Political and Cultural Representations of Muslims

Muslim Minorities

Editors

Jørgen S. Nielsen, University of Copenhagen
Felice Dassetto, University of Louvain-la-Neuve
Aminah McCloud, DePaul University, Chicago

VOLUME 11

The titles published in this series are listed at brill.nl/mumi

Political and Cultural Representations of Muslims

Islam in the Plural

Edited by

Christopher Flood
Stephen Hutchings
Galina Miazhevich
and
Henri Nickels

BRILL

LEIDEN · BOSTON
2012

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Political and cultural representations of Muslims : Islam in the plural / edited by Christopher Flood.
p. cm. -- (Muslim minorities, ISSN 1570-7571 ; v. 11)
Includes bibliographical references (p.) and index.
ISBN 978-90-04-23102-3 (hardback : alk. paper) -- ISBN 978-90-04-23103-0 (e-book) 1. Muslims--Non-Muslim countries. 2. Muslims--Public opinion. 3. Islam and politics. 4. Islam--21st century. I. Flood, Christopher.

BP52.P65 2012
305.6'97--dc23

2012013136

This publication has been typeset in the multilingual "Brill" typeface. With over 5,100 characters covering Latin, IPA, Greek, and Cyrillic, this typeface is especially suitable for use in the humanities. For more information, please see www.brill.nl/brill-typeface.

ISSN 1570-7571
ISBN 978 90 04 23102 3 (hardback)
ISBN 978 90 04 23103 0 (e-book)

This book is printed on acid-free paper.

CONTENTS

LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS

Ahmed K. al-Rawi, Ph.D. (2004) University of Baghdad, Ph.D. (2011) University of Leicester, teaches Media and Communication at Erasmus University, Rotterdam. Besides publishing a large number of journal articles and chapters in edited collections, he has authored two books, including *Media Practice in Iraq* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012).

Ebru Ş. Canan-Sokullu, Ph.D. (2006) University of Siena, is Assistant Professor of International Relations, Bahçeşehir University, Istanbul. She has published articles on public opinion and foreign policy in *Armed Forces & Society*, *South European Society & Politics*, and *Perceptions: Journal of International Affairs*.

Tereza Capelos, Ph.D. (2002) Stony Brook University, is Senior Lecturer in Politics at the University of Surrey, with research specialisms in political psychology, electoral behaviour, and public opinion. Her recent publications examine the determinants of candidate reputations, the role of affect and emotions in politics, political knowledge and civic IQ, and the impact of political scandals on accountability attributions.

Gaetan Clavien, Ph.D. (2011) University of Geneva, is Lecturer in Media and Communication Studies at that university and coordinator of the doctoral programme in Political Science of Western Switzerland. Among his publications, he co-edited the book *Racisme, libéralisme et les limites du tolérable* (Geneva: Georg, 2003).

Christopher Flood, D.Phil. (1981) University of Oxford, is Emeritus Professor in the School of Politics, University of Surrey. His books and articles have centred on ideological discourses, political myth, and defensive nationalism. His most recent book (co-authored with Stephen Hutchings, Galina Miazhevich and Henri Nickels) is *Islam, Security and Television News.* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012).

Danila Genovese, Ph.D. (2010) University of Westminster, UK, is a freelance researcher, who previously taught in the Centre for Democracy, University of Westminster. Her research focuses on Middle East Politics, political Islam and Muslim minorities in the West.

Matteo Gianni, Ph.D. (1999) University of Geneva, is Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science of that university and a founding member of the Group of Researchers on Islam in Switzerland (GRIS). He recently co-edited the book *Musulmans d'aujourd'hui: identités plurielles en Suisse* (Geneva: Labor et Fides, 2009).

Stephen Hutchings, Ph.D. (1987) University of Durham, is Professor of Russian Studies at the University of Manchester and President of the British Association for Slavonic and East European Studies. He has published widely on the Russian media and recently completed a major grant project on European television representations of Islam.

Signe Kjær Jørgensen is a Ph.D. candidate in the Department of Political Science, University of Copenhagen. She has published chapters and articles on topics relating to citizenship, journalism and Muslim women. Her recent publications include a co-authored article in *Social Theory and Health* (2011) analysing public debates about Muslim women actively engaged in party politics.

Priyasha Kaul is a media sociologist in the School of Sociology, Politics and International Studies, University of Bristol. Her research interests focus on the intersections of contemporary social issues in media in relation to nationalism and globalisation.

Galina Miazhevich, Ph.D. (2007) University of Manchester, is Gorbachev Media Research Fellow at Christ Church, Oxford. She is also an associate of the Reuters Institute for Journalism, University of Oxford, and was previously a Research Associate at the University of Manchester. She has published extensively on media and socio-cultural change in post-communist societies.

Henri C. Nickels, Ph.D. (2005) University of Amsterdam, is Programme Manager—Social Research at the EU Fundamental Rights Agency. He has published articles on the social construction of Muslim and Irish communities, recently including "De/constructing 'Suspect' Communities," *Journalism Studies* (2012).

Chloe Patton, Ph.D. (2009) Royal Melbourne Institute of Technology, is a Postdoctoral Research Fellow in the International Centre for Muslim and Non-Muslim Understanding at the University of South Australia. She is

currently working on a book exploring the alternative multicultural realities of young Muslims in the context of the perceived crisis of multiculturalism.

Timothy Peace, Ph.D. (2010) European University Institute, is a Postdoctoral Fellow at the University of Edinburgh, affiliated with the Alwaleed Centre. His research investigates the relationship between religion and politics, focusing particularly on Islam in Europe. His work has been published in journals such as *Patterns of Prejudice* and *Parliamentary Affairs*.

Mirjam Shatanawi trained in Arabic Studies at the University of Amsterdam and African/Asian History at SOAS, University of London. She is Curator of the Middle East and North Africa at the Tropenmuseum in Amsterdam, for which she has curated exhibitions on Islam, Iran and Palestine. Her most recent book is a critical analysis of the history of the Tropenmuseum's Islamic collections.

Dunya van Troost is a Ph.D. candidate in the Sociology Department of VU University, Amsterdam. Her current research deals with large demonstrations in Europe, exploring how emotions are related to protest issues and how they originate in contextual socio-political factors. Her previous work concerned the links between emotions, political attitudes and perceptions of threat.

John Turner is a Ph.D. candidate at the University of Surrey, working on issues related to terrorism, religion and international politics. He has previously published on the ideology of jihadist organisations, including "From Cottage Industry to International Organisation: The Evolution of Salafi Jihadism and the al-Qaeda Ideology," *Journal of Terrorism and Political Violence* (2010).

INTRODUCTION

Christopher Flood, Stephen Hutchings, Galina Miazhevich and Henri Nickels

Since the events of 11 September 2001, there has been an incremental growth of concern in many predominantly non-Muslim countries about the nature of Islam and its relationship with non-Islamic societies. In the states which public discourse conflates under the ideologically loaded label of 'the West' (hereafter the inverted commas are taken for granted) and in some non-Western states with Muslim minorities, the stances adopted by politicians and public commentators have often echoed Samuel Huntington's notorious 'clash of civilisations' thesis. Other voices, by contrast, have pleaded for an end to the Islamophobia widely regarded by Muslims, and by many non-Muslim observers, as endemic in Western or Westernised political and media cultures. At the same time, lively debates within Islamic theological circles have generated, on the one hand, claims that in modernised form the religion can and should accommodate itself to Western values without compromising its own fundamental principles. On the other hand, defiant Islamist critics of Western decadence have preached a return to the literal truths of the Quran and sometimes invoked them as warrants for violent action against enemies of the faith. Paradoxically, the transnational resonance of such anti-Western critiques is largely attributable to the tools of the very processes of globalisation against which they are directed.

What is certain is that changing attitudes to Islam and Muslims have had a profound influence on political cultures and national identities, as well as on policies regarding immigration, security and multiculturalism. Indeed, the complexity of the very notion of Islam and the multiple responses that it elicits are such that there is no uniform approach to its representation or social construction. Nevertheless, one of the paradoxical benefits of the national and international tensions crystallised by 9/11 has been the growth of academic and intellectual interest in Islam, Muslim societies and the situations of Muslim diasporas as immigrant communities. The lists of academic publishers in these areas have swollen, specialist journals have proliferated and university courses have multiplied. The more thoughtful media, whether conventional or internet-based, have

organised searching debates on the implications of the new intensity of interaction between Islamic culture(s) and non-Islamic ones.

These developments are all to the good, insofar as they foster deeper understanding among academic and wider publics, with the possibility of reducing the pervasiveness of negative, exclusionary, homogenising stereotypes held by non-Muslims and Muslims about each other. Precisely because both Islam itself, and responses to it, are becoming increasingly internationalised, it is important that analyses of these phenomena should be nuanced, non-reductive, sensitive to the particular cultures in which they are encountered and conscious of the heterogeneity characterising Muslim societies. This must include gaining a sense of key parallels, differences and interactions within and between the various nations or other communities affected.

The overarching aim of this book is to make a contribution to this process of filling perceptual gaps, thereby giving real meaning to the notion of studying Islam in its international context. The book offers a set of eleven essays dealing with perceptions and public representations of Islam and Muslims at a time when international and national contexts make those identifications inescapably political. The geographical coverage of the collection is broad: chapters are based on case studies of events and processes in a wide range of countries, either considered individually or in comparative perspective. They include analyses relating to Britain, France, the Netherlands, Denmark, Germany, Switzerland, India, the United States, and Australia, as well as a more generic comparison of Western and Islamic concepts of international relations.

The essays are not directly concerned with government policy, but with the broader spheres of public opinion and debate, grass-roots politics, ideological beliefs, the media and public culture. The collection is therefore multidisciplinary and, correspondingly, multimethodological. It draws on a broad range of fields in the social sciences, humanities and arts, using qualitative or quantitative methodologies according to the nature of the respective topics under investigation. The methodological approaches are not mutually exclusive but complementary. Insights and methods deriving from theory of international relations combine with intellectual history to shed light on aspects of contemporary Muslim political thought, but intellectual history equally feeds into political analysis of debates within and between contemporary social movement organisations in a predominantly non-Muslim, European society. Political anthropology and ethnographic study are based on fieldwork involving individual interviews but also on qualitative analysis of written or visual texts. The

perspectives offered by literary and film criticism are combined with attention to ideological and political contexts of cultural production, while theoretical as well as practical aspects of museum curation are used to shed light on the dilemmas of representation of Islam within Western, non-Muslim cultural environments. The methodology of critical discourse analysis offers a valuable approach to investigation of political debate in the press but so too does quantitative content analysis. Experimental methods in political psychology, using quantitative measures applied to relatively small sets of participants, generate results which offer highly productive insights into the interplay of values, emotions and social contexts underlying non-Muslim public attitudes towards groups representing Muslims and Islam. On the wider canvas of mass public opinion a classical quantitative approach is equally fruitful in shaping the analysis. However, while the diversity of disciplinary approaches and their related methods gives richness and variety to the collection as a whole, all of the chapters have been written to make the arguments interesting and intelligible to non-specialist readers from different disciplinary backgrounds to those of the authors.

The book is organised on the principle that the chapters cover issues which overlap and interlock with each other in a variety of ways. The first four chapters focus primarily on self-perceptions and self-representations of Muslims in relation to Western or other predominantly non-Muslim societies. The emphasis in subsequent chapters is more heavily on perceptions and representations of Muslims by mass publics or by particular groups within multicultural, predominantly non-Muslim societies. Among the questions running through the collection are the following:

- How do Muslim thinkers conceptualise the relationship between the 'land of Islam' and non-Islamic societies in a world of nation-states dominated by Western powers?
- How do self-representations of Muslim men and women engage with majority representations of Islam within predominantly non-Islamic societies?
- How do radical Muslims define themselves in relation to the definitions given of them within the mainstream media in predominantly non-Muslim societies?
- How do Muslims, and especially Muslim women, participate in the politics of non-Muslim societies without renouncing their distinctive cultural identities?
- How does Islam fit with public perceptions of multiculturalism and integration?

- How do public attitudes towards Muslims intersect with democratic values in a climate of anxiety over actual or potential security threats from Muslim sources?
- To what extent do reductive assumptions equating Islam with *Islamism,* and *Islamism* with terrorism conflate with anti-immigrant attitudes?
- What challenges does Islam pose for European anti-racist movements, when ethnically-linked Islamophobia coincides with, and cuts across, other forms of racism?
- How are these tensions reflected and refracted in literary, filmic, photographic and other cultural representations within non-Muslim societies, between those which deliberately or inadvertently promote negative stereotypes of Muslims and those which seek to challenge reductive characterisations?

The opening chapter of the collection is the one with the broadest field of view. John Turner sets out to uncover an Islamic paradigm of international relations which has hitherto remained largely unacknowledged outside Muslim cultures. Turner recognises that there is a wealth of literature devoted to the study of Islam within the academic field of International Relations, a sub-discipline that has grown exponentially in recent decades, and especially since the crisis precipitated by 9/11. However, the majority of commentators have viewed Islam as a factor to be understood in relation to existing, Western paradigms of International Relations and have thereby neglected its specificity.

In Turner's view, this may be explained by the fact that Islam has tended to be perceived at once as a non-Westphalian discourse and as a theoretical concept grounded in neither positivist nor post-positivist inquiry. While international relations have historically been conceptualised through the Western experience, the Islamic standpoint assumes that the sources for inquiry have been revealed through the Quran and Sunnah. Perhaps because of its Western-centric focus, the importance of religion in international affairs has largely been marginalised by International Relations scholars, who have tended to reduce religion to simply playing a monolithic role that is at best merely a part of power politics or simply a tool of persuasion. Following the recommendation that religion must be taken into account in International Relations theorising without rejecting previous theories or disregarding research methods developed in the 20th and 21st Centuries, Turner's chapter supports the argument that it is possible for alternative, non-Western-centric concepts of international relations to exist and to deserve being explored by Western theorists.

Not all schools of thought in Islamic theory of International Relations view the relationship with the non-Muslim world in terms of violent, inevitable struggle for dominance. Non-traditionalist reformists believe it is necessary to engage with modernity, but to develop a specifically Islamic modernity by learning from the West without allowing the Islamic world to be absorbed or dominated by the West. Conversely, the strand of thought which Turner labels Salafist/Jihadist does see the world in terms of a zero-sum, winner-takes-all game in which militant Islam must be the winner in pursuit of the sacred duty to unite the world under Islam.

Although it vigorously rejects the charge of advocating violence, the utopian goal of global unity within a single Islamic Caliphate is shared by the radical Islamist party, Hizb ut-Tahrir. The British branch of the party is examined in detail by Danila Genovese in Chapter Two, focusing particularly on the interrelationship between external representation of the group and its own representation of itself. The research for the chapter was conducted on the basis of Genovese's own interviews and personal conversations with the leaders and members of the party, on the one hand, and analysis of news reports or other articles produced by leading media institutions and scholars on the phenomenon of radical Islamism in the UK, on the other.

The argument put forward by Genovese is that there is a mirroring effect between the essentialised representation of Islam and Islamism in the Culturalist and Orientalist approaches of external commentators and the self-representation voiced by the Islamist radicals themselves, especially in the context of a veritable fetishisation of politics and power on their part. Thus, there is a perverse and paradoxical dynamic whereby categories imposed from outside become unconsciously internalised within the group, but in inverted form, as in a mirror, which in practice deprives the party of political relevance or effectiveness. Genovese argues that the current neglect of this element in the analysis of Islamism could mask a refusal to address the West's own failure to make a serious political examination of the phenomenon itself.

The same failure to engage seriously with Muslim self-understandings and aspirations, even with those of ethnic minorities established within Western societies, contributes to the problem of coming to terms with Muslim practices in relation to dress and public behaviour. Against the backdrop of wider controversy over the building of mosques and other aspects of the complex accommodation with Muslim minorities, the willingness of many politicians and public intellectuals to justify legal discrimination against Muslim women, or other forms of normative pressure on them, in the name of freedom and equality exhibits clashes between

different civil and human rights considered essential to liberal democracies. The controversies in several European countries concerning the wearing of the *hijab* (Islamic headscarf or veil) by many Muslim women are particularly notorious instances of the paradoxes involved.

Basing herself on a discourse analysis of articles in a number of major Danish newspapers, Signe Kjær Jørgensen, in Chapter Three, examines the criticisms levelled at Asmaa Abdol-Hamid, a prominent, headscarf-wearing, Muslim female candidate for a left-wing party during the campaign for the 2007 parliamentary election in Denmark. The chapter shows how the legitimacy of her candidature was challenged in the light of a feminist critique, while Asmaa Abdol-Hamid herself invoked a multiculturalist, feminist discourse of her own in order to defend her aim of being elected as a member of parliament. At the same time Abdol-Hamid attempted to counter other secularist and nationalist positions that were used to criticise her. The chapter demonstrates the multiplicity of symbolic meanings which can be attached to the Muslim headscarf, with the result that it can always be open to contestation in Western social environments.

Abdol-Hamid's claim to have a right to wear the Muslim headscarf as a positive, personal choice in relation to her identity, and not as an emblem of cultural acceptance of the oppressive subordination of Muslim women by Muslim men, chimes with the subjective accounts given to Chloe Patton in the course of a visual ethnographic study involving members of a Melbourne Islamic youth organisation to examine how young Australian Muslim women, when presented with the opportunity to create photographic self-portraits, used their headscarves to challenge dominant representations of their identity as 'dark'.

Using innovative social research methods to facilitate empirical insights beyond the scope of conventional text-based approaches, the chapter focuses in particular on the ways in which metaphoric journeys from darkness to light signify positive changes of state in a wide range of discursive settings. Further, Patton shows that the young Muslim women who participated in her study experienced metaphoric darkening of their identity, not only through hostile media representations of Islam in general but also through the well-intentioned but demeaning expressions of paternalistic concern for their well-being, which they frequently met in their day-to-day social dealings with non-Muslim Australians.

The first of the chapters dealing predominantly with the other side of the picture, by examining non-Muslim attitudes towards Muslims, opens with an application of theory developed in the field of political psychology to a case study of public opinion. In Chapter Five Tereza Capelos and

Dunya van Troost explore political attitudes towards groups representing Muslims and Islam at a time when perceived threats to Western societies challenge the political tolerance of non-Muslim populations towards Muslim minorities and call established policies of integration into question. The Netherlands, with its long-established reputation for acceptance of diversity, is one such society, where tensions surrounding its substantial Muslim population have intensified national debates over multiculturalism and integration. From the standpoint of political psychology interesting questions arise as to the interaction between tolerance, on the one hand, and Islamophobia, as a form of intolerance, on the other, since both involve cognitive and emotional dimensions. In an experimental setting with Dutch participants, Capelos and Van Troost manipulate the emotional appraisal of an interaction with a fictitious Islamic group, and use a range of measures to examine how emotions of anger or fear intersect with ideological values and political attitudes. The chapter shows that while individuals' support for democratic values reverses the otherwise negative impact of fear on political tolerance, it has no effect under conditions of anger. This research is timely in a period of widespread threat perceptions, where support for tolerance and civil liberties is eroding.

Negative European perceptions of Islam and of Muslims are investigated further in Chapter Six by Ebru Canan-Sokullu, who examines the political debate surrounding Turkey's potential accession to the EU from the viewpoint of mass public opinion, focusing particularly on the interplay between Islamophobia and fear of immigration into Europe. Because the opinions and preferences of mass publics play an indispensable role in this debate, the chapter investigates (i) whether publics consider Islam to be compatible with democratic values; (ii) whether Turcoscepticism is entrenched in the fear of an influx of immigrants into Europe; and (iii) how these factors affect public positions on Turkey's EU membership in Germany, France, Britain and the Netherlands. Taking a comprehensive view of the existing polling data, Canan-Sokullu provides a rigorous investigation into comparative public attitudes towards Turkey over the period from 2004 to 2007. The analysis reveals a common misinterpretation of public opinion in these EU countries: Islamophobia is not the central issue at stake, but the climate of opinion is anti-immigrationist and this fear contributes to popular anxiety towards Turkey.

Returning in Chapter Seven to the vexed question of how the status of Muslim women is perceived by non-Muslim publics, Matteo Gianni and Gaetan Clavien examine the case of Switzerland, another of the European societies currently undergoing transformations of their multicultural,

social and political dynamics. The increasing demographic, social and political visibility of the Muslim population in Switzerland has been playing a crucial role in the trend and Muslims have been the main target of public debate over the meaning of multiculturalism and integration. To contribute to understanding the implications of this broad trend, the chapter investigates the Swiss French-speaking media's representation of Muslims and Islam as a category in identity/difference constructions. In particular, a content analysis of stories selected from media coverage over the period from 2004 to 2006 shows how gender issues contribute to the specific constructions and representations of Muslims and Islam in Swiss public space.

The nature and the extent of Islamophobia are hotly debated issues in France, particularly since the law banning religious symbols in schools in 2004, then the more recent ban in 2011 on the wearing of the *burqa* (full head and body covering) or *niqab* (full-face veil) in public places. In Chapter Eight Timothy Peace addresses a hitherto neglected aspect of this debate—the way in which it has divided many on the Left in France, especially amongst anti-racist groups. The chapter traces the roots of these divisions, which have been exacerbated by the rise in acts of anti-semitism in parallel with increasing Islamophobia. Peace sheds light on the reasons for the splits and internal tensions within organisations such as the MRAP, France's principal anti-racist association. The chapter sets out to explain the logic behind the various conflicting positions held by antiracist campaigners, including the refusal of many to engage actively in the fight against Islamophobia. Peace argues that the divisions within these groups are a consequence of deeply embedded norms and discourses within the anti-racist movement which have been thrown into practical disarray by the emergence of 'the Muslim question'.

The question of Western stereotyping of Muslims, which runs through many of the chapters in the collection, is central to Ahmed al-Rawi's discussion of one of the forms of Anglophone, predominantly American, popular culture in Chapter Nine. The author traces the increasingly negative image of the Arab in English-language popular fiction after the 1948 Arab-Israeli War and successive conflicts in the Middle East, with the climax of this process following 9/11. Reeva Simon, Janice J. Terry and many other scholars researching into the stereotyping of Arabs have emphasised the effect of biased Middle East news coverage on the perceptions held by popular fiction writers. Al-Rawi endorses this idea, but further argues that there is a connection between the distorted Arab image and US and British foreign policy in the Middle East. With reference to

novels by Harold Robbins, Paul Erdman, Maggie Davis, Michael Thomas and Laurie Devine in particular, he discusses how popular fiction writers express the anxieties and aspirations of their cultures and subsequently their governments, suggesting a pattern of thought that views the Middle East as part of an Anglo-American Empire. Any destabilising factors like militant Islamic groups or Arab national movements in the region are presented as threats, so the characters involved in these movements are vilified, and such views correspond with official government stances. In this respect writers of popular fiction play an important role in enhancing the moral and national value of foreign policy issues.

While the sub-genre of popular fiction examined by al-Rawi tends to perpetuate negative stereotypes, Priyasha Kaul focuses in Chapter Ten on the interesting and unusual case of a product of popular culture in a predominantly non-Muslim society that focuses on the climate of suspicion and exclusion in which Muslims have to live. The chapter explores the identity politics of 'being Muslim' in contemporary India through an analysis of the critically acclaimed but commercially unsuccessful 2007 Bollywood film, *Anwar*. Although the marginalisation of Muslims as a religious minority in India has been touched upon in other recent films, *Anwar* emphatically places the issue firmly within the larger dynamics of the contemporary geo-political environment. It is the story of an idealistic Muslim young man named Anwar, who finds himself 'caught' in a Hindu temple, branded as a terrorist and ultimately killed in the midst of a media and political frenzy. Kaul uses the film as the basis for exploring the articulations of voluntary and involuntary identities and the ways in which the global and local spheres interact to produce complex everyday lived realities of exclusion.

Finally, in a first-hand account of her own experience, Mirjam Shatanawi presents an insider's look at the role of the museum in the public debate on Islam. In today's heavily politicised climate, museums aim to act responsibly and aspire to build bridges between a diversity of cultures but they cannot escape the force of existing representations. Consequently, museums position themselves as mediators for cultures in confrontation. Yet although the intentions of museums might be to challenge the current debate on Islam, the author suggests that their chosen strategy of producing alternative images of Islamic cultures actually weakens their undertaking, and might even turn out to be counterproductive. Examples are drawn from two exhibitions shown at the Tropenmuseum in Amsterdam; the permanent Islam Gallery (1954–1970), and the more recent exhibition Urban Islam, co-curated by Mirjam Shatanawi in 2004. The chapter

discusses the negotiation processes that took place during the making of both exhibitions as well as their reception by the press and visitor groups.

Taken as a whole, the collection provides a range of important, overlapping, mutually supporting insights into a set of problems, (mis)perceptions and representations, which characterise the present period of uncertainty in the long historical dialectic between monoculturalism and multiculturalism, where Muslims form significant minorities in many non-Muslim societies. The tendency of politicians and the media to communicate homogenising, often patronising and implicitly or explicitly exclusionary stereotypes of Muslims as the obverse of more or less chauvinistic stereotypes of the nation has been noted throughout the collection, but so too several chapters have drawn attention to the difficulty for Muslims to resist internalising negative stereotypes or the danger of inverting them within frameworks of hostile Islamist counter-ideology. The empirical findings in many of the chapters are not encouraging for those who wish to see multicultural societies transcend the present anxieties of adaptation. Too often, religion and other markers of ethnicity combine with economic and political factors to engender zero-sum demands for the Muslim Other to renounce or repress beliefs, traditions and behaviours which do not fit with the norms of the dominant group, or to remove themselves physically, rather than find patterns of mutual accommodation for reciprocal benefit. However, the less prominent but more hopeful story is that slow adaptation is taking place nevertheless.

CHAPTER ONE

UNCOVERING AN ISLAMIC PARADIGM OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

John Turner

According to J. Harris Proctor in *Islam and International Relations* (1965), the notion that Islam could be influential upon international affairs and should therefore be an independent subject of study was clearly invalid. Like many International Relations (IR) scholars, Proctor was working exclusively within the confines of Western-centric thought, which gives limited space to religion as a significant factor in international affairs and has tended to reduce religion either to playing a monolithic role that is at best merely a part of power politics or to simply being a tool of persuasion. From within the traditional boundaries of IR theory, it is difficult to consider Islam as a concept that can stand alone, much less as a theory of international relations in its own right. Thus, while there is a wealth of literature devoted to the study of Islam within IR—a field that has grown exponentially in the wake of the events of 11 September 2001—the bulk of these resources view Islam as a factor to be understood in relation to existing paradigms of International Relations, thereby neglecting its specificity.

Yet Muslim scholars speak of an *al-siyasi al-Islami* (Islamic political order). This is the notion that the world exists in a state of natural disorder that must be managed by means of a culture of order (al-Azmeh 1993). In fact, Islam through the Quran and Sunnah contains concepts of international affairs and Islamic scholars have constructed a theory of international relations outside of orthodox IR. Bearing in mind that questions surrounding Islam, terrorism and the politics of the Middle East are afforded significant space in contemporary discussions on international affairs, observing Islam as a theoretical paradigm in its own right will aid in conceptualising these perplexing issues. Following Fawcett's (2005) recommendation that religion must be taken into account in International Relations theorising without rejecting previous theories or disregarding research methods developed in the 20th Century, the present chapter argues that it is possible for alternative, non-Western-centric

concepts of international relations to exist, as has been discussed most prominently in collaborative work by Buzan and Acharya (2009).

1. *Towards an Islamic Paradigm of International Relations*

Abdul Hamid Abu Sulayman opened the door for an exclusively Islamic concept of the international in his book, *Towards an Islamic Theory of International Relations* (1987). Conceding that even among contemporary Islamic scholars significant work on international relations has been limited, Sulayman convincingly lays down the framework for an Islamic theory of International Relations. This chapter will move the argument one step further by identifying various schools within Islamic international thinking, demonstrating their parallels with orthodox International Relations thought and discussing the evolution of Islamic theories through the Great Islamic Debates. It is not possible here to account for the entire arena of Islamic international political thought. However, it is possible to advance the discussion regarding non-Western international theory by exploring the Islamic paradigm.

Islamic International Relations is not a concept of how states interact with each other but, rather, a concept of world order that focuses on the relations between the Muslim and the non-Muslim spheres. The idea that Islam possesses a theory of International Relations may be intellectually uncomfortable for some, as it speaks to abstract concepts such as the *Ummah* (the Muslim community as a whole irrespective of national borders, ethnic identity or linguistic differences) or *assabiya* (the concept of the feeling of kinship held by the inhabitants of the Middle East) relying upon a conviction of belief in extra-rational agency. However, these are the primary components that constitute Islamic notions of world order and they give it a unique perspective. Muslim states, it is argued, behave much like non-Muslim states in the international system on the basis of self-help and self-interest. It is in many ways just another case of realpolitik (Hassan 2007). The difference is that Islam can potentially be a universal system of values and thereby form the basis for a common identity. Differences that exist between states and governments therefore become secondary for Islamic theorists (Hourani 1983). The diminished value of the concept of the nation-state allows for an alternative Islamic concept of order and for an alternative model of what represents the boundaries of the inside (*Dar al-Islam*) and the outside (*Dar al-Harb*). This dichotomy represents the division of the world into two opposing halves, which, according to traditionalist Islamic thinkers, are in perpetual conflict.

From this perspective, laws governing society are primarily normative as opposed to prescriptive. Where a Western understanding of law governing nations consists of a body of rules, Islamic law is designed for moral education as well as legal enforcement (Sulayman 1987). Thus far Islam has, however, been ineffective in building a unified political bloc, particularly since the disbanding of the Ottoman Empire in 1924 (Hourani 1983). This is evidenced by the persistent inter- and intra-state conflicts that have occurred in the Middle East, such as the Iran/Iraq war of the 1980s that lasted eight years and resulted in more than one million deaths. Nevertheless, there is still an underlying concept of Islamic unity that emerges in the foreign relations of Islamic states, something that can clearly be observed through the discourse of community, imagery and appeals to a shared historical experience. The utility of arguing for Islamic International Relations theories is that what is needed is to understand the Islamic world in its own terms and not always in relation to the West. Indeed, a secular, Westphalian reading of International Relations in the Islamic world is impoverished. An Islamic theory of International Relations is needed alongside orthodox concepts if one is to understand the role Islam plays in international affairs.

2. *Three Approaches: Classical* (*Traditional*), *Reformist* (*Non-Traditional*) *and Revolutionary* (*Salafi/Jihadi*)

While the various existing schools of Islamic International Relations share an agreed ontology in the belief in one God, they differ in regard to issues of methodology. Interestingly, Islamic theories in many ways resemble their Western theoretical cousins, realism and liberalism, but also include a third school of thought that is revolutionary in character. Indeed, Islamic thought regarding the international has been forged in reaction to particular historical periods, which Rajaee (1999) called phases or debates. Islamic political thought, and by extension international theorising, is not a fluid developmental process. For its part, orthodox International Relations theory has produced debates where the ontological and epistemological foundations held by one camp are brought into serious question through inter-theoretical dialogue, forcing a conscious re-examination of an approach to reassert or create an entirely new position. Islamic debates, however, have produced a consistent rehashing of the ideas of the two opposing traditional and reformist points of view, with the third position developing from elements of the traditionalists and early reformists. This has resulted in the building of theories

that, although new, remain close to their original form, due primarily to their shared ontology, the most basic principle of which is *tawhid*, the oneness of God (Sulayman 1987).

Thus, three distinct theoretical approaches to international politics can be identified when investigating Islamic thought. A traditional or classical school, which in many ways mirrors classical realist concepts regarding power, anarchy, war and the state of nature (Abo-Kazleh 2006). A reformist, or non-traditional school, that contains less rigid concepts of cooperation and security, engages with modernity, accepts the temporal existence of nation states in Islamic lands, and provides a discourse for a durable peace with non-Muslims. Finally, a revolutionary school termed Salafi/Jihadi, which serves as the ideological backbone for international organisations prone to terrorism and is a product of both the classical and reformist schools, taking on the classical school's Hobbesian concept of the state of nature and the reformist school's Salafist approach.

Nevertheless, three key concepts are present in all Islamic international theory and warrant discussion. First is the concept of the state and sovereignty. In the Islamic concept, the state does not appear as a system of sovereigns but rather one indivisible Muslim *Ummah* bound by *assabiya*. Second, the Islamic theoretical world view contains a conception of inside/outside. Inside is the domain of Islam (*Dar al-Islam*), outside is the realm of the other (*Dar al-Harb*). Finally, all Islamic approaches have a shared ontology in the belief in Allah and the starting point for knowledge is the Quran and Sunnah.

While these competing theoretical approaches may disagree as to where the boundaries of the inside and outside are, how they are to be engaged and whether they are in perpetual conflict, all agree that there is a concept of the Islamic and non-Islamic space that defines the boundary between what is the domestic and where the international begins (Abo-Kazleh 2006). The Quran and Sunnah are the only sources from which any foundational knowledge can be obtained. Here again the approaches differ on method in regard to the practice of *ijtihad* (i.e. the concept of making a personal judgement on a particular issue not specifically covered by the Quran and Sunnah after careful study of the texts), but all agree that the ontological foundation of all Islamic International Relations theory is derived from these sources (Rajaee 1999). These three concepts are therefore defining components of Islamic International Relations theories. Though they are in some ways similar to present International Relations theory, they cannot be comfortably pigeonholed into existing spaces, as their ontological foundations in the Quran and Sunnah allow for neither a

positivist nor a post-positivist inquiry, and the concepts of sovereignty are alien to the Westphalian model. As this is the case, Islam must be regarded not just as a subject to be studied within existing International Relations but as a paradigm of international theory in its own right.

2.1. *The Classical Approach*

The three theoretical concepts noted above as being prevalent in all Islamic International Relations thought—the non-Westphalian approach to sovereignty, the inside/outside conception of the *Dar al-Islam* and *Dar al-Harb* in defining the domestic and international respectively, and the reliance on the Quran and Sunnah for foundational knowledge—may seem to be in stark opposition to accepted International Relations theory. However, traditionalism in Islamic thought contains elements analogous to classical Hobbesian realism. Classical realism perceives a world defined by insecurity, a condition that results in a persistent existential struggle. Peace can only be temporary as each actor is consistently seeking to maximise its power over the other. Islamic traditionalists arrive at rather similar conclusions. Classical theories of Islamic International Relations were formed during what Rajaee (1999) terms the First Debate. The First Debate emerged during Islam's formative years. A period of conquest and defence, where Muslims perceived themselves as threatened at first by fellow-Arabs and then by the powers of Persia and Rome and later Byzantium and Ethiopia. This time of regular conflict with neighbouring actors gave a particular Hobbesian essence to the thinking of Islamic scholars. According to their view, the world exists in a state of *Jahiliya*, ignorance of God's law. Security arrives when the world is subjugated by the rule of God.

Jihad is a defining concept of the Classical school. Note that the concept of *jihad* is complex and cannot be covered in its entirety within this piece. *Jihad* can take on a variety of meanings and interpretations. It is defined as a struggle, which can either be the greater *jihad* to better one's community and self or the lesser *jihad* of holy war (for discussion of classical *jihad*, see Cook 2009). As noted, the world is divided into two contrasting realms, the external *Dar al-Harb* (the realm of war) and the internal *Dar al-Islam* (the realm of Islam). Here a very distinct concept of foreign relations as being defined by constant struggle for survival is evident. The *Dar al-Islam* is those areas under Islamic control where the rights of Muslims are observed, and which are ruled by a 'true' Muslim. The world beyond this domain is the *Dar al-Harb*, the space under the

hegemony of infidels. That domain is not just considered dangerous and threatening—just as in traditional International Relations a classical realist theorist might conceptualise anarchy—but it is also considered a space which can be justifiably conquered in the name of spreading the religion under the appropriate conditions (Abo-Kazleh 2006). For a considerable period, this concept of the outside and inside defined Islamic foreign relations and in some cases still does today (Rajaee 1999).

Classical thinking is based on the Quran and Sunnah, and as with all Islamic political thought this is the starting point of inquiry. The Quran is the word of God as revealed to the Prophet Mohammed and the Sunnah are the words and deeds of the Prophet. Time is irrelevant and interpretation of these texts to adapt to conditions of modernity is perceived as heretical. As Islam claims to be a complete guide to economic, social, political and, as is argued here, international matters, then the Quran and Sunnah are perfect guides to the proper understanding of all realms of social life without the need for human interference in what has been divinely given. Islamic International Relations is a non-Western discourse containing a concept of sovereignty not necessarily amenable to orthodox International Relations theory and Western concepts of the nation state. This is not to say that there is no concept of sovereignty or 'state' in Islamic thinking but the *Ummah* or the community of believers is indivisibly bound by the all-encompassing *assabiya*. Muslims must not be ruled by non-Muslims, nor can there be more than one sovereign. Sovereignty is God's, and manifests itself in earthly form in one who is divinely chosen. The concept of the *Ummah*, of course, did not eliminate tribal authority, but overruled it with the belief in God and sovereignty on Earth in the form of a new Leviathan, Mohammed and the Caliphs that followed as the *amir al muminin*, i.e. the Commander of the Faithful (Vatikiotis 1997). Order began with the Caliph and diffused into smaller parochial units. The state may be a focal point of concern in Western political thought, but in the Islamic world it has never attained the absolute claims of the Western Westphalian-style state (Cox 1996).

The Western concept of sovereignty in the form of the nation state requires identification of people as a national cultural group in a defined territory. Islam emphasises a dynastic concept of what power and sovereignty are, as the Islamic world was never united under one absolute sovereign. Islamic civilisation had always been fragmented into minor states or managed by mercenary armies loyal to patrimonial dynasties (Turner 1978). This allows for a somewhat more fluid, hierarchical and ambiguous concept of sovereignty than is possible in a Westphalian order of equally

sovereign states. Claims of world order however and the image of the Caliphate have yet to be removed from the inter-subjectivity of Islam. The state, though the focus of power, is in fact an intermediary between the *telos* of Islamic peoples and a unified Islamic community (Cox 1996). Traditionalists have been criticised for clinging to static, outdated concepts of foreign affairs, yet they remain influential in modern Islamic thought (Abo-Kazleh 2006). Classical thought is often caught in a particular time period, thus binding it to a particular position that is difficult to alter (Sulayman 1987). This makes the cornerstone of the traditional Islamic international theory the concept of *jihad* as the starting point for all foreign relations in a Hobbesian world of aggressive forces that present a persistent existential threat to the *Ummah* (Abo-Kazleh 2006).

2.2. *The Reformist* (*non-Traditional*) *Approach*

Reformist theories of Islamic International Relations are a relatively new addition to Islamic political thought, being products of the Second Great Islamic Debate beginning in the late 19th Century. The Reformists are influenced by the concept of Salafism. The term *Salaf* refers to righteous predecessors, specifically the four immediate successors to the Prophet Mohammed. Salafism advocates looking to the early period of Islam for guidance on how to approach modernity and re-establish the dominance of Islam. It is the product of pioneering thinkers such as Jamal-ad-din al-Afghani (1838–1897) who in the Second Debate asserted an intermediate position between the zealot wing of the rejectionist position that sought to shun modernity and the West and the modernists who sought to fully incorporate Western ideals (Henzel 2005).

Traditional and non-traditional Islamic International Relations can be perceived as concepts of world order, the former taking a Hobbesian account of the state of nature and the latter conceiving of a Lockean order which, although still conscious of threats, allows for potential co-operation and peaceful coexistence between the Islamic and non-Islamic spheres. The Islamic world, as the Reformists understand it, is no longer capable of supporting both universalism and transnationalism (Rajaee 1999). This concession means there must be an acute revision of the traditionalist concepts of *Dar al-Harb* and *Dar al-Islam*. The Reformists envision the possibility of alternate inter-subjective worlds coexisting without one asserting its hegemony upon the other through a superior *assabiya* (Cox 1996). Reformists argue that the classical concept of the divided world and the perpetual *jihad* is a product of a particular time in history

(Hassan 2007). They assert that this concept is incompatible with the contemporary and insist that there can no longer be an absolute division of the world. They argue for a third way, the concept of the *Dar al-Ahd* (realm of treaties), a principle regarding the possibility of peace with the non-Muslim world (Abo-Kazleh 2006).

Reformists are more accommodating in their acceptance of the existence of nation states. The *Ummah* for them is not just a physical entity but also a metaphysical concept. They claim, however, that this does not mean surrendering Muslim principles. They believe it is not a betrayal of the faith to be both modern and Muslim. What emerges is a dual-faceted concept of sovereignty. They concede that they must accept the *raison d'État* but also insist that the state must adhere to Islamic principles and hold to an eternal consciousness of *assabiya*. The condition of the Islamic world divided into nation states is for them at least temporarily acceptable and does not require a scuttling of the system by means of *jihad* but rather the willingness of peoples to work within the system to unify Muslims over time by non-violent means (Abo-Kazleh 2006).

Non-traditionalists differ most distinctly from traditionalists in their methodological approach. Where both agree that the Quran and Sunnah are the basis for all societal structure, and regard these as divinely inspired, they differ on issues regarding interpretation. Traditionalists argue that, as this is given directly by God through the Prophet, personal judgement on matters without the consent of the *Ulema* (Classical religious elite) is heretical. Conversely, for Reformists *itjihad* is an idea of legitimate religious endeavour in employing personal judgement to deal with matters not specifically detailed in the Quran and Sunnah, while using these sources as guidance (Benjamin and Simon 2003, Abo-Kazleh 2006). In the 11th Century the so called 'gates of *ijtihad*' were closed by the *Ulema* supposedly ending the practice. However, it was revived first by ibn Taymiyya in the 14th Century and later by the Salafist reformers. It represents the cornerstone of non-traditionalist theory. Traditionalists reject this but the reformists assert it is necessary to contend with the conditions of the modern world.

Non-traditionalists who make these arguments are careful not to be seen as marginalising Islam. They believe that engagement with modernity is necessary and yet the Islamic world is not suited for the Western style of modernity. What they suggest is needed is an Islamic modernity that is capable of taking from the West without permitting the Islamic world to mirror or to be subjugated by the West in such a manner as to weaken or eliminate Islamic identity.

2.3. *The Third and Fourth Debates and the Emergence of the Salafist/ Jihadist School*

Just as orthodox International Relations theory has emerged through challenges presented through debates that have resulted in reconstructed or novel theoretical perspectives as new ontological and epistemological challenges emerge that are often dependent upon the changing nature of world politics, so too has Islamic International Relations theory evolved in response to the changing conditions of international politics. The evolution of orthodox International Relations was subject to international political determinants beginning with the First World War and continuing through the Second World War, the Cold War and finally the contemporary period characterised by US hegemony, globalisation and post-9/11 international politics. Islamic theorising with regard to the international has developed in a somewhat similar manner. As was discussed in previous sections, the Islamic First Debate had been a product of Islam's formative years, characterised by persistent conflict, first defensive and later offensive. As the followers of the new religion faced an existential struggle for survival that later became a period of expansion, particular attitudes were entrenched in the minds of Islamic scholars. Religion was intimately connected to war and survival. Much like Hobbes, who observed an insecure world laden with violence and an eternal existential struggle which defines the human experience, so too did the classical thinkers who influenced the traditionalist school of Islamic International Relations.

The Second Debate had begun in the middle of the 19th Century as European power, culture and ideas increasingly encroached upon the Islamic world. Scholars challenged the long sustained traditionalist approach by asserting that the Islamic world was no longer capable of maintaining a position of transnationalism and universalism. That is engaging fully with European influence while still arguing that Islam was an absolute guide to life. They advocated the re-opening of the 'gates of *ijtihad*' to find a method for preserving and advancing Islam during a period of rapid change. The experience of colonialism and the increasing influence of Western thought and culture, however, spurred a split amongst the Reformists. Armed with the tool of *ijtihad* and free from the limitation imposed upon Islam by the *Ulema*, 20th century thinkers—most notably Sayid Qutb, Hassan al-Banna and Maulana Maududi—engaged in Islam's Third Great Debate. This manifested itself as the theoretical foundation for revolutionary organisations such as the Muslim Brotherhood in the 1920s. As was previously asserted, concepts of the

international developed by Islamic theorists are products of the world in which they live. The first Traditionalist theories were forged in Islam's Hobbesian origins, the Second Debate and the rise of non-traditional thinking was the product of a crisis of identity resulting from encounters with Europe and a feeling of stagnation in the Islamic world. The Third Debate represented a split in the Reformist school with contrasting notions of the manner in which to employ *ijtihad* to deal with the complexities of humiliation through the colonial experience and erosion of identity in the post-Ottoman state order. How then is the contemporary period of the early 21st century to be understood? The late 20th century marked the beginnings of the Fourth Debate that may speak more to a struggle for the Muslim world to define itself than for the Islamic world to verify its role in the international system.

Salafists envision an idealised Islamic world and seek to model the contemporary world by looking to the time of the Prophet and seeking out an authentic Islam (Livesey 2005). Salafists contend that Islam was perfect in its origins, but that it has been corrupted over the centuries by foreign influences. They therefore seek to rediscover the original Islam through the Quran, Sunnah and by looking to the time of the Rightly Guided Caliphs. Whereas the two major strands within the Islamic International Relations paradigm of Classicism and Reformism can be compared to orthodox International Relations theory—to realism and liberalism respectively—Salafism/Jihadism is a revolutionary political theory. It is a utopian conception infused with an Islamic hyper-realism and universalism that is in stark opposition to the neo-liberal Western order. It is a product of Salafist Reformists mixed with Classical concepts of world order and *jihad*. At its core are the tenets of traditionalism with millennial and confrontational beliefs regarding international relations. A key tenet of Salafist Jihadism is *ijtihad*. However it is the method of its use that divides the non-traditionalists between the Reformist and Salafist Jihadist camps during the course of the Third Debate. *Ijtihad* for the Salafist Jihadists is a tool for bypassing the authority of the *Ulema* of the Classical school, while for the Reformists it is a method of engaging with modernity and the West without being consumed by them. For the Salafist Jihadists it is a means by which to take Islam back to a blank slate and start anew to build an idealised Islamic state using *jihad* as a tool, free from the foreign influence or internal corruption that occurred over the previous 14 centuries.

Salafist Jihadists draw on the arguments of Sayid Qutb to assert that Muslims have lost their way and Islam has been altered to the point of

only existing in the minds of the revolutionaries (Cooper 2004). As there are no perfect Sharia-governed states, there are no true Muslims (Habeck 2006). When Kemal Ataturk made the decision to dissolve the Caliphate and tend to the business of building a nation state in Turkey in 1924, the question of how to live as proper Muslims in the absence of the Caliph for leadership was thrust upon the *Ulema*. Meeting at al-Azhar in 1926, the *Ulema* came to the conclusion that re-establishing the Caliphate was not possible under current conditions. Thus, it was no longer possible for a Muslim to live correctly. For the Salafist Jihadists sovereignty is absolute and universal. Conflict, then, is not just a matter of survival but the only tool for achieving peace, as there can be no peace without a global Islamic political order (*al-siyasi al-islami*) as brought about through the re-establishment of the Caliphate governed through monarchy in the form of a Caliph (Livesey 2005).

The Classical assertion of the world as a dichotomy, engaged in a constant struggle, is a vital component of the Salafist Jihadist doctrine. Reformists argue that the notion of the divided world was constructed by the Hannafi School of Islamic jurisprudence (Abo-Kazleh 2006). They assert that there is no textual support in the Quran or Hadith to justify this position of a world divided. Rather, the world is one and this concept is only descriptive of the condition of the world in times of war (al-Zuhili 2005). From the Reformists the Salafist Jihadist take the practice of *ijtihad* but their world view is more in line with the Classical perception of the divided world, where *jihad* is a necessity.

Salafist Jihadists seek to underscore Islamic universalism free from external influences (Roy 2004). Dialogue and compromise are not tools they employ. Neither can they accept the division of the Islamic world. Islamic states and nationalist movements are incompatible with their universalistic philosophy. When the first Salafist Jihadist organisations began to form in the 1920s it was with these principles in mind. Hassan al-Banna, founder of the Muslim brotherhood, rejected any notion of a Muslim nation state like Turkey (Cooper 2004). The movement was to be total and uncompromising. In the contemporary world this kind of thinking is demonstrated through the works of the al-Qaeda ideologue Ayman al-Zawahiri chastising the Palestinian leadership for engaging in a nationalist struggle as opposed to the global *jihad* (al-Zawahiri 2001).

The changes that occurred in the years following the assassination of Anwar Sadat in 1981 mark the beginnings of the Fourth Debate that once again split the Salafist non-traditional wing of Islamic International Relations. The crackdown by Sadat's successor Hosni Mubarak forced the

most radical Islamists to flee, leaving their comrades the choice to flee too, be destroyed or join the fold of the political status quo. Some have been willing to work within the existing system to bring about change. In this they are a political entity: they speak of social justice or economics and thereby engage in a dialogue with the people and the existing powers to bring about the kind of change they advocate. For the Salafist Jihadist School these are Western activities that have no place in the Islamic political order and will in no way be successful in re-establishing the Caliphate. Organisations like the Muslim Brotherhood are seen in essence to be insufficiently radical and to have compromised the traditional fundamentalist position. For the Salafist Jihadists there is no dialogue or compromise. Additionally there is no need to speak of social justice or economic concerns as these are matters that are unrelated to the primary duty of Muslims in a world not ruled by true Muslims. From this perspective, man's rule over man and the employment of Western concepts of order are at the source of all Islamic ills (Habeck 2006).

The Salafist Jihadists are engaged in a zero-sum game tied to perceptions of competing universalisms: Islam and Western liberalism. Perhaps what we have instead of a clash of civilisations is a clash of universalisms, as perceived through the lens of the Salafist Jihadist ideologues. Here is a clear departure from the discourse of the Islamic inter-paradigm debate in which the traditionalists and the non-traditionalists had engaged. The objective is absolute and non-negotiable even at the expense of the ideology or Islam itself. It is then quite basic in its assertions, a utopian vision set against a Hobbesian state of nature which allows for no compromise with those who would challenge its divine universalism, even at a cost to its own survival (Cornell 2006).

3. *Conclusion*

Proctor's (1965) assertion that Islam is irrelevant as a subject of inquiry within the study of International Relations has clearly been demonstrated to be incorrect in light of events over the course of the last half century. Islam as a relevant political concept may be novel for the relatively young discipline of International Relations but it has long been influential as a catalyst of political thought within and more recently outside of the Islamic sphere. In fact, Islam can be understood as more than just a subject of study for scholars of International Relations: it is a theory in its own right.

Westphalian discourses on the study of International Relations are only one type of tool of analysis: positivist and post-positivist modes of inquiry do not necessarily represent absolute epistemological boundaries. While an ontological position believed to be divinely inspired may be out of place in the traditional understandings of orthodox political theory, it does not render such an approach invalid. To grapple fully with many of the most perplexing questions regarding global terrorism, theorists need an Islamic theory of International Relations alongside orthodox thinking if we are to move beyond our theoretical confines.

CHAPTER TWO

REPRESENTATION AND SELF-REPRESENTATION OF RADICAL ISLAMISM IN THE UK: THROUGH THE MIRRORING LENS OF THE POLITICAL SELF

Danila Genovese

This chapter examines how the practices of representation and self-representation of a 'radical Islamist' party in the UK (Hizb ut-Tahrir) mirror one another. The mirroring process engenders a form of political fetishism that disempowers the party, which continues to lack political relevance and is persistently portrayed by government and the mainstream media as a security threat. The chapter analyses the self-representation of Hizb ut-Tahrir on the basis of interviews and personal discussions that I conducted with leaders and members of the party, while the analysis of its representation to the outside world draws upon the party's public discourse, including articles, papers and news stories produced by leading media institutions, eminent scholars and policymakers dealing with the phenomenon of radical Islamism in the UK. The chapter posits that essentialist representations of Islam and Islamism deriving from the dominant Culturalist/Orientalist paradigm (Said 1978, 202–5) are mirrored in how radical Islamist parties represent themselves. This mirroring effect consists of interpretative categories imposed from above being unconsciously internalised from below, with both Culturalists/Orientalists and radical Islamists proposing an inverted image of what occurs in reality.

