say a few words. The present Government, although it is a popularly elected Government still is not an independent Government.

- M. Tell him we recognise that fully.
- C. Under such circumstances, therefore, when we bring out our suggestions we have got to have regard to this situation. If these popularly elected Governments of the Federation and Singapore have self-determination in matters concerning internal security and national defence, then all problems could be solved easily. As soon as these two Governments have self-determination in internal security and national defence matters, then we can stop the war immediately.
- T. Is that a promise? When I come back from England that is the thing I am bringing back with me.
- C. That being the case, we can straightaway stop our hostilities and also disband our armed units.

- M. You say that as soon as the two Governments have control of internal security and national defence you will end hostilities and lay down your arms and disband your armed forces. Mr. Chan Tian, is this right please?
- T. There is one word "self-determination".
- CT. Not self-determination - full power to control internal security.
- T. One of the purposes for which I am going to England is to get control of internal security. When I do get that, are you saying that you are prepared to accept our terms and lay down your arms, if the terms come from me?
- M. What do you mean by "national defence"? Do you mean control over all internal forces?
- CT. National defence includes control over all armed forces within the country.
- M. You say "national defence" means control over the armies within the country?
- CT. At least local forces.
- M. Local forces? Fair enough. Would you in those circumstances then accept these terms?
- CT. To give an example - control over the Malay Regiment, the Federation Regiment.
- M. And Singapore National Forces and Federation and Singapore Navy - that sort of thing?
- T. You mean that if Singapore doesn't get control of internal security and the Federation does....
- M. Don't assume that, Tungku. Forgive me, Tungku, my Government will not remain in power if we don't get control of internal security.
- T. I have got to make my point because I am going to London before you.

Assuming the Federation gets control of internal security and national defence and Singapore doesn't, would you give up the struggle, or would you want both territories to get it before you give up?

- M. May I put it this way. The Tunku is coming back in February, and he expects to have complete control of internal security by February. I will be going in April and will expect to be back in early May, and we expect then to have control of internal security. So the question is, if the Federation gets it in February, will you come out in February without waiting for Singapore, because we are going to be three months later?
- T. The fighting is in the Federation.
- M. Forgive me for interrupting but I want this to be clear - I will say it again.

The Tunku is going to London the day after tomorrow, and he will be coming back February 12th or 15th, and he will have then an agreement that he will have control of the internal security and national defence. He stands or falls by that. I am going in April. I will come back by mid-May, and if I do not have control of internal security and national defence I am going out - the Government is going out. So the question is, you see, there will be three months' difference between February and May - if in February the Federation has got control of internal security and national defence will you come out without waiting for Singapore?

- C. If Tunku obtained control in matters concerning internal security in February - and national defence - then we will stop our hostilities at once and we will not wait for the result of Mr. Marshall's mission.

Our armed forces are called "National Liberation Army". When we have attained our object, in other words, when this country is already liberated, then there is no point in continuing the existence of this army.

- M. I agree.
- C. But by that time will we still be subject to investigations?
- T. That is another point. Would you ask for any terms before you throw down you arms?
- C. This question is very simple. The answer is very simple. If the M.C.P. is recognised, if members of the M.C.P. are not subject to detention and investigation, they can throw down their arms at once. The question of weapons can be solved easily. (Interpreter: I don't know what they actually mean by that).

The downing of arms does not mean that the arms will be handed in (repeats) is not equivalent to the handing over of arms to Government.

May I repeat: the downing of weapons is not equivalent to the handing over of weapons to Government.

- T. They want to keep their arms?
- C. If only the M.C.P. is recognised; if only we are not subject to restriction of our liberty, it is possible for us to surrender our weapons.
- M. Now?
- C. After Tunku's return from London when he has attained his aims.

I maintain that what I have said just now is quite correct. Because the conditions laid down in the proclamation - in the Amnesty declaration - is that the downing of arms is not surrender of arms.

- T. I don't quite follow him for the moment. It would convey to me the meaning that because in the Amnesty terms there is a mention of the laying down of arms - it means that when they surrender they would still be allowed to keep their arms.
- C. That is how we interpret it.
- T. Oh, no, it is not. The conditions are obvious. If, after you surrender, you were not happy with certain things it would mean that you could again take up arms if you do not surrender you weapons.
- C. That being so, then we have misinterpreted the terms.
- M. At first I understood them to say that as soon as the Federation gets control of internal security and local armed forces, they will come out. Mr. Chen Tien, I will read out this note to you and then I will hand it to you: "As soon as the Federation obtains control of internal security and local armed forces we will end hostilities, lay down our arms and disband our forces." Would you initial that because I want to issue it to the Press.

