

# 林连玉

## 青年公民学程

专题讨论会：种族政治 / 华教运动 / 建国历史

- 7/7 | 历史的斗争：谁遗忘、谁记得林连玉？
- 7/21 | 马哈迪的困境？或马来西亚人的困境？
- 8/4 | 马来西亚有没有「建国社会契约」？
- 8/18 | 终结或延续「种族政治」的社会制度
- 9/1 | 谁需要华教？谁做华教运动？
- 9/15 | 结业：评论心得报告与讨论

演讲嘉宾

陈穆红 / 国民大学高级研究员  
潘永强 / 南方大学通识教育中心主任

主持与导读

黄科量 / 国立台湾大学社会所硕士

地点/ 林连玉基金三楼活动中心

时间/ 星期六 2:00pm - 4:30pm

收费/ 全部6堂课 | 学生RM40 公众RM60

（如有变动，以海报为准）



llgcultural.com



info@llgcultural.com



03 2142 2496/97



No. 89 & 91, Jalan Maharajalela,  
50150 Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia



# 目录

## Week 1

### 一、历史的斗争：谁遗忘、谁记得林连玉？

#### 专题讨论会读本

I. 何国忠，2002，马来西亚华人：身份认同、文化与族群政治，吉隆坡：华社研究中心，页 49-88。（第三章，林连玉：为族群招魂的故事）

II. \*\*Cornell, Stephen (2000) That' s the Story of Our Life. Pp. 41-53 in We are a People: Narrative and Multiplicity in Constructing Ethnic Identity, edited by Paul Spickard and W. Jeffrey Burroughs. Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press.

III. Cheah, B. K. (2002). Malaysia: The making of a nation. Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. Pp. 1- 74. (Chapter 1: '1945-1957: Malay Dominance and the Making of a Malay "Nation-state" ' and 2: '1957-2001: The "Bargain" and Contesting Nationalisms' )

## Week 2

### 二、马哈迪的困境？或马来西亚人的困境？

#### 专题讨论会读本

I. 崔贵强，1990，新马华人国家认同的转向 1945-1959，新加坡：新加坡南洋学会。（第十一章，马来亚华人国家认同的转向 1950-1957）。

II. 马哈迪，1981，马来人的困境，世界书局（马）有限公司，页 61-145。（第五章，种族平等的意义；第六章，国民团结的基础；第七章，马来人之复权与马来人之困境；第八章，马来人之问题）

III. \*\*Omi, M., and Winant, H. (2014). Racial formation in the United States. Routledge. Pp. 103-158. (Chapter4 : The Theory of Racial Formation; Chapter 5: Racial Politics and the Racial State)

IV. Ishak, M. M. (2014). The Politics of Bangsa Malaysia: Nation-Building in a Multiethnic Society. UUM Press. Pp.88-141. (Chapter3: From state building to nation-building)

## Week 3

### 三、马来西亚有没有「建国社会契约」？

#### 专题讨论会读本

I. Mavis C. Puthucheary 著、李永杰译，2008，〈马来西亚的社会契约：概念的发明和历史演变〉，诺拉妮等编，《一个马来西亚，两种社会契约？》，页 7-26，策略资讯研究中心。

II. Haris Zuan(2015). “Becoming Malay.” Pp. 1-26 in *Young and Malay*, edited by Ooi Kee Beng and Wan Hamidi Hamid. Selangor: Gerakbudaya.

III. Syed Saddiq (2015) ‘I was once a racist’ . Malaysiakini.

IV. 张茂桂，2008，〈多元文化主义在台湾与其困境〉，沈宪钦等编，《知识分子的省思与对话》，页 310-325，台北：时报文教基金会。

## Week 4

### 四、终结或延续「种族政治」的社会制度

#### 专题讨论会读本

I. 黄进发（2015）公民可以差異而平等嗎？—馬來西亞的 69 年糾結，香港立场新闻。

II. Guan, L. H. (2000). Ethnic relations in Peninsular Malaysia: The cultural and economic dimensions. *Social and cultural issues*, 1, 1-39.

III. 柯嘉逊（2017）马来西亚的种族主义和种族歧视，人民之声，页 261-312。（第十章，当前马来西亚的种族主义与种族歧视；结论，“扶弱政策”应以“需要”不以种族为根基；附录，前进的道路）

IV. \*\* Desmond, M., & Emirbayer, M. (2009). What is racial domination?. *Du Bois Review: Social Science Research on Race*, 6(2), 335-355.

## Week 5

### 五、谁需要华教？谁做华教运动？

#### 专题讨论会读本

I. 柯嘉逊，1999，马来西亚华教奋斗史，董教总教育中心，页 32-136。

II. Wan Saiful (2016) Vernacular Schools not the problem. The Star Online.

III. Syed Saddiq (2016) Vernacular Schools and national unity. Malaysiakini.

IV. \*\*Della Porta, D., & Diani, M 著、苗延威译，2002，社会运动概论，台北：远流图书有限公司。（第四章：集体行动与认同）

**林连玉青年公民学程——讨论单**  
**专题讨论会：种族政治、华教运动与建国历史**

**一、历史的斗争：谁遗忘、谁记得林连玉？**

(2018 年 7 月 7 日，星期六，2p.m. - 4:30p.m.)

**专题讨论会读本**

- I. 何国忠，2002，马来西亚华人：身份认同、文化与族群政治，吉隆坡：华社研究中心，页 49-88。（第三章，林连玉：为族群招魂的故事）
- II. \*\*Cornell, Stephen (2000) That's the Story of Our Life. Pp. 41-53 in We are a People: Narrative and Multiplicity in Constructing Ethnic Identity, edited by Paul Spickard and W. Jeffrey Burroughs. Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press.
- III. Cheah, B. K. (2002). Malaysia: The making of a nation. Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. Pp. 1- 74. (Chapter 1: '1945-1957: Malay Dominance and the Making of a Malay "Nation-state"' and 2: '1957-2001: The "Bargain" and Contesting Nationalisms' )

**讨论重点**

- 什么是「反对叙事」（counter-narrative）？
- 官方历史中的建国功臣是谁？如何评断林连玉的建国贡献？
- 为什么需要说族魂的故事？族魂的故事对华人的文化认同有什么影响？

#讨论会开始前，参观林连玉纪念馆，由馆员导览讲解“族魂林连玉”的生平与奋斗史；学员须做笔记，以延伸对照讨论官方历史叙事与反对叙事。

## 讨论单

1.	III. 马来西亚有哪些建国方案？ <u>为何特定的建国方案胜出与落败？</u> 胜出与落败的社会条件是什么？
2.	III. <u>如何看待殖民对马来西亚的影响？</u> 独立建国以后，马来西亚的政治结构（民主选举、文化态度等等）是与过去断裂而走向一个全新的自治道路，或是延续殖民与历史的问题？
3.	III. 谢文庆 Cheah Boon Kheng 提到“Malay dominance”（马来人支配），他如何利用这个概念贯穿解释 1945-47 的历史进程？ <u>马来人支配具体上是指什么（请从作者的资料、论证来谈）？</u>
4.	III. 谢文庆认为，马来亚建国形成一份社会契约，这份社会契约如何被体现？ <u>那你是否赞同这样的史观？</u> 就这份社会契约而言，作者如何评价英殖民政府的作为？
5.	I. 林连玉在争取华语作为官方语言的运动中所遭遇的 <u>结构性困境</u> 为何？林连玉运用哪些管道与社会条件来回应困境？
6.	I. 谢文庆提到的“ <u>Malayan Nationalism</u> ”与林连玉对马来亚的认同有何相同或冲突之处？这种相同与冲突之处是否延续至今，展现在哪里？
7.	II. Stephen Cornell 认为，ethnic identity 与 narrative 有何关系？对弱势团体而言， <u>narrative 在认同上可以起何种作用？</u>
8.	II. Stephen Cornell 提及，美国移民脉络下浮现 multiplicity 的叙事，那在马来西亚的脉络是否有相似的情况？林连玉纪念馆、林连玉的故事是否可以称之为 multiplicity 的叙事？ <u>林连玉（招魂）的故事是否一种认同的叙事？林连玉（招魂）的故事与 Malay dominance 有何关系？</u>

## 导读

II. \*\*Cornell, Stephen (2000) That's the Story of Our Life. Pp. 41-53 in *We are a People: Narrative and Multiplicity in Constructing Ethnic Identity*, edited by Paul Spickard and W. Jeffrey Burroughs. Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press.

### 叙事作为族群认同的一种形式

1. When people take on, create, or assign an ethnic identity, part of what they do—intentionally or not—is to take on, create, or assign a story, a narrative of some sort that captures central understandings about what it means to be a member of the group.
2. The story has a subject (the group in question), it has action (what happened or will happen) and it has value: it attaches a value to its subject. It makes group members feel good or bad or guilty or self-righteous or superior or justified or something else.
3. Narrativization involves three steps: Selection, Plotting, Interpretation. It situates groups among events and situates events in larger matrices of relations.

### 认同如何改变——说的故事不一样了

1. At those moments old assumptions or understandings maybe challenged, calling for a new or reconfirmed definition of the situation—a new sense of things. New events have to be taken into account or dismissed; new relationships among events proposed; new interpretations made. In short, such situations call for a renarration of group identity.

### 但不是每个人都有能力重构故事，说不一样的故事体现了权力关系

1. Both identity narratives and their production are bound up in power relations.
2. The first issue has to do with who gets to narrate whom and with whose version of an identity narrative gains currency where. Narrative construction is often a contested process, shaped by power differentials.
3. The second way in which narratives are bound up in power relations has to do with what an identity narrative claims. Particular interpretations of event may undergird moral or legal claims to power.

### 说不一样的故事体现了权力地景、社会结构的变迁

1. Narratives of multiplicity, whether revealing the complexities within established categories or the overlaps among them, challenge this social arrangement. At the very least, they argue that “we are the people who do not fit the established categories.” More ambitiously, they deny some of the assumptions that underlie exclusion.

## 第三章

# 林连玉：为族群招魂的故事

我们将要走近的这个人马来西亚华教史最为人津津所称道的斗士，他死后被塑造成一个典范性及被学习的对象，他的追随者称他为“族魂”。马来西亚华校教师会总会不久前为了纪念他一百岁冥诞还举办了一系列的活动，这人名叫林连玉。

“华教斗士”是马来西亚华人社会特有的名词。它是用来形容不屈不挠，为了华教废寝忘食，敢怒敢言的人。林连玉生前是华教斗士的精神领袖，最主要的原因是他为了华教已到了造次必于是，颠沛必于是的地步。

我们在这一章希望可以透过这个人的一生，观察一下一个文化人在一个多元种族的国家的命运，他的遭遇可以让我们深切地体会到要在马来西亚传授中华文化所面对的难题和挑战。

### 1. 来自中国的穷教员

#### 1.1 家庭背景和中国教育

林连玉，原名林采玉，1901年出生于福建永春县蓬壶西昌乡一经堂。关于他早年的资料，我们现在可以找得到的，都是从他的回忆录里头看到的，虽然并不精彩，但是为了让他的的一生全貌显现，简单的叙述还是有必要的。

像其他同时代有机会读书的孩子一样，林连玉接受的是传统式的教育，七岁开始正式读书，先后读完了《三字经》、《孝经》、《朱子家训》、《中庸》、《大学》、《论语》、《诗经》。他的祖父林以仁是清朝的贡生，是蓬壶西昌乡有名的老师，林连玉的启蒙教育，就是由他负责。祖父去世后，这个责任才交给他的父亲。其父林赓飏是清朝的廪生，据说早年受到康梁变法的影响，略解物理和化学，对数学悟性极高，林连玉因此也学了一些算术、代数等，但儿子心目中文理皆行的父亲穷怕了，不认为读书有什么好处，因此林连玉十六岁的时候，被送到厦门姑丈处当学徒。<sup>1</sup>但三年以后，他违背了其父亲要他当商人的意愿，进入集美师范部就读。<sup>2</sup>

集美师范学院是陈嘉庚为了挽救“本省教育之颓风”而创办的。<sup>3</sup>满清政府在1911年被推翻后，集美里的私塾被关闭之余，又无力兴办新式学校，“十岁儿童成群游戏，多有裸体者，几将回复上古野蛮状态。”<sup>4</sup>这是陈嘉庚的感触也是促使他以后积极办学的原因。他从兴办小学出发，继而在集美和厦门，接二连三开办了中学、师范学院、大学等。<sup>5</sup>

顾名思义，集美师范学院就是训练教师的场所，这个学校的特色是不收钱，学膳宿费皆免。林连玉入此校的年龄比其同

学大了好多。分秒必争，勤奋好学是许多人对他的形容。1924年集美师范学院毕业后，留校教书的他觉得非常光荣，只是日子不长。<sup>6</sup>1926年，国民党北伐，学校里一些国民党的学生一向就对不让学生干政的集美学校校长叶渊不满，借机发动学潮及倒校长运动。当时在新加坡的陈嘉庚非常不满，宣布停办集美学校。<sup>7</sup>失业的林连玉就在这个偶然的情况，为了生活而南来。

林连玉在集美念书正是五四新文化运动开展的同时，只可惜我们不知道林连玉在那个时期受到什么冲击。他在集美念书时比较了不起的一件事是向永春纂修县志负责人抗议何以不用其父，使到有关当局低头。<sup>8</sup>除此以外，我们再也找不到其不平则鸣的例子。他南来的时候已是二十六岁，在当时风起云涌的时代中，他是不是一样热血沸腾？他为林语堂、鲁迅、顾颉刚等人的演讲做记录，他自己是不是也有为那个时代留下片言只语？<sup>9</sup>他说他爱读梁启超、鲁迅及胡适的文章，但我们看不到这些人对他的影响。在一个内忧外患的时候，林连玉对中国时局有什么看法？如果他有写文章的话，文章留在哪儿？他南来时内心有没有经过挣扎？这一点让我们觉得纳闷，也许我们

1 林连玉：〈林连玉小史〉，《风雨十八年》下集（吉隆坡：林连玉基金会，1990），页190-191。

2 郑锦瑞：〈侨教功臣林连玉〉，教总秘书处编：《族魂林连玉》（吉隆坡：林连玉基金会，1991），页52；吕凤整理：〈林连玉年表〉，教总秘书处编：《九五年华教节特辑：林连玉先生逝世十周年纪念》（吉隆坡：林连玉基金会，1995），页86。

3 陈嘉庚：《南侨回忆录》（台北：龙文出版社，1989），页15。

4 同上，页5。

5 同上，页4-18。

6 师范部主任李昭茂要林连玉留校服务，充当师范部国文科教员，留校的九位同学中，其他八人都附属在小学部，只有他一人是在师范部。林连玉：〈林连玉小史〉，《风雨十八年》下集，页194。

7 杨进发（李发沉译）：《陈嘉庚：华侨传奇人物》（Teaneck：八方文化企业公司，1990），页106-107；林连玉：〈林连玉小史〉，《风雨十八年》下集，页194。

8 林连玉：〈有关永春县志〉，《杂锦集》（吉隆坡：林连玉基金会，1986），页1-3。

9 林连玉在回忆中仍然为当记录的工作感到荣幸万分。见林连玉：〈林连玉小史〉，《风雨十八年》下集，页191-194。



只能那么说，这位以后在马来西亚领导和保卫华文教育的人，在中国是个名不经传的学生和教员。

从陈嘉庚的办校方式，我们倒是可以知道一些集美的文化氛围。陈嘉庚非常强调“品学兼优”，他不忘伦理教育之灌输，并为此亲自选定“诚”与“毅”为校训，要代代学生秉承不忘，他反对学生假借“自由”、“爱国”之名实行罢课，视此为不尊师重道之行径。在当时学潮一波又一波的新文化运动和反传统时代，陈嘉庚如此看重儒家伦理，当然显得异常。<sup>10</sup> 林连玉在写到集美学校的学潮时，显然是站在校长和陈嘉庚那一边的。

如果我们看林连玉一生的行径，则他的气质更倾向于当时的保守主义而非激进派那一边。他对传统文化的坚守不只是一种感情上的依恋，在理智层面上也是以儒家的价值观念为做人的准则。他没有摆脱儒家所代表的意识形态在知识分子的文化心理结构所起的作用，更无法舍弃他们赖以建立自尊自信的那条源远流长的文化根脉。对这种人而言，传统文化越是面临困境，他们的反应就越强烈，这种对文化的维护感往往又是和民族主义的情绪交织在一起的。近百年来中国所面临的亡国灭种的危机和中国传统文化左右不逢源的困境，恰恰是为保守主义倾向的根植和繁衍提供了丰富的土壤。<sup>11</sup>

## 1.2 初来马来亚

1927年初林连玉抵达马来亚，根据他自己回忆，他在新加坡成功地说服了陈嘉庚复办母校。任务完成后，他才到爱大华

国民学校担任代课老师。但是为了找一份较为安定的工作，他在工作不到一个月后即随友人到爪哇碰运气，并在东爪哇当了三年教员。三年的生活转眼就过，林连玉在其回忆录对这一段生活完全没有片言只语，我们只知道1930年，他由于不能忍受怀乡之情，回中国去了。<sup>12</sup>

回国不久，林连玉受邀回东爪哇担任校长。在前后一年半的时间里，林连玉在当地报章上发表了不少文章，写的是些什么？我们无缘拜读，只知道其内容引起荷兰殖民地政府不快，当时有传言指荷兰殖民地政府要对付他。这个时刻刚好有人请他到巴生共和学校服务，林连玉借这个机会回到马来亚。半年以后，他又转到加影育华中学当校务主任。两年过后，即1934年，其母病故。为了奔丧，他又回到中国去。<sup>13</sup>

全球性经济危机这时正波及马来亚，许多学校停办。林连玉在家乡找到教书的工作，但是半年后，有朋友邀他来马来亚共事，他改变在家乡度过此生的念头。这次林连玉工作的地点是吉隆坡尊孔中学。离家不久，他在中国的妻子因病去世。<sup>14</sup>

12 林连玉：《林连玉小史》，《风雨十八年》下集，页194。

13 同上。

14 林连玉在1918年春天娶了一个比他大一岁的女子尤春姑为妻，妻子未曾受过教育。婚后一年，林连玉即离开她到集美师范学院求学。林连玉共有十首悼亡诗是纪念她的，诗中流露了林连玉对她的歉意。其妻嫁到林家以后过的是清贫如洗，“累月何曾知肉味”的生活。最令林连玉内疚的还是两人婚后聚少离多，用林连玉的话，即是“好梦才温三两月，离愁又绕万千丝”，见林连玉：《悼亡十首》，《连玉诗存》（吉隆坡：林连玉基金委员会，1986），页18-20。林连玉来到南洋以后，“薪金所得，除了本身生活费用外，悉数寄返唐山。但是教师薪水不高，以致家道困顿，难以维持，其妻去世后，留下三个儿子，林连玉远在千里之外，孩子们都被迫‘寄食于弟’”。郑锦瑞：《侨教功臣林连玉》，教总秘书处编：《族魂林连玉》，页54。

10 杨进发（李发沉译）：《陈嘉庚：华侨传奇人物》，页108-109。

11 有关传统文化和保守主义者的关系，见景海峰：《编序》，封祖盛编：《当代新儒家》（北京：三联书店，1989），页1-14。

这次南来才真正是林连玉进入马来亚的实际生活，马来亚从此成为他的家园。从1935年到1961年被教育部吊销教师执照止，除了日据时代他以养猪维持生活以外，林连玉都在尊孔中学服务。日据前夕他与一批华校教师参加过雪兰莪医药辅助队，1942年英军撤退后他到新加坡，过后又跟他的朋友，即以后成为雪兰莪中华大会堂会长的丘祥炽一起做生意，没有多久，他又到士拉央侨民小学当校长。这里顺便替林连玉的日据事迹补一个生活上的小插曲，他在1942年9月娶了一位名叫叶丽珍的女子当继室。<sup>15</sup>

尊孔学校在战争过后，变成一片废墟，为了复校，他把所养的猪全部变卖，并号召朋友一同组织校务委员会。这是林连玉的文化遗产意识第一次在马来亚具体的表现。过程虽简单，但是一些小节却不得不让我们注意。他的一位学生在回忆林连玉时有这样的刻划：

当林先生在第一节踏入我们的教室时，我便发觉到，他的脸孔正给一团忧愁的云雾遮盖着，他的无神的眼睛明显地表露出睡眠不足的神态……他的太太病了。昨天回来学校时口袋里只有五分钱，吃了一碗面，再买一包香烟便不剩下一个铜板了。他哽咽着对我们说：——吃教育饭是死路，我老早就打算退出教育界了。可是，我始终没有那么做，这就是因为良心不许我那么做。<sup>16</sup>

所谓“良心不许我那么做”的悲壮色彩，事实上是担心文

15 吕风：〈林连玉年表〉，教总秘书处编：《九五年华教节特辑：林连玉先生逝世十周年纪念》，页87。

16 黄东文：〈林师连玉印象记〉，教总秘书处编：《族魂林连玉》，页49。

化灭亡的具体表现。林连玉的国学根基应付中学生绰绰有余，他的学生说他教书可以“不假借课本，对于许多篇章，皆能成诵。”<sup>17</sup>当时马来亚的文化人不多，华文老师都是中国文化在海外的传薪人，这种独特的文化境遇激发了他们内心的焦虑并由此衍生成一种献身精神。卖猪办学因此理所当然。他成为华教运动的发言人，就自己来说，恐怕也有舍我取谁的需要。

林连玉一生不重视仪表，不爱梳头发，不结领带，一双帆布鞋，不穿袜子，物质生活对他虽然是次要的，但却也知道穷的可怕。他涉身筹备教师公会，主要是心领神会教师的处境。华文教师一方面没有获英国殖民政府的津贴，中国政府除了做一些表面功夫外，在经济上完全无法照顾他们。教师的薪水都是由董事部负担，薪金微薄是意料之事，在战后初期，百业待兴，教师生活更是陷入困境。林连玉自己也曾在自己的文字中现身说法。他将夫人的金钗送去典当，原因是“仰屋苦无粮”及“奇穷煎迫来”，并且不断写稿赚取稿费。<sup>18</sup>

在这个背景下，林连玉在1946年发起了吉隆坡华校教师福利基金，三年以后，发展成吉隆坡华校教师公会。林连玉是吉隆坡华校教师公会首任的秘书，并在1950年至1960年担任主席。

教师公会的任务当然是“以教师的力量创造教师的福利。”在“刻薄寡恩”的董事商人的管理之下做一些自我保护的工作。<sup>19</sup>但是五十年代局势的演变却使到教师公会的任务被逼调

17 又翔：〈向林连玉先生学习〉，吡叻华校董事会联合会编：《林连玉》（怡保：吡叻华校董事会联合会，1986），页20。有关林连玉文史知识丰富的描绘，另见李业霖：〈怀念林连玉先生〉，教总秘书处编：《族魂林连玉》，页89-90。

18 陈玉水：〈把一生献给民族教育的巨人〉，教总秘书处编：《族魂林连玉》，页86。

19 林连玉：〈我组织教师公会〉，《风雨十八年》下集，页175-179。

整，这是林连玉意想不到的事。由于这样的演变，使到教师福利的关心变成次要的领域。

## 2. 华教运动的启幕

### 2.1 从《巴恩氏报告书》到《拉萨报告书》

在青史的记录里，华族社会几乎一直在交白卷，司马迁当年撰述史记时，把万世师表的孔子升入世家；如果今天要我来撰述大马华族历史的话，我会把林连玉先生从列传里编进世家的第一篇。让这一地区的各民族知道，华族社会已在白卷上写上第一名人物，一位秉承及发扬华族传统文化精神的人物。<sup>20</sup>

这是郑良树师在林连玉去世时所写的感言，点出了林连玉在他心目中的地位。从战后到林连玉被褫夺公民权，爱护中华文化的人说他是华社的良心，不了解其中文化情怀的人则说他是洪水猛兽。而这一切都得从《巴恩氏报告书》的发表说起。

马来亚联合邦成立于1948年，两年以后，英国殖民地政府提出以英文为主的教育来建立马来亚国家新观念。这个建议受到马来社会及华人社会的反对。英国政府于是邀请了五位洋人和九位马来人组成一个委员会重新检讨这份报告。

委员会以牛津大学的巴恩氏(L. J. Barnes)为首，所提呈的报告书因此命名为《巴恩氏报告书》(Barnes Report)，这份

报告书主张国家教育必须通过两种语文，即以英文与马来文的国民学校来培养马来亚国家的观念。

为了显示顾及全民，殖民地政府也委任方氏(William P. Fenn)及吴德耀撰写华文教育的报告，这份报告书和《巴恩氏报告书》的意见不同。它主张政府也应该发展华文教育，并认为华人其实乐于学习英文及马来文，知道多语所带给他们的好处，但是却反对政府限制他们学习语文的自由，特别是不准他们学习自己的母语。

《巴恩氏报告书》发表于1951年初，而《方吴报告书》则发表于1951年中。1951年对林连玉来说是不平凡的一年，从此以后，他的命运发生了很大的变化，他从一位纯粹的教书先生变成华教运动领袖，并且和政治扯上了千丝万缕的关系。

当《巴恩氏报告书》发表时，那时林连玉已是吉隆坡教师公会的主席，对此当然不能坐视不理。为了壮大声势，他以吉隆坡华校教师公会主席的身份召开全马华校教师会代表大会。这个代表大会直接催生了1951年12月25日华校教师会总会(教总)的成立。林连玉虽然拒任主席只当理事，但是他却是教总最积极的一位代表。从这一刻开始，华教运动就卷入马来亚的政治洪流中，而林连玉更是南下北上，风尘仆仆。

1952年在立法议会11月通过的报告书美其名是综合及检讨两份报告书，事实上却是《巴恩氏报告书》的另一个版本，政府不重视《方吴报告书》、不重视华人意见的心态昭然若揭。追根究底，当然是和左派思潮有关，自从紧急法令实施以后，政府对华校生极为不信任，大肆拘捕，搜查事件层出不穷，华校生动辄被等同于有倾左的意识。

林连玉对意识形态的论争一向置之度外，他的立世精神在于中华文化的完整性，当时“马来亚华人占总人口的一半，华人文化为最优秀的文化之一”，他这样一位刚烈的人绝对接受

<sup>20</sup> 郑良树：〈华族社会第一世家〉，教总秘书处编：《族魂林连玉》，页91。

不了《巴恩氏报告书》。<sup>21</sup> 因此在报告书未通过以前，他与报馆配合，制造舆论。<sup>22</sup> 另外一个重要的插曲当然是于 1952 年 11 月 9 日，他借在吉隆坡召开的教育新薪津制会议发动反对 1952 年教育法令。

出席这个会议的团体包括了教总、华校董事联合会总会（董总）以及马华公会。意义因此非比寻常，这是华人教育史中少数令人振奋的事件，由教总、董总以及马华公会形成的“三大机构”组织，就在这个时候成立。在众人反对教育法令声中，马华公会总会长陈祯禄发言表示“一定要保持我们的母语”，并向与会者表示“马华公会对于华文教育的发展给予全力支持”。<sup>23</sup> 两年后他再次重申“马华公会一定支持华教，不支持就不是华人。”<sup>24</sup>

虽然这个法令最终在立法会议上通过，对林连玉而言，三大机构的合作使他对华教运动信心无比，华社在华教问题上看来有了共识。林连玉在 1953 年出任教总主席，最大任务是寻求政府将华文列为官方语文。虽然华教工作者和马华公会常有往来，但许多事情并不是想像中那么简单。所谓的同声同气，可能只是集会中的嚷嚷叫声，具体的运作有许多意想不到的问题。

21 教总 33 年编辑室编：《教总 33 年》（吉隆坡：马来西亚华校教师会总会，1987 年），页 313。

22 这份报告书未交立法会通过以前，林连玉无意中从一位友人处知道这个消息。林连玉：〈谁泄露 1952 年教育法令的秘密〉，《风雨十八年》上集，页 59。

23 教总 33 年编辑室编：《教总 33 年》，页 317。

24 董总出版组编：《董总卅年》（吉隆坡：华校董事联合会总会，1987），页 578。

## 2.2 多元族群下的对话

不懂英语或马来语可以说是林连玉的致命伤，这个弱点使他无法和英国官员或马来精英直接对话。许多事情因此出现了更多的波折。在以后的华教运动史中，我们发现华教人士的言论经常遭到英国官员或马来精英的曲解，以致在族群政治的运作中被边缘化。1952 年讨论教育的法令中，我们可以看到林连玉采用的方法只是通过华社制造舆论，形成压力。声音越大，效果越佳，这是林连玉处理华教问题的惯常手段。引申开去，华人大团结就是彻底解决问题的方法。

既然要团结，当然不能少掉华人政党。马华公会是华人在政治上的唯一代表，教总当然希望它可以发挥“里应外合”的角色。教总和马华公会一唱一和，华教才有前途。为了表示教总对马华公会的尊重，林连玉让三大机构附属在马华公会里。这点看来有些委曲求全，但是权衡轻重，这样的安排也势所必致。这里头牵涉了一个林连玉没有说过的因素。马华公会和殖民地政府关系良好，他们的共同语言更多，这是一个典型的形势比人强局面。

比较一下林连玉和陈祯禄是极为有趣的。两人在五十年代有着密切的关系，陈祯禄不懂中文，不能以华语和林连玉沟通，他祖籍福建，但福建话却不流利，他和林连玉见面的时候还得请人担任翻译。<sup>25</sup> 陈祯禄通过英文著作了解中国经典，对中国文化虽然有所体悟，但始终觉得英文给他更多好处，他曾经揶揄林连玉说，孙中山和尼赫鲁之所以厉害，因为“他们学习英文。我自己所以厉害，也是因为我学习英文。可惜你不懂英文，不然也是一个厉害的人物。”<sup>26</sup>

25 林连玉：〈马华公会教育政策订立的经过〉，《风雨十八年》上集，页 76。

26 同上，页 80。

陈祯禄是一个充满政治细胞的人物。他虽然也认为华人要求华文教育合情合理，但是他做事瞻前顾后，老练圆滑，对其他族群的反应更是了然于胸。林连玉除了华教以外，对其他事一向都不曾处心积虑，他做事率性而为，和马来社群领袖几乎是道不同不相为谋。陈祯禄善于交际，和巫统的一些领袖更能促膝谈心，但在同时又晓得如何不辜负华人对他的期待，是华人史上一位少数能在马来社会和华人社会中左右逢源的人。而林连玉的名气却只局限在华人社会，马来人对他几乎一无所知。

从林连玉的文字中，看得出来陈祯禄谈笑自如的风度让他产生好感。也因为如此，他才认为华人大团结不是一个梦想，一些小障碍消除以后，这个族群还是有前途的。

当时的小障碍来自马华公会本身。对教总的华文教育必须完整无缺的主张，马华公会内部有许多不同的声音。如果林连玉只是说服陈祯禄一人，华人大团结就指日可待。令林连玉头痛的还是其他党要如李孝式、梁宇皋等人的感受和体验完全和教总不同。林连玉和马华公会合作因此一波三折。

以1953年召开的三大机构会议为例，雪州马华公会会长李孝式大发咆哮，指教总“争取华文列为官方语文”的提案将引起族群不和，他一时控制不住内心的愤怒，建议把担任总秘书的马华公会代表温典光革职。<sup>27</sup>李孝式的反应并不让人吃惊，身兼数十职的这位华团领袖是其中一名支持1952年教育法令的立法会议员。<sup>28</sup>他的立场一目了然，一切都要以“国家利益”为前提，任何会引起他族不满的提案都应被阻止。

李孝式的所谓“过于敏感”，并不是无知乱说。四十年代

27 林连玉：〈马华教育中央委员会的真相〉，《风雨十八年》上集，页65。

28 林连玉：〈全国华校董教代表第一次大会〉，《风雨十八年》上集，页48。

末期及五十年代初期最有影响力的马来领袖拿督翁以及他的追随者，就为了教育问题特别举行马来人大会，激烈反对华文列为官方语文的提议。但是对林连玉及大部分华人而言，华文列为官方语文的要求言之成理，他的后面有强大的支持者，报章署名支持响应的华人社团不计其数。除此以外，劳工党以及人民进步党，甚至是马华公会青年团，也认为这个主张是合理的。<sup>29</sup>

这个问题出现歧义的关键点在于如何解读马来社会。独立以前，马来亚连一所马来中学也没有，师资和英国政府的漠视都是原因。一些马来民间团体早就对这一点不满，他们不只要在标准型国民小学的媒介语由英语改为马来语，而且要把以英语为媒介语的学校全部以马来语代替。<sup>30</sup>对华文教育，他们也有异议。1953年，拿督翁曾大骂华人领袖企图颠覆马来亚的独立运动，要把这个国家变成中国的另一个省。<sup>31</sup>

自从1952年马华、巫统在吉隆坡市选举组成了华巫联盟以后，马华公会和巫统领袖从此建立了一个协商的管道，在为独立努力的过程中，一个新政策利谁，往往都得看双方领袖的智慧和谈判时的技巧和能力，下面的会谈在当时无疑是很有代表性的。

1955年1月12日，林连玉率领董教总代表团与以东姑为首的联盟在马六甲陈祯禄家里会谈。东姑正和拿督翁争雄，当时拿督翁的国家党里有许多有权势及担任高级政府公务员的党员，这个新党对由巫统、马华公会及印度国大党所组成的联盟构成了最大威胁。东姑知道这位搞种族情绪的马来领袖是不受

29 林连玉：〈马华教育中央委员会的真相〉，《风雨十八年》上集，页65。

30 张木钦：《民族先锋之歌》（吉隆坡：南洋商报，1984），页50。

31 见 Heng Pek Koon, *Chinese Politics in Malaysia: A History of Malaysian Chinese Association* (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1988), p.171。



华人所喜欢的，但是为了确保华人真正支持联盟，他认为和林连玉会谈是有必要的。林连玉的回忆录中有一些引人注目的资料，虽然冗长，但是还是值得一引：

东姑说：“就是由现在起至今年七月选举止，你保证不再提官方语文问题。我不是要求取消你的要求，只是要求你暂时不谈，便利我争取选举罢了。”当时我心里盘算着：反正这个问题不是急切间可以解决的，有时间性的保证无碍于事，不如送个人情给陈祯禄爵士罢……伊斯迈执笔起草新闻稿，仅有两句话：“今天会谈的结果：华校教师已答应不提华文列为官方语文问题。”温典光译成华文给我看，我说：“不对，不对，我保证的是：从现在到七月这七个月里不提华文列为官方语文。问题如此写法，将会给人误会我们永远取消了基本要求。”于是我提起笔来，在“答应”下面添着“暂时”两字……伊斯迈说：“这样，今天的会谈就失掉作用了。”他提起笔来，把“暂时”两字圈去，拍着我的肩膀说：“今天我们的谈话是以真实记录作根据的，新闻不过对外宣传而已。林先生，你要帮忙，请帮忙到底吧。”我说：“这样，我是为了你们联盟吞了一颗炸弹，给我们华人骂死了。好吧！我准备暂时挨骂，希望你们能够获得政权，实践今天的诺言。”东姑和伊斯迈齐声说：“那是当然的！那是当然的！”果然新闻发表以后，舆论哗然。攻击我把教总出卖了。《南洋商报》更以专篇社论评道：“马六甲会谈除掉放弃基本要求以外，毫无所获。我们不知道所为何求。”<sup>32</sup>

这个会谈弥漫着亲切和睦的气氛，所谓“实践诺言”，指的是联盟在胜利后，将修改1952年教育法令中不利华文教育的文字，并且将华文中学的津贴增加100%。其条件是林连玉在这个关键时刻成人之美，不要让华文教育问题在选举中节外生枝，让联盟穷于应付。

这是林连玉第一次和东姑会谈。林连玉事后回忆说，这次会谈奠定了董教部代表华文教育的地位，可见他对这次平起平坐的机会极为珍惜，这个被“约见”的安排，使他相信和他对谈的人都有诚意，更何况安排会谈的陈祯禄是他信任和敬佩的政治人物。

1955年选举联盟胜利，作为首席部长的东姑实践了马六甲会谈的诺言，组成了以敦拉萨教育部长为首的十五人教育委员会，重订教育政策。在1956年6月公布，这份报告书建议“以马来文为国语，并维护和支持本邦其他各族群的语言与文化发展。”

在这个过程中有一个事件必得一书，1956年的教育报告书本来有一项“第12条”，全文是这样的：“我们进一步相信，这个国家的教育政策的最后目标，必须是把所有各族的儿童集中在一个以国语（马来语）为主要教学媒介的国家教育制度底下，不过我们不禁地认识到，朝此目标迈进的步伐必须是按部就班的，不能操之过急。”

林连玉对这一点暴跳如雷。在1956年5月6日这份报告书在国会公布的前一个星期拉萨和教总及董总代表会面时，拉萨指出这个条文的政治目的多于实质目的，主要是“现在连一间巫文中学也办不起来，又怎能有资格以巫文作为所有学校的主要教学的媒介。”但林连玉认为这是原则问题，他完全不能妥协，原因是：“若是有一天可能时，我们华文教育不是要被消灭了吗？”拉萨同意在一年后草拟正式教育法令时，取消“第12条”。教育法令通过后，拉萨提醒林连玉：“你必须严

32 林连玉：〈马六甲会谈〉，《风雨十八年》上集，页109-111。

谨地为我守密。倘若消息外泄，我们巫人知道我对你们退让一条最主要的原则，他们将会吃掉我的肉。”<sup>33</sup> 联盟和教总在这时候还是合作无间，谁都不会想到拉萨的一句话影响了林连玉最后二十年的生活。

《拉萨报告书》和 1957 年教育法令，看来更像是为了马来亚独立而制造出来的政治产品，各个族群齐声接受的教育政策向殖民地政府展示了马来亚各大种族都能和睦相处。

如果我们认为在华教运动上林连玉是最激进的人，那显然是错了，林连玉在这方面还有许多转折的空间，但他的一些战友却不如此。吡叻教师公会就认为不应接受此报告书，因为和英文及马来文相比，华文教育的地位显然大为逊色。<sup>34</sup> 林连玉不否认这点，<sup>35</sup> 甚至也认为政府往往言行不一致，不可过分信任他们。可是他对马华公会却有绝对的信心。他相信马华公会立法议员是和他们同进退的。<sup>36</sup>

### 3. 马来亚独立和华文教育

#### 3.1 不要妨碍独立！

在马华公会还没有成立以前，华人在政治上的事务基本上是由华团代表的。马华公会成立以后，这些华团的政治性质并

33 林连玉：〈有关最后目标问题〉，教总秘书处编：《林梁公案》（吉隆坡：林连玉基金会，1989），页 216。

34 《星洲日报》，1956 年 8 月 12 日。

35 他认为拉萨报告书在实质上和巴恩氏报告书没有什么不同。在接受新加坡海峡报的访问时，他也强调它过于偏重英文。见《中国报》1956 年 7 月 5 日的报导。

36 分别见《中国报》1956 年 7 月 23 日及 1956 年 7 月 25 日。

没有被取代，它们和马华公会的差别是没有参加大选。华团可以代表舆论，他们的意见不一定和马华公会一样。马华公会基于政治上的考虑，不得不顾及华团的感受，因为他们的意见可以左右选民的倾向。

独立以前，政治和教育可以说是构成华社斗争的主轴。一边是以马华公会为主，另一边则是董总和教总。华教发展从来不是华人主观意识中可以决定的，特别是在教育政策还没有定型的时候。要如何面对殖民地政府或马来族群所施加的压力？要如何使到华人可以无阻地接受完整的中文教育？陈绿漪一本以华文教育为题材的书就直接以《马来亚华文教育政治》为名。<sup>37</sup> 华文教育的发展的确不能脱离政治的讨论。事实上，独立以前，教总的工作几乎和政治工作者没有什么两样，由于在文化的发扬上他们说出了大部分华人的心声，使到他们的影响力扩展到政治领域，许多人显然是以教总的言论马首是瞻。

1956 年，联盟自治政府和英国谈判后，英国终于同意让马来亚独立。但是仍然有许多华人未成为公民。1955 年立法会议半民选时，华裔选民才占总选民人数的 11.20%，也就是说，有超过 90% 的华人不是公民。

在筹备新宪法的时候，巫统开会决定：反对凡是当地出生的华人都可以成为公民。这个消息一传出，使到原本就已棘手的问题更加复杂。马来人的这个举动和他们对自己在马来亚地位的安全感有关。如果华人全当公民，以当时的新马人口总计，他们的比例是少之于华人的，在教育上、经济上，他们又被远远地抛在后头，他们所承受的压力自然有迹可寻。

应如何回应马来人舆论？教总的举动是华社所关注的。

37 Tan Liok Ee, *The Politics of Chinese Education in Malaya, 1945-1961* (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press), 1997.

1956年4月27日林连玉领导教总和怡保中华大会堂、雪兰莪中华大会堂、三十六行团总会及马六甲中华大会堂，在吉隆坡召开全马华人团体争取公民权大会。到会的454华团，一千余名代表一致通过发表一份宣言，并通过四大要求：一、当地出世即为当然公民。二、在本邦居留五年者，得申请为公民，免受语言考试；三、凡公民权利与义务一律平等。四、列巫、华、印为官方语文。

从到会的华团而言，可见林连玉登高一呼的能力。“争取公民权宣言”由林连玉起草，希望马来人对华人“加以善意的了解，我们华人移入马来亚，纯粹是人类求生欲望的驱迫，并不负有政治的使命……我们当然要启示我们的下一代：以马来亚为他们效忠的对象。”<sup>38</sup>

1956年6月，为独立工作而设的一个调查团前来马来亚搜集各族人士的意见。调查团共收到了131份备忘录。华人所呈的备忘录中，都重提“争取公民权宣言”里的四个意见。但是调查团在半年后所提呈的报告中，却令华人不满意。公民权的申请依旧设了许多不利华人的条件；报告书也认为华文及印文不适合成为官方语文。

由华团所发起的“争取权益”运动，因此决定往英国据理力争。代表团1957年5月5日起程，林连玉虽然也被选为其中一个代表，但却拒绝同行，代表团往英国后空手而回，有人认为如果他一起同行，成败的情况会改观。这当然是高估了林连玉的作用。林连玉和英国人本来就没有交情。除了不懂英语以外，他对英国人的作业方法一向就没有花心思研究。对英国人来说，林连玉要华文列为官方语文的强硬态度，本来就被他们认为不实际的，在林连玉和英国人交手的过程中，几乎没有

38 教总33年编辑室编：《教总33年》，页374。

一次不是不欢而散的。

现在看来，到英国的华团代表，演的还是跑龙套的角色。林连玉对这一点倒是有自知之明。但是说他悲观吗？那又不见得，他心中还是有一个期待，即是华人大团结。这个目的不能被枝节小事破坏，华团代表若到伦敦，必定和马华公会发生分裂，这是他不愿看到的。<sup>39</sup> 林连玉因此有眼前最重要的事是争取独立的主张，对于许多不利华人的事，包括语文，包括教育，可以等到独立后才处理。因此他不断高喊“最高原则，就是争取独立，一切的一切，都以不妨碍独立”的立场，以及“忍辱负重”的态度。<sup>40</sup>

所以即使他对1957年7月10日在立法议会通过的宪法不满，但却将这些失望放在心中，并且找一些话来加强自己的信心。他甚至借用东姑最爱用来为自己辩护的话加强论点：“宪法不是十全十美的”，但“以后可以修改”。他要华社给予东姑“试行的机会。”因为“建国的实际工作比空洞的宪法条文更加重要。”<sup>41</sup> 这样的顾全大局，使到马来亚各族间看起来当然更是万众一心了。

### 3.2 华人社会的两种心态

将华文列为官方语文的诉求，林连玉从来没有放弃。马来亚独立以后，他更希望尽快了结这个心愿。在这方面，他对三机构有极大寄望，也因为如此，他常常为三机构说话，坚持三

39 林连玉：《伦敦之行》，《风雨十八年》下集，页11-23。

40 1956年12月12日林连玉在教总大会中的说话，收录于教总33年编辑室编：《教总33年》，页180-182。

41 1957年8月6日林连玉在全马华团代表大会十五人工委会议上的讲话，现收录于教总33年编辑室编：《教总33年》，页401。



机构合作的重要性。他在 1957 年 11 月 11 日马华教育中委会紧急扩大会议上说：

或许有人要误会三大机构的努力不够，事到其间，开一次大会，送一张呈文就算了吧！其实不然，几年以来，我们是走尽了可走的途径，用尽了可用的力量。许多要人们，为我所能接触到的，哪一个我没有和他们接触？……我平生是最怕长途乘车的，连行十几里路，我都会呕吐。所以过去十几年来我的足迹总是不离开吉隆坡。但是请统计一下，单是去马六甲，我就跑了几多回！……结果还是如此，我还有什么话说。<sup>42</sup>

事实上，三大机构在陈祯禄 1956 年因病丧失部分记忆后就已名存实亡，后来林苍佑接任总会长，林连玉内心中又浮现了一些曙光。

像陈祯禄一样，林苍佑可以诚恳地听林连玉等人的意见，三机构因此又可为华文问题坐下来开会谋求对策。1959 年 4 月 26 日，马华教育中央委员会、华校教总及董总召开社团代表大会，参加的代表有一千多人，声势浩大。事前副首相曾经一再阻止林苍佑参加这个大会，但是林苍佑置之不理。眼看这个大会势在必行，教育部长佐哈里在 1959 年 4 月 22 日召见了林连玉。这一次的会谈大约花了两个多小时，气氛虽然不错，但是无法解决“华文为官方语文的问题。”<sup>43</sup>

林苍佑于 1958 年 3 月 23 日击败陈祯禄，但只是控制党中央，陈修信则控制了马华公会各州的领导层。1959 年 9 月的

大选前夕，才上任十八个月的马华公会会长林苍佑失去了实权而辞职，林苍佑的失势，除了因为陈修信在背后密谋策划，更重要的是林苍佑和东姑阿都拉曼交恶。

在 1959 年 6 月大选前夕，林苍佑向联盟提出了两个要求。第一是“马华公会要在 104 席的国会里，分得 40 个席位”；第二就是“华人社会对华文教育的总要求，必须列入联盟的竞选纲领。”这两个要求点燃了东姑的怒火。林连玉对林苍佑“千万人吾往矣”的精神当然感激不尽。林连玉过后在实兆远说了这样的一段话：

以前我们存有错误的见解，以为马华公会是理想的盟友，理论上也算得执政有分了，我们有四个合理的要求通过马华总可解决的。可是不幸得很，由于这次联盟内部风潮的暴露，我们可以清清楚楚的看到了原来马华的要求竟没有得到盟友的理会，马华公会和会长林苍佑先生不但对于联盟的政纲不能参加一句话，甚至连所谓代表华人的候选人名单，也没有过目的权力……那是我们的最高领袖，就这么可怜……<sup>44</sup>

上述的这一番话清楚地看到林连玉对于林苍佑失败的感叹。马华受制于巫统的处境一目了然，主次即成，胜负已分。三机构在林苍佑下台以后，就停止一切活动。<sup>45</sup> 林苍佑的位子由来自吉打州的谢敦禄取代，但大家都清楚谢敦禄只是过渡时期的领袖。马华公会最有势力的人是陈祯禄的独生儿子陈修信。

42 教总 33 年编辑室编：《教总 33 年》，页 410。

43 林连玉：〈与佐哈里私人会谈〉，《风雨十八年》下集，页 60-69。

44 引自谢诗坚：《林苍佑评传》（槟城：槟榔出版社，1988），页 129-130。

45 1961 年 3 月 15 日林连玉在教总工委会议上的讲话。收录于教总 33 年编辑室编：《教总 33 年》，页 449。

在比较陈祯禄父子二人时，林连玉认为陈祯禄是民族英雄，而陈修信则是民族“大罪人”。<sup>46</sup> 他批评陈修信和他的支持者“群小当道，假借名誉，胡作妄为。”<sup>47</sup> 又说陈修信是东姑的“忠实傀儡”。<sup>48</sup> 在他的回忆录中，为了形容陈修信，许多不堪入眼的文字他都用上了。他最为生气的是独立不久，陈修信和他的同僚告诉当时的教育部长佐哈里说，华文教育问题不必与华校教总及董总交涉，应当由马华公会文化组办理。<sup>49</sup> 他批评陈修信“以我们为敌人，甚至要借外力残害自己的同胞，真是丧心病狂。”<sup>50</sup> 陈修信对林连玉也没有好感，不认同林连玉的斗争方式，他对林连玉不了解国情，特别是不谅解东姑及巫统的处境，更是摇头感叹。

花一些笔墨描述一下马来社会的动态有助于我们了解马华公会的方针和决定。在 1956 年 5 月 18 日的立法会议里，许多马来议员抨击《拉萨报告书》过于顺从非马来人的意愿。许多议员坚持只有马来语可以当教学媒介语，并且说华人的要求破坏了国民的团结。他们也批评《拉萨报告书》委员会缺乏道德勇气提供一个确定马来文可以成为唯一教学媒介语的日期。<sup>51</sup> 到了独立以后，东姑所面对的压力并没有缓和。联盟政府迟迟不开办巫文中学引起了马来社会的不快。佐哈里为首的教育部认为此事不宜操之过急，因为当时师资缺乏，在全国非巫文学

46 林连玉：〈马来西亚到今日还有华校继续存在，不要忘记华校教总的功劳〉，《风雨十八年》下集，页 187。

47 林连玉：〈争取公民权大会〉，《风雨十八年》下集，页 3 及林连玉：〈伦敦之行〉，《风雨十八年》下集，页 21。

48 林连玉：〈副教育部长朱运兴先生〉，《风雨十八年》下集，页 123。

49 林连玉：〈与佐哈里私人会谈〉，《风雨十八年》下集，页 60。

50 林连玉：〈有关申请公民权的史实〉，《风雨十八年》下集，页 159。

51 有关这方面的讨论，见 Tan Liok Ee, *The Politics of Chinese Education in Malaya, 1945-1961*, p.178.

校，小学缺巫文教师 800 名，中学缺 200 名，如果开办巫文中学，则推广马来文的工作将受影响。但是马来社会不接受这个解释。退党风潮在各地蔓延。巫统教师造反，使到东姑不得不在 1959 年暂时离职。<sup>52</sup>

陈修信非常关心马来社会的动态，他因此认为林连玉的激进无理取闹。他在 1959 年解说不宜退出联盟时补充了一句：“维护华文教育问题不重要。”<sup>53</sup> 陈修信对考试媒介语的看法最可说明他的心态。陈修信认为以中文为初级教育文凭考试媒介语是不符实际的。他关心的是华人教育，不是华文教育，华人只要懂得中文就行，不必精深。教育政策要考虑的是学生将来的就业和竞争能力。如果“华文教育永远要用中文作答，不用英文作答，这样下去，华人学生则永远分成两派，读华文的和读英文的。这样读华文的，如何与其他的来往？如何培养马来亚共同的思想？”<sup>54</sup>

教总无法在观点上和马华公会合拢，从此就有两辆马车代表华社开步走，华教运动的路走得更加颠颠簸簸。到了 1960 年政府公布《达立报告书》后，林连玉和马华公会之间再也没有回归之路，使两者之间水火不容的是下述的文字：

一、1961 年起，政府不再举办初中会考和华文中学升学考试，中学所有的公共考试，只能以国语或是作为官方语文的英文为考试媒介语。

二、本邦之中学，规定将只有“全部津贴中学”和“独立中学”两种，由 1962 年 1 月 1 日起，停止对所有不合格（不接受改制者）的局部资助学校

52 张木钦：《民族先锋之歌》，页 50-53。

53 《中国报》，1959 年 7 月 13 日。

54 引自张木钦：《民族先锋之歌》，页 36。

的津贴，独立中学可以继续存在，但须受政府教育条例之限制。

华校改制的问题在独立前就已是华社中的大问题。毕业自苏州东吴大学的槟城钟灵中学校长汪永年，在1955年便已向政府申请“特别津贴金”，变相的将钟灵中学改制为国民中学（英文中学），1957年9月芙蓉的振华中学也跟随钟灵的脚步，接下来则是昔加末华侨中学。

上述几所学校的做法加强了政府对改制中学的信心，但是逐一改制的方法对政府来说速度太慢了。《达立报告书》要快刀斩乱麻。全国72所华文中学因此立刻面对一个抉择，接受政府的条件进行改制，或是成为独立中学，不受政府分文津贴。当时执政党的马华公会不断鼓吹华文学校改制，其主要理由是“一、改制后有三分之一的时间学华文；二、董事部不必为经费操心；三、学生学费减少，减轻家长负担；四、改制后学生有出路。”<sup>55</sup>这也就是当年廿七岁的马青总秘书李三春1961年7月3日在电台广播时所说的：“联盟政府，事实上要在目前的情形下，为我们的子弟定下了一条最好的教育政策。”<sup>56</sup>由于许多华文中学的董事都是当地马华党要，因此马华公会的鼓吹有相当显著的效果。结果有16所坚持独立，55所接受政府的献议，包括1906年建立，林连玉感情最深厚的尊孔中学。<sup>57</sup>林连玉的苦闷无处发泄，写了一篇文章大骂开先锋

的汪永年，题目单刀直入：“出卖华文教育罪魁汪永年”。<sup>58</sup>

林连玉再度推动华人社会表示民意，并请求代表华人社会参与《达立报告书》的三位议员梁宇皋、王保尼及许金龙改变初衷。华人所呈的备忘录一共有七十四份，每份都在报章发表，这三人对教育政策的观点和陈修信是一致的，自然不理睬林连玉等人鼓噪。<sup>59</sup>

在这里，有必要将梁宇皋拉进我们的讨论。他是林连玉在华教运动历程中最后交手的一个人。梁宇皋毕业自伦敦大学，是当时的司法部长，也是在《达立报告书》中代表政府的华人。他和汪精卫是亲戚，曾经是国民党员，但是后来成为东姑的密友。<sup>60</sup>林连玉对梁宇皋没有好感，而梁宇皋也视林连玉为眼中钉，梁宇皋因《达立报告书》而受到华人激烈的批评后对林连玉更是恨之入骨。1960年8月12日梁宇皋在国会批评林连玉是“走江湖卖膏药的，他为了自己的牛油和面包。”<sup>61</sup>林连玉在报章反唇相讥，批评梁宇皋“贪图个人的高官厚禄，不惜把华人的利益出卖，再出卖。”<sup>62</sup>口舌之战越演越热，一来一往僵持了几个月。梁宇皋最后在报章上说《达立报告书》、1957年教育法令及《拉萨报告书》是一体的，《拉萨报告书》所谓的最后目标，即最终以马来文为所有学校的教学媒介语，是“林君及部分反对《达立报告书》的人士，一再表示衷心接受的。”<sup>63</sup>

55 黎整理：〈华文中学改制的回顾〉，教总教育研究中心编：《华文中学改制专辑》（吉隆坡：马来西亚华校教师会总会，1986），页22。

56 《星洲日报》，1961年7月4日。

57 郑良树：〈独立后华文教育〉，林水椽、何启良、何国忠、赖观福编：《马来西亚华人史新编》第2册（吉隆坡：马来西亚中华大会堂总会，1998），页265-268。有关尊孔中学的改制经过，见教总33年编辑室：《教总33年》，页462-464。

58 林连玉：《风雨十八年》上集，页178-197。

59 林连玉：〈有关最后目标问题〉，教总秘书处编：《林梁公案》，页217。

60 Tunku Abdul Rahman Putra, *Looking Back* (Kuala Lumpur: Pustaka Antara, 1977), p.173; 林连玉：〈有关最后目标问题〉，教总秘书处编：《林梁公案》，页216。

61 教总秘书处编：《林梁公案》，页40-42。

62 同上，页47。

63 同上，页95。



这是这场争论的转折点，这句话使到巫统人物被搬上了舞台。1956年他和拉萨对话的尘封往事于是出土。林连玉在1961年8月10日在教总理事扩大会议中，将1956年和拉萨会谈的具体内容、时间、地点及当时在场的人物公布出来。<sup>64</sup>这篇演词第二天在各报章刊登，举国震惊是可想而知的。8月12日，内政部即下令剥夺林连玉的公民权。<sup>65</sup>

林连玉在为华教斗争的过程中，早就知道这种处境出现的可能性。五十年代初期，在和一位殖民地官员争辩以后，他对他一位学生说他已安排了太太的将来，“你们只要不时到我家看看就够了。”<sup>66</sup>对于林连玉不利的传言从没间断。例如1955年，李孝式建议钦差大臣把林连玉驱逐出境。<sup>67</sup>林连玉的言论是大胆的，表达方法是直接的、不给面子的。政府不喜欢他，许多马华要员也不喜欢他，主要是他的观点左右了华社的舆论。他的演讲经常“万头攒动”，他的言论往往是华文报纸的头条新闻。<sup>68</sup>陈修信禁不住感叹：“这个英语不通，这个从来

64 林连玉：〈有关最后目标问题〉，教总秘书处编：《林梁公案》，页114-121。

65 林连玉公布和拉萨对话情况有考虑到失信于拉萨的事。他认为拉萨身为政府中最有力的决策人，其势力凌驾当时首相东姑，达立检讨委员会的成立必然出于拉萨的授意，而拉萨在演讲时也强调马来亚最后将以马来文为学校主要的媒介语。林连玉因此觉得先失信的是拉萨而不是他自己。林连玉：〈有关最后目标问题〉，教总秘书处编：《林梁公案》，页218。

66 林启东：〈悼林连玉老师：五年祭〉，教总秘书处编：《族魂林连玉》，页190。

67 林连玉：〈全国华校董事代表第一次大会〉，《风雨十八年》上集，页55。

68 例如见1959年9月10日至11日剪报，收录于教总33年编辑室编：《教总33年》，页61。

没有被邀请出席元首晚宴的人竟是华社最有影响力的人。”<sup>69</sup>

当林连玉公布他和拉萨会谈的内容，在马来亚的族群政治游戏规则中，他应该知道后果不堪设想。拉萨是当时巫统最有势力的人，他怎么容许林连玉如此破坏他的形象？可是林连玉的镇定是让他的友人惊讶的，根据黄润岳当时的回忆：

在他收到政府通知要取消他的公民权证之后，他仍是泰然自若。他因律师的事去新加坡，从新加坡回来，又收到政府的第二份通知，要取消他的教师注册证。他是坐夜车回吉隆坡的，早晨到达，为了那份通知，忙了一天。下午三点多，回家冲了凉之后，就到逸园去消遣了。他的心情，是那么宁静，是那么镇定。当晚的小牌，他还赢了几块钱。于是，像往常一样，十点左右，买了两盒炒果条，挂在那辆破脚车上，慢吞吞地又踏回他的亚答屋去。<sup>70</sup>

林连玉显然有欲当烈士的心态，他告诉他的朋友：“争取民族教育平等之实现，责任在肩，纵使刀锯当前，亦所不避，个人利害，早置度外。”<sup>71</sup>

韦伯在以政治为天志的论述中，用了两种有关政治的伦理观点，来界定政治范畴的独立性。第一个观点他称为“信念伦理”（an ethic of ultimate ends），第二是责任伦理（an ethic of responsibilities）。信念伦理最大的特征是这种政治人物认为他们最大的责任是保持意图的纯真，任何政治行为均不得在道德

69 Frank H. H. King, *The New Malayan Nation: A Study of Communism and Nationalism* (New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1957), p.40.

70 黄润岳：〈我所认识的林连玉〉，教总秘书处编：《族魂林连玉》，页67。

71 同上，页53。

上有暧昧之处，他们并不是完全不顾责任，但他们考虑更多的是诚意和道德性，远多于考虑行为的结果，他们的弱点是忽略了左右着我们的是一个完全不同的善恶报应原则。至于责任伦理的人则认为世界上没有十全十美的人，也没有十全十美的事，把自己行为的意图定得十全十美，并不能使世界变得十全十美，但这也并不表示他们是毫无信念的机会主义者，但是为了达到可以预见的后果并对其负责，他们往往得在政治上与其他势力做必要的妥协和协议，因此常常变成政治市侩而不自知。但是韦伯不忘补充一点，谁也不能教导某个人是该按照信念伦理或是政治伦理行动。<sup>72</sup>

依照韦伯的分类而言，林连玉显然更倾向前者，而他的支持者显然也因为他的“信念伦理”而敬佩他。他当然会辩护自己也考虑到责任问题，但是执政的人却不相信他的话，他们认为他的话有极强的煽动力，不顾一切，不想后果。

政府在吊销林连玉的公民权显然就是给了这个理由，第一、故意歪曲、颠倒政府的教育政策，有计划地煽动对最高元首、联合邦政府的不满；第二、你的动机含有极端种族性质，以促成各民族间的恶感与仇视，可能达成动乱。

林连玉被吊销公民权案后来被带到法庭，前后一共有六个律师尽义务作辩护律师。这个案子从马来亚的高等法庭、上诉法院到英国枢密院，又回到调查庭，前后一共花费了三年多的时间。<sup>73</sup>

72 就韦伯的观点来看，两者应该结合在一起，才可以构成一个真正的政治家。但是在结合在一起的时候，却充满了许多张力而不得不靠一个人的智慧去克服。有关韦伯的意见，见 Max Weber, "Politics as a Vocation," *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology*, translated and edited by H. H. Gerth (New York: Oxford University Press, 1946), pp. 77-128.

73 教总秘书处编：《林连玉公民权案》（吉隆坡：林连玉基金会，1989）。

林连玉在 1961 年被吊销公民权后，战斗力还是非常旺盛，除了忙于打官司外，他还在 1963 年出版了《回忆片片录》，但一个月后即被内政部宣布为禁书，几天以后又将登载《回忆片片录》文章的第九期《教书杂志》列为禁书。<sup>74</sup> 政府和他已经誓不两立。所谓调查庭的设立，只不过是將吊销公民权的日子宽限一些时日吧了。

《中国报》在 1964 年 11 月 5 日有这样的一则新闻：“本邦公民登记总监日前致函林连玉，通知后者其公民权经被取消，由今年 10 月 23 日开始生效。”<sup>75</sup> 华教运动史上重要的一章，终于被划上了休止符。

### 3.3 华教斗士的困境

就眼前的情形说，马来亚各民族中，文化与经济最先进的，便是我们华人了，那么我们应该设身处地，为他人打算，我们应当赶快伸出友谊之手，辅助别人，使他们的文化与经济也跟我们一样的进步。<sup>76</sup>

这是 1956 年 9 月 9 日在檳城筹募教总基金慰劳大会上林连玉的演词。如果他有机会形容自己的话，他绝对不会认为自己是位极端者。除了和拉萨对话的那一次以外，他触及马来人的时候，文字都极为谨慎客观，在他的回忆录里，他对陈修信等人恶言相向，但我们却没有看到他指明道姓，批评任何一位

74 有关林连玉这本书被禁的情形，见林连玉：《回忆录被禁止》，《风雨十八年》下集，页 90-95 及陆庭谕：《〈回忆片片录〉与《风雨十八年》》，收录于《风雨十八年》下集，页 204。

75 教总秘书处编：《林连玉公民权案》，页 205。

76 同上，页 384。

巫统领袖。

林连玉和马来人的对话机会不多，1956年5月4日受《马来前锋报》的邀请，在开斋节特刊中发表感言。在这篇文章中，他的确有意摆脱激进的形象，他对华人的赠言是“要培养以马来亚为第一家乡的观念。”对马来人则是充满鼓励：“马来亚各民族的文化与经济发展得极不平衡，这是极可遗憾的现象。但我们相信天生人类是生而平等的，民族的文化与经济的进步，只有先期与后期的分别，并没有可能与不可能的差异。”<sup>77</sup>这篇对种族交流极为重要的文章无疑是希望马来人和华人之间可以互相帮助，互相容忍。很可惜的是，许多事情却和他的期待背道而驰。他寻求马来人对他的理解和了解，而得到的是更多无转圜的误解。

呈现在林连玉前面的马来亚，有着截然不同的“两面性”，一方面他被一个“马来亚共同体”的认知想法所吸引，这一个新的国家包括了马来亚的和平、独立自主以及对这个新国家所遇到的挑战采取一致的行动。另一方面，他又对文化的“同化”感到担忧。林连玉认为自己没有错的原因在于争取华文为官方语文并不是消灭马来文或英文，他不断强调自己早在1954年已主张政府把马来文中学建立起来，他也支持马来文为国语，并且在华校列马来文为必修科。<sup>78</sup>他认为争取华文教育完整性是身为国民的权利，也是符合宪法第152条的保障：“……本款不得妨碍联合邦政府或任何州政府保存并扶持联合

77 这篇题为〈心理的建设〉的文章现收录于教总33年编辑室编：《教总33年》，页375。

78 例如见《中国报》，1956年7月5日；1956年9月9日教总与雪兰莪印校教师联合会共同宣言，收录于教总33年编辑室：《教总33年》，页382-383；1960年在教总工委会议上的讲话，收录于教总33年编辑室：《教总33年》，页438-439。

邦其他种族语文之使用和研究。”

“马来人要恢复往日文化的光荣，这口号很有向心力。”但是“华人不能说恢复往日中华文化的光荣，这是沙文主义。甚至我们的领袖也这么说。”这是一位报刊总编辑的感触。<sup>79</sup>在马来人的眼中，是不可能出现两个官方语文，语文的问题看似简单，彼此间却谁也无法说服对方自己的观点是正确无误的。华文作为官方语文的提案，因此就变成永远也无法解决的死结。

林连玉却要越过这个死结，1958年9月28日在怡保举行的全马华文教育大会里，林连玉有这样的一席话：

1954年吾人要求列华文华语为官方语文时，余曾宣称可有五十万人，签名提出此要求。现今余相信签名者可达一百万人。唯余无意将此事与教育问题混为一谈。教总本系无党无派者，在大选前，考试之问题，希望有满意解决。不然，教总将不会继续参加马华公会华文教育委员会。<sup>80</sup>

林连玉说他为了不破坏马来亚独立的进度而容忍。<sup>81</sup>但对东姑来说，林连玉一直都喋喋不休，不断容忍的不是林连玉，而是他东姑。独立以后，东姑越来越觉得华教斗士不识时务。东姑在1959年7月警告过林连玉不可在大选以前召开讨论华文教育的会议，当时教总并没有这个会议，东姑显然对教总的印象坏透了。一有风声，即深信不疑。<sup>82</sup>在东姑眼中，林连玉是不理国情、不可救药的华教维护者。1961年5月东姑说到

79 张木钦：《民族先锋之歌》，页55。

80 教总33年编辑室编：《教总33年》，页425。

81 引自张木钦：《民族先锋之歌》，页48。

82 东姑原信现收录于教总33年编辑室编：《教总33年》，页84。

林连玉时就表明：“幸亏这种对本邦的效忠值得怀疑的人并不多。”<sup>83</sup>在林连玉被取消公民权一个月后，东姑又有一段不客气的批评：

当教总主席林连玉君鼓励华人的极端爱国思想以及呼唤不忠于中国的华人为走狗时，政府就取消其公民权，因为他已经不是马来亚人，因此没有资格保有他所拥有的公民权。<sup>84</sup>

林连玉不断地被马来领袖形容为极端主义者，即使是已退出华教运动的舞台，政府还是摆不开这个深刻的印象。1968年2月教育部长佐哈里在回忆中就有这样错误的记录：“1958年林连玉先生会见他时，曾要求所有的华校只能教授华文。”<sup>85</sup>林连玉在马来社会的形象，已被越描越黑。

对马来亚这个地方产生认同甚至要当马来亚的公民不是林连玉的困扰。早在1951年他就已正式申请成为马来亚联合邦的公民。他想归根在马来亚的心态是极为清楚的。1946年父亲去世他回中国奔丧，匆匆忙忙又回到马来亚来，这里有太多他关心的事。他的同时代朋友写到他时都特别强调这一点。黄润岳说“近十余年的所有大小事项、会议会谈之类，他连日期时间地点都记得清清楚楚。”<sup>86</sup>五十年代以后，他对马来亚问题的关怀，常常不眠不休。林连玉不只一次鼓励华人要关心本地事务，并且要华人将马来亚当作自己的第一故乡：“我们的子

83 教总秘书处编：《林连玉公民权案》，页7。

84 同上，页20。

85 林连玉澄清他没有说过这样的话，见教总33年编辑室编：《教总33年》，页495。

86 黄润岳：〈我所认识的林连玉〉，教总秘处编：《族魂林连玉》，页66。

子孙孙，必须定居于此，已经成为一个不可逃避的事实。”<sup>87</sup>

在第二章当我们讨论五十年代初期华人定位的问题时，曾经蜻蜓点水触及到林连玉在1952年积极参与华文教科书的重编，改变之前教科书由中国编纂，中国出版的格局。林连玉的意图是极为明显的，他希望新的教科书更加符合本地的实际，但也必须维护中国文化传统。他想要新一代的华人对这块土地产生感情的同时，也能够以华人而自豪，所谓华文教育者，就是在本土化和民族特性之间寻找一个平衡点。

这只是林连玉的一厢情愿。独立前的副教育部长朱运兴在1958年全马教育大会说过这样的话：

列华文为官方语文，需要修正宪法，修正宪法需要上下两院三分之二议员通过。……现在我们有一百万公民，不过，我们没有三分之二的议员，最多只有三分之一的华人议员，我们那里有把握争取另三分二的议员支持我们。……这个问题，马华公会不是不争取，要等到我们二百万华人成为公民，将来才逐步进行……。<sup>88</sup>

这个所谓将来逐步进行，今日看来当然更是海市蜃楼。当时持有朱运兴这种“逐步进行”看法的人极多。如果我们说林连玉不识时务，其他人似乎就是自欺欺人了。伤他的心的人不只是陈修信和梁宇皋，华社显然也对他的努力不完全领情。

尽管林连玉及华教人士对教育问题紧追不舍，但是华人的

87 林连玉1957年1月20日在森美兰的讲话，见教总33年编辑室编：《教总33年》，页64。

88 教总33年编辑室编：《教总33年》，页425。

反应却背道而驰。在六十年代，许多家长有感于英文的前途较为光明，进入华小学生的人数不断减少，在同一个时候，国民中学越建越多，独立中学的生存受到极大的挑战，独中学生人数从1962年的34,410人跌落到1969年18,476人。一部分的独中因此关闭。<sup>89</sup>

华人矛盾的心态在这里一览无遗，林连玉虽然掌握舆论气候，但华人内心无力感及对将来的恐惧，或者说华人的“识时务”，却影响华人的实际行动。在形势比人强的情况下，子女的前途是家长最为在意的。独中的文凭不受政府承认，接受独中教育不只要付更多的学费，也可能会使子女面对就业上的困难。文化的传承在这种情况下只好成为第二线的问题，有些家长更是矫枉过正，干脆不让子女接受中文教育，英文至上的观念在六十年代可说操纵了华人的思想形态。林连玉的公民权被吊销，看起来并无法号召华社注意文化遗产的问题。华人一方面固然因为陈修信教育主张而不愿意将选票投给他所领导的马华公会，另一方面又觉得林连玉的主张看来不太实际，因此只能在舆论上与他共进退，但在行动上却走了相反的方向。这种心理，大概只能用王国维的名句“可爱者不可信，可信者不可爱”来形容了。<sup>90</sup>

#### 4. 林连玉的下场

几位替他写传记的人都说林连玉最后的二十年还在关心国事，其实也不过是让他林连玉看来更加一以贯之。晚年的林连玉可以做的事其实不多，从公民权被吊销到他去世的这段时间，

89 Chai Hon Chan, *Education & Nation-Building in Plural Society: The West Malaysian Experience* (Canberra: Australian National University, 1977), p.94.

90 《静安文集续编·自序二》。

林连玉没有留下多少可以让我们大书特书的事迹。他偶尔出席教总举行的一些庆典，大体而言对国家大事只能做一个旁观者，他的生活不外是聊天、弈棋、打牌、翻报纸、整理旧稿。1962年，林连玉给黄润岳的信提到：“近一星期武侠小说绝粮，只好移用这份时间写回忆录。……眼前只有你和严博士、陆庭谕以及极少数的人可以畅谈心事，毫无顾忌，其余的人都是昨日今宵大不相同。”<sup>91</sup>

自从公民权案发生后，林连玉被政府严厉监视，许多人都不太敢接触他，他这个感叹不是没有道理的。<sup>92</sup> 1965年10月由于政府征用土地建造马来巴刹，他迁离住了几十年的马来地区甘榜巴鲁，先是栖身在吉隆坡半山芭义子家，1966年10月搬到吉隆坡士拉央新村。吉隆坡甲洞区国会议员陈胜尧医生在七十年代经常造访林连玉，他在回忆林连玉的文章时忍不住加了一句：“虽然林先生已经没有受到政府的监视，其门前冷落车马稀。”<sup>93</sup>

晚年和林连玉同住者包括他的太太、义子及义女，林夫人在林连玉晚年的时候跌断脊椎骨，不能走动，同一个时候林连玉的视力又衰退，可谓祸不单行。林连玉去世的前几年，他的住家对面建了一家新工厂，每天都排出秽气，空气严重受到污染，虽然有人投诉，但情况一直都没有改变。林连玉的义女在一次病倒以后，全家搬走，林连玉晚年的生活都是靠朋友救济。陆庭谕刻划林连玉晚景的时候有这样的一幕：

91 教总秘书处编：《九五年华教节特辑：林连玉先生逝世十周年纪念》，页92。

92 陆庭谕先生跟笔者的谈话也证实了这一点。

93 陈胜尧：〈向林连玉取经〉，教总秘书处编：《九五年华教节特辑：林连玉先生逝世十周年纪念》，页37。



有人要探望林先生，林先生则说：“我不能招待你们，也没有人招待你们。……林先生有时巍颠颠地拿着小桶回到厨房拿水进房间，里面是老人呻吟声。”<sup>94</sup>

这就是林连玉的最后日子。他的妹妹在七十年代初期要他回中国，但是他拒绝了。他初来南洋的时候曾有化不开的乡愁。在不能发挥自己的理想之余，回去也许从个人的精神生活上是一个解脱，当然这个问题不容易回答，回去以后林连玉要干什么？当时文化大革命还未结束的中国是不是一个理想的居所？事实上，在林连玉的一生中，我们看不到他对国民党或共产党的评价，这个在马来亚积极关心政治的人，对中国政治左右之争没有什么鲜明的立场。他的文字，基本上都是和文化遗产有关，对“民族性”特别讲究。那样看起来，他之所以留在马来西亚倒是有迹可寻了。他给他妹妹的信中这么说道：“我留下来，可以卫护我的历史及主张……我的历史及主张必然重光是无所置疑的。”<sup>95</sup> 他知道他在马来西亚的象征意义。他对华教运动始终耿耿于怀，骂起一些人来火气还是一样大。1980年在他八十岁生日的时候，他说了这样的话：

我的头上是天，我的脚下是地，我林连玉顶天立地！  
堂堂正正的做人！我不变节投降！我没有垂头丧气！  
我没有逃避走开。<sup>96</sup>

94 陆庭谕：〈林师母与佛：悼林连玉夫人〉，教总秘书处编：《族魂林连玉》，页223。

95 1974年3月18日林连玉给其在中国的妹妹林子贞的信，收录于教总秘书处编：《九五年华教特辑：林连玉先生逝世十周年纪念》，页83。

96 教总秘书处编：《林连玉公民权案》，页292。

林连玉在1985年12月18日去世，死讯传出，就如文物出土，林连玉三个字再度成为话题。各党团代表，他的朋友、学生都来瞻仰遗容，出殡之日，送殡队伍长达一英里，万人空巷，接下来的日子，各地都举行追思与哀悼会。

马来西亚全部华文报章都以极大篇幅报导此事。最大的两家报章《南洋商报》和《星洲日报》都在社论中说了一些温馨的话。《南洋商报》的社论说“他的浩气正义，不惜牺牲自己，已树立了后世的懿范。”<sup>97</sup>《星洲日报》的社论说“郑板桥有句诗：‘闭门只是栽兰竹，留得春光过四时’。我们相信一切有良知的人，都会像板桥那样，把林先生爱国家、爱民族、公而忘私的典范种在心田的。”<sup>98</sup> 两家报章的社论都对林连玉表现了最高的敬意，不约而同地用“高风亮节”形容他。林连玉在临终的遗嘱里希望遗体葬在最靠近其住家的甲洞义山。<sup>99</sup> 但是为了方便外地来凭吊者，林连玉的追随者决定将墓地改在吉隆坡福建义山。在林连玉的墓园里，刻有“族魂”二字。

林连玉要中华文化在海外生根的理想，奠定其在马来西亚华教历史上一个让人百感交集，但却不容抹煞的地位。但有一点恐怕也得作点补充，他之所以成为马来西亚重要的人物，不是和他思想的深度有关，不管是用任何尺度来看他，林连玉都不是一个思想家。从其文字来看，他也不算是一位出色的作家。林连玉的文章虽然言之有物，也很会辩论，但文字一板一

97 《南洋商报》，1985年12月21日。

98 《星洲日报》，1985年12月20日。

99 林连玉的遗嘱如下：一、不可聘法师和尚或尼姑打斋超渡；二、只焚香不焚冥镪；三、出殡时不用音乐不用仪仗，不用联轴；四、墓地最好在甲洞华人义山双人穴准备夫妻合葬；五、最简修筑坟式墓碑如下：林连玉、叶丽珍之墓。见陆庭谕：〈林连玉墓园的设计〉，教总秘书处编：《族魂林连玉》，页168。

眼，有时近乎粗糙，让人余音袅绕的空间不多。即使他晚年写的回忆录，也一样理胜于情，没有品味人生，引人幽思的作品，而且书写范围狭小，所叙述的事件来来去去都是一个调子。

但是我们是不是因此就能用阮籍的“时无英雄，使竖子成名”来形容林连玉呢？<sup>100</sup> 那也不尽然。他的特色是对中华文化传承有一种锲而不舍的毅力，他所拥有的是执着的精神，他对华社的作用看来更是道德上的、人格上的。

对于受儒家影响的华人社会而言，林连玉的确是属于“信道之笃，守道之严”的人物。林连玉在现今甚至是以后的马来西亚儒学史上可能都占不上任何特殊的地位，但是林连玉的做人方式合乎儒道，却是毫无疑问的。孔子说：“始吾于人也，听其言而信其行；今吾于人也，听其言而观其行。”又说：“有德者必有言，有言者不必有德。”<sup>101</sup> 这是儒家最基本的特色：精神价值的重要性是在生活中的实践而不在理论上的思辨。在中国的儒学史上，关于知行的问题虽然有种种争论，但是儒学的这个意涵却始终没有受到挑战。如果从听其言而观其行的话，他的儒者特色是一以贯之的。用严元章的话，大概就是“威武不能屈”、“临难毋苟免”、“宁为玉碎，不为瓦全。”<sup>102</sup> 而他自己也那么强调：“吾人读圣贤书，所学何事？维护正义，树立风标，不其然乎？玉之责任已尽，是非自有公论，功罪交由历史批评。梁任公云：‘十年以后当思我’。”<sup>103</sup>

今天华社许多人将林连玉视为民族斗士、精神领袖、伟大导师等等，就是基于上述的原因。只要华社一朝还认为华文教育仍然充满危机感，则林连玉的现代意义就会存在。华人社会不断提林连玉，是希望后来者可以继续秉承林连玉不屈不挠的精神，在政治、经济、文化、教育等种种不利华社发展的领域上勇往直前。

如果以成败来论英雄的话，林连玉在马来亚的历史上无疑是站在失败的一方。在马来人的心目中，类似林连玉的人越少越好。华教斗士和马来政治精英仿佛有一个不能逾越的鸿沟，林连玉不知道为什么马来人不能接受华文为官方语文，而马来人则不能理解林连玉为什么执迷不悟。

任何时代仿佛都有自己的运行轨道。它将一些人，纳入一个他们丢弃不了的运行方式。顺着轨道者，我们称之为合潮流、识时务。逆之者我们则称之为历史悲剧或是不识时务。林连玉一生努力为民族教育招魂的结局，是他个人的悲剧，还是时代的悲剧？

100 阮籍的话见《晋书·阮籍传》（北京：中华书局，1974），第5集，卷49，页1361。

101 分别见《论语》〈公冶长〉及〈宪问〉。

102 教总秘书处编：《林连玉公民权案》，页45。

103 同上，页53。

*We Are a People*

**Narrative  
and  
Multiplicity in  
Constructing  
Ethnic  
Identity**

---

Edited by  
Paul Spickard and W. Jeffrey Burroughs





As the twentieth century closes, ethnicity stands out as a powerful force for binding people together in a sense of shared origins and worldview. But this emphasis on a people's uniqueness can also develop into a distorted rationale for insularity, inter-ethnic animosity, or, as we have seen in this century, armed conflict. Ethnic identity clearly holds very real consequences for individuals and peoples, yet there is not much agreement on what exactly it is or how it is formed.

The growing recognition that ethnicity is not fixed and inherent, but elastic and constructed, fuels the essays in this collection. Regarding identity as a dynamic, ongoing, formative, and transformative process, *We Are a People* considers narrative — the creation and maintenance of a common story — as the keystone in building a sense of peoplehood. Myths of origin, triumph over adversity, migration, and so forth chart a group's history, while continual additions to the larger narrative stress moving into the future as a people.

Still, there is more to our stories as individuals and groups. Most of us are aware that we take on different roles and project different aspects of ourselves depending on the situation. Some individuals who have inherited multiple group affiliations from their families view themselves not as this or that but all at once. So too with ethnic groups. The so-called hyphenated Americans are not the only people in the world to recognize or embrace their plurality. This relatively recent acknowledgment of multiplicity has potentially wide implications, destabilizing the limited (and limiting) categories inscribed in, for example, public policy and discourse on race relations.

*We Are a People* is a path-breaking volume, boldly illustrating how ethnic identity works in the real world.

**Paul Spickard** is Professor of History at the University of California at Santa Barbara and is author of *Mixed Blood*.

**W. Jeffrey Burroughs** is Professor of Psychology at Brigham Young University, Hawai'i.

Cover design: Marjorie Corbett

Printed in U.S.A.

**TEMPLE UNIVERSITY PRESS**

Philadelphia 19122

[www.temple.edu/tempress](http://www.temple.edu/tempress)

cloth ISBN 1-56639-722-7

paper ISBN 1-56639-723-5

ISBN 1-56639-723-5



9 781566 397230

中研院人文社會聯圖



3 0610 02 025801 8

GN495.6

.W4

2000


# We Are a People

---

## **Narrative and Multiplicity in Constructing Ethnic Identity**

**EDITED BY**

**Paul Spickard and W. Jeffrey Burroughs**



TEMPLE UNIVERSITY PRESS

PHILADELPHIA

L20133270 50

Temple University Press, Philadelphia 19122  
Copyright © 2000 by Temple University  
All rights reserved  
Published 2000  
Printed in the United States of America

⊗ The paper used in this publication meets the requirements of the American National Standard for Information Sciences—Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials, ANSI Z39.48-1984.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

We are a people: narrative and multiplicity in constructing ethnic identity / edited by Paul Spickard and W. Jeffrey Burroughs.

p. cm.

Includes bibliographical references.

ISBN 1-56639-722-7 (alk. paper). — ISBN 1-56639-723-5 (pbk.: alk. paper)

1. Ethnicity. 2. Indigenous peoples. 3. Immigrants—Ethnic identity.

4. Multiculturalism. I. Spickard, Paul R., 1950-. II. Burroughs, W. Jeffrey.

GN495.6.W4 1999

305.8-DC21

99-14398

Lyrics of "I'm An Indian Too" by Irving Berlin reprinted on page 249. Copyright © 1946 by Irving Berlin. Copyright Renewed. International Copyright Secured. All Rights Reserved. Reprinted by Permission.

To Lonia Burroughs and Jim Spickard

# Contents

Acknowledgments ix

I. WE ARE A PEOPLE I

*Paul Spickard and W. Jeffrey Burroughs*

## **Part I: The Indeterminacy of Ethnic Categories: The Problem and a Solution**

2. MULTIPLE ETHNICITIES AND IDENTITY IN  
THE UNITED STATES 23

*Mary C. Waters*

3. THAT'S THE STORY OF OUR LIFE 41

*Stephen Cornell*

## **Part II: Construction of Ethnic Narratives: Migrant Ethnicities**

4. BLACK IMMIGRANTS IN THE UNITED STATES 57

*Violet M. Johnson*

5. THE CHILDREN OF SAMOAN MIGRANTS  
IN NEW ZEALAND 70

*Cluny Macpherson and La'avasa Macpherson*

## **Part III: Ethnicities of Dominated Indigenous Peoples**

6. NARRATING TO THE CENTER OF POWER  
IN THE MARSHALL ISLANDS 85

*Phillip H. McArthur*



7. DISCOVERED IDENTITIES AND AMERICAN INDIAN  
SUPRATRIBALISM 98  
*Stephen Cornell*
8. THE ANATOMY OF SCIENTIFIC RACISM: RACIALIST  
RESPONSES TO BLACK ATHLETIC ACHIEVEMENT 124  
*Patrick B. Miller*
9. I'M NOT A CHILENO! RAPA NUI IDENTITY 142  
*Max E. Stanton*

#### **Part IV: Emerging Multiethnic Narratives**

10. MULTIRACIAL IDENTITY IN BRAZIL AND THE  
UNITED STATES 153  
*G. Reginald Daniel*
11. MIXED LAUGHTER 179  
*Darby Li Po Price*
12. PUNJABI MEXICAN AMERICAN EXPERIENCES  
OF MULTIETHNICITY 192  
*Karen Leonard*

#### **Part V: Theoretical Reflections**

13. RETHINKING RACIAL IDENTITY DEVELOPMENT 205  
*Maria P. P. Root*
14. THE CONTINUING SIGNIFICANCE OF RACE 221  
*Lori Pierce*
15. WHAT ARE THE FUNCTIONS OF ETHNIC IDENTITY? 229  
*Cookie White Stephan and Walter G. Stephan*
16. ETHNICITY, MULTIPLICITY, AND NARRATIVE:  
PROBLEMS AND POSSIBILITIES 244  
*W. Jeffrey Burroughs and Paul Spickard*
- Contributors 255

### 3 That's the Story of Our Life

Several years ago, in the course of extended research on economic development on American Indian reservations, a colleague and I had an introductory appointment with the senior executive of an Indian nation that we hoped to add to our field sample. We were ushered into his office and explained why we were there and what we were doing. We told him what we wanted to know about: the economic strategies his nation was pursuing, the role that tribal government had played in those strategies, the problems and the successes they had encountered as they tried to take greater control of their economic future. When we were done he was quiet for a few moments. Then, without preamble, he sat forward, looked at us intently, and proceeded to relate to us a history of his people. The heart of his account was some key events that had shaped his nation, and more generally the nation's treatment at the hands of the United States. Very little of what he said had to do with the specific things we wanted to know, although all of it had to do with how this particular people had descended into the poverty and powerlessness from which they were trying to rise. He did not take long—a few minutes. His account was pithy and laconic. When he had finished, there was another pause while he looked at us. We were silent, unsure how to respond to this capsule saga. After a moment he sat back, relaxed, and said, "So: economic development," and launched into a discussion of the topics we had introduced.

It was only later that it occurred to me what the purpose of his historical digression had been. It was not merely informational. He was not telling us the history of his people because he thought we would be interested. It was not even a digression. He had wanted to be sure, before we began to talk about the issues that had brought us there—issues of critical importance to the future of his nation—that we understood *who his people were*. And the best way for him to tell us who they were was to tell us *what they had done* and *what had happened to them*. The unspoken subtext of his soliloquy was: Do you know who we are? Let me tell you the story of our life. We are the people who experienced these things. Now you know our story. Now you know who we are. Now we can talk.

This unspoken subtext is key to the argument of this paper. In what follows, I wish to make three points. The first is that narrative lies at the heart of many ethnic identities;

that is, that many such identities often take a narrative form.<sup>1</sup> The second point is that the narrative form of ethnicity becomes most salient in periods of rupture, when the taken-for-grantedness that characterizes most collective identities is disturbed. The third point is that the narrativization of ethnicity is intimately bound up in power relations, albeit in particular ways. Finally, the paper includes some reflections on narrative and multiplicity.

## **Ethnicity and Narrative**

Like most students of ethnicity in recent years, I approach the topic from a constructionist perspective, which emphasizes contingency. Ethnic identities are not given, fixed, or unchanging, but are continually evolving products of material and social circumstances and of the actions of groups themselves, wrestling with, interpreting, and responding to those circumstances, building or transforming identities in the process.<sup>2</sup> This perspective, supported by a vast array of case materials, has greatly improved our understanding of the dynamics of ethnic identity, but it raises a question. When we construct an ethnic identity, what exactly is being built?<sup>3</sup>

At one level, ethnic identities are labels that we claim or assign, ways of classifying ourselves or others. It may be tempting to say they are “simply” labels, but it is seldom simple. Identities have consequences and capabilities. In distributing persons among categories, societies also, inevitably, distribute things among persons: honor or recognition or power or opportunity or disadvantage. Such distributions also may arouse those persons to action; one need only think of ethnic or racial epithets and their capacity to provoke.

Both the distributional and the provocative implications of ethnic labels depend to a large degree on what those labels signify. Most ethnic labels have meanings attached to them that lend them power as organizers of relationships, resources, experience, and action. But where do those meanings come from?

When people take on, create, or assign an ethnic identity, part of what they do—intentionally or not—is to take on, create, or assign a story, a narrative of some sort that captures central understandings about what it means to be a member of the group. It is a story that can be told in many ways, but ultimately it can be reduced to something along the lines of “we are the people who . . .” (alternatively: “they are the people who . . .”), in which the lacuna becomes a tale of some sort, a record of events. The story has a subject (the group in question), it has action (what happened or will happen), and it has value: it attaches a value to its subject. It makes group members feel good or bad or guilty or self-righteous or superior or justified or something else. Its primary idiom is events: the things the group does or did or will do or had done to it. These need not be major events, although they typically are; they could be accumulations of minor, eminently forgettable episodes. The point is that the narrative is an event-centered conception of the group. The label group members carry or assign to others is a referent or symbol, in effect a condensation of that narrative. When a group claims an ethnic identity or assigns one to others, it is claiming that narrative as its story, or as its version of someone else’s story. Constructing an ethnic identity involves, among

other things, a gradual layering on and connecting of events and meanings, the construction of a collective narrative.

This process of narrativization typically involves three steps (which may occur in any order): selection, plotting, and interpretation. *Selection* refers to the selection of events themselves, to choosing from unlimited amounts of past, anticipated, or imagined experience a limited number of happenings that constitute the episodic components of the narrative. *Plotting* refers to the linking of these events to each other in causal, sequential, associational, or other ways, and the linking of the group in question to those events, an assigning of roles. *Interpretation* refers to the making of claims about what the events and plot signify, and to the making of claims about the degree to which that particular plot and its constituent events define the group as subjects.

For example, these components emerge, unnamed, in Michael Arlen's book *Passage to Ararat*, which traces the evolution of his understanding of his Armenian identity and in the process reveals central components of that identity. Confronted, as a mature adult, with his own partly Armenian descent, something he had only barely acknowledged, he sets out to discover what being Armenian means. His expedition to then-Soviet Armenia is a journey through which he unearths—partly through his own efforts, partly through the intense effort and encouragement of his Armenian guide—an Armenian identity narrative. It embraces selected events—central among them the Turkish genocide directed against Armenians in the early part of the twentieth century—as keys to Armenian experience and therefore identity. It links these events to each other and through them links Armenians to other groups and to the surrounding world. Through these events and the relationships among them it puts forward a moral understanding of suffering and survival that is central to Armenian peoplehood. It assigns those events a central place in Armenian identity and takes from them certain meanings that are held to capture the essence of “what it is to be an Armenian.”<sup>4</sup>

This narrative not only emerges from archives and histories but is elaborated in conversations and fierce assertions and made concrete in physical monuments and sacred space. As Arlen pieces the story together, he has the profound sense of discovering, in Armenians' sense of themselves, a missing part of his own sense of self. Armenians become for him the people who did these things, or to whom these things happened, and by virtue of the putative blood connection of ethnic descent, their story becomes in part his story, part of the meaning of his own Armenianness—fundamentally, part of his identity.

This Armenian narrative, while filled with tragedy, is a morally positive one: it exalts Armenians for what they have been through. Not all identity narratives are similarly positive. Some are negative. Of course many groups interpret the things done by others in negative terms, but they may also adopt a negative interpretation of their own life stories. Gordon Nakagawa, for example, shows how some Japanese American narratives about internment during World War II not only detail social control practices taking place under internment but reveal “the historical self-understanding of the Nikkei community,” a self-understanding deeply affected by the experience of being turned into “docile and deformed subject[s].”<sup>5</sup>

What makes all of these narratives—positive or negative—ethnic is the principle that governs the three steps involved. Particular narratives play a role in ethnic identity

insofar as an ethnic identity or boundary is the “key organizing principle”—I take the phrase from Steinmetz’s discussion of narrative and social class<sup>6</sup>—of the narrative. To the extent that selection, plotting, and interpretation take ethnic boundaries into account and use them as central organizing principles, the result is an ethnic identity narrative, the story of a particular ethnic “us” or “them.”

The events such narratives include vary substantially. Identity narratives may combine fact and fiction in varying proportions. Some focus on life-shattering or history-making events—migration, genocide, slavery, the Holocaust—while others focus on quotidian behavior. Some are rich with detail; others are barely compositions or narratives at all. Ultimately, what matters is not the events they include but the claims they make about those events, the sources of those events, and their attendant meanings. What matters is not the validity of representations but their effects: the degree to which the narrative and its component parts are understood—by group members or by outsiders—as illustrative or exemplary, as capturing something essential about the group in question.

Of course such understandings may vary across both groups and time. Different groups may see the same events differently or see different events as similarly emblematic of a single group’s identity. Furthermore, as groups’ understandings of themselves and others change, so do the narratives in which those understandings are encapsulated and through which they are given substance. Selection, plotting, interpretation—all or any may change over time. For some European-descent ethnic groups in the United States, for example, identity narratives have thinned in recent years as the distance from key events in them—departure from the old country, immigration, the experiences of transition and adjustment—increases. The events chronicled in those narratives are fewer now, the detail less, the links among events less clear, their meanings more vague. For some members of those groups, such narratives are being replaced by a more general European identity narrative or a narrative of Whiteness, neither one as richly detailed as the older stories that gave many European immigrants to the United States part of their sense of themselves.<sup>7</sup>

The power of narrative as a source or representation of identity comes from its sense-making properties. “The problem of identity,” says Dan McAdams, “is the problem of arriving at a life story that makes sense—provides unity and purpose—within a sociohistorical matrix that embodies a much larger story.”<sup>8</sup> Although McAdams is writing about individual identities, we can say much the same of collective identities. The problem of collective identity is the problem of creating an account of who “we” (or “they”) are that makes sense of the larger matrix of social relations in which the group finds itself and of its place within that matrix and its experience of those relations. Narrative—the relational ordering and framing of event and experience—is peculiarly suited to these sense-making tasks. Anthony Kerby goes so far as to call it “the privileged medium for understanding human experience.”<sup>9</sup> It situates groups among events and situates events in larger matrices of relations. Not only does it give coherence and meaning to what might otherwise seem isolated episodes; it places the group at the center of the tale. It specifies the group’s relationship to those events, and in so doing it not only makes sense of events; it makes sense of the group itself.

Not every person with an ethnic identity has an ethnically constructing story to tell. For some, such as the Indian official who prefaced his discussion of economic development with the story of his people, it may be a prominent part of consciousness. For others, it may be a skeletal tale recalled only with difficulty. Narrative may not lie at the heart of ethnic identity as that identity is felt and experienced. But it lies at the heart of the ethnic category. Ultimately that category can be reduced to a statement that follows narrative lines. The category consists of the people who—so the story goes—came from there, did that, experienced this particular history, and so on. Ethnic categories are categories of collective life stories.

### **Narrative and Rupture**

By linking narrative and ethnic identity, I do not mean to suggest that narrative is necessarily a salient part of all ethnicities or of individual ethnic consciousness. The narrative aspect of most ethnicities lies hidden for the most part beneath the taken-for-grantedness that characterizes collective identities generally. But at certain times, in certain circumstances, it breaks the surface, becoming more explicit and apparent.

Jerome Bruner argues that individuals turn to narrative as a means of making sense of situations of breakdown or deviation from expectations, when things are not “as they should be.” In search of meaning, they narrate the unexpected or disturbing, creating a sense of order—a sense that things make sense after all—through the imposed order of narrative.<sup>10</sup>

Something similar seems to be the case with ethnically based collective identities. They, too, respond to crisis with a search for order. What we might call periods of rupture—not in the identity but in its taken-for-granted quality—prompt the narrative process, and for similar reasons.

By periods of rupture I mean those periods when identities, for one reason or another, are questioned by those who carry them, are called into question by others, or are severely tested by events. At these times identities lose their taken-for-granted quality. Such periods commonly result from significant changes in group or individual situations, as through, among other things, migration, abrupt changes in group political or economic fortunes, political mobilization, or rapidly rising rates of ethnic intermarriage. At those moments old assumptions or understandings may be challenged, calling for a new or reconfirmed definition of the situation—a new sense of things. New events have to be taken into account or dismissed; new relationships among events proposed; new interpretations made. In short, such situations call for a renarration of group identity.

Of course, sense making may not be the only purpose served. Narrative also can be used to make common cause against both human and nonhuman threats, against both the acts of oppressors or usurpers and the impacts of social change. To claim that “my” story and “your” story are essentially the same is to propose a common bond between us, a reason for us to join together in the face of rupture in the world we have known. To make a particular sense of events can be a way to make common cause as well.

The narrative process comes to the foreground in situations of rupture as groups try to make sense of new problems or opportunities, defend or assert claims, reframe

identities, mobilize members for political action, or otherwise rethink who they or others are. The group's story is told or retold at such moments—in new or old forms—as this sense- and cause-making process goes forward, integrating new experiences or concerns with old understandings.

Liisa Malkki provides an example of this reconstruction through narrative in her study of Hutu refugees from Burundi, victims of Hutu-Tutsi conflict in the early 1970s, living in camps in Tanzania. These refugees, writes Malkki, “were intensively and continually engaged in a kind of historical ordering and reordering of their past.” It was a process that seemed to involve virtually everyone in the camps and that fused personal and collective experience, as refugees, in talking about their lives, “regularly slipped from the domain of personal life history into the wider field of the collective history” of the group. Much of this effort took the form of narrating the Hutu past, from the colonial history of Burundi through ethnic warfare to the present period of exile. Hutus continually revisited past and present events, incorporating them into an evolving narrative, and in the process reinterpreted those events. The result was what Malkki calls a “mythico-history,” replete with recurrent themes and pivotal episodes that added up to a highly standardized, collective Hutu narrative “which heroizes them as a distinct people with a historical trajectory setting them apart from other peoples.” It is a narrative in which the Hutus “are the principal actors” and through which they recast historical events in moral terms. Narration is part of the way they deal with loss, with refugee status, with exile, and with discrimination at the hands of the Tanzanians, and it is how they construct themselves as a people. The Hutu label has not changed, but the identity it represents has been narratively reconstructed.<sup>11</sup>

In his study of Afrikaner civil religion in South Africa, Dunbar Moodie describes how, in the early decades of this century, Afrikaners consciously attempted to construct and disseminate within the Afrikaner ethnic population a heroic narrative of Afrikanerdom sufficiently compelling to sustain group solidarity in the face of British domination and the threat of anglicization, emergent class divisions as a result of urbanization and industrialization, and eventually the resistance waged by the vast population of oppressed Black Africans. By selecting particular events (for example, the Great Trek into the interior of the country in 1838, the battle with the Zulus at Blood River, concentration camp experiences in the Boer War), linking them to each other in a narrative of testing, suffering, and heroic survival, and investing them with elements of the sacred, they sought to revivify Afrikaner identity and to overcome emergent, alternative bases of action.<sup>12</sup>

Periods of rupture may be long or short. For some groups they are typically brief and inconsequential; for others, rupture is normal: life is struggle and collective life stories are the currency of daily interaction, retold again and again as continual reminders of “who we are” and why the struggle matters. But as periods of rupture come to an end, as identity issues become less contested, as group conditions—positive or negative—regain some certainty, the narrative process tends to attenuate. Either the newly established narrative becomes the new, taken-for-granted version of collective identity, understood but seldom presented, or narrative itself moves into the background of group consciousness. It retreats again behind the group label, a label that carries ample meaning but now retains few explicit connections to events.

## Narrative and Power

Both identity narratives and their production are bound up in power relations. This is apparent in at least two ways.

The first issue has to do with *who gets to narrate whom* and with *whose version of an identity narrative gains currency where*. The same identity may have attached to it very different narratives, some composed by insiders narrating their own identity, some by outsiders narrating the identity of others. The narratives insiders and outsiders construct may be radically different from each other. Members of an ethnic group may discover that the dominant narrative underlying their identity—the one that prevails in the common conception of the group within the society and even, perhaps, among many group members—is not the story they wish to tell at all but is a story composed by nonmembers, reflecting the experience, imagination, and interests of others.

For a long time, the prevailing African American narrative in the society at large was told largely by outsiders; it was someone else's story about African Americans. In the 1960s and 1970s many Blacks waged an aggressive campaign to tell their own story in their own way, and to give that story prominence in the society at large. The selection and interpretation of events—from slave revolts to raising families—were a crucial part of that effort, aided both by new media representations such as the book and television saga *Roots* and by a flowering of new scholarship, both Black and White, that provided new raw material for narrative construction. In time a new narrative of resistance, resourcefulness, and endurance began to replace the older narrative of victimization, passivity, and incapacity.<sup>13</sup> This new narrative gained increasing currency in the wider society as Blacks struggled to make it known and claim it as their own. They struggled not only against those who carried or defended an older account but against that account's inertial power, a product of its embeddedness in popular culture, educational practice, and even in the minds of some Blacks.

As this example suggests, narrative construction is often a contested process, shaped by power differentials. Some groups have greater resources for storytelling than others do; some have greater access to the public arena than others do. "Our" version of your story may prevail in the public arena over "your" version because our group controls access to that arena, or because we have more of the positional or other resources through which one or another version of an identity narrative can be promoted.

This is not only an intergroup issue—whether it will be our story about you or your story about you that gains currency in the public arena, being supported in schools, media, political discourse, and elsewhere. It is also at times an intragroup issue. Conflict over narrative can occur among insiders, where there may be major differences over what should be in or out of "our" story, what the story means, and how it should be told. Different insiders may tell radically different versions of their own story, and one subgroup may have sufficient resources to dominate the storytelling and control the more public narrative. Much of the dynamic of both inter- and intragroup relations is a contest for whose version of a particular identity narrative will prevail.

Such conflict surrounded a 1991 Smithsonian Institution exhibit in Washington, D.C., titled "The West as America: Reinterpreting Images of the Frontier, 1820–1920."<sup>14</sup> While the identity at stake in this exhibit and the responses to it may not match the



conventional conception of ethnic, the parallels are acute. The European or Euro-American exploration of the West, the displacement of the indigenous population, and the process of White settlement together have long constituted one of the defining events in U.S. history and, therefore, identity—classically narrated as a triumph of the resourceful, courageous, and pioneering American spirit, a colossal exercise in nation building and the spread of civilization.<sup>15</sup> The Smithsonian exhibit presented many of the classic paintings, photographs, and other icons of that story but recast their meaning, emphasizing as well or—particularly in the wall texts in the exhibit—instead the less triumphant side of the story: the destruction of Native American societies, the exploitation of the labor of other groups, the aggressive seizure of lands, environmental damage, and so forth, as well as the commercial motives behind much of the enterprise.

This renarrating of the West immediately thrust the exhibit deep into controversy, involving not only ordinary museum goers—some of whom praised the exhibit, some of whom condemned it—but also angry members of the U.S. Senate.<sup>16</sup> At stake was the issue of whose version of the American story would remain dominant. Americans were arrayed on either side, struggling to place their own interpretations on events. It was, in effect, a conflict over *who we are*.

Conflict may occur in any or all of the processes involved in the construction of identity narratives: selection, plotting, and interpretation. It is apparent in all of these in the Smithsonian controversy: over which events in the potentially vast story of the West should be highlighted and narrated; over how those events are linked to each other and to the larger American idea; over what those events and the relationships among them mean. Of course not all narrative constructions are conflictual. Some involve little more than the efforts by groups of persons to come to terms with and understand their situations and to establish a clearer sense of who they are—a complex task, to be sure, but not necessarily a contested one.

The second way in which narratives are bound up in power relations has to do with *what an identity narrative claims*. Particular interpretations of events may undergird moral or legal claims to power. A key element in Native American identity narratives, for example, for both Indians and non-Indians, is the history of native land dispossession at the hands first of Europeans and later of Euro-Americans. That history is not only about power relations and the changing distribution of power between Indian nations on the one hand and European colonies and the United States on the other. It also can be used to construct a narrative that in turn asserts moral claims. The narrative may “tell” Indian dispossession in a way that asserts the moral claims of the dispossessors, as in the idea that hunting societies’ failure to cultivate the land denies them a moral claim to it. Or it may “tell” dispossession in such a way that it adds moral force to the claims of the group, as in the Indian claim that specific acts of duplicity and violence were the primary methods of dispossession (see chapter 7). Power, in other words, is latent in the narrative itself, in the implicit or explicit claims the story makes and in the asserted bases of those claims. This power is conditional; it may not be manifest unless the group in question has the ability to give currency to the narrative in which it is embedded. But it may be enough to give the narrative currency among the group’s own members, where it may arouse the otherwise apathetic or hopeless to action.

Patricia Ewick and Susan Silbey, whose concern is not with identity but with the sociology of narrative itself, distinguish between what they call “hegemonic” and

“subversive” narratives: on the one hand, those “that reproduce existing relations of power and inequity,” and, on the other, those that reveal “the connections between particular lives and social organization.”<sup>17</sup> Certainly this distinction is apparent in ethnic identity narratives,<sup>18</sup> which often help either to reproduce or to challenge the power relations in which the group itself is situated—and can do so from either the superior or the subordinate position.

### **Narrative and Multiplicity**

Among the narratives that challenge existing social arrangements in the United States are the emerging narratives of multiplicity. The idea of the United States as a multi-ethnic and multiracial society is long established, but attached to that idea have been certain assumptions about the nature of that multiplicity. One such assumption has been that the boundaries among groups—and among racial groups in particular—are readily identifiable and nonoverlapping. Racial identities, both in government policy and classification and in a great deal of public discourse, supposedly are singular identities. You only have one. You're either this or that but not both (or more).

This social convention depended on another social convention: the idea that race, when used as a discriminator among human beings, is an essentially biological phenomenon, rooted in consistent, substantial, and identifiable biological difference. Both ideas were nothing but agreed-upon myths, but they nonetheless exercised—and continue to exercise—extraordinary power in American life.

The first of these conventions is the one of interest here—the idea of unmixed races. Although this assumption frequently departed dramatically from the facts, until recently neither the institutions that collect or use data on racial identities nor many individuals whose backgrounds are significantly more complex than this convention allows paid much attention to the discrepancy. African Americans, for example, most of whom are of variously mixed African, native American, and European descent, generally have been thought of by most persons in the United States as monoracial and have tended, largely in response to that assumption and to the stark realities of powerlessness in the United States, to adopt much the same stance as a basis of organization and action.

In recent years, however, new narratives of multiplicity have been emerging, particularly as marriage across racial boundaries has increased and both the partners and their offspring have resisted the idea that those who mix racial or ethnic heritages should have to choose among them when it comes to classification or, for that matter, identity. These new narratives not only underline and, increasingly, celebrate some of the new versions of multiplicity that have come with changing patterns of immigration to the United States; they also have drawn attention to the very substantial degree of multiplicity hidden historically behind official conceptions of race. For example, Itabari Njeri opens her study of multiplicity, identity, and conflict with the following statement: “I am your ordinary, everyday, walking-around Brooklyn Negro. That is to say, I am African, East Indian, French, English, Arawak, and more I don't know about. In other words, I am a typical New World Black.”<sup>19</sup>

One of the striking aspects of Njeri's statement is the number of very different stories it brings together in one person's genealogy. There are the English who came to the

New World, fought a revolution, and founded a new society; the Arawaks who were already in that New World but lost their lands and their lives to European force of arms and disease; the Africans whom Europeans dragged across an ocean and forced into brutal labor to build that new society; and so on. An array of identity narratives potentially comes together in Njeri. The word "potentially" is essential, however, for some of those narratives are effectively denied her by the encompassing society. It is not easy for someone of color who is also of mixed racial or ethnic heritage to claim the English or French or White narrative as in any sense her own, for each is jealously guarded by others. The implied trope in ethnicity narratives—"We are the people who . . ."—has an implied counterpart: "and you're not." The insistence on monoracial categories supports a social arrangement based on exclusion.

Narratives of multiplicity, whether revealing the complexities within established categories or the overlaps among them, challenge this social arrangement. At the very least, they argue that "we are the people who do not fit the established categories." More ambitiously, they deny some of the assumptions that underlie exclusion. They suggest that identity tales are many-layered and that those who dig deeply will find their stories growing increasingly complex and less exclusive. Indeed, as far as identity narratives are concerned, along with the distinction between hegemonic and subversive narratives we might distinguish between segregating and integrating ones. One of the ways in which narratives of multiplicity are subversive lies in their tendency to be integrative. They are narratives of connection, focused not on boundaries—on what separates peoples—but on connection, on the intertwined patterns of descent that muddy boundaries, fuzz differences, and create shared narrative spaces.<sup>20</sup>

Those spaces are by no means uncontested, however. Those who carry multiple racial or ethnic identities may struggle not only against the dominant group's insistence on clear boundaries and unitary classifications, but against the similar insistence on the part of subordinate groups. A student of mine once pointed this out in her own account of her ethnicity. She is the daughter of an African American father and a German mother who met while her father was serving with the U.S. military in Europe. Her parents raised her to value both of her ancestries, and she gladly claims for herself both African American and German American identities. She is the first to admit that these identities are very different. One is largely symbolic, a matter of food, music, the occasional trip to Germany to visit relatives, and the stories her mother has told her over the years. The narrative attached to that identity is a modest one. The other, however, looms large, not least because its narrative is an elaborate, contentious, and heavily weighted one in U.S. society, and because her African American identity carries with it significant consequences that are apparent both in her daily experience and in her socioeconomic fortunes. Because she looks Black, that identity is the one that organizes much of her life; it is other people's narratives of Blackness that she most often encounters and that shape much of their interaction with her.

But something else is involved. To some of her African American friends, she reported, her insistence on being not only African American but German American presents a challenge. They want from her a wholehearted commitment to Blackness and a concomitant rejection of the European ancestry she also carries. These two sources of pressure have the same result: in the face of their joint rejection, her German

American identity is slipping away. Neither the dominant White society nor her African American friends will allow her the complexity she sees and values in herself and her heritage. Both deny her a genuine choice, including the option that says "I am both."

Thus not only the society at large demands simplification, a choice to be one thing only. Sometimes the identities that come together in individuals make similar demands. To be multiethnic or multiracial is not only to defy the conventions of the social order; on occasion it also is to defy the pressures attached to one or more of the component identities.

These pressures can make narratives of multiplicity tenuous and fragile, the spinning of a story that few other people want to hear. It is often a complicated story to begin with, a piecing together of disparate histories and understandings. Many of the events in such narratives have no obvious linkage other than the moment of union when lines of descent converge, precipitating a lineage that fits no standard category but claims for itself the distinctive events to which several categories refer and struggles to attach meaning of some sort to them all. The connections are there. The task in narrating multiplicity is to give them meaning and to establish for that narrative some currency in the world at large.

### Now We Can Talk

In the struggle to construct ethnic narratives, to assert authorship, to control selection, plot, and meaning, and to give narrative currency or dominance in the group's conception of itself and in wider conceptions of the group, much is at stake, and not only power, although surely that is sufficient. Identity itself is at issue. "In the end," says Moraes Zogoiby, the narrator of Salman Rushdie's novel *The Moor's Last Sigh*, "stories are what's left of us."<sup>21</sup> They are a large portion of what the world knows about us.

But they also are what we start with. For ethnic groups, at least, the "we" begins with stories, with the events and interpretations that tell us that "we" are a people and what kind of people "we" are. Sometimes those stories are ours, and for that reason, perhaps, we believe them; sometimes they are the work of others, and for that reason, perhaps, or because they fit our needs or interests, or because we don't know any other stories, we believe them. Even if we don't believe them, they constitute a version of ourselves that we may celebrate or reject, struggle against or struggle to change.

To narrate an identity is to argue: it is to make an assertion about the scope or nature or meaning of that identity. It is a claim to a particular significance. As the official of the Indian nation seemed to suggest: *Now you know who we are. Now we can talk.*

### Notes

**Acknowledgment:** I am grateful to Maura Grogan, Joseph Gusfield, Jeffrey Haydu, Kathy Mooney, Joane Nagel, Paul Spickard, Mary Waters, and Kathryn Woolard for helpful comments and suggestions.

1. The idea that identity and narrative are closely linked is hardly new. In recent years narrative has been treated as a core element in many forms of identity, both individual and collective. See, for example: Dan P. McAdams, *Power, Intimacy, and the Life Story: Personological Inquiries into Identity* (Homewood, Ill.: Dorsey, 1985); Jerome Bruner, *Acts of Meaning* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1990); Anthony Paul Kerby, *Narrative and the Self* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1991); George Steinmetz, "Reflections on the Role of Social Narratives in Working-Class Formation: Narrative Theory in the Social Sciences," *Social Science History*, 16 (Fall, 1992): 489-516; Adrian Coyle, "'My Own Special Creation'? The Construction of Gay Identity," in *Social Psychology of Identity and the Self Concept*, ed. Glynis M. Breakwell (London: Surrey University Press, 1992), 187-220; Margaret R. Somers and Gloria D. Gibson, "Reclaiming the Epistemological 'Other': Narrative and the Social Constitution of Identity," in *Social Theory and the Politics of Identity*, ed. Craig Calhoun (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994), 37-99. However, while some beginnings have been made (e.g., Brent O. Peterson, *Popular Narratives and Ethnic Identity* [Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1991]), the place of narrative in ethnic identities has yet to be worked out systematically. The present paper is an effort to contribute to this working-out process.

2. See, among many others, William Yancey, Eugene P. Ericksen, and Richard N. Juliani, "Emergent Ethnicity: A Review and Reformulation," *American Sociological Review* 41 (1976): 391-403; Elizabeth Tonkin, Maryon McDonald, and Malcolm Chapman, eds., *History and Ethnicity* (London: Routledge, 1989); Kathleen N. Conzen, David A. Gerber, Eva Morawska, George E. Pozzetta, and Rudolph J. Vecoli, "The Invention of Ethnicity: A Perspective from the U.S.A." *Journal of American Ethnic History* 12 (1992): 3-41; Joane Nagel, "The Political Construction of Ethnicity," in *Competitive Ethnic Relations*, ed. Susan Olzak and Joane Nagel (Orlando, Fla.: Academic, 1986), 93-112; Joane Nagel, *American Indian Ethnic Renewal* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996); Stephen Cornell and Douglas Hartmann, *Ethnicity and Race* (Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Pine Forge, 1998).

3. I treat ethnicity as a form of identification distinguished by an at least implicit claim to shared bonds of kinship (real or assumed) or their approximation (e.g., descent from a common homeland) and by a claimed history or present of shared culture and experience. Ethnic identities may be either asserted or assigned. Racial identities, in contrast, typically are assigned on the basis of selected physical differences. A racial group becomes an ethnic group when it asserts its own distinctive identity on the basis of common descent and present or historical shared culture and experience. Race thus is not a subcategory of ethnicity but a different basis of identification. Some racial groups are at one and the same time ethnic groups; others are not. References to ethnicity in this paper therefore include, by implication, those racial groups involved in their own construction as groups. For relevant definitional discussions, see Stephen Cornell, "The Variable Ties that Bind: Content and Circumstance in Ethnic Processes," *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 19 (April 1996): 265-89; Cornell and Hartmann, *Ethnicity and Race*; and Stuart Hall, "New Ethnicities," in *Race, Culture, and Difference*, ed. James Donald and Ali Rattansi (London: Sage, 1992), 252-59.

4. Michael Arlen, *Passage to Ararat* (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 1975), 72.

5. Gordon Nakagawa, "Deformed Subjects, Docile Bodies: Disciplinary Practices and Subject-Constitution in Stories of Japanese-American Internment," in *Narrative and Social Control*, ed. Dennis K. Mumby (Newbury Park, Calif.: Sage, 1993), 161.

6. Steinmetz, "Reflections on the Role of Social Narratives."

7. Whiteness may be an increasingly important identity for many Euro-Americans, but, as Ruth Frankenberg argues, it remains for many of them assumed, unnamed, and undefined (*White Women: Race Matters: The Social Construction of Whiteness* [Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1993]). There may be a narrative of Whiteness, but for many Whites it is an



unarticulated one. Of course narratives of Whiteness are hardly a White monopoly. Non-White groups often have their own well-articulated narratives of Whiteness. See, for example, Keith H. Basso, *Portraits of "The Whiteman": Linguistic Play and Cultural Symbols among the Western Apache* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1979), and John Langston Gwaltney, *Dry-longso: A Self-Portrait of Black America* (New York: Vintage, 1981).

8. McAdams, *Power, Intimacy, and the Life Story*, 18.
9. Kerby, *Narrative and the Self*, 4.
10. Bruner, *Acts of Meaning*, 39–40.
11. Liisa Malkki, "Context and Consciousness: Local Conditions for the Production of Historical and National Thought among Hutu Refugees in Tanzania," in *Nationalist Ideologies and the Production of National Cultures*, ed. Richard G. Fox (Washington: American Anthropological Association, 1990), 37, 34.
12. T. Dunbar Moodie, *The Rise of Afrikanerdom: Power, Apartheid, and the Afrikaner Civil Religion* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975). See also Hermann Giliomee, "The Growth of Afrikaner Identity," in *Ethnic Power Mobilized: Can South Africa Survive?* ed. Heribert Adam and Hermann Giliomee (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1979), 83–127; Leonard Thompson, *The Political Mythology of Apartheid* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1985); Gerhard Schutte, "Afrikaner Historiography and the Decline of Apartheid: Ethnic Self-Construction in Times of Crisis," in *History and Ethnicity*, ed. Tonkin et al., 216–31.
13. E.g., Alex Haley, *Roots* (New York: Doubleday, 1976); Eugene Genovese, *Roll, Jordan, Roll: The World the Slaves Made* (New York: Vintage, 1976); V. P. Franklin, *Black Self-Determination: A Cultural History of the Faith of the Fathers* (Westport, Conn.: Lawrence Hill, 1984); and the discussion in Peter Novick, *That Noble Dream: The "Objectivity Question" and the American Historical Profession* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1988), chap. 14.
14. A book published by the Smithsonian on the occasion of the exhibit includes much of the material, along with extended essays and commentary. See William H. Truettner, ed. *The West as America: Reinterpreting Images of the Frontier, 1820–1920* (Washington: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1991).
15. See the discussion in Patricia Hills, "Picturing Progress in the Era of Westward Expansion," in *The West as America*, ed. Truettner, 97–147.
16. John Fiske, *Power Plays, Power Works* (London: Verso, 1993), 162–72; Dell Hymes, "Indian Identities: What It Was and Is to Be a Native North American," *Times Literary Supplement*, August 7, 1992, pp. 3–4.
17. Patricia Ewick and Susan S. Silbey, "Subversive Stories and Hegemonic Tales: Toward a Sociology of Narrative," *Law and Society Review* 29 (1995): 197–226.
18. See, for example, George Lipsitz, *Time Passages: Collective Memory and American Popular Culture* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1990), chap. 10.
19. Itabari Njeri, *The Last Plantation: Color, Conflict, and Identity: Reflections of a New World Black* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1997), 1.
20. See Paul R. Spickard and Rowena Fong, "Pacific Islander Americans and Multiethnicity: A Vision of America's Future?" *Social Forces* 73 (1995): 1365–83.
21. Salman Rushdie, *The Moor's Last Sigh* (New York: Pantheon, 1996), 110.

years and has drawn on all his historian's skills to tell us what it has been like to make a nation. He has thought deeply about what the people hoped for, the quality of their leaders, and the processes that rendered Malaysia so distinctive. He has written a terse and focused account about the hopes and realities that the country's many communities have experienced. His venture into contemporary history makes an appropriate start to this series.

## NOTES

- 1 Wang Gungwu, "Nationalism and its Historians", *Bind Us in Time: Nation and Civilisation in Asia* (Singapore: Times Academic Press, 2002). That volume of essays is offered as a companion volume to the series.
- 2 The three political parties were the United Malays National Organization (UMNO), Malayan Chinese Association (MCA) and Malayan Indian Congress (MIC).

## CHAPTER ONE

1945–57

# Malay Dominance and the Making of a "Malay" Nation-State

*With regard to the proposal that independence should be handed over to the "Malayans", who are these "Malayans"? This country was received from the Malays and to the Malays it ought to be returned. What is called "Malayans", it is not yet certain who they are; therefore let the Malays alone settle who they are.*

Tunku Abdul Rahman in his inaugural speech as President of UMNO on 26 August 1951 on taking over from Datuk Onn.

*You asked who are these 'Malayans?', and I must admit that this remark really worried me. I regarded this remark as implying that the non-Malays in this country had no right to call themselves Malaysians ... in the last analysis what converted not me, but many other Chinese, was your magnificent leadership. It is no exaggeration to say that had anybody but you been at the helm of the Alliance in the early years of independence, the history of Malaya, and later Malaysia, could well have been different.*

Tun Tan Siew Sin, former Finance Minister in the Tunku's Cabinet, in his letter to the Tunku, reproduced in the Tunku's memoirs, *Looking Back*, pp. 175–81.

WHO WOULD inherit power from the British? Who would receive independence? In the contest for Malaya, these issues were quickly

decided in the immediate post-war period. "For the people of Malaya," says a British observer,<sup>1</sup> "decolonisation was a series of profound struggles through which they fought for the welfare of their communities, to secure position and place, and to contest the identity of the nation."

A resurgent Malay nationalism was born during this period. It was manifested in the United Malays National Organization (UMNO) which successfully campaigned against the British Government's post-war Malayan Union plan. Under the plan the British had intended to end Malay sovereignty, impose direct rule in Malaya and create an equal citizenship for both Malays and non-Malays. If this plan had been fully implemented (the Malayan Union was only in force for two years), Malaya would have become more of a "Malayan" nation-state than a "Malay" nation-state. When it withdrew the plan in the face of the strong Malay opposition, the British Government restored Malay sovereignty and Malay proprietaryship of the country and thereby ensured Malay political primacy among the various races. This allowed the Malays to set the pace and agenda for the creation of a new "Malay" nation-state. Independent Malaya eventually materialized on 31 August 1957. It formed the basis for the future enlarged federation of present-day Malaysia.

The period 1945-57 marked the crucial last 12 years of British rule, the period of decolonization. In 1948 British officials together with the UMNO nationalists and the Malay Rulers worked out the legal framework for a modern administration, citizenship, the future basis for the construction of nationhood, and a brief, final and meaningful pattern of collaboration and partnership. All three parties had agreed to create a Federation of Malaya comprising the nine Malay states together with the settlements of Malacca and Penang to replace the Malayan Union under a centralized form of government. In order to end colonial rule and achieve national independence for Malaya, the UMNO nationalists were compelled by the British officials to work out a formula of inter-racial co-operation, unity and harmony among the various races in the country. In 1955 and again in 1956 they negotiated and achieved a "Social Contract" with the two major non-Malay political parties, the Malayan Chinese Association (MCA) and the Malayan Indian Congress (MIC), on the basic principles for co-operation, partnership

and administration of the future nation-state. The UMNO-MCA-MIC coalition won the country's first general elections in 1955. Two years later, after independence talks had been concluded, the British Government handed over power to the UMNO-MCA-MIC coalition government. It is necessary to assess the major political events which had led to the formation of the new nation-state of Malaya.

### The New Malay "Nation-State"

To a large extent, the UMNO nationalists had dictated, and obtained, their terms for the future nation-state when they and the Malay Rulers had secured from the British Government the Federation of Malaya Agreement in 1948. The Agreement had won back recognition from the British Government that Malaya was basically "the country of the Malays". In actual fact, this meant the nine Malay States under their Sultans, although the settlements of Penang and Malacca were still British colonies with larger non-Malay populations. The Agreement, however, also secured concessions from the UMNO representatives and the Malay Rulers that qualified immigrant non-Malays who were resident in Malaya would be allowed to share citizenship with Malays. The British Government had negotiated the terms for citizenship following representations by the non-Malays. But the conditions for obtaining citizenship were made restrictive by both the UMNO representatives and the Malay Rulers.

Although the 1948 Agreement returned political rights to the Malays, the issue of who would inherit political power had still to be settled. In 1948 an armed communist insurgency had broken out, and the British Government found itself fighting a "war" that could not easily be won overnight. Although Malays and non-Malays were found among the ranks of the armed communist insurgents, the majority of its members were actually Chinese. The British Government saw its fight against the communist insurgents as part of the Cold War against international communism. Within Malaya, however, the communist struggle had made British rule untenable as the former attempted to present itself as a nationalist movement and part of a world-wide anti-colonial struggle for national independence. The British

Government was, therefore, forced to adopt a policy of rapid decolonization. It decided to grant self-government, hold general elections and eventually transfer power to a locally-elected non-communist government. One of its conditions before it would relinquish colonial rule was that there should first be inter-racial co-operation and unity among the various races. This triggered off the formation of several inter-racial alliances and political groups among the various communities, such as Datuk Onn Jaafar's Independence of Malaya Party and Tunku Abdul Rahman's UMNO-MCA-MIC Alliance.

In Malaya's first general elections held in 1955, the UMNO-MCA-MIC Alliance won 51 of the 52 contested seats and was allowed to form the government. In the eventual agreement which the Alliance component parties had worked out among themselves and with the British Government, the UMNO leaders had dominated the negotiations and dictated their terms. These terms were eventually spelt out more clearly in Malaya's 1957 Constitution in the provisions for "the special position of the Malays", "Malay reservations", Malay as "the national language" and Islam as "the religion of the Federation".<sup>2</sup> In 1957, as they had done in 1948, the sovereignty of the Malay Rulers and the individuality of each of their respective states were reaffirmed. The rulers were also given considerable powers as constitutional monarchs to "safeguard the special position of the Malays" and reserve quotas for public service jobs, licences, services and scholarships to Malays.<sup>3</sup> In contrast, the non-Malay nationalists in the MCA and the MIC could only secure citizenship rights for those non-Malays born in Malaya or who qualified on residential and other terms. They failed in their demands for Chinese and Tamil to be accepted as official languages on par with Malay and English. But they secured guarantees that "no person shall be prohibited or prevented from using (otherwise than for official purposes), or from teaching and learning, any other language",<sup>4</sup> and that "other religions may be practised in peace and harmony in any part of the Federation".<sup>5</sup> All parties, however, agreed that for a period of 10 years English could be used in the Parliament, in the law courts and for the drafting of legislation and for "all official purposes".<sup>6</sup>

In fact, what had been put into place on Independence Day on 31 August 1957 was a new, inclusive "Malay" nation-state called "Federation of Malaya", similar to the 1948 state. Known by its shortened name, "Malaya"<sup>7</sup> comprised some 5,200,000 million people, of whom about 2,200,000 were Malays and other races deemed indigenous, and the other 3,000,000 were non-Malays. In the Alliance representations to the Constitutional Commission in 1956, "Malaya" was the name preferred by the MCA, while the UMNO wanted the new state to be called "Malaysia"<sup>8</sup> "Malaya" was, however, retained. It marked a continuity with the earlier Anglo-Malay structured Federation of Malaya, which was established in 1948.

The name Malaya continued to be used until 1963 when "Malaysia", comprising Malaya, Singapore, Sarawak and Sabah, was created, but Singapore left Malaysia in 1965. This time, UMNO got the name it desired originally. The Malay name for the Federation of Malaya was *Persekutuan Tanah Melayu* (literally Federation of Malay States or Federation of Malay Lands). Malaya in the English name "Federation of Malaya", as well as in "Malaysia", reflected the Malayness of the nation-state and the Malays' racial identity. Malaya's citizenship in the 1957 Constitution, however, was known only as "Federal citizenship". "Federal citizenship" meant membership of a nation, like a membership of a club with rights and duties. Nationality, however, meant a national identity, which was something else. The Alliance parties failed to spell out the features of Malaya's nationality in the Constitution because they were uncertain how to define its national identity.<sup>9</sup>

"By *Merdeka* [Independence] the Malay community had been elevated into a nation, and it seems that to Tunku Abdul Rahman the nation was a political and cultural entity based on the concept of original sovereignty. Non-Malays could be admitted to the nation, but Tunku Abdul Rahman did not concede that nationality should be the basis of citizenship. Citizenship had a different foundation: it was merely a legal guarantee of specified privileges. This distinction was played down in the interests of unity, and in so far as the term 'nationality' was used it was used in its restricted legal sense, almost synonymously with citizenship — but the Tunku would not allow the term *bangsa* [race/nation] to be used for it. In 1951 Tunku Abdul

Rahman had asked rhetorically who the 'Malayans' were: his answer was that there could be a Malayan nation, but the Malay *bangsa* [race/nation] would exist as a distinct core within it."<sup>10</sup>

This constitutional arrangement represented a compromise and a dilution of the UMNO's Malay nationalism and its initial stand of an exclusive "Malaya for the Malays" nation-state. Given the strident nationalist appeals of its early days from 1946, its transformation in the 1955-57 period of state formation was, indeed, remarkable. In order to achieve national independence, it had become a "nucleus" of an inclusive, wider, multi-ethnic nationalism which has been called "Malayan nationalism" by some scholars.

The fact that UMNO's leaders did not develop their nationalism into an exclusive nationalism of "Malaya for the Malays" would make the future nation-state always subject to continuous pressures and challenges from its own members and from other Malay nationalists and organizations to realize that goal in the future. This in turn would arouse among the non-Malays strong resistance to such Malay nationalist appeals. These recurring struggles and conflicts would dominate the history of racial politics and nation-building in Malaysia.

UMNO's Malay nationalism had developed in strength during its formative years in the wake of the country's worst inter-racial conflicts between Malays and Chinese in 1945-46 during and after the period of the Japanese Occupation. In this first post-war contest for Malaya, Malays were the "real victors". They had successfully resisted and defeated a wartime armed predominantly-Chinese communist movement which had tried to seize power in many parts of the country when the Japanese Occupation ended. The second time, they defeated the British Government's "Malayan Union" plan to offer non-Malays citizenship and equality of status with Malays.<sup>11</sup>

Both the wartime and post-war interracial conflicts have left long-lasting repercussions on national politics until today. The Malay-Chinese clashes also meant that Malays would resort to widespread extremist violence if pushed. The long-term implications of this extremism were very great: the overall Malayan polity might always be held subject to ultimate Malay

recourse to mass bloodshed. If so, then the Chinese would have to either accept this threat perpetually and make concessions whenever demanded, or develop their own capability at least to make the violent Malay option very debilitating. Otherwise, talk of pan-ethnic co-operation would usually be at Chinese expense.<sup>12</sup>

If history could be said to repeat itself, the May 1969 interracial clashes demonstrated once again that a Chinese political challenge could result in bloodshed. The 1969 clashes reaffirmed Malay political primacy which in turn upheld the historic "Social Contract" of the UMNO-MCA-MIC as the "corner-stone of the new Malaysian nation".<sup>13</sup> Much of present-day racial politics and nation-building in Malaysia can only be understood within this wider historical context.

### The Problematic "Malayan" Nationality

To ensure that their future nation-state would be Malay in character, the UMNO nationalists had since 1946 objected to the term "Malayan" because this was associated with the detested Malayan Union. In their representations to the Anglo-Malay Working Committee to review the Malayan Union, the UMNO representatives had asserted, "Malayans had come to mean people who had some association with Malaya, but did not include Malays, and that Malays took the strongest objection to being called or referred to as Malaysans".<sup>14</sup> Unlike "Malaysian", the term "Malayan", has, therefore, always been problematic. This is due largely to the way it has been used in pre-war and post-war Malaya. Even radical Malays like Dr Burhanuddin Al-Helmy had objected to the term "Malayan" (although not the term "Malaysian"), regarding the former as a "smaller mould" than the term *Melayu* [Malay]. *Melayu* was a "bigger mould" (*acuan yang lebih besar*) which could incorporate "Malayan" but not the other way around.<sup>15</sup> He said the conflict between "Malayan" and "Melayu" would never end. "Malayan" follows the colonial mould, it belittles and destroys the Malay nation or Malay nationalism that demands the return of its rights, that is wider than the "Malayan" demand", he said.<sup>16</sup>



However, paradoxically, in the past, some Malay political leaders such as Tunku Abdul Rahman and Tun Abdul Razak had not been averse to using the term "Malayan" as a short-hand description of the country's way of life and culture inclusive of both Malays and non-Malays. In their public speeches and statements in English (but not in Malay), "Malayan" had been used when addressing mixed audiences which included both such groups. However, when speaking to only Malay audiences, the Malay leaders would use the Malay terms for the country, "Persekutuan Tanah Melayu". They would also use the term "*bangsa*" which means both "nation" and "race". Delivered to Malay audiences, it would literally mean *bangsa Melayu*, the Malay race. Their usage of the term "Malayan" may be viewed as a "politically correct" term, depending on the audience and the circumstances. Like *bangsa*, it is deliberately vague. Such vagueness was due to their reluctance to define the concept of Malaya's nationality in the early years of Malaya's nation-building.

This ambiguous usage of the term "Malayan" partially followed the colonial usage before independence to mean both a nationality and as a convenient adjective to describe any aspect of life or object pertaining to Malaya. For instance, the term "Malayan" in "Malayan Union" (1945), or in the title of English novelist Anthony Burgess' *Malayan Trilogy* (1956), or in T.H. Silcock's book of essays *Towards a Malayan Nation* (1961). "Malayan" also appeared in the census reports. Some writers, however, adopted the term "Malayan" to mean specifically "non-Malay residents" in Malaya, for instance, British writer Michael Ardizzone in his 1946 book:

A Malay is a member of the Malay race; a Malayan is a person of any other origin who happens to live in Malaya. There are 2,250,000 Malays; and 3,050,000 Malayans.<sup>17</sup>

Given the undefined nature of Malaya's nationality at this time and the problematic meaning of the term "Malayan", the expression "Malayan nationalism" cannot adequately represent the new strand of multi-racial nationalism, especially when Malays were unhappy about it and did not

include themselves in the term "Malayan". "If the Malays have the right to continue being Malays first and foremost, what use is there for the term 'Malayan'?" asked political scientist K.J. Ratnam.<sup>18</sup> Historian Wang Gungwu was one of those who had identified this multi-racial nationalism as "Malayan nationalism" and was aware of the problems associated with the term:

If we were to venture a definition at this stage it would probably be fair to say that "Malayan nationalism consists of two component parts: a nucleus of Malay nationalism enclosed by the idea of Malay-Chinese-Indian partnership". This is perhaps not the way which many Malay and non-Chinese politicians would like to see it. There are some Malay leaders who equate Malayan nationalism with Malay nationalism and prefer to use "Melayu" instead of "Malayan" in every possible context. And many Chinese and Indian leaders who describe themselves as "Malayan" refer to an altogether new political identity and would refuse to consider it as in any way similar to "Malay". But what cannot be denied is that the dynamism, the single-mindedness and the leadership in Malayan nationalism has been ably provided by the present ruling Malay group. These Malays have been supported by both Chinese and Indians, but they have at no time surrendered their claim, or their rights of leadership.<sup>19</sup>

For purposes of discussion and for historical reasons, it might be just as well to retain the term "Malayan nationalism" to refer to its usage for the relevant period or social context.<sup>20</sup>

### Historiography of "Malayan Nationalism"

In the 1950s and the 1960s the question of when "Malayan nationalism", or, later, "Malaysian nationalism" had emerged engaged the attention of both historians and non-historians. These writers had apparently not found a

more suitable term than "Malayan" to describe this nationalism. They also could not agree on its features. On the other hand, they arrived at a consensus that "Malayan nationalism" had not emerged before World War II. Malaya was said to have had separate strands of nationalism — Malay nationalism, Chinese nationalism and Indian nationalism, each pulling the loyalties of members of the three main communities towards their respective countries of origin.

Clearly, Malay nationalist sentiments were focussed at creating a Malay nation-state for Malaya, although in the pre-war period its form was still unclear. This was clearly recognized in 1946 by the Anglo-Malay Working Committee appointed to review the Malayan Union. In its report it asserted that "as these States are Malay States ruled by Your Highnesses, the subjects of your Highnesses have no alternative allegiance or other country which they can regard as their homeland, and they occupy a special position and possess rights which must be protected".<sup>21</sup> Yet, for a small section of Malays their "imagined community"<sup>22</sup> was a "Greater Malaysia", or "Greater Indonesia", in which Malaya would be part of a large union of the Malay world and incorporate the "Malay" peoples living in the territories of both British Malaya and the Dutch East Indies.<sup>23</sup>

This pre-war ethnic Malay nationalism was aimed at a nation-state exclusively for Malays in which Chinese and other non-Malay residents in Malaya would find no place. The story of "Malayan nationalism", is, therefore, the story of how Malay nationalism, i.e., as an "ideological movement for the attainment and maintenance of autonomy, unity and identity ... of an actual or potential nation",<sup>24</sup> transformed itself into an inclusive "Malayan" multi-ethnic force and movement. This it did due to its overriding need to succeed and achieve complete self-government and independence from British colonial rule. This was a goal that the British Government would not accede to without inter-racial co-operation and unity among the various races in the country.

Henceforth, post-war Malaya's history has seen several Malay nationalists who rose to the occasion by embracing "Malayan nationalism" to make Malaya an inclusive multi-racial nation-state open to large numbers of non-Malay residents, who constituted nearly half of the population of the country.

The climax of these efforts was when the UMNO nationalists successfully joined hands with the MCA and the MIC to forge inter-racial unity and struggle for national independence. The remarkable success of this effort has impressed most scholars of Malaya's political history of this period.

Studies done in the 1950s and 1960s have presented evidence of a nascent "Malayan nationalism" in the immediate post-war decade, 1946–57. The sentiments were said to have emerged when the British Government introduced its Malayan Union constitutional plan which would foster "Malayan nationalism", a "Malayan nation-state", a "Malayan nationality" as well as a "Malayan national culture". The plan aroused the various races to respond and think about Malaya's future. Some of the Malayan Union's basic ideas were embraced by the leftist PUTERA-AMCJA coalition of political parties and social organizations (representing both Malays and non-Malays). Support came in different forms from the British-sponsored Communities Liaison Committee and even from Dato Onn Jaafar, the president of the UMNO who had initially opposed the plan. Later, even Onn's successor, Tunku Abdul Rahman, and his Alliance coalition, the UMNO-MCA-MIC embraced and promoted similar ideas of inter-racial unity and co-operation, the creation of a multi-racial nation-state, a common citizenship and a common loyalty to Malaya.

Some important insights on the crucial 1945–57 period have been discerned by different groups of scholars. Two economists, Ungku Aziz and T.H. Silcock, writing in 1951, commented that while "Malayan nationalism" did not exist before World War II, its sentiments or invocation seemed to have appeared at the time they were writing. "A Malayan nationalism, and a Malayan nation, can be built on the basis of approximate equality of status among the members of all races", they asserted.<sup>25</sup> In 1958 historian Lennox Mills also observed that "Malayan nationalism" had appeared in 1955–57 "among the politically-conscious minority", especially in the UMNO-MCA-MIC Alliance's demands for and eventual achievement of full self-government and independence for Malaya. He added, "The solution of the problem had no parallel in the rest of Southeast Asia. Three communal parties arose in the Federation of Malaya — Malay, Chinese and Indian — and the leaders formed an alliance in order to destroy the only non-

communal party. They then demanded complete self-government and arranged a compromise settlement of the principal communal differences...."<sup>26</sup>

In 1962, as already noted above, historian Wang Gungwu, writing on "Malayan nationalism", had claimed that pre-war Malaya's seemingly "three irreconcilable ideas of nationhood" had been replaced by the "unique growth of Malayan nationalism" in 1957. In his view, the "Malayan nation" was born in 1957 when Malaya attained independence from colonial rule. On the other hand, he stated, "Malayan nationalism" in sentiment and in the form of an inter-racial alliance of political parties had emerged only around 1955-57 for the express purpose of achieving independence. Wang described this nationalism as "a modified or attenuated Malay nationalism". It consisted of two parts: "a nucleus of Malay nationalism enclosed by the idea of Malay-Chinese-Indian unity". He referred specifically to the achievement of the UMNO-MCA-MIC Alliance's landslide victory in the 1955 general elections and their successful efforts in establishing "a peaceful, constitutional and democratic basis for nationhood" in 1957.<sup>27</sup> Wang's was the first real attempt to describe the characteristics of the nascent "Malayan nationalism".

Wang's views, however, did not go unchallenged. The Dutch historian, Jan Pluvier, his colleague in the History Department at University of Malaya, where both taught, writing in 1967, without citing Wang's 1962 views on "Malayan nationalism", said that "Malayan nationalism" before 1965 was a "myth". He said that the Malay-Chinese-Indian unity of UMNO-MCA-MIC in 1957 was an "act of opportunism". Pluvier only detected some signs of what he called "Malaysian nationalism" in the period 1963-65 when, according to him, the various races in Malaysia were forced to come closer together to meet the common threat of Indonesian confrontation.<sup>28</sup> In 1972, James Ongkili, another Malaysian historian in the same History Department, claimed that not only "Malayan nationalism" but even "Sarawak nationalism" had emerged in 1946-48. Both these forces were brought about by the British Government's proposals for the Malayan Union and the cession of Sarawak by Rajah Vyner Brooke to the British Crown, respectively. Two years later, and again in 1985, Ongkili reiterated that the

most positive evidence of "Malayan nationalism" was that, on 14 September 1952, 1.2 million, or 60 per cent of the Chinese in Malaya, and 180,000 Indians had become citizens of Malaya.<sup>29</sup>

From the different opinions expressed above, it is clear that "Malayan nationalism" or "Malaysian nationalism" had arrived by 1957, if not by 1963. Most of these scholars had acknowledged the British Government's important post-war role in creating a political consciousness among the people towards Malaya for the first time through its constitutional proposals on the Malayan Union in 1945. This represented a major departure from its pre-war policies towards Malaya. What had caused these changes was the wartime Japanese victory over the British forces in Malaya and the three-and-a-half years of Japanese occupation of the country. The British knew that they could not return to Malaya without a post-war programme of political advancement.

### Malayan Union: Britain's Idea of an Embryonic "Nation-State"

Britain's post-war Socialist Government, therefore, proposed on its return to Malaya to offer equal citizenship rights to both Malays and non-Malays. The various communities would be encouraged to view themselves no longer as different peoples, but as one people living in one enlarged and centralized state, the Malayan Union. It would comprise the nine Malay states and the British settlements of Malacca and Penang, while the predominantly-Chinese British settlement of Singapore would be detached and administered separately as a British colony in order to inflate the size of the Malayan Union's Malay population. The British hoped the Malays would be weaned from their strong loyalties to their respective States and Sultans and transfer them to the new centralized state, while the non-Malay communities would also be weaned from their loyalties to their respective homelands and transfer them to the Malayan Union.

These proposals were radical in nature because they reversed the pre-war policy of preserving Malaya to the Malays and according them special rights. The Malayan Union citizenship would not be a nationality because



the Malayan Union would not be an independent sovereign nation-state yet. But the British Government held out the possibility that this would happen before long and that citizenship could later become the basis of an enduring nationality. Malays would automatically become Malayan Union citizens. Non-Malays had to apply and to satisfy residential and language conditions.

The Malayan Union citizenship provisions have been regarded as "liberal" and "inclusivist" by a later group of scholars. The citizenship was seen as "encouraging and building a new loyalty and identity, and an emerging nation-state".<sup>30</sup> One of its most liberal features was said to be its offer of citizenship on the basis of *jus soli*, i.e., based on birth in the country, to the non-Malays.

The Malayan Union's centralized system of government would replace the three pre-war separate systems of administration in Malaya — the British colony of the Straits Settlements comprising Singapore, Malacca and Penang; the Federated Malay States (FMS) of Perak, Selangor, Negri Sembilan and Pahang which came together in 1896; and the Unfederated Malay States (UMS) of Johor, Kedah, Perlis, Terengganu and Kelantan, so-called because collectively they had refused to join the FMS. Under the Malayan Union, the sovereignty of the Malay Sultans in the FMS and UMS would be transferred to the British Crown. Malay sovereignty had been acknowledged in the pre-1941 treaties between the British Government and the Sultans of each of the respective Malay states, under which the Rulers had to ask for and accept advice from British Residents or British Advisers in all matters except in Malay customs and Islam. But under the Malayan Union plan, the British Parliament would henceforth be empowered under the Foreign Jurisdiction Act to legislate on behalf of Malaya's affairs. The UMNO leaders declared that the plan amounted to complete annexation of the Malay States, an abrogation of the pre-war 1941 treaties with the Malay Rulers and the abolition of Malay sovereignty.

However, the Malay opposition to the Malayan Union spearheaded by UMNO was immensely successful, and forced the British Government to rescind the Malayan Union plan. On the other hand, the non-Malay reaction to the plan was lukewarm. In the case of the Chinese community, various

Chinese organizations appeared to be more concerned about losing Chinese nationality rather than adopting Malayan Union citizenship. In fact, most Chinese in Malaya appeared to have been caught off-guard, unable to comprehend its wider implications.<sup>31</sup> As Lennox Mills rightly observed, "The Chinese showed no interest in the Union and made no attempt to defend a policy which was so much to their advantage".<sup>32</sup> The British Government's change of mind had been brought about not only by the storm of Malay protests, but also by pressures brought to bear upon it from British newspapers, opposition British Conservative Members of Parliament and former British Pro-Consuls who had served in Malaya.<sup>33</sup> In a sense, the non-Malays had lost the contest for Malaya by default.

According to political scientist K.J. Ratnam, "The roots of Malay apprehension [had] now become clear: the non-Malays, having had little if any political authority before the War, were now to be made as much the masters of the country as the Malays themselves".<sup>34</sup> The British Government was held responsible for making this concession. For this reason, UMNO was determined to crush its Malayan Union plan. The future Malay nation-state had to be secured.

### Federation of Malaya, 1948: Real Basis of the First Malay "Nation-State"

When the British Government capitulated, it ensured that Malaya would revert eventually to Malay rule. The signs were clear: it agreed to restore sovereignty to the Malays and the Sultans. It would return to the Sultans their pre-war position as the legal sovereigns, respect the individuality of the Malay States and safeguard the special position and rights of the Malays. The Malay rulers and UMNO, in turn, accepted the British Government's need for a centralized government in Malaya by returning to the pre-war model of federation (the FMS) for the nine Malay States and the British settlements of Malacca and Penang. This enlarged territory, similar in size to the Malayan Union, would be called the Federation of Malaya. It would similarly exclude predominantly-Chinese Singapore which would be governed separately as a British colony. This was the second time Singapore

was excluded from the other states; but its merger with the Federation would become the subject of nationalist appeals later in both territories right after the independence and establishment of the Federation of Malaya in 1957. It would lead eventually to its merger within an enlarged Malaysia in 1963.

Besides mounting a successful campaign against the Malayan Union plan, UMNO's president, Dato Onn Jaafar, had not only aroused a strong spirit of nationalism among the Malays, but made the Malay Rulers become subservient to the will of the Malay people. He has, therefore, been called "Father of Malay Nationalism", with some justification. It was Onn, an aristocrat from Johor state, who won back British recognition that Malaya was "the country of the Malays". He had used the argument of the historical factor effectively by reminding the British that before 1941 they had treaties with the Malay Rulers but none with the non-Malays. Onn's Malay nationalism was also significant in the "taming" and "demystification" of the Malay Rulers. The Malay Rulers were blamed for "selling out" the Malays' birthright by signing the new treaties with Sir Harold MacMichael, the British Government's plenipotentiary. The new treaties handed over the rulers' powers to the British King, and allowed the British Government to enforce the Malayan Union. The Sultans signed the new treaties, without consulting their Malay Ministers and advisers, but later claimed they had signed under duress.

Malay feelings against the Rulers had first been aroused at a crucial meeting in Johor Bahru convened by the Persatuan Melayu Johor (Johor Malays Association), held on 1 February 1946. At this meeting Sultan Ibrahim of Johor was denounced for signing the MacMichael Treaty in violation of the Johor Constitution, promulgated in 1895, which prohibited the ruler from handing over the state to any European power. Shouts of "Down with Sultan Ibrahim" had punctuated the air. Despite Datuk Onn's intervention, the meeting approved a resolution, declaring that the Johor Malays would no longer recognize Sultan Ibrahim as their ruler. Although Malays in other States did not go as far as this in denouncing their rulers, the repercussions were serious. The Malay newspapers spoke of their rulers' betrayal. The rulers were said to have committed *derhaka* (treason) towards the people.

"The *raayat* [the people] were now the rajas, and the rajas were the people".<sup>35</sup> This was the best example of the full flowering of Malay nationalism. Datuk Onn best exemplified these aspirations of the Malay struggle, when he coined the cry, "*Hidup Melayu!*" (Long Live the Malays), a cry which was picked up by Malays, instead of "*Hidup Raja-raja Melayu!*" (Long Live the Rajas). "From today", he asserted, "the Will of the Malay people is paramount".<sup>36</sup>

The All-Malay Congress, which Datuk Onn convened on 1 March 1946, decided to set up UMNO. It formally came into existence at a later meeting of the Congress on 11 May 1946. However, before the inaugural meeting, at a meeting with the Malay Rulers on 30 and 31 March, UMNO's preparatory committee warned the Rulers not to attend the inauguration of the Malayan Union Governor, Sir Edward Gent. They were told that if they did so, they would no longer be accepted by the Malay people. The Rulers bowed to the advice, thereby showing that they had succumbed to the will of the Malay people. "In those few hours the very basis of the Malay political traditions had been subverted and the trend towards constitutional monarchy had inexorably begun", observed Allen.<sup>37</sup>

The successful struggle of the UMNO nationalist movement in recovering these Malay rights, including the Rulers' sovereignty, had put the Rulers in a position of being beholden to the nationalist movement and to the Malay people. In securing the thrones back for their Rulers, UMNO had also insisted that the Rulers should be their symbols of Malay identity and Malay paramountcy. They became constitutional monarchs to safeguard the Malays' rights and privileges. This was clearly spelt out in the Federation of Malaya Agreement 1948, and in the later Constitutions of the independent states of the Federation of Malaya and Malaysia. Thus, the victory of post-war Malay nationalism in 1946-48 ensured not only the restoration of Malay rights and Malay sovereignty, but also secured constitutional monarchy. In Thailand, constitutional monarchy was achieved through a civilian-backed military *coup d'état*, which has since been called the "1932 Revolution".<sup>38</sup>

Theoretically, however, the Sultans had become "constitutional monarchs" long before 1941, as the British authorities had already treated



them as symbolic heads of state. They had to ask for and accept advice from the British Resident or British Adviser and to give assent to legislation which was approved by their respective state legislature. However, legally speaking, only the Sultans of Johor and Trengganu were "constitutional monarchs" within the true definition of this term, as only their State Councils had drafted and approved their state constitutions in 1895 and in 1911 respectively. All the remaining Malay states did not have their own constitutions until 1948 under the Federation of Malaya Agreement.

Under the 1948 Agreement, each Sultan made an agreement with the British Government on behalf of his own state, allowing it complete control of defence and foreign affairs. Each Sultan would govern in accordance with British advice as formerly. The head of the federation would be the British High Commissioner, whose title was different from that of the previous Governor of the Malayan Union. The British High Commissioner's office before 1941 had been in Singapore, but he would now reside in Kuala Lumpur. He was empowered to protect the rights of any state or settlement, the powers and dignity of the Sultans, and safeguard the "special position of the Malays" and the "legitimate interests of other communities". Like his previous counterpart in the Malayan Union, he was to be assisted by an executive council and a legislative council of both official and unofficial members.

However, the Federal Legislative Council would have a greater Malay representation. Of the fourteen official members, nine would be *Mentri Besar* (Chief Ministers of the Malay States); while of the sixty-one non-official members, thirty-one would be Malays, fourteen Chinese, five Indians, seven Europeans, one Ceylonese, and one Eurasian. In addition, there would be one representative each from Penang and Malacca, who could come from any community. A Conference of Malay Rulers would meet whenever necessary. A special provision gave the Rulers veto powers on immigration, apparently arising from their fear of further immigration from China and India. In each Malay state, the Sultan exercised the authority of the state, but he was still required to give his assent to Bills passed by his respective State legislature. It is clear that with the signing of the Federation of Malaya Agreement, which came into force on 1 February 1948, Malay

sovereignty was virtually intact. The non-Malays' status had been considerably weakened. They had, in fact, never seriously challenged Malay political sovereignty.

With regard to the terms for citizenship, both the Malay Rulers and UMNO now made them more restrictive. Citizenship on the basis of *jus soli* was withdrawn. Only Malays, who were born in a Malay state or were subjects of the Rulers, would become citizens automatically. Chinese and others had to be British citizens born in the former Straits Settlements of Penang, or Malacca or in the Federation "before, on or after the prescribed date", and one of whose parents was born in the Federation, and satisfy at least fifteen years' residence in the Federation. Applicants for Federal citizenship were also required to have an adequate knowledge of Malay or English. This excluded a large number of non-Malays as very few Chinese or Indians knew English and most had only a smattering knowledge of Malay. The 1948 "Federal citizenship" also was not a nationality as the Federation of Malaya would not be an independent sovereign nation. The general non-Malay position with regard to Malay sovereignty of Malaya was surprisingly one of indifference. At no time did they ever seriously challenge Malay claims to political primacy, or the creation of the Federation of Malaya as a "Malay nation-state". The citizenship proposals clearly reflected the desire of the Malay thinkers that the multi-racial political community should adopt an identical Malay cultural homogeneity, or be assimilated within the larger Malay community.<sup>39</sup> What occupied the minds of most non-Malays seemed to be how to acquire more liberal terms to become citizens of this potential "nation-state", such as citizenship by *jus soli*, and to make Chinese and Tamil official languages similar to Malay and English.

The Anglo-Malay accord created a simmering mood of dissatisfaction among non-Malays in both Malaya and Singapore:

... the Federation of Malaya Agreement 1948 placed certain restrictions on the eligibility of non-Malays for Malayan citizenship and was exclusionary in intent. It was an issue which dominated much of the politics of Malaya in the 1950s and spilled into debates

over what language was to be given priority in a national education policy. It polarized the Malay and Chinese communities and posed a major obstacle to nation building efforts. The fall-out from an exclusionary conception of citizenship and its ramifications for language and education spread to Singapore.<sup>40</sup>

However, although the terms for citizenship for non-Malays were restrictive under the 1948 Agreement, the willingness of the Malay leaders to share citizenship with a small category of non-Malays in their new Malay "nation-state" or "Malay nation", in fact, marked a major shift towards an *inclusionary* multi-ethnic nationalist perspective.<sup>41</sup> An awareness of political necessities, coupled with enlightened leadership, had made these new proposals possible. "Although the numbers of non-Malays made eligible were by no means overwhelming", says political scientist K.R. Ratnam, "it should be remembered that, before the War, the Malays would probably have refused to entertain any possibility of such a concession".<sup>42</sup>

In fact, this willingness to accept non-Malays can also be seen in the proposals of the leftwing PUTERA coalition of Malay political parties and social organizations, dominated by the Malay Nationalist Party led by Dr Burhanuddin Al-Helmy and Ishak Haji Mohamed. In putting forward their "People's Constitutional Proposals" as a counter-response to the Malay-British Working Committee's Accord, PUTERA and its coalition partner AMCJA represented the first inter-racial alliance of any consequence in this post-war period. PUTERA-AMCJA urged "equal political rights for all who regarded Malaya as their real home and as the object of their loyalty". The Malay Rulers should become "fully sovereign and constitutional rulers".<sup>43</sup> They also agreed that Malay should be the official language of the country, that the national flag should "incorporate the red and white colours of the Indonesian national flag", and that citizenship should be equivalent to nationality. They even went further and suggested that the federation be given full self-government with a fully-elected legislature. Owing to the insistence of the Malay nationalists in the MNP, the coalition recommended a nationality to be called *Melayu*, the name of the Malay race, and after much debate, it was accepted by the AMCJA led by Tan Cheng Lock. The

PUTERA-AMCJA proposals were, however, rejected by the British Government and by the Malay Rulers and UMNO. Despite this rejection, scholars have remained fascinated by the willingness of the MNP nationalists to compromise and accept non-Malays within their concept of the new nation-state. Commenting on the PUTERA-AMCJA's proposal on the *Melayu* nationality, two scholars Michael Hill and Lian Kwen Fee have interpreted that it would simply connote a common identity and not a "racial identity":

The new nationality was to be termed *Melayu* acknowledging its historical past and cultural origins. Such an identity was to be conceived as ethnic and transcended "racial" origins. Hence *Melayu* nationality was premised on free will and would be bestowed on all who decided to renounce their ties outside of the Malay peninsula. In other words, "Malays" might choose to reject such an identification or the Chinese could adopt such a nationality if they so wished. A *Melayu* nationality was quite different from *bangsa Melayu*. The latter was defined in *primordial* terms, in that cultural traits were inalienably bound to a particular people sharing a single and common origin (Nagata, 1981:98), whereas the former stressed a common identity rather than origin and was situational. Hence a Chinese or non-Malay could never be *bangsa Melayu*.<sup>44</sup>

Still, there were many Chinese who feared that they would lose their Chinese identity by adopting the *Melayu* nationality. Tan Cheng Lock, a leader of the AMCJA-PUTERA, assured one group, the Malayan Chinese Chamber of Commerce, that this would not happen.<sup>45</sup> But the fact that there was a section of the Chinese community who were willing to become *Melayu* nationals meant that they did not really mind being accorded an identity homogenous with Malays provided they enjoyed equal rights with Malays, which the Anglo-Malay Agreement, however, refused to hold out.

The non-Malay communities, therefore, bore a great grievance towards the Anglo-Malay Agreement which had worked out a *provisional* programme "acceptable to Malay opinion",<sup>46</sup> and it would not turn back to what had been offered earlier in the Malayan Union proposals. Non-Malay

groups organized a campaign of opposition, including a "hartal" (a combination of both a strike and boycott of trades), but their opposition met with failure, as the British Government stood firm behind the Anglo-Malay Agreement, which had restored Malay sovereignty.

The British rejection of non-Malay demands coincided with a breakdown of law and order on the industrial front, as workers and trade unions fought for bargaining rights and for improvement of wages and working conditions. In June 1948, some four months after the Federation of Malaya had been brought into existence in place of the Malayan Union, the British Government was forced to declare a State of Emergency. This came in the wake of industrial violence by workers and trade unions, which was blamed on the semi-legal Communist Party of Malaya (CPM). The state of Emergency, which was not to end until 1960, was precipitated by a series of murders of European managers in several rubber plantations. The Emergency imposed restrictions on people's movements, food supplies, press freedom, and led to the arrests and detentions of several thousands of people suspected of being communists or communist sympathisers. These repressive measures, which the Government argued were necessary to check the spread of further violence, caused the CPM to launch an armed uprising belatedly, resulting two months later in its proscription.

### Communist Insurrection: A Catalyst to Independence

Ironically, it was this communist insurrection which forced the British Government to accelerate its plans further for Malaya's decolonization. Not much recognition has been accorded the communist insurgents for their important role as a catalyst of this development. However, in his years of retirement, Tunku Abdul Rahman, looked back and belatedly acknowledged their role:

Just as Indonesia was fighting a bloody battle, so were the communists of Malaya, who too fought for independence. With the difference that the communists of Malaya were not the indigenous people of this country and they were fighting to set up a communist regime which the believers in the faith of Islam [i.e., the Malays]

could not support nor could those orthodox people, who believed in democracy and freedom. So the struggle for the independence of this country was carried out by the communists alone and they fought a subversive as well as a shooting war, losing many of their men and at the same time killing many of our men and the Commonwealth soldiers. The battle continued for 12 years [1948–1960] and would have gone on had the British Government not yielded to our demand for a general election as a step towards independence.<sup>47</sup>

Even though the communist rebellion was an ideologically-oriented uprising that coincided with other communist uprisings in Burma, the Philippines and Indonesia,<sup>48</sup> it was also identified as an uprising which involved more Chinese than Malays or Indians because the Communist Party of Malaya was a predominantly-Chinese movement. It would be a mistake to see it as a Chinese uprising, as the targets of the Communists were not only the security forces but also pro-government Chinese supporters and politicians. In 1949 China fell to communist rule, raising problems for the ethnic Chinese community and their nationality in Malaya. Britain decided to recognize Communist China, but not to allow it to set up consulates in Malaya in view of alleged links between the Chinese Communist Party and the underground CPM. Many Chinese were now not keen to return to China. Those Chinese who supported the overthrown anti-communist Guomindang government of Chiang Kai-shek which had fled for refuge to Taiwan, were now anxious to take up Federal citizenship. To the British authorities, the atmosphere appeared to be conducive to wean the Chinese away from their loyalties to their homeland by extending political rights to those "who regard Malaya as their real home and as the object of their loyalty". In 1949, India and Pakistan had achieved independence from Britain, at the cost of a massive racial bloodbath, forcing both the British authorities in Malaya and the newly-independent Governments of India and Pakistan to tighten immigration and citizenship regulations. The Indians in Malaya also seemed to be in a similar dilemma on whether to become Indian/Pakistani nationals or Federation of Malaya citizens. The British authorities, therefore, brought pressure to bear on

以下  
手  
不  
能

印人  
以下手  
不  
能

UMNO leaders and the Malay Rulers to relent on the citizenship provisions for non-Malays in the Federation of Malaya Agreement.

### Communities Liaison Committee

To appease non-Malay dissatisfaction and soften the attitudes of UMNO's Malay nationalists, the British Government appealed to the various races to promote the Federation of Malaya citizenship and the ideas associated with it. British officials reiterated that these citizenship provisions essentially meant the bonding of inter-racial unity and co-operation among the various races in Malaya. Such unity had to be achieved before complete self-government and independence could be granted to Malaya. The British insisted that the "ethnic Chinese problem" had to be tackled. They were alarmed by intelligence reports of increasing Chinese support for the communists, and accused the Chinese of "back-sliding" and insincerity in supporting government efforts to curb the communist insurgency.

To deal with the Chinese problem, they created Chinese Advisory Boards, appointed Assistant Secretaries for Chinese Affairs and Resettlement Officers in the State Governments and officially sponsored the formation of the first post-war Chinese political party, the Malayan Chinese Association (MCA) to organize the Chinese in Malaya.<sup>49</sup> The British Commissioner-General for Southeast Asia, Malcolm MacDonald, in talks he initiated with UMNO's president, Dato Onn Jaafar, urged a moderation of the stand of Malay nationalism. He believed that if some compromises could be reached among the communal parties, a deal or formula could be worked out for Malaya's future. In 1949 MacDonald achieved a remarkable measure of success when he established the Communities Liaison Committee to which he brought Onn and other prominent personalities from the Malay and non-Malay communities, such as Dato Panglima Bukit Gantang, Zainal Abidin bin Haji Abbas, Yong Shook Lin, Tan Cheng Lock (the leader of the Malayan Chinese Association), C. Thiraisingam, a Ceylonese leader, and other community leaders.<sup>50</sup>

Whether MacDonald had made any promises to Onn, such as his possible appointment as the future Prime Minister of a self-governing

Malaya if he was found acceptable to all communities, is not known, but there is speculation that he had exerted some influence over the latter.<sup>51</sup> When Onn was sufficiently won over, he first persuaded the UMNO members to accept the British Government's proposal to offer more liberal terms of citizenship with more relaxed residential and other qualifications. At a special meeting of UMNO on 10 June 1950 to discuss the proposal, Onn was, however, roundly criticized for backing the offer and even accused of "selling out" Malay rights. Stung by the members' criticisms, Onn promptly resigned as the party's president, saying it was clear the Malays did not want to be led by him. Three days later, in an unprecedented display of his popularity and mass support, thousands of UMNO members gathered outside his house in Johor Bahru to appeal for his return. Onn agreed and soon at UMNO's annual meeting on 27 August got the British proposal on citizenship approved, with some amendments. A year later, Onn again advocated multi-racial unity and urged UMNO to open its doors to non-Malays and transform itself into a "Malayan" party.<sup>52</sup> The proposal was first received with a stunned silence, and when it was put to the vote, unanimously defeated. Thereupon, Onn decided not to take up the post of president when he was again nominated for re-election as president.<sup>53</sup>

He, therefore, became the first UMNO president to become a casualty in the cause of "Malayan nationalism". He had transformed himself from an exclusive Malay nationalist to an inclusive "Malayan" nationalist, and when he was disillusioned by "Malayan nationalism" he would revert to being an exclusive Malay nationalist again. His departure from UMNO marked his eventual decline in politics, and is one of the strangest ironies of recent Malay political history. Yet who could have predicted his fate in 1946-47 when he was at the height of political success and popularity? Onn was a hero of the Malays, courted by the Malay Rulers and British officials. In 1951, he formed the multi-racial Independence of Malaya Party (IMP) to work towards multi-racial unity and Malaya's independence within seven years. Since MacDonald had cultivated Onn in adopting "Malayan nationalism", he had, in fact, advised him against leaving the party.<sup>54</sup> However, despite Onn's departure from UMNO, he still believed that Onn



had popular support among the Malays. He gave him his official support,<sup>55</sup> which was also endorsed by Henry Gurney, the British High Commissioner in Malaya and the Colonial Office in London.

The British official secret and confidential records, which are now open, reveal that from 1951 to 1955 the British Government continued to endorse Onn and followed closely his speeches and activities in the belief that he still had great charisma and large Malay support. This official support for Onn continued until the general elections in 1955 made it clear that UMNO's Tunku Abdul Rahman was the more popular Malay leader. These official records present an interesting revisionist view that it was not the Tunku but Onn who was Britain's "man" from 1951 to 1955.<sup>56</sup> Since the British stakes were so high, it is little wonder that the British Government had to come to terms with Malay nationalism, first, in the form of Onn, and later in the form of Tunku Abdul Rahman.

### The Tunku: From Exclusivist to Inclusive Nationalist

According to the saying, some achieve success on their own, while others have it thrust upon them. The latter case was certainly true of the Tunku (Malay word for prince). He was catapulted from the relative obscurity of the post of a Kedah branch official of UMNO to that of president at its annual general assembly in 1951, much to the surprise of himself and to everyone else. When Onn stepped down at the 1951 UMNO assembly, the Tunku, who had sided with the faction which opposed Onn's proposal to open the party's doors to non-Malays, was elected as the party's second president. Whether it was due to his princely background or to his Kedah state faction's advocacy of extreme Malay nationalism, the Tunku's open criticisms of Datuk Onn's policies certainly helped ensure his election victory. His election speech, which upset British officials, had attacked the label "Malayan" whose usefulness he had argued had ended with the Malayan Union:

With regard to the proposal of some of our men that independence should be handed over to the "Malayans", who are these

"Malayans"? This country was received from the Malays and to the Malays it ought to be returned. What is called "Malayans", it is not yet certain who they are; therefore let the Malays alone settle who they are.<sup>57</sup>

Thus, he had begun his career in UMNO by being on the side of exclusionary Malay nationalism. We shall see how, even before becoming Malaya's first elected Chief Minister, the Tunku would follow the path of Datuk Onn and change from exclusionary Malay nationalism to inclusive "Malayan nationalism". This was a trend which subsequent UMNO presidents and Prime Ministers would follow.

The Tunku, in his memoirs, has explained that he had "opted out" of the tumultuous years of the nascent post-war Malay nationalist movement in 1946. Although he supported UMNO's campaign, he spent this period in London studying law. In 1948, at the age of 46, he passed the final Bar examination and returned to Malaya where he got a job, first, at the State Legal Adviser's Office in Kedah and then at the Attorney-General's office, as a Deputy Public Prosecutor. He was willing to leave the service and take up politics as a full-time career.<sup>58</sup> On taking over UMNO, the Tunku pursued the policy of Malaya for the Malays, but in order to defeat Dato Onn's new party, the Independence of Malaya Party (IMP), his UMNO formed an alliance with the Chinese communal party, the MCA, to contest Malaya's first ever municipal council elections in Kuala Lumpur.

This came about in an unexpected way, as the MCA leader, Tan Cheng Lock, had agreed to join Dato Onn's IMP by bringing in the MCA as well, but this did not happen largely due to Onn's abrasive personality which led him frequently to antagonize friends and foes. In the municipal elections at Kuala Lumpur in February 1952, both UMNO and MCA formed an electoral alliance to ensure the defeat of the IMP.<sup>59</sup> The Alliance won nine seats and the IMP two. This successful experiment was repeated in later municipal elections, and in 1952-53 the Alliance won 94 out of 124 seats. This led them to formalize their alliance with a view to contesting the general elections which were due to be held in 1955. In 1954, in anticipation of the forthcoming general elections and in view of the dismal support he had received from

non-Malay individuals and groups, Onn decided to dissolve the IMP and form another party, the Party Negara.

In 1951 the British Government introduced the "Member system" (akin to the Ministerial system) to train unofficial members of the Legislative Council in various responsibilities. They also became spokesmen of the High Commissioner's administration. Selected unofficial members were appointed as Member for home affairs; Member for agriculture and forestry; Member for health; Member for education; Member for lands, mines, and communications; and Member for works and housing. These special Members sat in the Federal Executive Council. Three were Malays, one was a Chinese, one a Ceylonese, and one a European. IMP and UMNO leaders were appointed to these posts. Although Onn had stepped down as UMNO's president, he was appointed Member for Home Affairs, while Dato Thuraisingham was appointed Member for Education, but Tunku Abdul Rahman was not. It is believed that Onn hoped through his role as Member for Home Affairs, he could build up a public following to undermine UMNO and Tunku Abdul Rahman's leadership. But as it soon turned out, Onn's abrasive personality was a serious liability. He began to lose more and more friends, for instance, Tan Cheng Lock who had initially pledged support for the IMP withdrew when he himself came under Onn's criticism. He decided to throw in his lot with UMNO. UMNO's strategy to sow distrust in his party's inconsistent policies was beginning to bear fruits. The UMNO-MCA Alliance proved that the formation of an inter-racial partnership was more successful than Datuk Onn's single non-communal party, the IMP, which attempted to represent members of all communities. The UMNO-MCA Alliance later enlarged its membership to include the Malayan Indian Congress (MIC). The various communities seemed to prefer communal representation to look after their own communal interests.

### Improved Citizenship Terms to Non-Malays

In 1952, given the good work of the Communities Liaison Committee and Onn's strong support, the British authorities in Malaya succeeded in convincing the Malay Rulers to give their assent to the modified citizenship

provisions for non-Malays in the federal constitution. A new Federal citizenship ordinance and nine State Nationality Enactments were introduced in 1952.<sup>60</sup> Under these laws, if a Chinese was born in a Malay state he became automatically a subject of a sultan and was qualified to become a Federal citizen; similarly, if one of his parents had been born anywhere in the Federation, he was also qualified to be a citizen. This brought in a large number of second-generation Chinese.<sup>61</sup> It also enabled several categories of citizens of the United Kingdom and Colonies to become Federal citizens. However, an alien who became a citizen by naturalization or registration was required to renounce his foreign nationality. The MCA, however, demanded that citizenship should be based on *jus soli*, but this was not acceded to. "The only answer which could be made was that the law of 1952 was as much as the Malays could be persuaded to concede after about two and a half years of negotiation, and that Britain was not prepared to compel them to go further", observed Mills.<sup>62</sup> By May 1952, 346,935 aliens had been naturalized, of whom about 300,000 were Chinese. Expressed in total numbers, Malaya's citizens were distributed as follows: about 2,650,000 Malays and Malaysians, 1,100,000 Chinese and 180,000 Indians. The MCA still complained that this left the Chinese in an inferior position in the Malayan Civil Service compared with the Malays. The British authorities agreed in December 1952 that non-Malay Federal citizens would be admitted to the service in the ratio of one to every four Malays appointed, but "this was as large a concession as the British officials could persuade the Malays".<sup>63</sup>

### Alliance Demand for Independence

In 1952 Tunku Abdul Rahman, with the support of UMNO, demanded that Malaya be given independence within three years in response to the IMP's demand within seven years.<sup>64</sup> In March 1953 the leaders of UMNO and MCA announced they had reached agreement on the principle of general elections for the federal legislative council. Attempts were made to reconcile differences between Datuk Onn and Tunku Abdul Rahman, but their meeting proved unsuccessful. According to one source, the former insisted that "the

tri-racial  
party

formula  
✓

inter-racial  
party

gap

✓  
second-generation



Tunku would have to dissolve the Alliance and join his IMP".<sup>65</sup> Soon after this, the UMNO-MCA Alliance demanded the establishment of an Independent Constitutional Commission to inquire into constitutional reforms, aimed apparently at reviewing the 1948 Agreement. Its members were to be composed of eminent jurists from outside Malaya. In February 1954 Onn launched his *Parti Negara*. After the various political parties had aired their proposals on the general elections, the new High Commissioner, General Templer, announced, with the consent of the sultans, that the new Federal Legislative Council would consist of 52 elected and 46 nominated members. Elections would be held early in 1955. The UMNO-MCA Alliance was dissatisfied with an elected majority of only six, and threatened to boycott the elections. It withdrew the threat after the new High Commissioner MacGillivray assured Tunku Abdul Rahman that he would consult with the majority elected party to appoint some five or seven nominated members.<sup>66</sup>

The Alliance under the Tunku's leadership swept to a landslide victory in Malaya's first-ever general elections on 17 July 1955, winning 51 of the 52 seats contested. An example of how much the Tunku had changed from an exclusionary Malay nationalist to a multi-racial nationalist was how he had persuaded his UMNO party to make compromises and to accept the Alliance concept of inter-racial unity. As only a very small proportion of non-Malays had been registered as voters, this first electorate was predominantly Malay. The registered electorate in 1955 comprised approximately 84 per cent Malays, 11 per cent Chinese and less than five per cent Indians. UMNO members, therefore, insisted that the Alliance field 90 per cent Malay candidates, but the Tunku rejected the suggestion. He threatened to resign and got his way. Consequently, the Alliance fielded 35 UMNO, 15 MCA and two Malayan Indian Congress (MIC) candidates in the 52 constituencies. UMNO lost one candidate to the Pan-Malayan Islamic Party (PMIP). The elections represented a test for "UMNO discipline, and the Alliance concept".<sup>67</sup>

However, in their election manifesto, the Alliance had, in fact, recognized that the communists' armed insurrection was pivotal to winning the independence struggle. Aware of the people's need to bring this "war" to a peaceful end, the Alliance had campaigned on a platform of peace and amnesty for the insurgents.<sup>68</sup> This had alarmed the British authorities who

feared that both the nationalists and the communists would do a deal behind their backs. In November 1955, shortly before the talks began, the British Government in London announced that the continuation of the Emergency would not be an obstacle to Malaya's advance towards self-government nor would it be an obstacle to the establishment of a commission to review the constitution, [as demanded by the Alliance] "provided that no concessions are made to the communists during the forthcoming talks which would affect the ability of the Federation Government to keep the internal security position under control".<sup>69</sup>

### Baling Talks: Tunku Secures Trump Card from Chin Peng

Clearly, the British officials feared that the Tunku would make concessions to the communists at the peace talks on the issues relating to the recognition of the CPM, the amnesty terms, and the repeal of the Emergency regulations.<sup>70</sup> The Alliance strategy of offering amnesty to the communists had proved "politically correct". It had stirred the British to hasten the pace of decolonization.

The British officials had, however, underestimated the negotiating skills of the Tunku at the talks which eventually took place at Baling in Kedah state, near the Malay-Thai border, on 28 and 29 December 1955. The Tunku was flanked by David Marshall, the Chief Minister of Singapore, and Sir Cheng Lock Tan, the MCA leader, while facing them at the table were the CPM representatives, Chin Peng, Chen Tian and Rashid Mydin. From the start, they were bogged down over the demand for recognition by the CPM, which was flatly rejected by the Tunku and his team. The Tunku, in fact, challenged the arguments of the communists that they alone were fighting for nationalism and freedom from British imperialism. The Tunku argued that the Alliance was also doing the same and that the electorate had recently endorsed its programme. An exchange followed between the Tunku and Chin Peng, during which Chin Peng made a "voluntary" commitment that the communists would lay down their arms if the Alliance could obtain independence and get the British to transfer internal security and defence powers into its hands. The exchange, according to the official minutes of the meeting, went as follows:

Chin Peng then continued: The present Government, although it is a popularly elected government still is not an independent government.

Mr Marshall: Tell him that we recognize that fully.

Chin Peng: Under such circumstances, therefore, when we bring out our suggestions we have got to have regard to this situation. If those popularly elected Governments of the Federation and Singapore have self-determination in matters concerning internal security and national defence, then all problems could be solved easily. As soon as these two Governments have self-determination in internal security and national defence matters, then we can stop the war immediately.

Tunku: Is that a promise? When I come back from England that is the thing that I am bringing back with me.

Chin Peng: That being the case, we can straightaway stop our hostilities and also disband our armed units.<sup>71</sup>

The implications arising from this communist undertaking were extremely far-reaching. The mass media gave Chin Peng's pledge much publicity. The Tunku, indeed, had obtained a trump card.<sup>72</sup> The British authorities who had been trying to end the Emergency, now discovered that the Tunku had won a promise from the communists. If the British wanted to end the Emergency, they had no choice but to expedite independence and grant him the powers on internal security and national defence, as suggested by the communists.

Soon after the Baling talks, the Tunku led an Alliance delegation to London to discuss independence and constitutional advance for Malaya scheduled to start on 18 January 1956. In view of the widespread publicity on the CPM's conditional offer, the Tunku tried to pre-empt the talks by committing the British Government, stating that it had already agreed to

grant internal security to his government.<sup>73</sup> There was no denial from London, but clearly on the agenda were control of defence, internal security and finance and the future of the public service. At the talks, the British Government was extremely conciliatory and granted most of the Alliance demands, including the achievement of independence, if possible, by 31 August 1957.<sup>74</sup> Both sides agreed that Britain would gradually start transferring the powers of internal security and external defence to the hands of local ministers. A Malayan Minister of Finance would continue to regulate the country's dollar expenditure in general conformity with the policy followed by the sterling area. A Public Service Commission would be set up from 1 July 1957. A compensation scheme for expatriate British civil service staff would be implemented. It was decided that a British judge, Lord Reid, would head the Independent Constitutional Commission with members coming from Canada, India, and Pakistan.<sup>75</sup> The Alliance demand for a team of experienced foreign jurists to draft the Constitution was clearly meant to make its terms as impartial and respectable as possible.

On the matter of the Emergency, although the CPM did not make good its promise to end its struggle and lay down its arms on the achievement of independence in 1957, the party's continued armed struggle had unavoidable consequences for the country's nation-building efforts in the future. Expenditure for defence and internal security would remain high in the national budget, and the national government would justify the continuation of the draconian colonial Emergency laws which infringed fundamental human rights. Under these laws, the government imposed restrictions on freedom of the media and arrested and detained suspected persons with communist leanings indefinitely without trial. Consequently, under the conditions of the Emergency which did not end till 1960, freedom was not fully nurtured. As the communist threat continued until its armed struggle ended in 1989, the national government retained and used its authoritarian powers whenever it felt the "interests of national security and racial harmony" were threatened, despite the democratic trappings of the country's political system.

### Self-Government 1955: The Start of Nation-Building

Thus, in our survey so far, "Malayan nationalism" had come about largely as a result of local compromises among the various communities in response to British efforts to decolonize. They thereby helped to accelerate the pace for Malaya's self-determination and independence, the last a goal which the British Government had repeatedly stressed could not come about without inter-racial unity. When Malaya's independence did come about on 31 August 1957, Tunku Abdul Rahman and the other leaders of the Alliance had already been at the helm of an interim democratically-elected government for about two years. The title of his office was immediately changed from Chief Minister to Prime Minister. Malaya became a full-fledged sovereign state and a member of the United Nations and the Commonwealth.

However, the Alliance Government had already put into place several measures and governmental structures within those crucial two years. Some of the Alliance programmes underwent further changes in the first decade of independence, but a few remained intact and survived well into the 1970s and 1980s. It is necessary to look briefly at a few of these initial policies and measures.

Since the British Government had only initiated nation-building in Malaya in the post-war period, much was left undone. The newly-elected Alliance government had to continue laying the foundations for its future nation-state by adopting a number of measures, the most important of which was the establishment of a system of national schools. The idea of national schools had already been accepted and incorporated into the 1952 Education Ordinance, after the British authorities had considered various studies such as the Barnes Committee on Malay Education and the Fenn-Wu Committee on Chinese education. The Ordinance provided that these national schools would be established with Malay and English as the media of instruction but agreed that the teaching of other vernacular languages would be allowed. However, the Tunku's government felt that the matter needed to be studied further. A multi-racial committee headed by the Minister for Education, Datok Abdul Razak, was appointed with the following terms of reference:

... to examine the present educational policy of the Federation of Malaya and to recommend any alterations or adaptations that are necessary with a view to establishing a national system of education acceptable to the people of the Federation as a whole which will satisfy their needs and promote their cultural, social, economic, and political development as a nation having regard to the intention to make Malay the national language of the country whilst preserving and sustaining the growth of the languages and culture of other communities living in the country.<sup>76</sup>

Although the Razak Education Report was controversial, arousing strong criticisms from leading educationalists of the Chinese community, especially from the United Chinese School Teachers' Association and the All-Malaya Chinese Schools Management Association,<sup>77</sup> the MCA representatives in the Legislative Council endorsed it. They also supported the 1957 Education Ordinance incorporating its provisions when its bill was presented in the Legislative Council. The Ordinance, which incorporated many of the Razak Report's recommendations, outlined the priorities to introduce a single system of national schools for all races. It would bring more Malay children into the secondary schools, and use English and Malay temporarily as the media of instruction, with the view of ultimately elevating Malay as the sole official language and sole medium of instruction. Nevertheless, the Ordinance allowed the vernacular primary schools to continue to teach in the existing media, that is, Standard Primary Malay Schools would be established with Malay as the medium of instruction, while Standard-Type Primary Schools in English, Chinese or Tamil would also be maintained or established. Only for the secondary schools, would there be "one type of National secondary school open to all races by competitive selection and with a common syllabus, a flexible curriculum permitting the study of all Malayan languages and cultures and room for diversity in the media of instruction". Two new secondary school examinations, the Lower Certification of Education and the Federation of Malaya Certificate of Education, were to be available in the two official languages, English and Malay. "It meant that though Chinese secondary schools were permitted",

observed a foreign educationalist, "Chinese was elbowed out in respect of these two important examinations that were based on a common content syllabus".<sup>78</sup> The Chinese secondary schools' struggle for Chinese language to be included within the national educational system would pose a problem in nation-building. They did not press this issue, preferring to put it aside for the time being, arguing that the overall interests of the UMNO-MCA Alliance's need to secure complete self-government and national independence were more important. Chinese education and Chinese language were two issues which would continue to plague racial relations and nation-building in Malaya.

Malaya's first Development Plan covered the period 1950–55. It was aimed at providing social services, eradicating poverty and uplifting the predominantly Malay rural areas. Under the Tunku's Alliance Government, Malaya's first Five-Year Plan (1956–60) was introduced to develop the Malayan economy and to improve the standards of living of the people, in particular those in the rural areas. The Alliance had inherited from the British administration a lop-sided economy. The Malays remained largely in the rural sector, engaged in subsistence economy, and were economically backward, while the other major communities, the Chinese and Indians, were involved in the more thriving activities of the business, plantation and mining sectors. The Alliance partners had recognized that it was their major responsibility to uplift the economic livelihood of the Malays, many of whom lived below the poverty line. The Alliance aim was apparently to work out a political equation between Malay political primacy/Malay economic backwardness and Chinese citizenship/Chinese economic dominance.

### The Social Contract

The best example of Alliance compromises is to be seen in their representations to the Constitutional Commission on what basis the Federation of Malaya was to be established and what its nationality was to be.<sup>79</sup> Given the precedents set up in the Federation of Malaya Agreement of 1948, the terms could not vary much. For UMNO, the trappings of a Malay

state had to be preserved. The Malays had to be given political primacy. On the other hand, for the MCA and the MIC, the terms of citizenship had to become as open and loose as possible to the non-Malays and their rights had to be protected.

The Alliance memorandum to the Reid Constitution had, in fact, agreed to all the features of a Malay state — "special position of the Malays", "Malay as the national language", "Islam as the official religion" and the Malay Rulers as "constitutional monarchs". There were also "Malay land reservations" and "reservation for Malays of a certain proportion of jobs in the civil service". But the controversial questions of citizenship and nationality had been left vague. The MCA had pressed for the principle of *jus soli* for all those born *before, on or after* Malaya's independence, but UMNO's demand was that only those born in the country "*on and after* the declaration of independence" should become nationals of the country. UMNO's demand was accepted by the Reid Constitution.

A vague "common nationality" was propounded in the UMNO-dominated Alliance memorandum to the Reid Constitutional Commission in September 1956:

The constitution should provide for nationality laws that would build a peaceful and stable independent federation, with a contented and unified people whose loyalty is unquestioned and undivided, so that, in due course, the country can take its proper place in the comity of nations. To achieve this end, it is essential to have a nationality law which provides for a *common nationality*, to the exclusion of all others.<sup>80</sup>

In fact, UMNO had suggested the name of "Malaysia" for the new nation-state, but the MCA had preferred the name "Malaya" to be retained. "Federation of Malaya" was instead accepted. Consequently, the future "Malayan" nationality became problematic. Interestingly, the "common nationality" which had been recommended in the Alliance memorandum to the Reid Constitution remained undefined. But by 1963, six years after independence, Malaya was superseded by the formation of Malaysia. The



new name was the one UMNO had originally desired. Thereafter, the evolution of a "Malaysian" nationality became a real possibility.

"Malayan" and "Malaysian" as possible names for its nationality were held out in the comments made by the commission's chairman, Lord Reid, during hearings of the Alliance memorandum. The memorandum had insisted that those persons born in Malacca and Penang after independence would have to become "nationals of Malaysia". If they chose to remain "British subjects" or "citizens of the Commonwealth", to which they were entitled as Malacca and Penang were former British territories, they could no longer remain "nationals of Malaysia". This invited a remark from the commission's chairman, Lord Reid:

There are many people with dual nationality and it does not cause much trouble. *Of course, anybody who is a Federal citizen is, in the eyes of the international law, a Malayan or a Malaysian.* There is no question as to his nationality in international law. It is possible to have two nationalities both within the Commonwealth, or maybe one within and one outside. There are lots of people like that. It does not seem to cause much trouble.<sup>81</sup>

However, in the end, the adopted Constitution made it explicitly clear that dual nationality was not acceptable.

In an overall assessment, it is clear that Britain left some durable and some not so durable legacies in the early years of Malaya's nation-building. Its most important contribution, according to one British historian T.N. Harper, was in community development. "Britain sought to break down the divisions of a plural society, and create an integrated economic and political entity, bound together by a shared allegiance, a common culture and the obligations of active citizenship," says Harper.<sup>82</sup> Britain also did attempt to introduce a system of parliamentary democracy, constitutional monarchy and independence of the judiciary. Over the years, however, constitutional amendments have further eroded some of the foundations of these institutions. Britain tried but failed in creating a multi-racial "Malayan" national identity and a "Malayan" political consciousness. It gave way to the creation of a "Malay" nation-state.

ethnic (race)  
bargain ← historic bargain

On 31 August 1957, a multi-ethnic nationalism, based on the UMNO-MCA-MIC historic bargain, achieved through their own efforts without British intervention, had brought about full self-government and national independence. The first decade and a half of independence had shown that the "historic bargain" had worked well on the basis of compromise, consensus and reciprocity. An American scholar's assessment of the working of the "historic bargain" in 1972 seemed to have been positive:

This political bargain realized great benefits for all parties, in many cases more than the original participants had expected to achieve. The Malays gained political independence, control of government, and a polity which was to be Malay in style and in its system of symbols. In return the Chinese gained more than overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia had dreamed of — equal citizenship, political participation and officeholding, unimpaired economic opportunity, and tolerance for their language, religion and cultural institutions. In the decade and a half since this great bargain was struck the leadership of the major structures of the Alliance has been remarkably stable, notwithstanding costly defections on both sides.<sup>83</sup>

The Indian position may be said to be similar to that of the Chinese described above. But these goals were achieved in the early years of nation-building under Tunku Abdul Rahman's leadership. The bargain has remained the basis of the country's nation-building efforts.

## NOTES

- 1 T.N. Harper, *The End of Empire and the Making of Malaya* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. 309.
- 2 See L.A. Sheridan, "Federation of Malaya Constitution", *University of Malaya Law Review* (Singapore), 1961, [Article 3. (1) on Islam], p. 4; [Article 88 and 89 on Malay reservations], pp. 96-97; [Article 152.1 on national language], p. 140; [Article 153.(1) on special position of the Malays], p. 141.
- 3 See Article 153.(1) of the Federation of Malaya Constitution, in *ibid.*, p. 141.
- 4 Article 152.(1) in *ibid.*, p. 140.
- 5 Article 3.(1), *ibid.*, p. 4.

- 6 Article 152.(3), (4) and (5), *ibid.*, pp. 140–41.
- 7 The preamble of the officially adopted 1957 Federation of Malaya Constitution states: "The Federation shall be known by the name of Persekutuan Tanah Melayu (in English the Federation of Malaya)." *Ibid.*, p. 1. However, the preamble of the draft Constitution of the Federation of Malaya which was proposed by the Reid Constitutional Commission reads: "Malaya shall be a Federation of States and its name shall be the Federation of Malaya, hereinafter called the Federation". See Appendix II of *Report of the Federation of Malaya Constitutional Commission* (Kuala Lumpur: Government Press, February 1957), p. 123. It may be worthwhile to compare it with the preamble of the constitution which was proposed and adopted under the *Federation of Malaya Agreement 1948* which stated that it would "establish under the protection of Great Britain a Federation, to be called Federation of Malaya, and in Malay, Persekutuan Tanah Melayu, which will consist of the nine Malay States and the Settlements of Penang and Malacca."
- 8 See 'Political testament of the Alliance': memorandum by Tunku Abdul Rahman for the Reid Commission. Appendix: 'Fundamental rights', CO889/6, ff219–239, Document 426, in Anthony Stockwell, ed. *Malaya: Part III The Alliance Route to Independence, 1953–1957*, British Documents on the End of Empire, Series B, Vol. 3 (London: HMSO, 1995), p. 307.
- 9 According to one definition, "citizenship is not merely about formal rights, but about participation in social life and therefore contributes to the integration of society. In its most developed form, it is real membership of a real society, based on loyalty to a civilization commonly shared." See J.M. Barbalet, *Citizenship: Rights, Struggle and Class Inequality* (Milton Keynes: Open University Press, 1988), cited in Michael Hill and Lian Kwen Fee, *The Politics of Nation Building and Citizenship in Singapore* (London: Routledge, 1995), p. 30. Nationality, as David Miller explains, however, means something more than citizenship; it means national identity, a collective personality of the nation or a set of features which the citizens, including those who were immigrants, come to share in a public culture. It is not necessary that such features must be shared or displayed in equal measure, but merely constitute a national identity which exercises a pervasive influence on people's behaviour. "A public culture may be seen as a set of understandings about how a group of people is to conduct its life together," says Miller. "This will include political principles such as a belief in democracy or the rule of law, but it reaches more widely than this. It extends to social norms such as honesty in filling your tax return or queuing as a way of deciding who gets on the bus first. It may also embrace certain cultural ideals, for instance religious beliefs or a commitment to preserve the purity of the national language. Its range will vary from case to case, but it will leave room for different private cultures within the nation." For an interesting discussion of the complex nature of national identity, see David Miller, *On Nationality* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), pp. 27–31.
- 10 Harper, *The End of Empire and the Making of Malaya*, p. 350.
- 11 For a study of the wartime and post-war interracial conflicts in Malaya, see Cheah Boon Kheng, *Red Star Over Malaya: Resistance and Social Conflict During and After the Japanese Occupation, 1941–1946* (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 1983).
- 12 *Ibid.*, p. 298.
- 13 *Ibid.*, p. 301.
- 14 See *Report of the Working Committee appointed by a Conference of the Governor of the Malayan Union, The Rulers of the Malay States and the Representatives of the United Malays National Organisation* (Revised up to the 19th of December, 1946) (Kuala Lumpur: Malayan Union Government Press, 1946), p. 9.
- 15 See the objections of Dr Burhanuddin Al-Helmy, the Malay Nationalist Party leader, to the concept of "Malayan" and a "Malayan nationality" in his book, *Falsafah Kebangsaan Melayu*, 1954, reproduced in *Dr Burhanuddin Al-Helmy: Politik Melayu dan Islam*, compiled and edited by Kamaruddin Jaafar (Kuala Lumpur: Yayasan Anda, 1980), pp. 108–109.
- 16 *Ibid.*
- 17 Michael Ardizzone, *A Nation is Born* (London: Forum Books, 1946), p. 34.
- 18 K.J. Ratnam, *Communalism and the Political Process in Malaya* (Singapore: University of Malaya Press, 1967), p. 29.
- 19 See his essay, "Malayan Nationalism", in Wang Gungwu, *Community and Nation: Essays on Southeast Asia and the Chinese* (Singapore: Heinemann, 1981), p. 205.
- 20 See Cheah Boon Kheng, "Asal-Usul dan Asas Nasionalisme Malaya [The Origins and Basis of 'Malaya' Nationalism]", in *Nasionalisme: Satu Tinjauan Sejarah [Nationalism: A Historical Perspective]*, ed. R. Suntharalingam and Abdul Rahman Haji Ismail (Kuala Lumpur: Fajar Bakti, 1985), pp. 81–103; see also Hanapi Dolah, "Nasionalisme Malaya: Satu Versi Yang Defektif", in *Ilmu Masyarakat* 5 (Jan.–June 1984): 71–76.
- 21 See *Report of the Working Committee*, 1946, *op.cit.*, p. 7.
- 22 This was first used by Benedict Anderson in his book, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (London: Verso, 1983), p. 15. Anderson quotes a line from page 5 of Hugh Seton-Watson's *Nations and States: An Inquiry Into the Origins of Nations and the Politics of Nationalism* (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1977) as follows: "All that I can find to say is that a



nation exists when a significant number of people in a community consider themselves to form a nation, or behave as if they formed one." Anderson adds, "We may translate 'consider themselves' as 'imagine themselves'."

- 23 W.R. Roff, *The Origins of Malay Nationalism* (Kuala Lumpur: University of Malaya Press, 1967), pp. 232-33; Angus McIntyre, "The Greater Indonesia Idea of Nationalism in Malaya and Indonesia", *Modern Asian Studies* 7, no. 1 (1973): 75-83; see also Cheah Boon Kheng, "The Japanese Occupation of Malaya, 1941-1945: Ibrahim Yaacob and the Struggle for Indonesia Raya", *Indonesia*, no. 28 (October 1979), pp. 85-120.
- 24 See this interesting definition of nationalism by Anthony D. Smith, "Nations and Their Past", in *Nations and Nationalism* 3, Pt. 3 (November 1986): 359. There are, of course, numerous definitions of nationalism. Another which is extremely pertinent and may be said to be incorporated within Anthony Smith's definition is that by Hans Kohn: "Nationalism is a state of mind, permeating the large majority of a people and claiming to permeate all its members; it recognizes the nation-state as the ideal form of political organization and the nationality as the source of all creative cultural energy and of economic well-being. The supreme loyalty of man is therefore due to his nationality, as his own life is supposedly rooted in and made possible by its welfare." See Hans Kohn, *The Idea of Nationalism* (Toronto: Collier Books, [first published 1944 and since revised several times], 1969), p. 16. See his reiteration in Hans Kohn, *Nationalism: Its Meaning and History* (New York: Van Nostrand, 1965), p. 10. Throughout this work, when I use the term "nationalism" its meanings will incorporate those ideas which have been defined by both Smith and Kohn.
- 25 T.H. Silcock and Ungku Abdul Aziz, "Nationalism in Malaya", in *Asian Nationalism and the West*, ed. W.L. Holland (New York: Macmillan, 1953), p. 330.
- 26 Lennox A. Mills, *Malaya: A Political and Economic Appraisal* (Westport, Conn.: 1973), Greenwood Press, p. viii. The "non-communal party" was the multi-racial Independence of Malaya Party led by Dato Onn Jaafar.
- 27 Wang Gungwu, "Malayan Nationalism", p. 205.
- 28 Jan M. Pluvier, "Malayan Nationalism: A Myth", *Journal of the Historical Society, University of Malaya*, 1967/68, pp. 26-40.
- 29 J.P. Ongkili, "Perkembangan Nasionalisme", *Jebat* I (1971/1972), pp. 24-43; J.P. Ongkili, "The British and Malayan Nationalism, 1946-1957", *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies* V, no. 2 (September 1974); and also James P. Ongkili, *Nation-building in Malaysia, 1946-1974* (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1985), p. 89.
- 30 Hill and Lian, *The Politics of Nation Building*, p. 58.
- 31 See file "Malayan Press Comment on the White Paper on the Malayan Union", March 1946, in SCA 26/46, CC1/2, Malayan Union, Arkib Negara Malaysia.

- 32 Mills, *Malaya: A Political and Economic Appraisal*, p. 36.
- 33 For an excellent account of this Pro-Consular campaign, see James de V. Allen, *The Malayan Union*, Monograph No. 10, Southeast Asian Studies Council (New Haven: Yale University, 1967).
- 34 Ratnam, *Communalism and the Political Process in Malaya*, p. 75.
- 35 See Cheah Boon Kheng, "The Erosion of Ideological Hegemony and Royal Power and the Rise of Postwar Malay Nationalism, 1945-46", *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies* XIX, no. 1 (March 1988): 25-26.
- 36 Here we may quote Hans Kohn: "It is this will which we call nationalism, a state of mind inspiring the large majority of a people and claiming to inspire all its members. It asserts that the nation-state is the ideal and the only legitimate form of political organization and that the nationality is the source of all cultural creative energy and of economic well-being." See Hans Kohn, *Nationalism: Its Meaning and History*, p. 10.
- 37 Allen, *The Malayan Union*, p. 42.
- 38 See Benjamin Batson, *The End of Absolute Monarchy in Siam* (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1984), pp. 236-64. See also Cheah Boon Kheng, "The Erosion of Ideological Hegemony and Royal Power and the Rise of Postwar Malay Nationalism", pp. 4-5.
- 39 Ratnam, *Communalism and the Political Process in Malaya*, p. 29.
- 40 Hill and Lian, *The Politics of Nation Building*, pp. 58-59.
- 41 Ratnam, *Communalism and the Political Process in Malaya*, p. 83.
- 42 *Ibid.*
- 43 Discussed in Yeo Kim Wah, "The Anti-Federation Movement in Malaya, 1946-1948", *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies* 4, no. 1 (1973): 31-51.
- 44 Hill and Lian, *The Politics of Nation Building*, p. 46. The cited work by J. Nagata is entitled, "In Defence of Ethnic Boundaries: The Changing Myths and Charters of Malay Identity", in *Ethnic Change*, ed. C. Keyes (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1981).
- 45 Cheah Boon Kheng, "Malayan Chinese and the Citizenship Issue, 1945-1948", *Review of Indonesian and Malayan Affairs* 12, no. 2 (December 1978): 1-25.
- 46 See *Report of the Working Committee, Constitutional Proposals for Malaya* (Kuala Lumpur: Malayan Union Government Press, 1946), p. 6.
- 47 Tunku Abdul Rahman Putra, *Lest We Forget: Further Candid Reminiscences* (Singapore: Eastern Universities Press, 1983), p. 34.
- 48 See R.T. McVey, *The Calcutta Conference and the Southeast Asian Uprisings* (Ithaca: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1958).
- 49 See letter from Sir H. Gurney to J.J. Paskin on a variety of recent developments, in CO537/4741, no. 78, 2 December 1949, and letter from Mr Creech Jones to Sir H. Gurney (Policy Towards the Chinese community), in CO537/4741, no.

76, 5 Dec. 1949, in Stockwell, *op.cit.*, *Malaya: Part II The Communist Insurrection, 1948–1953*, pp. 187–92.

- 50 A British Colonial Office document, commenting on the committee's work, states: "Mr Macdonald is optimistic at the progress made in the [Communities Liaison] Committee, and feels that it is on the way to solving the fundamental political problems of Malaya. He has found that the men whose names count most in Malaya have been able to agree on matters where two years ago they would have disagreed, even if they had been prepared to sit around the same table for discussion." See CO brief for D.R. Rees-Williams, Parliamentary Under-secretary of state, CO, for his tour of Hong Kong, Singapore and Malaya, Oct.–Nov. 1949, in CO967/84, no. 70, in Stockwell, *ibid.*, p. 157.
- 51 See Ramlah Adam, *Dato Onn Jaafar: Pengasas Kemerdekaan* (Kuala Lumpur: Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka, 1992), p. 182.
- 52 *Ibid.*, p. 204.
- 53 See *ibid.*, pp. 192–96, for details on the second UMNO crisis over Onn's leadership.
- 54 In a letter to Datuk Onn, MacDonald said: "The point is that I think there would be immense advantage if you retained your Presidency of UMNO at the same time as you form and lead the new party [IMP]. I know that in some ways this would be troublesome and add to your already tremendous burdens of work, but I believe it may be a real mistake if you abandon the leadership and guidance of UMNO." Cited in Pamela Ong Siew Imm, *One Man's Will: A Portrait of Dato' Sir Onn bin Jaafar*, published by author (Penang, 1998), p. 204.
- 55 MacDonald's admiration for Onn is clearly stated in a letter to the British Minister of Colonial Affairs, Creech-Jones as follows: "Without question he is the outstanding Malay leader, with qualities of courage, constructive thought and action, and statesmanship which command attention. At the same time, he is a person of considerable attraction and charm, and I am only one of many Europeans who feel affection as well as admiration for him." Cited in *ibid.*, p. 166.
- 56 See the three volumes of the C.O. 537 and other secret and confidential records compiled and edited by Anthony Stockwell, *ibid.*
- 57 Harper, *The End of Empire and the Making of Malaya*, p. 322.
- 58 The Tunku recalls these years in two chapters, "The Day I Was Vindicated", pp. 88–93, and "The Alliance That Led to Independence", pp. 94–100, in his book of memoirs, *Lest We Forget, op.cit.*
- 59 According to T.H. Tan, one of the founding members of the Alliance, the initiative for co-operation was undertaken by Ong Yoke Lin and Datuk Yahaya bin Abdul Razak, both of Kuala Lumpur, who were former school friends. This

led to a formal meeting between UMNO and the MCA, under the chairmanship of Col. (Later Tun) Henry H.S. Lee. The idea was later endorsed by both the Tunku and Tan Cheng Lock, the MCA president. See T.H. Tan, *The Prince and I* (Singapore: Mini Media, 1979), pp. 25–26.

- 60 Ratnam, *Communalism and the Political Process in Malaya*, p. 86.
- 61 Lennox Mills, *Malaya: A Political and Economic Appraisal*, pp. 81–82.
- 62 *Ibid.*, p. 83.
- 63 *Ibid.*, p. 84.
- 64 On the IMP's demand, the British High Commissioner, Sir Henry Gurney, in a note to the Colonial Office in London, dated 22 June 1951, said: "Onn told me that Press reports of his first statement referring to independence in 7 years were incorrect, but he had not contradicted them because that might have made the situation worse." Cited in Stockwell, *op.cit.*, p. 295.
- 65 T.H. Tan, *The Prince and I*, p. 28.
- 66 *Ibid.*, pp. 97–98.
- 67 Diane K. Mauzy, *Barisan Nasional: Coalition Government in Malaysia* (Kuala Lumpur: Maricans, 1983), p. 26.
- 68 According to Chin Peng, former secretary-general of the CPM, the party's cadres had been urged to support and campaign for the Alliance candidates in the general elections. "We wanted the party to win because its programme of amnesty was most favourable to us," he said in an interview with this author in February 1999 after a workshop on the writing of his memoirs at the Australian National University in Canberra.
- 69 See "Federation of Malaya: minute no PM (55) by Mr Lennox-Boyd to Sir A Eden on the forthcoming talks between Tunku Abdul Rahman and Chin Peng", 31 Oct. 1955, FO371/116941, no 77, in Document No 381 in Stockwell, *ibid.*, Vol. 3, pp. 192–93.
- 70 It was debated among British officials in London and Malaya whether to put all their fears in writing to the Tunku, but finally the idea was rejected for fear it would create an "atmosphere of distrust" and "impel him to go up to and beyond the limits set simply in order to avoid being called a British stooge." See file 'Meeting between Tunku Abdul Rahman and Chin Peng: inward telegram no. 691 from Sir D MacGillivray to Mr Lennox Boyd,' dated 8 Nov. 1955, in FO 371/116941, no 80, in Document 382, in Stockwell, *ibid.*, pp. 193–95. See also MacGillivray's decision not to put these points in writing to the Tunku before the meeting took place, in CO1030/27, no 10, "Meeting between Tunku Abdul Rahman and Chin Peng: letter from Sir D MacGillivray to Sir J Martin," 1 Dec. 1955, in Document 385, Stockwell, *ibid.*, pp. 199–201.
- 71 "Report of the chief minister of the Federation of Malaya on the Baling Talks":

draft summary by Tunku Abdul Rahman on the verbatim record, 29 Dec. 1955, in CO1030/30, ff3-16, in Stockwell, *op.cit.*, *Malaya: Part III The Alliance Route to Independence, 1953-1957*, p. 224.

- 72 When asked whether he had voluntarily made the concession or been trapped into doing it, Chin Peng said: "No, we were not trapped. We really desired the Tunku to gain independence because we wanted to end colonial rule quickly. We felt we could strengthen his bargaining position with London. The other matters could be taken up later with the Tunku." Interview with Chin Peng, Jan. 1999.
- 73 A report by the British High Commissioner, Sir Donald MacGillivray, to the Colonial Office, dated 9 Jan. 1956, said: "During the 24 hours before leaving Kuala Lumpur, Abdul Rahman twice stated publicly that Her Majesty's Government had already agreed in principle that the Elected Ministers should be responsible for internal security and that the Alliance was going to London merely to work out the details. He must be aware that this advance was not being achieved on account of Chin Peng's conditional offer but had been obtained by the Alliance before the Chin Peng meeting took place. He would not wish it to appear that he was beholden to the Communists for this achievement or to allow them to get a measure of credit for it." See Stockwell, *op.cit.*, Part III, "The Alliance Route to Independence, 1953-1957", p. 242.
- 74 In fact, in a paper drawn up for the British negotiating team, the view was put across that Britain needed to meet Alliance demands for self-government and independence as much as possible: "...I see no effective counter to the answering argument that a determined Malayan Government with full responsibility for their own internal affairs could deal more successfully with the Communists than a 'Colonial' regime running a country anxious to be rid of it....The indications are that, if we accept the Alliance view on this, we shall be able to secure satisfactory agreements on defence and the other issues of particular concern to us...." See the Minister for Colonial Affairs, Lennox Boyd, to the British Cabinet Colonial Policy Committee.
- 75 See "Federation of Malaya": Cabinet Memorandum by Mr Lennox Boyd on the constitutional conference. Annex C: "Notes on the main conclusions and recommendations of the conference", CAB 129/79, CP (56)47, 21 February 1956, in Stockwell, *Part III: The Alliance Route to Independence, 1953-1957*, pp. 260-65.
- 76 *Report of the Education Committee, 1956* (Kuala Lumpur: Government Printing Office, 1956). Preamble, p. 1.
- 77 For a good account of the Chinese educationalists' struggle, see Tan Liok Ee, *The Politics of Chinese Education, 1945-1957* (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1997).

- 78 J.E. Jayasuriya, *Dynamics of Nation-Building in Malaysia* (Colombo: Associated Educational Publishers, 1983), p. 70.
- 79 See "Political Testament of the Alliance": memorandum by Tunku Abdul Rahman for the Reid Commission. Appendix: "Fundamental rights", 25 Sept. 1956, in CO889/ff.219-239, in *ibid.*, pp. 307-17.
- 80 *Ibid.*, p. 312.
- 81 See "Constitutional Commission and the Alliance Submission: transcript," 27 Sept. 1956, in CO889/6, ff281-290, in Stockwell, *ibid.*, p. 319. Emphasis added.
- 82 Harper, *The End of Empire and the Making of Malaya*, p. 358.
- 83 Milton J. Esman, *Administration and Development in Malaysia* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1972), pp. 25-26.

## CHAPTER TWO

### 1957–2001 The “Bargain” and Contesting Nationalisms

*More potent than state nationalism in Sabah and Sarawak was the growth of communalism, in the sense that communal sentiments were becoming more prominent and communal groups becoming larger and more inclusive.*

Milne and Ratnam, *Malaysia: New States in a New Nation*, p. 61

*Sabah and Sarawak are multiethnic societies but due to the different ethnic patterns prevailing there, their electoral politics have unfolded quite differently from that in the Peninsula ..... With the demise, at least temporarily, of the non-Muslim Bumiputera ethno-nationalist movements in the early 1990s, reconfiguration of the political process seems underway, perhaps towards a political system more clearly dominated by the Muslim Bumiputera, as in the case of the Peninsula.*

Francis Loh Kok Wah, “Understanding Politics in Sabah and Sarawak: An Overview”, *Kajian Malaysia* XV (1997): 12

---

**M**ALAY POLITICAL primacy has always been a matter of perception. During the 1957–63 period, it seemed like an illusion. As peninsular Malaya’s population was slightly still predominantly non-Malay, the UMNO-led Alliance leaders attempted to project the image of Malaya as one belonging to all citizens. They had put little emphasis on the creation of an integrated new society. They could not decide what to call it. Every effort



was made to avoid endangering communal harmony and straining constitutional democracy. These were the early fragile years of a newly-independent state.

Malay political supremacy was, therefore, not openly stated or touted. As Diane Mauzy has observed, even UMNO's dominance within the Alliance was not overtly stressed: "The MCA and MIC combined did not have the electoral weight, the unity, the support, or the historical precedents to be exact political equals with UMNO. This fact was obscured, however, because for years the dominance of UMNO was masked, though at times not altogether convincingly, under the façade of an equal partnership. UMNO's supremacy was understood by its partners, but the MCA and the UMNO top élite did not want any obvious public demonstration of this fact. The lower echelon officials, however, were often not so sensitive to this point."<sup>1</sup>

Malay poverty, Malay special rights, Malay quotas in the civil service, and Malay as one of the two official languages (the other being English), did give the impression that the Malays were being treated as a "special" people who needed a lot of government assistance. Economically weak, the Malays lagged behind the other races in education, commerce and finance, and seemed unable to compete with the other races. Although Malay Sultans were the sovereign rulers of nine Malay states, they did not have executive power; they appeared merely as symbolic heads of state. Malaya's Prime Minister was a Malay. Malays outnumbered non-Malays in the Cabinet, in the armed forces and in the police. But there were Chinese Cabinet Ministers and an Indian Cabinet Minister, and most of the top civil service posts were still held by non-Malays. The image of the country did not appear, therefore, as one of Malay political supremacy, but of power-sharing among the races.

Most Malays were acutely conscious of this illusion constructed by the Government. For this reason, Malay nationalists had urged the UMNO-led Alliance Government to adopt Malay as the National Language immediately and start making Malay political dominance a reality. Until the National Language Act was introduced in 1967, this issue alone gave the Malay nationalist movement the excuse to begin demanding that the Government demonstrate that Malaya was a "Malay country". Leading this agitation

were the "language nationalists", especially the Malay schoolteachers and academics, Malay writers and Malay journalists as well as the PMIP, which adopted a very high nationalistic profile in 1962 by its attempts to put on record in the Constitution that Malaya belongs to the Malays. The PMIP, which later became known as PAS, was at this time led by an ethno-centric Malay leadership, which advocated a Muslim-Malay nation-state. UMNO itself had been committed to the slogan "Malaya for the Malays", but for the sake of independence had agreed to a mixed government by different ethnic groups rather than by the Malays alone. It was not long before the Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman had felt the need to acknowledge Malay ethno-centric sentiments by describing them as the original inhabitants of Malaya or *bumiputra* (literally "sons of the soil"), over non-Malay opposition.

Although the Constitution safeguarded Malay rights, the Malay nationalists were still unsure what this meant. Their "Make Malay the National Language" campaigns began to cast a powerful shadow over society and politics. As Malaya was a racially-divided country, race and politics were a heady mix. The Malay nationalist movement's demands made it clear to the non-Malays that Malay political supremacy was not yet a political reality, but might soon very well be. Malay nationalist demands were countered by non-Malay demands for immediate equality of civic rights.

The "historic bargain" was initially regarded only as a compromise to accommodate the interests of the ethnic groups in government policies, but after the 13 May 1969 riots it was elevated to a binding and cast-iron "social contract" which became sacrosanct to control or prevent communal differences. During this interval there were frequent attempts by members of the UMNO-MCA-MIC Alliance or those of the opposition parties to change the terms of the bargain and extend its parameters. This was a period of the "politics of accommodation". The Tunku was a moderating influence on the Malay nationalists. He would restrain them or urge them to agree to the concessions that he had made to the non-Malays under the pretext that the Malays already possessed political primacy. British scholar J.M. Gullick, writing in 1967, praised the Tunku's "gift for compromise and

→ process  
of making  
malay-  
dominated  
nation

historic  
bargain

1967

National Language Act

conciliation" and said his influence was largely a matter of personality.<sup>2</sup> But before long, the Tunku could no longer play this role, himself becoming a target of communal politics.

### Rise of Communalism

Based on the experiences of the Alliance and opposition parties, studies revealed that communal/religious parties were more successful than non-communal parties in winning popular support in Malaya during this period. In the case of the Alliance, political scientist K.J. Ratnam's study of communalism, published in 1965, showed that the Alliance parties could not sustain the Alliance if they continued to remain communal themselves. Yet, when they acted as an inter-communal partnership, by making mutual concessions and adopting common policies, their popular support declined. Because they did not act constantly as communal organizations, their supporters felt that they had failed to represent their respective communal interests effectively. This contributed "very substantially" in a shift of increased public support to communal parties during the 1959 elections.<sup>3</sup>

Another study, done by political scientist R.K. Vasil, published in 1971, showed that Malays were not keen to join non-communal parties. As a result, non-communal parties, especially those based on the socialist ideology, did not get enough popular Malay support. These parties turned into essentially non-Malay parties, "in terms of leadership and rank and file, though not necessarily, initially, in terms of policy and programme, and thus made them even more unattractive to the Malays", who felt they were not specially committed to safeguard the interests of their Malay community. Over the years, the leaders of these non-communal parties succumbed to the pressures of their own members. They were unable to stop their parties from championing mainly the cause of the non-Malays.<sup>4</sup> The left-wing parties had on occasion been vehement critics of Malay special rights entrenched in the constitution. This may perhaps explain their success in securing 13 parliamentary seats in and around the predominantly non-Malay and urban centres of Penang, Ipoh and Kuala Lumpur in the 1959 general elections. On the other hand, the Alliance still managed to poll over

half the total votes cast and won 73 out of the total of 104 seats. The Malay nationalists in the PMIP/Party Negara won 14 seats all in the east coast states of Kelantan and Terengganu.

Parliamentary democracy had worked justly and with some success, but the Federation faced grave problems in this period. In 1959 the unresolved problem of the further assimilation of the Chinese schools to the rest of the educational system had caused friction within the Alliance coalition, between the UMNO and the MCA, and also, outside the Alliance, between the MCA and the Chinese school management committees and the Chinese school teachers. Due to the forthcoming 1959 general elections, it was agreed by the Alliance coalition that the policy on Chinese schools would be reviewed after the polls. Another problem that threatened to split the Alliance was the internal conflict over the allocation of constituencies between the parties for the 1959 elections. The issue was resolved only after the "militants" in the MCA who had asked for more MCA candidates were expelled and the MCA's "moderates" who had taken over the party's leadership had accepted the formula devised by the Tunku. The Alliance victory in the polls was largely due to its success in ensuring communal harmony and achieving economic prosperity after independence.

### The Bargain's First Serious Challenge, 1963–65

It was during Singapore's membership of Malaysia, from September 1963 until its departure in August 1965, that the first serious challenge to the Alliance's "historic bargain" took place. Many points of disagreement had developed between the Singapore Government and the Federal Government. The most serious had centred largely around party policy and leadership differences between the Alliance and the ruling People's Action Party (PAP) of Singapore. Other contentious issues related to interpretations of the Malaysia Agreement with regard to finance, revenue sharing and a common market. Both the Alliance and the PAP also adopted different approaches to communalism. The former did not believe in an open discussion of communal issues, while the other considered that communal issues could be discussed rationally.



Relations began to deteriorate further when the PAP leader, Lee Kuan Yew, criticized the Tunku and his UMNO colleagues for not giving up their policy of total Malay dominance in Malaysia for a more balanced position between the races.<sup>5</sup> Although he was careful not to attack the Malays' special rights, or Malay as the official language, he did question the basis of Malay rule. His calls for an equality of status between Malays and non-Malays, or what he termed "Malaysian Malaysia" did not go down well with UMNO's leaders and even with MCA leaders like Tun Tan Siew Sin, who felt he was "rocking the boat". The "historic bargain" had been based on the assumption of Malay supremacy in the government and administration of the country as a counter-weight to Chinese economic and commercial power. But the PAP refused to accept this.

Lee attacked the "ultras" (extremists in UMNO) and the Malay newspaper *Utusan Melayu* for attempting to foster Malay dominance over Malaysia. He argued for a re-alignment of forces between those who wanted a "Malaysian nation" and those "who preferred a communally segregated nation dominated by one of the constituent parts".<sup>6</sup> The PAP next joined with two parties in peninsular Malaysia, the United Democratic Party led by Dr Lim Chong Eu and the People's Progressive Party of Ipoh under the Seenivasagam brothers, and two in Sarawak, the Sarawak United People's Party (SUPP) and MACHINDA, to form the Malaysian Solidarity Convention, to campaign for "Malaysian Malaysia" in 1964. In the same year, tensions rose over racial issues and race riots occurred in Singapore in July and September. The causes were attributed to alleged Malay dissatisfaction with PAP rule and to the heat generated by the Alliance-PAP conflicts. Feelings had been heightened by the Alliance's earlier participation in Singapore's general elections in September 1963, and, in turn, by the PAP's later participation in Malaya's general elections in 1964.

Later, Alliance leaders like Malaysian Deputy Prime Minister Tun Razak replied to Lee's arguments by stating that although they, too, subscribed to a concept of a "Malaysian Malaysia", their approach was different from that of the PAP leaders. The Malay "ultras" called on the Alliance leaders to arrest and detain Lee for making allegedly seditious remarks against Malay-dominated rule in Malaysia. These events led the Tunku to conclude that

Singapore's presence in Malaysia had become untenable and the political crisis had reached a point beyond his control. He took the decision, which was approved by his Cabinet and the Malaysian Parliament, to expel Singapore from Malaysia on 9 August 1965. The PAP's struggle for "Malaysian Malaysia" is still continued in Malaysia by the DAP, generally regarded as its off-shoot, although the latter has distanced itself from the PAP and its policies in Singapore.

### Nation-Building in Sarawak and Sabah, 1963–2000

Since independence in 1957, the informal UMNO-MCA-MIC "historic bargain" had been the basis for establishing national integration and racial harmony in peninsular Malaya. But with the formation of Malaysia in 1963 the application of this "bargain" to Sarawak, Sabah and Singapore had become rather problematic. These states had joined the federation on their own special terms, and not on the basis of Malaya's "historic bargain". Those terms not only tended to protect their state rights and their own specific *bumiputra* status, but also engendered conflict between building loyalties at state level and at national level. Sarawak and Sabah versions of *bumiputra*-ism fostered their own state nationalisms and contested Malay *bumiputra*-ism from peninsular Malaysia. While UMNO attempted to influence and unify the indigenous *bumiputra* in Sarawak and Sabah within, the ambit of its policy of Malay political primacy, its efforts were being resisted. In fact, after Malaysia was formed, the various ethnic communities became more conscious of their need to reinforce communal unity and saw themselves more and more as communal groups.

Whenever Sarawak or Sabah raised criticisms towards federal government policy affecting their respective ethnic communities or state rights, the contribution to Malaysian nation building might have been negative, said Milne and Ratnam, both political scientists, adding,<sup>7</sup> "Viewed from Kuala Lumpur, the conversion of Kenyahs and Punans in Sarawak to Islam could be seen as promoting nation-building. However, in Sarawak such conversions could be regarded as splitting ethnic groups which had already acquired a group identity." Singapore's challenge to ethnic Malay rule, too,

had aroused Singapore nationalism and created divisiveness rather than national unity.

Because of the initial reluctance of Sarawak and Sabah to join Malaysia, and also due to strong opposition by the left-wing labour and political movement in Singapore to the idea, concessions had to be made on the part of Malaya to these three territories. Malaya had found the Malaysia proposal (originally proposed by Britain, then adopted by Malaya's Tunku Abdul Rahman) attractive because the Borneo territories, with a predominantly non-Chinese population, would in some sense help to balance, or offset, a union between Malaya and predominantly-Chinese Singapore. By joining an enlarged federation of Malaysia, the Borneo territories would achieve independence from colonial rule and be "partners of equal status" with Malaya. But Malaya had no intention to replace one form of colonialism with another, Malaya's Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman assured Malaya's Parliament on 28 April 1962.

The Borneo States were, therefore, given a wide variety of privileges and benefits, while Singapore was given safeguards in the areas of education and labour. Initially, none of the leaders of these three territories objected to the political dominance of Malaya's ruling national leadership of UMNO-MCA-MIC. Nor did they object to the terms of the "historic bargain", or to its constitutional contract, as embodied in Malaya's Constitution. They had separately negotiated for, and finally agreed to, the additional safeguards respectively for Sarawak, Sabah and Singapore. "It was decided," observed political scientists Milne and Mauzy, "that Malaysia should be brought about by amendment to the existing Constitution of Malaya rather than by the adoption of a new Constitution."<sup>8</sup> When Malaya had reached agreement with the leaders of the other three states, and with the British, its government amended the Constitution accordingly by passing the Malaysia Act (1963). Malaya's Parliament also passed an Immigration Act which restricted entry to North Borneo (Sabah) and Sarawak, as demanded by these two states. Although such restrictions did not foster national integration, the founding fathers of Malaysia agreed it was a temporary measure to safeguard Sabah and Sarawak's interests. After Malaysia was formed, Malaya's relationships

with Sarawak & Sabah appeared more harmonious than those with Singapore, largely because Singapore's ruling People's Action Party (PAP) leaders continued to be excluded from the UMNO-MCA-MIC Federal Government. It was this factor that caused the PAP leaders to voice dissatisfaction with the "historic bargain", and later to challenge its terms.

Singapore's departure was nearly followed by Sarawak and Sabah. But secession was nipped in the bud by tough action on the part of the Federal Government's leaders. With Singapore out of Malaysia, attempts have been made to extend the "bargain" to both Sarawak and Sabah, but there have been occasional objections and resistance. According to Milne and Mauzy, it had been made plain by Federal Government leaders that, socially as well as politically, the policy of integration assumed a "native", that is, a Malay, base. "It has been well said", they added, "that Malayan [now Malaysian] nationalism" consists of two parts, 'a nucleus of Malay nationalism enclosed by the idea of a Malay-Chinese-Indian partnership'. Since the formation of Malaysia, this outer ring would include contributions from Sarawak and Sabah."<sup>9</sup> But the various indigenous communities in Sarawak and Sabah have not necessarily accepted such a Malay base.

Although Singapore had questioned Malay dominance, it had accepted two aspects of the constitutional contract — Malay special rights and the Malay language as the national language of Malaya. In fact, most of the island's political leaders had previously inculcated a sense of nationhood, based on the merger of Singapore and the Federation of Malaya. Such a union, they believed, would bring about a united nation, a United Malaya, comprising Malays, Chinese and Indians and other races with kinship and cultural ties in both territories. This merger goal appeared in the manifesto of most political parties in Singapore until 1963. In 1959 the PAP Government of Singapore adopted Malay as an official language and even had its state anthem in Malay, *Majulah Singapura* (Long Live Singapore). But Malay nationalists in Malaya had refused to accept a merger with Singapore because the total Chinese population in Malaya would then outnumber the Malays in the country. It was only with the inclusion of the Borneo territories whose "indigenous natives" were regarded as "brothers" by Malays in

Malaya, and the communist threat in Singapore that Malaya's Prime Minister, Tunku Abdul Rahman, accepted Singapore in Malaysia. This is more fully discussed in Chapter III, which deals with the Tunku's period of administration.

Sarawak and Sabah had obtained special guarantees in the Malaysia Agreement with regard to the following items: language; education; qualification to be Head of State; ethnic composition of the civil service; citizenship; religion; native privileges; immigration; and representation in the Federal Parliament. Sabah especially presented a list which has become known as the "Twenty Points", which was accepted by Malaya and included special rights for the "natives" including the "Sino-Kadazans", "Borneonization" of the public services and "appropriate representation" to offset its smaller population in Parliament.<sup>10</sup> Non-implementation of some of these "Twenty-Points" by the Federal Government would be a bone of contention between the Sabah state government and the Federal Government. The present Constitution of Malaysia contains lists of state powers and concurrent powers which belong only to the two Borneo states. Sabah was given a special grant, while both states were given additional sources of revenue. Special safeguards included immigration controls to prevent citizens from peninsular Malaysia moving to live in Sarawak and Sabah or to take up jobs in these two territories. The Malaysia Act allowed both territories to use the English language as an official language until 1973, although in Malaya the Malay language had become the national language in 1967 and been enforced since 1970. Sarawak was given 16 seats in the Malaysian Parliament and Sabah 24, while Singapore was only offered 15. The present total parliamentary representation for Sarawak and Sabah has risen to 44 following the re-delineation of electoral boundaries in the two states and the increase of the number of seats in Parliament.

From the formation of Malaysia until 1974, the Alliance parties had ruled these two states. Later, the parties were replaced by components of the Barisan Nasional coalition (which replaced the tripartite Alliance Party in 1974). Their ability to capture all or almost all the 44 seats in the two states in national elections has enabled the UMNO-led BN to retain a two-

thirds majority of seats in Parliament and form the Federal Government. This two-thirds majority enables them to change the Constitution, whenever necessary. For UMNO leaders, the inclusion of Sarawak and Sabah has been fortuitous, for it has enabled them to remain in power, prolong the terms of the "historic bargain" and promote Malay political primacy.

On the other hand, Opposition parties in peninsular Malaysia have failed to make headway in the two Borneo territories. UMNO has now established itself firmly in Sabah, but not yet made any inroads into Sarawak, due to the opposition of the BN component parties there. The DAP had been able to capture one or two parliamentary or state seats in Sarawak, but has made no headway in Sabah. It is largely due to UMNO's political skill and experience in establishing alliances with BN component parties in the two states that has allowed it to obtain their crucial combined 44 parliamentary seats to rule Malaysia.

The UMNO-led federal government has used various means such as ministerial contacts, federal-state party relations, civil service contacts, development projects, language and education policies, and financial and economic arrangements to strengthen federalism and national integration in the two territories.<sup>11</sup> The occasional appointment of state representatives to the Federal Government posts of Minister of Sarawak Affairs and Minister of Sabah Affairs in the early years of Malaysia<sup>12</sup> had also involved them directly in decision-making at the Federal Cabinet level. However, difficulties between the states and the centre have taken place. In the Sabah crisis of 1964 and the Sarawak crises of 1965 and 1966 the combined governmental-party influence of the federal Alliance government had prevailed. Recalcitrant Chief Ministers of Sarawak and Sabah were removed. Although the crises were resolved, they fomented state nationalisms.

### State Nationalism vs. Malaysian Nationalism

Sarawak nationalism and Sabah nationalism emerged in the respective state's struggles with the Federal Government over state rights. Their political and constitutional disputes have sometimes been seen in terms of "rival nationalisms", i.e., ethnic state nationalism versus Malaysian nationalism.

Ethnic state nationalism in Sarawak was seen in the rise of Iban nationalism, and in Sabah, Kadazandusun nationalism.<sup>13</sup> In 1965 Sabah nationalism erupted when its Kadazandusun Chief Minister, Datuk Donald Stephens, was removed for raising the question of a re-examination of the "Twenty-Points" between Sabah and the Federal Government in the light of Singapore's departure from the federation. Sarawak nationalism was aroused during the 1966 constitutional crisis when the Iban Chief Minister Datuk Stephen Kalong Ningkan was removed by the State Governor, under Federal Government pressure, for campaigning for state rights following the exit of Singapore.

Unlike Sabah nationalism, a certain degree of national consciousness had already existed in Sarawak before the formation of Malaysia in 1963. Ethnic awareness of the Ibans during Brooke rule before 1941 was already formed, and Sarawak Malays owed strong loyalty to the Brookes. In 1949 Malay nationalists who opposed the cession of Sarawak by the last Brooke ruler to the British Government assassinated the British Governor, Duncan Stewart.<sup>14</sup> The first two Chief Ministers of Sarawak after the formation of Malaysia were Ibans, Datuk Kalong Ningkan (1963–66) and Penghulu Tawi Sli (1966–70). "Casting himself in the role of the Sarawak nationalist fighting the Malay hegemony of Kuala Lumpur, Ningkan won considerable sympathy and support particularly from the Iban and Chinese communities," says one source.<sup>15</sup>

Although the Ibans constitute the majority ethnic group in Sarawak, they are politically disunited, weak and present the image of being a disadvantaged minority. Due to divisions within the non-Muslim Iban community and to political alliances between Malays and Muslim *bumiputra* (Melanau) and Chinese parties, the office of Chief Minister has since fallen to Sarawak Melanau, first to Datuk Abdul Rahman Yaakub and, now to his nephew Datuk Mahmud Taib. In the "check and balance" political system in Sarawak which now forms the basis of power-sharing, the State Government has come under the dominance of the Malay/Melanau party, the Pesaka Bumiputera Bersatu (PBB). This suits the UMNO-led Federal Government fine, as it ensures Malay political primacy in Sarawak.

However, the Chinese party, the Sarawak United People's Party (SUPP), is the power broker whose support is needed by the other two groups — the Malays/Melanaus and the Ibans, represented by the Sarawak National Party and the Parti Bangsa Dayak Sarawak. Initially the SUPP preferred to ally itself with the former.<sup>16</sup> These parties are now component parties of the BN whose national leaders in Kuala Lumpur are quite happy with the present arrangements, under which Iban nationalism has been checked. The state government's economic and development policies appear to be "integrationist" and in line with federal government's nation-building goals. However, in mid-August 2001, as the Sarawak state elections approached, there were signs that the Melanau Taib Mahmud-led coalition of parties might split, as Malay leaders within his government had broken away to form a group known as "Parti Bebas" to challenge Melanau primacy and displace him from the Chief Ministership. If they had succeeded in the elections in returning a large Malay electoral base and been accepted within the BN coalition, they would have taken over the state BN leadership from the Melanaus and led the BN coalition government with the support of the SUPP and the Iban parties. They could then form UMNO and emplace UMNO into a dominant position in Sarawak in the same way that Tun Mustapha's former USNO had done in Sabah.

The Malay group's leader, Datuk Abang Abu Bakar Mustapha, a former Federal Defence Minister, resigned from the PBB in January 2001, after tabling a motion in the PBB's general assembly asking for UMNO's entry.<sup>17</sup> In 1998 the UMNO president and Malaysian Prime Minister, Dr Mahathir, when opening the PBB Assembly, had said it was UMNO's intention to spread its wings to Sarawak, but it was up to the people of Sarawak to decide. The PBB's Melanau leaders were not enthusiastic to the idea. When Sarawak went to the polls in September, Federal UMNO leaders quickly denied that UMNO would become involved in Sarawak politics by standing behind Datuk Abang Abu Bakar's group. Although Datuk Abang's group contested in a large number of the 45 state constituencies, UMNO's failure to endorse his group saw it suffer total defeat. This indicated that UMNO preferred the coalition to be led by the



Malay/Melanau leadership of Datuk Mahmud Taib and did not wish to rock the BN "scales" in Sarawak.

In Sabah, Kadazandusun nationalism had appeared to be a post-Malaysia phenomenon. Its rise and fall in the 1960s was related to the rise and fall of the Kadazandusun leader, Donald Stephens. Thereafter, it was said to have suffered a demise<sup>18</sup> but it began to revive itself in the 1980s. The period of Tun Mustapha's regime (1967–76) saw the processes of Malayization and Islamization, which from Kuala Lumpur's view appeared to be a check on Kadazandusun nationalism and was therefore "integrationist". Subsequently, however, Mustapha began to assert state rights and arouse Sabah nationalism in order to enhance his political authority in the state, and was in turn removed by the Federal Government.

The successor Berjaya government under Datuk Harris Salleh (1967–84) continued the Malayization and Islamization policies. The Malay language was promoted in government-aided schools in Sabah, while the Kadazandusun language was no longer taught anywhere at all. The state sponsored Koran-reading competitions and organized various *dakwah* (missionary) activities. All these the Berjaya government considered to be in line with the promotion of "national culture", the core of which was to be derived from Malay-Muslim elements. "The Federal Government believed this would help to promote national unity," says one observer.<sup>19</sup>

However, in the 1985 state elections, the Parti Bersatu Sabah (PBS), formed by a Berjaya breakaway group of Kadazandusun and Chinese members, which was led by Datuk Pairin Kitingan, swept to power. In 1986 PBS joined Barisan Nasional, but left the BN in 1990 and joined the opposition at the federal level. Its period of office saw a revival of Kadazandusun nationalism and a reversal of policies adopted by the Mustapha and Harris Salleh governments. Kadazandusun music and songs were played again over Radio Sabah, and the Kadazandusun language was once more taught in state schools. However, as PBS remained with the opposition, its conflict with the Federal Government caused the latter to cut back aid to weaken the PBS government's ability to provide for economic development. From 1991 to 1994, Sabah received some of the lowest levels of development aid. The federal Anti-Corruption Agency arrested and charged Pairin for

misusing his powers over a government contract. He was convicted, but the court's imposition of a fine allowed him to retain his office and his state assembly seat. His brother Jeffrey was next detained under the ISA on a charge of plotting secession. In the 1994 election, although PBS under Pairin's leadership was returned to office, its majority in the state assembly was gradually eroded by cross-overs of PBS assembly members to the BN component parties. Eventually the BN parties had the majority of seats to form the state government and to oust Pairin from office. Tun Mustapha's party, United Sabah National Organization (USNO), was eventually dissolved and replaced by UMNO. Even Sabah's Parti Angkatan Keadilan Rakyat (Akar), comprising Kadazans and Sino-Kadazans, has been dissolved, and its members absorbed into UMNO.<sup>20</sup>

The Barisan Nasional headquarters in Kuala Lumpur has since devised a system to rotate the Chief Minister's post every two years among its component parties representing the Muslim *bumiputra*, non-Muslim (Kadazandusun) and Chinese. The system was introduced in 1994 after the BN took over the state from the Parti Bersatu Sabah.<sup>21</sup> The present Chief Minister, Datuk Chong Kah Kiat, is from the Liberal Democratic Party.<sup>22</sup> The rotation system, the idea of the Malaysian Prime Minister Datuk Seri Dr Mahathir Mohamed, has given rise to dissatisfaction among some component parties, especially those representing the Kadazandusun who feel they have to wait a longer period for their turn, while UMNO's Malay, Muslim leaders in Sabah feel the Chief Minister's post should come from their party and should remain in its hands to reflect Malay dominance. The power-sharing system had been created to ensure co-operation among the different communities in Sabah, including the Kadazandusuns, and to prevent the return of PBS and Kadazandusan nationalism to power. However, bearing in mind that the use of *bumiputra* as an ethnic symbol by the dominant party UMNO to extend Malay political primacy and forge an alliance with the other indigenous communities in Sabah, UMNO has not yet established its predominance in the State Government. This is largely because the divergent strands of *bumiputra*-ism seem to represent a challenge to *Malayness* and Malay rule. The role of the Chinese parties as power brokers complicates the issue further.

With hindsight, it is possible to state that Sabah ethnic or state nationalism was not in conflict with Malaysian nationalism during Indonesia's "Confrontation" of Malaysia and Malaysia's resistance to the Filipino claim for Sabah from 1963 to 1966. Sabah remained loyal and supportive of Malaysia. In Sarawak, "both state nationalism and Malaysian nationalism were opposed to the Indonesians when Confrontation existed, and both types of nationalism were also behind government measures against Communist terrorists", observed Milne and Mauzy (1978, p. 65). Thus, it seems that in facing external threats, both Sabah and Sarawak have remained loyal to Malaysia and worked to reinforce national unity. Even as independent states, Sarawak and Sabah are likely to face serious threats from their stronger neighbours.

Nevertheless, from the viewpoint of nation-building in Malaysia, the twin threats of ethnic nationalism and secession will always remain in Sarawak and Sabah if Kuala Lumpur mishandles its relations with them. Since 1965 after the exit of Singapore, national leaders in Kuala Lumpur visit the two states almost weekly to keep in touch with state leaders and oversee development projects. Since the administration of Malaysia's fourth Prime Minister Datuk Seri Dr Mahathir Mohamed, Sabah time has officially become Malaysia's Standard Time. The Federal Government has even held the official National Day celebrations and parade in Kuching and in Kota Kinabalu on separate occasions to foster national unity with the people of the two states.

It was during the administration of the second Malaysian Prime Minister Tun Razak, that Sabah under the Chief Minister Tun Mustapha posed the threat of secession once again, and Tun Mustapha was removed from office. The secession problem continued during the administration of Tun Hussein Onn, Tun Razak's successor. Tun Mustapha's supporters attempted to create trouble after the Berjaya government had been installed. Kota Kinabalu, the state capital, was continuously rocked by bomb explosions, believed to have been set off by Tun Mustapha's immigrant Filipino supporters. Federal troops had to be used to maintain security in the city, and military reinforcements sent from Kuala Lumpur.

Military force from the Federal Government will be used as a last resort to crush any secession bid in Sabah or Sarawak, after political and constitutional means have been exhausted. In 1965, when Sabah under Kadazandusun leader Datuk Donald Stephens had threatened secession, Malaysia's first Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman had declared that: "Any who intends to secede by force or by any other action will be regarded as rebels and traitors and will be dealt with as such."<sup>23</sup> Sarawak and Sabah would remain in Malaysia for ever, he said. Initially, in the 1970s, Tun Mustapha helped to accelerate "integration" by pushing the Malay language to replace English and follow the federal example in the sphere of education. He remained devoted to the idea of achieving national unity. However, when he attempted to remain undisputed leader of Sabah and arouse state nationalism, the Federal Government intervened to check his powers. When he threatened secession, he was removed from office.

Nation-building in Malaysia is likely to encounter this pattern of politics time and again in Sarawak and Sabah. It would appear that any strong leader in Sarawak or Sabah could easily arouse state nationalism at the expense of Malaysian nationalism. But such nationalisms will in turn be checked by the Federal Government. No such problem of state nationalism has been encountered in peninsular Malaysia probably because the Borneo states are new states and more ethnically distinct from the rest of Malaysia, while the peninsular states had experienced federation earlier, some as far back as in 1896, while the others in 1948.<sup>24</sup>

### **The Bargain and Mahathir's "Vision 2020", 1990–2001**

It was during Datuk Seri Dr Mahathir Mohamed's administration that the "social contract" became a controversial issue once again in peninsular Malaysia. In 1991 he declared that he had a Vision of creating a *Bangsa Malaysia* (Malaysian nation) by the year 2020. This would be a country with a "fully developed" status, with the winning formula of an accelerated industrialization programme. It would be a just and egalitarian nation, "a full and fair partnership", possessing "a sense of a common and shared



destiny", irrespective of race. Although there was no reference to the "social contract", many observers interpreted it to mean that by the time Vision 2020 materialized, the contract might no longer be needed. The Malays would have economically progressed and developed the ability to compete on equal terms with the other races. Malay special rights might be given up, and Malaysia would move towards Mahathir's version of a kind of Malaysian Malaysia which Lee Kuan Yew could only have dreamed of. However, Malays were generally lukewarm to Mahathir's *Bangsa Malaysia* idea, while non-Malays were very enthusiastic. To the Malays *Bangsa Malaysia* apparently meant giving up their special status and special rights and sharing equality with non-Malays, which was something they did not seem to cherish.

So for 10 years there was talk and rhetoric about *Bangsa Malaysia* but mostly on the non-Malay side. Then non-Malay doubts began to set in about achieving *Bangsa Malaysia*. In September 1999 just prior to the general elections a group, the Chinese Associations Election Appeals Committee or known as SUQIU by its acronym in Chinese, urged the Mahathir Government to accord non-Malays equality of status with Malays and end Malay special rights, including education quotas, to make his Vision 2020 a reality. Their recommendations were made in an 83-point memorandum under 17 headings. The SUQIU represented 2,095 Chinese organizations, among them the United Chinese School Committees Association of Malaysia (Dong Zong), the United Chinese School Teachers Association of Malaysia (Jiao Zong) and the Nanyang University Alumni Association of Malaysia. The main thrust of their recommendations was that the government should restructure society towards *Bangsa Malaysia* by reviewing existing policies and laws, like the Internal Security Act and other regulations, that it deemed unnecessary in the creation of a modern, democratic society. Its ideas, the SUQIU argued, represented the natural evolution of a Malaysian Nation, or *Bangsa Malaysia*.

As the UMNO-led BN Coalition had just suffered a split over the sacking of Mahathir's Deputy Prime Minister Datuk Seri Anwar Ibrahim, the BN had begun to lose Malay support and was facing the possibility of serious electoral losses in the forthcoming 1999 elections. Aware of the BN's

need for non-Malay support to win the elections, the SUQIU had submitted the demands apparently in the hope that the government would appear conciliatory since it needed such non-Malay support. Dr Mahathir did not reject the demands outright. He, in fact, agreed to most of them in principle, but said they merited further study.

In the elections, the BN was returned to power by a largely non-Malay electorate, while 70 per cent of the Malay voters had swung to the opposition Malay parties like Parti Islam (PAS) and the Parti Keadilan, the breakaway group of UMNO, largely due to the Anwar Ibrahim issue and dissatisfaction with Mahathir's leadership. After about eight months without any positive response from the Mahathir Government on the *Bangsa Malaysia* idea, a Chinese businessman Datuk David Chua was reported in the Malay-language newspaper, *Utusan Melayu*, on 14 August 2000, under banner headlines as calling for the abolition of Malay special rights and privileges. He said that in order to carry out a restructuring of society the government needed to do this, so that Malays could become competitive. Chua, who was deputy secretary-general of the Association of Chinese Chambers of Commerce and Industry Malaysia, was also a member of the Second National Economic Consultative Council (NECC II), at whose deliberations he had raised such views. *Utusan Malaysia* had interviewed Chua after the *Far Eastern Economic Review* had leaked his views at the NEEC II meeting. In a statement the following day, Chua denied he had asked for Malay special rights to be abolished. He clarified that he had asked instead for "special assistance and affirmative action policies" to be phased out gradually. The same day the Deputy Prime Minister Datuk Seri Abdullah Ahmad Badawi, in a commentary on Chua's statement, said Malay special rights would remain as they had been "agreed upon by the Government which is represented by the various races".<sup>25</sup> Other UMNO leaders criticized recent statements raising the issue of Malay privileges, with one Cabinet Minister and UMNO vice-president, Tan Sri Muhyiddin Yassin, stating that Malay privileges were a "social contract" which had been agreed to by the other BN leaders to develop the Malay community after Independence.

On 16 August 2000 the SUQIU at a press conference on the anniversary of its 83 demands called on the government and on Members of Parliament

Bangsa Malaysia - Sugou  
- review Quota system

1999  
2000  
收回  
人  
權  
要

Social  
Contract  
↓  
Special  
rights

to give further thought to its demands. It reiterated its call for an end to the different status between *bumiputra* and non-*bumiputra* in all fields, the abolition of the Internal Security Act and the cancellation of the Vision Schools project, under which Malay, Chinese and Tamil schools would be integrated at one site and share school facilities. Present at the press conference was a PAS representative, Subky Latif, who had been invited by SUQIU. SUQIU's executive secretary, Ser Choon Ing, explained that SUQIU did not challenge Malay political primacy, but only demanded equality of status for Malays and non-Malays. On 17 August the Prime Minister Datuk Seri Dr Mahathir assured the Malays that their rights and privileges would be protected, "until they themselves do not want the government's help any more". He said the Government on its own would "not even take one step backward" in this matter. He was addressing a crowd of about 500 from 11 Malay organizations, representing the business community, Malay women and students. The Prime Minister said he did not want any racial misunderstanding and animosity in the country, and for that matter, all races "need to be careful when making statements". They had the right to make statements, but this should be done behind closed doors, so that it would not trigger racial hatred. Of late, he said, there was disunity among the Malays which meant "we are weak", and "when we are weak, there are calls to drop the Malay rights".

On 23 August 2000 it was reported that David Chua had met Dr Mahathir and explained his position that he did not call for the abolition of Malay special rights. The Prime Minister advised him not "to raise the sensitive matter again". On 30 August in his National Day eve message, the Prime Minister attacked SUQIU's demands as "extreme" and compared them to the "communists" and the Islamic terrorist Al-Maunah group which had recently raided two Army camps in Perak to seize arms.

For the next four months, debates raged in the newspapers over SUQIU's 83 demands. Numerous Malay organizations called on SUQIU to withdraw its demands. On 13 November at a by-election in Lunas, Kedah state, the Barisan Nasional lost to the opposition Parti Keadilan. Several days later the BN accused SUQIU of campaigning in the by-election and influencing

the Chinese electors to vote against it. The BN by-election defeat, according to the opposition DAP and an UMNO Government backbencher, Shahrir Ahmad, was due to the Chinese community's "anger" at the Prime Minister's remarks in calling SUQIU "no different from the communists".

The debates reached their climax in December when the Prime Minister declared he could not prevent Malays and Malay organizations from expressing their feelings and hostility towards SUQIU. This apparently was a reference to the Federation of Peninsular Malaysia Malay Students (GPMS)'s move to hold a mammoth rally in Kuala Terengganu on 6 January 2001 to protest SUQIU'S demands. On 11 December 2000 at a meeting in Parliament, in reply to a DAP member's question, Dr Mahathir said the Government could not entertain demands by SUQIU as they were "tantamount to abolishing Malay rights, a move which will result in chaos and will paralyse the country's progress". He reiterated his earlier statement that SUQIU was not much different from the communists "who wanted to abolish the special status of Malays". The Prime Minister said while his criticism was only directed at SUQIU, "especially certain leaders of the group, they and in particular Chinese newspapers, made his remarks appear as if they were targeted at the entire Chinese community". He added, "If the Chinese in general are offended by my remarks which had been deliberately distorted by SUQIU and some Chinese newspapers, I apologize to them." He went on to say that any potential chaos arising from SUQIU's demands was defused because he personally forbade UMNO Youth and other Malay groups from resorting to violent protests. Despite the restraint, SUQIU's "disregard for the ban on raising sensitive issues and disrespect for the Government's social contract and national policies are akin to the attitude of communists". Dr Mahathir said that SUQIU had to be reprimanded for challenging the "social contract and attempting to grab all for one community through so-called equal rights and meritocracy which the Malays rejected half a century ago". When asked by the opposition DAP Member of Parliament Kerk Kim Hock why SUQIU's demands had been agreed to "in principle" by the Cabinet and by the MCA, Gerakan and the SUPP on 23 September 1999, Dr Mahathir

said, "If we had rejected the demands, we would have lost the elections. We were forced not to take a strong stand, if we did, we would have been defeated. We had to look after our interests just like the DAP... which collaborated with the PAS..."<sup>26</sup>

On 17 December 2000 in his speech to declare open the Sixth World Federation of Foochow Associations Convention in Kuala Lumpur, the Deputy Prime Minister Datuk Seri Abdullah Badawi, urged all the communities to respect the "social contract". "We believe that no one community will be sidelined. We believe that every Malaysian has a responsible role to play in nation-building and we believe that it is this unity in diversity that will define a *Bangsa Malaysia* or Malaysian Nation in the years to come," he said.

Several meetings were held between SUQIU and several Malay organizations to discuss its demands. A meeting between SUQIU and UMNO Youth on 5 January 2001 ended with a joint statement, in which SUQIU agreed to "put aside" seven of its 83-point election appeals in view of the "prevailing ethnic tension". It was later explained that the meeting had nearly collapsed over the wording of the statement, as SUQIU had insisted on the words "set aside" instead of the word "withdraw" to indicate its position.

Both parties agreed that the action was taken "in view of the special rights, position, and privileges of the Malays and the natives of any of the state of Sabah and Sarawak as enshrined in Article 153 and other such relevant Articles of the Federal Constitution not be questioned". Both parties also "expressed regret over the unintended reaction within the Malay and Chinese communities which had arisen from the Seven Points and subsequent incidents". The seven points (demands) put aside were:

- any affirmative action initiated by the government should benefit and protect the weaker groups of society, regardless of their religious, social and racial background;
- efforts be made to abolish the differences between the *bumiputra* and non-*bumiputra* communities in all fields;
- fair and equitable distribution of agricultural land to farmers without racial distinction;

- to abolish the race-based quota system and to replace it with one that is based on merit;
- to do away with the quota system for entry into universities;
- fair treatment be accorded to all religious organizations in terms of development of religion. Government assistance should also be extended to all such organizations which include sufficient coverage from the official media; and
- to establish a loan scheme or financial assistance for needy students regardless of race.<sup>27</sup>

The agreement was hailed by the country's newspapers as welcome news in defusing the racial tensions in the country. Several politicians from the BN component parties such as the MCA, the Gerakan and the MIC were quoted as supporting the settlement. In the following days, UMNO leaders urged SUQIU and non-Malay groups not to raise the demands again in the future. The strong Malay opposition to SUQIU's demands appears to serve as a warning that racial tensions might flare up again if the "social contract" was ever challenged once more. However, the strong reactions to SUQIU's demands have been confined mainly to peninsular Malaysia. It remains to be seen whether the "social contract" will continue to stand the test of time in the new millennium.

Besides the issue of *bumiputra* rights, the other issue that has attracted much attention has been the controversy between the DAP and PAS over the latter's aim to establish Malaysia as an Islamic state. Both parties were members of a coalition, called Barisan Alternatif, which had contested against Dr Mahathir's BN coalition in the 1999 general elections. In the elections PAS performed better than the DAP, which suffered electoral losses attributed to its endorsement of the PAS programme to set up an Islamic state. The DAP continued to urge PAS to drop its "Islamic state" goal, but PAS had refused to do so. As events unfolded in Malaysia and internationally, indicating the rise of radical Islamic militancy, the DAP announced on 22 September that it would pull out of the BN coalition. PAS remained undeterred, believing that the BN coalition had been merely an "electoral coalition" and that it might be possible for both PAS and the DAP to come together again in future elections.



## Conclusion

From the foregoing discussion, it is clear that the 1957 historic bargain is more applicable to peninsular Malaysia than to Sarawak and Sabah, where the ethnic communities are more varied than in the former. The contesting communalisms and nationalisms present different problems and challenges. The UMNO-led Federal Government in Kuala Lumpur shows that it has been more adept than the opposition parties in meeting these problems and challenges in Sarawak and Sabah.

Malay political primacy is likely to continue in Malaysia for a long time. Malay political primacy is also ingeniously presented as *bumiputra* political primacy. Given this combined "unity" of both Malays and other indigenous groups in peninsular Malaysia and in Sarawak and Sabah, it is unlikely that Malay if not *bumiputra* political primacy could ever be dislodged.

From Dr Mahathir's handling of the SUQIU issue, it is clear that his "Vision" of Malaysia in the year 2020 will not see the elimination of *bumiputra* rights. His *Bangsa Malaysia* (Malaysian Nation) will not see a revision of the 1957 "historic bargain". It will see a continuation of Malay political primacy. It is no different from that of Tunku Abdul Rahman's vision of first Malaya and then Malaysia nor of that of Tun Razak and Tun Hussein Onn. The non-Malay, or non-*bumiputra* population will have to accept this vision as a reality for a long time to come.

The following studies of Malaysia's four Prime Ministers as nation-builders will show how they had grappled with the complex problem of creating a Malaysian nation-state in which Malay political primacy was entrenched and perpetuated.

## NOTES

- 1 Diane K. Mauzy, *Barisan Nasional: Coalition Government in Malaysia* (Kuala Lumpur: Maricans, 1983), p. 24.
- 2 J.M. Gullick, *Malaya* (London: Ernest Benn, 1967), p. 122.
- 3 K.J. Ratnam, *Communalism and the Political Process in Malaya* (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1965), p. 215.
- 4 See R.K. Vasil, *Politics in a Plural Society* (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1971), p. 292.

- 5 Lee Kuan Yew, *The Singapore Story* (Singapore: Times Editions, 1998), p. 572.
- 6 Albert Lau, *A Moment of Anguish: Singapore in Malaysia and the Politics of Disengagement* (Singapore: Times Academic Press, 1998), p. 233.
- 7 R.S. Milne and K.J. Ratnam, *Malaysia — New States in a New Nation: Political Development of Sarawak and Sabah in Malaysia* (London: Frank Cass, 1974), p. 61.
- 8 R.S. Milne and Diane K. Mauzy, *Politics and Government in Malaysia* (Singapore: Federal Publications, 1978), p. 60.
- 9 Milne and Mauzy, *Politics and Government in Malaysia*, p. 366. The quotation is taken from Wang Gungwu's essay, "Malayan Nationalism", *Royal Central Asiatic Society Journal*, Parts 3 and 4 (July–October 1972), p. 366.
- 10 Francis Loh Kok Wah, "Modernization, Cultural Revival and Counter-Hegemony: The Kadazans of Sabah in the 1980s", in *Fragmented Vision*, ed. Joel S. Kahn and Francis Loh Kok Wah (Sydney: AAS-Allen & Unwin, 1992), p. 227.
- 11 Milne and Ratnam, *Malaysia — New States in a New Nation*, p. 28.
- 12 The previous incumbents of these posts were Temenggong Jugah of Sarawak and Datuk Donald Stephens and Tun Mustapha of Sabah respectively. Singapore was denied an equivalent post of the Minister for Singapore Affairs during its membership of Malaysia.
- 13 Milne and Ratnam, *ibid.*, pp. 60–61. The Kadazandusun used to be known as "Kadazan" but recently has adopted "Kadazandusun" as its ethnic name.
- 14 For an account of this incident, see R.W. Reece, *The Name of Brooke: The End of White Rajah Rule in Sarawak* (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1982).
- 15 Peter Searle, *Politics in Sarawak, 1970–1976: The Iban Perspective* (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1983), p. 39.
- 16 See Jayum A. Jawan, *Iban Politics and Economic Development: Their Patterns and Change* (Kuala Lumpur, Bangi: Penerbit Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia, 1994), pp. 131–57.
- 17 See background details in *New Straits Times* report, 8 August 2001, p. 4. In the 1996 elections, the Sarawak BN won 58 seats; the DAP, two; and Independents, two.
- 18 Margaret Roff, "The Rise and Demise of Kadazan Nationalism", *Journal of Southeast Asian History* 10, no. 2 (1969), pp. 326–43.
- 19 Francis Loh Kok Wah, "Modernisation, Cultural Revival and Counter-Hegemony: The Kadazans of Sabah in the 1980s", in *Fragmented Vision*, ed. Joel Kahn and Francis Loh Kok Wah (Sydney: AAAS-Allen and Unwin, 1992), p. 233.
- 20 *New Straits Times*, 22 May 2001, p. 2.
- 21 See reports in *The Star*, 18 March, 2001, p. 2, and *New Straits Times*, 15 March, 2001, p. 2, and 19 March 2001, p. 21, on the controversy relating to the rotation system of the Chief Minister's post in Sabah.

- 22 This is the third time that Sabah has had a Chinese Chief Minister. The previous Chief Ministers were Datuk Peter Lo and Datuk Yong Teck Lee.
- 23 Milne and Ratnam, *ibid.*, p. 65.
- 24 Lim Hong Hai compares Sabah and Sarawak with the peninsular states of Penang and Kelantan in his interesting article, "Sabah and Sarawak in Malaysia: The Real Bargain, or what have they gotten themselves into?" *Sabah and Sarawak: The Politics of Development and Federalism*, *Kajian Malaysia* XI, nos. 1 and 2 (Jan/December 1997): 15–56.
- 25 *New Straits Times*, 15 August 2000, p. 1.
- 26 See the full text of the question and answer session in Parliament in *Utusan Malaysia*, 12 December 2000.
- 27 See report, "Suqiu sets aside seven points", *New Straits Times*, 6 January, 2001, pp. 1–2; see also report in *Utusan Malaysia*, "Suqiu gugur 7 tuntutan," pp. 1, 4. Although the latter carried the word "gugur" (dropped) in its headline, its report used the words "bersetuju menarik balik" (agreed to withdraw) and also carried a column identifying the seven points which it declared as "yang ditarik balik" (withdrawn).

## CHAPTER THREE

### 1957–70 "Pluralism" in Nation-Building during the Tunku's Administration

*He [the Tunku] had a simple philosophy: the role of the Malays was to control the machinery of the state, to give out licences and collect the revenue, and most important of all, to ensure that they were not displaced. Unlike the Chinese and Indians who had China and India to return to, they had nowhere else to go. In his soft-spoken, gracious way, he was absolutely open about his determination to maintain the ascendancy of the Malays and ensure that they and their sultans would remain the overlords of the country.*

Lee Kuan Yew, *The Singapore Story: Memoirs of Lee Kuan Yew*, p. 442

TUNKU ABDUL Rahman was not only Malaya's first Prime Minister, but also the leader who led the country to independence; hence, his title *Bapa Kemerdekaan* (Father of Independence).<sup>1</sup> He is also known as *Bapa Malaysia* (Father of Malaysia), or father of the nation, a title given for bringing about the present wider federation of Malaya, Sarawak and Sabah. These are major nation-building achievements. He was also independent Malaysia's first world statesman. He received numerous tributes and awards from foreign countries for his services towards international peace and co-operation. He was best known in the Commonwealth for his strong stand against apartheid, and for his pioneering role in the formation of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). On retirement as

## 二、马哈迪的困境？或马来西亚人的困境？

（2018年7月21日，星期六，2p.m. – 5p.m.）

### 专题讨论会读本

- I. 崔贵强，1990，新马华人国家认同的转向 1945-1959，新加坡：新加坡南洋学会。  
（第十一章，马来亚华人国家认同的转向 1950-1957）。
- II. 马哈迪，1981，马来人的困境，世界书局（马）有限公司，页 61-145。（第五章，种族平等的意义；第六章，国民团结的基础；第七章，马来人之复权与马来人之困境；第八章，马来人之问题）
- III. \*\*Omi, M., and Winant, H. (2014). Racial formation in the United States. Routledge. Pp. 103-158. (Chapter4 : The Theory of Racial Formation; Chapter 5: Racial Politics and the Racial State)
- IV. Ishak, M. M. (2014). The Politics of Bangsa Malaysia: Nation-Building in a Multiethnic Society. UUM Press. Pp.88-141. (Chapter3: From state building to nation-building)

### 讨论重点

- 什么是「种族构成」(racial formation)与种族政治？
- 从《新马华人国家认同转向》、《马来人的困境》来看，华人与马来人面对的困境有何异同？
- 马哈迪提出的“国民团结的基础”是否有助于打造“马来西亚人”？

专题演讲：陈穆红博士（林连玉基金学术委员会委员、国民大学高级研究员）  
演讲主题：建国政策与种族关系



## 讨论单

1.	崔贵强 <u>从哪些方面指出</u> ，独立前，马来亚华人首先是政治冷漠的群体？为何这些群体对政治冷漠？
2.	崔贵强认为， <u>哪些“结构性条件”</u> （社会风气、政党模式、文化认同等）导致马来亚华人的认同转向？如何评价马华与教总、全马华人注册社团在争取公民权的行动？
3.	Racial Formation 这个概念可以从 <u>哪些面向</u> 讨论 Malay state (racial despotism) 的形构？
4.	马哈迪如何论述 <u>种族平等</u> 的意义？他提出的了哪些对马来人不平等的 <u>结构性因素与种族特质</u> ？
5.	马哈迪如何看待贫穷与种族不平等的课题？他 <u>是否支持援助贫穷的非马来人</u> ？他的扶弱政策有什么基本假设？
6.	马哈迪 <u>如何定义土著</u> ？马哈迪如何解释马来人特权、 <u>马来人国家</u> 的合理性？他如何看待 <u>非马来人是否效忠马来亚</u> 的课题？他如何看待 <u>马来人与原住民</u> 谁才是马来亚这片土地的拥有者？
7.	马来西亚的新经济政策、国家文化政策在哪些面向反映了 <u>华人、马来人的集体困境</u> ？

名学生死亡，8人受重伤。直至3天后，紧张气氛才消退，秩序才恢复平静。<sup>91</sup>

至于工人的政治认同于当地，早在1945年9月以后就发生了。正如第七章所述，那时候的泛马各业总工会在全马各地掀起罢工浪潮，从事政治性的活动。1946年8月，泛马各业总工会一分为二，即新加坡工会联合会与泛马工会联合会，在马共的幕后指使下，新加坡工会联合会异常活跃，引起了政府的关注，并谋对策，以削弱其力量。迨至1948年中期实施紧急法令后，政府决定大刀阔斧，突击其会所，逮捕其领袖，使它销声匿迹。

另一方面，政府极力扶持亲政府工会的组织与发展，于是由林有福等人领导的新加坡工会组织便出现了。可是该组织以受英文教育人士为主，领导人仅致力于图谋个人的利益，彼此勾心斗角，争权夺利，并不为受中文教育的工人所欢迎。

左翼人士因此趁虚而入，在方水双与林清祥等人的号召与领导下，巴士工友、布业工友、工厂工友等工会的势力日益壮大，如新加坡工厂与商店工人工会（Singapore Factory and Shop Workers' Union），到了1955年底，便有会员近30,000人。<sup>92</sup>在展开活动的同时，也掀起了反殖的怒潮。嗣后，工人积极参与当地政治活动，支持人民行动党，使行动党于1959年大选后取得了新加坡的政权。

从上述可见，在50年代里（尤其是后期），华族社会的上层、中层与下层的若干人士，已经显示了国家认同的转向。然而，大多数的华族各阶层人士，对当地政治依然抱着冷漠的态度，他们并不热衷选民登记与选举，也不积极争取公民权。他们当中，也许还有人对神州大地的新政权引以为豪，但可以肯定的是，大多数人已经扬弃了作客他乡的观念，而以新马作为永久的故乡了。

<sup>91</sup> Yeo Kim Wah, 同前书, p. 244.

<sup>92</sup> Yeo Kim Wah, 同前书, p. 241.

## 第十一章 马来亚华人国家认同的转向 1950—1957

50年代的首5年，在200多万的马来亚华人中，除了少数有识之士以外，广大的华人对当地政治仍具有一种冷漠感。他们并不热衷于近期间所举行的一连串市政委员与立法议员的选举。然而自1955年以后，马来亚阔步迈向自治独立之途，华人才从政治的迷途中惊醒过来，对当地的国家认同作了一定程度的转向。

### （一）争取公民权夜长梦多

第五章述及华人因反对新宪制建议书而发动的总休业抗议行动，但英政府却一意孤行，按照原订计划，于1948年2月1日正式成立马来亚联合邦政体。在1948年马来亚联合邦协定（Federation of Malaya Agreement 1948）下的公民权条例规定，除了马来土著为当然公民外，在槟城与马六甲出生、并在马来亚联合邦居住达规定年限的英籍民，可申请成为公民。在马来亚联合邦（檳榔嶼除外）出生者，须住上8年才能提出申请公民权。至于那些在马来亚以外出生的移民，则需住上15年才有资格申请。申请人除了需具备良好品德与宣誓效忠当地外，还得通过英语或巫语考试。但住满20年且超过45岁的申请人，则可豁免语文测验。<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> J. M. Gullick, Malaya (London, 1963), pp. 224-225.

在公民权的新条例下,截至1950年为止,大约有35万华人自动成为公民。另有约15万人通过申请归化为公民。<sup>2</sup>倘若以1950年马来亚联合邦华人人口总额200万来计算<sup>3</sup>,那么华人获得公民权者只占1/4,另有3/4的华人被拒于公民权的门槛外。那么多华人被剥夺了公民的权利,不能享有公民的地位,不论对华人的政治、经济、社会与文化都是重大的打击,所以有识之士的奋起疾呼,力争华人公民权,是理所当然的事。

1951年9月,马六甲中华总商会召开华人社团代表大会,出席团体达60个单位,代表120人,对公民权问题,一致议决支持马华公会的意见,主张出生地主义,凡在马来亚联合邦出生者,自动成为当然公民。<sup>4</sup>接着,吡叻中华总商会召开的侨团学校代表大会,也支持出生地主义的决议。<sup>5</sup>不久,马华商联会也向政府提呈备忘录,指出任何人在檳、呷出生者应享有马来亚联合邦公民权。<sup>6</sup>翌年2月初,马来亚嘉应会馆联合会代表议决,向政府呈请放宽公民权的申请手续。<sup>7</sup>

1948年马来亚联合邦协定中的公民权条例规定,对非马来人含有浓烈的排他性,历年来遂成为各民族争议的焦点,且产生了一种离心力的不良因素,因此,联合邦立法议会于1951年7月间成立了公民权

审查委员会,就规定中的各项原则加以审议。经过了几个月的审议后,审查委员会终于3月19日提出一份公民权报告书,5月7日,经立法议会三读通过,是为1952年马来亚联合邦公民权修订法令,并订于9月15日起生效。

该法令的新规定主要是:(1)凡属马来州邦之州籍民,即自动成为联合邦公民,又凡在马六甲及檳城出生之英籍民,即自动成为联合邦公民;(2)外地出生之移民,住满10年后(过去规定为15年),即可申请归化为公民;(3)凡在法令实施后5年内申请者,在语言考试方面可获优待,语言考试方面亦将改善。对非马来人而言,公民权修订法令较过去放宽了。据估计,截至1953年6月30日为止,已经有1,157,000华人成为马来亚联合邦公民与州籍民。<sup>8</sup>而这也只马来亚华人全人口之半数。

修订法令实施后,公民权虽稍有放宽,一般华人仍认为距离理想尚远,他们的不满是:(1)华人主张的“土生即当然公民”的出生地主义原则未被采纳;(2)放宽语言考试及格未有具体规定;(3)在檳呷出生者可自动成为公民,而在马来州邦出生者,尚有附带其他条件,如其父或母须在联合邦出生者才可自动成为公民,这样的规定亦欠合理,而华文舆论也认为修订法令仍未能扫除种族畛域成见与猜忌的阴影,如《星洲日报》评论道:

由过去两年来公民权讨论经过看来,基本课题并不在公民权,而在先从根源上打破种族对立成见,扬弃种族特权的意识形态……巫人与非巫人间的界限一天存在,公民权问题即一天得完满解决。因为公民权制度的基本目标便是在消泯国家社会各构成分子间的种族、肤色、文化、信仰上畛域成见分野,修正后的联合邦公民权法令与这个基本目标相差仍远。<sup>9</sup>

<sup>8</sup> K. J. Ratnam, 同前书, p.92。

<sup>9</sup> “联合邦公民权修正法令”,《星洲日报》社论,1952.9.16。

<sup>2</sup> Federation of Malaya, Annual Report 1950, p.24;《光华日报》(1951.3.2)引述英国殖民部大臣的报告。

<sup>3</sup> 作者无法知道1950年马来亚联合邦华人人口总额的精确数字。但知道1947年的华人人口总额是1,884,534人(Malayan Census Report, 1947, p.40)、1957年的总额是2,332,936人(1957 Population Census of the Federation of Malaya, p.1),10年内华人人口增加了448,402人,每年平均增加额约为45,000人,从1948年至1950年的增加人数约为135,000人,故1950年的华人人口总额约稍微超过200万。又据《南洋商报》社论(1952.3.9)引述联合邦官方发表的数字,1951年华人总人口为2,067,000人。

<sup>4</sup> 《星洲日报》,1951.9.6。

<sup>5</sup> 《南洋商报》,1951.9.7。

<sup>6</sup> 《南洋商报》,1951.9.24。

<sup>7</sup> 《星洲日报》,1952.2.2。

然而，翻阅新马各地华文旧报章与各社团出版的纪念刊资料显示，介于1950年与1954年9月间，涉及华人争取公民权的文字，除了上述几项简单的叙述外，不见其他记载，反映了这期间的一部分马来亚联合邦的华人，对公民权的冷漠态度，从而显示了华人对马来亚国家的认同还处在模棱两可、迟疑不决的阶段。

作为雪兰莪华人最高机构的中华大会堂，其活动纪录也证实了这种模棱两可的心态。介于1950年与1954年间，大会堂虽然加强了当地事务的活动，如反对移民统制法令及回马签证条例；反对巴恩教育报告书；筹办民众图书馆；庆贺雪州苏丹公主结婚；欢宴钦差大臣等等。但它也同时介入中国的事务，如反对中共派遣代表团到马来亚调查；举办自由中国照片展览；庆祝双十节；庆祝蒋介石寿辰与复职等等。<sup>10</sup>

另一方面，马华公会领导人（尤其是陈祯禄会长）却积极争取华人公民权，他们周旋于马来人领袖群中，取得各种族联络委员会（Communities Liaison Committee）的谅解，促进了1952年马来亚联合邦修订法令的实现。然而，马华公会的努力却遭遇到很多困难。对马华公会的吁请华人获取公民权，许多华人都报以冷漠的反应。<sup>11</sup>

迨至1954年9月以后，华人争取公民权运动才开始慢慢炽热，经过1955年的酝酿与冲击，到了1956年与1957年间，华人争取公民权的运动达到巅峰。华人争取公民权的由冷漠变为炽热，自然是基于当地政治发展的趋势。1954年以后，马来亚更向自治独立之途迈进。1955年7月，马来亚第一次举行普选，联盟获得压倒性的胜利，东姑

受命组阁。1956年1月联盟代表团赴英国谈商独立，取得了意外的成就。6月，李特宪制代表团抵马来亚，拟汇集各方意见，为独立的马来亚拟订宪法。配合自治独立的发展，马来亚华人不得不积极争取公民权，以期一旦成为公民，在独立后的马来亚国享有公民的地位。

1954年9月19日，雪兰莪中华大会堂召开了雪州华人社团代表大会，商讨如何鼓励华人申请公民权之问题。出席团体有38个单位，代表70余人。席间代表纷纷发言，都认为华人应踊跃申请为公民，因为持有联合邦公民权的人，无论申请任何事情，均有优先权。而且也只有获取公民权后，才有选举权与被选权，因此希望各代表广为宣传，鼓励华人从速进行申请，勿再犹疑观望，坐失良机。会议商讨结果，一致通过成立“吉隆坡协助申请公民权或州籍民权委员会”，推举100名委员专责办理<sup>12</sup>。

嗣后，文冬（属彭亨州）中华大会堂召开华人社团大会，议决协助华人申请公民或州籍民。<sup>13</sup>芙蓉（森美兰州首府）也举行了侨团代表大会，议决推动同侨踊跃申请公民权。<sup>14</sup>

然而，1955年上半年，全马各领导社团多集中争取废除立法议会语言限制，反而把争取公民权给忽略了。直至1955年8月，公民权的问题才再度酝酿起来。先是有檳城潮州会馆提呈政府修改公民权法令。<sup>15</sup>接着泛马东安总会代表大会在怡保举行，议决促请新马政府放宽申请公民权条例。<sup>16</sup>8月中旬，雪兰莪州华人行团总会主席梁志翔也

<sup>10</sup> 雪兰莪中华大会堂庆祝五十四周年纪念特刊，1977年，pp. 207-210。

<sup>11</sup> Wong Yoke Nyen, "Chinese Organization and Citizenship in Post-War Malaya, 1945-1958", Review of Southeast Asian Studies, Vol.12, Dec. 1982, p. 15.

<sup>12</sup> 同注10, p.157。

<sup>13</sup> 《中兴日报》，1954.9.19。

<sup>14</sup> 《星洲日报》，1954.10.3。

<sup>15</sup> 《星洲日报》，1955.8.2。

<sup>16</sup> 《南洋商报》，1955.8.13。



促请政府应立即考虑放宽公民权申请之限制。<sup>17</sup>同时，新马潮州联合会也召开大会，议决呈请联合邦政府改善公民权法令。<sup>18</sup>

8月28日，由吡叻中华大会堂及中华总商会联合召开了全吡叻华人社团代表大会，出席者共70余个单位，讨论争取华人公民权事宜，席间发言者热烈，广东会馆、福建公会、近打华侨小商公会、实兆运中华公会、巴力中华树胶公会及吡华派报公会等代表均先后发言，指出现有公民权条例之不合理，实应改善与修订，俾给予华人合理平等的公民权。会议决力争华人公民权，并成立15人小组委员会，以负责草拟备忘录及专责推动工作，至于进行争取之步骤有：（1）以大会名义呈具争取华人公民权之备忘录，分别呈给各州苏丹议会、联盟新政府、钦差大臣与英国殖民部大臣；（2）通函全马各地中华大会堂或华人最高团体，吁请一致同情支援；（3）以大会名义将该备忘录呈交将来马来亚之宪制调查团。<sup>19</sup>

吡叻华人社团大会之备忘录，对于请求政府修订公民权法律问题条陈了13项理由，同时作4项建议。所提的13项理由中，指出现行的公民权法律，含有种族歧视之性质，其范畴欠广泛，故未能容纳华人或其他非马来人成为联合邦公民，在此情况下，约有3/4华人被剥夺公民权。在马来亚州邦内，出生地权利原则不被采纳，所规定尤其矛盾，不能自圆其说。华人对马来亚联合邦竭尽忠诚，对本邦工商业及贸易贡献殊巨，这完全是由于华人本身不屈不挠的努力有以致之，而并非剥夺他人的机会。备忘录提出之4项建议是：（1）采纳出生地权利原则；（2）所有在外地出生之华人，在本邦继续居住期间超过5

年，选择归化本邦者，应可申请公民权；（3）豁免语言考试；（4）公民权改革应在马来亚获得独立之前付诸实行。<sup>20</sup>

在1955年终了之前，提出修订放宽公民权条例的，还有马来亚台山会馆联合会与泛马广东会馆联合会等。<sup>21</sup>

1956年1月，在东姑的率领下，联盟新政府代表团往英伦与英殖民部大臣及最高专员举行谈商独立问题。会谈始于1月18日，终于2月8日，历时三周，一切进行顺利。英方答应如有可能的话，将让马来亚联合邦于1957年8月独立。为了替独立的马来亚拟订一部宪法，一个独立的宪制调查团将到马来亚进行实地视察，广纳民意，以作为制订宪法之参考。马来亚独立已是大势所趋，而宪法条文的厘订，对马来亚华人独立后的命运影响至巨，因此，进入1956年3月以后，各华人社团纷纷召开代表大会，草拟备忘录，决定争取公民权之步骤。

然而，像这样单独行动，各行其是，是否能取得预期的效果，令人怀疑。而且，正当华人社团力争公民权之际，巫统雪州及呷州分部与马来亚国民党主席拿督翁都提出强烈反对，发出了强烈的排华言论。面对着排外性极浓的激流，华人处境恶劣，而号称代表华人的马华公会却三缄其口，噤若寒蝉，因此华人非团结起来，行动一致，不足以应付当前的危机。1956年4月11日，雪华行团总会开会议决，以雪华行团总会的名义，致函雪州中华大会堂、吡叻中华大会堂与联合邦华校教师总会，联名通函各州之华人最高领导机关，发动召开全马华人团体代表大会，以商讨向宪制调查团提呈修订宪法之意见，争取华人在当地的合法权益。<sup>22</sup>

雪华人行团总会的建议，立即获得了各州华人之热烈支持，纷纷响应。曹尧辉（雪州中华大会堂署理总理）、刘伯群（吡叻中华大会

<sup>17</sup> 《南洋商报》，1955.8.14，雪兰莪华人行团总会是以各途商社团为会员单位。截至1955年，拥有会员30余，其中包括商业职员公会、铜铁商公会、杂货行、慎忠行、建造行、酒商公会、咖啡茶叶公会、鱼业公会、自由车商公会等。

<sup>18</sup> 《星洲日报》，1955.8.18。

<sup>19</sup> 《星洲日报》，1955.8.29。

<sup>20</sup> 《星洲日报》，1955.10.6。

<sup>21</sup> 《南洋商报》，1955.10.17；《星洲日报》，1955.12.19。

<sup>22</sup> 《星洲日报》，1956.4.13。



堂总理)、林连玉(联合邦华校教师总会主席)、黄锦和(马华商联会秘书)等人均表赞同,并主张积极进行。于是筹备工作迅速展开,拟于召开大会期间,通过一项备忘录,发动签名运动,发表严正之宣言,不达目的誓不罢休。否则将采取下列步骤以示抗议,即:(1)发动全马罢市一日;(2)吁请全马民选之各级议会华籍部长、立法议员、州议员、市委及地方议会议员,一致提出总辞职,杯葛各级议会;(3)派出请愿团赴英国,向英廷力争。<sup>23</sup>

争取“出生地主义”的公民权原则,可谓人同此心,心同此理。可是面对着汹涌的群情,马华公会却闪烁其词,迟疑不决。虽然马华公会宣传主任陈修信表示绝对赞成“出生地主义”的原则,并主张必要时罢市抗议;马华公会义务总秘书梁宇皋也口口声声保证马华公会绝对不致出卖华人之利益与福利;但马华公会中央领导层始终未曾正式公开表态,以致引起广大华人的不满,因此有人趁机提出,在4月27日召开大会的当天,讨论组织联合邦“华人总公会”,以争取华人之权益。

筹组“华人总公会”,兹事体大,自该建议提出后,引起了各方的瞩目,巫统认为“华人总公会”是直接与马华公会相抗衡,巫统认为马华公会是效忠于本邦的华人最高机构,因此绝不跟筹组中的“华人总公会”发生关系。马华公会会长陈祯禄认为新机构绝不会对马华公会发生危险,因此马华公会不拟采取任何对策。《海峡时报》更趁机兴风作浪,大字标题“争取联合邦华人实际领导权,企图推翻马华公会”,极尽挑拨离间之能事。<sup>24</sup>

“华人总公会”应否成立之问题,在联合发起召开华人社团会议的四大团体代表中也展开了激辩,其中雪州中华大会堂与教总持异

议,而雪华行团总会与吡叻中华大会堂却极力赞成。持异议者认为:全马华人社团大会之召开,其目的只有一个,即争取公民权,如届时讨论组织“华人总公会”的问题,不仅将分散华人的力量,可能被人作为挑拨离间的借口,且于手续不合。正如林连玉指出:马来亚是一个民族复杂的国家,民族间存有一些争执,在所难免,在“独立第一”与“团结第一”的原则下,大家不要说足以伤害民族间感情的话。由于商组“华人总公会”的问题,经过了一些西报的渲染后,问题似乎已趋严重,所以最好不要提。而持赞成论者却认为:马华公会乃一政党,事事要受到联盟其他成员的牵制,不能替华人争取利益。再者,马华公会会员以个人为单位,而“华人总公会”却以团体为单位,性质不同,在活动上不会彼此冲突。经过一番激辩后,结果否决了原拟“组织全联合邦华人总公会”之提议,而通过了林连玉的如下建议:“授权大会主席团,于必要时,再召开全马华人社团大会,继续由那一个机构来领导争取公民权。”<sup>25</sup>

1956年4月27日,联合邦华人注册社团代表争取公民权大会于吉隆坡精武体育馆轰轰烈烈举行,出席的有全马454个社团单位,1,000余名代表<sup>26</sup>。当天的精武体育馆,人潮汹涌,热血沸腾,代表们发出了一连串的狮吼声,一千颗心凝成一条心,一千张嘴高声呼出“我们要公民权”,吼声响彻云霄,喊出了300万华人的心声。林连玉把那天的会议比拟为1774年在美国费城所举行的争取独立大会,说明了华人要在马来亚生存,所以华人要争取公民权。这是人同此心,心同此理。

<sup>25</sup> 《中国报》,1956.4.22。

<sup>26</sup> 参加的社团包括马来亚联合邦8州(吉兰丹中华总商会未曾派代表参加,但以快邮代电,表示极力服从大会议决)及檳城与马六甲两殖民地。社团以宗乡会馆与业缘团体居多,此外还有各地中华大会堂、中华总商会、教师公会、俱乐部及各学校校友会等。各社团均派两个或以上的代表,代表人数以雪兰莪州最多,共320人,吡叻州居次,共222人,檳威省最少,只有11人。

<sup>23</sup> 《南洋商报》,1956.4.17。

<sup>24</sup> 《南洋商报》、《星洲日报》,1956.4.19。

大会通过了严正的宣言，指出华人要与其他种族合力建国，和睦共处，共存共荣。对巫族人士经济的落后，华人极表同情，并希望政府予以扶助，纠正不平衡的现象，但却不能违背宪法平等的精神。宣言强调华人已视马来亚为永久家乡，不但以它作为效忠的对象，也要子子孙孙对它忠贞不渝。华人子子孙孙要在马来亚生存，因此必须基于出生地主义的国籍法，授予华人公民权，享有同等的权利与义务。宣言最后声明，这次行动，其动机纯然是热爱马来亚的表示。华人的口号，是独立第一，团结第一，而公民权的合理解决，是实现完全独立，与真诚团结的最主要条件。<sup>27</sup>这篇宣言，义正词严，不亢不卑，的确是不可多得的历史文献。

大会也一致通过四大提案：即：（1）凡在马来亚出生之男女，均为马来亚当然公民；（2）外地来马居住满 5 年者，得申请为公民，免受语言考试；（3）凡属马来亚之公民，权利与义务一律平等；（4）列华巫印语文为官方语文。此外，大会也通过：（1）联络本邦各民族共同争取公民权；（2）大会备忘录正本由主席团签名，并亲自联袂呈递独立宪制调查团主席，副本分送各党派领袖、钦差大臣、联合邦立法议员、联合国秘书长及英殖民地部大臣；（3）签名运动，将大会印就之表格，分与各州自行办理，签名以团体为单位，每团体共签 6 份；（4）凡大会未决之事项，授全权予 15 人工作委员会办理，工作委员会之组成如下：主席团 5 人（雪州中华大会堂曹尧辉、吡叻中华大会堂刘伯群、联合邦华校教师会总会林连玉、雪华行团总会梁志翔、马六甲中华总商会陈期岳）、马华商联会、联合邦华校董事会总会及联合邦 8 州（雪州与吡州除外）各推举 1 名代表；（5）以大会名义致函首席部长东姑阿都拉曼，抗议东姑日前在巫统机关报撰文攻击争取公民权运动。



1956 年 4 月 27 日全马华人社团争取公民权大会会场

<sup>27</sup> 《中国报》，1956.4.28。



接着，15 人工委会展开的工作是：草拟一份备忘录，以提呈宪制调查团作参考。工委认为该备忘录绝不能马虎，必须具有法律观点与国际法观点，以便有必要时呈请联合国申诉，因此决定聘请一名法律专家负责起草的工作。其次是发动与协助联邦注册社团签名盖章运动，经过二个多星期的努力，已盖章的社团计吡叻 210 个，雪州 160 个，森美兰州 63 个，其他各州尚在进行中。<sup>28</sup>

1956 年 6 月初，以李特为首的宪制代表团抵达马来亚，进行调查工作，并准备广泛接受各族人士提供书面或口头的意见，华人社团如马华商联会、泛马广东会馆联合总会、马六甲华人联合社团及联邦华校教师会总会等都纷纷提呈备忘录，并获宪制调查团接见。这些备忘录之重点，无非是反复解释全马华人社团大会通过的四大提案。8 月 24 日，全马华人注册社团大会 15 人工作委员会委员，会见了宪制调查团成员，工委除了提呈备忘录外，还向调查团举出诸多事实，证明华人对马来亚的贡献与效忠。他们表示，巫人的特权必须有所限制与限期，无限的特权会造成阶级之分，从而引起种族间的争执，各种族必须平等，倘若独立后各种族不能取得公平待遇，宁可不要独立。因此他们希望调查团能制订一部公平而合理的马来亚宪法。<sup>29</sup>

宪制调查团成员在马来亚逗留了约 5 个月，这期间，他们节目紧凑，工作繁忙，曾到各地去视察，接见各族人士，会见各州苏丹与殖民地官员，总共收到了 131 份备忘录，或来自团体，或来自个人。调查团搜集了充足的情报后，离开马来亚，并订于 11 月 22 日在罗马聚首，以完成其报告。在离马前夕，李特爵士郑重声明，调查团草拟其

宪制建议书，绝对独立，不与任何方面磋商，这也就是他们不去英国而到罗马去草拟报告书的原因。<sup>30</sup>

在各方瞩目与期待下，宪制调查团报告书终于 1957 年 2 月 21 日正式公布。调查团鉴于联盟是由三大种族不同的政党所组成，而且又是赢得大选的执政党，所以报告书多采纳了联盟政治委员会提呈的备忘录之意见。至于全马注册社团大会所提出的四大原则，竟全部未受接纳，却作出了相反的建议如下：

（1）独立以前出生及独立后出生者自然成为公民，但对独立前在联邦出生者，却须在申请前 7 年中有 5 年住在联邦，略懂巫语，始可登记为公民。申请人须在独立后一年内申请，才可豁免语文考试。这样的规定，与全马注册社团大会提出的“出生地主义”之原则并不完全相等。

（2）在外地出生的联邦居民，须在申请前 12 年中有 8 年住在联邦，且须略懂巫语。只有那些年纪在 45 岁以上，而于独立后一年内申请，始能豁免语文考试。这与全马注册社团大会提出的 5 年期限与豁免考试，多出了 3 年。

（3）调查团建议巫文为官方语文，英文在 10 年内可继续为官方语文；10 年后是否继续采用，则由国会决定。报告书不建议列华文与印文为官方语文，理由是：“过去此事并不需要，我们认为可能引起重大的不便”。这大大违背了全马注册社团大会提出的提案，触犯了华人的顾忌。华人深恐华文不被列为官方语文之后，中华文化将不受尊重，华文教育将深受打击，华校将被迫变质为英校。

（4）报告书建议保留巫人所享有之特权，继续延长 15 年。这与全马注册社团大会提出的公民的权利与义务一律平等，悖不相融。

<sup>28</sup> 《星洲日报》，1956.5.24。

<sup>29</sup> 《中国报》，1956.8.25。

<sup>30</sup> G. P. Means, *Malaysian Politics*, p. 173; 《南洋商报》，1956.10.26。

总之,全马注册社团大会工委会对报告书的内容深感失望与不满。他们矢言要据理力争,俾四大原则能明文纳入宪法中。不达目的,他们将派代表团赴英国向英廷交涉,并向联合国人权委员会申诉。

报告书内容的偏袒巫族,工委会也将它归咎于马华公会的失责。身为联盟的成员之一,马华公会一路来都向巫统采取妥协的态度,不敢为华人的利益力争。在1956年9月中旬的马华公会委员会议中,即通过了如下的政治路线:“国家第一、政党第二、华人利益第二”,可见马华公会是把政党的利益置于华人的利益之上,因此在列华文为官方语文与马来人特权的问题上,马华公会表现了优柔寡断、踌躇不前的态度,成为华文舆论与华人领袖抨击的把柄。

1957年4月7日,马华公会会长陈祯禄在中央工作委员会会议上发表了一篇重要的演词,他表示再度支持联盟向宪制调查团提呈的建议,认为联盟的建议是最公允者,马华公会因此而感自满。他继续说,马华公会曾将其他华人团体之意见传达给李特宪制调查团,马华公会所能做到的仅此而已。马华公会不能自认为是代表超过大多数人士的机构,其他华人团体当然有权提出其本身的意见,马华公会是负责的政团,因此有责任与联盟的盟友取得最大程度的协议。马华公会不应提出任何极端不合理之要求,否则只要采取一个错误的步骤,即使本邦陷于混乱的局面,以及痛苦的深渊。<sup>31</sup> 14日,全马注册社团大会工委会召开会议,对陈祯禄的演词作了激烈的反响。主席刘伯群说:我们过去非常尊重马华公会,希望它能为全马华人做事。现在马华公会胜利了,却说是一个政党,只讲政党的话,不讲华人的话。林连玉也认为陈祯禄的一番话,说明了马华公会只是本邦的执政党之一,在全马华人中,只占十分之一,并不能代表全体华人,而华人之

<sup>31</sup> 《星洲日报》, 1957.4.8。

最高机关为工委会,争取全马华人的利益,已落在工委会的身上。会议于是通过一项郑重声明:马华公会仅为普通华人政党之一,绝不能代表全马华人公意。会议也决定组成一个4人代表团,首席代表刘伯群、团员林连玉、陈期岳与叶茂达,前往英国向英廷力争,俾将四大要求列入宪法中。<sup>32</sup>

首席部长东姑闻讯,特发表谴责声明,他说:我已经确知这些人士是谁,并知道他们是国民党的中坚分子,因此他们对马来亚并无利害关系,对马来亚也没有任何效忠之心,他们前往英伦的整个目标是为了宣传自己,以及为了阻碍我们独立的进展,因此我不以为殖民部大臣应接见他们。<sup>33</sup> 嗣后,林苍佑也以马华公会总会政治组主任的身份发表一篇声明指出:马华公会已有一个时期觉察到,若干华人对马来亚之效忠已发生了动摇,他们不但不效忠本邦,且曾在若干情形下,宣布效忠台湾。他们与本邦反独立分子朋比为奸,勾结在一起。他们企图在华人中以及华人与其他种族间制造分裂。声明继续称:我们快将独立了,已经是到了抉择是否要做马来亚人的时刻。作为马来亚一分子的华人,首先应该团结一致,同时也要与其他种族在共同的目标下团结奋斗。因此对于刘伯群等人所提议派代表赴英伦及组织新集团以与马华公会对抗之事,深感骇异。我们觉得他们这一举措,不但不利于马来亚国家,更不利于华人之团结。<sup>34</sup> 同时,马华公会更恫言进行“清党”计划,将违背章程者开除党籍。

政府发言人更进一步宣称:政府将采取严厉之行动,对付那些表面效忠本邦,实际上却反其道而行的人。政府如有确凿的证据,将剥夺其公民权。<sup>35</sup>

<sup>32</sup> 《南洋商报》, 1957.4.15。

<sup>33</sup> 《南洋商报》, 1957.4.16。

<sup>34</sup> 《中国报》, 1957.4.17; 《星洲日报》, 1957.4.17。

<sup>35</sup> 《星洲日报》, 1957.4.19。



另一方面，刘伯群等人除发表声明驳斥东姑与马华公会的指责外，决定于5月5日，“代表本邦（马来亚联合邦）1094个华人注册社团”赴英争取联合邦华人之宪制权益。至于原来预订为团员之一的林连玉，却以宪制问题之争取，应不妨碍本邦独立与各民族之团结之原则，以及马来亚问题最好由马来亚人民在马来亚解决为理由，力辞代表资格，不拟参加英伦之行，因此最后的代表团以刘伯群为首，连同陈期岳与叶茂达共三人。陈期岳又以马六甲之马来亚党代表身份到英国去。

这次马华团宪制请愿团在英国逗留了半个月之久。这期间，由东姑率领的“默迪卡”代表团也到英国去，与英殖相谈判独立等问题。英殖民大臣只承认东姑率领的代表团，因此对马华团宪制请愿团避而不见，因此请愿团颇受冷落。直至制宪会议圆满结束之后，英殖相始接见请愿团代表。他向代表们说，他们的请愿宣言中的四大要求，已经在制宪会议中详细讨论清楚。他说宪法条文将有折衷的解决办法。他请代表们接受宪法，效忠国家，努力为新马来亚而团结与努力。此外请愿团曾与保守党与劳工党远东小组委员会委员会谈。请愿团也接见记者，畅谈华人社团的四大要求。不过总的来说，请愿团这次千里迢迢到伦敦请愿，没有多大成就，而这也是意料中事。<sup>36</sup>

7月2日，马来亚联合邦新宪制白皮书在伦敦与吉隆坡同时发表，并于10月在立法议会通过，全马华人社团代表所提的四大原则，除公民权略作修改外，其他的三项原则完全不被采纳。工委会虽然表示抗议，并声明在以后适当的时机内，再争取实现四大原则。但也有人认为在独立团结的大前提下，工委会应顾全大局，忍让为国。刘伯群也表示工委会一致拥戴马来亚的独立。他说，宪制不平等，我们要争

<sup>36</sup> 达人，“泛马华人代表伦敦请愿经过”，《星洲日报》，1957.5.31。

取，但马来亚独立，我们要拥护，这是两件事，不能混为一谈。可见工委会诸君已摆出了妥协的姿态。

工委会于8月6日再度召开会议，商讨决定今后工作的新方针，通过了全力协助推动申请公民权的决议。并致函联盟政府，要求在独立后的一年里，凡年达45岁者，申请公民权可豁免语言考试。政府必须保证，在这一年内的申请者，如果当局接纳其申请书后，来不及发给公民证书，亦应准许他们参加投票选举。同时，工委会也致函全马华人注册社团，请尽力协助推动华人申请公民权。<sup>37</sup>

另一方面，马华公会总会为推动华人申请马来亚公民权，订于11月10日召开联合邦华人社团代表大会，俾联合全体华人之力量，对有意申请为独立马来亚公民之各界人士，予以必要的协助。针对这一点，工委会决函请全马华人注册社团踊跃派代表参加，以玉成斯举。至此刘伯群等人与马华公会似已前嫌冰释，马华公会也收回开除刘氏党籍的成命，只予以象征性的惩罚。

11月10日，全马华人注册社团、马华公会中央委员及各州分会委员联席会议终于如期召开，出席社团单位约700个，代表近千人，济济一堂，堪称热闹。席间众代表情绪激昂，散会时发生了小风波，但大会最终还是通过了林连玉的提案，即：“组织推动申请公民权总机构，其成员包括马华公会中央公民权小组委员5人（翁毓麟、陈修信、林苍佑、杨章港、杨邦孝）、马华公会11州分会代表11人，及11州代表11人，共27人，此27人应包括刘伯群在内”。<sup>38</sup>

提案的最后部分，显然是要给刘伯群挽回面子。

随着会议的结束，推动华人申请公民权运动迅速展开，开始时成绩是令人鼓舞的。据官方报告，每周的申请者约有38,000人。不过，

<sup>37</sup> 《星洲日报》，1957.8.7。

<sup>38</sup> 《星洲日报》，1957.11.11。



到了 1958 年 1 月初,热潮逐渐冷却。至 4 月,据估计只有半数的合格的华人申请公民权。马华公会有鉴于此,在新会长林苍佑的领导下,于 5 月间再度召开泛马华人社团大会,以便寻求各种途径,重新鼓起申请公民权的热潮。各州的马华分会与社团携手合作,吁请华人提高警惕,要他们尽量利用宽限的一年里进行申请,以享有豁免语文考试的优待。这些努力毕竟没有白费,截至 1958 年 8 月(宽限期满),马来亚联合邦申请公民权的人数达 1,003,831 人,其中有 803,064 (80%) 是华人。<sup>39</sup> 连前此获得颁发的华人公民总数约达 200 万。查 1957 年马来亚联合邦华人人口总额为 2,332,936 人,<sup>40</sup> 这样一来,没有获取公民权的华人只占少数,扰攘多年的公民权问题,至此总算大致上解决了。

华人的争取公民权,掀起了轩然巨波,不仅引起了华人社团与马华公会的抗衡,导致马华社会的分裂;也引发了马来人领袖如东姑与拿督翁等人对中国国民党人的抨击,使华巫两族关系益趋尖锐化,给独立建国前夕的马来亚,抹上了一层阴影。此外,华文语文与马来人的特权问题,也触痛了种族间的疤痕,从而使阴影愈益蔓延开去,我们将在下面第十三章论述。

## (二) 争取参政权全然失败

直至 50 年代上半期,除了少数有识之士外,马来亚的广大华人群众,并不热衷于当地政治活动,欠缺了对当地的政治认同,这可以从好几次的市议会及 1955 年的立法议会选举反映出来。

1951 年与 1952 年交替间,政府决定在马六甲、檳城与吉隆坡先后举行市政委员之选举。1951 年 6 月间,三个地方的中华总商会联合了华人社团积极推动选民登记的工作。雪兰莪中华总商会决定商请各社团负责调查并协助有资格的选民登记填表;并派员沿门挨户劝说协助选民登记;也请《中国报》与《丽的呼声》广事宣传。<sup>41</sup> 马六甲成立了推动选民登记委员会,敦请社会名流演讲,并编队逐户向选民晓以大义,协助登记。<sup>42</sup>

马六甲原订由选民选出 9 名市政委员,并于 12 月 1 日投票。但至 11 月 5 日的候选人提名截止日期,只有 9 名候选人,恰好填补了 9 个名额,毋须选举。而在 9 名市委中,只有 1 名华裔人士余有锦。马华公会会长陈祯禄对这次事件深表失望,他说:一般华人对市委选举裹足不前,反应冷漠,是羞耻的事,且损及马来亚独立的前途。他吁请华人必须积极参与本地政事。不过他也指出华人的冷漠态度,一部分原因是由于政府对非巫人申请公民权的严格限制所造成。<sup>43</sup>

檳城的市委选举于 12 月 1 日举行,由选民选出 9 名市委,各党竞争较激烈,标榜“非种族性”的激进党赢得了 6 席。据报道,很多华人没有选举权,对选举不感兴趣,没有把选举当着一回事。<sup>44</sup>

如果说檳城市委选举还不是全马政党实力竞争的试金石,那么吉隆坡市委的选举却吸引了若干政党的参加角逐,从而可窥出各政党的实力。参加吉隆坡市委竞选的政党有马来亚独立党(以拿督翁为首)、巫统、马华公会与劳工党,此外还有独立人士。较早时,马来亚独立党标榜不分种族,以团结争取独立为号召,声势浩大,志在必得。可是到了 1952 年 1 月 8 日,局势有了戏剧性的变化,原是种族性

<sup>41</sup> 《南洋商报》, 1951.6.7。

<sup>42</sup> 《南洋商报》, 1951.6.10。

<sup>43</sup> 《星洲日报》, 1951.11.7。

<sup>44</sup> 《星洲日报》, 1951.12.2。

<sup>39</sup> Wong Yoke Nyen, 同前文, p.36; 《南洋商报》, 1958.9.6。

<sup>40</sup> 1957 Population Census of the Federation of Malaya, p. 1.

政党的巫统与马华公会,竟宣布结成联盟,携手合作,参加竞选,这使得情势急转直下。

促成巫统与马华公会政治结盟的原因,在巫统来说,马来亚独立党争取马来选民的支持,在竞选中获优势,无疑是削弱了巫统的力量,所以巫统主席东姑阿都拉曼决定给独立党迎头打击。而吉隆坡市区的居民,有资格投票的华人虽不多,但却占了一定的比重。与马华公会携手出击,可争取到华人的选票。至于马华公会方面,却由于陈祯禄与拿督翁的私人积怨深重,拿督翁是个善变的人物,独立党曾标榜不分种族,骨子里的拿督翁却是个极端的种族主义者。如独立党在竞选中得势,将不利于华人,因此陈祯禄与东姑一拍即合,决意把独立党压下去。

吉隆坡市委选举于 1952 年 2 月 16 日举行。吉隆坡市区的居民约有 23 万,华人占了约 14 万。但选民登记未见踊跃,只有 11,005 人,其中华人 3,850 名、巫人 4,300 多人,其他为印度人及其他种族。当天投票者只有 7,995 人,约占登记选民的 70%。选举结果揭示,在 12 个议席中,华巫联盟获得 9 席,马来亚独立党获两席,另 1 席归独立人士。代表马华公会当选者是陈光汉、翁毓麟、李润添、陈志雄、李剑桥与谢有吉。<sup>45</sup> 华巫联盟第一次携手合作,初试啼声,便取得了辉煌的成就,于是奠定了日后长期合作的基础。

1955 年 7 月 27 日是马来亚联邦立法议员大选的日子,这是破题儿的第一遭,吸引了全马各政党的参加,展开激烈的角逐。参加的政党有:华巫印联盟、<sup>46</sup> 国民党 (Party Negara)、<sup>47</sup> 泛马回教党 (Pan-

<sup>45</sup> 《星洲日报》、《中国报》, 1952.2.17。据另一说法是:华巫联盟获票 10,240,马来亚独立党获票 6,641,与上述华文报的投票人数差异颇大。见 G. P. Means, *Malaysian Politics*, p. 134。

<sup>46</sup> 印度国大党于 1946 年 8 月成立。1954 年底加入为联盟另一成员。

Malayan Islam Party)、<sup>48</sup> 马来亚劳工党 (Labour Party of Malaya)、<sup>49</sup> 吡叻公民公会 (National Association of Perak)、<sup>50</sup> 吡叻进步党 (Perak Progressive Party)、吡叻马来人同盟 (Perak Malay League)<sup>51</sup>、以及独立人士。各政党共提出了 129 名候选人,计有联盟 52、国民党 30、泛马回教党 11、马来亚劳工党 4、吡叻公民公会 9、吡叻马来人同盟 3、吡叻进步党 2、独立人士 18,其中华裔候选人只有 20 名、印度籍 6 名,其他清一色是马来籍,<sup>52</sup> 角逐 52 个立法议席。

这次大选的另一特色,是选民结构的不平衡。估计登记选民总数为 128 万人,巫人有 1,078,000 人 (84.2%)、华人 143,000 人 (11.2%)、印人 50,000 人 (3.9%), 其他种族 9,000 人 (0.7%), 因此巫人选民的意向,成为决定大选的关键。据估计,有资格投票的华籍选民约达 60 万 (即华人成人人口的半数),<sup>53</sup> 但登记的华籍选民只有 143,000 人,约占 1/4,可见华人对大选的冷漠态度。

大选结果显示,联盟以其雷霆万钧之势,获得压倒性的。除了一席 (吡叻之吉辇 Krian) 归泛马回教党外,联盟囊括了 51 个席位。国民党全军覆没,即使是在拿督翁的老巢——新山,他也只得 22.4% 的选票,落个惨败。联盟大胜,东姑受命组阁,除了国防、外交与财政

<sup>47</sup> 国民党的前身是马来亚独立党,自 1952 年竞选吉隆坡市委失败后,拿督翁便锐意重整旗鼓,于 1954 年 2 月组成了国民党,它基本上是一个马来人的政党,走种族主义路线,全力争取马来人的选票。

<sup>48</sup> 泛马回教党的前身是马来亚回教徒党 (Malayan Muslim Party), 于 1948 年在吡叻成立,以宗教为号召,到 1954 年与 1955 年间,势力逐渐壮大。

<sup>49</sup> 马来亚劳工党势力主要在檳城、吡叻与雪兰莪,政治立场左倾,争取工会的支持,势力并不大。

<sup>50</sup> 吡叻公民公会成立于 1953 年,最早的主席是刘伯群,表面上是开放给各不同种族,实际上是与国民党同声连气,走种族主义的路线。

<sup>51</sup> 吡叻进步党与吡叻马来人同盟都是小政党,具有浓烈的种族主义色彩。

<sup>52</sup> K. J. Ratnam, 同前书, p. 187。

<sup>53</sup> F. G. Carnell, "The Malaya Elections", *Pacific Affairs*, Vol. 28 (1955), p. 316。



外, 联盟政府包揽其他大权。联盟政府接下来的任务便是争取全面独立。

上述的市委与立法议员的选举, 反映了华人对当地政治的冷漠。导致这种情形的因素之一是许多华人被剥夺了公民权。没有公民权就不能有选举权, 因此华人要争取公民权。然而, 即使有了公民权, 囿于立法议会的语言限制, 不谙英语或巫语, 就没有被选权, 因此争取废除语言限制, 从而使更多华人能跻身立法议会之林, 便成为争取的另一目标。

1955年2月间, 雪兰莪与吡叻先后召开华人社团大会, 一致议决请求废除议会语言限制。同时檳城中华总商会召开董事会议, 表示赞同。吡叻的小组委员草拟了一份备忘录, 呈给州苏丹议会, 副本则呈交钦差大臣转英女王。备忘录指出, 议会语言限制将使一部分人不能参加议会, 沦为第二等公民, 这样既不公平, 也会造成阶级间的纠纷, 而且选出的代议士也不能代表民意, 这也违背了国际的先例。<sup>54</sup> 雪兰莪华人社团也具备一份备忘录, 分别呈交雪州苏丹、英女王、钦差大臣与殖民部大臣, 作出类似的申诉。<sup>55</sup>

要求华语成为立法议会通用语之一, 乃至至于华文教育在当地之存亡, 关键在于华文华语是否能成为官方语文。到了1956年, 华人社团(尤其是教育团体)便积极争取列华文为官方语文。上一节提到的华人社团向李特宪制调查团呈交的备忘录, 提出四大原则, 其中之一即为列华文为官方语文。

然而, 要求议会采用多种语言却引起很大的争议, 马来人激烈反对。李特宪制调查团报告书也认为通译既麻烦且耗费, 不易执行, 因而不拟接受。<sup>56</sup> 华人的这项要求, 可说是全然失败了。

<sup>54</sup> 《星洲日报》, 1955.3.16。

<sup>55</sup> 《星洲日报》, 1955.5.12。

<sup>56</sup> K. J. Ratnam, 同前书, p. 131。

### (三) 知识分子国家认同的转向

这里所谓的“知识分子”, 是指那些受过旧式中文教育或新式中等中文教育以上, 具有基本的写读中文能力者。至于受英文教育的知识分子, 除少数例外, 大都效忠英殖民地政府。受中文教育的“士”的阶层, 日本学者把他们归类为华族中层阶级。这个阶层的人数有多少? 自然没有精确的统计, 但就战后十多年的情况而言, 中文教育越来越发达, 华校越来越蓬勃, 华校培训出来的知识分子越来越多。<sup>57</sup>

<sup>57</sup>

1946-1957 马来亚联邦华校、学生及教员教学

年份	学校	学生	教员
1946	1105	172,101	4513
1947	1338	193,340	5293
1948	1364	189,230	5337
1949	1338	202,769	5493
1950	1319	216,465	6245
1951	1171	206,343	6369
1952	1203	239,356	6057
1953	1214	250,881	6748
1954	1236	252,312	7035
1955	1276	277,454	7606
1956	1325	320,168	8435
1957	1347	391,667	9663

资料来源: Federation of Malaya, Annual Report on Education, 1946-1957

1946-1957 马来亚联邦华文中学、学生及教员教学

年份	学校	学生	教员
1946	15	4,508	194
1947	22	3,194	201
1948	21	3,474	220
1949	27	4,450	265
1950	32	5,830	380
1951	38	7,503	426
1952	40	11,378	462
1953	45	14,670	1,438
1954	38	18,112	512
1955	54	32,491	946
1956	70	40,330	1,037
1957	60	49,536	1,141

资料来源: Federation of Malaya, Annual Report on Education, 1946-1957

注: (1)学校数目包括附设于小学之中学; (2)学生数目不包括高师班学生。

他们服务于教育界、报业界与工商业界。他们的活动推动了华人社会的发展,产生了不可忽视的影响力。

有些知识分子,善于舞文弄墨,富有办报经验,便投身报界,或当主笔,或当编辑。由于见多识广,政治嗅觉灵敏,政治觉醒也较早。他们挥动其如椽之笔,撰述鸿文,再三发出振聋发聩的呼声,吁请广大的读者群,不能固步自封,一成不变,而须适应环境,把马来亚视为永久故乡,效忠当地政府。

早在 1947 年与 1948 年时,英殖民地政府加紧了限制华人申请公民权,给予华人不公平的待遇时,华文舆论界即发出议论,强调新马华人已将新马视为第二故乡,吁请政府给予华人合理的待遇,华人应争取公民权<sup>58</sup>。随着 50 年代争取公民权与废除立法院语言限制等运动的兴起,华人舆论界更屡屡发出议论,支持这一连串的运动。

马来亚联合邦华校教师会总会(简称教总)于 1951 年 12 月 25 日正式成立,其成员有 9 州 12 单位,辖属会员有五六千人,可说是代表全马华校教师的一个庞大机构,其言论反映了多数华文知识分子的心声。教总成立伊始,就作了认同于马来亚的表态,它说:

“……而目前华人几占全马人口总数之半,绝大多数与各民族和睦共处,且生聚教养,视若故乡,这可想见华人对本邦的热爱。马来亚将成为一簇新的国家,更需要各民族携手合作,互相尊重其文化,我们对建设马来亚的忠诚,过去如此,现在如此,将来也如此。”<sup>59</sup>

1955 年是马来亚民选立法议员的大选年,在全部 98 名议员中,由人民投票选出 52 名代表。在大选前几个月,敌对政党已展开宣传战。

<sup>58</sup> 如曾心影的“马来亚宪法草案批评与建议:华侨占人口半数应争取当然公民权”,《南洋商报》星期论文,1947.1.19;“公民权的重要性”,《星洲日报》,1948.2.12。

<sup>59</sup> “联邦华校教师总会宣言”。

教总意识到大选的重要性,并号召华籍选民给同情教总主张的候选人投下神圣的一票,教总的主张是:(1)华文教育应与各民族教育平等;(2)举办初级免费教育,各以母语教授;非英文学校,列英文为必修科目;(3)占全马人口半数的华人的应用语文——国语,应列为官方语文之一。在告华校教师及学生家长书中,教总说:

“本会为教育团体,属会遍十一州,会员数千名,日常能发生密切关系之学生家长,数达数十万人。我们均是知识分子,对于马来亚之自治,我们表示衷诚支持。我们并将加强工作,训导学童效忠于马来亚,与各民族平等,共建和平乐土。”<sup>60</sup>

嗣后,在为马六甲会谈<sup>61</sup>发表的书面谈话中,教总说:

“华校课本经已在改编中,以求适合于马来亚背境,我们欲提高华校英、巫文程度,亦欲训练华校学生成为忠诚的马来亚人民,并与其他民族学校(巫校、英校及印校)发展良好之关系。但我们也要保存我们的学校、我们的语言及文化。”<sup>62</sup>

上述两篇书面谈话的片段,已经充分显示了教总的当地认同感了。教总的对马来亚“效忠诚尽义务”的认同感,也见诸其他文字,这里就不一一列举了。<sup>63</sup>

<sup>60</sup> 《教总 33 年》(吉隆坡:马来西亚华校教师会总会,1987),p. 351。

<sup>61</sup> 马六甲会谈是于 1955 年 1 月 12 日下午 5 时在马六甲拿督陈祯禄爵士私邸举行,出席者除教总代表如林连玉、沙渊如、蔡任平等外,有联盟领导人如东姑阿都拉曼、伊士迈、梁宇皋、李孝式等人。他们在会谈中取得默契,即教总答应在大选期间,不提列国语为官方语文之问题,而联盟答应于执政后考虑修改 1952 年教育法令与 1954 年教育政策白皮书。

<sup>62</sup> 《教总 33 年》,p. 360。

<sup>63</sup> 如“教总呈英殖民部大臣波霭爵士备忘录”、“教总纪念第一届华文教节宣言”等,见《教总 33 年》,pp. 365-366。



1956年4月间，马来亚的争取独立运动如火如荼地展开，独立建国已经指日可待，但许多华籍人士仍然不被授予公民权，被剥夺了生存发展的权力。教总见事态严重，便连同吡叻、雪兰莪中华大会堂、马六甲中华总商会与雪兰莪华人行团总会发起召开全马华人注册社团代表争取公民权大会，教总主席林连玉在这次争取公民权的行动中，扮演了异常积极的角色，大会的宣言也是由他草拟的。宣言中呼吁建国后马来亚各民族应友好合作，纠正各种族不平衡的现象。强调华人对马来亚开发的伟大贡献，华人必须成为马来亚公民。宣言接着说：

我们当然要启示我们的后一代，以马来亚为效忠的对象，告诉他们：马来亚即是他们的故乡；马来亚各民族的父老兄弟及姐妹，都是他们的父老兄弟及姐妹；假设不幸，马来亚有了外来的共同敌人，他们必须挺身而出，为保卫马来亚而作战，不管那敌人来自何方，以及属于何种人，他们必须紧紧地站在马来亚这一边。<sup>64</sup>

这一段坦诚直率的告白，教总对当地的认同感不是跃然纸上吗？

教总的灵魂人物是林连玉，从1953年至1961年间，他众望所归，蝉联教总主席八届。林氏以威武不屈、贫贱不移的精神，领导教总与险恶的风浪搏斗。他的“横挥铁腕批龙甲，怒愤空拳搏虎头”的诗句，就是他刚烈勇猛的写照。现在就让我们看看林氏国家认同感转向的过程。

林氏是福建省永春县人，出身书香世家。幼时跟从祖父及父亲读书，及长，进入集美学校师范部就读文史地系，成绩优越，毕业后在母校服务，充当师范部国文教员。国民党北伐时，局势动荡，买棹南来谋生，先后在吡叻爱大华、印尼爪哇泗水、雪州巴生、育华及尊

孔等校任教，其中以在尊孔中学任教的时间最长，直至1961年被褫夺公民权，教育部下令停教为止。由上述可见，林氏是一介寒士，终身服务教育界，培养英才。

1940年初，战云密布，日军即将南侵，林氏参加了“雪兰莪医药辅助队”，平时勤加操练，一旦战事爆发，该队便负起救伤扶危的任务。当日机进袭吉隆坡时，该队发挥了高度勇敢的服务精神，到灾区救护受害的平民。嗣后，该队更移师南下新加坡，继续到灾区去执行救伤的工作，林氏也因此而蒙受皮肉之伤。林氏这种冒险的行径，一方面固然是痛恨侵略者的滥杀无辜，表现了人溺己溺的仁者精神；一方面也说明了他热爱马来亚这片土地，在大难临头的当儿，尽了一个小市民的绵力。

沦陷期间，林氏隐居乡间，以养猪种菜为业。胜利后，尊孔中学复校。然因日本统治期间，尊孔中学被日军占用，破坏殆尽，一切图书设备均荡然无存，复校需款亟殷，这时林氏便变卖猪只，将所得的款项作为复校基金之用。他热爱华校与民族教育的仁风义举，感人至深。

战后的华校教师待遇菲薄，命途多舛，为了改善教师的待遇，林氏从1946年起便积极筹建吉隆坡华校教师公会。然公会的组织一波三折，最后到1949年10月才正式宣告成立，林氏蝉联主席多年，会务进展迅速，为教师谋得多项福利，林氏居功厥伟。

1951年，林氏正式成为马来亚公民，这显示了他已经抛却了“飘零作客滞南洲”的心态，把马来亚视为永久故乡，认同于马来亚，终老于此地了。那时候，许多华人对马来亚公民权的申请，仍抱着犹疑不决的态度，而林氏却毅然作出决定，这不能不说他有先见之明。

<sup>64</sup> 《教总33年》，p. 374。



那时候，马来亚的争取自治独立运动正如火如荼地展开，英殖民政府也鉴于大势所趋，逐步地扶持殖民地的自治独立，一个新生的马来亚国，眼看就要诞生了。林氏原本对于新生的马来亚国抱有美丽的理想，寄予很大的期望，可是这时英殖民政府却接二连三颁布了压制华文教育的法令，使华校的生存与发展面临危机，为了保存民族文化的堡垒，林氏不得不振臂疾呼，奋斗不懈。保存中华文化，独立建国，难以取信于人，林氏有时不免要陷于矛盾的境地。

林氏理想中的马来亚国是怎样的呢？他强调独立建国后的马来亚，必须具有“马来亚精神”：

因为这地区，现有的居民，分明都有居住下去的决心，这族与彼族之间，虽然有其各自的文化背景，俨然有你疆我界的划分，而为着生活的关系，接触频繁的结果，当然会互相观摩互相吸收，经历若干时日以后，旧有的鸿沟逐渐泯灭，新生的观念逐渐形成，由小变而积成大变，以至于完全否定了从前。<sup>65</sup>


依林氏的意见，最美满的“马来亚精神”，应包括下列四种要素：（1）英人的民主精神。（2）华人的勤俭美德。（3）巫人的乐天襟怀。（4）印人的和蔼态度。<sup>66</sup>

林氏也强调在马来亚独立建国的事业中，挺重要的工作，就是国民的心理建设，大家要培养共存共荣的观念，就必须把所有的民族当作一家人看待，权利与义务一律平等，使大家都相信有福同享，有难同当，把国家建设得完整而稳固。<sup>67</sup>

<sup>65</sup> 康如也（林连玉笔名）“谈马来亚的精神”，刊于《杂锦集》（吉隆坡：林连玉基金委员会，1986），p. 37。

<sup>66</sup> 同上文，p. 38。

<sup>67</sup> 林连玉，“心理的建设”，原载《马来西亚前锋报》开斋节特刊献词，1959年5月4日；转载于《华文教育呼吁录》（吉隆坡：林连玉基金委员会，1986）序言。



联合邦华校教师会总会主席林连玉（1901.8.19 - 1985.12.18）：

马国须具备“马来亚精神”

早在 1952 年, 林氏就公开宣称: 我们生存的条件与马来亚有不可分割的关系; 在马来亚准备建国的前夕, 我们甚愿献身给马来亚, 为马来亚而效忠。<sup>68</sup> 嗣后, 他更呼吁外来民族要有以马来亚为第一家乡的观念, 只有马来亚才是祖国, 才是永久的家乡。只有马来亚的利害, 才是切身的利害。凡是做了马来亚的公民而不以马来亚为祖国的人, 就是马来亚的罪人。<sup>69</sup>

1952 年, 林氏曾协助教育部审查及改编华校教科书, 使其具有马来亚化的色彩, 向学生灌输效忠马来亚的意识。在一次演讲会上, 他更呼吁华文教育工作者, 须负起两大使命, 即: (1) 教导小孩子效忠于马来亚。他解释道, 人类是以求生存为目的, 而生存的条件与土地有不可分割的关系, 华人子子孙孙定居在马来亚, 已经成为不可避免的事实, 因此教师必须使小孩子认识马来亚是唯一的祖国。(2) 培养小孩子共存共荣的观念。因为要建设国家, 各民族必须和衷共济, 才能向上发展, 假如互相猜疑摩擦, 则力量抵消, 其后患不堪设想。<sup>70</sup>

由此可见, 到了马来亚建国前夕, 林氏已然消除了他乡作客的心态, 而把自己视为马来亚国民的一分子, 效忠于祖国。他不但自己率先成为公民, 更帮助推动华人申请公民权运动; 他不但自己效忠于祖国, 更要培养后代子子孙孙对祖国忠诚不二。

然而林氏认为华人献身祖国, 对祖国效忠不二, 是国民应尽的义务, 但华人尽义务后, 必须与其他种族一样, 享有平等的权利。换言之, 马来亚的立国必须建立在平等的基础上, 否则建国就没有意义了。林氏承认各民族的文化与经济发展并不平衡, 但他反对以一个多

<sup>68</sup> “马来亚联合邦华校董教及马华公会代表联席会议宣言”, 林氏为这篇宣言的起草人, 见《教总 33 年》, p. 319。

<sup>69</sup> 《心理的建设》, 序言。

<sup>70</sup> “林连玉在森美兰华文高师同学成立大会上的讲话”, 《教总 33 年》, p. 392。

数人的种族, 利用政治上的优势, 压抑另外一个种族。这正如赛跑一样, 把领先者的脚截断, 让后来者赶上, 这是不能令人接受的。尤其令他痛心疾首的, 是殖民政府 (乃至后来的民选政府) 蓄意消灭华文教育的阴谋, 更使他不能不振臂疾呼, 为保存民族文化的堡垒而奔走呼号。

执政者企图以国民学校来取代方言学校, 其最冠冕堂皇的理由是, 不同种族的儿童, 在同一类型的学校一块儿读书游戏, 最能促进种族的和谐, 培养效忠祖国的观念。林氏直斥这是一种美丽的幻想, 也是一种巧妙的诡辩。他申辩道: 国民教育是以教育的力量, 培养健全的公民, 以适合国家的需要。假使各民族所施行的教育, 与国家所订的教育宗旨, 不是背道而驰, 而所培养的学生, 能够适合国家的需要, 就是以华文为媒介, 也是国民教育的。<sup>71</sup> 林氏认为: 民族效忠之对象是以生存权利为条件, 而不是以文字工具为条件, 规定教育政策应强调精神上之合作共进之发挥, 倘若拘泥于形式上文字工具之学习是无意义的。<sup>72</sup> 他认为只要得到政治上的平等待遇, 纵使接受不同语文的国民教育, 人民依然会对国家矢志不二。瑞士即是一个很好的例子, 它不但有德意法三大多数民族, 还有其他少数民族, 自独立以来, 数百年间, 未曾发生过内乱, 这是因为政治上的权利义务分配平均, 没有主奴之分, 因此不同文不同种的人也可以团结。<sup>73</sup>

林氏宣称: 中华文化便是华人的灵魂, 必须受到极神圣的尊重。而华人文化的传递与发扬, 必须寄托在华文教育的继续存在与发展上。所以尊重华文教育就是尊重华人文化。政府要华人对马来亚效

<sup>71</sup> 林连玉, “在反对教育法令声中应有的认识”, 刊于《华文教育呼吁录》, p. 39。

<sup>72</sup> “呈教育遴选委员会意见书”, 刊于《华文教育呼吁录》, p. 2。

<sup>73</sup> “吉隆坡华校教师公会驳钦差大臣邓普勒爵士文”, 《教总 33 年》, p. 338。



忠，也要尊重华文教育。<sup>74</sup>为了确保华文教育与文化，林氏列举了很多理由：政府应列华文为官方语文之一，而这也是教总多年来奋斗的目标。

1957年，马来亚终于独立了。但政府以消灭方言学校为最终目标的教育政策，依然不变。而少数华人为了高官厚禄不惜出卖民族利益，这更触怒了林连玉。他不畏强权，声色俱厉，批评政府，痛斥权贵。1961年8月，政府以林氏故意歪曲教育政策及煽动各民族间的恶感与仇视为理由，褫夺了他的公民权，吊销了他的教师注册证，但林氏却泰然处之，以多年来所作所为，都是深爱与效忠马来亚的表现，正所谓仰不愧于天，俯不怍于地，是非自有公论，功罪交由历史评判。

1985年，林氏终因年老体衰，溘然长逝，享寿85岁。噩耗传来，轰动华社，天地同悲。出殡那天，万人空巷，灵柩穿过闹市，竟有市民当街下跪膜拜。林氏可谓生得伟大，死得光荣，其英烈风范，高风亮节，永垂不朽。

#### （四）资产阶级分子国家认同的转向

与新加坡的情况一样，领导马来亚华人争取公民权与参加政权的，是各地的中华大会堂与中华总商会，这些机构的高层领导人，大多是资产阶级人士，这也显示了在50年代期间，若干华人资产阶级分子已作了政治转向，认同于当地。

此外，马华公会的最高领导人之一的李孝式，也提供了华人资产阶级国家认同转向的一个例子。

李孝式是广东信宜人，民国初年曾在广州岭南学校附小及广州中学肄业，转入香港皇仁书院，毕业后赴英国剑桥大学学习经济与法律，获硕士衔。1924年到马来亚经营锡矿，鸿图大展，曾任雪兰莪矿商俱乐部主席、森美兰、雪兰莪、彭亨矿务公会会长，马来亚矿务总会会长等职。李氏也是极活跃的华人社会领袖，曾任雪兰莪中华总商会会长、马来亚广东会馆会长等职。

与战前其他中国移民一样，在李氏的潜意识里，仍眷恋着中国，关注中国的命运，因此当1937年七七事变，日军大举进攻中国时，新马华侨发动了抗日救亡运动，各地组织了华侨筹赈祖国难民委员会，他被举为雪州华侨筹赈会会长。在他的领导下，雪兰莪华人积极开展救国运动筹募巨款，抵制日货，购买公债，召募华籍机工回国服务，不一而足。1941年日军南侵，李氏被任为吉隆坡防空总司令。新马沦陷，李氏走避印度，辗转返抵重庆，向中国军事委员会作详细报告。旋往印度任职军上校参谋，在印度及缅甸各重要地点联络三国军事。<sup>75</sup>

随着日本投降，李氏于1945年10月返抵马来亚。那时，马共的气焰高涨，并利用舆论发动工潮；而中国国共两党的恩怨，并没有随着抗战的结束而消失，反而变本加厉。为了加强反共的宣传声势，李氏遂邀集若干侨领，募资创办《中国报》。《中国报》于1946年2月1日创刊，李氏被举为董事主席。初期的《中国报》的立场是反共的。对中国政局，它是拥戴国民党政府，反对中共；对马来亚政局，它是极力支持英政府的剿灭马共政策。

<sup>74</sup> “马来亚联合邦华校董教及马华公会代表联席会议宣言”，《教总33年》，p. 319。

<sup>75</sup> 关于李孝式的简略生平，见《陇西李氏纪念特刊》，pp. 26-27；宋哲美编，《星马人物志》，第一集（香港，1969年），pp. 306-307。



李孝式：马华公会创始人之一，国家认同转向的先知

不过，有许多事实证明了战后的李孝式越来越疏远了中国政治，尤其是国民党政府播迁台湾以后，李氏就没有公开发表支持国民党政府的言论，更不用说有政治行动的表现了。相反地，他越来越认同于本地政治，参与本地政治活动。

正如上述，李孝式是马华公会的主持者之一，而马华公会的其中一个宗旨，就是吁请华人以本邦作为第一故乡，为本邦效忠及牺牲。李氏既认同这样的宗旨，反映了其政治动向的转移。

自 1948 年至 1957 年间，李氏被英殖民政府委任为立法会议员兼行政会议员。原来根据马来亚联合邦协议，钦差大臣代表英国政府，负责推行政府的统辖权。协助他执行任务的是联邦执行议会（Federal Executive Council）与立法议会（Legislative Council），其中若干官方议员是由钦差大臣委任的，他们直接向钦差大臣负责，而能被委任的官方议员，必须是联合邦公民。<sup>76</sup> 李孝式之所以能被委任，首先是因为他已经具备联合邦公民的条件，这是一个认同转变的具体证据。当然，官方议员并不一定能反映民意，有时甚至违背民意，如 1952 年立法议会通过的教育法令，即是华籍议员悖逆民意的表现。

1952 年 2 月初，吉隆坡举行市议会选举，由合格选民选出 12 个市议员。马华公会与巫统第一次组成联盟参加竞选，主要对手是拿督翁（Dato Onn）的马来亚独立党与劳工党。竞选前，李孝式积极推动竞选工作，他以雪州马华分会会长身份，召开侨团代表大会，安排与策划竞选事宜；他也在电台与群众大会上，畅谈各族和谐共处之道与驳斥敌对党的议论。<sup>77</sup> 大选结果，联盟共获 9 席，其他 3 席分别归独立党与独立人士。吉隆坡市议会的竞选，说明了李氏是如何热心投入当地的政治活动。

<sup>76</sup> G. P. Means, *Malaysian Politics* (Hodder & Stoughton Ltd., 1976), pp. 57-58.