After two years of fieldwork, it became evident to me that the leaders and members of Hizb ut-Tahrir had become infatuated with power and with having the upper hand, whether over their 'enemies' and political antagonists or over their acolytes. This finding debunks the myth of a future Islamist government where the 'spiritual' would prevail over the 'political'. This somewhat schizophrenic attitude can be explained through the dynamic of political fetishism, which is also found in the dominant Culturalist/Orientalist paradigm's interpretative categories of 'religious fundamentalism' and 'terrorism'. This fetishism ultimately obscures the political motives that may underlie religious beliefs and terrorism, thereby stripping Islamist parties of political legitimacy while at

the same time perpetuating the perceived security threat. In this way, the UK government's unwillingness to engage in dialogue with radical Islamists is itself a paradoxical threat to national security. Analysing the practices of (self-)representation within a framework of political fetishism entails examining the construction of a dominant regime of representation (i.e. policy-makers, the media, academics) and possible counter-strategies adopted by the *dominated* (i.e. radical Islamists). Dissecting this process is not only important for gaining a better understanding of the discourses and practices of radical Islamist groups in the UK. It is also offers valuable insights into these groups' power relations with government.

1. *An Ethnography of Radical Islamism*

Throughout two years of fieldwork (2005–2007) spent among radical Islamist parties, mostly in London, I interviewed leaders and party members of Hizb ut-Tahrir at a time when they were publicly accused of supporting terrorism and of being 'fundamentalists'. My main concern when I embarked upon this fieldwork was that experience is not the linchpin or *axiom* of explanation. Instead, it is what we *want* and what we *need* to explain that comes first. This kind of approach does not undermine politics by denying the existence of the subjects under analysis. It does, however, interrogate the processes whereby subjects are created and it attempts to chart power relations, taking account of the struggles that imbue and mobilise them. Such an approach powerfully refigures history, the experience of carrying out the research itself, and the researcher's role within it. In other words, the researcher also becomes the subject and the object of the inquiry.

I began conducting my fieldwork with Islamists by questioning the extent to which it mattered whether the researcher was a man, a woman, white, black, straight, gay, a believer, atheist or agnostic. I found that the question of where the researcher is situated, who she is, how she is defined in relation to others, what the political effects of her history may be, seemed never really to enter the discussion. Nevertheless, in conducting my research I considered it essential to raise important questions about discourse, about difference and subjectivity, about what counts as experience, and about *who* gets to determine this. For this reason, it became essential to reflect upon the fact that I was a non-Muslim woman interviewing Muslim men who saw their political future in Islam; *Islamists*.

This led me to reflect critically on the history I was writing, rather than to premise my history upon the fact that I was a woman. I could not deny or be blind to the fact that knowledge and experience are always bound within power relationships and that they are indeed political. That meant that I had to acknowledge my *responsibility* in writing within the inescapable limits of "critical ethnocentrism" (De Martino 1972, 89). The strength of this approach was that it allowed me to view and treat all the analytical categories as contextual, contested and contingent. It allowed me to question how categories of representation and analysis (e.g. class, gender, race, identity, subjectivity, experience, culture) acquired their foundational status. In other words, it allowed me to question what it meant for a researcher to analyse reality in terms of those categories and for individuals to think of themselves in these terms.

This also implies that for a researcher such as myself to conduct fieldwork in this context, I needed to take into consideration that experience is already an interpretation, which is itself in constant need of interpretation. What counts as experience is never self-evident nor is it ever straightforward. It is always contested and therefore also political. Adopting such an approach has helped me to consider that *experience* was what I needed to explain, which I did by interrogating the processes whereby subjects are created and suppressed. I therefore had an important stake in the production of knowledge, which raised my awareness of the fact that categories (and specifically categories of identity) are never merely descriptive but always normative and, as such, exclusionary. This did not mean that I had to stop using such categories altogether or even reject them out of hand. Instead, I had to deconstruct and interrogate them, use them subversively, and remove them from a context where they had previously been taken for granted and unquestioned.

The fruit of these reflections was particularly helpful when I participated in meetings and informal gatherings with the Islamists I engaged with during my fieldwork. Being aware that my own identity and self-representation would entail entering into a power relationship with my interviewees and with how they would perceive me (a non-Muslim female researcher interested in their political views) gave me a better basis for analysing their practices and their own discourses of self-representation in relation to another interlocutor than myself—the UK government, which constructed its own representation of Islamist parties. Being aware of the circularity of representations, so to speak, was extremely important as a practice. It allowed me to interrogate and understand the formative and exclusionary power of discourse in constructing difference and

identity. It allowed me to understand how making a binary distinction between Us and Them can never be synonymous with peaceful coexistence.

2. *Fetishism and Power*

In this chapter, I use power to mean the power of representing and of making someone or something intelligible within a certain regime of representation. In this sense, power relates to the production and diffusion of knowledge. This conceptualisation of power cannot simply be thought of in terms of one group having a relationship of domination over a subordinate group. Attention must also be paid to the positions of both the dominant and the dominated, and to relationships between their respective practices and discourses of (self-)representation, including their fantasies of (self-)representation and their 'fetishising' devices. From the perspective of anthropology, fetishism refers to the way the powerful spirit of a god can be transferred onto an object, which then becomes charged with the spiritual power of that for which it is a substitute. In psychoanalysis, fetishism is analysed as the substitute for the absent phallus, meaning that the sexual drive is displaced elsewhere (Mercer 1994). The notion of fetishism in representation used here borrows from both these meanings, as it involves both displacement and a transferential relationship (La Capra 1987). As Bhabha (1986, 168) puts it,

> it is a sort of non-repressive form of knowledge that allows for the possibility of simultaneously embracing two contradictory beliefs, one official and one archaic… one that allows the myth of origins and the other that articulates difference and division.

Fetishism also comprises a sort of reverse denial, which means that the strongly felt, powerful fascination is both indulged and rejected. Fetishism can therefore be seen as a type of disguising strategy used for representing and for not representing, for alluding to something that cannot be shown, as it is forbidden and taboo. What is declared and commonly regarded as different, hideous, primitive or deformed is at the same time being obsessively enjoyed and lingered over because it is 'exotic' (Gilman 1985). Throughout the chapter, it will become clear that the concepts and practices of representation and self-representation, with their inherent fantasies and fetishism, are essential keys to understanding the deflected interaction between Islamist parties and government, and to comprehending the deadlock between the persistent security threat and the

improbable actualisation of Hizb ut-Tahrir's Islamist political programme in the UK.

3. *Hizb ut-Tahrir: A Historical Overview*

Hizb ut-Tahrir (the Party of Liberation) was founded in Palestine in 1953 by Sheikh Taqiuddin al-Nabhani. It belongs to a strand of British Islamist parties that I call 'rejectionist', as they refuse to take part in British political and public life. The core of the party's political discourse is that the depressed political condition of Muslims in the contemporary era results from the abolition of the Caliphate in 1924. The essential idea of Hizb ut-Tahrir can be found in al-Nabhani's book, the *Islamic State*, which was published in 1998. In it, the Ottoman regime is blamed for its intellectual stagnation, which involved closing the doors of *ijtihad* (i.e. "The exercising of discretionary judgment … in order to deduce a law or rule of conduct which is not self-evident in the scriptural sources," Oxford English Dictionary 2010), and neglecting the Arabic language. The book also blames the Ottoman regime for its failure to understand "the intellectual and legislative side of Islam" (p. 168), something that led to perplexity when the Industrial Revolution and democratic ideas transformed Europe. al-Nabhani also rejects and is fiercely opposed to all forms of secular ideology, including democracy. He insists on the Caliphate not just as a possible expedient, but as a sort of "scriptural injunction" (p. 222) confirmed by the Quran. The qualities required for someone to be a Caliph are that he must be male, sane and Muslim, which immediately excludes women. He also specifies in detail how the Islamic state should be structured, which does not resemble any actual, contemporary political entity, not even Iran, which is a "mockery of an Islamic state, devoured by greediness for power," as Taji Mustafa, Hizb ut-Tahrir's media representative described Iran to me during a personal talk on 11 July 2006 at the party's headquarters in London. The perfect Islamic state is thus envisaged as a structure based on seven pillars: the Caliph, his assistants, the commander of *Jihad*, the judiciary, the *wulaa*, the administrative system, and the *majlis al ummah*. The ruling system of this perfect Islamic state is based on four principles: sovereignty resides with *sharia*; authority belongs to the *Ummah*; a single Caliph is appointed; only the Caliph has the right to adopt *sharia* rules (al-Nabhani 1998: 221).

What emerges quite powerfully is the emphasis on a single Caliph to support the idea of a pan-Islamic state "without divisions among the

Muslim brothers, which are a source of confusion and weakness," as Taji Mustafa described it during that same talk. Another relevant aspect of Hizb ut-Tahrir's political and discursive innovation is that both Shia and Sunni Muslims are accepted, which points towards its intellectual *ijtihad* and the efforts it makes towards intelligent dialogue in the (re-)constitution of the Caliphate. The fundamental idea here is that the Caliphate will be established after a "dedicated work of preparation" through *dawah* (i.e. preaching), and "Muslims will be happy and willing to work in order to achieve this, to implement Islam where it is not implemented, to change the *Dar al-kafir* into *Dar al-Islam*," according to Taji Mustafa. From its origins in Palestine, Hizb ut-Tahrir has spread to other countries, particularly in Central Asia, where there have been several claims that it was involved in the protests that shook Uzbekistan in 2005. It appears that there are more Hizb ut-Tahrir prisoners in Central Asia's prisons than those of any other movement (Rashid 2002, 115). However, it is banned in Germany and, according to Majid Nawaz, a former member of Hizb ut-Tahrir UK, in "most of the Middle East countries, [such] as Egypt, Jordan, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, Turkey, Yemen, as a terrorist and extremist party" (personal conversation with the author, 9 July 2007).

The British branch of Hizb ut-Tahrir was established by a Palestinian, Fouad Hussein. It was later headed by Omar Bakri Mohamed, "despite his claims that he was the actual founder and initiator of the movement," as Majid Nawaz pointed out. Hizb ut-Tahrir first came to public attention during the Gulf War when some of its members visited the Iraqi embassy to urge Saddam Hussein to "announce his acceptance of the office of the Caliphate" (Taji-Farouki 1996, 178). Zaki Badawi of the Muslim College stated that "Hizb ut-Tahrir appeared after the Gulf War, after the delegitimisation of the regimes in the Gulf, which all appeared to be paper regimes, unable to defend themselves" (quoted in LeBor 1997, 140). Thus, the Gulf War and its many complications seemed to provide a springboard for the emergence of Hizb ut-Tahrir. Taji-Farouki observes that the main attraction of Hizb ut-Tahrir consisted in the fact that it was spreading a very simple message: the solution to all problems lies in the resurrection of the Caliphate. This message was crafted with intellectual sophistication, "which appealed in particular to young Asian Muslims" (Taji-Farouki 1996, 177). One of the party's biggest triumphs was undoubtedly the Caliphate Conference in August 1994, held at Wembley Arena, where, according to Majid Nawaz, "thousands of Muslims gathered for the first time to start discussing, planning and thinking about their future as Muslims," and according to whom the conference called for "the

overthrow of the existing order in the Muslim world and the establishment of a single Islamic Caliphate, which would come to the defence of Muslims whenever they faced danger."

It has also been argued that the Wembley conference brought together diverse groups who were against the Muslim Brotherhood and shared a revolutionary ideology with a willingness to adopt an anti-Saudi stance. In fact Zaki Badawi has remarked that the Wembley conference "marked the final blow to all Saudi efforts to control Muslims in Britain" (*Sunday Telegraph*, 23 May 1994). Hizb ut-Tahrir achieved great popularity among students, managing to recruit a large number of young members very quickly. Its strong stance on Palestine and homosexuality and its inflammatory rhetoric certainly attracted many young people, especially second and third generation Muslims who, according to Majid Nawaz,

> were looking for some strong catalyst to channel their frustrations; who were rejecting the Islam brought over from their fathers, as ritual and backward, but interested in hearing its revolutionary message, as a way of feeding new hopes for their future.

Hizb ut-Tahrir's inflammatory rhetoric and allegations that it made violent threats have brought condemnation from the National Union of Students (NUS). For example, a Sikh welfare officer speaking at the 1995 NUS conference claimed to have received death threats from Hizb ut-Tahrir (*Muslim News*, 11 October 1995).

In the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks and after the departure of Omar Bakri Mohamed, Hizb ut-Tahrir became less public for a while. In 2003, it organised a conference in Birmingham, which attracted 8,000 people under the provocative title: *British or Muslim?* Once again, it came to public attention through rallies, protesting at the prospect of the Iraq War, setting up tables in Hyde Park and at local rallies to push its literature. However, it came in for some derision when, during the anti-war campaign, it distributed stickers and leaflets that urged "Do not stop the war—except through Islamic politics." This was meant to emphasise the importance of avoiding *kafir* (unbeliever) politics, i.e. "politics as a man-made, western discourse" and practice (Majid Nawaz). Instead, Hizb ut-Tahrir appeared to be advising Muslims in the UK to demand that Qatar and other Muslim countries prevent the Americans launching war from their soil.

A further episode of note occurred in 2006, when 16 year-old Shabina Begum won her High Court case granting her the right to wear the *hijab*. Her victory speech was a very political declaration, referring to "a world

where Muslim women, from Uzbekistan to Turkey, feel the brunt of policies guided by western governments", and declaring that her triumph was

> a victory for all Muslims, who wish to preserve their identity and values in face of an atmosphere that has been created in western societies post-9/11, an atmosphere in which Islam has been made a target for vilification in the name of the war on terror (quoted in *The Guardian*, 3 March 2005).

It would not be too risky to suggest that this declaration was orchestrated, and the reference to Uzbekistan was certainly peculiar. A simple explanation for such rhetoric is that Shabina's brother was a Hizb ut-Tahrir supporter, and the party was proud to confirm that it had helped Shabina and had advised on her case. This was surely an unusual move for an Islamist party rejecting involvement with the British public, its political system and what it regarded as illegitimate and man-made law. However, this contradictory stance was paradoxical only in appearance. Indeed, my argument here is that such events, practices and discourses have to be analysed and ultimately understood within a regime and practices of representation of political fetishism nurtured by political actors themselves.

There is little doubt that the main event in the UK that triggered heated debate around Hizb ut-Tahrir and "its extremist and dangerous Islamist ideology" (*The Independent*, 8 August 2005), was the UK's involvement in the so-called War on Terror. This anxiety escalated in the aftermath of the July 2005 bombings in London, after which there was great political and parliamentary momentum behind banning the party on the charge of glorifying terrorism. Hizb ut-Tahrir responded very promptly to this proposed ban, writing to then Home Secretary, Charles Clarke, describing the government's proposal as nothing more than an expression of its "own form of fanaticism and extremism to curtail legitimate political debate in Britain for their own political ends." Likewise, Hizb ut-Tahrir's chief media advisor, Dr Imran Waheed, asserted that the proposal was proof of the government's failure to face the political opinions of the party through rational debate and discussion, describing it as a desperate attempt to prevent the British public from hearing the opinions of the Muslim community.

4. *Hizb ut-Tahrir and the Diverging Lenses of the Political Self*

In the letter to Charles Clarke it was made clear that Hizb ut-Tahrir's objective was to establish the Caliphate in the Muslim world through peaceful means, without advocating the violent overthrow of any state, but rather

through *dawah*. As specified in other documents, Hizb ut-Tahrir was not planning to take over power in the UK or to establish a Caliphate there. Rather, it hoped to convert the UK as a whole to Islam. Within this framework, the role of Muslims in the UK and other Western countries was to support the work of Muslims in Muslim lands. Yet, in other documents, declarations can be found to the effect that it would not exclude establishing the Caliphate in Britain a priori, but this would require *dawah* to succeed in turning Britain into a Muslim majority country.

A simple act of conversion and submission to Islam would have prompted the supposed interaction. However, it is highly probable that turning Britain into a majority Muslim country could only occur through an act of force, as Hizb ut-Tahrir's interaction with wider society is blocked by the fact that it considers UK society to be *kafir*. It then becomes obvious that the missing element in Hizb ut-Tahrir *representational* practice is the dynamic of an actual interaction: the power relationship and struggle between the actors. The specificity of the power relationship consists of two elements: that the *other* (the one over whom power is exercised) is recognised and maintained to the very end as a *subject* who *acts*; that faced with a relationship of power, a whole field of responses, reactions and possible inventions may open up (Foucault 1980). In Hizb ut-Tahrir's discourse, the *other* actor is paralysed, in the sense of being totally deprived of *agency*, which is also (ultimately) the way the Culturalist/Orientalist approach frames and represents the power relationship involving Muslim/Islamist actors, thereby giving a clear example of a mirroring dynamic between representation and self-representation.

Related to this, there is a document by Hizb ut-Tahrir (1999, 32) that outlines the process by which the Caliphate would be established. This process consists of three stages:

1. *culturing*, which involves finding and cultivating individuals who will be convinced by the thoughts and methods of the party;
2. *interaction*, which implies interacting with the *Ummah* to encourage it to work for Islam and to carry out *dawah* to establish Islam in life, the state and society;
3. *taking on the government*, which means implementing Islam completely and totally, and carrying its message to the world.

This plan also involves seeking *nusrah* (help, in the sense of protection) and interacting with the wider (*kafir*) community, which would "allow us to present our values as well as trying to engage with various public bodies in society without compromising our ideals" (Jessica Aldred, *The Guardian*,

30 November 2004). According to Taji Mustafa, this is exemplified "in the same structure and organisation of Hizb ut-Tahrir UK, as led by an executive committee." Hizb ut-Tahrir holds elections every two years to determine the composition of the committee, and the entire membership takes part. Here again, it may be paradoxical for a party that rejects man-made decisions and laws to use an electoral system to appoint its leadership. The interaction stage outlined above also envisages encouraging the *Ummah* to work for Islam. This is a slightly peculiar way of presenting and framing a political plan: the *Ummah* itself should be the main beneficiary of the establishment of an Islamic state and not the means to achieve it. Within this framework, the Caliphate seems a rather vague, ideological construct more than a pragmatic, achievable political entity whose establishment should primarily benefit Muslims.

Likewise, it is interesting to notice how Hizb ut-Tahrir's definition of Islam is very similar to that propounded in the Culturalist/Orientalist paradigm. More specifically, it echoes the clash of civilisations theory advanced by Huntington, where Islam is represented as a monolithic, totalising entity; a sort of living being, with its own life, whose needs have to be fulfilled by the Muslim community. What is overlooked (in both cases) is that Islam can exist only through the lived experiences, interactions, discursive operations and signifying practices of its agents, i.e. Muslims. That is to say, the dominant representation and self-representation of Islam and Islamism are constructed through the same reifying practice, which reduces a variegated, contested, historical, contextual, political, social reality to a uniform entity. It becomes artificial, manufactured in its attributes and is thereby deprived of agency.

Within the Culturalist/Orientalist paradigm and Huntington's theory, the purposes were to identify a new enemy and to define a new front to rally and fight against after the end of the Cold War. Similarly, in Hizb ut-Tahrir's case, it might be argued that the objective was to unify and gather supporters for a political plan, which is more easily divulged and promoted if personified and reduced to a monolithic entity: a nearly utopian reality where everything is legitimised, sacred and then secured by the vessel of Islam. Furthermore, I would argue that the operation of reification in relation to self-representation helps in gathering supporters and in making them acolytes. By depriving the *Ummah* of agency (by representing it as a uniform entity) more leverage is given to those within it who hold a leading role: the party leaders. The mirroring dynamic of representation and self-representation, in relation to Islamism, and specifically to Hizb ut-Tahrir, interacts with three other relevant elements residing within

representational practices: *fetishism* for politics as the suppression of what is ultimately sought and desired but cannot be disclosed as a taboo; *infatuation* with power; and the *desire* to take power.

5. *Hizb ut-Tahrir and Its Fetishism for Politics*

Despite Hizb ut-Tahrir's intention of engaging with the wider community in the UK and of supporting a rational and open debate, its members have always utterly rejected any form of participation in UK elections, on the basis of refusing to join a *kafir* political system, while also defining voting as a sinful diversion (Kassem 1997). During the 2005 general election, for example, Hizb ut-Tahrir ran a campaign against voting in that election. The alternative put forward was to strengthen the *community*'s Islamic identity and *dawah* to non-Muslims. It also rejected the Respect party, despite its opposition to the occupation of Iraq and Palestine, because of its policies on homosexuality and abortion, which Hizb ut-Tahrir strongly opposed, calling them un-Islamic practices. It also rejected Respect because it did not support establishing Islamic states in Iraq and Palestine.

Seen from the perspective of wanting to promote a rational and constructive debate with non-Muslims, Hizb ut-Tahrir seems rather intransigent towards democracy, which it describes as an infidel system. Only *sharia* would be worthy of being implemented, and even here it affirms that the *Ummah* does not have the right to legislate, because "Allah is the legislator … However Allah has given the authority of rule and the implementation to the *Ummah* and therefore given it the right to elect or appoint a ruler" (Hizb ut-Tahrir 2005: 52). Effectively, Hizb ut-Tahrir's position towards democracy is ambivalent. In a similar vein, it allows for a plurality of parties, with the proviso that they must all be established by Muslims and committed to Islam. Holding such positions is very much in contradiction with its often stated intention of opening a debate and starting a dialogue with non-Muslim political actors and with parties holding different beliefs and adhering to other ideologies. In an ironic twist, Hizb ut-Tahrir's positions on democracy can be described as "attempts to curtail the legitimate political debate for its own political ends," as Waheed himself wrote in the letter addressed to the then Home Secretary, Charles Clarke, whom he accused of "extremist and fanaticist behaviour" for proposing to proscribe Hizb ut-Tahrir. This constitutes another clear example of a mirroring dynamic between representation and self-representation.

However, these contradictions and mirroring effects are perhaps best illustrated with reference to some of the interviews and informal talks

which I conducted with members of Hizb ut-Tahrir. I was always struck by their professional attitude in presenting their political programme, by their indisputable ability to talk and to intervene in the debate, by showing a clear endeavour to conduct an open and rational debate with non-Muslims and with their detractors. I was both a participant and a non-participant observer when interviewing and talking with members of Hizb ut-Tahrir at meetings and workshops it organised. This gave me privileged access to its signifying practices and its fetishism for politics and power, key elements for understanding its political discourses, its practices of self-representation and its relationship with the dominant group.

The core idea of Hizb ut-Tahrir's political agenda is that the institution of the Caliphate will constitute a stabilising force for the Muslim world. In relation to the concept of authority, it declares that the Caliphate is a political system whose head is only legitimised through popular consent, and the Caliph engages with dissenting voices through the *political* system. While there is strong emphasis on the political here, other official declarations by Hizb ut-Tahrir also state that, as Taji Mustafa pointed out,

> the Islamic system is a totalising and complete way of life, where the political is at the service of the spiritual and it is therefore a part of it that does not even need to be separated or extracted from the whole.

During our talk, Taji Mustafa also stressed that, once elected, the head of state is bound to an agreement with the people through the *baya* contract. This contract, he explained, stipulates a number of conditions for the leadership of the state, including the condition that the leader manages the affairs of the people on their behalf. Until that point, I had been greatly impressed by his use of political concepts and mostly of the notion of the *political*. His discourse seemed to be tailored to a Western audience.

I ventured to point out the human and mundane aspects of this system, expressing some surprise at the apparent lack of divine involvement. The careful response I received was that the laws that regulate the Caliphate originate exclusively in *sharia*, whose implementation is prescribed by the most eminent and qualified judge in the state, who is himself granted extensive powers by *sharia*. He is responsible for forming the Court of Unjust Acts, which has the authority to monitor and repeal laws instated by the Caliph. That said, my argument was that despite the (divinely inspired) written text, a further stage was needed that implied an act of interpretation and decision-making, which was still dependent on the human factor and definitely consisted of a political discourse and practice. Instead of addressing this point, Taji Mustafa informed me that,

in addition to the Court of Unjust Acts, there was another important institution that forms part of the Caliphate's architecture of accountability: a representative assembly whose members are elected directly by citizens from any ethnicity, gender or creed.

This still did not dissipate my doubts. In fact, it made me more curious about the terminology itself and about the schools of *fiqh* (Islamic jurisprudence) adopted by the Caliphate system. My interest was not purely semantic: it was mostly directed toward understanding the genealogy of Hizb ut-Tahrir's Islamist discourses and thereby the processes whereby it represents and practises its politics. The response was laconic, simply stressing that Hizb ut-Tahrir encourages open debate, meaning that the Caliphate will variously adopt the four schools of *fiqh*. At this point, after highlighting that this was a further proof of the intervention of man-made decision in selecting interpretations, Taji Mustafa stressed that the judges who are in charge receive their authority from *sharia* and that "they are the best men at doing this job." This sounded to me like an assumption rather than an explanation. The interview ended here, and my curiosity about these unclear aspects of the Caliphate grew.

My next opportunity to pursue the discussion arrived when I was invited to a meeting organised by Hizb ut-Tahrir in East London on 13 July 2007, on "Radicalisation, Extremism and Islamism". I had the good fortune to be sitting close to the chairman of the UK executive of Hizb ut-Tahrir, Dr. Abdul Wahid, with whom I exchanged views on the Caliphate during our interview. My interest was still focused on the variable use of the schools of *fiqh*, of which he counted five, although he could not remember their names. Note that the five schools of *fiqh* to which he was referring are the four schools of the Sunni sect (Hanafi, Shafi, Hanbali, Maliki) plus a school that is only recognised by Shias, the Jafari. What came out most strongly from this interview, however, was again that, despite Hizb ut-Tahrir's intention of instituting an Islamic state where the political dimension could not be dissociated from the spiritual one, the political dimension was dominant, whether in terms of discourses, signifying practices, or power relationships.

During the course of the interview, I was surprised to find out that Dr. Wahid was not fluent in Arabic, the language in which all the sacred texts were originally written. This led me to question the extent to which other members of Hizb ut-Tahrir who attended the meeting were fluent in Arabic, and therefore also what language they used when studying sacred texts. The answer confirmed my doubts: the most commonly used language was English, as most of them were Urdu speakers and second- or

third-generation Bengalis and Pakistanis. English is also the language used by Hizb ut-Tahrir on the European level, whether to study sacred texts or to write pamphlets, documents and letters, which are then translated into other European languages used in countries where it is based, such as France, Italy or Spain. Translations from Arabic into English are made very carefully and, to a certain extent, adopt a catchy tone, in order to appeal to, I would argue, its Western supporters, sceptical listeners, and detractors. To someone who knows Arabic and has read and studied the main texts of the Islamic schools of *fiqh*, some concepts expressed and promoted by Hizb ut-Tahrir seem to have been manipulated or at least tailored towards encouraging the implementation of the Caliphate.

Despite Hizb ut-Tahrir's and my interviewees' assertions to the contrary, the political dimension was overwhelming and overpowering; it resurfaced constantly and there was a real *fetishism* for it. This fetishism for the political dimension was also accompanied by much importance being given to power and relations of power, which overshadowed the "spiritual dimension and basis to Islamic polity" (Hizb ut-Tahrir 2005, 38). Writings on the Caliphate and on the Islamic state system produced by Hizb ut-Tahrir UK constantly stress the openness and great level of tolerance of Islamism. For instance: "what distinguishes Islam… is the existence of a detailed system of governance… for the good of mixed communities comprising both Muslims and non-Muslims" (Hizb ut-Tahrir 2005, 29).

Declarations such as these become questionable when put against Dr. Wahid's answer to my question about how apostates should be dealt with in the Caliphate. After a short hesitation, he answered that "the Quran is clear about the apostate: the capital penalty." This reply left me perplexed and wondering what people in the Middle East (the supposed base for the Caliphate) would think about such a stance. I then remembered Hizb ut-Tahrir's media representative (Taji Mustafa) quoting, during our interview, a poll conducted "among the population of the Middle East by Hizb ut-Tahrir party branches, where it emerged that 87% of the population want the institution of the Caliphate." It occurred to me that Hizb ut-Tahrir branches are banned in most Middle Eastern countries, and people suspected of being Hizb ut-Tahrir supporters could be jailed for years (e.g. Majid Nawaz, Ian Nisbet and Reza Pankhurst, who were jailed in Egypt for four years under the accusation of trying to implant Hizb ut-Tahrir in Egypt where it is banned), sometimes "after fake trials," Majiid Nawaz told me during our first personal talk, after he was released from prison on 21 July 2007. I therefore clearly doubted the validity of this opinion poll.

I was back at square one and began questioning how a general upheaval in support of the Caliphate could actually take place across the Middle East. Because it is banned in many places on the basis of it being seen as an Islamist party and because its actual popularity may not be as widespread as its members claim it to be, Hizb ut-Tahrir's political plan could only really be achieved through a violent and abrupt takeover of power. The twin dimensions of power (in terms of both the struggle and desire for it) and politics were therefore prevalent again, even though my interviewees tended to try to repress these dimensions from their processes of self-representation. This repression is also evidenced in my interviewees' claims that all of Hizb ut-Tahrir's members would move to the Caliphate, and, according to Taji Mustafa, they would "encourage all the other Islamists across the world to move there as they could finally live in a state freed from imported political structures, alien to the values of the Muslim world."

It is striking that such remarks echo the Culturalist/Orientalist approach, where Islam is presented as a unifying and totalising entity that homogenises histories and stories of dynamic interactions, exchanges, transformations within richly diverse social, political and 'cultural' contexts. Paradoxically this is the approach adopted by authors such as Bernard Lewis and Samuel Huntington, whose scholarship is considered as fundamental to American foreign policy interests and who are accused of "drawing false battle lines between the West and Islam" (Hizb ut-Tahrir 2005, 31). The mere concept of *Western Islamists* promoting and pushing for the institution of the Caliphate—without ever having lived where it is meant to be instituted and who do not even speak Arabic—ironically evokes the political agenda of Zionists, who have been labelled by Hizb ut-Tahrir as "invaders, colonisers of the Palestinian lands" (Hizb ut-Tahrir 2005, 13). This highlights another aspect of the mirroring effect: the unconscious emulation of the 'enemy' strategy, as Zionists are always characterised in Hizb ut-Tahrir's Islamist discourse.

The idea of the Caliphate stretching across the Middle East, North Africa and Central Asia is in itself a forward-thinking and, to a certain extent, revolutionary plan. It goes beyond merely being "an indigenous political system consistent with the values of the Muslim world," as Taji Mustafa describes it. It is difficult to imagine the possibility of re-establishing a historical formation that ended formally in 1924 with the collapse of the Ottoman Empire by simply erasing centuries of political, historical, social and economic events, transformations and interactions. The plan of recreating such a historical formation (which ultimately never

took the shape proposed by Hizb ut-Tahrir's leadership) is definitely a revolution that could take place only by uprooting existing institutions and by abruptly taking over power. In fact, it would blatantly constitute a new foundational act that would require the complete erasure of previous 'strata' of social, political and cultural life. This leads me to conclude that the widespread characterisation of Hizb ut-Tahrir as a political movement that aims to bring back medieval political structures (*The Times*, 21 July 2004) is clearly flawed. In fact, I would argue that the exact opposite is true: its plan would be a drastic innovation, in that Hizb ut-Tahrir's political discourse, its semantics and its practices of self-representation have never been seen before.

Paradoxically, I found out through Dr Wahid that Hizb ut-Tahrir's members themselves reject the label of innovators, with their declared intention instead being to restore an indigenous political system that had been contaminated by centuries of foreign intervention and occupation in the Muslim world. According to them, the Caliphate is the only political structure that permits one to "respect, protect and promote the moral and spiritual values of Islam, by forming an integral whole with its political viewpoint." As my interviews showed, the defining dimensions of the Caliphate (or of an *Islamic state*) are ultimately politics and the struggle for power, whether within Hizb ut-Tahrir itself or within the longed-for Caliphate. Such an effort at politicisation would ironically promote the 'secularisation' of Islam, a process the political actors themselves deny ferociously. Not only that, but the political dimension is also lost in the dominant representation of Hizb ut-Tahrir under the label of 'religious fundamentalism'. In this way, the representation and self-representation of Hizb ut-Tahrir are affected by a mirroring effect, although they both paradoxically voice the opposite of what they perceive is the Other's representation. This process happens under a specific set of constraints and repression: the fetishism for politics, which *deflects* the interaction between the two parties (dominant and subordinate). This ultimately leads to a political stalemate and to (the perception of a) persisting security threat.

6. *Conclusion*

The ethnography of a prominent Islamist party in the UK presented in this chapter has shown how the practices of representation and self-representation of Hizb ut-Tahrir are affected by a mirroring dynamic and by a paradoxical fetishism for politics and power. My argument has

been that its project of establishing the Caliphate by truly implementing *sharia* law—thereby establishing an Islamic way of life where politics is inherently embodied in religion—would prompt the secularisation of Islam, which would come to be dominated by the political dimension and the struggle for power. What emerged strongly from my fieldwork is that Islamist political actors have a powerful fascination, a fetishism, for politics and for taking over power. To justify this position, they claim that their struggle is aimed at instituting an Islamic system where the 'political' would be at the service of the 'spiritual', in the same way as it had been at the time of the Prophet. This is the reason why they describe themselves as Salafi, i.e. as followers of the purest form of Islam. As a result, Islamist parties like Hizb ut-Tahrir come to be seen and constructed as 'fundamentalists' within dominant Culturalist/Orientalist discourses: the focus lies on fanatics and 'mad mullahs' who plot terrorist attacks against the West and the Western way of life. Islamist parties are thereby stripped of any political relevance and legitimacy. Instead, they are constructed as terrorists/fundamentalists that willingly represent themselves as outsiders within the Western political system. This broken dialogue and deflected interaction reinforce perceptions of a persistent security threat, which ultimately weakens the political legitimacy of the dominant group, e.g. government.

Nevertheless, terrorism remains a "real security threat" (Borradori 2004, 92), but it could be dealt with more effectively by using better intelligence, more accurate (and less Islamophobic) policy tools, and without waging war. There cannot be a real "geo-strategy of Islam" (Samaddar 2001, 43), because Islam is not, and has never been, a territory or a state. Instead of a 'land of Islam', there are Muslims who are negotiating *new* identities in a de-territorialised Islam; they create new discourses and experience new practices. When they think about their political future they do so as *Islamists*. The so-called politicisation of Islam is a phenomenon that should be recognised, addressed and dealt with within the political arena, while remembering that terrorism is a marginal, yet revealing phenomenon. Mostly, it compels everyone to go beyond misinterpretations and misgivings, and beyond Culturalist and Orientalist categories of thought.

I may have spent too much time dealing with the differences between Islamism and terrorism; but political violence can always occur within the interactions, provocations and clashes among different political discourses and practices, no matter what genealogy of discourse is adopted. Instead, the hope is for the present chapter to contribute to an 'awakening' that would encourage dialogue with the Other. This would push us to

reinvigorate a process of critiquing, questioning and understanding the difficulties and demands of "cultural translation and dissent", to create a public space where "oppositional voices are not feared" (Butler 2004, 151), neglected, degraded or ostracised, but valued for the instigation of a functioning, meaningful democracy, that they occasionally—even by default—perform.

CHAPTER THREE

WHY WEAR A HEADSCARF IN PARLIAMENT? DANISH SECULARIST, NATIONALIST AND FEMINIST IDEAS ABOUT MUSLIMS

Signe Kjær Jørgensen

Muslim candidates have had a hard time gaining positions in the *Folketinget*, the Danish parliament. Several of them became centres of heated debates between 2001 and 2007, due to their membership of special immigrant associations, or the way they practised their faith. These debates caused some of the candidates to withdraw, and made people reluctant to vote for Asmaa Abdol-Hamid, an immigrant Muslim candidate who chose to stay in the race (Hervik 2002, Jørgensen 2011). In this chapter, I analyse the critique levelled at Abdol-Hamid, who ran for the Socialist Red-Green Alliance (*Enhedslisten*), in the period preceding the 2007 general election. I also analyse her responses to the critique of her identity as a headscarf-wearing candidate. The aim of this chapter is therefore to illuminate the various positions held by the Danish public with regard to her political identity. It begins by providing a short introduction to Danish integration politics in order to clarify the cultural, ideological and political context of the debate about her identity.

1. *Danish Integration Politics*

In relation to integration, a range of restrictive policies were adopted by the Liberal-Conservative minority government that gained power on 20 November 2001 and remained in office until 2011. The most important of these policies were the tightening-up of requirements for family reunification, the introduction of socio-cultural and economic requirements to obtain citizenship rights, and the so-called '24-year rule' prohibiting young Danes from living with their foreign spouses in Denmark (Jensen 2010, 189–91). The introduction of these policies was accompanied by negative rhetoric directed at Muslims (Gad 2010, Jacobsen 2008). Consequently, many people perceived these measures as discriminatory towards Muslims, specifically. Anders Fogh Rasmussen, who served as Prime Minister from 2001 to 2009, was himself a firm critic of any claims by Muslims for

special rights. He advanced what may be termed a Protestant secular discourse (Berg-Sørensen 2006, 37), hinting at the Lutheran basis of Danish (political) culture in a broad sense (Gundelach, Iversen and Warburg 2008). Over time, a broad parliamentary consensus on 'integration' as implying assimilation was reached by changes in the chairmanship of the three major opposition parties, the Social Democrats, the Social-Liberal Party (*Radikale Venstre*), and the Socialist People's Party, between 2005 and 2007. Thus, it chimed with the negative attitude towards Muslims shown by the government. An exception to this was represented by the Red-Green Alliance (an alliance of three Socialist and Marxist parties, but which also includes Communists in a broader sense). This was probably one of the reasons why Abdol-Hamid chose to run for election as a representative of this party. Having introduced the context of the debate about Abdol-Hamid, I move to clarify my conceptual framework, basic assumptions and reflections on method.

2. *Identity, Discursive Interchanges and Public Debate*

My theoretical approach relies on a critical discourse analytical perception of reality that emphasises its discursively constituted character. Hence, I take discourses to be constitutive of identity. However, I also, to some extent, acknowledge material factors as well as relatively fixed ideas and perceptions as entities that form identity (Fairclough 1992, 43, 91). Basically, I perceive a discourse as "different perspectives on the world … associated with the different relations people have to the world, which in turn depends on their positions in the world, their social and personal identities, and the[ir] social relationships" (Fairclough 2003, 124). Consequently, discourses are, on the one hand, perceived as determinative for individual identity—they may be said to identify individuals—but, on the other hand, individuals also possess some latitude to choose the discourses with which they wish to identify.

Returning to the definition of discourse, difference and equivalence are perceived as basic to it (Fairclough 2003, 88). By difference, I mean distinctions that separate discourses from one another. One way to see that two discourses are distinctive is that it is possible to substitute words from one to another. This might be expressed as an argument of analogy where the basic structure of an argument is maintained, but where one or more words are substituted between them. However, this kind of substitutability may simultaneously work to underscore similarities between different

discourses. Thereby it may make the reader's mind open to the replacement of one discourse with another one (Chilton 2005, 40).

As an example, we may take the right-wing discourse that represented the headscarf as a symbol of a totalitarian ideology, drawing comparisons with the swastika and thereby invoking memories of the indoctrinated Germans of the 1930s (Mikkelsen 2007). The analogy may make readers think of headscarf-wearing Muslims as indoctrinated because of the symbol they carry. Thus, by means of a familiar sentence structure, similarity of arguments may help to introduce a new discourse. When someone attempts to change the perception of somebody's identity by means of associating words in alternative ways, I generally apply the metaphor of emptying or detaching content. Conversely, I use the concept of equivalence to refer to associative linkages among words that temporarily constitute a discourse (Fairclough 2003, 101). In the debate about Abdol-Hamid and her headscarf, what may be classified as a neo-feminist linkage between feminism, headscarf, and self-determination was important (Andreassen 2007). It aimed at fixing the identity of Abdol-Hamid as an independent, modern, and strong-willed Muslim woman. As we see, the processes of differentiating and associating are closely intertwined. Since they take place successively by articulations in public debate, I have underscored the temporality of any discourse.

As regards public debate, I take it to be composed of discursive interchanges aiming to maintain or change perceptions of Abdol-Hamid's identity. I apply the term hegemony as far as one specific perception of her identity is viewed as stronger than competing ones (Laclau and Mouffe 1985, Fairclough 2003). I assume that the relative influence of one discourse vis-à-vis other ones affects public opinion in a broad sense, since most opinion-makers and citizens with an interest in politics regularly read the major newspapers.

As concerns method, I have delimited my material to interviews and opinion material that included Abdol-Hamid's first name, Asmaa, commonly used when speaking about her, and which dealt with her headscarf. The sources are the five major Danish daily newspapers: *Berlingske Tidende*, *Information*, *Jyllands-posten*, *Kristeligt Dagblad* and *Politiken*. The period is from the time of the formation of an anti-religious network in the Red-Green Alliance during the first weeks of September 2007 until the date of the election, 13 November 2007. This is due to the fact that the internal debate about Abdol-Hamid's candidacy was closely intertwined with broader public debate, so any causality is hard to discern precisely. The debate material of the five newspapers is assumed to be

representative, since the newspapers, due to their large circulation, receive a significant amount of debate material from the public. A total sample of 47 articles has been surveyed. To identify discourses, I have applied a relatively narrow operationalisation of a discourse as an argument consisting of, at a minimum, a claim and some kind of premise. In my analysis, I have quoted selected, typical discourses to illustrate the diverse positions on whether Abdol-Hamid ought to become an MP or not.

3. *Discursive Challenges to Abdol-Hamid and Her Headscarf*

The first argument against Abdol-Hamid selected for analysis was articulated by Kjeld Kjeldgaard Ghozati on 19 September 2007 in the *Kristeligt Dagblad*, where he wrote:

1 Asmaa Abdol-Hamid's problem is not that she wears Muslim headgear.
2 The problem is those countries in which you risk imprisonment for not
3 wearing it. As long as there are countries where women do not have the
4 option of choosing not to wear headgear, Muslims must accept that
5 some people will have great difficulties in accepting their headgear.
6 Similarly, some people would perceive a cross in a necklace as a symbol
7 of oppression, if there were any countries in which you could risk
8 imprisonment for not wearing one.

First, we see how Ghozati makes punishment the basis for his claim that Abdol-Hamid and other Muslims must accept that some people will have great difficulty in accepting their headgear (lines 1–5). His argument may be perceived as an expression of a general empathy that some people may feel on behalf of Muslims upon whom a headscarf or veil has been imposed, as in Iran, for example. However, this discourse relies on the assumption that people who react to Abdol-Hamid's headscarf, a *hijab*, do not know how to distinguish between an imposed headscarf and one which is self-chosen as Abdol-Hamid repeatedly says her headscarf is. Thus, Ghozati deprives headscarf-wearing Muslims of individuality by presenting them as subsumed by one specific reason for wearing it. Finally (lines 6–8), Ghozati applies an analogy with a hypothetical situation in which someone would be punished for not wearing a Christian cross. He thereby aims at legitimising the antipathy that some people feel towards Abdol-Hamid's headscarf by universalising the scope of such feelings to

cover all upon whom a symbol has been imposed. However, since the analogy refers to a hypothetical state, it instead reinforces the perception of his argument as a critique of Muslim practices in particular.

The following day, 20 September 2007, two long-standing supporters of the Red-Green Alliance, Eva Jørgensen and Franck Johnsen, wrote in *Politiken*:

1 It is because religious values form the basis of her political identity [*that*
2 *we do not support the decision to let Abdol-Hamid run for office*].
3 Her religious beliefs oblige her, among other things, to accept
4 that women should wear headscarves; i.e. to accept some degree
5 of inhibition—and a hierarchical, unequal relationship between the
6 sexes.

In the first line, Jørgensen and Johnsen disapprove of the decision to appoint Abdol-Hamid as a candidate because they perceive religion to be the basis of her political identity. They sustain their claim by arguing that by wearing a headscarf, she accepts a practice that imposes headscarves on women (lines 3–4). The reason why a woman would accept a headscarf is presented as subjugation to the demands of Islam, and, consequently, Abdol-Hamid is presented as someone who is forced by her faith to do so. In lines 4–6, we see how they further associate the headscarf with constrains and inequality. It is clear from Jørgensen and Johnsen's initial argument (line 1) that they want a strict separation of religion and politics, which they do not think Abdol-Hamid is able to represent. Their discourse can be classified as secularist. However, their subordinate argument (lines 3–6) also touches on features of a feminist discourse.

After a long holiday abroad, Abdol-Hamid herself then entered the debate. A relatively long interview published in *Politiken* on 23 September 2007 included the following interchange:

1 Politiken: You have said that a woman in a burqa ought to be allowed
2 to speak from the *Folketinget*'s rostrum. Could you elaborate on that?
3 Asmaa: Our democracy works, and if the voters say they want a burqa-
4 wearing woman, it must be up to them to decide. I would never wear a
5 burqa myself. But if the voters think they can be represented by a woman
6 in a burqa, they should be free to choose that.

The reporter's question regarding the *burqa* is based on an assumption that veiled women—here broadly perceived as wearing either a *hijab*

(covering a woman's hair and part of her shoulders), a *niqab* or a *chador* (covering parts of the lower face and the body as well as the hair), or a *burqa* (like the *niqab* and *chador*, but covering the woman's face so that she has to look through a loosely-woven cloth in order to see)—are not allowed to become MPs in the *Folketinget*. In lines 3–4, Abdol-Hamid confirms the reporter's assumption, and she takes the electoral mandate of a *burqa*-wearing woman as the basis for asserting that there should be a legal right for veiled women to speak. Abdol-Hamid's view of the right of *burqa*-wearing women may be perceived as analogous to her perception of her own right if she was elected. Thus, by defending the right of a hypothetical *burqa*-wearing candidate, she at the same time defends her own right in case she becomes an MP.

To summarise, we see that Abdol-Hamid aims to legitimise her religious appearance, through the democratic legitimacy she may receive from the Red-Green Alliance's voters. Hence, she counters critique of the type advanced by Jørgensen and Johnson.

Keld Albrechtsen, a former MP for the Red-Green Alliance and a member of the party's anti-religious network was quoted in *Politiken* on 24 September 2007. He added the following perspective to the debate:

1 People are welcome to have a religion but not to signal it in politics.
2 The right to religious freedom must apply all the way up to the rostrum of
3 the *Folketinget*. But the right to speak about it ends at its first step.

In this quote, we learn that Albrechtsen perceives religious faith as acceptable among MPs (lines 1–3). However, in line 1, he says that he disapproves of signalling religious identity, and this is a direct reference to Abdol-Hamid's headscarf. Further, in line 3, his stated disapproval of MPs who speak about their faith expresses a typical secularist standpoint. The shift from "signal" (line 1) to "speak about" (line 3) is a narrowing-down of meaning. This may be due to the primacy of speech as a way of communicating in politics compared to, for instance, body language, individual identity markers, or symbols. However, it may also be an expression of a prejudice saying that signalling easily leads to speaking about religion. At any rate, the quote sustains a claim that Abdol-Hamid ought not to run for a seat in the *Folketinget*.

On 25 September 2007, in *Politiken*, two MPs from the Red-Green Alliance, Line Barfod and Rune Lund, wrote a reply to Jørgensen and Johnsen, and those whom they termed "sceptics" in general:

1 We are the only party aiming for total separation of state and religion;
2 however, we have always emphasised the right to practise one's
3 faith, and it has never been an obstacle to anyone acquiring a position of
4 trust in the Red-Green Alliance. Nor do we regard it as a problem if
5 religious members of the party find coincidences between the political
6 programme of the Red-Green Alliance and their own personal beliefs.

At the beginning of the quote, Barfod and Lund clarify their stance on freedom of conscience among active members (lines 1–4). However, in lines 4–6, they delimit the room for religious arguments and practices by writing that they are legitimate only insofar as they coincide with the aims of the Red-Green Alliance. The liberal stance makes their discourse share features with, what I will later define as a neo-feminist discourse that makes room for religious and cultural diversity.

The exchange between Jørgensen and Johnsen, and Barfod and Lund, respectively, reflects some of the internal debate in the Red-Green Alliance earlier in September 2007, when between 20 and 30 members created an anti-religious network. Keld Albrechtsen's secular discourse (quoted above) is an expression of the secularist, anti-religious position in this debate.

Departing from the debate about secularism and religion, we find another critic of Abdol-Hamid's candidature. Ruben Olrik, then member of the Liberal Party (*Venstre*) and a participant in local politics in Copenhagen, wrote in *Jyllands-Posten* on 27 September 2007:

1 In view of the recent stay by disguised Palestinian Asmaa Abdol-
2 Hamid (Red-Green Alliance), at a madrasah in the dictatorship of
3 Yemen, Danes ought to be smart enough to see that it would be a slippery
4 slope if she was allowed to speak from the rostrum of *Folketinget*
5 wearing a headscarf, if elected as an MP ….
6 It is prohibited to adorn oneself with a cross in Saudi Arabia, and it is
7 forbidden to bring a Bible into the country. Asmaa Abdol-Hamid
8 ought to consider this because after all it is legal for Muslim women
9 in Denmark to wear headscarf, veil and burqa on the street.

At the beginning of his letter to the editor (lines 1–5), we see how Olrik associates the fact that Abdol-Hamid has visited a Quran school in Yemen with extremist aims. Labelling Abdol-Hamid as a "disguised Palestinian"

connotes furtiveness both visually and politically, as well as a perception of her as a stranger, from Palestine, and not as a Dane, able to represent the interests of Danes. Further, he argues that allowing her to go on the rostrum of the *Folketinget* would have far-reaching consequences. Finally, Olrik presents the current Danish practice of allowing headscarves as something Abdol-Hamid ought to be satisfied with by counterposing Saudi Arabia, which rejects Christian symbols such as the cross and the Bible, to Denmark. Thus, by invoking an analogy, he makes her aim to gain access to the rostrum of the *Folketinget* appear excessive.

From the quote, we see that Olrik, like Ghozati, presents Danish practices as liberal compared to practices of selected Muslim states. Moreover, we see how they both fuse the distinction between an individual Muslim, Asmaa Abdol-Hamid, and other Muslims, e.g. those living in Yemen, Saudi Arabia, or other countries where a veil is imposed on women. This type of fusion is basic to stereotyping (Pickering 2001, 10), and therefore it is often articulated in populist discourse critical of Islam. In view of the cherishing of Danish practice and the counter-positioning of this to a stereotypical perception of Muslim practice, I consider the quoted passages as articulations of a nationalist discourse.

On 26 September, in *Information*, the well-known, left-wing opinion-maker, author and feminist Bente Hansen wrote:

1 Yes, everyone should be allowed to express their opinions, and that is
2 why we have different parties. But then she should affiliate
3 herself with a party that promotes hierarchy between the sexes as her
4 headgear shows that she does …
5 Sometimes people ask me how I can be a Socialist and a practising
6 Christian. This is only possible for me because the National Church,
7 unlike most other Christian churches, allows women to preach. If it did
8 not allow them to do so, then I would not be a member, and I would, so
9 to speak, "practise it in private". I will use the same argument towards
10 the Red-Green Alliance: If they do not support equal opportunities,
11 I will leave. It is that simple.

First, Hansen implicitly argues against the discourse of neo-feminists who, since the spring of 2007, had argued that the Red-Green Alliance ought to give a voice to individuals of different cultures, despite the fact that their views on some issues might depart from the party's general position (lines 1–2). Then, Hansen concludes that Abdol-Hamid ought to join a party that promotes inequality between the sexes, since she sees her

headscarf as implying that (lines 2–4). Hansen then moves on to defend her own identity as a Christian Socialist by pointing out that women are allowed to preach in the National Church (lines 5–9). Since she does not think this is permitted by Muslims, she makes equal opportunities the demarcation line of beliefs acceptable within a Socialist party. In lines 8–11, Hansen argues by analogy from the particular concern with equal opportunities within the Church to the general concern of the Red-Green Alliance, and she makes her membership of both organisations dependent on their support for equality of opportunity to preach.