(Paper passed to Communist side)

- C. The question is: If we disband our army, are we also subjected to investigation?
- T. That I will have to decide later on; I won't say it now. I am only talking now on our Amnesty offer. I will have to get a further mandate from the Alliance National Council and the U.M.N.O. General Assembly.

- M. Do they accept that?
- C. I will accept that with an amendment.
- M. Perhaps Mr. Chen Tien would like to put the amendment on the paper.
- C. I will accept it with an amendment: "that is not equal to the fact that we accept the terms of the Amnesty".
- T. Quite right: I understand. You mean provided it does not mean surrendering under the terms of the present Amnesty? The present Amnesty terms are only going to be on offer for about another month from today. If there is to be a further Amnesty, it may be different. The present Amnesty cannot go on for ever. It has got to end at some time.

(Paper handed back to Mr. Marshall)

- M. The note with amendments now reads: "That as soon as the elected Government of the Federation obtains complete control of internal security and local armed forces, we will end hostilities, lay down our arms and disband our army. It does not amount to accepting the present Amnesty terms." Are we to understand that you are not prepared now to consider the question of the present Amnesty terms or any extension of them, or any amelioration of them?
- C. No.
- M. Can I ask: Whether pending the return of the Tunku, and reecognising the serious set-backs to the economic life of the country which are brought about by your activities, you would refrain from activities which endanger life and property of the citizens of the country?
- C. Long ago we announced that we advocated a general cease fire. As I have said just now, even from today until the day when the Tunku returns from London, we can arrange for a general cease fire.
- T. The point is that we have done that before. We are the only party which respected it; your party carried on as if there was no general cease fire declaration at all.
- C. The point is that Government's declaration did not declare that there would be a stop to offensive activities by Government forces - they attacked us all along.

- T. That is not quite true. In most cases, although the cease fire was given, the Government troops were also ordered not to shoot at sight but to challenge first, and this they did. If the Amnesty terms are not acceptable to you, then do you agree that they must be withdrawn?
- C. If it comes to that we cannot help it.
- T. I will have to announce tomorrow that the Amnesty terms will have to be withdrawn.
- C. There is no question of that.
- M. Are you in a position to speak for the Communists in Singapore?
- C. Yes. But I cannot control those who have been sent there by the Special Branch of the Police.
- M. Are you suggesting that the Government sent Special Branch people to infiltrate into the Communist party?
- C. There is nothing curious about that. They have, but I cannot tell you the number.
- M. What on earth for?
- C. There are those who call themselves Communists, but in fact, they were sent there by the Government. They are, in reality, the detectives of the Government. How can I control these people?
- M. You said you control the activities of the Communists in Singapore?
- C. Yes, that is right. I wish to clarify one point. In Singapore we discovered a lot of such cases, not a few but quite a number. I do not say a lot, but not little. The Special Branch of Singapore have infiltrated into our Communist party by sending people to join our Communist party. Such people will not listen to us, but they make use of our name to do what they like. That is exactly what happened in the Hock Lee Bus Company strike.
- M. You mean to say that whenever activities of a character which are unpopular to the public are committed by the Communist party, you disown them by saying that the Communist spies have committed them?
- C. If we are responsible for any such activities, we say so. If we make a mistake, we accept it. Once we announced publicly that we accepted

our mistakes in collecting identity cards and destroying them. But the strike at Hock Lee Co. is not one we would like to do. I want to reiterate once again. Under such circumstances we have no wish to create chaos. Of course we would lead the labourers in strikes and in their struggle, but we do not wish to have such unfortunate incidents. In that strike - although I have not received detailed information but I have reports - there are people who wilfully incited the labourers to do the things they have done. They openly said that they wanted to carry on their struggle until independence has been achieved. Such a slogan cannot be that of the Malayan Communist Party. We members of the M.C.P. will never utter such slogans.

As regards the question of the terms of the Amnesty, I wish to say a few words. The primary question is investigation. Such an investigation, no matter how it is explained, implies that we come out to surrender. It is impossible to want us to come out and surrender. If you demand our surrender we would prefer to fight to the last man. I am not telling a lie, I am telling the truth. If the question of the principle of investigation can be altered, we would give even greater concessions.

- M. Do I understand that even if the Federation has control of internal security and local armed forces and achieves independence, you will not consider coming out if the Government insists on investigations before release?
- C. As regards investigation, supposing we return to our respective homes and then the Government starts to investigate us, then it is a different matter. But if we were to be enclosed in one place and investigations are to be carried out, that amounts to surrender.
- T. I want to make it quite clear to you. As I said yesterday, our ideologies are completely at variance. As I said, in one case you will go to extremes in order to enforce chaos even to the extent of taking up arms. Again, your organisation is a very powerful one. It has got support from within and aid from without. In fact, we would be powerless to control your movement, if you were to come out of the jungle and put yourselves on the same level and the same status as we are. Therefore if you do not come out to surrender, we would rather not accept you in our society. If you want to have peace in this country, one side must give in - either we give in to you, or you give in to us. The two ideologies, yours and ours, can never work side by side. That is my frank opinion.
- C. But if Tunku's opinion is that after he has obtained power he is afraid of subversion as has been reported in the editorial of the Straits Times of yesterday's date, I think this question is not difficult to solve.