<sup>77</sup> 《南洋商报》，1952.1.26。



1955年7月，<sup>78</sup> 马来亚联邦举行立法议员大选，选出52个立法议员。参加角逐的主要政党有联盟、国民党与泛马回教党。在竞选期间，李孝式再度表现的高度的政治热忱，参加电台广播，出席群众大会，阐述联盟的独立主张，呼吁选民支持联盟。大选结果显示，联盟取得了51个席位，获得压倒性的胜利。这次登记的选民有1百20余万人，其中超过80%是马来选民，华籍选民只占11%，后者却表现了对政治的冷漠。大选过后，由联盟组织政府，李孝式被委为交通部长。<sup>78</sup>

为了争取马来亚的全面独立，一个由东姑率领的代表团于1956年1月中飞赴伦敦，与英国政要举行谈判，李氏是代表团的成员之一。出乎意料之外，谈判过程进行得很顺利，英政府同意1957年8月31日让马来亚独立。当马来亚独立后，李氏被任为财政部长。<sup>79</sup>

类似李氏一样，华人资产阶级分子政治认同转向的例子，还有相当多，如刘伯群、黄树芬等人都是，这里就不一一详细列举了。

<sup>78</sup> 《星洲日报》，1957.7.22。

<sup>79</sup> 《星洲日报》，1957.7.21。

## 第十二章 海峡华人的政治活动 1950—1957

战后初期，海峡华人的政治思想意识，已有了明显的分野，一派是开明派，随着战后政治的遽变，他们已扩大其政治视野，认识到所有华人（包括海峡华人与中国移民）必须团结一致，与其他民族同心协力，共同奋斗，才能达到马来亚的独立，创建一个新兴的马来亚国，陈祯禄与李光耀是这一派的典型代表。另一是保守派，他们依然抱残守缺，迷恋于殖民地时代英籍民所享有的权益，斤斤于少数人的利益，不能容忍异样的政治行为。这种政治思想意识的分野，自然会导致两派的对抗，也造成了保守派海峡华人与中国移民（及其后裔）的分庭抗礼。然而，时代的巨轮毕竟是不断地向前迈进，新马的政治局势不停地翻新，到了五十年代后期，即使连保守的海峡华人也改变了其思想。基于共同的利益，海峡华人终于觉悟到自我孤立是无济于事的，他们改变了对中国移民及受中文教育者的看法。槟城的海峡英籍华人公会甚至有意并入马华公会，虽然鉴于两者歧见的深重，这种意图终究无法实现。

### （一）马来亚的海峡华人

在50年代里，槟城与马六甲的海峡英籍华人公会当然异常关注他们的命运，并努力争取其合法的权益。50年代初期，马共势力膨胀，活动异常猖獗，槟城海峡英籍华人公会一本过去对当地的热爱，向政府建议组织职业军队，以保家卫国。他们认为时机已然成熟，并有数项好处。即：（1）可促进当地人民明了在防务工作上，一般公民应负

的，就好像在“馬來亞聯盟”危機中，馬來領袖所採取的那樣。事實須用肯定的語氣加以說明。馬來人必須警覺到他們本身及他人的缺點。在必要時，必須制定法律，以便使被視為需要的經濟政策發生效力。必須制訂嚴峻的懲罰措施，以對付那些阻碍馬來人提高本身地位至跟其他種族平等的人。明智的領袖們對當前的問題有廣泛的了解，并具有毅力去解決它們，那麼，國內經濟的穩健成長將不會受到干擾。其實，當馬來人的地位提高至跟其他馬來西亞人同等的水平，將能導致常年財政預算案演詞所粉飾的國家收益與生產的輝煌統計數字更為準確。

但是，馬來人的困境是：不僅很少作出努力去糾正使馬來人受苦的經濟錯誤，同時，提及這種經濟錯誤的存在，也被指為是不對的。整個概念似乎是，越少談論它，那麼，國家就能從華人控制的經濟穩定中受惠。有人告訴馬來人：重要的是，馬來西亞必須是一個繁榮的國家，而像他們這類商業上的業餘人士，對於這種繁榮看來是不大可能有貢獻的。這一切論調都完全確實。假如華人在全面控制馬來西亞經濟的道路上沒有碰到人為障礙，國家就一定會繁榮起來。馬來人的困境是，究竟他應該停止自助，以便他們可以成為一個繁榮國家的貧窮公民，抑或是他們應該嘗試取得一些這個國家所誇耀的財富，即使這樣做會略略沾污馬來西亞的經濟美景。對馬來人來說，這不僅是一個經濟困境，而且是馬來人之困境。

## (五) 種族平等的意義

種族平等是種族和諧及國民團結的一個先決條件。沒有人真正地爭論這點。主僕之間，貧富之間，統治者與受統治者之間的和諧，不是真正的和諧，這只是接受看來是不可改變的事實。價值觀念和思想的改變遲早會導致人們反對現狀，接着將產生一種運動去促成一個更公平的局面。要有平等，無者將得益，有者就損失，因此，在達致這個目標的過程中，以往的“和諧”關係勢將出現緊張。一旦實現了平等，社會所受的壓力和緊張將減緩，最終更可能達到和諧。到時仍會有衝突，不過，起碼其中一個公認的根源應可消除。

不幸的是，雖然種族平等被公認為是種族和諧不可或缺的條件，但人們對種族平等的意義，還是了解不多。每個種族社會或個人往往依據各別的利益來闡釋種族平等，例如，在獎學金問題上，有些人認為種族平等的意義是公平競爭獎學金，而不論種族背景。假如接受這種釋義的話，其結果是不但不能實現種族平等，反而加劇種族間的懸殊，至少在馬來西亞會發生這種局面，換句話說，某個領域的平等，可能會造成另一個領域的懸殊擴大。

種族偏差不單只是馬來西亞的特點，在大多數有不同種族聚居的國家，情形沒有兩樣。種族偏差的現象是那麼地普遍，意味着問題不易解決。再說，各國種族衝突的原因都不相同。無論如何，對其他國家的情況做一個研究，雖然不一

定能夠解決我們的問題，但應該是有益的，至少對問題的根源，有更廣泛的了解。

在以下的篇幅中，我將試圖對種族平等下一個定義，主要是援引美國的種族問題為例。這並非不偏不倚的，不過，由於有關馬來人作為一個特權民族的問題人們已談得很多。也許目前正是適當的時機去聆聽馬來人對這些特權和種族平等問題的看法，然後讓態度認真和誠實的人去評價，並且找出一個解決問題的方案。

在任何擁有超過一個種族文化集團的國家裏，種族平等的問題構成一個非常重大的論題。自馬來西亞誕生以來，甚至在馬來亞獨立以前，這個問題就一直是苦難和政治論爭的焦點。獨立了十二年頭以及相對的種族和諧，並未減少這種問題所挑起的政治爭論。1969年5月13日的事件使到這個問題表面化。問題才顯得比以往更迫切，這是明確了解馬來西亞種族平等意義的時候了。

種族平等包含某些價值觀念，而價值觀念是根據某個種族所接受的標準而有所不同。要了解種族平等的意義，就必須知道所比較的價值准則是什麼，把這些價值准則與其他國家的價值作一比較也可以顯示出其意義。

每談到種族平等，第一個聯想到的國家是美國。在美國，全體公民，不論膚色，種族或宗教在法律面前一律平等。當然有幾個州，即使法律也是帶歧視性的，不過，聯邦憲法，正如法院所闡釋那樣，賦予黑人與其他美國公民同等的地位。美國的種族不平等，並非歧視性法律造成，而是社會和經濟排斥的結果。如果反應出來的暴行算是一種徵兆的話，社會和經濟的隔離，與法律面前的不平等同樣，或甚至更令人憎惡。

美國黑人處境如何？正如上面指出，美國憲法十三、十四和十五條修正案，給予黑人與其他美國公民平等的地位。早期人們對憲法的釋意是存有偏見的，目前對憲法的釋意是明確的，即所有公民，不論種族、膚色、宗教或淵源，法律面前人人平等，同享公民的平等權利。第十四條修正案中的權利法案進一步澄清了公民的權利。由於憲法是美國的最高法律，又因為最高法院在各州都有其司法權，各州的歧視性法律和慣例可以，而且已經訴諸憲法條文加以廢除。換句話說，毫無疑問的，在法律上，種族平等存在於美國，假如美國因為種族不平等而發生不安和騷亂，並非因為憲法具有歧視性，而是因為在社會和經濟上對黑人存有意識上的歧視。

社會和經濟歧視與法律上的歧視同樣有力和具侮辱性，甚至可能比法律上的歧視更有作用。少數民族聚居區並非為黑人而設，它們是相當普通的城市住宅區，開設予所有公民享用，波士頓的洛杉堡黑人住宅區看來與美國的其他城市住宅區沒有兩樣。洛杉堡之成為一個黑人區，是白人不約而同地遷出，而黑人遷入的結果。因此，一旦黑人經濟上有能力移居城市中任何環境較佳的地區時，白人就遷出，把這個地區轉變為黑人區。由於比黑人富裕的白人不會住用所空下的建築物，造成產業跌價，貧窮的黑人隨即遷入，城市黑人區就這樣變成貧民窟。

黑人區的形成不外是社會排斥的結果，這種過程在美國各地一直進行着，人民要遷居，法律不能強迫他們永遠居住在一個地方，也沒有什麼方法能強迫白人與黑人為鄰。因此，黑人區仍將不斷在美國形成，造成種族不平等，甚至法律也解決不了。

在美國，社會歧視的例子比比皆是，經濟排斥是造成美



國種族不平等的另一個因素，就像社會排斥一樣，經濟排斥形形色色。如果有人要找出這種經濟歧視的原因，他所得到的答案不外是，這並非種族因素，而純粹是經濟問題。黑人是下等的、愚蠢的、懶惰的，他們無能知道金錢的價值，不懂吸取技能，也不會適應新方法和新概念。除非不得已，否則沒有人要僱用他們。長遠來說，僱用白人比較廉宜，因為他們生產力較高，水平也較高，而且各行業的白人勞工絕對不會嚴重短缺，對黑人的大量需求是很小的。

這個問題的答案很簡單，如果黑人的工作能力那麼低，他們當初為何會被帶入美國？我們知道，黑人是從最黑暗的非洲的森林運入美國，在美國移民的園坵和家中工作，他們不僅成為優秀的園坵工人，而且還成為廚師和管家。

如果說今日黑人在技術和能力上落後，那是因為他們世代在社會和經濟上受隔離。美國逐漸從農業經濟銳變到高度精密的工業經濟，白人的後裔隨着時代的演進而進步，改變了他們的生活方式，接受適當的教育，吸取新的技能。隨着黑人與白人之間的能力差距擴大，前者變得冷漠起來，使他們越來越不能適應環境和溝通鴻溝。這種冷漠態度以及看似無能力學習和適應環境的特質現在被用來在經濟上隔離黑人，使黑人與白人之間的差異持續下去且不斷擴大。

當然，有少數黑人取得突破，他們就是最能看到和感受到本族社會憤懣的人，並且渴望糾正黑人世代以來所背着的錯誤，而他們也一樣難免訴諸政治行動，這種行動帶有某個程度的暴力而驚動世界，他們甚至採納騷亂、縱火、以及謀殺作為爭取種族平等的手段。

我們可以達到一個明顯的結論，即單單法律上的平等並不足夠。所謂平等，是指在每一個事物上都有份，包括生活

中的美好實物和責任。讓全民公平分享生活中的美好事物，不單只是政府的意向，人民也須有同樣想法。這種意向必須時時明確地闡釋。美國政府和人民向世界誓言，他們無意把黑人看作是下等公民。如果黑人分享不到美國的繁榮，那是他們本身的過失。但是，把全部過失推到黑人身上既不正确，也不能令人接受。黑人與白人之間所以出現無法縮小的鴻溝，是因為美國的經濟制度和社會排斥，這種鴻溝正在自動擴大，時移境遷，這個問題變得越來越難解決。單單向黑人說：“我們不反對，過來取吧！如果你們願意與我們一樣苦幹，一切都屬於你們的。”這是不夠的。我們很清楚，黑人只說：“我會苦幹！”並不能夠越過世代在經濟、社會和教育上落後的深淵。

美國政府顯然體會到它有責任協助黑人縮小這個鴻溝，它曾經耗費數以百萬元計的款項，推行一系列的新計劃，創立各種新制度，為黑人提供必需的訓練，使他們適應美國經濟繁榮的體系。但是，除非整個美國人民停止歧視黑人，否則，政府的一切功夫都告白費。國內的商店、工廠、辦事處和酒店必須接受黑人做各級工作。更重要的是，在最初的適應時期，政府須為黑人提供某種利便。其實，黑人所需要的，不僅是平等的待遇，而要多多將就他們，以便順應他們。由於黑人與白人之間的鴻溝是世代的歧視所造成的，培養適應意識，也要經歷世代才能見效。一旦做到這點，真正的種族平等就建立起來了。

種族集團可在法律範圍以外實行社會與經濟排斥，法律上的平等是毫無意義的，一名僱主拒絕僱用黑人，隨時可提出一連串似乎正當的理由，倘政府和社會願意接受這些表面堂



皇的理由，種族不平等將繼續存在，導致不滿、憤懣、騷亂、縱火和死亡，開明的政府和社會必須堅持以積極的步驟去融合；說得貼切一點，兩者應並肩齊步去剷除不平等現象，把它澈底地糾正過來，以便抗拒將來勢必產生的反响。實際上，這意味着政府和社會不但要追究公共行動，也要細查私人行動，確保種族平等普及。對於一個只僱用一名店員的店東，應該像對僱用數以千人計的龐大工業機構一樣懷疑他們是否實行種族歧視。美國的開明輿論正慢慢做到這點，開明的美國人畢竟不多，無法使全國體會到其成效。

美國還有另一個鮮為人關注的種族不平等例子；紅印第安人因種族不平等而受的痛苦並不亞於黑人，不過，由於人數較少，居住地區在新聞記者的追查範圍之外，他們的處境沒有暴露出來。奇怪的是，紅印第安人實際上在美國是擁有特權的人民。他們擁有別人無法得到的土地，他們甚至獲得豁免某些課稅。在法律上，他們比美國的其他公民更加“平等”。然而，他們並非美國的超級民族，實際上反而是賤民。每當問及紅印第安人的問題時，美國白人的典型見解是：印第安人是無可救葯的，如果你給錢他們，他們寧可購買一輛“卡迪叻”房車，也不會用錢去改善生活。

然而，如果一名白人中了彩票，他不一定會立即從商，以鞏固他的利益，相反的，他極可能會把大部份的獎金花在他以往所妄想的奢侈品方面。因此，印第安人的反應不足為奇，這是人的本性。不過，所欠缺的是要如何協助印第安人融入其他美國人社會的意願，換句話說，儘管享有特權地位，印第安人仍被視為下等民族，不配在美國社會享有平等地位。

印第安人沒有像黑人那樣作出暴力反應，那是因為他們

的人數較少，而且散居各地，在地理上和部落認同上分隔開來。到美國觀光的人，即使逗留好幾個月，可能也碰不到一個印第安人。不過，他們的憤懣是真實的，在美國家喻戶曉的印第安人民歌手布菲·聖瑪莉就曾在一首民歌中訴說他的祖先的土地被人掠奪，却不知道印第安人換回了什麼，很明顯的，種族不平等對印第安人的損害與黑人沒有差別。法律上規定特權是不夠的，必須使平等名符其實，明顯的，印第安人須公平分享作為美國白人特色的經濟繁榮。印第安人應享有的特權，不應當作歷史片段來保存而為美國圖景增添色彩，他們必須真正地融入美國社會，不論在經濟上、社會上或政治上。

那麼，種族平等是什麼？它是否一個能夠加上定義、分類或受法律捍衛的法律定量？若然，紅印第安人將是美國的超級民族，不過，從黑人不安演變成的暴力事件以至印第安人無聲的吶喊看來，法律上的地位是不足夠的。要達到平等，在社會上、經濟上和政治上，這些民族就要被接受融入社會的各個階層中，其程度應多少反映各種族的組成比例。在美國武裝部隊中有黑人軍官率領白人士兵，美國總統用黑人當他的局主任或總統助手，有黑人任法官和大使，這些都不足夠，而應讓他們參與更多的領域，如私營工業中須有黑人行政人員、有黑人飛機師和空中小姐、黑人店員和餐廳管理員、黑人工程師、律師和醫生。此外，同樣必要的是，這些等級的人不應在受僱地方被隔離或住在黑人村或保留區。

在今日的美國，這是白人和黑人自由主義者的想法，也是美國政府的主張，但是，一般的美國白人仍傾向於歧視黑人，表現得與眾不同和比人優越。縱使政府不使白人的優越地位合法化也不要緊，白人依然能夠個別，私自和集體去壓

迫黑人。白人有能力不給他們工作，不讓他們吸取技能，不給他們經商的機會，不給他們貸款和知識，也不讓他們接近現代經濟的複雜組織。

美國的種族不平等與馬來西亞的情況有什麼關連呢？答案是：“的確非常有關係”，因為種族不平等不論在何處，都產生相同的現象——更大的不平等、痛苦和暴力。在馬來西亞，不平等的程度不像美國那樣大，但暴力的種子無疑是存在着的。

在馬來西亞，無可否認，馬來人的地位與非馬來人有別，馬來人與美國的紅印第安人情況大致上相似，馬來人被接受為土生的人民，但國家却不是他們專有的。不過，為了保護和保存他們的地位，制定某些法律是有必要的。

在這些法律中，最重要的是與馬來保留地有關者，凡是熟悉紅印第安人歷史的人，發現到不僅法律中的條款相似，甚至歷史內容也相同，制定原有法律的因由並非英國殖民地時代授予馬來人某種國民特權。移民在法律上向來有合法權利佔有土地，甚至在馬來保留地法律生效以後，移民和外國人仍然能夠為他們的土地領到地契。因此，這條法律並不是在表現國家意識，但其他國家的法律則不同，規定只有公民才可擁有土地。馬來保留地的原來用意，是要反擊殖民地時代的一個日益明顯的趨勢：即馬來人的所有土地正易手給比較富裕的移民和外國人。顯然的，除非採取法律上的措施，否則，馬來人將在自己的國家內向外國人和移民地主租賃土地。換句話說，雖然馬來人把馬來亞稱為“馬來人的土地”，但實際上，這裡沒有一塊土地是真正屬於他們的。在某個時期，這種可能性真是昭然若揭，足以相信。

原有的法律並非要取回馬來人已經失去的土地，甚至不

是要完全制止外國人取得土地，它的目的純粹是要確保馬來人有些空地居住，而且還可稱為自己的。那些非馬來人——當時也是非公民所擁有的土地，仍然是屬於他們的產業。此外，法律也有條款規定馬來保留地可割讓給人，這樣，非公民不會完全受禁止取得新土地，在殖民地政府看來，基於種種原因，這樣做是有必要的。而割讓土地的原因却是不勝枚舉。

不公平地割讓馬來保留地的最顯著例子，就是涉及吡叻州內蘊藏錫礦的土地。每當在馬來保留地發現錫藏時，州理事會必定允准把適當的部份割讓出來給英國人和非馬來人。另一方面就從別處撥出一塊面積相等的州土地作為馬來保留地，這些新土地都是從原始森林中挑選出來，既進不到去，也沒有具價值的礦藏。這等於說，有價值的馬來保留地換回不足取的森林，這些森林對馬來人或任何人都毫無即時的作用。

在城市地區，割讓馬來保留地是殖民地時代最常見的現象。割讓的理由條條都顯得充份。最常見的理由是馬來人貧窮。城市地區的馬來人為了致力維持與其他城市居民相等的生活水準，很快就負債累累，債主是非馬來人。最普通的抵押品是他們的土地。馬來人無法還債，法庭就諭令拍賣土地，若馬來人出價不夠高，土地就售賣給非馬來人，只要從馬來保留地割讓出來，非馬來人就有權擁有這些土地，這是法律上的規定。這種事件不但發生在城市地區，鄉村地區也不例外。在吉打州，就因為這項條款，數以千計馬來人擁有的稻田脫手。

這種割讓法有個奇特現象：如果馬來人買回一塊從馬來保留地割讓出來的土地，這塊地便自動回復以前的地位。這



項條款防止馬來人重新取得被割讓過的土地。非馬來保留地的價格通常比較昂貴，因為這些土地是為比較富裕和比較機智的種族所有。這種土地通常給非馬來人地主帶來豐厚的入息。如果這些土地由馬來人買回去，而恢復馬來保留地的地位，其價值就會貶低。換言之，馬來人購買過去屬於馬來保留地的土地，是無利可圖的。因此，馬來保留地一旦被割讓，就等於成為非馬來保留地了。

保留土地給馬來人的法律條款，是否就使馬來人成為比非馬來人高一等的公民了呢？這項條款是否造成種族不平等？我們可以不假思索就得出結論，這條法律的制定，最初是種族不平等促成的，在英國殖民地初期，情形非常明顯，如果任由掠奪成性的移民和英國剝削者擺佈，馬來人將成為沒有土地的一羣。這個趨勢在城市地區最為顯著。以吉隆坡為例，到了一八九〇年的時候，馬來人幾乎已失去所有的土地，以當時非馬來人購置土地和吉隆坡擴展速率來看，馬來人正逐漸成為吉隆坡的外來者，因此政府趕緊在這個當時屬於雪蘭莪州首府及後來成為馬來聯邦首都的城市開闢一個稱為“甘榜峇魯”的馬來保留區。

在國內其他地區，馬來保留地法律成為保留一些土地在馬來人手中的一個法律依據，正如前述，統治當局也想出一些方法來迴避這條法律，這些方法，加上非馬來人的財富，有效地否棄了這條法律原本看來要賦予馬來人的優越地位。這條法律並未完全防止人們把最富庶的土地割讓給非馬來人。經年累月，這條法律的作用是把馬來人趕去價值較低的土地，而非馬來人，尤其是歐洲人則取去蘊藏錫礦和適宜種植橡樹的土地。在某些州屬，儘管有馬來保留地法律，非馬來人所擁有的土地還是比馬來人多，而無可否認的，以實質估

值來算，只有在一兩個州內，馬來人地產價值比非馬來人高。

城市地區土地的價格往往比鄉村地區高昂，馬來保留地法律實施的結果，使城市裡的土地很容易讓非馬來人取得。一旦非馬來人獲取了從馬來保留地割讓出來的土地，價值激升，貧窮的馬來人根本沒有能力購買。城市地區的土地，實際面積雖然小，但却比鄉村地區一大片一大片的馬來保留地有價值。

我們可以下個結論，到真正估價的時候，擁有高價城市地皮和最富庶的生產性土地的非馬來人，地位更具特權。換言之，雖然有馬來保留地法律，馬來人仍淪為次級地主。最糟糕的是，目前的法律仍不可能糾正這種情況。

因此，馬來保留地法律不能說導致了種族不平等，這些法律的原意其實是想糾正種族不平等。在這方面，這些法律只是部份成功而已，由於這條法律過去應用得不得法，加上馬來社會與非馬來社會之間的經濟財富有天淵之別，這條法律的作用變得很小。儘管實行這條法律，種族不平等依然存在，不過，如果廢除這條法律，種族不平等不但不會矯正，反會加深。原本促成這條法律的馬來人的不幸處境，並沒有完全糾正過來。當然，若沒有這條法律，馬來人將會陷入更惡劣的處境，進而加劇現存的不平等。

其他“法律上”的不平等牽涉到獎學金和民事服務中的工作。這些不平等基本上與教育有關，在教育方面，馬來人遠比其他種族落後，只要看看每年的學校文憑考試成績，就可發現這點，在馬來亞的人口中，將近五十巴仙是馬來人，但考試成績顯示，馬來人考生的及格率却比五十巴仙低很多，更壞的是，考獲一等文憑的馬來人數比其他種族來得少。

因此，很明顯的，除非採取特別糾正措施，否則，馬來人的受教育機會將永遠無法超越初級教育，而他們也只有做國內最低級的工作。

馬來學生表現差勁，部份原因是他們的長期貧窮和鄉村背景。大多數人都不充分了解貧窮的不良影響。貧窮的父母不但窮困潦倒，而且受教育少，沒有辦法照顧求學的子女。他們不了解教育的價值，對教育態度冷淡，對孩子的潛質缺乏信心，甚至常常無法應付孩子求學的基本需求。若孩子天資特別聰慧，他也許還能克服這些困難，但對於那些資質普通的孩子，缺少這些基本需求必然對他們的學業有不良影響。

貧窮的馬來父母，由於無知和缺乏興趣，而沒有給予求學的孩子精神上的鼓勵。他們鮮少敦促孩子努力向學，他們沒有提供地方和設備給孩子讀書，不是沒有這個念頭，就是無能為力。在鄉村地區，孩子晚上讀書，父母也沒有準備燈光，由於本身未受過教育，這類父母根本不知道孩子學習什麼，更遑論在學業上指導他們了。孩子生病，他們也沒有能力提供適當的食物或醫葯護理，當然，他們也無法給予孩子額外的教育輔助，好像書本及請補習教師來教導成績差的孩子，其實，若不是政府實施強制教育，貧窮的馬來父母甚至不會關心孩子的正式教育。

政府協助人民受教育的其中一個比較有效方法，就是提供獎學金。獎學金是為兩類學生而設，第一種是為聰慧的學生而設。事實上這是獎品，正像其他獎品一樣，並非由最需要的人贏獲。得到獎學金固然值得興奮，但沒有獎學金，對獲獎的人並非一個絕對的障礙，贏得這類獎學金的聰慧學生，往往都不是出身貧苦家庭。來自家庭貧窮學生，是屬於例

外，原因早已詳述。在一個種族或國家的教育進展中，這類獎學金不能說是不可或缺的。

另一種獎學金是發給資格最低的學生，這類學生因為經濟困難而在學業上面對不利條件。對於他們，獎學金是絕對需要的，這是突破惡性循環的方法。在現代社會中，落後就會造成貧窮，貧窮導致教育程度欠佳，教育低劣，貧窮情況就會惡化，這種循環須在某個部份打破。富裕國家如馬來西亞，若不補貼窮苦子弟的教育，勢將被冠以一個沒有負起道義責任的罪名。貧窮馬來學生目前所領取的獎學金在道義上是正當的，從社會角度看也是有必要的，這是在進步中的國家內，落後民族謀求進步的方法，是糾正種族不平衡的一個方法，同時也是把馬來人的水準提高到與華人和印度人同等的方法。

有人會問，為何把那麼大部份的獎學金發給馬來人？這種比例不就顯示種族偏愛和不平等嗎？難道沒有貧窮的華人和印度人也需要這些獎學金嗎？

要答覆這個問題，我們不得不重談給予馬來人優待的基本原因，給予馬來人優待，並不是要把他們置於優越地位，而是要把他提升到跟非馬來人同等的水平。在英國殖民地政權下，情形已經很明顯，馬來人不單只在經濟上落後，在教育上也追不上別人。雖然當時馬來學生的人數遠遠超過非馬來人，但他們只不過是普通小學的學生。這是因為馬來人免費接受普通小學教育。這種小學教育對馬來人適應現代社會並沒有幫助。事實上，人們也不敢期望這些學生能適應現代社會。除了少數之外，預料大多數都是留在他們的村莊裏，過着他們的祖先那種貧窮困累的生活。

另一方面，非馬來人經濟上富裕，從英國人所推行的中



學教育中受益較大。其實，只要有錢，他們的教育是沒有止境的。不錯，並非每一個非馬來人都富裕，有能力接受良好的教育，但是，由於能夠受良好教育的非馬來人相當多，相比之下，馬來人的教育水準便遠遠落在後頭。不用說，假如少數貧窮的非馬來人獲援助去接受高深教育，那馬來人與非馬來人之間的教育懸殊將會更大。

因此，在分配獎學金方面給予馬來人特別優待，並不是要建立他們的優越地位。獎學金並不說明種族不平等。這是打破非馬來人在教育上之優越地位的一個方法，馬來人並不為這種優待而自豪，他們也不因有像跛子一樣受法律保護的“特權”而感到自豪。如果能夠的話，他們願意取消這些特權，但是，因為現實迫人，他們不得不把自豪感置於第二位。

如果說不按比例分配獎學金，不足以證明這是一種種族不平等的話，那麼馬來西亞的民事服務又怎樣？這方面的規定是，民事服務中每有一個非馬來人，就有四個馬來人。當然，這等於說國家的行政牢牢地操在人口不及總人口半數的民族手中。

如果說根據種族來給予優待是件不光采的事，那麼職位應該分配給資格最高的人。重要的一點是，工作必須做好。但每個人會承認，在某些特殊情況下，這個原則是不適用的，且讓我們研究一下這些特殊情况背後的原則。

獨立前，英國人把這個國家管理得井井有條。他們可能沒有給予非英國公民最好的待遇，但却是卓越的行政人員。他們的工作很有效率，他們建立了一個有效率的民事服務制度，以及一個作用全面的執法機關。他們使吡叻和雪蘭莪內那些受戰鬥蹂躪的礦區恢復法律和秩序，解決馬來拉惹之間

的小戰爭，並消滅了海盜。他們鋪設公路和鐵道，徵收課稅，這些課稅直達國庫，然後用在公共服務上。他們的確是擅長行政工作的民族。

然而，我們並不因為工作已有能人做好就感到心滿意足，我們要考慮到我們的自尊。我們要自己治理這個國家。我們的工作效率也許比不上英國人，但不相干，重要的是，我們不但要取得獨立，我們還要進行馬來亞化，同時須訂下一個時間表，盡快實現。其用意是，不論我們是否能把工作做得一樣好，我們只是要接管過來，因為我們是馬來亞人。換句話說，在這種情況下，我們應優待自己，我們鄭重地宣佈，職業上的優待應以種族為基礎。就說種族偏見成為實行馬來亞化的依據。

如果這個國家只有一個種族，或者是各種族能力相等，大家都可以在馬來亞化的過程中受惠，而不會造成職位分配的不平衡，那麼偏見就到此為止。可是，不幸的，事實已很明顯，因為經濟財富上的差距，影响到不同種族的教育，馬來亞化過程所留下的空懸職位，極可能只由一個種族填補。倘若各種族作為馬來亞人具有形同手足的親緣，這還不成問題，但事實是，馬來人與華人的關係，比跟英國人的關係更加疏遠。

能操英語的馬來人比能講華語的多，馬來人曾在政府與英國人共過事，但在華人機構中却從未有過這種同事關係。對馬來人以至整個國家來說，在馬來亞化以後以一個英國政府來交換一個華人政府，簡直是荒唐可笑的事。馬來人與華人的關係比較淡薄，與華人的利益衝突甚於跟英國人的衝突，如果他們受到華裔馬來亞人的統治，獨立對馬來人而言，將毫無意義。唯有在馬來人有份參與政府行政，獨立才有意

義。因此，必須制定法律條款來確保職位不僅根據能力，也要根據種族來分配。

即使馬來人要求在分配英國人遺留下來的職位方面偏惠他們，但他們並不全然漠視資格。他們只在能夠勝任愉快的領域中堅持這個程序。而純屬行政服務性質的工作就是一例。爲了避免因爲沒有作好涉足其他領域的準備而太過落在後頭，他們在行政服務方面所要求的職位分配額很高。縱使是四個馬來人對一個非馬來人的高比例分配額，拿本國馬來人口比例來比較，政府（民事）服務中的馬來僱員人數仍然低。

在馬來亞，馬來族佔總人口的大約 48%，華族只佔 38%，但在涉及政府政策的方針和執行的第一級和第二級公務員中，馬來人只佔官員總人數的三分之一，所領取的薪金也只佔政府薪金總額的三分之一。無需細想，就可以定論，馬來人在民事（行政）服務中的分配額並不是構成種族不平等的因素，很明顯的，這是糾正現存和潛在的種族不平等的一個方法。只要看看高等學府學生每年的學校文憑考試成績，就足以說明，若民事服務中沒有職位分配額，馬來西亞政府服務會變成怎樣。由於種族偏見就像目前一樣明顯，沒有明文規定馬來民事官員的分配額，政府服務中可能完全沒有馬來人，這必將是種族不平等的結果。對馬來人來說，馬來亞將是一個笑柄，因爲政府的樣貌與過去的英國政府無異，是個外國人政府，更糟的是，甚至英國人的家長式統治將一去不返。

除了馬來保留地法律以及獎學金和民事服務的分配額之外，還有其他法律可能看起來似優待馬來人，然而，馬來亞的歧視性法律和政策並不旨在讓某個種族強過另一種族。其

實，這些法律的目的，是要預防這種現象。在某個程度上，這些法律還防止了許多不公平的優勢，但肯定沒有完全成功。住在馬來亞或前來本國訪問的人都很清楚，這個國家與美國一樣，沒有種族平等，而即使訂有不含歧視性的法律，依然沒有種族平等。法律不能使人民平等，而只能使平等有望實現而已。因此，最終的分析是，平等取決於人民，只有人民才能使他們本身平等。

要談得上有種族平等，每個種族不但要在法律面前平等，而且還要在社會的每一個層次、國家的每一個領域有代表性，比例大致上應反映他們在全國人口中的百分比。如果這個對種族平等的釋義正確的話，那麼在馬來亞，什麼因素使到種族不平等那麼明顯？在分層次討論以前，首先應當考慮到總的情況。談到總的情況，最顯著的地方是各族在地理上的分佈情況，城市裡住的是非馬來人，鄉村地區則幾乎全是馬來人，這個人口學上的特點本身就是種族不平等的明証。

在這個新的時代，人們又難識別出，城市化到了極點的國家，就是最進步的國家。美國開國時，95%的人口是在鄉村地區務農，今天只有 5% 的美國人口稱得上是真正的鄉村居民。美國的力量是在城市，對美國人的國家和國際生活有重大作用的一切，都以工業和商業為主幹，而工商業都建立在城市。甚至在蘇聯，當蘇聯革命開始時，這個國家基本上還是一個農業國，而現在已經高度城市化。歐洲更不在話下，它作爲一個城市力量的歷史，比世界任何一個地方更悠久。

在馬來亞，馬來人主要是住在鄉村，華人則多屬城市居民，這個事實意味着各族的進步和發展出現了不平等。一個發展中的國家或種族社會，應使本身逐步城市化，但是，儘



管在英國統治下，政治制度與其他許多國家相似，但馬來人却未追隨其他國家農業社會特有的那種發展方向。

在一個社會的發展過程中，城市化的重要性在於市鎮和城市所提供的較複雜的組織。這使城市居民更加敏銳和知識更淵博。另一方面，鄉村區的居民沒有機會享有這種經歷，只有過着鄉村地區特有的那種古老生活方式，他們的認識有限，改革的能力有限。因此，與城市社會相比，鄉村社會比較靜止，簡而言之，城市與鄉村地區之間的發展存在着不平等。

在本國，種族不平等就是財富上的不平等，機會上的不平等以及發展方面的不平等。在追尋種族不平等的真正原因時，人口分佈不均勻的確是個重要因素。它既是種族不平等的根源，也是種族不平等的結果。如果馬來亞人口的分佈情形是種族不平等的明証，那麼應歸咎馬來人。表面上看來很明顯，馬來人寧可住在鄉村或甚至從城市移居鄉村，他們選擇過田園生活，妨碍本身的進步，等於給自己製造不平等。其他種族已經隨着城鎮的進步特性而發展起來，而馬來人似乎滿足於旁觀他族的進步，看來沒有什麼東西阻止他們移居城市地區，參與城鎮的發展，但他們却没有這樣做。

但是，這種假設是否全然正確呢？人民為城鎮的霓虹燈所吸引是正常的，馬來人是否例外？他們是否真想住在鄉村地區，永遠那麼落後？要答覆這些問題，人們必須研究馬來人在選擇居住環境時所面對的困難。

首先有馬來保留地法律，這些法律防止了馬來人失去他們所有的土地，而要向非馬來地主租地的現象。但這些法律的實施對馬來人並不完全有利，我們已經看到這些法律怎樣使非保留地變為非馬來人保留地。由於政府的政策趨向於在

城市區創立這些非馬來人保留地，馬來人，即使他們富足有餘，也寧可定居在鄉村地區內保留給他們的土地上，鄉村地區的土地價格低廉，而且易找。縱使他們在城市地區擁有土地，但附近鄉村地區的廉價土地足以誘使他們賣掉城市裡的土地，而遷離城市。他們在城市裡擁有的土地若轉售予人，還可賣到好價。如果他們有戀棧他們在城市的產業的趨勢，價格就會越開越高，直至他們受不住引誘，把產業賣掉為止。即使他們的產業屬於馬來人保留地，別人仍會促他賣掉，這些人將會教馬來人怎樣走法律漏洞，用誘人的利潤來打動他們的心，直至他們的決心崩潰為止。馬來人保留地法律對於保存城市地區的馬來保留地，並沒有多大效果，只有像施予吉隆坡甘榜峇魯馬來人保留地的嚴格法律，才能成功促使馬來人住在城市地區。

除了馬來人保留地法律之外，當然要有其他因素迫使馬來人遷離城市地區。其中一個因素是工作缺乏。城市社會是高度組織和專門化的。每個人都有一個對他人有益的職業，這份工作可能是純服務性質，如駕駛汽車、貨車或踏三輪車或當傭人；這份工作可能是專門售賣食品或其他貨品，也可能是娛人或管理娛樂設備。不論是什麼職業，最終目的是賺取金錢，以便購買糧食和付住宿用費。鄉村地區的情形則完全不同。糧食和住所幾乎輕易可得。一小塊土地和一間小小的亞答屋就足以維持他們的生活。

在城市地區，馬來人有什麼就業機會？對馬來人來說，最好的機會是當公務員，在政府服務中，他們不會受歧視，薪金不錯，而且工作有保障。除了政府服務的工作之外，其他地方開放給他們的工作都是低級的。他們也許是當司機或踏三輪車。在規模宏大的歐洲人商行，他們或可找到幾份工

作，除此之外，馬來人在城市區就沒有謀生之處了。無數的華人和印度人商店拒絕僱用馬來人。印度人向來從印度聘請僱員，直到最近才停止這樣做。華人基於種種理由不會請馬來人當店員。最普遍的理由是馬來人不懂賣東西。但是，馬來人也一樣在不需要特別技能的推銷工作中被排斥出來，現代化的華人商行和銀行不請馬來人擔任書記，更談不上請他們任執行人員。由於在馬來亞的城鎮，商業活動幾乎全部操在非馬來人手中，這種歧視意味着千千萬萬個職位都沒有馬來人的份兒。然而，職業是城市地區謀生之道，這種歧視的結果是把城鎮中屈指可數的馬來人迫到鄉村地區去，並且防止了鄉村區人民移居城市地區。

爲了能在城市裏生活，馬來人或許應從商，自己開設商店，進而爲馬來人提供就業機會。如果人們接受這樣的話：種族間不應融合，而在商業上，他們應各自爲政，那麼，城市地區的馬來商店也不過虛有其表。不幸的是，開創企業，不論規模多小，都不簡單，對馬來人而言，由於在工商業中處境脆弱，使到他們的生意更具冒險性，他們不但要與資本強大的商家競爭，而且要與國內最根深蒂固的商業傳統和經驗一爭長短。華人是做生意的適合對象，他們擁有各種交錯縱橫的連鎖性組織，照顧本族的最大利益，華人在各行各業中都有公會組織，也有勢力強大的商會，批發貿易全操在他們手中，他們的貨品沒有定價，賬期可長可短，賬額可大可小，輕易地把零售商控制在他們的股掌中。

這一切，加上各種種族特徵，使敢於跟非馬來人競爭的單純的馬來人處在極不利的境況中。即使經驗豐富，財力穩固的非馬來人，要在競爭激烈的商場上生存，機會也很低，對馬來人來說，這些機會幾乎等於零。少數的幾個可能會堅

持到底，但大多數還未完成創業的策劃階段，可能就半途而廢。如果唯一使馬來人城市化的方法是在城鎮裏設立馬來企業，那麼成功的機會幾乎肯定是零點，要馬來人住在城市地區，唯一的方法是非馬來人不要歧視他們。

歧視馬來人的現象有多普遍呢？在商場上，歧視現象是那麼嚴重，以致人們已經認爲是理所當然的。一個華人機構，不論大小，無論如何不會僱用馬來人，也許充其量是請個司機，而沒有人會說這是歧視。不過，憑心而論，其中原因是實際成份居多，種族歧視成份居少。華人商行使用華文，不論做賬或記錄，一切使用華文，商業上的連系也幾乎全是華人，此外，規模較小的華人商店都是家庭生意，依賴家庭效忠來防止欺騙行爲。

無論如何，假如有心的話，華人僱用馬來人是可以的，普通的零售商店可輕易請到馬來人任推銷員，他們可能比不上華人，但沒有機會學習，他們又怎會好呢？初期，也許有一些會中途離職，但相信起碼會有一些堅持到底，最終成功。規模宏大的華人商行和銀行，使用的是英文，他們沒有理由不能僱用馬來人，他們或許沒有非馬來人那麼勤奮，關於馬來人懶散的指責似乎也有一點根據，但事實並不那麼糟糕，政府部門和好些英國商行僱用馬來人，也一樣生存下去。指馬來人懶散，而又一竹竿打沉一船人，是不合理的，我們必須以更開明和諒解的態度對待他們，國內遲早會出現一批脫胎換骨的馬來核心份子，他們的工作能力和商業上的認識，即使不能與非馬來人相等，也應該相去不遠。甚至現在，馬來人在他們已經深入的領域中，表現已相當特出。

種族不僅是以種族淵源來區分，還以其他許多特性來區別。這些特性很重要。這些特性怎樣演進是另一回事，但是



，當各族在某個領域上競爭時，這些特性的作用非常重要，例如，猶太人不單只勾鼻，而且天性善於計算金錢的得失；歐洲人膚色白皙，天生一副好奇心；馬來人的皮膚棕色，族性隨和容忍；華人則不僅擁有一對杏眼，而且生來就善於從商，他們在整個東南亞的成就是可證明這點。

這些特性比外表上的特徵如膚色和相貌，更能區分種族，當然，各族或多或少都有這些特性，當不同種族互相接觸時，這些特性才會顯著。猶太人的吝嗇和魔術般的理財法，使他們在商業上控制歐洲，同時激起了一股反親猶太主義運動，這個運動在歐洲興衰了好幾個年代。歐洲人生性好奇，渴於吸收經驗，這種特性激發他們四處探險，並征服了亞洲和非洲的土地，這些地區的人民沒有他們那麼具好奇心。馬來人的自由放任和容忍，使英國人不花一兵一卒就征服了馬來亞，並引入了其他亞洲人。華人在商業上的敏銳性使他們成為東南亞的國際生意中間人。由此可知，當各族互相接觸時，這些特性就確定了各族之間的關係，在同一個種族間，這些特性不大重要，因為在他們之間，特性對誰都既無利，也無害，不過，一旦不同種族互相接觸時，這些特性立即使他們有強烈的你我之分，隨即強調種族上的分別了。

這一小段閒話，對進一步討論馬來西亞的種族不平等及其意義很重要，它解釋了馬來人聚居鄉村和經濟上落後，以及非馬來人多住在城市 and 經濟上進步的原因。馬來人並非要選擇住在鄉村和貧窮，這是種族特性衝突的結果，他們隨和、容忍，華人格外勤奮、商業上機敏，當兩族接觸時，結果是無法避免的。面對進取心強的華人的攻勢，馬來人退居到較差劣的地區，政府想象到這種種族特性競爭的後果，所以迅速制定馬來人保留地法律，這些法律的確幫助了馬來人，但也造

成馬來人世代聚居在鄉村。

這種局面本來會持續下去的，但因為教育和政治因素，馬來人開始以不同的觀點來看問題，正如任何人一樣，他們不願屈居鄉村地區，生活貧窮；他們要與國內其他人民平等；他們要住在城市，富裕和受良好的教育；他們要公平分享這個富庶國家的繁榮，他們認為這是應份的。向他們解釋政府已盡能力協助他們或叫他們把處境歸咎於他們的民族性，都是沒有作用的。除非他們能公平分享到國家的財富，有種族平等，否則，他們不能忽視或寬恕其他的因素和做法，這些因素曾妨礙他們爭取應有的地位。在他們看來，工商業領域永遠在歧視他們，造成他們落後，其他獨立國家的人民所享有的東西，他們沒有機會得到。不錯，政府在盡它的能力，但是單靠政府不能實現種族平等，人民本身必須在行動上做到種族平等，種族平等才會成為事實。要做到種族平等，工商業中的歧視現象必須剷除，這種歧視不但製造了種族不平等，而且還事實上拖長和強調了不平等現象，因為歧視把馬來人趕出城市地區。

馬來人的匿居鄉村地區是怎樣延長和突出不平等現象呢？我已指出城市居民是怎樣的本着在城市裏吸取到的經驗比鄉村居民敏銳。還有其他因素養成城市居民的特性。

國內最好的學校都是在城市裏，雖然政府也盡力為鄉村地區的學校提供相同的設備，但是，城市地區的兒童無論如何也比鄉村區兒童較有機會進入優秀的學校唸書，著名的學校也是在較大的市鎮裏，學生幾乎都是非馬來人，這些學校擁有優秀的教師及一流的設備和教具，不過，在這些學校唸書費用當然高昂，城鎮裏的大多數馬來人無能為力。

在吉隆坡、怡保和檳城，就讀最好的學校的學生幾乎清一色是非馬來人。好的學校不是一朝一夕就辦起來的，城市

裏的名校的傳統可追溯至百多年前，它們的建築物堅固而寬闊，操場保養得好，教師也是最優秀的，肯為教育獻身。每年的考試成績顯出了學生的優越素質，出身這些學校的學生，必然成為社會上的特權階級，他們將來大都成為醫生、律師、繪測師及其他專業人士，他們將是企業家和商業管理人，未來的領袖亦非他們莫屬。這些精英份子有進取性，知識淵博，深懂處世之道，才華洋溢，即使鄉村區的子弟取得的文憑與他們相等，亦難望其項背。

這個問題從學校一直延伸到大學學院。由於各族的教育背景本來已經不平等，到高等教育階段，種族不平等將會愈加顯著，這點不會奇怪。國內的學院和馬來亞大學享有不受政治干預的權利，他們有權自由錄取和挑選學生，而不必顧到國家的政治需要。它們聲言，作為學府，它們只關心學術資格和水準，它們不理什麼種族淵源，它們也不歧視這種淵源，但這種做法的結果却像歧視。正如我們已經指出，教育背景對城市居民有利，推而廣之，城市居民即非馬來人，每年以最優異的成績畢業的就是這些人，他們在最好的小學和中學唸書，是屬於特權人士，因此，這些特權給他們在大專學院裏帶來更大的特權。

在馬來西亞的小學人數中，馬來學生的人數比非馬來人多，在中學，馬來人就失去這個優勢，唸中學的馬來學生人數比非馬來人略低，尤其是在英文中學。但是在高等學府，未來的種族不平等的模式已經定了形，不論是在國內大學深造或出國留學的非馬來人，都比馬來人多。

有人可能會提出爭辯，高等學府不能乖離它們的宗旨，他們志在辦教育，不是處理種族問題，它們只根據能力來挑選學生。現在讓我們調查研究其他國家的情形。教育上的能

力是否為入學的唯一標準？難道各國的國內情況對學院或大學收生模式沒有影響嗎？

在戰後的美國，大學必須接受任何想深造的退役軍人。這種有利於退役軍人的歧視，不是單單為了感激，同時也因為戰爭使軍人處於不利的處境。因為戰爭，軍士被迫放棄他們的正規教育，否則其中必有一些會進入大學深造，由於無法區別那一些退役軍人有條件唸大學，當局唯有對他們一視同仁，認定每一個退役軍人都具有接受高等教育的潛質。不可否認，若非他們是退役軍人，他們之中有好些將沒有機會上大學，不過，問題是因為他們有這個絕佳的機會，連比較平凡的人在大學裏顯然都有特出的表現。難道這個論點在馬來西亞沒有根據嗎？

這裏無意輕視其他國家，凡是對外國學術水準有研究的人都很清楚，在一些國家，學術水準雖然符合起碼的程度，其實並不是很高的。由於許多國家相繼取得獨立，大學如雨後春筍般地紛紛建立。這些國立大學旨在迎合新興國的需求，並估量國內的現有情況。如果某新國家的一般教育水準低落，那麼凡是能夠及格的學生，它的國立大學都會錄取，但是，如果教育水準高，單單及格是不理想的。有潛質的學生，並不是那些只能剛剛及格的學生，而是成績優良的學生，換句話說，雖然可能有許多學生基本教育良好，足以升大學，但並非每一個都有機會深造。

毫無疑問地，即使那些功課勉強及格的學生，假如有適當的指導，也能夠取得優異成績，一個人吸收知識的能力不是終生都那麼強，劃分一個人的學習潛質的方法也不一定正確無誤，甚至輟學者的表現也可能會比備受推崇者更為特出。



在剛果獨立以前，國內幾乎沒有大學生，所有學生都被視為沒有學術潛能，的確，剛果學生在小學和中學階段的水準，顯示他們沒有深造的能力。獨立以來，剛果的國立大學，甚至外國大學，都接受成績較差，通常難受大學錄取的剛果學生。過去數年來，持有大學學位的剛果人激增，倘若大學當局嚴格講究水準，這些剛果人就失去了受高等教育的機會。誠然，如果通過考試來錄取學生，由剛果人與他們的前殖民地主人競爭，那今天可能沒有一個剛果人受大學教育，上述例子說明高等教育如何適應一個國家的需要和當時情況。

現在讓我們談談馬來西亞的情況，馬來西亞是個獨特的多元種族國家，甚至美國黑人與白人融合，比馬來西亞各族之間融合還來得容易。黑人是基督教徒，他們與白人講同樣的語言，風俗習慣基本上也與白人相同，黑人與白人通婚普遍。但是在馬來西亞，人民不僅在種族淵源、文化、語言和經濟上有歧異，教育上亦然。馬來人屈居鄉村，貧窮，受良好中小學教育的機會比住在城市而富裕的非馬來人少，每年的考試成績都顯示出各族之間的尖銳懸殊，而儘管竭盡所能，世代代不同經驗和背景所產生的影响，並不能澈底剷除，以製造各族發展的平等機會。在今後的歲月裏，馬來人的平均高等教育資格，勢必落在其他種族的後頭。在這種情況下，通常由學生對申請入國內外大學進行競爭的做法，必然對馬來人不利。在各學科中，如果申請人太多，造成僧多粥少的局面，那麼如果不是半個馬來人都進不了大學，就是被錄取的馬來人寥寥無幾，學額與申請人的人數相距愈大，馬來人的機會就愈少，而馬來人改善處境的機會越少，他們的城市化機會也就更少。正如我指出的，城市的馬來人越多，

種族不平等的現象就越尖銳。

爲了證明這點，看看醫學院的情形就夠了，馬來亞大學醫學院的收生額每年都很有限，國內中學每年所培育出來的最優秀學生都申請選修醫科，這些學生要成爲醫生，必須擁有起碼的資格。各地的情況都顯示，這些具備起碼資格，而被醫院錄取的學生，在受過良好的訓練後，最終都能畢業成爲醫生。但由於學額有限，只有成績最優良的學生才被接受選修醫科，而通常來自鄉村地區，或畢業自劣等學校的馬來人，因爲平均成績欠優，只有少數非常特出者，才有機會攻讀醫科，這種選修醫科方面的競爭情形，對馬來人一直非常不利，如果不是有非馬來人競爭，所有的馬來學生都可能被接受進入醫學院，但是，非馬來人畢業自優等學校，學術成績標青，背景又好，醫學院裏的所有學額都給他們包辦了，以致妨礙了馬來人培育出人數能反映他們的人口比例的醫生。在這裏，我們也順便提一提考不上馬來亞大學的學生。人數不少的非馬來學生進不到馬大，通常都到印度或其他國家攻讀醫科，他們可以做到這點，因爲他們在經濟上應付得來，這麼一來，各族在醫生方面的懸殊就更大。

大學其他院系的現象也與醫學院大同小異。即使是文學系，馬來學生依然比非馬來人少。就這樣，馬來人與非馬來人在教育上的差距日益擴大，因爲負責辦高等教育的人以爲，國家的政治現實和社會組成結構，與所謂的探尋知識毫無關係。

這麼一來，教育不但不能作爲實現種族平等的工具，反而延伸，甚至加深了種族不平等。因爲貧窮，在城市又找不到工作，使馬來人退居鄉村，也因爲這樣，馬來子弟的小學和中學教育追不上非馬來人，中學教育欠佳，妨礙了馬來人

受高等教育，成為專業人士及找到較好的工作。在專業領域中難找工作，使馬來人不得不聚居在鄉村地區，這樣又造成他們教育上的落後，因此形成了一個惡性循環。

馬來人的就業機會有限，是因為由非馬來人控制的工商業採取歧視態度。在政府部門，這種歧視現象不存在，不過，馬來人教育水準低，沒有歧視現象也起不了太大作用，在第一級和第二級公務員中，非馬來人仍然比馬來人多，這點再度說明了教育是個阻碍因素，雖然在民事服務中，馬來人與非馬來人的比例是四對一，但還是出現這種懸殊。

馬來人的技術和專業教育亦比非馬來人落後，但並非自始以來都是這樣，戰前，在吉打州，各級的馬來工程系學生曾經比非馬來人多，其實，若非吉打州政府的計劃受到戰爭的破壞，馬來人將可在吉打州公共工程局取代歐洲人，出任所有與工程有關的職位。

戰後，馬來人的地位逆轉，政府服務的門戶向非馬來人大開，這些人受過比較好的教育，很快就取得了必需的資格，填補了戰後馬來亞繁榮進步中製造出來的新職位。從這點可以看出，雖然馬來人盤據最高職位，但其餘大多數職位都由非馬來人擔任，而正常的退休過程將會把目前擔任最高職位的馬來人完全除去。

由於大多數的第一級和第二級職位都屬技術性質，擔任這些職位的馬來人，遠遠低過他們在本國的人口比例，研究了這種趨勢後，當可預料這個比例將會進一步降低。

政府服務中較低級的職位又如何呢？當然，我們有足夠合格的馬來人填補數目相當的這些職位，政府沒有這方面的數字，不過，調查教育和醫葯服務應該可以說明一切。

馬來西亞獨立後的其中一個成就是，教育服務迅速擴大

，為配合這個發展，政府設立了許多各類學院，迅速訓練師資。獨立以後，政府接管了“戈比學院”和“布林斯福住宿師訓學院”，並大事擴充，另一方面則在馬來亞開辦日間師訓學院和其他師訓學校。

除了蘇丹依迪利斯學院和馬六甲的馬來女子師訓學院之外，其他的師訓學院都開放給各種族，每年都有大批符合資格的學員申請進入這些學院。由於成績優異的非馬來學生人數往往超過高等教育所提供的學額和獎學金，連許多資格過高的非馬來人也申請受師資訓練。由於僧多粥少，減少了只擁有起碼資格的學生的機會，而為數不多資格優越的馬來人可能又不想當教師，另圖別業，造成師訓學院或甚至日間師訓學院的馬來學員人數極少，因為他們大多數只擁有起碼的資格，無法與資格太過優越的非馬來人競爭。

過去這些年來，這些根據資格來取舍的挑選方法，已經使學校的教務處越來越像非馬來人的天地，只有馬來學校例外，這種趨勢的發展，使政府服務第三級職位中的機會，也變得對馬來人不平等。看看每年的考試成績，我們可以發現這種現象因何一直不變，我們已很了解馬來人教育不足的原因，因此，既使在教育服務中，這種惡性循環所造成的後果，已在預料中。

護士服務向來只有一類，這類職員從學生護士做起，完成訓練後，就成為合格護士，有資格一路躍升至護士長，在英殖民地時代，這只是一個理論，但現在却是個事實。

初期，護士服務中鮮有馬來人，她們沒有受到歧視，但因為自己的偏見，考獲基本資格的馬來少女又不多，使護士服務中的馬來人為數極少，在戰後的一個時期，馬來人已經克服了對當護士的偏見，但夠資格的馬來少女依然很少，使



她們難以加入這個專業。

獨立前的某個時期，當局曾決定創設一個級位較低的護士類別，這個新職稱為助理護士，不必擁有普通護士應具的資格，結果吸收到大批馬來少女加入這個服務，但這個好景只是曇花一現。

由於普通護士服務的職位有限，而具備資格的非馬來少女人數日增，造成助理護士這個較次級的職位也為這些資格過高的少女佔去，曾經有個時候，當局曾降低錄取助理護士的資格，但作用不大，具備資格的非馬來少女的確太多，阻礙了資格欠足的馬來少女加入護士行列，目前護士服務中馬來人與非馬來人的對比一直是一對二十。

就因為這種情形，即使是第四級的職位，馬來人的機會都給閉塞，助理護士的情況，也一樣可以用來說明其他各級政府僱員的情況。這種根據所謂資格來取舍的挑選法，正逐漸且必將馬來人擠出各級政府服務的部門外，目前排擠馬來人的程度，各州不同。在以前的非馬來聯邦州，政府服務中的馬來人比例勉強還相當高，在前馬來聯邦州屬，比例則比較低，在南海峽殖民地州屬，比例最低。但是，在各州併入一個聯邦後，工作申請人可自由流動，這意味着馬來人的移入。我們可以假設，馬來人缺乏機會的現象，終有一天會在整個西馬來西亞一致。

馬來人能夠退據一隅的就業領域仍然有少數幾個，其中包括武裝部隊和警察，特別為土著而設的機構，如人民信託局，聯邦農業銷售局和土著銀行則仍然敢於在僱傭方面公開優待馬來人。此外當然還有一個發人深思的集團，即是穿著簡單馬來民族服裝的雜役，他們使吉隆坡的政府公署那麼充滿馬來風味。

以上所述，都是明顯和基本的現象。這些機會上的不平等引致了其他方面的不平等，例如，馬來人的房屋破爛簡陋，馬來人的健康惡劣，非馬來人則活力充沛。馬來人的死亡率和嬰孩夭折率比非馬來人高，馬來人的儲蓄少，缺乏資金，遠遠落在非馬來人的後頭。

這類例子不勝枚舉，造成不平等機會的障礙，加深和增加了馬來人與非馬來人之間現有的不平等現象，而這種不平等的最壞之處，是自我表達上的不平等。由於受教育少，傳統上謙恭有禮，就業上不能獨立而毫無作為，馬來人甚至無法清楚地陳述他們的處境。他們所擁有的原已夠少，但別人依然指責他們剝奪了別人的機會，歧視非馬來人以及支配國家政治，他們每受到指責，都是只有結舌無助的份兒。最近發生的其中一件大事，足以說明對他們的指責是多麼荒謬可笑；馬來西亞一家規模宏大的廠商，以倫敦一家著名公司的名義生產香煙，為證明它遵循政府的願望，這家外國公司委任一名馬來人為董事主席，並召募一批小數目的馬來人任園丁、司機和非熟練工人，該公司的大多數僱員，上自執行人員，下至書記和熟練工人，都是非馬來人。

突然間，謠言四播，說這間工廠開除了華裔僱員，而代以馬來人。華人佔了九十五巴仙的這家香煙廠的零售商也不調查真相，就發動杯葛運動。顯然的，沒有任何負責任的組織真正發出這個指示，只賴口頭上的流傳，這個杯葛運動就蔓延至馬來亞各個角落。在短短的一週內，這家香煙廠就覺得情況危急，不出一個月，這家公司被迫向華裔分銷商和華人商會求助，為了擺脫困境，該公司不得不准許一團又一團的華人入廠調查，直到他們承認這種指責沒有根據時，杯葛運動才取消。

人們都會想到，馬來人將會抗議這種明目張胆的反馬來人的態度。然而，儘管該公司顯然已經立下規定，不論在任何情況下，華人都不會由馬來人取代。但馬來人保持緘默，華人贏得了全面的勝利。此後，工廠和其他企業如果要生意順利，他們必須格外小心，不好激怒華人。

在一個多元種族社會中，種族和諧的唯一基礎是種族平等。要建立種族平等，則必須先了解種族平等的意義。在馬來西亞，每一個種族都覺得受到歧視，這證明人民仍未充分了解種族平等的意義。

馬來人的境況已經長篇累牘地談過。對非馬來人而言，他們不滿和怨恨的根源是各項法律 and 政策的實施，這些法律和政策彷彿有利於馬來人，因此看來又似乎使非馬來人成為二等公民。假設這些法律真如非馬來人所認為那樣偏惠馬來人，它們也應被視為非常薄弱的障礙，不會影響平等與和諧。只需幾張紙以及適當立法機構的數聲贊成，就可以糾正人們所指的錯誤。

不過，廢除這些法律，是否就能魔術般為馬來西亞帶來種族平等與和諧？如果這裏所談論的一切勉強稱得上正確的話，廢除這些所謂的歧視性法律不但無法實現種族平等，反而會加深種族間的分裂和懸殊，因為馬來人所申訴的歧視，並非人訂的法律，而是人類的固有行為。

我已經指出，種族不單只以膚色、相貌、語言和文化來區分，種族的特性也是其中一個要素。德國人和日本人的固有民族特性，說明了德國和日本在第二次世界大戰過後迅速復興的原因。德國人和日本人在大戰期間幹下殘酷的暴行，但勝利的英國人却寬大地對待他們，這也是英國人的種族特性使然。北美洲和南美洲資源同樣豐富，但南美的發展却落

在北美後頭，這是因為殖民化南美洲的南歐洲人在行為和種族特性方面異於殖民化北美洲的北歐洲人。南非的成就遠較其他非洲國家輝煌，因為非洲白種移民的種族特性與土生的非洲黑人有所別。

種族特性和行為不能在一夜之間由人訂的法律改變過來。不過，種族特性與行為並不是不可能改變的。例如，醫學上的道德準則與目前就有所不同。一度在許多國家所未聞的宗教容忍，目前隨處可見。甚至蘇聯的共產主義者，他們曾一度只醉心於世界共產主義運動，不是通過正當方法，就是不擇手段，但現在已經沒有那麼激進，而且接受了共存的原則。移居到北美洲的白種人本來也是與眾不同，常常心懷敵意的，但已改變過來。他們的特性可稱為典型的美國人，與他們原來的各種歐洲血統不同。人類的種族特性可以改變，但人類需要長時間去適應，況且改變也需要誘因和有利的氣氛。

馬來人聲言在馬來西亞受到歧視，並非基於法律，而是馬來西亞主要種族集團的特性和行為的問題。馬來人傾向精神生活，容忍而逍遙自在；非馬來人，尤其是華人，則重視物質生活，深具進取性心及熱愛工作。要實現平等，這些特性完全相反的種族有必要互相適應，法律不能做到這點，只有各有關方面瞭解了種族平等的意義，各族之間才有諒解和親善。

## (六) 國民團結的基礎

國民團結，好像大多數的政治術語一樣，往往由不同的人來作不同的解釋。例如公正是一個普遍的概念。它並不能只對或為一個種族作獨特的解釋。它必須具有某些共同的價值，雖然在不同環境下會有所變化。

今天，在馬來西亞有着一個“國民團結”部門。這說明了國民團結不僅獲得“全國行動理事會”政府的承認，而且馬來西亞具有正確思想的人士也認識到這點。

簡單地說，國家團結基礎即是在特定疆界內的一個單一的種族集團，擁有一個共同語言、文化和宗教。如果這些因素結合起來，就可以創建一個國家——古老的釋義。

在交通落後，很少旅行的年代中，國家只是部落組織的擴大而已，後者又是由家庭擴大或結合而成。局限性因素是地理上的藩籬，不管是距離，山脈，海洋或河流。在特定的地區，部落由於戰爭或和平而集合一起，形成一個共同語言、文化和宗教而融合成一個國家。

在一個國家中，是由於對一個共同語言、文化和宗教的了解而產生了效忠和團結意識。當其他擁有不同文化的種族集團來到，跟這個種族接觸，由於互不了解，造成衝突。在武裝衝突中，每個集團所產生的一個更強烈的親屬感，將導致更強烈的國民團結意識。

在現代，美國成為建國的一個大實驗。當美國十三州獲

得獨立，這證明了：帝王對於團結人民的作用並不是重要的。獨立以後，盎格羅·撒克遜系的移民，開始允准其他不同宗教、文化和語言的異族移民進入。問題是，採納而非繼承一個共同的語言和宗教，是否能對一個法定國家產生效忠。美國當然是一個法定的國家，而不是一個擁有自然地理藩籬作為界限的自然國家。

在十九世紀和二十世紀初葉，當大量移民湧入美國的時期，這個新國家面對嚴酷的考驗。新的移民包括華人和蘇聯人。實際上每個種族和語言集團都在內。移民對作為官方語言的英文及美國歷史背景和文化懂得很少，甚至一無所知。同樣的，宗教也有差異。在這個多種語言的人民中，國民團結原本是建立在語言的基礎上。十三州殖民地移民是操英語的民族，他們及其後裔是國家的核心。這兒，一個重要的原則已經確立和受到維護——移民要成為公民必須學習作為國語的英語，並完全加以接受，在日常生活中真正地使用它。至於口頭上說“我們接受英語作為美國的官方語言”，事實上却忽視它的問題是不存在的。更不用說要建議移民的語言必須和英語列於相近的地位，或官方給予容忍。其實，那是憲法中有關效忠的條文內含的公民權條件，即非盎格羅·撒克遜新公民無權堅持其他語言和英語須列於同等地位。他們對這點都了解得很清楚。雖然有大批的非盎格羅·撒克遜人聚居於某些地區，沒有人嘗試要繼續使用他們的語言。在許多情況下，他們的語言在第二代以後就失傳了。

一個人民在文字上相通的社會建立以後，國家的文化就會自由地發展起來。但由於語言和文化有着密切的關係，結果就產生了主要的盎格羅·撒克遜文化，其特點是能接受修改後的非英國人影響。這樣的途徑就能達致國民團結，無需



一個共同的種族根源，地理藩籬和宗教。然而，某些輔助性控制是需要的。教育幾乎只限於英語。歷史僅限於美國歷史，對於英國殖民地的起源的強調，多過後來移民的歷史背景。在沒有傳統的帝王，而其邊界又非自然藩籬的情形下培養對國家的效忠意識。在學校中和公民集會時，教導人民尊敬憲法，國旗及國家的其他象徵。

美國人的國民團結在美國所參與的兩次大戰中受到嚴峻考驗。不可避免的，最少部份美國人必須跟和他們的祖先同一種族集團的人民作戰。他們的美國意識是否夠強烈地使他們跟以前和他們原本同一民族的人民作戰和殘殺呢？答案是很清楚的，艾森豪威爾將軍，他本身具德國血統，却領導美國和西歐聯盟取得最後的勝利。

美國的建國實驗，同樣的在拉丁美洲的國家和澳洲獲得顯著成功。這些國家和英國一樣，擁有多種族的移民，他們接受和運用俗成的語言，學習尊敬國家的象徵，和成為團結的人民，受人承認及在國際上具有特色。因此語言似乎是國家團結的鎖鑰。它開放門戶以建立一個基本文化，並通過一個統一教育制度，達到其他不可缺少的團結象徵，如憲法、國旗、國歌以及國家的法律。

但是，強調語言作為統一的力量，可能遭人反駁說：瑞士已經證明，一個單一的國語不是國家團結的必需條件。那些引証瑞士作為例子的人，忽略了瑞士人和瑞士的許多獨特事實。瑞士的結合，內部的團結不及外在力量，瑞士對於環繞她的國家是作為一個緩衝國，是發生糾紛時的一個出口和中立地帶。瑞士只能扮演一個角色——中立。它沒有強權政治和戰爭的緊張。

在內部，瑞士的財政是依靠人民的技能，以及吸引旅客

的政治安寧。當政治發揮最少影響力的時候，經濟就會繁榮。因此，內外原因，使得瑞士人民嫌惡政治。在最近的大選中，很少人競選或投票，同一個政府繼續當政，僅僅是因為沒有人對政治發生興趣。在這種氣氛中，語言並不會成為政治課題。它並不會團結或分裂人民。

瑞士人的另一個特點，他們能夠擁有四種官方語言。其中羅曼斯徹語（Romansch）只限於一個小民族（格拉巴登縣人口的三分之一），實際上只有三種官方語言——法語、意大利語和德語。在實踐上，每個成年的瑞士人最少講三種官方語言中的兩種。這意味着，一個瑞士人不了解另一個瑞士人的局面是很少出現的。此外，法語和意大利語屬於同一個語言集團，一個集團只須略微學習，就能了解另一個集團。

最後，所有瑞士人都是歐洲人——法國人和意大利人所講的是源自拉丁語的語言，而德國人講的是日耳曼語。這些集團都是屬於幾乎一致的歐洲文化，在瑞士他們不難混合起來。在這種情況下，語言在國民團結中便成為無關輕重的因素。許多事物是共同的，許多內外力量都能導致團結，所以四種官方語言的事實是不重要的。

概要地說，國民團結的基礎原本是在一定的地域內，由擁有共同種族、文化、語言和宗教的人民所組成。現代歷史的發展已經顯示：種族根源和宗教不是必要的條件。語言和一個密切聯繫的文化，仍然是促進國民團結的必需因素。在一個好像馬來西亞的多元民族國家中，只要對於語言和有關文化的選擇達致協議，就可以達致團結。只要接受了所選擇的語言，一個多元民族的國家，可以通過附加的方法來塑造國民團結，譬如：突出效忠形像如帝王，教導國家歷史，尊



敬國家的象徵如國旗、國歌和顏色等，同樣重要的是尊敬國家憲法和法律。在這些過程中，人民必須真正地融合起來。必須衝破每一個區分種族或其他根源的藩籬。各種生活中的歧視必須消除。最後，必須鼓勵異族通婚。這些都是國民團結的基礎，是一個多元種族社會要建設一個穩定和生氣蓬勃的國家所必須瞭解的一點，這是不可或缺的條件。

## (七) 馬來人之復權與馬來人之困境

馬來人之困境，不只是經濟的，同時也是政治的問題。今天，每個人都在談論種族衝突與馬來西亞不同種族的不均發展之間的關係。人們一度認為，最好的解決辦法是不管這個差距。有人甚至相信：困境的問題是不存在的，因為馬來人並不希望成為什麼，只想保持其樸實的自我。

1969年5月13日的事件已經說明：不管事實是多麼地令人不愉快，也必須面對它。在那個災難性的日子，“發狂亂殺”的是馬來人。這種猝然爆發的事件，使十二年所達到的成就幾乎喪失殆盡。假如我們不希望再看到屠殺重演，我們必須明瞭這個空前不幸事件的導因，並且認真思考馬來人的復權問題。

因為馬來人之困境也就是馬來西亞之困境。如果任由這種癌症侵蝕她的心臟，馬來西亞國家不能期望興旺和繁榮。馬來人組成人口的巨大部份，而任何影響他們的事件必然也影響到國家。因此，有必要採取堅決的步驟以解決這個困境。第一個需要就是革命。馬來西亞過度地恐懼“革命”這個字眼。革命使人聯想到暗殺事件和無政府狀態。但是，倘最能幹者能掌握革命技巧，將革命進行到底，就能使革命具創造性和有秩序。

另一個選擇是進化。進化在速度或目標上是不能加以適當控制的。它是太過於依賴環境及難以發現的一連串因素，所

以很難加以運用和控制。如果革命是解決馬來西亞馬來人問題的方案，它必須是謹慎策劃的革命；它必須擺脫和避免其他革命的陷阱和錯誤。這就是對馬來人性格、文化和能力的分析有用之處。

革命意指激烈的變化。理論性的革命家往往失敗，因為他們只看到目標而完全忽視環境：既存的勢力和制度。如果要使革命在馬來西亞成功，我們必須辨認出什麼是應該廢棄的，什麼是必須保存，甚至傳播者。它的目標是為了改善馬來人，非破壞別人，馬來人可以建立起他們在馬來西亞社會中的適當地位，而無需取代別人。

首先必須注意的是，大部份馬來人是封建主義者，並希望保持現狀。如果一場革命開始時就主張摧毀固定的君主制度秩序，必將遭受失敗。它將不能獲得大多數正統馬來人的支持。在任何情況下，君主政體對於馬來人及其他任何人，並沒有損害。這種制度的維持無疑須付出很高的代價，但由於他們沒有實權，統治者並不能成為獨裁者。此外，一個沒有統治者的馬來人，將意味着馬來人的黯然失色。這些統治者在過去有着輝煌的表現，如今繼續代表着馬來亞的馬來人特性。如果除掉他們，傳統性馬來亞的最後遺迹將告消失。這就是為什麼馬來人繼續成為封建主義者，即使他們接觸了新教育和政治權術。因此，君主制度必須保留下來。作為憲法上的君主，蘇丹對於時代變遷是開通和警覺的。在進展的過程中，他們很少收穫。如果所建議的變革對於國家和馬來人有好處的，蘇丹將不會阻擋。事實上，在爭取獨立的時候，統治者的同意，為順利的過渡鋪路，並且避免了其他地方常見的紛爭。

宗教是馬來人的另一種既存的勢力。反對馬來人的宗教

的任何變革、計劃和思想，都難免失敗。在馬來人尋求進步的過程中，必須將回教擱置一旁。其實，如要確保成功，就必須提倡，甚至進一步傳導回教。

馬來人的第三種力量是自他們的價值制度衍生出來的傳統風俗。但今日風俗已不像從前那樣成為必需品。風俗已對馬來人喪失了吸引力，現在已經不再有人說：“與其讓風俗滅亡，不如讓我們的孩子死亡。”因此，在進步的過程中，風俗可以改變或置之不理。革命應當考慮風俗，但不應受它過份的約束。

評價和接受了既存的勢力，就可以描繪出馬來人的前景。必須強調的是，沒有一個計劃是完善的。必然會有缺陷和忽略的地方，甚至也會有錯誤。最重要的是要了解，一個革命計劃及其早日進行與貫徹到底的必要。

基本上，由於環境和遺傳因素使然，馬來人成為一個住在鄉村的種族，只有小部份是居住在城市。各處的鄉村居民，比起城市居民較為單純和落後。我們對於這項問題的解決方法，必須是嘗試轉變這狀況。換句話說，我們必須使馬來人“城市化”。

在這個問題上，將會有許多人持反對意見，但在面對馬來人佔多數的地方缺乏耕地的情況時，一切反對意見將消匿。重新安置和移殖，只能解決一代的問題，但是，根據回教承繼法典，一旦移殖者死亡，這些移殖地將縮減為非經濟性地產。太多人佔有和耕作一小塊一小塊的土地，大多數沒有正當的合法地契，因此，受益人與承繼法典的錯綜複雜性進行永無休止的鬥爭。

“城市化”的問題很多且各不相同。但是不像其他國家，這些問題不能任由本身去解決。它們必須通過政府的計劃

有系統地加以解決。由於馬來人傳統上是鄉村居民，他們傾向於城市的程度，不像其他種族那樣強烈。迫切需要做的是積極將他們勸誘到城市來，而唯一能夠使他們信服的誘勸，就是確保他們有固定的收入。

馬來亞花費巨額金錢在發展上。經常興建橋樑、公路、建築物、工廠及推行其他計劃。這些建設工程大多數是在承包的情況下進行。政府只是通過公共工程局進行監督而已。馬來亞的大承包商如不是華人，就是歐洲人，只有少數馬來承包商。但是，公共工程局在時間和規格上的規定，使承包商為了安全起見，排斥馬來工人，即使是非技術性工作也不讓馬來工人做。現在，如果政府堅持本身去逐步進行較大部份的發展工程，這樣，就能大量地聘用來自鄉村的馬來人。他們可以由非熟練勞工，逐漸地進步到半熟練，最後成為熟練的技術工人。他們可以一面從實踐中學習，一面領取工資。這是非常重要的。馬來人必須從工作中吸取技術。他們不能只接受理論課程。鄉村業餘補習學校有一次試驗教導馬來青年技術，結果失敗，因為這些青年知道他們是沒有前途的。即使他們非常熟練於砌磚，但由於種族偏見，也沒有人要僱用他們。另一方面，受政府強制僱用馬來工人的建築公司發現他們完全能夠掌握所需的技術。在這項計劃下，先保障就業，然後才提供訓練。如果對所取得的技術給予足夠的誘導，馬來工匠的技能將有機會運用和發展。

但是，不能硬性保障安全，以致損害到企業。政府服務目前所提供的退休金制度，使馬來人束縛於政府。在政府部門服務中的馬來人，比受僱於其他地方的馬來人來得有知識和有才幹。這是意料中事，是政府可以通過其薪金選擇最好的結果。此外，政府服務工作使他們洞察到官方程序的

複雜性，這有利於商業。在政府中服務幾年後，他們可成為出來工作並與非馬來人競爭的人選。但在政府中服務的馬來人為了保障退休金，將永遠不會離開政府服務。即使他們了解到，以他們的豐富知識和經驗，在其他種類的工作中將會賺取更多的收入，但惟恐失去享受退休金的權利，他們不願離開政府服務。

政治領域中也出現同樣的情形。一般人知道，當國家需要幹練的馬來領袖的時候，其中大多數可以從政府服務中發掘。他們不會離開政府服務，以免失去其所提供的保障。除非擬定一項新的計劃，使到他們能夠保有他們的退休金，才能誘勸他們進入政壇。

同樣地，政府在僱用馬來人，並訓練他們成為熟練與半熟練工人的計劃中，絕不能允許退休金產生約束性作用。必須使馬來人了解到，為政府服務只是一個踏腳石，以獲取更美好的事物。一旦掌握了技能，他們必須毫不猶疑地到別處尋找更好的職業。事實上，必須鼓勵他們這樣做。公積金的條件不會產生和退休金同樣的後果。如果老年時的保障在道義上是必需的話，則應該採用公積金的形式。這種制度的好處在於它可以隨着不同的僱主而轉移。這不會使僱員在一生中受縛於一個僱主，就猶如退休金所產生的後果一樣。

不論固定的工資多麼的少，具有這種保障的工作將吸引馬來人去做。其目的不是永久地僱用他們，而是使他們除種稻以外，還習慣於其他工作，進而使他們“城市化”。在這裡薪金起重大作用。考慮到甘榜的生活費用低以及馬來人對於失業親戚的寬大態度，薪金必須高於馬來稻農的平均收入。但最理想的是，薪金不會使他們對於離開這些職業，到他處担任薪酬較高的同樣職業感到猶豫不前。



工會制度已在馬來亞生根。一般認為工會是有益於工人。它防止了勞工受到剝削，使他們能夠公平分享部份是他們的勞動創造的繁榮。不幸的，一些工人為他們新建立的力量感到榮耀，他們不僅把工會當作是利用集體談判，以爭取較高工資，而且是提出其他要求的機會。如果不是代價很高的工業行動，是不能採取紀律行動的。在這些條件之下，勤勉是不受鼓勵，自我改善的慾望是受禁止。在一項強制馬來勞工進入競爭性強的技術工作領域的計劃中，工會主義不能立足。絕對保障和良好工作條件，並不是這項計劃的目標。為了確保勞工可能獲得公平交易及避免裙帶關係，以及其他形式的偏袒，必須建立一個公正無私的機構來照顧勞工的福利。

凡是有勞工湧入的城市，貧民窟都會如雨後春筍般紛紛冒現。由於馬來人城市化的概念，是為供他們城市的便利和精美設備，如果任由他們居住在貧民窟里，將有違目標。必須興建廉價房屋以收容他們。如果能夠建立小型的自足的衛星市鎮，新近城市化的鄉村移民將能獲得最大的利益。它須擁有商店、市場、學校、民衆會堂和醫藥設備。

我已經闡明馬來人可從跟非馬來人的接觸中所能取得的好處。這些衛星市將是可進行這種接觸的第一個地方。這些新興社會的一個重要特色，必須是提供便利，以使馬來人跟非馬來人進行接觸。一部份房屋和商店須撥給非馬來人。被僱來經營公用事業的職員中，少數是非馬來人。但是，雙方的接觸必須要加以控制，因為一向來都存在着非馬來人壓倒馬來人的趨勢，特別是在市場和商店。小商販設備必須成為馬來人城市化的獎掖。

過去，華人有效地將馬來人從各種形式的商業中排斥出

去。這種事情為什麼會發生，原因是衆皆知曉的。那些牽涉到種族特性的問題，是很難加以克服的。其實，惟一的方法就是馬來人城市化。不論商業規模怎樣小，在馬來人能從商業上獲取酬償之前，我們不能期待城市化會實現。

因而，在初期必須為馬來店主提供保護措施。新衛星鎮內的大多數商店和市場，必須分配給馬來人。但單單這樣做還不夠。為了使新的城市居民能光顧其社區內的商店，必須創造一些條件，使他們感到難於或須付出昂貴代價才能由外地購買物品。在理論上，合作社商店誘導社員光顧其本身的商店。實踐上，合作社商店對於馬來人是一項失敗。這些商店即使經營得好，也只發給很少的紅利，而且每年只發一次。傳統上馬來人是沒有耐心的，而且易被眼前的利益所吸引。競爭性價格和華人商店私下所提供的輕易可獲得的貸款，構成一種誘惑，使馬來人遺棄了其本身的合作社商店。但合作社可以作為促進馬來人參與小商業，以及控制馬來人開支的一種途徑。

一個微小但却重要的可以協助馬來人從商的因素，就是利用馬來婦女的天賦勤勞和敏捷性。在稻農中，男人在一年中大約勞動兩個月，婦女却終年操勞。她們跟男人一樣耕田。而且，在插秧和收穫的季節里，她們為所有農夫煮食。當稻田工作結束以後，她們繼續為家庭事務，看顧孩子，以及其他瑣碎但必要的工作而忙碌。在一些情況下，婦女製作糕點，甚至負販衣料和售賣森林土產，以賺取外快。準備鹹魚和醋漬淡水魚，都是婦女專有的工作。馬來婦女比男人較勤勞和敏捷。馬來婦女比起男人較傾向於儲蓄。這可以從她們購買珠寶首飾多於較不耐久的奢侈品的偏好中看出來。

在城市化計劃中，男人必須担任受薪職業，而婦女即使



爲家務而忙碌，仍能撥出時間來經營小商店。要做到這點，商店和住所必須同在一座建築物內。在吉蘭丹，馬來鄉村的商店都是設在店主住家的前面，幾乎全部是由婦女所料理。事實上，在吉蘭丹，大多數小商店和小販生意是由婦女所經營。然而，假如更儉約和精明的華族小商店主的競爭不減至最低點的話，這一切保護措施和策劃將遭受失敗。我們知道，華人到來馬來西亞前，馬來人已經是店主和小商人。就是由於華人商業策略的優越性，才導致馬來商店退隱消失。

華人的商業技巧是多方面的，它的基礎是建立在華人的節儉天性上，這使得他們養成儲蓄的習慣，並在微小的利潤上擴展業務。馬來人可以被教化少花費一些，但世代代的習慣和性格是不能在一朝一夕改變的。華人還使用各種手段使到馬來店主得不到公平競爭的機會，現金借貸就是他們的策略之一。華人的判斷力較敏銳，他們通過借貸一定數額的款項，使顧客受縛於他們。他們的手法也包括預先支付貸款。在甘榜中，這已經發展成爲非法的田地押借（padi-kuncha）制度。要結束這種活動，必須通過立法措施。售賣必須以現款進行，假如是除賬的話，必須有正確的賬目，以備稅務官調查，同時，賒欠不能累積太多。店主必須負起責任，一旦顧客無法還清債務時，他承担一切損失。這樣一來，給予馬來顧客的小宗貸款，不會被利用來阻止他們到其他商店購物。

有一個因素能夠促使馬來人跳出小商業的框框，就是商品的定價。蘇彝士以東的價格是從未確定的。討價還價是一種被接受的程序，購買是進行一種論價的過程，是顧客和店主之間的一項競爭。向來被人視爲理所當然的是，商人在任何交易中都不會吃虧。這點不是永遠都對的。有時候，商人答

應以一種低於成本的價格出售貨物，是希望在較少爲人知曉的貨物中賺取利潤。商譽是貿易中的重要質素。假如商人在虧幾分錢的情況下，仍然繼續售物給相同的顧客，那麼，他將毫無疑慮地預見到他很快就能賺回利潤，假如涉及與鄰近商店的競爭，通常是採取“現在虧本，將來賺回”的政策。由於華人的節儉和相對雄厚的資本，他們通常比馬來人更能經得起虧本；或者他們減低利潤數額，這也將確保顧客的繼續光顧。

假如馬來人要復興他們的小商業，就必須廢除伸縮性的價格制度。假如所有商店出售的全部貨物都有標明固定的價格，並且禁止低於標價的售價，那麼，無情的競爭就會消除。顧客在任何地方都將沒有選擇價格的餘地，他將在任何一間商店購物。在這樣情況下，鄰近華人商店的馬來商店才不會從商場中排擠出來。他不會被指斥暗中以較高的價格售物，而他與顧客論價的能力，不致於每作一次買賣都受到考驗。但是，當然總會有方法來抵禦這種性質的定價制度。不同的批發價格可能影響零售商的實質利潤。這能夠通過抽樣檢查的辦法來加以克服，堅持須發收條，以及真正爲批發交易定下價格，而其所得的收入，將須發收據和記賬。必須通過立法改換稱量器，只准使用彈簧秤。現在所採用的可以擺動的抗衡秤，稱爲提秤，易於操縱它來減低實際重量。華人零售商擅長於這種作法，他們非法地利用它作爲競爭中的武器。

有兩種方法可以用來抵禦定價和標價制度，必須敏銳提防那些逃避這種旨在減少不公平競爭之方法的企圖。當然，這些建議不只限於重新安置鄉村居民於城市地區的計劃。它必須普及全國，這樣，公平競爭才能作爲規範而不是特殊例

子。

這裡並不籌劃出馬來人城市化的全部步驟。我的意圖只是要說明它是有利的，並且是能夠做得到的。如果適當地調整和規劃，城市化似乎提供唯一的促使馬來人配合周圍環境和世界其他地方進展的方法。它將提供城市的現代化便利給他們，這不是鄉村地區所能獲得的。他們的健康，教育和外貌在無意識下發生了實質的變化。

另一方面，現在的觀念主張，限制馬來人在鄉村地區，以免惡化城市中失業問題，這只是意味着我們拒絕承認鄉村地區的嚴重貧窮和落後問題。地荒幾乎等於缺地的事實。只需一代的時間，單單回教徒繼承法典就能導致現有一切產業變成非經濟性。森林和其他保留地已經被蔑視法律的移民佔住和耕種，只有城市的工業和小商業能夠吸收未來的馬來失業者。爲了使吸收過程順暢和具效率，現在就必須開始着手城市化的必需策劃工作。對於馬來人或政府來說，沒有其他可以選擇的道路。

即使在馬來社會的範疇內，城市化與強制培養技術勞工，它們本身不能構成一場革命，但它們肯定的代表着一種激烈的變遷。光是城市化的事實就涉及一個將馬來人從傳統鄉村社會中趕離出來的實際和心理性過程。無疑的，在這種遷離中，舊的價值觀念和生活方式必須讓位給新的。舊的價值觀念和生活方式導致馬來人落後，將他們與國內和世界上不斷發生的變遷隔絕開來。只要我們比較馬來鄉村的真正實質結構，就可以體會到他們的社會處於怎樣的靜止狀態！

爲了完成馬來人的復權工作，須使他們擺脫風俗的束縛，接受新的思想方式和新的價值制度。城市化將使這種工作達到某種程度，但也必須有一種意識上的努力，以破壞舊的

方式，並以新思想和價值觀來取代它。馬來人必須面對現實的生活，並被迫調整他們的思想來適應這些現實。

政府已經推行各種計劃，來協助促推馬來人的進步。教育已經加速進展，鄉村馬來人已獲機會到城市去觀光。但這還不夠，馬來人朝向進步的步伐缺乏系統性及協調的方向。總之，這些重新調整馬來人的零星努力缺乏組織性。

其中一個足以說明馬來人的思想還未能適應的事項，就是他們經常投訴非馬來僱主。在非馬來人的公司或在非馬來上司的監督下工作的馬來人經常投訴他們遭受歧視。他們似乎不能明瞭，這是完全自然的事。在馬來人手下工作的非馬來人，也有同樣的感覺。但非馬來人把它接受爲理所當然的事，馬來人却拚命地反對它。他們並未嘗試去迎合他們的上司。他們並未嘗試去勝過非馬來競爭者。他們並未嘗試去使本身成爲僱主所倚重的人物。結果，他們失去人們的好感，其地位也難於維持。

他們沒有能力接受不可避免的現實，說明了他們未能調整和適應環境。當瑪拉工藝學院（Mara Institute of Technology）的畢業生進入工商業領域的時候，這種特有的無能在最近的將來會成爲很大的障礙。馬來人或馬來公司不能吸收所有的畢業生。他們之中大多數人將直接在非馬來人之下工作。而這一羣人將面對同樣的種族歧視。除非這些年青的馬來人理解這種歧視，他們將發覺其地位難於維持下去。假如這種情況發生了，那麼馬來人將再次遭遇失敗。

這只是一個說明馬來人未能面對現實及作自我調整的例子，假如馬來人要復權，則必須檢討和評估造成他們今日困境的一切態度和價值觀念，如果有必要的話，必須廢棄或加以改變。

馬來人的城市化，獲取新技術，以及接受那些跟他們的宗教和基本上是封建的外貌仍然可以共存的新價值觀念，這些將構成一場革命。必須承認的是，這些建議並不新鮮。事實上，這些事物正在發生着。到目前為止，其步伐是一個溫和進化的過程，不牽涉一致的行動或是殘酷的實行方式。整個過程必須妥為策劃和加速進行，並且貫徹到底，以至為馬來人帶來一個完全和根本的改變。如果能掀起這場革命，馬來人將能復權，他們的困境將成為過去。而國家將能在不必背負馬來人問題的包袱下邁向進步。

## (八) 馬來人之問題

在馬來西亞，或尤其是在馬來亞，馬來人面對着一項個人的問題。這個問題關係到他們對於馬來亞和馬來西亞以及對於和其他種族配分馬來人土地的真實內在態度。這關係到他們爭取到“默迪卡”時的希望，以及遭現實無情擊破的希望。這是一個苦境，由於各種原因，每個人避免在公開場合中談論它。華人和印度人相信：馬來人瞭解自己面對一個錯綜複雜的問題，而公開提及它將產生不能控制和災難性的連鎖式反應。馬來人本身一直避免對於這項問題發表公開聲明，因為它將使他們難堪，也使到其他人士難堪。對於這個特有的馬來人問題的壓制，他們比其他任何人須負更大的責任。

謹慎地避免討論這項問題，表面上看來是好的。它維持了安寧的氣氛，而這被誤以為是馬來西亞的種族和諧。它有利於良好的行政。它促進了投資和發展。但在這個看來平靜和諧之下的真正局勢，却充滿着危機。每個種族，不論華人、印度人或馬來人，緊緊地依附於種族效忠，不斷地爭論着這個馬來人問題。並且因為各個集團不明瞭對方的力量，以及其所包含的激烈感情，這種爭論使局勢逐漸緊張，隨時可沸騰起來。假如這事發生，而它極有可能發生，由於彼此缺乏認識，使得妥協變得不可能。局勢可能變得不可收拾。災禍可能發生。馬來亞可能遭致和尼日利亞同樣的命運。



除了瞭解馬來人性格的人外，有關馬來人比起其他任何人更要負起壓制這個問題的責任的論據在其他入眼中是荒謬的。因此，瞭解馬來人這種特性是很重要的。這是問題的組成部份。事實上，它構成問題的重要性和複雜性。馬來人是謙恭和自卑的。他的世界洋溢着高貴品質，他從不遠離拉惹和酋長。他讓步，並向他們表示敬意。這樣做是一種良好禮貌。它並不是卑微。事實上，它是有教養的表現。馬來人通常是站在一旁，而讓路給其他人。他不僅站在一旁，而且鞠躬，以示尊敬。馬來人秉性謙恭有禮，不僅通過不完全佔據道路，同時通過讓路和鞠躬，表現出他的教養。每個人都希望從別人身上得到這點禮貌。但如果對方不是馬來人，這種期望即告消失。非馬來人將得到寬恕。他並不明白這種禮貌。他不會受到埋怨。非馬來人向來受到優待。他不受寄望去遵循一般的禮節。他可以說出和做出被認為是對馬來人粗魯或不良的行為。他甚至可以拉惹和酋長面前，做出馬來人所做不出事，但他卻不會受到處罰。在每次的事件中馬來人都準備原諒和容忍非馬來人，這事實本身體現了他的良好教養。令客人難堪是一種失禮的行為，而非馬來人向來是馬來人的客人，在他的國家的客人。

但令人遺憾的是，馬來人的良好禮貌却受到非馬來人誤解。英國人將馬來人的尊敬和經常讓步視為懦弱和劣等的證據。馬來人習慣上稱呼他們為“Tuan”或“主人”，而這被認為是馬來人接受歐洲人為他們實際上的主子。

溫斯特甚至在他所著的《英馬詞典》中指出，馬來人，包括拉惹在內，稱呼歐洲人的正確方法是在名字之前加上“Tuan”的尊稱。假如這種傲慢氣焰未引起公憤，或這種錯誤未被指正，是因為馬來人認為，指正外國人在禮節上的錯

誤是一種失禮的行為。

華人和印度人來自人口眾多的國家，他們較不注意良好行為和禮貌。在他們的生活中缺乏與教養有關的品性特質。他們只依從年齡和財富。華人和印度人從來不瞭解馬來人讓步的習慣。他們不把這種良好教養當作一回事。他們不羨慕它，也不覺得需要模倣它。但他們肯定的發覺到，這對於他們是有利的。他們發覺對於他們有利的是：他們能夠做馬來人所不能做的事。他們發覺到，在這馬來人的土地上，他們是擁有特權的一羣。

馬來人的謙恭和自卑的習慣，只是馬來人性格的一面。馬來人不斷的自我抑制，是很不自然的。他們經常有着一種內部鬥爭，一種衝突，而這種衝突通過各種方式表達出來。最先和最重要的後果，是自我退縮到他的種族內。他從不對別人坦白，除非是那些有同情心及他信賴的人。而他只能完全信賴本族人民。因此，他向非本族人民與本族人民所表達的意見是不同的。當然，這種差異只發生在當他向別人表達不愉快或不合口味事情的時候。如果他的真正意見不會引起不愉快或憎恨，他將毫不猶疑地向本族及其他種族表白出來。因此，以表面的評價來接受馬來人是謬誤的。他的禮貌和對於不愉快的事件的不相容態度，如能為人所瞭解是最好不過的。他的內部衝突具潛在性的危險。它不斷地在尋求表達的機會。

“亂殺”(Amok)是一個馬來字，這個字現在已被普遍理解。沒有其他單個字眼可以形容“amok”，理由是很顯然的——因為“amok”形容馬來人性格的另一方面。“Amok”代表馬來人內部衝突的外在表達形式，這是他長期觀察加諸在他身上的法規和條例的結果。這是他的內部痛苦的一種溢



出和氾濫。這是擺脫束縛的一種方式。這完全違背了常理與教養。施諸在他身上的束縛和抑制解除了。責任沒有了。什麼也不必管了。他自由了。跟過去的聯繫已切斷，未來的不再有希望，他只顧眼前。如果用騎馬的術語，他看到紅色。在恍惚中，他紊亂地衝擊出去。他的怯弱和自卑感消除了。現在他是一個“海德先生”(Mr Hyde)——殘忍，無情及破壞狂。但是，從一個謙恭而自卑的馬來人轉變成爲亂砍亂殺的狂人往往是一個緩慢的過程。它太過緩慢以致可能完全不會出現。他可能來不及等到騷動爆發就已躺入墳墓了。

在今天，“亂殺”只成爲一種傳說。文明已經使馬來人馴服了。他仍然懷着憤恨，但他能更好的控制它，戰勝它。但它仍保留爲他的特質的重要部份，是他的性格的一個基本部份。

馬來人的性格還有其他的方面。現在，暫擱不談。它們跟馬來人問題有關連，但它們只牽涉到問題的解決方法，而不是牽涉瞭解問題的潛在危機。這些問題留待後面討論。

這裡對於馬來人性格的某些方面的約略檢討，僅旨在說明：馬來人問題較其所表現的迹象更具爆炸性。其用意在於使人們在壓制馬來人的不滿之際，關注他們的特性。現在我們可以明白：爲什麼整個歷史過程中，馬來人似乎願意逐步喪失權勢。他們公開和有禮地讓出幾乎全部的勢力及他們自己國土的統治權。

英國人在毫無察覺之下僭取馬來半島的控制權時，似乎是得到馬來人，上至蘇丹下至地位低下的鄉村居民的合作。一名英籍駐扎官的被殺，雖然它使得英國人精明和狡猾起來，但却不能使這個過程中斷。他們學會覺察馬來人中間的不滿暗流，以及不滿與謙恭天性之間的矛盾。他們學習怎樣撫

慰馬來人。他們懂得怎樣進行工作。因此，在他們逐漸取得政權的過程中，不再受到其他不愉快事件所干擾。移民的湧入，開始時只是涓涓小流，直到英國統治時期，才蔚爲洪流，他們取代了馬來人，而似乎未受到馬來人的任何反對。

在第二次世界大戰爆發之前，已經有迹象顯示：馬來人欲衝破他們施加於自己身上的有害性束縛。當日本南侵的時候，“馬來青年協會”行將與英國殖民統治者進行公開衝突。英國情報局偵察到這點，但威斯敏斯特(英國議會所在地)却被蒙在鼓裡。洋洋自得的威斯敏斯特草擬了“馬來亞聯盟”計劃，其最終目標是要剝奪馬來人在馬來亞仍保有的微小權力或地位。一名傲慢無禮的公務員受委出任總督，作爲立法政權的象徵，然而這種政權早已是既成事實。因此，憤恨的暗流重新沸騰起來。馬來人自認爲是他們本身特有的統治者的唯一臣民，在面對威脅他們的危險時，突然團結起來。敏感而富於歷史意識的英國人，再一次作體面的退卻。馬來人中的紳士覺察出這個動向。紳士做了作爲一個紳士所應做的事情。友好關係幾乎完全恢復。事實上，對英國的敬意提高了。

由於撫慰和保證，使馬來人再次成爲謙恭的紳士。但是，不久事實即顯示，英國人又要耍花樣。反對“馬來亞聯盟”原則的鬥爭並沒有結束。馬來人在“馬來亞聯盟”事件結束以後，繼續採取警戒和憂慮的態度，他們很快地察覺到英國人將要採取的更邪惡手段。在防衛上，他們以同樣的迂迴方式抗拒英國人的行動。我們已經看到英國人熟練於處理馬來人問題。每當局勢顯得難以駕御時，英國人即表演一場體面的撤退。情緒緩和下來的馬來人接着將面對新的更圓滑的手法。最終結賬時，馬來人敗了。

英國人在馬來亞逗留期間，是馬來人和華印族移民之間的緩衝者。這兩個種族與馬來人之間的接觸，不論在行政或社交上，都減少到最低點。英籍的“華民政務司”以及印度人的代理人的設置，說明了這些移民種族的問題是在馬來人管轄範圍以外。隔離以及文化和語言上的差異，妨礙了社會接觸。其結果是，這些移民懂得很少有關馬來人的行為和特性，至於怎樣去應付他們，更一無所知。

但是，獨立撤除了英國緩衝者。驟然間，馬來人和非馬來人之間建立了各級的接觸。當馬來人以其古老方式的禮貌和謙恭的態度，面對着那些不瞭解這種品質以及如何對待他們的人們，局勢就逐漸緊張起來。幸虧在政府中還有足夠的非馬來領袖，明瞭馬來人問題以及英國人的避免正面衝突的方法。但獨立過後好幾年，開明的馬來領袖人數並未增加。較新一代的非馬來領袖，所能看到的只是：馬來人對非馬來族要求無限制進步的慾望是一種障礙。馬來人的謙恭和對於擾亂的畏懼，被視為懦弱的表現，不被瞭解反而受人利用。

裂痕擴大了。容忍為狹隘的效忠所取代。問題日益嚴重，而馬來人內部的矛盾也日益尖銳。禮貌和避免不愉快的願望，跟自我保存的需求進行鬥爭。禮貌和教養能居支配地位多長時間？馬來人問題在爆發之前能解決多少？答案須視馬來人、華人和印度人的態度而定。我們必須學習英國人的政策。我們必須學習去瞭解問題。我們必須知道它的基礎、比例及理由。

這一杯馬來人的苦茶必須沖淡。必須尋找一個解決方案，一個沒有對任何人不利但却恢復馬來人在馬來亞陽光下的正當地位的公平解決方案。必須闡明，分析和評價馬來人問題，以使我們能夠獲得一個解決方案。我們必須面對問題，

而且必須現在面對，以免為時太晚。

因為馬來人突然開始認識到：他甚至不能稱馬來亞為其土地。不再是 Tanah Melayu —— 馬來人的土地。他現在是一個不同身份的人，一個馬來西亞人，他只是一個馬來裔馬來西亞人，他在馬來亞——他的土地——的權益，不僅與別人分享，而且分享得不平等。但這似乎還不夠，他一直受促放棄越來越多他份內的影响力。

這是馬來人的基本論點，它受到其他種族的挑戰。馬來人堅持，馬來亞一向來是，現在仍是他們的土地。假如要頒發公民權給居住在馬來亞並視馬來亞為其家鄉的其他種族人士，決定公民權形式、特權和義務的必須是馬來人。一旦成為公民後，非馬來人不僅與馬來人分享馬來西亞的所有權，還分享作為一個公民的特性，並且分担作為一個公民的條件，而新公民不能改變這點。

馬來亞是否是馬來人的土地？畢竟，華人和甚至印度人在此已有一段很長很長的時間，他們和馬來人有着一樣多的要求。此外，馬來人不是馬來亞的第一批居民。在馬來人到來之前，原住民已經在這裡。假如馬來人可以從原住民手中取得土地，那麼華人和印度人同樣可以這樣做。因此，華人和印度人必須和馬來人站在平等的地位上。圖駁斥一度成為馬來亞公認事實的馬來人基本權利的這場陰險運動，始於英國人的“馬來亞聯盟”概念。它隨着馬來亞政治的演變而增強或衰落。最後，它隨新加坡總理李光耀先生，在新加坡退出馬來西亞前夕所作的著名聲明而達到高潮，他說：“我們（華人）在這裡是我們的權力。”換句話說，馬來人不會比華人或印度人對馬來半島擁有較大的權力。

自從有歷史以來，國家主權往往是產生戰爭和糾紛的原



因。無論辯論的是非曲直怎樣，或戰爭的結果如何，涉及爭執的雙方從未能達致協議。在這裡給馬來人的要求提出理由，似乎是沒有用的。幸運的是，許多國家擁有和馬來西亞相似的問題，而全世界對於它們的公民權政策和國際人格的承認，提供我們一個支持馬來人論點的根據。澳洲就是這樣的一個例子。幾個世紀以前，移居到澳洲的英國人，當然片面地認為他們本身是澳洲土著的土地之正當擁有人。一直到今日，沒有一個人認真地提議，白種澳洲人管治澳洲的權力須比土著少。澳洲人已經被國際上一致接受為澳洲的人民。

國際上的同意和承認，對於建立一個國性是很重要的。這種承認可以採取許多方式。外交使節是最具體的形式。但假如沒有委派代表，政府或一個國土的當權者，可以與外國談判，締結條約和貿易，成為有關領土的合法的、種族的或國家統治者。全世界都跟澳洲人而不是跟澳洲土著進行談判和接觸，這個現象建立了這樣的事實：澳洲屬於移民的澳洲人。

我們知道，澳洲最初的移民是英國人血統。逐漸地，其他歐洲血統的移民移居到這裡。但當其他種族來到的時候，澳洲人已經被承認為一個國際人格。他操英語，基本上依據英國風俗，和信仰基督教。他接受與英國皇室的聯繫，甚至當他的國家獨立後，仍然保持這種聯繫。這種特性的建立，意味着較後來自歐洲其他或亞洲國家的移民，必須依從這種特性。如果不能依從，意味着他將不能取得作為一個澳洲人的合法地位。非英籍移民跟其祖國斷絕了一切聯繫，而且無意離開澳洲，這些事實並不能使他自動成為澳洲人。新來者何時可以稱自己為澳洲人，這個問題是由確定的澳洲人決定。

假如他依從成為一個澳洲人所須接受的條件，他將獲得法律地位而後裔將成為澳洲人。但是，他和他的後裔作為一個澳洲人的權利，並不擴張到要堅持：改變澳洲人的定義，以使其語言、風俗和傳統，跟他的祖國相同。一個俄裔澳洲人並不能堅持，只因為他和澳洲的其他任何澳洲人擁有相同的權利，那麼，蘇聯人的語言和風俗必須成為澳洲的語言和風俗。一個華裔澳洲人不能要求華人的語言和文化被接受成為澳洲的語言和文化。

換句話說，一旦澳洲人的國際人格已經建立起來，以及澳洲人本身希望保持這種身份，沒有一個澳洲人可能根據他們自己的解釋嘗試改變它。原本講英語的澳洲人將不會容忍此種行為，勢將採取行動將這些新澳洲人驅逐出境及阻止更多這類移民的入境，以防止任何弱化他們地位的運動。

其實，整個移民、行政和教育政策是為永久保留澳洲人作為一個基本上是白種的講英語的跟隨英國風俗及信仰基督教的人的特性而擬訂的。移民受到控制，使得常常有足夠的確定的澳洲人去沖淡新移民的影響。

美國是另一個擁有跟澳洲相似的歷史和政策的國家。雖然紅印第安人比澳洲土著較有組織和較進步，但國際上從未把他們當作是美國的主人。移居在今日美國各地的人民並不是全部屬於盎格羅撒克遜血統，即使在初期也不是這樣。有十三州是英國人的殖民地。許多荷蘭人移居到新阿姆斯特丹州，過後遷移到紐約州。南部的路易斯安那州則受法國殖民統治。通過人數的絕對優勢和戰爭及談判，講英語的盎格羅撒克遜民族支配了美國，並創立美國人的確定形象。連續的歐洲移民浪潮，雖然他們最終在人數上超過那些純英國血統者，但他們是那麼地有節制，以致英國的語言和文化調整和

保留為美國國性的基礎。

今天，美國仍然有少數人民保留使用其祖國的語言以及一些風俗和宗教。猶太人、意大利人、波多黎各人、甚至華人，生活在特定的集團內，並使用本身的語言。他們甚至擁有本身的報紙。他們與“故國”保持聯繫。但作為美國人，他們全部講英語，並沒有嘗試去要求承認他們本身的語言和文化為美國的語言和文化。其實，一旦他們獲得公共的承認，他們就嘗試忘却他們的語言和祖國，嘗試遷出他們的少數民族居住地並自命為普通美國人。他們比美國人更為“美國化”，他們小心翼翼地注意維護移民法令，教育政策及其他政府設施，以保留受公認的作為美國人的概念。

比較接近我國的有泰國和越南。泰國擁有其中一個最大的華裔少數民族。在全國的二千五百萬人口中，估計華人大約佔三百萬。此外，不少華人與泰人通婚，而被視為泰人。華族移民到泰國，幾乎跟華人到他們仍然稱為南洋的地區進行冒險活動同一時期。東南亞大陸的國家被視為中華帝國的進貢國家，而中國外交使者的任命，比其他國家來得早。最終，華人強求貿易和獲取財富，導致越來越多華人移居到東東南亞各國。直到最近，這些華人仍不願申請居留國的公民權。

不過，在泰國，華人經濟霸權的威脅早就受公認。不肯定的是，甚麼時候泰人覺察到一個不被吸收的大華族社會可能使已經因跟中國毗鄰而感到不自在的泰國淪為那個帝國的進貢國。但可以肯定的是，在泰國早期的歷史中，為防止增長中的華人社會影響泰國人的國家和國性而擬定的制約受強制實施。通過施加於純血統華人的貿易和就業限制，鼓勵異族通婚及吸收泰國文化、語言和宗教。政權穩固的掌握在泰

人或是那些依從泰國意識，有着華泰血統的人手中。在泰國的歷史中，從未產生誰對泰國擁有更多權力的問題。不論很早就定居在泰國的是什麼種族，只有確定的泰人，在誰能獲公民權的問題上擁有最後言權。雖然現在有三百萬華人是泰國的永久居民，這種事實並不授給他們權力稱自己為泰人或要求他們的語言和文化被接受為泰國的語言和文化。

華人本來是越南的統治者。在越南，華人從未被真正吸收。在法國統治時期，華人遠離越南人而生活。對於越南的所有權從未引起質疑。越南人從法國手中承繼這個所有權，然後限制華人（大約二百萬人）在他們的社區中。華人征服者的後裔和較後來的華裔商人，則被視為外國人，沒有公民權利。華人在越南的歷史比在東南亞各地的來得悠久。他們的國家是毗鄰的，他們的宗教相同，他們的姓名常常難以辨別。但是越南人堅持只有他們擁有越南，而他們決定誰以及怎樣才是越南人。

東南亞其他地區的華人歷史跟馬來亞的一樣悠久，但是，沒有一個地方的華人要求或已經被接受為這些地區的土著。

我的爭論重點是：馬來人是馬來亞的合法擁有者，如果公民權頒發給馬來人以外的其他種族，那是因為馬來人同意這樣做。這個同意是有條件的。

從對其他國家的研究中，所得到的第一個結論是，原住民的存在早於其他種族移殖者，並不意味着國際上公認這個國家屬於原住民。舉幾個例子，澳洲、台灣和日本存在着原住民，但沒有一個地方，他們被視為是有關國家的“確定人民”。“確定人民”是那些建立第一個政府，而這些政府是有跟其他國家進行官方活動及有着外交關係者。



還有一個條件。組成第一個有效政府的人民及其合法承繼者，必須在任何時候，人數超過有關國家原有的部落。上述的國家情形是這樣。但在南非、肯雅和羅德西亞，原住民人數超過組成第一個有效政府的種族人數。

我們知道，今日世界對於這些國家局勢的態度。雖然肯雅的白人政府曾是第一個有效政府，現代觀念堅持：原來的非洲黑人，因為他們的人數超過白種人，以及他們是這個地區的原住民，所以必須成為肯雅的政府和確定的人民。隨着時間的演進，世界輿論的壓力強迫肯雅發生這種變遷。同樣的論據可以引申到南非和羅德西亞。儘管在這兩個國家，白人移民組成第一個有效的政府，而且長久以來在國際上已經被接受為確定的人民，他們仍然被促讓步給在人數上壓倒他們，而且在種族上是跟這個地區有着密切的聯繫的非洲黑人。

在馬來亞，無疑的是馬來人成立第一個有效的政府。自從馬來亞有史以來，馬來土邦就已經獲得國際上的承認。外國的貿易，條約和外交代表，是跟馬來人統治的馬來土邦進行談商。馬來人（Orang Melayu）一路來就是馬來半島的確定人民。原住民從未獲得這種承認，他們亦未要求這種承認。沒有聽聞過原住民政府或原住民邦國。最重要的，原住民人數從未超過馬來人。相當明顯的，假如今天原住民有四百萬，馬來人視馬來半島為其國家的權力，將會受到全世界的質問。但事實上，原住民人數不超過區區幾千人。

中華帝國向一些馬來土邦索取貢物。這本身就是一種中國承認馬來土邦的存在以及馬來政府合法地位的形式。因此這可以看出，假如國際慣例可以作為指示，馬來人真正是馬來半島的確定人民，馬來亞的真正和原來的統治者和主人。

沒有其他種族具有任何理由來爭論這點。歷史，特別是現代史，支持馬來人的論點。外國政府和人民的一切事務，是跟這個國家的統治者，馬來拉惹進行接觸的。沒有其他人冒稱他有權力可以代表半島與外國締結任何協定或條約。葡萄牙人從馬來人手中取得馬六甲。後來，葡萄牙人喪失了這塊領土給荷蘭人，而荷蘭人又喪失給英國人。吉打的馬來蘇丹將檳城租借給英國人，後來，威利斯省也是通過跟吉打蘇丹簽訂協約而併入英屬檳城的領土。天定和邦咯島是吡叻蘇丹租借出去。當這兩個地區對於英國沒有用途時，英國將它們歸還給吡叻蘇丹。沒有人提出質問，究竟在這兩個地區的英國殖民地人民是否為英國人的承繼者。他們甚至從未被諮詢過。在天定和邦咯歸還以後，也沒有人抗議和議論。

以新加坡來說，英國人欺騙了柔佛的馬來王。相當明顯的，如果不是英國人策劃秘密轉換柔佛統治者，新加坡可能不會割讓給英國。這些事務之必須進行，說明了英國承認馬來人對於新加坡島的權力。

以後的英國統治馬來亞的歷史中，馬來人和馬來統治者是唯一受英國人諮詢和承認為馬來亞的確定人民。在海峽殖民地，英國人的統治沒有跟馬來人商議。這可能是因為馬來統治者沒有地位去抗議。吉打蘇丹曾經嘗試重新取回檳城，但却受到英國僱傭兵的挫敗。在此事件以後，他們認為最好將英國擱置一旁。馬來人非常清楚地看出，一旦領土租借給英國人，英國人表現得不像租借人，而像徹頭徹尾的主人或地主。除非擁有可擊敗英國的武裝力量，任何欲使英國人修正他們對於租借這個名詞的解釋之努力，都是枉費心機的。

在馬來半島的其他地方，英國人通過馬來人實施其統治。應該承認的是，馬來人沒有選擇，只有服從。在跟英國人

締結的各項條約中納入的有關馬來統治者“必須接受英國顧問所提出的勸告”的條文，除英國人外，誰都感到羞恥。這個策略使英國人可以任意做所喜歡的事，而他們所喜歡的事情是沒有限制的，其中包括撤除蘇丹和竄改承繼法典。

但事實依然是，英國人通過馬來人而不是其他人統治馬來亞。固然，諮詢性的立法機構也包括一些非馬來人。但這些機構並沒有執行的作用，可以說它們的存在只是用來減輕英國人的愧疚。非馬來人不是真正的立法者，他們只是進行官樣文章批准的人。所有主要的改革，例如創立“馬來聯邦”以及擬議中的包括馬來亞各州在內的“關稅聯盟”，是直接與作為各州的真正執行首長的蘇丹商議的。

日本人對馬來亞的佔領，並沒有改變馬來統治者的地位。日本人保留他們的蘇丹地位，雖然日本軍事政府覺得沒有需要再跟他們討論行政事務或政策。在東南亞戰爭中，日本人將北部四個馬來州轉讓給泰國。泰人通過軍事總督實施統治，但同樣的沒有廢除這些蘇丹。其實，當時的蘇丹，比在日本人手下擁有更大的特權地位。

日本人的戰敗，以前受英國保護的地區，在行政上發生許多變遷。砂撈越的白人拉惹布魯克和英屬北婆羅州公司受促將它們在這兩個地區的管轄權移交英國政府。當其中一個布魯克抗議時，英國立刻採取對付的行動，這顯示出英國的決心。即使英國駐砂撈越的總督被刺殺，也不能改變英國的決心。

在馬來亞，英國首次在沒有與馬來統治者商議的情況下提出其計劃。當時的英國工黨政府對這個國家只有很少或缺乏認識，覺得馬來蘇丹不夠民主。他們的地位因而減至主教身份，而全國行政工作完全由英國人管轄。此外，所有居住

在馬來亞的人都成為公民，並和馬來人擁有同等的權利。這符合英國人在牽涉到他人的財產時所持的一般性論調。以巴勒斯坦為例，英國人把整個國家從阿拉伯人手中取來交給猶太人。

英國人仍然保持着拘泥形式的作風。雖然他們擁有權勢，可以忽視蘇丹和馬來人，他們在形式上堅持取得蘇丹對於建議中“馬來亞聯盟”的同意。一個來自巴勒斯坦的官吏被委派處理此事。英國人在發出如不妥協，將不予承認的威脅後，不顧禮節地倉促迫使九個馬來統治者同意此事。這裡提出此點旨在說明：即使在馬來人和英國人關係最惡化時期，英國人仍然在形式上承認馬來蘇丹在馬來半島各州的合法權力。當馬來人的鼓噪和騷動日益惡化，以致英國人被迫放棄“馬來亞聯盟”的計劃和恢復馬來統治者的地位時，這點顯得更加突出。

自此以後，一切導致1957年馬來亞獨立的改革，都是經過馬來統治者及代表馬來人的最大馬來政黨——巫統充份的協商和同意後作出的。因此很清楚的，一直到英國於1957年8月放棄統治權之前，英國人承認馬來人為對馬來亞進行任何改革時唯一須取得同意的人。其他種族也受到諮詢，但馬來人反對的建議根本沒有機會通過。

獨立後，還發生其他有關華人和印度人跟馬來人擁有同等權力去要求馬來亞作為他們本身的國家的爭論。這些要求忽略了先例和歷史的事實。其中一個較有趣的要求是，華人和印度人是發展馬來亞並促進繁榮的人民。這看來是須頒所有權予發展者，而不必顧其他的因素。

首先，這個聲明是不大正確的。許多因素促成馬來亞的發展，而所有種族對於發展，都有貢獻。馬來人對於大量移



民的容忍，是不能不被視為重要的因素。假如馬來人一早就加以反對，那就沒有移民到來發展馬來亞。馬來人不僅允准移民，他們也負責治理和為國家制訂政策，使得移民可以累積財富而不必害怕遭剝奪。雖然，在這種工作上，他們曾獲得英國人的勸導和協助，但這僅僅顯示，英國人同樣負責發展國家，並促進繁榮。其次，移民並不是為發展馬來亞而來的。他們到來，是因為能在容忍和穩定的氣氛中賺取財富，而這種氣氛在東南亞所有殖民地和國家中，是馬來亞所獨有的。這種發展的利益，主要是謀求財富的移民所取得。馬來人大多數居住在鄉村地區，並未從這些發展和繁榮中得到多大利益。假如沒有發展，他們也不會怎樣介意。他們當然將不會因他們不能享受繁榮而放棄對於馬來亞的索求。

這個要求所產生的問題是：是否發展國家的人民就能夠自動地得到權利？假如僅僅是發展，就使得任何種族移民在所居留的國家中能夠享有這種權利，那麼英國人必然是第一個對馬來亞、肯雅及其他殖民地提出這種要求的人。華人對於菲律賓、泰國、印尼和越南也作出很大的貢獻。但在這些華族移民——發展者符合了一系列複雜的條件，可能包括改變姓名及跟確定公民結婚之前，他們是不可能聲明，這個國家為他們所有。在美國，因對於國家的發展有能力作出貢獻而被挑選出來的移民，仍須符合多項居留限制條件，包括語言測驗，才能成為公民，並且聲稱美國是屬於他們的國家。

世界上沒有一個地方，僅僅是對於一個國家的發展和繁榮有貢獻的事實，就可以作為要求貢獻者成為這個國家的主人的唯一准則。因此，宣稱華人和印度人負起馬來亞的發展任務，並不能使這些移民及其後裔獲授予跟土著馬來人同等的地位。他們必須符合一系列的條件，才能達到這個地位。

另一個論點是，無數移民已經在馬來亞居住了超過一代以上，並已跟其本國斷絕關係。這些人民聲稱由於他們只對馬來亞效忠，他們必須擁有馬來亞公民權及和馬來人同等的地位。聲稱效忠是很容易的。為了表示效忠，必須着重某些條件。即使這樣，也不能視所有的聲明得到印証。移民可以聲稱馬來亞是他們唯一的國家。他們在馬來亞出生，他們在這裡工作，以及他們有財產在這裡。他們死於斯並埋葬在這裡。正如馬來人，他們沒有其他國土可去或稱為他們的家鄉。在國內外，他們都是馬來西亞人。

但事實依然是，假如一名馬來人和一名印度人被迫離開馬來亞，印度人可以定居在印度，並成為一名印度人，但馬來人則不能夠。華人也一樣，無論他有怎樣的看法，假如他覺得有需要回去，他仍會被中國接受入境。其實，我們還沒有聽說過，離開馬來亞的印度人要申請印度公民權而遭印度拒絕的事。同樣地，馬來亞和印尼的海外華人如因政治理由被驅逐出境，將受到中國熱烈歡迎。假如馬來人遭驅逐出境，他們要到哪里去？他們將發覺，由於種族聯繫，沒有一個國家會接受他們為公民。甚至印尼也不認為馬來人源自印尼，它不會自動接受被放逐的馬來人。

一個人要成為一名真正的土著，他不能屬於其他種族，而且真正認同於某一個國家。假如一個人的種族根源，被其他任何國家所認同和接受，他就不再是土生土長的，並且不能聲稱居留國為他所有。這並不是說，假如能夠符合公民權的其他所有限制條件，這項聲明也不能生效。但僅僅聲稱效忠和歸屬感，並不能證明一個人有資格獲取公民權。

當前我們正處於建設一個新國家的過程中，新的國家將成為不同種族集團的混合體。這個新國家的形式和新公民權

，必須滿足所有組成的種族。假如我們要避免自私的種族偏見所產生的差異，瞭解每個種族的有關權利和要求是很重要的。這種瞭解必須具普遍性和廣泛性。重要的是，這種瞭解必須基於理性的論點，而不是僅僅情緒和自私的動機。

我堅決認為馬來人是馬來亞原有或土生的人民，唯一可以聲稱馬來亞為他們的唯一國家的人民。按照全世界的慣例，馬來人對於施加在非土著淵源公民身上的公民權的形式和義務問題上享有某些不可轉移的權利。在討論這些權利的內容以及馬來人怎樣地要求和堅持其權利以前，必須注意的是，在馬來亞，即使這些權力的有限實施，也是非常顯明的，理由是顯而易見的。當局相當輕率的授公民權予異種的、非同化的、數目大到難於管治的非馬來種族。在東南亞其他國家（以及在澳洲、美國和巴西），擴展公民權的過程是逐步的，並且受具有遠見的移民政策所控制。當不同種族淵源的小移民集團獲得公民權，他們採納有關國家中人數較大的確定種族的特性、特有語言和文化。這些新公民忘掉了祖先，他們不但與確定種族之間難於區分，而且反過來堅持保留他們所接受的公民權條件。這種保留和持續確定種族特性的過程，最初是人為的計劃，後來變得自我拘謹和從其本身取得衝力。它利用了人類的某些價值觀和特徵。新移民的持久處於少數種族和非特權的地位，使他們產生一種慾望，要跟多數種族結合，以獲取特權地位。原有文化，語言和種族特性立即消失，這些和作為公民所獲取的特權比較，是微不足道的。既已獲得這些特權和被平等接受，人類天生的嫉妒心理使他們去維護這種地位的條件。這個過程一旦開始，是不會中斷的，除非有某一個侵略性和詭狡的特定種族集團移民的大量湧入。

在馬來西亞，非常明顯的，只在英國統治時期，這種現象才會發生。有迹象顯示，在英國人將其勢力擴展到這兒之前來到馬來亞的華人和印度人經過了一種典型的同化過程。在馬六甲，華人和印度人失去運用他們的語言的能力而使用馬來語。他們也採納馬來服裝和馬來文化，儘管還保留其本身的宗教。可以肯定的是，假如英國人沒有鼓勵華人和印度人以不能控制的數目移入，然後將他們和馬來人隔離開來，這些外來種族和馬來人之間的差異將會減少，而馬來人的問題也不會產生了。現在，即使對習慣於某些權利和不必盡義務的大異族集團實施最低的公民權條件，也受到過份的注意。

再回到原有人民的權利問題，我們可以說，這些權利是有限的。這些權利的目標及其實施，並非為了使原有確定種族的特權持久不變，以排斥新移民種族，而只是確保確定種族的特性永久存在。因此，種族起源不是重要的，也不能使新移民失去資格。這一切條件的實施意味着：移民們如果願意依從確定公民的特性，將能正式成為公民，並且將行使同樣的權利和特權。但這些權利和特權並不包括改變確定種族的特性。這種對於確定特性而非種族根源的強調，是一個重要的原則，這體現在限制新公民改變這些特性的權利上。

在馬來亞的整個歷史過程中，馬來人向來承認這個原則，並接受那些具備馬來特性的非馬來人。唯一的額外限制就是堅持：馬來人的定義是指一個信仰回教的人，這個堅持使得馬來公民權只局限於印尼人、阿拉伯人和印度回教徒。因此，我國有些馬來人很明顯的是阿拉伯人、印尼人或印度人。重要的是，這些人民不僅依從馬來人的所有特性，並且堅持永遠保留成為馬來人的準則。



在其他國家，外來的公民對於他們本身特性的控制和維持的權利，是受到限制的。這種限制隨着不同的國家而有所差異。另一方面，控制維持一國國性的手法，不僅是原有確定公民，也是歸化公民所關注的事情。順從和堅持語言、移民、文化等政策，從而創造和保存獨特的國性，是全體公民的責任。

必須承認的是，語言是最重要的特性。任何國家的國語，通常使國民與其他人區分出來。只有英語例外，由於偶然的歷史事件，它成為了英國以外國家的國語。然而這個原則仍應用於：——原本被採納為國語的語言的持久使用，成為原來的以及歸化公民的權利和所關注的事。在馬來亞，馬來語是第一個建立有效政府的原來人民的語言。因此，馬來語成為國語是很符合邏輯的。馬來語可能通過新字的結合和新結構，而經歷各種改革，但它必須一直被承認為馬來語。

可能有人爭論，馬來語基本上也是印尼的語言，在馬來亞，它不會比華語和印度語更具有土生性。但是，印尼語也不是印尼的土語。在印尼的羣島中，居民操多種不同的與馬來語有關聯的語言。因此在爪哇，主要語言是爪哇語，在蘇門答臘，有阿齊語、孟達希琳語、米南加堡語及其他蘇門答臘語言。在西里伯斯，居民操講另一種跟馬來語約略相同的語言。由於偶然的歷史事件，本來是馬六甲和整個馬來半島，廖內以及蘇門答臘小部份地區使用的馬來語成為了整個馬來羣島的共通語言。當第一個政治醒覺，震撼了今日印尼的不同人民，這個共通語言是唯一的聯系媒介，並廣泛地用作團結的因素。很自然的，它後來被採用為印尼的國語。但是印尼不同地方的人民，在他們本身關閉的社會中，仍運用他們的方言。只有在馬來半島各州，馬來語是土著人民的共同

語言。馬來語的確是馬來亞的土語。作為最先移入半島和建立有效政府的人民的語言，它比其他語言更有優先權成為國家的確定語言。

還有其他須接受馬來語作為國語的理由。但它們與現在討論着的關於原有人民使這方面的特性持久化的權利問題毫無關連。他們的語言將他們跟其他國民區分出來，當這種語言被新的非馬來公民所採納時，也同樣的區別出他們。

在國語的問題上，新公民的權利是受限制的。他們並不能嘗試以其他語言來取代它，即使在技術上和法律上，這是可以做到的。憲法上明確規定了馬來亞的國語。憲法可以在獲得三份之二的國會議員同意下加以修改，看來新公民可能動議改變國語。任何類似行動將違反馬來人所給予並由非馬來人所接受的公民權之精神。

在馬來亞，講非馬來語的公民人數太過於高，這個事實可能被利用作為理由將馬來語從例常用途分開出來。然而，重要的是要記得：講非馬來語公民人數的增加，是得到馬來人的同意。這是基於一項默契：公民權的準則不僅要加以遵守，而且必須保持不變。可以肯定的是，馬來人將不同意自由授發公民權給非馬來人，如果他們有一絲懷疑新公民有意以任何方式改變國語。世界上其他地方的普通實踐，使馬來人相信，一個非馬來公民，將不能改變馬來語作為馬來亞人民特有語言的基本地位。

但是，馬來人以其慣有的容忍精神，並不堅持使國語具有真正專獨地位，正如其他國家所認為理所當然者。其他移民語言的繼續使用和發展，不但被允許，還獲得憲法的保證。馬來亞並沒有堅決主張像東南亞其他國家那樣對於移民語言進行嚴酷壓制，以及像澳洲和美國那樣的有效但較不明顯

的加以控制。爲申請公民權人士所設的語言檢定測驗，如果和澳洲及美國比較起來，是微不足道的。其實，可以這麼說：馬來人實際上協助發揚非馬來語言，他們同意政府資助專爲非馬來公民而設的非馬來學校。

所有這些舉措趨向於抑制馬來語作爲確定語言的應用和發展。馬來人不想令人不愉快和難堪的慾望，已經給他們造成困境，這在其他地方是不能想像的。

今天，新公民正在發起一種運動，完全反對優先權和慣例。對於使用移民語言的要求，越來越強烈和不合情理。在殖民統治時期，所有政府文件使用英文却被視爲理所當然。那些不能明瞭英文者，只好去找尋他們本身的通譯者。招牌和通告，除少數例外，都是用英文，如果這些告示只對少數人有用，這種情形是可以預料和容忍的。馬來語，即使在殖民統治時期，比起英語來，用途更廣和較易爲人明白。現在，情形更是如此。但是，文件和通告專用作爲國文的馬來文，却遭受反對，理由是很少上了年紀的非馬來人能夠明白。過去，當這些同樣的一批人不能明白英文時，他們却不抗議。

“馬來西亞廣播電台”實際上已經增加使用非馬來移民的語言。不懂得華族方言的人士將沒有機會在一些公共公司任職。馬來亞大學進行華語和淡米爾語的教學和研究。以英語作爲媒介語的學校有教導華文，假如有需要，亦可以在以馬來語作爲媒介語的學校中教導華文。戲院放映的西片附有華文字幕却没有馬來文字幕。公共服務中對於講非馬來語官員的大量僱用，意味着馬來人會見這些官員時，只能通過通譯員而不能直接交談。

這些情形不可能發生在馬來西亞周圍的任何國家中。澳

洲和美國也沒有這般情形。但在馬來西亞，非馬來公民却堅持說，在促進和推廣這些外語方面，還做得不夠。他們要求政府擴大官方的華語用途，並且倡議從最低一級到大學級開辦華文教育。專門華文教育資格被接受爲有足夠條件僱用於公共服務。馬來人對於這些一直保持被動的態度。由於慣有的謙恭和禮貌，他們大多數沒有提出反對。領袖們呼吁他們冷靜，一些甚至提倡作更大的容忍。惶惑和麻痺，使得馬來人容忍了在語言問題上所面對的困難，他們不是基於一種公平的感覺，而是基於回教人民的宿命論。迹象顯示，馬來人將保持這種態度。對馬來人語言問題的任何諒解精神及對馬來人採取的任何正義行動，必須來自非馬來人，他們中較爲世故者，都認識到馬來人的要求是公正的。

移民的控制，通常是任何一個國家的人民保持其特性的一種辦法。在那些由外來種族集團通過移殖而建立起來的國家，例如澳洲、新西蘭、美國和拉丁美洲國家，情形更是如此。如果馬來半島的馬來人在過去控制了移民，那麼他們將能確保作爲確定人民的他們在任何時候都不會受到滅種的威脅。但馬來人却没有做到這點。

，而是容忍和自由放任態度的結合，以及  
賴所造成的

在葡萄牙人到來之前，有零星的外國商人，好像阿拉伯人、印度人和華人，差不多已是定居在馬來土邦的各個角落。這些人跟他們的祖國斷絕了聯繫，他們傾向於吸收馬來人特性而被馬來人吸收。抗拒性最強的集團是華人，儘管他們採納了馬來人的語言、服裝甚至社會活動方式，他們仍保持獨特和隔離。然而，只要政權是在馬來人的手中，這些不被吸收的移民，其人數當不會增加到足以向馬來人提出挑戰。



一直到馬六甲，及至檳城和新加坡落入英國人手中之前，在各種情形下，都沒有出現過大量移民。這些城市、海港完全是由外國人控制，排斥馬來人對移民問題的發言權。對於華、印移民大量湧入給他們帶來的恐懼，他們也無能為力。結果這些殖民地成為華、印人侵入腹地的驛站。首先他們只是以商人和貿易者的身份，而不是以移民的身份出現。馬來拉惹和酋長的恐懼，終於被豐厚的禮物和向來是華人商業特點的直接利潤分配所消除殆盡。授予華族商人的鴉片和賭博專有權，給馬來酋長賺回財富。他們也發覺，與其自己去採礦，不如將之轉讓華人，所得的利潤更多。

統治者對於國內華、印人數增加所感到的不安，很快地因從移民企業徵收到大量捐稅而平靜下來。當時，移民們沒有表示要定居下來及要求公民權利，更沒有表示要根據他們本身的特性來改變馬來亞國民的特性。他們主要是華、印籍人民，出外尋求財富，然後回到他們的國家。假如他們在馬來亞擁有房屋，主要購置於英國殖民地如檳城、馬六甲和新加坡，作為業務的基地。因此，當英國人擴張統治權至馬來土邦時，一些非馬來移民早已存在其間。我在前面已經指出，英國人非常賞識華人和印度人的用途，他們一旦控制了這個國家，即鼓勵大量移民。英國人能從他們身上獲取一切。他們看得出，馬來人將遭受越來越大的損失。

過了一些時候，馬來人非常的驚恐以致要採取行動。但因為當時英國人是這個國家的真正統治者，覺醒的馬來人所能採取的唯一行動，僅僅是一種消極抵抗。他們並未要求控制移民，只是表達對未被視為國家的真正公民而感到的恐懼。英國人於是關注這種局勢。他們建議各種保護馬來人的方法，據他們解釋，這足以確保馬來半島保留為一個馬來國家

。這種對於馬來人及其蘇丹的保護性措施，圍繞着專門的馬來民事服務及只將土地保留給馬來人這兩種方法。後來，英國人和非馬來人用計取勝了馬來人，但這些方法，一旦建議出來，再次使馬來人陷入安全的錯覺。他們在開始時對於大量華、印移民的恐懼，平息了一個時期，而這推遲了關閉防洪閘門的行動。

但是，第二次世戰大戰開始時，馬來人再次產生疑懼。日本人征服馬來亞，粉碎了馬來人對於英國人保護他們之能力的信心。當英國人回來後，倡議“馬來亞聯盟”，其政策是讓人民獲得同等公民權，馬來人不再相信英國的信用，這更促使他們對英國的能力失去信心。連馬來統治者也恐懼移民佔優勢。其後對於“馬來亞聯盟”進行的抗議中，移民的控制成為馬來民族主義份子的緊急問題。既然給予移民正式公民權，已經不再是世界大戰以前馬來人所認為的可笑的事情，移民人數可能超過土著人民的局面就不能讓它發生。其實，在馬來人向印尼尋求靈感的日子裡，確有認真的計劃，鼓勵那些較易同化的人移居，這樣才能保留甚至提高馬來人在數目上的優越地位。

看來合乎邏輯的做法是：一旦馬來人從英國人收回支配他們國家命運的權力，他們將馬上着手管治移民，以符合他們的利益。雖然承繼英國政府的是馬來人、華人和印度人的聯盟，他們仍有足夠勢力去這樣做。但是，馬來人的謙恭和公平對待的觀念，阻礙了這項工作。馬來人的政府妥協了，並沒有堅持採取積極步驟去利用移民政策，以建立他們種族的力量。他們滿足於將事情擱置一旁，而將移民政策的真正執行工作，置於非馬來人的手中。其實，他們對由於沒有嚴格執行移民法律，許多非馬來人移民已經溜進這個國家的事

實裝作不見。他們這樣做，因為他們不喜歡去使那些不守信用的非馬來人朋友和同事難堪。這就成為另一個問題。馬來人本來有辦法去增強他們的政治力量，却讓機會溜掉，因為他們無心去做別人已做的事情。在別個國家中，移民的控制，經常是確定的種族保留其政治控制權的一種手段。馬來亞的確定種族却不這樣做。而這是在選擇的情形下發生。天生的謙恭，再次挫敗了馬來人。假如得到賞識，這一切都很有價值的。但事實却是，不但沒有得到賞識，反而被認為是懦弱的表現以及馬來人本身對於作為馬來亞確定的原本人民所應有的特別權利失去信心的結果。

任何國家的教育政策，其功能除了傳授和普及知識以外，還是向未來公民灌輸整體意識以及對於國家的效忠和自豪感的一種工具。在新興國家中，非常重視教育的運用。在美國和澳洲，確定種族利用教育來向不同祖先的未來公民灌輸這樣的意識：作為這些國家的公民，他們自動地屬於和承繼確定種族的文化和特性。因此，使到德裔美國人重視“七六”的精神，尤甚於德意志帝國的光榮史，而希臘裔澳洲人，較熟悉澳洲細羊毛灣而不是希臘過去的光榮史。

在創造整體的意識中，媒介語是非常重要的，因此，教學媒介語通常是確定種族的語言。沒有人會要求以新移民的語言作為教學媒介語。但是語言並不只是一個國家教育政策的唯一重要因素。整個課程是重要的。歷史、地理、和文學的教學目的是在於宣揚一個觀念：國家屬於確定的人民，而要屬於這個國家，並索求這個國家的擁有權，就必須與確定人民認同。這種“認同”是要普及的，而且沒有與其他國家和文化“認同”的餘地，要跟確定的人民認同，就必須接受他們的歷史，他們的地理，他們的文學，他們的語言和他們的

文化，並拒絕其他的一切。

教育制度常常是單一和國民性的。除加拿大以外，沒有一個國家以移民的語言為移民種族提供教育。即使加拿大也不是這個實踐的典型例子，因為法國人並不是移民到以英國人為主的國家。他們比英國更早到達加拿大。

除馬來西亞以外，在東南亞國家制訂國民教育政策的時候，這些原則被明確地遵循。確定的人民，就是組成第一個有效政府的人民，他們制訂的教育政策是要使未來的公民能保存和宣揚可區別他們語言、文化和宗教。這就是慣例，並且是確定人民的特權和權利。移民並未受到禁止。他們被接受，不過却是基於確定人民所提的條件。其中一個條件就是，教育政策必須是根據確定人民的意旨。

馬來亞忽略了這個基本條件。英國人要負起這個責任。他們無視他們在本族所移殖的殖民地，如澳洲和紐西蘭所做的事情，他們允許馬來亞教育發展脫離了國民性。幾乎各種類的學校都獲准開辦，每種教學媒介語都可以使用，每種課程都被允許。看來沒有不平常的地方。馬來學校的宗旨在於提高識字能力，其課程內容毫無國民性，甚至其教育政策只偏重地區性。英文學校是為了培養半教育的白領階級，他們對於英帝國制度和宗主國的神話式人物的效忠多過於對他們本身定居的國家。淡米爾學校則完全沒有目的。教會學校獻身教育和傳播基督教信仰。阿拉伯學校不在英國人控制之下，但却非常興盛。最後就是華校，它們簡直像移殖到馬來亞的小中國。在英國統治時期，整個華文教育制度只是早在十九世紀和二十世紀初葉制訂的中國國民教育制度的延伸，但它却朝氣蓬勃地發展。

對於整個教育結構的特性，那些負責向馬來政府提供意



見的人們，並沒有提及。其實，有現象顯示，國民教育制度的概念被蓄意壓制。當其他獨立國家，包括新英帝國自治領和美國，已經利用教育來培養國家特性和效忠精神時，馬來亞對於這些發展却是無知的。推廣識字只被當作教育的最終目標，而不是尋求更偉大事物的手段。教育和國性變成了兩回事，因此，一個外國教育制度如華文教育也有立足之處。

把這種不平常的情況當作完全正常來看待，構成了今日馬來西亞國家教育計劃所面對的困難根源。華人和印度人已習慣於為所欲為，對於實施一個導致消滅傾向外國的學校的教育制度，他們只看到其不公正的地方。可是，對於在一個國家中宣揚和鼓勵外國的語言、文化和制度，他們却看不出其錯誤的地方。而且，他們拒絕接受其他國家在教育領域內的先例和實踐。

馬來人面對這種局勢，他們並沒有提出他們作為國家的確定人民的權利。這將使其他種族的同事和朋友感到難堪。馬來人大方地建議妥協。這種寬宏的行為並不受激賞。它被視為理所當然的事。馬來人作出很多而且不同的讓步，開始時，他們放棄已逐漸形成為國民文體的根據阿拉伯文的文體。這表面看起來很平凡，但是如果跟要華人放棄漢字時，他們所表現出來的憤慨相比較，馬來人的犧牲可以視為相當大的。假如我們記住，為了宗教的需要，馬來人仍需負起這種字體的重担，則其讓步的確是值得。但這不是他們唯一的讓步。其他國家的語言和制度仍被保留為馬來西亞偽國民教育制度的一部份。

這些語言和教育制度與馬來教育制度，不僅因語言和課程的不同而區分開來，同時在外表上，建立於不同的建築物和地點，擁有不同的教師和行政及受種族淵源限制的僱傭制

度。某種實例顯示，這些外來教育制度比馬來教育達到較高的水準。但是，要求馬來人讓步的需求仍在繼續中，只要馬來人不願令別人難堪，而只堅持着：作為確定的人民，他們有權力制定國民教育的形式，這種索求將持續下去。

對於英國統治時期的不正常教育設施，必須認識它的實質。一旦認識了這點，那麼，在實行一個真正的馬來西亞教育制度時將比較少的面對來自那些公開要求不正常權利的人民的騷擾。馬來人必須堅決地面對這個問題，而不是因對於他們的權利失去信心，就懷着戰慄的心情來面對它。從長期來看，一個真正的馬來西亞國民教育制度，必須被全體公民所承認和接受為塑造一個單一、團結的國家的唯一途徑。一旦這個政策被接受而加以實施，它將發展其本身的衝力。那麼，馬來人將不須再堅持它，反而是所有馬來西亞公民，不論其種族根源和文化，將維護和實施這種教育政策。

在大量移民還未產生，交通落後的日子裡，對大多數國家來說，公民權並未成為問題。疏散了的小股移民，因跟其祖國沒有接觸，趨向於迅速的同化。一旦發生這個現象，對於不同文化的外國人所產生的天生對立和嫉妒就會消失，那麼，公民權的頒發和接受，將會順其自然地進行。其實，由於外來移民跟確定人民完全認同，人們不會再討論合法公民權的問題，因為這已經不再引起質疑。

以英國來說，當諾曼人征服英國的時候，許多法國人民移入。隨着歲月的消逝，這些人失去他們絕大部份的法國人特性，並在語言、行為和感情上成為英國人。聯系上的困難，妨礙他們去瞭解現代法國文化。漸漸地，已不再需要在法律上授予公民權，他們成為了英國人。這並不涉及意識上的努力。

在馬來半島，英國人到來之前，同樣的過程是常見的。來自阿拉伯、印度和中國的移民商人，吸收馬來文化，包括語言和服裝，假如移民和同化的均衡沒有被擾亂，他們都將成為馬來公民。但是，在英國鼓勵下所造成的移民洪流以及後來的隔離，阻止了這個正常的、自然的過程，從而產生了使馬來人煩擾的問題，並且損害了他們作為半島上確定人民的權利。

這種大量移民，以及移民和祖國之間聯系的改善，使得公民權成為確定人民所關注的問題，並使到公民權的控制成為他們的特別權利。全世界所公認的原則是，對一個國家公民權的控制是為了適合確定人民的需要。移民的控制，就是為了這個目的。但最重要的是，遴選可能領取公民權的移民，也是確定人民的合法任務。在大多數國家，法律和條例都列明了公民權的取得方式以阻止移民扭轉局勢甚至強制確定人民去跟隨他們的特性。換句話說，法律的制定是用來阻止征服，因為，當移民保留了他們本身的文化，並且取得該國的政治和經濟控制權，他們事實上是征服了原有人民。如果說，這些移民準備保護國家而流盡他們最後一滴血，那是不中肯的；他們只是保護他們所征服到的國家。

公民權從未被當作是一個移民的權利。公民權通常是一種承認的形式，只有當原有人民感到一個移民已表現出效忠，並已跟確定人民真正的認同，才能授予他公民權。如果是同一種族的人民，即使原有的語言和文化可能不同，這種承認是很易取得的。如果是牽涉到不同種族的人民，即使他們具備了確定人民的語言，文化和特性，要獲得承認還是有困難的。在許多東南亞國家中，雖然移民與土著人民已經難於分辨，但是公民權的授予還不是自動的。在歐洲國家中，亞

洲人和非洲人已幾乎與他們本身文化失去聯繫，並且吸取了他們所定居國家的文化，仍然難於取得公民權。他們的前面橫着各種專制的藩籬。只有取得特殊的成就後，真正的平等才受到承認。這點可從日裔美國人在第二次世界大戰中作出巨大犧牲以後，才被接受為美國人的例子中看出來。

由於公民權是一種承認的形式，我們可以發現到世界各地的移民都特別積極地模倣和表現出確定人民的明顯特性。在美國和澳洲，移民通常比確定的美國人和澳洲人來得更為美國化和澳洲化。在東南亞國家中，被接受的移民也有同樣的情形。實際上，東南亞國家中的外來公民對待新移民，比原來公民來得更為嚴酷。新公民意識到，除非他們強調完全的認同，否則將被懷疑，因此他們要表現出對於他們的外國根源的絕對排斥。

日裔美國人在太平洋戰役中為美國出色地戰鬥，其用意就在此。在和平時期，他們沒有這種表現機會。因此在日常生活中，移民努力地證明他們認同的誠意。現在定居於美國的大多數華裔移民，不僅嘗試遺忘他們本身的四千年語言和文化，事實上，他們為他們能夠這樣做而感到自豪。據報載，華裔菲律賓人說過，對於海外華人的歧視是一宗好事。華裔泰國人在他們家中只用泰語。華裔印尼人遊行示威反對中國。他們改名換姓，這樣聽起來更像確定人民。他們可能放棄本身的宗教信仰，轉而信奉居留國的共同宗教。

除非種族根源是極端明顯，同化的過程通常在兩三代之間完成。一旦達到這點，情感，反應和行為將自動反映出跟有關國家和確定人民的同化。移民的後代跟這個國家人民密切同化，以致他們將本身視為確定的人民。

在馬來西亞，英國人到來之前，少數移民不是已被吸收



，就是在被吸收的過程中。英國統治時期，移民大量湧入，首先進入海峽殖民地，接着轉移到馬來土邦。公民權的問題並沒有產生，只有在海峽殖民地，一種形式的公民權毫無區別地授給移民。在馬來半島的其他地方，馬來人在法律上是唯一的公民和被接受的確定人民。即使當移民大量增加，也沒有想到頒發公民權的權利給居留較久的後來者。一直到第二次世界大戰結束，馬來人只有一個移民問題。公民權被認為是馬來人的專有權利和事務，但却不當作是一項問題。

現在事情是非常清楚的，即使移民沒有興趣成為永久的公民，也沒有真正為這個地位而展開運動，他們長久以來就怨恨公民所設下的藩籬，以反對他們無限制的獲取和擴展他們的活動範圍。他們仍要保留作為外國公民的地位，又看不出公民設藩籬的理由。他們不但要得到各個州政府和帝國政府的同等對待，也希望馬來亞的結構和行政根據他們的願望而改變。由於缺乏中央政府組織，再加上關稅壁壘，使各州的貿易發生困難，這是華裔移民商人所不喜歡的。馬來公民的有限行政權力，是憤懣的一個根源，而他們不能明白，為什麼英國人不能像對待海峽殖民地那樣對待馬來土邦。

即使在二十世紀二十年代，當華族移民商人歡迎馬來各州政府的中央集權化，及建立一個共同的關稅地區（其結果是馬來蘇丹的權力遭剝奪），沒有人提議創立一個馬來國籍，使移民的願望能跟馬來人作為確定公民的權力調和。如果馬來西亞當前所實施的一切有關移民、教育和公民權的政策，在當日實施的話，所導致的較少數的移民，加上他們與自己的祖國相對疏遠的聯繫，將能避免馬來人今日所面對的公民權問題。但是，英國人太過份重視華人企業和印度勞工，以致忽略了馬來人的命運。馬來人在行政和土地方面受到所

謂的“保護措施”，而且他們作為馬來亞唯一合法公民的地位之永久性和有效性也受到保證。那個時候，當局並無誠意去控制移民。也沒有嘗試讓移民明白，作為一名移民和一名外國人，他必須接受世界各地所實施的若干限制條件。

由於使各馬來州政府的權力完全集中於中央組織的努力失敗，以及馬來人權利的繼續受到捍衛，一直到戰後英國人提議“馬來亞聯盟”之前，沒有人想過要擴大公民權。忽然間，馬來人面對着醜惡的事實，英國人所固守着的協議可以被英國人片面地撕毀。給予馬來亞所有居民同等公民權的建議，是那麼的令人震驚，甚至馬來人對於他們在自己國家內的地位日益降低所持的漠然態度，也被破壞了。這可能是第一次，馬來人的反應不是採用典型的馬來人方式。可能是此建議的突然性，使馬來人從麻木中震醒過來。

在他們成功地反對“馬來亞聯盟”計劃中的公民權建議以後，有關馬來人會鞏固他們地位的預測是合乎邏輯的。他們在反對“馬來亞聯盟”鬥爭中所顯示的力量是相當大的，對公民權問題應該採取堅定的立場。他們並不是不懂得世界其他地方的慣例可加以充份利用。他們恐懼將在自己的國家中降低地位，成為沒有特權的少數民族，這種恐懼使他們從未間斷反對將公民權擴大到其他人。然而，出乎人意料之外的是，在當局實行新措施授公民權予那些效忠有疑問，且對馬來人懷有敵意的移民時，馬來人並沒有像他們對於“馬來亞聯盟”的公民權建議感到震驚時那樣作出反應。他們看得出這是得寸進尺的開端，他們清楚地認識這點，但他們幾乎沒有做出什麼來。如果我們研究自從“馬來亞聯盟”建議以來的公民權變化，將會發現，其破壞性發展是像時鐘那樣有規律性的。在每個階段，憲法每經過一次修改，本國的馬來

公民與那些原是移民的公民比較，人數越來越少了。今天，公民權的情況跟假如馬來人當初接受“馬來亞聯盟”的結果幾乎沒有兩樣。雖然他們警戒此事，但沒有像以前那樣作出反應。他們還是恢復以前那個老樣子。破壞性發展仍然繼續着，我們可以預見到馬來人會引退，將事情交給命運。有些人甚至說這不再是他們的國家，而是屬於索求它的任何人。有人說，即使他們是原有人民和確定公民，他們沒有權力去實施和控制公民權資格，不論其他地方的慣例如何。

馬來人的領導層素來傾向於開明，其隨從者却不是這樣。怨言已有所聞。在普通的馬來人看來，授公民權予外國人等於帶來外人支配的威脅。他們知道本身的權利，如果不顧這些權利，不但不聰明，也不公平。在公民權的問題上，他們的困難是不會在令別人難堪和引起危機的情況下表明他們的態度。這是一個艱辛的任務，他們可能遭受失敗。假如這種情形發生，結果對於大家將是一種災難。最好現在就着手解決這些問題，並且正確評鑑馬來人的困境。馬來亞的公民權必須依照其他國家的公民權形式。公民權必須附帶義務和特權。公民權必須接受為一種承認的形式，而非一種引誘。只有這樣，新公民的誠意才能獲得證明。也只有這樣，才能阻擋馬來人的失望和不滿的浪潮，並且建立一個基於真正效忠的公民之上的馬來西亞。

假如馬來人在過去曾經指出：他們是確定的人民，正如其他國家的情形一樣，在語言、移民、國民教育和公民權的問題上，這賦予他們一定的發言權，那麼，困擾國民團結的難題就不會越來越惡化。公民的明顯特性也就實現。一旦這個同性質的社會形成，許多問題就不會產生。但是，正如現在一樣，種族主義似乎是馬來西亞的永久特色。公民的這種

分裂是一種不僅由於語言和文化，同時由於職業、經濟、福利、習慣、教育背景、價值，甚至思想方式所造成的真正分裂。它往往將帶來一連串的問題，而這經常將成為種族間緊張關係的來源。

在其他的國家，語言、移民、公民權和國民教育，都是確定人民堅持要控制的主要因素。此外，國教和國家文化也是確定人民要控制的因素。確定人民對於宗教信仰的想法似乎有了改變，很少堅持新公民必須信奉確定種族的宗教。確定種族的文化是通過對語言、移民、公民權和教育的控制而永存下去。在任何情形下，文化是隨着時代而演變，一旦其他因素發揮了它們最大的影響力，將牽涉到整個種族，因而將使具備確定種族的基本特性的公民保留同一的性質。

在追溯馬來人作為馬來半島確定人民之要求的背景時，我們發現，馬來人失去了在開始時塑造一個同性質公民的機會。現有的政策不可能成功地團結各族。因而分裂現象將持續下去，並將永遠成為衝突的根源。我指出受忽略的地方，目的是在於說明，一有機會，就可以對這裡那里進行補修。這種情況產生了許多主要是影響馬來人的問題。由於他們的特性和環境，他們成了自己國土中的“無”者。當問題還可能解決的時候，必須突出這些問題，以便尋求矯正方法。漠視這些問題，就等於允許它們滋長以及任由它們變成不能解決的問題。這種短見的方針只能帶來災難。



PART II

---

# Racial Formation

This page intentionally left blank

## The Theory of Racial Formation

Race is a way of “making up people.”<sup>1</sup> The very act of defining racial groups is a process fraught with confusion, contradiction, and unintended consequences. Concepts of race prove to be unreliable as supposed boundaries shift, slippages occur, realignments become evident, and new collectivities emerge. State-imposed classifications of race, for example, face continuing challenges by individuals and groups who seek to assert distinctive racial categories and identities. Historical shifts in scientific knowledge, in fields ranging from physical anthropology to the genomic sciences, fuel continuing debates about what race may or may not mean as an indicator of human variation. While such debates and reformulations regarding the concept of race initially occur in specific institutional arenas, public spaces, or academic fields, their consequences are often dramatic and reverberate broadly throughout society.

Race-making can also be understood as a process of “othering.” Defining groups of people as “other” is obviously not restricted to distinctions based on race. Gender, class, sexuality, religion, culture, language, nationality, and age, among other perceived distinctions, are frequently evoked to justify structures of inequality, differential treatment, subordinate status, and in some cases violent conflict and war. Classifying people as other, and making use of various perceived attributes in order to do so, is a universal phenomenon that also classifies (and works to amalgamate and homogenize) those who do the classifying (Blumer 1958). “Making up people” is both basic and ubiquitous. As social beings, we must categorize people so as to be able to “navigate” in the world—to discern quickly who may be friend or foe, to position and situate ourselves within prevailing social hierarchies, and to provide clues that guide our social interactions with the individuals and groups we encounter.

But while the act of categorizing people and assigning different attributes to such categories may be universal, the categories themselves are subject to enormous variation over historical time and space. The definitions, meanings, and overall coherence of prevailing social categories are always subject to multiple interpretations. No social category rises to the level of being understood as a fixed, objective, social fact.

One might imagine, for example, that the category of a person’s “age” (as measured in years) is an objective social category. But even this familiar concept’s meaning varies across time and space. In many societies where the elderly are venerated and highly valued as leaders and living repositories of wisdom, individuals tend to overstate their age in years. By contrast, people in the youth-oriented United States tend to understate how old they are. Processes of classification, including self-classification, are

reflective of specific social structures, cultural meanings and practices, and of broader power relations as well.

The definitions of specific categories are framed and contested from “above” and “below.” The social identities of marginalized and subordinate groups, for example, are both imposed from above by dominant social groups and/or state institutions, and constituted from below by these groups themselves as expressions of self-identification and resistance to dominant forms of categorization. In any given historical moment, one can understand a social category’s prevailing meaning, but such understandings can also be erroneous or transitory. They are often no more than the unstable and tentative result of the dynamic engagement between “elite” and “street” definitions and meanings.

## Race as a Master Category

It is now widely accepted in most scholarly fields that race is a *social construction*. Simply stating that race is socially constructed, however, begs a number of important questions. How is race constructed? How and why do racial definitions and meanings change over time and place? And perhaps most important, what role does race play within the broader social system in which it is embedded?

With respect to this last question, we advance what may seem an audacious claim. We assert that in the United States, *race is a master category*—a fundamental concept that has profoundly shaped, and continues to shape, the history, polity, economic structure, and culture of the United States. Obviously, some clarification is in order. We are not suggesting that race is a transcendent category—something that stands above or apart from class, gender, or other axes of inequality and difference. The literature on intersectionality has clearly demonstrated the mutual determination and co-constitution of the categories of race, class, gender, and sexual orientation. It is not possible to understand the (il)logic of any form of social stratification, any practice of cultural marginalization, or any type of inequality or human variation, without appreciating the deep, complex, comingling, interpenetration of race, class, gender, and sexuality. In the cauldron of social life, these categories come together; they are profoundly transformed in the process.<sup>2</sup>

We hold these truths of intersectional analysis to be self-evident. But we also believe that race has played a unique role in the formation and historical development of the United States. Since the historical encounter of the hemispheres and the onset of transatlantic enslavement were the fundamental acts of race-making, since they launched a global and world-historical process of “making up people” that constituted the modern world, race has become the *template* of both difference and inequality. This is a world-historical claim, but here we develop it only in the context of the United States.

We suggest that the establishment and reproduction of different regimes of domination, inequality, and difference in the United States have consciously drawn



upon concepts of difference, hierarchy, and marginalization based on race. The genocidal policies and practices directed towards indigenous peoples in the conquest and settlement of the “new world,” and towards African peoples in the organization of racial slavery, combined to form a template, a master frame, that has perniciously shaped the treatment and experiences of other subordinated groups as well. This template includes not only the technologies (economic, political, cultural) of exploitation, domination, and deracination; it also includes the technologies of resistance: self-activity (James et al., 1958); “*liberté, égalité, fraternité*,” sisterhood, and abolition democracy (Du Bois 2007 [1935]).

Consider the questions of class and gender. Historically in the United States, race has provided a master category for understanding the definition of class and the patterns of class consciousness, mobilization, and organization. Class stratification in the United States has been profoundly affected by race and racism, and the reproduction of class inequalities is inextricably linked to the maintenance of white supremacy. Race has shaped the meaning of such concepts as work and worker, labor and employment, master and servant, supervisor and subordinate (Roediger 2007 [1991]). Race is a fundamental organizing principle of social stratification. It has influenced the definition of rights and privileges, the distribution of resources, and the ideologies and practices of subordination and oppression. The concept of race as a marker of difference has permeated all forms of social relations. It is a template for the processes of marginalization that continue to shape social structures as well as collective and individual psyches. Drawing upon social psychology and mind science research that explores mechanisms of “othering,” John A. Powell and Stephen Menéndian assert: “Without being identical, most of the forms of marginalization and stratification in society share a common set of heuristics and structure, which is patterned on race” (Powell and Menéndian n.d.).

From conquest and slavery on, racial parallels and racial “crossings” have shaped gender relations. Women and slaves were at best lower-status humans, at worst not human at all. They were both subject to chattelization. Their labor was coerced and unremunerated; they were physically brutalized. Although there were, of course, very distinct and widely varied experiences of subordination among different classes of women and of blacks, the objectification of both groups was near-total. Repression of women’s autonomy, intellect, and bodily integrity was obsessive and often violent (Beauvoir 1989; Federici 2004). Blacks, Indians, and women were afforded very little recognition: Their entry into the public sphere, corporeal integrity, and intellectual capacity was strenuously denied. In political and legal theory, the sexual contract and the racial contract have been extensively compared (Goldman 1911; Rubin 1975; Pateman 1988; Mills 1999).

The corporeal distinction between white men and the others over whom they ruled as patriarchs and masters, then, links race to gender, and people of color to women. Whether they were defined by their racial status (as enslaved or “free,” black, Indian, *mestiz@*), or by the patriarchal family (as daughters, wives, mothers), they

were corporeally stigmatized, permanently rendered as “other than,” and the possessions of, the white men who ruled. As in the case of class distinctions, evolving gender distinctions coincided in important ways with racial ones. In part, this too was corporeal: Perhaps at the core of intersectionality practice, as well as theory, is the “mixed-race” category. Well, how does it come about that people can be “mixed”? What does the presence of mixed people mean for both white and male supremacy?

In short, the master category of race profoundly shaped gender oppression. It is fascinating that this pattern of combined political influence and political tension, which was established in the antebellum intersection between abolitionism and early feminism and reproduced during the struggle for women’s suffrage and against Jim Crow at the turn of the 20th century, was then reiterated again in the post-World War II years in “intersectional” alliance and conflict between the civil rights movement and “second-wave” feminism. To be sure, there were many “intersections” between the two patterns described here. The tense and ultimately ruptural relationship between “first-wave” feminism and the black freedom movement around the turn of the 20th century is perhaps the best-known example: The (white) women’s suffrage movement broke with its former black allies, abandoning black women (and black men too) in the process, as the Jim Crow system was institutionalized in the United States. Southern states’ ratification of the 19th Amendment was conditional on their continued denial of black voting rights. Such black women activists as Ida B. Wells, Mary Church Terrell, and Anna Julia Cooper, as well as many lesser-known figures, fiercely denounced this as a betrayal. Of course, it reflected the pervasive white racism of the epoch (see Crenshaw 1991; Cooper 1998; Collins 2008 [1999]; Davis 2011 [1983]).

While race is a template for the subordination and oppression of different social groups, we emphasize that it is also a template for resistance to many forms of marginalization and domination. The new social movements of the 1960s and 1970s, for example—the women’s movement, the student movement, the anti-war movement, the gay liberation movement—were inspired by and consciously drew upon the black movement’s theoretical insights, strategies, and tactics to organize their specific constituencies, make political demands, and challenge existing practices of exclusion and subordination. These movement challenges underscore the dual-edged and dynamic qualities that inhere in the social category of race. These qualities are, once again, economic, political, and cultural technologies. They involve asserting previously stigmatized identities, “fusing” previously “serialized” groups (Sartre 2004), creating “commons” where resources can be shared. “Making up people” racially, then, has been “portable” across U.S. history. It has spread from one oppressed group to another and proved transferable to other marginalized identities, social cleavages, and political struggles.

Before we can consider and fully evaluate the notion of race as a master category of social organization in the United States, we need to think about how race itself is defined, what meanings are attached to it, and how it is deployed to create,

reproduce, or challenge racist structures. The process of race making, and its reverberations throughout the social order, is what we call *racial formation*. We define racial formation as *the sociohistorical process by which racial identities are created, lived out, transformed, and destroyed*.

Our presentation of racial formation theory proceeds in several steps. First, we provide a concept of *racialization* to emphasize how the phenomic, the corporeal dimension of human bodies, acquires meaning in social life. How are corporeal differences among humans apprehended and given meaning? Next, we advance the concept of *racial projects* to capture the simultaneous and co-constitutive ways that racial meanings are translated into social structures and become racially signified. Then, we discuss the problem of *racism* in an attempt to specify under what conditions a racial project can be defined as *racist*. Finally, we discuss *racial politics*, the way society is racially organized and ruled. Here, we consider *racial despotism*, *racial democracy*, and *racial hegemony* as frameworks for racial rule and racial resistance. We suggest that in the early 21st century the hegemonic concept of race in U.S. society is that of “colorblindness.” The ideological hegemony of colorblindness, however, is extremely contradictory and shallow. It confronts widespread resistance and falls short of achieving the political stability that hegemonic projects are supposed to deliver. This chapter ends there; the post-World War II political trajectory of race is treated in detail in the chapters that follow.

## Racialization

Race is often seen as a social category that is either objective or illusory. When viewed as an objective matter, race is usually understood as rooted in biological differences, ranging from such familiar phenomic markers as skin color, hair texture, or eye shape, to more obscure human variations occurring at the genetic or genomic levels. When viewed as an illusion, race is usually understood as an ideological construct, something that masks a more fundamental material distinction or axis of identity: our three paradigms of ethnicity, class, and nation typify such approaches. Thus race is often treated as a metonym or epiphenomenon of culture (in the ethnicity paradigm), inequality and stratification (in the class paradigm), or primordial peoplehood (in the nation paradigm).

On the “objective” side, race is often regarded as an *essence*, as something fixed and concrete. The three main racial classifications of humans once posed (and now largely rejected) by physical anthropology—Negroid, Caucasoid, and Mongoloid—are examples of such an essentialist perspective. Another example is “mixed-race” identity: To consider an individual or group as “multiracial” or mixed race presupposes the existence of clear, discernible, and discrete races that have subsequently been combined to create a hybrid, or perhaps mongrel, identity. Here race is functioning as a metonym for “species,” although that connection is generally not admitted in the present day.

While race is still popularly understood as essence, it has also been viewed as a mere *illusion*, especially in more recent accounts. As a purely ideological construct, race is considered to be unreal, a product of “false consciousness.” As we have seen in our discussion of class paradigms of race, both orthodox (neoclassical) economics and orthodox Marxism viewed race this way. For the former, it was an irrational distraction from pure, market-based considerations of value in exchange; for the latter it was an ideological tool that capitalists (or sometimes privileged white workers) deployed to prevent the emergence of a unified working-class movement. In the current period, colorblind ideology—expressed, for example, in affirmative action debates—argues that any form of racial classification is itself inherently racist since race is not “real.”

We are critical of both positions: race as essence and race as illusion. Race is not something rooted in nature, something that reflects clear and discrete variations in human identity. But race is also not an illusion. While it may not be “real” in a biological sense, race is indeed real as a social category with definite social consequences. The family, as a social concept, provides an intriguing analogy to grasp the “reality” of race:

We know that families take many forms ... Some family categories correspond to biological categories; others do not. Moreover, boundaries of family membership vary, depending on individual and institutional factors. Yet regardless of whether families correspond to biological definitions, social scientists study families and use membership in family categories in their study of other phenomena, such as well-being. Similarly, racial statuses, although not representing biological differences, are of sociological interest in their form, their changes, and their consequences.

(American Sociological Association 2003, 5)

We cannot dismiss race as a legitimate category of social analysis by simply stating that race is not real. With respect to race, the Thomases’s sociological dictum is still in force: “It is not important whether or not the interpretation is correct—if men [sic] define situations as real, they are real in their consequences” (Thomas and Thomas 1928, pp. 571–572).

One of our aims here is to disrupt and reorganize the rigid and antinomic framework of essence-versus-illusion in which race is theorized and debated. We understand race as an unstable and “decentered” complex of social meanings constantly being transformed by political struggle. With this in mind, we advance the following definition: *Race is a concept that signifies and symbolizes social conflicts and interests by referring to different types of human bodies.* Although the concept of race invokes seemingly biologically based human characteristics (so-called phenotypes), selection of these particular human features for purposes of racial signification is always and necessarily a social and historical process. Indeed, the categories employed to differentiate among human beings along racial lines reveal themselves,



upon serious examination, to be at best imprecise, and at worst completely arbitrary. They may be arbitrary, but they are not meaningless. Race is strategic; race does ideological and political work.

Despite the problematic nature of racial categorization, it should be apparent that there is a crucial and non-reducible *visual dimension* to the definition and understanding of racial categories. Bodies are visually read and narrated in ways that draw upon an ensemble of symbolic meanings and associations. Corporeal distinctions are common; they become essentialized. Perceived differences in skin color, physical build, hair texture, the structure of cheek bones, the shape of the nose, or the presence/absence of an epicanthic fold are understood as the manifestations of more profound differences that are situated *within* racially identified persons: differences in such qualities as intelligence, athletic ability, temperament, and sexuality, among other traits.

Through a complex process of selection, human physical characteristics (“real” or imagined) become the basis to justify or reinforce social differentiation. Conscious or unconscious, deeply ingrained or reinvented, the making of race, the “othering” of social groups by means of the invocation of physical distinctions, is a key component of modern societies. “Making up people,” once again. This process of selection, of imparting social and symbolic meaning to perceived phenotypical differences, is the core, constitutive element of what we term “racialization.”

We define racialization as *the extension of racial meaning to a previously racially unclassified relationship, social practice, or group*. Racialization occurs in large-scale and small-scale ways, macro- and micro-socially. In large-scale, even world-historical settings, racialization can be observed in the foundation and consolidation of the modern world-system: The conquest and settlement of the western hemisphere, the development of African slavery, and the rise of abolitionism, all involved profuse and profound extension of racial meanings into new social terrain. In smaller-scale settings as well, “making up people” or racial interpellation (a concept drawn from Althusser 2001 (1971) also operates as a quotidian form of racialization: Racial profiling for example, may be understood as a form of racialization. Racial categories, and the meanings attached to them, are often constructed from pre-existing conceptual or discursive elements that have crystallized through the genealogies of competing religious, scientific, and political ideologies and projects. These are so to speak the raw materials of racialization.

To summarize thus far: Race is a concept, a representation or signification of identity that refers to different types of human bodies, to the perceived corporeal and phenotypic markers of difference and the meanings and social practices that are ascribed to these differences.

It is important to emphasize that once specific concepts of race are widely circulated and accepted as a social reality, racial difference is not dependent on visual observation alone. Legal scholar Osagie Obasogie makes the intriguing point that iterative social practices give rise to “visual” understandings of race, even among

those who cannot see. The respondents in his study, blind since birth, “see” race through interpersonal and institutional socializations and practices that shape their perceptions of what race is (Obasogie 2013). Thus race is neither self-evident nor obvious as an ocular phenomenon. Instead racialization depends on meanings and associations that permit phenotypic distinction among human bodies.

Some may argue that if the concept of race is so nebulous, so indeterminate, so flexible, and so susceptible to strategic manipulation by a range of political projects, why don’t we simply dispense with it? Can we not get “beyond” race? Can we not see it as an illusory thing? Don’t we see how much mischief has occurred in its name? These questions have been posed with tremendous frequency in both popular and academic discourse.<sup>3</sup> An affirmative answer would of course present obvious practical difficulties: It is rather difficult to jettison widely held beliefs, beliefs which moreover are central to everyone’s identity and understanding of the social world. So the attempt to banish the concept as an archaism is at best counterintuitive. But a deeper difficulty, we believe, is inherent in the very formulation of this schema, in its way of posing race as a *problem*, a misconception left over from the past, a concept no longer relevant to a “post-racial” society.

A more effective starting point is the recognition that despite its uncertainties and contradictions, the concept of race continues to play a fundamental role in structuring and representing the social world. The task for theory is to capture this situation and avoid both the utopian framework that sees race as an illusion we can somehow “get beyond,” as well as the essentialist formulation that sees race as something objective and fixed, a biological given. We should think of race as an element of social structure rather than as an irregularity within it; we should see race as a dimension of human representation rather than an illusion. Such a perspective informs what we mean by racial formation.

Since racial formation is always historically situated, understandings of the meaning of race, and of the way race structures society, have changed enormously over time. We now turn to a historical survey of the race concept and the domains in which it has been defined and debated, consolidated and contested. Our effort here is to outline a genealogy of racialization that proceeds from religion to science to politics. Such a trajectory is by no means linear or progressive; rather it consists of the accretion of racialized experiences that are uneven and often incompatible. But it does allow us roughly to map and situate the development of the race concept, and to underscore its still unstable and ambiguous character.

## The Evolution of Race Consciousness

How do perceived differences between groups of people become racialized? The identification of distinctive human groups, and their association with differences in physical appearance, goes back to prehistory, and can be found in the earliest documents—in the Bible, for example, or in Herodotus. But the emergence of a

modern conception of race does not occur until the rise of Europe and the arrival of Europeans in the Americas. Even the hostility and suspicion with which Christian Europe viewed its two significant non-Christian “others”—the Muslims and the Jews—cannot be understood as more than a rehearsal for racial formation, since these antagonisms, for all their bloodletting and chauvinism, were always and everywhere religiously interpreted.<sup>4</sup>

It was only when European explorers reached the Western Hemisphere, when the oceanic seal separating the “old” and the “new” worlds was breached, that the distinctions and categorizations fundamental to a racialized social structure, and to a discourse of race, began to appear. The European explorers were the advance guard of merchant capitalism, which sought new openings for trade. What they found exceeded their wildest dreams, for never before and never again in human history has an opportunity for the appropriation of wealth, for predation or “primitive accumulation” remotely approached that presented by the “discovery.”<sup>5</sup> Modern capitalism could not have come into being without this grand infusion of stolen wealth: a seemingly limitless reservoir of treasure—land, labor, lives by the millions—to do with as one willed.

But the Europeans also “discovered” people, people who looked and acted differently. These “natives” challenged their discoverers’ preexisting conceptions of the origins and possibilities of the human species (Jordan 2012 [1968], 3–43). The representation and interpretation of the meaning of the indigenous peoples’ existence became a crucial matter, one that would affect not only the outcome of conquest but the future of empire and thus the development of the modern world. For the “discovery” raised disturbing questions as to whether *all* could be considered part of the same “family of man,” and more practically, the extent to which native peoples could be exploited and enslaved. Thus “discovery,” conquest, and soon enough, enslavement, launched not only the headlong rush toward modernity, but also debates over human nature, philosophical anthropology. Such questions as: “What is a human being?” and “What is the nature of human difference?” were posed repeatedly as rulers and their advisers sought to organize and exercise control over their new dominions and new subjects.<sup>6</sup>

In practice, of course, the seizure of territories and goods, the introduction of slavery through the *encomienda* and other forms of coerced native labor, and then through the organization of the African slave trade—not to mention the practice of outright extermination—all presupposed a worldview which distinguished Europeans, as children of God and fully-fledged human beings, from “others.” Given the dimensions and the ineluctability of the European onslaught, given the conquerors’ determination to appropriate labor, land, and goods, and given the presence of an axiomatic and unquestioned Christianity among them, the ferocious division of society into Europeans and “others” soon coalesced. This was true despite the famous 16th-century theological and philosophical debates about the identity of indigenous peoples.<sup>7</sup> In fact it ran right over whatever cautionary notes religious ethicists like las Casas, or

later Antonio Vieira (Blackburn 1997; Cohen 1998), William Wilberforce, or Henry Ward Beecher might have sounded.

Indeed, debates about the nature of the “others” reached their practical limits with a certain dispatch. Plainly, they would never touch the essential: Nothing, after all, would induce the Europeans to pack up and go home. The “discovery” signaled a break from the previous proto-racial awareness by which Europe had contemplated its “others” in a relatively disorganized fashion. The “conquest of America” was not simply an epochal historical event—however unparalleled in importance. It was also the advent of a consolidated social structure of exploitation, appropriation, domination, and signification. Its representation, first in religious terms, but later in scientific and political ones, initiated modern racial awareness. It was the inauguration of racialization on a world-historical scale.

The conquest, therefore, was the first—and given the dramatic nature of the case, perhaps the greatest—racial formation project. Together with African slavery it produced the master category of race, the racial template we have discussed. Its significance was by no means limited to the Western Hemisphere, for it also began the work of constituting Europe as the metropole, the center, of a series of empires which could take, as Marx would later write, “the globe for a theater” (Marx 1967, 751). This new imperial structure was represented as a struggle between civilization and barbarism, and implicated in this representation all the great European philosophies, literary traditions, and social theories of the modern age (Said 1993).

The immensity of this historical arc, the *longue durée* of racial formation from religion to science to politics, also underlies our claim that race provided a master concept for our understanding of oppression and resistance. But it is worth noting that right from the beginning of this historical journey, something like the social construction of race was *already* present. Before the white talking heads had debated the philosophical anthropology of Native Americans, or Africans,<sup>8</sup> well before that in fact, *the immediate need to classify and categorize, to “make up people,” had already surfaced*: Who was a European, a settler, a free man, and who was an *Indio*, an African, a slave? As a practical matter, something relatively devoid of theology or philosophy, the exercise of power required these distinctions.<sup>9</sup> The main criteria available for this purpose were phenomic: the visual appearance of the bodies that had to be judged, sometimes under great pressure and with speed—for violence was omnipresent—as like or unlike, similar or different. This social (or more properly, this power-oriented, political) construction, this phenomic categorical imperative, would soon enough be reprocessed in the discourse available at the time: primarily and for a long time to come, theological discourse.

Only in later epochs would other ways of knowing supplant theological understandings: First scientific, and later, political accounts of race would be offered. Still the earlier religious and scientific frameworks, though losing influence, would never be fully eliminated, never really die. Thus do we arrive at our own time, our own knowledge of race, our own insistence on the social construction of race, with its



unstable combination of corporeal and performative elements, its inherent biosociality. We are still on this journey. We should be clear-sighted enough to recognize that these components, most centrally the political technology of the body, were there from the beginning. In short, just as the noise of the “big bang” still resonates through the universe, so the overdetermined construction of world “civilization” as a biosocial manifestation of European subjugation and the resistance of the rest of us still defines the race concept in the present.

## From Religion to Science

After the initial depredations of conquest, religious justifications for racial difference gradually gave way to scientific ones. By the time of the Enlightenment, a general awareness of race was pervasive, and most of the great philosophers of Europe, such as Hegel, Kant, Voltaire, and Locke, were issuing virulently racist opinions (Count, ed. 1950; Eze, ed. 1997; Bernasconi and Lott, eds. 2000).

The problem posed by race during the late 18th century was markedly different than it had been in the earlier stages of conquest and enslavement. The social structures through which race operated were no longer primarily those of violent subjugation and plunder, nor of the establishment of thin beachheads of settlement on the edge of what had once seemed a limitless wilderness. Now the issues were much more complicated: nation-building, establishment of national economies in the world trading system, resistance to the arbitrary authority of monarchs, and the assertion of the “natural rights” of “man,” including the right of revolution (Davis 1999 [1975]). In such a situation, racially organized exploitation in the form of slavery, the expansion of colonies, and the continuing expulsion of native peoples, was both necessary and newly difficult to justify.

*Early Iterations of Scientific Racism:* The invocation of scientific criteria to demonstrate the “natural” basis of racial hierarchy was both a logical consequence of the rise of this form of knowledge, and an attempt to provide a more subtle and nuanced account of human complexity in the new, “enlightened” age. Spurred on by the classificatory scheme of living organisms devised by Linnaeus in *Systema Naturae* (1735), many scholars in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries dedicated themselves to the identification and ranking of variations in humankind. Race was conceived as a *biological* concept, a matter of species. Voltaire wrote that “The negro race is a species of men [sic] as different from ours ... as the breed of spaniels is from that of greyhounds,” and in a formulation echoing down from his century to our own, declared that

If their understanding is not of a different nature from ours ..., it is at least greatly inferior. They are not capable of any great application or association of ideas, and seem formed neither for the advantages nor the abuses of philosophy.

(Voltaire, in Gossett 1997 [1965], 45)

Jefferson, the preeminent exponent of the Enlightenment doctrine of “the rights of man” on North American shores, echoed these sentiments:

In general their existence appears to participate more of sensation than reflection. ... [I]n memory they are equal to whites, in reason much inferior ... [and] in imagination they are dull, tasteless, and anomalous.... I advance it therefore ... that the blacks, whether originally a different race, or made distinct by time and circumstances, are inferior to the whites.... Will not a lover of natural history, then, one who views the gradations in all the animals with the eye of philosophy, excuse an effort to keep those in the department of Man [sic] as distinct as nature has formed them?

(Jefferson 1984 [1785], 264–266, 270)

Such crackpot claims of species distinctiveness among humans justified the inequitable allocation of political and social rights, while still upholding the doctrine of “the rights of man.” They rationalized the rapacious treatment to which the racial “others” were subjected, and even justified it as the unfortunate byproducts of development. You can still hear these arguments today: “Sure, these natives and slaves might be suffering now, but that is still preferable to being condemned to the eternal darkness of primitiveness and superstition....” The frequent resort to familial metaphors (“Our slaves are like our children; they must be taught to obey ...”), and the mad search for scientific justifications for unequal treatment—in phrenology and craniometry, for example, and then in evolution—all attest to the overarching importance of racial rule in the genealogy of the modern world.

Indeed the quest to obtain a precise scientific definition of race generated debates which continue to rage today, reiterated in the genomic, the criminological, and the humanistic approaches to race that we take for granted. Yet despite efforts to define race scientifically, ranging from Dr. Samuel Morton’s studies of cranial capacity<sup>10</sup> to contemporary attempts in the genomic sciences, the concept of race has defied biological precision.

In the mid-19th century, Count Joseph Arthur de Gobineau drew upon the most respected scientific studies of his day to compose his four-volume *Essay on the Inequality of Races* (Biddiss 1970; Gobineau 1999 [1853–1855]; Todorov 1993). He not only greatly influenced the racial thinking of the period, but his themes would be echoed in the racist ideologies of the next one hundred years: beliefs that superior races produced superior cultures and that racial intermixtures resulted in the degradation of the superior racial stock. These ideas found expression, for instance, in the eugenics movement launched by Darwin’s cousin, Francis Galton, which had an immense impact on scientific and sociopolitical thought in Europe and the United States (Chase 1980; Kevles 1998; Graves 2001; Black 2012). In the wake of civil war and emancipation, and with immigration from Southern and Eastern Europe as well as East Asia running high, the United States was particularly fertile ground for notions such as Social Darwinism and eugenics. Within

this context, racial difference became the rationale for discriminatory policies and practices of immigrant exclusion, naturalization rights, residential segregation, and forced sterilization.

Although black scholars like Kelly Miller, William Monroe Trotter, and W.E.B. Du Bois had questioned biologicistic racism at the end of the 19th century, and Chicago sociologists had cast doubt on evolution-based accounts of racial difference in the 1920s, it was not until after World War II that a sustained attack on the notion of race as a biological concept emerged and gained widespread acceptance. Only after eugenics had been discredited as the basis for racial science in Nazi Germany—eugenics had, of course, flourished in the United States as well—did scientific critiques of biologicistic racism become prominent. The 1950 UNESCO “Statement on Race”<sup>11</sup> boldly asserted that race was not a biological fact but a social myth. During this period, social and cultural conceptions of race became ascendant and it was optimistically assumed that the death knell of scientific racism had been rung. But had it?

*Contemporary Reiterations of Scientific Racism:* Over the past decades, the study of human variation in a number of fields has often defaulted to, and indeed relied upon, biological concepts of race in research on “population groups.” Default to the race concept remains pervasive. After the launching of the Human Genome Project, for example, geneticists have engaged in vigorous debate about whether race is a meaningful and useful genetic concept. But they can’t get rid of it. The notion of race as a discernible “biological category” has not been relegated to the proverbial dustbin of history.

Geneticist Neil Risch contends that genetic differences have arisen among people from different continents and uses the term “race” to categorize and cluster the human population into five major groups. This recognition of race, he contends, is important for understanding genetic susceptibility to certain diseases and receptivity to medical interventions such as drug treatments (Wade 2002). Indeed, the linkage between race and genetics finds its sharpest expression in the field of pharmacogenomics. The ultimate goal of pharmacogenomics is to be able to deliver the precise type of medication—and precise dose—to a patient based on their individual genome. Its goal is to tailor-make drugs to treat a specific condition. Because it is not yet practical to sequence each individual’s genome in a quick and cost-effective manner, much less to do drug design on this level, race often serves as a “proxy” for determining how treatment with a specific drug might be targeted, if not at individuals, then at identifiable groups. And not surprisingly, race is the descriptor employed to select such groups (Lee 2005).

Consider the introduction of BiDil as the first “ethnic designer drug.” Originally produced by the now defunct biotech firm NitroMed, BiDil was marketed to African Americans who suffer from congestive heart failure, despite serious doubts that arose in clinical trials about the distinctive racial claims being made for the drug. Yet it was released anyway, and prescribed for African Americans. Some medical researchers feared that BiDil sets a dangerous precedent by linking race and genetics in ways that

could distract from alternative ways of understanding the causes of a disease and the means to treat it (Kahn 2012).

The issue of race and genetics is a contentious one that finds expression in different sites and arenas.

- In 2010, PBS aired *Faces of America with Henry Louis Gates, Jr.*, a four-episode documentary series that traced the ancestral roots of prominent celebrities through “genealogy and genetics.” An extension of earlier shows focused on famous African Americans, the series reflects a growing popular quest by individuals to find their “roots” through allegedly scientific means.
- In the field of forensics, Tony Frudakis of DNAPrint Genomics, a molecular biologist who came to fame in a Baton Rouge serial killer case in 2003, claims that he can determine a murderer’s race by analyzing his or her DNA (Wade 2003; Quan 2011; Obasogie 2013).
- DNA testing has increasingly been used by individuals and groups to claim Native American tribal membership. The Meskwaki Nation in Iowa utilized genetic-ancestry testing as a way to screen out individuals who sought tribal affiliation in order to share in the tribe’s casino profits. The Mashantucket Pequot Tribal Nation of Connecticut, which controls the huge Foxwoods casino, requires DNA testing of newborns. Both the Cherokee and Seminole nations/tribes have been embroiled in conflicts with blacks who claim tribal ancestry and seek access to court-ordered monetary judgments. In these cases disputes have revolved around the “blood quantum” system of measuring Indian belonging (put in place by the Dawes Act of 1887), and have also involved tribal attitudes toward DNA testing of present-day claimants (Tallbear 2003; Indians.com 2005; Kaplan 2005; Koerner 2005).<sup>12</sup>

Henry Louis Gates, Jr. has said: “We are living through an era of the ascendance of biology, and we have to be very careful. We will all be walking a fine line between using biology and allowing it to be abused” (Harmon 2007). There is indeed a fine line. Our individual sense of racial identity, the system of racial classification we employ, the meanings we ascribe to racial categories, and their use in social analysis and policy formation are rendered more complex, indeterminate, and muddy with the increasing re-biologization of race.

In psychology too, the cognitive presence of race, the immediacy of race that is seemingly rooted in perception rather than reasoning, leads researchers to think of it as an essence, something innate. Cognitive psychology and related fields have sought to uncover forms of racial animus that function “below the radar” of the conscious mind. Studies on the mechanisms and processes that affect perception, interpretation, memory, and decision-making have convincingly demonstrated that people harbor “implicit biases” and possess “racial schemas” that strongly influence perceptions and behaviors.<sup>13</sup> Implicit biases can influence or shape various forms



of individual or institutional racial discrimination. Such discrimination, therefore, can occur in the absence of conscious intent, explicit prejudice, or racial animus. Thus the pervasiveness of racial meanings and their significance goes deep, very deep (Hirschfeld 1973 [1938]; Eberhardt and Fiske, eds. 1998; Goff et al. 2008; Marsh, Mendoza-Denton, and Smith, eds. 2010). Notions of race do not only inform our conscious understanding of the social world; they also permeate our unconscious minds—shaping our perceptions and attitudes, and influencing our actions.

For all its obvious importance, this approach also raises troubling questions: Are those cultural formations not themselves constructed? Are those “aggregate relations of power” impervious to challenge? Social constructions like race (or gender, or countless other human qualities) are of course composed of layered attributes that human beings *understand* as essences, but that does not make race, or gender an essence *in reality*, does it? (What would W.I. Thomas reply to that question?) If in practice race remains flexible and unstable, how does that instability affect the “racial schemas” that structure immediate perceptions? What is the essence of blackness or whiteness? Of maleness or femaleness (Butler 1993; Butler 2006 [1990]; Shelby 2007)?

There is a very strong temptation to derive racial distinctions, and perforce racism, from biological or evolutionary sources. This tendency is not limited to reactionary or conservative thinkers, but also affects progressive and egalitarian analysts, as we have seen in Douglas S. Massey’s “categorical” approach to inequality (discussed in Chapter 2). No doubt there is irony in contemporary attempts to provide a seemingly objective and scientific definition of race, and of the boundaries and contents (the essences) of racial categories as well. In previous historical periods, scientific racism provided the rationale for the subordination, if not elimination, of what were seen as undesirable, “mongrel,” and threatening racially identified groups. In the current period, biological/genetic definitions of race are mobilized to improve the treatment of diseases and minimize health disparities, to serve justice by providing “hard evidence” in criminal cases, to help individuals find their ancestral “roots,” and in the case of cognitive psychology, to reveal the deep mental structures of racism. While often motivated by good intentions, the premises behind these examples share an underlying logic with the racist frameworks of the historical past: a quest for some fundamental quality of racial identity, if not skin or hair, then genomic or limbic.

The recourse to “human nature,” to philosophical anthropology, to explain the supposed differences and “natural” biases entailed by race, has been a constant feature of human thought, especially in western civilization.<sup>14</sup> It is tempting to extrapolate from implicit bias research: to conclude that race thinking is an innate part of human consciousness—something to which we are intrinsically and naturally predisposed. In clear disagreement with such views we insist that the “racial schemas” that structure immediate perceptions are also cultural formations; they may be deeply embedded as a result of centuries of reiteration in various forms. Yet they remain socially, not biologically, given. They remain subject to change. We are not biologically “hardwired” to be

racist. We reject any default to an essentialist and intrinsically unprovable notion of race. Yet resisting the temptation to racial biologism, whether conscious or unconscious, remains as difficult in science as it once was in religion.

## From Science to Politics

Efforts to “re-biologize” race suggest that the understanding of race as a preeminently social concept remains an embattled and contested notion. While we acknowledge this ongoing tension, we suggest that conflicts and controversies about the meaning of race are principally framed on the terrain of politics. By privileging politics, we do not mean to suggest that race has been displaced as a concern of scientific inquiry, or for that matter as a theological question. Nor do we claim that struggles over cultural representation are less significant than political ones in shaping prevailing patterns of race and racism. We do argue, however, that race is now a preeminently political phenomenon.

*Toward Social Construction:* The historical trend towards recognizing race as a social and political construction has been slow and uneven. While critiques of race as a biological concept were more evident and ascendant in the early post-World War II period, there were previous historical precedents for understanding race as a social and political category. For example, Max Weber discounted biological explanations for racial conflict and instead highlighted the social and political factors that engendered it (Weber 2008, 385–387; Manasse 1947). Du Bois too wrestled with the conflict between a fully sociohistorical conception of race, and the more essentialized and deterministic vision he encountered as a student in Berlin.<sup>15</sup> Pioneering cultural anthropologist Franz Boas rejected attempts to link racial characteristics to biological or evolutionist schemas, labeling as pseudoscientific any assumption of a continuum of “higher” and “lower” cultural groups, and allying with Du Bois quite early on (Boas 1969 [1945], 1962; Baker 1998).<sup>16</sup>

Du Bois and many prominent black scholars, for example, Alain Leroy Locke, philosopher and theorist of the Harlem Renaissance, had switched the focus of race studies definitively away from biologicistic accounts and towards sociopolitical explanatory frameworks, almost before modern sociology even existed in the United States. Black voices were ignored, however, until white exponents of socially based views of race like Robert E. Park, one of the founders of the “Chicago School” of sociology, reinvented a socially grounded account of it in the 1920s. Park combined the standard German training in sociology with a history of eight years as journalist and publicist for Booker T. Washington. After his substantial career at Chicago, Park’s last job was at Fisk University, the leading historically black college (Du Bois’s *alma mater* as well).<sup>17</sup>

Perhaps more important than these and subsequent intellectual efforts, however, were the political struggles of people of color themselves. Waged all around the globe under a variety of banners such as anti-colonialism and civil rights, these battles to challenge various structural and cultural racisms have been a major feature

of 20th-century politics. The racial horrors of the 20th century—colonial slaughter and apartheid, the genocide of the Holocaust, and the massive bloodlettings required to end these evils—have also indelibly marked the theme of race as a sociopolitical issue *par excellence*.

*Racial Politics:* Our notion of racial formation foregrounds the ongoing political contestation that takes place between the state and civil society—across the political spectrum—to define and redefine the very meaning of race. This is a good example of the way race operates across micro–macro linkages: The persistent and continuing controversies regarding state-based racial classification provide a particularly apt illustration of racial formation.

Over the last several centuries, the designation of racial categories by the state—the political dimensions of state assignment of racial identity—has provoked intense disputes in the United States. Who was considered “free” and who “unfree”? Who could be a naturalized citizen (Carbado 2005)? Who could marry whom? In this last regard, it is sobering to think that it was not until 1967 that all state anti-miscegenation laws were ruled unconstitutional in *Loving v. Virginia*. The state wields enormous power in defining what race is. Through its powers of racial classification, the state fundamentally shapes one’s social status, access to economic opportunities, political rights, and indeed one’s identity itself.

In 2003, former University of California Regent Ward Connerly introduced a measure popularly known as the Racial Privacy Initiative (Proposition 54) before California voters. Proposition 54 sought to amend the California State Constitution by enacting a ban on racial data collection by the state. Connerly (2003) asserted that relying on racial classification and maintaining race-based remedies to racial inequalities would only “give credence to the dangerous view held by many that ‘race’ is a fixed biological reality.”<sup>18</sup>

The discrepancies, gaps, and contradictions between state definitions and individual and collective racial identities are no more evident than in the racial and ethnic categories employed by the U.S. Census. Among others, the U.S. Census establishes categories based on nativity, citizenship status, age, household income, and marital status. None of these categories, however, has been subject to such intense scrutiny, vigorous debate, and political controversy as that of race.

The race questions on the U.S. Census have been shaped by the political and social agenda of the historical period in question. The first census in 1790 distinguished holders of the franchise, namely tax-paying white males, from the general population. The practice of slavery motivated changes in categorization such as grouping blacks into free and slave populations. Prior to the 1960s, census categories were utilized politically to disenfranchise and discriminate against groups defined as nonwhite, a practice that has diminished but not entirely ceased in the “post-civil rights” era. From restrictions on, naturalization rights to the setting of national quotas in the 1924 National Origins Immigration Act, census categories were routinely and strategically deployed to circumscribe the political, economic, and social rights of people

of color and immigrants. By the 1960s, the idea of race as a biological construct was widely discredited in academic and scientific circles, and the race question would have been excluded from the 1970 census had it not been for the passage of civil rights and equal opportunity legislation. The new laws required federal agencies to compile data, look for patterns of discrimination, and selectively redress them through various programs and initiatives. This made it necessary to continue to employ forms of racial classification and statistics (Prewitt 2013).

In 1977, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) issued Statistical Directive No. 15 that fostered the creation of “compatible, nonduplicated, exchangeable racial and ethnic data by Federal agencies.” The directive defined the basic racial and ethnic categories to be utilized by the federal government for three reporting purposes: statistical, administrative, and civil rights compliance. The five standard categories were American Indian or Alaskan Native, Asian or Pacific Islander, Black, White, and Hispanic (U.S. Office of Management and Budget 1994).

These racial categories are rife with inconsistencies and lack parallel construction. Only one category is specifically racial, only one is cultural, and only one relies on a notion of affiliation or community recognition. Directive No. 15 defines a black person as one who has his or her “origins in any of the black racial groups of Africa,” but it does not define a white person with reference to any of the white racial groups of Europe, North Africa, or the Middle East. Indeed “Black” is the only category that is defined with an explicit “racial” designator—one which is quite problematic. What, we might ask, are the “black racial groups of Africa”? Hispanics are not considered or classified as a “race,” but as an “ethnic group.” The Hispanic category is, in fact, the only “ethnicity” that the state is interested in explicitly identifying and classifying. The category is defined through a combined national/ethnic designator—a person of “Mexican, Puerto Rican, Cuban, Central or South American or other Spanish culture or origin.” In this definition, Hispanics can be of any race.<sup>19</sup> The category of “American Indian or Alaskan Native” complicates matters further. To be counted as part of the group, individuals must not only trace their origins in any of the original peoples of North America, but they must also maintain “cultural identification through tribal affiliation or community recognition.” This is a condition that the state does not require of any of the other groups.

While originally narrowly conceived to provide consistent categories for use by federal agencies, Directive No. 15 had the unintended consequence of reshaping much of the discourse of race in the United States. These categories have become the *de facto* standard for state and local agencies, the private and nonprofit sectors, and the research community. Social scientists and policy analysts have widely adopted census directives since data is organized under these rubrics. The social and cultural impact of these categories is readily apparent. They inordinately shape both group identities and community-formation patterns. Largely in response to these categories, new organizations have emerged representing the interests of “Asian and Pacific Islanders” or “Hispanics” in a variety of forms from service providers to professional



caucuses. Census categories have played a pivotal role in the emergence and sustaining of panethnic forms of social organization and consciousness. The Census has become the primary site within the U.S. state where competing political claims for group recognition by race and ethnicity are advanced, and where classifications are established in response to statistical needs, administrative recordkeeping practices, and legal requirements. Racially identified groups realize the political value of racial categorization, along with the strategic deployment of “numbers,” in highlighting inequalities, arguing for resources, and lobbying for specific redistricting plans, among other demands. Electoral districts, for example, are drawn on the basis of census data.

Despite attempts to achieve standardized and generally understood racial categories, all such forms of classification are fundamentally unstable. One problem is the persistent gap between state definitions and individual/group forms of self-identification. According to the U.S. Census Bureau, over the last four Censuses (from 1980 to 2010) at least 40 percent of “Hispanics” failed to answer either the race question and/or the ethnicity question. Correspondingly, over 95 percent of individuals who mark the “Some Other Race” box were classified Hispanic by the Census. This reflects individual, group, and/or national differences in conceptualizing race. Immigrant groups who come from societies organized around different concepts of race and ethnicity often have difficulty navigating and situating themselves within U.S. racial categories.

Groups continually contest the existing system of racial classification. Arab Americans, currently classified as “white,” have argued for a distinctive category to capture forms of discrimination exemplified by the hate crimes and profiling that have occurred as a result of the “War on Terror” and continuing political instability in the Middle East. Taiwanese Americans have been lobbying for a distinctive category as Taiwanese, separate from that of Chinese under the Asian or Pacific Islander category. In both these instances, racial and ethnic consciousness is being fueled in large part by geopolitical transformations that affect how groups see themselves as well as how they are viewed by others.

*Multiracial Identity:* The debate surrounding the establishment of a multiracial category in the U.S. Census illustrates how some groups contest the existing framework of racial classification, how other groups seek to preserve it, and how the power of the state is employed to adjudicate different racial claims.

For the past 100 years or so, the U.S. Census has assumed that each individual possessed a clear, singular, and monoracial identity. Earlier census enumeration schedules, by contrast, recognized “mixed race” individuals. The 1890 Census listed “mulatto, quadroon, and octoroon” along with “white, black, Chinese, Japanese, and Indian.” These mixed race categories eventually disappeared from the census, but the “one-drop rule” of racial descent and the imposition of an arbitrary monoracial identity on individuals of racially mixed parentage remained in place. The 1920 census stipulated that “any mixture of White and some other race was to be reported

according to the race of the person who was not White.” In 1977, OMB Directive 15 stated that “[t]he category which most closely reflects the individual’s recognition in his community should be used for purposes of reporting on persons who are of mixed racial and/or ethnic origins.”

In an attempt to assert their multiracial heritage, some individuals ignored census instructions to “[f]ill ONE circle for the race that the person considers himself/herself to be,” by marking two or more boxes. However, since the census scanners are designed to read only one marked box, these people were reclassified as monoracial, based on whichever box was marked more firmly. In addition, individuals specifying the “Other” category are routinely reassigned to one of the OMB’s distinct racial categories based on the first race listed.

Beginning in the 1970s, various individuals and groups formally protested the notion of mutually exclusive racial categories embodied in the “single-race checkoff” policy. Much of the public pressure came from the parents of school-age multiracial children. In the public schools, a multiracial child is often faced with the dilemma of having to choose one race, and constantly risks being misclassified in this setting.

After several years of intense debate, the OMB’s Interagency Committee for the Review of the Racial and Ethnic Standards rejected the proposal to add a separate multiracial category. Instead, in July 1997, the 30-agency task force recommended that Directive 15 be amended to permit multiracial Americans to “mark one or more” racial category when identifying themselves for the census and other government programs. At first, most of the major civil rights organizations, such as the Urban League and the National Council of La Raza, along with groups such as the National Coalition for an Accurate Count of Asians and Pacific Islanders, opposed a multiracial category. These groups feared a diminution in their numbers, and worried that a multiracial category would spur debates regarding the “protected status” of groups and individuals. According to various estimates, from 75 to 90 percent of those who checked the “black” box could potentially check a multiracial one if it were an option. Concerned about the possible reductions in group numbers, civil rights groups argued that existing federal civil rights laws and programs were based on exclusive membership in a defined racial/ethnic group. It would be difficult, if not impossible, from this angle, to assess the salience of multiraciality in relationship to these laws and programs. The “mark one or more” option was adopted in Census 2000.

## Racial Projects

Race is a “crossroads” where social structure and cultural representation meet. Too often, the attempt is made to understand race simply or primarily in terms of only one of these two analytical dimensions. For example, efforts to explain racial inequality as a purely social structural phenomenon either neglect or are unable to account for the origins, patterning, and transformation of racial meanings, representations, and social identities. Conversely, many examinations of race as a system of signification,

identity, or cultural attribution fail adequately to articulate these phenomena with evolving social structures (such as segregation or stratification) and institutions (such as prisons, schools, or the labor market).

Race can never be merely a concept or idea, a representation or signification alone. Indeed race cannot be discussed, cannot even be *noticed*, without reference—however explicit or implicit—to social structure. To identify an individual or group racially is to locate them within a socially and historically demarcated set of demographic and cultural boundaries, state activities, “life-chances,” and tropes of identity/difference/(in)equality. Race is both a social/historical structure and a set of accumulated signifiers that suffuse individual and collective identities, inform social practices, shape institutions and communities, demarcate social boundaries, and organize the distribution of resources. We cannot understand how racial representations set up patterns of residential segregation, for example, without considering how segregation reciprocally shapes and reinforces the meaning of race itself.

We conceive of racial formation processes as occurring through a linkage between structure and signification. *Racial projects* do both the ideological and the practical “work” of making these links and articulating the connection between them. *A racial project is simultaneously an interpretation, representation, or explanation of racial identities and meanings, and an effort to organize and distribute resources (economic, political, cultural) along particular racial lines.* Racial projects connect what race *means* in a particular discursive or ideological practice and the ways in which both social structures and everyday experiences are racially *organized*, based upon that meaning. Racial projects are attempts both to shape the ways in which social structures are racially signified and the ways that racial meanings are embedded in social structures.

Racial projects occur at varying scales, both large and small. Projects take shape not only at the macro-level of racial policy-making, state activity, and collective action, but also at the level of everyday experience and personal interaction. Both dominant and subordinate groups and individual actors, both institutions and persons, carry out racial projects. The imposition of restrictive state voting rights laws, organizing work for immigrants’, prisoners’, and community health rights in the ghetto or barrio are all examples of racial projects. Individuals’ practices may be seen as racial projects as well: The cop who “stops and frisks” a young pedestrian, the student who joins a memorial march for the slain teenager Trayvon Martin, even the decision to wear dreadlocks, can all be understood as racial projects. Such projects should not, however, be simply regarded and analyzed as discrete, separate, and autonomous ideas and actions. Every racial project is both a reflection of and response to the broader patterning of race in the overall social system. In turn, every racial project attempts to reproduce, extend, subvert, or directly challenge that system.

Racial projects are not necessarily confined to particular domains. They can, for example, “jump” scale in their impact and significance. Projects framed at the local level, for example, can end up influencing national policies and initiatives. Correspondingly, projects at the national or even global level can be creatively and strategically

recast at regional and local levels. Projects “travel” as well. Consider how migration recasts concepts of race, racial meaning, and racial identity: Immigrants’ notions of race are often shaped in reference to, and in dialogue with, concepts of race in both their countries of origin and settlement. Thus migrants can maintain, adopt, and strategically utilize different concepts of race in transnational space (Kim 2008; Roth 2012).

At any given historical moment, racial projects compete and overlap, evincing varying capacity either to maintain or to challenge the prevailing racial system. A good example is the current debate over the relevance of “colorblind” ideology, policy, and practice; this provides a study of overlapping and competing racial projects. We discuss the hegemony of colorblindness in the concluding section of this book.

Racial projects link signification and structure not only in order to shape policy or exercise political influence, but also to organize our understandings of race as everyday “common sense.” To see racial projects operating at the level of everyday life, we have only to examine the many ways in which we “notice” race, often unconsciously.

One of the first things we notice about people when we meet them (along with their sex) is their race. We utilize race to provide clues about *who* a person is. This fact is made painfully obvious when we encounter someone whom we cannot conveniently racially categorize—someone who is, for example, racially “mixed” or of an ethnic/racial group with which we are not familiar. Such an encounter becomes a source of discomfort and momentarily a crisis of racial meaning.

Our ability to interpret racial meanings depends on preconceived notions of a racialized social structure. Comments such as “Funny, you don’t look black” betray an underlying image of what black should look like. We expect people to act out their apparent racial identities. Phenotype and performativity should match up. Indeed we become disoriented and anxious when they do not. Encounters with the black person who can’t dance, the Asian American not proficient in math and science, or the Latin@ who can’t speak Spanish all momentarily confound our racial reading of the social world and how we navigate within it. The whole gamut of racial stereotypes testifies to the way a racialized social structure shapes racial experience and socializes racial meanings. Analysis of prevailing stereotypes reveals the always present, already active link between our view of the social structure—its demography, its laws, its customs, its threats—and our conception of what race means.

Conversely, the way we interpret our experience in racial terms shapes and reflects our relations to the institutions and organizations through which we are embedded in the social structure. Thus we expect racially coded human characteristics to explain social differences. “Making up people” once again. Temperament, sexuality, intelligence, athletic ability, aesthetic preferences are presumed to be fixed and discernible from the palpable mark of race. Such diverse questions as our confidence and trust in others (for example, salespeople, teachers, media figures, and neighbors), our sexual preferences and romantic images, our tastes in music, films, dance, or sports, and our very ways of talking, walking, eating, and dreaming become racially coded simply because we live in a society where racial awareness is so pervasive.



To summarize the argument so far: The theory of racial formation suggests that society is suffused with racial projects, large and small, to which all are subjected. This racial “subjection” is quintessentially ideological. Everybody learns some combination, some version, of the rules of racial classification, and of their own racial identity, often without obvious teaching or conscious inculcation. Thus are we inserted in a comprehensively racialized social structure. Race becomes “common sense”—a way of comprehending, explaining, and acting in the world. A vast web of racial projects mediates between the discursive or representational means in which race is identified and signified on the one hand, and the institutional and organizational forms in which it is routinized and standardized on the other. The interaction and accumulation of these projects are the heart of the racial formation process.

Because of the pervasion of society by race, because of its operation over the *longue durée* as a master category of difference and inequality, it is not possible to represent race discursively without simultaneously locating it, explicitly or implicitly, in a social structural (and historical) context. Nor is it possible to organize, maintain, or transform social structures without simultaneously engaging, once more either explicitly or implicitly, in racial signification. Racial formation, therefore, is *a synthesis, a constantly reiterated outcome*, of the interaction of racial projects on a society-wide level. These projects are, of course, vastly different in scope and effect. They include large-scale public action, state activities, and interpretations of racial conditions in political, artistic, journalistic, or academic fora,<sup>20</sup> as well as the seemingly infinite number of racial judgments and practices, conscious and unconscious, that we carry out as part of our individual experience.

The concept of racial projects can be understood and applied across historical time to identify patterns in the *longue durée* of racial formation, both nationally and the entire modern world. At any particular historical moment, one racial project can be hegemonic while others are subservient, marginal, or oppositional to it. White supremacy is the obvious example of this: an evolving hegemonic racial project that has taken different forms from the colonial era to the present. In the chapters that follow, we utilize the concept of racial projects to examine the political trajectory of race over the past six decades in the United States.

But we are not done with racial formation yet. Before we get to the recent history of racial politics, and with the foregoing account of racial formation in mind, we must turn our attention to the problem of *racism*. Racial politics are necessarily deeply bound up with this topic. But race and racism are not the same thing. What is the relationship between them?

## Racism

Magnus Hirschfeld, a German physician and sexologist of the Weimar era who was an early advocate of gay and transgender rights, initially gave currency to the term “racism.” Published posthumously, Hirschfeld’s book *Rassismus* (*Racism*; 1938) provided a

history, analysis, and critical refutation of Nazi racial doctrines. Since the 1930s, the concept of racism has undergone significant changes in scope, meaning, and application. As historian George Fredrickson observes, “Although commonly used, ‘racism’ has become a loaded and ambiguous term” (2002, 151). While ideological notions of race have been directly tied to practices ranging from social segregation, exclusion from political participation, restrictive access to economic opportunities and resources, and genocide, the precise definition and significance of *racism* has been subject to enormous debate.

Robert Miles (1989) has argued that the term “racism” has been conceptually “inflated” to the point where it has lost its precision. While the problem of conceptual inflation and its political implications are evident in an era of colorblindness, the term “racism” is also subject to conceptual *deflation*. That is, what is considered racist is often defined very narrowly, in ways that obscure rather than reveal the pervasiveness and persistence of racial inequality in the United States. For example, racism has been popularly and narrowly conceived as racial *hate*. The category of “hate crimes” has been introduced in many states as a specific offense with enhanced sentencing consequence, and many colleges and universities have instituted “hate speech” codes to regulate expression and behavior both inside and outside of the classroom. Dramatic acts of racial violence are given considerable play in the mass media, and are the subject of extensive condemnation by political elites. But as critical race scholar David Theo Goldberg (1997) has pointed out, the conceptual and political reduction of racism to hate both limits our understanding of racism and of the ways to challenge it. Racist acts are seen as “crimes of passion”—abnormal, unusual, and irrational deeds that we popularly consider offensive. Missing from such a narrow interpretation of racism are the ideologies, policies, and practices in a variety of institutional arenas that normalize and reproduce racial inequality and domination.

How should we understand racism today? We have argued that race has no fixed meaning, that it is constructed and transformed sociohistorically through the cumulative convergence and conflict of racial projects that reciprocally structure and signify race. Our emphasis on racial projects allows us to advance a definition of racism as well. A racial project can be defined as racist if it *creates or reproduces structures of domination based on racial significations and identities*.

Rather than envisioning a single, monolithic, and dominant racist project, we suggest that racist projects exist in a dense matrix, operating at varying scales, networked with each other in formally and informally organized ways, enveloping and penetrating contemporary social relations, institutions, identities, and experiences. Like other racial projects, racist projects too converge and conflict, accumulate and interact with one another.

Complex and embedded as this web of racist projects is—remember, projects both signify and structure relationships, practices, and institutions—it is not the whole story. Powerful as racism is, it does not exhaust race. It does not crowd out anti-racism or eliminate the emancipatory dimensions of racial identity, racial solidarity, or racially conscious agency, both individual and collective. Indeed race is so

profoundly a lived-in and lived-out part of both social structure and identity that it *exceeds and transcends* racism—thereby allowing for resistance to racism. Race, therefore, is *more* than racism; it is a fully-fledged “social fact” like sex/gender or class. From this perspective, race shapes racism as much as racism shapes race.

That said, a number of questions remain to be addressed. Our discussion has focused on racist projects, but are there also anti-racist projects? Can groups of color advance racist projects?

*Are there anti-racist projects?* On some level, this question answers itself. Millions of people in the United States (and elsewhere) have committed their actions, intellects, emotions, and in many cases their lives, to the cause of ending, or at least reducing, racism. Numerous individuals and groups continue to mobilize against racism. They seek to respond to racist attacks: assaults and murder, often by the police, on black and brown people, racial “steering” in housing and credit markets, racially biased sentencing practices in criminal courts . . . the list is seemingly endless. They act to resist institutionalized racist practices, such as “stop and frisk” policies targeting black and brown youth;<sup>21</sup> to educate and organize against racism through media, research, legal and political action; and to disrupt and counter racist practices in everyday life. Continuing the argument advanced throughout this chapter, we define anti-racist projects as those that *undo or resist structures of domination based on racial significations and identities*.

Anti-racism has been the subject of seemingly endless discussion, especially through the rise and fall of the post-World War II political trajectory of race. It has become much more difficult to understand anti-racism since racism went “underground” at the end of the 1960s; since the racist practices and the meaning of racism have changed from “old school” explicit discourses and white supremacist actions like lynchings and cross-burnings. Instead, racism now takes more implicit, deniable, and often unconscious forms. Because the law continues to understand racism (racial discrimination) in the old way—as an explicit, intentional, *invidious* distinction based on race—legal remedies have been sharply curtailed.<sup>22</sup> By restricting its understanding of discrimination in this way, the Supreme Court has permitted and tacitly encouraged denial and concealment of racist practices.

If racism is not merely a matter of explicit beliefs or attitudes—significations or identities, in our vocabulary—but also and necessarily involves the production and maintenance of social structures of domination, then the denial of invidious intent is clearly insufficient to undo it. The absence of invidious intent does little or nothing to unwind the social structures through which racism flourishes and is reproduced. In the “post-civil rights” era, racism has been largely—though not entirely, to be sure—detached from its perpetrators. In its most advanced forms, indeed, it has no perpetrators; it is a nearly invisible, taken-for granted, common-sense feature of everyday life and social structure. This is the situation that has allowed U.S. courts and mainstream political discourse to block race-conscious reparative measures such as affirmative action, to proclaim the United States a “colorblind” society, and to

stigmatize anti-racist activists and intellectuals—legal practitioners, community organizations, school systems and universities, and other individuals and institutions seeking to overturn structures of racial exclusion and discrimination—as “playing the race card,” as the “real racists.”

*Can Groups of Color Advance Racist Projects?* Some scholars and activists have defined racism as “prejudice plus power.”<sup>23</sup> Using this formula, they argue that people of color can’t be racist since they don’t have power. But things are not that simple. “Power” cannot be reified as a thing that some possess and others do not; instead it constitutes a relational field. Furthermore, unless one is prepared to argue that there has been no transformation of the U.S. racial order in the past several decades, it is difficult to contend that groups of color have attained *no* power or influence. To do so risks dismissing the political agency of people of color.<sup>24</sup>

Racialized groups are positioned in unequal ways in a racially stratified society. Racial hierarchy pervades the contemporary United States; that hierarchy is preponderantly white supremacist, but it is not always that way. There are some exceptions, specific urban areas where groups of color have achieved local power, for example, in the administration of social services and distribution of economic resources. In cities like Oakland and Miami, this has led to conflicts between blacks and Latin@s over educational programs, minority business opportunities, and political power, with dramatically different results depending on which group held relative power. In these cases, some groups of color are promoting racial projects that subordinate other groups of color. While such exceptions do not negate the overarching reality of white supremacy, they do suggest that differences in racial power persist among groups of color. Inter-group racial conflict is not unidimensional; it is not solely whites vs. people of color, though whiteness still rules, OK?

## Racial Politics: Despotism, Democracy, and Hegemony

For most of its existence, both as a European colony and, as an independent nation, the United States was a *racial despotism*. In many ways it remains racially despotic today. Progress towards political standing and the empowerment of people of color, for example, has been painfully slow and highly uneven. It took over 160 years, from the passage of the Naturalization Law of 1790 to the 1952 McCarran–Walter Act, to abolish racial restrictions regarding naturalization (well, not totally).<sup>25</sup> After the civil war, there was the brief democratic experiment of Reconstruction that terminated ignominiously in 1877. In its wake there followed almost a century of legally sanctioned segregation and wholesale denial of the vote. While the civil rights movement and its allies made significant strides towards enhancing formal political rights, obstacles to effective political participation have remained stubbornly persistent, as recent legal decisions jeopardizing voting rights have revealed (U.S. Supreme Court 2013).

It is important, therefore, to recognize that in many respects, racial despotism is the norm against which all U.S. politics must be measured. Centuries of U.S.



racial despotism have had three important and dramatic consequences. First, they defined “American” identity as white: as the negation of racialized “otherness”—initially African and indigenous, later Latin American and Asian as well (Rogin 1991; Morrison 1993; Drinnon 1997). This negation took shape in both law and custom, in public institutions and in forms of cultural representation. It became the archetype of racial domination in the United States. It melded with the conquest and slavery as the “master” racial project.

Second, racial despotism organized—albeit sometimes in an incoherent and contradictory fashion—the “color line,” rendering racial division the fundamental schism in U.S. society. The despotism of the color line also demanded an ongoing and intensive policing of racial boundaries, an ongoing racialization effort that ran not only between various groups and people, but also *through* them. In other words, racial despotism did not only elaborate, articulate, and drive racial divisions institutionally; it also hammered them into our psyches, causing untold fear and suffering, and extending, up to the moment in which you are reading this, the racial obsessions and oppressions of the conquest and slavery periods.

Third, racial despotism consolidated oppositional racial consciousness and organization. Originally framed by slave revolts and *marronage*,<sup>26</sup> by indigenous resistance, and by nationalisms of various sorts, and later by nationalist and equalitarian racial freedom movements, oppositional racial consciousness took on permanence and depth as *racial resistance*. Just as racial despotism reinforced white supremacy as the master category of racial domination, so too it forged racial unity among the oppressed: first native peoples assaulted and displaced by armed settlers, later Africans and their descendants kidnapped and reduced to mere chattel, and then conquered Latin@s/*mestiz@s* and superexploited Asian immigrants. Racial despotism generated racial resistance: Just as the conquest created the “Indian” where once there had been Pequot, Iroquois, or Tutelo, so too it created the “Black” where once there had been Asante or Ovimbundu, Yoruba, or Bakongo. What had once been tribal or ethnic consciousness—among enslaved Africans, Native Americans “removed” to reservations or decimated by settler violence, Latin@s forcibly denationalized and stripped of their lands, and Asian immigrants subjected to virtual *corvee* labor and then violently expelled from the communities they had created—ultimately became oppositional *race consciousness* and *racial resistance*. Thus in many ways racial despotism laid the groundwork for the creation of the racially based movements of today.

These patterns are now understood as “panethnicizing” processes. (Every racially defined group is a panethnic group.) They comprise not only the shared experience of suffering and the unifying pressures it brings to bear, but also the concerted self-activity of the oppressed to confront their tormentors and change their conditions. Panethnicity is a type of racialization; it is not without internal tension and conflict; it is often uneven and incomplete; it often does not liquidate ethnic difference but subsumes it; above all, it is a product of racial despotism.

The transition from racial despotism to *racial democracy* has been a slow, painful, and contentious one; it remains far from complete. A recognition of the abiding presence of racial despotism, we contend, is crucial for the development of a theory of racial formation in the U.S. It is also crucial to the task of relating racial formation to racial resistance, the broader current of political practice, organization, and change.

Over extended periods of time, and as a result of resistance of disparate types, the balance of coercion and consent began to change, to move *from domination to hegemony*. It is possible to locate the origins of hegemony right within the heart of racial despotism, for the effort to possess the master's tools—religion and philosophy in this case—was crucial to emancipation and to “freedom dreams” (Kelley 2003), crucial to efforts both individual and collective to possess oneself, so to speak, to achieve some degree of “self-determination” as a people. As Ralph Ellison reminds us, “The slaves often took the essence of the aristocratic ideal (as they took Christianity) with far more seriousness than their masters” (1964, xiv). In their language, in their religion with its focus on the Exodus theme and on Jesus's tribulations (Glaude 2000), in their music with its figuring of suffering, resistance, perseverance, and transcendence (Du Bois 2007 [1935]), in their interrogation of a political philosophy which sought perpetually to rationalize their bondage in a supposedly “free” society (Douglass 2000 [1852]), enslaved Africans and their descendants incorporated elements of racial rule into their thought and practice, turning them against their original bearers.

Racial rule can be understood as a slow and uneven historical process that has moved from despotism to democracy, from domination to hegemony. In this transition, hegemonic forms of racial rule—those based on consent—eventually came to supplant those based on coercion. But only to some extent, only partially. By no means has the United States established racial democracy in the 21st century, and by no means is coercion a thing of the past. But the sheer complexity of the racial questions U.S. society confronts today, the welter of competing racial projects and contradictory racial experiences which Americans undergo, suggests that hegemony is a useful and appropriate term with which to characterize contemporary racial rule.

What form does racial hegemony take today? In the aftermath of the epochal struggles of the post-World War II period, under the conditions of chronic crisis of racial meaning to which U.S. society has grown accustomed, we suggest that a new and highly unstable form of racial hegemony has emerged, that of *colorblindness*. In the following chapters, we discuss the post-World War II political trajectory of racial formation that has brought us to this point.

## Notes

1. Ian Hacking (2006; 1999) has given us the phrase “making up people” to explain how the human sciences operate, but Hacking doesn't stop there: he discusses medicine, education, ideology, law, art, and state institutions as they do this work.

2. The notion of *intersectionality* was advanced by legal scholar Kimberlé W. Crenshaw, who argued that both oppression and resistance are always situated in multiple categories of difference (Crenshaw 1989). Failure to grasp how categories of race, gender, sexuality, and class dynamically interact and shape one another, she asserted, led to a fragmented politics:

Feminist efforts to politicize experiences of women and anti-racist efforts to politicize experiences of people of color have frequently proceeded as though the issues and experiences they each detail occur on mutually exclusive terrains. (Crenshaw 1991, 1242)

Two other key intersectionality theorists should be mentioned. Patricia Hill Collins emphasizes the mutual determination of race, gender, and class in her survey and theoretical synthesis of the themes and issues of black feminist thought. Collins invented the phrase “matrix of domination” to describe the “overall social organization within which intersecting oppressions originate, develop, and are contained” (Collins 2008 [1999] 227–228). Evelyn Nakano Glenn argues that race and gender are relational concepts in an interlocking system, providing a historical examination of citizenship and labor in the United States between 1870 and 1930. Glenn argues that these categories cannot be understood separately, but are defined and given meaning in relationship to each other: “Race and gender share three key features as analytic concepts: (1) they are relational concepts whose construction involves (2) representation and material relations and (3) in which power is a constitutive element” (Glenn 2002, 12–13). In many respects, race is gendered and gender is racialized. Inequality is always racialized and gendered as well. There are no clear boundaries between the “regions” of hegemony, so political conflicts will often invoke some or all these themes simultaneously.

3. “The truth is that there are no races; there is nothing in the world that can do all we ask race to do for us.... The evil that is done is done by the concept, and by easy—yet impossible—assumptions as to its application” (Appiah 1992, 45). Appiah's eloquent and learned book fails, in our view, to dispense with the race concept, despite its anguished attempt to do so; this indeed is the source of its author's anguish. We agree with him as to the non-objective character of race, but fail to see how this recognition justifies its abandonment.
4. George L. Mosse (1985) argues that anti-semitism only began to be racialized in the 18th century. For a competing view, see Thomas 2010.
5. As Marx put it:

The discovery of gold and silver in America, the extirpation, enslavement, and entombment in mines of the aboriginal population, the beginning of the conquest and looting of the East Indies, the turning of Africa into a warren for the commercial hunting of blackskins, signalized the rosy dawn of the era of capitalist production. These idyllic proceedings are the chief momenta of primitive accumulation. (1967, 75)

David E. Stannard (1992) argues that the wholesale slaughter perpetrated upon the native peoples of the Western hemisphere is unequalled in history, even in our own bloody century. See also Lovejoy and Rogers, eds. 1994.

6. Debates of a similar nature also took place among the subjects of conquest and enslavement. On Native American perspectives, see Calloway 1994; Richter 2003; White 2010. On African perspectives, see Opoku-Agyemang et al., eds. 2008; Thornton 2012.

7. In Virginia, for example, it took about two decades after the establishment of European colonies to extirpate the indigenous people of the greater vicinity; 50 years after the establishment of the first colonies, the elaboration of slave codes establishing race as *prima facie* evidence for enslaved status was well under way. See Jordan (2012 [1968]).
8. In 1550–1551 two Spanish Dominicans, Bartolomeo de las Casas and Juan Ginés de Sepúlveda, conducted a prolonged theological debate in Valladolid, Spain, about the humanity and spiritual status of Spain's Native American subjects. The debate was carried out at the behest of the Spanish king, Charles V, and in the shadow of the Inquisition. While ostensibly theological, and thus focused on such questions as the status—or even presence—of the souls of the Indians, the debate also addressed questions of Spanish imperial development strategy, notably the scope and legitimacy of slavery and the status of the *encomienda* system vis-à-vis religious and royal authority. See Hanke 1974; Todorov 1984.
9. For a pointed, parallel demonstration of the imperative of racial classification during relatively early stages of conquest, see the genre of Mexican *casta* paintings (Denver Art Museum 2004; Katzew 2005).
10. Proslavery physician Samuel George Morton (1799–1851) compiled a collection of 800 crania from all parts of the world, which formed the sample for his studies of race. Assuming that the larger the size of the cranium translated into greater intelligence, Morton established a relationship between race and skull capacity. Gossett reports that “In 1849, one of his studies included the following results: the English skulls in his collection proved to be the largest, with an average cranial capacity of 96 cubic inches. The Americans and Germans were rather poor seconds, both with cranial capacities of 90 cubic inches. At the bottom of the list were the Negroes with 83 cubic inches, the Chinese with 82, and the Indians with 79” (Gossett 1997 [1965], 74). When Steven Jay Gould reexamined Morton's research, he found that the data were deeply, though probably unconsciously, manipulated to agree with his “a priori conviction about racial ranking” (1981, 50–69).
11. See UNESCO 1950/1951. The production of the documents was coordinated by Alfred Metraux (1951). The 1950 authors included Professors Ernest Beaglehole (New Zealand), Juan Comas (Mexico), E. Franklin Frazier (U.S.), Humayun Kabir (India), Claude Lévi-Strauss (France), Morris Ginsberg (United Kingdom), and Ashley Montagu (U.S.). It was revised by Montagu “after criticism submitted by Professors Hadley Cantril, E. G. Conklin, Gunnar Dahlberg, Theodosius Dobzhansky, L. C. Dunn, Donald Hager, Julian S. Huxley, Otto Klineberg, Wilbert Moore, H. J. Mullet, Gunnar Myrdal, Joseph Needham, and Curt Stern” (ibid, 35). The 1950 document was criticized as excessively sociologically oriented; the 1951 revision included text drafted by anthropologists, geneticists, and biologists as well. On Metraux see Prins 2007.
12. These are complex cases. The Cherokee Freedmen are the descendants of black slaves owned by the Cherokee (Jones 2009). The Seminole Blacks are the descendants of U.S. maroons who fled slavery to tribal lands in Florida, Indian territory controlled by Spain until 1821. The U.S. fought two “Seminole Wars” (1817–1818 and 1835–1842) to recapture the area and reimpose slavery. Many Seminoles were transported (or fled) to the Oklahoma territory, but some remained in Florida. In 1849, threatened by slave-raiders, c.200 armed Black Seminoles under the leadership of John Horse escaped from Florida and conducted a heroic “long march” across slave-holding Alabama, Louisiana, and Texas.



Accompanied by some traditional (i.e., non-black) Seminole comrades led by the Seminole chief Coacochee. This amazing feat culminated in their crossing into abolitionist Mexico in July 1850; they formed a community in Coahuila that is still called *Nacimiento de los Negros*. See Mulroy 2007.

13. The Implicit Bias Test (IAT) was developed in the mid-1990s by experimental/social psychologist Anthony G. Greenwald. It has spawned a large literature and been applied to various issues of bias (notably race, gender, and stereotyping of various types) in numerous settings, particularly educational, political, and legal. For a small sample of relevant work by Greenwald and collaborators, see Greenwald et al. 2003; Greenwald et al. 2009; Kang et al. 2012.
14. The legacy of Kant is particularly evident here (McCarthy 2009), but sociological and psychological concepts such as “consciousness of kind” (Giddings 1932) have also acquired great followings over the years.
15. See “The Conservation of Races” (1993 [1897]), an early statement that has occasioned much debate among Du Bois scholars (Marable 1986, 35–38; Appiah 1992, 28–46; Lewis 1993, 372–373; Reed 1997a).
16. Boas’s work has drawn contemporary criticism for its residual essentialism; his early physical anthropology at times overwhelmed his vaunted cultural relativism (Boas 1912a, 1912b; Williams 1996).
17. Park’s *Race and Culture* (1950) is still useful; see also Lyman 1992; Steinberg 2007. Locke’s 1915 lectures at Howard University, unpublished until 1992, bear a remarkable resemblance to contemporary racial theories and comparative historical sociologies of race (Locke 1992 [1915]).
18. Proposition 54 was defeated, less because voters wished to preserve racial categorization as an overall state practice, but rather because in a few particular areas of state activity they had been convinced that maintaining racially based data was good for society overall. A particularly crucial source of Connerly’s defeat was a series of campaign ads run by medical societies arguing that collecting racial data was important for public health purposes (HoSang 2010).
19. In August, 2012 the Bureau announced that it was considering redefining the Top of Form–Bottom of Form “Hispanic” category to the status of a racial category, possibly called “Hispanic/Latino,” that would be equivalent on the form to white or black. See Cohn 2012.
20. We are not unaware, for example, that publishing this work is itself a racial project.
21. *Floyd, et al. v. City of New York, et al.*, a class action suit brought by the Center for Constitutional Rights on behalf of victims of “stop and frisk” racial profiling by New York City police, was decided on August 12, 2013. Federal judge Shira Scheindlin decided for the plaintiffs and ordered a series of modification and reforms of “stop and frisk.” See Center for Constitutional Rights 2013. Challenges to the decision suggest that the case’s ultimate outcome remains in doubt.
22. Racial jurisprudence largely relies on the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment and on the 1964 Civil Rights Act. The full extent of Supreme Court rulings on the nature of racism cannot be addressed here. An exemplary decision is *Washington v. Davis* (U.S. Supreme Court 1976), which established the rule of “invidious discriminatory purpose” as the criterion for determining if discrimination had occurred. The Court understood “purpose” as “intent” and refused to extend its concept of discrimination to include “disparate

- impact”; in other words the consequences of practices alleged to be discriminatory were officially ignored. See Pillai 2001.
23. Bonilla-Silva defines this view as an “institutionalist perspective,” in which “racism is defined as a combination of prejudice and power that allows the dominant race to institutionalize its dominance at all levels in a society (Bonilla-Silva 1997, 466). See also Katz 2003.
  24. See our debate with Joe Feagin and Chris Elias over these issues: Feagin and Elias 2013; Omi and Winant 2013.
  25. In practice, this just means rendering the racial dimensions of race informal, outside explicit legal regulation, but still subject to political pressures, and thus to racist projects and anti-racist ones as well. Thus it may be an overstatement to say that such restrictions were “abolished.”
  26. This term refers to the practice, widespread throughout the Americas, whereby runaway slaves formed communities in remote areas, such as swamps, mountains, or forests, often in alliance with dispossessed indigenous peoples. The Black Seminoles discussed above were a maroon people.

# Racial Politics and the Racial State

*“[H]istorical reality is completely obfuscated in the myth of an all-inclusive contract creating a sociopolitical order presided over by a neutral state equally responsive to all its colorless citizens.”*

—Charles W. Mills<sup>1</sup>

## Introduction

Race is consummately political. The instability of the race concept and the controversies it generates are emblematic of the racially contradictory society in which we live. In the United States, a system of racial rule has always been in place, operating not merely through macro-level, large-scale activities, but also through micro-level, small-scale practices. The racial regime is enforced and challenged in the schoolyard, on the dance floor, on talk radio, and in the classroom as much as it is in the Supreme Court, electoral politics, or on the battlefield of Helmand province. Because racial formation processes are dynamic, the racial regime remains unstable and contested. We cannot step outside of race and racism, since our society and our identities are constituted by them; we live in racial history.

Race is a vast and variegated theme. Any racial theory is a work-in-progress. Race is a factor not only in politics and history, but also in economy, culture, experience ...; it is a fully-fledged *social fact* like class or gender. Like those other large markers race is an unstable set of *collective representations* as well.<sup>2</sup> We focus here on racial politics and the racial state because through politics, through struggles over power and freedom, we can see race and racism being remade both social structurally and experientially. What we call racial projects have interacted over half a millennium to build up the *social structures* of race and racism. A parallel *experiential dimension* exists as well: The short-term, present-tense experience of racial subjectivity, in which new racial projects are being launched and interacting all the time.<sup>3</sup>

Looking at racial politics in general and the racial state in particular also allows us to consider the state–civil society distinction: The state may represent the core of a given racial regime, but no state can encompass all of civil society. People conceive of, operate, and inhabit their own racial projects (within broader constraints) and “experience” race in distinct and varied ways.

To theorize racial politics and the racial state, then, is to enter the complex territory where structural racism encounters self-reflective action, the radical pragmatism

of people of color (and their white allies) in the United States<sup>4</sup> It is to confront the instability of the U.S. system of racial hegemony, in which despotism and democracy coexist in seemingly permanent conflict. It is to understand that the boundary between state and civil society is necessarily porous and uncertain where race is concerned. Emphasizing the political dimensions of race and racism allows us to discern the contours of the racial system, to understand what racial hegemony looks like, to specify its contradictions, and to envision alternative scenarios.

Racial politics are bigger than the state. They involve civil society, political socialization and thus race-consciousness, racial identity-making (both individual- and group-based), and group boundary formation (Barth, ed. 1998 [1969]) as well. The enmeshment of the state in our everyday lives means that all racial identities are contradictory and “hybrid”; it means that uncertain group boundaries are regulated and often tightened and enforced by the state. We make our racial identities, both individually and collectively, but not under conditions of our own choosing.

Racial formation theory approaches politics as an uneasy combination of despotic and democratic practices, of self-reflective action undertaken both with and against established social structures. Why, for example, are racial attributions so prone to violence, so “hot,” so fiercely upheld and contested, so necessary in the modern world as components of both self and social structure? Why is race so available as a “scavenger concept”: a default variable on the basis of which so many disparate phenomena are supposedly explained?<sup>5</sup> How can a social distinction be both so determining—of life chances and status, of freedom, of economic, political, and social institutions, and indeed of identity itself—and at the same time so undetermined, inchoate, and indeed unreal on so many levels?

The modern state makes use of ideology—racial ideology in this case—to “glue” together contradictory practices and structures: despotism and democracy, coercion and consent, formal equality and substantive inequality, identity and difference.<sup>6</sup> The racial state does not have precise boundaries. Although based in formally constituted institutions and grounded in a contentious historical process, the state extends beyond administrative, legislative, or judicial forms of activity. It inhabits and indeed organizes large segments of social and indeed psychological identity, as well as everyday life. Internalizing and “living out” a particular racial identity, for example, is in some ways internalizing the state; post-structuralist theorists might describe this in terms of “governmentality” (Foucault 1991, 1997). From a Freudian point of view, we might understand the racial state in terms of “introjection”: another form of internalization in which rules and constraints become mechanisms of psychological self-defense. Still another way in which the racial state casts its net over our identities, our everyday experiences, is through the process Althusser called “interpellation”: the way the state “notices” us, “hails” us. In Althusser’s account, a police officer calls out “Hey! You there!” and we instantly flinch; we turn to face the state that is already within us:

[I]deology “acts” or “functions” in such a way that it “recruits” subjects among the individuals (it recruits them all), or “transforms” the individuals



into subjects (it transforms them all) by that very precise operation which I have called interpellation or hailing, and which can be imagined along the lines of the most commonplace everyday police (or other) hailing: “Hey, you there!”

Assuming that the theoretical scene I have imagined takes place in the street, the hailed individual will turn round. By this mere one-hundred-and-eighty-degree physical conversion, he [sic] becomes a subject. Why? Because he has recognized that the hail was “really” addressed to him, and that “it was really him who was hailed” (and not someone else).

(Althusser 2001 [1971], 174; see also Butler 1997a)

By *despotism* we refer to a familiar series of state practices: deprivation of life, liberty, or land; dispossession, violence, confinement, coerced labor, exclusion, and denial of rights or due process. The contemporary United States, and the colonial societies that preceded it in North America, were founded on these and related forms of despotism, all organized according to race. Although racial oppression has lessened over the years, and although some of these despotic practices have been significantly reduced if not eliminated (slavery is a good example here), others continue unabated and in some cases have even increased. For example, carceral practices today rival or exceed any previous period in both the proportions and absolute numbers of black and brown people held in confinement. The little-noticed development of a whole gulag of specialized immigration prisons has no precedent in U.S. history.

All right then, how about the *democratic dimensions* of the racial state? Though it is a constant and prominent feature of the racial state, despotism is not the only story that the state tells about race. “Freedom dreams” (Kelley 2003) rooted in racial politics are among the most enduring contributions to the foundation of democracy in the modern world; these “dreams” have constantly challenged the state, most famously in Martin Luther King, Jr.’s August 1963 speech, but on numerous other occasions as well. In fact the persistence and depth of social justice-oriented movements has been the chief source of popular democracy and indeed popular sovereignty in the United States. What W.E.B. Du Bois called “abolition democracy” is a clear instance of that movement challenge. In Du Bois’s view, the American Revolution of 1776–1781 was only a partial and incomplete anti-imperial transformation, since it was dominated by elites and left slavery intact. The Civil War, and Reconstruction, abortive as it was, were the second phase of the American Revolution, based upon the expansion of the rights that abolition implied: the achievement by all of complete democracy and full citizenship (Du Bois 2007 [1935] 186; see also Lipsitz 2004; Davis 2005, 73–74).

To be sure, democratic movements have often been foreclosed by state-based coercion, as well as by reactionary practices based in civil society: mob violence and lynching, for example. Only under some circumstances has open and “free” political mobilization for democratic reform been possible for people of color: The two great

moments of this mainstream political upsurge were, of course, the Reconstruction period (1865–1877) and the post-World War II civil rights period (1948–1970). At other times democratic political action had to take shape quite autonomously, beneath the radar of the state (and often beneath the social scientific radar as well). This suggests the subaltern character of racial democracy.<sup>7</sup>

\* \* \*

In order to understand racial politics and to grasp the contradictory relationship between racial despotism and racial democracy, it is necessary to situate the racial state historically and account for its development over time. Here, we accomplish this by discussing the transition from *war of maneuver* to *war of position*. Next, we address the *racial body politic*, the corporeal or phenomic dimensions of raciality. Race and racism politicize the body, subjecting it to state control, surveillance, and violence. In the next section, *The Radical Pragmatist Politics of Race*, we consider the micro–macro linkages that operate in racial politics. We examine such matters as the way individuals and movements “navigate” in unstable and uncertain racial conditions, and the contradictions between racial despotism and racial democracy that continue to shape and reshape the racial state. We draw once again on the theories of the Italian neo-Marxist politician, theorist, and anti-fascist leader Antonio Gramsci. In the next section, we introduce the concept of *trajectories of racial politics*. Trajectories are shaped interactions, taking place over historical time, between the racial state and race-oriented social movements. Finally, we reflect upon racial politics in everyday life, discussing the *politicization of the social* that took place in the United States during the post-World War II years. We argue that anti-racist movements greatly expanded the political “space” available in the country, achieving an enormous deepening and broadening of political awareness. From (and within) race this “politics of identity” went everywhere: into personal relationships, family, sexuality, and “micro-political” interactions of all types. Prior to the 1970s, these identities and relationships were seen as mostly private matters, located outside the political sphere. Since the black movement challenge, they have “gone public”; awareness of racism, sexism, and homophobia cannot be removed from the public sphere.

## From War of Maneuver to War of Position

There has been a racial system in North America since the earliest days of contact with and conquest by Europeans. This system has linked political rule to the racial classification of individuals and groups. The major institutions and social relationships of U.S. society—law, political organization, economic relationships, religion, cultural life, residential patterns—have been structured from the beginning by this system.

Clearly, the system was more monolithic, more absolute, at earlier historical moments. Despite its epochal revolutionary origins, the early U.S. maintained

many of the residues of the absolutist system of monarchical rule from which it had emerged. Empire, slavery, and patrimonialism were some of these “birthmarks.” Having thrown off the shackles of the British empire, “the first new nation” (Lipset 2003 [1963]) proceeded to establish itself as an empire of its own, seizing the land and labor of native peoples of North America (Kaplan 2005; Stoler, ed. 2006;). Having declared itself subject to a natural law in which “all men [sic] are created equal,” the United States quite comprehensively disobeyed that law in practice: not only through its support for hereditary chattel slavery, but also through its severe restrictions on democratic participation.<sup>8</sup> The American Revolution was in many respects triggered by trade restrictions imposed by the “mother country”;<sup>9</sup> the insurgent colonies were merchant capitalist, not yet industrial capitalist. They were patrimonial systems that were still marked by feudalism (Adams 2005). Not only did romantic racist ideology justifying slavery develop out of this political-economic complex—the plantation owner as the father, the slaves as children—but also the chattelization of both slaves and women was operating here (Pateman 1988; Mills 1999). Furthermore, because there was very little industrial production in the early decades of the nation’s existence, property-less white men were uncertain about their status. The main “workers” were slaves, and white men, unwilling to accept the quasi-feudal status of “servant,” were determined to distinguish themselves from slaves at all costs. David Roediger (2007 [1991]) finds deep roots for later U.S. racism in this unstable and conflictual situation. What about the slaves themselves? The 1790 census—the first ever taken in the country—counted roughly 20 percent of the U.S. population as enslaved (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1791). In Virginia, the principal slaveholding state of the time, the enslaved population was around 40 percent of the total.

Thus policing and controlling the enslaved population was a particular concern, especially in the South, where slaves were concentrated and represented the main source of labor. The U.S. Constitution reflected extensive experience in the surveillance and punishment of slaves, experience that had been acquired by Europeans over 250 years of colonization before the Constitution was even promulgated. Protection for “the peculiar institution” was provided by the document in numerous ways: notably in its provision for the return of escaped slaves, and in its ignominious “three-fifths clause,” whereby the enslaved population, though obviously unrepresented in the legislature, could yet be counted as a component of the population for purposes of legislative enumeration.

For most of U.S. history, state racial policy’s main objective was repression and exclusion. Congress’ first attempt to define American citizenship, the Naturalization Law of 1790, declared that only free “white” immigrants could qualify. A persistent pattern of disenfranchisement targeted people of color. Before the Civil War, “free persons of color” were stripped of their right to vote—the key to citizenship status—in many states. The extension of eligibility to all racial groups has been slow indeed. Japanese, for example, could become naturalized citizens only after the passage of the McCarran–Walter Act of 1952.<sup>10</sup>

The state plays a crucial part in racialization, the extension of racial meaning to a previously racially unclassified relationship, social practice or group. Throughout the 19th century, many state and federal laws recognized only three racial categories: "white," "Negro," and "Indian." In California, the influx of Chinese and the debates surrounding the legal status of Mexicans provoked a brief juridical crisis of racial definition. California attempted to resolve this dilemma by classifying Mexicans and Chinese within the already existing framework of "legally defined" racial groups. After the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo (1848), Mexicans were accorded the political-legal status of "free white persons," a fig-leaf placed by the U.S. conquerors over the realities of Mexican *mestizaje* and slave emancipation. State racialization of Asians was even more baroque: In 1854 the newly established California Supreme Court ruled in *People v. Hall* (CA Supreme Court 1854) that Chinese should be considered "Indian"[!] and denied the political rights accorded to whites.<sup>11</sup>

But even at its most oppressive, the racial order was unable to arrogate to itself the entire capacity for the production of racial meanings or the racial subjection of the population. Racially defined "others"—people of color—were always able to counterpose their own cultural traditions, their own forms of organization and identity, to the dehumanizing and enforced "invisibility" imposed by the majority society. As the voluminous literature on black culture under slavery shows, black slaves developed cultures of resistance based on music, religion, African traditions, and family ties, among other political technologies. By these means they sustained their own ideological project: the development of a "free" black identity, a sense of "peoplehood," and a collective dedication to emancipation.<sup>12</sup> Similar processes of cultural resistance developed among Native Americans, Latin@s, and Asians.<sup>13</sup>

Without reviewing the vast history of the U.S. racial order, it is still possible to make some general comments about the manner in which this order was historically consolidated. Gramsci's distinction between "war of maneuver" and "war of position" will prove useful here. In his account, *war of maneuver* is the form of politics appropriate to conditions of dictatorship or despotism, when no terrain is available for opposition inside the system. Resistance to the regime mobilizes outside the political arena, in the hinterlands, the slums and barracoons, the places of worship, the fields and mines and other workplaces, everywhere the subaltern strata are gathered. Once it has acquired the necessary force, resistance moves to the key locus of power, the capital, and seizes the key redoubts (the Bastille, the Winter Palace) from which oppressive power has been exercised.

*War of position*, by contrast, is the political form appropriate to hegemonic systems of rule that operate by incorporating their opposition, at least up to a point. Modern mass societies of both the fascist and the democratic type are the kinds of political systems Gramsci has in mind. Resistance to fascism combines the two forms of politics. Democratic states may be quite restrictive, but they still generally provide some space for challenge from within: legislative, electoral, or judicial processes, for example. In such societies the state is fortified (Gramsci calls it a system



of “trenches”)<sup>14</sup> by structures of legitimation and consent against insurrection or other direct challenges. The task faced by any oppositional movement engaged in a “war of position” is to delegitimize the hegemonic system and to erode or undermine consent. By rearticulating political and cultural “common sense” in such a way that the excluded, oppressed, and exploited sectors of society can achieve their own legitimacy, their own inclusion, the opposition develops *counter-hegemony*. It seeks to attain the rights, justice, and political power that its supporters had earlier been denied. “War of position” is thus a prolonged struggle for the adherence of the general population and the achievement of political power, generally without insurrection or armed struggle.<sup>15</sup>

For much of American history, no political legitimacy was conceded to alternative or oppositional racial projects. The absence of democratic rights, of material resources, and of political and ideological terrain upon which to challenge the monolithic character of the racial order, forced racially defined opposition both outward, to the margins of society, and inward, to the relative safety of self-defined communities. Slaves who escaped to the North or Canada, or who formed maroon communities in forests and swamps; Indians who made war on the United States in defense of their peoples and lands; Chinese and Filipin@s who drew together in Chinatowns and Manilatowns in order to gain some measure of collective control over their existence—these are some examples of the movement *outward*, away from political engagement with the racial state.

These same blacks, Indians, Asians (and many others), banned from the political system and relegated to what was supposed to be a permanently inferior sociocultural status, were also forced *inward* upon themselves as individuals, families, and communities. Tremendous cultural resources were nurtured among such communities; enormous labors were required to survive and to develop elements of an autonomy and opposition under such conditions. These circumstances can best be understood as combining with the violent clashes and necessity of resistance (to white-led race riots, military assaults) which characterized these periods, to constitute a racial war of maneuver.

War of maneuver was gradually replaced by *war of position* as racially defined minorities achieved political gains in the United States.<sup>16</sup> A strategy of war of position can only be predicated on political struggle—on the existence of diverse institutional and cultural terrains upon which oppositional political projects can be mounted. To the extent that you can confront the racial state from within the political system, to the degree that you possess political “voice” (Hirschman 1971), you are fighting a war of position. Prepared in large measure by the practices undertaken under conditions of war of maneuver, black movements and their allies were able to make sustained strategic incursions into the mainstream political process during the post-World War II years. “Opening up” the state was a process of democratization which had effects both on state structures and on racial meanings. The postwar black movement, later joined by other racially based minority movements, challenged the dominant racial

ideology in the United States, insisting upon a more egalitarian and democratic concept of race. The state was the logical target for this effort.

## The Racial Body Politic

Race and racism both define and disrupt the body politic of the nation-state.<sup>17</sup> As we saw in Chapter 3, concepts of the *nation* like “the American people” or “the French people” presuppose a degree of inclusion and commonality that is impossible to achieve in practice. States occasionally become the instruments of necessarily genocidal attempts to attain that level of uniformity (“purity”), which is usually framed in racial terms.<sup>18</sup> But more often they must manage the heterogeneity of the body politic, operating on the continuum of despotism–democracy that we have discussed. Therefore racial difference and racial inequality are fundamental dimensions of social organization. This is something that reductionist theoretical approaches to race and racism *just can’t explain*. There is a persistent tendency to recur to other, supposedly more fundamental social forces like class and culture/ethnicity, in the effort to explain the persistence and breadth of race. Such accounts always neglect or dismiss the embeddedness of race in the modern world.

Foucault’s concept of “biopower”<sup>19</sup> addresses some of the problems of this sort of management. Though he developed it in his later work on sexuality, Foucault also applied this term to issues of race and racism, especially in regard to colonialism and empire. The biopower concept is useful here because it allows us to see the normalization and comprehensiveness of race and racism in the modern world (and most certainly in the U.S.). With Foucault, we challenge the idea—found everywhere in both scholarly work and common sense—that human differentiation according to race is somehow aberrant, and that racism is an irrational deviation from such immutable principles as individualism, “*liberté, égalité, fraternité*,” or the law of supply and demand. Foucault labels such accounts “scapegoat theories” of race. As Ann Laura Stoler writes,

Scapegoat theories posit that under economic and social duress, particular sub-populations are cordoned off as intruders, invented to deflect anxieties, and conjured up precisely to nail blame. For Foucault, racism is more than an *ad hoc* response to crisis: It is a manifestation of preserved possibilities, the expression of an underlying discourse of permanent social war, nurtured by the biopolitical technologies of “incessant purification.” Racism does not merely arise in moments of crisis, in sporadic cleansings. It is internal to the biopolitical state, woven into the web of the social body, threaded through its fabric.

(1995, 69)

From this standpoint the “scavenger concept” of race also acquires new focus and emphasis. The ready availability of race as an “explanation” for deviance from some

attributed norm becomes more intelligible when we recognize both the ease with which racial distinctions are made—their “ocularity”—and when we simultaneously admit the breadth and depth of racial awareness in American society. With these political tools in view, with an awareness of biopower handy and Foucault by your side, consider once again the raciality of the body politic: the endless list of attributed variation by race that pervades the United States, and much of the rest of the world as well. Variation by race in scores on the SAT test? In evacuation rates by race from hurricane-flooded New Orleans? In different racial groups’ commitments to “hard work”? In criminal propensities? How about in common-sense beliefs about sexual proclivities across racially defined groups (consider the word “vanilla” in this context)? This list can go on for days.

The phrase “body politic,” of course, refers not only to the collective body, the “nation” or its equivalents; it also refers to the politicized body. Here we are arguing that the phenomic dimensions of race are among the central components of this phenomenon. Race and racism not only politicize the social but render up the human body into the burning heart of the state as material for the social control. State racial policy is directed against the racial body, in such forms as surveillance, profiling, policing, and confinement. This racial body politic is also gendered and classed: State violence against black men—against poor, dark, mainly male bodies—is one of the most continuous and seemingly central aspects of the U.S. racial system. Women of color are also targeted, especially by violence, discrimination, and assaults on their reproductive rights (Harris-Perry 2011); profiling is everywhere (Glover 2009).

Much recent scholarship has properly been devoted to “performing race” (Kondo 1997). In parallel fashion, critical studies of racism tend to see it as something that can be “performed” or not; for example we are urged to “interrupt” racism, or to “ally” against racism. We consider that both these dimensions of race—race as “performance” and race as “phenomics”—must be synthesized if we are to conceive fully of the racial politics of civil society. To be sure there is no easy separation of the racial state from the racial dimensions of identity and everyday life.

*The body is the person.* It is not news that racism derives much of its energy from the effort to control racially marked bodies. Nor is it surprising that despotism operates on the racial body, assaulting it, confining it, and profiling it.<sup>20</sup> Whether traditional or modern, whether religious or corporate, whether super-exploiting immigrant workers, profiling “suspicious” persons (“stop and frisk”; “show me your papers”), whether enforcing the boundaries of neighborhood segregation, policing school hallways in neighborhoods of color (Nolan 2011)—again the list is long—the convergence between despotism and the racial body is comprehensive. For this reason—as well as for reasons of gender and sexuality—the right of all human beings to control their own bodies is a fundamental democratic demand.

## The Radical Pragmatist Politics of Race

Racial formation theory draws a great deal from the pragmatist philosophical tradition. Pragmatist concepts of self and society are based on the core idea of *self-reflective action*. This term means that both individually and collectively we are self-consciously cognizant of the social forces in which we are immersed, and through which we steer our individual and collective selves.<sup>21</sup> Consider racial formation as a continuous process of this type. It is not only a struggle over the meaning of one's own racial identity within a particular social context and defined set of relationships; it is also a conflict over the terms of collective self-definition carried out in the shadow of the state and its biopolitical capabilities. In the post-World War II period, these struggles have taken place in explicitly political terms, as an ongoing "war of position" between racial despotism and racial democracy.

A radical pragmatist approach allows us to analyze the interaction of the racialized self and the racialized social structure. At the "micro-level," each racial self engages in a certain amount of sociopolitical "navigation," so to speak. This activity takes place in everyday life and in political life, and requires what might be called racial "intelligence." When one acts self-reflectively in respect to race, she or he links the racial conditions of everyday life with those of the overall social structure. Often this racial intelligence is taken for granted, but it is also self-conscious much of the time, especially for people of color.

At the "macro-level," the radical pragmatism of racial formation theory allows us to understand why even in the present—in the post-civil rights, neoliberal era—racial politics are so intractable, why they consist of simultaneous advances and setbacks. At some moments and during some periods, projects for collective self-definition assume the utmost importance, while at others they are in relative abeyance. Under some conditions, when mobilization is sufficient—say in 1963 Birmingham, Alabama—movements and organizations are able to intervene politically and act strategically on behalf of insurgent groups of color. More often, self-reflective political activity is diffused and sporadic, less frequently concentrated in mass political undertakings. The Birmingham campaign or the August 1963 March on Washington were exceptional moments of collective mobilization. But self-reflective action is always present to some degree.

*The state also operates this way.* Indeed a radical pragmatist approach to racial politics also allows us to see the "life of the state" as Gramsci describes it, as

a continuous process of formation and superseding of unstable equilibria ... between the interests of the fundamental group and those of the subordinate groups—equilibria in which the interests of the dominant group prevail, but only up to a certain point, i.e., stopping short of narrowly corporate economic interest.

(1971, 182)



The framework here is Marxian class analysis, but if we think about this processual notion of “the life of the state” from a racial point of view it closely parallels the pragmatist concept. The “fundamental group” may be seen as whites—or more properly whites and others who benefit from white supremacy and racism—while the “subordinate groups” are people of color and their allies who are incorporated into the “unstable equilibrium,” but only “up to a point.” Racial politics are unstable because state and opposition are both the targets and operators of intersecting racial projects. In the old days, the racial state could be more overt and violent. In the “post-civil rights” era, the racial state cannot merely dominate; it must seek *hegemony*. It does this in two related ways; first by incorporating “subordinate” groups: the “sub-” others, in other words the *subaltern*; and second by creating and embodying racial “common sense,” as we have discussed. Yet state violence, confinement, and aggressive and repressive policing of people of color all continue; this is how hegemony and subalternity are maintained: though a combination of repression and incorporation.

What is despotic, and what is democratic, about the U.S. racial state? Despite several historical “breaks”—when abolition of slavery, decolonization, and large-scale extensions of citizenship and civil rights took place—the contemporary world is still mired in the same racial history from which it originally sprang. The U.S. state was born out of white supremacy and still maintains it to a significant degree. Yet the state has been forced time and time again to make concessions to the racial “others”: people of African descent, subjects of imperial conquest, indigenous people, and immigrants. The racial state has been transformed over and over in unending efforts to deal with its fundamental contradictions: Its concept of “freedom” included slavery. It is a racial despotism that also claims to be democratic. It is an empire that arose out of an anti-imperial revolution. It is a settler society (based on immigration) that is also exclusionist.

Colonial rule and slavocracy were systems whose fundamental political character was despotic. By seizure of territory, by kidnapping and theft, by coercive and authoritarian rule, Europe-based imperial regimes destroyed countless lives and sensibilities. No amount of rationalization, no invocation of themes of development and uplift, no efforts at historical relativization can justify these predations or deodorize their moral stink. So, racial politics and the racial state have their origins in the ravaging of the globe, in the consolidation of European rule, and in the classification of all humanity along racial lines. It is a bleak picture.

But not in every way. Racial politics also embody self-activity, resistance, and “situated creativity” (another pragmatist phrase; see Joas 1996). For the past half-millennium, refusal of slavery, resistance to colonialism, noncompliance with racial domination, fidelity to oppositional cultural traditions and alternative concepts of group and individual identity, and belief in racial solidarity have been some of the most crucial sources of insurgency, some of the central passions underlying emancipatory and democratic politics, both in the United States and around the world.

## Trajectories of Racial Politics

What happens in racial politics when huge crises and racial “breaks”—matters of global and not just national significance for the most part—are *not* on the horizon? The 17 years of the Civil War/Reconstruction (1860–1877) and roughly 22 years (1948–1970) of the post-World War II racial “break” were exceptional periods. The brief and heroic latter period is now receding historically. As President Obama has noted—speaking about himself as well as other present-day black leaders—the “Moses” generation of Dr. King and his contemporaries has now been succeeded by the “Joshua” generation (Bobo and Dawson 2009). What do “normal” racial politics look like today?

Racial politics should be understood in terms of *trajectories*. In the post-World War II civil rights era and its aftermath, there have been a rising and a declining phase of this political trajectory. The trajectory proceeded from the relative abeyance of racial justice movements before the war; it was initiated during the war with the 1941 desegregation of the defense industries, and continued with the desegregation of the armed forces and the 1954 *Brown* decision; it reached its apogee with the upsurge of the civil rights, black power, and their allied movements in the 1960s. It began its decline after the adoption of civil rights reforms in the mid-1960s. A victim of its own (partial) success, the movement confronted the onset of racial reaction at the hands of the new right from about 1970 onward.

Applying Gramsci’s approach, let us consider the U.S. racial system as an “unstable equilibrium.” The idea of politics as “the continuous process of formation and superseding of unstable equilibria” has particular resonance in describing the operation of the racial state. The racial system is managed by the state—encoded in law, organized through policy-making, and enforced by a repressive apparatus. But the equilibrium thus achieved is unstable, for the great variety of conflicting interests encapsulated in racial meanings and identities can be no more than pacified by the state. Racial conflict persists at every level of society, varying over time and in respect to different groups, but ubiquitous. Indeed, the state is itself penetrated and structured by the very interests whose conflicts it seeks to stabilize and control.<sup>22</sup>

Disruption and restoration of the racial order suggest the type of reiterative movement or pattern we designate by the term “trajectory.” Both racial movements and the racial state experience such transformations, passing through periods of rapid change and virtual stasis, through moments of massive mobilization and others of relative passivity. While the movement and regime versions of the overall trajectory are independently observable, they could not exist independently of each other. Racially based political movements are inconceivable without the racial state, which provides a focus for political demands and structures the racial order. The racial regime, in turn, has been historically constructed by racial movements; it consists of agencies and programs which are institutionalized responses to racially based movements of the past.

Our concept of the trajectory of racial politics thus links the two central actors in the drama of contemporary racial politics—the racial state and anti-racist social movements, the “dominant” and “subordinate” groups in Gramsci’s account—and suggests a general pattern of interaction between them. Change in the racial order, in the social meaning and political role played by race, is achieved only when the state has initiated reforms, when it has generated new programs and agencies in response to movement demands. Movements capable of achieving such reforms only arise when there is significant “decay” in the capacities of pre-existing state programs and institutions to organize and enforce racial ideology. Contemporary patterns of change in the racial order illustrate this point clearly.

Taken as a whole, the anti-racist movements of the post-World War II period constitute a broad democratic upsurge, whose goals were a wide aggregation of “freedom dreams” (Kelley 2003) that ranged from moderate (voting rights) to radical (socialist revolution, national liberation). The state response to this challenge sought to contain it through reforms that would substitute a system of racial *hegemony* for the previous system of racial *domination*. The various civil rights acts and court decisions of the 1960s incorporated movement opposition. This involved making tangible concessions without altering the underlying structural racism that was characteristic of the United States. It also meant the marginalization and in some cases destruction of those sectors of racial opposition that were unwilling to accept limited (aka “moderate”) reforms.

After the dust had settled from the titanic confrontation between the movement’s radical propensities and the “establishment’s” tremendous capacity for incorporative “moderate” reform, a great deal remained unresolved. The ambiguous and contradictory racial conditions in the nation today result from decades-long attempts simultaneously to ameliorate racial opposition and to placate and sustain the *ancien régime raciale*. The unending reiteration of these opposite gestures, these contradictory practices, itself testifies to the limitations of democracy and the continuing significance of race in the United States.

Where are we located today on this trajectory? Were the incorporative reforms effective in defusing the anti-racist movement? Of course, they were; let’s not have any illusions about that. But the political processes we are discussing here proceed forward in time, driven in part by the very limitations of the reforms that shaped them. The trajectory of racial politics continues. Perhaps perversely, or at least ironically, the reforms which curtailed racial inequality and injustice’s most despotic features have worked to reinforce the production and diffusion of “colorblindness” as the hegemonic U.S. racial ideology in the late 20th and early 21st centuries. In Chapters 7 (*Racial Reaction: Containment and Rearticulation*) and 8 (*Colorblindness, Neoliberalism, and Obama*), we consider the rise to hegemony of colorblind racial ideology, as well as its contradictions and vulnerabilities.

This is the racial crisis of the early 21st century. “[C]risis,” Gramsci wrote, “consists precisely in the fact that the old is dying and the new cannot be born: in this

interregnum, a great variety of morbid symptoms appear” (1971, 276). The significant advances made since World War II in overcoming the entrenched systems of U.S. racial despotism coexist with a system of ongoing racial stratification and injustice that manages to reproduce most of the conditions that have supposedly been abolished.

## The Politicization of the Social

The race-based/anti-racism movements that arose after World War II were the first *new social movements* (Laraña, Johnston, and Gusfield, eds. 1994; Goodwin, Jasper, and Polletta, eds. 2001). They were the first systematically to expand the concerns of politics to the social sphere, to the terrain of everyday life and emotional life.<sup>23</sup> New social movement politics would later prove “contagious,” leading to the mobilization of other people of color, as well as other groups whose concerns were principally social. The new social movements were inspired by the black movement—particularly in the United States but all around the world as well (Mullings 2009). These movements challenged the more limited notions of politics that had shaped “mainstream” understandings. They vastly enlarged and qualitatively transformed the classical definition of politics: “Who gets what, when, and how” (Lasswell 1950 [1936]).

What distinguishes the post-World War II racial regime, and the anti-racist initiatives of the mid-20th century, from previous periods of racial despotism and earlier attempts to create racial democracy? Of course, no historical period is completely different from those that preceded it; all political systems, all racial projects, bear the “birthmarks” of their epochs of origin. Even a radical “break,” like the one described by Du Bois in *Black Reconstruction*, or the post-World War II upheaval in racial dynamics—which was a worldwide phenomenon, not just a U.S. one—preserves within itself substantial components of what went before.

How could it be otherwise? Enslaved people of African descent may have sought freedom, and indeed fought and died for it with all their hearts, but they nevertheless remained wounded and brutalized by the system they succeeded in overthrowing. And that system, however much it had been laid waste by Sherman’s armies, and however much it had been chastened by Lincoln’s poignant warning in his Second Inaugural Address (1864) that

if God wills that it [the War] continue until all the wealth piled by the bondsman’s two hundred and fifty years of unrequited toil shall be sunk, and ... every drop of blood drawn with the lash shall be paid by another drawn with the sword, as was said three thousand years ago, so still it must be said, “The judgments of the Lord are true and righteous altogether...,”

would still not emerge from the carnage and suffering of the Civil War as a truly free society.

The achievement of civil rights reforms was a great triumph, despite the limitations and compromises built into the reform legislation and the Supreme Court



decisions involved (the *Brown* decision's "all deliberate speed" equivocation on desegregation was but one example of this). Yet the passage of civil rights laws in the mid-1960s was no more the creation of racial democracy than was the passage of civil rights laws in the late 1860s. The Supreme Court overturned the 1868 Civil Rights Act and other emancipatory Reconstruction-era measures, just as it has eviscerated the 1960s civil rights laws in the decades since their enactment.<sup>24</sup> The achievement of slavery's abolition was at best a hint of what "abolition democracy"—that quasi-revolutionary ideal that Du Bois identified as the heart of slaves' auto-emancipation during the Civil War—would have involved: redistribution of land, severe punishment for rebellious Confederates. Civil rights are not the same as democracy. They do not spell the end of racism; indeed they are marked by racism's continuity, not its elimination.

Yet the post-World War II racial upheavals in the United States, the anti-racist movements of that epoch, did indeed achieve something new and unprecedented. This was the *politicization of the social*: the overflow of political meaning and awareness into the arena of everyday and emotional life, which had up to then been a largely "private" and depoliticized sphere. This terrain had previously been seen as largely irrational, disembodied, unrelated to politics, unconnected to power, and outside the purview of the state.

Emerging from the territory of the everyday, lived experience of racism, and indeed embedded with that experience, the anti-racist movement was all about the ways race was conceived, constructed, and practiced at both the macro-level of institutional arrangements and social structure and the micro-level of everyday social relationships. The modern civil rights movement, and its allied anti-racist movements, were struggles over these concepts, practices, and structures; they were conflicts about the *social meaning of race*. It was their incursion into the nation's political life, and their achievements within it, that created what we call The Great Transformation—the shifts in racial awareness, racial meaning, racial subjectivity that were brought about by the black movement. Race is not only a matter of politics, economics, or culture, but operates simultaneously on all these levels of lived experience. It is a pre-eminently social phenomenon that suffuses each individual identity, each family and community, and that also penetrates state institutions and market relationships.

After World War II, the black movement *politicized the social*. It asserted the "fact of blackness" (Fanon 1967), a realization that erupted like a volcano onto the sleeping village below. The village of American social life—that is, the white "mainstream" of segregated American society—was turned inside out by this "social fact" (Durkheim 2014) after centuries of white obliviousness and dormant racial insurgency. The rise of the black movement eclipsed the ethnicity-based model of race and instituted a new model based on new understandings—what we call *rearticulations*—of key socio-political pillars of U.S. "common sense": democracy, state, and identity.

Because it represented a critical upheaval in the meaning of race and a far more profound understanding of the dynamics of racism, the politicization of the social

was linked to the two challenging paradigms of racial formation that we have discussed here: the class-based paradigm and the nation-based paradigm. But it was only linked in part. Yes, the class-based and nation-based approaches to race and racism shared a rejection of the “moderate” orientation of the ethnicity paradigm. This drew them together in their quest for a more radical anti-racist position, and it suggested a deeper critique of race and racism in everyday life. For example, some class-based theories of race focused on the *experience* of inequality and superexploitation (Oppenheimer 1974). Cultural nationalist politics and theory focused on community, customs, and *peoplehood*.

But the challenging paradigms could not grasp the larger significance of the racial politics of everyday life, the social psychological and experiential dimensions of the politicized social. The class-based and nation-based paradigms of race, though critical and radical, relied on more traditional forms of politics—on economic determinism and anti-colonialism respectively. Because they were limited by their reductionism of race, even the radical varieties of the class-based and nation-based paradigms—Marxist accounts and internal colonialism accounts in particular—could not fully embrace the autonomy and *self-activity* of the new social movements.

We do not argue that the politicization of the social was a purely spontaneous phenomenon. Indeed it was *crafted* in part by movement activists and theorists, for example by Bayard Rustin (Rustin 2003 [1965]; D’Emilio 2004). We draw special attention, however, to the movement’s ability to pay attention to its base, to “learn from its followers.” This derived from its profound commitment to the complexities of race itself. This recognition of black “self-activity” (James et al. 2006 [1958]) bore a strong resemblance to the “situated creativity” highlighted in Dewey’s political philosophy. We have discussed this *radical pragmatism of race*. The movement’s immersion in the black religious tradition, its embrace of direct action, and its heteronomous adoption of such political tactics as the “sit-in” (based in the labor movement) and *satyagraha*/nonviolence (based in Gandhi’s anti-colonial struggle in India; see Chabot 2011)<sup>25</sup> all undermined the racist barriers that had for so long separated the thoroughly racialized social life of American society from the exclusive white politics of the Jim Crow regime. A notable feature of the black movement’s politicization of the social was the active role that youth, especially black youth, played in this transition. The willingness of young blacks to expose their bodies to the brutality of white racism—particularly in the South—was itself a rearticulation: a practical reinterpretation of the significance of the black body, as well as a defiance of the inherent violence of lynching.<sup>26</sup>

In short, racial identity, racial experience, racial politics, and the racial state itself were deeply transformed after World War II by the black movement and its allies. They were so profoundly reinvented and reinterpreted that the racial meanings established during this period continue to shape social and political life, even in the current period of reaction.

Furthermore, the politicization of the social spread across all of American life, highlighting the injustices, inequalities, and indignities that pervade U.S. society. The

taken-for-granted unfreedom of women as a result of their sexual objectification and assumed unsuitability for the public sphere—in other words, the whole panoply of sexist practices and social structures—now became visible and a matter of contention, not only in the legislatures and courts but in the workplace and bedroom.<sup>27</sup> The assumed abnormality, perversion, deviance, and criminality of homosexuality—in other words, the unquestioned homophobia, ostracism, and discrimination experienced as a matter of course by anyone recognized as gay—now became a public political conflict, not only for those stigmatized as a result of their sexual identities, but for *everyone*, for the whole society.<sup>28</sup> Of course, these shifts did not take place overnight; they required years to unfold; indeed they are still very much sociopolitical battlefields and are likely to remain so, just as race and racism itself will remain a political “war zone,” a field of profound conflict. But our point here is not that that these were “problems” that were “solved” in political life and everyday life. Indeed it is quite the opposite: that racism, sexism, and homophobia—and other society-wide conflicts as well—were *revealed and politicized* by the anti-racist movement that succeeded World War II. Henceforth these and related dimensions of injustice, inequality, and exclusion became public issues, ceasing forever to be relegated to the private and personal sphere, or worse yet, to be utterly denied and suppressed.

The radical upsurge of the anti-racist movement during the post-World War II years succeeded in disrupting white supremacy. It discredited the European immigrant-based model of race that had grounded ethnicity theory and had rationalized the racial “moderation” and complacency of white liberals. Anti-racist mobilization incentivized class-based and nation-based theories and analyses of race—the challenging paradigms we have discussed in Chapters 2 and 3. But although the movement launched a new political trajectory of conflict and reform, neither of the two challenging viewpoints could achieve hegemonic status. They suffered from serious deficiencies, largely because (as we have argued in Part I) of their reduction of race to other phenomena. The subsequent waning of the class- and nation-based viewpoints and organizations, grounded in challenging paradigms left a vacuum in racial theory and politics. This vacuum permitted the racial state to adopt new techniques of violence and repression, working under the “law and order” ideology of the new right. This vacuum also created the political space for the rearticulation and containment of movement demands under the ideology of colorblindness.

Despite these serious setbacks, the depth and breadth of “the Great Transformation” can hardly be exaggerated. *The forging of new collective racial identities during the 1950s and 1960s has been the single most enduring contribution of the anti-racist movement.* It is a set of political resources that endures today as a central component of the struggle for democracy in the United States. Today, the gains won in the past have been rolled back in many respects. Many anti-racist movement organizations have been forced onto the defensive: Rather than demanding increased racial justice, they have had to fight to uphold welfare state policies and liberal reforms—affirmative action is perhaps the best example—that they once condemned as inadequate and

tokenistic at best. The trajectory of racial politics continues, but now in a prolonged downturn. Amidst these reversals, the persistence of the politicized social, the continuity and strength of the new racial identities forged by the anti-racist movement, stands out as the most formidable obstacle to the consolidation of a repressive racial order. Apparently, the movements themselves could be fragmented, many of the policies for which they fought could be reversed, and their leaders could be coopted or even assassinated; but the racial subjectivity and self-awareness that they developed have taken permanent hold, and no amount of repression or cooptation can change that.

## Notes

1. Mills 2008, 1389.
2. Durkheim's theoretical claims about social facts and collective representations are conveniently assembled and discussed in Durkheim 2014.
3. Concepts of the subject, subjection, and subjectivity are usefully deconstructed in Butler 1997a. The experience/structure framework parallels Mills's "sociological imagination" (2000 [1959]), and also Levi-Strauss's (1966) concept of social structure as simultaneously synchronic and diachronic. All three of these accounts share central pragmatist tenets as well.
4. The concepts of "situated creativity" and "self-reflective action" are core ideas in the radical pragmatism of John Dewey (1933, 1948 [1919]). A parallel concept can be found in C.L.R. James's idea of "self-activity" and in Grace Lee's early work. The term "self-activity" was introduced into the political lexicon in *Facing Reality*, a theoretical text by C.L.R. James, Grace Lee, Martin Glaberman, and Cornelius Castoriadis that appeared in the 1950s. Because "self-activity" cannot be delegated to others, it embodies radical democracy. The authors write:

The end toward which mankind is inexorably developing by the constant overcoming of internal antagonisms is not the enjoyment, ownership, or use of goods, but self-realization, creativity based upon the incorporation into the individual personality of the whole previous development of humanity. Freedom is creative universality, not utility. (2006 [1958], 58)

- The radical pragmatist (and arguably Deweyan) framework here is quite palpable. See also Rawick 1972; Lawson and Koch, eds. 2004. Lee (later Grace Lee Boggs), still active today at age 95, remains a leading anti-racist radical activist and author. She received her Ph.D. in 1940 with a dissertation on George Herbert Mead and has written on Dewey as well.
5. The notion of racism as a "scavenger ideology" was first elaborated by George Mosse (1985, 213). It is also noted in Collins and Solomos 2010, 11; Fredrickson 2002.
  6. On Gramsci's concept of ideology as "glue," see Gramsci 1971, 328.
  7. In U.S. race studies the subalternity argument goes back through Robin D.G. Kelley to the "hidden transcripts" of James C. Scott. Scott in turn drew on the "subaltern studies" school of Ranajit Guha, Partha Chatterjee, and Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, among others. The term "subaltern" comes from Gramsci. In our view, it pairs domination and "otherness," and thus addresses key race/racism issues. In important part of subalternity theories is the argument that it is difficult to govern subaltern peoples "all the way down."

Implicitly, “below” normal politics there is a level of autonomy available to such groups and individuals, an “infrapolitical” terrain beneath the radar of white supremacy, colonialism, slavocracy, or other authoritarian regimes. This theme relates to the theme of race/racism as the “politicization of the social” that we discuss later in this chapter.

8. The American Revolution was a bourgeois revolution, in the sense that it overthrew a feudal system and established a system of rule by a property-holding class of “commoners.” The revolution thus repudiated not only absolutism and “divine right” but also nobility and aristocracy. But because it occurred in the early stages of capitalism’s development, it initially recognized only the democratic rights of established (male, white) property-holders. The founding fathers’ distaste for the “rabble,” the masses, even those who were white and male, is well-known. Later, as capitalism developed, political rights could be extended (gradually to be sure) to the “middling sorts”: small (white, male) property-holders. See Beckert 2001.
9. This is true of almost all the American anti-colonial revolutions: Beginning in the early 19th century, local (“creole”) elites—Bolívar, Juárez, San Martín—sought to throw off the restrictive commercial practices demanded by colonial administrations based in Europe. They wanted to control their own exports—largely primary products—and sell to the world market, a form of “free trade” much encouraged by the superpower of that century: Great Britain. The one exception here is Haiti and even that epochal struggle was partially trade-based.
10. The ideological residue of these restrictions in naturalization and citizenship is the popular equation of the term “American” with “white.” The emergence of the “birther” phenomenon in the aftermath of Barack Obama’s election in 2008 has been cited as evidence of this. As pundit Andrew Sullivan writes:

The demographics tell the basic story: a black man is president and a large majority of white southerners cannot accept that, even in 2009. They grasp conspiracy theories to wish Obama—and the America he represents—away. Since white southerners comprise an increasing proportion of the 22% of Americans who still describe themselves as Republican, the GOP can neither dismiss the crankery nor move past it. The fringe defines what’s left of the Republican center. (Sullivan 2009; see also Parker and Barreto 2013; Fang 2013)
11. For a comparative analysis of Mexican and Chinese experiences in 19th-century California see Almaguer 2008 [1994].
12. A brief selection of sources: Lester 1968a; Harding 1969; Rawick 1972; Gutman 1976; Aptheker 1983 (1963); Thompson 1983; Hahn 2003; Du Bois 2007 (1935).
13. The examples of Geronimo, Crazy Horse, and other Native American leaders were passed down from generation to generation as examples of resistance, and the Ghost Dance and Native American Church were employed by particular generations of Indians to maintain a resistance culture (Geronimo 2005 [1905]; Powers 2011; see also Snipp 1989). Rodolfo Acuña has pointed out how the same “bandits” against whom Anglo vigilantes mounted expeditions after the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo—Tiburcio Vasquez and Joaquín Murieta are perhaps the most famous of these—became heroes in the Mexican communities of the Southwest, remembered in folktales and celebrated in corridos (Acuña 2011 [1972]; see also Peña 1985). Chinese immigrants confined at Angel Island in the San Francisco Bay carved poetry in the walls of their cells, seeking not only to identify themselves



- and their home villages, but also to memorialize their experiences and to inform their successor occupants of those same places of confinement (Lai, Lim, and Yung 1991; Huang 2008). We do not offer these examples to romanticize repression or to give the air of revolutionary struggle to what were often desperate acts; we simply seek to affirm that even in the most uncontested periods of American racism, oppositional cultures were able, often at very great cost, to maintain themselves.
14. "The massive structures of the modern democracies, both as State organisations, and as complexes of associations in civil society, constitute for the art of politics as it were the 'trenches' and the permanent fortifications of the front in the war of position: they render merely 'partial' the element of movement which before used to be 'the whole' of war" (Gramsci 1971, 503).
  15. Gramsci's elliptical language, required by imprisonment in fascist Italy, makes concise citation difficult. For more details of his approach to the war of maneuver/war of position concepts, see "State and Civil Society," in Gramsci 1971, 445–557. The entire work (itself an edited selection) is useful for the student of race and racism.
  16. Our treatment here is necessarily very brief. The contemporary configuration of racial politics is a major subject later on in this work.
  17. We confine ourselves here to the issue of political uses of the racial body, which is what we mean by "the racial body politic." Originally the phrase "body politic" referred to absolutist political frameworks, in which the sovereign's body was conceived as dual. A mortal individual, the sovereign's political body was also divine. As a result of divine right, it incorporated (note the bodily etymology of this term) his or her people as well. Only because sovereignty embodied the divine in the mortal, only because of "the king's two bodies" could it exercise absolute power (Kantorowicz 1957; see also Allen 2004, 69–84).
  18. Eric D. Weitz (2003) has traced a whole series of 20th-century genocides back to the attempt, which he calls "utopian," to achieve racial (or quasi-racial) homogeneity in particular nations or empires.
  19. This term refers to the making of political distinctions among human bodies. This happens according to gender and race most centrally, but in respect to other phenomic characteristics as well. Such distinctions are not merely imposed from outside, but are seen as intrinsic by their bearers; they thus become essential to the political-economic and cultural self-discipline Foucault calls "governmentality." He refers to biopower as a political technology—that is, an apparatus of rule and subjection—that took the shape of "an explosion of numerous and diverse techniques for achieving the subjugations of bodies and the control of populations" (Foucault 1990 [1978], 140). See also Butler 1997a.
  20. Similar patterns can be discerned in efforts to control the gendered body and the queer body: abortion restriction, gay-bashing, and numerous other repressive practices are clear examples.
  21. This definition imperfectly renders some organized principles of pragmatist thought, notably its democratic currents. These proceed from Dewey 1933; see also Joas 1996.
  22. The main means available to the state for the equilibration of conflicting interests is precisely their incorporation into the state in the form of policies, programs, patronage, etc. Gramsci argues that various forms of hegemony flow from this process of incorporation: "expansive" hegemony if state–society relations display sufficient dynamism and are not inordinately plagued by crisis conditions; or "reformist" hegemony (what he calls "transformism") if political stability requires continuing concessions to competing forces.

23. This is not strictly true, of course. From the onset of racial slavery there has always been a ferocious social critique not only of slavery itself, but of racism too, although that term was not yet used. This is evident in the writings and speeches of Douglass, Wells, Cooper. “First-wave” feminism also possessed a social critique: It was about women’s lives, not just about the vote.

Yet our claim holds, because by and large the earlier movements were far more constrained by the very laws, customs and conventions that they sought to oppose, than were the post-World War II movements. The appeal that the modern civil rights movement exercised, its penetration into the everyday, its appeal to youth, its institutional base (“resource mobilization”) were unprecedented in earlier cycles of protest. We address this topic at greater length in Chapter 6.

24. This may be yet another example of Myrdal’s “cumulative and circular development.” On the SCOTUS annulment of the 1960s civil rights laws and the undoing of the Warren Court’s own liberal race jurisprudence, see Kairys 1994; Alexander 2012. On the undoing of the Radical Republican civil rights laws of the 1860s, see Kaczorowski 1987.
25. The movement’s early assertion of nonviolent resistance linked it to anti-colonialism well before civil rights and antiwar politics fused in the later 1960s.
26. Martin Luther King, Jr. wrote:

In 1960 an electrifying movement of Negro students shattered the placid surface of campuses and communities across the South. The young students of the South, through sit-ins and other demonstrations, gave America a glowing example of disciplined, dignified nonviolent action against the system of segregation. Though confronted in many places by hoodlums, police guns, tear gas, arrests, and jail sentences, the students tenaciously continued to sit down and demand equal service at variety store lunch counters, and they extended their protest from city to city. Spontaneously born, but guided by the theory of nonviolent resistance, the lunch counter sit-ins accomplished integration in hundreds of communities at the swiftest rate of change in the civil rights movement up to that time. In communities like Montgomery, Alabama, the whole student body rallied behind expelled students and staged a walkout while state government intimidation was unleashed with a display of military force appropriate to a wartime invasion. Nevertheless, the spirit of self-sacrifice and commitment remained firm, and the state governments found themselves dealing with students who had lost the fear of jail and physical injury.

The campuses of Negro colleges were infused with a dynamism of both action and philosophical discussion. Even in the thirties, when the college campus was alive with social thought, only a minority were involved in action. During the sit-in phase, when a few students were suspended or expelled, more than one college saw the total student body involved in a walkout protest. This was a change in student activity of profound significance. Seldom, if ever, in American history had a student movement engulfed the whole student body of a college.

Many of the students, when pressed to express their inner feelings, identified themselves with students in Africa, Asia, and South America. The liberation struggle in Africa was the great single international influence on American Negro students. Frequently, I heard them say that if their African brothers could break the bonds of colonialism, surely the American Negro could break Jim Crow (King 2001, 137–138; see also MLK Jr Research and Education Institute n.d.).

It is also vital to note the key role of Ella Baker in the emergence of the student-based components of the movement: in the 1960 Greensboro sit-ins and the Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee (SNCC). In the 1964 Freedom Summer, students were the key activists (Carson 1995 [1981]; Ransby 2005).

27. The origins of “second-wave” feminism have been linked to the analyses and practice of key women activists in the civil rights movement. See Echols 1989; Curry 2000; Breines 2007.
28. Here too Bayard Rustin must be acknowledged. As a gay man Rustin was marginalized and discriminated against in the movement he did so much to found. See Rustin 2003; D’Emilio 2004.

# 3 From State Building to Nation-Building

As a result of the May 1969 tragedy, the government embarked upon several radical reforms to address the problem of ethnic imbalance and disunity in the country with the ultimate aim of achieving national integration. These reforms can be seen in terms of the formulation of the New Economic Policy (NEP), the National Cultural Policy, and the reformulation of the National Language and Education Policy. Although these three major policies were aimed at complementing efforts towards national integration, they were also an attempt to consolidate Malayness and Malay nationalism into the project of nation formation. Indeed, the policies were the hallmark of the revitalization of Malay nationalism, aimed to complete the unfinished agenda in the socio-economic and cultures spheres. However, the non-Malays saw this as a conscious attempt by the Malay nationalists to turn nation-building into an ethnic project at the expense of their interests. Above all, they considered such moves to severely affect the framework of multiculturalism in Malaysia. Though these three major policies were merely devised to achieve the ultimate objective of inducing the process of nation-building, what emerged in the implementation of the policies were new obstacles and controversies.

This chapter will examine the extent to which the so-called reforms have made an impact on the project of nation formation in the country. It will draw attention to some important insights on of the perceptions, responses, and reactions of the various ethnic groups in Malaysia to the idea of creating a united Malaysian nation or the *Bangsa Malaysia*. To begin with, the discussion will examine the politics of language and education as this has a very long history in influencing the pattern of ethnic politics in Malaysia. Next is the discussion on the NEP, and this is followed by a discussion on the National Cultural Policy.

## THE NATIONAL LANGUAGE AND EDUCATION POLICY

Education has long been recognized by sociologists as the most effective medium to transmit to new generation the values, norms, and experiences of civilization of previous generations. Indeed, society can only survive if there exists among its members a sufficient degree of homogeneity, and education perpetuates and reinforces this homogeneity by socialising in the child from the beginning the essential similarities which collective life demands (Dukheim, 1961; Parsons, 1959). Apart from being a formal agent to equip people with modern skills and knowledge, education in modern complex society is the main apparatus of a modern state and all national education systems indoctrinate the oncoming generation with the basic outlook and values of the political order (Key, 1965). In this context, it is thus almost impossible to divorce education from politics.

It is evidently clear that theoretically, education provides one of the most effective means of social and political integration in modern society. In the United States, education was viewed as the "instrument par excellence of inducing newcomers to the American way of life" (Cremin, 1962, p. 68) and to create new loyalties to the new homeland. The process of Americanization was vital since the new immigrants came from various parts of the world and were different from their predecessors. It was schools and education system in general that carried out this crucial task to develop the American norms and values that led to the creation of 'American culture'.

In developing countries, education once again stands as the principal institution for overcoming problems of ethno-cultural pluralism. In many cases the national language policy is often consolidated into the education system as an instrument for integration and nation-building. Von der Mehden (1969) perceived that the most important factor for integration in the developing nations is the national language and the education system. In many countries, such as in India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Nigeria, Thailand, Indonesia, Mexico, and Malaysia, the

mission of national integration through the means of education is often explicitly spelled out in government reports (Ibrahim Saad, 1979). In other words, effective education and language policies are immensely crucial for the success of nation-building in divided societies.

In retrospect, the politics of language and education in Malaysia has its long history in shaping the pattern of ethnic political mobilisation. The political salience of language and education had emerged prior to independence. The basis of the national education system in Malaysia was laid by the Razak Report issued in 1956. This report spelled out a clearly defined mission for social integration of the people. Before the introduction of the Razak Report, education in Malaya was the responsibilities of the various ethnic communities themselves. According to Lim Mah Hui (1980), education was never a matter of priority for the British, who tended to concentrate on developing the economy. The British adopted a *laissez-faire* approach in education for Malaya, which led to the establishment of five types of schools: Malay, Chinese and Indian vernacular schools, English schools, and Malay religious schools. This situation led to the phenomenon of ethnic association with schools which in the end perpetuated and reinforced cultural pluralism in Malaysia even after independence.

Prior the 1969 tragedy, the politics of language and education was centred on several key issues. While the government maintained that a single national language policy as stipulated in the Federal constitution and the Razak Report of 1956 was important to forge national unity, the non-Malays demanded that multilingualism should be the basis of the national language policy. In other words, while recognizing Malay as the national language, the non-Malays wanted Mandarin, Tamil, and English to be given equal status to Malay. The non-Malays also saw that the provision of Article 21(2) in the Education Act 1961 was a serious threat to the continued existence of Chinese and Tamil schools in Malaysia. Until the introduction of the Education Act 1996 which revoked the clause, the existence of Section 21(2) of the Act 1961 made Chinese primary schools liable to extinction by the mere stroke of the

Minister of Education's pen. The clause enabled the Education Minister to change the status of government-sponsored Chinese and Indian primary schools to national language primary school when he deemed fit. Nevertheless, despite such a provision, no education minister had ever used his power to convert Chinese and Tamil primary schools which continued to exist, and in the case of Chinese schools, the number of student enrolment has increased considerably over the years.

For the Malays, they saw the government had been rather lenient in implementing the national language policy in education.<sup>1</sup> Although the Education Act 1961 stipulated that by 1967 all government primary schools or government-aided primary schools (including government English primary schools, and Chinese and Tamil primary schools funded by the government) must use the national language as the medium of instruction, this had not been implemented. The Malays also felt that the implementation of the National Education Policy had not adequately addressed their socio-economic backwardness. Education in Malay was only available up to secondary level. Even if a Malay student from a Malay medium school had the opportunity to pursue higher education, he or she could only be accepted at the department of Malay Studies in the University of Malaya (the only university that existed then), as this was the only department that conducted its teaching in Malay. The Malays were also aware that the non-Malays had continued to struggle for multilingualism, which was perceived as a direct challenge to the 1957 social contract. The period between 1957–1969 was the politics of language and education that polarised the Malaysian society (Ibrahim, 1976; Kua Kia Soong, 1990b). Even in the post 1970 period, the complexities that prevailed in the politics of language and education reflected the competing ideologies informing the nation-of-intent in Malaysia which had indeed affected the state of ethnic relations in the country.

As a reaction to the 1969 racial riots, the Cabinet Committee on Education made a number of important recommendations. These include; removing unequal participation in education; improving



opportunities for higher educational attainment among youths from disadvantaged groups; developing stronger moral and ethical qualities of citizenship for school children; greater emphasis on vocational orientation in education; and streamlining the professional and administrative management of the education system (Education in Malaysia, 1980). The 1969 report on education also marked a major change in educational emphasis. The Malay language, later to be called *Bahasa Malaysia* (Malaysian Language), replaced English in all English schools and for the teaching of most subjects. Nevertheless, the position of Chinese and Tamil primary schools, as well as Chinese private secondary schools remained.

Furthermore, the Malays and *Bumiputera* pupils were given easier access to opportunities in higher education through a university entrance quota system. This was done in accordance with Article 153 of the Federal Constitution and in line with the objective of social engineering, as laid down in the NEP. Several more universities were established to cater to the need for higher education especially among the Malays. From only one university, which existed before 1970, five more universities were established by 1982. A number of polytechnics were also established to provide education at diploma and certificate levels, and in technical and apprentice fields for *Bumiputera* students. The most significant move was the establishment of the *Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia* (UKM) or the National University of Malaysia in 1970, which symbolised the fulfilment of the national language and education policy, as the university fully used Malay as its medium of instruction. In addition, the Mara Institute of Technology (ITM), a higher education institute, exclusively for the *Bumiputera* community run by MARA (a government agency established in 1960s to assist the *Bumiputeras* in small and medium scale businesses), was established at around the same time. Since then, a number of new ITM branches have been opened throughout the country. Under the Fifth Malaysia Plan, RM225.21 million was allocated for ITM. The Ministry of Education also established 30 residential schools throughout the country to provide better education for 6,927 students, who were mostly *Bumiputera* (Fifth Malaysia Plan, 1986).

MARA also established 45 Mara Junior Science Colleges and 14 mini vocational training institutes (the *Institut Kemahiran* MARA [IKM]) to achieve the same objective of improving education facilities for Malays and *Bumiputera* communities. The government investments in education increased from RM25.8 million in 1969 to RM350.8 million in 1980, and the expenditure per student in tertiary education rose from RM3,700 to RM12,900 annually (Fourth Malaysia Plan, 1981). Moreover, by 1982, there were 50,000 Malaysian students pursuing education abroad, mostly in the United Kingdom, North America, and Australia. Most *Bumiputera* students studying abroad were fully funded by the government or its agencies such as MARA, Petronas, and so on. MARA alone spent RM690 million under the Fifth Malaysia Plan to provide scholarships for *Bumiputera* students (Fifth Malaysia Plan, 1986–1990).

Even though the non-Malays were distressed with the educational developments that appeared to favour the *Bumiputeras*, their struggle to preserve and promote their culture, language, and education had never lost its momentum. Both Chinese political parties and the *Huatuan* (Chinese Guilds) worked closely to pursue Chinese interests in education, language, and culture (Sia, 1997). But due to limited places available in local universities, non-Malay parents had to send their children abroad for further education. By 1987, there were around 61,000 non-Malay students studying overseas, the majority of whom were self-sponsored (Kua Kia Soong, 1987). In response to this, Chinese educationists began their aggressive campaign to establish the *Merdeka* University, a private university which used Mandarin as its medium of instruction. Although the *Merdeka* University issue had emerged much earlier, the campaign heightened in the post-1970 period.

For nearly a decade the country witnessed the aggressive campaign of the Dong Jiao Zong (Chinese Education Movement) to establish the *Merdeka* University.<sup>2</sup> In three general elections—1969, 1974, and 1978—the issue dominated election campaigns. The cause was championed by the DAP with the strong support of the *Huatuan*. As a result of the

*Merdeka* University issue, the BN coalition government was put in a difficult position by the MCA and *Gerakan* (the former is a Chinese political party while the latter is a Chinese-based multiethnic party), who were members of the coalition government, had put the *Merdeka* University issue put in a very difficult situation particularly with regard to Chinese voters. The issue reached its climax when Michael Bloff, a Queens Council from England, was employed to file a suit against the government in Malaysia High Court in 1981. However, the High Court dismissed the suit with costs on the basis that the project was against the National Education Policy in particular the Universities and College Act 1971.<sup>3</sup> The case was then brought to the Federal Court for appeal against the High Court ruling but once again rejected. Dismissing the appeal again with costs, the Lord President, Tun Suffian made the following remark:

...bearing in mind the history of education in Malaysia, the divisive results of allowing separate language schools, the experience of 'our neighbour' with a private university, and the determination of Parliament to regulate schools and universities as an instrument of bringing about one nation, the court had no choice but to hold that *Merdeka* University, if established, would be a public authority within Article 160(2) of the Constitution.

The controversies surrounding education and language had strongly influenced the post-independence political scene. While the issues were centre-stage item on the campaign agenda to woo Chinese voters in general elections, at the same time they were also very sensitive for Malay voters. While opposition parties such as the DAP and PAS had an advantage of exploiting language education issues in seeking voter's support, this always placed the ruling parties in the BN coalition in a very tough position. The MCA and the *Gerakan* had to face the DAP allegations that they were not doing enough for Chinese education. Indeed, when the MCA attempted to dissociate the party from the *Merdeka* University project in 1969, it cost the party very clearly in that election.

To some extent, the growing popularity of the DAP amongst non-Malay voters in the post-1970 period was largely attributed to its 'success' in exploiting the language and education issues (Sia Keng Yek, 1997). To counter the DAP, the MCA and the *Gerakan* in many instances had to explicitly show mere sympathy on the issue but implicitly support the cause of Chinese education, insisting that by virtue of their position in the government, they could do better to protect the Chinese interests. On the other hand, UMNO, while realizing the importance of support from Chinese voters for the BN, had to balance that with the sensitivities of Malay voters in facing PAS criticism that they were selling off Malay interests to the MCA and the *Gerakan*. For more than three decades education had plagued ethnic political mobilisation in Malaysia. Although the issue at stake might be different from one election to the other, the main contention remained the same,<sup>4</sup> that, is the non-Malay, in particular the Chinese, saw Chinese schools and language as a crucial mark of Chinese identity, which had to be protected at all costs. For the Malays, the general view was that the continued existence of Chinese and Tamil schools had not significantly helped promote national integration.<sup>5</sup> The dilemma faced by the government was to balance these two views while at the same time avoiding ethnic conflicts in its programmes to promote national integration.

Despite the ups and downs throughout the history of its implementation some believed that the National Education Policy has contributed to promote national integration.<sup>6</sup> In comparison to the situation in the 1960s, most Malaysians today speak and understand the national language. It has become the most important symbol of national identity in Malaysia. Wan Yaacob Hassan, the former Director of the National Unity Department asserted that:

The National Education Policy is the most successful policy in the process of nation-building in Malaysia. Without the policy, the national language vision will not materialize. Education has been a very crucial instrument

to foster integration over the past three decades. Although we have Chinese and Tamil schools, not all non-Malay parents send their children to these schools. Although the language used in vernacular schools is either Mandarin or Tamil, the syllabus is standard national curriculum that was devised by the government. No one can deny the contribution and the success of the national and education policy.<sup>7</sup>

To Ranjit Singh, a historian from University of Malaya, he concurred that:

It is clear that language has not been a problem now, though in the sixties there was more problem with it. We already have a common education system where integration is continuously being pursued through a common national language and curriculum. Everybody accept [sic] the role of Malay as the national language. Malaysian society is becoming much more cohesive as far as language and education systems are concerned.<sup>8</sup>

As to whether the national language and education policy have significantly contributed towards promoting national integration, Lim Kit Siang, the DAP leader, gave the following answer:

If you are talking about promoting a common national language, then it is essential, as this is a precondition for the creation of one *Bangsa Malaysia*. But you must also give full recognition of the multilingual reality that exists in Malaysia. If the people feel that their mother tongue was being threatened, then it would immediately create rejection. If you look at the early seventies, when the government began to convert English schools into national schools and later attempted to do the same to the Chinese school, it had caused a lot of ethnic tension and backlash.

Even ... English educated Chinese who had never been interested in their mother tongue felt ... it was a threat to their cultural identity. This is assimilation. People should have the opportunity to preserve and develop their own ethnic languages.<sup>9</sup>

Although Kit Siang did not give a straight forward answer, he seemed a lot more lukewarm in his reply. Dr. Tan Seng Giaw, who was the DAP Vice-Chairman gave these remarks:

To me language is a very important instrument for integration. Yes, the National Education Policy has made many significant contributions especially in the use of Malay as the national language and medium of instruction in schools. But as far as vernacular schools are concerned, my view is that the Chinese and Indian languages that are used there are just a vehicle to convey the knowledge and education. What is important is that we use the same standard national curriculum. Vernacular schools are not the source of disunity in Malaysia. Even Malays are disunited in terms of their support to either UMNO or PAS, yet they went [sic] to the same national schools. Therefore, I would say that by using the same language and going to the same schools will not guarantee that people will be united. It is politics and human factors that contribute to ethnic division in Malaysia.<sup>10</sup>

Clearly the two DAP leaders were rather cautious in their remarks on the contribution made by the national language and education policy. Although Tan Seng Giaw was rather confused on differentiating between national integration and political group fragmentation in his second part of the interview, he 'recognised' the importance of national language and education policy in promoting national integration. Regardless of the sentiment, the DAP leaders insisted that the position of vernacular schools must be protected.



Although at face value the answers given by the two DAP leaders may indicate 'support' for the national language and education policy, this may not entirely reflect the 'hostility' that might still prevail below the surface. A point made by Kua Kia Soong (1987), an ardent Chinese educationist and the former DAP Member of Parliament, may perhaps sum up the non-Malays' 'real' reaction to the national language and education policy:

The attitude of the government towards people's own language and the Independent Chinese Secondary Schools is also an indication of its illiberal policy towards the non-Malay languages and education stream... Another divisive factor in education is the result of the implementation of the NEP in student enrolment in the various educational institutions, awarding of scholarship and the like... The existence of almost wholly-Bumiputera public institutions like MARA Junior Science Colleges and the residential schools are not only seen as unfair and unequal opportunities, but are evidence of double standard when the government argues that vernacular schools are segregationist... Deserving non-Malays refused places in local Universities through a quota systems based on ethnicity rather than socio-economic status are more likely to harbour deep frustration and resentment at what they see as racial discrimination. (pp. 70-80)

Clearly, there are several critical issues that disturbed the non-Malays on the implementation of the National Education Policy. Whilst the Malays might appear satisfied with the position of Malay as the national language and its role in forging national integration, the non-Malays might still have some reservation which regard to vernacular schools, awarding of government scholarships, and the quota system.

Nevertheless, some shifts occurred in the post-1990 period especially after the government introduced the Education Act 1966, which many

Malays perceived as contrary to the spirit of the Razak Report. This time around a controversy was sparked between the government and Malay intellectuals with regard to several provisions in the new Act, which were seen as implicating the position of the national language and the project of nation-building. The government's rationale for the amendment of the education act was to pave the way for Malaysia to emerge as the centre of excellence in higher education in Southeast Asia. As such, several reforms in the education policy were necessary, such as, allowing English to be used as medium of instruction in private universities and colleges in order to attract foreign students to study in Malaysia.<sup>11</sup> Therefore, to pursue this goal, Parliamentary Acts governing the education system were changed. These included the Federal Constitution, Education Act 1961, the National Language Act 1967, and the University and University College Act 1971. However, while the government wished to reduce the number of students sent overseas for tertiary education due massive currency outflow, the major constraint for this plan was insufficient places local universities can provide to cater for the growing needs in higher education. Therefore, the government felt that by allowing the establishment of private colleges and universities, the issue of insufficient places in local universities and the financial burden of funding tertiary education by the government, can be addressed. This was the backdrop to the introduction of Education Act 1996.

As the details of the Education Bill were revealed in Parliament, many Malay intellectuals including some UMNO veterans and PAS politicians had begun to raise their concern over the implication of the amendment on the position of Malay as the national language and its far-reaching consequences on the project of nation-building.<sup>12</sup> It is worth noting that in the past major amendments in the national education system often resulted in a political row between the government and Chinese educationists or Chinese political parties. But the amendment of the Education Act 1996 was an exception, as the non-Malays neither explicitly supported nor aggressively opposed the Act. This was something very peculiar as far as the history of National Education Policy was concerned. This question was posed to Dr. Kua Kia Soong, a leading

figure on the Dong Jiao Zong, who simply said that the Chinese felt that the position of Chinese schools is still under threat in the new education policy.<sup>13</sup>

However, one Chinese academician from the National University of Malaysia admitted almost all issues and aspirations concerning Chinese education and language were resolved and fulfilled with the introduction of the Education Act 1996.<sup>14</sup> Therefore, if one is satisfied with the policy, there is no need to oppose it.

But apparently, it was the Malays who were more concerned about the amendment. There were four key issues in the Education Act 1996 that provoked discontent among many intellectuals. These issues were:

- (i) Section 16 of the Act which states that with the exception of the expatriate schools, the new Act finally recognizes private education institutions including Chinese independent secondary schools and private colleges and universities that use Mandarin or English as medium instructions as part of the national education system. Prior to this, only Chinese and Tamil primary schools and government sponsored secondary schools were considered as part of the national system.
- (ii) The question of Malay language *vis-à-vis* English and Mandarin. The new Act under Section 17(1) empowers the Minister of Education to exempt any education institutions to use language other than the national language as medium of instruction.
- (iii) The impact of the Act upon national integration and nation-building.
- (iv) The economic value of the national language and the employment prospect of graduates from government sponsored universities that use Malay as medium of instruction.

The provision of Section 16 and 17 of the 1996 Act abrogated Article 21(2) of the Education Act 1961 that empowered the Minister of Education to change any Chinese or Indian national-type schools

to national schools when he deemed fit. As such, the central issue of non-Malays' concern over the future of Chinese or Tamil schools has been resolved. Zainal Abidin (1996), a Malay nationalist and a retired professor of history, argued that the provisions of Section 17(1) in the new Act would ultimately lead the 1,290 Chinese primary schools with more than 580,000 pupils and 540 Tamil primary schools with 96,000 pupils to continuously use Mandarin and Tamil as mediums of instruction. Besides, 60 more Chinese independent secondary schools will be regarded as part of the national system of education and continue to use Mandarin as medium of instruction. Zainal further contended that the newly established 250 English medium private institutions of higher learning will also benefit, as they are now considered part of the national education system. He argued that:

...since 95% of students in these institutions were Chinese and Indians, be it a Chinese or Tamil national-type school, or even an independent Chinese secondary school, as well as 250 private colleges and universities, how could the country ambitiously claim that we are moving toward achieving the vision of the *Bangsa Malaysia* those students will spend 16-17 years of their educational life, from primary to tertiary education, in isolation from the rest of the Malays, who are mostly educated in Malay national primary and secondary schools and later continue their study in public universities that use Malay as the medium of instruction? How could one say that nation-building is being forged through the National Education policy? Can a united Malaysian nation be created if this system prevails?<sup>15</sup>

Zainal and several other Malay intellectuals who opposed the amendment maintained that the Act 1996 did not reinforce the position of Malay as the national language but rather further strengthened the position of English, Mandarin, and Tamil in the National Education Policy.<sup>16</sup> He went on to say that the problems of ethnic polarization in the education system would prevail and perhaps deteriorate. To them,



the Razak Report and the Education Act 1961 had clearly identified the position of Malay as the national language, which was crucial to be adopted and enforced in the national education system to promote nation-building. However, the important role of the Malay language in fostering national unity would be seriously affected as a result of the implementation of the Act 1996. The critics also highlighted the effect of the policy on the perceived economic value of the national language and the future of graduates from the Malay medium stream in the job market. They argued that graduates from Malay-instructed universities would be at a disadvantage in the competition for employment in the private sector against those who came from private colleges and overseas universities. Employment of Malay graduates could be more problematic since the private sector, whose business communication has been primarily in English, is increasingly becoming more significant in the Malaysian economy in light of continued downsizing of the public sector (which fully adopts the use of Malay as the language of business and communication) in accordance with government privatization and corporatisation policy.

PAS also joined the critics and rejected the Bill. According to the PAS's President, Fadzil Noor:

From our point of view, the Education Act 1996 has severely affected the Malays. As far as Islamic dimension is concerned, the new Act does not improve in strengthening the role of Islam in education. Islamic religious schools have not benefited from the Act as their status quo does not change. The new Act also undermines the position of Malay as the national language. We do not want the position of the national language to be reduced to only as one of the compulsory subjects taught at private colleges and universities while English and Mandarin are used as the medium of instruction. Malay has to be the main medium of instruction at these institutions. After four decades of independence, it is embarrassing for

the government to reduce the position of the national language to be at par with other languages which are considered the second or third languages in this country. I was told by several PAS members in the Parliament that most of the non-Malay MPs from across the bench have given a big welcome to the Education Act. It is obvious that the non-Malay's struggle over the past forty years to promote their language and education has been rewarded by the government culminating in the 1996 Education Act, which has significantly changed the basis of the Razak Report.<sup>17</sup>

In answering the critics, Najib Tun Razak, the Minister of Education (who is also the eldest son of the late Tun Razak, who introduced the Razak Education Report in 1956) who tabled the Bill in the Parliament, argued that the position of Malay language is preserved and protected under the New Act and will not be changed. The amendment was done in accordance with Vision 2020 of making Malaysia an industrialized country and in line with the idea of creating a united Malaysian nation or the *Bangsa Malaysia* (*Utusan Malaysia*, 1996). However, he did not clearly explain how the act would be compatible with the idea of creating a united Malaysian nation neither did he convincingly answer his critics on the question of the position of Malay as the national language, which now has to compete with English and Mandarin under the new National Education Policy. Instead, he stressed that, "The 1995 Bill would not only serve as an amendment to the 1961 Act, but rather is totally a brand new and a futuristic education statute, that would lead Malaysia to emerge as a centre of educational excellence in the world" (*Utusan Malaysia*, 1995). On this score, Johan Jaafar, the Editor-in-Chief of the *Utusan Malaysia* (the major Malay daily newspaper owned by UMNO) stated that:

As far as I can see, under Mahathir's administration, linguistic nationalism is no longer important as an instrument to bring about national integration. Mahathir

is more concerned with the economic aspect of nation-building than any other approach. Even in education, the government has adopted a more liberal and global approach in order to transform education as one of an important economic commodity.<sup>18</sup>

While Johan's remark on 'linguistic nationalism' may be relevant as far as the non-Malay and nation-building are concerned, it may not be particularly so when it involves the Malays especially with regard to the position of the national language. The changes in the policy may perhaps satisfy the non-Malays, yet they have provoked discontent among the Malays. In short, it is argued that although the new National Education Act aims to modernize the Malaysian education system and to facilitate the accomplishment of Vision 2020, the new initiatives in the education policy have clearly perpetuated the existing scenario of the association of ethnicity with education. To several Malay intellectuals, the Act 1996 was seen as one step backward in the nation-building process.<sup>19</sup> The main contention was whether it is the Malay language or multilingualism that would facilitate the process of nation formation in Malaysia. Chamil Wariya, who was a senior journalist with the *Utusan Malaysia* newspaper, lamented:

At one particular point in time I used to think the National Education Policy would continue to make an important contribution towards the project of nation formation in Malaysia. However, the policy was reversed by the Education Act 1996. The government's liberal stand on the use of English at tertiary level and the establishment of hundred of private colleges and universities, which use English and Mandarin as medium of instruction in recent years, has weakened the objective of nation-building through the education system.<sup>20</sup>

Professor Zainal Abidin Wahid saw that, "if, in the 1970s and 1980s the Chinese community sought to establish only one *Merdeka* University,

the new education policy rewarded them with numerous *Merdeka* University".<sup>21</sup>

As far as the non-Malays are concerned, the position of Chinese and Tamil schools are no longer a threat, as the new Act finally incorporates them as part of the national system. This has resolved most of their concerns about the future of Chinese and Indian education and languages. This is very important as far as the perpetuation of their cultural identities is concerned. Clearly, their steadfastness in the long political battle to materialize the notion of pluralism in education has paid off. By contrast, while the position of Malay as the national language though remains unaffected, its instrumental role in inducing nation-building through the education system appears to have been compromised. Malaysians can choose to have their education in Mandarin right from nursery to tertiary level and this is recognized by the state as part of the national education system, which is said to 'uphold' Malay as the national language. English also seems to enjoy almost an equal status to the national language at tertiary level under the new education policy. While many Malays may not question the importance of English to compete in the global world, they, however, wish to see the Malay language to play a vital role in the nation-building project. Perhaps the relevant question to ask is, is *Bangsa Malaysia* best achieved through a stronger, or weaker Malay language policy? If aspects of 'essential similarities and homogeneity' (as argued by many sociologists such as Durkheim [1961], and Parsons [1959] as being crucial in reinforcing social integration) are considered in this context, clearly, the new National Education Policy may not have much to offer. Perhaps these are some of the most fundamental questions that need to be addressed by the government rather than looking at education as a form of an economic commodity.

### **Education and the Politics of Nation-Building**

The role of language and education policies in the evolution of educational development in Malaysia was central in the nation-building

project. Almost all major shifts in educational policy were geared towards achieving the objective of restructuring the society and building a united Malaysian nation. Even the 1996 major educational shift (which may not truly be moving toward that direction) was said by the government to be part and parcel of the mission of constructing the vision of the *Bangsa Malaysia*. Since independence, the politics of languages and education has strongly affected the pattern of ethnic political mobilisation. The crux of the problem is simply this: while the state agenda had been to make education and language policy serves as an instrument for political socialization in line with the objective of promoting national integration, the non-Malays, in particular Chinese educationists and politicians, saw that it was also crucial for them to ensure that no matter what the education policy was, the position of Chinese schools and the right to learn and promote Chinese language and culture must be protected. They would not tolerate any form of assimilationist tendencies in the education system. In fact, since the time Malay was institutionalized as the national language in 1956, they had begun to challenge it with the notion of multilingualism. Although the post 1970 period saw the strengthening of the position of Malay as the national language and its consolidation in the education system, the struggle of the non-Malays to gain state recognition for all Chinese and Tamil schools persisted. To achieve this end, various means had been used and the political arena was and still is the most effective way of pursuing it. The struggle to establish the *Merdeka* University could be seen as part of the grand vision to materialize the notion of multilingualism in the education policy.

For the Malays, apart from the question of social mobility through better education of their community, they envisaged Malay, as the national language, formed a core element in the National Education Policy. For the Malays, the basis of the Razak Report 1956 had to be retained in the education policy. They aspired that the institutionalization of Malay language in the wider societal life would reflect Malayness as the basis of national identity. For them, these aspirations and expectations were not only legitimate but must be met. As Chai Hon-Chan (1977) put it:

...the Malay had made clear the terms and conditions for the non-Malays to be accepted into the Malaysian political community; and one of the cardinal conditions was, and still is, the wholehearted acceptance of Malay as the national language. For the Malays, loyalty to the nation and the essential expression of Malaysian national identity entail the unconditional identification of the individual with *Bahasa Malaysia* (Malay/Malaysian Language). (p. 73)

Perhaps, Chai's remark explained why most Chinese politicians were reluctant to openly criticize the policy in the post 1970 period. On the contrary, the non-Malays perceived that if the principle of multilingualism in education was not observed, it would lead to the diminution of the multiethnic characteristic of the Malaysian society. For them if the principle of multilingualism in the education policy was not allowed, the education system would turn nation-building into an ethnic project, hence, the 'encapsulation' of the non-Malays into Malay society.

Over the years, the government has always been confronted with the daunting task of mediating the conflicting aspirations between the Malays and the non-Malays. It has come to realize that since any attempt that hints at assimilation would invite strong opposition from the non-Malays, it has to accommodate the interests of the nation with those of the reality of plural society. By and large, while the National Education Policy has contributed toward making Malay as the national language, association of ethnicity with education is yet to be completely removed. The growing numbers of enrolment in Chinese primary schools in recent years speak for this fact.<sup>22</sup> For the non-Malays, until the introduction of the Education Act 1996, the National Education Policy as laid down by the Razak Report as well as the Education Act 1961 (specifically Article 21[2]) was perceived as a threat to the continued survival of Chinese and Tamil education. They saw that the assimilationist agenda was still clearly embedded in the national education policy. However, the enforcement of the Education Act 1996 seems to be a great relief



for them. In other words, the new education policy is the epitome of success of four decades of struggle of Chinese and Indians in the politics of education. With the abrogation of Article 21(2) of the Act, and given the state recognition of education in mother tongue from primary to tertiary level, much anxiety of the non-Malays about the future of vernacular education has been finally resolved. However, to what extent this would change the pattern of the politics of education involving the non-Malays in the future is yet to be seen. Also, does this shift in policy demonstrate the government's attempt to set up a new framework of accommodation towards the construction of the *Bangsa Malaysia*?

For many Malay intellectuals, the implementation of the Education Act 1996 marked the government's compromise on the Razak Education Report particularly by 'sacrificing' one of the important attributes of the Malayness, namely, the Malay language. Although the government had said that the Education Act 1996 was in line with Vision 2020 and the idea of constructing the *Bangsa Malaysia*, many Malay intellectuals argued that the new Act could revert the crucial role of the national language in promoting national integration. The effective role of the Malay language in the process of nation-building could now be greatly diminished, as the new Act has strengthened the notion of multilingualism. Whether the discontentment of the Malay intellectuals reflects the revitalization of Malay linguistic nationalism is yet to be seen. If this is to be the case, would it not invite a non-Malay counter-reaction to defend the 'new status quo' that was created by the Education Act 1996? As the impact of the policy may only emerge in the years to come, the immediate and crucial question to ask is, "To what extent will this new education policy facilitate the process of creating a united Malaysian nation as envisaged in Vision 2020?"

### THE NEW ECONOMIC POLICY 1970–1990

The May 1969 racial riots unequivocally alerted Malaysians to the harsh realities of the effects of economic imbalance amongst the different

communities. The goodwill and compromise practiced amongst the three major communities which lasted for twelve years after independence had resulted in differing economic growth trends, culminating in sizeable gaps in the standard of living amongst them. The riot also prompted the Malays to believe that whilst their political supremacy was under threat, their socio-economic well being had not changed but, rather, had continued to deteriorate. For the Malays, the economic dimension of Malay nationalism was not yet complete. Indeed, the perpetuation of Malay nationalism in the post 1970 period reflected the burning desire to address the Malay's economic agenda. The government also realized that until and unless some major reforms were made to address the grievances of the Malays in the fields of economics and education, the condition of ethnic relations in the country would not be substantially improved.

A series of consultations were held amongst the various community leaders and in 1970 the New Economic Policy (NEP) was introduced to rectify the problem of economic imbalances amongst the communities. Though the policy was economic in nature, the overriding objective of the NEP was political, that, is to achieve national unity. A two-pronged strategy to achieve this goal was adopted (Fourth Malaysia Plan, 1981):

- (i) Eradicating poverty irrespective of ethnicity; and
- (ii) Restructuring society so that the identification of ethnicity with economic function and geographical location is reduced and eventually eliminated.

### The NEP and Socio-Economic Reforms

To attain the NEP objectives, various state intervention measures were undertaken including the establishment of various state-owned enterprises or institutions such as *Bank Pertanian Malaysia* (The Agricultural Bank), LPN, FAMA, LKIM, RISDA, FELDA, FELCRA, MARDI, MARDEC, MIDA, UDA, Petronas, FIMA, HICOM, PERNAS, and PNB. Since 1970, these state-owned enterprises have been playing

very visible and extensive roles in helping the government deal with the problem of economic imbalances in society. State intervention in economic development has been variously interpreted as "*laissez-faire* towards socialism" (Gale, 1981; Milne & Mauzy, 1980), "state capitalism or bureaucratic bourgeoisie" (Hing Ai Yun, 1984; Jomo, 1986), "Malay economic indigenism" (Wan Hashim, 1983), "development by trusteeship" (Mehmet, 1986), "communal capitalism" (Chandra, 1985), "positive discrimination in favour of *Bumiputeras*" (Seaward, 1986), "*Bumiputeraism* policy," and "Malay economic nationalism" (Shamsul, 1996a, 1997). Whatever the term used, it clearly reflected the government's strong determination to pursue a very radical approach to implementing the NEP, given the limited time frame of 20 years for the policy to last. The government's aim was to ensure the redistribution of wealth programmes to work as effectively as possible to rectify the socio-economic imbalances among ethnic groups especially among the Malays and the *Bumiputeras*.

But the programmes for redistribution of wealth will only be viable so long as the country can sustain reasonable economic growth to cope with the cost and dislocations of redistributive policies. As such, the government since the late Tun Razak stewardship has constantly attempted to create a favourable investment climate in the country to attract foreign investors. Except in the mid 1980s when the recession hit the country as a result of the plunging of commodities prices, the economic growth during the 20 years of the NEP period was reasonably high. Even in the post-NEP period, growth continued to be a crucial factor in determining success in wealth redistribution programmes. Mahathir (1992) put this rather succinctly: "Managing our nation-building well entails redressing the socio-economic imbalances among the various ethnic groups and the various regions in our country. Grow, we, no doubt, must. If we do not grow we will not have the resources to redress anything".

The 1997 economic crisis which had severely affected Malaysia and the Southeast Asian region in general was viewed with great concern by some

observers with regards to its impact on the socio-political parameters of the society in particular ethnic relations.<sup>23</sup> Nevertheless, despite the economic downturn which turned into a political turbulence a year later following the abrupt dismissal of Anwar Ibrahim, ethnic crisis has yet to happen in Malaysia, unlike in Indonesia as a result of the downfall of the Suharto regime in May 1998. However, as far as correcting ethnic disparity in the socio-economic field is concerned, growth is crucial as a driver to wealth distribution programmes.

Besides the two-pronged strategies stated above, the NEP also set a target that at least 30 per cent of the *Bumiputera* ownership and participation in all industrial and commercial activities was to be achieved by 1990. This was the government's direct response to the low participation of the *Bumiputera's* community in the economy. Statistics in 1969 indicated that ownership of shared capital in Limited Companies by ethnic groups was as follows: Chinese 90.5 per cent, Malay 5.9 per cent, and Indian 3.6 per cent. However, of the total RM5,678 million shared capital, 62.1 per cent was held by the foreign interests, whilst the Chinese owned 22.8 per cent, Malay 1.5 per cent, and Indian 0.9 per cent (Second Malaysia Plan, 1971). To ensure the *Bumiputera* communities gain access to all sectors of the economy and acquire a more equitable share of the wealth of the country, the provision of 'Malays special rights' promulgated in Article 153 of the Constitution was expanded in various government policies. These include the extension of *Bumiputera* quotas for government employment, *Bumiputera* quotas for admission and access to funding in higher education, and certain kinds of business licenses and government contracts. In addition, most state-owned enterprises provided special assistance programmes for *Bumiputeras* or acted as surrogate institutions for the transfer of foreign or government capital shares and ownership to the *Bumiputera* communities. Under the Industrial Coordination Act, the government had made it compulsory for the private sector to reserve quotas for employment of *Bumiputeras* as well as to establish plans for the training and promotion of to more skilled and higher paid managerial positions.



To initiate more rapid development of *Bumiputera* towards ownership and control of at least 30 per cent of the country's economic pie, the *Permodalan Nasional Berhad* (PNB), a *Bumiputera* trust agency, was tasked in buying corporate shares and acquiring control of industries and enterprises on behalf of the *Bumiputera* community. Furthermore, when foreign corporations operated in Malaysia or engaged in joint-stock agreements with local private or government corporations, the agreement usually specified a quota of stock issues to be reserved for sale to Malays or to *Bumiputera* trust agencies (Jomo, 1983). These were among the most obvious measures undertaken by the government during the NEP period to address Malay grievances in the socio-economic fields. Clearly, all the possible avenues that could be exploited to induce wealth redistribution to rectify the meagre 1.5 per cent of the Malay and *Bumiputeras* take in the country's economic pies in 1969 were explored by the government.

How did NEP perform and to what extent its objectives had been met? Despite the fact that poverty is still prevalent in some pockets of the population such as among fishermen, estate workers, and those in urban slums and remote rural areas, the NEP programmes for eradicating poverty have, by and large, been successful in reducing the level of poverty. As far as restructuring of society is concerned, the Malay and the *Bumiputera* communities by 1990 have been able to secure approximately 22 per cent of the country's economic equity. Although it was 8 per cent short of the original target, the tremendous change brought about by the NEP has to be recognized. In fact, some writers argued that this figure may not reflect the real equity secured by the *Bumiputeras* as it did not account for equity owned under nominee companies (which arguably are largely owned by *Bumiputeras*) and the stake owned by the government which in the final analysis could raise *Bumiputera* equity much higher (Kua Kia Soong, 1990a; Mehmet, 1986). Table 1 demonstrates inter-ethnic economic imbalances that prevailed in Malaysia in 1970, the improvements made in 1985, and the position in 1995.

Table 1

*Progress of the New Economic Policy, 1970-85/95*

I. Eradication of Poverty (Incidence of poverty)	1970	1985
Peninsula Malaysia	49.3	18.41
Rural	58.7	24.71
Rubber Smallholders	64.7	43.41
Padi Farmers	88.1	57.71
Estate Workers	40.0	19.71
Fishermen	73.2	27.71
Coconut Smallholders	52.8	46.91
Other Agriculture	89.0	34.21
Other Industries	35.3	10.01
Urban	21.3	8.21
Sabah	58.32	33.11
Sarawak	56.52	31.91
II. Mean Monthly Household Income in Malaysian Ringgit: (In constant 1970 prices)	1970	1985
<i>Bumiputera</i>	172	1,600
Chinese	394	2,895
Indians	304	2,153
Urban	428	2,596
Rural	200	1,300

(continued)

### III. Restructuring of Society

(a) Restructuring of Employment Pattern (Figures in 1970 refer to Peninsula Malaysia only)

(i) by selected occupation (in percentage)	1970 (Ethnic Group)				1985 (Ethnic Group)			
	B	C	I	O	B	C	I	O
Professional and technical	47.0	39.5	10.8	2.7	54.4	32.4	11.1	2.1
Administrative and managerial	24.1	62.9	7.8	5.2	28.2	66.0	5.0	0.8
Production	34.2	55.9	9.6	0.3	45.5	43.1	10.9	0.5
Agricultural	72.0	17.3	9.7	1.0	73.5	17.2	8.3	1.0
Sales	26.7	61.7	11.1	0.4	37.9	56.8	5.2	0.1

(ii) *Bumiputera* professional membership

Architect	4.3	80.9	1.4	13.4	27.0	71.3	1.5	0.2
Accountants	6.8	65.4	7.9	19.9	12.6	80.5	5.9	1.0
Engineers	7.3	71.0	13.5	8.3	38	43	15	4.0
Doctors	3.7	44.8	40.2	11.3	32.4	32.6	32.5	2.5

(b) Restructuring of Corporate Sector

	1970	1985
<i>Bumiputera</i>	2.4	24
Non- <i>Bumiputera</i>	34.3	63
Foreign	63.3	11

Table 1 clearly demonstrates that the level of poverty in Peninsula Malaysia sharply declined from almost 50 per cent in 1970 to 18.41 per cent in 1985. The incidence of poverty in Sabah and Sarawak also dropped from nearly 60 per cent in 1970 to between 30 per cent and 33 per cent during 1970-1985. Nevertheless, in general, the commercial

and business sectors were still predominantly controlled by the Chinese. Therefore, the National Development Policy (NDP) that replaced the NEP in 1990 continued to pursue programmes to improve *Bumiputera* participation in the commercial and business sectors.

Another important dimension of the impact of the NEP is the creation of the new *Bumiputera* 'middle' and 'upper middle class'.<sup>24</sup> This class structure within the *Bumiputera* community became more stratified than before independence when there were only two dominant classes, namely, the feudal/aristocrat class and the rural peasantry. The new Malay middle class created by the NEP was sometimes regarded as the new capitalists or as what Shamsul Amri (1997) called them, the class of the Malay OKBs (*Orang Kaya Baharu* or literally 'New Rich Person'). The emergence of this new *Bumiputera* middle and upper classes were important in generating a sense of confidence within the *Bumiputera* communities of their political and economic position in facing Chinese strength, which had also consolidated during the NEP period despite the criticism that the policy was only meant for the Malays. Indeed, as a result of this new sense of confidence within the Malay and *Bumiputera* communities, the government introduced several 'liberalisation' policies in the economy and education, in the post-1990 period, which some observers argued as moving away from its earlier practices.<sup>25</sup> This shall be examined in the later chapter.