From Hansen's defence of her own identity as a Christian and a Socialist, we see that in theory she sympathises with the principle articulated by Barfod and Lund. However, since the Red-Green Alliance aims to promote equality between the sexes, and she views this as incompatible with including a headscarf-wearer as a member. Hansen's association of headscarf hierarchy and permission to preach confirms that she occupies a headscarf-critical position. However, her concern for equality means that her discourse can be considered a feminist one.

A few days after this critical letter to the editor, Abdol-Hamid replied. In an open letter, published on 29 September 2007 in *Information*, she wrote:

1 You perceive the headscarf as a symbol of repression and a symbol of
2 male domination. That is not what it means to me. For me, wearing the
3 headscarf is a personal choice that only expresses my affiliation to
4 Islam, and religious symbols change over time and have different
5 meanings due to changing circumstances. In comparison, wearing the
6 Christian cross does not mean that you are affiliated with the Ku Klux
7 Klan.
8 I am aware that in some countries, such as Iran, the headscarf is a
9 univocal symbol of the subordination of women, and I have clearly
10 dissociated myself from that. But right now, I am experiencing the
11 opposite: some try to force me not to wear a *hijab* at any rate, if I am to
12 be 'allowed' to call myself someone of leftist observance.
13 But as I have said before, I will fight for women's right to decide for
14 themselves how they want to live their lives and what to do with their
15 bodies.

In her letter, Abdol-Hamid begins by taking exception to Hansen's discourse by stating that for her, wearing a headscarf is a personal choice (lines 2–3). Then, she detaches a particular meaning of the headscarf as

well as the Christian cross from the possible symbolic meanings they may have (lines 4–7). In the case of the headscarf, this is the subordination of women, and in the case of the cross, it is the racist discourse articulated by members of the Ku Klux Klan. Further, by pointing to the fact that the cross may be associated with racism, she implies that the headscarf is only perceived as a symbol of subordination by a minority of Muslims, occupying a position similar to the marginalised situation of the Ku Klux Klan among Christians. In this way Abdol-Hamid aims to dissolve Hansen's discourse linking the headscarf with subordination.

Abdol-Hamid also takes exception to the meaning of the headscarf in, for example, Iran (lines 8–10), and she thereby shows the limits to her own acceptance of headscarves. Simultaneously, she acknowledges the critique, like Ghozati's, that points to imposed wearing of such garments. In lines 10–12, she associates the criticism expressed by many Danes of what they perceive to be a contradictory identity—on the one hand, a Muslim who wears a *hijab* and, on the other hand, a left-winger—with the type of censure applied in totalitarian, theocratic Iran. In this way, Abdol-Hamid suggests a linkage between respect for a practice that she considers fundamental to her as a person, and adherence to tolerance and liberal ideas in a more general sense. This suggestion is underscored by lines 13–15, where she assures the public that she is committed to fighting for women's rights. In her final remark, "and what to do with their bodies" (lines 14–15), she acknowledges that choosing what to do with one's body is not necessarily included in choosing how to live one's life. The equivalence between the two notions is often upheld by associating from choosing for oneself how to live to making use of equal opportunities in the labour market, typical of Danish feminists of the 1970s (Dahlerup 1998), who, due to the need for unrestricted movement in many kinds of work, often perceived a headscarf as inhibiting. However, Abdol-Hamid shows that she sees the question of what to do with one's body (to wear a *hijab*) as a part of choosing for oneself how to live one's life.

Thus, by her discourse, Asmaa Abdol-Hamid seeks to empty the concept of feminism of the content with which Hansen and other feminists have filled it and to refill it with a neo-feminist aspiration towards equal opportunities, despite different ways of dressing. This is a typical aim; since neo-feminists have often emphasised that what may have been perceived as liberating to women in the West not necessarily is perceived as such by other women (Andreassen 2007). Abdol-Hamid ended her reply, writing:

Just as you and other feminists proved that women were able and willing to participate in society on an equal footing with men, I hope to be able to prove that one can at the same time be a Muslim, a woman, a Socialist, and a part of this society. And Bente, there actually already are several female preachers of Islam and I think we should have many more of them.

First, Abdol-Hamid attempts to dissolve the tension between Hansen's position and her own (lines 1–2). By pointing to Hansen's own feminist aim to participate on an equal footing, Abdol-Hamid tries to enclose Hansen's argument in her own. In lines 2–4, she links her Muslim identity, her female identity, and her Socialist identity, implicitly assumed to show concern for equal opportunities, with her ambition to take part in society by becoming an MP. Finally, in lines 5–6, Abdol-Hamid addresses Hansen directly and points out that female Muslims are already allowed to preach, though without specifying that this is only accepted within some branches of Islam. By pointing to the shared respect for the rights of women among many Christian and Muslim believers, she underscores her and Hansen's shared concern with equal opportunities. Further, Abdol-Hamid dissolves Hansen's distinction between Islam and Christianity, making both of them acceptable within a Socialist party.

A few days later, on 5 October 2007, Abdol-Hamid once again articulated a neo-feminist discourse. During an interview with journalist Karen Syberg, published in *Information*, the following exchange occurred:

The right to self-determination
Asmaa Abdol-Hamid emphasises women's right to self-determination. "Fundamentally, I believe it is my right. Women must have the right to self-determination. No one should tell them what to wear."
However, it is not just individual headgear that you wear but a collective symbol?
"But whether you choose to wear it or not may be a personal choice."
Is it just an outward symbol, or does it reflect a spiritual practice, too?
"My personal relationship with my religion is reflected in the way I dress. It has actually come as a surprise to me that there is now a new struggle to be fought for the right to self-determination. I thought that it had been fought, and that there was a broad consensus that women had the right to self-determination. However, if you talk about women who

14 wear headscarves from the perspective that they are repressed, you
15 deprive them of their individuality and ignore their own reflections on
16 their choices."

In the quoted passage, we first see three statements that are basic to Abdol-Hamid's perception of self-determination. First, she states her own right to wear a headscarf. She then broadens this claim to give it a universal aim, and, finally, she encloses her vision by rejecting the right of any authority to determine how women should dress (lines 3–4). In line 6, the reporter's choice of the term "collective symbol" establishes a distinction between an individual choice and wearing something that constitutes a symbol for a community, the latter is presumed to be a fixed structure of identification. In her reply (line 7), Abdol-Hamid does not directly challenge this distinction but upholds her own position by equating the right to self-determination with considerations of whether to wear a headscarf or not. Abdol-Hamid explains that what may be perceived as a collective symbol ought to be perceived as an individual marker of identity if that is the meaning that the individual ascribes to it. Thus, "self-determination" becomes the process of making up one's mind on how to appear. She thereby transcends the reporter's distinction between 'the collective' and 'the individual'. In line 8, when the reporter asks whether the headscarf is only an outward symbol of identity, or whether it is also linked to spiritual practice, s/he is presumably hinting at the types of spiritual practices associated with Sufism. In her answer, Abdol-Hamid once again emphasises her individual choice (line 9). Since she thinks the present political consensus fails to take women's individual reflections on their reasons for wearing the headscarf into account, she also expresses the need to engage in a new struggle for self-determination (lines 10–16). This may be read as a critique of the Danish feminists of the 1970s for having had too narrow a perception of self-determination. This may then be perceived as yet another attempt to *denationalise* feminist discourse to make her own Muslim identity become accepted as a feminist one by critics such as Hansen.

Later in the same article, Abdol-Hamid is quoted again. Asked about her own reflections prior to choosing to wear a headscarf, she replied:

1 "When I was 14 years old, I was concerned about the huge focus on
2 women's bodies in advertising. It was something I discussed with
3 my friends: how people were so focused on how one looked, not on
4 how one was as a being. I do not think it is so important how one looks,"

says Asmaa Abdol-Hamid, and emphasises that women who choose to act in advertisements of course must remain free to do so, but that she thinks there is an increasing abuse of the female body in public. Does the headscarf imply that you reject the idea of presenting yourself as a sexual object? "I am not saying that other women turn themselves into sexual objects."

First, Abdol-Hamid points to what in Denmark is a typical teenage girl's concerns over the public exposure of the female body in advertisements (lines 1–2), and says that she aimed to counter the tendency to focus on appearance (line 4). These reflections supported her choice to wear a *hijab*, since it covers the hair and bust, which, as everyone knows, is often a concern for vain teenage girls. However, in the latter part of the quote (lines 5–6), Abdol-Hamid emphasises that, in her view, other women may choose for themselves whether to act in advertisements. In lines 9–10, the reporter asks whether wearing the headscarf means that Abdol-Hamid rejects presenting herself as an object for sexual fantasies, a question that directs our attention to the tacit implication that women who do not wear a headscarf are perceived as presenting themselves as such. Abdol-Hamid rejects this (line 11), underscoring her neo-feminist discourse by saying that similar ideas, such as critique of exposure, may underlie different choices of appearance.

The last quote that I will present here is from Karen Jespersen, a member of the Liberal Party, who was appointed Secretary for Social Affairs and Secretary for Equality in the early autumn of 2007. On 10 October 2007, she wrote in *Politiken*:

Asmaa is a committee member of the association Muslims in Dialogue. When this association holds meetings, men and women sit apart. That is the way orthodox Islam prescribes it to avoid women provoking men. This perception often also implies that women's conduct should be controlled by the men in their family. At the same time women should be veiled, and they should avoid shaking hands with men—rules that Asmaa Abdol-Hamid herself follows.

The quoted passage is part of the argument for a statement made earlier in the letter to the editor, saying: "Asmaa represents a perception of the role of women that needs to be scrutinised" (Jespersen 2007). Analysing the quote, we see that Jespersen identifies Abdol-Hamid with an association

of which she is a committee member, and that organises its meetings according to especially strict Islamic guidelines (lines 1–3). Further, Jespersen explains that men and women sit apart because women are perceived as being sexually provocative (line 3). One ought to note that Jespersen presents to "sit apart" as something the members are required to do by the prescriptions of Islam as implemented by the committee (line 3). Jespersen thereby neglects the possibility that the decision to sit apart has been agreed upon by the members to make it attractive for a minority to participate in the meetings, as commonly happens in Danish associational life.

Jespersen proceeds by referring to constraints on Muslim women (lines 4–5). Since the reasons for the practices—that women are perceived as being sexually provocative by nature—are articulated as the same (line 4), they appear as closely intertwined. Finally, when Jespersen says that women are required to wear veils and to avoid touching male strangers by shaking hands, she links these ideas of what she terms "orthodox Islam" to Abdol-Hamid by pointing to the fact that she follows these practices (lines 5–7). Thus, Jespersen makes it appear as though Abdol-Hamid thinks that women by nature are sexually provocative and therefore should be surveyed by male family members, should wear some kind of headgear, and abstain from approaching men in general.

As regards the debate about Abdol-Hamid's identity, Jespersen counters Abdol-Hamid's own discourse explaining why she wears a headscarf. Abdol-Hamid had argued that her *hijab* prevented *other people* from perceiving her as sexually attractive, and she thereby emphasised that sexuality was something ascribed to her body by those influenced by advertisements when she did not wear a headscarf, but it had not been something essential as Jespersen assumed she thought. To Abdol-Hamid, her headscarf was a defence and not a symbol of adherence to a perception of women as unacceptable and temptresses by nature. Due to Jespersen's concern for women's equality, I classify her discourse as a feminist one, which in its critique of the headscarf resembles that articulated by Hansen. However, the two discourses are not similar in their arguments: Jespersen's emphasis is on the sexually provocative nature that she thinks the headscarf expresses, whereas Hansen's emphasis is on equality of opportunity. Moreover, we should note that Jespersen's discourse shares features with the nationalist discourse, since it erases the distinction between Abdol-Hamid and other Muslims through reference to what she perceives as orthodox Islam. Summarising, the quote from Jespersen

illustrates the basis on which feminists and nationalists sometimes succeeded in forming a forceful alliance in their critique of Islam during 2007 (Syberg 2007).

4. *Conclusion*

My analysis has showed that the debate about Abdol-Hamid's headscarf, and the headscarf in a more general sense, was closely linked with the debate about the appropriateness of her nomination as a candidate for parliamentary election. In the section below I briefly summarise the debate and provide some explanations as to why it evolved as it did. The debate in September 2007 was primarily a debate about the compatibility of politics and religion within a Socialist party. It reflected a general scepticism towards religion among Socialists but also a concern for the inclusion of minorities. The reason why the secularist discourse of Jørgensen, Johnsen and Albrechtsen was not re-articulated later may be that Hansen, for instance, promoted a feminist and Socialist perspective in the debate. Due to Hansen's arguments concerning the chauvinist nature of Islam, the concern for Muslim women's rights may have appeared to be more important than secularism. Moreover, feminism was important to the broader Danish public, and this may have been the reason why it became so prominent in the debate.

I also showed how Hansen and Jespersen formed a feminist, headscarf-critical opposition to Abdol-Hamid. One of the causes of their critique is the historical linkage between the women's movement of the 1970s, on the one hand, and special ways of (un-)dressing, on the other (Andreassen 2007, 205–7). By choosing their manner of appearance feminists showed their ability to compete unrestrictedly for positions in the labour market and to control their sexuality.

However, we have also learned that the young Abdol-Hamid articulated a discourse saying that she rejected the imposition of such 1970s expressions of womanhood. She emphasised that she exerted control of others' sexualised perceptions of her by hiding part of her head and shoulders. She also emphasised that the right to liberation (self-determination), in her view, ought to be perceived as including a right to dress as one pleased. She thereby countered both the claim that the headscarf was inhibiting in a way that could not be overcome, and that her headscarf was an expression of a sexually provocative nature. To her, wearing a headscarf as an MP would only reflect a personal choice as how to dress

and not any special ideas about women's opportunities. The nationalist discourse occupied a relatively weak position in the debate during the autumn of 2007. This may be due to some very harsh statements uttered by Danish right-wing politicians during the spring of 2007. The public criticism of these MPs may have caused them to withdraw from the debate, and their position was adopted by debaters such as Ghozati and Jespersen, who fused nationalism and liberal concerns in their critique of the headscarf. Hence, we have learned how Abdol-Hamid attempted to dissolve the discourses levelled against her. This may have had important implications for the recognition of headscarf-wearing women in the public sphere. Furthermore, it may be perceived as indicative of a Danish neo-feminist movement (Andreassen 2007, 121–8). Finally, it countered critique, making sure that Abdol-Hamid achieved a position as a substitute MP.

A central aim of this chapter has been to show how some Danes perceived Abdol-Hamid as a potential headscarf-wearing MP. However, having answered this question, I have also reflected on why Abdol-Hamid became a centre of debate. One reason may be that her headscarf was a visible marker of her religious identity. This made it easy for opponents to categorise her ideas as deriving directly from her faith and not, as is considered typical of Danish MPs, as being expressions of well-considered, personal standpoints concerning how to appear, and how to behave. Another associated reason may be that the headscarf has an ambivalent symbolic meaning. It may be perceived as a marker of cultural identity in a world of migration and 'cultural flows'; or as a marker of individuality, as in the case of Abdol-Hamid; or it may be imposed on women due to their sexuality, as in Iran or Saudi Arabia, or by Muslim parents for various reasons. These latter perceptions touch upon expansionary aims associated with the headscarf, viewed as a symbol, which aroused fear in some critics (see, for instance, the quotes from Olrik and Jespersen). Further, feminists of the 1970s also perceived the headscarf as restricting women's opportunities to compete in the labour market and thereby gain equal recognition and economic independence. Since all these different meanings may be reflected in the same garment, the meaning of the headscarf is unstable and is always likely to be contested by someone.

In general, I suggest that identities characterised by identity markers that may also function as symbols are likely to be contested by those who point to a symbolic value of the identity marker. However, the high degree of exposure of Asmaa Abdol-Hamid to discursive attacks may also be a consequence of her weak position as a member of a minority group that is

marginalised in many ways, and as a first-time candidate for a small opposition party. Her distinctive self-presentation has made her vulnerable to attacks both by those critical of Islam and by those hostile to Socialism of the far left.

5. *Acknowledgements*

I would like to thank Anders Berg-Sørensen, André Sonnichsen, Birgitte Schepelern Johansen, Christian Kock, Gro Hellesdatter Jacobsen, Hans Raun Iversen, Jeffrey Haynes, Morten Raffnsøe-Møller, Nils Holtug, Noel Parker, Robert Asen, Ruth Wodak, Torben Bech Dyrberg, Trudy Govier, the editors of the volume, and the participants at the workshop at the annual conference (2008) at the Centre for the Study of Equality and Multiculturalism, University of Copenhagen, and the conference Representing Islam: Comparative Perspectives, University of Manchester in collaboration with University of Surrey (2008), for comments on early drafts of this chapter.

CHAPTER FOUR

"PEOPLE THINK OUR LIVES ARE DARK." DIASPORIC RESISTANCE TO THE METAPHORIC DARKENING OF FEMALE MUSLIM IDENTITY

Chloe Patton

> As soon as they see this [points to headscarf], well it's in the human being, they quickly judge, they don't even want to know where I'm coming from. It's like, "I already know", coz they've heard something in the media. [Zhila]
>
> Especially on women. They would think, "oh my god, the poor Islamic woman, she's gonna get an arranged marriage", or "her husband's gonna beat her five times a week…" [Haifa]
>
> They just judge us by our appearance, they don't care exactly what's happening inside our lives. They don't know…we're happy. [Amira]
>
> The media is spreading bad, different, you know, wrong images of Muslims, especially ladies. I get surprised 'coz at school like, teachers, I don't know, they'll ask me questions like "are you going to finish school?", "are you allowed to drive?" or stuff like that…That's why it's like this thing I have to show out, inside me… people don't know that Muslim women are allowed to reach the high levels, they are allowed to become educated and stuff, so it's our duty to express that, you know, that we are allowed and… you're getting this bad image of us… [Haifa]

Contemporary Western misrepresentation of Islamic identities is often termed 'Islamophobia', a form of racism conflating ethnic and religious identities, which is played out within public discourses on Islam and within everyday social encounters. Islamophobic representations follow familiar Orientalist constructions of Islam as irrational, barbaric, backward, violent and incompatible with Western democratic values (Said 1978, 1997). The ethnic, linguistic, and religious diversity existing within diasporic Muslim communities becomes blurred as Muslim citizens are seen as belonging to singular, homogeneous communities. Mistakenly assumed to be united by common interest, the members of these fictitious collectives do, nevertheless, share an important characteristic—an externally-defined identity as Other.

However, despite the cultural homogenisation of Muslims as Other, an important distinction relating to gender is often made within Islamophobic discourses that circulate in the public sphere, where Muslim men

tend to be constructed as a dangerous threat and Muslim women as perpetual victims. This differentiation coheres around two conceptions of masculine violence, according to which Muslim men are both a source of spectacular displays of irrational violence directed against the state, and the perpetrators of sustained violence against Muslim women. In this way, the female Muslim subject becomes the corporeal symbol of the oppressive nature of Islamic patriarchy.

Against this backdrop, it is striking that actions taken by Western states in response to fears over spectacular displays of irrational masculine violence are often justified in relation to freeing Muslim women from the sustained violence they suffer at the hands of Muslim men. For instance, US media discourses on the invasion of Afghanistan often fetishised the 'unveiling' of Muslim women as a form of liberation (Ayotte and Husain 2005). Similarly, prominent French philosophers rallied behind proposed legislation banning the wearing of so-called Islamic headscarves in public schools, in a stated effort to free Muslim girls from "the harshest patriarchy in the world" (*L'Express*, 2 February 2004). Although set in different political contexts, both discourses bear remarkable similarity to 19th century justifications of imperialist conquest articulated around the desire to liberate Muslim women (Ahmed 1992). In both, as is often the case, headscarves were the focal point of the narrative of liberation. Such representations of (veiled) Muslim women as subservient to Muslim men do not only serve political purposes; they also weigh on young Muslim women themselves, who feel their identities are misrepresented in dominant discourses.

Islamophobic representations of Muslims in Australia are in fact similar to those in other Western contexts. For example, in a comparative study of the othering of Muslims in Australia and the UK, Poynting and Mason (2006) found that Muslims in both countries have been demonised in media and political discourses through cycles of moral panic relating to issues of national security, immigration control and crime. A report by the Anti-Discrimination Board of New South Wales (2003) examining Australian media coverage of such issues also showed that Muslims were consistently defined in relation to the so-called global War on Terror. At the same time that local problematisations of Muslim identity are increasingly framed in international terms, this chapter shows that Muslims themselves see issues affecting Muslims abroad as heralding potential problems in local settings. For example, participants in the study detailed below were aware of the French legislation proposing to ban the

wearing of headscarves in public schools and were concerned that a similar policy could be introduced into Australian schools.

In this chapter, I explore the role metaphoric enlightenment plays in representations of the identity of young Australian Muslim women that circulate in the public sphere. I examine how metaphors of enlightenment—understood here as the transformation from a negative, 'dark' female subjective state to a positive way of being associated with 'light' — are scripted into the representation of female Muslim identity. I achieved this through focusing on how Muslim women chose to represent themselves, asking them to create and comment upon photographic self-portraits that expressed their own sense of self. This method differs significantly from the linguistic or textual analysis that is commonly adopted in the study of metaphor as discourse practice, in that it prioritises a conception of metaphors as socially situated phenomena.

This is not to say that scholars writing from other perspectives do not recognise the importance of metaphor in social practice; the powerful role metaphor plays in shaping social reality was an underlying theme throughout Lakoff and Johnson's (1980) seminal cognitive linguistic work on metaphor, just as it is a central tenet of critical discourse analysis (Van Dijk 2001, Fairclough 1992). I argue, however, that the ways in which people engage with metaphor cannot be adequately addressed solely through language-based research methods. According to Fairclough (1992), questions of subjectivity receive little attention in textually oriented discourse analysis, and language scholars too often assume that people enter social situations with pre-formed identities. Text-based studies—particularly those influenced by the early work of Foucault—also tend to view individuals as the products of discourse, paying little attention to their capacity for agency.

While such studies often present excellent analyses of external representations of identity, the scope for understanding how individuals actually relate to such representations is often limited. This chapter responds to this lacuna by using symbolic interactionism—one of the main sociological approaches to understanding subjective identity—as its theoretical basis. Inspired by the ethnographic work of Cooley, Mead and Goffman, symbolic interactionists see the relationship between external representations of identity and self-representation as dialectical (for detailed accounts of symbolic interactionism see Blumer 1969 or Jenkins 1996). According to this perspective, self-identity is socially constructed, in the sense that our narratives of selfhood are formed through a process

of continual dialogue with the world around us. As Jenkins (1996, 50) argues,

> Self-identification involves the ongoing to-and-fro of the internal-external dialectic. The individual presents herself to others in a particular way. That presentation is accepted (or not), becoming part of her identity in the eyes of others (or not). The responses of others to her presentation feed back to her. Reflexively, they become incorporated into her self-identity (or not). Which may modify the way she presents herself to others. And so on. As presented here, it appears simple, sequential and linear; it is multiplex, simultaneous and tortuous in practice.

Gaining a holistic understanding of subjective identity requires an examination of the interplay between how individual identity is represented externally through discourse, and the way in which individuals represent themselves back to society. As cultural theorists such as Stuart Hall (1994) argue, identity is constructed within a politics of representation; symbolic interactionist ethnography is a means through which this can be empirically explored.

1. *Self-Portraits of Australian Muslim Women—An Ethnographic Study*

As part of an ethnographic study of Muslim identity in Australia, I taught weekly photography workshops to members of a Melbourne based Shi'a Islamic Youth Association over a six-month period, between late 2005 and mid-2006. The object of these workshops was to help participants produce photographic self-portraits for a public art exhibition titled *I am a Muslim Australian*. Forty people (25 women and 15 men, ranging in age from 13 to 22) took part in the study. While several of them were born in Australia to Lebanese and Afghani parents, the majority were born in Afghanistan or in Iraq. Most had arrived in Australia as asylum seekers within six years prior to the workshops taking place, often via circuitous routes involving lengthy stays in Iran, Pakistan or Syria.

During the first workshop I explained what my project consisted of and showed participants some examples of self-portraits, including non-corporeal images, which had been created by young people as part of Britain's Channel Four *Self Portrait UK* initiative. While some workshop time was devoted to learning basic photographic techniques, most of the workshops were spent discussing portrait ideas in a group setting. In the fourth workshop, session participants were provided with disposable cameras and offered the opportunity to create a more formal portrait in

a portable mini studio we constructed. Later workshops were devoted to creating the portraits of participants who chose to use the studio format. Each of these photographs was a group accomplishment, as participants helped each other use equipment and offered advice about composition and how to overcome any problems they encountered.

While the main objective of the Shi'a Islamic Youth Association is to provide religious instruction, youth leaders had identified problems of low self-esteem among local Muslim teenagers and group work was considered a good way of addressing this. The art exhibition that was held in a prominent Melbourne photographic gallery at the completion of the fieldwork component of this study was designed to increase the confidence of participants by encouraging them to speak publicly about their images, both with people attending the exhibition opening and media outlets covering the event. Asking participants to create photographic representations of their self-identity was not simply a means of collecting data for this study; it also became instrumental to achieving the youth association's objectives.

At the end of the project I recorded in-depth interviews with 10 participants. The quotes at the beginning of the chapter emerged from these interviews, which used the portraits as a starting point to explore the participants' sense of belonging to the Australian national community. Here, I focus on self-portraits of Muslim women, and draw upon ethnographic observations I made during the weekly workshops. The interpretations of the images I present have been pieced together from field notes detailing what participants shared with the group during the collaborative process of image design and construction.

The methodology employed can be situated within the field of visual ethnography (Knowles and Sweetman 2004, Banks 2001, Pink 2001). Visual methods are particularly relevant here given that self-expression through non-verbal means relies heavily on the use of metaphor in order to establish shared meaning with an audience. The benefits of incorporating metaphor into the design of innovative qualitative research has been recently demonstrated by Gauntlett (2007), who asked participants involved in a study on self-identity to create Lego models representing their sense of self. Drawing on Lakoff, Gauntlett argues that metaphor can be a powerful social research tool, particularly when exploring abstract concepts such as identity, because it allows individuals the means to "express ideas or thoughts which they might not otherwise be able to put into words" (p. 151). The Lego models produced by the participants expressed a wide range of ideas about self-identity through metaphor,

from a headless animal representing lack of ambition, to more complex metaphors such as a tiger lurking beneath the main model representing underlying pride and defensiveness. Gauntlett also argues that activity-based social research methods may help tap into unconscious thought processes because participants' metaphors are often selected first, with their meaning only becoming apparent later. My study supports this, for participants often chose to photograph certain things they considered important to their sense of self, and it was only late in the image creation process that they were able to articulate why they did so.

Piety was a common theme in participants' self-representations. One way in which they articulated their commitment to Islam was through the use of light as a metaphor for religious enlightenment. Sonya, for example, photographed herself with one of her younger sisters against the background of a setting sun. The girls' faces are brightly illuminated by a flash, with the accompanying caption reading: "Oh Allah shine your light upon us." One particularly striking image depicts another participant, Alia, praying alone in a darkened room. Seated on the floor with an open Quran in her lap, the sole source of light in the photograph comes from a narrow strip of intense light falling across Alia and the Quran. Two of the three portraits created by Asra also rely on an enlightenment metaphor. While the first of her exhibited self-portraits depicts a silver decorative disc, which she says expresses a sense of her Afghani identity, the remaining two images focus on her Muslim identity. In the second photograph a Quran is held up in front of a window. The light streaming in through the window burns out the background so that only a hint of foliage of the garden outside is discernible through the whiteness. The intensity of this light creates a dramatic halo effect around the Quran in the foreground. The third photograph depicts the same window. This time a hand draws back a curtain to reveal a burnt-out triangle of light. Again the intensity of the light renders what lies outside indiscernible; the subject of the photograph is clearly the light itself.

Not only did 'enlightenment' serve as a means for participants to articulate their religiosity, it also played a central role in their conscious efforts to redress what they perceived to be negative representations of their identity. They identified these representations as 'dark' and sought to counter their effects through strategic use of light in their self-representations. In seeking to represent her religious identity, Aisha, for example, decided to restrict the use of colour in her portrait to white, in order to convey the message that Islam is a religion of peace, despite what she said many non-Muslims are led to believe by politicians and the media.

Figure 1. Alia studying the Quran.

The resulting image depicts an open Quran framed by a white rose on one side and a white porcelain dove, an obvious metaphor for peace.

Efforts to represent visually female Muslim identity as enlightened frequently relied on the most prominent visual signifier of that identity: the headscarf. One participant's initial portrait idea involving the scarf prompted a lengthy class discussion on colour and the representation of female Muslim identity. Marwah said that her religion was the most important element of her self-identity; she decided to express this visually by photographing her headscarf. This became a point of contention for others in the class, as she happened to be wearing a dark coloured scarf that day. Another participant was concerned that a dark scarf might be construed as conveying a negative image of her Muslim identity, and a discussion of how the use of certain colours in the photographs could have a positive or negative effect on the way viewers interpret them followed. The group agreed that it was best to use light colours in the representation of Islam wherever possible, because as one participant succinctly put it, "people think our lives are dark". Marwah therefore announced to the group that she would remember to wear a light-coloured scarf when creating her portrait.

Another Iraqi participant, Najwa, used a coloured headscarf in a similar way. Najwa explained during the workshop that she wanted to

photograph herself running against a background of merged images representing important events in her past. She said that she wanted her portrait to communicate a positive message about female Islamic identity, in contrast to what she perceives to be problematic representations of Muslim women in the Australian media. Najwa therefore decided that her corporeal representation must associate female Islamic identity with energy and light. Interestingly, this led to a decision to photograph another participant in her place because she did not feel that her appearance matched the message she wanted to convey about her identity. The colour of the headscarf to be worn by her stand-in was deemed vitally important and explained the rationale behind Najwa's decision to use a substitute body in the photograph. Najwa found it necessary that her stand-in wear a white or brightly coloured scarf and outfit. Najwa herself, however, wears mostly charcoal or black headscarves and raincoat style jackets, like most of the other participants of Iraqi background. Like Marwah, Najwa's coloured scarf symbolises her resistance to a dominant belief that Muslim women are oppressed.

Leila's principal self-portrait was the most visually flamboyant example of participant resistance to the metaphoric darkening of female Muslim identity. Using a conventional portrait format, Leila photographed herself wearing a traditional Afghani dress. The red fabric of the dress is richly embroidered in purple and green thread and encrusted with circular pieces of mirror; the bodice is heavily embroidered in silver. She wears a bright green headscarf, which contrasts dramatically with the dress and the similarly coloured piece of fabric used as a backdrop. The resulting image radiates colour. Her other self-portraits concentrate on the headscarf. Leila has a keen interest in art and design, and several of her photographs depict pages from her sketchbook. Several of these images are of rainbow coloured scarves drawn in pencil or created through collage. Another is comprised of two facing pages of the sketchbook. The drawing on the left depicts a visually uniform crowd of female figures wearing blue *burqa* while the drawing on the opposite page shows one of these figures in isolation. By means of the x-ray vision through which Leila renders the body beneath the *burqa* visible, the viewer gains some sense of the individual identity obscured by the visual conformity of the *burqa* wearers in the first image. Once again, the notion that female Muslim identity is 'dark' is challenged through the use of colour, for the figure in the second image wears brightly coloured clothing and flowers bloom around her.

This second illustration holds particular significance for Leila, for it appears again in another portrait. This time the illustration is depicted in

Figure 2. Leila's depiction of a colourful life beneath the *burqa*.

close-up with a silver necklace placed over it. The necklace, which bears an Arabic script pendant, is similar to those that other participants also wear as a mark of their faith. By placing such a personal symbol of her Islamic identity over the image, Leila seems to be indicating that this is *her* experience of female Islamic identity. While this image may seem at odds with her corporeality in an immediate sense (Leila is older than the girl she depicts and does not wear the *burqa*), it constitutes a chosen corporeal representation that best expresses the difference between her lived experience and dominant representations of female Islamic subjectivity. This chosen representation is a conscious demonstration of subjective agency in reaction to the negative images projected onto the bodies of young Muslim women.

Leila's use of coloured scarves is not restricted to the articulation of her sense of self through her artwork; it is also part of her everyday corporeal practice. When I initially asked her how she might realise her stated desire to express a sense of her Afghani/Australian identity visually, she told me that she had a large collection of headscarves in different colours and fabrics that she wanted to use. Through our discussions, it became apparent that these scarves represent an integral part of her self-identity, not only

because they convey her religious identity, but also because they are symbolic of the process of constructing her identity within an Australian context. Leila began wearing the headscarf in Iran, where she was restricted to wearing sombre colours. Upon moving to Australia, she sought out brightly coloured fabric from which to sew scarves in reaction to this drabness. Wearing them, she remarked, helps her "show the true beauty of the Islamic woman." Her coloured scarves therefore operate as a visual metaphor of the transformation that, according to her, both her appearance and personality have undergone in the three years she has lived in Australia.

2. *Contextualising the Enlightenment Metaphor*

In Islam, light is often equated with a metaphoric journey towards spiritual enlightenment. In the surah entitled An-Noor (light), the Quran (24:35) states that "God is the Light of the Heavens and of the Earth," whereas the Unbelievers' situation

> is like the depths of darkness in a vast deep ocean, overwhelmed with billow topped by billow, topped by dark clouds: depths of darkness, one above another: if a man stretches out his hands, he can hardly see it! For any to whom Allah giveth not light, there is no light! (Quran 24:40)

To believe, therefore, is to move closer to the light of God. In a secular equivalent, the move from darkness to light serves as a metaphor for the transformative effect of intellectual education upon the soul.

In Plato's cave allegory, darkness represents the soul's pre-existing imitative state, while light signifies the end result: knowledge of the Good. The same metaphor of transformation is evoked in Kant's conception of Enlightenment as the rational thinking that frees us from the immature intellectual state that blindly submits to authority. Enlightenment, in this sense, is commonly represented as the triumph of the light of Modernity over the darkness of Tradition, just as for early Christian scholars the light of Christianity was charged with vanquishing the dark forces of paganism. The very word *enlightenment*, whether conceptualised as a mode of thinking or an historical epoch, is itself a metaphor for a positive change of state. Following the Lakoffian theorisation of metaphor, this metaphor of positive transformation—whether religious or secular—relies on two universally understood and basic concepts: *light is good, darkness is bad*; and *states are destinations*, which accounts for the conceptual vocabulary of movement associated with it. Because the enlightenment metaphor is

universally understood, it proved an ideal means for participants to simultaneously express their religiosity in a way that is recognisable in an Islamic context, and voice their resistance to the use of metaphoric enlightenment to 'darken' their identity.

Metaphoric enlightenment has a long history as a rhetorical device used to darken 'Other' identities and to justify Western hegemony. For example, in a famous John Gast painting of Manifest Destiny—*American Progress* (1872)—a luminous white female apparition sweeps across the 19th century American frontier, bringing the light of modernity to the American West. This can be read as an attempt to justify the extension of governmental control from the Eastern seaboard, and to justify the 'civilising' of indigenous populations still living in metaphoric darkness. The persistent metaphor of Africa as the 'dark continent' further illustrates the ideological power and scope of the enlightenment metaphor. For instance, Jarosz (1992) analysed the use of the metaphor over time, from early missionary and colonialist missions to contemporary media coverage of HIV/AIDS. She argues that the metaphoric darkening of African landscapes and of the continent's indigenous societies (whether in discourses relating to bringing the light of Christ or that of civilisation to Africa) positions the West as morally superior in the dichotomies of civilisation/barbarity and tradition/modernity.

Contemporary use of metaphoric enlightenment to darken female Islamic identity follows the same logic. The French law banning the *hijab* in schools was frequently portrayed as a necessary measure to rescue oppressed Muslim women. The transcripts of the parliamentary sessions in which the proposed law was debated are replete with passionate speeches denouncing the *hijab* and calling for it to be banned in order to uphold the Enlightenment principles upon which the French Republic is based. Support for the ban was particularly strong amongst politicians of the Left. Here Communist Jean-Pierre Brard uses metaphoric enlightenment to portray France as a light of hope for veiled women trapped in the darkness of obscurantism throughout the world:

> What are the motivations and significance of wearing the veil? Is it really the voluntary act of emancipation that certain women claim? We know from experience that this unfortunately isn't the case… In voting for this law we follow in the footsteps of our distant predecessors who put into practice, without hesitation, their Republican convictions. We continue a tradition that has its origins in the Revolution… And we make France shine throughout the world for those who are thirsty for light and who courageously battle obscurantism every day (Assemblée Nationale 2004, 61–2).

This rhetoric is almost identical to French colonial administrator General Daumas' stated desire to "tear off the veil that still covers the morals, customs and beliefs" of Muslim society by outlawing the veil in French-occupied Algeria (Clancy-Smith 1998, 164).

Early imperialist representations of veiled corporeality were also reflected in the discourse on veiling following the US-led invasion of Afghanistan. In their analysis of media coverage of Taliban oppression of Afghani women following the invasion, Ayotte and Husain (2005) argue that the practice of Islamic veiling itself was often vilified, rather than its forceful imposition by the Taliban. According to Ayotte and Husain, the key discursive components of this coverage—the reductionist interpretation of veiling as synonymous with women's oppression, the homogenisation of Islam and the fetishisation of 'unveiling'—were also central to the 19th century rhetoric on veiling used to justify military conquest of the Orient (see Ahmed 1992). Cloud (2004) presents a similar analysis of the photographic images of veiled Afghani women that appeared in the Western media at the time. Many of these images, according to her interpretation, "seem to argue for intervention toward nation building, an allegedly humanitarian kind of control that is somehow worth the violence visited upon those being rescued" (p. 292). She describes the visual metaphor of positive transformation evident in a *Time Magazine* photo-essay entitled "From Shadow to Light" (p. 293):

> In "From Shadow To Light," there is a photograph of a lone woman, dressed head to toe in a burqa, wandering through crumbling desert ruins early in the morning with the sun rising in front of her. As in other examples from the "From Shadow To Light" compilation, she moves visually from darkness into the light of liberation promised by U.S. intervention.

This move from the darkness of oppression towards the light of modernity envisaged as Western liberalism is based on a teleological concept of social progress that is mapped onto both societies and individuals. At the same time that it rallies support for distant military forays it also shapes perceptions of female Muslim subjectivity within Western diasporic contexts. As was evident throughout discussions within the photography workshops and in the interviews I recorded, participants experienced the metaphoric darkening of their identity through not only media representations, but also through paternalistic worrying about their well-being, which they often encounter in everyday social interactions with non-Muslim Australians.

3. *Conclusion*

Young Muslim women's use of the enlightenment metaphor to represent their identity can be read as a conscious struggle to usurp the Imperialist variant of the metaphor present within Islamophobic representations of female Muslim identity. The power of the metaphoric transformation from the darkness of veiled oppression towards the light of modern liberated subjectivity is diminished when the veiled self is represented as an enlightened state to begin with. Leila's portraits are particularly successful in constructing a more complex representation of female subjectivity in this sense. While they can be interpreted as expressing a positive personal transformation, this is certainly not between the binary poles of oppressive tradition and Western liberation. As she is keen to point out, life beneath the *burqa* can be rich and colourful.

The methodology I used in this chapter helps address the structure/agency dilemma that is often overlooked within studies of the social implications of discourse. Are subjects merely the effects of discourse, as Foucault's early work is often interpreted to mean, or should they be seen more as the agentive outcomes of their own self-fashioning, as some postmodernists suggest? According to Giddens (1984), neither perspective is fully viable; discourses are social structures that both constrain subjective agency and also enable it by supplying the tools to resist its power. The enlightenment metaphor used to 'darken' female Muslim subjectivity is the same one deployed by young Muslim women in their efforts to challenge the social effects of this darkening. It is particularly pertinent that the self-representation of young Muslim women was a conscious exercise of agency in relation to external representation, for the representation of female Muslim identity they were challenging is one in which their agency is denied.

CHAPTER FIVE

REASON, PASSION, AND ISLAM: THE IMPACT OF EMOTIONALITY AND VALUES ON POLITICAL TOLERANCE

Tereza Capelos and Dunya van Troost

In this chapter, we borrow from political psychology theories to explore political attitudes towards groups representing Muslims and Islam. Our study of public opinion focuses particularly on political tolerance, and its affective and cognitive determinants. Soaring levels of perceived threats to 'the Western way of life' by Muslims put tolerance to the test in many Western democracies, and raise questions about xenophobia and discrimination. Politicians and civic organisations have no easy solutions to this perceived problem. More than 12 million citizens in Europe are Muslim, and their demands for equality are thought to be the next big challenge for Europe. We believe that understanding the origins of political tolerance is crucial, since welcoming and integrating Muslim populations is becoming steadily more inhibited by rising levels of intolerance.

Our study takes place in the Netherlands, a country famous for its tolerant attitudes towards soft drug use, euthanasia and gay marriage. In this nation of 16 million where one million residents are Muslim, ethnic tensions have been transforming the country, and Islam now lies at the centre of the tolerance debate. After 9/11, Dutch society struggled to absorb anti-Muslim shocks fuelled by controversial political figures like Pim Fortuyn, founder of the *Lijst Pim Fortuyn* (LPF), a now defunct populist right-wing political party promoting anti-Muslim policies. Many indigenous Dutch citizens considered Islam incompatible with their way of life and a danger to their democratic culture. They feared the emergence of militant Islamist terrorism, manifesting their anger and frustration with verbal and physical violence. Following the murder of Pim Fortuyn by an animal rights activist during the 2002 national election campaign, immigration policy changed to become one of the strictest in Europe, and Dutch politics saw a rise in right-wing politicians who focused on the issue of integration. After the murder of film-director Theo van Gogh in November 2004 by a Dutch-Moroccan Muslim, a number of mosques and Islamic schools became the target of attacks throughout the country. Emotions rose and a

number of politicians voiced their anger towards Muslims in the Netherlands. Geert Wilders, a Dutch right-wing politician and leader of the Party of Freedom, demanded that mosques attended by radicals should be closed. Gerrit Zalm, former Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Finance, declared 'war' on Islamic extremists. Frits Bolkestein, a Dutch politician and former EU Commissioner, was reported in *De Standaard* (8 November 2004) to have told King Mohammed VI in Rabat, Morocco, that if he did not want to be seen as an "exporter of murderers" he should stop "his" citizens from performing terrorist acts.

Public opinion polls in 2002 reported that about 20 percent of the Dutch population had become less tolerant towards Muslims after the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center (EUMC 2002). By 2006, about 52 percent of Dutch citizens perceived Islam as intolerant, 40 percent indicated that Islam was violent, and 54 percent believed that Islam and democracy were incompatible (*Algemeen Dagblad* 2006). Intolerance was accompanied by strong emotional reactions. In 2005, about 37 percent of Dutch citizens had negative feelings towards Muslims (TNS-NIPO 2005a), and about 68 percent reported feeling afraid of a potential terrorist attack by Muslim fundamentalists (TNS-NIPO 2005b). In March 2005, the French *Le Monde Diplomatique* cautioned that the pillars of Dutch society were shaking with the weight of exposed intolerance. But intolerance and Islamophobia do not start or stop at the Dutch border. Similar trends were observed in France, Spain and the UK (Pew Global Attitudes Project 2005). The Centre for Monitoring Racism and Xenophobia—replaced by the EU Agency for Fundamental Rights and based in Vienna—reports that discrimination and Islamophobic incidents against European Muslims are under-reported and that non-Muslim European citizens are increasingly wary of their Muslim counterparts (EUMC 2002, 2003, 2006).

The heightened levels of fear and anger towards the Arab world and Muslims, and the growing divide between non-Muslim majorities and Muslim minorities in Europe, make the study of political tolerance very topical. Political tolerance, i.e. the "willingness to permit the expression of ideas or interests that one opposes" (Sullivan, Piereson and Marcus 1979, 784), is important for the functioning of pluralistic societies. Political psychology studies show that tolerance is put to the test by extraordinary threatening events such as terrorist attacks, and that it is challenged by everyday tensions, such as the clash between the lifestyle of migrants and native groups within society (Skitka, Bauman and Mullen 2004). Here, we investigate experimentally how even mild feelings of anger or fear towards a fictional Islamic group interact with ideological and cultural

considerations, and shape political tolerance judgments. Unlike studies that measure changes in political tolerance in the context of heightened physical threat due to terrorist attacks (Skitka et al 2004), we study changes in tolerance when social and personal threat is low and not accompanied by physical harm. We conducted an experimental study in which we measured tolerance under 'calm' and 'mildly stressful' scenarios involving an Islamic social group. We also measured cultural and ideological predispositions about groups in society (negative attitudes towards immigrants versus negative attitudes towards extremists), and examined their interactions with induced emotionality.

Our research contributes to our understanding of perceptions of Muslims in societies where Islam is a minority religion by highlighting the psychological determinants of people's attitudes towards minorities. Macro-sociological and political approaches can benefit from political psychology studies that examine the components of attitudes at the individual level. By elaborating on the affective and cognitive mechanism of tolerance judgments, we can understand better how public attitudes towards Muslims intersect with political values and ideological considerations. Islamophobia contains emotional and cognitive elements, expressed often as anger, fear and anti-immigrant attitudes and it is this specific interaction between emotions of fear and anger and negative cognitions that we highlight with our experimental study.

Our research also engages with ongoing debates in political psychology focusing on the interrelationship between feeling and thinking. We show that emotional appraisals of fear generated by social events are important determinants of citizens' reactions when they interact with ideological tensions, while anger does not play the same role. In addition, we show that tolerance towards minority groups is not a static or one-dimensional concept. Its determinants under a terrorist attack can differ from those under milder threatening scenarios, examples of which are abundant in the daily life of our societies.

Our research also complements the work of several authors included in the current volume. Indeed, Canan-Sokullu analyses polling data on attitudes towards Turkey's accession to the EU (Chapter Six), looking at the compatibility of Islamophobia with anti-immigration values, and the significance of fear in shaping popular anxieties in Germany, France, Britain and the Netherlands. The negative, threat inducing public perceptions of Arabs are also examined in the chapter by al-Rawi, focusing particularly on stereotypical images available in popular fiction (Chapter Nine).

A common theme in these chapters is the investigation of emotionality, political values, Islamophobia and perceptions of threat as determinants of perceptions of Islam. The present chapter proceeds as follows. First, we present existing research on tolerance and its determinants. Then we turn to an in-depth discussion of fear and anger, and review differences between the two in influencing political tolerance under conditions of threat. We review the design and implementation of our experimental study, and we close by discussing the implications of our findings for the understanding of the expression of tolerance towards Muslim minorities in western democracies.

1. *The Affective Side of Political Tolerance: Particularities of Fear and Anger*

Political tolerance draws on affective and cognitive considerations. The role of affect is prominent because, as Kuklinski, Riggle, Ottati, Schwarz and Wyer (1991) point out, in real life we are more likely to form tolerance judgements on the basis of our feelings. In an experimental study, they show that, contrary to conventional wisdom, when participants are asked to consider the consequences of their judgments, they express lower levels of tolerance than those asked to respond from their gut feelings. The authors conclude that when it comes to tolerance, gut feelings appear to be more influential than thought. Examining the role of emotional reactions further, we see that tolerance decreases when the actions of a social group generate anxiety. Several scholars examine political tolerance under conditions of threat, and show that tolerance is influenced by perceptions of threat in predictable ways: threatening stimuli decrease tolerance, while reassuring stimuli increase tolerance.

Tolerance has also been investigated under conditions of extreme threat, such as terrorist attacks. Skitka et al (2004) examined the effects of psychological reactions to 9/11 on intolerance, demonstrating the mediating effect of intense threat. Similarly, Huddy, Feldman, Taber and Lahav (2005) and Feldman and Stenner (1997) show that anxiety and intolerance increase under conditions of threat. This is because people with a heightened perception of threat pay more attention to contextual information, and thus to negative stimuli. It is therefore not surprising to note that threat is associated with political intolerance, prejudice, ethnocentrism and xenophobia (Feldman and Stenner 1997, Huddy et al 2002, Marcus 1995, Sullivan et al 1981).

Recently, attention has turned to the interplay of tolerance with the stress-related emotions of anger and fear (Kuklinski et al 1991, Sales 1973, Skitka et al 2004, Small, Lerner and Fischhoff 2006, Sullivan et al 1981).

Both anger and fear are positively linked to perceptions of threat and play a significant part in forming judgments about society and groups (Kuklinski et al 1991, Skitka et al 2004, Whalen, Shin, McInerney and Fischer 2001). However, their independent effect on tolerance judgments has not yet been measured. Anger and fear are worth studying because they share interesting similarities but also differences. Both are negative emotions central to the formation of political judgements and they influence how new information is dealt with in the brain (Huddy et al 2005). However, as several studies show, they diverge physiologically, neurally, and behaviourally.

For example, in terms of physiological distinctions, while both anger and fear cause the heart rate to rise, their physiological manifestation through body temperature, or perspiration is not the same. While people who are angry report feeling hot, people who are afraid report feeling cold (Roseman and Evdokas 2004). Furthermore people who are afraid have an increase in perspiration whereas anger is not associated with this symptom (Rime, Philippot and Cisamolo 1990). Brain activity is another area where there is differentiation between anger and fear. Wacker, Heldmann and Stemmler (2003) studied the neural system in the brain and its natural response in situations that make one angry or afraid. They find that fear leads to stimulation of the part of the brain related to withdrawal (flight), while anger leads to increased activity in the part of the brain related to approach (fight). In other words, these two discrete emotions have a different biological function. According to Berkowitz (1999, 421), "the anger experience presumably grows out of the awareness of the aggression-related reactions, whereas fear derives from the awareness of the fight-linked responses."

There are also behavioural differences between the two emotions. High levels of fear are associated with a limited capacity to use cognitive abilities. In a state of anxiety, all attention is focused on the threatening source, leaving no space for non-threatening aspects of the environment (Huddy et al 2005). Fear also makes people more eager to avoid danger and pull back (Isbel, Ottati and Burns 2006). Anger, on the other hand, makes people want to be responsive and more aggressive in their behaviour. Feelings of anger evoke responsibility attributions and thoughts about whom to blame for a negative event, as for example in the case of the terrorist attacks on 9/11 (Small et al 2006). Studies in the field of psychology report differences of out-group-related behaviour. While anger leads to more optimistic risk estimates and out-group aggression, fear leads to pessimistic risk estimates and in-group improvement (Learner, Gonzalez, Small and Fischhoff 2003).

In a situation where there is a risk of threat, the behavioural consequences of anger and fear become obvious. While fear holds information about risk, anger gives information about who is at fault (Schwarz 1990). Resulting from their different states of appraisal (certainty and control), the goals of individuals who feel angry contrast with the goals of those who feel afraid. According to Lerner and Keltner (2001), people who experience fear want to reduce risk, while those who experience anger are more likely to take risks. Differentiation is also evident in the consequences of these emotions on the assessment of political events. In a field experiment, Lerner et al (2003) examined how priming either fear or anger determined citizens' risk estimates. The results show opposite effects for the two emotions. Experiencing anger triggers more optimistic beliefs regarding matters of national interest, while experiencing fear triggers greater pessimism, which can lead to punitive preferences or to preferences for conciliatory policies. Considering the above, our interest here is to examine similarities and differences in the impact of anger and fear on political tolerance. We can all imagine social scenarios when citizens feel afraid of a particular group or situations where they feel angry. By identifying nuances in the affective conditions under which tolerance is influenced, we hope to shed more light on the mechanism by which tolerance judgments are affected.

2. *So Close and Yet So Far: Political Environment and Tolerance*

The political environment has a significant impact on the levels of stress generated on individuals. Because stress affects tolerance, the political environment can also play an indirect role in how much people are willing to share their world with others. We know that tolerance is a function of considerations regarding the nature of the activity in which a target group exercises certain democratic rights or social behaviour. Chanley (1994) shows that tolerance diminishes when space or time proximity is high, in other words when the activity or situation is perceived as immediate, when it involves people one cares for, and when it takes place nearby, thus implying contact. In contrast, when involving an unknown place or distant time, people find it easier to say that they would allow others, even those they do not like, to exercise their rights and participate fully in society. Higher tolerance has been reported for scenarios that involve a group holding a public rally, a situation scoring low on physical contact. Similarly, in scenarios where there is little contact with the ideas or with a member of a group that one does not like, people generally accept the

group's activity, regardless of whether they are personally involved. Under intense contact scenarios, however, people generally oppose the group's activity more strongly.