- T. To me I think it is quite difficult. To me I have the clear example of China - because China at one time was run by forces with different ideologies - Chiang Kai Shek's Nationalist China and Mao-Tse-Tung's Communist China. What happened there we all know. The Chiang Kai Shek's Nationalist Government had to be driven out of the mainland. If I accept you on equal status I have no doubt that I and my party will similarly be driven out of Malaya before long because our ideologies are widely different. That is plain language. Therefore you either give in to us on certain terms which we consider fair, or else this struggle will have to go on, much to my regret.
- C. I have already said that we are prepared to give great concessions, but the principle of investigation implies surrender which we cannot accept. It is humiliation to us. May I say, if you were in my position, what would you do?
- T. Well, it all depends. If I were a communist I would probably demand the same terms that you have. But, on the other hand, I am a nationalist of the Malayan type, pure and simple. If I were a Communist and had carried on the war as you have done, I would welcome being offered Amnesty terms. On the other hand, assuming that the Communist Party was in power in this country and they had been accepted by the people at large, I, as a Nationalist type, would not want war; I would give in to them. Actually the position will not arise.
- M. If I might paraphrase the Tunku: as a human being who seeks the welfare of the people, if the Communists were in power he would not go shooting them, killing them, burning their houses; he would accept the position. The Tunku is a strong nationalist and a strong democrat and he says that if the Communists were in power as the Government, he would not try to fight the Government with bullets, with knives and with fire, because he considers the welfare of the people. He would loyally accept the Government.

He appeals to you now as a nationalist to be loyal to the Government, to accept the decision of the people, for the welfare of the people.

I would like to add my voice to his as a human being. There are 7,000,000 people in Malaya and Singapore. There are about 3,000 communists. The welfare of the 7,000,000 must come first. Now that we have elected Governments and we are on the verge of independence, it cannot be said that your struggle is for independence. I appeal to you to think of the welfare of the people as a whole, even if it means a certain humiliation for the 3,000: if you seek the welfare of the people, you should not put your pride before their welfare. Could you look at the

question from the point of view of what is good for Malaya? Certainly, it is not the hostilities of today. Today, I am not talking about the past, it is doing harm to the people of Malaya. Why not accept the position, even if it means slight humiliation. You have accepted sacrifices in the past, so accept the sacrifice of humiliation and serve the people by coming out and put an end to these hostilities.

- T. I want to give an example. It happened in my Organisation. I was in the U.M.N.O. when Dato Onn was the leader, but Dato Onn did not agree with me in all matters. Nevertheless, I remained within the U.M.N.O. without quarrelling. Eventually it proved I was right and he was wrong and therefore he went out and I came in. It happened again within the Alliance itself. M.C.A. Selangor wanted to join U.M.N.O. Sir Cheng Lock Tan did not want to join U.M.N.O. but wanted to join I.M.P., but when he found that the majority of the people wanted to join U.M.N.O. he gave in. It is a principle that works well for an Organisation of that size. I think it can work very well with the Government too. But our two ideologies cannot work side by side. Either you give in or we give in. If you will not, the struggle must go on.
- C. May I ask one question? May I know the true reason why the Tunku wants us to surrender? Is it because of our threat to his leadership or may there be other reasons?
- T. No. Not because of any threat to my leadership at all, because I do not think it can be threatened at this moment. It is because I want peace. There can never be peace while these two ideologies conflict very strongly one with another. I want peace; that is why I ask you for the sake of the masses of the people of Malaya, the 7,000,000 - as was said just now - to accept our ideology. You are only a few thousands - I mean you are many less than us. So for the sake of peace, I think those fewer people should give in to us. Later these fewer people may grow stronger and if they are stronger we will give in to them.
- M. Is there a chance of your reconsidering this?
- C. I have made it quite clear that as far as investigation is concerned this is impossible. I have no authority to accept that, unless such investigation is imposed in such a way which does not give the colour of surrender.
- M. What kind of investigation would you suggest?
- C. Frankly speaking, our number is not many, our number is not very large. My suggestion to you is that out of this number, a certain number be

allowed to leave this country and the others be allowed to go back freely to their homes. Government can investigate them, but they must be allowed to go back freely to their homes.