### The NEP Critics

Since the NEP focused mainly on efforts to uplift the socio-economic conditions of the *Bumiputera* communities, the non-*Bumiputeras* felt alienated. This was the main criticism levelled against the government by the non-Malays during the period of the NEP implementation. Although the level of poverty had declined sharply and *Bumiputera* participation and stake in the economy had increased, could this really imply that the problem of national integration has been resolved or partially overcome? To what extent do economic policies and performance correlate with national integration and ethnic polarization? To answer

these questions, one needs to review qualitatively the whole question of national unity and the NEP, not merely by looking at the quantitative values as demonstrated by the statistical figures. Rustam (1991) noted a tendency in the government's approach to the question of nation-building to perceiving it as merely a matter of economic and physical development. When the process of nation-building is perceived in terms of strategic economic balance between ethnic groups by focusing on aspects such as economic quantum and percentages owned by diverse ethnic groups, the more profound aspects of nation-building such as the question of developing national identities and a sense of nationalism are unfortunately ignored. To Rustam (1991), the fundamental issue faced by Malaysia has always been "...the problem of consolidating all sorts of diversities that were inherited from the past (especially the colonial history) to mould a solid social unity in the form of a nation that could then play the role of active participant in the modern civilization of the world".

Rustam observed that a country that bases its politics of wealth distribution in terms of quantum according to ethnic groups risks an unstable future. Quite likely, the amount of distribution has to be negotiated and renegotiated over time as circumstances change. Thus, the rival ethnic groups would always be alarmed over such development when it occurs, and the perpetuation of conflict to protect the interests of each community would be a permanent communal agenda in the political arena. But the New Development Policy (NDP) that was in place since 1990 did not specify the distribution of wealth in terms of percentage or quantum based on ethnicity as rigidly as the NEP. Instead, as stated in Vision 2020, Malaysia's economic development agenda would be geared towards achieving the status of a fully developed country and one that ensures an economically just society (Mahathir, 1991a). In other words, the NDP intends to create a society where there is fair and equitable distribution of the wealth of the nation in which a full partnership between ethnic groups in economic progress prevails. This would thus ensure that the identification of ethnicity is eliminated. Nevertheless, there is always a great difference between the

stated objectives and the actual outcome of any public policy; the NEP or even the NDP for that matter is no exception.

Over the 20-year period of the NEP, the non-Malays, through their representatives inside and outside the government, had continuously raised their concern and grievances over the implementation of the NEP which they argued only benefited one community, the Malays, to the neglect, exclusion, and detriment of others (Chua Jui Meng, 1988; David Chua, 1988; Kua Kia Soong, 1990a, 1992; Lim Kit Siang, 1986; Lim Lin Lean, 1988). Even among the Malays, some critics argued that it was the elite group and the corporate class who were close to UMNO leaders benefited much from the policy especially in the wealth redistribution programmes (Gomez, 1994; Jomo, 1995; Mehmet, 1986). Following the 1997 economic downturn, it became more fashionable to talk about the rise of 'crony capitalism' in Malaysia than to talk about the rise of the new Malay corporate class and UMNO's central role in terms of rent-seeking (Gomez & Jomo, 1997; Jomo, 1995) or 'the corporate involvement of political parties' (Gomez, 1994). Quite ironically, in the midst of the economic and political turmoil, the most vocal criticism against crony capitalism, nepotism, and corruption in the Mahathir's administration came mainly from the Malay middle class who were basically the product of the NEP and the government's affirmative action policy (FEER, 1998).

Indeed, the construction of several different terms to describe the same thing reflects the unceasing criticism against the NEP, wealth redistribution programmes and above all the affirmative action policy that is still in practice in Malaysia. To some extent those close to UMNO's top leadership from both the *Bumiputera* and the non-*Bumiputera* corporate elite might gain greater access to opportunities to create wealth through government contracts and projects under the NEP or even under Mahathir's privatization policy. However, it was inaccurate and indeed a gross error to suggest that the policy had only benefited a small group of corporate elite at the expense of the entire *Bumiputera* and the non-*Bumiputera* communities (cf. Kua Kia Soong, 1987, pp. 50-67).



As illustrated in Table 1, the NEP has significantly transformed the socio-economic landscape of Malaysian society especially with respect to the position of the Malays. Thousands of children of ordinary farmers, fishermen, rubber tappers, teachers, soldiers, policemen, civil servants and so on, had been transformed into a new middle class as a result of the policy. The creation of a sizeable Malay and *Bumiputera* middle class in the post 1990 period would not have been conceivable without the NEP.

From a different perspective, Shamsul Amri (1996a) argued that the controversy arose because the academic writing on the NEP by both Malay and non-Malay scholars had been somewhat ethnicised. He noted that:

On the one hand, a number of non-*Bumiputera* scholars opposed to the NEP have been writing 'scholarly' books and articles in international journals on the impact of this discriminatory policy on lower-class Malaysian Chinese and how it has made a few *Bumiputeras* extremely rich. On the other, a group of *Bumiputera* scholars has defended the NEP and published 'academic' pieces which argue that without the NEP the plight of the poor *Bumiputera* would worsen and another racial riot might occur as a consequence. They also ask 'what's wrong with having more *Bumiputera* millionaires?'...with the exception of Peter Searl's thesis (1994), no detailed and systematic studies have been carried out to show the role of Malaysian Chinese in the commercial sector, nor any attempt to study the extent they have benefited from the NEP. For non-*Bumiputera* scholars to describe the benefits that Chinese have received from the NEP would only weaken their 'academic' argument about the highly discriminatory nature of the policy. The 'nationalist' *Bumiputera* scholars seem to find it a waste of time to study ethnic groups other than the *Bumiputera*. (pp. 24-25)

In other words, the non-Malays' disenchantment over the NEP was founded on several important issues, which have led to the entire NEP programme of eradicating poverty and restructuring society being politicized in ethnic terms. The non-Malays' criticism concerning the implementation of the NEP could be summarized in four important domains:

- (i) Questioning of affirmative action programmes and the use of *Bumiputera*/non-*Bumiputera* dichotomy;
- (ii) Questioning of government statistics pertaining to the NEP;
- (iii) Questioning whether poverty eradication programmes and restructuring of society only benefited the Malays and not the poor and the needy among all Malaysians; and
- (iv) Questioning whether the redistribution of wealth programmes more greatly benefited the Malay elite and corporate class and not the ordinary Malay masses.

On the question of affirmative action programmes to assist the Malays and other *Bumiputera* communities, the non-Malays argued that the problem confronting Malay/non-Malay relationship sprang from the 'dichotomy of *Bumiputera* and non-*Bumiputera*', which had led to the erosion of democratic rights to the non-Malays through the *Bumiputeraism* policies of the government (Kua Kia Soong, 1992). To them, "the racial quota system is not only divisive but irrational and obfuscatory" (Chinese Memorandum on the Post 1990 Malaysian Economic Policy). The non-Malays felt that the dichotomy of *Bumiputera* and non-*Bumiputera* had rendered them second-class citizens of the country. Dr. Tan Seng Giaw, the DAP Chairman commented:

In our efforts to rectify the socio-economic imbalance, we must not create further disaffection and discontentment among the people. While the NDP does have some flexibility, it is actually a continuation of the NEP.

The perception that we now have is that Malays are helped by the government and the non-Malays have to help themselves. Even in business, the prevailing view is the Malay businesses were helped by the government and the non-government agencies are supposed to help the non-Malay businesses. In the allocation of shares to the people and in the government's privatization projects there should not be a single group monopolizing the project. In the education policy why must we continue to have quota system for admission which is based of ethnicity and not meritocracy.<sup>26</sup>

On official statistics relating to the NEP issued by the government, the non-Malays argued that, "...these figures are doctored to suit political ends...by the fact that all compilation is undertaken by the EPU (Economics Planning Unit of the Prime Minister Department), which is staffed at the senior level, almost exclusively by Malays" (Kua Kia Soong, 1992, p. 38). Related to this, Kua Kia Soong noted that, "in many cases, official statistics are taken by ideologists to put a scientific gloss on conservative political convictions" (1992, p. 29). As such, he argued that, "...in the politics of the NEP, poverty itself has been politicized as some government leaders identify poverty only with the Malay community" (1992, p. 26). In his view, the problems faced by the Malays had been exaggerated by the suspicious government statistics, which may not reflect the actual condition of economic imbalance amongst ethnic groups in Malaysia especially in terms of attainment of the NEP target of 30 per cent in *Bumiputera* participation in the economy. Some argued that the *Bumiputeras* had achieved well beyond the 30 per cent equity targeted by the NEP as many nominee companies owned by Malay corporate elite were not accounted for in the government statistics (Jomo, 1995; Kua Kia Soong, 1992).

In addition, critics also questioned whether the Chinese and Indian poor had benefited fairly *vis-à-vis* the Malay poor from access to land, physical capital, training, and other public facilities that were supposed

to be given to help the poor irrespective of ethnicity, as underlined in the NEP blueprint (Lim Lin Lean, 1980). In addition, David Chua (1988) argued that, "the deviations in the implementation of the National Education Policy and the New Economic Policy with the reference to educational opportunities are the root cause of the mounting discontent, dissatisfaction and growing sense of deprivation among Malaysian Chinese" (p. 77). Moreover, Mehmet (1988) noted that the *Bumiputera* elite who had benefited from the NEP trusteeship was small, powerful and influential group organized as a cartel, who gained through collusion, transaction costs, and other forms of non-competitive bargains. Therefore, it was argued that, despite the Malays being able to increase their equity to 22 per cent in 1990, the poor Malays had seen little change in their lifestyles. The criticism against the NEP, by and large, was multi-dimensional, as Osman Rani (1987) put it rather eloquently:

...it is sometimes difficult to distinguish whether the criticism levelled against the government, particularly on the NEP, were on the policies per se, or on the way the policies were implemented, or on the results (intended or otherwise) of the implementation themselves; just it is equally difficult to know whether the criticism about the NEP were genuinely to correct the weaknesses inherent in the policy, or because they were being made a scapegoat to press for parity in other fields, beyond economics.

Issues surrounding the implementation of the NEP clearly reflected the ramifications in addressing the problems of ethnic imbalances and national unity in Malaysia. The *Bumiputera* and the non-*Bumiputera* communities tended to have opposite views on how nation-building is to be achieved in Malaysia. While the non-Malays felt they had been discriminated against by the policy, the Malays saw that without the policy, the condition of the *Bumiputera* communities could have been worse and another ethnic riot would be imminent. Indeed, as Indonesia succumbed to ethnic violence (which saw the victimization of the



minority ethnic Chinese who were said to dominate the Indonesian economy) as a result of the 1997 economic crisis, leading local Malay press highlighted that Malaysians should be grateful to the NEP and above all the affirmative action policy which had helped avert a similar incident from recurring in Malaysia (*Utusan Malaysia*, 1998). The feeling of the Malays about the policy and the non-Malays' criticism of its implementation perhaps are best reflected by the following speech made by Datuk Abdullah Ahmad in 1986 (as cited in K. Dass, 1997), who was the former Political Secretary to the late Tun Razak, the architect of the NEP.

Let us make no mistake—the political system in Malaysia is founded on Malay dominance. That is the premise from which we could start. The Malays must be politically dominant in Malaysia as the Chinese are politically dominant in Singapore....The political system of Malay dominance was born out of a sacrosanct social contract which preceded national independence. There have been moves to question, to set aside and to violate this contract that has threatened the stability of the system. The May 1969 riots arose out of the challenge to the system agreed upon, out of the non-fulfilment of the substance of the contract. The NEP is the programme, after those riots in 1969, to fulfil the promises of the contract in 1957, but now we are beginning to have questions about the political system all over again, this time under the guise of the implementation of the NEP....You must not forget that if the Malays are pushed to the wall they would react. When what happened on May 13 is evoked it is dismissed as a ruse to resurrect the ghost of 1969....In the Malaysian political system the Malay position must be preserved and Malay expectations must be met. Even after 1990, there must be mechanism of preservation, protection and expansion in an evolving system....The non-Malays can have their own schools, if they so want, their language, culture and

religion. They have so many organizations that voice and represent their interests. They are quite capable of effecting change—as in obtaining agreement for the amendment of the Education Act. Indeed, one state in Malaysia has even been recognized as a de facto Chinese State....But what does UMNO get for its pains? ...I say to all—the Chinese in Malaysia and to Singaporeans—don't play with the fire.

Between the time this very provocative speech was made in late August 1986 and October 1987, the Malays and the non-Malays had had exchanges of arguments on several sensitive issues such as the *Bumiputera/non-Bumiputera* dichotomy and the position of Chinese education, which heightened ethnic tension in the country. As a result, the infamous massive crackdown known as 'Operasi Lalang' was launched in October 1987 by the government to avoid the recurrence of the 1969 incident.<sup>27</sup>

Before the expiry of the NEP period, in 1988 the government established the National Economic Consultative Council (NECC) or better known as 'MAPEN' (*Majlis Perundingan Ekonomi Negara* in Malay) to formulate a new policy for the post 1990 period.<sup>28</sup> Although MAPEN submitted its recommendations to the government, not all of them were accepted. Instead, it was the government itself which finally decided that Vision 2020 and the National Development Policy (NDP) would be in country's next agenda in the post-1990 period.<sup>29</sup> Throughout the years, as well as in the course of MAPEN deliberations, the non-Malays sent a strong signal to the government that they could not tolerate another 'NEP' to prevail after 1990. As the objectives of the NEP were not fully accomplished, the perpetuation of Malay economic nationalism must take a new form drawing on a new set of rhetoric. Vision 2020 and the notion of *Bangsa Malaysia*, therefore, could be seen in this perspective. Although the NDP blueprint did not clearly state the specific quantum or percentage for the *Bumiputera* community to achieve as was in the case of the NEP, in reality, *Bumiputeraism* policy prevailed. The government continued to observe the policy of at least 30

per cent *Bumiputera* participation in the economy. As the debate over the NEP gradually died down, Malaysians tended to be more concerned about Vision 2020, and interest in this subject kept on growing in the post-1990 period.

### **The NEP and National Unity**

As a result of NEP, Malaysians, on average, are better off now economically than say 30 or 40 years ago. The overall standard of living of the people, irrespective of ethnicity, has significantly improved. Absolute poverty has been substantially reduced, and so has inter-ethnic inequality. Nevertheless, the ultimate aim of the NEP of achieving national integration has yet to be fully attained. This is clearly reflected in Vision 2020's nine strategic challenges, which place the agenda of creating a united Malaysian Nation, or the *Bangsa Malaysia* as the most basic and fundamental challenge to be resolved in order to be realize the target of turning Malaysia into a fully industrialized country in 2020. In as much as the NEP is concerned, it seems that economic success, though necessary, is not a sufficient condition for national integration. But this does not mean that economic factors can simply be ignored. The danger is that, whilst economic success can be easily offset by other negative factors, failure in economic programmes can be easily manipulated and politicized and eventually acrimony may worsen the process of nation-building. Economic development, therefore, is instrumental for the whole project of nation-building to succeed. Indeed, growth has to be sustained to provide the resource for the wealth redistribution agenda.

It is within the context of sustained economic growth that the 1997 economic turmoil that hit Malaysia and other South East Asian countries had caused much alarm within the government and the Malay community. The collapse of the economy would have grave consequences on all achievements made during the NEP period. In other words, the socio-economic disparity between ethnic groups that

had been rectified since 1970 could re-appear as a result of the economic meltdown. If this occurred, it would inevitably affect political stability and thus, in one way or another, implicated ethnic parameters and the entire social fabric. Ethnic violence that occurred in Indonesia following the economic crisis was something many Malaysians would not wish to see happening in Malaysia. As far as the NEP is concerned, it is apparent that the agenda of Malay economic nationalism is yet to be perfected. Though the government seems to be more concerned about achieving the status of an industrialized country as laid down in Vision 2020, economic programmes to induce more Malay and *Bumiputera* participation in the areas in which they are less represented continue to be promoted despite the official expiry of the NEP in 1990. It is argued, therefore, that economic consideration is no more than one of the many factors needed for success in nation-building. As indicated by the NEP experience, economic prosperity can be more important in preventing ethnic conflict than in resolving the problems of national integration. As such, economics as part and parcel of the whole process of nation-building has to be combined with education, culture, change in human values, orientations, and perceptions, if new Malaysian nationalism is to be developed in line with the vision of constructing the *Bangsa Malaysia*.

### **THE NATIONAL CULTURAL POLICY**

Reforms in the education and economic policies have triggered endless controversies. The introduction of the National Culture Policy in 1971 also turned to be a critical issue in the politics of nation-building in Malaysia. The non-Malay communities perceived the formulation of National Cultural Policy as an explicit indication of Malay cultural domination over other cultures. Thus, if the policy was fully implemented, it would result in the dilution of the multiethnic cultures that prevail in the country. Although the policy stated that the traits from other cultures which are pertinent would be absorbed to enrich the national culture, making Islam and Malay culture as the basis of the



national culture was unacceptable to the non-Malays. Their opposition to the National Cultural Policy was a straight forward one in contrast to the criticism made against the NEP or the education policy. Since the formulation of the policy, the government seems unable to devise substantial programmes or strategies to implement it.

The formulation of the National Culture Policy has only served to accommodate the rising tide of Malay nationalism that re-emerged in the aftermath of the May 1969 incident, yet it remains a blueprint which has never been implemented. Although the non-Malay opposition to the policy prevails, the debate surrounding the policy has been somewhat subdued in recent years. The reason for this lies in the fact that no substantial attempt has been made by the government to pursue the policy aggressively. Above all, the repeated assurances given by top government leaders (especially Mahathir) that assimilation policy would not be implemented in Malaysia have served to ease some of the concerns of the non-Malay communities. Nevertheless, despite the failure of the government to effectively implement the policy, no attempt has been made to review it. The discussion in this section will outline some of the crucial issues pertaining to the debates on the National Cultural Policy. It will also examine the problematic nature of the cultural dimension in the politics of nation-building in Malaysia.

### **The Politics of National Cultural Policy**

The concept and the basis of the National Cultural Policy were formulated in 1971 at the end of the National Cultural Congress held in Universiti Malaya, Kuala Lumpur. The policy was the major outcome of the congress which was overwhelmingly dominated by right-wing nationalists.<sup>30</sup> It is important to note that the Congress was held when the country was still recovering from the aftermath of the May 1969 incident. Then, the Malays were anticipating moral and political support after their constitutional position was seriously challenged by the non-Malays in the 1969 election that led to the outbreak of the riot. Later, the Ministry of Culture, Youth

and Sports issued guidelines for the formulation of national culture, which was adopted from the resolution of the Congress:

- (i) That the basis of national culture is the culture which is native to the region.
- (ii) The traits from other cultures which are pertinent should be absorbed to enrich the national culture.
- (iii) That Islam as the official religion of Malaysia should play its role in the formulation of the national culture.

Whilst the Malays generally welcomed the policy guidelines as it merged with the aspiration of Malay nationalism, the non-Malays (especially the Chinese) saw the policy as a major threat to the multiethnic characteristics of Malaysian society. Indeed, the policy was regarded as a move towards assimilation, and an attempt to subjugate their cultures under the domain of Malay and Islamic cultures. The non-Malays clearly opposed the policy and considered it unfair. To them, the policy does not do any justice to the interests of the other communities who have made Malaysia their home. Besides, they argued that sheer numbers alone does make it necessary to provide a legitimate role to their cultures, including languages and religions (Chew Hock Thye, 1979; Kua Kia Soong, 1990a; Ting Chew Peh, 1985). They maintained that the modern concept of citizenship recognizes the right of a citizen to use and study his/her own language, adhere to his/her own faith, and practice his/her own culture, as inviolable rights according to the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights (Chinese Organizations Joint Memorandum, 1983). In their memorandum to the government in 1983, the Chinese Guilds and Associations laid down three main grounds for opposing the National Cultural Policy:

- (i) The process of letting the scholars and politicians of one ethnic group to unilaterally formulate policies with such profound and far-reaching consequences, under the auspices of the government, is not consistent with the principle that the national culture must developed through democratic consultation;

- (ii) While stressing the importance of Islam and the Malay culture, these principles deny the significant role that should be played by the cultures and religions of the non-Malays. This is contrary to the principle of equality and uninhibited development of the cultures of all ethnic groups;
- (iii) They exhibit the close-minded philosophy of cultural development centring on the Malays, rather than a liberal attitude of promoting the interaction with and absorption of other non-Malays and foreign cultures.

The Chinese community felt that all ethnic cultures in the country should be given equal treatment in the process of building the national culture for Malaysia. The memorandum did not concentrate only on cultural issues, but went on further to argue about the problems affecting Chinese language and education, literature, arts, and religion in Malaysia. Apart from the Chinese, the Indian community also submitted a similar memorandum to the government in 1984, to highlight their concern over the policy which was essentially founded on a less-than-inclusive basis. In general, the non-Malay communities in Malaysia were deeply concerned about the future of their cultures and called on the government to adopt a more liberal approach to National Culture, and revamp the policy accordingly.

The non-Malays instead, proposed four major principles to be adopted as the basis for the national culture:

- (i) The fine elements in the culture of each ethnic community to be adopted as the basis for the national culture.
- (ii) The guidelines for the establishment of a set of common cultural values are science, democracy, rule of law and patriotism.
- (iii) The common cultural values must be expressed through the unique forms of each ethnic group, as well as reflect the multiethnic characteristics of the Malaysian society.

- (iv) The process of developing the national culture should be consistent with the principle of equality of all ethnic groups and the method of democratic consultation.

The non-Malays contended that the objective of the National Culture should be 'Unity not Uniformity'. To them, the emphasis of the government appeared to be shifting from the concept of cultural unity to cultural uniformity, with rejection of important strands of culture found in Malaysian society in favour of Malay Culture (Indian Community Joint Memorandum, April 1984). The non-Malays insisted that the National Culture Policy should reflect three main characteristics. It should include aspects of cultural diversity, common values of the society, and must be truly Malaysian oriented. Clearly, their stand was absolutely in conflict with the official stand of the government. Professor Zainal Abidin Wahid, a Malay historian, in an uncompromising view argued:

To me if the non-Malays wanted to be true Malaysians they have to make several sacrifices. One of these is the Chinese must be less Chinese and the Indians to be less Indian. If they want to be just like the Chinese in mainland China or the Indian in India, it is better for them to return to those countries. I have repeatedly said on several occasions to the non-Malays' audience. To the questions where they should regard Islam as an important element for the national culture, my answer is, go back to history. Some of the non-Malays do not like to face intellectual discourse based on history, as this would weaken their argument. If we do not take history as an important element, then we cannot trace back the process of political development in this country especially the root of its socio-political origins.<sup>31</sup>

If Zainal's view could represent the Malays' view on the national culture, clearly it reflects the sharp contrast between the Malay ideas of 'national identity' and the non-Malay vision of 'Malaysian identity'. As long



as this difference remains, a national cultural policy that is acceptable to all, and one that everybody could be proud of, would be difficult to develop.

Although anthropologists argued that culture is created and changes over time (Eriksen, 1993), as far as the politics of culture in Malaysia is concerned, the Malays, the Chinese, and the Indians regard themselves as inheritors of three great traditions, that is the Malay-Islam, primordial Chinese, and Hindu. Therefore, any attempt to instil the national culture that is based on values and norms perceived to be different from one's own culture is a very sensitive subject. Besides, since Malay and Islam in Malaysia are always taken to be synonymous, the non-Malays sometimes find it difficult to distinguish what is Islam and what is Malay. To them, if "Malay culture is to become the basis of National Culture, then it follows that Islam will be the basis of National Culture and because Islam is such an all-embracing religion, it also follows that the National Culture in such a context will have little or no room for other cultures" (Indian Community Memorandum, 1984). Obviously such a situation is not acceptable to the non-Malays, whose cultures are based on different religious beliefs and norms. As they put it, "... in the final analysis, (this) will lead to the Islamisation of the country, in which the cultures of other communities cannot really survive for long" (Indian Community Memorandum, 1984). As such, the Malay-Islamic culture approach to the formation of National Culture is utterly unacceptable to them.

Moreover, the situation in Malaysia is different from that in some other countries in Southeast Asia. For example, although in Thailand and Indonesia the Chinese are numerically more than the Chinese and Indians put together in Malaysia, they only represent a small fraction of the population—10 per cent and 3 per cent respectively. In these countries, the Chinese have gradually merged into the dominant group as a result of various assimilationist trends in language, education, cultural and socio-economic policy. Nevertheless, this by no means implies that

those countries are free from problems of ethnic politics. The superiority of ethnic Chinese in business and economic is very peculiar in those states. This could be one of their major assets and perhaps serve as a catalyst for the assertion of their ethnic identity in due course. But it could also constitute a liability, as shown in Indonesian politics. Every time there is national economic turmoil, ethnic Chinese will live in fear for being made 'scapegoats' by some quarters of the population. That was the case in the 1998 civil riot which saw ethnic Chinese shops and business premises being looted and burned, as a result of the economic crisis that badly hit Indonesia and the rest of the region.

Obviously, defining the identity of a nation is probably the most challenging task for Malaysia in its quest for nation-building. The political acts of planning in the field of culture including implementation of plans are more difficult, complex, and dangerous than comparable acts in the spheres of education and economy. This is because one is dealing with intangible values, differences in perception, and personal attitudes. Cultural policy is more complicated than other kinds of policy because culture can neither be forced nor commanded. Cultural regimentation would simply not work in the realpolitik of the modern world. Even the communist totalitarian regimes that attempted the regimentalisation of cultural processes for several decades were doomed to fail, as seen in the former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. High handed treatment of culture and of cultural relations could only lead to adverse effects and is simply counter-productive.

### **Resolving the Cultural Dilemma**

Given the socio-political reality that prevails in Malaysia, what are the options the country has in dealing with the national culture issue? According to Chandra Muzaffar (1980), the best possible approach to developing a national identity and national culture in Malaysia is to recognize the position of Malay as the sole official and national language and the status of Islam as the official religion of the country.<sup>32</sup> At the

same time, the use and study of other languages and the practice and perpetuation of other religions and cultures must be guaranteed. The other communities would also enjoy full equal opportunities in the political and economic spheres of the nation. Chandra (1980) also argued that:

[The] distinction in status and significance between Malay and Islam, on the one hand, and the other languages and religions, on the other, should not be perceived as inimical to the interest of the other communities.... the position of Malay and Islam is consistent with historical realities; it also helps sustain the only tenable conception of national identity. There should not be any apprehension among non-Malays as long as the right to speak one's language and practice one's religion and culture is protected. (p. 40)

From Chandra's point of view, putting other languages and religions on the same status as Malay and Islam would be grossly unfair to the history of the land, for Malay has had a long, unbroken relationship with the cultural history of this region, just as Islam has been a major factor in the social development of the peninsula, since the 15<sup>th</sup> century (Chandra, 1980; Syed Naguib, 1972). According to Chandra, the approach he proposed is consistent with the Federal Constitution of 1957, a constitution which inter-alia recognizes the official position of both Malay and Islam, while providing for the continued existence of other languages and religions. He also observed that the national culture must also emphasize aspects of common values in the cultural life of the nation. Chandra (1980) noted that many Malaysians have failed to realize that there is so much they share in common as inheritors of great traditions:

Malays, Chinese and Indians value the family as the basis of the community. All of us emphasize respect for parents, the aged and the wise. Islam, Confucianism and Hinduism

regard a collective social morality as essential for happiness and harmony. Unbridled materialism and greed are condemned by all our cultures. Corruption is a vice in the eyes of all our communities....Finally, all the three traditions place a great deal of premium upon sincere, able leadership in the quest for a virtuous society....It is commonalities of this sort in social philosophy and in cultural practices that deserve to be highlighted in a society, which proclaims national unity as its primary goal. Exaggerating ethnic differences, or seeking ethnic solutions, for every single social malaise would be a dangerous approach to adopt in a multiethnic setting. (pp. 40-41)

Although the logic of Chandra's views was obvious, it may not represent the view held by the majority of the non-Malays. Ting Chew Peh (1985), a Chinese sociologist who was the MCA Secretary General and a Federal Minister, asserted that to ensure that Malaysia attains its objective of building the national culture, the government has to consider that (1) the national culture reflects the socio-political reality of the society; (2) it is sensitive to the desire and needs of the various sections of the society; (3) it emphasises the spirit and the aspirations of the Federal Constitution, *The Rukunegara* (the National Ideology), principle of equality, justice, freedom and democratic consultations; and (4) it gives all ethnic cultures equal and fair treatment. Ting's view was clearly a reflection of the non-Malay communities' aspirations concerning the national culture, as clearly underlined in the Chinese and Indian communities' memoranda to the government in 1983 and 1984. Tan Sri Dr. Koh Tsu Koon, the Chief Minister of Penang, commenting on the politics of the national culture argued that cultural matter in Malaysia should not be too formalized. In his words:

It should not be formalized. Although you may have an organization that takes this as an aim, to promote things, you cannot promote it in a very rigid way. Instead, it should be through an informal way of encouraging



informal interactions. It should not be a 'top-down' process, but rather the opposite way, that is the 'bottom-up' process. It must come from the people. It is obvious that a process of integration and not assimilation is taking place in Malaysia. It is not so much to be based on ethnicity, but rather a sort of sense of sharing among ethnic groups in Malaysia about their future destiny. This would diffuse every potential that might hinder the process of integration. The people now are very accommodative and sensitive among each other than they have been in the past. We could see that people share a lot of similarities in food, custom, the way they dress, their daily practices and so on. I do not think that religious and cultural differences that prevail in Malaysia constitute major obstacles to the creation of national culture and identity. To me, we should continue to develop the economy of the country, rather than putting too much emphasis on the socio-cultural aspects. A lot of people tend to end up with very petty arguments, over say whose culture should dominate in the creation of Malaysian culture, or those '*bangsa*' should be the dominant '*bangsa*'. When we start arguing like this it becomes confrontational and we could lose sight of the higher ideal. On the other hand, if Malaysians involve in the economic task of competing with other nations, then we tend to learn from one another and we tend to blend.<sup>33</sup>

Although the introduction of the national culture should be substantiated with tangible programmes, as in the case of the NEP, this has not been the case in Malaysia. Despite major disagreements on the philosophy of the policy from various sections of the population, the implementation of the policy by the government has not been consistent. Ibrahim (1983) called this the politics of ambiguity, and argued that it is a form of conflict regulation in Malaysia. It is only during times of crisis that a clear definition has to be made and until such a time, emotional issues are always kept on the periphery (Ibrahim, 1983). Ibrahim was referring

to Mahathir's speech to the Malay World Conference in December 1983, in which the Premier said:

We have agreed that integration and unity will be inculcated and built by using one language that is the national language; one culture, that is, the national culture. The national language is the Malay language and the core of the national culture is the culture that is native to this region.

It was this statement by Mahathir that prompted the non-Malay communities to submit the memorandum to the government in 1983, expressing their grave concern over the government stance on the implementation of the National Cultural Policy. Although the statement by Mahathir reflected the government's firm stand on the policy, Ibrahim saw that no firm action to implement it had ever taken place. In the meantime, the government appeared to find it convenient to use a conflict management policy that promotes cultural tolerance and harmony within the society. The inconsistency continued when in 1988 Mahathir stated that:

By accepting Malaysia, *Bangsa Malaysia* and Bahasa Malaysia does not make us a Malay. In terms of ethnicity, we remain as Chinese, Indian, Iban, Kadazan, or Murut and so on....Without abandoning our ethnic identities, we could still be a meaningful *Bangsa Malaysia*.

Obviously, whilst the first speech reflected the government commitment to the principles of the National Cultural Policy, the second speech implied that the government could accept and tolerate cultural pluralism. The second speech was made in 1988, prior to the introduction of Vision 2020 in April 1991. After Vision 2020 and the notion of creating the *Bangsa Malaysia* was officially unveiled, there was another statement made by the Premier in what was seen as another attempt to clarify the government's policy on cultural development in Malaysia:

Previously we tried to have a single entity but it caused a lot of tension and suspicious [sic] among the people they thought the Government was trying to create a hybrid. There was fear among the people that they may have to give up their own cultures, values, and religions. This could not work, and we believe that the *Bangsa Malaysia* is the answer. (*The Star*, 1995)

Although the later speech by Mahathir did not clearly explain as to what should constitute the *Bangsa Malaysia*, it indicates Mahathir's admission that there was an attempt in the past to create a single entity. The statement of "previously we tried to have a single entity" could be referring to the assimilationist orientation embodied in the National Cultural Policy.

While the government, from time to time made ambiguous statements about the policy, ambiguity was also reflected in the reactions by various sections of the population representing their respective interests. For the Malay-minded section of the society, 'Malay' and 'Islam' are the most important provision in the policy and should be considered as 'core elements' (Aziz, 1989; Zainal, 1988). To the non-Malays, despite the provision for accepting some aspects of their culture as part of the national culture, the National Cultural Policy was an attempt toward assimilation (Chinese Joint Memorandum, 1982). Although the government seemed to realize that the non-Malays were not prepared to tolerate the philosophy of the National Cultural Policy, so far no attempt had been made to revise the policy. This is probably because an attempt to review the policy to accommodate the non-Malays' aspirations could only result in generating distrust and anger amongst the Malays towards the government. Therefore, along with the declining interest in the issue among the public especially in the post-1990, the government probably felt that it was better for the question of national culture to be set aside at this juncture, until there was a need for it to be revisited.

In sum, the controversies surrounding the National Cultural Policy demonstrated the difficulties in the formulation and implementation

of a national policy that had to juggle with sensitive ethnic interests in society. It is not easy for the government to draw up a formula that is acceptable to all parties. The conflict over the National Cultural Policy only reinforces the fact that the cultural dimension of nation-building is much too complicated to be resolved especially when ethnicity and communal politics are involved.

In Malaysia, the people are constantly reminded that every project which the government embarks on, be it economics, education, politics, or social, is for the sake of national integration. Since independence, the political elite in Malaysia regarded the question of national unity and nation-building as superseding any other political agenda. Without national unity, there would be no political stability and even the democratic process of the country would be in jeopardy. Virtually all major policies devised by the government are aimed at promoting national unity. Therefore, any study embarking upon the question of nation-building in Malaysia would be insufficient without a critical assessment over the three major national policies, namely, the National Education Policy, the NEP and the National Cultural Policy. These national policies were formulated and aimed at addressing the acute problems of ethnic division in the country in the aftermath of the May 1969 racial riots, which nearly brought the political system to a total collapse.

Over the past four decades, the Education Policy has in many ways influenced ethnic politics in Malaysia and remains an important variable in nation-building. A similar position applies to the NEP and the National Cultural Policy, notwithstanding the lack of a coherent strategy in the implementation of the latter. Whilst the debates on education and language policies continue, especially after the introduction of the Education Act 1996, a parallel debate on the NEP gradually died down when the policy ended in 1990. However, the National Cultural Policy continues to be a controversial subject and the political discourse on it has been more restrained in the post-1990 period in light of the rejection of the non-Malay communities of the principles of the National Cultural Policy. The government itself has not aggressively pursued the policy in



contrast to the National Education Policy and the NEP. It can be argued that to a significant extent the education and language policy and the NEP, despite having confronted enormous challenges, have been able to play an important role in rectifying the socio-economic imbalances in society and therefore have contributed towards national integration. On the contrary, the National Cultural Policy seems to fail to make any significant headway.

This chapter also demonstrates that the three major national policies of education and language, the NEP, and culture, constituted an important part in the larger nationalist project to materialize the aspiration of Malay nationalism that was in place when independence was achieved in 1947. Those projects were repackaged and represented in the form of Malaysian project in order to garner support and participation from all segments of the society. However, elements of Malay nationalism embodied in those three major policies, intended to strengthen Malay identities in the agenda of nation-building, were seriously questioned and challenged by the non-Malays. The most obvious challenge was directed at the National Cultural Policy, which after more than two decades since its inception, still could not be implemented. On the other hand, the education and language policy, despite being contentious, was able to proceed. The NEP, though, had to face various criticisms for its *Bumiputera* tendencies, managed to survive its twenty years in the socio-economic landscape of Malaysia's plural society.

Apparently, the Malay nationalist project culminating in those three national policies was in collision with the realpolitik of ethnicity that prevailed in society. Since the Malays had assumed political supremacy, they evidently had to be pragmatic enough to accommodate the aspirations of the non-Malay communities. Failing this would result in the weakening of the consociational pact as the protest votes would be advantageous to the non-Malay opposition parties. Likewise, insufficient attention to Malay aspirations would also result in PAS capitalizing on Malay grievances thus making electoral gains against UMNO. This would result in the erosion of the Malay power base in

the government. Therefore, the realpolitik has always been to strike a fine balancing act to accommodate these centrifugal tendencies that prevail in the society.

The discussion in this chapter also demonstrates that there was no coherent direction in the project of nation-building in the post-1970 period, as more attention was given to managing ethnic conflict and promoting ethnic harmony rather than constructing a viable framework for nation formation. To what extent Vision 2020 and the notion of constructing *Bangsa Malaysia* could serve the above purpose is yet to be seen. Nevertheless, before this can be further examined, it is crucial that the roots of the varying perceptions between the Malays and the non-Malays on the project of nation-building are explored in order to establish the parameters upon which the viability of *Bangsa Malaysia* can be assessed.

### End Notes

- <sup>1</sup> Interview with Professor Zainal Abidin Wahid, a Malay historian who was the first head of the Department of History (1970-1991) in UKM. He has held Tun Abdul Razak Chair at Ohio University for two terms, from 1985-1987.
- <sup>2</sup> The *Merdeka* University issue was one of the Chinese guilds and educationists' reactions to the Education Act 1961 and also a direct response to the establishment of the National University of Malaysia in 1970. They wanted to establish a private university, similar to Nanyang University in Singapore. Nanyang University has now merged with the National University of Singapore and Mandarin is no longer the medium of instruction as it was replaced with English. The call for the establishment of the *Merdeka* University was made in the 1969 election (cf. Safar Hashim (1989). *Jurnal Negara*, 13(1).
- <sup>3</sup> The Act stipulated that a public or private sponsored university in Malaysia was considered to be a public statutory body. Since Article 142(1) of the Federal Constitution stipulated that Malay as the national language is to be used in all public authority activities, the *Merdeka* University which intended to make Mandarin its medium of instruction, was thus ruled as being contrary to the provision made under the Constitution (*New Straits Times*, 1982).
- <sup>4</sup> Several different issues have engulfed the politics of language and education in Malaysia since independence. From 1947 to 1970 the main conflict was on the issue of a single national language policy *vis-à-vis* multilingualism. In the post-1970-1982, the *Merdeka* University issue centred on the language and education

controversies. In 1987, the decision to place the non-Mandarin speaking Chinese headmasters in Chinese primary schools by the Ministry of Education sparked a row between Chinese educationists and the government. Nevertheless the crux of the issue has always been the continued survival of Chinese and Indian schools. The non-Malays interpreted Article 21(2) of the Education Act 1961 that provides a special power for the Minister of Education to change the status of these schools into national language schools, a threat to their ethnic identity. This issue, however, was ultimately resolved with the introduction of the Education Act 1996 that revoked the 1961 Act.

- 5 Interview with Professor Zainal Abidin Wahid, Rustam A. Sani, Chamil Wariya. Indeed most Malay scholars interviewed tended to agree that the continued existence of Chinese and Tamil schools has not contributed towards integration.
- 6 Interview with Professor Zainal Abidin Wahid and Rustam A. Sani.
- 7 Interview with Wan Yaacob Hassan, the former Director of the National Unity Department, Ministry of National Unity and Social Development.
- 8 Interview with Dr. Ranjit Singh.
- 9 Interview with Lim Kit Siang.
- 10 Interview with Dr. Tan Seng Giaw.
- 11 Interview with Tan Sri Muhyiddin Yassin, Minister of Youth and Sports.
- 12 Interview with Professor Zainal Abidin Wahid, Rustam A. Sani, Datuk Salleh Majid, and Chamil Wariya.
- 13 Kua Kia Soong was interviewed on 2 May 1997 at his Dong Jiao Zong office in Kajang, Selangor.
- 14 Interview with one Chinese academician from the National University of Malaysia who preferred to remain anonymous.
- 15 Interview with Professor Zainal Abidin Wahid on 11 March 1997 in his house in Petaling Jaya, Selangor. Zainal's view on this matter was also published in his interview with a Malay magazine *Tamadun* (March, 1997). His view was explored in my separate interviews with Rustam A. Sani, Johan Jaafar, Chamil Wariya, Nazri Abdullah, Dr. Ahmad Fawzi Mohd. Basri, the late Professor Dahlan Hj. Aman, the late Datuk Salleh Majid, the late Dato' Fadzil Noor, Subky Latiff, and Tan Sri Ghazali Shafei. All of them held a view similar to that expressed by Zainal.
- 16 Ibid.
- 17 Interview with Fadzil Noor, the President of PAS.
- 18 Interview with Johan Jaafar.
- 19 Interview with Rustam A. Sani, Chamil Wariya, Professor Zainal Abidin Wahid, and the late Professor Dahlan Haji Aman.
- 20 Interview with Chamil Wariya.
- 21 Interview with Professor Zainal Abidin Wahid.
- 22 There were 1,290 Chinese primary schools with more than 480,000 pupils that existed throughout Malaysia in 1997. On the other hand, there were 440 Tamil schools that accommodated 96,000 pupils nationwide (see Zainal Abidin, 1997a).


- 23 On 11 January 1998, a Hong Kong based Political and Economic Risk Consultancy Agency predicted that ethnic tension was imminent in Malaysia following the economic turmoil that hit the Southeast Asian region. According to the analysis, ethnic tension might arise between the Malays, and the Chinese and Indian minorities as a result of a stiff competition for the limited resources in the country following the crisis. However, such predictions were dismissed by the government. Even the opposition parties disagreed with such a view. They noted that Malaysia has learnt its lesson from the 1969 tragedy and will not be easily driven into such a scenario. The basis of ethnic unity and co-operation established since 1947 was highly valued by its multiethnic citizens (see *Utusan Malaysia*, 1998).
- 24 The emergence of this small group of *Bumiputera* capitalist class was proposed by several observers, which was created at the expense of the majority of the *Bumiputeras*, who still remained in poverty. The making of this exclusive class has been subject to criticisms by various scholars, both Malays and the non-Malays, such as, Gomez and Jomo (1997), Jomo (1989), Jomo and Ishak Shaari (1986), Kua Kia Soong (1992), Lim Mah Hui (1984), Mehmet (1986), and Zawawi Ibrahim (1984). In fact, the perceived discrepancy in the NEP had also caused resentment among many non-*Bumiputeras* who regarded the NEP as a policy designed to produce richer and well off Malays and *Bumiputeras* and not to eradicate poverty and restructure society (Kua Kia Soong, 1992).
- 25 Interview with Johan Jaafar, Chamil Wariya, and Rustam A. Sani.
- 26 Interview with Dr. Tan Seng Giaw.
- 27 See Crouch (1996) and Means (1991) for detailed accounts of the Operasi Lalang crackdown.
- 28 MAPEN was established in 1988 consisting of various individuals, political parties, and NGOs representing a wide range of interests in the country under the Chairmanship of Tan Sri Ghazali Shafei, one of the architects of the NEP. The MAPEN final report was submitted to the government in 1990. However, the Prime Minister said that "the government was not bound to accept all the proposals of the NECC" (*The Star*, 1990).
- 29 Interview with Tan Sri Ghazali Shafei.
- 30 Tan Sri Samad Ismail, a veteran journalist who was also known for his leftist ideas in the past, argued that the National Congress on culture held in 1971 was a Malay affair as the non-Malays were not invited to participate in its deliberation. The Congress was largely dominated by right-wing Malay nationalists, and even he himself was not invited to attend the meeting (an interview session with Tan Sri A. Samad Ismail).
- 31 Interview with Professor Zainal Abidin Wahid.
- 32 Dr. Chandra Muzaffar is a distinguished non-Malay scholar who is known for many of his rational ideas in criticizing government policies on various issues.
- 33 Interview with Tan Sri Dr. Koh Tsu Khoo.

# A Sine Qua Non For The Malays : A Paradigm Shifting Disclosure @ Tun Dr. Mahathir Mohamad's 1970 "The Malay Dilemma".

Posted by *Shahrill Ramli* on *June 29, 2015*

Posted in: Novels/Book, 4 Comments

I can proudly said that now, I have already read the legendary "The Malay Dilemma" written by our 4th Prime Minister a.k.a. Malaysian Father of Modernization, Tun Dr. Mahathir Mohamad. Written in 1970, the provocative book was launched as the beacon in the awakening of self-disclosure, post the Racial Riot 1969. I have always wanted to read the book but never had the chance. *As I am furthering my Master's Degree now in Corporate Communication, UPM gave me the 1Malaysia vouchers worth RM250 on books.* So, to make full use of the incentive given, I have bought several books and one of them were "The Malay Dilemma."



My own "The Malay Dilemma". I am proud to say, I have read this legendary book.

Tun Dr. Mahathir Mohamad is certainly one of my heroes. I have written in 2012 about his **bravado in condemning the oppression of Palestinians by Israel via his letter to Benjamin Netanyahu in 1997** (REFER to <https://undomiel84.wordpress.com/2012/02/29/che-det-the-true-malaysian-moslem-warrior-a-letter-from-malaysian-ex-prime-minister-tun-dr-mahathir-mohammad-to-israels-ex-prime-minister-benjamin-netanyahu-1997/>) ; **and I also had my own**



**Malay Dilemma entry on the difference between Urban Malays & Rural Malays in 2009** (REFER to <https://undomiel84.wordpress.com/2009/10/20/a-malay-dilemma-confluence-of-rural-urban/>) – of which was inspired by my own life experiences.



The face I used to see in formal buildings and classrooms since I was a kid back in the 90s. A man who has done so many things to Malaysia, irregardless the relentless criticism from the haters – ranging from Mahathirism, autocratic, anti-semitic, etc.

I have to say, this is a **MUST-READ** book for all Malays out there. Yes, undeniably, the writing was somewhat provocative especially on the affairs of Sino-Malay relationships but Tun Dr. Mahathir (affectionately known as Che'Det) really struck to the core of the polemics and enumerated every inches of possible 'dilemmas' that have been swamping the Malays for ages. *I have to confess that I couldn't put the book down, always intrigued to read further and further – AND, it was so amazing to read his manifestation of thoughts which echo to what are happening right now in the Malaysian political landscapes!* Imagine, a writing that was first initiated 45 years ago (even older than me!) IS STILL RELEVANT until today – and it is not far-fetched to say that his hitherto writing has forecast and predicted scenario that will happen if no firm actions are taken to tackle the problem – AND we are witnessing the cracks, NOW.





Tun Dr. Mahathir Mohamad and beloved wife, Tun Dr. Siti Hasmah Mohamad Ali.

The book is segregated into **11 chapters**, namely :-

1. *Introduction*
2. *What Went Wrong?*
3. *The Influence of Heredity & Environment on The Malay Race*
4. *The Malay Economic Dilemma*
5. *The Meaning of Racial Equality*
6. *The Bases of National Unity*
7. *Rehabilitation of The Malays and the Malay Dilemma*
8. *The Malay Problem*
9. *Code of Ethics & Value Systems of The Malays*
10. *Communal Politics & Parties*
11. *Malaysia & Singapore*



What I like about “The Malay Dilemma” is that it is not a mere write-up on life experience basis **BUT** buttressed by the several comparisons happening in countries abroad. For example in the matter of Racial Equality, he drew the analogical comparison of “dissatisfaction over Malay’s right” with scenarios happening in United States of America – namely for the Black Americans (Negroes) and the Red Indians. ***These comparison were made in the light to address that “Malays being a privileged people in Malaysia”.*** He analyzed the situation by making comparison the dilemma of the Malays as equivalent to the ones experienced by **The Red Indians**. This was enlightened in page 93 :-

***“In Malaysia there can be no denying that the status of the Malays differs from that of the non-Malays. The Malays and Red Indians of America are more or less in the same category. Malays are accepted as indigenous people of the country, but the country is no longer exclusively theirs. However, in order to protect and preserve their status, certain laws are necessary. The most significant of these laws is concerned with Malay Land Reserve. Those acquainted with the history of the Red Indians will see here not only a similarity of terms but also historical content..... The Malay Land Reserve Laws were by intention a measure to counter what was becoming quite obvious during the colonial era : that the Malays were losing all their land to richer immigrants and foreigners.”***



Of course, his ounce of opinions were weighed into biased ambiance but as bitter and as controversial as the statements might sound, those were the realities. **And realities bite.** Tun Dr. Mahathir addressed this in page 14 :-

*"Looking back through the years, one of the startling facts which must be admitted is that there never was true racial harmony. There was a lack of inter-racial strife. There was tolerance. There was accommodation. There was certain amount of give and take. But there was no harmony. There was, in fact, cacophony, muted but still audible. And periodically, the discordant notes rose and erupted into isolated or widespread racial flights. Racial harmony in Malaya was therefore neither real nor deep-rooted. What was taken for harmony was absence if open inter-racial strife. And absence of strife is not necessarily due to lack of desire or reasons for strife. It is more frequently due to a lack of capacity to bring about open conflict..... If it is accepted that there never was true racial harmony, then it is easier to trace the relationship between Malays and the non-Malays through history and explain why inter-racial strife occurred."*





**In 2003, Tun Dr. Mahathir Mohamad resigned from being a Prime Minister. I have to say, his successors have yet to prove their worth to Malaysians, so far.**

One thing that caught my attention was how he correlated the custom of inbreeding (marriages within the clans or families) could possibly contribute to the defect of hereditary traits. **As a Science student with Microbiology degree from USM, I feel connected to what he wrote about the basic of Mendel Law (Mendelian Inheritance) where the inbreeding with genomic similarity of the DNAs are likely to produce progeny with low body defense and weak antigens resistance – as opposed to the cross-breeding where genomic variance of the DNAs are likely to produce progeny with high body defense and strong antigens resistance.** He correlated the Malay customs of inbreeding with the scientific explanation and hypothesized that perhaps due to that, the genes of the Malays are somewhat less competitive – this is due to the opinion he quoted from a British geneticist Cyril Dean Darlington's book ***"The Evolution of Man & Society"*** that 'civilizations flourish and decay in obedience to genetic decrees.'





Another polemic that Tun Dr. Mahathir tackled in his book was the rightful ownership of **Malaya**. With unfiltered sharpness, he wrote about the claims by non-Malays on the sentiment that “Malays are immigrants as well as the Asli people (Aborigines) are the real native in Malay Archipelago”, therefore are fighting for equivalent rights on par with the Malays. ***To give clearer illustration of the question, Tun Dr. Mahathir compared the scenario with British settlements in Australia who ‘certainly unilaterally appropriating to themselves the land of the land of Australian Aborigines’.*** The Aborigines are found not just in Australia but also in Taiwan, Japan and inclusive of Malaya but they are never regarded as the definitive people of the country concerned. **The definitive people are those who set up the first governments, and these governments were the ones with which other countries did official business and had diplomatic relations.** This can be traced from the Olden Kedah monarchy as well as the Malaccan Sultanate :-

***“In Malaya, the Malays without doubt formed the first effective governments. The Malay states have been internationally recognized since the beginning of Malayan history. Trade, treaties and diplomatic representation by foreign countries were negotiated with the Malay-governed Malay states of Malaya. The ‘Orang Melayu’ or Malays have always been the definitive people of the Malay Peninsula. The aborigines were never accorded any such recognition nor did they claim such recognition. There was no known Aborigine government or Aborigine state.”***



With President Mandela.



Never shy to announce the allegiance and support Palestine. With the late Yasser Arafat.

The most sensitive part of the book would undoubtedly be the Sino-Malay relationship, particularly in economics. He perused every single dilemmas of the Malays in the economics and how the initially epiphytic relationship had evolved into parasitic interaction. *I can see why Tun Dr. Mahathir has been labeled as 'Ultra-Malay' as the spirit resonated strongly in his opinions.* I shall not write candidly on that as I know I have non-Malay friends and it would be uncouth for me to write things that could hurt them (Let them find from the book itself). Nevertheless talking about “trying to avoid controversial things so that non-Malays wouldn't hurt” sentiment of which I have written earlier; it actually echoed to what Tun Dr. Mahathir wrote in his book when he compared the typical trait of Malays (which is me!) as opposed to **Plato's Three Cardinal Values** in page 202 :-

***“The good Malay is always unobtrusive and self-effacing, unwilling to impose his will if it conflicts with others, and ever willing to compromise.”***



Nevertheless, like a dormant volcano waiting to erupt, the patience of a Malay cannot be undermined. Tun Dr. Mahathir enumerated the issue via the phenomenon of “amok” (or in Malay, is “amuk”) on page 151 :-

***“Amok is a Malay word. It is a word now universally understood. There is no other single word that can quite describe amok. And the reason is obvious – for amok describes yet another facet of the Malay character. Amok represents the external physical expression of the conflict within the Malay which his perpetual observance of the rules and regulations of his life causes in him. It is spilling over, an overflowing of his inner bitterness. It is a rupture of the bonds which bind him. It is a final and complete escape from reason and training. The strain and the restraint on him are lifted. Responsibility disappears. Nothing matters. He is free. The link with the past is severed, the future holds nothing more. Only the present matters. To use a hackneyed expression, he sees red. In a trance he lashes out indiscriminately. His timid, self-effacing self is displaced. He is now a Mr Hyde – cruel, callous and bent on destruction.”***





His guts are hated by the haters. But he is the MAN. Like what he wrote, do not meddle with Malay's patience. 'AMOK' (derived from Malay word "Amuk" is potentially lethal). And that goes to me as well. Do not push my envelope by keep provoking. Leave it there.

And not to forget, the close affiliation of Islam and also the faith to Sultans by the Malays were also touched by Tun Dr. Mahathir Mohamad. The Malays were described as pious and after the age passes 35 or 40 years, the focus of life is more inclined towards religion, "severe neurosis" that lead the Malays into more cautious and avoid anything dangerous or perceive to be potential in raising difficult problems in life. In short, the Malays will withdraw into himself and refuses to make any great effort for worldly well-being. As for the affiliation with Sultans or Malay rajas, practice of obeisance is normal and the tabooed structured politeness and formality is extended to descendants of these rajas as well as the "**Syeds**" (*descendants of Prophets*) which at some states regarded as privileged as royalty, remain a race apart and accorded with high degree of respect.





His identity card. His Indian origin has somewhat become a ridicule by the haters (his late father hailed from Kerala, India). He addressed the assimilation of Arab and Indian traders with Kedahan Malay in “The Malay Dilemma”. When assimilation adopts the new entity and forget old root, a new set of identity emerges. My mother herself is a Thai-Malay descent. Malays are hybrids of various origins.

On whole, I do understand if there were to be any apprehensions by the non-Malays when they read “The Malay Dilemma”. Tun Dr. Mahathir was quite blatant in describing the whole scenario, from a point of view of a Malay. Of course, if I were to wear the hats of the non-Malays, I understand the anger or dissatisfaction. *Why are the non-Malays are put as the threat when the Malays are the ones who are lazy and insufficient to grab the opportunities, no?* The book also has invited quite several retaliations by some of global audience as Tun Dr. Mahathir made no sugar-coating when he described Jews as ‘hooked-nose’, etc.




I admit that I have been sugar-coating my review on this one. **I guess I have to admit with Tun Dr. Mahathir that being a Malay, we are so bound to cautiousness when dealing with delicate matter.** We do not want to provoke our non-Malay friends with statements that will offend them and everything. BUT, what Tun Dr. Mahathir wrote also resonated truth. Most of non-Malays don't care about this 'self-effacing' courtesy of the Malays but they see that as advantage. So, they lash out remarks that are unkind and insensitive about Malay & Islam. *I have seen that in my Penangite primary school friends' Facebook. Unfortunately, that left scars and severed our friendships. Personally, I am not the kind of person who like to stir on race and religion issues and I will leave from giving comments on that – but when seeing such insolent comments taking place, I need to straight things up.*



Featured on the facade of TELEKOM Tower in 2004.

But as time passes by, I ponder – is it worthy to jeopardize friendships due to comments in Facebook? **I have learned to agree in disagreeing. I also learned that different folks come with different strokes.** Everyone is entitled to his or her own opinions. ***But what I can say is that, after reading “The Malay Dilemma” by Tun Dr. Mahathir, I feel changes in my head and heart.*** Some may call it Paradigm Shift.



What was written in 1970 is very much relevant until now. I personally think that “Malay Dilemma” should be adapted as a module to govern the current Malaysia. Too much leeway is given; hence too much insolence remarks engendered.

And my respect and love to this man, blossoming ever flourish. Enough, said.



Che' Det. The man with superior visions and missions. You are not alone.

## 目录/ Table Of Content

	节目 / Programme	页 / Page
1.	流程 / Tentative	2-3
论文 / Thesis		
2.	反思钟灵中学改制事件 陈利威，新加坡国立大学博士生 <b>Rethinking the Chung Ling High School 'Renegade' Incident</b> <i>Tan Lee Ooi, PhD Candidate, NUS</i>	4-15
3.	国家文化政策：40 年文化民族主义之试验 陈穆红博士，国民大学研究员 <b>National Culture Policy: Forty Years of Experimentation with Cultural Nationalism</b> <i>Dr. Helen Ting, Researcher, UKM</i>	16-42
4.	东马少数原住民多元文化下的团结 Dr.Chemaline Anak Osup，苏丹依德利斯教育大学高级讲师 <b>Perpaduan Dalam Kepelbagaian Kebudayaan Pribumi Minoriti Di Malaysia Timur</b> <i>Dr.Chemaline Anak Osup, Senior Lecturer, UPSI</i>	43-64
5.	独立四十年后的国家文化政策 Alis bin Puteh，北方大学讲师 <b>Dasar Kebudayaan Kebangsaan Sesudah 40 Tahun Merdeka</b> <i>Alis bin Puteh, Lecturer, UUM</i>	65-70
6.	多元族群社会国族建造的困境——以马来西亚国家文化政策为例 Abd Ghapa Harun，国民大学高级讲师 <b>Dilema Pembinaan Bangsa Dalam Negara Pelbagai Kaum –Rujukan Khusus Kepada Dasar Kebudayaan Kebangsaan di Malaysia</b> <i>Abd Ghapa Harun, Senior Lecturer, UKM</i>	71-97



## “省思国家文化概念与政策”研讨会

### 研讨会流程

10:00am-10:15am	报到
10:15am-10:30am	主办单位致辞，开幕人致辞与颁发纪念品
10:30am-12:30pm	<p>第一场</p> <p>反思钟灵中学改制事件 <i>陈利威，新加坡国立大学博士生</i></p> <p>国家文化政策：40 年文化民族主义之试验 <i>陈穆红博士，国民大学研究员</i></p> <p>主持人： <i>吴益婷，理科大学博士生</i></p>
12:30pm-02:00pm	午餐
02:00pm-04:00pm	<p>第二场</p> <p>东马少数原住民多元文化下的团结 <i>Dr. Chemaline Anak Osup，苏丹依德利斯教育大学高级讲师</i></p> <p>独立四十年后的国家文化政策 <i>Alis bin Puteh，北方大学讲师</i></p> <p>多元族群社会国族建造的困境——以马来西亚国家文化政策为例 <i>Abd Ghapa Harun，国民大学高级讲师</i></p> <p>主持人： <i>祝家丰博士，马大高级讲师</i></p>
4:00pm	结束

## Symposium on "Rethinking the Concept and Policy of National Cultural: 40 years of Implementation"

### Tentative

10:00am-10:15am	Registration
10:15am-10:30am	Organiser Speech, Opening Speech and Opening Ceremony
10:30am-12:30pm	<p>Session 1</p> <p><b>Rethinking the Chung Ling High School ‘Renegade’ Incident</b> <i>Tan Lee Ooi, PhD Candidate, NUS</i></p> <p><b>National Culture Policy: Forty Years of Experimentation with Cultural Nationalism</b> <i>Dr. Helen Ting, Researcher, UKM</i></p> <p>Moderator : <i>Ngu Ik Tien, PhD Candidate, USM</i></p>
12:30pm-02:00pm	Lunch
02:00pm-04:00pm	<p>Session 2</p> <p><b>Perpaduan Dalam Kepelbagaian Kebudayaan Pribumi Minoriti Di Malaysia Timur</b> <i>Dr.Chemaline Anak Osup, Senior Lecturer, UPSI</i></p> <p><b>Dasar Kebudayaan Kebangsaan Sesudah 40 Tahun Merdeka</b> <i>Alis bin Puteh, Lecturer, UUM</i></p> <p><b>Dilema Pembinaan Bangsa Dalam Negara Pelbagai Kaum – Rujukan Khusus Kepada Dasar Kebudayaan Kebangsaan di Malaysia</b> <i>Abd Ghapa Harun, Senior Lecturer, UKM</i></p> <p>Moderator: <i>Dr. Thock Ker Pong, Senior Lecturer, UM</i></p>
4:00pm	The End

## **Rethinking the Chung Ling High School ‘Renegade’ Incident**

### **反思钟灵中学改制事件**

**By**  
**Tan Lee Ooi**  
**PhD Candidate in Asian Research Institute, National University of Singapore**

**作者：**  
**陈利威**  
**新加坡国立大学亚洲研究院博士生**

## Abstract

Chung Ling High School in Penang was the first Chinese secondary school accepted the aid from colonial government in 1950s. Since then the decision of the management committee and school headmaster has been perceived as ‘renegade’ by Chinese educationist, who expected the aid without expecting any changing of language of instruction. Subsequently, the other Chinese secondary schools in Malaya followed the Chung Ling model. After half a century passed, this article intends to contemplate the meaning of the decision taken by Chung Ling High School from the perspective of the shifting relationship between Chinese community and state. This article will reflect on the criticism and betrayal discourses of Chinese educationists to Chung Ling incident as a way in rethinking the National Cultural Policy.

## 摘要

钟灵中学董事会和校长开启关键性决定接受津贴，全马各地的华文中学在 1950 年代也纷纷改制。经过半个世纪后，是时候重新思考这个事件对华社有什么意义，尤其是从华社与国家关系的角度。这篇文章，主要从钟灵中学改制这个对华教而言是“痛心疾首”，一般华教人士视为“污点”的事件，来反思其中的当今意义，也是作为局部反思国家文化的回应姿态和起点。

## 前言

林连玉在一篇题目为《谈马来亚的精神》的杂文中，提出过类似国家文化概念的想法。根据他的意见，马来亚的精神，应该包括四种如下的要素：（一）英人的民主精神；（二）华人的勤俭美德；（三）巫人的乐天胸襟；（四）印人的和蔼态度。<sup>1</sup>

---

<sup>1</sup>林连玉，1986: 38.



对于国家的精神，他有更时段宏观的看法。他认为，“一个民族复杂的地区，要熔铸一种新的共同的精神，必须有较长的时期.... 马来亚建国的拟议，不过是第二次世界大战以后，最近数年的事，谈何容易，可以于弹指之顷，立即有马来亚的精神可以指出呢？”<sup>2</sup>

华文中学在 1950 年代改制，经过半个世纪的沉淀后，是否需要重新思考，这个事件对华社产生怎样的影响，尤其是针对华社与国家的关系。这篇文章，主要从钟灵中学改制这个对华教而言是“痛心疾首”，一般华教人士视为“污点”的事件，来反思其中的意义。然本文的目的并不在于判断谁是谁非，改制事件造成的历史难题，仍有更多诠释的可能。马来西亚国族的建构与语文政治脱离不了关系。我将从华文中学改制事件，来间接借鉴对国家文化的反思。

## 研究方法

五十年代的华校改制事件，是华文教育者心中永远的痛。这样的题目，并不适合使用一般论文来涵盖，也不是一篇论文可以理解的。因此，这篇文章尝试跳脱论文的格式，把主要想法带出来，即完成目标。

首先需要说明，这篇文章依赖二手资料。那些资料主要是 华教 的研究文献，以及华教运动参与者的出版物，尤其是林连玉 的杂文、片断回忆与事记。从那些资料，通过个人身处的环境来反思改制事件。因此，个人的经验和观察也变成主要的参考来源，以及建立论述和关怀之所在。

这篇文章，也期望与华教人士沟通和交流。因此，不追求严谨的论文格式和语言名词，来铺陈文章主旨，以达到非学术性双向交流的可能。我也把文献引用的数量，减到最低。

## “一个华教”文献

一般华教的研究中，都认为马来西亚华教只是单数，或者像张景云（2009: i）称的：“过去半个世纪里，华人社会关于华教运动的书籍，可说多得汗牛充栋，体裁形式林林总总，评论者、编撰者、研究者身份背景纵使纷繁复杂，史实主体基本上已可勾勒出可轮廓，多数主要议题已有趋同的归向。”

---

<sup>2</sup>林连玉，1986: 37.

在这样的单元观下，华教长时段的历史，是一种声音的华教史，似乎所有华文教育者都认同一个追求完美华教体系的历史想象<sup>3</sup>和方向（郑良树 2001）。华教政治和华教运动，也被视为出现一个华教的阵营对垒国家的文化霸权（Tan 1997）。在二十世纪五十年代的学生史料汇编中，也从这样的角度记录了“华校学运的集体记忆”，其中参杂了不少汪永年为民族罪人论（陈子鸢 2003）。其他更多华教人士的个人意见论述的合集，也假设了所有大马华人都认同华小、认同独中教育、认同华文独立大学的需要（陆庭谕 2005）。

## 改制事件初邂

第一次遇见独中生，是在中四时的槟城消费人协会主办的《独中生消费人生活营》，在一位常投稿《消费人前锋报》的华文老师的介绍下，误闯独中生的活动。作为对独中是华教其中的一环并不熟悉的国中生（国民型中学），那次的遇见，影响了我对独中的印象、对华教的认知，也开启我对独中生的认识和偏见。懵懂中，独中生给我的印象是，他们是一群无法掌握国语（马来语）的怪胎。在当时所知的一切常识里头，并没有独中这样的概念。

摒除国中与独中竞争意识的稚嫩本能反应，像类似的陌生际遇，其实是马来西亚华教的区域抉择的历史问题。先人的决定，产生了历史延续，对一位就读国民型中学的中学生，在面对独中时感到有点惊讶和错愕。

当年我也是图书馆管理员，再一次午后无聊胡乱翻阅书籍的时刻，意外中看到《风雨十八年》里关于谈论钟灵中学改制的文件，在进一步阅读之下，惊觉原来引以为豪的母校，竟然是“出卖华文教育”的“历史罪人”。<sup>4</sup>

在北马人的眼中，国民型中学乃是华校。每一年的政府考试成绩放榜的时刻，地方报纸《光华日报》即会以大篇幅报道北马各间华校的表现，除了优秀生的照片和名单外，甚至把所有及格考生的名字列出，因为这是当地社会所关注的。且与其他各源流学校 做比较，那也是证明华校仍然成功，获得聊以自慰的自信。

---

<sup>3</sup> 郑良树，第四册，2001: iv.

<sup>4</sup> 另一本是教总教育研究中心编辑的《华文中学改制专辑》。

不同的华文报，对华教的理解模式也是不一样的。我开始阅读《星洲日报》的时候，才发觉华教的主流论述底下，国民型中学不属于华校。放在中马和南马的情境下，这是可以理解，中南马的家长，把自身优秀的孩子送到独中求学。阅读北马家乡报《光华日报》，国民型中学则属于华校。北马国民型中学录取优秀生的机制，是获得州教育局的合作，即选择州内华小成绩优秀者，调配他们到国民型中学。在檳城，除了最主要的檳岛钟灵中学、北海钟灵中学、檳华中学、日新中学外，还有二线的国民型中学，比如恒毅中学和中华中学收取其他成绩较逊色的华小生。在吉打的双溪大年有新民中学，亚罗士打有吉华中学。那些就是华小家长期望获得的特选中学，把所有优秀生配给了国民型中学之后，独中的优秀学生来源就出现问题了。

### 钟灵中学改制事件

钟灵中学的中英并重路线，是华教其中的一个选择。这样的选择，“不是钟灵一两个人、数年间的事，而是钟灵自创办以来的事，是檳城人文化、历史使命感的事。”<sup>5</sup>它是“在面对一个多源语言、文化及民族的环境里，檳城人希望在英校及华校之间开辟出第三种学校——钟灵路线。”<sup>6</sup>钟灵的双语政策，在1923年教务长顾因明的上任后，开始奠定下基础。<sup>7</sup>

所谓的“钟灵路线”是什么呢？在1954年，“高中部除了华文一科外，其他数理化及史地商等，全是英文课本，以英语教学；初中部除了华文、史地及公民外，其他数理化也都是英文课本”。<sup>8</sup>中英并重之下，学生可以参加政府主办的考试，并且取得标青的成绩，傲视其他华校，甚至可以和一些英校并驾齐驱，“成为若干华文中学仿效的对象”。这样的表现之下，校誉蒸蒸日上，“学生冠全马，比其他华文中学多出一倍以上，而其校长陈充恩也被推选为教总第一任主席，领导华教。”<sup>9</sup>

---

<sup>5</sup> 郑良树，第三册，2001：397.

<sup>6</sup> 同上。

<sup>7</sup> 叶钟铃，2009：26-32.

<sup>8</sup> 郑良树，第三册，2001：393.

<sup>9</sup> 同上。

根据郑良树的分析，钟灵中学接受改制，就是跟以上的办学方针有关。“他们对殖民政府‘英语至上’的教育政策，也就比较容易接纳，甚至主动认同及归队”<sup>10</sup> 他也这样形容在钟灵 1953 年就申请政府的津贴，“向‘国民学校’概念迈前一步”。<sup>11</sup>

之后发生的接受更多津贴和彻底的改制，以及接下来更多华校也逐步接受，并且引发了学潮事件，钟灵中学的董事和校长，成为了华社指的“出卖华文教育者”，“华文中学改制摧毁了华教完整的教育体系”<sup>12</sup>，那些人成为了“民族罪人”。

一般华教主流论述认为，钟灵接受改制，“打乱了华社的阵脚”<sup>13</sup>，“华教工作者多年来的抗衡和争取，在钟灵的单独行动下，有决堤之虞了”<sup>14</sup>。在当时的时代里，类似的反应是可以获得同情之理解，尤其在多数华人仍然处于对中国有强烈的中华文化情感和想象催促下。到了今天，是否可以更冷静来看待这个接受改制的事件，在所有定论都“有趋同的归向”中，寻找不同却合理的解释呢？而华教只有一个“史实主体”吗？

“怀着无比的敬意”来看待五十年代学潮的“悲怆壮烈”，唤醒的除了其“喧嚣与愤怒”<sup>15</sup>，除了作为“爱校运动”、“华教运动”、“反殖运动”与“左翼运动”<sup>16</sup>之外，如何放置于当今来检视其意义？

我认为有三个方面，是主流论述所故意忽略的。其一，是关于所谓的“中英并重”的问题。对于中英并重的语文运用一些华教人士虽有微言，不过，这样的所谓“钟灵路线”，却非学潮所批判的。钟灵中学早在 1954 年，即学潮发生的前三年，就已经全面化英语的教学，在高中部只有一个科目时是华文，其他都是英文了。钟灵人对中英并重是非常自豪的。<sup>17</sup>

---

<sup>10</sup> 郑良树，第三册，2001：397.

<sup>11</sup> 郑良树，第三册，2001：398.

<sup>12</sup> 郑良树，第四册，2001：iv.

<sup>13</sup> 郑良树，第三册，2001：400.

<sup>14</sup> 郑良树，第三册，2001：408.

<sup>15</sup> 张景云语，2009：viii.

<sup>16</sup> 张景云，2009：iv - v.

<sup>17</sup> 陈荣照，2007.



学潮追随所谓的华教的大方向，不过，所要求的是钟灵不要改制，虽然在实质上早已经“变质”了。部分学潮参与者之后在各地独中的办学中，也追寻类似的“中英并重”的独中教学。<sup>18</sup>全马目前有多少间独中是采取这个路线呢？然而，类似的“改制”，是生存的需要，在大马这个多语环境中，只懂华文的学生，未来在职业和事业上，会面对诸多的限制。可见，反对改制本身，即便对华教的语文使用，也有不同的立场。华教的复杂性可见一斑，并不是一个单一历史主体可了解。<sup>19</sup>

其二，回应国民化的问题。学潮工委会的序言中，有个名词或适合形容那个斗争的目的——“民族教育运动”<sup>20</sup>。工委会序言中也指，“1950 年臭名昭彰的‘荷格（Holgate）教育报告书’、1951 年的巴恩教育报告书、1952 年教育法令、1954 年教育报告书和 1956 年的拉萨教育报告书等，都露骨地欲施行将华文学校改制为英校的计划。”<sup>21</sup>

翻查一些英文研究文献，当它们从殖民者、民族国家建立者、或所谓的马来民族主义者的角度来看待华教的反应时，即呈现不同的角度。那些被视为消灭华文教育企图的教育法令和措施，是英殖民在殖民地独立前的国民化的关注，并非只发生在马来亚，在无法平衡各方所需之下，出现了偏差，对于华教者而言是“露骨地欲施行将华文学校改制为英校的计划。”这样的看法，也一脉相传到 21 世纪前十年。

其三，英语教学其实被华教所接受，可是国语却不行，这是其中最大的吊诡所在。不过，从社会经济角度却是可以理解的。英语是殖民统治机关政府部门的语言，也是大型工商界流通语言。研究显示新加坡华人纷纷选择英校，其中国家投资更多资源于英校，造成英校教育水平远远比华校来得优良，加上华校毕业生出路问题，他们无法获得政府工作。这造成了华校的没落，执政集团也顺利关闭华校，从多元放任教育改成一个以英语为主的国民教育体系。

---

<sup>18</sup> 胡万铎曾在 1990 年代引发关于独中“中英并重”的论战。

<sup>19</sup> 在林连玉的《回忆片片录》中，对 1954 年的六十七号教育白皮书，建议要在每一间华校开设英文班，马华三大机构（马华教育中央委员会、华校总会及董总）做出两大议决，其中之一为：绝对拒绝于华校内设英文班。林连玉，1963: 68.

<sup>20</sup> 全马华文中学生捍卫华教运动五十周年工委会 2009: ix

<sup>21</sup> 同上。

郑良树编的《林连玉先生言论集》中收录了一则香港大学讲师访问林连玉的笔录，该讲师的第一个问题或代表了殖民政府的看法：“据我们所知，中国人的文化，含有一个特征，那就是自高自大，与瞧不起他族的倾向，非常明显，马来亚华人的文化，倾向于中国非常显著....”<sup>22</sup>

## 华教在不同区域的差异

根据华教的主流看法，钟灵中学遭受到的压力，并非只是来自其他地区华教人士的压力而以，檳城当地也出现反对的声音。郑良树引述《星报》报道，“郊区如日落洞、三条路及社尾万山，市区如钟灵附近及市区内等地，都先后出现反汪永年的标语”。<sup>23</sup>郑良树形容“民愤之激烈，于此可见矣”。<sup>24</sup>

面对学潮冲击之下的钟灵中学，在“吉隆坡教育界的意见”宣判死刑之后，董事会诸公，比如董事主席王景成、副主席许锦亮、秘书苏承球、财政陈正直等人，并没有因此受到来自吉隆坡华教界巨大的压力而辞职。根据记录，他们仍然大权在握多年。<sup>25</sup>除了少数教职员的抗议，比如孔翔泰和任雨农二君外，董事会基本上掌握了大局。孔翔泰在檳城教师公会召开理事会，席间他“对汪永年有所批评，汪永年闻后咆哮离场，会议由他人主持”。<sup>26</sup>“任雨农则用笔名在报章上严责钟灵当局举措失当，为华社招来莫大损失”。<sup>27</sup>

从只有汪永年成为戴罪羔羊外，董事会却仍依旧如昔不变，看来那确实是“在政府边缘化华校之际，钟灵领导人认为这是一条折衷的求存之道”<sup>28</sup>。在“民愤之激烈”、“星火燎原年代”<sup>29</sup>之后，改制后的钟灵中学，在校务和学生来源是否就因此一挫不振？

独中在 1970 年代开始的复兴运动后，只是成功成为一些地区父母的首选。独中在不同地区展现不同的面貌，并非所有的独中都成功复兴起来。改制后的国民型中学，在北马地区以及霹雳怡保一带，仍然成

---

<sup>22</sup> 郑良树，2003: 233.

<sup>23</sup> 郑良树[第三册]，2001: 409。

<sup>24</sup> 同上。

<sup>25</sup> 职位的图表显示，他们仍然各司其职（Tan 1997: 215）。

<sup>26</sup> 郑良树[第三册]，2001: 408 & 409。

<sup>27</sup> 郑良树[第三册]，2001: 409。

<sup>28</sup> 郑良树[第三册]，2001: 309。

<sup>29</sup> 易真，2009: 3 - 14.

为父母的首选。因此，从区域的角度来看，吉隆坡、马六甲与新山，独中的复兴并不能涵盖所有的独中。

而钟灵中学等在北马的国民型中学，虽然被排除在吉隆坡华教中心之外，不过，北马的家长却仍然支持这些改制国民型中学，反而独中给人落地生收容所之印象。

改制华文中学，多数仍然保持华校的传统，华文水平并没有比独中生逊色。一些改制华文中学，每个星期有六到七节的华文课。学校基本上持续了华语的使用，再周会、学生活动、报告、校刊、毕业刊等，仍然维持了华文的语文生态。再鼓吹所谓的中华文化方面，学校内有不少团体再华乐、书法、舞狮、武术等，有杰出的表现。在华文报的时评作者中，不乏改制中学毕业生。马华文学作家群中的佼佼者，他们也并不缺席。而在社会运动方面，这些除了华文之外，也懂得马来文和英文者，也是常见到他们的身影。

## 我与改制历史的和解方式

从小学的懵懂开始，华文的学习一直与族群政治挂钩。这样的包袱，上了中学和大学，持续类似“华教在风雨飘摇中”<sup>30</sup>的忧患情感。那种情怀似乎和华校改制事件有关，一种深层的放不下。无法和解的社会心理，系绑多个世代的不安。对于母语的执著，需要松绑。

和解之必要，，一个族群与国家关系的心理治疗，避免让未来的世代延续类似的心理负担。然而，和解的必要也是当今政治社会变迁的回应。

首先，华教的结构基本已经成形。完整的六年华文小学，已经是政治共识，不容被推翻。独中的继续生存，也非可以轻易改变。而追寻一个连中学都全部以华语教学为主的理想，其实可以放弃了。

其二，虽然出现土权的组织，不过，整体的大环境，已经无法威胁国语的地位，连全民都放弃英语的趋势也已经无可挽回了，坚持国语人士的信心已经建立。在加上中国成为世界重要的经济体，华语的学习是必要的，那种消灭华文教育的政治环境消失了。

---

<sup>30</sup> 陆庭谕语，[辑一]，2005: 87.

## 改制华文中学对华社的贡献

张景云指“其实今天的华教运动已经不是数十年前的铁板一块，董教总往昔清鲚高蹈的权威领导地位，在经受多年主客观因素的冲击之下，时至今日已今非昔比”。<sup>31</sup>其实华社内部，就华文教育问题的立场，已经出现微妙的变化。这和国民型中学和国民中学世代的出现有关。

放在现今 21 世纪的时刻来审视，改制华文中学对华社是有贡献的。钟灵中学那个关键的决定，带来了就读国民型中学的华社子弟，获得比独中更国民化的教育机会。虽然在国民型中学内，主要都是华族，然而，接受的教育体系训练下，以及这个体系允许的高等教育机会，让华族在不同层面更接近国家。

在国民型中学和国民中学就读，或者在独中最后却选择政府考试上本地大学的华裔生，属于华社内的“国文世代”。这一世代，对马来文的运用没困难了。由于语文的驾驭，一些人有更多机会接触其他族群。虽然在意识中仍然有华人、马来人、印度人的偏见，纵使他们对华文教育仍然坚持，但对国家主体的要求，他们与其他接受世界各地高等教育的新生代，有趋向同意放弃部分所谓的华人特征（Chineseness）。他们对华教的感情有异于一般的华教人士。

陈绿漪点出四个方面华教政治化的因素，即华教影响政治地位、文化身份、教育机会与社会阶级升迁。<sup>32</sup>她研究的时期是从 1945 年到 1961 年，50 年过去了，省视那四个因素，其中的关键结构也已经松动。华文是文化身份，而且更具升迁价值。随着高等私立大专的林立，教育机会大门开敞，无需一味依赖国立大学。政治地位在 308 政治海啸之后，出现了新气象。

想象如果当年没有那个改制的决定，现今所有华裔子弟从小学到中学都在华文学校就读，甚或连大学都上华文大学，那么，族群之间的关系，摩擦层度，更难以预估。

---

<sup>31</sup> 张景云语，2009: vi.

<sup>32</sup> Tan 1997，页 294。



对于英化数理的争议，“大馬國民型中學校長理事會主席吳文寶指出，國民型中學的學生主要來自華小，當他們升上中學後，基本上數理科的特有名詞，不管是用國語或英語教導，對學生來說都得重新學起。‘這其實沒有甚麼分別，但一般家長都向我們表達，希望政府允許用英語教學。’”<sup>33</sup>

感激那一代人对华文的坚持，让我们今天可以使用华语，使用华文书写自己的想法。不过，使用华文，却有不同的立场和看法来看待华教。对于华教如此，对其它涉及族群利益的事件也是如此。比如说对于国家文化概念，一个太单元、排他性的立场自然不可取，但从内部反省的思辨却也必要。

我想用林连玉的一句话来做总结：“可爱的马来亚，过去时代洪荒未辟，在世界文明舞台上寂寞无闻的，在未来的世界文明舞台上，必定有最光辉一页，我们衷心地这样期待着。”<sup>34</sup>

## 参考书目

### 英文书

Tan Liok Ee (1997) *The Politics of Chinese Education in Malaya, 1945-1961*, Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press.

### 中文书

叶钟铃：《槟城钟灵中学史稿》，新加坡：华裔馆，2009年版。

全马华文中学生捍卫华教运动五十周年工委：《二十世纪五十年代学生运动史料汇编——纪念 1957 年“11.14”全国华校学潮五十周年》，2009年版。

陈子鹦：《馬來亞華文中學改制 --汪永年與鍾靈中學為例》，硕士论文，暨南國際大學 / 東南亞研究所，2003年。

陈荣照编：《槟城钟灵中学校史论集，1917-1957》，新加坡：钟灵中学（新加坡）校友会。

---

<sup>33</sup> 《星洲日报》，‘吳文寶：多數家長支持·盼國民型中學英教數理’，<http://www.sinchew.com.my/node/225611?tid=1>.

<sup>34</sup> 林连玉，1986: 40.

陆庭谕：《京华风雨鹿鸣呦呦——辑一：华教征途从头越》，吉隆坡：东方企业有限公司，2005 年版。

陆庭谕：《京华风雨鹿鸣呦呦——辑二：经年尘土满征衣》，吉隆坡：东方企业有限公司，2005 年版。

陆庭谕：《京华风雨鹿鸣呦呦——辑三：路漫漫其修远兮》，吉隆坡：东方企业有限公司，2005 年版。

张景云：序，《二十世纪五十年代学生运动史料汇编——纪念 1957 年“11.14”全国华校学潮五十周年》，2009 年版。

林连玉：《回忆片片录》，吉隆坡：马来亚联合邦华校教师总会出版委员会，1963 年版。

林连玉：《杂锦集》，吉隆坡：林连玉基金会，1986 年版。

林连玉：《风雨十八年》（上、下），吉隆坡：林连玉基金会，1988 年版。

郑良树：《马来西亚华文教育发展史》四册，吉隆坡：马来西亚华校教师总会，2001 年版。

郑良树：《林连玉先生言论集》，吉隆坡：林连玉基金会，2003 年版。

易真：‘星火燎原年代 - - 钟灵“11.23”事件纪事录’，全马华文中学生捍卫华教运动五十周年工委：《二十世纪五十年代学生运动史料汇编——纪念 1957 年“11.14”全国华校学潮五十周年》，2009 年版。

教总教育研究中心编：《华文中学改制专辑》，吉隆坡：马来西亚华校教师会总会，2000 版。

**National Culture Policy:  
Forty Years of Experimentation with Cultural Nationalism  
国家文化政策：四十年的文化民族主义之试验**

**By**  
**Dr. Helen Ting**  
**Institut Kajian Malaysia dan Antarabangsa (IKMAS),  
Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia (UKM)**  
**作者：**  
**陈穆红博士**  
**马来西亚国民大学马来西亚与国际研究院研究员**

## Introduction

Forty years after the formulation of the National Culture Policy (NCP), it is perhaps time to take stock of its effectiveness and impact, in particular with regards to the objective of nation-building and the forging of national unity. Two decades ago, an academic had suggested that meetings to discuss the idea of national culture are almost fit for museum (Shamsul 1993), as presenters were getting less and less, and confined to a section of a single ethnic group. Despite so, the NCP as a policy, though perceived to be diminished in its influence (Mandal 2008), has demonstrated its staying power, as two academic theses (one M.A. and another PhD) researching on the topic were written thereafter, not to say other book chapters and articles which discuss it.

This paper begins by examining the historical background and underlying issues related to the NCP, followed by a review and synthesis of its evolution and impact based on published sources. The last part of the paper uses data collected from a survey to understand these issues from the point of view of a group of young university students, before putting forward some reflection.

## Historical Background

The National Culture Policy was formulated in 1971 in the context of a series of measures taken to rehabilitate ethnic relations and re-define the strategy of nation-building in the aftermath of the 1969 ethnic riots. From the point of view of the policy makers, the NCP was formulated to “increase the authority and legitimacy of the government in administering the state”, and to “fulfil the need of the country to create a national identity and a sense of belonging among the citizens”. Prime Minister Abdul Razak was said to stress that “harmony and unity among the races are not just a matter of economic issues, but it is important also to strengthen them with symbols of national identity that could play a role in the heightening of patriotism and nationalism” (Nik Anuar *et al.* 2011: 302-3).

The NCP was formulated based on inputs made at a National Culture Congress held in August 1971 attended by about a thousand participants, with only a handful of non-Malays. Three principles were adopted to develop a national culture, namely, that it must be based on the culture of the people indigenous to the region; that “pertinent and suitable” (sesuai dan wajar) elements from other cultures may also be incorporated; and lastly, that Islam would be an important element in the national culture (Aziz 2003: 148-9). It was also specified that “pertinent” “foreign elements” to be accepted should be compatible with existing norms and culture of



indigenous people of the region and Islam, and especially those that symbolise the uniqueness of Malaysia (Aziz 2003: 153). In his opening speech to the Congress, Razak stated that it was fair (*sudah sewajarnya*) for the national culture to be based on the culture of indigenous people of the region, but cultural elements that came to the region should also be admitted so that their positive influence could rejuvenate and shape the future national culture of Malaysia<sup>35</sup> (Abdul Razak 2003: 192). He repeatedly reminded the participants that in determining the framework of national culture, they should be mindful of the reality of the multiracial society (p. 192-3). He specified that the congress was only a preliminary step in exploring fundamental base for the national culture, the long term consolidation of which would necessitate popular acceptance and adoption of the people (p. 188, 196). In his speech to the Parliament in July 1973, Razak reiterated that all Malaysian citizens should contribute towards the formation of national culture, which is necessarily original (*asli*) of this country, that is, native of the soil. On the other hand, he also stressed that national culture for Malaysia can only come about in the long term and its formation should not be forced upon the people (Nik Anuar *et al.* 2011: 305).

A number of scholars (Funston 1980, Vasil 1980, Cheah 2002) noted that post-1969 was marked by a visible increase in the public assertion of Malay political primacy. This idea of Malay political primacy was clearly articulated in *The Malay dilemma*, the controversial book of Dr Mahathir after being expelled from UMNO. He described the Malays as the “definitive people” of Malaya, the “rightful owner of the land”, who have the right to define the “international personality” of the country (Mahathir 1970: 122-3). He asserted that non-Malays’ citizenship should be conditioned on their acceptance of this understanding, which should be propagated through all nation-building policies:

“The teaching of history, geography, and literature are all designed to propagate one idea; that the country belongs to the definitive people, and to belong to the country, and to claim it, entails identification with the definitive people. This identification is all-pervading and leaves no room for identification with other countries and cultures. To be identified with the definitive people is to accept their history, their geography, their literature, their language and their culture, and to reject anything else.” (p. 143)

When the book was published, it was immediately banned by the government. Dr Mahathir was expelled from UMNO for challenging the Tunku, blaming his “pro-Chinese” policies as a cause of the racial riots. After

---

<sup>35</sup> Bagaimanapun, patutlah juga kita mengambil unsur kebudayaan yang datang ke rantau ini dan membawa pengaruh ke atasnya semenjak beberapa lama supaya pengaruh yang bermanfaat dapat menyebarkan dan menentukan corak kebudayaan Malaysia pada masa hadapan (p. 192).

replacing the Tunku as the Premier and UMNO president, Abdul Razak not only brought Dr Mahathir back to the party, the latter was also appointed as a senator and later on, the Education Minister.

Therefore, Abdul Razak appears to be juggling between two contradictory political exigencies: firstly, to foster a sense of national belonging and unity in the face of tense interethnic relations and secondly, to maintain the unity of UMNO by integrating the so-called “ultra young Turks” such as Dr Mahathir. This contradiction is manifest when comparing between the liberal Rukunegara or national ideology formulated in 1970 with the participation of the multi-ethnic National Consultative Council on the one hand, and on the other, the National Culture Policy, which clearly stresses the primacy of the so-called “indigenous” culture, and even disregards the fact that the majority of the indigenous people in East Malaysia are not Muslims. Mandal (2008) noted the influence of “an exclusionary Malay cultural leadership” who managed to “cast the NCP after their own vision” despite the more liberal position held by Premier Razak (p. 279). One of the prominent spokespersons of this “cultural leadership” was a scholar and activist, Ismail Hussein, who “has single-handedly contributed greatly to making Malay language and culture the basis of national identity” (Mandal 2008: 281). In a debate on how historical studies should be “indigenised” so as to be more “Malaysia-centric” in 1977, Ismail contended that the Malays should be regarded as the main social base of the Malaysian society while the immigrants were “splinters” broken off from their own main societies, hence should not be regarded as of equal status (Cheah 1997: 61)<sup>36</sup>.

### **Setting the scene: Competing “Nations-of-intent”**

The National Culture Policy is arguably an expression of a particular “nation-of-intent” (Shamsul 1996) by those proponents of the policy, as illustrated by the discourse of Dr Mahathir and Ismail Hussein above. Over the decades, there have been different attempts at conceptualizing or imagining the form of political community or nation in Malaysia. British colonialism had bequeathed to Malaya a race paradigm which dominated the way political and social agenda have been set. The British administration legitimated their rule by perpetuating the myth of protecting the native Malay “race” from the immigrant “races”, thus reinforcing the indigene-immigrant dichotomy between the Malays and the sizeable non-Malay inhabitants. This was despite the fact that by 1947, 62.5% of the Chinese and almost 50% of the Indian population were locally born (Ariffin 1993: 9). They were legally regarded either as British subjects or British-protected Persons.

---

<sup>36</sup> Similar perspective was articulated by Malik Munip, a history lecturer turned politician, in his book *Tuntutan Melayu* published in 1981.

The heightened interethnic tension after the Second World War enhanced interethnic mistrust and antipathy, widening further the ethnic gap in the conception of the preferred form of political community. Through public actions, various social and communal groups pushed for their preferred nations-of-intent to be adopted by the ruling elites in the formulation of their nation-building programs. This framework was not completely finalised at independence, and was the source of continued political contentions.

At its foundation in 1946, UMNO which represented the conservative stream of Malay nationalism fought for the idea of Malaya as a “Malay land” (*Tanah Melayu*) and Malayism<sup>37</sup> (Ariffin 1993). Maintenance of Malayism in the face of the very large, unassimilable, non-Malay population was obviously contentious if not untenable. Despite the realisation of the need to take a more reconciliatory position, successive UMNO leaders are confronted with the need to juggle between race-baiting and interethnic accommodation. Successive and successful UMNO leaders (as well as Malay politicians in opposition parties), depending on their immediate objective, played either the role of rabble rousers to increase their credentials as Malay nationalists, or at other times, of political peace-brokers trying to forge a sense of national unity (Cheah 2002, Ting 2011). Funston (1980) noted in his study of Malay politics this “contradiction between UMNO’s ideological and practical approach to non-Malays” (p. 139).

Post-war leaders of Chinese-speaking community espoused a multicultural nation whereby various ethnic communities may preserve their respective linguistic and cultural identities<sup>38</sup>. On the other hand, Western-educated political elites were more inclined towards conceiving citizenship in liberal, individualistic and civic terms. Interestingly, Tan Cheng Lock who did not speak Mandarin was supportive of Chinese education but looked at it more from individual citizen’s democratic right to one’s culture. The liberal guarantee of fundamental civil and political liberties in the nascent Federal Constitution was arguably an expression of the initial political ideals of these British-educated Alliance political elites.

Rival Malay nationalists such as Dr Burhanuddin Al-Helmy initially distinguished *bangsa*, which carries the notion of a cultural community, from *kebangsaan*, which he used to refer to a political community of nation. But soon after, in response to UMNO-MCA collaboration, his idea of *kebangsaan Melayu* leaned towards

---

<sup>37</sup> Dato Onn Jaafar, the first president of UMNO, reportedly said that the UMNO movement did not adhere to any ideology other than *Melayuisme* (Mohammad Yunus Hamidi 1961: 126). Ariffin (1993) defined Malayism as “the belief that the interests of the bangsa Melayu must be upheld over all else” (p. 52).

<sup>38</sup> Tan (1988) argues that historical and semantic differences in the Malay and Chinese words denoting ethnic community and nation may have contributed to this divergence. The Chinese term for a sub-national ethnic or cultural community (*minzu*) is conceptually distinct and constitutive of the nation (*guozu*), without requiring a fusion of the diverse cultural communities to forge a united nation.

assimilationist perspective, requiring non-Malays to shed their ancestral culture to adopt *kebangsaan Melayu* (Ting 2007). Many Malay community leaders seem to regard multiculturalism as antithetical to the concept of *bangsa*<sup>39</sup>, in particular from the seventies. While such inconsistency in discourse is commonplace among all the UMNO presidents and other political leaders, another way they dealt with this contradiction is the recourse to the so-called politics of ambiguity, whereby the politicians carefully tailor their discourse in accordance to the ethnic composition of their audience.

Upon becoming the Prime Minister in 1981, Dr Mahathir introduced another controversial idea of Malaysia as *negara Islam* (meaning loosely, “Islamic country/state”)<sup>40</sup>, which for him derived arguably from the same logic as his “definitive people” argument. In December 1982, Mahathir was reported to have defended his Islamisation programs, saying that since Islam was integral to the Malay culture which was the basis of the national culture, no one should make a political issue out of it (Hussin 1990: 141). The controversial nature of his Islamisation policy had led to two living former Prime Ministers publicly calling for a halt to government’s endeavour. The first Prime Minister of Malaysia, Tunku Abdul Rahman, stated that Malaysia with its multi-ethnic population should never become an Islamic state (Milne & Mauzy 1983: 631).

In 1991, Premier Mahathir proclaimed a national project for Malaysia: to attain the status of developed country as a united nation of *Bangsa Malaysia* with a sense of shared destiny by 2020. This so-called Vision 2020 has been credited with the official switch to ethnically more inclusionary policy rhetoric (Mandal 2008, Loh 2002, Lee 2004, Case 2000, Bunnell 2002). Scholars noted several state efforts to re-package the image of a Malaysian nation with a multicultural emphasis. Case (2000) reported that,

“even Hang Tuah, a folk hero from the Malay Annals, was reconfigured ‘as a polyglot who [could speak] Mandarin, Tamil, and Thai’. In this situation, Mahathir – the one-time ethnic ultra – was likened by many Chinese to the Tunku, benevolently presiding over ethnic relations, albeit in the wake of much onerous restructuring” (p. 141).

Bunnell (2002) documented what he called “multicultural marketing” by Premier Mahathir overseas to secure investment of foreign companies in information and multimedia industries based in the Multimedia Super

---

<sup>39</sup> In the Malay language, *bangsa* could be used to denote both a cultural community and a “nation”.

<sup>40</sup> A year after he began his premiership, Dr Mahathir declared that Malaysia was already an Islamic state (Milne & Mauzy 1983). This statement was repeated again in September 2002 by Dr Mahathir, which was clearly an attempt to outdo PAS in reclaiming the Islamic credentials of UMNO (Lee 2004:101).



Corridor (MSC). Dr Mahathir emphasised the “cultural connections” of the multi-ethnic Malaysian population with Asia’s main markets and the strategic geographical location of Malaysia in the region, which provide added advantage in “the tailoring of IT and multimedia products to a range of (national and transnational) cultural and linguistic markets” (p. 113-4). Awareness of projected shortage of “knowledge workers” also led to government efforts to woo back skilled professional Malaysians overseas, many of whom are non-Malays. In doing so, the MSC project became intertwined with the “multicultural imaginings of Malaysian national identity” (Bunnell 2002: 113).

Yet in July 2001, obviously in the context of intra-Malay contests with PAS, Premier Mahathir announced that Malaysia was already an Islamic State (*negara Islam*), sending shock waves to the non-Muslim communities. Such ambiguity of announcing one ethnically inclusive policy following another exclusionary one and vice versa, without explicitly abandoning the previous, contradictory one, is the hallmark of the way the political leadership managed ethnically contentious issues in Malaysia.

In Sabah and Sarawak, notions of racial stereotypes and identities were not altogether absent. Attempts to assert political hegemony by Ibans, the largest native group in Sarawak, was unsuccessful due to inter- and intra-ethnic rivalry on top of federal political interference. Similar problems plagued Kadazan-Dusun leaders in their quest for ethnic assertion and resistance to federal intervention (Singh 2003). This relatively more fluid and heterogeneous nature of ethnic identities among the natives, in contrast with the Sino-Malay mobilisation and confrontation as two major ethnic blocks in West Malaysia, arguably rendered the nature of ethnic identity incomparably less politicised in East Malaysia.

### **Negotiating Cultural Citizenship**

Commenting on the public debates on the national culture policy during the eighties, Carstens (2005) noted that people understood national culture in different ways. There is its dual-function of “representing *externally* to the international community an historically legitimate image of the nation, while also symbolizing *internally* the imagined community of the nation’s citizenry to its domestic audience” (p. 145). There is also the formal understanding of the term culture in the form of artistic and intellectual activities, the so-called high culture, versus the anthropological understanding of culture as everyday way of life. And lastly, there is also the question of what exactly people meant when they want the reality of cultural diversity to be acknowledged. (p. 144)

The immediate public reaction to the formulation of the National Culture Policy was muted (Carstens 2005: 151). This could be because people were unsure of the exact impact of such policy. Subsequently, many scholars have documented the public contestations arising from measures implemented in the name of the NCP during the late 1970s and 1980s (Milne & Mauzy 1978: 370, Horowitz 1989: 261, Kua 1990, Tan 1992, DongZong 1987: 666-671). They range from the use of Chinese characters on commercial signboards and even school buses, public performance of lion dance and other cultural or artistic programs, stipulation of the type of songs and cultural performance allowed in schools, language used during weekly assembly of Chinese schools, and so forth. State control is carried out through issuance or renewal of licence or permit by the relevant local and state authorities, departments under ministry, police, or circulars and guidelines to be adhered to by schools. From time to time, in the process of regulation, government officials apply their own “creativity” in determining as to whether the spirit of the NCP is respected, independent of the intention of the political leaders at the top (Horowitz 1989: 261).

Religious and traditional cultural manifestations in the public sphere were nevertheless allowed. Daniels (2005) saw these activities as the way “non-Bumiputera participants forge closer ties amongst themselves in these shared festival activities and enhance a sense of incorporation and belonging in the broader society” (p. 177). He interpreted the creation of this cultural and religious space as a means for the non-Malays to reclaim their cultural citizenship, in contrast with “the dominant form of cultural citizenship in which Malays are the definitive race and Malay culture is the foundation of national culture.” (p. 177).

In the realm of official functions involving state agencies, the government appears to be relatively successful in imposing this particular way of envisioning the “national culture”. On their part, various religious and cultural communities carry on their communal or religious activities which correspond to their respective way of life. It is when state agencies interfered with the particular cultural practices that contestations arose. The restriction of the public performance of lion dance and the suggestion that it was “unMalaysian” at the end of 1970s was a case in point. This resulted in backlash from the Chinese community, who regarded it as disrespectful to the community. Lion dance performance became an electoral issue (Kua 1990: 12-6), and acquired added political significance as an ethnic marker for the Chinese community. The eighties saw a revival of popular interests in it such that by 1991, Malaysia became world’s biggest importer of tools and apparatus for lion dance performance from China (Lim 1999: 145-6).

The 1980s also saw vibrant public debates on the National Culture policy in the media (Kua 1990). In response to the invitation of the Minister of Culture, Youth and sports in 1981, Chinese and Indian associations submitted their respective memorandum to the ministry voicing their objections to official measures taken in the name of the National Culture Policy, which they complaint as assimilative in nature (Kua 1990: 207-270).

In the 1990s, far less public contentions arose due to policy implementation related to the NCP. This is attributed to the so-called liberalisation of cultural policy, which removed the previous restrictions on the public performance of the lion dance (Loh 2002). Lee (2004) discussed how imagery of racial harmony was used during a large part of 1990s into the new millennium by the government in the mass media to “seduce” the public into imagining multiculturalism in terms of “image of difference” whereby cultural differences were depicted as positive and compatible with national unity. At official functions such as “national Day celebrations, during the Penang Pesta, the Malaysia Fest, and Visit Malaysia Year campaigns”, more non-Malay cultural programs were accommodated, though Loh (2002) expressed his scepticism that this may be more a strategy to attract tourist dollars rather than being consciously inclusive. Muhd Ikmal Said (1996), on his part, argued that the commercialisation of culture for touristic purposes has contributed to depoliticise “the promotion of culture as a specifically ethnic project”. After all, the “peculiar ‘cultural mix’ that Malaysia boasts so often may be packaged as a tourist attraction” (Muhd. Ikmal Said 1996: 58), instead of being perceived as a challenge or obstacle to nation-building. Moreover, Muhd Ikmal (1996) also observed perceptively that the Malay middle and upper classes were “mindful of the importance of the English language, have acquired the West’s high culture (ballet, classical music, jazz), prefer to live in cosmopolitan, rather than just Malay, suburbs”, thus bringing about the cultural convergence of the multi-ethnic middle classes who shared similar life style (p. 59).

In the meantime, Rowland (2004) noted that the earlier discrete influence of the need to conform to Islamic values, the third principle of the NCP, appeared to exert a more prominent role in theatre performance during the 1990s. During the 1970s, traditional Malay folk theatre with “pre-Islamic” roots such as *wayang kulit*, *makyong* and other forms of Malay arts, were acknowledged to be “national heritage”. Nonetheless, very little encouragement or assistance were provided to preserve these art forms. This was allegedly due to the pressure exerted by Islamic purists who regarded them as *haram* (forbidden) as these performances either use non-Islamic stories or were conducted in the context of invoking spirits for healing purposes (Tan 1992: 287). PAS-controlled state government in Kelantan effectively prohibited public showing of wayang kulit as haram, though not in the name of NCP. Following the implementation of the Islamisation policy during the 1980s, dance and drama co-curricular activities perceived to be incompatible with Islamic values were reportedly dropped. The

performance of traditional theatre in government schools needed to be “cleansed” of its ritualistic effects (Rowland 2004). Some of the plays produced by independent artist groups and even television entertainment shows during subsequent decades were, from time to time, denounced as unIslamic (Rowland 2004).

On the other hand, the continued heavy Malay bias as manifested in official cultural functions did not escape attentive scholars. Daniels (2005) describes the dynamics as reproducing and expressing “a hierarchical sense of belonging”: “Everyone belongs to the ‘national community’ but not as much or in the same way” (p. xxi). Bunnell (2002) who described the re-scripting of a multicultural national identity to attract foreign investment during the 1990s also noted “no official change in the national culture policy” and the “continued political resistance to any dilution of Malay special rights” (p. 117).

### **“Nation-views” from Below**

We now try to look at issues related to national identity and culture from bottom-up by examining the views of some ordinary citizens. The non-representative findings of a survey conducted in July and August 2003 in a local public university are used for discussion here. More than 1000 survey forms were distributed with the assistance of lecturers or faculty staff but only 197 forms were returned. The majority of the respondents are typical undergraduate university students, with the exception of some mature students and a few post-graduate students, as shown in the table below. For convenience sake, our discussions are directed mainly to the patterns of responses of those aged between 21-26 years old.

Responses to three groups of questions are examined here, the first are what is called ethnic characterisation of Malaysia, followed by more specific questions related to the national culture policy, and lastly, on the national literature.



**Table 1: Composition of the Respondents (Age Range \* Descent)**

	Descent				Total
Age Range	Chinese	Malay	Indian	Other Bumuputera	
21-25	54	61	17	8	140
26-30	7	8	2	3	20
31-35	14	2	1	0	17
36-40	12	3	1	0	16
≥ 41	2	2	0	0	4
Total	89	76	21	11	197

With regards to the ethnic characterization of Malaysia, respondents were asked, among others, to answer the following five questions:

Please answer True/False/Don't know or Yes/No/Don't know:

1. Malaysia is a Muslim country (Malaysia adalah sebuah negeri Islam). .....
2. Malaysia is a Malay country (Malaysia adalah sebuah negeri Melayu). .....
3. Malaysia is a multi-cultural country (Malaysia adalah sebuah negeri berbilang kebudayaan). .....
4. Malaysia is an Islamic State (Malaysia adalah sebuah negara Islam). .....
5. Malaysia should be an Islamic State (Adalah sewajarnya Malaysia menjadi sebuah negara Islam?) .....

In order to distinguish conceptually “country” from “state”, the questionnaire used “negeri” for “country” and “negara” for “state”; though it is not clear whether the distinction is well understood by the respondents.

Ethnicised patterns of response to these questions, as indicated in the tables next page, are not surprising. Nonetheless, the ethnic gap did not seem to be as clear-cut as expected. Less than 50% of the Malay respondents agreed that Malaysia is a Muslim or Malay country, whereas more than 90% of the respondents of all ethnic groups agreed that Malaysia is a multicultural country. Significant gap is nonetheless manifested in

the responses to the question of negara Islam, intended to be understood as Islamic state. More than 70% Malay respondents thought that Malaysia is a negara Islam, and almost 40% of Chinese respondents thought so too. This could be due to the 2001 announcement of Dr Mahathir that Malaysia was already a negara Islam as mentioned above. The ethnic gap is the widest with regards to the answers on whether Malaysia *should* be a negara Islam. Almost 78% of Chinese respondents said “no” while more than 85% of the Malay respondents said “yes”. But what is more instructive is the ambiguous meanings these terms acquire in the everyday language we use, as shown by the ambivalent pattern of responses given by the respondents.

In the first place, the contradictory pattern of the responses is of interest to us here. If it is indeed true that Malaysia is a multi-cultural country, how is it that some of those who agreed so could *also* agree to the statement that Malaysia is a Malay country? If a respondent held that the two statements could *both* be true, s/he would have taken the first as a statement of fact and accepted the second as an ideological statement. A Malay respondent who said that Malaysia is not a Malay country put next to the statement a remark that ‘it used to be (a Malay country) but now no more’. Without being ‘programmed’ to think of Malaysia as a ‘Malay country’, those Malay respondents who rejected the statement that Malaysia is a Malay country rejected it as factually wrong.

**Table 2: Perception: Malaysia as Muslim Country (21 - 26 years old)**

Descent		Perception: Malaysia as Muslim Country			Total
		Yes	not sure	no	
Chinese	Count	15	5	34	54
	% within Descent	27.8%	9.3%	63.0%	100.0%
Malay	Count	30	6	31	67
	% within Descent	44.8%	9.0%	46.3%	100.0%
Indian	Count	8	1	10	19
	% within Descent	42.1%	5.3%	52.6%	100.0%

Ulang Tahun Ke-40, Konsep dan Dasar Kebudayaan Kebangsaan: Penilaian Semula  
 省思国家文化概念与政策研讨会

Other Bumiputera	Count	5	0	6	11
	% within Descent	45.5%	.0%	54.5%	100.0%
Total	Count	58	12	81	151
	% within Descent	38.4%	7.9%	53.6%	100.0%

**Table 3: Perception: Malaysia as Malay Country (21- 26 years old)**

Descent		Perception: Malaysia as Malay Country			Total
		Yes	not sure	no	
Chinese	Count	15	5	34	54
	% within Descent	27.8%	9.3%	63.0%	100.0%
Malay	Count	28	4	35	67
	% within Descent	41.8%	6.0%	52.2%	100.0%
Indian	Count	6	0	13	19
	% within Descent	31.6%	.0%	68.4%	100.0%
Other Bumiputera	Count	2	1	8	11
	% within Descent	18.2%	9.1%	72.7%	100.0%
Total	Count	51	10	90	151
	% within Descent	33.8%	6.6%	59.6%	100.0%

**Table 4: Perception: Malaysia as Multicultural Country (21 - 26 years old)**

Descent		Perception: Malaysia as Multicultural Country			Total
		Yes	not sure	no	
Chinese	Count	53	0	1	54
	% within Descent	98.1%	.0%	1.9%	100.0%
Malay	Count	63	0	4	67
	% within Descent	94.0%	.0%	6.0%	100.0%
Indian	Count	18	1	0	19
	% within Descent	94.7%	5.3%	.0%	100.0%
Other Bumiputera	Count	11	0	0	11
	% within Descent	100.0%	.0%	.0%	100.0%
Total	Count	145	1	5	151
	% within Descent	96.0%	.7%	3.3%	100.0%

**Table 5: Perception: Malaysia as an Islamic State (21 - 26 years old)**

Descent		Perception: Malaysia as an Islamic State			Total
		no	not sure	yes	
Chinese	Count	28	5	21	54
	% within Descent	51.9%	9.3%	38.9%	100.0%
Malay	Count	12	6	49	67
	% within Descent	17.9%	9.0%	73.1%	100.0%



Ulang Tahun Ke-40, Konsep dan Dasar Kebudayaan Kebangsaan: Penilaian Semula  
 省思国家文化概念与政策研讨会

Indian	Count	10	1	8	19
	% within Descent	52.6%	5.3%	42.1%	100.0%
Other Bumiputera	Count	3	1	7	11
	% within Descent	27.3%	9.1%	63.6%	100.0%
Total	Count	53	13	85	151
	% within Descent	35.1%	8.6%	56.3%	100.0%

**Table 6: Intent: Malaysia as an Islamic State (21 - 26 years old)**

Descent		Intent: Malaysia as Islamic State			Total
		No	not sure	yes	
Chinese	Count	42	9	3	54
	% within Descent	77.8%	16.7%	5.6%	100.0%
Malay	Count	5	5	57	67
	% within Descent	7.5%	7.5%	85.1%	100.0%
Indian	Count	14	3	2	19
	% within Descent	73.7%	15.8%	10.5%	100.0%
Other Bumiputera	Count	5	3	3	11
	% within Descent	45.5%	27.3%	27.3%	100.0%
Total	Count	66	20	65	151
	% within Descent	43.7%	13.2%	43.0%	100.0%

**Table 7: Contradictory perceptions of ethnic dimensions of Malaysian national identity (21 - 26 years old)**

Perception	Yes		not sure		No	
	Count	%	Count	%	Count	%
Malaysia as Malay Country	51	29.9%	10	6.7%	90	63.4%
Malaysia as Muslim Country	58	39.7%	12	7.7%	81	52.6%
Malaysia as an Islamic State	85	57.7%	13	8.2%	53	34.0%
Malaysia as Multicultural Country	145	95.9%	1	1.0%	5	3.1%

Follow-up in-depth interviews reveal that in layman's Malay language, the specific difference attached to the English word 'State' (*negara*) as opposed to the general term 'country' (*negeri*) was not clear to all. In the Malay media, the term *negara* appears to be used generally for both meanings. The hesitation of some of the non-Malay respondents on the statement as to whether Malaysia should be an Islamic State was no doubt enhanced by the lack of clarity of what 'Islamic State' actually entails. Many might as well have understood *negara Islam* as equivalent to the meaning of a Muslim country. In fact, a Chinese respondent who believed to be true that 'Malaysia is an Islamic State' made a comment next to the statement, 'stated in Constitution', which is incorrect. For most non-Malay respondents, however, there is no ambiguity when it comes to whether they *wanted* an "Islamic State", for whatever meaning or form it could take.

Among the Muslims, the term *negara Islam* itself is understood differently by different people. While the questionnaire did not ask the respondents to explain their understanding of what the term *negara Islam* meant to them, some of their thoughts were expressed in their answers to other questions. In the survey forms, some of them who were on the radical end of the spectrum called for the Malaysian Constitution to be amended according to al-Quran and Hadith. Others wanted the economy to be regulated in accordance with Islamic principles. One liberal Malay respondent whom I interviewed in depth explained that for him, an Islamic State is understood more as a process, whereby the values of the society as a whole functioned more and more in

accordance with Islamic principles. For him, some Christians could be more “Islamic” than some Muslims. Understood this way, who as a Muslim would not feel obliged to say “yes” to an “Islamic State”? Hence the apparently consensual “yes” of the Malay respondents camouflaged a widely differing interpretation of what type of “Islamic State” was desired.

### Envisioning National Culture

In the questionnaire, the respondents were also asked whether they knew what National Culture Policy was. Less than a third of the respondents knew about the existence of a national culture policy. While a greater proportion of the older respondents appear to know about the policy, the difference between generation and ethnic groups was not very great.

The respondents were also asked to respond to three other statements regarding Malaysian national culture:

1. Malaysian national culture should consist **only** of Malay Culture.
2. Malaysian national culture should consist of the best of all cultures of the Malaysian population.
3. Malaysian national culture should consist **mainly** of Malay Culture supplemented by other cultures when appropriate.

The table below shows the overall response to the three statements. It could be seen that the one with the biggest consensus is that Malaysian national culture should *not* consist *only* of Malay culture (93.8%), followed by the statement that Malaysian national culture should consist of the best of all cultures of the Malaysian people (88.7%). It is notable that among the younger Malay respondents, the response in support of the best of all cultures statement (85%) is more enthusiastic than the support for a Malay-dominated national culture (72%). The third statement suggesting that Malaysian national culture should be a Malay-dominated culture, the closest to the gist of National culture policy, obtained a small majority of 51.5%. It is interesting that a survey among civil society leaders conducted in 1989 yielded similar ethnic distribution of responses with regards to ethnic composition of national culture, though 80% of the respondents were aware of the NCP (Muhd. Ikmal Said 1996: 57).

**Table 8: Intent: Ethnicity and National Culture**

	Intent: Malay National Culture		Intent: Malay-dominated National Culture		Intent: Multi-cultural National Culture	
	Count	%	Count	%	Count	%
no	182	93.8%	81	41.8%	8	4.1%
not sure	7	3.6%	13	6.7%	14	7.2%
yes	5	2.6%	100	51.5%	172	88.7%

Evidently, it is pertinent to look at the ethnic breakdown of responses especially for the statement on Malay-dominated national culture. Among the younger respondents, it could be seen from the table below that more than 60% of Chinese and Indian respondents said ‘no’ to a Malay-dominated national culture, while more than 70% of Malay respondents and more than 60% of non-Malay natives said ‘yes’ to it.

**Table 9: Intent: Malay-dominated National Culture (21- 26 years old)**

Intent: Malay-dominated National Culture		Descent				Total
		Chinese	Malay	Indian	Other Bumiputera	
No	Count	36	11	12	4	63
	% within Descent	66.7%	16.4%	63.2%	36.4%	41.7%
not sure	Count	2	8	0	0	10
	% within Descent	3.7%	11.9%	.0%	.0%	6.6%
Yes	Count	16	48	7	7	78
	% within Descent	29.6%	71.6%	36.8%	63.6%	51.7%
Total	Count	54	67	19	11	151
	% within Descent	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%



From the point of view of the pattern of responses, apart from the ethnically aligned answers to the question on Malay-dominated national culture, the respondents seems to be consensual that Malaysian national culture should not be just about Malay culture, while the proposal that the best of all cultures be the national culture of Malaysia also obtained an overwhelming acceptance of the majority. In other words, the perspectives of young university students on issues such as national identity and culture, notwithstanding the pattern of ethnic alignment, appear to be relatively flexible and open when compared with the ideologically-minded officials and politicians.

### **Criteria for National Literature**

Another product of the same National Culture Congress in 1971 was policies pertaining to the fostering of a National Literature, which defined national literature as “works written in Bahasa Malaysia and the contents of which reflect the background of Malaysian society” (Tan 1992: 292). Financial support and official encouragement were extended only to Malay literary works and activities by the Ministry of Culture, Youth and Sports. The Literary Consultative Committee used to consist largely of Malay writers only. This state of the affair was judged to be unfair not only by vernacular writers in Tamil and Mandarin languages, but also by the English language writers, all of whom were regarded by some as obstacle to the development of a national culture.

In the questionnaire, three open questions were asked with regards to the National Literature:

1. Do you think that national literature should include all literature written in Malay language (i.e. including those in Bahasa Indonesia)? Why? .....
2. Do you think that Malaysian national literature should include non-Malay language writings written by Malaysians? Why? .....
3. What do you think should be the main criteria to determine whether a literary work constitute a part of Malaysian national literature? .....

**Table 10: Intent: National Literature by Malaysian**

Intent: National Literature by Malaysian		Descent				Total
		Chinese	Malay	Indian	Other Bumiputera	
Yes	Count	72	48	20	7	147
	% within Descent	86.7%	66.7%	95.2%	63.6%	78.6%
	Count	7	9	0	3	19
	% within Descent	8.4%	12.5%	.0%	27.3%	10.2%
No	Count	4	15	1	1	21
	% within Descent	4.8%	20.8%	4.8%	9.1%	11.2%
	Count	83	72	21	11	187
Total	% within Descent	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

When the respondents were asked whether literature written by Malaysian citizens but in languages other than the national language could be considered as part of the national literature, the majority of them agreed, with more dissenting voices from ethnic Malay respondents.

The respondents were also asked what they considered as the criteria for the determination of national literature. Almost 30% suggested that the literary work should reflect the local context, thinking or way of life. Another 21% suggested that the literary work should reflect the multicultural nature of the Malaysian society. 12.5% said that the literary work should possess a ‘national’ character or ‘Malaysian-ness’. Here, it appears that there was the assumption that this ‘national’ character or ‘Malaysian-ness’ existed and was left undefined.

14% of the (mostly Malay) respondents wanted the national literature to be literary work written in the national language only. This linguistic requirement was the most popular criteria given by the Malay respondents (28%).

**Table 11: Criteria for determination of national literature**

Category of criteria	Descent				Total	Percentage*
	Chinese	Malay	Indian	Non-Malay Native		
Malaysian Citizenship simply	9	3	2	0	14	10.3
Native writers only; concerns Malay world only	0	4	0	1	5	3.7
Quality and originality of work	4	9	2	1	16	11.8
Didactic value	12	13	3	0	28	20.6
Reflect local context, thinking and way of life	21	11	5	3	40	29.4
Multiculturalism	14	10	3	2	29	21.3
In Malay language only	2	16	1	0	19	14.0
‘Malaysian-ness’ or national features	12	4	1	0	17	12.5
Others	4	1	0	0	5	3.7
Total**	59	57	15	5	136	

\* Total number of valid respondents for this variable is 136.

\*\* Actual number of respondents for each ethnic group. Since some gave more than one criterium, the total count of the column is not expected to tally with the actual sum here.

Despite the detection of a slight “ethnically polarised” pattern of responses to the definitions of National Culture and National Literature, it appears that it is still easier for the ordinary folks to arrive at some sort of consensus on these issues than politicians influenced by specific nationalist ideology. Their flexibility on the issues was manifested by the fact that some of them regarded more than one articulation of National Culture as acceptable. In fact, even among the Malay respondents, the statement suggesting that the Malaysian National Culture should consist of the best of all cultures received the most resounding support over the official definition of National Culture. In addition, contrary to the inflexible official stand regarding national literature, the majority of the respondents regardless of ethnicity agreed that nationality and other aspects of the literary work such as

the contents which reflect local reality and thinking rather than language *per se* should be the criteria in the determination of national literature.

### **Forging an Imagined Unity**

In an international seminar on literature and the politics of nation-building in 2004, the dean of the UKM anthropology and sociology programme Kamaruddin M. Said, contended that there is yet a national culture in Malaysia, but only “an official arts as seen from the dances and songs in the Merdeka celebrations and other festivities”. He envisioned national culture to be “a doctrine of life and an ideology that forms society’s soul collectively and is capable of giving birth to an esprit de corps for the whole citizenry” (Rozi Ali, “Literature unread, unsung”, *New Straits Times*, 21 July, 2004). This is a tall order, and judging from the experimentation in implementing NCP over the last four decades, it is doomed to fail. If we take what Abdul Razak said in his opening speech of the National Culture Congress seriously, I am not sure whether he believed in the chances of success of the NCP.

There is undeniably an “imagined” component when we speak about interethnic harmony or national unity, as the latter are abstract terms that can only be assessed subjectively. Attitudes pertaining to interethnic relations, be it acceptance or latent antagonisms, are reproduced in the construction of ethnic category and identity as abstract models. It is not the outcome of direct interethnic contact, in so far as not being falsified in actual interethnic interactions (Eriksen 1998: 37). The persuasiveness of the multicultural imagery touted as symbolising interethnic harmony and national unity during the 1990s (Lee 2004) illustrates that cultural and religious differences need not be *a priori* divisive.

Attempts at re-articulation of national discourse during the 1990s serve to demonstrate that the projection of Malaysia as a multicultural country in the international arena does not appear to be as problematic as those advocates of national culture policy made it out to be. In effect, a multicultural image of Malaysia could even be promoted in the international arena as a comparative advantage in the modern world of nations. The inconsistent and contradictory signals made by the Malaysian government based on political expediency only serve to increase the cynicism of the people and reinforce social contradictions.

On their part, individual citizens tend to understand the discourse on nation based on their own social identity and self understanding (Cohen 1996). They make sense of public rites and discourse and render them personally meaningful by giving their own interpretation as far as they could identify with it based on personal situations.

Hence Cohen (1996) advised aspiring “political entrepreneurs” of nationalism to articulate a discourse or vision that could reflect meaningfully the local experience of a maximum number of his target audience.

The power of a national identity to engender strong attachment among its citizens to the putative nation-state depends on how well the nation-state harmonises and comes to terms with these localised ways of belonging to social webs of relationship in order to transcend potentially conflictive identities. It is a matter of re-channelling sub-national social solidarity rather than suppressing it (Calhoun 2003: 536-7). As noted by Duara, “the most successful states are able to contain these conceptions within relatively depoliticized spaces” (1995: 9). The NCP did just the opposite. It is a truism to say it but it is still worth saying that national identity would not be able to gain a wide adherence if it is formulated in such a way as to marginalise a significant section of sub-national identities.

In itself, national identity is an empty conceptual framework within which different social elements could be organised and accorded meaning and significance based on specific organising principles (Greenfeld 1992: 12). The “raw materials” used for such purposes are usually retrieved from or attributed to historically existing social identities on the putative territory. Hence national identity is ultimately a product of negotiation with existing historical identities, be they regional, ethnic or religious, within the framework of a modern nation-state system (Duara 1996: 158). Ultimately, the forging of an alternative national identity may require a re-interpretation of these historical identities and a new articulation of the historical narratives of the nation. Even politically expedient nationalists who manipulate history for their own gain are obliged to engage with these historical identities in doing so.

The ambivalence of the national discourse articulated by the politicians is a consequence of the ambiguous approach they have chosen to accommodate social forces with contradictory nation-views and the exigencies of meeting the challenges posed by a globalised economy. Whether or not a different approach to the “national question” may emerge is a matter of political contests and historical contingency, but premised on the enlargement of democratic space. While the electronic media has broken down the hegemonic control of the ruling elites over the access of information and expression of dissent, this democratic space is still being negotiated and contested. For it to be sustainable and politically legitimate, it is essential that a civil political culture whereby citizens’ political and civil rights may be respected not only by the political authorities but also by all citizens may take root.



## References

- Abdul Razak Hussein. 2003. “Lampiran: Ucapan Y.A.B. Perdana Menteri Allahyarham Tun Haji Abdul Razak bin Hussein di Majlis Perasmian Kongres Kebudayaan Kebangsaan di Dewan Tunku Canselor Universiti Malaya, Kuala Lumpur, 16 Ogos 1971” in *Masyarakat dan Kebudayaan Malaysia: Suatu Analisis Perkembangan Kebudayaan di Malaysia*, Aziz Deraman, 187-196.
- Ariffin Omar. 1993. *Bangsa Melayu – Malay Concepts of Democracy and Community 1945-50*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Aziz Deraman, A. 2003. “Dasar Kebudayaan Kebangsaan Malaysia” in *Masyarakat dan Kebudayaan Malaysia: Suatu Analisis Perkembangan Kebudayaan di Malaysia*, Aziz Deraman, 147-157.
- Bunnell, Tim. 2002. “(Re)positioning Malaysia: High-Tech Networks and the Multicultural Rescripting of National Identity”, *Political Geography*, 21: 105-124.
- Calhoun, Craig. 2003. “‘Belonging’ in the Cosmopolitan Imaginary”, *Ethnicities*, 3(4): 531-568.
- Carstens, Sharon A. 2005. “Dancing Lions and Disappearing History: The National Culture Debates and Chinese Malaysian Culture” in *Histories, Cultures, Identities: Studies in Malaysian Chinese Worlds*, Sharon A. Carstens, Singapore: National University Press, 144-176.
- Case, William F. September 2000. “The New Malaysian Nationalism: Infirm Beginnings, Crashing Finale”, *Asian Ethnicity*, 1(2): 131-147.
- Cheah Boon Kheng. 1997. ‘Writing Indigenous History in Malaysia: A survey on approaches and Problems’, *Crossroads*, 10(2): 33-81.
- Cheah Boon Kheng. 2002. *Malaysia: The Making of a Nation*, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.
- Cohen, Anthony P. Nov 1996. “Personal Nationalism: A Scottish View of Some Rites, Rights, and Wrongs”, *American Ethnologist*, 23(4): 802-815.

Ulang Tahun Ke-40, Konsep dan Dasar Kebudayaan Kebangsaan: Penilaian Semula

省思国家文化概念与政策研讨会

Daniels, Timothy P. 2005. *Building Cultural Nationalism in Malaysia: Identity, Representation, and Citizenship*, New York & London: Routledge.

DongZong Chuban Zu 董总出版组 (comp.). 1987. *Dongzong sanshinian, 董总三十年* (Thirty Years of UCSCA) Vol. 1-3. Kuala Lumpur: United Chinese School Committees' Association (UCSCA).

Duara, Prasenjit. 1995. *Rescuing History From the Nation – Questioning Narratives of Modern China*, Chicago & London: The University of Chicago Press.

Duara, Prasenjit. 1996. "Historicizing National Identity, or Who Imagines What and When" in *Becoming National – A Reader*, eds. Geoff Eley & Ronald Grigor Suny, Oxford & New York: Oxford University Press, 150-177.

Eriksen, Thomas Hylland. 1998. *Common Denominators: Ethnicity, Nation-Building and Compromise in Mauritius*, Oxford & New York: Berg.

Funston, John. 1980. *Malay Politics in Malaysia: A Study of UMNO and PAS*, Heinemann Educational Books: Petaling Jaya.

Greenfeld, Liah. 1992. *Nationalism – Five Roads to Modernity*, Cambridge (Massachusetts)/London: Harvard University Press.

Horowitz, Donald L. 1989. "Cause and Consequence in Public Policy Theory: Ethnic Policy and System Transformation in Malaysia", *Policy Sciences*, (22): 249-287.

Hussin Mutalib. 1990. *Islam and Ethnicity in Malay Politics*, Singapore: Oxford University Press.

Kua Kia Soong (ed.). 1990. *Malaysian Cultural Policy & Democracy*, Kuala Lumpur: The Resource and Research Centre, Selangor Chinese Assembly Hall.

Lee, Raymond L.M. 2004. "The Transformation of Race Relations in Malaysia: From Ethnic Discourse to National Imagery, 1993-2003", *African and Asian Studies*, 3(2): 119-143.

Lim Khay Thiong. 林开忠 1999. *Jian gou zhong de "huaren wenhua": zu qun shu xing, guojia yu hua jiao yungdong* 建构中的“华人文化”:族群属性、国家与华教 运动 (Development of ‘Chinese Culture’: Ethnic Belonging, National and Chinese Education Movement). Kuala Lumpur: Huazi Resource and Research Centre 华社资料研究中心.

Loh, Francis Kok Wah. 2002. “Developmentalism and the Limits of Democratic Discourse” in *Democracy in Malaysia: Discourses and Practices*, eds. Loh Francis Kok Wah & Khoo Boo Teik, Surrey: Curzon Press, 19-50.

Mahathir bin Mohamad. 1970. *The Malay Dilemma*, Singapore: Asia Pacific Press.

Malik Munip. 1981. *Tuntutan Melayu* (The Malay Demand), Kuala Lumpur: Sarjana Enterprise.

Mandal, Sumit. 2008. “The National Culture Policy and Contestation over Malaysian Identity” in *Globalization and National Autonomy: The Experience of Malaysia* edited by Joan Nelson, Jacob Meerman & Abdul Rahman Embong, Singapore & Bangi: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies & Institute of Malaysian and International Studies, 273-300.

Milne, R.S. & Mauzy, Diane K. 1978. *Politics and Government in Malaysia*, Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press.

Milne R.S. & Mauzy Diane K. Winter 1983. “The Mahathir Administration in Malaysia: Discipline through Islam”, *Pacific Affairs*, (56): 617-48.

Mohammad Yunus Hamidi. 1961. *Sejarah Pergerakan Politik Melayu Semenanjung* (History of Peninsular Malay Political Movement), Kuala Lumpur: Pustaka Antara.

Muhammad Ikmal Said. 1996. “Malay Nationalism and National Identity” in *Malaysia – Critical Perspectives*, eds. Muhammad Ikmal Said & Zahid Emby, Petaling Jaya: Persatuan Sains Sosial Malaysia, 34-73.

Nik Anuar Nik Mahmud, Muhammad Haji Salleh & Abd. Ghapa Harun. 2011. *Biografi Tun Abdul Razak: Negarawan dan Patriot*, Bangi: Penerbit UKM.

Rowland, Kathy. 2004. “Bukan Budaya Kita”, *Kakiseni*, published online on 8 September 2004.

Shamsul A.B. 1993. “Kebudayaan Kebangsaan: Suatu Kenyataan, Harapan Atau Bayangan Palsu?” in *Masyarakat Malaysia dan Alam Sosialnya*, Shamsul A.B., Kuala Lumpur: Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka, Kementerian Pendidikan Malaysia, 97-99.

Shamsul A.B. 1996. “Nations-of-Intent in Malaysia” in *Asian Forms of the Nation*, eds. Stein Tonnesson & Hans Antlov, Surrey: Curzon Press, 323-347.

Singh, Ranjit. 2003. “Ethnicity, development and Federal-State Relations in Sabah and Sarawak, 1963-1990” in *The State, Economic Development and Ethnic Co-Existence in Malaysia and New Zealand*, eds. Edmund Terence Gomez and Robert Stephens, Kuala Lumpur: CEDER, University of Malaya, 53-71.

Tan Liok Ee. 1988. *The Rhetoric of Bangsa and Minzu: Community and Nation in Tension, The Malay Peninsula, 1900-1955*, Clayton (Victoria, Australia): Centre of South-East Asian Studies, Monash University.

Tan Sooi Beng. 1992. “Counterpoints in the Performing Arts of Malaysia” in *Fragmented Vision – Culture and Politics in Contemporary Malaysia*, eds. Kahn Joel S. & Loh Kok-wah Francis, Sydney: Asian Studies Association of Australia in association with Allen & Unwin, 282-306.

Ting, Helen. 2007. *From Ketuanan Melayu to Bangsa Malaysia? A Study of National Integration and Identity in West Malaysia*. PhD thesis submitted to the Institute of Political Studies of Paris [Science Po] and defended in November, 2007.

Ting, Helen. 2011. “Institutional Reforms and Bi-party Political System: Beyond ‘Expedient Multiculturalism’” in *Malaysia at Crossroads: Can It Make the Transition?*, (eds) Abdul Rahman Embong & Tham Siew Yean, Bangi: UKM Press, 154-180.

Vasil, R.K. 1980. *Ethnic Politics in Malaysi*

**Perpaduan Dalam Kepelbagaian Kebudayaan Pribumi Minoriti Di Malaysia Timur**  
东马少数原住民多元文化下的团结

**Dr.Chemaline Anak Osup**  
Pensyarah Kanan, Universiti Pendidikan Sultan Idris  
马来西亚苏丹依德利斯教育大学高级讲师



## Pendahuluan

Umumnya, budaya merangkumi setiap aspek kehidupan masyarakat tanpa mengira kaum, bangsa dan agama penganutnya. Perkataan budaya berasal dari cantuman perkataan Sanskrit dan Melayu yang membawa pengertian kecergasan fikiran dan akal (budhi) dan kekuatan kuasa, tenaga dan pengaruh (daya). Kebudayaan ditakrifkan sebagai keseluruhan cara hidup manusia merangkumi cara bertindak, berkelakuan dan berfikir. Oleh demikian, masyarakat menggunakan segala kekuatan kuasa, tenaga dan pengaruh semula jadi bagi membantu menjana pemikiran mereka untuk terus hidup. Dalam *Kamus Dewan* budaya ditakrifkan sebagai kemajuan fikiran, akal budi (cara fikiran), berkelakuan dan sebagainya. Hasil daripada cara berfikir itu, terhasil satu cara hidup yang diamalkan oleh masyarakat ini dan ia meliputi sistem sosial, susunan organisasi ekonomi, politik, agama, kepercayaan, adat resam, sikap dan nilai. Nik Safiah Karim mengatakan bahawa budaya adalah tenaga fikiran, usaha rohani atau kuasa mengerakkan jiwa.

Konsep percampuran populasi bukanlah merupakan satu fenomena baru di negara kita. Negara kita pernah menjadi tumpuan pengembaraan, pelayaran dan pusat perdagangan Tanah Melayu tentunya pernah menjadi tempat persinggahan dan penempatan bagi orang-orang daripada pelbagai kebudayaan dan asal usul. Malah, struktur susunan ras etnik dan corak penempatan penduduk masa kini telah ditentukan pada zaman perkembangan kolonial dan eksploitasi orang British di Semenanjung Malaysia.

Etnik bermaksud satu kelompok manusia yang mempunyai ciri-ciri distingtif tertentu misalnya agama, bahasa, keturunan, budaya atau asal usul kebangsaan yang diperturunkan dari generasi ke generasi, dikongsi bersama, dipelajari, menggambarkan nilai dan identiti kelompok, menyediakan kerangka rujukan bagi satu-satu masyarakat dan bersifat dinamis serta kreatif. Kita perlu memahami etnik pribumi minoriti kerana Malaysia merupakan sebuah negara berbilang dan ia berkait rapat dengan seluruh struktur sosial. Selain mencerminkan perkembangan sejarah, ia juga membantu kita memahami isu prasangka dan diskriminasi di sesebuah negara serta mempengaruhi dasar sosial dan perancangan sosial sesebuah negara.

## Latar Belakang

Malaysia ialah sebuah negara yang terdiri daripada masyarakat majmuk (*plural society*) di mana pelbagai bangsa (*multi-racial* sama-sama berkongsi hidup dan tinggal di negara ini. Masyarakat majmuk ini terdiri daripada beberapa kelompok majoriti, disusuli oleh sub-sub etnik (kelompok minoriti) lain yang lebih kecil dan kurang berpengaruh. Menurut Furnivall (1939) masyarakat majmuk di Malaysia muncul akibat daripada dasar-dasar colonial. Beliau menjelaskan bahawa penghijrahan penduduk berlaku mengikut kehendak-kehendak sistem ekonominya dan keadaan ini telah mewujudkan kelompok-kelompok yang berbagai ragam dalam satu unit politik.

Bagaimanapun, kelompok-kelompok yang berbagai ragam itu “bercampur tetapi tidak bergabung” kerana setiap kelompok memegang kuat kepada agama, kebudayaan, bahasa, idea-idea dan cara-cara kehidupan sendiri dan setiap kelompok dalam masyarakat itu mempunyai fungsi-fungsi yang berlainan. Harry Eckstein (1966) dalam “Division and Cohesion in Democracy” menulis bahawa masyarakat majmuk terpisah kerana segmen-segmen yang berasingan seperti ras tau kumpulan etnik, budaya, bahasa, kepercayaan agama dan ideologi.

Istilah *budaya* secara amnya memberi maksud cara hidup manusia termasuk proses perkembangan sahsiah, akal, semangat dan usaha manusia dalam sesuatu kelompok. Dari segi etimologinya, perkataan "budaya" bermaksud cantuman kata "budi" (aspek dalaman manusia yang meliputi akal dan nilai) dan “daya” (aspek lahiriah manusia yang meliputi usaha dan hasilan). Maknanya, segala penghasilan masyarakat manusia dalam pelbagai bentuk sama ada yang dapat dilihat atau tidak, termasuk tamadun, peradaban dan kemajuan.

Pendek kata, budaya boleh ditafsirkan sebagai cara hidup manusia yang hidup berkelompok sama ada yang berbentuk material (ciptaan manusia) dan bukan material (adat resam, kepercayaan, kesenian, ilmu pengetahuan, undang-undang dan kemahiran yang dimiliki dan diamalkan oleh manusia dalam sesuatu masyarakat). Budaya sebagai segala amalan, peneimaan dan kepercayaan oleh sesuatu masyarakat yang dipraktikkan secara berterusan atau diulangi oleh generasi yang seterusnya.

Demografi masyarakat majmuk di Malaysia terdiri daripada pelbagai bangsa dan agama. Kaum Melayu merupakan etnik terbesar (orang yang berbudaya Melayu, bertutur bahasa Melayu dan beragama Islam) dan golongan bumiputera dianggap kaum asal Malaysia merangkumi Melayu, Dayak, Iban, Kadazan, Kadazan Dusun yang terdapat di Sabah dan Sarawak. Kepelbagaian masyarakat ini memerlukan usaha berterusan untuk

membentuk masyarakat yang saling memahami antara satu sama lain khususnya apabila berlaku pertembungan budaya. Masyarakat majmuk adalah masyarakat berbilang kaum, bertutur banyak bahasa dan dialek, menganut semua agama, menyambut pelbagai perayaan dan mengamalkan berjenis-jenis adat. Pada asasnya hubungan antara kaum adalah baik. Bagaimanapun adakalanya hubungan antara kaum dan etnik boleh menjadi tegang, seperti yang pernah berlaku seperti Peristiwa 13 Mei 1969.

Kewujudan pelbagai etnik menyebabkan pembentukan masyarakat majmuk melalui garis pemisah seperti ras, etnik, agama, bahasa, budaya, adat resam, cara hidup dan ideologi. Justeru, budaya perpaduan harus dipupuk dengan segera dalam kehidupan bermasyarakat kini. Oleh demikian halnya, perpaduan kaum amat penting untuk membentuk masyarakat yang aman dan harmoni bagi mewujudkan identiti nasional. Dalam mencapai status negara moden, Malaysia meletakkan perpaduan nasional sebagai matlamat akhirnya. Matlamat akhir proses penyatuan ini ialah terbentuknya satu 'bangsa Malaysia' yang terdiri daripada satu masyarakat berbilang etnik yang berstau padu, sejahtera dan mempunyai identiti nasional tersendiri, sekaligus merealisasikan gagasan *1 Malaysia* yang diperjuangkan oleh YAB Perdana Menteri Malaysia.

### **Etnik Pribumi Minoriti Di Malaysia Timur**

Realitinya ialah berlakunya pembangunan identiti etnik pribumi minoriti di Malaysia - contohnya Orang Asli di Semenanjung Malaysia, orang pribumi minoriti di Sabah dan Sarawak.

Orang pribumi Sabah terdiri daripada dua puluh tiga etnik pribumi minoriti seperti Kadazan-Dusun, Bajau, Murut, Brunei, Bisayah, Kedayan, Lutod, Dumpas, Rungus, Sulu dan sebagainya. Kadazan-dusun merupakan suku kaum yang terbesar. Kebanyakan mereka berasal dahulu dari Kalimantan, Pulau Mindanao dan Kepulauan Sulu dari Brunei.

Negeri Sabah mempunyai tidak kurang dari tiga puluh etnik suku kaum. Etnik terbesar di Sabah adalah Kadazan Dusun, Bajau dan Murut. Suku kaum yang lain ialah Kedayan, Bisaya, Irranun, Rungus, Kimarang, Kwijau, Lundayeh, Ubian, Binadan, Orang Sungai, Tatana, Tagaas, Brunei, Suluk dan lain-lain. Perbezaan di antara berbagai-bagai suku kaum tersebut adalah ketara terutama sekali dari segi bahasa, ugama, adat istiadat dan pegangan hidup termasuklah pakaian tradisi mereka.

Kaum Kadazan Dusun merupakan nama kaum bumiputera asli yang terbesar di Sabah dan berasal daripada Indo-China. Kaum etnik ini menggunakan pelbagai bahasa dan dialek dengan pelbagai kebudayaan dan adat resam tradisional. Terdapat 27 suku kaum di dalamnya. Antaranya ialah Dusun Liwan, Dusun Tindal, Dusun Pahu, Dusun Lotud, Bagahak, Dusun Labuk, Dusun Kimaragang, Tagahas, Tangara, Dusun, Rungus, Orang Sungai, Kuijau, Tambanuo, dan sebagainya. Kadazan Dusun membentuk 30 peratus populasi Sabah yang terdiri daripada dua kaum, Kadazan dan Dusun digabungkan bersama kerana berkongsi bahasa dan budaya yang serupa. Bagaimanapun, bezanya etnik Kadazan tinggal di kawasan lembah dan secara tradisi terlibat dalam penanaman padi, sementara etnik Dusun tinggal di kawasan pergunungan di pedalaman Sabah.

Kumpulan etnik kedua terbesar di Sabah, kaum Bajau merangkumi 15 peratus populasi penduduk negeri ini. Mereka asalnya adalah keturunan pelaut yang menyembah Omboh Dilaut (Tuhan Laut) dan sering dikenali sebagai gipsi laut. Ada yang telah meninggalkan kehidupan di laut dan menjadi peladang serta penternak. Mereka pula dikenali sebagai 'Koboi Timur' kerana kepakaran mereka menunggang kuda. Terdapat pelbagai suku kaum di kalangan masyarakat Bajau seperti Ilanun, Sulu dan sebagainya. Kebanyakan masyarakat Bajau mendiami kawasan Semporna dan Kota Belud. Kaum lelaki dalam kalangan masyarakat ini terkenal sebagai penunggang kuda yang mahir.

Orang Murut merupakan etnik ketiga terbesar di Sabah, Murut merangkumi tiga peratus populasi penduduk negeri ini. Secara tradisi, mereka menduduki kawasan pedalaman di utara Borneo. Mereka juga adalah antara etnik Sabah terakhir untuk membuang amalan memburu kepala. Kini, mereka penanam padi huma dan ubi kayu, sambil memburu menggunakan sumpitan dan menangkap ikan. Kebanyakan kaum pribumi di Sabah, pakaian tradisi mereka turut dihiasi dengan hasil seni manik yang menarik.

Rungus juga dikenali sebagai Dusun Laut atau Dayak Dusun. Suku kaum Momogun Rungus mendiami kawasan pesisir pantai barat Kudat, pantai timur Kudat, Teluk Marudu, Pitas hingga ke Beluran dan juga kepulauan sekitar Kudat. Kebanyakan suku kaum Momogun Rungus adalah menganut agama Kristian.

Iranun atau Illanun ialah nama satu suku kaum yang dikategorikan sebagai penduduk bumiputera Sabah. Iranun bermaksud berkasih-kasih. Ini bagi mewujudkan sistem hubungan sosial yang amat erat, yang terikat oleh tali persaudaraan yang amat intim, yang berlandaskan sistem kerjasama dan gotong-royong.

Mereka merupakan pelayar yang cekap, tempat tinggal masyarakat Iranun banyak tertumpu di kawasan tepi pantai. Namun ada juga yang terletak di bahagian dalam daerah. Masyarakat Iranun ini banyak menetap di

daerah Kota Belud seperti di kampung Pantai Emas, Kaguraan, Kota Peladok, Tamau, Paya-Payas, Marampayan, Kota Bongan, dan lain-lain.

Idaan adalah etnik yang menetap terutamanya di sekitar daerah Lahad Datu di persisiran timur Sabah. Populasi semasa dianggarkan sekitar 6,000, etnik ini memiliki hak eksklusif bagi mengumpulkan sarang burung layang-layang di dalam gua batu kapur di kawasan penempatan mereka. Sebahagian besarnya adalah muslim, tetapi sebahagian kecil suku kaum yang dikenali sebagai Begaak adalah animist. Selama beberapa abad etnik Idaan telah memiliki mekanisme sosial berasaskan sejarah. Sebagai etnik minoriti, Idaan beroperasi sebagai kumpulan korporat berkait rapat berkaitan dengan aktiviti menuai sarang burung layang-layang.

Bisaya dikatakan di antara yang pertama menerima Islam pada awal kurun ke-13. Kedatangan Islam dalam kaum Bisaya adalah melalui hubungan dagang dengan pedagang dari tanah Arab. Jika dilihat daripada segi kehidupan sosial, sedikit sebanyak pengaruh Arab memainkan peranan dalam urusan mereka sehari-harian. Bangsa Bisaya adalah suku kaum asli yang telah tinggal dan menetap di Borneo Sabah sejak beribu tahun yang lalu. Kemahiran suku kaum ini dalam bidang pertanian. Mereka juga mahir memburu binatang liar di hutan untuk dimakan. Selain itu mereka juga menternak ayam, itik, angsa, lembu dan lain-lain binatang sebagai makanan. Kaum Bisaya juga mahir dalam seni kraftangan dan sebahagian besar peralatan kraftangan digunakan dalam kehidupan seharian mereka selain mahir menangkap ikan.

Sulu berasal daripada Kepulauan Sulu dan Borneo (Sabah) sejak zaman Kesultanan Sulu lagi. Kaum Suluk ini menggunakan bahasa Tausug sebagai bahasa pertuturan. Agama rasmi yang dianuti adalah agama Islam. Kaum Suluk ini juga mempunyai budayanya yang unik dan tersendiri. . Pusat petempatan bagi orang Suluk adalah terletak di daerah Kudat, Semporna, Sandakan, Lahad Datu, Kota Kinabalu, Menggatal, Tuaran dan Telipok. Orang Suluk tidak memanggil diri mereka Suluk melainkan menggelar diri mereka Tausug yang membawa maksud "Orang dari Sulu".

Suku kaum Tidung adalah suku kaum rumpun Melayu yang banyak terdapat di bahagian tenggara Sabah iaitu sekitar daerah Tawau dan Sebatik. Antara suku kaum Melayu Tidung begitu dikenali di Tawau ialah Tidung Apas, Tidung Indrasabah, Tidung Membalua, Tidung Merotai dan Tidung Kalabakan. Terdapat juga ramai suku kaum Tidung di beberapa kawasan di Sandakan seperti di Beluran. Mereka adalah etnik Muslim dan menggunakan bahasa Melayu untuk berkomunikasi dengan entiti masyarakat lain di sekitarnya seperti masyarakat Bolongan ( Tanjung Selor), masyarakat Banjar ( Banjarmasin ), masyarakat Kutai dan masyarakat Berau yang merupakan penghuni.



Masyarakat pelbagai etnik pribumi minoriti hidup dalam keadaan yang harmoni dan saling bantu membantu antara satu sama lain adalah merupakan keunikan bagi negeri Sabah. Masyarakatnya hidup dalam keadaan kepelbagaian budaya dan menarik perhatian ramai pelancong luar ke negeri ini.

Terdapat 36 kumpulan pribumi yang berbeza di Sarawak dan ini dapat dibahagikan kepada kumpulan-kumpulan besar seperti berikut: Iban, Bidayuh, Orang Ulu dan Melanau. Mereka tinggal di sepanjang pesisir pantai dan sungai seperti Sungai Rejang, Sungai Batang Lupar dan Sungai Sekrang, dan ada juga yang masih tinggal di pedalaman seperti orang Punan dan Penan. Setiap kumpulan etnik ini telah mewarisi pengetahuan tradisional yang luas daripada nenek moyang mereka dan sebahagian besarnya tidak pernah didokumentasikan. Pengetahuan ini termasuklah amalan yang telah dilakukan berkurun lamanya seperti penanaman sumber makanan dan bagaimana untuk terus hidup dalam alam sekitar mereka. Penggunaan dan pengurusan sumber-sumber biologi oleh masyarakat pribumi ini sedari zaman dahulu dikenali sebagai pengetahuan tradisional.

Sementara ramai di antara generasi-generasi tua di dalam komuniti-komuniti ini yang masih mempertahankan pengetahuan tradisional mereka, terdapat kebimbangan akan hilangnya pengetahuan ini disebabkan oleh perubahan cara hidup, keutamaan, senangnya memperoleh kemudahan-kemudahan moden dan hilangnya kebergantungan ke atas sumber-sumber semulajadi oleh komuniti-komuniti pribumi ini. Ini menjadikannya semakin penting untuk mendokumentasi Pengetahuan Tradisional oleh setiap komuniti pribumi dan mempertahankannya sebagai warisan agar ia tidak hilang ditelan masa.

Orang Ulu ialah suatu gelaran ciptaan politik untuk mengumpulkan kira-kira 27 kelompok etnik kecil tetapi berbeza di Sarawak, Malaysia dengan populasi di antara kurang 300 orang hingga lebih 25,000 orang. *Orang Ulu* bukan merupakan istilah rasmi dan tidak wujud dalam Perlembagaan Malaysia. Istilah ini dipopularkan oleh satu persatuan minoriti yang dibentuk pada 1969 dan dikenali sebagai "Persatuan Kebangsaan Orang Ulu" (OUNA). Antara kaum yang termasuk dalam kelompok Orang Ulu ialah: Kayan, Kenyah, Kajang, Kejaman, Punan, Ukit, Penan, Lun Bawang, Lun Dayeh, Murut, Berawan dan Kelabit.

Kaum Bidayuh adalah masyarakat yang mendiami kawasan barat daya Sarawak, terutamanya Bahagian Serian, Kuching dan di barat Kalimantan. Mereka terdiri daripada empat pecahan etnik iaitu Selakau/Lara (Daerah Lundu), Jagoi/Singai (Daerah Bau), Biatah (Daerah Kecil Padawan) dan Bukar/Sadong (Daerah Serian). Mereka kebanyakannya beragama Kristian. Hanya sebahagian sahaja yang menganut agama Islam dan animisme.

Pada zaman dahulukala suku kaum bidayuh tinggal di rumah panjang. Lazimnya penempatan rumah panjang suku kaum Bidayuh terletak jauh di kawasan pendalaman dan tanah tinggi. Ini adalah bagi tujuan keselamatan iaitu sukar untuk dikesan oleh musuh. Struktur rumah panjang kaum Bidayuh tidak jauh bezanya dengan struktur rumah panjang masyarakat Iban di Sarawak. Atap rumah panjang kaum Bidayuh diperbuat daripada atap rumbia atau sagu, manakala dindingnya pula daripada buluh. Pelantar atau lantai rumah panjang pula diperbuat daripada papan atau buluh manakala tiangnya pula diperbuat daripada kayu belian.

Rumah panjang masyarakat Bidayuh terbahagi kepada 3 bahagian iaitu bilik utama, awah dan tanju. Bilik utama dapat kita samakan dengan ruang utama kediaman pada masa sekarang. Di dalam bilik ini masyarakat Bidayuh lazimnya meletakkan barang-barang peribadi milik keluarga dan keturunan mereka seperti Gong, tempayan, tembikar dan sebagainya. Ruang ini juga berfungsi sebagai tempat tidur di kala malam hari. Awah pula adalah bahagian pelantar di luar rumah panjang Masyarakat Bidayuh dan lazimnya ia bertutup dan beratap. Ia dapatlah disamakan dengan berandah rumah pada dewasa ini. Di "awah" masyarakat Bidayuh menjalankan aktiviti aktiviti harian mereka seperti menganyam, berbual, membuat peralatan bertani dan sebagainya. Ruangan Awah juga akan digunakan untuk sebarang upacara keagamaan seperti perkahwinan, pantang larang dan pesta-pesta tertentu seperti pesta gawai dan sebagainya. "tanju" pula adalah bahagian terluar di dalam rumah panjang masyarakat bidayuh. Bahagian Tanju agak terdedah dan lazimnya ia tidak bertutup mahupun beratap. Tanju lazimnya digunakan untuk Menjemur hasil tuaian masyarakat Bidayuh seperti padi, lada, jagung dan sebagainya

Bahasa Bidayuh agak unik berbanding bahasa-bahasa yang lain yang terdapat di Sarawak. Keunikan ini adalah berdasarkan sebutan, pertuturan, gerak gaya dan alunan yang dipertuturkan. Lazimnya, bahasa Bidayuh akan berubah intonasi dan bahasa mengikut kampung dan daerah tertentu. Hal ini menyebabkan suku kaum ini sukar untuk berkomunikasi dengan satu sama lain sekiranya mereka adalah suku atau dari daerah yang berlainan. Sebagai contoh, suku Bidayuh dari Kawasan serian menyebut "makan" ialah "ma-an" manakala suku Bidayuh dari kawasan padawan pula menyebut "makan" sebagai "man".

Warna hitam adalah warna utama dalam pemakaian masyarakat Bidayuh. Bagi Kaum wanita masyarakat Bidayuh, pakaian lengkap adalah termasuk baju berlengan pendek atau separuh lengan dan sepasang kain sarung berwarna hitam paras lutut yang dihiasi dengan manik manik halus pelbagai warna disulami dengan kombinasi warna utama iaitu putih, kuning dan merah. Tudung kecil separuh tinggi dengan corak anyaman yang indah atau penutup kepala daripada kain berwarna warni dengan sulaman manik halus adalah pelengkap hiasan kepala wanita masyarakat Bidayuh. Kaum Lelaki masyarakat Bidayuh pula lazimnya mengenakan sepasang persalinan berbentuk baju hitam separuh lengan atau berlengan pendek dengan sedikit corak berunsur

flora dan seluar hitam atau cawat yang berwarna asas seperti biru, merah dan putih. Kain lilit kepala pula adalah pelengkap hiasan kepala kaum lelaki masyarakat ini.

Bagi masyarakat Bidayuh, muzik memainkan peranan yang penting dalam setiap upacara keagamaan yang mereka jalankan. Muzik ini berperanan menaikkan semangat, mengusir roh jahat dan sebagai pententeram kepada semangat roh. Muzik juga memainkan peranan dalam pemberitahuan motif sesuatu upacara yang dijalankan. Umumnya muzik tradisional masyarakat Bidayuh terdiri daripada sepasang gong besar, Canang, Gendang dan Tawak (sejenis gong kecil. Terdapat juga alat muzik tradisional yang lain seperti serunai/seruling dan gitar buluh. Namun alat muzik seumpama ini amat kurang dimainkan kerana proses pembuatannya yang agak rumit. Lembing, tombak, parang ilang (parang pendek), sumpit, "jepur" (seakan samurai) dan "rira" (meriam kecil) adalah peralatan senjata yang lazimnya digunakan oleh masyarakat ini untuk berperang pada zaman dahulu kala. Manakala peralatan senjata seperti parang, cangkul dan sabit selalunya digunakan untuk aktiviti pertanian.

Kaum Iban dahulu dikenali sebagai *Dayak Laut* dan dengan jumlah sebanyak 876,000 iaitu 40% daripada jumlah penduduk Sarawak, kaum Iban merupakan kumpulan etnik yang terbesar di Sarawak, mereka mendiami daerah dan bahagian negeri Sarawak dari daerah Lundu di barat dan Limbang di timur laut, tetapi kepadatan penduduk Iban adalah di bahagian Kota Samarahan, Sri Aman, Sarikei, Sibu, Kapit, Bintulu dan Miri. Kebanyakan kaum Iban tinggal berkampung di rumah panjang yang kebiasaannya terletak di tebingan sungai dan di tepi jalan raya ini adalah bagi mempermudah aktiviti kerja, berhubung dan berkomunikasi antara satu sama lain. Amalan cara hidup yang diamalkan adalah berlandaskan hukum adat, pantang-larang, tolak-ansur (*tolenransi*), dan berteraskan perhubungan persaudaraan yang erat antara satu sama lain. Kebanyakan masyarakat Iban pada hari ini menerima agama Kristian sebagai pegangan, tetapi dalam masa yang sama masih mengekalkan nilai adat resam dan ciri-ciri kebudayaan yang menjadi lambang tradisi masyarakat Iban. [Sarawak mempunyai 112 jenis suku Dayak]

Orang Iban biasanya menduduki di lembah Sungai Saribas, Sungai Skrang, Sungai Batang Lupar, dan Sungai Rajang. Kaum Iban adalah kaum yang mengamalkan banyak budaya yang menarik. Mereka hidup bermasyarakat dan mendiami rumah-rumah panjang. Diketuai oleh ketua kampung yang dipanggil Tuai Rumah. Kebanyakan masyarakat Iban sekarang telah menetap di bandar-bandar besar di sekitar Negeri Sarawak.

Perayaan Gawai merupakan perayaan utama bagi suku kaum Iban. Jenis-jenis Hari Gawai adalah seperti Gawai Dayak, Gawai Burung, Gawai Batu, Gawai Kenyalang, Gawai Panggul, Gawai Kelingkang, Gawai Tuah, Gawai Lelabi dan Gawai Antu. Antaranya sambutan Hari Gawai Dayak yang dijalankan antara hari pertama dan kedua pada bulan Jun adalah terpenting. Biasanya, Tarian Ngajat ditarikan dalam sambutan Hari Gawai sebagai tanda kesyukuran dalam kehasilan menuai padi sepanjang tahun ini. Tuai rumah merupakan orang yang bertanggungjawab untuk menguruskan sambutan yang penting ini. Perayaan Gawai juga tidak akan lengkap, sekiranya Tuak tidak dihidangkan. Minuman yang diperbuat daripada ragi dan beras boleh didapati di rumah panjang.

Kaum Iban dikenali dengan " Master of Language " oleh dunia. Prof Derek Freeman adalah salah seorang dikalangan pengkaji Bahasa Iban yang menyatakan bahawa orang Iban sememangnya master of language. Prof Derek Freeman turut menyatakan bahawa Orang Iban pandai dalam menggunakan bahasa, di setiap baris ayat, mencipta serta membina puisi dengan cantik, bijak dalam memilih dan menyusun ayat sereta mempunyai banyak jenis puisi yang menggunakan penyusunan ayat yang sesuai dengan bunyi, seperti yang digunakan dalam poems dan prose dalam Bahasa Inggeris. Orang Iban yang mempunyai bahasanya yang tersendiri, iaitu Bahasa Iban, bahasa Iban berbeza di setiap tempat bukan sahaja di Sarawak tetapi di Kalimantan, Sabah dan Semenanjung. Bahasa Iban merupakan bahasa yang seragam (homogenous). Masyarakat Dayak-Iban merupakan satu-satunya bangsa bumiputra di Malaysia yang mempunyai sistem tulisan yang disebut 'Turai'. Ia mempunyai tidak kurang daripada 59 abjad yang mewakili bunyi sebutan seperti tulisan rumi. Sistem tulisan ini berkesan apabila orang Iban dapat merujuk keturunan sehingga 15 generasi yang terdahulu dengan darjah ketepatan yang mengagumkan dan juga merekodkan peristiwa penting. Salah satu peristiwa yang penting dalam sejarah orang Iban ialah 'Pirate of Beting Maro' di mana mereka mematahkan kemaraan penjajah dengan serangan [Ngayau] dan membawa pulang kepala musuh yang dipenggal. Kebanyakan generasi baru masyarakat Iban pada masa kini tidak tinggal di rumah panjang, mereka hanya ke rumah panjang apabila tibanya Gawai.

Dalam Kepercayaan Iban, mereka berpegang kepada adat yang diwarisi turun temurun dan ditulis di dalam 'Papan Turai' oleh 'Tuai Raban Bansa' atau "Chief Paramount" dengan berpandukan nasihat 'Beliau' dan 'Lemambang'. Contohnya apabila hendak membuka penempatan dan mendirikan rumah, kawasan tanah yang hendak didirikan rumah tersebut hendaklah disemak terlebih dahulu. Mereka juga percaya pada petanda-petanda lain seperti bunyi burung ketupung dan burung beragai. Bunyi yang dikeluarkan oleh binatang-binatang

ini adalah petunjuk dan alamat untuk menentukan kesesuaian tapak. Semua petanda akan ditafsirkan oleh 'Beliau' dan 'Manang' bagi mematuhi adat supaya tidak mendatangkan malapetaka.

Mimpi merupakan salah satu sumber alamat tentang sesuatu yang bakal terjadi di masa akan datang dan diterjemah oleh Beliau dan Manang. Bagi menghidar alamat yang boleh mendatangkan malapetaka, biasanya upacara 'Ngintu Burung' dan 'belian' akan dijalankan mengikut 'Adat' yang dirujuk kepada Tuai Raban Bansa.

Sebahagian besar masyarakat Iban masih tinggal di rumah-rumah panjang dimana pola pertempatan bagi rumah panjang ini adalah beselerak dilembah sungai di seluruh Negeri Sarawak, segolongan besar orang Iban masih melibatkan diri di dalam kegiatan pertanian iaitu menanam padi bukit atau padi huma. Orang Iban pada zaman dahulu merupakan peneroka terulung dalam membuka hutan rimba (berimba) atau (berumpang kampong) bagi tujuan penanaman padi bukit. Aktiviti penerokaan ini dilakukan dengan seluas yang termampu dengan matlamat untuk mendapatkan hasil tuaian tanaman padi yang lebih banyak. Bagi masyarakat Iban sesiapa yang dapat tuaian padi yang banyak maka dia merupakan seorang yang boleh dianggap kaya dan dipandang tinggi, pintar dan rajin. Justeru itu masyarakat Iban pernah dianggap sebagai salah satu masyarakat yang terkenal dengan penanaman padi bukit (Sultive, 1978:3). Selain itu orang Iban yang tinggal di rumah panjang masih menjalankan aktiviti memburu dan mendapat sumber-sumber hutan untuk mendapatkan bekalan makanan dan perubatan. Pada hari ini sebahagian orang Iban mula menetap di bandar-bandar besar di Sarawak, kebanyakan generasi baru Iban mempunyai pengetahuan dan kelayakan pendidikan dan berkerja di dalam sektor awam dan sektor swasta.

Tarian Ngajat sangat popular dalam kalangan orang Iban di Sarawak. Tarian Ngajat terdiri daripada beberapa jenis, antaranya ialah Ngajat Induk, Ngajat Bebung, Ngajat Lesong, Ngajat Semain, Ngajat Berayah dan Ngajat Ngemai "antu pala". Ngajat bagi orang-orang Iban ialah tarian semasa menyambut Hari Gawai orang-orang Iban sebelum berperang dan selepas musim menuai. Pada zaman dahulu tarian tersebut ditarikan selepas mereka kembali dari berperang. Penari akan memakai pakaian tradisi seperti 'sirat', 'gagung' atau baju burung. Penari juga memakai topi yang dihias dengan bulu-bulu burung. Gagung merupakan sejenis baju yang tebal dan keras yang diperbuat daripada kulit haiwan seperti kulit beruang tetapi tidak dihajit kiri dan kanannya.

Tarian ini ditarikan dengan berdiri atas bulatan langsung ke atas dan ke bawah, penari akan melompat bersama iringan lagu. Setiap rentak yang dimainkan adalah bersesuaian dengan upacaranya. Bagi Gawai Sandau Ari, gendang Rayah dimainkan untuk tetamu kehormat dan orang yang menyambut gawai untuk ber'Rayah' sambil membawa tengkorak musuh. Satu lagi jenis tarian ini ialah penari akan memegang perisai kayu di tangan kiri



dan pedang di tangan kanan lalu menari seperti berdepan dengan musuh dengan menghayunkan badannya ke kiri dan ke kanan. Lagu iringan dibunyikan daripada alat-alat seperti gong besar dan kecil, gendang, tawak, bebendai, engkurumong dan sapeh, iaitu alat bertali seperti gitar. Bagi penari lelaki atau digelar 'keling', Mereka akan memakai pakaian tradisi seperti 'sirat', 'gagung' atau baju burung dan juga memakai topi yang dihias dengan bulu-bulu burung. Gagung merupakan sejenis baju yang tebal dan keras yang diperbuat daripada kulit haiwan seperti kulit beruang tetapi tidak dijahit kiri dan kanannya. Manakala bagi penari wanita atau digelar sebagai 'kumang' pula, mereka memakai pakaian tradisional.

Ngayau, merupakan tradisi kaum Dayak Iban pada suatu masa dahulu. Kini tradisi memburu kepala atau "ngayau" tidak lagi diamalkan dan telah diharamkan oleh terutamanya pada zaman penjajahan lagi. Ramai pihak berpendapat atau berfahaman bahawa, "lelaki iban yang berjaya memperolehi kepala dalam ekspedisi ngayau akan menjadi rebutan atau kegilaan ramai wanita" ini kerana ia melambangkan keberanian dan satu jaminan dan kepercayaan bahawa lelaki tersebut mampu menjaga keselamatan wanita yang dikahwininya. Sebenarnya kenyataan itu tidak 100% tepat, malah masih boleh dipersoalkan. Ia dikatakan sedemikian kerana menurut cerita lisan masyarakat Iban di Rumah-Rumah panjang, selain orang Bujang ada juga individu yang telah berkeluarga menyertai ekspedisi memburu kepala.

Oleh itu, paling tepat kalau kita katakan bahawa, aktiviti "Ngayau" dijalankan adalah untuk mendapat penghormatan pada mata masyarakat. Dalam erti kata lain, "ngayau" juga berperanan untuk menaikkan taraf sosial seseorang. Orang yang pernah memperolehi kepala dalam aktiviti "ngayau" yang disertainya akan digelar sebagai "Bujang Berani", serta dikaitkan dengan hal-hal sakti. Ternyata bahawa masyarakat Iban Tradisional tidak memandang "Ngayau" sebagai perkara yang memudaratkan. Malah berdasarkan cerita lisan masyarakat Iban juga, "ngayau" sentiasa dikaitkan dengan berbagai-bagai unsur positif. Misalnya, "Ngayau sebagai lambang keberanian, Simbol Kelelakian, serta martabat Sosial.

Bagi masyarakat Iban dahulu, usaha bagi si teruna untuk memikat si dara akan dilakukan pada malam hari melalui amalan yang dipanggil Ngayap (Sandin,1980:69).amalan ngayap ini dilaksanakan bagi membolehkan si teruna dan si dara untuk berkenalan dan meluahkan isi hati kepada pasangan masing-masing,walaupun amalan ngayap dibenarkan ,namun ngayap seharusnya dilakukan dengan adap sopan santun yang berlandaskan adat dan pegangan hidup bermasyarakat kaum iban itu sendiri bagi mengelakan salah sangka dan fitnah yang boleh mencemarkan nilai budaya masyarakat iban.

Mengikut adat, seseorang teruna boleh mengunjungi si dara tidak melebihi tiga malam berturut-turut, jika kunjungan berterusan, ibu- bapa si gadis mempunyai hak untuk menentukan dan bertanya kepada si teruna samada si teruna serius di dalam usahanya untuk memikat atau tidak, jika didapati si teruna tidak jujur dan hanya ingin berfoya-foya maka kunjungannya haruslah dihentikan dengan segera . Dan jika si teruna serius dan bercadang untuk mengawini si Gadis, maka si teruna dinasihatkan supaya memberitahu ibubapanya tentang hasratnya untuk datang meminang si gadis. Sekiranya si teruna masih berkunjung tanpa membuat keputusan maka ibubapa si gadis berhak menangkap si teruna dan menguruskan perkahwinan pasangan yang berkernaan dan kemudian merujuk perkara tersebut kepada Tuai Rumah (Ketua Kaum) dan penduduk rumah panjang yang berkenaan.

Pada masa kini tradisi dan amalan ngayap tidak lagi diamalkan di dalam arus pembangunan dan cara hidup yang lebih bersifat kemodenan, justeru itu perjumpaan si teruna dan dara dijalankan semasa majlis keramaian, seperti gawai, pergaulan di sekolah, di institusi pengajian tinggi, atau di tempat kerja pasangan masing-masing. Namun demikian ngayap adalah sebahagian kecil daripada budaya warisan Iban, untuk mengelakan budaya ini dari disalahgunakan oleh generasi baru, maka amalan ini harus dihadkan untuk orang Iban sahaja, sekiranya terdapat pelanggaran adap atau campurtangan kaum lain di dalam amalan ini, maka undang-undang boleh diambil seperti yang termaktup dalam Seksyen 132 Adat Iban, 1993.

Sesama dengan suku kaum Iban, Orang Melanau tinggal di dalam rumah panjang (yang dibina dengan tinggi). Namun, masyarakat Melanau pada masa kini telah mengubah cara kehidupan mereka dengan tinggal di dalam rumah kampung yang mengikut corak orang Melayu. Masyarakat Melanau yang bukan beragama Islam mempercayai makhluk ghaib yang dipanggil Ipok.

Suku etnik Melanau berkumpul di persisiran pantai seperti kawasan lembah utara Sungai Rajang, Igan, Mukah, Oya, dan Bintulu. Masyarakat yang terawal di Sarawak menetap di Mukah.

Kegiatan ekonomi utama mereka adalah menangkap hasil laut dan menjadi petani padi sawah bagi sebahagian kecil daripada mereka yang tinggal di pedalaman. Selain ini, perusahaan sagu juga diusahakan oleh kaum ini. Pokok sagu tumbuh di kawasan yang berpayau. Pokok Sagu hanya boleh ditebang selepas sepuluh tahun. Tepung sagu atau lemantak diperoleh daripada isi pokok sagu yang dipanggil ripo. Ripo dijemur sehingga kering dan diproses sebelum dijadikan lemantak, iaitu tepung sagu. Sarawak merupakan pengeksport sagu yang terbesar di Malaysia.

Perayaan Kaul disambut oleh orang Melanau dengan meriah pada bulan Mac/April setiap tahun dalam bulan Pengejin mengikut kalender Melanau. Perayaan ini diadakan untuk menjamu ipok yang mengawal laut. Tujuannya untuk memperoleh tangkapan yang memuaskan dan selamat semasa berada di laut serta mengelakkan pelbagai wabak dan penyakit. Perayaan ini melambangkan berakhirnya musim hujan dan kedatangan atau permulaan musim menangkap ikan. Dalam hari ini, serahang akan disediakan untuk menjamu ipok. Serahang adalah diperbuat daripada daun buluh dan daun nipah dengan memasukkan bertih, telur ayam, pulut kuning, kirai atau rokok daun, dan sirih ke dalamnya. Walau bagaimanapun, perayaan ini datang dengan kehairahan dan kegembiraan.

Selain Pesta Kaul yang disambut meriah setiap tahun, terdapat budaya yang masih utuh diamalkan oleh masyarakat Melanau khususnya yang melibatkan peristiwa kematian ahli keluarga. Walau bagaimanapun, amalan tersebut berbeza-beza mengikut daerah dan kampung. Bagi masyarakat Melanau yang mendiami daerah Matu, amalan yang berkaitan dengan kematian sudah banyak dipengaruhi oleh agama Islam. Selepas selesai majlis pengebumian, ahli keluarga akan bersedia untuk mengadakan upacara "sare" iaitu seperti rumah terbuka selama 7 malam berturut-turut. Rumah keluarga si mati akan dikunjungi oleh sanak saudara dan masyarakat setempat. Akan tetapi ia sudah dipengaruhi oleh agama Islam secara dengan majlis tahlil, bacaan yassin, sembahyang berjemaah, dan kenduri arwah. Adalah fenomena biasa bagi satu keluarga Melanau yang orang tuanya menganuti agama tradisional, dan anak-anak menganuti agama Islam dan Kristian.

Bahasa Melanau mempunyai tatabahasanya yang tersendiri dan tidak begitu sukar untuk dipelajari. Sebagai satu bahasa yang mempunyai banyak dialek, bahasa melanau berkongsi tatabahasa yang serupa. Oleh itu apa yang perlu ditumpukan ialah kosa kata yang unik untuk dialek itu sahaja. Di alam maya laman untuk mempelajari bahasa melanau telah diusahakan oleh orang-orang melanau dan bukan melanau untuk memastikan kemandirian bahasa ini di zaman moden. Antaranya ialah Learn Melanau yang memfokuskan bahasa Melanau mukah serta budaya melanau merentasi dialek-dialek.

### **Kepelbagaian Budaya Etnik Pribumi Minoriti**

Seperti budaya Melayu yang dominan atau budaya Cina dan India, etnik pribumi minoriti juga ada budaya yang unik dan tersendiri dari segi keagamaan, perayaan, pakaian, makanan, seni bela diri, seni tampak, teater, warisan ketara dan tak ketara, tarian, adat pertunangan, adat perkahwinan, adat menyambut kelahiran, upacara kematian, perubatan, nilai dan norma, muzik dan nyanyian, permainan tradisional dan sebagainya.

Warisan ketara adalah seperti tapak tanah bersejarah, monumen, bangunan atau sesuatu yang tidak boleh dipindahkan, dan artifak iaitu bahan kebudayaan yang boleh dipindahkan termasuk artifak (seperti batu nisan, tekstil, ukiran kayu, manik, manuskrip), manakala warisan tak ketara adalah seperti ilmu, kepakaran, tradisi lisan, nilai-nilai adat dan kebudayaan, bahasa & persuratan, acara perayaan, ritual & kepercayaan, seni persembahan, seni tampak, seni perubatan tradisional, sukan dan permainan tradisional.

Contohnya, pesta pribumi minoriti di Sabah dan Sarawak, walaupun terdapat variasi-variasi mengikut suku kaum dan tempat, namun secara amnya mereka mengadakan perayaan yang agak seragam iaitu pesta Keamatan dan Gawai. Pada asasnya pesta tersebut adalah perayaan kesyukuran selepas menuai padi. Di Sabah, ada perayaan yang dikenali sebagai Samazai di kalangan masyarakat Kadazan yang dirayakan pada bulan Mei. Di Sarawak, pesta utama dinamakan Gawai iaitu perayaan Orang Dayak pada awal bulan Jun. Perayaan yang sama dilakukan oleh suku kaum lain di pelbagai tempat di negeri tersebut seperti oleh Orang Ulu dan Bidayuh.

Program tipikal pada pesta itu ialah penjualan kraf, persembahan kebudayaan, pertandingan menyumpit dan tarian suku-kaum masing-masing. Setiap pesta tersebut masih mempunyai keunikan, misalnya di Kota Belud (Sabah) diadakan demonstrasi orang Bajau menunggang kuda (equestrians) dalam pakain penuh berhias. Masyarakat pribumi minoriti di Sabah dan Sarawak juga mengadakan perarakan kereta berhias, pertandingan kedai berhias, pertandingan permainan, perarakan lampu, pertandingan ratu kebaya dan ratu cantik dan pertunjukan orkid.

Penglibatan pribumi minoriti di Sabah dan Sarawak dalam pembangunan kebudayaan adalah seiringan dengan pembangunan pelancongan kerana festival di Sabah dan Sarawak mempunyai nilai eksotis dan autentik yang dapat menarik pelancong ke negara ini. Gawai di Sarawak dan Samazai di Sabah telah diistiharkan oleh Kerajaan Pusat sebagai hari cuti umum di dua buah negeri berkenaan dan persembahan perayaan itu telah diwartakan oleh kerajaan secara rasmi sebagai program Rumah Terbuka Malaysia.

Pesta-pestanya yang berbenih dari agama Kristian di Sabah dan Sarawak adalah seperti Krismas, Feast of Santa Cruz (pada bulan September) dan Palm Sunday Procession. Krismas ialah suatu perayaan di kalangan penganut Kristian dari pelbagai mazhab. Feast of Santa Cruz (pada bulan September) ialah perayaan tahunan bagi penganut Katolik. Ia suatu perayaan peringatan “the Feast of the Exaltation of the Holy Cross”. Palm Sunday Procession, biasanya pada 16 Mac setiap tahun. Ia adalah suatu perarakan agama dan acara utamanya ialah perarakan patung Christ yang disalib dan mereka berarak dengan membawa lilin yang dinyalakan.

Secara tradisi kehidupan masyarakat pribumi minoriti diatur oleh adat mereka yang amat rapat berkait dengan sistem pertanian berhumas padi. Di atas kepercayaan kepada semangat padi maka pelbagai perayaan dan ritual dilakukan pada bila-bila masa sepanjang tahun. Gawai dan ritual ini diketuai oleh beberapa ketua tertentu bergantung kepada jenis dan tujuannya. Disepanjang tahun masyarakat pribumi minoriti di Sarawak merayakan suatu jenis Gawai tertentu bergantung kepada tahap bertani dan juga kehidupan seluruhnya. Gawai kecil adalah semacam doa selamat setelah berjaya mendapat sesuatu atau pun terelak dari bahaya. Gawai utama ialah yang berkaitan dengan pertanian padi.

Permulaan kegiatan pertanian itu sendiri akan diketuai oleh ketua suku kaum pribumi minority masing-masing sebagai ketua dalam rumah panjang. Apakala sampai kepada membaca sampi (jampi) dan doa, mereka ada ketua agama mereka yang memimpin mereka melakukan ritual tertentu. Jika berlaku kesakitan mereka panggil dukun atau *manang* (pawang) untuk melakukan ritual pengubatan. Kadang-kadang pawang memeriksa punca penyakit dengan cara menilik hati babi hutan. Penyakit dikatakan berpunca dari pelanggaran terhadap adat terutama pantang (mali) dan larangan dalam berbagai upacara kepercayaan, kehidupan sosial dan juga kegiatan berhumas. Pelanggaran terhadap pantang berkaitan semangat padi adalah yang paling berat kerana ia melibatkan makanan dan hasil tuaian.

Dalam konsep masyarakat pribumi minoriti, masing-masing ada kuasa ketuhanan. Contohnya, dalam masyarakat Iban, *Raja Entala* adalah tuhan mereka, dipercayai telah melahirkan manusia yang menurunkan orang Iban yang memberi segala macam upacara, gawai dan pantang larang dan peraturan hidup bernama *adat*. Segala macam peraturan, adat-istiadat dan upacara adalah adat. Untuk memulakan kehidupan bertani, orang Iban ada *Tuai Burung* yang memimpin upacara ritual pertanian. Mereka percaya pada tanda dari melihat dan mendengar bunyi beberapa jenis burung kerana bunyi ini memberikan petanda terhadap bertuah atau buruknya suatu kegiatan dan masa melakukannya. Jika bunyi burung ini diketepikan, mereka akan didatangi bala serta kematian.

Kehidupan masyarakat pribumi minoriti berlaku dalam rumah panjang, rumah biasa, bilik-bilik dan juga ruang tertentu. Di situlah mereka melahirkan anak, berkahwin dan kemudian meninggal dunia dan dikebumikan di kawasan berdekatan rumah. Adat diaplikasikan mereka untuk mengatur semua segi kehidupan termasuk nilai utama, kebiasaan harian dan juga hukuman yang melanggar pantang serta taboo yang berat.



Upacara memandikan anak di sungai dilakukan selepas bayi diberi nama dan berusia lebih kurang satu bulan. Tujuannya ialah untuk membiasakan bayi dengan air sungai. Jiran-jiran sekampung dan juga kampung-kampung berdekatan akan dimaklumkan tentang upacara yang akan dijalankan. Bayi yang dipakaikan kain *pua* akan digendong dan dibawa ke sungai sambil diringi dengan muzik tradisional Iban. Sepanjang upacara ini gendang akan dimainkan tanpa henti supaya semangat jahat tidak mengganggu dan upacara berjalan dengan baik. Dua orang lelaki akan dipilih (seorang daripadanya akan membawa seekor ayam dan seorang lagi akan membawa panji-panji). *Lemambang* atau ketua upacara akan membaca mantera seterusnya akan menetak air sungai. Bayi akan dimandikan dan nama bayi itu akan diumumkan. Bayi tersebut akan dibawa pulang semula ke rumah dan dipangku oleh ibunya yang duduk di atas *tawak* atau gong yang diletak di tengah-tengah *ruai*. Kedua-duanya akan diselimutkan dengan *pua kumbu*. Mereka akan disiramkan dengan air rendaman bahan-bahan seperti cincin emas, wang syiling atau batu penawar supaya bayi tersebut akan dirahmati dengan segala kekayaan. Setelah itu, ibu dan bayinya akan membawa bayi masuk ke bilik dan berakhirilah upacara memandikan bayi.

### **Pendekatan Membudayakan Perpaduan Di Kalangan Pribumi Minoriti**

Pada hari ini, Malaysia mendapat pengiktirafan dunia atas kejayaan mewujudkan perpaduan di kalangan masyarakat majmuk. Namun, proses pengukuhan perpaduan negara perlu terus dilaksanakan kerana peredaran masa membawa bersama pelbagai cabaran baru yang boleh menjejaskan perpaduan negara. Masyarakat pribumi minoriti di Sabah dan Sarawak mempunyai perasaan sepunya dan setiakawan dengan masyarakat dominan seperti Melayu, Cina dan India. Oleh demikian mereka ada semangat patriotik dan kesetiaan kepada negara serta rasa megah sebagai rakyat Malaysia. Mereka tidak memikirkan sangat tentang minoritinya tetapi perasaan kekitaan. Hal inilah yang menyatupadu mereka, iaitu budaya meningkatkan semangat patriotic dan kesetiaan. Pendek kata, pribumi minoriti sanggup memberikan sokongan yang padu kepada dasar perpaduan negara. Malah, semangat patriotik dan kesetiaan kepada negara ini telah dipupuk dari awal agar mereka merasa bangga menjadi rakyat Malaysia.

Kedua, masyarakat pribumi minoriti di Sabah dan Sarawak sedar bahawa Malaysia terdiri daripada pelbagai kaum, agama, budaya dan berasal dari wilayah. Justeru, mereka toleran dan sensitif serta prihatin terhadap kepelbagaian ini. Dengan demikian, wujudlah keharmonian antara kaum, agama dan wilayah melalui pemupukan nilai-nilai masyarakat majmuk yang murni, termasuk hormat-menghormati, toleransi dan saling memahami sesama kaum dan sesama kaum. Ini kerana mereka mementingkan soal perpaduan dalam menentukan keamanan, kesejahteraan dan pembangunan negara amnya.

Ketiga, masyarakat pribumi mengiktiraf kepelbagaian kaum, budaya dan agama dan menghormatinya. Hasilnya ialah suasana kedamaian dan persefahaman di antara mereka dengan masyarakat pribumi majoriti. Pengiktirafan dan penerimaan hakikat ini menjadi satu langkah yang strategik untuk meningkatkan keharmonian antara kaum dan sesama kaum, kebudayaan dan agama. Maknanya, mereka boleh menjadi akrab dan bersatu dengan masyarakat dominan atau dengan semua lapisan dan golongan masyarakat sekaligus meningkatkan keharmonian di kalangan masyarakat majmuk di negara kita.

Seterusnya, masyarakat pribumi di Sabah dan Sarawak tidak mempunyai perasaan yang membezakan antara kaum dan sesama kaum dan wilayah atau antara masyarakat pribumi minoriti dan majoriti. Mereka mahu hidup serasi dengan semua lapisan masyarakat. Sikap demikian mengurangkan polarisasi antara dan sesama kaum, agama dan wilayah kerana tidak timbul perasaan curiga dan benci kepada anggota masyarakat dari kaum dan wilayah yang berlainan, maka tidak tercetus juga ketegangan dan konflik sesama kaum, agama atau wilayah. Hasilnya, perpaduan tidak tergugat.

Memang tidak boleh dinafikan bahawa namun masih terdapat jurang perbezaan yang ketara dari segi pembangunan di sesetengah tempat di Sabah dan Sarawak, apabila dibandingkan dengan negeri-negeri di Semenanjung, khususnya dari aspek infrastruktur asas seperti sistem perhubungan, kesihatan dan pendidikan, tetapi itu bukan alasannya utk tidak bersatu. Masyarakat pribumi minoriti di Sabah dan Sarawak mengalu-alukan program dan proses integrasi ini agar perasaan perbezaan wilayah ini tidak akan membantutkan usaha untuk membina 1 Malaysia seperti dilaungkan oleh Perdana Menteri Malaysia. Sejak program integrasi wilayah (nasional) ini dilaksanakan, proses pengukuhan perpaduan di kalangan masyarakat dominan dan masyarakat pribumi minoriti telah berlaku dengan berkesan. Mereka percaya bahawa gagasan 1 Malaysia boleh dicapai jika mereka menghormati kepelbagaian dalam budaya negara kita.

### **Keserasian Antara Budaya Pribumi Minoriti Dengan Budaya Masyarakat Dominan**

Keserasian boleh berlaku kerana beberapa proses pembudayaannya seperti asimilasi, akulturasi, akomodasi, amalgamasi dan pluralisme. Asimilasi ialah satu proses percampuran kumpulan minoriti ke dalam kumpulan majoriti. Kumpulan minoriti akan mempelajari, menyertai dan mengamalkan cara hidup kumpulan majoriti. Inilah yang berlaku di Sabah (contohnya dalam masyarakat Kadazan-dusun) dan di Sarawak (contohnya Iban Balau-Remun atau Undup-Saribas).

Keserasian ini berlaku asimilasi struktur di mana kumpulan pribumi minoriti berjaya menyertai institusi utama kumpulan majoriti seperti institusi pendidikan, petempatan, ekonomi, politik dan sosial. Dalam kes ini

kumpulan minoriti tidak akan hilang ciri-ciri dan identiti asal, kerana mereka cuma mengalami sedikit perubahan sahaja. Kadang-kadang kumpulan pribumi minoriti diasimilasikan melalui perkahwinan campur dengan ahli kumpulan masyarakat dominan atau ahli kumpulan etnik pribumi yang lebih besar. Keadaan ini membina toleransi identiti dan seterusnya meningkatkan usaha hubungan etnik.

Proses akulturasi juga berlaku apabila kumpulan pribumi minoriti mempelajari budaya pribumi majoriti (atau budaya masyarakat dominan) dan cara hidup seperti ilmu pengetahuan, kepercayaan, seni lukis, moral dan lain-lain tetapi tidak secara keseluruhan. Ini berlaku setiap hari melalui Dasar Ekonomi Baru, Dasar Pendidikan negara, Sekolah Kebangsaan, Barisan Nasional dan sebagainya. Melalui proses akulturasi ini masyarakat pribumi minoriti dengan kebudayaan tertentu nya dihadapkan dengan unsur kebudayaan yang lain. Kebudayaan yang baru (yang dianggap asing) itu lambat laun diterima dan diolah ke dalam kebudayaannya sendiri tanpa menyebabkan hilangnya unsur kebudayaan pribumi minoriti itu sendiri.

Melalui proses akomodasi pula satu kelompok masyarakat pribumi minoriti yang berkonflik telah bersetuju untuk menghentikan dan mengelakkan konflik itu melalui interaksi secara aman. Mereka hidup secara harmoni dan menghormati antara satu sama lain. Contohnya, mereka tidak mahu lagi bertelagah tentang tentang agama atau adat resam tertentu, maka mereka berdamai dan bersetuju menghormati satu sama lain.

Amalgamasi pula ialah percantuman seluruh aspek kehidupan melalui perkahwinan campur. Kepelbagaian etnik bersatu padu dan membentuk satu budaya baru dengan percantuman biologi itu. Proses amalgamasi kerap berlaku di kalangan masyarakat pribumi minoriti dengan masyarakat dominan samada di Sabah dan Sarawak.

Proses pluralisme tidak kurang pentingnya untuk mewujudkan keserasian di kalangan kepelbagaian budaya yang koita boleh namakan sebagai pluralisme kebudayaan. Melalui proses ini tiap kaum pribumi minoriti mempertahankan kepelbagaian budaya dan cara hidup mereka masing-masing. Pendek kata, mereka hidup bersama-sama kaum majoriti lain dan menerima perbezaan yang sedia ada. Maksudnya, mereka mengamalkan budaya masing-masing tanpa sentimen perkauman.

Dalam kes tertentu golongan pribumi minoriti tertentu mengekalkan budaya asal mereka tetapi menerima unsur-unsur kebudayaan kumpulan pribumi majority yang lain hasil daripada pergaulan, interaksi sosial dan perhubungan sesama mereka, contohnya segelintir orang Iban atau Kadazan-dusun yang bermastautin di pekan masyarakat Melayu atau masyarakat Cina/India. Di situ berlaku nya usaha menjayakan hubungan dengan meraikan kepelbagaian etnik melalui budaya, sukan, muzik, fesyen dan makanan. Keadaan ini akan membina

toleransi identiti dan seterusnya meningkatkan usaha hubungan etnik. Model pliralisme ini boleh disebut sebagai *pluralisme ubahsuaian*.

Sejak berlaku Peristiwa 13 Mei 1969 dahulu, tidak kedengaran lagu prasangka mana-mana etnik kerana masyarakat Malaysia serasi. Tidak lagi orang yang bertindak terhadap kaum lain secara *streotaip* (atau *tindakan prejudgement*) dan mengatakan *pribumi mundur*, *melayu malas*, *india putar belit* atau *cina tamak duit*. Sentimen perkauman sudah kurang sekali dan kita telah menjalinkan semangat muhibbah antara satu dengan lain. Kita tidak lagi hanya mementingkan kumpulan etnik kita sendiri atau kumpulan pribumi minoriti sahaja dalam semua hal politik, ekonomi, sosial dan kebudayaan. Dengan kata lain, kita sudah sampai kepada peringkat *etnocentrik* iaitu kita mempunyai kepercayaan bahawa unsur budaya itu sendiri lebih agung/ mulia dari budaya kaum kita sendiri.

Dari segi bahasa, masyarakat pribumi minority di Sabah dan Sarawak telah menerima dan menggunakan Bahasa Melayu dalam kehidupan bermasyarakat seharian mereka kini. Budaya dalam konteks pendidikan semasa dilihat melalui budaya di sekolah. Murid akan di didik untuk berbudaya sebagaimana dikehendaki oleh masyarakat. Oleh demikian, guru perlu menerapkan pendidikan nilai toleransi dan hormat-menghormati supaya semua pelajar dapat diterima oleh pelbagai lapisan masyarakat yang terdiri dari pelbagai kaum. Sekolah harus berupaya menerapkan budaya melalui pendidikan formal dalam kurikulum dan kegiatan ko-kurikulum. Maknanya, perpaduandalam kepelbagaian budaya memerlukan satu usaha yang berterusan khususnya melalui pendidikan demi 1 Malaysia.

### **Cadangan**

Dari segi perancangan negara, “pembangunan masyarakat majmuk” dengan sifat-sifat yang paling ideal dirancang secara konstruktif oleh pihak kerajaan melalui beberapa cara. Antaranya, melalui penganjuran pesta, membawa kumpulan seni persembahan ke luar negara dan mengadakan persembahan seni kebudayaan dalam upacara-upacara (events) tertentu. Misalnya, menurut laporan rasmi Kerajaan (Rancangan Malaysia Kelapan, 2000: 473) tujuan kerajaan menganjurkan Citrawarna Malaysia adalah “untuk mempamerkan adat resam dan tradisi unik masyarakat berbilang kaum sebagai produk tarikan pelancong.”

Salah satu program terpenting dalam pembangunan pelancongan Malaysia kontemporari ialah “Malaysia Truly Asia” – kerana boleh dianggap dasar induk pembangunan produk pelancongan kerana sejak 1999. Objektif utama program ini adalah untuk menjadikan Malaysia sebagai sebuah “Asia kecil” (Asian miniature), iaitu,

Ulang Tahun Ke-40, Konsep dan Dasar Kebudayaan Kebangsaan: Penilaian Semula

省思国家文化概念与政策研讨会

sebuah negara yang mempunyai kesemua peradaban Asia, meliputi peradaban masyarakat peribumi (Melayu dan Bumiputera lain), peradaban Cina, peradaban India, peradaban Arab dan peradaban Barat (komuniti Portugis di Melaka) (Rancangan Malaysia Kelapan 2000: 473).

## Rujukan

A. Aziz Deraman (2001). Masyarakat dan kebudayaan Malaysia (edisi baharu). Kuala Lumpur: Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka.

Brosur Tourism Malaysia (1992 hingga kini). Bahan-bahan penerbitan oleh Pejabat Pelancongan (DOT) dari 1959-1970 tersimpan di Arkib

Furnivall, J. S. (1965). Colonial policy and practices. New York: New York University Press. (Asalnya diterbitkan pada tahun 1948).

Furnivall, J. S. (1980). Plural society. Dalam Hans-Dieters Evers (ed.), Sociology of South-East Asia: Reading on social change and development. Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University. Pp. 86-96.

Khoo Kay Kim (ed.) (1977). The history of the South East, South and East Asia: essays and documents. Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press. Pp. 15-21.

Kua, K. S. (ed.). (1985b). National culture and democracy. Petaling Jaya: Kersanis Penerbit-Penerbit Sdn. Bhd.

Kua, K. S. (ed.). (1987). Polarisation in Malaysia: the root causes. Kuala Lumpur: The Resource & Research Centre of Selangor Chinese Assembly Hall.

Laporan Prestasi Kementerian Kebudayaan, Kesenian dan Warisan, 2004-2007 (Kuala Lumpur: Kementerian Kebudayaan, Kesenian dan Warisan).

Mohamed Anwar Omar Din (2000). “Perkembangan konsep kebudayaan dalam masyarakat Melayu. Dalam Sidik Fazhil, Hanapi Dollah, Mawar Shafie (Penyelenggara). Dari Lontar ke Layar. Bangi: Jabatan Persuratan Melayu, Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia.



Ulang Tahun Ke-40, Konsep dan Dasar Kebudayaan Kebangsaan: Penilaian Semula

省思国家文化概念与政策研讨会

Rex, J. (2001). The Concept of a Multicultural Society. Dalam Guibernau, Monserrat and

Rex (eds.). The Ethnicity Reader, Nationalism, Multiculturalism and Migration. Cambridge: Polity Press, pp. 205-220.

Tylor, E.B. (1958). The Origin of Culture. New York: Harper Torchbooks.

Winstedt, R. O. (1958). The Malays: a cultural history. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

Wood, R. E. (1984). Ethnic tourism: the state, and culture change in Southeast Asia. Annals of Tourism Research. 11 (3): pp. 353-374.

**Dasar Kebudayaan Kebangsaan Sesudah 40 Tahun Merdeka**  
**独立四十年后的国家文化政策**

**Alis bin Puteh**  
**College of Arts and Science, Universiti Utara Malaysia**  
马来西亚北方大学人文与科学院讲师

## PENDAHULUAN

Usaha negara-negara moden pada abad ke-20 untuk mencapai matlamat pembangunan ekonomi yang pesat, kemajuan teknologi yang membanggakan dan modenisasi masyarakat secara menyeluruh telah berjaya menjadikan negara-negara tersebut terkenal sebagai “developed” (maju), “advanced” (terkehadapan) atau “fully industrialised countries” (negeri-negeri yang telah mencapai kemajuan perindustrian sepenuhnya). Tetapi kemajuan dan modernisasi yang dicapai khususnya oleh negara-negara Barat itu juga telah menghasilkan, pada umumnya, kelunturan nilai-nilai budaya, kelonggaran nilai-nilai moral dan keterasingan nilai-nilai agama (Mohd. Kamal, 2010).

Banyak negara umat Islam yang baru mencapai kemerdekaan politik daripada kongkongan penjajahan Barat turut melaksanakan model pembangunan atau modernisasi negara ala Barat dan natijahnya, antara lain, ialah proses pembaratan budaya tempatan dan pencairan nilai-nilai moral yang merisaukan. Modernisasi sekular yang digembar-gemburkan sebagai agenda perubahan yang rasional dan teknologikal rupa-rupanya telah menanamkan akar-akar budaya asing atau westernisasi dan sekularisasi yang bertentangan dengan ajaran agama dan sistem moral orang Islam atau orang Timur (Mohd. Kamal, 2010).

## GLOBALISASI BUDAYA

Memasuki abad ke-21, negara Malaysia dan umat Islam berhadapan pula dengan tiga gelombang besar – globalisasi, ledakan teknologi maklumat dan ekonomi pengetahuan atau maklumat (knowledge-driven economy). Ketiga-tiga gelombang ini juga bermula dari negara-negara Barat yang kaya dan kuat, dan dalam tata dunia yang baru (“New World Order”) di bawah pimpinan negara Amerika Syarikat dan sekutu-sekutunya, ketiga-tiga gelombang itu merupakan cabaran hebat yang sekaligus membuka peluang-peluang tertentu bagi negara-negara sedang membangun untuk berada dalam arus perdana dalam hubungan antarabangsa. Melalui gelombang globalisasi, pengaruh kekuatan ekonomi negara-negara kaya dan kepentingan korporasi gergasi ultinasional dapat menguasai ekonomi dunia di samping menyebarluaskan hegemoni politik dan kapitalismen antarabangsa

Menurut Mohd. Kamal (2010), di bawah dasar liberalisasi dan deregulasi perdagangan antarabangsa pimpinan *World Trade Organisation (WTO)*, globalisasi yang didukung oleh kuasa korporat global memberikan peluang besar kepada mereka untuk mengeksploitasi ekonomi negara-negara membangun, termasuk Malaysia. Situasi

ini akan mempercepat proses homogenisasi budaya secara global di mana negara yang kuat akan mempengaruhi negara yang lemah. Pada waktu itu ciri-ciri luhur dalam budaya Malaysia dan sistem nilai agama dan tradisi yang mendasarinya akan dihipit dan digugat oleh gagasan-gagasan atau aliran-aliran kebudayaan asing yang berjiwa materialistik, sekularistik, relativistik, neo-modernistik, hedonistik atau permissive (serbaboleh). Aliran-aliran yang ingin melemahkan pengaruh nilai-nilai budaya, agama dan moral tempatan itu dibawa masuk oleh unsur-unsur ekonomi kapitalistik tempatan atau antarabangsa yang mementingkan keuntungan kewangan semata-mata tanpa mempedulikan isu tanggungjawab sosial atau moral. Pelbagai saluran akan digunakan untuk mencapai matlamat ekonomi dan budaya bebas mereka, termasuk industri-industri pengiklanan, perfileman, fesyen, muzik, hiburan, pelancongan, media cetak, media elektronik dan Internet.

Dalam masyarakat yang sarat dengan nilai-nilai kebebasan individu di luar kawalan agama dan pandangan hidup sekularistik, telah muncul di akhir abad ke-20 gerakan-gerakan sosial yang memperjuangkan kebebasan seks, penggunaan marijuana, hak pengguguran anak, kebebasan pelacur-pelacur (yang dikenali sebagai “sex workers”), perkahwinan sejenis dan hari-hari perayaan golongan “gay” yang disambut secara besar-besaran. Satu contoh gerakan yang benar-benar merbahaya dan mencabar budaya manusia bertamadun dan nilai-nilai agama tradisional dan moral yang suci ialah perjuangan masyarakat liberal Barat untuk menjayakan konsepsi keluarga yang tidak lagi terdiri dari lelaki dan perempuan, suami isteri dan anak-anak yang sah. Konsep ini diperjuangkan pertama kali dalam persidangan *United Nations Conference on Population and Development* di Cairo pada 1994 dan kemudian di Beijing pada tahun 1995. Seiring dengan itu diperjuangkan juga supaya dihalalkan hubungan seks sebelum nikah kerana hal ini sudah menjadi lumrah di negara-negara maju teknologi. Aliran-aliran seperti ini, sama juga dengan aliran-aliran sastera bebas ala Salman Rushdie, bertitik tolak daripada sikap atau keyakinan sebahagian manusia moden bahawa nilai-nilai agama, budaya dan moral sudah lama ketinggalan zaman dan manusia dengan kepintaran dan kehebatan teknologi inteleknya sahaja boleh mendapat makna hidup dan kesejahteraan tanpa bimbingan agama samawi atau moral yang berteraskan ajaran agama.

## DASAR KEBUDAYAAN KEBANGSAAN?

Penggubalan Dasar Kebudayaan Kebangsaan adalah penting bagi sesebuah negara membangun dan yang mempunyai penduduk berbilang kaum seperti Malaysia. Dasar ini nanti akan dapat menjadi **Garis panduan dalam membentuk, mewujudkan dan mengekalkan identiti negara** di kalangan dunia antarabangsa. Penggubalan dasar ini perlu dibuat dengan mempertimbangkan fakta-fakta perkembangan sejarah serantau dan kedudukan negara ini sebagai pusat pertemuan serta pusat tamadun dan perdagangan sejak dua

ribu tahun yang lampau. Peranannya sebagai sebuah pusat pertemuan, telah melahirkan proses interaksi, pengenalan, penyerapan dan penerimaan pelbagai unsur-unsur yang sesuai kepada kebudayaan asas rantau ini dari pelbagai unsur-unsur kebudayaan dunia.

Dengan yang demikian, sebagai satu proses yang berterusan, penwujudan Kebudayaan Kebangsaan Malaysia akan terus berlandaskan **unsur-unsur dan tiga prinsip yang ditetapkan oleh Kerajaan sebagai Dasar Kebudayaan Kebangsaan iaitu:**

(i) **Berteraskan kepada Kebudayaan Rakyat Asal rantau ini** yang merangkumi kawasan Malaysia, Indonesia, Filipina, Singapura, Brunei, Thailand dan Kampuchea serta Kepulauan Selatan Pasifik (Polynesia, Melanesia dan Oceania) sehingga Malagasi adalah merupakan bahagian utama dari kawasan tamadun atau budaya Melayu. Rantau ini merupakan pusat pemancaran, pengembangan dan warisan Kebudayaan Melayu sejak zaman berzaman dan ditandai pula oleh kegemilangan dan keagungan tamadun Melayu yang berpusat di Melaka yang menggunakan Bahasa Melayu sebagai bahasa perhubungan antarabangsa (linguafranca). Kebudayaan serantau ini digambarkan oleh persamaan-persamaan di bidang bahasa yang berasaskan keluarga bahasa Melayu - Austronesia, kedudukan geografi, pengalaman sejarah, kekayaan alam, kesenian dan nilai-nilai keperibadiannya. Budaya Melayu pada hari ini merupakan cara hidup, lambang identiti dan asas ukuran keperibadian kepada lebih 200 juta umat manusia yang menuturkan satu rumpun bahasa yang sama. Dengan yang demikian, kebudayaan rakyat asal rantau ini dalam pengertian sempit atau luasnya kebudayaan Melayu telah dijadikan teras kepada Kebudayaan Kebangsaan.

(ii) **Unsur-unsur Kebudayaan Lain Yang Sesuai dan Wajar boleh diterima** Kebudayaan sebagai sesuatu yang dinamik, sentiasa berubah-ubah melalui proses penyerapan dan penyesuaian secara berterusan. Prinsip ini bertepatan dengan situasi penduduk berbilang kaum yang mewarisi pelbagai budaya. Dengan itu unsur-unsur budaya Cina, India Arab, Barat dan lain-lain yang sesuai dan wajar diberi penimbangan dan penerimaan dalam pembentukan Kebudayaan Kebangsaan. Kesesuaian penerimaan dalam penyerapan ini adalah bergantung kepada tidak wujudnya percanggahan dengan Perlembagaan dan prinsip-prinsip Rukun Negara dan kepentingan nasional serta asas-asas moral dan kerohanian sejagat pada amnya dan pada Islam sebagai agama rasmi negara khususnya.

(iii) **Islam Menjadi Unsur Yang Penting Dalam Pembentukan Kebudayaan Kebangsaan** - Agama atau kepercayaan kepada Tuhan merupakan unsur penting dalam proses pembangunan negara serta



pembentukan rakyat yang berakhlak dan berperibadi mulia. Agama Islam memberi panduan kepada manusia dalam mengimbang dan memadukan usaha bagi mengisi kehendak-kehendak emosi dan fizikal dan kerana itu patut menjadi unsur yang penting dalam pembentukan Kebudayaan Kebangsaan memandangkan kedudukannya sebagai agama rasmi negara, di samping telah wujudnya fakta sejarah dan nilai-nilai Islam yang telah sedia didukung oleh sebahagian besar rakyat rantau ini. Ketiga-tiga prinsip asas di atas adalah melambangkan penerimaan gagasan Kongres Kebudayaan Kebangsaan 1971.

### Objektif

Pembangunan Kebudayaan Kebangsaan bagi negara-negara yang baru merdeka amatlah penting untuk mewujudkan sebuah negara yang stabil dan bersatupadu. Dengan yang demikian usaha-usaha pembentukan Kebudayaan Kebangsaan Malaysia adalah bertujuan untuk mencapai **tiga objektif penting iaitu:**

(i) Mengukuhkan **perpaduan bangsa** dan negara melalui Kebudayaan;

(ii)Memupuk dan memelihara **keperibadian kebangsaan** yang tumbuh daripada Kebudayaan Kebangsaan; dan

(iii) Memperkayakan dan mempertingkatkan **kualiti kehidupan kemanusiaan dan kerohanian yang seimbang dengan pembangunan sosioekonomi** (<http://pmr.penerangan.gov.my/>)

### PERBINCANGAN

Berdasarkan pengaruh globalisasi dan penghayatan ideologi Barat yang berterusan didapati Dasar Kebudayaan Kebangsaan (DKK) hanya tinggal di atas kertas sahaja tanpa ada pengamalan yang bersungguh-sungguh. Walau bagaimana baik sekali pun dasar tersebut, jika tidak di amalkan tidaklah berguna dan memberi manfaat kepada masyarakat. Oleh sebab itu, didapati semua objektif DKK itu tidak tercapai sepenuhnya malah keadaan kehidupan rakyat semakin hari semakin tidak beradap, kadar jenayah tidak menurun dan pelbagai lagi masalah keruntuhan akhlak yang mencerminkan terhakisnya nilai-nilai budaya yang hendak dibina oleh DKK itu.

Penulis merasa agak malas untuk menghuraikan isu ini dengan lebih mendalam lagi memandangkan tidak adanya kesungguhan dari pelbagai pihak untuk mengatasi isu budaya ini dengan lebih serius lagi.

### Rujukan:

Ulang Tahun Ke-40, Konsep dan Dasar Kebudayaan Kebangsaan: Penilaian Semula

省思国家文化概念与政策研讨会

1. Tan Sri Prof. Dr. Mohd. Kamal Bin Hassan Panel Pemikir Islam Hadhari  
KEUTUHAN BUDAYA DAN MORAL, [Education platform](#), Wednesday, 28 July 2010
2. Mohd. Arif Atan, Malaysia menuju 'acuan budaya' Barat-Cina-Arab
3. <http://pmr.penerangan.gov.my/>

**Dilema Pembinaan Bangsa Dalam Negara Pelbagai Kaum –Rujukan Khusus  
Kepada Dasar Kebudayaan Kebangsaan di Malaysia\***

多元族群社会国族建造的困境——以马来西亚国家文化政策为例

**Abd Ghapa Harun**

**Fakulti Sains Sosial dan Kemanusiaan**

**Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia**

马来西亚国民大学社会科学与人文学院高级讲师

“Tiga belas tahun sejak merdeka kita telah membuat berbagai2 persediaan dan rancangan kemajuan. Jika diibaratkan sa-buah rumah kita telah mendirikan rangka, tiang, atap dan lantai.

Sekarang kita mestilah mengadakan dinding dan perkakas2 yang lain supaya rumah itu dapat menurut bentuk dan rupa yang kita sa-benar2 kehendaki. *Ini bermakna sa-bagai satu bangsa, kita mesti adakan keperibadian kita sendiri atau ‘identity’.*”

(Tun Abdul Razak, *Berita Harian*, 23 September 1970)

## Pendahuluan

Kertas ini membincangkan upaya pemerintah dan permasalahan dalam proses pembinaan bangsa bagi negara yang mempunyai penduduk pelbagai kaum (polyethnic). Perbincangan secara umum dilakukan ke atas proses pembinaan bangsa di negara berkenaan, dengan tumpuan khusus kepada permasalahan identiti nasional di Malaysia. Sejak awal 1970an pemerintah di negara ini telah berusaha mengintegrasikan masyarakat pelbagai kaum di negara ini ke dalam satu komuniti politik – ‘bangsa’ yang bersatu. Dalam proses integrasi itu, pemerintah Malaysia telah melaksanakan pelbagai program nasional dari segi sosial, politik dan ekonomi. Salah satu wahana integrasi yang digunakan adalah menerusi Dasar Kebudayaan Kebangsaan. Dasar ini digubal pada tahun 1971 bagi mencapai matlamat pembinaan identiti nasional bagi sebuah ‘Bangsa’ Malaysia. Namun begitu, kepelbagaian masyarakatnya, terutama sifat dan kedudukan sosio-ekonomi etnik yang berbeza membawa cabaran besar ke atas upaya berkenaan. Persoalan utama dihadapi pemerintah adalah bagaimana mahu membina sebuah sistem politik dan sosial yang kohesif dalam masyarakat pelbagai kaum dengan identiti yang berbeza-beza dan ikatan kesetiaan yang masih bersifat primordial terhadap etnik masing-masing. Masalah kepelbagaian budaya menjadi cabaran utama kepada keberkesanan proses pelaksanaan dasar tersebut.

\*Dibentang pada Seminar on “Ulang Tahun Ke-40 Konsep dan Dasar Kebudayaan Kebangsaan: Penilaian Semula” at The Kuala Lumpur and Selangor Chinese Assembly Hall (KLSCAH), on 10 December 2011

## Pemerintah dan cabaran pembinaan bangsa dalam masyarakat pelbagai kaum

Lazimnya, kebanyakan regim di negara paska-kolonial yang pelbagai kaum dikuasai oleh kumpulan etnik dominan (Henry, 1994.) Setelah berkuasa, regim tersebut menggerakkan upaya membina bangsa sesuai dengan citra “negara-bangsa idaman” nasionalisme etnik dominan tersebut (Rustam, 1993.) Namun percubaan menggunakan unsur identiti etnik dominan sebagai ‘marker of identity’ mencetuskan persoalan besar dalam

proses pembinaan bangsa.<sup>41</sup> Memandangkan kebanyakan negara paska-kolonial ini mempunyai komposisi penduduk yang pelbagai etnik maka upaya seperti ini bukan sahaja memerlukan kebijaksanaan politik dan keupayaan tinggi pemerintah mengerakkan dasarnya, tetapi juga memperoleh legitimasi masyarakat terhadap dasar berkenaan.

Dasar pembinaan bangsa yang dirangkakan itu hanya dapat direalisasikan sekiranya pemerintah mampu mewujudkan keadaan kondusif kepada pelaksanaan proses. Jika sebaliknya, dasar berkenaan bercenderung mencetuskan konflik politik dalam kalangan masyarakat. Konflik tersebut boleh muncul dalam dua bentuk, iaitu konflik yang bersifat kualitatif dan konflik yang bercorak kuantitatif. Konflik kualitatif adalah perteleghaan dalam soal idealisme, filosofikal dan ideologikal tentang identiti, bentuk dan hala tuju negara-bangsa. Manakala konflik kuantitatif pula berkisar kepada masalah pengagihan sumber negara yang berbentuk *tangible* (Brown, 1981:213.) Konflik kuantitatif lebih mudah diuruskan berbanding dengan bentuk konflik kualitatif. Konflik politik kualitatif menjadi ancaman besar dan berpanjangan kepada pemerintah di sesebuah negara sehingga menjerumuskan negara itu dalam kancah konflik yang disebut oleh Brown (1981: 202) sebagai “*conflict of incompatible interest.*” Dalam keadaan konflik seperti ini, pertarungan kelompok-kelompok dalam masyarakat berlaku secara berterusan kerana setiap pihak cuba mempertahankan matlamat, kepentingan dan identiti masing-masing yang berbeza sama sekali (Rustam, 1993.)

Dalam konteks politik pembinaan bangsa, konflik kualitatif berlaku kerana wujudnya perbezaan yang tajam tentang bentuk bangsa yang masing-masing mahu wujudkan. Sidanius, et.al. (1997) menyatakan ada tiga perspektif yang menjadi dasar kepada pembinaan identiti nasional di sesebuah negara, iaitu perspektif ‘melting pot, perspektif multicultural atau pluralisme etnik dan perspektif kumpulan (group) dominan. Perbezaan setiap perspektif dalam menangani permasalahan identiti etnik dalam konteks pembinaan identiti nasional samada melalui pendekatan asimilasi, mengekalkan kepelbagaian identiti atau dominasi identiti etnik menyebabkan sukarnya setiap kelompok membina konsensus tentang bentuk identiti nasional dan nilai-nilai fundamental sebagai asas integrasi pelbagai etnik sebagai satu bangsa.<sup>42</sup> Lantaran itu, kelangsungan sistem politik di negara berkenaan amat bergantung kepada kepada kebijaksanaan pemerintah menerapkan salah satu tiga perspektif di

---

<sup>41</sup> Pembinaan bangsa merujuk kepada “the process by which individuals in a state identify with both the physical and mythical aspects of the state in such a way that their other (most times, more primary) identifications are not seen to be in conflict or threatened.” (Henry, 1994: 137.) Rustam (1993: 6), menganggap negara-bangsa adalah komuniti politik yang bersifat simbolis. Para anggota atau warganya mengesahkan kewujudan komuniti itu, dan keanggotaannya dalam komuniti itu, melalui ikatan hak dan tanggungjawab dengan wilayah kewibawaanya dan hubungan kesetiaan dengan symbol-simbol yang menjadi asas komuniti politik tersebut.

<sup>42</sup> Identiti nasional, menurut William Bloom, ‘describes that condition in which a mass of people have made the same identification with national symbols – have internalized the symbols of the nation – so that they acts as psychological group when there is a threat to, or a possibility of enhancement of these symbols of national identity.’ (dipetik dalam Henry, 1994: 137.)



atas dan kemampuan memanipulasikan aset yang dimilikinya untuk meregulasi tingkah laku politik rakyat, baik dalam kalangan individu mahupun kelompok supaya tindak-tanduk mereka tidak meruntuhkan legitimasi pemerintah yang boleh membawa negara ke arah disintegrasi (Tsurutani, 1973; Palmer, 1973; Migdal, 1988)

Aset dalam konteks ini merujuk kepada sumber dan strategi yang dimiliki pemerintah dalam mengendalikan hubungannya dengan masyarakat. Palmer (1973:7) membahagikan aset tersebut kepada tiga, iaitu aset koersif-perundangan, aset ekonomi dan aset identitif-psikosimbolik (lihat juga Tsurutani, 1973). Menurut Tsurutani, kemahiran pemerintah memanipulasikan aset tersebut amat kritikal dalam proses pembinaan bangsa. Menerusi keupayaan memanipulasi pelbagai aset tersebut pemerintah memperoleh kekuatan mengawal dan menjuruskan pola tingkah-laku politik rakyat bagi mencapai matlamat pembinaan negara-bangsanya. Kemahiran itu jugalah yang akan membolehkan pemerintah memperoleh legitimasi, disamping berjaya pula membina dinamika-dinamika dalaman dalam kalangan anggota masyarakat seperti yang ia kehendaki. Sekiranya keadaan seperti ini dapat dicapai, maka halangan kepada proses pembinaan negara-bangsa akan dapat diminimumkan. Malah, menerusi kecekapan penggunaan aset tersebut juga, pemerintah mampu menguruskan konflik politik dan mewujudkan keamanan dan kestabilan dalam negara. Lazimnya, corak penggunaan dan proses manipulasi ketiga-tiga aset tersebut bergantung kepada bentuk dan keadaan konflik yang berlaku di dalam masyarakat di sesebuah negara itu. Misalnya, dalam sesebuah masyarakat mengalami konflik kualitatif yang parah dan wujudnya '*conflicts of incompatible interests*' sehingga boleh menjuruskan negara ke arah disintegrasi, akan memaksa pemerintah menggunakan aset kuasa koersif dan perundangan serta memanipulasikan aset ekonomi untuk mengendurkan ketegangan dan mengelakkan legitimasi pemerintah daripada terus terhakis. Aset tersebut terpaksa digunakan bagi menampung kelemahan manipulatif aset identitif-psikosimbolik dalam mengawal dan meregulasi pola kelakuan politik individu mahupun kelompok dalam kalangan masyarakat. Namun begitu, mana-mana pemerintah yang hanya bergantung kepada aset koersif-perundangan dan aset ekonomi sentiasa berhadapan dengan krisis legitimasi. Tanpa aset identitif-psikosimbolik yang mantap, pemerintah tidak berupaya mewujudkan integrasi yang utuh dari segi ekonomi, politik dan sosialnya untuk membina sebuah negara-bangsa yang mapan. Keadaan ini mewujudkan fenomena yang disebutkan oleh Seers (1982:73) sebagai kewujudan '*artificial nation-state*' dalam kalangan negara paska-kolonial.

Oleh sebab itulah setiap pemerintah sedaya upaya berusaha membina legitimasi dan menggerakkan proses integrasi nasional menerusi manipulasi aset identitif-simbolik. Pembinaan identiti nasional adalah asas utama kepada proses mengukuhkan aset identitif tersebut. Para pengkaji mensifatkan aset ini sebagai *sine-qua non* kepada apa pun bentuk sistem politik sejak dahulu sehingga kini (Wolin, 1960; Tsurutani, 1973; Migdal, 1988;

dan Norbu, 1992). Dalam konteks pembinaan bangsa, aset identitif-simbolik adalah mekanisme paling berkesan dari segi pengaruhnya berbanding dengan aset koersif-perundangan dan aset ekonomi dalam menumbuh dan memantapkan orientasi afektif, kognitif dan evaluatif yang positif dalam kalangan rakyat terhadap sistem politik dan negaranya. Malahan aset ini mempunyai pengaruh yang kuat dalam mengharmonikan proses hubungan sosial di antara kelompok-kelompok di dalam masyarakat. Kebanyakan negara yang memiliki daya manipulatif yang tinggi menerusi aset ini, misalnya Jepun dan German pada penghujung abad kesembilan dahulu tidak banyak mengalami kesukaran membina identiti sebagai wahana pemerintah untuk menggerakkan mobilisasi sosial dalam kalangan rakyatnya. Dalam negara seperti itu rakyat memberikan persetujuan (*voluntary compliance*) secara sukarela untuk sama-sama merealisasikan cita-cita dan matlamat negara. Mobilisasi yang digerakkan menerusi aset identitif-psikosimbolik amat berkesan dalam memantapkan komitmen rakyat dan 'attachment' mereka terhadap negara. Dengan darjah komitmen yang tinggi itu cita-cita dan matlamat negara menjadi sebahagian daripada hasrat mereka juga (Tusurutani, 1973.)

Sebenarnya, kejayaan pembangunan di sesebuah negara itu tidak ditentukan oleh dasar dan program yang digubal semata-mata. Sebaliknya banyak dipengaruhi oleh kemahiran manipulatif dan keupayaan pemerintah menggunakan aset yang ada. Menurut Tusurutani, (1973) dalam konteks pembinaan bangsa, kebanyakan negara paska-kolonial tidak menghadapi masalah untuk menggubal dasar dan merangka program pembangunan masing-masing. Sebaliknya, masalah utamanya adalah dari segi kemampuan yang rendah setiap pemerintah dalam memobilisasikan rakyat dan menggerakkan proses pelaksanaan dasar berkenaan. Memandangkan banyak negara di dunia ini tidak dianugerahkan dengan sekitaran sosial dan politik serta sumber kemanusiaan dan kebendaan yang selari dengan keperluan pembangunannya, maka langkah yang perlu dilakukan pemerintah adalah menggembeling segala sumber yang ada dalam negara untuk mewujudkan sekitaran yang kondusif bagi melancarkan pelaksanaan dasar dan program pembangunannya. Proses membina sekitaran kondusif inilah yang menjadi masalah besar bagi kebanyakan pemerintah apabila menggerakkan proses pembangunan negara-bangsa masing-masing. Upaya ini memerlukan daya kemahiran manipulatif pemerintah yang tinggi dalam menggunakan aset-aset yang ada padanya, khususnya aset identitif-psikosimbolik untuk mengubah keadaan ke arah sekitaran yang kondusif itu. Oleh sebab itu, di negara manapun, pemerintahnya terpaksa berusaha meningkatkan kemahiran manipulatifnya dalam menggunakan aset identitif-psikosimbolik tersebut secara berkesan. Mana-mana pemerintah yang lemah kemahiran manipulatifnya terpaksa bergantung sepenuhnya aset koersif-perundangan dan aset ekonomi untuk melancarkan pelaksanaan dasar dan program pembangunannya. Sehubungan dengan itu, dasar pembangunan di sesebuah negara itu memerlukan sebuah dasar lain untuk meningkatkan kemampuan aset psiko-simboliknya. Dasar tersebut dikenali sebagai dasar paliatif (*palliative*).

Manakala dasar pembangunan ‘proper’ pula dikenali sebagai dasar kuratif (curative). Dasar kuratif memerlukan kepada dasar paliatif untuk meminimumkan gangguan kepada proses perlaksanaannya. Dasar paliatif menurut Tsurutani, (1973) mempunyai beberapa tujuan. Paling penting sekali adalah,

...to elicit and heighten favorable popular emotion and feelings (or to depress unfavorable or negative feelings) to the point of readiness, willing or involuntary, to surrender traditional commitments and loyalties and individual preference so that members of society may, again willingly or otherwise accept the curative policies which they would otherwise resist or reject.

Secara amnya, dasar paliatif dibina hasil daripada proses pengadunan pelbagai komponen yang terangkum di dalam aset identitifi-psikosimbolik. Dasar ini digerakkan melalui pelbagai program membina karisme pemimpin atau institusi, strategi mewujudkan suasana krisis dan perasaan terancam dalam kalangan rakyat, memanipulasi pelbagai unsur kebudayaan seperti sistem nilai, simbol dan institusi tradisional, pembinaan ideologi dan mitos nasional dan sebagainya. Tujuan utama dasar paliatif itu dirangka adalah membina orientasi positif (afektif, kognitif dan evaluatif) dalam kalangan rakyat terhadap pemerintah dan negara. Disamping itu, dasar ini juga bertujuan mengharmonikan (debarbarizing) proses hubungan sosial di antara pelbagai kelompok etnik di negara berkenaan. Dalam konteks pembinaan bangsa, keberkesanan pemerintah memanipulasi aset identitifi-psikosimbolik menerusi dasar paliatifnya amat menentukan dari segi meningkatkan kesepaduan sosial dalam sesebuah negara. Keberkesanan dasar ini mampu mengurangkan intensiti konflik politik yang bercorak kualitatif. Jadi, pelaksanaan dasar kuratif secara berkesan amat penting dalam menentukan kejayaan sesebuah negara mengalami proses pembangunannya.

Dasar Kebudayaan Kebangsaan negara kita yang digubal pada tahun 1971, adalah juga termasuk sebagai salah satu dasar paliatif pemerintah. Sebagai alat paliatif pemerintah, dasar ini berperanan penting sebagai penggerak proses pembinaan bangsa di negara ini, khususnya dalam konteks pembentukan identiti nasional, dan juga mengendurkan konflik pertarungan politik kualitatif dan pertarungan politik dalam kalangan pelbagai kumpulan etnik di negara ini. Tegasnya, sebagai dasar paliatif pemerintah, Dasar Kebudayaan Kebangsaan perlu dilihat sebagai mekanisme kepada upaya pemerintah mengukuhkan aset psiko-simbolik dalam usahanya meningkatkan koherensi sosial dan kestabilan politik dalam kalangan masyarakat pelbagai kaum di negara ini. Sejauhmanakan dasar ini dilaksanakan secara efektif akan dikupas dalam bahagian akhir makalah ini.

### **Dilema Pembinaan Bangsa Dalam Masyarakat Pelbagai Kaum**

Dari segi sejarahnya, kemunculan sistem negara bangsa moden dengan ‘bangsa’ sebagai anggota komuniti politik tersebut mempunyai pertalian yang rapat dengan proses hegemoni suatu kumpulan etnik ke atas anggota

komuniti politik ke dalam satu entiti politik yang tunggal (Haynes, 1997; Goh, 2008.) Menerusi hegemoni itu etnik berkenaan dapat menguasai alat-alat negara serta mewujudkan hubungan secara simbiosis dengan sistem kenegaraan tersebut. Dikebanyakan negara Eropah komuniti politik yang disatukan itu membentuk sebuah komuniti politik baru yang kemudiannya dikenali sebagai ‘bangsa’ dan sifat ‘kebangsaan’nya di dalam sistem negara bangsa itu samada ianya dikonsepkan dari segi perundangan atau persamaan budaya sebagai unsur yang mengikat komuniti politik tersebut.<sup>43</sup> Namun bagi kebanyakan negara di Dunia Ketiga, ‘negara’ yang menjadi mekanisme bagi membentuk ‘bangsa’ sebagai satu entiti sosio-budaya tunggal kerap kali menghadapi masalah dalam upaya tersebut kerana perbezaan yang besar dalam komposisi penduduknya (Haynes, 1997; Orman, 2008) Walau bagaimanapun masalah itu bergantung kepada komposisi etnik dalam sesebuah negara. Komposisi etnik dan kekuatan setiap etnik dari segi politik dan ekonomi menentukan keupayaan etnik majoriti memonopoli sistem dan alat-alat kenegaraan dan melaksanakan hegemoni dalam masyarakat di disesebuah negara. Keupayaan menghegemoni membolehkan etnik majoriti mewujudkan *monoetnik* dan *monoculture state* tanpa banyak menghadapi tentangan etnik-etnik minoriti lain, terutamanya apabila kuasa sosial etnik minoriti berkenaan lemah. Etnik minoriti yang tidak berdaya itu samada terpaksa atau dipaksa melalui proses asimilasi untuk memastikan terbina ikatan psiko-budaya dengan etnik majoriti. Bagi sesetengah negara, proses hegemoni etnik majoriti dan pengasimilasian etnik minoriti ke dalam sistem kebudayaan kebangsaan tunggal menjadi asas kepada pembentukan identiti kebangsaan dan juga pengaliran perasaan ‘kebangsaan’ (sense of the nation) bagi komuniti politik di negara tersebut. Di sini kita dapat melihat bagaimana proses membina sebuah ‘bangsa’ tunggal sebagai komuniti politik di negara berkenaan berlaku seperti di Thailand dan juga di Indonesia (Connors, 2005.)

---

<sup>43</sup> Namun begitu, di Britain, lain pula tafsirannya. Di negara itu, konsep ‘bangsa’ dalam sistem perundangannya tidak membawa pengertian yang menitikberatkan kepada ikatan kebudayaan. Sebaliknya, konsep ‘bangsa’ dalam sistem kenegaraannya lebih menjurus kepada ikatan secara perundangan. Ini membawa makna bahawa ‘bangsa’ itu disinonimkan dengan ‘kerakyatan.’ Ringkasnya, ‘bangsa’ dalam pengertian tersebut tidak merujuk kepada ikatan sosio-budaya sebagai asas penyatuan masyarakatnya, menjurus kepada ikatan secara perundangan. Ini membawa makna bahawa ‘bangsa’ itu disinonimkan dengan ‘kerakyatan.’ Ringkasnya, ‘bangsa’ dalam pengertian tersebut tidak merujuk kepada ikatan sosio-budaya sebagai asas penyatuan masyarakatnya, sebaliknya ditentukan oleh status keanggotaan seseorang itu secara perundangannya di dalam komuniti politik di sesebuah negara itu. Jelas sekali bahawa pengertian ‘bangsa’ dalam konteks ‘kerakyatan’ itu lebih mudah, tetapi amat longgar dari segi ikatannya dari segi sosial dan juga budaya. Sekiranya konsep ‘bangsa’ yang sinonim dengan ‘kerakyatan’ itu dipakai dalam proses pembinaan bangsa, maka kita akan mendapati bahawa negara-negara di dunia pada hari ini tidak menghadapi banyak masalah. Ini kerana setiap orang yang menjadi ‘rakyat’ kepada sesebuah negara itu adalah secara automatik menjadi ‘bangsa’ bagi negara berkenaan. Masalahnya timbul apabila negara, terutamanya negara paska-kolonial memakai konsep ‘bangsa’ yang ditafsirkan bukan sahaja secara perundangan, malahan juga berasaskan kepada ikatan psiko-budaya dalam kalangan anggota komuniti politiknya sebagai asas ‘kebangsaan’nya. Menurut Seers, (1982), hampir 90 peratus negara bangsa di dunia kini adalah ‘artificial nation-state’ kerana negara-negara tersebut dianggotai oleh kumpulan-kumpulan etnik yang berbeza dari sudut sistem sosio-budayanya. Kebanyakan negara ini menghadapi masalah dalam proses pembinaan negara bangsa, khususnya untuk membina sebuah komuniti politik dengan ‘sense of national identity’ yang berasaskan sistem kenegaraan *monoetnik* atau *monoculture*. (Smolic, 1979.)

Namun begitu, tidak semua negara, khususnya negara-pasca kolonial di Dunia Ketiga yang muncul setelah berakhirnya kolonialisme Barat berjaya melalui pengalaman dan proses pembinaan bangsa secara hegemonik oleh etnik majoriti untuk membentuk *monoetnik* dan *monoculture state* (Phadnis, 1990; Alemseged, 2004; Miguel, 2004.) Kesukaran berlaku apabila dalam negara berkenaan terdapat kumpulan etnik yang disebut Turner dan Bonacich, (1980), sebagai 'middleman minority.' Kumpulan minoriti jenis ini memiliki kedudukan sosial dan ekonomi yang kukuh. Mereka adalah etnik yang sukar di integrasi/asimilasikan. Dikebanyakan negara Dunia Ketiga komposisi etnik yang menganggotai komuniti politiknya, adalah samada hampir seimbang dari segi jumlahnya atau etnik majoritinya dibelenggui oleh pelbagai masalah ekonomi. Sementara etnik minoriti pula memiliki kekuasaan sosial dan ekonomi yang tinggi. Malaysia adalah salah sebuah yang memiliki komposisi etnik seperti ini. Dalam keadaan seperti ini etnik majoriti terpaksa menghadapi cabaran yang besar dalam usaha masing-masing membentuk sebuah sistem *monoetnik* dan '*monoculture state*.' Pergolakan politik yang berpanjangan di kebanyakan negara di Afrika dan masalah politik di Sri Lanka umpamanya adalah manifestasi kepada fenomena tersebut (Bonacich, 1973; Hennayake, 1992; Haynes, 1997; Zewde, 2008.)

Secara umumnya, kebanyakan pemerintah di negara yang mempunyai masyarakat pelbagai kaum menghadapi kesukaran mengintegrasikan masyarakat masing-masing (Gidden, 1993; Seers, 1982; Norbu, 1992; Mehden, 1969; Nugent, 1994; Yamamoto, 2007.) Perbezaan tajam dari sudut sosio-budaya di antara pelbagai etnik mewujudkan kuasa *centrifugal* yang sentiasa mengganggu usaha pemerintah mengintegrasikan komuniti politik tersebut apabila setiap etnik enggan mengorbankan warisan identiti primordial mereka dalam proses pembinaan bangsa itu (Turner & Bonacich, 1980.) Oleh sebab itu, keupayaan pemerintah menggerakkan proses berkenaan dipengaruhi kuat oleh darjah legitimasi pemerintah di negara-negara berkenaan (Seers, 1982.) Dalam kebanyakan negara, kegagalan memperolehi legitimasi daripada etnik minoriti melemahkan proses mobilisasi sosial yang diperlukan dalam proses pembinaan bangsa. Kegagalan meraih legitimasi bukan sahaja melemahkan kedudukan pemerintah, malahan turut menjejaskan keupayaannya memanipulasi aset identitif-psikosimbolik. Kelemahan ini, menurut Seers (1992,) menyukarkan pemerintah memupuk *voluntary compliance* dalam kalangan masyarakat pelbagai kaum itu.

Kelemahan kerajaan menggerakkan mobilisasi bagi membina identiti nasional kerana setiap kumpulan etnik berkenaan berpegang kuat kepada ideologi 'negara idaman' yang bertentangan di antara satu sama lain. Malahan mereka juga menuntut 'recognition' daripada pemerintah dan melakukan penentangan terhadap upaya pembinaan identiti nasional oleh pemerintah atas dasar hak asasi manusia. Lantaran itu, persoalan politik yang bersifat kualitatif, terutamanya dalam soal menentukan 'siapa kita' dan 'ke mana kita akan pergi di masa



depan' yang menjadi asas kepada pembinaan bangsa bagi kebanyakan negara mengalami kemelut yang berterusan. Ini kerana setiap etnik mengemukakan jawapan yang berbeza-beza tentang identiti dan halu tuju masing-masing sehingga sukarnya membina konsensus dalam menetapkan corak identiti kebangsaan negara (Merkel, 1970; Haynes, 1997). Keadaan menjadi lebih buruk apabila persoalan 'siapa kita' dan 'ke mana kita' tadi cuba diselesaikan secara 'keras' oleh etnik majoriti menerusi prinsip *monoculture* dan *mono-etnik state* yang rigid. Lazimnya, prinsip yang rigid seperti ini mencetuskan masalah yang sukar diselesaikan, malahan memerlukan kos sosial yang besar kerana pemerintah terpaksa bergantung kepada aset koersif-perundangan dan aset ekonomi untuk mencapai matlamat tersebut (Turner & Bonacich, 1980; Haynes, 1997). Keupayaan pemerintah menggunakan kemahiran manipulatifnya dalam kebanyakan negara yang mempunyai sistem sosial polyetnik, banyak bergantung kepada penggunaan kedua-dua aset tersebut (Migdal, 1988.) Keadaan ini ada kaitannya dengan sejarah kemunculan negara berkenaan. Di negara yang mempunyai masyarakat seperti itu, nasionalisme yang digerakkan oleh etnik majoriti pada peringkat awal perjuangan menuntut kemerdekaan adalah bersifat ethno-nasionalisme (Norbu, 1992 dan Hennayake, 1992.) Nasionalisme etnik majoriti ini kemudiannya menjadi kuasa yang menghegemoni negara setelah berakhirnya kolonialisme. Tujuannya adalah bagi membolehkan etnik majoriti mewujudkan hubungan simbiosis dengan negara yang baru terbentuk itu. Kejayaan mewujudkan hubungan simbiotik itu memberi peluang kepada etnik majoriti membina negara-bangsa yang berteraskan kepada imej 'negara idaman'nya. Sekiranya hegemoni nasionalisme etnik majoriti itu boleh berlaku sepenuhnya dan hubungan simbiosis yang mantap di antara etnik majoriti dengan negara dapat diwujudkan, maka persoalan 'siapa kita' dan 'ke mana kita' , atau dalam erti kata lain, masalah identiti kebangsaan dan soal integrasi komuniti politik ke dalam satu rupa bangsa yang memiliki ikatan psiko-budaya itu lebih mudah dicapai. Namun begitu, apabila hegemoni tidak berlaku dengan sempurna, maka percubaan etnik majoriti itu hanya akan mencetuskan konflik politik yang berpanjangan (Hennayake, 1992.) Pertarungan dan penentangan yang berterusan oleh etnik minoriti adalah bertujuan untuk menghalang wujudnya hubungan simbiotik itu (Rustam, 1993.) Kesannya, proses pembinaan bangsa yang cuba digiatkan itu bertukar menjadi pertarungan politik hegemoni - kontra hegemoni di antara etnik majoriti dengan etnik minoriti. Dalam keadaan pergolakan seperti itu, pemerintah menghadapi masalah mewujudkan kestabilan politik, apa lagi hendak melaksanakan dasar dan program pembangunannya secara berkesan.

Secara umumnya, kegagalan kebanyakan pemerintah di negara pelbagai kaum adalah berpunca daripada ikatan rapatnya dengan nasionalisme etnik majoriti. Ikatan ini mencorakkan orientasi dasar pemerintah, baik dalam penggubalan dasar kuratif mahupun dasar paliatif. Sementara itu, kegagalan nasionalisme etnik majoriti bertukar kepada nasionalisme negara (*large scale nationalism*) menyebabkan komponen-komponen yang

mendasarinya berakar umbi kepada cita-cita dan etos etnik majoriti berkenaan. Masalah yang paling utama dalam kedua-dua dasar pemerintah itu muncul apabila etnik minoriti menanggapi bahawa nasionalisme yang dipelopori melalui dasar kebangsaan oleh negara itu adalah hanya mewakili cita-cita nasionalis etnik majoriti berkenaan (Haynes, 1997; Rustam, 1993.) Oleh itu, kewujudan nasionalisme etnik majoriti sebagai kuasa berpengaruh dalam arus politik negara tidak kurang mencetuskan kontradiksi kepada proses pembinaan bangsa di sesebuah negara itu. Kontradiksi itu berlaku kerana nasionalisme biasanya berdiri di atas dua komponennya yang penting, iaitu komponen identiti dan komponen solidariti. Komponen identiti diperkukuhkan oleh data-data tradisional seperti etnisiti, kepercayaan agama, sistem nilai, sejarah, kesusasteraan dan pelbagai aspek kebudayaan yang lain. Manakala komponen solidariti pula diperteguhkan oleh data-data moden seperti kebebasan (*liberty*), persaudaraan (*fraternity*) dan persamaan (*equality*). Prinsip-prinsip ini menjadi teras kepada ideologi egalitarianisme dalam nasionalisme (Hennayake, 1992.) Upaya menasionalisasikan identiti menerusi kebudayaan yang digiatkan oleh pemerintah ditanggapi oleh etnik minoriti sebagai bercanggah dengan prinsip egalitarianism tersebut.

Dalam sebuah negara bangsa yang bersifat monoetnik dan *monoculture*, komponen-komponen nasionalisme itulah yang mendasari pembinaan identiti kebangsaan sesuatu bangsa. Komponen identiti menjadi pengikat hubungan psiko-budaya, khususnya dalam mengasaskan solidariti etnik mahupun komuniti politik untuk membina ‘bangsa’ di negara tersebut. Tetapi tidak demikian halnya di dalam masyarakat pelbagai kaum kerana komponen identiti nasionalismenya adalah mewakili sekumpulan etnik sahaja, iaitu etnik majoriti. Kontradiksi berlaku apabila data-data tradisional dalam komponen identiti nasionalisme etnik majoriti tadi diangkat menjadi penanda kepada identiti ‘kebangsaan’(marker of identity) untuk diterapkan sebagai identiti bagi semua kumpulan etnik lain yang membentuk komuniti politik di negara berkenaan. Malahan pemerintah yang ada hubungan simbiotik dengan etnik majoriti juga turut menjadikan komponen identiti ethno-nasionalisme tersebut sebagai sumber aset identitif-psikosimboliknya. Pemakaian komponen identiti tersebut sebagai sebahagian dasar paliatif pemerintah biasanya diterjemahkan menerusi pelbagai dasar yang bersifat kebangsaan dan juga pengekal pelbagai simbol dan institusi tradisional etnik majoriti sebagai lambang kewujudan sebuah negara-bangsa itu (Orman, 2008.)

Sementara itu, orientasi dasar dan program pembangunan negara juga banyak dipengaruhi oleh tuntutan nasionalis etnik majoriti sehingga menyebabkan prinsip-prinsip egalitarianisme yang menjadi inti penting nasionalisme tidak diterapkan secara menyeluruh dalam kalangan masyarakat pelbagai etnik itu. Lebih buruk lagi, apabila tuntutan etno-nasionalis yang bersifat *exclusionary*, ditanggapi oleh etnik minoriti sebagai

percubaan meminggirkan mereka daripada proses pembangunan yang berlaku itu. Dengan adanya kontradiksi seperti itu dasar-dasar yang bersifat kebangsaan seringkali tidak mendapat penerimaan yang sepenuhnya daripada etnik minoriti. Ini menyebabkan tugas pemerintah mengintegrasikan masyarakat pelbagai kaum sebagai satu 'bangsa' menjadi rumit. Kerumitan itu semakin bertambah pula apabila dasar dan program pembangunan yang dilaksanakan itu tidak mencetuskan kesan efektif yang merata dalam mencorakkan perubahan dari segi psiko-sosial kumpulan-kumpulan etnik di negara berkenaan.

### **Dasar Kebudayaan Kebangsaan Sebagai Paliatif Politik Pemerintah dalam Konteks Pembinaan Bangsa Malaysia**

Isu tentang identiti nasional telah mula diberikan perhatian sejak sebelum negara mencapai kemerdekaan lagi (Shamsul, 1996; Mandal, 2008.) Paling awal adalah wujudnya pemikiran tentang identiti yang dicitrakan sebagai 'negara-bangsa Melayu.' (Rustam, 1993.) Dalam persidangan kebudayaan yang diadakan pada tahun 1957 dan 1962,<sup>44</sup> gesaan supaya dilaksanakan dasar kebudayaan kebangsaan yang berteraskan kebudayaan Melayu telah suarakan. Namun begitu, gagasan tersebut tidak mendapat perhatian kerajaan Perikatan (Rustam, 1993.) Disamping itu, muncul pelbagai konsepsi tentang bangsa dan identiti yang saling berlawanan, yang setiap satunya tidak difahami bersama turut diartikulasikan oleh pelbagai pihak.<sup>45</sup> Suasana politik yang bersifat perkauman sejak pertengahan tahun 1960an telah membantutkan upaya pembinaan sebuah negara-bangsa yang

---

<sup>44</sup> Pada tahun 1962, Pertubuhan Pemuda Desa yang dipimpin oleh Sardon Jubin, dalam Persidangan Tahunannya telah menggesakan kerajaan supaya menggubal sebuah dasar kebudayaan bagi mewujudkan sebuah Kebudayaan Kebangsaan bagi penduduk negara ini. Pertubuhan tersebut mencadangkan supaya Kebudayaan Kebangsaan bagi negara ini hendaklah yang berteraskan kepada kebudayaan Melayu. Sungguhpun isu ini mencetuskan kebimbangan di kalangan kaum bukan Melayu, tetapi kontroversi tentang isu ini tidak lama. Ini kerana dalam tahun-tahun berikutnya, suasana politik dan perhubungan kaum banyak dipengaruhi oleh isu-isu bahasa dan pendidikan. Sebagai tindakbalasnya, kaum bukan Melayu juga turut mendesak agar kerajaan mengamalkan sikap yang lebih liberal dalam soal bahasa dan juga kebudayaan.

<sup>45</sup> Selanjutnya, setelah kemasukan Singapura ke dalam Persekutuan Malaysia Lee Kuan Yew giat mengartikulasikan gagasan politik baru yang dikenali sebagai Malaysian-Malaysia. Beliau menegaskan bahawa gagasan ini adalah lebih sesuai sebagai asas kepada pembinaan sebuah Negara bangsa Malaysia yang berbilang kaum kerana melalui Malaysian-Malaysia tiada kaum yang akan mendominasi kaum yang lain. Lebih tegas lagi, gagasan Malaysian-Malaysia menganjurkan prinsip persamaan di antara kaum-kaum di negara ini. Prinsip ini menekankan bahawa setiap kaum di negara ini memiliki status yang sama. Oleh sebab itu peluang yang sama rata diberi kepada setiap rakyat di negara ini tanpa mengira kaum dan asal keturunannya. Hak semua kaum dari segi agama, bahasa dan kebudayaan turut dihormati. Lebih penting lagi, setiap unsur tersebut hendaklah dibenarkan berkembang secara bebas sehingga lama kelamaan setiap satunya akan bergabung membentuk identiti kebangsaan negara ini. Kemunculan DAP sebagai sebuah parti pelbagai kaum yang memperjuangkan gagasan Malaysian-Malaysia setelah ketiadaan PAP tidak banyak membantu meredakan suasana perkauman yang semakin tegang itu. Malahan, kemunculan parti berkenaan menambah tajamkan lagi keadaan perkauman di negara ini, terutamanya apabila DAP mula menjadi pilihan baru bagi golongan muda dari kaum Cina dan kaum India yang kecewa terhadap MCA dan MIC selama ini. Hasilnya, DAP muncul sebagai satu platform baru bagi kaum bukan Melayu untuk memperjuangkan aspirasi dan kepentingan mereka. Menurut Vasil (1980,) gagasan Malaysian-Malaysia yang diperjuangkan oleh DAP adalah lebih radikal berbanding dengan konsep yang diartikulasikan oleh PAP dahulu. Lantaran itu, menurut beliau, dalam penghujung tahun 1960an itu keadaan perkauman di negara ini menjadi semakin militan.

bersatu padu. Tidak hairanlah, menurut Vasil, (1980) meskipun negara ini telah mencapai kemerdekaan lebih sedekad, tetapi pemimpin politik dan rakyat jelata semakin berpecah belah. Setiap daripada mereka hanya mementingkan cita-cita yang berasaskan kepada citra, hasrat dan kepentingan mempertahankan identiti etnik masing-masing. Dalam keadaan suhu politik perkauman yang hangat itu, rakyat jelata dan pemimpin politik setiap kaum tidak berminat membina konsensus tentang sifat - sifat kebangsaan bagi negara ini. Malahan mereka juga tidak mampu membayangkan rupa bentuk identiti dan kepentingan sepunya yang harus dikongsi bersama oleh setiap kelompok masyarakat (Rustam, 1993.) Malaysia ketika ini berhadapan dengan 'krisis identiti' yang parah. Menghuraikan keadaan ketika itu, Tan Sri Ghazali Shafei, (1985:49) menyatakan:

In 1969, the Malaysian was a person utterly lost in the noises of these slogans. He was a being without a vision, without a sense of direction and without objectivity. He was skeptical, with a paralyzing effect on himself and on society as a whole.

Hanya selepas peristiwa 13 Mei 1969, isu identiti dibangkitkan semula kerana tuntutan menangani krisis identiti tersebut semakin mendesak. Dalam ucapan di Perhimpunan Agung UMNO, pada tahun 1970 Tun Abdul Razak membangkitkan soal pentingnya dibina satu bentuk identiti nasional bagi Malaysia (Berita Harian, 23 September 1970.) Berikutan dengan itu, kerajaan bersetuju supaya Kementerian Belia dan Sukan menganjurkan sebuah kongres kebudayaan bagi tujuan tersebut. Kongres yang diadakan di Kuala Lumpur pada 16 Ogos 1971 bertujuan mengidentifikasi asas utama kebudayaan kebangsaan sesuai dengan hasrat Tun Abdul Razak itu. Sebanyak enam kertas kerja dasar, disamping kertas kerja iringan yang lain telah dibentangkan dalam kongres tersebut. Hasilnya garis panduan bagi pembinaan identiti nasional telah dikemukakan. Menurut garis panduan itu, pembinaan identiti nasional bagi negara ini hendaklah berasaskan kepada 3 prinsip utama: Pertama, kebudayaan kebangsaan hendaklah diasaskan kepada kebudayaan penduduk asal negara ini. Kedua, Islam menjadi unsur penting dalam kebudayaan tersebut. Dan ketiganya, lain-lain kebudayaan yang tidak bertentangan dan sesuai akan diterima.<sup>46</sup> (Nik Anuar, Muhd Hj Salleh & Abd.Ghapa, 2011.) Ketika menghuraikan konsep kebudayaan yang telah dipersetujui oleh kongres itu, Encik Ali Haji Ahmad, Menteri Kebudayaan Belia dan Sukan menjelaskan,

Konsep ini tidaklah lahir dari kekosongan sejarah tetapi adalah lahir dari pernyataan sejarah Asia Tenggara dan tanah air kita sendiri. Sejak beribu-ribu tahun, rantau ini telah mempunyai identitinya sendiri dalam kebudayaan, berlainan daripada yang terdapat samada di India, atau di negeri China, atau di

---

<sup>46</sup> Kementerian Kebudayaan Belia dan Sukan kemudiannya telah menubuhkan sebuah Jawatankuasa Penasihat Perlaksanaan Rumusan Kongres bagi meneliti 198 rumusan dan menyediakan satu *blue-print* kerajaan. Selain itu kongres tersebut juga memperakui bahawa aspek kebudayaan Melayu, khasnya kesenian dijadikan asas utama kebudayaan kebangsaan. Kongres tersebut juga menyarankan bahawa aspek-aspek kebudayaan Melayu, khasnya aspek kesenian dapat dijadikan unsur penting pembentukan kebudayaan kebangsaan itu.

Eropah atau di Asia Barat. Meskipun kebudayaan ini memang mempengaruhi pertumbuhan kebudayaan rakyat asal rantau ini (ibid.)

Tambah Menteri itu lagi, bahawa kebudayaan kebangsaan itu adalah berteraskan kebudayaan rakyat asal rantau ini, iaitu kebudayaan yang tumbuh, berkembang dan diwarisi oleh rakyat asal sendiri dan tidak di-*transplant* dari luar samada sejak dahulu kala, atau dalam masa seratus dua ratus tahun kebelakangan ini. Pada masa yang sama, beliau memberi jaminan bahawa kerajaan tidak akan melarang mana-mana pihak pun daripada mengamalkan kebudayaan mereka sendiri selagi ianya tidak bertentangan dengan perlembagaan negara. Namun begitu, kebudayaan-kebudayaan itu hanya berupa kebudayaan kaum itu sendiri sahaja. Seandainya dari kebudayaan itu terdapat unsur-unsur yang sesuai dengan kebudayaan rakyat asal rantau ini, yang tidak menenggelamkan identiti keMalaysiaan, maka unsur-unsur itu boleh diterima, atau diserapkan ke dalam kebudayaan kebangsaan Malaysia.<sup>47</sup>

Sebenarnya, sejak awal lagi Tun Abdul Razak amat menyedari akan sensitiviti dan kebimbangan kaum bukan-Melayu itu terhadap upaya pembinaan identiti itu. Sewaktu merasmikan kongres tersebut Tun Abdul Razak menegaskan bahawa keadaan perbezaan dari segi kebudayaan di kalangan kaum-kaum di negara ini perlu dikurangkan. Sebagai sebuah negara berbilang kaum, Malaysia amat memerlukan kepada sebuah dasar kebudayaan kebangsaan sebagai teras kepada proses pembinaan jati-diri di kalangan rakyatnya. Manakala dalam ucapan yang lain, Tun Abdul Razak turut memberi jaminan bahawa tujuan kerajaan menggubal dasar berkenaan bukannya untuk melakukan ‘outright assimilation’ dari segi budaya. Sebaliknya untuk menggerakkan proses integrasi melalui ‘mutual adjustment’ budaya dan tret-tret sosial yang pelbagai itu sehingga ianya dapat diterima oleh semua kaum. Seterusnya menurut beliau pembentukan kebudayaan kebangsaan merupakan, “...a

---

<sup>47</sup> Selari dengan penggubalan dasar kebudayaan itu, Kementerian Kebudayaan dan Sukan telah mengeluarkan garis panduan khusus bagi dijadikan panduan kepada perkembangan dan kegiatan budaya di negara ini. Dalam garis tersebut kemeterian berkenaan menyarankan supaya kegiatan budaya di negara ini dijalankan secara lebih selektif, berdisiplin dan bertujuan. Supaya ianya dapat disesuaikan dengan tujuan kerajaan untuk menanamkan nilai-nilai yang progresif, demokratik dan rasional dalam masyarakat Malaysia, sesuai dengan Gerakan Pembaharuan dan Dasar Ekonomi Baru kerajaan. Disamping itu, garis panduan itu juga menyarankan supaya diberikakan galakan kepada perkembangan mana-mana nilai kebudayaan yang sesuai dengan zaman moden dan Gerakan Pembaharuan. Berkaitan dengan itu, pegawai-pegawai kebudayaan negeri dan daerah diarahkan supaya memastikan kegiatan kebudayaan diselarakan dengan dasar kebudayaan baru itu. Namun begitu, garis panduan itu menetapkan bahawa kebudayaan kesukuan masih boleh dijalankan seperti biasa, tetapi menegaskan bahawa, “tenaga pegawai kementerian tidaklah hendaknya digunakan untuk maksud kegiatan kebudayaan kesukuan itu.” Berikutnya garis panduan itu menghendaki supaya pegawai-pegawai kebudayaan membuat penelitian secara kritis ke atas kegiatan kebudayaan supaya nilai-nilai yang feodalisitik, beku dan merugikan rakyat serta bertentangan dengan Gerakan Pembaharuan tidak lagi digiatkan atau ditonjolkan dalam masyarakat Malaysia. Sementara itu, dalam konteks masyarakat Melayu pula, Bahagian Penyelidikan Kementerian berkenaan diberikan tanggungjawab “mencari nilai-nilai yang rasional dan saintifik, nilai-nilai yang demokratik dan bersifat keagamaan yang dapat dimajukan masyarakat Melayu. Seterusnya garis panduan itu mengarahkan supaya hal-hal yang tidak sesuai dengan kehidupan yang rasional dan saintifik dan demokratik dan yang bertentangan dengan agama tidak lagi ditinjolkan di dalam masyarakat Melayu, dan ianya tidak harus lagi digalakkan.



continuing process of acceptance and rejection, subject to the test of time, and it can survive only so long as this process of transmission of its accumulated knowledge from our generation to the next continues without interruption.” Dalam ucapan yang lain di Parlimen Tun Abdul Razak turut menegaskan bahawa, “ Satu kebudayaan nasional bagi Malaysia hanyalah dapat terujud dalam jangka masa panjang dan oleh itu pembentukannya tidak boleh dipaksa ke atas rakyat jelata.” Tun Abdul Razak juga memberi jaminan bahawa matlamat dasar kebudayaan kebangsaan bukan bertujuan asimilasi secara paksa. Sehubungan dengan itu, Tun V.T. Sambanthan ketika menjawab soalan pembangkang berkenaan dasar kebudayaan tersebut mengatakan bahawa ucapan Tun Abdul Razak itulah yang sebenarnya menjadi dasar kerajaan. Malah, dalam konteks kebudayaan kebangsaan, kerajaan juga berpegang kepada semangat Rukun Negara yang menekankan kepada prinsip, ‘untuk menjamin satu cara pendekatan yang liberal terhadap kebudayaan yang berbagai-bagai corak.’ (Nik Anuar, Muhd Hj Salleh & Abd.Ghapa, 2011.)

Sungguhpun dari semasa ke semasa, kerajaan menegaskan pendiriannya terhadap prinsip tersebut, namun Dasar Kebudayaan Kebangsaan terus mencetuskan kontroversi dalam masyarakat pelbagai kaum di negara ini. Cadangan kerajaan meneliti semula dasar tersebut pada awal tahun 1980an, meningkatkan minat para sarjana terhadap dasar berkenaan. Banyak penulisan dilakukan para sarjana yang menyokong Dasar Kebudayaan Kebangsaan dari segi konsep dan juga rasionalnya (Aziz Deraman, 1987; Zainal Kling, 1987; dan Firdaus Abdullah, 1987.) Pada masa yang sama, kritik terhadap dasar ini juga banyak dikemukakan oleh para sarjana bukan-Melayu. Kebanyakan kritik tersebut melihat Dasar Kebudayaan Kebangsaan sebagai dasar yang kuat dipengaruhi unsur ‘ethnoculturalisme’ Melayu. Mereka meneliti dasar berkenaan berdasarkan prinsip *cultural relativisme* (Ting Chew Peh, 1985; Yew Yeok Kim, 1985, Kua Kia Song, 1987; Tan Liok Ee, 1992; Collins, 2006; Lim Teck Ghee & Gomez, 2009). Memandangkan perdebatan pro dan kontra tentang dasar ini sudah dilakukan secara meluas dan mendalam, maka dalam perbincangan selanjutnya penulis akan memberikan tumpuan kepada kepentingan dan keberkesanan dasar kebudayaan ini sebagai satu kaedah paliatif politik untuk mengukuhkan aset identitif-psikosimbolik pemerintah. Sekiranya diteliti dari sudut itu, adakah Dasar Kebudayaan Kebangsaan menjadi asset atau liabiliti kepada pemerintah dalam menguruskan konflik politik kualitatif di negara ini atau sebaliknya? Sehubungan persoalan itu, beberapa rumusan dapat dibuat.

Pertama, memang ketara bahawa penggubalan Dasar Kebudayaan Kebangsaan adalah manifestasi kebangkitan nasionalisme kebudayaan orang Melayu (Muhammad Ikmal, 1996.) Perkembangan politik selepas peristiwa 13 Mei 1969 membuka ruang hegemoni kepada nasionalisme itu mewujudkan hubungan simbiotik dengan negara (Ho Khai Leong, 1997.) Hegemoni ini membolehkan cita-cita nasionalisme berkenaan diterjemahkan ke dalam

pelbagai dasar negara. Menerusi hegemoni ini, doktrin *nativisme* yang melihat penyelesaian masalah pembinaan bangsa dari sudut pembentukan *monoculture state* juga berjaya diterapkan ke dalam dasar kerajaan. Justeru, dasar kebudayaan ini telah mencetuskan kebimbangan setiap kumpulan ras/etnik tentang masa depan dan kesinambungan budaya dan identiti masing-masing (Shamsul, 1992.) Dari sudut ini, Shamsul (1998) mensifatkan Dasar Kebudayaan Kebangsaan tersebut sebagai dasar yang bersifat ‘top-down’ dan ‘state-sponsored – bumiputera-based authority-defined national identity.’ Memandangkan dasar seperti ini dijadikan sebagai dasar paliatif pemerintah, maka Dasar Kebudayaan Kebangsaan hanya diterima baik oleh orang Melayu. Manakala kaum bukan Melayu pula secara umumnya mempersoalkan legitimasi kebudayaan Melayu sebagai teras kebudayaan kebangsaan (Muhammad Ikmal, 1996.) Menurut Shamsul, (1996), ada tiga kumpulan yang menolak gagasan kebudayaan kebangsaan. Pertama adalah kumpulan bukan-Bumiputera, kedua kumpulan Bumiputera bukan Islam dan ketiga, kumpulan bumiputera Islam radikal. Rata-rata mereka telah menolak konsep kebudayaan kebangsaan itu kerana unsur ‘bumiptera-based dan bumiputera-defines national identity’ yang tebal. Sebaliknya, mereka menuntut pembinaan identiti nasional mestilah berteraskan kepada identiti pelbagai kaum selari dengan realiti masyarakat pelbagai kaum di negara ini (Kahn & Loh, 1992.) Dalam perbahasan di Parlimen, wakil-wakil bukan Melayu mempersoalkan legitimasi dasar tersebut, sambil mensifatkan penggubalan dasar berkenaan sebagai percubaan ke arah asimilasi kaum. Beberapa pemimpin DAP dalam ucapan di parlimen umpamanya menganggap dasar tersebut sebagai satu bentuk ‘hegemoni kaum’, yang cuba dipaksakan ke atas kaum-kaum lain. Tanggapan yang sama juga diberikan oleh kumpulan bukan-bumiputera – samada kaum Cina ataupun India melalui kongres kebudayaan masing-masing dan memorandum yang mereka kemukakan kepada kerajaan. Misalnya, Seramai 600 perwakilan Hua Tuan seluruh Malaysia yang menghadiri Kongres Kebudayaan Cina di Pulau Pinang, 27 Mac 1983 secara menolak Dasar Kebudayaan Kebangsaan. Mereka menuntut supaya pembinaan bangsa hendaklah berasaskan kepada konsep *civic nation* dan dasar kebudayaan yang bersifat multicultural. Kongres tersebut menggariskan 4 prinsip kebudayaan nasional, dengan tiga ciri asas iaitu bentuk kebudayaan yang beraneka ragam, nilai-nilai bersama dan bercorak tempatan (Sia Keng Yek, 1997:133):

1. Unsur-unsur unggul kebudayaan semua kaum di negara ini haruslah dijadikan asas kebudayaan kebangsaan.
2. Garis panduan pembentukan nilai kebudayaan bersama ialah sains, demokrasi, pemerintahan undang-undang dan patriotism.
3. Nilai kebudayaan bersama haruslah ditonjolkan melalui bentuk pelbagai kaum.
4. Proses pembentukan kebudayaan kebangsaan haruslah selaras dengan prinsip kesamarataan semua kaum melalui perundingan demokratik.

Tuntutan yang sama juga dimuatkan dalam memorandum bersama yang dikemukakan kepada kerajaan oleh ‘15 kumpulan utama Cina.’ Memorandum ini memberikan enam alasan mengapa Dasar Kebudayaan Kebangsaan tersebut tidak dapat diterima, iaitu: kongres kebudayaan tidak mewakili semua kaum, menekankan kepentingan Islam dan kebudayaan Melayu - agama dan kebudayaan lain tidak dibenarkan memainkan peranan bermakna, falsafah kebudayaan yang sempit dan tidak bersifat liberal –tidak menggalakkan akulturasi budaya dan integrasi secara semulajadi, mengabaikan isi positif kebudayaan – sistem nilai bersama sesuai dengan realiti masyarakat, bertentangan dengan semangat Perlembagaan Persekutuan, Rukun Negara dan Perisytiharan Bangsa-bangsa Bersatu Mengenai Hak-Hak Manusia, dan kecenderungan menggunakan kuasa pentadbiran bagi memaksa asimilasi (Sia Keng Yek, 1997:129-132.) Mereka menganggap bahawa dasar kebudayaan yang ditawarkan kerajaan itu adalah bersifat ‘exclusionary national identity,’ dan telah mengemukakan pendekatan balas dalam bentuk ‘multiculturalisme/civic nation’ yang bercorak ‘inclusionary’ sebagai dasar kepada pembinaan identiti dan bangsa bagi negara ini. Sekiranya dilihat kepada sambutan etnik bukan Melayu terhadap Dasar Kebudayaan Kebangsaan, menunjukkan bahawa peranannya sebagai kaedah paliatif politik dalam menguruskan konflik politik tidak membawa kesan yang efektif. Oleh itu, sumbangan Dasar Kebudayaan Kebangsaan kepada pemerintah dalam bentuk memperkasakan asset identitif-psikosimbolik tidak begitu bermakna jika dilihat dalam konteks reaksi dalam kalangan etnik bukan-Melayu.

Kedua, Dasar Kebudayaan Kebangsaan cuba mentafsirkan identiti ‘kebangsaan’ bangsa dan Negara Malaysia dari sudut psiko-budaya – dengan penekanan yang kuat kepada unsur primordial Melayu. Oleh kerana penolakan kaum bukan-Melayu terhadap pendekatan yang dianggap primordialistik itu proses merealisasikan identiti tersebut memerlukan kos sosial yang besar – Proses asimilasi sebagaimana yang dikehendaki dalam usaha tersebut sekiranya dilaksanakan secara tegas dan keras boleh melemahkan legitimasi pemerintah. Ini kerana, dengan mewujudkan hubungan simbiosis dengan nasionalisme kebudayaan Melayu itu, pemerintah juga turut dilihat sebagai pelopor kepada hegemoni nasionalisme tersebut. Keadaan ini menyebabkan pemerintah dianggap tidak lagi bersifat ‘neutral’ dalam proses pembinaan bangsa. Malahan, menurut Tan Chee-Beng, (1987), nasionalisme Melayu yang dijelmakan menerusi dasar kebudayaan itu telah menggalakkan pencetus nasionalisme komunal Cina, nasionalisme kaum Kadazan, Nasionalisme Iban dan lain-lain. Tindak-balas secara kontra-hegemoni, memaksa pemerintah memanipulasi asset koersif-perundangan kerana asset identitifnya menjadi lemah.

Ketiga, oleh kerana Dasar Kebudayaan Kebangsaan hanya diterima oleh orang Melayu, maka dasar ini tidak dapat berfungsi secara menyeluruh dalam menggerakkan proses mobilisasi sosial dalam kalangan etnik lain di negara ini. Oleh itu, proses pembinaan bangsa yang melibatkan soal mendidik dan membina semula sikap (*re-educate* dan *re-form*) sikap anggota etnik sesuai dengan matlamat pembinaan bangsa dalam sebuah negara yang bersatu padu tidak dapat dilaksanakan dengan sepenuhnya. Ini menyebabkan unsur *primordialisme* dan sikap *parochial* dalam kalangan pelbagai etnik lambat mengalami perubahan. Akibatnya, 'kaum-kaum yang berbeza masih kekurangan satu fahaman yang bersama mengenai arah pembangunan negara – satu "imaginasi" yang bersama mengenai Malaysia sebagai satu komuniti politik (Tan Chee-Beng, 1987.) Sehubungan dengan itu, fungsi Dasar Kebudayaan Kebangsaan sebagai alat palitif pemerintah dalam upaya membina orientasi (kognitif, afektif dan evaluative) positif dalam kalangan rakyat tidak berlaku secara berkesan (Hilley, 2001.) Oleh kerana sifat masyarakat *polyetnik* dicirikan oleh etnik dengan kategori sosial yang berlainan, maka dasar paliatif yang mengangkat komponen identiti nasionalisme etnik majority (Melayu) memang sukar diterima oleh etnik minoriti bukan-Melayu. Tambahan pula setiap etnik mempunyai idea mengenai bentuk negara-bangsa yang masing-masing idamkan - etnik-etnik ini tidak sekata tentang bentuk 'negara idaman' masing-masing (Shamsul, 1994.) Oleh itu, menurut pandangan mereka dasar kebudayaan kebangsaan yang 'legitimate' mestilah dasar yang bersifat supra-etnik. Hanya dengan cara ini, kebudayaan yang bersifat 'kebangsaan' (*large scale nationalism*) di Malaysia dapat berkembang. Penolakan terhadap dasar kebudayaan tersebut memberi kesan penting ke atas keupayaan Dasar Kebudayaan Kebangsaan berperanan sebagai dasar paliatif pemerintah. Perkembangan politik dalam tahun-tahun 1980an memperlihatkan Dasar Kebudayaan Kebangsaan yang mengekalkan sifat nasionalisme Melayu yang eksklusif tidak dapat membantu meningkatkan kemahiran pemerintah dalam memanipulasikan asetnya untuk mengawal dan meregulasi tingkah laku politik rakyat. Kelemahan pemerintah dari sudut ini hanya mewujudkan keadaan sekitaran yang sangat sesuai kepada kegiatan politik yang bercorak kontra-hegemoni. Perkembangan seperti ini membawa kepada berlakunya ketegangan hubungan sosial dalam kalangan etnik pelbagai kaum. (Gabriel, 2005.) Dalam keadaan yang tegang ini, palitif politik pemerintah tidak banyak membantu melicinkan proses perlaksanaan dasar kuratif pemerintah.

Berdasarkan kepada rumusan di atas, dapat ditegaskan bahawa konsep, matlamat dan mod perlaksanaan Dasar Kebudayaan Kebangsaan memerlukan pemikiran semula, terutamanya jika dilihat dari sudut palitif politik pemerintah. Dalam membuat pertimbangan semula tersebut, beberapa perkara perlu diberikan perhatian sejajar dengan perkembangan pemikiran tentang pembinaan bangsa dan identiti mutakhir ini – khususnya dari sudut *inclusivity* dan *exclusivity* dasar berkenaan. Pertama, sejak penghujung awal 1990an, falsafah ekonomi-politik pemerintah telah banyak mengalami perubahan. Pengaruh neo-liberalisme semakin kuat dalam mencorakkan

dasar ekonomi dan juga amalan sistem politik negara. Pensejagatan juga turut memberi kesan ke atas peranan dan kedudukan pemerintah. Malahan elit pemerintah di seluruh dunia kini mencari-cari formula baru bagi meningkatkan legitimasi pemerintah. Sesuai dengan *trend* liberalisasi kini, mereka lebih cenderung memberikan konsesi yang lebih banyak kepada sentiment budaya/agama etnik minoriti. Kemunculan fenomena *tribalism* seperti yang dihuraikan oleh Drucker (1993), mencetuskan pelbagai cabaran baru terhadap upaya membina identiti nasional. Menyedari peningkatan kecenderungan pelbagai golongan menuntut perakuan (recognition) ke atas identiti masing-masing, Dr Mahathir akhirnya berusaha merombak acuan 'bangsa' dan identiti Melayu dan Malaysia dan membina sebuah ideologi 'bangsa' yang bersifat konsensual dan inklusif serta menggalakkan kepelbagaian budaya (Harper, 1996; Hilley, 2011; Lim Teck Ghee & Gomez, 2009.) Perkembangan dalam 1990an, menyebabkan pengaruh golongan ethno-nasionalist yang mempelopori Dasar Kebudayaan Kebangsaan merosot (Mandal, 2008.) Realiti masyarakat pelbagai etnik di Malaysia sebagai satu kategori sosial yang berbeza sama sekali dan perkembangan politik semasa perlu diambil kira dalam membuat penilaian semula ke atas Dasar Kebudayaan Kebangsaan (Arakaki, 2009.) Ini kerana seperti yang dinyatakan oleh Seers (1982) bahawa, "an unappeased minority disrupt unity."

Kedua, Dasar Kebudayaan Kebangsaan hendaklah dijadikan dasar yang lebih jelas dalam proses membina etos kebangsaan negara ini. Etos mempunyai hubungan erat dengan identiti sesuatu bangsa. Oleh itu, adalah perlu diberikan perhatian terhadap proses membina nilai yang dapat dikongsi bersama sebagai teras kepada kebudayaan masyarakat di negara ini. Nilai-nilai supra-etnik yang dapat dikongsi bersama, khususnya menerusi Rukun Negara dan wawasan 2020 perlu disemai dan diartikulasi secara meluas dalam kalangan setiap etnik. Nilai yang bersifat supra-etnik boleh menjadi komponen utama kepada pembinaan identiti bersama dan asas kepada solidariti kepada 'nasionalisme Malaysia.'

Akhir sekali, pengalaman sejak negara mula mencapai kemerdekaan menunjukkan bahawa pemikiran yang berpaksi kepada primordialisme dan pluralisme budaya secara ketat ternyata gagal dalam membina konsensus menentukan rupa bentuk kebudayaan kebangsaan bagi negara ini. Alternatif kepada kedua-dua pemikiran ini perlu diterokai. Dari sudut teoritisnya, perdebatan dalam kajian identiti yang berlaku sejak tiga dekad lalu semakin cenderung kepada kompromi intelektual bagi mewujudkan konvergensi pemikiran tentang identiti. Kini sudah terbina pemikiran 'middle position' dalam penelitian tentang identiti dan bangsa. Para peneliti mengakui bahawa dalam konteks pembinaan bangsa, unsur *primordiality* tidak dapat dipisahkan daripada entiti bangsa, meskipun ianya dibentuk dalam acuan 'civic nation.' Menurut Dawisha, (2002), "primordial building block have to reside in the collective memories of the people for the nationalist project to proceed and succeed."



Dalam pendekatan 'middle position' ini, unsur *primordiality* diterima, tetapi dengan *proviso* tambahan yang inklusif. Sejajar dengan perkembangan ini, secara praktisnya, pengaruh doktrin liberal kosmopolitanisme mendasari prinsip solidariti dalam Rukun Negara dan Wawasan 2020 perlu dimanfaatkan dalam proses memikirkan sebuah Dasar Kebudayaan Kebangsaan yang inklusif untuk pembinaan bangsa pada masa depan (Arakaki, 2009) Namun begitu, sebarang bentuk pemikiran semula tentang bangsa dan identiti dalam konteks dasar kebudayaan yang inklusif hendaklah tidak sama sekali mengeneipkan unsur kesinambungan sejarah, tradisi dan institusi pra-modern yang telah bertapak sejak sekian lama sebagai bahagian yang penting dalam pembinaan bangsa. Perhatian kepada aspek ini sangat penting sebagaimana dinyatakan oleh J.Orman(2008:37) di bawah:

Modern nations reflect a combination of modern and pre-modern elements and probably the most significant continuity between the modern and pre-modern eras is the ethnic character of national communities. Overlooking the necessary ethnic component of national identity has been a mistake of many post-colonial 'nation-building' endeavours which have tended to promote highly civic conceptions of nationhood in the absence of an appropriate existing ethnic basis for the aspired –to national community. Successful nation-building cannot simply jettison the ethnyic component in favour of a purely political image of the nation since evidence overwhelmingly suggests that the existence of shared political values and practices is not, by itself, a sufficiently powerful generator of the sentiments of fellowship and solidarity which are necessary for the founding of national community.

### **Penutup**

Secara umumnya, perbincangan di atas cuba menunjukkan bahawa sesuatu dasar, khususnya yang berada dalam kategori dasar paliatif, walaupun pada prinsipnya dirancang untuk mencetuskan perubahan, pembangunan dan pembinaan bangsa, tetapi sekiranya tidak bersifat kondusif dengan realiti masyarakat hanya mencetuskan konflik yang berterusan. Dasar Kebudayaan Kebangsaan yang digubal pada tahun 1971, dengan matlamat membina identiti nasional dan sebagai upaya meningkatkan 'attachment' rakyat terhadap negara dan pemerintah terbukti tidak dapat berperanan secara efektif ke arah pembinaan sebuah bangsa di negara ini. Tegasnya, setelah sedekad memasuki abad kedua puluh satu, negara kita masih berhadapan dengan cabaran menangani permasalahan identiti, yang tidak dapat ditangani sejak empat puluh tahun lalu menerusi perlaksanaan Dasar Kebudayaan Kebangsaan.

**RUJUKAN**

Abd Ghapa Harun, 1995. Kebudayaan Kebangsaan dan Politik Pembinaan Negara Bangsa,” Kertas Kerja untuk *Seminar Serantau Kebudayaan Kebangsaan*, Kuala Lumpur, 12-13 Disember.

Abd Rahman Embong, 1995, Negara Bangsa dan Bangsa Malaysia, *Pemikir*, Bil.2 Oktober-Disember.

Alemseged Abbay, Diversity and State-Building in Ethiopia, *African Affairs* , Vol. 103, No. 413 (Oct., 2004)

Anderson, Benedict (1983), *Imagined Communities, Reflections on the origin and spread of nationalism*, London, New Left Books.

Ang, Ien. 2010. ‘Between Nationalism and Transnationalism: Multiculturalism in a Globalising World’, Paper no. 1. Centre for Cultural Research Occasional Paper Series, Volume 1

Arakaki, Robert K. 2009. 2008 Malaysian Election: The End of Malaysia's Ethnic Nationalism ? *Asian Politics & Policy*, [Volume 1, Issue 1](#), pages 79–96, January/March .

Aziz Deraman, 1992. Kebudayaan Etnik dan Perpaduan Bangsa Menjelang 2020, *Dewan Budaya*, November.

Banting, K. & Kymlicka, W., eds. (2006) *Multiculturalism and the Welfare State, Recognition and redistribution in contemporary democracies*, Oxford, Oxford University Press.

Barnet, R.J. & Cavanagh J. 1995. *Global Dreams: Imperial Corporation and the New World Order*, New York: Touchstone Book.

Bonacich, Edna, 1973. A theory of middlemen minorities, *American Sociological Review*, Vol.37.

Brown, D. 2000. *Contemporary Nationalism: Civic, ethnocultural and multicultural politics*, London: Routledge.

Calhoun, Craig. 1993. Nationalism and Ethnicity, *Annual Review of Sociology*, Vol. 19.

Ulang Tahun Ke-40, Konsep dan Dasar Kebudayaan Kebangsaan: Penilaian Semula

省思国家文化概念与政策研讨会

Cheah Boon Kheng, 2002. *Malaysia: The Making of a Nation*, Singapore: ISEAS.

Collins, Alan. 2006. Chinese Educationalists in Malaysia: Defenders of Chinese Identity

*Asian Survey*, Vol. 46, No. 2, March/April.

Connors, Michael Kelly, 2005. Hegemony and the politics of culture and identity in Thailand, *Critical Asian Studies*, 37:4

Drucker, F. F, 1993. *Post Capitalist Society*: Oxford: Butterworth-Heineman Ltd.

Firdaus Abdullah, 1987. Politik Kebudayaan Kebangsaan di Malaysia: Satu Perbicangan Awal, dalam, *Pertemuan Dunia Melayu* 82, Kuala Lumpur: Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka.

Fortier, A-M (2005), 'Pride politics and multiculturalist citizenship', *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 29(3): 559-578.

Gabriel, Sharmani Patricia. 2005. Nation and Contestation in Malaysia: Diaspora and Myths of Belonging in the Narratives of K. S. Maniam, *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies*, 36 (2) June.

Geertz, C. 1967. The Integrative Revolution: Primordial Sentiments and Civic Politics in the New State, Claude E. Welch jr. (ed.) *Political Modernization: A Reader in Comparative Political Change*, Belmont: Wardsworth Pub. Inc.

Gellner, E., 1983. *Nations and Nationalism*, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press)

Ghazali Shafei, 1985. *Rukun Negara: A Testament of Hope*, Kuala Lumpur: Creative Ent.

Gibbons, D.S. 1989, Perpaduan Nasional dan Kepelbagaian Budaya di Malaysia, dlm, Syed Ahmad Husin & Y.Mansoor Marican, (eds.) *Integrasi Politik*, Kuala Lumpur: Dewan Bahasa & Pustaka.

Gloor, LeAna B. 2006. From the Melting Pot to the Tossed Salad Metaphor: Why Coerc, *Hohonu*, Volume 4, Number 1- <http://hilo.hawaii.edu/academics/hohonu/writing.php?id=91>

Ulang Tahun Ke-40, Konsep dan Dasar Kebudayaan Kebangsaan: Penilaian Semula

省思国家文化概念与政策研讨会

Goh, Daniel P. S. 2008. From Colonial Pluralism to Postcolonial Multiculturalism: Race, State Formation and the Question of Cultural Diversity in Malaysia and Singapore, *Sociology Compass*, Vol.2, Issue 1, January.

Gomez, Alberto, 2009. Superlative Syndrome, Cultural Politics and Neoliberalism in Malaysia, dlm, Lim Teck Ghee, Alberto Gomez & Azly Rahman, eds. *Multiethnic Malaysia: Past, Present and Future*,

Petaling Jaya & Kuala Lumpur: SIRD & MiDAS@UCSI University.

Gregory Jusdanis, 1995. Beyond National Culture? *Boundary 2*, Vol. 22, No. 1 Spring.

Hall, Stuart, 1996. The Question of Cultural Identity” dlm, Hall, Stuart, David Held, Don Hubert and Kenneth Thompson, (eds.) *Modernity; An Introduction to Modern Societies*, US: Blackwell

Harper, T.N., 1996. New Malays, New Malaysian: Nationalism, Society and History, *Southeast Asian Affairs*, Singapore: ISEAS.

Haynes, Jeff, 1997. *Third World Politics*, Malden, Mass.: Blackwell Pub.

Hefner, Robert W. “Introduction: Multiculturalism and Citizenship in Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia,” Robert W. Hefner, (ed.) *The Politics of Multiculturalism: Pluralism and Citizenship in Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2001.*

Hennayake, S.K. 1992, Integrative nationalism: An Alternative Explanation of Minority Ethnonationalism, *Political Geography*, Vol. II, No.6, November.

Henry, Andre-Vincent, 1994. Multi-Ethnicity and National Identity: The Case of Trinidad & Tobago, *Ethnic Studies Report*, Vol.XII, No.2, July.

Hilley, John. 2001. *Malaysia: Mahathrism, Hegemony and the New Opposition*, London: Zed Books.

Ulang Tahun Ke-40, Konsep dan Dasar Kebudayaan Kebangsaan: Penilaian Semula

省思国家文化概念与政策研讨会

Ho Khai Leong, (1997). *Political Indigenization and the State in Peninsular Malaysia*, dlm, H.M.Dahlan, et.al, (eds.) *ASEAN in the Global System*, Bangi: Penerbit UKM.

Horowitz, Donald, 1985. *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*, Berkeley: University of California Press.

Kahn, J. & Loh Kok Wah, Francis, eds. 1992. *Fragmented Vision: Culture and Politics in Contemporary Malaysia*, Sydney: Allen & Unwin.

Kymlicka, W. (1995), *Multicultural Citizenship, A liberal theory of minority rights*, Oxford, Clarendon Press.

Kymlicka, W., 2001. *Politics in the Vernacular: Nationalism, Multiculturalism, and Citizenship*, (New York: Oxford University Press)

Kua Kia Soong, (ed.) 1987, *Polarisation in Malaysia: The Root Causes*, Petaling Jaya: K.Das Ink.

Lily Zubaidah Rahim ,2001. Whose Imagined Community? The Nation-State, Ethnicity and Indigenous Minorities in Southeast Asia, Paper prepared for the United Nations Research Institute for Social Development Conference on Racism and Public Policy, September, Durban, S.Africa

Lim Teck Ghee & Gomez, Alberto, 2009. *Culture and Development in Malaysia*, dlm, Lim Teck Ghee, Alberto Gomez & Azly Rahman, eds. *Multiethnic Malaysia: Past, Present and Future*, Petaling Jaya &

Kuala Lumpur: SIRD & MiDAS@UCSI University.

Mandal, Sumit, K. 2008. The National Culture Policy and Contestation over Malaysian Identity, dlm, Joan M.Neslon, J.Meerman & Abdul Rahman Embong, (eds.) *Globalization & National Autonomy: The Experience of Malaysia*, Singapore: ISEAS & IKMAS.

Maclure, Jocelyn, 2003. The Politics of Recognition at an Impasse? Identity Politics and Democratic Citizenship, *Canadian Journal of Political Science / Revue canadienne de science politique*, Vol. 36, No. 1 March.



Ulang Tahun Ke-40, Konsep dan Dasar Kebudayaan Kebangsaan: Penilaian Semula

省思国家文化概念与政策研讨会

Merkel, Peter, H. 1970, *Modern Comparative Politics*, New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, inc.

Migdal, J.1988. *Strong Societies and Weak States. State-Society Relations and State Capabilities in the Third World*, Princeton NJ: Princeton Uni.Press.

Miguel, Edward ,2004. Tribe or Nation? Nation Building and Public Goods in Kenya versus Tanzania, *World Politics*, Vol. 56, No. 3, April

Muhammad Ikmal Said, 1996. Malay Nationalism and National Identity, dlm, Muhammad Ikmal Said & Zahid Emby, eds. *Malaysia: Critical Perspectives, Essays in Honours of Syed Husin Ali*, Petaling Jaya: Persatuan sains Sosial Malaysia.

Nair, Sheila, 2009. Colonialism, Nationalism and Ethnicity: Constructing Identity and Difference, dlm, Lim Teck Ghee, Alberto Gomez & Azly Rahman, eds. *Multiethnic Malaysia: Past, Present and Future*, Petaling Jaya & Kuala Lumpur: SIRD & MiDAS@UCSI University.

Nik Anuar, Muhd Hj Salleh & Abd Ghapa Harun, 2011. *Biografi Tun Abdul Razak: Negarawan dan Patriot, Bangi*: Penerbit Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia.

Nugent , David, 1994. Building the State, Making the Nation: The Bases and Limits of State Centralization in "Modern" Peru, *American Anthropologist*, New Series, Vol. 96, No. 2, Jun.

Orman, J. 2008. *Language Policy and nation-Building in Post apartied South Africa*, Springer.

Phadnis, Urmila, *Ethnicity and Nation-building in South Asia*, New Delhi: SAGE Publications India, 1990.

Palmer, M. 1973. *Dilemmas of Political Development: An Introduction to the Politics of the Developing Areas*, Itasca. Ilk: F.E.Reacock.

Parekh, B. (2006), *Rethinking Multiculturalism, Cultural diversity and political theory*, 2nd edn, Basingstoke, Palgrave.

Ulang Tahun Ke-40, Konsep dan Dasar Kebudayaan Kebangsaan: Penilaian Semula

省思国家文化概念与政策研讨会

Rustam A. Sani, 1993. *Melayu Baru dan bangsa Malaysia: Tradisi Cendekia dan Krisis Budaya*, Kuala Lumpur: Utusan Puc.& Dist.

Sanderson, Stephen, K. 1995. *Macrosociology*, New York: Harper Collins.

Saravanamuttu, Johan (2002) "Multiculturalism in Crisis: Reflections from Southeast Asia," *Macalester International*: Vol. 12, Article 9. <http://digitalcommons.macalester.edu/macintl/vol12/iss1/9>

Seers, D. 1983. *The Political Economy of Nationalism*, Oxford: Oxford Univ.Press.

Shamsul Amri Baharudin, 1994. Pembentukan 'Bangsa Malaysia' Dalam 'Program Modenisasi Malaysia: Satu Sorotan Konsptual, *Kertas Seminar FSSK*, Ukm.Bangi.

Shamsul A.B. 1996. Debating about Identity in Malaysia: A Discourse Analysis, *Southeast Asian Studies*, Vol.34, No.3, Disember.

Shamsul Amri Baharuddin, 1998. Etnisiti, Kelas atau Identiti: Analisis Sosial dalam Pengajian Malaysia, *Kertas untuk Seminar FSSK*, ke-3, 18-19 Ogos, UKM, Bangi.

Sia Keng Yek, 1997. *Hua Tuan dan Perkembangan Politik Malaysia: Satu Kajian Tentang Asal-usul dan Perkembangan Gagasan Sistem Dua Barisan*, Tesis M.A, Jabataan Sejarah, UKM, Bangi.

Sidanius, Jim, et.al, 1987. The Interface Between Ethnic and National Attachment: Ethnic Pluralism or Ethnic Dominance?, *The Public Opinion Quarterly*, Vol. 61, No. 1, Special Issue on Race (Spring, 1997), Siti Rohayah, 1995. DKK perlu lebih jelas - Ghapa, *Utusan Malaysia*, 14 Disember.

Smith, Anthony (1993) "The Nation: Invented, Imaged, Reconstructed?" in Marjorie Ringrose and Adam J. Lerner (eds.), *Reimagining the Nation* (Buckingham: Open University Press).  
(1991) *National Identity* (Reno, Nevada: University of Nevada Press).

Smolics, J.J. 1979. *Culture and Education in A Plural Society*, Canberra: Curriculum Dev. Centre.

Ulang Tahun Ke-40, Konsep dan Dasar Kebudayaan Kebangsaan: Penilaian Semula

省思国家文化概念与政策研讨会

Tan Chee Beng, 1987. *Ethnic relations in Malaysia in Historical and Sociological Perspective*, Kajian Malaysia, Vol.5, No.1, Jun.

Tan Liok Ee, 1992. *DJZ and the Challenge to Cultural Hegemony 1951–1987*, dlm, Joel S. Kahn and Francis

Loh Kok Wah, (eds.) *Fragmented Vision: Culture and Politics in Contemporary Malaysia*, Sydney: Allen and Unwin.

Ting, Helen, 2009. The Politics of National Identity in West Malaysia: Continued Mutation or critical Transition, *Southeast Asian Studies*, Vol.47, No.1 Jun.

Taylor, Charles. "The Politics of Recognition." In *Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of Recognition*, edited and introduced by Amy Gutman. New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1994, pp. 25–73.

Ting Chew Peh, 1979. *Konsep Asas Sosiologi*, Kuala Lumpur: Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka.

Ting Chew Peh, 1985. *Kebudayaan China Dalam Pelaksanaan Dasar Kebudayaan Kebangsaan*, *Konvensyen Kebudayaan dan Identiti Nasional*, UKM, Bangi.

Tsurutanni, T. 1973, *The Politics of National Development: Political Leadership in Transitional Society*, New York: Chandler Pub. Co.

Turner, Jonathan, H & Edna Bonacich, 1980. Toward a composite theory of middleman minorities, *Ethnicity*, Vol.7.

Vasil, R.K. 1980. *Ethnic Politics in Malaysia*, New delhi: Radiant Pub.

Weiner, M. 1967. *Political Integration and Political Development*, dlm, Claude E. Welch jr. (ed.) *Political Modernization: A Reader in Comparative Political Change*, Belmont: Wardsworth Pub. Inc.

Ulang Tahun Ke-40, Konsep dan Dasar Kebudayaan Kebangsaan: Penilaian Semula

省思国家文化概念与政策研讨会

Wriggins, H.W. 1967. Impediment to Unity in New Nations: The Case of Ceylon, dlm, Claud E. Welch jr. (ed.) *Political Modernization: A Reader in Comparative Political Change*, Belmont: Wardsworth Pub. Inc.

Yamamoto, Kazuya, 2007. Nation-Building and Integration Policy in the Philippines, *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 44, No. 2, March.

Yew Yeok Kim, 1985. Masalah Pembentukan Dasar Kebudayaan Nasional: Keberkesanan Perlaksanaan Masa Kini, *Konvensyen Kebudayaan dan Identiti Nasional*, UKM, Bangi.

Zainal Kling, 1987. Konsep Kebudayaan Kebangsaan Malaysia, dlm, *Pertemuan Dunia Melayu 82*, Kuala Lumpur: Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka.

Zawawi Ibrahim, 2004. Globalization and National Identity: Managing Ethnicity and Cultural Pluralism in Malaysia, dlm, Yoichiro Sato, (ed.) *Growth and Governance in Asia*, Honolulu: Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies.

Zewde, Bahru ed., (2008) *Society, state, and identity in African history*, Addis Ababa: Forum for Social Studies.









THIRD EDITION

# RACIAL FORMATION IN THE UNITED STATES

MICHAEL OMI & HOWARD WINANT

ROUTLEDGE  


# Racial Formation in the United States

*Racial Formation in the United States* is appearing here in an entirely new edition, 20 years since its last publication. Authors Michael Omi and Howard Winant have maintained the structure and vision of their classic work, but have completely revised and rewritten every chapter. The ambitious purpose of the book remains the same: to develop a theory of race and racism adequate to their complexity, historical depth, and ongoing political importance. *Racial Formation* explains how concepts of race are created and transformed, how race shapes U.S. society, and how it permeates both identities and institutions. Some of the contemporary themes that Omi and Winant discuss are: the steady journey of the U.S. toward a majority nonwhite population, the creativity and political legacy of post-World War II anti-racism, the linkage between colorblind racial ideology and neoliberalism, the new racial genomics, the emergence of “implicit bias” accounts of race, the rise of a mass immigrants rights movement, the achievement of race/class/gender intersectionality theories, and the election and reelection of a black president of the United States.

In Part I the authors review and critique the main theories of race—the ethnicity-, class-, and nation-based paradigms—examining the main contemporary trends and limits in racial theory. In Part II they offer their own advanced theory of racial formation, placing the racialized body much more front and center in the analysis, without diminishing in any way their commitment to a social constructionist account of race. Omi and Winant argue that throughout U.S. history race has provided a “template” for patterns of inequality, marginalization, and difference; this is a new claim for their book. In their view no other social conflict—not class, not sex/gender, not colonialism or imperialism—can ever be understood without taking race into account.

The new Part III treats U.S. racial history up to 2013. Omi and Winant look anew at the radical challenge presented by the black movement in the post-World War II years. They stress the movement’s alliances (and sometimes conflicts) with other racial justice, gender justice, and anti-imperialist movements. They argue that because it virtually reinvented U.S. politics and greatly expanded the horizons of democracy and equality, its containment became the top priority of the U.S. power structure. Part III therefore treats the dynamics of racial reaction at greater length than did earlier editions of *Racial Formation*, exploring not only the Nixon, Reagan, and Bushes’ years in power, but also the accommodations of Clinton and Obama to colorblind racial ideology and to the regime of neoliberalism.

Omi and Winant continue to see race as a fundamental organizing principle of social life, one that deeply structures politics, economics, and culture in the United States. They rethink race as intersectional, ubiquitous, and unstable, continually operating at the crossroads of social structure and identity. Because race is socially constructed and historically conflictual, it is continually being made and remade in everyday life. Race is constantly in formation.

*Test questions and a range of additional instructor support materials, prepared by Cameron Lippard, Associate Professor of Sociology at Appalachian State University, are available on a password-protected website, [www.routledge.com/cw/omi](http://www.routledge.com/cw/omi) to faculty and administrative staff who have been approved to request Review Copies by Routledge.*

## Titles of Related Interest from Routledge

Middle Class Meltdown in America: Causes, Consequences, and Remedies

*Kevin T. Leicht and Scott T. Fitzgerald*

Black Sexual Politics: African Americans, Gender, and the New Racism

*Patricia Hill Collins*

Black Feminist Thought: Knowledge, Consciousness, and the Politics of Empowerment

*Patricia Hill Collins*

Race, Law, and American Society: 1607–Present, Second Edition

*Gloria J. Browne-Marshall*

The Nation and Its Peoples: Citizens, Denizens, Migrants

*Edited by John S.W. Park and Shannon Gleeson*

Racist America: Roots, Current Realities, and Future Reparations, Third Edition

*Joe Feagin*

The Enduring Color Line in U.S. Athletics

*Krystal Beamon and Chris Messer*

The Pains of Mass Imprisonment

*Benjamin Fleury-Steiner and Jamie Longazel*



# Racial Formation in the United States

Third Edition

**MICHAEL OMI AND  
HOWARD WINANT**

*Test questions and a range of additional instructor support materials, prepared by Cameron Lippard, Associate Professor of Sociology at Appalachian State University, are available on a password-protected website, [www.routledge.com/cw/omi](http://www.routledge.com/cw/omi) to faculty and administrative staff who have been approved to request Review Copies by Routledge.*

Third edition published 2015

by Routledge

711 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10017

and by Routledge

2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon, OX14 4RN

*Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business*

© 2015 Michael Omi & Howard Winant

The right of Michael Omi and Howard Winant to be identified as authors of this work has been asserted by them in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilized in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers.

*Trademark notice:* Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe.

First edition published by Routledge 1986

Second edition published by Routledge 1994

*Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data*

Omi, Michael.

Racial formation in the United States / by Michael Omi & Howard Winant. — Third edition.  
pages cm

Includes bibliographical references and index.

1. United States—Race relations. 2. United States—Social conditions—1960–1980. 3. United States—Social conditions—1980— I. Winant, Howard.  
II. Title.

E184.A1O46 2014

305.800973—dc23

2014002651

ISBN: 978-0-415-52098-0 (hbk)

ISBN: 978-0-415-52031-7 (pbk)

ISBN: 978-0-203-07680-4 (ebk)

Typeset in Ehrhardt MT

by Apex CoVantage, LLC

# Contents

Author Biographies	vi
Preface and Acknowledgments	vii
Introduction: Racial Formation in the United States	1
<b>PART I</b>	
<b>Paradigms of Race: Ethnicity, Class, and Nation</b>	<b>19</b>
CHAPTER 1 Ethnicity	21
CHAPTER 2 Class	53
CHAPTER 3 Nation	75
<b>PART II</b>	
<b>Racial Formation</b>	<b>103</b>
CHAPTER 4 The Theory of Racial Formation	105
CHAPTER 5 Racial Politics and the Racial State	137
<b>PART III</b>	
<b>Racial Politics Since World War II</b>	<b>159</b>
CHAPTER 6 The Great Transformation	161
CHAPTER 7 Racial Reaction: Containment and Rearticulation	185
CHAPTER 8 Colorblindness, Neoliberalism, and Obama	211
Conclusion: The Contrarities of Race	245
Works Cited	271
Index	315

# Author Biographies

**Michael Omi** is Associate Professor of Ethnic Studies and Associate Director of the Haas Institute for a Fair and Inclusive Society at the University of California, Berkeley.

**Howard Winant** is Professor of Sociology at the University of California, Santa Barbara. Winant is the founding director of the University of California Center for New Racial Studies (UCCNRS), a MultiCampus Research Program Initiative.

# Preface and Acknowledgments

This book has been a long time coming. It has been nearly 30 years since the initial publication of *Racial Formation in the United States* (1986), and 20 years since the appearance of the second edition (1994). Over the years, much has changed and much has remained the same in the overall patterns, structures, discourses, and individual/collective experiences of race and racism in the United States. Legally sanctioned forms of racial discrimination may have receded, but racial inequality and racial injustice have stubbornly persisted. In many ways racism has proliferated, adopted new guises, and deepened. Continuity and change are also apparent in racial theory: how race and racism are recognized, defined, and narrated keeps changing too. Racial politics, both state-based and experiential, have shifted as new understandings of race and racism are applied in the public sphere and in everyday life. Given the continuing instability of the concept of race and the uncertainty and anxiety about its meaning, a reworking and restatement of the racial formation perspective was long overdue.

But what should be retained from the earlier editions of *Racial Formation*? What ideas required further elaboration, what should be revised, and what updating was needed in order to account for new and emergent issues of racial theory and politics? We deliberated deeply, read widely, and argued passionately with one another about these questions as we prepared this third edition of the book.

*Racial Formation* has been our intellectual “home” for decades. So we initially saw this revision as a “home remodeling” project. Our visions of what we wanted to do initially clashed. Scale was a big issue. One of us saw the project as a modest renovation. Imagining the chapters as rooms, he wanted simply to update each room, freshen the paint, rearrange the furniture, and bring in some new pieces to complement the revised décor. The other author wanted to knock down the walls, change the plumbing and electrical work, install new windows and insulation, and perhaps shore up the foundation.

The final product represents a synthesis of both our desires and plans. Because so much had changed over the two decades since the second edition of *Racial Formation*, a lot more than remodeling was required. The steady journey of the United States towards a majority nonwhite population, the ongoing evisceration of the political legacy of the early post-World War II civil rights movement, the initiation of the “war on terror” with its attendant Islamophobia, the rise of a mass immigrants rights movement, the formulation of race/class/gender “intersectionality” theories, and the election and reelection of a black president of the United States were some of the



many new racial conditions we had to address. While the house of *Racial Formation* was still standing, while its theoretical foundation was still intact, the home was very out-of-date and old-fashioned. The book needed reconstruction, although its basic design remained quite elegant.

In this new edition we have kept the book's structure intact: It begins with a critique of existing racial theories, proceeds to offer our own new theory, and then applies our theory to recent political developments and prevailing U.S. racial dynamics. While we have maintained the original design of our home, we have radically revised and rewritten each chapter.

We believe that the original book's core formulations have stood up quite well over the years. But much of its early content has not aged like fine wine. Many of the empirical materials and examples of racial politics referenced in the previous editions are now dated and have been removed. We have tried to provide current empirical reference points as far as possible, knowing full well that these too will be superseded. Race is unstable, flexible, and subject to constant conflict and reinvention. Rather than seeing the present moment—whatever moment that is—as distilling the *longue durée* of racial politics, we in the United States should recognize that we live in history. Especially in this country there is a desire for instant solutions for problems, even for deep-seated conflicts: Just add boiling water, just heat and serve. If the bad news is that there are no quick fixes for structural racism, the good news is that we live in history. We built this society over historical time; we can rebuild it as well.

While our theory has been highly generative, it has drawn a good deal of criticism too. We are grateful for that; we have learned from our critics that parts of our analysis were cryptic and opaque, and that there were significant gaps in our coverage. Our discussion of the prevailing paradigms of racial theory in Part I required a substantial makeover to engage more recent literature and to sharpen analytic distinctions both within and among different paradigms.

The core theory of racial formation in Part II has elicited both praise and criticism. In this version of *Racial Formation*, we place the racial body—the phenomic/corporeal/"ocular" dimensions of racialization—much more front and center, without diminishing in any way our commitment to the social construction of race. The body was largely undertheorized in our earlier accounts.

We argue that race has been a master category, a kind of template for patterns of inequality, marginalization, and difference throughout U.S. history. This is a new claim for us. We are not suggesting that race has been primordial or primary, or that it has operated as some sort of "fundamental contradiction." Rather we are emphasizing its ubiquity: its presence and importance. We are noting that no other social conflict—not class, not sex/gender, not colonialism or imperialism—can ever be understood independently of it.

Speaking of racial history, in the previous edition of our book, Part III ended at the dawn of the Clinton era. Obviously, much has transpired since the early 1990s.

The new Part III treats U.S. racial history up to 2013, extending into the Obama period. We have expanded our account of The Great Transformation, the rising phase of the political trajectory of race. We look anew at the civil rights movement and the black power movement (brown power, red power, and yellow power movements too). We focus greater attention on the radical threat these movements posed to the despotic regime of the United States, notably as they combined with “second-wave” feminism, the anti-imperialist movement that began with opposition to the Vietnam war, and the dawning LGBT movement.

We have argued that the U.S. racial regime is fundamentally despotic; radical challenges to it occur only rarely. The post-World War II political trajectory of race that preoccupies this book was only the second such challenge in U.S. history; the first full-scale confrontation with racial despotism, of course, came a century earlier with the Civil War and Reconstruction. From the vantage point of the 21st century we can see that the political trajectory of race that we study in this book consists of a vital and radical democratic interruption of U.S. racial despotism, followed by an extended racial reaction. The all-too-brief Great Transformation, we argue, set in motion permanent political and cultural shifts that 40 years of racial reaction have been required to control. And those radical challenges have still not been controlled. They remain disruptive, transformative, explosive.

The black movement inspired a tremendous democratic upsurge, not only in the United States but all around the world. Part III has been extended to treat at greater length the racial reaction that returned to power in about 1970. To make sense of these immense political effects, we focus intensively in Part III—and throughout the book—on the racial ideology of colorblindness: on its genealogy and ascendance to hegemonic status in the United States. Colorblindness is today the prevailing mode of racial “common sense.” We make a number of key claims about it; one of our main arguments is that colorblindness is a component, an enabler so to speak, of neoliberalism, the hegemonic economic project of our time. But we do not disparage colorblindness in every way. While we roundly criticize colorblind racial ideology, we also note its aspirational qualities and potential for rearticulation.

We made a lot of changes in this edition, but our overall purpose and vision remain the same. We want to provide an account of how concepts of race are created and transformed, how they become the focus of political conflict, and how they come to shape and permeate both identities and institutions. Without some notion of the socially constructed meaning of race, it is hard to grasp the way racial identity is assigned and assumed, or to perceive the deeply embedded racial dimensions of everyday experience. Similarly, without an awareness that the concept of race is subject to permanent political contestation, it is difficult to recognize the enduring role race plays in shaping social structure—in establishing and reproducing social inequalities, and in organizing political initiatives and state action across the entire U.S. body politic.

The concept of racial formation that we first advanced in the 1980s was a reaction to the dominant modes of theorizing about race in both mainstream social science and

left anti-racist politics. In many ways the post-World War II social science disciplines still reproduced white supremacist assumptions. This led them to conceptualize race and racism as aberrant and anomalous in U.S. society, rather than as constitutive elements of the nation-state, foundational ideas about the nature of the American people, and lineaments of the limited democracy that operated in every U.S. institution, public and private. In prevailing social science research, race was conceptualized and operationalized in a fixed and static manner that failed to recognize the changing meaning of race over historical time and in varied social settings. Race was understood much too simply: as an independent variable that was correlated with other variables to assess the scope and degree of economic inequality, health disparities, residential segregation, or incarceration rates. Could one effectively analyze patterns of residential segregation, to take one example, without considering the racial categories that were utilized and encoded in research, in public documents, in legal decisions and how they changed over time and place? Didn't one have to ask not only how race shaped segregation, but how segregation reciprocally shaped race? Didn't one have to examine how segregation invested racial categories with content and meaning? Asking these questions led us to interrogate the race concept itself and to think about its socially constructed nature.

On the political left, we were critical of the assumptions that guided Marxist analyses of race in the 1970s and 1980s—both social-democratic and Marxist-Leninist, both sectarian and humanist. In Marxist approaches race was seen as epiphenomenal to class and class relations. Racism was understood as a form of “false consciousness,” an ideology and practice utilized by the capitalist class to sow discontent among workers, to create artificial divisions within the working class, and prevent the emergence of unified class-consciousness and organization. In such arguments, the independent role of race was never considered. Also on the left, we were critical of nationalist positions of various types: notably pan-/diasporic accounts and internal colonialism theories. Such approaches tended to ignore or homogenize variations within racially identified groups and categories, to disparage the racial hybridity that is so widespread in the United States, and to import their political programs (many Marxists did this too) from elsewhere, notably the anti-imperial movements of the global South and East.

Parting with both mainstream social science and left political theorizing about race, we tried to imagine it as a fundamental principle of social organization—one that deeply structured polity, economy, culture, and society in the United States. Central to this was to see race as a legitimate and autonomous social concept that needed to be critically engaged in its own right. Then and now, we emphasize the fundamental instability of the race concept. Race, we claim, operates in the space of intersections, at the crossroads where social structure and experience meet. It is socially constructed and historically fluid. It is continually being made and remade in everyday life. Race is continually in formation.

Our concept of racial formation also developed in relationship to political struggles. Both of us were engaged and transformed by struggles of the new social movements of the 1960s and 1970s: the black power movement and other movements of color, the “second-wave” feminist movement and queer movement, the anti-war movement, the insurgent labor movement, the student movement, and the struggles for ethnic studies on university campuses. These new social movements expanded and deepened the very meaning of politics in the United States. What we term “the politicization of the social” was articulated in these political spaces and times. Though it is sometimes disparaged as “identity politics,” we affirm that designation and support that current. We recognize that, messy and processual as this politicization of the social is, it goes much deeper than the mainstream definition of politics as who gets what, when, and how. It is not outside the social structures of violence, injustice, inequality, and stigmatization; indeed it is deeply and more self-consciously embedded within those structures. The politicization of the social, developed and led by the black movement in the post-World War II United States, is the application to current conditions of the radical pragmatism developed by John Dewey, W.E.B. Du Bois, and C.L.R. James, and in our time by Cornel West, Judith Butler, Kimberlé Crenshaw, and others. Drawing upon categories of difference and marginalization, this emergent politics represents a shift toward the radical democracy we so desperately need today.

Our concept of racial formation has also been forged in struggle with each other. We wouldn’t have it any other way. The work before you is the product of the intense discussion and argument, endless rewriting, and compromise that a deep and loving collaboration requires. After more than 30 years of working together, we are so aware of each other’s idiosyncrasies that we can often complete each other’s sentences. Ours is an enduring, productive, and at times challenging relationship. We continue to enjoy the rare privilege of working together, of questioning each other and ourselves as deeply as we know how to do in the process of arduous intellectual labor. Over the years, we have more and more learned to respect, trust, depend on, and love one another. We are very grateful for our friendship, and appreciate the chance to acknowledge it here.

There are, of course, others whom we want to thank. The substantive changes made in this revised edition have been motivated not only by contemporary events and crises that have profoundly shaped the meaning of race, but by the work of race scholars and activists seeking to understand the protean nature of race and racism. We have learned a great deal from their ideas and political practice and have incorporated their insights, and their vision of social justice, throughout this revised edition. We are particularly indebted to those whose work has deepened, extended, and at times critically challenged our concept of racial formation. They have creatively engaged the theory and, in so doing, advanced new ways of thinking about race and opposing racism in all their multiple manifestations and dimensions. While no list of all those who have helped us can ever be complete, we would like to offer our thanks to:

Bob Blauner  
 Eduardo Bonilla-Silva  
 Devon Carbado  
 Gary Delgado  
 Mitch Duneier  
 Troy Duster  
 Hardy Frye  
 Evelyn Nakano Glenn  
 Ramón Gutiérrez  
 Michael Hanchard  
 Cheryl Harris  
 Lane Ryo Hirabayashi

Daniel Martinez HoSang  
 Moon-Kie Jung  
 Terence Keel  
 Oneka LaBennett  
 Marc Mauer  
 Jonathan Okamura  
 Gary Y. Okihiro  
 John S.W. Park  
 Andrew Penner  
 john a. powell  
 Laura Pulido

David Montejano  
 David Roediger  
 Debbie Rogow  
 Steve Rutter  
 Aliya Saperstein  
 Nikhil Pal Singh

Dana Y. Takagi  
 Yasuko Takezawa  
 France Winddance Twine  
 Geoff Ward  
 Gabriel Winant  
 Dianne Yamashiro-Omi

We'd particularly like to thank Cameron Lippard at Appalachian State University for producing a broad range of instructor support materials for this third edition, available to instructors on our book's password protected website. We also wish to thank the following, who provided many thoughtful comments and suggestions to Routledge, based on their use of our second edition in their teaching:

Eric Ishiwata  
 Rhacel Parreñas  
 Daryl Maeda  
 Tony Roshan Samara  
 Lisa Brush  
 Crystal Parikh  
 Nina Banks  
 Rudy Busto  
 Ruby Mendenhall  
 Lisa Tessman  
 Jennifer Ho  
 Emily S. Lee  
 Laura Barraclough

Colorado State University  
 University of Southern California  
 University of Colorado  
 George Mason University  
 University of Pittsburgh  
 New York University  
 Bucknell University  
 University of California, Santa Barbara  
 University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign  
 Binghamton University  
 University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill  
 California State University, Fullerton  
 Kalamazoo College



---

Miguel Ceballos	University of Nebraska, Lincoln
Eric Boehme	Dension University
Matthew Hughey	University of Connecticut
Nancy López	University of New Mexico
Darrel Allan Wanzer	University of North Texas
Clement Lai	Cornell University
Johnson Cheu	Michigan State University
Karthick Ramakrishnan	University of California, Riverside
Michael Jerryson	Eckerd College
Joyce Bell	University of Pittsburgh
Niambi M. Carter	Purdue University
Christopher James Perez	University of Maryland
Gniesha Y. Dinwiddie	University of Maryland
Jessica Vasquez	University of Oregon
Eric Love	Dickinson College
Derrick M. Bryan	University of Alabama
Phoebe Godfrey	University of Connecticut
Sujani K. Reddy	Amherst College
David Embrick	Loyola University, Chicago
Amy Sueyoshi	San Francisco State University
Tanya Golash-Boza	University of California, Merced
Derek Martin	Southern Illinois University, Carbondale
Jeffrey Langstraat	University of North Dakota
Ronald Nerio	City University of New York, Graduate Center
Arthur Scarritt	Boise State University
Sophia Wallace	Rutgers
Eric Fure-Slocum	St. Olaf College

Michael Omi

Howard Winant

This page intentionally left blank

# Introduction: Racial Formation in the United States

Mic Check! Mic Check!

Can we talk about race and racism? They are just as prevalent as ever, though awareness of their presence is often suppressed. The racial present always needs to be studied and explained anew. Race and racism remain central in our lives, but they are changing too.

Let us introduce this book with the call-out “Mic Check!” a request to speak that is commonly associated with the Occupy movement, but is actually a couple of decades older than that.<sup>1</sup> This Introduction frames our major concerns in the book. We adopt the term “Mic Check,” because we see our work as a call-out, a demand that new attention be paid to the deepening crisis of race and racism in the contemporary United States.

Way back in 1993, funkmaster George Clinton (our favorite Clinton), urged folks to “Paint the White House Black” (Clinton 1993; see also Lusane 2011; Jeffries 2013). A mere 15 years later in 2008, what was a once a hip-hop racial fantasy became a reality with the election of Barack Obama.

In the immediate wake of the Obama victory, the claim that the United States was now a “post-racial” society enjoyed popular dissemination and acceptance. The “fact of blackness” in the White House was interpreted as resounding proof that the nation was moving “beyond race.” That a black man<sup>2</sup> could be elected to the highest post in the land was cited as a stunning testament to how far the nation had come in moving beyond the discriminatory racial attitudes and exclusions of the past.

But lest we lapse into a comforting scenario of advancing progress towards the eventual eclipse of racism, a bit of perspective is warranted. A reporter once told Malcolm X that the passage of key pieces of civil right legislation was clear proof that things were getting better for blacks. In response, Malcolm countered that it did not show improvement to stick a knife nine inches into someone, pull it out six inches, and call it progress. “But some people,” Malcolm observed, “don’t even want to admit the knife is there” (Malcolm X, quoted in Lipsitz 1998, 46).

The “knife,” the weapon and wound of racial disadvantage and dispossession, continues to be ignored today. Structural forms of racial inequality persist and in many cases have deepened. Empirical studies on health care access, educational opportunity, and incarceration rates demonstrate continuing inequalities along racial lines. The Great Recession that began in 2008 and was rooted in the subprime home

mortgage crisis had extensive racial dimensions. People of color were more than three times as likely as whites to have subprime and high-cost loans. Such loans accounted at one point for more than 55 percent of all black and Latin@ mortgages (Rogers 2008). The distribution of economic resources, the patterns of cultural consumption, and the organization of residential space are all social processes in which race operates as a fundamental organizing principle of inequality and difference. Americans may have “painted the White House black,” but race remains a fundamental category of (dis)empowerment in the United States. As a nation, we appear deeply unable to challenge or even address the significance of race in our own lives, as well as the enduring forms of racism and the attitudes, policies, and practices that sustain them.

Persistent racial inequality and difference are rendered illegible in U.S. popular political discourse. Many people in the United States believe that the goals of the civil rights movement have been substantially achieved, that racial discrimination is a thing of past, and that we are rapidly evolving into a truly colorblind society. “Race thinking,” it is argued, no longer significantly informs our perceptions, shapes our attitudes, and influences our individual, collective, and institutional practices. Indeed, it is said that the most effective anti-racist consciousness, policy, and practice is simply to ignore race. We are urged to see people as individuals only, not as persons or groups whose identities or social positions have been shaped and organized by race.

After Obama’s January 27, 2010 State of the Union speech, MSNBC host Chris Matthews said of the President, “He is post-racial, by all appearances. I forgot he was black tonight for an hour” (Matthews 2010). But can anyone in the contemporary United States really ever “forget” race? Can we actually suspend how we immediately “see” and “read” people with whom we come into contact? Can we avoid categorizing people into existing racial categories? In short, can we actually transcend racial distinctions and meanings as we navigate our institutional and everyday lives? As Martha and the Vandellas once put it, “Got nowhere to run to, baby, nowhere to hide” (1965). The ubiquity of race is inescapable across nearly every social domain.

But race and racial meanings are neither stable nor consistent. Contradictions abound today, as they have in the past. Most overt forms of racial discrimination have been outlawed, but racial inequalities pervade every institutional setting. A professed desire to be colorblind bumps up against the ubiquity of race consciousness, both in political life and everyday life. Consider the problematic nature of racial identity itself. The U.S. Census employs a system of racial classification, but many individuals and groups cannot locate themselves within it. They cannot conveniently fit into any of the designated racial categories. A person’s own sense of racial identity may differ significantly from how other people see and categorize her/him. Some individuals actively resist imposed categories by “performing” race in a subversive manner. A white person, for example, might take on the linguistic patois and stylistic gait we commonly associate with contemporary blackness. Over a person’s life course, they may “switch” racial identities—or be transferred to a new racially defined group, as a result of changes in state-based racial classification, the emergence of new group definitions, or even a longing to claim a suppressed or long-abandoned identity, real

or imagined. For example, since the 1960 Census, there has been a dramatic increase in the American Indian population in the United States. (Passel 1996, 79). Such an increase is not driven by actual growth, but by increased numbers of Americans claiming Native identity.

Racial identity is a slippery thing. Given these many contradictions, how might we begin to grasp the overall meaning of race in the United States? In this book we discuss *the centrality of race in the organization of political life in the United States*. We attempt to develop an overarching perspective on both race and racism in this country. Our hope is to provide a coherent conceptual framework by which we can grasp the importance of race as a key category: of inequality, of difference/identity, and of agency, both individual and collective. Such a framework also seeks to understand racial change—how concepts and ideologies of race and racism evolve, transform, and shift over historical time. We engage in a deep interrogation of racial theory, both past and present. We try to understand and contextualize the race concept. We explore how race has both informed and been informed by prevailing political conflicts.

## Racial Theory

Race and racism in the United States have been shaped by a centuries-long conflict between white domination and resistance by people of color. Theories of race and racism have necessarily been molded by the same relationships. Informed to a large extent by the needs of dominant groups who required the nation-state they were building to be both organized and intelligible for the purposes of rule,<sup>3</sup> racial theory for years served mainly the interests of the powerful—white settlers, slave owners, colonial and later national elites. Entire systems of rule—labor and political regimes among others—had to be organized, structured, regulated, and explained. The concept of race, developing unevenly in the Americas from the arrival of Europeans in the Western Hemisphere down to the present, has served as a fundamental organizing principle of the social system. Practices of distinguishing among human beings according to their corporeal characteristics became linked to systems of control exploitation, and resistance.

Since race and racism involve violence, oppression, exploitation, and indignity, they also generate movements of resistance and theories of resistance. The necessity to comprehend and explain the modern world extended beyond the oppressors to the oppressed, who sought to understand the calamities that had befallen them through conquest, kidnapping, mass murder, enslavement, exclusion, and genocide. While early resistance-based theories of race have largely been suppressed and hidden, the past is being excavated and examined in new and greater detail. We now have a large number of slave narratives to draw upon, for example. Recent work in African and Spanish colonial history, as well as work on indigenous and Arabic texts produced in the Americas, has increased our awareness of early resistance-based accounts of what we would now call race and racism.<sup>4</sup>



Despite the enormous legacy and volume of racial theory, the concept of race remains poorly understood and inadequately explained. This is true not only in everyday life but also in the social sciences, the humanities, law, medicine, and the biological sciences. Because race operates as a “common-sense” concept, a basic component of social cognition, identity, and socialization, everyone considers herself/himself an expert on the subject. Race seems obvious and in some ways superficial. What is there to explain? Race appears to be a given attribute, an ordinary “social fact.” That one has a racial identity is thus no more problematic, no more worthy of interpretation, than that one has a head upon one’s shoulders. That’s just the way it is.

But when asked what race *means*, what the significance is of being black, white, brown, red, or yellow, difficulties rapidly set in. Over the ages these categories’ meanings have varied a great deal: They have carried religious, scientific, political, and cultural weight. Race has been understood as a sign of God’s pleasure or displeasure, as an indicator of evolutionary development, as a key to intelligence, and as a signifier in human geography, among many other things. Concepts of race have conformed to the exigencies of time and place. In rising empires, the imperatives of conquest have shaped ideas about racial hierarchy, with portrayals of the strong and superior occupiers contrasted with the weak and inferior natives. In periods of social dislocation and economic decline, race has come to mark those groups who signify corruption and dilution of the national spirit and purpose. When secularism and scientism have contended against religious dogma, efforts to classify, categorize, and rank humanity along racial lines have come to the fore. Today, we reject many (though not all) of the earlier incarnations, understandings, and uses of the race concept. Indeed, in the contemporary United States it is frequently claimed that race has become meaningless, that it is an outdated idea, a throwback to earlier, benighted times, an empty signifier at best. No wonder confusion reigns.

## Race and the Social Sciences

Attention to race has risen and fallen in the social sciences, driven once again by racial “common sense.” The great social theorists of the 19th-century, towering figures such as Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, Emile Durkheim, and Max Weber, were all consumed with analyzing the transition from feudalism to capitalism, and interpreting the dynamic forces shaping modern (i.e., 19th-century European) society. Although they shared this central intellectual concern, these thinkers could not agree on which structural relationships were the most important factors explaining the rise of that modern, capitalist society, with its “rational-legal” form of authority and complex division of labor. What they could agree upon, though, was the belief that racial and ethnic social bonds, divisions, and conflicts were remnants of a pre-industrial order that would decline in significance in the modern period.<sup>5</sup> Marx and Engels, for example, predicted that as society split up into two great, antagonistic classes, social distinctions such as race and ethnicity would decrease in importance.

In fairness to Marx and Engels, they did consider race in their discussion of “primitive accumulation,” the launching-phase of modern capitalism. Marx writes:

The discovery of gold and silver in America, the extirpation, enslavement, and entombment in mines of the aboriginal population, the beginning of the conquest and looting of the East Indies, the turning of Africa into a warren for the commercial hunting of blackskins, signalized the rosy dawn of the era of capitalist production. These idyllic proceedings are the chief momenta of primitive accumulation. On their heels treads the commercial war of the European nations with the globe for a theater. It begins with the revolt of the Netherlands from Spain, assumes giant dimensions in England’s Anti-Jacobin War, and is still going on in the opium wars with China.

(1967, 351)

Furthermore, in their support of the abolitionist cause they linked race to the working-class movement, both in Britain and the United States; Marx famously asserted in *Capital* that “labor cannot emancipate itself in a white skin where in a black skin it is branded” (1967, 329). Writing somewhat later, Weber and Durkheim were much less cognizant of the complexities of race.<sup>6</sup>

The “founding fathers” of American sociology (men such as Albion Small, William Graham Sumner, and Edward A. Ross) were explicitly concerned with racial hierarchy and racial classification, which they saw in terms of evolutionary theory.<sup>7</sup> Social science was shaped, not only by the European founding fathers, but also by the Social Darwinist currents of the period. As did virtually all the early figures, these men adhered to the unquestioned white supremacy of their time. Their work contributed, sometimes inadvertently but often by intention, to the racist hysteria of the late 19th and early 20th centuries. The epoch of the emergence of modern social science in the United States coincided with a sustained period of racial reaction, marked by the institutionalization of Jim Crow in the South, the success of the movement for Asian exclusion, and the rise of eugenics. Especially in this atmosphere, adherence to biologicistic perspectives on race severely limited innovation and social scientific interest in this field.<sup>8</sup>

As nearly every race-oriented U.S. social scientist pursued the chimera of “natural” racial hierarchy, a small number of scholars, almost all of them black, challenged mainstream (i.e., white) conceptions of race, and implicitly racism as well, although that term did not yet exist. Led by the protean intellectual and activist W.E.B. Du Bois, such scholars as Alain Locke, Kelly Miller, William Monroe Trotter, Anna Julia Cooper, and others created a social science of race and racism, refusing and refuting the biologicistic racism of their white contemporaries. These writers and activists were largely denied entrance to the whites-only universities of the time. Based in historically black colleges and universities like Howard, Atlanta (now Clark-Atlanta), and Fisk and active in community-based institutions and organizations, these people were the true intellectual leaders of their time, at least in respect to racial theory. Although

there were some minor lapses here and there, their work was premised on then radical understandings of the meaning of equality, political and social rights, and on a commitment to a fully democratic and racially inclusive U.S. society.<sup>9</sup> Besides breaking new ground in racial theory, Du Bois's *The Philadelphia Negro: A Social Study* virtually invented modern, empirically grounded sociology in the United States as well (Du Bois 1998 [1899]).

Only in the 1920s did mainstream sociology even begin to catch up to these pioneering black efforts. Led by Robert E. Park, the "Chicago School of Sociology" began after World War I to rework social scientific approaches to race, and eventually reinvented much of the wheel that Du Bois had created two decades earlier. Park had earlier been a publicist and ghost-writer for Booker T. Washington; in his later years he taught at Fisk, having been invited there by Charles S. Johnson, a former student and major sociologist of race in his own right (Johnson 1996 [1934]), who had become the university's president.

Park and other progressive white thinkers largely succeeded in mainstreaming a socially grounded, if not political, concept of race, and countering the racial biologism that had dominated racial theory in an unbroken fashion throughout U.S. history. Chicago sociology would shape the dominant theoretical and methodological assumptions about race for the greater part of the 20th century and beyond. That black scholars could not have achieved this result is a bitter but obvious truth that speaks directly to their marginalization in the field. Just as black popular music—blues and jazz—could only gain popular currency when white musicians played it, black racial theory could only begin to make headway in the "mainstream" social sciences when reframed and advanced by white scholars.<sup>10</sup>

Chicago School racial theory still left a lot to be desired. It was deterministic and resolutely apolitical. Park's "race-relations cycle," for example, still widely regarded as one of the most important contributions to the field, understood its subject as moving through four stages—contact, conflict, accommodation, and assimilation—leaving such matters as collective action and political agency out of the picture, and postulating assimilation (presumably into whiteness) as the positive end-state of "race relations." Park proposed the cycle as a theoretical law of historical development, a way of analyzing group relations and assessing a "minority" group's progress along a fixed continuum.<sup>11</sup>

Beginning with Park's concepts, a set of assumptions have gradually come to characterize the field and serve as guides for social scientists investigating the nature of race in the United States. Blauner discusses these assumptions as follows:

First, the view that racial and ethnic groups are neither central nor persistent elements of modern societies. Second, the idea that racism and racial oppression are not independent dynamic forces but are ultimately reducible to other causal determinants, usually economic or psychological. Third, the position that the most important aspects of racism are the attitudes and prejudices

of Americans. And, finally, the so-called *immigrant analogy*, the assumption, critical in contemporary thought, that there are no essential long-term differences—in relation to the larger society—between the *third world* or racial minorities and the European ethnic groups.

(2001 [1972], 2; emphasis original)

These assumptions are as much political as they are theoretical. They neglect both the institutional and ideological nature of race in America, and the systematic entrenchment of racial dynamics in such spheres as education, art, social policy, law, religion, and science. They focus attention on race as an irrational construct, a product of individual “attitudes and prejudices” rather than a social structure deeply rooted, not only in ideas and beliefs, but also in institutions, fundamental patterns of inequality, social geography, and the exercise of political power.<sup>12</sup> Such assumptions make it impossible to grasp the specificity of racism and racial conflict in the United States. They lead the analyst toward evolutionary models that optimistically predict the gradual absorption of racially identified groups into the (implicitly white) mainstream of American political, economic, and cultural life.<sup>13</sup> Racial theories based on these assumptions—launched in the 1920s and reaching down to the present—reveal as much about the prevailing state of racial politics and racial ideology when they were produced as they do about the nature of race relations.

## The Trajectory of Racial Politics

At any given moment, we are in a particular phase of the *trajectory* of racial politics. Our idea of trajectory refers to a political process, in which rising phases of mobilization are followed by declining phases. From the long-run standpoint, the trajectory of racial politics is a process of “cumulative and cyclical development”<sup>14</sup> taking place over centuries: the *longue durée*. To consider seriously the depth and variety of racial rule and of resistance to it is to contemplate the genealogy of race and racism (Martinot 2002) in the United States and on a global scale. Over the centuries, we see North America as a terrain both for populating (with settlers) and depopulating (the removal and genocide of the original inhabitants). Over the centuries, we see the United States as both a key part of the slavery system and as a locus for abolitionism and “abolition democracy” (Du Bois). Over the centuries, we see the United States as—always and simultaneously—an anticolonial and colonial nation-state.