In our research, we are particularly interested in expressions of tolerance in everyday political situations with minimal levels of physical threat (e.g. a rally, demonstration or political speech) that allow for ideological contact. As prior research has demonstrated, in a highly stressful and threatening environment, such as the aftermath of a terrorist attack, people tend to feel less tolerant (Skitka et al 2004). What we do not know is whether citizens experience lower tolerance in ordinary political situations (such as political demonstrations or rallies) outside the high-threat context of a terrorist attack that implies physical harm. Because in ordinary politics anger and fear can be experienced simultaneously and because it is often difficult to separate their effects (Huddy, Feldman and Cassese 2006), here we employ an experimental manipulation of the two emotions. We use a fictional Islamic out-group as the target to examine how anger and fear generated in the context of a public demonstration shape political tolerance, and to understand the role of the two emotions in scenarios that we are all likely to encounter in our everyday political interactions with others in society.

3. *A Significant Cognitive Component: Political Values and Tolerance*

Feelings, although important, are not the only determinants of tolerance. Stressing its cognitive component, Kinder (1998) shows that what people think about at a particular point in time can have a positive or negative influence on tolerance judgments. Important elements are the frame of consideration and the types of information in the political environment. For example, being asked to make an evaluation of a group can have a positive effect on tolerance, when thinking takes place in the context of principles such as support for democratic values and civil liberties (Kinder 1998). This is because when people are confronted with value conflicts, they stop and think, and their frame of mind influences their judgments (Peffley, Knigge and Hurwitz 2001). Note, however, that Marcus (1995) suggests that actually it is not so much the state of mind at the time the information is stored that matters, but it is the state of mind when the information is being recalled that influences the tolerance judgement.

Research shows that judgments of political tolerance also depend on more permanent value considerations and individual characteristics.

For example, conservatives and authoritarians are more intolerant (Feldman 2003, Stenner 2005, Sullivan et al 1981), while their counterparts, political liberals, appear to be more tolerant even towards unsympathetic target groups (Lindner and Nosek 2009). While close-mindedness is often considered as a characteristic of the political right, is has been also found to exist in certain forms of left-wing political expression (Greenberg and Jonas 2003). And moving beyond ideological differences, other scholars turn to the role of education and cognitive sophistication as promoters of the acceptance of others (Bobo and Licari 1989, Golebiowska 1995, Kinder 1998). Golebiowska (1995) shows that while people with higher levels of education are more tolerant, it is their cognitive sophistication that accounts for a substantial part of the positive effect of education. Correlations of tolerance with gender, urbanism and region of residence have also been examined (Abrahamson and Carter 1986, Golebiowska 1995, Peffley et al 2001).

Putting feeling and thinking together, Gibson and Bingham (1982) examined the interaction of cognitive and affective elements as determinants of tolerance. They showed that when mediated by tolerance-promoting thoughts and democratic values, fear can lead to an increase of tolerance. That is because when we are afraid, our pre-existing cultural values can be strengthened and reaffirmed. Parenthetically, the finding that fear can act as a catalyst that strengthens an individual's worldview is in line with experimental findings of terror management studies in psychology developed by Solomon, Greenberg and Pyszczynski (1991). Drawing on Freud and Fromm, this motivational theory argues that our awareness of mortality generates psychological terror. In several experiments, emotional distress generated by making mortality salient made the world-view of the participants more salient and, as a result, they clung strongly to their ideological beliefs.

Going back to political psychology studies, Kinder (1998) showed that people who value civil liberties are able to hold on to their opinion even under conditions of threat. On the other hand, in the presence of strong negative opinions about a group, anxiety increases, which leads to sensitivity towards new negative information, which in turn leads to a decrease in tolerance. The interaction of cognition and emotion is also evident in a study by Marcus (1995), where the participants were asked to select a least-liked racist or non-racist group and report their level of anxiety. Respondents became more nervous and emotionally engaged when confronted with their least liked-group, and more affected by new negative information.

4. *A Tripartite Relationship: Emotions, Values, and the Environment*

In this chapter, we are particularly interested in the interplay between emotions, values and the environment, for the expression of political tolerance. As we discussed, under calm conditions citizens can set aside their prejudices and reservations about other groups in society, but in a stressful environment, the increase in perceptions of threat can lead to a decline in tolerance proportional to the level of stress in the environment. The issue is one of degree. Naturally, when the political context is highly threatening (e.g. implying physical harm, or when high proximity and contact with the target group is imminent) tolerance will decline sharply. Under situations of low stress, we expect a less sharp decline of tolerance. The question we are interested in here is whether every-day life situations that stimulate ideological threat (e.g. a demonstration or a rally by an out-group) are able to induce a decline in tolerance. A second factor we want to examine is the role of civic values in the expression of political tolerance. Pre-existing negative considerations towards an out-group are expected to enhance negative feelings and decrease tolerance in a stressful environment. This is following evidence in psychological studies that in a situation that is considered unsettling, a disliked group will be evaluated on the basis of existing beliefs. While anxiety and stress activate predispositions, a calm political environment is expected to mute differences in tolerance based on individual predispositions.

We also expect a qualitative difference in the type of stress experienced by individuals. In a situation that generates stress in the form of anger, individuals will behave differently from how they will in a situation that stimulates fear. In general, we expect anger to lead to a decline in tolerance, stimulating opposition, risk taking and willingness to fight for ideas that clash with the target group. We expect that the effect of anger will not be mediated by the values of the individuals because even low levels of anger are associated with limited cognitive processing. Even when the stress is low, as in a rally or demonstration, as individuals feel angry due to the violation of expected behaviour from an out-group, we expect a decline in reported tolerance irrespective of cognitive considerations. Fear, on the other hand, has low risk behavioural consequences, and people who are afraid usually opt for less conflict. Because low levels of fear encourage cognitive processing, when fear is mediated by support for democratic values the negative emotion should not generate intolerance. On the other hand, when fear is mediated by values that point to prejudice towards an out-group, we expect a sharper decline of tolerance.

To recapitulate, we examine potential shifts in tolerance from a calm scenario, to an 'everyday' mildly threatening political situation. That is all the more important in the current times of change and tension within groups in multicultural societies where 'ordinary' conflict regularly puts tolerance to the test. Having said that, it is also important to highlight an important distinction between the low threat scenarios we examine here, and the high threat scenarios examined by other scholars in the field. Under conditions of high threat, as in the aftermath of a terrorist attack, emotional reactions and civic values affect tolerance in different ways. When an individual comes in high contact with the source of stress, fear has a much more detrimental effect on his or her tolerance compared to anger. Studies that examine political tolerance in the context of 9/11 show that under highly stressful conditions, fearful individuals take notice of a negative situation faster than individuals who are angry. When the environment stimulates high levels of fear, people's capacity to stop their initial reaction and have second thoughts is diminished, so their tolerance declines, irrespective of their values and considerations. As we saw earlier, in high stress scenarios, fear or panic at its extreme, prevent cognitive processing. Interestingly, it is anger that allows rethinking and moderating a negative judgment.

5. *Research Design, Procedures and Measures*

To test our hypotheses we conducted an experimental study that manipulates the experience of fear or anger under a mildly stressful scenario and then measures changes in the level of reported tolerance towards a fictional Islamic group. The experiment took place in the autumn of 2005 and participants were 88 political science undergraduate students of Leiden University in the Netherlands. Participants arrived at the computer laboratories of the Social Sciences Faculty, and were randomly assigned to experimental conditions. We asked participants to take part in two ostensibly unrelated studies within the same 45-minute session. The first survey was presented as an investigation of what people think about political issues and leaders in government, and contained measures of support for civil liberties, political knowledge and tolerance towards groups in society. Participants were asked to name the group in society they disliked the most and answered general tolerance questions about their least-liked group. Filler questions included responses to current political issues, evaluations of political candidates, party preferences, and a word recognition

puzzle. The second survey was described as a test of how much information people remember when they read a story in the news, but it actually presented participants with a reassuring and then a threatening description of a fictional group that generated fear or anger. The two-study procedure was adopted in order to avoid any emotional carry-over from the least-liked group evaluations in the first survey, to the fictional Islamic group in the second survey.

In the second survey, participants were presented with stimulus materials that were identified as actual news stories about a fictional Islamic youth organisation called *Youth for Islam*. Note that we used a fictional group because we wanted to ensure that the experimental material was not contaminated by participants' attitudes towards actual groups. Participants received first the reassuring, and then the threatening scenario. In the reassuring scenario, our intention was to create a situation where feelings and thoughts about the target group were non-threatening. Participants read that a youth organisation called *Youth for Islam* received a subsidy by the Dutch government. In the text, a spokesperson explained what the group stood for, and a public opinion poll indicated that the general public had moderate feelings towards this group. Following the news article, participants answered questions on their recall of facts about the fictional group, and reported their tolerance towards the group.

Next, all participants were subjected either to the anger or the fear conditions of the mildly stressful scenario designed to alert them to a potential low-level threat. We manipulated the affective state of the participants (fear or anger) as appraisals towards the fictional target group violating standards of good behaviour. Such violations have shown to be significant determinants of intolerance in previous studies. The text described a demonstration organised by the same fictional group which took place in The Hague and caused disturbance. Banners held by *Youth for Islam* members were described in the text as using inflammatory language. While the article did not specify the content of the banners (in order to avoid contamination due to cognitive evaluations of the content) it noted that it was disturbing to bystanders.

The text also contained the experimental manipulation of anger and fear. Half of the participants read that bystanders at the demonstration felt angry, and the other half read that the bystanders felt afraid, after reading the banners held by *Youth for Islam*. Similar non-invasive manipulations have also been used successfully in and experiment done by Kuklinski et al (1991) to study political tolerance judgements, where respondents were primed via a small text to consider the consequences or try to think

about their feelings. A manipulation through text priming was also sufficient in an experiment testing the influence of types of national unity on tolerance of cultural diversity. Another example of a similar manipulation was carried out by Li & Brewer (2004). To make their respondents think about a certain type of national unity, a brief description about the meaning of American identity was inserted as part of the general instructions in a questionnaire. In both studies the manipulation had the desired effect on the respondent's attitude.

Since we are interested in the dynamic relationship between anger, fear, and stress generated by mild threat, the manipulation was essential to determine whether mild threat perceptions interact with fear and anger to influence tolerance judgments. After reading the stressful scenario, participants were asked a series of questions that measured again their reactions to the fictional group. At the end of the study, participants were informed about the purpose of the study. Their assessment of their experience was positive and none said that they had guessed that the two studies were related or that the purpose of the study was to investigate political tolerance towards Islamic groups.

Our study includes a measure of tolerance towards the fictional Islamic youth group in the calm scenario and a measure of tolerance in the stressful scenario. The study also contains a measure of baseline tolerance towards the respondents' least liked group (reliability α = .50). For this measure, we asked participants whether they would feel comfortable if a member of their least liked group came to live next door to them, and also whether they thought that members of their least liked group should be allowed to teach in schools. For the measures of target-specific tolerance in the 'calm' and 'stressful' scenarios, we asked participants to indicate whether they would be comfortable sitting next to someone from this group, whether members of groups like the *Youth for Islam* would be part of the participant's group of friends, and whether they should be allowed to make a public speech. Participants then indicated whether they agreed or disagreed with the posed statement by choosing a number between –5 (strongly disagree) and +5 (strongly agree). The scale measuring tolerance under the calm scenario ($\text{Tolerance}_{\text{Calm}}$) has alpha reliability α= .65, and in the stressful scenario ($\text{Tolerance}_{\text{Stressful}}$) has alpha reliability α= .78. The questionnaire also included measures of the participants' overall feelings towards *Youth for Islam*, as well as their specific emotional reactions, accounting for anger, fear, happiness and anxiety. Respondents also rated *Youth for Islam* on being honest, trustworthy, safe, violent and good. Note that for the overall evaluation, we used the standard thermometer score

ranging from 0–100. For the emotional responses and trait items, we used 11-point scales from zero to 10, where zero indicated absence of the emotion or the trait, and 10 indicated strong presence of the emotion or the trait.

6. *Analysis and Results*

In line with previous studies, we expect to see valence congruent effects following the 'calm' and 'mildly stressful' scenarios. In other words, in the mildly stressful scenario there should be a decline in political tolerance, in comparison with the 'calm' scenario. Table 1 shows the changes in tolerance levels and the evaluations of the fictional Islamic youth group, between the 'calm' and 'mildly stressful' scenario, without accounting for the anger and fear manipulation. Under the 'calm' scenario, tolerance levels ($\text{Tolerance}_{\text{Calm}}$) were at .76 points, but in the 'stressful' scenario tolerance significantly declined, dropping to .72 points. Significant changes were also evident in the evaluations of *Youth for Islam*. Under the 'calm' scenario, participants gave the group moderate ratings on honesty (.59) and trust (.53). In addition, they considered *Youth for Islam* to be neither very good nor very bad (.52). In the 'stressful' scenario, where the reputation of the group is challenged, its ratings drop sharply. The overall rating of the group goes to .43 and evaluations of honesty and trust declined to .53 and .47 points respectively.

Table 1. Tolerance and evaluations of *Youth for Islam* in calm and stressful scenarios.

	Calm scenario	Stressful scenario
Tolerance	$.76^{a}$ (.20)	$.72^{b}$ (.22)
Honesty	$.59^{a}$ (.22)	$.53^{b}$ (.22)
Trust	$.53^{a}$ (.19)	$.47^{b}$ (.21)
Overall evaluation	$.52^{a}$ (.16)	$.43^{b}$ (.17)
Anxiety	$.41^{a}$ (.20)	$.49^{b}$ (.21)
Safety	$.53^{a}$ (.18)	$.44^{b}$ (.19)
Violence	$.34^{a}$ (.22)	$.45^{b}$ (.24)
N	88	88

Note: Entries are means, standard deviation in parentheses. Tolerance scales range from 0 to 1 with the value of 1 indicating a tolerant attitude. Superscripts (a and b) indicate significant differences at .05 level between the means in the same row.



Figure 1. Tolerance and evaluations of *Youth for Islam* in calm and stressful scenarios.

These findings link environmentally induced stress and changes in tolerance. As evidenced in Table 1 and also Figure 1, under the 'calm' scenario, anxiety levels are low (.41 points). Under the mildly 'stressful' scenario we generated here, anxiety increased by .08 points, climbing to .49 points. Similarly, under the calm scenario *Youth for Islam* is perceived as relatively safe (.53) and not particularly violent (.34). After the 'stressful' scenario *Youth for Islam* received lower ratings on safety (.44) and higher on violence (.45). These changes are small, but they are statistically significant, and indicate that attributions and evaluations can be affected even in the presence of a mildly stressful situation like the one simulated in our experiment. Our next focus is the effect of political predispositions on tolerance judgments.

In the analysis that follows, we categorised our participants in two groups, based on their identification of their least-liked group in society: the group who disliked immigrants and the group who disliked the extreme right. Note that participants responded to an open-ended question asking them to identify their least-liked group in society. The responses were then sorted, and two main groups were identified: disliking extreme right, and disliking immigrants. Participants whose least-liked group was different are excluded from further analysis.

Our expectation was that participants with a predisposition against immigrants would report lower levels of tolerance towards the fictional Islamic youth group, because their least liked group is associated with the target group used in our experimental manipulation.

As we see in Table 2, political tolerance is not only a matter of the political environment and the information available. It is also a matter of the values and appreciations that people hold about other groups in society. Participants who disliked the extreme right report tolerance levels towards *Youth for Islam* of around .82 points. In addition, moving from the 'calm' to the 'stressful' scenario did not change the reported tolerance towards *Youth for Islam* among these participants. In contrast, participants who identified immigrants, a group that shared similar characteristics with *Youth for Islam*, as their least-liked group report significantly lower tolerance for *Youth for Islam* under a 'calm' scenario (.62) and their tolerance drops further (.53) in the 'stressful' scenario. Although this .9 point change is not statistically significant due to the low number of cases, it is indicative of the power of pre-existing values on changes of political tolerance.

Our third hypothesis involves the distinct effects of anger and fear on political tolerance. Here, we expect that a 'mild threat' scenario generating fear will be more detrimental to tolerance than a 'mild threat' scenario generating anger. In other words, participants in the fear manipulation will feel less tolerant towards *Youth for Islam* compared to participants in the anger manipulation. Contrary to our expectation, as Table 3 shows, we do not find significant differences between the two conditions in any of our measures, although the differences between the two manipulations point to the expected direction.

Table 2. Tolerance of *Youth for Islam* and predispositions.

	Dislike extreme right	Dislike immigrants
Tolerance calm scenario	.81[a] (.15)	.62[b] (.26)
Tolerance stressful scenario	.82[a] (.14)	.53[b] (.24)
N	28	13

Note: Entries are means, standard deviation in parentheses. Tolerance scales range from 0 to 1 with the value of 1 indicating a tolerant attitude. Superscripts (a and b) indicate significant differences at .05 level between means in the same row.

Table 3. Change of evaluations of *Youth for Islam* under stress: differences between anger and fear.

	Anger	Fear
Tolerance	.73[a] (.21)	.70[a] (.23)
Honesty	.53[a](.20)	.53[a] (.23)
Trust	.49[a] (.22)	.46[a] (.23)
Overall evaluation	.45[a] (.17)	.41[a] (.19)
Safety	.45[a] (.17)	.44[a] (.23)
Anxiety	.52[a] (.22)	.5[a] (.26)
Violence	.47[a] (.23)	.42[a] (.23)
N	44	44

Note: Entries are means, standard deviation in parentheses. Tolerance scales range from 0 to 1 with the value of 1 indicating a tolerant attitude. A common superscript (a) indicates non-significant differences at .05 level between means in the same row.

More analytically, tolerance under the 'anger' condition is at .73, and under 'fear' it drops to .70. Evaluations of *Youth for Islam* in terms of honesty are identical for the two conditions (.53) while perceptions of trust decline slightly with fear (.48 vs. .46). The overall evaluation of the group takes a sharper decline, from .45 in the anger condition to .41 in the 'fear' condition. Emotional reactions regarding safety are almost identical (.45 vs. .44) but anxiety increases slightly under fear (.52 vs. .56). Expectations of violence on the other hand, are affected by anger, moving the average of .42 under the fear condition to a high of .47 under anger.

Our manipulation of anger and fear did not yield significant changes in a mildly stressful environment. While mild stress itself has a significant impact on tolerance (Table 1), we were not able to detect an obvious difference between the anger and fear generating scenarios (Table 3). Our next test involves a more in depth analysis of the role of emotions on political tolerance, as we turn to the interaction of emotions with political values and orientations. We expect that under low stress situations, fear will interact with pre-existing values, and when mediated by prejudice against the target group, it will lead to a sharp decrease in tolerance.

Table 4 shows the tolerance scores towards *Youth for Islam* among participants who dislike the extreme right (.82) and participants who dislike immigrants (.53), a difference of .29 points on average. This is evidence that values and pre-existing opinions about groups in society mediate changes in political tolerance. Second, the type of emotional manipulation does not cause much change in tolerance towards *Youth for Islam*

Table 4. Changes in levels of tolerance based on prejudice and emotions.

Least liked group	Manipulation	Tolerance	N
Dislike extreme right	Anger	.79[a] (.14)	14
	Fear	.84[a] (.14)	14
	Total	.82[a] (.14)	28
Dislike immigrants	Anger	.62[a] (.23)	6
	Fear	.46[b] (.24)	7
	Total	.53[c] (.24)	13
Total	Anger	.74[a] (.18)	20
	Fear	.71[a] (.26)	21
	Total	.72[a] (.22)	41

Note: Entries are means, standard deviation in parentheses. Tolerance scales range from 0 to 1 with the value of 1 indicating a tolerant attitude. Superscripts (a, b, c) indicate significant differences at .05 level between same column means of the same category.

among the group that dislikes the extreme right. The average reported tolerance among this group fluctuates between .79 and .84 points for the fear and anger conditions. We believe that is because in the context of the low stress scenario generated by the experiment, the mild manipulations of fear or anger were unable to override the pre-existing reassuring cognitive considerations about the target group.

Also, as we see in Figure 2, in the presence of negative prejudice, feeling angry or afraid makes a significant difference for political tolerance that fluctuates between .46 and .62 points. Among the participants who dislike immigrants, those in the fear manipulation become about .24 points less tolerant towards *Youth for Islam* than their counterparts in the anger manipulation. These findings are shown in Table 5 as regression coefficients. Here, predispositions, the affective manipulation and their interactions predict levels of tolerance towards *Youth for Islam* under a mildly stressful scenario. The negative coefficient of the dummy variable labelled 'Dislike immigrants' points to the .17 point lower tolerance score among the participants who dislike immigrants compared to the participants who dislike the extreme right under the anger condition (the anger condition is the baseline in this analysis). In Table 4 this corresponds to the change from .79 points to .62 points.

In Table 5, the constant marks the starting level of tolerance for the baseline group. This corresponds to the .79 score of the group that disliked the extreme right, under the anger manipulation in Table 4. The non-significant coefficient of the 'Fear Manipulation' confirms that



Figure 2. Prejudice and emotion interaction.

Table 5. Prejudice and emotions—interaction.

	Tolerance
Dislike Immigrants	−.17* (.09)
Fear Manipulation	.28 (.16)
Dislike Immigrants * Fear	−.22* (.11)
Constant	.79*** (.12)
Adj. R square	.37
N	40

Notes: *p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001.
Parameter estimates are unstandardised regression coefficients, standard errors in parenthesis.

considering independently the move from the anger to the fear manipulation has no significant effect on tolerance under mild stress. The significant interaction coefficient 'Dislike Immigrants * Fear' points to the additive effect of the fear manipulation on the effect of predispositions against immigrants on political tolerance. The significant baseline 'Dislike Immigrants' negative effect (-.17), together with the significant interaction variable labelled 'Dislike Immigrants * Fear' (-.22) point to a decline of .39 points in tolerance of the participants in the fear condition who dislike immigrants, in comparison to those that dislike the extreme right. Looking

back at Table 4 and Figure 2, this change is evident in the move from .84 points to .46 points.

Taken together, the findings presented here show the multifaceted origins of tolerance change. Political tolerance can be shaken by negative affect, disapproving predispositions, and a stressful political environment. We see that even in the context of a mildly stressful situation generated by mere descriptions of a political rally where the target group holds provocative signs, political tolerance declines significantly. This is in line with other studies that find that appraisals of safety or threat have a significant role in expressions of tolerance. While safe environments boost tolerance, stressful environments foster its decline. We also saw that apart from contemporary information on the political environment, tolerance changes depend on existing beliefs and predispositions. Disliking a group similar to *Youth for Islam* had a significant accelerant effect on tolerance decline. In addition, we found that fear interacts with negative predispositions, verifying the triangular interdependence of emotions, predispositions and political environment for political tolerance, even in situations that are not particularly threatening.

7. *Discussion and Conclusion*

The findings of our research point to the importance of the political context, the levels of citizens' affective state and the nature of their civic values for the understanding of political tolerance towards Islam. We expected that under mildly threatening events that stimulate fear, tolerance judgments would shift upwards or downwards on the basis of the valence of pre-existing cognitions. We found that people who disliked the extreme right and were exposed to a situation generating 'fear' were slightly more tolerant towards the fictional Islamic youth group than those in the situation generating anger, but this difference was not statistically significant. In other words, fear matters in the context of negative cognitions, but does not seem to stimulate higher tolerance when cognitions are positive. We did find interesting effects of fear for the group that disliked immigrants. For them, fear primed negative cognitions more than anger did, and led to a decline in tolerance. For people with negative cognitions, fear accelerated the effect of mild threat, leading to significantly lower evaluations than anger.

Two interesting points are raised by our findings. First, it is important to stress that in our experiment we measured tolerance towards Islam under

low threat, in the absence of a physical threat. Our scenario emulated a social event that called for tolerance towards an Islamic youth group whose behaviour and beliefs challenged the participants' ideological space with offensive messages. This is a different social context from a scenario involving physical harm. There the interplay of emotionality and cognition are expected to be very different. As we have seen in studies examining tolerance towards Muslims in the context of a terrorist attack, where threat is high and can be of a physical kind, high levels of anxiety block the activation of value considerations. In such a scenario, it is the increased emotionality that will drive tolerance changes. It would be interesting to examine changes in tolerance under intense ideological threat, where the ideas and way of life of citizens are put to a severe test. As we saw earlier, studies in psychology demonstrate that high levels of anger allow cognitive processing, unlike high levels of fear. In this case, anger would magnify the mediating role of existing predispositions, producing different results from the ones we noticed in our experiment. Future studies can vary the intensity of everyday ideological threat scenarios by altering the proximity and contact with the message of the target group, and examine whether emotionality and values produce different interactions.

A second point worth exploring further is the very interaction of emotionality and pre-existing values for the expression of political tolerance. We saw that a frightened and negatively biased citizen becomes a less tolerant citizen. In our scenario, citizens who disliked immigrants were the least tolerant towards the Islamic youth group. On the other hand, participants who identified right-wing extremists as their least-liked group did not react significantly to the threat condition or to the anger and fear manipulation. This lack of reaction among the group that disliked extremists is interesting but should not be seen as a qualitative statement of their general tolerance. Rather, it pushes our understanding of tolerance change further. We expect that this seemingly unaffected group would display similar shifts in tolerance to the group that disliked immigrants when the target group resembled their least-liked group. Future work can test this hypothesis directly in an experiment that involves evaluations of an extreme right-wing group involved in street demonstrations, in place of the fictional group *Youth for Islam* used here.

Islamophobia in the western world is also present in electoral politics, as the fear of Islam taints electoral races from the local, to the national, to the European level. In September 2004, Jean-Pierre Raffarin, the former French prime minister, referring to Turkey's potential entry in the EU

asked: "Do we want the river of Islam to enter the river bed of European secularism?" (Spencer 2004). Rumours of US presidential candidate Barack Hussein Obama being a Muslim might have cost him votes in certain states during the 2008 Democratic Party primary contest. At the same time, in Britain, the far-right British National Party (BNP), in an attempt to make a breakthrough in the May 2008 London Mayoral election, campaigned on a platform that attempted to rekindle the historical enmity between Jewish and Muslim communities. Pat Richardson, a BNP party councillor, is quoted in *The Guardian* saying "I'm in the BNP because no one else speaks out against the Islamification of our country." Shedding light on the determinants of political tolerance becomes an essential tool in understanding citizens' electoral decision-making and support for particular policy proposals.

The further study of the tripartite relationship between emotions, values and the political environment in shaping political tolerance becomes all the more relevant in light of the challenges to multicultural societies heightened by the terrorist attacks in Madrid on 11 March 2004, in London on 7 July 2005, the protests following the *Jyllands-Posten* Mohammed cartoons in Denmark on 30 September 2005, and the failed car bomb in Times Square, New York, on 1 May 2010. While Islamophobic sentiments are on the rise, the social challenge that Western democracies face is how to embrace their Muslim citizens. The debate is open about how to integrate Muslims in an increasingly secular world. Our research highlights the affective and cognitive dimensions of tolerance judgments in mildly stressful situations, and shows that neither reason nor passion alone can guarantee tolerance towards Islam, unless balanced by empathetic civic values.

CHAPTER SIX

ISLAMOPHOBIA AND TURCOSCEPTICISM IN EUROPE? A FOUR-NATION STUDY

Ebru Ş. Canan-Sokullu

It is often said that socio-political and cultural-religious divides crystallised in the European Union (EU) in the aftermath of the 11 September 2001 attacks in the USA, leading to increased tension and concerns with regard to the role and place of Islam and Muslims in the EU. The March 2004 and July 2005 bombings in Madrid and London triggered a further change in the social and political landscape, which is thought to have compounded existing antagonisms towards Islam and Muslims within the EU. The socio-political status of Muslim minorities in the EU became ever more controversial, as evidenced in pan-European public furores relating to Islamic dress, Islamophobic reactions to bombings, the assassination of film-maker Theo van Gogh in the Netherlands, the publication of cartoons of the Prophet Mohammed in Denmark, or comments made by Pope Benedict XVI in Germany on Islam, to name but a few. Against this backdrop, some have argued that Turkey's accession to the EU would lead to an 'Islamisation' of Europe, while others have argued that opposition to its accession reflects 'Turcoscepticism'.

Evidence for Turcoscepticism can be found in limited and mistaken descriptions of Turkey as a poor and populous Islamic country riddled with social, cultural and political problems that would prevent it from effectively adopting and internalising the values of the EU. Discussions on Turkey's potential membership in the EU are not limited to the political sphere though. Indeed, they have found their way into popular discourses relating to the compatibility of Turkey's socio-cultural and religious values with those of the EU. Discussions and discourses such as these have revolved around perceived differences in collective identities rooted in religion, culture, ethnicity and national dynamics. These discussions also revolve around Europe's supposed Christian and Enlightenment heritage, as well as its secular values of liberalism, democracy and the defence of human rights (Casanova 2006, 74). As a result, Turkey's EU integration project has recently come to be viewed in Europe as a process of political incorporation premised on inclusive notions of legal citizenship and value

orientations. On the other hand, concerns have begun to grow about the relationship between religion and the state in Turkey, about its cultural-religious history, and the value system to which it adheres. This was combined with fears over uncontrolled waves of immigration from Turkey into other EU member states, whereby almost 70 million Muslims would become European citizens overnight. These concerns have contributed to the growth of Turcoscepticism in Europe; in effect, there has been a growing perception within the public sphere that the *Turkish Crescent* would endanger the *European Cross*. Underlying this, there appears to be an anxiety felt among the European public that Europe is being 'Islamicised', with Islam perceived as a homogeneous, proselytising Other. The present chapter will address a number of questions raised by these issues:

- To what extent does the European public harbour Islamophobic sentiments?
- How does this affect relationships between Turkey and the EU?
- Is Turcoscepticism based on the fear of an influx of immigrants into Europe?
- To what extent does the European public believe that Islam and democracy are compatible systems of values, beliefs and norms?
- How are perceptions of Islam related to Turcoscepticism?

1. *Turcoscepticism, Islamophobia and Migration: The Dialectic between Islam and Western-Style Democracy*

The prospect of Turkey joining the EU has a long history and has generated unease among many Europeans, whether they are Christian or not. This unease revolves around issues relating to national identity, religion, culture, ethnicity and Europe's perceived secular values (Casanova 2006, Yavuz 2006). In 1989, two years after Turkey applied for full membership to the European Community, the poor Turkish economy, its large population and concerns over democratic incompatibility and cultural differences provided a convenient basis for rejection, as expressed in the European Commission's Opinion on Turkey's request for accession (20 December 1989). Turkey was eventually given the status of Candidate Country in 1999, while negotiations for accession began in earnest in 2005. However, these negotiations have been in deadlock since November 2006, ostensibly because Turkey was deemed not to have fulfilled essential administrative commitments. Others believe that this deadlock is a reflection of long-held European Turcoscepticism, which is itself based on the

definition of Turkey as an Islamic country, even though Turkey is a secular state, albeit with a majority Sunni Muslim population.

However, while the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) government has Islamist roots, it has remained dedicated to reforming Turkey's political system. This government has premised its agenda on human rights, social justice and a secular political system, thereby closely following EU policies and directives, on the assumption that the consolidation of democracy, legislative reforms and reducing the military's political power would pave the way for EU membership. Nevertheless, many argue that *Muslim* and *European*, and *Turkish* and *European* identities are mutually exclusive, claiming that Turkish membership would undermine European integration. The counter-argument to this view holds that Turks can be both European and Muslim, and can therefore reinforce multiculturalism, pluralism and democracy in Europe. According to Casanova (2006, 72), this

> debate revealed how much 'Islam', with all its distorted representations as 'the Other' of Western civilisation, was the real issue rather than the extent to which Turkey was ready to meet the same stringent economic and political conditions as all other new members.

Islam and Muslims have in fact often been the targets of prejudice. The social construction of a global Islamic threat in the post-Cold War era created a reservoir of hostility towards Islam and Muslims, which has led many scholars to fit Islam into a framework of fundamentalism and terrorism, a process accelerated by the events of 11 September 2001. For instance, Akram (2002, 68) argues that "Islam is [now] inextricably linked with 'holy war', male patriarchy and terrorism." Much scholarly research has focused on radical movements and political Islam, presenting Islam as a violent, cultural and political threat to Western societies (e.g. Huntington 1993). The representation of Islam in such terms is akin to Islamophobia, which is itself an artefact of the stereotyping of Muslims with xenophobic cultural approaches fed by the demonisation of Islam and Muslims in the media. Once Muslim collective identities and their public representation had become a source of anxiety in Europe, Muslims were represented as a religious and cultural Other to European secularism (Casanova 2006), which increased the temptation to equate Islam with fundamentalism (Shadid 1991, Khalid 1982, Wagtendonk and Aarts 1986). Inevitably, such representations have encouraged dread, dislike and the exclusion of Muslims, as expressed in the term 'Islamophobia' (Runnymede Trust 1997).

Feelings of Islamophobia are rooted in militant and terrorist activities (Dwyer and Meyer 1995). In this context, Tibi (2006) distinguishes between three militant Islamic movements in Europe: radical Islamist institutionalists, moderate Islamist institutionalists, and *jihadis*. Radical Islamist institutionalists are defined as political organisations that tend to associate themselves with fundamentalist activities and are likely to support militants who celebrate murderous attacks (e.g. Muslim Brotherhood). Moderate Islamist institutionalists tend to renounce violence, seek reconciliation and aim for peaceful social transformation (e.g. National Outlook Movement). *Jihadis* are closer to radical Islamist institutionalists in that they support militant activism (e.g. al-Qaeda). However, they constitute a new branch of radical Islamism with broader and more extreme objectives rooted in terrorism. Recent 'Western' understandings of Islam have been shaped more by the militant *jihadi* practice of Islam than that of the institutionalist groups. This has played an important role in the recent growth and spread of Islamophobia. As a result of the connection between Islamophobia and Turcoscepticism discussed above, I therefore hypothesise that *if Islamic fundamentalism is perceived as an important threat to Europe, then this will cause negative feelings towards Turkey's accession to the EU* (Islamic Fundamentalist Threat Hypothesis).

The fear of Islam and Muslims is also intricately related to issues of migration (Carey 2002, De Master and Roy 2002, Fetzer 2000, Fetzer and Soper 2005, McLaren 2002, 2003). McLaren (2003) conceptualises the perception of immigration as a threat, referring to realistic and symbolic threats. The realistic threat taps into how individuals feel about competing with foreigners for jobs that are available in their home country. Thus McLaren (2003, 915):

> The central contention of this approach is that members of the dominant group may come to feel that certain resources belong to them, and when those resources are threatened by a minority group, members of the dominant group are likely to react with hostility.

Symbolic threats are associated with fears that the Other will change domestic culture; such threats are "likely to be at play in explaining extreme anti-immigrant hostility in Europe" (McLaren 2003, 917). Kinder and Sears (1981) argue that the perception of a symbolic threat, whereby the Other is seen as having different mores, values, beliefs and attitudes from the majority group can lead to prejudice. Symbolic threats that stem from prejudice represent a form of resistance to change in the racial status quo based on moral feelings, principles and values that the minority group

violates (Citrin, Reingold and Green 1990). Based on this debate, I hypothesise that *if immigration is perceived as an important threat to Europe, then this will cause negative feelings towards Turkey's accession to the EU* (Immigration Threat Hypothesis).

The dialectic between Islam and Western democracy constitutes an alternative perspective to Islamophobic perceptions, as it concerns itself with 'value compatibility'. Europeans share common values based on constitutional patriotism, liberal democracy, and respect for universal human rights (Canan-Sokullu and Kentmen 2011). Europeans might view those who do not share the common traits of their culture as Others and as a threat to their European identity (Caporaso 2005, Habermas 2006). Identity-related research focuses on the religious identities that might help shape an individual's political attitudes. Some scholars have claimed that the norms and values attached to religious identities provide uninformed individuals with heuristics for understanding the political domain and explaining which actions and attitudes are socially preferable (e.g. Jelen 1993, Kelly and Kelly 2005, Rokeach 1968). Other scholars focusing on identity-related aspects of Islam argue that Islam as a belief system is also based on values such as democracy and secularism. Therefore, Islam should not be seen as threat to Western civilisation (Kibble 1998). For instance, Kibble (1998) suggests that the Islamic world is experiencing a significant evolutionary phase in a highly conflictual process of democratisation.

In this context, Mazrui (1997, 118) argues that "Westerners tend to think of Islamic societies as backward-looking, oppressed by religion and inhumanely governed, comparing them to their own enlightened, secular democracies." Furthermore, Alessandri and Canan (2008, 28) argue that "The contested nature of Islam and democracy in Europe among the public inextricably relates to the EU membership of Turkey—a predominantly Muslim but secular state founded on democratic values and principles." This suggests to some that some Europeans do not view Turkey as being European; they do not see it as having a consolidated Western European-style democracy (Flam 2004, Laçiner 2005). As a counterpoint, Casanova (2006, 73) argues that "Muslim democracy is as possible and viable today in Turkey as Christian democracy was half a century ago in Western Europe." In light of such value-based perceptions of Turkey's accession to the EU, I hypothesise that *if Islamic values are believed to be incompatible with democracy, this will cause negative feelings towards Turkey as a predominantly Muslim country, creating opposition towards Turkey's accession to the EU* (Compatibility Hypothesis).

2. *Research Design*

This chapter contributes to a burgeoning literature on public opinion in the EU that enhances our understanding of trends in European mass attitudes, thereby generating important insights into processes underlying EU enlargement policies. A number of studies have demonstrated the importance and relevance of carrying out systematic comparisons of public attitudes in democratic systems. As Gelb (1972) argues, public opinion is an essential domino of policy-making. The EU has experienced much immigration from (nominally) Muslim countries, in particular from Turkey. Consequently, tensions that arise in relation to Turkey have steadily increased in Europe since the 1970s. Although European public opinion has been monitored closely in recent years, comparative research on these tensions over time has been missing from the literature on Turcoscepticism.

Accordingly, the empirical analysis of public opinion data provided in this chapter addresses concerns about Turkey's EU membership, with particular reference to the perceived increasing threat of radical Islam in Europe and to fears related to Turkish immigration. The data collected for this particular study comes from the Transatlantic Trends Surveys (TTS) conducted between 2004 and 2008, focusing on the four EU member states with the largest proportions of Muslim minorities: France, Germany, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, hereafter referred to as the EU4. These countries have long histories of co-habitation and familiarity with Muslim diasporas. The dependent variable here was 'public opinion on Turkey's EU membership', and it was operationalised using the following question from the TTS: *Generally speaking, do you think that Turkey's membership of the European Union is a good thing, a bad thing or neither good nor bad?*

In line with the three hypotheses outlined above, three independent variables were tested and measured: *threat of Islamic fundamentalism*; *threat of immigrants*; and *Islam's compatibility with democracy*. Perceptions of Islamic/religious fundamentalism and immigrants as threats were measured using the following question from the TTS:

> I am going to read you a list of possible international threats to Europe in the next 10 years. Please tell me if you think each one on the list is an extremely important threat, an important threat, or not an important threat at all: (a) Islamic fundamentalism (the more radical stream of Islam) (b) large numbers of immigrants and refugees coming into Europe (TTS 2004, 2005, 2006).

In 2005, 2007 and 2008, TTS queried threat perception in terms of potential *personal exposure* to threats. The question read: *In the next 10 years, how likely are you to be personally affected by the following threat?* (*a*) *Islamic fundamentalism* (*b*) *Large numbers of immigrants and refugees coming into Europe*.

The issue of Islam's compatibility with democracy was incorporated into TTS 2006. The question was worded as follows: *Do you feel that the values of Islam are compatible with the values of [country]'s democracy?* The survey also asked a follow-up question on the reasons for answering that Islam was incompatible: *Why do you feel that way? Is the problem with Islam in general or with particular Islamic groups?*

Age, Gender, Ideology and Country of Origin were included as control variables. These have previously been studied in the literature (Gabel 1998a, 1998b, Markus and Converse 1979, Page and Jones 1979). Note that Country of Origin variables were created as dummies, and these were not held constant, as Muslim minorities in each country show different racial or ethnic variations that may account for cross-national variance in opinions on Turkey's membership of the EU. Different levels of acquaintance between the host populations and migrants were assumed, as each country's different colonial past determines social contact between the two groups.

Six models were constructed for binary logistic regression analysis to gauge the impact of perception of Islam and immigration and value compatibility on support for Turkey's EU membership. Note that each model was tested through binary logistic regression to avoid ordering issues and to calculate the different effects of predictors (McCullagh 1980), while controlling for Age, Gender, Ideology and Country of Origin:

- Model 2004: Logit (Opinion on Turkey's EU membership) = f (perception of threat of Islamic fundamentalism, perception of threat of large number of immigrants coming into Europe, Country of Origin, Gender, Age, Ideology)
- Model 2005: Logit (Opinion on Turkey's EU membership) = f (perception of threat of Islamic fundamentalism, perception of threat of large number of immigrants coming into Europe, likelihood of personal exposure to threat of Islamic fundamentalism, likelihood of personal exposure to threat of immigrants into Europe, Country of Origin, Gender, Age, Ideology)
- Model 2006: Logit (Opinion on Turkey's EU membership) = f (perception of threat of Islamic fundamentalism, perception of threat of

large number of immigrants coming into Europe, Islam-democracy compatibility, problem of Islam as a religion, problem of Islamic groups, Country of Origin, Gender, Age, Ideology)

- Model 2007: Logit (Opinion on Turkey's EU membership) = f (likelihood of personal exposure to threat of Islamic fundamentalism, likelihood of personal exposure to threat of immigrants into Europe, Country of Origin, Gender, Age, Ideology)
- Model 2008: Logit (Opinion on Turkey's EU membership) = f (likelihood of personal exposure to threat of Islamic fundamentalism, Country of Origin, Gender, Age, Ideology)

3. *Empirical Analysis*

A descriptive analysis of the survey data showed that public support for Turkey's EU membership varies across the four countries under investigation. Firstly, in France and Germany, it came to be considered a bad thing by a substantial proportion of the population, but this was less the case in the UK and the Netherlands (Figure 1). Secondly, while in Germany and France people showed rather consistently increasing Turcosceptic opinions over the five years, the number of undecided people gradually increased in the Netherlands and in the UK. The follow-up investigation into the reasons for perceiving Turkey's EU membership as good or bad revealed interesting patterns, particularly in 2004 and 2005.

In 2004, the most common reason given for public support of Turkey's accession to the EU in the four countries was the advantage that its membership would bestow to the EU in terms of promoting peace and stability in the Middle East (33%), with Turkey seen as a model for how to strengthen moderate Islam in the world (33%), as Table 1 shows. German and Dutch public opinion prioritised the latter, while French and British public opinion was more concerned with Turkey's effect on the Middle East in terms of regional peace and stability. Related to this religious and regional focus, the second most prevalent reason was that Turkey's accession to the EU would have a positive impact on European Muslims (20%). On the other hand, the main reason in 2004 for Turcosceptic responses to including Turkey in the EU was that as a predominantly Muslim country, Turkey would not belong in the EU.

While German, French and Dutch opinion shared this concern, public concerns in the UK were almost equally split between Turkey's Muslim population (32%) and problematic democracy (29%), as Table 1 shows. The least important worry for these European Turcosceptics was the fear of a 'too poor or populous' Turkey in the EU (17%), which might result in



Figure 1. Cross time and country distribution of opinion on Turkish membership of the EU (%).

Source: TTS (2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008)
Question wording: Generally speaking, do you think that Turkey's membership of the European Union would be: a good thing/ a bad thing/ neither good nor bad.
Note: 2004: N_{GER} = 974, N_{FRA} = 960, N_{NL} = 958, N_{UK} = 874; 2005: N_{GER} = 985, N_{FRA} = 985, N_{NL} = 991, N_{UK} = 921; 2006: N_{GER} = 975, N_{FRA} = 986, N_{NL} = 958, N_{UK} = 927; 2007: N_{GER} = 995, N_{FRA} = 980, N_{NL} = 970, N_{UK} = 929; 2008: N_{GER} = 992, N_{FRA} = 986, N_{NL} = 967, N_{UK}= 927

waves of immigration into Europe. In 2005, public opinion in the EU4 was more concerned about a poor and overpopulated Turkey and its integration into the EU. However, the primary driver of Turcoscepticism was the perception that Turkey's predominantly Muslim population would not allow it to fit into the EU (38%). In contrast, 'Turcophiles' mainly concentrated on Turkey's potential to enhance Middle East peace and stability, as well as the economic benefits that Turkish membership would carry with it. In sum, positive views about Turkey's membership in the EU were driven by the contribution it is perceived to be able to make to promoting peace and stability in the Muslim-dominated Middle East and its potential to be a role model for the Muslim world as a moderate Muslim country. Reasons for Turcoscepticism focused mostly on concerns about Islam, and secondarily about immigration.

Regarding European perceptions about Islam and immigration, the data showed that respondents feared Islamic fundamentalism more than immigration, with fear of personal exposure to threat triggering the most anxiety. Across the EU4, the perceived threat of Islamic fundamentalism

Table 1. Reasons for Turkish membership in the EU being perceived as 'a good bad thing' (%).

	Turkish membership is		*GER*	*FRA*	*NL*	*UK*	*EU4*
2004	a good thing because...	It would help the EU promote peace and stability in the Middle East (ME)	32	35	29	34	33
		It would have a positive effect on Muslim communities in other European countries	16	18	23	23	20
		Turkey's membership would be good in economic terms for the EU	19	11	16	12	15
		Turkey's membership will strengthen moderate Islam as a model in the Muslim world	34	35	31	31	33
	a bad thing because...	As a predominantly Muslim country, Turkey does not belong in the EU	64	62	55	32	53
		It would drag the EU in the ME conflict	11	16	20	20	17
		Turkey is [too poor or too populous] to be digested into a growing EU	4	5	12	10	8
		It would make the running of the European institutions more complicated	4	4	4	10	6
		Turkey's democracy is still problematic	17	13	9	29	17
2005	Turkey's membership in the EU would help promote peace and stability in the ME		50	40	52	63	36
	Turkey's membership in the EU would be good in economic terms for the EU[c]		31	26	40	46	36
	As a predominantly Muslim country, Turkey does not belong in the EU		39	46	39	27	38
	[Split half] Turkey is too populous to be integrated into the EU		36	31	34	30	33
	[Split half] Turkey is too poor to be integrated into the EU		26	30	31	35	31

Source: TTS 2004 and 2005; *Note:* Figures show the 'agree' responses to the question only.



Figure 2. Threat perception: Islamic fundamentalism and immigration (%).

Source: TTS 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, and 2008. *Note:* The total sums of 'very and somewhat likely' figures are represented in the figure.

decreased between 2004 and 2005, but increased again thereafter. At its highest, respondents in France indicated that they were more likely to be affected personally by Islamic fundamentalism. On the other hand, Germans apparently felt most threatened by Islamic fundamentalism in Europe over the next decade (Figure 2).

As far as the likelihood of personal exposure to the perceived Islamic fundamentalist threat was concerned this fear grew stronger between 2005 and 2007. Across the EU4, fear of possible immigration was less marked than fear of Islamic influence. The results showed that public opinion was less agnostic when immigration was perceived as a threat to Europe rather than to respondents' personal lives. UK respondents tended to believe that immigration would affect them personally. At the same time, the number of respondents who believed that immigration would affect them personally grew significantly (as seen in 2005 (1), 2007 and 2008), although this pattern varied across countries and over time. While in 2005 those in the UK were the most concerned about the perceived threat of immigration, by 2007, German respondents, and by 2008, French respondents showed the highest fear of immigration affecting them personally.

Perceptions of the compatibility of Islam and democracy revealed interesting differences in belief structures in the four countries. In all four,

Table 2. Islam and democracy compatibility (%).

Islam-democracy compatible	Why?	*GER*	*FRA*	*NL*	*UK*
Yes		28	39	47	47
No		72	61	53	53
	The problem is with Islam in general	29	26	19	26
	The problem is with particular Islamic groups	71	74	81	74

Source: TTS 2006.

majorities responded that the values of Islam and democracy were incompatible with each other. This belief was much stronger in Germany (72%) and in France (61%) than in the Netherlands or the UK, where the supporters of compatibility were almost as numerous as those who were against it (Table 2). However, in all four countries, a large majority of the respondents who felt that the values of Islam were incompatible with democracy said that the problem lay with particular Islamic groups rather than with Islam as a whole. This might suggest that Islamophobia is mostly related to the fear of certain radical groups.

Given these inter-country differences, what can we conclude about the opinion climate in the EU4 about Turkey's EU membership? What can we infer about the impact of perceived threats (Islamic fundamentalism and immigration) and value compatibility on Turcoscepticism in these countries? In this study, these questions have been addressed by analysing the association between all three factors and public opinion concerning Turkey's EU membership. Using binary logistic regression analysis, it examined the association between public opinion about Turkey's EU membership and the potential impact of Islam and immigration with reference to threats and value compatibility.

The binary response to the dependent variable was whether Turkey's EU membership is good (Y = 1) or bad (Y = 0), treating the 'Don't Know', 'Refusals' and 'Neither Good nor Bad' response categories as 'missing categories' because respondents' indifference was not of concern in this chapter. A coefficient greater than 1.0 (*Exp B*) of independent and control variables indicates an increase in the likelihood of favourable (pro-Turkish) opinions regarding Turkey's EU membership. The logistic

regression results from Model 2004 showed that, while controlling for other variables, the fear of a large number of immigrants coming into Europe was an important threat that had a significant negative (Exp (*B*) = .366) impact on support for Turkey's EU membership, as can be seen in Table 3. In Model 2005, public opinion in the EU4 was strongly Turcosceptic concerning perceived threats from Islamic fundamentalism in Europe and potential negative effects on their personal lives. The perceived fear of immigration into Europe, however, was a greater concern than the rise of radical Islam in Europe. Islamic fundamentalism, whether perceived as a threat to Europe as a whole or to individuals directly, had no significant effect ($p > .05$) on opinion on Turkey's EU membership. On the other hand, the threat of immigration to Europe reduced support for Turkey's EU membership. In 2006, (Model 2006) Europeans were asked their opinions about the compatibility of Islam and democracy and the main reason behind their perception of this incompatibility. Those who considered that the problem was inherent to Islam *per se* were more Turcosceptic (Exp (*B*) = .430), whereas believing that Islam and democracy are compatible value systems encouraged people to have a favourable opinion towards Turkey (Exp (*B*) = 2.795).

Those who considered Islam as a religion incompatible with Western democracy had a negative opinion about Turkey's EU membership. As in 2004 and 2005, in 2006, the perception of immigration as a threat to Europe was associated with a significantly negative public opinion towards Turkey. According to the results of Model 2007, fear of personal exposure to threats of Islamic fundamentalist and immigration both proved to have strongly significant impacts on Turcoscepticism. Finally, the 2008 model indicated that Islamophobia, in the form of the fear of personal exposure to radical Islam (Exp (*B*) = .294), had a significant negative impact on support for Turkey's EU membership.

To summarise, the first hypothesis (Islamic Fundamentalist Threat) that if Islamic fundamentalism is perceived as an important threat *to Europe*, then this will cause negative feelings towards Turkey's accession to the EU was not confirmed. However, the fear of potential *personal exposure* to Islamic fundamentalist threats in the next ten years strengthened Turcosceptic tendencies in the EU4. This does lend support to the first hypothesis, at least as far as personal exposure to Islamic fundamentalist threats is concerned. Secondly, the analysis indicated that public opinion became more Turcosceptic, to the extent that large-scale immigration into Europe was perceived as an important threat. This validated

Table 3. Binary logistic regression of public opinion on Turkey's EU membership.