- T. How can we contact them? We don't know their homes.
- C. We are not going to act as we have acted in the period 1945-1948.
- M. The Tunku has accepted the suggestion that there will be no investigation for those who are going overseas. They can go straight to the boat.
- T. How many is that part - those who want to go away?
- C. This is one means by which you are asking for something from me?
- T. I want to ascertain if a large number is going back, then perhaps the ones remaining need not be held for investigation, that is, if a large number is going back. If many of the leaders and a large number of followers want to go back to China, and those who want to remain to be citizens are few, then I won't carry on with investigation. We can work on that general line. There will be no need to carry out investigation. The only condition is that they will have to report where they are.
- C. Reporting to the Police has a touch of surrender.
- T. As I have said, surrender is inevitable.
- C. We can do it in this manner: allow them to come out to rejoin society as any normal person. Then Government can send detectives to shadow them.
- T. Then the number of detectives will have to be equal to the number of communists. Government cannot afford to do that. Will the number going to China be large?
- C. The reply to this depends on whether the M.C.P. is recognised.
- T. No. In all countries, you know for yourselves, where there have been struggles between communists and nationalists, they have been forced to divide up the territories. For example, Korea had to be divided, Vietnam had to be divided. We cannot exist together either. If we accept 'no surrender' we have to divide Malaya into Communist Malaya and Non-Communist Malaya. Malaya is too small. There will be constant trouble, constant warfare, if we were to divide Malaya. You know very well what I said just now - one party must give in. Unfortunately,

although you do not like the word 'surrender', I have got to be frank with you and say that you have got to surrender.

- M. Now, will you take this message back? We on our side - I am the representative of Government today, there will be elections in 1957 and I may not be the representative of the new Government, which will take its own decisions, but I will accept the decision of that Government - we ask for the welfare of the people; we genuinely do it to the best of our knowledge and ability. I appeal to you, in your activities, think of the general welfare of the people. Personal pride should not stand in the way of the welfare of the people of a country. You who have struggled courageously if, I think, erroneously, you who have accepted deprivation and personal sacrifice, even including your own lives, you should not let a matter of mild humiliation for a matter of a few months stop you from seeking the welfare of the people. If you can see it as we see it. Once more, gentlemen, I ask - Is there a chance of our meeting on the basis of the welfare of the country?
- T. I think, perhaps, you won't answer the question now. I do appreciate the fact that you have come out to meet me and I feel very happy indeed. I must thank you.
- M. I think you can accept it both from the Tunku and myself - you have indicated certain anxiety for your personal security - that the two Governments will be personally responsible to see that you return safely without molestation. The Tunku and I will be responsible. And if in future there is a chance that you can see the light, in the welfare of the people, show a change of attitude, neither the Tunku or I will consider any question of pride in coming to meet you again.
- M. I speak for you, Tunku?
- T. Yes. I want to add this: speaking on the view at the opposite end of the poles, I did not expect very much at this talk. Nevertheless, the fact is that we have had an opportunity to talk things over, to know what is in each other's mind. You have time to think. Whatever may be the result, I hope you will place before everything else the peace, prosperity and happiness of the people of this country.
- T. I hope you are comfortable, that you had everything you wanted. Please let me know whether you want anything before I go away.
- M. I think they want a fan.
- C. There is nothing we want. We don't need a fan. The question is how are we going back.

- T. In the same way that you came. You will be escorted.
- C. That is all.

(Meeting terminated at 12.48 p.m.)


Notes:

- T = Tunku Abdul Rahman
C = Chin Peng
M = David Marshall
D = Dato' Tan Cheng Lock

Source : PRO : The Baling Meeting. CO1030/31



The Chief Ministers give a final press conference in the press room in Baling town before their departure



They leave the meeting site with the Conducting Officer, Mr Davis



The Chief Ministers and Dato Sir Cheng Lock Tan walk down to hold their preliminary press conference in the guard tent

DOCUMENT V**Letter from Chin Peng**

Tanggal 12 October, 1957

Yang Berhormat Perdana Menteri,
Persekutuan Tanah Melayu.

Dengan hormatnya saya maa'lomkan bahawa saya bersedia berunding samula dengan Tengku untuk menchapai suatu persetujuan yang a'dil dan menasabah bagi menamatkan peperangan.

Dalam hal ini, agar perundingan kita pada kali ini dapat menchapai persetujuan dengan lunakny, maka saya menchadangkan hendaknya diadakan terlebih dahulu pertemuan pendahuluan diantara wakil2 dari pihak saya dengan pihak Tengku.

Sekianlah terimakasih.

Yang benar,

.....
(Chen Ping)
Setiausaha Agong,
Party Komunis Malaya.

Source : Arkib Negara Malaysia

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