While past racial atrocities are now commonly acknowledged, optimistic observers of our nation’s recent history offer a vision of a society trying to live up to democratic and egalitarian principles by slowly extending and applying them to the gnawing issues of race. We are in the midst, so it is claimed, of a period of enlightened progress—an unfolding drama of racial incorporation that will not be thwarted or reversed. A truly colorblind society, it is argued, will eventually emerge. How did we get to this point and where might we be headed?

A cursory glance at American history reveals that far from being colorblind, the United States has always been an extremely race-conscious nation. From the very inception of the republic to the present moment, race has been a profound determinant of one's political rights, one's location in the labor market, and indeed one's sense of identity. The hallmark of this history has been racism. While groups of color have been treated differently, all can bear witness to the tragic consequences of racial oppression. The United States has confronted each group with a unique form of despotism and degradation. The examples are familiar: Native Americans faced removal and genocide, blacks were subjected to racial slavery and Jim Crow, Latin@s were invaded and colonized, and Asians faced exclusion.<sup>15</sup> While the ethos of equality has been invoked quite frequently, this has usually served merely to justify blatant inequality and mistreatment.

Recent U.S. racial history has followed a more complex and contradictory path. The country has experienced successive waves of racial turbulence and quiescence. Political challenges to the U.S. racial regime have been followed by containment of such challenges, sometimes through reform and sometimes through repression. Reforms that were supposed to diminish the depth and extent of racism have undoubtedly had some positive effects, but overall they have produced contradictory, even ironic results. Racial injustice and racial inequality, exclusion, violence, and neglect, are all so deeply rooted in the nation that just reducing them "moderately"—while presumably preferable to exacerbating them or treating them with "benign neglect"—may *itself* have baleful consequences. Inadequate and vulnerable civil rights measures, after all, have also served to ratify and reinvigorate the underlying racial regime.<sup>16</sup>

By the 1960s, because of the upheavals and challenges that developed during and after World War II, race occupied the center stage of American politics in a manner unprecedented since the Civil War era a century earlier. Civil rights struggles and ghetto revolts, as well as controversies over state policies of reform and repression, highlighted a period of intense conflict in which the meaning of race was fiercely politically contested. Civil rights laws and the Voting Rights Act of 1965 enfranchised millions whose democratic rights had long been denied. Congress also sought to curtail discrimination in the labor and housing markets. A long-overdue reform in U.S. immigration law (the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965) laid the foundation for the massive demographic shifts that were to follow over the next decades. However limited some of these legislative and judicial reforms would turn out to be, the decade saw the greatest expansion of democratic rights in the nation's history. As virtually all observers agree, the political and policy-oriented transformations of the 1960s were driven by massive popular mobilization, notably for civil rights and racial equality.

There was a moment, a spark of recognition before the assassinations and upheavals of 1968, when it was recognized that the accomplishments of the black movement had opened up a broader prospect for radical democratic transformation in the United States. The black movement at that moment was deeply torn between radical and centrist currents; black power politics were particularly under attack: by



the state, the right-wing, and the “moderates” as well. The “long hot summers,” the restive ghettos across the country, were a particular target for attack. But at that point the movement was still active and growing; the Black Panther Party was galvanizing the ghetto and its example was influencing Native American, Latin@, and Asian American organizing as well. The Poor People’s Movement was being built by SCLC and its allies, so a transracial movement of the poor was at least imaginable. Even at the state level, adjustments to the new domestic balance of forces were underway: The War on Poverty and the Great Society were promising redistribution as J. Edgar Hoover was killing Panthers (Haas 2011). In the streets, the anti-war movement and the developing “second-wave” feminist movement were coming into their own.

The spark of radical democratic hope was brief indeed. It was murdered with Martin Luther King, Jr. in Memphis on April 4, 1968, with Robert F. Kennedy in Los Angeles on the night of June 5, 1968, in Chicago at the Democratic Party convention in late August of 1968, and in hundreds of other setbacks as well. Indeed, after King was killed more than 100 cities went up in flames.

It seems reasonable to argue that the containment of the movement began with those killings and riots and burnings. Still it required an extended process, a comprehensive reordering of U.S. political life, to block the advance of the black movement and its allies toward greater equality and “participatory democracy.” We have experienced nearly half a century of reactionary racial politics since that peak moment in the late 1960s.

Yet the movement has not been destroyed. Its accomplishments live on as a gift from earlier generations of activists and thinkers to later ones. Yes, the reforms it achieved have been largely neutralized by state-based reaction, by authoritarian populist movements, and by colorblind racial hegemony as well. But racial reaction could not destroy the increased awareness, the enhanced race consciousness, and the profoundly politicized identities that sprang from the black movement and its feminist, working-class, anti-imperialist, and queer allies. The epochal confrontation between the post-World War II anti-racist movement—what we call the Great Transformation—and the racial reaction that succeeded it, has generated a new type of crisis in U.S. society.

“[C]risis,” Gramsci famously wrote, “consists precisely in the fact that the old is dying and the new cannot be born: in this interregnum, morbid phenomena of the most varied kind come to pass” (1971, 276). Using the Gramscian formula, we suggest that in the U.S. there has developed, during the extended declining phase of the political trajectory of race, an enormous and chronic crisis. “Chronic” is not a word usually associated with the term “crisis,” which usually signifies an acute problem, not an extended one. But, as Dr. Dre reminds us, we have not yet emerged from this ongoing pattern of racial contradiction, the chronic racial dilemma we are still in. It is quite mind-boggling, when looked at as a whole: On the one hand, the old verities of established racism and white supremacy have been officially discredited, not only in the United States but fairly comprehensively around the world. On the other

hand, racially informed action and social organization, racial identity and race consciousness, continue unchecked in nearly every aspect of social life! On the one hand, the state (many states around the world) now claims to be colorblind, non-racialist, racially democratic; while, on the other hand, in almost every case, those same states need race to rule. Consider in the United States alone: race and electoral politics, race and social control, race and legal order...

Why don't our heads *explode* under the pressures of such cognitive dissonance?

## Looking Forward in this Book

Despite all the upheaval we have experienced in recent years, the outcome of contemporary racial conflict remains uncertain and unresolved. The continuing ebb and flow of racial politics, and the intense contradictions it evokes, beg for a new interpretation. This book developed from our desire to comprehend the centrality of race in U.S. life and to understand how ideologies of race have changed over the past 50 years. Our discussion is divided into three parts. First, we survey how the concept of race has been interpreted in the main currents of social scientific thought. Then, we propose our own account of the race concept and racial politics. Finally, we trace how ideologies of race have shifted over the past 50 years in order to discern the overall political trajectory of race and racism in the present-day United States.

Now that we have introduced our approach and theoretical premises, we turn to a brief chapter outline in the remaining part of this Introduction.

In Part I, *Paradigms of Race: Ethnicity, Class, and Nation*, we examine recent racial theory in the United States. We argue that this theory is encompassed by three paradigmatic approaches to race and racism—approaches based on the categories of ethnicity, class, and nation. These approaches are *paradigms*,<sup>17</sup> in the sense that they have particular core assumptions and highlight particular key issues and research variables. Racial paradigms have implicit and explicit policy and political action orientations; they also serve as guides for research and education about race and racism.

There are, of course, limitations to this approach. We do not suggest that these three paradigms encompass all the racial theories generated during the period under consideration, but we do think that they embrace the vast bulk of them and demarcate the major lines of debate. Specific theories, and the paradigms themselves, are treated as *ideal types*: That is, our concept of paradigms is a distillation for the purpose of analysis of complex and variegated theoretical arguments. A qualification to our approach, therefore, is the recognition that often a specific viewpoint, concept, or study cannot be neatly classified in one or the other paradigm. In many cases particular analyses of race—political, jurisprudential, or academic, say—which we locate in one paradigm, contain arguments that resemble those suggested within another paradigm. We discuss each of these main currents in racial theory, devoting a chapter to each. While these theoretical approaches all contributed to our understanding race in the United States, each was flawed in its own way, limited by its particular

need to *reduce* race to a manifestation of some other, supposedly more fundamental, sociopolitical concept. To overcome this reductionism is a key objective of our racial formation approach.

Chapter 1 examines *ethnicity* theory—a perspective that arose in the post-World War I years as an insurgent challenge to the religious doctrines and biologicistic accounts of race that prevailed at that time. From its initial efforts to explain the social upheavals brought about by vast waves of immigration to the United States around the turn of the 20th century, ethnicity theory focused on U.S. processes of incorporation such as assimilation and cultural pluralism. The early concerns of ethnicity theory involved inclusion and its obstacles in respect to different European immigrant groups. At this time, the acceptance and integration of Europeans was still in doubt, while that of immigrants of color was highly restricted, and groups of color were subject to overt discrimination.

From the end of World War II through the 1960s, however, racial conditions changed. The emphasis on incorporation was extended to the situation of blacks and other groups of color who continued to be marginalized and excluded. Drawing analogies to the assimilation and integration of European immigrant groups, ethnicity scholars were initially optimistic regarding the integration of blacks and other groups of color. The rise in the late-1960s and early-1970s of radical social movements based in communities of color caught ethnicity theorists by surprise. Movements rejected the assimilationist and pluralist visions that were central to ethnicity theory by demanding group recognition and political rights, resource redistribution, and broad cultural transformation. In response to the perceived radical threat, ethnicity theorists moved rightward, gravitating to neoconservative positions that emphasized individualism, not “groupism,” and embracing colorblind racial policies and practices.

Chapter 2 considers *class* theories of race, accounts that afford primacy to economic structures and processes. Class theories render race legible by examining economic inequalities along racial lines. Within the broader class paradigm, we examine three general analytic orientations to race. We designate these as the market-, stratification-, and class conflict-based approaches. These three currents of the class paradigm are grounded in different economic spheres: exchange relationships (markets), systems of distribution (stratification), and conflict over labor exploitation (in Marxist terms, conflict over the “social relations of production”).

Efforts to interpret racial inequality as a consequence of economic relationships obviously have an important role to play in understanding race as an overall phenomenon. Yet these efforts uniformly fail to account for the role of race as a *cause* of existing economic relationship. Both market-based and stratification-approaches tend to detach economic life from social and political life. Class conflict theories (generally Marxist) admirably recognize race–class interaction more comprehensively, but they still reduce race to a subset of labor-based conflict in which class trumps race. While inequality is certainly an important dimension of race and racism, we argue that race cannot simply be reduced to an economic matter. Politics, culture, and

many other other social factors shape economic life as much as they are shaped by it; these are all eminently racial matters.

Chapter 3 considers *nation*-based theories of race. These have their origins in the imperial seizures of territory and the settler colonialism of the modern era. Since the imperial dawn, the ideas of race and nation have been deeply connected through concepts of *peoplehood*. Both as North American colonies of European empires, and then as a nation-state of its own, the United States identified as white. This identification as a white nation remains visible in the associations with whiteness that are visible across extensive historical time in such concepts as “the American people” and in U.S. nationalism more generally.

The concept of peoplehood, however, did not operate only among the ruling whites. It was present from the start among the racialized “others” as well. Africans and their descendants, Native Americans, Latin@’s and Caribeñ@s subject to conquest and settlement, and immigrants who were not white (or not yet white) understood their identity collectively in terms of peoplehood: For them, the concept was born out of resistance. Many were drawn toward insurgent nationalisms, as the possibilities of inclusion and full citizenship were consistently denied them. Thus nation-based concepts of race became rooted, not only in the dominant group, but also in subordinate ones. The production of racial otherness generated not only the mark of oppression but also the mark of resistance. While the nation-based paradigm supplies a valuable concept—peoplehood—to the overall corpus of racial theory, it is still reductionist vis-à-vis race. Nation-based theories treat race as a mere manifestation of the presumptively deeper concept of “the nation,” and project “internal” colonial relations of domination and resistance forward into the present.

In Part II, *Racial Formation*, we advance our own theory of racial formation, departing from ethnicity-, class-, and nation-based understandings. We do not repudiate these paradigms across the board, but criticize their limitations and seek to incorporate them in a larger, more realistic, and in our view more practically radical account, based in our theory of racial formation.

In Chapter 4, *The Theory of Racial Formation*, we stress that race is a social construction and not a fixed, static category rooted in some notion of innate biological differences. The construction of race and racial meanings can be understood as part of a universal phenomenon of classifying people on the basis of real or imagined attributes. We all engage in “making up people” (Hacking 2006, 1999) as a way to navigate in the social world—to situate ourselves and others in the context of social hierarchies, to discern friend from foe, and to provide a guide to social interactions with different individuals and groups. Race is not unique as a category of difference. Gender, class, age, nationality, and culture have all been invoked to capture, and in many cases explain, difference. This process is not benign. It involves “othering,” which is used to justify subordinate status, unequal treatment, to structure oppression and exploitation in numerous ways. It is important to note, on the flip side, that resistance to such oppressive practices also involves the creation of social categories of difference.

To say that race is socially constructed is to argue that it varies according to time and place. Concepts and ideologies of race have shifted over historical time and differ according to the sociohistorical conditions in which race is embedded. There are many examples. Consider the Irish and the Jews, groups who were not considered racially “white” earlier in the U.S. history, yet eventually became white (Ignatiev 1995; Brod-kin 1998).<sup>18</sup> Consider Asian Americans, who have been popularly regarded as either a “yellow peril” or a “model minority” depending on the historical period in question, the configuration of racial hierarchy in the United States, and the prevailing tenor of United States–Asia relations (Okihiro 1994; Jun 2011). Widening the scope beyond the United States, it is apparent that what race means in different regional and national settings is highly variable. What race means in Brazil, Japan, or in South Africa is dramatically different from what it means in the United States. This underscores the fact that race is a fluid and flexible social concept (Fredrickson 1997).

While acknowledging the inherent instability and socially constructed characteristics of race, we argue that there is a crucial *corporeal* dimension to the race-concept. Race is *ocular* in an irreducible way. Human bodies are visually read, understood, and narrated by means of symbolic meanings and associations. Phenotypic differences are not necessarily seen or understood in the same consistent manner across time and place, but they are nevertheless operating in specific social settings. Not because of any biologically based or essential difference among human beings across such phonemic variables as “color” or “hair texture,” but because such sociohistorical practices as conquest and enslavement classified human bodies for purposes of domination—and because these same distinctions therefore became important for resistance to domination as well—racial phenotypes such as black and white have been constructed and encoded through the language of race.<sup>19</sup> We define this process as *racialization*—the extension of racial meaning to a previously racially unclassified relationship, social practice, or group.

We also advance the concept of *racial projects* to capture how racial formation processes occur through a linkage between structure and representation. Racial projects are efforts to shape the ways in which human identities and social structures are racially signified, and the reciprocal ways that racial meaning becomes embedded in social structures. We see racial projects as building blocks in the racial formation process; these projects are taking place all the time, whenever race is being invoked or signified, wherever social structures are being organized along racial lines. Racial formation is thus a vast summation of signifying actions and social structures, past and present, that have combined and clashed in the creation of the enormous complex of relationships and identities that is labeled race.

Chapter 5, *Racial Politics and the Racial State*, focuses on the political sociology of race, the social organization of power along racial lines. A central concern here is the historical development and contemporary orientation of the U.S. racial state. We stress the porous boundary between state and civil society, especially where race is concerned. The racial state inhabits us, so to speak; it is within our minds, our psyches,



our hearts. At the same time we shape and reshape the state, identifying with it or against it, carrying out the signifying action that is the essence of political life, both collectively and individually. In this chapter, we stress the shift *from racial domination to racial hegemony* that has taken place in the post-World War II period. We highlight the trajectory of racial politics, the first rising and then declining path of the anti-racist movement that has taken shape up to now (we are writing this in 2013). We argue that the anti-racist movements that arose in the 1960s dramatically expanded the political space available for challenging racism by ushering in the *politicization of the social*. The chief achievement of the black movement and its allied new social movements was the enlargement and deepening of U.S. politics. Issues previously regarded as private and therefore outside the realm of formally defined politics were now embraced by an expansive politics of identity. Such an expansion of the terrain of politics by race-based social movements, and then by gender-, anti-imperialist, queer-, and other movements as well, represents a radical and permanent shift. It is a shift, however, that cannot be regarded as an exclusively progressive transformation. In the wake of the left-wing politicization of the social at the hands of the black movement, feminist movement, and gay movement, a racial reaction took shape. Right-wing movements proved themselves capable of rearticulation as well, reframing the emancipatory politics of the black movement and its allies, first as threats to whites, then as “reverse racism,” and finally seeking an erasure of race itself through colorblind racial ideology.

In Part III, *Racial Politics Since World War II*, we apply our racial formation approach to recent racial history. The post-World War II period, up to the present historical moment, is our central concern: The transformation of U.S. racial despotism in the period up to about 1970, and then the containment of those democratic and transformational movements during subsequent decades, is the overarching theme of these chapters.

Movements rise and fall, both on the political left and the right. The civil rights era can be seen in terms of rising and declining phases of a political trajectory or cycle: proceeding from the relative abeyance of racial justice movements before World War II, and then moving through a phase characterized by the dramatic rise and impact of the civil rights, black power, and allied movements in the 1960s. This “rising phase” of the cycle culminated in the achievement of partial movement victories during the 1960s. It was quickly followed by incorporation and containment of the movement challenge, starting in about 1970. In Chapter 6—*The Great Transformation*—we consider the development of the anti-racist movement, focusing particular attention on the 1960s. We trace the transformation of the black movement from an inclusion-oriented reform movement seeking to end segregation and achieve full political citizenship for blacks, to a broader radical democratic movement allied with the other social movements that collectively sought the redistribution of resources, an end to U.S. imperialism, and social citizenship not only for blacks but for other excluded and oppressed groups as well. It was this expansive radical potential, combined with these allied movements’ inability to attract majority (mainly white) support, that led to their containment and prolonged decline.

The postwar racial trajectory, then, entered its declining phase in about 1970; Chapter 7—*Racial Reaction: Containment and Rearticulation*—discusses the development over time of a center-right power bloc capable of counterattacking and curtailing the influence of the radical democratic movements that had developed through the 1960s. The racial reaction moved on various fronts simultaneously, using violent tactics of repression and assassination as well as seeking to *rearticulate* movement demands and the emancipatory politics of identity in individualistic, repressive, and reactionary ways.

The declining phase of the movement, brought about largely by racial reaction, has continued until today, achieving a new racial hegemony based upon the concept of *colorblindness*. In Chapter 8—*Colorblindness, Neoliberalism, and Obama*, we argue that colorblind racial ideology underwrites the neoliberal accumulation project in the United States, and that neither colorblindness nor neoliberalism would be politically feasible without the other. We also consider the deep contradictions between colorblindness and race-consciousness as both ideology and practice. “Painting the White House Black” under Obama, it turns out, deeply heightened the tensions of colorblind hegemony, even though Obama tried hard to minimize the anti-racist commitments that were always at least implicit in his presidency.

In sum, after World War II a system of racial *hegemony* was substituted for the earlier system of racial *domination*. It took a great amount of blood, sweat, and tears to accomplish these limited reforms, this “Second Reconstruction.” To do away with official Jim Crow, to end the 1924 McCarran–Walter immigration restrictions, as well as ending the Vietnam War and legalizing abortion, were enormous triumphs, but they were not definitive. They were generally vulnerable, not so much to “backlash” and rollback, as to erosion and subversion, what we have termed rearticulation. To outlaw *de jure* segregation did not prevent the preservation of segregation *de facto* by other means. To overturn the highly restrictive immigration policies that had lasted from the 1920s to the 1960s did not prevent the continuity, and indeed the increase, of a draconian system of immigrant deportation and imprisonment that continues to this day.

The success of racial reform policies—the various civil rights acts and court decisions of the 1960s—worked to incorporate and thus defuse movement opposition. This incorporation required that tangible concessions be made without altering the underlying *structural racism* that was characteristic of the United States. It also required the marginalization and, in some cases, destruction of those sectors of anti-racist opposition that were more recalcitrant about accepting limited (aka moderate) reforms. Once reforms had been enacted and legislated, once some movement demands and movement activists had been incorporated, a subsequent stage of the hegemonic racial project was the rearticulation of racial meanings in a series of steps that culminated in colorblind racial hegemony. Unsteady, limited, and contradictory, the colorblind concept of race will retain its hegemonic perch until it can be challenged or rearticulated yet again.

We live in racial history. The racial instability that has characterized the whole of American history continues unabated. The unsettled meaning of race, and the continuing elusiveness of a genuine, substantive racial democracy in the United States, presents the country with both countless problems and limitless opportunities. In this book's conclusion—*The Contrarities of Race*—we highlight some of the dilemmas that the country, and perforce the reader, face today. We pose such questions as: What do you want *your* race-consciousness to be? What do *you* consider a democratic and just racial policy in the United States?

To recognize that race is historically and politically constructed is not only to see it as a “moving image,” as something we make and remake over time; it is also to acknowledge our power, both collective and individual, to transform the meaning of race. We created this meaning-system and the social order it supports. We can change it as well.

## Notes

1. The earliest use of this term that we can find is a track with that title located on a 1999 Rage Against the Machine record, *The Battle of Los Angeles*.
2. The depth and degree of Obama's blackness was widely debated. On the far right, he was branded an African revolutionary, enacting his father's anticolonial revenge fantasies (D'Souza 2012). In the black community, Debra Dickerson and Cornel West, among others, cast Obama's blackness—his authenticity—into serious doubt (Dickerson 2007; on West see Thompson 2011; see also Lowndes 2013). Others worried that electing a black president would defuse whatever reform-oriented demands the black movement could muster (Bobo 2008). In various statements, Obama somewhat inconsistently wrestled with his blackness: discussing his growing recognition and acceptance of it in his youth, his own encounters with prejudice and discrimination, and in his most comprehensive political analysis of racism (“A More Perfect Union”—3/18/2008), the contradictions and limitations of U.S. democracy in respect to race.
3. On “intelligibility” and domination, see Scott 1998.
4. Some key slave narratives are collected in Gates, ed. 2002. On Spanish colonialism in the North American Southwest, see Gutiérrez 1991. Enslaved Africans included many Muslims, some of whom were literate in Arabic. On Muslims and Arabic-language accounts of slavery and the slave trade, see Opoku-Agyemang et al., eds., 2008; see also Thornton 1998. On indigenous views, see Thornton 1987.
5. Blauner writes: “[T]he general conceptual frame of European theory implicitly assumed the decline and disappearance of ethnicity in the modern world; it offered no hints in the other direction. Without significant alteration, American sociology synthesized this framework into its models of social structure and change” (Blauner 2001 [1972], 4). See also Schwendinger and Schwendinger 1974, 39.
6. Weber's treatment of the concept of *ethnie* under the rubric of “status” (a relational category based on “honor”) is in some ways a social constructionist approach; but in Weber's voluminous output there is no intensive consideration of the modern imperial phenomenon, and there are numerous instances of European chauvinism (especially during the World War I years, when Weber was somewhat afflicted with German nationalism—see Weber 1994, 131;

Weber 1996, 255). In fairness, Weber also recognized racism, notably anti-black racism in the United States. See his remarks on U.S. racial attitudes in Gerth and Mills, eds., 1958, 405–406. Weber’s sensitivity to U.S. racial matters may be attributed, at least in part, to the orientation provided him by Du Bois. See Lewis 1993, 225, 277.

Durkheim too ranks the world eurocentrically, distinguishing rather absolutely between “primitive” and “civilized” peoples based on the limited ethnology available to him; he also muses in abstractly racial ways: Racial categories are employed as “social types” in *Suicide*, for example.

7. They were also “liberal Anglo-Saxonists,” as John H. Stanfield (1982, 189–190) has termed them. See also Winant 2007.
8. “After a promising start in the early period, the study of race and ethnic relations suffered.... With little room for ethnic and racial phenomena in the macroscopic models of social structure and process, the field was isolated from general sociological theory and particularly from those leading conceptual themes that might have provided coherence and useful lines of inquiry: stratification, culture, community. The study of race relations developed in a kind of vacuum; no overall theoretical framework guided its research and development” (Blauner 2001 [1972], 5).
9. In a series of five lectures given at Howard University in 1915, Alain Leroy Locke, who had been the first African American Rhodes Scholar and had attended the London Race Congress in 1911, presented a very worked-out and extremely “modern” theory of race, an account fully compatible with social constructionist views, and one deeply politically engaged as well. Locke had been greatly influenced by Du Bois, as were all the leading resistance scholars of the time (Locke 1992). The remarkable Anna Julia Cooper, writer, educator, and activist, more or less founded black feminism. Born a slave in 1858, Cooper was the principal of the M Street High School, a prestigious, segregated black institution in Washington D.C., at the time of the publication of her still-influential book *A Voice from the South: By A Woman from the South* in 1892 (Cooper 1998; Guy-Sheftall 2009). William Monroe Trotter, a black journalist and activist, was a Harvard graduate and one of the founders of both the Niagara Movement and the NAACP. Supposedly a descendant of Jefferson through Sally Hemings, Trotter challenged Woodrow Wilson in a White House meeting, and defied Booker T. Washington’s accommodationist racial politics when the latter gave a speech in Boston (Fox 1971). Kelly Miller, Professor of Mathematics at Howard University, founded the Sociology Department there in 1895 and taught at Howard until 1935 when he retired as Dean of Arts and Sciences. A prolific author, Miller’s book *Race Adjustment* (1908) sought to reframe the dispute between Booker T. Washington and W.E.B. Du Bois. In a review of economist Frederick L. Hoffman’s *Race Traits and Tendencies of the American Negro*, one of the leading eugenics-based works to argue for the innate inferiority of African Americans, Miller used census data to argue that Hoffman’s claims were statistically flawed (Miller 1897; see also Stepan and Gilman 1993).
10. On the Chicago sociology of race, see Bulmer 1986; Steinberg 2007.
11. Lyman notes: “It [the race-relations cycle] was ideology too, for Park believed that once the racial cycle was completed, the social arena would be cleared of those racial impediments interfering with the inevitable class struggle” (1972, 27).
12. The concept of “institutional racism,” often conflated with that of “structural racism,” was first floated in Ture/Carmichael and Hamilton 1992 (1967); see also Knowles and Prewitt, eds. 1969.

13. As early as 1967 Pierre van den Berghe wrote that  
in spite of the claim of many social scientists that detachment and objectivity are possible and that they can dissociate their roles as scientists and as private citizens, much of the work done by North Americans in the area of race has, until the last three or four years, been strongly flavored with a great deal of optimism and complacency about the basic “goodness” of American society and with the cautious, slightly left-of-center, reformist, meliorative, gradualist approach of “liberal” intellectuals.... The field has been dominated by a functionalist view of society and a definition of the race problem as one of integration and assimilation of minorities into the mainstream of a consensus-based society. (1967, 7)
14. This concept is taken from Myrdal (1963, 1962 [1944]). See also Winant 2001.
15. This is an introductory formulation. We shall have more to say later about the numerous variations (ethnic, national, class-based) possible within racial identity. Among Latin@s, for example, the Puerto Rican, Central American, and Cuban cases all retain distinct aspects; among Asians, Vietnamese and other Southeast Asians, South Asians and Filipinos all have particular histories in the United States. There are those whose racial category is ambiguous at present (e.g., Middle Eastern and South Asian Americans–MEASA, Sami, Persians, Uighur). Further still, racial classification, as we shall argue below, is always flexible, a process without an end point or finality of any kind.
16. *Bush v. Gore* (U.S. Supreme Court 2000), let it be remembered, was decided as a voting rights case. Many Supreme Court decisions favoring corporate elites have also been grounded in civil rights laws. The best-known example of this is *Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific Railroad* (U.S. Supreme Court 1886), which afforded “personhood” status to corporations, anticipating a host of later decisions including *Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission* (U.S. Supreme Court 2010). See also Beatty 2007, 172.
17. The concept of a *paradigm* in scientific or scholarly investigation gained currency after the appearance of Kuhn 1970. Our usage of the term is slightly at variance with Kuhn’s. A racial paradigm, in our view, is an assumed theoretical category that classifies racial phenomena. Today, there is a strong reluctance in social scientific circles to indulge in “race-thinking” (undoubtedly due to the legacy of biologism with which pre-World War II scholarship encountered issues of race). This is yet another incentive to understand race in terms of other, supposedly more fundamental or objective, social scientific categories.
18. Not entirely, of course. There are black Irish and black Jews in the United States today, Latin@s who consider themselves Irish or Jewish, and numerous other variations on these identities as well.
19. Walter Johnson writes of the buyers in the New Orleans slave market:  
As the experienced guided the inexperienced [in the slave marketplace], slaves’ bodies were made racially legible. The buyers’ inspections, the parts they fingered, the details they fetishized, and the homosocial connections they made with one another gave material substance to antebellum notions of “blackness” and “whiteness” and outlined for observers the lineaments of a racial gaze. Out of the daily practice of slavery, they reproduced the notions of race that underwrote the system as a whole. (2001, 161)



PART I

Paradigms of Race: Ethnicity,  
Class, and Nation

This page intentionally left blank

# Ethnicity

## Introduction

In this chapter we examine the historical and theoretical trajectory of ethnicity-based theories of race from their *early years* as an insurgent and occasionally politically engaged set of arguments for assimilation, cultural pluralism, inclusion, and democracy, through their *ascent to dominance* in the mid-20th century, to their ongoing *decline and fall* in the late 20th and early 21st centuries. Throughout, we frame ethnicity theory as a paradigm: It is an approach to race that affords primacy to cultural variables. Ethnicity theory was in fact the first mainstream social scientific account of race to understand it as a socially constructed phenomenon.

Theoretically, the ethnicity paradigm represents the mainstream of the modern sociology of race. The paradigm has passed through three major stages: a pre-1940s stage in which the emergent paradigm challenged the biologicistic (and at least implicitly racist) view of race which was dominant at that time; a 1940s to late 1960s stage during which the paradigm operated as the left/liberal “common sense” approach to race, and during which two recurrent themes—assimilationism and cultural pluralism—were prominent; and a post-1960s stage, in which ethnicity-oriented accounts of race focused on defending conservative (or “neoconservative”) individualism against what was perceived as the radical assault of group rights.

Ethnicity theories arose in the early years of the 20th century, in anthropology and sociology most centrally, but elsewhere as well.<sup>1</sup> In the United States, the development of the ethnicity concept was largely driven by massive European immigration around the turn of the 20th century. The millions of new European immigrants were whites “of a different color” (Jacobson 1999). Their identity and social status needed to be assigned. Their relationships to their new country and to their “mother country” needed to be understood (Thomas and Znaniecki 1984 [1918–1920]).

Yet ethnicity theory has also been losing its grip. In response to the racial conflicts of the 1960s, ethnicity-based approaches to race abandoned their earlier progressivism, opting for neoconservatism, a center-right racial ideology that key ethnicity theorists helped to found (Glazer and Moynihan 1970 [1963]; Murray 1994 [1984]; Thernstrom and Thernstrom, 1999; Wilson and Herrnstein 1985). Since the early 1970s, neoconservative approaches to race have fueled the racial reaction in the United States, operating in an effective although at times uneasy alliance with the new right. Under the banner of “colorblindness” this alliance has attempted to forge a new “post-racial” hegemony, a new “common sense.” The contemporary United States

is not only “post-racial” in this account, but also “post-civil rights.” In a colorblind society, it is claimed, racial inequality, racial politics, and race-consciousness itself would be greatly diminished in importance, and indeed relegated to the benighted past when discrimination and prejudice ruled.

To treat race as a matter of ethnicity is to understand it in terms of *culture*. It is to undermine the significance of corporeal markers of identity and difference, and even to downplay questions of descent, kinship, and ancestry—the most fundamental demarcations in anthropology. Because cultural orientations are somewhat flexible—one can speak a different language, repudiate a previous religious adherence or convert to another, adopt a new “lifestyle,” switch cuisine, learn new dances—ethnicity theories of race tend to regard racial status as more voluntary and consequently less imposed, less “ascribed.”

There are immense and obvious problems with this approach, too many for us adequately to address here. Just to pick one item: The assignment of group identity on the basis of physical appearance—the corporeal—has served for half a millennium as a practical tool in the organization of human hierarchy and domination, and as a tool of resistance as well. Who is a native, and who a settler? Who is a slave, and who a citizen? These and other distinctions, while sometimes made inaccurately on the basis of “ocular” criteria, have nevertheless generally facilitated imperial rule, “primitive accumulation,” mass labor recruitment, and all the main practices of human subjection on view throughout the modern world. It is not so easy to be “colorblind,” after all.

Guided by ethnicity theory, Americans have come to view race as a cultural phenomenon. Racial identity is often seen as parallel to other forms of status-based group identity, such as that of “hyphenated American” groups (Italian-Americans), gendered groups (women), groups identified by sexual orientation (LGBTQ), and religiously identified groups (Catholics, Muslims). In this account race is understood as a fundamentally ethnic (i.e., cultural) matter. It is conceptualized in terms of attitudes and beliefs, religion, language, “lifestyle,” and group identification. In ethnicity-based approaches, the race-concept is thus reduced to something like a preference, something variable and chosen, in the way one’s religion or language is chosen. Racism too is reduced in importance: It is seen as a mere matter of attitudes and beliefs, involving such issues as prejudice, beliefs about others, and individual practices: “I’m not racist; I treat everyone equally.”

There is an undeniable affinity between the concept of race as a cultural phenomenon and such ideas as assimilation, cultural pluralism, diversity, and multiculturalism. The connection is commonly made between ethnicity theories of race and the democratic ideals with which the United States has always identified itself, however much these ideals were (dis)honored in reality. You see, “we” may not be a perfect democracy, we may not be a fully equal society, but at least we believe in the full inclusion of all, “without regard for race, creed, or color.” Sometimes in U.S. history such professions of inclusiveness have appeared quite radical, quite

subversive. At other moments, they seem to liquidate racial difference and thus freedom and democracy, to deny deep historical injustice, and to insist on universalizing the dominant—white—culture. Indeed, sometimes these concepts are doing both simultaneously: The offer of inclusion may be a Faustian bargain, in which one (or even a group) achieves acceptance at the price of deracination. In other words, it may sometimes be an offer you can't refuse, to quote Mario Puzo. Du Bois wrote in 1960, at age 92, when the civil rights movement was on the rise in the United States:

[W]hat we must now ask ourselves is when we become equal American citizens what will be our aims and ideals and what we will have to do with selecting these aims and ideals. Are we to assume that we will simply adopt the ideals of Americans and become what they are or want to be and that we will have in this process no ideals of our own?

That would mean that we would cease to be Negroes as such and become white in action if not completely in color. We would take on the culture of white Americans doing as they do and thinking as they think.

Manifestly this would not be satisfactory. Physically it would mean that we would be integrated with Americans losing first of all, the physical evidence of color and hair and racial type. We would lose our memory of Negro history and of those racial peculiarities which have long been associated with the Negro. We would cease to acknowledge any greater tie with Africa than with England or Germany. We would not try to develop Negro music and Art and Literature as distinctive and different, but allow them to be further degraded as is the case now. We would always, if possible, marry lighter-hued people so as to have children who are not identified with the Negro race, and thus solve our racial problem in America by committing race suicide....

(Du Bois 1973 [1960], 149–150)

Ethnicity theories of race grew out of reaction and accommodation to two fundamental features of U.S. racial dynamics: *biologicistic understandings of race*, and *Puritanism*, the founding religious/political orientation of the White Anglo-Saxon Protestant (and actually Calvinist) settlers of North America.

The ethnicity-based paradigm arose in the early 20th century as an explicit challenge to the prevailing racial views of the period. The then-prevalent biologicistic paradigm continued to explain racial inferiority as part of a natural order of humankind. Whites were considered the superior race; white skin was the norm, the most advanced form of the human body. Other nonwhite corporeal features, such as dark skin color, nappy hair, or variations in eye shape, had to be explained in respect to the white norm. Religious doctrine had long been employed for this purpose. Since the early days of slavery and colonization the “curse of Ham” had been invoked to connect the phenotype of dark skin with God's displeasure, especially with black people, but also with others deemed nonwhite (Haynes 2002).



With the development of evolutionary theory—and especially after the 1859 appearance of Darwin's *The Origin of Species*, scientific accounts of racial difference became prevalent. Race was equated with distinct hereditary characteristics and linked to the degree of “development” of a group:<sup>2</sup> not only its physicality (the “beauty” and even the supposed smell of its members, for example),<sup>3</sup> but also its attributed mental and social level (the group's level of “civilization”), were identified with race.<sup>4</sup> Differences in intelligence, temperament, and sexuality (among other traits) were deemed to be racial in character. Racial intermixture was seen as a sin against nature that would lead to the creation of “biological throwbacks.” These were some of the assumptions in Social Darwinist, Spencerist, and eugenicist thinking about race.<sup>5</sup>

But by the early decades of the 20th century, biologicistic accounts of race were losing coherence. Already in the late 19th century racial biology had come in for significant criticism by black scholars, notably Martin Delaney, W.E.B. Du Bois, and Kelly Miller. But the white “mainstream” was quite oblivious to black voices.<sup>6</sup> Biological theories of race eventually were attacked by adherents of Progressivism and were also called into question by the work of the Chicago School of sociology. The Progressive attack was led by Horace Kallen, who introduced the concept of *cultural pluralism*, which was to become a key current of ethnicity theory (Kallen 1915, 1924). The Chicago sociologists were led by Robert E. Park, who had been secretary and publicist for Booker T. Washington, and whose approach embodied the other major current of the ethnicity paradigm, *assimilationism*.

The Puritan legacy was imparted by the primordial U.S. ethnic group: White Anglo-Saxon Protestants. This group is not often seen through the ethnicity lens, but that is certainly a worthwhile angle on them. Puritanism's history has been exhaustively examined: It was an orthodox Protestant sect, Calvinist in its orientation, that was in flight from the conformist and repressive pressures of early Reformation England. Quite repressive itself, ferociously patriarchal (Salem anyone?),<sup>7</sup> archetypically Protestant-ethic practitioners (Max Weber, can you dig?), and slave-owning as well (Condé 1994), the broad cultural orientation of this early settler community has steadily and continuously organized and influenced North American ideas of identity and belonging in ways that are deeply intertwined with concepts of race. The tendency to apply to racially defined groups key beliefs and values whose origins lie in the settlement of North America by English immigrants—and later European ones—has been discussed extensively (Miller 1956; Dewey 1984 [1930]; Rogin 1996; White 2010).

This militant, authoritarian, Calvinist sect, quite closely related to the Dutch Reformed Church (NHK) of the Afrikaners, set the basic ethnic pattern in North America. That pattern, insistent upon strict doctrinal adherence, individualism, repression (especially sexual repression), and a sort of primitive communitarianism of the elect, generated many of the components of what we now call “American exceptionalism.”

Baptism was grafted onto this pattern; especially Southern Baptism, a white denomination that split from other Baptist currents in the 1840s over issues of slavery<sup>8</sup> and was abandoned by most of its remaining black congregants after the Civil War. The resulting synthesis (or syncretism) was Southern white Protestantism, now a national religious movement.<sup>9</sup>

The ending of Reconstruction in 1877 signaled the rise of a new southern racial regime. The post-Civil War United States, now a traumatized “republic of suffering” (Faust 2009), shaken by emancipation and threatened by Reconstruction, reconstituted itself by recurring, as far as possible, to its white nationalist fundamentals. In the South, this meant coercive debt peonage, denial of political rights, segregation, and negrophobic terrorism. A major economic downturn in 1873 had deeply depressed wages and heightened unemployment. A national railroad strike in 1877 was defeated after 45 days of armed attacks on workers by national guards, federal troops, and marines. In the West, 1877 also marked the onset of white working-class assaults on communities of Asian descent and the start of a comprehensive program of expulsion, exclusion, and expropriation of Chinese and Japanese (Pfaelzer 2008). That same year, Crazy Horse surrendered (and was promptly murdered) in the Black Hills of South Dakota, marking the approaching end of Indian resistance (with the Nez Perce Long March in 1890) and the “closing of the frontier.”

After 1877 the U.S. colorline started to be inscribed around Europe, rather than through it, chiefly because of the sheer demographic weight of the new immigrants, and also because other racial conflicts drew attention away. These Atlantic immigrants were not WASPs and not considered white: While not black or Asian either, they did possess an intermediate racial status. In the nation’s industrial heartland, immigrant workers were induced to refashion themselves as white and to compete with each other for that coveted status (Roediger 2005). The cultivation of European workers’ desires for inclusion became a political and corporate priority in the turn-of-the-20th-century United States: It was a powerful antidote to the radicalism and syndicalism that were brewing among these same workers. Ensuring that European immigrants would not be racialized as blacks and Asians had been, guaranteeing that they would not be equated with the (barely) emancipated ex-slaves or the “coolies” who had built the western railroads and cleared the California heartland for agriculture (Saxton 1971; Almaguer 2008 [1994]), effectively renewed the “psychological wage” dynamic that Du Bois had analyzed as a crucial means for cementing the loyalties of working-class whites in the antebellum South (Du Bois 2007 [1935]; see also Morgan 2003 [1975]).

Beginning in the early 20th century, ethnicity theory challenged this politico-religious bloc, basing itself largely on the incorporation of tremendous waves of non-English, and indeed non-Protestant, European immigrants who had inundated the eastern seaboard and Midwest by that time. Joining their millions of Irish immigrant predecessors, Italians, Slavs, Jews, Greeks, and Middle Easterners entered the mix and required that over time they be admitted to whiteness (Brodin 1998; Jacobson 1999; Guglielmo 2004).

These demographic shifts generated pressing needs for social scientific theory and analysis at the turn of the 20th century. The ethnicity paradigm became the core of that framework: modern, urban, social scientific, progressive and reform-oriented, but decidedly not radical.<sup>10</sup>

Ethnicity theory's main empirical reference point in the United States was the study of immigration and the social patterns resulting from it. Two distinct currents emerged: assimilationism and cultural pluralism. Both largely emphasized European, white immigrants, what Horace Kallen called "the Atlantic migration." While recognizing the presence of blacks and to a lesser degree, that of Asians, writers on ethnicity sought to incorporate those groups' experiences into the broad ethnic framework: The arrival of "strangers in the land" (Higham 2002 [1955]), the resettlement of "the uprooted" (Handlin 2002 [1951]), and the subsequent management and eventual overcoming of the consequent cultural differences.

Chicago sociologists Robert E. Park and his student Louis Wirth saw the development of ethnic enclaves and what Park called a "mosaic of segregated peoples" as stages in a cycle leading to assimilation. Kallen's perspective, by contrast, focused on the eventual democratic acceptance of different immigrant-based cultures (Kallen 1915, 1924). The origins of the concepts of "ethnicity" and "ethnic group," then, lay outside the experience of those identified (not only today, but already in Park's and Kallen's time), as racial minorities: Afro-Americans, Latin Americans, Native Americans, and Asian Americans.

In its early days, ethnicity-based theory concentrated on problems of migration and what Park called "culture contact."<sup>11</sup> The approach was largely ethnographic and tended to downplay conflict, not to mention racial politics. This limited the early work in numerous ways and reflected a large-scale neglect of black scholarship, notably that of W.E.B. Du Bois but also work by Alain Locke, William Monroe Trotter, Kelly Miller, Anna Julia Cooper, Monroe Work, and numerous others. Park's aversion to political sociology and insistence on value-free methodology—always a chimera in social scientific research—inhibited the effectiveness of Chicago sociology as racial critique. Racial inequality and injustice were not seen as outcomes or objects of state policy, but as phenomena of civil society. Lacking a focus on the racial state, Park (and to varied extents the Chicago researchers he mentored) argued that racial conflict itself would generate egalitarian and inclusive pressures; this was the essence of the "race relations cycle" (Park 1950; Lyman 1972, 27–51). Political alliances with progressives, immigrant groups, feminists, the labor movement, or among people of color themselves, were not considered viable; this view may have descended from Park's previous association with Booker T. Washington.<sup>12</sup> Park's sociology of race also tended to analogize U.S. racial struggles with the European ethnic conflicts he had observed during his graduate school days in Heidelberg. In his view, the European model of "ethnocracy" (Persons 1987, 79–83) paralleled U.S. racial stratification, explaining both prejudice and discrimination (whites' defense of their dominant status) and the ineluctable pressures of assimilation (blacks and other minorities overcoming the cultural disadvantages imposed by slavery and exclusion).

Chicago School sociology owed a lot to pragmatism, the progressive and democratic philosophical orientation whose influence in Chicago was linked to John Dewey's tenure at the university.<sup>13</sup> Pragmatism shaped Thomas and Znaniecki's work, helped to generate the social psychology of George Herbert Mead and his student Herbert Blumer, and oriented the urbanism of the Sociology department, which maintained cautious relationships with reform-oriented currents in the city. For example, Jane Addams, social activist and founder of Hull House, had an adjunct relationship with the Sociology department (Bulmer 1986; Deegan 2002). Pragmatism brought an empirical richness and a modicum of respect to Chicago School studies of immigrants, blacks, working-class neighborhoods, and urbanism. It afforded a certain recognition of the independent agency and interpretive capacity of these social actors, something that was routinely denied at the time. Pragmatist social scientific premises, then, opened a window to racial democracy, since blacks were acknowledged to have the ability to understand and act upon their own experience. Like Du Bois before them (Katz and Sugrue, eds. 1998), Park and his students approached black and other nonwhite communities with a degree of interest and respect not previously shown to them by white scholars. In an additional important departure, Park trained black students: Such illustrious scholars as E. Franklin Frazier, Charles S. Johnson,<sup>14</sup> and Oliver C. Cox received their degrees under Park (Steinberg 2007).

For all these reasons—most centrally because of its pragmatist orientation—Chicago sociology could acknowledge black experience to a greater extent than any mainstream (that is, white) social science discipline had ever done. Park and his students also studied racial conflict: in Chicago's anti-black racism, in European anti-semitism, in California's and Hawai'i's hostility towards Asians, and elsewhere. They understood this conflict as but an early stage of the deterministic "race relations cycle" that constituted the core of Park's approach. The "cycle" not only ended in assimilation: the eventual liquidation of difference that was later to play such a crucial role in the ethnicity paradigm of race. It also reduced all race conflict to cultural terms—denying or at least downplaying the political-economic dimensions (super-exploitation, slavery, exclusion, violence), the national dimensions (empire, sovereignty over a given territory, political self-determination), and indeed the corporeal markers (the role of the racialized body) that occupy such crucial positions in the social construction of race.

Despite these significant limits, Park and his students recognized the agency of the racially subordinated and oppressed, and so departed from the biologicistic and Social Darwinist concept of race that had dominated the early sociology of race in the United States. This constituted a real innovation, an important reform in the field. The combination of all these developments (and many more factors we cannot examine here, such as the centrality of micro-level work at Chicago later developed by Mead and extended and modified by Blumer)—revitalized the sociology of race in numerous ways. In particular, the Chicago School's emphasis on an empirically driven approach to race brought new attention to issues of variability, agency, and conflict among racially defined groups. Work at Chicago at long last

incorporated at least some of the insurgent insights pioneered by Du Bois—previously relegated to sociology’s margins because of his radicalism as well as his race—into the disciplinary mainstream.

Horace Kallen’s alternative approach to ethnicity theory—“cultural pluralism”—was less influential than the assimilation-oriented position of Park, although in recent decades something very close to this current has been reincarnated as “multiculturalism.” An immigrant himself, Kallen challenged the assimilationist and ethnocentric dimensions of the progressive—and implicitly WASP—elite, which was expressed in both Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson’s Anglophilia.<sup>15</sup> A former student of William James at Harvard, Kallen experienced the intense anti-semitism and nativism of the campus (and the country) in his early years.<sup>16</sup>

Another important source of the immigrant analogy was the monumental study produced over 1918–1920 by Chicago sociologists W.I. Thomas and Florian Znaniecki, which significantly reconceptualized the sociology of migration (Thomas and Znaniecki 1984 [1918–1920]). This enormous project combined a great deal of primary data with a humanistic account of migration that was largely unprecedented, especially in scope and scale. Although they weren’t primarily concerned with race, Thomas and Znaniecki’s work broke new ground by dispensing with the racism common in then-existing work on immigration. They theorized their subjects as world-aware agents who comparatively assessed their situations in Central Europe and Chicago, using political, economic, and cultural criteria. Basing their research on primary data—employment records, ship manifests, Polish village records, and letters back and forth—Thomas and Znaniecki’s five-volume work was essentially a transcontinental community study that dealt with labor, religion, gender and sexuality, and numerous other quotidian topics, all in the context of the economic and political sociology of migration. This was a quite different perspective on the “huddled masses”; Thomas and Znaniecki should be seen as the founders of today’s sophisticated sociology of migration.

A generally parallel path was taken by anthropology over roughly the same period. Although we are primarily concerned with sociology’s role in framing ethnicity theory in its early years, we would be remiss if we did not mention Franz Boas’s influential role here. Boas virtually founded cultural anthropology in the United States. The Boasian legacy meshed nicely with ethnicity theory. His fundamental claim was that cultural variation among distinct peoples could neither be ranked hierarchically nor classified along a scale that ran from savagery to civilization. He sought both to counter nativist and eugenicist positions in the public sphere, and to rethink social science fundamentally, so as to surpass such positions. He bequeathed a remarkable anti-racist, though somewhat uneven, legacy. His contributions were based upon decades of work at Columbia and at the American Museum of Natural History, where in his early career he had to coexist (and contend) with various eugenicist stalwarts, politicians, and trustees. In the anti-racist annals of American social science, Boas’s contribution is exceeded only by that of Du Bois, with whom he was associated



at various points (Baker 1998). He trained dozens of influential anthropologists (among them Zora Neale Hurston, Gilberto Freyre, Ruth Benedict, and Melville Herskovitz), and deeply reoriented the field in the United States and beyond.<sup>17</sup>

The combination of these political influences and theoretical/analytical currents shaped the sociology of race (as well as other social scientific disciplines such as anthropology and psychology), especially as the ethnicity paradigm climbed to theoretical dominance. The adoption of the immigrant analogy and the emphasis on immigrant incorporation and assimilation were the two most central examples of this. These themes continue to exert tremendous influence even today. Notably, the immigrant analogy involves a “default to whiteness,” especially visible in its treatment of assimilation, inclusion, and integration. This “default” is sometimes explicit, but more often it is what Moon-Kie Jung calls an “unconscious”<sup>18</sup> feature of social scientific concepts of race.

With the advent of the somewhat egalitarian vision of the New Deal<sup>19</sup> and of the anti-fascism of World War II,<sup>20</sup> the ethnicity paradigm definitively dislodged the biologicistic view in what appeared to be a triumph of liberalism. Yet this victory was a hollow one where racial minorities were concerned, for the new paradigm was solidly based in the framework of European (white) ethnicity, and could not appreciate the extent to which racial dynamics differed from ethnic ones. In particular, it could not transcend the culturally determined framework that lies at the core of ethnicity theory. What was the relationship between ethnicity and political economy: not just inequality/stratification, but also exploitation and coercion? What was the relationship between ethnicity and the corporeal: We know what a racialized body is, but what is an ethnicized body? Were the historical experiences that people of color encountered similar to those of white Europeans? Were the trajectories for their perceived eventual incorporation and assimilation the same? To these questions ethnicity theorists generally answered yes. Many anti-racist activists and movement groups, though, begged to differ.

## Ascent to Dominance

Ethnicity theory began as a liberal<sup>21</sup> challenge to religious and biologicistic accounts of race. It operated on cultural territory, between the parameters of assimilationism and pluralism. Ethnic groups were implicitly white (or becoming white), and religious differences were minimized. Thus the ethnicity paradigm challenged bedrock U.S. racial ideology only to a limited extent: It was more concerned with “whiteness of a different color” (Jacobson 1999) than with racialized “others,” notably black people. Only after World War II was the immigrant analogy stretched at all; only then did social scientists move from a focus on the U.S. “racial frontier”—a phrase of Park’s that incorporated imperial and nativist assumptions and was pregnant with problematic meanings—toward more comprehensive attention to the idea of racial “otherness” within the American nation (Park 1950 [1926]; see also Ross 1914).

To apply the immigrant analogy to non-Europeans was a large social scientific project. Like most racial theory, it was driven by ineluctable political events, most of them linked to the social upheavals that rocked the United States during and after World War II.

*Black "Immigrants":* The vast majority of U.S. black folk were not immigrants; the black presence in the United States predates that of most white-identified groups. But the great preponderance of U.S. blacks remained in the South. The South moved north, as Robert Coles (1971) famously wrote, because labor shortages in defense industries and an effective unemployment rate of near-zero percent (by 1944 or so) impelled their internal migration. This was actually the second "great migration" of blacks to the North; a similar wave of black souls had flowed north during World War I (Griffin 1996; Marks 1989). Northern black votes, combined with the return of more than one million black veterans who were less likely to accept segregation and racism, both "down South" and "up South" (i.e., in the North) brought renewed pressures for civil rights. Many civil rights movement leaders were veterans (Parker 2009). With a renewed political force behind it, and with an obvious set of urban precedents close at hand, the immigration model began to be applied to blacks. This was not illogical, given the vastly augmented presence of black folk in the urban North, and to some extent the urban West. Irving Kristol's famous (1966) declaration, "The Negro today is like the immigrant of yesterday," was not the first attempt to locate black history within the immigration framework. Already in the late 1940s the immigrant analogy was being invoked, sometimes by blacks themselves (Reid 1947; Denby 1989 [1952]; see also Taeuber and Taeuber 1964; Tolnay 1997; Sugrue 1996).

*Asian American "Immigrants":* Ethnicity theory also re-encountered the Asian American experience during and after the war. In 1943 FDR signed the Magnuson Act, repealing the Chinese Exclusion Act that had prevented Chinese from naturalizing since 1882.<sup>22</sup> After the war, the incarceration of Japanese Americans under the infamous 1942 Executive Order 9066 also received social scientific attention. Notable in this regard was the Japanese American Evacuation and Resettlement Study (JERS), which was directed at the University of California, Berkeley by Dorothy Swaine Thomas, widow of William I. Thomas and a formidable social scientific methodologist in her own right. (Thomas and Nishimoto 1946; Thomas, Kikuchi, and Sakoda 1952). Collaborators on the JERS study included Nisei (second generation Japanese American) such as Charles Kikuchi, Togo Tanaka, and Tamotsu Shibutani who had themselves experienced wartime incarceration under the infamous Executive Order 9066.<sup>23</sup> Important research was also conducted clandestinely by incarcerated Japanese American scholars, notably Tamie Tsuchiyama and Richard Nishimoto.<sup>24</sup> Japanese naturalization only became possible in 1953; the United States did not apologize or undertake redress and reparations for this immense injustice until 1988, when many of its victims had already died.<sup>25</sup>

*Latin@ Immigrants:* Mexicans—the largest Latin@ group in the United States—also began their journey toward immigrant status during and after World

War II. Having become U.S. citizens as a result of conquest in the mid-19th century, Mexican Americans had been subject to sustained efforts at exclusion and marginalization, especially in Texas and in California (Foley 1999). The U.S.–Mexican border had undergone successive stages of fortification and militarization, especially in consequence of the Mexican revolution of 1910–1924 (Romo 2005). After the Johnson–Reed Act of 1924, legal Mexican immigration was problematic, although in practice travel across the border has been continuous. The 1930s saw extensive mass deportations of Mexican@s from the Southwest, particularly from Southern California, as a consequence of prevalent anti-Mexican race-baiting and intense job competition in the Depression years (Balderrama and Rodriguez 2006 [1995]). These oppressive circumstances did not permit recognition of Mexican@s as “immigrants,” much less as the citizens many already were. Many Mexican American U.S. citizens were summarily deported. When labor-demand rose during World War II, the U.S. government initiated the “bracero” program for temporary contract laborers, with the strong support of agribusiness and the acquiescence of the Mexican government. But braceros were not permitted immigrant status (Ngai 2005). So the appearance after the war of Mexican American advocacy organizations like the GI Forum, and the initiation of anti-discrimination lawsuits like the *Méndez* and *Hernandez* cases, represented some early steps in the Latin@ struggle for civil rights (Lopez 2003).

As long as race could be subsumed under the ethnicity label, in short, the immigrant analogy could be applied. Thus when the civil rights movement began to gain traction in the 1940s and 1950s, ethnicity-based accounts were initially sympathetic. Kristol’s declaration that “The Negro today is like the immigrant of yesterday” was continuous with a long line of northern, left-liberal, and often Jewish efforts to ally with and harness the black struggle to a revamped, post-Dixiecrat, Democratic Party. Jewish writers had been the key theorists of ethnicity since the 1920s: Among these were Horace Kallen, Walter Lippman, Max Lerner, Milton Gordon, and Nathan Glazer. Jews were very active in the civil rights movement, had long-standing associations with liberalism and the left, and were clearly unhappy with the tendency—evident in both the Puritan roots and Southern Baptist currents in mainstream American Protestantism—to see the United States as a “Christian nation.” They properly linked biologicistic racism with Nazism and the Holocaust.

So ethnicity theory’s repudiation of religious and biologicistic forms of discrimination and exclusion, and its claim that ethnicity (including race) was but a cultural distinction, overlapped with anti-racist political movements. Culture, after all, is malleable and adaptable; assimilation fits right in with that idea. And a certain degree of ethnic (racial) pluralism was clearly compatible with American democracy: Look at the Irish, the Jews, the Italians ... (Glazer and Moynihan 1970 [1963]); why not the Negroes as well?

The appearance of Gunnar Myrdal’s *An American Dilemma* (1944) marked the ascent of the ethnicity paradigm to a position of theoretical dominance. This monumental study, funded by the Carnegie Commission, was the product of the labors not

only of its director and principal author, but also of an wide array of talented students of racial issues in the United States.<sup>26</sup> Myrdal both challenged biologicistic theories of racism and asserted the desirability of assimilation for blacks (Myrdal 1962 [1944], 929). He argued that there was an “American Creed” of democracy, equality, and justice, that was fundamentally in conflict with black inequality, segregation, and racial prejudice in general.<sup>27</sup> In order to resolve this conflict, America would be called upon, sooner or later, to extend its “creed” to include blacks. Myrdal’s assessment was optimistic about the ultimate resolution of this battle—in his view racial domination would eventually give way to racial equality and the integration of blacks into the mainstream of American life.

Rather than presenting his “dilemma” as something endemic and foundational in U.S. society and culture, Myrdal framed racial injustice as an aberration, a retardation and obstacle besetting the higher virtues of U.S. democracy. He combined this account with a Fabian faith in progress over the historical medium to long term, which he saw as a process of “cumulative and circular development.”<sup>28</sup> He would later apply this approach to global problems of poverty and economic development as well (Myrdal 1963). Myrdal also presented assimilation as an unproblematic objective of racial reform, a position that surely differed with the views of many of his black informants and collaborators. In short, Myrdal’s devotion to the cause of racial reform—the product of many determinations and influences—drove his project at its most fundamental level. Writing during the World War II and desirous of contributing to an Allied victory, Myrdal idealized the “creed” and minimized the very real obstacles to its achievement:

If America in actual practice could show the world a progressive trend by which the Negro finally became integrated into modern democracy, all mankind would be given faith again—it would have reason to believe that peace, progress, and order are feasible.... America is free to choose whether the Negro shall remain her liability or become her opportunity.

(Myrdal 1962 [1944], 1021–1022)

Assimilation was simply the most logical and “natural” response to the “dilemma,” which was the anachronistic and baleful legacy of slavery, a hindrance to both white and black development. While there was no doubt that whites must repudiate racial prejudice (Myrdal did not use the term “racism”), blacks had also to rise to the occasion and demonstrate their worthiness. Indeed Myrdal, drawing on the work of E. Franklin Frazier (as Daniel Patrick Moynihan was to do 20 years later), suggested that there was a “pathological” aspect to black culture which only full assimilation could cure.<sup>29</sup>

Elevated to theoretical dominance by the Myrdal study, ethnicity theory derived its agenda from the political imperatives of the period: to condemn in the liberal terms of the war years the phenomenon of racial inequality, which smacked of the kinds of despotism the United States fought against in Europe; to modernize and mobilize

American society in preparation for its postwar role of world leadership; and to distribute the seemingly limitless resources deriving from U.S. hegemony—resources which were not only economic, but also political and cultural—to all at home, even as they were to be offered abroad to American allies (and to the vanquished Axis powers as well). The ethnicity-based theoretical tradition, derived from the experiences of European immigrants, was thus extended in the conclusions of *An American Dilemma* so that it might include blacks.

And indeed, in the aftermath of the war, racial reforms became imperative. A “second” migration during the war years had brought millions of blacks and Latinos to the North and West; these were voters who identified with the New Deal and began to challenge Dixiecrat power in the Democratic Party, as well as to influence the Republicans. In the liberal view of the time, in short, these were black (and brown) “immigrants” whose conditions could be equated to the Italians, Jews, Polish peasants, Greeks, and others whose earlier arrivals had created 20th-century ethnicity in the first place.

Desegregation of the armed forces, which began in 1948, and the contested 1948 Democratic Party convention, also challenged racial divisions at home. The term “civil rights” returned to the political scene after World War II. Congress had passed civil rights acts in 1866, 1871, and 1875, during the Reconstruction years. Not until 1957 would it pass another such act. The Cold War and the rising tide of anti-imperialism in the global South brought Myrdal’s prescriptions into sharper focus. Racial politics became central issues: At the United Nations, in the anti-colonial wars taking place in the Maghreb and Southeast Asia, and in a sharpening U.S. political debate that combined red-baiting as well as black-baiting, global and domestic racial concerns began to overlap. This rising phase of the trajectory of racial politics is discussed more fully in Chapter 6.

Ethnicity-based racial theory took off after World War II, driven by developing debates and controversies in everyday life and mainstream politics, drawing on the Myrdal study, and influenced by a range of recent social scientific work on race. In a 1947–1948 series of lectures on “Discrimination and National Welfare” offered at the Jewish Theological Seminary in New York, influential social scientists sought to apply Myrdal’s analysis, not only domestically but internationally. Prominent New Dealer and Latin Americanist A.A. Berle, Jr. discussed “Race Discrimination and the Good Neighbor Policy”; Roger Baldwin, founder of the ACLU, lectured on “Our Standing in the Orient”; big-time Columbia sociologist Robert MacIver’s talk was titled “Our Strengths and Our Weaknesses”; and a young Robert Merton presented a paper, still frequently cited, on “Discrimination and the American Creed.”<sup>30</sup>

Social scientific studies of race based in the ethnicity model developed dramatically after World War II. In sociology, the disciplinary center of gravity moved east from Chicago to Harvard and Columbia, where structural-functionalism took over from Chicago School pragmatism. The structural-functionalist framework stressed the unifying role of culture, and particularly American values, in regulating and



resolving conflicts. This approach was notably in evidence in respect to the sociology of race. It overlapped significantly with the argument of the Myrdal study—the “American creed.” Myrdal and Talcott Parsons, Myrdal and Robert Merton, influenced each other. As for “who zoomed who?” we don’t need to worry about that too much here. Parsons was a racial liberal and Merton had been involved in civil rights activity since his undergraduate days at Temple University<sup>31</sup>—but, in any case, the consensual political climate of the war years provided an appropriate moment for calls for racial reform. This was a point Myrdal had made clear in his book’s concluding pages, pointing out the inconsistencies and contradictions inherent in a racially exclusionary and discriminatory society’s leading a war for democracy.<sup>32</sup>

Another major sociological study that tackled race issues at this time, and that resonated very deeply with the structural-functionalist perspective, was Samuel Stouffer et al.’s *The American Soldier* (1949–1950; see also Ryan 2013). Research for this project was initiated in 1941 with War Department support; it was published in 1949–1950. The Stouffer study devoted significant attention to racial attitudes in the wartime military, and to the experiences of the over one million black members of the U.S. armed forces. In its explicit examination of the tensions of racial segregation and the aspirations for racial progress that characterized the wartime armed forces, *The American Soldier* strongly paralleled the Myrdal study, which had preceded it by some five years. In Stouffer et al.’s interviews, white soldiers continued to express their Negrophobia, while blacks articulated their expectations—as they had during World War I—that their sacrifices in wartime would be recognized and rewarded later. Stouffer et al. suggested that the war reduced the degree of white racism. While not a vacuous claim, the extent of this meliorism has since been called into question. To be sure, the armed forces remained segregated through the war years, various race riots (and even black–white gun battles) took place on U.S. bases, and U.S. servicemen of color were often discriminated against and assaulted, sometimes even while in uniform.<sup>33</sup>

Although Myrdal’s was the predominant voice in the 1940s sociology of race, Stouffer et al.’s influence was also significant, especially since the latter work appeared at roughly the same moment that the U.S. military was finally being desegregated. Both studies departed from the conflict-oriented approach that had largely informed the sociology of race into the 1930s. Viewed in conjunction with other mainstream sociological work of the period (notably MacIver, ed. 1949), these works must be seen as definitively introducing an integration-oriented perspective on U.S. racial dynamics into mainstream sociology.

While recognizing the gravity of segregation and racial prejudice, the structural-functionalist view of race consistently stressed the integrative qualities of U.S. society; thus the overlap of the two uses of the term “integration”—one that summarized the key civil rights demands of the era, and one that framed sociological explanations in terms of social unity and commonality—is more than a casual synecdoche. Deep-seated conflicts were not amenable to the structural-functionalist account; at

most they could appear as “social problems,” or be understood as having “latent” functions (Coser 1956) of an integrative sort. An understanding of race and racial injustice as foundational elements in U.S. society and culture (not to mention as world-historically significant issues) was not possible within this viewpoint, which thus tended to marginalize radical accounts such as those deriving from the Duboisian tradition, anticolonialist and pan-African thought, or Marxism.

Once properly reconceptualized as symptoms of the tensions inherent in societal self-regulation, however, racial matters could be understood as amenable to reform. Racial conflict received little attention in Parsons’s early work, but after the appearance of *An American Dilemma*, he began writing more about race. Drawing on the work of his Harvard colleague, the psychologist Gordon Allport, and focusing largely upon micro-sociological phenomena, Parsons began thinking about prejudice as a problem of values (in other words white values) in the late 1940s. The edited work *Toward a General Theory of Action* (Parsons and Shils, eds. 1951) contained a substantial essay by Allport taking this approach.<sup>34</sup> Parsons began the essay “Full Citizenship for the Negro American? A Sociological Problem,” written for *The Negro American* (Parsons and Clark, eds. 1967) at the height of the civil rights struggle, by arguing social-psychologically. He recognized the values-conflict that exclusion and the experience of white prejudice engender in blacks, echoing Myrdal’s diagnosis of the “dilemma.” A reform-oriented transition was underway, he suggested, in which inclusion would first be advanced by legal action, then by politics, and finally by state-based guarantees of social citizenship and even redistribution of resources (Parsons in Parsons and Clark 1967, 718). The informed reader must have struggled with this even in 1967, notably with its underestimation of the white resistance—from overt “backlash” politics on down to limited reform—that such a program would face, and indeed was already confronting “up South” (for example, in the North, in places like the Chicago neighborhood of Cicero) as well as “down South.”

Looking back on Parsons’s account of race, what is most striking is his ungainly combination of sympathy (“moderate,” to be sure) with the civil rights movement and his striking unfamiliarity with the nonwhite world. He did manage some criticism of white prejudice and discrimination, but he depicted U.S. “race relations” as undergoing a steady progress toward inclusion of blacks, a condition which he seemed to think was on the verge of accomplishment in 1966. A deeper interest in black life and thought, not to mention black experience, eluded him.

Parsons’s co-editor was the eminent black psychologist Kenneth B. Clark, whose work in *The Negro American* took a much less rosy view of mid-1960s U.S. racial politics.<sup>35</sup> Clark’s book *Dark Ghetto* appeared in 1965, with an epigraph by Du Bois and an introduction by Myrdal. In that work Clark was already reassessing what had been a lifelong commitment to integration. Clark’s analysis of black exclusion and white racism invoked the “internal colonialism” framework; his influential book anticipated Blauner’s important radical analyses (1972) that extended and popularized the concept several years later. Clark had been the first tenured black professor at City College of

New York, where he began teaching in 1942. He is perhaps best known for the influence his early work on internalized prejudice (the famous “doll experiments,” the use of dolls to determine a child’s racial attitude; carried out in collaboration with his wife Mamie Phipps Clark) had on the Supreme Court’s 1954 *Brown* decision. His social psychological approach to racism and black identity, both collective and individual, has shaped thinking about racial “identity politics” more generally, right down to the present day. In rough parallel to Du Bois’s trajectory, Clark’s early work envisioned racial progress as occurring through integration and the extension of rational and democratic norms to U.S. blacks; we can see his affinities with the Myrdal model, as well as with Parsons’s attempted systematization, through this lens. But his doubts were already visible in the mid-1960s and became more pronounced throughout his later work. He turned to more radical—and in some respects more “nationalist”—positions as similar tendencies gained increasing traction in the black community.

In the 1960s and 1970s, Nathan Glazer and Daniel Patrick Moynihan attempted a further innovation in ethnicity theory. Stimulated by the burgeoning civil rights movement, and threatened with being outflanked on their left, these two Harvard sociologists wished both to validate the assimilationist bent of previous ethnic group-based theory, and to reintroduce the theme of “ongoing ethnicity” or cultural pluralism. In *Beyond The Melting Pot* they sought to link cultural pluralism with political pluralism, the dominant construct in American political science, and thus seemingly to reconcile the paradigm’s problem of ethnic group identity—assimilation vs. cultural pluralism, incorporation vs. preservation—at a stroke. This volume’s title itself encapsulates the ethnicity paradigm’s perspective on race; the book’s two editions bracket the paradigm’s triumphal moment and the onset of its downfall.

Glazer and Moynihan argued that immigrating groups were transformed, if hardly “melted,” by their experiences in New York, emerging as communities distinct not only from each other and their pre-existing socio-cultural *milieux*, but also from their communities of origin.

Ethnic groups, then, even after distinctive language, customs, and culture are lost ... are continually recreated by new experiences in America. The mere existence of a name itself is perhaps sufficient to form group character in new situations, for the name associates an individual, who actually can be anything, with a certain past, country, or race.

(Glazer and Moynihan 1970 [1963], 17)

Assimilation, they argued, does take place as individuals acculturate and groups enter the political arena. Yet out of this very process a separate identity emerges, which must sustain itself culturally and deliver tangible political gains (as well as—ultimately—economic gains, “upward mobility”) to the group. Thus, fundamental political interests, rather than factors such as primordial ties, cultural differences, or majoritarian resistance to incorporation, were ultimately decisive in the maintenance of ethnic identities. Continuing with the same passage:

But as a matter of fact, someone who is Irish or Jewish or Italian generally has other traits than the mere existence of the name that associates him [sic] with other people attached to the group. A man is connected to his group by ties of family and friendship. But he is also connected by *ties of interest*. The ethnic groups in New York are also interest groups.

(Ibid, emphasis original)

This political focus initially seemed quite compatible with the racial conflicts of the 1950s and early 1960s. At that time ethnicity theory was grappling with black attempts to achieve equality through the civil rights movement. As seen through the lens of ethnicity, the civil rights movement was a drive for black integration and for the removal of any remaining forms of institutional/legal discrimination. From the perspective of writers such as Glazer and Moynihan or Milton Gordon (1964), civil rights demands were intelligible and comprehensible within the ethnicity framework, and thus deserving of support. The civil rights movement was trying to create for blacks the same conditions that white ethnics had found: “opportunity” and relative equality, the absence of formal discriminatory barriers, however much attitudinal prejudice may have existed (Glazer 1987 [1975], 25–27).

Although virulent forms of racism persisted in the South, the remedies for segregation were clear. The North, though, presented a different set of problems for ethnicity theorists. At first glance, it was assumed that black equality had already been achieved there:

One looked at the demands of the civil rights movement in 1963—equality in the vote, equality in the courts, equality in representation in public life, equality in accommodations—saw that they existed more or less in New York City, and concluded that the political course of the Northern Negro would be quite different from that of the Southern Negro. He [sic] would become part of the game of accommodation politics—he already was—in which posts and benefits were distributed to groups on the basis of struggle, of course, but also on the basis of votes, money, and political talent, and one concluded that in this game Negroes would not do so badly.

(Glazer and Moynihan 1970 [1963], x)

In other words, blacks already had equal opportunity in the North; what more could they demand? Once equal opportunity legislation along with its judicial and administrative enforcement were accomplished facts, it fell to blacks to follow in their “predecessors” footsteps. Through hard work, patience, and delayed gratification, blacks could carve out their own rightful place in American society. In the North, where blacks were still recent “immigrants” (from the South), this would involve some degree of assimilation (Glazer 1983). It would involve the development of a new post-immigration cultural identity, and it would require engagement in mainstream pluralist politics. Race relations would thus continue in what Nathan Glazer called the “American ethnic pattern.”

So, ethnicity theory assigned to blacks and other people of color the roles which earlier generations of European immigrants had played in the great waves of the “Atlantic migration” of the 19th and early 20th centuries. *But both whites and people of color refused to play their assigned roles.* Structural barriers continued to render the immigrant analogy inappropriate; the trajectory of incorporation did not develop as the ethnicity paradigm had envisioned. Large-scale obstacles blocked the path to inclusion. (We discuss structural racism later in this book, but for now think of red-lining, racial steering and residential segregation, school segregation, hiring patterns, imprisonment.) In the face of these concrete practices of states, corporations, and millions of whites, many blacks (and later, many Latin@s, Native Americans, and Asian Americans as well) rejected ethnic identity and the false promise of inclusion, in favor of a more radical racial identity which demanded group rights and recognition. Given these developments, ethnicity theory found itself increasingly in opposition to the demands of anti-racist movements. The ethnicity paradigm had to be reworked once again. The result was the phenomenon of neoconservatism.

Not long after ethnicity theorists’ embrace of civil rights came a new round of racial conflicts: above all, the black power revolt and its cousins, brown power, yellow power, and red power. These poked significant holes in the liberal framework of integration through values-convergence, aka the culturalism of ethnicity theory, aka the structural-functionalist sociology of race. In addition, race began to appear as a global issue, not just a U.S. domestic problem. Earlier sociological paradigms had recognized this better than the post-World War II approaches did: For all their limits, the biologicistic approach had located race in the sphere of “development,” and the Chicago pragmatists had at least hinted at its intimate connections with nascent U.S. imperialism.<sup>36</sup> By the mid-1960s, then, ethnicity theory and its liberal stalwarts were beginning to part company with the race radicals, nationalists and leftists alike, who had been at least tacit allies earlier. These were the seeds of ethnicity theory’s decline and its hastening turn to the right.

The combination of post-World War II racial issues—the crisis of the Jim Crow regime at home and the breakdown of empire and neocolonialism abroad—all in the context of the Cold War and the “communist threat”—exceeded the tolerance level of the racial moderates. Where was the immigrant analogy now? How could the “free world” and the New Deal coalition address these new conditions? Sociology’s leading lights were cold warriors; they had taken up the civil rights banner at a time when segregation, lynching, and discrimination against people of color had become deep embarrassments for the United States around the world. Did Parsons read Fanon or even Du Bois? Did Merton consider the sociology of African development proposed by his one-time junior colleague Immanuel Wallerstein? Did Kingsley Davis—who wrote on population in South Asia, comparative urbanization, and the sociology of the family and reproduction in global perspective—ever address anticolonialism? According to Lipset at least (1994), these leading figures, and many others as well, came to sociology after youthful involvements with socialism and communism. No



doubt they were nervous in the late 1940s and 1950s. This was quite logical: Many of them were being watched.<sup>37</sup>

From the vantage point of the present, racial dynamics can be seen as deeply structuring all these issues. But during the 1950s and 1960s, racial issues appeared largely to be U.S. domestic problems. They were not to be confused with the battle against communism. Racial integration was supported while the purges and witch-hunting that stigmatized and disemployed some of the field's most active advocates for racial justice were condoned, at least in part.<sup>38</sup> The major figures associated with the structural-functionalist paradigm of race did not oppose the Vietnam War or consider its racial implications.<sup>39</sup> King's 1967 denunciation of the war from the pulpit of New York's Riverside Church was condemned by such "moderate" sociologists of race as Daniel Moynihan, as it was by such "moderate" civil rights leaders as Roy Wilkins and Whitney Young. In the 1960s such figures as Milton Gordon and Nathan Glazer combined support for the "moderate" tendencies in the civil rights movement and rejection of "positive" discrimination (aka affirmative action). Thus they first prefigured and soon after launched the neoconservative racial reaction and the "colorblind" resurgence of the "post-civil rights" era (Steinberg 2001).

The elective affinity between movement-oriented racial reformism and the sociological critique of racial prejudice and discrimination, then, only operated until the mid-1960s or so. The assimilationism advocated so unequivocally by Myrdal and the integrationism put forward by Parsons and Clark were soon exceeded by the vast agenda that meaningful racial reform entailed. This was a point made forcefully by the new wave of race riots beginning in Harlem in 1964 and Watts in 1965, by the assassinations of Malcolm and Martin, by the resurgence of black nationalism and the "black power revolt," and also—as Dr. King pointed out so powerfully—by the doomed U.S. defense of neocolonialism in Asia and elsewhere. Although Parsons, Merton, and other moderates tried valiantly to advocate an incrementalist and integrationist view of race and civil rights, by the later 1960s the reassertion of a conflict-oriented sociology of race (Ladner, ed. 1973) and the emergence of identity politics were well advanced.

## **Decline and Fall**

Although the ethnicity paradigm of race began as a progressive and liberal challenge to racial biologism, eugenics, and white racial nationalism, it has shifted since the enactment of civil rights reforms in the mid-1960s. The core concepts of the paradigm—the immigrant analogy, cultural determinism, and the denial of the corporeal and "ocular" dimensions of raciality—have become the principal intellectual apparatus of the neoconservative and now "colorblind" racial project. Most of the paradigm's proponents have moved rightward, locating their arguments within an individualist problematic that has more in common with the white racial nationalism

their predecessors once attacked than with the civil rights movement those same predecessors once supported. In many ways this shift is a consequence of efforts to understand race as a cultural phenomenon.

Once Chicago sociology had discarded the biological determinism of Sumner, Spencer, Madison Grant, Social Darwinism, and eugenics, the mainstream sociology of race dismissed the corporeal dimensions of race rather comprehensively. The body all but disappeared from the sociology of race, as it did from the cultural anthropology of race (post-Boas), and from other social scientific discussions as well, for example Myrdal's study. This was a *reductionist* view of race, one that neglected the importance of the body as a signifier of status, and as signifier of group belonging (Blumer 1958) in its own right. The racial body had served from the earliest days of conquest, and still serves today, as an imperfect but effective tool and marker: for both domination and resistance, for the assignment of identity and the recognition of difference, for the maintenance of social control and the drawing of boundaries among groups, and for claims of solidarity made both by the powerful and the powerless.

To understand race as a variety of ethnicity, then, was to neglect stigma, exclusion, privilege, and violence, all characteristics inherent in "the mark of race," the phenomic, "ocular" dimension of racial belonging. It was to adopt the immigrant analogy: the assumption that racially identified individuals and groups, like immigrants, could adapt to new circumstances (say, the urban settings of the North or West rather than the rural settings of the South, or industrial labor rather than agricultural labor). Just as immigrant ethnic groups learned a new language and new customs, eating and speaking (and perhaps worshipping) differently, so too could blacks, Asians, and Latin American immigrants. Indeed becoming "ethnic groups" at all, acquiring the hyphenated identity that marked ethnicity—Italian-American, Jewish-American, Mexican-American, Negro-American (or later, African-American)—was what ethnicity was all about (Glazer and Moynihan, eds. 1975). Both assimilation and cultural pluralism involved obtaining this ethnic option (Waters 1990) that was the mark of inclusion. Achieving ethnic identity might be an uneven and prolonged process that required several generations; it might not eliminate all status differentials, hierarchies, and prejudice; and indeed it might not render all groups equally permeable in the melting pot (or equally tasty in the "salad bowl"). But it would go a long way toward reducing remaining inequalities and differences.

Concerned that the incorporative consequences of immigration (assimilation and cultural pluralism once again) might not apply fully enough to racially "different"—that is, not white—groups, ethnicity theorists had struggled to keep up with the racial upheavals of the post-World War II period, in which the legacies of slavery and empire were central, and immigration was secondary. The capture, transport, mass murder, and chattelization of millions of Africans<sup>40</sup> could not easily be explained within the immigration analogy, though Kristol, Glazer and Moynihan, and others tried their best to locate it within their framework of immigrant inclusion and urban ethnic

politics. Nor was the problem of the displacement, removal, and genocide of the pre-existing native inhabitants of the Americas a major concern of ethnicity theorists.<sup>41</sup> The “immigrant analogy” obviously did not work here. Or maybe it only worked in reverse: with the immigrants/settlers playing the dominant role.

The radical charge that the construction of American economies, cultures, and states, both in North America and elsewhere in the hemisphere, depended on slavery and empire. Indeed the fact that these imperial projects and subsequent American nations were intrinsically racist projects themselves, was discomfiting for ethnicity theorists (Drinnon 1997; Stoler, ed. 2006). From the 1960s on, the dominant ethnicity paradigm was confronted with radical critique from the left. Politically it was upset by the embrace of various Marxisms in the black movement and other anti-racist movements. It was hostile to the black power movement (Van DeBurg 1992; Joseph 2006), as well as to such related radical and nationalist organizations as the Black Panthers, the Young Lords, the American Indian Movement, and the Partido de la Raza Unida. None of these were comfortable political bedfellows for ethnicity theorists of race.

Confronted with the intractability of racial difference and the resilience of racial inequality in the aftermath of civil rights legislation and Supreme Court rulings that favored inclusive social policies, ethnicity theorists faced a stark choice. Broadly speaking, there were two possible reasons why reform did not effectively reduce racial inequality and difference and facilitate social and political inclusion under the “American creed”: Either U.S. society was unwilling to tackle the endemic racial injustices that prevailed within it, or people of color were unwilling to grasp the opportunities newly becoming available. Ethnicity-based approaches could not accept the former view; was this not what the Panthers and other radicals were claiming? Calls for “positive” or “affirmative” anti-discrimination policies, for example, assumed the existence a far more entrenched system of racial injustice than ethnicity theorists such as Glazer, Moynihan, Charles Murray, and Thomas Sowell were willing to recognize. After all, earlier generations of immigrants had not required special policies or treatments; why should blacks? State activities should be restricted, they argued, to guarantees of formal equality for individuals.

This position was not new. Milton Gordon had argued something similar as early as 1964. But the *doyens* of the ethnicity school, Glazer and Moynihan, were ambivalent about the group rights question in the 1960s. Indeed, Moynihan had endorsed positive anti-discrimination measures (“equality of result”) in his famous “Report” (Rainwater and Yancey 1967, 49); Moynihan also coauthored Lyndon Johnson’s Howard University speech “To Fulfill these Rights” (June 5, 1964):

You do not take a person who, for years, has been hobbled by chains and liberate him [sic], bring him up to the starting line of a race and then say, “you are free to compete with all the others,” and still justly believe that you have been completely fair.

(Ibid)

For his part Glazer had warned about group rights early on. He argued, also in 1965, that a “new national interest” in “the final liquidation of Negro separation” was being defined, and that blacks themselves had best not oppose it, for “When an ethnic group interest has clashed with a national interest, we have been quite ruthless and even extreme in overriding the group interest” (Glazer 1983, 27).<sup>42</sup>

During its long reign, ethnicity theory has frequently been modified as its advocates attempted to account for new empirical phenomena or to address competing theoretical approaches. In the early postwar period, the ethnicity model encountered its main opponents in conservative quarters. Explicitly racist perspectives, rooted in the formerly dominant biologicistic, hierarchical, and religious beliefs of the prewar era, maintained their hold, especially in the South but also on a national level. (Think KKK.) The early civil rights movement in the South, and the mobilization of Mexican Americans in the Southwest, evoked overt expressions of hardcore white supremacy and violence in the 1960s, although reforms slowly took some hold in these regions as well.

The ethnicity paradigm was still on board the movement train in the early 1960s, operating as its “mainstream” explanatory voice. Until roughly 1966, ethnicity theorists supported the “moderate” desegregation policies of the Johnson presidency and Warren Court. Subsequently, in the wake of Goldwater’s 1964 defeat, the Voting Rights Act (1965), and George Wallace’s campaigns, and as a consequence of Nixon’s (1968) “southern strategy” and party realignment, ethnicity theory was pushed to the right. By the early 1970s, it had been transformed into neoconservatism. Today, that political current is seen chiefly through its neo-imperial agenda in Iraq and its alliance with the right-wing Israeli Likud Party, but we should remember that it began as a center-right racial realignment after breaking with the civil rights movement, not only the black power movement, but also the movement of Martin Luther King, Jr.

The ethnicity-based, neoconservative approach to race had three main problems: 1) the social scientific, indeed methodological, limitations encountered by the ethnicity paradigm in its attempt to reduce race to an element of ethnicity; 2) the paradigm’s consequent inability to deal with the particular characteristics of racially-defined groups as a direct consequence of this reductionism; and 3) the ethnicity paradigm’s reliance on a single historical case in its use of the great wave of European migration at the turn of the 20th century to develop its “immigrant analogy.” The first of these problems we call the “Bootstraps Model”; the second we refer to as “They All Look Alike”; the third we label “Once Is Not Enough.”

*The “Bootstraps Model”:* As we have noted, substantial reworking of the ethnicity paradigm took place in the later 1960s and early 1970s. By 1975 Glazer and Moynihan felt themselves able to offer a general hypothesis on the dynamics of group incorporation:

Ethnic groups bring different norms to bear on common circumstances with consequent different levels of success—hence group differences in status.

(Glazer and Moynihan, eds. 1975, 7)

The “group norms/common circumstances” correlation raises multiple problems, which can be traced back to the immigrant analogy. The key factor in explaining the success that an ethnic group will have in becoming incorporated into “normalized”<sup>43</sup> white society (a goal whose desirability is unquestioned) is the values or “norms” which the group brings to bear on the general social circumstances it faces, just as all other minorities have done. Since the independent variable is the “norms,” the idea that “differences in status” could be affected by factors outside or even unrelated to the group is ruled out at the level of assumptions. Everything is mediated through “norms” internal to the group. If Chican@s don’t do well in school, this cannot, even hypothetically, be due to low-quality education; it has instead to do with Chican@ values. After all, Jews and Japanese Americans did well in inferior schools, so why can’t other groups? Ongoing processes of discrimination, shifts in the prevailing economic climate, the development of a sophisticated racial ideology of “conservative egalitarianism”—in other words, all the concrete sociopolitical dynamics within which racial phenomena operate in the United States—are ignored in this approach.<sup>44</sup>

“Common circumstances,” by contrast, are relegated to the dependent variable. These are the universal conditions to which each ethnic group must accommodate. The assumption is that each racialized “ethnic group” faces the normalized white society in the same way that its predecessors did; furthermore it is assumed that each group confronts that majority society *alone*, unaffected by the histories, accomplishments, or misfortunes of previous ethnic/racial groups. The experiences of immigrants who previously arrived in the United States, or those of other racially defined minorities, are not considered relevant in the Glazer/Moynihan model. The achievement of mobility—the group-status dependent variable—reflects group willingness and ability to accept presumptive white norms and values. The “difference” that characterizes a racialized “ethnic group,” once that group is incorporated, will be outweighed by the “commonality” it shares with whites.

In other words, something akin to Milton Gordon’s notion of “structural assimilation” (1964, 70) is assumed to take place as immigrant groups pass beyond their “fresh off the boat” status and gain the acceptance of whites. Yet this assumption is quite unwarranted with respect to people of color, whose distance from the normalized whiteness valorized by the model has generally not been appreciably lessened by adoption of the dominant (white) norms and values of American society, something that actually occurs quite a lot, though obviously unevenly. A large literature on discrimination bears this out: Returns to education are not equivalent across racial lines, for example; employment levels and wage rates vary considerably even when we control for everything but race; the same may be said for access to credit, access to equivalent housing, and numerous other patterns of discrimination.

The entire model for comparing and evaluating the success of ethnic groups—in achieving higher status or in being incorporated into normalized white society—is thus limited by an unwillingness to consider whether there might be any *special circumstances* which racially defined minorities encounter in the United States,

circumstances which definitively distinguish their experiences from those of earlier European immigrants, and make the injunction to “pull yourselves up by your own bootstraps” impossible to fulfill.

In addition, the “bootstraps” model is *dated*. The trend toward a “majority-minority” demographic is advancing in the United States. In other words, a situation is emerging in which no single racially defined group, including those considered white, will be a majority in the country. This inexorable transition casts the assimilationist premises of the “bootstraps” model, as well as the immigrant analogy, into considerable doubt. In practical terms, there is no longer a clear-cut set of “common circumstances” into which a given ethnic group can possibly blend its cultural values and norms. Race *exceeds* ethnicity in many respects, as it has done for centuries: Black immigrants from the Caribbean or Africa, for example, blend into U.S. blackness, perhaps retaining some cultural (that is, ethnic) differences, but unable and maybe unwilling to escape the all-inclusive framework of race (Waters 2000). Recent work on Mexican Americans suggests that broadly similar processes of racialization are operating in respect to that community as well (Telles and Ortiz 2009).

*“They All Look Alike”*: In what sense can groups of color be considered in ethnic group terms? In what sense is the category “black,” for example, equivalent to the categories “Irish” or “Jewish”? “Blacks” in ethnic terms are as diverse as “whites.” Latin@s as well, Asian Americans and Native Americans too. Since ethnicity theory focuses on cultural identity and difference, its practitioners should go much deeper than they generally do. How might ethnicity theory address the range of subgroupings represented in the U.S. black community? What distinctions might it employ? Haitians? Jamaicans? Francophones? Georgians? Northern/southern? The black community has been intensively studied from an ethnographic standpoint, so there is no lack of materials for analysis.<sup>45</sup> Latin@ communities vary as well: by language, religion, place of origin; for example, in the United States there are substantial communities of indigenous people of Mexican origin whose first (and sometimes only) language is not Spanish but Maya, Mixtec, or Nahuatl (Fox and Rivera-Salgado, eds. 2004). Large numbers of Latin@s are phenotypically black, *Afro-descendientes*, while many others are visually indistinguishable from North American whites (Montalvo and Codina 2001; Rodriguez 2000).

Ethnicity theory has not delved to any significant extent into the meaning of these distinctions. There is a racist element in this substitution—in which whites are seen as variegated in terms of group identities, but blacks, Latin@s, Native Americans, and Asian Americans “all look alike.” In our view, this is the effect of the application of a paradigm based in white ethnic history to a variety of racially defined groups. Indeed, in sharp contrast to the lack of interest among ethnicity theorists (and their neoconservative successors) in this issue of intra-racial distinctions, an important race-studies literature on *panethnicity* has developed over the past few decades. Racial formation always involves “lumping”; racialization proceeds through a combination of centripetal and centrifugal forces. Despite the presence of different cultural



orientations and sometimes long-standing antagonisms—this is the “centrifugal” force—ethnic groups may be pressured into allying and “bridging” because of the common pressures they face: exclusion, discrimination, violence against them; such circumstances constitute “centripetal” forces (Calderón 1992; Espiritu 1993; Jones-Correa and Leal 1996; Okamoto 2006).

*Once is Not Enough:* The ethnicity paradigm was initially developed in reference to an unprecedented and perhaps unique period of U.S. immigration history: the arrival and eventual inclusion of vast waves of Southern and Eastern European immigrants before and after the turn of the 20th century, roughly 1880–1924. Though popularly regarded as a general theory of ethnic group incorporation, the paradigm might simply be characteristic of specific historical circumstances that may never be repeated again.

The dynamics of immigration have shifted dramatically between the turn of the 20th century and the present. The United States now relates to the global South and global East through a master-policy of “accumulation by dispossession.” Displaced and impoverished workers and peasants from Latin America and the Caribbean, as well as from the Pacific Rim, continue to immigrate, their human flow modulated but hardly contained by boom and bust, “bubble” and recession. And the United States has also become more racially predatory domestically, practicing a similar policy of “accumulation by dispossession” at home as well. Consider post-Katrina New Orleans or the subprime housing crisis—to pick just two prominent examples. So is the country less able to integrate immigrants than it was in previous historical periods?

Where will the United States find another “engine of mobility” to parallel that of the late 19th and early 20th centuries, the epoch of mass labor recruitment to the industrial economy? The country’s economic capacity to absorb enormous numbers of immigrants—low-wage workers and their families, and a new globally based (and very female) servant class (Glenn 2002)—without generating the sort of established subaltern groups we associate with the terms “race” and “racism,” seems to us more limited than was the “whitening” of Europeans a century earlier, this argument’s key precedent.

We suggest that the ethnicity paradigm’s use of an “immigrant analogy” in an attempt to make sense of the post-World War II black movement upsurge, was fundamentally flawed. Most criticism to date has focused on the differences between the situations faced by European immigrants c. 1900 and blacks who sought integration post-1945. Perhaps an even more telling critique, however, is political-economic. The integration of the European immigrants *may have been a one-off*. The ethnicity paradigm’s efforts to apply turn-of-the-20th-century accounts of European immigration and integration to the post-World War II United States may thus be a classical case of bad social science: the conception and (highly influential) divulgation of a theory based on little more than a single very limited case study and a good deal of ideological wishful thinking.

In sum, the logic of assimilation, the default to whiteness—whether conscious or unconscious—is an inherent part of ethnicity theories of race (Jung 2009). As U.S. society transitions from the substantial and largely unquestioned white majorities of the past, to an increasingly majority-minority demographic pattern, the normalization of whiteness that has been an assumed constant of ethnicity-based theories of race may be eroding.

Ethnicity-based approaches have lost social scientific coherence as they capitulated to neoconservative political priorities, insisting that in the “post-civil rights” era a new framework of “colorblindness” could replace race-consciousness. We discuss colorblind racial ideology at greater length in subsequent chapters; here it is sufficient to note that far from moving in an egalitarian and inclusive direction, far from achieving the “dream” of extending democracy across the color-line that was the elemental heart of the civil rights and allied movements in the early post-World War II period, American society has in many ways moved in the opposite direction. It has become more segregated and more racially unequal. Because on the most practical level these developments are perfectly visible, they undercut all claims that the significance of race is declining, and deeply undermine the idea of the United States as a colorblind or race-neutral society.

Under these conditions, the default to whiteness has gradually been revealed as the true message of the ethnicity paradigm of racial theory. Being “ethnic” turns out to be about whether and how much an individual or group can assimilate into or hybridize with whiteness. Being “racial” is about how much difference there is between an individual or a group and their white counterparts.

## Notes

1. Max Weber’s early concept of *ethnie* as a form of status, shaped by “honor”—a cultural construct—is frequently applied to racial matters. Weber also recognized racism, notably anti-black racism in the United States. See his remarks on U.S. racial attitudes in Gerth and Mills, eds. 1958, 177, 405–406. Weber’s sensitivity to U.S. racial matters may be attributed, at least in part, to the orientation provided him by W.E.B. Du Bois (Lewis 1993, 225, 277). For critical remarks on Weber’s treatment of race and ethnicity see Banton 2007.
2. The assignment of membership in a given racial group was, of course, problematic in itself. The existence and characteristics of supposed human groups, the boundaries of the groups, the groups’ locations in the “great chain of being,” and so on, were all debated.
3. All these themes had extensive intellectual histories, generally flowing from Enlightenment discussions of race: Linnaean, Kantian. Jefferson’s reflections on such issues as the beauty and smell of black people may be contemplated in his *Notes on the State of Virginia* (Jefferson 1984 [1785]).
4. In fact what became “development theory” had its origins in race-based (and racist) scholarship: in anthropology, sociology, history, and beyond (Vitalis 2010).
5. Although these currents were often at odds with one another, they were all committed to the idea of racial hierarchy, with guess who at the top and bottom? Indeed, a great deal of

inflammatory “theoretical” material appeared on this topic as the biologicistic paradigm consolidated its intellectual hegemony and achieved the status of “common sense” (Grant 1916; Stoddard 1920; Davenport 1972 [1911]). On eugenics, see Chase 1980; Kevles 1998; Spiro 2009.

6. In 1879 the black activist and scholar Martin R. Delaney attacked the early physical anthropology of Africa for its racial bias, with a book entitled *Principia of Ethnology* (Delaney 2009 [1879]). Du Bois’s 1897 essay “The Conservation of Races” attempted a “transvaluation” of the racial hierarchy implicit in eugenics (Du Bois 1995 [1897]). Kelly Miller, Professor of Mathematics at Howard University, reviewed economist Frederick L. Hoffman’s 1897 *Race Traits and Tendencies of the American Negro*, one of the leading eugenics-based works to argue for the innate inferiority of African Americans, using census data to argue that Hoffman’s claims were statistically flawed. See Miller 1897; Stepan and Gilman 1993.
7. Witch-burning—the 250-year (c. 1450–1700) mass assault on women and the mass killings and torture that it involved—remains a sociologically undertheorized territory. Federici’s audacious treatment (2004) is an erudite and crucial intersectional contribution to this necessary work. See also Lerner 1987.
8. The New England Puritans were slaveholders as well, but on a much smaller scale than the southern planters. There were also significant religious differences between the two settler groups.
9. Southern (white) Baptism is the world’s largest Baptist denomination and the second largest U.S. church after Roman Catholicism. Religious adherence remains quite segregated in the United States today. Though various currents jostle within U.S. white Protestantism—some of them “liberal” (center-left) and some of them racially diverse—the majority of the national Protestant congregation is “conservative” (center-right), retains a “born again” theology and strong evangelical dimensions, and is in many ways still southern. Here we have all the basic elements for a politico-religious white racial nationalism: a civil religion (Bellah 2005) largely inclined to the right and still linked with theological, not to mention biological, racism. Witness the racial tensions in contemporary American Protestantism: traditionally white-black, but now augmented by substantial numbers of Latin@ and Asian American congregations as well (Wuthnow 2011).
10. The ethnicity paradigm continues today in sociology and other fields as well under a social psychological banner: “ethnicity as cognition” (Brubaker, Loveman, and Stamatov 2004).
11. This relatively innocuous notion tends to mask the underlying realities of U.S. imperialism, which was particularly active in the Pacific during the years when the Chicago School sociology of race was developing. Park’s notion of an American “racial frontier” also gestures in this direction. As the early Chicago work was being carried out, U.S. troops were still pursuing the brutal subjugation of the Philippines, a war that was explicitly presented as a racial project (Kramer 2006). Hawai’i’s annexation was still relatively recent, increasing Japanese power in the region was becoming a concern in Washington, and U.S. competition with various European powers for “spheres of influence” in China was well underway. In general, immigration—the matter of persons travelling *into one’s country*—should be seen as producing only one-half of the issue known as “race contact”; the other half is produced by imperial travel *out from one’s country*, notably in projects of settlement and conquest.
12. A little-remembered feature of Washington’s famous Atlanta Exposition speech of 1895 was its anti-immigrant message. His plea to white elites was that they prefer blacks over

- immigrants in their industrial employment practices and thus open the door to inclusion (Washington 2010 [1895]). That's what "Cast down your buckets where you are" is all about.
13. Here too Du Bois preceded the Chicago sociologists. Du Bois had been a student at Harvard of William James, one of the founding fathers of pragmatist philosophy.
  14. Johnson was hired by Park to investigate the 1919 race riot in Chicago, probably the worst of that "Red Summer's" series of attacks by white mobs on black communities.
  15. Roosevelt sought to mediate between his friend Madison Grant's biologicistic (and in some ways proto-fascist) Aryanism, on the one hand, and the radical potentialities he saw in mass movements of immigrants on the other. Hence TR urged deliberate "Americanization" programs through schooling and other public policies, and embraced the "melting pot." Roosevelt's anti-black racism was mild, far less than that of his fellow progressive Woodrow Wilson, who was still fighting the Civil War as the Virginia confederate he had been in his youth. Wilson not only celebrated the film *Birth of a Nation* in 1915, but the following year ran for reelection on a nativist platform, calling for restrictions on immigration and explicitly red-baiting immigrant groups and organizations. For Wilson too, only immigrants who adapted to "true American" cultural norms could be accepted.
  16. Kallen was a lifelong advocate of Jewish causes and a strong early Zionist. One of the founders of the New School for Social Research, he was also close friends with Alain Locke, whom he knew from Harvard and later worked with in New York. The origins of the term "cultural pluralism," and Kallen's own beginnings with the idea, are linked to Jewish student struggles for recognition around the turn of the 20th century (Greene 2011). Despite his celebration of what we today would call "diversity" and his apparent lack of personal racism, Kallen never addressed African-American issues or took a pro-civil rights stand. "Kallen's 'symphony of civilizations,' despite its apparent inclusiveness, excluded people of color—African Americans, Latinos, Asian Americans, and Native Americans," writes Gerald Meyer (2012).
  17. At the American Museum of Natural History Boas had to combat the eugenicism of Madison Grant and the elite racism of Henry Fairfield Osborn, the paleontologist who became the Museum's President and chief primatologist (Haraway 1990). For a history of race in American anthropology, see Baker 1998.
  18. Achieving whiteness serves as the desirable end-state of immigration, as it did for Park's cycle. This "default" operates in cultural pluralism accounts as well; there the desirable end-state is white recognition and tolerance for the former "others"; multiculturalism and diversity programs work in this direction as well. See Jung 2009.
  19. The racial orientation of the New Deal was contradictory at best. FDR's coalition included both northern liberals and southern Dixiecrats. Roosevelt sought to accommodate both groups. He placated the South (and other racist allies) by excluding blacks from Social Security and the Wagner Act in 1935, exempting domestic and agricultural workers from labor regulation, resisting anti-lynching law proposals, and limiting the scope of welfare. He also maintained restrictive and racist immigration controls. Roosevelt gestured toward racial liberals by taking small steps toward integration, particularly as the war approached: most notably, he integrated defense industries by executive order, a move prompted by threats of black protest led by trade unionist A. Philip Randolph. As industrial employment and the demand for black and brown labor increased in the North and West, a combination of demographic shifts, unionization of blacks and Latinos in the CIO,

women's entry into industrial work, and linked voting shifts outside the South, deepened the Democratic Party's racial divisions. See Katnelson 2013; Klinkner and Smith 2002; Sitkoff 1978; Vargas 2007; Weiss 1983.

20. In the United States, World War II was anti-racist on the Atlantic front but decidedly racist on the Pacific front. See our discussion of Myrdal's *An American Dilemma*, below.
21. Unless otherwise stated, we use the term "liberal" here in the colloquial U.S. sense, meaning "center-left."
22. The Magnuson Act was a complex business. On the one hand, it recognized China as an ally in the anti-Japanese war; refocusing anti-Asian racism away from Chinese and more intensely onto Japanese and Japanese Americans. In no way, however, did it relax the anti-Asian Johnson-Reed immigration law, which had been in effect since 1924 and allowed only 105 Chinese immigrants to enter the country per year. Asian exclusion was not reduced until the passage of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965 (Hart-Celler). See Ngai 2005. Notably, numerous states (including California) maintained anti-miscegenation laws that prohibited Asians from marrying whites. Some of these laws were repealed or struck down in the late 1940s; some lasted until the U.S. Supreme Court struck down all anti-miscegenation laws in *Loving v. Virginia* (1967). See Spiro 2009.
23. Kikuchi had been a student at Berkeley—he was expelled in 1942 and was subsequently interned under EO 9066 (Briones 2013).
24. On these heroic figures, see Hirabayashi 1999.
25. The U.S. Congress passed, and President Ronald Reagan signed, the Civil Liberties Act of 1988, which stated that Executive Order 9066 was "unjust and motivated by racism rather than real military necessity." A second apology and further reparations were issued in 1992. For a good general account see Weglyn 1996 (1976).
26. The study has a monumental history of its own. See Stanfield 1985; Southern 1987; Jackson 1990. Black reaction to the Myrdal volume varied significantly. E. Franklin Frazier heaped praise upon the work. Myrdal, he wrote, "revealed a remarkable facility for getting the feel of the racial situation in the United States. His objectivity was apparent from the very beginning in his relations with Negroes. They were simply people to him" (Frazier 1945, 557). Ralph Ellison's review—written in 1944 but not published until 1964 in Ellison's *Shadow and Act*—was deeply critical: "It does not occur to Myrdal," Ellison writes, "that many of the Negro cultural manifestations which he considers merely reflective might also embody a *rejection* of what he considers 'higher values.'" Du Bois had been largely excluded from the project due to his radicalism; he was properly offended. The study's collaborators included, among many others, Arnold Rose and Richard Sterner (Myrdal's secondary authors), Ralph Bunche (Myrdal's principal associate and guide), Doxey Wilkerson, Sterling A. Brown, St. Clair Drake, E. Franklin Frazier, Melville J. Herskovits, Otto Klineberg, Edward Shils, and Louis Wirth. Consultants acknowledged were W.E.B. Du Bois, Horace Cayton, Robert E. Park, W.I. Thomas, Hortense Powdermaker, John Dollard, Alain Locke, Walter White, Abram L. Harris, and Ruth Benedict.
27. The Myrdal book was explicitly about "the Negro problem"; Myrdal only discussed blacks and whites; he had nothing to say about other racialized groups.
28. Myrdal's theory of "cumulative and circular development" appeared in an early form in *An American Dilemma* (1962 [1944]), 1065–1070. It was developed further in later writings on global inequality (Myrdal 1963) and as an economic analysis oriented toward progressive

redistribution of resources. Explicitly pragmatist, this account is counterposed to “vicious circle” explanations of racism (“prejudice”) and poverty. Though primarily crafted to urge intervention against inequality, the theory also seeks to explain the breakdown of political systems based on unstable equilibria, and the reiterative dynamics of struggles against them.

29. See Myrdal 927ff. Frazier remained both a radical and a committed assimilationist:  
 Since the institutions, the social stratification, and the culture of the Negro community are essentially the same as those of the larger community, it is not strange that the Negro minority belongs among the assimilationist rather than the pluralist, secessionist, or militant minorities. It is seldom that one finds Negroes who think of themselves as possessing a different culture from whites and that their culture should be preserved. (Frazier 1957a, 681)  
 His position derived from an insistence on political engagement with the questions of race and racism, which he traced back to Du Bois. See Platt 1991.
30. The papers were published under MacIver’s editorship in 1949.
31. Robert Merton, personal communication.
32. Portions of this section appeared in different form in Winant 2007.
33. For additional commentary see Kryder 2001; for a valuable fictionalized account, see Killens 1983 (1963).
34. This essay, “Prejudice: A Problem in Psychological and Social Causation,” is an early version of Allport’s *The Nature of Prejudice* (1979 [1954]), a work that was to have a significant impact in social psychology.
35. *The Negro American* (1967) was initially a two-issue collection published in the journal *Daedalus*. It later went through several book-length editions. References here are to the 1967 Beacon edition. The contrast between the perspectives of black and white contributors to the book is quite notable. Clark’s introduction to the volume, *The Dilemma of Power*, and John Hope Franklin’s essay in the volume, *The Two Worlds of Race*, are standouts. Other critical black voices included are those of Martin Kilson, St. Clair Drake, and Whitney Young. Only Young, Director of the National Urban League, takes a “moderate” position.
36. Du Bois had never hesitated to make this connection, and had particularly emphasized it in *Black Reconstruction* (2007 [1935]).
37. The scandalous McCarthyite harassment (and at one point, indictment) of the octogenarian Du Bois in the 1950s occurred without notable protest from within the field. FBI surveillance extended to such mainstream figures as Samuel Stouffer, Herbert Blumer, Robert Bellah, Robert and Helen Lynd, E. Franklin Frazier, Alfred McClung Lee, and, of course, C. Wright Mills. Some leading sociologists, we know, cooperated with witch-hunters, most notably Pitirim Sorokin; but most remained cautious, at least through the late 1940s and 1950s (Lipset 1994; Keen 1999). Mass dismissals did occur on occasion and surveillance was very widespread (Slaughter 1980). Particular attention was being paid to area studies: notably Russia and China, but also to the insurgent “third world” (Simpson, ed., 1999; for parallels in anthropology, see Price 2004). A striking aspect of a great deal of this late 1940s–1950s academic repression and red-baiting was how much of it related to race. A major signal to the FBI, HUAC, and other similar agencies that a given scholar or teacher was ripe for purging, or at least needed watching, was that he or she participated in anti-racist activities or attended mixed-race events. A certain cold-war orthodoxy was



- mandatory; this in itself resulted in a muting of sociological criticism of U.S. racism. For larger treatments of the links between the Cold War and the civil rights movement, see Kelley 2008 (1999); Borstelmann 2003; Dudziak 2011.
38. The battles of the McCarthy period lamentably engulfed the black movement as well, as W.E.B. Du Bois, Paul Robeson, and others were denounced as pariah figures, and racial “moderates” strove to distance themselves from them.
39. In a later edited work, Glazer and Moynihan (1975) did try to address the comparative sociology of race (in their framework, “ethnicity”). By this time, structural-functionalist approaches to race were effectively dead, though. Neoconservatism was emerging as the inheritor of both Parsons and Myrdal.
40. A partial exception here was the very controversial 1965 “Moynihan Report,” formally titled “The Negro Family: The Case For National Action,” and prepared by then-Assistant Secretary of Labor Daniel Patrick Moynihan (Rainwater and Yancey, eds. 1967). Moynihan provided a stilted reading of an important study by E. Franklin Frazier to argue that female-dominated black families did not adequately socialize young black men to the work ethic, leading to high rates of black male unemployment and crime. The source of this problem was traced to slavery’s assault on the black family. Although appropriately attacked on numerous grounds—for misreading Frazier, for misunderstanding the strength of black family ties under and after slavery (Gutman 1976; see also Wilson 2009b), for “blaming the victim,” for gender bias, and for neglecting larger social structures of racism, the report was at its core a proper liberal document, urging the Johnson administration to focus energy and attention on job-creation and job-training in the ghetto.
41. In fact it is striking how little attention ethnicity-based theories of race have devoted to the American Indian. See Rogin 1996; Drinnon 1997.
42. Still later, writing in retirement, Glazer (1997) provided some self-criticism of his own earlier racial views.
43. Not the “majority.” In many areas of the country, whites are no longer the majority. Even if the local or regional population is not majority white, however, conformity with white norms is still understood as a prerequisite for assimilation under the colorblind standards of neoconservatism, the contemporary form of the ethnicity-based theory of race. For this reason we refer here to “normalized” white society, rather than uncritically adopting the white majority/nonwhite minority framework.
44. Probably the most straightforward application of this set of assumptions is Sowell 1995. Sowell treats racial/ethnic groups as equivalent and internally homogeneous; in a largely decontextualized fashion. He equates the cultural norms attributed to various groups with their access (or lack of access) to “human capital,” seen as the key to well-being and prosperity. Though Sowell’s treatment of these issues is quite shallow, he is far from alone in his insistence on the “bootstraps model.”
45. See among a welter of possible sources, Clark 1965; Stack 1974; Gwaltney 1980; Kasinitz 1992; Gregory 1998; Bobo et al., eds. 2002.

This page intentionally left blank

## Class

## Introduction

The class paradigm of race includes those approaches which, in Stuart Hall's characterization, argue that "Social divisions which assume a distinctively racial or ethnic character can be attributed or explained principally by reference to economic structures and processes" (Hall 1980, 306). The class paradigm of race includes schools of thought running from right to left, but they all afford primacy to economic relationships: market exchange, distribution, production. A central objective of this chapter is to review and critique class-based theories of race.

Our adoption of Hall's formulation truly opens up a Pandora's box. To equate his "economic structures and processes" with class, whether understood in the Marxian sense of relationship to the means of production, or in the Weberian sense of relationship to the mode of distribution (giving rise to particular "life chances"), is to make a certain analytic leap (Gerth and Mills 1958, 181–183). Indeed there is a significant economic literature on race, exemplified by the "neoclassical" approach of Nobel laureate Gary Becker and many other Chicago economists, that does not recognize the existence of classes at all, but confines itself narrowly to market relationships. This view overlaps with the paleoeconomic "Austrian"<sup>1</sup> perspective of Hayek, Friedman<sup>2</sup> et al., also tied to Chicago, that has informed the anti-statism of neoliberalism.

How, then, do we define the class paradigm of race, and how can the variety of approaches which emphasize "economic structures and processes" in their analyses of racial phenomena be categorized, linked, and compared?<sup>3</sup> Once we recognize that class theories principally explain race by reference to economic processes, understood in the standard sense of the production, exchange, and consumption of commodities, that brings inequality to the table. Once we are dealing with any sort of inequality—unequal exchange, unequal allocation of resources, exploitation in labor, or equivalent relationships—we have a "class" system, although particular analysts might prefer not to use this designation. Therefore, in the broad terms we have employed to describe the paradigm, these are class theories, even if the authors assume the existence of a totally free market (Becker's starting point is international trade!). Such "institutional" economists as Joseph Stiglitz, Paul Krugman, and Jeffrey Sachs clearly recognize this (Stiglitz 2001 [1944]; Krugman 2008).

This is how the class paradigm of race is constituted, in the broadest possible sense. We suggest that there are three general approaches to racial formation contained within it. We designate these as the market, stratification, and class conflict approaches. These

three approaches ground themselves in the different economic spheres: in exchange relationships (markets), in systems of distribution (stratification), and in conflict over production processes (in Marxist terms, conflict over the “social relations of production”), to provide their respective frameworks of analysis.

In this chapter we review and critique class-based theories of race, moving through the class paradigm’s varieties: market-, stratification-, and production/labor-based accounts. These roughly correspond to a right-to-left political spectrum: neoliberal theories (“Austrian,” Chicago-based) emphasize the significance of exchange relationships and market-based approaches in explaining racial inequality; Marxism-based theories focus more on the role of production relationships and labor in shaping race; while U.S. “liberals”—mostly located on the center-left—focus on stratification/inequality-based accounts of race that emphasize distribution and the role of the state.

But this is only a rough correspondence. A number of civil rights organizations are oriented to markets, for example, the PUSH organization and the Urban League. These groups and parallel organizations in Latin@ communities represent the substantial black and brown business sectors and their markets, the professional and “striving” sectors, and even some of the “coping stratum” (Kilson and Cottingham 1991) of blacks and Latin@s today. On the Marxist left today (and throughout the left’s history), there have been “colorblind” currents that seek to minimize or even ignore racial inequality, instead focusing their attention entirely (or nearly entirely) on class. Across the ideological spectrum from right to left there are peculiar overlaps and concurrences about the relationship between race and class. Eliminating or minimizing the significance of race is a feature of the *laissez-faire* positions associated with neoliberalism and Chicago economics. This idea is also associated with “colorblind” racial ideology and was featured in some pioneering civil rights movement positions. Class-based theories of race, in short, traverse the political spectrum.

## The Market Relations Approach

Market relations approaches deal with the social *exchange* of resources such as labor and credit. Racial inequality—like all forms of inequality—is anomalous in market settings. In the 1950s and 1960s, debates around the nature of racial inequality in the United States revealed some glaring problems in market-based economic models: They lacked the capacity to explain racial discrimination as a market phenomenon. Indeed, the predominant economic model of the time, neoclassical theory, suggested that the market itself, unhampered by an interventionist state, would eliminate racial discrimination. Writers such as Milton Friedman argued that this was in fact taking place (Friedman 2002 [1962], 108–110).

A more accurate account would note that race was simply outside the awareness of the economics field. As elsewhere, racial inequality was an assumed condition, beneath the interest of economic explanation. To cite but one (prominent) example:

In his extremely well-known article, “Economic Development with Unlimited Supplies of Labor” (1954, 139–191), W. Arthur Lewis did not emphasize the means by which these unlimited supplies became available.<sup>4</sup> The discovery of the problem of racial discrimination came later; economics, which had largely seen inequality as eternal and natural where race was concerned, was finally troubled by the civil rights movement, but only in the 1960s.

The field was challenged by the upheavals of the postwar civil rights struggle, but civil rights introduced political variables that could not be accommodated within the “neoclassical” model. Three sources of market disequilibrium, potentially capable of generating racial inequality, were proposed: an irrational prejudice or “taste for discrimination”; monopolistic practices, which grant “privileges” or “special benefits” to strategically placed groups, and hence create various interests and incentives for maintaining (or transforming) racial inequality; and disruptive state practices which interfere with the supposed equilibrating tendencies of the market (Becker 1971 [1957]; Williams 1982).

Focus on each of these three destabilizing forces generated three different (but related) accounts of the social dynamics of race. Note that all these accounts introduce a non-economic independent variable, which they argue disrupts the “normal” equilibrium of the market.

The *irrational prejudice model* attributes inequality to a white “taste for discrimination,” essentially a sociocultural variable. In the socially disembedded economy presumed by neoclassical economics, discrimination would be irrational and costly to its practitioners. Therefore this model suggests that a society segregated into black and white sectors, linked as “trading partners” but separated by white “distaste” for blacks,<sup>5</sup> will be gradually integrated by market pressures. This was the analysis offered by (Nobel laureate) Gary Becker (1971 [1957]; see also Friedman 2002 [1962]). Perhaps the most “liberally” inclined Chicago-school economics don, Becker further amended his markets-only orientation in the 1971 revision of his book, to suggest that this “natural” overcoming of the “taste” will occur only if countervailing irrationalities can be tamed by limited and judicious state interventionism. Becker’s model thus includes a place for the state to intervene usefully—though still on the side of re-equilibrating markets, of course. This puts him on the “left” side of market-based approaches to race.<sup>6</sup>

The *monopolistic practices model* suggests a society structured in the interests of all whites, who gain through a systematic transfer of resources from nonwhites in a wide variety of fields. Whites, for example, can receive wages above the marginal utility rate for their labor and benefit from discriminatory pricing practices. Whites become de facto *rentiers* (landlords) who derive benefits from their ownership or control of resources: access to jobs, business licenses, union cards, and the like. Whiteness is itself a resource: there is a white monopoly or “cartel” that operates comprehensively across U.S. society, as much locally as nationally. It imposes inequalities in labor, capital, and consumption goods markets in order to maximize white gain.

Competition over scarce resources motivates whites to act in exclusionary or discriminatory ways (i.e., monopolistically) toward people of color. This combines with such extra-economic resources as the authorized use of violence (racial harassment and profiling; state-based violence via policing, courts, prison) to place obstacles between people of color and access to a “free” market. All forms of exchange are involved: Access to food, housing, and basic services, for example, is truncated; what is available is elevated in price (“the poor pay more,” and poverty is more prevalent among people of color). This amounts to a “race tax” that directs benefits to whites: for example, higher rents collected by white landlords, or steeper credit terms of mortgage rates offered to blacks or Latin@s, or real estate “steering.”<sup>7</sup> Furthermore, the stresses and vulnerabilities associated with these practices—fear of public officials or police, anticipation of profiling or stereotype threat, pressure to “act white” (Steele 2010; Carbado and Gulati 2013)—also impose costs. According to this model various racial inequalities—even seeming political or cultural conflicts about affirmative action, profiling, or racial disparities in sentencing practices—can be explained by reference to imputed monopolistic market-based interests.<sup>8</sup>

In the *disruptive state interventionism* model, class/racial inequality is generated by state action on behalf of some racially defined group. There are several different versions of this account, each with its own ideological baggage. A *laissez-faire*, free market account accuses state policies such as minimum wage laws, labor laws, licensing procedures in labor-intensive trades (barbering, taxi-driving, trucking), and importantly, affirmative action, of disrupting market equilibrium and depriving people of the opportunity to compete fairly (Williams 1982; see also Katznelson 2005).<sup>9</sup> Such policies are to distort the market—here the labor market—on behalf of powerful political actors. Historically, they developed to assist whites in insulating their jobs from nonwhite competition; today in the form of affirmative action, they operate to assist nonwhites. In this account, people of color and capital share an interest in free market economics, which the state and white workers act to obstruct. Partially overlapping with this is the “split labor-market” account, a neo-Marxist position that also emphasizes the actions of “dominant” (white) workers in protecting their jobs and wages from “subordinate” (nonwhite) workers’ competition. We discuss this below in the section about class conflict-based class theories of race.

Historically, struggles over control of labor, as well as over taxes, property rights, and other principally economic matters—“political class struggle”—developed as industrial capitalism took hold in the United States. In this country—perhaps above all others—these conflicts were racially inflected. Before the Civil War, there was only a nascent working class in the strict sense of the term; white men were yeomen in the rural areas and artisans in the towns; work for wages emerged out of contract labor. Workshops and sweatshops appeared in the 1820s in New England, New York, and elsewhere (Dawley 2000 [1975]; Wilentz 2004 [1984]). There was a large number of enslaved black laborers, and (from the 1840s on) a semi-racialized group of impoverished and barely integrated immigrants, the Irish. “Native” white workers had been



mobilized in the 1840s and 1850s against the Irish. After emancipation, both they and the (now-integrated) Irish feared competition from cheap black labor. In the West, Asian immigrants played the same threatening role. By the end of Reconstruction in 1877, each of these potentially explosive conflicts had been contained by a combination of state action and state-sanctioned political violence.

In the United States, the state has always regulated capitalist development by means of race-based law and racial policy-making. This has been evident in labor law, but operates in other spheres as well. For example, many previously marginalized Irish immigrants had fought in the Civil War,<sup>10</sup> obtaining citizenship and state recognition as a result. New York, Philadelphia, and Boston, among other cities, incorporated them into the Democratic Party machine politics of the period, directing city jobs their way and harvesting their votes in return (Katznelson 2005; Roediger 2005). Efforts to regulate labor conditions, form trade unions, and discipline capital were struck down by the Supreme Court—for example, in the *Lochner* case (U.S. Supreme Court 1905)—based on due-process arguments grounded in the 14th amendment, which had been designed to protect emancipated slaves' citizenship rights. Anti-Chinese riots on the West Coast in 1877 were quickly translated into state policy: The Chinese Exclusion Act was signed in 1882<sup>11</sup> and the California Chinese were driven out of hundreds of cities and towns by armed mobs, often led by police and state officials with torches and pitchforks ready to hand (Pfaelzer 2008). Exclusionist policies vis-à-vis Asian labor were soon firmly in place. After the *Plessy* decision in 1896 (and in many ways before), Jim Crow was institutionalized as state racial policy, severely curtailing black labor's competitive threat to whites (and also holding down white wages). In the South after Reconstruction's end in 1877, convict leasing was institutionalized by the state as a form of peonage on farms and in factories (Blackmon 2009).

Market exchange theories of race necessarily try to reconcile racial inequality with the equilibrium assumptions of their model, but as we show here, this is not really possible. In market theories, discrimination is irrational because it increases labor costs, so it should be driven out of the market by the force of competition itself. Its persistence can only be explained, therefore, by the extra-economic dimensions of racial formation: notably coercion and state action. Market approaches conceive of racial phenomena rather monolithically in terms of (in)equality and discrimination in exchange. Racial interests are either cast in these terms or assumed to be irrational.

Certain elements of the market-based approach overlap with views deriving from other paradigms. For example, the disruptive state interventionism model agrees with "colorblind" theories that racial policies should be guided by principles of individualism, and opposes demands for "equality of result." In similar fashion, the monopolistic practices model shares certain elements with nation-based analyses of race, especially those that stress the operation of "white privilege" or of a "colonial labor principle" which allocates rights and resources differentially to groups on the basis of race. There are innumerable theoretical coincidences, along with patterns of

agreement and influence, in the vast literature on race. These resemblances, however, should not be mistaken for theoretical accord. Market-based theories (which are class-oriented, economic theories) are based on quite different perceptions of what race means than are ethnicity- or nation-based approaches.

## Stratification Theory

Stratification approaches deal with the social *distribution* of resources—chiefly though not exclusively economic ones. Individuals receiving roughly equal incomes, or partaking of equal quantities of wealth, are deemed to have similar “life chances” and located in similar positions in the ranked hierarchy of classes.<sup>12</sup> Varying degrees of social mobility are postulated among the ranks of a racial hierarchy and numerous non-economic factors are seen as shaping the stratification system’s maintenance and modification over time. Social networks, informal ties, elite recruitment, caste-like barriers or other forms of extra-market means of allocation of resources, often play a role here.

Politics are also a crucial factor. In stratification theory the relationships of elites and masses, the dynamics of authority systems and forms of domination, and the overall shape of sociopolitical conflict are central preoccupations. In most respects these extra-economic factors reinforce the distribution dynamic. Patterns of elite rule, for example, are frequently traced back to the distribution of economic resources.

Especially since the civil rights movement challenged the racial inequality that had been taken for granted (especially by whites) throughout U.S. history, there has been unending debate on the dynamics of racial stratification. What accounts for its persistence and depth? In what ways does it parallel and in what ways does it diverge from class stratification? There is no real dispute on its extent and depth: In a deeply unequal society, whose class-based disparities in wealth and income distribution greatly exceed all other countries at equivalent levels of “development”—Western Europe, Japan, Canada, Australia—inequalities along racial lines are far greater still. Whatever variable one chooses: wealth/income (in)equality, health outcomes, access to/returns to education, segregation by residence or occupation, rates of surveillance or punishment by the criminal “justice” system, or many other indicators that compare racial “life-chances,” one finds strikingly persistent patterns. Black unemployment and poverty are consistently double that of whites (and increase greatly if we factor in incarceration). Median black wealth now stands at about 5 percent of white wealth, an appalling statistic. Disparities between whites and Latin@s, whites and Native Americans, and whites and some (not all) Asian American groups also remain very deep.<sup>13</sup>

Almost all the discussion of racial stratification is framed along the *race versus class* divide, although serious efforts have been made in sociology to synthesize the two axes of inequality in various theories of “eth-classes”; these run all the way from Milton Gordon’s assimilation-oriented account (1964) to James Geschwender’s

neo-Marxist one (1977). There is a profound tendency to reify these two dimensions of inequality, which makes synthesis difficult social scientifically.

In experiential terms, of course, inequality is not differentiated by race or class. Impoverishment is concretely about suffering, whether it derives from race-based discrimination or class-based unemployment or superexploitation, or as is more likely, from a combination of the two. We consider all stratification-based accounts to be located within the class paradigm of race, because they all seek to explain measurable differences in “life-chances” by race. Here we compare two leading currents: class-based accounts, represented by the extensive work of William J. Wilson on this subject; versus race-based accounts, as embodied by the equally large body of work on this theme by Douglas S. Massey. These distinguished researchers’ positions define the parameters of the stratification approach and encompass much, if not all, of the key work on racial inequality in the contemporary United States.

William J. Wilson made his foundational statement with *The Declining Significance of Race* (2012 [1978]), which he then followed up with *The Truly Disadvantaged* (2012 [1987]). His earlier work on race, *Power, Racism, and Privilege*, had been political sociological and comparative, with the United States and South Africa serving as his principal cases (Wilson 1973).<sup>14</sup> But *Declining Significance* shifted the focus in the later 1970s toward a center-left class analysis, and set the stage for Wilson’s entire later *oeuvre*. The book addressed problems of racial inequality in the context of deindustrialization, as well as interpreting emerging class cleavages within the black community as functions of limited but real civil rights era reforms. Wilson accepted an economically determined theory of race-based stratification for previous epochs of U.S. history (an “economic system,” he wrote, shaped the “polity” and thereby structured and enforced “racial norms”). He argued, however, that the civil rights reforms of the 1960s had allowed the state to develop “autonomy” in handling racial problems (2012 [1978], 17). According to Wilson, although black life-chances were formerly determined by racial stratification, after 1965 (that is, after the main civil rights reforms) they were shaped directly by class recomposition. After state-enforced racial inequality was eliminated by civil rights legislation, blacks were admitted to the society-wide system of stratification, rather than being confined by segregation and exclusion to limited numbers of jobs. But a mismatch arose in the cities, as manufacturing shrank and the remaining industrial work, as well as administrative labor, moved away. White flight, capital flight, and a widespread lack of both blue-collar and white-collar skills condemned most blacks to an “underclass” stranded in the ghetto. The black community was further stratified as well: A small privileged “class” emerged whose opportunities and status were effectively equivalent to those of whites with similar, high levels of training and skills. While a significant number of blacks obtained what were essentially middle-class jobs—many in the public sector—the massive black “underclass” was relegated to permanent marginality.

Echoing Bayard Rustin’s “From Protest to Politics” (1964), Wilson argued that transracial alliances within the Democratic Party would best be able to combat the

emerging austerity of the 1970s and 1980s, as well as to confront the developing racial reaction of the Republicans. By the time Wilson's book first appeared (1978), however, that reactionary trend had been underway for a decade at least. Nixon's "southern strategy" had driven a racial wedge into U.S. class politics, deepening political divisions that had long histories: white workers who had previously flirted with George Wallace and would soon become known as "Reagan democrats" were resonating with the Republicans' code words of "law and order" and anti-welfarism. They were not inclined to make common cause with inner-city blacks. Wilson's call for state policies that would counteract deepening class cleavages in the black community fell on deaf ears in the Democratic Party. For instance his support for an expansion of day care services available to low-income single mothers (Wilson 1980, 161) went nowhere. Cowed by Republican arguments against more state "giveaways" to be funded by hard working (i.e., white) people's tax dollars, destined for black "welfare queens," whose children's fathers were probably in jail or ought to be (Edsall and Edsall 1992; Hancock 2004), Democrats barely defended welfare rights or even civil rights after the advent of Reagan.

Leaving aside Wilson's framework of a 1960s shift from race-based to class-based explanations of black inequality (Pettigrew 1980; Steinberg 2001), other serious questions remain about *Declining Significance*. Wilson argued that since the mid-1960s a genuinely egalitarian racial state had existed in the United States, and that support for its policies was now a permanent feature of U.S. politics. If the turn to the right that began under "Nixonland" did not undermine this idea, later developments—such as Bill Clinton's 1996 "welfare reform"—did not reinforce Wilson's benign view of state racial policy either.<sup>15</sup>

Wilson's argument that the contemporary black community was now stratified into a relatively small privileged class and a large black "underclass" implied that race was no longer a salient linkage between those who have "made it" and their less fortunate "underclass" counterparts. While that position may have appeared plausible at the time, today the condition of the black middle class seems more fragile, not less, as job losses in the public sector have accelerated and the already huge chasms of income and wealth distribution have deepened enormously (Oliver and Shapiro 2006; Woldoff and Ovadia 2009; Rugh and Massey 2010; Squires and Hyra 2010; McKernan et al. 2011; Taylor et al. 2012). The distribution of wealth remains tied to race in increasingly brutal ways.

Wilson's empirical findings are not really in dispute. It is his conceptual framework that has attracted opposition: the notion that class divides have superseded racial ones within the black community. In more recent books and articles, Wilson has focused on what happens "when work disappears" (1997). A tremendous amount of literature has documented urban poverty and explored the conditions of the urban poor in the aftermath of deindustrialization (Edin and Lein 1997; Brown 1999; Duneier 2000; Newman 2000; Anderson 2009; Conley 2009). Even before the massive job losses and regressive redistributions of wealth that accompanied the Great

Recession after 2008, black (and brown) positions in the U.S. stratification system were shaky, both for middle- and lower-strata households. As middle-class, “coping stratum” teachers, postal workers, and other public-sector workers faced cutbacks, low- and semi-skilled workers in the private sector were decimated by outsourcing. The educational and job opportunities available to middle-class blacks are located disproportionately in the public sector. These positions were largely created as a result of civil rights reforms as well as other 1960s shifts to more inclusive social policies and redistributive measures.<sup>16</sup> Furthermore, many middle-class blacks work in industries and economic sectors whose economic and political *raison d’être* is linked to those masses. Government workers, educators, and other tertiary sector workers, for example, may have achieved middle-class status and incomes, but their employment relates directly to the management, marketing, and servicing of the black community as a whole.<sup>17</sup> In addition, the repressive state apparatus (to borrow Althusser’s phrase) employs millions of people of color, mainly with the purpose of controlling or brutalizing other people of color. Lots of whites are employed in this work too, of course; we’re talking about the police, prison guards, and the armed forces, together with their huge infrastructural and logistical bases.<sup>18</sup>

Black personal, familial, and community ties, not class-based ones, continue to connect the middle-class (or formerly middle-class) and lower-class strata, though Wilson’s claims about deepening stratification within the black community remain accurate. Feeble attempts on the part of a few neoconservative black intellectuals to rally better-off blacks to the conservative banner have not availed.<sup>19</sup> Forty years of neoliberalism, first appearing during the Nixon years and then continuing largely unchecked—though mildly impeded by Carter, Clinton, and Obama—until the onset of the Great Recession in 2008, have massively eroded whatever evidence existed for black upward mobility. Ongoing assaults on the welfare state (by Democrats as well as Republicans), underfunding of public education, and restriction of health and social security benefits as well have proven detrimental, not only to the black “underclass,” but to middle-class blacks as well.<sup>20</sup>

In a recent book, *More Than Just Race* (2009a), Wilson has largely abandoned his agenda of a cross-class alliance against poverty, no doubt because of the deep political polarization that now shapes U.S. debates about such matters as redistribution and public investment. Written before the election of Obama, the book renews and deepens Wilson’s long-standing argument that racial inequality (black poverty) is the consequence of deindustrialization and globalization, most notably induced by “impersonal economic forces, which sharply increased joblessness and declining real wages among many poor African Americans in the last several decades” (2009a, 6).

In other words, as Sidney Willhelm (1970) said a generation earlier, “who needs the negro?” In response to these conditions, Wilson argues, poor blacks have adopted a “culture of poverty”: since there are no jobs, drug-dealing and other criminal vocations are the only alternatives for young men—with the very high likelihood of arrest and incarceration. For young women, pregnancy and subsequent dependence on

what remains of the welfare state are all too often the only “careers” imaginable. Wilson explains these conditions as “cultural” adaptations to the harsh “structural” conditions of the ghetto (the “inner city”), explicitly invoking the legacies of Daniel Patrick Moynihan, as well as Oscar Lewis’s “culture of poverty” theories. And, once again, he argues for “race neutral” policies to overcome these dire conditions: Minimum wage jobs programs akin to those of the New Deal, and vocational training efforts as well are about the only recommendations he can envision in the effort to overcome poverty and inequality. And while he recognizes that blacks are the main victims of this dire situation, the relationship between poverty and race seems almost incidental in his account: The global capitalist economy took the jobs away; only a hardheaded social policy aimed at instilling a culture of higher motivation and greater personal responsibility can restore hope in the ghetto.

In contrast to Wilson’s class-based account of the sources of racial inequality, Douglas S. Massey offers a race-based view. Massey grounds his research in demographic and human geography-based approaches to race. Although his work has focused extensively on segregation and anti-black racism, his career’s main thematic emphasis has been on migration, particularly Mexican immigration to the United States. Massey’s book *American Apartheid* (co-authored with Nancy A. Denton 1993) was written as a fairly direct response to Wilson’s *The Truly Disadvantaged*. This was a breakthrough work on the subject of residential segregation, addressing both its structure and consequences. Segregation was measured empirically, using dissimilarity indices that not only indicate the degree of black–white “apartness” in given geographic areas (principally cities), but also show segregation trends over time.

A few years earlier Massey had published an important book on immigration: *Return to Aztlán* (Massey et al. 1987). This work was grounded in a transborder stratification model, in which migrants were seen as situated, informed agents of their own mobility and to some extent that of their communities.

Both books had an “ethnographic” dimension, but the focus in *Apartheid* was on black isolation, exclusion, and separation, while that in *Return* was on brown initiative and mobility. Race was a more peripheral matter in *Return*; in *Apartheid* it was central.

We see these two books—and Massey’s enormous subsequent work in both areas—as the foundations of his extensive—indeed, career-long—effort to rework the study of racial inequality in the United States. Both racial segregation and Mexican migration have experienced shifting trajectories over the last decades. Although there has been no qualitative shift in patterns of black–white racial segregation, moderate declines in dissimilarity indices did occur during the 1990s and 2000s; these were reversed after the crash of 2008 and the onset of the great recession, when black–white racial inequalities expanded greatly. On the immigration side, ongoing increases in the Latin@ population, led by Mexicans, have reshaped U.S. racial demography. The earlier immigration reforms of 1965 and 1986, which both combined elements of legalization with new restrictions, greatly increased the number of legal residents



and citizens of Latin American ancestry. Legal immigration was restricted in 1996, as a new wave of anti-immigrant hostility gathered force on the right-wing. New restrictive policies enacted during that year in parallel with reductions in welfare programs—both policies supported by Bill Clinton as part of his “triangulation” strategy—resulted in a jump in the undocumented immigrant population.<sup>21</sup> Further crackdowns and cutbacks, the emergence of a mass immigrants rights movement (2006), and failed efforts at further immigration reform (2007) all complicated the situation. Latin@s also suffered disproportionately in the great recession, and in the present are experiencing levels of discrimination that parallel those of blacks, although nowhere near the same extent of residential segregation.

Massey developed a theoretically grounded account of the U.S. stratification system in his 2008 book *Categorically Unequal*. Here for the first time he comprehensively linked his understandings of anti-black and anti-brown racism, arguing that the ongoing system of stratification in the United States can be traced back to a systematic, “categorical” racial inequality that was endemic throughout U.S. history and that operated through a “socially defined process of exclusion” (6). Massey argued that poverty, injustice, and human suffering, though shifting over time in accord with state policy (levels of inequality substantially fell during the 1945–1975 period, he points out), nevertheless exhibit an ongoing longevity and depth that is largely intractable. Inequality is the result of a combination of practices that he documents in detail: Social groups are framed conceptually through deeply ingrained cognitive processes that in his view are of an intrinsic, biological nature. Massey’s relatively recent turn to intrinsic/biological explanations for the operation of racial difference strikes us as problematic. Immediate and preconscious perception of race, he says, is rooted in the less evolved parts of the brain:

Emotions stored in the limbic system may be positive or negative, but when they are associated with particular classes of people or objects they contribute to prejudice, which is a predetermined emotional orientation toward individuals or objects....

(Massey 2008, 10, emphasis original; Wheeler and Fiske 2005)

Though closely tied to the *implicit bias* literature, Massey’s account exceeds that framework by arguing that prejudice derives from ineluctable features of human biology and evolution, rather than patterns of socialization, however deeply ingrained over multiple generations. This is not a trivial difference; it suggests that racism (and other forms of bias as well) are permanent and ineradicable, casting a shadow of deep doubt over social construction-oriented accounts of race. We return to this debate—which is of course quite extensive—in Chapter 4.

On the social level, in Massey’s account human groups are understood as deserving or underserving, capable or incapable, fully human or inferior and despicable. The latter “lend themselves to exploitation with relative impunity, [and] encounter few defenders in society” (2008, 244). Inequality is thus built into social

geography, patterns of labor, education, law enforcement, and citizenship, largely through legitimated discrimination:

[S]tratification—the unequal allocation of material, symbolic, and emotional resources among social categories—is accomplished by establishing social mechanisms that operate according to one of two templates: exploitation or opportunity hoarding. Exploitation is the expropriation of resources from an out-group by members of an in-group, such that out-group members receive less than full value for the resources they give up. Opportunity hoarding is the monopolization by in-group members of access to resources so as to keep it [sic] for themselves or charge rents to out-group members in return for access. In contemporary America, the most common form of exploitation is discrimination within markets, and the most common form of opportunity hoarding is exclusion from markets and resource-rich social settings.

(2008, 244)

Massey includes patterns of gender inequality and class inequality (“defined by access to human capital, or more specifically, education” [2008, 252]) in his account, and looks at inequality largely in terms of income, not wealth.<sup>22</sup> His emphasis on long-standing, deeply entrenched patterns of inequality overlaps in many ways with our claim that in the United States race is a “master category” of domination and inequality. Where we differ is over his reliance on a biologically grounded, cognitively rooted basis for human equality, and indeed over his idea that inequality is the basic framework through which race (and gender as well) should be understood. In Massey’s view, the sociopolitical dimensions of race and racism play a secondary role in structuring race; pride of place goes first to the biological/evolutionary dynamics of inequality (i.e., where the term “categorically” is grounded), with the economic determinations running close behind (that’s the business about “discrimination within markets” and “opportunity hoarding”).

As in the case of market-based theories, stratification theories overlap with viewpoints originating in other paradigms. Where they emphasize “caste,” that is, the closing-off of “mobility” in a status order with racial characteristics, they resemble certain nation-based views that deny the potential for integration across racial (or colonizer/colonized) lines (Dollard 1937 and Warner and Srole 1976 [1947]). Massey’s (2008) account of the “categorical” nature of inequality is an example here, especially since he relies on that stubborn limbic system.

Where the stratification-based approach focuses on those characteristics of the system which facilitate mobility, such as the avenues available to various minority groups for economic advancement, it resembles ethnicity-based views. Shifting cultural norms, adaptations to new conditions in the labor market or to new educational opportunities, can allow improvements in SES for individuals, households, or even

whole communities (Blalock 1967; Banton 1980). Wilson's account is an example here, with its stress on the significance of the civil rights reforms and its call for cross-racial, class-based alliances.

A notable feature of stratification approaches is the absence of attention to the political agency of people of color. Wilson thinks of racial politics in terms of the elite-led class-based alliances he hoped to cultivate as an advisor to Clinton and later, Obama. Massey's views of Mexican immigrants as pragmatic opportunity-maximizers, emphasized in much of his work on patterns of settlement, remittances, labor patterns and the like, has more in common with rational choice approaches than social movement ones, and is largely eclipsed by his "categorical" view, which relegates more radical aspirations to the historical dustbin. The mass mobilizations that challenged the Jim Crow system, that put millions of demonstrators in the streets of hundreds of U.S. cities on May 1, 2006, to demand immigrants' rights, that began to shift U.S. voting patterns in a majority-minority direction well before the 2008 presidential election, do not figure in these accounts. Neither of these writers, despite their immense contributions, can explain how egalitarian or social justice-oriented transformations could ever occur, in the past, present, or future.

## Class Conflict Theory

"Classical" Marxism never explicitly addressed issues of race and racial conflict, but it did consider the problems of division within the working class and the nature of "national oppression." Of course, Marxism has had a profound impact on the class-based paradigm of race. As the modern civil rights movement developed after World War II, its radical wing necessarily drew close to Marxist currents. The "old left," which included both the Communist Party and its rivals, had been deeply involved in anti-racist struggles for decades. The "new left" was as much an offshoot of the civil rights movement as it was a successor to communist and socialist currents of the past. For both these broad currents, race and racism were central issues.<sup>23</sup>

Despite their anti-racist orientation, however, Marxists had difficulties in explaining racial inequality and racial conflict. This was because of the *primacy of class* in Marxist theory. From a Marxist standpoint, the key relationship in capitalism is that of production, the social relationship between the capitalist class and the working class, the owners and the producers. Marxism explains racial conflict as occurring within the "social relations of production," that is, in terms of class conflict. So this form of class theory begins with a class reductionist model driven by what C. Wright Mills called a "labor metaphysic": Racial conflict improperly divides the working class, whose fundamental struggle requires solidarity. Workers of the world, unite!

Just as in the market-based approach racial division (discrimination) within the labor force (the working class) appears disruptive to market forces and distorts the price mechanism, so in the Marxist framework racial division (discrimination) within the working class disrupts the class struggle and undermines (distorts) the

revolutionary process. Thus for decades the orthodox Marxist position was that “racism is the bosses’ tool.” Thus too the slogan, “Black and white, unite and fight.”

In the “post-civil rights” period this analysis took the form of *labor market segmentation* studies. An exemplary book by Michael Reich, *Racial Inequality* (1981), measured the effects of racial (in)equality on wage levels and on the distribution of social spending in such areas as education and welfare. Reich showed that class cohesion across racial lines correlated to higher wages, and that class segmentation across racial lines depressed wages overall, though less so for whites than blacks. He attempted to synthesize the class conflict and neoclassical modes of analysis. Here as elsewhere, to develop this argument it was necessary to “bring the market back in.” Concerned to emphasize the structural aspects of discrimination, Reich employed the concept of “bargaining power theory.” Because a working class that lacks unity will exercise less leverage over employers, Reich argued, “Capitalists benefit from racial divisions whether or not they have individually or collectively practiced racial discrimination” (Reich 1981, 269; see also Franklin 1991; Goldfield 1997; Roemer 2000; Martinot 2002). This analysis had much in common with the structural racism accounts we discuss elsewhere in this book.

An alternative Marxist scenario was *split labor market* theory, which emphasized white labor’s efforts to limit competition from lower-paid minority workers (Saxton 1971; Bonacich 1972). Where unemployment is higher and competition from low-waged labor greater, white workers tend to support discriminatory (or exclusionist) policies even at the price of receiving lower wages themselves. This account pointed to the extensive U.S. historical record of white working-class racism. Notably it recognized that under conditions of high unemployment and slack demand for labor—conditions that have become endemic in recent years—capitalists and non-white workers have a common interest in maintaining a low-waged labor market.

The debate on the left between segmented and split, or class conflict vs. race conflict, theories, has been around for decades. The resemblance of these approaches to market-based theories of racial inequality is not surprising, because both accounts rest upon extra-economic, coercive capabilities based not in the labor-capital relationship—the “social relations of production” themselves—but rather in the political power of one class or another, or one class segment or another, to intervene in the labor market in defense of its interests. Historically, corporate influence has achieved some victories in this structured-in conflict, and labor pressure has achieved others. It is not coincidental, for example, that most “right-to-work” states have been concentrated in the South; this was the result of the 1948 corporate victory of passing the Taft–Hartley Act, and of overriding Truman’s veto of the law.<sup>24</sup> This reinforces the “divide-and-conquer” argument. On the other hand, immigration restriction has historically been a demand both of white mobs and white unions; this orientation only began to shift in the 1970s as the consequences of the civil rights reforms set in, especially the 1965 immigration reforms.<sup>25</sup> In the debates over immigration law taking place as we write, many unions have taken positions supporting

reform, especially public-sector unions with large numbers of immigrant members. Other unions—notably craft unions, police unions, and prison guard unions in California—have maintained their restrictionist positions (Zimring, Hawkins, and Kamin 2003).

In most cases race conflict at the “point of production” is not involved in class conflict approaches; this is a major limit on these arguments. There are some situations, however, where class conflict and race conflict do overlap very closely. Discrimination at “the point of production” can be identified, for example in the assignment of more dangerous or dirty work to workers of color (Oppenheimer 1974). The huge struggles in the auto industry in the 1970s—mainly situated in Detroit—pitted radical black workers not only against the big three auto makers (Ford, General Motors, and Chrysler) but also against the white-led United Auto Workers union (Geschwender 1977; Georgakas and Surkin 2012 [1975]). The Justice for Janitors movement, based in the Service Employees International Union, conducted a series of strikes that were explicitly anti-racist (Greenhouse 2006; Zolniski 2006).<sup>26</sup> Important as these combined race/class struggles have been, however, they were exceptions to the secular trends of deindustrialization, increasing polarization of the racial wealth/income gap, and relentless assaults upon unions that have characterized the U.S. since the 1980s.

### Some Critical Reflections on the Class Paradigm of Race

All three class-based approaches to race are limited by economic determinism. All three approaches necessarily emphasize racial inequality as the defining feature of race and the core dimension of racism. Their task then becomes explaining how race operates economically, how it is generated and reproduced in the key economic relationships of market exchange, resource distribution, and class conflict in production itself. This is a valuable but more limited understanding of race, an approach that reduces its importance to an ancillary aspect of inequality, an epiphenomenon of class. While inequality is a fundamental dimension of race and racism, race can no more be reduced to an economic matter than it can to a cultural or national one. Political factors, violence, psychological elements, and numerous other social relationships shape economic life as much as they are shaped by it.

Still, the class paradigm makes indisputable contributions to racial formation theory, principally by linking racial identity and racial collectivity to the most material human questions: How do we create and sustain ourselves materially, practically? Labor, food, health, housing, and education are central to the class paradigm. But putting inequality at the center also has its limits. Class-based theories of race, whether right, left, or in between, all always forced to look *outside the economic sphere* to obtain their causal, or independent, variables. In order to explain racial inequality one must turn to social and political processes and practices. One must *re-embed* the economy in the society: Culture, politics, and collectivity all come back into play.

Labor, and particularly labor markets, play a central role in all three varieties of the class paradigm. This is undoubtedly a result of economic thinking itself. Mainstream economics, while riven by conflicting tendencies, while dreaming desperately and recurrently of achieving a unified theory of the field, some form of “synthesis” (the neoclassical synthesis, the Washington consensus), still clings to a view of markets as autonomous and self-regulated entities, “disembedded” as Karl Polanyi (2001 [1944]) famously argued, from social and political conditions. In the real world, markets cannot be understood in this way, especially after the Great Depression of the 1930s, the contributions of John Maynard Keynes, the emergence of social democracy throughout the “developed” capitalist world, and the rise of the New Deal. All the class-based approaches we have discussed—the market-, stratification-, and class-conflict approaches—focus their attention on the role played by labor-market processes in determining racial inequality.

*Market/exchange-based approaches* focus most directly on labor markets and try to explain why discrimination and exclusion continue when, in strict “supply and demand,” disembedded economic terms, such practices are inefficient and therefore should be eliminated. Unable to account for these outcomes within their pure market model, even such hardcore market theorists as Gary Becker and Thomas Sowell have identified exogenous, non-economic causal or independent variables as shaping discrimination, exclusion, and thus racism. Looked at more deeply, this calls into question much of standard economic theory, not just racial theories of racial inequality.

*Distribution/stratification-based approaches* also focus on labor—on the demand for black and brown labor—also determined by extra-economic factors. In William J. Wilson’s view global economic pressures, combined with anti-racist political conflict (the civil rights movement and its elimination of official discrimination) have reshaped the demand for black labor. In Douglas S. Massey’s view a deeply ingrained, biologically based inequality shapes U.S. society (and human nature across the board), ultimately generating power-holders’ strategies for the isolation of blacks and the super-exploitation of Latin@s. Blacks’ labor is less required than it was previously; it is more profitable to exploit blacks via the housing market—especially by using their housing as poker-chips in global capital markets, and by stigmatizing, profiling, and punishing them—than it is to invest in their labor, even at low wages, or in their education. Latin@ labor is available at a bargain. It competes favorably with black labor because it is not native; it is reproduced at low cost in the periphery. Latin@s and Asians can integrate into U.S. society in ways that black people cannot, not only because they are a lower-cost labor force, not only because in many cases they are closer to phenotypic whiteness, but also because for many immigrants it is still possible to remit wages, to subsidize a family in Mexico, Egypt, or Vietnam, say.<sup>27</sup> Here, once again, extra-economic factors, such as global flows of immigrant labor and the centrality of race as a key social and political dimension of U.S. society, shape racial inequality.

Until quite recently, *class-conflict/production-based approaches* were also unduly focused on labor. Older Marxist frameworks have been particularly limited by



economic determinism in their understanding of race. Because of the difficulty of locating racial dimensions in production processes themselves, many neo-Marxist approaches turned to class divisions produced by discrimination or exclusion as the key variables explaining racial inequality. Some theories cast the capitalist class in the role of racist villain, arguing that it seeks to divide and demobilize the workers' movement. Others assigned this role to the white working-class, since white workers seek to make use of their racial privileges to protect their jobs and status. Either way, the consequence was the same: Intra-class division and competition along racial lines were seen to undermine class struggle. In this way class conflict theories reproduced not only market-based approaches and their limits, but also fell victim to the "labor metaphysic."

Already more than a quarter-century ago, it was clear that this account did not correspond with economic realities: As the U.S. economy became less nationally self-contained, as it was more engulfed by the global economy, as it became ever-more deindustrialized and financialized, intra-class conflict along racial lines became less central to inequality. Once the turn away from the New Deal/social democracy had begun in the mid-1970s, followed shortly thereafter by the full flowering of neoliberalism, more abstract forms of racism and more predatory forms of inequality—"accumulation by dispossession" (Harvey 2004) and colorblind racial ideology most notably—had emerged to plague workers across the board, especially people of color.

## Notes

1. Although the "Austrian school," with its premises of antistatism and individualism, is associated most closely with Hayek and Mises, other Austrian economists such as Schumpeter, Hilferding, and Goldscheid had very different views. See Heilbroner 2000 [1953].
2. Milton Friedman's views differed in many ways from those of his mentor Hayek (2001 [1944]). In sharp contrast to Friedman's monetarism, Hayek went so far as to disapprove of the state's issuance of money.
3. "Mainstream" economics thinks of the economy as "disembedded," a set of relationships driven by the rational action of those engaged in market exchanges. Market events and practices are considered distinct and separate from other types of social relationships. The mainstream was roughly characterized by Paul Samuelson in the 1960s as a "neoclassical synthesis" of Walrasian equilibrium theory and Keynesian theory. The disembedded model of economic life has always been subject to criticism, notably from Marxist and institutional economists. Critics point out that a wide range of human needs and relationships inevitably impinge upon, or even dominate and structure, actual market relationships. Subsistence requirements, human creativity, political organization, psychological processes, and numerous institutional factors must be taken into account in meaningful economic accounts. Karl Polanyi (2001 [1944]) produced perhaps the most sophisticated critique of "disembedded" economics, emphasizing among many other factors the impossibility of rendering land, labor, or money as commodities equivalent to others (such as needles and pins) produced for sale at market. We cannot adequately address Polanyi's

insights here, but in this chapter we make extensive use of his concept of the economy as a necessarily complex social relationship, shaped by politics, culture, psychological factors, and self-reflective action of every sort.

Ernesto Laclau's remarks on this same topic, made without reference to Polanyi, seem prophetic today, and highly relevant to the race–class relationship:

I think the critique of economism should have a much wider deconstructive effect on traditional Marxist theory. That is, we should no longer conceive the economy as a homogeneous milieu that follows its own endogenous laws of development.... Today we can see that the space which traditional Marxism designated “the economy” is in fact the terrain of a proliferation of discourses. We have discourses of authority, technical discourses, discourses of accountancy, discourses of information. Even categories such as profit can no longer be accepted as unequivocal. For instance, a multinational corporation today develops complex political and economic strategies within which the search for profit certainly plays a fundamental role, but does so within a whole policy of investment which can often require sacrificing immediate profits to wider strategic aims. The functioning of the economy itself is a political functioning, and cannot be understood in terms of a single logic. What we need today ... is a non-economistic understanding of the economy, one which introduces the primacy of politics at the level of the “infrastructure” itself. (Laclau and Mouffe 1982, 92; see also Mouffe 1983)

4. Sir William Arthur Lewis was another Nobelist (1979), an Afro-Caribbean (born in St. Lucia). A black intellectual pioneer, he was most certainly not oblivious to race. His early work on development has been applied to current conditions in China, Southeast Asia, and elsewhere. Where the “unlimited supplies of labor” are located, how they are recruited, and what their practical conditions are, are all consummately racial matters; indeed they are some of the core issues of the “modern world-system.”
5. This “taste” business is merely a euphemism for prejudice or Negrophobia. We find it doubly unacceptable: as the bias that it embodies and as the crude disguise by which it is euphemized.
6. Becker's major innovation is introducing psychological factors into economic analysis, thus taking a step toward overcoming the image of a socially “disembedded” market. As the field has spiraled into deeper intellectual crisis, Becker has assumed higher status. The revised version of the book was undoubtedly influenced by the civil rights movement. On Becker's account, see Reich 1981, 86–88.
7. “Steering” is simply an economic form of profiling. Customers are steered—with race as a central orienting factor in the practice—to “appropriate” neighborhoods. Mortgage borrowers are steered to sub-prime and Alt-A loans—featuring deceptive interest rates, hidden “balloon” payments, “bundling” procedures, and extremely high foreclosure rates. These were particularly profitable during the real estate boom years of the late 1990s and 2000s. “Blockbusting” practices in the 1950s and 1960s were a more open form of steering. Such activities were supposedly outlawed by fair housing and fair credit legislation in the later years of the civil rights era. In more covert ways, however, many of these practices are still flourishing. See Satter 2009.
8. This account overlaps in numerous ways with white privilege theories (Allen 2012 [1994; 1997]; Wildman et al. 1996; Williams 2003; Lipsitz 2006).

9. "There is a 'moral [and] constitutional equivalence' between laws designed to subjugate a race and those that distribute benefits on the basis of race in order to foster some current notion of equality. Government cannot make us equal; it can only recognize, respect, and protect us as equal before the law. That [affirmative action] programs may have been motivated, in part, by good intentions cannot provide refuge from the principle that under our Constitution, the government may not make distinctions on the basis of race" (Thomas 1995).
10. Many young Irishmen were purchased as substitutes in the Union army draft by better-off citizens; many others were drafted; still others rioted in New York in 1863, attacking free blacks (blacks were excluded from the draft) and black neighborhoods. See Harris 2003.
11. The Act was supposed to suspend Chinese immigration for ten years; in fact it remained in effect for 60 years, until it was finally repealed by the Magnuson Act in 1943.
12. Stratification theories of class have their origins in Max Weber's critique of Marx; for Weber class position is shaped by relationship to the means of distribution, not production. It's income and wealth, baby: what you receive, not what you put into the economy, that shapes your class or "life-chances." See Gerth and Mills 1958.
13. For data on black-white economic inequality see Taylor et al. 2012; Oliver and Shapiro 2006. For good overview material on racial inequality, see O'Connor, Tilly, and Bobo, eds. 2001. For data on residential segregation, see Iceland, Weinberg, and Steinmetz 2002; Massey et al. 2009. For data on incarceration, see Mauer 2006. For data on educational segregation, see Frankenberg and Orfield, eds. 2012. For data on workplace segregation, see Hellerstein and Neumark 2005. For data on racial attitudes and racial politics, see Bobo 2001; Dawson 2003.
14. Racial stratification/inequality already received significant attention there, but largely as the outcome of despotic power relations organized along racial lines. Reflecting the influence of the civil rights movement, Wilson introduced his subject this way:  

[C]onsidering the nature of both United States and South African race relations, I have given concepts of "racism" and "power" special attention in this study. In fact, the central arguments of this volume are (1) that a comprehensive account of the nature of race relations in these two societies must deal with the dimensions of power and their relation to dominant- and minority-group contact, and (2) that the dimensions of power cannot be completely understood if treated independently of the phenomenon of racism. (1973, 5)

In this work Wilson not only also explored racial stratification, but also considered in depth the political conditions under which anti-racist protest operated in the two countries, the significance of biologicistic racism, and a host of other topics that were largely left aside in his later work.
15. Wilson served as an adviser to Clinton, and has also consulted with Obama, whose "post-racial" efforts certainly resonate with Wilson's work.
16. Anti-poverty, Headstart, affirmative action programs, the rise of multiculturalism and diversity criteria in hiring, education, and public service provision, exemplified these shifts. Many such programs have been eviscerated under the neoliberal project, the decades-long right-wing effort to curtail social expenditures.
17. On this point Wilson's views converge with neocon/neoliberal abhorrence of "dependency" on the welfare state. Wilson argues that the black "underclass" is to some extent produced by this "dependency." While he notes that public sector employment has been

- the chief route to black middle-class status, he does not engage the ongoing relationship of the black middle class and the “underclass.”
18. On the situations of blacks and other people of color employed in the criminal “justice” system, see Ward 2006. On people of color in the military, see Latty and Tarver 2005. On black cops, see Bolton and Feagin 2004.
  19. On this group, see Roberts 1996; Boston 1998; Ondaatje 2009. Some of the most durable black conservatives have been John McWhorter, Robert Woodson, Thomas Sowell, and Walter Williams. Economist Glenn Loury, after an early sojourn on the black right, moved back to the center in the Bush II years. It is instructive to compare the new ethos of “black conservatism” with classic works on the subject, notably Frazier 1957a.
  20. In respect to health care, the Affordable Care Act (“Obamacare”) may represent a partial reversal of the entrenched abandonment of the health rights of poor people (disproportionately black and brown). We must await the law’s full implementation in 2014. In respect to welfare, it is important to note that despite Clinton’s abandonment of cash-grant welfare (AFDC) in 1996, he did greatly expand the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) which was a substantial gain for the working poor.
  21. By adopting a number of Republican-backed, racially inflected policies Clinton sought to immunize himself from white working-class voter discontent in the 1996 election year. This voting bloc—are they still the “Reagan Democrats”?—remains a significant force today: They are disproportionately male, blue-collar voters who have experienced increased economic vulnerability for decades; they are anti-welfare, anti-immigrant, right-wing populist, inclined toward the “Tea Party,” and vote Republican (Frank 2005).
  22. Perhaps because his book appeared before the onset of the great recession of 2008, Massey understates contemporary inequalities somewhat, especially with regard to recent developments such as loss of assets through foreclosure and sustained unemployment. In later work Massey has addressed foreclosure patterns and race (Rugh and Massey 2010).
  23. The extensive history of “black–red” relationships, and also other communist and socialist relationships with anti-racist movements, is beyond our present scope. Some important contributions are Sale 1973; Allen 1974; Horne 1986; and Pulido 2006.
  24. More recently the “right-to-work” (anti-union) strategy has been making gains outside the South, most notably in the intermountain West and in some midwestern states as well (Indiana and Michigan). Where this has occurred, there have been significant attacks against public-sector unions and against social “safety-net” programs, attacks that usually mobilize coded racist tropes (Fraser 2012). Taft–Hartley’s original success in 1947 was based on a tactical alliance between Southern Dixiecrats (i.e., Democrats) and right-wing Republicans based in the Midwest.
  25. The United Farmworkers—a very important case—supported immigration restrictions until after the death of Cesar Chavez in 1981. See Bardacke 2012.
  26. In 2008 an explicitly anti-racist workers’ movement carried out a sit-in against offshoring at the Chicago factory of Republic Windows and Doors, occupying the factory and forcing its reopening (Cullotta 2009).
  27. Space is not available here to explore the role of the periphery in capitalist reproduction. World-system theory in general acknowledges the subsidization of the core global capitalist economy by its hinterlands, not only in terms of reducing the costs of labor reproduction but also by furnishing cheaper raw materials, absorbing pollution, and

---

externalizing other costs as well. This line of argument goes back through Immanuel Wallerstein to Rosa Luxemburg. Consider:

The imperialist phase of capitalist accumulation which implies universal competition comprises the industrialization and capitalist emancipation of the *hinterland* where capital formerly realized its surplus value. Characteristic of this phase are: lending abroad, railroad constructions, revolutions, and wars. (Luxemburg 1973 (1913), 399; emphasis original; see also Schmidt 2010)

The hinterland today is the immigrant-sending area, whether in the periphery or the semi-periphery in Wallerstein's terms (1974–1989). Let us say that here in rural Zacatecas, a young migrant begins her journey to the lettuce-fields of Arizona or domestic service in Beverly Hills. To produce this worker has cost U.S.-based employers (and U.S. tax-payers) almost nothing. If formally employed and undocumented, her payroll tax payments accrue to the benefit of the Social Security Trust Fund, not to her future retirement income. If settlement in the United States is not an option after years of immigrant labor, her remittances and savings, accumulated in an immigrant household or community, might permit the construction of a cinderblock house with shingled roof, water well, and indoor plumbing where previously only a *bohio* (shack) had stood. On these issues, see in general Massey et al. 1987. The racialization of the periphery, the phenomic or diasporic link between the hinterlands of Mexico and the Mexican–American economy, needs greater attention than we can provide here.

This page intentionally left blank



# Nation

## Introduction

The *nation-based paradigm* of race originates in seizures of territory by modern empires. The European conquest of the Western hemisphere, and the colonies that resulted, both extended the practice of “nation-building” that was central to imperial ventures,<sup>1</sup> and laid the groundwork for later, insurgent nationalist projects that would challenge and eventually overthrow these same empires.

In this chapter we explore the nation-based paradigm of race in the United States, focusing largely on post-World War II events. We begin by discussing *the white nation*, the historically dominant construct of the “American people.” We note the centrality of whiteness in enabling the nation’s expansion and rise to power on the world stage; we also recognize the instability and anxieties of white nationalism. Next, we discuss *race/class/gender/nation*, the intersectional cleavages and conflicts that shaped the white nation from its colonial origins through independence and beyond. From the beginning, there were *insurgent nationalisms* that were hallmarks of early resistance to the white nation, and that re-emerged among racially subaltern people in the postwar United States. Building on earlier religious, panethnic, and sometimes revolutionary forms of resistance, and linking their struggles to global anti-imperialism, new nationalist movements were launched after World War II. “Black power” nationalism was the most established and embedded form of these, but important nationalist projects were also developed during those years in Latin@, Native American, and Asian American communities as well (Pulido 2006; Joseph, ed. 2006).

The chapter concludes with *some critical remarks on the nation-based paradigm of race*. Here we focus on the limits of the race–nation equation, the nation-based paradigm’s inherent incompleteness regarding race. We evaluate the uneven democratic commitments of nationalist politics; we consider the problem of transracial relations and alliances within the nation-based paradigm; and we reflect on the uncertain significance within it of class- or culture/ethnicity-based identities and social positions.

## The White Nation

For five centuries the phrase “the American people” has been understood as an implicitly white designation. This understanding predates the achievement of national independence in the American Revolution and ignores or dismisses the continuing presence—in substantial numbers—of people not considered white. In other words,

almost from the beginning of European settlement there has been a dominant white nation in North America. The colonies and the post-revolutionary independent U.S. state all explicitly celebrated their whiteness, and always took it for granted.

But the congruence of race and nation has never been a done deal, and periodically it has been necessary to tinker with the equation of whiteness and American identity. The United States has passed through numerous cycles of racial politics: Despotic moments have alternated with democratic ones; harder and softer racial regimes have taken the stage. Slavery, genocide, conquest, and empire all mess with the homogeneity implicit in the concept of a white nation. Immigration and exclusion also call the nation's assumed foundational whiteness into question. There have been various iterations of nativism and legalization, for example, and alternating trajectories of racial reform and backlash. These also parallel global developmental processes, in ways too complicated to detail here.<sup>2</sup>

White rule in North America, before and after 1776, has always been riven by racial conflict. The centrality of white/male/property-holders' rule has been both taken-for-granted and unstable. There have continually been two contradictory principles at work: national unity and racial division. To fuel and justify first the colonial impulse and later the nation-building process, race has served as what Antonio Gramsci called an ideological "glue" (Gramsci 1971, 328). Race operated as a multi-leveled organizing principle that established who was "civilized" and who was "savage," who was "free" (and hence human), and who was a slave (chattel, not a person). Race linked the corporeal/visible characteristics of different social groups to different sociopolitical statuses, and provided various religious and political principles for inclusion and exclusion from the imagined community (Anderson 2006) of the nation.

In the United States, the trope of the white nation—the forging of unity and solidarity among white rulers and their white subordinates—has time after time overwhelmed nonwhite or transnational (class-based, diasporic, hemispheric) conceptions of the nation and its peoples (Morgan 2003 [1975]). Oppositional nationalisms (from groups of color) have often faltered; they have repeatedly been subdued or absorbed. Yet uncertainty remains about the coherence of the "white nation" and white "peoplehood." The intelligibility and collectivity of whiteness were first cast into doubt after the Civil War, when the 14th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution extended U.S. citizenship and ostensible equality to the emancipated slaves. The white republic (Saxton 2003 [1990]) experienced numerous subsequent crises: over Asian immigration, relations with Latin America, and the extension of U.S. imperialism (previously a continental matter) overseas at the turn of the 20th century. The reactionary racism all this inspired continues to operate today.

During and after World War II, white peoplehood was problematized again, not only in the United States but on a worldwide level: by the traumatic and galvanizing experience of the war itself; by the rising tides of anticolonialism and anti-racism the war fostered; by the mass migrations it set in motion within the United States (and globally); and by the Cold War, which was waged on racial terrain in many ways; and

above all by the political struggles for racial justice and democracy that took shape after World War II, not just in the United States but all over the world.<sup>3</sup>

So, white racial nationalism both built and fractured the United States. It unified whites across tremendous chasms of class and culture/ethnicity, precisely because it allowed them to claim their whiteness, sometimes with ease and sometimes only after passing through extended “probationary” periods. The racial cleavages we see in the nation are the products of the exploitative and exclusionist commitments of the white nation: its deracination of the indigenous inhabitants of North America; its capture, killing, transport in chains, and enslavement of millions of Africans; its conquest of adjacent territories and its relegation of their inhabitants to lesser status; and its massive dependence on immigration, mostly on the part of people not considered (or not yet considered) white. Thence cometh the divided and hierarchical peoplehood, the stratified and conflictual nation, the United States of America.

From the earliest days of U.S. national independence, Anglo-Saxonism and “anglo-conformity” helped create a norm of whiteness that shaped the national image and culture. State policy sometimes relaxed and sometimes tightened the boundaries of citizenship, but always reflected restrictive norms. Expansionism and economic interest linked “nation-building” and domestic labor recruitment to foreign policy and empire-building: Not only the “turning of Africa into a warren for the commercial hunting of black-skins” (Marx 1967, 351) but also Indian removal (i.e., ethnic cleansing; genocide) and hemispheric domination (after the 1823 Monroe Doctrine) were established principles by the early 19th century (Gonzalez 2011 [2001]).

Internally as well, citizenship was assigned or withheld according to racial criteria. The 14th Amendment notwithstanding, blacks only became citizens in a practical sense in the 1960s, and even then imperfectly; many Asians only achieved naturalization rights in the 1950s; and native peoples only received their citizenship in the 1920s. Stringent immigration restrictions were imposed on Asians after the upheavals of 1877, and on Europeans after the great influx that occurred around the turn of the 20th century. After World War I the screws were further tightened on immigration through highly restrictive policies that would endure for forty years. Mass deportations to Mexico occurred in the 1930s, with no regard given to whether the Latin@s rounded up (in Los Angeles and elsewhere) were U.S. citizens or not; a brown skin was all you needed to be placed on a sealed train to Jalisco or Michoacan (de Genova 2004; Balderrama and Rodriguez 2006 [1995]). Immigration raises large questions about national identity, about the meaning of citizenship, and about global inequality (Smith 2003; Massey, ed. 2008). Indeed the U.S. immigration regime has profoundly shaped the patterns of racial inclusion and exclusion

The common sense view of “the nation” has always been explicitly inflected by race. The United States was perceived as “a white man’s country,” a *herrenvolk* republic. This identification of the nation with whiteness (and maleness) was a nearly universal feature of imperial and settler nations.<sup>4</sup> Nativism (Higham 2002 [1955]; Saxton 1975) periodically flamed up when immigrants were seen as threats, just as

anti-black racism and contempt for indigenous peoples underwrote state racial policy in both colony and metropole.<sup>5</sup> Despite the penchant for “exceptionalist” accounts of U.S. nationhood (Lind 1995; Zelinsky 1988; Lipset 2003 [1963]; Billig 1995 offers a good critique), the United States was no exception to this “rule of racialization” (Martinot 2002). Indeed, it was the rule’s pioneer.

How white is the U.S. nation? The question of who makes up the American nation, indeed the question of what is the racial identity of the American nation remains unanswered. “Your country? How came it yours?” asked Du Bois in 1903. “Before the Pilgrims landed we were here....” (Du Bois 2007 [1935], 162–163). And Native Americans had been “here” perhaps 25,000 years before that, according to paleoarchaeologists. Indeed, what we now call the United States of America only became “yours”—a white country—when first it fell under English imperial rule around the turn of the 17th century. It remained “yours” after it freed itself from that rule after 1776 in the first modern revolution. It is still “yours” in many respects. It has been a “white man’s country” through conquest, settlement, and expansion, through slavery and emancipation, through continuing immigration, and through ascent to a global imperialism of its own, until finally becoming the greatest empire in world history.

But, white men, is the country still “yours”? Starting after World War II and in parallel with similar race-oriented conflicts elsewhere, the concept of “the American people” has become less white and less patriarchal. The United States is darkening, demographically speaking. Because of the black movement and the feminist movements it inspired—not only in the post-World War II period but continually since abolition—the country is less definitively a white male nation than it used to be, and that trend is continuing.<sup>6</sup> The U.S. racial regime has been losing momentum, both internally as a white republic, and globally, as the leading “developed” economic and military power. Patriarchal power is eroding as well. Of course, the age of the white and male nation is not over, at least not yet. But that nation is being undone; whether gradually or rapidly we do not know.

Especially since the imperial dawn, the ideas of race and nation have been deeply connected, mainly through concepts of *peoplehood*. Both as outposts of the British Empire (and to some extent of other European empires as well), and then as an independent nation-state, the United States (and its forerunners) identified itself as a *white nation*. This racial nationalism remains visible in the associations with whiteness that are implicit in such concepts as “the American people.” The nation is gendered as well: the motherland, the fatherland, *patria o muerte*. Throughout the modern era the nation has been racialized. This proceeds from its imperial origins: its seizure of bodies (indigenous people, Africans), and of land as well, for purposes of primitive accumulation. Racialization is discussed in more detail in Chapter 4. Here it refers to the process of sorting out the bodies.

In the wake of the civil rights era, in the aftermath of the postwar racial “break,” the meaning of the terms “nation” and “nation-state” in the United States must be carefully examined. What is in question here is “peoplehood.” The general tendency

is still to see the United States as a WASP nation, not only white, but Anglophilic and Protestant. U.S. nationalism is still a strong tendency: particularly on the right, particularly in the “heartland” and in the “red” states, but not only there. Nationalism is also a civil religion and a working-class creed that cuts across racial lines.

At the same time, the standard racialized and gendered picture of the United States—as a “white man’s country”—is breaking down. Significant portions of U.S. territory are now occupied in the majority by people who are not white. “Majority-minority” demographics now obtain in California as well as several other states and major cities, and in many other places that condition is not far off. A recent projection by the U.S. Department of the Census places the national transition to a “majority-minority” demographic in the year 2042 (U.S. Bureau of the Census 2008).

### Race/Class/Gender/Nation

In early North America, race, class, and gender were deeply interlinked. Their amalgamation was established both by the necessity of developing a division of labor, an organized labor force; and by the necessity of supplying, through various forms of human trafficking (only some of which can be labeled as “voluntary immigration”) the steady flow of actual human bodies (and souls) that would constitute the North American population.

An endemic and taken-for-granted national chauvinism consigned blacks and Indians to inferiority and subhumanity. This condition, this absence of fully human status, was supposedly permanent. As the settler nation expanded westward, the right of conquest and the license of the “pioneers” to deprive the Indians of life and land was never seriously questioned from within the white regime.<sup>7</sup> Although armed Indian resistance slowed the advance of the European-led tide, it could not, in the end, repel it. The centrality of slavery and the “primitive accumulation” of Indian lands in early American life meant that race and not class was the key social division both in the colonial period and after.<sup>8</sup>

What about other “others”? The Irish had been trafficked by the hundreds of thousands during the colonial period. In a British colonial outpost they were racialized as nonwhite, though generally subject to indenture, not chattelization (Jordan and Walsh 2008; Allen 2012 [1994; 1997]). The millions of Irish immigrants who arrived in the 1840s, driven by British-imposed famine, were exposed to the torches and pitchforks of mobs inflamed by nativism, and subject to racial discrimination as well. In the Civil War the Irish made good cannon fodder, especially in the North. Irish service in the Union armies (when they couldn’t buy substitutes and anti-black riots didn’t prevent their being drafted) finally launched them on the path to whiteness. The Civil War made many immigrant Irish members of the American nation.

The invasion of Mexico and subsequent incorporation of the Southwest, from the annexation of Texas in 1845 through the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo in 1848, accomplished an enormous conquest of territory. Initially transferring their

citizenship to the United States and retaining their land rights and titles, the Mexican population of this huge territory were progressively disenfranchised and stripped of their land (Pitt 1999 [1966]; Almaguer 2008 [1994]; Gomez 2008).

Post-Civil War industrialization augmented labor demand and European immigrant numbers increased. The floodgates would remain open to European arrivals for decades. But the ending of Reconstruction in 1877, the great railroad strike of that year, and the general economic crises of the 1870s combined with the rise of anti-Asian nativism to put new pressure on the white nation framework. Blacks were now citizens, but their labor (and that of Asians who were mere denizens, largely in the West) threatened the cross-class alliance that the white nation had maintained since colonial times. Additional threats came from mobilized white labor. Huge strikes and bitter labor conflict swept the nation, particularly in 1877 and 1894. Redrawing the boundaries of the white nation was essential for the development of U.S. capitalism. Class conflict could be controlled to some extent by the gradual whitening of European labor (Montgomery 1987; Saxton 2003 [1990]). This was not accomplished by any legislative decree or capitalist maneuvering to divide the working class, but rather by white workers themselves. Many of them were recent immigrants, who organized on ethnic lines as much as on traditionally defined class ones.

Race shaped class in America, then, because of the demand for territorial expansion, because racial slavery was crucial to the development of the early nation, and because whiteness played an important role in deterring rebellion and undermining popular transracial (i.e., class-based) solidarity (Morgan 2003 [1975]; Du Bois 2007 [1935]; Blight 2002).

Gendered practices were central to nation-building as well. Just as there was a “racial frontier” in the settlement of the United States, so too was there a “gender frontier.”<sup>9</sup> As Ann Laura Stoler puts it, “Intimate domains—sex, sentiment, domestic arrangement, and child rearing—figure in the making of racial categories and in the management of imperial rule” (Stoler 2001, 829; see also Stoler 2002; Schiebinger 2004). In practice these two boundaries were often indistinguishable. From its earliest moments North American colonialism involved sexual encounters between Europeans and Indians; these became fodder for fiction and fantasy, and later for Hollywood films as well (Nash 1995). Some settlers “went native” (Torgovnick 1991; Ware 1992; McClintock 1995; Cooper and Stoler 1997; Caslin 2008). Miscegnation<sup>10</sup> was inevitable and widespread. Hence mixed-race children and families; hence the immediate problematization of racial categories.

The plantation, and African slavery overall, were also obviously gender frontiers (Williamson 1995). Rape and concubinage were commonplace. These practices were barely stigmatized because they were so widespread. Not unlike other colonial systems, U.S. nation-building from its earliest moments featured widespread interracial sex/racial hybridity/*mestizaje*/*métissage*.<sup>11</sup>

These currents have all continued up through the present. Still, the maintenance of “patriarchal authority and power, racial hierarchy, and white supremacy”



(Woodward 1998), for all its horrors, was never monolithic, never without opposition. Subversion, escape, revolt, and political mobilization (via abolitionism and, later, anti-imperialism and immigrants rights), all exposed the conflictual and indeed contradictory character of the white nation.

To the extent that the legitimacy of the white nation—with its almost unbroken history of structural racism, its history of slavery, violence, exclusion, and dispossession—is not accepted by racially subordinated groups, alternative national frameworks may be adopted by those groups as insurgent concepts, as an “imagined community” in rebellion.

## Insurgent Nationalism

The national dimensions of nonwhite racial identities, the experience of collectivity and solidarity along racial lines, and the sense of collective identity (“peoplehood”) among distinct—and often panethnic—peoples of color, were key dimensions of the national liberation and anticolonial struggles of the post-World War II period. The national impulse remains strong, as a form of cultural identification (where it overlaps with ethnicity); as the form of various nationalist movements; and as a general signifier of race-based community: the ghetto, the barrio, Koreatown. These recognitions—about the ever-problematic white nation and white nationalism, and about the continuing exclusion, denial of political and human rights, and discrimination experienced by peoples of color—all underlie the nation-based paradigm of racial formation.

So while white racial unity certainly fueled a great deal of nation-building zeal over the course of U.S. history, it also bred its own opposition. Perhaps ironically, some of the most committed adherents to the democratic ideals professed since the founding of the United States have been those to whom the white nation denied democratic rights and full membership; think again of Du Bois: “Your country? How came it yours...?” For those like Du Bois (especially the later Du Bois [Porter 2010]), Malcolm X, José Angel Gutiérrez, Russell Means, or Bobby Seale, inclusion in the white nation that was the United States, was never fully possible. Hence they saw themselves not only as Americans, but also as part of other, insurgent peoples, of various sorts: Pan-African, irredentist, anti-imperial, internally colonized.

As the limits of the civil rights reforms of the mid-1960s became clear, a substantial sector of the movement turned toward nationalist positions. This shift occurred first within the black movement, where long-standing discontent with civil rights moderates was most established, and where the immediate experience of betrayal was most galling: One example—out of many—was the experience of SNCC (Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee) at the 1964 Democratic convention in Atlantic City, New Jersey.<sup>12</sup> SNCC’s adoption in 1965 of a “black power” orientation was followed in the next few years by the emergence of red power, brown power, and yellow power movements.

The upsurge of black nationalism in the mid-1960s definitively ruptured the already tenuous unity of liberal and radical tendencies within the civil rights

movement. It signaled a growing disillusionment with the moderate political agenda of non-violence and integration. The slogan “black power,” and the growing popularity of black nationalism that it expressed, also initiated an intense theoretical and strategic debate about the nature of racism and the future of black politics in the United States. It followed the split in the Nation of Islam and the emergence of Malcolm X as the most visible black nationalist leader in the country.<sup>13</sup> It coincided with Lyndon Johnson’s escalation of the Vietnam war and the emergence of the anti-war—and in a broader sense, anti-imperialist—movement. It also overlapped with a new phenomenon in U.S. racial politics: black-led, black-based ghetto rebellions (aka race riots), beginning with Harlem in 1964 and Watts in 1965.<sup>14</sup>

The nation-based analysis of black oppression and resistance had, of course, its historical antecedents. The refusal of assimilationism could be traced back at least to Ethiopianism and the repatriation movements of the mid-19th century, led by men such as Martin Delany, Edward Wilmot Blyden, and Paul Cuffe.<sup>15</sup> The Pan-Africanist and Marxist-Leninist traditions had also elaborated nationalist analyses, and a substantial current of cultural nationalism also existed whose components could be discerned in Du Bois’s *The Souls of Black Folk* (1999 [1903]), in the Harlem Renaissance of the 1920s (Locke, ed. 1997 [1925]), and in the influential writings of Harold Cruse (1967, 1968), to name just a few sources. Strong nationalist traditions can also be found in all communities of color, notably among Puerto Ricans, Mexican Americans, and Native Americans.

The nation-based paradigm, to a far greater extent than the ethnicity- or class-based approaches, is a theoretical convergence, a resultant of disparate currents. Nationalist currents had always existed in the United States, notably in the black church (Rawick 1972; Moses 1998; Glaude 2000). Nation-based approaches to race also have a long theoretical fetch; this is the profound and variegated black political tradition, excluded for centuries from mainstream (white) intellectual and political discourse.

Rooted in the resistance to empire and colonialism, insurgent nationalisms logically invoke racial criteria in their efforts to theorize and mobilize opposition to white supremacist rule. Once again, “peoplehood” is a central concern. Who are black people, Latin@s, Native Americans, Asian Americans? In what historical, political-economic, and cultural conditions were these peoples created? In what ways are these groups’ claims for self-rule, land, and freedom justified? How do imperial and colonial structures of power persist in the contemporary, ostensibly postcolonial world, the “modern world-system”?<sup>16</sup> How are they maintained, indeed, in the very contours of the international division of labor, based on unequal exchange and the domination of the “periphery” by the “core”? In the nation-based paradigm, racial dynamics are understood as products of colonialism and therefore as outcomes of relationships which are global and epochal in character.<sup>17</sup>

Framing the nation-based paradigm to emphasize “peoplehood” and post-coloniality has several advantages. First, it stresses the relationships among the

different elements of racial oppression—inequality, political disenfranchisement, territorial and institutional segregation, cultural domination—in contrast to the ethnicity or class paradigms which focus on a few aspects (or even one “fundamental” aspect) of the social order in an attempt to explain racial dynamics. Recognition of the centrality of the colonial heritage also provides an alternative to other, more taxonomic approaches to nation-based theories of race. Many writers have delineated, for example, “varieties of black nationalism”: bourgeois, proletarian, reformist, revolutionary, cultural, religious, economic, educational (Allen 1990 [1970]; Van Deburg 1996; Hanchard 2006). While efforts to catalog the range of nationalist positions within specific minority group traditions, and to trace debates within these traditions, obviously have merit, they often reveal a notable lack of specificity about the meaning of nation-based categories in such approaches. Nationalism is easily reduced to mere group militance or separatism if no effort is made to specify its historical and theoretical origins in particular racially defined peoples’ experiences of colonialism.

Here we offer an all-too-brief examination of a few of the main insurgent nationalist approaches to race: Pan-Africanism, cultural nationalism, Marxist accounts of the “national question,” and internal colonialism theory. We recognize the selective nature of focusing on these currents, still, we think that they encompass much of the broad sweep of nation-based paradigms of race.

While not comparable in many respects, we include these perspectives as varieties of insurgent nationalism that take shape within the nation-based paradigm of race. These approaches all share a reliance on concepts of *race as peoplehood* that derive from the meaning and uses of the race-concept prevalent in colonialism’s heyday. Chief among these is the use of racial categories to distinguish members of the oppressor and oppressed “peoples”—the colonizers and the colonized, the “free” and the enslaved. Several consequences of these arguments may be specified: the explicit demand for organizations and movements uniformly composed of the “colonized” (the victims of racial oppression), the need for “cultural autonomy” to permit the development of those unique characteristics which the colonized group has developed or preserved through the ordeal of subjugation, and the necessity of “self-determination” to uproot the colonial heritage and restructure society on a non-racial basis.

*Pan-Africanism:* The roots of Pan-Africanism in the United States lie in the identities, principally collective identities—Yoruba, Bakongo, Asante—that enslaved Africans carried with them to the Western Hemisphere. In the 20th century, Pan-Africanism took shape on two fronts: The first was a series of international conferences held in Europe and the United States from 1900 to 1945, most of them organized by W.E.B. Du Bois.<sup>18</sup> These conferences were oriented primarily toward decolonization of Africa and had relatively little U.S. domestic impact.

The second front of Pan-Africanist activity was the formation, largely but not only in the United States, of the Universal Negro Improvement Association, led

by Marcus Garvey. The UNIA (Universal Negro Improvement Association) had unprecedented success in mobilizing blacks, numbering millions of adherents at its height in the 1920s. Garvey sought to unite blacks throughout the world in a movement for the “redemption” of Africa, which he envisioned as a “racial empire.” For him and his followers, Africa existed not only on the continent, but in the diaspora that slavery had visited on its inhabitants and their descendants. Thus the fates of blacks throughout the world were linked. The liberation and reconstruction of the African homeland would allow blacks finally to overcome the racial oppression that sustained colonialism (Hill and Bair, eds. 1988; Clarke 2011 [1974]; Taylor 2001).

Garvey was greatly influenced by the doctrines of Booker T. Washington, specifically those promoting separate economic development. Garvey’s economic argument, however, went beyond Washington’s in two respects: First, he denounced the exploitation of Africa and African labor throughout the world.<sup>19</sup> Second, he saw the black population of the United States not only in the “self-help” terms of Washington, but as

a vanguard for Africa’s redemption.... He believed that if the Negroes were economically strong in the United States, they would be able to redeem Africa and establish a worldwide confraternity of black people.

(Essien-Udom 1962, 50)

For all its excesses and errors, the most notorious being its derelict business practices and its *rapprochement* with the Ku Klux Klan,<sup>20</sup> the Garvey movement represents one of the founding pillars of modern Pan-Africanism, and stands as a crucial source for much other black nationalism as well.<sup>21</sup> Indeed, it still represents the high-water mark of mass black political mobilization, rivaled only by the movements of the 1960s.

Pan-Africanism maintained a limited foothold in the United States through the contributions of W.E.B. Du Bois, George Padmore, and C.L.R. James. When Malcolm X broke with the Nation of Islam in 1964 to form the Organization of Afro-American Unity, making a series of well-publicized trips to Africa and the Middle East, and attempting to enlist the support of African governments in denouncing U.S. racism at the United Nations, he dramatically stimulated black interest in African issues. With the advent of black power, the contributions of Malcolm, Kwame Nkrumah, Frantz Fanon, and later, Amílcar Cabral and Walter Rodney received new attention in the United States, and contributed to the Pan-African canon. Kwame Ture (Stokely Carmichael) in particular moved to embrace Pan-Africanism after 1967.<sup>22</sup>

Beginning in the 1930s, political action in support of African independence became a focal point for U.S. Pan-Africanists. Before that, U.S. black activities in Africa had been largely confined to missionary work.<sup>23</sup> From Mussolini’s invasion of Ethiopia in 1935 onward, U.S. black involvement with African politics confronted racism at home as much as imperialism on the continent, especially because the United States was often complicit in atrocities in Africa. During the Cold War, anti-imperialist struggles in Africa were linked quite closely to the anti-racist movement in the U.S. Africa (and the global “Third World” more broadly) became the sites of

struggle for political influence between the U.S. and USSR. Pan-Africanism enjoyed a small renaissance in the United States when it became clear that Jim Crow practices were well understood on the continent, just as U.S. support for South African apartheid, the British war against the Mau-Mau in Kenya, the assassination of Patrice Lumumba in the Congo, and numerous other events were deeply resented by blacks in the United States (von Eschen 1997, 2006; Kelley 2003; Dudziak 2011). This connection began to wane in the 1970s as debates over the Angolan revolution divided left-wing Pan-Africanists, who supported the MPLA (People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola) and accepted (often dogmatically) some version of Marxism, from right-wing U.S. Pan-Africanists, who maintained an (equally dogmatic) Garveyish "race-first" position and sided with UNITA (Marable 1980, 86–88).<sup>24</sup> A final and largely symbolic iteration of this conflict took place in the United States over the downfall of the apartheid regime in South Africa in the early 1990s. In this instance, right-wing U.S. Pan-Africanists like Roy Innis sided with the South African Inkatha Freedom Party in opposition to the African National Congress, and Afrocentrists took up the causes of the South African Pan Africanist Congress (PAC—founded by Robert Sobukwe), and the Black Consciousness Movement (BCM—founded by Steven Biko).<sup>25</sup>

Pan-Africanist perspectives have lost ground in the post-cold war and post-apartheid periods. Africa is now wracked by civil wars sponsored by competing corporate (and to some extent, national) interests seeking unfettered access to such primary materials as coltan (Nest 2011), copper, and of course, petroleum. Wars and genocides in Eastern Congo, Southern Sudan, the Darfur region, and elsewhere have taken millions of lives and sparked horrifying atrocities such as rape epidemics. Chinese investment has skyrocketed, generating new claims of inter-imperial rivalries. Post-apartheid South Africa has emerged as an important regional power, operating through the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD).<sup>26</sup>

If Pan-Africanism retains any vitality in the wake of the massive transitions that Africa has undergone in recent decades, it would be based in its recognition of the continuity of the exploitation of Africa by the "developed" countries (China included). This is something that Du Bois denounced a century ago in his prescient 1915 article "The African Roots of the War" (Du Bois 1995 [1915]). Du Bois's vision of a unified African continent, which was in a broad sense also Nkrumah's vision, Garvey's vision (although Garvey and Du Bois were bitter opponents), Cheik Anta Diop's vision (Diop 1989, 1991), and the vision of what we today call Afrocentrism, was always a practical impossibility in a black diaspora riven in a thousand ways by rivalries and differences. Yet as a *cultural phenomenon*, Pan-Africanism still possesses considerable interpretive power; it still has the ability to link the specific forms of oppression which blacks face in various societies with the colonialist exploitation of Africa of past centuries. The impact this theoretical current has had in the United States stemmed from its argument that black identity conferred membership in a single worldwide black "nation"—the African diaspora itself.

*Cultural Nationalism:* The roots of cultural nationalism can be traced back at least to the Harlem Renaissance of the 1920s (Locke, ed. 1997 [1925]). As a broader phenomenon, however, cultural nationalist perspectives have been enunciated and practiced in nearly all U.S. communities of color. Because cultural nationalism has focused less on the political and economic elements of the nation-based approach—demands for statehood and self-determination within specific territorial boundaries for example—than it has on the cultural elements that give rise to collective identity, community, and a sense of “peoplehood,” it exhibits certain overlaps with ethnicity-based theories of race.

Probably the most devoted and incisive cultural nationalist theorist has been Harold Cruse. In two early and highly original books (1967, 1968), Cruse argued that “The only observable way in which the Negro rebellion can become revolutionary in terms of American conditions is for the Negro movement to project the concept of Cultural Revolution” (1967, 111).

Cruse stressed the unique conditions facing American blacks, conditions which, while related to those encountered by other victims of colonialism, were unlike those of the African continent, the West Indies, or elsewhere. Cruse also accepted certain “domestic colonialism” concepts; indeed, he gave voice to them as early as 1962 (Cruse 1962). Anticipating the “black power” view, he criticized the civil rights movement in the early 1960s for being dominated by liberal ideas and demands:

This Negro rebellion, mistakenly called by some the Negro revolution, is not revolutionary because it projects no new ideas beyond what have already been ratified in the democratic philosophy of the American Constitution.

(Cruse 1967, 111–112)

He proposed that the movement “incorporate ... a cultural program along with its economic, social, and political programs” (ibid). A “cultural program,” in Cruse’s view, would recognize both the unique characteristics of black cultural traditions, and the essential part that these cultural elements—for example, in music, art, or language—played in the cultural life of the United States. Cruse suggested that the black movement focus its demands on “the creation and distribution of cultural production in America” (ibid, 117). The ultimate aim of this challenge, Cruse argued, was “the revolutionizing ... of the entire apparatus of cultural communication and placing it under public ownership” (ibid, 112).

This approach raised as many questions as it answered. How the cultural apparatus could be so transformed, how blacks could affect cultural production under the proposed new “revolutionary” conditions, and what would be the ultimate social and political impact of such changes, were only a few of the issues Cruse did not address. What was significant about his work, however, was not its immediate practical application. Rather, his accomplishment lay in the development of a culturally based radical perspective. His positions reframed debates between integrationists and nationalists in the later 1960s and 1970s. He re-opened questions that had lain dormant for nearly



half a century.<sup>27</sup> In many ways Cruse explored the terrain upon which later figures of this current such as Maulana Karenga and Imamu Amiri Baraka would stand (on Karenga, see Brown 2003; on Baraka, see Benston 1976; Woodard 1999; Watts 2001.).

Many black nationalists embraced African values, traditions, culture, and language through Pan-Africanism, or became adherents of groups such as Karenga's US Organization or Baraka's Spirit House in Newark, New Jersey, without becoming Pan-Africanists politically. Cultural nationalism had many indirect effects on black "lifestyle": clothes, hair, language, and art reflected the perspective's upsurge. African heritage was often invoked to support domestic ideological and political aims.<sup>28</sup>

Cultural nationalism has taken a wide variety of forms among Latin@s, Asian Americans, and Native Americans as well. It has developed during the post-World War II period in rough correspondence with the rise and fall of racial justice movements, immigration rates and policies, and political-economic conditions. These racialized ethnic/national groups have undergone huge transformations over recent decades. To mention only a few of the major shifts:

- Latin@ and Asian immigration rates soared after passage of the 1965 Immigration and Nationality Act, dramatically changing U.S. racial demography over the medium to long term;
- U.S. wars and imperial adventures, notably in Asia, Central America, the Caribbean, and the Middle East, have focused attention and increased the numbers of such U.S.-based diasporic communities—Korean, Salvadoran, Vietnamese, and MEASA Americans, among others;<sup>29</sup>
- The linkage between U.S. domestic and global racial policies and the breakdown of moderate racial reformism after about 1970 generated a wide variety of radical movement groups across many communities of color; the legacy of SNCC and the influence of the Black Panther Party also were significant in this process, which generated the Young Lords, the Brown Berets, the American Indian Movement, the Asian American Political Alliance, and similar groups (Chávez 1998; Pulido 2006; Erick-Wanzer, ed. 2010; Ogbar 2001; Fujino 2012).

As anti-racist movements gained strength in the 1960s, they brought with them a sense of collective identity, race pride, and deepened interest in "roots" at various levels: family, community, and history. All these tendencies flowed together towards cultural nationalist politics, as larger numbers of people in communities of color moved to reject the assimilationism offered by mainstream (often white liberal), moderate currents in the civil rights movement and grounded in ethnicity theory. This was particularly true for youth and those influenced by student movements.

In the late 1960s and early 1970s, black student associations, deeply attuned to the civil rights and black power movements, as well as Latin@ student groups like the *Movimiento Estudiantil Chicano@ de Aztlán* (MEChA), carried out numerous demonstrations and occupations on college campuses, demanding the creation of

“ethnic studies” programs and the hiring of more faculty of color.<sup>30</sup> This movement began—as it usually does—in California, but soon became a national one, issuing a series of manifestos in support of black, brown, red, and yellow power,<sup>31</sup> and linking to anti-war movements and other national and international insurgencies as well. The year 1968, for example, was a moment of global student unrest in New York, Paris, Mexico City, Tokyo, Prague, and elsewhere.

Parallel to the occupations and conflicts that took place in the arena of higher education, a wide variety of other developments that occurred in the arts and mass media (popular music, film, TV)<sup>32</sup> from the mid-1960s onward may also be described as culturally nationalist: Various manifestos, arts movements, and media-based interventions advocating and celebrating the collective identities and insurgent histories of particular peoples of color appeared at this time, in some respects echoing Harold Cruse’s call for cultural revolution. Such groups as the Black Arts Movement (Smethurst 2005), the Chican@ Asco group in East Los Angeles (Los Angeles County Museum of Art 2011), and the Asian American Kearnly Street Workshop in San Francisco, to name but a few, built upon established national and ethnocultural traditions, both “highbrow” and popular, such as salsa, the vast black musical canon, the *muralista* movement in Mexico, and various literary and visual genres, all in the effort to express (and invent) emancipatory concepts of racial/national identity.

Yet for all its political aspirations, cultural nationalism was limited by its focus on expression rather than action. Although there were instances in which cultural action could be linked very directly to community-based action, such as the work of Sun Ra’s Arkestra and Horace Tapscott’s Pan Afrikan Peoples Arkestra, groups which combined jazz performance with music education and protest activity in Philadelphia and South Central Los Angeles respectively (on Sun Ra see Szwed 1998; on Tapscott see Tapscott 2001; Lipsitz 2007), much of black art or brown art could be coopted and commodified with relative ease. There was, it turned out, nothing inherently radical about dashikis, Kemet, or the concept of “soul,” or for that matter about the Aztec heritage, pupusas, menudo, or fry bread. As Adolph L. Reed, Jr. noted in respect to black cultural nationalism:

[T]he intellectual climate which came to pervade the movement was best summarized in the nationalists’ exhortation to “think black”.... Truth became a feature of the speaker’s “blackness,” i.e., validity claims were to be resolved not through discourse but by the claimant’s manipulation of certain banal symbols of legitimacy.

(Reed, in Glaude 2002, 52)

Demographic, economic, and political fissures within communities of color—whose “unity” and “peoplehood” had been central features of cultural nationalist theory—increasingly became too obvious to ignore. By the 1970s and 1980s, faced with some of these changes, leading adherents moved on to new political horizons. Some, notably Baraka, made spectacular and belated conversions to Marxism-Leninism and

Maoism, subsuming their original “racial” projects under broader “class” ones; these too would prove to have serious limits.

In sum, cultural nationalism built “countercultural” institutions, and wound up occupying a broad political spectrum that extended from the creation of small (though sometimes influential) alternative institutions like bookstores and schools, all the way to a “black capitalism” not too different from what Frazier had characterized in *Black Bourgeoisie* (1957a). Too often, though certainly not in all cases, cultural nationalist approaches neglected the key political determinants of race—the racial state, class conflict, the politics of alliance and coalitions—preferring expressive authenticity to political engagement.

The real accomplishment of cultural nationalist currents was in the nature of community service and education: “consciousness-raising.” This is not to be sneezed at. An immense amount of interpretive and expressive work, and community organization based on culturally grounded themes such as music and art, has burst onto the American scene in recent decades. Making use of hip-hop, Indian rock, punk rock, talk radio, music videos, and social media of various kinds, the cultural politics of race have been redefined since in the 1960s. Sun Ra and Horace Tapscott’s work has been continued by George Clinton, Rage Against the Machine and Tom Morello, Lupe Fiasco, The Roots, Michael Franti, Das Racist, X-Clan, and innumerable others. Race-based cultural politics, and thus something very close to cultural nationalism, continues as a durable feature of American life. This underscores the centrality of cultural domination as a component of racial oppression, and stresses the importance of “cultures of resistance” in unifying and promoting collective identity among the oppressed.

*The “National Question” and Marxism:* Classical Marxism viewed nations and national boundaries as increasingly meaningless as world capitalism inexorably penetrated every corner of the planet. Marx and Engels stated this perspective clearly in *The Communist Manifesto* and viewed it as a “progressive” feature of the unfolding capitalist order:

National differences and antagonisms between peoples are daily more and more vanishing, owing to the development of the bourgeoisie, to freedom of commerce, to the world market, to uniformity in the mode of production and in the conditions of life corresponding thereto.

(Marx and Engels 1968 [1848], 55)

This was not their final word on the subject, though. Indeed the idea of a tendential abolition of national boundaries and antagonisms is undermined in other writings of Marx. For example, addressing the national question with specific reference to Ireland, Marx argues that the bourgeoisie not only maintains but *heightens* national antagonisms. National hostilities are engendered by

- The struggle to control world markets, which creates conflicts among capitalist powers;

- The exploitation of colonies, which creates antagonism between oppressed and oppressor nations; and
- The use of nationalism as an ideological tool to deflect proletarian attention away from class antagonisms (Marx and Engels 1972a, 1972b; Lowy 1976).

This contradictory stance towards the persistence or demise of nations is further complicated by an implicit stage theory of development that views colonial penetration and plunder as progressive events: They are seen as rupturing traditional and “backward” social relations and supplanting them with modern capitalist ones.

Marx and Engels did not resolve the “national question,” largely because it did not fit within the class struggle/mode of production problematic. Nationalism and empire occasioned significant debates during the period of the Second International.<sup>33</sup> An important polemical exchange between Lenin and Luxemburg, for example, revolves around the “right of nations to self-determination.” Lenin argued that all nations should be free from national oppression and enjoy the right to determine their own destiny.<sup>34</sup> Luxemburg was critical of this “right to self-determination,” which led in her view to a certain pandering to the aspirations of the national bourgeoisies of the “oppressed” countries. Both Lenin and Luxemburg attempted to steer a course between positions which asserted an unqualified right to national/cultural autonomy, and a position which completely denied the legitimacy of nationalist aspirations (Luxemburg 1976 [1909]).

The legacy of these debates on the national question was subsequently invoked to analyze the situation of blacks in the United States. Prior to 1928, the Communist Party of the United States had attributed no special role or status to blacks (or other “national minorities”) within the general class struggle. Comintern (aka the Third International or the Communist International) discussions between 1928 and 1930, however, resulted in the “Black Nation Thesis”: that blacks in the southern region known as the Black Belt (supposedly named for the soil) constituted a nation and were therefore entitled to “self-determination”—including the right of political secession. Blacks in the North were considered an oppressed “national minority” whose salvation was to be sought in solidarity with white workers in the struggle for socialism (Allen 1974).

The criteria for the thesis were drawn from a 1908 pamphlet by Joseph Stalin, who had proposed a formula of four defining characteristics of a nation:

A nation is a historically constituted, stable community of people, formed on the basis of a common language, territory, economic life, and psychological make-up, manifested in a common culture.

(Stalin 1975 [1908], 22)

In 1928 what Stalin said was not to be questioned. The Black Nation Thesis was both dogmatic and inapplicable to the United States, but it was adopted anyway, in

an effort to resolve contradictions within the Communist Party due to racism. Most important, it was intended to help the party compete with Garveyism and other supposedly "bourgeois" separatist trends in the black community.

The Communist Party adhered only fitfully to this increasingly marginal analysis. Between 1936 and the early 1950s, the right to self-determination was subordinated to the New Deal and the war against fascism.<sup>35</sup> Between 1955 and 1959, the party moved to discard the thesis entirely, recognizing that black migration from the South had eroded its political viability. After dying this slow death, the thesis was exhumed by various Marxist-Leninist groups in the 1970s (Revolutionary Union n.d.; October League 1976). There never was any consensus about the application, or indeed the meaning, of the Black Nation Thesis on the Marxist-Leninist left.

Lacking an orthodox Marxist theory of racism, and unable to examine U.S. society without a comforting pillow of citations from the "classics," Marxists of all varieties have performed some strenuous theoretical labor in their efforts to apply the literature on the "national question" to racial dynamics in the United States. The general practice has been to substitute national categories for racial ones. The corresponding political rights, such as self-determination for "legitimate" nations, can then be asserted. The result has been confusion and endless debate over the appropriate criteria for "nationhood."<sup>36</sup> For Marxist-Leninists, nation-based approaches became little more than a convenient way to deal with the messy and undertheorized concepts of race and racism.

*Internal Colonialism:* The internal colonialism perspective has been applied to nationalist movements in many countries, among them France, Peru, South Africa, and Great Britain (Cotler 1970; Berger 1972; Wolpe 1975; Hechter 1998 [1975]). In the United States, the concept achieved great currency in the late 1960s and early 1970s (although earlier formulations, such as that of Cruse, can be found), when various writers employed it to account for the upsurge in racial minority militance. The radical nationalist movements that (re)surfaced in black, Latin@, Native American, and Asian American communities at this time generally rejected reform-oriented politics, preferring to link their struggles with those of such national liberation movements as the Vietnamese, Algerian, or Chinese revolutions.

Internal colonialism approaches attempted the synthesis of different aspects of racial oppression: economic, political, and cultural, through the invocation of a colonial model. In most cases they appealed as well to nationalist forms of mobilization against this generalized system of oppression. Among the elements of internal colonialism which analysts identified were:

- A colonial *geography* emphasizing the territoriality or spatial arrangement of population groups along racial lines;
- A dynamic of *cultural domination and resistance*, in which racial categories were utilized to distinguish between antagonistic colonizing and colonized groups, and conversely, to emphasize the essential cultural unity and autonomy of each;

- A system of *superexploitation*, understood as a process by which extra-economic coercion was applied to the racially identified colonized group, with the aim of increasing the economic resources appropriated by the colonizers.
- Institutionalization of *externally-based control*, such that the racially identified colonized group is organized in essential political and administrative aspects by the colonizers or their agents.

In some cases militant groups themselves adopted analyses of their conditions and demands based on internal colonialism arguments; in others, scholarly treatments brought these perspectives to bear. Notable studies were devoted to the black and Chican@ communities (Moore 1970; Barrera, Muñoz, and Ornelas 1972; Barrera 2002 [1979]; Flores 1973; Allen 1990 [1970]; Ture [Carmichael] and Hamilton 1992 [1967]).

Internal colonialists argued that the ghetto and barrio were in fact colonized territory (Boggs 1970). Robert Blauner's *Racial Oppression in America* is probably the most familiar general discussion of race in the U.S. written from an internal colonialism perspective, and the one most "tailored" to U.S. conditions (Blauner 2001 [1972], 2011).<sup>37</sup> Blauner had two central preoccupations: The first was to provide theoretical arguments with which to counter the dominant ethnicity paradigm of race in the United States. The second crucial commitment in Blauner's work was his identification with the radical nationalist politics of the 1960s. Blauner acknowledged the intellectual influence of movement theory and practice on his work, and counterposed its radical depth to the complacency of the ethnicity-oriented sociology he criticized.<sup>38</sup> He explicitly sought to deepen radical nationalist practice by grafting internal colonialism theory onto it.

Blauner employed the distinction between "colonized and immigrant minorities" to criticize the ethnic group paradigm. By "colonized" minorities he meant those whose presence in the United States was the result of "forced entry," a criterion that seeks to distinguish between those (Africans and Latin Americans) whose entry into the country was the direct result of processes of colonialism and slavery and those (Europeans) who "became ethnic groups and minorities within the United States by the essentially voluntary movements of individuals and families" (2001 [1972], 55). In using the distinction between coerced and voluntary migration, superimposing it, so to speak, on the race/ethnicity distinction, Blauner was on somewhat shaky ground. The line between coerced and voluntary migration is far from clear: consider the Irish emigrations in the 1840s, for example, or Jewish emigrations from Russia at the turn of the 20th century. In these cases, mass starvation (imposed by the British as a form of what we today might call "ethnic cleansing") and widespread pogroms (organized campaigns of murder, rape, and expulsions of impoverished and stigmatized people), seem to be sufficiently violent, and to cause sufficient desperation, to qualify as coercive practices, even if their monstrosity does not fully attain the levels of predation and mass murder achieved by the



Atlantic slave trade.<sup>39</sup> Further problems arise when we consider Asian immigration: coerced or voluntary, racial or ethnic? When we apply the Blauner's approach to contemporary patterns of global racism and migration, still other difficulties arise, for example: massive trafficking of living human bodies (preponderantly women) to the United States that combines coerced and voluntary dimensions; refugee and asylum policies shaped by U.S. government *realpolitik*; and post-1965 shifts in "voluntary" immigration from Africa, the Philippines, the Caribbean, and China (Zolberg 2008).

In respect to Blauner's second point of emphasis, derived chiefly from the militant black politics of the late 1960s—his "basic thesis that the most important expressions of protest in the black community reflect the colonized status of Afro-America" (2001 [1972], 89)—the internal colonialism approach also fares poorly, especially in a more contemporary perspective. None of the protest phenomena Blauner cites (ghetto riots, cultural nationalism, ghetto-based "community control" movements) necessitates the internal colonialism perspective as an analytical framework. For example, ghetto uprisings have been explained as an extension of "normal" politics when institutionalized channels of political expression are blocked (Piven and Cloward 1978). As the 1992 Los Angeles riots showed, urban revolt is now a multiracial phenomenon: black, brown, and even a bit white, and with Asians often targeted along with whites (Rutten 1992; Gooding-Williams 1993; Kim 2008).

What is "nationalist" about race-based social movements is a matter of considerable ambiguity and debate. Ghetto community control demands have proved subject to quite moderate (or "reformist") interpretation, besides proving to be at best "too little, too late" as key decisions about the cities' fate are made elsewhere. There is nothing inherently democratic about "community control"; it should be remembered that Richard Nixon was a major proponent of affirmative action, community control, and black capitalism, all of which he rearticulated to serve as "divide and conquer" strategies for the diffusion and demobilization of the black power movement (Perlstein 2008; Goldberg and Griffey, eds. 2010; Hill and Rabig, eds. 2012). At best, such programs can provide employment and training, and, of course, support for progressive sectors of the "black bourgeoisie" (see Cross 1974). At worst, such demands provide grounds for rearticulation in new right or neoconservative analyses and programs, for example to provide code words for opposition to busing or welfare rights.

Blauner's internal colonialism approach neglected the cleavages that exist within communities of color, notably class- and gender-based ones. He did not address inter-group rivalries either: "black-brown" and black-Asian conflicts, for example. Finally, the extensive "hybridization" of racial cultures in the U.S. societies went largely untheorized. Though it is hardly as complete as an ethnicity theorist like Glazer might wish to argue, the extensive mixture of racial identities and communities in the (still very segregated) United States casts doubt on the internal colonialism analogy in respect to territoriality, at the very least.<sup>40</sup> Racial hybridity also suggests

limits to other elements of the nation-based paradigm in the U.S. context. The cultural domination/cultural autonomy tension so central to cultural nationalism, for example, appears to be but one element of a broader cultural dynamic that includes both the distinctiveness and the interaction of whiteness, blackness, and brownness, at a minimum. In the same way, the concept of “superexploitation,” something central to Marxist accounts of race and nation, does not adequately address contemporary economic developments which include marginalization and permanent dependency for many, on the one hand, and significant “upward mobility” for some, on the other.

In many respects, then, there are limits to nation-based approaches to race. It is quite understandable why the epochal history of racial nationalism—notably black nationalism—was grafted onto or analogized to the national liberation struggles that swept the planet during the post-World War II period. The political affinities between domestic, U.S.-based racial freedom struggles and the anti-colonial battles of Vietnam, Algeria, and elsewhere, were linkages and overlaps of great resonance and importance. But because accords were grounded in political considerations and not theoretically or analytically worked out, they could not sustain the internal colonialist version of nation-based racial theory.

### **Some Critical Remarks on the Nation-Based Paradigm**

How effectively does the nation-based paradigm account for racial dynamics? In fact, the connection is tenuous. Both the U.S. system of racial oppression and colonial systems of racial rule composed of colonizers and colonized made use of racial distinctions. But in the present period the two cannot be compared in more than a general way. All the specifically national aspects of the internal colonialism perspective (geography, culture, extra-economic coercion, and external political rule), while remaining true in a general fashion, are contradictory and problematic when examined in detail. While segregation is still extensive, it varies widely by class and racial category; culture is racially hybridized to an unprecedented degree. As we have already noted, extra-economic coercion, what David Harvey calls “accumulation by dispossession” (Harvey 2004) is a general feature of neoliberalism, and not only a matter of structural racism; and external political rule also operates fairly comprehensively under the present-day oligarchical regime of the United States.

Racial oppression and white supremacy retain their power, but these patterns and social structures have been reorganized and rearticulated over the post-World War II period, and especially since the late 1960s, in ways that render the nation-based paradigm of race problematic. As applied to the contemporary United States (with significant if partial exceptions such as Native American conditions or the cases of Puerto Rico and Hawai’i), the appeal of nationalism, in political practice or in theory, appears to be limited. This is true across the board: for the various cultural nationalisms, for Marxist accounts, and for internal colonialism theories as well. In our view,

the nation-based paradigm of race is an important component of our understanding of race: in highlighting “peoplehood,” collective identity, it “invents tradition” (Hobsbawm and Ranger, eds. 1983) and “imagines community” (Anderson 1998). Nation-based understandings of race provide affective identification: They promise a sense of ineffable connection within racially identified groups; they engage in “collective representation” (Durkheim 2014). The tropes of “soul,” of “folk,” of *hermanos/hermanas unidos/unidas* uphold Duboisian themes. They channel Martí’s hemispheric consciousness (Martí 1977 [1899]); and Vasconcelos’s ideas of *la raza cósmica* (1979; Stavans 2011). In communities and movements, in the arts and popular media, as well as universities and colleges (especially in ethnic studies) these frameworks of peoplehood play a vital part in maintaining a sense of racial solidarity, however uneven or partial.

So the nation-based paradigm remains valuable, but cannot capture the complexity of U.S. racial dynamics across the board. In this respect it parallels the other two paradigms we have discussed: ethnicity-based theory and class-based theory. Because it is based on a reductionism of race—in this case to the idea of “peoplehood”—it cannot grasp the phenomenon comprehensively.

Unlike many of the old colonial nations, and possibly because it was created in an anti-colonial revolution, the U.S. political scene allows insurgent racial nationalisms little space. It does preserve and protect *white* racial nationalism, not only as a popular ideology, but as a respectable intellectual position. This is visible not only on the political and academic right-wing (Swain 2002; Walters 2003), but also among centrist and liberal scholars, including those identified with the ethnicity paradigm (Glazer 1997; Thernstrom and Thernstrom 1999; Lipset 2003 [1963]). White racial nationalism remains the bedrock of the U.S. right wing, and much of its liberal center as well (Amadae 2003). This normalization of whiteness is often quite invisible to leading U.S. nationalists, who prefer to celebrate “western civilization” and the “triumph of democracy” (Smith 2003).<sup>41</sup>

Insurgent nationalisms tend to *reduce* race to a taken-for-granted “peoplehood,” but they do take it seriously. They do not dismiss it as a mask for something else, as do both the ethnicity- and class-based approaches. Yet insurgent variants of the nation-based paradigm of race fail to demonstrate the existence of relatively homogeneous black, brown, or other colonized “nations,” notably internally colonized peoples whose claims to “self-determination” in the United States might be logical and workable.<sup>42</sup> Despite the ongoing realities of structural racism, the vast increase in the incarcerated black and brown population over the past three decades, and the deepening of economic inequality since the onset of the great recession in 2008, U.S. communities of color remain highly stratified by class and gender, vastly differentiated by age cohorts, and more hybridized culturally—as well as through mixed-race relationships and identities—than was ever the case before. Therefore nation-based accounts cannot sustain the argument that the ghettos and barrios are so thoroughly and structurally separated from U.S. society overall that they could be reorganized in

democratic and egalitarian fashion along the lines of “self-determination” and “community control.” While these notions may have some emotional resonance for those who are simply “sick and tired of being sick and tired” (Nappy Roots 2003), in practical terms such measures would represent the opposite of an emancipatory solution to problems of segregation, isolation, and exploitation. Not that practical measures of this type are feasible, but if they were, they would more likely take the form of South African “bantustans” or “townships” than they would of liberated territory.

Nation-based theories of race still practice epiphenomenalism. They treat race as a manifestation of “peoplehood”—and thus still reduce it to a something supposedly more fundamental. We argue that race is not a mask for something else. It cannot be reduced to the “true” national identity of a racially categorized people—as the nation-based paradigm would claim. It cannot be reduced to cultural differences—as the ethnicity-based paradigm suggests. And it cannot be reduced to a type of inequality either—as the class-based paradigm suggests. Although race contains all these dimensions, it exceeds them all as well.

Perhaps it is the very inability of the nation-based account to specify precisely what exactly is “national” about racial oppression in the United States that leads it to lend a certain primacy and integrity to racial phenomena. The ethnicity and class paradigms, working from more secure assumptions about the “primacy” of their paradigmatic categories, tend to dissolve the unity of racially constituted groups more easily than the nation paradigm does.

## Notes

1. Imperialism and conquest had been inherent in the making of modern European nations themselves. Even today many European nations are uneasy aggregations of distinct peoples forged by conquest: consider Scots or Catalan nationalisms today, for example. The transoceanic imperial adventures of the European powers were therefore extensions of earlier transitions to nation-states. Though that process was already well underway, it was expanded significantly after the politically foundational Treaties of Westphalia ended the Thirty-Years War in 1648 (Bobbitt 2002; Geary 2002).
2. For an overview of the linkages between U.S. and global racial politics, see Winant 2001. A substantial literature now links domestic racial policy and U.S. foreign policy in respect to the international coordination of racial rule. For example, the CIA worked with the BOSS, the apartheid-era South African secret police. On the flip side of this, these linkages were also recognized by radical democratic oppositions: SNCC, the South African ANC or Algerian FLN, and many other anti-racist and antiwar organizations around the world explicitly made these connections, especially during the 1960s (Dudziak 2011; Kelley 2003; Singh 2004; Hanchard 2006; Prashad 2007). Movement efforts to identify anti-imperial struggles in the “Third World” (the then-current term for the Global South), with anti-racism politics on the domestic front (“in the belly of the beast”) have a very long history.
3. Debates on the dynamics of whiteness are extensive. We recognize the importance of “privilege” in the constitution of whiteness, but resist the reduction of white identity to

*nothing more* than privilege. We note that while whites generally benefit materially from racism and thus have an interest in perpetuating it (Harris 1993; Lipsitz 2006), they are also hurt by racism and therefore have contrary interests in reducing or ending it. Consider: about 750,000 Americans died in the Civil War, for example; the majority of them were white (Faust 2009; Gugliotta 2012).

4. In Europe as well, citizenship rights were only gradually extended (and even more gradually granted in practice) to immigrants, Jews, and nonwhites. In Germany *jus sanguinis* policies were continued from the formation of the nation, through the Third Reich, and into the establishment of the EU, when they were finally relaxed only in the 1990s (Brubaker 1992). French “racial differentialism” (Taguieff 1999, 2001) struggles in vain to reconcile the exclusion and despair of the *banlieues* with the Jacobin/Napoleonic legacies of assimilationism and secularism (Wieviorka 1995; Noiriel 1996; Silverstein 2004).
5. South Africa explicitly institutionalized the *herrenvolk* model, first piecemeal, and then systematically after 1948. All the European empires struggled to distinguish between metropolitans/citizens and colonials/natives, especially as mixed-race populations expanded, miscegenation became commonplace, and “creoles,” “wogs,” “kaffirs,” “beurs,” and “Indos” established themselves in London, Paris, Lisbon, Amsterdam, and elsewhere (Stoler 2002).
6. There are more women than men in the United States, and for the first time, more women than men in the U.S. labor force.
7. What few legal, political, or cultural constraints there were on Indian expulsions or land seizures were ignored in practice. The most famous case was Andrew Jackson defiance of the Supreme Court’s ruling in *Worcester v Georgia* (31 U.S. 515, 1832): writing for the Court, Chief Justice John Marshall ruled that the Cherokee were a sovereign nation and therefore not subject to the Indian Removal Act, which Jackson supported. Jackson’s famous response was, “Justice Marshall has made his decision. Let him enforce it now if he can.” Jackson’s defiance paved the way for the “Trail of Tears” forced march of the Cherokee from their homes in Georgia to the Oklahoma territory. See Rogin 1991.
8. Neither race nor class were ever fully worked-out and definitive characteristics of the early U.S. social system: from the early days the presence of free blacks, the abolitionist impulse, and the extensive overlap between the categories of “servant” and “slave” had both intensified and muddled the waters of racial despotism (Roediger 2007 [1991]). And the ill-defined and preliminary forms of capitalist development also vitiated clear distinctions of class: who or what was a “worker” and who a “servant” was being determined in the shoe factories of Lynn, Massachusetts, at the same time that the slave system was shaping U.S. exports, shipping, and investment opportunities (Dawley 2000 [1975]). Although most slaves were rural laborers, there was also industrial slavery (Starobin 1970) and of course extensive domestic slavery (mainly but not entirely female).
9. Brown (1998) provides a good overview of the historiography of gender and race in early North America, focusing on its late emergence under the influence of the civil rights and second-wave feminist movements. See also Hodes 1997; Gordon 2001; Gilmore 1996; and Bederman 1996 on the intersections of race, gender, and national identity in the United States. Mosse 1997 (1981); Radhakrishnan 1992; Stoler 2002; and McClintock 1995 link race, gender, and nation in the global context of imperialism.
10. A word to which we object, since it signifies “misbreeding.” It was “coined in the election of 1864 by Northern Democrats, who used it to denounce Lincoln Republicans as advocates of interracial sex” (Woodward 1998).

11. As Martha Hodes (1997) has shown, in the slave South before the Civil War, there existed many varieties of intimate relationships, including marriages, between white women and black men. After the war, the southern regime became far more brutal and terroristic, in the age of the KKK and under the command of Judge Lynch. By then a great deal of interracial breeding had occurred. Mixed-race identity undermined and threatened the system of racial classification on which slavery and Jim Crow were based. After the war interracial liaisons grew far more dangerous, and white antagonism to them became ever more irrational and violent. See also Williamson 1986.
12. Urged on by the Kennedy administration and various liberal foundations and policy groups, SNCC had deeply committed itself to voter registration work in Mississippi. In return it was subject to unremitting KKK violence. The torture and murders of the three SNCC workers Chaney, Goodman, and Schwerner during the 1964 SNCC-led "Freedom Summer" project—a voting rights effort—were just the most publicized of these vicious reprisals. The Johnson administration, focused on the 1964 election and still pandering to the South, offered very little support and almost no protection to the effort its predecessor—especially Robert Kennedy—had sponsored. When the SNCC-led alternate Mississippi delegation to the national convention, known as the Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party, arrived in Atlantic City, it was rudely dismissed. Offered two seats in the state delegation, the MFDP (Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party)—led by civil rights hero Fannie Lou Hamer—criticized Lyndon Johnson ferociously and publically. SNCC went on to complete its turn, already well underway, to black power and the anti-imperialist left. See Payne 2007 (1995); Lee 2000; Carson 1995 (1981).
13. Malcolm's assassination in February of 1965 (at the age of 40) significantly narrowed the prospects for the creative development of black nationalist politics in the U.S. In Malcolm's final few years he had not only developed his own independent political orientation, but had also crafted the beginnings of a creative and autonomous black nationalist politics that combined internationalism, socialism, religious syncretism, and anti-racism. That approach to black nationalism would never come to fruition. See Marable 2011.
14. All previous race riots in U.S. history had been white attacks on people of color and their communities (Rucker and Upton, eds. 2006).
15. In 1854, for example, a National Emigration Convention was held at Pittsburgh, with Delany in the leadership, which called for emigration "towards those places where the black and colored man [sic] comprise, by population ... the ruling element of the body politic" (Bracey, Meier, and Rudwick, eds. 1970, 93).
16. Immanuel Wallerstein's term has now entered the social scientific canon; it intersects with race theory at multiple points. Original an anti-colonial sociologist of Africa, Wallerstein has written on race and racism fairly extensively. See Balibar and Wallerstein 2011, among other sources.
17. Peruvian sociologist Anibal Quijano (2000; see also Mignolo 2011) has developed a theory of "the coloniality of power" to account for the persistence of structures of unequal power in postcolonial societies. Quijano asks how racism, and racial categories themselves, managed to survive and indeed deepen in the aftermath of colonial rule throughout the global South. What accounts for the resilience, not only of racial inequality and exclusion from the political process of, say, indigenous and African people in Peru, long after the end of Spanish colonialism there?



18. A sixth (or seventh, depending on which events are counted) Pan-African Congress was held in Tanzania in 1974.
19. Garvey's origins were as a labor insurgent in Jamaica. See among many statements his "Speech at Royal Albert Hall." In Clarke 2011 (1974), 284–299.
20. Garvey visited Ku Klux Klan headquarters in June, 1922, and subsequently declared his agreement with the Klan that "this is a white man's country." He also flirted with the Anglo-Saxon Clubs of America, a white supremacist group led by one John Powell. His connection with such groups was certainly ill-advised, but his motivation in making these contacts has never been sufficiently explained. He was obviously not in agreement with such groups on white supremacy itself. See Moore in Clarke, ed. 2011 (1974), 225, 233–234. For a strong contemporary critique of authoritarianism in Garvey—and in black nationalism more generally—see Gilroy 2000.
21. Even opposing tendencies of black nationalism were influenced. For example, it is unlikely that the Communist Party would have adopted its "black nation" approach in 1928 had not Party leaders both in the United States and in Moscow become alarmed at Garvey's successes.
22. On Carmichael's 1967 meetings with Sekou Toure and Kwame Nkrumah, see Carson 1995 (1981), 276. Carmichael later founded a small Pan-Africanist party in the United States, the All African Peoples Revolutionary Party.
23. See Fredrickson 1995; Comaroff and Comaroff 1991, 1997. Of course, there were some exceptions. We have already mentioned U.S. black colonization movements. The early involvement of George Washington Williams—an extraordinary 19th-century U.S. black activist and intellectual—in the effort to curtail the genocidal practices in the Congo of King Leopold II of Belgium, also deserves notice. See Hochschild 1998; Franklin 1998 (1985).
24. In Angola, the U.S. and the USSR fought a "hot" proxy war for a quarter-century: from 1975 to 2002. Angola, a major oil-producing state, became independent in 1975 after Portugal's decrepit fascist regime was overthrown, largely by colonial soldiers disgusted with counterinsurgency warfare in Portugal's African colonies. Two anti-imperialist Angolan movements, the MPLA and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), then commenced a brutal civil war for control of the resource-rich country. The MPLA, a Marxist group, received support from the USSR; the UNITA declared itself "anti-communist" and gained U.S. backing. Neighboring South Africa—a U.S. ally and then still an apartheid state—invaded in support of UNITA. Cuba, a USSR ally, sent in troops in support of the MPLA. The MPLA achieved victory only in 2002; an estimated 500,000 people died, and the country was largely destroyed.
25. The U.S. steadily backed the apartheid regime on Cold War grounds, branding the opposition ANC as communist, maintaining clandestine CIA ties with BOSS (the South Africa Bureau of State Security), and resisting a rising movement for democratization at home that included an anti-corporate boycott campaign and extensive civil disobedience. The fall of the regime was met with great excitement in the U.S., especially in the black community. Still, within the Pan-Africanist current there were echoes of the divisions that had arisen over Angola: right-wing support for Inkatha, and Afrocentrist support for the South African Pan-Africanist Congress, the organization founded by Robert Sobukwe in opposition to the "non-racialism" of the ANC. On Sobukwe see Pogrud 1991; Fredrickson 1991.

26. NEPAD has been strongly criticized from the left as a new sub-imperialist cartel in which South Africa dominates but Nigeria, Algeria, and the Organization of African Unity (OAU) also play important roles (Bond 2002, 2010).
27. Cruse's contention that the demand for "public ownership" of the cultural apparatus formed the basis for a new revolutionary nationalist politics was unrealistic. The *integration* of the U.S. cultural apparatus, on the other hand, proved possible, though not without ongoing struggle. A more conservative version of black cultural nationalism, akin to notions of "black capitalism," may be seen here. Robert Allen has noted the hegemonic dimensions of this process (Allen 1990 [1970], 179). Political battles within hip-hop, and struggles over TV and Hollywood "production values" with respect to race/class/gender, were all prefigured in Cruse's work.
28. A vast cultural nationalist literature seeks to establish links between U.S. black *habitus* and the (sometimes idealized and stereotyped) African motherland. Discussions here often intersect with long-standing debates in the anthropology of race. See Asante 1998; Moses 1998; Glaude, ed. 2002.
29. For a systematic treatment of the relationship over historical time between U.S. imperialism in Latin America and the emergence of Latin@ politics at home, see Gonzalez 2011 [2001].
30. To a large extent the presence on U.S. college and university campuses of ethnic studies departments and programs, multicultural centers, and recognized race-based organizations of various kinds is the product of these actions. Though still uneven and sometimes beleaguered in budgetary battles and ideological disputes, the institutionalization of ethnic studies has been a tremendous political and cultural accomplishment, responsible for reshaping the race consciousness of millions of U.S. students, by no means only students of color, across the United States for nearly half a century. Today, ethnic studies—and the teaching about race and racism in general—faces new challenges, and new attempts to curtail it as well. See Winant 2006; Alcoff 2012).
31. See *El Plan de Santa Barbara*, adopted April 1969 (Chican@ Coordinating Council on Higher Education, 1969).
32. Marlon Riggs's documentary film *Color Adjustment* (1992) traces the transformation of U.S. television from its all-white beginnings in the late 1940s through its various racial conflicts and accommodations up to the late 1980s.
33. The European "empires within" (Austria-Hungary and Tsarist Russia particularly) were the main objects of these debates. External colonies drew less attention, but were certainly not ignored, especially in the work of Luxemburg.
34. Lenin sought to place these "national" conflicts in their international "class" context: the relationship between the proletariat of the "oppressor" nation and the proletariat of the "oppressed" nation (the so-called "aristocracy of labor") was also one of exploitation (Lenin 1970 [1915]). Lenin's ideas on self-determination are productively compared to Woodrow Wilson's—who made this concept central to his position at the 1919 Versailles conference—by Nikhil Pal Singh (2004, 31).
35. As is well-known, the CPUSA undertook some torturous reversals during these years, moving from sectarian attacks on other leftist groups during 1928–1935, then embracing its former rivals in a "popular front" posture until 1939, then attacking them again during the period of the Hitler–Stalin pact (1939–1941), and then making common cause

with leftists and liberals after Germany attacked the Soviet Union in June of 1941. These reversals alienated many left-oriented black nationalists, as they did other anti-racists and progressives. See Robinson 2000 (1983) for the definitive analysis and background on these matters.

36. Some of the analyses are tragically humorous. The Communist Labor Party, a Marxist-Leninist group, understood the black nation in the following manner:

Owing to the specifics of the rise of USNA [United States of North America] imperialism and the history of the Black Belt of the South, there arose a nation, oppressed by USNA imperialism, whose social root and base was the aforementioned Negro people ... Now, when referring to the nation, we use the term Negro and mean national and not color ... In the sense of national, Negroes are both the "black" majority and "white" minority. (Peery 1975, 11)

One can well imagine the success of efforts to organize both blacks and whites in the South on the basis of their common identity as "Negroes."

37. Blauner's approach influenced us very deeply. We pay tribute to him in Omi and Winant 2012. Of course this work, like other "internal colonialism" analyses, can be criticized as well. Blauner departs from the original meaning of the term "colonialism," as Michael Burawoy (1974, 546) has argued. Burawoy offers a definition of colonialism that reasserts the criterion of territoriality in terms which no "internal" application can satisfy:

Colonialism may be defined as the conquest and administration by a "metropolitan country" of a geographically separate territory in order to utilize available resources (usually human or natural) for the creation of surplus which is repatriated to the metropolis.

38. "My own developing framework," Blauner writes, "probably owes more to the social movements of the oppressed than to standard sociology" (2001 [1972], viii).
39. Blauner is not unaware that economic suffering and political persecution in their countries of origin impelled much immigration to the United States, but he notes that these problems, however dire, did not force their victims to come to the U.S. *specifically*. Many European emigrants headed for South America, for example. This seems to us an inadequate foundation on which to rest so important a distinction.
40. Ralph Ellison writes,

What, by the way, are we to make of a white youngster who, with a transistor radio screaming a Stevie Wonder tune glued to his ear, shouts racial epithets at black youngsters trying to swim at a public beach—and this in the name of the ethnic sanctity of what has been declared a neighborhood turf? (1995 [1986])

Charles Gallagher writes,

An adolescent white male at a bar mitzvah wears a FUBU shirt while his white friend preens his tightly set, perfectly braided corn rows. A black model dressed in yachting attire peddles a New England yuppie boating look in Nautica advertisements. It is quite unremarkable to observe whites, Asians, or African Americans with dyed purple, blond, or red hair. White, black, and Asian students decorate their bodies with tattoos of Chinese characters and symbols. In cities and suburbs, young adults across the color line wear hip-hop clothing and listen to white rapper

Eminem and black rapper Jay-Z. A north Georgia branch of the NAACP installs a white biology professor as its president. The music of Jimi Hendrix is used to sell Apple Computers. Du-Rag kits [sic], complete with bandana headscarf and elastic headband are on sale for \$2.95 at hip-hop clothing stores and theme parks like Six Flags. Salsa has replaced ketchup as the best-selling condiment in the United States ... (2003, 22–23; see also Wimsatt 1994)

41. Some writers—for example, Samuel P. Huntington—do argue unabashedly that U.S. civic culture was founded on White Anglo-Saxon Protestant values, and that the ticket for inclusion in “our” society remains full adherence to those values (Huntington 2005).
42. With the partial exceptions of the Puerto Rican, Native Hawai’ian, and Native American peoples, who have more credible claims as racialized nations because of their history of U.S. occupation.

PART II

---

# Racial Formation

This page intentionally left blank



## The Theory of Racial Formation

Race is a way of “making up people.”<sup>1</sup> The very act of defining racial groups is a process fraught with confusion, contradiction, and unintended consequences. Concepts of race prove to be unreliable as supposed boundaries shift, slippages occur, realignments become evident, and new collectivities emerge. State-imposed classifications of race, for example, face continuing challenges by individuals and groups who seek to assert distinctive racial categories and identities. Historical shifts in scientific knowledge, in fields ranging from physical anthropology to the genomic sciences, fuel continuing debates about what race may or may not mean as an indicator of human variation. While such debates and reformulations regarding the concept of race initially occur in specific institutional arenas, public spaces, or academic fields, their consequences are often dramatic and reverberate broadly throughout society.

Race-making can also be understood as a process of “othering.” Defining groups of people as “other” is obviously not restricted to distinctions based on race. Gender, class, sexuality, religion, culture, language, nationality, and age, among other perceived distinctions, are frequently evoked to justify structures of inequality, differential treatment, subordinate status, and in some cases violent conflict and war. Classifying people as other, and making use of various perceived attributes in order to do so, is a universal phenomenon that also classifies (and works to amalgamate and homogenize) those who do the classifying (Blumer 1958). “Making up people” is both basic and ubiquitous. As social beings, we must categorize people so as to be able to “navigate” in the world—to discern quickly who may be friend or foe, to position and situate ourselves within prevailing social hierarchies, and to provide clues that guide our social interactions with the individuals and groups we encounter.

But while the act of categorizing people and assigning different attributes to such categories may be universal, the categories themselves are subject to enormous variation over historical time and space. The definitions, meanings, and overall coherence of prevailing social categories are always subject to multiple interpretations. No social category rises to the level of being understood as a fixed, objective, social fact.

One might imagine, for example, that the category of a person’s “age” (as measured in years) is an objective social category. But even this familiar concept’s meaning varies across time and space. In many societies where the elderly are venerated and highly valued as leaders and living repositories of wisdom, individuals tend to overstate their age in years. By contrast, people in the youth-oriented United States tend to understate how old they are. Processes of classification, including self-classification, are

reflective of specific social structures, cultural meanings and practices, and of broader power relations as well.

The definitions of specific categories are framed and contested from “above” and “below.” The social identities of marginalized and subordinate groups, for example, are both imposed from above by dominant social groups and/or state institutions, and constituted from below by these groups themselves as expressions of self-identification and resistance to dominant forms of categorization. In any given historical moment, one can understand a social category’s prevailing meaning, but such understandings can also be erroneous or transitory. They are often no more than the unstable and tentative result of the dynamic engagement between “elite” and “street” definitions and meanings.

## Race as a Master Category

It is now widely accepted in most scholarly fields that race is a *social construction*. Simply stating that race is socially constructed, however, begs a number of important questions. How is race constructed? How and why do racial definitions and meanings change over time and place? And perhaps most important, what role does race play within the broader social system in which it is embedded?

With respect to this last question, we advance what may seem an audacious claim. We assert that in the United States, *race is a master category*—a fundamental concept that has profoundly shaped, and continues to shape, the history, polity, economic structure, and culture of the United States. Obviously, some clarification is in order. We are not suggesting that race is a transcendent category—something that stands above or apart from class, gender, or other axes of inequality and difference. The literature on intersectionality has clearly demonstrated the mutual determination and co-constitution of the categories of race, class, gender, and sexual orientation. It is not possible to understand the (il)logic of any form of social stratification, any practice of cultural marginalization, or any type of inequality or human variation, without appreciating the deep, complex, comingling, interpenetration of race, class, gender, and sexuality. In the cauldron of social life, these categories come together; they are profoundly transformed in the process.<sup>2</sup>

We hold these truths of intersectional analysis to be self-evident. But we also believe that race has played a unique role in the formation and historical development of the United States. Since the historical encounter of the hemispheres and the onset of transatlantic enslavement were the fundamental acts of race-making, since they launched a global and world-historical process of “making up people” that constituted the modern world, race has become the *template* of both difference and inequality. This is a world-historical claim, but here we develop it only in the context of the United States.

We suggest that the establishment and reproduction of different regimes of domination, inequality, and difference in the United States have consciously drawn

upon concepts of difference, hierarchy, and marginalization based on race. The genocidal policies and practices directed towards indigenous peoples in the conquest and settlement of the “new world,” and towards African peoples in the organization of racial slavery, combined to form a template, a master frame, that has perniciously shaped the treatment and experiences of other subordinated groups as well. This template includes not only the technologies (economic, political, cultural) of exploitation, domination, and deracination; it also includes the technologies of resistance: self-activity (James et al., 1958); “*liberté, égalité, fraternité*,” sisterhood, and abolition democracy (Du Bois 2007 [1935]).

Consider the questions of class and gender. Historically in the United States, race has provided a master category for understanding the definition of class and the patterns of class consciousness, mobilization, and organization. Class stratification in the United States has been profoundly affected by race and racism, and the reproduction of class inequalities is inextricably linked to the maintenance of white supremacy. Race has shaped the meaning of such concepts as work and worker, labor and employment, master and servant, supervisor and subordinate (Roediger 2007 [1991]). Race is a fundamental organizing principle of social stratification. It has influenced the definition of rights and privileges, the distribution of resources, and the ideologies and practices of subordination and oppression. The concept of race as a marker of difference has permeated all forms of social relations. It is a template for the processes of marginalization that continue to shape social structures as well as collective and individual psyches. Drawing upon social psychology and mind science research that explores mechanisms of “othering,” John A. Powell and Stephen Menéndez assert: “Without being identical, most of the forms of marginalization and stratification in society share a common set of heuristics and structure, which is patterned on race” (Powell and Menéndez n.d.).

From conquest and slavery on, racial parallels and racial “crossings” have shaped gender relations. Women and slaves were at best lower-status humans, at worst not human at all. They were both subject to chattelization. Their labor was coerced and unremunerated; they were physically brutalized. Although there were, of course, very distinct and widely varied experiences of subordination among different classes of women and of blacks, the objectification of both groups was near-total. Repression of women’s autonomy, intellect, and bodily integrity was obsessive and often violent (Beauvoir 1989; Federici 2004). Blacks, Indians, and women were afforded very little recognition: Their entry into the public sphere, corporeal integrity, and intellectual capacity was strenuously denied. In political and legal theory, the sexual contract and the racial contract have been extensively compared (Goldman 1911; Rubin 1975; Pateman 1988; Mills 1999).

The corporeal distinction between white men and the others over whom they ruled as patriarchs and masters, then, links race to gender, and people of color to women. Whether they were defined by their racial status (as enslaved or “free,” black, Indian, *mestiz@*), or by the patriarchal family (as daughters, wives, mothers), they

were corporeally stigmatized, permanently rendered as “other than,” and the possessions of, the white men who ruled. As in the case of class distinctions, evolving gender distinctions coincided in important ways with racial ones. In part, this too was corporeal: Perhaps at the core of intersectionality practice, as well as theory, is the “mixed-race” category. Well, how does it come about that people can be “mixed”? What does the presence of mixed people mean for both white and male supremacy?

In short, the master category of race profoundly shaped gender oppression. It is fascinating that this pattern of combined political influence and political tension, which was established in the antebellum intersection between abolitionism and early feminism and reproduced during the struggle for women’s suffrage and against Jim Crow at the turn of the 20th century, was then reiterated again in the post-World War II years in “intersectional” alliance and conflict between the civil rights movement and “second-wave” feminism. To be sure, there were many “intersections” between the two patterns described here. The tense and ultimately ruptural relationship between “first-wave” feminism and the black freedom movement around the turn of the 20th century is perhaps the best-known example: The (white) women’s suffrage movement broke with its former black allies, abandoning black women (and black men too) in the process, as the Jim Crow system was institutionalized in the United States. Southern states’ ratification of the 19th Amendment was conditional on their continued denial of black voting rights. Such black women activists as Ida B. Wells, Mary Church Terrell, and Anna Julia Cooper, as well as many lesser-known figures, fiercely denounced this as a betrayal. Of course, it reflected the pervasive white racism of the epoch (see Crenshaw 1991; Cooper 1998; Collins 2008 [1999]; Davis 2011 [1983]).

While race is a template for the subordination and oppression of different social groups, we emphasize that it is also a template for resistance to many forms of marginalization and domination. The new social movements of the 1960s and 1970s, for example—the women’s movement, the student movement, the anti-war movement, the gay liberation movement—were inspired by and consciously drew upon the black movement’s theoretical insights, strategies, and tactics to organize their specific constituencies, make political demands, and challenge existing practices of exclusion and subordination. These movement challenges underscore the dual-edged and dynamic qualities that inhere in the social category of race. These qualities are, once again, economic, political, and cultural technologies. They involve asserting previously stigmatized identities, “fusing” previously “serialized” groups (Sartre 2004), creating “commons” where resources can be shared. “Making up people” racially, then, has been “portable” across U.S. history. It has spread from one oppressed group to another and proved transferable to other marginalized identities, social cleavages, and political struggles.

Before we can consider and fully evaluate the notion of race as a master category of social organization in the United States, we need to think about how race itself is defined, what meanings are attached to it, and how it is deployed to create,

reproduce, or challenge racist structures. The process of race making, and its reverberations throughout the social order, is what we call *racial formation*. We define racial formation as *the sociohistorical process by which racial identities are created, lived out, transformed, and destroyed*.

Our presentation of racial formation theory proceeds in several steps. First, we provide a concept of *racialization* to emphasize how the phenomic, the corporeal dimension of human bodies, acquires meaning in social life. How are corporeal differences among humans apprehended and given meaning? Next, we advance the concept of *racial projects* to capture the simultaneous and co-constitutive ways that racial meanings are translated into social structures and become racially signified. Then, we discuss the problem of *racism* in an attempt to specify under what conditions a racial project can be defined as *racist*. Finally, we discuss *racial politics*, the way society is racially organized and ruled. Here, we consider *racial despotism*, *racial democracy*, and *racial hegemony* as frameworks for racial rule and racial resistance. We suggest that in the early 21st century the hegemonic concept of race in U.S. society is that of “colorblindness.” The ideological hegemony of colorblindness, however, is extremely contradictory and shallow. It confronts widespread resistance and falls short of achieving the political stability that hegemonic projects are supposed to deliver. This chapter ends there; the post-World War II political trajectory of race is treated in detail in the chapters that follow.

## Racialization

Race is often seen as a social category that is either objective or illusory. When viewed as an objective matter, race is usually understood as rooted in biological differences, ranging from such familiar phenomic markers as skin color, hair texture, or eye shape, to more obscure human variations occurring at the genetic or genomic levels. When viewed as an illusion, race is usually understood as an ideological construct, something that masks a more fundamental material distinction or axis of identity: our three paradigms of ethnicity, class, and nation typify such approaches. Thus race is often treated as a metonym or epiphenomenon of culture (in the ethnicity paradigm), inequality and stratification (in the class paradigm), or primordial peoplehood (in the nation paradigm).

On the “objective” side, race is often regarded as an *essence*, as something fixed and concrete. The three main racial classifications of humans once posed (and now largely rejected) by physical anthropology—Negroid, Caucasoid, and Mongoloid—are examples of such an essentialist perspective. Another example is “mixed-race” identity: To consider an individual or group as “multiracial” or mixed race presupposes the existence of clear, discernible, and discrete races that have subsequently been combined to create a hybrid, or perhaps mongrel, identity. Here race is functioning as a metonym for “species,” although that connection is generally not admitted in the present day.

While race is still popularly understood as essence, it has also been viewed as a mere *illusion*, especially in more recent accounts. As a purely ideological construct, race is considered to be unreal, a product of “false consciousness.” As we have seen in our discussion of class paradigms of race, both orthodox (neoclassical) economics and orthodox Marxism viewed race this way. For the former, it was an irrational distraction from pure, market-based considerations of value in exchange; for the latter it was an ideological tool that capitalists (or sometimes privileged white workers) deployed to prevent the emergence of a unified working-class movement. In the current period, colorblind ideology—expressed, for example, in affirmative action debates—argues that any form of racial classification is itself inherently racist since race is not “real.”

We are critical of both positions: race as essence and race as illusion. Race is not something rooted in nature, something that reflects clear and discrete variations in human identity. But race is also not an illusion. While it may not be “real” in a biological sense, race is indeed real as a social category with definite social consequences. The family, as a social concept, provides an intriguing analogy to grasp the “reality” of race:

We know that families take many forms ... Some family categories correspond to biological categories; others do not. Moreover, boundaries of family membership vary, depending on individual and institutional factors. Yet regardless of whether families correspond to biological definitions, social scientists study families and use membership in family categories in their study of other phenomena, such as well-being. Similarly, racial statuses, although not representing biological differences, are of sociological interest in their form, their changes, and their consequences.

(American Sociological Association 2003, 5)

We cannot dismiss race as a legitimate category of social analysis by simply stating that race is not real. With respect to race, the Thomases’s sociological dictum is still in force: “It is not important whether or not the interpretation is correct—if men [sic] define situations as real, they are real in their consequences” (Thomas and Thomas 1928, pp. 571–572).

One of our aims here is to disrupt and reorganize the rigid and antinomic framework of essence-versus-illusion in which race is theorized and debated. We understand race as an unstable and “decentered” complex of social meanings constantly being transformed by political struggle. With this in mind, we advance the following definition: *Race is a concept that signifies and symbolizes social conflicts and interests by referring to different types of human bodies.* Although the concept of race invokes seemingly biologically based human characteristics (so-called phenotypes), selection of these particular human features for purposes of racial signification is always and necessarily a social and historical process. Indeed, the categories employed to differentiate among human beings along racial lines reveal themselves,



upon serious examination, to be at best imprecise, and at worst completely arbitrary. They may be arbitrary, but they are not meaningless. Race is strategic; race does ideological and political work.

Despite the problematic nature of racial categorization, it should be apparent that there is a crucial and non-reducible *visual dimension* to the definition and understanding of racial categories. Bodies are visually read and narrated in ways that draw upon an ensemble of symbolic meanings and associations. Corporeal distinctions are common; they become essentialized. Perceived differences in skin color, physical build, hair texture, the structure of cheek bones, the shape of the nose, or the presence/absence of an epicanthic fold are understood as the manifestations of more profound differences that are situated *within* racially identified persons: differences in such qualities as intelligence, athletic ability, temperament, and sexuality, among other traits.

Through a complex process of selection, human physical characteristics ("real" or imagined) become the basis to justify or reinforce social differentiation. Conscious or unconscious, deeply ingrained or reinvented, the making of race, the "othering" of social groups by means of the invocation of physical distinctions, is a key component of modern societies. "Making up people," once again. This process of selection, of imparting social and symbolic meaning to perceived phenotypical differences, is the core, constitutive element of what we term "racialization."

We define racialization as *the extension of racial meaning to a previously racially unclassified relationship, social practice, or group*. Racialization occurs in large-scale and small-scale ways, macro- and micro-socially. In large-scale, even world-historical settings, racialization can be observed in the foundation and consolidation of the modern world-system: The conquest and settlement of the western hemisphere, the development of African slavery, and the rise of abolitionism, all involved profuse and profound extension of racial meanings into new social terrain. In smaller-scale settings as well, "making up people" or racial interpellation (a concept drawn from Althusser 2001 (1971) also operates as a quotidian form of racialization: Racial profiling for example, may be understood as a form of racialization. Racial categories, and the meanings attached to them, are often constructed from pre-existing conceptual or discursive elements that have crystallized through the genealogies of competing religious, scientific, and political ideologies and projects. These are so to speak the raw materials of racialization.

To summarize thus far: Race is a concept, a representation or signification of identity that refers to different types of human bodies, to the perceived corporeal and phenotypic markers of difference and the meanings and social practices that are ascribed to these differences.

It is important to emphasize that once specific concepts of race are widely circulated and accepted as a social reality, racial difference is not dependent on visual observation alone. Legal scholar Osagie Obasogie makes the intriguing point that iterative social practices give rise to "visual" understandings of race, even among

those who cannot see. The respondents in his study, blind since birth, “see” race through interpersonal and institutional socializations and practices that shape their perceptions of what race is (Obasogie 2013). Thus race is neither self-evident nor obvious as an ocular phenomenon. Instead racialization depends on meanings and associations that permit phenotypic distinction among human bodies.

Some may argue that if the concept of race is so nebulous, so indeterminate, so flexible, and so susceptible to strategic manipulation by a range of political projects, why don’t we simply dispense with it? Can we not get “beyond” race? Can we not see it as an illusory thing? Don’t we see how much mischief has occurred in its name? These questions have been posed with tremendous frequency in both popular and academic discourse.<sup>3</sup> An affirmative answer would of course present obvious practical difficulties: It is rather difficult to jettison widely held beliefs, beliefs which moreover are central to everyone’s identity and understanding of the social world. So the attempt to banish the concept as an archaism is at best counterintuitive. But a deeper difficulty, we believe, is inherent in the very formulation of this schema, in its way of posing race as a *problem*, a misconception left over from the past, a concept no longer relevant to a “post-racial” society.

A more effective starting point is the recognition that despite its uncertainties and contradictions, the concept of race continues to play a fundamental role in structuring and representing the social world. The task for theory is to capture this situation and avoid both the utopian framework that sees race as an illusion we can somehow “get beyond,” as well as the essentialist formulation that sees race as something objective and fixed, a biological given. We should think of race as an element of social structure rather than as an irregularity within it; we should see race as a dimension of human representation rather than an illusion. Such a perspective informs what we mean by racial formation.

Since racial formation is always historically situated, understandings of the meaning of race, and of the way race structures society, have changed enormously over time. We now turn to a historical survey of the race concept and the domains in which it has been defined and debated, consolidated and contested. Our effort here is to outline a genealogy of racialization that proceeds from religion to science to politics. Such a trajectory is by no means linear or progressive; rather it consists of the accretion of racialized experiences that are uneven and often incompatible. But it does allow us roughly to map and situate the development of the race concept, and to underscore its still unstable and ambiguous character.

## The Evolution of Race Consciousness

How do perceived differences between groups of people become racialized? The identification of distinctive human groups, and their association with differences in physical appearance, goes back to prehistory, and can be found in the earliest documents—in the Bible, for example, or in Herodotus. But the emergence of a

modern conception of race does not occur until the rise of Europe and the arrival of Europeans in the Americas. Even the hostility and suspicion with which Christian Europe viewed its two significant non-Christian “others”—the Muslims and the Jews—cannot be understood as more than a rehearsal for racial formation, since these antagonisms, for all their bloodletting and chauvinism, were always and everywhere religiously interpreted.<sup>4</sup>

It was only when European explorers reached the Western Hemisphere, when the oceanic seal separating the “old” and the “new” worlds was breached, that the distinctions and categorizations fundamental to a racialized social structure, and to a discourse of race, began to appear. The European explorers were the advance guard of merchant capitalism, which sought new openings for trade. What they found exceeded their wildest dreams, for never before and never again in human history has an opportunity for the appropriation of wealth, for predation or “primitive accumulation” remotely approached that presented by the “discovery.”<sup>5</sup> Modern capitalism could not have come into being without this grand infusion of stolen wealth: a seemingly limitless reservoir of treasure—land, labor, lives by the millions—to do with as one willed.

But the Europeans also “discovered” people, people who looked and acted differently. These “natives” challenged their discoverers’ preexisting conceptions of the origins and possibilities of the human species (Jordan 2012 [1968], 3–43). The representation and interpretation of the meaning of the indigenous peoples’ existence became a crucial matter, one that would affect not only the outcome of conquest but the future of empire and thus the development of the modern world. For the “discovery” raised disturbing questions as to whether *all* could be considered part of the same “family of man,” and more practically, the extent to which native peoples could be exploited and enslaved. Thus “discovery,” conquest, and soon enough, enslavement, launched not only the headlong rush toward modernity, but also debates over human nature, philosophical anthropology. Such questions as: “What is a human being?” and “What is the nature of human difference?” were posed repeatedly as rulers and their advisers sought to organize and exercise control over their new dominions and new subjects.<sup>6</sup>

In practice, of course, the seizure of territories and goods, the introduction of slavery through the *encomienda* and other forms of coerced native labor, and then through the organization of the African slave trade—not to mention the practice of outright extermination—all presupposed a worldview which distinguished Europeans, as children of God and fully-fledged human beings, from “others.” Given the dimensions and the ineluctability of the European onslaught, given the conquerors’ determination to appropriate labor, land, and goods, and given the presence of an axiomatic and unquestioned Christianity among them, the ferocious division of society into Europeans and “others” soon coalesced. This was true despite the famous 16th-century theological and philosophical debates about the identity of indigenous peoples.<sup>7</sup> In fact it ran right over whatever cautionary notes religious ethicists like las Casas, or

later Antonio Vieira (Blackburn 1997; Cohen 1998), William Wilberforce, or Henry Ward Beecher might have sounded.

Indeed, debates about the nature of the “others” reached their practical limits with a certain dispatch. Plainly, they would never touch the essential: Nothing, after all, would induce the Europeans to pack up and go home. The “discovery” signaled a break from the previous proto-racial awareness by which Europe had contemplated its “others” in a relatively disorganized fashion. The “conquest of America” was not simply an epochal historical event—however unparalleled in importance. It was also the advent of a consolidated social structure of exploitation, appropriation, domination, and signification. Its representation, first in religious terms, but later in scientific and political ones, initiated modern racial awareness. It was the inauguration of racialization on a world-historical scale.

The conquest, therefore, was the first—and given the dramatic nature of the case, perhaps the greatest—racial formation project. Together with African slavery it produced the master category of race, the racial template we have discussed. Its significance was by no means limited to the Western Hemisphere, for it also began the work of constituting Europe as the metropole, the center, of a series of empires which could take, as Marx would later write, “the globe for a theater” (Marx 1967, 751). This new imperial structure was represented as a struggle between civilization and barbarism, and implicated in this representation all the great European philosophies, literary traditions, and social theories of the modern age (Said 1993).

The immensity of this historical arc, the *longue durée* of racial formation from religion to science to politics, also underlies our claim that race provided a master concept for our understanding of oppression and resistance. But it is worth noting that right from the beginning of this historical journey, something like the social construction of race was *already* present. Before the white talking heads had debated the philosophical anthropology of Native Americans, or Africans,<sup>8</sup> well before that in fact, *the immediate need to classify and categorize, to “make up people,” had already surfaced*: Who was a European, a settler, a free man, and who was an *Indio*, an African, a slave? As a practical matter, something relatively devoid of theology or philosophy, the exercise of power required these distinctions.<sup>9</sup> The main criteria available for this purpose were phenomic: the visual appearance of the bodies that had to be judged, sometimes under great pressure and with speed—for violence was omnipresent—as like or unlike, similar or different. This social (or more properly, this power-oriented, political) construction, this phenomic categorical imperative, would soon enough be reprocessed in the discourse available at the time: primarily and for a long time to come, theological discourse.

Only in later epochs would other ways of knowing supplant theological understandings: First scientific, and later, political accounts of race would be offered. Still the earlier religious and scientific frameworks, though losing influence, would never be fully eliminated, never really die. Thus do we arrive at our own time, our own knowledge of race, our own insistence on the social construction of race, with its

unstable combination of corporeal and performative elements, its inherent biosociality. We are still on this journey. We should be clear-sighted enough to recognize that these components, most centrally the political technology of the body, were there from the beginning. In short, just as the noise of the “big bang” still resonates through the universe, so the overdetermined construction of world “civilization” as a biosocial manifestation of European subjugation and the resistance of the rest of us still defines the race concept in the present.

## From Religion to Science

After the initial depredations of conquest, religious justifications for racial difference gradually gave way to scientific ones. By the time of the Enlightenment, a general awareness of race was pervasive, and most of the great philosophers of Europe, such as Hegel, Kant, Voltaire, and Locke, were issuing virulently racist opinions (Count, ed. 1950; Eze, ed. 1997; Bernasconi and Lott, eds. 2000).

The problem posed by race during the late 18th century was markedly different than it had been in the earlier stages of conquest and enslavement. The social structures through which race operated were no longer primarily those of violent subjugation and plunder, nor of the establishment of thin beachheads of settlement on the edge of what had once seemed a limitless wilderness. Now the issues were much more complicated: nation-building, establishment of national economies in the world trading system, resistance to the arbitrary authority of monarchs, and the assertion of the “natural rights” of “man,” including the right of revolution (Davis 1999 [1975]). In such a situation, racially organized exploitation in the form of slavery, the expansion of colonies, and the continuing expulsion of native peoples, was both necessary and newly difficult to justify.

*Early Iterations of Scientific Racism:* The invocation of scientific criteria to demonstrate the “natural” basis of racial hierarchy was both a logical consequence of the rise of this form of knowledge, and an attempt to provide a more subtle and nuanced account of human complexity in the new, “enlightened” age. Spurred on by the classificatory scheme of living organisms devised by Linnaeus in *Systema Naturae* (1735), many scholars in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries dedicated themselves to the identification and ranking of variations in humankind. Race was conceived as a *biological* concept, a matter of species. Voltaire wrote that “The negro race is a species of men [sic] as different from ours ... as the breed of spaniels is from that of greyhounds,” and in a formulation echoing down from his century to our own, declared that

If their understanding is not of a different nature from ours ..., it is at least greatly inferior. They are not capable of any great application or association of ideas, and seem formed neither for the advantages nor the abuses of philosophy.

(Voltaire, in Gossett 1997 [1965], 45)

Jefferson, the preeminent exponent of the Enlightenment doctrine of “the rights of man” on North American shores, echoed these sentiments:

In general their existence appears to participate more of sensation than reflection. ... [I]n memory they are equal to whites, in reason much inferior ... [and] in imagination they are dull, tasteless, and anomalous.... I advance it therefore ... that the blacks, whether originally a different race, or made distinct by time and circumstances, are inferior to the whites.... Will not a lover of natural history, then, one who views the gradations in all the animals with the eye of philosophy, excuse an effort to keep those in the department of Man [sic] as distinct as nature has formed them?

(Jefferson 1984 [1785], 264–266, 270)

Such crackpot claims of species distinctiveness among humans justified the inequitable allocation of political and social rights, while still upholding the doctrine of “the rights of man.” They rationalized the rapacious treatment to which the racial “others” were subjected, and even justified it as the unfortunate byproducts of development. You can still hear these arguments today: “Sure, these natives and slaves might be suffering now, but that is still preferable to being condemned to the eternal darkness of primitiveness and superstition....” The frequent resort to familial metaphors (“Our slaves are like our children; they must be taught to obey ...”), and the mad search for scientific justifications for unequal treatment—in phrenology and craniometry, for example, and then in evolution—all attest to the overarching importance of racial rule in the genealogy of the modern world.

Indeed the quest to obtain a precise scientific definition of race generated debates which continue to rage today, reiterated in the genomic, the criminological, and the humanistic approaches to race that we take for granted. Yet despite efforts to define race scientifically, ranging from Dr. Samuel Morton’s studies of cranial capacity<sup>10</sup> to contemporary attempts in the genomic sciences, the concept of race has defied biological precision.

In the mid-19th century, Count Joseph Arthur de Gobineau drew upon the most respected scientific studies of his day to compose his four-volume *Essay on the Inequality of Races* (Biddiss 1970; Gobineau 1999 [1853–1855]; Todorov 1993). He not only greatly influenced the racial thinking of the period, but his themes would be echoed in the racist ideologies of the next one hundred years: beliefs that superior races produced superior cultures and that racial intermixtures resulted in the degradation of the superior racial stock. These ideas found expression, for instance, in the eugenics movement launched by Darwin’s cousin, Francis Galton, which had an immense impact on scientific and sociopolitical thought in Europe and the United States (Chase 1980; Kevles 1998; Graves 2001; Black 2012). In the wake of civil war and emancipation, and with immigration from Southern and Eastern Europe as well as East Asia running high, the United States was particularly fertile ground for notions such as Social Darwinism and eugenics. Within



this context, racial difference became the rationale for discriminatory policies and practices of immigrant exclusion, naturalization rights, residential segregation, and forced sterilization.

Although black scholars like Kelly Miller, William Monroe Trotter, and W.E.B. Du Bois had questioned biologicistic racism at the end of the 19th century, and Chicago sociologists had cast doubt on evolution-based accounts of racial difference in the 1920s, it was not until after World War II that a sustained attack on the notion of race as a biological concept emerged and gained widespread acceptance. Only after eugenics had been discredited as the basis for racial science in Nazi Germany—eugenics had, of course, flourished in the United States as well—did scientific critiques of biologicistic racism become prominent. The 1950 UNESCO “Statement on Race”<sup>11</sup> boldly asserted that race was not a biological fact but a social myth. During this period, social and cultural conceptions of race became ascendant and it was optimistically assumed that the death knell of scientific racism had been rung. But had it?

*Contemporary Reiterations of Scientific Racism:* Over the past decades, the study of human variation in a number of fields has often defaulted to, and indeed relied upon, biological concepts of race in research on “population groups.” Default to the race concept remains pervasive. After the launching of the Human Genome Project, for example, geneticists have engaged in vigorous debate about whether race is a meaningful and useful genetic concept. But they can’t get rid of it. The notion of race as a discernible “biological category” has not been relegated to the proverbial dustbin of history.

Geneticist Neil Risch contends that genetic differences have arisen among people from different continents and uses the term “race” to categorize and cluster the human population into five major groups. This recognition of race, he contends, is important for understanding genetic susceptibility to certain diseases and receptivity to medical interventions such as drug treatments (Wade 2002). Indeed, the linkage between race and genetics finds its sharpest expression in the field of pharmacogenomics. The ultimate goal of pharmacogenomics is to be able to deliver the precise type of medication—and precise dose—to a patient based on their individual genome. Its goal is to tailor-make drugs to treat a specific condition. Because it is not yet practical to sequence each individual’s genome in a quick and cost-effective manner, much less to do drug design on this level, race often serves as a “proxy” for determining how treatment with a specific drug might be targeted, if not at individuals, then at identifiable groups. And not surprisingly, race is the descriptor employed to select such groups (Lee 2005).

Consider the introduction of BiDil as the first “ethnic designer drug.” Originally produced by the now defunct biotech firm NitroMed, BiDil was marketed to African Americans who suffer from congestive heart failure, despite serious doubts that arose in clinical trials about the distinctive racial claims being made for the drug. Yet it was released anyway, and prescribed for African Americans. Some medical researchers feared that BiDil sets a dangerous precedent by linking race and genetics in ways that

could distract from alternative ways of understanding the causes of a disease and the means to treat it (Kahn 2012).

The issue of race and genetics is a contentious one that finds expression in different sites and arenas.

- In 2010, PBS aired *Faces of America with Henry Louis Gates, Jr.*, a four-episode documentary series that traced the ancestral roots of prominent celebrities through “genealogy and genetics.” An extension of earlier shows focused on famous African Americans, the series reflects a growing popular quest by individuals to find their “roots” through allegedly scientific means.
- In the field of forensics, Tony Frudakis of DNAPrint Genomics, a molecular biologist who came to fame in a Baton Rouge serial killer case in 2003, claims that he can determine a murderer’s race by analyzing his or her DNA (Wade 2003; Quan 2011; Obasogie 2013).
- DNA testing has increasingly been used by individuals and groups to claim Native American tribal membership. The Meskwaki Nation in Iowa utilized genetic-ancestry testing as a way to screen out individuals who sought tribal affiliation in order to share in the tribe’s casino profits. The Mashantucket Pequot Tribal Nation of Connecticut, which controls the huge Foxwoods casino, requires DNA testing of newborns. Both the Cherokee and Seminole nations/tribes have been embroiled in conflicts with blacks who claim tribal ancestry and seek access to court-ordered monetary judgments. In these cases disputes have revolved around the “blood quantum” system of measuring Indian belonging (put in place by the Dawes Act of 1887), and have also involved tribal attitudes toward DNA testing of present-day claimants (Tallbear 2003; Indians.com 2005; Kaplan 2005; Koerner 2005).<sup>12</sup>

Henry Louis Gates, Jr. has said: “We are living through an era of the ascendance of biology, and we have to be very careful. We will all be walking a fine line between using biology and allowing it to be abused” (Harmon 2007). There is indeed a fine line. Our individual sense of racial identity, the system of racial classification we employ, the meanings we ascribe to racial categories, and their use in social analysis and policy formation are rendered more complex, indeterminate, and muddy with the increasing re-biologization of race.

In psychology too, the cognitive presence of race, the immediacy of race that is seemingly rooted in perception rather than reasoning, leads researchers to think of it as an essence, something innate. Cognitive psychology and related fields have sought to uncover forms of racial animus that function “below the radar” of the conscious mind. Studies on the mechanisms and processes that affect perception, interpretation, memory, and decision-making have convincingly demonstrated that people harbor “implicit biases” and possess “racial schemas” that strongly influence perceptions and behaviors.<sup>13</sup> Implicit biases can influence or shape various forms

of individual or institutional racial discrimination. Such discrimination, therefore, can occur in the absence of conscious intent, explicit prejudice, or racial animus. Thus the pervasiveness of racial meanings and their significance goes deep, very deep (Hirschfeld 1973 [1938]; Eberhardt and Fiske, eds. 1998; Goff et al. 2008; Marsh, Mendoza-Denton, and Smith, eds. 2010). Notions of race do not only inform our conscious understanding of the social world; they also permeate our unconscious minds—shaping our perceptions and attitudes, and influencing our actions.

For all its obvious importance, this approach also raises troubling questions: Are those cultural formations not themselves constructed? Are those “aggregate relations of power” impervious to challenge? Social constructions like race (or gender, or countless other human qualities) are of course composed of layered attributes that human beings *understand* as essences, but that does not make race, or gender an essence *in reality*, does it? (What would W.I. Thomas reply to that question?) If in practice race remains flexible and unstable, how does that instability affect the “racial schemas” that structure immediate perceptions? What is the essence of blackness or whiteness? Of maleness or femaleness (Butler 1993; Butler 2006 [1990]; Shelby 2007)?

There is a very strong temptation to derive racial distinctions, and perforce racism, from biological or evolutionary sources. This tendency is not limited to reactionary or conservative thinkers, but also affects progressive and egalitarian analysts, as we have seen in Douglas S. Massey’s “categorical” approach to inequality (discussed in Chapter 2). No doubt there is irony in contemporary attempts to provide a seemingly objective and scientific definition of race, and of the boundaries and contents (the essences) of racial categories as well. In previous historical periods, scientific racism provided the rationale for the subordination, if not elimination, of what were seen as undesirable, “mongrel,” and threatening racially identified groups. In the current period, biological/genetic definitions of race are mobilized to improve the treatment of diseases and minimize health disparities, to serve justice by providing “hard evidence” in criminal cases, to help individuals find their ancestral “roots,” and in the case of cognitive psychology, to reveal the deep mental structures of racism. While often motivated by good intentions, the premises behind these examples share an underlying logic with the racist frameworks of the historical past: a quest for some fundamental quality of racial identity, if not skin or hair, then genomic or limbic.

The recourse to “human nature,” to philosophical anthropology, to explain the supposed differences and “natural” biases entailed by race, has been a constant feature of human thought, especially in western civilization.<sup>14</sup> It is tempting to extrapolate from implicit bias research: to conclude that race thinking is an innate part of human consciousness—something to which we are intrinsically and naturally predisposed. In clear disagreement with such views we insist that the “racial schemas” that structure immediate perceptions are also cultural formations; they may be deeply embedded as a result of centuries of reiteration in various forms. Yet they remain socially, not biologically, given. They remain subject to change. We are not biologically “hardwired” to be

racist. We reject any default to an essentialist and intrinsically unprovable notion of race. Yet resisting the temptation to racial biologism, whether conscious or unconscious, remains as difficult in science as it once was in religion.

## From Science to Politics

Efforts to “re-biologize” race suggest that the understanding of race as a preeminently social concept remains an embattled and contested notion. While we acknowledge this ongoing tension, we suggest that conflicts and controversies about the meaning of race are principally framed on the terrain of politics. By privileging politics, we do not mean to suggest that race has been displaced as a concern of scientific inquiry, or for that matter as a theological question. Nor do we claim that struggles over cultural representation are less significant than political ones in shaping prevailing patterns of race and racism. We do argue, however, that race is now a preeminently political phenomenon.

*Toward Social Construction:* The historical trend towards recognizing race as a social and political construction has been slow and uneven. While critiques of race as a biological concept were more evident and ascendant in the early post-World War II period, there were previous historical precedents for understanding race as a social and political category. For example, Max Weber discounted biological explanations for racial conflict and instead highlighted the social and political factors that engendered it (Weber 2008, 385–387; Manasse 1947). Du Bois too wrestled with the conflict between a fully sociohistorical conception of race, and the more essentialized and deterministic vision he encountered as a student in Berlin.<sup>15</sup> Pioneering cultural anthropologist Franz Boas rejected attempts to link racial characteristics to biological or evolutionist schemas, labeling as pseudoscientific any assumption of a continuum of “higher” and “lower” cultural groups, and allying with Du Bois quite early on (Boas 1969 [1945], 1962; Baker 1998).<sup>16</sup>

Du Bois and many prominent black scholars, for example, Alain Leroy Locke, philosopher and theorist of the Harlem Renaissance, had switched the focus of race studies definitively away from biologicistic accounts and towards sociopolitical explanatory frameworks, almost before modern sociology even existed in the United States. Black voices were ignored, however, until white exponents of socially based views of race like Robert E. Park, one of the founders of the “Chicago School” of sociology, reinvented a socially grounded account of it in the 1920s. Park combined the standard German training in sociology with a history of eight years as journalist and publicist for Booker T. Washington. After his substantial career at Chicago, Park’s last job was at Fisk University, the leading historically black college (Du Bois’s *alma mater* as well).<sup>17</sup>

Perhaps more important than these and subsequent intellectual efforts, however, were the political struggles of people of color themselves. Waged all around the globe under a variety of banners such as anti-colonialism and civil rights, these battles to challenge various structural and cultural racisms have been a major feature

of 20th-century politics. The racial horrors of the 20th century—colonial slaughter and apartheid, the genocide of the Holocaust, and the massive bloodlettings required to end these evils—have also indelibly marked the theme of race as a sociopolitical issue *par excellence*.

*Racial Politics:* Our notion of racial formation foregrounds the ongoing political contestation that takes place between the state and civil society—across the political spectrum—to define and redefine the very meaning of race. This is a good example of the way race operates across micro–macro linkages: The persistent and continuing controversies regarding state-based racial classification provide a particularly apt illustration of racial formation.

Over the last several centuries, the designation of racial categories by the state—the political dimensions of state assignment of racial identity—has provoked intense disputes in the United States. Who was considered “free” and who “unfree”? Who could be a naturalized citizen (Carbado 2005)? Who could marry whom? In this last regard, it is sobering to think that it was not until 1967 that all state anti-miscegenation laws were ruled unconstitutional in *Loving v. Virginia*. The state wields enormous power in defining what race is. Through its powers of racial classification, the state fundamentally shapes one’s social status, access to economic opportunities, political rights, and indeed one’s identity itself.

In 2003, former University of California Regent Ward Connerly introduced a measure popularly known as the Racial Privacy Initiative (Proposition 54) before California voters. Proposition 54 sought to amend the California State Constitution by enacting a ban on racial data collection by the state. Connerly (2003) asserted that relying on racial classification and maintaining race-based remedies to racial inequalities would only “give credence to the dangerous view held by many that ‘race’ is a fixed biological reality.”<sup>18</sup>

The discrepancies, gaps, and contradictions between state definitions and individual and collective racial identities are no more evident than in the racial and ethnic categories employed by the U.S. Census. Among others, the U.S. Census establishes categories based on nativity, citizenship status, age, household income, and marital status. None of these categories, however, has been subject to such intense scrutiny, vigorous debate, and political controversy as that of race.

The race questions on the U.S. Census have been shaped by the political and social agenda of the historical period in question. The first census in 1790 distinguished holders of the franchise, namely tax-paying white males, from the general population. The practice of slavery motivated changes in categorization such as grouping blacks into free and slave populations. Prior to the 1960s, census categories were utilized politically to disenfranchise and discriminate against groups defined as nonwhite, a practice that has diminished but not entirely ceased in the “post-civil rights” era. From restrictions on, naturalization rights to the setting of national quotas in the 1924 National Origins Immigration Act, census categories were routinely and strategically deployed to circumscribe the political, economic, and social rights of people

of color and immigrants. By the 1960s, the idea of race as a biological construct was widely discredited in academic and scientific circles, and the race question would have been excluded from the 1970 census had it not been for the passage of civil rights and equal opportunity legislation. The new laws required federal agencies to compile data, look for patterns of discrimination, and selectively redress them through various programs and initiatives. This made it necessary to continue to employ forms of racial classification and statistics (Prewitt 2013).

In 1977, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) issued Statistical Directive No. 15 that fostered the creation of “compatible, nonduplicated, exchangeable racial and ethnic data by Federal agencies.” The directive defined the basic racial and ethnic categories to be utilized by the federal government for three reporting purposes: statistical, administrative, and civil rights compliance. The five standard categories were American Indian or Alaskan Native, Asian or Pacific Islander, Black, White, and Hispanic (U.S. Office of Management and Budget 1994).

These racial categories are rife with inconsistencies and lack parallel construction. Only one category is specifically racial, only one is cultural, and only one relies on a notion of affiliation or community recognition. Directive No. 15 defines a black person as one who has his or her “origins in any of the black racial groups of Africa,” but it does not define a white person with reference to any of the white racial groups of Europe, North Africa, or the Middle East. Indeed “Black” is the only category that is defined with an explicit “racial” designator—one which is quite problematic. What, we might ask, are the “black racial groups of Africa”? Hispanics are not considered or classified as a “race,” but as an “ethnic group.” The Hispanic category is, in fact, the only “ethnicity” that the state is interested in explicitly identifying and classifying. The category is defined through a combined national/ethnic designator—a person of “Mexican, Puerto Rican, Cuban, Central or South American or other Spanish culture or origin.” In this definition, Hispanics can be of any race.<sup>19</sup> The category of “American Indian or Alaskan Native” complicates matters further. To be counted as part of the group, individuals must not only trace their origins in any of the original peoples of North America, but they must also maintain “cultural identification through tribal affiliation or community recognition.” This is a condition that the state does not require of any of the other groups.

While originally narrowly conceived to provide consistent categories for use by federal agencies, Directive No. 15 had the unintended consequence of reshaping much of the discourse of race in the United States. These categories have become the *de facto* standard for state and local agencies, the private and nonprofit sectors, and the research community. Social scientists and policy analysts have widely adopted census directives since data is organized under these rubrics. The social and cultural impact of these categories is readily apparent. They inordinately shape both group identities and community-formation patterns. Largely in response to these categories, new organizations have emerged representing the interests of “Asian and Pacific Islanders” or “Hispanics” in a variety of forms from service providers to professional



caucuses. Census categories have played a pivotal role in the emergence and sustaining of panethnic forms of social organization and consciousness. The Census has become the primary site within the U.S. state where competing political claims for group recognition by race and ethnicity are advanced, and where classifications are established in response to statistical needs, administrative recordkeeping practices, and legal requirements. Racially identified groups realize the political value of racial categorization, along with the strategic deployment of “numbers,” in highlighting inequalities, arguing for resources, and lobbying for specific redistricting plans, among other demands. Electoral districts, for example, are drawn on the basis of census data.

Despite attempts to achieve standardized and generally understood racial categories, all such forms of classification are fundamentally unstable. One problem is the persistent gap between state definitions and individual/group forms of self-identification. According to the U.S. Census Bureau, over the last four Censuses (from 1980 to 2010) at least 40 percent of “Hispanics” failed to answer either the race question and/or the ethnicity question. Correspondingly, over 95 percent of individuals who mark the “Some Other Race” box were classified Hispanic by the Census. This reflects individual, group, and/or national differences in conceptualizing race. Immigrant groups who come from societies organized around different concepts of race and ethnicity often have difficulty navigating and situating themselves within U.S. racial categories.

Groups continually contest the existing system of racial classification. Arab Americans, currently classified as “white,” have argued for a distinctive category to capture forms of discrimination exemplified by the hate crimes and profiling that have occurred as a result of the “War on Terror” and continuing political instability in the Middle East. Taiwanese Americans have been lobbying for a distinctive category as Taiwanese, separate from that of Chinese under the Asian or Pacific Islander category. In both these instances, racial and ethnic consciousness is being fueled in large part by geopolitical transformations that affect how groups see themselves as well as how they are viewed by others.

*Multiracial Identity:* The debate surrounding the establishment of a multiracial category in the U.S. Census illustrates how some groups contest the existing framework of racial classification, how other groups seek to preserve it, and how the power of the state is employed to adjudicate different racial claims.

For the past 100 years or so, the U.S. Census has assumed that each individual possessed a clear, singular, and monoracial identity. Earlier census enumeration schedules, by contrast, recognized “mixed race” individuals. The 1890 Census listed “mulatto, quadroon, and octoroon” along with “white, black, Chinese, Japanese, and Indian.” These mixed race categories eventually disappeared from the census, but the “one-drop rule” of racial descent and the imposition of an arbitrary monoracial identity on individuals of racially mixed parentage remained in place. The 1920 census stipulated that “any mixture of White and some other race was to be reported

according to the race of the person who was not White.” In 1977, OMB Directive 15 stated that “[t]he category which most closely reflects the individual’s recognition in his community should be used for purposes of reporting on persons who are of mixed racial and/or ethnic origins.”

In an attempt to assert their multiracial heritage, some individuals ignored census instructions to “[f]ill ONE circle for the race that the person considers himself/herself to be,” by marking two or more boxes. However, since the census scanners are designed to read only one marked box, these people were reclassified as monoracial, based on whichever box was marked more firmly. In addition, individuals specifying the “Other” category are routinely reassigned to one of the OMB’s distinct racial categories based on the first race listed.

Beginning in the 1970s, various individuals and groups formally protested the notion of mutually exclusive racial categories embodied in the “single-race checkoff” policy. Much of the public pressure came from the parents of school-age multiracial children. In the public schools, a multiracial child is often faced with the dilemma of having to choose one race, and constantly risks being misclassified in this setting.

After several years of intense debate, the OMB’s Interagency Committee for the Review of the Racial and Ethnic Standards rejected the proposal to add a separate multiracial category. Instead, in July 1997, the 30-agency task force recommended that Directive 15 be amended to permit multiracial Americans to “mark one or more” racial category when identifying themselves for the census and other government programs. At first, most of the major civil rights organizations, such as the Urban League and the National Council of La Raza, along with groups such as the National Coalition for an Accurate Count of Asians and Pacific Islanders, opposed a multiracial category. These groups feared a diminution in their numbers, and worried that a multiracial category would spur debates regarding the “protected status” of groups and individuals. According to various estimates, from 75 to 90 percent of those who checked the “black” box could potentially check a multiracial one if it were an option. Concerned about the possible reductions in group numbers, civil rights groups argued that existing federal civil rights laws and programs were based on exclusive membership in a defined racial/ethnic group. It would be difficult, if not impossible, from this angle, to assess the salience of multiraciality in relationship to these laws and programs. The “mark one or more” option was adopted in Census 2000.

## Racial Projects

Race is a “crossroads” where social structure and cultural representation meet. Too often, the attempt is made to understand race simply or primarily in terms of only one of these two analytical dimensions. For example, efforts to explain racial inequality as a purely social structural phenomenon either neglect or are unable to account for the origins, patterning, and transformation of racial meanings, representations, and social identities. Conversely, many examinations of race as a system of signification,

identity, or cultural attribution fail adequately to articulate these phenomena with evolving social structures (such as segregation or stratification) and institutions (such as prisons, schools, or the labor market).

Race can never be merely a concept or idea, a representation or signification alone. Indeed race cannot be discussed, cannot even be *noticed*, without reference—however explicit or implicit—to social structure. To identify an individual or group racially is to locate them within a socially and historically demarcated set of demographic and cultural boundaries, state activities, “life-chances,” and tropes of identity/difference/(in)equality. Race is both a social/historical structure and a set of accumulated signifiers that suffuse individual and collective identities, inform social practices, shape institutions and communities, demarcate social boundaries, and organize the distribution of resources. We cannot understand how racial representations set up patterns of residential segregation, for example, without considering how segregation reciprocally shapes and reinforces the meaning of race itself.

We conceive of racial formation processes as occurring through a linkage between structure and signification. *Racial projects* do both the ideological and the practical “work” of making these links and articulating the connection between them. *A racial project is simultaneously an interpretation, representation, or explanation of racial identities and meanings, and an effort to organize and distribute resources (economic, political, cultural) along particular racial lines.* Racial projects connect what race *means* in a particular discursive or ideological practice and the ways in which both social structures and everyday experiences are racially *organized*, based upon that meaning. Racial projects are attempts both to shape the ways in which social structures are racially signified and the ways that racial meanings are embedded in social structures.

Racial projects occur at varying scales, both large and small. Projects take shape not only at the macro-level of racial policy-making, state activity, and collective action, but also at the level of everyday experience and personal interaction. Both dominant and subordinate groups and individual actors, both institutions and persons, carry out racial projects. The imposition of restrictive state voting rights laws, organizing work for immigrants’, prisoners’, and community health rights in the ghetto or barrio are all examples of racial projects. Individuals’ practices may be seen as racial projects as well: The cop who “stops and frisks” a young pedestrian, the student who joins a memorial march for the slain teenager Trayvon Martin, even the decision to wear dreadlocks, can all be understood as racial projects. Such projects should not, however, be simply regarded and analyzed as discrete, separate, and autonomous ideas and actions. Every racial project is both a reflection of and response to the broader patterning of race in the overall social system. In turn, every racial project attempts to reproduce, extend, subvert, or directly challenge that system.

Racial projects are not necessarily confined to particular domains. They can, for example, “jump” scale in their impact and significance. Projects framed at the local level, for example, can end up influencing national policies and initiatives. Correspondingly, projects at the national or even global level can be creatively and strategically

recast at regional and local levels. Projects “travel” as well. Consider how migration recasts concepts of race, racial meaning, and racial identity: Immigrants’ notions of race are often shaped in reference to, and in dialogue with, concepts of race in both their countries of origin and settlement. Thus migrants can maintain, adopt, and strategically utilize different concepts of race in transnational space (Kim 2008; Roth 2012).

At any given historical moment, racial projects compete and overlap, evincing varying capacity either to maintain or to challenge the prevailing racial system. A good example is the current debate over the relevance of “colorblind” ideology, policy, and practice; this provides a study of overlapping and competing racial projects. We discuss the hegemony of colorblindness in the concluding section of this book.

Racial projects link signification and structure not only in order to shape policy or exercise political influence, but also to organize our understandings of race as everyday “common sense.” To see racial projects operating at the level of everyday life, we have only to examine the many ways in which we “notice” race, often unconsciously.

One of the first things we notice about people when we meet them (along with their sex) is their race. We utilize race to provide clues about *who* a person is. This fact is made painfully obvious when we encounter someone whom we cannot conveniently racially categorize—someone who is, for example, racially “mixed” or of an ethnic/racial group with which we are not familiar. Such an encounter becomes a source of discomfort and momentarily a crisis of racial meaning.

Our ability to interpret racial meanings depends on preconceived notions of a racialized social structure. Comments such as “Funny, you don’t look black” betray an underlying image of what black should look like. We expect people to act out their apparent racial identities. Phenotype and performativity should match up. Indeed we become disoriented and anxious when they do not. Encounters with the black person who can’t dance, the Asian American not proficient in math and science, or the Latin@ who can’t speak Spanish all momentarily confound our racial reading of the social world and how we navigate within it. The whole gamut of racial stereotypes testifies to the way a racialized social structure shapes racial experience and socializes racial meanings. Analysis of prevailing stereotypes reveals the always present, already active link between our view of the social structure—its demography, its laws, its customs, its threats—and our conception of what race means.

Conversely, the way we interpret our experience in racial terms shapes and reflects our relations to the institutions and organizations through which we are embedded in the social structure. Thus we expect racially coded human characteristics to explain social differences. “Making up people” once again. Temperament, sexuality, intelligence, athletic ability, aesthetic preferences are presumed to be fixed and discernible from the palpable mark of race. Such diverse questions as our confidence and trust in others (for example, salespeople, teachers, media figures, and neighbors), our sexual preferences and romantic images, our tastes in music, films, dance, or sports, and our very ways of talking, walking, eating, and dreaming become racially coded simply because we live in a society where racial awareness is so pervasive.

To summarize the argument so far: The theory of racial formation suggests that society is suffused with racial projects, large and small, to which all are subjected. This racial “subjection” is quintessentially ideological. Everybody learns some combination, some version, of the rules of racial classification, and of their own racial identity, often without obvious teaching or conscious inculcation. Thus are we inserted in a comprehensively racialized social structure. Race becomes “common sense”—a way of comprehending, explaining, and acting in the world. A vast web of racial projects mediates between the discursive or representational means in which race is identified and signified on the one hand, and the institutional and organizational forms in which it is routinized and standardized on the other. The interaction and accumulation of these projects are the heart of the racial formation process.

Because of the pervasion of society by race, because of its operation over the *longue durée* as a master category of difference and inequality, it is not possible to represent race discursively without simultaneously locating it, explicitly or implicitly, in a social structural (and historical) context. Nor is it possible to organize, maintain, or transform social structures without simultaneously engaging, once more either explicitly or implicitly, in racial signification. Racial formation, therefore, is *a synthesis, a constantly reiterated outcome*, of the interaction of racial projects on a society-wide level. These projects are, of course, vastly different in scope and effect. They include large-scale public action, state activities, and interpretations of racial conditions in political, artistic, journalistic, or academic fora,<sup>20</sup> as well as the seemingly infinite number of racial judgments and practices, conscious and unconscious, that we carry out as part of our individual experience.

The concept of racial projects can be understood and applied across historical time to identify patterns in the *longue durée* of racial formation, both nationally and the entire modern world. At any particular historical moment, one racial project can be hegemonic while others are subservient, marginal, or oppositional to it. White supremacy is the obvious example of this: an evolving hegemonic racial project that has taken different forms from the colonial era to the present. In the chapters that follow, we utilize the concept of racial projects to examine the political trajectory of race over the past six decades in the United States.

But we are not done with racial formation yet. Before we get to the recent history of racial politics, and with the foregoing account of racial formation in mind, we must turn our attention to the problem of *racism*. Racial politics are necessarily deeply bound up with this topic. But race and racism are not the same thing. What is the relationship between them?

## Racism

Magnus Hirschfeld, a German physician and sexologist of the Weimar era who was an early advocate of gay and transgender rights, initially gave currency to the term “racism.” Published posthumously, Hirschfeld’s book *Rassismus* (*Racism*; 1938) provided a

history, analysis, and critical refutation of Nazi racial doctrines. Since the 1930s, the concept of racism has undergone significant changes in scope, meaning, and application. As historian George Fredrickson observes, “Although commonly used, ‘racism’ has become a loaded and ambiguous term” (2002, 151). While ideological notions of race have been directly tied to practices ranging from social segregation, exclusion from political participation, restrictive access to economic opportunities and resources, and genocide, the precise definition and significance of *racism* has been subject to enormous debate.

Robert Miles (1989) has argued that the term “racism” has been conceptually “inflated” to the point where it has lost its precision. While the problem of conceptual inflation and its political implications are evident in an era of colorblindness, the term “racism” is also subject to conceptual *deflation*. That is, what is considered racist is often defined very narrowly, in ways that obscure rather than reveal the pervasiveness and persistence of racial inequality in the United States. For example, racism has been popularly and narrowly conceived as racial *hate*. The category of “hate crimes” has been introduced in many states as a specific offense with enhanced sentencing consequence, and many colleges and universities have instituted “hate speech” codes to regulate expression and behavior both inside and outside of the classroom. Dramatic acts of racial violence are given considerable play in the mass media, and are the subject of extensive condemnation by political elites. But as critical race scholar David Theo Goldberg (1997) has pointed out, the conceptual and political reduction of racism to hate both limits our understanding of racism and of the ways to challenge it. Racist acts are seen as “crimes of passion”—abnormal, unusual, and irrational deeds that we popularly consider offensive. Missing from such a narrow interpretation of racism are the ideologies, policies, and practices in a variety of institutional arenas that normalize and reproduce racial inequality and domination.

How should we understand racism today? We have argued that race has no fixed meaning, that it is constructed and transformed sociohistorically through the cumulative convergence and conflict of racial projects that reciprocally structure and signify race. Our emphasis on racial projects allows us to advance a definition of racism as well. A racial project can be defined as racist if it *creates or reproduces structures of domination based on racial significations and identities*.

Rather than envisioning a single, monolithic, and dominant racist project, we suggest that racist projects exist in a dense matrix, operating at varying scales, networked with each other in formally and informally organized ways, enveloping and penetrating contemporary social relations, institutions, identities, and experiences. Like other racial projects, racist projects too converge and conflict, accumulate and interact with one another.

Complex and embedded as this web of racist projects is—remember, projects both signify and structure relationships, practices, and institutions—it is not the whole story. Powerful as racism is, it does not exhaust race. It does not crowd out anti-racism or eliminate the emancipatory dimensions of racial identity, racial solidarity, or racially conscious agency, both individual and collective. Indeed race is so



profoundly a lived-in and lived-out part of both social structure and identity that it *exceeds and transcends* racism—thereby allowing for resistance to racism. Race, therefore, is *more* than racism; it is a fully-fledged “social fact” like sex/gender or class. From this perspective, race shapes racism as much as racism shapes race.

That said, a number of questions remain to be addressed. Our discussion has focused on racist projects, but are there also anti-racist projects? Can groups of color advance racist projects?

*Are there anti-racist projects?* On some level, this question answers itself. Millions of people in the United States (and elsewhere) have committed their actions, intellects, emotions, and in many cases their lives, to the cause of ending, or at least reducing, racism. Numerous individuals and groups continue to mobilize against racism. They seek to respond to racist attacks: assaults and murder, often by the police, on black and brown people, racial “steering” in housing and credit markets, racially biased sentencing practices in criminal courts . . . the list is seemingly endless. They act to resist institutionalized racist practices, such as “stop and frisk” policies targeting black and brown youth;<sup>21</sup> to educate and organize against racism through media, research, legal and political action; and to disrupt and counter racist practices in everyday life. Continuing the argument advanced throughout this chapter, we define anti-racist projects as those that *undo or resist structures of domination based on racial significations and identities*.

Anti-racism has been the subject of seemingly endless discussion, especially through the rise and fall of the post-World War II political trajectory of race. It has become much more difficult to understand anti-racism since racism went “underground” at the end of the 1960s; since the racist practices and the meaning of racism have changed from “old school” explicit discourses and white supremacist actions like lynchings and cross-burnings. Instead, racism now takes more implicit, deniable, and often unconscious forms. Because the law continues to understand racism (racial discrimination) in the old way—as an explicit, intentional, *invidious* distinction based on race—legal remedies have been sharply curtailed.<sup>22</sup> By restricting its understanding of discrimination in this way, the Supreme Court has permitted and tacitly encouraged denial and concealment of racist practices.

If racism is not merely a matter of explicit beliefs or attitudes—significations or identities, in our vocabulary—but also and necessarily involves the production and maintenance of social structures of domination, then the denial of invidious intent is clearly insufficient to undo it. The absence of invidious intent does little or nothing to unwind the social structures through which racism flourishes and is reproduced. In the “post-civil rights” era, racism has been largely—though not entirely, to be sure—detached from its perpetrators. In its most advanced forms, indeed, it has no perpetrators; it is a nearly invisible, taken-for granted, common-sense feature of everyday life and social structure. This is the situation that has allowed U.S. courts and mainstream political discourse to block race-conscious reparative measures such as affirmative action, to proclaim the United States a “colorblind” society, and to

stigmatize anti-racist activists and intellectuals—legal practitioners, community organizations, school systems and universities, and other individuals and institutions seeking to overturn structures of racial exclusion and discrimination—as “playing the race card,” as the “real racists.”

*Can Groups of Color Advance Racist Projects?* Some scholars and activists have defined racism as “prejudice plus power.”<sup>23</sup> Using this formula, they argue that people of color can’t be racist since they don’t have power. But things are not that simple. “Power” cannot be reified as a thing that some possess and others do not; instead it constitutes a relational field. Furthermore, unless one is prepared to argue that there has been no transformation of the U.S. racial order in the past several decades, it is difficult to contend that groups of color have attained *no* power or influence. To do so risks dismissing the political agency of people of color.<sup>24</sup>

Racialized groups are positioned in unequal ways in a racially stratified society. Racial hierarchy pervades the contemporary United States; that hierarchy is preponderantly white supremacist, but it is not always that way. There are some exceptions, specific urban areas where groups of color have achieved local power, for example, in the administration of social services and distribution of economic resources. In cities like Oakland and Miami, this has led to conflicts between blacks and Latin@s over educational programs, minority business opportunities, and political power, with dramatically different results depending on which group held relative power. In these cases, some groups of color are promoting racial projects that subordinate other groups of color. While such exceptions do not negate the overarching reality of white supremacy, they do suggest that differences in racial power persist among groups of color. Inter-group racial conflict is not unidimensional; it is not solely whites vs. people of color, though whiteness still rules, OK?

## Racial Politics: Despotism, Democracy, and Hegemony

For most of its existence, both as a European colony and, as an independent nation, the United States was a *racial despotism*. In many ways it remains racially despotic today. Progress towards political standing and the empowerment of people of color, for example, has been painfully slow and highly uneven. It took over 160 years, from the passage of the Naturalization Law of 1790 to the 1952 McCarran–Walter Act, to abolish racial restrictions regarding naturalization (well, not totally).<sup>25</sup> After the civil war, there was the brief democratic experiment of Reconstruction that terminated ignominiously in 1877. In its wake there followed almost a century of legally sanctioned segregation and wholesale denial of the vote. While the civil rights movement and its allies made significant strides towards enhancing formal political rights, obstacles to effective political participation have remained stubbornly persistent, as recent legal decisions jeopardizing voting rights have revealed (U.S. Supreme Court 2013).

It is important, therefore, to recognize that in many respects, racial despotism is the norm against which all U.S. politics must be measured. Centuries of U.S.

racial despotism have had three important and dramatic consequences. First, they defined “American” identity as white: as the negation of racialized “otherness”—initially African and indigenous, later Latin American and Asian as well (Rogin 1991; Morrison 1993; Drinnon 1997). This negation took shape in both law and custom, in public institutions and in forms of cultural representation. It became the archetype of racial domination in the United States. It melded with the conquest and slavery as the “master” racial project.

Second, racial despotism organized—albeit sometimes in an incoherent and contradictory fashion—the “color line,” rendering racial division the fundamental schism in U.S. society. The despotism of the color line also demanded an ongoing and intensive policing of racial boundaries, an ongoing racialization effort that ran not only between various groups and people, but also *through* them. In other words, racial despotism did not only elaborate, articulate, and drive racial divisions institutionally; it also hammered them into our psyches, causing untold fear and suffering, and extending, up to the moment in which you are reading this, the racial obsessions and oppressions of the conquest and slavery periods.

Third, racial despotism consolidated oppositional racial consciousness and organization. Originally framed by slave revolts and *marronage*,<sup>26</sup> by indigenous resistance, and by nationalisms of various sorts, and later by nationalist and equalitarian racial freedom movements, oppositional racial consciousness took on permanence and depth as *racial resistance*. Just as racial despotism reinforced white supremacy as the master category of racial domination, so too it forged racial unity among the oppressed: first native peoples assaulted and displaced by armed settlers, later Africans and their descendants kidnapped and reduced to mere chattel, and then conquered Latin@s/*mestiz@s* and superexploited Asian immigrants. Racial despotism generated racial resistance: Just as the conquest created the “Indian” where once there had been Pequot, Iroquois, or Tutelo, so too it created the “Black” where once there had been Asante or Ovimbundu, Yoruba, or Bakongo. What had once been tribal or ethnic consciousness—among enslaved Africans, Native Americans “removed” to reservations or decimated by settler violence, Latin@s forcibly denationalized and stripped of their lands, and Asian immigrants subjected to virtual *corvee* labor and then violently expelled from the communities they had created—ultimately became oppositional *race consciousness* and *racial resistance*. Thus in many ways racial despotism laid the groundwork for the creation of the racially based movements of today.

These patterns are now understood as “panethnicizing” processes. (Every racially defined group is a panethnic group.) They comprise not only the shared experience of suffering and the unifying pressures it brings to bear, but also the concerted self-activity of the oppressed to confront their tormentors and change their conditions. Panethnicity is a type of racialization; it is not without internal tension and conflict; it is often uneven and incomplete; it often does not liquidate ethnic difference but subsumes it; above all, it is a product of racial despotism.

The transition from racial despotism to *racial democracy* has been a slow, painful, and contentious one; it remains far from complete. A recognition of the abiding presence of racial despotism, we contend, is crucial for the development of a theory of racial formation in the U.S. It is also crucial to the task of relating racial formation to racial resistance, the broader current of political practice, organization, and change.

Over extended periods of time, and as a result of resistance of disparate types, the balance of coercion and consent began to change, to move *from domination to hegemony*. It is possible to locate the origins of hegemony right within the heart of racial despotism, for the effort to possess the master's tools—religion and philosophy in this case—was crucial to emancipation and to “freedom dreams” (Kelley 2003), crucial to efforts both individual and collective to possess oneself, so to speak, to achieve some degree of “self-determination” as a people. As Ralph Ellison reminds us, “The slaves often took the essence of the aristocratic ideal (as they took Christianity) with far more seriousness than their masters” (1964, xiv). In their language, in their religion with its focus on the Exodus theme and on Jesus's tribulations (Glaude 2000), in their music with its figuring of suffering, resistance, perseverance, and transcendence (Du Bois 2007 [1935]), in their interrogation of a political philosophy which sought perpetually to rationalize their bondage in a supposedly “free” society (Douglass 2000 [1852]), enslaved Africans and their descendants incorporated elements of racial rule into their thought and practice, turning them against their original bearers.

Racial rule can be understood as a slow and uneven historical process that has moved from despotism to democracy, from domination to hegemony. In this transition, hegemonic forms of racial rule—those based on consent—eventually came to supplant those based on coercion. But only to some extent, only partially. By no means has the United States established racial democracy in the 21st century, and by no means is coercion a thing of the past. But the sheer complexity of the racial questions U.S. society confronts today, the welter of competing racial projects and contradictory racial experiences which Americans undergo, suggests that hegemony is a useful and appropriate term with which to characterize contemporary racial rule.

What form does racial hegemony take today? In the aftermath of the epochal struggles of the post-World War II period, under the conditions of chronic crisis of racial meaning to which U.S. society has grown accustomed, we suggest that a new and highly unstable form of racial hegemony has emerged, that of *colorblindness*. In the following chapters, we discuss the post-World War II political trajectory of racial formation that has brought us to this point.

## Notes

1. Ian Hacking (2006; 1999) has given us the phrase “making up people” to explain how the human sciences operate, but Hacking doesn't stop there: he discusses medicine, education, ideology, law, art, and state institutions as they do this work.

2. The notion of *intersectionality* was advanced by legal scholar Kimberlé W. Crenshaw, who argued that both oppression and resistance are always situated in multiple categories of difference (Crenshaw 1989). Failure to grasp how categories of race, gender, sexuality, and class dynamically interact and shape one another, she asserted, led to a fragmented politics:

Feminist efforts to politicize experiences of women and anti-racist efforts to politicize experiences of people of color have frequently proceeded as though the issues and experiences they each detail occur on mutually exclusive terrains. (Crenshaw 1991, 1242)

Two other key intersectionality theorists should be mentioned. Patricia Hill Collins emphasizes the mutual determination of race, gender, and class in her survey and theoretical synthesis of the themes and issues of black feminist thought. Collins invented the phrase “matrix of domination” to describe the “overall social organization within which intersecting oppressions originate, develop, and are contained” (Collins 2008 [1999] 227–228). Evelyn Nakano Glenn argues that race and gender are relational concepts in an interlocking system, providing a historical examination of citizenship and labor in the United States between 1870 and 1930. Glenn argues that these categories cannot be understood separately, but are defined and given meaning in relationship to each other: “Race and gender share three key features as analytic concepts: (1) they are relational concepts whose construction involves (2) representation and material relations and (3) in which power is a constitutive element” (Glenn 2002, 12–13). In many respects, race is gendered and gender is racialized. Inequality is always racialized and gendered as well. There are no clear boundaries between the “regions” of hegemony, so political conflicts will often invoke some or all these themes simultaneously.

3. “The truth is that there are no races; there is nothing in the world that can do all we ask race to do for us.... The evil that is done is done by the concept, and by easy—yet impossible—assumptions as to its application” (Appiah 1992, 45). Appiah's eloquent and learned book fails, in our view, to dispense with the race concept, despite its anguished attempt to do so; this indeed is the source of its author's anguish. We agree with him as to the non-objective character of race, but fail to see how this recognition justifies its abandonment.
4. George L. Mosse (1985) argues that anti-semitism only began to be racialized in the 18th century. For a competing view, see Thomas 2010.
5. As Marx put it:

The discovery of gold and silver in America, the extirpation, enslavement, and entombment in mines of the aboriginal population, the beginning of the conquest and looting of the East Indies, the turning of Africa into a warren for the commercial hunting of blackskins, signalized the rosy dawn of the era of capitalist production. These idyllic proceedings are the chief momenta of primitive accumulation. (1967, 75)

David E. Stannard (1992) argues that the wholesale slaughter perpetrated upon the native peoples of the Western hemisphere is unequalled in history, even in our own bloody century. See also Lovejoy and Rogers, eds. 1994.

6. Debates of a similar nature also took place among the subjects of conquest and enslavement. On Native American perspectives, see Calloway 1994; Richter 2003; White 2010. On African perspectives, see Opoku-Agyemang et al., eds. 2008; Thornton 2012.

7. In Virginia, for example, it took about two decades after the establishment of European colonies to extirpate the indigenous people of the greater vicinity; 50 years after the establishment of the first colonies, the elaboration of slave codes establishing race as *prima facie* evidence for enslaved status was well under way. See Jordan (2012 [1968]).
8. In 1550–1551 two Spanish Dominicans, Bartolomeo de las Casas and Juan Ginés de Sepúlveda, conducted a prolonged theological debate in Valladolid, Spain, about the humanity and spiritual status of Spain's Native American subjects. The debate was carried out at the behest of the Spanish king, Charles V, and in the shadow of the Inquisition. While ostensibly theological, and thus focused on such questions as the status—or even presence—of the souls of the Indians, the debate also addressed questions of Spanish imperial development strategy, notably the scope and legitimacy of slavery and the status of the *encomienda* system vis-à-vis religious and royal authority. See Hanke 1974; Todorov 1984.
9. For a pointed, parallel demonstration of the imperative of racial classification during relatively early stages of conquest, see the genre of Mexican *casta* paintings (Denver Art Museum 2004; Katzew 2005).
10. Proslavery physician Samuel George Morton (1799–1851) compiled a collection of 800 crania from all parts of the world, which formed the sample for his studies of race. Assuming that the larger the size of the cranium translated into greater intelligence, Morton established a relationship between race and skull capacity. Gossett reports that “In 1849, one of his studies included the following results: the English skulls in his collection proved to be the largest, with an average cranial capacity of 96 cubic inches. The Americans and Germans were rather poor seconds, both with cranial capacities of 90 cubic inches. At the bottom of the list were the Negroes with 83 cubic inches, the Chinese with 82, and the Indians with 79” (Gossett 1997 [1965], 74). When Steven Jay Gould reexamined Morton's research, he found that the data were deeply, though probably unconsciously, manipulated to agree with his “a priori conviction about racial ranking” (1981, 50–69).
11. See UNESCO 1950/1951. The production of the documents was coordinated by Alfred Metraux (1951). The 1950 authors included Professors Ernest Beaglehole (New Zealand), Juan Comas (Mexico), E. Franklin Frazier (U.S.), Humayun Kabir (India), Claude Lévi-Strauss (France), Morris Ginsberg (United Kingdom), and Ashley Montagu (U.S.). It was revised by Montagu “after criticism submitted by Professors Hadley Cantril, E. G. Conklin, Gunnar Dahlberg, Theodosius Dobzhansky, L. C. Dunn, Donald Hager, Julian S. Huxley, Otto Klineberg, Wilbert Moore, H. J. Mullet, Gunnar Myrdal, Joseph Needham, and Curt Stern” (ibid, 35). The 1950 document was criticized as excessively sociologically oriented; the 1951 revision included text drafted by anthropologists, geneticists, and biologists as well. On Metraux see Prins 2007.
12. These are complex cases. The Cherokee Freedmen are the descendants of black slaves owned by the Cherokee (Jones 2009). The Seminole Blacks are the descendants of U.S. maroons who fled slavery to tribal lands in Florida, Indian territory controlled by Spain until 1821. The U.S. fought two “Seminole Wars” (1817–1818 and 1835–1842) to recapture the area and reimpose slavery. Many Seminoles were transported (or fled) to the Oklahoma territory, but some remained in Florida. In 1849, threatened by slave-raiders, c.200 armed Black Seminoles under the leadership of John Horse escaped from Florida and conducted a heroic “long march” across slave-holding Alabama, Louisiana, and Texas.



Accompanied by some traditional (i.e., non-black) Seminole comrades led by the Seminole chief Coacochee. This amazing feat culminated in their crossing into abolitionist Mexico in July 1850; they formed a community in Coahuila that is still called *Nacimiento de los Negros*. See Mulroy 2007.

13. The Implicit Bias Test (IAT) was developed in the mid-1990s by experimental/social psychologist Anthony G. Greenwald. It has spawned a large literature and been applied to various issues of bias (notably race, gender, and stereotyping of various types) in numerous settings, particularly educational, political, and legal. For a small sample of relevant work by Greenwald and collaborators, see Greenwald et al. 2003; Greenwald et al. 2009; Kang et al. 2012.
14. The legacy of Kant is particularly evident here (McCarthy 2009), but sociological and psychological concepts such as “consciousness of kind” (Giddings 1932) have also acquired great followings over the years.
15. See “The Conservation of Races” (1993 [1897]), an early statement that has occasioned much debate among Du Bois scholars (Marable 1986, 35–38; Appiah 1992, 28–46; Lewis 1993, 372–373; Reed 1997a).
16. Boas’s work has drawn contemporary criticism for its residual essentialism; his early physical anthropology at times overwhelmed his vaunted cultural relativism (Boas 1912a, 1912b; Williams 1996).
17. Park’s *Race and Culture* (1950) is still useful; see also Lyman 1992; Steinberg 2007. Locke’s 1915 lectures at Howard University, unpublished until 1992, bear a remarkable resemblance to contemporary racial theories and comparative historical sociologies of race (Locke 1992 [1915]).
18. Proposition 54 was defeated, less because voters wished to preserve racial categorization as an overall state practice, but rather because in a few particular areas of state activity they had been convinced that maintaining racially based data was good for society overall. A particularly crucial source of Connerly’s defeat was a series of campaign ads run by medical societies arguing that collecting racial data was important for public health purposes (HoSang 2010).
19. In August, 2012 the Bureau announced that it was considering redefining the Top of Form–Bottom of Form “Hispanic” category to the status of a racial category, possibly called “Hispanic/Latino,” that would be equivalent on the form to white or black. See Cohn 2012.
20. We are not unaware, for example, that publishing this work is itself a racial project.
21. *Floyd, et al. v. City of New York, et al.*, a class action suit brought by the Center for Constitutional Rights on behalf of victims of “stop and frisk” racial profiling by New York City police, was decided on August 12, 2013. Federal judge Shira Scheindlin decided for the plaintiffs and ordered a series of modification and reforms of “stop and frisk.” See Center for Constitutional Rights 2013. Challenges to the decision suggest that the case’s ultimate outcome remains in doubt.
22. Racial jurisprudence largely relies on the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment and on the 1964 Civil Rights Act. The full extent of Supreme Court rulings on the nature of racism cannot be addressed here. An exemplary decision is *Washington v. Davis* (U.S. Supreme Court 1976), which established the rule of “invidious discriminatory purpose” as the criterion for determining if discrimination had occurred. The Court understood “purpose” as “intent” and refused to extend its concept of discrimination to include “disparate

- impact”; in other words the consequences of practices alleged to be discriminatory were officially ignored. See Pillai 2001.
23. Bonilla-Silva defines this view as an “institutionalist perspective,” in which “racism is defined as a combination of prejudice and power that allows the dominant race to institutionalize its dominance at all levels in a society (Bonilla-Silva 1997, 466). See also Katz 2003.
  24. See our debate with Joe Feagin and Chris Elias over these issues: Feagin and Elias 2013; Omi and Winant 2013.
  25. In practice, this just means rendering the racial dimensions of race informal, outside explicit legal regulation, but still subject to political pressures, and thus to racist projects and anti-racist ones as well. Thus it may be an overstatement to say that such restrictions were “abolished.”
  26. This term refers to the practice, widespread throughout the Americas, whereby runaway slaves formed communities in remote areas, such as swamps, mountains, or forests, often in alliance with dispossessed indigenous peoples. The Black Seminoles discussed above were a maroon people.

# Racial Politics and the Racial State

*“[H]istorical reality is completely obfuscated in the myth of an all-inclusive contract creating a sociopolitical order presided over by a neutral state equally responsive to all its colorless citizens.”*

—Charles W. Mills<sup>1</sup>

## Introduction

Race is consummately political. The instability of the race concept and the controversies it generates are emblematic of the racially contradictory society in which we live. In the United States, a system of racial rule has always been in place, operating not merely through macro-level, large-scale activities, but also through micro-level, small-scale practices. The racial regime is enforced and challenged in the schoolyard, on the dance floor, on talk radio, and in the classroom as much as it is in the Supreme Court, electoral politics, or on the battlefield of Helmand province. Because racial formation processes are dynamic, the racial regime remains unstable and contested. We cannot step outside of race and racism, since our society and our identities are constituted by them; we live in racial history.

Race is a vast and variegated theme. Any racial theory is a work-in-progress. Race is a factor not only in politics and history, but also in economy, culture, experience ...; it is a fully-fledged *social fact* like class or gender. Like those other large markers race is an unstable set of *collective representations* as well.<sup>2</sup> We focus here on racial politics and the racial state because through politics, through struggles over power and freedom, we can see race and racism being remade both social structurally and experientially. What we call racial projects have interacted over half a millennium to build up the *social structures* of race and racism. A parallel *experiential dimension* exists as well: The short-term, present-tense experience of racial subjectivity, in which new racial projects are being launched and interacting all the time.<sup>3</sup>

Looking at racial politics in general and the racial state in particular also allows us to consider the state–civil society distinction: The state may represent the core of a given racial regime, but no state can encompass all of civil society. People conceive of, operate, and inhabit their own racial projects (within broader constraints) and “experience” race in distinct and varied ways.

To theorize racial politics and the racial state, then, is to enter the complex territory where structural racism encounters self-reflective action, the radical pragmatism

of people of color (and their white allies) in the United States<sup>4</sup> It is to confront the instability of the U.S. system of racial hegemony, in which despotism and democracy coexist in seemingly permanent conflict. It is to understand that the boundary between state and civil society is necessarily porous and uncertain where race is concerned. Emphasizing the political dimensions of race and racism allows us to discern the contours of the racial system, to understand what racial hegemony looks like, to specify its contradictions, and to envision alternative scenarios.

Racial politics are bigger than the state. They involve civil society, political socialization and thus race-consciousness, racial identity-making (both individual- and group-based), and group boundary formation (Barth, ed. 1998 [1969]) as well. The enmeshment of the state in our everyday lives means that all racial identities are contradictory and “hybrid”; it means that uncertain group boundaries are regulated and often tightened and enforced by the state. We make our racial identities, both individually and collectively, but not under conditions of our own choosing.

Racial formation theory approaches politics as an uneasy combination of despotic and democratic practices, of self-reflective action undertaken both with and against established social structures. Why, for example, are racial attributions so prone to violence, so “hot,” so fiercely upheld and contested, so necessary in the modern world as components of both self and social structure? Why is race so available as a “scavenger concept”: a default variable on the basis of which so many disparate phenomena are supposedly explained?<sup>5</sup> How can a social distinction be both so determining—of life chances and status, of freedom, of economic, political, and social institutions, and indeed of identity itself—and at the same time so undetermined, inchoate, and indeed unreal on so many levels?

The modern state makes use of ideology—racial ideology in this case—to “glue” together contradictory practices and structures: despotism and democracy, coercion and consent, formal equality and substantive inequality, identity and difference.<sup>6</sup> The racial state does not have precise boundaries. Although based in formally constituted institutions and grounded in a contentious historical process, the state extends beyond administrative, legislative, or judicial forms of activity. It inhabits and indeed organizes large segments of social and indeed psychological identity, as well as everyday life. Internalizing and “living out” a particular racial identity, for example, is in some ways internalizing the state; post-structuralist theorists might describe this in terms of “governmentality” (Foucault 1991, 1997). From a Freudian point of view, we might understand the racial state in terms of “introjection”: another form of internalization in which rules and constraints become mechanisms of psychological self-defense. Still another way in which the racial state casts its net over our identities, our everyday experiences, is through the process Althusser called “interpellation”: the way the state “notices” us, “hails” us. In Althusser’s account, a police officer calls out “Hey! You there!” and we instantly flinch; we turn to face the state that is already within us:

[I]deology “acts” or “functions” in such a way that it “recruits” subjects among the individuals (it recruits them all), or “transforms” the individuals

into subjects (it transforms them all) by that very precise operation which I have called interpellation or hailing, and which can be imagined along the lines of the most commonplace everyday police (or other) hailing: “Hey, you there!”

Assuming that the theoretical scene I have imagined takes place in the street, the hailed individual will turn round. By this mere one-hundred-and-eighty-degree physical conversion, he [sic] becomes a subject. Why? Because he has recognized that the hail was “really” addressed to him, and that “it was really him who was hailed” (and not someone else).

(Althusser 2001 [1971], 174; see also Butler 1997a)

By *despotism* we refer to a familiar series of state practices: deprivation of life, liberty, or land; dispossession, violence, confinement, coerced labor, exclusion, and denial of rights or due process. The contemporary United States, and the colonial societies that preceded it in North America, were founded on these and related forms of despotism, all organized according to race. Although racial oppression has lessened over the years, and although some of these despotic practices have been significantly reduced if not eliminated (slavery is a good example here), others continue unabated and in some cases have even increased. For example, carceral practices today rival or exceed any previous period in both the proportions and absolute numbers of black and brown people held in confinement. The little-noticed development of a whole gulag of specialized immigration prisons has no precedent in U.S. history.

All right then, how about the *democratic dimensions* of the racial state? Though it is a constant and prominent feature of the racial state, despotism is not the only story that the state tells about race. “Freedom dreams” (Kelley 2003) rooted in racial politics are among the most enduring contributions to the foundation of democracy in the modern world; these “dreams” have constantly challenged the state, most famously in Martin Luther King, Jr.’s August 1963 speech, but on numerous other occasions as well. In fact the persistence and depth of social justice-oriented movements has been the chief source of popular democracy and indeed popular sovereignty in the United States. What W.E.B. Du Bois called “abolition democracy” is a clear instance of that movement challenge. In Du Bois’s view, the American Revolution of 1776–1781 was only a partial and incomplete anti-imperial transformation, since it was dominated by elites and left slavery intact. The Civil War, and Reconstruction, abortive as it was, were the second phase of the American Revolution, based upon the expansion of the rights that abolition implied: the achievement by all of complete democracy and full citizenship (Du Bois 2007 [1935] 186; see also Lipsitz 2004; Davis 2005, 73–74).

To be sure, democratic movements have often been foreclosed by state-based coercion, as well as by reactionary practices based in civil society: mob violence and lynching, for example. Only under some circumstances has open and “free” political mobilization for democratic reform been possible for people of color: The two great

moments of this mainstream political upsurge were, of course, the Reconstruction period (1865–1877) and the post-World War II civil rights period (1948–1970). At other times democratic political action had to take shape quite autonomously, beneath the radar of the state (and often beneath the social scientific radar as well). This suggests the subaltern character of racial democracy.<sup>7</sup>

\* \* \*

In order to understand racial politics and to grasp the contradictory relationship between racial despotism and racial democracy, it is necessary to situate the racial state historically and account for its development over time. Here, we accomplish this by discussing the transition from *war of maneuver* to *war of position*. Next, we address the *racial body politic*, the corporeal or phenomic dimensions of raciality. Race and racism politicize the body, subjecting it to state control, surveillance, and violence. In the next section, *The Radical Pragmatist Politics of Race*, we consider the micro–macro linkages that operate in racial politics. We examine such matters as the way individuals and movements “navigate” in unstable and uncertain racial conditions, and the contradictions between racial despotism and racial democracy that continue to shape and reshape the racial state. We draw once again on the theories of the Italian neo-Marxist politician, theorist, and anti-fascist leader Antonio Gramsci. In the next section, we introduce the concept of *trajectories of racial politics*. Trajectories are shaped interactions, taking place over historical time, between the racial state and race-oriented social movements. Finally, we reflect upon racial politics in everyday life, discussing the *politicization of the social* that took place in the United States during the post-World War II years. We argue that anti-racist movements greatly expanded the political “space” available in the country, achieving an enormous deepening and broadening of political awareness. From (and within) race this “politics of identity” went everywhere: into personal relationships, family, sexuality, and “micro-political” interactions of all types. Prior to the 1970s, these identities and relationships were seen as mostly private matters, located outside the political sphere. Since the black movement challenge, they have “gone public”; awareness of racism, sexism, and homophobia cannot be removed from the public sphere.

## From War of Maneuver to War of Position

There has been a racial system in North America since the earliest days of contact with and conquest by Europeans. This system has linked political rule to the racial classification of individuals and groups. The major institutions and social relationships of U.S. society—law, political organization, economic relationships, religion, cultural life, residential patterns—have been structured from the beginning by this system.

Clearly, the system was more monolithic, more absolute, at earlier historical moments. Despite its epochal revolutionary origins, the early U.S. maintained



many of the residues of the absolutist system of monarchical rule from which it had emerged. Empire, slavery, and patrimonialism were some of these “birthmarks.” Having thrown off the shackles of the British empire, “the first new nation” (Lipset 2003 [1963]) proceeded to establish itself as an empire of its own, seizing the land and labor of native peoples of North America (Kaplan 2005; Stoler, ed. 2006;). Having declared itself subject to a natural law in which “all men [sic] are created equal,” the United States quite comprehensively disobeyed that law in practice: not only through its support for hereditary chattel slavery, but also through its severe restrictions on democratic participation.<sup>8</sup> The American Revolution was in many respects triggered by trade restrictions imposed by the “mother country”;<sup>9</sup> the insurgent colonies were merchant capitalist, not yet industrial capitalist. They were patrimonial systems that were still marked by feudalism (Adams 2005). Not only did romantic racist ideology justifying slavery develop out of this political-economic complex—the plantation owner as the father, the slaves as children—but also the chattelization of both slaves and women was operating here (Pateman 1988; Mills 1999). Furthermore, because there was very little industrial production in the early decades of the nation’s existence, property-less white men were uncertain about their status. The main “workers” were slaves, and white men, unwilling to accept the quasi-feudal status of “servant,” were determined to distinguish themselves from slaves at all costs. David Roediger (2007 [1991]) finds deep roots for later U.S. racism in this unstable and conflictual situation. What about the slaves themselves? The 1790 census—the first ever taken in the country—counted roughly 20 percent of the U.S. population as enslaved (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1791). In Virginia, the principal slaveholding state of the time, the enslaved population was around 40 percent of the total.

Thus policing and controlling the enslaved population was a particular concern, especially in the South, where slaves were concentrated and represented the main source of labor. The U.S. Constitution reflected extensive experience in the surveillance and punishment of slaves, experience that had been acquired by Europeans over 250 years of colonization before the Constitution was even promulgated. Protection for “the peculiar institution” was provided by the document in numerous ways: notably in its provision for the return of escaped slaves, and in its ignominious “three-fifths clause,” whereby the enslaved population, though obviously unrepresented in the legislature, could yet be counted as a component of the population for purposes of legislative enumeration.

For most of U.S. history, state racial policy’s main objective was repression and exclusion. Congress’ first attempt to define American citizenship, the Naturalization Law of 1790, declared that only free “white” immigrants could qualify. A persistent pattern of disenfranchisement targeted people of color. Before the Civil War, “free persons of color” were stripped of their right to vote—the key to citizenship status—in many states. The extension of eligibility to all racial groups has been slow indeed. Japanese, for example, could become naturalized citizens only after the passage of the McCarran–Walter Act of 1952.<sup>10</sup>

The state plays a crucial part in racialization, the extension of racial meaning to a previously racially unclassified relationship, social practice or group. Throughout the 19th century, many state and federal laws recognized only three racial categories: "white," "Negro," and "Indian." In California, the influx of Chinese and the debates surrounding the legal status of Mexicans provoked a brief juridical crisis of racial definition. California attempted to resolve this dilemma by classifying Mexicans and Chinese within the already existing framework of "legally defined" racial groups. After the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo (1848), Mexicans were accorded the political-legal status of "free white persons," a fig-leaf placed by the U.S. conquerors over the realities of Mexican *mestizaje* and slave emancipation. State racialization of Asians was even more baroque: In 1854 the newly established California Supreme Court ruled in *People v. Hall* (CA Supreme Court 1854) that Chinese should be considered "Indian"[!] and denied the political rights accorded to whites.<sup>11</sup>

But even at its most oppressive, the racial order was unable to arrogate to itself the entire capacity for the production of racial meanings or the racial subjection of the population. Racially defined "others"—people of color—were always able to counterpose their own cultural traditions, their own forms of organization and identity, to the dehumanizing and enforced "invisibility" imposed by the majority society. As the voluminous literature on black culture under slavery shows, black slaves developed cultures of resistance based on music, religion, African traditions, and family ties, among other political technologies. By these means they sustained their own ideological project: the development of a "free" black identity, a sense of "peoplehood," and a collective dedication to emancipation.<sup>12</sup> Similar processes of cultural resistance developed among Native Americans, Latin@s, and Asians.<sup>13</sup>

Without reviewing the vast history of the U.S. racial order, it is still possible to make some general comments about the manner in which this order was historically consolidated. Gramsci's distinction between "war of maneuver" and "war of position" will prove useful here. In his account, *war of maneuver* is the form of politics appropriate to conditions of dictatorship or despotism, when no terrain is available for opposition inside the system. Resistance to the regime mobilizes outside the political arena, in the hinterlands, the slums and barracoons, the places of worship, the fields and mines and other workplaces, everywhere the subaltern strata are gathered. Once it has acquired the necessary force, resistance moves to the key locus of power, the capital, and seizes the key redoubts (the Bastille, the Winter Palace) from which oppressive power has been exercised.

*War of position*, by contrast, is the political form appropriate to hegemonic systems of rule that operate by incorporating their opposition, at least up to a point. Modern mass societies of both the fascist and the democratic type are the kinds of political systems Gramsci has in mind. Resistance to fascism combines the two forms of politics. Democratic states may be quite restrictive, but they still generally provide some space for challenge from within: legislative, electoral, or judicial processes, for example. In such societies the state is fortified (Gramsci calls it a system

of “trenches”)<sup>14</sup> by structures of legitimation and consent against insurrection or other direct challenges. The task faced by any oppositional movement engaged in a “war of position” is to delegitimize the hegemonic system and to erode or undermine consent. By rearticulating political and cultural “common sense” in such a way that the excluded, oppressed, and exploited sectors of society can achieve their own legitimacy, their own inclusion, the opposition develops *counter-hegemony*. It seeks to attain the rights, justice, and political power that its supporters had earlier been denied. “War of position” is thus a prolonged struggle for the adherence of the general population and the achievement of political power, generally without insurrection or armed struggle.<sup>15</sup>

For much of American history, no political legitimacy was conceded to alternative or oppositional racial projects. The absence of democratic rights, of material resources, and of political and ideological terrain upon which to challenge the monolithic character of the racial order, forced racially defined opposition both outward, to the margins of society, and inward, to the relative safety of self-defined communities. Slaves who escaped to the North or Canada, or who formed maroon communities in forests and swamps; Indians who made war on the United States in defense of their peoples and lands; Chinese and Filipin@s who drew together in Chinatowns and Manilatowns in order to gain some measure of collective control over their existence—these are some examples of the movement *outward*, away from political engagement with the racial state.