		Model 2004	Model 2005	Model 2006	Model 2007	Model 2008
		Exp(*B*) (SE)	Exp(*B*) (SE)	Exp(*B*) (SE)	Exp(*B*) (SE)	Exp(*B*) (SE)
Threat perception	Islamic fundamentalism (to Europe)	.776 .219	.855 .174	.655 .330	[a]	[a]
	Immigration (to Europe)	.366** .113	.317** .125	.346** .180	[a]	[a]
	Islamic fundamentalism (personal exposure)	[a]	.847 .114	[a]	.553** .106	.294** .125
	Immigration (personal exposure)	[a]	.600** .117	[a]	.602** .110	[a]
Value compatibility	Islam-democracy compatible	[a]	[a]	2.795* .379	[a]	[a]
Reason of incompatibility	Problem of Islam in general	[a]	[a]	.430* .442	[a]	[a]
	Problem of particular Islamic groups	[a]	[a]	.932 .382	[a]	[a]

The dependent variable is 'opinion about Turkey's EU membership: good bad neither good nor bad'. Reference category of dependent variable is 'bad'.

Note 1: Model 2004: R^2 = 0.184 (Cox and Snell), 0.245 (Nagelkerke), 0.147 (McFadden). Model χ^2 (15) = 384.557**,

Note 2: Model 2005: R^2 = 0.219 (Cox and Snell), 0.198 (Nagelkerke), 0.186 (McFadden). Model χ^2 (17) = 497,490**,

Note 3: Model 2006: R^2 = 0.237 (Cox and Snell), 0.327 (Nagelkerke), 0.210 (McFadden). Model χ^2 (18) = 263,866**,

Note 4: Model 2007: R^2 = 0.146 (Cox and Snell), 0.202 (Nagelkerke), 0.123 (McFadden). Model χ^2 (15) = 316,556**,

Note 5: Model 2008: R^2 = 0.145 (Cox and Snell), 0.197 (Nagelkerke), 0.117 (McFadden). Model χ^2 (11) = 316,375**,

Note 6: Values of Wald's tests, the likelihood ratio and the confidence intervals for the odds-ratios are not reported in Table 3 to make the interpretation of the table easier. However, these figures are available upon request to the author.

Note 7: Results of country of origin, gender, age and ideology as control variables are not reported in Table 3 to make the interpretation of the table easier. However, these figures are available upon request to the author.

[a]These variables are not included in the data and analysis.

** p < .001, * p < .05

the Immigration Threat Hypothesis that if immigration is perceived as an important threat to Europe, then this will cause negative feelings towards Turkey's accession to the EU.

Thirdly, perceiving Islam and democracy as compatible with each other contributed to positive opinions on Turkey. This confirmed the Compatibility Hypothesis that, if Islamic values are believed to be incompatible with democracy, then this will cause negative feelings towards Turkey (a predominantly Muslim country), thereby creating scepticism towards Turkey's accession to the EU. However, in addition to these general findings, responses also differed across demographic groups. French respondents made the most negative assessment of Turkish membership, except in 2006. Left wing supporters were pro-Turkey. Only gender had no effect on responses regarding Turkish accession to the EU. These results can be summarised as follows: (a) finding Islam and democracy to be compatible, rather than fear of Islamic fundamentalism at a European level, made a majority of respondents support Turkey's EU membership; (b) conversely, those who feared that immigration and Islamic radical movements would have negative effects on their personal lives feared Turkey joining the EU.

4. *Conclusion*

This chapter showed a split in the EU4 as regards public opinion on Turkey's membership of the EU. While a growing proportion of the public in Germany and France considers Turkey's membership to be a bad thing, in the UK and the Netherlands public opinion is somewhat more favourable. As regards the relationship between Turcoscepticism and Islamophobia among Europeans, firstly, Turcoscepticism lies in the fear that Turkey, as a predominantly Muslim country, would not truly belong with the EU. Secondly, the egocentric fear of *personal exposure* to Islamic fundamentalism, rather than sociotropic concerns about the Islamic fundamentalist threat to Europe increases Turcoscepticism. Conversely, Europeans who consider Islam as a religion compatible with Western democracy tend rather to be Turcophiles.

These observations bring us to two conclusions about Turcoscepticism and Islamophobia: (i) Turcoscepticism has largely to do with egocentric rather than sociotropic evaluations of Islamophobia, and (ii) better understanding of the democratic credentials of Islam could foster cultural understanding between the EU and Turkey, thereby bridging the cultural, religious and societal gap that is perceived to exist between the two. Together, Turkey and the EU can play a role in bridging the gap between

Muslims and Christians. European integration and the Europeanisation project would thereby serve the interests of secular Europeans, Muslims and immigrants alike because they are "a potential bridge between Europe, Muslim migrants and Turkey" (Tibi 2006, 209).

However, a cosmopolitan Europeanisation should be based on expansion not only of the borders of Europe but also of the internal mental limits of cultural Europeanisation through the internalisation of other cultures and religions. As Europeanisation is not restricted to EU member states, Turkey would add to the European project by contributing to multiculturalism and religious pluralism. Furthermore, Turkey's membership could also be beneficial to the Muslim world as a whole. As Yavuz (2006) argues, Europe's encounter with Islam, through immigration or enlargement, would contribute to multiculturalism in Europe. Immigrants, the Muslim diaspora, and Turks in this particular case, need to achieve the Europeanisation of their values, though not of their religion, ethnicity or national identification, if they really want to be part of the European family. Yet, Europeans also need to realise that Islam is one of the foundations of Europe's social and cultural architecture because the relation between Muslims and Christians in Europe started long ago, and Islam contributed to Europe's history long before the beginning of mass migration into Europe.

CHAPTER SEVEN

REPRESENTING GENDER, DEFINING MUSLIMS? GENDER AND FIGURES OF OTHERNESS IN PUBLIC DISCOURSE IN SWITZERLAND

Matteo Gianni and Gaetan Clavien

On 28 November 2009, Swiss citizens accepted a constitutional ban on the construction of new minarets. The referendum campaign had led to a very emotional and harsh public debate on the Muslim presence in Switzerland. In a sense, the debate functioned according to a metonymic logic: starting from the specific detail of the meaning of minarets, it led to very broad considerations on Islam, such as its assumed lack of capacity to fit in with democracy or the risks of Islamisation and radicalism. Among the issues raised during the campaign, gender concerns were particularly salient. In fact, the debate on minarets progressively shifted to a debate on Muslim women's condition. This is exemplified by the poster of the group behind the popular initiative: it represents a Swiss map full of minarets (pointing to the sky as missiles); in the foreground is a Muslim woman wearing a *burqa*. This poster is very interesting for two reasons: firstly, it clearly demonstrates the metonymic logic of the debate; secondly, it suggests a compelling reason for Swiss citizens to ban new minarets, namely the protection of women's rights and condition. Why has this shift occurred? Are gender issues a contingent political argument strategically mobilised by some actors to win the campaign, or are they part of a wider structural frame of representations underlying the construction of Muslims as figures of otherness?

Although Switzerland presents some institutional characteristics, such as federalism and direct democracy, that might be seen as facilitating the integration of cultural differences, the question of asylum policies or of the integration of foreigners is traditionally a very heated issue in public debate. In particular, for the last decade, Swiss society has been experiencing a transformation of its multicultural social and political dynamics, namely through a shift from the accommodation of territorialised minorities to the accommodation of minorities for whom the territorial reference is not an issue. The increase of the Muslim population—which had risen from about 16,000 in 1970 to almost 320,000 by 2000—leading to its higher social and political visibility, has played a crucial role in this trend.

This group is indeed the main target of current social and political debates over the meaning of Swiss multiculturalism and of Swiss national identity; it is therefore represented as the main figure of the Other that Swiss society has to deal with. In this perspective, the main line of argument that we suggest in this chapter in order to address the aforementioned question is that the presence of the gender issue in the overall debate concerning the accommodation and integration of Muslims in contemporary Switzerland is far from contingent, but is the product of the crystallisation of representations that have figured significantly in Swiss public debate for several years. The social and political relevance of the poster is therefore unsurprising.

According to some literature (Okin 1999, Young 2007), gender has a central incidence in the overall discourse on multiculturalism. This is because one of the most controversial aspects of the accommodation of cultural minorities in Western liberal countries concerns the equality of women. Okin (1999) argues that a significant proportion of conflicting issues raised by illiberal minorities in Western countries are about gender issues. In her view, the politics of recognition—about providing protection for cultural and religious values, practices or traditions—entail a high risk of harming rather than promoting women rights. Therefore, from a liberal feminist point of view, Okin argues that the protection of individual rights of women should prevail over the recognition of cultural practices or values. In other words, the principle of equality and the respect of women's autonomy are non-negotiable principles to which cultural groups should adapt. This issue is particularly relevant to Muslim social and religious practices. Young (2007, 87) observes that "many of the political debates currently taking place about multiculturalism focus on the beliefs and practice of cultural minorities, especially Muslims, concerning women." A very broad overview of media coverage in Europe shows that there is an increasing concern with issues such as wearing headscarves in public, stoning, crimes of honour, polygamy, genital mutilation and forced marriages. In this light, Okin and Young's points seem to be intuitively plausible at an empirical level.

Having said this, it is still not clear (a) whether the gender issue plays a systematic role in the debate on Muslims and, if this is true, (b) how and to what extent it contributes to the framework of representation that constructs Muslims as figures of otherness in a given public space. Through an analysis of the Swiss case, we attempt to provide some empirical evidence to assess these two aspects. In order to do so, we address three analytical levels, using a methodological framework broadly inspired by the work

done by Poole (2002) on media representations of Islam and Muslims: we first observe whether reference to gender issues is actually present in media discourse on Muslims. We then use a content analysis of selected cases to examine the extent to which gender issues contribute to the general framework of representations of Muslims. Finally, we focus on the specific content of gender issues and the ways in which they contribute to the construction of Muslims as figures of otherness.

In this respect, our wider purpose is not only to understand how gender issues are mobilised in public debate; it is also to understand how they contribute to the overall debate about multiculturalism in Switzerland and to what extent they can have an impact on policies of integration. Therefore, through the analysis of the social representations of difference embedded in the public debate, we attempt to grasp the meaning of integration that prevails in Switzerland. Although it is certainly not the only way to take stock of integration (for instance, legal or public policy approaches are also extremely important), analysing how minority groups or individuals are depicted and represented in the public discursive space is an important step towards understanding and explaining tensions and conflicts in multicultural societies. Going on the assumption that media discourse represents a platform for public discourse, analysing media discourse about Muslims is therefore methodologically suited to make sense of the social and cultural representations attached to them in the public space.

The fact that Western media often depict Islam through negative stereotypes, contributing to its social and political construction as a 'problem', or treat Muslims as figures of otherness, is well established in academic literature. For example, in her study on more than 300 individuals belonging to what she calls "the new Muslim political elite in Europe" (namely in Denmark, Sweden, Germany, France, Netherlands and the UK), Klausen (2005, 57–64) maintains that media and xenophobic political parties are "the most commonly cited source of problems experienced by Muslims … Negative press treatment of Muslims was ranked as the single biggest problem across countries in the study." 80.2% of the Muslims leaders interviewed qualified the media as a very important problem, 18.6% as a somewhat important problem, and only 1.2% as an unimportant problem (see also Poole 2002, Commission on the Future of Multi-Ethnic Britain 2000, Deltombe 2005, Geisser 2003, Mishra 2007, Richardson 2004, Said 1997, Schranz and Imhof 2002).

Our purpose is not, therefore, to (re)assess the validity of this broad thesis, but mainly to examine what role gender issues play in the debate

involving Islam, and how they contribute to a more general discourse on multiculturalism in Switzerland. On the one hand, the understanding of how and to what extent gender issues function in the overall framework of representation of Muslims is an important step towards appreciating how they relate to the more general issue of the accommodation of Swiss multiculturalism. On the other hand, the way integration and assimilation are perceived in Switzerland plays a role in the relevance that gender issues have in the overall construction of Muslims as figures of otherness.

1. *Multiculturalism, Integration and Gender: A Conceptual Overview*

It is a fact that multiculturalism is a highly controversial category nowadays in contemporary European democracies (Modood, Triandafyllidou and Zapata-Barrero 2006). In the Netherlands and Britain, countries where multicultural models have been implemented most extensively, public authorities and public opinion have become increasingly hostile towards multicultural policies (Sniderman and Hagendoorn 2007). It is often argued that multicultural models of integration have failed, and that the time has come to put strict limits on the recognition of cultural practices at odds with democratic liberal values (Barry 2001). In this broad picture, questions centring on the integration and/or accommodation of Muslim minorities in Western countries have become a central feature of public debate. As Parekh (2008, 99) argues, "it is widely held in many influential circles in the EU that its more than 15 million Muslims pose a serious cultural and political threat, and that this shows, among other things, that multicultural societies do not work." The claim that multicultural societies do not work requires defining and implementing new kinds of policies of integration.

Integration is an essentially contested concept. There are different public philosophies of integration (Favell 1998) leading to different ways of transposing it to actual public policies, or of politically determining which values and behaviours linked to cultural minorities are acceptable, or not, in the public sphere. Broadly speaking, there are two dominant conceptions of integration that structure the available options symbolically and politically regarding the accommodation of cultural minorities in democratic societies. In some countries, integration is seen as a process allowing for culturally different groups and/or individuals to keep an important part of their ethnic-religious particularities; in others,

assimilation is implicitly or explicitly considered as the only possible way to promote integration and social stability (Brubaker 2001). For instance, as Van den Brink (2007, 352) argues, in the Netherlands,

> the dominant tone in public debate was that Muslim immigrants should either largely assimilate (make harmless) their religious-ethnic identity into that of majority culture, or exclude themselves (as different and dangerous) from the political community in the case of refusal to assimilate themselves.

In Switzerland, the trend is basically the same: although the notion of integration has supplanted that of assimilation in the discourse of public authorities, the contemporary political debate is very much structured around the idea of compelling immigrants to adapt to local democratic norms, a pressure that can be considered as intrinsically assimilative (Gianni 2009). The banning of minarets can be seen as the most visible manifestation of this dominant conception of assimilative integration.

In Europe, one of the main arguments in favour of assimilation is the need to preserve basic liberal democratic principles (Modood, Triandafyllidou and Zapata-Barrero 2006). In this light, assimilation is presented as the acceptance of democratic norms by immigrants; to assimilate immigrants—the argument goes—is a way to protect the non-negotiable values and procedures of democracy and liberal justice. The discourses underlying those public debates involve social representations that strongly contribute to the negative symbolic and political characterisation of the Muslim population. More specifically, such discourse contributes to the construction of the generalised Muslim as possessing given and fixed cultural-religious attributes (Van den Brink 2007, 352). Those generalised images entail a naturalised construction of Muslims' social, political and cultural lack of capacity and willingness to integrate themselves in and adapt to democratic countries, and this fosters representations of "Islam [as] being deeply opposed to the ethos of democracy and gender equality" or the idea that "the presence of too many Muslims amongst migrants and new citizens [is] a problem for democracy."

More specifically, in public discourse, Islam is frequently referred to, on the one hand, as being *against* various freedoms (freedom of expression and of choice), against secularism and *laïcité* (for discussion of this peculiarly French notion designating the neutrality of the French State towards religion and religious groups, see Laborde 2006), against rational thought, and against different sexual orientations; on the other hand, Islam is at times presented as *being in favour* of actively contesting democratic norms

and practices, of using violence (or terrorism) as political means, of fostering a collectivist conception of society, and of considering religion and faith as the structural pillar of social, cultural and political order. According to authors who have analysed this tendency (Parekh 2008, 103–6, Modood 2007, 130–1, Modood, Triandafyllidou and Zapata-Barrero 2006, see also Commission Fédérale contre le Racisme 2006, European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia 2006, Gottschalk and Greenberg 2008); such representations nourish Islamophobia and racism towards Muslims and construct them as actors who are not able to integrate in a democratic community.

In this general framework of representations, gender issues are expected to play a significant role. In fact, the representation that Muslims are *against* the principle of equality between men and women is a central aspect of the negative categorisations mentioned above. That some Islamic interpretations or practices are in strong contradiction with gender equality or with the recognition of women as autonomous moral subjects (see Laborde 2006) is undeniable. For instance, in their critique of Huntington's *Clash of Civilizations*, Norris and Inglehart (2002) argue that, contrary to Huntington's assertions, the main opposition between Western and Muslim civilisations is not related to political values, but to social values. According to them, "the Huntington thesis fails to identify the most basic cultural fault line between the West and Islam, which concerns the issues of gender equality and sexual liberalisation. The cultural gulf separating Islam from the West involves Eros far more than Demos" (Norris and Inglehart 2002, 235–6). Nevertheless, although some empirical evidence supports this thesis, especially in Arab societies (Rizzo, Abdel-Latif and Meyer 2007), the systematic reference to practices that go against gender equality overemphasises the potential *inability* of the Muslim population living in Western countries to adapt and endorse democratic values.

The next question is: what exactly are the gender issues that appear in Swiss public discourse and how can we determine the way in which they emerge? At the conceptual and theoretical level, on the basis of existing literature (Oakley 1972, Scott 1988, Nicholson 1994, Parini 2006), we use the concept of gender as referring to the social and cultural construction of meanings attached to (i) the markers of the *feminine*; (ii) the construction of the (sexual) identity of individuals (masculinity and femininity); and (iii) the behavioural, cultural or psychological traits typically associated with one gender in a specific configuration of social and political relations. This three-dimensional understanding of gender has a

heuristic and theoretical purpose. On the one hand, it allows us to structure the categorisation of the corpus under scrutiny; on the other hand, it introduces a more fine-grained understanding of the ways gender topics occur in the discourse. In fact, instead of univocally categorising gender as all kinds of discourses about women, the three-dimensional understanding of gender allows us to differentiate the ways in which gender appears in the discourse, and therefore the relative weight of each dimension in the overall framework of representations.

2. *Identifying Gender in Media Discourse about Muslims*

The research in this chapter is based on an analysis of two French-language Swiss newspapers, *Le Temps* (a liberal newspaper of record) and *Le Matin* (more of a tabloid); two periodicals, *L'Hebdo* and *L'Illustré*; television news programmes and the *Infrarouge* programme, which centres on political and public debates. It is important to emphasise that, although the selected media were in French, they allowed us to collect materials whose content was representative of the overall Swiss public debate on Muslims and Islam. The debate on issues relating to cultural differences follows a very similar logic in the French- and German-speaking areas, as is shown by the fact that our results are very close to those of other Swiss research teams (see Ettinger and Udris 2009).

We considered articles pertaining to Switzerland and excluded articles concerning international questions about Islam. We selected media articles from 2004 to 2006, following the results of an exploratory analysis of *Le Temps* using the *Lexis/Nexis* database, which showed a very important increase in media coverage of Muslims starting in 2004. That year saw the beginning of a trend of increased focus on Islam-related issues in Switzerland (for instance, we found 160 articles in 2004 while there were only 70 in 2001, a year marked by the 9/11 terrorist attacks). This can be explained by the fact that specific issues (such as the headscarf affair, the rift over Muslim cemeteries and other issues discussed below) progressively contributed to creating a 'Muslim problem'. In particular, because of the politicisation of their presence and the visibility of right-wing parties (especially the Swiss People's Party), the Muslim presence increasingly became a central feature of Swiss political debates on the policy of integration and, more broadly, Swiss multiculturalism (see Schneuwly Purdie et al 2009). This led to more restrictive measures in the integration of foreigners and asylum policies.

After an inductive classification of the selected articles according to the main issues they address, we identified a set of articles that can be considered as dealing primarily with gender issues. Figure 1 presents the classification of all potential issues and the percentage of their occurrences in our sample. Broadly speaking, we identified the following categories: the category we have called *culture*, where we included the issues linked to culture in a broad sense, for instance, the caricatures of the Prophet; the *national security* category that mainly concerns several debates on terrorism and espionage; the *religious practices/Islam in Switzerland* category, which refers mainly to the way Islam is lived in Switzerland; the *politics* category, referring to the political debates on Islam and Muslims; the *community leaders* category, covering the controversies relative to prominent figures among the Muslim population in Switzerland; the *interreligious dialogue* category, which covers the relationship between religions, and the *religious leaders* category, referring to controversies about imams. Finally, the *gender* category included diverse aspects, such as several headscarf affairs and the problem of mixed-gender sports activities. As shown by Figure I, among the eight categories covered, gender represents 7% (n = 64) of the total occurrences. At first glance, these initial descriptive results do not seem to confirm our expectations, namely the idea that gender issues should occupy a more prominent place. Is this really the case?

In order to answer this question, and in order to manage the scope of our corpus, we looked at a single affair (selecting the one which generated the largest number of articles) from each of the categories identified in



Figure 1. Main categories of news stories (n = 858).

Figure 1 and analysed all the articles pertaining to it as a case study of a media story in depth. As Poole (2002, 26) argues, stories "illustrate how issues are conceptualised and then problematised, and what solutions each paper prefers, along with how they resolve and close in around an issue." Because of their topic structure, stories are well suited to analyse the framework of representations of Muslims that we are seeking to reconstruct. The selected cases are:

- the cartoons affair, namely the publication of caricatures of the Prophet Mohammed by a Danish newspaper (118 articles);
- the Achraf affair, concerning the arrest in Switzerland of a suspected terrorist who, according to Spanish authorities, was planning a terrorist attack against the main Spanish penal court (33 articles);
- the naturalisation procedure vote affair, namely the political debate triggered by the popular initiative to facilitate access to citizenship for second- and third-generation foreigners. One of the most salient issues of the campaign was the newspaper publication concerning the (supposed) dramatic rise in the number of Muslims living in Switzerland. The right-wing Swiss People's Party, which was behind the publication, called for the rejection of this popular initiative (36 articles);
- the Tariq Ramadan affair, focusing on the accusations of fundamentalism levelled at this well-known Swiss Muslim intellectual (78 articles);
- the minaret affair, concerning the demand of two local Muslim associations to be allowed to build two minarets in Langenthal and Soleure (33 articles);
- the headscarf affair, which centred on the issue of Islamic headscarves in a professional context (17 articles);
- the *Enbiro* affair, regarding the introduction in public schools in French-speaking Switzerland of a new method of teaching religion (*enseignement biblique romand*), sparking controversy about the fact that too much space and importance have been devoted to Islam in the text book (7 articles); and
- the Imam of Sion affair, concerning the charges against the Imam of the city of Sion for his (supposedly) radical and racist sermons at the Islamic Center of Sion (14 articles).

The comparison between these cases will allow us to analyse whether gender issues appear in cases which do not seem to address them directly (i.e. in cases that do not necessarily involve gender issues).

To do so, we undertook a content analysis to understand (1) to what extent gender issues were present as topics in the articles; and (2) their relevance in the overall debate about multiculturalism. We used computer-assisted qualitative data analysis software (*Atlas.ti*) to categorise the collected data systematically in units that give a precise description of the pertinent characteristics of content (Holsti 1969 in Bardin 1983, 102). This allowed us to examine, on the one hand, the relative weight of relevant topics (in this case, gender-related topics) and, on the other hand, their interrelation with other topics (in this case, constituting the overall framework of representation of Muslims).

The topics that emerged from our analysis result from an exhaustive coding of all the articles in the sample (first level categorisation). We then aggregated them in order to obtain a second-level categorisation comprising the following groups of topics:

- gender issues;
- liberal-democratic norms;
- home security;
- relations between Islam and the West;
- religious practices;
- relationships between religions;
- immigration—integration—naturalisation;
- Islamic radicalism/fundamentalism, terrorism, political radicalism in Switzerland;
- manipulation, media, teaching and xenophobia/Islamophobia.

These groups structure and constitute the overall framework of representation of Muslims, and the public debate on multiculturalism and integration in Switzerland with respect to Muslims. What is the scope of gender issues within this framework of representation? Figure 2 shows the proportion of gender issues in relation to the other categories constituting the framework of representation of the different cases.

As mentioned above, among the eight cases, only one was expected to directly address gender issues, while the others were not expected to refer to gender in a central way. Unsurprisingly, the headscarf case presented the highest proportion of gender issues; but our analysis shows that gender issues are present in *all* the cases, including where their presence is not intuitively expected. This result concurs with our theoretical expectations that gender issues play a significant role in basically all debates concerning Muslims.



Figure 2. Distribution of gender issues among cases (n = 175).

What is the relevance of gender issues in the frameworks of representation of the different cases? Our results show that gender topics are not only transversely present in all cases, but also that they often rank among the most important topics (in terms of number of occurrences) in media coverage of the cases. Therefore, gender topics are not only quantitatively present in all cases, but they are also often ranked among the most present group of topics in the overall debate on the specific cases. For example, gender issues appear in the Achraf case (3%), despite it being a case where references to women's situation were intuitively very improbable; this case is mainly framed through groups of topics concerning home security (41%), terrorism (25%), Islamic radicalism/fundamentalism and immigration—integration—naturalisation (approximately 10% each). It is interesting to note that, with respect to this case, references to gender appear at the end of media coverage of the affair, namely when the debate shifts from the specific issues of home security and terrorism to more general questions regarding Islamic fundamentalism.

In the cartoons affair, gender issues (6%) are the third most present group of topics in a framework of representation mainly structured around issues related, on the one hand, to liberal-democratic norms (18%) and, on the other hand, to the relations between Islam and the West (17%). In the case of *Enbiro*, 13% of occurrences consisted of gender issues, while its main group of topics centred on the relationships between

religions (almost 60%); in this case, gender issues are in second position among all the groups of topics constituting the case. The same trend is present in the case regarding the imam of Sion, where gender topics (13%) appear in third position after the groups of topics related to liberal-democratic norms (17%) and Islamic radicalism/fundamentalism (14%), and has the same weight as the immigration—integration—naturalisation issue. The minarets case is concerned with the topic groups relating to religious practices (25%), liberal-democratic norms (11%) and immigration—integration—naturalisation (9%), with gender topics in third position (5%). It is important to recall that these data concern the 2004–2006 period. If the year 2009 was considered, when the campaign about minarets had reached its paroxysm, the share of gender issues would dramatically increase. Indeed, the political party supporting the ban explicitly framed women's equality and freedom as being one of the most compelling principles to protect through the vote against minarets.

The case of Tariq Ramadan is mainly framed by topics related to radicalism and fundamentalism (21%). Gender topics (16%) rank second among all groups of topics present. In the case on the naturalisation procedure, mainly framed through topics concerning political radicalism in Switzerland (28%), liberal-democratic norms (15%), manipulation (12%), immigration—integration—naturalisation (12%) and xenophobia/Islamophobia (9%), gender issues (4%) do not appear in a prominent position. In sum, these results of content analysis show that gender topics are not only present in all cases, but they also contribute greatly to the framework of representation on Muslims in Switzerland because of their generally high ranking among all groups of topics.

How are gender issues mobilised in the public debate? In order to achieve a three-dimensional understanding of gender as described above, our data illustrate that the presence of the three dimensions is quite diverse among all the selected cases. Figure 3 shows their distribution in each case.

Among the three dimensions of gender that are categorised, the markers of the feminine—namely discursive references to practices (such as wearing a headscarf) or behavioural attitudes that mark and define the feminine—are the most present. These markers very often appear in coverage of cases not expected to address gender issues (in particular, through



Figure 3. Distribution of gender issues among cases.

references to the Islamic headscarf, excision, stoning or the (non)-mixing of sexes in swimming pools, etc.). For instance:

> But let us look at the more everyday aspects. Do we learn to live with Muslims and their sensibilities? Does it mean we have to gradually accept those things which go against our political advances? Oblige public swimming pools to provide bathing times for men only, then for women? Allow teachers to wear veils to school, and pupils too? And in hospitals, with their husbands ever present. And offer same-sex classes? And why not provide buses with reserved seats? And, of course, bowing to the sort of pressure we have already seen, ban any play or film that offends the aforementioned sensibilities? (*Le Temps*, 14 February 2006, p. 12)

The identity construction dimension refers to the construction of meanings defining sexual identities and is realised principally through the attribution of meanings to the markers of the feminine. For instance:

> We are basically observing an ever-increasing tendency towards an intensification of religious identity: a growing number of Muslim girls are wearing headscarves and failing to go to swimming classes. And minarets are not a mere building, but a symbol of power. (*Le Temps*, 27 September 2006, p. 8)

Interestingly enough, and contrary to what may be expected, gender topics referring to gender relations, namely the different kinds of social, political, economic or cultural relations structuring the material and/or

symbolic resources women have or do not have in specific power configurations, are much less visible in debates than references to the markers of the feminine. This means that explicit references to questions of sexual (in)equality, feminism or women's emancipation are less present in the debates than references to feminine attributes. For instance:

> "It should be said that certain things cannot be tolerated," explained commission member Michel Béguelin (PS/VD). We cannot accept the creation of exclusively Muslim cemeteries; equality between men and women must be recognised. People who come to live here cannot bring their customs and habits with them: they have to adapt. (*Le Temps*, 18 November 2004, p. 10)

Therefore, the markers selected to illustrate the issues raised about women in Islam often contribute to the construction of Muslims as 'a problem', fostering a negative representation of them. For instance, in the two cases where the markers of the feminine are the most present (namely the cartoons and Tariq Ramadan stories), the main topics are Muslim extremism (for the Ramadan story) and compatibility between Islam and the West (in the case of the cartoons). In these cases, the constant use of markers of the feminine in discourses pertaining to extremism, fundamentalism, terrorism or the incompatibility between Islam and Western values, seems to contribute to a configuration of meaning, which tends to transform the markers into performative elements playing a direct part in the construction of the problem at stake.

In other words, in discourses about Muslim leaders or cartoons, the simple reference to a marker of the feminine can be enough to suggest and to frame (without directly expressing it) the implications that those markers have regarding, for instance, the sexual division of labour in Muslim societies/culture or the oppression of, or discrimination against, women in Islam. In a sense, in such discursive configurations, markers of the feminine can be considered as a proxy for issues regarding the broader theme of gender power relations. Thus, markers of the feminine are important discursive resources in the framework of representation constructing Muslims as figures of otherness.

This is not to say that the other two dimensions of gender issues do not play a role in the overall framework of representation. With regard to topics related to identity (or meaning) construction, gender is mobilised as a negative consequence of the politicisation and public visibility of Islamic religious symbols and practices in Switzerland. In particular, they are relevant to the cases of the headscarves and minarets, in which the veil

is portrayed as a factor fostering hostility and the minarets as a threat and symbol of the domination of Islam.

Our analysis shows that when gender is present as a form of identification, Muslims are generally constructed as having given and fixed cultural-religious attributes. In other words, these discursive representations construct and reproduce the figure of the essentialised, generalised Muslim that is at the core of the framework of representation of Muslims. This essentialisation of identity is constructed around two main attributes, namely that, on the one hand, Muslim women uncritically endorse the oppression inherent in some Islamic practices, and, on the other hand, that Muslim women are pressured and forced by Muslim men's patriarchal view of religion to conform to practices that call into question their autonomy and freedom of choice.

Topics referring to the social power between genders are often analogously used to express the idea that the principle of equality between women and men is a central Western value and a pillar of Western civilisation, and consequently that Muslim individuals or groups calling gender equality into question for religious reasons are depicted as not endorsing Swiss democratic norms and, hence, as not being fully integrated into Swiss society. This topic parallels the criticism of Muslim leaders claiming recognition of practices that are constructed as going against equality between women and men: "But we want them to learn our language and accept basic values such as equality between men and women" (*Le Temps*, 6 February 2006, p.12). The non-negotiable character of the principle of equality is thus constantly (re)affirmed in public debate, and sheds negative light on the framework of representation of the symbolic and actual possibilities for Muslims to integrate into Swiss society:

> In day-to-day life, a minaret should on principle be accepted. The right to a burial place that respects Islam is undeniable. In return, Muslims must obey our rules at school: teachers are not allowed to wear veils, PE and swimming classes must be attended. And equality between the sexes is *non-negotiable*. (*Le Temps*, 06 September 2006, p. 2, emphasis added)

In sum, when gender power relations appear as topics, the reference to the protection of liberal principles and democratic norms predominates. Therefore, the role that gender has in the framework of representation is quite evident: to provide compelling reasons to put strict limits on the acceptance/recognition of Muslim values and practices (for instance, emphasising the inequality of treatment of women in Muslim countries

and comparing it to the protection women have in Western legal systems).

3. *Conclusion*

Inspired by Okin and Young, we started from the assumption that gender issues have a prominent place in the overall discourse representing Muslims, because gender discriminations are considered as deeply anti-liberal and anti-democratic. Gender issues are therefore expected to contribute to the narrative of incompatibility between Islamic and Western liberal democratic values. Our empirical analysis confirms this assumption; it shows that gender issues strongly contribute to the framework of representation that constructs Muslims as the figures of otherness in contemporary Swiss society. Gender issues are not only quantitatively present in all the stories considered in our empirical analysis, even in stories that, at first glance, are not concerned with them; they also play an important qualitative role in the connotations they provide to the general debate about Islam. Present as markers of the feminine, as identity constructions or as social power relations, gender issues systematically function as rhetorical leverage to emphasise the construction of Muslims as a *problem* for Swiss society.

The overall framework of representation of Muslims that emerges from mobilisation of gender in this group of topics constructs Muslims as being an 'excess of alterity' (Grillo 2007) in the Swiss public space. This result is in line with what has been suggested by Delphy's (2006) analysis of the French debate on headscarves. In her view, the French republican willingness to protect (Muslim) women against the wearing of the *hijab* in public schools has constructed Muslim women as being the target of a specific Muslim violence. Such a framework of representation, based on Orientalist and racist premises, leads to the construction of Muslims as figures of otherness (see also Fernandez 2009).

With regard to Switzerland, this symbolic construction impacts strongly on the debate on integration of Muslims. Indeed, Swiss public authorities foster an increasingly defensive and restrictive conception of integration, seen principally as an adaptation to and endorsement of liberal democratic norms. This public philosophy of integration is based on assimilationist assumptions, and is therefore reluctant to recognise the specificities of the Muslim population. Our results show that, to promote better forms

of integration, institutional and policy reform is a necessary but insufficient condition; action on the content of the framework of representations attached to Muslims and discourses challenging the essentialist presuppositions on which their otherness is constructed are also crucial in order to promote new, more encompassing forms of common belonging.

CHAPTER EIGHT

THE FRENCH ANTI-RACIST MOVEMENT AND THE 'MUSLIM QUESTION'

Timothy Peace

It has been suggested that there may be less sympathy for the notion that Muslim minorities are subjected to racism by virtue of their real or perceived 'Muslimness' than there is for Jewish minorities in Europe. Public anxiety over the 'Muslim question' leads to hesitancy in naming this phenomenon as 'anti-Muslim sentiment' or 'Islamophobia' (Meer and Modood 2009). This situation is clearly in evidence in contemporary France where the 'Muslim question' has split the anti-racist movement. The split is symptomatic of a more general division within the French Left in relation to Islam and Muslims. It has coincided with a series of controversies and debates that began emerging in the year 2000, foremost among them those relating to the adoption of the law on secularity and conspicuous religious symbols in schools (also known as the 'Headscarf Law') in 2004. This was then followed by the ban on face covering in 2010 which aimed to stop Muslim women from wearing either the *niqab* or *burqa* in public.

The reaction of French anti-racist organisations to these issues may appear confusing to those who have not followed recent public debates on Islam in France. The fact that many of these organisations even supported the implementation of such laws may appear equally, if not more, baffling. In fact, two camps emerged over these issues, encompassing the four main anti-racist organisations active on the national level. Furthermore, there are also internal divisions within these organisations. Problems such as these are not unique to France, but it is arguable that the situation there is particularly complex as a result of the strict historical and cultural attachment to *Republican* and *secular* values in the country.

In this chapter, I begin by presenting the anti-racist movement in France, introducing its main organisations. I then move to explain how issues relating to antisemitism sowed the seeds of discontent between these organisations, and how this informed the split we can now observe in the movement. I will focus particularly on the crucial period between 2003 and 2004, when the law banning religious symbols in French state

schools was being debated, and on how this led to a wider debate amongst anti-racist organisations on the relative merits (and demerits) of the term 'Islamophobia'. I close with a look at how other events relating to Islam in France have reinforced these divisions in the anti-racist movement, and conclude with some reflections on its future.

1. *The French Anti-Racist Movement*

The French anti-racist movement, or what might more accurately be called Republican anti-racism (House 2002), has a long and distinguished history, stretching back to the Dreyfus affair in the late 19th century (see Gibb 2005 and Lloyd 1998 on anti-racism in France). This affair led to the formation of the country's first anti-racist organisation, the *Ligue des droits de l'homme* (LDH—Human Rights League), in 1898 (Agrikoliansky 2002, Irvine 2007). Antisemitism was also the catalyst for the creation of the *Ligue internationale contre le racisme et l'antisémitisme* (LICRA—International League against Racism and Antisemitism) in 1927, in response to the rise of fascism (Allali 2002, Allali and Musicant 1987) and the *Mouvement contre le racisme et pour l'amitié entre les peuples* (MRAP—Movement Against Racism and for Friendship Between Peoples) was set up in 1949 by mostly Jewish members of the French Resistance (Lévy 1999, Lloyd 1998). The fourth key organisation is *SOS-Racisme*, formed in 1984 by a group of Paris-based students and activists (Malik 1990).

SOS-Racisme was founded in response to the racism suffered by post-colonial migrants and their children and, in particular, in reaction to the rise of the extreme right-wing *Front national* (FN—National Front). Most anti-racist organisations in France can be considered as belonging to the left of the political spectrum, with *SOS-Racisme* particularly close to the *Parti socialiste* (PS—Socialist Party). However, LICRA positions itself as a cross-party group, and its president between January 1999 and January 2010 was a centre-right politician, Patrick Gaubert. There is also much internal diversity within each of these organisations. For example, activists within the *Ligue communiste révolutionnaire* (LCR—Revolutionary Communist League) once formed a significant bloc within *SOS-Racisme* (Gibb 2001) and its founders all began their political careers on the far left (Juhem 2001).

The organisations that make up the French anti-racist movement have not always seen eye to eye, and share a history of conflict. For instance,

LICRA and MRAP have always been rivals as a result of the former seeing itself as being anti-communist, while the latter traditionally enjoyed close links with the *Parti communiste français* (PCF—French Communist Party). The first major disagreement between them came as a result of the Six Day War in 1967, when LICRA criticised MRAP for being too pro-Arab, which led a number of MRAP activists to leave the organisation (Gastaut 2005). At that time, both organisations had a mostly Jewish leadership, which remains the case today for LICRA, whereas MRAP has become more diverse. In the 1980s, divisions between North African and Jewish activists in the anti-racist movement came to a head following the Israeli invasion of Lebanon and the growing identification of second-generation North Africans in France with the Palestinian cause (Silverstein 2008). The prominence of the pro-Israel *Union des étudiants juifs de France* (UEJF—French Jewish Student Union) within *SOS-Racisme* was a constant source of tension within the organisation. During the Gulf War of 1991, tensions came to the fore between Jewish and Arab members of the organisation, and many left due to the pacifist stance it took during the conflict.

Since its emergence in 1984, *SOS-Racisme* has been the most controversial anti-racist organisation. It has often been looked upon suspiciously because of its links with the PS, and because of the way in which it had stifled the movement by second-generation North Africans in the 1980s (Malik 1990, Fysh 1998). Other organisations have also resented the generous funding and media attention this organisation has received, despite not having a rich history and lacking genuine support at the grass-roots level. However, it is within the last decade that the most durable split between the various organisations involved in the anti-racist movement has occurred. This cleavage pits *SOS-Racisme* and LICRA against LDH and MRAP, while it is also reflected in tensions within each of these organisations.

2. *Antisemitism in France and the Emergence of the Split*

In the autumn of 2000, France witnessed an explosion of antisemitic violence, unprecedented since the Second World War. This wave of anti-Jewish acts persisted, and peaked again in 2002 and 2004, making it the major form of racism in France—at least in terms of recorded violence, since it is widely acknowledged that many acts of racism against other minorities go unreported. These acts of violence precipitated a debate on

the emergence of a new form of antisemitism, which coincided with a wider discussion about the perceived problems France faced in relation to its Muslim population (Peace 2009). Indeed, it is often forgotten that the decision to appoint the Stasi Commission was not simply a response to Muslim girls wearing headscarves in schools, but also a reaction to wider concerns about the *banlieues* (the suburbs where disaffected families of migrants often live), such as violence against women and antisemitism (Bowen 2007).

The problem for anti-racist organisations was that these acts of antisemitism. were no longer solely the preserve of the extreme right, but were now also caused by people of North African extraction. This created a problematic situation for many anti-racists. If one stigmatised group was responsible for attacks on another, how should anti-racists react? In contrast to past episodes of antisemitism in France, which seemed to galvanise the anti-racist movement, this wave of attacks represented a genuine dilemma. Thus while the bombing of a Paris synagogue in 1980 and the desecration of a Jewish cemetery in Carpentras in 1990 were followed by marches against antisemitism and fascism involving parties from across the political spectrum and all anti-racist associations, a massive debate ensued in the 2000s as to whether antisemitism should be condemned in its own right, or be opposed as part of a wider fight against racism, including Islamophobia, a concept that would itself become highly contested.

Those reluctant only to condemn antisemitism were motivated by four main concerns. The first was the fear of painting victims of racism (those of North African origin) as racists, thereby contributing to the negative image these citizens were already suffering from. The main issue here was that this might lend credence to the notion that people of North African origin were alone responsible for the upsurge in antisemitism, when the evidence to that effect was far from conclusive. Another concern was that the far-right would seek to exploit the situation by trying to fuse their racist discourse on the presumed criminality of immigrants with these acts of antisemitism. Added to this, there was a concern that solely denouncing antisemitism would draw attention away from the fight against anti-Arab and anti-Muslim prejudice. Finally, many anti-racists were reluctant to join demonstrations against antisemitism because of the link with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict; they were concerned that demonstrating against antisemitism might be construed as supporting the actions of Israel. Indeed, notable surges in antisemitism coincided with the Israeli Defence Force's incursion into the West Bank in April 2002, or with its confrontation with Hamas in Gaza in January 2009.

This reluctance to condemn antisemitism outright led to a paralysis of the anti-racist movement, which could not seem to agree on an appropriate way of protesting against the surge of anti-Jewish violence. The absence of such a protest, traditionally coordinated by anti-racist organisations, infuriated Jewish groups, many of which had been claiming that antisemitism in France was being ignored. As a result, in April 2002, the *Conseil représentatif des institutions juives de France* (CRIF—Representative Council of French Jewish Institutions) and other Jewish organisations decided to organise their own protest march, with a strong pro-Israel flavour. Many prominent anti-racists, including Jewish intellectuals such as Rony Brauman, Gisèle Halimi or Pierre Vidal-Naquet felt unable to align themselves with such a demonstration, and refused to be involved with anything that could be construed as being akin to supporting the policies of Ariel Sharon (*Le Monde*, 6 April 2002).

SOS-Racisme, despite not being an organisation specifically committed to the fight against antisemitism such as LICRA, had been at the forefront when condemning this new wave of antisemitic attacks. However, it began to distance itself from other anti-racist organisations, which it believed had not taken a clear stance on the issue. *SOS-Racisme* collaborated with UEJF in publishing a book cataloguing a list of antisemitic incidents that occurred in France (UEJF and *SOS-Racisme* 2002). The whole issue came to a head when a demonstration against antisemitism was organised by *SOS-Racisme* in May 2004, in the wake of the desecration of a Jewish cemetery, an initiative supported by LICRA and UEJF. LDH, MRAP, PCF, LCR and the Green Party all insisted that the march should condemn all forms of racism, and when the demonstration went ahead, the representatives of these organisations marched at the back of the cortege, forming a separate demonstration (*Le Monde*, 14 May 2004). Months later, MRAP and LDH organised a protest march against racism, antisemitism and discrimination on 7 November 2004. This time, *SOS-Racisme* and LICRA refused to join due to the involvement of the *Union des organisations islamiques de France* (UOIF—Union of Islamic Organisations of France, the French chapter of the Federation of Islamic Organisations in Europe and one of the groups that make up the French Council of the Muslim Faith, the CFCM). Dominique Sopo, president of *SOS-Racisme*, declared that his organisation could not march alongside those that oppose gender equality and are "not clear on matters regarding secularism, homophobia and antisemitism" (*Libération*, 6 November 2004).

Indeed, Sopo was so incensed that he wrote a book condemning the current state of the anti-racist movement in France, titled: *SOS*

antiracisme (Sopo 2005). This short piece provides a fascinating insight into the logic of his position in the debate. Sopo analyses the split within the movement as a battle between those who remain faithful to traditional (i.e. Republican) anti-racist principles and those who have decided to abandon them (a similar assessment is provided in the autobiography of Patrick Gaubert 2009). Sopo considered many anti-racists to be suffering from post-colonial guilt and a new white man's burden, and deplored what he saw as the encouragement of a victim mentality among ethnic minorities. He defined this as the "communitarian approach to anti-racism" (Sopo 2005, 26) as opposed to the universalist/Republican (and therefore truly French) approach of *SOS-Racisme*. Note that in French political discourse, *communautarisme* means encouraging separateness or identifying with one's own community at the expense of national unity. Therefore to be classed as *communautariste* is a serious accusation, as it is anathema to traditional French Republican ideology.

Sopo saved most of his critique for the phenomenon of 'Islamism', which he portrays as malevolently waiting in the wings to exploit the discrimination faced by young people. In France, outside of academic circles, this term is not applied solely to those who combine Islam and politics, but rather to any practice of Islam perceived to be in conflict with French secularism (*laïcité*). Anyone considered as not being moderate enough is frequently derided as either an Islamist or a fundamentalist (*intégriste*). In the popular imaginary, the classic example of an Islamist is Tariq Ramadan. The decision to invite the Swiss intellectual to the European Social Forums in Paris (2003) and London (2004) was deplored by Sopo as a stab in the back for those fighting for democracy in the Muslim world. So-called Islamists, such as Ramadan, are described as the enemies of equality between men and women, while Sopo (2005, 74) also chastised those on the Left who refused to condemn the antisemitism found in the poorer suburban neighbourhoods and/or by those of immigrant origin:

> There is no room for negotiation when it comes to condemning antisemitism … When one professes to defend young people of immigrant origin, one does not go about it by allowing a small proportion of them to lapse into acts of hatred, of which they are moreover usually the first victims. That would allow them to think that beating up a Jew, held up as a symbol of the oppressive system, would be some kind of short cut to social emancipation and individual fulfilment … Saying that condemning new forms of antisemitism would mean stigmatising Arabs/Muslims is like saying that opposing Le Pen would stigmatise white people.

Blaming the Left for its inability to condemn antisemitism and for encouraging antisemitism became a familiar theme around that time (Finkielkraut 2003, Lacroix 2005, Taguieff 2002, 2004). Indeed, the leader of CRIF indirectly accused the Green Party and LCR of antisemitism, when he spoke of a 'red-green-brown alliance' at an annual dinner in January 2003. Politicians attempted to outdo each other in their condemnation of antisemitism, and even used the issue to score political points against adversaries. Pierre Lellouche of the ruling UMP party—instigator of a law mandating more severe penalties for violent crimes committed by virtue of the victim's membership of a particular ethnic group, nation, race, or religion—suggested there was a problem of left-wing antisemitism.

This discourse of the 'antisemitic Left' prompted the scholar Vincent Geisser (2003, 91) to note ironically that, "the French Left, by its silence and complacency regarding 'young Muslim delinquents' is supposedly largely responsible for antisemitism in the 21st century." Another collection of essays that refuted this assertion was edited by the Marxist philosopher Etienne Balibar (2003). However, criticism meted out to the Left continued, and it was not only the preserve of the Right. For example, *Le Monde* journalist Nicolas Weill (2004) criticised the tendency to make excuses for antisemitism in the *banlieues*. A report commissioned by the Prime Minister's Office also suggested that anti-Zionism could lead to antisemitism by proxy (Rufin 2004). Discussions about antisemitism also came to the fore during the public debate that preceded the introduction of the Headscarf Law in 2004. It was this controversy that left the biggest scar on the anti-racist movement.

3. *The 'Headscarf Law' and the Battle over 'Islamophobia'*

When it became clear that the government was considering a law banning conspicuous religious symbols in state schools, anti-racist organisations were for the most part united in their opposition. The presidents of all four anti-racist organisations were interviewed by the Stasi Commission, which was tasked with compiling the report that led to the eventual introduction of the law (Stasi 2003). MRAP was a key player in the debate because Laurent Lévy, the father of the two sisters who instigated the headscarf affair of October 2003 in Aubervilliers, was a lawyer for the organisation (Lévy 2010). MRAP was thus clearly opposed to any proposed legislation, and its president Mouloud Aounit cleverly attempted

to persuade the Stasi Commission that a ban on headscarves would lead to an increase in private Muslim faith schools. Echoing comments by Aounit, Patrick Gaubert (LICRA) argued that such a law would stigmatise Muslims in France, and Michel Tubiana (LDH) described the issue of the headscarf as a smokescreen to avoid discussing other problems in society.

Sopo gave a rather equivocal testimony by stating that he saw such a law as an advantageous means to protect Muslim girls who did not wish to wear headscarves. Yet, he also voiced his doubts about a move that would effectively single out black and Arab citizens, and therefore proposed a circular as a compromise measure. At this point, *SOS-Racisme* was still regarded by most observers as an opponent of a law against headscarves, along with most religious groups and trade unions. When the very first French headscarf affair erupted in 1989, *SOS-Racisme* denounced the virulent campaign that was being waged in the French media, and the then president of the organisation Harlem Désir declared that to be against the veil was to be racist. Yet, by the time this issue had flared up again in 1994, the organisation had made a complete *volte face* and was calling for the kind of legislation that would eventually be implemented 10 years later (*Le Monde*, 27 October 1994).

In 2003/2004 the organisation was divided on the subject. Francis Terquem, co-founder and long time lawyer of the organisation, voiced his opposition to Sopo's sympathies regarding the law, and eventually defected to MRAP in January 2004. By this time, *SOS-Racisme* had declared its official support for the law, following the consensus that had slowly developed in France during the auditions for the Stasi Commission and in the national media. This consensus saw the headscarf as a threat to France's secular order, an expression of *communautarisme*, an obstacle to achieving gender equality and a means for Islamists to dictate their rules in the *banlieues* (Deltombe 2005).

By early 2004, the divisions between the various anti-racist organisations had become relatively clear on this issue. Nonetheless, organising a demonstration against the law proved problematic, as even LDH and MRAP were aware of the fact that not all of their members supported the official position. This created an opportunity for the highly marginal (but also vocal) *Parti des musulmans de France* (PMF—Party of the Muslims of France) to organise a demonstration, which both MRAP and LDH were keen to distance themselves from. Indeed, these organisations were very careful not to be seen as promoting the wearing of headscarves and thereby endorsing a pro-religion agenda.

Therefore, when they took part in a demonstration organised by the campaign group *Une école pour tous-tes* (School for Everyone), they made sure that the protest was not structured around the issue of religious freedom (as was the case in other countries), but around the prospect of girls being denied an education by being excluded from school (Lévy 2010). *SOS-Racisme* responded with their own (failed) group called *Laïcs, retrouvons-nous* (Secularists, unite!) and called for a demonstration in favour of the law on 6 March 2004. Malek Boutih, president of *SOS-Racisme* between 1999 and 2003, declared that the Headscarf Law was the first important defeat of the Islamists in France, and criticised MRAP and LDH for sympathising with 'fundamentalists' (*Le Figaro*, 5 February 2004). In circumstances such as these, the inability of anti-racist organisations to march together against antisemitism a few months later appears entirely explicable. Relations between *SOS-Racisme* and MRAP continued to deteriorate, and MRAP even refused to march in a demonstration organised by *SOS-Racisme* to protest against the murder of a young Jewish man, Ilan Halimi, in 2006. The official reason given for their absence was the participation of Philippe de Villiers, a right-wing politician notorious for his critical comments about Islam in France. However, *SOS-Racisme* and LICRA had already made statements opposing the participation of Jean-Marie Le Pen and de Villiers.

Many of those who opposed the Headscarf Law did so because they considered it to be an example of Islamophobia. In France, this term had not been widely used, and racism directed at Muslims was usually subsumed under the category of anti-Arab racism. However, since 2003, Mouloud Aounit (MRAP), had been campaigning for the recognition of a specifically anti-Muslim variety of racism, which he argued had become increasingly apparent since 9/11. In September 2003, he even organised a conference on Islamophobia at the French National Assembly, which coincided with the launch of a book by Vincent Geisser (2003) entitled *La Nouvelle Islamophobie* (The New Islamophobia), thereby paraphrasing the title of Pierre-André Taguieff's (2002) book *La Nouvelle Judéophobie*. However, not everyone was convinced about the appropriateness of using the term 'Islamophobia'. Some people argued that using it might lead to confusion between racism directed against Muslims and the critique of Islam as a religion. According to them, using the term could constitute a threat to freedom of expression. Others opposed the term because they saw it as essentialising people in terms of a 'Muslim' ethnic identity, when some people of Muslim heritage do not even practice the Islamic

faith. The following examples help illustrate the controversial nature of the term.

On 24 October 2003, the editor of *Le Point* magazine and member of the *Haut conseil à l'intégration* (HCI—High Council for Integration), Claude Imbert, declared in an interview that he was quite Islamophobic. The philosopher Pascal Bruckner (*Le Figaro*, 5 November 2003) also entered the debate, deriding the term 'Islamophobia' as being dangerous, and criticising Geisser's book, describing it as intellectual propaganda. Journalist Caroline Fourest also warned of what she perceived to be the dangerous nature of the term, claiming that it was invented by Mullahs in Iran to denounce women who did not wear headscarves after the revolution (*Libération*, 17 November 2003). Finally, a leaked report prepared by the French watchdog on racism and human rights, the *Commission nationale consultative des droits de l'homme* (CNCDH—National Consultative Commission on Human Rights), was also critical of the term.

Within France, and particularly within the anti-racist movement, the debate about this term grew in intensity. Richard Serero, vice-president of LICRA, described Islamophobia as "a concept invented after 11th September by those who cannot accept criticism of Islam. We have the right to challenge Christianity and Judaism but we can't challenge Islam without being accused of racism" (*Le Temps*, 19 March 2004). The internal debate within MRAP was particularly fierce, and many members were unhappy about their leader using the term. In May 2004, MRAP's national council decided to ban the use of the term 'Islamophobia' until its national congress in December, when the issue could be properly debated. In fact, the issue dominated the event, with some arguing for the necessity of fighting Islamophobia and others proposing a motion to ban using the term permanently. A compromise was reached, and a motion was passed stating that MRAP would continue to oppose Islamophobia within the framework of the legal definition of incitement to racial hatred. In February 2005, a conflict emerged between MRAP, LICRA and the teacher's union *UNSA-Éducation*. The latter two opposed the use of the word 'Islamophobia' in a document prepared for the national educational week against racism. UNSA general-secretary Patrick Gonthier (Agence France Presse, 5 February 2005), justified his position in these words:

> Islamophobia can only mean a fear of Islam; it therefore cannot not be associated with racism. This poses a number of questions: should blasphemy of Islam be regarded as a crime and should we leave Salman Rushdie and Taslima Nasreen to the mercy of fatwas?

Dominique Sopo (2005: 78) of *SOS-Racisme* agreed, and believed that the introduction of this term was part of a sinister plan by 'Islamists':

> As a means of avoiding criticism of their reactionary aims and their strategy of gaining influence, the extremists go about denouncing 'Islamophobia' of which even the slightest criticism of them would be a sign, thus profoundly distorting the philosophy and language of anti-racism.

French anti-racists also campaigned against the institutionalisation by the UN of 'Islamophobia' as a distinct type of racism. In 2007, two years before the Durban Review Conference, LICRA published a report about the malicious intentions of the UN Human Rights Council and their position on Islamophobia (LICRA 2007). One year before the conference, it launched a petition, which called for the boycott of Durban II. In this petition, signed by many of France's most celebrated intellectuals, it claimed that the UN was trying to kill off human rights, 60 years after the anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (*Le Monde*, 28 February 2008).

4. *Divisive Episodes, Internal Tensions and Amicable Relations*

The controversy surrounding the caricatures of Muhammed printed in the Danish newspaper *Jyllands-Posten* in September 2005 continued to open up the wounds of division amongst French anti-racists. The newspaper *France Soir* republished all 12 caricatures, and was taken to court by MRAP for incitement to racial hatred, which led to much criticism and ridicule by the French press. The satirical newspaper *Charlie Hebdo*, which itself became involved in a similar court case, even referred to the organisation as the *Mouvement contre le racisme et pour l'amitié du Prophète* (Movement against Racism and for Friendship of the Prophet). The outrage provoked by MRAP's decision illustrated just how sensitive the subject had become. In 2001, MRAP and LDH brought a case against the writer Michel Houellebecq for comments he made on Islam, while in 2002 MRAP, LICRA and LDH took the publisher of Oriana Fallaci's *The Rage and the Pride* to court for the same reason. In both cases, there was no public uproar, as these organisations were simply applying the 1972 and 1990 anti-racist laws designed to outlaw the incitement of hatred against a religious group (Bleich 2003). By 2006, of course, the climate had altered remarkably. *SOS-Racisme* supported the publication of the caricatures and went on the offensive by organising a debate (later cancelled) at a Parisian

university to defend freedom of expression. Dominique Sopo expressed his support for *Charlie Hebdo*, and its editor-in-chief, Phillipe Val.

Caroline Fourest, along with former minister Corinne Lepage and Pierre Cassen—founder of the secularist website *Riposte Laïque*, initiated a petition entitled *Contre un nouvel obscurantisme* (Againt a new obscurantism), which aimed to fight against all expressions of racism, sexism, homophobia and fundamentalism. This petition was signed by a number of anti-racists, including Sopo, Françoise Seligmann (honorary president of LDH) and several high ranking members of MRAP, including Alain Callès (ex-president), Emmanuelle Le Chevallier (administrative council) and Nadia Kurys (national executive). Nevertheless, Jean-Pierre Dubois, Henri Leclerc and Michel Tubiana of LDH criticised the petition, stating that dialogue with certain elements of political Islam was actually needed (*Libération*, 16 May 2006). Yet again though, it appeared that a significant number of figures within the organisation's central committee disagreed, and Philippe Lamy, Cédric Porin and Antoine Spire hit back a few days later by publishing an article citing their approval of the petition (*Libération*, 30 May 2006).

This kind of public argument between prominent figures within the same organisation had, as yet, been unheard of. The same battle lines were drawn when philosopher Robert Redeker published an opinion piece critical of Islam in *Le Figaro*, and was subsequently forced to go into hiding due to death threats he received. Mouloud Aounit condemned these threats, while also criticising the offensive language Redeker had used in his article, reminding him of the limits of freedom of expression. LDH took a similar line and, in response, *SOS-Racisme*, along with CRIF and *Charlie Hebdo*, organised an evening in support of Redeker and freedom of expression. LDH's response led Cédric Porin and Antoine Spire to leave the organisation, publishing their resignation letter in *Le Monde* on 24 November 2006:

> The straw that broke the camel's back was the Redeker affair. Instead of defending the freedom of expression of a philosopher at all costs, someone who has received death threats for criticising Islam, LDH firstly made known its rejection of his "disgusting ideas" before eventually conceding that "whatever we think of Mr Redeker's writing, nothing justifies what he has had to go through." However, the ambiguity and timidity of this support does not fit well with the necessary intransigence the fight for freedom of expression demands of us.

However, certain campaigns still managed to unite anti-racist organisations. In early 2007, a debate emerged about the introduction of ethnic

statistics in order to fight discrimination (see the articles collected in Sabbagh and Peer 2008). The need for these statistics was promoted by the recently formed *Conseil représentatif des associations noires de France* (CRAN—Representative council of Black associations of France), and the issue also became important during the presidential election. In February 2007, the leaders of MRAP, LICRA and *SOS-Racisme* all signed a petition against the introduction of such statistics, in the name of their shared ideal of colour-blind anti-racism, or 'anti-racism without races' (Bleich 2004).

Relations between these organisations also improved in the wake of the '*affaire des Vosges*', when a woman asked two Muslim women to take off their headscarves while staying at her holiday home. This case was brought to court and won by MRAP, LDH and LICRA in October 2007. The offender received a suspended sentence of four months in prison, a €1,000 fine and was forced to pay €7,400 in damages. In March 2008, these organisations were again united in their condemnation of a number of events, including an antisemitic assault that took place in Bagneux; the Chinese repression of the Tibetan liberation movement; and the release of controversial Dutch MP Geert Wilder's anti-Islam film *Fitna*. They also undertook a joint action against the comedian Dieudonné after he made antisemitic comments at one of his shows in December 2008, and they were unanimous in their condemnation of his anti-Zionist electoral list for the European elections of 2009. Still, this unity was occasionally broken, such as when MRAP deplored the lack of action organised in the wake of the desecration of Muslim graves in a war cemetery in northern France in April 2008. Another such case arose in July 2008, after Siné, a political cartoonist, wrote an article mocking Jean Sarkozy (son of the French president) in the satirical newspaper, *Charlie Hebdo*. When the article was deemed antisemitic, the paper's editor, Philippe Val, fired Siné. LICRA took Siné to court for inciting racial hatred and *SOS-Racisme* supported these actions, but LDH and MRAP refused to comment.

Although relations between France's anti-racist organisations had improved remarkably since the period between 2002 and 2006, internal divisions remained. Problems within MRAP date back to November 2004, and relate to the decision to demonstrate alongside the UOIF. This prompted anti-colonial writer Albert Memmi to leave the organisation, and at the national conference the following month, the organisation's annual report of activities was approved with only the narrowest of margins. From this moment on, Mouloud Aounit increasingly came under attack and dissidents within the organisation created blogs voicing their

concern about his leadership. The decision to bring the case against *France Soir* to court was unpopular and singer Jean Ferrat became the second major figure to leave the organisation in protest. Senior leaders in MRAP subsequently formed an internal opposition group named 'MRAP Pluraliste'. In May 2007, they officially asked Aounit to step down from the leadership, claiming he no longer respected the universalist and secular values of the movement (Agence France Presse, 24 May 2007). In the same year, a long-time member published a history of the organisation, severely criticising the direction it had taken in the last few years (Winnykamen 2007). In January 2008, many local sections boycotted the annual conference, where only 131 out of 286 delegates were present, and where Aounit was himself re-elected by the narrowest of margins. Later that year MRAP decided to introduce a *Collège de la présidence* meaning the organisation was led by four co-presidents. This was widely interpreted as a move to save the organisation.

When asked about these divisions within his organisation and in particular the battle around 'Islamophobia', Aounit, during a personal interview I held with him in Paris in December 2008, responded:

> I think history will show that we were right and that one day this struggle, which is today tarnished and stigmatised, will be recognised as legitimate. It's a fact we can't ignore. The other day, I went to a demonstration against the desecration of a cemetery and the leader of the Jewish community spoke of Islamophobia. I was happy that when the President [Sarkozy] went to Algeria a few months ago he said it was necessary to fight against antisemitism *and* Islamophobia! I'm also happy that the European institutions are calling for and recommending that Islamophobia be tackled. My aim is to try to get this recognised as a form of racism [in France].

5. *Conclusion*

In this chapter, I have attempted to chart the divisions that have appeared within the anti-racist movement in France, which were largely due to debates and concerns around the issue of Islam. These divisions are not only inter-organisational but also intra-organisational. However, these issues are of course not uniquely French. If we take the example of Islamophobia, we see that this term has also been hotly debated amongst anti-racists in other countries. The equivalent of MRAP in Belgium, the *Mouvement contre le racisme, l'antisémitisme et la xénophobie* (MRAX) has been divided on the issue, and its president Radouane Bouhlal received similar criticisms to those faced by Mouloud Aounit in France. Similarly,

Kenan Malik (2009), who was very involved in anti-racist struggles in Britain in the 1970s and 1980s, criticised the term 'Islamophobia', expressing concern that it might be used not only to describe anti-Muslim prejudice, but also as a prescription for what may or may not be said about Islam.

The divisive nature of Islam for the Left in France is no doubt related to the importance of the concept of *laïcité*, and to the fact that the Left sees itself as the standard bearer of this principle. Every time *laïcité* had been perceived to be under threat, the French Left mobilised to save it. French debates about Islam, such as the numerous headscarf affairs, take on monumental proportions, because they are always framed as a battle over the survival of French secularism. This, in turn, is perceived by many anti-racists to go hand in hand with the ideal of the Republican model of integration. As Sopo (2008: 19) explains:

> *Laïcité* is both intimately and even ontologically related to anti-racism. To allow *laïcité* to decline or be 'redefined' would mean weakening the possibility for different groups—who are today discriminated against—to free themselves from a state of inferiority and reinforce this modern day tendency of seeing people close themselves off in their own identities.

The goal for many anti-racists was therefore not simply to fight against discrimination and prejudice, but also to encourage integration and discourage the formation of community identities. As Peter Fysh (1998, 209) noted in his analysis of the shortcomings of the anti-racist movement in France, "there has been no explicit break with the lay Republican tradition which claims that France has successfully integrated generations of immigrants by denying community attachments."

Anti-racism in France has thus traversed a major crisis in the first decade of the 21st century, a crisis that is far from unresolved. It is undoubtedly more serious than the soul searching that accompanied the perceived failure of anti-racism in the early 1990s. At that time, the problem was presented as racism having evolved from biological to more cultural forms, and the danger of the extreme right using arguments about difference to support its own ends (Taguieff 1991). The proposed solution was therefore to reaffirm the Republican model of integration and end talk of multiculturalism (Guiraduon 1996).

There appear to be no easy solutions to today's dilemmas and the 'Muslim question' has thrown the movement into practical disarray. How does one deal with an antisemitism that is no longer the preserve of the extreme right? How do we fight against increasing attacks on Muslims,

if we cannot agree upon a name to describe such events? The perceived lack of response from the traditional anti-racist organisations has led to the creation of grass roots initiatives, such as the *Coordination contre le racisme et l'islamophobie* (CRI—Coordination against Racism and Islamophobia) based in Lyons. Other forms of anti-racist expression have also emerged, such as the *Indigènes de la République* whose members challenge the traditional organisations with a much more radical discourse about racism and its links to the colonial period.

French reticence to use the terminology of 'Islamophobia' may eventually prove futile, due to recent developments taking place in Anglo-Saxon scholarship, which seek to consolidate a definition of this term (Fekete 2009, Allen 2010, Sayyid and Vakil 2010), and the fact that the UN, OSCE, the EU and even French government ministers all seem to have adopted it. The need for French anti-racists to find a broader unity seems more pressing than ever. The actions taken by the now defunct Ministry of Immigration, Integration and National Identity were an obvious example. However, this has not been helped by the more recent furore over the *burqa* which again sowed the seeds of division. A further question also looms large: if ethnic statistics are to be avoided, in what way can French society provide equal opportunities for all of its citizens? These are the challenges that lie ahead, not only for French anti-racist organisations, but also for all those who are of a progressive bent in the country.

CHAPTER NINE

FOREIGN POLICY AND ITS IMPACT ON ARAB STEREOTYPES IN ENGLISH-LANGUAGE POPULAR FICTION OF THE 1970S–80S

Ahmed K. al-Rawi

Serious literature is generally judged by its aesthetic merits, whereas popular fiction is mainly written for entertainment, and tends to follow simple—if not naïve—plot lines filled with episodic events that tend to simplify the moral and emotional issues treated. The sheer number of spy novels, historical, detective, and crime thrillers etc., indicates the success of such forms; they exceed one quarter of all fictional works published in the Western market (Simon 1989). These books abound in vernacular expressions, overtly erotic scenes, and gratuitous violence, all of which appeal to the tastes of their mass readerships, as does the fact that they are cheaply priced (Long 1985, Neuburg 1977). Mass-market fiction is a vehicle of popular culture because it expresses its hopes, fantasies, and anxieties. William J. Palmer claims that the genre of spy fiction is always connected with "the cultural issues of each particular novel's time and space" (2006, 497). Thus, one can study this genre and others like it, in order to understand the culture that has produced them.

Popular novels tend, however, to express stereotypical notions of certain ethnic groups, cultures and religions because they magnify small details and present them to the reader as undisputed realities. The authors of these novels often fantasise a fictional world in which the 'heroes', who embody the noble Western concepts of justice and chivalry, collide with the ignoble deeds of a villain, in many instances an Arab Muslim, who has to be punished at the end to achieve poetic justice. Unfortunately, many novels that dehumanise and distort Arab Muslim characters receive large Western audiences. The publication of works of popular fiction with Middle Eastern themes or characters increased in the year 1985 alone to reach more than 600 in the United States and Britain (Simon 1989). This points to the scale of the issue and the likely impact of the negative stereotypes that the novels contain.

Motives vary according to the writer's background. There are two kinds of writers; the first is the one who, for commercial reasons, follows popular

demand shaped by old prejudices peddled by the mass media. In the 20th and 21st centuries, the ideas formed in people's minds about religions and races have been increasingly influenced by the media (Berger 2006) including television and print coverage of news. Many media specialists believe that the meaning of reality itself is conditioned by the media, particularly by television which changes "many social situations by changing everyday life" (Altheide 1976). For example, Iyengar (1991, 11) discusses how the media "frame" events and present them from their own perspective through the "subtle alterations in the statement or presentation of judgment and choice problems." Further, Shaheen (2005) describes how such indirect methods of influencing the public mean that the "stereotyping of Arabs regularly appears in media designed to entertain" because in this context the public is more likely to accept the information "unknowingly" and "without suspicion" (1985, 162 & 166).

Whilst it may not be all-determining, one cannot ignore the role that governments play in influencing the media's portrayal of major world conflicts such as those in the Middle East (for a detailed analysis of the influence of government on the media, see Ghareeb 1983. For the British media, see Mayhew and Adams 1976). Patricia A. Karl, a news correspondent covering the Arab region, goes as far as to claim that "the Government's manipulation of the American media and media participation in foreign policy have conditioned situations where events are often shaped to fit policies or foreign policy programming becomes a substitute for policy" (1983, 284). It is beyond the scope of this study to investigate the precise extent of the American state's manipulation of the media to serve its foreign policy.

However, it is hard to dismiss Steven Salaita's (2006) argument that popular American mistrust of Arabs is closely linked to the idea of "patriotism and national pride" (265) promoted by a government whose foreign policy sets the standard of loyalty. For example, during the First Gulf War, the US media took most of its information from the US Army, adopting the official stances dictated to them because 'patriotic journalism' was the required norm (Bennett & Paletz 1994, 4). Referring to preparations for the 2003 US-led invasion of Iraq, Alterman (2004), an insider and a specialist in US media, says that most American journalists possessed the 'natural patriotism' to side with the US government, whilst others had commercial reasons to do so. He argues that such an attitude "not only empowers right-wing jingoists and chauvinists to silence honest debate, it also silences some of the internal debate that takes place in our own hearts and

minds" (Alterman 2004, 268 & 269). Alterman believes that the US media and US foreign policy are aligned. If criticism is directed against US foreign policy, such criticism would normally be dismissed in the US media as "the products of old-fashioned European anti-Americanism at best, and of antisemitism at worst [if Israel is implicated], or frequently, both" (Alterman 2004, 18).

Herman and Chomsky (1994) devised their propaganda model to take account of the ways in which key players shape the media. They identify five main "news filters", which include "information provided by government, business, and 'experts' funded and approved by these primary sources and agents of power" (*Id.*, 2). Herman and Chomsky believe that the media's dependence on these sources' privileged access to information means that they can "use personal relationships, threats, and rewards to further influence and coerce the media" (*Id.*, 22). Moreover, the credibility such sources enjoy with the public confers 'objectivity' on media coverage which draws on them. Finally, as media channels seek to "protect themselves from criticisms of bias and libel suits, they need material that can be portrayed as presumptively accurate" (*Id.*, 19). Other studies of source bias focus on showing how reporters depend on limited governmental sources when they present the news (Sigal 1974, Brown et al. 1987, Reese et al. 1994).

Another important filter identified by Herman and Chomsky (1994, 26) is "flak": those negative responses to a media statement or programme used to "discipline" the media. In many cases, government officials attack certain reporters as a means of sending a warning signal to other journalists who might think of criticising the government. A related filter is that of "anticommunism" used in the Cold War period as a pretext for silencing dissident voices and an active "control mechanism" (Herman and Chomsky 1994, 2). More recently, it is arguable that the communist has been replaced by the figure of the Arab terrorist, who shares with his predecessor a perceived desire to destroy the West, at least in certain tendencies exhibited by the mainstream media. Finally, it is important to mention other cultural manipulations that governments deploy in support of their foreign policy. Mel van Elteren (2003, 174) claims that the U.S. government plays "an important role in promoting cultural exports, not only as a source of export income but also as a means of exporting beliefs, values, and practices that inherently favor U.S.-based corporate capitalism," including those relating to issues of race and gender.

In times of crisis, governments condition the public in an indirect way to make them see the world in pre-designed perspective. If portrayals of Arabs as desert nomads, ignorant peasants, Muslim fanatics and bloody hijackers who kidnap foreigners and ransom them recur continuously in the media (Caesar 1993), they tend to be questioned less and less, and end up approaching the status of received wisdom. Gordon W. Allport (1954) asserts that stereotypes are "socially supported, continually revived and hammered in, by [the] media of mass communication" (1954, 200). David Altheide (1976, 27) believes that, through the amplification process, the media can make some events "interesting and socially significant," sometimes ensuring that their influence may be "fundamentally changed."

It is important to stress that the West is no more homogeneous than the so-called 'Arab World', and that the extent of the media's inclination and ability to shape public perceptions in a reductive, negative fashion conforming to approved government policy varies considerably. The US media represent a much more extreme case than, say, their British or French equivalents where one can find far greater plurality, and a much greater willingness to interrogate and criticise government policy. Even in America, oppositional voices are there to be heard, albeit at the peripheries of the mainstream media, Nonetheless, particularly in the USA, the stereotyping process and the policies informing it form part of the cultural context in which writers of popular fiction operate, and to which they must accommodate their work in order to appeal to the reading public. In this very indirect and generally unintentional fashion, they collude in the promotion of popular culture and the agenda of the government. The latter, in turn, is prone to shut its eyes to the widespread vilification of Arabs which, at worst, takes the form of a "licensed national sport," as Jonathan Raban puts it (1979, 343).

There is a second, much smaller, category of writers with an open political agenda and a clear intention to use popular fiction as a tool of propaganda. Some pro-Israel novelists writing in English (or whose novels are translated into English), belong to this group. Their work tends to indulge in overt and calculated stereotypying of Muslims and of Arabs (prominent novelists in this category include: Leon Uris, Moshe Shamir, Amos Oz, Benjamin Tammuz, Maisie Mosco, and Yael Dayan). By publishing their works in English, those writers reach a wide international readership.

In brief, foreign policy agendas in America (and to an extent in other Western countries) play a significant, though not determining, role in shaping and providing the context to certain stereotypes prevalent in

popular fiction. However, writers' motives in propagating reductively negative images of Arab Muslims differ considerably, and by no means do all of them conform to the equally stereotypical and reductive image of the 'Orientalist Westerner'. Those that do follow such a path are sometimes driven by the perceived need to secure high sales and therefore to avoid confronting comforting popular prejudices, and sometimes by a more calculatedly political strategy.

1. *The Political Background*

For many decades and up to today, America and Britain have regarded the Middle East as a legitimate sphere of national interest owing to their historical ties to the region. Britain occupied parts of the region after the First World War and remained there, controlling many countries and retaining military bases subsequently. One of the perceived benefits of British control over the Middle East in the interwar era was that of preventing "Nazi Germany reaching the oil fields" (Johnson 2003, 163). During the same period, the Middle East and India were regarded as the "main areas of unrest" for the British because of the rise of national movements in reaction to the unfulfilled "promises of independence" (Louis and Brown 2001, 287).

It is perhaps not surprising, then, that instead of depicting leaders of the respective independence movements as revolutionary figures seeking to liberate their lands from foreign dominance, some Anglo-American purveyors of popular fiction vilified those who challenged the authority of Britain and the Arab governments it had installed by presenting their actions as inherently evil and illegitimate. They showed little desire to convey the complexity of the conflict and of popular reactions to the promises of independence. For instance, Spencer Bayne's *Agent Extraordinary* reflected British concern over the Arab-German alliance during the Second World War. The Mufti of Damascus, Jamal, designated as the historical Mufti of Jerusalem, tried to move the public against British rule with the help of the Nazis. In order to demonstrate that his cause was unlawful, the author presented Jamal as a gangster whose national aspirations for "Pan-Arabism" were described as a "bogey" with which he attempted to "mask his gangsterish ambition" (1944, 35). Further, Geoffrey Household's *Doom's Caravan* (1971) referenced the anti-British revolt in Iraq in 1941 and portrayed its leader, Rashid Ali al-Kaylani, in an unsympathetic way. The Arabs who sided with the Germans against the British and

French are pictured as "conspirators" (1971, 100). Whilst collaboration with Nazis is hardly an action compatible with the spirit of liberation, the reasons for the collaboration, and the desperation that led to it, are left unacknowledged.

After the Second World War, and in the context of the new reality of the Cold War with an expansionist Soviet Union, America sought to acquire a share in Britain's control over the Middle East, so it began cooperating with Britain in this regard. Proposals for disseminating pro-American and British publicity in the region were suggested as soon as the early 1950s (US Government, Office Memorandum 1951). Adam Watson, from the British Embassy, suggested making an "Anglo-American cooperation in the psychological field in the Arab states and Iran." Other documents released by the National Security Archive revealed the extent of US preoccupation with propaganda issues which it termed 'Campaign of Truth Program' in order to counter communism in the Middle East and to project a favourable image of America. In the end, the US government can achieve a strategic goal of preserving its interests in the region. Tore T. Petersen mentioned in *The Decline of the Anglo-American Middle East* that Anglo-American control over the region in the 1960s helped to prevent the spread of communism and to ensure a continuous flow of cheap oil (2006, 2–3).

Predictably, the 1948 Arab-Israeli conflict had many implications and consequences for popular images of the Arab. Western public opinion was generally conditioned to regard Arabs as wrong in defending their own lands and properties. As Michael Ionides poignantly puts it: "If the Arabs submitted, that showed their unworthiness, if they resisted, that showed their savagery" (1960, 83). The Cold War created its own villains because the Soviets began, during this period, to aid Arab countries such as Iraq, Syria and Egypt by supplying them with arms and expertise. Kem Bennett tackled this concern in *The Devil's Current* (1953), and Stewart Thomson's *Show of Force* (1955) touched on anti-British sentiments in Iraq.

Representations of Middle Eastern societies were by no means universally hostile. In his novel, *The Picnic at Sakkara* (1955), P.H. Newby portrayed an Arab poet who belonged to the Muslim Brotherhood, a religious association opposing Westernisation. The writer captured the atmosphere of frustration that overwhelmed Egypt before Jamal Abdel Nasser's rule when protests used to be organised against British dominance and protestors cried "The Canal for Egypt!" (1955, 30). However, other political concerns expressed in fictional texts stemmed from the cynical desire to protect Western oil investments; for instance, Peter O'Donnell in

Sabre-tooth (1966) described the efforts of two British agents in Kuwait to save it from being invaded by a neighbouring country. The novel was written in response to the intention of the then president of Iraq, Abdul Karim Qassim, to annex Kuwait to Iraq in the early 1960s, something which was clearly against British interests.

Elements in the West also saw in the nationalisation of the Suez Canal by Egypt in 1956 a more direct threat affecting economic stability, a fact which found reflection in the image of the Arab as represented in news media and fiction alike. Slade (1981, 143) commented on this incident, arguing that: "the American media have broadcast a predominantly negative picture of the Arab personality. Sophisticated content analysis of news coverage as well as the monitoring of television has supported this contention." In a fictional context, P.H. Newby, in *Something to Answer For* (1969, which was awarded the writer the British Council's Booker Prize), dealt with the issue of the nationalisation of the Suez Canal, revealing a certain sympathy with the British concern over the rise of Jamal Abdel Nasser.

After the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, another image became prevalent in the Western popular imagination: that of the hesitant deserter (Ghareeb 1983). Some elements in the West treated the defeat primarily in religious terms; as the outcome of a war between Judaism and Islam, where the latter and its Arab proponents were regarded as backward and stubbornly foolish. Morris West's *The Tower of Babel* (1968) offers one of several examples of this approach. Moreover, Arab efforts to assert control over the imagery of the 1967 War tended to prove counter-productive. In Gregory Orfalea's (1988, 126) words:

> The 1967 War marked a turning point not only in the history of the conflict, but also in the coverage of the Palestinians and their leadership … Ironically, it was in trying to counter their invisible victim image of refugee, that the Palestinians created a highly visible—yet primarily negative image, the Palestinian 'terrorist'.

With the increasing number of hijacking operations and assassination attempts conducted by Palestinians in Europe in the 1960s, the image of the Arab as 'terrorist' gained considerable ground. Despite the fact that few Palestinians were actually involved in such operations, and that the operations were conceived as responses to Israeli actions, Palestinians as a whole acquired the status of potential terrorists. The PLO, in particular, was regarded as a terrorist organisation, and in the 1980s its anti-Israeli stance conferred on it for many Americans (though not necessarily for

other Western populations) the most negative image of all Arab organisations and nations (Slade 1981, 35). When, following the Oslo peace talks with Israel in 1994, the US government removed the organisation from its list of terrorist groups, the image of the PLO became gradually more positive, as did that of the former PLO's leader, Yasser Arafat, who had been depicted for decades in novels, movies and the media as a terrorist. Popular imagery shifts with the changing of political relations, which is one of several reasons why it is important not to be over-categorical about the trends we are identifying.

Moreover, such shifts take place slowly and the stereotyping of Arabs in fictional works continued to gather pace relentlessly, reaching its climax after the 1973 War and the oil boycott. In spite of the fact that the Arabs were considered to have fought bravely in the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, a phenomenon which Said (1975, 436) referred to as "shattered Myths", the negative stereotypes persisted in circulating, owing to their rigidity and relative impermeability. Indeed, the oil boycott affected the very fabric of Western society because "shivering households … faced cold furnaces in January and February of 1974" (Archer 1976, 8). As a result, the emergent figure of the 'tycoon oil sheikh' accumulated all the older stereotypes, supplementing them with the perceived ability to shake Western markets at will. Arabs were now often seen as vindictive troublemakers out to wreak havoc in the West, and ungrateful for the Western technological assistance offered to their 'backward' courtiers. The boycott threat became linked to an inherent belief in Islamic danger. Gilles Kepel called this concatenation of forces "Petro-Islam" (2003, 69), referring to the bolstering of Islamic doctrine in oil-rich Saudi Arabia and Iran.

The Arab oil boycott led also to more direct political strategies. For instance, the former US Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, proposed the doctrine of universal intervention based primarily on domestic interests (Cooper 2004). Kissinger even suggested a military invasion of the Persian Gulf if the crisis continued, exemplifying the perception among some US policymakers of an urgent need to contain the area in order to secure Western oil needs. Herrmann and Fischerkeller (1995) believe that US foreign policy follows a quasi-colonialist approach towards many countries in the Middle East such as Iraq, suggesting that the whole region is part of a kind of informal American Empire. This political outlook has helped shape the way many policymakers, and, in their wake, writers of popular fiction, view the region.

Saudi Arabia was the most influential Arab state to apply the boycott. Novels featuring this country presented different fictional imaginings of Anglo-American policy ambitions. In *The Fourth of July War* (1978), Allan Topol pictured a time when America would invade Saudi Arabia for increasing the prices of oil, improbably comparing the fictional conflict to the US War of Independence because it could liberate America from dependence on Arab oil. In *A Crack in the House of God* (1983), Giora Shamis and Diane Shamis imagined how the Americans and Soviets might collaborate in devising a plot to destabilise the Arab region. The result was to be the sending of 10,000 American soldiers to the Gulf as the "core of a multinational Gulf-protection force" (238). Robert Ludlum's *The Icarus Agenda* (1988) likewise told of a US decision to invade Saudi Arabia, an act that benefited not only "the Saudi Kingdom, but the entire world" (227).

Another key political event affecting portrayals of Muslims was, of course, the 1979 Iranian Revolution that toppled the pro-Western Shah rule, and after which Iran was placed under Islamic jurisdiction (for an analysis of the effect of the Iranian Revolution on the perception of Islam in the West, see Said 1985). Most importantly, the American hostage crisis that accompanied the Revolution generated a new negative Muslim stereotype: that of a crazed Ayatollah Khomeini and his fellow Shiite Mullahs conspiring against the West (see the following novels that deal with Khomeini: Murphy 1982, Innes 1983, Eastermann 1984, and MacKinnon, 1986).

In brief, popular fiction offers an insight into the way that ordinary people's beliefs, concerns and prejudices are shaped by political actors and events in the public sphere: the rise of Arab nationalist movements, the Arab-Israeli conflict, the appearance of militant Islamic groups, and the oil boycott. It also reveals the aspirations and wish-fulfilling fantasies by which such fears tend to be compensated: controlling the oil resources of hostile countries, toppling anti-Western leaders, and killing fanatical terrorists. Let us now look at how some of these phenomena play out within specific texts.

2. *The Novels*

Works of popular fiction dealing with the West's reliance on Arab oil began to flourish in the 1970s. In these novels, Arabs became mostly associated

with "the negative aspect of oil, i.e. boycotts, price increases, (often referred to as 'gouging,' 'robber,' etc.), and the price-fixing 'oil cartel'" (Suleiman 1982, 149). One such novel is Herbert Stein's *On the Brink* (1977), in which Arabs are shown as "crafty oil magnates who care nothing about the economic well-being of the world," and in which the reader is led to believe that Arab oil producing countries have to be controlled by the West for the sake of the world economic stability (Terry 1983a, 26, Terry 1983b, 324). Reeva Simon (1989, 48) commented on the transformation of the Arab image that took place following the oil boom, claiming that a "wealthy Arab" now

> rides in Cadillacs rather than on camels, and lives a belief based on hedonism, a conglomeration of Hindu eroticism and the Western perception of Muslim sexual mores: large harems and many concubines. Instead of hand-to-hand physical violence, today's bedouin petrosheikh can hire financial wizards to purchase giant corporations or terrorists to threaten the very Westerners who have provided him with his powerful new image.

It is important to pay closer attention to certain novels that appeared in the 1970s and 1980s because they represent the climax of the stereotyping process. The works discussed below are representative of the main types to be published during this period. The stereotypes and villains that populate them recur over and over again in mainstream Anglo-American popular fiction of the time.

Harold Robbins is one writer clearly exercised by the issue of Arab oil; Robbins had a Jewish father, but when he was between eight to eleven years old, a Jewish family adopted him and called him Rubin, which is how he received his name. According to his publisher, Robbins has sold 700 million books around the world, at an average of forty thousand a day. One of his best known works is *The Pirate* (1979 [1974]), and in the year of its publication the novel was made into a movie, indicating its wide public reception. The hero of *The Pirate* is a Western-educated Arab called Baydr Al Fay who descends from a royal family. Baydr's wealth has dramatically increased with his worldwide trade in oil, since "he controlled an international investment fund of over five hundred million dollars" (42). He is also very handsome and attractive (20), and Robbins presents him as a "playboy" (230) who spends his money extravagantly on women. In America, Baydr married his second wife, Jordana Mason, a bohemian American woman, whom he abused:

> Though he had been Westernised in many ways and she had become a Muslim, they were still separated by a thousand years of different

> philosophies. Because although the Prophet had granted women more rights than they had ever had until that time, He still had not granted them full equality. In truth all their rights were subject to man's pleasure. (132)

Jordana is presented as an oppressed woman who desires freedom, but she has no way to escape the harem-like atmosphere in which she lives. The novel strongly implies that any marriage between an Arab and a Western woman is doomed to failure because the couple come from different worlds. It further suggests that the two cultures can never meet because they always clash, and Islam is the reason behind the separation of East and West. "In his world the woman was nothing, the man everything. If she said to him that she had the same needs he did, the same … social drives, he would regard it as a threat to his male supremacy" (143).

In spite of the oil boom, life in fictional Arab countries is shown to be regressive and steeped in the detestable old customs of male supremacy. In Margaret Rome's *Son of Adam* (1978), for instance, the writer presents a highly fantastic image of the Arab homeland in which it is customary to see Arab males "refuse to admit a woman's existence except when necessity forced them to" (1978, 144). Similarly, *The Pirate* shows Arab men treating women like objects of pleasure as if they have no dignity at all; hence, Jordana protests: "I'm not an Arab woman who can be ordered about like a slave! … This isn't the Middle Ages … Neither are we in the Middle East, where you can lock me in a harem" (189). Jordana's marriage to Baydr dehumanises her because she feels as "if she were nothing but a receptacle for his own use and convenience" (193). In fact, Robbins perpetrates a typically Western stereotypical view of how Arab women are treated by their men when he puts these words in Baydr's mouth: "You are my wife, my possession, and you are only entitled to those rights and feelings which I allow you….You will live as I order you" (189). Baydr is also portrayed as a savage who regularly beats his two wives.

In a familiar technique adopted by many other writers, Robbins connects the Palestinian cause to the oil crisis by interweaving it into the plot. He presents the Al Ikhwah organisation, headed by Ali Yasfir, as corrupt and filthy; its members sell hashish in order to make huge profits, rendering their struggle illegitimate. The members are seen as a group of "thieves, blackmailers and murderers," and they are used to "demean and bring dishonour to the cause they pretend to serve" (292). Leila, Baydr's daughter, is later recruited by Al Ikhwah, whose aim is to create ruthless women. In order to denigrate the *fedayeen* cause, Robbins portrays the organisation as blackmailing Baydr. They hijack Baydr's aeroplane carrying his two sons

and wife in order to demand a huge ransom. The *fedayeen* are presented as a group of merciless killers who care only about money and profits, and Robbins shows nothing of their national yearning to liberate their occupied lands, attributing their motives to profiteering.

In order to rescue his kidnapped family, Baydr seeks a retired Israeli general, Ben Ezra, to perform the mission, perhaps to emphasise the Arabs' inability to act as required. Ben Ezra is, in fact, the archetypal Israeli superhero of twentieth century fiction; even the Arabs call him "the Lion of the Desert" (105). The plot resolution delivers 'poetic justice' as the Al Ikhwah villains are punished, and the Israeli victors left as the sole survivors. As Tom Dardis (1984) argues, Robbins is merely replicating traditional Western stereotypes, thereby comforting the reading public with what it thinks to be a familiar truth.

Another novelist who adopts a similar approach to that of Robbins is Paul Erdman, a Canadian-born writer and son of American parents. The issue of Arab wealth is his dominant theme, too, and Erdman's novels similarly lack deep characterisation, which is again sacrificed for the sake of the plot. His novel, *The Crash of '79* (1976) was a best-seller in its year and remained at the top of the best twenty novels list in 1977. Erdman subsequently spawned many imitators and established an entire genre which might be termed the 'economic thriller' (novels of this kind include: Leigh James' *The Caliph Intrigue* (1979), Wilbur Smith's *The Delta Decision* (1979), and Geoffrey Clarkson's *Jihad* (1981).

The Crash of '79 presents an imaginary economic conflict in the Middle East, culminating in an actual war, the winner of which will control the whole world. A character named Dr. Bill Hitchcock is presented as the chief financial advisor to one of the Arab countries since Arabs want someone to "help them *stay* rich" (1978, 12). In fact, Hitchcock's characterisation draws on Erdman's own knowledge and experience because the author had worked previously as an oil and gas consultant in the Arab world. The Arab country in question represents every rich Arab State wholly dependent on foreign assistance. Such countries are pictured as having an unprecedented source of money because of their oil production, and because they have "accumulated a hoard of savings that was absolutely unique in the history of mankind—over half a trillion dollars, an amount almost equal to the value of all the shares of the corporations listed on the New York Stock Exchange" (88). However, the country is threatened from the outside, and also from within by local nationalists supported by the Palestinians who, as in many such fictions, are seen as a corrupt group of "radicals" (111), having "a potentially elite revolutionary corps" (184).

The narrator (whom one can in this instance safely identify, broadly speaking, with the authorial voice) asserts that blackmail and economic threats are inherently linked with the Arabs after the "1973 bombshell", as he puts it: "The Arabs put an embargo on oil exports to the West, and within months, in the most successful blackmail attempt in the history of the world, had forced a quadrupling of the petroleum price" (29). Meanwhile, Abdullah, the new ruler of the state, is pictured as a backward man who is a threat and a menace to the West because he withdraws the dollars deposited in American banks and wreaks havoc there. Instead of pursuing the five-year development programme, he orders his people "to read the Koran and tend their goats. As they did before. Or get shot" (283).

The sheikhs withdraw huge amounts of money from European banks to deposit them in American ones, enhancing the reader's impression of their imaginary treachery and propensity for intrigue; Europe is "being stabbed in the back by an Arab dagger, guided by a Yankee hand" (234). In this context, Linda Blandford (1978), an American journalist, describes how Arab sheikhs in the 1970s received an almost universally negative press and were "accorded the blame for practically everything bad that has happened to us since and were hated as our new overlords" (1). Indeed. Peter Dickinson's *The Poison Oracle* (1974) conforms almost exactly to Blandford's account. Finally, Israel is interwoven into the plot; the novel ends with a complete Arab defeat that cannot be reversed. "Arabs are through. And if there is a winner in this whole mess, it is Israel. They are now safe" (349). Even in the fiction of financial intrigue, the Arab-Israeli conflict lurks in the background, eventually emerging to play the key role in the plot.

Similar trends can be traced within the work of the American romance writer, Maggie Davis, who also uses the *noms de plume*, Katherine Deauxville and Maggie Daniels. In *The Sheik* (1977), she presents the Rahsmani State, a fictional country, in which Arab characters live in a semi-medieval age. The author had visited Tunisia twice in the sixties and seventies and drew on her experience in the novel (Maggie Davis, e-mail message to author, 16 March 2002). Davis points out that *The Sheik* was published "at a time when there were virtually no popular novels with an Arab hero on the market, at least in the United States" (*Id.*). As Davis herself asserted: "At the time I was very conscious that readers in the US were generally uninformed about the Arab oil states or even the Arab world in general" (*Id.*). She claims with conviction that she was "earnestly devoted to presenting a picture, based on fact, of a young head of a Gulf oil country" (*Id.*). The numerous stereotypes that the novel contains suggest that

her efforts were not altogether successful, though there is no reason to doubt her intentions.

The novel deals with the character of Abdullah al Asmari. Like Robbins's Baydr, Abdullah is a wealthy, handsome playboy who seeks only power and pleasure. When he was twenty-three years old, his grandfather sent him to the United States to buy banks. There, he is pictured as a bohemian sex maniac who cannot control his lust, and he assaults two women. Abdullah himself is made to acknowledge that he is brought up in "the old sensuous Arab tradition that accounted women as one of the great pleasures in life, along with money and horses, to serve in any way that would bring the ultimate pleasure" (1979, 132–3). As in Robbins's work, so here, women are regarded as objects devoid of any feelings and sensations. When he is in the United States, a friend tells him of the value of having female friends, to which Abdullah replies: "Women are not part of the trading.... My people deal in oil and money now and a few well-bred horses and Cadillacs" (175). Such comments serve to intensify the enlightened reader's disgust towards this Arab character. Nancy Sullivan, Abdullah's American girlfriend, eventually challenges him, accusing him of being: "used to treating women like THINGS" (201). The writer presents the behaviour of Arab rulers as if they belonged to a medieval time when slave owning, concubines and absolutism still existed. Indeed, Abdullah's grandfather had once "brought him a concubine, an American girl" (23–4). Abdullah is not only "selfish, superficial and irresistible to women" (Terry 1985, 78) but also "a spoiled, wealthy young man (arguably not unusual in an Arab oil kingdom) who is suddenly exposed to the harsh realities of life, and responds successfully (sic) to them" (e-mail to author, 15 March 2002).

Another character, Ameen Said, a minister of education and public works and a graduate of an American university, is pictured as a patriot who refuses any compromise over Arab oil (33–4). But, like many other writers of popular fiction, Davis depicts Arab characters with such nationalistic convictions as dishonest; Said is shown later to be a traitor to Emir and the country. He cooperates with a Palestinian group called the Children of Fire, presented as an illegal gang having "no respect for anything" (335) and believing only in "anarchy" (336). Once more, Palestinians are interwoven in the plot in order be revealed as troublemakers. Said dies at the end of the novel in what appears as a symbolic punishment for not being pro-Western. And though, like Robbins's Baydr, Said is educated in the West, he retains his original 'bad' traits. In other words, it is implied that Arabs cannot change their nature no matter how much education and 'cultivation' they receive in the West.

I now turn to the works of Michael Mackenzie Thomas, an American financial consultant. His *Green Monday* (1980) became an international best-seller in the year of its publication. The novel is set in a fictional Arab country called Qu'nesh and tells of a fanatical, oil-rich Muslim ruler from the al-Misaz family who tries to control the world's economy by political intrigue, economic pressure and assassinations. Money has begun to flow into the country following the famous 1973 boycott, when "the kingdom became calculably wealthy" (1981, 82). The story revolves around how Qu'nesh State reduces the price of crude oil in order to achieve political and economic objectives, and specifically to persuade the king to buy huge American market stocks to be sold after a readjustment in the oil price. The title of the novel refers to the day on which the announcement of the new oil price is made. However, Prince Alrazi, a senior official, believes that it would be better declared at Easter because it is the "great gift of Islam to the West on the greatest Christian holiday" (159). Thomas intentionally accords Alrazi a religious rhetoric to show that the oil crisis is faith-based rather than political. In other words, a clash of religions rather than political antagonism is the main reason behind the conflict in the Middle East. Military threats are the only way to encounter the Arab danger, as Buster, the President's secretary elaborates:

> Those Arabs have been bitchin' about the dollar for six years now. They have been bitchin' about this Israeli peace treaty. They're scared…that they are goin' to wake up one bright mornin' to find the marines sittin' on them oil-fields, along with some Russians and Japs and Europeans, and their oil bein' sold *by* us *to* us for four dollars a barrel. (447)

As in the earlier-mentioned novels portraying an American invasion of Saudi Arabia, the US President believes that invading this Arab state would bring the price of oil down to four dollars per barrel. In fact, Thomas's description completely corresponds to Kissinger's doctrine of universal intervention. In another indirect US strategy, Arabs are intimidated and blackmailed into withdrawing their plan because of American threats to bomb "the greatest mosque in Islam" (477). Thomas is probably referring here to Mecca, with its importance to Muslim religious sentiment and consequently to Arab wealth. The novel strongly implies that the Americans are morally justified in their policies, that the Arabs thus have no right to their own resources, and that they must be grateful to the West for investing in their oil and for saving them from their medieval way of living. Once again, the whole region is viewed as part of an inherently American sphere of influence.

Inherited stereotypes are also dominant; Muslims are treated as savages, and the citizens of Qu'nesh are shown to be backward, illiterate, and ignorant of worldly matters (53). They have no capacity to master their oil production or even their own countries; the writer suggests that Arabs have no right to remain independent because they are incapable of submitting to the rule of law, or of sound thinking. Arabs are only "poor savages whose waterholes happened by chance to sit upon the source of the rest of the world's wealth" (60).

Another stereotypical Arab character featured is Colonel Osman, who is a mercenary, killing "chosen individuals, one at a time and alone" (399). He is a terrorist, and in order to connect the Palestinian struggle with the plot, the writer makes Osman a member of the PLO. While Robbins introduces the Al Ikhwan group and Davis focuses on the Children of Fire organisation, Thomas refers repeatedly to the PLO. In all cases, the Palestinians are portrayed as terrorists directly responsible for the troubles of the Middle East.

Finally, we should mention Laurie Devine, an American novelist, who writes of her impressions of the Arab homeland in *Saudi* (1985). Her work follows that of Davis in depicting Arabs as backward, filthy human beings. She shows life in a fictional Arab country, represented by two Arab characters, Rashid and Muhammed, who are "dark handsome brothers" (1985, 125), living among Westerners at the time of the oil discoveries. Rashid and Muhammed correspond closely to the 'Arab playboy' type familiar from the work of Robbins and Davis.

Devine suggests that the West is antagonistic towards Arabs for "quadrupling the price of oil; and triggering the panic of the energy crisis and fuelling an international financial recession" (13). As reflected in Thomas's previous remark, there is a recurrent conception that Arab oil belongs to the West, and that it has the right to sell it. Nevertheless, Devine acknowledges that Western states have exploited Arab oil in the worst manner, demonstrating that American popular fiction is not uniformly and consistently anti-Arab. "They've had unlimited amounts of incredibly cheap… Arabian oil at their disposal" (292). In *The Exploiters* (1974), Samuel Edward deals with the same theme, but his novel, which centres on a narrative in which the Americans send an expert to an Arab oil kingdom to stop its ruler from signing a contract with the French, concentrates on rivalry among the great powers. Here, then, is another exception to the otherwise unrelenting focus on Arab treachery and barbarism.

In Devine's novel, Rashid, a Harvard graduate, is one of the founders of OPEC which sponsored the oil boycott. He describes the purpose of the

boycott as being to "unsheath (sic) the oil weapon and use its economic power to force the West to redress thirty years of wrongs against the Palestinian people" (409). Rashid and his colleagues view Arab economic interests and those of Western states from an Islamic point of view:

> Twice in the past five centuries the Turks and their armies of Allah had swept all the way to the city's gates. Just out there, Islam had been turned back. Rashid did not think he and his fellows would be turned back this time.... *Inshallah*—if God willed it—at last the Muslims would use their oil as a weapon for a good cause, for the best cause. (405)

As also conveyed by Prince Alrazi's rhetoric, Rashid is shown as a man in conflict with the West on the basis of religious difference, enhancing the sense that he is prone to fanaticism. In the United States, he is abused and beaten by a group of Americans thinking that he is a coloured man (once again, authorial suspicion of Arab motives is not necessarily accompanied by a ringing endorsement of all things American; the situation is at times more complicated and multi-faceted than this.) The incident makes Rashid look to revenge in the form of oil nationalisation. As he puts it: "America must be shown it could not continue to cheat and win forever" (198).

Sunny, Rashid's American wife, faces the same dilemma in her efforts to be assimilated into an Arab society "whose values were so very different from her own", and where "right and wrong, good and bad, grace and sin were not the same as at home" (268). This is why her marriage to Rashid has not succeeded, and her relationship with her son, Khalid, has become a disaster. Sunny's experience echoes that of Robbins's Jordana Mason. Both writers attribute the problems to the rigid and extreme nature of Islamic culture. Khalid later becomes a devout Muslim and joins a religious organisation the name of whose very leader connotes violence and bloodshed. "Juhayman was so intense and wild-eyed that he was nicknamed el-wahash, 'the one who is like a wild beast'" (505). Khalid's beliefs result ultimately in an ignominious death which appears to be the fictional norm for all fanatical Muslims.

3. *Conclusion*

The fictional portrayal of the dishonest, primitive Muslim fanatic goes hand in hand with the image of the Arab as a terrorist. Arabia is shown as a place that has not changed since medieval times; its people are backward womanisers, but they are filthily rich. Many (though not all) writers

erroneously link Arab strife with the West to a conflict with the whole of Islam, instead of looking at the big picture in which politics play the major role. Furthermore, the similarity of the plot lines and character delineations in the novels discussed above suggests that most writers tend to borrow their ideas from, or at least operate under the influence of, the same media sources, which in turn are shaped by the foreign policy concerns of the governments that oversee (if not exert power over) their activities. But since political issues change with time, stereotypes alter accordingly, hardening, softening, or even disappearing in response to shifting events on the international stage. Clearly, for as long as political rhetoric in the West remains overwhelmingly suspicious of Islam and Muslims (as is the case in the USA in particular), the mainstream mass media are liable to absorb and reproduce that suspicion, though not necessarily intentionally, and not universally. Meanwhile, writers of popular fiction are no more immune to such trends than the public at large and may, in certain cases, even attempt to exploit them in order to appeal to the 'lowest common denominator' of public opinion.