These same blacks, Indians, Asians (and many others), banned from the political system and relegated to what was supposed to be a permanently inferior sociocultural status, were also forced *inward* upon themselves as individuals, families, and communities. Tremendous cultural resources were nurtured among such communities; enormous labors were required to survive and to develop elements of an autonomy and opposition under such conditions. These circumstances can best be understood as combining with the violent clashes and necessity of resistance (to white-led race riots, military assaults) which characterized these periods, to constitute a racial war of maneuver.

War of maneuver was gradually replaced by *war of position* as racially defined minorities achieved political gains in the United States.<sup>16</sup> A strategy of war of position can only be predicated on political struggle—on the existence of diverse institutional and cultural terrains upon which oppositional political projects can be mounted. To the extent that you can confront the racial state from within the political system, to the degree that you possess political “voice” (Hirschman 1971), you are fighting a war of position. Prepared in large measure by the practices undertaken under conditions of war of maneuver, black movements and their allies were able to make sustained strategic incursions into the mainstream political process during the post-World War II years. “Opening up” the state was a process of democratization which had effects both on state structures and on racial meanings. The postwar black movement, later joined by other racially based minority movements, challenged the dominant racial

ideology in the United States, insisting upon a more egalitarian and democratic concept of race. The state was the logical target for this effort.

## The Racial Body Politic

Race and racism both define and disrupt the body politic of the nation-state.<sup>17</sup> As we saw in Chapter 3, concepts of the *nation* like “the American people” or “the French people” presuppose a degree of inclusion and commonality that is impossible to achieve in practice. States occasionally become the instruments of necessarily genocidal attempts to attain that level of uniformity (“purity”), which is usually framed in racial terms.<sup>18</sup> But more often they must manage the heterogeneity of the body politic, operating on the continuum of despotism–democracy that we have discussed. Therefore racial difference and racial inequality are fundamental dimensions of social organization. This is something that reductionist theoretical approaches to race and racism *just can’t explain*. There is a persistent tendency to recur to other, supposedly more fundamental social forces like class and culture/ethnicity, in the effort to explain the persistence and breadth of race. Such accounts always neglect or dismiss the embeddedness of race in the modern world.

Foucault’s concept of “biopower”<sup>19</sup> addresses some of the problems of this sort of management. Though he developed it in his later work on sexuality, Foucault also applied this term to issues of race and racism, especially in regard to colonialism and empire. The biopower concept is useful here because it allows us to see the normalization and comprehensiveness of race and racism in the modern world (and most certainly in the U.S.). With Foucault, we challenge the idea—found everywhere in both scholarly work and common sense—that human differentiation according to race is somehow aberrant, and that racism is an irrational deviation from such immutable principles as individualism, “*liberté, égalité, fraternité*,” or the law of supply and demand. Foucault labels such accounts “scapegoat theories” of race. As Ann Laura Stoler writes,

Scapegoat theories posit that under economic and social duress, particular sub-populations are cordoned off as intruders, invented to deflect anxieties, and conjured up precisely to nail blame. For Foucault, racism is more than an *ad hoc* response to crisis: It is a manifestation of preserved possibilities, the expression of an underlying discourse of permanent social war, nurtured by the biopolitical technologies of “incessant purification.” Racism does not merely arise in moments of crisis, in sporadic cleansings. It is internal to the biopolitical state, woven into the web of the social body, threaded through its fabric.

(1995, 69)

From this standpoint the “scavenger concept” of race also acquires new focus and emphasis. The ready availability of race as an “explanation” for deviance from some

attributed norm becomes more intelligible when we recognize both the ease with which racial distinctions are made—their “ocularity”—and when we simultaneously admit the breadth and depth of racial awareness in American society. With these political tools in view, with an awareness of biopower handy and Foucault by your side, consider once again the raciality of the body politic: the endless list of attributed variation by race that pervades the United States, and much of the rest of the world as well. Variation by race in scores on the SAT test? In evacuation rates by race from hurricane-flooded New Orleans? In different racial groups’ commitments to “hard work”? In criminal propensities? How about in common-sense beliefs about sexual proclivities across racially defined groups (consider the word “vanilla” in this context)? This list can go on for days.

The phrase “body politic,” of course, refers not only to the collective body, the “nation” or its equivalents; it also refers to the politicized body. Here we are arguing that the phenomic dimensions of race are among the central components of this phenomenon. Race and racism not only politicize the social but render up the human body into the burning heart of the state as material for the social control. State racial policy is directed against the racial body, in such forms as surveillance, profiling, policing, and confinement. This racial body politic is also gendered and classed: State violence against black men—against poor, dark, mainly male bodies—is one of the most continuous and seemingly central aspects of the U.S. racial system. Women of color are also targeted, especially by violence, discrimination, and assaults on their reproductive rights (Harris-Perry 2011); profiling is everywhere (Glover 2009).

Much recent scholarship has properly been devoted to “performing race” (Kondo 1997). In parallel fashion, critical studies of racism tend to see it as something that can be “performed” or not; for example we are urged to “interrupt” racism, or to “ally” against racism. We consider that both these dimensions of race—race as “performance” and race as “phenomics”—must be synthesized if we are to conceive fully of the racial politics of civil society. To be sure there is no easy separation of the racial state from the racial dimensions of identity and everyday life.

*The body is the person.* It is not news that racism derives much of its energy from the effort to control racially marked bodies. Nor is it surprising that despotism operates on the racial body, assaulting it, confining it, and profiling it.<sup>20</sup> Whether traditional or modern, whether religious or corporate, whether super-exploiting immigrant workers, profiling “suspicious” persons (“stop and frisk”; “show me your papers”), whether enforcing the boundaries of neighborhood segregation, policing school hallways in neighborhoods of color (Nolan 2011)—again the list is long—the convergence between despotism and the racial body is comprehensive. For this reason—as well as for reasons of gender and sexuality—the right of all human beings to control their own bodies is a fundamental democratic demand.

## The Radical Pragmatist Politics of Race

Racial formation theory draws a great deal from the pragmatist philosophical tradition. Pragmatist concepts of self and society are based on the core idea of *self-reflective action*. This term means that both individually and collectively we are self-consciously cognizant of the social forces in which we are immersed, and through which we steer our individual and collective selves.<sup>21</sup> Consider racial formation as a continuous process of this type. It is not only a struggle over the meaning of one's own racial identity within a particular social context and defined set of relationships; it is also a conflict over the terms of collective self-definition carried out in the shadow of the state and its biopolitical capabilities. In the post-World War II period, these struggles have taken place in explicitly political terms, as an ongoing "war of position" between racial despotism and racial democracy.

A radical pragmatist approach allows us to analyze the interaction of the racialized self and the racialized social structure. At the "micro-level," each racial self engages in a certain amount of sociopolitical "navigation," so to speak. This activity takes place in everyday life and in political life, and requires what might be called racial "intelligence." When one acts self-reflectively in respect to race, she or he links the racial conditions of everyday life with those of the overall social structure. Often this racial intelligence is taken for granted, but it is also self-conscious much of the time, especially for people of color.

At the "macro-level," the radical pragmatism of racial formation theory allows us to understand why even in the present—in the post-civil rights, neoliberal era—racial politics are so intractable, why they consist of simultaneous advances and setbacks. At some moments and during some periods, projects for collective self-definition assume the utmost importance, while at others they are in relative abeyance. Under some conditions, when mobilization is sufficient—say in 1963 Birmingham, Alabama—movements and organizations are able to intervene politically and act strategically on behalf of insurgent groups of color. More often, self-reflective political activity is diffused and sporadic, less frequently concentrated in mass political undertakings. The Birmingham campaign or the August 1963 March on Washington were exceptional moments of collective mobilization. But self-reflective action is always present to some degree.

*The state also operates this way.* Indeed a radical pragmatist approach to racial politics also allows us to see the "life of the state" as Gramsci describes it, as

a continuous process of formation and superseding of unstable equilibria ... between the interests of the fundamental group and those of the subordinate groups—equilibria in which the interests of the dominant group prevail, but only up to a certain point, i.e., stopping short of narrowly corporate economic interest.

(1971, 182)

The framework here is Marxian class analysis, but if we think about this processual notion of “the life of the state” from a racial point of view it closely parallels the pragmatist concept. The “fundamental group” may be seen as whites—or more properly whites and others who benefit from white supremacy and racism—while the “subordinate groups” are people of color and their allies who are incorporated into the “unstable equilibrium,” but only “up to a point.” Racial politics are unstable because state and opposition are both the targets and operators of intersecting racial projects. In the old days, the racial state could be more overt and violent. In the “post-civil rights” era, the racial state cannot merely dominate; it must seek *hegemony*. It does this in two related ways; first by incorporating “subordinate” groups: the “sub-” others, in other words the *subaltern*; and second by creating and embodying racial “common sense,” as we have discussed. Yet state violence, confinement, and aggressive and repressive policing of people of color all continue; this is how hegemony and subalternity are maintained: though a combination of repression and incorporation.

What is despotic, and what is democratic, about the U.S. racial state? Despite several historical “breaks”—when abolition of slavery, decolonization, and large-scale extensions of citizenship and civil rights took place—the contemporary world is still mired in the same racial history from which it originally sprang. The U.S. state was born out of white supremacy and still maintains it to a significant degree. Yet the state has been forced time and time again to make concessions to the racial “others”: people of African descent, subjects of imperial conquest, indigenous people, and immigrants. The racial state has been transformed over and over in unending efforts to deal with its fundamental contradictions: Its concept of “freedom” included slavery. It is a racial despotism that also claims to be democratic. It is an empire that arose out of an anti-imperial revolution. It is a settler society (based on immigration) that is also exclusionist.

Colonial rule and slavocracy were systems whose fundamental political character was despotic. By seizure of territory, by kidnapping and theft, by coercive and authoritarian rule, Europe-based imperial regimes destroyed countless lives and sensibilities. No amount of rationalization, no invocation of themes of development and uplift, no efforts at historical relativization can justify these predations or deodorize their moral stink. So, racial politics and the racial state have their origins in the ravaging of the globe, in the consolidation of European rule, and in the classification of all humanity along racial lines. It is a bleak picture.

But not in every way. Racial politics also embody self-activity, resistance, and “situated creativity” (another pragmatist phrase; see Joas 1996). For the past half-millennium, refusal of slavery, resistance to colonialism, noncompliance with racial domination, fidelity to oppositional cultural traditions and alternative concepts of group and individual identity, and belief in racial solidarity have been some of the most crucial sources of insurgency, some of the central passions underlying emancipatory and democratic politics, both in the United States and around the world.



## Trajectories of Racial Politics

What happens in racial politics when huge crises and racial “breaks”—matters of global and not just national significance for the most part—are *not* on the horizon? The 17 years of the Civil War/Reconstruction (1860–1877) and roughly 22 years (1948–1970) of the post-World War II racial “break” were exceptional periods. The brief and heroic latter period is now receding historically. As President Obama has noted—speaking about himself as well as other present-day black leaders—the “Moses” generation of Dr. King and his contemporaries has now been succeeded by the “Joshua” generation (Bobo and Dawson 2009). What do “normal” racial politics look like today?

Racial politics should be understood in terms of *trajectories*. In the post-World War II civil rights era and its aftermath, there have been a rising and a declining phase of this political trajectory. The trajectory proceeded from the relative abeyance of racial justice movements before the war; it was initiated during the war with the 1941 desegregation of the defense industries, and continued with the desegregation of the armed forces and the 1954 *Brown* decision; it reached its apogee with the upsurge of the civil rights, black power, and their allied movements in the 1960s. It began its decline after the adoption of civil rights reforms in the mid-1960s. A victim of its own (partial) success, the movement confronted the onset of racial reaction at the hands of the new right from about 1970 onward.

Applying Gramsci’s approach, let us consider the U.S. racial system as an “unstable equilibrium.” The idea of politics as “the continuous process of formation and superseding of unstable equilibria” has particular resonance in describing the operation of the racial state. The racial system is managed by the state—encoded in law, organized through policy-making, and enforced by a repressive apparatus. But the equilibrium thus achieved is unstable, for the great variety of conflicting interests encapsulated in racial meanings and identities can be no more than pacified by the state. Racial conflict persists at every level of society, varying over time and in respect to different groups, but ubiquitous. Indeed, the state is itself penetrated and structured by the very interests whose conflicts it seeks to stabilize and control.<sup>22</sup>

Disruption and restoration of the racial order suggest the type of reiterative movement or pattern we designate by the term “trajectory.” Both racial movements and the racial state experience such transformations, passing through periods of rapid change and virtual stasis, through moments of massive mobilization and others of relative passivity. While the movement and regime versions of the overall trajectory are independently observable, they could not exist independently of each other. Racially based political movements are inconceivable without the racial state, which provides a focus for political demands and structures the racial order. The racial regime, in turn, has been historically constructed by racial movements; it consists of agencies and programs which are institutionalized responses to racially based movements of the past.

Our concept of the trajectory of racial politics thus links the two central actors in the drama of contemporary racial politics—the racial state and anti-racist social movements, the “dominant” and “subordinate” groups in Gramsci’s account—and suggests a general pattern of interaction between them. Change in the racial order, in the social meaning and political role played by race, is achieved only when the state has initiated reforms, when it has generated new programs and agencies in response to movement demands. Movements capable of achieving such reforms only arise when there is significant “decay” in the capacities of pre-existing state programs and institutions to organize and enforce racial ideology. Contemporary patterns of change in the racial order illustrate this point clearly.

Taken as a whole, the anti-racist movements of the post-World War II period constitute a broad democratic upsurge, whose goals were a wide aggregation of “freedom dreams” (Kelley 2003) that ranged from moderate (voting rights) to radical (socialist revolution, national liberation). The state response to this challenge sought to contain it through reforms that would substitute a system of racial *hegemony* for the previous system of racial *domination*. The various civil rights acts and court decisions of the 1960s incorporated movement opposition. This involved making tangible concessions without altering the underlying structural racism that was characteristic of the United States. It also meant the marginalization and in some cases destruction of those sectors of racial opposition that were unwilling to accept limited (aka “moderate”) reforms.

After the dust had settled from the titanic confrontation between the movement’s radical propensities and the “establishment’s” tremendous capacity for incorporative “moderate” reform, a great deal remained unresolved. The ambiguous and contradictory racial conditions in the nation today result from decades-long attempts simultaneously to ameliorate racial opposition and to placate and sustain the *ancien régime raciale*. The unending reiteration of these opposite gestures, these contradictory practices, itself testifies to the limitations of democracy and the continuing significance of race in the United States.

Where are we located today on this trajectory? Were the incorporative reforms effective in defusing the anti-racist movement? Of course, they were; let’s not have any illusions about that. But the political processes we are discussing here proceed forward in time, driven in part by the very limitations of the reforms that shaped them. The trajectory of racial politics continues. Perhaps perversely, or at least ironically, the reforms which curtailed racial inequality and injustice’s most despotic features have worked to reinforce the production and diffusion of “colorblindness” as the hegemonic U.S. racial ideology in the late 20th and early 21st centuries. In Chapters 7 (*Racial Reaction: Containment and Rearticulation*) and 8 (*Colorblindness, Neoliberalism, and Obama*), we consider the rise to hegemony of colorblind racial ideology, as well as its contradictions and vulnerabilities.

This is the racial crisis of the early 21st century. “[C]risis,” Gramsci wrote, “consists precisely in the fact that the old is dying and the new cannot be born: in this

interregnum, a great variety of morbid symptoms appear” (1971, 276). The significant advances made since World War II in overcoming the entrenched systems of U.S. racial despotism coexist with a system of ongoing racial stratification and injustice that manages to reproduce most of the conditions that have supposedly been abolished.

## The Politicization of the Social

The race-based/anti-racism movements that arose after World War II were the first *new social movements* (Laraña, Johnston, and Gusfield, eds. 1994; Goodwin, Jasper, and Polletta, eds. 2001). They were the first systematically to expand the concerns of politics to the social sphere, to the terrain of everyday life and emotional life.<sup>23</sup> New social movement politics would later prove “contagious,” leading to the mobilization of other people of color, as well as other groups whose concerns were principally social. The new social movements were inspired by the black movement—particularly in the United States but all around the world as well (Mullings 2009). These movements challenged the more limited notions of politics that had shaped “mainstream” understandings. They vastly enlarged and qualitatively transformed the classical definition of politics: “Who gets what, when, and how” (Lasswell 1950 [1936]).

What distinguishes the post-World War II racial regime, and the anti-racist initiatives of the mid-20th century, from previous periods of racial despotism and earlier attempts to create racial democracy? Of course, no historical period is completely different from those that preceded it; all political systems, all racial projects, bear the “birthmarks” of their epochs of origin. Even a radical “break,” like the one described by Du Bois in *Black Reconstruction*, or the post-World War II upheaval in racial dynamics—which was a worldwide phenomenon, not just a U.S. one—preserves within itself substantial components of what went before.

How could it be otherwise? Enslaved people of African descent may have sought freedom, and indeed fought and died for it with all their hearts, but they nevertheless remained wounded and brutalized by the system they succeeded in overthrowing. And that system, however much it had been laid waste by Sherman’s armies, and however much it had been chastened by Lincoln’s poignant warning in his Second Inaugural Address (1864) that

if God wills that it [the War] continue until all the wealth piled by the bondsman’s two hundred and fifty years of unrequited toil shall be sunk, and ... every drop of blood drawn with the lash shall be paid by another drawn with the sword, as was said three thousand years ago, so still it must be said, “The judgments of the Lord are true and righteous altogether...,”

would still not emerge from the carnage and suffering of the Civil War as a truly free society.

The achievement of civil rights reforms was a great triumph, despite the limitations and compromises built into the reform legislation and the Supreme Court

decisions involved (the *Brown* decision's "all deliberate speed" equivocation on desegregation was but one example of this). Yet the passage of civil rights laws in the mid-1960s was no more the creation of racial democracy than was the passage of civil rights laws in the late 1860s. The Supreme Court overturned the 1868 Civil Rights Act and other emancipatory Reconstruction-era measures, just as it has eviscerated the 1960s civil rights laws in the decades since their enactment.<sup>24</sup> The achievement of slavery's abolition was at best a hint of what "abolition democracy"—that quasi-revolutionary ideal that Du Bois identified as the heart of slaves' auto-emancipation during the Civil War—would have involved: redistribution of land, severe punishment for rebellious Confederates. Civil rights are not the same as democracy. They do not spell the end of racism; indeed they are marked by racism's continuity, not its elimination.

Yet the post-World War II racial upheavals in the United States, the anti-racist movements of that epoch, did indeed achieve something new and unprecedented. This was the *politicization of the social*: the overflow of political meaning and awareness into the arena of everyday and emotional life, which had up to then been a largely "private" and depoliticized sphere. This terrain had previously been seen as largely irrational, disembodied, unrelated to politics, unconnected to power, and outside the purview of the state.

Emerging from the territory of the everyday, lived experience of racism, and indeed embedded with that experience, the anti-racist movement was all about the ways race was conceived, constructed, and practiced at both the macro-level of institutional arrangements and social structure and the micro-level of everyday social relationships. The modern civil rights movement, and its allied anti-racist movements, were struggles over these concepts, practices, and structures; they were conflicts about the *social meaning of race*. It was their incursion into the nation's political life, and their achievements within it, that created what we call The Great Transformation—the shifts in racial awareness, racial meaning, racial subjectivity that were brought about by the black movement. Race is not only a matter of politics, economics, or culture, but operates simultaneously on all these levels of lived experience. It is a pre-eminently social phenomenon that suffuses each individual identity, each family and community, and that also penetrates state institutions and market relationships.

After World War II, the black movement *politicized the social*. It asserted the "fact of blackness" (Fanon 1967), a realization that erupted like a volcano onto the sleeping village below. The village of American social life—that is, the white "mainstream" of segregated American society—was turned inside out by this "social fact" (Durkheim 2014) after centuries of white obliviousness and dormant racial insurgency. The rise of the black movement eclipsed the ethnicity-based model of race and instituted a new model based on new understandings—what we call *rearticulations*—of key socio-political pillars of U.S. "common sense": democracy, state, and identity.

Because it represented a critical upheaval in the meaning of race and a far more profound understanding of the dynamics of racism, the politicization of the social

was linked to the two challenging paradigms of racial formation that we have discussed here: the class-based paradigm and the nation-based paradigm. But it was only linked in part. Yes, the class-based and nation-based approaches to race and racism shared a rejection of the “moderate” orientation of the ethnicity paradigm. This drew them together in their quest for a more radical anti-racist position, and it suggested a deeper critique of race and racism in everyday life. For example, some class-based theories of race focused on the *experience* of inequality and superexploitation (Oppenheimer 1974). Cultural nationalist politics and theory focused on community, customs, and *peoplehood*.

But the challenging paradigms could not grasp the larger significance of the racial politics of everyday life, the social psychological and experiential dimensions of the politicized social. The class-based and nation-based paradigms of race, though critical and radical, relied on more traditional forms of politics—on economic determinism and anti-colonialism respectively. Because they were limited by their reductionism of race, even the radical varieties of the class-based and nation-based paradigms—Marxist accounts and internal colonialism accounts in particular—could not fully embrace the autonomy and *self-activity* of the new social movements.

We do not argue that the politicization of the social was a purely spontaneous phenomenon. Indeed it was *crafted* in part by movement activists and theorists, for example by Bayard Rustin (Rustin 2003 [1965]; D’Emilio 2004). We draw special attention, however, to the movement’s ability to pay attention to its base, to “learn from its followers.” This derived from its profound commitment to the complexities of race itself. This recognition of black “self-activity” (James et al. 2006 [1958]) bore a strong resemblance to the “situated creativity” highlighted in Dewey’s political philosophy. We have discussed this *radical pragmatism of race*. The movement’s immersion in the black religious tradition, its embrace of direct action, and its heteronomous adoption of such political tactics as the “sit-in” (based in the labor movement) and *satyagraha*/nonviolence (based in Gandhi’s anti-colonial struggle in India; see Chabot 2011)<sup>25</sup> all undermined the racist barriers that had for so long separated the thoroughly racialized social life of American society from the exclusive white politics of the Jim Crow regime. A notable feature of the black movement’s politicization of the social was the active role that youth, especially black youth, played in this transition. The willingness of young blacks to expose their bodies to the brutality of white racism—particularly in the South—was itself a rearticulation: a practical reinterpretation of the significance of the black body, as well as a defiance of the inherent violence of lynching.<sup>26</sup>

In short, racial identity, racial experience, racial politics, and the racial state itself were deeply transformed after World War II by the black movement and its allies. They were so profoundly reinvented and reinterpreted that the racial meanings established during this period continue to shape social and political life, even in the current period of reaction.

Furthermore, the politicization of the social spread across all of American life, highlighting the injustices, inequalities, and indignities that pervade U.S. society. The

taken-for-granted unfreedom of women as a result of their sexual objectification and assumed unsuitability for the public sphere—in other words, the whole panoply of sexist practices and social structures—now became visible and a matter of contention, not only in the legislatures and courts but in the workplace and bedroom.<sup>27</sup> The assumed abnormality, perversion, deviance, and criminality of homosexuality—in other words, the unquestioned homophobia, ostracism, and discrimination experienced as a matter of course by anyone recognized as gay—now became a public political conflict, not only for those stigmatized as a result of their sexual identities, but for *everyone*, for the whole society.<sup>28</sup> Of course, these shifts did not take place overnight; they required years to unfold; indeed they are still very much sociopolitical battlefields and are likely to remain so, just as race and racism itself will remain a political “war zone,” a field of profound conflict. But our point here is not that that these were “problems” that were “solved” in political life and everyday life. Indeed it is quite the opposite: that racism, sexism, and homophobia—and other society-wide conflicts as well—were *revealed and politicized* by the anti-racist movement that succeeded World War II. Henceforth these and related dimensions of injustice, inequality, and exclusion became public issues, ceasing forever to be relegated to the private and personal sphere, or worse yet, to be utterly denied and suppressed.

The radical upsurge of the anti-racist movement during the post-World War II years succeeded in disrupting white supremacy. It discredited the European immigrant-based model of race that had grounded ethnicity theory and had rationalized the racial “moderation” and complacency of white liberals. Anti-racist mobilization incentivized class-based and nation-based theories and analyses of race—the challenging paradigms we have discussed in Chapters 2 and 3. But although the movement launched a new political trajectory of conflict and reform, neither of the two challenging viewpoints could achieve hegemonic status. They suffered from serious deficiencies, largely because (as we have argued in Part I) of their reduction of race to other phenomena. The subsequent waning of the class- and nation-based viewpoints and organizations, grounded in challenging paradigms left a vacuum in racial theory and politics. This vacuum permitted the racial state to adopt new techniques of violence and repression, working under the “law and order” ideology of the new right. This vacuum also created the political space for the rearticulation and containment of movement demands under the ideology of colorblindness.

Despite these serious setbacks, the depth and breadth of “the Great Transformation” can hardly be exaggerated. *The forging of new collective racial identities during the 1950s and 1960s has been the single most enduring contribution of the anti-racist movement.* It is a set of political resources that endures today as a central component of the struggle for democracy in the United States. Today, the gains won in the past have been rolled back in many respects. Many anti-racist movement organizations have been forced onto the defensive: Rather than demanding increased racial justice, they have had to fight to uphold welfare state policies and liberal reforms—affirmative action is perhaps the best example—that they once condemned as inadequate and

tokenistic at best. The trajectory of racial politics continues, but now in a prolonged downturn. Amidst these reversals, the persistence of the politicized social, the continuity and strength of the new racial identities forged by the anti-racist movement, stands out as the most formidable obstacle to the consolidation of a repressive racial order. Apparently, the movements themselves could be fragmented, many of the policies for which they fought could be reversed, and their leaders could be coopted or even assassinated; but the racial subjectivity and self-awareness that they developed have taken permanent hold, and no amount of repression or cooptation can change that.

## Notes

1. Mills 2008, 1389.
2. Durkheim's theoretical claims about social facts and collective representations are conveniently assembled and discussed in Durkheim 2014.
3. Concepts of the subject, subjection, and subjectivity are usefully deconstructed in Butler 1997a. The experience/structure framework parallels Mills's "sociological imagination" (2000 [1959]), and also Levi-Strauss's (1966) concept of social structure as simultaneously synchronic and diachronic. All three of these accounts share central pragmatist tenets as well.
4. The concepts of "situated creativity" and "self-reflective action" are core ideas in the radical pragmatism of John Dewey (1933, 1948 [1919]). A parallel concept can be found in C.L.R. James's idea of "self-activity" and in Grace Lee's early work. The term "self-activity" was introduced into the political lexicon in *Facing Reality*, a theoretical text by C.L.R. James, Grace Lee, Martin Glaberman, and Cornelius Castoriadis that appeared in the 1950s. Because "self-activity" cannot be delegated to others, it embodies radical democracy. The authors write:

The end toward which mankind is inexorably developing by the constant overcoming of internal antagonisms is not the enjoyment, ownership, or use of goods, but self-realization, creativity based upon the incorporation into the individual personality of the whole previous development of humanity. Freedom is creative universality, not utility. (2006 [1958], 58)

- The radical pragmatist (and arguably Deweyan) framework here is quite palpable. See also Rawick 1972; Lawson and Koch, eds. 2004. Lee (later Grace Lee Boggs), still active today at age 95, remains a leading anti-racist radical activist and author. She received her Ph.D. in 1940 with a dissertation on George Herbert Mead and has written on Dewey as well.
5. The notion of racism as a "scavenger ideology" was first elaborated by George Mosse (1985, 213). It is also noted in Collins and Solomos 2010, 11; Fredrickson 2002.
  6. On Gramsci's concept of ideology as "glue," see Gramsci 1971, 328.
  7. In U.S. race studies the subalternity argument goes back through Robin D.G. Kelley to the "hidden transcripts" of James C. Scott. Scott in turn drew on the "subaltern studies" school of Ranajit Guha, Partha Chatterjee, and Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, among others. The term "subaltern" comes from Gramsci. In our view, it pairs domination and "otherness," and thus addresses key race/racism issues. In important part of subalternity theories is the argument that it is difficult to govern subaltern peoples "all the way down."



Implicitly, “below” normal politics there is a level of autonomy available to such groups and individuals, an “infrapolitical” terrain beneath the radar of white supremacy, colonialism, slavocracy, or other authoritarian regimes. This theme relates to the theme of race/racism as the “politicization of the social” that we discuss later in this chapter.

8. The American Revolution was a bourgeois revolution, in the sense that it overthrew a feudal system and established a system of rule by a property-holding class of “commoners.” The revolution thus repudiated not only absolutism and “divine right” but also nobility and aristocracy. But because it occurred in the early stages of capitalism’s development, it initially recognized only the democratic rights of established (male, white) property-holders. The founding fathers’ distaste for the “rabble,” the masses, even those who were white and male, is well-known. Later, as capitalism developed, political rights could be extended (gradually to be sure) to the “middling sorts”: small (white, male) property-holders. See Beckert 2001.
9. This is true of almost all the American anti-colonial revolutions: Beginning in the early 19th century, local (“creole”) elites—Bolívar, Juárez, San Martín—sought to throw off the restrictive commercial practices demanded by colonial administrations based in Europe. They wanted to control their own exports—largely primary products—and sell to the world market, a form of “free trade” much encouraged by the superpower of that century: Great Britain. The one exception here is Haiti and even that epochal struggle was partially trade-based.
10. The ideological residue of these restrictions in naturalization and citizenship is the popular equation of the term “American” with “white.” The emergence of the “birther” phenomenon in the aftermath of Barack Obama’s election in 2008 has been cited as evidence of this. As pundit Andrew Sullivan writes:

The demographics tell the basic story: a black man is president and a large majority of white southerners cannot accept that, even in 2009. They grasp conspiracy theories to wish Obama—and the America he represents—away. Since white southerners comprise an increasing proportion of the 22% of Americans who still describe themselves as Republican, the GOP can neither dismiss the crankery nor move past it. The fringe defines what’s left of the Republican center. (Sullivan 2009; see also Parker and Barreto 2013; Fang 2013)
11. For a comparative analysis of Mexican and Chinese experiences in 19th-century California see Almaguer 2008 [1994].
12. A brief selection of sources: Lester 1968a; Harding 1969; Rawick 1972; Gutman 1976; Aptheker 1983 (1963); Thompson 1983; Hahn 2003; Du Bois 2007 (1935).
13. The examples of Geronimo, Crazy Horse, and other Native American leaders were passed down from generation to generation as examples of resistance, and the Ghost Dance and Native American Church were employed by particular generations of Indians to maintain a resistance culture (Geronimo 2005 [1905]; Powers 2011; see also Snipp 1989). Rodolfo Acuña has pointed out how the same “bandits” against whom Anglo vigilantes mounted expeditions after the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo—Tiburcio Vasquez and Joaquín Murieta are perhaps the most famous of these—became heroes in the Mexican communities of the Southwest, remembered in folktales and celebrated in corridos (Acuña 2011 [1972]; see also Peña 1985). Chinese immigrants confined at Angel Island in the San Francisco Bay carved poetry in the walls of their cells, seeking not only to identify themselves

- and their home villages, but also to memorialize their experiences and to inform their successor occupants of those same places of confinement (Lai, Lim, and Yung 1991; Huang 2008). We do not offer these examples to romanticize repression or to give the air of revolutionary struggle to what were often desperate acts; we simply seek to affirm that even in the most uncontested periods of American racism, oppositional cultures were able, often at very great cost, to maintain themselves.
14. "The massive structures of the modern democracies, both as State organisations, and as complexes of associations in civil society, constitute for the art of politics as it were the 'trenches' and the permanent fortifications of the front in the war of position: they render merely 'partial' the element of movement which before used to be 'the whole' of war" (Gramsci 1971, 503).
  15. Gramsci's elliptical language, required by imprisonment in fascist Italy, makes concise citation difficult. For more details of his approach to the war of maneuver/war of position concepts, see "State and Civil Society," in Gramsci 1971, 445–557. The entire work (itself an edited selection) is useful for the student of race and racism.
  16. Our treatment here is necessarily very brief. The contemporary configuration of racial politics is a major subject later on in this work.
  17. We confine ourselves here to the issue of political uses of the racial body, which is what we mean by "the racial body politic." Originally the phrase "body politic" referred to absolutist political frameworks, in which the sovereign's body was conceived as dual. A mortal individual, the sovereign's political body was also divine. As a result of divine right, it incorporated (note the bodily etymology of this term) his or her people as well. Only because sovereignty embodied the divine in the mortal, only because of "the king's two bodies" could it exercise absolute power (Kantorowicz 1957; see also Allen 2004, 69–84).
  18. Eric D. Weitz (2003) has traced a whole series of 20th-century genocides back to the attempt, which he calls "utopian," to achieve racial (or quasi-racial) homogeneity in particular nations or empires.
  19. This term refers to the making of political distinctions among human bodies. This happens according to gender and race most centrally, but in respect to other phenomic characteristics as well. Such distinctions are not merely imposed from outside, but are seen as intrinsic by their bearers; they thus become essential to the political-economic and cultural self-discipline Foucault calls "governmentality." He refers to biopower as a political technology—that is, an apparatus of rule and subjection—that took the shape of "an explosion of numerous and diverse techniques for achieving the subjugations of bodies and the control of populations" (Foucault 1990 [1978], 140). See also Butler 1997a.
  20. Similar patterns can be discerned in efforts to control the gendered body and the queer body: abortion restriction, gay-bashing, and numerous other repressive practices are clear examples.
  21. This definition imperfectly renders some organized principles of pragmatist thought, notably its democratic currents. These proceed from Dewey 1933; see also Joas 1996.
  22. The main means available to the state for the equilibration of conflicting interests is precisely their incorporation into the state in the form of policies, programs, patronage, etc. Gramsci argues that various forms of hegemony flow from this process of incorporation: "expansive" hegemony if state–society relations display sufficient dynamism and are not inordinately plagued by crisis conditions; or "reformist" hegemony (what he calls "transformism") if political stability requires continuing concessions to competing forces.

23. This is not strictly true, of course. From the onset of racial slavery there has always been a ferocious social critique not only of slavery itself, but of racism too, although that term was not yet used. This is evident in the writings and speeches of Douglass, Wells, Cooper. “First-wave” feminism also possessed a social critique: It was about women’s lives, not just about the vote.

Yet our claim holds, because by and large the earlier movements were far more constrained by the very laws, customs and conventions that they sought to oppose, than were the post-World War II movements. The appeal that the modern civil rights movement exercised, its penetration into the everyday, its appeal to youth, its institutional base (“resource mobilization”) were unprecedented in earlier cycles of protest. We address this topic at greater length in Chapter 6.

24. This may be yet another example of Myrdal’s “cumulative and circular development.” On the SCOTUS annulment of the 1960s civil rights laws and the undoing of the Warren Court’s own liberal race jurisprudence, see Kairys 1994; Alexander 2012. On the undoing of the Radical Republican civil rights laws of the 1860s, see Kaczorowski 1987.
25. The movement’s early assertion of nonviolent resistance linked it to anti-colonialism well before civil rights and antiwar politics fused in the later 1960s.
26. Martin Luther King, Jr. wrote:

In 1960 an electrifying movement of Negro students shattered the placid surface of campuses and communities across the South. The young students of the South, through sit-ins and other demonstrations, gave America a glowing example of disciplined, dignified nonviolent action against the system of segregation. Though confronted in many places by hoodlums, police guns, tear gas, arrests, and jail sentences, the students tenaciously continued to sit down and demand equal service at variety store lunch counters, and they extended their protest from city to city. Spontaneously born, but guided by the theory of nonviolent resistance, the lunch counter sit-ins accomplished integration in hundreds of communities at the swiftest rate of change in the civil rights movement up to that time. In communities like Montgomery, Alabama, the whole student body rallied behind expelled students and staged a walkout while state government intimidation was unleashed with a display of military force appropriate to a wartime invasion. Nevertheless, the spirit of self-sacrifice and commitment remained firm, and the state governments found themselves dealing with students who had lost the fear of jail and physical injury.

The campuses of Negro colleges were infused with a dynamism of both action and philosophical discussion. Even in the thirties, when the college campus was alive with social thought, only a minority were involved in action. During the sit-in phase, when a few students were suspended or expelled, more than one college saw the total student body involved in a walkout protest. This was a change in student activity of profound significance. Seldom, if ever, in American history had a student movement engulfed the whole student body of a college.

Many of the students, when pressed to express their inner feelings, identified themselves with students in Africa, Asia, and South America. The liberation struggle in Africa was the great single international influence on American Negro students. Frequently, I heard them say that if their African brothers could break the bonds of colonialism, surely the American Negro could break Jim Crow (King 2001, 137–138; see also MLK Jr Research and Education Institute n.d.).

It is also vital to note the key role of Ella Baker in the emergence of the student-based components of the movement: in the 1960 Greensboro sit-ins and the Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee (SNCC). In the 1964 Freedom Summer, students were the key activists (Carson 1995 [1981]; Ransby 2005).

27. The origins of “second-wave” feminism have been linked to the analyses and practice of key women activists in the civil rights movement. See Echols 1989; Curry 2000; Breines 2007.
28. Here too Bayard Rustin must be acknowledged. As a gay man Rustin was marginalized and discriminated against in the movement he did so much to found. See Rustin 2003; D’Emilio 2004.

PART III

---

# Racial Politics Since World War II

This page intentionally left blank

# The Great Transformation

## Introduction

The racial upsurges of the 1950s and 1960s were among the most tempestuous events in American history. The struggles for voting rights, the sit-ins, freedom rides, and boycotts to desegregate public facilities, the ghetto rebellions, armed standoffs (Wounded Knee, Tierra Amarilla, Alcatraz, Attica...), and the mobilizations of Latin@s, Indians, and Asian Americans dramatically transformed the political and cultural landscape of the United States. The postwar period has indeed been a racial crucible. During these decades, new conceptions of racial identity and its meaning, new modes of political organization and confrontation, and new definitions of the state's role in promoting and achieving equality were explored, debated, and fought out on the battlegrounds of institutionalized politics, the politics of law, and the politics of everyday life.

Beginning during World War II, movements for racial justice, led by the black movement, initiated a "second reconstruction," a Great Transformation (*pace* Polanyi),<sup>1</sup> an expansion of democracy that challenged some of the pillars of despotism in the United States. The black movement enlarged and deepened democracy, not only in terms of racial justice and equality, but in terms of *social* justice and equality. Over a mere quarter of a century, very real reforms were achieved, though there were numerous limits and indeed failures in this democratizing project.

We suggest that two important changes characterize postwar racial politics: *paradigm shift* and *new social movements*. Paradigm shift occurred as the hegemonic theory of race, based in the ethnicity paradigm of race, experienced increasing strain and opposition. This opposition gradually took shape within the civil rights movement, initially as a challenge against segregation in the South, and was subsequently transformed into a national movement against racism. The second change was the rise of *new social movements*, led by the black movement, as the primary means for contesting the nature of racial politics. These movements irreversibly expanded the terrain of political conflict, not only recentering and refiguring race, but also refiguring experience itself as a political matter, a matter of identity and self-conscious activity. They thus set the stage for a general reorganization of U.S. politics.

*Paradigm Shift:* The modern civil rights movement was initially organized *within* the dominant paradigm of ethnicity. The ethnicity perspective initially shaped the movement's political agenda. Early movement leaders were also assimilation-oriented and individualistic to a degree that appears a bit embarrassing today, but made more



sense in the repressive and exclusive racial climate of the time. They were moderates who sought to end “race-thinking” and assure “equality” to each individual. The movement initially focused its energies on the South, the most racially reactionary region of the country. There the ethnicity paradigm of assimilation and group-oriented pluralism retained a critical edge in facing exclusion, segregation, and still-vibrant Jim-Crow racism.<sup>2</sup> “Civil rights” was then a radical challenge to explicit white supremacy. Later, when demands for racial reforms attained national scope and expanded beyond the black movement to other racially defined minorities, the limited explanatory abilities and programmatic usefulness of the ethnicity paradigm were revealed. The eclipse of this perspective led to a period where competing paradigms—the class- and nation-based views—flourished and contested for hegemony.

Although the challenging paradigms were not able to replace the dominant ethnicity-based view of race, they did manage to dislodge it for a while. When it regained its hegemony as the dominant paradigm, the ethnicity-based approach had been rearticulated, deeply transformed, emerging as the “colorblind” concept of race. It remains highly problematic and riven by contradictions, as we shall see in later chapters of this book.

*New Social Movements:* The upsurge of racially based movements that began in the 1950s was a contest over the *social meaning* of race. It was this battle that transformed racial awareness, racial politics, and racial identity. Race is not only a matter of politics, economics, or culture, but of all these “levels” of lived experience simultaneously. It is a pre-eminently *social* phenomenon, something which suffuses each individual identity, each family and community, yet equally penetrates state institutions and market relationships. The racial justice movements of the postwar period were the first *new social movements*—the first to expand the concerns of politics to the social, to the terrain of everyday life. New social movement politics would prove “portable,” leading to the mobilization of other racial minorities, as well as other groups whose concerns were principally social. The black movement, in other words, made it possible for a wide range of movements to reframe social identities, both at the collective and individual level. It helped these movements connect with each other as well, though not always easily (Epstein 1987; Scott 1988; Morris and Mueller, eds. 1992; Polletta and Jasper 2001). An extensive literature that developed even before the development of “intersectionality” accounts drew upon the black struggle as an organizing framework, a “master narrative” of oppression and resistance. Both in political practice and in critical theory, then, the black movement’s politicization of the social shaped the upsurges of the 1960s: anti-imperialist, student, feminist, and gay. As British playwright and activist David Edgar wrote, black mobilization was “a central organizational fact ..., a defining political metaphor and inspiration” (1981, 222).

These two interrelated dimensions—the eclipse of the ethnicity paradigm and the emergence of new social movement politics—constitute an alternative framework

by which to assess the racial politics of the Great Transformation. Racial identity, the racial state, and the very nature of racial politics as a whole were radically transformed during the 1960s—were transformed so profoundly that the racial meanings established during this period came to shape U.S. politics permanently, even after the movements peaked and entered a decades-long decline.

Although the ethnicity paradigm was weakened during the 1960s and the class-based and nation-based paradigms of race increased in strength, these two challenging viewpoints could not achieve hegemonic status. All three paradigms suffered from serious deficiencies, largely because their concepts of race were *reductionist*: They relied on other, supposedly more fundamental phenomena, such as culture (the ethnicity paradigm), inequality (the class paradigm), or “peoplehood” (the nation-based paradigm), to explain the social fact of race. The subsequent waning of class-based (generally Marxist) and nationalist movements, and of the specific organizations operating within these challenging paradigms, left a vacuum in racial theory and politics. This created the political space for the resurgence of neoconservatism, which developed in the 1970 and 1980s as a reworked, right-wing version of the ethnicity paradigm. This contributed to the rise of colorblind racial ideology.

Still, the depth and breadth of “the Great Transformation” can hardly be exaggerated. The forging of new collective racial identities during the 1950s and 1960s has been the enduring legacy of the new social movements pioneered by the black movement. Even though many anti-racist movement victories were rolled back, even though many movement organizations were marginalized by the combined powers of the racial state and racial reaction, the *politicization of the social* during this rising phase of the political trajectory of race has persisted. The deepening and broadening of racial politics in the sphere of everyday life stands out as the single truly formidable obstacle to the consolidation of a newly repressive racial order. Apparently, the movements of people of color themselves could be weakened, the policies for which they fought could be reframed and even reversed, and their leaders could be coopted or destroyed, but the racial subjectivity and self-awareness which they developed had taken permanent hold, and no amount of repression or cooptation could change that. The genie was out of the bottle.

## The Emergence of the Civil Rights Movement

The moderate goals of the early civil rights movement did not challenge the nationally dominant paradigm of racial theory, the ethnicity perspective. Indeed, early movement rhetoric often explicitly appealed to the ideal of a “race-free” society, the centerpiece of the liberal ethnicity vision. This was consistent with the call for integration framed by Gunnar Myrdal in 1944, or with Nathan Glazer’s description of the “national consensus” which abolished Jim Crow in the mid-1960s (Glazer 1975, 3).

Although its political goals were moderate, the black movement had to adopt radical tactics of disruption and direct action due to the “massive resistance” strategy

of the South, a region that clung to the racist assumptions of the Jim Crow/*Plessy* era.<sup>3</sup> The modern civil rights movement came into being when southern black organizations, frustrated by Southern intransigence and drawing on both national and indigenous support bases, moved to mobilize a *mass* constituency in the South. They thus augmented the tactics of judicial/legislative activism—based in the elite politics that had previously characterized the civil rights struggle<sup>4</sup>—with those of direct action, which required an active “grass-roots” constituency. This was the key shift of the mid-1950s.

What made this change possible? After the civil rights upsurge, social movement studies have developed models of “political process” or “resource mobilization” to explain the emergence of significant struggles for change. Analyses of the formation of the modern civil rights movement in the mid-1950s are often based on these models (McAdam 1984; Morris 1984). Clearly, such approaches have their merits as they focus on essential conditions for the emergence of movements: the inadequacy of “normal” political channels to process demands, and the availability of material and political resources for the organization of movement constituencies. The monolithic southern resistance to desegregation is an instance of the failure of “normal” politics to respond to demands for change; white supremacist intransigence revealed the ossification and racial despotism of the political system in Dixie, generating a new political process and a new organizing vision (Payne 2007 [1995]). The role of such groups as the local NAACP chapters, and particularly the black churches, effectively documented by Aldon Morris, exemplifies the centrality of resource mobilization issues.

Although both the resistance to change and the availability of economic and political resources in the black community were essential components of the civil rights movement’s shift to a direct action strategy, neither of these conditions were sufficient to spark the transition. After all, racial degradation, exclusion, and violence had been well-established in the region since Reconstruction’s termination in 1877, and black mobilization had been continuous, even under severely repressive conditions (Hahn 2003). A third element was required. This was an ideological or cultural transformation, the politicization of black identity, the *rearticulation of black collective subjectivity*. It was this change that would eventually place radical objectives on the agenda of racial minority movements, facilitate the diffusion of racially based movement activity to other groups, and become anathema to the moderate advocates of civil rights operating within the ethnicity paradigm of race.

## New Social Movement Politics: Identity and Rearticulation

Before the modern black movement’s appearance on the political stage, the U.S. political system had not significantly changed since the New Deal. The Democratic Party had served as a repository of consensus ever since Roosevelt led it to power in the 1930s. Compromise and coalition-building among disparate interests, constituencies, and loyalties (“interest-group liberalism”)<sup>5</sup> shaped national politics. “Interests”

themselves were largely defined economically. Such a system had obvious limitations in its ability to respond to challenges that cut across class (or “status”) lines. It was unable to confront an unjust social system which had not only economic but also political and cultural causes and consequences. The near-total disenfranchisement of black voters in the South, for example, not only underwrote the New Deal coalition and vastly increased the legislative power of Southern legislators in Congress (as it had done throughout U.S. history), but also undermined prospects for social legislation, not only in regard to civil rights but also in labor law, health, education, and other areas. A good example of this was Congress’s overriding of Truman’s veto of the Taft–Hartley Act in 1947, perhaps the single most telling setback of labor rights in U.S. history. This was accomplished by a coalition of Southern Democrats and right-wing, pro-business Republicans (Cockburn 2004).

In its efforts to transform precisely that social system, the black movement sought to *expand* the concerns of politics, without abandoning the earlier economically centered logic. The expansion of normal politics to include racial issues—a “common-sense” recognition of the political elements at the heart of racial identities and meanings—made possible the movement’s greatest triumphs, its most permanent successes. These did not lie in its legislative accomplishments, but rather in its ability to create new racial “subjects.” The black movement redefined the meaning of racial identity, and consequently of race itself, in American society.

Social movements create collective identity by offering their adherents a different view of themselves and their world; different, that is, from the worldview and self-concepts offered by the established social order. Movements take elements and themes of existing culture and traditions and infuse them with new meaning. This process of *rearticulation* produces new subjectivity by making use of information and knowledge already present in the subject’s mind. Drawing once again on the insights of Antonio Gramsci, we define rearticulation as a *practice of discursive reorganization or reinterpretation of ideological themes and interests already present in subjects’ consciousness, such that these elements obtain new meanings or coherence*. In Gramsci’s account this practice is ordinarily the work of “intellectuals,” those whose role is to interpret the social world for given subjects—religious leaders, entertainers, school teachers (Gramsci 1971, 3–23; Butler 1997b; Laclau and Mouffe 2001 [1985]; Visweswaran 2010).<sup>6</sup>

The movement’s “intellectuals” were often preachers. They infused their activism with a well-known set of symbols and rhetorical tools.<sup>7</sup> The centuries-long black interrogation of biblical images of bondage and liberation—as embodied in the Exodus, for instance, or the theology of Christian redemption—had traditionally furnished a familiar vocabulary and textual reference-point for freedom struggle, a home-grown “liberation theology” (West 1982).

The civil rights movement rearticulated black collective subjectivity. It reframed traditional black cultural and religious themes to forge a new black politics. Its intellectuals augmented the already vast treasure-trove of emancipatory black historical and religious imagery with ideas, lessons, and strategies developed not only in North

America but in India, Africa, and Europe (in the experience of anti-Nazi resistance).<sup>8</sup> Martin Luther King, Jr.'s application of the Gandhian philosophy of *satyagraha* drew upon Bayard Rustin's involvement in the anti-colonial struggle in India (Anderson 1998; Rustin 2003; Prashad 2009).

The adoption of the "sit-in" as a tactic for forcing integration had deep roots not only in union battles against the repressive, post-*Lochner* U.S. labor regime in the early decades of the 20th century, but also in the legacy of enslaved people of African descent "sitting in" in the fields and slave quarters of the plantation and forcing their masters to negotiate over working conditions, time off, and the right to cultivate their own garden plots and sell their produce for money at town markets (Hahn 2003). Parallels drawn between the Civil Rights and Black Power movement struggles and those of African liberation movements also provided material for rearticulation as they invoked already known, long-standing cultural traditions that traversed the whole dark history of black oppression in the United States.

The formation of the modern civil rights movement is a classical illustration of rearticulation processes. In order to win mass black support for the tactics of direct action, it was necessary to replace the established cultural norms through which ordinary blacks, particularly in the South, had previously sought to ameliorate the impact of racial oppression: "shuckin' and jivin'," "putting on whitey," feigning ignorance and humility. These strategies had served in the past to limit the extent of white control, to insulate the black community and black institutions from white intrusion and surveillance, and to protect individual blacks who ran afoul of white authority. But they had also limited the extent and depth of black organization, organization that would be necessary to challenge the system of segregation. They represented a range of *subaltern* political adaptations, in effect both practical recognitions of powerlessness, and strategies for surviving it.<sup>9</sup>

But this is not the whole story. Researchers associated with the subaltern studies school have shown that even where political mobilization is highly restricted, a substantial reservoir of cultural resistance necessarily confronts racist regimes, peripheral or metropolitan, colonial or postcolonial. In their studies of colonial and postcolonial systems of rule in a variety of spatiotemporal contexts—India, Latin America, Southeast Asia, as well as the American South—they have demonstrated that where rule is highly despotic and racially exclusive, it cannot "go too deep." It generally must rely on "indirect" strategies of domination: collaborators, colonial administrators, agents, informers, and the like. Beneath this level, *infrapolitically* so to speak, an alternative and antagonistic culture of resistance takes hold, operating largely defensively, impenetrable from above (Bond-Graham 2010). The term "subaltern," after all, combines the meanings "subordinate" and "other" (alterity).<sup>10</sup>

Elsewhere in the book we have characterized the Jim Crow era as necessitating opposition in the form of "war of maneuver." Only in the post-World War II period did anything like normal politics—"war of position"—become possible on a mass scale. And given the degree of racial despotism that had to be overcome, even after

World War II, the achievements of the modern civil rights movement truly stand out as remarkable and heroic.

The movement sought not to survive racial oppression, but to overthrow it. Thus the traditional ideological themes of liberation and redemption, and the political tactics of protest derived from movements around the world were rearticulated: incorporated in the heat of political struggle as elements of a *transformed racial identity*, one of explicit collective opposition. According to Robert Parris Moses or Martin Luther King, Jr., blacks were, collectively, the moral, spiritual, and political leadership of American society. They represented not only their own centuries-long struggle for freedom, but the highest and noblest aspirations of white America as well.

Far from having to passively accept the “bukes and scorns” of segregation and perhaps trying to outmaneuver “whitey,” blacks were now called upon to oppose the system with righteous and disciplined action:

To accept passively an unjust system is to cooperate with that system; thereby the oppressed become as evil as the oppressor. Noncooperation with evil is as much a moral obligation as cooperation with good.

(King, quoted in Sitkoff 1981, 61)

Thus the old linkages of religious and cultural themes—for example, the Christian virtues of humility, of “turning the other cheek”—were not negated, but dramatically captured by the movement. The “culture of resistance” with which these virtues had previously been identified was displaced from an emphasis on individual survival to one of collective action. This process of rearticulation made the movement’s political agenda possible, especially its challenge to the existing racial state.

## Black Power

In subsequent stages of the movement’s history, rearticulation processes continued to function as radical perspectives, filling the void created by the eclipse of the ethnicity paradigm. This is particularly true of the emergence of *black power*. When the moderate demands of the civil rights movement were realized—after a fashion—in 1964 with the passage of the Civil Rights Act, and in 1965 with the enactment of voting rights legislation, many black activists considered that their underlying ideals had not only gone unfulfilled, but had been betrayed. Not only had they failed to create a “beloved community” (which they now admitted had been a utopian vision; see Lester 1968b), but they had failed to achieve significant change in the overall social conditions faced by blacks. Kenneth Clark echoed these sentiments in 1967:

The masses of Negroes are now starkly aware that recent civil rights victories benefited a very small number of middle-class Negroes while their predicament remained the same or worsened.

(Clark, quoted in Wilson 1981, 28)

The radicalization of an important segment of the black movement took shape in the myriad disappointments and disillusionments that afflicted civil rights activists: the acrimonious division between SNCC (Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee) and civil rights moderates amidst the ferocity of the Birmingham campaign of April–May, 1963, combined with the limited victory won there;<sup>11</sup> the conflicts during the preparations for the August, 1963 March on Washington;<sup>12</sup> the experience of the Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party, an SNCC-organized project to unseat the segregationist “regular” delegation at the 1964 Democratic Party convention in Atlantic City;<sup>13</sup> the onset of rioting in northern cities during the summer of 1964, followed by hundreds of riots during the next four years;<sup>14</sup> and the development of a new “backlash” politics in the middle 1960s, after the “massive resistance” strategy of the South had been broken. Backlash was epitomized by the appearance in the national spotlight of George Wallace, the segregationist Governor of Alabama. It also took the form of white counterdemonstrations and violence against civil rights marches, notably in 1966 in Cicero, Illinois, a white suburb of Chicago. Many movement radicals viewed white resistance (especially white resistance in the North) as decisive proof that non-violent strategy was ineffective in its efforts to lead not only blacks but whites toward greater racial equality and harmony.

By the time of the Selma campaign (February–March, 1965), no more than limited tactical cooperation existed between the radicals, led by SNCC, and the moderates, led by SCLC (Southern Christian Leadership Conference). Militants from SNCC were infuriated when King, maneuvering between Washington, the federal courts, and the marchers themselves, halted an attempt to march from Selma to Montgomery on March 10, 1965.<sup>15</sup> By June, 1966, when diverse civil rights groups came together to complete a march through Mississippi begun by James Meredith (who had been shot by a sniper), there was open competition between advocates of “black power” and supporters of integration.

Beginning with the Meredith march,<sup>16</sup> the more radical wing of the movement signaled its disillusionment with past emphases on civil rights and the transformative power of nonviolence. SNCC and CORE (Congress of Racial Equality), in particular, adopted the more militant positions associated with the slogan “Black Power.”

Black power was a crystallization of numerous political and cultural tendencies, some of them quite venerable, within the black community and black history.<sup>17</sup> It was a flexible, even amorphous concept, but it was frequently interpreted to mean separatism. It was this connotation which the moderates, operating within the ethnicity paradigm, despised and strenuously denounced: “We of the NAACP will have none of this. It is the father of hatred and the mother of violence. Black power can mean in the end only black death” (Wilkins, quoted in Allen 1990 [1970], 78).

But the concept of black power was also a rearticulative move. It operated on a very practical level. It expressed black popular frustration—especially among young people—with the glacial pace of racial reform. The cry of “black power” was no more a complete break with the civil rights movement than that movement



had been a break with the older “establishment” of civil rights organizations such as the NAACP and National Urban League. The concept of black power embraced a wide spectrum of political tendencies, extending from moderate “self-help” groups through reform-oriented advocates of “community control” to cultural and revolutionary nationalism and armed struggle. The concept’s emergence as a nationalist ideology was an effort once more to rearticulate traditional themes of the black movement. The rearticulation of civil rights as black power invoked themes central to both the dominant ethnicity paradigm and the civil rights movement, while simultaneously rejecting their integrationist and assimilationist goals. It also vastly expanded the already resourceful black imagination: The postwar decades of black activism had rendered possible and had concretized a set of new political and economic strategies ranging from boycotts to sit-ins, from black business opportunities to insurrection, all situated somewhat uncomfortably under the black power umbrella.

Indeed black power had a mainstream political version: In the early 1960s the premier liberal ethnicity theorists, Nathan Glazer and Daniel P. Moynihan, mindful of their paradigm’s origins in the experiences of white ethnic groups of previous generations, had suggested that blacks in the North, too, should be organized as an interest group (Glazer and Moynihan 1970 [1963], x). Much of the black power current could be understood as following this advice. The idea that the black community should patronize businesses owned by blacks, that it should adopt cooperative forms of organization, that it should mobilize politically at the local level (“community control”) were concepts which borrowed as much from the tradition of Booker T. Washington as they did from those of Cyril Briggs, Marcus Garvey, or Malcolm X. Robert Allen notes that in many respects black power was “only another form of traditional ethnic group politics” (1990 [1970], 50; see also Ture (Carmichael) and Hamilton 1992 [1967], 44; Joseph 2006).

Despite its many “moderate” elements, black power drew an important line of demarcation within the black movement and deeply disturbed the dominant (i.e., white) political culture. White liberals reacted in horror when their ethnic prescriptions were put into practice by black militants; they quickly retreated into a fundamentalist individualism which would have embarrassed Adam Smith.

While liberals like Glazer and Moynihan sought to rearticulate the ethnicity paradigm, which was after all the dominant current in U.S. race-thinking during the mid-1960s, black power theorists were also breaking with it. They were reinvigorating black nationalism, a current that had far deeper roots, something that went back centuries in black America (Moses 1988 [1978]). Black power also repudiated the ethnicity paradigm by drawing upon colonial analogies to analyze the plight of blacks, and by focusing attention on racially based intra-class conflict. The political implications of this paradigmatic shift represented a distinct departure from the “interest group” politics of the ethnicity paradigm. Ture and Hamilton’s work, for example, explicitly addressed black conditions from within the nationalist paradigm.<sup>18</sup> James

Boggs' essays (1970) focused on the role of black industrial workers and urban struggles from a perspective based in Marxism-Leninism.

A key figure in the transition from civil rights to black power was Malcolm X, who framed radical black nationalism with a political energy and coherence never seen before in the United States. Malcolm attracted mass black support that in some ways echoed the Garvey movement of the 1920s.<sup>19</sup> First as organizer and chief spokesperson for the Nation of Islam (NOI), and then, briefly, as founder of the Organization of Afro-American Unity, Malcolm played a unique role in the black community. Although he often derided the civil rights movement, referring to its organizations and leaders as "Uncle Toms," Malcolm also recognized the importance of raising civil rights demands, even while arguing that the United States could not meet them (Malcolm X 1964; 1990 [1965]).

After his 1963 break with the Nation of Islam, Malcolm moved closer to the radical wing of the movement and deeply influenced SNCC thinking, bringing a more internationalist orientation to the organization. In late 1964 he met with SNCC leaders in Nairobi, Kenya, where he stressed the importance of Pan-Africanism for U.S. blacks (Williams 1997). He also approached socialist positions in a number of respects (Malcolm X 1990 [1965]; Marable 2011). Malcolm formulated a radical challenge to the moderate agenda of the civil rights movement and prefigured the themes of black power. In February, 1965 he was assassinated at the Audubon Ballroom in Harlem, under circumstances that remain mysterious. Malcolm's chief bodyguard was later revealed to have been a police agent; his criticisms of the misdeeds of Elijah Muhammad, as well as his break with Elijah's politics, drew death threats from the NOI.

Black power advocates and adherents questioned the integrationist and assimilationist orientations pursued by the civil rights movement, especially by its moderate leadership and middle-class black adherents. In breaking away from the earlier black movement's struggle for a "raceless society" they anticipated—by several decades—later opposition to "colorblindness" as a supposedly anti-racist orientation. Integration, they powerfully argued, could only be a result of political power and equality, never its cause. The radicalization of the black movement appropriated and rearticulated the legacy of civil rights, much as the earlier movement had appropriated the legacy of the southern "culture of resistance" which had been nourished in the black church, in black music, in folklore and literature, even in food (Childs 1984).

In addition to the demand for social justice, black power advocates raised the question of "self-determination." This was not only a revindication of the centuries-long legacy of black nationalism, but also a convergence with the Marxist (and in some instances Leninist and Maoist) left. In the great debates about nationalism that had preoccupied the Second and Third Internationals, and that had drawn passionate polemics from Rosa Luxemburg, V.I. Lenin, the "Austro-Marxists," and Joseph Stalin, U.S. black radicals rediscovered the socialist and communist affinities that had preoccupied and confounded the black left in their grandparents' times (Luxemburg 1976 (1909); Naison 1983; James 1999; Robinson 2000 [1983]; Perry 2008; Kelley

and Esch 2008 [1999]). The prospect of having not only “rights” but “power” once again rearticulated black cultural and political traditions, reviving themes from black political history. The cultural nationalism and black Marxism of the late-1960s were restatements of positions which harked back to the 1920s and 1930s, the days of the Harlem Renaissance, the African Blood Brotherhood, the Garvey movement, and the “black nation” thesis of the Communist Party. The nation-based paradigm was not, however, synonymous with radical politics. Less “progressive”—or, as Huey P. Newton, co-founder of the Black Panther Party, called them, “pork chop”—nationalists tended to dilute their vision of black power by ignoring its racial dimensions for a more limited, “ethnic” view of its meaning. These groups often adopted reformist orientations, embracing “black capitalism,” for example (Allen 1990 [1970], 153–164, 210–238; Hill and Rabig, eds. 2012).

## Encountering and Reforming the Racial State

There were two phases to the minority encounter with the state in the 1950s and 1960s. The first phase was shaped by the civil rights movement’s mass mobilization in the South, a “direct action” political strategy aimed at desegregation that is usually seen as beginning in the mid-1950s with the Montgomery bus boycott. As we have seen, this already depended upon new social movement politics, on the “politics of identity,” and rearticulation of racist tropes in new and insurgent directions.

Selection of this 1955 point of departure accepts the movement’s decision to focus on desegregation, rather than labor injustice and superexploitation, as the cutting-edge issue in the civil rights struggle. That decision in turn was influenced by the NAACP’s exercise of leadership in the early post-World War II years. Success in desegregating the armed forces and in the courts were crucial in shaping the turn toward desegregation as the major goal. Use of the “due process” clause of the 14th Amendment as a weapon against state-based, *de jure* segregation was the linchpin of NAACP attorney Thurgood Marshall’s decades-long campaign for racial justice. An alternative strategy that had been equally successful but was not pursued involved labor rights. This was to attack racism via the 13th Amendment’s prohibition of involuntary servitude, a situation that continued through peonage, convict leasing, and racist labor practices. This approach had been effectively supported by the Civil Rights Section of the Justice Department, but was dismissed by the NAACP (for this argument see Goluboff 2007).

The first phase resulted in the civil rights reforms of the mid-1960s. Through desegregation campaigns the black movement set in motion a reform-oriented, democratizing political process. The resulting concessions were limited but real: policy shifts through executive order and legislation, judicial action against specific racist practices, establishment of new state programs and agencies with “equal opportunity” mandates, and the election and the hiring of many black activists by state institutions. Civil rights reforms were crafted in numerous state settings: NAACP

legal offices, the White House, the Congress, the federal courts. They were then implemented unevenly throughout the state apparatus at all levels: resisted, unevenly enforced, subverted even after adoption, sure, but also carried out to a significant extent. These victories ended the exceptional situation in the South by forcing that region to confront the nationally dominant racial ideology, as defined by the ethnicity paradigm. The reforms of the 1960s also signaled the fulfillment of that paradigm's vision of racial equality.

The second phase of the movement/state encounter was marked the onset of racial reaction. Indeed it was the reality of civil rights reforms—the moderate, limited, but nevertheless significant democratic concessions that the movement obtained—that allowed the racial reaction to consolidate. The capacity of the racial reaction to adjust to a somewhat democratized racial state, and to the national civil society's broad endorsement of limited racial reform, was what made possible the right-wing rearticulation of concepts of civil rights—notably racial equality and racial justice—in what would become the colorblind racial ideology we see all around us today.

We discuss racial reaction at length in later chapters of this work. Here we emphasize the fragmentation of the black movements into competing currents—entrists and radicals, most notably—in the aftermath of the adoption of the racial reforms of the mid-1960s. As the new reforms took hold, they transformed a part of the movement into a constituency for the new programs its efforts had won. They lent support to the assimilationist and pluralist policy orientations rooted in the ethnicity-based paradigm of race. At the same time, the inadequacy and limitations of the reforms reinforced the radical tendencies in the movement, accelerating the rise of the insurgent class- and nation-based paradigms of race, and fuelling radical and rebellious political approaches.

The state was the chief movement target for several reasons. The state, as the “factor of cohesion in society,” gives shape to the racial system. State racial policy ultimately defines the extent and limits of racial democracy, of racial despotism and inequality, of racial inclusion or exclusion. The state is traversed by the same antagonisms that penetrate the entire society, antagonisms that are themselves the results of past cycles of racial struggle. The lukewarm commitments to desegregation in public employment and the armed forces extracted by A. Philip Randolph from Roosevelt and Truman, the use of the 14th Amendment by NAACP lawyer Thurgood Marshall to challenge school segregation, the freedom rides of the 1940s and 1960s (which probed the federal commitment to integration of interstate travel), and the voting rights drives in the South, were all examples of the small but significant “openings” through which the existing racial state was susceptible to challenge. Movement tactics often sought to make use of the state's internal racial contradictions. For example: The SNCC-led voting rights drives sought to induce confrontations between different branches of the state—the courts vs. state legislatures, federal police vs. local

or state police. The idea was to force the federal government to defend civil rights from infringement by racist local and state agencies. In some respects SNCC's strategic turn to voting rights was fomented by the Kennedy administration, although the Justice Department (headed by Robert F. Kennedy) did not adequately protect the activists of the 1964 Freedom Summer campaign.<sup>20</sup>

By the latter stages of this process—the late 1960s—the reform-oriented program of the black movement was acquiring a foothold in state institutions, where movement activists were becoming officials: social service agencies, electorally based positions: legislators, mayors, elected judges and local officials. The numbers weren't large, but they were growing. This "entrism" was linked in important ways with such Great Society programs as Head Start, the War on Poverty (OEO),<sup>21</sup> massive new federal aid to education, new labor programs, and expansions in the welfare system (AFDC).<sup>22</sup> It amounted to a modest but real shift toward progressive redistribution, which would not only benefit people of color but be democratically directed by them, under the banner of "maximum feasible participation," a guiding principle of the Community Action Program, one of the most important components of the OEO.

In the racial minority movements of the period, the state confronted a new type of opposition, one that for a while deployed an "inside–outside" strategy. Numerous progressive initiatives were undertaken after the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965; this was a moment of national remorse following the JFK assassination and the landslide victory of Lyndon Johnson in November, 1964. These were the first years of the "Great Society," when the black movement and its allies were at their apogee of political influence. They were able to challenge established racist practices simultaneously through direct action, through penetration of the mainstream political arena (electoral/institutional projects from voter registration to community organization, and other sorts of entrism as well), and through "ethical/political" tactics (taking the "moral initiative," developing "resistance cultures" and service projects). For a brief time the movement was able to link spontaneity and mass participation, on the one hand, with electoral/institutional politics, on the other. The unifying element in this opposition was at first the burgeoning collective subjectivity of blacks—and later that of other people of color—which connected demands for access to the state with more radical demands for freedom, "self-determination," cultural and organizational autonomy, "community control," and a host of other issues. The beginning of urban uprisings, the rise of black power, and the reorganization of right-wing opposition as well, all were looming up during this brief period, roughly 1964–1966.

By combining different oppositional tactics, the black movement of the 1960s initiated the reforms that eventually created a new racial state. This new state, however, was not the institutional fulfillment of the movements' ideals. Rather it held a cloudy mirror up to its antagonists, reflecting their demands (and indeed their rearticulated racial identities) in a distorted fashion.

At the same time, splits and divisions had surfaced in the movement, and in minority communities as well. These included inter-group rivalries, class divisions, controversies over strategy, and disputes over the meaning of race: notably racial integration and pluralism vs. black power and ghetto-based “community control.” Malcolm’s assassination in February 1965 was a huge blow to mass-oriented black radical organization; his nationalism, always clearly present, had been evolving steadily towards a more class-based and global orientation that had the potential to bridge across divisions among people of color, and even across the black–white divide, the core of the colorline. Martin Luther King, Jr.’s assassination in 1968 would remove many more possibilities for alliances across movements. As the 1960s wore on, class polarization deepened within communities of color. Those who were able to do so took advantage of new jobs and educational opportunities, while the majority of ghetto and barrio dwellers remained locked in poverty. The war on poverty was lost, as King had warned, on the battlefields of Vietnam.<sup>23</sup> Some formerly integrated movement organizations expelled their white members (SNCC did so in December of 1966); others that formed in the later 1960s were organized from the beginning as exclusively black, Mexican American, or Asian American.

### Contesting Paradigms/Strategic Divisions

By the late 1960s, the fragmentation within the movement was clearly visible and shaped very distinct and sometimes antagonistic currents. New social movement politics had galvanized activists in their respective communities, but the lack of theoretical clarity about racial dynamics in the United States splintered political action. Although the ethnicity paradigm had been seriously challenged, it remained an important explanatory model, not only for academics, but also for movement activists who sought to work within the reformed racial state. The challenging paradigms—the class- and nation-based views—gave rise to counterposed strategic orientations. Strategic divisions also flowed from class cleavages internal to communities of color, from state repression that marginalized radical tendencies, and from the very effectiveness of state strategies of reform, which tended to replace movement perspectives with the constituency-based (and ethnicity paradigm-derived) viewpoints of “normal” politics.

Three broad political currents can be recognized within the racial minority movements of this period.<sup>24</sup> These were *electoral/institutional entrism*, *socialism*, and *nationalism*. Each recognized the incompleteness of the civil rights reforms. While distinct from one another both in their understandings of race and in their practical activities, the *entrists*, socialists, and nationalists were not diametrically opposed: They overlapped and drew upon each other’s orientations. They had, after all, emerged from roughly similar movement experiences. Each tendency embodied and enacted a particular understanding of race, one of the three theoretical paradigms of race discussed here.

*Electoral/Institutional Entrism* reflected greater participation in existing political organizations and processes by movement activists. The electoral/institutional *entrists* were oriented by the ethnicity paradigm of race. Drawing upon the assimilationist and cultural pluralist frameworks that shaped the ethnicity paradigm (and that had always been in tension with one another as well), and recognizing that ethnic group mobilization had been essential to obtaining political power and access to the state for more than a century of U.S. history, they built political organizations that could win elections, penetrate and influence state bureaucracies, and either exercise power in the Democratic Party or openly compete with it.<sup>25</sup> By the 1970s, groups such as the Congressional Black Caucus and the Joint Center for Political Studies had achieved real influence on the national political scene, while local political machines developed under victorious black and Chican@ mayors in Atlanta, Newark, Gary, Birmingham, Denver, Detroit, Chicago (the important Harold Washington campaign), and San Antonio. These instrumentalities were in turn linked to the many civil rights, lobbying, and local political groups, including those at the neighborhood, social agency, union, or church level. Thus as a result of the 1960s movement victories, social programs and policies—with all their limitations—addressed the needs of minority communities as never before. The nascent influence of entrism activists of color made innovations not only in the obvious areas of policy—in employment, housing, education, health—but also in the less obvious such policy areas of foreign affairs, taxation, environment, science and arts support. The network of entrists as a whole played a key long-term role in maintaining minority viewpoints and positions—for example, the Congressional Black Caucus's annual alternative budget proposals—in the mainstream political process.

After the successes of the civil rights movement, pressures to include communities of color in the mainstream political process increased rapidly as voting patterns shifted, immigration expanded, and the “politics of turmoil” escalated. The ethnicity paradigm of race came under significant assault and for a time seemed in disarray. It ultimately re-emerged under the banner of neoconservatism and later “color-blindness.” The permanently increased presence of people of color in elective or administrative office, while a clear victory for racial reform, did not signal the end, but only the limited democratization, of white supremacy in the United States. The ethnicity paradigm retained its grasp on racial hegemony, but only under conditions of ongoing tension and instability. Party politics, local government agencies, welfare state and poverty programs, and electoral campaigns were some sites for entrism. While this tendency was perhaps most closely associated with the reform orientation of moderate movement factions, more militant currents also experimented with entrism strategies, for example, in the campaigns of La Raza Unida Party Texas during the 1970s (Shockley 1974; Navarro 2000; Barrera 2002 [1979]; Acuña 2011 [1972], 329–331), and SNCC's organization of the campaigns of activist Julian Bond for the Georgia House of Representatives and later the Georgia Senate (Carson 1995 [1981], 167–168). Still later, the Black Panther Party engaged in entrism as well, first



running the electoral campaign of Bobby Seale and later that of Elaine Brown for the mayoralty in Oakland, California. The necessity of “entering the mainstream” was advocated for the following reasons: to avoid marginalization, since no other historically continuous political terrain was available to minority activists; to achieve reforms such as redistribution of income, goods, and services; to obtain increased access to the racial state at all levels from municipal to national; and to educate and “raise consciousness” that would allow for further movement-building.

The *socialist* tendency was oriented by the class paradigm of race. Marxist (sometimes Marxist-Leninist) and social democratic trends were the main representatives of this current. These approaches emphasized the class dimensions of anti-racist struggles. They argued that racism is an indispensable support to advanced capitalism; that class cleavages exist within communities of color—this served to curb excessive nationalism and point out the dangers of multi-class alliances; and that it was essential to base organizational efforts on the (traditionally defined) working class. Somewhat paradoxically, Marxist-Leninist groups often successfully recruited minority memberships, particularly among students, even as they became increasingly marginal among working-class communities of color and on the U.S. political landscape in general (Pulido 2006).

Although Marxist-Leninists lost influence precipitously in the 1970s and by the 1980s had lost touch with communities of color as well, social democrats (aka democratic socialists) retained a certainly relevance at the left of the Democratic Party and in a wide range of movements. In trade unions, anti-war and anti-imperial movements, women's and gay movements, and in many local and issue-oriented social justice groups, these anti-racist activists and intellectuals dug in for the long-haul effort to revitalize and expand the welfare state and social rights (Marshall 1987 [1950]). In some sense they were successors to the New Deal and the Great Society. The former had abandoned blacks and people of color to obtain the support of the racist South; the latter had gestured in the direction of racial inclusion and racial justice, but had sacrificed those aims on the altars of the Cold War and imperial adventure. Such organizations as the Institute for Policy Studies, Children's Defense Fund, NAACP, ACLU, National Council of La Raza, various immigrant rights groups, and the National Organization for Woman—to name but a few—emerged from both the civil rights and anti-war movements with strong redistributionist agendas, anti-racist commitments, and sometimes with anti-war and anti-imperial agendas as well.<sup>26</sup> These groups and intellectuals—academic, religious, community-based—worked within the social democratic tradition and emphasized the class-based paradigm of race, at least implicitly if not explicitly. Although socialist organizations and intellectuals have made major contributions to the struggle for racial equality, they were relegated to the margins of mainstream politics quite rapidly after the success of the civil rights reforms in the mid-1960s.<sup>27</sup>

Under the banner of the class paradigm, some intellectuals and activists ultimately adopted a left-wing version of colorblindness, arguing that progressive redistribution

of income across racial lines would ultimately erode racism in the United States. This was a reversion to old-school understandings of race/class intersectionality, on the model of the old slogan, “black and white, unite and fight,” that had proved destructive to communities of color in the past. And indeed, in the era of colorblind racial hegemony, we see once again that the greatest suffering—in strictly economic terms—is experienced in communities of color, where the chasms of inequality in income, and especially in wealth, have yawned open dramatically just in the wake of the 2008 economic crash. It is vital to state, once again, that there is a huge difference between efforts to understand and challenge racial inequality by synthesizing race- and class-based forms of inequality on the one hand, and by denying the ongoing significance of race and racism by stressing the supposedly “fundamental” class conflict on the other hand. “Colorblindness” on the political left remains a major defect in the class-based paradigm of race.

*Nationalism* was a diverse current whose main strategic unity lay in rejection of the assimilationist and integrationist tendencies associated with the movement moderates. A tremendous diversity of political tendencies were understood in different communities of color under the “nationalist” label. In the black community the term referred not only to a legacy of radical opposition to assimilation, but also to the “separate development” strategy associated with Booker T. Washington, and to various Pan-Africanist currents that passed through Garvey and Du Bois. It also included a cultural nationalist current which was largely anti-political. In the Mexican American community, nationalism had its roots in Mexican revolutionary traditions, notably those of land struggles,<sup>28</sup> and confrontations at the border that went way beyond issues of migration.<sup>29</sup> Asian American nationalism, for the most part, centered on community issues. Native American, Puerto Rican, and Hawai’ian nationalisms focused to varying degrees on territorial autonomy, up to and including radical demands for independence.

Nationalists called on minority communities to develop their distinct collective identities and unique political agendas, based on their particular histories of oppression and resistance. Nationalists opposed both political frameworks of the dominant ethnicity paradigm—integrationism and cultural pluralism—arguing that these were formulas for tokenism and cooptation that fell far short of the self-determination sought by their particular communities of color. Nationalists had a more mixed relationship with the class paradigm of race: Some groups and thinkers, generally those on the left, embraced a synthesis of the nation- and class-based paradigms, often linking U.S. racial oppression to U.S. imperialism and colonial history via an “internal colonialism” analysis (Blauner 2001 [1972]; Allen 2005).

The nation-based paradigm generated the range of particularist racial movements we have described above—focused on the African diaspora, Aztlán, the Rez, or the ghetto/barrio as a locus of “community control.” Embracing black, Latin@, or Native American particularity meant confronting major divisions and at times glaring contradictions: Black nationalists ranged from separatists like Revolutionary Action

Movement (RAM),<sup>30</sup> to internal colonialism theorists to black capitalists inspired by Booker T. Washington, and to bitter black conservatives (think Clarence Thomas). Native Americans ranged from AIM (American Indian Movement) activists to (some-what later) casino operators. Cultural nationalist groups and intellectuals in every community also ranged from radical artists engaged in art-based social movement organizing (Lipsitz 2007) to radicals in the Harold Cruse tradition, to commercial operations selling dashikis (Reed 2002), to those who habitually repudiated political activism as “the white man’s game.”

Internal colonialist perspectives should also be included here. These approaches bridged between the socialist and nationalist paradigms, depicting racism as an ongoing historical process which contained *both* class- and nationally based elements. Racially defined communities within the United States were analogized to colonies, and said to face the same types of economic exploitation and cultural domination that the developed nations had visited on the underdeveloped ones. The internal colonialism rubric included a strategic spectrum running all the way from moderate reform initiatives to revolution and “national liberation.” Demands for increases in the number of “natives” occupying key posts in businesses or state institutions (police, schools, social agencies), plans to achieve “community control” of the ghetto and barrio economies, and schemes for a two-stage revolutionary process analogous to the Guinea-Bissau or Vietnamese experiences were all put forward based on the internal colonialism analysis.<sup>31</sup>

And what about alliances? Conflicts among communities of color—black/brown or black/Asian American—frequently reduced nationalist politics to squabbling over political spoils, or worse, to racist stereotyping. And what about whites? Were alliances possible with anti-racist whites? Did anti-racists whites even exist? By focusing too intensely on “white privilege”—obviously, a crucial issue in white supremacist America—nationalists often abandoned alliances that were politically essential. Although there were numerous reasons to insist on organizational “purity” along racial lines, in practice all racial categories are panethnic and decentered, so that sort of homogeneity would be impossible to achieve, even if it were desirable. Indeed, important nationalist organizations, such as the Black Panther Party, did ally with other groups across racial lines, including white groups.

Although nationalist organizations challenged the ubiquity and despotism of white supremacy, made important contributions to community organization and community control efforts—sometimes taking a page from the entrlist playbook as in the La Raza Unida electoral drive in Crystal City, TX, or the Bobby Seale/Black Panther Party campaign for the mayoralty of Oakland, California—and played an important role in advancing “identity politics,” they were not able to develop the political alliances and mass base necessary to challenge the dominant racial paradigm in the United States.

Considered critically, none of these political projects succeeded even remotely in forging an oppositional racial ideology or movement capable of radically transforming

the U.S. racial order. The electoral/institutional entrists succumbed to illusions about the malleability of the racial state and were forced into a new version of ethnic group pluralism—the idea that racial minorities, like the white ethnics of the past, could claim their rights through “normal” political channels. Marxists (and particularly Marxist-Leninists) could fight racism only by recourse to a futile dogma, and moreover one which consigned race to the terrain of “false consciousness,” while social democrats were reduced to becoming an ineffective appendage of the Democratic Party. Internal colonialism critics, like an earlier generation of black (and other minority) nationalists, refused to recognize the particularities of the U.S. racial order and the limits of all analogies with revolutionary movements abroad. The cultural nationalists ignored the political sphere, and indeed heaped scorn upon both reform-oriented entrists and minority socialists.<sup>32</sup>

\* \* \*

All these tendencies were at best partial assaults on the U.S. racial system and on white supremacy. All failed to grasp the comprehensive manner by which race is structured into the U.S. social fabric. All *reduced* race: to interest group/cultural identity, class inequality, or nationality. Perhaps most importantly, all these currents lacked adequate conceptions of racial politics and the racial state. In their radical as much as in their moderate phases, anti-racist movements neglected the state’s capacity for adaptation under political pressure. And while the civil rights movement and its allies, both radical and moderate, had launched the politics of identity, had initiated the “politicization of the social,” the movement and its allies could not manage the contradictions and uncertainties that these new identities and new political configurations generated.

The movement’s limits also arose from the strategic divisions that befell it as a result of its own successes. Here the black movement’s fate is illustrative. Only in the South, while fighting against a backward political structure and overt cultural oppression, had the black movement been able to maintain a decentered unity, even when internal debates were fierce. Once it moved north, the black movement began to split, because competing political projects, linked to different segments of the community, sought either integration in the (reformed) mainstream, or more radical transformation of the dominant racial system.

After initial victories against segregation were won, one sector of the movement was thus reconstituted as an interest group, seeking to enter the political fray and fulfill the “dream” of integration and cultural pluralism. Once it entered the state, this entrust current found itself locked in a bear hug with the state institutions whose reforms it had itself demanded, forced to compromise on basic demands, and—in what sometimes appeared to be a modern minstrel show—presented to the nation on the public stage in seeming proof of the state’s openness and racial democracy.

The radical sectors of the movement were similarly marginalized on the left or in cultural arenas. Those who confronted the state from radical positions (SNCC,

the Black Panther Party, the League of Revolutionary Black Workers, and others) were met with intense repression, and often succumbed to authoritarian and anti-democratic impulses. Socialists were relegated to the fringes of the Democratic Party. “Cultural revolution” might raise consciousness, but it did not move political power from white hands to darker ones. And indeed, many nationalists disdained engagement with the racial state.

Although the mass movement for racial justice that arose in the early postwar years and culminated in the 1960s would be contained by a combination of concessions and repression, the partial victories it won should not be condemned or dismissed. The movement persisted, decentered to be sure, but also broadened and deepened. As we have argued, the complex of racial meanings inherited from the Jim Crow era were irrevocably altered by years of political activity, by intense campaigns for racial equality and democracy, by the production of deeply transformed notions of “blackness,” “whiteness,” “*Latinidad*,” and all other racial identities as well. The movement vastly expanded the terrain of politics, generating not only a new racial politics of identity, but a new *social* politics of identity: intersectional, conscious of sex/gender issues, and hungry for a new and radical democracy that would transform every facet of American experience. The specter of racial equality, and beyond that, of an end to race/class/gender oppression itself, continued to haunt American dreams and nightmares.

## Notes

1. This phrase, of course, is Karl Polanyi’s term for the transition to capitalism in England. Polanyi stresses the social embeddedness of the capitalist economy. We have appropriated his term—with appropriate apologies—to indicate the social embeddedness of the political system, a recognition brought home by the post-World War II black movement and its allies, in the United States.
2. Katznelson (2013) makes the important argument that the New Deal, while allied with Jim Crow, also undermined it by “nationalizing” and “uplifting” the South. The South was also transformed by the effects of enormous black emigration during World War II (family members voting and working in factories in Detroit, Chicago, Philadelphia and so on), by the 1948 desegregation of the U.S. armed forces (which caused great anxiety and conflict in the highly militarized South), by the return of hundreds of thousands of black soldiers, and by deepening political divisions in the Democratic Party over civil rights.
3. By no means was Jim Crow confined to the South. As James Loewen (2005) points out, cities and towns throughout the country had explicitly racist local laws. Many “sundown towns” (purposely all-white municipalities) were located in the Midwest, Pacific Northwest, and elsewhere.
4. Use of the term “elite” is not meant pejoratively. Although the prewar civil rights movement included some episodes of direct action and mass mobilization, notably during Reconstruction and in the aftermath of World War—for example, the Garvey movement—these were infrequent and antagonistic to moderate reforms. Even during the first decade of the post-World War II period strategies concentrated, for reasons of necessity, on lobbying,

use of the courts, and appeals to enlightened whites, tactics which depend on knowledgeable elites for leadership and render mass participation counterproductive. In addition, the straitened conditions facing blacks before World War II generated a survival-oriented ideology which did not adapt itself well to mass mobilization. For accounts of racial politics in the 1930s, see Weiss 1983; Rosengarten 2000 (1974); Katznelson 2013.

5. For representative statements from this period, see Dahl 1967; Rose 1967. Good contemporary critiques are Lowi 1969; Bachrach and Baratz 1970; Lukes 2005 (1974).
6. A little-known passage in Gramsci's short discussion on "Intellectuals" refers to American blacks, chiefly noting how they might provide leadership to the impoverished and then still-colonized masses in Africa. Rather amazingly, though, sitting in his dark cell in a fascist prison (in about 1930), Gramsci recognizes the black freedom struggle, "the formation of a surprising number of negro intellectuals who absorb American culture and technology." He continues:

It seems to me that, for the moment, American negroes have a national and racial spirit which is negative rather than positive, one which is a product of the struggle carried on by the whites in order to isolate and depress them. But was not this the case with the Jews up to and throughout the eighteenth century? (Gramsci 1971, 21)
7. For a startling and vivid evocation of that rhetorical toolkit, see Zora Neale Hurston, "The Sermon" (1984 [1929]). This is a transcribed field recording by Hurston, then an anthropology graduate student, of a sermon given by preacher C.C. Lovelace in a church in Eau Gallie, Florida, in 1929.
8. Robert Parris Moses drew important inspiration from Camus, for example Carson 1995 (1981).
9. Eugene Genovese has argued that the slavemasters' paternalism allowed a substantial black culture of resistance to develop, and that slavery was consequently rendered more benign. Against this view, Steven Hahn has documented deeply-rooted patterns of resistance and political struggle during the slavery era; and Walter Johnson has reasserted the savagery, not only of slavery's oppression and exploitation, but also of its militarism and expansionist ambitions (Genovese 1974; Hahn 2003; Johnson 2013).
10. "Subalternity" is also a term launched by Gramsci. See his "Notes on Italian History," "The Modern Prince," and elsewhere (Gramsci 1971). A few major sources in subaltern studies, by no means all consistently in agreement, are these: Guha and Spivak, eds. 1988; Scott 1990; Kelley 1996; Beverley 1999; Mignolo 2000; Chatterjee 2010.
11. White violence culminated a month after the campaign's end in the "Birmingham Sunday" bombing of the 16th Street Baptist Church (September 15, 1963), which killed four black children in an institution that had been the center of the Birmingham movement. On Birmingham, see King 1964; Greenberg 1980; Branch 1988, 1998; Garrow, ed. 1989; McWhorter 2001.
12. The march had been planned as a unified effort to demonstrate black and liberal support for national civil rights legislation. The SNCC speaker, John Lewis, was forced to censor his remarks by white and black moderates, but even the rewritten speech contrasted sharply with the self-congratulatory tone of the rest of the event: "The party of Kennedy is also the party of Eastland ... the party of Javits is also the party of Goldwater. Where is our party?" (Moyers 2013).

13. At first promised and then denied white liberal support, the MFDP challengers left the convention profoundly disillusioned. On the MFDP, see Carson 1995 (1981).
14. The “long hot summers” of the middle 1960s were viewed by many blacks (and by the U.S. police at all levels) as a proto-revolutionary situation. Many activists saw the black underclass as “voting with shopping carts,” taking what was deservedly theirs, and accelerating the unacceptably slow pace of reform. Moderates, by contrast, questioned the effectiveness of disruption and argued that riots discredited efforts to achieve political reforms. In retrospect we may discount the more extreme claims made by all sides during these years. Still, during the 1967–1968 period alone, some 384 “racial disorders” were recorded in 298 cities (McAdam 1984, 227). These can hardly be considered as unrelated to the atmosphere of black protest that engulfed the nation after 1964, not just the South. See also Rustin 2003 (1965), 1967; Feagin and Hahn 1973; Killian 1975; Button 1978; Piven and Cloward 1978.
15. On March 7, 1965 some 2,000 marchers were ferociously attacked on the Pettus Bridge at Selma. For good analyses of the complexities of the Selma situation, which many see as the point at which southern intransigence was finally ruptured, see Garrow 1978; Carson 1995 (1981).
16. Many commentators date the black power phase of the movement from the “Meredith march” of June, 1966, though this is clearly a somewhat arbitrary periodization.
17. Richard Wright’s *Black Power* appeared in 1954; Wright was certainly not the first to use the term. Over recent decades an enormous amount of writing has been produced on black power; our treatment here is necessarily brief. Some classic texts from the black power period are Boggs 1970; Allen 1990 [1970]; Ture (Carmichael) and Hamilton 1992 [1967]. Among the many contemporary contributions, see Van Deburg 1992; Tyson 1999; Woodward 1999; Robinson 2000 [1983]; Glaude, ed. 2002; Joseph 2006; Slate 2012.
18. Still Ture and Hamilton did not entirely burn their moderate bridges. Robert Allen wrote that *Black Power* “was largely an essay in liberal reformism” (Allen 1990 [1970], 247), a judgment based on the authors’ lack of a “revolutionary” political program. Ture and Hamilton wanted to break with the ethnicity paradigm, but not with the mainstream aspirations of U.S. blacks.
19. Malcolm’s own father was a UNIA activist who may have been lynched in Michigan in 1931 by a racist group called the Black Legion. See Marable 2011.
20. The vastness of the literature on Freedom Summer attests in its own right to the importance of this SNCC initiative in shaping U.S. racial history. That importance goes far beyond voting rights, important as those rights may be. See Belfrage 1965; Payne 2007 (1995); Martinez, ed. 2007 (1965); Watson 2010.
21. The “war on poverty” was launched by the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, which set up the Office of Economic Opportunity. OEO was dismantled under the Nixon administration.
22. Piven and Cloward’s 1965 call for additional redistribution of resources through the AFDC system helped set off the Welfare Rights Movement. See Cloward and Piven 1966.
23. Radical black organizations like SNCC opposed the war, while moderate groups like the Urban League supported it. King’s late but fierce declaration of opposition was proclaimed in his Riverside Church speech, “A Time To Break Silence,” on April 4, 1967, exactly one year before his assassination. This courageous act deeply embodied the split



in the movement, placed MLK Jr. solidly on the side of its radical wing, and undoubtedly contributed to his death, now credibly seen as an FBI murder (Pepper 2008).

24. None of these currents is by any means exclusive. Specific perspectives often contain elements of more than one current. Internal colonialism, for example, can be expressed in nationalist or socialist terms. The categories we employ are “ideal types”—they permit the classification of diverse tendencies for analytical purposes.
25. What about Republican “entrism”? After the New Deal came to power the GOP never regained the influence in communities of color—particularly black communities—that it earlier possessed as the “party of Lincoln.” But it still held on until the 1960s, for example electing Edward Brooke to the Senate in 1966 as the first black senator seated in the 20th century(!). The Democrats were also the “Dixiecrats,” let it be remembered (Weiss 1983), and civil rights found no secure home in either party until the 1960s, when the Republicans adopted the “southern strategy.” Even with blacks gone, the GOP held onto a sizeable number of Latin@ and Asian American voters until it kissed them off with its support for the anti-immigrant Proposition 187 in California. Sporadic attempts to woo voters of color, and efforts to put on display such putatively attractive tokens as Sen. Marco Rubio, and former Secretaries of State Condoleezza Rice and Colin Powell, have not availed (Lusane 2006; Hattam and Lowndes 2013). The Republicans are now the white people’s party, a fact they only intermittently bother to deny.
26. For example, the Children’s Defense Fund is active in opposing the “school to prison pipeline” and in challenging the continuing and disgracefully high numbers of children in poverty in the U.S.; these social policies—which is what they are; they are not accidental—disproportionately destroy the lives of millions of children of color in the United States. See Edelman 2000, 1993.
27. Both Kennedy and Johnson harassed MLK Jr., abetted by J. Edgar Hoover who charged that King was under the influence of “the Communists.” See Churchill and Vander Wall, 2001 (1988).
28. Land struggles were most strenuously pursued by the *Alianza Federal de Mercedes*, founded in 1963 by Reies Lopez Tijerina. The *Alianza* (later renamed *La Confederación de Pueblos Libres*) sought to restore lands originally held by Mexican Americans in northern New Mexico under grants dating from the conquest, and built upon regional traditions of struggle dating from the 19th century (Tijerina 1978; Nabokov 1969). Tijerina’s politics have been the subject of some debate. His personalistic and confrontational style and his focus on the tactics of land occupation place him in a venerable Mexican revolutionary tradition. But Tijerina built upon and altered this legacy in the attempt to address modern U.S. conditions. He ran for Governor of New Mexico in 1968, joined Martin Luther King, Jr.’s Poor People’s Crusade, and espoused a Pan American and Third Worldist revolutionary philosophy. After extensive harassment, Tijerina was jailed in 1969, and his movement dispersed.
29. Revolutionary nationalism in Latin@ communities has a long tradition. Chican@ nationalism, for example, was tied to the legacy of the Mexican revolution of 1910–1920, which both swept across the U.S. border and provoked U.S. military intervention into Mexico. Revolutionary movements in Mexico sparked early Mexican-American radical efforts, and linked to radical movements in the United States as well. For example, the Flores Magón brothers, Enrique and Ricardo, were both leaders of an anarchist tendency

- in the Mexican Revolution and activists in the International Workers of the World, mainly in Southern California. Caught up in the Palmer raids of the 1920s, Ricardo Flores Magón was cruelly persecuted in the United States and died in Leavenworth Prison in Kansas (Gómez-Quíñones 1973). In Texas/Chihuahua, the El Paso-Juarez urban complex was also the site of significant Mexicano radical activity and U.S. repression (Romo 2005). The U.S. general John J. Pershing invaded Northern Mexico in 1916–1917 on a so-called punitive expedition against Mexican revolutionary general Pancho Villa, who had attacked a village on the New Mexico side of the border (Eisenhower 1995).
30. The RAM was a revolutionary black nationalist organization founded by Muhammad Ahmad (Max Stanford), who had been an associate of Malcolm X. Some of its members became active in SNCC in its later days, as well as in the Black Panther Party and the League of Revolutionary Black Workers. Other insurrectionary black nationalist groups that were linked with RAM include the African Peoples Party, the Black Liberation Army, the Black United Front, the Black Workers Congress, and the Republic of New Africa. See Ahmad, Allen, and Bracey, eds. n.d.
  31. The first “stage” is the creation of a multi-class united front to liberate the colony; the second “stage” is the subsequent pursuit of socialist reconstruction and, presumably, class struggle. The internal colonialist orientation of the 1960s was often explicitly Maoist, as were many other Marxisms of the period.
  32. See, for example, Moore 1974–1975.

# Racial Reaction: Containment and Rearticulation

## Introduction

The black movement and its allied movements that emerged during the Great Transformation disrupted and reshaped American society. They called into question the logic and structure of racial segregation. They appealed for social justice and drew upon cherished principles of equality and freedom. The movements' demands for the elimination of racial discrimination became a broad-based challenge to racism across-the-board, and thus developed in radical and sometimes revolutionary ways. The revolutionary potential of the post-World War II Great Transformation cannot be understated. To shake up white supremacy as the black movement did was to reiterate the nightmare from which the racist system cannot awake: black insurgency. The Civil War was the first great assault on the U.S. racist system. The Great Transformation was the second great assault, the second anti-racist uprising. It revealed and called into question the fundamental limits of democracy in the United States.<sup>1</sup> The issues that were posed by the movement had deep and sustained reverberations throughout the world, not only in regard to race and racism but much more broadly.

The black movement and its allies confronted not only the state but the nation itself—"the American people."<sup>2</sup> The movement sought not only equality but also community. Equality could possibly, though by no means definitively, be enhanced through state-based reform policies. But to create community required a *social* reorientation, a reinterpretation or rearticulation of the very definition of the American nation and the American people. The movement asked, "Who is included, and who excluded, from our community?"

This remains a radical, even revolutionary question. When the movement demanded the incorporation of racially defined "others," the democratization of structurally racist institutions, it challenged both the state and civil society to recognize and validate racially defined experience and identity. This was the *politicization of the social*. It was transformative and attractive. It was contagious; you "caught" it. It spread from one person to another, from one group to another. This new emphasis on social identity came to frame emancipatory and democratic aspirations more generally. It arched over different issues, selves, groups, and conceptions of liberation. The "politics of identity" has been critiqued by both the political right and left. But that may be precisely the point: Over the past few decades *all* politics have become,

to a large degree, “identity politics.” The politicization of the social meant, above all, the recognition of a new depth of political life (Guigni 1988; Melucci 1989; Laraña, Johnston, and Gusfield, eds. 1994).

Consider the immensity of this recognition. No longer would it be sufficient to think of politics as a competition for resources regulated by a neutral legitimate arbiter, namely the state. The famous definition of politics as “who gets what, when, and how” (Lasswell 1950 [1936]) was now superseded. “The personal is political,” a phrase often associated with second-wave feminism, was now in play; this concept too has its origins in the black movement (Hanisch 1969; Evans 1979). The post-World War II upsurge of racial subjectivity and self-awareness into the mainstream political arena set off this transformation that, in many ways, resonated with democratic impulses worldwide. The prevailing racial regime in the United States, then, was seriously challenged.

The racial reaction that emerged had an obvious central objective: the demobilization of the black movement and of the other anti-racist and new social movements that it had spawned. This was far from an easy task. Among many other reasons why the movement had to be stopped was that it consciously embodied a wide range of fundamental American ideals and cherished beliefs. The movement’s demands could not be rejected out of hand, for this would have emboldened and radicalized it further, as well as risk drawing new supporters from varying quarters to movement ranks.

As a racial project, therefore, racial reaction had to combine different responses to the movement upsurge. Movement gains could not be easily halted, much less reversed. They had to be blunted and absorbed. The most immediate task was that of containment. Repression was present from the earliest stages of the movement upsurge: The coercive powers of the state were employed to disrupt, demobilize, and destroy by any means necessary (including murder) the more radical elements of the movement. Repression had dramatic results. Still, the insurgency moved fast in its early years. Even by the time of the March on Washington for Jobs and Freedom in 1963, a return to the past modalities of racial terror and oppression was no longer a serious option for the state at the federal level.

Nor could repression alone contain the movement. The key objective of the U.S. racial regime from the later 1960s onward was incorporation, not rollback. The incorporation of the movement’s demands through civil rights reform legislation, through administrative maneuver, and through judicial action was already well under way when Martin Luther King, Jr. stood on the Lincoln Memorial steps in August 1963. Indeed, reform initiatives undertaken to incorporate movement demands bore a striking resemblance to state action undertaken a century before during the Reconstruction period. The enactment of “moderate” civil rights reforms, themselves painstakingly negotiated (Carmines and Stinson 1989; Lieberman 1998), and the Warren Court’s piecemeal expansion of black citizenship rights as well (Kluger 2004 [1976]) were both reiterations of that earlier period of reform.

In the late 1860s, there had been conflicts between the vision, policies, and practices of “Presidential” Reconstruction and that of “Congressional” Reconstruction; these paralleled the debates, squabbles, and contradictory moves underway within the racial state during the 1860s. But things were also different during the “Second Reconstruction.”

Nor was the combination of repression and incorporation adequate to the objective of containment. A third element was needed: the *rearticulation* of the movement’s central themes and ideals—those of freedom and equality, and of what constitutes a fair and just society. The forces of racial reaction sought to reestablish racial hegemony by reinterpreting and reframing key civil rights principles and practices, through an ideologically driven process of rearticulation.<sup>3</sup> The racial meanings and identities, as well as the visions of equality advanced by movement activists and organizations, would eventually become subject to rearticulation by the political right. Yes, identities of emancipation, speaking broadly, could be rearticulated as identities of incorporation. Ideals of redistribution and justice, again speaking broadly, could be rearticulated as ideals of formal, but not substantive, equality.

In summary, containment of the movement, which was imperative to sustain the broader racial regime, involved outright state repression, selective incorporation of movement demands, and most important from our perspective, the rearticulation of the movement’s identities and ideals.

The forces of racial reaction had both to affirm and to reject the movement’s vision and demands. They had both to propose a system of racial rule broad enough to absorb the egalitarian and inclusive thrust of the black movement and its allied movements; and at the same time, incremental enough to preserve the entitlements of white supremacy that were the system’s key features. This was obviously a contradictory racial project: often hypocritical, sometimes naive, but always deeply ideological.

In the next pages we discuss the early “post-civil rights” period, focusing on the development of projects to contain the movement in the late 1860s and 1870s. We begin with *incorporation and repression*; move through the two main *reactionary racial projects*, the new right and neoconservatism; and conclude the chapter with a working summary: *from code words to reverse racism to colorblindness*.

## Incorporation and Repression

The brief period of moderate reform politics during the mid- to late-1860s was filled with irony and contradiction. Incorporation created a host of difficulties for movement groups and activists attempting to engage with and operate within the state—including those who were now directly employed by it. In the effort to adapt to the new racial politics it had created, the black movement lost its decentered political unity. Before the civil rights reforms, opposition to the backward and coercive racial order of the South had permitted a tenuous alliance between the moderate and radical currents of the movement. But after a modicum of reform had been achieved, that

alliance was weakened. Working within the newly reformed racial state was more possible, and confronting it more difficult, than during the preceding period.

Many civil rights activists went to work in the housing, healthcare delivery, legal services, education, and “community action” programs set up as part of the Great Society (McAdam 1988). These people were the foot soldiers of service provision, advocacy, and to some extent mobilization. Programs such as the War on Poverty, Model Cities, and Head Start, among others, brought resources and jobs to the ghettos, barrios, and reservations. But reforms of this type could also be interpreted as classic examples of incorporation, at times resembling the “machine” politics of Chicago or Philadelphia more than the radical work of the black freedom movement in the South such as SNCC’s “freedom schools,” for example.<sup>4</sup> The landscape created by new reforms thus echoed the critical reflections originally posed by E. Franklin Frazier in his classic text *Black Bourgeoisie* (1957a). Frazier dissed his “bourgeoisie” as opportunists in the main: They were generally local black leaders, often preachers or local businessmen, whose relationships with white power structures allowed them to broker local resources in segregated cities. They found themselves torn between their loyalties to the black communities they “represented,” and the white elites whose local clients and fixers they had become. Over time they vacillated between accommodation—when resources were forthcoming and they received respect from their white business and political counterparts—and opposition: turning to black nationalism, trade union, or protest politics when the needs of their communities were slighted or when they themselves felt disempowered and disrespected.

Movement activists and veterans of the “beautiful struggle” often felt the same way—“entrists” were torn between their roles as agents of change and incipient bureaucrats. Local power structures based in City Hall or the Board of Education sought to routinize or dismiss their work. Meanwhile, the supposed triumph of civil rights failed to placate radicals who sought not simply rights, but power, resources, and the broader goal of “self-determination.” From the radical perspective, the conferring of formal rights or the provision of a job-training program did not appreciably change the circumstances of a black youth in Harlem or a *vato loco* in East Los Angeles. What were heralded as great victories by moderates appeared to radicals as merely more streamlined versions of racial oppression. As George Lipsitz reports, Malcolm X used to tell his followers that “Racism is like a Cadillac; they bring out a new model every year.”<sup>5</sup>

In the immediate wake of civil rights reforms, the question of how to understand and conceptualize the meaning and significance of race and racism in a transformed political, social, and cultural landscape was one of overwhelming significance. Theories of race were reconsidered, debated, invented, and reinvented. The explanatory power and political efficacy of the ethnicity perspective—with its belief in the gradual assimilationist and cultural pluralist currents—was deeply debilitated, especially by the regime’s repressive activities. Radical theories of race gained strength and

adherence as liberal approaches lost their appeal and coherence. Embracing nation-based and class-based paradigms, groups like the Black Panther Party (founded in Oakland, California, in 1966) and the League of Revolutionary Black Workers (founded in Detroit, Michigan, in 1969) advanced radical demands for a more thoroughgoing restructuring of the social order—one which would recognize the pervasiveness of racial oppression not only in “normal” politics, but in the organization of the labor market, urban geography, and in the forms of cultural life (Boggs and Boggs 1966; see also Boggs 1970; Geschwender 1977; Hilliard 1993; Abu-Jamal 2008; Georgakas and Surkin 2012 [1975]).

Corresponding to the radicalization of parts of the movement, the racial regime was dramatically increasing its repression, notably its political policing, of the black movement and the black community. The FBI COINTELPRO (Counter-Intelligence Program) was the best-known and most extensive of these activities. Started by J. Edgar Hoover to monitor and disrupt the Communist Party USA, it was first expanded, and then shifted almost entirely toward, surveillance and harassment of the U.S. black movement (Churchill and Vander Wall 2001 [1988]; Weiner 2012). State agencies at all levels from the national to the local committed numerous crimes against movement activists and supporters, and against black communities as a whole (Irons 2010).

These crimes included assassinations, arson, torture, larceny, and fraud, among others (Haas 2011). COINTELPRO also fomented internecine conflicts in the movement, infiltrated movement organizations and hired *agents provocateurs*, and ran entrapment schemes to delegitimize and decimate radical opposition (Rosenfeld 2013). All this occurred during the very same period when the federal government was supposedly legislating and adjudicating the terms of the belated inclusion of blacks and others in the national polity. The “iron fist” of repression has always lurked beneath the “velvet glove” of reform and accommodation.<sup>6</sup>

Throughout this period, the spectrum of maneuver and manipulation on the part of the racial regime—ranging from democratic openings on the left to secret policing and covert action/state-based terrorism on the right—contained the movement by fragmenting it, keeping it off balance, and hindering its ability to maintain clear goals, principles, and focus. But attempts simply to contain the movement’s challenge to the existing racial regime—through incorporation of political demands for formal/legal racial equality or through outright state repression—would simply not be enough, in the long run, to address what the movement had unleashed, what the millions of people whom it had touched were seeing, feeling, and thinking anew. “Freedom dreams” would not be forgotten, the yearning for a truly racially just society would remain undiminished, and the politicization of the social would not be restricted or restrained. The forces of racial reaction required stronger ideological weapons, more powerful castor oil, to counteract the indigestion that racism was now generating in the black community and beyond. The regime needed to combat the powerful medicine that the movement had produced in the form of politicized identities and



collective mobilization. A thorough political and ideological rearticulation of the movement's understanding and vision of race and democracy was required—a rearticulation on the right that would recast themes of racial equality and justice in ways that would serve to rationalize and reinforce persistent patterns of racial inequality.

## Reactionary Racial Projects

There were clear limits to any attempt to undo the effects of the Great Transformation. Racial equality had to be acknowledged as a desirable goal, but the *meaning* of equality, and the proper means for achieving it, had to be reopened for debate.

After the civil rights reforms and the anti-racist upsurge of the 1960s, the forces of racial reaction required time to regroup and develop a new strategic orientation. Existing racist projects were no longer sustainable and posed significant risks: of marginalization at the far right of the political spectrum, and of a further radicalization of the new social movements, now composed of a growing, though loose and uneven, alliance of anti-racist, second-wave feminist, and anti-war contingents. Still, white supremacy had hardly been overturned. However “shook up” it was—Elvis had been right about that—both everyday and structural racism still substantively shaped U.S. society and culture. White racial subjectivity, media-based representations of race, and the sheer cognitive incapacity of the white population—still over 80 percent of all Americans at that time—had not been significantly transformed. In fact, the ameliorative effects of the moderate civil rights reforms and of Supreme Court racial jurisprudence—sometimes gestural at best—were thought by many whites to be enough to solve “the race problem”: with a few significant concessions to the demand for racial democracy, domestic tranquility could be restored.

Like other political projects to consolidate hegemony, racial reaction involved both the state and civil society. It was a concerted, sequentially developing response to the demand for “racial liberation” (Wolfenstein 1977) that had been posed by the black movement and its allies. Just as the movement developed through various stages, evolving from demands for inclusion to demands for community self-determination and radical redistribution of resources, so too did the racial reaction move along a historical trajectory. Its main players sought to accommodate and absorb movement demands with moderate reforms, attempting to rearticulate those radical demands in a conservative or even rightwing fashion. Like the black movement it followed, racial reaction was a combination of initiatives; it contained disparate “racial projects.” Over time, some of these would succeed and others would fail; some would develop and others would atrophy. The racial reaction was by no means driven by a unified political orientation, ideology, or strategic approach. Emblematic of distinct approaches are the ideology and politics of the new right and that of neoconservatism. Both emerged as responses to the overall transformation of polity and culture in the wake of the new social movements of the 1960s, and both were centrally concerned with defining the limits of racial democracy.

## The New Right: Authoritarian Populism and “Code Words”

Walter Dean Burnham noted that the political culture of the United States is highly influenced by the values of 17th-century dissenting Protestantism and that this has frequently become manifest in periods of transition and crisis:

Whenever and wherever the pressures of “modernization”—secularity, urbanization, the growing importance of science—have become unusually intense, episodes of revivalism and culture-issue politics have swept over the American social landscape. In all such cases since at least the end of the Civil War, such movements have been more or less explicitly reactionary, and have frequently been linked with other kinds of reaction in explicitly political ways.  
(Burnham 1983, 125)

The new right emerged and developed in such a political space. It was an attempt to create an authoritarian, right-wing populism—a populism fuelled by resentment.

The political, economic, and social transformations and dislocations of the late-1960s and early-1970s called the “American Dream” into question and shook people’s faith in their country. Apolitical, perpetually prosperous, militarily invincible, and deeply self-absorbed and self-righteous, mainstream American culture was shaken to its foundations by developments over this period. Economic stability and global military supremacy were perceived to be eroding. Commonly held concepts of nation, community, and family were transformed, and no new principle of cohesion, no new cultural center, emerged to replace them. In a period of dramatic political fragmentation, the mainstream was left with no clear notion of the “common good.”<sup>7</sup>

In the face of these challenges, traditional conservatism seemed to have little to offer—society and politics, and the conventional way in which they were understood, had *already* been radically transformed. Only the appearance of the new right in the middle 1970s gave the millions of threatened members of what Richard Nixon called the “silent majority” a sense of cultural identity, renewed faith, and political hope. The new right was a well-organized alternative to the moral and existential chaos of the preceding decades: a network of conservative organizations with an aggressive political style, an outspoken religious and cultural traditionalism, and a clear populist commitment.

Gillian Peele defined the new right as “a loose movement of conservative politicians and a collection of general-purpose political organizations which have developed independently of the political parties” (1984, 52). The new right had its origins in the Barry Goldwater campaign of 1964 and the George Wallace campaign of 1968. An early achievement was influencing the Republican “Southern Strategy”; a project developed around the 1968 presidential election—and fully supported by the wily Richard Nixon—with the objective of repositioning white supremacism as a mainstream political initiative in the aftermath of the civil rights reforms (Phillips 1970; Perlstein 2008, 2009 [2001]).

The main new right affiliates emerged, for the most part, in the 1970s: the American Conservative Union, the National Conservative Political Action Committee (NCPAC), the Conservative Caucus, the Young Americans for Freedom, the Heritage Foundation, and a group of fundamentalist Protestant sects incorporating millions of adherents. Leading figures of the new right were fundraiser/publisher Richard A. Viguerie, Paul Weyrich (Committee for the Survival of a Free Congress), Howard Phillips (Conservative Caucus), and John T. Dolan (NCPAC), as well as activist Phyllis Schlafly (Eagle Forum, Stop-ERA) and fundamentalist evangelist Rev. Jerry Falwell (Moral Majority). Periodicals identified with the new right included the *Conservative Digest*, *Policy Review*, and *New Guard*. The key new right think tank was the Heritage Foundation, founded by brewer Joseph Coors and Paul Weyrich in 1973. Central to the new right's growth, as Alan Crawford notes, was the ramped-up use of direct-mail solicitation to build a movement:

Collecting millions of dollars in small contributions from blue-collar workers and housewives, the new right feeds on discontent, anger, insecurity, and resentment, and flourishes on backlash politics.

(1980, 5)<sup>8</sup>

The new right was not just a grassroots, right-wing populist movement. As Coors's early support already indicated, it was also an attempt by politically conservative corporate elite members to develop a mass base. These leaders faced a challenge in the political gains of the anti-racist movements. They sought to avoid large-scale redistribution, not only of state resources, but also of political power. The racial upheavals of the 1960s ruled out any attempt to return to legally enforced segregation. They also precluded mounting a defense of inequality rooted in the "scientific racism" of the immediate past.<sup>9</sup>

Since the political gains of anti-racist movements could not be easily reversed, they had to be *rearticulated*. The key device used by the new right to challenge these gains was the innovative use of "code words" in its political messaging. Code words are phrases and symbols that imply or refer indirectly to racial themes, but do not directly challenge popular democratic or egalitarian ideals such as justice and equal opportunity.

The issue of busing to achieve racial integration in the schools provides an example of how such code words were deployed. The new right framed its opposition to busing not as an overt effort to maintain residential or school segregation, but as an assault on "the community" and "the family." School integration, new right activists argued, meant that the state was usurping decision-making powers which should be vested in parents: deciding in what kind of communities their children would be raised and what kind of education their children will receive. As Linda Gordon and Allen Hunter observed, the link between family and community was clearly emphasized in anti-busing mobilization:

The anti-busing movement is nourished by ... fears for the loss of the family. The loss of neighborhood schools is perceived as a threat to community, and

therefore family stability by many people, particularly in cities where ethnically homogenous communities remain.

(2005, 239)

In similar fashion, the progressive theme of “community control” advanced earlier in the 1960s was recast to prevent school desegregation and to challenge fair housing initiatives. As HoSang notes, California opponents of the 1963 Rumford Act that outlawed housing discrimination succeeded in overturning it with the 1964 Proposition 13. They labeled the Rumford Act the “Forced Housing Act” and campaigned for their 1964 initiative, not by supporting residential segregation, but by avowing a “freedom to choose” on the part of the landlord or home-seller. In declaring this “right” (which did not exist in law and amounted to nothing more than the right to discriminate), they rearticulated civil rights doctrines of equality and community control, reframing them as property rights. This anticipated later campaigns against affirmative action (“reverse discrimination”) and other reforms such as fair lending (HoSang 2010, 69). Many civil rights reforms proved vulnerable to strategically framed campaigns of rearticulation designed to blunt or avoid charges of explicit racism. Indeed one measure of the success of such coded language was the confusion it sowed even among left organizations during the Boston busing controversy of the 1970s.<sup>10</sup>

Beginning with the Wallace campaign of 1968, we can trace the pattern of new right experimentation with these code words, and with the rearticulation of racial meanings they attempt. The first rumblings of the new right agenda were heard in George Wallace’s 1968 presidential bid. Wallace’s initial role on the national political stage had been that of die-hard segregationist.<sup>11</sup> His entry into the presidential race was seen at first as a replay of the Dixiecrat strategy which had led to the candidacy of Strom Thurmond 20 years before. Few analysts expected Wallace to have mass appeal outside the South, yet in northern blue-collar strongholds like Milwaukee, Detroit, and Philadelphia, he demonstrated surprising strength.

Although Wallace’s image as a racist politician had originally placed him in the national spotlight, it did not make good presidential politics, and he was forced to incorporate his racial message as a subtext, implicit but “coded,” in a populist appeal. Wallace thus struck certain chords that anticipated the new right agenda—defense of traditional values, opposition to “big government,” and patriotic and militaristic themes. But the centerpiece of his appeal was his racial politics. Wallace was a law-and-order candidate, an anti-statist, an inheritor of classical southern populist traditions. He called for the stepped-up use of force to repress ghetto rebellions, derided the black movement and the war on poverty, and attacked liberal politicians and intellectuals. Wallace departed from his early 1960s style, however, by avoiding direct race-baiting.

During the same campaign, political analyst Kevin Phillips, then a young aide to Nixon campaign manager John Mitchell, submitted a lengthy and rather scholarly analysis of U.S. voting trends to Nixon headquarters.<sup>12</sup> Phillips argued that a

Republican victory and long-term electoral realignment were possible on racial grounds. His subsequently published *The Emerging Republican Majority* suggested a turn to the right and the use of “coded” anti-black campaign rhetoric; he recognized quite accurately that a great majority of southern white voters had abandoned the Democratic Party, and that Negrophobia was alive and well, not only in the South but nationally. In fact what was “emerging” had been there all along: a massive racist complex of white resentment, dread, and shame that went back to slavery, the “lost cause,” and reactionary political resentment.<sup>13</sup>

Wallace’s success, the disarray in Democratic ranks caused by the “Negro socio-economic revolution,” and polling data from blue-collar districts around the country convinced Phillips that a strategic approach of this kind—a “Southern Strategy”—could fundamentally shift political alignments which had been in effect since 1932. The Democratic “Solid South” could become the Republican “Solid South.” And lo it came to pass ...

These innovations bore rich political fruit. They coincided with the fragmentation of the New Deal coalition, the “loss” of the war on poverty, and the decline of the black movement. They represented an apparent alternative to ghetto riots and white guilt, to the integration of northern schools and the onset of “stagflation.” They effortlessly, if demagogically, appealed to a majority of the electorate, then more than 80 percent white—something that the black movement and its allies had not succeeded in doing.

By the early 1980s, the new right’s dream seemed within reach: to consolidate a “new majority” which could dismantle the welfare state, legislate a return to “traditional morality,” and stem the tide of political and cultural dislocation which the 1960s and 1970s represented. The new right project linked the assault on liberalism and “secular humanism,” the obsession with individual guilt and responsibility where social questions were concerned (crime, sex, education, poverty), with a fierce anti-statism. The political strategy involved was populist. Use of the initiative process, especially in California, permitted well-funded campaigns of electoral mobilization in defense of (suitably coded) white privilege: on issues of housing, education, and especially taxation. Legislating through the ballot-box provided the new right a detour around the courts, the bureaucracy, state governments, and the Congress as well. Such strategies alienated traditional conservatives, who labeled the channeling of popular rage through direct democratic channels “antipolitical”:

A near-constant theme of conservative thought, from Edmund Burke to William Buckley, has been that unrestrained expressions of popular will militate against the orderly processes of government on which stable societies depend.... The new right, impatient for short-run results, has rejected this dominant theme of conservatism in favor of direct democracy, threatening to shatter the safeguards against political centralization and, therefore, freedom itself.

(Crawford 1980, 311–312)

But they worked, so the new right pressed ahead with them, and the Republicans signed on.

Some analysts saw the new right as a status revolt<sup>14</sup> by those whom Ben Wattenberg called the “unyoung, unpoor and unblack” (Crawford 1980, 148), whose identities and interests were articulated *negatively* by the social movements of the 1960s and the crises of the 1970s. This newly identified “silent majority” resented any mobility on the part of lower-status groups, and demanded that the political process recognize the traditional values to which they subscribed. Their anger was directed at those who were “not like themselves”; this involved a racial dimension which they experienced as a cultural and political threat as much as an economic one:

[T]he fear of black power, “reverse discrimination” at the community level—associated with fear of crime, property devaluation, dirtiness and noisiness—reflects not only the direct economic crunch on white working-class people but also a less tangible sense of cultural disintegration.

(Gordon and Hunter 2005, 239; see also Rieder 1985)

The perceived failure of the Great Society and other liberal experiments focused the new right’s wrath not only on the undeserving (and implicitly black) poor,<sup>15</sup> who had the nerve to demand “handouts,” but also on the welfare state. That state was viewed as an alliance between the racially identified poor and a *new class* of educators, administrators, planners, consultants, and journalists, who advocated the expansion of welfare state policies. For the new right, the Great Society was not the continuation of the New Deal—from which many white working-class families had benefited greatly—but its opposite. The New Deal, let it be remembered, had largely excluded blacks and Latin@s. Wallace charged that “pointy-headed intellectuals,” especially those based in universities and state institutions, were responsible for the prevailing political, economic, and cultural malaise. According to the new right, the state was recklessly allowed to expand and intervene in every aspect of social life, to threaten private property and individual rights—mainly the right to discriminate, although this was rarely acknowledged—and to dictate social policy, all with disastrous results. In particular, the state was accused of acceding to the demands of formerly stigmatized groups (people of color, women, gays and lesbians) at the expense of “real Americans,” in other words white men. Charges flew that civil rights reforms were attacks on principles of merit and legitimate authority, that they established privileged access for people of color to jobs and social services. Ed Davis, a new right cult figure and former Chief of the Los Angeles Police Department, put it this way: “I always felt that the government really was out to force me to hire 4-foot-11 transvestite morons” (Evans and Novak 1978).<sup>16</sup>

The new right criticized liberal statism at every juncture. The Supreme Court was criticized for its liberal bias in matters of race relations. The electoral college system was opposed for restricting third-party efforts and, as Kevin Phillips suggested, maximizing the influence of a “Third World state”<sup>17</sup> such as California. While

constantly calling for a return to the basics of the Constitution, new right activists were also intent on revising it through amendments to stop busing, prohibit abortions (after 1973), and encourage school prayer.

To summarize thus far: The new right's ascendance can be traced directly back to the late-1960s political reaction against the black movement and its allied new social movements. Both the Wallace and Nixon presidential campaigns of 1968 sought leverage from the national civil rights laws that were then in place: Wallace by launching a national, electorally oriented, reactionary populist movement; and Nixon by a more stealthy approach aimed at de-linking the formerly "solid South" from the Democratic Party.

Wallace's right-wing politics were aimed squarely at white working-class voters who were threatened both by economic crisis and by the social upheavals of black liberation, feminism, the student and antiwar movements, and other manifestations of the "counterculture." Through whatever optics political reaction employed—anti-communism, racism, southern chauvinism, states' rights doctrines going back to Calhoun, agrarian populism, nativism, America First isolationism—the Wallace-ites and their numerous supporters grasped a deep truth: that white supremacy was not an excrescence on the basically egalitarian and democratic "American creed," but a fundamental component of U.S. society. To destroy it meant reinventing the social order, the state, and American national identity itself.

Nixon's strategy was to raise some of those same specters, but to employ a more moderate and more inclusive tone in doing so, recognizing the importance for his campaign of suburban, centrist, white voters—the "silent majority" as he was later to call them. Nixon was adroit enough to use the Vietnam War against the Democrats as well: Hapless Hubert Humphrey, the Democratic candidate, failed to distance himself from the outgoing President Lyndon Johnson's doomed Vietnam policies until the very end of the campaign, when it was too late to undo Nixon's phony efforts to present himself as the peace candidate.<sup>18</sup>

Nixon learned from Wallace but, unlike the *guv-nah*, he kept his racist pitch on the down-low. He countered the black movement's democratic and egalitarian appeal, as he did the anti-war appeal, in ways that would not leave him vulnerable to charges of explicit racism (or of excessive hawkishness). Building on the right-wing populism of Wallace, and exploiting the self-immolation of the Democrats—by highlighting black unrest, the antiwar demonstrations in Chicago and the predicament of the forlorn Humphrey—Nixon helped the new right develop a new subtextual approach to politics. This involved the *rearticulation* of white resentments against blacks, and soon enough against other insurgent groups as well: "second-wave" feminists, the anti-war movement, the counterculture, and the dawning gay rights movement. It did not, however, repudiate civil rights in its entirety, nor did it directly attack the new social movements. Instead of defending segregation, institutionalized discrimination, and white supremacy, the new right invoked the code words of "law and order"; instead of advocating for systemic patriarchy and justifying male chauvinism, it upheld "family



values”; instead of justifying yet again the duplicitous and unpopular war in Vietnam (which, after the April 1968 Tet offensive and the massive anti-war demonstrations of Fall 1969, the U.S. was now clearly losing), the Nixon administration now claimed to be seeking “peace with honor.”

These were the early days of racial rearticulation, when white supremacy was in the process of “going underground.” In later stages of the process, the new right would *adopt* black demands, claiming that civil rights enforcement and efforts at racial redistribution constituted “racism in reverse.” Still later, efforts at rearticulation would involve the wholesale denial of racial discrimination and indeed of racial identity itself.

But at the end of the turbulent 1960s, racial rearticulation was still in an early and experimental phase, still marked by the tumultuous period from which the United States was only just emerging. Indeed the new right itself was still wet behind the ears. The accomplishments of the civil rights movement, and the horrors of the assassinations of the two Kennedys and MLK Jr., were still fresh in the national memory; division and confusion beset not only the two national political parties but also the political alignments of both the liberal North and the reactionary South. In such a period of political transition, neither the outrages of racial injustice nor the requirements of significant racial reform could easily be defended. The consequences of any attempt to reinstate the *ancien régime raciale* were too horrifying to contemplate: Both the enactment of civil rights laws (however moderate) and the “long hot summers” from 1964 through 1968 had demonstrated that civil rights reform was ineluctable and that the strategy of “massive resistance” had failed.

At the same time, a serious program of racial democratization was equally unimaginable. At a minimum, such an effort would have included significant economic redistribution and official acknowledgement of the racially despotic dimensions of state power, not only in slavery times but in the present. Thus the risk posed by the black movement—material, political, and psychic—to the key institutions of the Pax Americana, not to mention the majority of the U.S. population, the white majority, was quite profound. The radical consequences of black demands for racial democracy continued to horrify whites, as they had for centuries.<sup>19</sup>

Under these conditions, the new right’s adoption of racial “code words” and phrases like “law and order,” “the right to life,” and “family values” as strategies to maintain racial inequality and repression, as well as militaristic foreign policy, patriarchal rule, repressive forms of social control, and assaults on the welfare state, all made sense as strategies for political navigation. Nixon had won the 1968 election, but the South was not yet in the Republican column. George Wallace was still on the scene.<sup>20</sup> Because the Democrats were unable to move beyond their late 1960s crackup, the new right had a significant period in the 1970s during which it could consolidate itself institutionally (notably around the Heritage Foundation and other think tanks) and ideologically (more or less around the Southern Strategy). During that same period, the U.S. polity had to be steered away from the racist past whose repressive

and indeed despotic policies had been discredited. The new right was groping and maneuvering toward a new racism—a new strategy of racial rearticulation—that could incorporate the civil rights “revolution” in an ideology of “colorblindness.” This would emerge in a more developed form during the 1980s.

## Neoconservatism

While the new right was experimenting with racial “code words,” another approach was being developed by the neoconservatives, who in earlier incarnations had been Democratic racial “moderates”: generally based in the North, white, and liberal supporters of civil rights. Some neocon leaders were ex-Marxists who had been traumatized by the McCarthy period and redefined themselves as anti-communist, which in practice meant anti-socialist as well. Supporters of the Vietnam war (a cold war, anti-communist conflict) and often Zionist,<sup>21</sup> they were also disaffected by the black movement’s links to anti-colonialist struggles around the world, notably by Malcolm’s turn to orthodox Islam and tours of Africa and the Middle East. Thus the black movement’s radical turn in the mid-1960s, its affinity for socialism (including the developing political orientation of Dr. King), and its increasing black nationalism (embodied in black power) all raised red flags, so to speak, for such intellectuals as Irving Kristol, Norman Podhoretz, Sidney Hook, and others.<sup>22</sup> Marked by their white ethnicity, their experience as the children of immigrants, and in particular by their youthful leftism and their struggles against anti-semitism (many key neoconservatives were Jews), these thinkers and politicians had made visceral commitments to what they saw as the core political and cultural values of the United States: pluralism, consensus, gradualism, and individualism. Their opposition to outright state-supported discrimination, which had temporarily allied them with the pre-1965 civil rights movement, thus had very different sources from that of their former movement allies. The idea of white supremacy as an abiding presence in American life was troubling to the neoconservatives, for it called into question their idealized view of U.S. political culture.

Largely unwilling to engage in “coded” or subtextual race-baiting *à la* the new right, these activists and intellectuals took up centrist positions on the right of the Democratic and left of the Republican parties; over time they became more right-wing. They subscribed to an ethnicity-based model of race, derived quite consciously from the “immigrant analogy” (see Chapter 1).

Equally problematic was the fact that blacks and other people of color questioned the legitimacy of reforms based on the principle of individual equality and rights, calling instead for a radical collective equality. Both nationalist positions and Marxist/social democratic tendencies were oriented towards “group rights”—autonomy programs *à la* “community control” and redistributionist schemes such as a “Marshall plan for the inner cities.”<sup>23</sup>

From the neoconservative standpoint—rooted in the ethnicity paradigm—group rights were anathematized as anti-democratic. To demand equality as an *outcome* of

civil rights policies, or to frame measures of egalitarian reforms in terms of the policies' *results*, called into question the opportunity-based premises of the "American dream," what W.E.B. Du Bois in 1935 had called "the American assumption." By the 1970s, opposition to radical demands for equality of "outcomes" rather than "opportunities" had become a centerpiece of the neoconservative perspective. The ethnicity theorists associated with the current did not ground their arguments, as some in the new right did, on "white rights." Instead they restricted their opposition to racial discrimination to "negative" cases: exclusion, inequality, denial of opportunity to individuals, not to groups. To go farther than prohibiting these injustices, they argued, would be to indulge in "positive" discrimination (Gordon 1964). Nathan Glazer's objections to affirmative action (1987 [1975]) policies centered on their challenge to the fundamental civic ideals which had made the "American ethnic pattern" possible: individualism, market-based opportunity, and the curtailment of excessive state interventionism. Affirmative action, he wrote,

has meant that we abandon the first principle of a liberal society, that the individual's interests and good and welfare are the test of a good society, for we now attach benefits and penalties to individuals simply on the basis of their race, color, and national origins. The implications of this new course are increasing consciousness of the significance of group membership, an increasing divisiveness on the basis of race, color, and national origin, and a spreading resentment among the disfavored groups against the favored ones. If the individual is the measure, however, our public concern is with the individual's capacity to work out an individual fate by means of education, work, and self-realization in the various spheres of life. Then how the figures add up on the basis of whatever measure of group we use may be interesting, but should be of no concern to public policy.

(Glazer 1987 [1975], 220)

This position provided ideological grounding for racial reaction in a way that use of "code words" could never do. Eschewing the dissembling and disguised racism that appeals to "law and order" or "states' rights" involved, the neoconservative view was initially framed by moderates as a centrist but in their view pro-civil rights ideology. Its studious avoidance of the structural dimensions of white supremacy was still somewhat disingenuous. Notably Glazer did not argue that white resentment against such programs as affirmative action was justified—in the manner of a William Rusher (an advocate of postwar conservatism) or a George Wallace—only that it was inevitable. He even went so far as to suggest that if affirmative action programs were effective he might support them out of pragmatic commitment to equality:

For me, no consideration of principle—such as that merit should be rewarded, or that governmental programs should not discriminate on the grounds of race or ethnic group—would stand in the way of a program of preferential

hiring if it made some substantial progress in reducing the severe problems of the low-income black population and of the inner cities.

(1987 [1975], 73)

This distinguished the neoconservative and new right oppositions to such policies: the neoconservatives feared the politics of resentment as an unwanted consequence of state over-involvement, while the new right mobilized precisely such sentiments.

The power of the neoconservative critique of affirmative action was based on the ability of writers such as Glazer to present themselves as simultaneously opposed both to discrimination *and* to anti-discrimination measures based on “group rights” principles. The neoconservatives thus refocused the debate on the question of what ideas and what means were best for achieving racial equality. Although they were children of the New Deal and not anti-welfare statist, in some ways the neocons adopted views quite close to market fundamentalism. According to the neoconservative argument, only individual rights exist, only individual opportunity can be guaranteed by law, and only “merit” justifies the granting of privilege. Yet even the most cursory examination of such arguments reveals their deeper political subtexts. Glazer’s concern about the resentments and heightened racial polarization any abandonment of traditional liberalism would inspire, for example, does not extend to the resentments and polarization which adherence to liberalism entails. Morris Abram, a former liberal partisan of civil rights and early neocon who served on the U.S. Civil Rights Commission under Reagan, proposed the extension of unionization as a better remedy than affirmative action for alleviating minority poverty and powerlessness (Abram 1984, 60). Thereby he merely indicated which groups he considered acceptable vehicles for political demands. Workers were apparently free to have collective interests, but people of color were not. Concepts of “individual merit,” as many writers shown, have the same shallowness. “Merit” is a construct too, as numerous studies of the SAT and similar exams have shown (Lemann 2000). Employers, schools, and state agencies need to legitimate the allocation of benefits, and to deny the validity of competing claims. But the means of judging merit remain questionable at best.<sup>24</sup>

By limiting themselves to considering discrimination against individuals, neoconservatives trivialized the problem of racial equality, and of equality in general. Discrimination never derived its main strength from individual actions or prejudices, however great these might have been or might still be. Racial inequality is deeply embedded in the very organization of the social order and reflected in all its political, economic, and social domains. The neoconservative concept of “reverse discrimination” took the political demand for equality presented by the black and allied racial justice movements of the 1960s and stood it on its head. Racial discrimination and racial equality—in the neoconservative model—were problems to be confronted *only* at an individual level, once legal systems of discrimination such as *de jure* segregation had been eliminated. Thus discrimination may be an illegitimate infringement on individual rights, but it can no longer be a legitimate source for group demands. What the neoconservatives opposed was therefore not racial equality, but racial collectivity.

Neoconservatives abhorred the arguments of black militants—for example, Malcolm's statement that "We don't see any American dream; we've experienced only the American nightmare" (Malcolm X 1964; variant version in Malcolm X 1990 [1965], 26). In a striking way, the neoconservatives reproduced the fearful and compensatory allegiance to whiteness exhibited in the United States in the late 19th century (Roediger and Esch 2012). Just as many whites in the 19th century had opposed slavery but resisted a comprehensive reorganization of their privileged status vis-à-vis emancipated blacks, so too the neoconservatives opposed overt discrimination, but resisted an in-depth confrontation with the enduring benefits that race conferred on whites. Thus they sought to confine the egalitarian upsurge, to reinterpret movement ideas more narrowly and individualistically, and to channel them in more gradualist directions. Their views aligned them with the white ethnics whose integration into mainstream American society had led them—especially after the New Deal—toward more conservative politics and a sense of "optional" ethnicity (Waters 1990). In its critique of race conscious policies and practices, neoconservatism laid the theoretical foundations and politico-moral justifications for the "colorblind" ideology that has been consolidated as the reigning racial "common sense" of the past several decades.

In contrast to the new right, the neoconservatives never had significant mass support or a major voting bloc that they could mobilize. The neocons were essentially a bunch of policy wonks. Their assaults on affirmative action and on welfare were important (Mead 1993; Murray 1996 [1984]), but after the Reagan years and with the Cold War's end they would largely abandon domestic policy for foreign policy. The term "neoconservatism" reappeared in the later Clinton years as a shorthand designation for an influential group of imperial hawks, organized in something called the Project for a New American Century and linked to the right-wing think tank the American Enterprise Institute. This group distinguished itself by providing the monumentally mendacious rationale for the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq (Mann 2004).

## **From Code Words to Reverse Racism to Colorblindness**

So the containment of the black movement by the U.S. state was initially achieved through a contradictory political strategy that combined incorporation of movement demands and violent repression directed against movement organizations and leaders. Containment was largely accomplished by the mid-1970s, setting the stage for the protracted crisis of racial meaning that has preoccupied the country ever since.

Incorporation and repression were not enough to curtail the movement's political effects. Winning political demands is a contradictory experience. On the one hand, winning means the installation of movement objectives as components of state policy; on the other hand it has demobilizing consequences. The black movement, like other insurgent movements, demanded that the state act to achieve the movement's objectives: integration, redistribution, an end to racist violence, and equalization of political rights. The state was adjured not only to legislate these reforms but to

enforce them practically. It was to *take over* for the movement, to institutionalize the movement. That this incorporation of the movement agenda was enacted in a series of compromises and “moderate” versions only reinforced the fact that although the movement’s “victories” were substantial, they also involved defeats. Not only did civil rights become law in 1964 in a limited and toothless fashion—for example, discriminatory practices were not criminalized but only made subject to civil remedies—but also incorporation of movement demands subsequently rendered the movement less effectual in respect to the deeper conflicts that shaped its original demands. The black movement’s successes in the 1960s can be compared to the labor movement’s successes in the 1930s: Union rights were guaranteed by the Wagner Act, but organized labor paid the price of having to accept state regulation, to uphold and enforce labor contracts, to oppose wildcat strikes, and to all intents and purposes collaborate in enforcing labor law on their own members (Klare 1977–1978, 2004).

Incorporation rules, OK? Successful movements undermine the conditions for their own existence. Insurgent movements are generally split by their very achievements into accommodationist and radical fractions, and the gains thus achieved are purchased at the price of at least partial demobilization. For those who refuse the compromises that mainstream political achievements entail, marginalization and repression await.

Yet that is obviously not the whole story. Winning reforms is also empowering. It places activists in positions where they can themselves enforce their former demands: serving their communities (now their “constituents”), punishing their opponents, operating the levers of state power, and continuing to provide leadership. Winning demands advances the horizon of movement vision, both because when you move closer to achieving your goals, you have met certain democratic needs, and also because you have learned valuable lessons about how limited your former goals were. As we move toward the horizon, the horizon recedes before us.

Racial reaction, then, could not be accomplished simply by repression of its radical elements, because the incorporated components, the “entrists” who had now gained some measure of power, were not thereby rendered ineffective, even if they had been absorbed into the state. In fact, radicals were not neutralized by repression either; though they suffered and were subjected to brutal and illegal state practices, they were not destroyed. Reaction had to find other means to cope with the movement’s successes: There had to be mobilization against the black movement’s accomplishments.

“Code words” did some of the early work of reactionary mobilization. It was politically salutary for the new right to engage its supporters with calls of “law and order” and other similar appeals. These served the purpose of reinforcing white supremacy without explicitly advocating it, of motivating the right wing after the doctrine of “massive resistance” to civil rights reforms had collapsed.

But “code words” did not themselves provide doctrine. They were ideologically insufficient for the cause of racial reaction. What was required was

ideologically grounded opposition to substantive racial reforms going forward in the early “post-civil rights” period: affirmative action, busing, “fair-housing” and “fair-lending,” initiatives and so on. With the 1968 election of Richard Nixon, strategically guided by the Southern Strategy, it became possible to “mainstream” such an ideology, in the form of opposition to “reverse discrimination” (or “reverse racism”). A blizzard of academic treatises and law review articles debated the politics and constitutionality of these concepts, and political mobilization for and against them proliferated. Legal challenges multiplied, moving from the cautious upholding of affirmative action in the *Griggs* case (1971a), through the *Charlotte-Mecklenburg* school desegregation cases (1971b, 2001) and cresting with the *Bakke* case (1978).<sup>25</sup>

The Nixon administration played an important role in making this shift happen. Nixon’s strategic orientation toward the electoral politics of race was of a piece with his approach to state racial policy. After his early years as a fire-breathing red-baiter, Richard Nixon had become something of a centrist in the 1960s. Defeated in his run for California governor in 1962 (“You won’t have Nixon to kick around anymore” (Hill 1962; see also Perlstein 2008, 61), and chastened by the Goldwater debacle of 1964, Nixon had spent some years in the woodshed, reinventing himself as a mainstream, modern Republican. This was a stance that was indexed to the civil rights “revolution” in more ways than one. In Nixon’s first term he tacked left from the Southern Strategy and away from “code words,” advocating black capitalism, proposing a guaranteed annual income, minority enterprise zones, and affirmative action initiatives. These moves consolidated the coastal and northern moderates of the Republican Party. Influenced by Daniel P. Moynihan, the Nixon administration’s initial racial maneuvering was actually to the “left” of the neoconservatives, for whom affirmative action was a particular anathema.<sup>26</sup> In his second term, though, Nixon moved sharply toward the new right and adopted a more authoritarian direction, disavowing his earlier interests in welfare reform and jousting with the unions whose support for his Vietnam strategy he had previously courted. His rightward shift during his second term was made possible by the dismantlement of the black movement under the twin pressures of incorporation and repression, by the effectiveness of the “code words” appeal in cementing the new right to the Republican Party, and by Nixon’s unwavering disposition toward divisive political tactics.<sup>27</sup>

The Nixon administration’s short-lived experiment with an authentic Southern Strategy backfired at the height of the busing controversy, but the alignment of federal desegregation policies with the grassroots demands of the Silent Majority established the spatial constraints on the scope of *Brown*.  
(Lassiter 2007, 19)

Nixon’s resignation from office in August 1974; the ignominious U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam in 1975; and Jimmy Carter’s defeat of Gerald Ford in 1976 seemed, at least on the surface, to suggest a new dawn. Carter himself seemed to embody the country’s racial contradictions. A post-segregationist Southern governor and a “born



again” Southern Baptist, Carter was solidly within the moderate civil rights camp and projected a certain political quiescence on racial terrain (Allitt 2005, 148–149).

But all was not well. The 1970s were the cradle years for the new right and for the neoconservatives who were directly responding to anti-racist movements’ vision of racial democracy and the promotion of “group rights.” The *Bakke* case (U.S. Supreme Court 1978) constituted a pivotal legal challenge that framed affirmative action as “affirmative discrimination.” To anti-racist activists, the limits of the civil rights reforms of the mid-1960s were becoming increasingly apparent while persistent patterns of racial oppression and inequality remained and, in some cases, had become more glaring. The use of civil rights logic to protect whites from anti-racist reforms—the “reverse racism” argument as legal, academic, and above all political ideology—was a more effective *rearticulation* of the “post-civil rights” era than the new rights “code words” had been. It was to be followed by the revival of “colorblind” racial ideology, a further (and eventually hegemonic) rearticulation in the 1980s. We consider colorblindness in Chapter 8.

As we have argued throughout this book, the post-World War II anti-racist movement *politicized the social*. In the United States and around the world, overlapping movements demanded the inclusion of racially defined “others,” the democratization of structurally racist societies, and the recognition and validation by both the state and civil society of racially defined experience and identity. These demands broadened and deepened the nature of democracy itself. They inspired a range of new social movements oriented to social equality, justice, and inclusion.

What goes around comes around. The political forms developed on the left were also adaptable by the right (Laclau 1978; Laclau and Mouffe 2001 [1985]). The vision, principles, and even language of the new social movements were soon rearticulated by right-wing reactions of various types, also overlapping in many ways: racist, anti-feminist, homophobic. These matured in the 1970s. Notions of “community control,” the “right to life,” and “traditional values” were used to beat back the fragile gains of the new social movements. Mobilization on the political right presented a partial and distorted mirror image of the black, feminist, and gay movements, but it was real enough and effective as hell. Both racial reaction and neoconservatism brought about setbacks in legislation, law, policing and punishment practices, and other state actions. Reaction also took cultural forms: moving from early recodings and rearticulations of anti-racist meanings to more ideologically grounded reactionary rearticulations as “reverse discrimination” and anti-statism.<sup>28</sup> Yet even the incorporation and containment of “identity politics” reveals the politically transformative character of the “politicization of the social.” It was the long-delayed eruption into the mainstream political arena of racial subjectivity and politicized identity that set off this transformation, shaping both the democratic and anti-democratic social movements that today dominate American politics, and in a variety of ways transforming democratic impulses worldwide.<sup>29</sup>

We have argued that the *declining phase* of the political trajectory of racial politics started around 1970. History continued, not to repeat itself, but to rhyme (to quote, probably spuriously, Mark Twain). Despite the partial reforms accomplished at a tremendous human cost, the basic patterns of racial despotism remained unchanged. The First Reconstruction (after the Civil War) had not been able to undo white supremacy; the Second Reconstruction (after World War II) was not able to do so either. From about 1970, a racial reaction set in—a long, declining phase of the post-World War II political trajectory of race. We trace this trajectory further in the next chapter, centering in the emergence and consolidation of colorblindness as a hegemonic racial project, linked and in many ways overlapping with neoliberalism.

## Notes

1. The Great Transformation was certainly not as enormous as the Civil War. It did not “tear the roof off the sucker,” so to speak. But it was still a big challenge to white supremacy.
2. The Duboisian question—“An American, a Negro?”—is a permanent question.
3. Hegemony operates, Gramsci says, by incorporating opposition. Speaking the language of class, he writes, “Undoubtedly the fact of hegemony presupposes that account be taken of the interests and the tendencies of the groups over which hegemony is to be exercised, and that a certain compromise equilibrium should be formed—in other words, that the leading group should make sacrifices of an economic-corporate kind. But there is also no doubt that such sacrifices and such a compromise cannot touch the essential; for though hegemony is ethico-political, it must also be economic, must necessarily be based on the decisive function exercised by the leading group in the decisive nucleus of economic activity” (1971, 161).
4. On the Freedom Schools, see Payne 2007 (1995), 301–306.
5. George Lipsitz elaborates: “In [Malcolm X’s] view, just as General Motors made adjustments in surface features of its automobiles, racism changed its contours and dimensions. The racism of 1964 might not look like the racism of 1954, but it was still racism. Malcolm X warned against thinking that racism had ended because it had changed its appearance, at the same time cautioning his listeners that they could not defeat today’s racism with yesterday’s slogans and analysis” (Lipsitz 1998, 182).
6. Elsewhere in this book we refer to the reiterative aspects of racial rule, invoking for example Myrdal’s idea of “cumulative and circular development.” Certainly in respect to repression there are ample instances of reiteration: convict labor and leasing; torture in various forms including mutilation as well as solitary confinement; this list could be extended. Mass incarceration organized along race lines, often for petty, victimless offenses, is an unprecedented development, resembling slavery more than any other mode of repression. Note the clause in the 13th Amendment outlawing slavery, “except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted....” In respect to repression of movements, John Adams arrested political opponents under the Sedition Act of 1790.
7. A parallel (and intersecting) case was the “second wave” feminist movement, which critiqued the patriarchal family, inequities in sex/gender relations, and women’s lack of control over their own bodies (Baxandall and Gordon, eds. 2000).

8. The new right learned about direct mail from the New Left, or more accurately from the George McGovern campaign of 1972. As Richard Viguerie wrote:

Direct mail is the advertising medium of the non-establishment candidate....

George McGovern became the Democratic presidential nominee in 1972 because of direct mail.

When he couldn't afford to advertise on television, McGovern could spend \$200,000 (mostly on credit) to write to 1 million identified liberal Democrats, knowing that an appeal for money in the letters would bring in enough funds within 30 days to pay for the direct mail advertising.

So George McGovern and his brilliant direct mail team of Morris Dees and Tom Collins used the mails to bypass the party bosses, the party establishment, and the smoke-filled rooms to go straight to the people.

Most of the news media didn't understand political direct mail, until George McGovern came along that year and made it an acceptable political tool. (1981; 90–98)

9. Eugenics was hardly dead, though. It was always knocking around, appearing under the bylines of William Shockley, Hans Eysenck, and Roger Pearson (among many others), and receiving organization support and funding through the Pioneer Fund (Tucker 2007). It then made a massive splash with the publication of Herrnstein and Murray's *The Bell Curve* (Herrnstein and Murray 1994; see also Fraser, ed. 1995; Fischer et al. 1996). Like Malcolm X said, "Racism is like a Cadillac ..."
10. Certain left groups allied themselves with the anti-busing forces, arguing that the issue was one of class, rather than race (*Radical America* 1974, 1975).
11. As a young Alabama politician, Wallace was seen as something of a moderate. But after losing a close election early in his career he made a public vow to "never be outniggered again." He then rose to his second last stand, when as Governor of Alabama in 1962 he "stood in the schoolhouse door" to prevent integration. His third incarnation, as presidential candidate, required him to moderate his white supremacy and to experiment with "code words." His fourth and final identity, which appeared in the aftermath of the Voting Rights Act and of a 1972 assassination attempt, was once again "moderate."
12. Phillips's subsequent and somewhat iconoclastic journey leftward may be viewed as a prolonged atonement for this early and quite consequential political mistake; see 2007; 2004.
13. What Phillips was picking up on and framing politically was the emotional sociology of racism. As Scheff and Retzinger argue (1991), shame is an extremely difficult emotion to manage. It often transmogrifies into anger. The social fact of slavery, for all its rationalizations both ante- and post-bellum, produced great emotional stress and shame for whites. This is evident in the very need for a "psychological wage" (Du Bois 2007 [1935]; Roediger 2007 [1991]). In addition: the ever-present demand to exercise oppressive and violent control, the perceived necessity to mete out punishment; the requirement to patrol and police constantly. In addition: the fear of black revenge. What if they do to us what we've done to them? To say nothing of the Hegelian master-slave dialectic or of the immense greed, sexism, eroticism, or religious contortions that characterized the slavery complex... This storm of terrifying emotions experienced by whites as a consequence of their deeply rooted racism—far more than a set of attitudes and beliefs; in fact a whole *Weltanschauung* and comprehensive social structure—was then subjected to the trauma of massive defeat and societal destruction in the

Civil War, followed by military occupation. After Sherman's tender mercies, for example, very little remained standing in many places. On top of that, the liberation of the former slaves and their elevation to a putatively equal status resulted—as is well-documented—in a boundless white rage and resentment that ultimately led to the Jim Crow system (Williamson 1986; Woodward 2002 [1955]; Hahn 2003).

14. The concept of "status revolution" has its origins in the liberal historian Richard Hofstadter's rejection of the class-based categories of Charles Beard and others whose work on U.S. social movements had reached its high point in the 1930s (Hofstadter 1965).
15. The majority of poor people in the United States were white in the 1960s and 1970s. This did not prevent the new right's identification of poverty and blackness, a trope that was quickly institutionalized and remains in force today.
16. This was all rather ironic, since police departments, licensing and zoning practices, municipal employment and service-provision in general, patronage and machine politics, and public subvention had been proprietary white ethnic zones for almost a century. See Katznelson 2005.
17. Phillips coined the term "Third World state" to describe states that had an increasing racial minority population. This anticipated the onset of a majority-minority" demographic. "Retention of the Electoral College," Phillips wrote, "would probably guarantee a minority-oriented presidential selection process for the 1980s" (Phillips 1977, cited in Crawford 1980, 324).
18. When Humphrey did manage to bleat softly against the war and thus crawl out from under Johnson's imperious shadow, about two weeks before election day, his poll numbers began to improve. In the end, Nixon's electoral margin was very thin.
19. That sort of transformation would also have required revising standard conceptions of the state: The Constitution would have had to be apprehended as a white supremacist and slavocratic document, a notion that brings to mind the abolitionist William Lloyd Garrison. At a public meeting in Boston on July 4, 1844, Garrison burned a copy of the Constitution on the stage, calling it a "covenant with death" and "an agreement with Hell" (Mayer 1998).
20. Wallace ran again for president in 1972. An attempted assassination during the campaign left him paralyzed and removed him from the national political stage. By 1972 he had begun to moderate his racial politics and reinvent himself as a centrist.
21. The Six-Day Israel–Arab war (June 1967) was viewed as a great triumph by many members of this group (Segev 2007).
22. On April 4, 1967, exactly one year before his murder, King denounced the Vietnam war in a magnificent speech at the Riverside Church in New York City. He immediately came under severe criticism not only from the right, but from "moderate" civil rights movement leaders as well (such as Roy Wilkins and Whitney Young). He was exceeding his mandate, they said; he should focus entirely on domestic issues. But by this time the antiwar movement and the more radical elements in the black movement (notably SNCC) were allied. King was following his movement—and his own deep ethical sense of course. Beyond that, as his speech itself made clear, the Vietnam war *was* a domestic issue; if there had ever been a gap between anti-racism at home and abroad, that gap had now ceased to exist.
23. A striking example of this trend was the presentation of a "Black Manifesto" at New York City's Riverside Church—where MLK's April 4, 1967, anti-Vietnam War speech had also

been delivered. On Sunday May 11, 1969, a group of activists led by SNCC President James Forman interrupted services at the church:

Addressing himself to “the White Christian Churches and Jewish Synagogues in the United States of America and All Other Racist Institutions,” [Forman] read a Black Manifesto which demanded that the churches and synagogues pay \$500 million “as a beginning of the reparations due us as people who have been exploited and degraded, brutalized, killed and persecuted.” The amount demanded by the Manifesto, which was adopted by the National Black Economic Development Conference before Forman’s action was taken, was to be used to establish a Southern land bank, publishing and printing industries, four audio-visual networks, a research skills center, a training center for teaching skills in community organization and communications, a black labor strike and defense fund, a black university, and several other institutions. (Bittker 2003 [1973], 4)

Forman had also planned to carry out a parallel interruption two weeks later at the Saturday services of Congregation Emanu-El of the City of New York, perhaps the most prestigious Jewish synagogue in the United States. The action was called off after the Jewish Defense League, a radical right-wing Jewish organization led by Rabbi Meir Kahane, threatened to confront Forman and his group with violence. The JDL members assembled at the synagogue on Fifth Ave., carrying chains and clubs, and Forman did not appear at the synagogue.

24. It turns out that whites’ commitment to meritocratic principles in higher education admissions varies depending on their perception of the “racial group threat” these principles pose. Using a survey-based experiment of California residents, Frank Samson (2013) found that when whites received a prompt that noted the high proportion of Asian American undergraduates in the University of California system, they decreased the importance they afforded to grade point averages in admissions decisions. This suggests that affirmative action in higher education should be understood in terms of “group position” (Blumer 1958) and access to resources more than in terms of “academic standards” and merit. Similar considerations may apply to affirmative action in other areas, such as employment, government contracting, and licensing (Katznelson 2005).
25. In *Griggs* (U.S. Supreme Court 1971a) the SCOTUS cautiously approved an employment-based affirmative action plan; in *Swann* (U.S. Supreme Court 1971b) they approved a school redistricting and busing plan that had been worked out by NGOs and local community/political alliances (somewhat transracial). The Swann decision was reversed in 2001 on appeal in the *Belk v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg* case, with the SCOTUS refusing certiorari (U.S. Supreme Court, 4th Circuit 2001). *Bakke* was a turning-point on affirmative action, in which the Court set restrictive limits to affirmative action by applying anti-discrimination law in favor of whites in such cases (U.S. Supreme Court 1978).
26. Although these were all developed as political “wedge” issues that would both fracture the Democratic Party’s labor-black alliance and consolidate right-wing (and racist) anti-statism, some of these proposals had strategic advantages that the Democrats did not grasp. On the “failed” welfare reform initiatives of the 1970s—the “Family Assistance Plan” of Nixon (crafted by Moynihan) and the “Better Jobs and Income” plan of Carter—see Steensland 2007.
27. Nixon’s personal racism has been well documented. “On April 28, 1969, [Nixon’s Chief-of-Staff H.R.] Haldeman recorded: ‘P [Nixon] emphasized that you have to face the fact

that the whole problem is really the blacks. The key is to devise a system that recognizes this while not appearing to.” In the second term: “‘Had me tell Mitchell not to open Southern offices and not to send his men down en masse, only when needed on a spot basis. Also set policy that we’ll use no federal troops or marshals to enforce, must be done by locals ... We take a very conservative civil rights line,’ Nixon instructed” (Graham 1996, 99).

28. In an argument parallel to ours, HoSang (2010) applies the term “political whiteness” to these projects, arguing that after the taken-for-granted previous meanings of whiteness had been called into question by civil rights struggles, a new framework had to be invented to advance exclusive and discriminatory white interests in such areas as housing, employment, and access to higher education.
29. One example of many that could be provided: In the “Bloody Sunday” demonstration in Derry, Northern Ireland (January 30, 1972), marchers sang “We Shall Overcome” and carried pictures of Martin Luther King, Jr. British troops fired on the protest, killing 13 unarmed demonstrators.

This page intentionally left blank



# Colorblindness, Neoliberalism, and Obama

## Introduction

We have argued that the declining phase of the political trajectory of racial politics started around 1970. For all the ways that it had challenged the old Jim Crow-based, hegemonic system of white supremacy, for all the reforms and cultural recognition (and self-recognition) that it had won, the movement lacked the political support, particularly of white allies, that would have been needed to realize more of its demands. In many ways the standard pattern applied: partial reforms were accomplished at a tremendous human cost, but basic patterns of racial despotism remained unchanged. From about 1970 a “racial reaction” set in, a long, declining phase of the post-World War II political trajectory of race. Under Reagan, beginning in 1981, a new neoliberal administration came to power. Though not generally recognized as such, neoliberalism in the United States was very much a racial regime. This chapter concentrates on neoliberalism and race in the Reagan to Obama period.

In the chapter’s next section, we discuss the *Rise of the Neoliberal Project*, focusing on neoliberalism’s racial elements. Although they were not revolutionary in scope, the black movement and the new social movements did represent a radical threat to the limited and manipulated democracy that had previously operated as the political mainstream. It was the convergence of these movements, the rise of a radical, democratic, participatory culture, that neoliberalism had to overcome. Neoliberalism took charge under the banners of anti-statism and authoritarian populism. Although it was led by big capital, it owed its ascent to the mass electoral base that only the new right could provide. Neoliberalism was at its core a racial project as much as a capitalist accumulation project. Its central racial component was colorblind racial ideology. The hegemony of neoliberal economics is matched and underwritten by the racial hegemony of colorblindness.

The new right’s authoritarian populism attracted mass white support. The competing tendency on the right, the neoconservatives, had never commanded a significant mass following. The new right could deploy a *politics of resentment* that flowed directly from the southern strategy—the subject of this chapter’s next section. In its mobilization of white suburban tax-payers, in its hostility to integration, in its use of long-standing producerist ideology to distinguish between “deserving” and “undeserving” members of U.S. society, neoliberalism adapted the new right’s deep-seated racist ideology to the “post-civil rights” era.

The *genealogy of colorblind politics* is the subject of the following section. The new right rearticulation of racial politics passed through several phases: a “code words” phase and a “reverse racism” phase, before finally landing on colorblindness. Colorblind racial ideology developed in league with neoliberalism from the Reagan years forward, until it got elected in the form of Barack Obama.

Neoliberalism too had its internal tensions, its competing political tendencies. It took center-right and center-left forms. In the next section of this chapter, *Long Road Out of Eden: Presidents and Race Politics*, we note the centrality of colorblind racial ideology to the neoliberal economic project; this is a connection that is not frequently made, and deserves serious exploration.

Through the whole “post-civil rights” era, through all that political waffling over race—three decades’ worth—the anti-racist movement remained; critical race consciousness remained. Of course, its key ideals—of expanded democracy, inclusion, and egalitarian redistribution—took a beating, but they were not destroyed. Because it was impossible to repudiate the “dream,” it was necessary to rearticulate it. A new racial ideology of colorblindness developed as Reagan and his successors worked to construct a new racial hegemony. The colorblind racial project fit in nicely with neoliberalism’s emphasis on market relationships and privatization, but it clashed with neoliberalism’s barely covert racism. In its anti-immigrant initiatives (California’s 1994 Proposition 187); in its vindictive policies of racial profiling, mass incarceration, and disfranchisement of voters of color; in its assault on welfare (led by Bill Clinton in 1996); and in its systematic victimization of post-Katrina New Orleans under Bush II in 2005, the colorblind project ran into difficulties as well. The same regime that professed colorblindness, it turned out, also needed race to rule.

The election of Barack Obama, in the midst of a catastrophic recession and a tidal wave of anti-Bush II revulsion, seemed to portend a repudiation of neoliberalism and a reawakening of the inclusive ideals of the civil rights and Great Society era. But this promise was not to be fulfilled. Obama was a progressive alternative to his predecessor, but he has disappointed many of his supporters by maintaining the neoliberal regime he inherited. We discuss *Obama and Colorblindness* in a later section of the chapter,

We conclude this chapter with some reflections on contemporary political realignments, affording particular attention to the role of race. In *Where’s the (Tea) Party?* we note the racial cleavages emerging in the U.S. political system in light of such matters as the hugely destructive Great Recession of 2008, the ongoing demographic shift to a “majority-minority” U.S. population, the heightening costs of repression, and the resurgence of the new social movements.

## Rise of the Neoliberal Project

That U.S. neoliberalism would be racially reactionary is not a stretch. Rooted in possessive individualism and worshipful of the “free market,” it ran counter to the

state-centered, generally democratizing legacies of the New Deal, World War II, and the Great Society. These programs and policies had a lot of popular support; to roll them back required a great deal of political effort. Only by tapping into the deep current of white supremacy that was fundamental to U.S. development and that structured the country's political unconscious could an assault on the welfare state be mounted. Neoliberalism came to power at a moment when capital perceived itself to be facing a radical threat that was based in part on the political accomplishments of the new social movements of the 1960s. It must be recognized as part and parcel of the racial reaction that followed the Great Transformation. Indeed, civil rights, black power, red, brown, and yellow power, the antiwar movement, the feminist movement, and the student movement ..., all menaced the oligarchic system that passed for democracy in the United States.

In 1971 Lewis F. Powell, corporate lawyer, former American Bar Association President, former Chairman of the (of course segregated) Richmond Virginia School Board, and future Supreme Court justice (he wrote the 1978 *Bakke* decision), sent a "Confidential Memorandum" to the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, with which he was closely connected. The memo was titled "Attack on the American Free Enterprise System" and outlined a plan for a new level of corporate political activism (Powell 1971). Powell proposed that business organizations move from their former, somewhat desultory style of lobbying to a much more engaged approach, mobilizing existing organizations like the Chamber itself, and also setting up new ones. Sparked in part by the Powell memo, there emerged an activist, corporate-led network of think tanks, campus and media activities, and lobbying. At the core of this initiative was a widespread and lavishly funded effort to support corporate interests against demands for redistribution of wealth and expansion of the welfare state. Although Powell's document—just eight pages in length—only glancingly acknowledged the civil rights movement, his hostility to the 1960s social movements and their political-economic consequences was palpable and comprehensive. Powell named adversaries: Ralph Nader, Eldridge Cleaver, William Kunstler, and Herbert Marcuse, among others (there were no women on his enemies list). His memo has become quite famous as the blueprint for the subsequent corporate turn to the right.<sup>1</sup>

Spurred by business's turn toward political activism and by Nixon's defeat of George McGovern in 1972, the corporate elite now moved to abandon whatever remaining agreement (or acquiescence) they had with the New Deal, in favor of a strategy of regressive redistribution and increased discipline for American workers. The collective bargaining accord with big labor—especially the UAW—that wages could rise in parallel with productivity and automation, was unceremoniously disavowed (Aronowitz 1991 [1973]; Stein 2010). The economy was entering recession, with unemployment rising and GDP dropping. As *Business Week* announced, "Some people will obviously have to do with less ... Yet it will be a hard pill for many Americans to swallow—the idea of doing with less so that business can have more" (*Business*

*Week* 1974, 51–53; see also Perlstein 2008, 605; Cowie 2010, 224). Kim Phillips-Fein reports that

Between September 1974 and September 1975 top corporate executives from firms such as IBM, Exxon, Bechtel, and Hughes Tool held eight three-day meetings to explore the role of business in American society. Most in this anxiety-ridden group believed that “the have-nots are gaining steadily more power to distribute the wealth downward. The masses have turned to a larger government.” The businessmen believed that the government, responding to the have-nots, controlled and allocated too much of the nation’s wealth. They feared that the trend toward government financing, subsidy, and control would end up socializing investment decisions.... Many thought that only a sharp recession would sober up their fellow citizens.

(Phillips-Fein 2010, 123, citing Silk and Vogel 1976, 21–22)

They got that deep recession, starting in 1975. It combined with a rising rate of inflation, the “stagflation” phenomenon, which economists were at a loss to explain. Economic crisis ultimately doomed Carter, who could not extricate himself from the slowdown by the normal means of increasing government expenditure and expansion of the money supply. Indeed, on his watch inflation spiraled upward. In August 1979 Carter appointed Paul Volcker as Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board, with the commitment to wringing out inflation, which was nearing 13 percent as the 1980 election took place. Reagan trounced Carter.<sup>2</sup> The punishing recession Volcker engineered drove inflation down to 3.5 percent in 1981, when he was reappointed by Reagan as Fed Chair. Volcker’s legacy was thus not only Reagan’s but Carter’s as well: low inflation, sure, but permanently higher unemployment, endemic wage stagnation, and the undoing of the post-World War II tradeoff between industrial capital and big labor of increasing wages in return for productivity gains. In a deep structural sense, working-class hostility to the Democrats proceeded from the annulment of this bargain. As liberalism and Keynesianism went out the window, neoliberalism came in the front door.

## The Politics of Resentment

The racial regime that developed under Reagan involved a quite explicit ramping-up of what might be called the “politics of resentment.” That resentment had been nurtured in the Wallace campaigns and Nixon’s “Southern Strategy”; it underwrote Reagan’s unsuccessful attempt to win the 1976 Republican nomination and his subsequent campaigns and elections in 1980 and 1984. Even before its arrival in Washington, neoliberalism was premised on racial resentment. Nixon had tried out anti-statism, particularly anti-welfare statism. He had begun to withdraw the state from social provisioning: in education, health care, and other state-based services as well. Under Reagan, neoliberalism was grounded more deeply. It was far more

ideologically driven, far more right-wing. It took the form of market-worship and “devolution” of social policy: ideally to the private sector; if not, then at least to the states and local authorities. Reagan sought as far as possible to lessen government regulation of the economy, to reduce taxes, and to abandon the “social safety net” in favor of an “individual responsibility” ethos.

Two central aspects of U.S. neoliberalism had particularly clear overtones of racial resentment: *tax revolt* and *producerism*.

*Tax revolt:* In 1978 California enacted Proposition 13, a measure that severely restricted property taxes and limited the state’s ability to tax. The initiative was racially driven from the start: It was a reaction by residents of wealthier school districts to civil rights-oriented court decisions that required the state to distribute funds to public schools equitably across the state. Its sharply deleterious consequences for public education, however, soon expanded to social expenditures of other types, particularly those that benefited lower-income citizens and people of color.

Tax revolt spread rapidly as a national movement. This was a delicious dish for the Republican Party to serve in the suburbs, since it focused (white) popular resentment on poor people, which in the national popular culture meant black people (Lo 1995; for a more sanguine assessment of Prop. 13, see Citrin 2009). Ever in search of a mass base for regressive redistribution of resources and curtailment of social expenditure, Republicans linked Prop. 13 and its successors to the new “political whiteness” that they had been practicing in California since the late 1940s (HoSang 2010).<sup>3</sup>

*Producerism:* The ideology of producerism lies at the heart of right-wing populism and is fertile ground for the politics of resentment. It has a long and twisted history going back to Jefferson. At its core is hostility to “nonproductive” classes, originally seen as both *rentier* interests living off unearned income (banks in particular), and the “undeserving poor” living off public outlays (Piven and Cloward 1993 [1971]; Block and Somers 2003). The latter category deeply overlaps with white supremacism: laziness, irresponsibility, difference in “intelligence,” an orientation to “immediate gratification,” and a vast set of (largely biologicistic) racist tropes have long been associated with blackness. The “rentiers” have largely disappeared, although they still surface from time to time, for example, in Steinbeck’s *The Grapes of Wrath* or in the 2011 Occupy movement.<sup>4</sup> In Jacksonian times, when industrial capitalism was in its infancy and there was no working class yet, producerism was explicitly racist. Berlet and Lyons note that “[P]roducerism bolstered White supremacy, blurred actual class divisions, and embraced some elite groups while scapegoating others” (Berlet and Lyons 2000; see also Saxton 1990; Kazin 1995; Roediger 2007 [1991]). By the “post-civil rights” era, of course, that racism had become more implicit; it was framed in “coded” terms. In 1975 new right publisher William Rusher wrote:

A new economic division pits the producers—businessmen, manufacturers, hard-hats, blue-collar workers, and farmers—against a new and powerful class of non-producers comprised of a liberal verbalist elite (the dominant

media, the major foundations and research institutions, the educational establishment, the federal and state bureaucracies) and a semipermanent welfare constituency, all coexisting happily in a state of mutually sustaining symbiosis. (Rusher 1975, 31)

Although Rusher's claim that this division was "new" was incorrect, he was accurate in his efforts to frame regressively redistributive economic policies as politically attractive to working-class and middle-class whites.<sup>5</sup>

*Discipline and Punish:* Neoliberalism has been distinctly despotic, both in the United States and globally. The U.S. defeat in Vietnam, which occurred in 1975 just as the neoliberal project was taking off, seemed to limit the country's global coercive capabilities somewhat. The armed enforcement of corporate interests certainly did not stop, however, the "Vietnam syndrome" notwithstanding. Indeed this was the period in which the Chilean "experiment" was underway (Klein 2008). That horrific assault on democracy was perhaps the prototypical test of the neoliberal model; it involved the kidnapping, torture, and summary execution of trade unionists, movement activists, and student leaders; the privatization of state-held enterprises and social services, and the gutting of the country's educational and health programs.<sup>6</sup>

In the United States, the project gestured in similar directions but concentrated its punitive attention on racial subjects and movement activists. A related set of repressive means were directed against political opponents. For these targets there was a vast repertoire of surveillance and disciplinary technologies available, much of it deriving from slavery and post-Reconstruction approaches to controlling blacks. What Rebecca M. McLennan (2008) labels the U.S. "mode of punishment"—an ongoing, contested, and unstable interaction of "forces of repression" on the one hand, with the "social relations of repression" on the other—entered a new phase. A massive increase in incarceration—unabashedly and disproportionately targeting black and brown men—began in the early 1980s and has continued until the present. The "race to incarcerate" was multiply determined: it afforded major opportunities for profit-making and privatization, it thrived on the politics of fear, and it was traditionally associated with racism (Mauer 2006 [1995]; Wacquant 2009; Soss et al. 2011). Perhaps the most important aspect of mass imprisonment, seen from the perspective of neoliberalism, is its anti-democratic effects: Not only does it banish millions of felons and ex-felons from the electoral rolls, but it comprehensively disadvantages low-income people of color on a mass scale. In stark contrast to our argument about the Great Transformation—that the black movement and its allied new social movements expanded the terrain of politics by politicizing identity—mass incarceration *depoliticizes* the social, removing the potential for political engagement and participation from those it confines and "supervises," and indeed from most who have ever come into contact with the carceral system (Weaver and Lerman 2010).

Both during the rising phase of the post-World War II movement trajectory, and during the neoliberal (right-wing) ascendance after 1973 or so, the government

expanded its assaults against the black movement and other “new social movements” as well (Donner 1990; Rosenfeld 2013). Infiltration, disruption, and surveillance by police or other state agencies, deportation, assassination and disappearance (only occasional, unlike Chile, Brazil, and other dictatorships, where *desaparición* was standard operating procedure), profiling, counter-intelligence operations such as the FBI’s COINTELPRO are all examples of repressive techniques introduced at this time. But then again, imprisonment is a type of disappearance, is it not? Of course, many of these despotic practices had extensive histories.<sup>7</sup>

## The Genealogy of Colorblind Politics

We have argued that racial reaction has gone through a series of stages since the partial “victory” of the civil rights movement and the enactment of civil rights reforms in the mid-1960s. Our idea of the trajectory of postwar U.S. racial politics suggests that the apogee of democratizing, inclusionist, and egalitarian trends was reached around the middle of the decade, and that a “downward” trend (from the movement’s perspective) had begun by about 1970.

Nothing in the early phases of racial reaction pointed toward what would become “colorblind” racial ideology.<sup>8</sup> The initial reaction to civil rights reform was driven by racist rage and full-throated rejectionism. That is hardly surprising. Well before the passage of civil rights and voting rights laws, the South was mobilizing—often violently—against civil rights. The movement “called the question” on the Democrats’ racially split personality. On the one hand, the Democrats were grounded in the “solid South” where since the end of the Civil War whites were open in their negrophobia; and, on the other hand, they were dominant in the liberal North, to which millions of blacks had migrated, where they could vote and join unions, and where segregation, though still omnipresent, was less oppressive.

The Dixiecrat wing had broken with the Democratic Party before. Implacably opposed to a civil rights plank in the 1948 party platform, and incensed about the imminent desegregation of the U.S. armed forces, southern Democrats had bolted to run Strom Thurmond for president on an independent ticket. They had spent the 1950s murdering civil rights activists (and lynching ordinary black people like 14-year-old Emmett Till), and had implacably bottlenecked and filibustered the legislative civil rights agenda. In the aftermath of the Brown decision, they had developed the “massive resistance” strategy, which involved local obstructionism that sometimes approached insurrection. They had mercilessly harassed and degraded black people, and terrorized not only local communities but federal officials. Civil rights reforms been achieved in the teeth of these tactics. Furthermore, by the mid-1960s the black movement’s political trajectory had been on a two-decade ascent and had achieved a practical alliance with other anti-racist currents, new social movements, the massive anti-war movement, and the left-wing, the social democratically inclined wing of the Democratic Party.



So opposition to civil rights reform in the form of “massive resistance” was actually a late stage of racist rejectionism. It involved defending segregation by such means as engineered closures of public school systems and the establishment of private (and, of course, all white) schools.<sup>9</sup> After the collapse of “massive resistance,” opposition to civil rights reform evolved: It developed more sophisticated legal strategies for opposing school desegregation, for example.

Racial reaction had to win allies outside the South; it had to operate within the national party system (both parties). It had to make strategic concessions. At its core was the task of developing a new right. This required formidable political reinvention: making use of the deep-seated racism of the white working and middle classes, without explicitly advocating racial “backlash.” Of course, diehard segregationists, white citizens groups, the KKK, biologistic racists, and other racial troglodytes still abounded; these had to be marginalized on the “far right.” The rise of “code word” strategies was a logical next step, an effort to race-bait less explicitly, while making full use of the traditional stereotypes. “Code words” like “get tough on crime” and “welfare handouts” reasserted racist tropes of black violence and laziness without having to refer to race at all. As Lee Atwater put it:

You start out in 1954 by saying, “Nigger, nigger, nigger.” By 1968 you can’t say “nigger”—that hurts you. Backfires. So you say stuff like forced busing, states’ rights and all that stuff. You’re getting so abstract now [that] you’re talking about cutting taxes, and all these things you’re talking about are totally economic things and a byproduct of them is [that] blacks get hurt worse than whites. And subconsciously maybe that is part of it. I’m not saying that. But I’m saying that if it is getting that abstract, and that coded, that we are doing away with the racial problem one way or the other. You follow me—because obviously sitting around saying, “We want to cut this,” is much more abstract than even the busing thing, and a hell of a lot more abstract than “Nigger, nigger.”

(Perlstein 2012; see also Lamis et al. 1990; Herbert 2005; Brady 1997)<sup>10</sup>

“Code words” never disappeared and never lost their rearticulative utility. But their deployment was inadequate to the task of mobilizing an adequate mass base for racial reaction, especially one that could incorporate the political center, not just the whites of the Jim Crow South, but whites nationally as well.

In order to reach out further, the new right developed the ideologically grounded “reverse racism” allegation. This took shape over the 1970s. “Reverse racism” (or “reverse discrimination”) had several advantages over “code words.” First and most important of these was the claim that racially inclusive reform policies—notably affirmative action—were unfair to whites: They “punished” whites who were merely seeking a job, admission to a university, or a federal contract. In seeking to overcome the legacy of past racism, ostensibly anti-racist policy and state actions were engaging in racism themselves, racism against whites, “reverse racism.”

In other words the implementation of civil rights policy was recast as an attack on whites. It was reframed as a redistribution of resources away from whites—deserving, hard-working, family-values whites—and towards people of color. The latter, of course, were undeserving, lazy, promiscuous, and criminal, but these stereotypes could be implied, not stated openly. “Reverse racism” had obviously not been foremost in anyone’s mind—at least in no white people’s minds—while racial discrimination was the law of the land. But now that a significant if partial attempt was underway to ameliorate it, whites’ sensibilities and sensitivities were activated big time. White concern with supposed discrimination *against them* was in any case a complete red herring, since extensive research—exploring such matters as returns to education and racial “steering,” looking at employment and housing rental practices via audits—showed that traditional patterns of white racism continued largely unabated in the “post-civil rights” era.

What was significant, however, was the reframing of racism as a “race-neutral” matter. Racism was now recast as something that could affect anyone; a century of white predication—whites as the subjects of racism, blacks and people of color as the objects—was thus peremptorily dismissed. And that was only taking the post-emancipation period into consideration; when the structural legacies of slavery were addressed—massive theft of life and labor, comprehensive appropriation of value added without compensation, ongoing denigration and exclusion, not to mention torture and terror past and present—the *chutzpah* of the “reverse racism” ideology mounted to the very heavens.

The ideology of “reverse racism” was presented to whites as an effort to protect them from “unfair” claims on the part of blacks or other people of color. In this respect it had some continuity with the previous “code words” approach. But there was obviously a deeper agenda, since “reverse racism” barely existed. That agenda was to consolidate and expand the new right’s mass base among whites without appealing to racist tropes as the “code words” approach had done. It was to rearticulate “post-civil rights” racial politics in such a way that the democratizing and egalitarian effects of the movement could be more effectively contained. The new right shift from the somewhat defensive use of “code words” to the ideology of “reverse racism” reframed racism as a zero-sum game. “Reverse racism” was conceptualized as an issue of “fairness,” thus rearticulating the central tenets of civil rights demands—equality and justice. This was an ideological appeal that seemed consistent with the anti-discrimination demands of the movement, yet simultaneously attacked the movement for “going too far” and indeed violating its own principles. Because “reverse racism” charges targeted policies that sought practically to overcome the legacies of racial discrimination, segregation, and exclusion, these attacks had the concrete consequences of impeding redistributive efforts in such areas as university admissions, employment, government contracting and licensing, and civil rights in general.

Attacking affirmative action as an unfair system of “racial quotas” worked to defend existing systems of racial inequality and domination much more effectively

than use of “code words” could ever have done. Other civil rights efforts to overcome or at least mitigate established practices of discrimination were subject to the same charges. The new right could now present itself as anti-racist: To understand the “true meaning” of civil rights was to declare that race would henceforth be “irrelevant” to the distribution of scarce resources like jobs or college admissions.<sup>11</sup> The “reverse racism” charge also undercut movement advocates, who were depicted as serving their own “narrow interests”—not those of larger communities of color—by pressing demands for “equality of result,” not equality of opportunity.

“Reverse racism” ideology already contained the seeds of the colorblind concept, since as noted it was premised on the concept of “race neutrality.” A vast literature has successfully demonstrated the impossibility of viewing race “neutrally,” in the sense of ignoring it or dismissing its sociohistorical significance (Brown et al. 2003; Carbado and Harris 2008; Roediger 2008; Sugrue 2010; powell 2012). Here we focus on the political *process* that established colorblindness as the hegemonic ideology of racial reaction in the United States, and on the political *consequences* that the attainment of colorblind racial hegemony entailed. We also explore the contradictory conditions that curtail and constrain colorblindness, even in its currently hegemonic form.

Colorblind racial ideology represented a step beyond “reverse discrimination” because it repudiated the concept of race itself. In certain respects the concept of race “neutrality” already does that ideological work. To dismiss the immense sociohistorical weight of race, to argue that it is somehow possible, indeed imperative, to refuse race consciousness and simply not take account of it,<sup>12</sup> is by any rational standard a fool’s errand. Yet from a political point of view colorblind racial ideology has scored some successes, as well as taking some losses. It is worthwhile asking why.

In our view it is the convergence of colorblindness and neoliberalism that accounts for the success of both ideologies, for their conjoint rise to hegemonic positions, and for their eventual demise. These seemingly distinct theoretical and practical formulas are each politically indispensable for the success of the other. As we have noted, the rise of neoliberalism in the United States, and its attainment of hegemonic status as an accumulation project on a world scale (Jessop 1990) depended on the containment of the political challenge of the new social movements, led by the black movement. Containment meant more than restricting the reach of demands for greater racial equality and vastly expanded democracy; it also meant resisting the redistributive logic of the Great Society, which was an early effort to extend the New Deal to the lower strata of U.S. society, and especially to people of color. The threat that the black movement and its allies posed to the dominant power-bloc (or if you prefer, ruling class) was extremely severe: It involved the prospect of a fully-fledged social democratic system in the United States, serious commitments to full employment,<sup>13</sup> substantial curtailment of U.S. imperial adventures—the war on poverty, Dr. King famously said, was lost on the battlefields of Vietnam—and recognition of race- and gender-based demands for full-scale social equality and inclusion.

Neoliberalism was ideologically anti-statist, but in order to acquire a mass base it had to undo the New Deal coalition, which had held power—under both Democratic and Republican administrations—from the 1930s to the 1970s. This task, first envisioned under Nixon, was accomplished by Reagan. The New Deal had been politically and morally complicit with Jim Crow and indeed could not have been implemented without its deference to the “solid South” (Katznelson 2013). But in the post-World War II period, and in many ways because of the war itself, that complicity was no longer politically viable. The black movement challenged it and ultimately overthrew it, splitting the Democratic Party in the process and transferring the South, as Lyndon Johnson lamented, to the Republican column. This political shift in which the party of Lincoln became the party of Lee Atwater was a bitter historical irony, absolutely Hegelian in its dialectical cunning.

Even though the assault on the welfare state required containment of the black movement and its new social movement allies, even though derailing demands for expanded racial democracy and for increased racial equality were the *sine qua non* of the neoliberal agenda, that agenda could not be proposed in such an explicit form. It could not be presented as “backlash,” rollback, or resegregation, although it was all those things. Indeed the racial reaction experimented with a series of ideological approaches for containment and rearticulation during the 1970s, as we have noted. Colorblindness would become the central component of the racial reaction, but its establishment as a new racial “common sense” was tendential, not immediate. The term, of course, had been around for nearly a century.

## Long Road out of Eden: Presidents and Race Politics<sup>14</sup>

Combining repression with austerity, neoliberalism reiterates and reinvents the sordid and racist histories of slavery and empire; it rearticulates racist cultural tropes. In short, it is as much a racial project as a class project. The links between racism in the metropole and racism in the periphery remain in force under the neoliberal regime. Neoliberalism rose to prominence as doctrine and policy in response to the post-World War II global insurgencies of which the black movement and its allies—not just the “new social movements” at home but the anti-imperial insurgencies among “the darker nations”—were an integral part.

Issues of race were dramatically revived in the 1980s. The Reagan campaigns and administration spoke “backlash” fluently. Reagan characterized black welfare recipients as “welfare queens” and black men as “strapping young bucks.” He invoked “states’ rights” at a campaign stop in Philadelphia, Mississippi—site of the kidnapping and murder of the three civil rights workers Chaney, Goodman, and Schwerner in 1964. These were repudiations of civil rights and reminders to black voters of their powerlessness. Allying with the Christian right—the Moral Majority, the Christian Coalition, Focus on the Family, and the Family Research Council—Reagan attracted millions of Southern Baptists to the Republican Party. Up through

1976, the evangelical and increasingly fundamentalist Southern Baptist Convention had largely avoided involvement in electoral politics. Indeed many of these voters had been supporters of Jimmy Carter, a “born again” Southern Baptist himself.<sup>15</sup> But by 1980 the “solid South” was solid again, this time on the Republican side, despite the fact that blacks could now vote there. Even beyond Dixie, Reagan could appeal to former Democrats using racial “code words.” An ex-New Deal Democrat and former union leader himself, a former media mouthpiece for the giant corporation General Electric, Reagan could strike some of the same notes that Wallace and Nixon did: pro-business, anti-welfare (i.e., anti-black), law and order (i.e., anti-black), anti-feminist, anti-hippie, anti-communist. He drew to the right wing the intellectual, academic, and other defectors from the “moderate” camp of the civil rights movement—the neoconservatives—to form an uneasy but powerful alliance that underwrote his administration’s racial politics. In short, Reagan consolidated the Republican Party’s authoritarian populist appeal; he was genial where Nixon had scowled; he inspired trust rather than mistrust, all the while repudiating the civil rights movement and the legacy of the Great Society, both largely associated with the Democrats.<sup>16</sup>

Reagan’s neoliberal commitments were of a piece with his genial racism. His iconic comment in his 1981 Inaugural Address, “In this present crisis, government is not the solution to our problem; government *is* the problem,” distilled a political orientation that was hostile to civil rights, hostile to the welfare state, hostile to taxation (though Reagan did raise taxes several times), and hostile to unions.<sup>17</sup> His successor George H.W. Bush developed a similar two-faced style: half patrician/Connecticut Yankee, half Texas oilman, Bush I maintained the simmering white coalition of Republicans on a wobbly bridge located between the gentility of Wall Street and the new right ferocity of his political gunslinger Lee Atwater, who became famous for the Willie Horton political ads (on behalf of Bush) and the “white hands” ads (on behalf of reactionary North Carolina Senator Jesse Helms). These race-baiting maneuvers stoked white fears of black crime, affirmative action, and the like.

In the 1990s the nation experienced a Democratic Party version of the same balancing act. The brilliant but troubled Bill Clinton, dubbed by Toni Morrison (no doubt to her later regret) “America’s first black president,” cultivated the black community effectively and understood the depths of southern racism better than any of his predecessors. Ever. A fabled policy wonk, former Rhodes scholar, and preternaturally talented politician, Clinton’s chosen mission was to *centrifuge* the Democratic Party. The way he did that was by curtailing the influence of the black movement and the new social movements. Many movement veterans, choosing to take the moderate “entrism” route to achieving power, had acquired real influence in the party. They had to make their peace with Clinton, who could do the blue-eyed soul thing very well, who never repudiated and indeed identified with the civil rights movement, and who had after all, returned the White House to Democratic occupants.

Clinton’s later career mirrored his early rise to power. Though he was never a movement activist, he had been an opponent of the Vietnam War. He had worked for

Arkansas Senator J. William Fulbright and had run (with Hillary) McGovern's 1972 campaign in Texas. Elected Governor of Arkansas at the age of 32, he had no problem playing a double game: he could be Bubba and a good ole boy when the occasion demanded it, and talk Southern Baptist when he needed to. To win the Democratic nomination in 1992, he spanked a symbolic negro, Sistah Souljah (Lisa Williamson).<sup>18</sup> Soon after taking office, he threw his friend the voting rights scholar, Lani Guinier, under the bus; he was unwilling to defend Guinier's nomination for the post of Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights, notably distancing himself from her criticism of the racial gerrymandering taking place in the South.<sup>19</sup>

A third black woman to be repudiated by Clinton was Marion Wright Edelman, who was jettisoned in connection with the greatest racial injustice perpetrated by his administration: its abandonment of the Aid to Families with Dependent Children program (AFDC, commonly known as "welfare") in 1996. Clinton campaigned for reelection on a promise to "end welfare as we know it." He set his sights on AFDC. The program had evolved out of the New Deal Social Security Act of 1935, slowly developing over the decades into its Great Society version, which after years of exclusion and continuous neglect was finally extended to blacks and other people of color (Quadagno 1994). AFDC remained punitive and was subject to constant right-wing stigma,<sup>20</sup> but it stood in sharp contrast to the 1935 law, which had been crafted by Dixiecrats to exclude black recipients, in provisions FDR had never questioned. Clinton's proposal substituted for AFDC the much more punitive Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act (PWORA).<sup>21</sup> PWORA limited cash payments (renamed Temporary Assistance to Needy Families—TANF) and attached them to work requirements, often at below-minimum wage levels. The attack on AFDC was a significant concession to neoliberal market-oriented ideology (Block et al., 1987). In abandoning public assistance, Clinton took a page from Reagan's playbook; as early as 1982 Reagan had proposed "devolution" as a way to limit the federal government's powers of market regulation and countercyclical economic policy-making. Reagan had argued that welfare provision should be a state responsibility, not a federal one.<sup>22</sup>

Clinton embraced a great deal of neoliberal ideology beyond the attack on welfare. By the time he took office, the influence of the 1960s movements was receding in memory, though there was still plenty of racial discontent to go around. The Los Angeles race riots that occurred during the 1992 campaign—after the police officers who had savagely beaten Rodney King were acquitted in a rigged trial—reminded the nation that the racial cauldron continued to bubble; but they drew only ritual condemnations from candidates Bush I and Clinton (and no notice to speak of from potential spoiler Ross Perot). Though police beatings and killings continued at a normal pace, the riots proved to be a one-off affair that was quickly forgotten. South Central eventually cooled down; most of the rioters were Latin@s; there were almost as many white arrests as black ones (Rutten 1992).

Clinton worked in small and largely symbolic ways to "bridge the racial divide," as suggested by his sometime advisor William J. Wilson. This meant ceaseless promotion

of the “one America” argument, an attempt to shift attention from race to class. Nothing epitomized this symbolic approach better than “The President’s National Conversation on Race,” described by radical critics as “the politics of yakkety-yak.”<sup>23</sup>

The Clinton years reiterated the Carter presidency racially, and bridged between the Reagan and Obama years in terms of neoliberalism. To be sure, Clinton deserves some credit. Despite the Democrats’ maneuvering and rebranding, and notwithstanding ferocious right-wing hostility to Clinton, the 1990s were a decade of relative racial peace and prosperity. It helped that this was a period of spirited economic growth, driven by the rise of Silicon Valley, the internet revolution, and transformations wrought by these “postindustrial” technological events in both the U.S. and world economies.<sup>24</sup> During the 1990s, the black and Latin@ shares of the national income distribution rose slightly; black and Latin@ unemployment rates were cut in half: The black rate fell from 14.2 percent in 1992 to 7.3 percent in 2000; Latin@ unemployment dropped from 11.8 percent in 1991 to 5.0 percent in 2000 (U.S. Department of Labor 1995, 2001). The poverty rate also fell dramatically (U.S. Census Bureau 2001, 18).

Some of Clinton’s economic policies were attempts to accommodate the neoliberal agenda initially proposed under Reagan. At times his maneuvers were creative and even relatively egalitarian. For example, he significantly increased support for the working poor through the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC), and made additional federal commitments to low-income housing, nutrition, health, and education. The EITC was an effort to support the working poor, and particularly those with children, through the tax system rather than welfare. Tax credits (or “refunds”) were indexed to inflation, and could exceed the amount of taxes owed by as much as \$5,800/family (in US\$ 2012). This was a back-door approach to income subsidization, billed as a “market incentive” for the working poor. It did not at all help the millions of unemployed, who, of course, did not pay income taxes and could thus receive no tax credit, but it definitely helped the working poor.<sup>25</sup> EITC has operated steadily since its enactment in 1993; in 2012 the program distributed the whopping sum of \$62 billion (U.S. Department of the Treasury 2013).

In other initiatives, Clinton’s accommodations were more problematic. His global trade initiatives, which included support for the World Trade Organization and The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), both carried over from the Bush I period, would have regressive race (and class, and environmental) consequences in the United States. NAFTA undercut wages in both the United States and Mexico, spurring a corporate agribusiness invasion south of the border. Companies like Cargill and ConAgra took control of corn production, driving millions of Mexican@s out of their traditional *ejidos* (communal agricultural systems) and into the *maquilas* (corporate sweatshops) on the U.S. border. These policies also vastly ramped up migration to the United States.<sup>26</sup>

After the Republican victories in the 1994 elections and their promulgation of a fully neoliberal economic program (the “Contract with America”), Clinton was



reduced to strategies of compromise; he made numerous concessions, not only in the area of welfare, which probably had the most visible and direct negative impact on people of color, but also in tax policy, domestic spending, and deregulation of corporations, especially in the financial arena (Meeropol 1998).

“George Bush doesn’t care about black people,” Kanye West famously said (West 2005).<sup>27</sup> Bush II had acquired a centrist reputation as Governor of Texas (Latin@-friendly, for instance). But as president he steered consistently to the right, and implemented a hardcore neoliberal agenda that outdid Reagan on several fronts. His failed attempt to privatize Social Security was of a piece with other privatization initiatives in education (No Child Left Behind) and health (Medicare drug expenditures). There is a pattern here: dismantlement of the welfare state. Bush argued that Social Security discriminates against blacks because they have a lower life expectancy (Kranish 2005); if their Social Security accounts could just be transformed into privately owned individual retirement accounts (IRAs), they could get at their money faster (presumably before they died young). Beyond that callousness, the privatization initiative represented a potentially endless windfall for Wall Street, a paradigmatic effort privately to appropriate public resources. The scheme died ignominiously.

Bush had been “born again” after a somewhat dissolute youth. His personal redemption narrative resonated with a populist and religious base that was heavily Southern Baptist. He was a creature of big oil and the Christian right. His electoral larceny was blessed by the Supreme Court in *Bush v. Gore* (2000), an anti-democratic decision foully grounded in civil rights law. In addition, without major racist chicanery in the 2000 Florida election, the presidential vote would not have even been close.<sup>28</sup> He was a “racial realist,” ideologically speaking. Clarence Lusane describes this position as follows:

In the post-civil rights movement era, racial realism appears to be not only logical but also progressive and modern. Legal segregation is over. High-profile minorities exist in every field and occupation. Public discourse on race is intolerant of racist slurs and insults. Indeed, the only reason race remains an issue is due to the continual harping by civil rights leaders who use the issue to justify their existence. The racial realists argue that as far as public policy is concerned, there is no need for any new legislation....

(2006, 60)

Racial “realism,” part of the developing “colorblind” racial project, could also trace its lineage back to neoconservatism. It still had traction with some high-profile minorities, the same ones Bush knew and appointed (Lusane 2006; Hattam and Lowndes 2013). It appealed to black conservatives as well.<sup>29</sup> As a religiously conversant Southern Baptist, Bush not only cemented the loyalty of millions of evangelical white Protestants, but some black and brown folk too. Sometimes he seemed to be speaking especially to the faithful. His use of the phrase “wonder-working power,” for instance, referred to a hymn about salvation through Jesus: “There’s power, power, wonder-working power in

the blood of the Lamb.” Carter and Clinton might have referred to their Baptist roots, but never preached the gospel from the bully pulpit.

Bush followed Clinton’s lead in shunning the 2001 UN World Conference against Racism (WCAR), which occurred days before the 9/11/2001 attacks and thus was almost wiped out of history, especially U.S. history. Both men were scared off by the idea of confronting the very long history of U.S. complicity with racism and imperialism in a contemporary global forum. Afraid they would be asked for apologies and reparations for slavery, forced to admit their complicity with South African apartheid (the CIA had fingered then-underground Nelson Mandela for arrest in 1962 (Johnston 1990)),<sup>30</sup> or challenged about their ongoing support for Israeli policies, both U.S. presidents boycotted the conference in Durban.<sup>31</sup>

Bush carried out a series of actions that can best be described as ideological anti-anti-racism. One example among many was the purging and reconstitution of the U.S. Civil Rights Commission. Prompted by Abigail Thernstrom as well as other right-wing critics, he dismissed anti-racist scholar and activist Mary Frances Berry from her Chairship of the Commission—she had occupied that post since her appointment by Bush’s father in 1992—elevating Thernstrom herself to Vice-Chair. Also dismissed was Cruz Reynoso, previously the first Chican@ Justice of the California Supreme Court. Bush’s Justice Department, led first by John Ashcroft and then by the toxic Alberto Gonzalez, featured as its Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights one Bradley Schlozman.<sup>32</sup> This new right warrior intervened in the *Gratz* (2003) and *Grutter* (2003) cases with *amicus curiae* briefs opposing affirmative action admissions policies at the University of Michigan.

Of all the problematic activities regarding race that Bush II undertook, the most notorious, and the most archetypal, was undoubtedly his blundering reaction to the inundation and destruction of the City of New Orleans by Hurricane Katrina in August–September 2005. The administration’s preparation and response were lacking and at times oblivious, but its worst sins were not the errors of noncommission during and immediately after the storm, but rather its support for the urban reconfiguration (or should we say “urban renewal”), gentrification, and permanent reduction of the city’s black population in the longer-run aftermath of the storm.

In what would prove to be a template for neoliberal programs of urban privatization and “structural adjustment” that would later be applied to ghettos and barrios across the country (Detroit, Philadelphia, Chicago, Milwaukee, and elsewhere), black New Orleans was stripped, not only of housing—poor black residents who had lost their homes were driven permanently from the city<sup>33</sup>—but also of its public schools, public hospitals, and public services. This was accomplished not by the federal government alone, but by a strategic alliance of business-oriented officials and agencies at all levels of government, working closely with large financial and real estate interests (Woods 2005; Lipsitz 2006; Marable and Clarke, eds. 2007; Klein 2008; Luft 2008; Bond–Graham, 2010).

No discussion of the Bush II years and race can dispense with the subject of Islamophobia. In the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, this somewhat ill-defined set of

beliefs and attitudes—racist, religiously chauvinistic, xenophobic, and with a long history in the United States—acquired a high degree of popular currency. Although Bush himself took pains to repeat the mantra “Islam means peace” several times, his administration defined itself by means of the “war on terror,” both globally and domestically. The invasion of Iraq in March 2003 was opposed by millions of protesters, in a brief recapitulation of the anti-Vietnam War protests a generation before. But to no avail. U.S. war policy targeted Muslims, Arabs, and South Asians both around the world and domestically. In Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere the administration reprised the worst offenses of imperial rule, embracing torture, kidnapping, assassination, and a range of other extrajudicial and unconstitutional practices (Jaffer and Singh 2009; Cole 2009.) In the United States, Middle Eastern Americans and South Asians (MEASAs), who were generally U.S. citizens and documented immigrants, were swept up in an extensive program of quasi-racial profiling (Love 2011).

Inclined to despotism both abroad and at home, the Bush forces mainly harmed black communities through neglect: Bush’s dereliction of duty during and after the Katrina disaster of 2005 was the clearest instance of this. His abandonment of New Orleans’s black population was part of a larger renunciation of interest in the well-being of the black community that involved local, state, and federal officials of all stripes, including some Democrats.

Bush’s economic mismanagement and corruption led to the catastrophic economic meltdown of 2008, but to be fair, much of the groundwork for that crisis had been laid under Clinton. The subprime mortgage crisis that exploded under Bush II constituted the largest regressive racial redistribution of resources to have occurred in U.S. history. It impoverished black and brown families at unprecedented rates (as well as many white families). As a result, over a couple of years the already huge gap between black and white wealth *more than doubled*, as did the gap between whites and Latin@s. Millions of black and brown families were cast out of the “coping stratum,” lower-middle-class status to which they had obtained limited access during the Clinton years (Reid and Laderman 2009; Rugh and Massey 2010; Hill 2011; Taylor et al. 2012).

A proper analysis of the racial dimensions of the subprime mortgage collapse in 2008 would exceed the scope of this book. Still, it is important to note that the “subprime” mortgage instrument links neoliberalism and race quite closely. During the 1990s and 2000s, under both Clinton and Bush II, extensive marketing campaigns targeted lower-income, and especially black and brown families, to consider home purchase. These programs were combined public and private ventures, pushed by both administrations, and facilitated by the parastatal home lending guarantor agencies Fannie Mae and Freddy Mac (Morgenstern and Rosner 2011). In addition, these measures were extensively lobbied for by the biggest banks: Citi, Goldman Sachs, and Wells Fargo among others.

“Steering” campaigns proliferated in retail home lending to lure borrowers of color to take out subprime and Alt-A mortgages—which were loan “products” of an

“assigned risk” type, aimed at less credit-worthy borrowers. In numerous cases, however, the families pushed into the assigned risk pool had credit scores in the “prime” range, that is, equivalent to other, largely white, preferred borrowers. This steering occurred because fees and commissions earned by loan officers in the subprime range were higher than those earned through making prime mortgage loans. As in so many other patterns of racial discrimination, the visibility of black or brown racial identity, its corporeal, phenomic presence and immediacy, combined with greater vulnerability—perhaps economic, perhaps political, perhaps fear of profiling—facilitated unequal and damaging treatment at the hands of power-holders who were usually white. Consider “vote caging,” or gerrymandering in segregated neighborhoods, or “stop and frisk” policing, as other examples of these same practices. Black or brown identity often offers the most convenient way to select subjects for the “racial tax” that is discrimination. Where does the Wells Fargo or Bank of America “greeter” send you when you enter a retail bank branch to inquire about a home mortgage?

At the Wall St. level, subprime loans were justified as “opportunity finance,” a kind of affirmative action lending policy. Karen Ho (2009) quotes “an African American male managing director” at a major Wall St. investment firm:

You may not have the best credit, but because Wall Street is out there creating markets for aggressive markets [sic], and you will pay a relatively higher rate, but it won’t be as high of a rate if you—well, frankly, you would not have gotten a loan from the banks, so it is hard to even compare it to that. So the capital markets have made [borrowing money] much more efficient, so you just have to pay the cost of capital, which is exactly the way it should be.... Nobody should be denied credit within reasonable means....

“Of course,” Ho adds, “as the devastation of the subprime crisis continues to unfold, Wall Street’s experiment with broader access and ‘opportunity finance’ has shown itself to be more akin to the creation of a niche market for the purposes of exploiting the poor, creating a bubble real-estate market, and mortgaging the future” (Ho 2009, 299–300).<sup>34</sup> As Ho’s final remark suggests, racial discrimination in the subprime mortgage crisis nearly pulled the Wall Street temple down on everybody, not just in downtown Manhattan but across the globe. Neoliberalism is premised on racism in many different ways.

## Obama and Colorblindness

Is he a mere token, a shill for Wall Street? Or is he Neo, “the one”? If neither alternative is plausible, then we are in the realm of everyday 21st-century U.S. politics. Yet Barack Obama has transformed the U.S. presidency in ways we cannot yet fully appreciate. Obama is not simply the first nonwhite (that we know of) to occupy the office. He is the first to have lived in the global South, the first to be a direct descendent of colonized people, the first to have a genuine movement background. Consider: How

many community meetings, how many movement events did Obama attend before entering electoral politics (Lizza 2007)?

None of that has meant that, two-thirds of the way through his entire time in office, Obama has acted in an appreciably different way from, say, Bill Clinton acted. Both men started their terms with congressional majorities, which they both lost after only two years. Of course, Clinton was hurt by scandal, but in Obama's case he *IS* the scandal: a black man in the White House. But what you are ain't what counts. It's what you do that counts.

Obama is certainly no more powerful than any of his predecessors; he is constrained as they were by the U.S. system of rule. Of course, he is more hemmed in than his predecessors by the U.S. racial regime, by structural racism. Indeed he confronts racism as no other president has ever done. No other president has experienced racism directly:

Moreover, while my own upbringing hardly typifies the African American experience—and although, largely through luck and circumstance, I now occupy a position that insulates me from most of the bumps and bruises that the average black man must endure—I can recite the usual litany of petty slights that during my forty-five years have been directed my way: security guards tailing me as I shop in department stores, white couples who toss me their car keys as I stand outside a restaurant waiting for the valet, police cars pulling me over for no apparent reason. I know what it's like to have people tell me I can't do something because of my color, and I know the bitter swill of swallowed back anger. I know as well that Michelle and I must be continually vigilant against some of the debilitating story lines that our daughters may absorb—from TV and music and friends and the streets—about who the world thinks they are, and what the world imagines they should be.

(Obama 2008b, 233)

No other president has ever felt the need to be racially vigilant in the way Obama has.

On the other hand, he has a “kill list.” All presidents kill people, but Obama is the first to take charge systematically and publically of these egregious and unconstitutional uses of exceptional powers. In this he echoes Carl Schmitt, the Nazi political theorist, whose famous dictum is “Sovereign is he who decides on the exception” (2004 [1922]; see also Agamben 2005; Butler 2006). The drones, the surveillance, and the moralistic lectures about parenting and hip-hop culture that Obama likes to deliver only to blacks, all contradict the anti-racist legacy of the civil rights movement that arguably put him in office.

Obama himself largely deploys colorblind racial ideology, although he occasionally critiques it as well. Beneath this ostensibly postracial view the palpable and quite ubiquitous system of racial distinction and inequality remains entrenched, as Gramsci might say. Though modernized and “moderated,” structural racism has been fortified,

not undermined, by civil rights reform; Obama is not challenging it, at least not directly. Obama has not interceded for blacks against their greatest cumulative loss of wealth in U.S. history, the Great Recession of 2008. He has not explicitly criticized the glaring racial bias in the U.S. prison system. He has not intervened in conflicts over workers' rights—particularly in the public sector where many blacks and other people of color are concentrated. When massive demonstrations took place against public sector union-busting in Wisconsin in February and March of 2011, Obama was conspicuously silent.

In many ways Obama is reiterating the center-left neoliberalism first developed by Bill Clinton. David Theo Goldberg (2008, 42–44) has written of a “racial neo-liberalism” that is linked to political theories of absolutism, state sovereignty, and “exceptional” states (drawing on classical sources and once again echoing Schmitt). This modern state governs a *civil* society. It has an *outside* that is not civil. Its outside consists of slums, occupied territories, prisons, and the underground underworlds where fugitives, undocumented, poor, and homeless people live (Mbembe 2001; Davis 2006; Goffman 2009; Park 2013). “Those people” are dangerous, criminal, less “civilized,” less deserving. Goldberg’s “threat of race” centers on this frontier between these two social spaces, let us call them. They can neither be entirely joined nor separated. The border between them must be strenuously policed, an effort that requires electrified fences, Hellfire missiles, and extraordinary rendition. As Goldberg suggests, this is the form racism takes today: supervision and control of the racial “threat” in defense of an ever-more confined and restricted zone of prosperity: the ostensibly “civil” society of neoliberalism.

In its abandonment of the social, in its repudiation of the welfare state, in its passionate embrace of market rationality, neoliberalism gives its adherents permission to ignore the others, the darker nations, the poors, of the United States and the entire planet. Though harnessed to greed, neoliberalism is also about exercising unfettered power, both throughout the economy, the marketplace; and through the state. Workers, women, people of color, LGBT people too, are disposable in this world: They are somewhere on the spectrum that runs from human beings to “bare life.”

Could Obama have changed that? Has he signed onto it? Could he have assisted many of those poors, at least many in the United States, through public employment programs perhaps? Such initiatives, descending from the New Deal, focused on impoverished people who today tend disproportionately to be people of color, were proposed by Obama’s left-wing supporters, notably Van Jones. In 2009 Jones suggested that public employment be aimed at “green” jobs: everything from building solar energy farms on federal land to weatherstripping doors and windows in the ghetto.<sup>35</sup> Could Obama have subsidized the mortgages of low-income people—again, disproportionately black and brown, and many victimized by corrupt real-estate and financial practices in the run-up to the 2008 crash—the way he subsidized banks, insurance companies, Big Pharma, the auto industry, and out-on-a-limb hedge funds?

Parallel to those questions: Could Obama have disciplined the market, the way he has disciplined South Waziristan and the Occupy movement? (Well, maybe not

by attacking Greenwich, Connecticut, or East Hampton with predator drones, but how about bringing criminal indictments against the Wall St. fraudsters?) In his first term he was assiduous in bailing out Wall Street, the “too big to fail” banks, big auto, and numerous other besieged fortresses of capital. His Affordable Care Act, claimed as his greatest accomplishment, is also a huge giveaway to the insurance companies and Big Pharma.

Obama’s subsidization policies (and those of Ben Bernanke at the Federal Reserve Board) did not extend to Main Street. They did not lead to Martin Luther King, Jr. Boulevard. Small gestures were made to the foreclosable and underwater homeowner; (very) small mercies were directed at the millions of overburdened student debtors. Reorienting his policy choices in this direction would have been politically difficult and risky, but it would have undone some of the neoliberal moorings that tied this president not only to his predecessors, but also to the oligarchic and anti-democratic power elites (or if you prefer, “ruling class”) that runs the country.

This is the dilemma of the Obama administration, made more severe, or more poignant, by the tremendous burdens, obligations (and yes, some thrills too) of being a black president. The Obama administration wants a strong state: It is at war, both overtly and covertly. The president has a “kill list.”

Like a Roman emperor, President Obama is constantly putting down rebellion. Of course, all U.S. presidents have done this, always. The state demands loyalty; secrecy is extensive, and those who reveal state secrets are harshly punished. Meanwhile surveillance is effectively total. Center-left neoliberalism under Obama combines the politics of “permanent war” with those of modest redistribution: notably in respect to employment, wages, and tax policy. Obama inherited from Bush II not only the Great Recession of 2008, but also the permanent war state, the great Moloch with its limitless appetite for prisoners, its obsessive quest to discipline, punish, and surveil its citizens. Under Obama there have been reductions in the permanent war—the 2011 exit from Iraq; the promised 2014 near-exit from Afghanistan—but the use of unmanned drones firing Hellfire Missiles hardly qualifies as a policy of peace. Below a certain socioeconomic status level the United States is a police state, and Obama does not seem willing, or perhaps is unable, to do much about it.

Some have suggested that Obama is so constrained by the oligarchy, so hemmed in by the FIRE sector (Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate, to which we might add Big Pharma and Big Oil) that he is so beholden to the oligarchy’s ownership of the U.S. political process (especially after the *Citizens United* case (2010), that he has to rely on a “long game” (Sullivan 2012; Lewis 2012). On this account, only a political strategy premised on demographic shifts and their impact on voting can avail the democratic and egalitarian needs of the majority of the (soon to be majority non-white) American people.

The idea here is that the state can play a guiding role in fostering “smart growth” and ameliorating inequality, mediating between the corporate overlords and the growing numbers of excluded masses: increasingly people of color, increasingly working-class



or poor, increasingly female. On the anti-racist left, we often see, and complain about, Obama's deflection of race, his refusal to engage with race issues unless there is a huge outcry: "If I had a son, he would look a lot like Trayvon" (Thompson and Wilson 2012). "Another way of saying that is Trayvon Martin could have been me, thirty-five years ago" (Obama, July 19, 2013).<sup>36</sup> But from Obama's point of view, he is "normalizing race," leading the United States, and socializing the nervous/racist white masses, to the "majority-minority" demographic that is coming their way.

Obama's approach to immigration is a good example of his centrism; he has run the most comprehensive deportation regime of any administration in history, but at the same time supports immigration reform and a "path to citizenship." Thus Obama both immunizes himself from nativist attacks of the Republican right wing, and distinguishes himself (and the Democrats) from their opponents' virulent and racist anti-immigrant politics. For the small price of supporting similar reforms to those Bush II sought and was denied in 2007, Obama locks up three-quarters of the Latin@vote.

At best Obama's civil rights policy (civil rights not civil liberties) has been an incremental reversal of Bush II's. Although Obama has an earlier history of anti-racial profiling activity,<sup>37</sup> he has not developed any serious anti-poverty or criminal justice reform policies. As we write, ex-felon disenfranchisement deprives 5.3m Americans, disproportionately black and brown, almost all poor people, and, of course, mostly men, of the right to vote (Manza and Uggen 2006; Chung 2013), but this is an area that is politically risky to enter, especially for a neoliberal regime, however "moderate." Contrast this with immigration reform, which is supported by at least some major corporate interests, as well as by a majority of voters and most people of color.

As a black politician, Obama heads the modern-day version of an "entrist" cohort of officials of color, both elected and appointed, who are working within the state at various levels: electoral, administrative, national or local. On January 17, 2009, just before his first inauguration, the Obama campaign launched Organizing for America (OFA), a mass lobbying group, similar to MoveOn.org. Officially separate from the Democratic Party, OFA overlapped with the Obama campaign and, by 2013, had absorbed much of its campaign technology as well: its lists, the profound attention/research/surveillance it directs towards its base of millions of users/voters.

Notably, OFA does not directly mobilize low-income voters; it does not cross the digital divide, which is both a class divide and a race divide. Obama relies on his political positions, and on the truculence and racism of his opposition, to attract the support of lower-income voters of color, to increase their voting rates. Why do they come out for him when he delivers so little? Because he is black and because he is way better than the alternative. And many of them, as we have argued here, do not and cannot act politically; they have been demobilized by the system of "crime and punishment"; their racial identity places them outside civil society, half a century after the enactment of civil rights reforms, long after "the Great Transformation" promised an inclusive and egalitarian society, and once again failed to realize that promise.

## Where's the (Tea) Party?

Neoliberal policies shrink the public sphere, and seek to privatize state resources, often precipitating state fiscal crisis in support of these ends. Tax revolt is a crucial component of right-wing populism that can link Wall St. and Main St. Who benefits from such initiatives? Neoliberalism increasingly pits public space and the civic commons against private space and privatized services. The suburbs are under pressure too, but their schools have not been repossessed as yet.<sup>38</sup> And the rich, the 1 percent, can staff their gated economic enclaves with undocumented immigrant gardeners and private security patrols. They can send their children to private schools. As the public sphere is devalued, democracy is weakened. Neoliberalism decrees school closures and the privatization of education at every level. It demands layoffs and assaults unions. It attacks workers in the public sector and forces government to reduce social services such as public health and transportation. At its worst it drives the public sector into insolvency. The City of Detroit declared bankruptcy on July 18, 2013; other cities such as Stockton, California, have done so as well.

These trends generate a massive, disenfranchised, urban, largely black and brown (yes there are some whites too) U.S. subaltern stratum, not only an underclass *à la* William Julius Wilson, but also a racially distinct melange: *the others*. Not just the subordinate, inegalitarian dimension of this group's collective identity carries weight here (the "sub" of subaltern); but also the "alterity" of the term. The growing subaltern have the potential for disruption, both political and in everyday life. They also hover on the margins of "bare life," experiencing the police state everyday: profiled, surveilled, "stopped and frisked." This growing stratum of U.S. society, "working poor," "on the run," fugitives and "clandestinos," prisoners and ex-felons (Newman 2000; Dow 2005; Goffman 2009; Park 2013), are aliens in the United States, whether they are citizens or not. Neoliberalism can render you homeless, useless, mentally or physically ill, a stranger in your own country.

A new trend on the right is a divided Republican Party. The GOP is in danger of incurring a cavernous split between the demographic imperative to move toward the political center and the demands of its narrowing base in the red states. Its strongest support is regionally confined: to the South, the intermountain West, and a few other pockets like Kansas. It is white, older, increasingly male, paranoid, and racist. Funded by a substantial sector of financial capital and in a major way by Big Oil, the Republican Party pledges its allegiance to neoliberal economics and to reactionary politics every chance it gets. The 1 percent (both Republican and Democrat) can still effectively buy elections and indeed governments: locally, state-wide, and regionally, not only in Dixie, but all through the country: Wisconsin, Pennsylvania, Michigan ... But Republican long-run prospects are shrinking in many of those politically contested states. Although the right-wing seems unlikely to organize a democratic (small d) voting majority, it has been more successful in organizing an obstructionist anti-democratic minority, based on gerrymandering at the state level, and of course on big money.

The Republican right wing may yet succeed in running out the clock on Obama's second term. It possesses many political and economic resources: the U.S. Supreme Court above all, but also the control of state legislatures, governors' mansions, and the House of Representatives. In the era of *Citizens United*, its oligarchs are able to buy legislators (and elections) extensively; we are living in a new gilded age. The right wing's power at the state level is also propped up by extensive gerrymandering. On top of all that, Republicans actively seek to prevent political action by various constituencies of color, youth, and low-income people (notably by restricting voting).<sup>39</sup> Their assaults on the franchise are conspicuously racialized: vote-caging, restricting voting hours, requiring photo IDs, prohibiting students from voting in their university/college area of residence (Piven et al. 2009). Yet it is difficult to see how a policy of obstructionism can indefinitely delay immigration reform, a position that has already consolidated the expanding Latin@ vote in the Democratic column. It is also unclear how the right wing's assault on abortion rights can help it with the women's vote, which is also trending Democratic.

The emergence in 2009 of the various political organizations and fractions that collectively became known as the *Tea Party* took political analysts by surprise. It was widely assumed that the outcome of the 2008 Presidential contest—Barack Obama's victory and John McCain's defeat—signaled that conservatism was in retreat and had perhaps run its course after decades of popular political support. What was clearly unanticipated was the scope of the grassroots mobilization that moved American conservatism further to the right and, as Lawrence Rosenthal and Christine Trost argue, "resurrected themes that mainstream conservatism had rejected as too radical forty years earlier" (Rosenthal and Trost 2012, 3). Tea Party activists advance a fundamentalist reading of the U.S. Constitution to argue for "states' rights" in opposition to what is perceived to be an increasingly bloated and illegitimate federal government under the sway of liberal ideology. At its extreme, such a perspective informs and undergirds strategic doctrines such as nullification, the effort by states to overturn laws. The Tea Party is a right-wing populist movement that couples its incoherent reading of the Constitution with the neoliberal ideology of free-market absolutism.

Avoiding or taking what can be considered a libertarian view on social issues (notably same-sex marriage),<sup>40</sup> Tea Party activists want to maintain a sustained focus on fiscal policy and the oppressiveness of "big government." As Tea Party-backed U.S. Senator Rand Paul has stated, "The Tea Party doesn't see politics in black and white, but black and red" (quoted in Lowndes 2012, 159).

Given this perspective, in what ways can the Tea Party movement be read and understood as a racial project? First, Tea Party activists and supporters were mobilized not only by the financial collapse of 2008 and the federal response to it, but equally by the election of Obama. The outrage expressed over bank bailouts and massive loans to automakers, entities supposedly "too big to fail," was matched by fears of the "other" who came to occupy the Oval Office. Five of the six national Tea Party organizations have "birthers," those who assert that Obama is not a natural born U.S. citizen and

therefore cannot legally be president, in their leadership ranks (Lowndes 2012, 157). Obama's universally recognized and self-affirmed American blackness overlaps with his "foreignness"—his Kenyan father, his Indonesian stepfather, his childhood in Jakarta and even Honolulu. He enacts the unconscious racist nightmares of much of the American right (and a few in the American left as well). It is small wonder that as late as April 2011, 45 percent of Tea Party members still believed that Obama was not born in the United States (cited in Rosenthal and Trost 2012, 9). Tea Party supporters suggest that Obama does not share the values that most Americans live by and that he does not understand the problems of people like themselves (Zernike and Thee-Brenan 2010). Tea Party supporters were more likely (25 percent vs. 11 percent of all survey respondents) to think that the Obama administration "favors blacks over whites," and over half of supporters (52 percent compared to 28 percent of all survey respondents) believed that in recent years "too much has been made of the problems facing black people."<sup>41</sup>

The core constituency of the Tea Party consists of older, middle-class whites who fear the demographic change around them and the loss of rights, privileges, and resources that such change forebodes:

Tea Partiers see themselves as the "real Americans" who have worked hard all their lives and earned everything they have. They view liberals, unions, and often minorities, as forces trying to take away what they possess and redistribute it to the "undeserving", the poor who haven't worked hard.

(Rosenthal 2013)

While the Tea Party movement has attempted to distance itself from overt expressions of racism, the racial attitudes of many Tea Party supporters are disturbing. Tea Party supporters believe blacks and Latin@s to be less intelligent, less hardworking, and less trustworthy than whites (Parker 2009). In a notorious incident on March 19, 2009, black Congressional Representatives André Caron, Emanuel Cleaver, and John Lewis were subject to racial epithets and spat upon by Tea Partiers protesting the passage of federal healthcare reform. In July 2010, the NAACP publicly condemned "rampant racism" in the Tea Party movement, and subsequently issued a report, *Tea Party Nationalism*, that dismissed the "non-racial" claims of the movement and surveyed the links between Tea Party organizations and explicitly white supremacist groups:

The result of this study contravenes many of the Tea Parties' self-invented myths, particularly their supposedly sole concentration on budget deficits, taxes and the power of the federal government. Instead, this report found Tea Party ranks to be permeated with concerns about race and national identity and other so-called social issues. In these ranks, an abiding obsession with Barack Obama's birth certificate is often a stand-in for the belief that the first black president of the United States is not a "real American."

(Burghart and Zeskin 2010)

The Tea Party movement resembles the new right movement of the 1970s and 1980s (Perlstein 2013). Both are hostile to a perceived liberal cultural elite that has imposed its will on the majority of Americans and has rallied the support of the poor, welfare recipients, people of color, and other “marginal” groups to redistribute the hard-earned resources of the “producer” class. Both right-wing movements have relied on “coded” racial language and politics. The Tea Party, however, operates under conditions of colorblind hegemony, so its activists try to avoid making reference to race.<sup>42</sup> Many recent studies point out that Tea Partiers are explicitly and often self-consciously aware of being white in an increasingly racially diverse country. They frequently label welfare recipients and “illegal immigrants” as intruders and parasites (Democracy Corps 2013).

What has shifted since the earlier years of the racial reaction (discussed in Chapter 7) is a more sustained focus on the state itself. As Joseph Lowndes notes,

In the populist imagination of the modern right forged in the 1960s and 1970s, hardworking white Americans were threatened by blacks below and their liberal elite allies above. The current absence of a black freedom movement, along with the election of a black president, has shifted white populist anger almost entirely upward toward the state itself.

(2012, 152–153)

Lawrence Rosenthal argues,

The election of a black president and the assumption of power by the liberal Democratic Party have fundamentally transformed the vise-like effect of such classical populist formulations as producerism. Now, both the liberal elite and their client base are on top. The experience is less one of being squeezed from top and bottom, but rather one of being flattened from above.

(Rosenthal 2013, 5)

The Tea Party’s anti-statist politics is indeed a racial project. It appeals to whites who benefited from the New Deal and who consider themselves the “real Americans,” who see their social status as threatened by the “undeserving poor,” and who worry about the “stranger (of color) at the door.” Most of these themes are generally not publicly articulated, but now and then, such sentiments seep out. In June 2012, a board member of the Ozark Tea Party made a speech at their annual rally with the following joke:

A black kid asks his mom, “Mama, what’s a democracy?”

“Well, son, that be when white folks work every day so us po’ folks can get all our benefits.”

“But mama, don’t the white folk get mad about that?”

“They sho do, son. They sho do. And that’s called racism.”<sup>43</sup>

The *demographic shift* of the U.S. population to a “majority-minority” pattern is a politically unprecedented situation. Reforms in 1965 and 1986 removed some

of the overtly racist components of the immigration laws<sup>44</sup> that had shaped U.S. policy since the 1920s, and thereby set off enormous shifts in the racial composition of the U.S. population. The emerging “majority-minority” demographic will mean that no single racially defined group, including those considered white, will be a majority in the country. Although we are still a few decades away from the emergence of that pattern nationally, major regions and cities are already majority-minority: California became a M-M state in 2000; New Mexico attained M-M status in 2002; Texas became M-M in 2005; and Hawaii and the District of Columbia have long been M-M (U.S. Bureau of the Census 2007). Arizona, Florida, New York, Nevada, New Jersey, and Maryland are projected to lose their white majorities around 2025. The three largest cities—New York, Los Angeles, and Chicago—are now M-M. Across the entire country, whites are poised to become one racially defined minority group among others, probably at some point in the middle of this century.<sup>45</sup>

*Immigration* dynamics are shaping both the divisions in the Republican Party and the deeper demographic shifts we have mentioned. Demography is not destiny, but anti-immigrant hostility—inevitably racist—is one of the most venerable traditions in U.S. politics (Ngai 2005; Chavez 2013 [2008]; Schrag 2010). Nativism today confronts obstacles that did not exist in the past. In contrast to the sweeping anti-immigrant upsurges of yore (Higham 2002 [1955]), today a significant immigrant rights movement exists in the United States; this is unprecedented in U.S. history. Before the rise of the modern civil rights movement, exhortations on behalf of “Anglo-conformity” (Gordon 1964) were taken quite seriously. Virulent nativist assaults such as the anti-Irish movements of the 1840s (the American Native party or “Know-Nothings”), the 1870s and 1890s assaults on west coast Asian communities (Saxton 1971; Pfaelzer 2008), and the 1930s mass deportations of Mexican@s from Southern California (Balderrama and Rodríguez 2006 [1995]) would prove considerably harder to stage today. The outcome of present-day immigration struggles is dependent on a lot of political contention at the local, national, and global levels, but pressures for inclusion unquestionably have greater resonance today than ever before.<sup>46</sup>

Immigration dynamics have not only reshaped racial demography and race politics in the past half-century; they have reshaped American society (de Genova, ed. 2006). This is evident in the deep transformations of the roles of Asians and Latin@s. Many Asian immigrants arrived after 1965, but poor and unskilled Asians were discouraged from coming after 1990. Today a bifurcated Asian American class pattern exists, largely structured by immigration policies. In much of Asian America today, immigrants and their descendants constitute a professional class, while significant working-class and impoverished sectors remain. Asian migration patterns have been tied since 1900 to American imperial practices on the Pacific Rim and beyond. Even liberal whites underestimated how race-neutral immigration rules, coupled with state practices in Asia to expand educational opportunities, resulted in one of the most significant migrations of skilled people from one region to another in world history.

The racialization of Latin@s has also shifted dramatically. Policies of immigration control and repression (policing, deportation, and incarceration) have divided and eroded public culture, notably in the Southwest but nationally as well. The policing and militarization of the border, the extension of immigration surveillance and repression into the interior (Coleman 2007), combined with the continuing recruitment of immigrant labor at all strata of the workforce, have steadily transformed U.S. society. The U.S.–Mexico border was until recently a low-waged, free labor market, with minimal state regulation. It is now a 2000 mile-long crime scene, where trafficking and vigilantism operate symbiotically with official nativism.<sup>47</sup>

Meanwhile not just the Obama presidency, but a host of recent developments have demonstrated the growing isolation and marginalization of the Republican Party. It has become the white people's party, driven in large measure by racial, religious, and gender/sexuality-based resentment.<sup>48</sup> As the Republican Party locks in its white identity, and as the demographic increase of the U.S. population of color continues, it is hard to avoid the impression that after what seemed like an endless reactionary march, the U.S. electoral system will have to move again toward the left. In the short term, though, there are undoubtedly still political gains to be made through immigrant-bashing, law-and-order fearmongering, use of racial "code words," and above all, appeals to be colorblind.

## Notes

1. On the Powell memo, see Phillips-Fein 2010, 150–165; Harvey 2004, 43–44. Out of Powell's memo came these right-wing think tanks: Cato, Heritage, and the American Enterprise Institute, as well as numerous others. Some of these organizations had been around for years already, but had not seen themselves as particularly activist. Others were founded in response to business class demands (Stefancic and Delgado 1996; Woodward 2008). Powell was appointed to the Supreme Court by Nixon in 1973, two years after circulating the memo. Though he was a genteel segregationist for most of his life, by the 1970s he had become a racial centrist, whose position in the 1978 *Bakke* case shaped affirmative action policy for more than 20 years.
2. Reagan's victory was also helped by the debacle of the Iranian hostage crisis and Carter's failed rescue attempt, known as Operation Eagle Claw.
3. While Reagan's rise predated Prop. 13, the measure's popular base in California was congruent with his base as governor. Though Reagan never pledged not to raise taxes—and in fact did so several times as president—he remained an icon of anti-welfare statism.
4. In channeling resentment against the poor and especially against people of color, authoritarian populist ideology often neglects those *rentiers* entirely; in contemporary Republican Party parlance (and sometimes in Democratic Party discourse as well) they become the "job-creators," for example. It was not always thus. The Jeffersonian tradition was hostile to banks; agrarians from Andrew Jackson to William Jennings Bryan have shared these views. In the 1870s, 1890s, and 1930s substantial class resentments against the "trusts" and banks sometimes outweighed anti-black and anti-immigrant currents, though this was not



the usual pattern. See Steinbeck 1939, Chapter 22; Kazin 1995; Saxton 2003 [1990]. In the wake of the Great Recession of 2008, hostility to banks and the “too big to fail” formula echoed the producerist sentiments of earlier times. The “we are the 99%” formula of the Occupy movement has its origins in this Jeffersonian hostility to banks and *rentier* interests. (Sanders 2008; Graeber 2012.)

5. The continuities are unmistakable between this rap of a quarter-century ago and the right-wing rhetoric of today. Consider Republican presidential candidate Mitt Romney’s famous remarks that were leaked to the press during the 2012 campaign:

Romney: There are 47 percent of the people who will vote for the president no matter what. All right, there are 47 percent who are with him, who are dependent upon government, who believe that they are victims, who believe that government has a responsibility to care for them, who believe that they are entitled to health care, to food, to housing, to you name it. That that’s an entitlement. And the government should give it to them. And they will vote for this president no matter what. And I mean, the president starts off with 48, 49, 48—he starts off with a huge number. These are people who pay no income tax. Forty-seven percent of Americans pay no income tax. So our message of low taxes doesn’t connect. And he’ll be out there talking about tax cuts for the rich. I mean that’s what they sell every four years. And so my job is not to worry about those people—I’ll never convince them that they should take personal responsibility and care for their lives. What I have to do is convince the 5 to 10 percent in the center that are independents that are thoughtful, that look at voting one way or the other depending upon in some cases emotion, whether they like the guy or not, what it looks like. I mean, when you ask those people ... we do all these polls—I find it amazing—we poll all these people, see where you stand on the polls, but 45 percent of the people will go with a Republican, and 48 or 4 ... [Recording stops.] (Mother Jones Newsteam 2012)

6. The United States had been actively involved in organizing the Chilean coup of September 11, 1973. As Secretary of State Henry Kissinger said at the time, “I don’t see why we need to stand by and watch a country go communist due to the irresponsibility of its people. The issues are much too important for the Chilean voters to be left to decide for themselves” (Hersh 1983, 265; see also Marchetti and Marks 1974; Klein 2008).
7. The beat goes on today: as we write these words, surveillance and punishment are more with us than ever. The undeclared war in Vietnam has been recapitulated in the U.S. occupations of Iraq and Afghanistan, and in the undeclared “war on terror.” Numerous U.S. government agencies have targeted Americans of Middle Eastern and South Asian (MEASA) descent for roundups and harassment. Such policies, repressive and Islamophobic, have distinctive racist overtones; they mirror broadly observable prejudices in U.S. civil society. The U.S. government, it has recently been revealed, is monitoring *all* telephone, email, and web traffic worldwide. These warrantless searches were instituted under Bush II and ramped up under Obama. J. Edgar Hoover and his boys had nothing on these guys.
8. Of course, the term had been in circulation since Justice Harlan’s (mendacious) claim in his *Plessy* dissent that “Our Constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens” (Gotanda 1996).

9. In “massive resistance” we can see an early glimmer of neoliberalism’s overlap with white supremacy, in the confluence between privatization and the “right” to discriminate.
10. Lee Atwater (1951–1991) was Bush I’s campaign manager and subsequently Chairman of the Republican National Committee. He was also a high-up official in the Reagan campaign and mentor to Bush II guru Karl Rove. Atwater also had a side career as a rhythm and blues guitar player, releasing an album with—wait for this—Isaac Hayes, Chuck Jackson, B.B. King, Sam Moore, Billy Preston, Arletta Nightingale, Carla Thomas, and others. These stars contributed to different tracks on the record (Lee Atwater and the Red Hot and Blue Band 2001). On his deathbed at the age of 40, Atwater “apologized” (whatever that means) to the candidates he had race-baited: Michael Dukakis, Harvey Gantt, and Tom Turnipseed. Atwater reset the standard for race-baiting in “post-civil rights” era electoral politics.
11. Carbado and Harris note the persistent conflation between “is” claims and “should” claims in respect to racism, the “tendency both in law and public discourse to treat normative claims about race as empirical ones. Put another way, the dominant analytical framework treats ‘should’ or ‘ought’ as ‘is’ or ‘does’” (2008, 28). In other words, the normative idea (itself quite problematic) that race “should” not play a role in, say, college admissions decisions often slips easily into the claim that it can be disregarded in admissions procedures. Many other examples can be cited.
12. In his opinion in the *Bakke* case (1978), Justice Blackmun attempted to tackle this issue. He asked whether it was possible to overcome racial discrimination by simply ignoring race, and answered that question fairly resoundingly in the negative: “I suspect that it would be impossible to arrange an affirmative-action program in a racially neutral way and have it successful. To ask that this be so is to demand the impossible. In order to get beyond racism, we must first take account of race. There is no other way. And in order to treat some persons equally, we must treat them differently. We cannot—we dare not—let the Equal Protection Clause perpetuate racial supremacy” (U.S. Supreme Court 1978).
13. Various full employment schemes were mooted under the Great Society’s influence, for example the Humphrey–Hawkins Act. Probably the most serious proposal—A. Philip Randolph and Bayard Rustin’s “Freedom Budget”—had its origins in the civil rights movement (Le Blanc and Yates 2013; Rustin 2003 [1965], 197–201).
14. “Long Road Out of Eden” is the title of an Eagles track and eponymous album (Eagles 2007).
15. In 1976 Carter had received a majority of evangelical votes over Ford. In the mid-1970s the Christian right was still in its formative stages, and the Southern Baptist Convention was being drawn into politics by right-wing religious movements and televangelists; these were reacting to the Warren Court’s ban on prayer in the public schools and to the new reality of *Roe v. Wade*. Mobilized by the Christian Coalition and their local preacher, they went for Carter, the first of their kind ever to capture the White House, but their hearts were on the right, to which they would return with Reagan and where they would remain. Carter was an evangelical Southern Baptist, but not a fundamentalist. A modern liberal and technocrat, his religious views had been influenced by Reinhold Niebuhr. He was a lay preacher and taught Sunday school in the rural community where his family were planters.
16. Reagan was strategic enough, however, to make symbolic concessions on racial issues. He signed a bill to establish a Martin Luther King, Jr. commemorative national holiday (he had opposed this at first), and agreed after prolonged delays to the Civil Liberties Act of

- 1988, which granted reparations and redress to the Japanese American community for their barbarous treatment during World War II.
17. Before becoming president, Reagan had opposed both the 1964 Civil Rights Act and the 1965 Voting Rights Act. As president, he strongly supported the apartheid government in South Africa. His Justice Department urged over 50 states, counties, and cities to modify their affirmative action plans “voluntarily,” removing numerical goals and quotas. It was hinted that failure to comply “voluntarily” might result in court action. Reagan also pioneered efforts to eliminate government record-keeping on race. In March 1985, the Office of Management and Budget ordered the Department of Housing and Urban Development and the Veterans Administration to stop tracking the racial and ethnic characteristics of Americans who received benefits from these two agencies. These policies were recommended by the Heritage Foundation, a leading right-wing think tank, in its “Agenda 83” report (Holwill, ed. 1983).
  18. In the 1992 presidential campaign—with Los Angeles burning in the background—Bill Clinton seized upon some anti-white remarks by hip-hop activist and author Sister Souljah to repudiate “black racism,” and not coincidentally to challenge Jesse Jackson, then the nation’s leading black politician. Clinton’s comments were presented in a speech before Jackson’s organization, the National Rainbow Coalition. The net effect of the incident was to reassure centrist white voters that Clinton could “stand up” to the black and left base of the Democratic Party.
  19. Lani Guinier, the first black woman ever to receive tenure at Harvard Law School, had been a classmate of Bill and Hillary Clinton at Yale Law School in the 1970s. An authority on voting rights, Guinier was nominated in April 1993 for the position of Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights, the administration’s highest civil rights-oriented position. The nomination came under severe attack from the new right, notably in respect to the issue of affirmative action (Guinier was labeled as a “quota queen,” a notably racist and sexist phrase), but also because she had written extensively about racial gerrymandering. Clinton failed to defend his nominee, who was also abandoned by such liberal Democrats as Edward Kennedy. After a prolonged period of savaging of Guinier’s distinguished record, her nomination was withdrawn in June 1993. See Guinier 1995.
  20. In 1966 Frances Fox Piven and Richard A. Cloward published an article in *The Nation* titled “The Weight of the Poor: A Strategy to End Poverty” (Piven and Cloward 2010 [1966]). Their proposal was to organize as many poor people as possible to apply for AFDC, since many more qualified than were enrolled and receiving cash payments. This intervention—a potentially effective strategy for distributing large quantities of money to the poor, helped spark the National Welfare Rights movement and drew howls of anger from right-wing groups.
  21. A veteran of SNCC, the Mississippi Freedom Summer Campaign of 1964, and MLK Jr.’s Poor People’s March on Washington of 1968, Marian Wright Edelman was the first black woman admitted to the practice of law in the State of Mississippi. She founded the Children’s Defense Fund in 1973; Hillary Clinton was an active ally and board member of the CDF. Edelman fiercely criticized the new PWORA/TANF program as far more punitive and onerous, and denounced her former allies for punishing poor children as an electoral strategy. Her husband Peter Edelman resigned from his position as an Assistant Secretary in the Department of Health and Human Services in protest of Clinton’s welfare policy (Edelman 1997). Clinton later abandoned Peter Edelman *again* after his proposed

- appointment to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, the second-most important court in the country, ran into opposition in the Senate.
22. Reagan's "New Federalism" was announced in his 1982 State of the Union address (Reagan 1982).
  23. The official title of the effort, launched late in Clinton's second term on June 14, 1997, was "One America in the 21st Century: The President's Initiative on Race." The deprecatory remarks may be found in Reed 1997b; Steinberg 2007.
  24. The rise of Silicon Valley was related to the new social movements of the 1960s, and thus to the black movement, in ways that are not generally recognized. See Markoff 2005.
  25. Since earned-income credits vary with the number of children per family, reproducing as a tax expenditure what used to be a direct outlay. Tax policy is family policy! Tax policy is racial policy!
  26. We do not have space here to address NAFTA and the WTO adequately. These policies should be seen as reiterations of long-established patterns of mass low-waged labor recruitment and imperial economic management on a global scale. Those patterns, in turn, are deeply structured by racial dominance and subjection. On NAFTA see Hing 2010.
  27. Bush later said in his memoir *Decision Points* that being called a racist was the thing that hurt him most in his entire presidency.
  28. For example, the use of "vote-caging" in the Florida registration process. See Piven et al. 2009.
  29. Some key racial realists were Abigail Thernstrom, Shelby Steele, John McWhorter, and Tamar Jacoby, intellectuals on the political right. There were centrist and even left-wing racial realists too, sometimes people who abhorred Bush II on other grounds, but bought into one or another version of colorblindness (Kahlenberg 1997).
  30. The WCAR had positive effects elsewhere, notably in Brazil. See Htun 2004.
  31. One of the present authors was a participant at Durban and took part in some of the preparations for the WCAR as well. Yes, there were expressions of anti-Semitism at the Conference, as well as critical responses to it. There were also numerous critiques of governments around the world, including South Africa itself, for various racist practices. In a highly charged setting, this was inevitable, and not an acceptable reason for boycotting a meeting of this importance.
  32. Schlozman was a right-wing lawyer who had dedicated his work to voter suppression, among a range of other anti-racist activities. From within the department, he led an effort to politically influence the selection and retention of U.S. attorneys around the country. He also pursued the anti-poverty organization ACORN on trumped-up voting fraud allegations and succeeded in destroying it. Schlozman was reprimanded after a Congressional investigation found he had reorganized the staff of his division along ideological grounds. See U.S. Department of Justice 2008.
  33. Public housing that had survived the storm and was fit for reoccupation—solid brick apartment buildings that had mostly been built under the New Deal in the 1930s and were now nearly 100 percent black-occupied—were demolished on the order of the Federal Housing Administration.
  34. Ho has a lot to say about racism and sexism in those Wall St. highrises too. For example, she points to the pressures women analysts feel not to wear comfortable shoes or sneakers on their way to work, changing to dressier shoes in the office; to do so would indicate that

they are commuting, rather than living close by the financial district, and hence that they are of lower status. Black analysts feel pressure not to associate with each other at work, even if they are friends: “Like one of the guys from finance, he just happened to be a friend, but anytime that we are in wordprocessing at the same time and people see us, they are like ‘What’s going on with you two?’” (Ho 2009, 117, 119). For similar stories about high-end law firms, see Carbado and Gulati 2013.

35. Jones was a movement activist and intellectual briefly employed as the White House Council on Environmental Quality’s Special Advisor for Green Jobs. A policy wonk with a Yale law degree, he was also the founder of two movement organizations: the Ella Baker Center for Human Rights, and Green for All. He was booted fairly rapidly when his left-wing past became embarrassing to Obama. See Jones 2008, 2012.
36. In what became a national scandal, Trayvon Martin, a 17-year-old black youth walking in a largely white Florida neighborhood, was shot and killed by a “neighborhood watch” vigilante in 2011.
37. In 2000 Obama, then an Illinois state senator, sponsored and enacted Senate Bill 1324, a bill that required police to gather and report data about the race and ethnicity of all motorists stopped for moving violations. Although this measure only dealt with profiling in a partial way—only law enforcement profiling, only drivers, only data collection—it nevertheless did acknowledge the injustice of the practice.
38. Some suburban and exurban areas, like the Inland Empire of Southern California, experienced substantial economic downturns in the post 2008 crash. Along with urban neighborhoods, they often face virtual extortion by large retail employers—especially WalMart—that seek to replace outsourced industrial employment with low-income, no-benefit (and obviously non-union) jobs. For detailed analysis of the neighborhood cleavages this can involve, see Dawson 2011, 92–135.
39. In *Shelby County v. Holder* (2013), the Supreme Court struck down Section 4 of the Voting Rights Act, which had required voting districts with a history of racial discrimination to obtain permission from the Justice Department before implementing shifts in electoral practices and voting requirements. The removal of this part of the law, a key 1965 achievement of the civil rights movement, was followed virtually instantaneously by the imposition of restrictive voting procedures, not only in the South but in such places as Pennsylvania and Michigan, where Republicans control both the legislature and the governorship.
40. Democracy Corps (co-founded by James Carville and Stan Greenberg) found that when asked about gay marriage, Tea Party Republicans were apt to say “who cares” or “it’s not the government’s business” (Democracy Corps 2013).
41. New York Times/CBS News Poll: National Survey of Tea Party Supporters, April 5–10; <http://s3.amazonaws.com/nytdocs/docs/312/312.pdf>
42. Inevitably, racist attitudes and actions pop up from within the Tea Party ranks:  
 In quick succession in one week’s time, a protestor waves a sign “bye bye black sheep” and a small chorus chimes in and puts it to the popular song ditty of “Bye, Bye, Blackbird” in front of Desert Vista High School in Phoenix where President Obama spoke about housing finance reform. Hundreds of attendees at a Missouri state fair roared with laughter and applause at a rodeo clown’s mocking Obama. In Orlando, a knot of protestors waved racially insulting signs including “Kenyan Go Home” at Obama’s motorcade. (Hutchinson 2013)

43. Tea Party leaders in Arkansas later distanced themselves from the remarks when a newspaper contacted them for comment, and the broad member in question subsequently said she would stop using what she said was an “ice-breaker” joke in her speech (Celock 2012).
44. Although not free of conflict—sometimes of the black vs. brown variety, the civil rights connection to immigrant rights remains strong—most notably embodied in the legacy of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965, which was a civil rights bill in its own right and a priority of the Kennedys.
45. Population projections are notoriously iffy. In 2004 the U.S. Bureau estimated that in 2050 the proportion of the U.S. population designated as “Whites, non-Hispanic” would represent 50.1 percent of the total U.S. population (U.S. Bureau of the Census 2004).
46. Immigration reform has huge consequences for voting patterns, especially over the medium and long term; this has been clear in respect to Latin@ voting patterns since 1994, when Latin@ voters in California, who had been seen as a swing constituency, were pushed into the Democratic Party column as a result of California Governor Pete Wilson’s promotion of Proposition 187 (Ono and Sloop 2002; Jacobson 2008; Wroe 2008; HoSang 2010). Of course, catastrophic events on the order of the 9/11 tragedy are always possible—such tragedies remain susceptible to racialization and nativism. In the past, the United States has often recurred to “domestic foreign policy” in response to political threats. In other words, the country has tended to address major social conflicts (and sometimes international ones) by recourse to racist domestic practices. This is exemplified by the internment of Japanese Americans during World War II, the Palmer raids on Eastern and Southern Europeans in the 1920s, and the enormous waves of Islamophobia that followed the 9/11 attack.
47. Thanks to John S.W. Park for assistance on these points.
48. In U.S. history, there has generally been one political party that took charge of racial rule. This has been especially true vis-à-vis black/white demarcations, for example the organization by the Democratic Party of white supremacist rule in the Jim Crow era. But rapid swings are possible. After the critical election of 1932, U.S. blacks (those who could vote) shifted their loyalties away from the “party of Lincoln” *en masse* (Weiss 1983; Katznelson 2005). This occurred even though Roosevelt’s New Deal coalition effectively delegated control of the South to the plantocratic/agrarian/racist/“Dixiecrat” wing of his party. After the civil rights reforms of the mid-1960s, large numbers of white voters, particularly those based in the South, similarly embraced the Republicans.

# Conclusion: The Contrarities of Race

*The destiny of the colored American ... is the destiny of America.*

—Frederick Douglass<sup>1</sup>

## Introduction

A great human sacrifice created the United States and all the Americas: the twin genocides of conquest and slavery. Although an immense effort has been made to repair the damage that sacrifice caused, the destruction can never really be undone. Much of the work of repair has been carried out by the victims themselves and their successors, who have tried to make a life on the gravesite of their ancestors, and have sought to make “the destiny of America” finally theirs. That has not happened yet. Some of the work of restoration has also been done by the descendants of the original criminals, and by people who arrived at the crime scene later: white anti-racists and more recent immigrants. These people also suffered in the shadows of the foundational genocides and tried to come to terms with the “rituals of blood” (Patterson 1999) that descended from it.

Our aim in this book has been to provide a *theoretically informed examination of the United States as a racially organized social and political system*. Race itself has proven to be a very contradictory notion. The idea of race barely existed before the Enlightenment and the onset of modernity; indeed it has had a rather rocky relationship with the rationalism and scientism in which the Enlightenment was grounded. Race is certainly a modern concept: It is linked to the conquest of the Americas, the rise of capitalism, the circumnavigation of the globe, the Atlantic slave trade, and the rise of European and then United States domination of the Middle East, Indian Ocean, and Pacific rim as well.<sup>2</sup> Yet the race-concept also preserves premodern and irrational characteristics, most notably its “ocular” elements: “You can’t judge a book by its cover,” goes the saying, but reference to the human body is an inescapable element of the race-concept.

We regard race as a *master category* of oppression and resistance in the United States. This does not mean that race somehow created class or sex/gender conflict, or that it was more central than the other major social cleavages of the analytic framework of intersectionality. Rather, it means that in the United States race has served as a *template* for both difference and inequality. The establishment and reproduction of race has established supposedly fundamental distinctions among human beings (“othering”), ranking and hierarchizing them for purposes of domination and



exploitation. The importance of the phenomic dimensions of race—its corporeality, its ocularity—cannot be overstated. From the beginning of the conquest and settlement of the Western hemisphere, the necessity of distinguishing between settlers and natives, between free and slave, has profoundly shaped racial cleavages and conflicts, establishing the concept and categories of race as terms of oppression and resistance.

Today, the race-concept is frequently rejected as little more than an illusion. In contemporary popular discourse it is often claimed that “there is only one race—the human race.” Yet even as it is dismissed, race is also taken for granted. Though at times denied ethical legitimacy and scientific recognition, racial identity continues to constitute a fundamental aspect of human identity. How one sees oneself and how one is seen by others are both profoundly, and often contradictorily, shaped by notions of race.

Throughout this book, we have sought to understand the shifting political meaning of race. We have endeavored to explain the racial contradictions, both embedded and emergent, that are operating in the United States. We have argued that race and racism remain unstable, contested, and ubiquitous, at both the experiential or “micro-” level and the structural or “macro-” level of U.S. society.

In this concluding chapter, we address the main points of our account of racial formation in the United States. We concentrate on core theoretical and political themes, and do not attempt to systematize the arguments of the whole book. The following section, *Race as a Master Category: The Political Technology of Rule and Resistance*, frames some of the key issues: the long-term presence of race on North American shores; its relationship to oppression and resistance; and its sociohistorical attachment to the human body. Next, we turn to *Paradigms of Race in the United States*, where we note the inveterate reductionism of the main theoretical approaches to race and racism, the ethnicity-, class-, and nation-based paradigms. Then, in *The Trajectory of Racial Politics*, we focus on the post-World War II period, considering the brief rise and prolonged decline of the black movement (and its allied new social movements), as well as their accomplishments and disappointments in the struggle for radical democracy and meaningful political-economic equality. Next, we turn our attention to the present, considering first *Colorblindness as a Hegemonic Racial Project*, and then *Race-Consciousness as a Racial Project*. We conclude the chapter with a section on *Racial Rearticulation: Can It Happen Again?* There the question is future directions, both theoretical and political.

## Race as a Master Category: The Political Technology of Rule and Resistance

From the very inception of the American nation, race has provided a *template* for other sociopolitical cleavages and conflicts. Concepts of race have profoundly informed and legitimated domination and inequality. They have also shaped resistance, insurgency, and radical democratic struggles.

Because race is located on the body, it has proved a convenient means of rule, a political technology through which power can be both exercised and naturalized. As a means by which power can be “made flesh,” race has gained an enormous hold on North American political culture. Racialization began very early in the United States and never went away, though processes of racial formation have varied greatly across both time and space.

Conquest and settlement had its own racial logic vis-à-vis indigenous people. Settlers did practice slavery, but their main goal in North America was acquisition of land, territorial (dis)possession. Settler colonialism was largely oblivious to indigenous peoples’ identities and cultures; the Indians’ particularities were of interest to the Europeans and their descendants only to the extent that they proved useful for purposes of subjugation and rule. The racialization of the Indians began very early, producing not only genocidal but also deracinating effects.

Slavery rapidly acquired a racial logic as the European settlement of North America colonies developed a tremendous need for mass labor. There was never any hesitation about coercing labor: Native Americans and Europeans (mainly Irish) were enslaved first, the latter in very large numbers. But these “local” solutions didn’t work: Indians were vulnerable to diseases and prone to escape; indenture was a still a contract, not full-scale chattelization of the other. Nor was the available labor supply adequate in size. The turn to African slavery was ready to hand: The Portuguese and Spanish empires had already adopted it, and British ships were already engaged in supplying slaves to Brazil and the Caribbean.

Racialization involved the promotion of certain corporeal characteristics such as skin color and hair texture to a greater degree of importance than other presumably “normal” human variations, such as, say, physical height or eye color (Newman 1977). These phenomic traits, initially associated with African bodies or with indigenous bodies in the Americas, were soon elevated to the status of a “fundamental” (and later biological) difference. The attachment of this process of “othering” to immediately visible corporeal characteristics facilitated the recognition, surveillance, and coercion of these people, these “others.” This phenomic differentiation helped render certain human bodies exploitable and submissible. It not only distinguished Native Americans and Africans from Europeans by immediately observable, “ocular” means; it also occupied the souls and minds that inhabited these bodies, stripping away not only people’s origins, traditions, and histories, but also their individuality and differences. In response to these outrages and assaults, resistance developed from individual to collective forms, “groupness” or “fusion” grew, and soon enough also took on a racial framework, if only to face the white oppressors.<sup>3</sup>

The corporeality and ocularity of race—its visibility in the immediate present, in real time, allowed for its politicization as the fundamental cleavage in U.S. society. This is not to say that race either created, prefigured, displaced, or trumped other categories of social/biological “difference.” Rather, other forms of stratification and difference that existed alongside or even prior to processes of racialization—religious,

tribal, economic, geographical—found new expression and were given new meaning in a system increasingly dominated by the logic of race.

The intersection of race and *gender* gains particular importance because sex/gender also is a corporeal phenomenon. The chattelization of the body has been a common experience for both people of color and women. In many ways racial difference and sex/gender-based difference resemble each other because they are both grounded in the body. Millions of people, after all, are *both* people of color and women. Gender differentiation resembles racial differentiation in numerous discomfiting ways. Sexual relations, sexual coercion, can both uphold and breach racial norms: On the one hand, it can demonstrate male power. Consider the prerogatives of the property-holders of human chattel (they were all male): their tendency to normalize rape and concubinage for instance. On the other hand, the race-sex/gender intersection can also reveal commonality and shared humanity, breaking apart supposedly impregnable racial boundaries, and creating racially “hybrid” identities via miscegenation (Hodes 1999). Therefore anything from assault and immiseration to transcendence and resistance could and did occur on this liminal frontier. In turn, racialization problematizes gender boundaries: Consider the plantation “mistress” and her conflicting roles; the racist defeminization implicit in the “mammy” role, the racist hypersexualization implicit in the “Sapphire” role (West 2012).<sup>4</sup>

What about *class* and the racial body? David Roediger (2007 [1991]) has revolutionized our understanding of these intersections in many ways. His work on U.S. class formation as a process of conflictual racial socialization follows Du Bois in emphasizing the links between racism and the submission of white workers to capitalist control. Roediger also stresses issues of masculinity, desire, and shame in this disciplining process. White degradation requires (much) greater black degradation. Still, in the view of Roediger, and in those of such other scholars as Hahn (2003) or Painter (2010), blacks observe and comprehend racism (and whiteness) with far more dignity and political depth than white culture could ever manage, whether through its rude art of minstrelsy or its other attempted exorcisms of the ongoing “fact of blackness.”

Corporeality is the “fact of blackness,” and in numerous ways, of “brownness,” “redness,” “yellowness,” and indeed “whiteness” as well. The phenomic distinguishes race from ethnicity (culture) and nation (peoplehood), as well as from class. This “phenomenology” of race was an early form of the “social construction of race.” It was driven not by any consolidated view on who black people were or who Native Americans were (those views developed later), or even who Europeans were. Instead, immediate and practical political needs shaped race: to assert control, to police the empire, to take possession of land and to extract labor. Religion provided whatever poor theory was available to explain these initial practices.

Only after conquest was assured and slave-trading was an established transnational business, in the 17th and 18th centuries, did “enlightened” debates take place among whites as to the nature and humanity of the native and the African. Kant and

Hegel, Locke and Hume, Voltaire and Jefferson (see Count, ed. 1950; Eze, ed. 1997; Bernasconi and Lott, eds. 2000), all the great thinkers in fact, made preposterous claims about race.<sup>5</sup> It was only after the founding genocides were established historical facts—the mines of Potosí, the liquidation of the Arawak, the Angolan “way of death” (Miller 1996 [1988])—that rationalization became necessary: “Sure there were terrible brutalities, but these backward peoples had to be dragged kicking and screaming into the modern world,” and so on. Even Marx, who denounced “the turning of Africa into a warren for the commercial hunting of black skins,” was susceptible to this sort of thinking.

In the United States the theoretical framework for deciphering the social construction of race began in earnest with Du Bois.<sup>6</sup> It derived in part from pragmatism, both for “the Doctor” and for the Chicago School of Sociology, where Du Bois’s insights were re-invented by white people. Social constructionists at Chicago rejected much of the biologicistic approach to race. They saw it, as Du Bois had seen it as well, as the product of a crude Darwinism that had developed out of the 19th-century efforts to rationalize the brutalities of primitive accumulation, slavery, and empire. With evolutionary accounts and eugenics, scientific means of ideologizing race largely supplanted religious ones.

Even with social constructionism, in the hands of Robert E. Park (the “race relations cycle”), of Gunnar Myrdal, of post-World War II ethnicity theorists (Glazer and Moynihan), or indeed in our own racial formation theory in this book, we social scientists continue to reiterate that early ocular view of race. It must be remembered that the visibility of race was used as a tool to consolidate domination, to seize land, and to recruit and extract mass labor. All this is still going on today. The racism of the past is still active in the present.

To what extent is this racial body, this phenomic raciality, enmeshed in politics, even in today’s supposedly colorblind age? To look at the nightly news in 2014 America is to answer that question clearly: the highlighting of black and brown crime; as well as racial profiling, the murders of blacks and Latin@s by whites and especially by the police, continue at a steady pace, as if civil rights had never happened.<sup>7</sup> If profiling were not “ocular,” it would not exist. Corporeality continues to determine popular understandings of race and thus to shape both white supremacy and colorblind hegemony in the United States today.

## Paradigms of Race in the United States

Theory is driven by demand; by the necessity to explain, account for, and manage (as well as to resist) socio-historical changes. At the close of World War II, Ashley Montagu and others associated with the United Nations labeled race “man’s most dangerous myth” (Montagu 1945) in direct response to the horrors of Nazi race science. The civil rights upsurge in the postwar period generated the need for new racial theory to address issues of inequality, marginalization, and disenfranchisement. The

three paradigms we have discussed—ethnicity (culture)-based, class (inequality)-based, and nation (peoplehood)-based—all emerged from this historical crucible.

The post-World War II black movement represented the second great upsurge in U.S. racial history. The first such upsurge, of course, was the Civil War and Reconstruction. Both in the mid-19th century and in the mid-20th, these movements were connected to larger, global, insurgencies: abolitionism and anti-imperialism in particular. Triggered by the vast mobilizations and demographic shifts during World War II and its aftermath, the Civil Rights movement in the United States was a “case,” maybe the largest case, of the racial upsurge that took place around the world in the mid-20th century (Winant 2001).

*Ethnicity theory* was originally driven by the need to explain (and control) massive European immigration to the United States around the turn of the 20th century. It was revived in the post-World War II period in response to the civil rights upsurge. It was the only accommodation-oriented racial paradigm that was available. Greatly facilitated by the Myrdal study (1944), ethnicity theory was resuscitated to inform and support liberal race politics and civil rights reforms. The assimilationist and cultural pluralist tendencies in ethnicity theory were originally accounts of the great European migrations of the late 19th and early 20th centuries—stories of slow, gradual integration of non-Protestant, not quite white people, into the American mainstream (Jacobson 1999).

Ethnicity theory’s encounter with blackness from the late 1940s through the 1960s was naïve and meliorist. It assumed that people of color could access the same mobility, and be granted the same opportunities, that European, non-WASP immigrants like Jews and Italians had acquired, especially after World War I, and that the Irish had gradually achieved in the decades after the Civil War.

The ethnicity paradigm was conceived in reference to an unprecedented and perhaps unique historical period of immigration and assimilation. Although it is still popularly regarded as a general theory of group incorporation, ethnicity theory might more appropriately be seen as specific to one particular historical conjuncture: one limited period of U.S. immigration and settlement *that might never be repeated*.<sup>8</sup> Fabricating such a grand theory based on limited case studies in specific historical circumstances is, of course, problematic. Ethnicity theory neglected normative whiteness; it largely failed to notice the corporeal significance of race. In linking post-World War II black “progress” to that of earlier European immigrant groups, ethnicity theory denied the emancipatory and democratic dimensions of the black struggle. It also gestured toward the neoconservative orientation its chief analysts would later pursue.

*Class-based theory*—Mainstream economics, liberal sociology, and Marxism were also challenged by the civil rights upsurge. Most centrally, they had to take sides: for or against the welfare state? *On the pro side* were those who favored extending the New Deal to include blacks and the “other others” who had been excluded in the 1930s. This was something the government itself embraced, in the form of the Great Society.

Beyond that lay Marxism, and many class theorists identified as such—as social democrats on one end of the left spectrum and Marxist-Leninists on the other. While left variants of the class paradigm of race educated and mobilized many people, they could never attain a foothold in the racial state. With the benefit of hindsight we can see that the social democrats who advised the Democratic Party to adopt redistributive policies were bound to be disappointed. Obama, we read, has banned the term “redistribution” from the White House (Harwood 2013). Clinton too danced to the tune of Wall Street. Even his advisor William J. Wilson’s (2012 [1987]) sage counsel about lessening racial inequality by adopting a policy of redistribution along class lines was largely disregarded by his patron. Abjuring across-the-board redistribution policies has been the price that neoliberal economic hegemony exacted from Democratic administrations.

The Democrats were only able—perhaps only allowed—to make small, badly needed, minimally effective, redistributive reforms, such as the Earned Income Tax Credit under Clinton and the Obamacare health “reforms”—the Affordable Care Act.<sup>9</sup> Both the Wilson and the Massey/Denton stratification analyses effectively pointed to the intractability of racial inequality in the absence of much more radical transformations than the United States has seen since Civil War and Reconstruction days. These and other class theorists of race produced useful policy analysis. They chronicled the evacuation of jobs (Wilson 1997) and the persistence and indeed deepening of segregation (Massey and Denton 1993). Beyond the ghetto, Douglas Massey’s (2008) work on immigration suggested the emergence of a more complex pattern of stratification, with limited mobility for some Latinos but not for all.

Marxist-Leninist approaches to race were demolished by the global collapse of their ideology. While some vestiges of social democracy survived the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the adoption of the Deng Xiaoping version of neoliberalism in China, not many race theories from the M-L trend endured. Even in 1980, when Brezhnev still ruled the USSR and Mao’s body was barely cool in its Tiananmen mausoleum, the impossibility of communism in the United States was plain to see.

*On the con side* it was the right-wing class theorists of race who opposed the welfare state. The rise and consolidation of neoliberalism, beginning with the Reagan administration and continuing today, represented a profound victory for them, a deep defeat for people of color, and a stark rejection of the democratic and egalitarian gains achieved by the movement and its allies. Neoliberalism incorporated colorblind racial ideology, indeed depended upon it and saw it elevated to hegemonic status, beginning in the Reagan years and especially after Obama was elected.

*Nation-based theories* of race, along with class theories, played an important role in challenging the dominant ethnicity paradigm during the later stages of the black movement’s rising phase (roughly 1966 to 1970) and as the declining phase of the trajectory set in during the early 1970s. This was the black power era. Malcolm lay dead, but his influence loomed large. The Black Panther Party had some tremendous achievements—notably in “politicizing the social,” but also in community service (Nelson 2013). The diverse nationalist currents of this brief period—black,

Latino, Asian, and Native American—were all limited by the problematic of racial “lumping,” the downside, so to speak, of the “peoplehood” framework. Within each racially-derived notion of “the nation”—the black nation, Aztlán and panethnic concepts of *La Raza*, indigeneity, and Asian American panethnicity as well—there were enormous divisions, class-based, ideological, and ethnic. Collectivity proved ephemeral, and thus the concept of peoplehood faltered as well.

Beyond this, nation-based activists and intellectuals were unable to delineate a successful strategy to oppose racial reaction. Although the sense of peoplehood that lies at the core of nationalism could not be consolidated theoretically or practically, it did survive as an informal cultural framework. Especially in the black community, where it had a centuries-long history, nationalism was quite resilient (Walters 1997; Dawson 2003). Amplifying and diffusing the already present race-consciousness that existed within and among communities of color, the nation-based paradigm continued to operate as a theoretically rich framework for cultural and political activism. Although constantly susceptible to the pitfalls of authoritarianism (Gilroy 2000) and to decay into apolitical symbolism, today the nation-based paradigm has shed many of its earlier separatist and merely gestural dimensions. Perhaps what Huey P. Newton once called “intercommunalism” is the direction in which 21st century U.S. racial nationalism is heading. Reductionist as it may be, to the extent that this paradigm has been able to uphold the banner of race consciousness through the dark night of colorblind racial hegemony, it offers clues and lessons for the U.S. racial future.

\* \* \*

The three paradigms of race that developed during the postwar period were all limited by their partiality. They all relied on one central category—culture, inequality, or peoplehood—in their interpretations of racial dynamics in the United States. None of the paradigms had a clear conception of race itself. All reduced race to a manifestation of another, supposedly more fundamental, sociopolitical cleavages or differences.

This reductionism systematically neglected the uniqueness of race: its corporeal manifestations, its ubiquity, its permanent instability. Since racialization began in the early days of conquest and slavery, race has infused all identities in North America: we emphasize its scope and sweep. Racial identification, racial interpellation, has always involved “lumping,” both by the state and in everyday society.

Just as some people (mainly property-holding white men) have benefited through the authoritarian and dehumanizing characteristics of racial difference, others (mainly working people of color) have continually resisted those dynamics. Practices of resistance have sought to reinvent racial identities and to overturn racial institutions: hence the permanent instability we stress throughout this book. Because the racial paradigms of ethnicity, class, and nation were all based on the reduction of race to a manifestation of some other, supposedly more fundamental and “objective” human or social characteristic, none of the paradigms could visualize race as a unique



type of social identity and social structure, corporeal, central to modernity itself, varying across time and space, operating at both the individual and collective levels of U.S. (and world) society. Consequently, the race-concept remained something of a theoretical cypher, a congeries of distinct and unreconciled elements: Politics, ethics, culture, collectivity, history, geography, science, and religion all partook of race, and all jostled for influence over its meaning.

Still, despite their limitations the three paradigms each contributed something important to the mix of racial theory; they each furnished some of the key dimensions of the synthetic account of racial formation theory that we have presented here.

## Trajectories of Racial Politics

Derrick Bell insightfully described and lamented the “permanence of racism” (1992). We acknowledge that racism is a constitutive dimension of U.S. society, but we also argue that racism has limits, that it is widely contested, and that it is both politically organized and politically resisted. So how should we understand racial *change*? We answer this question by focusing on the trajectory of U.S. racial politics in the post-World War II period.

From the standpoint of the black movement and its allies, this trajectory can be envisioned as a rising and then falling arc. The movement achieved substantial democratic reforms only to see these gains substantially, if not completely, contained starting in the 1970s. Containment involved greater inclusion in the U.S. racial system, but did not eliminate the inveterate white supremacy whose origins lay in the colonial and slavery era. From the standpoint of the U.S. racial regime, the trajectory proceeded conversely: A long-standing pattern of stability and social control was disrupted and transformed by the black movement’s radical political challenge. This destabilizing threat was subsequently contained, in part by repression, but mainly by incorporation. What was crucial to the recalibration of the U.S. racial system was the political and ideological rearticulation of the movement’s vision of race and democracy.

It was an enormous achievement to put an end to official Jim Crow—the legally sanctioned and popularly supported (by most whites at least) racial despotism that had governed the United States for almost a century. The enactment of civil rights laws in the mid-1960s marked a real if partial democratization, an accommodation of the demands of a mass movement too wide and too deep to be resisted any longer. The post-World War II shift or racial “break” (Winant 2001) involved more than legislated and judicial reforms. Political incorporation was required as well as large-scale cultural reorientation. Both the mass movement and the elite supporters of civil rights also saw the reforms as essential elements of U.S. foreign policy, key ideological and political responses to the Cold War and the anti-imperial upsurge sweeping the “darker nations” of the planet (Prashad 2007; Dudziak 2011).

Civil rights reforms happened, though movement demands were often compromised and attenuated in the process of translating them into law. As Bell noted, major

reforms could only be enacted in a “moderate” fashion, and only if their key provisions were acceptable to whites and compatible with the supposed values of U.S. politics and culture: the American “civil religion” of individualism, equality, competition, opportunity, and the accessibility of “the American dream” to all who strove for it. For movement activists and intellectuals, acceptance of the reform agenda meant forgoing a more radical vision of social transformation in exchange for short-term gains, or facing marginalization or repression if they would not.

The radical vision that was largely abandoned was the “dream,” Dr. King’s dream, in which racial justice (not color blindness) played the central part. King’s vision in “Beyond Vietnam: A Time to Break Silence,” his April 4, 1967 speech at New York’s Riverside Church, also definitively linked the civil rights movement with anti-imperialism around the world (King 2002a). To be “free at last” meant something deeper than the gaining of partial access to key social and political institutions. It meant more than limited reforms and palliation of the worst excesses of white supremacy. It meant a *substantive reorganization of the U.S. social system*. It meant political implementation of egalitarian economic and democratizing political measures. Above all it meant redistribution of resources along social democratic lines and the extension of full citizenship to people of color. This radical alternative was also intimately linked to *global* questions: notably the end of U.S. war-making in the global South, particularly in Vietnam.

To achieve such a radical democratic program was beyond the reach of the 1960s black movements and its allies. The black movement in particular was facing repression, was internally divided along many axes, and lacked sufficient “mainstream” (that is white) support.

It was especially in reference to issues of redistribution that the “moderate” custodians of racial reform drew their boundary line, both in practical terms and in theoretical ones. To undo official, explicit, legalized racial inequality was permissible; to create racial equality through positive state action was not. Economic and political elites were threatened by the prospect of redistribution. Demands for substantive redress for the unjustified expropriation and restriction of black economic and political resources, both historically and in the present, were both economic and political anathema to the ruling class. Redistribution of resources to people of color meant not only social democracy but *radical* democracy, the political inclusion of millions whose marginalized status had guaranteed not only white supremacy but also elite rule for centuries. The potentially permanent linkage between the “third world” abroad and the “third world within” was also particularly frightening to the established powers (Kelley 1996; von Eschen 2006).

To contain such a radical vision, moderate civil rights reform became part of the political mainstream, which moved from domination to hegemony. The key component of modern political rule, of hegemony as theorized by Gramsci most profoundly, is the capacity to *incorporate opposition*. By selectively adopting the movement’s demands, by developing a comprehensive program of limited reform that hewed to

a centrist political logic and reinforced key dimensions of U.S. nationalist ideology, political elites were able to define a new racial “common sense.” This new racial ideology celebrated (and inflated) the significance of the concessions won. It divided the movement between more moderate and more radical tendencies. It permitted the reassertion of a certain broad-based racial stability, and defused a great deal of political opposition.

The partial reconfiguration of the U.S. racial system both made real concessions and left major issues unsettled and unaddressed. The fundamental problems of racial injustice and inequality, and of white supremacy more generally, remained: moderated perhaps, but hardly resolved. As the trajectory of post-World War II racial politics swung into its declining phase in about 1970, after the supposed triumph of the “civil rights revolution,” the U.S. state, the nation’s cultural apparatuses, and the people themselves had to manage and reconcile the contradictory conditions that anti-racist movements and civil rights reforms had created. This was, and remains, a tough assignment.

Sure, reforms happened. But race also retained its significance as a definitive dimension of the U.S. social structure. In other words, race continued to define North American identities and institutions. The “post-civil rights” era tugging and hauling, the escalating contestation over the meaning of race, resulted in ever more disrupted and contradictory notions of racial identity. The significance of race (“declining” or increasing?), the interpretation of racial equality (colorblind or race-conscious?), the institutionalization of racial justice (reverse discrimination or affirmative action?), and the very categories—black, white, Latin@/Hispanic, Asian American, and Native American, that were employed to classify racial groups—all these were called into question after the civil rights “victories” of the mid-1960s.

The declining phase of the political trajectory of race has now lasted more than four decades, despite the 2008 election of Barack Obama and his reelection in 2012. Yes, Obama has proved disappointing in many respects, but the expectations attending his ascent were outlandish across the entire political spectrum.

Over the post-World War II decades, the *rearticulation* of racial ideology has been central both to the rise and the containment of the black movement and its allied movements. Rearticulation was a key weapon in the movement’s rise: It provided a vital moral component of the movement’s claim to represent the true American ideals; it played a crucial role in the movement’s development of nonviolent strategy and tactics. It enabled the movement’s “inside/outside” political strategy.

But the racial reaction also learned how to use strategies of rearticulation to defuse the radical democratic and egalitarian thrust of the movement. Rearticulation proved far more effective than repression in containing the radical thrust of the black movement, and of its allied movements as well. A clear sequence of ideological tropes deepened and extended “post-civil rights” era rearticulations of racism: first code words, then reverse racism, and finally colorblindness.

At each stage of its development, the racial reaction carried out what we might call cumulative “latent functions” (Merton 1968). Code words channeled white

shame, fear, and rage; reverse racism deracialized discrimination, effectively absolving whites; and colorblindness reasserted American nationalism and the “unity” of “the American people” across the supposedly disappearing boundaries of race.

Based on this evolving racial “common sense,” the racial reaction was able to build a mass base, largely but not entirely composed of working- and middle-class whites who were threatened by racial equality and racial democracy. These whites (or their parents and grandparents) had benefited from the welfare state under the New Deal, which was predominantly a whites-only affair, and was quite anti-immigrant as well. When the New Deal restrictions on social investment in communities of color were lifted in the mid-1960s, many whites got off the freedom train.

The new right worked assiduously to fan white racial fears (code words), and to stigmatize such state-based reform policies as affirmative action, fair housing, and desegregation, as discriminatory toward whites (reverse racism). It revived nativism. Joined by right-wing populist anti-tax groups and armed with the age-old ideology of producerism, reverse racism activists reframed their defense of white privileges as a political and legal offense. Although they claimed to be fighting discrimination of all types, their real problem was civil rights reforms such as affirmative action, fair housing, voting rights, and immigration.<sup>10</sup> Ultimately, after years of Supreme Court hedging and trending toward the right, it became clear that the Court viewed racial discrimination as something that happened principally to white people.

But the containment of civil rights was not the end of the racial reaction’s project to reverse the gains of the movement. The objective had always been larger than that. It was to dismantle the welfare state, to limit taxation and other forms of regulation of capital, and to ensure the docility and desperation of the “others”: the poor, the workers, who were increasingly people of color but also white people, and even the middle classes. This was the neoliberal agenda. It was nationalist and “authoritarian populist.”<sup>11</sup>

*Neoliberalism both overlapped with and required colorblindness.* It required a racial ideology that repudiated the civil rights agenda of state-enforced equality and state-based extension of democratic rights, without regressing to explicit white supremacy or reverting to explicit policies of Jim Crow segregation. Repelling, repressing, and rearticulating the black movement’s (and allied movements’) agendas would not be enough for this purpose. In order to achieve hegemony for the neoliberal project of reinforced social inequality in a U.S. rid of its welfare state, with all the redistributive dimensions of social rights finally repudiated, it would be necessary not only to oppose demands for racial justice and racial democracy; it would be necessary to take race off the table.

## Colorblindness as a Hegemonic Racial Project

Today, in the 21st century, the concept of “colorblindness” is hegemonic in the United States. It has become the racial common sense and *desideratum* of our time. This does not mean that it is free of contradictions, however.

Those advocating a colorblind view of race assert that the goals of the civil rights movement have been substantially achieved, that overt forms of racial discrimination are a thing of the past, and that the United States is in the midst of a successful transition to a “post-racial” society. From a colorblind standpoint, any hints of race consciousness are tainted by racism. Thus it is suggested that the most effective anti-racist gesture, policy, or practice is simply to ignore race (Skrentny 1996; Connerly 2007). Critics of colorblindness, in contrast, point to the pervasive presence of race and racism—white supremacy—throughout the U.S. social structure. They emphasize the enduring significance of race and the persistence of racism, arguing that it continues to generate inequality across the entire society, most notably in such areas as education, employment, criminal “justice,” health, and housing, but elsewhere as well. In order to address the persistence of racial inequalities, they argue that race-conscious policies and practices are necessary, specifically to target and address the sources and causes of racial disparities (Brown et al. 2003; Feagin 2006; Kennedy 2013).

Both positions lay claim to the legacy of the black movement of the 1950s and 1960s. Indeed, colorblindness itself both reflects and subverts that legacy. Early on, colorblindness provided the general framework for anti-racist movement goals, a moment most familiar from the famous sentence in Dr. King’s August 28, 1963, speech: “I have a dream that my four children will one day live in a nation where they will be judged not by the color of their skin but by the content of their character” (King 2002b)<sup>12</sup> But colorblindness represented something very different in the last years of Jim Crow segregation than it did in the early 21st century. In August 1963 as the marchers converged on the Lincoln Memorial and Dr. King’s and other civil rights leaders’ voices rang out across the capital, overt racism, the U.S. version of *apartheid*, was still the law of the land. Desperate public officials and private citizens, many of them avowed white supremacists, were determined to preserve it at all costs from the growing consensus that sought change.

And things did change. An overtly racist ideology, buttressed by “scientific” claims, was widely disavowed. The Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965 led to the subsequent demise of state and local Jim Crow laws. Anti-miscegenation laws were deemed unconstitutional by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1967. Colorblindness, therefore, cannot simply be seen as a deceptive political hoax or naive matter of wishful thinking. It is a result, however intended or unintended, of the partial dismantlement of the U.S. *apartheid* system in the 1960s. Only by challenging that system, and by creating new, more egalitarian racial dynamics, was it even possible to advance the colorblind position.

“Partial dismantlement.” Consider the contrast between the 1960s and today. Half a century later, racism is mostly tacit. Although profiling is ubiquitous and discriminatory practices are often thinly veiled at best, explicitly racial laws are frowned upon. Although race is supposedly a suspect category, courts wink at implicitly discriminatory measures and indeed preoccupy themselves with supposed discrimination against whites. The reforms of the civil rights era seem increasingly ineffective

against an ongoing structural racism that sees, hears, and undoes no evil. To ignore ongoing racial inequality, racial violence, racial disenfranchisement, racial profiling, quasi-official resegregation of schools and neighborhoods, and anti-immigrant racism—it's a long list—under the banner of colorblindness is to indulge in a thought process composed in substantial parts of malice, disingenuousness, and wishful thinking.

Can we really embrace a colorblind approach to race in the face of recurrent nativism with its “show me your papers” laws and extensive network of harassment, imprisonment, and deportation? Can we ignore the existence of a prison system whose highly disproportionate confinement of black and brown people is a national scandal? Mass incarceration has become a racialized system of social control and super-exploitation with blacks and Latinos making up more than 60 percent of the current prison population (Mauer 2006 [1999]; Alexander 2012). Health disparities by race remain clearly evident with regards to access to healthcare, disease prevention, and life expectancy (Smedley, Stith, and Nelson 2003; Ansell 2011). Can we agree with the colorblind approach to race when, as Gary Orfield and Erica Frankenberg (2013), Jonathan Kozol (2012 [1991]), and many others have documented, school segregation has not only persisted but been both exacerbated and normalized in the United States? Can we accept claims that racism is “a thing of the past” when median white net worth is now *twenty times* greater than median black net worth, having *more than doubled* since the onset of the great recession of 2008 (Kochhar et al. 2011; see also Oliver and Shapiro 2006)? Regressive redistribution almost as abysmal has plagued Latin@s over the same period. How can such a rapid shift for the worse, how can a leap in economic inequality of such dramatic scope, be blamed on anything other than the victimization of black and brown people who aspired to middle-class status? How can it be reconciled with the concept of colorblindness?<sup>13</sup> How can we take seriously professions of belief in colorblind attitudes, when they are rife with irrationalities and contradictions (Brown et al. 2003; Carbado and Harris 2008; Bonilla-Silva 2009; Wise 2010)? From the cradle to the grave, race continues to shape and define our prospects, opportunities, life chances, and dreams.

Even more ominous is the realization that even past gains can be rolled back. In June 2013, the U.S. Supreme Court substantially weakened the Voting Rights Act, thereby allowing nine states to change their election laws without advance federal approval (Liptak 2013). This decision allows states, counties, and municipalities to enact or move forward with voter identification laws that have the effect of disenfranchising groups of color. Was our confidence in Jim Crow's passing premature, as Derrick Bell argued?

The litany of racial inequalities goes on (and on), but the appeal of colorblind ideology cannot be easily dismissed. It promotes a compelling common sense, a general “rule of thumb,” to guide and inform both institutional and individual practices. It provides a facile means for individuals to denounce racist beliefs and actions of a certain type—those that are explicit, overt, unconscionable, and morally unacceptable.

Colorblindness allows people (mainly whites, but not only whites) to indulge in a kind of anti-racism “lite.” While explicit forms of racial animus (such as hate speech) are widely condemned, policies and practices that continue to produce racially disparate outcomes are accepted and even encouraged under the guise of moving us “beyond” race and towards a truly colorblind society.

Not surprisingly, attitudes vary by race regarding the persistence of racial inequality and whether the state needs to proactively do something about racial discrimination. In July 2013, Gallup pollsters asked respondents, “Do you think new civil rights laws are needed to reduce discrimination against blacks?” While only 17 percent of whites replied “yes,” 53 percent of blacks and 46 percent of Latinos replied in the affirmative (Gallup 2013). We may all want to get to the post-racial promised land, but group differences abound with respect to how far along the road we are and what are the best means by which to get there.

Despite the withering criticism directed at the concept of colorblindness, we will not succeed in overthrowing colorblindness if we see it as erroneous, deceptive, or merely a hoax. *Colorblindness is also aspirational*. Indeed it is precisely because the old U.S. apartheid system was formally dismantled, and because the new racial dynamic that was substituted for it was more open and fluid, that it became possible to advance the colorblind position. That it has attained hegemonic status as the racial “common sense” of the present has been the outcome of a prolonged period of rearticulation by the political right—a sustained attempt to contain the radical democratic potentialities of what we call the Great Transformation.

As a racial project, indeed as a bid for racial hegemony in the United States today, colorblindness is a rude beast: ineffective, uneven, ungainly, deceptive, contradictory. But since hegemony itself is about the selective and strategic incorporation of opposition, it comes as no surprise that there are contradictions in the very logic of colorblind ideology. In the long run, colorblind racial ideology is only credible and can only “work” to the extent that it reflects the successes of the “post-civil rights” era in ameliorating racial injustice and inequality. A purely fabricated, mythical colorblindness could hardly be sustained intellectually, politically, or even socially in the interactions of everyday life. The effectiveness of colorblind ideology depends on its verisimilitude, on the credibility of its claim that U.S. racial conditions have improved—that we now have less discrimination, less racial violence, less racial repression and, correspondingly, more tolerance, more equality, and more inclusion.

Concepts of race, racial categories, and racial meanings continue to haunt and circulate in all social domains. Both in everyday life and in the political sphere, race organizes U.S. society. In civil society, people continually use race: We rely on perceived racial categories in social interaction, in the presentation of self, and to “navigate” in varied social settings. Consider such matters as getting a job, shopping in a department store, attending university, or dating. In political life too *the state needs race to rule*. Racial profiling and mass (racial) incarceration, for example, have become constitutive of the policies and practices of social control. Patterns of immigration and



developing trends in U.S. racial demography have created and revived a whole series of political opportunities. Ongoing nativist appeals exploit white anxieties about the nation's future and fears of the "other" in our midst. Immigrant rights advocates rally an electorate increasingly composed of people of color on behalf of redistributive economic policies and the extension of democratic rights. Overall, however, structural racism still steers the ship of state. Disinvestment in education generates a "school to prison pipeline" (Knefel 2013). Persistent poverty and unemployment, engineered under neoliberalism by the failure to carry out needed social investment, produces increased demand for social control and repression. In the United States, all of this is immediately understood in racial terms.

### **Race-Consciousness as a Racial Project**

Critics of colorblind ideology have argued that race-conscious policies and practices are necessary to address the persistent and entrenched forms of racial inequality in the United States. What does it mean to "notice" race?

Just as colorblind racial ideology occludes recognition of race beneath the veneer of a supposedly already-accomplished universality, race-consciousness works to highlight racial differences and particularities. This may take various forms, both democratic and despotic, both emancipatory and reactionary. Generally speaking, race-consciousness involves *noticing* the social fact of race, the presence of racial identity/difference, racial inequality, and racial hierarchy. Across a broad political spectrum ranging from left to right, from social practices of inclusion to those of exclusion, conflicting racial projects make use of these concepts, practices, and structures for a wide range of purposes. How is racial identity (signification) linked to racial inequality and hierarchy (domination and subordination)? How are new racial projects generated?

At one extreme, there is an aggressive white supremacist movement, organized to a significant extent, and with many sympathizers as well. This movement is generally far right; it has a substantial Internet presence on various racist and fascist sites. There is a substantial neo-Confederate political current in the United States that bridges between the far right and new right (Murphy 2001; Sack 2001; MacLean 2009). Although we have mentioned these political currents from time to time, and have noted their anti-democratic, counter-egalitarian, and biologically racist proclivities, we have not devoted extensive attention to them in this book.

The new right largely avoids, or seeks to suppress, its connections with the white supremacist race-consciousness of the far right. For the most part, the new right has embraced colorblind racial ideology, melding it as far as possible with neoliberalism. To be sure there are endless occasions when the race-consciousness that colorblindness seeks to suppress busts out into the open: in arguments for "the right to discriminate" for example, or in producerism (recall Mitt Romney's "47%" analysis of electoral politics, delivered in Boca Raton, Florida, in 2012). Our key point

here is that colorblindness is yoked to neoliberal assaults on the welfare state and to exclusionary, anti-democratic (small “d”) politics.

On the left, there is an egalitarian, radical democratic, anti-racist current. Composed of numerous organizations concerned not only with countering explicitly racist actions, policies, and discourse, but also with improving and strengthening the status and living conditions of people of color, various movement groups and their supporters are active across the entire range of social and political conflicts. Indeed they often address issues that are not explicitly framed in racial terms: rape crisis centers, battered women’s shelters, tenants’ rights groups, access to quality education, immigrants rights....

For the racial justice movement, noticing race and achieving race consciousness is a very different matter than it is in the white supremacist or new right areas of the political spectrum; in no sense is this movement the “equal and opposite” of the right wing. Anti-racism affirms the goal of achieving greater social justice; this is continuous with the political logic and moral appeal that remain from the era of civil rights and black power (and, of course, from the more distant past). For all its incompleteness and disorder, the quest for radical racial democracy remains a left-wing racial project: dedicated to redistribution (an egalitarian social structure) and to the recognition of difference (racial identity) rather than its denial. This approach to race-consciousness highlights the ongoing presence and significance of racial identity, racial inequality, and racial injustice. It takes seriously the unfulfilled social justice agenda of dismantling American *apartheid* and upholds the goals of extending the reforms of the civil rights movement and challenging existing structures of racial domination. On the left, there is a general recognition—obviously incomplete and not always explicit—that racial identity is an issue of freedom and self-activity. In other words, there are or should be choices about how we racially “represent ourselves in everyday life,” to speak Goffman-ese. To be able to act black or act white, to embody one’s *latinidad* or not to do so, are or should be options we have, not compulsions subject to stigma, constraint, or profiling (Carbado and Gulati 2013). This race-consciousness is explicitly or implicitly *radically pragmatist*. It acknowledges the social structures and practices of race and racism: the vast fabric of inclusion and exclusion, advantage and disadvantage, and power and powerlessness that are built into a social system based on structural racism. There is an ill-defined but palpable racial solidarity here as well, something akin to the “peoplehood” concept that inspires racial nationalisms of all types.<sup>14</sup>

Drawing attention to race—racial identity and difference, racial inequality and oppression, racial exclusion and violence—allows us to question the inconsistencies and platitudes of colorblind racial ideology. But we recognize that race consciousness harbors certain contradictions as well. “Essentializing” race is always possible: treating it as a fundamental, transhistorical marker of difference can reduce race to a sort of uniform people are made to wear, thus reproducing—however consciously or unconsciously—the stereotyping that characterizes racism itself.<sup>15</sup>

We also draw attention to the risk of authoritarianism lurking behind race consciousness—observable not only in the obvious authoritarianism of white supremacy, apartheid, and colonialism, but also in movements framed in opposition to these regimes. The authoritarian trap has plagued many resistance and oppositional movements. Democratic commitments in Marxist movements, for example, have given way to Stalinism and other forms of repression; anticolonial movements have spawned dictatorships; religious movements against persecution have persecuted their own dissenters; feminism has been split, sometimes in highly antagonistic ways, between “difference” and “inequality” factions, with some groups denouncing others quite vitriolically. Race consciousness, though an obviously indispensable rejoinder to the shallowness of colorblindness, cannot deny the inherent fluidity and sociohistorical situatedness of racial identity and racial difference, without risking a collapse into a authoritarianism of its own (Gilroy 2000, 1999).

Not only amongst the talking heads on TV or in the far-fetched racial jurisprudence that dominates the present period, but also in everyday life today, we are often exposed to the putative common sense of “post-civil rights” era colorblindness. Many of our students tell us that they “don’t see race,” that “a person is just a person” to them, and that they seek “to treat everyone as an individual.” Mostly, of course, it is white students who say this, but by no means do these expressions come only from the lips of whites.

For a long time we argued with such claims: “You don’t see race? Have you had your eyes checked lately?” (On this point, see Obasogie 2013.) But in recent years we have come to see that response as counterproductive, tending to validate the self-righteousness that frames colorblindness—whether willfully or naively. We are now taking a new approach in our efforts to counter the “anti-racism lite” that such positions entail. Rather than arguing directly against colorblindness, we want to recognize the unresolved dimensions, the contradictions that necessarily follow from the civil rights movement’s (and its allies’) combined accomplishments: their incomplete but real successes, their tentative visions of a solidaristic and “beloved” community, as well as their mistakes and limits, their necessary compromises, and their repression at the hands of a state and society built on racial despotism. Most of all, we want to recognize and rework the racial reaction’s post-1980s rearticulation of anti-racism into colorblindness. It was this long-acting racial project that most effectively contained the radical democratic aspirations of the black movement and its allies.

## Racial Rearticulation: Can It Happen Again?

If the “post-civil rights” years are characterized by anything, it is the experience of tension between colorblindness and race consciousness. Rather than denying that race matters, rather than arguing that nothing has changed, we should go deeper into the *contrarities of race*.

Although drawing attention to race—racial identity and difference, racial inequality and oppression, racial exclusion and violence—allows us to question the

depth and seriousness of colorblind racial ideology, we also want to recognize that race-consciousness exhibits contradictions as well. It is easy to mischaracterize race or misinterpret the significance of racial identity. Just when does race matter, anyway? Always, sometimes? If the answer is “sometimes,” what about those situations when race “doesn’t matter”? Are there conditions under which we should *not* notice race? Is not racial identity often ambiguous and contradictory? How should we interpret transracial solidarity and alliance? How should we interpret transracial identity, or transracial friendship, or indeed love across the color-line? These old themes no doubt retain something of their transgressive and unsettling character, but they are also increasingly normal, regular, and unremarkable (Daniel 2001; Parker and Song, eds. 2001). Can trust and solidarity exist across racial lines? Is it possible either in individual or collective social practice, to “get beyond” race? If so, how definitive is racial identity? If not, what are the implications for multiculturalism, democracy, humanism?

Race, we argue, has served as a fundamental organizing principle of injustice in the United States—one that has influenced the definition of rights and privileges, the distribution of resources, and the ideologies and practices of subordination and oppression. Racial domination has defined processes of “otherness” and marginalization; over the years it has “made up people” in ways that have indelibly shaped other dimensions of inequality and difference in the United States. Even under colorblind hegemony, race still operates as a master category: It is something that *must* be denied, or else the whole ideology of “American exceptionalism,” “the American assumption” (Du Bois’s term for “the American dream”), “government of the people, by the people, for the people,” and indeed “the American people” itself, falls into tatters.

We have described racial formation as a process of continuing encounters between despotic and democratic racial projects. As hegemonic racial ideology, colorblindness has to be enforced, not only in state policies and court decisions, but in popular culture and everyday life as well. This means that colorblind racial ideology and the social fact of race consciousness have a deep and queasy relationship with one another (Carbado and Harris 2008). Sure, to challenge colorblindness you must be race-conscious. But to police the ideological boundaries of colorblindness you must *also* be race-conscious.

Although the state needs race to rule, it is also confronted by anti-racist opposition and constrained by its own commitment to the achievement of racial hegemony through the “colorblindness” construct. In general, it cannot explicitly name, utilize, or exploit the race concept; instead it is forced to exercise racial rule covertly. The effects of the Great Transformation still resonate. This is a contradictory and conflictual situation, in which the racial regime simultaneously *disavows* its raciality and *deploys* it as broadly and deeply as ever. The crisis of hegemonic colorblindness generates the continuing instability of race in the United States today. Colorblindness underwrites neoliberal policies of superexploitation, anti-welfare statism, and “accumulation by dispossession.” Here we see the limits of President Obama’s post-racial

appeals, and the enormous difficulties involved in stemming, much less cleaning up, the ongoing accumulation of racial “waste.”<sup>16</sup> These contradictions extend to everyday life, where, on the one hand, we are supposed to be “postracial” and colorblind, and, on the other hand, we remain as race-conscious as ever!

Given the instability and processual quality of racial formation—Gramsci’s “formation and overcoming of unstable equilibria”—the hegemony of colorblind racial ideology seems particularly vulnerable and transitory. Changing domestic demographics, patterns of migration, the organization of repression, the politics of poverty, and propaganda initiatives (aka “the news”)—to pick just some obvious terrains—are all bubbling cauldrons of racial conflict. It is not likely that race consciousness is going to subside over time, especially in a social environment trending steadily towards deepening inequality in many social domains, and moving inexorably towards a “majority-minority” demographic.

Colorblindness is a highly contradictory phenomenon. In the past, it was a call for racial equality and inclusion. Today, it is largely an ideological framework for the effacement of race consciousness. But it can also be a vehicle for *deepening and variegating race consciousness*, especially if we can rearticulate the concept to mean something like “race-conscious when you need to be, when democracy and justice demand you to be.” A new and better understanding of race would recognize that the race concept’s meaning is being made and remade from moment to moment. This understanding points to a *radical racial pragmatism*.

Throughout this book, we have emphasized the concept of *rearticulation*. This idea refers to the *ideological appropriation of elements of an opposing position*. It is thus a central part of hegemony, which proceeds by “incorporating opposition.” After the 1960s, the racial reaction appropriated the ideal of colorblindness—which had been a radical, movement ideal—thereby turning it into a cheap simulacrum of the movement’s ideal, a parody of the “dream,” something that ratified instead of challenged the racial status quo. *Was that then the end of the story?* Was that the only time that such a bold political move could be pulled off? Or can that appropriation, that theft of a democratic ideal, be *re-appropriated, rearticulated once again*, such that a new paradigm of race based *both* on difference and solidarity, *both* on particularity and equality, might emerge? We would certainly not want to call such an ideal “colorblind,” but we would expect it to include the possibility of overcoming racial difference, at least in part, through a creative type of consciousness and action, a radical racial pragmatism. An emphasis on “self-reflective action,” to invoke a term from John Dewey (1939), is at the heart of the new racial politics needed in the 21st century.

The desire remains strong—not only in our hearts but in those of many others—for a more emancipatory concept of race and a more fulfilling, less conflicted, race consciousness. What would that look like? To be very specific, *what do you want your race consciousness to be?*<sup>17</sup>

If colorblind hegemony falters, if the “common sense” appeal of colorblindness cannot be consolidated, if the emperor of colorblindness is revealed to be wearing no

clothes, then what comes next? From a colorblind perspective, one has not to “notice” race, not to see it. Or one wouldn’t be “blind” to it, right? But what happens to race-consciousness under conditions of colorblind hegemony? Quite clearly, awareness of raciality does not dry up like a raisin in the sun. Just as colorblind racial ideology serves as a means to occlude recognition of race beneath the veneer of a supposedly already-accomplished universality, race-consciousness works to highlight racial differences and particularities. It can be linked to despotic or democratic ends, framed in defense of coercion, privilege, and undeserved advantage, or alternatively deployed in support of inclusion, human rights, and social justice.

Parallel to the question, what do you want your race consciousness to be? is another question: *What would a racial justice-oriented social policy look like to you?* What types of policies and practices—at the level of the state, civil society, and major institutions—would help us achieve a more comprehensive, deeper, and lasting racial democracy in the United States? We offer our own answers to these questions in the final section of this chapter.

\* \* \*

Since racism is so large, combating it must also be a large-scale practice. The reparations idea provides a valuable guidepost here (Munford 1996; Henry 2007). Reparation means repair, making whole, making good what was evil. As a sociopolitical project, reparations can be seen to extend from the large to the small, from the institutional to the personal (Yamamoto 1999).

Redistribution fits as well, but here we must be careful: The politics of income and wealth distribution are “double-entry” bookkeeping items. Not only the allocation of resources is involved, but also the derivation of revenues. If reparations were to be paid for the crime against humanity that was African slavery, it would be important to look at both the inflow and the outflow sides of the process. On the outflow side, reparations should take the form of social investment (think of a “Marshall Plan for the Cities” or something similar). Payments to individuals or families would be problematic. Slavery’s historical outcome in structural racism is the main evil we want to annul. On the inflow side, there is a danger that reparations would be paid out of general revenues, unduly assessing present-day working people for the crimes of past colonialists, slavocrats, and robber barons, perpetuating rather than attenuating racial conflicts, and allowing new variants of the colorblind argument to loom up in the future. An alternative revenue-oriented strategy would raise the money by means of a wealth tax, thus recognizing how many present-day capital hoards had their origins in slavery. Insurance companies indemnified slaveowners if their slaves escaped or shipbound Africans revolted, for example (Ogletree 2003).<sup>18</sup>

Beyond reparations, anti-racist practice can be understood macro-politically in terms of *social citizenship* and micro-politically in terms of *acculturation and socialization*.

The concept of *social citizenship* was proposed by T.H. Marshall (1950) as an obligation of the post-World War II welfare state, the proximate stage in the achievement of popular sovereignty. Rights, Marshall argued, had been acquired by the populace in historical stages: first economic, then political. The time had now come for the achievement of *social rights*. He meant that it was now possible and indeed necessary to consolidate and deepen the welfare state: not only through strengthening the social “safety net” but through inclusion, through the institution of far-reaching social democracy. Marshall’s framework was post-World War II Britain, and perhaps the industrial democracies of Europe and the United States. It was offered when the British flag still flew over Lagos and Singapore, and when Jim Crow still flourished; it was proposed when postmodern criticism of the limits of “rights talk” (in critical race theory, for example) had not yet been made. His idea of social rights did not encompass the diasporic and globalized issues of inequality and injustice that anti-racists face today. Yet we can make use of the concept of social rights to think anew about political inclusion, social provision, even world citizenship.

By *acculturation and socialization* we mean the reawakening of the 1960s concept that “the personal is political” as a key principle of anti-racist personal practice. No one—no matter what their racial identity is—can be free of racism in their heads or hearts; it is too deeply ingrained in the U.S. social structure. Structural racism determines that a comprehensive system of advantages and disadvantages—economic, political, cultural, and psychological—suffuses U.S. society. Yet a great deal of thought and action has been devoted to the problem of fostering anti-racist practice at the individual and experiential level. Developing these skills, fostering the interruption and interrogation of racism, and extending the reach of anti-racism in workplace, politics, family, school, cultural life, and indeed every interaction, is an important dimension of the practice we want to support.

While we have offered some tentative and sketchy answers to these questions, on a deeper level such serious issues can only be addressed adequately through the creative thought and political action of many people. Those are the masses, the multitude, whose “freedom dreams” (Kelley 2003) can transfigure and rearticulate the unstable and conflicted racial system yet again. Racial formation theory was developed to help explain the post-World War II challenge to the U.S. system of racial oppression: its rise and fall, its successes and failures. Surely, those movement-based challenges were not the last we shall ever know. If our approach has any value, it lies in the suggestion that racial politics is a *creative practice*, both individual and collective. Our actions and ideas—both individual and collective—should be seen as projects that have the potential to undo racial injustice and generate broader racial equality, creating greater freedom in every way. Racial formation theory should help us think about race and racism as *continuing encounters between despotism and democracy*, in which individuals and groups, confronted by state power and entrenched privilege but not entirely limited by those obstacles, make choices and locate themselves over and over in the constant racial reconstruction of everyday life.

## Notes

1. Douglass 2000 (1862), 485.
2. Winant (2001) offers a theoretically oriented historical sociology of the rise of the race-concept and the racialization of the planet in the modern epoch. For additional literature see Count 1950; Hannaford 1996; Davis 1999 [1975]; Fredrickson 1997; Bernasconi and Lott, eds. 2000. Obviously, any brief list will only scratch the surface of this vast topic.
3. The historical accounts provided by Thornton (1998), Lovejoy and Trotman (2003), Mullin (1995), and others suggest that African ethnicities may have been intermediate forms of slaves' collective mobilization. Thornton argues, for example, that numerous slave revolts were betrayed as a result of inter-ethnic rivalries. These authors also discuss how in the U.S. context slave owners, and the market in human chattel all on its own, worked to break up ethnic ties on individual plantations and in particular localities. Klein and Luna (2009) discuss some of these patterns in Brazil.
4. There are masculine tropes here as well: the "Sportin' Life" character in *Porgy and Bess* (Du Bose Heyward and George and Ira Gershwin, 1935); convict leasing and indeed incarceration itself as instances of race/class/gender intersectionality. The racist male tropes that have been applied to President Obama on innumerable web sites and political publications have their origins in 19th-century minstrelsy and 20th-century film culture (Bogle 2001; Robinson 2007; Lowndes 2013).
5. We 20th and 21st-century writers can only imagine the ridicule to which our great efforts at racial theorizing will be subjected in later periods. We can only welcome our critics, present and future....
6. Of course, "the Doctor" had important precursors: Frederick Douglass, George Washington Williams, and others, but none achieved his comprehensive level.
7. "[W]'ve been here before," writes Robin D.G. Kelley,
 

We were here with Latasha Harlins and Rodney King, with Eleanor Bumpurs and Michael Stewart. We were here with Anthony Baez, Michael Wayne Clark, Julio Nuñez, Maria Rivas, Mohammed Assassa. We were here with Amadou Diallo, the Central Park Five, Oscar Grant, Stanley "Rock" Scott, Donnell "Bo" Lucas, Tommy Yates. We were here with Angel Castro, Jr. Bilal Ashraf, Anthony Starks, Johnny Gammage, Malice Green, Darlene Tiller, Alvin Barroso, Marcillus Miller, Brenda Forester. We've been here before with Eliberto Saldana, Elzie Coleman, Tracy Mayberry, De Andre Harrison, Sonji Taylor, Baraka Hall, Sean Bell, Tyisha Miller, Devon Nelson, LaTanya Haggerty, Prince Jamel Galvin, Robin Taneisha Williams, Melvin Cox, Rudolph Bell, Sheron Jackson. And Jordan Davis, killed in Jacksonville, Florida, not long after Trayvon Martin. His murderer, Michael Dunn, emptied his gun into the parked SUV where Davis and three friends sat because they refused to turn down their music. (Kelley 2013)
8. The dynamics of immigration have shifted dramatically between the turn of the 20th century and the present. The U.S. now relates to the global South and global East through a policy of "accumulation by dispossession" (Harvey 2005). Immigrants are a lot darker than they were a century ago. Displaced and impoverished workers and peasants from Latin America and the Caribbean, as well as from the Pacific Rim, continue to immigrate, their human flow modulated but hardly contained by boom and bust, "bubble" and recession.



- And the United States has also become more racially predatory domestically, practicing a similar policy of “accumulation by dispossession” at home as well. Consider post-Katrina New Orleans or the subprime housing crisis—to pick just two prominent examples. So is the United States less able to integrate immigrants than it was in previous historical periods? Where will the country find an “engine of mobility” to parallel that of the late 19th and early 20th centuries, the epoch of mass labor recruitment to the industrial economy? In short, the country’s economic capacity to absorb enormous numbers of immigrants, low-wage workers and their families, and a new globally based (and very female) servant class (see Glenn 2002), without generating the sort of established subaltern groups we associate with the terms race and racism, seems to us more limited than was the “whitening” of Europeans a century earlier, this argument’s key precedent. On this matter, see Perlmann 2005.
9. “Reforms” in quotation marks here because the ACA was (a) modeled on a Heritage Foundation proposal later enacted by a Republican governor, Mitt Romney, then of Massachusetts; and (b) won support from the FIRE sector (the industries of Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate) by promising to deliver *c.*50m new customers to private insurance companies on a silver platter. Owning a health insurance policy was made mandatory, a tax according to the Supreme Court. The small alternative, the “public option,” was dumped. In fairness Obama did succeed at raising taxes slightly on the rich when the Bush II tax cuts expired. The cost of that was being forced to accept the “sequester,” Congress’s withholding of funding for already enacted social programs (as well as military spending). The 2013 cost of the sequester was \$85.4b (Congressional Budget Office 2011). All hail progressive and redistributive reform!
  10. The Supreme Court legal doctrine of “invidious intent” helped the racial reaction tremendously, because anti-racism policies and programs logically framed their objectives in racial terms. By contrast advocates for the racial *status quo* could argue in “colorblind” terms.
  11. On this concept, see the debate between Bob Jessop, Stuart Hall, et al. in *New Left Review* (Jessop et al. 1984; Hall 1985).
  12. Noting the distortions and perversions perpetrated—largely by the right wing—on Dr. King’s “I Have a Dream” speech, Michael Eric Dyson once proposed a ten-year moratorium on referring to it (Dyson 2001). That moratorium has now expired. The speech belongs to the tradition that Bercovitch (1978) called the “American Jeremiad.”
  13. The calamitous 2008 recession impacted groups of color far more than it did whites. From 2005 to 2009, median net worth fell by 66 percent among Latino households, 54 percent among Asian households, and 53 percent among black households compared with a decrease of just 16 percent among white households (Kochhar et al. 2011, 14). The entire subprime mortgage crisis was a racial crisis, with disproportionate numbers of black and Latino borrowers facing foreclosures and losing their homes. Long excluded from equal access to mortgage credit, people of color were first “steered” into unsustainable loans, and then dispossessed of their meager equities through foreclosures, “short sales,” and often fraudulent banking practices.
  14. Of course, white supremacism and authoritarian racism generate solidarity too. As Herbert Blumer pointed out, “race prejudice” against another group is often the most effective and rapid means of establishing solidarity and “group position,” both for the individual within her/his “own” group, and for the group itself to fortify its adhesive capacity (Blumer 1958).

15. Some scholars have warned about the scholarly reification of race, suggesting that race should not be treated as something “real”—as a legitimate social category in its own right, untethered from the mooring of racial oppression. This is visible in writings about the subject, sometimes large books, that insist on placing quotation marks around the term “race” (Darder and Torres 2004). While we have learned from many of these works, we stress that the instability of the race-concept does not imply the non-existence of race.
16. On racism as “waste,” see Feagin, Vera, and Batur 2001. These authors draw the concept from Bataille 1988–1991.
17. Some of the following text appeared in earlier form in Omi and Winant 2012.
18. British slaveowners were compensated for their “losses” in 1833 when Parliament abolished slavery, and North American slavocrats regained their autarchic local autonomy in the “Compromise” of 1877, which Du Bois (2007 [1935]) called a counterrevolution. No former slaves were ever compensated for their losses of family members, property, or pay, much less their kidnapping, confinement, and torture at the hands of their “masters.”

This page intentionally left blank

## Works Cited

- Abram, Morris. "What Constitutes a Civil Right?" *The New York Times Magazine*, June 10, 1984.
- Abu-Jamal, Mumia. *We Want Freedom: A Life in the Black Panther Party*. Boston: South End Press, 2008.
- Acuña, Rodolfo. *Occupied America: A History of Chicanos*, 7th ed. Boston: Longman/Pearson 2011 (1972).
- Adams, Julia. *The Familial State: Ruling Families and Merchant Capitalism in Early Modern Europe*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005.
- Agamben, Giorgio. *State of Exception*, trans. Kevin Attell. Chicago: University Of Chicago Press, 2005.
- Ahmad, Muhammad, Ernie Allen, and John H. Bracey, ed. *The Black Power Movement. Part 3, Papers of the Revolutionary Action Movement, 1962–1996 (microform)*. A guide to primary sources on the RAM is available at Lexis-Nexis; [http://www.lexisnexis.com/documents/academic/upa\\_cis/16313\\_blackpowermovemtp3.pdf](http://www.lexisnexis.com/documents/academic/upa_cis/16313_blackpowermovemtp3.pdf).
- Alcoff, Linda Martín. "In Arizona, Censoring Questions About Race." *The New York Times*. April 1, 2012; <http://www.opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/04/01/in-arizona-censoring-questions-about-race/>.
- Alexander, Michelle. *The New Jim Crow*, rev. ed. New York: The New Press, 2012.
- Allen, Danielle S. *Talking to Strangers: Anxieties of Citizenship since Brown v. Board of Education*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004.
- Allen, Robert L. *Reluctant Reformers: Racism and Social Reform Movements in the United States*. New York: Doubleday, 1974.
- Allen, Robert L. *Black Awakening in Capitalist America: An Analytic History*. Lawrenceville, NJ: Africa World Press, 1990 [1970].
- Allen, Robert L. "Reassessing the Internal (Neo) Colonialism Theory." *The Black Scholar*, Vol. 35, no. 1 (Spring 2005).
- Allen, Theodore W. *The Invention of the White Race*, 2 vols. New York: Verso 2012 (1994; 1997).
- Allitt, Patrick. *Religion in America Since 1945: A History*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2005.
- Allport, Gordon W. *The Nature of Prejudice*. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979 (1954).
- Almaguer, Tomás. *Racial Fault Lines: The Historical Origins of White Supremacy in California*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2008 (1994).
- Althusser, Louis. "Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses (Notes towards an Investigation)." In *Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays*, trans. Ben Brewster. New York: Monthly Review Press 2001 (1971).
- Amadae, S.M. *Rationalizing Capitalist Democracy: The Cold War Origins of Rational Choice Liberalism*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003.

- American Sociological Association. *The Importance of Collecting Data and Doing Social Scientific Research on Race*. Washington, D.C.: American Sociological Association, 2003.
- Anderson, Benedict. *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, 3rd ed. New York: Verso, 2006.
- Anderson, Elijah, ed. *Against the Wall: Poor, Young, Black, and Male*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2009.
- Anderson, Jervis. *Bayard Rustin: Troubles I've Seen*, 2nd ed. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998.
- Ansell, David A. *County: Life, Death and Politics at Chicago's Public Hospital*. Chicago: Academy Chicago Publishers, 2011.
- Appiah, Kwame Anthony. *In My Father's House: Africa in the Philosophy of Culture*. New York: Oxford, 1992.
- Aptheker, Herbert. *American Negro Slave Revolts*. New York: International Publishers, 1983 (1963).
- Aronowitz, Stanley. *False Promises: The Shaping of American Working Class Consciousness*. Durham: Duke University Press, 1991 (1973).
- artasiamerica; <http://www.artspiral.org> (digital archive) (n.d.).
- Asante, Molefi Kete. *The Afrocentric Idea*, 2nd ed. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1998.
- Atwater, Lee and the Red Hot and Blue Band, "Red Hot and Blue," Curb Records, ASIN: B000000CSI; audio CD, 2001.
- Bachrach, Peter, and Morton Baratz. *Power and Poverty*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1970.
- Baker, Lee D. *From Savage to Negro: Anthropology and the Construction of Race, 1896–1954*. Berkeley: University of California Press 1998.
- Balderrama, Francisco E., and Raymond Rodríguez. *Decade of Betrayal: Mexican Repatriation in the 1930s*. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2006 (1995).
- Balibar, Étienne, and Immanuel Wallerstein. *Race, Nation, Class: Ambiguous Identities*, 2nd ed. New York: Verso, 2011.
- Banton, Michael. "Ethnic Groups and the Theory of Rational Choice." In *Sociological Theories: Race and Colonialism*. Paris: UNESCO, 1980.
- Banton, Michael. "Max Weber on 'Ethnic Communities': A Critique." *Nations and Nationalism*, Vol. 13, no. 1 (2007).
- Bardacke, Frank. *Trampling Out the Vintage: Cesar Chavez and the Two Souls of the United Farm Workers*. New York: Verso, 2012.
- Barrera, Mario. *Race and Class in the Southwest: A Theory of Racial Inequality*. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2002 (1979).
- Barrera, Mario, Carloz Muñoz, and Gil Ornelas. "The Barrio as Internal Colony." In Harlan Hahn, ed., *People and Politics in Urban Society*. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1972.
- Barth, Frederik, ed. *Ethnic Groups and Boundaries: The Social Organization of Culture Difference*. Long Grove, IL: Waveland Press, 1998 (1969).
- Bataille, Georges. *The Accursed Share: An Essay on General Economy*, trans. Robert Hurley. New York: Zone Books, 1988–1991.
- Baxandall, Rosalyn, and Linda Gordon, eds. *Dear Sisters: Dispatches from the Women's Liberation Movement*. New York: Basic, 2000.

- Beatty, Jack. *Age of Betrayal: The Triumph of Money in America, 1865–1900*. New York: Knopf, 2007.
- Beauvoir, Simone de. *The Second Sex*, trans. H.M. Parshley. New York: Vintage, 1989.
- Becker, Gary S. *The Economics of Discrimination*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1971 (1957).
- Beckert, Sven. “Propertied of Different Kind: Bourgeoisie and Lower Middle Class in the Nineteenth-Century United States.” In, Burton J. Bledstein and Robert D. Johnston, eds., *The Middling Sorts: Explorations in the History of the American Middle Class*. New York: Routledge, 2001.
- Bederman, Gail. *Manliness and Civilization: A Cultural History of Gender and Race in the United States, 1880–1917*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996.
- Belfrage, Sally. *Freedom Summer*. Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1965.
- Bell, Derrick. *Faces at the Bottom of the Well: The Permanence of Racism*. New York: Basic Books, 1992.
- Bellah, Robert N. “Civil Religion in America.” *Daedalus*, Vol. 134, no. 4 (Fall 2005).
- Benston, Kimberly W. *Baraka: The Renegade and the Mask*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1976.
- Bercovitch, Sacvan. *The American Jeremiad*. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1978.
- Berger, Suzanne. *Peasants Against Politics: Rural Organization in Brittany, 1907–1967*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1972.
- Berlet, Chip, and Matthew N. Lyons. *Right-Wing Populism in America: Too Close for Comfort*. New York: Guilford Press, 2000.
- Bernasconi, Robert, and Tommy Lee Lott, eds. *The Idea of Race*. Cambridge, MA: Hackett, 2000.
- Beverly, John. *Subalternity and Representation: Arguments in Cultural Theory*. Durham: Duke University Press, 1999.
- Biddiss, M.D. *Father of Racist Ideology: The Social and Political Thought of Count Gobineau*. London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1970.
- Billig, Michael. *Banal Nationalism*. Newbury Park: Sage, 1995.
- Bittker, Boris. *The Case for Black Reparations*. Boston: Beacon 2003 (1973).
- Black, Edwin. *War Against the Weak: Eugenics and America’s Campaign to Create a Master Race*, 2nd ed. New York: Four Walls Eight Windows, 2012.
- Blackburn, Robin. *The Making of New World Slavery: From the Baroque to the Modern, 1492–1800*. New York: Verso, 1997.
- Blackmon, Douglas. *Slavery by Another Name: The Re-Enslavement of Black Americans from the Civil War to World War II*. New York: Anchor 2009.
- Blalock, Hubert M. *Toward a Theory of Minority-Group Relations*. New York: Wiley, 1967.
- Blauner, Robert. *Racial Oppression in America*. New York: Harper and Row, 2001 (1972).
- Blauner, Robert. *Still the Big News: Racial Oppression in America*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2011.
- Blight, David W. *Beyond the Battlefield: Race, Memory and the American Civil War*. Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 2002.
- Block, Fred L., Richard A. Cloward, Barbara Ehrenreich, and Frances Fox Piven. *The Mean Season: The Attack on the Welfare State*. New York: Pantheon, 1987.

- Block, Fred L., and Margaret Somers. "In the Shadow of Speenhamland: Social Theory and the Old Poor Law." *Politics and Society*, Vol. 31, no. 2 (June 2003).
- Blumer, Herbert. "Race Prejudice as a Sense of Group Position." *Pacific Sociological Review*, Vol. 1, no. 1 (Spring 1958).
- Boas, Franz. "The Instability of Human Types." Papers on Interracial Problems Communicated to the First Universal Races Congress Held at the University of London, July 26–29, 1911, ed. Gustav Spiller. Boston: Ginn and Co., 1912a.
- Boas, Franz. *Changes in Bodily Forms of Descendants of Immigrants*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1912b.
- Boas, Franz. *Anthropology and Modern Life*. New York: Norton, 1962.
- Boas, Franz. *Race and Democratic Society*. New York: Biblo and Tannen, 1969 (1945).
- Bobbitt, Phillip. *The Shield of Achilles: War, Peace, and the Course Of History*. New York: Knopf, 2002.
- Bobo, Lawrence. "Racial Attitudes and Relations at the Close of the Twentieth Century." In Neil J. Smelser, William Julius Wilson, and Faith Mitchell, eds., *America Becoming: Racial Trends and Their Consequences, Vol. 1*. Washington, D.C.: National Academies Press, 2001.
- Bobo, Lawrence. "President Obama: Monumental Success or Secret Setback?" TheRoot.com, July 17, 2008; <http://www.theroot.com/id/47320>.
- Bobo, Lawrence D., and Michael C. Dawson. "A Change Has Come: Race, Politics, and the Path to the Obama Presidency." *Du Bois Review: Social Science Research on Race*, Vol. 6, no. 1 (2009).
- Bobo, Lawrence D., Melvin L. Oliver, James H. Johnson, Jr., and Abel Valenzuela, Jr., eds. *Prismatic Metropolis: Inequality in Los Angeles*. New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2002.
- Boggs, James. *Racism and Class Struggle*. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1970.
- Boggs, James, and Grace Lee Boggs. "The City Is the Black Man's Land." *Monthly Review*, Vol. 18, no. 2 (June 1966).
- Bogle, Donald. *Toms, Coons, Mulattoes, Mammies, and Bucks: An Interpretive History of Blacks in American Films*, 4th ed. New York: Bloomsbury, 2001.
- Bolton, Kenneth, and Joe R. Feagin. *Black in Blue: African-American Police Officers and Racism*. New York: Routledge, 2004.
- Bonacich, Edna. "A Theory of Ethnic Antagonism: The Split Labor Market," *American Sociological Review*, 37 (1972).
- Bond, Patrick, ed. *Fanon's Warning: A Civil Society Reader on the New Partnership for Africa's Development*. Lawrenceville, NJ: Africa World Press, 2002.
- Bond, Patrick. "African Resistance to Global Finance, Free Trade, and Global Profit-Taking." In Richard Vestra, ed. *Confronting Global Neoliberalism: Third World Resistance and Development Strategies*. Atlanta: Clarity Press, 2010.
- Bond-Graham, Darwin C. *Bounce Back: Social Movements and Self-activity Through the Katrina Catastrophe*. Unpublished Ph.D Dissertation, University of California, Santa Barbara, 2010.
- Bonilla-Silva, Eduardo. "Rethinking Racism: Toward a Structural Interpretation." *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 62, no. 3 (June 1997).
- Bonilla-Silva, Eduardo. *Racism Without Racists: Color-Blind Racism and the Persistence of Racial Inequality in America*, 3rd ed. Latham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2009.

- Borstelmann, Thomas. *The Cold War and the Color Line: American Race Relations in the Global Arena*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003.
- Boston, Thomas. *Race, Class, and Conservatism*. London: Allen and Unwin, 1998.
- Bracey, John H., Jr., August Meier, and Elliot Rudwick, eds. *Black Nationalism in America*. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1970.
- Brady, John. *Bad Boy: The Life and Politics of Lee Atwater*. New York: Addison-Wesley, 1997.
- Branch, Taylor. *Parting The Waters: America in the King Years 1954–63*. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1988.
- Branch, Taylor. *Pillar of Fire: America in the King Years 1963–65*. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1998.
- Breines, Winifred. *The Trouble Between Us: An Uneasy History of White and Black Women in the Feminist Movement*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2007.
- Briones, Matthew M. *Jim and Jap Crow: A Cultural History of 1940s Interracial America*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2013.
- Brodkin, Karen. *How Jews Became White Folks and What That Says About Race in America*. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1998.
- Brown, Kathleen M. "Beyond the Great Debates: Gender and Race in Early America." *Reviews in American History*, Vol. 26, no. 1 (1998).
- Brown, Michael K. *Race, Money, and the American Welfare State*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999.
- Brown, Michael K., Martin Carnoy, Elliott Currie, Troy Duster, David B. Oppenheimer, Marjorie M. Shultz, and David Wellman. *White-Washing Race: The Myth of the Color-Blind Society*. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2003.
- Brown, Scot. *Fighting for Us: Maulana Karenga, the US Organization, and Black Cultural Nationalism*. New York: New York University Press, 2003.
- Brubaker, Rogers. *Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992.
- Brubaker, Rogers, Mara Loveman, and Peter Stamatov. "Ethnicity as Cognition." *Theory and Society*, Vol. 33 (2004).
- Bulmer, Martin. *The Chicago School of Sociology: Institutionalization, Diversity, and the Rise of Sociological Research*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986.
- Burawoy, Michael. "Race, Class, and Colonialism," *Social and Economic Studies*, Vol. 24, no. 4 (December, 1974).
- Burghart, Devin, and Leonard Zeskind. *Tea Party Nationalism*. Institute for Research & Education on Human Rights (IREHR), October 19, 2010; <http://www.irehr.org/issue-areas/tea-party-nationalism>.
- Burnham, Walter Dean. "Post-Conservative America." *Socialist Review*, 72 (November–December 1983).
- Business Week*. "The 1970s: A Second Look" (Editorial, Sept. 14, 1974).
- Butler, Judith. *Bodies That Matter: On the Discursive Limits of "Sex"*. New York: Routledge, 1993.
- Butler, Judith. *The Psychic Life of Power: Theories in Subjection*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997a.
- Butler, Judith. "Further Reflections on Conversations of Our Time." *Diacritics*, Vol. 27, no. 1 (Spring 1997b).



- Butler, Judith. *Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity*. New York: Routledge, 2006 (1990).
- Butler, Judith. *Precarious Life: The Powers of Mourning and Violence*, 2nd ed. New York: Verso, 2006.
- Button, James W. *Black Violence*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978.
- Calderón, José. "Hispanic' and 'Latino': The Viability of Categories for Panethnic Unity." *Latin American Perspectives*, Vol. 19, no. 4 (Autumn 1992).
- California Supreme Court. *People v. Hall* 4 Cal. 399 (1854).
- Calloway, Colin G., ed. *The World Turned Upside Down: Indian Voices from Early America*. New York: Bedford/St. Martins Press, 1994.
- Carbado, Devon W. "Racial Naturalization." *American Quarterly*, Vol. 57, no. 3 (September 2005).
- Carbado, Devon W., and Cheryl I. Harris, "The New Racial Preferences." 96 *California Law Review*, Vol. 1139 (October 2008).
- Carbado, Devon, and Mitu Gulati. *Acting White? Rethinking Race in Post-Racial America*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2013.
- Carmines, Edward G., and James A. Stimson. *Issue Evolution: Race and the Transformation of American Politics*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989.
- Carson, Clayborne. *In Struggle: SNCC and the Black Awakening of the 1960s*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995 (1981).
- Caslin, Sinead. "Going Native." The Imperial Archive, <http://www.qub.ac.uk/schools/SchoolofEnglish/imperial/key-concepts/Going-native.htm>; accessed Sept. 6, 2008.
- Celock, John. "Inge Marler, Arkansas Tea Party Leader, Makes Racist Joke At Event." *The Huffington Post*, June 14, 2012; [http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/06/14/inge-marler-tea-party-arkansas-leader-racist-joke\\_n\\_1597334.html](http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/06/14/inge-marler-tea-party-arkansas-leader-racist-joke_n_1597334.html)
- Center for Constitutional Rights, August 12, 2013. "*Floyd, et al. v. City of New York, et al.*"; <http://www.ccrjustice.org/floyd>.
- Chabot, Sean. *Transnational Roots of the Civil Rights Movement: African American Explorations of the Gandhian Repertoire*. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2011.
- Chase, Allen. *The Legacy of Malthus*, 2nd ed. New York: Knopf, 1980.
- Chatterjee, Partha. *Empire and Nation: Selected Essays 1985–2005*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2010.
- Chávez, Ernesto. "Birth of a New Symbol: The Brown Berets' Gendered Chicano National Imaginary." In Joe Austin and Michael Willard, eds. *Generations of Youth: Youth Cultures and History in Twentieth Century America*. New York: NYU Press, 1998.
- Chavez, Leo R. *The Latino Threat: Constructing Immigrants, Citizens, and the Nation*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2013 (2008).
- Childs, John Brown. "Afro-American Intellectuals and the People's Culture," *Theory and Society*, Vol. 13 (1984).
- Chung, Jean. "Felony Disenfranchisement: A Primer." Washington D.C.: The Sentencing Project, June 2013.
- Churchill, Ward, and Jim Vander Wall. *Agents of Repression: The FBI's Secret Wars Against The Black Panther Party and The American Indian Movement*, 2nd. ed. Boston: South End Press, 2001 (1988).
- Citrin, Jack, ed. *Proposition 13 at 30*. Berkeley: Berkeley Public Policy Press, 2009.