It is not surprising, therefore, that the most egregiously prejudicial and reductive portrayals of Islam and Arabs in the popular media have tended to follow in the wake of 9/11. The figures of Osama Bin Laden, the leaders of the Taliban movement, and the followers of al-Qaeda have given new momentum to pre-existing stereotypes, which have also been fed by the flow of shocking images of beheadings, kidnappings and suicide bombings emanating from occupied, post-Saddam Iraq. It is, of course, quite misleading to equate politics with popular fiction entirely; they operate according to radically different discursive logics and make different epistemological claims. Still more dangerous is to assume that opinions expressed by fictional characters and third-person narrators align straightforwardly with the views of biographical authors, or with single, unambiguous 'meanings'. Nonetheless, it would also be wrong to ignore the very real influence that political events and media representations exert on popular culture and its modes of interpretation. In this light, as Reeva Simon (1989, 140) comments:

> Middle Easterners will continue to populate the casts of villains and conspirators, in popular fiction because authors know that today, after watching the evening news and reports of bombed American embassies, kidnapped or killed diplomats, and the latest exploits of religious fanatics, the public will readily read about Middle Eastern conspirators, and that books about the area will sell well.

Moreover, the stock of Arab/Muslim 'villains' on which popular fiction might draw, consciously and unconsciously, is already being replenished thanks to the more recent actions of Hasan Nasrallah, the leaders of Hamas, and Iran's President Ahmadinejad. If past patterns are anything to go by, the vilification to which such figures are likely to be subjected within novels will be intensified through supplementary representation in movies, video games, comics, cartoons, jokes, and even graffiti. The writers themselves (along with their numerous fans) will no doubt continue to defend their practices by reference to the very real associations with violence and aggression attached to these figures. But until they are prepared to adopt a critical distance from the media and government sources which inspire their storytelling, to provide more multi-faceted portrayals which take account of the complexity of the situations in which the violence occurs, to cease tarring all Muslims and all Arabs with the same brush, to explore the motives behind the 'threatening' stances taken by a small minority of them, and to treat them as rounded human beings, as rich in contradiction and contrariness as those who oppose them, their protestations must be rejected.

CHAPTER TEN

EXPLORING *ANWAR*: RELIGION, IDENTITY AND NATIONALISM

Priyasha Kaul

Religion has become an extremely important identity marker in the post-9/11 world. In this climate, multicultural societies have had difficulty in becoming or remaining inclusive, often forcing religious minorities to live under constant threat of suspicion and distrust. In this chapter I examine the identity politics around 'being a Muslim' in contemporary India through an exploration of the critically acclaimed 2007 Bollywood movie *Anwar*. Although the marginalisation of Muslims as a religious minority has been touched upon in other recent Bollywood movies, *Anwar* for the first time talks of the issue explicitly and emphatically by firmly placing it within the larger geopolitical context. This chapter uses the movie to explore the articulations of voluntary and involuntary identities in their interaction with religion, gender and nationalism against the backdrop of communalism, party politics and exclusion in contemporary Indian society.

1. *Bollywood Cinema*

Bollywood movies, especially those belonging to mainstream Hindi cinema, have often been derided for being frivolous song and dance extravaganzas. There has been a tendency to argue that in a country like India where the majority of the population still lives in poverty, Bollywood cinema provides a means of escaping reality for people needing relief from the problems of everyday life. In fact, this has been a very strong discourse among both scholars and those involved in making these movies, for 'justifying' Bollywood movie practices (Ganti 2004). These sentiments are echoed, for instance, in the following excerpts by popular contemporary movie actors (Ministry of External Affairs 2008). When questioned about why they think Bollywood movies are so successful, leading Bollywood actor Abhishek Bachchan and actress Karisma Kapoor said:

> It's tough; it's a hard life, here! Come into a cinema, sit under a fan, come give us three hours of your time and we'll change your mind for three hours and

> let you escape into a … maybe sometimes a surrealistic world, time for which you won't have to think about how to feed your family or how hot it is outside.
>
> I think India has such a large population, with a variety of people, and I think they basically want a fantasy, after a hard day's work of breaking their backs I think they go and want to watch something where they feel 'wow!, I wish we could be a part of that!'

It is perhaps not a surprise that following this branding as escapist, Bollywood as a popular socio-cultural form has until recently not been considered worthy of much academic analysis and scholarship. Over the last decade or so, however, this has been changing with serious sociological investigation into the subject, emanating mostly, although certainly not exclusively, from Western academic circles (see Dudrah 2006). Along with this, there has also been a growing realisation that, even within the mainstream Bollywood form and sensibility, moviemakers have often tried to raise critical social issues whether related to patriarchy, communalism or other concerns.

According to Mishra (2002), the religious landscape portrayed in Indian movies has changed significantly over time. He identifies the 1977 movie *Amar, Akbar, Anthony*, which showed three brothers separated at birth and brought up as a Hindu, a Muslim and a Christian respectively, as the point of demarcation after which liberal communal politics began to recede in Bollywood movies. Although this has, on the one hand, limited the number of movies with significant Muslim characters, it has also led to a move away from simplistic glamorised plots. This, perhaps unwittingly, opened up a growing space for representing a more realistic image of the anti-secular currents in Indian politics and society, unlike the earlier decades when the issue of community relations was dealt with more in terms of an idealistic glorification (see Hirji 2008).

In fact, Bollywood has produced several landmark movies over the last two decades that have been vocal about marginalisation of religious minorities, particularly Muslims in Indian society. Some of the most noteworthy movies here include *Bombay* (1995), *Mission Kashmir* (2000), *Fiza* (2000) and *Dev* (2004), which have all in different ways raised the issue of the recent mistrust and stereotypes surrounding Muslims in India. Note that in this chapter, I am concentrating on movies focusing on Indian society and therefore do not include recent movies such as *New York* (2009) or *My Name is Khan* (2010), where the narrative is situated almost entirely in the United States. Thus, whether it was the character of a Muslim police officer whose loyalties to his duty are constantly under suspicion in

Mission Kashmir, or that of a young Muslim girl caught in the anti-Muslim Gujarat pogrom in *Dev*, through these characters such movies have forcefully highlighted the politics surrounding what 'being a Muslim' could mean in everyday Indian society (see Malhotra and Alagh 2004). These movies are perhaps even more significant since they have questioned the political scenario and saffronisation of Indian society (i.e. the increasing influence of the Hindu right wing, commonly known as *hindutva*, ideology and politics of nationalism on different aspects of Indian society) against the backdrop of the growing political power of the Hindu right-wing parties such as the Bharatiya Janta party (BJP). This occurred both in the central parts of India, where the BJP along with its allies held the political reins from 1996 to 2004, and in key states such as Punjab, Rajasthan and Gujarat, some of which are still ruled by the BJP and its coalition allies (see Anand 2005).

The reason why I focus particularly on *Anwar* (2007), a critically acclaimed, but commercially unsuccessful, small-budget, mainstream Bollywood movie in this chapter is that, unlike the other movies, it goes beyond tracing out uni-dimensional cause and effect narratives to deal with complex socio-political issues. Instead, *Anwar* provides what anthropologists call a thick description (see Geertz 1973) of the way in which religion in general, and Islam in particular, has become an identity marker in the contemporary world, an identity that has been so profoundly marked that it has become the justification for constant suspicion and scrutiny. In fact, paradoxically enough, this negative stereotyping has become the pretext for pernicious interpretations of both multiculturalism in Western countries such as Britain and liberal secularism in countries such as India.

This is also perhaps why *Anwar* as a movie is different from any other Bollywood movie thus far: it successfully invokes the contemporary geopolitical context in order to place its narrative and characters firmly within the global political scenario, by grounding the global narrative within the complexities of local factional politics, while refusing to be drawn into free-floating meta-narratives. It thereby succeeds in creating a scenario in which people are not just products of either the national or the global. Instead, they represent the complex ways in which the national and the global interact to produce an everyday lived locality within a particular context. The ways in which powerful discourses come to be selected and spread through the forces of globalisation—albeit producing unique permutations in each particular context—are points to which I will return later.

2. Anwar: *The Narrative*

The movie has a complicated, non-linear narrative and resorts to using the flashback device to narrate much of the story. The story of the movie starts out with a man travelling on a bus looking obviously disturbed. He suddenly gets off the bus at an unknown place, later revealed to us to be a small town in the north Indian state of Uttar Pradesh, Dholpur. As it is raining, he seeks shelter in an old building where he sleeps for the night. In the next scene, we see him going out of the ruins of the old building and performing his morning *namaaz* prayers. It is only at this point through the act of the prayer that the man is marked off as a Muslim. Immediately, while he is praying, a little boy eyeing him secretly from behind the wall steals his cloth bag, runs away and, as we later find out, hands it over at the local police station. This opening montage of the movie is very important in itself, as it poignantly highlights how the establishment of his identity as a Muslim person immediately marks him off as different. He becomes a source of suspicion and worthy of investigation as soon as he is established as a Muslim, a point reiterated in the movie at several points directly and indirectly. For instance, at one point one of the characters mentions how, while he was waiting in the queue to get his US visa, the applications of all four people in front of him were rejected since their last name was Khan, a Muslim name.

In the next scene we see this nameless man, about whom the only thing we know until now is that he is a Muslim, wake up inside the ruins to the sound of loudhailers from outside, treating him as a terrorist and warning him not to attack anyone and instead to surrender. The authorities outside then threaten to disclose the names of his accomplices, and exhort him not to bomb the site of the Hindu temple ruins where he finds himself. It then becomes apparent to us that the evidence upon which his status as a terrorist is established is a sketch book obtained from his bag, which contained pencil sketches of Hindu temple buildings along with a Muslim and Hindu names such as Pasha, Meera and Mehru scribbled on them.

Over the next part of the movie, we see an increasingly chaotic scenario developing around the temple ruins, with a local Hindu right-wing politician stirring up the crowd by giving lectures about the danger of losing centuries-old Hindu traditions and heritage due to the combined impact of the West and the supposed danger of Islam. All the while, this politician secretly instructs party workers to keep the crowd agitated, in order to manipulate the situation in an attempt to extract maximum possible political mileage from this event for the upcoming state elections,

irrespective of whoever may be inside the temple ruins. The crowd's passions are matched by the media frenzy, with journalists from different news channels vying to capture the breaking news by somehow being the first to get the footage of the 'confession of the Muslim terrorist'.

Three different characters try to speak to the protagonist, hitherto unnamed, from the outside during the course of his entrapment in this temple building. First, there is an imam who exhorts him not to defile the temple as it would permanently damage the lives of Muslims who live in the surrounding areas. Instead, the imam calls upon the man to quietly kill himself, as he would not be spared under any circumstances. Second, there is a sympathetic journalist, Anita. She tries to question him on what could be the reasons for locking himself up. Third, there is the local police chief who, although not convinced that he is a terrorist, is being pressured by the politician and his goons to capture him as a terrorist.

This outside scenario is interspersed with flashbacks of the man trapped inside, through which his life story is revealed to us. His name is Anwar; he is an ordinary boy from Lucknow, a small city in Uttar Pradesh in the Hindi speaking heartland of North India, studying temple architecture. He is deeply in love with a neighbourhood girl called Mehru. Mehru too studies in college, likes MTV and Britney Spears, and dreams of going to the United States one day. Anwar has an older, half-ascetic, maverick friend named Master Pasha, who bemoans the death of his beloved Meera. Pasha gives Anwar sermons on how love surpasses all boundaries.

One day Anwar finds out that Mehru loves another friend of his, Udai, who happens to be a Hindu and will soon be migrating to the USA. When Mehru elopes with her lover, a search operation is launched by her male relatives to track her down. Burning with jealousy and betrayal Anwar tells the relatives about this love affair, and soon Mehru and her lover Udai are caught on the highway, where Udai is beaten to death and Mehru is brought home in a deathly state and locked up. On seeing her in this state, Anwar is full of remorse, realises his mistake and goes to meet her but finds that she has already killed herself. Distraught and seeing himself as Mehru's murderer, Anwar leaves home, travelling randomly, lost in his own thoughts, and it is on one such a bus journey that we meet Anwar at the beginning of the movie.

Meanwhile, the political and media circus outside the temple continues to build up, ultimately reaching a point where Anwar, harrowed by the memories of Mehru and growing more and more disillusioned with the scenes around him, realises that no matter what he does, in the situation in which he is caught, he has no other option but to accept the identity of

a terrorist as he will not be spared in any case. He opens the door and steps outside. The final scene shows him lying on the ground, shot dead in the rain, with the police trying to restrain the crowds from going near his body, as he might still be alive and have weapons on him.

At first glance, the movie might seem to be a love story, but this is precisely where *Anwar* as a movie succeeds: it depicts the lives of ordinary people caught in extraordinary socio-political circumstances. It is, in fact, this 'ordinariness' of the everyday lives of people that provides important insights into how religion has, in fact, become a tool for carving out people's choices and meaning in the contemporary world. In the following sections, I discuss this in relation to two important and interrelated aspects touching upon religion: gender and patriarchy, and gender and nationalism.

3. *Religion, Gender and Patriarchy*

The issue of gender has always been inextricably intertwined with boundary maintenance, whether between nations or communities (see Yuval-Davis 1997, Walby 1992). Women's honour as the insignia of group pride has historically been an important issue in inter-group conflicts. Since women are seen as the embodiment of the group and its identity, restricting their marriage to within the group becomes crucial for the survival of the patriarchal setup. *Anwar* explores this struggle without taking sides or simplifying it into a happily ever after *filmi* resolution (*filmi* is a colloquial euphemism in Hindi meaning an unrealistic candyfloss manner characteristic of many Bollywood movies).

At different points in the movie, male characters representing the family/community or the state/law enforcement machinery take on the role of the guardian to protect women from, and/or discipline them for their perceived wrongdoings. This is evidenced in the scene where a police constable reprimands Mehru and Anwar for sitting and romancing in the park alone and thereby indulging in a conduct unworthy of a Muslim girl. It is also evidenced in a scene where the local right wing political leader, having been turned down by his lover, instructs his goons to ravage the market for any goods/decorations related to Valentine's Day, as they spread 'un-Indian' values. These scenes come together poignantly to highlight the power of the state as the patriarchal overlord with the authority to force its own arbitrary gendered notions of nationalism, while providing patronage and legal sanction to perpetuate the patriarchal conventions of religious communities.

As soon as Mehru elopes with Udai, her male relatives appear out of nowhere in order to launch a search mission to 'recover' her for the family and community honour. When they are eventually found, Udai is beaten to death publicly and Mehru is tortured to an extent where she commits suicide. The possibility of a Hindu-Muslim inter-religious marriage between the two is seen as a worse fate by her male relatives than their death. Thus, the 'ownership' of the women by the community becomes of paramount importance, even if it is in direct opposition to her own agency over her life and choices. It is possible to read this narrative historically against the long and chequered recovery process of women, stranded/lost on the wrong side of the India/Pakistan border according to their religion, after the partition of India, which served to protect the interests of the newly formed nations (see Bhasin and Menon 1998).

At a more contemporary level, however, it reinforces how religion and patriarchy combine together to produce the worst consequences in a scenario where communities are excluded rather than engaged with to build bridges of trust and change. When meta-narratives of suspicion are superimposed blindly, it ends up further consolidating local insecurities and inter-group mistrust, thereby becoming easily manipulated tools in the hands of vested and divisive forces both within and outside the community. Mehru, in this narrative, almost represents the thwarting of the youthful aspiration for hope and alliances across groups and cultures, bearing the double brunt of repression from both within the community as well as outside on the combined account of her gender and religion—a predicament whereby one's everyday life choices take on a larger than life meaning, especially in an already complex socio-political context, to generate stark narratives of (un)survival.

4. *Religion, Gender and Nationalism*

Religion is perhaps one of the most contentious issues of contemporary times. And when one particular religion is selectively vilified on a global scale, whether Judaism or Islam (Meer and Noorani 2008, Vertovec 2002), the reverberation is felt in the lives of ordinary people throughout the world. The rhetoric surrounding the demonisation of Islam as a religion has become a global meta-narrative in the post-9/11 world, a pretext for both official and everyday exclusion and marginalisation of Muslims.

There has been an increasing body of literature on the issue of Islamophobia internationally in recent times, which can roughly be defined as the fear and hatred of Muslims and Islam (Runnymede Trust

1997). There has however been a tendency to employ the concept as a free floating meta-narrative, which then becomes an umbrella explanation without actually having to relate it to the particularities of a specific context. Thus, while, Islamophobia as a meta-narrative is put forth as the explanation for a wide variety of scenarios, it rarely reveals to us the manner in which local context come together and interact with global fears to create differing impacts in different situations.

This is precisely where a movie like *Anwar* deserves attention. While it takes on a global narrative, it does so not by viewing it as a monolithic concept. Instead, it applies this narrative to a multi-religious, semi-urban small town in north India to interrogate the experiential, lived reality of globalised discourses. By stepping beyond immediate frames of reference, it examines how the impact of the stereotyping and suspicion of Muslims created by the discourses of the War on Terror interact with the party politics of a small town in Uttar Pradesh. It thereby gives birth to varied identities, such as in the self-appointment of the local political leader as the protector of heritage and traditions, or such suspect identities thrust upon young people like Mehru or Anwar, who are caught in a quagmire of violence.

This problematisation becomes crucially important to understand the grounded reality of the impact of global narratives on the lives of people in concrete contexts, since global forces interact with the national specificities of the local context to stir distinct yet overlapping results. Appadurai (1999, 231), when talking about the impact of the fear of cultural homogenisation of the world due to globalisation, argues that "global homogenisation and heterogenisation feed and reinforce each other rather than being mutually exclusive [thereby] producing a locality. In fact, globalisation produces problems that manifest themselves in local forms but have contexts which are anything but local." This play of identity not only draws upon elements from different geographical contexts but also fluidly stretches itself temporally. Thus, the stigmatisation and marginalisation of the Muslim community in India, for example, often evokes the partition of the country as a reference point (Rai 2006). This is highlighted in the movie, for example in a scene where Udai asks Anwar why his family did not migrate to Pakistan at the time of the partition in 1947, to which Anwar replies that Muslims were assured of an equal status in India at that time. Such scenes in the movie are important sequences highlighting how the trauma of powerful liminalities created by recent global power politics combines with local electoral manipulations to create and/or renew deep fissures, the pain of which often stretches back into historical memory.

In situations of unease, therefore, these global discourses are strategically tapped into and utilised to keep minority groups under scrutiny. Appadurai points out that fears of homogenisation can be used by nation-states in relation to their own minorities, by posing cultural homogenisation as more real than the threat of their own hegemonic strategies. Overarching global meta-narratives become justificatory tools in the hands of the state to impose its own select version of hegemonic nationalism. Posing the external threat as the paramount danger, as in the case of global Islamophobia, enables the state to discipline and punish its own citizens, especially minorities, for not being truly loyal to the purposes and values of the nation. This has been an extremely effective strategy in the post-9/11 world for nation states globally to enforce draconian and discriminatory laws in a manner that might perhaps not have been possible otherwise. The way in which these have engaged with the particularities of the local contexts has depended upon the specific socio-historical dynamics of the location, whether it is the anxieties related to immigration in the Western world, the trauma of partition, or other ongoing sensitive issues like hostilities with neighbouring Pakistan, in a country such as India.

Questions of nationalism and belonging therefore become the central spine through which minority groups are forced to choose one aspect of their identity over another in a classic example of defining 'whether you are one of us or against us' in a context where any form of non-majoritarian identity is quickly cast as 'enemy'. Islam and Westernisation become unlikely bedfellows lumped together to fan the passion and insecurities of the crowd. Thus, when the movie depicts how Western culture and Islam become the combined force of the Other as the threat to Hindu traditions in speeches delivered by the local politician outside the temple, it not only represents equating the majority culture as the only true form of nationalism, but also simultaneously, by default, excluding all others from it and thereby pitting one's religious identity against national identity. Thus, posing the highly pernicious choice as to whether you belong to the majority group and its way of life or live the life of an outsider in your own society and country, constantly needing to prove yourself. It is a recurrent question, which has been dangerously legitimised and sanctioned in different contexts by post-9/11 global politics. Whether the form in which this question is posed is a matter of choosing between being British or Muslim, or Indian or Muslim, it combines with local modalities to create even more complex and pernicious discourses of exclusion and marginalisation, where contemporary Muslim identity has become the battleground for geopolitical power struggles.

5. *Conclusion*

This chapter focuses on the 2007 Hindi movie *Anwar* to interrogate the meaning and impact of global meta-narratives such as Islamophobia and the War on Terror through people's everyday lived experiences. It attempts to pin down and understand these free-floating discourses by taking a view of the global and the national from the ground up. It highlights how seemingly ordinary people become embroiled in scenarios where they are sometimes forced to take on involuntary identities, due to the sheer force of the suspicion and mistrust surrounding them, as in the case of Anwar's eventual surrender to the crowd. These global forces interact with the national, feeding on mutual stereotypes and insecurities, to produce a lived locality that reinforces existing fissures, thereby producing an overlapping yet unique experience in each context, depending on its specificities. The movie highlights how in the context of a small multi-religious town in north India, the overarching narrative of Islamophobia combines with national *hindutva* party politics to intensify violence against Muslims as a minority group and its gendered impact on women. Thus, I have argued that the meta-narratives of suspicion and stigmatisation of Muslims spread through globalisation are often interpreted and reified through the contexts in which they are implicated at the local level—thereby producing complex strategic everyday localities where identities, both voluntary and involuntary, become political tools manipulated along the global/national, heritage/legacy, majority/minority group axes.

CHAPTER ELEVEN

CURATING AGAINST DISSENT: MUSEUMS AND THE PUBLIC DEBATE ON ISLAM

Mirjam Shatanawi

Since 9/11 and the War on Terror exhibitions featuring art and artists from the Middle East or the Islamic world have been booming in Europe and the United States. Hallmark museums like the Louvre in Paris, London's Victoria and Albert Museum, the Metropolitan Museum in New York and the Benaki Museum in Athens have been upgrading their Islamic galleries, most of them motivated by a mission to build bridges between their (Western) audiences and the Muslim world. Smaller museums have followed suit. On the surface, most museums seem to refrain from explicit political statements and draw attention to artistic qualities of the Islamic or Middle Eastern artworks on display. Yet plenty of visitors make a connection between what the museum displays and the political events of the past decades, assessing these works of art in the context of a 'clash of civilisations' (Huntington 1996). As a result, museums have found themselves having to defend Islamic culture in the broadest terms (Flood 2007, 38). The preferred strategy is to focus on a universal love of aesthetics; substituting beauty for violence and artistic skill for backwardness. As Mark Jones (in Riding 2006), director of the Victoria and Albert Museum, put it in a *New York Times* article on the newly opened Jameel Gallery of Islamic art

> Do we want to confront prejudice? Yes, we want to undermine negative attitudes that people bring with them. It's absurd for some people to claim that Islamic culture is a barbaric culture. If you see what there is here, you can't possibly think it is hostile to beauty or education and has no intellectual tradition.

1. *The Museum as a Cultural Mediator*

This remark by Jones illustrates the growing entanglement of the museum with contemporary global politics. Euro-American museums aspiring to present aspects of Islam or Muslim cultures are faced with new questions:

Is it possible to mount an exhibition on Islam that is not stereotypical when Islam itself has become a cliché? Can museums challenge the views of their audiences and at the same time accommodate those same views? Given today's heavily politicised climate, any representation will always be framed by the public debate of which it will inevitably become part. It is therefore not surprising that since the turn of the millennium, when presenting Islam-related topics, most if not all Euro-American museums position themselves as alternatives to what they perceive to be popular misunderstanding of Islam. Museums aim to act responsibly and aspire to build bridges between a diversity of cultures but they cannot escape the force of existing representations. One of the results is that museums position themselves as mediators for cultures in confrontation. Yet although the intentions of museums might be to challenge the current debate on Islam, I suggest their chosen strategy of producing alternative images of Islamic cultures actually weakens their undertaking, and might even turn out to be counterproductive. Indeed, many museums that play a prominent role in promoting a better image of Islam are able to fall back on large and valuable collections of Islamic art, which find their origins in (colonial) collecting practices of the 18th and 19th century. Yet the focus on Islamic art precisely makes these museums appear to be quite ill-prepared for this pedagogical task.

One reason is the historical practice of displaying Islamic art, which is characterised by an emphasis on the aesthetic and the lack of a conceptual and critical framework contextualising the objects on display (Heath 2007, 155). Art historians, and by consequence the museum displays informed by them, tend to focus on aspects of technique and decoration rather than religious or cultural life in the Islamic world. As Heath's (2007) extensive study of the representation of Islam in British museums reveals, the conventional practice of displaying Islamic material hardly accommodates the public's growing demand for better insight in Muslim history and societies.

Another concern is the problematic relationship of Western art history with modernity in the context of the Muslim world (Flood 2007). The art-historical narrative generally holds that almost nothing of importance was produced there after 1800 (Blair and Bloom 2003). In this notion the colonial credentials of Islamic art, a concept developed by 19th century Western scholarship, are clearly detectable. Following a theory of rise-and-fall, the idea of a declining Muslim world, partially supported by 'evidence' of an art in decay, was central to the colonial project. Yet exhibitions of Islamic art rarely, if ever, question this timeline, or even explain the particular context in which it was construed.

Meanwhile, the lack of collections from the colonial or postcolonial periods forces museums intending to promote a 'bridge of understanding' to locate the greatness of the Muslim world in the past (Flood 2007, 39). Consequently, it reinforces the proposition of a contrast between contemporary Islam (stagnant and intolerant) and early Islam (advanced and tolerant), which informs much of global politics. As Barry Flood (2007, 44) noted:

> We are confronted here with a series of major paradoxes: a sub-field of art history marked by the eschewal of any engagement with the problems of modernity and their political ramifications is increasingly situated within contemporary Euro-American debates about the nature of Islam… The museum—an institution founded on the secularization of religious fetishes—assumes a pedagogical role in providing models not only of cultural understanding, but also of religious belief; in a global conflict in which the opponents of the New World Order are often said to be characterized by a medieval mindset, the antique objects of the museum point the way toward a brighter future in which the right kind of Islam will prevail, modernized, and rejuvenated under the aegis of Euro-American tutelage.

This analysis shows the extent to which the reception of Islamic art is framed by Western perceptions of the Islamic present; the same collections could of course be used as 'evidence' of the intolerant nature of Islamic history.

The entanglement between museums and global politics is not limited to the historical domain of Islamic art; similar frictions arise when museums decide to present contemporary art from the Islamic world. For instance, Winegar (2008) analysed Middle East or Islam-related exhibitions hosted by American museums and art institutions since 2001. According to her analysis, museums rarely present art from Muslim regions as interesting in itself, but rather frame them as part of current debates on political events. The common trope in these art events is an attempt to humanise Muslims by presenting them as producers of art, drawing on the publicly accepted notion that art is the most refined human activity. However, Winegar argues, Muslims can only be labelled as human, creative and 'good Muslims' when they are distinguished from the 'bad Muslims', i.e. terrorists and religious fanatics. Therefore, the art as evidence of humanity narrative does not challenge dominant perceptions of Muslims but rather argues that there are exceptions to the rule. Meanwhile, the well-intended desire to humanise Muslims incites curators and museum directors to select only those art works that make for an acceptable bridge of understanding. As a result, Winegar (2008, 653–72) concludes that,

> When art is used to show Middle Easterners' humanity or to advance certain views of Islam, a very particular and politicized 'bridge of understanding' is created that obfuscates, and perhaps refuses, other understandings which might be less comfortable to America's secular cultural elites... Indeed the idea that a bridge of understanding could be built by recognizing shared acts of destruction is unimaginable in this framework. It is Middle Eastern Muslims who must be artistic in order to become human.

This last remark points to an issue that goes beyond the alignment of certain parts of the art world with dominant power interests, or the inability of art itself, be it Islamic or contemporary, to address current sociopolitical issues. It has to do with the ways in which Western museums position themselves in the triangle of public opinion, national discourse and the Muslim world they try to represent in their exhibitions.

In recent studies, museums—particularly those with colonial roots—have often been analysed as unproblematic reflections of dominant ideological interests. Seeking to analyse "museum displays in order to reveal the cultural assumptions and political motivations that they may contain" (Macdonald 1996, 4) tends to overlook an important aspect of the postcolonial museum, i.e. the ideological counter-positions taken up by museums. Moreover, in the world of museums, power is unequally concentrated. Ethnographic museums, like the Tropenmuseum in Amsterdam, have often served as a counterpoint to the prestigious museums of art and history, where national identity is formulated. In this sense, while they are politically marginal, they are also symbolically central (Clifford 1988). During the postcolonial period, ethnographic museums have used this relatively marginal position to take up counter-positions on the dominant discourse about non-Western cultures. The Tropenmuseum, for instance, has a long-standing reputation as an institution dedicated to promoting international and intercultural awareness, engaging with debates on issues such as slavery, child labour, poverty and the treatment of human remains (Kreps 1988, 57).

In this chapter, I discuss two exhibitions held at the Tropenmuseum, both of which can be considered 'oppositional' to mainstream debates on Islam of their time. Yet my analysis suggests that although both exhibitions aimed to take a look behind the clichés, they still managed to reinstate the power structures they intended to critique. It seems that in meeting the challenges of representation, museums are destined to reflect the world surrounding them—with all its conflicts, contradictions and pressures. The exhibitions in question are the permanent Islam Gallery (1954–1970), and the more recent exhibition, *Urban Islam*, which I cocurated with Deniz Ünsal in 2004.

2. *Confronting Christianity: The Islam Gallery (1954–1970)*

In 1954, the Tropenmuseum opened the first exhibition in its history that was fully dedicated to Islam (Shatanawi 2009, 54). For a period of 16 years, the permanent Islam Gallery presented the Dutch public with a concise introduction to the Islamic faith. Not coincidentally, the gallery opened five years after Indonesia, the world's largest Muslim country, gained full independence from Dutch colonial rule. In its prior existence as the Netherlands' prime colonial museum, the Tropenmuseum had all but ignored Islam, in line with colonial perceptions that downplayed the influence of Islam on Indonesian (and particularly Javanese) culture. Islam was seen as a superficial layer on top of essentially Hindu, Buddhist or animist traditions. Moreover, the lack of interest in Islamic culture was closely connected to the fear of the colonial authorities of Islam as a major threat to Dutch dominance in the Indonesian archipelago (Sears 1996, 23).

During the colonial period, the ethnographic department of the museum had showed the various cultural and religious traditions of the Dutch East Indies. Yet the Islamic objects on display were very few, and they were only exhibited for a short while (Shatanawi 2009, 51). Forced to reorient its focus after Indonesian independence in 1949, the museum decided to expand it geographical focus to other regions of the so-called Third World, including the Middle East and South Asia, while transforming itself into an educational centre in order to promote government policies on trade and development cooperation (Kreps 1988, 58, Van Duuren 1990, 33). Islam came into the picture because the museum management considered it to be the largest religion of the tropics, and even more important, the prime religion of those regions it believed to be of utmost economic importance to the Netherlands, i.e. the oil fields of the Middle East (Mellema 1954).

Although the decision to open the first Islam Gallery reflected the general policies of the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Tropenmuseum's main sponsor, its content was decidedly oppositional. The exhibition owed its contentious storyline largely to its curator, Remt Mellema (1899–1987). Mellema, a former colonial servant, was a great admirer of Islam who even seems to have converted during a trip to Pakistan in the early 1950s. On a personal mission to fight the anti-Islamic propaganda that had corrupted Western thinking about Islam since the Middle Ages, Mellema's primary goal for the exhibition was to clear Islam's reputation in the Netherlands (Mellema 1958, 14). A strong believer in the values of the Enlightenment, he was fully convinced that the masses would soon find out what great Orientalists like Nöldeke and Wellhausen had

discovered before them: the positive strength of the Islamic faith. In a speech for the inauguration of the exhibition Mellema (1954) outlined his views on the matter:

> Only after the ideas of the French Revolution became widely accepted, the doors of the University opened up to a truly free and open-minded study of the Eastern faiths, and Islam in particular... As a result the West eventually acquired a completely new image of Muhammad as well as the religion he founded. The one-time 'impostor' has been replaced by the pious introverted human being.

A closer look at Mellema's views reveals that he thought that the values of the Enlightenment not only facilitated an improved outlook on Islam in the West, but could also be found in the Islamic creed itself. In the deeply religious Dutch society of the 1950s, Islam was predominantly framed as a deceitful yet powerful competitor of Christianity. In reaction to this view, the exhibition presented Islam as a thoroughly rational religion—on a par with Christianity. Calligraphic works and a glass case filled with copies of the Quran focused on Islam as a scriptural religion, while a diorama of Cairo's al-Azhar University served to demonstrate the importance it attaches to science and education. By highlighting concepts like *tawhid* (unity), the *Ummah* (Muslim community) and the predominance of individual responsibility—in absence of a system of hierarchal power—the exhibition defended Islam against claims of irrationality, portraying it as a religion that might even be more advanced and more fit for modernity than its European counterpart.

In order to visualise this idea, Mellema hardly made use of the colonial collections from the former Dutch East Indies. Although they contained about a few hundred religious Islamic objects, most of them referred to local Islamic practices, e.g. magical beliefs or local rituals. It seems that Mellema either did not recognise these objects as Islamic because they did not fit his definition of religion, or discarded them because they would undermine his curatorial approach and the desired effect of the exhibition. Painted dioramas, wax figures and reproductions of Islamic art pieces from the Middle East took their place.

The Islam Gallery fitted in perfectly with the museological climate of the early period of decolonisation, when the Tropenmuseum, like other former colonial museums, tried to find a new raison d'être. In an attempt to shape new relationships with the cultures and societies it represented, the museum's displays and collections were decoded for Western biases and limitations (Kreps 1988, 56). It is clear that Mellema hoped that this

prevailing mood, inside the museum as well as in wider society, would turn out to be a window of opportunity for a more positive and unbiased view on Islam.

Yet the views brought forward by the Islam Gallery clearly entailed biases of their own, replacing notions of irrationality and superstition with the firm truths of theology. Although Mellema intended to break with colonial stereotypes, by framing Islam as an essentially Middle Eastern religion and neglecting Indonesian Islam, the presentation reaffirmed these views. Equally striking is Mellema's relentless faith in the authoritative power of both the museum and Western academia, leaving no doubt in his mind about the beneficial effect of museum education in installing the new scientific truths of the museum in visitors' minds. He did not realise that the kind of dialogue the exhibition envisioned was a rather unilateral one, in which Muslim opinions and experiences could only reach a Western audience through the filter of Western academic assessment.

3. *Accommodating the Public*

The example of Mellema's exhibition shows that the idea of the exhibition as a vehicle for counter-positions on Islam can be dated back to the early days of postcolonialism (and perhaps even earlier). Since then, museums have become increasingly complex places, in their relationships with audiences, and with public and academic knowledge. No longer the passive citizens of Mellema's modern aspirations, the visitors of today are recognisably diverse and more assertive. Museums' expectations of visitors and vice versa have similarly changed. In museums, more than simply interaction, visitors need to place themselves in the exhibition, to express their opinions and to join in the cultural dialogue.

To facilitate learning, museums in the West often work with constructivist models of educational theory, which argue that visitors' understanding of any exhibition is shaped by their personal interests, prior knowledge and experiences (Hein 1995). As part of the development process of exhibitions, museums regularly undertake evaluation studies to map visitors' attitudes and preferences. For an exhibition to succeed, it has to take into account the world views and experiences of its audiences. Prior to the installation of the Jameel Gallery of Islamic Art, staff members of the Victoria and Albert in London carried out an evaluation study to be able to adjust the exhibition to visitors' prior knowledge, interests, experiences

and attitudes towards Islamic art (Crill and Stanley 2006). In a similar vein, the permanent exhibitions at the Tropenmuseum that succeeded Mellema's Islam Gallery—called *Middle East and North Africa* (1978–1997) and *West Asia and North Africa* (1998–present)—both took visitors' ideas as a starting point to debunk stereotypes about the Muslim world. In a much more direct way than Mellema intended, these exhibitions made ample comparisons between Islam and Christianity, for instance by displaying paintings with Quranic stories that could also be found in the Bible and Torah. By focusing on themes that were easily recognisable by the Dutch public, Mellema's successor as curator, Carel van Leeuwen (1998), encouraged a more positive attitude towards the Muslim world, while at the same time trying to take the growing Muslim population into account:

> The intention behind the recent refurbishment is to highlight what unites us rather than divides us. By doing so, we hope to contribute to the demolition of our mutual hostile images… Many Muslims, Jews and Christians do not realise how many religious stories and images they share. Such recognition can work towards mutual acceptance. If we succeed to some extent, I will be already satisfied.

The constructivist model of education positions the museum somewhere between the media and the academic world. In its role of producer of specialist knowledge, the museum maintains strong ties with the academic world. But museums are also communicators, and much like the media, mediating between their audiences and sources of knowledge and experience. They do this by engaging in a process of meaning construction in which production, representation and response are dynamically interconnected (Silverstone 1988, 232). The recent change in the perception of the relationship between the museum and its audience represents an evening up of balance of agency. Yet it also entails a blurring of roles between producers and consumers of knowledge, between creators and readers of culture, and between the person in command and the person consenting. The tensions and frictions that subsequently arise affect museum practice during all stages of the process of exhibition-making.

4. *Repercussions of the Public Debate: Urban Islam* (2004)

As public institutions, museums of today that exhibit Islamic cultures are continuously negotiating between public and academic notions of Islam, and between a diverse range of both Muslim and non-Muslim

perceptions. I will use the exhibition, *Urban Islam*, as an example to argue that these negotiation processes actually limit the museum's discursive space.

Urban Islam was developed and shown at the Tropenmuseum (2004) and the Museum der Kulturen in Basel, Switzerland (2006). The exhibition set out to explore contemporary Islam in different parts of the world. In order to do so, it presented the personal stories of young adult Muslims living in five cities around the globe and their highly individual search for an Islamic identity in a rapidly globalising world. Through the deployment of interactive tools, the museum attempted to make the exhibition serve as an arena for debate. At the same time, the content of the exhibition was to a large extent grown from and a response to an increasing frustration with the Dutch debate on Islam.

The making of the *Urban Islam* exhibition took place against the backdrop of a vehement debate on Islam and a heightening of the tensions in Dutch society, which put considerable pressure on the project. Since the late 1990s, the Netherlands has developed an intense preoccupation with Islam and Muslim cultures. Media studies show that from 1998 to 2004 the focus on Islam grew more important in the Dutch media, with religious issues dominating reporting (Ter Wal 2004, D'Haenens and Bink 2006). Islam has often been related to terrorism, religious fundamentalism, the repression of women and violence. The debate being largely conducted by native Dutch opinion makers, the actual experiences of Muslims, or their divergent views, were largely ignored.

From its very start in the 1990s, the new debate on Islam in the Netherlands became closely intertwined with the question of the integration of immigrants. Migrant culture was equated with Islam, although Muslims only accounted for 60% of the migrants from non-Western countries and their descendants. Domestic problems with integration were more and more explained by referring to Islam as a religion. Dutch sociologist Willem Schinkel states that the Dutch political discourse on integration is based on a definition of society that includes its indigenous population only. Migrants, often equated with Muslims, are seen as being outside society and in need of literal integration into society (Schinkel 2007). Yet at the same time, Islam and Muslim cultures are ascribed characteristics that make them inherently unfit for integration. The anti-Islamic discourse that was derived from this thesis incorporated two main assumptions, both of them in fact having solid colonial credentials. The first assumption is that Muslims hold pre-modern ideas, which renders them unfit for integration. In fact, religion itself is pre-modern. Because of

this and because Islam defies any attempt of reform, Muslims are bound to remain backward as long as they remain believers. The second assumption reads that Muslims can never be(come) real Dutchmen because their loyalty is with other parts of their identity (Sunier 2003, 68).

The repercussions of this debate were amply felt when the Tropenmuseum conducted several focus group discussions with Dutch Muslims better to understand their expectations for the upcoming exhibition. Most participants gave answers in which what Sen (2006) has called a reactive self-perception of identity could be detected. The participants severely criticised how the media, as well as some cultural institutions, portrayed Islam. Time and again, they emphasised the need for a better-balanced, more diverse and more truthful view of Islam. And although there was significant diversity between participants in terms of how they perceived Islam, one thing they had in common; the suggestions they made for alternative themes and images all mirrored the terminology of Dutch discourse. Some asked us to show the modernity of Islam, represented by themes like science and education or Islamic fashion (the veil as a fashion item). Others suggested demonstrating Islam's track record of tolerance by highlighting the Ottoman Empire or Andalusia's Golden Age. Some proposed not to show religion at all, which they considered backward, but rather focus on secular life styles.

Asked about their expectations of the forthcoming exhibition, it became clear that they primarily perceived the exhibition as a vehicle to counter images of Islam presented by the Dutch media. Yet the alternatives they put forward were still situated within the dualist model of Dutch discourse and its notions of modernity versus tradition, inclusion and exclusion. Their own needs as visitors of the exhibition, for instance the need for in-depth information on issues concerning the Islamic faith or a desire to enjoy Islamic art, played a far lesser part in the discussions. (Indirect) representation not participation seemed to concern them most.

The results of this study of the views of Muslim target groups were then compared with those of a survey conducted among regular visitors to the Tropenmuseum, most of whom did not have a Muslim background. Indeed, as is the case for many museums in the Netherlands, the Tropenmuseum hardly has any Dutch visitors with a non-Western ethnic background, who only made up about one percent of the total number of visitors to the museum. As part of this survey, respondents could list the themes they wanted the exhibition to cover. The expectations of participants in this group contrasted sharply with those of their Muslim

counterparts. The themes they mentioned most often coincided with topics that featured prominently in the media, such as the integration of Muslim minorities into Dutch society (20%), religious tenets (18%) or the position of Muslim women (17%). In this sense, potential visitors of non-Muslim and Muslim backgrounds held completely opposite expectations of the exhibition. Non-Muslim respondents wanted the museum to give more information on familiar issues—in other words, the Islam they knew—while their Muslim counterparts hoped the exhibition would break away from stereotypes and present Islam from a new perspective. Both groups departed from the notion that the museum should construct a 'true' Islam, but inverted its meaning.

The comments of participants in the survey also revealed a difference in perception of the institution of the museum itself. While the self-image of the Tropenmuseum may be based on the oppositional model, its audiences tend to hold a different view. It was quite clear that Muslims saw the museum as a stronghold of mainstream discourse and wanted it to wield its authoritative power to put forward alternative readings of Islam. Regular (non-Muslim) visitors also saw the museum as a stronghold of mainstream discourse, but precisely for that reason, wanted it to give them information within the existing framework of mainstream public debate. The outcome of the survey thus exposed the paradox with which today's museum struggles—the tension between having to cater to well-established tastes and worldviews to attract large audiences and at the same having to challenge stereotypes to fulfil its social mission (Shatanawi 2007).

5. *Deconstructing Public Debate*

The preparations for the *Urban Islam* exhibition show how the often conflicting demands of different interests might affect museum practice. If taken literally, the conflicting expectations of different target groups left the Tropenmuseum with little space to manoeuvre. Each group wanted to instrumentalise the museum for its own goals, while these goals often concerned fellow museum visitors since many tended to regard the exhibition through the eyes of the others. We, the curatorial team, felt uncomfortable with the somewhat worn-out suggestions of our non-Muslim respondents, but we felt equally uncomfortable with the alternative idea of a 'pure' and 'perfect' Islam proposed by many of the Muslim participants. We decided to address this issue head on in the exhibition concept by focusing on one

of the dichotomies frequently mentioned during the survey—the distinction between culture and religion.

In the centre of the exhibition floor we erected a white tower 12 metres in height. Inside the tower were a series of enclosed glass cases containing objects from the museum's vast collection to illustrate the history of Islam. The conventionally laid-out displays included a tenth-century page from a Quran in Kufic script and 18th century Iranian miniatures of Quranic stories. The stark presentation of these objects symbolised an approach to religion that favours religious dogma, in its alleged static and universal manifestations, to present a definitive picture of contemporary Islam. Omnipresent in Dutch public discourse, such an approach sees Islam not as the product of Muslim believers, but rather as a fixed set of theological dogmas determining the behaviour of Muslims (Peters 2006). Remarkably enough, this view was shared by many Muslim participants in the focus group discussions, who made a strict division between religion, perceived as pure and unchangeable, and culture, described as the actions of Muslims (although participants varied widely in their positions on the definitions of these categories as well as the desirability of presenting them to a non-Muslim audience). We, the curators of the exhibition, with our academic backgrounds in cultural anthropology, considered such a dualist model to be a fairly limited approach to reality. From our perspective, religion and culture were intertwined; we argued that while all religion is culture, not all culture is religion.

Stuck between our academic views and the outcome of the survey, we felt a need to challenge visitors' assumptions. For this purpose, pavilions where the personal stories of young adult Muslims living in Dakar, Marrakech, Istanbul and Paramaribo were placed around the tower. The lively, colourful spaces in the pavilions where these stories were told, in brief videotapes supplemented with objects and images from daily life, contrasted sharply with the quiet, lifeless presentation in the tower. Often the opinions expressed in the pavilions contradicted each other, allowing visitors to note the complexities of Islamic discourse and practice.

Through the contrasts on display, the Dutch public debate on Islam was contested. Yet it also challenged the contentious legacy of the ethnographic museum, which creates the illusion of adequate representation of the world by cutting out objects from their contexts and then making them stand for abstract wholes—a Quran, for instance, becoming a metonym for Islam as a whole (Clifford 1988). On a similar level, we tried to tackle the conventional ethnographic museum and its staging of cultures

as necessarily silent (Clifford 1988). The diorama of al-Azhar University presented in Mellema's 1954 Islam Gallery, for instance, had included a wax figure of Abdel Latif Diraz, vice-chancellor of the university. Yet the vice-chancellor had only been present as a doll, there was no speech he had given, no text he had written. His presence being restricted to the visual, the display had allowed visitors to look at him but not to get to know his thoughts and ideas. The exhibition had thus turned the vice-chancellor from a person into a figure, not only in a literal but also a metaphorical sense, a man whose presence was only required as a symbol of Islamic theology.

In our analysis, the contemporary Dutch public debate on Islam shared many characteristics with the silenced displays of the ethnographic museum of the past. Although in the public arena the spotlight was continuously on Islam and Muslims, there were too many of the same clichéd images around and too few alternative representations. Like in the former museum, there was a general absence of Muslim voices, in the sense that Muslim experiences and opinions only served as illustrations to an ideological agenda set *for* them, not *by* them. We wanted to use our position as curators to give a platform to Muslim experiences, frame them as valid information and by doing so, re-insert them into the public arena. Yet the position of the Tropenmuseum as a mediator between these experiences and its Dutch audiences soon made that we became enmeshed in conflicting models of representation.

To counter the silencing of Muslim voices in Dutch debate, *Urban Islam* brought individual opinions to the fore. In short documentary films, young adults in the four cities introduced their personal perspectives on the place of Islam in their lives and the society they live in. This was followed by a museological display of the story of each protagonist, now expressed in images, text quotes and symbolic objects. For instance, secondary school teacher Ferhat Duçe from Istanbul explained the aspirations of secularism in Turkey and how deeply they have influenced his lifestyle. While he identified himself as a real Kemalist, a secular Muslim and a Westernised Turk, his section in the exhibition displayed fragments of daily newspapers to point to the ongoing discussions in Turkey on the meanings of Westernisation, modernity and the place of Islam in public life. The newspaper headlines reflected the major divisions in Turkish society with respect to the headscarf—on the issue of whether it was against secularism or not—and the expression of religious identity in public space—over the question of whether or not religion should be confined to the private sphere.

The choice of Ferhat as a protagonist was controversial from the start. In our preliminary visitor survey, religious respondents of Turkish background had strongly advised against introducing a Dutch audience to Kemalist ideology, since it might strengthen prevailing ideas that perceive Islam to be an obstacle to modernity or incompatible with Western culture. Faced with the choice between filtering out everything that could confirm prejudices and construct a single 'true' Islam, like former curators Mellema and Van Leeuwen had done, or showing a more complex reality on the ground with all its subtle twists, varieties and contradictions, we chose the latter. Either choice would antagonise segments of our audience, and no alternative would convince all.

As curators of the exhibition, we considered *Urban Islam* to be our curatorial statement against discussions about Islam and Muslims in the West, and the Netherlands in particular. Through the exhibition, we argued for an approach to religion and society from a human perspective. By focusing on personal stories and experiences in everyday life, we distanced ourselves from a-historical and oversimplified representations of Islam (Shatanawi and Ünsal 2004, 44). In this sense, we were trying to pursue a form of image critique, fighting images with images, in order to persuade our audiences to replace their perception of authenticity with ours. But did it work?

In the heavily politicised Dutch climate, the exhibition was first and foremost evaluated in terms of its contribution to the public debate. Visitors advocating a better-balanced approach to Islam scrutinised the displays for signs of optimism and a readiness to battle stereotypes. Others scrutinised them for signs of political correctness and deliberate underexposure of acts of terrorism and fundamentalist beliefs. Press reviews generally ignored the critical message of the exhibition, but rather focused on its deviation from the norm. The intellectual daily *NRC Handelsblad*, praised the well-researched content of the exhibition, but blamed the Tropenmuseum for lacking courage by not bringing themes like 9/11 to the fore, which the reviewer considered crucial to Islam:

> The actual sharp edges of Islam are totally kept out of reach. Hans Jansen's [a well-known anti-Islamic intellectual] recent study with the revealing title *God has Spoken. Terror, Tolerance and the Unfinished Modernization of Islam* is more informative and, more importantly, braver… I wanted more courage. There is no reference whatsoever to 9/11 for instance. But this says more about certain aspects of Islam than shaking buttocks and naked bellies in a nightclub. Within this subject matter, such images are pointless and even absurd (Freriks 2004).

6. *Conclusion: Rethinking Strategies*

The experiences of *Urban Islam* reflect some of the difficulties of cultural institutions like the Tropenmuseum, in engaging with the public debate on Islam in a political climate that leaves little room for alternative approaches. In the Netherlands, Islam is discursively defined in a two-camped discussion in which non-Muslims and Muslims define themselves against each other when framing the concept of 'Islam'. Such a debate leaves museums very limited discursive space, and museums attempting to act responsibly in such complex environments are bound to find themselves enmeshed in controversy (Lavine and Karp 1991, 5–6). This position is further problematised by the confusing notion of cultural dialogue itself. The 'cultures in confrontation' that the museum seeks to reconcile are not located outside European societies, as dominant discourse assumes, but also within these societies. In the case of the Netherlands, the real clash is not over 'foreign fundamentalists' versus 'Western culture', but rather over different perceptions of the power structures in Dutch society. Is the Netherlands becoming a multicultural society in the sense that Islam is publicly seen as part of Dutch culture, or does Islam remain a foreign element with which one can only communicate by means of dialogue?

However, I suggest there is a deeper issue at stake here. The shortcoming of the museum as a cultural mediator is its failure to circumvent the paradigms it intends to critique. When current Dutch debates on migrants depart from a singular notion of identity, reducing it to an Islamic core, and then essentialise this reduced identity, the choice for Islam as a rubric for the show replicates existing tropes. In the case of *Urban Islam*, even though the curatorial approach aimed to problematise notions of Islamic identity as an all-determining social factor, Muslims were still—and above all—presented in their capacity as Muslims. Nor did the exhibition's focus on Islam help to deflect attention from the Dutch obsession with Islamic identities to other aspects of the identities of Turkish or Moroccan citizens. To paraphrase Sen (2006), Istanbul protagonist Ferhat Duçe was portrayed as a dedicated school teacher, a motor bike rider, a potential husband seeking true love, someone who loves drinking beer with his friends, but first and foremost he embodied the Turkish Muslim.

Similar issues are at stake at museums that recently refurbished their galleries of Islamic art—galleries that take their name from a 19th-century notion of the Middle East as a region underpinned by a theocentric vision. While the academic debate is moving away from Islam as a unifying factor

to explain an immensely diverse art, these museums now have to revive this idea to meet the publicly felt need for better insights into Muslim cultures. Such a simplified notion of cultural diplomacy does not do justice to the eclectic variety of the artefacts, produced over a span of 1,500 years and three continents, which these exhibitions put on display. Moreover, the notion actually reinforces the reductive scheme on which the thesis of the clash of civilisations is founded. Just as Winegar (2008, 677) does, I wonder whether "the emphasis on art as evidence of humanity [can] really erase stereotypes of Middle Eastern Muslims as un-human destructive terrorists, or does this framing depend on these stereotypes for its own definition and execution?"

So the paradox of presenting Islam unfolds—greater understanding of the museum's subject only comes about when the museum steps out of the model that gave birth to cultural conflict and hence the ensuing desire for dialogue. The museum shares this uncomfortable position with other consumer-based institutions like the media and, to some extent, the art world. Museums looking for alternatives in an attempt not to assert, but rather subvert the thesis of the clash of civilisations have very few options. Unfortunately, with little advance on the political level since the optimistic days of early postcolonialism, the museological representation of Islam remains a puzzle that is just as unsolvable today as it was 50 years ago.

REFERENCES

Abo-Kazleh, Mohammed. 2006. "Rethinking IR Theory in Islam: Towards a More Adequate Approach." *Alternatives: Turkish Journal of International Relations* 5 (4): 41–56.

Abrahamson, Mark, and Valerie J. Carter. 1986. "Tolerance, Urbanism and Region." *American Sociological Review* 51 (2): 287–94.

Agrikoliansky, Eric. 2002. *La Ligue Française des Droits de l'Homme et du Citoyen depuis 1945: Sociologie d'un Engagement Civique*. Paris: L'Harmattan.

Ahmed, Leila. 1992. *Women and Gender in Islam: Historical Roots of a Modern Debate*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Akram, Susan Musarrat. 2002. "The Aftermath of September 11, 2001: The Targeting of Arabs and Muslims in America." *Arab Studies Quarterly* 23 (2–3): 61–118.

Allali, Jean–Pierre. 2002. *Contre le Racisme: Les Combats de la LICRA*. Paris: Cherche Midi.

Allali, Jean–Pierre, and Haim Musicant. 1987. *Des Hommes Libres: Histoires Extraordinaires de l'Histoire de la LICRA*. Paris: Bibliophane.

al-Azmeh, Aziz. 1993. *Islams and Modernities*. London: Verso.

al-Azmeh, Aziz and Eddie Fokas, eds. 2006. *Islam in Europe: Diversity, Identity and Influence*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Alessandri, Emiliano and Ebru Ş. Canan. 2008. " 'Mamma li Turchi!' Just an Old Italian Saying." In *Talking Turkey in Europe: Towards a Differentiated Communication Strategy*, edited by Nathalie Tocci, 11–41. Quaderno IAI No. 13. Rome: Istituto Affari Internazionali.

Allen, Chris. 2010. *Islamophobia*. Aldershot: Ashgate.

Alterman, Eric. 2004. *What Liberal Media? The Truth about Bias and the News*. New York: Basic Books.

Altheide, David L. 1976. *Creating Reality: How TV News Distorts Events*. London: Sage.

Allport, Gordon W. 1954. *The Nature of Prejudice*. Reading: Addison–Wesley.

al-Nabhani, Taqiuddin. 1998. *The Islamic State*. London: al–Khilafa Publications.

al-Zawahiri, Ayman. 2001. "Knights under the Prophet's Banner," translated extracts published by al-Sharq al-Awsat. Accessed 1 November 2010. http://web.archive.org/web/20060717194717/http://faculty.msb.edu/murphydd/ibd/MiddleEast-Islam/Zawahiri's+2001+book+extracts.htm

al-Zuhili, Sheikh Wahbeh. 2005. "Islam and International Law," *International Review of the Red Cross* 858: 269–83.

Anand, Dibyesh. 2005. "The Violence of Security: Hindu Nationalism and the Politics of Representing 'the Muslim' as a Danger." *The Round Table: The Commonwealth Journal of International Affairs* 94 (379): 203–15.

Andreassen, Rikke. 2007. *Der Er et Yndigt Land*. Copenhagen: Tiderne Skifter.

Appadurai, Arjun. 1999. "Globalization and the Research Imagination." *International Social Science Journal* 51: 229–38.

Archer, Jules. 1976. *Legacy of the Desert: Understanding the Arabs*. Toronto: Little, Brown.

Assemblée Nationale. 2004. *Laïcité: Le Débat à l'Assemblée Nationale, Séances Publiques du 3 au 10 Février 2004*. Paris: Assemblée Nationale.

Ayotte, Kevin J., and Mary, E. Husain. 2005. "Securing Afghan Women: Neocolonialism, Epistemic Violence, and the Rhetoric of the Veil." *NWSA Journal* 17 (3): 112–33.

Balibar, Etienne, ed. 2003. *Antisémitisme: L'Intolérable Chantage. Israël–Palestine, une Affaire Française?* Paris: La Découverte.

Banks, M. 2001. *Visual Methods in Social Research*. London: Sage.

Bardin, Laurence. 1983. *L'Analyse de Contenu*. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France.

Bayne, Spencer. 1944. *Agent Extraordinary*. London: Eyre & Spottiswoode.

Benjamin, Daniel and Steven Simon. 2003. *The Age of Sacred Terror: Radical Islam*. New York: Random House.
Bennett, Kem. 1953. *The Devil's Current*. London: Collins.
Bennett, W. Lance and David L. Paletz. 1994. *Taken by the Storm: The Media, Public Opinion, and US Foreign Policy*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Berg-Sørensen, Anders. 2006. "Religion i det Offentlige Rum? En Rundtur i de Danske Sekularismer." *Kritik* 182: 30–8.
Berger, Arthur Asa. 2006. *Media and Society*. Plymouth: Rowman & Littlefield.
Berkowitz, Leonard. 1999. "Anger." In *Handbook of Cognition and Emotion,* edited by Tim Dalgleish and Mick Power, 411–28. New York: Wiley.
Bhabha, Homi. 1986. "The Other Question: Difference, Discrimination and the Discourse of Colonialism." In *Literature, Politics and Theory: Papers from the Essex Conference 1976–84*, edited by Francis Barker, Peter Hulme, Margaret Iversen and Diana Loxey, 148–72. London: Methuen.
Bhasin, Kamala, and Ritu Menon. 1998. *Borders and Boundaries: Women in India's Partition*. New Delhi: Kali for Women.
Blair, Sheila S. and Jonathan M. Bloom. 2003. "The Mirage of Islamic Art: Reflections on the Study of an Unwieldy Field. *Art Bulletin* 85 (1): 152–84.
Blandford, Linda. 1978. *Oil Sheikhs: Inside the Supercharged World of the Petrodollar*. London: Star.
Bleich, Eric. 2003. *Race Politics in Britain and France: Ideas and Policymaking since the 1960s*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Bleich, Eric. 2004. "Anti–Racism without Races: Politics and Policy in a 'Color–Blind' State." In *Race in France: Interdisciplinary Perspectives on the Politics of Difference*, edited by Herrick Chapman and Linda L. Frader, 162–88. New York: Berghahn Books.
Blumer, Jay 1969. *Symbolic Interactionism: Perspective and Method*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Bobo, Lawrence, and Frederick C. Licari. 1989. "Education and Political Tolerance: Testing the Effects of Cognitive Sophistication and Target Group Affect." *The Public Opinion Quarterly* 53 (3): 285–308.
Borradori, Giovanni. 2004. *Philosophy in a Time of Terror*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Bowen, John R. 2007. *Why the French Don't Like Headscarves: Islam, the State, and Public Space*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Brown, Jane D., Carl R. Bybee, Stanley T. Wearden and Dulcie M. Straughan. 1987. "Invisible Power: Newspaper News Sources and the Limits of Diversity." *Journalism Quarterly* 64: 45–54.
Brubaker, Rogers. 2001. "The Return of Assimilation? Changing Perspectives on Immigration and Its Sequels in France, Germany, and the United States." *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 24 (4): 531–48.
Buskens, Léon. 2010. "Islamonderzoek in de Publieke Sfeer." *Zemzem* 6 (1): 25–32.
Butler, Judith. 2004. *Precarious Life*. New York: Verso.
Buzan, Barry and Amitav Acharya. 2009. *Non-Western International Relations Theory: Perspectives on and beyond Asia*. London: Routledge.
Caesar, Judith. 1993. "Arabs in Contemporary American Literature: Cultural Violence and Brand–Name Bigotry." *North Dakota Quarterly* 61 (3): 79–90.
Canan-Sokullu, Ebru Ş. and Çigdem Kentmen. 2011. "Turkey in the EU? An Empirical Analysis of European Public Opinion on Turkey's 'Protracted' Accession Process." In *A Sisyphean Story: Fifty Years of EU-Turkey Relations (1959–2009),* edited by Armagan E. Çakır, 105–31. London: Routledge.
Caporaso, James A. 2005. "The Possibilities of a European Identity." *Brown Journal of World Affairs* 12 (1): 65–75.
Carey, Sean. 2002. "Undivided Loyalties: Is National Identity an Obstacle to European Integration?" *European Union Politics* 3 (4): 387–413.

Casanova, José. 2006. "Religion, European Secular Identities and European Integration." In *Religion in an Expanding Europe,* edited by Timothy A. Byrnes and Peter J. Katzenstein, 65–93. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Chanley, Virginia. 1994. "Commitment to Political Tolerance: Situational and Activity-Based Differences." *Political Behavior* 16 (3): 343–63.
Chilton, Paul. 2005. "Missing Links in Mainstream CDA: Modules, Blends and the Critical Instinct." In *A New Research Agenda in* (*Critical*) *Discourse Analysis. Theory and Interdisciplinarity*, edited by Ruth Wodak and Paul Chilton, 19–52. Philadelphia: John Benjamins.
Citrin, Jack, Beth Reingold and Donald P. Green. 1990. "American Identity and the Politics of Ethnic Change." *Journal of Politics* 52: 1124–54.
Clancy-Smith, Julia A. 1998. "Islam, Gender and Identities in the Making of French Algeria, 1830–1962." In *Domesticating the Empire: Race, Gender, and Family Life in French and Dutch Colonialism*, edited by Julia A. Clancy-Smith and Frances Gouda, 154–73. Charlottesville, Va.: University Press of Virginia.
Clifford, James. 1988. *The Predicament of Culture: Twentieth-Century Ethnography, Literature and Art*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
Cloud, Dana, L. 2004. " 'To Veil the Threat of Terror': Afghan Women and the 'Clash of Civilizations' in the Imagery of the US War on Terrorism." *Quarterly Journal of Speech* 90 (3): 285–306.
Commission Fédérale contre le Racisme. 2006. *Les Relations avec la Minorité Musulmane en Suisse*. Berne: Commission Fédérale contre le Racisme.
Cook, David. 2009. "Islamism and Jihadism: The Transformation of Classical Notions of *Jihad* into an Ideology of Terrorism." *Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions* 10 (2): 177–87.
Cooper, Robert. 2004. *The Breaking of Nations: Order and Chaos in the Twenty–First Century*. Berkeley: Grove Press.
Cooper, Barry. 2004. *New Political Religions or an Analysis of Modern Terrorism*. Columbia: University of Missouri Press.
Cornell, Svante. 2006. *Islam and Foreign Policy*. Boston: MIT Press.
Cox, Robert. 1996. "Towards a Post-Hegemonic Conceptualisation of World Order: Reflections of the Relevancy of Ibn Khaldun." In *Approaches to World Order*, edited by Robert Cox with Timothy J. Sinclair, 144–73. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Crill, Rosemary, and Tim Stanley. 2006. *The Making of the Jameel Gallery of Islamic Art at the Victoria and Albert Museum*. London: Victoria and Albert Museum.
Dahlerup, Drude. 1998. *Rødstrømperne. Den Danske Rødstrømpebevægelses Udvikling, Nytænkning og Gennemslag 1970–1985*. Copenhagen: Gyldendals Forlag.
Dardis, Tom. 1984. "The Myth That Won't Go Away: Selling Out in Hollywood." *Journal of Popular Film & Television* 11 (4): 167–71.
Davis, Maggie. 1979. *The Sheik*. London: Granada. First published 1977, New York: Fawcett.
Delphy, Christine. 2006. "Antisexisme *ou* Antiracisme? Un Faux Dilemme." *Nouvelles Questions Féministes* 25 (1): 59–83.
Deltombe, Thomas. 2005. *L'Islam Imaginaire: La Construction Médiatique de l'Islamophobie en France 1975–2005*. Paris: La Découverte.
D'Haenens, Leen and Susan Bink. 2007. "Islam in the Dutch Press: With Special Attention to the *Algemeen Dagblad*." *Media, Culture & Society* 29 (1): 135–49.
De Master, Sara and Michael K. Le Roy. 2000. "Xenophobia and the European Union." *Comparative Politics* 32 (4): 419–36.
De Martino, Ernesto. 1972. *The World of Magic*. Seattle: Pyramid Communications.
Devine, Laurie. 1985. *Saudi*. London: Arrow.
Dickinson, Peter. 1982. *The Poison Oracle*. New York: Pantheon.
Dudrah, Rajinder. 2006. *Bollywood: Sociology Goes to the Movies*, London: Sage.
Dwyer, Claire and Astrid Meyer. 1995. "The Institutionalization of Islam in the Netherlands and in the United Kingdom: The Case of Islamic Schools." *New Community* 21: 37–54.

Eastermann, Daniel. 1984. *The Last Assassin*. New York: Doubleday.
Edward, Samuel. 1974. *The Exploiters*. New York: Prager.
Erdman, Paul. 1978. *The Crash of '79*. London: Sphere.
Ettinger, Patrik and Linards Udris. 2009. "Islam as a Threat? Problematisation of Muslims in the Mass Media and Effects on the Political System." In *Media, Religion, and Conflict*, edited by Lee Marsden and Heather Savigny, 59–80. Aldershot: Ashgate.
European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia (EUMC). 2002. *Anti–Islamic Reactions within the European Union after the Acts of Terror against the USA. Country Report of the Netherlands, Covering the Period 12 September – 31 December 2001*. Vienna: EUMC.
European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia (EUMC). 2003. *The Fight Against Anti-Semitism and Islamophobia. Bringing Communities Together*. Brussels/Vienna: EUMC.
European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia (EUMC). 2006. *Les Musulmans au Sein de l'Union Européenne: Discriminations et Islamophobie*. Vienna: EUMC.
Fairclough, Norman. 1992. *Discourse and Social Change*. Cambridge: Polity Press/Blackwell.
Fairclough, Norman. 2003. *Analysing Discourse*. London: Routledge.
Falk, John H., Lynn D. Dierking and Marianna Adams. 2006. "Living in a Learning Society: Museums and Free-Choice Learning." In *A Companion to Museum Studies*, edited by Sharon Macdonald, 323–39. Oxford: Blackwell.
Favell, Adrian. 1998. *Philosophies of Integration*. Basingstoke: Macmillan.
Fawcett, Louise. 2005. *International Relations of the Middle East*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Fekete, Liz. 2009. *A Suitable Enemy: Racism, Migration and Islamophobia in Europe*. London: Pluto.
Feldman, Stanley, and Karen Stenner. 1997. "Perceived Threat and Authoritarianism." *Political Psychology* 18 (4): 741–70.
Feldman, Stanley. 2003. "Enforcing Social Conformity: A Theory of Authoritarianism." *Political Psychology* 24 (1): 41–74.
Fernandez, Sonya. 2009. "The Crusade over the Bodies of Women." *Patterns of Prejudice* 43 (3/4), 269–86.
Fetzer, Joel S. 2000. *Public Attitudes towards Immigration in the United States, France and Germany*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Fetzer, Joel S. and Christopher J. Soper. 2005. *Muslims and the State in Britain, France and Germany*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Finkielkraut, Alain. 2003. *Au Nom de l'Autre: Réflexions sur l'Antisémitisme Qui Vient*. Paris: Gallimard.
Flood, Finbarr Barry. 2007. "From the Prophet to Postmodernism? New World Orders and the End of Islamic Art." In *Making Art History: A Changing Discipline and Its Institutions*, edited by Elizabeth C. Mansfield, 31–53. New York: Routledge.
Foucault, Michel. 1980. *Power/Knowledge*. Brighton: Harvester.
Freriks, Kester. 2004. 'Stortvloed aan Materiaal in Expositie over Islam', *NRC Handelsblad*, 9 January.
Fysh, Peter. 1998. "The Failure of Anti–Racist Movements in France, 1981–1995." In *The Mitterand Years: Legacy and Evaluation*, edited by Mairi Maclean, 198–216. London: Macmillan.
Gabel, Matthew J. 1998a. "Public Support for European Integration: An Empirical Test of Five Theories." *Journal of Politics* 60 (2): 333–54.
Gabel, Matthew J. 1998b. "Economic Integration and Mass Politics: Market Liberalization and Public Attitudes in the European Union." *American Journal of Political Science*. 42 (3): 936–53.
Gad, Ulrik Pram. 2010. (*How*) *Can They Become Like Us? Danish Identity Politics and the Conflict of Muslim Relations*. PhD diss., University of Copenhagen.
Ganti, Tejaswani. 2004. *Bollywood: A Guidebook to Popular Hindi Cinema*, London: Routledge.

Gastaut, Yvan. 2005. "La Guerre des Six Jours et la Question du Racisme en France." *Cahiers de la Méditerranée* 71 (2). Accessed 7 April 2010. http://cdlm.revues.org/index930.html.
Gaubert, Patrick. 2009. *Les Droits de l'Homme Ne Se Négocient Pas*. Paris: L'Archipel.
Gauntlett, D. 2007. *Creative Explorations: New Approaches to Identities and Audiences*. London: Routledge.
Geertz, Clifford. 1973. *The Interpretation of Cultures: Selected Essays*. New York: Basic books.
Geisser, Vincent. 2003. *La Nouvelle Islamophobie*. Paris: La Découverte.
Gelb, Leslie H. 1972. "The Essential Domino: American Politics and Vietnam." *Foreign Affairs* 50: 459–75.
Ghareeb, Edmund. 1983. "Imbalance in the American Media." In *Split Vision: The Portrayal of Arabs in the American Media*, edited by Edmund Ghareeb, 3–24. Washington: American–Arab Affairs Council.
Gianni, Matteo. 2005. *Vie Musulmane en Suisse: Profils Identitaires, Demandes et Perceptions des Musulmans en Suisse*. Report on behalf of Groupe de Recherche sur l'Islam en Suisse (GRIS). Berne: Commission Fédérale des Etrangers.
Gianni, Matteo. 2009. "Citoyenneté et Intégration des Musulmans en Suisse: Adaptation aux Normes ou Participation à Leur Définition?" In *Musulmans d'Aujourd'hui: Identités Plurielles en Suisse*, edited by Mallory Schneuwly Purdie, Matteo Gianni and Magali Jenny, 73–93. Genève: Labor et Fides.
Gibb, Robert. 2001. "Leadership, Political Opportunities and Organisational Identity in the French Anti–Racist Movement." In *Leadership and Social Movements*, edited by Colin Barker, Alan Johnson and Michael Lavalette, 60–76. Manchester: University of Manchester Press.
Gibb, Robert. 2005. *The Politics of Anti–Racism in Contemporary France*. Oxford: Berg.
Gibson, James L. and Richard D. Bingham. 1982. "On the Conceptualisation and Measurement of Political Tolerance." *American Political Science Review* 76 (3): 603–20.
Giddens, Anthony. 1984. *The Constitution of Society*. Cambridge: Polity.
Gilman, Sander. 1985. *Difference and Pathology*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
Golebiowska, Ewa A. 1995. "Individual Value Priorities, Education, and Political Tolerance." *Political Behavior* 17 (1): 23–48.
Gottschalk, Peter, and Gabriel Greenberg. 2008. *Islamophobia: Making Muslims the Enemy*. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield.
Greenberg, Jeff and Eva Jonas. 2003. "Psychological Motives and Political Orientation –The Left, the Right, and the Rigid: Comment on Jost *et al.* (2003)". *Psychological Bulletin,* 129 (3): 376–82.
Gregory, Orfalea. 1988. "Literary Devolution: The Arab in the Post–World War II Novel in English." *Journal of Palestine Studies* 66 (2): 109–28.
Grillo, Ralph. 2007. "An Excess of Alterity? Debating Difference in a Multicultural Society." *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 30 (6): 979–98.
Guiraudon, Virginie. 1996. "The Reaffirmation of the Republican Model of Integration: Ten Years of Identity Politics in France." *French Politics and Society* 14 (2): 47–57.
Gundelach, Peter, Hans Raun Iversen, and Margit Warburg. 2008. *I Hjertet af Danmark*. Copenhagen. Hans Reitzels Forlag.
Habeck, Mary. 2006. *Knowing the Enemy: Jihadist Ideology and the War on Terror*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Habermas, Jürgen. 2006. *The Divided West*, translated by Ciaran Cronin, Cambridge: Polity Press.
Haenni, Patrick. 1994. "Dynamiques Sociales et Rapport à l'Etat. L'Institutionnalisation de l'Islam en Suisse". *Revue Européenne des Migrations Internationales* 10 (1): 183–98.
Hall, Stuart. 1994. "Cultural Identity and Diaspora." In *Colonial Discourse and Post–Colonial Theory: A Reader*, edited by Patrick Williams and Laura Chrisman, 392–402. New York: Columbia.
Hassan, Mohammed Hariff. 2007. *War, Peace or Neutrality: An Overview of Islamic Polity's Basis of Inter-State Relations*. Rajarastan: School of International Studies.

Heath, Ian. 2007. *The Representation of Islam in British Museums*. Oxford: Archaeopress.
Hein, George E. 1995. "The Constructivist Museum." *Journal for Education in Museums* 16: 21–3.
Henzel, Christopher. 2005. "The Origins of the al-Qaeda Ideology: Implications for US Strategy." *Parameters* Spring: 69–80.
Herman, Edward S. and Noam Chomsky. 1994. *Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of the Mass Media*. London: Vintage Books.
Herrmann, Richard K. and Michael P. Fischerkeller. 1995. "Beyond the Enemy Image and Spiral Model: Cognitive–Strategic Research after the Cold War." *International Organisation* 49 (3): 415–50.
Hervik, Peter. 2002. *Mediernes Muslimer*. Copenhagen: Nævnet for Etnisk Ligestilling.
Hirji, Faiza. 2008. "Change of Pace: Islam and Tradition in Popular Indian Cinema." *South Asian Popular Culture* 6 (1): 57–69.
Hizb-ut Tahrir. 1999. *The Methodology of Hizb-ut Tahrir for Change*. London: al-Khilafah Publications.
Hizb-ut Tahrir. 2005. *Hizb-ut Tahrir*. London: al-Khilafah Publications.
Honneth, Axel. 1995. *The Struggle for Recognition*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
House, Jim. 2002. "Anti–Racism in France, 1898–1962: Modernity and Beyond." In *Rethinking Anti–Racism: From Theory to Practice*, edited by Floya Anthias, and Cathie Lloyd, 111–27. London: Routledge.
Household, Geoffrey. 1971. *Doom's Caravan*. London: Michael Joseph.
Huddy, Leonie, Stanley Feldman, Tereza Capelos, and Colin Provost. 2002. "The Consequences of Terrorism: Disentangling the Effects of Personal and National Threat." *Political Psychology* 23 (3): 485–509.
Huddy, Leonie, Stanley Feldman, Charles Taber, and Gallya Lahav. 2005. "Threat, Anxiety, and Support of Antiterrorism Policies." *American Journal of Political Science* 49 (3): 593–608.
Huddy, Leonie, Stanley Feldman, and Erin Cassese. 2006. "On the Distinct Political Effects of Anxiety and Anger." In *The Affect Effect: Dynamics of Emotion in Political Thinking and Behavior*, edited by W. Russell Neuman, George E. Marcus, Michael MacKuen, and Ann Crigler, 202–30. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Huntington, Samuel P. 1993. "The Clash of Civilizations?" *Foreign Affairs* 72 (3): 22–50.
Huntington, Samuel P. 1996. *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*. New York: Simon & Schuster.
Innes, Hammond. 1983. *The Black Tide*. New York: Doubleday.
Ionides, Michael. 1960. *Divide and Lose: The Arab Revolt 1955–1958*. London: Geoffrey Beles.
Irvine, William. D. 2007. *Between Justice and Politics: The Ligue des Droits de l'Homme, 1898–1945*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
Isbel, Linda, Victor C. Ottati, and Kathleen C. Burns. 2006. "Affect and Politics: Effects on Judgment Processing and Information Seeking." In *Feeling Politics: Emotion in Political Information Processing,* edited by David P. Redlawsk, 57–86. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
Iyengar, Shanto. 1991. *Is Anyone Responsible? How Television Frames Political Issues*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Jacobsen, Brian Arly. 2008. *Religion Som Fremmedhed i Dansk Politik*. PhD dissertation, University of Copenhagen.
Jarosz, Lucy. 1992. "Constructing the Dark Continent: Metaphor as a Geographic Representation of Africa." *Geografiska Annaler. Series B, Human Geography* 74 (2): 105–15.
Jelen, Ted G. 1993. "The Political Consequences of Religious Group Attitudes." *The Journal of Politics* 55 (1): 178–190.
Jenkins, Richard. 1996. *Social Identity*. New York: Routledge.
Jensen, Tina Gudrun. 2010. " 'Making Room': Encompassing Diversity in Denmark." *European Multiculturalism Revisited,* edited by Alessandro Silj, 181–213. London: Zed Books.

Johnson, Robert. 2003. *Histories and Controversies: British Imperialism*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Jørgensen, Signe Kjær. 2011. "Sharia og Dødsstraf: Et Indbilik i Komplekse Trovaerdighedsbetingelser" In *Islam og Muslimer i Danmark: Identitet og Sikkerhed efter 11. September 2001*, edited by Mikkel Rytter, and Marianne Holm Pedersen, 189–215. Copenhagen: Museum Tusculanums Forlag.

Juhem, Philippe. 2001. "Entreprendre en Politique. De l'Extrême Gauche au PS: La Professionnalisation Politique des Fondateurs de SOS–Racisme." *Revue Française de Science Politique* 51 (1–2): 131–53.

Karl, Patricia A. 1983. "In the Middle in the Middle East." In *Split Vision: The Portrayal of Arabs in the American Media*, edited by Edmund Ghareeb, 283–98. Washington: American-Arab Affairs Council.

Kassem, Farid. 1997. "Voting in Non-Islamic Elections: A Sinful Diversion." *Muslim News* 94: 5.

Kepel, Gilles. 2003. *Jihad: The Trial of Political Islam*. Translated by Anthony F. Roberts. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Khalid, Detlev. 1982. *Re-Islamisierung und Entwicklungspolitik*. Munich: Weltforum Verlag.

Kibble, David G. 1999. "Islamic Fundamentalism: A Transitory Threat?" In *21 Debated Issues in World Politics,* edited by Gregory M. Scott, Louis Furmanski and Randall J. Jones, 259–73. New Jersey: Prentice Hall. Originally published in *Strategic Review* 26 (2): 11–18 (1998).

Kinder, Donald R. 1998. "Opinion and Action in the Realm of Politics." In *The Handbook of Social Psychology,* 2 (4th edition), edited by Daniel Gilbert. Susan Fiske, and Gardner Lindsey, 778–867. New York: Oxford University Press.

Kinder, Donald R. and David O. Sears. 1981. "Prejudice and Politics: Symbolic Racism versus Racial Threats to the Good Life." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 40 (3): 414–31.

Klausen, Jytte. 2005. *The Islamic Challenge: Politics and Religion in Western Europe*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Knowles, Caroline, and Paul Sweetman. 2004. *Picturing the Social Landscape: Visual Methods and the Sociological Imagination*. London: Routledge.

Kreps, Christina. 1988. "Decolonizing Anthropology Museums: The Tropenmuseum Amsterdam." *Museum Studies Journal* 3 (2): 56–63.

Kuklinski, James H, Ellen Riggle, Victor Ottati, Norbert Schwarz, and Robert S. Wyer, Jr. 1991. "The Cognitive and Affective Bases of Political Tolerance Judgments." *American Journal of Political Science* 35 (1): 1–27.

Kymlicka, Will. 1995. *Multicultural Citizenship*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Laborde, Cécile. 2006. "Female Autonomy, Education and the Hijab." *Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy* 9 (3): 351–77.

Laborde. Cécile. 2008. *Critical Republicanism*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

La Capra, Dominick. 1987. *History and Criticism*. New York: Cornell University Press.

Laclau, Ernesto and Chantal Mouffe. 1985. *Hegemony and Socialist Strategy*. London: Verso.

Lacroix, Alexis. 2005. *Le Socialisme des Imbéciles: Quand l'Antisémitisme Redevient de Gauche*. Paris: La Table Ronde.

Lakoff, George, and Mark Johnson. 1980. *Metaphors We Live By*. Chicago: Chicago University Press.

Lavine, Steven and Ivan Karp. 1991. "Introduction: Museums and Multiculturalism." In *Exhibiting Cultures: The Poetics and Politics of Museum Display,* edited by Ivan Karp and Steven Lavine, 1–9. Washington: Smithsonian Institution Press.

LeBor, Adam. 1997. *A Heart Turned East: Among the Muslims of Europe and America*. London: Little, Brown.

Leech, Nancy, Karen C. Barrett and George A. Morgan. 2005. *SPSS for Intermediate Statistics: Use and Interpretation*. Mahwah, New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.

Lerner, J. S., and D. Keltner. 2001. "Fear, Anger, and Risk." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 81 (1): 146–59.

Lerner, Jennifer S, Roxana M. Gonzalez, Deborah A. Small, and Baruch Fischhoff. 2003. "Effects of Fear and Anger on Perceived Risks of Terrorism: A National Field Experiment." *Psychological Science* 14 (2): 144–50.
Lévy, Albert. 1999. *50 Ans contre le Racisme: Chronique d'un Combat Inachevé*. Pantin: Le Temps des Cerises.
Lévy, Laurent. 2010. *'La Gauche', les Noirs et les Arabes*. Paris: La Fabrique.
LICRA. 2007. *La Route vers Durban 2 – 2009. Rapport Réalisé par Malka Marcovic*. Accessed 7 April 2010. http://www.licra.org/attachments/057_Rapport–La%20route–vers–DurbanII–Marcovich–LICRA.pdf.
Li, Qiong, and Marillyn B. Brewer. 2004. "What Does It Mean to Be an American? Patriotism, Nationalism, and American identity after 9/11." *Political Psychology* 25 (5): 727–39.
Lindner, Nicole M and Brian A. Nosek. 2009. "Alienable Speech: Ideological Variations in the Application of Free-Speech Principles." *Political Psychology* 30 (1): 67–92.
Livesey, Bruce. "The Salafist Movement." *PBS*. Accessed 12 December 2009. http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/front/special/sala.html
Lloyd, Catherine. 1998. *Discourses of Antiracism in France*. Aldershot: Ashgate.
Long, Elizabeth. 1985. *The American Dream and the Popular Novel*. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
Louis, W Roger, and Judith M. Brown (eds.). 2001. *The Oxford History of the British Empire, Vol. 4*. New York: Oxford University Press.
Ludlum, Robert. 1988. *The Icarus Agenda*. New York: Random House.
Macdonald, Sharon. 1996. "Introduction." In *Theorizing Museums: Representing Identity and Diversity in a Changing World*, edited by Sharon Macdonald and Gordon Fyfe, 1–18. Oxford: Blackwell.
MacKinnon, Coil. 1986. *Finding Hoseyn*. New York: Arbor House.
Malhotra, S. and Alagh, T. 2004. "Dreaming the Nation: Domestic Dramas in Hindi Films." *South Asian Popular Culture* 2 (1): 19–37.
Malik, Kenan. 2009. *From Fatwa to Jihad: the Rushdie Affair and Its Legacy*. London: Atlantic.
Malik, Serge. 1990. *Histoire Secrète de SOS–racisme*. Paris: Albin Michel.
Marcus, George E. 1995. *With Malice toward Some: How People Make Civil Liberties Judgments*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Markus, Gregory, B. and Philip E. Converse. 1979. "A Dynamic Simultaneous Equation Model of Electoral Choice." *American Political Science Review* 73: 1055–70.
Mayhew, Christopher and Michael Adams. 1976. *Publish It Not: The Middle East Cover-Up*. London: Longman.
Mazrui, Ali A. 1997. "Islamic and Western Values." *Foreign Affairs* 76 (5): 118–30.
McLaren, Lauren M. 2002. "Public Support for the European Union: Cost/Benefit Analysis or Perceived Cultural Threat?" *Journal of Politics* 64: 551–66.
McLaren, Lauren M. 2003. "Anti-Immigrant Prejudice in Europe: Contact, Threat Perception, and Preferences for the Exclusion of Migrants." *Social Forces* 81 (3): 909–36.
McCullagh, Peter. 1980. "Regression Models for Ordinal Data." *Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, Series B* 42 (2): 109–42.
Meer, Nasar, and Tariq Modood. 2009. "Refutations of Racism in the 'Muslim Question'." *Patterns of Prejudice* 43 (3–4): 335–54.
Meer, Nasar, and Tehseen Noorani. 2008. "A Sociological Comparison of Anti–Semitism and Anti–Muslim Sentiment in Britain." *The Sociological Review* 56 (2): 195–219.
Mellema, Remt. 1958. *Een Interpretatie van de Islaam*. Amsterdam: Koninklijk Instituut voor de Tropen.
Menard, Scott. 2001. *Applied Logistic Regression Analysis*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
Mercer, Kobena. 1994. *Welcome to the Jungle: New Positions in Black Cultural Studies*. London: Routledge.
Mikkelsen, Morten. 2007. "Dansk Folkeparti Anmeldt for Racistik Propaganda." *Kristelligt Dagblad*, 21 April.
Ministry of External Affairs. 2008. *Made in Bollywood*. New Delhi: Government of India.

Mishra, Vijay. 2002. *Bollywood Cinema: Temples of Desire*, New York and London: Routledge.
Mishra, Smeeta. 2007. " 'Saving' Muslim Women and Fighting Muslim Men: Analysis of Representations in *The New York Times*." *Global Media Journal* 6 (11): Article 1. http://lass.calumet.purdue.edu/cca/gmj/fa07/gmj–fa07–mishra.htm.
Modood, Tariq. 2007. *Multiculturalism: A Civic Idea*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
Modood, Tariq, Anna Triandafyllidou, and Ricard Zapata–Barrero (eds.). 2006. *Multiculturalism, Muslims and Citizenship: A European Approach*. London: Routledge.
Murphy, Warren. 1982. *Red Moon*. New York: Fawcett.
Neuburg, Victor E. 1977. *Popular Literature: A History and Guide*. Harmondsworth: Penguin.
Newby, P.H. 1955. *The Picnic at Sakkara*. London: Jonathan Cape.
Newby, P.H. 1969. *Something to Answer for*. London: Faber & Faber.
Nicholson, Linda. 1994. "Interpreting Gender." *Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society* Autumn: 79–105.
Norris, Pippa, and Ronald Inglehart. 2002. "Islamic Culture and Democracy: Testing the 'Clash of Civilizations' Thesis." *Comparative Sociology* 1 (3–4): 235–63.
Oakley, Ann. 1972. *Sex, Gender and Society*. London: Temple Smith.
O'Donnell, Peter. 1966. *Sabre-Tooth*. New York: Doubleday.
Okin, Susan M. 1999. *Is Multiculturalism Bad for Women?* Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Page, Benjamin I., and Calvin C. Jones. 1979. "Reciprocal Effects of Policy Preferences, Party Loyalties and the Vote." *American Political Science Review* 73: 1071–89.
Palmer, William J. 2006. "Spies and Their Novelists." *Contemporary Literature* XLVII: 497–501.
Parini, Lorena. 2006, *Le Système de Genre. Introduction aux Concepts et Théories*. Zürich: Seismo.
Peace, Timothy. 2009 "Un Antisémitisme Nouveau? The Debate about a 'New Antisemitism' in France." *Patterns of Prejudice* 43 (2): 103–21.
Peffley, Mark, Pia Knigge, and Jon Hurwitz. 2001. "A Multiple Values Model of Political Tolerance." *Political Research Quarterly* 54 (2): 379–406.
Peters, Rudolph. 2006. *'A Dangerous Book': Dutch Public Intellectuals and the Koran*. European University Institute, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, RSCAS Working Papers 2006/39.
Petersen, Tore T. 2006. *The Decline of the Anglo–American Middle East, 1961–1969: A Willing Retreat*. Portland: Sussex Academic Press.
Pew Global Attitudes Project. 2005. "Support for Terror Wanes among Muslim Publics." www.pewglobalorg, 14 July.
Pickering, Michael. 2001. *Stereotyping. The Politics of Representation*. Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave.
Pink, Sarah. 2001. *Doing Visual Ethnography: Images, Media and Representation in Research*. London: Sage.
Poole, Elizabeth. 2002. *Reporting Islam: Media Representations of British Muslims*. London: I.B. Tauris.
Poole, Elizabeth and John E Richardson, eds. 2006. *Muslims and the News Media*. London: I.B. Tauris.
Poynting, Scott and Victoria Mason. 2007. "The Resistible Rise of Islamophobia." *Journal of Sociology* 43 (1): 61–86.
Proctor, J. Harris. 1965. *Islam and IR*. New York: Praeger.
Raban, Jonathan. 1979. *Arabia Through the Looking Glass*. Glasgow: Collins
Rai, Amit S. 2006. "Patriotism and the Muslim Citizen in Hindi Films." *Harvard Asia Quarterly* 7 (3). http://asiaquarterly.com/2006/01/28/ii-103/
Rajaee, Farhang. 1999. "Paradigm Shift in Muslim International Relations Discourse Studies." *Contemporary Islam* 1 (1): 1–31.
Rashid, Ahmed. 2002. *Jihad: The Rise of Militant Islam in Central Asia*. New Haven & London: Yale University Press.

Reese, Stephen D., August Grant, and Lucy H. Danielian. 1994. "The Structure of News Sources on Television: A Network Analysis of 'CBS News', 'Nightline', 'MacNeil/Lehrer', and 'This Week with David Brinkley'." *Journal of Communication* 44: 84–107.
Richardson, John E. 2004. (*Mis*)*representing Islam. The Racism and Rhetoric of British Broadsheet Newspapers*. Amsterdam: John Benjamins.
Riding, Alan. 2004. "An Essay: Islamic Art as a Mediator for Cultures in Confrontation." *New York Times*, 6 April.
Rime, Bernard, Pierre Philippot, and Daniela Cisamolo. 1990. "Social Schemata of Peripheral Changes in Emotion." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 59 (1): 38–49.
Rizzo, Helen, Abdel-Hamid Abdel-Latif and Katherine Meyer. 2007. "The Relationship between Gender Equality and Democracy: A Comparison of Arab versus Non-Arab Muslim Societies" *Sociology* 41: 1151–70.
Robbins, Harold. 1979. *The Pirate*. London: New English Library.
Roggeband, Conny and Rens Vliegenthart. 2007. "Divergent Framing: The Public Debate on Migration in the Dutch Parliament and Media, 1995–2004." *West European Politics* 30 (3): 524–48.
Rome, Margaret. 1978. *Son of Adam*. London: Mills & Boon.
Rokeach, Milton. 1968. "The Role of Values in Public Opinion Research." *Public Opinion Quarterly* 32 (4): 547–59.
Roseman, Ira J., and Andreas Evdokas. 2004. "Appraisals Cause Experienced Emotions: Experimental Evidence." *Cognition and Emotion* 18: 1–28.
Roy, Olivier. 2004. "Al-Qaeda Brand Name Ready for Franchise: The Business of Terror." *Le Monde Diplomatique*, September.
Rufin, Jean–Christophe. 2004. *Chantier sur la Lutte contre le Racisme et l'Antisémitisme*. Paris: La Documentation Française.
Runnymede Trust. 1997. *Islamophobia: A Challenge for Us All*. London: Runnymede Trust.
Sabbagh, Daniel and Shanney Peer (eds.). 2008. *French Color–Blindness in Perspective: The Controversy over "Statistiques Ethniques"*. Special issue of *French Politics, Culture, and Society* 26 (1).
Said, Edward. 1975. "Shattered Myths." In *Middle East Crucible: Studies on the Arab–Israeli War of October 1973*, edited by Nasser H. Aruri, and Janice J. Terry, 408–47. Illinois: Medina University Press International.
Said, Edward. 1978. *Orientalism*. Harmondsworth: Penguin.
Said, Edward. 1997. *Covering Islam: How the Media and the Experts Determine How We See the Rest of the World*. London: Vintage.
Salaita, Steven. 2006. "Beyond Orientalism and Islamophobia: 9/11, Anti–Arab Racism, and the Mythos of National Pride." *New Centennial Review* 6 (2): 245–66.
Samaddar, Ranabir. 2001. *Peace as Process*. New Delhi: Manohar Publishers.
Sayyid, Salman, and Abdulkaroom Vakil (eds.). 2010. *Thinking Through Islamophobia*. London: Hurst.
Schinkel, Willem. 2007. *Denken in een Tijd van Sociale Hypochondrie: Aanzet tot een Theorie voorbij de Maatschappij*. Kampen: Klement.
Schneuwly Purdie, Mallory, Matteo Gianni and Magaly Jenny (eds.). 2009. *Musulmans d'Aujourd'hui: Identités Plurielles en Suisse*. Geneva: Labor et Fides.
Schranz, Mario and Kurt Imhof. 2002. "Muslime in der Schweiz – Muslime in der Öffentlichen Kommunikation." *Medienheft*, 18 February.
Schwarz, Norbert. 1990. "Feelings as Information. Informational and Motivational Functions of Affective States." In *Handbook of Motivation and Cognition* (2nd edition), edited by Tory Higgins, and Richard Sorrentino, 527–61. New York: Guilford.
Scott, Joan W. 1988, "Genre: Une Catégorie Utile d'Analyse Historique." *Cahiers du GRIFF* 37/38: 125–53.
Sears, Laurie. 1996. *Shadows of Empire: Colonial Discourse and Javanese Tales*. Durham: Duke University Press.
Sen, Amartya. 2006. *Identity and Violence: The Illusion of Destiny*. New York: Norton.

Shadid, Wasif A. 1991. "The Integration of Muslim Minorities in the Netherlands." *International Migration Review* 25 (2): 355–74.
Shaheen, Jack G. 1985. "Media Coverage of the Middle East: Perception and Foreign Policy." *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 482: 160–75.
Shamis, Giora and Diane Shamis. 1983. *A Crack in the House of God*. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson.
Shatanawi, Mirjam and Deniz Ünsal. 2004. "Urban Islam: Rethinking the Familiar." *ISIM Newsletter* 14: 44.
Shatanawi, Mirjam. 2007. "Tropical Malaise." *Bidoun: Arts and Culture from the Middle East* 10: 42–4.
Shatanawi, Mirjam. 2009. *Islam in Beeld: Kunst en Cultuur van Moslims Wereldwijd*. Nijmegen: SUN.
Sigal, Leon. 1974. *Reporters and Officials: The Organisation and Politics of Newsmaking*. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield.
Silverstein, Paul A. 2008. "The Context of Antisemitism and Islamophobia in France." *Patterns of Prejudice* 42 (1): 1–26.
Silverstone, Roger. 1988. "Museums and the Media: A Theoretical and Methodological Exploration." *International Journal of Museum Management and Curatorship* 7 (3): 231–41.
Simon, Reeva S. 1989. *The Middle East in Crime Fiction: Mysteries, Spy Novels and Thrillers from 1916 to the 1980s*. New York: Lilian Barber Press, Inc.
Skitka, Linda J, Christopher W. Bauman, and Elizabeth Mullen. 2004. "Political Tolerance and Coming to Psychological Closure Following the September 11, 2001 Terrorist Attacks: An Integrative Approach." *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin* 30 (6): 743–56.
Slade, Shelley. 1981. "The Image of the Arab in America: Analysis of a Poll on American Attitudes." *The Middle East Journal* Spring: 143–62.
Small, Deborah A, Jennifer S. Lerner, and Baruch Fischhoff. 2006. "Emotion Priming and Attributions for Terrorism: Americans' Reactions in a National Field Experiment." *Political Psychology* 27: 289–98.
Sniderman, Paul M. and Louk Hagendoorn. 2007. *When Ways of Life Collide: Multiculturalism and Its Discontents in the Netherlands*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Solomon, Sheldon, Jeff Greenberg, and Tom Pyszczynski. 1991. "A Terror Management Theory of Social Behavior: The Psychological Functions of Self-Esteem and Cultural Worldviews." In *Advances in Experimental Social Psychology* 21, edited by M. E. P. Zanna, 261–302. San Diego, CA: Academic Press.
Sopo, Dominique. 2005. *SOS Antiracisme*. Paris: Denoël.
Sopo, Dominique. 2008. *Combat Laïque*. Paris: Cherche Midi.
Spencer, Robert. 2004. "Raffarin Fears 'River of Islam' from Early Turkey Membership of EU. Accessed 23 September 2009. http://www.jihadwatch.org/2004/09/raffarin-fears-river-of-islam-from-early-turkey-membership-of-eu.html.
Stasi, Bernard. 2003. *Laïcité et République: Commission de Réflexion sur l'Application du Principe de Laïcité dans la République*. Paris: La Documentation Française.
Stenner, Karen. 2005. *The Authoritarian Dynamic*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Sulayman, Abdul Hamid Abu. 1987. *Towards an Islamic Theory of International Relations: New Directions for Methodology and Thought*. Herndon Virginia: International Institute of Islamic Thought.
Suleiman, Michael. 1982. "Stereotypes, Public Opinion and Foreign Policy: The Impact on American–Arab Relations." *Journal of Arab Affairs* 1 (2): 147–66.
Sullivan, John L, George E. Marcus, Stanley Feldman, and James E. Piereson. 1981. "The Sources of Political Tolerance: A Multivariate Analysis." *American Political Science Review* 75 (1): 92–106.
Sullivan, John L, James Piereson, and George E. Marcus. 1979. "An Alternative Conceptualisation of Political Tolerance: Illusory Increases 1950s–1970s." *American Political Science Review* 73 (3): 781–94.

Sunier, Thijl. 2003. "Neo-Nationalisme en Historisch Besef: Beeldvorming over de Islam in Nederland." *Christen Democratische Verkenningen* Jaargang 2003: 64–9.
Syberg, Karen. 2007. "Feminismens Mange Ansigter." *Information*, 5 October.
Taguieff, Pierre–André. 1991. *Face au Racisme* (*Tome 2*). Paris: La Découverte.
Taguieff, Pierre–André. 2002. *La Nouvelle Judéophobie*. Paris: Mille et Une Nuits.
Taguieff, Pierre–André. 2004. *Prêcheurs de Haine: Traversée de la Judéophobie Planétaire*. Paris: Mille et Une Nuits.
Taji-Farouki, Suha. 1996. *A Fundamental Quest: Hizb al Tahrir and the Search for the Isalmic Caliphate*. London: Grey Seal.
Terry, Janice J. 1983a. "Arab Stereotypes in Popular Fiction." *Indiana Social Studies Quarterly* 36: 24–7.
Terry, Janice J. 1983b. "Images of the Middle East in Contemporary Fiction." In *Split Vision: The Portrayal of Arabs in the American Media*, edited by Edmund Ghareeb, 315–25. Washington: American-Arab Affairs Council.
Terry, Janice J. 1985. *Mistaken Identity: Arab Stereotypes in Popular Writing*. Washington: American-Arab Affairs Council.
Ter Wal, Jessika. 2004. *Moslim in Nederland. De Publieke Discussie over de Islam in Nederland: Een Analyse van Artikelen in de Volkskrant 1998–2002*. The Hague: Social and Cultural Planning Office.
Thomas, Michael. 1981. *Green Monday*. London: Arrow.
Thomson, Stewart. 1955. *Show of Force*. New York: Harper.
Tibi, Bassam. 2006. "Europeanizing Islam or the Islamization of Europe: Political Democracy vs. Cultural Difference." In *Religion in an Expanding Europe,* edited by Timothy A. Byrnes and Peter J. Katzenstein, 204–25. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
TNS-NIPO. 2005a. *Gevoelens van Autochtone Nederlanders ten Opzichte van Moslims. Onderzoek in Opdracht van de Groep Lazrak*. Amsterdam: TNS-NIPO
TNS-NIPO. 2005b. *Rapportage RTL Trend 5. Vijfde Meting Trendonderzoek. Onderzoek in Opdracht van RTL Nieuws*. Amsterdam: TNS-NIPO.
Topol, Allan. 1978. *Fourth of July War*. New York: William Morrow.
UEJF and SOS-Racisme. 2000. *Les Antifeujs: Le Livre Blanc des Violences Antisémites en France depuis Septembre 2000*. Paris: Calmann-Lévy.
United States Government, Office Memorandum. 1951. From NEA/P – Shepard Jones to NE Mr. G. Lewis Jones, 2 April. Declassified document. Accessed 12 May 2012. http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB78/propaganda%20023.pdf
Van den Brink, Bert. 2007. "Imagining Civic Relations in the Moment of Their Breakdown: A Crisis of Civic Integrity in the Netherlands." In *Multiculturalism and Political Theory*, edited by Anthony S. Laden, and David Owen, 350–72. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Van Dijk, Teun A. 2001. "Principles of Critical Discourse Analysis." In *Discourse Theory and Practice*, edited by Margaret Wetherell, Stephanie Taylor, and Simeon J. Yates, 300–17. London: Sage.
Van Duuren, David. 1990. *125 Jaar Verzamelen: Tropenmuseum, Amsterdam*. Amsterdam: Koninklijk Instituut voor de Tropen.
Van Elteren, Mel. 2003. "U.S. Cultural Imperialism: Today Only a Chimera." *SAIS Review* 23 (2): 169–88.
Van Leeuwen, Carel. 1998. "Tropenmuseum Opent Geheel Vernieuwde Islamvleugel." *Trouw*, 8 June.
Van Minden, Renée. 2003. *Vragen over Islam. Een Onderzoek naar de Vragen over Islam Die Leven bij de Doelgroepen van het KIT Tropenmuseum*. Unpublished report.
Vatikiotis, P.J. 1987. *Islam and the State*. New York: Routledge.
Vertovec, Steven. 2002. "Islamophobia and Muslim recognition in Britain." In *Muslims in the West: From Sojourners to Citizens*, edited by Yvonne Haddad, 19–35. New York: Oxford University Press.

Wacker, Jan, Marcus Heldmann, and Gerhard Stemmler. 2003. "Separating Emotion and Motivational Direction in Fear and Anger: Effects on Frontal Asymmetry." *Emotion* 3 (2): 167–93.

Wagtendonk, Kees and Paul Aarts, eds. 1986. *Islamitisch Fundamentalisme*. Muiderberg: Coutinho

Walby, S. 1992. "Women and Nation." *International Journal of Comparative Sociology* 33 (12): 81–100.

Weill, Nicolas. 2004. *La République et les Antisémites*. Paris: Grasset.

West, Morris. 1986. *The Tower of Babel*. New York: Dell.

Winegar, Jessica. 2008. "The Humanity Game: Art, Islam, and the War on Terror." *Anthropological Quarterly* 81 (3): 651–81.

Winnykamen, Maurice. 2007. *Grandeur et Misère de l'Antiracisme: Le MRAP Est–il Dépassé?* Brussels: Tribord.

Whalen, Paul. J, Lisa M. Shin, Sean. C. McInerney, and Hakan Fischer. 2001. "A Functional MRI Study of Human Amygdale Responses to Facial Expressions of Fear Versus Anger." *Emotion* 1 (1): 70–83.

Yavuz, M. Hakan. 2006. "Islam and Europeanization in Turkish-Muslim Socio-Political Movements." In *Religion in an Expanding Europe,* edited by Timothy A. Byrnes and Peter J. Katzenstein, 225–56. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Young, Iris. M. 2007. "Structural Injustice and the Politics of Difference." In *Multiculturalism and Political Theory*, edited by Anthony S. Laden, and David Owen, 60–88. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Yuval-Davis, Nira. 1997. *Gender and Nation*. London: Sage.

INDEX