- Clark, Kenneth. *Dark Ghetto*. New York: Harper and Row, 1965.
- Clarke, John Henrik, ed. *Marcus Garvey and the Vision of Africa*. Baltimore: Black Classic Press, 2011 (1974).
- Clinton, George. "Paint the White House Black." On *Hey Man, Smell My Finger*. Paisley Park Records: B000008EDO, 1993.
- Cloward, Richard and Frances Fox Piven. "The Weight of the Poor: A Strategy to End Poverty." *The Nation*, May 2, 1966; <http://www.thenation.com/article/weight-poor-strategy-end-poverty>.
- Cockburn, Alexander. "How Many Democrats Voted for Taft-Hartley?" *Counterpunch*, September 6, 2004; <https://www.counterpunch.org/2004/09/06/how-many-democrats-voted-for-taft-hartley/>.
- Cohen, Thomas. *The Fire of Tongues: Antonio Vieira and the Missionary Church in Brazil and Portugal*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998.
- Cohn, D'Vera. "Census Bureau Considers Changing Its Race/Hispanic Questions." Pew Research Center; <http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2012/08/07/census-bureau-considers-changing-its-racehispanic-questions/>.
- Cole, David. *The Torture Memos: Rationalizing the Unthinkable*. New York: The New Press, 2009.
- Coleman, Matthew. "A Geopolitics of Engagement: Neoliberalism, the War on Terrorism, and the Reconfiguration of Immigration Enforcement." *Geopolitics*, Vol. 12, no. 4 (2007).
- Coles, Robert. *The South Goes North*, Vol. 3 of *Children of Crisis*. Boston: Little, Brown, 1971.
- Collins, Patricia Hill. *Black Feminist Thought: Knowledge, Consciousness, and the Politics of Empowerment*. New York: Routledge, 2008 (1999).
- Collins, Patricia Hill, and John Solomos. "Introduction: Situating Race and Ethnic Studies." In idem, eds. *Sage Handbook of Race and Ethnic Studies*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 2010.
- Comaroff, Jean, and John L. Comaroff. *Of Revelation and Revolution: Christianity, Colonialism, and Consciousness in South Africa*, 2 vols. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991 and 1997.
- Condé, Maryse. *I, Tituba, Black Witch of Salem*. New York: Ballantine, 1994.
- Congressional Budget Office. "Estimated Impact of Automatic Budget Enforcement Procedures Specified in the Budget Control Act," September 12, 2011; <http://www.cbo.gov/publication/42754>.
- Conley, Dalton. *Being Black, Living in the Red: Race, Wealth, and Social Policy in America*, 2nd ed. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2009.
- Connerly, Ward. "Let's Strive for the 'Colorblind' Ideal." *San Francisco Chronicle*, September 19, 2003.
- Connerly, Ward. *Creating Equal: My Fight Against Race Preferences*, 2nd ed. New York: Encounter Books/Perseus, 2007.
- Cooper, Anna Julia. *The Voice of Anna Julia Cooper: Including A Voice From the South and Other Important Essays, Papers, and Letters*, ed. Charles Lemert. Lanham MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1998.
- Cooper, Frederick, and Ann Laura Stoler, eds. *Tensions of Empire: Colonial Cultures in a Bourgeois World*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997.
- Coser, Lewis A. *The Functions of Social Conflict*. New York: Free Press, 1956.

- Cotler, Julio. "The Mechanics of Internal Domination and Social Change in Peru." In Irving L. Horowitz, ed. *Masses in Latin America*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1970.
- Count, Earl W., ed. *This Is Race: An Anthology Selected from the International Literature on the Races of Man*. New York: Henry Schuman, 1950.
- Cowie, Jefferson. *Stayin' Alive: The 1970s and the Last Days of the Working Class*. New York, New Press, 2010.
- Crawford, Alan. *Thunder on the Right: The "New Right" and the Politics of Resentment*. New York: Pantheon Books, 1980.
- Crenshaw, Kimberlé W. "Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics." *University of Chicago Legal Forum*, 1989.
- Crenshaw, Kimberlé W. "Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence Against Women of Color." *Stanford Law Review*, Vol. 43, no. 6 (July 1991).
- Crenshaw, Kimberlé, Neil Gotanda, Gary Peller, and Kendall Thomas, eds. *Critical Race Theory: The Key Writings That Formed the Movement*. New York: The New Press, 1996.
- Cross, Theodore. *Black Capitalism: Strategy for Business in the Ghetto*. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1974.
- Cruse, Harold. "Revolutionary Nationalism and the Afro-American," *Studies on the Left*, Vol. 2, no. 3 (1962).
- Cruse, Harold. *The Crisis of the Negro Intellectual*. New York: William Morrow, 1967.
- Cruse, Harold. *Rebellion or Revolution?* New York: William Morrow, 1968.
- Cullotta, Karen Ann. "New Owners to Reopen Window Plant, Site of a Sit-In in Chicago." *The New York Times*, Feb. 26, 2009.
- Curry, Constance. *Deep in Our Hearts: Nine White Women in the Freedom Movement*. Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2000.
- Dahl, Robert A. *Pluralist Democracy in the United States: Conflict and Consent*. Chicago: Rand McNally, 1967.
- Daniel, G. Reginald. *More Than Black? Multiracial Identity and the New Racial Order*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2001.
- Darder, Antonia, and Rodolfo D. Torres. *After Race: Racism After Multiculturalism*. New York: New York University Press, 2004.
- Davenport, Charles B. *Heredity in Relation to Eugenics*. New York: Arno Press, 1972 (1911).
- Davis, Angela Y. *Abolition Democracy: Beyond Empire, Prisons, and Torture*. New York: Seven Stories Press, 2005.
- Davis, Angela Y. *Women, Race and Class*. New York: Vintage, 2011 (1983).
- Davis, David Brion. *The Problem of Slavery in The Age of Revolution, 1770–1823*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1999 (1975).
- Davis, Mike. *Planet of Slums*. New York: Verso, 2006.
- Dawley, Alan. *Class and Community: The Industrial Revolution in Lynn*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000 (1975).
- Dawson, Michael C. *Black Visions: The Roots of Contemporary African-American Political Ideologies*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003.
- Dawson, Michael. *Not In Our Lifetimes: The Future of Black Politics*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2011.

- Deegan, Mary Jo. *Race, Hull-House, and the University of Chicago: A New Conscience Against Ancient Evils*. Westport, CT: Praeger, 2002.
- De Genova, Nicholas. "The Legal Production of Mexican/Migrant 'Illegality.'" *Latino Studies*, Vol. 2, no. 2 (July 2004).
- De Genova, Nicholas, ed. *Racial Transformations: Latinos and Asians Remaking the United States*. Durham: Duke University Press, 2006.
- Delaney, Martin R. *Principia of Ethnology: The Origin of Races and Color, with an Archaeological Compendium of Ethiopian and Egyptian Civilization*. Whitefish, MT: Kessinger Publishing, 2009 (1879).
- D'Emilio, John. *Lost Prophet: The Life and Times of Bayard Rustin*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004.
- Democracy Corps. Inside the GOP: Report on Focus Groups with Evangelical, Tea Party, and Moderate Republicans. October 3, 2013; <http://www.democracycorps.com/Republican-Party-Project/inside-the-gop-report-on-focus-groups-with-evangelical-tea-party-and-moderate-republicans/>.
- Denby, Charles, pseudonym Matthew Ward. *Indignant Heart: A Black Worker's Journal*. Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1989 (1952).
- Denver Art Museum. *Painting a New World: Mexican Art and Life, 1521–1821*, abridged ed. Denver/Austin: Denver Art Museum/University of Texas Press, 2004.
- Dewey, John. *How We Think*. New York: Heath, 1933.
- Dewey, John. *Intelligence in the Modern World; John Dewey's Philosophy*, Joseph Ratner, ed. New York: Modern Library, 1939.
- Dewey, John. *Reconstruction in Philosophy*. Boston: Beacon, 1948 (1919).
- Dewey, John. *Individualism Old and New*. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1984 (1930).
- Dickerson, Debra J. "Colorblind: Barack Obama Would Be the Great Black Hope in the Next Presidential Race—If He Were Actually Black." *Salon*, January 22, 2007; [http://www.salon.com/2007/01/22/obama\\_161/](http://www.salon.com/2007/01/22/obama_161/).
- Diop, Cheikh Anta. *African Origins of Civilization—Myth or Reality*. Chicago: Lawrence Hill, 1989.
- Diop, Cheikh Anta. *Civilization or Barbarism—An Authentic Anthropology*. Chicago: Lawrence Hill, 1991.
- Dollard, John. *Caste and Class in a Southern Town*. New York: Harper and Row, 1937.
- Donner, Frank J. *Protectors of Privilege: Red Squads and Police Repression in Urban America*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990.
- Douglass, Frederick. "The Meaning of the Fourth of July to the Negro." Speech delivered at Corinthian Hall, Rochester, NY, July 5, 1852. In Philip Foner and Yuval Taylor, eds. *Frederick Douglass: Selected Speeches and Writings*. Chicago: Chicago Review Press, 2000.
- Douglass, Frederick. "The Future of the Negro People of the Slave States." Speech delivered at the Emancipation League, Tremont Temple, Boston, February 5, 1862. In Philip Foner and Yuval Taylor, eds. *Frederick Douglass: Selected Speeches and Writings*. Chicago: Chicago Review Press, 2000.
- Dow, Mark. *American Gulag: Inside U.S. Immigration Prisons*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005.

- Drinnon, Richard. *Facing West: The Metaphysics of Indian-Hating and Empire-Building*. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1997.
- D'Souza, Dinesh. *Obama's America: Unmaking the American Dream*. Washington, D.C.: Regnery 2012.
- Du Bois, W.E.B. "Whither Now and Why." *The Education of Black People: Ten Critiques 1906–1960*, Herbert Aptheker, ed. Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1973 (1960).
- Du Bois, W.E.B. "The African Roots of the War." In David Levering Lewis, ed. *W.E.B. Du Bois: A Reader*. New York: Henry Holt, 1995 (1915).
- Du Bois, W.E.B. *The Philadelphia Negro: A Social Study*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1998 (1899).
- Du Bois, W.E.B. *The Souls of Black Folk*. Norton Critical Edition, edited by Henry Louis Gates, Jr. and Terri Hume Oliver. New York: Norton, 1999 (1903).
- Du Bois, W.E.B. *Black Reconstruction in America: An Essay toward a History of the Part which Black Folk Played in the Attempt to Reconstruct Democracy in America, 1860–1880*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2007 (1935).
- Dudziak, Mary L. *Cold War Civil Rights: Race and the Image of American Democracy*, 2nd ed. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011.
- Duneier, Mitchell. *Sidewalk*. New York: Knopf, 2000.
- Durkheim, Emile. *The Rules of Sociological Method: And Selected Texts on Sociology and its Method*, ed. Steven Lukes. New York: Free Press, 2014.
- Dyson, Michael Eric. *I May Not Get There with You: The True Martin Luther King, Jr.* New York: Free Press, 2001.
- Eagles. *Long Road Out of Eden*. Lost Highway/Polydor, 2007.
- Eberhardt, Jennifer, and Susan Fiske, eds. *Confronting Racism: The Problem and the Response*. New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1998.
- Echols, Alice. *Daring To Be Bad: Radical Feminism in America 1967–1975*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1989.
- Edelman, Marian Wright. *Kids and Guns: A National Disgrace*. Washington, D.C.: Educational Fund To End Handgun Violence, 1993.
- Edelman, Marian Wright. *The State of America's Children*. Boston: Beacon, 2000.
- Edelman, Peter. "The Worst Thing Bill Clinton Has Done." *The Atlantic*, Vol. 279, no. 3 (March 1997).
- Edgar, David. "Reagan's Hidden Agenda: Racism and the New Right," *Race and Class*, Vol. 22, no. 3 (Winter 1981).
- Edin, Kathryn, and Laura Lein. *Making Ends Meet: How Single Mothers Survive Welfare and Low-Wage Work*. New York: Russell Sage, 1997.
- Edsall, Thomas Byrne with Mary Edsall, *Chain Reaction: The Impact of Race, Rights, and Taxes on American Politics*, rev. ed. New York: Norton, 1992.
- Eisenhower, John S.D. *Intervention! The United States and the Mexican Revolution, 1913–1917*. New York: Norton, 1995.
- Ellison, Ralph. "An American Dilemma: A Review" *Shadow and Act*. New York: Random House, 1964.
- Ellison, Ralph. "The Little Man at Chehaw Station." *Going to the Territory*. New York: Vintage, 1995 (1986).

- El Plan de Santa Barbara* (April 1969); <http://www.ucsbhlhp.blogspot.com/2012/04/el-plan-de-santa-barbara.html>.
- Epstein, Steven. "Gay Politics, Ethnic Identity: The Limits of Social Constructionism." *Socialist Review*, 17 (1987).
- Erick-Wanzer, Darrel, ed. *The Young Lords: A Reader*. New York: New York University Press, 2010.
- Espiritu, Yen Le. *Asian American Panethnicity: Bridging Institutions and Identities*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1993.
- Essien-Udom, E.U. *Black Nationalism: A Search for Identity in America*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962.
- Evans, Rowland, and Robert Novak, "Ed Davis, Toned-Down Favorite," *Washington Post*, February 3, 1978.
- Evans, Sara M. *Personal Politics: The Roots of Women's Liberation in the Civil Rights Movement and the New Left*. New York: Knopf, 1979.
- Eze, Emmanuel Chukwudi, ed. *Race and the Enlightenment: A Reader*. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 1997.
- Fang, Lee. *The Machine: A Field Guide to the Resurgent Right*. New York: New Press, 2013.
- Fanon, Franz. *Black Skin, White Masks: The Experiences of a Black Man in a White World*, trans. Charles Lam Markmann. New York: Grove Press, 1967.
- Faust, Drew Gilpin. *This Republic of Suffering: Death and the American Civil War*. New York: Vintage, 2009.
- Feagin, Joe, and Chris Elias. "Rethinking Racial Formation Theory: A Systemic Racism Critique." *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, Vol. 36, no. 6 (2013).
- Feagin, Joe R. *Systemic Racism: A Theory of Oppression*. New York: Routledge, 2006.
- Feagin, Joe R., and Harlan Hahn, *Ghetto Revolts: The Politics of Violence in America's Cities*. New York: Macmillan, 1973.
- Feagin, Joe R., Hernán Vera, and Pinar Batur. *White Racism: The Basics*, 2nd ed. New York: Routledge, 2001.
- Federici, Silvia. *Caliban and the Witch: Women, the Body, and Primitive Accumulation*. New York: Autonomedia, 2004.
- Fischer, Claude S., Michael Hout, Martin Sanchez Jankowski, Samuel R. Lucas, Ann Swidler, and Kim Voss. *Inequality by Design: Cracking the Bell Curve Myth*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996.
- Flores, Guillermo. "Internal Colonialism and Racial Minorities in the US: An Overview." In Frank Bonilla and Robert Girling, eds. *Structures of Dependency*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1973.
- Foley, Neil. *The White Scourge: Mexicans, Blacks, and Poor Whites in Texas Cotton Culture*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999.
- Foucault, Michel. *The History of Sexuality, Vol. 1: The Will to Knowledge*, trans. Robert Hurley. New York: Vintage, 1990 (1978).
- Foucault, Michel. "Governmentality." In Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon, and Peter Miller, eds. *The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991.
- Foucault, Michel. *Ethics: Subjectivity and Truth*, Paul Rabinow, ed. New York: New Press, 1997.

- Fox, Jonathan, and Gaspar Rivera-Salgado, eds. *Indigenous Mexican Migrants in the United States*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2004.
- Fox, Stephen R. *The Guardian of Boston: William Monroe Trotter*. New York: Scribners, 1971.
- Frank, Thomas. *What's the Matter with Kansas? How Conservatives Won the Heart of America*, 2nd ed. New York: Holt 2005.
- Frankenberg, Erica, and Gary Orfield, eds. *The Resegregation of Suburban Schools: A Hidden Crisis in American Education*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Education Publishing Group, 2012.
- Franklin, John Hope. *George Washington Williams: A Biography*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1998 (1985).
- Franklin, Raymond. *Shadows of Race and Class*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1991.
- Fraser, Steve, ed. *The Bell Curve Wars: Race, Intelligence, and the Future of America*. New York: Basic, 1995.
- Fraser, Steve. "The Hollowing Out of America." *The Nation*, Dec 3, 2012; <http://www.thenation.com/article/171563/hollowing-out-america#axzz2ccxV3aFR>.
- Frazier, E. Franklin. "Myrdal's *An American Dilemma*" (review). *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 50 (1945).
- Frazier, E. Franklin. *Black Bourgeoisie*. New York: Free Press, 1957a.
- Frazier, E. Franklin. *The Negro in the United States*, rev. ed. New York: Macmillan, 1957b.
- Fredrickson, George M. "African Americans and African Africans." *New York Review of Books*, Vol. 38, no. 15 (September 26, 1991).
- Fredrickson, George M. *Black Liberation: A Comparative History of Black Ideologies in the United States and South Africa*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1995.
- Fredrickson, George M. *The Comparative Imagination: On the History of Racism, Nationalism, and Social Movements*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997.
- Fredrickson, George M. *Racism: A Short History*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002.
- Friedman, Milton. *Capitalism and Freedom*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002 (1962).
- Fujino, Diane. *Samurai among Panthers: Richard Aoki on Race, Resistance, and a Paradoxical Life*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 2012.
- Gallagher, Charles A. "Color-blind Privilege: The Social and Political Functions of Erasing the Color Line in Post Race America." *Race, Gender and Class*, Vol. 10, no. 4 (2003).
- Gallup. "Four Key Findings on Race Relations." July 29, 2013. <http://www.gallup.com/video/163712/four-key-findings-race-relations.aspx?ref=image>.
- Garrow, David. *Protest at Selma: Martin Luther King Jr. and the Voting Rights Act of 1965*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1978.
- Garrow, David, ed. *Birmingham, Alabama, 1956–1963: The Black Struggle for Civil Rights*. New York: Carlson Publishing, 1989.
- Gates, Henry Louis, Jr., ed. *The Classic Slave Narratives*. New York: Penguin 2002.
- Geary, Patrick J. *The Myth of Nations: The Medieval Origins of Europe*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002.
- Genovese, Eugene. *Roll, Jordan, Roll: The World the Slaves Made*. New York: Pantheon, 1974.
- Georgakas, Dan, and Marvin Surkin. *Detroit: I Do Mind Dying: A Study in Urban Revolution*, 3rd ed. Chicago: Haymarket, 2012 (1975).
- Geronimo. *Geronimo: My Life*, as related to S.M. Barrett. New York: Dover 2005 (1905).

- Gerth, Hans, and C. Wright Mills, eds. *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1958.
- Geschwender, James A. *Class, Race, and Worker Insurgency: The League of Revolutionary Black Workers*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1977.
- Giddings, Franklin Henry. *Civilization and Society: An Account of the Development and Behavior of Human Society*, Howard W. Odum, ed. New York: Henry Holt, 1932.
- Gilmore, Glenda Elizabeth. *Gender and Jim Crow: Women and the Politics of White Supremacy in North Carolina, 1896–1920*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1996.
- Gilroy, Paul. “The End of Anti-Racism.” In Martin Bulmer and John Solomos, eds. *Racism*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1999.
- Gilroy, Paul. *Against Race: Imagining Political Culture beyond the Color Line*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000.
- Glaude, Eddie S., Jr. *Exodus!: Religion, Race, and Nation in Early Nineteenth-Century Black America*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000.
- Glaude, Eddie S., Jr., ed. *Is it Nation Time? Contemporary Essays on Black Power and Black Nationalism*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002.
- Glazer, Nathan. “Blacks and Ethnic Groups: The Difference and the Political Difference It Makes,” in idem, *Ethnic Dilemmas, 1964–1982*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1983.
- Glazer, Nathan. *Affirmative Discrimination: Ethnic Inequality and Public Policy*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1987 (1975).
- Glazer, Nathan. *We Are All Multiculturalists Now*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997.
- Glazer, Nathan, and Daniel P. Moynihan, *Beyond the Melting Pot: The Negroes, Puerto Ricans, Jews, Italians, and Irish of New York City*, 2nd ed. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1970 (1963).
- Glazer, Nathan, and Daniel P. Moynihan, “Introduction,” in idem, eds., *Ethnicity: Theory and Experience*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1975.
- Glenn, Evelyn Nakano. *Unequal Freedom: How Race and Gender Shaped American Citizenship and Labor*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002.
- Glover, Karen S. *Racial Profiling: Research, Racism, and Resistance*. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2009.
- Gobineau, Arthur. *The Inequality of Human Races*, trans. Adrian Collins. New York: Howard Fertig, 1999 (1853–1855).
- Goff, Phillip Atiba, Jennifer L. Eberhardt, Melissa J. Williams, and Matthew Christian Jackson. “Not Yet Human: Implicit Knowledge, Historical Dehumanization, and Contemporary Consequences.” *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, Vol. 94, no. 2 (February 2008).
- Goffman, Alice. “On the Run: Wanted Men in a Philadelphia Ghetto.” *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 74, no. 3 (June 2009).
- Goldberg, David Theo. “Hate, or Power?” In idem. *Racial Subjects: Writing on Race in America*. Routledge, 1997.
- Goldberg, David Theo. *The Threat of Race: Reflections on Racial Neoliberalism*. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2008.



- Goldberg, David, and Trevor Griffey, eds. *Black Power at Work: Community Control, Affirmative Action, and the Construction Industry*. Ithaca: ILR Press, 2010.
- Goldfield, Michael. *The Color of Politics: Race and the Mainsprings of American Politics*. New York: New Press, 1997.
- Goldman, Emma. "The Traffic in Women." In idem. *Anarchism and Other Essays*, 2nd ed. New York: Mother Earth Publishing Association, 1911; <http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/goldman/works/1910/traffic-women.htm>.
- Goluboff, Risa L. *The Lost Promise of Civil Rights*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007.
- Gomez, Laura E. *Manifest Destinies: The Making of the Mexican American Race*. New York: New York University Press, 2008.
- Gómez-Quíñones, Juan. *Sembradores, Ricardo Flores Magón y el Partido Liberal Mexicano: A Eulogy and Critique*. Los Angeles: Aztlán Publications, 1973.
- Gonzalez, Juan. *Harvest of Empire: A History of Latinos in America*, 2nd ed. New York: Penguin 2011 (2001).
- Gooding-Williams, Robert, ed. *Reading Rodney King/Reading Urban Uprising*. New York: Routledge, 1993.
- Goodwin, Jeff, James M. Jasper, and Francesca Polletta, eds. *Passionate Politics: Emotions and Social Movements*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001.
- Gordon, Linda. *The Great Arizona Orphan Abduction*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001.
- Gordon, Linda, and Allen Hunter. "Sex, Family, and the New Right: Anti-Feminism as a Political Force." In Dawn Keetley and John Pettegrew, *Public Women, Public Words: A Documentary History of American Feminism*, Vol. 3. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2005.
- Gordon, Milton. *Assimilation in American Life: The Role of Race, Religion, and National Origins*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1964.
- Gossett, Thomas F. *Race: The History of an Idea in America*, 2nd ed. New York: Oxford University Press, 1997 (1965).
- Gould, Stephen Jay. *The Mismeasure of Man*. New York: Norton, 1981.
- Graeber, David. *Debt: The First 5,000 Years*. New York: Melville House, 2012.
- Graham, Hugh Davis. "Richard Nixon and Civil Rights: Explaining an Enigma." *Presidential Studies Quarterly*; The Nixon Presidency, Vol. 26, no. 1 (Winter 1996).
- Gramsci, Antonio. *Selections from the Prison Notebooks*, eds. and trans. Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith. New York: International Publishers, 1971.
- Grant, Madison. *The Passing of the Great Race, Or, the Racial Basis of European History*. New York: Scribners, 1916.
- Graves, Joseph L. Jr. *The Emperor's New Clothes: Biological Theories of Race at the Millennium*. Piscataway, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2001.
- Greenberg, Stanley B. *Race and State in Capitalist Development*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1980.
- Greene, Daniel. *The Jewish Origins of Cultural Pluralism: The Menorah Association and American Diversity*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2011.
- Greenhouse, Steven. "Cleaning Companies in Accord with Striking Houston Janitors," *The New York Times*, November 21, 2006.

- Greenwald, Anthony G., Colin Tucker Smith, N. Sriram, Yoav Bar-Anan, and Brian A. Nosek. "Implicit Race Attitudes Predicted Vote in the 2008 U.S. Presidential Election." *Analyses of Social Issues and Public Policy*, Vol. 9, no. 1 (2009).
- Greenwald, Anthony G., Mark A. Oakes, and Hunter G. Hoffman. "Targets of Discrimination: Effects of Race on Responses to Weapons Holders." *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, Vol. 39 (2003).
- Gregory, Steven. *Black Corona: Race and the Politics of Place in an Urban Community*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998.
- Griffin, Farah Jasmine. "Who Set You Flowin'?" *The African-American Migration Narrative*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1996.
- Guglielmo, Thomas A. *White on Arrival: Italians, Race, Color, and Power in Chicago, 1890–1945*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2004.
- Gugliotta, Guy. "New Estimate Raises Civil War Death Toll." *The New York Times*, April 2, 2012.
- Guha, Ranajit, and Gayatri Chakravoty Spivak, eds. *Selected Subaltern Studies*, 2nd ed. New York: Oxford University Press, 1988.
- Guigni, M.G. "Was It Worth the Effort? The Outcomes and Consequences of Social Movements." *Annual Review of Sociology*, Vol. 24, 1988.
- Guinier, Lani. *The Tyranny of the Majority: Fundamental Fairness in Representative Democracy*. New York: Free Press, 1995.
- Gutiérrez, Ramón A. *When Jesus Came the Corn Mothers Went Away: Marriage, Sexuality and Power in New Mexico, 1500–1846*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1991.
- Gutman, Herbert C. *The Black Family in Slavery and Freedom, 1750–1925*. New York: Vintage, 1976.
- Guy-Sheftall, Beverly. "Black Feminist Studies: The Case of Anna Julia Cooper." *African American Review*, Vol. 43, no. 1 (Spring 2009).
- Gwaltney, John Langston. *Drylongso: A Self-Portrait of Black America*. New York: Vintage, 1980.
- Haas, Jeffrey. *The Assassination of Fred Hampton: How the FBI and the Chicago Police Murdered a Black Panther*. Chicago: Chicago review Press, 2011.
- Hacking, Ian. *The Social Construction of What?* Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999.
- Hacking, Ian. "Making Up People." *London Review of Books*, Vol. 28, no. 16 (August 17, 2006).
- Hahn, Steven. *A Nation under Our Feet: Black Political Struggles in the Rural South from Slavery to the Great Migration Reform*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003.
- Haley, Alex. *Roots*. New York: Doubleday, 1976.
- Hall, Stuart. "Race, Articulation, and Societies Structured in Dominance." In Marion O'Callaghan, ed. *Sociological Theories: Race and Colonialism*. Paris: UNESCO, 1980.
- Hall, Stuart. "Authoritarian Populism: A Reply to Jessop et al." *New Left Review*, Vol. 1, no. 151 (May–June 1985).
- Hanchard, Michael. *Party Politics: Horizons in Black Political Thought*. New York: Oxford, 2006.
- Hancock, Ange-Marie. *The Politics of Disgust: The Public Identity of the Welfare Queen*. New York: New York University Press, 2004.

- Handlin, Oscar. *The Uprooted: The Epic Story of the Great Migrations That Made the American People*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2002 (1951).
- Hanisch, Carol. "The Personal is Political" 1969; <http://www.carolhanisch.org/CHwritings/PIP.html>.
- Hanke, Lewis. *All Mankind is One: A Study of the Disputation Between Bartolomé de Las Casas and Juan Ginés de Sepéveda in 1550 on the Intellectual and Religious Capacity of the American Indian*. Normal: Northern Illinois University Press, 1974.
- Hannaford, Ivan. *Race: The History of an Idea in the West*. Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press/Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996.
- Haraway, Donna J. *Primate Visions: Gender, Race, and Nature in the World of Modern Science*. New York: Routledge 1990.
- Harding, Vincent. "Religion and Resistance Among Antebellum Negroes, 1800–1860." In August Meier and Elliott Rudwick, eds. *The Making of Black America*, 2 vols. New York: Atheneum, 1969.
- Harmon, Amy. "In DNA Era, New Worries About Prejudice." *The New York Times*, November 11, 2007.
- Harris, Cheryl I. "Whiteness as Property" 106 *Harvard Law Review* 1709–1795 (1993).
- Harris, Leslie M. "The New York City Draft Riots of 1863." In idem. *In the Shadow of Slavery: African Americans in New York City, 1626–1863*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003.
- Harris-Perry, Melissa. *Sister Citizen: Shame, Stereotypes, and Black Women in America*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2011.
- Harvey, David. "The New Imperialism: Accumulation by Dispossession." *Socialist Register* 2004.
- Harwood, John. "Don't Dare Call the Health Law 'Redistribution.'" *The New York Times*, November 23, 2013.
- Hattam, Victoria and Joseph Lowndes. "Birmingham to Baghdad: The Micro Politics of Regime Change." In Gerald Berk, Dennis C. Galvan, and Victoria Hattam, eds. *Political Creativity: Reconfiguring Institutional Order and Change*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013.
- Hayek, Friedrich A. *The Road to Serfdom*. New York: Routledge 2001 (1944).
- Haynes, Stephen R. *Noah's Curse: The Biblical Justification of American Slavery*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2002.
- Hechter, Michael. *Internal Colonialism: The Celtic Fringe in British National Development*. New Brunswick: Transaction, 1998 (1975).
- Heilbroner, Robert L. *The Worldly Philosophers: The Lives, Times and Ideas of The Great Economic Thinkers*. New York: Touchstone/Simon and Schuster, 2000 (1953).
- Hellerstein, Judith, and David Neumark. "Workplace Segregation in the United States: Race, Ethnicity, and Skill." NBER Working Paper No. 11599. Cambridge MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, Sept. 2005.
- Henry, Charles P. *Long Overdue: The Politics of Racial Reparations*. New York: New York University Press, 2007.
- Herbert, Bob. "Impossible, Ridiculous, Repugnant." *The New York Times*, October 6, 2005.

- Herrnstein, Richard J., and Charles Murray. *The Bell Curve: Intelligence and Class Structure in American Life*. New York: Free Press, 1994.
- Hersh, Seymour M. *The Price of Power: Kissinger in the Nixon White House*. New York: Summit Books, 1983.
- Higham, John. *Strangers in the Land: Patterns of American Nativism, 1860–1925*. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2002 (1955).
- Hill, Anita. *Reimagining Equality: Stories of Gender, Race and Finding Home*. Boston: Beacon, 2011.
- Hill, Gladwin. “Nixon Denounces Press as Biased.” *The New York Times*, Nov. 8, 1962.
- Hill, Laura Warren, and Julia Rabig, eds. *The Business of Black Power: Community Development, Capitalism, and Corporate Responsibility in Postwar America*. Rochester, NY: University of Rochester Press, 2012.
- Hill, Robert A., and Barbara Bair, eds. *Marcus Garvey Life and Lessons: A Centennial Companion to the Marcus Garvey and Universal Negro Improvement Association Papers*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988.
- Hilliard, David, with Lewis Cole. *This Side of Glory: The Autobiography of David Hilliard and the Story of the Black Panther Party*. Boston: Little Brown, 1993.
- Hing, Bill Ong. *Ethical Borders: NAFTA, Globalization, and Mexican Migration*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2010.
- Hirabayashi, Lane Ryo. *Politics of Fieldwork: Research in an American Concentration Camp*. Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1999.
- Hirschfeld, Magnus. *Racism*, trans. Eden and Cedar Paul. London: Victor Gollancz, 1973 (1938).
- Hirschman, Albert O. *Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971.
- Ho, Karen. *Liquidated: An Ethnography of Wall St.* Durham: Duke University Press, 2009.
- Hobsbawm, Eric J., and Terence O. Ranger, eds. *The Invention of Tradition*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1983.
- Hochschild, Adam. *King Leopold’s Ghost: A Story of Greed, Terror, and Heroism in Colonial Africa*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin 1998.
- Hodes, Martha. *White Women, Black Men: Illicit Sex in the Nineteenth-Century South*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997.
- Hodes, Martha. *Sex, Love, Race: Crossing Boundaries in North American History*. New York: New York University Press, 1999.
- Hofstadter, Richard. *The Age of Reform: From Bryan to FDR*, 2nd ed. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1965.
- Holwill, Richard N., ed. “Agenda 83: Mandate for Leadership.” Washington, D.C.: Heritage Foundation, 1983.
- Horne, Gerald. *Black and Red: W.E.B. Du Bois and the Afro-American Response to the Cold War, 1944–1963*. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1986.
- HoSang, Daniel Martinez. *Racial Propositions: Ballot Initiatives and the Making of Postwar California*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2010.
- Htun, Mala. “From ‘Racial Democracy’ to Affirmative Action: Changing State Policy on Race in Brazil.” *Latin American Research Review*, Vol. 39, no. 1 (2004).

- Huang, Yunte. *Transpacific Imaginations: History, Literature, Counterpoetics*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2008.
- Huntington, Samuel P. *Who Are We?: The Challenges to America's National Identity*. New York: Simon and Schuster, 2005.
- Hurston, Zora Neale. *The Sanctified Church*. Berkeley: Turtle Island, 1984 (1929).
- Hutchinson, Earl Ofari. "Method to Racist Madness in Fresh Racial Attacks on President Obama." *The Huffington Post*, August 13, 2013.
- Iceland, John, and Daniel H. Weinberg, with Erika Steinmetz. "Racial and Ethnic Residential Segregation in the United States: 1980–2000." US Bureau of the Census Special Report. Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, August 2002.
- Ignatiev, Noel. *How the Irish Became White*. New York: Routledge, 1995.
- Indians.com. "DNA Tests Being Used to Bolster Indian Heritage Claims"; <http://www.indianz.com/News/2005/010071.asp>.
- Irons, Jenny. *Reconstituting Whiteness: The Mississippi State Sovereignty Commission*. Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 2010.
- Jackson, Walter. *Gunnar Myrdal and America's Conscience*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1990.
- Jacobson, Matthew Frye. *Whiteness of a Different Color: European Immigrants and the Alchemy of Race*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999.
- Jacobson, Robin. *The New Nativism: Proposition 187 and the Debate over Immigration*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2008.
- Jaffer, Jameel, and Amrit Singh. *Administration of Torture: A Documentary Record from Washington to Abu Ghraib and Beyond*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2009.
- James, C.L.R., Grace Lee, Martin Glaberman, and Cornelius Castoriadis. *Facing Reality*. Chicago: Charles H. Kerr, 2006 (1958).
- James, Winston. *Holding Aloft the Banner of Ethiopia: Caribbean Radicalism in Early Twentieth Century America*, 2nd ed. New York: Verso, 1999.
- Jefferson, Thomas. *Thomas Jefferson: Writings — Autobiography / Notes on the State of Virginia Public and Private Papers / Addresses / Letters*. Merrill D. Peterson, ed. New York: Library of America 1984 (1785).
- Jefferson, Thomas. "On the Constitutionality of a National Bank"; <http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/amerdoc/bank-tj.htm>.
- Jeffries, Michael P. *Paint the White House Black: Barack Obama and the Meaning of Race in America*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2013.
- Jessop, Bob. *State Theory*. Malden, MA: Polity, 1990.
- Jessop, Bob, Kevin Bonnett, Simon Bromley and Tom Ling. "Authoritarian Populism, Two Nations, and Thatcherism." *New Left Review*, Vol. 1, no. 147 (September–October 1984).
- Joas, Hans. *The Creativity of Action*, 2nd ed., trans. Jeremy Gaines and Paul Keast. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996.
- Johnson, Charles S. *Shadow of the Plantation*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996 (1934).
- Johnson, Walter. *Soul by Soul: Life Inside the Antebellum Slave Market*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001.
- Johnson, Walter. *River of Dark Dreams: Slavery and Empire in the Cotton Kingdom*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2013.

- Johnston, David. "C.I.A. Tie Reported In Mandela Arrest." *The New York Times*, June 10, 1990; <http://www.nytimes.com/1990/06/10/world/cia-tie-reported-in-mandela-arrest.html>.
- Jones, Jessica. "Cherokee By Blood and the Freedmen Debate: The Conflict of Minority Group Rights in a Liberal State," 22 *National Black Law Journal*, 1 (2009).
- Jones, Van. *The Green Collar Economy: How One Solution Can Fix Our Two Biggest Problems*. New York: Harper, 2008.
- Jones, Van. *Rebuild the Dream*. New York: Nation Books, 2012.
- Jones-Correa, Michael, and David L. Leal. "Becoming 'Hispanic': Secondary Panethnic Identification among Latin American-Origin Populations in the United States." *Hispanic Journal of Behavioral Sciences*, Vol. 18, no. 2 (May 1996).
- Jordan, Don, and Michael Walsh. *White Cargo: The Forgotten History of Britain's White Slaves in America*. New York: New York University Press, 2008.
- Jordan, Winthrop D. *White Over Black: American Attitudes toward the Negro, 1550–1812*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1977 (1968).
- Jordan, Winthrop D. *White Over Black: American Attitudes Toward the Negro, 1550–1812*, 2nd ed. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2012 (1968).
- Joseph, Peniel E., ed. *The Black Power Movement: Rethinking the Civil Rights–Black Power Era*. New York: Routledge, 2006.
- Jun, Helen Heran. *Race For Citizenship: Black Orientalism and Asian Uplift from Pre-Emancipation to Neoliberal America*. New York: New York University Press, 2011.
- Jung, Moon-Kie. "The Racial Unconscious of Assimilation Theory." *Du Bois Review: Social Science Research on Race*, Vol. 6, no. 2 (2009).
- Kaczorowski, Robert J. "To Begin the Nation Anew: Congress, Citizenship, and Civil Rights after the Civil War." *American Historical Review*, Vol. 92, no. 1 (February 1987).
- Kahlenberg, Richard D. *The Remedy: Class, Race, and Affirmative Action*. New York: Basic, 1997.
- Kahn, Jonathan. *Race in a Bottle: The Story of BiDil and Racialized Medicine in a Post-Genomic Age*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2012.
- Kairys, David. "Race Trilogy." 67 *Temple Law Review* 1994.
- Kallen, Horace. "Democracy versus the Melting-Pot: A Study of American Nationality: Part I and Part II." *The Nation*, Feb. 18, 1915, Feb. 25, 1915.
- Kallen, Horace. *Culture and Democracy in America*. New York: Boni and Liveright, 1924.
- Kang, Jerry, Judge Mark Bennett, Devon Carbado, Pam Casey, Nilanjana Dasgupta, David Faigman, Rachel Godsil, Anthony G. Greenwald, Justin Levinson, and Jennifer Mnookin. "Implicit Bias in the Courtroom." 59 *UCLA Law Review* 1124 (2012).
- Kantorowicz, Ernst H. *The King's Two Bodies: A Study in Medieval Political Theology*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957.
- Kaplan, Amy. *The Anarchy of Empire in the Making of U.S. Culture*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2005.
- Kaplan, Karen. "Ancestry in a Drop of Blood," *Los Angeles Times*, August 30, 2005.
- Kasinitz, Philip. *Caribbean New York: Black Immigrants and the Politics of Race*. New York: Cornell University Press, 1992.
- Katz, Judith H. *White Awareness: Handbook for Anti-Racism Training*, 2nd ed. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2003.
- Katz, Michael B., and Thomas J. Sugrue. *W.E.B. Du Bois, Race, and the City: The Philadelphia Negro and Its Legacy*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1998.

- Katznelson, Ira. *When Affirmative Action Was White: An Untold History of Racial Inequality in Twentieth-Century America*. New York: Norton, 2005.
- Katznelson, Ira. *Fear Itself: The New Deal and the Origins of Our Time*. New York: Liveright/Norton, 2013.
- Katzew, Ilona. *Casta Painting: Images of Race in Eighteenth-Century Mexico*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2005.
- Kazin, Michael. *The Populist Persuasion: An American History*. New York: Basic, 1995.
- Keen, Mike Forest. *Stalking the Sociological Imagination: J. Edgar Hoover's FBI Surveillance of American Sociology*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1999.
- Kelley, Robin D.G. *Race Rebels: Culture, Politics, and the Black Working Class*. New York: Free Press, 1996.
- Kelley, Robin D.G. *Freedom Dreams: The Black Radical Imagination*. Boston: Beacon, 2003.
- Kelley, Robin D.G. "The U.S. v. Trayvon Martin: How the System Worked." *CounterPunch*, July 15, 2013; <http://www.counterpunch.org/2013/07/15/the-us-v-trayvon-martin/>.
- Kelley, Robin D.G., and Elizabeth Esch. "Black Like Mao: Red China and Black Revolution." In Fred Ho and Bill Mullen, eds. *Afro Asia: Revolutionary Political and Cultural Connections between African Americans and Asian Americans*. Durham: Duke University Press, 2008 (1999).
- Kevles, Daniel J. *In the Name of Eugenics: Genetics and the Uses of Human Heredity*, 2nd ed. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998.
- Kennedy, Randall. *For Discrimination: Race, Affirmative Action, and the Law*. New York: Pantheon, 2013.
- Killens, John Oliver. *And Then We Heard the Thunder*. Washington, D.C.: Howard University Press, 1983 (1963).
- Killian, Lewis M. *The Impossible Revolution Phase 2: Black Power and the American Dream*, 2nd ed. New York: Random House, 1975.
- Kilson, Martin, and Clement Cottingham. "Thinking About Race Relations: How Far Are We Still From Integration?" *Dissent*, Fall, 1991.
- Kim, Nadia Y. *Imperial Citizens: Koreans and Race from Seoul to L.A.* Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2008.
- King, Martin Luther, Jr. "The Sit-In Movement." Martin Luther King, Jr. Research and Education Institute, Stanford University; [http://www.mlk-kpp01.stanford.edu/index.php/kingpapers/article/chapter\\_14\\_the\\_sit\\_in\\_movement/](http://www.mlk-kpp01.stanford.edu/index.php/kingpapers/article/chapter_14_the_sit_in_movement/). n.d.
- King, Martin Luther, Jr. *Why We Can't Wait*. New York: Signet, 1964.
- King, Martin Luther, Jr. *The Autobiography of Martin Luther King, Jr.*, ed. Clayborne Carson. New York: Grand Central Publishing, 2001.
- King, Martin Luther, Jr. "Beyond Vietnam: A Time to Break Silence." In Clayborne Carson and Kris Shepard, eds. *A Call to Conscience: The Landmark Speeches of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.* New York: Grand Central Books, 2002a.
- King, Martin Luther, Jr. "I have a Dream." In Clayborne Carson and Kris Shepard, eds. *A Call to Conscience: The Landmark Speeches of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.* New York: Grand Central Books, 2002b.
- Klare, Karl. "The Horizons of Transformative Labour and Employment Law." In Joanne Conaghan, Richard Michael Fischl, and Karl Klare, eds. *Labour Law in an Era of Globalization: Transformative Practices and Possibilities*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2004.

- Klare, Karl E. "Judicial Deradicalization of the Wagner Act and the Origins of Modern Legal Consciousness, 1937–1941." 62 *Minnesota Law Review* 265 (1977–1978).
- Klein, Herbert S., and Francisco Vidal Luna. *Slavery in Brazil*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009.
- Klein, Naomi. *The Shock Doctrine: The Rise of Disaster Capitalism*. New York: Picador, 2008.
- Klinkner, Philip A., and Rogers Smith. *The Unsteady March: The Rise and Decline of Racial Equality in America*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002.
- Kluger, Richard. *Simple Justice: The History of Brown v. Board of Education and Black America's Struggle for Equality*. New York: Vintage, 2004 (1976).
- Knefel, Molly. "The School-to-Prison Pipeline: A Nationwide Problem for Equal Rights." *Rolling Stone*, November 7, 2013; <http://www.rollingstone.com/music/news/the-school-to-prison-pipeline-a-nationwide-problem-for-equal-rights-20131107#ixzz2oFoOdTK3>.
- Knowles, Louis L., and Kenneth Prewitt, eds. *Institutional Racism in America*. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1969.
- Kochhar, Rakesh, Richard Fry, Paul Taylor, Gabriel Velasco, and Seth Motel. "Twenty-to-One: Wealth Gaps Rise to Record Highs Between Whites, Blacks and Hispanics." *Social and Demographic Trends Report*, Pew Research Center, July 26, 2011; <http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2011/07/26/wealth-gaps-rise-to-record-highs-between-whites-blacks-hispanics/>.
- Koerner, Brendan I. "Blood Feud." *Wired*, Vol. 13, no. 9 (September 2005).
- Kondo, Dorinne. *About Face: Performing Race in Fashion and Theater*. New York: Routledge, 1997.
- Kornweibel, Theodore, Jr. *Seeing Red: Federal Campaigns Against Black Militancy, 1919–1925*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1998.
- Kozol, Jonathan. *Savage Inequalities: Children in America's Schools*. New York: Broadway Books, 2012 (1991).
- Kramer, Paul. *The Blood of Government: Race, Empire, the United States, and the Philippines*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2006.
- Kranish, Michael. "Bush Argues His Social Security Plan Aids Blacks," *Boston Globe*, January 30, 2005; [http://www.boston.com/news/specials/social\\_security/bush\\_argues\\_his\\_social\\_security\\_plan\\_aids\\_blacks/?page=full](http://www.boston.com/news/specials/social_security/bush_argues_his_social_security_plan_aids_blacks/?page=full).
- Kristol, Irving. "The Negro of Today is Like the Immigrant of Yesterday." *The New York Times Magazine*, September 11, 1966.
- Krugman, Paul. "Partying Like It's 1929." *The New York Times*, March 21, 2008.
- Kryder, Daniel. *Divided Arsenal: Race and the American State During World War II*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001.
- Kuhn, Thomas S. *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, 2nd ed. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1970.
- Laclau, Ernesto. *Politics and Ideology in Marxist Theory: Capitalism, Fascism, Populism*. London: Verso, 1978.
- Laclau, Ernesto, and Chantal Mouffe, "Recasting Marxism: Hegemony and New Political Movements." *Socialist Review*, 66 Vol. 12, no. 6 (November–December 1982).
- Laclau, Ernesto and Chantal Mouffe. *Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics*, 2nd ed. London and New York: Verso, 2001 (1985).
- Ladner, Joyce A., ed. *The Death of White Sociology*. New York: Random House, 1973.



- Lai, Him Mark, Genny Lim, and Judy Yung. *Island: Poetry and History of Chinese Immigrants on Angel Island 1910–1940*, 2nd ed. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1991.
- Lamis, Alexander P. *The Two Party South*, 2nd ed. New York: Oxford University Press, 1990.
- Laraña, Enrique, Hank Johnston, and Joseph R. Gusfield, eds. *New Social Movements: From Ideology to Identity*, 2nd ed. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1994.
- Lassiter, Matthew D. *The Silent Majority*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007.
- Lasswell, Harold D. *Politics: Who Gets What, When, How*. New York: Peter Smith Publishers, 1950 (1936).
- Latty, Yvonne, and Ron Tarver. *We Were There: Voices of African American Veterans, from World War II to the War in Iraq*, 2nd ed. New York: Amistad/HarperCollins, 2005.
- Lawson, Bill E., and Donald F. Koch, eds. *Pragmatism and the Problem of Race*. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2004.
- Le Blanc, Paul and Michael D. Yates. *A Freedom Budget for All Americans: Recapturing the Promise of the Civil Rights Movement in the Struggle for Economic Justice Today*. New York: Monthly Review Press, 2013.
- Lee, Chana Kai. *For Freedom's Sake: The Life of Fannie Lou Hamer*. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2000.
- Lee, Sandra Soo-Jin. "Racializing Drug Design: Implications of Pharmacogenomics for Health Disparities," *American Journal of Public Health*, Vol. 95, no. 12 (2005).
- Lemann, Nicholas. *The Big Test: The Secret History of the American Meritocracy*. New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 2000.
- Lenin, V.I. *Questions of National Policy and Proletarian Internationalism*. Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1970 (1915).
- Lerner, Gerda. *The Creation of Patriarchy*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1987.
- Lester, Julius. *Look Out Whitey! Black Power's Gon' Get Your Mama!* New York: Dial, 1968a.
- Lester, Julius. *To Be a Slave*. New York: Dial, 1968b.
- Lévi-Strauss, Claude. *The Savage Mind*, trans. John and Doreen Weightman. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1966.
- Lewis, David Levering. *W.E.B. Du Bois, 1868–1919: Biography of a Race*. New York: Holt, 1993.
- Lewis, Michael. "Obama's Way." *Vanity Fair*, October 2012; <http://www.vanityfair.com/politics/2012/10/michael-lewis-profile-barack-obama>.
- Lewis, W. Arthur. "Economic Development with Unlimited Supplies of Labor." *Manchester School of Economic and Social Studies*, Vol. 22 (1954).
- Lieberman, Robert C. *Shifting the Color Line: Race and the American Welfare State*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998.
- Lind, Michael. *The Next American Nation: The New Nationalism and the Fourth American Revolution*. New York: Free Press, 1995.
- Lipset, Seymour M. "What's Wrong with Sociology?" *Social Problems*, Vol. 9, no. 2 (June 1994).
- Lipset, Seymour Martin. *The First New Nation: The United States in Historical and Comparative Perspective*. New York: Transaction, 2003 (1963).
- Lipsitz, George. *The Possessive Investment in Whiteness: How White People Profit from Identity Politics*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1998.

- Lipsitz, George. "Abolition Democracy and Global Justice." *Comparative American Studies*, Vol. 2, no. 3 (August 2004).
- Lipsitz, George. "Learning from New Orleans: The Social Warrant of Hostile Privatism and Competitive Consumer Citizenship." *Cultural Anthropology*, Vol. 21, no. 3 (Aug. 2006).
- Lipsitz, George. *Footsteps in the Dark: The Hidden Histories of Popular Music*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2007.
- Liptak, Adam. "Justices Void Oversight of States, Issue at Heart of Voting Rights Act." *The New York Times*, June 26, 2013, A1.
- Lizza, Ryan. "The Agitator: Barack Obama's Unlikely Political Education." *The New Republic*, March 19, 2007.
- Lo, Clarence. *Small Property Versus Big Government: Social Origins of the Property Tax Revolt*, 2nd ed. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995.
- Locke, Alain Leroy. *Race Contacts and Interracial Relations: Lectures on the Theory and Practice of Race*, Jeffrey C. Stewart, ed. Washington, D.C.: Howard University Press, 1992 (1915).
- Locke, Alain, ed. *The New Negro: Voices of the Harlem Renaissance*. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1997 (1925).
- Loewen, James W. *Sundown Towns: A Hidden Dimension of American Racism*. New York: New Press, 2005.
- Lopez, Ian F. Haney. *Racism on Trial: The Chicano Fight for Justice*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003.
- Los Angeles County Museum of Art. "ASCO: Elite of the Obscure, A Retrospective, 1972–1987" (museum exhibit, 2011); <http://www.lacma.org/art/exhibition/asco>.
- Love, Erik. *Confronting Islamophobia: Civil Rights Advocacy in the United States*. Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of California, Santa Barbara, 2011.
- Lovejoy, Paul E. and Nicholas Rogers, eds. *Unfree Labour in the Development of the Atlantic World*. Ilford, Essex: Frank Cass, 1994.
- Lovejoy, Paul E., and David Vincent Trotman. *Trans-Atlantic Dimensions of Ethnicity in the African Diaspora*. New York: Continuum, 2003.
- Lowi, Theodore J. *The End of Liberalism: Ideology, Policy, and the Crisis of Public Authority*. New York: Norton, 1969.
- Lowndes, Joseph. "The Past and Future of Race in the Tea Party Movement." In Lawrence Rosenthal and Christine Trost, eds. *Steep: The Precipitous Rise of the Tea Party*. Berkeley: The University of California Press, 2012.
- Lowndes, Joseph. "Barack Obama's Body: The Presidency, the Body Politic, and the Contest over American National Identity." *Polity*, Vol. 45, no. 4 (Oct. 2013).
- Lowy, Michael. "Marxists and the National Question." *New Left Review*, 96 (March–April 1976).
- Luft, Rachel E. "Looking for Common Ground: Relief Work in Post-Katrina New Orleans as an American Parable of Race and Gender Violence." *NWSA Journal*, Vol. 20, no. 3 (Fall 2008).
- Lukes, Steven. *Power: A Radical View*. New York: Macmillan, 2005 (1974).
- Lusane, Clarence. *Colin Powell and Condoleezza Rice: Foreign Policy, Race, and the New American Century*. Westport, CT: Praeger, 2006.
- Lusane, Clarence. *The Black History of the White House*. San Francisco: City Lights, 2011.

- Luxemburg, Rosa. *The Accumulation of Capital*. New York: Routledge 1973 (1913).
- Luxemburg, Rosa. *The National Question: Selected Writings by Rosa Luxemburg*, ed. Horace B. Davis, Monthly Review Press, 1976 (1909).
- Lyman, Stanford M. *The Black American in Sociological Thought: A Failure of Perspective*. New York, Putnam, 1972.
- Lyman, Stanford M. *Militarism, Imperialism, and Racial Accommodation: An Analysis and Interpretation of the Early Writings of Robert E. Park*. Fayetteville: University of Arkansas Press, 1992.
- MacIver, Robert M., ed. *Discrimination and National Welfare*. New York: Harper, 1949.
- MacLean, Nancy. "Neo-Confederacy versus the New Deal: The Regional Utopia of the Modern American Right." In Matthew Lassiter and Joseph Crespino, eds. *The Myth of Southern Exceptionalism*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2009.
- Malcolm X. "The Ballot or the Bullet." Speech delivered April 12, 1964, at Cory Methodist Church in Cleveland, OH; <http://www.malcolmxfiles.blogspot.com/p/ballot-or-bullet-april-12-1963.html>.
- Malcolm X. *Malcolm X Speaks*, ed. George Breitman. New York: Grove Weidenfeld, 1990 (1965).
- Manasse, Ernst Moritz. "Max Weber on Race," *Social Research*, Vol. 14, no. 2 (June 1947).
- Mann, James. *Rise of the Vulcans: The History of Bush's War Cabinet*. New York: Penguin, 2004.
- Manza, Jeff, and Christopher Uggen. *Locked Out: Felon Disenfranchisement and American Democracy*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2006.
- Marable, Manning. "Black Nationalism in the 1970s: Through the Prism of Race and Class," *Socialist Review*, 50–51 (March–June 1980).
- Marable, Manning. *W. E. B. Du Bois: Black Radical Democrat*. Boston: Twayne, 1986.
- Marable, Manning. *Malcolm X: A Life of Reinvention*. New York: Penguin, 2011.
- Marable, Manning, and Kristen Clarke, eds. *Seeking Higher Ground: The Hurricane Katrina Crisis, Race, and Public Policy Reader*. New York: Palgrave/MacMillan, 2007.
- Marchetti, Victor, and John D. Marks. *The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence*. New York: Knopf, 1974.
- Markoff, John. *What the Dormouse Said: How the Sixties Counterculture Shaped the Personal Computer Industry*. New York: Viking, 2005.
- Marks, Carole. *Farewell—We're Good and Gone: The Great Black Migration*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1989.
- Marsh, Jason, Rodolfo Mendoza-Denton, and Jeremy A. Smith, eds. *Are We Born Racist? New Insights from Neuroscience and Positive Psychology*. Boston: Beacon, 2010.
- Marshall, T.H. *Citizenship and Social Class: And Other Essays*. London: Pluto Press, 1987 (1950).
- Martha and the Vandellas. "Nowhere to Run." 7-inch single, Gordy Records G7039, 1965.
- Martí, José. *Our America (Nuestra América): Writings on Latin America and the Struggle for Cuban Independence*, trans. Elinor Randall, Juan de Onís, and Roslyn Held. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1977 (1899).
- Martínez, Elizabeth Sunderland, ed. *Letters from Mississippi: Reports from Civil Rights Volunteers and Freedom School Poetry of the 1964 Freedom Summer*. Brookline, MA: Zephyr Press, 2007 (1965).
- Martinot, Steve. *The Rule of Racialization: Class, Identity, Governance*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2002.

- Marx, Karl. *Capital*, Vol 1. New York: International Publishers, 1967.
- Marx, Karl and Frederick Engels. *Manifesto of the Communist Party*. Beijing: Foreign Language Press, 1968 (1848).
- Marx, Karl, and Frederick Engels. *On Colonialism: Articles from the New York Tribune and Other Writings*. New York: International Publishers, 1972a.
- Marx, Karl, and Frederick Engels. *Ireland and the Irish Question: A Collection of Writings*. New York: International Publishers, 1972b.
- Massey, Douglas S. *Categorically Unequal: The American Stratification System*. New York: Russell Sage, 2007.
- Massey, Douglas S., ed. *New Faces in New Places: The Changing Geography of American Immigration*. New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2008.
- Massey, Douglas S. and Nancy A. Denton. *American Apartheid: Segregation and the Making of the Underclass*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993.
- Massey, Douglas S., Rafael Alarcon, Jorge Durand, and Humberto González. *Return to Aztlán: The Social Process of International Migration from Western Mexico*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987.
- Massey, Douglas. S. Jonathan Rothwell, and Thurston Domina. "The Changing Bases of Segregation in the United States." *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Vol. 626, no. 1 (November 2009).
- Matthews, Chris, MSNBC News, January 27, 2010; <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=15tVXQEcZlo>.
- Mauer, Marc. *Race to Incarcerate*, 2nd ed. New York: The New Press, 2006 (1999).
- Mayer, Henry. *All on Fire: William Lloyd Garrison and the Abolition of Slavery*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1998.
- Mbembe, Achille. *On the Postcolony*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001.
- McAdam, Douglas. *Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984.
- McAdam, Douglas. *Freedom Summer*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1988.
- McCarthy, Thomas A. *Race, Empire, and the Idea of Human Development*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009.
- McClintock, Anne. *Imperial Leather: Race, Gender, and Sexuality in the Colonial Contest*. New York: Routledge, 1995.
- McKernan, Signe-Mary, Caroline Ratcliffe, Margaret Simms, and Sisi Zhang. "Do Racial Disparities in Private Transfers Help Explain the Racial Wealth Gap? New Evidence from Longitudinal Data." White Paper, The Urban Institute, Washington, D.C., August 2011.
- McLennan, Rebecca. *The Crisis of Imprisonment: Protest, Politics, and the Making of the American Penal State, 1776–1941*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008.
- McWhorter, Diane. *Carry Me Home: Birmingham, Alabama, the Climactic Battle of the Civil Rights Revolution*. New York: Simon and Schuster, 2001.
- Mead, Lawrence M. *The New Politics of Poverty: The Nonworking Poor in America*. New York: Basic Books, 1993.
- MECHA, "El Plan de Santa Barbara: A Chicano Plan for Higher Education; Analyses and Positions by the Chicano Coordinating Council on Higher Education." Oakland: La Causa Publications, 1969; <http://www.nationalmecha.org/documents/EPSB.pdf>.
- Meeropol, Michael. *Surrender: How the Clinton Administration Completed the Reagan Revolution*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1998.

- Melucci, Alberto. *Nomads of the Present: Social Movements and Individual Needs in Contemporary Society*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1989.
- Merton, Robert K. "Manifest and Latent Functions." In *Social Theory and Social Structure*, 3rd ed. New York: Free Press, 1968.
- Métraux, Alfred. "United Nations Economic and Security Council, Statement by Experts on Problems of Race." *American Anthropologist*, New Series, Vol. 53, no. 1 (Jan.–Mar. 1951).
- Meyer, Gerald. "The Cultural Pluralist Response to Americanization: Horace Kallen, Randolph Bourne, Louis Adamic, and Leonard Covello." *Socialism and Democracy Online* 56, Vol. 25, no. 2; <http://www.sdonline.org/>; viewed 4/28/2012.
- Mignolo, Walter. *Local Histories/Global Designs: Coloniality, Subaltern Knowledges, and Border Thinking*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000.
- Mignolo, Walter. *The Darker Side of Western Modernity: Global Futures, Decolonial Options*. Durham: Duke University Press, 2011.
- Miles, Robert. *Racism*. New York: Routledge, 1989.
- Miller, Joseph C. *Way of Death: Merchant Capitalism and the Angolan Slave Trade, 1730–1830*. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1996 (1988).
- Miller, Kelly. "A Review of Hoffman's 'Race Traits and Tendencies of the American Negro.'" Washington D.C.: The American Negro Academy, Occasional Papers, No. 1 (1897). (Available in Library of Congress, American Memory Series, African American Pamphlet Collection); <http://www.gutenberg.org/files/31279/31279-h/31279-h.htm>.
- Miller, Kelly. *Race Adjustment; Essays on the Negro in America*. Miami: Mnemosyne Publishers, 1969 (1908).
- Miller, Perry. *Errand into the Wilderness*. New York: Harper and Row, 1956.
- Mills, Charles W. *The Racial Contract*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999.
- Mills, Charles W. *The Sociological Imagination*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2000 (1959).
- Mills, Charles W. "Racial Liberalism." *PMLA*, Vol. 123, no. 5 (Oct. 2008).
- Montagu, M.F. Ashley. *Man's Most Dangerous Myth: The Fallacy of Race*, 2nd ed. New York: Columbia University Press, 1945.
- Montalvo, Frank F., and G. Edward Codina. "Skin Color and Latinos in the United States." *Ethnicities*, Vol. 1, no. 3 (2001).
- Montgomery, David. *The Fall of the House of Labor*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987.
- Moore, Carlos. "Marxism: A Prolet-Aryan Outlook." *Berkeley Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 14 (1974–1975).
- Moore, Joan W. *Mexican Americans*. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1970.
- Moore, Richard B. "The Critics and Opponents of Marcus Garvey" In John Henrik Clarke, ed. *Marcus Garvey and the Vision of Africa*. Baltimore: Black Classic Press, 2011 (1974).
- Morgan, Edmund S. *American Slavery, American Freedom: The Ordeal of Colonial Virginia*. New York: Norton 2003 (1975).
- Morgenstern Gretchen, and Joshua Rosner. *Reckless Endangerment: How Outsized Ambition, Greed, and Corruption Led to Economic Armageddon*. New York: Times Books, 2011.
- Morris, Aldon D. *Origins of the Civil Rights Movement*. New York: Free Press, 1984.
- Morris, Aldon, and Carol Mueller, eds. *Frontiers in Social Movement Theory*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992.

- Morrison, Toni. *Playing in the Dark: Whiteness and the Literary Imagination*. New York: Vintage, 1993.
- Moses, Wilson Jeremiah. *The Golden Age of Black Nationalism, 1850–1925*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1988 (1978).
- Moses, Wilson Jeremiah. *Afrotopia: The Roots of African American Popular History*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998.
- Mosse, George L. *Toward the Final Solution: A History of European Racism*. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1985.
- Mosse, George. *Nationalism and Sexuality: Respectability and Abnormal Sexuality in Modern Europe*. New York: Howard Fertig, 1997 (1981).
- Mother Jones Newsteam, “Full Transcript of the Mitt Romney Secret Video,” September 19, 2012; <http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2012/09/full-transcript-mitt-romney-secret-video>.
- Mouffe, Chantal. “Working-Class Hegemony and the Struggle for Socialism,” *Studies in Political Economy*, Vol. 12 (Fall 1983).
- Moyers, Bill. “Two Versions of John Lewis’ Speech,” *Moyers and Company*, July 24, 2013; <http://www.billmoyers.com/content/two-versions-of-john-lewis-speech/>.
- Mullin, Michael. *Africa in America: Slave Acculturation and Resistance in the American South and the British Caribbean, 1736–1831*. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1995.
- Mullings, Leith. *New Social Movements in the African Diaspora: Challenging Global Apartheid*. Houndmills, Basingstoke (UK): Palgrave/MacMillan, 2009.
- Mulroy, Kevin. *The Seminole Freedmen: A History*. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2007.
- Munford, Clarence J. *Race and Reparations: A Black Perspective for the Twenty-First Century*. Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, 1996.
- Murphy, Paul V. *The Rebuke of History: The Southern Agrarians and American Conservative Thought*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001.
- Murray, Charles. *Losing Ground: American Social Policy, 1950–1980*. New York: Harper, 1996 (1984).
- Myrdal, Gunnar. *An American Dilemma: The Negro Problem and Modern Democracy*, 20th anniversary ed. New York: Harper and Row, 1962 (1944).
- Myrdal, Gunnar. *Economic Theory and Under-developed Regions*. London: Duckworth, 1963.
- Nabokov, Peter. *Tijerina and the Courthouse Raid*. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1969.
- Naison, Mark. *Communists in Harlem During the Depression*. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1983.
- Nappy Roots. “Sick and Tired.” In idem. *Wooden Leather*. Atlantic Records, 2003.
- Nash, Gary. “The Hidden History of Mestizo America.” *Journal of American History*, Vol. 82 no. 3 (Dec. 1995).
- Navarro, Armando. *La Raza Unida Party: A Chicano Challenge to the US Two Party Dictatorship*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2000.
- Nelson, Alondra. *Body and Soul: The Black Panther Party and the Fight against Medical Discrimination*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2013.
- Nest, Michael. *Coltan*. Malden, MA: Polity, 2011.
- Newman, Katherine S. *No Shame in My Game: The Working Poor in the Inner City*. New York: Vintage, 2000.

- Newman, Randy. "Short People." On idem, *Little Criminals*. Los Angeles: Warner Brothers, 1977.
- Ngai, Mae. *Impossible Subjects: Illegal Aliens and the Making of Modern America*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005.
- Nolan, Kathleen. *Police in the Hallways: Discipline in an Urban High School*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2011.
- Noiriel, Gérard. *The French Melting Pot: Immigration, Citizenship, and National Identity*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996.
- Obama, Barack. "A More Perfect Union." Speech at the National Constitution Center, Philadelphia, March 18, 2008. *The New York Times*, March 18, 2008a; <http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/18/us/politics/18text-obama.html?pagewanted=all>.
- Obama, Barack. *The Audacity of Hope: Thoughts on Reclaiming the American Dream*, 2nd ed. New York: Vintage, 2008b.
- Obama, Barack. "Remarks by the President on Trayvon Martin"; <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/07/19/remarks-president-trayvon-martin>.
- Obasogie, Osagie. "The Return of Biological Race? Regulating Innovations in Race and Genetics through Administrative Agency Race Impact Assessments." *Southern California Interdisciplinary Law Journal*, Vol. 22, no. 1 (Fall 2013).
- Obasogie, Osagie K. *Blinded by Sight: Seeing Race Through the Eyes of the Blind*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2013.
- O'Connor, Alice, Chris Tilly, and Lawrence Bobo, eds. *Urban Inequality: Evidence From Four Cities*. New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2001.
- October League. *The Struggle for Black Liberation and Socialist Revolution*. Chicago: October League, 1976.
- Ogbar, Jeffrey O.G. "The Formation of Asian-American (sic) Nationalism in the Age of Black Power, 1966–1975." *Souls*, Vol. 3, no. 3 (Summer 2001).
- Ogletree, Charles J. "Reparations for the Children of Slaves: Litigating the Issues," 2 *University of Memphis Law Review* 33 (2003).
- Okamoto, Dina G. "Institutional Panethnicity: Boundary Formation in Asian-American (sic) Organizing." *Social Forces*, Vol. 85, no. 1 (September 2006).
- Okihiro, Gary Y. *Margins and Mainstreams: Asians in American History and Culture*. Seattle London: University of Washington Press, 1994.
- Oliver, Melvin L. and Thomas M. Shapiro, *Black Wealth, White Wealth: A New Perspective on Racial Inequality*, 2nd ed. New York: Routledge, 2006.
- Oliver, Melvin L., and Tom M. Shapiro. "Sub-Prime as a Black Catastrophe: First Came Racial Redlining. Then Came Racial Targeting of Toxic and Predatory Loans. Both Spelled Economic Disaster for African Americans." *The American Prospect*, October 2008.
- Omi, Michael, and Howard Winant. "Racial Formation Rules: Continuity, Instability, and Change." In Daniel HoSang, Oneka LaBennett, and Laura Pulido, eds. *Racial Formation in the 21st Century*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2012.
- Omi, Michael, and Howard Winant. "Resistance is Futile? A Response to Feagin and Elias." *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, Vol. 36, no. 6 (2013).
- Ondaatje, Michael L. *Black Conservative Intellectuals in Modern America*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2009.

- Ono, Kent A., and John M. Sloop. *Shifting Borders: Rhetoric, Immigration, and California's Proposition 187*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2002.
- Opoku-Agyemang, Naana Jane, Paul E. Lovejoy, and David D. Trotman, eds. *Africa and Trans-Atlantic Memories: Literary and Aesthetic Manifestations of Diaspora and History*. Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, 2008.
- Oppenheimer, Martin. "The Sub-Proletariat: Dark Skins and Dirty Work." *Critical Sociology*, Vol. 4, no. 2 (January 1974).
- Orfield, Gary and Erica Frankenberg. *Educational Delusions? Why Choice Can Deepen Inequality and How to Make Schools Fair*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2013.
- Painter, Nell Irvin. *The History of White People*. New York: Norton, 2010.
- Park, John S.W. *Illegal Migrations and the Huckleberry Finn Problem*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2013.
- Park, Robert E. "Our Racial Frontier on the Pacific." *Race and Culture*, Vol. 1 of *The Collected Papers of Robert E. Park*, Everett Hughes et al., eds. Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 1926 (1950).
- Park, Robert E. *Race and Culture*, Vol. 1 of *The Collected Papers of Robert E. Park*, Everett Hughes et al., eds. Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 1950.
- Parker, Christopher. *Fighting for Democracy: Black Veterans and the Struggle against White Supremacy in the Postwar South*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009.
- Parker, Christopher S. and Matt A. Barreto. *Change They Can't Believe In: The Tea Party and Reactionary Politics in America*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2013.
- Parker, David, and Miri Song, eds. *Rethinking "Mixed Race."* London: Pluto, 2001.
- Parsons, Talcott, and Edward Shils, eds. *Toward a General Theory of Action: Theoretical Foundations for the Social Sciences*. New Brunswick: Transaction Press, 2001 (1951).
- Parsons, Talcott, and Kenneth B. Clark, eds. *The Negro American*. Boston: Beacon, 1967.
- Passel, Jeffrey S. *Changing Numbers, Changing Needs: American Indian Demography and Public Health*. Washington, D.C.: National Academies Press, 1996.
- Pateman, Carole. *The Sexual Contract*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988.
- Patterson, Orlando. *Rituals Of Blood: The Consequences of Slavery in Two American Centuries*. New York: Basic, 1999.
- Payne, Charles M. *I've Got the Light of Freedom: The Organizing Tradition and the Mississippi Freedom Struggle*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2007 (1995).
- Peele, Gillian. *Revival and Reaction: The Right in Contemporary America*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1984.
- Peery, Nelson. *The Negro National Colonial Question*. Chicago: Workers Press, 1975.
- Peña, Manuel H. *The Texas-Mexican Conjunto: History of a Working-Class Music*. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1985.
- Pepper, William F. *An Act of State: The Execution of Martin Luther King*. New York: Verso, 2008.
- Perlmann, Joel. *Italians Then, Mexicans Now: Immigrant Origins and Second-Generation Progress, 1890 to 2000*. New York: Russell Sage, 2005.
- Perlstein, Rick. *Nixonland: The Rise of a President and the Fracturing of America*. New York: Scribner, 2008.
- Perlstein, Rick. *Before the Storm: Barry Goldwater and the Unmaking of the American Consensus*. New York: Nation Books, 2009 (2001).



- Perlstein, Rick. "Exclusive: Lee Atwater's Infamous 1981 Interview on the Southern Strategy." *The Nation*, November 13, 2012; <http://www.thenation.com/article/170841/exclusive-lee-atwaters-infamous-1981-interview-southern-strategy>.
- Perlstein, Rick. "The Grand Old Tea Party: Why Today's Wacko Birds are Just like Yesterday's wingnuts." *The Nation*, November 25, 2013; <http://www.thenation.com/article/177018/grand-old-tea-party?page=full>.
- Perry, Jeffrey B. *Hubert Harrison: The Voice of Harlem Radicalism, Vol. 1, 1883–1918*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2008.
- Persons, Stow. *Ethnic Studies at Chicago, 1905–1945*. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1987.
- Peterson, William. "Concepts of Ethnicity." In idem, M. Novak, and P. Gleason, *Concepts of Ethnicity: Selections from the Harvard Encyclopedia of American Ethnic Groups*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1982.
- Pettigrew, Thomas F. "The Changing—Not Declining—Significance of Race." *Contemporary Sociology*, Vol. 9, no. 1 (January 1980).
- Pfazelzer, Jean. *Driven Out: The Forgotten War against Chinese Americans*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2008.
- Phillips, Kevin P. *The Emerging Republican Majority*. New York: Anchor, 1970.
- Phillips, Kevin. *American Dynasty: Aristocracy, Fortune, and the Politics of Deceit in the House of Bush*. New York: Penguin, 2004.
- Phillips, Kevin. *American Theocracy: The Peril and Politics of Radical Religion, Oil, and Borrowed Money in the 21st Century*. New York: Penguin, 2007.
- Phillips-Fein, Kim. *Invisible Hands: The Businessmen's Crusade Against the New Deal*. New York: Norton, 2010.
- Pillai, K.G. Jan. "Shrinking Domain of Individious Intent." 9 *William and Mary Bill of Rights Journal* 525 (2001); <http://www.scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmboj/vol9/iss3/2>.
- Pitt, Leonard. *Decline of the Californios: A Social History of the Spanish-Speaking Californias, 1846–1890*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999 (1966).
- Piven, Frances Fox, and Richard A. Cloward. *Poor People's Movements: Why They Succeed, How They Fail*. New York: Vintage, 1978.
- Piven, Frances Fox, and Richard A. Cloward. *Regulating the Poor: The Functions of Public Welfare*. New York: Vintage, 1993 (1971).
- Piven, Frances Fox, and Richard A. Cloward. "The Weight of the Poor: A Strategy to End Poverty." *The Nation*, March 8, 2010 (May 2, 1966).
- Piven, Frances Fox, Lorraine C. Minnite, Margaret Groarke and Adam S. Cohen. *Keeping Down the Black Vote: Race and the Demobilization of American Voters*. New York: The New Press, 2009.
- Platt, Anthony M. E. *Franklin Frazier Reconsidered*. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1991.
- Pogrud, Benjamin. *Sobukwe and Apartheid*. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1991.
- Polanyi, Karl. *The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time*, 2nd ed. Boston: Beacon, 2001 (1944).
- Polletta, Francesca, and Jasper, James M. "Collective Identity and Social Movements." *Annual Review of Sociology*, 2001.

- Porter, Eric. *The Problem of the Future World: W.E.B. Du Bois and the Race Concept at Midcentury*. Durham: Duke University Press, 2010.
- powell, john a. *Racing to Justice: Transforming Our Conceptions of Self and Other to Build a More Inclusive Society*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2012.
- powell, john a., and Stephen Menendian. "Constructing the Other: Understanding Structural Marginalization." Unpublished manuscript on file with authors.
- Powell, Lewis F. "Attack on the American Free Enterprise System." Confidential memo to the US Chamber of Commerce, 1971; <http://www.law.wlu.edu/deptimages/Powell%20Archives/PowellMemorandumPrinted.pdf>.
- Powers, Thomas. *The Killing of Crazy Horse*. New York: Vintage, 2011.
- Prashad, Vijay. *Everybody Was Kung Fu Fighting: Afro-Asian Connections and the Myth of Cultural Purity*. Boston: Beacon, 2002.
- Prashad, Vijay. *The Darker Nations: A People's History of the Third World*. New York: The New Press, 2007.
- Prashad, Vijay. "Waiting for the Black Gandhi: Satyagraha and Black Internationalism." In Michael O. West, William G. Martin, and Fanon Che Wilkins, eds. *From Toussaint to Tupac: The Black International Since the Age of Revolution*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2009.
- Prewitt, Kenneth. *What is Your Race? The Census and Our Flawed Efforts to Classify Americans by Race*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2013.
- Price, David H. *Threatening Anthropology: McCarthyism and the FBI's Surveillance of Activist Anthropologists*. Durham: Duke University Press, 2004.
- Prins, Harald E.L. "Toward a World without Evil: Alfred Métraux as UNESCO Anthropologist (1946–1962)." UNESCO Symposium 2007; [http://www.portal.unesco.org/en/ev.php-URL\\_ID=30431&URL\\_DO=DO\\_TOPIC&URL\\_SECTION=201.html](http://www.portal.unesco.org/en/ev.php-URL_ID=30431&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html).
- Pulido, Laura. *Black, Brown, Yellow, and Left: Radical Activism in Los Angeles*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2006.
- Quadagno, Jill. *The Color of Welfare: How Racism Undermined the War on Poverty*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1994.
- Quan, Natalie. "Black and White or Red All Over? The Impropriety of Using Crime Scene DNA to Construct Racial Profiles of Suspects." 84 *Southern California Law Review* 1403 (September 2011).
- Quijano, Anibal. "Coloniality of Power, Eurocentrism, and Latin America." *Nepantla: Views from South*, Vol. 1, no. 3 (2000).
- Radhakrishnan, R. "Nationalism, Gender, and the Narrative of Identity." In Andrew Parker, Mary Russo, Doris Sommer, and Patricia Yaeger, eds. *Nationalisms and Sexualities*. New York: Routledge, 1992.
- Radical America*, "Racism and Busing in Boston: Editorial Statement," Vol. 8, no. 6 (November–December 1974).
- Radical America*, "Racism and Busing in Boston: Comments and Criticism," Vol. 9, no. 3 (May–June 1975).
- Rage Against the Machine. "Mic Check." *The Battle of Los Angeles*. Epic Records.
- Rainwater, Lee, and William Yancey, eds. *The Moynihan Report and the Politics of Controversy*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1967.

- Ransby, Barbara. *Ella Baker and the Black Freedom Movement: A Radical Democratic Vision*, 2nd ed. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2005.
- Rawick, George P. *From Sundown to Sunup: The Making of the Black Community*. Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1972.
- Reagan, Ronald. "Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress Reporting on the State of the Union," January 26, 1982; <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=42687>.
- Reed, Adolph, Jr. *W.E.B. Du Bois and American Political Thought: Fabianism and the Color Line*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1997a.
- Reed, Adolph L., Jr. "Yackety-Yak about Race." *The Progressive*, Dec 1, 1997b.
- Reed, Adolph L., Jr. "Black Particularity Reconsidered." In Eddie S. Glaude, Jr., ed. *Is It Nation Time?: Contemporary Essays on Black Power and Black Nationalism*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002.
- Reich, Michael. *Racial Inequality: A Political-Economic Analysis*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981.
- Reid, Carolina, and Elizabeth Laderman. "The Untold Costs of Subprime Lending: Examining the Links among Higher-Priced Lending, Foreclosures and Race in California," Working Paper, Institute for Assets and Social Policy, Brandeis University, April 15, 2009.
- Reid, Ira De A. *Postwar Problems of Migration*. New York: Milbank Memorial Fund, 1947.
- Revolutionary Union, *Red Papers 5: National Liberation and Proletarian Revolution in the U.S.* Chicago: Revolutionary Union, n.d.
- Richter, Daniel K. *Facing East from Indian Country: A Native History of Early America*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2003.
- Ricourt, Milagros, and Ruby Danta. *Hispanas de Queens: Latino Panethnicity in a New York City Neighborhood*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2002.
- Rieder, Jonathan. *Canarsie: The Jews and Italians of Brooklyn against Liberalism*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985.
- Riggs, Marlon. *Color Adjustment*. San Francisco: California Newsreel, 1992.
- Roberts, Ronald Suresh. *Clarence Thomas and the Tough Love Crowd: Counterfeit Heroes and Unhappy Truths*. New York: New York University Press, 1996.
- Robinson, Cedric J. *Black Marxism: The Making of the Black Radical Tradition*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000 (1983).
- Robinson, Cedric. *Forgeries of Memory and Meaning: Blacks and the Regimes of Race in American Theater and Film before World War II*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2007.
- Robles, Kathleen L. and Richard Griswold del Castillo. "The History of Chicano Park"; <http://www.chicanoparksandiego.com>.
- Rodriguez, Clara E. *Changing Race: Latinos, the Census, and the History of Ethnicity in the United States*. New York: New York University Press, 2000.
- Roediger, David. *Working Toward Whiteness: How America's Immigrants Became White; The Strange Journey from Ellis Island to the Suburbs*. New York: Basic, 2005.
- Roediger, David R. *The Wages of Whiteness: Race and the Making of the American Working Class*, 2nd ed. New York: Verso, 2007 (1991).
- Roediger, David R. *How Race Survived U.S. History: From Settlement and Slavery to the Obama Phenomenon*. New York: Verso, 2008.

- Roediger, David R., and Elizabeth D. Esch. *The Production of Difference: Race and the Management of Labor in US History*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2012.
- Roemer, John. *Equality of Opportunity*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000.
- Rogers, Christy. "Subprime Loans, Foreclosure, and the Credit Crisis: What Happened and Why?" Kirwan Institute for the Study of Race and Ethnicity, The Ohio State University, December 2008; [http://www.kirwaninstitute.osu.edu/reports/2008/11\\_2008\\_SubprimeForeclosureRacePrimer.pdf](http://www.kirwaninstitute.osu.edu/reports/2008/11_2008_SubprimeForeclosureRacePrimer.pdf).
- Rogin, Michael. *Two Declarations of Independence: The Racialized Foundations of American National Culture*. Berlin: Free University Press, 1996.
- Rogin, Michael Paul. *Fathers and Children: Andrew Jackson and the Subjugation of the American Indian*. New Brunswick: Transaction, 1991.
- Romo, David Dorado. *Ringside Seat to a Revolution: An Underground Cultural History of El Paso and Juárez, 1893–1923*. El Paso: Cinco Puntos Press, 2005.
- Rose, Arnold. *The Power Structure: Political Process in American Society*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1967.
- Rosenfeld, Seth. *Subversives: The FBI's War on Student Radicals, and Reagan's Rise to Power*. New York: Picador, 2013.
- Rosengarten, Theodore. *All God's Dangers: The Life of Nate Shaw*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000 (1974).
- Rosenthal, Lawrence. *The Tea Party, the Government Shutdown, and Obamacare*. Policy Brief for The Foundation for Law, Justice and Society, 2013.
- Rosenthal, Lawrence, and Christine Trost. *Steep: The Precipitous Rise of the Tea Party*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2012.
- Ross, Edward A. *The Old World in the New: The Significance of Past and Present Immigration to the American People*. New York: Century, 1914.
- Roth, Wendy D. *Race Migrations: Latinos and the Cultural Transformation of Race*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2012.
- Rubin, Gayle. "The Traffic in Women: Notes on the 'Political Economy' of Sex." In Rayna Reiter, ed. *Toward an Anthropology of Women*. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1975.
- Rucker, Walter C., Jr. and James N. Upton, eds. *Encyclopedia of American Race Riots*, 2 vols. Westport, CT: Greenwood, 2006.
- Rugh, Jacob S., and Douglas S. Massey. "Racial Segregation and the American Foreclosure Crisis." *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 75, no. 5 (October 2010).
- Rusher, William. *The Making of a New Majority Party*. Ottawa, IL: Greenhill Publications, 1975.
- Rustin, Bayard. "From Protest to Politics: The Future of the Civil Rights Movement." *Commentary*, Feb., 1964.
- Rustin, Bayard. "The Lessons of the Long Hot Summer," *Commentary*, Oct., 1967.
- Rustin, Bayard. "Some Lessons from Watts." In D.W. Carbado and D. Weise, eds. *Time on Two Crosses: The Collected Writings of Bayard Rustin*. San Francisco: Cleis Press, 2003 (1965).
- Rustin, Bayard. *Time on Two Crosses: The Collected Writings of Bayard Rustin*, Devon W. Carbado and Donald Weise, eds. Berkeley: Cleis, 2003.
- Rutten, Tim. "A New Kind of Riot." *The New York Review of Books*, June 11, 1992.

- Ryan, Joseph W. *Samuel Stouffer and the GI Survey: Sociologists and Soldiers During the Second World War*. Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 2013.
- Sack, Kevin. "Member's Racist Ties Split Confederate Legacy Group." *The New York Times*, December 8, 2001.
- Said, Edward W. *Culture and Imperialism*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1993.
- Sale, Kirkpatrick. *SDS*. New York: Random House, 1973.
- Sanders, Bernie (Senator, VT). "Billions for Bailouts! Who Pays?" *The Huffington Post*, September 19, 2008; [http://www.huffingtonpost.com/rep-bernie-sanders/billions-for-bailouts-who\\_b\\_127882.html](http://www.huffingtonpost.com/rep-bernie-sanders/billions-for-bailouts-who_b_127882.html).
- Samson, Frank L. "Multiple Group Threat and Malleable White Attitudes Towards Academic Merit." *Du Bois Review: Social Science Research on Race*, Vol. 10, no. 1 (March 2013).
- Sartre, Jean-Paul. *Critique of Dialectical Reason*, Vol. 1, rev. ed., Jonathan Ree, trans. Alan Sheridan-Smith. London: Verso, 2004.
- Satter, Beryl. *Family Properties; How the Struggle over Race and Real Estate Transformed Chicago and Urban America*. New York: Picador/Holt, 2009.
- Saxton, Alexander. *The Indispensable Enemy: Labor and the Anti-Chinese Movement in California*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971.
- Saxton, Alexander. *The Indispensable Enemy: Labor and the Anti-Chinese Movement in California*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975.
- Saxton, Alexander. *The Rise and Fall of the White Republic: Class Politics and Mass Culture in Nineteenth Century America*. New York: Verso, 2003 (1990).
- Scheff, Thomas J., and Suzanne M. Retzinger. *Emotions and Violence: Shame and Rage in Destructive Conflicts*. Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1991.
- Schiebinger, Londa. *Nature's Body: Gender in the Making of Modern Science*, 2nd ed. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2004.
- Schmidt, Ingo. "Rosa Luxemburg's 'Accumulation of Capital': New Perspectives on Capitalist Development and US Hegemony." *Socialist Studies/Études Socialistes*, Vol. 6, no. 2 (Fall 2010).
- Schmitt, Carl. *Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty*, trans. G.D. Schwab. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004 (1922).
- Schrag, Peter. *Not Fit for Our Society: Immigration and Nativism in America*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2010.
- Schwendinger, Herman, and Julia R. Schwendinger. *The Sociologists of the Chair: A Radical Analysis of the Formative Years of North American Sociology, 1883–1922*. New York: Basic, 1974.
- Scott, James C. *Domination and the Arts of Resistance: Hidden Transcripts*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990.
- Scott, James C. *Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998.
- Scott, Joan W. "Deconstructing Equality Versus Difference." *Feminist Studies*, Vol. 14 (1988).
- Segev, Tom. *1967: Israel, the War, and the Year that Transformed the Middle East*. New York: Metropolitan Books, 2007.
- Shelby, Tommie. *We Who Are Dark: The Philosophical Foundations of Black Solidarity*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007.
- Shockley, John. *Chicano Revolt in a Texas Town*. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1974.

- Silk, Leonard, and David Vogel. *Ethics and Profits: The Crisis of Confidence in American Business*. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1976.
- Silverstein, Paul A. *Algeria in France: Transpolitics, Race, and Nation*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2004.
- Simpson, Christopher, ed. *Universities and Empire: Money and Politics in the Social Sciences During the Cold War*. New York: New Press, 1999.
- Singh, Nikhil Pal. *Black is a Country: Race and the Unfinished Struggle for Democracy*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2004.
- Sitkoff, Harvard. *A New Deal for Blacks: The Emergence of Civil Rights as a National Issue*. New York: Hill and Wang, 1978.
- Sitkoff, Harvard. *The Struggle for Black Equality*. New York: Hill and Wang, 1981.
- Skrentny, John David. *The Ironies of Affirmative Action: Politics, Culture, and Justice in America*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996.
- Slate, Nico. *Black Power Beyond Borders: The Global Dimensions of the Black Power Movement*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012.
- Slaughter, Sheila. "The Danger Zone: Academic Freedom and Civil Liberties." *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Vol. 448 (March 1980).
- Smedley, Brian D., Adrienne Y. Stith, and Alan R. Nelson, eds. *Unequal Treatment: Confronting Racial and Ethnic Disparities in Health Care*. Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 2003.
- Smethurst, James Edward. *The Black Arts Movement: Literary Nationalism in the 1960s and 1970s*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2005.
- Smith, Rogers. *Stories of Peoplehood: The Politics and Morals of Political Membership*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003.
- Snipp, C. Matthew. *American Indians: The First of This Land*. New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1989.
- Soss, Joe, Richard C. Fording, and Sanford F. Schram. *Disciplining the Poor: Neoliberal Paternalism and the Persistent Power of Race*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2011.
- Southern, David W. *Gunnar Myrdal and Black-White Relations: The Use and Abuse of An American Dilemma*. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1987.
- Sowell, Thomas. *Race and Culture: A World View*. New York: Basic, 1995.
- Spiro, Jonathan P. *Defending the Master Race: Conservation, Eugenics, and the Legacy of Madison Grant*. Burlington: University of Vermont Press, 2009.
- Squires, Gregory D., and Derek S. Hyra. "Foreclosures—Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow." *City and Community*, Vol. 9, no. 1 (March 2010).
- Stack, Carol B. *All Our Kin: Strategies for Survival in a Black Community*. New York: Harper and Row, 1974.
- Stalin, Joseph. *Marxism and the National-Colonial Question*. San Francisco: Proletarian Publishers, 1975 (1908).
- Stanfield, John H. "The 'Negro Problem' Within and Beyond the Institutional Nexus of Pre-World War I Sociology." *Phylon*, Vol. 43, no. 3 (1982).
- Stanfield, John H. *Philanthropy and Jim Crow in American Social Science*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1985.
- Stannard, David E. *American Holocaust: Columbus and the Conquest of the New World*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1992.
- Starobin, Robert S. *Industrial Slavery in the Old South*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1970.

- Stavans, Ilan. *José Vasconcelos: The Prophet of Race*. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2011.
- Steele, Claude M. *Whistling Vivaldi: And Other Clues to How Stereotypes Affect Us*. New York: Norton 2010.
- Steensland, Brian. *The Failed Welfare Revolution: America's Struggle Over Guaranteed Income Policy*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007.
- Stefancic, Jean, and Richard Delgado. *No Mercy: How Conservative Think Tanks and Foundations Changed America's Social Agenda*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1996.
- Stein, Judith. *Pivotal Decade: How the United States Traded Factories for Finance in the 1970s*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2010.
- Steinbeck, John. *The Grapes of Wrath*. New York: Penguin, 1939.
- Steinberg, Stephen. *Turning Back: The Retreat from Racial Justice in American Thought and Policy*, 2nd ed. Boston: Beacon, 2001.
- Steinberg, Stephen. *Race Relations: A Critique*. Stanford: Stanford University Press 2007.
- Stepan, Nancy Leys, and Sander L. Gilman. "Appropriating the Idioms of Science: The Rejection of Scientific Racism." In Sandra Harding, ed. *The "Racial" Economy of Science: Toward a Democratic Future*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993.
- Stiglitz, Joseph E. "Foreword." In Karl Polanyi, *The Great Transformation*. Boston: Beacon, 2001 (1944).
- Stoddard, Theodore Lothrop. *The Rising Tide of Color Against White World-Supremacy*. New York: Scribners, 1920.
- Stoler, Ann Laura. *Race and the Education of Desire: Foucault's History of Sexuality and the Colonial Order of Things*. Durham: Duke University Press, 1995.
- Stoler, Ann Laura. "Tense and Tender Ties: The Politics of Comparison in North American History and (Post) Colonial Studies." *The Journal of American History*, Vol. 88, no. 3 (Dec. 2001).
- Stoler, Ann Laura. *Carnal Knowledge and Imperial Power: Race and the Intimate in Colonial Rule*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002.
- Stoler, Ann Laura, ed. *Haunted by Empire: Geographies of Intimacy in North American History*. Durham: Duke University Press, 2006.
- Stouffer, Samuel Andrew et al. *The American Soldier*, 2 vols. Vol. 1: *Adjustment during Army Life*; Vol. 2: *Combat and its Aftermath*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1949–1950.
- Sugrue, Thomas J. *The Origins of the Urban Crisis: Race and Inequality in Postwar Detroit*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996.
- Sugrue, Thomas J. *Not Even Past: Barack Obama and the Burden of Race*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010.
- Sullivan, Andrew. "Obama Still Isn't President in the South." *The Sunday Times* (London), Aug. 9, 2009.
- Sullivan, Andrew. "How Obama's Long Game Will Outsmart His Critics." *Newsweek/The Daily Beast*, Jan 16, 2012; <http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/2012/01/15/andrew-sullivan-how-obama-s-long-game-will-outsmart-his-critics.html>.
- Swain, Carol M. *The New White Nationalism in America: Its Challenge to Integration*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002.
- Szwed, John F. *Space is the Place: The Lives and Times of Sun Ra*. Cambridge, MA: Da Capo Press, 1998.

- Tallbear, Kimberly. "DNA, Blood, and Racializing the Tribe," *Wicazo Sa Review*, Vol. 18, no. 1 (2003).
- Taueber, Kent, and Alma Taueber. "The Negro as an Immigrant Group: Recent Trends in Racial and Ethnic Segregation in Chicago." *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 69, no. 4 (1964).
- Tapscott, Horace. *Songs of the Unsung: The Musical and Social Journey of Horace Tapscott*. Steven L. Isoardi, ed. Durham: Duke University Press, 2001.
- Taguieff, Pierre-André. "The New Cultural Racism in France." In Martin Bulmer and John Solomos, eds. *Racism*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1999.
- Taguieff, Pierre-André. *The Force of Prejudice: On Racism and Its Doubles*, trans. Hassan Melehy. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2001.
- Taylor, Paul, Mark Hugo Lopez, Jessica Martínez, and Gabriel Velasco. "When Labels Don't Fit: Hispanics and Their Views of Identity." Pew Research Hispanic Trends Project, April 4, 2012; <http://www.pewhispanic.org/files/2012/04/PHC-Hispanic-Identity.pdf>.
- Taylor, Ula Yvette. *The Veiled Garvey: The Life and Times of Amy Jacques Garvey*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001.
- Telles, Edward E., and Vilma Ortiz. *Generations of Exclusion: Mexican Americans, Assimilation, and Race*. New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2009.
- Thernstrom, Stephan, and Abigail Thernstrom. *America in Black and White: One Nation, Indivisible*. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1999.
- Thomas, Clarence. Concurring in *Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña*, 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
- Thomas, Dorothy Swaine, and Richard S. Nishimoto. *The Spoilage*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1946.
- Thomas, Dorothy Swaine, Charles Kikuchi, and James Sakoda. *The Salvage*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1952.
- Thomas, James M. "The Racial Formation of Medieval Jews: A Challenge to the Field." *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, Vol. 33, no. 10 (November 2010).
- Thomas, William Isaac, and Dorothy Swaine Thomas. *The Child in America: Behavior Problems and Programs*. New York: Knopf, 1928.
- Thomas, William I., and Florian Znaniecki. *The Polish Peasant in Europe and America*, 5 vols. Abridged ed., ed. Eli Zaretsky. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1984. Original editions: Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1918 (Vols. 1–2); Boston: Richard G. Badger, 1918–1920 (Vols. 3–5);
- Thompson, Krissah. "Cornel West's Criticism of Obama Sparks Debate among African Americans." *The Washington Post*, May 18, 2011; [http://www.articles.washingtonpost.com/2011-05-18/politics/35232208\\_1\\_obama-and-race-obama-aides-barack-obama](http://www.articles.washingtonpost.com/2011-05-18/politics/35232208_1_obama-and-race-obama-aides-barack-obama).
- Thompson, Robert Farris. *Flash of the Spirit: African and Afro-American Art and Philosophy*. New York: Random House, 1983.
- Thompson, Krissah, and Scott Wilson. "Obama on Trayvon Martin: 'If I had a son, he'd look like Trayvon'." *Washington Post*, March 23, 2012.
- Thornton, John. *Africa and Africans in the Making of the Atlantic World, 1400–1800*, 2nd ed. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998.
- Thornton, John K. *A Cultural History of the Atlantic World, 1250–1820*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012.



- Thornton, Russell. *American Indian Holocaust and Survival: A Population History Since 1492*. Oklahoma City: University of Oklahoma Press, 1987.
- Tijerina, Reies Lopez. *Mi Lucha Por La Tierra*. Mexico, DF: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1978.
- Todorov, Tsvetan. *The Conquest of America: The Question of the Other*, trans. Richard Howard. New York: Harper and Row, 1984.
- Todorov, Tsvetan. *On Human Diversity: Nationalism, Racism, and Exoticism in French Thought*, trans. Catherine Porter. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993.
- Tolnay, Stewart. "The Great Migration and Changes in the Northern Black Family, 1940 to 1990." *Social Forces*, Vol. 75, no. 4 (June 1997).
- Torgovnick, Marianna. *Gone Primitive: Savage Intellectuals, Modern Lives*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991.
- Tucker, William H. *The Funding of Scientific Racism: Wickliffe Draper and the Pioneer Fund*. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2007.
- Ture, Kwame (Stokely Carmichael) and Charles V. Hamilton, *Black Power: The Politics of Liberation*. New York: Vintage 1992 (1967).
- Tyson, Timothy B. *Radio Free Dixie: Robert F. Williams and the Roots of Black Power*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1999.
- UNESCO. "Statement on Race." Issued July 18, 1950; revised June 8, 1951 as "Statement on the Nature of Race and Race Differences"; both available at: <http://www.unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0012/001229/122962eo.pdf>.
- U.S. Bureau of the Census. *1790 Census of Population and Housing*. Published 1791; <http://www.census.gov/prod/www/abs/decennial/1790.html>.
- U.S. Bureau of the Census (2001). Current Population Reports, Appendix. Time Series Poverty Estimates, Table A-1, "Poverty Status of People by Family Relationship, Race, and Hispanic Origin: 1959 to 2000." In "Poverty in the United States: 2000"; <http://www.census.gov/prod/2001pubs/p60-214.pdf>.
- U.S. Bureau of the Census, Population Division, Population Projections Branch. "Projected Population of the United States, by Race and Hispanic Origin: 2000 to 2050," Table 1A, March 18, 2004; <http://www.census.gov/ipc/www/usinterimproj/>.
- U.S. Bureau of the Census, "State and County QuickFacts," January 12, 2007; <http://www.quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/15000.html>.
- U.S. Bureau of the Census, National Population Projections, <http://www.census.gov/population/www/projections/>, release date Aug. 14, 2008.
- U.S. Bureau of the Census, "Historical Poverty Tables—People, Table 6," September 12, 2012; <http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/poverty/data/historical/people.html>.
- U.S. Department of Justice, 2008. Office of the Inspector General and Office of Professional Responsibility, "An Investigation of Allegations of Politicized Hiring and Other Improper Personnel Actions in the Civil Rights Division," US DOJ Special Report, July 2, 2008 (released publicly January 13, 2009); <http://www.justice.gov/oig/special/s0901/final.pdf>.
- U.S. Department of Labor. Bureau of Labor Statistics (2001). "Employment Situation: December 2000"; [http://www.bls.gov/news.release/history/empst\\_01052001.txt](http://www.bls.gov/news.release/history/empst_01052001.txt).
- U.S. Department of Labor. Bureau of Labor Statistics (1995). "Over 137 Million Persons Worked in 1994, 2.1 Million More Than in 1993"; [http://www.bls.gov/news.release/history/work\\_121395.txt](http://www.bls.gov/news.release/history/work_121395.txt).

- U.S. Department of the Treasury, Internal Revenue Service, "Statistics for Tax Returns with EITC," updated May 10, 2013; <http://www.eitc.irs.gov/central/eitcstats/>.
- U.S. District Court, Southern District, CA. *Gonzalo Mendez et al v. Westminster sic School Dist. of Orange County*, 64 F.Supp. 544 (S.D. Cal. 1946); affirmed 161 F.2d 774 (9th Cir. 1947) (en banc).
- U.S. Office of Management and Budget. Directive No. 15: "Race and Ethnic Standards for Federal Statistics And Administrative Reporting "Standards for the Classification of Federal Data on Race and Ethnicity." Adopted May 12, 1977. In Appendix, *Federal Register*, June 9, 1994; [http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/fedreg\\_notice\\_15](http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/fedreg_notice_15).
- U.S. Supreme Court. *Belk v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Education*, 269 F.3d 305 (4th Cir. 2001).
- U.S. Supreme Court. *Bush v. Gore*, 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
- U.S. Supreme Court. *Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission*, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
- U.S. Supreme Court. *Gratz v. Bollinger*, 539 U.S. 244 (2003).
- U.S. Supreme Court. *Griggs v. Duke Power Co.*, 401 U.S. 424 (1971a).
- U.S. Supreme Court. *Grutter v. Bollinger*, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
- U.S. Supreme Court. *Lochner v. New York*, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
- U.S. Supreme Court. *Loving v. Virginia*, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
- U.S. Supreme Court. *Regents of the University of California v. Allan Bakke*, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
- U.S. Supreme Court. *Roe v. Wade*, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
- U.S. Supreme Court. *Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific Railroad Company*. 118 U.S. 394 (1886).
- U.S. Supreme Court. *Shelby County v. Holder*, 570 U.S. \_\_\_\_ (2013). Note: As of this writing this case has not yet been assigned a page number in Vol. 570 of the U.S. Supreme Court cases. It does have a docket number (12–96). The case was decided on June 25, 2013.
- U.S. Supreme Court. *Swann et al. v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education et al.* 402 U.S. 1 (1971b).
- U.S. Supreme Court. *Washington v. Davis*, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
- Van Deburg, William L. *New Day in Babylon: The Black Power Movement and American Culture, 1965–1975*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992.
- Van Deburg, William. *Modern Black Nationalism: From Marcus Garvey to Louis Farrakhan*. New York: New York University Press, 1996.
- van den Berghe, Pierre L., *Race and Racism: A Comparative Perspective*. New York: Wiley, 1967.
- Vargas, Zaragoza. *Labor Rights are Civil Rights: Mexican American Workers in Twentieth-Century America*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007.
- Vasconcelos, José. *La Raza Cósmica/The Cosmic Race*, bilingual edition. Los Angeles: Dept. of Chicano Studies, California State University, Los Angeles, 1979.
- Viguerie, Richard. *The New Right: We're Ready to Lead*. Falls Church, VA: The Viguerie Company, 1981.
- Visweswaran, Kamala. *Un/common Cultures: Racism and the Rearticulation of Cultural Difference*. Durham: Duke University Press, 2010.
- Vitalis, Robert. "The Noble American Science of Imperial Relations and its Laws of Race Development." *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, Vol. 52, no. 4 (2010).

- von Eschen, Penny M. *Race against Empire: Black Americans and Anticolonialism, 1937–1957*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997.
- von Eschen, Penny M. *Satchmo Blows Up the World: Jazz Ambassadors Play the Cold War*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006.
- Wacquant, Loïc. *Punishing the Poor: The Neoliberal Government of Social Insecurity*. Durham: Duke University Press, 2009.
- Wade, Nicholas. “Race is Seen as Real Guide to Track Roots of Disease.” *The New York Times*, July 30, 2002.
- Wade, Nicholas. “Unusual Use of DNA Aided in Serial Killer Search,” *The New York Times*, June 3, 2003.
- Wallerstein, Immanuel M. *The Modern World-System*. 3 volumes. New York and San Diego: Academic Press, 1974, 1980, 1989.
- Walters, Ronald W. *Pan Africanism in the African Diaspora: An Analysis of Modern Afrocentric Political Movements*. Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1997.
- Walters, Ronald W. *White Nationalism, Black Interests: Conservative Public Policy and the Black Community*. Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 2003.
- Ward, Geoff. “Race and the Justice Workforce: A System Perspective.” In R. Peterson, L. Krivo, and J. Hagan, eds. *The Many Colors of Crime: Inequalities of Race, Ethnicity and Crime in America*. New York: New York University Press, 2006.
- Ware, Vron. *Beyond the Pale: White Women, Racism, and History*. New York: Verso, 1992.
- Warner, William Lloyd, and Leo Strole. *The Social Systems of American Ethnic Groups*. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 1976 (1947).
- Washington, Booker T. “Atlanta Exposition Address” (1895). In Finkelman, Paul, ed. *Milestone Documents in African American History*. Pasadena: Salem Press, 2010.
- Waters, Mary C. *Ethnic Options: Choosing Identities in America*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990.
- Waters, Mary C. *Black Identities: West Indian Immigrant Dreams and American Realities*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000.
- Watson, Bruce. *Freedom Summer: The Savage Season of 1964 That Made Mississippi Burn and Made America a Democracy*. New York: Penguin, 2010.
- Watts, Jerry Gafio. *Amiri Baraka: The Politics and Art of a Black Intellectual*. New York: New York University Press, 2001.
- Weaver, Vesla M., and Amy E. Lerman. “Political Consequences of the Carceral State.” *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 104, no. 4 (2010).
- Weber, Max. *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology*, eds. and trans. Hans H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills. New York: Oxford University Press, 1958.
- Weber, Max. *Weber: Political Writings*, eds. and trans. Peter Lassman and Ronald Speirs. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994.
- Weber, Max. *The Russian Revolutions*, eds. and trans. Gordon C. Wells and Peter Baehr. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996.
- Weber, Max. “Politics as a Vocation.” In H.H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, eds. *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology*. New York: Oxford, 2008.
- Weglyn, Michi. *Years Of Infamy: The Untold Story Of America’s Concentration Camps*. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1996 (1976).
- Weiner, Tim. *Enemies: A History of the FBI*. New York: Random House, 2012.

- Weiss, Nancy J. *Farewell to the Party of Lincoln: Black Politics in the Age of FDR*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983.
- Weitz, Eric D. *A Century of Genocide: Utopias of Race and Nation*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003.
- West, Carolyn M. "Mammy, Jezebel, Sapphire, and Their Homegirls: Developing an 'Oppositional Gaze' Toward the Images of Black Women." In Joan C. Chrisler, Carla Golden, and Patricia D. Rozee eds., *Lectures on the Psychology of Women*, 2nd ed. New York: McGraw Hill, 2012.
- West, Cornel. *Prophesy Deliverance! Toward A Revolutionary Afro-American Christianity*. Philadelphia: Westminster, 1982.
- West, Kanye, interviewed by Matt Lauer, at the Concert for Hurricane Relief, September 2, 2005; <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IqgcdnLHWzE>.
- Wheeler, Mary E., and Susan T. Fiske. "Controlling Racial Prejudice: Social-Cognitive Goals Affect Amygdala and Stereotype Activation." *Psychological Sciences*, Vol. 16, no. 1 (2005).
- White, Richard. *The Middle Ground: Indians, Empires, and Republics in the Great Lakes Region, 1650–1815*, 20th anniversary ed. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010.
- Wieviorka, Michel. *The Arena of Racism*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 1995.
- Wildman, Stephanie M., with Margalynne Armstrong, Adrienne D. Davis, and Trina Grillo. *Privilege Revealed: How Invisible Preference Undermines America*. New York: New York University Press, 1996.
- Wilentz, Sean. *Chants Democratic: New York City and the Rise of the American Working Class, 1788–1850*. New York: Oxford, 2004 (1984).
- Willhelm, Sidney M. *Who Needs the Negro?* Cambridge: Schenkman, 1970.
- Williams, Linda F. *The Constraint of Race: Legacies of White Skin Privilege in America*. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2003.
- Williams, Vernon J., Jr. *Rethinking Race: Franz Boas and His Contemporaries*. Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1996.
- Williams, Walter E. *The State Against Blacks*. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1982.
- Williams, Yohuru R. "American Exported Black Nationalism: The Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee, the Black Panther Party, and the Worldwide Freedom Struggle, 1967–1972." *Negro History Bulletin*, Vol. 60, no. 3 (July–September 1997).
- Williamson, Joel. *A Rage for Order: Black-White Relations in the South Since Emancipation*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1986.
- Williamson, Joel. *New People: Miscegenation and Mulattoes in the United States*. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1995.
- Wilson, James Q., and Richard J. Herrnstein. *Crime and Human Nature: The Definitive Study of the Causes of Crime*. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1985.
- Wilson, William J. *Power, Racism, and Privilege*. New York: Free Press, 1973.
- Wilson, William J. *When Work Disappears: The World of the New Urban Poor*. New York: Vintage, 1997.
- Wilson, William J. *More Than Just Race: Being Black and Poor in the Inner City*. New York: Norton, 2009a.
- Wilson, William J. *The Declining Significance of Race: Blacks and Changing American Institutions*, 2nd ed. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2012 (1978).

- Wilson, William Julius. "The Black Community in the 1980s: Questions of Race, Class, and Public Policy," *The Annals of the American Academy of Social and Political Science*, Vol. 454 (March, 1981).
- Wilson, William Julius. "Foreword: The Moynihan Report and Research on the Black Community." *The Annals of The American Academy of Political and Social Science*, January 2009b.
- Wilson, William Julius. *The Truly Disadvantaged: The Inner City, the Underclass, and Public Policy*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2012 (1987).
- Wimsatt, William Upski. "Wigger: Confessions of a White Wannabe." *Chicago Reader*, July 7, 1994; <http://www.chicagoreader.com/chicago/wigger/Content?oid=884951>.
- Winant, Howard. "It Was Just a Bad Dream ... Everything's Fine Now, Dear ... You Can Go Back to Sleep ...." *Contemporary Sociology*, Vol. 27, no. 6 (Nov. 1998).
- Winant, Howard. *The World is a Ghetto: Race and Democracy Since World War II*. New York: Basic, 2001.
- Winant, Howard. "Teaching Race and Racism in the 21st Century: Thematic Considerations." In Manning Marable, ed. *The New Black Renaissance: The Souls Anthology of Critical African American Studies*. Boulder: Paradigm, 2006.
- Winant, Howard. "The Dark Side of the Force: One Hundred Years of the Sociology of Race." In Craig Calhoun, ed. *Sociology in America: A History*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007.
- Winant, Howard. "A Dream Deferred: Toward the US Racial Future." In David Grusky and Tamar Kricheli-Katz, eds. *The New Gilded Age: The Critical Inequality Debates of Our Time*. Stanford, Stanford University Press, 2012.
- Wise, Tim J. *Colorblind: The Rise of Post-Racial Politics and the Retreat from Racial Equity*. San Francisco, CA: City Lights Books, 2010.
- Woldoff, Rachel, and Seth Ovdia. "Not Getting Their Money's Worth: African-American Disadvantages in Converting Income, Wealth, and Education into Residential Quality," *Urban Affairs Review*, Vol. 45 no. 1 (Sept. 2009).
- Wolfenstein, Eugene Victor. "Race, Racism, and Racial Liberation." *Western Political Quarterly*, Vol. 30, no. 2 (June 1977).
- Wolpe, Harold. "The Theory of Internal Colonialism: The South African Case." In Ivar Oxaal, Tony Barnett, and David Booth, eds. *Beyond the Sociology of Development: Economy and Society in Latin America and Africa*. London: Routledge, 1975.
- Wolpe, Harold. *Race, Class, and the Apartheid State*. Paris: UNESCO, 1988.
- Woodard, Komozi. *A Nation within a Nation: Amiri Baraka (LeRoi Jones) and Black Power Politics*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1999.
- Woods, Clyde. "Do You Know What it Means to Miss New Orleans? Katrina, Trap Economics, and the Rebirth of the Blues." *American Quarterly*, Vol. 57, no. 4, (Dec. 2005).
- Woodward, Bob. *The War Within: A Secret White House History 2006–2008*. New York: Simon and Schuster, 2008.
- Woodward, C. Vann. "Dangerous Liaisons," review of Martha Hodes, *White Women, Black Men: Illicit Sex in the Nineteenth-Century South*. *New York Review of Books*, Vol. 45, no. 3 (Feb. 19, 1998).
- Woodward, C. Vann. *The Strange Career of Jim Crow*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2002 (1955).

- Wright, Richard. *Black Power; A Record of Reactions in a Land of Pathos*. New York, Harper and Row, 1954.
- Wroe, Andrew. *The Republican Party and Immigration Politics: From Proposition 187 to George W. Bush*. New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2008.
- Wuthnow, Robert. *Red State Religion: Faith and Politics in America's Heartland*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011.
- Yamamoto, Eric. *Interracial Justice: Conflict and Reconciliation in Post-Civil Rights America*. New York: New York University Press, 1999.
- Zelinsky, W. *Nation Into State: The Shifting Symbolic Foundations of American Nationalism*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1988.
- Zernike, Kate, and Megan Thee-Brenan. "Poll Finds Tea Party Backers Wealthier and More Educated." *The New York Times*, April 15, 2010, A1.
- Zimring, Franklin, Gordon Hawkins, and Sam Kamin. *Punishment and Democracy: Three Strikes and You're Out in California*. New York: Oxford, 2003.
- Zolniski, Christian. *Janitors, Street Vendors, and Activists: The Lives of Mexican Immigrants in Silicon Valley*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2006.
- Zolberg, Aristide R. *A Nation by Design: Immigration Policy in the Fashioning of America*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2008.

This page intentionally left blank

# Index

- abolition democracy 7, 107, 139, 151
- abolitionism 7, 81, 109, 111, 250
- Abram, Morris 200
- acculturation 265, 266
- accumulation by dispossession 45, 69, 94, 263, 267–8n8
- Acuña, Rodolfo 175
- Addams, Jane 27
- affirmative action 39, 41, 56, 71n9, 110, 129, 153, 203, 241n17, 255, 256; attacks on 193, 201, 204, 219; neoconservative critique of 199–200, 201, 203; Nixon as proponent of 93
- Affordable Care Act 231, 251
- Afghanistan 227, 231, 239n7
- Africa 3, 5, 23, 38, 44, 47n6, 77, 83, 84–5, 93, 98n16, 122, 133n5, 157n26, 166, 181n6, 249; *see also* Angola; South Africa
- African Americans 17n9, 47n6, 48n16, 61, 117, 118, 229; *see also* black(s)
- African Blood Brotherhood 171
- African National Congress 85
- Afrocentrism 85
- agency 3, 27, 65
- Ahmad, Muhammad 184n30
- Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program 223, 241n20
- Alianza Federal de Mercedes 183n28
- Allen, Robert L. 100n27, 169, 182n18
- Allport, Gordon W. 35, 50n34
- Althusser, Louis 61, 111, 138–9
- American Conservative Union 192
- American Enterprise Institute 201
- American exceptionalism 24, 263
- American Indian Movement (AIM) 41, 87, 178
- American Indians *see* Native Americans
- American Native Party 237
- American Revolution 75, 139, 141, 155n8
- American Sociological Association 110
- Americanization 48n15
- Anglo-Saxon Clubs of America 99n20
- Angola 85, 99n24
- anthropology 28–9
- anti-colonialism 76, 120, 152, 155n9, 198
- anti-communism 99n24, 196, 198, 222
- anti-racist movement 14, 31, 41, 84–5, 87, 140, 151, 153–4, 163, 204; and racial state 148–9, 163; white 178; among workers 67, 72n26; and World War II 76; *see also* black movement; civil rights movement
- anti-racist projects 129–30
- anti-war movement 9, 82, 108, 176, 196, 217
- apartheid 85, 99n25, 226, 241n17
- Appiah, Kwame Anthony 133n3
- Arab Americans 123
- armed forces: desegregation of 33, 171, 172, 180n2, 217; segregation in 34
- arts 88, 89
- ASCO (Chican@ art collective) 88
- Ashcroft, John 226
- Asian American Political Alliance 87
- Asians 18n15, 26, 30, 58, 76, 77, 93, 237; cultural nationalism 87, 177; exclusion of 5, 8, 25, 49n22, 57; integration of 68; racialization of 142; superexploitation of 131; *see also* Chinese; Japanese
- assimilation/assimilationism 6, 11, 58; civil rights movement orientation towards 161–2, 170; and ethnicity paradigm 21, 22, 24, 26, 29, 31, 36, 37, 39, 40, 44, 46, 172, 175, 188, 250; and race-relations cycle 27; refusal of 82, 87, 177; structural 43



- Atwater, Lee 218, 222, 240n10  
 authoritarian populism, new right 191–2, 194–5, 211  
 authoritarianism 252, 262  
 auto industry 67, 230, 231
- backlash politics 35, 76, 168, 192  
*Bakke* case (1978) 203, 204, 208n25, 213, 238n1, 240n12  
 Baldwin, Roger 33  
 banking 227–8, 231  
 Baptists 25, 31, 47n9, 221–2  
 Baraka, Imamu Amiri 87, 88  
 bargaining power theory 66  
 Becker, Gary 53, 55, 68, 70n6  
 Bell, Derrick 253, 258  
 Benedict, Ruth 29, 49n26  
 Berle, A.A. Jr. 33  
 Berlet, Chip 215  
 Berry, Mary Frances 226  
 Biko, Steve 85  
 biologicistic perspectives 5, 11, 12, 21, 23–4, 27, 29, 31, 32, 38, 42, 47n5, 48n15, 71n14, 109, 115, 117, 119, 120, 215, 218, 249, 260  
 biopower 144, 145, 156n19  
 Birmingham campaign (1963) 146, 168  
 birther phenomenon 155n10, 234–5  
 Black Arts Movement 88  
 Black Consciousness Movement (BCM) 85  
 black movement 8–9, 14, 78, 143–4, 161, 164, 204, 211, 246, 250, 251, 253; and anti-colonialism 198; containment/repression of 186–90, 201, 217, 253; decline of 194, 246, 251; entrism 172, 173, 188, 202; as inspiration for other social movements 108, 150, 162; politicization of the social 14, 151, 152, 185–6; radical tendencies 168, 172, 179–80, 198; redefinition of racial identity 165; and reform of racial state 171–4; splits in 179; unity 179; *see also* Black Panther Party; black power; civil rights movement  
 Black Nation Thesis 90–1, 171  
 black nationalism 37, 75, 81–2, 83, 84, 94, 98n13, 99n20 and 21, 169–70, 177–8, 188, 198
- Black Panther Party 9, 41, 87, 171, 175–6, 178, 180, 184n30, 189, 251  
 black power ix, xi, 8, 14, 38, 41, 42, 82, 84, 148, 166, 167–71, 173, 174, 182n16 and 17, 195, 198, 213, 251, 261  
 blackness 2, 18n19, 88, 94, 119, 151, 180, 215, 248, 250; of Obama 16n2, 235  
 black(s) 26, 54; bourgeoisie 188; capitalism 89, 93, 100n27, 171, 178, 203; churches 82, 164, 170; conservatism 72n19; disenfranchisement of 165; employment 48n19, 61, 71–2n17, 93; immigrant 30, 33; integration of 11, 32; labor 56, 57, 68, *see also* slavery; Marxism 41, 170, 171; middle class 60, 61, 72n17; poverty 58, 61–2; as racial category 112; state violence against 145; student movements 87, 157–8n26; underclass 59, 60, 61, 71–2n17; unemployment 51n40, 58, 224; wealth 58; *see also* African Americans  
 Blauner, Robert 6–7, 16n5, 17n8, 35, 92, 93, 101n37, 38, 39  
 Blumer, Herbert 27, 40, 50n37, 105, 208n24, 268n14  
 Blyden, Edward Wilmot 82  
 Boas, Franz 28–9, 120, 135n16  
 body politic 140, 144–5, 156n17  
 Boggs, Grace Lee 154n4  
 Boggs, James 169–70  
 Bond, Julian 175  
 Bonila-Silva, Eduardo 136n23  
 Briggs, Cyril 169  
 Brown Berets 87  
*Brown* decision (1954) 148, 151  
 Brown, Elaine 176  
 Burnham, Walter Dean 191  
 Bush, George H. W. 222, 223  
 Bush, George W. 212, 225–7  
 busing 93, 192–3, 196, 203, 206n10, 208n25, 218
- Cabral, Amílcar 84  
 California: Chinese and Mexican immigrants 142; Racial Privacy Initiative (Proposition 54) 121, 135n18; tax policy (Proposition 13) 215

- Calvinism 23, 24  
capitalism 4, 5, 65, 80, 89, 113, 155n8,  
180n1, 245; black 89, 93, 100n27, 171,  
178, 203; industrial 56, 215; merchant  
113, 141  
capitalist class 69  
Caribeñ@s 12  
Carmichael, Stokely *see* Ture, Kwame  
Carter, Jimmy 61, 203–4, 214, 222,  
240n15  
categorization: social 105–6; *see also* racial  
categorization  
Census, U.S. 3, 79, 121–4, 141,  
*Charlotte-Mecklenburg* school segregation  
cases 203, 208n25  
Cherokee 118, 134n12  
Chicago School of sociology 6, 24, 26–8, 38,  
120  
Chican@ nationalism 183–4n29  
Children's Defense Fund 176, 183n26  
Chinese 25, 49n22, 57, 123, 134n10, 142,  
143; resistance culture 155–6n13  
Chinese Exclusion Act (1882) 30, 57, 71n11  
Christian Coalition 221, 240n15  
churches, black 82, 164, 170  
*Citizens United* case (2010) 231  
citizenship 12, 14, 57, 64, 76, 77, 97n4, 121,  
139, 141, 147, 155n10, 186, 232, 254;  
social 14, 35, 265, 266  
Civil Liberties Act (1988) 240–1n16  
Civil Rights Act (1964) 167, 173, 202, 257  
Civil Rights Commission 226  
civil rights laws/reforms 8, 41, 59, 61,  
148, 149, 167, 171–2, 173, 186, 187–8,  
202, 250, 253–4, 254–5, 257; limitations  
of 150–1, 204; new right and 195, 197;  
nineteenth century 33; opposition to  
217–18; and racial categorization 122  
civil rights movement 2, 8, 14, 30, 31, 54,  
55, 65, 81–2, 86, 148, 151, 157n23, 179,  
250; direct action strategy 163–4, 166,  
171; emergence of 163–4; and ethnicity  
paradigm of race 31, 35, 36, 37, 39,  
40, 42, 161–2; and feminist movement  
108; integrationist and assimilationist  
orientation 161–2, 170; intellectuals 165–  
6; Malcolm X and 170; mass mobilization  
in the South 171; rearticulation processes  
164, 165–7, 187; “sit-in” tactic 166  
civil society 138, 139; and racial inequality  
26; and state distinction 137, 138  
Civil War ix, 79, 97n3, 139, 148, 150, 151,  
185, 207n13, 250  
Clark, Kenneth 35–6, 39, 167  
class 4, 5, 10, 79, 95, 107, 144, 248  
class-conflict approaches 11–12, 53, 65–7,  
68–9  
class paradigm of race 11–12, 53–73, 109,  
110, 152, 153, 162, 163, 172, 174, 189,  
250–1; class conflict theory 11–12, 53,  
65–7, 68–9; critical reflections on 67–9;  
market relations approaches 54–8; and  
nationalism 177; reductionist view of race  
163, 246, 252–3; and socialist tendency  
176; stratification approaches 58–65  
Cleaver, Eldridge 213  
Clinton, Bill 222–5, 226, 227, 229, 241n18,  
251; and neoliberalism 61, 223–4, 224–5;  
triangulation strategy 63; welfare reform 60  
Clinton, George 1, 89  
Cloward, Richard 182n22, 241n20  
cognitive psychology 118–19  
Cold War 33, 38, 76, 84, 176, 253  
collective mobilization 146, 190, 267n3  
Collins, Patricia Hill 133n2  
colonial labor principle 57  
colonialism 12, 83, 92, 94, 101n37, 115, 147;  
internal 35, 83, 91–4, 152, 177, 178, 179,  
183n24, 184n31; settler 12, 247  
color line 131, 174  
colorblindness 2, 21–2, 39, 46, 57, 69, 110,  
126, 129, 149, 153, 163, 170, 175, 255,  
262–5; as hegemonic racial project 109,  
132, 256–60, 263–4; left-wing version  
of 54, 176–7; neoconservatism and 201;  
neoliberal 15, 211, 220–1, 251; Obama  
and 228–32  
Comintern 90  
Committee for the Survival of a Free  
Congress 192  
communism 38, 39, 72n23, 99n25, 170, 251;  
*see also* anti-communism

- Communist Party 65, 90, 91, 99n21, 100–1n35, 171, 189  
 Community Action Program (War on Poverty) 173  
 community control 93, 96, 169, 173, 174, 177, 178, 193, 198, 204  
 Congress of Racial Equality (CORE) 168  
 Congressional Black Caucus 175  
 Connerly, Ward 121, 135n18  
 conquest, era of 113–14, 131, 247  
 consciousness-raising 89  
 conservatism 191, 234; black 72n19; *see also* neoconservatism  
 Conservative Caucus 192  
 conservative egalitarianism 43  
 Constitution 71n9, 86, 141, 196, 207n19, 234; 14th Amendment 76, 171, 172; 13th Amendment 171, 172; three-fifths clause 141  
 consumption 53  
 Cooper, Anna Julia 5, 17n9, 26, 108  
 Coors, Joseph 192  
 corporate political activism 213–14  
 corporeal dimensions of race 39, 40, 110–11, 114, 246, 247–8, 249; *see also* racial body politic  
 Cox, Oliver C. 27  
 Crawford, Alan 192, 194  
 Crenshaw, Kimberlé W. 133n2  
 Cruse, Harold 82, 86–7, 88, 100n27  
 Cuffe, Paul 82  
 cultural determinism 39  
 cultural nationalism 83, 86–9, 93, 94, 152, 177, 178, 179  
 cultural pluralism 11, 21, 22, 24, 26, 28, 36, 40, 48n16, 175, 177, 179, 188, 250  
 cultural resistance 142, 155–6n13, 166  
 culture 22–3, 31, 109, 144, 252  
  
 Darwin, Charles 24  
 Davis, Ed 195  
 Davis, Kingsley 38  
 Dawes Act (1887) 118  
 deindustrialization 59, 60, 61, 67  
 Delaney, Martin R. 24, 47n6, 82  
 democracy 151, 212, 217; abolition 7, 107, 139, 151; direct 194; *see also* racial democracy  
 Democratic Party 49n19, 57, 59–60, 175, 176, 180, 197, 208n26, 221, 222, 236, 241n18, 244n46; Dixiecrat wing 33, 185n25, 217, 244n48; redistributive reforms 251; as repository of consensus 164; social democrats 217, 251; and Southern whites 194, 196  
 demographic trends 236–7, 260  
 Denton, Nancy A. 62, 251  
 deracination 23, 107, 247  
 desegregation 42, 151, 171, 172; of armed forces 33, 148, 171, 172, 180n2, 217; of the defense industries 148; southern resistance to 164  
 Dewey, John 27, 152, 154n4, 264  
 difference 2, 3, 12, 40, 106, 107, 144, 245, 247–8, 261  
 Diop, Cheikh Anta 85  
 discovery and conquest 113–14, 131, 247  
 discrimination 26, 43, 45, 55, 64, 65, 68, 69, 259; neoconservative opposition to 198, 199, 200–1; at the point of production 67; positive 39, 41, 199, *see also* affirmative action; reverse 193, 195, 200, 203, 204, 218, 255; structural aspects of 66  
 disenfranchisement 165, 212, 232, 249, 258  
 disruptive state interventionism model 56, 57  
 distribution 53, 54, 58, 67, 68; *see also* redistribution  
 diversity 22, 48n16 and 18, 71n16  
 DNA testing 118  
 Dolan, John T. 192  
 domination 3, 13, 22, 40, 58, 83, 91, 94, 106, 107, 108, 114, 128, 129, 149, 178, 219, 245–6; indirect strategies of 166; matrix of 133n2; of periphery by core 82; and processes of otherness 263; race as tool for consolidating 246, 249; and subalternity 154n7; substituted by hegemony 14, 15, 132, 149, 254  
 Douglass, Frederick 132, 157n23, 245, 267n6

- Du Bois, W.E.B. 5, 23, 24, 26, 28, 35, 38, 78, 81, 82, 117, 139; abolition democracy 7, 107, 139, 151; on the American assumption 199, 263; and Pan-Africanism 83, 84, 85, 177; on the “psychological wage” 25, 206n13; and social construction of race 120, 249; *Black Reconstruction* 150; *The Philadelphia Negro* 6; *The Souls of Black Folk* 83
- due process 139, 171
- Durkheim, Emile 4, 5, 17n6, 95, 154n2
- Dutch Reformed Church (NHK) 24
- Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) 224, 251
- Economic Opportunity Act (1964) 182n21
- economic relationships 11, 53, 67
- economics 54–5, 67–8, 69–70n3; institutional 53; neo-classical 53, 54, 55, 66, 110
- Edelman, Marian Wright 223, 241n21
- Edgar, David 162
- education 1, 7, 71n16, 130, 165, 174, 175, 199, 214, 216, 224, 233, 257; access to 58, 64, 209n28, 261; and class paradigm of race 64, 67, 68; funding of 61, 66, 173, 215, 260; higher 88, 208n24, 209n28; privatization 225, 233; returns to 43, 58, 219
- electoral/institutional entrisism 174, 175–6, 179
- Ellison, Ralph 101n40, 132
- empire, establishment of 141, 249
- employment 43, 48n12 and 19, 60–1, 93, 107, 175, 208n24 and 25, 219, 220, 230, 231, 240n13, 243n38, 257
- Engels, Frederick 4, 89–90
- Enlightenment 115, 116, 245
- entrisism: black movement 172, 173, 188, 202; electoral/institutional 174, 175–6, 179; Republican 183n25
- equality 6, 8, 161, 172, 185, 190, 254, 255; individual 198; of opportunity 37, 122, 171; social 161, 220
- Essien-Udom, E.U. 84
- ethnicity paradigm 10, 11, 21–51, 109, 152, 169, 172, 174, 175, 188, 198, 250; ascent to dominance 21, 29–39; “Bootstraps Model” 42–4; and civil rights movement 161–2; decline and fall 21, 39–36, 161–2; early years 21–9; reductionist view of race 40, 163, 246, 252–3; “They All Look Alike” model 44–5
- ethnocracy, European model of 26
- eugenics 5, 24, 28, 39, 40, 47n5–6, 116–17, 206n9, 249
- European immigrants 11, 21, 25, 26, 45, 77, 80, 250
- evolutionary theory 5, 24, 117
- exchange relationships 53, 54, 56, 67, 68, 69n3
- exclusion 26, 35, 45, 64, 68, 69, 76, 117, 162; Asian 5, 8, 25, 49n22, 57
- Executive Order 9066 (1942) 30, 49n25
- exploitation 3, 12, 63, 64, 107, 114, 115, 246; colonialist 85, 90; labor 11, 53, 68; super-27, 59, 68, 92, 94, 131, 171, 172, 258, 263
- Falwell, Jerry 192
- Fannie Mae 227
- Fanon, Frantz 38, 84
- FBI COINTELPRO (Counterintelligence program) 189, 217
- feminist movement 9, 14, 78, 108, 158n27, 186, 196, 204, 205n7, 262; *see also* gender; women
- Floyd, et al v. City of New York* (2013) 135n21
- Ford, Gerald 203
- forensics 118
- Forman, James 208n23
- Foucault, Michel 138, 144, 145, 156n19
- 14th Amendment 76, 171, 172
- Frazier, E. Franklin 27, 32, 50n29, 51n40, 188
- Freddy Mac 227
- Frederickson, George M. 128
- Freedom Summer campaign (1964) 173, 182n20
- Friedman, Milton 53, 54, 55, 69n2
- Frudakis, Tony 118
- Gallagher, Charles A. 101–2n40
- Galton, Francis 116

- Garvey, Marcus 84, 85, 99n19, 20 and 21, 169, 170, 171, 177, 180n4
- Gates, Henry Louis Jr. 118
- gay movement 14, 108, 176, 196, 204
- gender 79, 80, 95, 107–8, 133n2, 248, inequality, 64, 133n2; *see also* feminist movement; women
- genetics 117–18, 119
- genocide 3, 8, 41, 107, 156n18, 247, 249
- Genovese, Eugene 181n9
- Geschwender, James A. 58–9
- ghetto rebellions 82, 161, 193
- Glazer, Nathan 31, 36, 37, 39, 40, 42, 163, 169, 199–200, 249
- Glenn, Evelyn Nakano 133n2
- globalization 61
- Gobineau, Arthur 116
- Goldberg, David Theo 128, 230
- Goldwater, Barry 191, 203
- Gonzalez, Alberto 226
- Gordon, Linda 192–3, 195
- Gordon, Milton 31, 37, 39, 41, 43, 58
- governmentality 138, 156n19
- Gramsci, Antonio 9, 76, 140, 142–3, 146, 148, 149–50, 156n15, 264; on hegemony 156n22, 205n3, 254; on ideology as “glue” 76, 154n6; on intellectuals 165, 181n6; subalternity 154n7, 181n10; on war of maneuver and war of position 142
- Gratz v. Bollinger* case (2003) 226
- Great Recession (2008) 1–2, 60–1, 212, 227, 230, 268n13
- Great Society 9, 173, 176, 188, 195, 212, 213, 220, 223, 250
- Great Transformation ix, 9, 14, 151, 153, 161, 163, 185, 190, 205n1, 213, 216, 232, 259, 263,
- Griggs* case (1971) 203, 208n25
- group boundary formation 138
- group identity 22, 36–7, 138, 147
- group norms 42–3
- group rights 21, 38, 41–2, 198–9, 200, 204
- Grutter v. Bollinger* case (2003) 226
- Guinier, Lani 223, 241n19
- Hacking, Ian 12, 132n1
- Hahn, Steven 181n9
- Hall, Stuart 53
- Hamilton, Charles V. 17n12, 92, 169, 182n18
- Harlem Renaissance (1920s) 82, 86, 171
- Harlem riots (1964) 82
- Harvey, David 69, 94
- hate 123, 128, 259
- Hawai'i 94, 177
- Hayek, Friedrich A. 53, 69n1
- Head Start program 173, 188
- health/health care x, 11, 119, 125, 165, 175, 188, 214, 216, 233, 239n5, 257; access 1, 258; benefit restrictions 61; and class paradigm of race 67; outcomes 58; privatization initiatives 225; reforms 72n20, 224, 235, 251, 268n9
- hegemony 132, 156n22, 205n3, 251, 254, 256, 264; racial 9, 15, 109, 138, 147, 149, 175, 177, 190, 211, 212, 220, 236, 249, 252, 259, 263, 264, 265
- Helms, Jesse 222
- Heritage Foundation 192, 197
- Herskovitz, Melville 29
- higher education 88, 208n24, 209n28
- Hirschfeld, Magnus 127–8
- Hispanics 122, 123; *see also* Latin@s
- Ho, Karen 228, 242–3n34
- homophobia 140, 153
- Hoover, J. Edgar 9, 183n27, 189, 239n7
- HoSang, Daniel Martinez 193, 209n28
- housing 175, 188, 194, 209n28, 219, 224, 239n5, 243n42, 257; access to 43, 56; and class paradigm of race 67; fair 70n7, 193, 203, 256; market 8, 68; New Orleans, post-Hurricane Katrina 226, 242n33
- Human Genome Project 117
- human trafficking 93
- Humphrey, Hubert 196
- Hunter, Allen 192–3, 195
- Huntington, Samuel P. 102n41
- Hurston, Zora Neale 29
- hybridity, racial x, 80, 93–4
- hyphenated identity 22, 40

- identity 151; group 36–7, 138, 147;  
 hyphenated 22, 40; individual 138, 147;  
 mixed-race 98n11, 108, 109, 123–4; *see also* racial identity
- identity politics 36, 39, 140, 171, 178, 185–6, 204
- ideology 138–9; colorblind *see* colorblindness; conservative egalitarian 43; as “glue” 76, 154n6; of producerism 215–16, 256, 260; race-consciousness as 15; of reverse racism 14, 204, 212, 218–20, 255, 256
- immigrant analogy 7, 28, 29, 30, 31, 39, 40–1, 42, 43, 44
- immigrants: Asian 30, 76, 77, 87, 93, 131, 237; black 30, 33; of color 11; European 11, 21, 25, 26, 45, 77, 80, 250; Irish 13, 56, 57, 79, 92; Latin@s 30–1, 62–3, 87; Mexican 62, 65; notions of race 126
- immigration 26, 28, 62–3, 76, 77, 237, 259–60, 267–8n8; voluntary versus coerced 79, 92–3
- Immigration and Nationality Act (1965) 8, 49n22, 244n44
- immigration policy 15, 77, 237–8, 256; reform 8, 63, 66–7, 232, 234, 244n46; and voting patterns 244n46
- imperialism 47n11, 76, 87, 96n1
- implicit bias research 63, 118–19, 135n13
- incarceration 1, 58, 95, 139, 212, 216, 258, 259
- inclusion 11, 22–3, 29, 35, 40, 41, 212, 217, 220
- income: inequality 177; redistribution of 176–7, 265
- individual rights 198–9, 200
- individualism 21, 57, 212, 254; neoconservative 198–9, 200–1
- industrial capitalism 56, 215
- inequality 53, 106, 109, 245, 246; class 64, 179; as fundamental dimension of social organization 144, 200; gender 64, 133n2; income 177; structural 1–2; and wages 66; in wealth 177; *see also* racial inequality
- Inkatha Freedom Party 85
- Innis, Roy 85
- Institute for Policy Studies 176
- institutional economics 53
- institutional racism 17n12
- insurgent nationalism 75, 81–94, 95–6
- integration 29, 34–5, 36, 39, 48n19, 179, 201; of Asians and Latin@s 68; of blacks 11, 32; and civil rights movement 170; of European immigrants 11, 45; rejection of 177
- intellectuals 176–7, 181n6, 198; civil rights movement 165–6
- interest group politics 164–5, 169
- internal colonialism 35, 83, 91–4, 152, 177, 178, 179, 183n24, 184n31
- interpellation 138–9
- intersectionality 106, 133n2, 162, 245
- Iraq 227, 231, 239n7
- Irish 13, 56, 57, 79, 92, 247
- irrational prejudice model 55
- Islamophobia 226–7
- Jackson, Jesse 241n18
- James, C.L.R. 84, 154n4
- Japanese 25, 43, 49n22, 123, 241n16; naturalization 141; World War II incarceration of 30, 244n46
- Japanese American Evacuation and Resettlement Study (JERS) 30
- Jefferson, Thomas 116
- Jewish Defense League 208n23
- Jewish Theological Seminary lectures (1947–1948) 33
- Jews 13, 18n18, 25, 31, 33, 43, 92, 97n4, 113, 181n6, 198, 250
- Jim Crow system 5, 8, 15, 38, 57, 85, 108, 162, 163, 164, 166, 180n2 and 3, 221, 253
- job losses 60–1
- Johnson, Charles S. 6, 27
- Johnson, Lyndon 41, 82, 173, 196, 221
- Johnson, Walter 18n19, 181n9
- Johnson-Reed Act (1924) 31, 49n22
- Joint Center for Political Studies 175
- Jones, Van 230, 243n35

- Justice Department, Civil Rights Section 171, 172
- Justice for Janitors movement 67
- Kallen, Horace 24, 26, 28, 31, 48n16
- Karenga, Maulana 87
- Katznelson, Ira 56, 180n2, 207n16
- Kennedy, John F. 173, 197
- Kennedy, Robert F. 9, 197
- Keynes, John Maynard 68
- Kikuchi, Charles 30
- King, Martin Luther Jr. 139, 157n26, 166, 167, 168, 186, 220; I have a dream speech (1963) 257; anti-Vietnam War speech (1967) 39, 182–3n23, 207n22, 254; assassination of 9, 174
- King, Rodney 223
- Kissinger, Henry 239n6
- “Know-Nothings” (American Native Party) 237
- Kristol, Irving 30, 31, 40, 198
- Ku Klux Klan (KKK) 42, 84, 98n12, 99n20, 218
- Kuhn, Thomas S. 18n17
- labor 5, 28, 31, 54, 55, 56–7, 64, 68–9, 107, 113, 133n2; aristocracy of 100n34; black 56, 57, 68; coerced 107, 113, 139, 247; conflict 80; demand for 80; division of 79, 82; exploitation of 11, 53, 68; Latin@ 68; law 56, 165, 202; *see also* slavery
- labor markets 8, 56, 64, 68, 125, 189, 238; segmentation studies 66; split 56, 66
- labor movement xi, 26, 152, 172, 202; *see also* unions/unionization
- labor rights 165, 171
- Laclau, Ernesto 70n3
- Latin@s 8, 12, 18n15, 30–1, 33, 44, 54, 58, 62–3, 131, 237, 238; cultural nationalism 87; integration of 68; student groups 87; unemployment 224; *see also* Mexicans; Puerto Ricans
- League of Revolutionary Black Workers 180, 184n30, 189
- Lenin, V.I. 90, 100n34, 170
- Lewis, John 235
- Lewis, Oscar 62
- Lewis, W. Arthur 55, 70n4
- liberalism 29, 31, 194, 200, 214; interest-group 164
- Lincoln, Abraham 150
- Linnaeus, Carl 115
- Lipset, Seymour M. 38,
- Lipsitz, George 188, 205n5
- Lochner* case (1905) 57
- Locke, Alain Leroy 5, 17n9, 26, 120
- Loewen, James W. 180n 3
- Los Angeles riots (1992) 93, 223
- Lowndes, Joseph 236
- Lusane, Clarence 225
- Luxemburg, Rosa 73n27, 90, 100n33, 170
- Lyman, Stanford M. 17n11
- Lyon, Matthew N. 215
- McCarran–Walter Act (1952) 15, 141
- McCarthy period 50–1n37, 51n38
- McGovern, George 206n8, 213, 223
- MacIver, Robert 33, 34
- McLennan, Rebecca 216
- Magnuson Act (1943) 30, 49n22, 71n11
- majority–minority demographic 44, 46, 65, 79, 207n17, 212, 232, 236, 237, 264
- Malcolm X 1, 39, 82, 84, 98n13, 169, 170, 174, 188, 198, 201, 205n5
- Maoism 89, 170, 184n31
- March on Washington (1963) 146, 168, 181n12
- Marcuse, Herbert 213
- marginalization 8, 11, 31, 94, 106, 107, 108, 249
- market-based approaches 11, 53, 54–8, 68
- market exchange 53, 54, 67, 69n3
- Marshall, T.H. 266
- Marshall, Thurgood 171, 172
- Martí, José 95
- Marx, Karl 4, 5, 89–90, 114, 133n5, 249
- Marxism–Leninism 82, 88, 170, 176, 179, 251
- Marxists/Marxism 65–6, 68–9, 70n3, 94, 110, 152, 179, 198, 250, 251, 262; black

- 41, 170, 171; colorblind currents in 54; and the "National Question" 89–91; split labor market theory 66
- Mashantucket Pequot Tribal Nation 118
- mass media 88, 128
- Massey, Douglas S. 59, 62–4, 68, 72n22, 119, 251
- Matthews, Chris 2
- Mead, George Herbert 27
- Menendian, Stephen 107
- merchant capitalism 113, 141
- Meredith, James 168
- Merton, Robert K. 33, 34, 38, 39
- Mexican revolution (1910–1920) 31, 183–4n29
- Mexicans 30–1, 42, 62, 79–80; deportation of 237; nationalism 82, 177; racialization of 44, 142
- Mexico: invasion of 79; and NAFTA 224
- middle class 61, 256; black 60, 61, 72n17
- Middle Eastern Americans and South Asians (MEASAs) 227, 239n7
- migration: coerced versus voluntary 92–3; sociology of 28; *see also* immigration
- Miles, Robert 128
- Miller, Kelly 5, 17n9, 24, 26, 117
- Mills, C. Wright 50n37, 65
- Mills, Charles W. 137
- miscegenation 80, 97n5, 248
- Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party (MFDP) 98n12, 168, 182n13
- mixed-race identity 98n11, 108, 109, 123–4
- monopolistic practices model 55–6, 57
- Montagu, M.F. Ashley 249
- Montgomery bus boycott 171
- Moral Majority 192, 221
- Morello, Tom 89
- Morris, Aldon D. 164
- Morton, Samuel 116, 134n10
- Moses, Robert Parris 167
- Movimiento Estudiantil Chicano@ de Aztlán (MEChA) 87
- Moynihan, Daniel P. 32, 36, 37, 39, 40, 41, 42, 51n40, 62, 169, 203, 249
- MPLA (People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola) 85, 99n24
- Muhammad, Elijah 170
- multiculturalism 22, 28, 48n18, 71n16, 263
- multiracial identity *see* mixed-race identity
- Murray, Charles 41
- music 6, 23, 86, 88, 89, 102n40, 126, 132, 142, 170
- Muslims 16n4, 22, 113, 227
- Myrdal, Gunnar 31–3, 34, 36, 39, 40, 49–50n26, 27 and 28, 163, 250
- Nader, Ralph 213
- nation-based paradigm 10, 12, 57, 75–102, 109, 152, 153, 162, 174, 177–8, 189, 251–2; critical remarks on 94–6; insurgent nationalism 81–94, 95–6; and radical politics 171, 172; reductionist view of race 163, 246, 252–3; white nation construct 75–9
- Nation of Islam (NOI) 82, 84, 170
- National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) 164, 168, 169, 171–2, 176, 235
- National Coalition for an Accurate Count of Asians and Pacific Islanders 124
- National Conservative Political Action Committee (NCPAC) 192
- National Council of La Raza 124, 176
- National Organization for Woman 176
- National Origins Immigration Act (1924) 121
- National Rainbow Coalition 241n18
- nationalism 12, 76, 79, 174, 251–2; black 37, 75, 81–2, 83, 84, 94, 98n13, 99n20 and 21, 169–70, 177–8, 188, 198; Chicano@ 183–4n29; cultural 83, 86–9, 93, 94, 152, 177, 178, 179; insurgent 75, 81–94; Mexican 82, 177; new social movements 174, 177–8; white 25, 75, 78, 81, 95
- Native American Church 155n13
- Native Americans 8, 12, 25, 41, 58, 78, 82, 94, 178; cultural nationalism 87, 177; enslavement of 247; native identity 3; resistance culture 155n13
- nativism 77, 237, 256, 260
- naturalization 117, 121, 130, 155n10



- Naturalization Law (1790) 141
- neo-classical economics 53, 54, 55, 66, 110
- neocolonialism 38, 39
- neoconservatism 21–2, 38, 42, 46, 51n39, 61, 163, 175, 211, 225, 250; and affirmative action 199–200, 201, 203; and colorblind ideology 201; and individualism 198–9, 200–1; opposition to discrimination 198, 199, 200–1; racial reaction 39, 190, 198–201, 203, 204
- neoliberalism 15, 53, 54, 61, 69, 94, 211, 212, 230, 233, 256; Bush (George W.) 225; Clinton 223–4, 224–5; and colorblind ideology 211, 220–1, 251; and politics of resentment 211, 214–17; and producerism 215–16; Reagan 222; repressive techniques 216–17; rise of 212–14, 221, 251; and tax policy 215
- New Deal 29, 38, 48n19, 68, 69, 165, 176, 180n1, 194, 195, 213, 220, 221, 250, 256
- New Orleans, post-Katrina 212, 226, 227
- New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) 85, 100n26
- new right: authoritarian populism 191–2, 194–5, 211; and civil rights reforms 195, 197, 255–6; code words in political messaging 192–4, 196–7, 202–3, 204, 212, 218, 219; colorblind racial ideology 212; periodicals 192; politics of resentment 211, 214–17; and race-consciousness 260; racial reaction 190, 191–8, 202–3, 204, 255–6; racial rearticulation 192–4, 197, 198, 212, 255–6; reverse racism allegation 14, 204, 212, 218–20, 255, 256; and welfare state 194, 195
- new social movements 14, 108, 150–4, 161, 162–3, 164–7, 204, 211; electoral/institutional entrism 174, 175–6, 179; nationalism 174, 177–8; politicization of the social 150–4; socialist tendency 174, 176–7; *see also individual movements*
- Newton, Huey P. 171, 252
- Niebuhr, Reinhold 240n15
- Nishimoto, Richard S. 30
- Nixon, Richard 61, 93, 191, 196, 197; personal racism 208–9n27; and southern strategy 42, 60, 191, 203
- Nkrumah, Kwame 84, 85
- No Child Left Behind 225
- nonviolent resistance 157–8n26, 168
- North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) 224, 242n26
- Obama, Barack 1, 2, 15, 61, 148, 155n10, 212, 234–5, 251, 255, 263–4; “birther” assertions against 234–5; blackness of 16n2, 235; and colorblindness 228–32; and immigration reform 232
- Obasogie, Osagie 111–12
- ocularity of race viii, 8, 13, 39, 40, 112, 145, 245, 246, 247–8, 249
- Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO) 173, 182n21
- opportunity 37, 122, 171, 254
- opportunity hoarding 64
- Organization of African Unity (OAU) 100n26
- Organization of Afro-American Unity 84, 170
- Organizing for America (OFA) 232
- otherness/othering 29, 105, 113–14, 154n7, 245, 247, 263
- Padmore, George 84
- Pan-Africanism 82, 83–5, 87, 170, 177
- Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) 85, 99n18 and 25
- Pan Afrikan Peoples Arkestra 88
- panethnicity 44–5, 131, 252
- paradigms, racial *see* racial paradigms
- Park, Robert E. 6, 24, 26, 27, 29, 120, 249
- Parsons, Talcott 34, 35, 38, 39
- Partido de la Raza Unida 41
- patrimonialism 141
- Paul, Rand 234
- Peele, Gillian 191
- People v. Hall* (1854) 142
- peoplehood 12, 76, 78–9, 81, 82–3, 86, 95, 96, 109, 152, 163, 252, 261
- performing race 145

- Perot, Ross 223
- Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act (PWORA) 223
- pharmacogenomics 117–18
- phenomic dimensions 8, 40, 109, 114, 140, 145, 228, 246, 247–8
- Phillips, Howard 192
- Phillips, Kevin 193–4, 195
- Piven, Frances Fox 182n22, 241n20
- Plessy v. Ferguson* decision (1896) 57, 164, 239n8
- Podhoretz, Norman 198
- Polanyi, Karl 68, 69–70n3, 161, 180n1
- political participation 130
- political rights 6, 25, 130, 201
- politicization of the social 14, 140, 145, 150–4, 163, 179, 185–6, 204, 251
- politics 120–4, 186; of identity 36, 39, 140, 171, 178, 185–6, 204; of resentment 211, 214–17; *see also* racial politics
- Poor People's Movement 9
- populism, new right authoritarian 191–2, 194–5, 211
- positive discrimination 39, 41, 199; *see also* affirmative action
- poverty 58, 59, 60, 61–2, 260; culture of 61, 62; war on 9, 173, 182n21, 188, 194, 220
- powell, john a. 107
- Powell, Lewis F. 213, 238n1
- power, racial 130
- pragmatism 27, 38; radical 137–8, 140, 146–7, 152, 261, 264
- prejudice 6, 7, 22, 26, 32, 34, 35, 36, 39, 40, 63, 200; irrational 55
- primitive accumulation 5, 79, 249
- privatization 212, 218, 226, 240n9; of education 225, 233; health care 225
- producerism 215–16, 236, 256, 260
- production 53, 54, 68–9; class conflict in 67; social relations of 54, 65
- Progressivism 24
- Project for a New American Century 201
- Protestantism 23, 24, 25, 31, 47n9, 79, 191; fundamentalist 192
- Puerto Ricans 82, 94, 177
- Puritanism 23, 24, 31
- PUSH organization 54
- Quijano, Anibal 98n17
- race 79; biologicistic perspectives on 5, 11, 12, 21, 23–4, 27, 29, 31, 32, 38, 42, 47n5, 48n15, 71n14, 109, 115, 117, 119, 120, 215, 218, 249, 260; concept of 4, 105, 245; corporeal dimensions of 39, 40, 110–11, 114, 246, 247–8, 249; as cultural phenomenon 22–3; definitions of 108–9; as an essence 109, 110; experiential dimension of 137; as an illusion 110; immigrants' notions of 126; as a master category 8, 106–9, 245, 246–9; neoconservative approaches to 21–2; ocularity of 8, 13, 39, 40, 112, 145, 245, 246, 247–8, 249; paradigms of *see* racial paradigms; as peoplehood 83; as performance 145; phenomic dimensions of 8, 40, 109, 114, 140, 145, 228, 246, 247–8; reductionist view of 40, 163, 246, 252–3; scapegoat theories of 144; scavenger concept of 144–5, 154n5; as set of collective representations 137; social construction of 13, 21, 106, 114–15, 120, 248, 249; as a social fact 137; social meaning of 151, 162; and the social sciences 4–7; social structure of 137; visual understandings of 111–12, 114
- race consciousness 2, 8, 10, 15, 22, 112–15, 129, 131, 138, 212, 252, 255, 257, 260–5
- race neutrality 62, 219, 220
- race-relations cycle 6, 17n11, 26, 27, 249
- race riots 82, 93, 168, 182n14, 223
- racial body politic 140, 144–5, 156n17
- racial categorization 109, 111, 114, 121–4, 142, 255
- racial conflict 26, 27, 35, 38, 148
- racial democracy 109, 132, 138, 139–40, 146, 172, 197, 204, 261
- racial despotism 109, 130–1, 132, 138, 139, 140, 145, 146, 147, 166–7, 172, 197, 211, 253

- racial formation vii–viii, ix, xi, 11–13, 44, 53, 57, 67, 112, 114, 121, 125, 127, 132, 137, 138, 146, 152, 263, 264, 266; definition of 109  
 racial hegemony 14, 15, 109, 132, 138, 147, 149, 175, 212, 259, 263  
 racial hierarchy 4, 5, 13, 46–7n5, 58, 80, 107, 115, 130, 260  
 racial hybridity 10, 80, 93–4  
 racial identity 2–3, 10, 22, 138, 153, 154, 161, 162, 163; black movement and 165  
 racial inequality 2, 3, 7, 8, 11, 32, 41, 67, 144, 163, 177, 251, 252, 255; categorical 63, 64, 119; and civil society 26; class-based accounts of 59–62, 152; and colorblind racial ideology 22, 257, 258, 261; and disruptive state interventionism model 56, 57; and irrational prejudice model 55; market-based approach to 54–8, 68; and monopolistic practices model 55–6, 57; race-based accounts of 59, 62–4; and race consciousness 260, 261, 262; stratification-based approaches to 54, 58–65, 68  
 racial intelligence 146  
 racial justice 161, 172, 176, 180, 255, 261  
 racial paradigms 10–11, 249–53; shift in 161–2; *see also* class paradigm; ethnicity paradigm; nation-based paradigm  
 racial politics 22, 109, 121–3, 130–2; of the Great Transformation 161–84; and racial state 137–58; trajectories of 7–10, 140, 148–50, 253–6; *see also* colorblindness; racial reaction  
 racial profiling 56, 123, 128, 135n21, 145, 189, 212, 217, 227, 232, 243n37, 249, 257, 259  
 racial projects 13, 109, 124–7, 128, 137; colorblindness as 109, 132, 256–60; race-consciousness as 260–2  
 racial reaction 163, 172, 185–209, 211; and black movement containment/repression 186–90; neoconservative 39, 190, 198–201, 203, 204; new right 190, 191–8, 202–3, 204, 255–6  
 racial schemas 118, 119  
 racial solidarity 95, 128, 147, 261  
 racial state 13–14, 60, 89, 163, 167, 176, 179, 180, 187, 251; racial politics and 137–58; reform of 171–4  
 racial stereotypes 126  
 racial theory 3–4, 5–7, 10–12  
 racialization 13, 44, 78, 109–12, 142, 247; defined 111  
 racism 6–7, 8, 9, 22, 63, 78, 109, 127–30, 253, 257; experiential dimension of 137; institutional 17n12; performance of 145; reverse 14, 204, 212, 218–20, 255, 256; scientific 115–20, 192; social structure of 137; structural 1–2, 15, 17n12, 38, 66, 95, 137, 149, 190, 229–30, 258, 260, 266; white working-class 66, 218  
 radical pragmatism 137–8, 140, 146–7, 152, 261, 264  
 Randolph, A. Philip 172  
 Raza Unida Party Texas 175, 178  
 Reagan, Ronald 211, 212, 214–15, 221–2, 240n16, 241n17, 251  
 rearticulation processes 262–5; civil rights movement and 164, 165–7, 187; new right 192–4, 197, 198, 212, 255–6  
 Reconstruction period (1865–1877) 139, 148, 186, 187, 250  
 redistribution 61, 173, 176–7, 197, 198, 201, 212, 213, 216, 220, 251, 254, 261, 265  
 reductionist view of race 40, 163, 246, 252–3  
 Reed, Adolph L. Jr. 88  
 Reich, Michael 66  
 religion 22, 23, 24–5, 31, 42, 113, 114, 165, 248; *see also* Baptists; Protestantism  
 reparations 30, 49n25, 208n23, 226, 265  
 repression, of black movement 186–90, 201, 216–17, 253  
 Republican Party 33, 60, 61, 72n24, 165, 183n25, 195, 203, 215, 232, 233–4, 244n48; divisions in 233, 237; marginalization of 238; Southern Baptists 221–2; southern strategy 42, 60, 191, 194, 197, 203

- residential segregation x, 38, 62, 63, 117, 125, 193
- resistance 3, 131, 147, 245, 246–9; cultural 142, 155–6n13, 166; culture of 166, 167, 173, 181n9; nonviolent 157–8n26, 168; theories of 3; white 168
- reverse discrimination 193, 195, 203, 204, 218, 255
- reverse racism 14, 204, 212, 218–20, 255, 256
- Revolutionary Action Movement (RAM) 178, 184n30
- Reynoso, Cruz 226
- right-wing movements 14; *see also* conservatism; neoconservatism; new right
- Risch, Neil 117
- Rodney, Walter 84
- Roediger, David 141, 248
- Romney, Mitt 239n5, 260
- Roosevelt, Franklin D. 30, 48n19, 164, 172
- Roosevelt, Theodore 28, 48n15
- Rosenthal, Lawrence 234, 235, 236
- Rumford Act (1963) 193
- Rusher, William 199, 215–16
- Rustin, Bayard 59, 152, 158n28, 166
- scapegoat theories 144
- scavenger concept of race 144–5, 154n5
- Schaffly, Phyllis 192
- Schlozman, Bradley 226, 242n32
- Schmitt, Carl 229, 230
- schools: freedom 188; segregation 172, 193, 203, 218, 258
- scientific racism 115–20, 192
- Seale, Bobby 176, 178
- segregation 25, 94, 162, 251; in armed forces 34; residential x, 38, 62, 63, 117, 125, 193; school 172, 193, 203, 218, 258; *see also* desegregation; Jim Crow system
- self-determination 90, 95, 96, 132, 170, 173, 188
- self-reflective action 137, 138, 146, 154n4, 264
- Selma campaign (1965) 168, 182n15
- Seminole Indians 118, 134–5n12
- Service Employees International Union 67
- settler colonialism 12, 247
- sexism 140, 153
- Shibutani, Tamotsu 30
- slavery 3, 7, 8, 18n19, 26, 40, 79, 80, 92, 107, 111, 113, 115, 121, 131, 139, 141, 147, 150, 247, 249, 265
- slaves 132, 267n3; cultures of resistance 142, 181n9; escaped 141, 143; maroon communities 143; numbers 141; policing and controlling of 141; “sitting in” tactic 166
- Small, Albion 5
- Sobukwe, Robert 85, 99n25
- social citizenship 14, 35, 265, 266
- social construction of race 13, 21, 106, 114–15, 120, 248, 249
- Social Darwinism 5, 24, 116–17
- social democrats/social democracy 68, 69, 176, 179, 198, 217, 220, 251, 266
- social equality 161, 220
- social justice 65, 161, 170, 176, 185, 261, 265
- social rights 6, 176, 256, 266
- social sciences 4–7
- social security 61, 225
- Social Security Act (1935) 48n19, 223
- socialists/socialism 170, 174, 176–7, 180, 198
- socialization 4, 63, 112, 248, 265, 266
- South Africa 13, 59, 71n14, 85, 91, 96n2, 97n5, 99n24 and 25, 100n26, 226, 241n17, 242n31
- Southern Baptist Convention 222, 240n15
- Southern Baptists 25, 31, 47n9, 221–2
- Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC) 9, 168
- Sowell, Thomas 41, 51n44, 68
- split labor market theory 56, 66
- Stalin, Joseph 90, 170
- Stannard, David E. 133n5
- state 151; and civil society distinction 137, 138; designation of racial categories 121–4; interventionism 55, 56, 57, 199; *see also* racial state
- state’s rights 234
- stereotypes 126, 218, 219

- Stoler, Ann Laura 80, 144  
 Stouffer, Samuel Andrew 34  
 stratification approaches 11, 53, 54, 58–65,  
     68, 71n12 and 14, 109  
 structural assimilation 43  
 structural-functionalism 33–5, 38, 39, 51n39  
 structural racism 1–2, 15, 17n12, 38, 66, 95,  
     137, 149, 190, 229–30, 258, 260, 266  
 student movements 87–8, 108, 157–8n26  
 Student Nonviolent Coordinating  
     Committee (SNCC) 81, 87, 98n12,  
     158n26, 168, 170, 172–3, 174, 175, 179,  
     182n20 and 23, 184n30, 188  
 subalternity 147, 154–5n7, 166, 181n10, 233  
 subprime mortgage crisis 1–2, 45, 227–8,  
     268n8 and 13  
 Sumner, William Graham 5  
 Sun Ra 88, 89  
 superexploitation 27, 59, 68, 92, 94, 131,  
     171, 172, 258, 263  
  
 Taft-Hartley Act (1948) 66, 165  
 Tanaka, Togo 30  
 Tapscott, Horace 88, 89  
 tax credits 224, 251  
 taxation 215, 222, 256  
 Tea Party movement 234–6, 243n42, 244n43  
 Temporary Assistance to Needy Families  
     (TANF) 223  
 Terrell, Mary Church 108  
 Thernstrom, Abigail 226  
 13th Amendment, involuntary servitude  
     prohibition 171, 172  
 Thomas, Clarence 178  
 Thomas, Dorothy Swaine 30, 110  
 Thomas, William Isaac 27, 28, 110  
 Thurmond, Strom 193, 217  
 trajectories of racial politics 7–10, 140,  
     148–50, 253–6  
 Treaty of Guadalupe Hildago (1848) 79, 142  
 Trost, Christine 234  
 Trotter, William Monroe 5, 17n9, 26, 117  
 Truman, Harry 165, 172  
 Tsuchiyama, Tamie 30  
  
 Ture, Kwame (Stokely Carmichael) 17n12,  
     84, 99n2, 169, 182n17 and 18  
  
 underclass 59, 60, 61, 71–2n17, 233  
 unemployment 30, 51n40, 58, 59, 66, 72n22,  
     213, 214, 224, 260  
 unions/unionization 57, 66–7, 176, 200,  
     202, 203, 222, 230  
 UNITA 85, 99n24  
 United Automobile Workers (UAW) 67, 213  
 Universal Negro Improvement Association  
     (UNIA) 83–4  
 Urban League 54, 124, 169, 182n23  
  
 van den Berghe, Pierre L. 18n13  
 Vasconcelos, José 95  
 Vietnam War 39, 82, 196, 198, 254  
 Viguerie, Richard 192, 206n8  
 Volcker, Paul 214  
 voting: immigration reform and patterns in  
     244n46; restricted 234; rights 141, 173  
 Voting Rights Act (1965) 8, 42, 167, 173,  
     243n39, 257, 258  
  
 wages: and inequality 66; minimum 62;  
     “psychological” 25, 206n13  
 Wallace, George 42, 60, 168, 191, 193, 194,  
     195, 196, 197, 199, 206n11, 207n20  
 Wallerstein, Immanuel 38, 73n27, 98n16  
 war of maneuver 140, 142, 143, 156n15.166  
 war of position 140, 142–4, 146, 156n15, 166  
 War on Poverty 9, 173, 182n21, 188, 194,  
     220  
 war on terror 227  
 Washington, Booker T. 6, 17n9, 24, 26,  
     47–8n12, 84, 169, 177, 178  
*Washington v. Davis* (1976) 135–6n22  
 Wattenberg, Ben 195  
 Watts riots (1965) 82  
 wealth 58, 67; appropriation of 113; black  
     58; distribution/redistribution of 60–1,  
     213, 214, 265; inequality 177, 227; tax  
     265  
 Weber, Max 4, 5, 16–17n6, 46n1, 71n12, 120

- welfare state 61, 62, 153, 176, 213, 222, 266;  
 dismantling of 213, 214, 221, 225, 256;  
 and new right 194, 195
- Wells, Ida B. 108
- West, Cornel 16n2
- West, Kanye 225
- Weyrich, Paul 192
- white anti-racism 178
- white monopoly 55–6
- white nation 75–9
- white nationalism 25, 75, 78, 81, 95
- white privilege 57, 178, 194
- white resistance 168
- white supremacy 5, 9, 23, 94, 107, 127, 130,  
 147, 153, 162, 164, 175, 178, 185, 191,  
 198, 202, 213, 257, 260
- white working class 25, 66, 69, 218
- whiteness 18n19, 25, 29, 46, 48n18, 55, 75,  
 76, 77, 78, 95, 96–7n3, 180, 201, 209n28
- Wilkins, Roy 39
- Willhelm, Sidney M. 61
- Williamson, Lisa (Sistah Souljah) 223
- Wilson, William J. 59–62, 68, 71–2n14 and  
 17, 223, 233, 251
- Wilson, Woodrow 28
- women 107–8, 141, 145, 153, 234, 248; *see*  
*also* gender; feminist movement
- working-class 5, 56–7, 65, 66, 176; white 25,  
 66, 69
- World Conference against Racism (WCAR,  
 2001) 226, 242n30 and 31
- world-system theory 72–3n27
- World Trade Organization (WTO) 224,  
 242n26
- World War II 76, 213; racial justice  
 movements 161
- Wright, Richard 182n17
- Young Americans for Freedom 192
- Young Lords 41, 87
- Young, Whitney 39
- Zeskind, Leonard 235
- Znaniacki, Florian 27, 28

# Custom Materials

DELIVER A MORE REWARDING EDUCATIONAL EXPERIENCE.



**University Readers®**  
Custom Publishing Evolved.



**Routledge**  
Taylor & Francis Group

## The Social Issues Collection

This unique collection features 250 readings plus 45 recently added readings for undergraduate teaching in sociology and other social science courses. The social issues collection includes selections from Joe Nevins, Sheldon Elkan-Olson, Val Jenness, Sarah Fenstermaker, Nikki Jones, France Winddance Twine, Scott McNall, Ananya Roy, Joel Best, Michael Apple, and more.

- 1** Go to the website at [routledge.customgateway.com](http://routledge.customgateway.com)
- 2** Choose from almost 300 readings from Routledge & other publishers
- 3** Create your complete custom anthology



Learn more:

[routledge.customgateway.com](http://routledge.customgateway.com) | 800.200.3908 x 501 | [info@cognella.com](mailto:info@cognella.com)

University Readers is an imprint of Cognella, Inc. ©1997-2013

**National Culture Policy:  
Forty Years of Experimentation with Cultural Nationalism  
国家文化政策：四十年的文化民族主义之试验**

**By**  
**Dr. Helen Ting**  
**Institut Kajian Malaysia dan Antarabangsa (IKMAS),  
Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia (UKM)**  
**作者：**  
**陈穆红博士**  
**马来西亚国民大学马来西亚与国际研究院研究员**



## Introduction

Forty years after the formulation of the National Culture Policy (NCP), it is perhaps time to take stock of its effectiveness and impact, in particular with regards to the objective of nation-building and the forging of national unity. Two decades ago, an academic had suggested that meetings to discuss the idea of national culture are almost fit for museum (Shamsul 1993), as presenters were getting less and less, and confined to a section of a single ethnic group. Despite so, the NCP as a policy, though perceived to be diminished in its influence (Mandal 2008), has demonstrated its staying power, as two academic theses (one M.A. and another PhD) researching on the topic were written thereafter, not to say other book chapters and articles which discuss it.

This paper begins by examining the historical background and underlying issues related to the NCP, followed by a review and synthesis of its evolution and impact based on published sources. The last part of the paper uses data collected from a survey to understand these issues from the point of view of a group of young university students, before putting forward some reflection.

## Historical Background

The National Culture Policy was formulated in 1971 in the context of a series of measures taken to rehabilitate ethnic relations and re-define the strategy of nation-building in the aftermath of the 1969 ethnic riots. From the point of view of the policy makers, the NCP was formulated to “increase the authority and legitimacy of the government in administering the state”, and to “fulfil the need of the country to create a national identity and a sense of belonging among the citizens”. Prime Minister Abdul Razak was said to stress that “harmony and unity among the races are not just a matter of economic issues, but it is important also to strengthen them with symbols of national identity that could play a role in the heightening of patriotism and nationalism” (Nik Anuar *et al.* 2011: 302-3).

The NCP was formulated based on inputs made at a National Culture Congress held in August 1971 attended by about a thousand participants, with only a handful of non-Malays. Three principles were adopted to develop a national culture, namely, that it must be based on the culture of the people indigenous to the region; that “pertinent and suitable” (sesuai dan wajar) elements from other cultures may also be incorporated; and lastly, that Islam would be an important element in the national culture (Aziz 2003: 148-9). It was also specified that “pertinent” “foreign elements” to be accepted should be compatible with existing norms and culture of

indigenous people of the region and Islam, and especially those that symbolise the uniqueness of Malaysia (Aziz 2003: 153). In his opening speech to the Congress, Razak stated that it was fair (*sudah sewajarnya*) for the national culture to be based on the culture of indigenous people of the region, but cultural elements that came to the region should also be admitted so that their positive influence could rejuvenate and shape the future national culture of Malaysia<sup>35</sup> (Abdul Razak 2003: 192). He repeatedly reminded the participants that in determining the framework of national culture, they should be mindful of the reality of the multiracial society (p. 192-3). He specified that the congress was only a preliminary step in exploring fundamental base for the national culture, the long term consolidation of which would necessitate popular acceptance and adoption of the people (p. 188, 196). In his speech to the Parliament in July 1973, Razak reiterated that all Malaysian citizens should contribute towards the formation of national culture, which is necessarily original (*asli*) of this country, that is, native of the soil. On the other hand, he also stressed that national culture for Malaysia can only come about in the long term and its formation should not be forced upon the people (Nik Anuar *et al.* 2011: 305).

A number of scholars (Funston 1980, Vasil 1980, Cheah 2002) noted that post-1969 was marked by a visible increase in the public assertion of Malay political primacy. This idea of Malay political primacy was clearly articulated in *The Malay dilemma*, the controversial book of Dr Mahathir after being expelled from UMNO. He described the Malays as the “definitive people” of Malaya, the “rightful owner of the land”, who have the right to define the “international personality” of the country (Mahathir 1970: 122-3). He asserted that non-Malays’ citizenship should be conditioned on their acceptance of this understanding, which should be propagated through all nation-building policies:

“The teaching of history, geography, and literature are all designed to propagate one idea; that the country belongs to the definitive people, and to belong to the country, and to claim it, entails identification with the definitive people. This identification is all-pervading and leaves no room for identification with other countries and cultures. To be identified with the definitive people is to accept their history, their geography, their literature, their language and their culture, and to reject anything else.” (p. 143)

When the book was published, it was immediately banned by the government. Dr Mahathir was expelled from UMNO for challenging the Tunku, blaming his “pro-Chinese” policies as a cause of the racial riots. After

---

<sup>35</sup> Bagaimanapun, patutlah juga kita mengambil unsur kebudayaan yang datang ke rantau ini dan membawa pengaruh ke atasnya semenjak beberapa lama supaya pengaruh yang bermanfaat dapat menyebarkan dan menentukan corak kebudayaan Malaysia pada masa hadapan (p. 192).

replacing the Tunku as the Premier and UMNO president, Abdul Razak not only brought Dr Mahathir back to the party, the latter was also appointed as a senator and later on, the Education Minister.

Therefore, Abdul Razak appears to be juggling between two contradictory political exigencies: firstly, to foster a sense of national belonging and unity in the face of tense interethnic relations and secondly, to maintain the unity of UMNO by integrating the so-called “ultra young Turks” such as Dr Mahathir. This contradiction is manifest when comparing between the liberal Rukunegara or national ideology formulated in 1970 with the participation of the multi-ethnic National Consultative Council on the one hand, and on the other, the National Culture Policy, which clearly stresses the primacy of the so-called “indigenous” culture, and even disregards the fact that the majority of the indigenous people in East Malaysia are not Muslims. Mandal (2008) noted the influence of “an exclusionary Malay cultural leadership” who managed to “cast the NCP after their own vision” despite the more liberal position held by Premier Razak (p. 279). One of the prominent spokespersons of this “cultural leadership” was a scholar and activist, Ismail Hussein, who “has single-handedly contributed greatly to making Malay language and culture the basis of national identity” (Mandal 2008: 281). In a debate on how historical studies should be “indigenised” so as to be more “Malaysia-centric” in 1977, Ismail contended that the Malays should be regarded as the main social base of the Malaysian society while the immigrants were “splinters” broken off from their own main societies, hence should not be regarded as of equal status (Cheah 1997: 61)<sup>36</sup>.

### **Setting the scene: Competing “Nations-of-intent”**

The National Culture Policy is arguably an expression of a particular “nation-of-intent” (Shamsul 1996) by those proponents of the policy, as illustrated by the discourse of Dr Mahathir and Ismail Hussein above. Over the decades, there have been different attempts at conceptualizing or imagining the form of political community or nation in Malaysia. British colonialism had bequeathed to Malaya a race paradigm which dominated the way political and social agenda have been set. The British administration legitimated their rule by perpetuating the myth of protecting the native Malay “race” from the immigrant “races”, thus reinforcing the indigene-immigrant dichotomy between the Malays and the sizeable non-Malay inhabitants. This was despite the fact that by 1947, 62.5% of the Chinese and almost 50% of the Indian population were locally born (Ariffin 1993: 9). They were legally regarded either as British subjects or British-protected Persons.

---

<sup>36</sup> Similar perspective was articulated by Malik Munip, a history lecturer turned politician, in his book *Tuntutan Melayu* published in 1981.

The heightened interethnic tension after the Second World War enhanced interethnic mistrust and antipathy, widening further the ethnic gap in the conception of the preferred form of political community. Through public actions, various social and communal groups pushed for their preferred nations-of-intent to be adopted by the ruling elites in the formulation of their nation-building programs. This framework was not completely finalised at independence, and was the source of continued political contentions.

At its foundation in 1946, UMNO which represented the conservative stream of Malay nationalism fought for the idea of Malaya as a “Malay land” (*Tanah Melayu*) and Malayism<sup>37</sup> (Ariffin 1993). Maintenance of Malayism in the face of the very large, unassimilable, non-Malay population was obviously contentious if not untenable. Despite the realisation of the need to take a more reconciliatory position, successive UMNO leaders are confronted with the need to juggle between race-baiting and interethnic accommodation. Successive and successful UMNO leaders (as well as Malay politicians in opposition parties), depending on their immediate objective, played either the role of rabble rousers to increase their credentials as Malay nationalists, or at other times, of political peace-brokers trying to forge a sense of national unity (Cheah 2002, Ting 2011). Funston (1980) noted in his study of Malay politics this “contradiction between UMNO’s ideological and practical approach to non-Malays” (p. 139).

Post-war leaders of Chinese-speaking community espoused a multicultural nation whereby various ethnic communities may preserve their respective linguistic and cultural identities<sup>38</sup>. On the other hand, Western-educated political elites were more inclined towards conceiving citizenship in liberal, individualistic and civic terms. Interestingly, Tan Cheng Lock who did not speak Mandarin was supportive of Chinese education but looked at it more from individual citizen’s democratic right to one’s culture. The liberal guarantee of fundamental civil and political liberties in the nascent Federal Constitution was arguably an expression of the initial political ideals of these British-educated Alliance political elites.

Rival Malay nationalists such as Dr Burhanuddin Al-Helmy initially distinguished *bangsa*, which carries the notion of a cultural community, from *kebangsaan*, which he used to refer to a political community of nation. But soon after, in response to UMNO-MCA collaboration, his idea of *kebangsaan Melayu* leaned towards

---

<sup>37</sup> Dato Onn Jaafar, the first president of UMNO, reportedly said that the UMNO movement did not adhere to any ideology other than *Melayuisme* (Mohammad Yunus Hamidi 1961: 126). Ariffin (1993) defined Malayism as “the belief that the interests of the bangsa Melayu must be upheld over all else” (p. 52).

<sup>38</sup> Tan (1988) argues that historical and semantic differences in the Malay and Chinese words denoting ethnic community and nation may have contributed to this divergence. The Chinese term for a sub-national ethnic or cultural community (*minzu*) is conceptually distinct and constitutive of the nation (*guozu*), without requiring a fusion of the diverse cultural communities to forge a united nation.

assimilationist perspective, requiring non-Malays to shed their ancestral culture to adopt *kebangsaan Melayu* (Ting 2007). Many Malay community leaders seem to regard multiculturalism as antithetical to the concept of *bangsa*<sup>39</sup>, in particular from the seventies. While such inconsistency in discourse is commonplace among all the UMNO presidents and other political leaders, another way they dealt with this contradiction is the recourse to the so-called politics of ambiguity, whereby the politicians carefully tailor their discourse in accordance to the ethnic composition of their audience.

Upon becoming the Prime Minister in 1981, Dr Mahathir introduced another controversial idea of Malaysia as *negara Islam* (meaning loosely, “Islamic country/state”)<sup>40</sup>, which for him derived arguably from the same logic as his “definitive people” argument. In December 1982, Mahathir was reported to have defended his Islamisation programs, saying that since Islam was integral to the Malay culture which was the basis of the national culture, no one should make a political issue out of it (Hussin 1990: 141). The controversial nature of his Islamisation policy had led to two living former Prime Ministers publicly calling for a halt to government’s endeavour. The first Prime Minister of Malaysia, Tunku Abdul Rahman, stated that Malaysia with its multi-ethnic population should never become an Islamic state (Milne & Mauzy 1983: 631).

In 1991, Premier Mahathir proclaimed a national project for Malaysia: to attain the status of developed country as a united nation of *Bangsa Malaysia* with a sense of shared destiny by 2020. This so-called Vision 2020 has been credited with the official switch to ethnically more inclusionary policy rhetoric (Mandal 2008, Loh 2002, Lee 2004, Case 2000, Bunnell 2002). Scholars noted several state efforts to re-package the image of a Malaysian nation with a multicultural emphasis. Case (2000) reported that,

“even Hang Tuah, a folk hero from the Malay Annals, was reconfigured ‘as a polyglot who [could speak] Mandarin, Tamil, and Thai’. In this situation, Mahathir – the one-time ethnic ultra – was likened by many Chinese to the Tunku, benevolently presiding over ethnic relations, albeit in the wake of much onerous restructuring” (p. 141).

Bunnell (2002) documented what he called “multicultural marketing” by Premier Mahathir overseas to secure investment of foreign companies in information and multimedia industries based in the Multimedia Super

---

<sup>39</sup> In the Malay language, *bangsa* could be used to denote both a cultural community and a “nation”.

<sup>40</sup> A year after he began his premiership, Dr Mahathir declared that Malaysia was already an Islamic state (Milne & Mauzy 1983). This statement was repeated again in September 2002 by Dr Mahathir, which was clearly an attempt to outdo PAS in reclaiming the Islamic credentials of UMNO (Lee 2004:101).

Corridor (MSC). Dr Mahathir emphasised the “cultural connections” of the multi-ethnic Malaysian population with Asia’s main markets and the strategic geographical location of Malaysia in the region, which provide added advantage in “the tailoring of IT and multimedia products to a range of (national and transnational) cultural and linguistic markets” (p. 113-4). Awareness of projected shortage of “knowledge workers” also led to government efforts to woo back skilled professional Malaysians overseas, many of whom are non-Malays. In doing so, the MSC project became intertwined with the “multicultural imaginings of Malaysian national identity” (Bunnell 2002: 113).

Yet in July 2001, obviously in the context of intra-Malay contests with PAS, Premier Mahathir announced that Malaysia was already an Islamic State (*negara Islam*), sending shock waves to the non-Muslim communities. Such ambiguity of announcing one ethnically inclusive policy following another exclusionary one and vice versa, without explicitly abandoning the previous, contradictory one, is the hallmark of the way the political leadership managed ethnically contentious issues in Malaysia.

In Sabah and Sarawak, notions of racial stereotypes and identities were not altogether absent. Attempts to assert political hegemony by Ibans, the largest native group in Sarawak, was unsuccessful due to inter- and intra-ethnic rivalry on top of federal political interference. Similar problems plagued Kadazan-Dusun leaders in their quest for ethnic assertion and resistance to federal intervention (Singh 2003). This relatively more fluid and heterogeneous nature of ethnic identities among the natives, in contrast with the Sino-Malay mobilisation and confrontation as two major ethnic blocks in West Malaysia, arguably rendered the nature of ethnic identity incomparably less politicised in East Malaysia.

### **Negotiating Cultural Citizenship**

Commenting on the public debates on the national culture policy during the eighties, Carstens (2005) noted that people understood national culture in different ways. There is its dual-function of “representing *externally* to the international community an historically legitimate image of the nation, while also symbolizing *internally* the imagined community of the nation’s citizenry to its domestic audience” (p. 145). There is also the formal understanding of the term culture in the form of artistic and intellectual activities, the so-called high culture, versus the anthropological understanding of culture as everyday way of life. And lastly, there is also the question of what exactly people meant when they want the reality of cultural diversity to be acknowledged. (p. 144)

The immediate public reaction to the formulation of the National Culture Policy was muted (Carstens 2005: 151). This could be because people were unsure of the exact impact of such policy. Subsequently, many scholars have documented the public contestations arising from measures implemented in the name of the NCP during the late 1970s and 1980s (Milne & Mauzy 1978: 370, Horowitz 1989: 261, Kua 1990, Tan 1992, DongZong 1987: 666-671). They range from the use of Chinese characters on commercial signboards and even school buses, public performance of lion dance and other cultural or artistic programs, stipulation of the type of songs and cultural performance allowed in schools, language used during weekly assembly of Chinese schools, and so forth. State control is carried out through issuance or renewal of licence or permit by the relevant local and state authorities, departments under ministry, police, or circulars and guidelines to be adhered to by schools. From time to time, in the process of regulation, government officials apply their own “creativity” in determining as to whether the spirit of the NCP is respected, independent of the intention of the political leaders at the top (Horowitz 1989: 261).

Religious and traditional cultural manifestations in the public sphere were nevertheless allowed. Daniels (2005) saw these activities as the way “non-Bumiputera participants forge closer ties amongst themselves in these shared festival activities and enhance a sense of incorporation and belonging in the broader society” (p. 177). He interpreted the creation of this cultural and religious space as a means for the non-Malays to reclaim their cultural citizenship, in contrast with “the dominant form of cultural citizenship in which Malays are the definitive race and Malay culture is the foundation of national culture.” (p. 177).

In the realm of official functions involving state agencies, the government appears to be relatively successful in imposing this particular way of envisioning the “national culture”. On their part, various religious and cultural communities carry on their communal or religious activities which correspond to their respective way of life. It is when state agencies interfered with the particular cultural practices that contestations arose. The restriction of the public performance of lion dance and the suggestion that it was “unMalaysian” at the end of 1970s was a case in point. This resulted in backlash from the Chinese community, who regarded it as disrespectful to the community. Lion dance performance became an electoral issue (Kua 1990: 12-6), and acquired added political significance as an ethnic marker for the Chinese community. The eighties saw a revival of popular interests in it such that by 1991, Malaysia became world’s biggest importer of tools and apparatus for lion dance performance from China (Lim 1999: 145-6).



The 1980s also saw vibrant public debates on the National Culture policy in the media (Kua 1990). In response to the invitation of the Minister of Culture, Youth and sports in 1981, Chinese and Indian associations submitted their respective memorandum to the ministry voicing their objections to official measures taken in the name of the National Culture Policy, which they complaint as assimilative in nature (Kua 1990: 207-270).

In the 1990s, far less public contentions arose due to policy implementation related to the NCP. This is attributed to the so-called liberalisation of cultural policy, which removed the previous restrictions on the public performance of the lion dance (Loh 2002). Lee (2004) discussed how imagery of racial harmony was used during a large part of 1990s into the new millennium by the government in the mass media to “seduce” the public into imagining multiculturalism in terms of “image of difference” whereby cultural differences were depicted as positive and compatible with national unity. At official functions such as “national Day celebrations, during the Penang Pesta, the Malaysia Fest, and Visit Malaysia Year campaigns”, more non-Malay cultural programs were accommodated, though Loh (2002) expressed his scepticism that this may be more a strategy to attract tourist dollars rather than being consciously inclusive. Muhd Ikmal Said (1996), on his part, argued that the commercialisation of culture for touristic purposes has contributed to depoliticise “the promotion of culture as a specifically ethnic project”. After all, the “peculiar ‘cultural mix’ that Malaysia boasts so often may be packaged as a tourist attraction” (Muhd. Ikmal Said 1996: 58), instead of being perceived as a challenge or obstacle to nation-building. Moreover, Muhd Ikmal (1996) also observed perceptively that the Malay middle and upper classes were “mindful of the importance of the English language, have acquired the West’s high culture (ballet, classical music, jazz), prefer to live in cosmopolitan, rather than just Malay, suburbs”, thus bringing about the cultural convergence of the multi-ethnic middle classes who shared similar life style (p. 59).

In the meantime, Rowland (2004) noted that the earlier discrete influence of the need to conform to Islamic values, the third principle of the NCP, appeared to exert a more prominent role in theatre performance during the 1990s. During the 1970s, traditional Malay folk theatre with “pre-Islamic” roots such as *wayang kulit*, *makyong* and other forms of Malay arts, were acknowledged to be “national heritage”. Nonetheless, very little encouragement or assistance were provided to preserve these art forms. This was allegedly due to the pressure exerted by Islamic purists who regarded them as *haram* (forbidden) as these performances either use non-Islamic stories or were conducted in the context of invoking spirits for healing purposes (Tan 1992: 287). PAS-controlled state government in Kelantan effectively prohibited public showing of *wayang kulit* as *haram*, though not in the name of NCP. Following the implementation of the Islamisation policy during the 1980s, dance and drama co-curricular activities perceived to be incompatible with Islamic values were reportedly dropped. The



performance of traditional theatre in government schools needed to be “cleansed” of its ritualistic effects (Rowland 2004). Some of the plays produced by independent artist groups and even television entertainment shows during subsequent decades were, from time to time, denounced as unIslamic (Rowland 2004).

On the other hand, the continued heavy Malay bias as manifested in official cultural functions did not escape attentive scholars. Daniels (2005) describes the dynamics as reproducing and expressing “a hierarchical sense of belonging”: “Everyone belongs to the ‘national community’ but not as much or in the same way” (p. xxi). Bunnell (2002) who described the re-scripting of a multicultural national identity to attract foreign investment during the 1990s also noted “no official change in the national culture policy” and the “continued political resistance to any dilution of Malay special rights” (p. 117).

### **“Nation-views” from Below**

We now try to look at issues related to national identity and culture from bottom-up by examining the views of some ordinary citizens. The non-representative findings of a survey conducted in July and August 2003 in a local public university are used for discussion here. More than 1000 survey forms were distributed with the assistance of lecturers or faculty staff but only 197 forms were returned. The majority of the respondents are typical undergraduate university students, with the exception of some mature students and a few post-graduate students, as shown in the table below. For convenience sake, our discussions are directed mainly to the patterns of responses of those aged between 21-26 years old.

Responses to three groups of questions are examined here, the first are what is called ethnic characterisation of Malaysia, followed by more specific questions related to the national culture policy, and lastly, on the national literature.

**Table 1: Composition of the Respondents (Age Range \* Descent)**

	Descent				Total
Age Range	Chinese	Malay	Indian	Other Bumuputera	
21-25	54	61	17	8	140
26-30	7	8	2	3	20
31-35	14	2	1	0	17
36-40	12	3	1	0	16
≥ 41	2	2	0	0	4
Total	89	76	21	11	197

With regards to the ethnic characterization of Malaysia, respondents were asked, among others, to answer the following five questions:

Please answer True/False/Don't know or Yes/No/Don't know:

1. Malaysia is a Muslim country (Malaysia adalah sebuah negeri Islam). .....
2. Malaysia is a Malay country (Malaysia adalah sebuah negeri Melayu). .....
3. Malaysia is a multi-cultural country (Malaysia adalah sebuah negeri berbilang kebudayaan). .....
4. Malaysia is an Islamic State (Malaysia adalah sebuah negara Islam). .....
5. Malaysia should be an Islamic State (Adalah sewajarnya Malaysia menjadi sebuah negara Islam?) .....

In order to distinguish conceptually “country” from “state”, the questionnaire used “negeri” for “country” and “negara” for “state”; though it is not clear whether the distinction is well understood by the respondents.

Ethnicised patterns of response to these questions, as indicated in the tables next page, are not surprising. Nonetheless, the ethnic gap did not seem to be as clear-cut as expected. Less than 50% of the Malay respondents agreed that Malaysia is a Muslim or Malay country, whereas more than 90% of the respondents of all ethnic groups agreed that Malaysia is a multicultural country. Significant gap is nonetheless manifested in

the responses to the question of negara Islam, intended to be understood as Islamic state. More than 70% Malay respondents thought that Malaysia is a negara Islam, and almost 40% of Chinese respondents thought so too. This could be due to the 2001 announcement of Dr Mahathir that Malaysia was already a negara Islam as mentioned above. The ethnic gap is the widest with regards to the answers on whether Malaysia *should* be a negara Islam. Almost 78% of Chinese respondents said “no” while more than 85% of the Malay respondents said “yes”. But what is more instructive is the ambiguous meanings these terms acquire in the everyday language we use, as shown by the ambivalent pattern of responses given by the respondents.

In the first place, the contradictory pattern of the responses is of interest to us here. If it is indeed true that Malaysia is a multi-cultural country, how is it that some of those who agreed so could *also* agree to the statement that Malaysia is a Malay country? If a respondent held that the two statements could *both* be true, s/he would have taken the first as a statement of fact and accepted the second as an ideological statement. A Malay respondent who said that Malaysia is not a Malay country put next to the statement a remark that ‘it used to be (a Malay country) but now no more’. Without being ‘programmed’ to think of Malaysia as a ‘Malay country’, those Malay respondents who rejected the statement that Malaysia is a Malay country rejected it as factually wrong.

**Table 2: Perception: Malaysia as Muslim Country (21 - 26 years old)**

Descent		Perception: Malaysia as Muslim Country			Total
		Yes	not sure	no	
Chinese	Count	15	5	34	54
	% within Descent	27.8%	9.3%	63.0%	100.0%
Malay	Count	30	6	31	67
	% within Descent	44.8%	9.0%	46.3%	100.0%
Indian	Count	8	1	10	19
	% within Descent	42.1%	5.3%	52.6%	100.0%

Ulang Tahun Ke-40, Konsep dan Dasar Kebudayaan Kebangsaan: Penilaian Semula  
 省思国家文化概念与政策研讨会

Other Bumiputera	Count	5	0	6	11
	% within Descent	45.5%	.0%	54.5%	100.0%
Total	Count	58	12	81	151
	% within Descent	38.4%	7.9%	53.6%	100.0%

**Table 3: Perception: Malaysia as Malay Country (21- 26 years old)**

Descent		Perception: Malaysia as Malay Country			Total
		Yes	not sure	no	
Chinese	Count	15	5	34	54
	% within Descent	27.8%	9.3%	63.0%	100.0%
Malay	Count	28	4	35	67
	% within Descent	41.8%	6.0%	52.2%	100.0%
Indian	Count	6	0	13	19
	% within Descent	31.6%	.0%	68.4%	100.0%
Other Bumiputera	Count	2	1	8	11
	% within Descent	18.2%	9.1%	72.7%	100.0%
Total	Count	51	10	90	151
	% within Descent	33.8%	6.6%	59.6%	100.0%

**Table 4: Perception: Malaysia as Multicultural Country (21 - 26 years old)**

Descent		Perception: Malaysia as Multicultural Country			Total
		Yes	not sure	no	
Chinese	Count	53	0	1	54
	% within Descent	98.1%	.0%	1.9%	100.0%
Malay	Count	63	0	4	67
	% within Descent	94.0%	.0%	6.0%	100.0%
Indian	Count	18	1	0	19
	% within Descent	94.7%	5.3%	.0%	100.0%
Other Bumiputera	Count	11	0	0	11
	% within Descent	100.0%	.0%	.0%	100.0%
Total	Count	145	1	5	151
	% within Descent	96.0%	.7%	3.3%	100.0%

**Table 5: Perception: Malaysia as an Islamic State (21 - 26 years old)**

Descent		Perception: Malaysia as an Islamic State			Total
		no	not sure	yes	
Chinese	Count	28	5	21	54
	% within Descent	51.9%	9.3%	38.9%	100.0%
Malay	Count	12	6	49	67
	% within Descent	17.9%	9.0%	73.1%	100.0%

Ulang Tahun Ke-40, Konsep dan Dasar Kebudayaan Kebangsaan: Penilaian Semula  
 省思国家文化概念与政策研讨会

Indian	Count	10	1	8	19
	% within	52.6%	5.3%	42.1%	100.0%
	Descent				
Other Bumiputera	Count	3	1	7	11
	% within	27.3%	9.1%	63.6%	100.0%
	Descent				
Total	Count	53	13	85	151
	% within	35.1%	8.6%	56.3%	100.0%
	Descent				

**Table 6: Intent: Malaysia as an Islamic State (21 - 26 years old)**

Descent		Intent: Malaysia as Islamic State			Total
		No	not sure	yes	
Chinese	Count	42	9	3	54
	% within	77.8%	16.7%	5.6%	100.0%
	Descent				
Malay	Count	5	5	57	67
	% within	7.5%	7.5%	85.1%	100.0%
	Descent				
Indian	Count	14	3	2	19
	% within	73.7%	15.8%	10.5%	100.0%
	Descent				
Other Bumiputera	Count	5	3	3	11
	% within	45.5%	27.3%	27.3%	100.0%
	Descent				
Total	Count	66	20	65	151
	% within	43.7%	13.2%	43.0%	100.0%
	Descent				

**Table 7: Contradictory perceptions of ethnic dimensions of Malaysian national identity (21 - 26 years old)**

Perception	Yes		not sure		No	
	Count	%	Count	%	Count	%
Malaysia as Malay Country	51	29.9%	10	6.7%	90	63.4%
Malaysia as Muslim Country	58	39.7%	12	7.7%	81	52.6%
Malaysia as an Islamic State	85	57.7%	13	8.2%	53	34.0%
Malaysia as Multicultural Country	145	95.9%	1	1.0%	5	3.1%

Follow-up in-depth interviews reveal that in layman's Malay language, the specific difference attached to the English word 'State' (*negara*) as opposed to the general term 'country' (*negeri*) was not clear to all. In the Malay media, the term *negara* appears to be used generally for both meanings. The hesitation of some of the non-Malay respondents on the statement as to whether Malaysia should be an Islamic State was no doubt enhanced by the lack of clarity of what 'Islamic State' actually entails. Many might as well have understood *negara Islam* as equivalent to the meaning of a Muslim country. In fact, a Chinese respondent who believed to be true that 'Malaysia is an Islamic State' made a comment next to the statement, 'stated in Constitution', which is incorrect. For most non-Malay respondents, however, there is no ambiguity when it comes to whether they *wanted* an "Islamic State", for whatever meaning or form it could take.

Among the Muslims, the term *negara Islam* itself is understood differently by different people. While the questionnaire did not ask the respondents to explain their understanding of what the term *negara Islam* meant to them, some of their thoughts were expressed in their answers to other questions. In the survey forms, some of them who were on the radical end of the spectrum called for the Malaysian Constitution to be amended according to al-Quran and Hadith. Others wanted the economy to be regulated in accordance with Islamic principles. One liberal Malay respondent whom I interviewed in depth explained that for him, an Islamic State is understood more as a process, whereby the values of the society as a whole functioned more and more in

accordance with Islamic principles. For him, some Christians could be more “Islamic” than some Muslims. Understood this way, who as a Muslim would not feel obliged to say “yes” to an “Islamic State”? Hence the apparently consensual “yes” of the Malay respondents camouflaged a widely differing interpretation of what type of “Islamic State” was desired.

### Envisioning National Culture

In the questionnaire, the respondents were also asked whether they knew what National Culture Policy was. Less than a third of the respondents knew about the existence of a national culture policy. While a greater proportion of the older respondents appear to know about the policy, the difference between generation and ethnic groups was not very great.

The respondents were also asked to respond to three other statements regarding Malaysian national culture:

1. Malaysian national culture should consist **only** of Malay Culture.
2. Malaysian national culture should consist of the best of all cultures of the Malaysian population.
3. Malaysian national culture should consist **mainly** of Malay Culture supplemented by other cultures when appropriate.

The table below shows the overall response to the three statements. It could be seen that the one with the biggest consensus is that Malaysian national culture should *not* consist *only* of Malay culture (93.8%), followed by the statement that Malaysian national culture should consist of the best of all cultures of the Malaysian people (88.7%). It is notable that among the younger Malay respondents, the response in support of the best of all cultures statement (85%) is more enthusiastic than the support for a Malay-dominated national culture (72%). The third statement suggesting that Malaysian national culture should be a Malay-dominated culture, the closest to the gist of National culture policy, obtained a small majority of 51.5%. It is interesting that a survey among civil society leaders conducted in 1989 yielded similar ethnic distribution of responses with regards to ethnic composition of national culture, though 80% of the respondents were aware of the NCP (Muhd. Ikmal Said 1996: 57).



**Table 8: Intent: Ethnicity and National Culture**

	Intent: Malay National Culture		Intent: Malay-dominated National Culture		Intent: Multi-cultural National Culture	
	Count	%	Count	%	Count	%
no	182	93.8%	81	41.8%	8	4.1%
not sure	7	3.6%	13	6.7%	14	7.2%
yes	5	2.6%	100	51.5%	172	88.7%

Evidently, it is pertinent to look at the ethnic breakdown of responses especially for the statement on Malay-dominated national culture. Among the younger respondents, it could be seen from the table below that more than 60% of Chinese and Indian respondents said ‘no’ to a Malay-dominated national culture, while more than 70% of Malay respondents and more than 60% of non-Malay natives said ‘yes’ to it.

**Table 9: Intent: Malay-dominated National Culture (21- 26 years old)**

Intent: Malay-dominated National Culture		Descent				Total
		Chinese	Malay	Indian	Other Bumiputera	
No	Count	36	11	12	4	63
	% within Descent	66.7%	16.4%	63.2%	36.4%	41.7%
not sure	Count	2	8	0	0	10
	% within Descent	3.7%	11.9%	.0%	.0%	6.6%
Yes	Count	16	48	7	7	78
	% within Descent	29.6%	71.6%	36.8%	63.6%	51.7%
Total	Count	54	67	19	11	151
	% within Descent	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

From the point of view of the pattern of responses, apart from the ethnically aligned answers to the question on Malay-dominated national culture, the respondents seems to be consensual that Malaysian national culture should not be just about Malay culture, while the proposal that the best of all cultures be the national culture of Malaysia also obtained an overwhelming acceptance of the majority. In other words, the perspectives of young university students on issues such as national identity and culture, notwithstanding the pattern of ethnic alignment, appear to be relatively flexible and open when compared with the ideologically-minded officials and politicians.

### **Criteria for National Literature**

Another product of the same National Culture Congress in 1971 was policies pertaining to the fostering of a National Literature, which defined national literature as “works written in Bahasa Malaysia and the contents of which reflect the background of Malaysian society” (Tan 1992: 292). Financial support and official encouragement were extended only to Malay literary works and activities by the Ministry of Culture, Youth and Sports. The Literary Consultative Committee used to consist largely of Malay writers only. This state of the affair was judged to be unfair not only by vernacular writers in Tamil and Mandarin languages, but also by the English language writers, all of whom were regarded by some as obstacle to the development of a national culture.

In the questionnaire, three open questions were asked with regards to the National Literature:

1. Do you think that national literature should include all literature written in Malay language (i.e. including those in Bahasa Indonesia)? Why? .....
2. Do you think that Malaysian national literature should include non-Malay language writings written by Malaysians? Why? .....
3. What do you think should be the main criteria to determine whether a literary work constitute a part of Malaysian national literature? .....

**Table 10: Intent: National Literature by Malaysian**

Intent: National Literature by Malaysian		Descent				Total
		Chinese	Malay	Indian	Other Bumiputera	
Yes	Count	72	48	20	7	147
	% within Descent	86.7%	66.7%	95.2%	63.6%	78.6%
	Count	7	9	0	3	19
	% within Descent	8.4%	12.5%	.0%	27.3%	10.2%
No	Count	4	15	1	1	21
	% within Descent	4.8%	20.8%	4.8%	9.1%	11.2%
	Count	83	72	21	11	187
Total	% within Descent	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

When the respondents were asked whether literature written by Malaysian citizens but in languages other than the national language could be considered as part of the national literature, the majority of them agreed, with more dissenting voices from ethnic Malay respondents.

The respondents were also asked what they considered as the criteria for the determination of national literature. Almost 30% suggested that the literary work should reflect the local context, thinking or way of life. Another 21% suggested that the literary work should reflect the multicultural nature of the Malaysian society. 12.5% said that the literary work should possess a ‘national’ character or ‘Malaysian-ness’. Here, it appears that there was the assumption that this ‘national’ character or ‘Malaysian-ness’ existed and was left undefined.

14% of the (mostly Malay) respondents wanted the national literature to be literary work written in the national language only. This linguistic requirement was the most popular criteria given by the Malay respondents (28%).

**Table 11: Criteria for determination of national literature**

Category of criteria	Descent				Total	Percentage*
	Chinese	Malay	Indian	Non-Malay Native		
Malaysian Citizenship simply	9	3	2	0	14	10.3
Native writers only; concerns Malay world only	0	4	0	1	5	3.7
Quality and originality of work	4	9	2	1	16	11.8
Didactic value	12	13	3	0	28	20.6
Reflect local context, thinking and way of life	21	11	5	3	40	29.4
Multiculturalism	14	10	3	2	29	21.3
In Malay language only	2	16	1	0	19	14.0
‘Malaysian-ness’ or national features	12	4	1	0	17	12.5
Others	4	1	0	0	5	3.7
Total**	59	57	15	5	136	

\* Total number of valid respondents for this variable is 136.

\*\* Actual number of respondents for each ethnic group. Since some gave more than one criterium, the total count of the column is not expected to tally with the actual sum here.

Despite the detection of a slight “ethnically polarised” pattern of responses to the definitions of National Culture and National Literature, it appears that it is still easier for the ordinary folks to arrive at some sort of consensus on these issues than politicians influenced by specific nationalist ideology. Their flexibility on the issues was manifested by the fact that some of them regarded more than one articulation of National Culture as acceptable. In fact, even among the Malay respondents, the statement suggesting that the Malaysian National Culture should consist of the best of all cultures received the most resounding support over the official definition of National Culture. In addition, contrary to the inflexible official stand regarding national literature, the majority of the respondents regardless of ethnicity agreed that nationality and other aspects of the literary work such as

the contents which reflect local reality and thinking rather than language *per se* should be the criteria in the determination of national literature.

### **Forging an Imagined Unity**

In an international seminar on literature and the politics of nation-building in 2004, the dean of the UKM anthropology and sociology programme Kamaruddin M. Said, contended that there is yet a national culture in Malaysia, but only “an official arts as seen from the dances and songs in the Merdeka celebrations and other festivities”. He envisioned national culture to be “a doctrine of life and an ideology that forms society’s soul collectively and is capable of giving birth to an esprit de corps for the whole citizenry” (Rozi Ali, “Literature unread, unsung”, *New Straits Times*, 21 July, 2004). This is a tall order, and judging from the experimentation in implementing NCP over the last four decades, it is doomed to fail. If we take what Abdul Razak said in his opening speech of the National Culture Congress seriously, I am not sure whether he believed in the chances of success of the NCP.

There is undeniably an “imagined” component when we speak about interethnic harmony or national unity, as the latter are abstract terms that can only be assessed subjectively. Attitudes pertaining to interethnic relations, be it acceptance or latent antagonisms, are reproduced in the construction of ethnic category and identity as abstract models. It is not the outcome of direct interethnic contact, in so far as not being falsified in actual interethnic interactions (Eriksen 1998: 37). The persuasiveness of the multicultural imagery touted as symbolising interethnic harmony and national unity during the 1990s (Lee 2004) illustrates that cultural and religious differences need not be *a priori* divisive.

Attempts at re-articulation of national discourse during the 1990s serve to demonstrate that the projection of Malaysia as a multicultural country in the international arena does not appear to be as problematic as those advocates of national culture policy made it out to be. In effect, a multicultural image of Malaysia could even be promoted in the international arena as a comparative advantage in the modern world of nations. The inconsistent and contradictory signals made by the Malaysian government based on political expediency only serve to increase the cynicism of the people and reinforce social contradictions.

On their part, individual citizens tend to understand the discourse on nation based on their own social identity and self understanding (Cohen 1996). They make sense of public rites and discourse and render them personally meaningful by giving their own interpretation as far as they could identify with it based on personal situations.

Hence Cohen (1996) advised aspiring “political entrepreneurs” of nationalism to articulate a discourse or vision that could reflect meaningfully the local experience of a maximum number of his target audience.

The power of a national identity to engender strong attachment among its citizens to the putative nation-state depends on how well the nation-state harmonises and comes to terms with these localised ways of belonging to social webs of relationship in order to transcend potentially conflictive identities. It is a matter of re-channelling sub-national social solidarity rather than suppressing it (Calhoun 2003: 536-7). As noted by Duara, “the most successful states are able to contain these conceptions within relatively depoliticized spaces” (1995: 9). The NCP did just the opposite. It is a truism to say it but it is still worth saying that national identity would not be able to gain a wide adherence if it is formulated in such a way as to marginalise a significant section of sub-national identities.

In itself, national identity is an empty conceptual framework within which different social elements could be organised and accorded meaning and significance based on specific organising principles (Greenfeld 1992: 12). The “raw materials” used for such purposes are usually retrieved from or attributed to historically existing social identities on the putative territory. Hence national identity is ultimately a product of negotiation with existing historical identities, be they regional, ethnic or religious, within the framework of a modern nation-state system (Duara 1996: 158). Ultimately, the forging of an alternative national identity may require a re-interpretation of these historical identities and a new articulation of the historical narratives of the nation. Even politically expedient nationalists who manipulate history for their own gain are obliged to engage with these historical identities in doing so.

The ambivalence of the national discourse articulated by the politicians is a consequence of the ambiguous approach they have chosen to accommodate social forces with contradictory nation-views and the exigencies of meeting the challenges posed by a globalised economy. Whether or not a different approach to the “national question” may emerge is a matter of political contests and historical contingency, but premised on the enlargement of democratic space. While the electronic media has broken down the hegemonic control of the ruling elites over the access of information and expression of dissent, this democratic space is still being negotiated and contested. For it to be sustainable and politically legitimate, it is essential that a civil political culture whereby citizens’ political and civil rights may be respected not only by the political authorities but also by all citizens may take root.

## References

- Abdul Razak Hussein. 2003. "Lampiran: Ucapan Y.A.B. Perdana Menteri Allahyarham Tun Haji Abdul Razak bin Hussein di Majlis Perasmian Kongres Kebudayaan Kebangsaan di Dewan Tunku Canselor Universiti Malaya, Kuala Lumpur, 16 Ogos 1971" in *Masyarakat dan Kebudayaan Malaysia: Suatu Analisis Perkembangan Kebudayaan di Malaysia*, Aziz Deraman, 187-196.
- Ariffin Omar. 1993. *Bangsa Melayu – Malay Concepts of Democracy and Community 1945-50*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Aziz Deraman, A. 2003. "Dasar Kebudayaan Kebangsaan Malaysia" in *Masyarakat dan Kebudayaan Malaysia: Suatu Analisis Perkembangan Kebudayaan di Malaysia*, Aziz Deraman, 147-157.
- Bunnell, Tim. 2002. "(Re)positioning Malaysia: High-Tech Networks and the Multicultural Rescripting of National Identity", *Political Geography*, 21: 105-124.
- Calhoun, Craig. 2003. "'Belonging' in the Cosmopolitan Imaginary", *Ethnicities*, 3(4): 531-568.
- Carstens, Sharon A. 2005. "Dancing Lions and Disappearing History: The National Culture Debates and Chinese Malaysian Culture" in *Histories, Cultures, Identities: Studies in Malaysian Chinese Worlds*, Sharon A. Carstens, Singapore: National University Press, 144-176.
- Case, William F. September 2000. "The New Malaysian Nationalism: Infirm Beginnings, Crashing Finale", *Asian Ethnicity*, 1(2): 131-147.
- Cheah Boon Kheng. 1997. 'Writing Indigenous History in Malaysia: A survey on approaches and Problems', *Crossroads*, 10(2): 33-81.
- Cheah Boon Kheng. 2002. *Malaysia: The Making of a Nation*, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.
- Cohen, Anthony P. Nov 1996. "Personal Nationalism: A Scottish View of Some Rites, Rights, and Wrongs", *American Ethnologist*, 23(4): 802-815.

Ulang Tahun Ke-40, Konsep dan Dasar Kebudayaan Kebangsaan: Penilaian Semula

省思国家文化概念与政策研讨会

Daniels, Timothy P. 2005. *Building Cultural Nationalism in Malaysia: Identity, Representation, and Citizenship*, New York & London: Routledge.

DongZong Chuban Zu 董总出版组 (comp.). 1987. *Dongzong sanshinian*, 董总三十年 (Thirty Years of UCSCA) Vol. 1-3. Kuala Lumpur: United Chinese School Committees' Association (UCSCA).

Duara, Prasenjit. 1995. *Rescuing History From the Nation – Questioning Narratives of Modern China*, Chicago & London: The University of Chicago Press.

Duara, Prasenjit. 1996. "Historicizing National Identity, or Who Imagines What and When" in *Becoming National – A Reader*, eds. Geoff Eley & Ronald Grigor Suny, Oxford & New York: Oxford University Press, 150-177.

Eriksen, Thomas Hylland. 1998. *Common Denominators: Ethnicity, Nation-Building and Compromise in Mauritius*, Oxford & New York: Berg.

Funston, John. 1980. *Malay Politics in Malaysia: A Study of UMNO and PAS*, Heinemann Educational Books: Petaling Jaya.

Greenfeld, Liah. 1992. *Nationalism – Five Roads to Modernity*, Cambridge (Massachusetts)/London: Harvard University Press.

Horowitz, Donald L. 1989. "Cause and Consequence in Public Policy Theory: Ethnic Policy and System Transformation in Malaysia", *Policy Sciences*, (22): 249-287.

Hussin Mutalib. 1990. *Islam and Ethnicity in Malay Politics*, Singapore: Oxford University Press.

Kua Kia Soong (ed.). 1990. *Malaysian Cultural Policy & Democracy*, Kuala Lumpur: The Resource and Research Centre, Selangor Chinese Assembly Hall.

Lee, Raymond L.M. 2004. "The Transformation of Race Relations in Malaysia: From Ethnic Discourse to National Imagery, 1993-2003", *African and Asian Studies*, 3(2): 119-143.



Lim Khay Thiong. 林开忠 1999. *Jian gou zhong de "huaren wenhua": zu qun shu xing, guojia yu hua jiao yungdong* 建构中的“华人文化”:族群属性、国家与华教 运动 (Development of ‘Chinese Culture’: Ethnic Belonging, National and Chinese Education Movement). Kuala Lumpur: Huazi Resource and Research Centre 华社资料研究中心.

Loh, Francis Kok Wah. 2002. “Developmentalism and the Limits of Democratic Discourse” in *Democracy in Malaysia: Discourses and Practices*, eds. Loh Francis Kok Wah & Khoo Boo Teik, Surrey: Curzon Press, 19-50.

Mahathir bin Mohamad. 1970. *The Malay Dilemma*, Singapore: Asia Pacific Press.

Malik Munip. 1981. *Tuntutan Melayu* (The Malay Demand), Kuala Lumpur: Sarjana Enterprise.

Mandal, Sumit. 2008. “The National Culture Policy and Contestation over Malaysian Identity” in *Globalization and National Autonomy: The Experience of Malaysia* edited by Joan Nelson, Jacob Meerman & Abdul Rahman Embong, Singapore & Bangi: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies & Institute of Malaysian and International Studies, 273-300.

Milne, R.S. & Mauzy, Diane K. 1978. *Politics and Government in Malaysia*, Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press.

Milne R.S. & Mauzy Diane K. Winter 1983. “The Mahathir Administration in Malaysia: Discipline through Islam”, *Pacific Affairs*, (56): 617-48.

Mohammad Yunus Hamidi. 1961. *Sejarah Pergerakan Politik Melayu Semenanjung* (History of Peninsular Malay Political Movement), Kuala Lumpur: Pustaka Antara.

Muhammad Ikmal Said. 1996. “Malay Nationalism and National Identity” in *Malaysia – Critical Perspectives*, eds. Muhammad Ikmal Said & Zahid Emby, Petaling Jaya: Persatuan Sains Sosial Malaysia, 34-73.

Ulang Tahun Ke-40, Konsep dan Dasar Kebudayaan Kebangsaan: Penilaian Semula

省思国家文化概念与政策研讨会

Nik Anuar Nik Mahmud, Muhammad Haji Salleh & Abd. Ghapa Harun. 2011. *Biografi Tun Abdul Razak: Negarawan dan Patriot*, Bangi: Penerbit UKM.

Rowland, Kathy. 2004. “Bukan Budaya Kita”, *Kakiseni*, published online on 8 September 2004.

Shamsul A.B. 1993. “Kebudayaan Kebangsaan: Suatu Kenyataan, Harapan Atau Bayangan Palsu?” in *Masyarakat Malaysia dan Alam Sosialnya*, Shamsul A.B., Kuala Lumpur: Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka, Kementerian Pendidikan Malaysia, 97-99.

Shamsul A.B. 1996. “Nations-of-Intent in Malaysia” in *Asian Forms of the Nation*, eds. Stein Tonnesson & Hans Antlov, Surrey: Curzon Press, 323-347.

Singh, Ranjit. 2003. “Ethnicity, development and Federal-State Relations in Sabah and Sarawak, 1963-1990” in *The State, Economic Development and Ethnic Co-Existence in Malaysia and New Zealand*, eds. Edmund Terence Gomez and Robert Stephens, Kuala Lumpur: CEDER, University of Malaya, 53-71.

Tan Liok Ee. 1988. *The Rhetoric of Bangsa and Minzu: Community and Nation in Tension, The Malay Peninsula, 1900-1955*, Clayton (Victoria, Australia): Centre of South-East Asian Studies, Monash University.

Tan Sooi Beng. 1992. “Counterpoints in the Performing Arts of Malaysia” in *Fragmented Vision – Culture and Politics in Contemporary Malaysia*, eds. Kahn Joel S. & Loh Kok-wah Francis, Sydney: Asian Studies Association of Australia in association with Allen & Unwin, 282-306.

Ting, Helen. 2007. *From Ketuanan Melayu to Bangsa Malaysia? A Study of National Integration and Identity in West Malaysia*. PhD thesis submitted to the Institute of Political Studies of Paris [Science Po] and defended in November, 2007.

Ting, Helen. 2011. “Institutional Reforms and Bi-party Political System: Beyond ‘Expedient Multiculturalism’” in *Malaysia at Crossroads: Can It Make the Transition?*, (eds) Abdul Rahman Embong & Tham Siew Yean, Bangi: UKM Press, 154-180.

Vasil, R.K. 1980. *Ethnic Politics in Malaysi*

### 三、马来西亚有没有「建国社会契约」？

(2018 年 8 月 4 日，星期六，2p.m. - 4:30p.m.)

#### 专题讨论会读本

- I. Mavis C. Puthucheary 著、李永杰译，2008，〈马来西亚的社会契约：概念的发明和历史演变〉，诺拉妮等编，《一个马来西亚，两种社会契约？》，页 7-26，策略资讯研究中心。
- II. Haris Zuan(2015). “Becoming Malay.” Pp. 1-26 in Young and Malay, edited by Ooi Kee Beng and Wan Hamidi Hamid. Selangor: Gerakbudaya.
- III. Syed Saddiq (2015) ‘I was once a racist’. Malaysiakini.
- IV. 张茂桂，2008，〈多元文化主义在台湾与其困境〉，沈宪钦等编，《知识分子的省思与对话》，页 310-325，台北：时报文教基金会。

#### 讨论重点

- 什么是「多元文化主义」(multiculturalism)？
- 马来西亚的社会契约是什么？马来西亚的社会契约是否符合多元文化主义？
- 对照“Becoming Malay”、“I was once a racist”的马来人经验，作为华人的种族经验有何异同？

#讨论会开始前，看电影《争执》，该片由马来西亚人权组织“社会传播中心”制作；学员须做笔记，以延伸讨论校园中不同族群的文化刻板印象，以及校园教育是否贯彻多元文化主义。

#### 讨论单

1.	请你/妳简单定义、说明什么是种族主义者 (racist)？(可以用你/妳的生活经验来分享)
2.	电影 Gadoh 与读本 Becoming Malay、I was once racist 中呈现了哪些刻板印象？这些种族刻板印象，与上周《马来人的困境》一书中的哪些论述相互呼应或对抗？
3.	电影 Gadoh 与读本 Becoming Malay、I was once racist 中，人们采取哪些方式对抗种族主义？你/妳赞同或不赞同哪些方式，理由为何？
4.	你/妳认为，这三周的理论或概念如“ethnicity as narrative”、“racial formation”、“多元文化主义”、“社会契约”如何帮助我们思考种族主义的问题与寻求解决方案？
5.	电影 Gadoh 与读本 Becoming Malay、I was once racist 中，令你/妳想起中学校园中哪些相似的种族主义经验吗？

神，并向他们致敬。他们俩充满智慧和人文精神，也都是马来西亚宪法的起草人。他们更是法官、律师和一般公民宏伟愿景的喉舌。为示怀念，我们将书献给他们俩。我们无法知道他们是否会同意我们的法学推断或论点，不过我们相信他们会会心一笑，也许有些反讽的意味，但同时也会和蔼地同意这些议题的重要，并肯定我们企图向更广大马来西亚公众传达这些担忧的努力。

吉隆坡  
2008年1月

# 马来西亚的“社会契约”

## 概念的发明和历史演变

玛维斯·普都哲里

大马的政治演说和文章频频出现“社会契约”这个名词。但人们对于这个西方政治哲学词汇在大马脉络究竟有什么样的意义，却有着众多的歧见。本文企图探索“马来西亚社会契约”概念的历史发展，同时追溯这个强大西方概念的起源，以及它如何被利用来合理化各种各样的种族刻板论述，及产生铭记此论述的政权和政治支配。本文试图厘清，为何人们对“马来西亚社会契约”的概念会出现不同的解读与评价，以及这种种说法如何因应两方的权力关系转变而操弄。

本文企图进行的是政治和历史的探索，而非概念性探讨。文章并不企图处理社会契约理论背后所蕴涵的哲学思维，或者检验它对未来宪政民主有任何的影响。相反的，本文检视马来西亚人如何转借，如何有策略地吸纳这个西方政治哲学概念，同时怎样在本土政治脉络使用它。通过曝露这些不自觉的意义改写，本文凸显和挑战这一过程背后所隐含的一些影响元素，或说，这个概念如何被“偷渡进来”（smuggled into），同时通过知识分子的勾联和修订，最终成功移植到马来西亚民众所普遍接受的政治语境和意识当中。

本文第一部分检视独立时期的历史背景，即联盟领袖在1957年的立宪讨价还价过程，以及这样的协商结果最终如何铭刻到1957年宪法当中。在第二部分，研究者将回顾和解释，这些共识如何在1980年代中叶，被提升到“社会契约”的地位。最后，本文也将企图说明，一个正式纳入族群谈判协议的宪法，将不断引发冲突，同时阻扰国家团结。

## 历史背景

马来西亚的第一次族群间谈判其实发生在左翼领袖之间，他们当时企图组织一个广受群众支持的联合阵线，以争取脱离殖民统治。马来左翼政党的联盟，即人民力量中心（PUTERA），联同非马来政党联盟“泛马联合行动理事会”（AMCJA）起草了第一部宪法。这部宪法称为《人民宪法》，它容纳了这些政治领袖对部分重要课题所达致的协议，包括国籍和公民权、议会民主体制，以及这个新生国家将以马来文化作为其象征认同。

不过，英国殖民者和马来传统菁英，甚至巫统，都否决了这部1947年草拟的《人民宪法》草案。当时，巫统乃马来民族主义运动的龙头。就如杨恩（Young 1976, 121）所指出那样，“马来民族主义在两极化背景发展起来，大批的中国移民既构成衬托者，也是威胁的来源”。

巫统成功动员马来人反对马来亚联盟（Malayan Union）<sup>①</sup>的成立。在马来亚联盟的计划底下，新生国家将奉行出生地原则（*jus soli*），即只要是在这片土地（soil或bumi）出生者，都会获得公民权——不论他们的“种族”或社群最初的起源。对巫统领袖而言，他们的斗争并非在于脱离殖民统治，而是捍卫马来人的优越地位，确保非马来人，尤其华人不会拥有同等的政治权利，或取得公民权的待遇。

英国屈服于马来人的压力，撤回马来亚联盟计划，并且跟马来统治者和巫统领袖展开谈判，重新草拟一份能够让这些马来菁英接受的宪法。明显的，马来左派力量被排除在谈判之外。当时，马来国民党（Malay Nationalist Party）这类的左翼政党其实获得马来族群广泛的支持。为何英国要排除他们呢？

一些学者指出，英国殖民统治的最主要目的在于贸易，而非征服。英国当局将自己的利益嵌入拥有传统正当性的结构当中，以合理化自己的出现。当英国人发现，他过去的盟友，包括旧有的苏丹王国政治菁英，大部分都反对马来亚联盟计划，他便收回重组战后

马来亚的建议，选择恢复原有的状态。而英国人之所以不让非马来人和马来左派参与谈判，其理由是，他们当初是与马来统治者签订条约，因此往后任何修订都需要获得后者的同意，与其他人无涉。不过，在“英马工作委员会”（Anglo-Malay Working Committee）组成之际，巫统领袖却获邀参与，因为他们是统治者的“代表”。

在随后的马来亚联合邦协定（Federation of Malaya Agreement）下，非马来人的公民权受到大幅度限制，他们的公民权事宜被延后处理。值得一提的是，这项协定出现一项条款，赋予殖民政府维护“马来人特殊地位和其他社群的正当利益”的责任。不过，该条款并没有说明两者是否同等重要，一切仍待未来澄清。此外，“特殊地位”的道德重要性是否大于，或者等同于“正当利益”，也同样构成疑问。此一条款暗示，应该维持马来统治者和其子民过去所享有的特权，不过成问题的是，它是否也同时保障他们在现在和未来，永远享有这样的优越地位？

英国当局在过去无疑更倾向于马来族群——尤其吸纳殖民行政官僚的时候，但通过马来亚联合邦协定，它首次给予了马来特权正式和法定的认可。这些特权后来被纳入新的宪法当中。此外，马来人也获得其他方面的利益：

“这个新的法定实体称为马来土地联合邦（Persekutuan Tanah Melayu）。这部宪法给‘马来人’提出了严格的法律定义，可是‘马来亚（人）’（Malayan）却没有被定义。所谓的‘马来亚’国民（nationality）并不存在。该宪法勉为同意赋予非马来人公民权；不过，它却缩减了合格的人数。在早前的马来亚联盟计划下，大约有百分之八十三的华裔和百分之七十五的印裔将可获得公民权”（Bayly and Harper 2002, 362）。

囊获众多好处之后，巫统领袖其实没有需要跟非马来领袖谈合作，或者就其他基础，进行任何的族群间谈判——除非前者发现有利于己的情况。不过，由于巫统领袖必须跟更激进的马来民族主义者竞争，后者批评马来亚联合邦宪法草案，认为它继续图利统治阶层，而且没有致力于推动脱离殖民的独立斗争。由于担心自己倡议输人，甚至遭边缘化成为无足轻重的角色，巫统召唤“控制华人”的幽灵，强调马来亚联合邦协定已成功排除这样的危机（Amoroso 1998, 272）。巫统没有回应马来左派的具体批评，相反

译注① 旧译为马来亚联邦，因其实非联邦制，故另译为联盟。

的，其领导人选择专注于马来人团结的课题。正如阿莫罗索（Amoroso）所指出的那样：

“团结的概念有着某种历史共鸣。它召唤那个马六甲王朝一统马来世界的辉煌过去，以及过去上下有序的社会秩序。它将所有问题归咎于缺乏团结因素，这些问题从丢失新加坡、槟城，到马来人当代的落后不等。”（Amoroso 1998, 272）

通过扛起马来人和种族捍卫者的角色，巫统成功囊括越来越多马来人的支持，因为更多马来人开始相信它的马来民族主义。随着英国颁布紧急状态，以及重要的左翼领袖纷纷被逮捕和监禁，马来国民党和其他马来左翼组织也渐渐失去人们的支持。

英国殖民政府成功与更传统和保守的马来社会部分勾结起来，建立以族群因素来区别人民待遇的政治体系。随后，它也企图通过将各族领袖放置在同一个族群联络委员会（Communities Liaison Committee）底下，以图建立他们之间的和谐关系。不过，这个联委会却未能就任何重大的课题产生任何协议。无论如何，该联委会却成功启动首次的市议会选举。这种发展为往后巫统和马华的合作奠下基础，即使这两个政党原是相互敌对，而各自利益也相互矛盾的。

市议会选举落在全国选举之前，无疑给两党带来好运。由于当时城市居民大部分为华裔和印裔，巫统被迫寻求外人的合作以赢得选举。同样幸运的是，在第一次的市议会选举时，这个崭新的政治联盟并没有遇上其他种族政党的挑战。他们的主要对手并非以种族为基础，而是标榜意识形态的左翼政党，例如急进党（Radical Party）<sup>②</sup>、槟城劳工党（Labour Party of Penang）和马来亚独立党（Independence of Malaya Party）。急进党和槟城劳工党都参加了1951年12月举行的乔治市议会选举，而马来亚独立党则是巫统一马华在1952年2月吉隆坡市议会选举的最主要对手。

由于这些选举缺少其他种族政党参与，巫统和马华领袖得以选择彼此合作，而非相互竞争。他们考量到，携手合作可能导致少

译注② 该党由英语专业人士筹组，林苍佑亦为成员之一，乃为参与1951年槟城乔治市议会选举而组织，但在1952年另一选举时已告衰微。

数支持者流失（这些人会觉得领袖出卖自己的社群），不过另一方面，他们却可以从另一族群获得更大选票的补偿。就巫统而言，马来人在城市地区相对少数的情况，使其非常愿意合作。对马华来说，它与巫统合作的风险低，因为当时并不存在其他华基政党跟它竞争华裔选票。因此可以说，选举佳绩是促成巫统一马华在这些市议会选举合作的动力。这样的破天荒和临时的联盟，后来获得正式巩固，即1953年成立的联盟（Alliance coalition）。尽管联盟成员党之间存在着先天的矛盾和紧张关系，但是独立后从英国人手中继承政权的期盼，让他们拥有足够的动因继续站在一起，进行跨族群的合作。权力的渴望掩盖两党间因为不同观点而带来的忧虑，可能导致联盟破局的尖锐课题被束之高阁，他们专注于摆脱殖民统治。

一般以为，独立谈判的起点是在独立委员会（independent commission）成立，并开始起草独立的马来亚宪法之际。但事实上，这样的过程早在此之前启动。巫统和马华领袖针对少数重要课题，草拟了一系列的意见书，并提呈到伦敦的英国殖民部（British Colonial Office）（Heng Pek Koon 1998, 205）。不过，这些文件至今从未公开。第一份收录巫统和马华共同协议的公开文件是〈1955年联盟竞选宣言〉。不过，这份文件是单向的。马华同意在1955年举行选举，即使公民权课题仍未获得解决。如此一来，当时的选民组成严重被扭曲，有利于马来人。在那样的脉络下，马华领袖同意纳入数项关于宪赋马来人地位的课题（例如，马来语作为国语，保障马来人特殊地位的条款），同时剔除那些会冒犯马来人的议题（如以出生地原则来授予非马来人公民权，华文和华教的地位）。根据该竞选宣言，这些棘手难题将交由负责草拟新宪法的独立委员会来定夺。

在独立委员会开始商议之际，联盟已通过选举赢得关键的胜利。这个大部分以马来人为领导的政治联盟，其所展现的领导能力，以及所达致的成就是无可否认的。1957年马来亚独立的时候，他们已准备好，根据自己所要求的大部分条件，接收英国人留下的政治权力。所以，尽管独立委员会的成员致力于设置一部勾勒民主政府的宪法，他们却不免察觉到某些“政治现实”。首先，政治权力将转移到联盟政府手中，而当中的成员党领袖将自行安排权力分

享。其次，即使政府由多元族群组成，但国会仍由巫统所主宰。联盟各成员党在1955年选举都获得十分优异的成绩，不过当中的政治权力分配却是不平等的，巫统所囊获的权力大大压倒其他的成员党。

对于联盟，尤其巫统，其对宪法形构的影响力，我们可以通过独立委员会的权限一窥其堂奥。独立委员会是没有权力过问特定事务的，例如马来亚联邦高度集权化、马来统治者在政治体系内维持其角色（宪法定义的统治者）、以及保障马来人特殊地位的课题。至于落在其权力范围的其他事务，例如依据出生地原则给予非马来人公民权，独立委员会却在在面对着众多迥然不同，甚至矛盾的意见。虽然独立委员会没有义务接受联盟的建议，但它却仍然顺其意，理由是乖离联盟备忘录的做法，最终将招致“人民代议士”的否决。在马来选民比例特高和其政治势力占优势的情况下，独立委员会选择向政治现实低头。对于过程中及协商团体所开出的条件，包括马来人获得不合比例的暂时性优越主权，独立委员会都不加修改而接纳。

可是，独立委员会仍表达一项深切的担忧，即群体权利和个体权利之间可能产生冲突。基于这项理由，独立委员会虽然承认，经济地位处于劣势的马来人需要获得更多达致平等的机会，但也同时建议，这些优惠应不时予以重新检视，一旦发现没有存在的必要，则必须将其撤销。不过，联盟政府却反对这项建议，导致群体权利和个体自由产生紧张的共存关系。保障马来人特殊地位的宪法第一五三条文<sup>③</sup>，明显限制在平等原则下的个体自由基本概念。

宪法第一五三条文的存在，绝不代表联盟其他非马来成员党已认可马来人的政治支配，不若一些人近年召唤“马来西亚社会契约”时所讲的那样。尽管他们认可国家政治领导核心在未来将继续由马来人来占据，不过，这并不代表宪法保证马来人的永恒政治支配，正如没有人会期待，以马来政治领导权（hegemony）交换华人

译注③ 该条文授权最高元首可在“公共服务之职位（除州公共政府之公共服务之外）、奖学金、助学金、教育训练或相关特别设施、商业准证和执照申请、大学学额”等事项，让马来人和沙巴砂拉越原住民，拥有“合比例的份额”。

（和外国人）经济主宰的那种“交易”将永远有效。这不是什么长期世俗利益的中介，更不是什么极神圣的民间和政治盟约。

这项交易的最终安排并没有让任何一方完全感到满意。不过，由于各有所获，所以他们愿意接受这项交易。他们也同时寄望于未来，待自己的谈判筹码增加后，再要求新的协议，以还自己原初的心愿。

对马华而言，这样的机会在独立后，短短两年内就降临其家门。尽管大部分非马来裔成年人在出生地原则下，没有获得公民权，但大部分的华裔和印裔却得以通过注册的方式获得公民权。到1959年，独立后首次的选举展开之际，华裔选民的人数已经大致接近真正华裔人口的比例。马华领导层当时利用这样的选民族群变化，要求在该届大选能代表联盟出征更多的议席。巫统领袖百般不愿意，即使这是符合现实逻辑的，因为它担心失去在政府和国会的优势。

这样的僵局最终通过一项妥协获得善意解决。不过，联盟能够生存下来还全赖马华收回其原初的要求。随后，当新加坡加入马来西亚之际，非马来人企图争取一项更有利于己的新协议。针对族群之间更公平“协议”的诉求，就隐含在新加坡执政党人民行动党所提出的“马来西亚人的马来西亚”口号当中。巫统领袖立即反击，迫使新加坡退出马来西亚联邦，进而化解危机。不过，其他一些反对党公开地或者技巧地吸纳了这样的口号，进而转为自己的竞选主题。

由于其他对手以自己的方式来争取选举胜利，因此联盟内部较“温和”的政党发现自己越来越难以维持各自族群的支持。在1960年代，在野党赢得数个地方和城镇的议会选举，开始在地方执政起来。在野党掌政情况，在在地挑战了联盟的神话，即非马来人参与政府的唯一途径，就是通过联盟的不平等权力分享方程式。联盟政府将这种情况视为其生存的威胁，进而中止，随后更撤销了地方政府选举。这样的举动进一步强化紧张局势。由于无法在地方政府选举竞争，在野党开始动员起来，投入州级和全国选举。

联盟在1969年的大选中，成功保住国家政权，但却在数个州属惨遭滑铁卢，一些甚至丢失了多数议席的优势。随着吉隆坡爆发



族群冲突，国家进入紧急状态，这种情况使巫统领导得以借机重新检视局势。更明确而言，国家紧急领导层获得良机，通过“重新改造”基于过去族群间协定的机制安排，最终改变协定本身的本质和条件。

“新现实主义”于是降临。多元族群的政治联盟形式获得保存下来，但是巫统在其内的政治宰制却通过数项动作而巩固起来。首先，它对选区实施管理，甚至操弄，进而有效地减少以华人为主的国会和州议会选区。在城市内（华人地区），选区划得特大，而乡区（马来人）选区则划得较小。在国阵内部，议席是根据特定选区的族群比例来进行分配，而不是凭借整体选民比例。所以，巫统作为国阵内部唯一的马来人政党（除了短暂加入国阵的回教党之外），肯定囊获最多的议席。有些时候，巫统所竞选的议席总数，甚至超越其他国阵成员党的议席总和（Khoo Boo Teik 2005, 33）。其次，它通过立法，钳制公众公开讨论一些足以影响公众生活的关键议题。第三，它引入激进的政策，旨在恢复马来人对巫统的支持。

马来民族主义压倒“公民主义”（civic nationalism）的现实，也反映在新经济政策的成形，尤其马来人获得教育和经济的优惠照顾之上。尽管大部分非马来人认为，新经济政策已超越原本提供予马来人的特权范围，不过他们依然接纳了，他们的理由跟过去是一样的（尽管部分人十分地不愿意），即有必要缩减马来人与非马来人之间的经济鸿沟，而且这是有期限的，经过二十年之后，就变得没有必要，应该废除之。

马来民族主义亦成为国家机关扩张的重要动力。它将发展高举为国家最关键的任务，同时监控国家规定的各种优惠政策。马来西亚逐变为更加马来中心的国家。

## 从联盟谈判到“社会契约”

在马来西亚脉络之下，时任巫统国会议员的阿都拉·阿末（Abdullah Ahmad）在1986年首次使用“社会契约”一词。当时他说：

“马来人支配的政治体系是出于独立之前极神圣的社会契约。我们必须切记，马来人在马来西亚政治体系当中所享有的（特殊）地位是不能废止的，而马来人的期待也必须被满足。有人企图质疑、摒弃和违反这项契约，这种做法已危及整个体系的稳定。”

“1969年5月的暴动就是挑战这个体系的后果。大家原本已认可它，却因为契约内容未能兑现而起了质疑。在1969年暴动后推出的新经济政策，就是为了兑现1957年契约所承载的承诺……”

“新经济政策必须延续，以维持马来人在政治体系的支配，这是符合1957年契约精神的。即使在1990年以后，这个不断演化的体系仍需要有维持、保护和扩大的机制。”

（以上引文来自《星报》在1986年8月31日有关阿都拉·阿末的报导。）

当新经济政策的二十年期限来到尾声，像阿都拉·阿末这样的巫统政治人物企图将新经济政策定义为所谓“社会契约”的一部分，而作为一项契约，事情可谓已“银货两讫，恕不退换”了。

当时，阿都拉·阿末的言论受到舆论的抨击，指其看法不过是天马行空的虚构幻想，同时欠缺事实根据。数位作者（文章收录于达斯（K. Das）编辑的《马来人支配？》[*Malay Domination?*]）挑战了这种社会契约论述，他们的理由是马来人的政治支配是缘自独立时期的世俗政治现实，而非神圣、持久、永恒不变和具有道德约束力的宪法保证。他们使劲地否定宪法保障马来人永远支配的政治体系。不过，在此之后，尤其在近年来，“社会契约”这个词汇又显著地重返政治人物和学者的词库。在最近的2007年的巫统大会上，有巫青团代表声称，社会契约早在五十年前约定妥当，而非马来人如今没有理由质疑这项契约，或者害怕马来人的支配。

“这个社会契约是很久的东西了。它是五十年前所达致的。”

“若是老早同意，为何现在又要质疑呢？其实当时的领袖都接受这项契约。为什么这一世代的人却不能够尽力来理解它呢？”

“这个国家的非马来人无需害怕自己的影子。”



(这三则引文皆来自2007年11月8日《马来西亚前锋报》一篇题为“不要挑战社会契约”的文章。)

随着时间流逝,宪法第一五三条文已经过一系列的变化。在独立后不久,它被诠释为扶弱政策,主要目的在于减少历史所产生的不平等,即马来人与非马来人之间的经济鸿沟。到1960年代,“土著”和“移民”之分更被凸显,而且过去的“马来人特权”被扩大到“砂拉越和沙巴土著”身上。在没有公共舆论的参与下,这个历史性“交易”被重新诠释。东马两个州属的“土著”获得优惠的地位;而这个国家的非马来人“移民”如今则注定要同意给予这些新伙伴“土著”特殊经济地位,以作为他们早前获得公民权的部分“交易”。这形同单方面篡改合约(若真有的话),违反了订约双方应该拥有同等权利以及共同服膺于双方裁决的规定。

自从1980年代,“马来人主权”(Ketuanan Melayu,这一词汇也隐含马来西亚是马来人的故土,因此他们是这个“国家”的“主人翁”)日益被用于形容巫统在多元族群政府当中的宰制地位。不过此时,巫统似乎霸占了马来人议程,同时对它着魔不已。马来人和非马来人的二分,渐渐不再是简单的“土著”和“非土著”马来西亚人之间的区分。它获得提升到另一个境地,指涉一种差异和不平等关系,一种原乡人和移民的对立。在1987年政府“镇压”异议分子前夕的争议里,将非马来公民标签为“外来者”(pendatang)的做法极普遍,同时成为后来镇压的恶兆。因着这样的标签,非马来人的文化意愿和利益被漠视。

这样的变化主要来自焦点或论调的转移,在表面上并没有太大的差别。但事实并非如此。它产生了不同的心理取向,开始强调疏远,甚至排挤他族,如此一来,这种变化对族群关系有着深远的影响。此变化的不同隐含意义造成这样的差异:就“土著/非土著”的区分而言,它承认一项事实,即早在英国人来到马来亚之前,土著马来人已经在此建立有系统的政治体系;可是,就“原乡人/移民”的区分来说,它坚持一种规范性主张,即因为马来人是马来人,所以他们对这片土地和家园拥有比其他人更优先的权利。这种由特定本土和族群—民族团体所宣称拥有的“原乡人”特殊地位,导致移民社群的后代无论生活在马来西亚多久,他们都很

难或根本无法摆脱他们的移民地位,以将这个国家称为自己的家乡。他们背负着污名和挥之不去的印记,永远是局外人。就如康诺(Connor)解释那样:

“当某些人宣称拥有特定领土时,即使他们发动驱逐令的机会微乎其微,但事实总意味,他们可以随时这样做。离散社群的成员因此绝不可能称自己的原乡为家园。他们顶多就是在需要土著容忍的寄居者。”(Connor quoted in Yeoh 2005, 62)

就如杨国庆(Yeoh Kok Kheng)指出那样,“原乡人/移民”的区分“很大部分是社会—心理的建构,原乡情绪除了是个人本身的心理取向,更是横跨几个世代和长驻久居的结果。”(Yeoh 2005, 63-4)不过,华裔和印裔移居的历史太浅,因此这些群体在宣称自己是原乡人的时候,无法如马来人般有说服力。这种差别让马来民族主义者坐上权力的宝座,得以无所禁忌地宣称,马来人支配是原初国家宪法协议的一部分。在完全按照自己意愿来定义所谓的宪法协议之后,阿都拉·阿末警告非马来人,任何企图破坏协议的举动,都不会被容忍。当然,就马来人而言,任何从属者企图单边破坏或重新定义效忠契约的作为,都会被视为叛君(derhaka),这是最严重的政治罪行,足以判之以极刑。

近年来,由于马来族群—民族主义和回教霸权的联结,使得马来西亚多元文化、多元族群的特性已进一步被侵蚀。回教泛政治化以后,导致回教在公共领域的角色日益吃重。过去,无论马来政治人物以公开或隐蔽的方式来倡导马来霸权,都容易受到挑战,但现在他们可以间接和迂回为之,宣称是为了维护回教的地位、尊严和宪赋权利。如此一来,马来霸权和马来中心主义的主张被神圣化。在回教的形式下,某部分的公民似乎已优于或者高于其他人;而人们无法质疑这种现实,除非愿意冒巨大的危险。

对许多非马来人而言,政府不断推动回教化的作为,形同放弃和背叛了政府对多元文化和多元族群的承担。他们相信,这些多元特质是原初宪法协议最基本和内在的原则(Neo 2006, 95)。自从时任首相的马哈迪,以马来西亚大部分人口为回教徒理由,宣布马来西亚为回教国之后,其他政治人物也发表类似,甚至更荒腔走调的说法。这种现象让非马来人忧心,认为独立当初的“协议”如今已

被定义和再定义，乖离他们先贤与巫统早期领袖的共同意愿和所达致的协定。有时候，这些变化是难以观察，也鲜有人注意到；不过另一些时候，改变是明显且剧烈的。许多有同样担忧的非马来人表示，最近的回教霸权趋势不仅违反政府过去对多元文化的承诺，也威胁他们的公民权益和完整身份。

对大部分非马来人而言，马来霸权的幽灵最近变得更加凶恶。近日来的改教案件引爆回教法庭与民事法庭权力重叠的课题。而民事法庭将自己的裁决权力，转让予回教法庭的趋向，使得所有支持宗教多元主义和少数群体权利的人士都十分的关注和忧心。

## 西方和马来西亚“社会契约”：个体同意或族群间协议？

西方社会契约理论<sup>④</sup>的出现，是一连串的久远历史事件所带来的理性结果；其中阐述个体如何聚集起来，组成文明社会（civil society）<sup>⑤</sup>。相反地，马来西亚的社会契约论并非企图合理化构想的远古历史情境，而是近期的情境事件，即五十多年前带来独立的种种情况。大马的社会契约论宣称，联盟各成员党的领袖通过闭门会

译注④ 十七世纪开始，西方思想家援引自然法、自然权利等概念提倡“天赋人权”，反对君权神授说。霍布斯（Thomas Hobbes）在其名著《利维坦》（Leviathan, 1651）中讨论“自然状态”与政治秩序的形成，指文明社会形成前的无政府权威时期或原始政治情境，人人彼此处于对立战争状态，人们为了和平和安全，因此彼此签约，形成社会，同意将权力让渡予某些人，形成最高权力，也就是主权，所有人必须绝对服从主权。洛克（John Locke）批评此观点，主张政府唯有在获得被统治者同意，并保障人民生命、自由和财产权利时，其统治才有正当性。若政府乖离保护的目的，那么人民便有权推翻政府。

译注⑤ 早期自然法哲学著作中，civil society不是指自然状态下不受政治权威干涉的社会，而是政治社会或国家的同义词，因此可译为“文明社会”，与野蛮的自然状态相对。该概念后来发展成指家庭与国家之间的中介领域，则可译为市民社会。1980年代，学者倡国家、市场与社会三分理论，则civil society可译为公民社会较准确。

议达致协议，从此形塑整个国家的形态和命运。这些协议后来被铭记到1957年落实的国家宪法内。

政治哲学家认为，社会契约合理化特定的规范性命题（normative proposition），例如所有人皆平等的理念。马来西亚社会契约也同样拥有一些关键的规范性命题，即便人们对这些命题到底是什么，仍处有众多的分歧。当初的“协议”从来不见于任何文件，以构成一项合法契约。即使宪法吸纳了众多，而不是全部联盟领袖所达致的协议，但是宪法本身却出现一些矛盾和含糊不明，进而悬而未决的地方。在多数的民主国家，这样的矛盾通常将通过独立的司法机制来给予裁决。不过，在马来西亚，由于各种的理由，法院并未能承担起这样的重任。国家机关本应坚持，在社会契约下，所有公民都是一律平等的伙伴及利益相关者。可是，马来西亚的国家机关却没有这样做，它反而利用原本被视为短期措施的补偿机制来恢复，或者创造不同公民群体之间的平衡。这样的举动主要用意在于消除历史给特定公民群体所造成的社会经济劣势和不平等。国家机关拥有主权，即它对自己的领土和人口享有的绝对特权，因此国家机关也得以歧视特定公民群体，无论是基于阶级或者其他分类。在马来西亚，这样的歧视并没有发展到极致，没有到达种族隔离或种族清洗那种程度。不过，它却依据不同的族群背景，给不同的公民有差别的公民权利。

马来人的历史发展过程，以及随后的马来亚和马来西亚民族主义，造成了上述的公民差异，并且使其持续不怠。以马来人为中心的民族主义，是马来亚和马来西亚形塑过程的最主要力量，它淹没所有强调个体自由的思维。如此一来，我们不难解释为何在这个国家，种族群体的权利总是压倒个体自由。这也是为什么奠定国家独立的政治协议随后被标签和重新命名为“社会契约”。这意味巫统企图扩大人们对联盟协议的认同。不过这样的努力却反过来证明，这个国家共识是岌岌可危的。不过，这项由务实政治领袖所达致的世俗政治交易，其实是在后来才被重新想象成为神圣的合同，或者足以将国家和人民团结一起的国家盟约。

他们原本并不晓得要如何达致这样的成效，不过随着时间流逝，他们终于从西方社会契约理论中找到出路。不过，他们需要静

悄悄地替换其中的关键概念。质朴的“社会契约”概念指向一种政治秩序，它抑制社会混乱，或“所有人针对所有人战争”的个人与其近邻的敌对，而生命尽是“污秽、粗野和短暂”（就如霍布斯响当当的形容）。原初的联盟“交易”或者务实性妥协被“重新包装”，跟现代自由与民主政治哲学和其核心概念勾联起来，进而获得正当性。但事实上，后者的核心价值在于政治体系内的每个个体，都是自由和平等的公民。

不过，这种“重新包装”却没有伴随大型和广泛的公共辩论。巫统领袖和精英企图维持这样的印象，即协议是静止和不可改变的，甚至是极神圣的。不过国家机关渐渐给这个本土版“社会契约”进行修改，以符合自己和其未来权力继承人的主张，以及未来大马的需求和方向。这些修改属于精巧和隐匿的重新定义过程，也是不间断，甚至是机会主义的重构。

“社会契约”概念成为好用的工具。对马来人而言，它可以正当化这样的规范性命题，即非马来人应该承认他们的优越地位，顺从马来人和马来人的议题。这样的顺从代表他们接受“马来西亚社会契约”当今的意义：马来人的利益和意愿必须也必定，得以左右非马来人公民权和政治权利的定义和实践。而其所谓的“意愿”，并非“一劳永逸”在1957年给设定下来，反而能够继续单方面由马来人，端视其政治挑战或“挑衅”来更改。“马来西亚社会契约”概念坚持的马来人支配立场，却与非马来人渴望的平等公民权和权益，有潜在的冲突。因此，毫不意外的，马来人和非马来人都召唤“社会契约”的概念，以推进他们各自经常相互分歧的协议主张。

直至近期，社会才出现关于社会契约的辩论。因着人口增加和移民，马来人如今明显成为大多数，无论在数字或政治上，都是如此。马来人过去“在自己国土上被淹没”的担忧，早已失去其基础。现在，单单人数本身，就足维护马来人的地位。马来人的政治利益和未来，受到政治体系本身的保障，因为在这个民主选举的体制下，马来人组成了相对多数的选民。将族群特权铭写入宪法，或者挖掘政治壕沟的做法如今再也没有必要了。如此一来，忧虑开始出现，而且不断增长，尤其非马来人更是如此。随之，质疑马来

西亚社会契约定义的声浪开始浮现，而这些问题更重返日常政治领域，并成为公共政治生活的焦点。

最近关于改教的法庭判决，再次引爆类似的辩论。许多非马来人害怕，世俗国家的原则正受到马来民族主义，以及新近崛起而且蒸蒸日上回教霸权的联合侵蚀，连带威胁这个国家的多元文化社会特质。他们坚持认为，世俗国家是独立前谈判与联盟协议，以及“社会契约”所一贯保障的东西。世俗国家论者以及重视人权课题和宗教多元主义的进步回教徒疑虑加深，并且开始公开表达他们的看法，例如，有著名律师曾在2007年10月的“马来西亚法律研讨会”当中，提出〈社会契约：马来西亚宪法盟约〉论文<sup>⑥</sup>。人们开始发出重新检视马来西亚社会契约的紧急要求。

“社会契约”一词乃由知名西方哲学家霍布斯和卢梭所提出。他们以契约的概念说明社会的缘起，并且定义公民与国家之间的适当关系。他们关于契约的想象，提供一种“虚构的宪章”，构成政治秩序本身的基本假设或“真理”。这样的重构是假设和揣测性的，而非真有如此的历史，而不同哲学家对“社会契约”各有迥然不同的想法。

在马来西亚，倡导“社会契约”的不同人士也同样有着不同的观点。不过，相对于西方哲学家所发展的社会契约理论，马来西亚的社会契约却必须接受历史的拷问，因为它的发生还在活生生的人们记忆内。就这项半世纪之前所达致的协议而言，其真正的细部内容也许已不可考，但我们仍可以检验文件和涉及协议过程者的回忆录，推断出大部分所达致的共识。举例来说，早期作品以及最近的敦依斯迈医生（Tun Dr. Ismail）的回忆录都显示，马来人在宪法的“特殊地位”当初不过只是“暂时措施，以保障他们〔马来人〕能在充满竞争的现代世界中生存下来”（Ooi 2006, 83），一如高尔夫球赛的暂时“障碍”（handicap），以鼓励和支持马来人学习现代的关键技能，或转言之，好让他们提升和改进自己的竞赛能力。敦依斯迈坚称，这些马来特权不应该永久实施，必须仅限于极有限的期限，未来更不应该继续。若这些特权继续存在，则将玷污马来人

译注<sup>⑥</sup> 即Tommy. 2007一文。

的能力，弱化他们的毅力，打击他们的自尊，并在不久后给他们带来毁灭。

在马来亚独立近在眉睫之际，简单的多数民主统治未能提供国家充分的正当性和有效的主权。此时，“君子协定”和非正式、不成文的安排就变得有其需要。随着光阴飞逝，这些不成文的协议经历修改，而且经常是单方面重新定义。在此过程中，非马来人很重视的一些保证和承诺被牺牲，而政治体系的性质也随之走样：过去它秉持族群和宗教的多元主义，但如今变成马来人中心，同时也越来越回教化。在过去的日子里，巫统利用其国会优势和大幅增加马来选区的手法，来削减非马来人的政治实力。它的合理化借口是，马来政治支配是独立时期联盟成员党领袖所达成的协议。

自从1980年代开始，巫统将当初只不过是权宜的精英协议，提升为神圣的“社会契约”，或者是个别社群和种族之间所达成的民事盟约，以为其政策建立政治正当性。他们不承认这种权宜之计是最近的事情。西方哲学家利用“社会契约”的概念来形容国家与公民社会之间，或公民社会与个体之间的关系，但他们从未置之于社群整体之间，或一如埃德蒙·柏克<sup>⑦</sup>所形容的，他们的“虚拟”代表之间。伯克谓之“虚拟”，因为他们并不完全受制于人民，或接受人民的问责。这里所出现的意义改变，或者“滑动”（slippage），都有其狡猾的策略和政治意图。这些意义和政治论调的改变，尤其关于公民权的代价和国家归属的议题，都给马来人和非马来人带来不同的边际效应。这些影响是深远的，但鲜有人谈论之。人们至少有觉察。若真有争议，他们总是淹没或掩盖在成堆的文件之下。

以同样的态度，巫统部长和副主席慕尤丁（Muhyiddin Yassin）最近建议，所有的国阵成员党领袖参加闭门会议，以寻求一个共同的立场，即立足于“社会契约”和宪法的“新国家共识”。他当时也强调，自己并非主张重新检视原来的社会契约。（见2007年8月19日的《新海峡时报》。）

译注⑦ Edmund Burke, 十八世纪爱尔兰政治家与思想家，支持美国革命，但反对法国大革命，著有《法国革命论》，被视为是英美保守主义的奠基者。

慕尤丁的目的在于取得国阵所有成员党的合作，以公开捍卫1950年代中叶所达致的“历史交易”，并将之视为神圣和有约束力的社会契约。他希望以这种方式正当化现状（status quo），并打开一定的诠释弹性空间。不过，他却没有意识到他的呼吁，无意间暗示着，1950年代的协议其实并不享有任何道德和政治的高位。他的建议勉为其难地承认，1950年代的协议，以及随后对它的一切重新定义和认识，其历史意义的“建构”，都未能创造一份足以团结国家的宪章。而阿都拉·阿末和其追随者所倡导的那种，包含马来人支配的协议，就肯定不能达致这样的目的。

显然的，国阵的非马来人成员党也没有回应慕尤丁的倡言。尽管藉着“社会契约”的修辞，巫统主宰的政府似乎可为所欲为，或以马来人之名随心任取，不过非马来人却不断提出越来越激烈的挑战，要求他们作为公民的权利受到承认和保障。

非马来人担心，随着马来人口增长成为明显多数，同时掌握国会多数的优势，马来人对政治的宰制将进一步增强。虽然非马来人接受民主原则，即多数统治，同时愿意接受马来人所主导的国会，不过他们却排斥这样一些的粗糙概念，即马来人拥有支配政治的特权，只因为马来人的本质，或者他们的“马来特性”（Malayness）；又或非马来人必须接受这样一个政治体系，当中马来人拥有永远宰制的权利分配。作为人口及国会大多数的马来人，肯定会继续占据国家政治领导的核心，不过若就此认定，多数社群应该永久宰制，而少数族群应该立于从属地位的话，则这会是个站不住脚且没有历史根据的推断。对许多非马来人而言，现有的政治体系将导致非马来人实际上（*de facto*）失去政治权，或者大幅丧失公民权利。不过，一旦回教党拿下中央政权，或者成功加入巫统所领导的政府，并掌握相当的决策权力后，这项事实将获得正式的承认（*de jure*）。

由于群体权益长期压倒个体权利，使得跟社会正义、平等机会和个体自由等联结的重要价值，一直处于萎靡不振。相反地，区分，乃至根本的差别待遇，成为这国家公共决策的主流手法。而它们总是跟群体权利息息相关。捍卫“马来西亚社会契约”的呼声总是必要而且不变的，但却鲜有人认真了解这个词汇在马来西亚历史

和政治脉络下不断演化的意义。这种情况阻碍了国族<sup>⑧</sup>建构、经济成长、文化发展,以及社会正义,而社会凝聚力以及国家安全也随着受打击。

马来西亚的经验显示,一部建基于族群集团间交易的宪法,总是问题重重的。它使宪法以及其司法诠释存在模糊和矛盾。而掌政者可以根据他们眼前的利益来进行诠释和利用这些模糊地带。相反的,一部真正致力于族群间合作的宪法,必定要奠基于开放,同时接纳人类基本价值的国家共识。这些价值包括:法律面前人人平等、尊重个体自由和尊严,以及所有公民不分种族享有平等权利和义务。这样的宪法才能够促进未来国家的团结。当奠基宪章出现混淆和备受争议的时候,国家不可能有稳定。在脆弱或者破碎的基础上,绝对竖立不起“共享国家”(sharing the nation)的标杆。

译注<sup>⑧</sup> nation即指国家,又可指民族。所谓民族一般指的是,一群具有共同血缘、语言等历史文化认同的人民全体或公民全体。一般认为,反殖民运动中,民族主义的形成不外是成立民族国家(nation state),因此为凸显民族理念与国家打造的内在关系,可将“民族”(nation)和“民族主义”(nationalism)译成“国族”与“国族主义”。本书将有关亚非地区,为配合新国家建立,而打造统一均质国民特征的人民全体或论述,翻译为“国族”或“国族主义”,以示区别于内部各血缘群体的“民族”。其他地方则沿用民族或民族主义的译名。

## 参考文献

- Amoroso, Donna J. 1998. Dangerous politics and the Malay nationalist movement. *Southeast Asia Research* 6(3).
- Cowlishaw, Guy, and Robin Dunbar. 2000. *Primate conservation biology*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Bayley, Christopher, and Tim Harper. 2007. *Forgotten wars: The end of Britain's Asian empire*. London: Allen Lane.
- Das, K. 1987. *Malay dominance? The Abdullah rubric*. Kuala Lumpur: K. Das Ink.
- Du Toit, Pierre. 1989. Bargaining about bargaining. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 33(3).
- Groves, H.E. 1978. Fundamental Liberties in the Constitution of the Federation of Malaysia. In *The Constitution of Malaysia - Its development: 1957-1977*, eds. Tun Mohamed Suffian et al. Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press.
- Heng, Pek Hoon. 1988. *Chinese politics in Malaysia*. Singapore: Oxford University Press.
- Khoo, Boo Teik. 2005. Limits to democracy: Political economy, ideology and ruling coalition. In *Elections and Democracy in Malaysia*, eds. Mavis Puthuchearry and Norani Othman. Bangi: Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia.
- Neo, Jaclyn Ling-Chien. 2006. Malay nationalism, Islamic supremacy and the constitutional bargain in the multi-ethnic composition of Malaysia. *International Journal on Minority and Group Rights* 13.
- Ooi, Kee Beng. 2006. *The Reluctant Politician: Tun Dr Ismail and His Time*. Singapore: ISEAS.
- Thio, Li-Ann. 2007. Jurisdictional inbrolio: Civil and religious courts, turf wars and Article 121 (1A) of the Federal Constitution. In *Constitutional landmarks in Malaysia: The first 50 years 1957-2007*, eds. Andrew Harding & H.P. Lee. Petaling Jaya: LexisNexis.
- Thomas, Tommy. 2007. *The social contract: Malaysia's Constitutional*



covenant. Paper presented at the 14<sup>th</sup> Malaysian Law Conference, October, in Kuala Lumpur.

Vasil R.K. 1971. *Politics in a plural society*. Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press.

Yeoh, Emile Kok-Kheng. 2005. State, public policy and ethnic co-existence: A comparative analysis with particular reference to Malaysia, Spain, and Belgium. Paper presented at the International Conference on "Ethnicity, Equity and the Nation", August, in Kuala Lumpur.

Young, Crawford. 1976. *The politics of cultural pluralism*. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.

# 宗教、公民权利和性别正义

## 1980年代以后的女性、回教化和回教法

诺拉妮·奥托曼

马来西亚独立五十年之后，仍处于不确定和充满争议的立足点。它根据建国先贤和宪法所提供的地图来到这个境地。该地图所描绘的是既存，或者至少是未来的现代世俗民主国家；这个国家同时容纳文化和宗教多元。但如今，这种观点和发展路线却受到挑战。马来亚以及马来西亚作为开放包容国家的这种观点，最初被在野党所质疑，尤其来自马来民族主义政党回教党的回教力量——他们在政治上被孤立，对文化也有诸多不满。不过，自1980年代以后，这种质疑的源头，已从边陲转移到马来西亚政治的中心。巫统所主导的国阵政府开始落实在野党的议程和要求。国阵政府在马哈迪担任首相期间，即1981年至2003年之间，引介许多的相关政策。而本文就希望探讨这些政策的影响，尤其是修宪后宪法对回教法庭和回教家庭法的立场改变，及其对女性与性别正义的长期冲击。

### 文化和宗教多元主义：1957年的希望

马来亚独立宪法是历史和文化的融合体，它在1957年落实之际，被赋予创造和维系这个新生国家的任务。这部宪法融合了林林种种的元素，也是不同原则妥协的结果。它企图让迥异的利益能够并存，进而带来一致和公平。这些利益来自不同的族群、本土居民群体，尤其在经已是公民和尚未成为公民的群体之间；也源自联邦制度下，州属和中央的权限分配，以及不同法律文化和法学原则的

### WAN HAMIDI HAMID

Wan Hamidi has spent 25 years in journalism, working with, among others, *Berita Harian*, *New Straits Times*, *The Star*, *The Sun*, and *The Straits Times Singapore*, as well as the online news portal *The Malaysian Insider*. He also had a stint as media relations adviser at the Australian High Commission in Kuala Lumpur. He likes punk rock, spaghetti westerns, wayang kulit and Totoro.

### ZAIRIL KHIR JOHARI

Zairil Khir Johari became the youngest Member of the 13<sup>th</sup> Malaysian Parliament after winning the seat of Bukit Bendera, Penang in the General Election held in May 2013. He concurrently serves as the CEO of the Penang Institute, the public policy think tank of the Government of Penang. A graduate of the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, Zairil also sits in the Central Executive Committee of the Democratic Action Party, holding the portfolio of Assistant National Publicity Secretary. When he's not occupied with any of the above, he goes food hunting.

## BECOMING MALAY

— Haris Zuan —

This little piece represents an attempt at understanding the source of Malay insecurity, drawing closely from the author's experiences and readings: from memories of growing up in a Malay village far from the city centre, and the interaction with Malay literature which ignited my love for Malay culture, to personal encounters with the question of Malay insecurity and the degree of complexity involved in the consideration of Malay identity. Study of this fascinating topic has given me a deeper understanding of cultural identities, and has led me to the island of hope – Penang.

### Second-Class Malay

I grew up a second-class Malay, an experience that, till today, serves as background for my attitudes and thoughts, especially towards 'the other', for I was once upon a time an 'other' as well.

It is little known that within the state where I grew up, Johor, there exists a large Minang community. This community is strongly represented in my very own *kampung* – Kampung Lukut in Kota Tinggi. The name 'Lukut' also appears in Port Dickson, Negeri Sembilan, and in Sumatera. The name itself

suggests a romance between ancestors and homeland. However, we do not actually have any real connections with the Minang community in Negeri Sembilan. Instead, a great majority of us have direct familial connections in Bukit Tinggi in Sumatera.

During the Second World War, my paternal grandparents moved to Bukit Tinggi to avoid the Japanese onslaught. Travelling was not too convenient after the war, so they decided to stay there. That was how my father came to be born there, in a Minang village at Bukit Tinggi, Sumatera. Twenty years later, Father 'returned' to Kota Tinggi, his homeland on which he had never set foot, to reclaim a piece of land belonging to his parents.

Due to complications of migration, culture and the political boundaries of modern nation states, Father was, in the eyes of the State,<sup>1</sup> *the other*; he was not considered a local citizen, even though his parents originated from our *kampung* and a great majority of that village consisted of our kinsfolk. It was against such a backdrop that I was brought up.

With half a citizenship, I found my name at the bottom of every application for government aid during schooling, including textbook loan schemes and scholarships. More often than not, Father had to buy my textbooks, simply because I did not qualify for the scheme and even if I did, there would have been none left for me.

Most high school scholarships went to Malay students. I was classified as Malay, but Father was only a Permanent Resident (PR). Hence, on many occasions, I was denied

assistance. My first aid came when I was in Sixth Form, amounting to an annual sum of RM1,000.

My siblings and I were constantly reminded by friends and even teachers that Father's PR status could complicate matters and affect our chances of getting into university, despite our satisfactory academic performances. Father's PR status – and those constant reminders – soon erased our ambitions to get into boarding schools such as Maktab Rendah Sains MARA, which are reserved for Malay scholars only. It is for this reason that I have, from a young age, always felt that not only am I a second-class citizen, but also a second-class Malay.

It was not until the requirement for me to state my father's citizenship on every official government form was done away with that my life began to change for the better. I am indeed grateful to have been accepted into university with a full federal government scholarship.

### Growing up as a kampung boy

Kampung Lukut in the Kota Tinggi district – where I was raised – is separated from the town of Kota Tinggi by a rubber estate and a Chinese village by the name of Lukut Cina. My village was Kampung Lukut – but we never called our *kampung* Lukut Melayu, though if memory serves me right, there were no non-Malays living in my village. Needless to say, I did not know many of them during my childhood, at least not before I had enrolled in a high school in Kota Tinggi town.

The few Chinese that I remember were mostly the *duku*<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> The difference between the borders of geographic-historicist and modern nation state is discussed extensively by Farish A. Noor (2002, 2008, 2009 and 2010).

<sup>2</sup> *Lansium domesticum*, also known as *langsar*, *buahluku* or *lanzones*, is a species of the Mahogany family. The plant, which originates from western



traders from town, who came every *duku* season without fail. The *duku* grown in our village is famous, with most families owning an orchard, or at least some trees of the fruit. Then, there were the wild boar hunters, who often parked their four-wheel drives in our house compound, near the edge of the village. Thus, when growing up, I had no knowledge of non-Malays, specifically Chinese – all I knew about them was that they loved the *duku* fruit and hunted wild boars.

Nevertheless, whatever relationships we had with non-Malay visitors to our village were on very good terms. I do not recall hearing anything unpleasant regarding those people.

### School System and Ethnic Polarisation

It was only when I enrolled in high school that racial polarisation became obvious. Though it was a national school, we were all systematically segregated, even in our games. Football was a Malay game, with the exception of a few Chinese pupils – I cannot be sure, as I rarely stepped onto the field. Basketball, on the other hand, was dominated by Chinese students.

Statistically, the racial composition in my school did not reflect the true composition of Malaysian society at all.<sup>3</sup> During

---

Southeast Asia, bears edible fruit. It is the provincial flower for the Indonesian province of South Sumatera. See official website of Malaysian Agricultural Research and Development Institute (Mardi), <http://www.mardi.gov.my>.

<sup>3</sup> Malaysia has a 28.3 million-strong population, of which 91.8 per cent are citizens with the remainder 8.2 per cent being non-citizens. Malaysian citizenry consists of ethnic groups of Bumiputera (67.4%), Chinese (24.6%), Indian (7.3%), and others (0.7%). See Department of Statistics Malaysia for latest information.

my time, Malay students made up more than 70 per cent of the school population, while the Chinese were at 22 per cent only. The numbers were worse at the primary school level, with 94 per cent being Malay pupils in a national primary school and 88 per cent Chinese pupils in a Chinese primary school.<sup>4</sup> These figures represent a paradox – Chinese primary schools are more diverse than national ones. It is a curious observation that, since the 1970s, national schools have gradually become ‘Malay’ schools. Whether this was by accident or intent is unclear for me.

At this point, my carefully nurtured primary school interest in the sciences began to decline. For me, the main reason was the different ways the same subject was taught at the primary and secondary level. The former encouraged reasoning by employing logic and imagination, e.g. why do wet clothes dry quicker under the sun than in the wind; why do eggs float in salted water? The latter offered a very different scenario. There, I was forced to memorise that pi ( $\pi$ ) was 22/7, without any further elaboration. I realised that my lively imagination was no longer useful, and my ability to memorise was all that mattered.

History was taught in an equally boring manner, and it often puzzled me. Many of my questions went unanswered, and we were reduced to memorising dates and events without any understanding of their significance to us. One such question was, why did the British recognise and why were they willing to work with the Malayan Peoples’ Anti-Japanese Army (MPAJA)

---

<sup>4</sup> For further discussion see *Malaysia Education Blueprint 2013 – 2025*, published by the Education Ministry of Malaysia.

during the Japanese Occupation of Malaya, only to outlaw them when the Japanese Imperial Army had surrendered? Was this not betrayal and treachery? I was naïve then, and just like my questions about science, it remained unanswered, at least as long as I remained in school.

I was never good at sports, and classes were torpid. I preferred to happily spend time in the library, in the company of dusty books rarely read. As my interest in the sciences waned, I turned to the world of literature, and discovered that it brought similar exciting sensations to my mind; it was a blessing and a choice well chosen for me. My home in the village could not afford subscriptions to satellite television and so had less than ten channels (including some from Singapore and Indonesia). Thanks to this, I preferred to spend my time reading, especially novels. It was the beginning of the journey to better recognise myself, to at least know my purpose for being here, and to guide my direction from this point onward.

My newfound fixation with literature caused me to smuggle books out of the library on numerous occasions; the loan limitations were simply too narrow for the amount of books I wanted to borrow and read. Some of the writers who greatly influenced my thinking in the early stages of my life were Rahim Kajai, Abdullah Hussein, Shahnon Ahmad and Muhammad Haji Salleh.

There was, without any doubt, a certain pride in being Malay in Rahim Kajai's writings. In many of his short stories, for example 'Buang Bangsa, Buang Harta Keranamu Tuan', 'Pungguk Merindukan Bulan', and 'Hilang Bangsa Tidak

Berwang',<sup>5</sup> Rahim touched upon the struggles to define 'Malay'. In the conventional world, this was a discussion that should have never bothered a high school student, to whom the meaning is straightforward – a Malay is a Malay. Not a Chinese or an Indian or any 'others'. It was at this juncture that I eventually became aware of the complexity of the identity question. This question still remains today to haunt me.

At the same time, I found Rahim to be highly critical of Malay behaviour, perhaps because during his time the descendants of Syeds and Syarifahs were highly venerated (since they were rumoured to be descendants of the Prophet). Rahim found his fellow countrymen then (and some today as well) to have lost the pride of being Malay, even to the extent of being ashamed of being such. This does not gel with the fact that the Malays themselves possess high culture and have contributed extensively to academic knowledge, and thus are on par with any other civilisation in the world.

Initially, I was unsure about why the Malays do not value their own cultural treasures, letting go of them with little pride and self-esteem, and resorting to belittling or worshipping

<sup>5</sup> These short stories can be found in *Kajai Satire, Selected Short Stories by Abdul Rahim Kajai* (1985). Rahim Kajai was a prolific and influential writer. His greatest contribution is his consideration of the definition and position of Malays in society. Rahim viewed the Malays as losing self-esteem and resorting to the glorifying of Arab and Indian-Muslim descendants, which he labelled as *Darah Keturunan Arab* (DKA) and *Darah Keturunan Keling* (DKK). Among his short story anthologies is the *Pusaka Kajai* series of three, published by Qalam in 1949, and *Banyak Udang Banyak Garam* (1960); see also *Lain Padang Lain Belalang* (1961), published by Geliga Ltd in Singapore.

other civilisations and cultures. I found part of the answer in the writings of Muhammad Haji Salleh, who criticised the views of Orientalists like R.O. Winstedt who charged that the Malay culture was little more than a copycat of Arab and Hindu cultures.<sup>6</sup>

Indeed, all this while, the Malays have subscribed to the view espoused by people like Winstedt: that Malay civilisation is a young one, without the kind of deep cultural roots found in other global civilisations; that all Malays can do is to copy and imitate. To provide an example: Winstedt in *Father Civet* (1908) said Malay culture was 'not in origin Malayan, though much local colour has been added.'<sup>7</sup> Winstedt did not recognise the genius of Malay writers and was passionate in striving to show similarities between Malay works and Arabic or Hindu ones.

It is a great misfortune that a majority of Malays believed in this as well. This was where I began to learn about the source of the Malay sense of inferiority. What is more disturbing and saddening is the fact that this colonial doctrine is well received not only by the common Malays, but even by Malay intellectuals and politicians who claim to be champions of the Malay cause. This in turn affects the policies that they produce. I became ever more aware of the overwhelming influence of this prevalent view when I was furthering my studies in university.

A prominent example of this tradition is Syed Naquib Alatas who, during his *Syarahana Perdana* lecture at the

<sup>6</sup> For further discussion, see 'Richard Winstedt: Scholar and/or Colonial Writer' in Muhammad Haji Salleh (2006); and Muhammad Haji Salleh (1989).

<sup>7</sup> Ibid.

University Kebangsaan Malaysia in 1971, said that the Malay race, before the advent of Islam, was not known for its thoughts and philosophies.

Falsafah agama Hindu tiada mempengaruhi masyarakat Melayu-Indonesia, dan mereka yang berpendapat bahwa falsafah Hindu itu membawa pengaruh yang mendalam sebenarnya mem-besar2kan perkara yang tiada benar. Masyarakat Melayu-Indonesia lebih cenderung kepada sifat kesenian daripada sifat falsafah: mereka tiada benar2 berdaya merangkum kehalusan metafisika Hindu, atau pun dengan sengaja dan oleh sebab bawaan dirinya, mengabaikan falsafah dan menuntut hanya yang kurang sulit dan kusut untuk disesuaikan dengan keadaan jiwanya. Falsafah telah diubah-ganti menjadi seni, dan dengan demikian unsur2 akliah dan ilmiah menjadi terkorban. Pemikiran akliah dengan sechara mendalam, dengan menitik-beratkan unsur2 tatatertib logika dan rasionalismanya, tiada ternampak sebagai umum digemari. Meskipun memang barang sudah tentu bahwa aliran falsafah Hindu seperti yang terdapat dalam Bhagavad Gita itu mengalir juga sedikit2 dalam nadi kesusasteraan Melayu-Indonesia menghidupkannya dengan jiwa murninya, namun sebenarnya janganlah hendaknya kita terpedaya oleh yang demikian sehingga menganggap sastera Melayu-Indonesia yang bersifat Hindu itu benar2 murni, sama dengan yang terdapat dalam kandungan aslinya.<sup>8</sup>

<sup>8</sup> Extract from Syed Muhammad Naquib al-Attas's 1972 lecture, 'Islam in Malay history and culture':

The philosophies of Hinduism have no significant influence over Malay-Indonesian societies, and those who contend otherwise make a mountain out of a molehill. The Malay-Indonesian societies

The view that Malays were backward in their intellectual development before the advent of Islam has a great impact on the formation of the Malay identity. We are inclined to disregard all contributions made before Islam arrived and fused itself to the identities of the people in the region.

For example, in the *Dasar Kebudayaan Kebangsaan* (1971), the third element in National Culture was that Islam would become the most important component, which in turn influenced greatly the construction process of national identity, e.g. the approach adopted in national schools – as was experienced in my school days. The absorption of this ‘Islamic’ element has been criticised by some for its emphasis not on Islamic values, but on form, introducing the terms *Arabisation* versus *Islamisation* to argue their point.

In addition, Sutan Takdir Alisjahbana (1966) explains that Malay culture has already fashioned its own concept of culture. The Malay/Indonesian word for culture is *budaya*, a combination of *budi* and *daya*, which in Sutan’s opinion

---

are more inclined to the artistic rather than the philosophical: they could not embrace the fine lines of Hindu metaphysics, and they, either by will or natural predisposition, abandoned philosophy and sought only the less difficult and less disorderly in order to appease their souls. Philosophy was interchanged into art, and with the passing of time, elements of reasoning and academia vanished. Critical reasoning, with emphasis on the discipline of logic and rationalism, was not seen as a public favourite. There is nonetheless an iota of Hindu philosophy flowing in the veins of Malay-Indonesian literature reviving its pure spirit, yet we are not to be fooled by the notion that such Hindu-influenced works are as original as authentic Malay works.

is a very accurate description of Malay culture. *Budi* means the consciousness formed as a result of thinking, while *daya* means the strength to create or achieve something. From this, we can define culture as the ability to employ mental faculties and thinking in order to create or manifest positive values conducive to the betterment of life.

The English equivalent – culture – only came about during the mid-nineteenth century. Before 1843, anthropologists defined culture as the ways to work the land – agricultural efforts, as seen in the terms *agriculture* and *horticulture*. The statement that the Malays did not contribute much to knowledge before the arrival of Islam is therefore inaccurate.

**Abdullah Hussain** is another writer whose work left a mark on me, particularly his autobiography, *Perjalanan Mencari Bahasa* (2001). It helped me a great deal in obtaining a ‘feel’ for, and understanding of, the context of the nationalist struggle during the days leading up to Independence and the early post-Independence years. In fact, my first encounter with the notorious May 13 was through this same work. I still remember the author writing about how the curfew starved his cat, and how he went to get fish from a terrified fishmonger in Chow Kit Market.

*Interlok* (1971) is another book of his which wields great influence over me, and till today I regard it as a good literary volume to better understand racial relations in Malaysia during early post-Independence. To read it is to discover a portrayal of cordial ties among all races.

I enjoyed *Interlok* either during Form 2 or Form 3, around 15 years ago – long before it was made compulsory reading in school. Barely a decade later, it became an issue due to the term



'pariah' in its pages, which refers to the persons from the lowest Indian caste.

Literature and culture should not be seen through the lens of partisan politics, which is often emotional and coloured by current issues. For example, the Indian continent was known in the *Sulalatus Salatin* or *Malay Annals* as *Keling*, a term offensive in the present setting, but not when the *Annals* were written. When the logic of partisan politics is allowed to seep into literary and cultural matters, things tend to turn ugly.

As a matter of fact, it is rare for a novel to become a national issue; I remember only Shahnnon Ahmad's *Shit* (1999) managing such a feat. *Interlok* and *Shit* have this in common: those who foam at the mouth expressing their anger are those who have never tasted the goodness of Malay literary works and are only capable of seeing all issues from the viewpoint of narrow partisan politics.

It is a shame that racial relations in Malaysia are not underlined by daily interactions between various communities, but by the relationships between political parties. This means that whenever a certain race-based political party has a problem with another, people jump to the conclusion that the two races are at odds with each other. This cannot be further from the truth.

Personally, I feel that Abdullah Hussein's best novel is *Imam*. It tells of a young Islamic prayer leader, Imam Mihad, who tries to introduce a more moderate and progressive interpretation of Islam to his village. The novel retains its relevance by featuring contemporary discussions of issues. Examples are the comparison between the Roman alphabet and Jawi script, and more prominently, the function of a mosque:

whether it is to be solely a religious space, or a centre for communal activities which does not exclude non-Muslims. The author's views are well elaborated in his persuasive narrative. *Imam* propounds a different political view of a mosque – it is seen as a social institution. The rationale employed is a strong one capable of acceptance by the common man, and that does not resort to a mandatory imposition of its belief. It is a pity that, despite the novel's existence since 1995, the function of the mosque remains an issue controlled by conservative right-wing demagogues in the country.

The aforementioned Shahnnon Ahmad is one of Malaysia's many National Laureates who have shaped my perspective of politics. I recall getting to know Lahuma and Jeha through his novel *Ranjau Sepanjang Jalan* (1966) before I read *Rentong* (1965) and *Seluang Menodak Baung* (1978). Shahnnon was a man highly critical of power and the State. He grew up in the paddy fields of Sik in Kedah, which may be why he used them as the background to his novels. This is different from others, for example A. Samad Said, who prefers the Second World War as his backdrop.

Shahnnon's novels tell of the poverty of farmers and their endless battles with nature – flash floods, droughts, the birds and rats – in order to secure a harvest and a livelihood. The determination of these village farmers is then displayed in stark contrast to corrupt politicians, who often regard the villagers as mere cheerleaders and a means to power. I recall vividly how *Seluang Menodak Baung* – the first ever novel to make me shed tears – tells the story of how a starving family had to consume the ubi gadung, which had to be immersed in

the river overnight so as to get rid of its poison.<sup>9</sup>

I rarely read newspapers. Firstly, because I could not afford them, and secondly, because they were always missing from the school library, most probably taken by a teacher or a school functionary. The papers were not always returned either, and when they were, the condition they were in killed any urge to read them.

Hence, my first knowledge of culture, history, religious polemics and social matters was linked to Malay identity quandaries, while my perspective on politics was shaped by Malay literary works. They were far more humane and harmonious than the conservative mainstream newspapers overloaded with threats and anger – all results of oppressive rule. More importantly, early Malay writings gave me a finer appreciation of cultural and national issues, detached from narrow and nauseous partisan politics.

I have discovered my love for the beauty and caprices of the Malay race, and I am proud of it, without having to demean or even detest the culture of other races. My enjoyment of Malay literature and culture does not borrow support from the belief that the Malay race is superior, or that Malays are the *bumiputera*, the princes of the soil, or that Malay is the national language of this country. On the contrary, it is the aesthetic vision and texture of the Malay literary fabric which continues to draw me closer; no coercion necessary from either school or minister.

<sup>9</sup> Ubi gadung, a highly toxic tapioca and linked to political demonstrations in Baling. A family there mixed the tapioca with their meagre supply of rice, and all members died. The family did not die of hunger, but perished because the ubi was not cleansed in the proper manner.

More and more of my friends are rediscovering their interest in history and culture. This is not because of the syllabus or our history teachers, which to me have failed in their most basic and important function – to inspire. Instead, they are turning to history again after watching Fahmi Reza documentary films, Namewee video clips, or after reading Hishamuddin Rais. History as popular culture holds great attraction for young readers. It also allows them the opportunity to rebel against the official narrative endorsed by the state and preached in classrooms.

During my Sixth Form, a Chinese friend said that, compared to me, he had to work doubly hard to get into a public university, and it was much likelier for him to end up in a more expensive private university. His words both saddened and stung me.

Firstly, his chances of furthering his studies were diminished simply because his ancestors were born in a different place. In other words, he is punished for losing the ethnic lottery. It reminded me of my own experience in primary school, where I suffered discrimination because my father was born in a different place from the other fathers. Secondly, his words stung because it strongly implied that conversely, if not for the colour of my skin, I would not have made it into higher education; it was an insult to the efforts I had put in and to my intelligence.

### University and Stupidity

My freshman year was more shocking in its observations and had a great impact on me. This was when I began to understand the source of the Malay people's fear and their sense of inferiority that affected their readiness to compete with others.

The first varsity society I joined was a secretariat which served as a facilitator for university programmes. Most of its activities consisted of visits to *kampungs*, settlements and members' workshops. Naturally, it received special treatment, especially when it came to funding from the Student Affairs Department, the regulatory body overseeing all university societies and organisations.

To further cement its role in what I called the *Kitaran Pembodohan*<sup>10</sup> (Dumbing Cycle), membership in this secretary was limited to Malay university students only. This provides further credence to the Orientalist view of the natives as lazy, counter-productive, and unable to compete. Such a belief, when held, translates into a deep loss of self-esteem which, in turn, determines their attitude towards non-Malays.

The first item I was forced to digest was the notion that Malays are genetically weak. Without fail, every seminar and programme organised by the secretariat would include the agenda of *derogating the Malay race, proudly committed by the Malays themselves*. For example, they would have the students believe that they made it into the university not because of their capabilities and abilities, but solely because of the government's compassion.

My disappointment with my Form Six Chinese coursemate turned into disillusionment when it became apparent that this Orientalist view was strongly held by Malay students as well. They had been indoctrinated to believe that they were born stupid and would never be able to compete with members of

<sup>10</sup> A term I have used to explain the indoctrination process and depoliticisation amongst university students. See Haris Zuan (2010).

a different race. I knew then that there were two primary sources of reference for this belief: *The Malay Dilemma* (1970) by Dr Mahathir Mohamad, which was banned by former Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Razak and later unbanned when Mahathir became PM himself; and *Revolusi Mental* (1971), edited by Senu Abdul Rahman.

To be sure, the two books sought to be critical of the Malay character and tried to identify the reason for the decline in Malay participation in the development process. However, due to the lack of solid theoretical basis and research methodology – owing perhaps to the fact that the two authors were not academics – the points raised in both books have subconsciously affirmed the Orientalist's view, exhibiting what Syed Hussein Alatas (1972) refers to as the captive mind – uncreative and incapable of raising original problems.

Both books were written in the 1970s, when the nation was starting to think more seriously about economic development and social restructuring. The view that the Malays were too incompetent to stand on their own two feet provided for some moral legitimacy for affirmative action favouring the Malays. This view served as a useful tool in keeping conservative right-leaning political parties in power.

### Diskopi

After some time serving on this secretariat, it grew increasingly clear to me that its members were not prepared to change their attitudes, at least not during my time in campus. Already my first experience at this university had made me aware of this. With that in mind, I began to stay away from these students and tried to find a group that would be more meaningful for



me. Coincidentally, it was during this time that I noticed a poster for a forum organised by the Law Faculty on the Lina Joy<sup>11</sup> issue. I knew this was going to be interesting.

That night, with a borrowed motorcycle and a map showing the location of the Law Faculty, a friend and I found our way to the public forum. I was amazed at how packed the auditorium was. I still remember very clearly that the panel consisted of Azmi Sharom, a lecturer and law activist, Mustaqeem Al Radhi, an author and founder of the Middle Eastern Graduate Centre (MEGC), and constitutional expert Dr Abdul Aziz Bari. I didn't really manage to digest all that the panelists said, but I could strongly feel the tension and disgust among the audience, especially arising from the sections of the crowd who consisted of Islamic activists.

For the first time, I realised that many issues in this country that should be considered citizenship issues tended to be handled as Muslim affairs just because there were Muslims involved. The moment something is considered a Muslim affair, non-Muslims' viewpoints are automatically disregarded. They no longer have a right to ask questions or even show interest in these matters. To make things worse, we've been taught to believe that not even all Muslims have the right to discuss these issues. We were always taught that only the State – the religious

<sup>11</sup> Lina Joy was born Azlina Jailani in 1964. She converted to Christianity at the age of 26, and in 1998 applied to be legally recognised as a Christian. Her change of name was recognised in 1999 and so noted on her identity card, but her change of religion was not. Taking her case to the civil courts got her nowhere, and the publicity generated by her case has forced her to leave the country.

department, Islamic leaders and the Islamic courts – had the right to determine how we should think about these things. Every differing or opposing perspective was labelled with the all-too-familiar and frightening term – *deviant*.

Not long after this, I got to know two law students who were part of the organising committee for that public forum – one was a Punjabi and the other was a Chinese. We would later become very close friends, and eventually housemates. Together with a few other friends, we often got together to discuss all sorts of issues – from food, fashion, movies and music, to politics, economics and religion. From these informal discussions emerged *Diskopi*.

We were unsatisfied with just our small hangout sessions and desired to expand our discussions regarding ethnic relations in Malaysia, especially among young people. *Diskopi* began to make consistent blog postings ([diskopi.wordpress.com](http://diskopi.wordpress.com)) in both the Malay and English languages. The blog very quickly began to receive huge numbers of positive reactions from young people.

Besides that, *Diskopi* also began organising public forums to encourage more public discussions. We even co-organised a forum on Malays, Islam and royalty – a topic that is considered taboo and among the most sensitive to be publicly discussed.

*Diskopi* wanted to introduce a culture of critical discourse among young people which transcended borders of religion, culture and race. We also promoted a culture that accepted (and perhaps even encouraged) diversity of opinions. That was why our blog never exercised censorship and we always welcomed various parties to send in articles to critique our writings. We believed in ideas developed through dialectical processes and



refused to buy into the habit of simply compromising as the only form of resolution (a common rhetoric of our government).

Through these weekly informal discussions, we discovered that the different ethnic groups and individuals had more in common than not, including the fear of each other! The fear was a baseless one, previously built on word of mouth. *This is why most Malaysians construct stereotypes about other races; because we do not really communicate with each other.* Perhaps it is not too far-fetched to state that Malaysians live with the notion of the lazy Malay, the shrewd Chinese, and the Indian drunkard. *Diskopi* championed a diversity of ideas; for it was the lack of knowledge about each other which was the root of many of our country's problems – we came to suffer badly from a fear of differing opinions.

Despite my strong interest in literature and social culture, I took political science as my major in university. To me, political science was a wonderful opportunity and I really felt lucky studying it at university level, notwithstanding some opposition to this personal choice, especially from my school educators. I did not blame them; the common mentality of Malaysian education then was for bright science-stream students to become teachers and lecturers, while art students who did well generally became lawyers.

Political science was extremely useful in providing me with a perspective on the relationship between power (the State) and my beloved literature and social culture. Eventually, everything became clearer to me, notably the link between social culture and the Malay identity together with the ubiquitous fear that clouds any debate on my race. I named this as the *kebudayaan kekuasaan* vs *kekuasaan kebudayaan*.

*Kebudayaan kekuasaan* refers to the hegemony of the State in every and any relation between agencies and the prevailing structure. Malaysia has in place a very strong State – in the form of the federal government – which has considerable control over not only the electoral process, but also any discourse that takes place in the country, and by extension, the way Malaysians think and act. The public sphere where opinions are formed and expressed, from the mass media to social institutions (schools, mosques, and community centres) to public spaces (parks, fields, even Facebook), is all under the watchful eye of the State.

On the other hand, *kekuasaan kebudayaan* is the empowerment of culture by society to provide a credible resistance against culture endorsed and imposed by the State. My views on this drew inspiration mainly from James Scott and his works *Weapons of the Weak* (1985) and *Domination and the Arts of Resistance: Hidden Transcripts* (1990). These showed me the transient nature of state dominance and hegemony, and that an intellectually active society – acting as an agency – would never run out of ways to oppose the State and its machinery. The subtle and smooth methodologies available are limited only by our imagination.

I mention here also two important works of Syed Hussein Alatas, which have left a lasting influence on me: *The Myth of the Lazy Native* (1977a) and *Intellectuals in Developing Societies* (1977b). They provide the best answers for dispelling the 'Lazy Malay' myth, which has been accepted in its entirety as gospel truth. Unfortunately Syed Hussein Alatas' thought is not well-featured in this country, reasons for which I do not know; it could be due to his helping to found a political party

which was initially an opposition multiracial party before it joined the governing Barisan Nasional. His *Myth of the Lazy Native*, a crucial work, was not published locally and its Bahasa Melayu translation was an adaptation of the Bahasa Indonesia translation. The Bahasa Melayu version was only published in Malaysia in 1991, four years after Indonesia! This, perhaps, may be what he was referring to in *Intellectuals in Developing Societies – bebalism*.

At the same time, I began to be interested in the formation and forms of identities. I signed up for an elective class during my second year – Malay Films. It turned out not to be much of a help in my understanding of Malay identities. On the first day of class, I could not restrain myself from asking this question: what really is a Malay film? What differentiates, in this country, Malay among non-Malay films? If a so-called Malay film is defined as one filled predominantly with Malay actors, whose dialogues are primarily in the Malay language, even if the wordings are mixed, with a script and plot not too different from Hollywood and Hong Kong films, what then is to be defined as a Malaysian film?

I began to realise the degree of complexity of the identity question, a question which many consider solved, and hence take for granted. It seemed that the deeper I delved into this issue, more and more questions surfaced.

### Penang: Cosmopolitan Island & Identities

I soon moved to the state of Penang. The island serves as an intriguing subject for any person interested in the research of identities. Upon my arrival, I realised the diversity existing on the island. Here, it is complicated to differentiate between

an Indian Muslim, Penang Mamak, and Penang Malay. An example: an Indian friend there has Indian parents and an Indian elder brother, but also a 'Malay' younger sibling, though they are from the same parents! When I asked the reason why his parents had registered the younger sibling as Malay, my friend's reply was an easy one: 'well it's good for him isn't it, easier later on to get a scholarship.' The answer reminded me of a historical event in East Sumatera during the nineteenth century: the Bataks elected to become Malay by leaving their surnames in response to the reign of Malay rulers, only to return to being Batak when the Malay monarchy was deposed by the people.<sup>12</sup> This case clearly suggests that a racial identity is not necessarily given, but constructed, depending on what the consequent benefits are.

I have been excited about Penang because it is living proof that the Malays are a distinguished people capable of being on equal standing with other races. The island used to be home to Malay intellectual luminaries like Syed Sheikh Al Hadi,<sup>13</sup> Ahmad Rashid Talu,<sup>14</sup> Tun Abdullah Badawi (former

<sup>12</sup> See Ariffin Omar (1993).

<sup>13</sup> Syed Sheikh Al-Hadi was the pioneer of Madrasah Al-Mashoor (1926), which employed modern education and progressive Islamic interpretations as the primary criteria. He went on to publish the *Al-Imam* and *Al-Ikhwān* magazines, and the *Saudara* newspaper. He wrote the biography of Faridah Hanum, which rocked the general way of thinking among the Malay community during the 1920s. All this was done in Penang, whilst his efforts in Singapore, Johor Bahru and Malacca (his home state) did not bear much fruit.

<sup>14</sup> A prominent figure in literature and journalism, who established many printing presses and critical magazines in his time, notably the Jelutong Press.

PM), Anwar Ibrahim (opposition leader), Haji Yusof Rawa (renowned national political figure), Datuk Ahmad Nawab (song composer), Nordin Ahmad (actor in Malay classical films), Dato' Nordin Hassan, Prof. Muhammad Haji Salleh (National Laureate) and, of course, celebrated artist P. Ramlee. These are the figures that helped to give meaning to what it means to be Malay, a topic which, to me, should be revisited and reintroduced into public debate.

Joel S. Kahn, in his book *Other Malays: Nationalism and Cosmopolitanism in the Modern Malay World*, focused greatly on P. Ramlee's films, stirring a wave in the debate on what being Malay means. This book by Kahn, a professor of anthropology, was among the earliest and most comprehensive in linking the Malay characters in those films together with the concept of cosmopolitanism. For example, in *Tiga Abdul*, P. Ramlee managed to persuade his audience to accept his Malay character, clad in full European attire, coat and tie with a Turkish tarboosh, but still Malay to the core. Presumably, such an image of a Malay gentleman was conjured – whether by accident or intent – through P. Ramlee's interaction with Penang society during his childhood on the island.

It was more interesting to note Penang's pioneering roles in several fields: modern religious education, centre for the *islah* (revival) movement started by the Kaum Muda, a publishing centre for leading magazines and newspapers including the *Al-Imam* magazine. All this was accomplished during British times. Penang never had a monarch, and did not have a mufti, which means the state was technically a secular and liberal one. Hence my question is this: Are not the Malays capable of competition in an open marketplace?

My conviction is this: if the matters of nation, race and culture of the Malays are allowed to be discussed and argued freely and rationally, unshackled by cheap political rhetoric, a lot of problems can be solved. Malaysia has its own uniqueness thanks to its diversity, which in truth should be its real power base. Unfortunately, this is viewed adversely by some.

My pride in Malay cultural heritage and persona does not make me a racist; on the contrary, it enhances my respect for others, for I am safe in the knowledge of the richness of Malay traditions. My ambition is thus a modest one: that one day, we will on the one hand fully appreciate the primary strength of the Malays – the ability to absorb and blend in with other cultures; and on the other, advertisements bearing words like 'Room for rent – Chinese only' will be no more.

## Bibliography

- Abdul Rahim Kajai (1985) *Satira Kajai: Cerpen Pilihan Abdul Rahim Kajai (Selenggara oleh Hashim Awang)*, Kuala Lumpur: Fajar Bakti.
- Abdullah Hussain (1971) *Interlok*, Kuala Lumpur: Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka.
- (1995) *Imam*, Kuala Lumpur: Utusan Publication & Distributors Sdn. Bhd.
- (2001) *Perjalanan Mencari Bahasa*, Kuala Lumpur: Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka.
- Alatas, Syed Hussein (1969) 'The Captive Mind in Development Studies', *International Social Sciences Journal*, Vol XXIV, No. 1.
- (1977a) *The Myth of the Lazy Native: A Study of the Image of the Malays, Filipinos and Javanese from the 16<sup>th</sup> to the 20<sup>th</sup> Century and its Function in the Ideology of Colonial Capitalism*, London: Frank Cass.
- (1977b) *Intellectuals in Developing Societies*, London: Frank Cass.
- al-Attas, Syed Muhammad Naquib (1972) *Islam dalam Sejarah dan Kebudayaan Melayu*, 24 January, Koleksi Syarahan Perdana UKM.



- Ariffin Omar (1993) *Bangsa Melayu: Concepts of Democracy and Community, 1945–1950*, Oxford University Press.
- Farish A. Noor (2002) *The Other Malaysia: Writings on Malaysia's Subaltern History*, Kuala Lumpur: Silverfish Books.
- (2008) *Di Balik Malaysia Dari Majapahit Ke Putrajaya*, Kuala Lumpur: ZI Publications.
- (2009) *What Your Teacher Didn't Tell You (The Annexe Lectures, Vol. 1)*, Petaling Jaya: Matahari Books.
- (2010) *From Indrapura to Darul Makmur: A Deconstructive History of Pahang*, Kuala Lumpur: Silverfish Books.
- Haris Zuan (2010) *Malaysia-Lah (Himpunan Analisa Terpilih Kaki Lepak)*, Petaling Jaya: Gerakbudaya Publications.
- Kahn, Joel S. (2006) *Other Malays: Nationalism and Cosmopolitanism in the Modern Malay World*, Singapore University Press.
- Mahathir Mohamad (1970) *The Malay Dilemma*, Singapore: Asia Pacific Press.
- Muhammad Haji Salleh (1989) *Puitika Sastera Melayu: Suatu Pertimbangan*, Bangi: Penerbit UKM.
- (2006) *Menyeberang Sejarah, Kumpulan Esei Pilihan*, Kuala Lumpur: Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka.
- Scott, James (1985) *Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance*, New Haven: Yale University Press.
- (1990) *Domination and the Arts of Resistance: Hidden Transcripts*, New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Senu Abdul Rahman (ed.) (1971) *Revolusi Mental*, Kuala Lumpur: Utusan Publications.
- Shannon Ahmad (1965) *Rentong*, Melaka: Penerbitan Abbas Bandung.
- (1966) *Ranjau Sepanjang Jalan*, Kuala Lumpur: Penerbitan Utusan Melayu.
- (1978) *Seluang Menodak Baung*, Kuala Lumpur: Heinemann Educational Books (Asia) Ltd.
- (1999) *Shit*, Kota Bharu: Pustaka Reka.
- Sutan Takdir Alisjahbana (1966) *Values as Integrating Forces in Personality, Society and Culture*, Kuala Lumpur: University of Malaya Press.

## Confessions of an Ageing, Nerdy Malay Punk Rock Fan

— Wan Hamidi Hamid —

And now for something completely different, and perhaps a bit irrelevant. And let me say that I don't think I qualify to be a young person. Yet I don't think I'm that old. But what matters here is that I want to share the meaning of being young; it simply means doing what you want to do, whether right or wrong, being what you want to be. Most importantly, being young definitely doesn't mean waiting to be old, planning to join the mainstream or succumbing to society's pressure. At the same time, it doesn't mean you have to jump from a tall building, to be a hero everyone else must follow, to be the centre of attention. It is definitely not about being a misery-loves-company person. You can be a nerdy person, a simple person, a complex person. So what? Be what you are. Not what others tell you to be, even if it is the call to be what you are, to be different, to be anything. That's why I like punk rock.

Does this have anything to do with being Malay? Perhaps. But then again, perhaps not, yet it goes beyond that.

## **'I was once a racist'**

Syed Saddiq Syed Abdul Rahman

2 Dec 2015

I was once a racist. I believed that my race was the determinant of my social status. I believed that my colleagues who were not of the same skin colour were by default inferior to me. I believed that it was legitimate to discriminate against those who were not born into the same race as me, speak like me, act like me and preach like me.

I was by definition a racist who stood against the ideals of my beloved nation. A racist who can be epitomised as 'un-Malaysian'.

I am humiliated by my past. Unfortunately, the truth will not set me free nor will it liberate me from my prison of guilt but my future actions will hopefully atone for the injustices which I have committed.

It was hypocritical of me to despise the subpar treatment of the African-Americans in the United States, yet to do the very same at home.

It was hypocritical of me to condemn the KKK for preaching white supremacy, yet I am doing the very same localised version at home.

It was hypocritical of me to condemn the subjugation of Muslims abroad, yet I was fine with the subjugation of my non-Muslim brothers and sisters at home.

In hindsight, I realised that I was an intolerable hypocrite. Thank God I was brought back to the right path. I suffered once, it is therefore my duty to guide those who are struggling to find a way out.

I would like to spend some time explaining the journey out from the prison of racism which I was once locked in.

### **1) Compassion!**

Despite my racist tendencies, my friends never gave up on me. They were there for me when I needed them. They were there for me to pull me back to the right side. Even when I was

unbearably racist, they advised with compassion and affection. Never once did they cast me aside.

This is critical as compassion eventually overpowered the hate which fuelled my racist tendencies. It reminded me that the Chinese aren't there to bring me down but to pull me back up when I am having a bad day. That stereotypes can be broken by the actions of those who defy it.

If I had been ignored, I would have further insulated myself in that self-contained echo chamber of racism and bigotry. Compassion pierced its way through to liberate me. As Mahatma Gandhi once said, "Compassion is a muscle that gets stronger with use". I think is time that we collectively start flexing our muscles of compassion.

## **2) Exposure & interaction**

I had the privilege of getting enrolled into the most diverse boarding school in Malaysia, The Royal Military College. This new environment inculcated diversity through brotherhood. Surviving in this school meant that I had to embrace my brothers who I once saw as 'The Others' or 'the leeches' (yes I was that racist).

The exposure and interactions through class activities and military training slowly lifted the racist veil which once blinded me. It demystified the stereotypes which I once placed on those who are not of the same race. The initial few weeks were difficult, but as time passed by, I grew accustomed to this new environment which built an everlasting bond which until today is preserved in the deepest corner of my heart.

This situation is not unique. In 2014, 73 percent of Americans had an unfavourable attitude toward Muslims, according to the Arab American Institute. Interestingly, in the same study it was shown that most of the polled participants have never had any prolonged interactions with a Muslim. The empathy gap was driven by the vacuum of communication.

Furthermore, being in a racially diverse class also forced me to be more sensitive to the concerns and plights of the others. It is much more difficult to be racist when you have a friend who comes from that very race. It is much more difficult to be racist when you have the person stand right in front of you. This mitigates racism to a large extent.

This is why I am for the expansion of national schools which promote diversity at a very young age. The time when our minds are like sponges. The formative years which often construct our moral systems. I am proud to say that I am a beneficiary of this system.

I can never turn back time, but I can correct the future by learning from the past. I can never adequately atone for the injustices which I have committed, but I can ensure that it will never happen again. I owe a duty to those who I have wronged and that duty is best executed by standing up for their rights when it's being trampled upon.

Compassion brought me to where I am at today. I implore for all peace-loving Malaysians to not give up on those who we despise, those who once hurt us, those who we call as racists. I was one of them, yet I am here today.

The dream for a united Malaysia is still alive. It's hidden in our hearts waiting to be revived by those who call themselves, Malaysians.

Let us help them, help us, help Malaysia.

Retrieved from:

<https://www.malaysiakini.com/columns/321821>

# 多元文化主義在台灣與其困境

張茂桂

## 前言

如果有一是非題：「我們的國家定位是「多元文化」國家嗎？」答案應該選「是」。「多元文化」不但確實寫在「中華民國憲法增修條文」的第十條、第九項與第十項之中<sup>1</sup>，同時，在中央政府、地方政府兩層，有相應的主管部門，如「原住民事務委員會」與「客家事務委員會」；而立法院於二〇〇五年通過「原住民族基本法」，內

<sup>1</sup> 修訂成第十條第九項與第十項，其內容為：

（九）國家肯定多元文化，並積極維護發展原住民族語言及文化。

（十）國家應依民族意願，保障原住民族之地位及政治參與，並對其教育文化、交通水利、衛生醫療、經濟土地及社會福利事業予以保障扶助並促其發展，其辦法另以法律定之。對於金門、馬祖地區人民亦同。

容訂有政府對於原住民族應有之多元責任義務，使之更為完備，<sup>2</sup>而在文化訊息傳播上，「原住民族電視台」與「客家電視台」兩個單位正式於二〇〇七年加入「公廣集團」成為一員。

不過「多元文化」這個名詞，對現在很多人來說有不同的意涵。有些人依賴它來建構台灣主體意識，也就是台灣國的族群關係，也有依賴它來提倡鄉土文化與社區特殊文化意識，朝向「懷舊的本土化」路徑；有人則依賴它討論台灣的國際化以及全球化過程，朝向「世界村」、「國際公民」與世界其他文化連結的願景（莊勝義二〇〇一）。當然，批評的人也不少，如認為「多元文化」是欠缺「階級衝突、族群壓迫的物質基礎分析」，只創造一種膚淺的價值相對的嘉年華會，反而是一種「去政治化」的效果等等。

本文的主要目的，在檢視台灣的「多元文化」的主要問題。我將說明多元文化主義的拉雜起源，和台灣民主運動、獨立建國運動的關係，憲法依據，並審視其在今日所面臨的挑戰與問題，是無法處理真正的「文化多樣性」、「多重認同」與「跨國移動」的新局面。但在開始之前，我們需要為「多元文化」，英文多用「multiculturalism」（直譯為「多元文化主義」），提供一個實用而扼要的概念背景說明。

<sup>2</sup> 此外，行政院院會並於2007年通過新版的「原住民族自治區法」草案。



在一個比較抽象的和「多元文化主義」有關的相關的倫理學、認識論的討論，經常被提起的是屬於「社群主義」Communitarianism的觀點，例如Charles Taylor, Michael Walzer, Will Kymlicka, Alasdair MacIntyre, Michael Sandel等人。一般而言，「社群主義」假定個人的存在與意義世界，有社會或者集體生活的根源，個人之所以為「人」，因為是包裹在其所熟悉的語言、文化、社會關係與傳統遺產之中，雖然個人並非沒有獨立性，但絕非如同原子般的存在，自然不能否定其所屬的社會文化關係，特別是對於「自我認同」的「真實性」(authenticity)。是以，所有有關社會平等、正義的討論，因為涉及到國家和少數民族，多數和邊緣人群（受排斥者）之間，都需要考慮到「群體」的特殊文化權，因為涉及到自我價值、尊嚴與意義，故不能劃約為經濟剝削或者單純的政治排除問題。

對於「社群主義」的批判很多，有從古典自由主義，有從傳統左派到左傾的解構主義，有從女性主義，後現代主義等等角度反對，但這不是本文目前所可處理的範圍。本文關心的是較低層次的現實的政治問題，也就是作為一種政策，多元文化主義又是何種意義？有何問題？

## 一、加、美、澳洲之先例

現在一般人討論「多元文化主義」做為一種國家內不同文化與人口組成的政治指導原則，且大多會提到三個主要發源的國家：加拿大、澳洲與美國。例如，加拿大至今仍以自己是世界第一個能將「多元文化主義」列入其「權利與自由憲章」(一九七二)而感覺自豪的國家。在該憲章中，加拿大明訂聯邦政府對於不同語言文化背景的文化與特殊需求，需要「公平對待」與「平等接納」。

這三個國家，有幾個共同點，(一)相對於歐洲，都是屬於「新世界」的英語國家（或除了加拿大以外），因此都有如何公平對待「原住民族」議題，以及新移民的整合（融入）的問題；(二)在中央與地方關係上，都屬於聯邦制，需要提供「地方」分權與自治可能。(三)在國際關係都自認為是「西方」，在社會階層上則以歐裔白人優勢為傳統優勢。另外很重要的一個特色，就是：有關多元文化的論述以及政策，幾乎都在一九六〇到一九八〇年間陸續固定，而一九七〇年代則是最重要的關鍵。

考慮各國國內內政的特色，則其推動的歷史很不一樣。例如，美國是透過反種族主義，反同化主義，從黑人民權運動與女權運動而擴大，及於其他有色人種與其他特殊團體（如殘障、同性戀）等的人權與權益促進。其狹義的範疇在於學校教育，比如雙

語教育的推動，以及一九七二年推動的Ethnic Heritage Education Act，而廣義的多元文化政策則墊基於更早的「民權法案」（一九六四），特別是詹森總統其中有開肯認行動（Affirmative Action）的宣示，亦即如何用鼓勵以及優惠（保障）的方式，對待在歷史中受歧視，以致於無法公平競爭的少數族群、弱勢社會群體，使其在學習（包括入學）以及就業機會上獲得特殊待遇，矯正歷史不平等待遇。

而加拿大的多元文化主義，最主要問題要處理來自魁北克（法語裔）的政治分離主義，而在相關的爭辯之中，同時考慮了現代經濟的必要，也就是鼓勵新移民移住加拿大後的社會文化與整合問題，以及固有的北美原住民民族的經濟與文化發展需要。

而澳洲政府的多元文化主義，主體是「新移民」，則最主要是需要面對自己在印度洋，和南亞、東南亞的人口與地緣政治經濟的密切關係，如果不從原來的「白澳、親歐政策」轉向為更開放的親亞洲政策，恐將陷入孤立，而背後的另外一個原因則是其對於亞洲新移民的勞動力與資金之迫切需求。自一九七〇年以後，工黨執政發動一連串的移民政策與教育政策的改革，而基本人權、福利權問題等的政策修訂成為主軸。當然，澳洲固有的原住民問題、歧視問題，則構成另外一個重要面向。這樣逐漸建構出一種「多元文化、平等尊重」的移民、原住民族、以及教育文化相關的配套措施。

簡單說，多元文化主義作為一種族群或者特殊群體主義，作為政策指引方針，對立

面在於反種族主義歧視，反單一方向的「同化於優勢」，其積極面則在於鼓勵保障，並整合新移入人口的文化權力與參與議題，並協助歷史中，曾長期受不平等待遇的少數群體，能有實質上的「公平競爭」機會。但在公共政策上，這種以「群體屬性」，而不是個人特質或能力，為政策考量的諸多優惠政策，或者尊重、接納大量新移民的政策，因為違背了自由主義、經濟競爭的「自然」法則，被認為導致資源無效使用，並創造出新的「反轉歧視」（reversed discrimination）現象，在各地都曾經造成重大的政治與社會衝突問題。不但在新大陸的國家，一直都出現大規模的反移民、限制移民、驅除非裔移民、以及要求廢止各種少數民族優惠政策的聲浪，即使在西歐，包括荷蘭、德國、英國、法國，都因此發生過重大的族裔衝突事件，成為國際新聞的頭條，民意可說相當分歧。而這些衝突，在一九〇一年九一一攻擊事件之後，更加深了與伊斯蘭裔的不信賴與敵對感覺，時而波及其他族裔。

## 二、聯合國文化多樣性共同宣言 (Universal Declaration of Cultural Diversity)

二〇〇一年十一月（約在「九一一攻擊」之後的兩個月），「聯合國經科文組織」

(UNESCO)在巴黎，幾乎無異議的通過了歷來的第四項重要的人權宣言，稱為「文化多樣性共同宣言」，在上述以「國境內少數民族、新移民」等為主體的多元文化主義的基礎之上，又再加以形成一種以「跨國」、「全球化」的價值連結。此項共同宣言和既有的「多元文化主義」主張相符，認為「文化」（群體）是人類不可分離的基本尊嚴，是人類價值、人類自由的重要基礎，保障文化差異就是保障人權，特別是針對原住民族以及少數族裔而言（第四條）。但和之前不同，是此項宣言將原來屬於國境內的問題，提升到「人類」、「全球」的生存層面，將世界「文化多樣性」比喻為地球生態圈的「生物多樣性」，並在經濟上則為全球商品化和文化的關係（涉及創新、附加價值）建立永續發展、利益得以分享的一種倫理宣示立場。

這樣一來，一套關於國家境內、以及跨國連結的多元文化倫理觀點，作為一種世界倫理觀，看來正逐漸形成。

### 三、台灣的「多元文化」成形簡述

台灣的「多元文化」形成，直接因素是一九九七年國民代表大會集合在陽明山修憲。當時台灣原住民族運動者抓住機會，將近千人走上陽明山（中時，一九九七年六月十

七日），他們在名為「六一六原住民族上草山大遊行」的示威中，提出修改憲法中有關原住民族的條文，激動地提出「正名為原住民『族』」；保障民族自決權、保障土地權、參政權、發展權；廢除山地原住民與平地原住民區分等重大改革議題（林淑雅 二〇〇〇：六十三）。

此一條文對於日後原住民族政策與相關立法，提供重要的憲政基礎，但坦白說，當時修憲的主要議題並不在此，而是和「廢省」（後來改為「精省」），並朝向「總統制」傾斜的爭議有關。當時的衝突點在於國民黨內的權力鬥爭，並涉及到李登輝對於民進黨（許信良等）的安撫。如果說台灣成為「多元文化」國家是在政治人物大部分都沒注意，甚至「不注意」的情形下發生，並不離譜。

但是如果把所有多元文化體制形成的原因，都歸諸於原住民族抗爭的一時的「修憲成功」，我們似乎沒有看到台灣社會在過去所發生更長遠、累積的轉變。從遠一點來說，可以追到一九七〇年代初期「台灣社會力分析」、一九八〇年代台灣「多元化」論辯；往近程一點發展，可以推到「鄉土教育運動與教育改革」，但這些都不如一九八〇年代晚期的政治族群化過程與政治衝突。後者不但包含在八〇年代的台灣民族論、包含在許世楷、史明（一九九〇）、外獨會（一九九二）、修憲運動（一九九三—九五）以及民進黨族群政策白皮書（一九九三）之內，同時，也被國民黨的本土化（生命共同體、社

區總體營造與「新台灣主義」論述」（一九九四—一九九七），甚至被新黨的族群文化白皮書（一九九五）所同意。<sup>3</sup>

但是正因為促成「多元文化」論述等相關話語形成的政治環境複雜性，以及使用者的「政治目的」衝突對立，「多元文化」時代的來臨，並不代表過去爭議不休的問題的中止，下面我們將進入本文另外一個主題，就是關於當前「多元文化」的困境與挑戰問題。

## 四、難題與挑戰

難題一：無法解決「國家定位」的強衝突問題

「多元文化」要求「尊重與承認異文化、包容與開闊的心胸」，但這如何可能用到國內國家定位的對立情緒問題，或者兩岸關係？特別是晚近大陸移住台灣的人口呢？台灣的情形乍看之下和加拿大很相似，有國境內的獨立運動（分離主義，可透過「多元文化」政策來進行整合；但事實上並非如此。加拿大是幅員遼闊的聯邦國家，「即使」法語區

<sup>3</sup> 新黨的族群政策白皮書主要要處理福佬、客家與原住民的「地方」文化保存問題，並不處理中國人（外省人）的政治議題。

的魁北克可以藉由多元文化主義擴大自治成為政治獨立體，「加拿大聯邦」仍然可以「減去魁北克」的方式繼續存在。但在台灣，台灣獨立的四個重要環節，「制憲、公投、改國號、宣佈獨立」缺一不可的情形下，等於要先否定已經存在的一個國家，替之以另外一個獨立的國家，在這個問題上國家定位是「零和」關係，如放在加拿大的脈絡，可類比為如同「魁北克要改變加拿大的基本國體，且成為目前加拿大聯邦的統治集團」；是以，兩者間並無法類比，且爭議的激烈程度必定更大。只要是任何一方的「促統或反獨」或「反統或促獨」論述，雖然都是一種人民自決的「選擇」，但幾乎必然帶來另外一方的「受害」、「恐懼」、「嫌惡」、「被羞辱」等不一的負面感受，可能是「難以共量」。

過去的「多元文化」絕大多數是在假定所有的族群或文化歧異，原來均處於同一個既存國家的屋頂（制度）下才開始進行討論的，包括歐美的新移民整合問題，包括許世楷、黃昭堂各自的「台灣共和國憲法草案」在內——都是根據「願意在一起形成一個國家」的出發點而撰擬。但是現在大家對既有的「屋頂」價值評價如此大，略一磨擦雙方的強烈的認同價值就可能被召喚出來，<sup>4</sup>這個時候，如果中國大陸不時又施展「文攻武

<sup>4</sup> 強評價（strong evaluation）是Charles Taylor對於不能化約為功利主義、真實的、朝向「善」的自我的看法，參考蕭高彥的著作。

嚇」的威脅，或者用「經濟包圍政治」的策略，具有不同的強烈意見的台灣各「族群」背景人士，又要如何才能進行有意義、「合理性」、不被扭曲的「溝通」呢？是以眼前對於台灣多元文化的最大挑戰，是在國家定位有重大歧見的情形下，又不能免於強鄰與國際地緣政治的衝突情形下，島內不同國家定位政治主張的人群間，如何可能達到相互包容、信賴、尊重差異的問題？

而在此國家定位衝突下一層級涉及的移民問題，則是如何在既有統治統轄範圍之內，處理大陸新移民的問題？這又涉及諸多層面：（一）完整公民權的（以代表國家主權所授與的「身分證」為代表，現在需要八年）取得與限制；（二）平等工作權與社會福利權的取得與限制（以工作許可與健保、勞保為代表）；（三）生存的基本人權尊嚴（不受言語歧視、偏見污名對待、並不被大眾文化與社會所孤立）。這三者間因為環環相扣，彼此相連。以台灣的多元文化主義、價值與主張來說，目前對於此一問題，基本上是「排斥」思考的，也就是不將大陸新移民納入「可包容、尊重的本土文化構成人口之一」來思考。

難題二：既有的「多元文化論」，有足夠的「社會平等正義」的主張意涵嗎？

台灣左派、反國族主義論述，對於「多元文化」一直抱持疑慮與批判。除了它在起源上和台獨論述有較高的親近性，以及很容易轉化為針對「外省人」背景而發之外（見下節），同時也批判其因為「文化相對性」與「尊重差異」政治主張，並無法揭露社會階級、性別、種族等各種形式的「真實」壓迫，其政策反而容易淪為一種「去政治化」的文化表演問題。過去相關的批判論述，經常以台灣原住民民族的受殖民與外來統治者的壓迫的歷史「真實」為之，批判目前以「多元文化」為主體的族群論述「假象」，認為多元文化論述並無法推翻台灣漢民族的種族主義與殖民。

「推翻」當然不是主張多元文化的可能性。但事實上，台灣的原住民運動是台灣「多元文化」的一隻推手（如本文前段），且原住民民族的政治權利的擴張，自治範圍的擴張，社會福利、參與經濟活動的機會擴張，「間接」受惠於建構台灣獨立國所需要的「民族」種族真實性、「台灣民族」非為「中華民族」的「真實性」。目前「原住民基本法」建制完成，和建立「原住民族自治」有關的重建「傳統領域」工程，在一些地方算是確定完成，而原住民族正名、民族教育、經濟事業投資一直有所推進（行政院原住民事務委員會一年的預算達到六十億新台幣），雖然不能說這樣就足以「翻轉台灣原住民受壓迫的歷史處境」，但如果說「既有的多元文化政策因為協助維持了舊體制，進而限制了原住民追求獨立自主的可能」，則可能也不完全符合現實情形。

目前台灣多元文化的「正義不足」問題，除原住民議題外，更重要的恐怕是外籍配偶與大陸籍配偶問題（後者在前段已經有陳述）。例如，根據主計處的統計，目前台



灣約有四十萬名的外籍與大陸配偶，「其中十萬名已領有台灣身分證，加上三十萬待辦理歸化的姊妹」。最近「國籍法施行細則」第七條的修訂，對於申請歸化者要求財力限制，必須能提出約達新台幣四十多萬元的財力證明，不然就要出示每個月雙倍基本工資的扣繳憑單，或者五百萬元以上的不動產證明，增設歸化者的門檻限制，其所流露的階級歧視問題，以及可能增加貧窮者的負擔與就業風險，是對台灣的多元文化理想宣示以及人權立國的宣示，直接的否定。

涉及社會正義、經濟剝削，或者政治差別待遇，並不是單純的族群語言與文化的隔閡衝突。在這個多元論和社會正義的關連性上，女性主義者 Iris Marion Young (Justice and the Politics of Difference) 曾提出「壓迫的五個面向」作為違反正義的社會事實：

- (一) 經濟成果被剝削（如勞工）；
- (二) 社會生活被邊緣化（如貧窮與少數）；
- (三) 個人應享有的權威、地位、尊嚴的被剝奪（威權壓迫與歧視）；
- (四) 被主流「刻板印象化」（如婦女、外籍人士）；
- (五) 受到暴力侵犯威脅等（如侵略與仇恨犯罪）（Young 1990: 311-312）。當然這只是一些供參考的面向，它們之間並不排斥，也沒有輕重。反而最常見的壓迫，是好幾個面向與社會關係的重疊。

難題三：如何面對「轉型正義」中，有關「外省人」問題？（外省族群污名與醜化的問題）

在台灣所謂「轉型正義」的問題，主要是指二〇〇〇年政權轉移之後，如何處理面對「前朝」加害者，不論是個人或者團體，追究真相與追究相關的政治責任與加害責任，這本是重大的社會倫理價值重建工程。從二二八事件到白色恐怖，到文化與校園控制，到被認為「偏袒外省人」的特殊的軍公教福利與退輔制度，加害台灣人、威權受惠者，都被當成是有特殊疑問的「統治幫凶」或者在台獨建國途中，成為最大阻礙，可能「賣台」的「外省人」。是以，在有關「轉型正義」的討論與討伐聲中，「外省族群」成為一個被污名化的優勢、特權集團，而對於整體類別，進醜化，追究，藉以「轉型正義」之名號。

這造成一個特殊的現象，由於大部分外省人菁英都拒絕成為台灣民族組成的一類屬，拒絕變成構成台灣的「少數民族」，是以，除了抗拒「多元文化」在己身的可能使用，並嘲諷多元文化。

台獨論述主導的台灣的轉型正義，常用選擇性的方式進行，將「外省人類屬」當成一種需要被改造或進行政治鬥爭的目標，當作轉型正義的手段，其實是走向一種鼓動「排外（省人）」的路上，也更激化「外省人」的不安全與敵意。

## 五、結語

多元文化主義不只是一種有「社群主義」的哲學，它也是一種公共政策，涉及到社會要如何整合，和正義、平等、尊嚴有關的選擇。它不只是國境內的問題，也涉及到跨國境的問題。但其弔詭處在，所有的政策的正當性都有受惠對象，受保護對象的身分界定問題。是以，不論在政策的形成與維護的過程中，我們都必須強調經驗的特殊性、真實性。是以，有關多元文化的公共政策，常面臨得依賴先確定「特殊國民身分」為前提，採行特殊的「肯認行動」，與制訂特殊的語言（教育）政策。以台灣原住民政策為例，包含眾多已經通過，或正制訂中的法律與行政規定。這些福利制度與特殊身分規定，固然將保障族群文化與各種特殊性，賦予他們在大社會中較平等與有競爭力的位置，但雖然是為了策略性的目的，但因為和福利相互包裹，將導致這些制度不斷強調「特殊身分性」問題，使得社會關係僵固與持續的特殊化，或者將促成社會類別「標籤化」、「本質化」、「對象化」、「自然化」的問題，在社會交往關係上，構成「軟性隔離」，反而更加限制了人們建立有機的社會關係的空間，也不能「發明」新的「交互性」（reciprocity），甚至，如同在北美以及紐澳，因為單純考慮大結構的社會不平等，而沒考慮不平等的情境性與小環境特殊性，都招致reversed discrimination的指

控，引發新的社會衝突。

制度化的類型，建立特殊國民的待遇如社會福利保障，固有其必要，但是其施行必須考慮這些制度，將如何改變下一階段的社會群體之間的互動，是朝向更加冷漠隔離，還是建立「相互性」的認識與連帶關係。

在外省人議題上，多元文化恐怕必須回到文化綜合主義（cultural syncretism），而不是文化本質主義（essentialism）的立場。文化不論多麼特殊，幾乎必定是綜合的、相互涵化的。我們需要把焦點放在所有不同文化「承載者」的「多元」面貌，強調文化的多重來源，文化的柔軟性、多情境與綜合性，以及真正的多元發展上。既有的「多元文化」論不幸地指引人朝向「特殊性」的僵固類別性思考，不論是族群、性別還是宗教，但是「文化綜合主義」，指引我們朝向關係與情境性的思考，避免疆界化的問題。

我們不需否定各族群或社會類屬確實可能有他們特殊的社會形成歷史，但是我們不要將這樣的歷史發展「僵固成為單一不變的特質」，而要把重點放在他們的多重歷史建構進程，呈現其多樣形態，不但包括多樣的來源、過往的社會「涵容」與「綜合」關係，也包括與之對應的社會條件或情境，由此來思考如何處理「正義」的問題。

#### 四、终结或延续「种族政治」的社会制度

(2018 年 8 月 18 日，星期六，2p.m. - 4:30p.m.)

专题讨论会读本

- I. 黄进发 (2015) 公民可以差异而平等吗？—马来西亚的 69 年纠结，香港立场新闻。
- II. Guan, L. H. (2000). Ethnic relations in Peninsular Malaysia: The cultural and economic dimensions. *Social and cultural issues*, 1, 1-39.
- III. 柯嘉逊 (2017) 马来西亚的种族主义和种族歧视，人民之声，页 261-312。(第十章，当前马来西亚的种族主义与种族歧视；结论，“扶弱政策”应以“需要”不以种族为根基；附录，前进的道路)
- IV. \*\* Desmond, M., & Emirbayer, M. (2009). What is racial domination?. *Du Bois Review: Social Science Research on Race*, 6(2), 335-355.

#### 讨论重点

- 什么制度性的种族主义？
- 经济与文化政策对西马族群关系有什么影响？

#### 讨论单

1.	黄进发认为，1946 年问题对我国的族群关系有何影响？
2.	黄进发认为，“马来人支配”是靠什么来维系的？“差异性公民权待遇与慢性同化”如何强化“马来人支配”？
3.	Lee Hock Guan 认为，马来西亚西马半岛的族群关系是被哪些结构性因素 (structural forces) 影响？
4.	黄进发与 Lee Hock Guan 对马来西亚族群关系所做出解释，有何异同？  试想想，如果从“社会契约”的角度来讨论当代族群关系，是否有相同或差异的看法（可以参考第一周 Cheah, B. K. (2002) 的讨论；以及第三周 Mavis C. Puthucheary (2008) 的讨论）？



5.	<p>柯嘉逊如何定义制度性的种族主义？在柯嘉逊的讨论中，制度性的种族主义的受害者是谁？</p> <p>请问柯嘉逊的解释，与黄进发、Lee Hock Guan 对马来西亚族群关系或社会不平等所作出的解释，有何异同？</p>
6.	<p>Desmond 与 Emirbayer 如何定义 racial domination? Desmond 与 Emirbayer 提出的概念 racial domination, 与黄进发或前期讨论会提出的 malay dominance 有何异同？</p>
7.	<p>什么是 Intersectionality? 为何讨论社会不平等与压迫时需要运用 intersectionality 的观点？</p>

# 公民可以差異而平等嗎？ — 馬來西亞的 69 年糾結

2015/8/31 — 17:45

## 1. 1946 年問題：公民可以差異而平等嗎？

西方帝國主義在全球各個角落建立、爭奪殖民地時，一般都促使各國 — 不管能否避免淪為殖民地 — 同時在經濟上現代化和國際化。因為原有社會被殖民地統治者裂解或併合、同時人口大量遷徙，帝國主義和現代化往往使得殖民地形成多元社會（plural society），而這些國家的人民後來大量移居原殖民地宗主國，也讓後者逐漸變成多元社會。這兩者都不符合語言、文化、認同單一的「法國式」民族國家，促使後來應運而生「多元文化主義」。然而，在戰後如火如荼的去殖浪潮中，同質性的民族國家仍然是許多殖民地獨立後的範本，因此，他們所奉行的同化性政策往往讓族裔、宗教、語言成為社會的斷層線，不但危及本來所要追求的社會凝聚，甚至可能引發長期的族群對峙乃至政治暴力。

馬來西亞是英屬東南亞<sup>1</sup>的主要繼承者。英國通過與荷蘭、暹羅締約劃分勢力範圍，截斷了馬來半島與印尼蘇門答臘西岸、廖內群島、泰南北大年之間馬來邦國的政治紐帶，形成了包括新加坡的「英屬馬來亞」。在婆羅洲北岸，英國冒險家布洛克和英屬北婆羅洲公司一南一北，逐漸蠶食了汶萊蘇丹國的廣袤領土，把砂拉越和北婆羅洲（後來的沙巴）建成英國的保護國，與退居一隅的汶萊並列為英屬「北婆羅洲」三個保護國。最後，除了拒絕加盟的汶萊和入盟兩年後被逐出門牆的新加坡，這些前英國殖民地都成了馬來西亞的一部分。

從十九世紀以降，英屬馬來亞和英屬婆羅洲都形成了多元社會，其人民可以分為三類。

第一類是信奉伊斯蘭教和慣常說馬來話的馬來人，這包括了從印尼來的移民和融入馬來社會的阿拉伯裔與印度裔穆斯林。在馬來半島，馬來人與穆斯林認同的合流，其實歸功於英殖民地政府要維持馬來社會現狀的政策，一方面確立馬來君主為各自邦屬的伊斯蘭教首領，另一方面制止基督教傳教士向穆斯林傳教。

第二類是大部分既不信奉伊斯蘭教也不慣常說馬來話的華裔、印度裔移民。他們人數在英國殖民地統治下大增<sup>2</sup>，官方的後殖民論述因而歸咎殖民地統治改變人口結構。然而，在英國派遣參政司（Residents）掌管霹靂、雪蘭莪、森美蘭內政之前，當地的馬來酋長已經輸入華工開礦。後來這些州發生爭奪王位或者礦權的內戰時，交戰方各有馬來酋長與華人幫會。而柔佛州英主蘇丹阿布巴卡，在有生之年成功避免英人介入內政，卻自己招攬華人開墾農地，種植胡椒、甘蜜等作物，把華人墾殖民首領封為「港主」<sup>3</sup>。華印移民的遷入，與其怪罪殖民地政府的政策，毋寧是經濟現代化的產物。

第三類是信奉天主教、新教乃至泛靈信仰的婆羅洲土著。在英人入主之前，汶萊以外的婆羅洲北岸，伊斯蘭化程度不高。天主教會和新教團體積極深入內陸傳教，因而讓基督教成為砂拉越、沙巴土著的主要宗教。

二戰後重返馬來亞和婆羅洲的英國人清楚看到，去殖民地化是大勢所趨，同時美蘇兩大陣營冷戰業已開始，英人要能因應。1946年，英國人同時在南中國海兩岸改組其領地，以精簡政府架構和強化中央管制，為最終去殖做準備。

在婆羅洲，英國原有三個保護國：汶萊，「白人拉惹」（white rajah）布洛克（Brookes）家族統治的砂拉越王國，以及英屬北婆羅洲公司的領地北婆羅洲。英國把後二者改為殖民地，結果在砂拉越面對「反割讓」（anti-secession）運動的阻力。布洛克家族的統治深得民心，建立了砂拉越的國民認同，因而許多砂拉越人反對第三代國主查理斯·韋納·布洛克（Charles Vyner Brooke）割讓砂拉越予英國的決定，希望砂拉越保持自主，由王儲安東尼·布洛克（Anthony Brooke）繼位統治。1949年，英國第二任駐砂總督被馬來年輕老師羅斯利多比（Rosli Dhobi）暗殺，然而「反割讓運動」並無力回天。

在馬來亞，英國的領地分為三類：新加坡、檳城和麻六甲三個海港組成的「海峽殖民地」（Straits Settlements）；霹靂、雪蘭莪、森美蘭和彭亨這四個最早接受英國保護的礦產邦國所組成的「馬來聯邦」（Federated Malay States）；以及最遲成為藩屬、自主性較高、統稱為「馬來屬邦」（Unfederated Malay States）的柔佛和北方四邦。1946年4月1日，英國人宣佈把這些領地整合成兩個殖民地：新加坡以及另外十一州組成的「馬來亞合邦」<sup>4</sup>（Malayan Union）。

「馬來亞合邦」遭到了馬來社會左右上下的強烈反對。這固然是因為九個馬來邦國從「保護國」降級變成「殖民地」，權力中央化並集中在英國總督之手，讓九州的馬來統治者變成連虛君都說不上。更重要的是，它讓非馬來人輕易歸化成為公民，引發馬來人對自己在「本國」失勢的恐慌。殖民地政府為了維持社會穩定，除了栽培馬來權貴子弟成為官僚之外，其政策是讓大部分馬來人繼續留在鄉村務農捕魚，而原來只是引入作為短期客工的華印裔，反而有許多人選擇落地生根，成為城市現代經濟的主幹，讓馬來人起鵲巢鳩佔的不平之心。而二戰時，日本人殘酷對待華人而招攬馬來人為員警和公務員，結果戰後華人為主、馬來亞共產黨（馬共）主導的抗日軍在一些地區清算親日分子的行動，就變成族群衝突，更加劇了馬來人對華人的戒心。即使英國人刻意把華人居多的新加坡排除在「馬來合邦」外，避免非馬來人人數壓倒馬來人，「馬來合邦」依然激起馬來人強烈的存在憂患。

多元族群社會在去殖時面對一個重要問題，我稱之為馬來亞/馬來西亞的「1946年問題」：「公民可否差異而平等？」，意即：政治權利是否可與文化認同脫鉤？從法國大革命以降的民族國家流論述來看，答案為「否」，公民必須同質，才有凝聚力，民族國家才能維持。公民之間如果有明顯的文化差異，把公民隔離成不同的社群，等如國中有國，即使地理上雜居，也將威脅民族國家的長期存在。為了消弭差異，剛性做法是讓多數族群單向同化少數族群，如法國；柔性做法是讓各族群、文化混同，冶為一體，即美式「大熔爐」。心甘情願地求同存異者，如1947年獨立的印度，在當時甚至到今天仍然是異數。從歷史去看，馬來亞的主體族群馬來人就是操馬來語穆斯林的「大熔爐」。就如中國人的「夷入中國則中國之」民族觀，馬來人的期待大概可以視之為「夷入馬來（半島）則馬來之」。華印裔移民因為人數以及文化優越感而拒絕被同化，直至今日仍被許多馬來人視為「心懷舊邦」的表現。

對「1946年問題」而言，「馬來亞合邦」乃「是方」的方案，要建立「馬來亞人的國家」而非「馬來人的國家」。這個答案理所當然地受到馬來人的強烈反對，卻沒有立即受到當時沉溺於中國國共之爭的華人所重視。英國人最終決定撫順前者民意，在1948年1月31日，以「馬來亞聯邦」（Federation of Malaya, 馬來文名稱 Persekutuan Tanah Melayu，意為「馬來國土聯邦」）取而代之，收緊了非馬來人歸化的條件。「否方」的勝利同時確立了反「馬來亞合邦」政治載具——貴族主導的巫統<sup>5</sup>（UMNO）的政治主導權。

## 2. 1957年體制：差異性公民權待遇與慢性同化

1946年6月馬共的反英武裝起義，讓「1946年問題」否方（以巫統為代表的馬來民族主義者）五個月前的勝利迅速失色。如果大部分非馬來人沒有公民權，極可能會傾向華人主導的馬共，加劇馬來亞赤化的風險。如果馬共成功趕走英國人，其「馬來亞人民民主共和國」既不利於馬來貴族也不利於英國人。

英國人說服巫統創辦人翁嘉化走多元族群路線，最後出現兩個歷史性的意外結果：首先，巫統因為是否開放門戶給非馬來人而分裂，而主張開放的翁嘉化本人在1951年退黨另組多元族群的馬來亞獨立黨（Independence of Malaya Party）；然後，為了打敗獨立黨巫統和保守派華人主導的馬華公會兩黨的地方黨部，在1952年的吉隆坡市議會選舉中結盟，並因大勝而催生了「聯盟」（The Alliance）。冷戰堪稱改寫了馬來亞以及日後馬來西亞的政治架構。

聯盟後來還接納了馬來亞印度人國民大會黨（Malayan Indian Congress），形成三大族群政黨結盟壟斷中間路線的格局。巫統放棄了建立「馬來民族國家」的議程，改以代表馬來人掌握國家主權為己任。1955年，馬來亞舉行全國大選，聯盟贏得85%選票和98%議席，以全民代表之姿赴英談判，終於在兩年後領導馬來亞獨立。1957年到1969年種族暴亂前12年的馬來亞，荷蘭政治學者李普哈特視之為不同族群和平分享權力的「協和政治」（consociationalism）的典範之一。

馬來亞1957年的獨立憲法，涵蓋了聯盟主導下馬來人與非馬來人的主要妥協。這個族群間的「獨立妥協」（Merdeka Compromises）在後來的官方論述中被稱為「社會契約」強調當初的遊戲規則不得改變。這協定包含了三個配套。

一、公民權的條件大幅度放寬，讓大部分非馬來人都得以歸化成為公民，並享有經濟自由，滿足了非馬來人的訴求；作為交換條件，馬來人在憲法裡（第153條）獲得「特別地位」，在教育、公職、商業運營權上有其保障性配額<sup>6</sup>；同時不明文地讓鄉下選區享有過度代表權（over-representation），變相擴大當時鄉居為主的馬來人的選票比重保障其支配權。「特別地位」條文在草案中原本有十五年期限，代表著扶弱的考量，然而最終草案沒有期限，其基礎因而純然是土著主義。

二、憲法第3條列伊斯蘭教為聯邦宗教<sup>7</sup>，但同時闡明「其他宗教得以在和平與和諧的情況下奉行」，另外第11條再闡明宗教自由，但是其第4節留了非常重要的但書：各州得立法限制非穆斯林向穆斯林傳教。另外，法律不許跨教婚姻，所有與穆斯林結婚的非穆斯林都必須改信伊斯蘭教。基本設計是保障穆斯林人口只增不減。

三、憲法第 152 條明定馬來文為國文，但同時保障無人被禁止或阻止在非官方用途上使用其他語言，也不妨礙聯邦或州政府保存任何社群語言的使用與學習。然而，在法律層次，1956 年教育部長阿都拉薩發表的「拉薩報告書」，在承認華文、淡米爾文學校為國民教育體系一環的同時，也定下了讓馬來文成為唯一教學媒介語的目標。易言之，政府淘汰少數語言學校的方法不是積極關閉，而是消極忽略。

這三個配套的本質其實就是差異性公民待遇與「溫水煮青蛙式」的慢性同化政策。它一方面以特惠待遇與慢性同化的結構性機制來安撫害怕失勢的馬來人，滿足他們對移民被同化的文化期待；另一方面則以包含經濟自由的公民權、以及宗教自由與語文自由短中期不變的保障來滿足非馬來人的訴求。

用於落實憲法第 153 條下差異性公民權利的需要，憲法需要定義誰為「馬來人」，第 160 條下的定義有四個要點：信奉伊斯蘭教、慣常說馬來語、依循馬來習俗、本身或祖先在獨立日或之前生於馬來亞或新加坡。四者當中沒有一條要求說明馬來人必須有馬來人的祖先。

理論上，除了馬新祖籍不得由人選擇，其他三者完全是價值與行為上的選擇。雖然條文沒有明確說明，這個定義完全可以被視為充分條件。易言之，只要符合這四個條件，完全與馬來人沒有任何淵源的外人也可以在文化上「加入馬來人」（masuk Melayu），符合數百年來的文化規範。換句話說，這是歡迎外人自行跳入的「大熔爐」。

反過來說，不符合上述四種條件，還可以是馬來人嗎？從執行第 153 條特惠待遇的需要去看，這四個條件自然是必要條件。你要享受特惠，你就必須持續滿足那三個價值與行為上的條件，不得改變宗教、語言與習俗。因此，差異性公民待遇與慢性同化政策不止相連，而且前者是後者的工具，以（利益差）異促（文化趨）同。

回到「1946 年問題」，主流馬來人對國族定位的看法，已經從 1946 年的「純馬來人的國家」，退到 1957 年「以馬來人主導的國家」，把馬來族群變成馬來亞國族的核心，由巫統作為代表掌握支配性權力。易言之，維持以族群駕馭國家的形勢，需要馬來人政治勢力的集中。這不但否定了馬來人政治內多黨競爭甚至巫統內部競爭的正當性，而且需要一套機制來克服「集體行動」的難題。


### 3. 「馬來人支配的維繫」作為集體行動

奧爾森（Mancur Olson）指出，公共財因為其不可排除與不可分割的特性而難以供應。由於人人有「搭便車」坐享其成（free-riding）的誘因，因而大家都會期待別人承擔成本，最後可能誰都不願意做傻瓜，對「集體行動」形成了挑戰。他提出反直覺的洞見：群體越大，其成員越無法確定與制約坐享其成者，因而集體行動失敗的可能性越高，有如中國俗語所謂「一個和尚挑水喝，兩個和尚抬水喝，三個和尚沒水喝」。要克服集體行動的挑戰，奧爾森指出，群體需要有機制區分參與者與坐享其成者，提供選擇性誘因，以便正面獎賞或者負面懲罰坐享其成者。

奧爾森的基本理論建立在集體成員都有共同利益的假設上。易言之，不參與者都是坐享其成者，而非異議者，因此在目標的設定上並不存在壓迫，只是在行動上不允許置身事外。然而，這個理論的架構完全可以適用於無共同利益的群體。以要求加薪的罷

工為例子，行動成功則所有人都得利，因此，拒絕罷工者到底是因為想上工繼續賺錢同時坐享罷工成果，還是因為他真誠反對罷工，很難認定。然而，共同利益的假設在其他例子未必如此。在 1970 年代的美國肯德基州路易士維市，白人至上主義者反對族群融合學校，不但讓本身孩子轉校，也以暴力作為「負面選擇性誘因」威脅其他白人家長讓孩子轉校。同是白人，白人至上主義者與相信族群融合的白人家長利益並不一致，維持全白人學校只是前者認定符合所有白人利益的集體行動，然而沒有後者參與，前者就不可能單獨達到目標。這兩群人的利益結構並不符奧爾森的原有模式，因為後者已經不是坐享其成者，而是異議者。然而，選擇性誘因依然完全適用，通過非自願手段改變「異議者」的利益結構和損益計算，集體行動可以反過來創造和維持群體。

馬來亞「1957 年社會契約」所依以為基礎的「馬來人支配」（Malay dominance），其維繫就是這種典型的集體行動邏輯。非馬來人強勢存在與明顯差異所構成的心理威脅，讓被逼接受他們歸化的馬來人最終以巫統所建立的 1957 年體制自保；然而，如果馬來人不集中力量支援巫統，則不利非馬來人的「社會契約」就容易被推翻，那麼巫統黨人就算獨自要維持「社會契約」也不可得。




圖一 馬來亞三層結構的鳥瞰圖

這就形成了馬來亞人（國民）、馬來人（多數族群成員）與巫統黨人（執政黨成員）的三層結構。圖一為其鳥瞰圖，可見三個同心圓。要維持馬來人的支配，馬來人（第二個圓圈）相對於馬來亞人（第三個圓圈）的比例必須只增不減，而巫統黨人與支持者（第一個圓圈）相對於馬來人（第二個圓圈）同樣也必須只增不減。如何擴大馬來

人對巫統的支持取決於政黨領袖、政策、組織等；如何擴大馬來人在馬來亞人的比例，則取決於官方政策。

前述憲法第 160 條以宗教、語言、習俗和出生地/祖籍界定馬來人，而「社會契約」的後二個妥協為宗教與語言畫了紅線：非穆斯林可以改信伊斯蘭，而穆斯林不得改信其他宗教；非馬來人終將都以馬來文受教育，而马来人不应该以其他语言受教育。如果非穆斯林都改信伊斯蘭，非馬來人都能慣常說馬來文，則馬來人身份的四個要素中，兩個條件已經成熟。在後來的實踐中，其實只有宗教變成馬來身份認同的絕對關鍵。出生地/祖籍最無關宏旨 — 婆羅洲與印尼出生的穆斯林都輕易被接受為馬來人，以致多數人都忘記了馬來人定義中的這個因素。許多伊斯蘭基本教義派馬來人在文化上傾向阿拉伯化，並不奉行有印都教殘餘影響的馬來習俗，但從無人因此被否定他們的馬來人身份。許多馬來精英接受英文教育，日常生活以英語交談，少數甚至不能說流利馬來語，同樣沒有人因此失去馬來人身份。這些彈性的做法，有利達到人數只增不減的目的。

然而，一個人如果因為本身「喜歡」而信什麼宗教、說什麼語言、遵奉什麼習俗，這些自願的選擇都是利益；而一個如果因為「必須」而信什麼宗教、說什麼語言、遵奉什麼習俗，這些非自願的限制其實都是成本，難免會受到一些人的抗拒和違背。要確保沒有人脫離群體，甚至吸引外人加入，除了前述的負面限制，群體還必須提供一些正面的選擇性誘因。



圖二 馬來亞三層結構的鳥瞰圖

圖二展示這個架構的橫切面，展示國民、多數社群成員、執政黨人三個階層所享有的正面選擇性誘因。當所有馬來亞國民都享有公民權時，馬來人必須享有憲法賦予、法

律與政策層面上的「特權」，地位比一般國民更高，才能誘使他人同化；而當一般馬來人理論上都享有特權時，巫統黨人就必須另外還享受到政黨恩庇，地位更高，才能誘使馬來人入黨。

從這一點去看，「特權」與「文化同質性」是當代馬來人身份認同的關鍵，共存共榮。沒有了特權，馬來人的文化同質性就必須建立在自願的基礎上，必須面對個人理性與利益考量的檢驗，因而幾乎無可避免會受到衝擊，分裂成不同的文化-政治群體，有如比利時的法荷語系社群兩方各自分為左、中、右三派。反過來說，一旦失去了文化同質性，要保有特權的馬來人人數就不足以捍衛 1957 年體制；因此，要維持「特權」就不得不以強制手段維持馬來人的「文化同質性」，仇視並壓制自由派、包容派馬來人的異議。

#### 4. 1957 年體制的三次挑戰與調整

1957 年體制確立後，面對了三次挑戰與調整。

##### 4.1 1963-1965 年邊界變更

1959 年新加坡自治選舉之後，獨立勢不可擋，然而，當家的人民行動黨與英國政府都擔心左傾的民情最終可能讓島國在獨立後赤化，因而遊說馬來亞開國首相東姑阿都拉曼接受馬新重新合併。其時，馬來亞仍在剿共，如果新加坡赤化，則形同美國後院的古巴。然而，1946 年英國讓馬新分家，本意正是避免非馬來人人數壓倒馬來人，1959 年時這個隱憂仍然存在，對婆羅洲本有染指之意的東姑，因而提出合併的反建議：新加坡以外，英屬婆羅洲也必須同時成為新國家的成員。

除了汶萊最後堅持不參加，馬來亞、新加坡、砂拉越與沙巴在 1963 年攜手成立馬來西亞。然而，馬來亞與新加坡兩地執政黨之間競爭衝突不斷，新加坡人民行動黨在欲取代馬華公會作為巫統的華人夥伴不果之後，嘗試組織包含四邦在野黨的「馬來西亞團結陣線」（*Malaysian Solidarity Convention*），與巫統主導的聯盟逐鹿天下。巫統擴大版圖的目的原非引進競爭對手，最後只好壯士斷腕，把新加坡逐出聯邦，阻止兩線/兩黨政治成形。

在巫統原初的計算中，婆羅洲土著「近似馬來人」（*almost Malay*），應該是馬來人在族群博弈中的天然盟友。1957 年體制只做了輕微調整，把「特別地位」的受惠者從馬來人擴大為「土著」（*Bumiputera*），以建立新的多數族群組合。

然而，砂沙兩州的首任首席部長都是基督徒土著，對馬來人支配充滿戒心，最終都在聯邦干預下丟官，由巫統所信任扶植的穆斯林土著取而代之。聯邦政府為了加強控制砂沙兩州，通過其穆斯林代理人，鼓勵非穆斯林改宗，而穆斯林則以馬來人自居，尤其是在沙巴。「特權」理論上涵蓋所有土著，實際上卻以宗教分嫡庶，基督徒要充分享有特權就必須改宗。

在沙巴，基督徒土著主導的沙巴團結黨在 1984 年奪回政權，並在 1990 年大選期間退出國陣。憤怒的巫統東渡沙巴，並且大舉引進菲印穆斯林，發予公民權，終於在 1994 年重新奪回政權，從此確立在該州的支配地位。原本族群林立、認同多變的沙巴，逐



漸變成穆斯林土著、非穆斯林土著與華人三類，宗教作為斷層線的作用越來越重要，與馬來亞政治逐漸趨同。

## 4.2 1969 年暴亂後的調整

在馬來亞（半島），巫統以馬來人的政治代表自居，然而卻未能滿足馬來人對獨立的期待。經濟上，東姑阿都拉曼首相領導的聯盟政府採行不干預政策，滿足了非馬來人，卻無法有效提升馬來貧民的生活水準。文化上，聯盟政府面對馬來人要求獨尊馬來文、非馬來人要求語言平等的訴求，左右不能討好。1969 年，馬來亞舉行獨立後第三屆大選，聯盟在半島喪失了十個百分點的選票，巫統的主要對手伊斯蘭黨則增加了九個百分點。巫統與伊斯蘭黨在半島的得票比率從 1964 年的 5: 2 驟降至 3: 2，有分庭抗禮之勢。如果馬來政治中兩黨制終於成形，整個 1957 年體制就受到挑戰，因為非馬來人在野黨可以和伊斯蘭黨結盟，一起挑戰巫統所主導的聯盟。

然而，馬來西亞的簡單多數選制卻掩蓋了馬來人分裂的真相，而突出了非馬來人團結挑戰巫統政權的表像。伊斯蘭黨的半島得票率雖然從 15% 暴增至 24%，其國會議席卻只從 9 席微增至 12 席。相反地，非馬來人為主在野黨的半島得票率雖然維持在 26% 左右，幾乎紋風不動；但是，因為這些在野黨達成協議，不再如 1964 年時陷入多角戰，其議席反從原來的 6 席暴增至 22 席。聯盟不但失去以華人居多的檳城州政權，在馬來人與非馬來人人口相當的雪蘭莪州（首都所在）與霹靂州，朝野皆不過半，出現「懸空議會」，最後哪一黨執政成為懸念。非馬來人為主在野黨在首都的選後勝利遊行，引發了馬來人失去政治支配的焦慮，最終在 5 月 13 日發生族群暴亂，史稱「513 暴亂」。

這個暴亂讓巫統得以重寫遊戲規則。被視為對華人過於軟弱的拉曼首相立即失勢，其強悍的副手阿都拉薩在緊急狀態（戒嚴）頒佈後，組織了以馬來人政要、官僚、軍警高官為主的「國家行動理事會」，接管內閣權力，並在一年後「真除」首相。拉薩把暴亂歸咎於族群之間的財富分配不均，明確地讓 1957 年體制向馬來人利益傾斜。他一方面擴大解釋憲法第 153 條下馬來人與婆羅洲土著的「特別地位」，通過以「新經濟政策」（New Economic Policy）為代表的「土著主義」（Bumiputeraism）政策思維，給予馬來人/土著種種優惠，另一方面加強馬來語言、文化的地位，昭示馬來西亞是馬來人主導與定義的國家。

而為了避免非馬來人的挑戰，他三管齊下：一，修訂《煽動法令》，禁止國人包括享有免控特權的國會議員質疑「公民權」、「國語」、「特別地位」、「君主

制」四項憲法內容；二，重劃選區，降低非馬來人選票的分量，不讓代表他們的政黨坐大；三，擴大和改建「聯盟」為「國民陣線」（Barisan Nasional 簡稱「國陣」BN），收編主要在野黨，只有民主行動黨和砂拉越國民黨選擇在野。

拉薩這個大手筆奠定了巫統中興的基礎。擴大「特權」增加了土著與非土著之間的權益區別，讓馬來人/土著支持巫統/國陣變成理性選擇。拉薩把開國初年的「協和民主」實質改成「選舉性一黨制國家」，讓馬來人通過雨後春筍的國營企業參與正規經濟，不再困在小農形態；也讓巫統黨人進駐國營企業，或者夾權力要津之利與非馬來人財團合作，以權謀利。巫統通過政治權力分配經濟蛋糕的結果，是黨內分幫分派，不同山頭的恩庇系統競爭激烈，最終在經濟危機時誘發權力鬥爭，在 1980 年代中期經濟

蕭條與 1990 年代末期東亞金融危機時爆發兩次慘烈的黨爭。兩次的贏家都是在任 23 年的強人首相馬哈迪，而流落在黨外被逼另組政黨、統領在野黨挑戰國陣的東姑拉沙裡與安華都恰好是他不同時期的財政部長。

巫統的分裂有其社會基礎。黨國的恩庇政治加劇了巫統黨人與一般馬來人的利益差異。許多不是巫統黨員的馬來人，包括沒有門路或者押錯注的巫統黨員發現「特權」只是畫餅。朋黨與權貴以馬來人之名獨佔雨露，致令族群內貧富懸殊加劇，讓「新經濟政策」與「土著主義」在馬來人當中的正當性也受到侵蝕。然而，改變 1969 年體制風險太大，在 1990 年與 1999 年大選讓巫統/國陣保住了政權。1990 年時，非馬來人全力支持在野黨，然而前述沙巴團結黨臨陣倒戈投向拉沙裡陣營，卻讓巫統順勢打出拉沙裡出賣馬來人給基督徒的危機牌，讓一部分馬來人改投國陣。1999 年時，馬哈迪以肛交罪名毀掉安華名節的做法讓過半的馬來人背棄巫統，許多非馬來人卻因為顧慮改朝換代會導致 513 暴亂重演，而選擇國陣，讓後者逃過一劫。

### 4.3 2008 年後的變天威脅

2008 年 3 月 8 日的第 12 屆大選，巫統的 1969 年體制在沒有預警下受到反風重創，在野黨不但破天荒贏得 49% 選票和 36% 議席，而且拿下五州政權，普遍被稱之為「308 海嘯」。在 2004 年，接替馬哈迪的阿都拉首相曾以親民的新人之姿取得 65% 選票與 91% 議席，卻缺乏魄力改革前任弊政，反而坐視巫統右派崛起，又受到其前任馬哈迪的攻擊，結果左右受敵，只勉強保住政權。

由於 2008 年國陣慘勝之後並無發生暴亂，而在野黨執政州屬中最富饒的雪蘭莪與檳城兩州都交出可觀政績，安華所領導的在野「人民聯盟」（**Pakatan Rakyat**，簡稱「民聯」）聲勢上揚，終於在 2013 年 5 月 5 日的第 13 屆大選贏得過半選票，以 51% 對 47% 壓倒國陣，然而由於選區劃分不均與劃界不公，民聯只能贏得 40% 議席，而國陣囊括其餘 60% 議席，與政權失之交臂。

現任首相在選後把選績解釋為「華人海嘯」所致，暗示馬來人仍支持巫統/國陣，只是華人背棄國陣。在 2008 年後就先後冒起的馬來人/穆斯林極右派組織如 **Perkasa**（強盛土著）與 **Isma**（穆斯林聯盟）等在 2013 年選後加緊煽動馬來人對民聯上臺後的恐慌。一般視納吉首相與巫統把側翼的族群攻勢外包給這些極右派組織，以便納吉政府仍然大談「中庸」治國，穩住中間選票。極右派與巫統攻擊民聯內的（安華領導的）公正黨與伊斯蘭黨淪為其華人主導的盟友行動黨的傀儡，說他們沒有維護馬來人與穆斯林利益。

在 2008 年後因為趨中而得到許多非穆斯林支援的伊斯蘭黨，正面對著本身的認同危機：到底要繼續走中間路線，尷尬地受非穆斯林歡迎多於穆斯林歡迎？還是回歸保守路線，放棄非穆斯林和開明派穆斯林支持以回歸基本盤，進而斷送民聯執政的希望？伊斯蘭黨保守派堅持在其執政堡壘吉蘭丹州實行伊斯蘭刑事法（**Sharia Criminal Code**），不但讓不滿七歲的「民聯」搖搖欲墜，隨時瓦解；更直接改變憲政體制，引發馬來西亞會不會進一步伊斯蘭化、侵蝕個人、女性、非穆斯林權益的隱憂？

幾乎可以確定的是，在伊斯蘭刑事法的陰影籠罩下，如果此刻大選，民聯幾無勝算，因此，1969 年的體制得以再延續至少一屆國會（任期至多五年）。而 2008 年以來這

七年間，社會上有關宗教的爭議幾乎無月無之。除了伊斯蘭刑事法，其他重大爭議包括：

- Allah（阿拉伯文「神」The God）一詞乃穆斯林專用，非穆斯林不得使用。當高等法庭在 2009 年判內政部的上述禁令無效時，全國發生數宗基督教堂以及其他宗教場所被縱火與破壞事件。

- 非穆斯林婚姻觸礁時，改信伊斯蘭的父親擅自帶走孩子並使之改宗，讓非穆斯林母親失去撫養權，而世俗法庭判孩子歸母親的裁定不受警方執行。

- 伊斯蘭宗教官員突然出現在非穆斯林葬禮上，宣稱死者生前已改信穆斯林，因此奪走屍體以便以伊斯蘭儀式下葬。

- 非穆斯林面對種種阻礙，難以建造或設立宗教場所。

- 個別穆斯林乃至宗教官員詆毀非穆斯林不受制裁，而非穆斯林對伊斯蘭的批評則輕易觸犯法網。

- 宗教官員執行宗教律法時侵犯基本人權、個人隱私。

- 自由派穆斯林被視為宗教之敵、叛教者。

- 穆斯林女權組織被宗教當局列為異端。

- 一位穆斯林為了解除穆斯林對狗兒不潔的恐懼，主辦活動讓穆斯林學習接觸狗兒後如何以宗教儀式淨手，結果活動大受歡迎，卻遭保守派指為羞辱宗教司、意圖使穆斯林脫教。

## 5. 穆斯林極右派興起：神學還是政治？

2014 年 12 月，25 位曾居政府高位、德高望重的馬來人發表致納吉首相的公開信，以中庸自居，公開抨擊極右派、伊斯蘭宗教當局、宗教事務部長的狹隘、保守言行，反對伊斯蘭刑事法，要求首相出手制止這股風潮。這封信激起了千層浪，一時間從名人到普通民眾，許多人都紛紛聲援，支持中庸之聲。這股聲浪基本上把馬來西亞穆斯林極右派的興起，看做神學偏差的問題，要求回歸過去「中庸」的馬來西亞，彷彿這是近年來才走上的岔路，與馬來亞\馬來西亞的立國體制沒有關係。

真相是，所有宗教爭議皆來自兩個基本立場之一。第一，世俗體制是錯誤的，因為伊斯蘭教沒有取得獨尊地位；第二，穆斯林不得脫教或改教。這兩個問題固然有其神學根由，但是，伊斯蘭世界對這兩者並不存在單一意見。最好的例子是阿拉伯之春的起源地突尼斯，2014 年 1 月該國在伊斯蘭黨派執政下通過了新憲法，明定該國為「民權國」（civil state），保障宗教自由。

這兩個立場在馬來西亞之所以成為不得質疑的聖牛，其實源於「1946 年問題」——「公民可以差異而平等嗎？」。從純正的「否方」立場出發，1957 年體制是不得已的妥協，因而否定多元文化主義乃至世俗主義，視之為殖民統治的遺毒，就成為邏輯上

的必然。而穆斯林不得改教，本來就是 1957 年體制的關鍵部分。那麼，為什麼過去馬來西亞不曾蒙受宗教極端主義之害？

第一，直至 1980 年代末，語言仍然是馬來西亞主要的族群標記，多數馬來人重馬來文而輕其他語文，多數非馬來人輕馬來文而重其他語文；然而，在 1990 年冷戰結束後，英文抬頭，其後中國崛起讓中文價值提升，語文失去了定義族群的能力，要維持馬來人的族群邊界，自然就回到宗教——在土著主義政策的誘因下，極少穆斯林會強調自己不是馬來人，因而穆斯林輕易變成馬來人的同義詞。

第二，巫統的存亡危機從來不曾如今日的顯著與確定，而巫統政權的垮臺意味著過去維繫馬來人認同的「文化同質性」與「特權」都可能崩潰，讓馬來人依意識形態和經濟利益分裂成幾個群體。對馬來-穆斯林民族主義者而言，從 1946 年巫統的誕生算起，這是「近 70 年來前所未有之大變局」，其中的恐慌可想而知。巫統的土著主義固然幫了巫統權貴多過一般馬來百姓，然而，沒有了巫統，沒有了土著主義，馬來人在異族環伺下「如何不會變成自己國土上的乞丐」？要克服這種恐懼，馬來人的思想就不能不受到監管，以便他們仍然支援巫統，而監管的最正當基礎當然就是宗教。對需要特權者而言，維持甚至強化「1969 年體制」是他們無法獨立進行的「集體行動」，因此必須對外突出敵我之分，對內消滅差異。威權主義因而是生存之道：沒有黨國，就沒有族群。

不處理宗教爭議背後的利益糾結，不承認族群政治背後的「理性」，不提出比 1969 年體制優越但能夠消除大部分馬來人不安的替代性政策體制，不解除「世俗體制是殖民統治遺毒」和「穆斯林不得改教」這兩個金剛箍，馬來西亞只能在宗教極端思潮高漲中慢慢陸沉。

（本文原刊於台灣聯經出版、第 28 期《思想》）

\* \* \*

<sup>1</sup>英國在今日所謂東南亞的殖民地還有緬甸，然而緬甸直到 1937 年前是英屬印度的一省，與英國在麻六甲、南中國海的其他殖民地、藩屬不相統屬。

<sup>2</sup>在十五世紀的麻六甲時代或更早之前，馬來半島已有來自中國、印度、阿拉伯、波斯各地的商賈僑居，但是人口不多。

<sup>3</sup>「港」在閩潮方言為「河流」之意，「港主」因而有管轄河流流域的權利。

<sup>4</sup>這個重要的政體沒有正確的譯名。有些人譯為「馬來聯邦」，但這就與 **Federated Malay States** 同一譯名。有人譯為「馬來亞聯合邦」，但這與其繼承者「馬來亞聯邦」（**Federation of Malaya**）幾無二致。把 **Union** 譯成「聯盟」則過於寬鬆，完全違背它的「單一國家」（**unitary state**）特性。我譯之為「合邦」，取「合一」、「合眾」之意。

<sup>5</sup>其全名為 **United Malays National Organisation**，因為「馬來」舊譯為「巫來由」，故譯成「巫來由民族統一機構」，簡稱「巫統」。

<sup>6</sup>各州另有馬來保留地，除非獲得州政府核准，只能在馬來人之間買賣，以確保馬來人不會在地價揚升的城市地區沒有立錐之地。

<sup>7</sup>原來各馬來州屬都已列伊斯蘭教為官方宗教。

SOCIAL AND CULTURAL ISSUES NO. 1(2000)

**Ethnic Relations in Peninsular  
Malaysia: The Cultural and  
Economic Dimensions**

Lee Hock Guan

SOCIAL AND CULTURAL ISSUES NO. 1(2000)  
August 2000

# **Ethnic Relations in Peninsular Malaysia: The Cultural and Economic Dimensions**

Lee Hock Guan  
ISEAS Fellow

## **ETHNIC RELATIONS IN PENINSULAR MALAYSIA: THE CULTURAL AND ECONOMIC DIMENSIONS**

### **Abstract**

This paper looks at the changing ethnic relations in Peninsular Malaysia in terms of the interactions between the state's policies to advance Malay cultural dominance and reduce ethnic economic inequality and the aspirations and actions of the Chinese community. The state of ethnic relations partly will depend on whether the majority of the ethnic members, in particular the ethnic elites, are pursuing separatist or amalgamative strategies and goals, and on whether the rival ethnic groups stand in positions of marked inequality or near equality to each other. In this sense, since the 1969 ethnic riots, ethnic relations have eluded out right conflicts in part because the rival ethnic communities have pursued mainly amalgamative strategies and goals, and in part because the economic inequality gap has narrowed between the Malays and non-Malays. However, the expanding place of Islam in the Malay personal, and hence collective, identity and the relative success in making social classes more multiethnic have added additional complexities to the future of ethnic relations.

### **Introduction**

Ethnicity remains the most potent force in Malaysia even if of late its influence has been somewhat adulterated by other social stratification forces, principally class and gender. The potency of ethnicity lies in its ability to combine both affective and instrumental appeals. As members of distinct and self-conscious cultural communities, Malays, Chinese and Indians naturally were inclined to identify with and treasure their respective languages, cultures and religions, and thus actively strived to preserve and propagate them.<sup>1</sup> Since they share a common pool of generalized symbols and values, the ethnic members would primarily socialize and associate with their own. Ethnicity thus continues to constitute an integral constituent of the individual Malaysia psyche and ethnic membership critically demarcates his/her social life and taste. It follows that the effectiveness of affective appeals originates from the evident passionate



attachments to a particular ethnicity that continue to sway individual identification and pattern of social life.

Passionate attachments are readily excited for the purposes of galvanizing ethnic individuals to preserve, protect and promote their culture, language, and religion. Historically, in Malaysia, the affective appeals also became intimately intertwined with the instrumental pursuit of political and economic goals that aimed to manipulate the system and distribution of rewards in preference of the particular ethnic members. Consequently, because ethnicity combines “an interest with an affective tie”, ethnic groups were more effective and successful than social classes in mobilizing their members in pursuit of collective ends in Malaysia.

In post-independent Malaysia, ethnic relations became entangled and influenced by the rival ethnic communities’ struggle over the cultural constituents of national identity, the share of political power, and the distribution of economic wealth. This paper is divided into two parts. The first part examines the development in the cultural relations and the second part on the economic relations.

### **The Cultural Dimension**

In the Western European experience, the process of nation building was preceded by or coincided with the cultural process of collective identity formation that was grounded in ethnicity. If and when ethnicity formed the basis of nationality, the construction of a national culture/identity almost always would be based on the dominant ethnic group’s culture with the concurrent marginalization, and usually annihilation, of the minority ethnic groups’ cultures (Smith 1986). In most of the Western European nations, assimilation of the minority ethnic groups into the dominant ethnic group culture became the normative historical experience. The tacit conflation of nation and ethnicity largely arose from the emergence of European nations with relatively homogeneous national cultures. Indeed, the tacit conflation entrenched and perpetuated the notion of a nationalism that imagines the nation in terms of a people sharing a common history, culture, language and territory.

In the colonial world, the conflated conception of nationalism powerfully captured the imaginations of most of the national liberation movements. Inspired by

the image of a homogenous cultural nation led to efforts by the dominant ethnic groups in the postcolonial world to fashion national cultures out of their own. A result of this was the proliferation of assimilationist policies in many of the postcolonial nation-states. But, given the multiethnic character of nearly all the postcolonial nation-states, the imposition of assimilationist policies regularly resulted in accentuating the relations between the dominant and minority ethnic groups.

Although Malaysia is an exception to the rule in terms of not pursuing an outright assimilationist policy, the Malays, nevertheless, persisted on the construction of a national culture founded on their culture. The unequal relation between the Malay and non-Malay cultures was formally recognized and written into the 1957 Constitution<sup>2</sup>. This was a radical departure from the colonial period where no one ethnic group's culture was given privileged status and there was no conception of a common national culture. The colonial state moreover practiced an essentially non-intervention policy in the cultural development of the colony and each ethnic group had equal access to and could freely practice their culture in the colonial public space. The postcolonial state played, in contrast, an increasingly interventionist role in the cultural development of the society and actively promoted the public presence of Malay culture.

In post-independent Malaysia, the site of cultural contentions was centered over the status and place of the different ethnic groups' cultures in the public space. To construct a national culture founded on Malay culture necessary would mean the construction of a public space where Malay culture is omnipresence with the non-Malay cultures relegated to the periphery. However, to advance the Malay cultural symbols and Islam in the public space, the state would have to roll back the historically expansive presence of non-Malay cultural symbols in the public space in general and in the urban space in particular. Constitutionally, since the assimilationist notion was abandoned in Malaysia, the predicament was how to advance Malay cultural dominance without alienating the non-Malay communities and violating their rights to practice and to propagate their cultures as guaranteed in the constitution. In short, the ambivalence around the inclusion and exclusion of the non-Malays' cultures constitutes the key predicament in the construction of the modern Malaysian nation.

In the 1960s, the cultural terrain was a fiercely contested arena. This was because, during this period, the majority of Malays and non-Malays held diametrically opposing stances on the cultural, religion and language issues. On the one side, the popular Malay opinion strongly backed the dominant and privileged position of Malay culture in the new nation and expected the state to uphold and promote Malay culture and the official status of Malay language. Consequently, the perceived slow progress made by the state in advancing Malay culture and language led to increasing numbers of Malays, especially the Malay cultural nationalists,<sup>3</sup> to become disenchanted with the United Malays National Organization (UMNO) leaders. On the other side, the majority of Chinese vigorously and persistently advocated the equality of status for every culture in the society;<sup>4</sup> Mandarin as one of the official languages, equal treatment of Chinese culture and religion, and equal recognition of and rights to education in their mother tongue. The Chinese demand for complete equality was powerfully captured in the notion of a “Malaysian Malaysia”. The heated cultural contentions considerably envenomed the ethnic relations in the 1960s.

In the immediate aftermath of the 1969 ethnic riots, the Malay-dominated state proceeded, aggressively, to reconstitute the public cultural landscape. The National Culture Policy was implemented in 1971 to amplify the symbolic presence of Malay culture and Islam in the public space. Also in 1971, the National Education Policy was executed to incrementally make Malay language as the medium of instruction at all educational levels. Indeed, after 1969, the preeminence of Malay culture in the society became a non-negotiable proposition, and questioning it could result in prosecution under the Sedition Act. Conversely, the pro-Malay cultural policies put the non-Malay communities on the defensive and prodded them to safeguard their cultural presence in and access to the public space. In particular, when the state imposed increasing regulations and restrictions on their rights to stage public cultural performances or to acquire land to build Chinese schools and places of worship and burial, it induced the Chinese to mobilize to defend and struggle for their cultural space and rights.

The impact of the state cultural policies on the ethnic relations over the years depends on several factors. One factor is connected to what was the prevailing conception of Malay culture and the elements of the non-Malay ethnic cultures that

could go into the national culture. Another factor has to do with the specific cultural policies formulated and the manner the Malay-dominated state had pursued them. The varying responses of the Malay and Chinese groupings to the state cultural policies constitute another important factor. In the 1970s, pressures from the Malay cultural nationalists pushed the state to strive aggressively to enlarge the presence and function of Malay cultural symbols in the official and public spaces. Since the 1980s, however, pressures from the resurgence of Islam among the Malays led the state to introduce more measures to enhance the “Islamicization” of the society. Simply put, the state allocated funds and established institutions to research on and propagate Malay arts and cultures, “altering them where necessary to fit current ideological and religious sensibilities” (Carstens 1998, p 20). From the Chinese community’s perceptive, the cultural policies pursued in Malaysia have oscillated from almost intolerantly “assimilationist” to reasonably accommodating.

Broadly speaking, the impact of the state’s cultural policies and regulations on the relations between the Malay and Chinese communities could be divided into two periods. Between 1971-1990, the cultural relations between the state, thus Malays, and the Chinese were fraught with tensions. Since 1990, however, the cultural relations between the rival communities have turned markedly calm. The changing ethnic cultural relations is poignantly captured by the changing conflicts over Chinese education and by selected aspects of Chinese cultural symbols and practices.

Historically, the Chinese schools had been established, financed and managed by the Chinese themselves and the colonial state had, more or less, left the Chinese education system alone (Tan 1997). For various reasons, the Chinese in Malaysia developed and maintained a very passionate attachment to Chinese education.<sup>5</sup> The Malays in general viewed, in contrast, Chinese education as detrimental to the development of a national culture and to fostering national unity. In the 1961 Education Act, partly due to the pragmatics of consociation politics, the ruling elites agreed upon a compromise solution; the state will recognize vernacular primary schools but not the Chinese-medium secondary schools. This solution was, however, rejected by a large number of Malay cultural nationalists and Chinese-educated Chinese, but for entirely opposing reasons. The Malay cultural nationalists objected

because they felt strongly that Malay should be the only medium of instruction and that a Chinese education would not help to promote national unity. Conversely, the Chinese-educated Chinese objected because, they argued, they have the rights, as guaranteed in the Constitution, to be educated in their mother tongue.

Chinese secondary schools thus were faced with the options of either giving up Chinese as the medium of instruction in order to be accepted into the national system or to continue to teach in Chinese and remained outside the national system. Faced with the prospects of losing state funding, among other things, 54 out of 71 schools, by the end of 1961 decided to accept the government's terms. The Chinese secondary schools that opted to remain community supported formed the independent Chinese secondary schools system. At the primary school level, the Chinese schools were preserved and converted into National-Type Primary Schools which are permitted to use Chinese as the medium of instruction. Significantly, however, the 1961 Education Act conferred upon the Minister of Education with the arbitrary power to convert the primary Chinese schools into national primary schools (1961 National Education Act, Section 21(2)).

Beginning in 1971, when the state started its gradual conversion of English schools into Malay schools, the demand for Chinese primary education among the Chinese started to gain momentum.<sup>6</sup> For example, in 1971, 78% (or 413,270) of the total number of students receiving primary school education enrolled in the Chinese primary schools and that figure increase to 87.8% by 1978 (or 498,311) (see Table 1). In 1985, the number was close to 600,000 far exceeding the number of Chinese students enrolled in the national primary schools. The increasing preference for Chinese education is clearly illustrated by the falling enrollment in the "English" primary schools since the implementation of the New Economic Policy (NEP). Indeed, by the 1980s the demand for primary Chinese school education by Chinese of all social classes had broken down the traditional divisions between more urban, middle-class, English-educated Chinese and the Chinese-educated, who included both middle level Chinese businessmen and more rural and working class Chinese (Loh 1984).

At the secondary level, the same trend could be observed; the number of students enrolled in the independent Chinese secondary schools increased from 15,890

in 1970 to 25,047 in 1975, 44,600 in 1982 and 54,690 in 1990. However, even though the enrollment in the independent Chinese schools has increased, the majority of Chinese students continued to enroll in the national secondary schools where the medium of instruction is Malay. Thus, the pattern seems to indicate that the majority of Chinese would enroll their children in the Chinese primary schools and then in the national secondary school; only a minority opted to enroll their children in the independent Chinese secondary schools.

Table 1  
Enrolments in Government-assisted primary schools, Peninsular Malaysia

Year	English-medium	Chinese-medium
1965	248408	340724
1970	338799	394166
1975	313060	480984
1978	300753	498311

Source: Ministry of Education

In the 1970s and 80s, the Chinese primary and independent Chinese secondary schools were regularly besieged by political and financial challenges. Politically, there were constant fears that the state would invoke the 1961 Education Act and convert the Chinese primary schools into Malay medium schools. This in effect would mean the death knell for Chinese-medium education as a whole. Also, during this period, the acceptance of Chinese education among the Malay community remained manifestly tenuous and there were determined pressures from the Malay cultural nationalists to abolish the Chinese primary schools. It did not help that the Chinese education issue was periodically exploited by both Malay and Chinese politicians within the ruling coalition and outside to garner political mileage. Financially, the Chinese primary schools, between 1971-78, received only about 7% (or 18 million ringgit) of the total public allocation for education even though they enrolled more than 25% of the total primary school students. The state, in addition, did not build nor allow the Chinese community to build new Chinese primary schools. This led to overcrowded schools in areas that have large concentration of Chinese. By the 1980s, the average number of students per classroom in Chinese schools far exceeded that for the national schools;

50 to 30. In terms of teachers, the schools faced perpetual shortage of qualified teachers and had to continue to depend on hiring temporary teachers. The predicament persisted and worsened as the state had no long-term plan to expand or deal with the issue of training teachers for the Chinese primary schools.

For the independent Chinese secondary schools, the outlook was even more dismal. Not only the government did not provide them with any funding, but instead imposed various restrictions; “refused to approve the establishment of new schools or branches for existing independent schools, replaced permanent permits with temporary permits that require yearly renewal, delayed and obstructed the approval of teaching permits.” (cited in Kua 1990, p.214) Indeed, throughout the 1970s and 1980s, the independent Chinese schools were financially in dire straits. Why underpaid and overworked teachers in the independent Chinese secondary schools persevere can mainly be attributed to their commitment to preserve Chinese education in the society. At the tertiary level, with the introduction of the quota system in 1971, the already limited opportunity of Chinese students to receive a tertiary education further shrank considerably (see Table 2). The fact that the state stopped recognizing the diplomas from independent Chinese secondary schools also meant that graduates from those schools could not enter the public local colleges and universities, unless the students sat for the national examinations.<sup>7</sup>

Table 2  
Enrolments in public tertiary education by ethnic groups, Malaysia

Year	Malay Number (%)	Chinese Number (%)	Indian Number (%)
1970	6622 (49.7)	5687 (42.7)	678 (5.1)
1975	20547 (65.1)	9778 (31.1)	1038 (3.3)
1980	29094 (60.4)	15756 (32.7)	2926 (6.1)

Source: Ministry of Education

The rising concern over the future of Chinese education in general, and shrinking opportunities for Chinese students to gain admission into the local tertiary institutions in particular, led to the reactivation of the Chinese Education Movement (*Dongjiaozong*) from 1973-87 (Tan 1992). In the late 1970s, the *Dongjiaozong* led the campaign to establish the privately funded Merdeka University. The campaign gained very strong support from a wide spectrum of the Chinese community.<sup>8</sup> Nevertheless, even though the *Dongjiaozong* efforts to establish the Merdeka University generated an overwhelming support from the Chinese community, the Malay-dominated state refused to the request on the grounds that it would impede national integration and unity. Subsequently, the Merdeka University Berhad, a company formed to manage the Merdeka University affair, filed a suit against the Government in September 1981. The suit was in the end rejected by the courts. The Chinese frustrations over this rejection were obviously not helped by the state approving the establishment of the English-medium International Islamic University in the early 1980s.

Chinese education became a major source of conflict in the ethnic relations precisely because the Malay-dominated state's attempts to regulate, control and marginalize Chinese education was resisted resolutely by the Chinese community in general and by the *Dongjiaozong* in particular. The conflicts were particularly acute between 1973-1990, and reached a climax in 1987. In September 1987, Anwar Ibrahim, the then Minister of Education, announced the posting of non-Mandarin educated headmasters and teachers to National-Type Chinese primary schools. The Chinese reacted passionately to this policy; they organized school boycotts and rallies, and a large protest meeting attended by Chinese political leaders from all the three major Chinese parties (Carstens 1998, p. 27). On the other side, Anwar's decision was praised and supported by various Malay intellectuals and groups. The UMNO Youth organized a large racially provocative rally held at the national stadium to support the Government's move, while threatening the Chinese with violence. This particular conflict occurred in the context of a growing disunity, and anxieties, within the Malay community arising from a split in UMNO. Claiming that the ethnic tensions were reaching a potentially dangerous level, the state launched Operation Lallang on



October 27 1987. Operation Lallang selectively arrested and detained nearly a hundred and fifty assortments of individuals, including a number of Chinese educationists. Two senior UMNO officials, Najib Razak, the then UMNO Youth leader, who led the provocative rally, and Muhammad Taib, the then Menteri Besar of Selangor, who made menacing remarks on a number of occasions, were not arrested for making racially incendiary statements.

Pressured by the cultural nationalists in the 1970s and then by the Islamic resurgence in the 1980s, the state implemented various policies and projects to advance the presence of Malay cultural and Islamic symbols in the public space. In order to expand the public presence of Malay cultural and Islamic symbols and practices, the state inadvertently encroached into spaces originally occupied by the Chinese cultural and religious symbols and practices. The public standing of Chinese culture became subjected to varying government regulations and control. Thus, the public display of a number of Chinese cultural and religious symbols was strongly discouraged, and gradually marginalized, by the state. In short, with the advent of the 1971 National Cultural Policy, Chinese culture lost much of its historical relative autonomy. This generated much anxieties among the Chinese about the future of their culture in the country. The cultural conflicts were especially heated in areas where there were large concentrations of Chinese, especially in the urban areas. In fact, in the urban areas, the increasing Malay migration from the rural areas further heightened the Malay demands to “Malayize” the urban environment.

Beginning in the 1970s, a resurgence of interests in their traditional performing arts emerged among the Chinese. However, under the new state cultural policies and regulations, in order to stage any public performance a permit had to be obtained from the police. The conflict over the Chinese Lion Dance from the late 1970s to the middle of 1980s best illustrate the differences of conviction between the Chinese community and the Malay-dominated state over the concept of national culture and the place of Chinese culture in the national culture.<sup>9</sup> Symbolically, the lion dance appealed to the Chinese community on several levels, and it was widely performed during the Chinese New Year. The growing popularity of the lion dance among the Chinese led to the formation of lion dance teams all over the country. In 1974, when the Malaysian

Prime Minister arrived home from his historical visit to China, a lion dance performance was staged to welcome him back. Subsequently, considerable attempts were made by the Chinese to the Government to include the lion dance as a component of the national culture. However, vigorous objections of various Malay groups led the state to reject the Chinese attempts. In 1979, Ghazali Shafie, the then Home Affairs Minister, reiterated that the lion dance was foreign and could never be accepted as part of the national culture. Instead, he suggested changing the Lion Dance to a Tiger Dance accompanied by Malay music. Nevertheless, in spite of the official rejection, the lion dance continued to gain more and more support among the Chinese community and be performed regularly and widely.

While in the 1970s the state cultural policies were most influenced by the Malay cultural nationalists, in the 1980s the state became more pressured by the “Malay Islamic nationalists”. The pressure on the state to be more Islamic was largely due to the opposition Malay party, Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party (PAS), turning to using Islam as its main means to critique the state and to win the Malay votes. Partly to contain and counter the increasing influence of Islam among the Malays, the state expanded its Islamicization policy. The co-option of Anwar Ibrahim in 1981, then the leading Islamic youth leader, into the UMNO and Government was part of the state’s strategy to win over the more Islamic segment of the Malay community. The impact of the state Islamicization policy generated unease and anxieties among the non-Muslim population in general and the Chinese in particular. This was because as part of the expanded Islamicization, certain Chinese practices and symbols deemed offensive to the Muslims were either eliminated from or confined to the periphery of the public space. For example, in certain wet markets, the selling of pork was either banned outright or, if allowed to be sold, they were confined to spaces hidden from the public; frequently a little hidden corner in the car park level. Indeed, there was a generalized attempt by the state to erase the “pig” symbol from the public space, including text books, television, and government cafeterias.

It was the conflict over the places of worship that best illustrate the particular conflict between the Malay-dominated state and the non-Malay community arising from the state attempts to Islamicize the public environment. As part of its

Islamicization policy, the state allocation for building mosques throughout the peninsular increased significantly in the 1980s; as at December 1999 there are 4735 mosques in the peninsular. In contrast, not only non-Muslims efforts to build churches and temples usually did not receive funding from state, but, instead, local councils almost always refused to give permit to the non-Muslims to purchase lands to build new places of worship (Tan 1985). This experience especially affected the Christian community precisely because although their numbers increased significantly in the 1970s and 1980s, they had difficulties getting permits from local governments to buy the land to build their churches. It was because they could not get the land to build churches that resulted in the Christians buying or renting shop lots and converting them into “churches”. The “shop lot churches” phenomenon is most widespread in the Kuala Lumpur-Petaling Jaya areas. More surprisingly, when the Kuala Lumpur Masterplan blueprint was first unveiled, it did not allocate any spaces for the construction of new non-Muslim places of worship and burial. This was especially astonishing given that the majority of Kuala Lumpur residents are non-Muslims.<sup>10</sup>

Between 1971-1990 then, the enforcement of the 1971 National Cultural and Educational Policies generated much tensions in the relations between the Malay-dominated state and the Chinese community. On the one hand, the Malay-dominated state took aggressive efforts and steps to raise the presence of Malay culture, religion and language in the public space. The Malay language was gradually made the medium of instruction at all educational levels, and Malay cultural institutions and symbols received generous state support and funding from the public coffers. On the other hand, the state’s perceived prejudiced policies toward Chinese education and culture generated much resentments among the Chinese community. Ethnic anxieties were further worsened in the 1980s as a result of the state expansion of its Islamicization policy as a means to retain the support of the Malay community. A direct consequent of the expanded Islamicization policy was more restrictions imposed on the Chinese cultural practices and symbols in the public space.

Fortunately, in the 1990s, the cultural contentions between the Malays and non-Malays have turned remarkably calm, even cordial. Several factors have contributed to the relative tranquility in the cultural dimension.

An obvious contributing factor is because the state, in the 1990s, is no longer aggressively advancing Malay cultural and Islamic symbols and practices. The state has generally scaled down its promotion and propagation of Malay cultural symbols and language since the pre-eminent status of the Malay language and culture is publicly omnipotent and entrenched. While the Malays generally feel secure about the dominance of their language and culture in the society, the non-Malays have come around to accepting their languages and cultures subordinate position. Thus, despite the periodic objections from certain extreme elements of the Malay cultural nationalists, the state has largely refrained from threatening to deny the Chinese their existing cultural space.

In fact, for pragmatic reasons, there is a growing recognition among the Malay elites to regard the multiethnic character of the Malaysian society as an attractive advantage and asset in an increasingly globalized world in general and the increasing importance of China as a growing economic power in particular. This change in perception has directly benefited Chinese culture and education in the country.

For instance, the state has, more or less, permitted the non-Malay symbols and language to have reasonable access, and even presence, in the public space. In fact, as the state relaxed its intervention in the cultural arena, the Chinese community has taken the opportunity to reclaim more spaces for their cultural symbols and practices. The Chinese cultural revival was clearly enhanced by the globalization process which has enabled them to have access to and to communicate with their cultural counterparts in the world at large. In particular, the opening up of and expanding relations with China have amplified the cultural interactions between Malaysian Chinese and China. The gradual liberalization of Malaysia-China relations have offered the Chinese community more access to their cultural origins and traditions in China such as the regular visits by Chinese cultural troupes and art exhibitions. In addition, privatization of the telecommunications industry and the progress and spread of multimedia technologies have also opened up for the Chinese more avenues for and access to their culture.

In education, various changes in the Malay-dominated state policies and attitudes too have led to the waning anxieties among the Chinese about the future of Chinese education, especially at the primary level. In fact, for now, indications are that

the state generally recognized the value of preserving Chinese education in the country, at least up to the primary level. Indeed, there also seems to be a growing acceptance of Chinese primary schools in the Malay community as exemplified by the enrolment of 35,000 Malay students in such schools in 1999. An important factor is perhaps because the pragmatic Malaysian government recognizes that since China would be a major economic force in the next century, the Chinese-educated Malaysian Chinese, and Malaysians in general, would be a valuable human resource in developing and strengthening the commercial links between the two countries. Nevertheless, while the Chinese today feel secure about the future of Chinese education in the country, it remains difficult for the community to get permits to build new schools and the Chinese primary schools continue to receive disproportionately less public funding.

At the tertiary level, while it remains difficult for Chinese students to get admitted into the public colleges and universities because of the quota system, there are now more opportunities for them in the private education sector. By the latter half of the 1990s, there are nearly 600 private institutions in the country. The private institutions vary from private universities offering degree level courses to small shop lot colleges offering certificate and diploma programs. For degree level courses, there is also a wide variety of twinning programs that students could enroll and receive foreign degrees at a fraction of the actual costs. Moreover, the private colleges and universities are free to choose their own medium of instruction, usually English. Consequently, today, given the opportunities available, any qualified student can obtain a tertiary education — provided one can afford to pay.

Finally, although the state has significantly moderated down its Islamicization policies, the question of the place of Islam in the society poses the most complicated predicament. One factor is because UMNO's arch rival PAS continues to use a rather conservative version of Islam as its primary means to win support from the Malay community. A second factor is because, since the late 1970s, Islam has gradually become the defining source of the Malay personal and, thus, collective identity. The Malay-dominated state hence is pressured to act, or at least portray itself as, Islamic in its competition with PAS for the Malay community support. Thus, both UMNO and PAS have resorted to enforcing more Islamic practices upon directly the Muslims and

indirectly the non-Muslims. As such, further expansion of the Islamicization policies would only generate more anxieties among and alienate the non-Muslims, and probably the moderate Malay Muslims as well.

In the end, the cultural negotiations between the rival ethnic communities remain an on-going process. The two most important factors that would affect the cultural negotiations in the future are the fluidity of Malay identities and its impact on the non-Malays' cultures and the globalization of Malaysian society. In terms of the former, the question is how the changing identification with Islam among the Malays will influence the cultural negotiations in the future. In terms of the latter, the question is how the Malaysian society, the Malay community in particular, will respond to the cultural challenges posed by the globalization process.

### **The Economic Dimension**

More often than not, an individual feels a sense of personal deprivation when one feels that one is receiving less than what one desires and deserves.<sup>11</sup> In Malaysia, the economic inequality between the ethnic groups and the prevalence of ethnic stratification and mobilization transformed the personal sense of deprivation into an ethnic collective sense of relative deprivation. This ethnic collective sense of relative economic deprivation was moreover circumscribed by the prevailing discourse that perceived and constructed inequality in the society in predominantly ethnic terms.<sup>12</sup> Malays, hence, routinely compare what they have, what they think they deserve or are entitled to with the other ethnic groups, particularly the Chinese. Accordingly, the Malay-dominated state classified and presented the official data on income and employment pattern in the society in primarily ethnic categories.

The Malays' sense of relative deprivation furthermore became inextricably intertwined with the *bumiputrais*m doctrine and the desire to enhance their group worth. The *bumiputrais*m doctrine sanctioned the view that Malays have special privileged access to a determinate share of the economy because Malaysia is their homeland and thus they are its rightful owner.<sup>13</sup> The notion of group worth is a psychological construct rooted in the human requirement that feeling worthy is a fundamental human need (Honneth 1992). Since one's sense of self-esteem is

intimately linked to the social recognition of one's social group, then the systematic denigrative evaluation of one's group would raise doubts in oneself as a being whose characteristic traits and abilities are worthy of esteem. In Malaysia, Malays' experience of personal and collective disrespect because they belong to a "backward" group raised the normative goal of securing group recognition into a powerful driving moral force.<sup>14</sup> Thus, for Malays, their striving for economic parity with the Chinese embodied both material and affective elements.

After independence, due to their historical exclusion from full participation in the economic development of the country, a shared sense of relative deprivation rapidly emerged among the Malays.<sup>15</sup> By the mid-1960s, Malay feelings of being economically deprived had intensified noticeably, especially among the upwardly ambitious Malay civil servants and petty businessmen. The emerging Malay sentiment felt that circumstances were not providing the opportunities and benefits to which Malays were justly entitled as *bumiputras*. Increasing numbers of Malays gradually became disenchanted with and blamed the Alliance Government for not providing adequate assistance and opportunities to improve their life chances. By the late 1960s, the perception that the Government was being manipulated, if not controlled, by the Chinese gained considerable currency among the Malay population. Conversely, increasing number of Chinese also became disillusioned with the Government during this period as well, though for mainly cultural and political reasons.

After an exceptionally racially charged general election campaign, the worsening ethnic relations deteriorated into the ethnic riots on May 13 1969. While the ethnic riots could be attributed to a number causes, and missteps taken by the authorities, it was the shared sense of economic deprivation that evidently influenced the Malay political elites and intelligentsia to single out the ethnic inequality factor (National Operations Council 1969; Mahathir 1970).<sup>16</sup> Indeed, since then, Malay economic backwardness was regularly used to buttress the argument that for Malaysia to enjoy stability and progress in ethnic relations in the future would require narrowing and rectifying the economic imbalances between the ethnic groups.

Economic restructuring along ethnic lines was thus included as one of the two objectives of the New Economic Policy (NEP) which was implemented from 1971-90

(Second Malaysian Plan 1971-75; Mid-Term Review of the Second Malaysian Plan 1971-75). The elimination of ethnicity with economic functions was to be accomplished through the implementation of preferential policies that benefit Malays disproportionately. In social stratification terms, the ethnic restructuring aim to make social classes more multiethnic (Abdul Rahman 1996). Two realities, one economic and the other political, shaped the strategy eventually adopted to redress the ethnic inequality. Economically, the political leaders were cognizant of the distributive limits of the then predominantly agricultural-based economy. Politically, the prevailing consociational politics would eschew any uncompromising means to narrowing the inequality gap. Awareness of the limited economic pie and impelled by the consociational politics led the political leaders to adopt a gradualist strategy to increase Malay economic participation. The gradualist strategy would incrementally uplift the Malay wellbeing such that it would not unduly overburden the non-Malays nor discourage the investments, especially foreign, needed to spur economic growth. In numerical terms, the NEP aimed to increase Malay economic participation to an arbitrary figure of 30% by 1990.<sup>17</sup>

The NEP's second objective aimed to eliminate poverty in the society, regardless of ethnicity. In practice, however, the poverty eradication policy deviated from its purported ethnic-blind objective. Given that rural poverty constituted the overwhelming majority of the poor, it was natural that most poverty eradication programs targeted the rural poor. But because inequality was predominantly constructed in ethnic terms, poverty became identified primarily with rural Malay poverty. This led to the formulation and implementation of poverty eradication programs that largely only benefited the rural Malay poor.<sup>18</sup> The non-Malay poor hence were largely neglected in the government poverty eradication policies and were left to fend by themselves. For example, Indian estate workers and Chinese New Villagers in the rural areas have received barely any direct assistance from the government over the years.<sup>19</sup> More importantly, the Orang Asli groups were neglected even though they are *bumiputras* and theoretically should have benefited disproportionately from the NEP (Dentan et al 1997).

Needless to say, the majority of Malays and Chinese had diametrically opposing



feelings about the NEP. While Malays across all classes generally supported the NEP and welcomed the preferential steps taken to increase their community's share of the wealth and economic participation, the Chinese, in contrast, strongly felt that the NEP discriminated against them. But, although the Chinese objected to the NEP, they put up with it because the NEP, it was generally believed, helps to preserve the peace and stability in the country — and thus avoid out right conflicts like that of May 13 1969.<sup>20</sup>

In a sense, since the implementation of the NEP, the ethnic relation between the rival communities was significantly determined by the type of preferential policies formulated and the manner they were pursued to redress the inequality gap, and the economic circumstances when the policies were implemented.

In the first fifteen years, the preferential policies formulated and the manner they were pursued negatively impacted the ethnic relations. The state initial interventionist and highhanded implementation of the NEP did not do much to ease ethnic relations. The adopted strategy made the state appeared inflexible and overbearing. Partly, this was because, to increase Malay ownership of capital and economic participation, the state directly intervened in productive activities and capital accumulation. The state thus established and operated a wide range of productive enterprises as well as set up various Malay equity funds (Jesudason 1988; Mehmet 1986). Consequently, the number of state owned economic enterprises (SOEs) grew from 109 in 1970 to 362 in 1975, 656 in 1980 and 1,014 in 1985, and the size of the public bureaucracy to manage and monitor the much expanded state economic activities ballooned from 140,000 in 1970 to 520,000 in 1983.

In addition, to increase Malay ownership and participation in the private sector, new business regulations were instituted and new bureaucratic bodies created to monitor and influence the behavior of private businesses. The new state regulations and bodies significantly alienated the Chinese in general, particularly the Chinese businesses (Jesudason 1988, pp.134-163). For example, a new general guideline made it harder for non-Malay firms to get new or to renew business licenses if they did not meet the 30% Malay equity ownership requirement. The Industrial Coordination Act (ICA) of 1975 provided the state with the means to implement the equity policy.<sup>21</sup> The Act stipulated that all non-Malay firms with paid-in capital and reserves funds of more

than RM\$250,000 and more than 25 employees must have 30% Malay equity participation. The ICA also gave the state with wide discretionary powers to deny any firms a license unless the Malay share of its equity was satisfied. Thus, besides the stringent Malay ownership requirement, the implementation of the NEP also increased the direct bureaucratic intervention into the behavior and operation of the private sector.

Unsurprisingly, the adversarial view of the state had a depressing effect on the domestic private investments, which were mostly Chinese investments. Before the implementation of the NEP, Chinese investments comprised 66.9% of all investments in 1971. After 1972, Chinese investments averaged slightly just above 30% before the ICA was enacted in 1975. But from 1975 to 1985, except for 1984, Chinese investments in the manufacturing fell below 30%. Public investment increased, in contrast, dramatically from 1972-85, averaging close to 50% in the early 80s. Total government expenditure share of the GDP increased from 23.7% in 1971 to 40.4% in 1980, and the government sector share of total employment increased from 11.9% in 1970 to 14.4% in 1980, and, peaked, at 15% in 1981.

Nevertheless, despite the low percentage of private domestic investments, spurred by public and foreign investments the economy achieved healthy growth every year in the 1970s, except for 1974 due to the oil crisis. However, due to the world recession, the economic growth slowed down between 1980-1987; the economy grew at an average rate of 4.5% per annum and in fact registered a negative growth in 1985. A result of the slower growth rates during this period was that the unemployment nearly doubled when the jobs created fell short of the increased in labor force; 1.25 million jobs to 1.5 million persons between 1980-1988. Significantly, the slow down in job creation after 1985 fell unevenly on the Malays, especially Malay employment in the modern sector. The 1987 Labor Force Survey revealed that the most affected group was the young Malays with secondary education, including increasing numbers of university graduates.

The growing unemployment, especially among the young Malays with secondary education and above, between 1980-1987, was compounded by the fact that not much headway had been made in restructuring the ethnic pattern of employment.

The majority of the Malays continued to be employed in the agriculture and government sectors; Malay employment in the agriculture sector as a percent of the total Malay employed was nearly 51.3% of in 1980 and 40.7% in 1985 while the government services employed 14.3% and 16.3% respectively (Table 3). The fact that the employment pattern has been restructured but not to any great extent becomes more apparent when one looks at the occupational pattern (Table 4). As expected, a disproportionate number of Malays are still found in the agricultural occupations and, in contrast, they remained under presented in the administrative and managerial occupations. In the professional and technical occupations, while the number of Malay professionals and skilled labor has increased, they are still disproportionately represented in the lower unskilled categories. The glaring Malay under representation was clearly illustrated by the proportion of Malay registered professionals (such as accountants, engineers, doctors and lawyers); in 1985, Malays constituted 8.6% of the accountants, 27% of engineers, 18.1% of doctors, and 16.4% of lawyers (Table 5). As such, the Malay middle class remained an insignificant segment of the Malay community.

In terms of the ethnic ownership of share capital, although the Malay share has increased from 2.4% in 1970 to nearly 19.1% in 1985, the Chinese have also increased their share from 27.2% in 1970 to 33.4% in 1985 (Table 6). However, despite the credible increase in the Malay share, the number of Malay entrepreneurs remained unimpressive. This was because under the “trusteeship” approach the bulk of Malay ownership of share capital was held by the state, directly or indirectly; for example, in 1985, the trustee component took up almost 40% of the Malay share. In other words, the number of Malay entrepreneurs remained under represented. In its poverty eradication goal, the state did manage to bring down the incidence of poverty from 49.3% in 1970 to approximately 22.4% in 1987 (Table 7). Although the gains were impressive, nevertheless, the absolute number of Malays living in poverty remained uncomfortably high.

In the first fifteen years of the NEP then, despite the opportunities generated by the healthy economic growths, for different reasons, both the rival ethnic communities remained largely dissatisfied. While the state’s perceived highhanded intervention in

pushing the preferential policies alienated the Chinese, the Malays remained resentful of the fact that their community continued to receive much less than what they desire and believe they deserve. Progress in the restructuring of employment, one of the key elements in attaining greater ethnic economic equality, remained markedly slow. While increasing number of Malays have entered the modern and high paying sectors, the fact remains that the economic growth did not equally benefit the majority of the Malays. Consequently, large numbers of Malays continued to feel economically deprived and their shared sense of being economically deprived with respect to the Chinese remained very pervasive. As a result, between 1985 and 1987, when the economy was going through a bad patch, the ethnic relations deteriorated rapidly and reached a potentially explosive situation in 1987.

Changes in various policies were already beginning to take shape in the early 1980s when Dr. Mahathir Mohammed assumed the Prime Ministership in 1981. A fundamental shift was to recalibrate the relative importance attached to redistributive objectives with respect to stimulating economic growth. In other words, to encourage a more pro-growth environment a more flexible Malay equity and participation quota requirement was adopted. This was complimented in 1983 by the announcement and implementation of the Malaysian Incorporated (Malaysian Inc.) concept. The idea of a partnership between public and private sectors enjoyed overwhelming support from the business community, especially the Chinese businesses. And parallel to the Malaysian Inc. concept, the conducive environment for the private sector was further enhanced by the government's privatization policy. The main thrust of the privatization policy was to roll back the state's direct participation in the economic activities. The changes in the domestic economic environment fortuitously coincided with businesses in the industrialized countries, particularly Japan, looking to invest overseas. Thus, Malaysia received huge foreign direct investments from the mid-1980s up to mid-1997, before the financial crisis.

Consequently, the Malaysian economy grew rapidly from 1988 to mid-1997; for example, the real annual GDP growth rates averaged over 8% during 1988-1993. In terms of the structure of the economy, by 1989 the manufacturing sector contribution to the GDP had surpassed the agriculture sector; 26% to 20%. The

economic opportunities and wealth created raised discernibly the overall standard of living of most Malaysians. More importantly, this period witnessed both a dramatic jump in Malay capital ownership and participation in the modern sector, and as well as greatly benefited the non-Malay community.

In terms of ethnic ownership of share capital, the Malay share has increased from 19.1% in 1985 to 20.6% in 1995 and the Chinese share from 33.4% in 1985 to 40.9% in 1995 (Table 6). However, the official figure for the 20.6% Malay share, announced by the state, is hotly disputed by the non-Malays. The crux of the dispute is over where the nominee companies' share should be included. If the nominees' share were included in the Malay portion, then the Malay share would have reached nearly 29% in 1995 meaning that Malay ownership has pretty much reached the 30% target. Perhaps, more importantly, the implementation of privatization since 1983 has developed a sizable and vibrant Malay business community in general and a number of big-time Malay corporate businessmen in particular. The development of a vibrant Malay business community is shown by the fact that individual Malay ownership of share capital has impressively surpassed the Malay trustees ownership; in 1995, individual Malay ownership made up nearly 90.3% of the total Malay share (Table 6).

Since 1990, not only has the Malaysian economy achieved full employment but also that the economy has been experiencing a major of labor shortage problem. In 1997, the estimated number of foreign workers was nearly 2 million, including both legal and illegal workers, or about 20% of the total labor force. The overall trend in the employment pattern suggested that the objective to eliminate the ethnic group identification with economic functions has made considerable gains. Compared to the past when the overwhelming majority of Malays were employed in the agricultural sector, in 1995 the sector accounts for only 22.2% of the total Malay labor force (Table 3). Indeed, more Malays are now employed in the manufacturing (24.9%) and other services (24%) sectors. For the Chinese, the three largest sectors where the Chinese are found are wholesale/retail (27.7%), manufacturing (26.4%), and other services (13.8%). In terms of employment by occupations, production and agricultural workers constituted the two largest concentrations of Malay workers, 27.5% and 25.3% respectively (Table 4). For the Chinese, the two occupations with the largest

concentration of Chinese workers are production (37.2%) and sale (19.3%). Malays constitute the largest ethnic group in all occupations except for administrative and managerial and sale occupations where they made up about a third of the total work force.

Clearly then, the ethnic restructuring of employment has made impressive progress such that the ethnic identification with economic functions no longer exists. The trends in the registered professions by ethnic group clearly revealed the success in creating a professional Malay middle class (Table 5). In 1995, nearly one in three architects, lawyers, dentists, doctors and engineers are Malays, and there are more Malay surveyors and veterinary surgeons than Chinese or Indians. The only profession that Malays remained severely under presented is accountancy.

The mean household income has grown impressively for all ethnic groups; for the Malays from R172 in 1970 to R492 in 1979, R940 in 1990 and to an impressive R1600 in 1995, and for the Chinese from R394 to R938, R1631 and R2896 respectively (Table 8). Importantly, the difference between the Malay and Chinese household mean income disparity ratio generally has declined from 2.29 in 1970 to 1.74 in 1990, although the figure increase to 1.81 in 1995. State efforts to eradicate poverty in the country has also achieved credible success; the incidence of poverty has declined from a high of 49.3% (or 791,000 households) in 1970 to 15% (or 448,900 households) in 1990 and to 5.4% (or 183,100 households) in 1995 (Table 7). However, the progress made in the eradication of poverty assumed a single definition of poverty for the whole peninsular; it does not take into account the differential costs of living between the rural and urban setting.

Thus, in the 1990s, impressive progress has been made in terms of equalizing the economic disparities between the Malay and non-Malay communities, and as well as alleviating the standard of living of every Malaysian regardless of ethnicity. Malay horizontal and vertical participation in the economy has expanded substantially, especially in the modern sector. The preferential policies have created a more broad-based differential Malay employment structure and, above all, has successfully nurtured a significant Malay middle-class and business class (Abdul Rahman 1996). Nonetheless, while the state has successfully narrowed the inter-ethnic inequality gap

and reduced considerably the poverty level in the country, the income gap between the richest and the poorest groups has widened in the 1990s. A looming class inequality has plagued all the ethnic groups. Intra-ethnic group inequality has emerged as a result of the uneven distribution of benefits among the classes across all ethnic groups. For example, the intra-Malay inequity has grown very skewed and getting worse in the late 1990s largely because the state has unduly focus its energy on creating a Malay corporate business class (Jomo et al 1995).

How has the progress made in restructuring the employment and ownership pattern affected ethnic relations in the 1990s? Generally speaking, the frictions in the economic relations between the rival ethnic communities have eased during this period. The impressive economic growth has raised the standard of living of the population as a whole and greater ethnic economic equality has been achieved with the successful restructuring of employment and ownership pattern. The relative success in making social classes more multiethnic means that there now exists, among other things, a significant Malay middle class. Also, the existence of a discernible Malay corporate business class means that one can no longer simply accused the Chinese of hogging the wealth. An unintended consequence is that the growing class inequality within the Malay community has obviously contributed to weakening the solidarity within the community and thus vis-à-vis the Chinese community. Indeed, a growing Malay criticisms of corruption and cronyism in the Malay community has emerged and, since the Anwar crisis in September 1998, has gained considerable momentum. The criticisms appeared to have contributed to the declining support for UMNO precisely because the party is no longer perceived to be the protector and benefactor of the ordinary Malay interests.

Nevertheless, although the emerging class differentiation within the Malay community has introduced traces of class frictions in the community, the articulation of inequality in ethnic terms remains predominant. Partly, this is because the UMNO-Malay dominated state continues to subscribe to, use and apply the ethnic construction of inequality. While it is true that increasingly more Malays are critical of the way the NEP has, and is, been implemented today, it remains evident that the community's support for the preferential policies remains overwhelming. In fact, parallel to the

growing Malay criticisms of corruption and cronyism there is also a growing Malay support to revise the 30% quota upwards (Zainal Aznam 1991). Support for the idea of “ethnic proportional equality” that reflects the racial composition of the population has gained currency in the 1990s. Most importantly, the state has not made any substantive moves to remove and dismantle the instruments and institutions that were put in place to implement the NEP preferential policies.

The rationale behind the collective sense of relative deprivation is the subjective experience of the group comparing what they have to what they believe they deserve or are entitled to. In so far as the majority of Malay individuals continue to identify with their community’s feeling that there is an unacceptable gap between what they have and what they believe they deserve and are entitled to, an ethnic shared sense of relative deprivation will persist.<sup>22</sup> It follows that the emerging Malay criticisms of corruption and cronyism must not be interpreted to mean a rejection of the preferential policies, but, rather, simply mean growing Malay resentments over the way the preferential policies have been used to benefit a few. Indeed, there is a growing Malay support for a larger share of the economic pie. Moreover, entrenched material and affective interests would ensure continual Malay support for preferential policies that benefit them disproportionately. The preferential policies that continue to discriminate Malaysians based on the color of their skin will remain a thorn in the relations between the rival ethnic communities.



## **Conclusion**

Since 1990 then, the ethnic relations in Malaysia have been remarkably stable and even congenial. The rapid economic growth has enabled the state to pursue its ethnic redistributive policy without unduly overburdening the non-Malays. In the cultural arena, the state has relaxed its pro-Malay policy while allowing the Chinese culture more access and room in the public space. In general, out right conflicts have been avoided because both the rival ethnic communities were willing to give concessions and the economic inequality gap has discernibly narrowed between the Malays and non-Malays. Indeed, the ruling coalition party won an unprecedented victory at the polls in 1995, with substantial support from the Chinese community for the first time. The question, then, is the prospects of the ethnic relations in the future.

In the economic sphere, given the entrenched interests and the institutionalization of the pro-Malay policies, coupled with continued prevalence of the ethnic sense of relative deprivations, it would be extremely difficult for the state to reverse its ethnic-based formula without a backlash. Since growth will eventually slows down as the economy approaches maturity, it will become increasingly difficult for the state to maintain the existing pro-Malay policies without unduly overburdening the non-Malays. Perhaps, at some point down the road, when a reasonable ethnic economic parity has been realized the UMNO will have to convince itself and the Malay community that the pro-Malay redistributive policy be replaced with an income-based policy. If at that time the bulk of the poor continue to be Malays, then they would constitute the majority of those who would receive help from the government. The middle and upper Malay social classes, regardless of ethnicity, by and large should fend for themselves.

In the cultural arena, the biggest challenge to the stability of ethnic relations is the interrelated issue of how Islam will reconfigures the Malay identity as the community confronts modernity and how the state will response to the Islamic reconfiguration of Malay identity. The non-Malays would naturally be anxious of any moves by the state to further Islamicized the society. Perhaps, the continuing integration of Malaysia into the global society will encourage the state to maintain a more liberal and open cultural policy.

In general then, ethnic relations in Malaysia have been relatively congenial precisely because extremism and intolerance, factors that can undermine the stability of society, have been soundly contained in Malaysian society. Nevertheless, one must remember that when ethnic members are besieged by a sudden wave of anxieties and frustrations, they could become susceptible to extremists' ranting. And ethnic members become highly susceptible to extremists' ranting during periods of political, economic and cultural crises because crises would besiege a community with obsessive uncertainties and anxieties. If and when extremists' ranting assumed currency the society would experience the erosion of the foundation of tolerance without which the stability of ethnic relations would be severely tested — and might not be sustained.

## NOTES

1. In 1991, Malays made up 57.4%, Chinese 29.4%, and Indians 9.5% of the total population in the peninsular. Generally speaking, Malays are Muslims and speak Malay, Chinese are Taoist-Buddhists and speak a variety of Chinese dialects (including Mandarin), and Indians are Hindus and Tamil is their dominant mother-tongue (Population and Housing Census volume 1, 1991). In the official discourse, the rivalry is presented in terms of *bumiputra* versus *non-bumiputra* which tacitly conveys the impression that all the indigenous groups share similar interests and objectives. This of course is not the case. For example, the non-Muslim indigenous groups in East Malaysia and the Orang Asli in the peninsular obviously do not subscribe to the Malays' cultural goals (Loh and Kahn 1992: chpt. 10).
2. Article 3 stipulates that Islam is the religion of the country, but other religions may be practiced in peace and harmony in any part of the country. Article 152 specifies that the Malay language shall be the national language but at the same time "no person shall be prohibited or prevented from using (otherwise than for official purposes) or from teaching or learning, any other language."

3. Malay teachers were perhaps the single most important source of Malay cultural nationalism. In the mid-1960s, the Malay National Language Action Front was formed to hasten the process of making Malay as the national language.
4. Most of the supporters for complete Chinese cultural equality came from the Chinese-educated Chinese. Pressures for the recognition of Chinese as an additional official language thus came from the Chinese school teachers and the various Chinese guilds and associations.
5. A few of the reasons are; Chinese want to preserve their mother tongue, want to know their roots, and want to their culture to continue and language is part of and a means to their culture.
6. In the sixties, the trend was more and more Chinese sending their children to the English schools because of the perceived material advantage of acquiring an English education. In contrast, the rising popularity of Chinese education since 1971 could be attributed partly to cultural loyalty and partly to material reasons.
7. This was compounded by the fact that the state also relinquished its recognition of Taiwanese degrees which was the major country where the Chinese-educated students could further their studies. In later years, the independent secondary Chinese schools redesigned their curriculum such that their students could sit for both the Unified Examinations and the national examinations. The irony is that today the Unified Examinations are recognized by numerous American, British, Australian, and Singaporean tertiary institutions but remained unaccepted by the Malaysian Government.
8. The idea to establish the Merdeka University was first broached in the late 1960s. The main aim of the Merdeka University was to cater mainly, not exclusively, for graduates from the independent Chinese schools. Though Chinese would be the main medium of instruction but not the sole medium as Malay and English would be used as the medium of instruction for certain course, for example, law. The *Dongjiaozong* launched an intensive fund raising and petition campaign to support the establishment of Merdeka University.

9. A lively debate over the notion of “national culture” and the place of Chinese culture in the national culture was conducted in 1984 in the pages of The STAR, an English daily. See Kua (1985) *National Culture and Democracy*.
10. Interestingly, the Putra Jaya Masterplan, the future administrative city, too does not allocate spaces for the construction of non-Muslim places of worship and burial. The difference here perhaps is that it will not affect the non-Muslims that much since it is a new township and most of the civil service employees are Malay Muslims.
11. Here I am using the concept of relative deprivation. Generally, relative deprivation refers to the gap between what people have and what they believe they deserve, or have a right, to have.
12. In the 1960s, the most important rival to the ethnic construction of inequality was probably the socialist class analysis. But, since the 13 May 1969 ethnic riots, the UMNO’s ethnic construction of inequality in the society has predominated.
13. The connection between special position and privileged access to economic goods is, more or less, spelt out in Article 153 of the constitution.
14. Horowitz (1985) used the concept of group worth to explain ethnic conflicts and Sloane (1999) provides an excellent analysis of the ways the ‘new Malays’ (*Melayu Baru*) used group worth as a means to pursue economic ends.
15. A salient historical feature of the Malaysian economy was the acute economic disparities between the Malays and the Chinese. In terms of ownership of capital, though the foreigners owned most of the private capital, Chinese as the “economic middleman” dominated the small and medium businesses and employment in most of the modern sectors and at nearly all occupational levels. The vast majority of Malays, in contrast, resided in the rural areas and worked in the traditional agricultural sector. Relatively then, the Chinese because of their location and function in the economic system were perceived by the Malays to be wealthy and in control of the economy.
16. Until today there is no thorough study of this tragic episode in Malaysian history. By and large the official version has remained unchallenged, although

in the aftermath of the Anwar crisis in September 1998 Marina Yusof, a former UMNO supreme council member, has alleged that certain elements in UMNO were responsible for instigating the rioting. This view was also suggested by von Vorys (1975), especially pp 308-338, and Slimming (1969).

17. Needless to say, 30% is an arbitrary indicator. The figure perhaps was needed by the bureaucrats for planning purposes. Bureaucratic rationality demands a quantifiable goal to work towards. Thus, if and when Malays' expectations increases then there is no reason they would not raise the question of why not a figure that commensurates with the ethnic demographic representation.
18. In the Malaysian Plans and various other government poverty studies — and poverty studies conducted by mostly Malay scholars — the overwhelming focus has been on rural Malay poverty, and Malay poverty in general, with hardly any mention of non-Malay poverty. Additionally, the electoral system in Malaysia is weighted in favor of the rural constituencies and thus to win the rural Malay votes UMNO would have to deliver the goods to some extent. In fact, studies have shown how the poverty eradication programs were used by the ruling coalition, especially UMNO, to reward their supporter disproportionately (Shamsul 1986; Mehmet 1986).
19. See Lim (1994) for an interesting study of poverty and household economic strategies in New Villages. Perhaps, today, the single most important neglected problem is that of the development of an Indian underclass in the urban areas. For a number of reasons, more Indians have migrated to the urban areas over the last ten years.
20. The NEP has achieved almost a taboo status in the interaction between Malays and non-Malays. Non-Malays would almost never express what they really feel about the preferential policies to their Malay “friends” precisely because Malays generally get very upset if the preferential policies are criticized. The almost diametrically opposing views are frequently and clearly articulated in the cyberspace.
21. Guidelines for Equity Participation under the Industrial Coordination Act, 1975.

22. The lack, and problems, of inter-ethnic class solidarity is illustrated in various studies, for example Boulanger (1992).

## BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Abdul Rahman Embong. 'Social Transformation, the State and the Middle Class in Post-Independence Malaysia', *Southeast Asian Studies*, vol.34 no.3 December 1996, p56-79.
- Boulanger, Clare. 'Ethnic Order and Working Class Strategies in West Malaysia', *Journal of Contemporary Asia*, vol. 22, no. 3, pp. 322-339, 1992.
- Brown, Jason. *The Role of the State in Economic Development: Theory, The East Asian Experience, and The Malaysian Case*, Singapore: Asian Development Bank, 1993.
- Camroux, David. 'State Responses to Islamic Resurgence in Malaysia', *Asian Survey*, vol. 36 no.6, pp. 852-868 September 1996.
- Carstens, Sharon. 'Dancing Lions and Disappearing History: The National Culture Debates and Chinese Malaysian Culture', *Crossroads: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Southeast Asian Studies*, Vol.13(1), 1998: 11-64.
- Crouch, Harold. *Government and Society in Malaysia*, New South Wales: Allen & Unwin, 1997.
- Dentan, Robert K. et al. *Malaysia and the Original People: A case study of the Impact of Development on Indigenous Peoples*, Boston, Massachusetts: Allyn and Bacon, 1997.
- Gomez, Edmund T & Jomo K.S. *Malaysia's Political Economy: Politics, Patronage and Profits*, Melbourne: Cambridge University, 1997.
- Government of Malaysia. *Malaysian Plans, various years*.  
-----, *Mid-Term Reviews, various years*.  
-----, *Population and Housing Census Volume 1 1991, 1992*.
- Heng Pek Koon. 'Chinese Responses to Malay Hegemony in Peninsular Malaysia 1957-96', *Southeast Asian Studies*, vol.34 no.3 December 1996 p.32-55.

- Honneth, Axel. *Integrity and Disrespect, Political Theory* vol 20(2), 1992.
- Horowitz, Donald. *Ethnic Groups in Conflict* Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1985.
- Jesudason, James. *Ethnicity and the Economy: The State, Chinese Business, and Multinationals in Malaysia*, Singapore: Oxford University Press 1988.
- Jomo K.S. ed. *Privatizing Malaysia: Rents, Rhetoric, Realities*, Boulder and London: Westview Press, 1995.
- Kua Kia Soong. *National Culture and Democracy*, Petaling Jaya: Kersani Penerbit-Penerbit, 1985.
- . *A Protean Saga: The Chinese Schools of Malaysia*, Kuala Lumpur: The Resource and Research Centre, Selangor Chinese Assembly Hall, 1990.
- Loh Kok Wah. 'The Socio-Economic Basis of the Ethnic Consciousness: The Chinese in the 1970s' in Syed Husin Ali ed. *Ethnicity, Class And Development: Malaysia*, Kuala Lumpur: Persatuan Sains Sosial Malaysia, 1984.
- Loh Kok Wah & Kahn, Joel eds. *Fragmented Vision*, Sydney: ASAA Southeast Asia Publications Series, 1992.
- Mahathir Mohamad. *The Malay Dilemma*, Kuala Lumpur: Federal Publications, 1970.
- Mehmet, Ozay. *Development in Malaysia: Poverty, Wealth and Trusteeship*, London: Croom Helm, 1986.
- Ngata, Judith A. 'Perceptions of Social Inequality in Malaysia', *Contributions to Asian Studies*, Vol. VII, pp113-136, 197.
- National Operation Council. *The May 13 Tragedy*, Kuala Lumpur: Government Printing, 1969.
- Roff, William. *The Origins of Malay Nationalism*, Kuala Lumpur: University of Malaya, 1967.
- Shamsul A.B. 'Nations-of-Intent in Malaysia' in Tonnesson, S. ed. *Asian Forms of the Nation*, Surrey,UK: Curzon Press Ltd 1996.
- Slimming, John. *Malaysia: Death of a Democracy* London: J. Murray, 1969.
- Sloane, Patricia. *Islam, Modernity and Entrepreneurship Among the Malays*, London:

- MacMillan Press, 1999
- Smith, Anthony. *The Ethnic Origins of Nations*, New York: Basil Blackwell, 1986.
- Tan Chee Khoo. *Malaysia Today: Without Fear or Favor*, Petaling Jaya: Pelanduk Publications, 1985.
- Tan Liok Ee. 'Donjiaozong and the Challenge to Cultural Hegemony 1951-1987' in Loh Kok Wah & Kahn, Joel eds. *Fragmented Vision*, Sydney: ASAA Southeast Asia Publications Series, 1992.
- , *The Politics of Chinese Education*, Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1997.
- Von Vorys, Karl. *Democracy Without Consensus*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975.
- Wang GungWu. *Community and Nation*, New South Wales: ASAA Southeast Asia Publication Series (2<sup>nd</sup> ed.), 1992.
- Watson, C.W. "The Construction of the Post-Colonial Subject in Malaysia" in Tonnesson, S. ed. *Asian Forms of the Nation*, Surrey, UK: Curzon Press Ltd 1996.
- Zainal Aznam Yusof. 'Distributional Policies and Programmes: The Malaysian Experience' in Lee Kiong Hock and Shyamala Nagaraj ed. *The Malaysian Economy beyond 1990: International and domestic perspectives*, Kuala Lumpur: Persatuan Ekonomi Malaysia, 1991.

### **About the author**

Lee Hock Guan is Fellow at the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.

E-mail: [hockguan@iseas.edu.sg](mailto:hockguan@iseas.edu.sg)



**Table 3**  
**Employment by Economic Sector and Ethnic Group, Malaysia (percentages)**

	Malays		1985 Chinese		Indians		Malays		1995 Chinese		Indians	
	a	b	a	b	a	b	a	b	a	b	a	b
Agriculture	75	40.7	15.5	14.8	8.8	30.8	60.1	22.2	11.7	7.5	6	14.4
Mining	50.5	1	37.8	1	9.5	1	57.5	0.5	22	0.4	10.5	0.6
Manufacturing	45.8	12.1	42.8	19.9	10.9	18.5	49.8	24.9	30.4	26.4	11.2	36.5
Construction	42.2	5.6	51	11.9	5.8	4.9	37.4	6.4	41.1	12.3	4.7	5.3
Electricity	72.6	1	10.3		15.6	1.3	72.1	1.1	10.4	0.3	11.1	1.1
Transport	52.4	3.9	33.9	4.5	13	6.3	53.2	5.2	29.4	4.9	11.7	7.4
Wholesale	36.4	10.3	55.2	27.6	7.8	14.3	36.5	11.6	50	27.7	6.1	12.7
Finance	41.1	2.5	46.4	5	10.6	4.1	45.1	4.1	42.3	6.7	9.3	5.5
Government	66.7	16.8	24.3	10.8	8.5	13.8						
Others	66.8	6.4	24.2	4.1	8.5	5.2	64.4	24	21.4	13.8	6.8	16.5

Notes: a = percentage of ethnic group employed in sector as percentage of total employed in the sector.

b = ethnic group employed in sector as percentage of total ethnic group employed

Source: Mid-Term Review and Malaysian Plans, various volumes.

**Table 4**  
**Employment by occupation and ethnic group, Malaysia (percentages)**

	1970						1985					
	Malays		Chinese		Indians		Malays		Chinese		Indians	
	a	b	a	b	a	b	a	b	a	b	a	b
Professional an technical (including teachers and nurses)	47.1	4.3	39.5	5.2	10.8	4.9	56.4	7.3	30.7	7	10.9	9.1
Administrative and Managerial	24.1	0.5	62.9	1.9	7.8	0.8	28	1.1	63	4.4	5	1.2
Clerical workers	35.4	3.4	45.9	6.3	17.2	8.1	55.1	9.2	35.5	10.5	8.9	9.6
Sale workers	26.7	4.7	61.7	15.3	11.1	9.5	36.9	6.6	57	17.9	6	6.8
Service workers	44.3	6.8	17.3	8.6	14.6	10.9	58.7	11.7	30.2	10.6	10	12.8
Agriculture workers	72	62.3	55.9	21.2	9.7	41	76.5	41.3	15.2	14.4	7.8	27.1
Production workers	34.2	18	55.9	41.6	9.6	24.7	47.5	22.8	41.3	35.1	10.8	33.3
	1990						1995					
	Malays		Chinese		Indians		Malays		Chinese		Indians	
	a	b	a	b	a	b	a	b	a	b	a	b
Professional an technical	60.5	10	29.1	7.8	7.7	7.9	64.3	12.7	26.2	8.9	7.3	9
Teachers and nurses	68.5	4.3	24.6	2.5	6.4	2.5	72.3	4.9	20.5	2.4	6.6	2.8
Administrative and Managerial	28.7	1.3	62.2	4.7	4	1.1	36.1	1.9	54.7	4.9	5.1	1.6
Clerical workers	52.4	9.7	38.6	11.6	8.6	9.8	57.2	11	34.4	11.5	7.7	9.3
Sale workers	29.9	6.5	58.4	20.7	6.8	9.2	36.2	7.8	51.9	19.3	6.5	8.8
Service workers	57.8	12.7	26.8	9.6	9.5	12.9	58.2	13.8	22.8	9.3	8.7	12.9
Agriculture workers	69.1	37	13.8	12	7.3	24.2	63.1	25.3	12.9	8.9	7.5	18.8
Production workers	43.6	22.8	39.6	33.6	10.8	34.9	44.8	27.5	35	37.2	10.3	39.6

Notes: a = percentage of ethnic group employed in this occupation as percentage of total employed in the occupation.

b = ethnic group employed in occupation as percentage of total ethnic group employed.

Source: Mid-term Review and Malaysian Plans, various volumes.

**Table 5 : Registered Professionals by Ethnic Group ( percentages)**

	Malays	1980 Chinese	Indians			
Accountants	7.4	77.9	7.2			
Architects	10.7	86.5	1.3			
Dentists	10.3	65.7	21.3			
Doctors	9.7	43.7	41.7			
Engineers	18.5	71.3	6.3			
Lawyers	14.8	48.5	35.4			
Surveyors	31.2	58.7	7.2			
Veterinary surgeons	17.8	27.8	46.5			
	1990 Malays	Chinese	Indians	1995 Malays	Chinese	Indians
Accountants	11.2	81.2	6.2	16.1	75.2	7.9
Architects	23.6	74.4	1.2	27.6	70.7	1.5
Dentists	24.3	50.7	23.7	30.9	45.7	21.9
Doctors	27.8	34.7	34.4	33.4	32.1	32
Engineers	34.8	58.2	5.3	38.1	55.2	5.2
Lawyers	22.3	50	26.5	29	43.3	26.6
Surveyors	44.7	49.6	3.7	48.3	45.6	3.2
Veterinary surgeons	35.9	23.7	37	40.2	23.7	33.5

Source: Malaysian Plans, various years.

**Table 6**  
**Malaysia: Ownership of Share Capital (At par value) of Limited Companies (percentages)**

Year	Total value Ringgit million	Malaysian residents			Nominee companies	Chinese	Others	Total	Foreign residents
		Malays/Bumiputeras Individuals	Trustees	Total					
1971	5329.2	2.6	1.7	4.3	6	27.2	0.8	38.3	61.7
1980	32420.4	4.3	8.1	12.4			40.1	52.5	47.5
1985	77964.4	11.7	7.4	19.1	7.2	33.4	14.3	74	26
1990	108377.4	14.1	5.1	19.2	8.5	45.5	1.4	74.6	25.4
1995	179792	18.6	2	20.6	8.3	40.9	2.5	72.3	27.7
1998	294576	17.7	1.7	19.4	7.1	38.5	3.2	68.2	31.8

1. Individuals includes institutions such as Amanah Saham MARA, Tabung Haji, Cooperatives .

2. Shares held by MARA, PERNAS, UDA, SECs, FIMA, Bank Bumiputra,

3. Excludes shares held by Federal, state and Local Governments.

Source: Malaysian Plans, various volumes.

**Table 7**  
**Incidence of Poverty, Peninsular Malaysia**

	1970	Year 1980	1990	1995
Incidence of poverty (%)	49.3	29	15	5.4
Number of households (thousands)	791.8	635.9	448.9	183.1
incidence of hardcore poverty (%)			3.6	1.8
Number of hardcore poverty households			107.3	61
Total number of households	1606	2193	2986.4	3390.2

Source: Mid-Term Review and Malaysian Plans, various volumes

**Table 8**  
**Mean income "disparity ratios" and absolute difference in mean household**  
**incomes of major ethnic groups, Peninsular Malaysia (ringgit/current prices)**

Ethnic group	Year					
	1970	1976	1979	1984	1990	1995
Malay (M)	172	345	492	852	940	1600
Chinese (C)	394	787	938	1502	1631	2895
Indian (I)	304	538	756	1094	1209	2153
C-M Disparity Ratio	2.29	2.28	1.91	1.76	1.74	1.81
I-M Disparity Ratio	1.77	1.56	1.54	1.28	1.29	1.35
Differences of C-M mean incomes	222	442	446	650	691	1295
Differences of I-M mean incomes	132	193	264	242	269	553

Sources: Household Incomes Survey, various years.

## **ISEAS WORKING PAPERS**

### **I. ISEAS Working Papers on Economics and Finance**

(ISSN 0218-8937)

1(96): Nick J. Freeman, *Portfolio Investment in Vietnam: Coping Without a Bourse*, February 1996

2(96): Reza Y. Siregar, *Inflows of Portfolio Investment to Indonesia: Anticipating the Challenges Facing the Management of Macroeconomy*, March 1996

3(96): Helen Hughes, *Perspectives for an Integrating World Economy: Implications for Reform and Development*, May 1996

4(96): Carolyn L. Gates, *Enterprise Adjustment and Economic Transformation: Industrial Enterprise Behaviour and Performance in Vietnam during Stabilization and Liberalization*, June 1996

5(96): Mya Than, *The Golden Quadrangle of Mainland Southeast Asia: A Myanmar Perspective*, July 1996

1(99): Myat Thein, *Improving Resource Mobilization in Myanmar*, January 1999

2(99): Anita G. Doraisami, *The Malaysian Currency Crisis: Causes, Policy Response and Future Implications*, February 1999

3(99): George Abonyi, *Thailand: From Financial Crisis to Economic Renewal*, March 1999

4(99): Carolyn L. Gates, *The East Asian Crisis and Global Integration: Mismanagement and Panic Revisited or a New Beast?*, March 1999

5(99): Tin Maung Maung Than, *The Political Economy of Burma's (Myanmar's) Development Failure 1948-1988*, March 1999

6(99): Kim Ong-Giger, *Southeast Asian Economies in Crisis: The Emergence of Pax Capitalia*, April 1999

7(99): Carolyn L. Gates, *ASEAN's Foreign Economic Relations: An Evolutionary and Neo-Institutional Analysis*, May 1999

8(99): Kim Ong-Giger, *Japanese IT Development: Implications for FDI in Southeast Asia*, September 1999

9(99): Frank L. Bartels and Nick J. Freeman, *Multinational Firms and FDI in Southeast Asia: Post-Crisis Perception Changes in the Retail-Oriented Manufacturing Sector*, December 1999.

1(2000): Nick J. Freeman, *Constraints on Thailand's Equity Market as an Allocator of Foreign Investment Capital: Some Implications for Post-Crisis Southeast Asia*, January 2000.

2(2000): Nick J. Freeman, *Foreign Portfolio Investors' Approaches to Thailand's Equity Market: Survey Findings and Preliminary Analysis*, March 2000.

3(2000): Nick J. Freeman and Frank L. Bartels, *Portfolio Investment in Southeast Asia's Stock Markets: A Survey of Institutional Investors' Current Perceptions and Practices*, April 2000.

4(2000): Nick J. Freeman, *A Regional Platform for Trading Southeast Asian Equities: Viable Option or Lofty 'Red Herring'?*, July 2000.

5(2000): Sakulrat Montreevat, *Impact of Foreign Entry on the Thai Banking Sector: Initial Stage of Bank Restructuring*, August 2000.

## **II. ISEAS Working Papers on International Politics and Security Issues** (ISSN 0218-8953)

1(96): Derek da Cunha, *The Need for Weapons Upgrading in Southeast Asia: Present and Future*, March 1996

1(97): Simon J. Hay, *ASEAN's Regional Security Dialogue Process: From Expectation to Reality?*, March 1997

1(99): Sorpong Peou, *The ASEAN Regional Forum and Post-Cold War IR Theories: A Case for Constructive Realism?*, January 1999

2(99): Sheng Li Jun, *China and the United States as Strategic Partners into the Next Century*, February 1999

3(99): Jürgen Haacke, *'Flexible Engagement': On the Significance, Origins and Prospects of a Spurned Policy Proposal*, February 1999

4(99): Derek da Cunha, *Southeast Asia's Security Dynamics: A Multiplicity of Approaches Amidst Changing Geopolitical Circumstances*, July 1999



**III. ISEAS Working Papers on Social and Cultural Issues**  
(ISSN 0218-8961)

1(96): Federico V. Magdalena, *Ethnicity, Identity and Conflict: The Case of the Philippine Moros*, April 1996

1(98): Patricia Lim, *Myth and Reality: Researching the Huang Genealogies*, June 1998

2(98): M. Thien Do, *Charity and Charisma: The Dual Path of the Tinh Đô Cu Sĩ, a Popular Buddhist Group in Southern Vietnam*, September 1998

1(99): JoAnn Aviel, *Social and Environmental NGOs in ASEAN*, August 1999

1(2000): Lee Hock Guan, *Ethnic Relations in Peninsular Malaysia: The Cultural and Economic Dimensions*, August 2000

**IV. ISEAS Working Papers by Visiting Researchers**  
(ISSN 0219-3582)

1(2000): Ramkishen S Rajan, *Examining the Case for Currency Basket Regimes for Southeast Asia*, January 2000

2(2000): P Lim Pui Huen, *Continuity and Connectedness: The Ngee Heng Kongsì of Johor, 1844-1916*, January 2000

3(2000): Ramkishen S Rajan, *Examining the Case for an Asian Monetary Fund*, February 2000

4(2000): Thawatchai Jittrapanun, *The SIMEX Experience: Implications for Thailand's Futures Exchange*, February 2000

5(2000): Le Minh Tam, *Reforming Vietnam's Banking System: Learning from Singapore's Model*, February 2000

6(2000): Gao Haihong, *Liberalising China's Capital Account: Lessons Drawn From Thailand's Experience*, February 2000

7(2000): Liliana Halim, *Reviving the Indonesian Banking Sector? Indonesia's Economic Crisis: Impact on Financial and Corporate Sectors 1997-1999*, February 2000

8(2000): Ngiam Kee Jin, *Coping with the Asian Financial Crisis: The Singapore Experience*, March 2000

9(2000): Ramkishen S. Rajan and Iman Sugema, *Capital Flows, Credit Transmission and the Currency Crisis in Southeast Asia*, March 2000

10(2000): Wang Xiaomin, *Zhongguancun Science Park: A SWOT Analysis*, May 2000

11(2000): Doan Phuong Lan, *The Asian Financial Crisis and its Implication for Vietnam's Financial System*, May 2000

12(2000): Tracy Yang Su-Chin, *Regulatory Reforms in the Asia-Pacific Region: A Preliminary Study*, May 2000

13(2000): Akhmad Bayhaqi, *Education and Macroeconomic Performance in Indonesia: A Comparison with Other ASEAN Economies*, May 2000

14(2000): Ai-Gek Beh and George Abonyi, *Structure of the Asset Management Industry: Organizational Factors in Portfolio Investment Decisions*, June 2000

**Editorial Committee**

Derek da Cunha  
Nick J. Freeman  
Lee Hock Guan  
Sakulrat Montreevat  
Leonard Sebastian  
Tin Maung Maung Than  
Tracy Yang

Papers in this series are preliminary in nature and are intended to stimulate discussion and critical comment. The Editorial Committee accepts no responsibility for facts presented and views expressed, which rests exclusively with the individual author. No part of this publication may be produced in any form without permission.

Comments are welcomed and may be sent to the author.





的文化习惯，同时，也影响地方政府分配供朝拜和建墓地的地段。  
(127)

伊斯兰党掌权的吉兰丹和丁加奴两州，致力于实行伊斯兰刑法。马哈迪领导下的巫统，则开始在“伊斯兰政策拍卖”过程中竞争。马来西亚人因而得面对越来越可怕的后果。(128)

2001年9月29日，马哈迪竟然宣布，马来西亚是“伊斯兰国”。  
(129) 虽然政府试图从语意学角度来为他的说法辩解，但是，这直接表明，巫统试图使这个想法定型，以便为其伊斯兰民粹主义服务。

### 总结

马哈迪的遗产是，从一个新兴马来官僚资产阶级，建立起一个马来私人资产阶级。他是通过朋党资本主义来达到这个目的的。他把各种优惠赐给得宠的土著资本家。特别是在1988年的金融危机期间，这些朋党在商场上一败涂地，政府却用公帑拯救他们。

马哈迪的任期，以耸人听闻的财务丑闻见称。这些丑闻对一个威权民粹主义者来说，是意料中事，因为他对问责制和良好施政，并不多加理会。与此同时，伴随着私营化政策的是，工人阶级被分化成肢离破碎的状态。全国工人的职工运动也被解体。

马哈迪的种族主义模式全面转换，纳入政治、经济、教育、社会、文化政策。他留下的遗产就是种族主义思想意识。今天，极端右翼、马来人至上主义的一小撮人，紧抱着这个思想不放。马哈迪正是他们的靠山。

这个以马来人为中心的思想，越来越受伊斯兰极端民粹主义注入的影响。这种趋势甚至使“温和”的马来人开始担心他们的未来。

## 第十章

# 当前马来西亚的 种族主义与种族歧视

“法西斯是资本主义的畸形发展……它无限度地加强制度性的种族主义，而种族主义则是资本主义所孕育出来的……法西斯主义逆转了资产阶级民主制度在政治上所获取的利益，如：自由选举、法律面前人人平等、国会等。它也歌颂威权主义。”

- 华特罗尼 (Walter Rodney)

直到今天，种族主义和种族歧视仍然根深蒂固地盘据在马来西亚执政党的议程中。马哈迪接班人所承诺的改革方案，已淹没在统治阶级的阶级利益之下。统治阶级还在依赖“土著主义”思想意识，争取大部分土著选民的支持。

2008年大选发生政治海啸后，巫统把种族主义活动，外包给极端右派的“马来人至上主义”的组织。在政治庇护方面，以及在易于获取政府优惠等施舍方面，种族歧视是必然存在的。在巫统垄断政权之下，朋党资本主义盛行。

第13届大选见证了华人选票大幅度倾向在野党—人民联盟（民联）。为此，首相纳吉在大选后，宣布，给予土著更具种族歧视性的施舍，以此下策来故意刁难非土著选民。随之而来的政治情

景是，巫统加强推动“伊斯兰民粹主义”，特别是跟伊斯兰党互相竞争，导致宗教当局，过度热心地执行道德监管。

在民事服务、军事服务、司法、教育、宗教领域，种族主义已彻底制度化了。多年来，在众多政府机构中，灌输种族主义思想。这已是一个公开的秘密。最近，巫统忠贞不二的党员公开暴露了这个事实。

我们将探讨，政府如何采用特殊形式的种族主义，对付马来西亚印族和原住民。

### 重新走向朋党资本主义道路

2003年，阿都拉巴达威接任首相职，取代马哈迪。人们看好他会撤消马哈迪一些不得人心的政策。他承诺提供更高的透明度和问责制。这导致马哈迪的知己亲密朋友谢英福（Eric Chia）被提控。他在柏华惹钢铁公司案中涉嫌贪污。此案拖延了8年之久。一名沙巴部长卡西达（Kasitah Gaddam）也被提控。

首相巴达威所进行的改革毕竟是有限的。虽然巴达威有了改革的意图，但是，他重新委任了马哈迪任职时期的大部分部长进入内阁。这表明，他的改革热情是有限度的。他成立了一个“皇家调查委员会”来清理警察部队。这点，大受众人的欢迎。但是，他的主要建议（尤其是成立一个独立的申诉委员会—IPCMC）从未付诸实施。

为了使自己远离马哈迪的大型工程项目，巴达威取消了马哈迪价值马币145亿的双轨铁路工程。这项工程原本已交由一个财团处理。这个财团是由马哈迪所喜爱的朋友赛莫达（Syed Mokhtar Albukhary）所掌控的。

接着，他改组国家普腾汽车企业的董事部，更换了首席执行官。这个高职原本是由马哈迪的得意门生所担任的。巴达威也取消了马哈迪（通往新加坡的）“弯桥”项目，以及在布城的单轨铁路项目。

当巴达威跟满肚子怨气的马哈迪后来发生口角时，马哈迪指出，巴达威的儿子卡马鲁丁（Kamaluddin）的史格米公司（Scomi）曾与国营企业签下价值达10亿令吉的合同。他女婿则负责审查政府

所有的商业建议书，他们俨然把国家当作“家族生意”。（1）

巴达威回应说，马哈迪的孩子们获得远比史格米公司更大的项目。尤其是1998年，政府花了马币17亿，拯救马哈迪之子米占的船务公司（MISC）。（2）

尽管如此，在巴达威掌权下，土著朋党公司像往常一样运作。2007年9月，据透露，四家土著朋党公司，垄断了所有政府机构的“灯光供应”，每年价值2,000万令吉，包括：联邦和州政府机构、地方政府、国家能源有限公司（TNB）等。

用这种方式签下合同，跟以往公开招标的采购政策，成了鲜明的对比。四家朋党公司之一，由巫统政治人物莫哈末依斯迈（Mohd Ismail Mohd Shah）所拥有。另一家公司的董事包括：Ahmad Tajuddin Ali。他是国家能源公司TNB的前执行主席。（3）

巴达威始终未能建立起自己的改革派形象。2006年巫统大会的实况，在国家电视台现场直播。令国人感到震惊的是，巫青团长希山慕丁举起出鞘的马来短剑，向听众咆哮说，将誓死保卫亲马来人的国家政策，直到流尽“最后一滴血”。其中一名与会代表还引诱他，要他进而说出，他什么时候才开始使用短剑。

首相的演讲赢得了一片“马来人万岁”的呼叫声。（4）大会后不久，巴生港口发生了的另一宗巨大的财务丑闻。为了应对这宗丑闻，以巴达威为首的政府不得不出手拯救，因而花了数十亿令吉。（5）

在2008年的大选中，国阵得承受自1969年以来最大的败笔。它失去了国会三分二大多数议席，也失去了全国13个州中的5个州政权，只获得了联邦国会222个议席中的140席。比起2004年大选全国219个国会议席中获得199席，大为逊色。

### 巫统把种族主义外包给极端右翼组织

由于对巴达威改革方案的一切希望都破灭了，少数民族得面对越来越多的“马来主权”和伊斯兰化的论调。这些论调都是来自马来极端右翼组织。

2008年9月，檳城巫统执委阿末依斯迈（Ahmad Ismail）直称，华裔族群为“擅自占地者”（squatters，意即“非法居民”）和“外来移民”，并警告他们不准谋求政权：

“就把这当作是来自马来人的警告吧。马来人的忍耐性是有限度的。不要把我们逼得走头无路。我们将被迫掉转头进行反抗。为了生存，我们不得不把华族推开。”（6）

2009年，巴达威被迫提前退休，由纳吉取代。纳吉采用“一个马来西亚”的新口号，试图赢回非马来选民的支持。但是，他却完全保留了“新经济政策”的种族歧视服饰。与此同时，巫青团传统的种族主义捶胸顿足的角色，则外包给极端右翼组织。

巫统领悟到，巫青团长希山慕丁（被人谐称为“Kerishamudin”）在2006年巫统大会中，所扮演的、高举出鞘马来短剑的马来武士形象，令巫统在2008年大选中，损失了为数相当大的非马来人选票。

近年来出现的马来极端右翼组织，试图向马来群众灌输“马来中心主义”思想，努力阻遏马来群众加入日益壮大的、反对现有政权的运动。就好像发生危机的关键时刻，资本主义的历史显示，法西斯主义者一次又一次突然出现，诉诸种族主义和暴力行为，作为一种方案，奢望能解决人民所面对的问题。

2008年5月，200多个马来人非政府组织，成立了“马来人团结理事会”，声称是为了促进马来人的利益，对抗那些被认为是挑战“马来主权”者：

“这个大会，和大会成立的理事会，基本上，都是针对某些意识形态，如：‘马来西亚人的马来西亚’、多种语言主义、多元文化主义、多种宗教主义等。自从上届大选后，这些思想意识，已显得更加突出。”（7）

2010年2月27日，76个非政府组织在吉隆坡苏丹苏莱曼俱乐部，成立了一个“马来人非政府组织协商理事会”（Majlis Perundingan NGO Melayu - MPM），声称要捍卫“全国马来人权利和伊斯兰教”。其中包括下列非政府组织：

1. “土权会”  
（Perkasa - Pertubuhan Pribumi Perkasa Negara）
2. “马来西亚前人民代议士理事会”  
（Mubarak - Majlis Bekas Wakil Rakyat Malaysia）
3. 马来西亚半岛马来学生协会联合会  
（GPMS - Federation of Malay Students Association of Peninsular Malaysia）
4. 马来西亚马来专业人士协会  
（Malay Professional Thinkers Association of Malaysia）
5. 公务员职工联合会（Cuepacs）

依布拉欣阿里（Ibrahim Ali）担任“协商理事会”的发言人。他说，这理事会所扮演的好像是“盾牌”的角色，以抗拒那些对马来人权利和特殊优惠、伊斯兰教地位、马来统治者机制，提出质疑者。它也会制定和实施行动计划：

“……在马来人利益和伊斯兰教课题上，反击任何挑衅。”（8）

政府和这些团体同谋，是显而易见的。保安部队不仅疏于职守，而且还对极端右翼分子和种族主义者的胡作非为，采取宽容态度。

### 马来黑帮—内政部长在马六甲的谈话

2013年9月6日，内政部长查希（Zahid Hamidi）在马六甲，向巫统忠实信徒发表诽谤性谈话。这些情景逃不过网络报章记者的摄影机。这位部长在巫统支持者面前，得意忘形，不小心透露：（9）

- （1）他本身和马来黑社会挂钩，并鼓励他们进行活动；
- （2）他是一个不折不扣的种族主义者，偏袒马来黑帮，并把华人定性为黑帮首脑，印度人则是黑帮打手；
- （3）他表明警方采取的政策是：“先开枪再说”，完全无视人权和法治。

虽然“三线帮”（马来黑帮‘Three Line Gang’）已列为内政部所取缔的49个黑帮团伙之一，查希却公开暴露，他是这马来黑帮的秘密支持者。他辩解说，他们不是真正的私会党徒，而只是



“节日黑帮分子”（“festival gangsters”）。这究竟是什么意思，众人皆不知所云。

一个更加不祥之兆是，有个视频镜头显示，内政部长诱哄这些私会党徒，继续“做他们应该做的事”。内政部长这么揭露，恰好印证了“大马人民之声”多年来所指出的事实，那就是，马来西亚警方的政策是：“先开枪再说”。这就难怪警方枪杀案的死亡人数，不断在增加。

当他意识到自己已不慎失言，并察觉到有记者在场时，他即刻提出恐吓性警告，不准所有在场记者，报道他这则令人震惊的谈话。否则，他将亲自封闭他们的报章。过后，主流媒体一如既往，未能维护职业操守，屈服于部长的威胁。但是，《当今大马》则不同，它无视部长的恐吓，毅然发表了部长令人震惊的爆料。

这类种族主义挑衅，和挑起马来种族情绪，有助于确保巫统垄断政权，达致“马来中心主义”所期望的目的。在这个过程中，这类种族主义宣传，转移了马来贫穷阶层，对现实问题的视线，也转移了他们对统治精英的愤慨。统治精英应负起制造这类问题的责任。

### 第13届大选后：巫统实施土著主义政策进行报复行动

2013年5月5日举行的第13届大选，国阵赢得国会222议席中的133席，保住了国会多数议席。但是，国阵只获得全国总票数的47.38%而已，不到一半。反观反对党联盟一民联，则赢得了超过半数，50.87%的多数选票。

大选后不久，只因非马来人支持反对党，巫统决定惩罚他们。在国家立的大学中，只保留19%的学额给华族学生，印族学生只得4%学额。实际上，两个族群的学生人数加起来，等于全国学生总人数的30%。（10）

政府公然偏袒巫统利益的情况，也反映在“马来西亚钢铁厂有限公司”（简称Masteel—马钢）课题上。马钢通过直接谈判方式（而不是通过公开招标方式）获得柔佛州依斯干达发展区耗资10亿令吉的通勤铁路（commuter railway）项目。执政党巫统通过“KUB有限公司”拥有马钢40%股权。此外，马钢还获得7亿令吉的政府长期低利贷款，来发展这项目。（11）

第13届大选后，巫统回归马哈迪的极端种族主义政治。这和纳吉大选前的口号“一个马来西亚”背道而驰。这是180度的大转弯。纳吉原本想通过“一个马来西亚”口号来拉拢或吸引其他族群，争取选票。

如上所述，巫统昔日的马来沙文主义活动，现在已外包给马来极端右翼组织，如：土权会等团体。后者寻求延长亲马来人的歧视性政策。纳吉在大选前，试图削减“新经济政策”下的马来族特殊优惠。现在看来在政治上是徒劳的。

2014年10月10，在他的《2015年预算案》演词中，首相纳吉老调重弹，声称：巫统的标准立场是，土著只有效果地控制了企业股权的10%而已，所以还不如人意。这种老调立刻引起“政策措施研究中心”主任林德宜的反应：

“这个数字似乎是‘大力按摩’过的，因为这结论并未经过严格研究得出的……如果把政府官联公司（GLC）包括在内，显然土著控制的股权，是远远不止于此的。”（12）

### 沙巴移民问题

2013年7月17日，沙巴政治人物兼《星报》（STAR）主席杰弗里（Jeffrey Kitingan）暴露了巫统内“马来中心主义”的议程。他在“沙巴移民皇家调查委员会”上陈述，巫统设计了沙巴州穆斯林人口的急速增长。

他声称，巫统“蓄意”改变沙巴州的人口结构，增加州内的穆斯林人口，以便使巫统进军沙州合理化。穆斯林原本只有沙巴人口的5%-6%。但是，目前沙巴的马来人口，比起其他任何群体都更多。

他声称，1990年，一名官员暗地里告诉他，有一个“计划”正在进行中。跟据这个计划，政府准备颁发公民权给非法移民。不久，他在《内安法令》下被逮捕，从1991年被扣留到1994年。（13）

## “加强土著经济理事会”

非土著在第13届大选中，顽抗国阵。这样反国阵表现，令纳吉采取报复行动。2013年9月14日，纳吉成立了“加强土著经济理事会”（Bumiputera Economic Empowerment Council），为“增强土著权力”而拨出马币300多亿。

他感谢“马来人和土著社群，在第13届大选中，支持、托付、信任国阵。”（14）为了避免任何人存有任何幻想，纳吉提醒土著，谁才有资格成为“土地之子”：

“在2010年巫统大会上，我曾提到爪哇人是马来人，武吉士人是马来人，也提到Banjar是马来人，米南加保人肯定是马来人，那些发源于亚齐的是马来人。其实，改信伊斯兰教的，也被定义为马来人。甚至印度穆斯林（Mamak）和Malbari人……已被吸收为马来人。”（15）

“加强土著经济理事会”进行一个“五管齐下”的活动，目的是为了进一步加强：土著人力资本、企业股权所有制、非金融资产、创业和商业、提供服务和生态系统：

“由于马来人和土著，在最近的第13届大选中，支持（国阵），今天，政府决定进行大变更，以便实施具体的、全面的策略和方法。”（16）

纳吉的新作风包括：提供许多经济方案和资援，协助土著，当作他们投票支持国阵的奖励：

（1）为了提高土著的人力资本，政府提出许多计划，提升土著青年的技能，为“马拉活动组织”（GiatMARA）提供额外拨款。“全国青年技能学院”为失业土著提供更多的培训计划。有关的政府机构，如：公共服务部门、MARA大学毕业后，多增加教育课程，以满足市场的需要。

（2）为了增加土著在企业领域的股权，国民投资公司（PERNAS）推出“土著信托基金2”（ASB2），注入100亿个单位的股权。Equinas（政府资助的私人股票投资机构）则负责推动一项叫“Skim Jejak Jaya Bumiputera”计划，指导土著公司如何在“大马交易所”挂牌。

（3）为了加强土著非金融资产，如：房屋、工业厂房、商业综合大厦，“马来西亚回教善行基金会”将提升为一个法人实体。加强产业机构[如：“房地产投资公司”（Pelaburan Hartanah Berhad），MARA、“全国实业家公司”（Perbadanan Usahawan Nasional Berhad）]所扮演的角色，特别在全国的关键位置发展或获取工商业资产。

（4）加强“城市发展局公司”、政府关联企业、政府关联工业（GLICs）所扮演的角色，帮助发展土著资产，包括：城市地区的住屋、综合大厦、贸易场所，工商建筑物。

（5）为了扩大土著创业和商业活动，加强土著企业家机构（如：Amanah Ikhtiar Malaysia, Tekun Nasional, Mara和PUNB）所扮演的角色，以便在全国（包括沙巴和砂拉越在内）增加土著企业家的人数，。

另额外增加拨款马币3亿给Amanah Ikhtiar Malaysia，连续5年。这个组织的朋友大多数是妇女。到了2015年，人数从35万增加到50万。同时，政府还额外拨款7亿给TEKUN Nasional。还预计Tekun企业家人数，从2013年的27万，会增加到2015年的37万。

（6）政府关联公司受指示，必须加强“供应商发展计划”（VDP）包括：石油和天然气领域的“国家石油公司”（Petronas）；能源领域的“国家能源公司”（TNB）；通讯领域的“电讯和亚通（AXIATA）公司”；种植业中的森那美和“联邦土地发展局全球创投”；建筑业的“友乃德工程”（UEM）等。（17）

为了实现这个新的亲土著倡议，所有政府官联公司的首席执行官，必须制定土著参与的目标（包括让供应商收购的目标）。这还包括各公司首席执行官，必须提供“主要绩效指标”（KPI）。

直到2017年，石油和天然气领域的土著公司，在上游和下游服务者，每年将获得价值200亿的合同，而从中可获取利益。（注：“上游”指勘探与生产方面的工作。“下游”指提炼石油和净化天然气的工作。）

## “私营上市合作单位”——提升私营化计划

为了提升私营化计划，付托“私营上市合作单位”（Private Public Cooperation Unit - Ukas）负起一项任务，那就是，选择性为土著鉴定，值得私营化的政府服务领域。地铁项目已实践了这项政策。地铁工程的47%（价值等于马币90亿）已交由土著公司负责。

已确定私营化的另4个项目是：默迪卡遗产塔工程（50亿）、武吉免登市中心项目（50亿）、MATRADE展览中心（150亿）、“双溪毛糯橡胶研究所”发展项目（9亿）。

为了实现发展土著创业目标，将制定一项新计划，命名为“土著新企业家启动计划”（SUPERB），协助那些初创公司的运作。在3年内，政府将为这计划拨款1亿。SUPERB将提供津贴50万令吉，给那些在策略方面有潜能、具有创意和创新的新企业家。

同时，为了确保土著的社会经济发展，在各个政府部门设立的“土著发展单元”（UPB - Bumiputera Development Units），提出建议，实践土著议程的倡议。（18）

## 伊斯兰民粹主义思潮升级

2003年，阿都拉巴达威从马哈迪手中接过政权。他推出“伊斯兰文明社会”版本，即：形式较为温和的伊斯兰教。然而，他无法阻止伊斯兰意识形态进展的脚步，因为伊斯兰党为了争取穆斯林的人心，展开激烈的竞争。

由于欠缺宗教宽容态度，“道德警察”活动崛起。他们的行动包括：地方当局突袭私人住宅，甚至酒店；从殡仪馆强抢改教者的尸体；强行拆散父母与儿女，只因其中一名家长，在其配偶不知情的情况下，令孩子改信伊斯兰教。（19）

巴达威任职期间的特点是，他必须面对宗教狂热分子的攻击。但是，他显得束手无策，无奈至极。书籍被查禁（20）。甚至由政府组织组成的联盟（“第11条”联盟），举办不同宗教信仰者之间的对话时，一些伊斯兰宗教偏执狂前来骚扰，对话不得不终止。巴达威却选择支持宗教极端分子的恶劣行为。

在深陷种族和宗教泥潭的时刻，时任副首相纳吉，却发表挑衅性声明宣称，马来西亚是一个伊斯兰国，从来不是世俗国。（21）

在伊斯兰民粹主义升级的氛围中，联邦法院不愿聆听吉隆坡天主教大主教管区的荣誉退休大主教，在“阿拉”案中的上诉申请。这是意料中事。就如许多马来西亚人所预料的那样，联邦法院法官以4对3多数票，决定维持上诉庭的原判，禁止天主教周刊《先驱报》，使用“阿拉”一词。

最令人关注的是，法官并没触及案件的核心问题，即：宗教自由受威胁的问题。虽然这核心问题明明摆在法官面前，但是，他们却绕开回避了。（22）从那时起，巫统领袖和其他伊斯兰主义者纷纷跟进，宣称是为了捍卫他们的信仰。他们声称，伊斯兰教正面临来自基督教徒的攻击；基督教徒热衷于改变穆斯林同胞的信仰。

禁止非穆斯林使用“阿拉”字眼，显然是违反《联邦宪法》的，同时也违反了《1963年马来西亚协议》。这协议规定，宗教自由必须列入《宪法》条文中。《宪法》也不可把联邦宗教的条文，强加于沙巴和砂拉越两州。

独立后50多年，表面上，国家在迈向一个多元和包容的社会。然而，巫统领导人似乎一心想迎合种族和宗教民粹主义，所以把马来西亚宗教不宽容的一面，推向危险边缘。

## 制度性的种族主义

今天，马来西亚的种族主义和种族歧视，已在各方面制度化

了。在所有的国家机构里，马来西亚人从生到死，必须在官方文件中，申报自己属于哪一“种族”。出生、学校、申请身份证、驾驶执照、银行户口、护照、结婚证书、死亡证书等，以及在跟政府机关和商业上的来往，都必须申报自己属于哪一“种族”。

对民主权利来说，影响更加深远。“种族”作为区分的标志，已成了这些机构决定提供利益多寡的标准，特别是在教育、奖学金、执照、商业等方面。

执政党巫统仍然继续坚持“马来人团结”，甚至坚持“马来人主导地位”的立场。他们认为，要达致民族团结，这些立场是必要的。“马来人主导地位”总是和“马来人特别优惠”交替使用。这些马来统治精英，则利用《马来西亚联邦宪法》来为这些错误论调进行辩护。（23）

### （1）民事服务：族群组成极端不平衡

2011年8月，国会有人提询民事服务的课题，所得到的答复透露：民事服务（政府公务员）的族群组成，显得极端不平衡。国内第二大族群—华族的子弟，被录取为政府公务员的只有2%而已。

（24）在政府各部门的种族不平衡的比例，可以从下面的列表10.1看得出来。（24）

列表10.1：2011年—政府各部门的种族比例

政府部门	马来族	华族
首相署	31,297	797
乡村发展	2,442	18
联邦直辖区	2,442	18
青年与体育部	2,980	32
内政部	40,263	614
工程部	6,221	156
卫生部	130,106	9,500
财政部	15,835	508
外交部	1,215	53
教育部	273,791	43,669
旅游部	455	19
妇女、家庭、社区发展	5,461	75
新闻部通讯与文化部	8,839	402
高等教育部	15,012	334
交通部	9,028	205
国防部	12,078	113
房屋与地方政府部	11,363	173

[资料来源：2011.8.20 Free Malaysia Today]

下面的列表显示了，2005年6月，马来西亚各级公务员的种族组成。

列表10.2：2005年6月马来西亚各级公务员的种族组成

种族	高层 管理人员		管理层 人员		支援的 专业人员		总数	
	人数	%	人数	%	人数	%	人数	%
马来族	1,370	83.95	155,871	81.65	535,495	75.77	692,736	77.03
华族	151	9.25	17,896	9.37	66,248	9.37	84,295	9.37
印族	83	5.08	9,777	5.12	36,194	5.12	46,054	5.12
其他								
土著	23	1.41	6,156	3.22	3,649	9.01	69,828	7.77
其他	5	0.31	1,203	0.63	5,129	0.73	6,337	0.70
总数	1,632	100	190,903	100	706,715	100	899,250	100

[资料来源：2005年12月7日，Munusamy A/L Mareemuthu议员在国会提出询问，首相署政治秘书Datuk Mohd. Johari Baharum所作出答复。]

从上面列表，可以看出，非马来族群和东马土著族群，在各级民事服务领域，代表性是远远不足的。这就令人关注民族和谐与民族平等的课题。（25）

种族歧视的一个突出例子是，所有政府设立的大学，完全没有非土著担任校长职。在早年独立的时候，情况并不是这样的。这肯定对非土著所应享有的公平待遇和民主权利，产生了不良后果，也不利于马来西亚教育体系，追求培养英才之举。

看看下面的数字，今天，马来西亚民事服务，跟“新经济政策”实施前的情况，相比之下，非马来族的人数，明显在急剧下降：

列表10.3：1970和2009年—马来西亚半岛公务员的种族比例

族群	高等公共 服务				高层 管理层			
			合计				合计	
	1970				2009			
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
马来族	1,863	39.3	48,946	64.5	1,360	79.3	932,225	76.2
华族	1,636	34.5	13,925	18.3	165	9.6	72,875	6.0
印族	961	20.3	11,893	15.7	120	7.0	50,140	4.1
其他	284	5.9	1,111	1.5	38	2.2	78,533	6.4
其他土著					32	1.9	89,174	7.3
共	4,744	100	75,875	100	1,715	100	1,222,947	100

[资料来源：Lim Hong Hai, “The Public service and ethnic restructuring under the NEP” in Gomez, E.T. & Saravamuttu, J, “The New Economic Policy in Malaysia”, NUS 2013: 177-82.]



臃肿不堪的行政机构，工作人员的人数，以马来人占多数。这有利于巫统统治阶级达致民粹主义目标。政府从种族角度考量，通过经济计划，慷慨施舍利益和福利给马来人。这些措施包括：政府公务员的医疗卫生设施，所获得的优待，包括：奖学金、高等教育收生计划、养老金计划、退休行政人员享受车马费折扣；在政府酒店，享有酒店费折扣等。

警察等部门和机构，越来越多关于利用种族来划分的指控。这些都是明显的危险迹象。如果不希望这些指控日益增加而失控，那么，在招募更高层次新人，就迫切需要改变方法和种族比例。

### （2）司法制度：民事法庭不愿对伊斯兰课题作出裁决

据估计，在司法体系中，超过90%都是马来穆斯林法官。近年来，伊斯兰主义者一直在不断影响司法制度。1988年，《联邦宪法》进行了修订。在《联邦宪法》下，伊斯兰法庭肯定低于民事法庭。但是，在实践中，如果有非穆斯林纠缠于两个不同司法系统之间，民事法院法官不愿意对这类问题作出裁决。

2014年1月24日，前首席大法官阿都哈密（Abdul Hamid Mohamad）表露出了他的种族主义心态。他声称，基督徒使用“阿拉”一词作为一种策略，是要使马来人和东马原住民互相对抗。他还警告说，少数族群的目的，是要消除马来人所得的一切。如果马来人四分五裂，他们会变本加厉，更加胆大妄为。他们设法影响某些马来政党领导人跟他们合作。（26）

### （3）教育制度—存在种族歧视现象

近年来，政府的种族主义政策，体现在教育政策和经济政策的种族歧视现象。以及继续限制现有的华文学校和淡米尔学校的发展。相关统计数据，可说明一切。

1957年，国家独立时，共有1,342所华文小学，86所华文中学。淡米尔小学则有800多所。今天，全国人口已增加了一倍，但是，现在只有1,284所华文小学，60所华文独立中学。淡米尔小学则减少到刚超过500所而已。（27）

在政府预算案拨款方面，主要得益者是以马来语作为教学媒介语的学校。这些马来学校获得“完全辅助”。获得“部分辅助”的

是，以华语作为教学媒介语的小学，以及以淡米尔语授课的小学。它们所获取的拨款，还受到不利的限制。得到“部分资助”的华印学校所分配到的，只是教师薪俸；所有其他费用，都必须由各自的族群筹款承担。

华族社群多年来设法自己解决经费问题。但是，淡米尔社群经济情况较差，资金不足。所以，淡米尔小学经常入不敷出，导致学童学习表现差。全国淡米尔儿童人口的一半，进入淡米尔小学就读。在523所淡米尔小学中，大约有371所迫切需要援助。尽管这种情况长期影响着这些淡米尔学童，然而，政府继续否认这种情况的存在。（28）

在国民学校求学的非土著学生，也遭受种族歧视，如：在进入特殊学校和获取奖学金方面，受到歧视。每年都会重复发生这样的事件：非土著优秀学生在本地国立大学，被拒就读他们选修的科系。例如：最近，马华副教育部长魏家祥博士质疑，“公共服务局”（PSD）颁发外国学位奖学金的方式，缺乏透明度。许多成绩优秀的非土著学生，申请不到奖学金。（29）

与此同时，政府则为土著提供极其足够的教育。至少有42所精英寄宿学校—“玛拉理科初级学院”（Maktab Rendah Sains Mara - MRSM）。其他寄宿学校，还有1万2,440个学额（30）。这些学校的学生，几乎完全是马来穆斯林。只有几名象征性的非土著学生在这类学校就读，只因为他们都是运动健将，能为学校争光，增添光彩。

非土著学生也被拒于其他名校校门之外，如：皇家军事学院、阿米努丁峇基学院、大学预科课程、瓜拉江沙马来学院等。值得注意的是，这些学院全部资金，来自马来西亚的纳税人。

要进入本地国立大学，可通过两种不同的课程：一种是为期12个月的大学预科班；另一种是为期18个月，更为严格的高级文凭班。大学预科班课程，主要保留给马来学生。（31）他们进入大学的标准的依据，是武断的，而不是透明的。

获取选修课程、奖学金、贷学金的标准，也是缺乏透明度的。进入本地国立大学，优先权也保留给土著学生。有一所大学—国际回教大学（UiTM），在2011年，学生人数有17万，只招收土著学

生而已。另外19所本地国立大学，所招收的学生，绝大多数也是马来学生。

竞争性强的课程，在招收学生方面，也存在种族歧视现象。本地国立大学的医学系，只有极少数的非土著学生，能侥幸获得学额。例如，2010年，全国27所理工学院，文凭班课程有6万2,000个学额，学士学位课程有6万个学额。但是，只有极少数学额，是分配给非马来学生的，并且不考虑他们资格高低。（32）

在马来西亚的教育体系内，存在严重的种族歧视现象。这是对国家进步和发展的最大障碍之一。巫统领袖们越早承认和面对这个现实，对国家会更有好处。

#### （4）宗教课题：伊斯兰法庭冲击宗教自由权利

虽然《联邦宪法》规定，马来西亚有宗教自由，但是，也同时对宗教自由权利施加限制。所有马来人一出世就是穆斯林。宪法规定，伊斯兰教是“联邦宗教”。

1988年，《联邦宪法》第121条被修改了，承认伊斯兰法庭的权限和法律。修正法的目的是，要伊斯兰法庭对穆斯林群体的婚姻和个人法律，进行裁决。然而，每当穆斯林和非穆斯林之间起争端，司法机关往往不作出应有的裁决，却把权力下放，由层次级别较低的伊斯兰法庭审理。这些案件常涉及脱离伊斯兰教，皈依其他宗教的课题。还有家庭法中某些领域，涉及穆斯林和非穆斯林之间的纠纷。

马来西亚的伊斯兰法，不允许穆斯林皈依其他宗教，也不允许放弃伊斯兰信仰。法律还严格禁止非穆斯林，在穆斯林群体中传教。但是，反过来，穆斯林可在非穆斯林群体中传教，没有这类法律限制。

##### 1. 马廉姆地（Maniam Moorthy）案

2010年8月21日，上诉庭对马廉姆地（Maniam Moorthy）一案作了判决。这个判决是一个很好的例子，正好说明，司法机关判案的趋势，令人不安。司法机关放弃其权力，由层次较为低级的伊斯兰法庭来行使。其实，伊斯兰法庭只能在婚姻、离婚、财产分配等个人法律事项中，为穆斯林群体服务（33）

##### 2. 丽娜彩（Lina Joy）案

丽娜彩（Lina Joy）年龄42岁，出生在一个穆斯林马来夫妇家庭。她26岁时，改教而信奉基督教。国民登记局作出决定，不允许她把身份证上的“伊斯兰”字眼删掉。为此，她诉诸法律。（34）然而，2007年5月30日，联邦法院驳回了她的上诉案。这是她最后一轮的上诉机会。她败诉了。国家最高层次的法院作出这样的判决，实际上，已剥夺了她自行选择宗教的自由权利。宗教自由是宪法保障下的自由权利。

##### 3. 天主教《先驱报》案

2008年，政府向天主教《先驱报》发出警告，如果《先驱报》马来文版不停止使用“阿拉”字眼，其出版准证可能会被吊销。这份报章发行量大约有1万2,000份，以4种语文出版。《先驱报》和吉隆坡教区大主教，选择把政府告上法庭，目的是为了推翻不准使用“阿拉”字眼的裁决。（35）

穆斯林团体因而进行抗议活动和暴力威胁，声称基督教徒这类行为，是在“挑战伊斯兰教的地位”。不久，有几间基督教堂遭到袭击，并遭投掷燃烧弹。在这场纷争中，至少有一间教堂严重受损。

##### 4. 妈祖雕像事件

2008年，在沙巴州，穆斯林神职人员制定一项宗教法规（fatwa），要沙巴州政府取消当地道教徒兴建高达108英尺的妈祖雕像（妈祖是传说中的海洋女神）。其实，地方当局早已批准了这项妈祖雕像的建造。但是，州政府却把它取消掉。理由是，妈祖雕像会冒犯穆斯林。（36）

##### 5. 兴都教礼拜场所

兴权会（Hindraf）声称，兴都教礼拜场所，原本是建立在大胶园里，属于政府的胶园地上，却被有计划地摧毁了。据估计，约有1万个兴都教礼拜场所被拆除。政府所作出的辩解是，据称，这些场所是非法建造的，或，已占用了政府的土地。（37）

## 国家干训班—灌输种族主义思想

在“新经济政策”下，多年来，有个公开的秘密：在政府机构里，马来学生和公务员必须接受“国家干训局”的“灌输”课程。[“国家干训局”（Biro Tata Negara - BTN）是政府在首相署所设立的一个机构]，这国家机构成立于1974年，其明确的目标是：

“培育马来西亚人具有爱国主义和精益求精的精神，培养领导人和未来领导者，坚决支持国家的发展计划”。（38）

这些年来，据报道，干训局的课程，毫不掩饰地公开宣扬“马来人主导地位”，有党性地亲向掌权的国阵。（39）2009年后期，针对这干训班，有许多关于种族主义和政治宣传的指控，在网络报章上浮出水面。

雪兰莪州议会Seri Setia区州议员聂纳兹米（Nik Nazmi Nik Ahmad）指出，他所参加过的BTN干训营具有“种族和政治性质”。培训师告诉学员，马来人还需要“扶弱政策”，并批评反对党伊斯兰党（PAS）为“偏离分子”。（40）

黑风洞州议员阿米鲁丁（Amirudin Shari）声称：“学员被灌输的是关于“马来人主导地位”和“外来威胁”的宣传。（41）另一名学员说，培训师教导他们说，华人是“亚洲的犹太人”，参与阴谋推翻政府。（42）

副首相丹斯里慕尤丁为干训班辩护说，干训班课程灌输的是，民族主义和马来西亚人的团结，所以符合首相“一个大马”的理念。（43）但是，不久，首相署部长纳兹里对记者说，内阁已下令修改干训班课程，消除与“一个大马”理念不一致的元素。

纳兹里直言批评，否认外人对于干训班所提出的指控，那是徒劳的，因为“……那些曾经在政府内部工作的反对党成员，如：反对党领袖安华等，都知道实情。那么，有什么好否认的呢？”他补充说，BTN干训班曾经被利用来吹捧某些政治领袖。（44）

前首相马哈迪也决定参与辩论。他捍卫干训班时指出，BTN课程旨在为公务员和学者灌输纪律和勤奋工作的价值观。不过，这很快就导致这两名巫统忠实老党员公开对骂。这是前所未有的事。

纳兹里支持首相的“一个大马”活动，指责马哈迪的说法，是“真正的种族主义言论”。他批评前首相和《马来西亚前锋报》竟敢矢口否认人们对于干训班的指责：

“不要以为外人不知道，干训班课程大纲是根基于马来人的爱国主义……他们知道课程大纲是怎么一回事。那么，我们怎能说，事情并没有发生过？你真要撒谎？那你就让人当作笑柄。我的意思是说，有些人参加过这些课程过后，非常生气。”

“课程多处使用像‘马来人主导地位’的字眼。这是荒谬至极的……难道他们想说，马来西亚只属于马来人，而政府只是马来人的政府？是不是只有马来人应贯输爱国主义精神？其他种族不爱自己的国家吗？”（45）

马哈迪回应时，有意或无意地暴露了巫统的种族主义性质。他指出纳兹里虚伪的一面：

“如果纳兹里说我是种族主义者，那我就肯定是一个种族主义者。别再说我不是种族主义者。他什么都知道。他属于一个种族主义的政党……那就是巫统……巫统是一个种族主义政党。只有马来人才可加入巫统，其他人不行。也就是说，他（纳兹里）是在一个种族主义政党内。但是，他说他反对种族主义。那么，他就应该退党。”（46）

这两名巫统忠实老党员之间的争吵，使我们有机会确定马来学生和公务员，自1970年代起，就接受国家机构灌输种族主义思想。这是一个不可否认的事实。同时，也确认，巫统是一个种族主义的政党。

## 针对印度族群的种族主义措施

针对马来西亚印裔公民，政府采取的是一种特殊形式的种族主义。为了使“马来人主导地位”合法化，华裔和印裔的马来西亚人，被定性为“应该知道自己地位的外来移民”，以区别于政府所定性为“土著”（“土地之子”）者，以及马来极端右翼分子。

因此，“513事件”经常被用来作为一种威慑，以阻遏对现状

不满所进行的任何挑战，不论是在大选期间，还是单纯对巫统不公平政策所提出的挑战。

近年来，出现了一种模式：印裔人口虽然占总人口的比例不到10%，却在官方统计数据里，警方拘留期间死亡事件和警察枪杀事件中，大部分受害者是印裔。（47）这些令人震惊的统计数据，是国家机构对印度族群边缘化的种族主义写照。

这些年来，我们也见证了主流媒体和教科书，对印裔族群的种族辱骂，次数频繁。例如：1985年10月，由马来作家曼苏阿都拉（Mansur Abdullah）撰写的“马来古典文学”中，一些段落，含有诋毁和贬低印度人之意。因此，引起印裔社区，群起表示抗议。（48）

有人投诉，在一些高等学府，出现反印裔的种族主义论调。网络媒体的这篇文章指出：

“我的朋友在上社会学课时，因为不同意讲师提出的观点，而遭辱骂。

讲师告诉他：‘你一定是DKK’。

‘什么是DKK？’他问。

讲师指着他的黝黑皮肤说：‘你一定含有吉宁后裔的血液’（‘吉宁’是称呼印度人的贬义词）”。（49）

故意刁难印裔学生的种族主义行为，也发生在主要马来人占多数的寄宿学校：

“在寄宿学校的少数族群，必然会体验过一些不愉快的经历。少数群体，必须尽量适应占绝大多数土著学生的新环境。其他族群，尤其是印裔学生，必须接受新情况，即：常常会被称为‘吉宁’，或是重复押韵的‘lingko-lingko’贬义称呼。”（50）

### “2001年甘榜美丹暴力事件”

从2001年3月8-23日，八打灵甘榜美丹（Kampung Medan），有5名印度人被杀害，100多名印度人受重伤。这是怀有种族动机的犯罪行为。警方则声称，他们“无法控制当时的事态”。事实上，

所有这些事件，都发生在10平方公里范围内，并且警方已封锁了那地区。虽然公民社会针对这事件大声疾呼，但是，直到今天，政府对这件事一直都没有进行公正的调查，也没有设法把犯下这些暴行的罪犯绳之以法。

“2001年甘榜美丹暴力事件”的官方版本述说，这次“骚乱”是由某些事件引发的。这些事件，会“自然”发生在一个被忽略的城市贫民窟。

写作人纳格拉仁（Nagarajan）和阿鲁姆根（Arumugam）（51）以文件证明，暴力事件是从2001年3月8日开始，在八打灵一个相对较小的飞地发生，当局却任由其蔓延了好几天。悲惨事件最后一次是发生在3月23日。

警方这么迟才采取行动揭示了，我们执法单位和保安部队，是否可靠的严重问题。这些单位和部队未负起责任，逮捕使用种族暴力的歹徒，也没有进行调查，是谁组织这次暴力事件。这究竟是什么原因？

目击者叙述表明，一些种族性的袭击发生时，警察只是站在一边，袖手旁观，没有阻止和逮捕那些滋事的歹徒。这样的观察结果，和1969年“513”大屠杀期间发生的情况，大同小异。也就是说，保安部队并没有发挥专业公正的作用。这些专业行为正是大家对他们所期望的。

就如1969年那样，这次事件并非一般马来人和非马来人之间的“种族冲突”。从甘榜美丹的事件看来，显然，这个不同族群聚居的社区，族群之间的情谊也存在于以往1969年5月的甘榜峇鲁。涉及这次暴力事件的嫌犯，都是来自这社区之外。是“看不见的手”，把这些法西斯歹徒带进甘榜里来的。

警察部队和保安部队责无旁贷，必须逮捕这些歹徒，揭露出“看不见的手”，暴露他们的议事日程。毕竟，我们马来西亚警察部队，是世界这个角落最好的警察部队之一。他们是早在1950年代，由英国殖民势力培养出来，应付紧急状态的。对于这点，他们引以为傲。

他们在《内安法令》下展开逮捕行动，摧毁数以千计的民众示



威，以其速度之快而见称！值得注意的是，就在2001年甘榜美丹种族暴力事件发生之前，所谓的“马来行动阵线”极端右翼组织，举办了一个集会。在集会上，有人挑衅性地举起出鞘的马来短剑。这个集团誓死捍卫“马来民族至上主义”。（52）

### 橡胶—棕油—屋业发展

由于世界市场上油棕价格高涨，酝酿期更短，劳动密集较低，所以，种植油棕成了企业利益集团更加有利可图的投资。为世代代印裔工人阶级提供族群社区的大园丘，消失了。从此，印裔工人阶级就不得不离开胶园，流离失所。印裔工人阶级因而被边缘化。应该从这个背景来理解，印裔族群为什么会面对种族主义的侵袭。（53）

官僚资本家收购外商独资大胶园和矿业公司，因而出现了“经济民族主义”。但是，胶园里的印裔社群的生活，并没有多大变化。（54）到了1982年，这些国营企业代表“马来人”，占有60%的采矿业和种植业公司股权。（55）但是，许多大园丘工人的生活，并没有什么改善。实际上，新的管理层反而雇佣外劳，控制劳工的供应。（这点，往往没有文件可证明。）（56）

尽管马来西亚人均收入显著提高，从1968年的992令吉，增加到2000年的1万零300令吉，但是，在同一时期，胶工的日薪从3.10令吉，只增加到17.83令吉。消费价格指数则提高了3倍，从100点增加到297点。（57）

1980年代中期，橡胶和棕油价格低廉，促使种植公司把农业地转化为屋业发展地段。他们从中获取巨大的利润。因此，大园丘的种植地从1983年的90万6,000公顷，缩减为1992年的70万4,000公顷。在同一个时期，大园丘工人数目从10万5,000名，减少到5万9,000名。（58）

大园主出售土地给发展商，获取暴利。但是，他们尽量避免支付合理的补偿，给那些被裁退或被逼离开的工人。这些工人因而失去了工作和棲身之所。

政府也忽略了这些流离失所的种植工友和他们的家庭。政府未确保他们得到应有的补偿，也没为他们安排住所和再培训。捍卫种植工友权益的“种植工友联合会”（NUPW）也没有扮演好工人对它所

期望的角色。工会只为工友解决了他们最低限度的补偿金。（59）

政府跟一些官联公司，如：PNB等勾结。政府原本可以阻止发展商逼迫园丘工人及其家属搬迁，直到双方达成协议为止。在某些情况下，政府利用国家机器，残酷镇压被迫迁而流离失所者（如1997年，发生在沙阿南的例子）。（60）在另一些情况下，联邦政府和州政府征用大园丘，进行某些发展项目，却没有提供足够的补偿和替代性住处给受影响的家庭。（61）

印裔园丘工人和他们的家庭被迫搬离园丘。在“新经济政策”下，又没有机会接受再培训，也不能获得援助，因为他们不是土著。他们被迫涌向城镇，接受工资低微的职业，或进入非正规领域工作。他们只能住在城市贫民窟。

大众媒体把印裔工人阶级描绘成“低下层阶级”，只一味强调他们惯于群殴，或犯下其他罪行。他们一向来受到嘲笑，并遭到种族性的诋毁。（62）

2009年8月28日，八打灵一批马来穆斯林，群起表示抗议，兴都教寺庙坐落在他们的住所附近。抗议者携带了割下的牛头，对它进行百般侮辱，表现出他们完全无视兴都教徒的感受。警方却没有对这些犯罪者采取任何行动。然而，当16名兴都教徒在独立广场，举行和平烛光游行，对亵渎兴都教的象征事件，表示抗议时，警方竟然把他们逮捕。（63）

不过，印裔工人阶级也不是消极被动的。1990年代，大园丘工友工作和生活条件奇差，因而要求提高工资和改善住房设施，继而表示抗议。他们在国会、政府机关、种植公司总部面前，进行示威抗议。（64）

他们奋勇抗拒多宗迫迁行动。这些事件发生在宝马地产（1993-2003年）、武吉日落洞（1992-2004）、武吉丁宜（2001-2003）等地。凭借着完善的组织和亲自参与行动，一些工人和他们的家庭，设法争取到房屋和其他设施被破坏的适当赔偿。（65）

事实证明，反印裔的种族主义行为是非理性的。按照马来西亚社会的人口比例，印裔族群只占7%而已，但是，全国多达25%的医生、律师、兽医，都是印裔马来西亚人。（66）

## 原住民所面对的种族主义措施

危地马拉原住民领袖、诺贝尔和平奖得主里戈贝塔（Rigoberta Menchu Tum）说：“历史上，‘种族主义’是使扩张、征服、殖民化、统治等冒险事业合理化的一面旗帜。它和不宽容、不公正、暴力形影不离。”

在马来西亚，原住民群体遭到政府、执法机构、砍伐公司和其他公司工人，以同样的种族主义态度对待。只要他们留在祖传习俗地，继续过着他们的传统生活方式，他们就会被描绘成落后和“未开化”。

他们被赶出祖传习俗地。猖獗的伐木活动，大园丘的土地扩张，建设水坝和其他所谓的发展项目，减少或剥夺了他们进行打猎的场地。这不仅发生在东马，也发生在马来西亚半岛。

最近，我们看到，砂州肯定具有种族主义思想的特点。马来西亚政府采用同样的资本主义逻辑思考方法，把原住民赶出他们的祖传习俗地。这些土地的商业价值可以加以利用，而原住民可以被“解放”，成为雇佣劳工。

因此，虽然1997年，由于受金融危机的影响，巴贡水坝工程已暂停，但是，政府仍然一意孤行。1998年，政府迫使整万名原住民群体，搬迁到双溪阿沙（Sungai Asap）移殖区去。（67）

砂拉越政府最近宣布，打算在砂拉越总共建造12个大水坝。这就进一步引起人们的密切关注。马来西亚原住民，又会再次成为这个构思错误的计划下的主要受害者。

我们已得知，多达2万名原住民将被迫搬离他们祖传习俗地，以便让路给巴兰大坝（Baram Dam）。当原住民设立路障，保护他们的土地时，政府竟然采用暴力对付，并且和伐木公司串通为谋。（68）

在西马半岛，原住民也得承担大型工程项目带来的压力，如：受到雪兰莪河水坝和吉隆坡国际机场项目的冲击。他们所遭受的恶劣待遇，和获得的微薄赔偿金，在在反映了政府对原住民所采取的种族主义态度。（69）

## 国家、统治阶级、种族主义

在我们总结前，让我们试试分析一下马来西亚国家的性质，看看统治阶级如何玩弄种族主义手段，对付马来西亚社会各阶层人民。

为了确保到了1990年，至少有30%企业资本掌握在土著手中，巫统使用的主要方法，就是在商业上，采取种族歧视态度。自“新经济政策”开始实施以来，与统治集团有密切关联的土著，在很大程度上，由政府所创造的优惠制度中获取利益。表面上，优惠制度是为了达到“新经济政策”的目标。

因此，1990年，新经济政策有望结束时，在全部企业资本中，土著从1969年占有区区1.5%，增加到19%。1997年发生金融危机，许多土著企业失败了。其中一些还必须动用公帑拯救，才能生存。这就说明，为什么在2004年，股票所有权掉落到谷底。至于2008年的情况，可以从下面列表中见其一斑：

列表10.4：1969-2008—有限公司股本所有权（以%计）

	1969	1990	2004	2008
土著及信托机构	1.5	19.2	18.9	21.9
华族	22.8	45.5	39.0	34.9
印族	0.9	1.0	1.2	1.6
其他	-	-	0.4	0.1
委托公司 (nominee companies)	2.1	8.5	8.0	3.5
本地控制公司	10.1	0.3	-	-
外国人	62.1	25.4	32.5	37.9

[资料来源：《第3大马计划》（1976-1980）—吉隆坡国家印务馆1976年出版；《第9大马计划》（2006-2010）—布城：经济策划小组，2006；《第10大马计划》（2011-2015）—布城：经济策划小组，2010。]

## 林德义博士：土著企业股权早已超过30%

然而，根据马来西亚族群区分资本所有权的统计数据，被歪曲了。林德宜博士特别指出了这一点。他已辞去“亚洲战略研究与领导研究所”（ASLI）的“公共政策研究中心”（Centre for Public Policy Studies）研究主任的高职，因为他坚持研究中心报告的结论，是正确无误的。这份报告显示，土著所拥有的企业股权，比起

政府的统计数据，高得多。

林博士坚决认为，土著所拥有的企业股权可能高达45%，等于3,250亿8,000万。全国市场资本总共则是马币7,150亿。（70）

他指出，如果土著没有变卖自己的股份，其股权可能会高达45%以上。据估计，土著为了获取暴利，已把配给他们的优先股中的40%出售了。（71）

研究中心报告得出结论，“新经济政策”所预期的30%土著股权，早已超过了，并指出，从1970年代继承的官方衡量公司股权分配的方法，太过牵强了。

前首相马哈迪之子米占（Mirzan Mahathir）是ASLI总裁。他发表声明说，那份报告，在方法和假设方面，有缺陷。其结论并不是“完全合理”的。林博士随后就辞职了。（72）林德宜博士享有崇高美誉。他是前联合国区域顾问，世界银行的资深政治学家，获得许多国际学术奖项。

除了企业资本的所有权之外，马来资产阶级的优势，也是马来西亚生活的一个事实。另一个不应否定的事实是：马来资本家与非马来资本家之间的阶级联盟，依然完好无损，尽管他们不断发表种族主义的言论。

毕竟，马来统治阶级正需要非马来资产阶级和外国资产阶级，来完成“新经济政策”下累积资本的目标。这点，从另一事实得以证明。那就是，为了反对和抗议《1975年工业协调法令》的实施，发生了类似罢工的“拒绝投资”事件。（73）

1970-1980年间，私人投资每年实质增长了12%，从马币14.9亿增加到46.4亿。（74）从上述列表，可以看出，非马来资本所有权，从1969年的24%，增加到1990年的46%。但是，到了2008年因金融危机，又下降到36%。上层的非马来资产阶级接受新的事态发展，即：马来统治阶级在资本主义经济领域，享有新的、更大的经济利益。

资产阶级作为一个整体来说（其中包括外国资本家），都获得了利益。国家经济仍然得依赖外国直接投资，才能维持经济的增

长。这是因为，自从“新经济政策”开始实施以来，政府就一直不愿意培育中小型企业的发展。原因是，这些中小型企业，主要是由华族经营的。

此外，为了建立自己的经济基础，马来统治阶级，跟非马来族的商业资产阶级竞争。他们专注于马来农民阶级的信贷和营销需求。政府发给津贴和进行乡村发展，实施民粹主义的措施，为的是收买马来乡村人民。同时，政府机构和企业单位，也为巫统统治阶级提供了经济基础。

尽管政府发配给得宠的朋党，数十亿令吉的优惠和施舍，但是，“新经济政策”还是未能造就所期望的大量独立自主的土著企业家。不过，国家官僚机构的不断膨胀，庞大的开支拨款，发展教育等有利于土著的民粹主义计划，造就了不少土著中产阶级。

## 大马官僚机构一属世界最大之一

马来西亚的官僚机构，属于世界最大之一。2009年，全国总人口是2千600万，公务员就占了130万（等于总人口的4.68%）。相比之下，在新加坡，公务员只占总人口的1.5%。香港是2.3%，而台湾的比例是2.3%。

“……预算案中拨出太多款额，以维持臃肿不堪的民事服务的操作。国家预算案高达四分三的开支，都花在130万名公务员的薪金等福利上……国家预算案拨出这么庞大的款额，来应付这个领域的开支，显然，这根本上是错误的。一般上都认为，这领域是非生产性的，对效率只有不良的影响。（75）

“全国在职的公民有1千零50万人，其中6百40万是有登记的纳税人。但是，真正有缴税的只有1百零14万人。

“目前，我们每年要花马币410多亿（比国库控股和电讯局两者的市值多了10亿）来维持115万名公务员。这是一个惊人的昂贵成本，特别是在对比之下，只有114万名马来亚西人在缴付所得税。”（76）

当前的普遍趋势是，世界许多国家在减少公务员人数。但是，

马来西亚，特别是首相署，情况恰恰相反，不减少反而增加。公务员人数增加了一倍以上，从2万1,000名增加到4万3,554名。美国白宫只雇用1,888名工作人员！两者形成的对比，的确是太鲜明了感觉上，真有天壤之别。（77）

到目前为止，有10名“首相署部长”，在这些部长之下，还有其他重要机构或政府组织，受他们管辖。其中包括：总检察署、反贪污委员会、选举委员会、伊斯兰教发展部、公共服务部、统治者掌玺大臣、委任司法委员会、经济策划小组、海事执法机构等等。（78）

过于庞大的官僚机构和土著民粹主义，造成国家经济巨大的纰漏。2010年，公务员总工会（Cuepacs）主席奥马（Omar Osman）透露，全国公务员中，有41万8,200名涉嫌贪污（等于120万名公务员总人口的41%）（79）

2009年，全球腐败晴雨表（GCB）的报告显示，马来西亚人普遍认为，政党和民事服务是最腐败的群体。政府的反腐运动是毫无效果的。（80）

今天马来西亚社会的阶级结构，有了进一步发展。马来乡村社群，越来越无产阶级化和中产阶级化。下面的列表10.5，土著在管理层和专业方面的比例，已从1970年的22.4%，增加到2008年的51%；熟练工人从1970年的47.2%，增加到2008年的65.2%；半技术工人从1970年的31.3%，增加到2008年的64.6%。

马来工人阶级队伍大幅度壮大，从1970年的生产31.3%、文员33.4%、营销23.9%、服务行业42.9%，在2008年转化成：技术工人65.2%，64.6%半技术工人、非技术工人71.6%。

自1970年代开始，乡村马来人受鼓励迁移到城市中心去，为工业区提供劳动力，同时，也可以在传统非马来人选区，提高马来选民人数。在东马，类似的政治策划也在进行中。政府分发身份证给外国移民，方便他们在选举中参加投票。他们来自印尼和菲律宾。（81）

列表10.5：2008年—以职业和族群划分就业的情况（以%计算）

职业	土著	华族	印族	其他
管理层和专业	51.0	40.7	7.7	0.6
技术工人	65.2	26.2	8.1	0.5
半技术工人	64.6	26.7	7.6	1.1
非技术工人	71.6	15.6	9.9	2.9

[资料来源：2008年—统计部门，劳动力调查结果]

巫统统治阶级和乡村不同阶层的马来中产阶级之间，产生了矛盾。特别是学校教师和宗教教师，他们有能力影响乡村马来社会。具有讽刺意味的是，他们人数越来越多，正是因为土著政策，增加了乡村马来人教育机会的结果。

在某种程度上，这个阶层的马来中产阶级，反对巫统。这是因为他们厌恶马来精英贪污腐败，过着挥霍无度的生活方式。马来精英和大众媒体，公开炫耀这类奢华的生活。所以，伊斯兰党在乡村马来选民所聚居的州属，在选举中取得相当大的斩获。

### 始自1971—非马来中产与工人阶级受种族歧视

自1971年开始，非马来中产阶级和工人阶级，一直在商业、教育等机会方面，遭受到土著政策的歧视。他们终于在2008年和2013年的大选中，集中选票反对国阵。

虽然2013年大选出现政治海啸，在野党民联在选举中获得多数票，但是，不合理的选区划分和“得多数票者胜出”的单选区选举制度，确保国阵在大选中再次获胜。

被边缘化的非马来族群低下层人民，如：工人、小商贩、无业游民、农民、城市拓荒者、渔民、杂工等，要改善他们的赤贫状况，真是难上加难，并没多少选择。政府却把他们和所谓“经济上占主导地位的华人”混为一谈。

“第三个大马计划”估计，1975年，华族人口占主要多数的新村，贫穷率高达58%。（82）然而，政府故意把发展政策和策略，只针对减轻“马来人”的贫穷现象而已。这是因为政府认为，1969年“513事件”，是产生马来贫穷现象的根源。



在非土著族群中，大园丘印裔工人是最贫穷和边缘化的。大胶园转化为油棕园，大胶园被关闭，由工业与屋业发展所取代，加剧了他们的困境，迫使许多印裔胶工和他们的家庭，流落到各城市定居。

根据“第三大马计划”，1975年，大园丘的贫穷率是50%。（83）因此，2007年，兴权会组织了示威游行，参与者以印裔为主。在2008年大选中，这个事件促进政治海啸的产生，有利于在野党民联。

在殖民地时期，武装部队和警察部队，人数大大增加。在1950年代，紧急状态时期，这两种部队的人数进一步扩大。这些国家机器，政府用来进行镇压行动。所招聘的人员当中，非马来人占多数。非马来族的晋升机会也受限制。这使到非马来族对加入军队和警察部队兴趣淡然，特别是在1969年，“513”事件发生过后，更是如此。（84）

政府却反而利用这点，来指责非马来人不爱国，只因为他们不想加入武装部队和警察部队。（85）统计显示，1969年“513”事件发生之前的情况，肯定不是这样的。在“新经济政策”下，种族主义和种族歧视被制度化了，导致今天，马来人占军队和警察总人数的95%以上。

一向来，马来统治阶级所获取的最大支持，来自马来警察和武装军人。1969年5月13日过后，他们的支持力度，明显加强。如果现状遭到挑战，他们将成为最终的威慑力量。它代表着政府种族主义政策最原始的形式，因为它的目的是向马来社会展示，政权还是牢牢掌控在“马来人”手中。

军事官僚机构的最高阶层，在传统上，一向来都是马来统治阶级的组成部分。所以，武装部队参谋长，东姑奥斯曼（Tunku Osman Jawa）将军在“全国行动理事会”（NOC）占有一席之地。NOC是1969年“513”事件发生过后才成立的。当时，国会已停止操作。1969年后，国家资金转入国防开支，武装部队进行扩充。

随着军工业的发展，我们见证了“旋转门”的出现：它简化了相关程序，让退休武装部队首长，易于进入众多的国防企业。（86）

列表10.6：1975-2005—马来西亚武装部队的人员

年份	陆军	海军	空军	总共
1975	51,000	4,800	5,300	61,100
1980	54,000	6,000	6,000	66,000
1985	90,000	9,000	11,000	110,000
1990	105,000	12,500	12,000	129,500
2005	80,000	15,000	15,000	110,000

[资料来源：The Military Balance 2003-4, London International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2003; Asian Defence Journal, Jane's Defence Weekly (various issues)]

首先，武装部队和警察部队为统治阶级服务，作为吸收被剥夺土地的马来农民和城市无业马来人的一种手段。这正如我们所看到的，他们是种族主义政府策略的重要组成部分。

因此，自“第一大马计划”开始，为发展保安措施所拨出的款额，数目相当大。同时，在采购武器的交易中，国防承包商收取佣金的机会，普遍存在。（87）

列表10.7：为发展保安措施和健康各个计划所拨出的款额

计划	保安		健康	
	(百万马币)	(以%计)	(百万马币)	(以%计)
5年计划1(1955-60)	35	3.4	50	5.0
5年计划2(1961-65)	244	9.2	145	6.7
第1大马计划 (1966-70)	550	11.5	147	3.5
第2大马计划 (1971-75)	810	9.1	214	2.9
第3大马计划 (1976-80)	1,024	15.9	174	1.8
第4大马计划 (1981-85)	7,741	12.3	776	1.6
第5大马计划 (1986-90)	4,704	6.8	715	1.0
第6大马计划 (1991-95)	8,400	15.0	2,253	4.1
第7大马计划 (1996-2000)	11,644	11.8	3,726	3.8

计划	保安		健康	
	(百万马币)	(以%计)	(百万马币)	(以%计)
第8大马计划 (2001-05)	10,750	9.8	5,500	5.0
第9大马计划 (2006-10)	14,500	8.1	10,700	6.0
第10大马计划 (2011-15)	23,000	10.0	-未详列-	

[资料来源：多年来的大马5年计划]

### 目前马来西亚的阶级分化现象

巫统党内的统治阶级，还可利用土著思想意识，拉拢马来民众多久呢？自1998年“烈火莫熄”运动所发生的事件，见证了一个事实：种族民粹主义可能不足以解决资本与劳工之间的矛盾，尤其是一个族群内部的矛盾。

族群内部的不平等现象，在马来族群内是最严重的。1990年代，征用土地和强行迫迁马来城市拓荒者，是马来西亚社会最普遍的斗争。（88）

在前面的章节里，我们已经了解到，自从殖民地时代开始，不公平的土地使用权，对小农户的农村改革，具有关键性的阻碍作用。但是，政府一直以来，都拒绝进行土地改革。

独立以来，经济快速增长，但是资本主义工业化措施，还未和农产品基础建立起联系，因而造成农村贫穷现象依然存在。政府机关内的地主阶级利益代表，确保技术创新、土地发展计划、津贴等，主要由富农和地主获得。

政府不专注解决社会各贫穷阶层的特殊需要，反而把马来农民的困境，归罪于“华人主导国家经济”的错误看法上。与此同时，国家的民粹主义土著政策，旨在争取整个马来族群对统治阶级的效忠。其实，这种政策的主要受益人，还是较为富裕的阶层。

新经济政策消除贫穷方面，取得了一定的、令人瞩目的进展，特别是在土著人口占多数的乡村地区。从“第二大马计划”开始，一直到“第6大马计划”，政府拨出20%-40%的发展开支，供消除

贫穷，主要重点放在土著占多数的乡村地区。这可以从下面的列表看得出来。

1996-2005年间，专供消除贫穷的拨款数额，在第7和第8大马计划中，没有明确说明。但是，相信这是相当大的数目。

对于全国来说，1970年，贫穷家庭总共有100万户。到了2002年，下降到只剩下26万7,900户。贫穷率下降了（从52.4%降到5.1%）。

在这期间，城市贫穷率萎缩到2%，而农村贫穷率下降到11.4%。（89）”第10大马计划”指出，2009年，整体已降到3.8%。（90）

列表10.8：1971-1995—为扶贫所拨下的发展款额

大马计划(MP)	平均 年长 (%)	发展拨款总 额 (百万令吉)	消除贫穷 拨款额 (百万令吉)	巴仙率 (%)
第2MP(1971-75)	7.1	8,950	2,350	26.3
第3MP(1976-80)	8.6	31,147	6,373	20.5
第4MP(1981-85)	5.1	46,320	11,239	24.3
第5MP(1986-90)	6.7	35,300	13,660	38.7
第6MP(1991-95)	8.7	54,705	13,901	25.4

[资料来源：各年的大马计划]

沙巴贫穷率仍然是最高的（2004年是24.2%），其次是登嘉楼（15.4%）和吉兰丹州（10.6%）。虽然各族群的贫穷率有所降低，但是，马来族的贫穷率仍然很高。乡村地区的非马来土著，贫穷率最高，有一些群体的贫穷率高达40%以上。（91）

列表10.9：1970-2002—城乡阶层的贫穷率

阶层（按地方）	1970		2002	
	贫穷家庭 (‘000)	贫穷率 (%)	贫穷家庭 (‘000)	贫穷率 (%)
西马	791.8	49.3	195.9	4.3
乡村	705.9	58.7	143.5	10.3
城市	85.9	21.3	52.4	1.7
沙巴	n.a.	n.a.	49.2	16.0
乡村	n.a.	n.a.	35.4	24.5
城市	n.a.	n.a.	13.8	8.5
砂拉越	n.a.	n.a.	22.8	5.8

阶层（按地方）	1970		2002	
	贫穷家庭 （‘000）	贫穷率 （%）	贫穷家庭 （‘000）	贫穷率 （%）
乡村	n.a.	n.a.	19.4	10.0
城市	n.a.	n.a.	3.4	1.7
马来西亚	1,000	52.4	267.9	5.1
乡村	n.a.	n.a.	198.3	11.4
城市	n.a.	n.a.	69.6	2.0

[资料来源: Ragayah Haji Mat Zin, 'Poverty eradication, development and policy space in Malaysia' in Joan M.Nelson, Jacob Meerman and Abdul Rahman Embong (eds): *Globalisation and Autonomy: the experience of Malaysia*. Singapore: Institute of SE Asian Studies (ISEAS) and Institute of Malaysian and International Studies (IKMAS), 2008: 116-58.]

根据“第10大马计划”，2009年，最底层的40%家庭（约240万个家庭），每月家庭总收入不到2,300令吉。1.8%的家庭属于赤贫群体，7.6%的家庭属于贫穷群体，其余90.6%的家庭属于低收入家庭群体。

最底层的40%家庭，在2009年，平均月入是1,440令吉。这最底层的40%家庭，平均分布在城市和乡村。其中65%分布在6州：柔佛、吉打、霹雳、沙巴、砂拉越、雪兰莪。这些家庭中，大约有73%是土著。（92）

第10大马计划确认，特定群体有特殊需求，如：沙巴和砂拉越的少数民族，马来西亚半岛的原住民，华人新村村民、印裔园丘工人。不过，发展计划和援助，不明确和不具体：

“将探讨AIM和TEKUN现有的援助计划，可帮助华人新村的小企业……在2011-2012年间，政府将拨出1亿零900万令吉，为园丘提供净水。不过，这些园丘面积不得超过1,000依格，并且离大水管不到5公里的距离。”（93）

原住民是马来半岛最贫穷的族群，尤其是因为他们不被承认是“土著”（马来人才被承认为“土著”）。政府已经为原住民社区，实施了土地开发和所有权计划，好让他们成为“土地所有者和积极的农民”。这究竟是不是原住民族群的意愿，那是另一回事！至于沙巴和砂拉越的少数族群，政府将提供援助，为他们建立家园

和生态旅游的业务。（94）

对比之下，为了提高乡村马来人的生活素质，”第10大马计划”批准更多资助计划，由政府代理机构提供。这些国家机构是MARA、AMANAH Ikhtiar (AIM)、Tabung Ekonomi Kumpulan USAHA Niaga (TEKUN) 等。

技能培训则继续由一些机构提供，如：马拉活动中心、社区学院、社会进步局（KEMAS）、“技能发展中心”。这些技能培训则没提供给非土著。同样的，政府促进承包农业耕作，为小园主提供农业投入成本、培训、市场营销。受益者主要是土著。非土著则必须自力更生。（95）

“第10大马计划”目标之一就是，改善收入不平等的现象，把基尼系数，由2009年的0.441，降低到2015年的0.420。从下面的列表10.11可以看出，在土著族群内部，存在着更严重的收入不平等现象。其次是华裔族群，最后才轮到印裔族群。[注：基尼系数（Gini coefficient）是年收入分配公平程度的指标。坚尼系数越小，年收入分配越平均，坚尼系数越大，年收入分配越不平均。]

虽然政府的政策和计划，是为了提高最底层的40%家庭，创造收入的潜力，却没有减少收入不平等的具体计划。到了2011年底，土著信托基金（ASB）单位最上层的20%持有人，占有基金单位总数的94%。基金单位最顶端的7%持有人，却拥有基金单位总数的70%。土著族群内部贫富悬殊的严重现象，不言而喻。（96）

列表10.10：

2004年和2009年马来西亚基尼系数按族群和社会阶层划分

族群和社会阶层	基尼系数	
	2004	2009
马来西亚	0.462	0.441
土著	0.452	0.440
华族	0.446	0.425
印族	0.425	0.424
其他	0.462	0.495
城市	0.444	0.423
乡村	0.397	0.407

[资料来源：2004年和2009年—马来西亚“经济策划小组”和“统计部”家庭收入调查；第10大马计划，第400页。]

## 政府镇压行动和种族主义

然而，尽管土著群体内部收入不平等现象日益严重，但是，不要以为，阶级意识自然会在马来工人阶级内部出现，以便推动国内的民主转型。

“土著主义”起着霸权意识形态的重要作用，目的是为了挫败工人的阶级意识。这是政治积极分子所要面对的一个问题。伊斯兰教的复兴，对那些未能获得朋党恩惠的马来人来说，是一股凝聚的力量。它对民主运动是一项挑战。

政府禁止谈论所谓“敏感”课题，而颠覆了民主程序。所谓“敏感”课题，包括：质疑马来人特殊地位、国语、统治者特权等。这些禁令是通过援用未经审讯扣留的法律和《煽动法令》来落实的。

针对工人和农民、教育、宗教和文化团体、原住民和区域性少数民族的需求，政府采取玩世不恭的态度，草率地利用这类压制性的法律来处理。

“新经济政策”使种族歧视制度化。它的继续存在，对马来西亚国家的威权民粹主义，是至关重要的。在武装部队、公民服务、教育、经济等领域，政府公然实施种族歧视政策。种族主义是国家意识形态的内在组成部分。今天，它继续在马来西亚社会产生紧张氛围。在2008年大选中，政治现状受到挑战之后，情况变得更为严重。

### 诸多严峻的压制性法律

自1970年代以来，即使马来西亚有健康的经济增长率，但是，政府还继续依靠镇压行动和种族主义政策，作为分化人民的手段。始自1969年，当权者制定和修改了各种压制性的法律，使这些法律更加严峻。（97）

2011年，《内安法令》（ISA）和《1960年紧急法令》被废除了，却由其他无审讯拘留法律所取代，如：《2012年保安罪行（特别措施）法令》和2013年修订的《防止犯罪法令》。

自《内安法令》从1960年实施以来，超过一万人在这法令下被逮捕和拘留。《印刷与出版法令》实际上在压制新闻自由。《煽动法令》目前仍被用来遏制异议分子的言行。《大学与大专法令》用来控制大专生和学者。《社团法令》则用来控制和吊销团体，专门用来对付那些违反政府条规的团体。政府还对“政治”活动设置了范围。

《1959年职工会法令》和《1967年劳资关系法令》经修订后，进一步限制职工运动。多年来，马来西亚一直都没有正式的最低工资标准。2013年，稍微作了调整。但是，一经雇主抗议，这项政策已打了水漂。

要在新兴工业组织工会，几乎是不可能的。自1970年开始，电子业工人必须争取，在本行业中，组织工会的权利。（98）

## 华印中小学发展受遏制

政府的镇压行动，包括：种族主义政策，旨在进行民族压迫。自殖民地时代开始，华文学校和印裔学校得依靠各自族群的支持。但是，政府却热衷于变本加厉地遏制这些学校的发展。

今天，学生人口已增加了一倍。但是，目前华校和淡米尔学校的数目，和国家独立时的统计数据，相比之下，一切都一目了然：

列表10.11：1957-1997华印中小学校的数目

	华文小学	淡米尔小学	华文中学
1957*	1,342所	880所	86所
1997	1,281所	550所	60所

注：1957\*年的数字，只是马来半岛的数字而已。

[资料来源：Kua Kia Soong, 2008: 151.; 25.11.96《星洲日报》；Education statistics of Malaysia, 1938-67, Ministry of Education, Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka 1968, Tables 24-27]



## 总结

只要“亲土著政策”仍然有助于赢取土著的选票，巫统统治阶级不太可能放弃这种统治形式。种族主义已彻底注入所有的国家机构内（包括：在政府机构，灌输土著主义意识）。最近曝光的BTN干训班就是一个例子。

自从2008年国阵惨败后，首相纳吉推出“一个马来西亚”口号，尝试吸引具有不满情绪的非土著选民。以往与巫青团有关联的尖锐刺耳的种族主义叫嚣，现在已经外包给极端右翼、崇尚“马来人至上主义”的群体。这些群体继续扮演冲锋陷阵的角色，扰乱民间社会组织，促进社会公正、民主、人权的活动。

巫统与伊斯兰党之间的互相竞争，也加剧了本国的伊斯兰民粹主义活动。这对民族和谐关系造成严重的不利影响。最重要的是，种族歧视助长了朋党资本主义。那是巫统维持垄断政权必要的支柱。这点，自马哈迪时代开始，就从来没有改变过。

印裔工人阶级和东西马的原住民群体，是马来西亚最贫穷的群体。印裔工人阶级和西马原住民不能依赖“土著”的特殊优惠。西马的马来人可享有政府的慷慨施舍，但是，东马的原住民群体，则不得问津。即使东马原住民也被划为“土著”，但是，对他们来说，则无助于事。

土著群体内部，存在着日益严重的收入不平等现象。但是，政府依靠镇压行动，并利用“土著主义”作为霸权意识形态，以挫败马来劳动阶级内部发展起来的任何阶级意识。

极端伊斯兰主义运动的兴起，使那些得不到朋党恩惠的马来人，凝集成一股力量。这也对民主运动形成一种挑战。

## 结论

## “扶弱政策”应以“需要” 不以种族为根基

“我不能接受这样的观点：人类是如此悲惨地捆绑在种族主义和战争中，没有闪闪星光的午夜，致使和平与友爱的美好黎明，永远不会到来。”

- 马丁路德金

这本书的主要论断是：种族主义是马来西亚统治阶级掌控政权，试图稳住马来选民效忠的最主要机制。1969年“513”大屠杀，国会中止运作，使当时巫统内新兴官僚资产阶级获得国家的政权，并制定了他们主导经济和政治体系的议程。他们的阶级统治则纳入巫统“保护马来人利益”的民粹主义思想意识中。（1）

我们追溯马来西亚殖民地时代到今天的种族主义和种族歧视根源，以及它们所带来的影响。殖民地时代前的马来社会里，马来族和其他亚洲贸易商与锡矿工人之间的关系，在很大程度上，是非对抗性的。华族矿工们往往是当地马来首领在经济企业方面的伙伴，也是马来统治者之间持续不断的内战盟友。

欧洲重商主义，在马六甲海峡和马来半岛其他地方，占据贸易主导地位。亚洲商人则成为中介人。英国人介入马来州属事务后，矛盾才开始出现。

英国殖民政府采用分而治之的策略，扶持贵族精英，也就是，传统的马来统治者，因而制造了存在“马来主权”的假象。他们有必要这么做，因为当初，英国殖民统治遭到马来族的激烈反抗。

马来农村经济和社区，有如被防疫封锁线般隔离开来。政府制定〈马来保留地法令〉，切断马来族和城市经济的联系。为了他们自己的经济利益，英殖民主义从中国和印度输入劳工，分配到锡矿场和大胶园工作。英国分而治之的策略，导致来自印尼群岛周围的移民成为公民，但不接受华人和印度人为公民。

日治时期，日本法西斯侵略者明目张胆地玩弄残暴的种族主义和族群政治，导致在战后，族群关系面临严重后果。他们招募马来人当保安队伍，对付以华族为主的抗日游击队。随后，在紧急状态时期，英殖民统治者也沿袭这种方法，对付抗英游击队。

战争结束后，工人运动和反殖民主义运动的战斗，是宪制斗争中反对种族主义的一个楷模。这个运动所提出的〈人民宪法〉建议，符合劳动人民的要求，以及劳动人民对自治、民主、公民自由权利的愿望。

颁布紧急状态，是为了阻挠工人阶级斗争和反殖民主义运动。殖民政府尽其所能，使马来农民阶级和城市运动隔离开来。他们也从未停止妖魔化城市运动。紧急状态为殖民政府提供机会，作出一个新殖民主义的安排，将权力移交给传统的马来统治精英，及其非马来资产阶级中的盟友。

英国殖民政府就这样，通过种族主义政治，违背自己所作的承诺。他们曾经承诺，在战后，让所有的马来亚人民，享有民主和公民自由权利。

北婆罗洲和新加坡左翼力量极力争取自治。英国所提出的解决方案，就是推动大马合并。沙巴和砂拉越两州土著人口，不成比例地占多数议席，英国则利用这点，来中和华族选民占多数的新加坡议席。这就是英政府主要的种族主义考量。

马来西亚较大的种族课题，不可避免地产生诸多问题，那是因为“联盟种族方案”存在内在矛盾。不久，1965年，新加坡被逐出马来西亚。新马分家后，巫统确立了他们在联邦的统治地位。这就

进一步鼓舞了巫统内部的官僚资产阶级，推动更多的“亲土著”政策，以维护他们的利益。

独立后不久，鉴于新殖民主义经济的内在矛盾，农民领域有必要进行改革。国家花费巨额财政拨款，以抚平农村人口。这反过来又资助了巫统内部的官僚资产阶级。资助形式包括：新的信贷、营销机构、合作社、土地发展计划。

这新生的马来官僚资产阶级的出现，对传统的马来贵族统治阶级是一项挑战。1969年的“513”大屠杀，以及随后颁布的紧急状态，为马来官僚资产阶级的兴起，东姑的大权旁落，提供了条件。

巫统内的新兴统治阶级，利用“土著主义”作为它的民粹主义意识形态。马来宗教和文化机构，也被利用来转移农民的不满情绪，胡指“华人”显然已掌控了国家经济。新经济政策是积累资本的载体。政府迅速修改宪法，以实施扶弱政策为借口，使种族歧视制度化，进而使土著得利。

1970年代见证了政府加强镇压行动，加速推动资本积累。以外资为首的出口导向工业化政策，也同时实施。尽管如此，即使国家在平息外国投资者，工人坚持为争取权利而进行斗争。紧急法律和种族主义措施，则被利用来阻挠人民对民主的希望。

到了1970年代末，新经济政策已导致族群内部的不平等现象在扩大。尤其是马来族群内部，更是如此。官僚资产阶级，跟非马来族的商业阶层与民族资本家互相竞争。这项竞争是以种族主义色彩进行。官僚资产阶级还试图接管国家经济的重要资产，但是成效有限。

扩大的官僚机构，教育方面增加国家开支，促成了日益增长的马来中产阶级，并且为官僚资本家提供了社会基础。土著民粹主义意识，体现在公务员和武装部队人员的工资上涨，提供奖金等额外津贴等。

上世纪1980-1990年代，马来私人资产阶级通过私营化国家资产，有利于创建马哈迪遗产，培养出土著朋党资本家。当他们生意失败时，尤其是在1998年的金融危机期间，政府纯粹利用国家公帑，拯救这些朋党资本家。

马哈迪任职期间，耸人听闻的财务丑闻层出不穷。这是无法避免的，因为问责制和良好施政，并不是他优先考虑的事项。随着国家资产的私营化，工人阶级被分化，马来西亚工人的工会组织被瓦解。

新经济政策的“土著托管”制度和重工业项目，受益的是巫统新的朋党资本家以及他们的非马来资本家伙伴。来自不同族群起源的马来西亚统治精英，其阶级凝聚力巩固了种族主义政治。自独立以来，种族主义政治一直都是马来西亚社会的特征。

“新经济政策”原本应该从1971年，实施到1990年。但是，“土著”精英特殊优惠，和他们诉诸于民粹主义的举措，确保新经济政策成为“永无终结的政策”。它摇身一变，转化成了“国家发展计划”（NDP）。这项计划从1991年延续到2000年。随后的“国家愿景政策”穿越2001年到2010年。在纳吉掌政期间，又把它改称为“国家转型政策”。

直到今天，这些种族歧视政策仍然存在。显然，它并未激发马来族的“创业精神”。他们只是通过寻租机制，快速致富。从前面的章节中我们看到，任人唯亲的朋党主义文化一直是巫统的标志。即使是国际企业资本家的商业活动，也受到百般阻挠。他们也受够了马来西亚朋党资本主义和种族歧视的欺压。（2）

马哈迪的种族主义模式普遍应用于政治、经济、教育、社会、文化领域。这“马来中心主义”的意识形态，已注入了伊斯兰教极端民粹主义，由极端右翼的“马来人至上主义”团体所推崇。

作为推行种族主义的国家工具，种族主义和种族歧视，是国家进步和人民团结的最大和最严重的障碍。执政党和极端右翼“马来至上主义者”的各种组织，仍然在讥讽少数民族为“移民”。这是为了使种族歧视政策合理化，而有利于土著。

马来西亚国家威权民粹主义，一直以来是执政党巫统标准的意识形态。巫统通过控制军队和警察，援引不经审判拘留法律等包罗万象的法律，如：〈煽动法令〉等，作为他们展开镇压行动的国家机器。

在巫统统治下，少数民族的民主权利继续被剥夺。巫统动员大多数的土著，支持经济领域“纠正种族不平衡”的要求。他们把贫

穷和不平等现象，说成是“种族”之间分配不均的产物。这是为了蓄意模糊阶级剥削关系。

种族主义和种族歧视，一直是赢得土著选票的简便方法，尽管这完全不符合治理国家的现代标准。种族主义已在许多国家机构彻底制度化。在国家机构内，灌输种族主义意识的事件，也已曝光了。

自从纳吉推出“一个马来西亚”的口号，试图在2008年大选溃败后，吸引具有不满情绪的非土著选民，回流到国阵这边来。刺耳的种族主义叫嚣，原本和巫青团系系相关，现在已外包给崇尚“马来人至上主义”的极端右翼组织。他们继续发挥“冲锋陷阵”的功能。他们随心所欲，蓄意破坏公民社会所组织的任何活动。

在马来西亚，种族主义和种族歧视政策的主要受害者，是非土著工人阶级，尤其是印族、东西马的原住民以及外劳。非土著工人阶级和原住民不能享有扶弱政策所提供的优惠，只因他们不属于“土地的王子”。东马的原住民不能享有半岛马来人所享有的同等优惠，尽管他们也被视为土著。外劳被当作纯粹是商品，甚至是害虫。政府认为在适当时机，就定期地把他们清除，“冲洗殆尽”。

尽管土著社群内收入差距日益扩大，政府依靠镇压行动和“土著主义”作为一种意识形态霸权，挫败马来劳动阶级中可能发展起来的阶级意识。极端的伊斯兰复兴运动，也给实践民主的事业，带来了严峻的挑战。

## 为更大民主空间而斗争

朝向马来西亚人民大团结的道路，必须通过大家在各领域共同努力，不只是在政治领域，也必须在经济、教育、社会、文化领域，争取更大的民主空间。自1970年以来，由于政府企图把“国家文化政策”强加于广大人民，所以出现了许多涉及民族压迫的事件。（3）

政府是想通过一种语言、一种文化的政策，来创造“民族团结”的意识观念，同时要剷除华校和淡米尔学校来达致“民族团结”。其实，那是为了煽动马来沙文主义情绪。民族团结主要是建立在，承认各民族平等的基础上。把一种语言和一种文化的政策强

加在所有族群身上，那只能产生徒有虚名、空空洞洞的团结。这本书中，一直认为，追根究底，民族压迫就是阶级压迫的工具。

各族群对文化意愿所提出的民主诉求，正是促进民族融合的积极表现。这是因为，在争取更大的（真正的）民主的过程中，毫无疑问，群众会接触到其他族群对文化的意愿。近年来的净选盟集会和烈火莫熄示威游行，表明了这一点。

此外，来自不同的语文源流的学生，如果可共享公共设施，如：运动场、图书馆、演出场馆、资讯技术中心、食堂、体育馆等；参加普通比赛，如：田径、游戏、辩论、艺术剧院等，那么，不同语文源流的学生就有充分机会互相融合。

承认马来语为我们的国语和通用语言，同时，要求接受母语教育的权利，那肯定不是互相矛盾的。接受母语教育的权利，是马来西亚各族群，花了将近200年，才争取和发展起来的。母语教育是各族群文化遗产的一部分。我们传承了近200年。此外，统计数据显示，越来越多的马来族和印族莘莘学子，报名就读华校。（4）

群众团结的基础，必须建立在对民主的承诺之上，以及提高工人和农民生活水平，同时团结他们的政策之上。这就涉及解除对合法政治组织和活动的限制，还必须促进真正由人民控制的社会机构和政治机构。

自从英国实施殖民主义统治以来，政府一直都在阻碍以民主方式，组织起马来西亚的人民群众。最新近的例子就是：2012年，“大马人民之声”遭到政府的骚扰。还有，政府企图取缔净选盟与“我的国家”的活动。

直到目前，在反民族压迫这场斗争中，主要都是由少数民族提出他们对民主权利的要求。2007年11月25日，超过2万名印裔在首都进行街头示威。这场斗争是由兴权会（Hindraf—兴都教权利行动阵线）所领导的。

警方用暴力行动，催泪瓦斯和水枪把他们驱散。兴权会的3名领袖，在〈煽动法令〉下被逮捕，罪名是涉嫌发表煽动性的演讲。在示威游行前和示威过程中，有400多名示威者被警方逮捕。（5）

在民族问题和各族群保卫民主权利的斗争中，所有知识分子都必须参与。从长远来看，随着争取更大的民主在不断发展，维护非马来人的民主权利的斗争，将有利于马来人。在平等的基础上，争取人民团结的斗争，意味着，反对推行种族主义的政府，摧毁以种族主义分裂人民的政府根基。

既然我们从历史和阶级的角度了解到，马来西亚政府所实施的种族主义和种族歧视的真相，马来西亚所有人民的任务是，创建一个为民主而斗争的团结运动。要充分认识到，改善人民群众生活的重要性；要建设一个进步、包容性、真正平等的社会。就如美国前黑豹党主席鲍比西尔（Bobby Seale）所说的：

“你不要利用种族主义来反对种族主义。反对种族主义的最佳方式，就是人民团结起来。”

## 前进的道路

### 1. 取缔种族主义、种族歧视、仇恨犯罪

随着极端右派的抬头，种族主义和仇恨犯罪已变得更加普遍。“仇恨犯罪”（hate crime）就是恐吓、威胁、破坏财产、行凶、杀人等刑事犯罪行为。仇恨犯罪侵犯人与人之间平等的原则，剥夺他们实现人的完整尊严，充分发挥其潜力的权利。

显然，“仇恨犯罪”对广大社区会产生负面影响，那是无须强调的。为了防患于未然，“煽动种族仇恨”必须定性为刑事犯罪。这包括企图蓄意挑起对一个族群的仇恨心理；分发散播种族主义的材料给公众人士；发表煽动性的公开演讲；在互联网上创建种族主义网站；对个人或族群散播煽动性的谣言，制造种族不满情绪。

在马来西亚，我们需要一个〈平等法〉和“平等及人权委员会”，专门处理仇恨犯罪和煽动种族仇恨的事件。我们“国家人权委员会”（SUHAKAM）。可以扩大其管辖权，纳入“平等及人权委员会”。毕竟，平等权是我们人权内在的组成部分。

“平等及人权委员会”的工作是，鼓励更大程度的融合和更良好的民族关系。利用法律权力，帮助消除种族歧视和骚扰。因此，它的工作范围涵盖清除教科书和报章宣扬的种族主义定型观念；



以及在公共领域、就业、教育、社会服务、广告方面的种族歧视现象。

这样的独立委员会，可获得授权发出工作准则，有权进行正式调查工作，送达通知书，要求提供资料或文件，方便执行法律。

过后，则由马来西亚法院决定，在马来西亚社会，这些机构是否合法，还是非法。这些机构或政策包括：自1971年以来，玛拉工艺大学等公共机构“只有土著可享有”的政策，固打制及其实施；在各个经济交易中获取折扣等，明目张胆的种族歧视形式。

在一个真正积极的民主国家，如果极端右翼的种族至上主义者，胆敢针对有关“种族”主导地位的课题，进行无理叫嚣，他们将被绳之以法，遭“平等与人权委员会”的对付，即在〈平等法〉下面对起诉。

如果发生大屠杀事件，如：1969年“513”事件，或2001年的“甘榜美丹事件”，难逃其咎的嫌犯将被迅速逮捕，被控以谋杀罪，而不是以“种族暴乱”的名堂，掩盖事件的真相。

最后，如果政府想说服国人相信，政府真正有兴趣进行改革，并建立更好的民族关系和平等权利，我国应立即着手核准〈消除种族歧视公约〉（CERD）和〈国际公民与政治权利公约〉（ICCPR）。如果不能做到这点，只会令人怀疑，国阵政府在遭受第13届大选灾难性的失败之后，只是在做些门面的工作。

珍视公信力的政府，必须实施“零容忍种族主义”和“不准法西斯主义有任何平台”的政策。“言论自由”并不赐予使用暴力的权利，以及煽动种族或宗教仇恨的权利。事实上，法西斯主义者在威胁着广大人类的“表达自由”权利。绝对不允许法西斯主义沾污我们祖辈建立起来的民主空间。

## 2. 真理和正义永存

尽管“甘榜美丹事件”发生至今，已有10多年了，勇于道出真相，并且为受害者讨回公道（他们惨遭有组织的种族暴力迫害），永远都不会太迟。为真理和正义而进行的斗争，是沒有时限的。就如目前，英国政府被迫对1948年发生的“巴当加里大屠杀”事件，

进行司法审查一样。

2007年，当我撰写的“513”事件的书出版时，我曾呼吁，成立一个“真理与和解委员会”，以便让全体国人知道1969年大屠杀的真相。在这场大屠杀中，有数百名华裔公民被杀害。

43年过去了，我们仍然不知道受害者的身份，也不知道策划“513事件”的凶手究竟是谁。在这方面，南非为我们提供了一个很好的“真相与和解委员会”模式。只要是真正民主的国家，都会有勇气效仿南非的模式。

## 3. 一些改革的步骤

如果马来西亚社会各阶层人民不能吸取这一事件的教训，所有一切努力将是徒劳的。我们必须纠正政府，因为它还没有解决相关的人权课题，并且必须进行改革，确保“甘榜美丹事件”和“513事件”，永远不会再发生。应采取的改革步骤包括：

- 如果将来再发生这类事件，必须成立和迅速部署，多元族群维持和平的特种部队，以维持秩序；
- 紧急设立中立的“皇家调查委员会”，调查这类事件，并且以谋杀罪名提控难逃其咎的嫌犯；
- 实施“独立警察不当行为委员会”（IPCMC）；
- 确保招募警察和武装部队和职业发展时，必须以业绩为依据；
- 颁布〈平等法〉，促进平等，消除不分种族、信仰、宗教、性别、残疾的歧视现象。这项法令必须具有设立“平等与人权委员会”的条文；
- 使平等和人权教育，在各个决策层面制度化，包括：政府和非政府人员和机构；
- 核准〈消除种族歧视公约〉。

## 4. 应以不分种族的机构进行国家发展

目前，马来统治精英已明显获得了马来西亚经济制高点的控制权。因此，早就应该取得新的共识。新的共识必须基于非种族因素，如：阶级、领域、需要，并使扶弱政策合理化。

目前，是所有渴求和平与自由的马来西亚人，一劳永逸取缔种族主义和种族歧视的时候了。同时，必须促进真正的团结。真正的团结必须建立在坚持人权、平等、全国人民利益的基础上：

#### (A) 国家政治机构—不分种族的解决方案

1. 建立在“种族”基础上的政党，只是为了促进各自的“种族”利益，所以必须加以取缔。因为这种政党的存在，不符合反种族主义和种族歧视的国际公约。
2. 必须核准马来西亚政府尚未核准的所有国际公约和联合国公约，确保国家所有法律都符合国际人权标准。
3. 颁布〈平等法〉，并设立“平等与人权委员会”，消除马来西亚所有机构里的种族主义和种族歧视现象。
4. 选区划分必须基于“一人一票”的原则，并且，在不同选区的选民人数之间，不应该有巨大差异。
5. 恢复民选的地方政府，以不分种族的形式，解决住屋、学校等问题。
6. 确保民事服务和武装部队不存在种族歧视现象，各族群应享有平等的机会。
7. 建立一个独立自主的广播局，公平对待马来西亚所有族群。

#### (B) 国家经济发展—不分种族的解决方案

8. 必须有充分的透明度与问责制，确保合同和股权分配不以“种族”为依据，取缔裙带风、朋党主义、或贪污舞弊行为。
9. 不应以扶弱政策为幌子，利用国家公帑，拯救失败的私营企业。
10. 政府政策，必须不分种族、宗教、性别、残疾、政治关系，减少贫富之间的收入差距。
11. 中小型工业是国家工业化的脊梁。在没有种族歧视的情况下，应该加以发展。
12. 对各行业，应给予充分和公平的支持，尤其是在面临经济危机时期。
13. 应公平分配土地给所有族群的农民。
14. 应以“经济能力测试”为根基的浮动机制，取代以“种族”为根基的固打制。符合条件者才能获得资助。

#### (C) 国家社会发展—不分种族的解决方案

15. 使全国450多个新村现代化。全国的新村已存在了60多年。我国许多中小型工业都座落在新村，但基础设施却不足，应设法改善。
16. 工人应有更好的工作条件，包括：拥有民主权利，以控制投资、生产、定价、就业决策，充分就业、就业保障、更好的生活水平，有更好的住屋、更好的养老金和儿童福利制度、改善社会服务等。
17. 核准相关国际公约，保护外劳及其家庭的权利。
18. 设立一个“平等就业机会委员会”，以处理工作场所的一切形式的歧视现象。
19. 在宪报上公布，所有原住民和其他原著民的土著习俗地，让他们控制自己的土地资源，选择自己的生活方式。
20. 制定法律，确认城市定居者的权利。发展商有义务为城市定居者，提供公平的补偿金，和替代性住屋。
21. 为妇女、儿童、老年人、残疾人士，提供特殊需要。
22. 不分种族，为青年提供更多的娱乐设施。
23. 成立“房屋发展机构”，不论种族，为贫穷阶层建设政府廉价屋和中价屋。
24. 公平实施消除贫穷计划，造福各族群的贫穷阶层。

#### (D) 国家教育—不分种族的解决方案

25. 特别补助金，必须根据“需要”，分配给弱势群体或低下阶级，而不以“种族”为根基。
26. 教育补助金和贷学金，应采用以“经济能力测试”为根基的浮动机制，让符合条件者，不分种族、宗教、性别，进入大专院校。
27. 应由“国家认证局”以严格的学术水准，处理教育证书、文凭、学位等。在这方面，不应政治化，或采取种族歧视态度。
28. 应建设以少数民族母语教学的学校（只要这些族群的任何集聚区有这种需求）。在财政拨款方面，他们不应受到种族歧视。
29. 应设计一个长远的解决方案，化解华校和淡米尔学校的师资短缺危机。

30. 修改〈1996年教育法令〉，以反映〈1957教育法令〉中最初规定的国家教育政策：确保各族群可自由使用、教学、发展母语教育。
31. 在任何学校里，只要有任何族群的5名学生就读，就应该在正常的学校课程内，强制开办“学生母语”班（POL）。

### （E）国家文化政策—不分种族的解决方案

32. 促进国人具有知识、尊重和关注文化、宗教、种族。
33. 各族群祈祷和礼拜的地方，应在他们居留地区刊登在宪报上，使他们不受到任何阻挠，也不应对这些礼拜场所，胡乱加以限制。
34. 国家艺术和文学奖项与奖学金，应包容：所有马来亚西人的作品，不计其所采用的语言。
35. 各族群的马来西亚文化，在官方文化机构和媒体中，应得到公平反映。

## 注解

### 前言

1. Hua Wu Yin, “*Class & Communalism in Malaysia*”, Zed Press, London 1983, a critique of social scientific analyses of ethnic relations which ignore the role of the state and the dominant classes in society. They take ethnic divisions as assumed rather than something that needs to be explained. Communalism is explained as an ideology produced under concrete historical circumstances and by social classes.
2. “Vision 2020”, Mahathir bin Mohamad during the tabling of the Sixth Malaysia Plan in 1991.
3. As recently as October 2014, this categorisation of non-Bumiputeras as “immigrants” (*pendatang*) was used by the Home Minister, Zahid Hamidi to justify the Bumiputera policy.
4. See Kua Kia Soong (ed.), “*Media Watch: The Use and Abuse of the Malaysian Press*”, Malaysian Chinese Research Centre 1990.
5. For them, the principal contradiction remains the same throughout in any society and at every historical context, ie. capital/labour. Such crude analyses can lead not only to wrong practice but end up on the same side as the state’s, for example in relation to the National Cultural Policy and mother tongue education.
6. *The Star*, 24.5.1997.
7. See Anne Munro-Kua, “*Authoritarian populism in Malaysia*”, Macmillan London 1996.
8. The latest addition to this propaganda is the state-sponsored film, ‘*Tanda Putera*’.
9. See Kua Kia Soong, “*May 13: Declassified documents on the Malaysian riots of 1969*”, SUARAM, Petaling Jaya 2007.
10. See Government White Paper on Operation Lalang, “*Towards preserving national security*”, *Kertas Perintah* 14 Tahun 1988.
11. See Kua Kia Soong (edited), “*Mob Rule: The East Timor Conference, 1996*”, SUARAM Petaling Jaya 1998.
12. See Kua Kia Soong, “*The Malaysian Civil Rights Movement*”, SIRD, Petaling Jaya 2005: 108.
13. See Kua Kia Soong (edited), “*Kampung Medan 2001: Violence against an ethnic minority in Malaysia*”, by Nagarajan & Arumugam, SUARAM 2012.
14. *Suaram Human Rights Report* 2005: 96.
15. *Malaysiakini*, 16 March 2006.
16. *Malaysiakini*, 15 May 2006.
17. Sophie Lemièrre (ed.), “*Misplaced Democracy: Malaysian Politics and People*”, 2014.
18. *Ibid.*
19. *Ibid.*
20. *The Star*, 30.10.2010.
21. Fortunately, he has since recanted his foolish past.
22. See Kua Kia Soong, “*History and the Pribumi: Fruitless quest for the unholy grail*” in *Malaysian Political Realities*, Oriengroup Petaling Jaya, 1992.
23. “*The Study of Ancient Times in the Malay Peninsula and Straits of Malacca*”, MBRAS, 1980: 3.
24. R.O. Winstedt, “*Malaya and its history*”, London 1962: 86.



# WHAT IS RACIAL DOMINATION?

**Matthew Desmond**

*Department of Sociology, University of Wisconsin—Madison*

**Mustafa Emirbayer**

*Department of Sociology, University of Wisconsin—Madison*

### Abstract

When students of race and racism seek direction, they can find no single comprehensive source that provides them with basic analytical guidance or that offers insights into the elementary forms of racial classification and domination. We believe the field would benefit greatly from such a source, and we attempt to offer one here. Synchronizing and building upon recent theoretical innovations in the area of race, we lend some conceptual clarification to the nature and dynamics of race and racial domination so that students of the subjects—especially those seeking a general (if economical) introduction to the vast field of race studies—can gain basic insight into how race works as well as effective (and fallacious) ways to think about racial domination. Focusing primarily on the American context, we begin by defining race and unpacking our definition. We then describe how our conception of race must be informed by those of ethnicity and nationhood. Next, we identify five fallacies to avoid when thinking about racism. Finally, we discuss the resilience of racial domination, concentrating on how all actors in a society gripped by racism reproduce the conditions of racial domination, as well as on the benefits and drawbacks of approaches that emphasize intersectionality.

**Keywords:** Race, Race Theory, Racial Domination, Inequality, Intersectionality

### INTRODUCTION

Synchronizing and building upon recent theoretical innovations in the area of race, we lend some conceptual clarification to the nature and dynamics of race and racial domination, providing in a single essay a source through which thinkers—especially those seeking a general (if economical) introduction to the vast field of race studies—can gain basic insight into how race works as well as effective ways to think about racial domination. Unable to locate a single and concise essay that, standing alone, summarizes the foundational ideas of a critical sociology of race and racism, we wrote this article to provide scholars and students with a general orientation or introduction to the study of racial domination. In doing so, we have attempted to lend

analytical clarity to the concept of race, as well as to its relationship with ethnicity and nationality. Perhaps more important, along with advancing a clear definition of racial domination, we have identified five fallacies—recurrent in many public debates—that one should avoid when thinking about racism. Although we believe this paper will provide guidance for advanced scholars conducting empirical and theoretical work on race, we have composed it primarily with a broader audience in mind.

## WHAT IS RACE?

You do not come into this world African or European or Asian; rather, this world comes into you. As literally hundreds of scientists have argued, you are not born with a race in the same way you are born with fingers, eyes, and hair. Fingers, eyes, and hair are natural creations, whereas race is a social fabrication (Duster 2003; Graves 2001). We define race as *a symbolic category, based on phenotype or ancestry and constructed according to specific social and historical contexts, that is misrecognized as a natural category*.<sup>1</sup> This definition deserves to be unpacked.

### Symbolic Category

A symbolic category belongs to the realm of ideas, meaning-making, and language. It is something actively created and recreated by human beings rather than pre-given, needing only to be labeled. Symbolic categories mark differences between grouped people or things. In doing so, they actually bring those people or things into existence (Bourdieu 2003). For example, the term “Native American” is a symbolic category that encompasses all peoples indigenous to the land that is known, today, as the United States. But the term “Native American” did not exist before non-Native Americans came to the Americas. Choctaws, Crows, Iroquois, Hopis, Dakotas, Yakimas, Utes, and dozens of other people belonging to indigenous tribes existed. The term “Native American” flattens under one homogenizing heading the immensely different histories, languages, traditional beliefs, and rich cultural practices of these various tribes. In naming different races, racial categories create different races.<sup>2</sup>

Such insights into the importance of the symbolic have not always been appreciated. Consider, for example, Oliver Cromwell Cox’s hypothesis “that racial exploitation and race prejudice developed among Europeans with the rise of capitalism and nationalism, and that because of the worldwide ramifications of capitalism, all racial antagonisms can be traced to the policies and attitudes of the leading capitalist people, the [W]hite people of Europe and North America” (1948, p. 322). Though few scholars today would agree fully with Cox’s reduction, many continue to advance structuralist claims, filtering racial conflict through the logic of class conflict (e.g., Reich 1981), regarding racial formation as a political strategy (e.g., Marx 1998), or concentrating on the legal construction of racial categories (e.g., Haney-López 1996).<sup>3</sup> Helpful as they are, structuralist accounts often treat race as something given and accepted—that is, as a “real” label that attaches itself to people (Bonilla-Silva 1997) or as an imposed category that forms racial identity (Marx 1998)—and thereby overlook how actors create, reproduce, and resist systems of racial classification, dynamics documented in works such as Kimberly DaCosta’s *Making Multiracials* (2007), Thomas Guglielmo’s *White on Arrival* (2004), John Jackson, Jr.’s *Harlemworld* (2001), Robin Sheriff’s *Dreaming Equality* (2001), or John Hartigan, Jr.’s *Racial Situations* (1999). Political and legal racial taxonomies do not necessarily align with quotidian processes of recognition and identification practiced by classified subjects

(Loveman 1999). Since no institution, regardless of its power, monopolizes the definition of race (Brubaker and Cooper, 2000), we must resist assuming an easy correspondence between “official” categorizations and the practical accomplishments of racial identification.

### Phenotype or Ancestry

Race also is based on phenotype or ancestry. A person’s phenotype is her or his physical appearance and constitution, including skeletal structure, height, hair texture, eye color, and skin tone. A person’s ancestry is her or his family lineage, which often includes tribal, regional, or national affiliations. The symbolic category of race organizes people into bounded groupings based on their phenotype, ancestry, or both. It is difficult to say which matters more, phenotype or ancestry, in determining racial membership in the United States. In some settings, ancestry trumps phenotype; in others, the opposite is true.

Recent immigrants often are pigeonholed in one of the dominant racial categories because of their phenotype; however, many resist this classification because of their ancestry. For instance, upon arriving in the United States, many first generation West Indian immigrants, quite familiar with racism against African Americans, actively resist the label “Black.” Despite their efforts, many are considered African American because of their dark skin (that is, they “look” Black to the American eye). The children of West African immigrants, many of whom are disconnected from their parents’ ancestries, more readily accept the label “Black” (Waters 1999). And many individuals with mixed heritage often are treated as though they belonged only to one “race.”

Some people, by contrast, rely on their phenotype to form a racial identity, though they are often grouped in another racial category based on their ancestry. Susie Guillory Phipps, a blond-haired blue-eyed woman who always considered herself “White,” discovered, upon glancing at her birth certificate while applying for a passport, that her native state, Louisiana, considered her “Black.” The reason was that Louisiana grouped people into racial categories according to the “one thirty-second rule,” a rule that stated that anyone who was one thirty-second Black—regardless of what they looked like—was legally “Black.” In 1982, Susie Guillory Phipps sued Louisiana for the right to be White. She lost. The state genealogist discovered that Phipps was the great-great-great-great-grandchild of a White Alabama plantation owner and his Black mistress and, therefore—although all of Phipps’s other ancestors were White—she was to be considered “Black.” (This outlandish law was finally erased from the books in 1983.) In this case, Phipps’s ancestry (as identified by the state) was more important in determining her race than her phenotype (Davis 1991).

### Social and Historical Contexts

Racial taxonomies are bound to their specific social and historical contexts. The racial categories that exist in America may not exist in other parts of the globe. In South Africa, racial groups are organized around three dominant categories: White, Black, and “Coloured.” During apartheid, the Coloured category was designed to include all “mixed-race” people (Sparks 2006). More recently, the Black category has been expanded to include all groups oppressed under apartheid, not only those of African heritage but also those of Indian descent and (as of 2008) Chinese South Africans. In Brazil, five racial categories are employed in the official census: *Branco* (White), *Pardo* (Brown), *Preto* (Black), *Amarelo* (Asian), and *Indígena* (Indigenous).

However, in everyday usage, many Brazilians identify themselves and one another through several other racial terms—including *moreno* (other type of brown), *moreno claro* (light brown), *negro* (another type of black), and *claro* (light)—which have much more to do with the tint of one's skin than with one's ancestry (Stephens 1999; Telles 2004). Before racial language was outlawed by the Communist regime, Chinese racial taxonomies were based first and foremost on blood purity, then on hair, then odor, then brain mass, then finally—and of least importance—skin color, which, according to the taxonomy, was divided into no less than ten shades (Dikötter 1992). And in Japan, a group called the Burakamin is considered to be unclean and is thought to constitute a separate race, although it is impossible to distinguish someone with Burakamin ancestry from the rest of the Japanese population (Eisenstadt 1998; Searle-Chatterjee and Sharma, 1994).

Cross-national comparisons, then, reveal that systems of racial classification vary greatly from one country to the next. Racial categories, therefore, are *place-specific*, bound to certain geographic and social contexts. They also are *time-specific*, changing between different historical eras. As a historical product, race is quite new. Before the sixteenth century, race, as we know it today, did not exist. During the Middle Ages, prejudices were formed and wars waged against “other” people, but those “other” people were not categorized or understood as people of other races. Instead of the color line, the primary social division in those times was that between “civilized” and “uncivilized.” The racial categories so familiar to us only began to calcify around the beginning of the nineteenth century, a mere two hundred years ago (Gossett 1965; Smedley 1999). In fact, the word, “race,” has a very recent origin; it only obtained its modern meaning in the late eighteenth century (Hannaford 1996).

But racial domination survives by covering its tracks, by erasing its own history. It encourages us to think of the mystic boundaries separating, say, West from East, White from Black, Black from Asian, or Asian from Hispanic, as timeless separations, as divisions that have always been and will always be. We would be well served to remember, with Stuart Hall, that we must grapple with “the historical specificity of race in the modern world” (1980, p. 308) to gain an accurate understanding of racial phenomena. In the American context, the “Indian” was invented within the context of European colonization, as indigenous peoples of the Americas were lumped together under one rubric to be killed, uprooted, and exploited. Whiteness and Blackness were invented as antipodes within the context of English, and later American, slavery. More than any other institution, slavery would dictate the career of American racism: Blackness became associated with bondage, inferiority, and social death; Whiteness with freedom, superiority, and life. The Mexican American was invented within the context of the colonization of Mexico. At the end of the nineteenth century, the Asian American was invented as a response to immigration from the Far East. Whiteness expanded during the early years of the twentieth century as new immigrants from Southern, Central, and Eastern Europe transformed themselves from “lesser Whites” to, simply, “Whites.”<sup>4</sup> All the while, White supremacy was legitimated by racial discourses in philosophy, literature, and science. By the middle of the twentieth century, the racial categories so familiar to us today were firmly established. Although the second half of the twentieth century brought great changes in the realm of race—including the rise of the Civil Rights Movement and the fall of Jim Crow—the racial categories that emerged in America over the previous 300 years remained, for the most part, unchallenged. Americans, White and non-White alike, understood themselves as raced, and, by and large, accepted the dominant racial classification even if they refused to accept the terms of racial inequality.

### Misrecognized as Natural

The last part of the definition we have been unpacking has to do with a process of naturalization. This word signifies a metamorphosis of sorts, where something created by humans is mistaken as something dictated by nature. Racial categories are naturalized when these symbolic groupings—the products of specific historical contexts—are wrongly conceived as natural and unchangeable. We misrecognize race as natural when we begin to think that racial cleavages and inequalities can be explained by pointing to attributes somehow inherent in the race itself (as if they were biological) instead of understanding how social powers, economic forces, political institutions, and cultural practices have brought about these divisions.

Naturalized categories are powerful; they are the categories through which we understand the world around us. Such categories divide the world along otherwise arbitrary lines and make us believe that there is nothing at all arbitrary about such a division. What is more, when categories become naturalized, alternative ways of viewing the world begin to appear more and more impossible. Why, we might ask, should we only have five main racial groups? Why not ninety-five? Why should we divide people according to their skin color? Why not base racial divisions according to foot size, ear shape, teeth color, arm length, or height? Why is ancestry so important? Why not base our racial categories on regions—North, South, East, and West? One might find these suggestive questions silly, and, indeed, they are. But they are no sillier than the idea that people should be sorted into different racial groups according to skin color or blood composition. To twist Bourdieu's phrase, we might say, *when it comes to race, one never doubts enough* (1998 [1994], p. 36).

The system of racial classification at work in America today is not the only system imaginable, nor is it the only one that has existed in the young life of the United States. Race is far from fixed; rather, its forms, depending on the social, economic, political, and cultural pressures of the day, have shifted and fluctuated in whimsical and drastic ways over time (Duster 2001). Indeed, today's multiracial movement is challenging America's dominant racial categories (which remained relatively stable during the latter half of the twentieth century) as people of mixed heritage are refusing to accept as given the state's racial classification system (DaCosta 2007). Race is social through and through. Thus, we can regard race as a *well-founded fiction*. It is a fiction because it has no natural bearing, but it is nonetheless well founded since most people in society provide race with a real existence and divide the world through this lens.

### ETHNICITY AND NATIONALITY

The categories of ethnicity and nationality are intrinsically bound up with race. Ethnicity refers to a shared lifestyle informed by cultural, historical, religious, and/or national affiliations. Nationality is equated with citizenship, membership in a specific politically delineated territory controlled by a government (cf. Weber 1946). Race, ethnicity, and nationality are overlapping symbolic categories that influence how we see the world around us, how we view ourselves, and how we divide "us" from "them." The categories are mutually reinforcing insofar as each category educates, upholds, and is informed by the others. This is why these three categories cannot be understood in isolation from one another (Loveman 1999). For example, if someone identifies as ethnically Norwegian, which, for them, might include a shared lifestyle composed of Norwegian history and folklore, language, cultural rituals and festivals, and food, they may also reference a nationality, based in the state of Norway, as well

as a racial group, White, since nearly all people of Norwegian descent would be classified as White by American standards. Here, ethnicity is informed by nationality (past or present) and signifies race.

Ethnicity often carves out distinctions and identities within racial groups. Ten people can be considered Asian American according to our modern racial taxonomy; however, those ten people might have parents or grandparents that immigrated to the United States from ten different countries, including Thailand, Vietnam, Cambodia, Singapore, China, South Korea, North Korea, Japan, Indonesia, and Laos. They might speak different languages, uphold different traditions, worship different deities, enjoy different kinds of food, and go through different experiences. What is more, many Asian countries have histories of conflict (such as China and Japan, North and South Korea). Accordingly, we cannot assume that a Chinese American and a Japanese American have similar lifestyles or see the world through a shared vision simply because they are both classified as “Asian” under American racial rubrics.<sup>5</sup> Therefore, just as race, ethnicity, and nationality cannot be separated from one another, neither can all three categories be collapsed into one (cf. Brubaker et al., 2004).<sup>6</sup>

Race and ethnicity (as well as nationality) are both marked and made.<sup>7</sup> They are *marked* through America’s racial taxonomy, as well as a global ethnic taxonomy, which seeks to divide the world into distinct categories. In this case, race and ethnicity impose themselves on you. They are *made* through a multiplicity of different practices—gestures, sayings, tastes, ways of walking, religious convictions, opinions, and so forth. In this case, you perform race or ethnicity. Ethnicity is a very fluid, layered, and situational construct. One might feel very American when voting, very Irish when celebrating St. Patrick’s Day, very Catholic when attending Easter mass, very “New Yorker” when riding the subway, and very Northern when visiting a relative in South Carolina (Waters 1990). Race, too, can be performed to varying degrees. One might act “very Black” when celebrating Kwanza with relatives but may repress one’s Blackness while in a business meeting with White colleagues. Race as performance is “predicated on actions, on the things one does in the world, on how one behaves.” As anthropologist John Jackson, Jr. notes, “You are not Black because you are (in essence) Black; you are Black . . . because of how you act—and not just in terms of one field of behavior (say, intellectual achievement in school) but because of how you juggle and combine many differently racialized and class(ed) actions (walking, talking, laughing, watching a movie, standing, emoting, partying) in an everyday matrix of performative possibilities” (2001, pp. 171, 188). Because racial domination attaches to skin color, a dark-skinned person can never completely escape its clutches simply by acting “not Black.” But that person may choose one saying over another, one kind of clothing over another, one mode of interaction over another, because she believes such an action makes her more or less Black (cf. Johnson 2003). This is why we claim that race and ethnicity are ascribed and achieved, both marked and made.

One may create, reproduce, accept, or actively resist imposed systems of racial classification; one may choose to accentuate one’s ethnicity or racial identity. But in many cases, one’s choices, one’s racial or ethnic performances, will have little impact on how one is labeled by others. A person born to Chinese parents but adopted, at infancy, by a Jamaican American couple might identify as ethnically Jamaican. She might enjoy Jamaican cuisine, read Jamaican literature, listen to Jamaican music, and study Jamaican history. However, although her adopted parents may be classified as racially Black, she would be classified as Asian, her race decided for her (Conley 2001). The crucial point is that the degree to which an individual can slip and slide through multiple ethnic identities depends on the degree to which those identities are stigmatized. White Americans typically enjoy a high degree of fluidity and



freedom when self-identifying ethnically. They can choose to give equal weight to all aspects of their ethnicity or to highlight certain parts while de-emphasizing others. For instance, the same person could identify as either “half-Italian, quarter-Polish, quarter-Swiss,” “Polish and Italian,” or just “Italian.” Many people of color do not enjoy the same degree of choice. Someone whose father is Arab American and whose mother is Dutch American could not so easily get away with ethnically identifying only as “Dutch.”

In some instances, non-Whites may perform ethnicity in order to resist certain racial classifications (as when African migrants teach their children to speak with an accent so they might avoid being identified as African Americans); in other instances, they might, in an opposite way, attempt to cleanse themselves of all ethnic markers (be they linguistic, religious, or cultural in nature) to avoid becoming victims of discrimination or stigmatization. Either way, their efforts may prove futile since those belonging to dominated racial groups have considerably less ethnic agency than those belonging to the dominant—and hence normalized—group.<sup>8</sup>

One reason why race and ethnicity are relatively decoupled for White Americans but bound tightly together for non-White Americans is found in the history of the nation’s immigration policies and practices. Until the late nineteenth century, immigration to America was deregulated and encouraged (with the exception of Chinese exclusion laws); however, at the turn of the century, native-born White Americans, who blamed immigrants for the rise of urban slums, crime, and class conflict, began calling for immigration restrictions. Popular and political support for restrictions swelled and resulted in the development of a strict immigration policy, culminating in the Johnson-Reed Act of 1924. America’s new immigration law, complete with national quotas and racial restrictions on citizenship, would fundamentally realign the country’s racial taxonomy. “The national origins system classified Europeans as nationalities and assigned quotas in a hierarchy of desirability,” writes historian Mae Ngai in *Impossible Subjects: Illegal Aliens and the Making of Modern America*. “[B]ut at the same time the law deemed all Europeans to be part of a White race, distinct from those considered to be not [W]hite. Euro-American identities turned both on ethnicity—that is, a nationality-based cultural identity that is defined as capable of transformation and assimilation—and on a racial identity defined by [W]hiteness” (2004, p. 7). Non-Whites, on the other hand, were either denied entry into the United States (as was the case for Asian migrants) or were associated with illegal immigration through harsh border control policies (as was the case for Mexicans). Indeed, the immigration laws of the 1920s applied the newly formed concept of “national origin” only to European nations; those classified as members of the “colored races” were conceived as bereft of a country of origin. The result, Ngai observes, was that “unlike Euro-Americans, whose ethnic and racial identities became uncoupled during the 1920s, Asians’ and Mexicans’ ethnic and racial identities remained conjoined” (2004, pp. 7–8).

The history of America’s immigration policy underscores the intimate conception between race, ethnicity, citizenship, and national origin. Racial categories often are defined and changed by national lawmakers, as citizenship has been extended or retracted depending on one’s racial ascription. The U.S. justice system has decided dozens of cases in ways that have solidified certain racial classifications in the law. During the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, legal cases handed down rulings that officially recognized Japanese, Chinese, Burmese, Filipinos, Koreans, Native Americans, and mixed-race individuals as “not White.” In 1897, a Texas federal court ruled that Mexicans were legally “White.” And Indian Americans, Syrians, and Arabians have been capriciously classified as both “White” and “not White” (Haney-López

1996). Briefly examining how the legal definitions of White and non-White have changed over the years demonstrates the incredibly unstable and fluid nature of racial categories. It also shows how our legal system helps to construct race. For instance, the “prerequisite cases” that determined peoples’ race in order to determine their eligibility for U.S. citizenship resulted in poisonous symbolic consequences. Deemed worthy of citizenship, White people were understood to be upstanding, law-abiding, moral, and intelligent. Conversely, non-White people, from whom citizenship was withheld, were thought to be base, criminal, untrustworthy, and of lesser intelligence. For most of America’s history, courts determined race, and race determined nationality; thus, nationality can only be understood within the context of U.S. racial and ethnic conflict (Loury 2001; Shklar 1991).<sup>9</sup>

## FIVE FALLACIES ABOUT RACISM

According to the Southern Poverty Law Center (2005), there are hundreds of active hate groups across the country. These groups are mostly found in the Southern states—Texas, Georgia, and South Carolina have over forty active groups per state—but California ranks highest in the nation, housing within its borders fifty-three groups. For some people, hate groups epitomize what the essence of racism amounts to: intentional acts of humiliation and hatred. While such acts undoubtedly are racist in nature, they are but the tip of the iceberg. To define racism only through extreme groups and their extreme acts is akin to defining weather only through hurricanes. Hurricanes are certainly a type of weather pattern—a harsh and brutal type—but so too are mild rainfalls, light breezes, and sunny days. Likewise, racism is much broader than violence and epithets. It also comes in much quieter, everyday-ordinary forms (cf. Essed 1991 [1984]).

Americans are deeply divided over the legacies and inner workings of racism, and a large part of this division is due to the fact that many Americans understand racism in limited or misguided ways (Alba et al., 2005; Nadeau et al., 1993). We have identified five fallacies, recurrent in many public debates (see, e.g., Harper and Reskin, 2005; Reskin 1998; Sears et al., 2000), fallacies one should avoid when thinking about racism.

(1) *Individualistic Fallacy*.—Here, racism is assumed to belong to the realm of ideas and prejudices. Racism is only the collection of nasty thoughts that a “racist individual” has about another group. Someone operating with this fallacy thinks of racism as one thinks of a crime and, therefore, divides the world into two types of people: those guilty of the crime of racism (“racists”) and those innocent of the crime (“non-racists”) (Wacquant 1997). Crucial to this misconceived notion of racism is intentionality. “Did I intentionally act racist? Did I cross the street because I was scared of the Hispanic man walking toward me, or did I cross for no apparent reason?” Upon answering “no” to the question of intentionality, one assumes one can classify one’s own actions as “nonracist,” despite the character of those actions, and go about his or her business as innocent.

This conception of racism simply will not do, for it fails to account for the racism that is woven into the very fabric of our schools, political institutions, labor markets, and neighborhoods. Conflating racism with prejudice, as Herbert Blumer (1958) pointed out fifty years ago, ignores the more systematic and structural forms of racism; it looks for racism within individuals and not institutions. Labeling someone a “racist” shifts our attention from the social surroundings that enforce racial inequalities and miseries to the individual with biases. It also lets the accuser off the



hook—"He is a racist; I am not"—and treats racism as aberrant and strange, whereas American racism is rather normal. Furthermore, intentionality is in no way a prerequisite for racism. Racism is often habitual, unintentional, commonplace, polite, implicit, and well meaning (Brown et al., 2003). Thus, racism is located not only in our intentional thoughts and actions; it also thrives in our unintentional thoughts and habits, as well as in the social institutions in which we all are embedded (Bonilla-Silva 1997; Feagin et al., 2001).

(2) *Legalistic Fallacy*.—This fallacy conflates *de jure* legal progress with *de facto* racial progress. One who operates under the legalistic fallacy assumes that abolishing racist laws (racism in principle) automatically leads to the abolition of racism writ large (racism in practice). This fallacy will begin to crumble after a few moments of critical reflection. After all, we would not make the same mistake when it comes to other criminalized acts: Laws against theft do not mean that one's car will never be stolen. By way of tangible illustration, consider *Brown v. Board of Education*, the landmark case that abolished *de jure* segregation in schools. The ruling did not lead to the abolition of *de facto* segregation: fifty years later, schools are still drastically segregated and drastically unequal (Neckerman 2007; Oaks 2005). In fact, some social scientists have documented a nationwide movement of educational re-segregation, which has left today's schools even more segregated than those of 1954 (see Eaton 1994; Harris 2006; Orfield 1993).

(3) *Tokenistic Fallacy*.—One guilty of the tokenistic fallacy assumes that the presence of people of color in influential positions is evidence of the eradication of racial obstacles. Although it is true that non-Whites have made significant inroads to seats of political and economic power over the course of the last fifty years, a disproportionate number remain disadvantaged in these arenas (Alexander 2006; Patterson 1997). Exceptions do not prove the rule. We cannot, in good conscience, ignore the millions of African Americans living in poverty and, instead, point to Oprah Winfrey's millions as evidence for economic equality. Rather, we must explore how Winfrey's financial success can coexist with the economic deprivation of millions of Black women. We need to explore, in historian Thomas Holt's words, how the "simultaneous idealization of Colin Powell," or, for that matter, Barack Obama, "and demonization of blacks as a whole . . . is replicated in much of our everyday world" (2000, p. 6).

Besides, throughout the history of America, one has been able to find at least a handful of non-White individuals who excelled financially and politically in the teeth of rampant racial domination. The first Black congressman was not elected after the Civil Rights Movement but in 1870. Joseph Rainey, a former slave, served four terms in the House of Representatives. Madame C. J. Walker is accredited as being the first Black millionaire. Born in 1867, Walker made her fortune inventing hair and beauty products. Few people would feel comfortable pointing to Rainey's and Walker's success as evidence that late nineteenth-century America was a time of racial harmony and equity. Such tokenistic logic would not be accurate then, and it is not accurate now.

(4) *Ahistorical Fallacy*.—This fallacy renders history impotent. Thinking hindered by the ahistorical fallacy makes a bold claim: Most U.S. history—namely, the period of time when this country did not extend basic rights to people of color (let alone classify them as fully human)—is inconsequential today. Legacies of slavery and colonialism, the eradication of millions of Native Americans, forced segregation, clandestine sterilizations and harmful science experiments, mass disenfranchisement, race-based exploitation, racist propaganda distributed by the state caricaturing Asians, Blacks, and Hispanics, racially motivated abuses of all kinds (sexual, murderous, and dehumanizing)—all of this, purport those operating under the ahistorical fallacy, are

too far removed to matter to those living in the here-and-now. This idea is so erroneous it is difficult to take seriously. Today's society is directed, constructed, and molded by—indeed grafted onto—the past (Ngai 2004; Patterson 1998; Winant 2001). And race, as we have already seen, is a historical invention.

A “soft version” of the ahistorical fallacy might admit that events in the “recent past”—such as the time since the Civil Rights Movement or the attacks on September 11—matter while things in the “distant past”—such as slavery or the colonization of Mexico—have little consequence. But this idea is no less fallacious than the “hard version,” since many events in America's “distant past”—especially the enslavement and murder of millions of Africans—are the *most* consequential in shaping present-day society. In this vein, consider the question French historian Marc Bloch poses to us: “But who would dare to say that the understanding of the Protestant or Catholic Reformation, several centuries removed, is not far more important for a proper grasp of the world today than a great many other movements of thought or feeling, which are certainly more recent, yet more ephemeral” (1953, p. 41)?

(5) *Fixed Fallacy*.—Those who assume that racism is fixed—that it is immutable, constant across time and space—partake in the fixed fallacy. Since they take racism to be something that does not develop at all, those who understand racism through the fixed fallacy are often led to ask questions such as: “Has racism increased or decreased in the past decade?” And because practitioners of the fixed fallacy usually take as their standard definition of racism only the most heinous forms—racial violence, for example—they confidently conclude that, indeed, things have gotten better.

It is important and useful to trace the career of American racism, analyzing, for example, how racial attitudes or measures of racial inclusion and exclusion have changed over time, and many social scientists have developed sophisticated techniques for doing so (e.g., Almaguer 1994; Bobo 2001; Patterson 1998; Schuman et al., 1997). But the question, “Have things gotten better or worse?,” is legitimate *only* after we account for the morphing attributes of racism. We cannot quantify racism like we can quantify, say, birthrates. The nature of “birthrate” does not fluctuate over time; thus, it makes sense to ask, “Are there more or less births now than there were fifty years ago?” without bothering to analyze if and how a birthrate is different today than it was in previous historical moments. American racism, on the other hand, assumes different forms in different historical moments. Although race relations today are informed by those of the past, we cannot hold to the belief that twenty-first-century racism takes on the exact same form as twentieth-century racism. And we certainly cannot conclude that there is “little or no racism” today because it does not resemble the racism of the 1950s. (Modern-day Christianity looks very different, in nearly every conceivable way, than the Christianity of the early church. But this does not mean that there is “little or no Christianity” today.) So, before we ask, “Have things gotten better or worse?,” we should ponder the essence of racism today, noting how it differs from racism experienced by those living in our parents' or grandparents' generation. And we should ask, further, to quote Holt again, “What enables racism to reproduce itself after the historical conditions that initially gave it life have disappeared” (2000, p. 20)?

## RACIAL DOMINATION

We have spent a significant amount of time talking about what racial domination is not but have yet to spell out what it is. We can delineate two specific manifestations of racial domination: institutional racism and interpersonal racism.<sup>10</sup> *Institutional*

*racism* is systemic White domination of people of color, embedded and operating in corporations, universities, legal systems, political bodies, cultural life, and other social collectives. The word “domination” reminds us that institutional racism is a type of power that encompasses the *symbolic power* to classify one group of people as “normal” and other groups of people as “abnormal”; the *political power* to withhold basic rights from people of color and marshal the full power of the state to enforce segregation and inequality; the *social power* to deny people of color full inclusion or membership in associational life; and the *economic power* that privileges Whites in terms of job placement, advancement, wealth, and property accumulation.

Informed by centuries of racial domination, institutional racism withholds from people of color opportunities, privileges, and rights that many Whites enjoy. Social scientists have amassed a significant amount of evidence documenting institutional racism, evidence that demonstrates how White people—strictly because of their Whiteness—reap considerable advantages when buying and selling a house, choosing a neighborhood in which to live, getting a job and moving up the corporate ladder, securing a first-class education, and seeking medical care (Massey 2007; Quillian 2006). That Whites accumulate more property and earn more income than members of minority populations, possess immeasurably more political power, and enjoy greater access to the country’s cultural, social, medical, legal, and economic resources are well documented facts (e.g., Oliver and Shapiro, 1997; Pager 2003; Western 2006). While Whites have accumulated many opportunities due to racial domination, people of color have suffered from disaccumulation (Brown et al., 2003). Thus, if we talk about “Hispanic poverty,” then we must also talk about White affluence; if we speak of “Black unemployment,” then we must also keep in mind White employment; and if we ponder public policies for people of color, then we must also critically examine the public policies that directly benefit White people.<sup>11</sup>

Below the level of institutions—yet directly informed by their workings—we find *interpersonal racism*. This is racial domination manifest in everyday interactions and practices. Interpersonal racism can be overt; however, most of the time, interpersonal racism is quite covert: it is found in the habitual, commonsensical, and ordinary practices of our lives. Our racist attitudes, as Lillian Smith remarked in *Killers of the Dream*, easily “slip from the conscious mind deep into the muscles” (1994 [1949], p. 96). Since we are disposed to a world structured by racial domination, we develop racialized dispositions—some conscious, many more unconscious and somatic—that guide our thoughts and behaviors. We may talk slowly to an Asian woman at the farmer’s market, unconsciously assuming that she speaks poor English; we may inform a Hispanic man at a corporate party that someone has spilled their punch, unconsciously assuming that he is a janitor; we may ask to change seats if an Arab American man sits next to us on an airplane. Miniature actions such as these have little to do with one’s intentional thoughts; they are orchestrated by one’s practical sense, one’s habitual knowhow, and informed by institutional racism.

### Conflict between Racially Dominated Groups

“Can people of color be racist?” This question is a popular one in the public imagination, and the answer depends on what we mean by racism. Institutional racism is the product of years of White supremacy, and it is designed to produce far-reaching benefits for White people. Institutional racism carries on despite our personal attitudes. Thus, there is no such thing as “Black institutional racism” or “reverse institutional racism” since there exists no centuries-old socially ingrained and normalized system of domination designed by people of color that denies Whites

full participation in the rights, privileges, and seats of power of our society (Brown et al., 2003). Interpersonal racism, on the other hand, takes place on the ground level and has to do with attitudes and habitual actions. It is certainly true that members of all racial groups can harbor negative attitudes toward members of other groups.

Indeed, some non-White groups have a deep, conflict-ridden history with other non-White groups. Consider the tense relationship, found in many urban areas, between Korean immigrants and African Americans. Immigrant groups have always found a way to establish a business in the inner city. Throughout the twentieth century, Jewish shopkeepers were a regular fixture in the center of town; but as their children inherited, not just the opportunities their parents had worked so hard to provide, but also the opportunities involved in being welcomed deeper into the ranks of Whiteness, they took leave of their shops and opened up in turn new opportunities for streams of other ethnic immigrants. Koreans have filled the business niche left by Jewish shopkeepers, and many have opened up shops in the Black ghetto because they can afford to live there and because they do not have to compete with large corporations, which are much more interested in the deeper pockets of suburban residents (Lee 2002; Waldinger 1996).

Some Black ghetto residents, however, view Korean shopkeepers with a fair degree of animus and resentment. Although Blacks and immigrants usually compete for different jobs (Baker 1999; McCall 2001), many poor Blacks feel that Korean entrepreneurs have stymied the growth of black business. Conflicts between Black patrons and Korean storeowners regularly are colored by racist language, with each party exchanging epithets (Kim 2000; Lee 2002). Black-Korean conflict boiled over in the early nineteen-nineties. In 1991, a Korean merchant shot and killed a Black teenager in South Central Los Angeles. A year later, Los Angeles went up in flames as insurgents of all racial identities took to the streets after four White police officers, who had been caught on videotape beating Rodney King, a twenty-five-year-old motorist, were acquitted. As the smoke settled from the country's first multiethnic uprising, fifty-two had been killed and millions of dollars worth of property had been destroyed. Korean storeowners were hit the hardest, suffering almost half the total property damage—roughly \$400 million (Lee 2002).

Black-Korean conflict, as well as other antagonistic relations between racially dominated groups—including the so-called Black-Brown divide, bitter relations among Hispanic subgroups, and animus between various American Indian Nations—remind us how racial domination can occlude and distort, how it can hide the real causes of human misery under false arguments that attribute those causes to certain dominated racial groups. Instead of examining processes of disinvestment and deindustrialization that hollowed out the city's core, ongoing modes of capitalist exploitation that keep plump the unemployment rolls, or America's skimpy welfare state and the retreat of state involvement in poor urban areas, the mind clouded by racial domination prefers to blame immigrants or Blacks. The distrust and fear that different racial and ethnic groups living in poor urban neighborhoods harbor towards one another is matched only by the interests and struggles shared by these groups.

People of color, then, can help to reinforce the White power structure by lashing out against other non-White groups. That said, we must realize that interpersonal racism targeting dominated groups and interpersonal racism targeting the dominant group do not pack the same punch. Take, for example, the following scenario: Two young men, one Black, the other White, bump into each other on the street. The Black man calls the White man a "honky." In response, the White man calls the Black man a "boy." Both racial slurs *are* racial slurs and should be labeled as such, and both reinforce racial divisions. However, unlike "honky," "boy" connects to the larger

system of institutional racial domination. The word derives its meaning (and power) from slavery, when enslaved African men were stripped of their masculine honor and treated like children. “Boy” (and many other epithets aimed at Blacks) invokes such times—times when murdering, torturing, whipping, and raping enslaved Blacks were not illegal acts. Epithets towards White people, including “honky,” have no such equivalent. “Boy” also reminds the Black man how things stand today. If the confrontation escalates and the police are called, the Black man knows that the police officers will probably be White and that he might be harassed or looked upon as a threat; if the two men meet in court, the Black man knows that the lawyers, judge, and jurors will possibly be mostly (if not all) White; and if the two men are sentenced, the African American man knows—as do many criminologists (e.g., Tonry 1995)—that he will get the harsher sentence. “Boy” brings the full weight of institutional racism—systematic, historical, mighty—down upon the Black man. “Honky,” even if delivered with venomous spite, is powerless by comparison.

Moreover, sociologists have shown that, unlike White people, people of color are confronted with interpersonal racism on a regular basis, sometimes daily. For people of color, there is a cumulative character to an individual’s racial experiences. Humiliating or degrading acts always are informed by similar acts that individuals have experienced in the past. To paraphrase Joe Feagin (1991), the interpersonal events that take place on the street and in other public settings are not simply rare and isolated events; rather, they are recurring events shaped by historical and social forces of racial domination.

### Symbolic Violence

Because racism infuses all of social life, people of color and Whites alike develop thoughts and practices molded by racism; people of color and Whites alike develop stereotypes about other racial groups. People of color often internalize prejudice aimed at their own racial group, unintentionally contributing to the reproduction of racial domination.<sup>12</sup> Psychologists have labeled this phenomenon “internalized oppression” or “internalized racism” (Fanon 1967). Following the work of Pierre Bourdieu, we label it “symbolic violence”: “*violence which is exercised upon a social agent with his or her complicity*” (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992, p. 167). In the case of racial domination, symbolic violence refers to the process of people of color unknowingly accepting and supporting the terms of their own domination, thereby acting as agents who collude in the conditions from which they suffer. “So we learned the dance that cripples the human spirit,” laments Smith, “step by step by step, we who were [W]hite and we who were colored, day by day, hour by hour, year by year until the movements were reflexes and made for the rest of our life without thinking” (1994 [1949], p. 96).

A good example of symbolic violence is the nearly worldwide acceptance of European standards of beauty. The false aesthetic separation between “White beauty”—epitomized by long, straight, blonde hair, blue eyes, and pale skin—and “Black ugliness”—epitomized by short, curly, black hair, brown eyes, and dark brown skin—grew out of slavery. Features associated with the African American phenotype were demonized. Since the “Black is Beautiful” movement of the 1960s, many African American women have resisted such standards, taking pride in their curly hair and their ebony-colored skin. Nevertheless, many others have internalized White standards of beauty. As such, they use costly and painful methods to straighten and dye their hair and, less frequently, to lighten their skin. In fact, Madame C. J. Walker, the first Black millionaire mentioned above, made her fortune developing a



product to straighten Black women's hair! Today, many Black women and other members of dominated races, to borrow Sartre's line, have been "poisoned by the stereotype others have of them" (1960 [1946], p. 95).

Symbolic violence operates by virtue of the fact that the dominated perceive and respond to the structures and processes that dominate them through modes of thought—and, indeed, also of feeling—which are themselves the product of domination. The "order of things" comes to seem to them natural, self-evident, and legitimate. Such an insight neither grants everything to structural causation nor blames the hapless victim. "[T]he only way to understand this particular form of domination is to move beyond the forced choice between constraint (by forces) and consent (to reasons), between mechanical coercion and voluntary, free, deliberate, even calculated submission. The effect of symbolic domination . . . is exerted not in the pure logic of knowing consciousnesses but through the schemes of perception, appreciation, and action that are constitutive of habitus and which, below the level of the decisions of consciousness and the controls of the will, set up a cognitive relationship that is profoundly obscure to itself" (Bourdieu 2001 [1998], p. 37). This in turn has an important practical implication. What is required is a radical transformation of the social conditions that produce embodied habits, dispositions, tastes, and lifestyles that lead people to become actively complicit in their own domination. The only way to bring about change that does not entail merely replacing one modality of racial domination with another is to undo the mechanisms of dehistoricization and universalization—"always and everywhere it has been this way"—through which arbitrary workings of power are enabled to continue.

### Intersecting Modes of Domination

Racial domination does not operate inside a vacuum, cordoned off from other modes of domination. On the contrary, it *intersects* with other forms of domination—those based on gender, class, sexuality, religion, nationhood, ability, and so forth. The notion that there is a monolithic "Arab American experience," "Asian American experience," or "White experience"—experiences somehow detached from other pieces of one's identity—is nothing but a chimera. Researchers have labeled such a notion "racial essentialism," for such a way of thinking boils down vastly different human experiences into a single "master category": race (Harris 2000). When we fail to account for these different experiences, we create silences in our narratives of the social world and fail to explain how overlapping systems of advantage and disadvantage affect individuals' opportunity structures, lifestyles, and social hardships. The idea of intersectionality implies that we cannot understand the lives of poor White single mothers or gay Black men by examining only one dimension of their lives—class, gender, race, or sexuality. Indeed, we must explore their lives in their full complexity, examining how these various dimensions come together and structure their existence. When we speak of racial domination, then, we must always bear in mind the ways in which it interacts with masculine domination (or sexism), heterosexual domination (or homophobia), class domination (poverty), religious persecution, disadvantages brought on by disabilities, and so forth (Collins 2000; Crenshaw 1990; Mohanty 2003).

In addition, we should not assume that one kind of oppression is more important than another or that being advantaged in one dimension of life somehow cancels out other dimensions that often result in disadvantage. While it is true that poor Whites experience many of the same hardships as poor Blacks, it is not true that poverty somehow de-Whitens poor Whites. In other words, though they are in a similarly

precarious economic position as poor Blacks, poor Whites still experience race-based privileges, while poor Blacks are oppressed not only by poverty but also by racism. In a similar vein, well-off people of color cannot “buy” their way out of racism. Despite their economic privilege, middle- and upper-class non-Whites experience institutional and interpersonal racism on a regular basis (Feagin 1991). But how, exactly, should we conceptualize these intersecting modes of domination? Many scholars have grappled with this question (e.g., McCall 2005; Walby 2007; Yuval-Davis 2006), and we do so here, if only in the most provisional way.

The notion of intersectionality is perhaps as old as the social problems of racial, masculine, and class domination, but in recent memory it was popularized by activists who criticized the feminist and civil rights movements for ignoring the unique struggles of women of color. The term itself is credited to critical race scholar Kimberlé Crenshaw (1989), who imagined society as divided every which way by multiple forms of inequality. For Crenshaw, society resembled an intricate system of crisscrossing roads—each one representing a different social identity (e.g., race, gender, class, religion, age); one’s unique social position (or structural location) could be identified by listing all the attributes of one’s social identity and pinpointing the nexus (or intersection) at which all those attributes coalesced. This conception of intersectionality has been the dominant one for many years, leading scholars to understand overlapping modes of oppression as a kind of “matrix of domination” (Collins 2000).

Recently, however, scholars have criticized this way of thinking about intersectionality, claiming that it reproduces, in minimized form, the very essentialist reasoning it sought to dismantle (see Ferree 2009; McCall 2005). For example, those who have concentrated on the ways that “class intersects with race” largely have bifurcated racial groups (especially African Americans) into two classes—the middle class and the poor (or “the underclass”)—attributing to each certain social characteristics, principles, and practices (e.g., Jencks 1992; Massey and Denton, 1993; Wilson 1978). Thus, instead of Black culture, we now have two distinct Black cultures; instead of the Black community, we think in terms of subcommunities. When scholars divide racial groups into a set number of classes, genders, sexualities, and so forth, the end result is not a critique of essentialism but a new, softer kind of essentialism, resulting in “a multichrome mosaic of monochrome racial, ethnic, or cultural blocs” (Brubaker et al., 2004, p. 45). At best, a model that represents society as a hierarchy of culturally discrete boxes—divided by vectors of social identity—encourages us to conceptualize oppression through a simple additive model (one often hears of a “double jeopardy” or “triple oppression”); at worst, it replaces larger homogenizing rubrics (“Hispanics”) with smaller ones (“Hispanic women”) and offers little conceptual refuge from reductionist and reifying tendencies.

We believe a more analytically sophisticated and politically useful rendering of intertwined oppressions is Myra Marx Ferree’s model of “interactive intersectionality” (cf. Prins 2006; Walby 2007). In this version, overlapping social identities are best understood, not as a collection of “points of intersection,” but as a “figuration” (as Elias would have it) or “field” (as Bourdieu would) of shifting, deeply-dimensioned, and “mutually constituted *relationships*.” This means “the ‘intersection of gender and race’ is not any number of specific *locations* occupied by individuals or groups (such as Black women) but a *process* through which ‘race’ takes on multiple ‘gendered’ meanings for particular women and men. . . . In such a complex system, gender is not a dimension limited to the organization of reproduction or family, class is not a dimension equated with the economy, and race is not a category reduced to the primacy of ethnicities, nations and borders, but all of the processes that system-

atically organize families, economies, and nations are co-constructed along with the meanings of gender, race, and class that are presented in and reinforced by these institutions separately and together” (Ferree 2009, p. 85).

The best metaphor for intersecting modes of oppression, therefore, may not be that of crisscrossing roads but of a web or field of relations within which struggles over opportunities, power, and privileges take place (cf. Bourdieu 1996 [1992]; Emirbayer 1997). The implication of this new theoretical development is that if we focus strictly on race and ignore other sources of social inequality (such as class and gender), not only will we be deaf to the unique experiences of certain members of society—their voices drowned out by our violent and homogenizing categorization—but we will also (and always) fundamentally misunderstand our object of analysis: race itself. Intersectional analysis of the type that breaks with old modes of thinking (e.g., society as a “matrix of domination”) and adopts a thoroughly relational perspective on multiple modes of oppression (e.g., “interactive intersectionality”) is not an option but a *prerequisite* for fully understanding the nature of racial identity and racial domination.

## CONCLUSION

The aim of this paper was to advance a socioanalysis of racial domination in embryonic form, introducing students to the analytical building blocks of a sociology of race and ethnicity. We strove to consolidate—in a single essay—insights from diverse bodies of scholarship, critically interrogating several ideas along the way. In so doing, we underscored a shared set of definitions and concepts and emphasized effective (and dissected fallacious) ways of thinking about racial domination. Racism can be slippery, elusive to observation and analysis. Twenty-first century patterns of racial stigmatization, exclusion, and repression—as well as promises of racial reconciliation and multicultural coalitions—do not immediately resemble those of the twentieth century. Like a recessive tumor, twenty-first-century racism has disguised itself, calling itself by other names and cloaking itself behind seemingly “race-neutral” laws, policies, practices, and language. As students of society—and as citizens of a world that grows more racially diverse every year—we must work to render apparent this pervasive, corrosive, and dehumanizing form of domination that infects the health of our society. We must understand how race works, developing tools to analyze this well-founded fiction responsible for so many cleavages and inequalities in our world today. This article has attempted to lay the groundwork necessary to do just that.

---

**Corresponding author:** Matthew Desmond, Department of Sociology, University of Wisconsin—Madison, 8128 William H. Sewell Social Sciences Building, 1180 Observatory Drive, Madison, WI 53706-1393. Email: mdesmond@ssc.wisc.edu

## NOTES

1. Race scholars must strive to construct their own object of inquiry rather than allowing that object to be pre-constructed for them, as it were, by taken-for-granted and commonsense understandings or folk knowledge (Banton 1979). As Durkheim (e.g., 1982 [1895]) often stressed, crafting a scientific definition is among the most effective ways to exercise epistemological vigilance. We present our own provisional definition of race here to break with commonsense impressions of the term and, by unpacking it one element at a time, to arrive at a “social-scientifically” sound understanding of race. By emphasizing the process of misrecognition (or naturalization), our definition differs from others, which tend to accept as given the existence of natural physical differences



that are, through the process of racialization, ascribed social importance or meaning. Since Weber, sociologists have defined race as a form of social classification based on “obvious physical differences” (1978 [1922], p. 385; e.g., Schaefer 2006, p. 7) or “different types of human bodies” (Omi and Winant, 1994, p. 55). In many (one might say most) cases, these conditions hold—what becomes known as a “race” is a group set apart through social classification, practice, and custom by skin tone, hair type, smell, or some other physical difference—but they prove insufficient in a non-insignificant number of other contexts, where the process of racialization relies on a set of non-obvious, or even non-existent, physical attributes (as in the case of Japan’s Burakamin or even light-skinned African Americans or Native Americans). Banton was correct when he said that people “do not perceive racial differences . . . [but] phenotypical differences of colour, hair form, underlying bone structure and so on” (1979, p. 130). But we can go further still, acknowledging that processes of racialization actually can demarcate difference where previously no phenotypic difference (even at the level of melanin count) existed. In all cases, the process of racialization relies on the process of misrecognition, whereby a social creation is mistaken for a natural phenomenon, either in hard form (as with scientific racism or the early human taxonomies) or in softer manifestations (as with stereotypical comments attributing to certain racial groups a collection of attributes, positive or negative, as if those attributes were genetically inherited).

2. Emphatically, this does not mean that refusing to recognize racial groups that were created through centuries of oppression, colonialism, political discourse, and scientific manipulation will somehow lead those races (and racial inequality) to magically disappear. The process of racial misrecognition is found both at the structural and individual levels and, most important, is a historical process. It follows, then, that the practice of refusing to recognize the misrecognition, as with France’s aversion to acknowledging racial categories or the prematurely celebratory declaration of a “color-blind” or “race free” America usually associated with neoconservative politics, is an ineffective and wrongheaded response to a world itself not color-blind. In many cases, the refusal to recognize race—a well-founded fiction—only exacerbates racial inequalities by rendering antiracist programs impossible.
3. For critiques of ethnicity-, nation-, and class-oriented theories of race, see Omi and Winant (1994).
4. Recently, an energetic and constructive debate has emerged over the historical construction of Whiteness in America, its genesis, development, and boundaries. While some historians have argued that certain European immigrants initially were not considered White but eventually came to be included under this privileged rubric, others have suggested that these immigrants were “[W]hite on arrival” (see Arnesen 2001; Guglielmo 2004; Roediger 1991).
5. Americans tend to focus on ethnic differences within the White race, while treating Blacks, Latinos, and Asian Americans as if they had no ethnicity and as if there were no cultural or historical differences between (for African Americans) Haitians, Jamaicans, Ethiopians, Trinidadians, Angolans, or Nigerians, or between (for Latinos) Puerto Ricans, Cubans, Mexicans, Peruvians, or Dominicans, or between (for Asian Americans) Laotians, Indonesians, Cambodians, Vietnamese, Chinese, and Japanese people (Waters 1999).
6. Although ethnic affiliations are often informed by national affiliations, ethnicity also can transcend national borders. Jewish ethnic affiliation encompasses a wide variety of people who vary in terms of nationality, political commitments, languages, and religious beliefs and practices. Despite these differences—which cut across national and religious boundaries—many Jews see themselves as bound together in a group, sharing a common history, culture, and ethnic identity.
7. For an extended discussion, see Desmond and Emirbayer (2009).
8. This is why some scholars have observed that, in its popular usage, the term “Hispanic” is deployed much more often as a racial, not ethnic, classification, while Hispanic “sub-categories,” such as “Mexican” or “Cuban,” are treated like ethnic markers (see Hirschman et al., 2000).
9. Today, many foreign-born residents still face great barriers when applying for U.S. citizenship. When we compare U.S. naturalization rates with those of Canada, we notice that the latter are higher than the former: over the past three decades, Canada has awarded most of its foreign-born population citizenship, while the U.S. has not naturalized the majority of its foreign-born population (Bloemraad 2006; see also Joppke 1999).

10. We eschew the misleading antinomy of “racism” and “prejudice”—or, in the words of Bonilla-Silva (1997), “structure” and “ideology”—since the latter term is only an extension and manifestation of the former; prejudice is in no way qualitatively distinct from racism and should not be portrayed as such.
11. At the same time, however, we should not assume that non-White gain automatically necessitates White loss, or vice versa, for racial domination does not function under such zero-sum conditions. More realistic is the notion that “racism legitimates the squandering and dissipation of an important *surplus* of societal resources and human talents” (Feagin et al., 2001, p. 7).
12. For an ethnographic account of symbolic violence among migrant workers, see Holmes (2007).

## REFERENCES

- Alba, Richard, Rubén Rumbaut, and Karen Marotz (2005). A Distorted Nation: Perceptions of Racial/Ethnic Group Sizes and Attitudes Toward Immigrants and Other Minorities. *Social Forces*, 84: 901–919.
- Alexander, Jeffrey (2006). *The Civil Sphere*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Almaguer, Tomás (1994). *Racial Fault Lines: The Historical Origins of White Supremacy in California*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- Arnesen, Eric (2001). Whiteness and the Historians’ Imagination. *International Labor and Work-Class History*, 60: 3–32.
- Baker, Susan Gonzalez (1999). Mexican-Origin Women in Southwestern Labor Markets. In Irene Browne (Ed.), *Latinas and African American Women at Work*, pp. 244–269. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.
- Banton, Michael (1979). Analytical and Folk Concepts of Race and Ethnicity. *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 2: 127–138.
- Bloch, Marc (1953). *The Historian’s Craft*. Translated by Peter Putnam. New York: Vintage.
- Bloemraad, Irene (2006). *Becoming a Citizen: Incorporating Immigrants and Refugees in the United States and Canada*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- Blumer, Herbert (1958). Race Prejudice as a Sense of Group Position. *The Pacific Sociological Review*, 1: 3–7.
- Bobo, Lawrence (2001). Racial Attitudes and Relations at the Close of the Twentieth Century. In Neil Smelser, William Julius Wilson, and Faith Mitchell (Eds.), *America Becoming: Racial Trends and their Consequences*, pp. 262–299. Washington, DC: National Academy Press.
- Bobo, Lawrence, and Cybelle Fox (2003). Race, Racism, and Discrimination: Bridging Problems, Methods, and Theory in Social Psychological Research. *Social Psychology Quarterly*, 66: 319–332.
- Bonilla-Silva, Eduardo (1997). Rethinking Racism: Toward a Structural Interpretation. *American Sociological Review*, 62: 465–480.
- Bourdieu, Pierre (2003). *Language and Symbolic Power*. Translated by Gino Raymond and Matthew Adamson. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Bourdieu, Pierre (2001 [1998]). *Masculine Domination*. Translated by Richard Nice. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Bourdieu, Pierre (1998 [1994]). Rethinking the State: Genesis and Structure of the Bureaucratic Field. Translated by Loïc Wacquant and Samar Farage. In Pierre Bourdieu (Ed.), *Practical Reason*, pp. 35–63. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Bourdieu, Pierre (1996 [1992]). *The Rules of Art: Genesis and Structure of the Literary Field*. Translated by Susan Emanuel. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Bourdieu, Pierre, and Loïc Wacquant (1992). *An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
- Brown, Michael, Martin Carnoy, Elliott Currie, Troy Duster, David Oppenheimer, Marjorie Shultz, and David Wellman (2003). *White-Washing Race: The Myth of a Color Blind Society*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- Brubaker, Rogers, and Frederick Cooper (2000). Beyond “Identity.” *Theory and Society*, 29: 1–47.
- Brubaker, Rogers, Mara Loveman, and Peter Stamatov (2004). Ethnicity as Cognition. *Theory and Society*, 33: 31–64.
- Collins, Patricia Hill (2000). *Black Feminist Thought: Knowledge, Consciousness, and the Politics of Empowerment*, 2 ed. New York: Routledge.

- Conley, Dalton (2001). Universal Freckle, or How I Learned to Be White. In Birgit Brander Rasmussen, Eric Klinenberg, Irene Nexica, and Matt Wray (Eds.), *The Making and Unmaking of Whiteness*, pp. 25–42. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
- Cox, Oliver Cromwell (1948). *Caste, Class, and Race: A Study in Social Dynamics*. Garden City, NY: Doubleday.
- Crenshaw, Kimberlé (1989). Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics. *University of Chicago Legal Forum*, 1989: 139–167.
- Crenshaw, Kimberlé (1990). Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence against Women of Color. *Stanford Law Review*, 42: 1241–1299.
- DaCosta, Kimberly (2007). *Making Multiracials: State, Family, and Market in the Redrawing of the Color Line*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Davis, F. James (1991). *Who Is Black? One Nation's Definition*. University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press.
- Desmond, Matthew, and Mustafa Emirbayer (2009). *Racial Domination, Racial Progress: The Sociology of Race in America*. New York: McGraw-Hill.
- Dikötter, Frank (1992). *The Discourse of Race in Modern China*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Durkheim, Émile (1982 [1895]). *The Rules of Sociological Method and Selected Texts on Sociology and its Method*. New York: Free Press.
- Duster, Troy (2003). Buried Alive: The Concept of Race in Science. In Alan Goodman, Deborah Heath, and Susan Lindee (Eds.), *Genetic Nature/Culture: Anthropology and Science beyond the Two-Culture Divide*, pp. 258–277. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- Duster, Troy (2001). The “Morphing” Properties of Whiteness. In Birgit Brander Rasmussen, Eric Klinenberg, Irene Nexica, and Matt Wray (Eds.), *The Making and Unmaking of Whiteness*, pp. 113–137. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
- Eaton, Susan (1994). The New Segregation: Forty Years after Brown, Cities and Suburbs Face a Rising Tide of Racial Isolation. *Harvard Education Letter*, X(1): 1–15.
- Eisenstadt, S.N (1998). *Japanese Civilization: A Comparative View*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
- Emirbayer, Mustafa (1997). Manifesto for Relational Sociology. *American Journal of Sociology*, 103: 281–317.
- Essed, Philomena (1991 [1984]). *Everyday Racism*. Claremont, CA: Hunter House.
- Fanon, Frantz (1967). *Black Skin, White Masks*. Translated by Charles Lam Markmann. New York: Grove Press.
- Feagin, Joe (1991). The Continuing Significance of Race: Antiblack Discrimination in Public Places. *American Sociological Review*, 56: 101–116.
- Feagin, Joe, Hernan Vera, and Pinar Batur (2001). *White Racism: The Basics*, Second Edition. New York: Routledge.
- Ferree, Myra Marx (2009). Inequality, Intersectionality and the Politics of Discourse: Framing Feminist Alliances. In Emanuela Lombardo, Petra Meier, and Mieke Verloo (Eds.), *The Discursive Politics of Gender Equality: Stretching, Bending, and Policy-Making*, pp. 84–101. New York: Routledge.
- Frankenberg, Ruth (1993). *White Women, Race Matters: The Social Construction of Whiteness*. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press.
- Gossett, Thomas (1965). *Race: The History of an Idea in America*. New York: Schocken.
- Graves, Joseph, Jr. (2001). *The Emperor's New Clothes: Biological Theories of Race at the Millennium*. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press.
- Guglielmo, Thomas (2004). *White on Arrival: Italians, Race, Color, and Power in Chicago, 1890–1945*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Hall, Stuart (1980). Race Articulation and Societies Structured in Dominance. In UNESCO (Ed.), *Sociological Theories: Race and Colonialism*, pp. 305–345. Paris, FR: UNESCO.
- Haney-López, Ian (1996). *White by Law: The Legal Construction of Race*. New York: New York University Press.
- Hannaford, Ivan (1996). *Race: The History of an Idea in the West*. Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins Press.
- Harper, Shannon, and Barbara Reskin (2005). Affirmative Action at School and on the Job. *Annual Review of Sociology*, 31: 357–379.
- Harris, Angela (2000). Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory. In Richard Delgado and Jean Stefancic (Eds.), *Critical Race Theory: The Cutting Edge*, Second Edition, pp. 261–274. Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press.

- Harris, Douglas (2006). *Lost Learning, Forgotten Promises: A National Analysis of School Racial Segregation, Student Achievement, and "Controlled Choice" Plans*. Washington, DC: Center for American Progress.
- Hartigan, John, Jr. (1999). *Racial Situations: Class Predicaments of Whiteness in Detroit*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Hirschman, Charles, Richard Alba, and Reynolds Farley (2000). The Meaning and Measurement of Race in the U.S. Census: Glimpses into the Future. *Demography*, 37: 381–393.
- Holmes, Seth (2007). "Oaxacans Like to Work Bent Over": The Naturalization of Social Suffering among Berry Farm Workers. *International Migration*, 45: 39–68.
- Holt, Thomas (2000). *The Problem of Race in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Jackson, John, Jr. (2001). *Harlemworld: Doing Race and Class in Contemporary Black America*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
- Jencks, Christopher (1992). *Rethinking Social Policy: Race, Poverty, and the Underclass*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Johnson, E. Patrick (2003). *Appropriating Blackness: Performance and the Politics of Authenticity*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
- Joppke, Christian (1999). *Immigration and the Nation-State: The United States, Germany, and Great Britain*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Kim, Claire Jean (2000). *Bitter Fruit: The Politics of Black-Korean Conflict in New York City*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- Lee, Jennifer (2002). *Civility in the City: Blacks, Jews, and Koreans in Urban America*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Lewis, Amanda (2004). "What Group?" Studying Whites and Whiteness in the Era of "Color-Blindness." *Sociological Theory*, 22: 623–646.
- Loury, Glenn (2001). *The Anatomy of Racial Inequality*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Loveman, Mara (1999). Is "Race" Essential? *American Sociological Review*, 64: 891–898.
- Marx, Anthony (1998). *Making Race and Nation: A Comparison of the United States, South Africa, and Brazil*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Massey, Douglas (2007). *Categorically Unequal: The American Stratification System*. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.
- Massey, Douglas, and Nancy Denton (1993). *American Apartheid: Segregation and the Making of the Underclass*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- McCall, Leslie (2005). The Complexity of Intersectionality. *Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society*, 30: 1771–1800.
- McCall, Leslie (2001). Sources of Racial Wage Inequality in Metropolitan Labor Markets: Racial, Ethnic, and Gender Differences. *American Sociological Review*, 66: 520–541.
- Mohanty, Chandra (2003). *Feminism without Borders: Decolonizing Theory, Practicing Solidarity*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
- Morrison, Toni (1992). *Playing in the Dark: Whiteness and the Literary Imagination*. New York: Vintage.
- Nadeau, Richard, Richard Niemi, and Jeffrey Levine (1993). Innumeracy about Minority Populations. *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 57: 332–347.
- Neckerman, Kathryn (2007). *Schools Betrayed: Roots of Failure in Inner-City Education*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
- Ngai, Mae (2004). *Impossible Subjects: Illegal Aliens and the Making of Modern America*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Oaks, Jeannie (2005). *Keeping Track: How Schools Structure Inequality*, Second Edition. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- Oliver, Melvin, and Thomas Shapiro (1997). *Black Wealth/White Wealth*. New York: Routledge.
- Omi, Michael, and Howard Winant (1994). *Racial Formation in the United States: From the 1960s to the 1990s*, 2 ed. New York: Routledge.
- Orfield, Gary (1993). *The Growth of Segregation in American Schools: Changing Patterns of Separation and Poverty Since 1968*. Washington, DC: National School Boards Association.
- Pager, Devah (2003). The Mark of a Criminal Record. *American Journal of Sociology*, 108: 937–975.
- Patterson, Orlando (1998). *Rituals of Blood: Consequences of Slavery in Two American Centuries*. New York: Basic Civitas.
- Patterson, Orlando (1997). *The Ordeal of Integration: Progress and Resentment in America's "Racial" Crisis*. Washington, DC: Civitas Counterpoint.



- Prins, Baukje (2006). Narrative Accounts of Origins: A Blind Spot in the Intersectional Approach? *European Journal of Women's Studies*, 13: 277–290.
- Quillian, Lincoln (2006). New Approaches to Understanding Racial Prejudice and Discrimination. *Annual Review of Sociology*, 32: 299–328.
- Reich, Michael (1981). *Racial Inequality: A Political-Economic Analysis*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Reskin, Barbara (1998). *The Realities of Affirmative Action*. Washington, DC: American Sociological Association.
- Roediger, David (1991). *The Wages of Whiteness: Race and the Making of the American Working Class*. London, U.K.: Verso.
- Sartre, Jean-Paul (1960 [1946]). *Anti-Semite and Jew*. Translated by George Becker. New York: Grove Press.
- Schaefer, Richard (2006). *Racial and Ethnic Groups*, Tenth Edition. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson, Prentice Hall.
- Schuman, Howard, Charlotte Steeh, Lawrence Bobo, and Maria Krysan (1997). *Racial Attitudes in America: Trends and Interpretations*, revised edition. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Searle-Chatterjee, Mary, and Ursula Sharma (1994). *Contextualising Caste: Post-Dumontian Approaches*. Oxford, U.K.: Blackwell.
- Sears, David, James Sidanius, and Lawrence Bobo (Eds.) (2000). *Racialized Politics: The Debate about Racism in America*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
- Sheriff, Robin (2001). *Dreaming Equality: Color, Race, and Racism in Urban Brazil*. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press.
- Shklar, Judith (1991). *American Citizenship: The Quest for Inclusion*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Smedley, Audrey (1999). *Race in North America: Origin and Evolution of a Worldview*, Second Edition. Boulder, CO: Westview.
- Smith, Lillian (1994 [1949]). *Killers of the Dream*, 1994 edition. New York: Norton.
- Southern Poverty Law Center Intelligence Project (2005). *Active U.S. Hate Groups in 2005*. Montgomery, AL: Southern Poverty Law Center.
- Sparks, Allister (2006). *The Mind of South Africa: The Story of the Rise and Fall of Apartheid*. Johannesburg, ZA: Jonathan Ball.
- Stephens, Thomas (1999). *Dictionary of Latin American Racial and Ethnic Terminology*. Gainesville, FL: University of Florida Press.
- Telles, Edward (2004). *Race in Another America: The Significance of Skin Color in Brazil*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Tonry, Michael (1995). *Malign Neglect: Race, Crime, and Punishment in America*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Wacquant, Loïc (1997). For an Analytic of Racial Domination. *Political Power and Social Theory*, 11: 221–234.
- Walby, Sylvia (2007). Complexity Theory, Systems Theory, and Multiple Intersecting Social Inequalities. *Philosophy of the Social Sciences*, 37: 449–470.
- Waldinger, Roger (1996). *Still a Promised City? African Americans and New Immigrants in Postindustrial New York*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Waters, Mary (1990). *Ethnic Options: Choosing Identities in America*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- Waters, Mary (1999). *Black Identities: West Indian Immigrant Dreams and American Realities*. New York, Cambridge, MA: Russell Sage Foundation, Harvard University Press.
- Weber, Max (1978 [1922]). *Economy and Society*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- Weber, Max (1946). Class, Status, Party. In H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (Eds.), *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology*, pp. 180–195. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Western, Bruce (2006). *Punishment and Inequality in America*. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.
- Wilson, William Julius (1978). *The Declining Significance of Race: Blacks and Changing American Institutions*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
- Winant, Howard (2000). Race and Race Theory. *Annual Review of Sociology*, 26: 169–185.
- Winant, Howard (2001). *The World is a Ghetto: Race and Democracy since World War II*. New York: Basic Books.
- Yuval-Davis, Nira (2006). Intersectionality and Feminist Politics. *European Journal of Women's Studies*, 13: 193–209.

## 五、谁需要华教？谁做华教运动？

（2018 年 9 月 1 日，星期六，2p. m. - 5p. m.）

专题讨论会读本

- I. 柯嘉逊，1999，马来西亚华教奋斗史，董教总教育中心，页 32-136。
- II. Wan Saiful (2016) Vernacular Schools not the problem. The Star Online.
- III. Syed Saddiq (2016) Vernacular Schools and national unity. Malaysiakini.
- IV. \*\*Della Porta, D., & Diani, M 著、苗延威译，2002，社会运动概论，台北：巨流图书有限公司。（第四章：集体行动与认同）

讨论重点

- 什么是社会运动（social movement）？社会运动的要件是什么？
- 马来西亚华教运动如何持续至今？华教运动中的集体行动与认同如何被形塑？
- 如何评价当前华教运动的困境与挑战？马来学者、政治人物的评价又如何？

\*试利用课堂的理论概念分组完成

**Week1 - Ethnic Identity and Narrativization**

**Week2 - Racial Formation, Racialization, and Racial Project**

**Week3 - Becoming (anti)Racist and Multiculturalism**

**Week4 - Institutional Racism and Racial Domination**

马来西亚华教奋斗史的分析

	华教运动的历史脉络（事件、制度、论述等）	华教运动的对策	评价与理论分析 （成败、困境、对当代运动的影响）

### 第三章 公民权与华文教育

公民权与语文教育这个密切联系的问题成了马来亚战后最热门的课题。当局向华人社会指出,鉴于华文并非国家官方语文,华文教育并不能被考虑纳入国家教育制度中,这点只有在华人成为大马公民后才能被考虑。带有种族主义色彩的宪制建议书,反映出民族主义者对民主的要求是不会被殖民地政府所接纳的。

这项斗争的过程终于使华人社会了解到急需团结起来,以保卫正受威胁的华人利益。华社所成立的商会与同乡会,仍不足以应付华人社会所面对的问题。公民权、移民、社会福利、语文与教育等问题是需要通过各地区、各州华团的合作和联系方能解决的。

在1946年,马来亚计有将近1,400个华人社团。(1)社团是全国各州或各地区的同乡会、商会、教育与文化组织的总称。这些社团的成员常有重叠的现象,领导层则多由富有商人担任。

战后,所有华校都必须重新注册。至1946年杪,马来亚共有1,078所华校,合计有168,303名学生。(2)华校能取得这样的成就应归功于社团的努力。在战后初期,中国对海外华文教育仍然深感兴趣,且拨出400万美元作为华校发展用途。中国当局也于1946年7月间,派遣一名教育官员南来马来亚,以对华校的建设提出建议。(3)

在战后初期,即使当时的马来联邦教育总监都曾经这样说过:

“很久以来,就觉得这个教育制度是有缺陷的,它使到青年

男女在无法学习本身的母语和无法了解自己的丰富文化和语言遗产的情况下,完成学校教育。”(4)

以下我们将看到当殖民地策略有所变动时,这个看法好像马来联邦一样,很快就被搁置一旁。

#### 3.1 战后的公民权建议

马来联邦是战时殖民地思想和重新评估的结果。这项建议旨在把苏丹的司法权力转予英国国王,以加强殖民地政府和放宽非巫人公民权条例。当局是鉴于非巫人在马来亚发展中和保卫国家方面,尤其是抗日战争中所扮演的积极角色,才在公民权方面做出让步。可是这个马来联邦并没有为马来亚的自治铺路,因它根本没有计划举行选举。况且,在缺乏真正民主权利之下,马来联邦所提出的有关公民权方面的建议,并不具有太大的意义。

随后的发展显示,英政府的政策有失圆滑,马来统治者开始发动巫裔社会反对这项建议,且成功说服殖民政权改变其战后的策略。巫统也反对马来亚联邦所提出的普及公民权法令,因它将使到83%的马来亚华人成为公民。

巫裔社会对马来亚联邦的强烈反对,迫使英政府全面更改所建议的宪制修正条文,并背着其他有关组织包括非巫人与巫籍主张共和政体者,即刻和马来统治者展开会谈商讨有关事宜。

较后时,马来亚联邦建议被“马来亚联合邦”建议所取代。对英国来说,只要其经济、政治和军事利益仍然像以往一样得到保障,这只是一个小小的让步。



1946年7月，由八位英国人和四位马来官员组成的工作委员会，草拟了一份马来亚联邦建议书。非马来人没有参与。工作委员会授权的范围之一为：

“这些是英王统治下的马来州，这里的臣民不贰效忠，也没有第二个祖国；因此，他们在这儿的特别地位和权利应受到保护。”（5）

马来统治者对马来风俗和宗教所拥有的传统权力将受到承认，而联邦立法即行政议员则由英殖民地官员委任。新加坡将不包括在联邦内。此外，将不会实行民主代议士制度，理由是马来亚在这方面仍未作好准备。

至于非巫人，申请公民权的条件修改后将更加严厉。根据马来亚联邦建议书，凡是在马来亚联邦居住满五年者就有条件申请公民权，而新条例却要求15年的居留期，方可申请。此外，申请者还必须具有巫文或英文的足够知识，而当时一般非巫人都不能掌握这两种语文。在这些附加条件下，估计只有大约10%的马来亚华人有资格获取公民权。（6）

这项由英政府、马来统治者与巫统秘密协商决定的建议书，引起非巫人社会及一些政治组织，如马来国民党的义愤。殖民地政府亦授权巫统为推选巫裔立法及行政议员的唯一机构。

当《宪制安排建议书概要》于1946年12月发表后，各社团即开始联系和组织起来抗议这项建议书。中华总商会亦基于该建议书排斥新加坡是企图削弱华人在联合邦的地位，而提出抗议。中华总商会也呼吁当局：

- （一）不分种族和血统，一律分发公民权予所有在马来亚出生并长期居留者；
- （二）或其上一代是马来亚公民；
- （三）或在过去15年内，有10年的时间是居住在联邦，而且表示愿意效忠联合邦的人士。

中华总商会要求通过申请成为公民的居留期限减至五年，且不附加语文条件。（7）

1946年12月，受马来亚联邦建议书所影响，但却未曾被征询意见的各阶层人士联合组成了一个泛马联合行动委员会。这是一个包括马来亚民主同盟、职工会、海峡华英协会、马来亚印度国大党和印度总商会等团体的组织。陈祯禄被推选为联合行动委员会主席。他于较后时组织马华公会。

泛马联合行动委员会正式成立后，即刻要求英政府停止与巫统和马来统治者进行协商，相反的应承认该联合行动委员会为马来亚各民族社会的当然代表。该联合行动委员会展开了和平请愿、群众大会、集会等大规模运动，以抗议有关建议书，另一个由巫裔人士组成的人民力量中心（Pusat Tenaga Rakyat, PUTERA）组织也起来反对该建议书。马来国民党和青年醒觉阵线（Angkatan Pemuda Insaf, API）是该中心里两个最大的组织。

泛马联合行动委员会和人民力量中心联合于1947年提呈一份《人民宪法建议书》予殖民地政府总秘书长，提出下列要求：（8）

- （一）所有在马来亚出生的人士应自动成为公民。
- （二）那些在海外出生，年龄在18岁以下，具有良好行为，在过去10年里有8年时间是居留在马来亚的，通过一项简单巫文考试和宣誓效忠国家者，就可取得公民权。

- (三) 在政治、经济、教育与文化领域里，不分种族、信念与性别，都一律享有平等的权利和机会。
- (四) 马来文将成为官方语文，但允许其他语文的使用。
- (五) 新加坡是联合邦的一个组成部分。
- (六) 全马所有立法议员必须由马来亚公民选出，而行政议员则从立法议员当中选出。
- (七) 设立一个“种族委员会”，此委员会有权拖延任何具有种族色彩的法律事项达三年之久。
- (八) 在前九年内，巫裔立法议会代表将不少过 55%。
- (九) 巫裔的宗教和风俗应由马来人本身所设立的机构管理。
- (十) 马来统治者仍然保留其立宪君主的地位。

英国殖民地政府对上述抗议行动视若无睹，并在 1947 年 7 月继续发表《宪法修正建议书》。这修正草案与宪制协议草案大同小异。此外，中华总商会因单独和英政府谈判失败而决定加入泛马联合行动委员会与人民力量中心。上述联盟以其强大的经济能力，对政府实施经济上的压力和抵制。可是，中华总商会一些领导人反对英国政府的立场开始动摇，坚持派出本身的代表，以寻求政策的改变。

1948 年 2 月，当工潮正处于高峰时，华裔商人领袖接受联邦议席的委任，准备“在内部争取”。1949 年，马华公会与巫统巫裔领导人合作组成一个各族联络委员会，作为三大民族上层阶级的“多元种族”论坛。

双方在会上达致一项协议，马华公会同意把英文和马来文列为政府和接受政府赞助的小学必修科，而巫裔领袖则答应放宽公民权条例。(9)这点可从 1952 年的马来亚联合邦协约(修正)法令及九州国籍法令中反映出：申请公民权居留期限已从 15 年改为在过去 12 年内，只要有 10 年的居留期，且父母当中，只要有一

人是在本地出生的即可。

虽然在 1947 年，超过五分之三的华裔及半数的印籍人口是在马来亚出生，(10)但至 1950 年，仅有 50 万华人和 23 万印籍人士拥有马来亚公民权。(11)换言之，华裔公民仅占了华人总人口的五分之一而已。

英政府通过马来亚联邦协约，把非马来人的注意力引到防御性的课题上，成功地转移了反殖民的力量。结果泛马联合行动委员会与人民力量中心联盟，为了争取公民权和语文问题，被迫把争取完全自治的更为基本的问题搁置下来。联盟的反建议被殖民地总督马尔科姆·麦克唐纳 (Malcolm MacDonald) 一口拒绝。然而，联盟的努力却获得海峡时报的好评：“……这是有史以来，首次试图使马来亚政治超越对立的种族利益的范围，亦是第一次尝试在非马来人与马来人社会之间筑起一座政治桥梁。”(12)

### 3.2 《巴恩报告书》与《芬吴报告书》(1951 年)

战后，殖民地政府开始逐步拟定一个“统一教育制度”，(13)而致力于废除非巫文教育。当 1948 年宣布紧急状态过后，殖民地政权管制华校的工作也变得更加容易了。1949 年，中央教育咨询委员会宣告成立。1950 年，马来亚联合邦学校注册法令给予当局更大的权力以管制那些不在教育部直接管辖之下的学校。第二年，《学校注册(紧急)法令》付诸实施。

一个由五名欧籍人士与九名马来人组成的委员会于 1950 年成立，“以调查马来学校的教育设备是否齐全。”(14)当这个委员会把其拟定的《巴恩报告书》呈交给联邦立法议会时，公众人士发觉它已远离其所授权调查的范围。该会的建议是：

- (1) 小学教育的目标应当是用来建立一个以新的多元种族为基础的共同国家体制。
- (2) 应该废除各语文源流学校，而以采用英文与马来文为教学媒介的国民型学校体制取代之。

“……国民学校(即政府小学)应该只教导两种语文，这两种语文必须是本国官方语文，即马来文与英文。

“马来语在全体小学里派上用场，作为双语制度中具有同等地位的搭挡语文，在上述条件下，将使全人口中尽可能多的人口获得母语教育的效益。”(15)

由于非马来人要维护母语教育制度，巴恩委员会便对这些非马来人的效忠表示怀疑，提出以下似是而非的论据：

“……我们(巴恩委员会)认为，所有将马来亚视为永久家园和不贰效忠对象的父母，将很乐意让儿女们接受以这些语言(即马来语和英语)进行的教育。若有家长不乐意这么做，那么他们的意愿将被严格地视为表示他们并不这样看待马来亚。”(16)

巴恩委员会的《建议与意见概要》表明了英国殖民地政府对华人与淡米尔人母语教育的一般态度；这份文件说：

“原则上，我们建议废除各族方言学校，代之以一种各族共用的小学。我们当然认识到，由于废除过程只能是循序渐进的，所以在国民小学(即政府小学)的发展的同时，母语学校将继续存在多年。不过，我们要求在拨款给小学时，优先考虑国民小学。”(17)

与此同时，英国驻马最高专员亨利葛尼爵士(Sir Henry

Gurney)也在 1951 年内委任另一个专门调查马来亚华文教育的委员会。来自中国的美国教育工作者威廉芬博士(Dr. William P. Fenn)与联合国官员吴德耀博士受邀进行研究，以便：

“……把目前的各语文学校制度和将来采纳不分种族，以英文与巫文为教学媒介，另一种语文为选修科的学校制度之间的差距缩小，同时为出版适合目前使用，有别于中国背景，但具有独特的马来亚风格与内容的课本之准备工作，提供意见。”(18)

《芬吴报告书》和《巴恩报告书》的立场是完全对立的，前者支持马来亚的华文教育制度，并强调它和建立马来亚国民意识是完全一致的，该报告书指出：

“……任何对马来亚公民贯彻一种或两种语文的限制性政策，(将)不能提供一个健康的环境以促进国民团结和种族间互相了解。”(19)

《芬吴报告书》也进一步指出马来亚华文教育制度所存在的弱点，诸如缺乏合格教师，设备不足及许多学校董事对教育的原则没有深入理解等。它亦促请政府大幅度提高对华校的津贴。

在 1949 年，每位学生所获得的政府津贴如下：(20)

华校	——马币	\$	8.72
印校	——	\$	55.84
马来学校	——	\$	67.88
英校	——	\$	187.88

华裔社会必须承担华文教育总开支的大约 90%经费。

### 3.3 《1952 年教育法令》

一个特别委员会于 1951 年成立，以研究《巴恩报告书》与《芬吴报告书》。研究结果肯定了有关殖民地政府坚决欲推行以巫英文为教学媒介的“国民学校”制度之事实。该委员会似乎完全采纳了《巴恩报告书》的建议，而只是象征性的接纳《芬吴报告书》的小部分意见。

接着被通过的《1952 年教育法令》，规定以国民学校为准则，把华文与淡米尔文列为第三种语文，其中最显著的即是华文与淡米尔文学校不被接纳为国家教育制度的一环。在国民学校里，除非有至少 15 名任何年级学生的要求，才可教导华文与淡米尔文：

“应该逐步鼓励(各语文学学校)转变为多元种族的国民学校。这些学校必须遵循政府国民学校的条例方能获得政府的全面津贴。” (21)

法令中下列条文清楚说明了殖民地政府无意多花钱发展非马来人的母语教育：

“成员和部门在行使和执行本法令授予他们的的权力和任务时须注意的总原则是，在符合国民教育政策、师资的供应以及避免不合理开支的原则下，学生将按父母的意愿接受教育。” (22)

1952 年教育法令另有一个方面是很值得注意的。它提出了“学生自己的语言”(Pupils' Own Language, POL) 这个概念：(23)

“第 21 条(3)：以马来语为主要教学媒介语的国民小学，将在整个课程中向全体学生教授英语。此外，在第 5 款(subsection)的规定下，如果有家长或监护人要求教授‘国语’(指华语)和淡

米尔语，则学校将可向有关学生教授这两种语言，并且将在各学年教授这两种语文。

“(4)：以英语为主要教学媒介语的国民小学，将在整个课程中向全体学生教授马来语。此外，在第 5 款的规定下，若有家长或监护人要求学校教授‘国语’和淡米尔语，则学校将可向有关学生教授这两种语言，并且将在各学年教授这两种语文。

“(5)：在国民学校里，除非至少有十五名在华语或淡米尔语上具有相同语言程度的学生以及他们的家长要求教授这两种语文，否则这两种语文是不必教授的。”

在我们回顾五十年代初期，马来亚华裔社会对他们的教育制度受到威胁而作出的反应之前，让我们先看看其他一些影响马来亚华人，使教育课题和公民权与语文问题，更形混淆复杂的法令。

1952 年，殖民地政府实行《“移民”(管制)法案》，以限制马来亚华人在中国与马来亚之间自由来往。所有华人包括在本地出生者，一旦到中国去，就不能再进入马来亚。这些华人在中国的亲戚欲进入联合邦，则面对更大的困难。

政府也于同年推出华校教师新薪金制建议书，欲实行新薪制的学校必须遵循一个条件，就是所有的决定，包括聘请教师、课本的采用及其他事项等，都必需先得到教育局的批准。这无形中剥夺了华校董事会的权利。

1953 年，《商业注册与执照法令》及《教育发展基金法令》正式通过。这两项法令规定所有作为赞助《1952 年教育法令》所指的国民学校之商业机构，必须缴税。

## 第四章 国民学校方案

1951年《巴恩报告书》提议的“国民学校”方案成为《1952年教育法令》的政策之后，使到华人社会反对这个法令的所有社团团结起来，紧密的合作与协调以捍卫显然是马来亚全体华人的利益。举国上下的社团召开了数以百计的公众集会，商讨这项严重威胁华校生机的法令。

教育课题是促使教总成为华人社会前锋的主要因素。教总是在《巴恩报告书》发表之后才成立的，以作为保护华校的原动力。

除了华人社会之外，一些尊重自由与民主的人士也反对《1952年教育法令》。两位英国的前教育总监，温斯特博士(Dr. R. O. Winstedt)和基斯曼先生(H. K. Cheeseman)提倡让华文和淡米尔文有平等发展机会。

在马来亚已具有四十多年服务经验的基斯曼先生，在海峡时报(Straits Times)连续发表了数篇文章，批评《巴恩氏报告书》为“教育谬论”。(1)他亦曾经在1946年的Council Paper(第五十三份)上，强调提供各源流包括马来文、华文、淡米尔文和英文的免费小学母语教育的需要。当温斯特博士担任海峡殖民地教育总监时，也曾引用了1923年5月28日世界教育家在立法会议上所作出的结论：

“除非学生已先扎稳母语的基础，经过利用母语思考的良好训练，否则用外文辅导的教育价值是值得怀疑的。……这个印度著名机构在报告印度大学的情况时总结说，最理想的做法是教导每个儿童先用母语思考。然而我们印度教育制度的难题就是从麦

考烈(Mac Caulay)时代起，就忽略了这个理想的做法。”(2)

印族社会也同样群起反对有关建议，甚至在巫族社会中，也有对非巫人的奋斗目标的同情者。1953年8月18日，《时代前锋报》(Utusan Zaman)的社论就是一个例子。

### 4.1 教总领导斗争

当《特别委员会报告书》于1952年8月间(比预定公布日期早两个月)泄漏的时候，教总主席林连玉和总务丁品松即刻会见立法议会教育委员会主席，商讨把华文教育纳入国家教育制度里，并且坚决反对有关教育法令。可是这一切都被该委员会一口拒绝了。

吉隆坡华校教师公会要求当局必须提供马来亚各族母语教育，并列华文为官方语文。(3)华校教师公会总会因此召集了一个全国华校教师公会代表大会。可是在会议召开的前两天，英联邦最高专员助理罗纳爵士(Sir Donald Mac Gillivray)传召所有的代表，阐明华文教育是不可能被纳入国家教育制度的，因为根据1948年马来亚联合邦协约，华文是不受承认为官方语文的。(4)

当时，由于数个州际性的董事部尚未成立，组织上的限制阻止教总采取进一步的行动，不过，当政府在1952年7月间提出《华校教师新薪金建议书》时，这些董事部终于在动荡的情况下成立了。这个薪金建议书所附带的实行条件是有关教师的聘请，课程纲要，教科书等的决定，都必须先经过教育部的批准。这个做法显然地剥夺了董事部的权力，因此受到各教师公会和董事部的强烈反对。

不久以后，州级的华校董事会宣告成立了。一个全国范围的号召呼吁所有中华总商会和中华大会堂支持华校教师公会和华校董事会。这两个团体代表整个华人社会，基于下列的原则，发表了一份联合声明，表明他们反对教育法令的立场：(5)

1. 教育自由是基本的人权。
2. 华人拥有作为独特的文化群体在马来亚生存的基本权利。
3. 多元语言社会的独特需求。
4. 华人社会有维护和发扬自己的语文、教育和文化的共同愿望。

其他社团也向英国最高专员邓普勒爵士(Sir Gerald Templer)和联邦立法议院评论员提出抗议。可是英殖民地政府对这些抗议不理不睬，装聋作哑。

1954年，马来亚华校董事联合会总会(董总)终于成立了。在这个阶段，马华公会因受到整个华人社会的压力，而初步参与捍卫华文教育的运动。因此，虽然马华公会在1952年的吉隆坡市议会选举中已和巫统联合，但在这事件上，却被迫采取和联盟不同的独立立场。

这三个华人社会的主要团体——教总、董总、马华(三大机构)——成立了一个委员会来处理教育问题。在1953年4月16至19日，教总、董总和马华召开了第二次全国性会议的时候，马华虽然获得领导权力，然而它若做出任何违反华教的行动，其他两个团体则有权否决之。(6)

这个华文教育中央委员会在1953年8月23日正式成立了。它宣布反对《1952年教育法令》，原因是这个法令否定华人学习与发展其母语的基本权利。一个七人代表团受委去跟最高专员邓普勒爵士协商。然而所得到的答案却是：

“……政府是不会允许共产主义中国的国语成为马来亚学校的媒介语的。”(7)

邓普勒爵士还进一步地向华人社会强调，既然该法令已经通过，要做任何修改已经是太迟了。英国最高专员拒绝华人社会的共同愿望的理由是值得关注的，因为这些理由和目前反对独中的存在和独大的创办的论调在多方面有相似的地方：(8)

- (一) 《1952年教育法令》允许在国民学校教导国语(华文)。
- (二) 家庭是塑造品德的主要动力，而不是学校，华校只是在灌输与马来亚其他种族社会隔离的意识。
- (三) 华文与淡米尔文母语教育在小学教育中是被列为选修科(即每级至少要有15名学生家长提出要求)，在每天正课后后附加半小时学习之。
- (四) 失去华校就等于失去华文与华族文化，这个论点显示华人对华族文化的历史延续性只存有薄弱的信念。
- (五) 国语是中国的官方语文，它原是中国某个部分的方言，后来基于政治因素而被采纳为国语及成为全国华校的教学媒介。华文会在马来亚使用，是因政治概念的扩展欲包括海外华侨之故。因此，华文并不能被接受为马来亚的官方语文，亦不能被形容为马来亚华裔的母语。
- (六) 母语教学媒介的教育原则只是针对拥有两种语文的社会，而这两种语文必须属于同一语族，而不是基本上完全相异的语文。
- (七) 一般上，学生每上一年级的入学人数也跟着减少，这点显示华裔父母并不希望他们的孩子在华小完成小学教育。

## 4.2 1954 年《华文教育备忘录》

1954 年 3 月 31 日，华文教育中央委员会，代表华人社会向当局提呈《马来亚联合邦华文教育备忘录》，以表达华人社会对新教育法令的不满。

“在此塑造文化之工作中，教育将负有其重大之使命焉……取缔本邦华文及印文教育乃无异于从马来亚人手中夺去估量及同化伟大之华、印二文化之工具。但此竟显然为《1952 年教育法令》所追求者。”(9)

《备忘录》主要是反驳殖民地政府的上述七要点：(10)

- (a) “《教育特别委员会报告书》指各语文学学校为现今文化的珍贵苗圃。可是《1952 年教育法令》却把华校置于死地。在所建议的“国民学校”里，把华文列为选修科，根本起不了什么作用，而且对华文与华族文化的发展也不会有什么贡献。这个选修母语教育的问题，亦是有违小学教育强制性的原则，因同样的论调也可用于针对一般性的教育。此外，政府设立国民学校及停止支援华校(这些支援基金原本是华人所缴付的税务)，就是旨在迫使华校关闭。
- (b) “反对华文母语教育的理由(即是家庭是一个比较重要的社会化单位)，又是一个与全世界所公认的教育价值互相抵触的论点。无可否认的，家庭是道德教育的主要动力，但是学校必然是更广泛的被认为是促进文化与价值观的最重要苗圃。全面学习一种语文是更深入了解一种文化的一个过程。

“华人社会从来就没有寻索过，没有在寻索，也将不会去寻索马来亚社会的排他主义者和分裂主义者。我们纯粹只是要

求平等与合理的对待，以华文作为使马来亚华人变成华裔马来亚人的最佳媒介语。很久以前，华校就已规定英巫文为必修科。我们应该强调内容而不是语文。其实，我们大家所渴求的马来亚化的最好方式就是通过目前在马来亚实行的多种语文传播媒介。

- (c) “华人社会针对有关以选修科方式，每天附加半小时教导华文与淡米尔文的问题发问道：“一个英国孩子，每天学习半小时英文，在六年时间里，是否能够掌握英文和欣赏英国传统风俗与文化的价值？”
- (d) “华校与华族文化是紧紧相连的，不可缺一。殖民地政府的论点相当于以一枝大木棍殴打人后说：‘一个像你这样巨大的有力的男士，必然可以经得起这轻轻的一棒。’
- (e) “华文在中国是普遍使用的，就好像马来文是印尼的共同语言一样，一般的人都同意华文是中国多种方言的源流，而鉴于教育、文化与交流的因素，被采纳为中国各语言的混合语。中国的各种方言都具有共同的文字。随着中国政治情况的变化而演变的语文课题应对马来亚产生影响，这是自然的规律。同样的，马来亚的巫裔爱国主义者，也是从印尼爱国主义运动中得到启发的。殖民地政府把华文看成是带有政治色彩，指它是中国政府用来在马来亚施展政治影响的工具，未免是太自以为是了。
- (f) “殖民地政府的逻辑实在是令人惊讶的，如果一个国家里不同种族的语言和思想状况有很大的差距，那就更清楚的说明不应该实行单种语文政策。再者，讲同一种语言的人，也不一定会有相同的思维。这点说明，心理和思想上的团结，比单一语文的团结更为重要。



“要达到心理和思想上的团结，最好是通过在各源流学校里，推行促进马来亚化的教育题材。如果瑞士使用法文、德文与意大利文，并没有妨碍国民团结，那在马来亚又会有什麼差别呢？而且如果依据殖民地政府的逻辑，（指在马来亚实行以母语作为教学媒介的教育制度是行不通的，因为华、巫、印三种语文的差距太大了），那么，以英文作为马来亚人的教学媒介，同样的是一个障碍。正如温斯特博士所说的，在家中讲华语的华人必须接受母语作为教学媒介的教育，因这是培育他们的最好方法。”

- (g) “摘引逐年减少的学生升级人数来说明华裔家长普遍上都不希望他们的孩子在华小完成小学教育，是很不公平的。事实上，虽然华校与华校毕业生在以往是受到歧视，但普遍上入学人数已从1946年11月的172,000名提高至1953年7月的257,781名。每上一年级，学生入学人数一般上也跟着降低，是因为受到战后经济萧条与其他困难的影响，这是无法避免的。”

“在紧急状态时期，不仅是华校，甚至很多其他源流的学校也宣告关闭。例如1947年，马来学校共有78,250名的一年级学生，于1948年升上二年级的学生只有55,681名，到了三年级，则只剩下49,402名。虽然这些马来学校是在比较有利的条件下生存，但学生升级数字仍然不断削减。即使如此，这不应成为废除马来学校的理由。”

虽然上述备忘录是以华文教育中央委员会的名义呈上的，但马华公会和董教总的关系从一开始合作时，就很清楚的是不很乐观的。比如，马华公会虽然在1953年8月举行的华文教育中央委员会会议上被委任为向当局呈交请愿书的代表，但当吉隆坡华校教师公会和教师总会促其提呈请愿书时，马华却断然拒绝。(11)

#### 4.3 1954年《教育白皮书》

《1952年教育法令》所建议的国民学校方案，除了受到华人社会的反对以外，也由于这项方案所需费用过于庞大而无法实行。在1953年11月，由于受到胶价与锡价跌落的影响，联邦邦政府在经济上透支1亿7,500万元。(12)有鉴于此，联邦行政议会委任一个特别委员会，进行调查教育开支问题。这个委员会在1954年10月间提呈一份白皮书。

整个白皮书的主要目的就是要改革母语教育：在马来学校推行两种语文教育，在华印学校推行三种语文教育，以使它们逐渐发展成所建议的国民学校制度。政府指责各语文学校的学术水平低落，只有在实行国民型教育制度后，才有可能减少不必要的开支。

与此同时，当局也通函所有华校，书明从1955年开始，所有已接受了1953年新薪金建议书的学校，若多聘教师或增设教室，政府将不会再给予任何薪金补贴。1955年2月，政府再度推行一些影响“于1954年后，在接受政府支援的学校里所增设的非补贴性的教室”的条例，这些教室将另外注册为学校的额外部分，具有其本身的教职员、教室和帐目等。(13)从1955年开始，殖民地政府将在各语文学校里附设250个以英文为媒介语的班级。

华人社会再度以教总为首，对这些后期的条例提出抗议：教总主席林连玉宣称：

“《巴恩氏报告书》宣布将消灭华文教育，《1952年教育法令》宣判华文教育死刑，1954年《教育白皮书》计划则是挖掘其墓穴……。”(14)



教总也针对政府指责华校教育水平低落之言，提出驳斥，并坚持它是用以消灭华文教育的借口。教总也通过一项议决案，即向政府当局提呈一份请愿书。即使华文教育中央教育委员会不赞同，教总也会提呈请愿书，并向华社保证：在捍卫华人文化和母语教育方面，教总决不会向政府妥协。

雪兰莪华校董事联合会受促领导抵制在华小推行以英文为媒介语的班级之行动。接着，各华校也都纷纷群起反对。各社团组织也全力支持教总的立场。

马华公会会长陈祯禄亦于较后时，呼吁所有华校别申请改制。华文教育中央委员会也通过一项议决案，声言不能接受在华校设立以英文为媒介语的班级。(15) 由于受到多方面的压力和反对，殖民地政府被迫宣布说成立英文媒介课程之事，并非是强制的。马来社会一些人士也认为这个白皮书计划具有浓厚的殖民地色彩。

1955年1月，殖民地政府采取了新的伎俩，数名教育局官员突然来到雪兰莪万挠，发出通告给各源流学校校长，令他们出席一项紧急会议，商讨有关全国英文媒介课程的实行课题。整个会议简直就是以一种威胁的形式，而不是商讨形式进行。(16) 这些官员还训令校长们将这项会议保密，各巫印学校校长皆遵从该项法令，惟三育学校董事长却不顾一切，直奔吉隆坡会见教总主席林连玉先生。

当华人社会获知这项会议的真相后，非常愤怒。华校学生家长誓言，若政府以停止拨款来威胁华校时，他们将发起筹募基金运动，来维持华校的生存。教总也提醒所有华校小心政府所采取的策略，为了表示抗议，教总拒绝出席一项与教育官员的联席会议，除非政府检讨其政策。

在整个白皮书争论过程中，教总需要不断的通过华文教育中央委员会，对马华公会施加压力。1955年1月4日，以林连玉为首的教总代表团和马华公会会长陈祯禄举行了“马六甲会谈”，彼此讨论了马华对华文教育及殖民地当局的各项条例所持的立场，因为如果马华公会在这些事项上，无法向当局施压，华人社会将会对它失去信心。

全马华校对教总发出莫理会政府的条列的呼吁，都很重视。当政府停止拨款给华校设立新教室时，学校董事会即发起筹募基金，以应付学校的开支。1955年初，马来亚华校共增添了500个民办班级。(17)

这样看来，《1952年教育法令》唤醒了华人社会，1954年的白皮书计划使到华人社会清楚地了解到，殖民地政府正采取具体行动来消灭华文教育，因而促使华人社会积极参与抗议行动。

1955年8月22日，马华、董总与教总联合会议上通过一项议决案，作出下列呼吁：(18)

- (一) 各族孩童应享有平等的教育机会。
- (二) 免费小学母语教育，英文列为必修科。
- (三) 应公平对待各语文源流学校。
- (四) 把华文列为官方语文。
- (五) 摒弃国民学校方案。

同年10月间，华文教育中央委员会联合宣布其坚决维护华文教育的宗旨，他们也指责政府利用从华人社会中筹得的款项来破坏华文教育与华人文化。

#### 4.4 南洋大学——马来亚华文教育的最高学府

关于创办一所大学来迎合马来亚和新加坡华文学校对高等教育的需要的概念，最先是由陈六使在 1953 年 1 月 16 日福建会馆会议上提出的。(19) 创办“南洋大学”（简称“南大”）的运动展开时，便获得不论贫富的各阶层马来亚华人的振奋人心的支持。整个华人社会动员起来，为创办这所马、新华文教育最高学府筹款。

这项努力要归功于商业巨子陈六使。陈六使协助著名的慈善家陈嘉庚为南大募捐。

南大建于新加坡云南园，于 1956 年 3 月 30 日开学。首任校长为林语堂。新加坡是在 1963 年加入马来西亚联邦时才获得独立的，因此，南大在创办成功后的头 10 年充满着政治论争，这是因为英国殖民地政府同激进的左翼反殖运动进行斗争。

南大是反殖运动的堡垒。在六十年代初期，南大的赞助人和学生必须反抗当局扰乱。陈六使由于反对新加坡政府改组南大评议会，在 1963 年被褫夺了公民权。(20)

在 1963 年与 1966 年之间，由于李光耀政府箝制南大学生会和各个学会，学生在校园里举行罢课及其他抗议。(21) 在 1964 年王赓武报告书公布时，学生又抗议了，因为王赓武报告书建议把南洋大学改为以英语教学的学府。

在 1968 年，在接受原来的南大教育的最后一批学生毕业后，作为马来西亚华文独立中学毕业生深造的华文高等学府的南洋大学，便告寿终正寝。(22) 待到 1980 年，南大与新加坡国立大学一合并，新加坡政府便实现了它要把南洋大学改为英文大学的意

图了。

尽管南洋大学的存在比较短暂，但是它的毕业生纷纷成为马来西亚和国外学术界的杰出人才；有的毕业生也在马来西亚社会的经济、政治及文化领域出人头地。直至今日为止，在马、新中文报章的言论版上经常有人提起“南大精神”。近年来，新加坡领袖不得不勉强地对这“南大精神”表示赞赏。(23)

## 第五章 马来亚联邦的教育政策

1955 年, 92 个联邦立法议席中, 有 52 个席位是要经过选举的。当时, 由巫统、马华公会及印度国大党所组成的联盟, 正要从各族权益斗争中得到共同协议, 而这次选举, 正好给予这个联盟一个重要的考验。有鉴于此, 教总于 1954 年 10 月 23 日发表了一篇有关“教育基本原则” (1) 的公函, 内容包括:

- (一) 在国家教育制度中, 华文教育应和其他民族教育一样, 享有同等地位。
- (二) 各民族应享有免费的小学母语教育。在以非英文为教学媒介之学校, 英文将被定为必修科。
- (三) 华语华文应是官方语言之一。

1955 年 1 月选举前夕, 联盟、董总和教总的代表在马六甲州马华公会领袖陈祯禄的官邸举行了一项会议。出席者包括东姑、教总代表林连玉及董总代表张昆灵等人。

会议上, 巫统领袖同意华文教育与华文文化应受到保护。同时许诺说: 如果联盟获胜, 它将会修改所有前殖民地的教育法令, 并承认华文母语教育。在另一方面, 董教总则答应将华文列为官方语文的要求押至选举之后才谈, 作为协调的条件。(2) 1955 年联盟的竞选宣言和随后政府政策相距甚远。

选举后, 联盟获胜, 教总要求东姑履行马六甲会议之诺言, 拨款二百万元, 充作华校发展基金之用, 但东姑却完全否认曾作出以上之承诺。过后, 在华文教育中央委员会会议上, 教总重提将华文列为官方语文之一的议案, 但却被马华公会在没有事前通

知下, 删去该项议案。之后, 教总决定在指责马华公会缺乏诚意之同时, 也公布各领袖在马六甲会议中所达致的协议。(3)

### 5.1 《1956 年拉萨报告书》

1955 年 9 月 4 日, 联盟政府宣布将推行一个“各民族所接受的, 以马来文为官方语文, 同时保存和发扬国内非马来人的语文和文化”的国家教育制度。

由联邦立法议员所组成, 以教育部长拉萨为首, 其中包括五名马华公会代表。授权调查的其中一个范围是: (4)

“……我国教育政策的最终目标必须是各族儿童接受一个以官方语文作为教育媒介的教育制度。”(《拉萨报告书》第 12 段)

1956 年 5 月 6 日发表的《教育委员会报告书》(《拉萨报告书》), 提出下列建议:

“……一个联邦人民所能接受, 且能满足他们的要求以促进其文化、社会、经济和政治发展的国家教育制度, 它也考虑采纳马来文为国语, 同时保存和发扬我国其他种族的语文和文化。”(5)

小学将分为两种:

- (一) 以国语为教学媒介的国民小学。
- (二) 以英文、华文或淡米尔文为教学媒介的国民型小学。

从此, 华文小学就正式成为国家教育制度中的一环。但是, 华文中学的地位仍然含糊不清:

“建立国民型中学……所有这类学校将致力于达致共同的课程和考试。教学媒介并非主要问题……学校可采用一种以上的教学媒介。” (6)

虽然在这类学校里，马来文和英文被定为必修科（《拉萨报告书》第 12 页），但并没有明文规定华文中学不能继续存在或不能以华文作为教学媒介语。

所有“依照政府教育政策”（《拉萨报告书》第 19 页）实行的学校，都可申请政府拨款。报告书中既然没有书明华文中学的地位，这点再次使到华文中学陷入混淆不清处境。

虽然教总反对《拉萨报告书》，且成功将报告书第 12 段压下不用，但大体上还是无法影响报告书特别委员会的看法。

教总主席林连玉先生批评说：“……非常明显的，这份报告书只着重英文与马来文教育而忽略了华文教育。” (7)

1956 年 7 月 27 日，教总通过下列七项决议：(8)

- (一) 华小的师资训练着重于一种语文而不是两种。
- (二) 政府应该津贴华校的建筑费，并且一律平等拨款给所有学校。
- (三) 在新教育法令实行的前三年内，成绩中等的学生应允许继续就读至完成整个课程为止。
- (四) 校外考试的试题应以考生在校的教学媒介出题。
- (五) 政府应该承认在新教育法令实行前所注册的教师之地位，而不应坚持这些教师必须重新注册。
- (六) 所有小学的课本应以其各自的母语编写。
- (七) 当局不应该规定大学先修班的教学媒介语。

当政府推行全国校外考试时，其对华文教育的态度才逐渐明朗化。当有关当局宣布于 1956 年杪举行初级教育文凭(中学第三年考试)时，教总呼吁所有华校抵制这项考试，这是因为这项考试是以英文出题，违反了《拉萨报告书》中所书明的平等对待我国各母语教育的诺言。此外，英校学生在初中三就可参加考试，而华校生却必须等到高中一才可参加。

教总因此向当局要求华校生的试卷应以华文出题，并允许他们在初中三而不是高中一才可参加考试。

至于六年级会考(中学入学试)，教总要求华校生的试卷应以华文及根据华小的课程纲要出题，教总也同时发出有关文告予华小学生家长。这项要求后来获得有关当局的接纳。

同样的，教师资格考试也是以英文出题，华校教师因此又被拒于门外。当时，华校教师公会提出抗议，要求华校教师的试卷应以华文出题，并要求当局澄清此项考试的基本原理。除此之外，拥有剑桥文凭(完成 10 年教育后的考试)的小学教师，被豁免参加这项考试，而那些持有华校高中会考文凭(完成 12 年教育的考试)者，仅获豁免考华文试卷。

这点使到华校教师深感愤怒，因为他们的文凭早在联盟政府成立之前，就受承认，而现今却被认为没有资格在新“标准型学校”执教。

1956 年 10 月 3 日，华文教育中央教育委员会呼吁所有华校教师抵制定于 1957 年 3 月举行的教师资格考试。结果，当局将这项考试展延至 1958 年才举行。

较后在 1956 年 12 月，教育总监通函各华文中学征询他们是

否愿意接受改制为“国民型中学”，如果他们答应，将可获得政府全面津贴，而其教师也将享有和其他国民型学校教师一样的薪俸。不过，他们得遵循一些条件，比如，宗教教育、国语和英语科目必须依照政府所规定的课程教学，以及推行五年制而非六年制的中学教育。

1957年1月26日，董教总和华文教育中央教育委员会针对上述事项联合发表文告，他们促请所有华校郑重考虑，不要为了获得金钱上的资助而忽略了维护华文文化的更重要任务。他们也于1957年2月24日联合召开全国教育团体代表大会，共有155名来自全马各地的58所中学和42所教育机构的代表出席。大会通过下列数项决议：(9)

- (一) 所有华校应该团结一致，等候华人社会三个主要教育机构的决定，勿单独处理此事，得静候公意。
- (二) 大会委任一个15人委员会，并授权该委员会依循下列原则和政府交涉：
  - (1) 所有政府考试，考生应可以其所接受的教学媒介语作答。
  - (2) 华文中学教师应在统一薪金制下获公平对待。
  - (3) 学校本身应可自由开设新班。
  - (4) 华文中学的现有课程应给予保留。

林连玉在大会上宣称：(10)

“塑造、享有和发展一个民族的文化是神圣不可侵犯的权力。我们非常高兴的能为马来亚献身，但如果她试图以政治力量来消灭华文教育，我们不得不采取法律和正义行动来对付它……显然的，要华文中学改制就是要消灭华校。”

1957年2月22日，华文教育中央教育委员会顾问兼巴株巴辖华侨中学校长严元章博士，以简明的文章，把华人社会的不满情绪，在《星洲日报》发表出来，他指出下列几点：(11)

- (一) 《拉萨报告书》和《教育法令》，都没有指定会考所应用的语文，如果华文不是其中一个可以应用的语文，那么最终华校将会被消灭。
- (二) 在华小一年级便实行三种语文教育，而渴望取得优良成绩是根本不可能的。
- (三) 如果母语是被承认为各校的教学媒介，那么，把学校分为“国民”与“国民型”是不符合情理的。假如“国民学校”的准则是采纳马来文为教学媒介，那它是一个政治准则而非文化准则。
- (四) 由政府来管制华校行政是不受欢迎的。

接着，华人社会发动“火炬运动”，劝导华裔家长把子女们送入华校。这是教总和华校教师公会联合其他社团所展开的全国性运动。这个运动终于取得了辉煌的成绩，将近八成的华裔子女进入华校，这点显示马来亚华人已准备不惜付出任何代价去维护他们的母语教育。

## 5.2 1956年新加坡关于华文教育的报告书

这份报告书是在1955年5月受到殖民地政府委托的。它的受权调查范围如下：

“调查新加坡华校的情形，以华人文化的利益为主，提出有助于促进和加强华文教育，进而循序渐进的发展成一个自治，最后自主的独立国家之建议”(12)（《报告书》第45页）。

虽然新加坡和马来亚的殖民地背景和发展是一样的，但是该报告书的结论和献议却和联合邦的政策形成一个强烈的对比：(13)

- (一) 政府不单只应考虑目前所给予华校的拨款，同时应该考虑拨给建校基金，这样才不至于产生对母语教育的歧视。
- (二) 根据联合国教育科学及文化组织的指示，所有代表新加坡的文化都应该同样的受到尊重和团结。
- (三) 华校教师应该和英校教师一样，考虑其资格或经验及其他重要因素，以取得同等的待遇，马来学校和淡米尔文学校的教师亦应该享有同样的利益。
- (四) 华校现有的行政系统应继续保留。
- (五) 应该提供充分的深造机会予华校生（及其他语文学生），同时有系统的吸收这些学生，让他们以所得的技术、训练和能力服务社会。
- (六) 华校、淡米尔学校（和其他设备仍不完善的马来文学校）应享有和英校一样的全面津贴。
- (七) ……应该采取积极的步骤，以促使不同源流教育（英文与其他语文）能融合在一起，尤其是在广泛的校外活动方面，更须加以关注。

这份报告书里值得注意的一点是，直至当时，新加坡和马来亚一直都被认为是属于一体的，在文化 / 教育政策，各民族语文与文化等，是和英文平等并列的，因而，以上的各项建议原适用于淡米尔文与马来文教育，这份一九五六年《新加坡各党委员会报告书》和联邦的实际情况形成了强烈的对比，因为前者的文化政策和国际舆论比较接近。

### 5.3 李特调查团

正当进行筹备独立的工作时，李特调查团于一九五六年六月抵达马来亚，展开一项有关马来亚联邦宪法的民意调查，这项调查再度证明公民权和语言问题是息息相关的，该调查团主要是根据“联盟”（14）的提议，以发出公民权予：

- (a) 所有在独立时是联邦公民者。
- (b) 那些在马来亚独立时或之后出生的，年龄十八岁或以上，而且在发出公民权申请表格日期之前七年内，有五年时间是住马来亚的。
- (c) 那些不是在马来亚出生，但一直居留在马来亚至独立日，年龄必须在十八岁或以上，且在发出申请表格日期之前十二年内，有八年时间居留在马来亚。

联盟的其他建议包括：马来人享有土地、公共服务局职位，商业和贸易执照，政府奖学金方面的特权；而且只有马来文与英文将成为官方语文。

华人社会因此召开了一个全马华人社团大会；以表明华人对上述建议的看法，总共有一千零九十四个来自全马各地的社团出席了这项大会。工作委员会也发起签署一份请愿书以支持大会备忘录，该备忘录呼吁：

- (a) 凡本地出生即为本地公民这项原则应毫无保留地被接受。
- (b) 所有在本国延续居留五年以上，把马来亚当成家乡并立志效忠马来亚的非土生华人，可以不必通过现有的语文测验及其他严格的手续，而有资格申请公民权。
- (c) 华文应被接纳为官方语文之一，并在政府各级议会上使用。
- (d) 所有联邦公民，不分种族、肤色或宗教，都应享有平等的权

利。

虽然华人社会在这一系列事件上，团结一致，深表关注，但是李特调查团却完全不理睬他们的不满，而仅采纳了联盟的建议。此後，社团对马华感到更加的失望。

在 1956 年 4 月 13 日，当林连玉和教总代表启程前往马六甲和陈祯禄与陈修信（后者只支持凡本地出生者将自动成为公民这个原则，而否决了各社团所提出的其他建议）商讨宪法问题时，全马华人社团大会的工作委员会也委派一代表团飞往伦敦会见殖民地秘书，向其表明华人社会的看法，他们的建议同样的也没有被接纳，因为李特调查团已决定联盟是代表马来亚人民的意见的唯一机构。

#### 5.4 1957 年教育法令

《1956 年拉萨报告书》于 1957 年在立法议会上通过，成为教育法令，因而成为刚独立的马来亚联邦的教育政策。教育法令第三条内容如下：

“联合邦的教育政策旨在制定一个能为联合邦全体人民所接受的国民教育制度。这个制度将满足人民的需求和促进国民的文化、社会、经济及政治的发展，其用意在于使马来语成为国语，同时维护和扶持国内非马来人语言和文化的发展。”（16）

不过，该教育法令第四条授权国家负起为非马来人提供母语教育的责任，条文如下：

“在行使本法令所授与和责成的一切权力和义务时，将须注

意的总原则是，在符合联合邦教育政策、师资的供应和避免浪费公帑的前提下，学生将按照父母的意愿接受教育。”（17）

然而，这个法令规定了“国民型中学”与“标准型小学”的设立：（18）

“‘国民型中学’是指提供五年课程中学教育的中学，这类中学采用国语、英语、华语及淡米尔语或这些语文中的任何两种语文作为教学媒介语，并且在国语或英语没有作为教学媒介语的情况下，国语和英语则是必修科目……”

“‘标准型小学’是指用华语、淡米尔语或英语作为教学媒介语的小学；在这种小学里，国语和英语若不是教学媒介语，则这两种语文是必修科目；并且在这小学里，当华语和淡米尔语不是教学媒介语时，只要学校有 15 名学生的家长提出要求，那么学校便将开班教导这两种语文……”

值得注意的是，《1957 年教育法令》没有提及马来亚其他少数民族的母语教育问题，尤其是没有提及原住民的母语教育问题。（19）

虽然华文教育在这个国家教育制度里所占的地位仍在激烈的争论中，但所有超龄学生已在这个新条例下被令停学，当局亦认为这些超龄学生就是 50 年代紧急时期动乱不羁的一群。

这点对华校生的打击很大，因为当时华裔社会正面对申请公民权和报生纸的严重问题，教总曾恳请联盟政府暂缓实行上述条例，但首相拒绝接见教总代表。

政府对这个事件的冷酷立场导致全马各地发生了学生骚动事

件。国内有很多间华校都爆发了示威与和平请愿行动。(20)当莫哈末克佐哈里于1957年接任教育部长时,他批评说:

“……我的办公室就好像将军的办事处一样;到处都贴满了地图和图表,指明全马各地发生示威和动乱的学校地点。”(21)

1957年,董教总要求政府津贴华文小学。同年,董总、教总与马华公会成立一个十五人委员会,以便和政府商讨全面津贴华文中学问题。有关的商讨是根据以下几点原则提出:(22)

- (一) 所有考试须依照授课媒介语出题。
- (二) 教师薪金应提早公布。
- (三) 学校董事会的权利必须获得保障。
- (四) 课程纲要必须符合华文中学的性质。
- (五) 华文中学必须获得自由的发展。
- (六) 原有的学校行政应获得保留。
- (七) 承认现有的教师资格。

在1958年华文小学被接受成为国家教育制度的一环,并享有政府全津贴地位。同年,全马华文教育大会在怡保召开并通过两项议决案:(23)

- (1) 以大会名义致备忘录予联盟政府,请在明年大选政纲内列华文为官方语文;
- (2) 若政府坚持以官方语文作为考试媒介,则请政府即刻列华文为官方语文。

总的来说,《1957年教育法令》已将小学阶段的马来文、华文及淡米尔文母语教育纳入国民教育体系。也值得注意的是,它没有提起《拉萨报告书》委员会所提及的只采用马来语和英语作

为马来亚学校教学媒介语的“最终目标”。这是各民族极力反对之后的结果,特别是华人社会坚决反对“最终目标”,他们认为“最终目标”是违反人权原则的。



## 第六章 “独立”中学的诞生

1960年，以拉曼达立为首的教育检讨委员会检讨了《1957年教育法令》。这份报告书后来被引入《1961年教育法令》，从而形成我国的教育制度。

在五十年代紧急状态时期，殖民地政府实际上是鼓励人民多设立华文小学，尤其是在新村地区，以预防华裔青年有闲参与政治活动，这使到华文中小学蓬勃成长，可是一切发展华文中小学的工作都是由华人社会本身主动去进行，殖民地政府仅是提供一些便利条件而已。

当新加坡逐渐脱离马来亚联合邦之时，这两个地区的语文、教育与文化政策的差异则开始明朗化。1956年，新加坡的四种语文，即华文、英文、马来文与淡米尔文，都被承认为官方语文，这点从中小学所采用的教学媒介语中已显示出来。(1)除了教学媒介语以外，学校亦教导另两种语文，作为第二与第三种语文。

至1957年，新加坡大部分华文私立学校都已成为政府全面资助的学校，全都在新加坡教育局管辖之下，并须依据政府的教育政策办学。

1959年，董教总、马华及其他华团与学校在另一个马来亚联合邦华文教育大会上，通过以下数项决议：(2)

- (一) 所有母语学校应该以母语作为主要教学媒介。
- (二) 对所有母语教育制度应予一视同仁。

(三) 政府应设立一个由华教团体代表所组成的华教咨询委员会，以协助解决华文教育问题。

(四) 政府应即刻加倍津贴华文中学。

### 6.1 1960年《拉曼达立报告书》

在1959年大选和第一个民选立法议会成立之后，当局即委任一个由三名马华成员，一名印度党成员和四名巫统成员，以教育部长阿都拉曼达立为首的委员会，以进行“检讨《1956年教委会报告书》所立下的教育政策……尤其是此政策推行以来的发展情况和将来其对国家与经济的影响，包括实施免费小学教育等，并提出建议。”(3)

这个委员会的成立主要是因为人民对国家教育政策的广泛不满，以及联盟政府受到各方的压力所致。

《1960年教育检讨委员会(拉曼达立)报告书》，就好像《巴恩报告书》一样超越了它的调查范围，以致对我国华文教育制度产生历来最重大的影响。华人社会也群起反抗其所提出的下列建议：(4)

- (一) 接受全面支援的马来文小学将命名为“国民学校”，其他源流小学则命名“国民型学校”。(第26页第135段)
- (二) 从1962年1月1日起，政府应停止拨给中学资助金，只有那些已改制为国民型中学的学校，才可获得政府的全面资助。那些拒绝改为国民型中学的学校将不附属于国家教育政策，而成为“独立”学校。(第29页第164段)

(三) 华文独立中学只要符合以下条件，将获准继续生存：

- (a) 董事部的委任必须符合政府所立下的规定。
- (b) 依循《1957 年教育法令》进行注册。
- (c) 必须遵照教育局所列定的共同课程纲要，时间表和科目等。
- (d) 遵守《1956 年教育（学校纪律）条例》。
- (e) 依循法定的卫生条件：学校注册总监将取消任何不符合上述条例的学校的注册。（第 29 页第 164 段）

(四) 独中学生不需规定要参加公共考试，但他们可以自愿参加。  
（第 32 页，第 186 段）

所有中学会考应只以官方语文出题，即英文与马来文，以往由政府主办以华文出题的考试卷，从此正式废除。

这些建议使到国会内外一片喧吵，主要是评论《达立报告书》歪曲了《拉萨报告书》的原则、政策与精神。拉曼达立委员会纯粹是个检讨委员会，它无权修改《拉萨报告书》的基本内容。当时国会辩论《1961 年教育法令》时，副首相敦拉萨在维护《达立报告书》之同时也坚持说：

“检讨委员会从来没有被指示，也没有权力厘定任何新政策或新制度，或者修改现有的政策与制度。”（5）

《拉萨报告书》、《1957 年教育法令》以及《联邦宪法》第 152 条文，已很清楚的列明非马来人的语文与文化在我国所占的地位：

“……我国的中学制度应该具有一点伸缩性，比如，如果华文中学是依循上述条件开办，那我们是没有理由阻止他们采用华

文为教学媒介的……”（6）

在这点上，甚至最令人发指的《1951 年巴恩报告书》及因此而产生的《1952 年教育法令》也曾指出：（7）

“我们同意这点是指，当各民族应联合起来组成一个团结的马来亚国时，任何一个民族都不需要丧失其民族特征，而且华巫印与其他种族的文化亦应受到保存和发展，以塑造一个共同的马来亚文化。”

相反的，《达立报告书》检讨委员会却擅自提出：

“要在一个真正忠于国家的政策范围内，去满足国内每一个民族对其文化与语文的要求是不可能的。”（8）

反对党国会议员在国会上愤怒的指出：

“要一个儿童平时学习一种语文，而参加另一种语文考试，是根本不可能的事情，何况当局给予学校准备参加另一种语文考试的时间是那么的短促……为什么我们一定要华校学生放弃以他们的母语出题的考试，而去参加以英文为媒介的考试呢？”（9）

此外，《拉萨报告书》中根本没有明文规定政府会考必需以哪一种语文作为考试媒介，可是检讨委员会却把它改成只准许用两种语文，即英文与马来文。

自从《拉萨报告书》公布后，马来亚联合邦的教育政策已成为首要课题。在 1957 年 11 月怡保万里望补选时，所有华人社团群起呼吁华裔选民投选人民进步党候选人辛尼华沙甘律师，而不要投马华公会，因它是代表政府的。辛尼华沙甘在 1955 年大选

中，败给其对手而失去按柜金，这次他却以大多数票击败联盟政府劲敌。值得一提的是，当 1955 年大选，马来亚人民反殖民地斗争的情绪正处于高潮时，联盟的竞选宣言对其他源流的学校来说是很公平的。以下是宣言简摘：（10）

第一段(e)：“让各源流学校自然发展，即是说，鼓励我国各民族去发展彼等的学校、语文与文化。”

第三段：“联盟深信，若要根据 1954 年联邦立法议会第六十七项议案(被纳入 1952 年法令)，把国民学校特征引入其他源流学校，是不被人民所接受的。”

第五段：“联盟以为最重要的是有统一的课本，凡是具有反映马来亚特征的教科书，应该以国内各语文，即英文、马来文、华文与淡米尔文编订，以使到我们的下一代能具有马来亚民族意识。”

第十一段：“基于联盟与上述政策，联盟将会尽力在联邦经济的允许下，平等对待所有接受津贴的学校，以使到所有适龄儿童有更多的机会接受教育。”

在国会里，辛尼华沙甘律师是主要反对《拉曼达立报告书》的发言人，他说该报告书违反了马来亚宪法第 152 条所规定：

“在所有的教育报告中，它包括《拉萨报告书》，都遗漏了‘使用’这个字眼……检讨委员会的这份报告书完全没有考虑到有需要保存我国其他种族的语文，以便配合我国宪法，使用这些语文。有鉴于此，我认为该委员会根本没有依照我国宪法的本意和精神行事。”（11）

辛尼华沙甘律师也指出，宪法规定联邦政府不仅需要保存国内各语文，同时更应该广泛使用之。

当国会辩论《1960 年教育法案》时，发现到很多华校教师被吊销注册的理由，纯粹是因为他们曾经批评政府的教育政策。（12）

于 1961 年，政府甚至吊销教总主席林连玉先生的注册(后来也褫夺他的公民权)。但他并没有提出上诉。在 1959 年之前，当他在大选中发动华裔选民支持马华公会时，他在政府眼中是一名伟人。可是在 1959 年间，由于马华公会并没有挺身维护华文教育时，他呼吁华人社会不要支持马华公会，他即成为受政府迫害的牺牲品。

当《1961 年教育法案》将被通过成为法令的那一天，辛尼华沙甘律师作出以下的预言：

“今天，《1961 年教育法令》将正式生效，但是我国的孩童仍然存在，除非我们将国内所有反对这个政策的孩童杀尽——我用“孩童”来代表我们的下一代——你不可能将他们一一杀绝，他们将会永远生存下去。”（13）

## 6.2 《1961 年教育法令》

《1961 年教育法令》采纳了《拉曼达立报告书》的建议，其“最终目标”是：

“为了国家的团结……让接受国家资助的学校制度取代各语文中学，以确保各族学生都进入国民与国民型中学”。（14）

这项教育法令在 1962 年 1 月 1 日付诸实施，成为刚独立的马来亚的第一份关于教育的立法文件。它的绪言给人的印象是它重申《1957 年教育法令》所陈述的教育政策：

“鉴于联合邦的教育政策，即《1957 年教育法令》原本声明的，是要建立一种将满足国家需求和促进国家在文化、社会、经济及政治上的发展的国民教育制度。”(15)

事实上，对于本国非马来人语文和文化的维护与扶持，本教育法令却遗漏了一些极其重要的保证：

“联合邦的教育政策旨在建立一个能为全体人民接纳的国民教育制度；这一体制将满足人民的需求和促进人民在文化、社会、经济及政治上的发展，目的在于使马来文成为本国国语，同时维护和扶持国内非马来人语文和文化的发展。”(16)

因此，以往的私立华文中学若决定接受政府支援（主要是在急需基金的情况下）必须改为“国民型”学校，除了华文科之外，其他的科目都是以英文教学。此外，华文节的时间亦将相应减少。

这些已显著的说明，政府的国家教育政策只允许华文小学的存在……而且，教育法令的第 21 条（2），甚至使到华小的生命，可随时断送在教育部长手中：

“任何一个时候，只要教育部长认为某一间国民型小学已适当转变为国民小学时，他可以直接命令有关学校改制为国民学校”(17)

“国民型小学”（即采用非马来人的母语为主要教学媒介语的政府小学）已特别定义为“采用英语、华语或淡米尔语为主要

教学媒介语的全津小学”；而“国民小学”则指“采用国语为主要教学媒介语的全津小学”。

在“国民小学”里，非马来人的母语的教学并不是强制的，但是根据以下两个条件，学校将可开班教授这些母语。这两个条件是：（一）校内至少有 15 名学生的家长要求开班；（二）由当局开班教授这些母语是合情合理且是切实可行的。

既然国民型小学是华文独立中学的生命线，《1961 年教育法令》第 21 条（2）也因而严重威胁独中的生存。

当国会辩论《1961 年教育法案》时，教育部长拉曼达立却说，第 21 条（2）只是针对政府建立的小学，而不是针对由私人设立的小学。可是这些只是花言巧语，因为该法令与其修正法令中并没有明文纳入这一点。

虽然《拉曼达立报告书》建议保留现有的学校董事部制度，惟须具有更大的伸缩性，且其董事成员应获得教育部长的批准。但《1961 年教育法令》在 1972 年修正时，这点已被新的一项条款取代之。

华文中学一般上对《1957 年教育法令》都持有一致的立场，可是当《达立报告书》规定从 1962 年 1 月 1 日开始停止给予中学的部分津贴，而仅全面援助所有接受改制为“国民型”的学校时，他们的立场即开始动摇了。(18)原因是很多华文中学都需要政府的资助才能生存。

因此，在 41 所华文中学之中，有一半以上的学校在毫无选择的情况下，接受改制为以英文为教学媒介的“国民型”学校，其余 14 所华文中学则拒绝接受，而从 1962 年开始一直以“独立”

中学自居至今。

今天的独立中学是采用与国民型学校相似的课程，唯一不同的就是它继续保留华文为教学媒介语。然而，英文和马来文在独中是列为必修科。至今，它们的离校文凭及（由 1975 年起的）由董教总全国华文独立中学工作委员会主办的统一考试文凭，并未受政府承认。

这些华文独中毕业生，到台湾大学和南洋大学（1980 年关闭）深造取得的学位，同样不受我国政府承认。

## 第七章 政治与华文教育

自从 1955 年的第一次选举以来，华文母语教育课题就一直影响着我国的政治。在第五章里，我们了解到在 1955 年大选前，联盟领袖是如何与董总及教总代表聚首，以了解华文、教育及文化在独立后的马来亚所应占的地位。会议上，联盟同意华文教育与文化应受到维护，而所有殖民地法律应再修订以认同这个原则。

### 7.1 1955 年至 1964 年普选

虽然，1955 年的大选显示，当时只有 128 万名选民，其中 84% 是马来族，11.2% 为华族，4.6% 为印族，但华人社会的精神面貌仍是建立在其母语教育及文化上。虽然当时 92 个联邦立法议席当中，只有 50 个公开选举，它却是大马首次大规模选举。当时除了许多华族及印族未获得公民权外，约有 75% 华印族公民年龄是 21 岁以下，没有资格投票。（1）

1955 年首届大选使我国初次尝到种族主义的滋味。国家党的拿督翁于 1955 年 7 月 5 日在马来亚广播电台发表演说时，针对华人及印度人的出生率日益增加，而向马来族提出警告就是一例。他说：“如果我们不要这个国家的华人数目超过马来人，我们就应鼓励更多印尼人到这里来，历史告诉我们，印尼人是我们的骨肉兄弟。”（2）

《海峡时报》对他的演词有如下的评论：

“他(拿督翁)的看法是很扰乱种族情绪的,它似乎牵涉一些种族性的计算法。”(3)

1955 年大选时,联盟鉴于华社是争取独立斗争中的一股力量,而不得不充分关注华社的愿望,也因为如此,联盟“迈向独立”的宣言,在今日几乎已不受承认了:

“一个事实是,一个自由的国家,为了国家的利益,应有她本身的国语……联盟也要给予其他语文法律上的承认。凡马来亚公民,不论种族或信仰,都有维护他们本身的语言、文字及文化的合法与基本权利。”(4)

联盟也保证:“让各语文源流学校正常扩展,即鼓励国内人民办校,提倡语文或文化,而不是将之毁灭。”(5)

基于其所持的立场,联盟竞选的 52 个议席,有 51 个报捷,胜利赢得总选票的 79.6%。

联盟获胜后,却背信食言,华社对《拉萨报告书》及李特调查团的不满,在 1956 年的怡保万里望补选中表露无遗。当时人民进步党候选人辛尼华沙甘律师的竞选宣言表达了华族选民对维护母语教育的要求,因此华社选择了他。在 1955 年首届联邦大选中,他与联盟候选人对垒败北,并失去其按柜金。这一回,由于马华公会在华文教育问题上采取了政府的立场,所以辛尼华沙甘以压倒的多数获胜。这显然是向联盟投反对票。

在马来亚联合邦独立后在 1959 年举行的首次大选中,非马来族选民的比例大量增加。2,144,000 选民中,有 56.8%是马来人,35.6%是华人,7.4%为印度人及 0.2%为其他种族,而且许多非马来族选民已届合格投票年龄,是已登记或已自动成为马来亚

公民者。当时,选区数目也由 52 个倍增至 104 个。

联盟得票总数比例也由 1955 年的 79.6%降至 51.8%。但是,由于反对党票数的分散,联盟仍赢得 74 个议席。(6)

在 1960 年 5 月金宝议席补选中,联盟政府以 7.5%选票之差败给人民进步党。在 1961 年 5 月,它又以 17.5%之差,把安顺选区拱手让给独立人士朱运兴:

“就华人选票而言,这些反向的主要原因是华裔选民对联盟的华文教育政策不满所致。”(7)

华文教育问题并不仅困扰着联盟执政党,当时主要的反对党,社会主义阵线之成员党,即劳工党和人民党因对语文与教育政策持有不同的立场,而于 1961 年开始分歧。当时,持以马来人为中心之立场的人民党,不同意华社对文化平等的要求。

1961 年 5 月地方议会选举时,人民党新山支会抗议当地的劳工党没有支持其候选人,导致人民党失去其议席。该党还恫言退出社阵,结果引起一个全国性的调查,以研究社阵这两个成员党之间的关系。

虽然如此,社阵却在这段内部紧张的时刻,在全国性的地方议会选举中,取得辉煌的胜利。尤其是乔治市议会选举,在所角逐的 15 个议席中,社阵夺得了 14 个议席。此外,社阵在关丹和马六甲,也获得同样的战果。(8)社阵能取得如此骄人的成绩,主要是当时华社对马华公会在华文教育课题的态度和立场,已失去信心,导致马华公会败北。

语文课题在 1964 年普选时,再度引人注目。在竞选运动进

行期间，财政部长和马华公会会长，走遍全国，拨出约五百万元款项予国内各华校。(9)显然的，这无非是一种宣传做法，以表示联盟是关心华教的，可是，当各阶层华人社会要求把华文列为另一种官方语文时，马华公会却再度反对。

在 1964 年整个普选运动中，政府的华文教育政策一直受到民主联合党(UDP)、社阵(SF)、人民行动党(PAP)及人民进步党(PPP)等反对党的攻击，彼等指责马华公会背叛了华社的奋斗目标。例如民主联合党指责联盟说：“拨款予华校进行修建工作是虚假的，其实际政策却是在歧视华文教育。”(10)

民联党的林苍佑能在槟城丹絨区获胜是因为他是站在维护华文教育的立场。

1965 年，全国华人社团代表大会针对马来西亚华文的地位问题，向东姑提呈备忘录。同年，政府废除(在小学六年级举行的)中学升学考试。这严重地打击华文独中的入学人数。

## 7.2 《1967 年国语法案》

一直以来，华文教育课题就与语文脱离不了关系。1957 年《联邦宪法》注明：

“国语必须是马来语”，(惟)“在独立后十年或更久的时间里，国会规定上下议院，各州立法议会及所有其他官方用途都可使用英语。”(11)

但是，十年后，联盟政府却立刻宣布有意立法规定由 1967 年 9 月开始，把马来文列为唯一的官方语文。

华社对这项宣布作出迅速的反应。马华公会各支会纷纷与华人社团及华校教师公会联合起来，抗议这项政策的实施。这些马华公会支会也同时向总会施压，以确保“在官方用途上，更开明地使用华语。”(12)

初时，马华公会会长陈修信及总秘书许启谟谴责这些基层的抗议行动是“企图在语文问题上制造课题”。但不久后，这些基层的怒潮迫使马华公会缓和下来，并宣布他们“……坚持华语的现有地位及可自由在指示牌、通告及传播媒介采用华语。”(13)

华人社团委任一个以沈慕羽为首的特别委员会，向首相提呈一份备忘录，要求承认华文为官方语文及其他课题。与此同时，辛尼华沙甘律师也在国会揭露政府曾寻求社团注册官的协助，以阻止华人社团涉及政治。(14)

另一方面，马来社会一些人士成立了一个“国语行动阵线”，目的是要确保国语法案获得充分实施。巫青团亦恫言，如果华人不放弃把华文列为官方语文之一的要求，他们将敦促当局重新检讨非土著公民权的宪法条款。(15)

尽管这样，华社的抗议行动终于起了作用。当时国会提呈了《1967 年国语法案》，该法案第 3 条列明：

“这项法令将不该影响联邦政府或任何州政府在官方文件或通讯上使用联合邦任何其他种族语文译文的权利，只要这是对公众有利的。”

此外，该法案第 4 条也指出：

“如果最高元首认为适合的话，可允许官方用途继续使用英

语。” (16)

这项法案引起马来社会部分人士的强烈抗议，他们认为这种特许优待是一种“背叛马来民族事业”的行为，并指责东姑“出卖马来人利益”。(17)他们还进行多项示威行动，并在其中一个示威行动中焚烧东姑的肖像。这项法案较后于1967年3月3日在国会下议院通过。

这项法令规定马来文是唯一的官方语文。教育部接着宣布，没有拥有大马教育文凭(MCE)或政府学校考试文凭(GSC)的学生将不准赴海外深造。董教总抗议这项规定，同时华人社会也因此开始考虑在国内设立一所大学，以迎合独中生的需求。

### 7.3 1969年大选

在1969年大选中，语文及教育仍然是主要的竞选课题，它也是大多数反对党的竞选主题。

民主行动党的宣言主要是强调民主的文化，其中一些呼吁是：(18)

- (一) 接受马来文为国家语文，作为大马人民表达及交流的共同语文，同时给予华文、淡米尔文及英文应有的官方地位。
- (二) 允许在国会、州立法议会、通告及政府通函中自由使用华文、淡米尔及英文。
- (三) 消除国民学校与国民型学校之间的差别。

- (四) 当局应采纳传授主要语文为教学及考试媒介的学校为国民学校之教育制度，只要有关学校教育是以马来西亚文化为主和把国文列为必修的语文。
- (五) 保留剑桥文凭考试委员会，以进行处理剑桥文凭及高级教育文凭考试，消除在评定学术性表现时，偏向某一种族的可能性。
- (六) 依据国际所接受的评定标准，拟定一份承认南洋大学、台湾、印度、中东及印尼学位及学历资格的迅速解决方案。
- (七) 政府应支持国民大学及独立大学计划。
- (八) 发展一个大马各族文化自由地相互影响而形成的马来西亚文化，和不应由任何一种文化独霸。

设立独立大学的概念是教总及董总于1967年联合倡导的，目的是为华校独中生提供大学教育，应付严重缺少高等教育机会的问题；为国家训练专业人才；以及在发展国家文化过程中，促进融合。(19)

在1969年竞选运动中，创立独立大学是最为突出的课题。获得华人支持的大部分反对党均宣称将致力进行这项工作。起初，马华企图转移视线，建议扩展马来亚大学华文组 and 成立它创办的私人学院“东姑阿都拉曼学院”，以吸收不能进入马来亚大学的华校生。但后来当马华基层也开始支持建立独大时，该党才逼不得已，作出让步，协助为这非营利公司“独大有限公司”申请注册。

人民进步党继续在其霹雳堡垒区鼓励华社支持独大。其在竞



选宣言中呼吁确定华文及淡米尔文的官方地位及指出：

“国家并不是任何一个个别社群或种族的霸业、福利和利益。” (20)

该党也进一步要求当局拟定一种符合各民族意愿，提供各种语文，即马来文、华文、淡米尔文和英文的教学和考试媒介之教育政策。

在大选前一年方成立的马来西亚民政党也列下以下的目标：(21)

- (一) 提供更多便利，俾便吸收受华文及淡米尔文教育的学生进入马大。
- (二) 承认华文与淡米尔文媒介的剑桥及高级教育文凭考试。
- (三) 在不与少数民族语文冲突的情况下提倡国语。

1969 年大选成绩对自 1955 年首次选举以来便一直取得辉煌战绩的联盟是一记沉重的打击。马华公会的惨败充分显示华社对其语文与教育政策的不满。

州选举方面，在总数 282 个议席当中，联盟只赢得 162 个席位，取得 47.95% 选票。而在 1959 及 1964 年的大选中，联盟却分别获取 206 个 (55.52%) 及 241 个 (57.62%) 州议席。

国会议席选举方面，联盟只赢得 104 个议席中的 66 个席位，取得 48.41% 选票，它分别在 1959 年及 1964 年赢取 74 个 (51.78%) 及 89 个 (58.37%) 席位。 (22)

虽然联盟仍占大多数议席，反对党的竞选策略已成功使到执政党失去占有三分之二多数议席。如此一来，执政党便无法任意修改宪法。在雪兰莪、槟城和霹雳这些非土著占多数人口的州里，马华公会候选人几乎全军覆没，而联盟在这三州也没有拥有大多数州立法议席，这次普选成绩的显著改变，使巫统了解到，马华公会已不再是华社心目中的代表组织了。

#### 7.4 新经济政策

随着 1969 年大选成绩公布而发生的“五一三”暴乱事件，正如它是我国社会、政治及经济领域的分水岭一样，也是我国教育史上的分水岭。在随后颁布的紧急状态中，政府也实施一项改变整个国家教育面貌的政策。从此以后，教育政策须符合新经济政策目标。于 1969 年 7 月，教育部长拿督阿都拉曼耶谷宣布，由翌年开始，从小学一年级至大学的英文教学媒介，将逐年以马来文取代之。

接着在 1971 年，《玛吉依斯迈报告书》建议本地大学将根据大马公民人口比例，无需以学术成绩录取学生，这就是“固打制度”的开端。接着，政府即修改宪法以便更多土著能被录取进入大学及其他学院。

1971 年，国会通过另一项重要的法令《大学与大专院校法令》。这项法令限制大专院校学生的权利是显而易见的，可是直到 1979 年，当法庭对独大诉讼案下判时，才使人发觉到它亦有针对母语教育的涵义。法庭在判词中援引《大学及大专院校法令》，禁止设立采用以非国语作为教学媒介语的私立大学。

固打制度实施后，至 1975 年时，大马五间大学合计学生人

数中，有 58.5%是马来人，比国内马来族人口占全国总人口比例稍高。由于这样，实际上，大专院校的马来学生比例远超过马来族在全国总人口的比例：于 1970 年，大专院校共计有 53.7%马来学生，而于 1975 年及 1980 年，马来学生的比例相继提高至 71.3% 及 73.3%。(23)

在新经济政策下，马来西亚教育制度发生了上述变化，直接或间接影响了华校。至于如何影响，且看下一章分析。

第八章 新经济政策下的华文教育

1969 年后，华校新生入学人数激增，一般认为这是由于政府当局在 1969 年后，把学校教学重点从英文转向马来文所引起的后果。(见下表)

表(六)：1971 至 1978 年马来西亚半岛政府全津小学的学生人数

年份	前英文源流	华文源流
1971	337, 560	413, 270
1972	336, 768	435, 266
1973	335, 297	450, 903
1974	324, 576	465, 541
1975	313, 060	480, 984
1976	304, 313	487, 877
1977	302, 449	493, 809
1978	300, 753	498, 311

资料来源：《1979 年内阁委员会教育报告书》

表(七)：政府全津小学的学生入学的式样

年份	前英文源流	马来源流	华文源流	淡米尔源流
1947-57	11. 20+	10. 20+	8. 40+	4. 10+
1957-67	8. 30+	3. 00+	1. 40+	4. 60+
1967-70	5. 40+	1. 00+	3. 80+	0. 03+
1971-78	10. 90-	17. 95+	20. 58+	0. 97-

资料：《新海峡时报》，1983 年 10 月 6 日

一些受英文教育的华籍父母决心把子女送入华校，也肯定是促使华族学生人数激增的另一个主要因素。这点可能有很多原因，其中两点是家长渴望重寻因接受英文教育而失去的优秀文化

传统，以及前贵族英校已逐渐灭亡之故。

在七十年代里，董教总全力集中于维护华小和发展华文独中的课题上，它和马华合作失败，尤其是当马华提出了《检讨国家教育制度备忘录》之后，有关备忘录表明该党的立场是秉持与政府相同的教育观念即从小学至大学教育，马来语文都将是大马教育制度的主要教学媒介语。

虽然在七十年代里，华小的学生入学人数逐年都有显著的增长，但学校和教室的间数却没有相对的增加。例如说，在 1970 年至 1973 年之间，马来西亚半岛共兴建四间华小，但原有的华小却有十间被关闭。(1)同样的，当局也完全忽略学校的维修工作。华小更因面对缺乏合格教师问题，而无法进行正常的活动和发展，而那些国中毕业教师的华文水平一般上都很低落。

华文小学的学术水平低落的危机，导源于这些华小學生的马来文程度必须达到和国小学生一样的水平。因此，经常只有损及母语教育的情况下才可能取得这样的成就，另一个投诉是指政府将分配那些不谙华文的音乐教师和书记到华小执教与办公。总的来说，有充分的事实证明政府是存心为难华文教育的。

除了华文教育体系里的华裔学生以外，在国家教育制度里其他类型学校的华族学生也有理由感到不满，比如说，1979 年的一万 19,362 名先修班一年级各族学生比例是：(2)

马来人	62.4% =	12079 人
华人	33.5% =	6491 人
印度人	3.7% =	711 人
其他	0.4% =	81 人

根据第四个《大马计划》，1980 年进入我国大学的各族学生

入学人数是：(3)

马来人	66.7% =	13,857 人
华人	26.2% =	5450 人
印度人	6.1% =	1248 人
其他	1% =	209 人

### 8.1 《1972 年教育修正法令》

自从我国华校创办以来，学校董事部在学校各方面的工作都扮演着主要的角色，这些包括学校的创办经费和行政。董事部对华文教育和华社所作出的贡献，受到广泛的赞赏。

《拉曼达立报告书》亦已立有法令和学校章程规定学校董事部的职权范围。

可是在 1972 年，一项修正案列入了《1961 年教育法令》。它结合《阿兹报告书》中关于废除全津学校董事部的建议。《教育修正法令》的新条款第 26 条 A 书明：

“所有全津学校或教育机构的董事会，必须在部长决定的日期，依据部长决定的方式解散；此后，董事会必须停止聘请任何教师及其他雇员，及不再成为他们的雇主，而所有对该学校或教育机构的管理权力亦都必须停止生效。”(4)

华社对这项条款深表关注，甚至国民型全津华文学校都表示抗议。

阿兹教学服务委员会已引证数个学校董事部滥用权力的不法行为，例如干涉学校行政，以裙带关系聘请教职员，挪用公款，

以及在合约和委任书里出现不合乎道德的作法。

当时的教育部长拿督胡先翁在国会辩论这项修正法令时说，除了聘请和解雇教职员以外，学校董事部在其他方面的权力将保持不变。(5)

当时，非政府教师如统一薪金制教师是和学校董事部签约受聘，在法律上，学校董事部是他们的雇主。现今阿兹委员会建议设立一个新的单一政府教学服务，即是无论教师们选择加入新的教学服务或仍然保留原有的地位和薪俸，他们还是中央局属下的雇员。

学校董事会今后再也没有权力聘请及解雇教职员。与此同时，教育部也没有清楚说明学校董事会的权限，比如它在学校行政上，学校扩充和学校资产拥有权方面的应有权力是什么。结果政府政策发生很多偏差，例如，调派不谙华文的校长和书记到华文源流学校服务。

1971年12月4日假吉隆坡举行的华校教师和学校董事联合大会上通过一项决议，吁请教育部保持华校董事会的原有权力，大会坚持说，学校董事会有必要继续保持原有权力，俾便保留华校的特征。(6)

反对党国会议员在国会辩论有关修正法令时指出，既然《1961年教育法令》已经授权教育部长对付没有负起职务的董事，解除他们的注册；(7)这次剥夺学校董事会权力的行动是意料中的事，他们询问国会为什么至今仍然没有提控那些滥用权力和有不法行为的董事。

华社广泛认为，学校董事会是华校的生命线，废除华校董事

会将导致华文教育学制的灭亡，反对党指控政府说：

“……政府食言无信……当华校接受转换为全津国民型华文小学时，双方达致协议将保留学校董事部的完整权，可是现今却违背协议……新条款第26条A赋予部长绝对权力去组织或拒绝一个董事会的成立。”(8)

另外一位反对党议员在国会辩论修正法令时，也同样指出学校董事部在华校的特殊的地位：

“我国的华校和英校、淡米尔文学校或马来学校都不一样，它们向来都是由董事部管制的。”(9)

## 8.2 独中复兴运动

1973年，霹雳华校董事联合会发起“华文独中复兴运动”，并推动以100万元为目标的筹款运动。这项筹募发展基金运动获得全国各阶层人士的热烈支持。一个负责起草全国独中办校方针的“独立中学工作委员会”随之成立。这项基金主要用在编写新课本、实行全国统一考试、举办研讨会及其他活动，以提高独中教学水准。

在同年12月16日举行的一项华文教育代表大会，通过了关于坚决支持学校董事会、维护华文教育及华小地位的决议。

## 8.3 1975年，全国华团向内阁教育检讨委员会提呈备忘录

政府在1974年10月9日宣布成立一个以当时教育部长马哈

迪医生为首的内阁教育检讨委员会，以进行检讨教育政策的贯彻情形，该委员会受委调查范围是：

“在现有国家教育政策的结构里，检讨教育制度的目标和实效，包括课程大纲，以求达到我国短期与长期的人力需求。此外，更必须确定我国教育制度能够达致出现一个团结、有纪律及经过训练的机会的最终目标。” (10)

政府针对此事征求公众的意见，结果共收到三百余份备忘录和恳请书，代表全国华社的华团提呈了一份备忘录，以表达马来西亚华裔的感受和意愿，下列是备忘录的基本要求：

#### (a) 关于母语教育

“正如政府的口号‘语言是民族的灵魂’所表达的，一个种族的文化本质只有通过母语才能够被吸收，并加以发展。语言和文化是一个民族的灵魂，我国各个种族包括马来人、华人、印度人、伊班人等等，都珍惜他们的语文和文化，因此在国家宪法下，一个民选的政府有义务公平及合理的对待我国各族人民的心声与愿望。

“《国际人权宣言》第 26 条规定，政府对国内各族母语教育的责任，正如《国际民权与政治权利公约》第 27 条所说的一样。母语教育也是提倡和促进我国各族之间的了解、容忍和亲善的基本条件之一。”

有关备忘录指出：

“由近十多年来的教育政策的实施，我们深深体验到政府在尊重各民族的基本人权上，还有许多方面有必要检讨与纠正！”

(11)

《备忘录》也指出各种族在文化、宗教与母语方面所享有的基本人权，与接受马来文为国语及通用语是完全没有冲突的：

“如果政府施行国语目的是要促进各民族之间的文化交流，在官方与私人立场上的理解，华裔公民是热烈欢迎的！如果政府片面强调国语，有意无意使其他种族的语文文化处于没落与式微的地位，我们觉得这种政策的实施，绝对不符合基本人权，更无法促进团结，是应该及时检讨，及时纠正的。” (12)

华社亦恳求政府在强调国语的重要性之同时，也给华文教育提供多面化的发展机会，“以便创造一个更加丰富的马来西亚文化。否则，马来西亚将失去了一个丰实的文化泉源。”

《备忘录》提出要求发展非巫人母语教育的另一个因素，即是教育家一般上都一致的认为母语是最有效的学习媒介语。因此学生应该先接受母语教育，其次才学习其他语文。无论一名学生的吸收力强抑是学习进度缓慢，在学术及文化上，学生都必须先接受母语教育，这是符合学习原理的。否则，我们只有致使学习进度缓慢同学今后的生活更加艰苦。

《备忘录》主要突出的一点是：

“华裔公民争取华文教育地位绝对不是沙文主义。” (13)

“根据历史的记载和世界其他国家的例子证明，要取得国家团结，完全不在于单元语文教育。例如瑞士、芬兰、比利时及加拿大，都是多元种族的国家，采用多种语文，但仍然保持和平亲善。”

有关《备忘录》因此郑重呼吁政府检讨它对母语教育的被动态度，并指出《1961 年教育法令》使到整个华社深感忧虑。因为这条法令废除了高中三和初中三<sup>三</sup>的政府考试，终止华校师资训练，此外这项法令第 21 条（2）更进一步授权教育部长，只要他认为适当，可把任何国民型小学改制为国民小学。

华社对《1972 年教育修正法令》亦具有同样的顾虑，这项法令更进一步的促使采用马来文作为华校师训的媒介语、电视台甚少播放华文节目、拒绝批准创办独大等等。政府在贯彻这些教育政策时，已乖离了《1957 年教育法令》的原有精神，进而严重打击国民团结。

这份备忘录接着向政府提出 16 项有关教育的基本要求，旨在纠正政府教育政策极可能出现的不健全和不一致的偏差。

#### (b) 关于学校董事部、学校经费、行政和教职员

有关备忘录极力反对旨在废除学校董事部的《1972 年教育修正法令》，这点已在前面讨论过，并促请教育部长尽快公布一份能被三大机构（董总、教总、马华）工作委员会所接受的新董事部章程。在新章程还未公布之前，董事部应保持原有权力。

“虽然华校在申请学校维修和扩展津贴方面，曾有被接受的例子，但一般上都证明是徒劳的。此外，一些在进行中的工程甚至被无理禁止。这一系列事件加深了华族对政府对待华教态度的恐惧感。”

#### (c) 关于小学、中学与高等教育

对华小产生莫大威胁之《1961 年教育法令》第 21 条（2）应

予废除。虽然这条文第一项规定应根据人民的需求，建立各源流的学校，但实际上，华文小学是最不够的。例如，八打灵的 10 万居民当中，八成以上是华籍，而该地区有 15 间小学，其中仅有一间是华文小学。

有关备忘录也吁请政府无条件拨款予华文独立中学，并承认其国家教育制度上的应有合理地位。（其他有关各个教育阶段的要求列在附录）此外，政府应该鼓励批准成立由私人机构赞助的高等学府，尤其是独立大学，这点完全符合我国渴望提供更多高等教育机会的意愿，并且可促进国家发展。每年大约有二万名合格学生申请进入本地合计仅有六千学额的大学和学院。

“增建私人高等学府亦有助于缓和国家经济负担。虽然国家发展基金拨出四分之一款项充作教育用途，但仅仅是学院和大学的开支，就已不敷 19%。据最低的估计，我国学生到海外深造所造成的大量金钱外流，每年高至 10 亿马币，大约相等于第二个大马计划下五年的国家教育开支。”

有关备忘录也要求调查本地大学与学院的入学固打制，承认南洋大学、义安工艺学院以及台湾大学所颁发的学位。

#### (d) 关于课程、教学、考试和自动升级制

华校教师公会和董总已经指出在华文源流学校采用和国民学校完全相同的课程大纲来教导国语是不合理的。因为国语在马来源流学校是第一语文，但在华文学校却不是。教育家和语文学家已经证实不能在同一个时期教导第一语文和第二语文。

我国的教育制度也应为智力较差的学生提供一些符合学生个人的需求。因此，自动升班制实有必要再作检讨。

### (e) 关于聘请教职员的问题

华文小学面对日趋严重的临教问题，应尽快解决。这些年来，共有两千至三千名华小临时教师，有关当局应该给他们提供受训的机会，而且应该采用华文作为受训的教学媒介语。

### (f) 关于薪金制

自从实行《阿兹报告书》所建议的薪金制，即属教育服务和中央局雇员各实行不同的薪金制时，引起了广泛的不满，这种情绪直接影响教学水准。因此，华团在有关备忘录中，提出要求纠正这种情形。

### (g) 关于大众传播媒介和其他

华文是世界重要语文之一。因此，我国其他友族也应受鼓励学习华文，它不但能够协助促进国民和谐，亦能加强地方性的了解与合作，华文应在官方函件、招牌和大众传播媒介，尤其是电视台里，更广泛的被使用，这样可以协助促进国民团结、各种族间互相了解与文化交流。

在 1975 年，马华公会也提呈一份《检讨马来西亚教育制度备忘录》。

## 8.4 设立了独中统一考试

当年，董教总决定举办第一届“统一考试”，当他们在进行筹备过程中，教育部长要求他们取消有关考试，理由是华文独立中学正试图建立另一教育制度，这将妨碍国民团结。

全国华教团体迅速召开一个代表大会，一致议决：

- (一) 独中统考将如期举行；
- (二) 授权董教总同政府谈判，寻求解决方案。

当统一考试即将举行时，林晃升与陆庭谕等华文教育工作者被当时的教育部长马哈迪·莫哈末医生传召到国会大楼。马哈迪医生直言不讳地向董教总领导人说，最好不要举行统一考试……“要不然……”，他没叫人回答什么，只说一句“就是这样了！”，就把华教工作者打发走了。

董教总领导层决定准备面对后果，因而华文独中第一届统一考试就如期在 1975 年年底举行。

在同一年，所有英文中学都改制为国民学校，由中一开始，所有非语文科的科目都用马来语教学。

在 1977 年，教育部长通令所有接受全津贴学校董事部解散。董教总提出强烈抗议并随后与首相拿督胡申翁交涉结果，董事部的职权与权利保持不变。

## 8.5 1979 年《马哈迪教育报告书》

1974 年，以马哈迪为首的内阁教育检讨委员会，利用了五年的时间才呈上有关报告书，并延至 1979 年 12 月才公布。

在国会辩论有关《马哈迪报告书》时，有反对党议员指出：“……公众人士知道内阁委员会和国民团结局属下一个委员会，利用了相当长的时间在讨论华文独立中学的前途。”(14)

内阁检讨委员会所提出的一些建议是：(15)

- 授权考试局长阻止任何私立教育机构举办对本地学生无益或有损国家利益的任何考试。
- 授权学校与教师注册官，以监督私立学校的收费和考试的进行情形。
- 授权学校与教师注册官，以监督私立学校所采用的课程纲要和教学媒介语。
- 授权学校注册官，以封闭任何一间没有注册或是违反注册准证之任何条例的私立学校。

综观七十年代，虽然政府通过不利于华文教育发展的法令(即《1972年教育修正法令》)，并恫言要以1975年统一考试的举办为由，向华文教育工作者采取行动，但是对马来西亚的华校来说，这10年历史是有重大意义的。

新经济政策下华文小学新生报名热潮的再度掀起，1973年独中复兴运动及具有历史意义的1975年华文独中统考的举办，都是七十年代里使华文独中体系扎稳根基向前发展的盛事。

## 第九章 独立大学

1967年杪，教总提出设立一所大学，为华校生提供升学的机会。这项提议在1967年12月8日教总常年代表大会上通过，并和董总联合成立了华教工作委员会。(1)

虽然创立独立大学(简称独大)似乎是华文教育体制的正常发展，但是实际上这个构思是在教育部长佐哈里宣布，所有欲到海外(包括新加坡南洋大学)深造的学生，马来文必须获得优等后才产生的。(2)

在创立独大的构思仍处于概念化的阶段时，其原意是设立一所多元种族、多元文化的大学，为我国造就更多专业人才，并能协助发展国家文化。

于1968年4月14日，全国华人社团大会上宣布通过创立独立大学计划后，这项计划即刻成为轰动我国华社的课题，同时也是随之来临的1969年大选的热门课题。筹募独大基金就好像当年南洋大学募捐运动一样，如火如荼，公众人士慷慨解囊，结果在“独大有限公司”注册之前，就已筹到60万元基金。

所有具有大多数华族党员的反对党都支持这项计划。初时，马华公会踌躇不前，而建议发展马来亚大学中文系以及设立“东姑阿都拉曼”学院，可是后来因为马华公会基层都支持创立“独大”，马华公会领导层别无他择，只好支持和协助非营利的独大有限公司，进行注册工作。



接着，全国华裔社团展开了轰轰烈烈的筹募基金运动，可是很不幸的，随着“五一三”事件的发生，全国陷入紧急状态后，这项运动只好停止。后来在《煽动法令》下，创立独大事宜被列为敏感课题，不许公开谈论。此外，1971年的《大学与大专院校法令》规定所有大学或大专学院必须得到最高元首和国会的批准才可设立。独大运动因此陷入低潮，尤其是当大部分反对党于1969年大选时，逐一被吸收入国阵联合政府之后。

1974年，加影华侨学校产业受托会把位于加影武吉路一块8.5英亩土地捐献给独立大学有限公司，作为拟议中的大学的校园。（译者按：“武吉路”的中文旧名为“禧街”，是根据英文Hill Street翻译的。）

于1977年，独大有限公司向最高元首提出上诉，要求恩准创立独大。此事再度引起华社的关注，并发起签名运动支持独大请愿，很自然地独大问题再度成为1978年大选的主要课题。推动这项新运动的主力仍然是董教总和全国中华总商会、大会堂和华团。全国各地支持独大运动风起云涌，纷纷举办筹募基金晚宴，召开群众大会和座谈会。

上一章已指出，在七十年代末期，非马来学生因无从进入本地大学，而感到万分失望。在先修班每年25万学生当中，只有两万名能在本地大学获得学额。较后，在新经济政策下，马来学生享有大学入学特别配额（固打制），非马来学生进入本地大学的机会就更加渺茫了。下图显示七十年代与八十年代时期，各种族学生的入学人数，例如，1970年马来亚大学原有40%巫裔学生，49%华裔学生，但到1975年时，我国五间大学当中，马来学生占57.3%，华人有35.8%及5.6%的印度人。（3）

表(八)：本国大专学院各族学生人数（1970与1980年）

	1970年					1980年				
	马来人	华人	印度人	其他种族	总数	马来人	华人	印度人	其他种族	总数
文凭班百分比	151 41.0	209 56.6	9 2.4	- -	369 100.0	2,166 32.4	3,879 58.1	551 8.3	81 1.2	6,677 100.0
专业文凭百分比	2,871 86.5	393 11.8	32 1.0	22 0.7	3,318 100.0	13,071 63.0	6,427 31.0	1,127 5.4	119 0.6	20,744 100.0
学士学位百分比	3,084 40.2	3,752 48.8	559 7.3	282 3.7	7,677 100.0	13,857 66.7	5,450 26.2	1,248 6.0	209 1.0	20,764 100.0

资料来源：《第四大马计划报告书》，表2123，第351至352页。

- 注：（1）提供文凭班的学校包括：关丹工艺学院、翁姑奥玛工艺学院、拉曼学院、玛拉工艺学院、  
 （2）提供专业文凭的学校包括：关丹工艺学院，翁姑奥玛工艺学院、拉曼学院、玛拉工艺学院、  
 农大、工大  
 （3）提供学士学位的学校包括：玛拉工艺学院、马大、理大、国大、农大、工大及学士以上课程

各个政党和社团，除了执政集团国阵内的马华与民政党，包括民主行动党、沙巴华人公会、砂劳越人联党、社会正义党以及4,234个华团，共同签署一份备忘录，并于1978年1月30日提呈给最高元首，请求恩准创设独大。当时创办独大的目的是：“设立一所民办的大学，为那些无法进入本地大学的学生提供高等教育的机会，培育良好公民和造就人才，以及分担政府的教育重担……”（4）

这所大学虽将采用华文为主要教学媒介语，但也同时重视马来文和英文的训练，并且将依照《大学与大专院校法令》的规定组织起来：

收筐标准将以学术资格为唯一依归，它将不受其他非学术性素的干预。”（5）

于提呈《备忘录》当天，巫青团团长哈芝苏海米即宣布说，巫青团坚决反对设立独大。

而政府却在1978年大选过后（即在1979年1月1日）才宣布反对独大的创立。反对的主要原因有三点：

- （一）建议中的大学将采用华文为教学媒介，这点违反我国教育政策。
- （二）它将由私人机构建立。
- （三）它将只招收华文独中学生。

政府深信这个宣布必会引起华社的强烈抗议，为了缓和这个局面，他也同时保证将扩充我国现有的大学及调查和改善非土著

学生的比率。马华公会从政府的看法中得到暗示后，即刻公开放弃支持独大计划，并说：

“这是为了国家利益”，和因为“根据《1971年大学与大专院校法令》，我国不能有华文大学。”（6）

民政党也采取同样的立场，惟他们仍然坚持私立大学有权利存在。

较后于1978年9月19日，独大理事会重申创立独大的决心，并于10月22日召开全国华团联席会议，商讨进一步的步骤。

当时，泛马回教党赞成政府拒绝《独大请愿书》，人民社会主义党则宣称它不能支持独大，但华社却继续恳请政府重新考虑。

1978年10月10日，反对党国会议员在国会动议修改《大学与大专院校法令》，却遭到巫统、马华与民政党的反对。

接着在1978年10月19日，内政部长加沙里沙菲依发出非法集会的传票给独大理事会，并警告他们谓：“政府将不会允许自己受威胁，也不会纯粹为了某个种族的利益，而修改政策”。10月22日警方引用《内部安全法令》禁止独大理事会召开全国签署华团代表大会。

结果于1978年11月15日，独大理事会决定通过法律行动寻求公断。为了筹措上述法律基金，“一人一元”运动遂发起。

马华公会会长拿督李三春于1978年11月26日在马华公会全国代表大会上，正式表明该党不支持独大的创办。

## 9.1 独大案件

独大理事会入禀高庭起诉政府案件于1981年9月28日开审，英国女皇御用律师迈克贝洛夫(Michael Beloff)代表独大出庭，他向法庭陈述华社创立独大的详情：

“倡议中的大学在录取学生时将不会带有种族歧视，而国语、英语和华语这三大语文在作为教学媒介语方面，将分别扮演其各自的角色。这所私立大学主要是吸收华文独中毕业生，但也欢迎他族的申请，华文将是主要的，但肯定不是唯一的教学媒介语。原因很简单，有一些科系如法学系等，将采用英文与马来文。再者，工艺课程的参考书也多数以英文为主，至于中医系的参考书则近乎纯为华文本。”

独大有限公司坚持指代表政府的最高元首，援引《大学与大专院校法令》所授予的权力，拒准创办独大的申请是错误和无效的。独大代表律师贝洛夫指出拒绝批准《创办独大请愿书》是无效的原因如下：

- (一) 当局对重要事实给予不正确的判断。
- (二) 应用《大学与大专院校法令》所授给权力以促进该法令的目标和拒准独大的因素，在法律上是毫无关系的。
- (三) 这项拒绝与《宪法》中，用以保护大马少数民族基本权利的重要条款互相矛盾，亦与世界人权宣言相对立。

律师也指出，教育部长对倡议中的独大所将使用的教学媒介语和收生问题，具有错误看法，他因而在不了解独大计划的事实前，便劝告最高元首拒绝批准《创办独大请愿书》。有鉴于此，

法庭有权利检讨教长的决定。

独大代表律师贝洛夫也指出，根据《宪法》第152条，要求在整个教育过程中，国语成为唯一的教学媒介语的国家教育政策是非法的。他坚持说：

“一个政策就算是存在立法中，并不意味着它是合法的。”(7)

《马来西亚联邦宪法》第152条规定马来语为国语，但它也附有条款说明：

“……除了官方用途以外，任何人都不能被禁止或被阻止使用、教导或学习其他语文。”

《宪法》第8条(2)也注明：

“除非《宪法》明文规定，否则任何法律或在贸易、商业、专业、职业和就业方面，都不能仅基于宗教、种族、出身或出生地的因素，歧视公民。”

因此，基于华文将是教学媒介语而拒准创办独大，有违《宪法》的规定，迈克贝洛夫律师进一步陈词说，这些因素显示联邦政府并未注重考虑有关建议的教育组织，以及决定如何使用所授予的权力。政府拒绝一所大学应用国内40%人民所应用的语文是没有理由的。更何况它并不只是吸收华人，而是华文独中学生。

“即使有关大学决定只录取华文独中学生，在《宪法》下也肯定不是非法的。”(8)

倡议创立独大的前一个原因是为了缓和土著对我国大学学

生分配额的不满：

“独大有限公司的倡议，旨在不须增加政府的负担下，缓和  
非马来族间普遍上存在的不满……倡议中的大学亦将培育可造就  
的人才，为国服务。”（9）

或许独大事件最有力的论点是它获得 4,238 个代表我国各阶  
层华人的华团的支持，早在独大有限公司成立之前，公众人士则  
已充分显示热心华教的精神，捐款源源而来。

迈克贝洛夫在陈词时亦慎重提醒法庭，要取得国家团结，则  
有须要确保少数民族在各领域里的权利，诸如语文方面。他也说，  
在一个多元文化、多元种族的社会里，国民团结的真正威胁是在  
当多数民族试图欺压少数民族时，才出现的，发扬国语故然是促  
进国民团结的适当途径，但在非官方用途上使用少数民族的语  
文，也是人民的权利，少数民族使用他们本身语文的权利，是一  
种神圣及意义深长的权利。

独大代表律师议论说，由于倡议中的大学是一间公司发起的  
私立大学，故此应该准予采用华文为教学媒介语，它不可能是像  
检察总长所提出的，依据法令所设立的“公共机构”。检察总长  
也提出其他特征以支持“公共机构”是适合於倡议中的大学，即  
是：

——倡议中的大学将在某种程度上受到公共管制。

——将会有一些公委职位。

——有关大学将符合公众利益。

——它将获得国会批准的公共基金。

迈克贝洛夫律师陈词说，上述四项特征，无论是独立或是综  
合起来看，都不可能使到独大成为公共机构。提及公众控制这一  
点，他指出，政府通过法律和条例等来控制各个领域，因此，在  
名誉上，一个机构是由公共管制，但实际上乃是政府控制，故并  
不能使到一个机构成为公共机构。最后，他针对总检察司旦士里  
阿布达立所提出的第三和第四点，指出，一般慈善机构亦是基于  
大众利益而设立，也有接受公众捐款，可是他们并不被认为“公  
共机构”：

“把一所私立大学指为公共机构是不可能成立的，是前所未  
有的司法先例。”（10）

贝洛夫律师说，人们应该分清为公众利益或为大众的好处和  
公共机构之间的差别。独大将是由一间公司设立，而不是在法律  
下设立。

女皇律师在最后陈词时提醒政府说，基于倡议中的大学建议  
采用华文为教学媒介语而拒绝批准大学的创立是错误和违反宪法  
的，虽然检察总长曾经提出我国的前途正受考验，而且如果《独  
大请愿书》被接受，它可能引起种族暴乱，迈克贝洛夫告诉法庭  
谓：

“我们不应该受到政治家关于厄运的预言所影响，而应该依  
照宪法与法律的基本原则行事……很久以前，罗马有句名言说”天  
塌下来都要维持正义。”（11）

有关建立倡议中大学的可行性，独大代表律师表示政府没有  
理由作出结论指独大有限公司无法设立，或维持一所私立大学。

他辩论说，自从 1962 年以来，华人社会就已自力更生，支撑起拥有超过 3 万名学生的 60 间独中。尤有进者，全马 4,000 多个华团签名支持倡办独大已充分证明马来西亚华裔对独大计划的热诚和信心。

当时的教育部长拿督慕沙希淡评论有关计划在经济上是难以实现的，确实是有失态。贝洛夫律师说，拿督慕沙在法庭上提及有关新加坡南洋大学的证据，纯属新闻，拿督慕沙本身曾经说明他所说的纯粹是听闻而来和政府对外报告中得来的。这位部长也曾经承认说，除了经济问题以外，尚有其他因素导致新加坡政府介入南大事件。

贝洛夫律师针对教长的证词陈词说，如果经济问题是反对创办独大的唯一因素，那么他将召开一项对话。他说，这个证据有损政府在这个案件中的形象，他建议说，即使诉方没有提出对话的要求，教长仍然有义务召开这项对话，教长有必要去了解所有事实，这是他对全民所应负起的责任。

## 9.2 高庭判决

1981 年 11 月 8 日，高庭法官拿督尤索菲阿都卡迪驳回独大有限公司要求法庭判决政府拒绝批准该公司创办独大的请愿是无效及违反宪法的诉讼，并谕令独大有限公司负责堂费，法官在判词中宣称，任何在《1971 年大学与大专院校法令》下成立的大学，不论是国立或是私立的，都一律属于公共机构。故此，它必须依照《宪法》第 152 条（1）的规定，在官方用途上采用国语，在创办及维持大学方面，应该考虑到国家的利益而不单仅是教育的利益。因此政府没有责任纯粹为了极需更多学额，而批准一所大学的设立。

“在《1971 年法令》下创立的大学，无论是公办或是民办，其中显然是包含着公共的因素，除了涉及最高水平的公共教育以外，其大学事务也将在某种程度上受到公众的控制，并公委一些职位。它将为公利服务，且有资格享受公款。”（12）

在这项法令下，教长有责任监督有关大学的事务以及一些涉及学生活动与纪律的活动。

拿督尤索菲法官总结说：“在第 160 条里关键的字眼，应该是指‘机构’，任何人士或机构要组成这样的实体，它的章程、活动、权力和职权，必须含有公共成分和公共事业意义。故此，作为一个具“官方用途”的公共机构，独大是否采用华文为主要或是唯一的教学媒介语并不重要，因为《宪法》第 152 条第一项的附带条件所提供的保护条例在这里并不存在。”（13）

宪法第 152 条（1）（a）指出：

“马来文应是国语，……除了在官方用途以外，任何人都不可被禁止或阻止使用、教导与学习任何其他语文。”

针对“使用”这个字眼事实上是否只限于作为有关少数民间的一种表达和通讯的工具，或可作为教学媒介语，法官裁决这项条文只能依前者，较狭窄意义的注解，他补充说，上述条文只提及“教导或学习”，而略去“in”这个介词，可见它的含意已很明显。

尤索菲法官说，单仅这一点就足以了结独大诉讼案。针对其他论点，他指出，诉方已经陈词说明独大并非只为华校生而创办，再者，拒准独大请愿书是对有潜能的学生和独大公司赞助人的歧视，违反了《宪法》第 8 条（2）条。然而，法官坚持认为，《宪

法》第 8 条 (2) 项只是禁止对公民存有偏见, 可是诉方是一间公司而不是公民。因此, 《宪法》第 8 条 (2) 并不能给予诉方任何保护。

提及独大计划的经济实力时, 法官认为, 由于大马在国内与国际上的形象已很糟, 而政府又必须对批准创办独大负起全责。因此, 政府当局是有充份的理由和根据拒绝批准独大的请愿。

评及起诉人申诉未被安排与教长举行对话, 是不公平之举, 拿督尤索菲法官裁决说, 教长已拥有充分的证据, 包括所有供词和文件, 方才作出公平合理的决定。

### 9.3 独大上诉案

独大有限公司不满高庭拒准创办独大的判决, 向联邦法院提出上诉, 这宗诉讼案于 1982 年 2 月 15 日开审, 由五位法官联合承审, 联邦法院院长敦苏菲安、大法官丹斯里拉查阿斯南沙、丹斯里阿都哈密奥玛法官、余锦成法官与丹斯里沙烈亚巴斯; 女皇律师迈克贝洛夫仍然是独大代表律师。

贝洛夫律师在其上诉词中指出, 法庭在恰当的情况下, 可以检讨元首关于设立大学所行使的裁决权, 这是因为最高元首事实上是代表政府行事。

《联邦宪法》第 40 节说明, 在《宪法》或联邦法律下, 最高元首应须依据内阁或一名部长的指示行使他的权力。他也指出, 在《1971 年大学与大专院校法令》下给予最高元首的权力, 并允许法院检讨最高元首的决定。

贝洛夫律师坚决认为, 法官拒绝批准创办独大是错误的, 这是不合理的使用和滥用在《大专院校法令》下赋予最高元首的权力。独大代表律师说, 虽然法官正确的分析法庭在解释和执行《宪法》以及在法院检讨原则方面的任务, “可是他在负起这个任务时的表现及它的引用一些原则施予本案的事实时, 犯上错误……在我们的陈词中, 已充分证实他们提出的有关宪法条文是无效的。” (14)

律师也提出说, 法官亦进一步作出对政府有利的裁决, 在其判词中有意忽视前教育部长 (政府当局的唯一证人) 所作出的一些清楚的证词, 这一段证词违反法官本身的判决理由。 (15)

贝洛夫律师继续说, 法官在对此案重要的法律论点所提出解释理由, 根本没有触及诉方的陈词, 指政府拒准独大是违反《宪法》、不合理、不公平及非法滥用行政权力。法庭接受政府拒准独大的第一个理由, 即华文将是唯一的教学媒介语, 就是一个大错, 因为很明显的这是违反了《宪法》第 152 条, 该条款允许使用 (除官方用途外)、教导和学习其他语文。

贝洛夫律师接着告诉联邦法院说, 只有在一些特别规定和限定的领域里, 如政府部门, 国语才是唯一准予使用的语文, 在理论上, 《宪法》152 条的“官方用途”这个词句的含义可以进一步加广, 使它超越传统的官方范围的含义, 然而政府却没有这样做, 反而给予一般狭窄的意义。

政府可以积极的去促进国语的使用, 只要它在进行时, 在官方范围以外, 不压制其他少数民族语文。贝洛夫律师也告诉法庭说, 诉方不能接受的是指少数民族的权利不能损及多数民族的权利而获得保障。他说:

“实际上，只有在这些少数民族的权利获得保障的情况下，才会导致社会和谐与安宁……诉方的诉讼并非是针对马来同胞或其他种族，而是起诉马来西亚政府，因为他违反《宪法》。”(16)

一种语文的使用权利如果不包括被应用为教学媒介语，那么，这个语文的权利的价值已大大被剥夺了。女皇律师也指出说，法官坚持指一所大学是立法机构，行使联邦法令下赋予公共机构的权力，然而，倡议中的大学将只采用华文为主要教学媒介语，而不会在官方用途上使用华文。因此，有关大学不能被列为公共机构。

公共机构是行使政府权力的机关，但不是所有在国会立法中设立的机构都具有公共的因素。教育领域里的公共机构应该是教育部和教育服务理事会，因为他们行使政府的权力，可是幼稚园、学校和工专学院却不能包括在内。

女皇律师因此陈词说，既然倡议中的大学并不是公共机构，那么联邦法院则不需要继续“斟酌”如何鉴别公共机构这个课题。显然的，一所大学并没有行使政府的权力，不是一个政府机关。

女皇律师贝洛夫律师指说，没有法律加以支持马来西亚教育制度规定国语为唯一的教学媒介语的政策。除非政府修改《宪法》，才能实施国家教育政策。否则推行这个政策有违《宪法》第 152 条，政府拒准创办独大的主要原因是，华文将是主要的教学媒介语，违反了国家教育政策，他陈词说，推行一个政策并非是修改基本法律的有效合法途径：

“即使有关政策是在民主方式下立定，它仍然需要符合法律程序。”(17)

此外，即使华文将是倡议中大学的主要媒介语而被认为是作为官方用途，政府也只有权力而非一定要阻止或禁止它，政府并非必须以该理由拒绝申请书。

贝洛夫律师亦表示说，高庭法官错误的指说，《宪法》第 8 条(该条文言明，法律之前人人平等)并不适用于语文问题上的歧视。他指出说，如果法官的判决是正确的，则政府可实施成文法律，规定不可创办独立学校或除非只采用马来西亚文为教学媒介语，才可继续生存下去。

他继续陈词说，《宪法》上的保证必须是免受政治变动和政府的怪思想所影响的，联邦法院应该设法避免导致该种保证受损的解释。(18)女皇律师也辩论说，《1971 年大学与大专院校法令》只是一种执照制度，以限制学院的权力来替代授权给予这些学院。

提及倡议中大学的可行性，贝洛夫律师说，政府的经济与社会政策是建立在华社在一定程度上控制着国家经济的前提下，可是在教育政策这方面，政府却颠倒事实，谓华社没有经济能力维持一所私立大学。

他继称，政府认为如果有关大学将来面对财政问题时，政府有义务利用公款来协助维持这所大学。这种说法是没有说服力的，很明显的，私立大学就是私立大学，正因为它和政府无关，而政府也不必负起财务方面的责任。一个很简单的解决方法就是政府可在批准创办大学申请之前，施加条件规定大学必须先取得令人满意的筹款额或其他类似条件。

独大代表律师迈克贝洛夫女皇律师在发表总结陈词时，呼吁联邦法院对关系到国语以及公民权利问题的《宪法》条文，作出



解释。他说，法庭也必须确定宪法——马来西亚法律与社会的基石——如何平衡我国各少数民族社会的各项利益，承审法官对《宪法》第 152 条与第 8 条作出“单纯简易”的解释，但却附加了有国家或公共利益的注解，法官忽略了《宪法》承认马来西亚是个不同种族组成的国家这个事实，他们有权利保护他们原有特征的因素，而这些是不应由政府来改变的。

贝洛夫律师亦批评高庭法官的观点，关于政府所持的理由，无论是单独性或集合起来，都可合理的拒绝独大的申请，这点是绝对不能接受的，否则法庭将使违反《宪法》的决定合法化。

#### 9.4 联邦法院的判决

联邦法院院长敦苏菲安法官说，这宗上诉案是举国关注的重要案件，也是联邦法院第一次审理关系到语文问题和大学的案件。

检察总长坚持说，《宪法》允许在种族族群交流上使用其他语文，但不可在教育学府里作为教学媒介语，这是因为《宪法》规定要通过共同语文来团结国民，他把《宪法》第 152 条形容为“一个授予政府的付托，以确保马来文是永久性的，直至最终它成为全国通用的语文。”（19）

检察总长也陈词说，政府拒绝批准创办独大的申请，并没有歧视独大赞助人的意思，而是要避免歧视现象出现。他说批准独大的设立，则意味着给予华文独立中学学生特权，使其他学校学生蒙受损失。

贝洛夫律师作最后陈词答复检察总长时批评说，对一个像他

一样在西方传统下长大的人来说，指一所私立大学的创办会对政府国库带来威胁的说法是令人难以置信的事，何况是对和平带来威胁。

“我们（诉方）都很清楚，也不反对国语最终将成为政府各级行政部门、各级民选议会，以及各级法庭和仲裁庭使用的唯一语文，而英文所扮演的角色最后将慢慢消失。”（20）

独大代表律师接着说，总检察司宣称，如果独大的上诉获胜，将是华文取代马来文为国语的第一步骤，这是一项令人感到惊奇的看法，律师说，当政府选择忽视少数民族的权利时，法庭有特权和义务作为宪法的监护者。

联邦法院保留判词达四个月之久，直至 1982 年 7 月 6 日才宣判独大败诉，联邦法院五司以四比一的大多数决定，驳回独大案的上诉，并须负责堂费。有关四司的判词由联邦法院院长敦苏菲安法官宣读，唯一持有不同判词的是东马余锦成法官。

敦苏菲安法官深表遗憾的说，非常不幸的，目前有一种广泛的趋势，有很多人，不只是华人都以需求创办教育学府这个课题，作为赢取选民支持的运动之一。

敦苏菲安法官提醒大家莫忘记马来西亚教育的史实，允许设立各源流学校所带来的分裂后果，邻国私立大学的处境以及我国国会决心管制学校和大学，作为团结国家的工具，因此法庭别无选择地判决：独大倘若创设，它将是《宪法》第 160 条第（2）项所指的一间公共机构。

在法律上，政府不能禁止或阻止独大教授华文及开办课程让学生学习华文，但是如果它是公共机构，政府就有权禁止它采用



华文为唯一或主要的媒介语，因为在大学教导华文，将是使用该种语文作为官方用途，这点受到《宪法》152 条所禁止，联邦法院因此赞同高庭的判决，独大将是公共机构。一所大学是履行联邦法律所赋予的权力的法定机构，因此它是公共机构。

相反的，唯一持有异议判词的余锦成法官说，《宪法》152 条 (1) (a) 所保证的宪法特权应该给予一个不受约束的解释，不应该有削弱它的意图。(21) 他说上述解释看来并没有为承审法官的见解提供证据。就是“使用”应局限于在有关种族和语文内作为一种表达或通讯媒介。

“我认为，“使用”并不意味着“讲话”，给予这个字眼订下如此狭隘和人为的解释是错误的。何况《宪法》152 条 (1) (a) 的唯一限制只是局限在官方用途上使用其他语文……。”(22)

他说，根据《宪法》152 条 (6)，“官方用途”是指联邦或州政府的所有用途，包括一个公共机构。

余锦成法官不同意联邦法院院长的观点指《宪法》160 条 (2) 里“一个公共机构”的关键字眼必须是“机构”，他说：

“我以最崇高的敬意表明我不同意这个见解，因为不是每个法定机构都是公共机构……只是一个运用联邦或州法律赋予的权力的法定机构，才符合一个公共机构的定义。”(23)

法官认为，“权力”一词应局限于政府或半政府权力。因此，独大倘若设立，将不是一个公共机构，而该大学建议采用华文为教学媒介语将不是作为官方用途。因此他说：

“这种作法是符合宪法的，是受到《联邦宪法》第 152 条 (1) (a)

的保护及保证的。”(24)

独持异议法官说他深受马来西亚和婆罗洲的联邦法院和高庭不被列入《宪法》160 条 (2) 下公共机构的解释的影响，他说：

“我认为，就如联邦法院和高庭一样，一所在《1971 年大学与大专院校法令》下创设的大学，是一所高等教育学府，不应成为政府的工具，尤其是大马的《宪法》是根据国会民主下塑造的威斯敏斯特样式 (Westminster type) 的宪法，情况就更应该是这样。”(25)

余法官说，现代化大学的活动包含更广范的领域而不纯粹是教导，如果拥有足够的资金，它们可依据工业、经济及文化领域的需求，展开对公众国家有重大价值的研究或试验工作，有鉴于此，余法官批准上诉及判政府负责堂费。

随着联邦法院的判决，总检察司成功向联邦法院申请得一份证书，指定独大案宣告审结。法庭是在《审讯法令》第 74 条 (4) 下，接受总检察司的申请，法庭决定驳回独大有限公司的申诉，因它涉及《宪法》问题，所以不能向枢密院提出上诉。

独大代表律师针对总检察司申请庭令的程序作出抗辩说，这项申请在程序上是错误的，应予以拒绝。他说：总检察司应该在独大有限公司正式向最高元首和枢密院提出上诉时，才向法庭申请审结证书，在任何情况下，都必须以书面提出申请，而不可以口头方式申请。

检察总长反驳说，这样的程序根本是没有作用的，因它完全是依赖宪法条款的诠释，法庭在批准发出审结证书之同时亦拒绝独大有限公司申请，要求将此问题展延一个月才处理，以便独大能向枢密院提出上诉。

## 第十章 八十年代的华校

八十年代初期，华文教育的发展更是荆棘满途。在诸多华校事中，独立大学并非是唯一的问题，但是，独大的法律诉讼案却是最引人关注的。政府的新政策和指示导致争论层出不穷。

### 10.1 八十年代初期的争论

1980年，教育部宣布在全国各华小实行“三M”制度。在这个制度下，华文小学除了华文科与算术课本为中文以外，其他科目都以马来文为主。

这项宣布在华人社会引起了一阵大骚动，他们认为政府正企图使华小变质。董教总、华社团体及反对党都提出强烈的抗议。次年，一份拥有四项基本要求的备忘录遂向教育部提呈：(1)

- (一) 除了国文及英文，所有教学与参考资料都必须使用华文书写。
- (二) 除了马来文与英文，其他科目的授课媒介语与考试都必须用华文。
- (三) 道德教育与音乐科目必须反映华人文化特色。
- (四) 增加英文的授课时间。

首相于是向华社保证，政府无意使华小变质，并表示教育部

将纠正有关的偏差。问题因此暂告解决。

1982年，董教总提呈一份有关文化教育备忘录，呼吁政府在吉隆坡大蓝图计划下，增建华文小学以供需求。(2)在1980年至1985年期间，全国接受津贴的各源流小学的入学人数、学校间数及教师人数可参阅表九。

表(九)：1980至1985年全国接受津贴小学入学人数、学校间数及教师人数

源流	1980			1985		
	学校	教师	学生	学校	教师	学生
国小	4,519	51,973	1,353,319	4,756	65,142	1,530,793
华小	1,312	18,131	581,696	1,286	21,623	585,082
淡小	583	3,560	73,958	555	4,333	76,653
总数	6,414	73,664	2,008,973	6,597	91,098	2,192,528

备注：国小 -- 国民小学（马来文媒介）

华小 -- 国民型华文小学

印小 -- 国民型淡米尔文小学

资料来源：《Educational Statistics of Malaysia, 1980-1985》，教育部，吉隆坡，1986年，表1.4，2.1

在政府的文化政策疑虑下，全国十五华团（包括董教总）于1983年针对国家文化问题再向文青体部提呈备忘录，希望政府公平对待非马来人的文化。(3)备忘录的内容是有关华文教育的宣言和一些特定的要求。（见附录一）

同年，董教总举办了一项重要的研讨会，作为检讨及调查独中过去十年来的进展。这份独中调查报告提供了确实的资料，作为未来发展独中的指导原则及参考。

为了收集国内外有关教学与教育发展的资料，教总设立了教育研究中心。同时，全国独中工作委员会也设立了小组委员会研究师资训练问题。独大有限公司则决定成立一个高等教育升学辅导处，为独中毕业生提供升学咨询服务。

有关发展独中的筹款运动在 1984 年大规模的展开。这项发展活动包括：统一考试、编辑课本、出版学生刊物、收集资料、师资训练计划及奖贷学金等。

同年，另一项具争论性的事件爆发。吉隆坡直辖区教育局发出通告给所有华小，命令他们在学校集会及其他活动上都必须用国语。

这项宣布引起了学校董事部、教师及其他团体立刻召开紧急会议并且提呈备忘录抗议。《备忘录》重中国民型小学的特质，包括教学媒介语、教材、考试媒介及行政上的语言都必须受到保护。(4)

教总副主席陆庭谕先生甚至在教育部办事处外静坐以示抗议。他的行动获得广大华社的支持。教育部最终收回这项通告。

但事情似乎不因此而了结。教育总监再另外发出一项通告，规定所有学校在文化活动方面，必须反映国家文化政策所列出的原则。文告指出，学校活动将不允许着重外国文化。

更不幸的是，所有被列为“马来西亚人”的文化项目都是属于马来人的。马六甲一间学校的华文学会被禁止出版他们的刊物。这无疑使到人们反对政府的国家文化政策情绪火上加油。

有如较早的一些计划，政府在未征询华小及淡米尔小学有关

方面的意见之下，于 1985 年宣布推行“综合学校”计划。(5)

此项计划甚至没有给予明确的概念，解释也产生矛盾。比如：一名副部长表示音乐课将列入综合学校制度下的其中一个项目，而经验告诉我们，具争论性的“三 M”制度下，非马来文的材料问题已被忽略了。

柔佛哥打丁宜直落胜益(TelukSengat)的其中一间华小在这个计划中被选为模范学校。在这个计划下，三间不同源流小学共用一个校园，而该间马来学校也只拥有马来图书的图书馆、只卖马来人的食物、煮食者必须是回教徒等。经过一番的强烈抗议后，当局终于取消几项不合理的规定。

针对综合学校计划所展开的广泛抗议行动，已经成功地改变有关计划，使它符合华教界所提的要求和建议。

除了修改名称，其他如委员会代表、各别学校的主权、课外活动的形式、自由选用媒介语、咨询、自由参与、行政自主等都被接受。

1986 年 6 月全国大选，华小与淡米尔小学的问题又被提出。同年五月廿四日董教总呼吁，若政府无意改变母语学校的特质，具争论性的教育法令第 21 条(2)应删除。教总主席沈慕羽比喻，这条法令像一条“套在颈项的绳索”。(6)

在这之前，马华公会总会长陈群川曾表示，有关的法令将在下一期即七月的国会会议上被修改。民主行动党秘书长林吉祥形容陈的宣布是令人失望和不满的。他促请马华解释为何不能删除教育法令第 21 条(2)。(7)

执政党国民阵线(国阵)在它的 1986 年的竞选宣言中,允诺提供公平的教育机会及保证华印小学的生存。然而,教育法令第 21 条(2) 完全未被提到。

1987 年 6 月 5 日,西马马来教师公会透露,教育部长安华依不拉欣并无意删除《1961 年教育法令》第 21 条(2)。(8)

## 10.2 1987 年 10 月大逮捕事件

政府在 1987 年 9 月所发出的不必要的指令,在两个星期内“情绪性的争论使执政的国阵成员党之间呈现种族紧张关系。”(9)它导致马哈迪政府引用《内部安全法令》大量逮捕持不同意见者。除了四位华教人士(包括本书作者)之外,国会反对党领袖、教会工作者、社会工作者及学者都遭受未经审讯的逮捕和扣留。

华教人士林晃升(董总)、沈慕羽、庄迪君博士(教总)及本书作者都被控以煽动种族情绪及威胁国家安全罪名。(10)从有关华校的许多不必要的争论中,可以看出谁真正应该对有关的事件负起责任。

调派不谙华文的校长与老师前往华小事件在华社中开始引起争论。由于担心不懂华文的老师会影响教学素质及不懂华语的校长与助理会影响学校的行政,家长们因此群起反对。(11)

副教长针对此事件表示不会撤除他们的职位,但可尝试将他们调往其他学校。董教总遂于 9 月 14 日联合派代表谒见教育部副部长云时进先生。

10 月 1 日,教育部宣布这些不谙华文的校长与助理职位将会

给予保留六个月作为试验期。这项宣布再度引起华社的不满。与此同时,马华公会也促请当局重新考虑这项决定,以保证华小不变质。(12)

拿督林良实医生指控,这项调职事件是由一小撮无视于马来西亚种族敏感性的分子搞出来的。(13)他说,这已经与国阵竞选宣言背道而驰。

10 月 4 日,教育部长安华宣布,擢升非受华文教育校长与助理的立场不变,声言决不会向“政治压力”低头。

同一天,董教总和数个团体在雪兰莪中华大会堂召开大会,议决假如问题未在十四天内解决,教师与家长将展开一项抵制行动。类似紧急大会也在全国各地展开。在马六甲,马华公会、民政党、行动党与华社团体领袖都出席大集会,抗议政府的不妥协。与此同时,教总陆庭谕老师也在这项行动中落发,以示抗议到底。(14)

董教总于 10 月 6 日向教长提呈备忘录,批评教育部对华小事件的处理方式,并重申反对行动是针对调升问题,绝对不含种族色彩。

“只要是华文合格的老师,不管他或她是来自哪一个种族,我们都会接受。”(15)

10 月 8 日,由全国十五华团(包括董教总)、马华公会、民政党及民主行动党组成的联合行动委员会,在雪兰莪中华大会堂一项紧急会议中成立,准备迅速采取必要的行动解决问题。

10 月 11 日,星期天,所有华团包括华校、马华公会、民政

党及民主行动党领袖，都出席了在吉隆坡天后宫举行的抗议大集会。人社党及社民党也派代表参加（后者后来澄清，该党只是以观察者的身分参与大会）。

会上，所有党团誓言团结一致，声言假如未在 10 月 14 日之前彻底解决华小教师擢升问题，有关学校决展开三天罢课行动。大会也通过以下议决案：(16)

- (一) 反对所有企图使华小变质的政策。
- (二) 支持华团向教育部提呈的备忘录。
- (三) 呼吁党团作好准备，随时响应联合行动委员会全国性抗议行动的号召。
- (四) 呼吁联合行动委员会密切关注教育部正在进行修改《1961 年教育法令》的动向。

马华公会副会长云时进也在会上声言，如果华小高职事件不能解决，他将辞去教育部副部长一职。马六甲巫统领袖拿督斯里阿都拉欣则警告，华小事件将使种族两极化更趋恶化及种族情绪呈现紧张。(17)

另一方面，马来社会也通过马来报章，针对此事大赞教育部长立场坚定。在北海的巫统区部召集了五百多名党员展开示威，谴责马华公会公然反政府。他们甚至指责有颠覆分子参与抗议行动及有人企图使华文成为官方语文。(18)

国会反对党领袖林吉祥在 10 月 12 日的国会提出紧急动议，讨论不具华文资格教师被调升至华小的问题。由于动议被认为符合议会常规，即是：它是一项“特定问题，与公众人士有关及紧急”，他的申请立即获得下议院议长批准，这是相当罕见的。(19)

罢课前夕，教育部副部长重申马华公会是绝对支持华社的，但他劝请华社不要罢课，因他有信心在年底之前解决这个问题。马华公会副秘书长陈祖排博士也在国会提出他的立场，表示希望在年尾前能够找出解决方案。(20) 同样的，民政党主席拿督林敬益医生表示应多给教育部一点时间。

随着五人内阁小组委员会成立，以便适当地安排被调升的教师之后，罢课行动在最后一分钟宣布无限期展延。然而，在槟城的三千名华教人士票决继续罢课，以维护廿八所受影响的小。

民主行动党由于不满取消罢课行动，决定退出联合行动委员会。该党秘书长林吉祥形容，成立内阁小组委员会是“荒谬的”。

他说：“实际上要解决的是：不谙华文的老师是否有资格当华小的行政人员；而部长本身是决策人，却变成解决这个事件的行政者。与其说是解决问题，其实他们是将事情复杂化了。”

虽然联合行动委员会已宣布取消罢课，可是当天仍有三万名学生未到校上课。

尽管罢课已经取消，文青体部长拿督斯里那吉也已被委为内阁小组委员会的成员，巫统仍依原定计划，在 10 月 18 日进行大规模的示威，以向华社展示他们的感受。内政部表示当天的紧张局势是可想而知的，可是当局竟没有阻止巫青团的大集会。

10 月 16 日，全国十五华团联合发表文告呼吁巫青团取消大集会，因华社的抗议行动是旨在维护华校不变质，绝非侵犯他族的权利。行动党秘书长林吉祥促请副首相嘉化阻止巫青团集会，以免破坏我国的种族和谐与团结气氛。

他说：“政府若委任具有华文资格的非华人任华小高职，行动党第一个支持，以证明华社的抗议行动是非种族性的。”(22)

巫青最终还是展开大集会。极具煽动性的演说及“五一三事件将重演”、“把剑浸在华人的血液中”等布条在会场飘扬。(23)国内多个团体纷纷呼吁政府对巫青团的煽动性行为采取行动，可是当局无动于衷。

教育部长安华依不拉欣在10月19日声明，当局擢升不具华文资格教师的决定将不改变。他不认为内阁小组委员会能够拒绝教育部的决定。他也警告华小校长及行政人员，若持续罢课将受到严厉对付。

当马哈迪政府在1987年10月27日展开“茅草行动”，扣捕了上百名与他意见相左的人士后，这项争论性的课题顿失去意义。国内三家报馆也在这项茅草行动中被关闭。官方归咎这次危机是维护华小抗议行动所引起的。而多个国际团体如大赦国际(Amnesty International)则有比较客观的看法：

“无论如何，观察家的评论显示，在数项危机中，那些被扣留的人士并未激起种族或宗教的紧张情绪，反而是国阵政府的决策人及同僚为了本身的利益，使到长久以来在大马社会中的政治及种族紧张情绪恶化。”(24)

马来西亚第一任首相东姑阿都拉曼更一针见血的指出此次危机的根源。他说：“巫统面对分裂，首相马哈迪医生被指在党改选中用手段拉票，结果险胜对手东姑拉沙里。这种不合常规的事件被巫统党员带上法庭，假如判决对他不利，他将下台。在这种情况下，他只有找出一条摆脱困境的途迳。国家危机于是被制造出来，以团结巫统党员的力量来对抗一个假想的敌人——华

人。假如它真的能够威胁国家的安全，那他为何不早点采取行动呢？”(25)

全国笼罩在《内部安全法令》的阴影下：比较敢言的报章被封闭，杰出的评论家被扣捕，华小事件被搁置，不过，它最终在当局同意将华小所有重要职位保留给具华文资格者的情况下解决。

虽然《1961年教育法令》在八十年代中期已提出来修改，可是步入九十年代的今天，前景看来似乎一片黑暗。

## 第十一章 总结：九十年代的挑战

在马来西亚,华人的总人口有 500 多万人<sup>(1)</sup>,目前有 1,200 多所受津贴的华文小学、60 所民办的华文独立中学及有教授华文科目的两所民办高等学院。不过,如果我们把马来西亚华文教育的现状同 1957 年独立时的状况比较一番,我们显然没有取得很大的进展。

表(十): 1957 年至 1997 年马来西亚华文教育系统

年份/人口/学校类型	华人人口	华文小学	华文中学
1957	2,300,000	1,342	86
1997	5,263,000	1,281	60

注: \* 1957 年的数字仅涉及马来西亚半岛。

资料来源: Saw Swee Hock,《马来西亚的人口结构》,新加坡 SUP1988 年: 50;《马来西亚教育数据》,1938 年至 1967 年,教育部、语文出版局 1968 年,表 24 至 27;《星洲日报》,1996 年 11 月 25 日

在独立当年,规模完整的中文大学南洋大学已在马来亚创办起来,它为华文中学毕业生开设学士课程。当时沙巴与砂劳越还不是马来亚联合邦的组成部分,半岛上的华人人口只有 230 万。<sup>(2)</sup>

在 1958 年,单单在半岛,共有八十六所间以华文为教学媒介的中学,其中 53 所是受政府津贴的华文中学,33 所为私立华文中学。<sup>(3)</sup>至于小学方面,共有 1,342 所华文小学,其中 943 所是受津贴者,而 399 所则是私立的。<sup>(4)</sup>

华文教育已在马来西亚存在了一百多年。在国家独立四十年后的今天,马来西亚的华文教育是值得我们检讨一番的。

### 11.1 社会的坚决支持

自 19 世纪华文学校创办以来,它们就一直获得超越政党的社会支持。这种支持是确保华校生存到今天的极为重要的因素。尽管政府颁布了两项法令条款,即《1961 年教育法令》第 21 条第 2 款和第 26 条 A,华校始终生存了下来。这两项法令条款直接威胁着华文小学和淡米尔文小学的生存。<sup>(5)</sup>

新颁布的《1996 年教育法令》对国内华文学校的发展是毫无裨益的。我们将在下文仔细地讲述这个问题。归根到底,是社会的赞助和社会上维护母语教育的政治意志确保华校生存下来的。这种社会支持由 1,281 所华文小学、60 所华文中学、两所高等学院和董总及教总的秘书处以及其他文化团体的存在体现出来。

董总秘书处目前约有职员 116 人,教总则有 30 人。董总与教总大概是马来西亚最大的两个民间团体。这两个团体编订课程,编纂教科书和为华文独立中学毕业考试出试题。这项“统一考试”目前受承认为进入世界各地大学的充分资格。董总 1997 年预算总额超过 600 万马元。<sup>(6)</sup>

华人社会年复一年地为国民教育预算捐献补助金,总额不容易算出来,但是想一想华校数量之多和华校存在之久,便知道其数额是以马币 10 亿元计的。

由于整个社会给以超越政党的坚决支持,马来西亚华人的母语教育得以保持下来。常常有人说,马来西亚的华文教育是很难



“超越政治”的，但是众所周知，它是超越党派政治的。纵观马来西亚历史，各政党吃尽了苦头才认识到，同维护母语教育的势力作对是愚蠢的。

华人社会除了以出钱赞助来表示对母语教育的支持以外，每当母语教育受到威胁时，总是随时加以捍卫的。华文教育史穿插着不少关于人们为捍卫母语教育而牺牲甚至抛头颅洒热血的事迹，正如在日治时期所见的一样。著名教育家林连玉有一句经常被引述的名言，很好地概括了这种不屈不挠的精神；这句名言是：

“对付破坏的最好答复就是建设。” (7)

因此，只要社会继续给予支持，马来西亚华文教育的前景将是光明的。

## 11.2 学校董事会和教师会的关键角色

要不是学校董事会和教师会在筹款和资助学校方面扮演了决定性角色，马来西亚的华校是不会生存到今天的。在反对《1961年教育法令》的行动中、在1972年修订这项法令的事件中、在1987年华小高职事件以及《1995年教育法案》事件中，这些机构对华校的重要性，便突显了出来。

这些年来，华校董事会以及前国民型中学董事会，在筹款和对学校的一般监督方面，始终扮演着重要的角色。

虽然如此，新颁布的《1996年教育法令》有多项条款并没有保证学校董事会的存在，而最终将依赖社会上的政治意志来维护董事会的合法存在。

不久以前，华校的另外一个重要组织，即华校校友会，成立了联合会。这必将又是一个有助于华文学校的发展的重要机构。(8)

## 11.3 受母语教育是人人享有的人权

近年来，我们看到，由于中国的经济地位日益提高，华语因而越来越“有市场”。无论如何，由于马来西亚华人社会长久地体会到必须维持自己的母语教育，所以从十九世纪以来，马来西亚华文教育运动持续不断。在维护母语教育权利的过程中，华文教育运动始终以世界人权作为斗争的根据。

许多国际大会和公约都承认，母语教育是一项民族权利，例如：(9)

- 《1948年世界人权宣言》；
- 1951年联合国教育科学及文化组织关于在教育中使用本族语 (vernacular) 的会议；
- 《1966年关于公民权利与政治权利的国际公约》；
- 《1966年关于经济、社会及文化权利的国际公约》；
- 《1979年关于防止歧视和保护少数民族问题的小组委员会特别报告》；
- 1982年（墨西哥市）文化政策世界大会；
- 《1996年（巴塞罗那）语言权利世界宣言》。

这些大会和公约提供了全世界（包括马来西亚在内）少数民族母语教育的道义基础。



#### 11.4 承认新时代的多元文化特征

当我们阅读这些国际公约以及有远见的国家的文化政策文件时，清楚地看到了多元文化主义的支配地位。新时代有希望获得国际社会重视教育中及其他社会政策中的多元文化主义。

现代技术社会在全球的广泛冲击，已促使各民族珍惜自己的根和文化价值。我们可以从诸如美国黑人、爱尔兰人、威尔士人、苏格兰人、加拿大法裔、澳洲土著等民族最近展开的运动中，看到这种趋势。

母语是实现我们寻根这一重要的精神历程的工具，也是求取知识的最适当的教学媒介。

因此，在今日的世界里，同化政策显然已是行不通的。首相马哈迪医生最近接受《时代》周刊的访问时，似乎也得出同样的结论。(10)

“《时代》周刊：您最近说过，各种同化种族的方法并不奏效，现在是改弦易辙的时候了。

“马哈迪：以前的想法是，为了要成为马来西亚人，人民就该成为百分之百的马来人。我们现在承认，这是一个多元种族的国家。我们应该把桥搭起来，而不是想办法把我们之间的障碍完全拆除掉。我们无意要全体华人皈依伊斯兰；我们也告诉我们的穆斯林同胞，‘你们不要想办法强迫人民改变信仰’。”

令人遗憾的是，新教育法令并没有反映这种开明的多元文化主义。

#### 11.5 《1996 年教育法令》所产生的问题

自从 1961 年教育法令通过以来，政府的教育政策便对马来西亚非马来人的母语教育构成最大的威胁。从六十年代直至九十年代，马来西亚华文教育界和各派政党不断要求撤销不合理的第 21 条(2) 和第 26 条 A。

在 1979 年，以当时教育部长马哈迪医生为主席的内阁检讨委员会，在受委任五年后终于提呈教育报告书。这份报告书更建议严厉管制和监督私立学校和由这些学校举办的考试。然而，新的教育法案尽管从八十年代中期便开始起草，却直到 1990 年才拟定。

当 1990 年大选即将来临之际，这份新的 1990 年教育法案已拟妥，随时可提交国会讨论。然而，这份法案因为不利于少数民族母语教育的发展，所以令少数民族大失所望。

董教总提出抗议，并向当局提呈一份详尽的备忘录，其中包括逐条逐款提出的新建议。到头来，在大选即将来临之际，由于人民的情绪对国阵政府不利，这项法案便被收回去了。

这项教育法案搁置了五年。在 1995 年大选的竞选期间，各个执政党在大众媒介上以种种言论保证，它们将提出一份不包含受人非议的条款的新教育法令。由于作出这些保证，以及当时经济形势一片大好，国民阵线联盟因而获得大胜。

那一年还没有过去，又有一份新的教育法案提交到国会下议院。这份法案的内容当时秘而不宣，连政府内的华基政党也不愿透露其内容，因为担心被援引官方机密法令控告。当这项法案终于提出来的时候，原来它基本上是与上一份《1990 年教育法案》

相似的。

在 1995 年 12 月，七大华团向教育部提呈一份关于《1995 年教育法案》的备忘录，通过备忘录表示了它们以下的疑虑：(11)

(一) 新法令没有捍卫非马来人的母语教育，它是不如《1957 年教育法令》的。《1957 年教育法令》在使马来语成为国语的同时，曾努力维护“国内非马来人的语言文化的发展”。另一方面，“国民教育制度”的新定义只强调马来语是“教学、全国课程及共同考试的主要媒介语”。(12) 根据新的教育法令，母语教育不再是本国非马来人的“权利”，而只是在教育部长的训示下存在而已。

(二) 国民型华文学校和国民型淡米尔文学校的地位不明确，因为第 17 条阐明：“国语将是国民教育制度中所有教育机构的主要教学媒介语，惟有根据第 28 条开办的国民型学校或其他凡是获得教育部长豁免而不受这一条款约束的教育机构例外。”

现在第 28 条阐明：“根据本法令的条款，教育部长可开办国民学校和国民型学校，并将维持这类学校。”

这样给“国民型”学校下定义，使人对于没有根据《1996 年教育法令》第 28 条开办的国民型学校产生了疑问，也就是说，对现存的所有国民型学校产生了疑问。

(一) 法令赋予教育部长超越司法权限的权力，他可以撤销教育机构和教师的注册，可以解散董事会以及干涉教育机构之间的联系。他的决定在法院里不容质疑。他还有权力制定同国民型小学和华文独立中学有关的条例。(第 58 条至第 62

条；第 67 条至第 69 条；第 75 条至第 77 条；第 85 条；第 126 条)

(四) 更重要的是，除非我们得到教育部长的豁免，否则我们将不再享有从殖民地时代以来即享有的自由。根据新教育法令第 67 条和第 77 条，除非教育部长按照新法令第 143 条准予豁免，否则马来西亚华文独立中学(华文独中)不能举行自己的统一考试，也不能同统一考试主办机构马来西亚华校董事联合会总会(董总)有所联系。凡违反上述条例者可能被罚以巨款或被监禁或两者兼施……

(五) 注册总监有权给教育机构及其董事和雇员注册和撤销注册；他的权力广泛得可以听任自己诠释(第 79 条、第 84 条、第 100 条、第 114 条)。此外，采取法律程序去调查一项为了反对注册总监所作决定而提出的上诉，是违反一般证据法规和法律条例的(第 127 条至第 129 条)。注册总监目前有权力在没有许可证的情况下，擅自进入学校场地，而《1961 年教育法令》是没有赋予这种权力的。这种权力与其说是和目前的马来西亚状况相适应的，倒不如说是和五十年代“紧急”状态相适应的。

《1961 年教育法令》只规定罚款为数百元马币，而新的《1996 年教育法令》所规定的罚款却以马币万元计，所规定的徒刑为一年、两年及五年不等。

## 11.6 接受母语教育的权利必须恢复

有人拿马来西亚城市里一团糟的交通系统同教育政策的施行相比拟：交通灯好比我们的教育法令，交通警察则好比“慈悲”

的教育部长；在红绿灯暂时失效的时候，这位交通警察挥手叫车辆开行。

可是，当可能不是那么“慈悲”的新教育部长上任的时候，情况会怎么样呢？

大家都明白，为了纠正马来西亚少数民族母语教育所受到的不公平对待，新教育法令必须修正。《联邦宪法》第 152 条赋予我们的母语教育权利必须恢复，必须在修订过的教育法令中得到反映。惟有这样，我们的母语教育体系才会开花结果，欣欣向荣。

尽管联邦法院对独立大学案件作出那样的判决，但是印度前任检察总长索利·J. 索腊济的以下这个主张以宪法原有的精神来诠释宪法的要求，是值得马来西亚人注意的：(13)

“一份最宽宏大量的权利法案可以因司法上偏狭和冷漠的诠释而变为一张羊皮纸字据。一份宪法是否有成效有赖于履行宪法的人士如何执行和诠释，甚至经过谨小慎微地起草的宪法亦是如此。如果起草宪法的人是有远见和正直诚实的人，那么他们将能够充分利用有纰漏的宪法。如果他们缺乏远见及真诚，那么是没有宪法可以援助这个国家的。

“一个稳妥可靠的原则是，决不以偏狭的观念而以宽大的胸襟来理解宪法条款，以便对变化着的形势有所预见和估计，因而宪法条文不会变得无效或僵化却依然灵活得足以应付新出现的问题和挑战。

“如果把‘权利法案’看作一个国家赋予她的公民的礼物，那是一种谬误。正因为个人是人类的一分子，所以个人早就拥有基本人权，并不拜任何宪法之赐。‘权利法案’并不‘授予’基

本人权。它确认了人权的存在并予以保护。

“因此，对一份‘权利法案’应给以豁达且有目的的诠释，避免所谓‘墨守法规’，切记‘字面意义会害人，而精神实质会救人’。法院诠释宪法，不应该死扣字面意义，而应该着眼于将使公民能够享受宪法所保证的权利，并且应该达到最详尽的限度。”

### 11.7 改革马来西亚华文独立中学：推行“素质教育”

正当二十一世纪即将来临的时候，马来西亚的华文独立中学已着手进行改革。领导独中发展的董教总，已倡议在独中推行“素质教育”。(14)

全球化的世界正在致力于提高教育的素质，目的在于训练我们的儿女应付未来的新挑战；新的教育以儿童为中心，采用均衡的课程，提供多方面的训练，并促进学生的全面成长，使学生既懂科技，又有人文科学和艺术的知识。

年复一年，筹款活动已令学校当局和华人社会精疲力竭，而学校生活则注重考试。马来西亚华文独立中学有一种令人困扰的趋势，那就是学生并不只参加一种考试，却参加两种考试，即参加统一考试(统考)和政府初中鉴定考试(PMR)或马来西亚教育文凭考试(SPM)或高级教育文凭考试(STPM)。因此，在这一类独中里，学生上午(以中文)上统考课程，下午则(以马来文)上初中鉴定考试或马来西亚教育文凭考试的课程。对于过关的学生来说，这似乎是一种了不起的成就，可是就“素质教育”而言，代价尚待估量。

尽管人口的增加造成需求越来越大，政府却不允许新的华校建起来，因而目前所有华校都发生学生拥挤的严重问题。班级人数多，是妨碍素质教育的推行的主要障碍。在所有华校里，班级人数超过五十个人的现象，是司空见惯的。

华校还长期存在着师资荒的问题。这是政府不承认马来西亚华文独立中学毕业文凭和独中统考文凭作为进入师范学院资格所造成的。如果华文独中毕业生可以被录取而参加师范课程，那就对解决华文小学师资荒大有帮助。在 1996 年，教育部副部长透露，华文小学缺乏 2,500 至 3,000 名教师。(15)

马来西亚华文独中的重要改革包括改善教师的待遇和提高他们的士气，使教师能够全心全意献身于莘莘学子的健康成长。这项致力于使教师安于职守的投资，是董事会与华社除了照常筹募建校基金以外要面对的一项挑战。

## 后记

只要马来西亚华人充分重视母语教育，使母语教育不受教育法令的幽灵纠缠，不论在景气时期还是在景气时期，都支援学校，并在变迁着的时代接受改革的挑战，那么马来西亚华文教育的前景是美好的。

在迈入新的一千年之际，马来西亚华文教育界依然肩负着一项重要任务，那就是要求修改教育法令，使《1957 年教育法令》的精神得以恢复。

二十一世纪所讲求的教育质量是能造就可以应付未来的新技能和新需求的学生。这意味着教师、家长和学校董事会必须以新的态度看待专业水平的提高，并把给我们子女接受全人教育的事看作一项特殊的使命。

最后，我们不同的母语教育体系对我们社会的文化财产的贡献，必须得到现任政府的承认，就像我们多年来对我国人力的贡献一样。出身于马来西亚华校的马来西亚人，今日遍布于政治、经济、社会及文化领域。

承认这样的母语教育体系会过份吗？

## **Vernacular schools not the problem**

Wan Saiful Wan Jan

Tuesday, 27 Sep 2016

AMONG those opposing vernacular schools, you can detect one umbrella argument that is continuously used by many parties. They say that the existence of vernacular schools is a threat to national identity and a hindrance to unity. Their fear is that this student segregation will lead to a fracturing of our society.

I disagree with this view. I think they confuse the purpose of education and there is also a lot of hypocrisy going on.

Let us firstly look at the concept of schooling. Historically, the entity known as a school has its origin in Prussia in the early 1800s.

At that time, Prussians were looking at methods to produce citizens who would loyally work and fight for causes determined by their rulers. So they devised a system where, from a very young age, their citizens were trained to live a regimented life.

It did not matter what your abilities and interests were. As long as you were of the same age, you would be grouped together and forced to learn subjects determined by the elites.

Like the military, there was heavy emphasis on leadership by head teachers and teachers, while students were mere recipients of what was taught to them. That regimentation remains as the nature of modern schools.

After two centuries of bureaucratic evolution, schools these days are not about providing holistic education to support the child's individual growth anymore. Instead it is about producing cohorts of citizens who can be easily grouped and compartmentalised.

Every one of us who went through the modern school system has been compartmentalised into groups based on our exam results.

And that is also why it has become the norm for those in power to use the school as a tool for social engineering. From day one, since Prussian times, the purpose of a school has always been about social engineering. Yet the vast majority of people today confuse schools with education.

In reality, you can still get an education without going to what have become our traditional schools. Education can be obtained from home, or in informal groups that come together for what is today known as "home-schooling".

More interestingly, there is also a global interest in concepts such as unschooling, Sudbury schools, and democratic schools.

Those who oppose vernacular schools usually do not argue about the quality of education received by the students. They are not driven by the desire to catalyse social mobility by ensuring everyone has access to quality education. But they are driven by their desire to produce a society moulded in a way that they approve of.

The elites have a concept of what they feel society should be like and they want to use the Prussian factory-like model of schools to produce underlings who behave according to their pre-determined mould. To legitimise their mould, they label it as unity.

Note that their desire for unity has nothing to do with education. Their focus is on schooling. And this is where the hypocrisy creeps in.

Many of the people who want to promote their mould of unity have never attended any of our government schools. They don't even send their own kids to our schools.

They step into our schools perhaps for a few hours a year for hyped-up visits, yet they speak as if they really know. More amazingly, they speak as if they actually have faith in our school system when their actions show otherwise.

In reality, these elites campaign for something that will never affect them. When it comes to their own families, they send their children for a "better" education elsewhere.

They want to limit our choices on schools because they know that they can always pay their way out and send their own children to a school of their choice.

This is the tragedy of some of the privileged. Instead of looking for ways to make sure everyone can afford school choices like them, they want to kill choice for everyone who cannot afford to pay.

Let me pose a rhetorical question.

If unity can only be achieved by making students from different backgrounds come together in one school, then why do they just want to close vernacular schools?

To be specific, data shows that Chinese schools have higher ethnic diversity than other schools. I can think of many non-Chinese schools that are completely mono-ethnic. If we are objective, it is not the Chinese schools that need to be closed down.

This is why I say that there is a lot of hypocrisy in the debate. Worse, that hypocrisy is clouded by confusion about whether we want to educate or we just want to have factory-like schooling.

The vernacular school debate is a debate of the elite. For us common people, our sole desire is to be able to provide our kids with quality education.

It is possible to provide school choices for the commoners, such as by using school vouchers so that choice is provided but schools are still free for the students.

Of course, it will take time to move towards this choice-based system. Until we get there, I beg the elites to stop trying to kill what few choices remain for us poorer citizens of this country.

Wan Saiful Wan Jan is chief executive of the Institute for Democracy and Economic Affairs ([www.ideas.org.my](http://www.ideas.org.my)). The views expressed here are entirely the writer's own.

Retrieved from:

<https://www.thestar.com.my/opinion/columnists/thinking-liberally/2016/09/27/vernacular-schools-not-the-problem-please-keep-element-of-choice-for-both-parents-and-students/#pIY17BRSGzHcKFUx.99>

## **Vernacular schools and national unity**

Syed Saddiq Syed Abdul Rahman

16 Apr 2016

I was [once racist](#) , a by-product of a system which celebrates the segregation of race during one's formative years. I lived in my own echo chamber, free from the liberating influence of racial diversity.

This radically changed when I enrolled myself into the Royal Military College, Malaysia's most diverse boarding school.

Division is a seed best planted in earliest years. After the turn of the millennium, it was reported that more than 25 percent of Malaysian students are enrolled into vernacular schools. These schools were part of a system that allows parents to decide that race defines their children's education.

In a country where racial segregation happens in numerous levels, vernacular schools have become dearly held and gleefully internalised. Granted, racial unity is not only formed in school; however, it plays a critical role in the formation of one's identity and beliefs. Often social circles are created at schools, if for no other reason than the sheer amount of time spent there.

The more diverse schools are, the more likely that these social circles will reflect that diversity.

One reason some people believe we should not oppose vernacular schools is because they perform well. I find this argument problematic in that it presumes the teaching of particular languages and cultures lead to a superior level of thinking.

Does this also mean that all the UiTM's across Malaysia are substandard due to its espousal of Malay culture? These universities also educate a small number of non-Malay bumiputra, similar to how vernacular schools host a fragment of Malays. If we are against the existence of universities like UiTM, then why are we not also against vernacular schools?

These two examples may be looking at different levels of education but I feel that they are both structured on race-based models.



If we are to truly combat a race-based education model, the best place to start is at school - a place which incubates a person's moral compass which will then be carried forward to the years in university. But our education system is broken and every single stream has its own gaping discrepancies.

My opposition of vernacular schools is not an unwavering endorsement of national schools by any means. Instead it actually places immense pressure on the government to better the unified school system since all parties are affected. It becomes a national issue, and one no longer divided along racial lines.

### **A matter of making a better curriculum**

Another reason people believe in vernacular schools is in learning of languages. I personally do not understand why we need exclusive schools to acquire proficient level of one or more languages. It is a matter of making a better curriculum and offering those options in national schools.

I feel it is critical that Malaysians from all races have an opportunity to master the national language as one to unite us all.

The intersectionality of races is what sets our country apart from others. However, the ability to choose what elements of a race one wishes to have and what elements of other races one wishes to acquire is what would make us multicultural. Boxing our dreams in schools only drifts us apart.

Thirdly, people also believe they ought to protect vernacular schools because it protects a certain culture. Malaysia needs to extend more opportunity for learning about all of the cultures and realise that we are not just about one or three races.

To some extent, all of these identities must influence the Malaysian identity. There needs to be stronger institutions. The institutions need to be empowered and funded in ways to ensure that history, progress, elements of non-Malay, such as the Chinese and Indian cultures, continue to be spread.

These are some of the oldest and richest cultures in the world and the whole nation needs to learn about them. There is no reason to restrict such priorities to particular schools.

According to the Malaysia Education Blueprint (MEB), bumiputera students now make up 94 percent of enrollment in national primary schools. This means that

national schools are no longer 'national'. A wall has been created to separate our children by race.

I find it hypocritical of those who advocate against race-based politics to oppose a non-race based education system. Similarly, I find it hypocritical for those who advocate against vernacular schools to champion Malay-exclusive schools or religious schools. A compromise must be made by both sides.

Politics can be a divisive force, but that division is constructed and incubated by an education system which divides us from young. Once you move beyond the claims we have gotten used to making because we have gotten used to conforming and making do with substandard political gamesmanship; you realise that the alternative is perhaps in a new system.

I hope that this system is one that we have to voice out for and that will provide STEM education in English. One to inspire our children to learn and not cram and that will prepare Malaysians for the world stage. One that will make us all multilingual, multicultural and proud Malaysians.

There is a wall separating our children today and we need to tear down this wall.

## 第四章 集體行動與認同

### 4.1 認同與集體行動

### 4.2 認同作為一種社會過程

#### 4.2.1 認同的自我定義與他者定義

#### 4.2.2 認同作為一種「重新發現」或「創造」

#### 4.2.3 政治機會與認同

#### 4.2.4 認同的產生與認同儀式

### 4.3 多重認同

### 4.4 認同、集體行動與搭便車

#### 4.4.1 認同與「理性」行動

#### 4.4.2 認同與「非理性」行動

### 4.5 小結

- 83 我想這讓我更堅強。我想這讓我更清楚自己是誰……我幾乎感覺到自己的生命有了主題。我不再只是機器裡的一顆螺絲釘。我有自己關心的事情，那是一種深刻的關心，讓我的生命充滿了意義。我保留了這點，我想我將永遠珍藏。

激進女性主義運動者，美國俄亥俄州哥倫布市

引自 Whittier 1995: 95

直到兩年前，我還是個只屬於某個男人的女人。然後，我遇到了「集體」女人，慢慢地，我和人們發展出一種全新的關係。如今，我覺得自己和這個男人的關係是平等的，就像我和「集體」女人之間的關係。

瑪汀娜，女性團體的成員，義大利米蘭

引自 Bianchi 和 Mormino 1984: 160

在參加格林漢營隊之後，我了解到，我其實常貶低自己。只是因為有男人在場的時候，我經常沒有把自己的想法說出來。以前我總是不夠直接……總是讓男人主導，我總是讓他們主導我。

卡羅拉·艾汀頓，格林漢共同區營隊成員，英國

引自 Roseneil 1995: 146

- 84 如果有人問我，「你是誰」？我是一個激進女性主義者……我將激進女性主義視為我的生命課程，即使我每一天，每一個星期，每一年，大部份的時間都在做別的事情。

一位公益團體的職員，哥倫布市

引自 Whittier 1995: 95

對我來說，身為女性團體的一員，不僅影響了我的生活，也改變了我的想法。認識自己是很重要的。集體消逝過，也重生過很多次，我的想望也是如此。不論我去到哪裡，總是找到新的女性團體。

依爾瑪，女性團體的成員，義大利米蘭

引自 Bianchi 和 Mormino 1984: 159

過去有礦工的罷工活動，礦工的妻子們也會來參加……印地安保留區的美國印地安人也會來……南非的代表也來。我們還只是從內部城市來的一般死勞工階級女性，跟來自各地，直接參與鬥爭的人說話。

特芮莎，格林漢共同區營隊成員，英國

引自 Roseneil 1995: 149

上述引文中，依爾瑪和瑪汀娜都是提齊尼思團隊（Ticinese Collective）的成員，而這是一個活躍於一九七〇年代和八〇年代初的米蘭地區女性運動團體（Bianchi and Mormino 1984）。特芮莎和卡羅拉都曾參加 1983-1991 年間女性和平運動團體刻意在英國巡弋飛彈基地所在地格林漢共同區（Greenham Common area）所舉辦的營隊（Roseneil 1995）。其他兩則引文的未具名作者，<sup>1</sup>則是美國俄亥俄州哥倫布市的激進女性主義運動參與者（Whittier 1995, 1997）。這些人參與的運動性質各有不同，其政治文化脈絡也不一樣。不過，儘管有著種種差別，這些引文顯示出了若干共同點：它們都以各自的方式表達出社會運動中，集體和個人經驗的關係，尤其是，它們指出了集體參與和個人投入之間的交集，而這也正是集體行動的特色之一。

1. 我們徵引了不少引用原文的文獻，因此本書的參考書目風格會出現不一致的情況。

(Melucci 1982, 1989, 1995; Rupp and Taylor 1987; Calhoun 1994a)。

85 一方面，這些故事是關於個人的生命變化：她們都見證了一種從集體行動中獲得力量的新感受，一種對自我的強化。對於卡羅拉來說，在「只有女人」(women only)的脈絡中對抗巡弋飛彈，代表了一種新的覺醒，省悟到以前太過低估了自己的潛質，尤其當有強勢男性在場的時候，更是如此。對於特芮莎來說，在格林漢共同區的經驗，使她重新面對她以往未曾省思過的勞工階級背景，因而產生了一種新的接觸與經驗空間。對於瑪汀娜來說，參加自我覺醒的團體活動，轉變了她的私人生活思維，使她對於公共事務產生了強烈的投入感。不過，即使在她的例子裡，也是由於集體經驗的特性增進了她的個人成長。另一方面，這些故事也透露了集體歸屬感為個人提供了一種生命連貫性。對於依爾瑪，以及哥倫布市女性團體的成員而言，身為女性主義者使她們找到一種鎖鏈，將她們生命中不同的階段，以及不同的體驗，都扣連起來了。這樣的連結不必然只存在於不同的時間點之間，就像特芮莎的故事所言，也由於共同的價值觀與願景，而連結了不同地方的人群和不同的議題。

換言之，這些故事的主題在於「認同」，尤其是關於認同與集體行動之間的關係 (Pizzorno 1978; Cohen 1985; Melucci 1989; Calhoun 1991; Mach 1993)。所謂的「認同」，並不是一種自然而然出現的東西，也不是社會行動者的本質；而是一種過程，透過這樣的過程，行動者開始認識自己，也認識其他的行動者，都屬於較大團體的一份子。基於這樣的歸屬感，她們對自己的體驗賦予意義，也對於自己的生命歷程賦予意義。<sup>2</sup> 值得注意的是，在形塑認同的過程之中，個人面向和集體面向之間有著錯綜複雜的關係。一方面，透過認同的產

2. 關於這點，請參見 Pizzorno (1978) 和 Melucci (1989)。在這裡，我們仍只說「認同」，而非「認同建構的過程」，純粹是為了保持文字的清晰流暢。而不將認同視為客觀的屬性，也不意味著認同的出現就一定會影響行動者的行為。

生、維持與再生，個人得以定義和再定義他們的行動課題，並評估其行動開展和結束的可能性。上述故事告訴我們，「認同常常反映在我們所參與的私人與政治行動方案 (personal and political projects)」(Calhoun 1994a: 28)。另一方面，認同的建構不能化約到心理機制，因為這是一個社會過程：藉由集體過程，自我的再發現於是成為可能。

我們將在本章處理認同建構 (identity construction) 及其特性方面的課題。首先，我們將指出，認同的形塑，乃是集體行動的一個基本成份，涉入衝突的行動者形塑認同的過程，會在行動者之間啟動一種信任關係，並建立起不同階段事件的連結關係。然後，我們將處理一些兩難的情況，因為認同的概念有著很複雜的面貌，必然會導致許多這類問題。首先，社會認同的性質同時涵蓋了靜態與動態的面向：一方面，認同的參考點會帶來一種跨越時間的連續性，以及同一陣營的歸屬感；另一方面，認同總是捲入一種不斷再定義過程當中，這也是不容忽略的事實。不論是基於特定的歷史經驗，還是基於特定的團體，社會行動者所建立起的連結，事實上，總是具有偶然的性質。這些連結，乃是出自對於世界的符號再詮釋 (symbolic reinterpretation)，所以必然是片面的和選擇性的。因此，認同的感覺雖然具有相對的穩定性，實際上卻不斷地被修正。

86 第二個兩難情況在於多重認同 (multiple identities) 的出現，換言之，個人可能會覺得自己同時歸屬於若干不同的集體。從某個角度來說，在個人與集體的關係裡，認同是一種自我組織的原則：例如，透過認同，行動者可以分辨自己的盟友或敵人。不過，盟友或敵人的關係與界線往往不是很清楚：比如說，女性主義運動產生了許多新的認同路線，經常與過去的路線（例如階級路線）之間存在著矛盾。不過，新的認同路線不會掃除既有的路線，而是與之並存，因而在行動者之間造成各種自我呈現的張力，<sup>3</sup> 或是在同一運動的不同世代之

間，產生緊張（Whittier 1995, 1997）。

最後一個兩難情況是關於，認同在集體行動的理性詮釋架構中所扮演的角色。當認同的定義碰觸到情緒或價值成本時，就很難依照理性行動模型加以解釋，因為理性行動的焦點在於成本與回收的計算。不過，很多學者還是在理性行動模型架構之下，運用認同的概念去解釋集體行動（Pizzorno 1978）。因此，關於此一概念操作是否妥當的辯論，也是值得我們留意的部分。

#### 4.1 認同與集體行動

87 認同建構不應該只被視為集體行動的前提。社會行動者在特定時期的認同，的確會引導他們後續的行為，事實上，當行動者有能力去定義自己、其他行動者，以及彼此關係的內涵時，行動就開始了（Touraine 1981）。然而，認同並非性質固定的行動計畫，相反地，透過行動本身，特定的歸屬感會被加強或削弱。換言之，對集體行動的評估，帶來和鼓勵了對認同的持續性再詮釋（Hirsch 1990; Fantasia 1988）。因此，集體認同的建構可說是集體行動不可或缺的成份之一（Melucci 1995）。

讓我們再進一步檢視行動賴以「建構」認同的機制。首先，這種情況的發生，乃是透過參與衝突的行動者對於彼此界線的認定。有別於鉅觀結構取向（macro-structural approaches），專注於行動的社會學對於社會衝突的分析，比較重視結構與行動之間的連結網絡，尤其強調不能只從結構關係與其代表的利益糾葛來理解社會衝突。反之，社

3. 參見 Roseneil (1995) 和 Johnston (1991b: 第 7 章)，他們論述了西班牙加泰隆尼亞 (Catalonia) 地區的民族主義與勞工階級認同之間的複雜關係。

會衝突的發生，乃是介於結構張力，以及一個集體主體的興起之間，而這個主體能自我認知為特定價值與利益的負載者，並依此來定義其對手（Touraine 1981）。如果欠缺一個具有共同特質與團結感的「我群」（a 'we'），集體行動是不可能發生的。同樣不可或缺的則是「他群」（the 'other'），因為這個「他群」可以讓行動者指控，藉以發起運動動員（Gamson 1992b）。認同的建構因而包含了正反兩面：特定運動團體參與者的自我正面評價，以及對於團體所排斥並強烈反對者的負面評價。此外還包括了一種對於衝突保持中立的中間位置，參照了這些位置，<sup>4</sup>運動認同才得以成形，展現活力。

其次，認同的生產也反映出，運動成員在複雜的社會環境裡，產生了一種新的信任關係網絡。<sup>5</sup>信任關係的擴展，確保了一定的機會範圍（參見第五章），以此為基礎，才能發展出非正式的溝通網絡，以利行動者彼此的互動和支持，更是在缺乏組織資源時的一種極為關鍵的替代品；還有，透過人際的網路，可以快速傳播訊息，至少彌補了有限的媒體資源；由於對相同政治與文化目標的認同，行動成員之間的信任，讓大家在面對壓迫時，可以更有效地面對可能的代價與危機；最後，行動者自我認定或被他人認定為運動的一部份時，也意味著他們可以倚靠運動戰將的奧援與一致對外的內聚情感（Gerlach and Hine 1970; Gerlach 1971）。

集體行動所涉及的危機和不確定感，會讓支持者卻步，除非他們有強烈的認同感和集體團結的感受，否則動員不太可能成功。以勞工運動為例，透過工作場所與居住地的就近接觸，勞工們情感的激發與再現得以被強化（請參見第二章）。不過，在後工業的社會中，以地

4. 用 Hunt、Benford 和 Snow 等人（1994）的話來說，這些位置包括了動員宣傳者、敵對者與觀眾。

5. 關於信任關係在公民社會興起的過程中所扮演的角色，請參見 Seligman (1992)。



緣為基礎的社會關係已然褪色，雖然這並不表示社群關係已經消失，不過，整體而言，比起過去地緣關係，現今社會關係的系統，較屬於遠距的連結（Wellman et al. 1988; Martinotti 1993），而現在的社群邊界事實上已經可以擴大到全國，甚至國際了（Giddens 1990）。因此，比起從前，集體行動較不會從強烈的地緣基礎出發，集體認同也較不根植於地方社群與日常空間的面對面接觸。這種現象，標示著由前現代性（pre-modernity）到現代性（modernity）的轉型，以及藉由印刷品，而非口耳相傳，來傳遞公共意見的時代已經來臨（Anderson 1983; Tarrow 1994），而媒體與電子革命的擴張，更加速了此一過程（Calhoun 1992; Wasko and Mosco 1992）。

89 認同一個運動的人們不見得會直接涉入運動動員，但是由於分享了同樣的願景與價值觀，因此對於組織動員的運動成員會有一定的凝聚感。<sup>6</sup>運動者與同情者都意識到，自己參與了一個比自身直接經驗更大更複雜的現實。而透過這個更大共同體，行動者獲得了行動的動機與力量，就算是看起來成功機會渺茫，或是會產生一種強烈的孤立感，也能義無反顧。

第三，集體認同確保了集體行動的長期延續性。一個運動可以分為「顯現期」與「潛伏期」（‘visible’ and ‘latent’ phases）（Melucci 1984a）。在顯現期裡，行動透過示威、公開訴求、媒體報導等事件而突顯其公共面向，此時受到各種動員而來的行動者之間具有高度的合作與互動關係。在潛伏期裡，最主要的是組織之內的活動和文化生產。社運組織與鷹派團體之間的接觸，整體而言，僅存在於成員彼此的私交，或維持在組織之間的官式往來，此時大多難以產生群眾動員的效果，集體連帶以及對某一信念的歸屬感，並不像密集動員時期那般明顯。在這個時期裡，認同的孕育乃是透過少數成員的隱性行動，

6. 而且有利於招募新運動成員（請參見第五章）。

從而複製了某種超越時間限制的理念訴求和團結模式，鋪陳出集體行動得以再生的條件，並讓有心者可以將他們新一波的運動發展歷史，上溯到前輩們的動員行動（Melucci 1984a; Rupp and Taylor 1987; Johnston 1991b; Mueller 1994）。

認同具有這種連結的功能，不僅展現在集體主張的層次上，以及特定社會現象的社會擴張，更將之扣連到個人的經驗上。個人在建構自我認同的同時，也為自己的公、私領域歷史各階段，賦予了連貫性與意義性，而且常常反映在個人的生命故事當中。任何社會運動的動員梯次，都會吸引一些至少就個人的生命史來說未曾有過集體行動經驗的人。然而，很多的研究都顯示，不論是當代社會運動（McAdam 1988; Diani 1995a; Whittier 1995 and 1997; Klandermans 1997: 第4章），或集體行動的「歷史」範例（Thompson 1963; Gould 1995），運動的戰鬥性具有一種自我延續的特性，亦即，過去參與過運動的人，比較容易再參與新的運動。

行動雖有跨越時間的延續性，但這並不表示認同是一成不變的，更不是固著的，事實上，對於歷史的參照，永遠都是具有選擇性的。在此，「延續性」所表示的，毋寧是一個人生命史元素及組織生命史的方式，在一個新的脈絡中的再度積極運作。就這點而言，平時看似無關，甚或矛盾的個人事件與集體事件，在此於是獲得了連結。舉例來說，恐怖主義的激進集體行動動員本身，便似乎成為個人生命史中的一個劇烈變化。一九七〇年代的義大利恐怖份子的自傳（della Porta 1990）就顯示了這點：他們當中有不少人從天主教組織裡的鷹派行徑，轉變到武裝鬥爭。顯然，在這個例子裡，行動方式與政治計畫出現了一個休止符號，不過，這種間斷只是表面上的現象，事實上，這些歷史仍然存在著若干延續性的元素，例如想要建立導正當前不平等與扭曲的社會關係的願景。此外，前後階段都展現了共同的集體行動特性，包括絕對真理的宣示，以及理想（和意識形態）原則的

落實方案——不論這些方案是否不切實際。

另一方面，集體行動的每一個新經驗，至少在相當程度上，都代表了某種跟過去經驗的斷裂。有時候，一個人在歷經了激烈的個人轉變之後，會從此投入、組織或計畫嶄新的集體活動，此時，個人就體驗了真正的改頭換面，而且往往想要切斷過去的社會關係。認同的轉變在這些情況下可能比較深刻，因為不僅關係到個人的政治傾向、涉入集體行動的程度，也關係到一種生命歷程的抉擇，甚至日常生活的模式。

在宗教運動裡，我們也可發現類似的現象（Robbins 1988: 第3章; Snow et al. 1980; Wilson 1982; Wallis and Bruce 1986）。<sup>7</sup>此外，典型的工業社會衝突歷史也顯示出了，「傳統」政治認同的力量以及集體行動常見的排他性與隱密性。在鉅型意識形態的世紀中，要放棄政治和／或階級位置，必須付出很大的代價，包括放棄特定的社會關係體系，以及彼此接受的情感認同關係，北愛爾蘭的宗教路線之爭，就是個很好的例子。宗教認同提供了一個判準，用以構築各層次的社會關係，包括社區與家族關係。跨越團體藩籬的連帶並不常見，即使有，也往往必須避開自己的社群連繫，而在隱避的情況中會面（Bew et al. 1979; McAllister 1983; O'Sullivan See 1986; Maguire 1993）。二十世紀義大利的政治生態裡誕生了兩個主要的政治傳統，即，天主教與社會主義（Ginsborg 1990）——雖然它們的出現過程實在稱不上戲劇化。他們構成了義大利人政治認同的基礎，因此可分別由上教堂或參加左翼政黨來辨別他們的認同光譜。在這樣的脈絡之下，相較於這兩種主流意識形態位置，諸如工會、文化社團與公司等其他組織的忠誠與認同，都只位居次要的角色。一直到一九七〇年代之前，這兩大傳

7. 當然也不見得都是如此，例如 Albert Melucci 一九八〇年代在米蘭所做的研究計畫就指出，當地人在轉而信奉新東正教時，比較不會經過那麼劇烈的轉變（Diani 1984, 1986）。

20世紀的地球

統領域都是密不通風的。天主教與社會主義這兩個世界，幾乎不相往來。從其中一邊轉到另一邊，往往意味著必須徹底改變個人的社會網絡，包括家族連繫。若想改變政治歸屬，可能會被視為等同背叛，隨之而來的常常是一段痛苦的經歷，因為這個人必須徹頭徹尾地跟自己的過去說再見。<sup>8</sup>

## 4.2 認同作為一種社會過程

### 4.2.1 認同的自我定義與他者定義

認同作為區隔

既然認同是一種社會過程，而非社會行動者的某種屬性，那麼，成員對於特定團體的歸屬感與凝聚力、個人對其生命史的連續性與不連續性的認知，以及對於敵人的辨認，也都可能必須經過不斷重新理解的過程。換言之，認同浮現自自我認同與外部認知的過程。行動者對於自我形象的看法，事實上，經常與外部行動者（包括政府機構、同情或敵對團體、輿論和媒體）對他們的看法相互激盪。

認同的建構同時也包含了一種希望突顯自我在世界的位置，一種跟別人有所區隔的願景（Melucci 1982; Calhoun 1994a）。集體行動者的存在，必須參照一些歷史經驗、符號與神話，以形塑其個體性的基礎。不過，與此同時，符號生產不能只靠自我合法性（self-legitimacy），因為自我的某種再現，還必須要在外部行動者對主體的看法中找到呼應。換言之，團體的自我定義還將其他行動者的世界觀納入考量。唯有在行動者互相承認的脈絡下，社會衝突以及一般社會

8. 國際共產組織也有類似的現象。關於這點，Koestler（1969）的報告雖非學術研究，但其敘述仍具有很強的說服力。



關係才可能存在 (Simmel 1955; Touraine 1981)，若非如此，光由行動團體單方面的自我肯定、自我認同的話，可能終將步入邊緣化和泡沫化的命運。

社會運動的故事，因而也是關於成員如何形塑某種自我形象，並且對抗支配團體企圖抹滅其主體個性的故事。由民族國家的建立所產生的族群衝突，即為一個例證。民族國家的歷史發展顯示，大量而密集的政治單位紛紛建立之後，透過對「民族」語言和「民族」文化的確認，而刻意強調文化的同質性，於是同化主義政策隨之而來，企圖將國家疆域裡的多元民族文化整併到新興國家的形式當中。在新興民族國家建國過程裡取得發言權的特定社會團體，則將弱勢的文化傳統予以污名化處理，視之為歷史殘跡。例如，隨著法國民族認同的建構，疆域內的普羅旺斯和不列塔尼的文化不但被邊緣化了，而且都被定義為前現代落後社會的殘渣，與新建立的法蘭西共和國所揭櫫的進步價值格格不入 (Beer 1977, 1980; Safran 1989; Canciani and De La Pierre 1993)。

事實上，抹黑或污名化其他團體認同的能力，正是社會宰制的深層機制。當一個邊緣化的團體所承載的價值觀和經驗類型，即使稱不上偏差，卻被社會大眾視為落伍、失序，並可能危及公共福祉的話，其成員就不可能順利推廣他們的另類形象，而且集體行動的動能也相當有限。他們甚至還可能會發現很難把自己視為主體，更遑論爭取其他社會團體享有的公民權。其他人對諸如貧民區居民之類的邊緣團體的刻板印象，很可能會對該團體的集體行動能力帶來負面影響。雖然在這種脈絡之下仍可發現不少社會連帶與互動網絡，以及各種團體生活的形式，但是，由於外來觀察者常常從剝奪與社會解組等角度來描繪這些團體處境，結果往往反而阻礙了團體成員掌握和衡量自我組織的可能性，即使機會來臨時，也常錯失良機 (Wacquant 1994)。換言之，由外而內的污名化過程，最後使得邊緣團體無法發展出強烈的自

主認同，也限制了集體行動的可能性。類似情況也發生在「女性」身上，女人經常被認為較少注意社會生活的公共與政治面向，其他的刻板印象還包括較關心私人領域、欠缺理性能力等等參與公共領域的基本素質，於是預設了女人不能直接涉入集體行動。這也就是為什麼女性主義運動除了要創造和增進女性參與公共事務的機會之外，打破傳統刻板印象也是其目標之一 (Zincone 1992; Taylor and Whittier 1995)。

#### 4.2.2 認同作為一種「重新發現」或「創造」

社會運動的認同最終多半會被其主要成員視為是「自然的」。透過集體行動，個人重新發現了與其他志同道合人士之間，長久以來隱而未顯的「自然」親近性，感覺到自己屬於一個共同的計畫，而這種感覺則是由於他們都處在一種被壓抑的位置而產生的「自然」反應。例如，一個基本教義派的蘇格蘭民族主義者之所以活躍於政壇，顯然是基於他對蘇格蘭歷史文化的堅定信念，相形之下，身為一個「不列顛臣民」(a 'British subject') 不過是一種行政管理下的產物。又如，對於婦運人士來說，集體行動反映了一種團結力量的開展，而女性團結的概念，幾乎是前所未有的。

另一方面，若說對團體的真正根源與「自然性」('naturalness') 的強調，是為了正當化團體的願景的話，那麼，對於一個運動來說，避免將運動本身窄化為團體根源與傳統的完全複製，也具同樣的重要性。運動必須能夠揭示「新」的元素，以呈現出一個有別於過去的新運動或新階段。例如，在婦女運動的各個歷史階段裡，運動健將不僅會將該階段的行動扣連到前輩的歷史傳承，同時也都會走出自己的新路線 (Bianchi and Mormino 1984; Rupp and Taylor 1987; Whittier 1995, 1997)。無論在個人或集體的層次上，認同建構總是會同時促進延續

與轉變。

在這種符號衝突裡，社會運動的對手也會採取類似的策略。一方面，他們會掌握機會，指出對方運動所創造的自我形象其實是被建構出來的，是刻意製造的，是「不自然的」。在蘇格蘭運動的例子中，批判者就質疑蘇格蘭民族主義所宣稱的貫穿蘇格蘭社會的共同利益與文化臍帶，其實經不起歷史的驗證。而在婦女運動的情況裡，反對者會說，與其說女性之間的連帶是自然的，還不如說傳統的陰陽調和才是自然的，所以才會近乎亙古不變。

因此，就社會行動者所決定的特定自我形象來說，無論是肯定或否定其自然基礎，牽涉到的衝突都涵蓋了很廣的範圍。根據此一觀察，社會運動研究者因而關心一個問題：認同的產生應如何被理解呢？是一種重新發現被某個支配體系所遮掩的個人人格特質和／或行動者的集體記憶等恆久特質的過程？還是一種以持續性的符號再製活動為基礎的創造過程呢？直到現在，這仍是個爭辯不休的議題。

在討論當代民族主義的性質時，不少人都相信，民族認同根源於長時期的歷史經驗，以及前現代時期所形成的文化模式。雖然民族主義在過去兩個世紀中演化成為一種特別的形式，但是民族認同所援引的事件、制度、神話與敘述，仍舊取材自更早期的歷史階段，多半遠在民族國家形成之前（Smith 1981, 1986）。其他人則認為，就像許多族裔／民族運動所彰顯的，現代民族認同乃是一種建構的結果，無論在制度上，或形成的過程中，都可以解讀到這種建構性。民族主義運動所引用的民族神話，泰半都缺乏可靠的歷史證據（Anderson 1983; 95 Hobsbawm 1991）。事實上，我們可以說這是一種「對傳統的杜撰」（invention of tradition）（Hobsbawm and Ranger 1984）。

類似的論點也適用於非地域性的族裔認同：在多元文化／傳統的社會裡，例如美國，我們常常可以發現這種「符號性族裔」（‘symbolic ethnicity’）的形成（Gans 1979）。這樣的認同形式，並非

基於特定團體的任何歷史或文化傳承，而是取材於多元社會的各種符號與參照加以雜揉，形成一個新的綜合體。比方說，羅司塔法利主義（Rastafarianism）運動的集體認同根源，只有部份是出自於特定的文化模型和宗教信仰，除此之外，該運動也是不同背景的個人所決定的產物，但他們卻藉著訴諸某種文化價值來激發歸屬感和誘因以利集體行動。因此，就算沒有該團體的歷史背景，也可以成為一個「羅司塔法利主義者」（a ‘Rasta’）〔譯按：羅司塔法利主義起自以牙買加為中心的加勒比海群島，可以上溯到黑奴時期但盛行於三〇年代的一種反奴役、反殖民思潮，較像是一種「反抗精神」，而不像「主義」，因其語彙和內涵並不拘泥於特定文化傳統〕。

近年來，社會科學界普遍接受建構論觀點（Agger 1991; Swidler and Arditi 1994），使得集體行動的學者也逐漸相信認同是一種創造過程（Melucci 1989, 1991; Calhoun 1994a; Hunt 1992）。即使當認同論述納入了運動團體的歷史、地理和文化根源，也還是一種符號性的重新闡述。集體記憶方面的研究更指出，行動者會重新挪用社會意識與歷史感，加以操弄，然後創造性地予以轉化，熔鑄出新的神話和新的典範（Swidler and Arditi 1994: 308-10）。

或者，一個懸而未決的問題在於，符號創造的自由度能有多高（Mennell 1994）。其實，認同的延續性並不需要透過所謂「客觀」基礎，才能出現。比如說，國家認同感並不是只有透過愛國熱狂，方得以複製維繫，相反地，民眾無需思索的反射實踐、某種心理狀態的堅持，以及穩定的生活風格，或許才是延續國家認同最關鍵的因素（Billig 1995）。

#### 4.2.3 政治機會與認同

認同的建構經常受制於一些具有嚴格政治性質的變數。社會團體



96 用以認同自身，同時也被外人辨識的判準，常常反映了國家的政治系統與政治文化特質。要解釋集體認同的發展，似乎只需修正一個廣為人知的論點，亦即政策制定的形式引導了政治行動的形式，而不是反過來（Lowi 1971）。事實上，社會行動者傾向以特定的性質去辨認自己，而忽略其他的性質，以符合特定的政策網絡或議題，從而引導某種公共政策的出線（Bartholomew and Mayer 1992; Jenson 1995）。

例如，若要解釋亞裔美國人所發展出來的族裔認同運動的話，就不能單單考慮亞裔行動者本身而已。事實上，公共部門在討論移民政策和少數民族權益等重要議題時，習慣於將「亞裔」視為一個同質的族裔團體，而忽略了不同的亞裔族群，如越南人和韓國人，根本就覺得彼此非常不同。在這種情況下，我們可以說，政治／行政判準反而催生了某些新的利益與認同，從而跨越了歷史與文化鴻溝，而產生了諸如「亞裔美國人」這種新興的認同和行動團體（Omi and Winant 1986）。同樣地，在英國倫敦當局的政策和制度規計裡，我們也不難看到一個被預設為「同質」的蘇格蘭民族。然而，居住在蘇格蘭邊陲區域如赫布萊德群島（the Hebrides）或雪特蘭群島（Shetland）的民眾，依然要求他們的族群認同受重視（Kinnear 1990），對他們來說，如果蘇格蘭獨立，或政府的重要功能轉移到蘇格蘭首府愛丁堡（Edinburgh）的話，他們的獨特性就能夠彰顯出來了。

在另一個層次上，如何定義行動者的認同，也關係到社會裡的主要政治主張區隔。社會運動發展於結構化的政治系統之中：運動企圖修正這個部分，並啟動政治重組的過程（Tilly 1978; Dalton et al. 1984）。為此，運動必須強化自我認同，辨別敵我；但是，同時又必須和傳統的集體認同維持一定的連繫，以供運動者與陸續認同該運動的人們進行溝通。制度化認同與對立認同之間的接觸元素（elements of contact）變得愈重要的話，前者所保持的活力元素（elements of vitality）就愈多，反之亦然。

義大利北部的區域聯盟近來特別強調地域認同，而且具有強烈的民粹主義與分離主義色彩，對於此一現象，我們不能僅從當地強悍的民風來解釋。其實，最具影響力的因素純粹來自政治上的考量，也就是說，他們必須在政治上將自己與主要的集體認同區分開來。在義大利，主要的集體認同乃是基於階級或宗教，而他們援引的「穩健」版地域主義元素也有類似的影響力。這種地域主義在左派運動中也曾出現，但是並不鮮明。左派勢力曾在若干區域中掌握權力，雖然不是中樞要津，但仍是很重要的區域，因此左派一度喜歡強調地方體制的自主性，不過，這樣的區域主義不曾激化成分離主義。因此，地區聯盟並未基於「內部殖民主義」模型而建構某種結合地區和階級屬性的集體認同（Hechter 1975）；同樣地，光是訴求人民當家做主的理念，而未強調「行政去中心化」的議題的話，也仍不足以建構區域主義行動者的認同。這兩種概念在左派的實踐行動中都曾出現，因此北方聯盟更有必要去發展出特定的地域認同。此外，傳統政治認同的危機也相當關鍵，因為在這種情況下，對聯盟來說，與其他政治行動者的關係，除了區隔之外，並不急於發展交集的部分（Biorcio 1992; Diani 1996）。

#### 4.2.4 認同的產生與認同儀式

如果我們採取以上的觀點，將運動的認同視為一種過程，就必須考慮一個重要的問題：認同的發展與維繫應以什麼方式進行呢？這些方式超越了智識和義理的發展。顯然，企圖羅列所有的方式大概是件不可能的任務，不過我們仍可指出若干基本原則。<sup>9</sup> 首先，一個運動的集體認同的強化，乃是透過某些不同於「一般人」或對手的行為模

9. 關於本節的討論，有部份是基於 John Lofland（1995: 192ff）對於運動的文化形式所做的分析。

式 (models of behaviour)，並將之定義為運動參與者的特質之一。透過某種服飾風格、明顯不同的外貌，以及／或者與他人不同的行為特徵，社運人士得以表現自己的與眾不同此外，他們也會透過一連串的物件 (objects)，以各種方式連結到自己的集體經驗。這類物件包括了：識別標記 (identifiers)，藉以迅速辨識某個運動的參與者（例如反核示威者的微笑太陽標誌或巴勒斯坦民兵的頭巾）；曾經在運動行動中扮演過重要角色，或對其意識形態發展有重大貢獻的人物 (characters)；人們藉以重建運動歷史及其發展起源，或辨識其利害關係的物品 (artifacts)，包括書籍或視覺記錄；以及，具有特殊符號意涵的事件或地點 (events and places)。另一個層次則是運動成員之間流傳的故事 (stories)，這些故事不但反映了他們的世界觀，也強化了成員的凝聚力。有時候，這些故事會以一種特殊的語言來表達，外人或許完全無法了解。

行為模式、物件和故事敘述常常結合成為特定的儀式。一般而言，儀式是一種符號表達的形式，透過風格化與戲劇化的方式，傳遞出集體行動者關於社會關係的訊息 (Whuntnow 1987)，特別是包含了一些或多或少編碼化的程序，藉此傳播他們的世界觀、複製基本的歷史經驗，以及顛覆象徵性的符碼 (Sassoon 1984a, 1984b)。它們都有助於強化認同，以及集體的歸屬感，同時，也讓運動參與者得以宣洩自己的情緒。

儀式化的實踐，可以用來重現反對運動歷史中具有特殊意義的事件。例如，透過在五一勞動節或三八婦女節示威，勞工運動與婦女運動不但提醒自己，同時也提醒社會關於他們的運動根源。世界中其他比較小規模的運動也都在重要事件的紀念日裡進行示威：從美國黑人權運動領袖金恩博士 (Martin Luther King) 和麥爾坎 (Malcolm X) 遇刺，到車諾比爾核災 (Chernobyl nuclear accident)，乃至於 1969 年，揭示義大利生命嶄新一頁的米蘭爆炸案等等紀念日。即使在運動

已經成功，獲得權力之後，儀式仍然非常重要。例如，當年的法國革命政府在戰神廣場 (Champs de Mars) 紀念「新人類」(new man) 的誕生，義大利的法西斯政權則藉著慶祝羅馬的建立來強調該政權承繼了光榮的過去。

不過，儀式化的實踐不能化約到慶祝或紀念性質的公開示威活動。所有由運動組織主導的抗議事件都具有一種儀式的面向，而且經常採取非常戲劇性和炫麗性的表現性質。示威的形式、喊口號的方式、海報看板的揮動、甚至行進的身體，都構成了基本的演出元素，以使運動的形象格外鮮明。因此，反核運動常在示威場合裡演出行動劇，以說明核能爆炸的災變景象。同樣的，婦女運動、族裔／民族主義運動，以及青年運動，除了政治示威之外，也都在集體行動戲碼中加入了表演的成份。他們透過儀式而顛覆了傳統的符號編碼，同時也否定了一般用以界定適當社會行為的規則。比如說，透過公開重現性暴力的情節，許多美國女性得以將原來意味著羞辱與孤立的經歷，轉變成為自尊的來源。

有些儀式是關於團體的內在發展，雖然並未公開，但仍不容忽略。例如，招收新成員加入運動組織的程序，常常採取一種真正的「通過儀式」(rites of passage) (van Gennep 1983; Sassoon 1984a, 1984b)。換言之，這種加入新組織的經歷，相當程度上有如個人人格的再生，尤其在宗教運動裡，這種情況更加顯著 (Berger and Luckmann 1966)。此外，在每一種社運組織形態之中，我們都可以發現某種地位轉型程序，藉此一般成員得以升格為投入程度較深的社運「健將」(militants)。例如，在激進的反體制團體裡，一般成員在親自上陣參加第一線遊行之前，往往必須先經過散發傳單等等較為輕鬆和危險性較低的任務分工。這些任務決定了一個成員是否值得信賴、是否夠堅強、或是具有鬥士般的政治激情 (della Porta 1990)。在很多女性主義團體中，行為儀式則支撐了意識覺醒的行動，以及個人的人格



轉型 (Taylor and Whittier 1995)。

### 4.3 多重認同

100 在現代社會中，社會運動的呈現，經常是透過一些具有行動策略能力，或負擔特定文化角色的「人物」。因此，他們經常被視為同質或整合的認同。少有人注意到行動者所涉入的關係系統，以致忽略了一個事實，亦即，運動團體和運動健將之間的認同與忠誠其實具有多重性格。反而傾向於將認同視為單純反映了底層的客觀現實。<sup>10</sup>

然而，和這些運動觀不同的是，集體的認同其實很少呈現為整合的同質認同。<sup>11</sup> 首先，由於認同是一個社會過程，而不是靜態的屬性，從認同中產生的團體或集體歸屬感因而也是流動的。以較寬鬆的方式來看待認同的話，我們就可以了解，認同不見得預設了一個強烈的「集體的我們」(collective we) (Lemert 1994; Billig 1995)。認同一個運動不必然表示分享了一種系統性的完整世界觀；也不妨礙人們將類似的感覺轉移到其他的團體或運動上。在特定的脈絡中，集體行動的延續性並不需要特別強烈或狹隘的歸屬感，即可獲得確保 (Melucci 1984a; Diani 1995a)。實際上，主要的認同很少能夠整合所有其他的認同。比較常見的是，認同呈現出一種多核心的狀態，而非層級關係。<sup>12</sup> 假若過份強調認同的整合功能的話，我們往往會忽略

10. 關於這點，Craig Calhoun (1994a: 26) 指出了一種「內團體的本質主義」(in-group essentialism)。

11. 對於此一觀點的新古典批判，請見 Touraine (1981)；Melucci (1982, 1989, 1996)。

12. 關於不同層次的認同，Stoecker (1995) 提出了有趣的討論：個人、社群、運動與組織上的認同。

了多重認同的重要性 (Calhoun 1994a)。

在各種認同類型之間所產生的張力裡，最先出現的是個別效忠於運動組織的參與者，以及組織的「官方」形象——亦即，團體領袖所表達的形象——之間的關係。實際上，個人參與運動的潛在動機與期待，比起運動提出的說法，亦即其主導運動者所承認的範圍來說，一定更加地豐富。所有成員都參與了運動組織的發展歷程，並從中為自己的願景與關懷尋找答案。例如，Melucci 等人在一九八〇年代研究的米蘭女性，便以各種不同的方式看待自己的參與行動：有些人比較看重個人的反省，有些人則比較重視外在的干預；有些人著重於團體活動，尤其是凝聚力與情感因素，而其他人則認為發展新的方式來詮釋世界更為重要 (Bianchi and Mormino 1984)。即使是對單一團體的認同，也可說是交雜了各種歷史、需求與異質的主張。

廣泛來說，在個別組織與運動之間的關係裡，也可以找到類似，甚至更為擴大的相同機制。一方面，組織的目標在於確保自身所形成的集體認同作為整個運動的全體認同。另一方面，強化單一組織的認同，也將同時與其餘的運動群體產生區隔作用 (Taylor 1989)。人們之所以認同組織，並不只是因為感覺到自我歸屬於一個更大的集體力量，而且也是為了藉以成為一個特殊的、自主的一份子。如此一來，他們就可能將認同扣連到比較堅實的和結構化的組織形式上，而不只在於運動成員之間較鬆散的非正式關係網絡。所謂的「運動認同」(movement identity)，是一個奇怪的名稱，它實際上所指的乃是一種協調的結果，亦即，透過各個行動者與組織所生產的集體形象，彼此協調所成。甚至，即使是小團體也可以體驗到那種運動認同特有的多重性格 (Melucci 1984a)。

例如，在米蘭，關於「提齊尼思團隊」經驗的分析，彰顯了兩種看待女性主義實踐的基本張力 (Bianchi and Mormino 1984)。第一個張力所區分的是，以大社會為目標的行動，以及朝向小團體內部的行

認同一場  
往還的相  
同以同在出  
同時也有  
自己其他  
的想法  
更大的  
共同性  
供市玩  
是就這

動；第二個張力則是關於，純粹情感與團結的行動，以及為了肯定女人能力與專業資格的行動。要討論整個運動的認同定義時，同樣的二元對立也提供解讀其中動態的有用關鍵。事實上，有一些意識覺醒的團體，和女同志團體，並不關心外在的世界，而專注於情感與內部情誼的行動面向。另一方面，作家團體和那些從女性觀點出發的知性團體，則在有限的層次上進行外部干預，以便喚起大眾對於女性知識與專業能力的重視，而在這類關心外部干預的團體之中，有的強調團結的情誼成份，例如空屋佔領社群（squatter communes）中的女性主義集體，有的則關心如何鞏固女性的社會呈現，包括經濟層次以及文化生產層次方面的議題（Bianchi and Mormino 1984: 147）。

102 我們必須記得，個人對運動的認同，不必然要依附在效忠運動組織的前提之下。事實上，人們可以感覺到自己是運動中的一份子，而不會對特定組織有類似的期待，更不用說有時還會對「組織」產生明顯的反感。如果群眾處在某種亢奮的狀態時，光是參加集會示威，就足以凝聚出一種信賴運動策略與目標的感覺，而無需透過特定組織的安排。一般而言，如同我們曾指出的，人們參與運動本身，就已經意味著個人感到自己屬於一種關懷大我的集體努力。另一方面，當認同的機制傾向於轉移到特定的組織行動者身上時，運動就會快速瓦解。義大利 1968 年到 1972 年的勞工階級示威潮的主要特質之一就在於，修正了工會主導的抗爭與整個勞工運動的抗爭之間的關係（Pizzorno et al. 1978）。工廠引進了新的代表形式（例如工廠會議），如此一來，即便沒有加入傳統工會，勞工們也可以有參與工運的機會。在這幾年當中，訴求工會團結聯盟，消除各工會的本位主義心態的聲浪，在工運之中也很強大。因此，唯有在運動風潮衰退，或運動認同減弱之後，勞工們對各自工會的歸屬感才會再度突顯出來。美國草根勞工運動的研究分析也支持了這個論點：在衝突昇高的時期，得到強化的往往是廣泛的集體團結，而非對特定工會的認同（Fantasia 1988）。

在某些情況裡，運動或運動組織表達出來的集體認同，可能會與其他認同的基本原則相牴觸，例如，女性主義運動者便指出，在傳統工運組織，甚至不少「新運動」裡，女人都處在從屬的地位。這一點也反映了一個現象，亦即，行動者的多重認同之間，存在著深刻的矛盾。雖然在婦運和工運之間，還是可以用所謂的「進步運動」領域來自圓其說，但碰到宗教或族裔運動認同的問題時，就行不通了。在宗教與族裔運動勃興的近幾年裡，行動者面臨了嚴酷的兩難，因為，他們很難將其他認同來源整合入強烈的宗教／族群認同。比如說，塞爾維亞人的激進民族主義意識形態，或阿爾及利亞的基本教義派，都讓信奉其義的該族裔女性很難在信奉的同時，也確認自己的性別認同價值（Calhoun 1994a; 亦參見 Fantasia and Hirsch 1995）。

103

## 4.4 認同、集體行動與搭便車（Free Riding）

### 4.4.1 認同與「理性」行動

若要了解個人為什麼願意涉入集體行動的背後機制，「認同」是個很根本但也充滿爭議性的概念。自從六〇年初，Mancur Olson（1963）率先提出關於集體行動的非理性面向之後，相關的辯論已經延續了三十多年。我們只打算用幾句話來簡介 Olson 廣為人知的論點。他的思考起點在於將集體行動定義為社會團體為了集體福祉而發出的抗爭行動。之所以是集體福祉，乃是因為不論個別行動者的具體貢獻為何，只要此一社會團體達成目標，一個廣泛的集體，包括行動者與非行動者，都可均等享受勝利的果實。有時這個「社會團體」包括了特定區域的人，例如地方性的環保組織成功地控管當地社區的轎車數量之後，當地居民無論是否對運動有貢獻，都可以享受到「乾淨

對認同運動中環境的反映

迅速運動瓦解



空氣」的集體福祉。有時這個「社會團體」的組成乃是基於特定的素質，例如女性投票權運動成功之後，無論個別女性是否參與了該運動，她都可享受到此一權利。而如果地區商業聯盟成功地促使政府投下巨資，改善當地的大眾交通，而所有的商業經營者都會獲利，就算沒有參加聯盟。從工具理性的判斷來說，集體福祉的性質決定了集體行動的非理性。換言之，為了製造集體福利，個別行動者不但要賠上心力，又得承擔失敗的代價，而那些沒有付出的人，卻可以坐享其成，既然如此，還願意投入集體行動的人，根本就稱不上是「理性」的行動者。

104 因此，為了讓集體行動發生，運動組織必須能夠強迫其成員去行動，或者提供選擇性誘因（selective incentives），亦即，讓參加集體行動的行動者能夠比一般人獲得更多利益。同樣的問題也適用於大團體——或者說，適用於那些不因個別成員的付出與否而影響集體效果的團體。在大型團體裡，兩個因素增加了動員的困難：首先，人數太多，難以協調；其次，諸如聲望、尊敬或友誼等在小團體中管用的社會誘因，都隨著團體的增大而逐漸失去其有效性。

Olson 所提出論點，果然引起了截然不同的反應。<sup>13</sup> 有些學者延伸了選擇性誘因的概念，將團結與規範類型的報償也包括在內。這至少又可以區分為內、外在選擇性誘因兩種。外在選擇性誘因，包括個人對於該團體的期待；更廣泛來說，在面臨集體的決定或否決議題的時刻，這便成為團體或其他社會行動者可以運用的報酬或獎懲。內在選擇性誘因則包括了一些機制，得以促使個人賦予集體行動特定的規範價值，或從中得到一種內在的滿足或心靈洗滌體驗（Opp 1989: 58-9）。根據許多學者對於個人參與的研究結果，當參與者提到所謂的「選擇性誘因」時，往往指的是團體的價值觀與團結，而非一向被視

13. 關於集體行動的「理性」問題，參見 DeNardo（1985）和 Chong（1991）的討論。Hargreaves Heap 等人（1992）的著作則介紹了理性選擇的理論。

為集體行動最佳誘因的物質動機（Marwell and Ames 1979; Walsh and Warland 1983; Oliver 1984; Opp 1988, 1989）。

然而，將規範與符號因素納入選擇性誘因的範圍，並未解決 Olson 模型忽略了跨時間向度的問題。Olson 論點立基於一種在短時間內作用的微觀經濟理性。然而，集體行動是一個歷時的延續過程，尤其是當我們把運動目標是否達成當作參考點時，更是如此。因此，我們很難決定運動的投資與報償內容。一方面，參與者一定會投入某種資源，而且接受短期的風險。另一方面，由於結果的不確定性，就個人來說，根本難以計算其間的風險，而且目標的達成似乎也仍在未定之數。可是，事實證明，集體認同的存在足以克服這些困難。感覺

105

另一方面，就像我們在前面說過的，集體認同的強度，尤其是內含於其中的排他性，反過來妨礙到行動者的程度，則依情況而定。因此，一個關鍵的問題在於，認同的性質是否以及如何影響了行動者的行動決定。有些學者認為，在特定集體認同所定義的包納性（inclusiveness）與開放性（openness）的程度，以及運動的動員能力之間，呈現出一種反比的關係：「有些團體企圖以一種總括性的我們（an all-inclusive we）來進行動員……這樣的聚合架構只是將『我們』變成了一種個體的聚集，而不是一個潛在的集體行動者……反之，集體行動所採取的乃是敵對的架構」（Gamson 1992b: 85）。

問題因此在於：在某種認同所界定的群體，以及因適當誘因而被動員的支持群眾之間，我們如何能尋找到一個令人滿意的平衡點。<sup>14</sup>

14. Marwell 和 Oliver（1993: 157-79）針對這評論者的反應性質，提出了延申（reach）和選擇（selectivity）的說法。

總括性的、具有彈性的集體認同，將難以建立起能夠精確地識別團體歸屬感的判準，換言之，這種性質的集體認同無法將運動扣連到特定的社會團體、特殊的意識形態、生活風格或文化符碼。不過如此一來，它也增進了運動行動者與外在世界之間的溝通，以及針對各種文化與政治領域發言的能力。另一方面，一個排他性較高的集體認同不但強硬地界定了運動的利益所在，在面對外在世界時，也比較強調運動的孤立性，然而這也同時比較能夠提供行動者某種顯著（選擇性）的誘因，並在運動過程中更加明確地定義行動者及其對手的身份（Friedman and McAdam 1992）。

不過，我們必須了解到，運動如何能結合這兩個彼此矛盾的要素，並非行動者可以單獨操控的。當然，個人會刻意去形塑和操弄認同符號的建構，而且也確實會影響到集體認同的樣貌，換言之，這是策略行動使得上力的部分。但是同樣重要的，甚至更重要的是，長期累積沈澱下來的心態與集體記憶，而這是運動行動者較難控制的部分，更何況，其他的社會行動者（例如媒體，參見 Gitlin 1980; Gamson and Wolfsfeld 1993; van Zoonen 1996），也能夠介入特定集體自我形象的塑造過程。

此外，動員群眾以及動員組織資源或經濟資源之間的差別，也值得探討（Oliver and Marwell 1992）。排他性的集體認同可以明確標定敵人與衝突重心，因此在直接動員支持群眾時，較為有效。而總括性的認同，原則上比較有利於動員後勤資源（Diani and Donati 1996）。運動組織的資源動員策略，逐漸採取傳統的行銷手法，例如直接透過郵件進行勸募（McFarland 1984; Donati 1996; Jordan and Maloney 1997）。雖然這類訊息往往經過精心設計，以符合特定的群眾特質，不過比起運動者透過個人網絡所散播的訊息，其內容還是相當具有包容性的（Snow et al. 1980）。因此，標舉總括性認同的行動動員，比較容易爭取到一般大眾的同情。反之，強調特定文化與政治認同的運

動組織，多半只能打動那些對其訴求由衷支持的人士。

#### 4.4.2 認同與「非理性」行動

雖然上述觀點指出了光從經濟觀點去解讀集體行動的侷限性，而且也應考慮非物質誘因，但這仍是一種理性主義的思維模型。其他的社會運動學者則對此模型持保留的態度，也就是說，他們覺得，以這種功利取向的個人行動模型來分析集體行動，是很有問題的（Fireman and Gamson 1979; Marx Ferree 1992; Melucci 1989）。把非物質誘因或認同因素，視為計算行動的投資報酬率的判準，之所以不恰當的原因，主要在於這些取向太過於偏向微觀經濟學的基本預設，尤其是「理性行動者」的概念，因而認定行動者是孤立的個體，根據個人的喜好與投資報酬率分析，能夠從諸多行動可能選項之中，做出最佳的選擇。

認定社會行動者總是會出於理性原則而行動，是個頗具爭議性的預設。首先，許多學者都指出，非理性因素如情緒、情感和感覺等等，也會引導行動的進行（Melucci 1989; Flam 1990; Marx Ferree 1992; Taylor and Whittier 1995; Scheff 1994a, 1994b; Jasper and Paulsen 1995; Jasper 1997）。支持此一論點的學者認為，理性主義觀點抬頭乃是由於歷史的偶然發展。強調行動的理性成份，尤其在一九六〇年代，主要是為了批判功能論對社會運動的詮釋方式，因為功能論傾向於把運動矮化到非理性的呈現，只是一種社會過程落差下的產物（Taylor and Whittier 1995: 179-80）。然而，這並不表示，理性和情緒之間是無法兼容並蓄的（Turner and Killian 1987）。

批判者還指出，理性主義觀點忽略了一個事實：社會行動者的行動與決策，乃是發生在一個與其他行動者彼此扣連的交互網絡之中。實際上，個人參與行動的決定，與其對其他行動者的期待，不無關

\*非  
→已推  
人感  
判斷



係。行動者獨立決策的能力，不但與其所屬的社會階級有關，而且受限於權力與社會資源的分配失衡現實（Marx Ferree 1992）。一旦我們了解到，即使是經濟行動也受限於行動者的人際關係與規範網絡（White 1988; DiMaggio and Powell 1991; Granovetter 1985），就會發現，如果從理性行動的角度來解析集體現象的話，的確大有問題。

事實上，行動者下定決心去追求的利益，並非經濟誘因模型所能論斷，這又衍生了另一個問題（Fireman and Gamson 1979: 23-7）。把個人利益與集體利益相提並論的正當性，仍然有效，因為與集體動員相關的若干「好處」（goods），並非只由特定社會團體所掌控，而是依附於集體行動而存在。例如，在集體行動發生之前，不會出現集體認同的強化過程，也不會產生像本章開頭提到的那些參與女權運動的女性所體驗到的私人與公共生活變化。這些好處是行動過程的產物，如果行動未曾發生，它們就不可能浮現。個人是否願意為了這些好處而付出，是一個不易回答的兩難問題，而我們若要解釋參與行動背後的動機的話，就必須超越 Olson 的理論觀點，以及他對於公共利益的定義。

最後，理性主義模型的最後一個預設，亦即，個人決定行動與否的偏好結構具有一定的穩定性，似乎也不適用於集體行動的詮釋。要是集體行動只涉及某一個時間點的決定，例如是否參與某一次示威，那麼倒還可能說得通。但是，集體行動往往是長時間發展的過程，因此，引導行動的動機，以及潛在的行動關懷，在行動者的關係脈絡中不斷受到修正，而是否繼續參與的決定，也不斷地被更新。何況，許多集體行動的參與者在被動員的時候，並不是根據一個穩定的、既有的集體認同，而是在行動過程中不斷發展、建構的認同感（Hirsch 1990; Fantasia 1988），也就是說，我們並不認為所謂穩定偏好結構的論點能夠站得住腳。

總而言之，從理性行動的模型出發的結果，產生了一種不切實際

的行動觀，既未能考慮到行動的動態過程，也忽略了認同乃是一個創造的過程。此外，採用理性選擇的觀點，還意外地模糊了利益所扮演的角色：行動者本身不再被視為運動訴求和主張的承載者，而變成只是為了從中獲得最大誘因才參與集體行動的人。最後，把團結感與規範性誘因也納入此一模型的結果，只是無限引申了「誘因」概念，反而導致一種套套邏輯（Fireman and Gamson 1979）。

這個爭論其實涵括了社會科學整個領域，因此在集體行動研究的脈絡裡，我們實在不太可能找出一個綜合雙方意見的折衷之道（Cohen 1985）。理性選擇理論的支持者在面對認同論者的批判時，曾做出回應，尤其是他們試著去分析行動者在複雜的交互關係裡的位置，從而修正了原先的孤立行動者假設，並發展出一種較切合實際的行動觀（Marwell and Oliver 1993; Gould 1993; Opp and Gern 1993; Oberschall and Kim 1996; Heckathorn 1996）。

109

## 4.5 小結

在集體行動中，認同的建構乃是一個基本的成份。這使得涉入衝突的行動者能夠把自己看成是某種利益、價值與共同歷史的承載者——或是基於這些因素而分隔出來的群體。在種種的過程中，認同得以發展。這些衝突包括：自我與他者對現實的定義的衝突；把認同視為行動者某些固有特質的「再發現」，抑或是某種符號性的「創造」，在認知上所形成的拉鋸戰；以及，對於支撐認同建構過程的儀式的歧見。此外，足以影響認同定義的公共條件，也具有舉足輕重的地位。

歸屬感並不必然具有排他性。反之，行動者經常會去認同一些在若干基本議題上立場分歧的不同集體。分析集體行動時，一個很核心的問題在於，我們該如何重新建構各種運動認同之間的緊張關係。最

不斷  
修正  
改變  
而目標

後，就算是將集體行動視為某種理性行為，當我們在解讀集體行動的時候，認同仍然扮演著關鍵性的角色。很多人認為，集體認同提供了特定的判準以評價行動的中、長程投資與報酬問題。不過，同樣也有很多人相信，運用認同概念根本無濟於事。這是由於他們認為，認同包含了強烈的情緒與情感因素，而且具有高度的爭議性與建構性，因此很難將之扣連到策略性比較高的行為。

## 第五章 運動網絡

### 5.1 社會網絡與個人參與

### 5.2 個人與組織

#### 5.2.1 獨佔歸屬

#### 5.2.2 多重歸屬

### 5.3 跨組織網絡

### 5.4 社會運動網絡既是行動的限制，也是行動的產物


#### 5.4.1 結盟作為工具選擇的結果

#### 5.4.2 運動網絡與衝突

#### 5.4.3 運動網絡與政治過程

### 5.5 小結

## **Institutions and Social Mobilization**




The **Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS)** was established as an autonomous organization in 1968. It is a regional centre dedicated to the study of socio-political, security and economic trends and developments in Southeast Asia and its wider geostrategic and economic environment. The Institute's research programmes are the Regional Economic Studies (RES, including ASEAN and APEC), Regional Strategic and Political Studies (RSPS), and Regional Social and Cultural Studies (RSCS).

**ISEAS Publishing**, an established academic press, has issued more than 2,000 books and journals. It is the largest scholarly publisher of research about Southeast Asia from within the region. ISEAS Publishing works with many other academic and trade publishers and distributors to disseminate important research and analyses from and about Southeast Asia to the rest of the world.

# Institutions and Social Mobilization

*The Chinese Education Movement  
in Malaysia, 1951-2011*

ANG MING CHEE



**INSTITUTE OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN STUDIES**

*Singapore*

First published in Singapore in 2014 by  
ISEAS Publishing  
Institute of Southeast Asian Studies  
30 Heng Mui Keng Terrace, Pasir Panjang  
Singapore 119614

*E-mail:* [publish@iseas.edu.sg](mailto:publish@iseas.edu.sg) • *Website:* [bookshop.iseas.edu.sg](http://bookshop.iseas.edu.sg)

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.

© 2014 Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore

The responsibility for facts and opinions in this publication rests exclusively with the author and her interpretation do not necessarily reflect the views or the policy of the publisher or its supporters.

---

#### ISEAS Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data

---

Ang, Ming Chee.

Institutions and social mobilization : the Chinese education movement in Malaysia, 1951–2011

1. Malaixiya Hua xiao dong shi lian he hui zong hui.
2. Malaixiya Hua xiao jiao shi hui zong hui.
3. Chinese language—Government policy—Malaysia.
4. Schools, Chinese—Government policy—Malaysia.
5. Chinese—Education—Government policy—Malaysia.
6. Social movements—Malaysia.
7. Associations, institutions, etc.—Political aspects—Malaysia.
- I. Title.

II. Title: Chinese education movement in Malaysia, 1951–2011.

LC201.7 M3A58

2014

ISBN 978-981-4459-98-3 (soft cover)

ISBN 978-981-4459-99-0 (E-book PDF)

---

*Cover photo:* The foundation stone that symbolizes the Chinese education movement is located at the movement headquarters in Kajang, Selangor. Photo taken by Ang Ming Chee.

Typeset by International Typesetters Pte Ltd  
Printed in Singapore by Markono Print Media Pte Ltd

**For papa and mama**





# CONTENTS

<i>List of Tables, Figures, and Maps</i>	ix
<i>Acknowledgements</i>	xi
<i>Abbreviation</i>	xiii
1. Institutions and Social Mobilization	1
2. Nation Building and Formation of Social Movement	38
3. Challenges and Adaptations	71
4. Leaders, Alliances, and Politics	100
5. Mobilization Machinery	133
6. Social Mobilization in Non-Liberal Democracies	166
<i>Appendices</i>	
Appendix 1 List of <i>Jiaozong</i> 's Members	187
Appendix 2 List of <i>Dongzong</i> 's Members	190
Appendix 3 List of Independent Chinese Secondary Schools in Malaysia	191
Appendix 4 Distribution of <i>Dongzong</i> Executive Branch Staff by Academic Qualification, Age, and Years of Service (1995–2011)	196
<i>Bibliography</i>	197
<i>Glossary of Non-English Text</i>	253
<i>Index</i>	267
<i>About the Author</i>	279



# LIST OF TABLES, FIGURES, AND MAPS

## Tables

3.1	Public Funding for Primary Schools under Malaysia Plans (1972–2010)	75
3.2	Characteristics of a Chinese School	90
5.1	Malaysian Independent Chinese Secondary Schools Working Committee Sponsorship Programme (1985–2011)	142
5.2	Sponsorship Programme for Chinese Primary Schools Development (1989–2011)	150
5.3	New Era College Sponsorship Programme (1998–2011)	153

## Figures

3.1	Distribution of Primary Schools in Malaysia (1970–2011)	77
3.2	Distribution of Primary School Students in Malaysia (1970–2011)	78
3.3	Distribution of Students by Ethnicity in Chinese Primary Schools (1989–99)	80
3.4	Changes in Membership of the Chinese Schoolteachers' Associations (1982–2011)	86
4.1	The Alliance of Seven Chinese Education-Related Guilds and Associations	122

5.1	Organizational Chart of <i>Dongzong</i> and Malaysian Independent Chinese Secondary Schools Working Committee	137
5.2	Distribution of Unified Examination Certificate Candidates (1973–2011)	139
5.3	Distribution of Independent Chinese Secondary School Students in Malaysia (1973–2011)	140
5.4	Growth of <i>Dongzong</i> 's Executive Branch (1953–2011)	143
5.5	Organizational Chart of <i>Jiaozong</i> and the <i>Dongjiaozong</i> Chinese Primary Schools Working Committee	148
5.6	Distribution of New Era College Students (1998–2011)	154

### Maps

4.1	The Alliance of Fifteen Leading Chinese Guilds and Associations	109
5.1	Southeast Asian Chinese Language Teaching Convention	155

## ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This doctoral dissertation-turn-monograph project would not have been possible without the help of a lot of people. My utmost gratitude goes first to my doctoral supervisor, Jamie Seth Davidson, for his enduring support, which has helped me overcome many challenges during my candidacy. I also thank my thesis committee members, Hussin Mutalib, and Goh Beng Lan, as well as my examiner, Maznah Mohamad, for their valuable feedback.

Special appreciation goes to all interviewees and resource persons, many whom are not named in this book, but have selflessly shared their valuable opinions and experiences with me. I would like to credit the following institutions for their support: the National University of Singapore for providing most of the financial resources for my fieldwork in Malaysia; *Dongzong, Jiaozong*, Centre for Malaysian Chinese Studies, Lim Lian Geok Foundation Centre, *Kwangwahyitpoh, Sinchew Daily*, Penang Heritage Trust, National Library of Singapore, National Library of Malaysia, National Library of Taiwan, Universiti Sains Malaysia, and Penang Institute for allowing me to access their valuable collections; the National Chengchi University (Taiwan) and Lund University (Sweden) for hosting me while I was working on this book.

The revision process of the manuscript has been very challenging due to my limited language proficiency and lack of access to resources that are located in Malaysia. Therefore, I am hugely indebted to the endless efforts of Tey Li Li for proofreading and improving the manuscript's drafts, and Teo Sue Ann for her assistance in acquiring the much needed facts and resources. There are many individuals, who have not been named, but have helped me over the past seven years in completing this research. I thank them all.

Last but not least, I owe my achievements today to my beloved family: my parents and siblings in particular, who have been supportive and understanding during my long absence all these years. Their love has been the source of my motivation to continue pursuing my dreams and to be a better person.

*Ming Chee*  
*Lund, Sweden*  
*28 February 2014*

## ABBREVIATION

BN	National Front coalition ( <i>Barisan Nasional</i> )
DAP	Democratic Action Party
<i>Dongjiaozong</i>	Alliance of <i>Dongzong</i> and <i>Jiaozong</i> (董教总)
<i>Dongzong</i>	United Chinese School Committees' Association of Malaysia (马来西亚华校董事联合会总会)
Gerakan	Malaysian People's Movement Party ( <i>Parti Gerakan Rakyat Malaysia</i> )
<i>Jiaozong</i>	United Chinese Schoolteachers' Association of Malaysia (马来西亚华校教师会总会)
MCA	Malaysian Chinese Association (马来西亚华人公会)
MCP	Malayan Communist Party
MPAJA	Malayan People's Anti-Japanese Army
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
PAS	Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party ( <i>Parti Islam Semalaysia</i> )
PR	People's Alliance ( <i>Pakatan Rakyat</i> )
Suqiu Committee	Malaysian Chinese Organisations' Election Appeals Committee
UMNO	United Malays National Organisation ( <i>Pertubuhan Kebangsaan Melayu Bersatu</i> )





---

## INSTITUTIONS AND SOCIAL MOBILIZATION

The Chinese education movement in Malaysia is arguably one of the oldest nationwide social movements in Asia. It has ceaselessly engaged in non-violent contentious politics against a non-liberal democratic regime since 1951. Against all odds, the Chinese education movement has been able to overcome many on-going and changing constraints to persist in pursuing its agenda. This book seeks to answer the many puzzling questions that have led to its persistency and possibilities.

Over the years, the state has sought to constrain the Chinese education movement, its organizations, and its supporters through a range of restrictive regulations and discriminatory policies. Unlike liberal democratic regimes, the state in Malaysia has been dominated by a powerful executive branch, especially so during Mahathir Mohamad's tenure as the longest serving prime minister of the country (1981–2003). A weak system of checks and balances has enabled the National Front coalition (*Barisan Nasional*, BN) ruling regime, led by the United Malays National Organisation (*Pertubuhan Kebangsaan Melayu Bersatu*, UMNO), to weaken the rule of law, restrict media freedom, manipulate law enforcement, and exploit the distribution of state resources to political ends, amongst others.

The lack of recourse to democratic institutions, coupled with the imposition of state-directed restrictions, has yet to bring the Chinese education movement to its knees, however. Instead, this movement has adroitly adapted and established clientelistic relationships with ethnic

Chinese politicians within the ruling regime in exchange for benefits for the movement. While other social movements in Malaysia — such as the trade union movements or the Islamic movements — have either faded or been crushed, this tactic by the Chinese education movement has prevented it from facing a similar fate.<sup>1</sup> In return, politicians — mostly those associated with the Malaysian Chinese Association (马来西亚华人公会, MCA) or the Malaysian People's Movement Party (*Parti Gerakan Rakyat Malaysia*, Gerakan) — make opportunistic use of the collaboration to achieve political gains by acting as brokers between the ruling regime and the Chinese education movement.

Notably, the broader social movement literature — largely predicated on the experiences of stable, industrialized Western democratic states — has not paid sufficient attention to the survival of oppositional social movements in repressive states. Concomitantly, the literature has emphasized the important role of structural institutions, namely, resources, political opportunities, and identities. Problems and tensions arise, however, when these concepts are applied indiscriminately across cultures and state systems. The nature and practice of institutions within single-party-dominated or non-liberal democratic states (commonly found in developing countries) have a different, yet significant impact on the understanding of social movements. The frequent emergence of social movements as vehicles for channelling social — and sometimes political — grievances in non-liberal democratic states points to the urgent need to develop a better understanding of such phenomena empirically and theoretically.

This book argues that structural institutions within non-liberal democratic states are, in various degrees, significantly influenced by informal relationships — that is, those built on interpersonal networks and trust. Such informal relationships seem to have similar, if not greater, effects on state-social movement interactions than official and structural relations do. In other words, social movements in non-liberal democratic states develop parallel, at times overlapping, formal, and informal institutions to prolong their existence and increase their opportunities to effect change.

This chapter first surveys the background of the case study, proposes the research questions and makes four explanatory propositions. It then examines the mainstream social movement literature, identifies its gaps, and traces the rise of social movement studies in non-liberal

democratic contexts. The theoretical framework correlates three main perspectives on the role of extra-institutional variables in the execution of structural institutions: (1) the intra-movement perspective focuses on the roles of social movement organizations and movement leaders in mobilizing movement activities within non-liberal democratic states, (2) the movement-state perspective concerns the dynamic interaction and the movement's actors through various movement repertoires, and (3) the inter-movement perspective explores the role of interpersonal bonds in forging and strengthening networks and alliances. Subsequently, this chapter presents the study's significance in the context of Malaysia's pluralistic society and non-liberal democracy. An elaboration of the research methodology, limitations of the research, and a general roadmap of the book concludes this introduction.

## THE CHINESE EDUCATION MOVEMENT

As early as 1920, leading Chinese community leaders in the Straits Settlements of Penang and Malacca protested against the British colonial administration's efforts to exert order over Chinese vernacular schools in Malaya through the 1920 Registration of Schools Ordinance.<sup>2</sup> Loosely structured and lacking the capacity to respond uniformly to changing developments, pre-World War II resistance was confined to towns and districts. Although activists enjoyed the support of the local Chinese population, in particular the Chinese-speaking community, most attempts to oppose colonial policies ended poorly.<sup>3</sup> The British simply expelled these agitators. Not until after World War II did the movement coalesce into an organization-led entity.

The Chinese education movement formally began in 1951, led by a group of Chinese schoolteachers who precipitated a sense of crisis in the local Chinese society after the release of the *Report of the Committee on Malay Education* (Barnes Report). This report recommended all vernacular schools to be abolished and replaced by a single system of teaching primary schools using only English and Malay as mediums of instruction. The early years of the movement witnessed collaboration amongst three major Chinese associations of the time: The United Chinese Schoolteachers' Association of Malaysia (马来西亚华校教师会总会, *Jiaozong*), the United Chinese School Committees' Association of Malaysia (马来西亚华校董事联合会总会, *Dongzong*), and MCA.

They were drawn together under the framework of the Grand Three Associations of Chinese Education (三大机构华文教育中央委员会, Grand Three) and sought to defend the status of Chinese education during Malaya's rocky and uncertain transition from a colony to a new nation state.

However, the collaboration of the Grand Three began to break apart in 1960 when MCA President Lim Chong Eu (林苍佑) and his supporters — many of them sympathizers of Chinese education movements — left MCA over disagreements with the then Prime Minister Abdul Rahman (1957–70). When the new leadership of MCA dropped its uncritical support for the Chinese education movement, it marked a historical turning point for the movement, where *Dongzong* and *Jiaozong* began their long journey of resistance as *Dongjiaozong* (董教总).

The Chinese education movement has fluctuated along with the political developments in Malaysia. In 1965, the Chinese population in Malaysia suffered a dramatic drop from 42 per cent in 1963 to 25 per cent after Singapore departed from the Federation of Malaysia, putting the Chinese in the new state of Malaysia at a political disadvantage (Ongkili 1985, p. 154). Many Chinese communities began to relate the right to operate Chinese schools in a “Chinese way” to the preservation of their culture and to the security of their ethnic identity amid heavy-handed nation-building policies and Islamization by the ruling regime. It was during this time that *Dongjiaozong* made a name for itself nationally through its unsuccessful efforts to establish Malaysia's first independent Chinese university, Merdeka University (独立大学).

Today, outside of China and Taiwan, only Malaysia has a complete Chinese education system, and it is the only country in Southeast Asia that has managed to perpetuate the Chinese education system established during the colonial era. The Chinese education movement led by *Dongjiaozong* remains a legitimate organization in the eyes of the Chinese-speaking community in Malaysia. *Dongjiaozong* regularly conducts activities such as seminars, donation campaigns, and press conferences, and submits memorandums to the authorities to put forth the movement's demands. In the face of a repressive state, the movement has refrained from organizing extra-constitutional or violent-oriented activities to avoid confrontations with the state.

The movement manoeuvres within the country's limited democratic space to mobilize and maintain resistance through the networks of Chinese school communities at the local, state, and national levels. Thus far, it has continued to exercise its influence from within and beyond the state to promote the status of Chinese language and Chinese education in state policymaking. To develop a better understanding of the conditions that have induced the processes and persistence of such a movement, this book brings a social movement perspective into the analysis to illuminate the historical and cultural experiences of the struggles of the Chinese education movement beyond the mainstream, Western-centric social movement literature.

## RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND PROPOSITIONS

The principal question this book seeks to answer is: How does a minority social movement persist in pushing its agenda despite facing on-going constraints imposed by a non-liberal democratic state?

The secondary questions of this book include:

- (a) What are the factors that have motivated the movement's activists (and general supporters), and how have these factors changed over time?
- (b) How do social movement organizations sustain a prolonged social movement?
- (c) How have the interactions between the challengers and state authorities influenced the movement's trajectory, and how have these interactions changed over time?
- (d) How has Malaysia, a non-liberal democratic state, constrained the movement? Why has the state yet to terminate the movement? Has it chosen not to do so, or have there been constraints placed on its repressive capacities?

To come to grips with these questions, the author suggests the following four propositions:

### Proposition 1

*Continuous threats and attempts by state authorities to dilute the identity of the ethnic minority have shaped a culture of resistance that has become a key source of motivation for the social movement.*

Threats by the Malay-dominated regime to dilute the identity of the minority Chinese and to assimilate them into the Malay-dominated society have ironically created a powerful desire amongst the Chinese to preserve their cultural distinctiveness as a last-ditch effort to avoid being marginalized by the state (Means 1991). This desire is manifested as a culture of resistance against the state through the Chinese education movement (Anderson, B. 1991; and Scott 1976, p. 33). This study argues that the volume of threats of assimilation from the regime is positively related to the collective support received by the movement from the Chinese community. The threats have unwittingly helped to promote unity, strengthen solidarity, and overcome movement supporters' differences in dialect, political preference, social status, and economic class.<sup>4</sup>

## Proposition 2

*The combination of Western-style bureaucratization with a distinct Chinese characteristic has produced a hybrid social movement organization that acts as a sustainable platform to attend to the managerial and mobilization needs of the movement.*

The Chinese education movement has managed to develop adequate strength to survive Malaysia's political hothouse by running a social movement organization that is formulated around loosely defined rules under its powerful leaders. The Constitution and regulated procedural system of the movement have transformed the traditional management operating style into a more result-oriented and responsive one. A bottom-up leader selection system has empowered and strengthened the traditional role of movement leaders who are vested with formal legitimacy to represent the movement in its interactions with the state. The social movement organization recruits individuals with a multitude of professional capabilities as full-time and salaried staff to maintain and execute the movement's activities, thus overcoming the free rider problems that commonly arise from the large and extensive grassroots support base of the movement.

## Proposition 3

*Movement activists sustain interactions with the non-liberal democratic state through interpersonal bonds, which have proven to be a more effective platform than structural institutions.*

Structural institutions within non-liberal democracy are imposed in varied degrees according to the interpersonal relationship between the power-executer and power-receiver. Lacking a stable channel for collective bargaining, movement activists rely on interpersonal bonds and offstage influences to deliver their demands and interact with the state. The significance of relational institutions is, however, inversely related to the effectiveness of democratic institutions. Notably, over the course of its development, the Chinese education movement has grown increasingly dependent on both structural and relational institutions, although the latter tend to dominate.

#### **Proposition 4**

*Malaysia's non-liberal democratic system has provided a limited but significant channel for political competition, which, in turn, has opened up opportunities for negotiation and thereby limited violent expression by state authorities and social movement activists alike.*

Non-liberal democratic regimes may infuse state bureaucracy, mediate patronage, dispense clientelistic benefits and avail partial democratic procedures by limiting but not extinguishing civil liberties, and distorting but not excessively manipulating electoral procedures (Milne and Mauzy 1999, pp. 180–81; and Zakaria 1989). Therefore, although political contenders hardly have room to manoeuvre or curb politicking, and such electoral processes are often symbolically rather than politically significant, the voters' choice in selecting its government via elections remains an important political institution in non-liberal democratic states (Case 2004). States with a lower quality of democracy will need to acquire legitimacy by winning elections and therefore tend to utilize carrot-and-stick strategies — that is, compromise and collaboration versus pressure and threats — to win support from citizens. It is within this tightly contended political environment that social movement actors may manoeuvre by striking deals with politicians. For example, by providing necessary support to the ruling regime during elections, the Chinese education movement has been rewarded with favourable responses from the regime.

#### **RESOURCES, OPPORTUNITIES, AND IDENTITIES**

Contemporary social movement studies have their origins in the collective behavioural literature of the 1940s and 1950s that examined riots,

crowds, and mass hysteria. These works considered the participants of these activities as irrational, dysfunctional, and abhorrent aberrations in the functioning of a modern social system.<sup>5</sup> In contrast to these studies that stressed the integration and equilibrium inherent in social systems, contemporary social movement studies pointed to conflicts and struggles as focal points of social systems.

Social movements are a series of sustained interactions and collective actions, contentious performances, displays, and campaigns by ordinary people outside established political institutions (Tarrow 1994; Thomas 2001; and Tilly 2004). These people share collective claims, common purposes, and solidarity to challenge authorities in order to change elements of the socioeconomic and political structure, or to change the distribution and exercise of power in society. Such collective actions are culturally oriented, socially conflictual, and based on the networks or movement areas of these individuals (Melucci 1985, pp. 793–99; and Touraine 1988, p. 68).

Social movements differ from political parties and interest groups. Political parties nominate candidates in elections and aim to win formal control of the state in order to implement its programmes, whereas interest groups and social movements do not principally engage in these activities. Social movements and interest groups overlap in terms of having the flexibility of being formally or informally organized to influence public policy in their areas of concern; some social movements may transform into interest groups when the need arises (Key 1964, pp. 9–10, 155; Thomas 2001, p. 5; and Truman 1951, pp. 33, 135–36). However, social movements cover broader issues, consist of heterogeneous membership, pursue transformational goals, engage in contentious interactions with the state, and have less access to political institutions than interest groups customarily do (Bashevkin 1996, pp. 134–59; Heinz et al. 1993; Kitschelt 2003; Smith, J. 2008, p. 109; and Walker 1991). Social movements, interest groups, and the state continuously and ineluctably influence each other. Movements influence state actors by setting agendas and suggesting new political strategies. The state, in return, influences movements by proactively employing overt, and occasionally covert, repression measures, as well as setting the rules for counter-movement activities (Goldstone 2003, p. 24).

Given that social movements involve collective behaviours and actions, how or why rational individuals act collectively in a sustained manner has puzzled scholars for a long time. Despite evident diversity



in their processes and outcomes, social movements share commonalities and principles that make comparative research and generalizations possible (Coy 1978; Davis et al. 2005; della Porta and Caiani 2009; Edelman 2001; Escobar and Alvarez 1992; Klandermans 1993; Klandermans, Kriesi, and Tarrow 1988; Veltmeyer 2004; Zirakzadeh 1997; and Zurcher and Curtis 1973). Resistance entails costs and usually requires such stimuli as grievances and deprivation, although such stimuli do not axiomatically translate into movement activity (Zald 1992). Quite famously, Mancur Olson argued that “unless the number of individuals in a group is quite small, or unless there is coercion or some other special device to make individuals act in their common interest, rational, self-interested individuals will not act to achieve their common or group interests” (Olson 1965, p. 2). These free rider problems are especially common in large social movement groups.

Certain scholars have begun to recognize and emphasize the importance of resource mobilization in solving the problem of free riders and achieving movement success (Gamson 1975; Jenkins and Perrow 1977; Lipsky 1968; McCarthy, Smith, and Zald 1973; Snyder and Tilly 1972; Tilly 1978; and Wilson 1973, p. 131). Any given society possesses external resources (money, time, media, facilities, and material), as well as internal resources (members’ capacity, commitments, and moral support), that can be put to use by movement leaders to coordinate, organize, mobilize, and ultimately, agitate (McCarthy and Zald 1977; Oliver and Marwell 1992; Olson 1965; and Tilly 1978). Mobilization is facilitated by the internal organization and structure of the collective, known as a social movement organization (Oberschall 1993, p. 56).

John McCarthy and Mayer Zald, two leading scholars in the resource mobilization school, placed special emphasis on the role of professional social movement organizations in solving collective action problems (McCarthy and Zald 1977). They defined a social movement organization as “a complex, or formal organization that identifies its goals with the preferences of a social movement or a counter-movement and attempts to implement these goals” (McCarthy and Zald 1977, p. 1217). Social movement activities may be organized by one or more social movement organizations. In some cases, the social movement organizations themselves constitute the movement; in others, the movement has no social movement organization. Nevertheless, the resource mobilization school tends to overstate the importance of external resources without explaining where and how these resources can be generated. It also fails

to explain why social movements have not appeared in all countries where there are grievances and sufficient resources to mobilize people to act on their grievances.

The political opportunities school arose in response to the limitations of the resource mobilization approach. A principal proponent of this perspective, Doug McAdam, argued that political opportunities, a heightened sense of political efficacy, and the development of institutions, played a central role in shaping the civil rights movement in the United States, for example (McAdam 1982). The political process model places great emphasis on the structural constraints and opportunities that social movements face. These include political pluralism, internal fragmentation within political systems, receptivity of political systems to organized protests, as well as support and facilitation of political elites. McAdam asserted that the emergence of social movements was determined by expanding opportunities, indigenous organizational strength of the population, and cognitive liberation. The success of mobilization or politicization hinges on the opportunities afforded by the group in question (McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 1997; 2001). The opportunities present themselves when there is a shift in the institutional structure or the ideological disposition of those in power. Although this approach has been successful in justifying the growth and development of social movements based on grievances, material needs, and accumulation of resources, it cannot adequately explain how social movements based on ideas and grievances related to ways of life could arise.

The European-focused social movement literature sought to tackle this problem. These scholars argued that advanced industrialization had created structural possibilities for conflicts, especially with the widening of access to higher education and the en masse entry of women into the labour market (della Porta and Diani 1999). Individuals opposed the state's and market's intrusion into their social life and asserted their rights to determine their private identities and affective lives (Melucci 1980; 1985; 1989; 1996). These new social movements, such as preservation of the environment, human rights, as well as gay and lesbian rights, foregrounded quality of life issues (Offe 1985). The new social movement paradigm places importance on the actors and their abilities to capture the innovative characteristics of movements. The formation and creation of personal, collective, and public identities were defined by Alberto Melucci

as “an interactive and shared definition produced by several interacting individuals who are concerned with the orientations of their actions, as well as the field of opportunities and constraints in which their actions take place” (Melucci 1989, p. 34).

This definition is supplemented by Joseph Gusfield, who saw that the members of the group “agreed upon definition of boundaries” and provided the basis that enabled shared beliefs, thus making collective action possible (Gusfield 1994, p. 15). This literature associated the formation and mobilization of movements based on the individualized, middle-class lifestyles and the diversity of social identity in post-industrial societies, especially in Western Europe. It went beyond the resource mobilization and political process schools that emphasized the availability of resources and political opportunities as key factors in giving rise to social movements. However, these three research agendas have been largely developed in the context of industrialized North American and Western European states with stable democratic regimes. The limitations of these camps are thrown into stark relief when their concepts and arguments are indiscriminately applied across cultures and state systems (Adams 2002, pp. 24–26; and Escobar and Alvarez 1992, pp. 317–19).

### **Social Movements in Non-Liberal Democratic States**

Liberal regimes are able to perform because they are based on highly institutionalized rules and democratic procedures such as constitutions, elections, and courts that structure social interactions by constraining or enabling actors’ behaviours (Campbell 2004, p. 1; Carey 2000, p. 735; Hodgson 2004, p. 424; Knight 1992, p. 2; and North 1990, pp. 1–4). Institutions within liberal democratic states invite comparison and evaluation, with emphasis on the reproduction and stability of social order. Nonetheless, societies’ access to institutions varies according to local legal settings, institutional hierarchies, cultural orientations, and type of regimes (Scheingold 2004). Non-liberal democratic regimes, for example, tend to control institutional access tightly to strengthen their capacity in achieving economic, political, or social goals. Institutions are frequently arranged according to the styles and preferences of the power-holders, who consist of heterogeneous agents, each with divergent interests (DiMaggio and Powell 1983; Evans 1989; March and Olsen 1984; and Skocpol 1979; 1985, p. 9).

Non-liberal democratic states, either of the military or civilian type, do differ in the degree of legal and institutional legitimacy. Today, save for North Korea, most non-liberal democracies range from semi-democracies (those with mixed or hybrid characteristics) to those deemed more authoritarian (Helmke and Levitsky 2006, pp. 1–2; Jopple 1995, p. x; and Marsh 2006, p. 1). At the illiberal end, authoritarian regimes rule without accountability, enabling abusive state actors to enjoy absolute impunity (Linz 1975, p. 264; and Mainwaring 2003). According to Francisco Panizza, instrumental authoritarian regimes may be democratically elected but the regimes would not hesitate to defer democracy temporarily through coercive military rule during political turmoil, such as brutal repression of open demonstrations (Panizza 1995, p. 183). These regimes do not tolerate social activism, and tend to quell contention through hefty penalties.

Hybrid regimes can be both authoritative and competitive. Hybrid regimes have been categorized by scholars according to the proportion of authoritarian and democratic features (Levitsky and Way 2002). For starters, Andreas Schedler separated electoral democracies from electoral authoritarianism, with the former having free and fair elections that comply with minimal democratic norms, while such criteria are absent for the latter (Schedler 2002). Within electoral authoritarianism regimes, Larry Diamond distinguishes competitive authoritarian regimes from hegemonic electoral authoritarian regimes (Diamond 1999). The former are instituted via multi-party electoral competition and a significant parliamentary opposition, while these challenges and processes are politically closed in the latter (Diamond 2002; Levitsky and Way 2002; and Schedler 2002, pp. 37–38). There are also repressive yet responsive semi-democratic regimes, which respond to pressure and demands from society, but do so through co-optation, neutralization, and suppression to control social conflict (Crouch 1996, pp. 236–47).

Most hybrid regimes consist of some features of formal democratic institutions with tightly-contained liberalism, resulting in little real competition for power. Usually, hybrid regimes are controlled by a small number of individuals, rather than democratic institutions, and the rule of law (Ottaway 2003, pp. 4–5). Such manipulation of power sees some hybrid regimes intervene aggressively in the economy through skewed state policies, and use performance legitimacy to substitute procedural legitimacy. These hybrid regimes tend to manipulate state resources to establish political patronage with their supporters, or frequently abuse

the law, resulting in poor representation of citizens' interests and low public confidence in state institutions (Diamond 1999; Forsyth 2001; Foweraker 1995, p. 2; Goodwin, Jasper, and Khattra 1999; Jones 1997; and Laothamatas 1997, p. 12).

Although such constraints have systematically weakened civil societies, avenues of social mobilization remain possible within these regimes as long as doing so does not challenge the state's political legitimacy (Case 1992; Gomez 1994; and Khoo 1997, p. 72). The emergence of an increasing number of hybrid states after the Cold War yielded a better understanding of the patterns and effects of these states on political systems, and of the influence of the domestic political environment on social movements (Armony and Schamis 2005; Carothers 2002, pp. 5–6; Diamond 2002; and Levitsky and Way 2002, pp. 51–52). Although political inequality is acutely felt by social movement actors in varied degrees, the need to fulfil one's internal motivations (such as self-expectations and conceptions, personal interests and political ideology) and external legitimacy (such as political structure and potential opposition) are elements that constrain the ability of institutions to achieve meaningful social change, making comparative analysis across states possible (Scheingold 2004).

Such a perspective was explored by Vincent Boudreau, who argued that the modes of people's resistance are shaped by the types, patterns, and degrees of repressive strategies imposed by authoritarian states (Boudreau 2004). Political opportunities — in particular, political openness — increase protests and anti-dictatorship pressure from democratization movements. Moreover, centralized and mediated movement organizational resources (such as formation of alliances) increase the capacity of resistance activities that may lead to successful contention against an authoritarian regime. Boudreau's study also demonstrated the state's ability to adapt its strategies in response to different patterns of contention, which may range from moderate to radical challenges.

Boudreau covered three different democracy movements in Southeast Asia. He showed how Ne Win's regime in Burma survived various challenges. The regime's intolerance of protest, its use of extreme means to weaken the oppositions' organizational capacities — which, amongst others, prevented alliances from forming amongst protest groups — resulted in a weak opposition that was easily crushed. In the Philippines, Boudreau highlighted how the coalition between politicians and the communist front survived initial repression and re-emerged as a strong

oppositional alliance; the latter played a key role in the toppling of the Marcos regime. The uprising to bring down Soeharto's regime in Indonesia was delayed until after the Asian financial crisis in the late 1990s, which formed the ripe moment that enabled a breakthrough in collaboration amongst opposition groups.

Although social movements within non-liberal democratic states may lack the capacity to effectively impose checks and balances on the state, their appearances (and subsequent protests) place pressure on the state and form the basis for political pluralism and structural change. Boudreau's argument was illustrated by He Baogang using the 1989 democratic movement in China (He 1996). Although the demonstrations at *Tiananmen Square* (天安门广场) in 1989 were brutally crushed by the communist regime, it had a positive impact on the subsequent liberalization process in China. Pressure to bolster the Chinese Communist Party's waning political legitimacy saw the party's political elites begin to adjust their conceptions of legitimacy, implement economic reforms, and allow the existence of populist and liberal notions of democracy proposed by the democratic camp from within the party.

Similarly, Benedict Kerkvliet studied the seemingly unorganized and non-confrontational manner in which Vietnamese peasants engaged in undermining the system of collective farming dictated by the state (Kerkvliet 2005). Consequently, the peasants forced the state into replacing collective farming with peasant family farming in the 1980s. As Kerkvliet convincingly argued, the character and power of "everyday politics" had significant political implications to Vietnam's state policies. Although the strong state had prevented the establishment of a broad peasant social movement organization to conduct open protests, these individualized forms of passive resistance successfully paralyzed the state's farming policy. The centrality of peasants as a source of labour power and its significance as the foundation of political support and national unification prevented the authorities from using coercive methods to crush peasant movements.

Somchai Phatharathananunth explored the struggles of small-scale farmers' assembly of Isaan, a major grassroots movement comprising farmers from the Northeastern region of Thailand, in their campaign to protect the rights of the rural poor to participate in meaningful democratization process since 1993 (Phatharathananunth 2006). The movement provided a political channel for peasants who had been marginalized in the Bangkok-based, elite-controlled electoral politics. The

state, in return, tried to control the increasingly powerful movement by co-opting key movement leaders and marginalizing the radical faction of the movement.

The differences in political ideology, experience of colonization, economic development, and social structure all have direct and powerful implications on the development and trajectories of social movements. Therefore, the analysis of social movements in non-liberal democratic states needs to pay special heed to cultural and historical contexts (Anderson, L. 1986; Callaghy 1988; Migdal 1988; Shevtsova and Eckert 2001, pp. 65–67; and Smith, A. 1986). This is what mainstream social movement literature — with its focus on structural conditions such as the availability of resources, political processes and opportunities, and the construction of identity — tends to lack. Moreover, power relationships between challengers and authorities are in a state of flux (and even more so in non-liberal than in liberal democratic states), ironically limiting the availability of opportunities on which social movements could capitalize. In light of this, activists rely less on formal institutions and more on unconventional methods to disseminate movement messages, mobilize support, and engage in contentious action.

In the social movement literature, the understanding of extra-institutional variables has been clumsily lumped into the categories of framing without much systematic analysis (Goodwin, Jasper, and Khattra 1999; McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald 1996; and McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 1997). Framing is a vital strategy for many movement activists in advanced Western states to instill a sense of injustice, shape collective identities, attract mass media coverage, garner bystanders' support, and demobilize antagonists (Benford 1993; Hunt and Benford 1994; McAdam 1996, pp. 340–41; Snow et al. 1986; Snow and Benford 1988, p. 198; 1992, p. 137; and Steinberg 1999, p. 737). The significance of framing and the distribution of its products (such as speeches, images, and writings) have different effects in the non-liberal democratic world. Limited access to media, higher risk of state suppression and a fragmented society divided along linguistic, ethnic, religious, and cultural lines make it distinctly challenging to create and sustain a universal frame that is equally appealing to all. Instead, cognitive understanding, community influences, moral missions, kinship links, and emotional attachments tend to matter more in the process of social mobilization in non-liberal democratic states. Therefore, it is necessary to take into consideration the humane, organic, dynamic, and interpersonal bonds in the execution of structural institutions. As will be discussed

in the following section, the analysis of this book will be conducted at three levels: dynamics within the movement (intra-movement relations), dynamics between the movement and the state (movement and state relations), and dynamics between the movement and other movements (inter-movements relations).

### **Intra-Movement Relations**

While studies on social movements focus on the logic of collective action, studies on social movement organizations expressly address the elements of agencies and institutions that harness collective action. Institutional elements such as regulations, strength of the organization, and financial and human resources set the criteria for defining a social movement organization. Social movement organizations are particularly important for reducing uncertainty through centralization of power, enhancing organizational effectiveness through collective decision-making procedures, mobilizing the grassroots to overcome external obstacles and constraints, as well as legitimatizing the selection of leaders to govern and consolidate the needs of social movements (Alberoni 1984, p. 171; Lounsbury and Kaghan 2001, pp. 25–51; North 1990, pp. 6, 37; and Oberschall 1993, p. 28).

Most social movement organizations are loosely organized, especially in the early phases, with institutionalization normally taking place following the height of mobilization (Kriesi, Koopmans, and Duyvendak 1995; and McCarthy and Zald 1977). Within many non-liberal democratic states, the execution of these institutions and the delivery of their functions are shaped and reshaped by temporal processes and political struggles. Unlike in liberal democratic states, social movement organizations in non-liberal democratic systems face higher risks of coercive suppression and encounter more constraints in terms of accessing resources and mobilizing support from the community. Such limitations force social movement organizations to adapt themselves frequently throughout their lifespan in response to pressures imposed on them.

The extent and sophistication of social movement organizations may vary throughout the process of achieving their objectives, but characteristically, there are divisions of labour and bureaucratic structures in social movement organizations. Formalization sees social movement organizations mature in terms of expansion in size and professionalization of staff. Appointed personnel serve as committee members while



administrative officers are hired to fill a hierarchy of positions, each defined by a specific scope of authority and responsibilities (Wilson 1973, pp. 8, 164). Social movement organizations may also establish parallel institutions to confront and engage with state institutions more directly. For instance, movement leaders may deal with cabinet ministers, social movement organizations officers with various federal departmental officers, and state-level committees with state-level government officers, and so on (Oberschall 1993, p. 31).

As will be shown in Chapter 4, the social movement organizations that have sprouted from the Chinese education movement have also followed the path of increasing professionalization, and doing so with strong local influences, such as congregating school professionals to form a hierarchical bureaucracy and structure for the working committee to enable the constant flow of sustainable resources to the movement. Moreover, in a persistent yet amorphous existence straddling between loosely defined assemblies and institutionalized organizations, the movement has enabled democratically elected leaders with centralized authority to respond promptly and effectively to the rapidly changing landscape of contentious politics.

Once a social movement has transformed from a state of resistance into a state of persistence, goal transformation occurs as leaders begin to replace unattainable goals with those that are more pragmatic and relevant so that the movement can be sustained (Huntington 1968; Powell and DiMaggio 1991, pp. 381–99; and Thelen 1999; 2004, pp. 25–31). These changes allow social movements to endure, especially when opportunities for influence are minimal; however, they may also alienate supporters and draw normative commitment away from members (Andrews 2002, p. 108; and McAdam 1982, pp. 55–56). Because the decisions for such transformations and changes are made based on the movement leader's judgement, little justification or opportunities for bottom-up participation are provided. Such top-down, authoritative management styles can mimic the regimes that constrain the movement in the first place, and the movement depends on the capacity of good leaders to successfully execute such relational mechanisms.

What makes a capable leader is profusely subjective, and these individuals are rare. As will be examined in Chapter 5, the Chinese education movement suffered internal tensions at various occasions. Movement activists and supporters are divided in camps according to their preference of movement strategies, which may range from

radical resistance to conservative persistence. In the case of the Chinese education movement, internal tensions became more complicated when each camp was supported by movement administrative officers who succeeded in the oligarchization of the movement — that is, concentrating power by manipulation of a hierarchical bureaucratic structure for personal desire and benefits (Wilkinson 1971, p. 108). As argued by Mayer Zald and Roberta Ash, the use of adversarial tactics increases with oligarchy (Zald and Ash 1966). An elaboration of the twists and turns of these contentions will contribute significantly to the literature on internal dynamics (and tensions) of social movement organizations, something that has been downplayed by contemporary social movement literature.

### **Movement and State Relations**

Social movements within non-liberal democratic contexts are defined by the interests they represent and the ways such demands are carried out. Repertoires are relational products of contention between challengers and power holders that limit both the strategic choice of performances and the conceptual mapping of possibilities for action (Tilly 1995, p. 42). Charles Tilly argued that since the nineteenth century, repertoires of collective action in advanced Western countries had changed from being local, autonomous, and reactive to national, directed, and proactive due to the rise and formation of full-fledged nation states as dominant political organizations (Tilly 1986; 1995). Yet, such shifts are absent from, or only partially exist, in most non-liberal democratic states that lack experience in the building of democratic institutions. This is usually because these states have inherited these institutions from their colonial masters and often carry the burden of having to deal with a host of other more critical state-building problems, such as an underdeveloped economic sector and a polarized society.

Repertoires can come in the form of highly conventional actions such as lobbying and judicial action, or as passive opposition such as everyday resistance. The latter may better encapsulate the challenger-versus-state authority relations in non-liberal democratic states. Demonstrations may be common in many mature democracies, but their absence or infrequency in non-liberal democratic states cannot be taken as an absence of social movements. The state's control of law enforcement allows little space for manoeuvre or negotiation. Therefore, high intensity social protests, open

political opposition, or any extra-constitutional mass groupings often face harsh, coercive repression. Movement leaders who (successfully or not) organize such contentious activities often face imprisonment and follow-up punishment from the regime.

Lacking institutional access and facing repression, resistance often occurs outside the political arena, and exists in a manner that is clandestine, small-scale, and constantly subjected to refrainment. The proliferation of everyday forms of peasant resistance observed by James Scott suggests that informal acts of resistance (such as foot-dragging, dissimulation, pilfering, or sabotage) involve no overt protest and require little or no coordination and organization (Scott 1987). These resistances concern largely immediate, *de facto* gains, and at the same time minimize the risks of any direct confrontation with the authorities. Scott's discourse, however, best applies to a small community with dense informal networks with historically deep subcultures of resistance.

This book proposes that social movement activists engage in active and dynamic collaboration, rather than passive resistance, with non-liberal democratic state regimes through brokers. Facing a regime that relies on interpersonal networks rather than on structured institutions has galvanized movement activists to seek informal yet potentially more promising channels such as brokerage to achieve their demands (Fukuyama 1995, pp. 7–9). Brokerage is a process in which intermediary actors facilitate transactions between other actors lacking access to or trust in one another. (Marsden 1982). Brokers connect and coordinate communication and interactions, improve access to material and state resources, and increase the success of promulgating changes between the movement and the regime (Foster 1961; North 1990, p. 37; Roy and Sidera 2006, p. 4; and Staggenborg 2002, p. 126). Brokers within a pluralistic society must be equipped with multi-linguistic ability and a good understanding of the sensitivities of traditional cultures. As will be discussed in Chapter 2, bilingual (English- and Chinese-proficient) Chinese politicians have created political advantages for themselves by assisting the inter-movement and state collaboration.

### Inter-Movement Relations

The formation of inter-movement networks and alliances is a strategy to reduce competition over resources amongst social movements. Strong institutional bonds based on a shared identity provide opportunities for

routine interaction and consequently reduces cleavages, develops trust, and promotes sharing of information and experiences (Bandy and Smith 2005, p. 4; Coleman 1990; Morrill 1995; Olson 1982; and Putnam 2000). Social movements establish both formal coalitions and informal collaboration with other movement organizations at local, national, and international levels, but social movements in non-liberal democratic states tend to rely on inter-leadership collaboration rather than inter-institutional coalition (Meyer and Tarrow 1998, p. 19). For one, not all social movements in such settings can afford to establish a formal organization. Moreover, agent-based alliance is easier to conduct — for instance, an underground meeting — and thus can remain under the regime's radar. Such agent-based networks rely primarily on the leaders' social reputation, professional commonalities, and political connections. Networks and alliances that are based on personal connections can be more reliable and enduring, especially in the face of oppression or co-optation by the state (Chwe 1999, pp. 128–56). A tight cadre of committed allies facilitates rapid and honest sharing of information.

Associational relationship can be dense, such as groups that share many similarities and a common identity, or weak, such as groups divided by ethnic, cultural, and linguistic differences. Sharing the same language, lifestyle, and experience of being exploited by the state and its policies, along with experiences of prior collaboration, helps to enhance collective bonds (Klandermans and Goslinga 1996; and Koopmans 2004, pp. 367–91). Because social movements in polarized societies tend to articulate their aims in terms of racialism or communalism rather than associational activities, opportunities for collaboration within the same ethnic, cultural, or linguistic groups are increased (Jennet and Stewart 1989).

Such prior collaboration is important for forming a strong associational alliance, which was the key to the success of the civil rights movement in the United States in the 1960s where black leaders and the non-black masses with similar religious backgrounds and experiences united for a common cause (McAdam 1982). Such an alliance may survive if members of the alliance can fulfil the components of a strong capital, which range from economic, cultural, and social to political resources (Bourdieu 1986; Diani 1997; and Purdue 2007, p. 224).

The lack of opportunities for collaboration between social movements may also result in a minimal level of trust across movement organizations, and delay the formation of a more unified and stronger alliance that would

enhance the ability of the movement to overcome constraints imposed by a repressive state. It is only during times of frustration, such as the failure of intra-ethnic alliances or the co-optation of former allies by the regime, that such inter-movement collaboration may ripe. Operating in the often unpredictable environment of non-liberal democratic regimes, every step forward and every act of resistance is meaningful. By joining forces, allied movements increase their capacity to seize political opportunities and overcome constraints (Andrain and Apter 1995, p. 6; Boudreau 2002, p. 44; and Oberschall 1993, p. 31).

### **POLITICS AND SOCIAL MOBILIZATION IN MALAYSIA**

Malaysia's BN regime, in particular during Mahathir Mohamad's era, has taken a relatively less authoritarian approach compared with its neighbours', such as General Ne Win's military regime in Burma, President Ferdinand Marcos' martial law regime in the Philippines, or Soeharto's New Order in Indonesia. Although Malaysia does claim some form of legitimacy through its domination of democratic institutions, it often waivers between authoritarianism and democracy, with notable variety and debate on the quality of its "brand" of democracy by scholars.<sup>6</sup>

During the 1950s and 1960s, the newly independent Malaya enjoyed a brief moment of democracy, with meaningful separation of power between the executive, legislative, and judiciary branches of government, and liberal political competition at the federal, state, and local elections (Ho, K.L. 1992*a*; LCHR 1990; Mohamed 1989*a*; 1989*b*; and Roger 1989, p. 158). The political arena during this time was dominated by the consociational collaboration between UMNO President Abdul Rahman, MCA President Tan Cheng Lock, and Malaysian Indian Congress President V.T. Sambathan Thevar under the framework of the Alliance coalition. The Alliance won the 1959 and 1961 General Election with a large majority (71 per cent of seats in 1959 and 86 per cent of seats in 1961) (Case 1996, pp. 1–2; Lijphart 1968, pp. 21–23; 1985, p. 6; 2008, p. 49).

Unfortunately, the political domination of Alliance was shaken by the formation of Federation of Malaysia in 1963. The rise of the opposition parties, escalating intra-party disputes within Alliance component parties, and the failure of the Alliance to compromise internally on critical issues (such as the installation of Chinese as an official language, and according

special privileges to ethnic Malays and citizenship rights to immigrants) dealt a significant political blow to the Alliance. It secured only 42 per cent of the total votes cast to win 51 per cent of parliamentary seats in the 1969 General Election (Weiss 2006, pp. 76–80).

As a consequence, Abdul Rahman resigned and made way for Abdul Razak to become the second prime minister of Malaysia in 1970. To ensure continuous domination in Malaysia politics, Abdul Razak broadened the Alliance and incorporated opposition parties, which included Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party (*Parti Islam Semalaysia*, PAS), Gerakan, and People's Progressive Party, to form BN.<sup>7</sup> The power of the executive branch was expanded, which weakened the checks and balances amongst government institutions, thus enabling BN, the ruling regime, to control and manipulate state resources to strengthen its political domination.

Not until 1998 with the rise of Malaysia's reform (*reformasi*) movement did a strong coalition of oppositions emerge to confront the BN ruling regime. Although this opposition coalition failed to challenge BN's two-thirds majority in parliament at the 1999 General Election, the formation of the People's Justice Party (*Parti Keadilan Rakyat*) and the increasing demands for democratic reforms by Malaysia's middle class laid important foundations for political change.

After Mahathir Mohamad's retirement in 2003, the political system gradually liberalized under the stewardship of his handpicked successor, Prime Minister Abdullah Badawi (2004–08). Abdullah Badawi promised to reconstitute an independent judiciary and reform the Anti-Corruption Agency to counter the degenerative corrupt practices within UMNO and across civil service agencies (Case 2005, p. 145). These promises convinced Malaysian voters to support Abdullah Badawi's administration and saw BN coalition win a landslide victory in the 2004 General Election. However, as these political promises remain unfulfilled at the end of Abdullah Badawi's first term as prime minister, Malaysians became progressively impatient and disappointed with the administration's inability to fulfil its campaign promises.

By 2008, for the first time after 1969, the opposition People's Alliance (*Pakatan Rakyat*, PR) successfully overturned BN's two-thirds majority in the parliament. It also won control of five state governments at the country's twelfth General Election (Loh and Khoo 2002). Scholars and pundits hailed these developments as the dawn of a true democracy, especially when an increasing number of senior BN politicians admitted there were deficits in the BN legitimacy that required political reforms

from within (Case 2010, pp. 113–14). While competing to remain as a significant player in the formal political arena, the BN regime also has to deal with demands from various social movements. One of the social movements whose interactions with the Malaysian government have produced significant yet puzzling outcomes is the Chinese education movement.

### SOCIAL MOVEMENTS IN MALAYSIA

Social movements in Malaysia can generally be divided into two main types: inclusive and exclusive. The former is concerned with universal issues such as the environment, democratization, and human rights, while the latter is limited to ethnic- and religious-based concerns. Inclusive-based movements have often been studied by movement activists, who may also be academics and researchers at local and international universities, as part of the activities of civil societies or of the democratization process of Malaysia.<sup>8</sup> On the other hand, exclusive-based social movements have largely been under-studied in the English-speaking scholarly world of social movement studies for two main reasons: first, the activists of exclusive-based movements tend to be in professions that are non-research-related, such as schoolteachers and religious teachers. Second, and more importantly, linguistic limitation has restricted the accessibility of research works and resources of these movements, resulting in most of these important developments in a country's history being left undocumented and ignored.

The works on women's rights movements are mostly published by well-established women research centres at local universities in Malaysia and these works have been gaining considerable attention in the country over the years.<sup>9</sup> Amongst the most significant works on women's rights movements is that by Cecilia Ng, Maznah Mohamad, and Tan Beng Hui (Ng, Maznah, and Tan 2006). Ng and her associates studied the market forces that drove the politicization of feminism in Malaysia. They found that urban development and industrialization increased the number of women engaged in higher education and employment, thus strengthening their economic mobility and empowering them politically. Women's newly acquired economic and political positions enabled them to participate in democratization struggles.

The book by Ng and associates also highlighted the restrictions placed upon, and inherent limitations of the women's movement in Malaysia — in

particular, conflicting interests within the multi-cultural and multi-religious milieu of the broader society. Like many other enduring movements, leaders of the women's movements have opted to collaborate with, instead of confront, the state, which has enabled prominent feminists to influence state policies from within the government, and thereby avoid incurring the state's wrath. The observations of Ng and her associates are important, for, as will be shown in this study, the Chinese education movement, to some extent, has also followed a similar repertoire.

Another noteworthy work on inclusive-based movements in Malaysia is that by Meredith Weiss and Saliha Hassan (Weiss and Saliha 2003). They provided insights into the sociological and economic circumstances that gave rise to the rapid growth of civil society in Malaysia in the 1980s. Booming in numbers in the 1980s, non-governmental organizations adopted strategies and tactics that ranged from antagonism to cooperation with the state in line with the state's ideology and interests. According to Weiss and Saliha, the state is particularly threatened by, and will react with harsh repression against, three types of movements: those that advocate Islamic fundamentalism, those that challenge the state's political foundation, and those that persist in the form of mass protests.

The Chinese education movement, the subject of this study, has steered clear of these three criteria in the course of its history. Unfortunately, because the contributors of Weiss and Hassan's edited volume are mostly practitioners and active movement entrepreneurs, the chapters, although richly detailed, failed to address wider social movement debates and issues. Moreover, by ignoring the exclusive-based movements, their works as a whole failed to consider a different kind of civil society envisioned by religious- or ethnic-based groups.

In *Protest and Possibilities*, Weiss took her analysis deeper to examine the conditions that prompted the formation of, and the factors that have constrained the sustainability of coalition capital between non-governmental organizations and opposition political parties (Weiss 2006). Illustrative of Weiss' proposition is the pro-Anwar opposition coalition formed to challenge BN's political hegemony in the 1999 General Election. Although the coalition fared poorly, it contributed to the country's democratization. Weiss argued that the gradual expansion of space for civil society activists to develop a non-communal-based movement and the opportunity to interact and cooperate with opposition parties helped to establish the coalitional capital — that is, mutual trust and



understanding — necessary for groups to find a common cause and work in coalitions.

Weiss' two studies debated the formation and strengthening of coalitional capital necessary for mobilizing collective action amongst civil society agents. She concluded that the lack of a long-term strategy of resistance in the non-governmental organizations' coalition ultimately handcuffed the 1998 *reformasi* movement. The role of coalitional capital will be further explored in this study through the analysis of the Chinese community's networks and coalitions dating from the colonial era.

Exclusive-based movements on the other hand, as argued by Joshua Fishman using his multi-modal nations model, are predominantly discrete from their cultural, vernacular, lingual, and educational differences (Fishman 1969). Linguistic familiarity brings members of a common linguistic group together in spite of their different social backgrounds and economic classes. Path dependency from Malaysia's unique colonial experience, and inter-cultural compromises made during its nation-building process has shaped the fundamental differences amongst different linguistic groups; these differences are often determined by ethnicity. Scholars of these movements have explored the consequences of social grievances and the politics of collective behaviour, such as the Islamic religious movement, the religious and socio-economical struggles of the Indian minority, and the Chinese education movement.

The literature on the country's religious movements is dominated by Islamic scholars. Since the early 1970s, Arabic- and religious-educated groups such as *Jammat Tabligh* and the *Darul Arqam* have been spreading fundamentalist Islamic ideas at the grassroots (Mohamad 1981). The rise of the highly organized and well-financed Muslim Youth Movement of Malaysia (*Angkatan Belia Islam Malaysia*) led by Anwar Ibrahim in the late 1970s, in particular, captured the attention of scholars who wanted to explore the far-reaching political influence of the organization (Abdul F. 2000; Camroux 1996; Lee, L.M. 1988; and Mauzy and Milne 1983). This Islamic student movement questioned the gradual loss of religiosity and spiritual values amongst Muslim communities (and state actors) in the face of rapid urbanization and Westernization (Chandra 1987; and Shamsul 1994). To appeal for the reconstruction of Malay society, the Muslim Youth Movement of Malaysia formed a powerful coalition with PAS in the late 1970s.<sup>10</sup> However, the rise of the Muslim Youth Movement of Malaysia was quickly subdued after its key leaders (such as Anwar Ibrahim) were co-opted into the BN ruling regime (Kessler 1980;

Lee, L.M. 1990; Lyon 1979; Mauzy and Milne 1983, p. 634; Maznah 2009; and Means 1978).

Norani Othman detailed the strategies adopted by the Sisters-in-Islam movement — comprising largely middle-class professional Muslim women — in negotiating for equal rights in the legal, political, economic, and social arenas for Muslim women (Norani 2005). The Sisters-in-Islam is a civil society group that professes greater religious expressions and demands for greater gender equality in Malaysia's male-dominated Islamic society. Tensions between the movement on the one hand, and the male-dominated PAS (which advocates an Islamic state) and UMNO (which has implemented a series of Islamization programmes since the 1980s within a secular nationalist vision) on the other hand, continue to this day (Wazir 1992).

Studies of the Indian community's movements have predominantly focused on religious or socio-economical perspectives. Andrew Willford studied the contrast between Hindu ecumenical movements and the Tamil identity (Willford 2006); Ravindra K. Jain compiled the sociological and economical challenges faced by Indian plantation workers (Jain 2009); Farish Noor researched the rise of Hindu Rights Action Force — a coalition of thirty Hindu- and Tamil-based non-governmental organizations in 2006 — that generated a new wave of collective action to protect the minority community (Farish 2008). In spite of the diversity of local studies on the Indian community, the quantity of the literature does not do justice to the magnitude of grievances suffered by the Indian community in Malaysia over the years.

Not surprisingly, the bulk of social movement research related to the Chinese community has revolved around the Chinese education movement. These studies will be explored in detail in the following section.

## STUDIES ON THE CHINESE EDUCATION MOVEMENT

Studies on the Chinese education movement can be categorized into three types: in-house publications by *Dongjiaozong* and affiliated organizations form the first, and independent authors and academic writers form the second and third types, respectively. *Dongjiaozong* has published prolifically on themes surrounding the various campaigns it conducted. These include its collections on selected issues of the Chinese education movement, historical descriptions of the movement, essays on its movement leader, Lim Lian Geok (林连玉), and others (UCSCAM 2001a; 2003a;

2004*a*, 2004*b*; 2004*c*; Lee, P.K. 2005; and Lew and Loot 1997). Amongst these in-house publications, the works of a prominent historian of Malaysian Chinese, Tay Lian Soo (郑良树), are notable (Tay 1998*a*; 1998*b*; 1998*c*; 1999; 2001; 2003; 2005). He compiled some of the most complete encyclopaedic references on the movement from the perspective of the Chinese community. Employing various vernacular sources such as school magazines and the vernacular presses, Tay's historical studies covered 600 years of the development of Chinese education, with detailed descriptions of the roles played by local actors at the school and community levels. Although Tay's works are largely limited to West Malaysia, they are significant records on the transition of the Chinese education movement from before, during, and after the colonial period.

One of the few in-house publications that examined intra-movement dynamics of the Chinese education movement was *The United Chinese Schoolteachers' Association of Malaysia and Its Activists* (华校教总及其人物) written by Lew Bon Hoi (廖文辉) (Lew 2006). The book surveyed the contributions by *Jiaozong* and movement leaders in the field of education, politics, and culture from 1951 to 2005. The first half of the book revealed the activities conducted by *Jiaozong* in promoting Chinese culture and its involvement in domestic politics. Lew also detailed the relationship between *Jiaozong* and *Dongzong* as partners in the movement. The second half of the book focused on the contributions of former *Jiaozong* leaders. Lew concluded that *Jiaozong* had played a significant role in safeguarding Chinese education in Malaysia, despite having failed to promote and secure benefits for Chinese schoolteachers as suggested in *Jiaozong's* constitution. However, Lew's analysis overstated *Jiaozong's* achievements during the 1950s and 1960s, and overlooked the factors that led to its weakening afterwards. Without analysis of the latter, there remains a lack of an understanding of the internal problems that plagued *Jiaozong* and the strategies it employed to overcome these challenges.

The second type of publications on the education movement comprises works written by independent authors. These works revealed another side of the movement, giving accounts from bottom-up perspectives, and discussing critical and sensitive issues regarding the movement. For example, long-serving Chinese educators, Wang Siow Nan (王秀南), Liu Bo Kui (刘伯奎), and Huang Zhao Fa (黄招发) published their experiences and personal observations derived from running the Chinese schools — the

most important and autonomous institutions of the Chinese education movement (Huang, Z.F. 2004; Liu 1986; and Wang 1970). There are also independent writers such as Lin Wu Cong (林武聪) et al., who disclosed secrets related to the controversy over the alleged corruption amongst principals of Chinese primary schools (华文小学) in Malaysia (Lin, W.C. et al. 2006). Other independent writers who also wrote about the movement included Tan Ai Mei (陈爱梅), who discussed the embedded dilemmas faced by the Malaysian Chinese schools education system, and Kua Kia Soong (柯嘉逊), who revealed his side of the story regarding the 2008 New Era College (新纪元学院) controversy that led to his resignation and that of the college's senior staff (Kua 2009; Tan, A.M. 2006).

The third type of writings on the Chinese education movement consists of academic publications, which can be categorized predominantly into historical, institutional and political approaches. Notably, Victor Purcell's documentation provided an important historical sketch of the early Chinese immigrants' political and sociological situation in Malaya from an English official's perspective (Purcell 1948). According to Purcell, Chinese immigrants viewed themselves as an exclusive race, and their desire to preserve their Chinese identity became the key motivation for the establishment of Chinese schools as educational and sociological institutions. Purcell, in another work, *Malaya: Communist or Free*, gave a chronological account of the political and social developments in post-war Malaya (Purcell 1954). He analysed the communist aggression in Malaya and its impact on Chinese school communities in particular. The threats of communism (whose ideology was supported predominantly by the Chinese community) and Chinese nationalism towards China became the basis for a series of public policies imposed by Malayan state authorities to control local Chinese schools. This marked the beginning of the Chinese education movement.

Another frequently cited work, *The Politics of Chinese Education in Malaya, 1945–1961*, authored by Tan Liok Ee, provided fundamental analysis on the emergence, challenges, controversies, and dilemmas of the movement from 1945 to 1961 (Tan, L.E. 1997). Adopting a chronological approach, Tan's study categorized the movement's trajectories into three periods: the reaction of activists towards the 1951 Barnes Report, the collaboration of Malaya's Alliance regime with the Chinese education movement leaders, and the failure of the *Jiaozong-Dongzong*-MCA alliance. Tan's work confirmed that the Chinese education movement in Malaysia

had developed into a social movement. Not only did she show that the movement was a heterogeneous entity, she also showed the dynamic interactions between the state and the social movement across various political trajectories.

Drawing on Tan's and Purcell's work, Chapter 2 of this study broadens the analysis of the movement in its early stages by discussing issues such as the influences of the anti-communist movement, the role of Chinese elites and the impact of the New Economic Policy. There are also scholars, such as Zainal Abidin Ahmad, who asserted that since the ethnic responses to education policies seemed to enhance the objectives of certain interest groups, educational reform efforts tended to be functionally disintegrative (Zainal 1980). However, most scholars who examined the impact of such policies using the Chinese education movement as their case study tended to disagree with Zainal's position. These scholars were mostly fixated with the idea that manipulative institutional policies were covert forms of ethnic discrimination.

Utilizing the development of Chinese schools in Malaysia from 1956 to 2000 as an example, Sia Keng Yek argued that the fears and resistance of the Chinese community towards the Ministry of Education of Malaysia were key factors in sustaining the movement (Sia 2005). Sia thematically analysed the physical development, management, and curriculums of these schools to demonstrate the movement's resistance. Similarly, Tan Yao Sua maintained that such manipulative state institutions exacerbated the conflict of interests between the Malay majority and the Chinese minority (Tan, Y.S. 2005). He adopted the concept of identity and framing from the social movement literature to analyse the role of *Dongjiaozong* as a social movement organization in the Chinese education movement.

Many authors have studied the responses of independent Chinese secondary schools (华文独立中学) in Malaysia towards the government's nationalization policies. Huang Guan Qin (黄冠钦) and Ku Hung Ting (古鸿廷) both studied the resistance of these schools against incorporation into the national system under the 1961 Education Act (Huang, G.Q. 1984; and Ku 2003). With Huang providing perspectives from West Malaysia and Ku from Sarawak in East Malaysia, the autonomy of Chinese school committees in school policymaking was credited as the main factor behind the success of Chinese schools in resisting the conversion. On the other hand, Tang Tze Ying (陈子鹦) argued that power relationships between Chinese schools committee members and state actors influenced

the reactions of Chinese schools towards the 1961 education reforms (Tang 2004). School committee members who had a close relationship with state agencies (Chinese politicians from MCA in particular) more readily accepted the government's call to include Chinese secondary schools in the converted system. In fact, the diverse outcomes of these studies reveal the reality of the Chinese education movement: the movement is divided between those supporting and those contesting the conversion. The division, as one of the causes behind the prolonged struggle of the movement, will be further explored and discussed in Chapter 5.

The struggles of the movement were also analysed through political approaches, as demonstrated in Lee Leong Sze (利亮时) and Cheong Yuen Keong (Cheong 2007; and Lee, L.S. 1999). Both studied the dilemmas of Chinese political parties within the BN ruling regime and their reactions towards the Chinese community's demands, such as demands for better protection of the interests of Chinese vernacular schools and better access of Chinese minorities to state resources. Both agreed that vernacular educational issues had been politicized to sustain the political interests of the Chinese political parties. Lee concluded that the politicization of vernacular educational issues widened the gap amongst ethnic groups, which was one of the escalating factors that led to the 1969 riots.

However, Cheong, who continued his observations into the post-1969 era, concluded that both MCA and Gerakan acted as intermediate agents, especially during general elections. Not only have their roles enabled parties to broker a compromise between the needs of the BN ruling regime and the Chinese education movement, but also their roles were the critical factor behind the survival of both Chinese political parties. Such dynamic interactions between the Chinese political parties and the movement, and the political opportunities arising from such interactions, will be further elaborated in Chapter 4.

To date, few studies have looked into the role of the social movement organization in the Chinese education movement's struggles. An exception is Teoh Ai Ling, who examined the institutional structure and functions of *Dongzong* (Teoh 1999). Her work provided rich descriptions of the functions and roles of each department within *Dongzong* and clearly explained the structural relationships amongst these departments. Nevertheless, her study fell short of analysing the competition and contentious politics amongst the departments. Admittedly, much light has been shed on the Chinese education movement, especially on its reactions and resistance

towards unjust policies. Yet, almost all studies have treated the movement as a homogenous entity.

In actuality, the movement's entities are stratified and factionalized. Additionally, most of the literature has taken for granted the resources (financial and human resources alike) that are needed to maintain and sustain the movement. In the current study, the author explores the intra- and inter-relationships amongst movement actors, comparing the various dilemmas faced by *Dongzong* and *Jiaozong*, the changing relationship between the movement and the state, as well as the transformations of the collaborative relationships between the movement and the Chinese guilds and associations (华人社团).

This study is the first to cover the movement in its entirety from 1951 to 2011. The analysis of the movement in the post-1998 period is particularly important, as there is a vacuum in the existing literature in the analysis of the logic and impact of the movement's shift from open contention to low-profile resistance. Information gathered during fieldwork, especially that related to the little known underground negotiations between movement activists and state agencies, is a theoretical and empirical attempt to broaden our understanding of the scope and depth of the movement.

## RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

The author collected the primary data for this study in Malaysia over the course of eleven months.<sup>11</sup> A major component of the fieldwork was conducting interviews. The author conducted seventy-four in-depth, open-ended, and semi-structured elite interviews. Almost all of the interviews were conducted in Chinese (华文), with about 20 per cent conducted in a mix of local dialects such as Hokkien (福建话) and Cantonese (广东话). The choice of conducting the interviews in the interviewees' vernacular languages was precipitated by the consideration that doing so would enable interviewees to relate to the author and share their thoughts with greater ease. Confidentiality of identity was assured to all interviewees at the beginning and reiterated at the end of every interview. The length of each interview was restricted to an average of one hour to optimize concentration for both the author and the interviewees.<sup>12</sup>

The informants can be divided into the following clusters (including both current and retired categories): local-, state-, and central-level movement

leaders; movement executive officers; schoolteachers, school principals, and school committees; and lastly, other influential Chinese community leaders outside the framework of *Dongjiaozong*, including commercial, political, societal, and educational leaders, amongst others. No state or federal government officials agreed to be interviewed. Thus, the author had to operate with caution, such as not to mention sensitive keywords, or any anti-government sentiments, when dealing with various state agencies. The author also kept a low profile while conducting fieldwork to avoid unnecessary scrutiny. The interviews were mostly conducted at the interviewees' office, or at a secure location. Some interviewees offered conservative views and were less candid at the beginning of the interview, but most began to shed light on the internal dynamics of the movement's structures, functions, goals, and framing strategies of issues as the interview progressed. The author strove to corroborate all information with data from other sources. Follow-up interviews and countercheck interviews were conducted, especially with those who played critical roles in various decision-making processes.

Primary sources included archival documents, letters, and annual working reports of *Dongzong*, *Jiaozong*, Lim Lian Geok Cultural Development Centre (林连玉基金会), and *Dongjiaozong* Higher Learning Centre (董教总教育中心). Other vernacular sources such as school magazines provided insights about the schools' organization, funding, and activities. The author also explored collections of theses, newspaper clippings, and reference books in various languages to balance diverse perspectives. Multiple visits were made to the offices of the Chinese printed media of *Sinchew Daily* (星洲日报), *Kwongwahyitpoh* (光华日报), and the Centre for Malaysian Chinese Studies (华社研究中心) to access their collections of newspaper clippings.

## SCOPES AND LIMITATIONS

The struggle against time had been paramount. Spending a total of only eleven months in the field forced the author to compromise and conduct fieldwork only in West Malaysia. Although the Chinese population in Sabah and Sarawak of East Malaysia constitute about 14 per cent of the total Chinese population of Malaysia, Chinese schools in these states have developed in different historical settings, which make generalizations from a study based on these two populations difficult (DSGM 2011).



To overcome this limitation, this study looks at the shared grievances of Chinese schools in West Malaysia across geographical boundaries. Although the establishment and set-up of Sabah's and Sarawak's state-level Chinese schools associations varied from those in the Peninsula, and they have yet to play a leading role in the movement, Chinese school communities of Sabah and Sarawak are represented within the Chinese education movement led by *Dongjiaozong*. More importantly, Chinese schools across Malaysia faced similar discrimination by the education laws, and shared the constraints in resources and other dilemmas (Huang, Z.F. 2004; and Liu 1986).

The second limitation pertains to the qualitative approach employed in this study. The author is aware of the methodological imperfections and domination of the qualitative approach in the study of the Chinese education movement in Malaysia and of social movement studies in general. However, given the exploratory nature of this study, the approach permitted intensive examination of the selected topic when time and resources available were limited. Lijphart's longitudinal (cross-historical) extension helped to minimize the conceptual and analytical weaknesses of having more variables than cases (Lijphart 1971, p. 686). Moreover, the process of making observations in an empirical case study allowed the author to trace causal processes and highlight the richness of their interactions, thus enhancing the magnitude, depth, and validity of this study's findings.

This research includes many observations on human behaviour, and, unlike the precision of natural science, the ability to observe accurately the attributes of people is rather limited. Interview effects and sensitizing of interviewees to the topics in the survey process (the participants of research might guess the rationale of the study and thus adjust their behaviour or opinions accordingly) might have reduced the internal validity of this study. Therefore, follow-up interviews and countercheck interviews were conducted to reduce these effects.

Last but not least, the author would like to excuse herself from acknowledging the various social and professional titles commonly used in Malaysia, as she seeks to treat all individuals as equals regardless of their background. As most of the primary and secondary data were in Chinese and some in Malay, the translated words followed by their original characters will be included on first mention. *Hanyupinyin* (汉语拼音) will be used to transliterate Chinese words if official translation

is not available. Unless otherwise mentioned, all translations from the written and verbal sources used in this book are by the author. For details, readers can refer to the glossary of non-English text and list of abbreviations in this book.

## ROADMAP OF THE BOOK

This book consists of six chapters. They are arranged thematically to illustrate the relationships of various institutions with social mobilization. Chapter 2 draws the readers' attention to the nation-building process and the rise of the Chinese education movement in Malaya. The chapter seeks to reveal many important, yet under-explored developments that took place from the post-World War II period to 1974 — the year Malaysia normalized its diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China. The main players of the Chinese education movement, *Dongzong* and *Jiaozong*, were established during the nation formation stage, and played significant roles in securing Chinese citizenship rights and the survival of vernacular schools in Malaysia. Elites — especially those from political parties and business groups — became important agents who initiated collaboration and brokered compromises between the state and the social movement until the new elites brought about the collapse of this relational institution when they discontinued their intimate collaboration.

The subsequent three chapters examine the design of the structural institutions and the adaptations made by various relational institutions in the face of state-imposed challenges. Chapter 3 analyses the elements of the lowest but most autonomous and fundamental units in the movement's hierarchy, such as the school committees and schoolteachers of Chinese schools. These include three types of Chinese schools, namely, Chinese primary schools, independent Chinese secondary schools, and converted Chinese secondary schools (国民型华文中学). These schools experienced continual marginalization as a result of the government's educational policies — especially in funding allocation — despite the fact that Chinese schools (with the exception of independent Chinese secondary schools) had already been incorporated into the national educational system. The chapter then analyses the role, formation, and collaboration of associational capitals of state-level Chinese school committees and Chinese schoolteachers' associations. The chapter ends with an exploration of the inter- and intra-organizational transformations

in *Dongzong* and *Jiaozong*, and evaluates the changing roles and challenges faced by the central-level leadership.

The analysis of any social movement organization will not be complete without an analysis of domestic contentious politics. Chapter 4 explores such interactions, particularly that of social movement leaders exploiting political opportunities through the state's electoral institutions. Many new repertoires have grown out of desperation during the process, and have resulted from changing relationships and formation of alliances between the movement and Chinese guilds and associations. The chapter also presents the emergence of various campaigns such as the Alliance of Three campaign (三结合) in 1982, the Alliance of Fifteen Leading Chinese Guilds and Associations (全国十五华团领导机构) since 1983, the promotion of the dual coalition system (两线制) since 1986, the national Chinese primary schools sit-in protest in 1987, joining of the opposition parties in 1990, and chairing of the Malaysian Chinese Organisations' Election Appeals Committee (马来西亚华人社团大选诉求委员会, *Suqiu* Committee) in 1999. The chapter also shows how the authorities deployed carrot-and-stick measures to co-opt and suppress the movement, although these efforts have failed to terminate the movement altogether.

Chapter 5 extends the scope of research into the functions of two nationwide working committees of the Chinese education movement, namely, the Malaysian Independent Chinese Secondary Schools Working Committee (董教总全国发展华文独立中学工作委员会) and the *Dongjiaozong* Chinese Primary Schools Working Committee (董教总全国发展华小工作委员会). The chapter reveals the working relationship between movement activists at the central level and the movement's local level supporters. The chapter also focuses on resource accumulation and mobilizational mechanisms of the movement, and the role of the professional secretariats in the process. The chapter ends by addressing the controversy surrounding the formation and maintenance of the *Dongjiaozong* Higher Learning Centre and the New Era College, highlighted by tensions within the movement.

In Chapter 6, the aforementioned themes are drawn together to examine the impact of institutions on social mobilization in the Chinese education movement, and to better understand various processes, stages, and structures of the social movement organizations. It is hoped that by analysing the general incompatibilities found in the Chinese education movement, this research would jumpstart the discussion about their

resolution and trends, so as to acquire a better understanding of social movement organizations in the future.

## Notes

1. On the trade union movements, see Jomo and Todd (1994); Ramasamy and Rowley (2008); Stenson (1970); and Wong, L. (1993). On Islamic related movements, see Hussin (1993); Jesudason (1996, p. 156); Lee, C.H. (2010); and Sheila (1999, p. 97).
2. The Federal Council of the Federated Malay States passed a similar law on 20 November 1920. Under this enactment, all schoolteachers and school committees had to register with the Department of Education and comply with various regulations. Many believe that the regulation was imposed due to the increase in Chinese nationalism and anti-imperial sentiments in Chinese schools strongly influenced by the 1919 May Fourth Movement in China. From 1925 to 1928, 315 Chinese schools' registrations were revoked for failure to comply with curriculum, administration and management, or sanitary standards. For more, see UCSCAM (1992*b*, pp. 76–77; 2004*b*, p. 183).
3. The Chinese population in the Federation of Malaya in 1921 was 1,174,777 or about 35 per cent of the total population. See Vlieland (1932, p. 36).
4. There are five major dialect groups within the Chinese community in Malaysia, namely, Hokkien, Cantonese, Hakka (客家), Teochew (潮州), and Hainanese (海南).
5. On European tradition, see de Tarde (1969); and Durkheim (1938). On American tradition, see Blumer (1939); Park (1955); Parsons (1937); and Smelser (1963).
6. Case (1992) introduced Malaysia as a semi-democracy; Chandra (1989*a*) used fettered democracy; Crouch (1992; 1993) described it as a modified democracy; Weiss (2006) refers to it as illiberal democracy; and Zakaria (1989) referred it as quasi-democracy.
7. Democratic Action Party, *Partai Rakyat*, and Social Justice Party of Malaysia refused to join BN. See DAP (1991).
8. On civil societies related studies, see Hilton (2009); Johan (2001); and S.M. (1986). On democratization process related studies, see Loh (2009), Tan, L.O. (2010); and Tan, J.E. and Zawawi (2008).
9. Other books that look into the women's movements in Malaysia are Lai, S.Y. (2004); Makmor (2006); Ng, C.S. (2010*a*; 2010*b*); Tan, B.H. and Ng (2001); and Wazir (1992).
10. PAS has been the main Islamic opposition party in Malaysia. It joined BN coalition and became part of the ruling regime from 1973 to 1977. However, conflicting political interests with the UMNO-led federal government in

early 1977 over the control of Kelantan state government eventually forced PAS to leave BN in December 1977. For more, see Mauzy (1983*a*, pp. 84, 112–14); and Milne (1976, pp. 186–92).

11. Fieldworks were conducted from February to March 2008; December 2008 to February 2009; November 2009 to March 2010; and July 2010. The first two trips of the fieldwork were partially financed by the National University of Singapore, while the rest were self-sponsored.
12. Many of the interviewees had witnessed important changes in the movement and Malaysia's transition from a colony to a developing country. Almost all the activists interviewed for this research had encountered state discrimination (for example, being detained under the Internal Security Act), and these experiences have motivated them to participate in the movement. Despite having operated in various factions, the interviewees were — and some remain to this day — well-connected with one another. They regularly share updates and information regarding the movement through small talk.

## 2

---

# NATION BUILDING AND FORMATION OF SOCIAL MOVEMENT

## INTRODUCTION

The development of the Chinese education movement in Malaysia parallels Malaysia's domestic politics after the British colonial era. The decolonization of the Malaya Peninsula in the post-World War II years redefined the balance of power, especially amongst the English-educated ethnic leaders. Although these elites dominated official state decision-making mechanisms, Malaya (renamed as Malaysia after the Peninsula merged with Singapore, Sabah, and Sarawak to form the new federation in 1963) was vulnerable during its infancy and therefore allowed space for negotiation with the influential vernacular-speaking ethnic elites. This chapter gives special attention to the role of Chinese elites in raising political awareness and creating a series of social movements amongst Malaya's Chinese communities through three main platforms: Chinese political parties, Chinese guilds and associations, as well as Chinese schoolteachers and Chinese school committees associations.

The chapter first explores the formation of political parties such as UMNO and MCA, and the significance of the Alliance coalition in making a peaceful demand for state independence from the British. To strengthen intra-Chinese collaboration, MCA established the Grand Three Associations of Chinese Education in collaboration with *Dongzong* and *Jiaozong* in 1952. The Grand Three was successful in bridging

the state and the Chinese education movement actors until it started crumbling in 1960, when its pro-vernacular education leaders left MCA. From then on, the Chinese education movement began to nurture stronger bonds with Chinese guilds and associations, which laid the foundation for the movement's trajectories from the 1970s to the 1990s.

The efforts of nation building by the Malay-dominated state unavoidably posited threats that would dilute the vernacular identities of the non-Malay communities, especially after the departure of Singapore from the Federation of Malaysia in 1965. The Chinese' resistance against the state's assimilation attempts is best demonstrated in their overwhelming support of *Dongjiaozong's* Merdeka University campaign in 1967. The chapter ends with a discussion on the impact of the implementation of the New Economic Policy in 1971, and the political consequences of normalization of diplomatic relations between Malaysia and the People's Republic of China in 1974.

### IMPACT OF COMMUNIST THREATS

Prior to World War II, massive migration had resulted in the number of Chinese and Indian immigrants outnumbering the Malays in the Peninsula, making it possible for immigrants to challenge the status quo of the native majority.<sup>1</sup> The British's policy and practice of divide and rule polarized the colony's social structure and led to a discernible economic division along ethnic lines that resulted in heightened tensions, fuelling local nationalist movements that were ethnically oriented (Abraham 1997). The situation worsened during World War II, when the Malayan Communist Party (MCP) and the Malayan People's Anti-Japanese Army (MPAJA) emerged as the backbones of resistance against the Japanese occupation of Malaya. MCP in particular emerged as a formidable political force after the defeat of Japan and briefly ruled Malaya from March to August 1945, before British authority was re-established.<sup>2</sup>

Aided by a power vacuum, the MPAJA killed some 2,500 Japanese collaborators (mostly Malays), abolished the sultanates, and attempted to make Malaya part of China (Horowitz 1985, p. 398). The Red Bands of the Holy War (*Sabillah*) was formed by Malays to combat the MPAJA. The intensity of this communal violence sealed in the minds of many Malays a negative stereotype of Chinese as communists and as a threat to Islam, the sultanates, and the Malay community (Lomperis 1996,

p. 204). When the British retook control of Malaya after the war, the Malayan Union government was introduced in April 1946 as a unified and more cost-effective government structure. It was also conceived as a form of preparation for the possibility of self-rule and independence. The scheme offered full citizenship rights to Chinese and Indians born in Malaya, and dissolved the sultanates into one secular union.<sup>3</sup>

The imposition of the scheme shocked the Malay community and led to the emergence of the first Malay nationalist party, UMNO, founded in May 1946, to oppose the Malayan Union. Due to strong protest and pressure from Malay aristocrats and former Malayan governors in London, the Malayan Union was dismantled and replaced by the Federation of Malaya, which reinstated the traditional prerogatives of the sultans and restored special positions to the Malays as "sons of the earth" (*bumiputera*) in February 1948.<sup>4</sup> It also tightened the qualification for federal citizenship by disqualifying over three quarters of the Chinese population.<sup>5</sup>

Facing increasing political uncertainties and discrimination against their rights to Malayan citizenship, disparate ethnic Chinese, although initially divided by their clans, dialects, social statuses, political views and economic identities, were given the impetus to unite again, in particular after the painful experience of the massacres during the Japanese occupation.<sup>6</sup> Chin Peng (陈平) became the MCP's secretary general in 1947 after the party's predecessor, Lai Tek, absconded with the party's funds in March 1947 (Fujio 1995, pp. 37–58; and Ramakrishna 2002, p. 32). In a bid to empower the weakening party, Chin emulated the successful model of Mao's revolutionary movement in China and launched an armed guerrilla rebellion under the Malayan Races Liberation Army, which prompted the British to declare a State of Emergency in June 1948 (Clutterbuck 1966, pp. 22–24; Heng 1988, p. 50; Keylor 2003, p. 51; Lee, K.H. 1998, pp. 31–32; Lomperis 1996, p. 204; and Pye 1957, p. 7). The Emergency also gave the British and their Malay successors justification to mobilize a significant amount of resources in their war against communism.<sup>7</sup>

As members of the MCP were largely ethnic Chinese, and many Chinese schools were used as centres of the Chinese Communist Party's propaganda, the British stereotyped the Chinese in Malaya as communist supporters, or as fence sitters in the anti-communist campaign (Chew 1975; Freedman 2000, p. 55; and Heng 1988, p. 251). For example, the British believed that the many Chinese squatters who hid in the jungles



during World War II had either provided supplies to the MCP, or had been recruited as new party members (Chai 1977, p. 10; and Lee, K.H. 1998, pp. 31–32). The new high commissioner in 1952, General Gerald Templer, launched the Briggs Plan and forcibly resettled almost 570,000 Chinese squatters into hundreds of new villages.<sup>8</sup>

The effort, albeit controversial and authoritative in its implementation, did in the end help to control and contain the communist rebellion (Sandhu 1964). According to Ramakrishna, “the rural Chinese were the target of government’s emergency measures: in particular individual detention and deportation, communal fines and curfews” (Ramakrishna 2001, p. 82). In total, 30,000 communist activists were jailed, and another 15,000 were deported to China, for many of them were school principals and schoolteachers recruited from China by the Chinese schools in Malaya (Lomperis 1996, p. 204).

With the establishment of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, most overseas Chinese communities harboured fears that the new communist state might confiscate their properties and businesses, and were therefore reluctant to express their loyalty to the new Chinese government. This included the Chinese in Malaya, who were beginning to think of Malaya as their only hope for a permanent homeland (Heng 1988, p. 251). In an attempt to alleviate the Chinese community’s dilemma, Tan Cheng Lock (陈祯禄) formed MCA in February 1949.<sup>9</sup> MCA sought to provide relief and welfare assistance to Chinese villagers displaced by the Briggs Plan, redirect Chinese support away from the communists, and provide an image of loyalty of the Chinese in the midst of suspicions aroused by the emergency decree against the Chinese community in general (Roff 1965, pp. 42–43).

MCA leaders were dominated by Straits-born, English-educated, ethnic Chinese elites who enjoyed linguistic advantages and were generally well accepted by both British and UMNO leaders. They incorporated wings of Chinese-educated, *Kuomintang*- (国民党) inclined leaders, established trust, and, through networking with various Chinese associations, successfully expanded MCA membership from about 3,000 in 1949 to about 250,000 in 1953.<sup>10</sup> In return for the strong support from Chinese-speaking communities, MCA began to take on a more comprehensive role, such as lobbying for more liberal requirements in acquiring citizenship rights for Chinese immigrants, protecting the status of Chinese education and preserving the Chinese identity in the Independence Constitution (Chan 1965; and Heng 1983).

Strong support from the British enabled MCA to outplay the MCP and the Chinese consulates in Malaya as the most effective legitimate Malayan-oriented organization in successfully creating a consciousness of Malayan identity within the local Chinese community (Hara 1997, p. 99). By 1952, the Alliance coalition was established between UMNO and MCA during the Kuala Lumpur municipal election, and with the Malaysian Indian Congress in 1954.<sup>11</sup> This marked the beginning of Malaya's national politics, characterized by compromising tactics and consociational collaboration that resulted in a series of unintended consequences over time.

### VERNACULAR STATUS WITHIN THE UNIFIED EDUCATION SYSTEM

Post-war and pre-independence Malaya was a fragile plural society that lacked social integration and capital for nation building (Furnivall 1948). The colonial government's lack of interest in unifying the educational system in the Federation of Malaya had resulted in the "absence of a consistent educational policy with definite aims and objectives" (Yeok 1982, p. 37). The formation of the British-administered Central Advisory Committee on Education came as late as in 1949, with the aim of preparing an integrative and nationally-focused educational system for Malaya.<sup>12</sup>

There were four main types of school systems in Malaya at that time: English, Chinese, Malay, and Tamil. Each system was different in terms of its sponsorship base, cultural orientation, and medium of instruction, and they co-existed to fulfil the needs of Malaya's diverse ethnic groups.<sup>13</sup> Harboursing an optimistic faith in the value of education as a primary instrument in nation building, the British perceived that an integrated national identity could be achieved by imposing a standardized educational system with a common medium of instruction. Three committees were commissioned between 1950 and 1951 to investigate and explore the most suitable educational system for Malaya (Chai 1977, p. 1).

The Special Committee by the Central Advisory Committee on Education, chaired by M.J. Hogan and consisted of eleven members, of which two were ethnic Chinese, proposed that English be used as the common medium of instruction in all schools in the colony (FM 1952c). The suggestion was rejected by the Federal Legislative Council due to

overwhelming opposition from the Malay community, which saw the proposal as undermining the primacy of the Malay language.

The second committee, led by L.J. Barnes and consisted of five Europeans and nine Malays, "advocated a system of National Schools in which the medium of instruction would be either Malay or English" (FM 1951*b*; Mason 1954, p. 31; and Purcell 1954, p. 154). The Barnes Report recommended "the end of separate vernacular schools for the several racial communities, and their replacement by a single type of primary school common to all" (FM 1951*b*, p. 75). The Chinese community reacted to the Barnes Report with uproar and rebuttal.<sup>14</sup> The report also received little support from the Malays, who were concerned about the subordination of the Malay language and the existing educational system to the English system (Ingham and Simmons 1987, p. 206).

Concurrently, the third committee, led by William Fenn and Wu Teh Yao (吴德耀) also released its report, *Chinese Schools and the Education of Chinese Malaysians* (Fenn-Wu Report), soon after (FM 1951*a*). This report proposed that Chinese-medium schools be integrated into the national education system, but these schools should not be eliminated until the Chinese themselves decided that such schools were not needed. In addition to the use of Chinese as the main medium of instruction in these schools, Chinese students would also study both English and Malay. It was during the various group conferences and individual interviews conducted by Fenn and Wu between February and April 1951 that the Chinese education movement leaders and supporters were alerted to the implications of the recommendations by the Barnes Committee (Purcell 1954, p. 156; and Tan, L.E. 1985).

The great disparity between the Barnes and Fenn-Wu reports forced the Central Advisory Committee on Education to review the suggestions from both reports and led to the *Report on the Barnes Report on Malay Education and the Fenn-Wu Report on Chinese Education*, which, in essence, endorsed Barnes' proposals (FM 1951*c*). The Chinese-speaking community generally felt that all three reports (Barnes, Fenn-Wu, and the Report on Barnes and Fenn-Wu) had failed to provide sufficient protection for Chinese education.<sup>15</sup> Fears amplified amongst the Chinese over the potential closure of all 1,319 Chinese schools in Malaya. Chinese guilds and associations nationwide held conferences at the state level and drafted memorandums to protest against these reports.<sup>16</sup> Continuous debates over the most appropriate educational system for the

Chinese communities led to the formation of the first formal Chinese education association, *Jiaozong*, which later became the institution that provided chief leadership in subsequent Chinese civic movements in Malaya.

In December 1950, Malacca Chinese Schoolteachers' Association (马六甲华校教师公会) Chairman Sim Mow Yu urged that "a national organization should convene as soon as possible to enhance the efficiency of Chinese education and improve the status of Malaya's Chinese schoolteachers".<sup>17</sup> Despite the growing number of Chinese schoolteachers' associations (华人教师公会) and the rapid expansion of its membership, Sim's proposal was turned down because most of these associations preferred to function as welfare associations rather than as pressure groups.<sup>18</sup> The proposal to form a unified Chinese schoolteachers' association was turned down in 1950, but events took a dramatic turn after the Barnes Report was made public. In July 1951, the Negeri Sembilan Chinese Schoolteachers' Association (森美兰华校教师公会) proposed to hold a National Convention of Chinese Schoolteachers' Associations in Malaya (全马教师公会代表大会) to consolidate the power of schoolteachers.

As the Barnes Report would dictate the future of Chinese schools and the career of Chinese schoolteachers, the national convention received tremendous support from associations nationwide. The two-day conference held from 24 to 25 August 1951 in the Selangor Hokkien Association (雪兰莪福建会馆) saw participation from representatives of Chinese schoolteachers' associations from local and state levels. Collectively, the participants voiced their rejection of the Barnes Report and drafted a memorandum to the Central Advisory Committee on Education to demand the incorporation of Chinese schools into the national education system.

On 25 December 1951, *Jiaozong* was formally inaugurated at the Second Conference of the Pan-Malayan Chinese Schoolteachers' Association (全马教师公会第二次代表大会). *Jiaozong's* main objectives were to improve the standard of Chinese education, promote Chinese culture within Malaya, safeguard schoolteachers' status, and improve schoolteachers' welfare (UCSTAM 1952a). At the first General Meeting of Member Associations, Penang Chinese Schoolteachers' Association (槟城华校教师会) was selected as the presidential association, and its chairman, David Chen (陈充恩), became the first *Jiaozong* chairman.<sup>19</sup>

Despite *Jiaozong*'s efforts to lobby for support from the Central Advisory Committee on Education and MCA representatives in the Legislative Council's Education Special Committee, the 1952 Education Ordinance was drafted based on the Barnes Report.<sup>20</sup> Chinese educationalists from *Jiaozong* and community leaders who sat on Chinese school committees were generally displeased with MCA's councillors for neither speaking up for, nor voting against the ordinance when it was unanimously passed by the Federal Legislative Council in November 1952.

### THE GRAND THREE

Although social movement and the state authorities may have conflicting interests, the nature of the Alliance coalition enabled the movement to pursue its goal through brokerage via MCA, the sole Chinese political party within the coalition. This brokerage was the key factor to the movement's survival in its early phase, and has been so in the ensuing development of non-violent interactions between the state and the social movement.

It was through the efforts and intervention of Wen Tien Kuang (温典光),<sup>21</sup> an active senior MCA member and an influential member of United Chinese School Committees' Association of Selangor and Kuala Lumpur (雪兰莪暨吉隆坡联邦直辖区华校董事会联合会), that the Joint Conference of Chinese School Committees and Schoolteachers' Representatives in Federation of Malaya with MCA Representatives (联合邦华校董教代表及马华公会代表联席会议) was made possible at the Selangor Chinese Assembly Hall (雪兰莪中华大会堂) in November 1952. By making MCA the sponsor of the conference, MCA President Tan Cheng Lock was given the opportunity to affirm the MCA's position in supporting the joint efforts of Chinese educational organizations in opposing the Barnes Report, thus strengthening MCA's political influence and collaboration with *Jiaozong*.

The conference provided a platform for representatives of various Chinese communities to affirm the collaborative framework of the Grand Three. Persuaded by MCA, the conference representatives entrusted the Chinese Education Central Committee (the working committee for the Grand Three) to act as an MCA subordinate. It was hoped that by associating the Grand Three with a political party, the Grand Three could become an asset for Chinese educationalists in their dealings with the government. In return, four Chinese educationalist representatives

(two schoolteachers and two school committee members) would work side-by-side three MCA representatives in the central committee.

The Second Joint Conference of Chinese School Committees and Schoolteachers' Representatives in Federation of Malaya with MCA Representatives (联合邦华校董教代表及马华公会代表第二次联席会议) was held in April 1953 to inaugurate the Grand Three and its constitution. The charismatic Tan Cheng Lock delivered a stirring speech to the Chinese education communities at the conference that won him respect and recognition in the Chinese community and movement community alike. Amongst the most important contents from Tan's speech was as follows:

... if you are not interested in politics, the practice of politics will not be uninterested in you. You must either pull your weight with the rest in the political sphere or you will certainly and compulsorily be pulled, whether you like it or not. That is politics, though you may care nothing for politics... Now you say, perhaps another president of the MCA may be antagonistic to the spread, development, and growth of Chinese education in this country. To me, such a situation is unthinkable and impossible because the constitution of the MCA is such that it must protect the interest of the Chinese not only politically but economically, culturally, educationally and in every other respect because if the Chinese don't know Chinese [language], they cannot be Chinese. They cannot be Chinese if they do not practise Chinese customs and traditions; and if they are not Chinese, they cannot be Malays or English or Indians. They will be described as pariahs (UCSTAM 1952*b*).

Subsequently, Tan was selected to head the Chinese Education Central Committee. Through his role as head of the Chinese Education Central Committee and through MCA's political influence, he played a bridging role between Chinese educationalists and the Alliance government during his tenure, enabling the Chinese Education Central Committee to become the highest authority and the leading vehicle of the Chinese education movement throughout the 1950s (Tan, L.E. 1988, p. 49). On 22 August 1954, the second primary component of the Chinese schools, *Dongzong*, was established. It was a national body that sought to unify, strengthen, and represent the interests of Chinese school committees in response to the government's education policy (UCSCAM 2004*a*, p. 42). Unlike *Jiaozong*'s membership, which was divided into the local, county, and state

level, *Dongzong's* membership comprised only state-level Chinese school committees' associations (董事联合会). For the list of *Dongzong's* members, see Appendix 2.

Despite fears and worries within the Chinese communities about the threats posed by the 1952 Education Ordinance, in actuality, this Ordinance could not be fully implemented. Financial constraints posed by the war on communism affected the budget originally allocated to build new national schools and to train new schoolteachers. The sharp increase in the country's student population from the post-war baby boom also pressured the government to utilize the existing infrastructure of schools, in particular Chinese schools, to meet the rocketing needs (Tan, L.E. 1997, p. 283). Additionally, the government was reluctant to take harsh measures against Chinese schools, as closing them would further alienate the Chinese and provide an opportunity for communists to recruit them.

By November 1953, a special committee headed by Education Minister E.E.C. Thuraisingham had been appointed to identify means to implement the 1952 Education Ordinance.<sup>22</sup> The special committee released the *Report of the Special Commission Appointed by the High Commissioner in Council to Consider Ways and Means of Implementing the Policy Outlined in the Education Ordinance* (1954 White Paper on Education Policy) in 1954, and reaffirmed the government's support to make English the main medium of teaching in all schools.<sup>23</sup> A common curriculum would be introduced, and Malay would be taught as a subject. To overcome the financial constraints in building new national schools, features typical of English schools, such as more time in the teaching of English as a subject, and teaching mathematics and science in English, were recommended to be introduced in all vernacular schools. Above all, the report also proposed that its ultimate aim would be to gradually replace all mother tongues with English in all schools.

The 1954 White Paper on Education Policy was seen by Chinese educationalists as a scheme by the government to eliminate Chinese schools in the country. The Chinese Education Central Committee expressed its opposition through the Memorandum Submitted by the United Chinese Schoolteachers' Association of Malaya in Opposition of the Conversion of Vernacular Schools into National Schools (教总反对改方言学校为国民学校宣言). The memorandum was submitted to the high commissioner in March 1954.<sup>24</sup> The committee also released statements through Chinese media, conducted large-scale signature campaigns, and mobilized

a nationwide boycott against the instalment of features of English schools in Chinese schools.<sup>25</sup> By late 1953, Malay educationalists were also opposed to the domination of English as a medium of instruction in Malay schools. In January 1955, chief minister of the Federation of Malaya, Abdul Rahman, finally pronounced the 1954 Education White Paper policy dead.

By September 1955, a fifteen-member Legislative Council Committee on Education, chaired by Education Minister Abdul Razak Hussein, had been formed to review Malaya's educational system. The *Report of the Education Committee* (Razak Report), released in April 1956, was a rare official document that favoured the interests of non-*bumiputera*. Its conception was credited to MCA representatives who sat in the education committee headed by Abdul Razak, and comprised members such as Lim Chong Eu, Goh Chee Yan (吴志渊), Too Joon Hing (朱运兴), Leung Cheung Ling (梁长龄), and Lee Thean Hin (李天兴), who had established an intimate working relationship with *Jiaozong*.

During the drafting of the Razak Report, MCA and *Jiaozong* exchanged information and conducted closed-door discussions to find solutions that would benefit the future of Chinese education (Lim, L.G. 1990, p. 145). Bilingual activists such as Wen Tien Kuang, Yan Yuan Zhang (严元章), Sha Yun Yeo (沙渊如), and Ding Pin Song (丁品松) translated the education memorandum drafted by *Jiaozong* from Chinese to English and shared it with MCA.<sup>26</sup> The document was later presented by MCA representatives to the Razak Committee. Working collaboratively, the Grand Three had a definite influence on the Razak Report, resulting in the integration of the vernacular schools (Chinese, Tamil, and English primary schools) into the national educational system as "national-type" primary schools (国民型小学). All schools (national and national-type) would adopt a common syllabus, and their students would be allowed to sit for common public examinations. In addition, teaching of Malay and English would be compulsory, but vernacular languages would be used as the main mediums of instruction in national-type schools.

The incorporation of vernacular schools into the national education system would allow vernacular schools to receive financial support and, most importantly, official recognition from the government, while being administered by their respective management committees (Heng 1988, p. 255). These compromises by the government were, to some degree, financially motivated. At the dawn of independence, the Malayan government was young and faced demanding tasks in nation-building.



The urgency of tackling nation-building issues such as strengthening national security, urban development, and poverty reduction was given priority over that concerning the vernacular schools. Moreover, the government had been operating short on funds and manpower; thus, sustaining these schools with support from their respective communities was seen as the most rational option during this period for both the government and its people.<sup>27</sup>

After approving the Razak Report in May 1956, the government conducted a nationwide survey, the Torch Movement (火炬运动), to register school-aged children who intended to enrol during the August school holidays in 1956. English schools had begun registering students since June that year, two months before the Chinese schools were informed by the Ministry of Education about the survey. Realizing the importance of the Torch Movement, *Jiaozong* alarmed Chinese schools nationwide and mobilized its members to conduct door-to-door visits to seek new students. Chinese schoolteachers conducted family visits to remind parents to register and enrol their children into Chinese schools, and Chinese school students were mobilized to inform their friends and relatives about the importance of the survey (UCSCAM 1992*a*; and YCSHEC 2008, p. 263).

With the help and intervention of the Chinese Education Central Committee, the Ministry of Education finally agreed to allow MCA branches, state-level Chinese assembly halls (华人大会堂) and more Chinese schools to operate as student registration facilities.<sup>28</sup> Through wide publicity by local Chinese newspapers and collective efforts of Chinese educationalists, Chinese schools successfully obtained a stable enrolment rate and legitimated the continued existence of vernacular schools in Malaya (UCSCAM 1992*a*, p. 79).

## FORMATION OF A NEW NATION

The political backdrop in Malaya in the late 1950s was one of passionate anticipation in becoming an independent state. The first Independence Mission led by Abdul Rahman in 1954 had failed due to the British's reluctance to grant Malaya independence unless there was evidence that the party that took over government had the support of the majority of the people in the colony.<sup>29</sup> After a series of political bargains, the Alliance successfully persuaded the British to hold Malaya's first Federal Election in 1955 in preparation for the country's independent rule.<sup>30</sup>

Under tremendous amount of pressure to win this election, the Alliance coalition tried to garner support to defeat its main political opponent, the Independence of Malaya Party, led by veteran Malay politician, Onn Jaafar.<sup>31</sup>

In a move to solidify support from the Chinese, Abdul Rahman agreed to meet leaders of the Chinese Education Central Committee in January 1955 at a secret meeting initiated by Tan Cheng Lock in Tan's private residence in Malacca. At this meeting, Abdul Rahman endorsed that "it would not be the Alliance's policy to destroy the schools, language and culture of any race".<sup>32</sup> The Alliance's representatives agreed to *Jiaozong's* demands to remove provisions in the Education Ordinance that threatened the existence of Chinese schools and promised to consider providing a two million straits dollar subsidy to Chinese schools in Malaya. However, both UMNO and MCA rejected the demand from *Jiaozong* to include Chinese as the second official language in their election manifesto at this meeting (UCSTAM 1975, p. 26).

Persuaded by Tan Cheng Lock, *Dongzong* and *Jiaozong* representatives softened their stand and agreed to postpone the issue until after the election. From the perspective of *Dongzong* and *Jiaozong*, they only agreed to temporarily cast the issue aside for the 1955 General Election. Nevertheless, it was perceived by UMNO and MCA that the Chinese educationalists had agreed to drop the petition in exchange for citizenship for the Chinese and inclusion of the Chinese vernacular system into the national education system.

With support from the Chinese Education Central Committee and majority of Malays, the Alliance coalition won a landslide victory at the 1955 General Election, taking fifty-one out of fifty-two elected seats in the Federal Legislative Council. The first self-government was formed on 2 August 1955, with Abdul Rahman as the territory's chief minister. He was given the mandate to form a new Malayan government and later successfully persuaded the British to grant Malaya independence during the London Talks in January 1956.<sup>33</sup>

By June that year, the Independent Constitutional Survey Commission headed by William Reid arrived in Malaya to assess views and formulate a new Constitution for Malaya (Abdul R. 1984, p. 180). The Alliance government submitted a memorandum representing official views of the self-rule government to the Commission in August 1956. Realizing this opportunity, the influential Federation of Malaya Chinese Guilds Association (马来亚华人行业社团总会) submitted an independent memorandum

in April 1956 and pressed for the Chinese cause in the drafting of the Independence Constitution.<sup>34</sup>

The Memorandum to Acquire for Citizenship by Representatives of Chinese Associations and Guilds in The Federation of Malaya (马来亚联合邦华人社团代表争取公民权宣言), which was drafted without the support of MCA, demanded *jus soli*-based citizenship and equal rights and responsibilities for all, regardless of ethnicity. It also called for waiver of the Malay proficiency test in granting citizenship rights to foreigners who have lived in Malaya for five or more years.<sup>35</sup> Above all, this memorandum suggested that Malay, Chinese, and Tamil should all be the official languages of Malaya. The Chinese groups' timely demands were rewarded: the *Report of the Federation of Malaya Constitutional Commission 1957* drafted by the Reid Commission included some of the suggestions proposed in the memorandum (CC 1957).

Malaya gained independence on 31 August 1957, with Abdul Rahman as its first prime minister. However, social and political stability — especially that tied to ethnic relations — in the new Malaya remained fragile. It was in the crucible of early independence politics and struggles over the definition of citizenship that the Chinese education movement in Malaya was given the impetus to come into being. Ethnic Chinese activists had accelerated their appeal on the drafting of the Independence Constitution in anticipation of further marginalization of the Chinese in Malaya. However, most working-class Chinese had been focusing their wholehearted efforts on securing their livelihoods and rebuilding homes. Therefore, the concept of Malaya as an independent nation and the importance of citizenship rights were relatively new and did not appeal to many of them.<sup>36</sup>

In an effort to increase political awareness amongst the Chinese, the most significant pillars of Chinese communities at that time — MCA, Federation of Malaya Chinese Guilds Association, *Dongzong*, and *Jiaozong* — jointly mobilized a nationwide Chinese citizenship registration movement between 1957 and 1958 (FM 1957*b*). The campaign was a success: by 1959 about 50,000 qualified Chinese residents in Malaya had successfully secured Malayan citizenship (K.J. Ratnam 1965, p. 84).

Other than citizenship, other difficult issues faced by the ethnic Chinese community in Malaya were the problems of overage students and the medium of the state examination conducted at the end of secondary education. Poverty, lack of initiative amongst illiterate parents to ensure their children received formal education, and school closure during the

Japanese occupation were the key factors that contributed to many overage students still residing in Chinese schools. These students, who tended to be influenced by left-wing political ideology, were perceived by the authorities as troublemakers and threats to their schools and younger classmates.

Therefore, soon after the Razak Report was announced, government officials at the state level began to disqualify overage students from continuing their education in Chinese secondary schools despite ongoing negotiations between the Grand Three and the Education Minister Abdul Razak. Feeling frustrated and victimized by the Razak Report, a nationwide strike by Chinese students first sparked off in Penang on 14 November 1957 and spread like wildfire to some twenty Chinese secondary schools across the country (Lim, L.G. 1988, pp. 208–21). Students from the largest of these schools in Penang, namely, Chung Ling High School (钟灵中学), Han Chiang High School (韩江中学), and Chung Hwa Confucian High School (孔圣庙中华中学), marched on the streets and assembled at Penang Chinese Girls' High School (槟华女中).

The following accounts are statements by a student activist who participated in the strike:

The [Penang Chinese Girls'] school field was full of students — about 2,000 boys from Chung Ling, Han Chiang, and Chung Hwa. Many were overage students and their sympathizers who were angry at the new policy. The demonstration ended chaotically when anti-riots police started firing tear gas at those of us who had just entered the school assembly hall. I ran home and learnt later that some ten students were injured. My school was closed for one week. I faced disciplinary action when the school reopened, and I was warned that I would be expelled from school if I participated in any future strike activities again.<sup>37</sup>

Simultaneously in Kuala Lumpur, students from Confucian Secondary School (尊孔中学), Kuen Cheng High School (坤成中学), and Tsun Jin High School (循人中学) also organized peaceful gatherings at their schools. Prompt intervention by *Jiaozong* leaders and Chinese educationalists reassured the students and persuaded them to abandon the strikes.<sup>38</sup> However, strikes continued in most parts of Perak and Johore (UCSTAM 1976, pp. 24–26). Facing increasing pressure from the Chinese community and having witnessed the manifested capacity of the students' strike, the government finally agreed to compromise. It agreed

to continue the grant-in-aid for most Chinese secondary schools, include Chinese as one of the language medium of the national examinations, and end the forceful expulsion of overage students (Lim, L.G. 1988, pp. 218–21).

## BEYOND CHALLENGES

Tension within the Alliance coalition surfaced after Lim Chong Eu defeated Tan Cheng Lock to become MCA's second party president in March 1958. The new MCA leadership was not endorsed by Abdul Rahman, who indicated his displeasure in his memoirs:

A new group of young MCA leaders took over the party from Tan Cheng Lock; and with that they also introduced a new MCA policy, which was to acquire more rights for the Chinese, and to end — what they imputed — UMNO control of the Alliance and the country, and to make Chinese language one of the official languages of the country (Abdul R. 1986*a*, p. 70).

The relationship between Lim Chong Eu and Abdul Rahman continued to worsen when Lim Chong Eu led MCA's reform faction to support the demand to acquire official status for Chinese language during the 1958 National Convention on Expansion of Chinese Education (全马华文教育扩大会议).<sup>39</sup> Their demand was further consolidated in the Memorandum of Demands on Chinese Education by Chinese Citizens in the Federation (本邦华人对教育总要求) at the Grand Three Associations of Chinese Education's National Convention of Chinese Education in Malaya (三大机构华文教育中央委员会全国华文教育大会) in 1959 (GTACE 1960).

By July 1959, the deteriorating relationship between Lim Chong Eu and Abdul Rahman reached a boiling point when a letter written by Lim to Abdul Rahman was cited by the press. The "Alliance Crisis", as it was dubbed by the press, came to be seen as an issue of "Chinese versus Malays" because of the highly controversial contents of the letter. The demands stated in this letter included a pledge to petition for vernacular schools to hold examinations in their own mediums of instruction and for the government to recognize these examinations as equivalent to national certificates, and objection to the requirement that all MCA candidates for competing in the elections had to be personally approved by the Alliance chairman (Abdul R. 1986*a*; and Ho, K.C. 1984, p. 12).

Above all, Lim also demanded forty parliamentary seats to be allocated to MCA in the coming general election.

Lim's efforts to secure political equality for MCA within the Alliance halted when MCA lost thirty out of thirty-two contested seats during the first post-independence general election held on 19 August 1959. After failing to secure unanimous support from MCA's Central Committee, Lim and his reform faction withdrew from MCA in December 1960. At the MCA Extraordinary General Meeting held on 10 November 1961, MCA appointed a more submissive Tan Siew Sin (陈修信) to head the new MCA party, and declared its support to UMNO.<sup>40</sup> This also marked Abdul Rahman's resumption of full control of the Alliance collaboration (Abdul R. 1986a, p. 70; and Daniel 1995, p. 36).

The departure of many sympathizers of the Chinese education movement out of MCA dealt a serious blow to the Chinese education movement, for MCA had been a powerful benefactor of the political negotiation in the collaboration amongst the Grand Three. The newly installed MCA leaders were unable to build a trusting relationship with the Chinese education movement activists, resulting in the fading and eventual termination of MCA's unconditional support for the Chinese education movement. Leaders of the movement were thus forced to establish closer alliances and rely heavily on Chinese guilds and associations for support in their battle to preserve Chinese education in Malaya. Chinese leaders from the Federation of Malaya Chinese Guilds Association, with their strong networks and robust financial resources, quickly took over the role of MCA (Yeok 1982, p. 118). The political change of tide eventually saw the Federation of Malaya Chinese Guilds Association, *Dongzong*, and *Jiaozong* become the most articulate social mobilization vehicles of the Chinese community in the 1960s.

The Chinese education movement faced further challenges in the 1960s with the publication of the *Report of the Education Review Committee* (Rahman Talib Report) in August 1960 (FM 1960). The Rahman Talib Report proposed taking a more aggressive approach to strengthen the role of Malay language as the main medium of instruction in all schools in Malaya. The report invoked Article 21 (No. 2), which empowered the Minister of Education to convert any national-type primary school into a national primary school at its discretion. A similar clause was included in the Razak Report; however, it had been removed from the 1957 Education Ordinance after heavy lobbying by MCA (FM 1957a). This clause had been perceived by Chinese educationalists as an attempt to abolish the

vernacular schools from the national education system. Their fears were rekindled with the setting of a definitive timetable to phase out English medium schools and convert government-aided Chinese secondary schools into Malay-medium schools. In addition, all national public examinations would be conducted in one of the official languages, that is, either English or Malay.

Threatened by these measures, *Jiaozong's* Chairman, Lim Lian Geok, led *Jiaozong* in mobilizing the Chinese community to reject the Rahman Talib Report. He also accused the Ministry of Education for violating the Constitution, infringing the Alliance's election manifesto, destroying the spirit of the Razak Report and ultimately, attempting to abolish Chinese schools in Malaya.<sup>41</sup> However, Lim failed to stop the implementation of the Rahman Talib Report, which was enacted as the Education Act in 1961. One of the most significant impacts of the new Education Act was the termination of the partially government-aided schools system by 1 January 1962. The act would accord funding only to schools that converted to national-type secondary schools, which would use English and Malay as mediums of instruction and examination.<sup>42</sup> This forced Chinese secondary schools to choose between converting to the use of English and Malay as mediums of instruction and becoming financially independent as a private school.

In total, at least fifty-three Chinese secondary schools nationwide accepted the government's terms of conversion and were transformed into the national-type system in 1961. Most schools accepted the conversion offer due to the reality of financial constraints that had been plaguing most Chinese schools in Malaya. In addition, the Alliance regime launched an impactful pro-conversion campaign, culminating in the successful conversion of Penang Chung Ling High School. Chung Ling High School was the first Chinese secondary school to accept the government's special allowances and was able to reduce its school fees and offer better salaries for its schoolteachers after receiving financial aid from the government (Tan, K.H. 2007, p. 175; and Tan, L.E. 1997, p. 223). In addition, state-level education departments also held informal meetings with Chinese secondary schools' committees to persuade them to convert to the national-type system (Huang, X.J. 2002, p. 44). More importantly, the Ministry of Education also provided special permission for converted Chinese schools to establish affiliated independent schools, which used Chinese as their medium of instruction. The permission was granted to appease angry Chinese communities and protect

the social interests of the school committees that had acceded to the conversion.<sup>43</sup>

Not surprisingly, the decision of these Chinese schools to accept the offer of conversion sparked off a wave of protests from students, parents, and the public alike. However, it was the decision of the Ministry of Home Affairs on 12 August 1961 to strip Lim Lian Geok's teaching permit and, soon after, revoke his citizenship under the pretext of "disloyal and disaffected towards the Federation of Malaya" (Lim, L.G. 1989, pp. 11–12) that became the pivotal point in the conversion of Chinese schools. Extreme retaliation by the government had been rare, and therefore the measures taken against Lim sent a message strong enough to strike fear in dissidents.

The self-censorship that constrained the reactions of the Chinese community was best exemplified by the reaction of *Jiaozong's* central level leaders after the incident.<sup>44</sup> On 3 September 1961, at the request of Lim, *Jiaozong* held an emergency meeting to discuss the position of the next chairman. However, none of the attendees was willing to take on the politically precarious position. The burden fell on Huang Yun Yue (黄润岳)

— who had not held any senior position within *Jiaozong* and was a mere editor of *Jiaozong's* in-house publication, *Teachers' Journal* (教师杂志) at that time — as the acting chairman. *Jiaozong's* Advisor Yan Yuan Zhang, who was then based in Singapore, strongly criticized the Malayan government at the meeting:

Lim Lian Geok, as the chairman of *Jiaozong*, has the responsibility to criticize unfair education policies, and is merely exercising his right to free speech under a democratic constitution. If this right is taken away, it signifies either the death of democracy, or that the government is against the Constitution (Lim, L.G. 1989, p. 44).

In the end, Yan Yuan Zhang paid a high price for his speech: he was forbidden by law from entering Malaya indefinitely. With two *Jiaozong* leaders' dissidence countered by draconian measures from the government, the rest of the *Jiaozong* activists were cowed into silence.<sup>45</sup> During this crisis, only sixteen Chinese schools chose to forsake government subsidies and continue using Chinese as their medium of instruction. These schools were later referred to as independent Chinese secondary schools.<sup>46</sup> The converted Chinese schools used English as their medium of instruction until the 1970s, when Malay was made the sole medium of teaching



in all national schools. The switch in the medium of teaching from Chinese to English and ultimately Malay was perceived by many as a betrayal and trap set by the ruling regime. This perception persists to this day, as Chinese educationalists continue to frown upon Chung Ling High School's principal, Wang Yoon Nien (汪永年), and executive director of the school committee, Ong Keng Seng (王景成), as chief betrayers of the Chinese community.<sup>47</sup>

### NEW MALAYSIA AND MERDEKA UNIVERSITY

Malaya merged with the British colonies of Sarawak, Sabah, and Singapore to form an enlarged Federation of Malaysia on 16 September 1963. However, the formation of Malaysia was not welcomed by its larger and more imposing neighbours. Indonesian President Sukarno voiced threats to crush Malaysia, which was deemed by him as a neo-colonial puppet state of the British, and declared a policy of confrontation in January 1963 (Mackie 1974). It was a tense moment for the new Malaysian state, as armed conflict loomed in the region, especially after the Philippines President Macapagal had staked his claim on Sabah.<sup>48</sup>

Domestically, Singapore People's Action Party leader, Lee Kuan Yew, provoked a debate on a "Malaysian Malaysia", whereby equality before the law predicated on citizenship and no one community would enjoy special privileges. Lee's ideology tapped into the brewing resentment against the Malays' political domination of the new state (Cheah 2002, pp. 54–55; and Rudner 1970, p. 3). Lee also requested for partnership amongst members of the Alliance (Heng 1988, p. 254). Following the outbreak of ethnic riots between Chinese and Malays in Singapore in 1964, Singapore was asked to leave the federation in August 1965 by Prime Minister Abdul Rahman due to fears that the assertive Chinese minority would undermine the stability of the federation (Keylor 2003, p. 252; and Lee, K.H. 1998, p. 35).

With Singapore's departure, the proportion of the Chinese population in Malaysia dropped dramatically from 42 per cent to 25 per cent by the end of 1965 (Ongkili 1985, p. 154). It was a significant political disadvantage for the Chinese in Malaysia. In an effort to boost the political spirits of the ethnic Chinese in Malaysia, the Convention of Chinese Guilds and Associations Against the Invasion of Rights (华团反侵略大会) was held in June 1965, hosted by Selangor Chinese Assembly Hall. More than 280 representatives of Chinese guilds and associations nationwide

attended the assembly to demand that Chinese be installed as an official language of Malaysia.

The Convention chairperson, Lee Hau Shik (李孝式), persuaded participants of the National Convention to entrust their appeal to MCA and wait for an appropriate moment to seek legitimacy for their mother tongue. Unfortunately, the participants discovered in August 1965 that their trust had been misplaced: in the midst of widespread objections from the Chinese community, the MCA Central Working Committee (马华中央工作委员会) opted to endorse the decision of the Alliance coalition not to support the demand for Chinese to be installed as an official language.

In response, *Dongzong* and *Jiaozong* joined the Federation of Malaya Chinese Guilds Association in drafting the Memorandum to the Prime Minister for a Rightful Place of the Chinese Language (为争取华文地位向首相东姑阿都拉曼呈送备忘录). It was submitted to the Prime Minister in November 1965 after the organizers had successfully obtained more than 2,000 signatures as a collective act of support from Chinese guilds and associations nationwide (PWCRGAGM 1965).

Somewhat surprisingly, MCA's Youth Division leader, Sim Mow Yu, did back the demand. Sim was a schoolteacher in Malacca, but also a very powerful political leader amongst the MCA youth community. He founded the MCA Youth Division, and was elected as chairman in February 1966. However, he volunteered to let Lee San Choon (李三春) assume the position of chairman while he opted to be a vice chairman. He explained his reason for doing so in an interview for this study:

San Choon had a better working relationship with MCA's party president, while I could work closely with the Chinese pressure groups. This would ideally reap the greatest benefits for the Chinese community, especially with regard to our petition for Chinese language become one of the official languages of the country.<sup>49</sup>

Nonetheless, Sim's hope of forming a "San Choon and Mow Yu dream team" was dashed in October 1966 when Sim was expelled from MCA. Sim's insistent demands to instate Chinese as an official language were also not well received by MCA's leaders, and Sim was expelled for purportedly breaching the rules of MCA and the Alliance. Members of many MCA Youth Division branches demonstrated their great displeasure over Sim's

expulsion in boycotts and freezing of activities; some supporters even quit the party in displeasure over the decision of the central committee. The magnitude of the protests, which lasted for about two years, almost paralyzed MCA. The expulsion motivated Sim to transform himself from a mainstream political actor into a wholehearted *Jiaozong* activist.

Sim, together with fellow Chinese educationalists, participated actively in the Chinese Education Working Committee (华教工作委员会) — a reformed collaborative body established in 1966 between *Dongzong* and *Jiaozong* — after the failure of the Grand Three. The momentum of active political activities within the Chinese communities reached its height in 1967 in response to the restrictions by the Ministry of Education requiring all students to obtain either a Cambridge School Certification or the Malaysian Certification of Education before they could leave the country for further studies abroad. This regulation hit hard particularly the non-converted Chinese secondary school graduates who had obtained only a Chinese secondary school certificate. Thus, limited enrollment opportunities at local universities forced many Chinese school graduates to continue their studies at overseas universities, or quit school altogether (Chian 1994, p. 60).

Calls for an independent Chinese university started to grow after the government refused to include Chinese as an official language under the 1966 National Language Bill (GM 1963). In an attempt to resolve the impasse, *Dongzong* and *Jiaozong* suggested the formation of Merdeka University, and the suggestion was met with overwhelming positive response from the Chinese community nationwide.<sup>50</sup> During the opening speech at the Merdeka University Founders' Assembly (马来亚独立大学发起人大会) held at Selangor Chinese Assembly Hall in April 1968, the chairman of the founding committee, who was also *Dongzong* chairman, Ye Hong En (叶鸿恩), summoned support from his fellow countrymen with the following call:<sup>51</sup>

The founding of Merdeka University has a significant meaning for the Chinese community here, and the university has a long road ahead of it. Although we will face many challenges, we shall possess the determination and courage to surmount all difficulties, and we shall not be daunted by repeated setbacks (UCSTAM 1968).

In this Assembly, a Merdeka University Formation Working Committee (马来西亚独立大学筹备工作委员会) was formed to establish a non-profit

Merdeka University (Limited) Company (独立大学有限公司). Merdeka University received overwhelming support from the Chinese community, as well as from MCA's Youth Division and Women Wing (MUB 1978*b*, p. 75). The strength of its support base was apparent in the various fundraising campaigns held by Merdeka University in 1968, which successfully collected about two million straits dollars by May 1969 (NUAAM et al. 1982, pp. 84–85; Zeng et al. 1993, pp. 149–51; and Zhuan 2004, p. 242). More significantly, *Dongjiaozong*, as an entity that represents the collaboration between *Dongzong* and *Jiaozong*, was popularized during the Merdeka University movement, and has since been widely recognized by the Chinese communities in the country as the defenders of Chinese education.

Despite overwhelming support from the rank and file of MCA, the formation of Merdeka University did not meet with the blessings of MCA's central leaders (DNICSSDWC 1993, p. 21; and MUB 1978*b*, p. 86). MCA President Tan Siew Sin criticized the formation of Merdeka University as being "politically motivated" and that "it would have been easier for 'hell to freeze' than for Merdeka University to be established in this country".<sup>52</sup> As a counter response, MCA proposed the expansion of the University of Malaya's Department of Chinese Studies into a full faculty and set up the Tunku Abdul Rahman College (拉曼学院) as palatable alternatives.<sup>53</sup> Still, flagging political strength and mounting pressure from MCA members forced MCA to finally back down and agree to work with Merdeka University Company. The registration of Merdeka University Company was approved by the government as a non-profit corporation under the Companies Act on 8 May 1969 — two days before the 1969 General Election. This, however, did not save the Alliance coalition from losing two-thirds of the parliamentary majority in the elections held on 12 May 1969, resulting in MCA leaders declaring that the party would pull out from the cabinet.

At the same time, opposition parties, mostly non-Malays who won the polls, celebrated their victory in organized demonstrations. The demonstrations only served to deepen the fear and mistrust amongst the Malays over the Chinese's growing influence and power in the country. The immediate eruption of ethnic riots on 13 May 1969, involving ethnic Malays and Chinese communities, resulted in hundreds of deaths.<sup>54</sup> As a consequence of the ethnic riots, the formation of Merdeka University was stalled after the subsequent declaration of a State of Emergency, with

Merdeka University Company's financial assets frozen by the government (Zhen 2006, p. 84).

Prime Minister Abdul Rahman resigned and paved the way for Abdul Razak as the second prime minister of Malaysia in September 1970. Abdul Razak led the National Operation Council in governing the state with an Emergency Decree for the next twenty-one months. Abdul Razak's regime sought to restructure state and society relations in Malaysia, and the centrepiece of this overhaul, the New Economic Policy, was introduced in 1971. Aimed at restructuring state and society, the main approach of the New Economic Policy was to:

... eradicate poverty, by raising income levels and increasing employment opportunities for all Malaysians, irrespective of race. It also aimed at accelerating the process of restructuring the Malaysian society to correct economic imbalance, so as to reduce and eventually eliminate the identification of race with economic function (cited from GM 1971*e*, p. 2).

The first decade of the New Economic Policy saw state-led *bumiputera* capitalist development rocketing. Civil servants' wages were increased and an official Islamization programme was promoted to nudge Muslims on the path to capitalism in Malaysia.<sup>55</sup> As discussed in Chapter 1, Alliance coalition was broadened after the 1969 riots by co-opted PAS, Gerakan, and People's Progressive Party to form BN.<sup>56</sup> The expanding ranks of the ruling coalition enhanced UMNO's political domination and procured more power in the hands of Malays; it also weakened the status of MCA as the sole representative of the Chinese population in the government.

MCA launched a series of nationwide Chinese Solidarity Conventions (全国华人团结大会) after the end of the Emergency Decree in 1971 to garner support from the Chinese community in an attempt to rebound from its declining political status (Loh 1982). Leaders and communities assembled at the Seminar of National Chinese Leaders in Malaya (全马华人领袖座谈会) in February 1971 to discuss the issues and challenges of unity amongst the Chinese. Sim Mow Yu, who remained influential and popular at the grassroots level despite having been expelled from MCA, was invited to be the keynote speaker.<sup>57</sup> The Chinese Solidarity Conventions continued in Perak, Negeri Sembilan, and Penang.<sup>58</sup> Despite overwhelming participation from the community in the

National Chinese Alliance Movement, the movement neither reformed MCA nor improved the political status of the Chinese by means of securing the status of Chinese language and culture in Malaysia (Lee, K.H. 1998, pp. 39–40; and Lew and Loot 1997). The movement ended dramatically when Sim and Gu Hsing Kuang (顾兴光) were arrested in April 1971 under the Sedition Act.<sup>59</sup>

Later in December 1971, *Dongzong*, *Jiaozong*, and the Chinese Education Central Committee jointly organized the National Convention of Chinese School Committees and Schoolteachers (全国华校董教大会) to discuss strategies to persuade the government to allow Chinese schools to retain their traditional features. Despite this being the largest gathering of Chinese educationalists with more than a thousand attendees, including representatives from Sarawak, the weakened MCA failed to achieve any breakthrough in negotiations with the government on this issue.

The Chinese education movement suffered more setbacks in 1974 with the normalization of diplomatic relations between Malaysia and the People's Republic of China. Not only did this diplomatic move signify the end of China's state-level support to the MCP, but it also confirmed both governments' recognition of the principle of *jus soli*, rejection of dual nationality, and recognition of Malaysian Chinese as legitimate citizens of Malaysia.<sup>60</sup> The recognition and acknowledgement Abdul Razak and his administration gave to China rewarded him with favourable support from the Chinese community, leading to his landslide victory in the 1974 General Election (Loh, Phang, and Saravanamuthu 1981, pp. 27–33).

## CONCLUSION

Anti-communist sentiments arising from the Cold War controversies of the 1960s and 1970s generally targeted Chinese as supporters of communists in Malaya, especially those who fought against the Japanese under the MCP-led MPAJA in World War II. The Chinese education movement arose in the process of the British's efforts to fight communism in Malaya and the rise of nationalism amongst Malayan Chinese prior to Malaya's independence in 1957.

The Grand Three coalition in the 1950s marked the birth of the movement in Malaya's nation-building process. Although state and movement

actors did not share many of the same principles, their interpersonal and inter-institutional working experiences had built gradually upon a foundation of trust to become the key factors for the widespread support the Alliance coalition garnered from vernacular communities for the 1955 Malacca Meeting. Nevertheless, the “honeymoon” of the political marriage was brief. When elites in the top echelon were changed, pro-vernacular MCA leader, Lim Chong Eu, and his reformist wings did not have the blessings of Alliance Chairman, Abdul Rahman. When Tan Siew Sin came into power through the help of the Alliance regime’s old guards, the Chinese education movement was forced to turn to the support from Chinese guilds and associations.

This shift in support base expanded the magnitude of the movement to include intellectuals, financially-established Chinese entrepreneurs, as well as the Chinese speaking community that harboured similar grievances. The Chinese education movement transformed from a claim by a small organization over educational issues into a full-blown campaign to secure citizenship rights for the Chinese in Malaya, along with demands for installing the Chinese’s vernacular language as an official language and forming a more comprehensive and inclusive national education system.

While the implementation of the New Economic Policy, National Educational Policy, and other pro-Malay affirmative actions fostered the growth of political patronage in the Malay middle class, yet it also further polarized the dichotomy between Malays and non-Malays in the country (GM 1971a). Ironically, ethnic exploitation, inequitable distribution of national wealth and deliberate marginalization of the non-*bumiputera* would become the key factors that united the Chinese in the Chinese education movement. The events presented in this chapter form the backdrop for the establishment of various institutions in the social movement in its later stages.

Although Malaysia has grown from a new state in the 1950s into a successful developing country by the 2010s, yet the Chinese education movement, with its claim on constitutional discrimination, has left an ugly scar on the country’s facade of political progress. The reminder by Donald MacGillivray to *Jiaozong* leaders in November 1952 remains eternal: “... lacking the status as an official language in Malaya, Chinese [language] and Chinese schools will never be recognized within the Malaysian education system”.<sup>61</sup>

## Notes

1. According to Silcock and Aziz (1953, p. 279), Malays are territorially allegiant to sultans, culturally to Islam. By 1951, the non-Malays comprised about 50 per cent of the total population in Malaya. Amongst them, 62 per cent Chinese and 50 per cent Indians were locally born. See FM (1952*b*, p. 2).
2. The MCP was formed in 1930, crushed by the British government in 1955, with remnants of the party continuing military resistance against the Malaya federal government along the Thai-Malaya border until the 1989 peace treaty. The MPAJA was a political association controlled by the MCP, and was once equipped by the British. It grew from 200 in 1942 into a force of 10,000 by 1945. For more, see Purcell (1967, pp. 258–62); Pye (1957, p. 8); Ramakrishna (2002); and Springhall (2000, p. 50).
3. The British ruled Malaya through direct and indirect governments. The *entrepot* trade centres of Penang, Malacca, and Singapore had non-Malay majorities, which were ruled directly as crown colonies. Malay states with significant commercial activities (tin mines and rubber plantations) — Perak, Selangor, Negeri Sembilan, and Pahang — were set up as Federated Malaya States. Those states lacking in such activities — Perlis, Kedah, Kelantan, Terengganu, and Johore — were ruled as Unfederated Malaya States. See Cheah (1983, pp. 441–46); and von Vorys (1975, pp. 22, 142).
4. *Bumiputera* refers to two groups of people: the ethnic Malay who habitually speaks Malay, professes Islam, and conforms to traditional Malay customs (*adat*), and the indigenous occupant of the Malay archipelago. For more, see Chai (1977, p. 7).
5. Only 350,000 (11 per cent) Chinese and 225,000 (7 per cent) Indians were eligible to become citizens of Federation of Malaya under the “operation of law” condition in February 1948. *Ibid.*, p. 8.
6. Japanese military began the *Kakyo Shukusei* (purge through purification) — operation wartime massacres on ethnic Chinese — from December 1941 to April 1942, and continued in other forms until August 1945. The number of victims reached as high as 50,000 in Singapore and 40,000 in Malaya. For more, see Cheah (1983, p. 23); Hirofumi (2008); and Peattie (1996, pp. 230–31).
7. The lengthy guerrilla war (1948–60) cost the British and the Malayan government about 850 million straits dollar. About 11,048 people were killed (6,710 guerrillas, 1,865 security forces and 2,473 civilians). For more, see O’Balance (1966, p. 177); Pye (1957, p. 15); and Stockwell (1999, p. 486).
8. General Templer arrived in Malaya in February 1952 to replace Henry Gurney who died in a terrorist ambush in late 1951. Templer was both high commissioner and military director of operations, and had full authority to



- wage counter-communist insurgency operations, using policing, intelligence and psychological warfare. For more, see Abdul R. (1986a, p. 35); and Ramakrishna (2001).
9. Tan was Straits-born, English-educated and a nominated member of the Malacca Municipal Council and Straits Settlements Legislative Council, and known to British's highest officials, such as Malcolm MacDonald and Henry Gurney. For more, see Heng (1988, pp. 67, 251); and Tan, L.E. (1988, pp. 50–51).
  10. These leaders included Sim Mow Yu, Leong Yew Koh (梁宇皋), and Lee Hau Shik. For more, see Heng (1983, pp. 291–309); Lee, K.H. (1998, p. 31); and Lomperis (1996, p. 212).
  11. Malaysian Indian Congress was established since 1946 to support India's independence from British. After India had gained its independence, it started to support the independence of Malaya. For more, see Abdul R. (1986a, p. 35); and Lomperis (1996, p. 207).
  12. In 1946, the Malayan Union Council Paper (No. 53) marked the first official education reform plan by the British. The plan proposed English as the compulsory subject for all vernacular schools but it vanished with the rejection of the Malayan Union in 1949. For more, see MU (1947).
  13. English and Malay schools received full support and control from the government. As Tamil schools were mostly located in rural areas and functioned independently like the Chinese schools, they faced more challenges to sustain the financial resources necessary to maintain the schools' operation.
  14. The day after Barnes Report was published in the newspapers, domestic Chinese press filled their pages with articles attacking and accusing the Barnes Report of intention to abolish the Chinese schools and subsequently to destroy the Chinese culture. For more, see *China Press*, 12 June 1951; and *Nanyangshangpao*, 13 June 1951.
  15. *Kinkwok Daily News*, 12 July 1951; *Nanyangshangpao*, 9 July and 19 July 1951; and *Sinchew Daily*, 8 July and 10 July 1951.
  16. Anti-Barnes Report gatherings were also conducted in Selangor (19 July 1951) and Johore (9 August 1951). For the debates, see *China Press*, 12 June 1951; *Kinkwok Daily News*, 12 July 1951; *Nanyangshangpao*, 13 June, 9 July, and 19 July 1951; and *Sinchew Daily*, 8 July and 10 July 1951.
  17. Sim Mow Yu (founder of the Malacca MCA Youth, former *Jiaozong* chairman), interview by the author, Malacca, 26 March 2008.
  18. Ibid.
  19. The presidential association (主席區) was a system practised by *Jiaozong* from 1951 to 1954, whereby one of the member associations would be selected and be responsible for all office-bearer positions (chairman, general secretary, and treasurer). The role of the presidential association was further consolidated

- in 1954 to allow the same Chinese schoolteachers' association to hold the committee position without term limits. This change allowed capable leaders to stabilize the organization in the fragile early phase of *Jiaozong*. After more Chinese schoolteachers' associations were established and potential leaders promoted from across Malaya, *Jiaozong's* Constitution was amended in 1954 to enable the selection of the executive committee on a personal basis. For more, see UCSTAM (1976, p. 2). For the list of *Jiaozong's* members, see Appendix 1.
20. The special committee was appointed on 20 September 1951 to make recommendations for various Education Reports and draft the 1952 Education Ordinance. Chong Khoon Lin (张崑灵) and Leung Cheung Ling were in the Central Advisory Committee; Lee Hau Shik and Leung Cheung Ling were in the Special Committee. For more, see CACE (1951).
  21. Graduated from Columbia University in the United States, Wen Tien Kuang (温典光) had been the Chinese-English translator of MCA during the 1950s, responsible for almost all documents between *Jiaozong* and *Dongzong* with MCA. He was the Selangor Chinese School Committee Association general secretary (1956–59), deputy chairman (1960–64), Chinese Education Central Committee secretary, and the middleman between Lim Lian Geok and Tan Cheng Lock. The Selangor Chinese Assembly Hall was renamed as Kuala Lumpur and Selangor Chinese Assembly Hall (吉隆坡暨雪兰莪中华大会堂) in 2006 to legitimize and strengthen the power of representation of this organization on behalf of Chinese communities at Selangor and Kuala Lumpur regions.
  22. MCA was represented by Lee Chang Jing (李长景) and Yong Xu Ling (杨旭龄).
  23. For the report, see FM (1954). For the implementation suggestions of this report, see FLC (1954).
  24. The memorandum claimed that schooling through the “mother tongue” was a basic means of preserving one's culture. The memorandum also clarified, for the first time, the Chinese's demand to affirm Chinese language as an official language. It warned that Chinese and Tamils should be won over — not forced — to become Malaysians. For more, see UCSCAM et al. (2009); and UCSTAM (1954; 1983a; 1987b).
  25. Protest at the state-level spread like wild fire, especially in November 1954. Open contention was manifested in the local Chinese communities in Perak (2 and 8 November), Batu Pahat (4 November), Johore (6 November), Perlis (11 November), and Penang (13 November). See *Nanyangshangpao*, 20 October and 23 October 1954; 10 November and 15 November 1954; and *Sinchew Daily*, 31 October and 9 November 1954.
  26. Yan Yuan Zhang (1909–96) acquired his Doctorate in Education from London University in 1951. He was well respected amongst the Chinese

- scholarly community and leading Chinese education activists in Malaya during the 1950s. He was deported from Malaysia in 1962, but continued his involvement in the movement from Singapore as the head of department of education at Nanyang University (1960–65).
27. The Razak Report's second recommendation was to use either English or Malay as the medium of public examinations (Lower School Certificate and Federation of Malaya Certificate of Education). A minimum requirement of "pass" in Malay was required for the award of these certificates. The exclusion of Chinese as a medium in public examinations was seen by Chinese educationalists as a threat to the existence of Chinese secondary schools and to the preservation of Chinese language and culture. For more, see FM (1956*b*, p. 1).
  28. Only twenty registration centres were located at Chinese schools amongst the total 133 registration centres in Selangor, despite there being more Chinese schools than Malay or English schools. See Tay (2001, pp. 375–80).
  29. The first Independence Mission was led by Abdul Rahman and the delegation consisted of Abdul Razak and Tan Tiong Hai (陈东海). For more, see Abdul R. (1986*b*, pp. 213–16).
  30. The Alliance coalition threatens to withdraw its members from all towns, municipals, and legislative councils if the British refused to accept their suggestion to hold the state and federal elections in 1955. For more, see Abdul R. (1983, pp. 33–38, 94–100).
  31. Abdul Rahman and Alliance coalition representatives conducted negotiations with the MCP's representative, Chin Peng, in the Baling Talk on 28 December 1955. For more, see Abdul R. (1986*a*, pp. 63–68); Chin, P. (2003, p. 328); and FM (1956*a*).
  32. Conducted at Tan Cheng Lock's private residence in Malacca, the meeting was attended by twenty-one representatives from UMNO, MCA, *Jiaozong*, and *Dongzong*. See UCSTAM (1975, p. 26).
  33. The London Talks were led by Abdul Rahman, joint by Abdul Razak, Lee Hau Shik, and Tan Tiong Hai. For details on the independent process, see Abdul R. (1977, p. 25; 1984, pp. 138–46; 1986*b*, pp. 213–16).
  34. Known as the Federation of Malaysia Chinese Guilds Association after 1963, this federation was officially registered in 1955 and was one of the leading pressure group in the Chinese citizenships, language, and education movement during the pre-independence era. It consisted of a wide network of registered Chinese guilds and associations in the Federation of Malaya.
  35. The conference was in collaboration with Selangor Chinese Assembly Hall, Ipoh Chinese Assembly Hall, and *Jiaozong*. It was participated by 1,094 Chinese organizations. Lim Lian Geok, Lau Pak Kuan (刘伯群), and three other members were selected as representatives to London to put forth their

- appeal at last resort if the negotiations with Lord Reid failed. For details of the memorandum, see FMCGA (1956).
36. By 1954, despite two years after the liberalization of citizenship requirements, the non-citizen proportion of the Chinese population remained as high as 50 per cent. See Heng (1988, p. 83); and Lomperis (1996, p. 210).
  37. Huang J.J. (pseudonym, one of the students who participated in the Penang school strike in 1957), interview by the author, Penang, 17 January 2009.
  38. Liu Huai Gu (刘怀谷), Yang Ya Ling (杨雅灵), Chong Min Chang (钟敏章), Lim Lian Geok, Cheng Ji Mou (陈济谋), and Wen Tien Kuang have played important roles in calming the students.
  39. *Sin Chew Daily*, 23 September 1958.
  40. Tan Siew Sin served as MCA president from 1961 to 1974 and was minister of finance and minister of commerce and industry, both are powerful positions, from 1957 to 1974.
  41. Lim Lian Geok (1901–85) played a key role in the Chinese education movement during the 1960s. Born in Fujian province (福建省) of China and migrated to Malaya in 1927, he taught at Confucian Private Secondary School from 1934 until 1961, and was *Jiaozong* chairman from 1953 to 1961. For more, see Lim, L.G. (1960, p. 3).
  42. Once converted, the medium of instruction in a Chinese school would no longer be Chinese, except for Chinese language and literature. For details, see Heng (1988, p. 255); and Yeok (1982, pp. 120–21).
  43. Sim Mow Yu, interview by the author, Malacca, 26 March 2008.
  44. Expression of support from Kuala Lumpur Chinese Teachers' Association came as late as 23 August. Three days later, Sim Mow Yu, who had just concluded his visit in Indonesia, attempted to persuade Tan Siew Sin to retract the decision, but failed.
  45. Parliament opposition leader, People's Progressive Party Chairman S. Seenivasagam, challenged Abdul Rahman to revoke his (Seenivasagam) citizenship too, at the 20 October parliamentary debate. Lim Lian Geok fought against the revocation for three years through judiciary prosecutions but was ultimately not vindicated at the Court of Appeals. Lim secluded himself from the society since, and spent the rest of his life writing memoirs.
  46. For the list of Chinese secondary schools which refused the conversion, see Appendix 3.
  47. Loot Ting Yee (陆庭瑜) (former vice chairman of *Jiaozong*), interview by the author, Kuala Lumpur, 24 March 2008.
  48. The confrontation ended after Soeharto assumed power in March 1966. Indonesia eventually accepted Malaysia as an independent country during the Peace Talks in Bangkok on May 1966. For details on the confrontation, see Abdul R. (1986a, pp. 77, 81); Mackie (1974, pp. 318–22); and Milne (1964).

49. Sim Mow Yu, interview by the author, 26 March 2008.
50. The Federation of Malaya Chinese Senior Normal Graduate Teachers' Union (高师职总) proposed the establishment of a Chinese university in Malaysia, mimicking the format of Nanyang University (南洋大学) in Singapore on 7 December 1967. The proposal was accepted by the *Jiaozong* annual representative assembly the next day and engaged *Dongzong's* involvement. Other names proposed for the university included Harmony and Union University (协和大学), Cheng Ho University (郑和大学), Kuala Lumpur University (吉隆坡大学), Tan Cheng Lock University (陈祯禄大学), and Tunku Abdul Rahman University (拉曼大学). It was eventually named Merdeka University to commemorate Malaya's independence. For details of the naming process, see *Sin Chew Daily*, 25 February 1968; and UCSTAM (1968, pp. 18–28).
51. Ye Hong En was the founder of Perak United State-Level Chinese School Teachers' Association (吡叻州华校教师会联合会) and played a significant role in supporting *Jiaozong's* formation in 1961. He was an active leader in Selangor Chinese School Committees' Association from 1958 to 1978.
52. Chinese educationalists and the Chinese-speaking community perceived the comments as an ultimate act of betrayal of ethnic Chinese by English-educated Tan Siew Sin. For Tan's comments, see *Malay Mail*, 17 April 1969.
53. *China Press*, 15 July 1968.
54. No precise fatality figures were made public until today. Casualties' counts by the police reported 196 dead, 439 wounded, and 9,183 detained. For details of the riot, see NOC (1969, pp. 89–92).
55. By 1970, Malays owned only 2 per cent of the share capital, 22 per cent by Chinese, 1 per cent by Indians, and 60 per cent by foreigners. The New Economic Policy aimed to ensure 30 per cent shares for Malays in the country's corporate interests by 1990. The second phase of the New Economic Policy saw Mahathir introduced a greater sense of Malay nationalism in the national economy by "UMNO-nizing" ownership of European corporations, and through the "Look East" industrialization model. For details on the policy, see Chin, B.N. (2000, pp. 1043–44); GM (1971c); Means (1991, pp. 19–53); and Torii (2003).
56. Democratic Action Party, *Partai Rakyat*, and Social Justice Party of Malaysia refused to join BN.
57. Sim mentioned in the interview that he was persuaded by Tan Siew Sin and other senior MCA party leaders to be the speaker of the seminar for the sake of the Chinese. Sim Mow Yu, interview by the author, Malacca, 26 March 2008.
58. *Tongbao*, 9 February 1971.

59. They were prosecuted for giving stirring speeches in Ipoh on 29 April; however, Malaysian authorities dropped the case on 27 October 1972, and proposed Sim to take on a senator position; however, the invitation was declined. Sim Mow Yu, interview by the author, Malacca, 26 March 2008.
60. Although China promised the end of state-level support towards the MCP, the party level ties (Chinese Communist Party-MCP) continued until the dissolution of the MCP in 1989. For more, see Chin, P. (2003).
61. *Jiaozong*'s representatives had a closed door meeting with the Deputy High Commissioner of the Federation, Donald MacGillivray in November 1952 to discuss the problems faced by Chinese schools. During this meeting, *Jiaozong* leaders were informed that as Chinese language was not Malaya's official language, therefore it could not be used as a medium of instruction in schools; nor would Chinese schools be recognized within the Malayan education system. Aware of the importance of gaining official recognition, *Jiaozong* began to demand for Chinese as an official language in Malaya since then. For details of this meeting, see Lim, L.G. (1965; 1988); Tay (2001, pp. 251–53); and UCSTAM (1987*a*, p. 515).

# 3

---

## CHALLENGES AND ADAPTATIONS

### INTRODUCTION

Chapter 2 detailed the formation of the Chinese education movement, its trajectories and the external challenges faced during the early stages of the movement during Malaya's transition from a colony to an independent state. The chapter demonstrated the significant role that Chinese elites' personal social capital played in determining the social movement's trajectories. The movement gained momentum in the 1950s through the collaboration amongst MCA, *Dongzong*, and *Jiaozong* under the framework of the Grand Three Associations of Chinese Education. The collaboration proved its value in defending the interests of Chinese schoolteachers and Chinese school committee communities when Chinese schools were incorporated into the national education system under the 1957 Education Ordinance. Unfortunately, the collaboration fell apart when MCA's leadership was reshuffled, placing the survival of Chinese schools under threat as the state's assimilative policies of the 1960s and 1970s took hold.

Due to the difficulty of penetrating the movement's stronghold at the central level, the state began to impose a series of limitations and soft coercive approaches by manipulating state agencies, such as Ministry of Education, to weaken the movement at the local level. This divide-and-attack strategy significantly limited the capacities of the movement agencies, hitting the movement's local-central associational linkages particularly hard. This chapter argues that the state, through manipulating state institutional mechanisms such as education policies and distribution of financial resources,

managed to weaken the movement without using force. This strategy enabled the state to suppress the movement, and at the same time, secure the political interests of the non-liberal democratic government to stay in power. Such an environment forced the social movement to learn, adapt, and withstand challenges, which became the key factor to its survival.

In order to examine each of these challenges in detail, this chapter is divided into four sections. The first section presents the challenges faced by Chinese school committees when their traditional role as caretakers of Chinese schools were severely threatened and weakened by state-imposed structural constraints through educational policies and distribution of state resources. These constraints altered the character, structure, and capabilities of these local agencies, resulting in changes to their involvement in the Chinese education movement.

The second section describes a critical turning point for Chinese schools in the 1970s when English-medium primary schools were phased out by the state. Similar to the Chinese and Tamil vernacular schools, English-medium primary schools (many of them formally Christian mission schools) were incorporated into the national education system as “national-type” primary schools. Although these schools could retain their original English name, they could no longer enjoy the privilege of teaching only in the English language. Phasing out of the English-medium schools resulted in a spike in student enrolment in Chinese schools, which in turn caused a revival in the role of Chinese school committees.

Competition to enrol in already overcrowded urban Chinese schools saw the development of a patronage relationship between Chinese parents and school committees, which have the power to recommend candidates for enrolment into popular schools. Opaque policies in the allocation of state grants to these vernacular schools also stimulated the participation of urban middle-class parents in the schools’ fundraising campaigns. Efforts to overcome state constraints saw some school committees seek political intervention from MCA to obtain special funding allocation or facilitate the relocation of the school to a more populated neighbourhood to boost enrolment. Although the phasing out of English-medium schools provided justification for keeping Chinese school committees, it did not solve the fundamental problems faced by Chinese schoolteachers.

The third section of this chapter takes on this issue. Chinese schoolteachers, as civil servants, felt uneasy about their participation in anti-government activities. This resulted in the lack of a broad support base in most Chinese schoolteachers’ associations. Facing the lack of resources and new leadership, most of these associations were forced to operate under



the patronage of school principals, thus weakening the central institution of *Jiaozong* considerably.

The chapter's final section evaluates the impacts of the state's efforts to co-opt the movement during the 1990s. During this period, politically ambitious individuals tried to seek positions in various Chinese education associations, especially at the state-level alliance of Chinese school committees' association, as a stepping stone for their political career. These individuals gradually made their way into the national organizations of the movement, but held the integrity and independence of the Chinese education movement hostage in various accounts after they had been co-opted by the state. The implementation of the controversial 1996 Education Act also presented new challenges to the role of school committees and the overall sustainability of the movement. All these technical challenges and changes experienced by local level agents have a domino effect on the movement's overall capacity and ability to mobilize support from movement members and the Chinese community at large. The chapter ends with an evaluation of the consequences of changes to the relationship between *Dongzong* and *Jiaozong* at the national level.

## CONTROL AND CONSTRAINTS ON CHINESE SCHOOLS

All Chinese primary schools in Malaya were incorporated into the national education system under the 1957 Education Ordinance, followed by a mass conversion of Chinese secondary schools into the national system under the 1961 Education Act. Only sixteen Chinese secondary schools refused the conversion in the 1960s and became the last independent standing institutions of the Chinese education movement as independent Chinese secondary schools. This also meant that about three quarters of the Chinese schools in Malaysia became entitled to receive financial support from the state, and therefore, were constrained by the national education acts to participate in the movement.

To begin with, the status of school committee was degraded from "owner" of the school into "a trustee institution" under the 1961 Education Act.<sup>1</sup> As a consequence, the school committee no longer enjoyed its powerful role of being the sole decision-maker of Chinese schools during the colonial era, nor could it continue to enjoy unquestioned power to relocate or transfer the school's property without the consent and authorization of school sponsors and the Ministry of Education. In its attempt to persuade Chinese schools to be incorporated into the national

education system as its larger social control strategy, the state agreed to provide substantial financial support to these schools.

However, the actual implementation and distribution of state resources were skewed. The state's efforts to promote Malay-medium national schools had resulted in limited opportunities for Chinese and Tamil schools to access state resources. Moreover, vernacular schools built on non-government-owned premises were categorized as "partially-assisted schools", and therefore only entitled to state subsidies for executive expenses and schoolteachers' salaries.<sup>2</sup> By 2008, a total of 68 per cent or 879 Chinese schools in Malaysia had been categorized as partially-assisted schools (MCACEB 2008). Not only did these schools receive less entitlement for state resources as a rule, in practice, they were also allocated insufficient resources for development.

As illustrated in Table 3.1, a comparison of funds allocated under the Malaysia Plan from 1972 until 2010 demonstrated that national schools received most of the allocated budget. Chinese and Tamil primary schools received considerably less funds in proportion to the student distribution ratio in the Malaysia Plan during the same period.

As education is an expensive investment, the lack of financial support from the government seriously weakened the development of Chinese schools and other vernacular education institutions in the country alike. Many of these schools had been built during the colonial era and their wooden and zinc roofed facilities had been left unrepaired. As a result, many of the school facilities were infested with termites. In order to meet the costs of maintenance and improvement works, Chinese schools had been depending on financial sources derived from renting out the school canteen and profits from the school cooperative shops to survive.

Nevertheless, the imposition of a tenure of three years for each term on all school committee members under the 1957 Education Ordinance resulted in frequent turnover of school committee members, thus reducing the opportunity for junior members of school committees to learn from their senior partners, and weakening the line-up of school committees. Due to the lack of written documents that defined the rights of school committees, inexperienced school committees lacked the knowledge and skills to subvert abusive decisions from the state agencies. Hence, if Chinese school committees were unable to defend their affirmative rights to administrate such incomes, not only was the sustainability of the respective Chinese schools at risk, but the impact reverberated throughout the Chinese education movement and threatened the overall survival of the movement.

**TABLE 3.1**  
**Public Funding for Primary Schools under Malaysia Plans**  
 (1972-2010)

	National Schools	Chinese Schools	Tamil Schools
<b>Allocated Public Funding (1972-78)</b>	237,118,327 (91 per cent)	18,097,380 (7 per cent)	5,892,660 (2 per cent)
Number of Students in 1970	1,046,513 (67 per cent)	439,681 (28 per cent)	79,278 (5 per cent)
Ideal distribution	174,550,943	73,319,229	1,323,819
<b>Sixth Malaysia Plan (1991-95)</b>	1,133,076,000 (90 per cent)	102,726,000 (8 per cent)	27,042,000 (2 per cent)
Number of Students in 1991	1,845,400 (73 per cent)	583,218 (23 per cent)	99,876 (4 per cent)
Ideal distribution	921,623,551	291,338,111	49,882,338

TABLE 3.1 (Cont'd)

	National Schools	Chinese Schools	Tamil Schools
<b>Seventh Malaysia Plan (1996–2000)</b>			
Number of Students in 1996	1,027,167,000 (97 per cent)	25,970,000 (2 per cent)	10,902,000 (1 per cent)
Ideal distribution	2,128,227 (75 per cent)	595,451 (21 per cent)	102,679 (4 per cent)
<b>Eighth Malaysia Plan (2001–05)</b>			
Number of Students in 2001	4,708,800,000 (96 per cent)	133,600,000 (3 per cent)	57,600,000 (1 per cent)
Ideal distribution	2,209,736 (76 per cent)	616,402 (21 per cent)	88,810 (3 per cent)
<b>Ninth Malaysia Plan (2006–10)</b>			
Number of Students in 2006	4,598,120,000 (95 per cent)	174,340,000 (4 per cent)	54,840,000 (1 per cent)
Ideal distribution	2,298,808 (76 per cent)	636,124 (21 per cent)	100,142 (3 per cent)
	3,663,838,480	1,013,854,230	159,606,290


Notes: Data for the Tenth Malaysia Plan (2010–15) was not made public by the government. The currency unit used is ringgit.

Sources: GM (1971e; 1976; 1981b; 1986; 1991; 1995; 2001; 2006b); MEM (1986a); UCSCAM (2007, p. 156).

To further reduce the power of any school committee, the 1957 Education Ordinance also regulated the selection of school committee members, and required three to six representatives from each of the following clusters to form a school committee: school sponsors, alumni, parents of current pupils, school trustees and representatives appointed by the Ministry of Education. The inclusion of representatives appointed by the Ministry of Education as a key condition for continuation of government subsidies, in particular, was part of the state's efforts to control the authority of school committees. Other than financial and structural constraints, the state had also halted the formation of new vernacular schools since the independence of Malaya in 1957. All the slots for schools in the new housing areas were exclusively reserved for Malay-medium national schools, resulting in a significant decrease in the number of vernacular schools (Chinese and Tamil schools) since the 1970s.


As illustrated in Figures 3.1 and 3.2, the number of national schools rose from 4,277 in 1970 to 5,848 in 2011, a sharp increase of 36 per cent or 1,571 schools. Correspondingly, the number of students in

**FIGURE 3.1**  
**Distribution of Primary Schools in Malaysia**  
(1970–2011)



Source: Compiled by the author with data provided by *Jiaozong* and data extracted from MEM (1978; 1986b; 1990; 1991; 2007; 2011).

**FIGURE 3.2**  
**Distribution of Primary School Students in Malaysia**  
 (1970–2011)



Source: Compiled by the author with data provided by *Jiaozong* and data extracted from MEM (1978; 1986*b*; 1990; 1991; 2007; 2011).

national schools grew from 1,046,513 in 1970 to 2,150,139 in 2011, a 105 per cent increase. In contrast, although the number of Chinese school students increased from 439,681 to 598,488 students, equivalent to a rise of 36 per cent over the same period, but the number of Chinese schools was reduced from 1,346 to 1,291 schools. Comparatively, a total of 134 Tamil schools were closed down during this period, despite a gradual growth of 23,364 or 29 per cent of the Tamil schools' student population over time.

The Chinese school committee community, in particular, had been frustrated with the state's unjust treatment and delay in executing its promises. The experience of betrayal later became the basis of the movement's lack of trust in the state, particularly in UMNO leaders. The deteriorating relationship was only salvaged by the outgrowth of a brokerage culture — an important role played by MCA state members — that helped to bridge collaboration, link shared interests and, above all, prevent the escalation of any violent confrontations, which will be elaborated in the next chapter.

## THE TURNING POINT


The state's educational policies and its control of resources have successfully contained the development of vernacular schools to this day. However, one of these state strategies was a crucial turning point for the Chinese education movement. After the 1967 National Language Bill was passed to secure Malay language as the country's sole national language, Malay formally replaced English as the medium of instruction in all primary one classes in English-medium schools; the higher levels followed suit thereafter (GM 1971*b*). By 1986, English schools in the country had been completely eliminated.

Phasing out of English schools had a strong impact on the Chinese education movement, especially in the 1980s. It confirmed the concerns raised by *Dongjiaozong* since the 1950s that the same fate awaited the Chinese schools, and proved to be a timely wake-up call for fence-sitting Chinese communities to defend the future of Chinese primary schools. Beyond being a place to learn the Chinese language, Chinese schools had also become a symbolic institution that secured the Chinese's ethnic identity and that presented the Chinese's resistance against the continuous denial of their rights by the Malay-dominated state. Hence, in hindsight it is ironic for the government unwittingly did the Chinese primary schools a favour by eliminating all English schools — the then leading and most popular primary educational institution — and converting the English schools into Malay-medium national schools.

Chinese parents who used to favour competence in English were reluctant to place their children in national schools, so they began to send their children to the second best option available, which were Chinese schools. Compared with national schools and Tamil schools, Chinese schools were more competitive academically (especially for mastering mathematics and science), and well reputed for strict discipline. Chinese schools also offered the benefit of trilingual education (Chinese, English, and Malay).<sup>3</sup> Hence, Chinese schools began to see a boost in student enrolment in the 1970s. Recognition of the quality of Chinese schools even went beyond ethnic boundaries. Over time, many non-ethnic Chinese parents, including Malays, began enrolling their children in Chinese schools.

As elaborated in Figure 3.3, the number of non-Chinese students enrolled in Chinese primary schools rose from 17,309 students (about 3 per cent) in 1989 to 65,000 students (about 10 per cent) in 1999. As a consequence of their popularity and the state's refusal to build new Chinese schools, almost all Chinese schools located in heavily Chinese-populated neighbourhoods

**FIGURE 3.3**  
**Distribution of Students by Ethnicity in Chinese Primary Schools**  
 (1989–99)



*Note:* Data for non-Chinese category was not made public by the government after year 1999.

*Source:* Compiled by the author with data provided by *Jiaozong* and data extracted from MEM (1990; 1991).

were overcrowded. The situation forced Chinese school committees to raise funds from the public to expand the schools' infrastructure. The fundraising activities, in turn, led to a revival of the role of these school committees as an important mechanism and key benefactor of Chinese schools.

Generally, the school committees of Chinese schools in Malaysia were managed by the main office-bearers, namely, the chairman (董事长), general secretary (总务), and treasurer (财政). The chairman played the most important role in safeguarding the school's interests and generating money for the school. According to Quek Suan Hiang (郭全强), a former *Dongzong* chairman (1993–2005) and school committee chairman of Kluang Chong Hwa High School (居銮中华中学) from 1987 to 2006,

A successful chairman might not be the richest, or the most generous donor, but he has to be the one who can and is willing to assume the role of a noble 'beggar'. He must have the audacity and persistence to seek donations from the local communities. To establish a successful



fundraising campaign, the chairman must plan strategically. One can start the momentum for fundraising by first donating a sum of money, and then mobilize a few individuals to contribute impressive amounts of donations, the more the merrier. This will keep the ball rolling and generate waves of donations from the rest of the communities.<sup>4</sup>

To raise funds, school committees also organized events such as temporary amusement parks, stage performances, and fundraising dinners in the school compound. Members of the schools, including schoolteachers and students, were often mobilized for the preparation and execution of these events. Teachers and students multitasked to manage logistics, decorate the venue, create and circulate publicity materials, prepare various entertainment and performances, and so on. School committee members rode on their personal connection to invite influential figures, such as famous entertainers, successful businessmen and important politicians to grace these events and attract more community participation. To this day, these events remain as significant platforms for engaging and enhancing the bonds between schools and the communities. The success of these events also reflects the reputation and popularity of a school and its school committee.<sup>5</sup>

Chinese schools also generated incomes through the school sponsorship system. Although the 1957 Education Ordinance had limited the size of school committees to a maximum of fifteen members in each committee, their numbers in Chinese schools sometimes reached a hundred in reality. Considered as the schools' sponsors, these committee members contributed cash donations to the school, and were entitled to recommend an allocated number of new students to be enrolled into the school. This sponsor-recommended enrolment system was prevalent in overpopulated Chinese schools, where enrolment was exceedingly competitive, and gradually became the best means of securing enrolment for new students. The donor-beneficiary relationship helped to solidify committee members' social status and strengthen their networks with the local community.

While the sponsorship system motivated businessmen to involve and invest themselves as members of Chinese school committees, incomes from the system had also been especially crucial for the survival of the schools. As mentioned earlier, partially-assisted schools were not entitled to full state subsidies: the state paid only the teachers' salaries and benefits, but did not finance water and electricity bills. Therefore, all the Chinese schools, whatever the size of their coffers, were constantly under pressure

to be creative in operating within a limited budget. According to a retired schoolteacher, Huang:

Although we were one of the biggest schools in Penang, we often picked up used chairs and tables from the national schools to replace broken facilities in our schools. [The national schools] needed to discard them anyway, and principals of the national schools did not mind that we took them because they also knew that Chinese schools were receiving much less funding from the government than them. The national schools received funds for new tables and chairs every two to three years, but we [Chinese schools] had been using the same set of tables and chairs for decades. By recycling these valuable resources, we could save a lot of money. This also minimized the financial burden on our school committee.<sup>6</sup>

The above interview was reflective of the general phenomenon at the grassroots level. Although the Chinese education movement involved contentious interactions between Chinese educationalists and the UMNO-dominated state, relations at the local level could be perceived as harmonious and peaceful. Members of school communities at the national schools (dominated by ethnic Malay) and Chinese schools generally knew each other in their private capacity, and enjoyed good interpersonal relationships. Although they did not and would not interfere with each other schools' business, requests to share used and unwanted resources as mentioned above, were common and often seen as a win-win situation for both parties: the Chinese schools could have new resources, while the national schools could dispose these resources at ease.

Other than facing the problem of scarcity of resources, many schools located in smaller towns had also been facing the crippling problem of diminishing community population (UCSTAM 2007*a*; 2007*b*). Contrary to the overpopulated schools in the cities, schools located in deserted town had been facing the problems of shrinking student enrolment and, ultimately, the threat of closure. To overcome these problems, some Chinese school committee who were also MCA members began to seek assistance from MCA central leaders to relocate these schools. Playing the role of broker and facilitating negotiation between the Chinese schools and the Ministry of Education, these politicians manipulated the mechanism to gain political leverage. Although the approval rate for school relocation under such approach was very low, it was one of the approaches that worked in particular during the 1980s and 1990s.

By 2008, a total of forty-two out of seventy-five Chinese primary schools had received approval for relocation prior to a general election — a timely and strategic political move for MCA to gain support from Chinese voters (Dongjiaozong 2010). The political influence of the MCA members was seen not only in the relocation of Chinese schools but also in the way pro-BN agents began to intrude on the Chinese education movement at the state and central levels in the early 1990s, which will be elaborated at the later section of this chapter.

### TAMING OF SCHOOLTEACHERS

While Chinese school committees had survived the various challenges to their continued existence and importance to Chinese schools by redefining their roles, Chinese schoolteachers had not fared as well. As leading partners of the Chinese education movement in the 1950s, Chinese schoolteachers were the most outspoken critics of the state then. In order to constrain the movement, the state sought to tame these schoolteachers via a series of tough approaches.

First, the state removed their leaders. This included the revocation of *Jiaozong* Chairman Lim Lian Geok's citizenship and expulsion of *Jiaozong* Advisor Yan Yuan Zhang from Malaysia in 1961, followed by the dismissal of the then newly elected *Jiaozong* Chairman Sim Mow Yu from MCA in 1966. Upon removal of the influential leaders of the Chinese education movement, the state exploited the unstable political situation during the Indonesia Confrontation (1963–66) to instil White Terror. The state police, for example, detained suspicious individuals, leftists, and social activists by force and without trial under the Internal Security Act. Sim Mow Yu, for example, was regularly observed by secret police during his early days as *Jiaozong* chairman. Although there were no serious threats to his life and freedom until he was detained under the Internal Security Act during the Weeding Operation (*Operasi Lalang*) in 1987, the fear of being targeted and the risk of being detained effectively discouraged the rise of new leaders to take over *Jiaozong*'s premiership. According to Sim, in his review of his years as *Jiaozong* chairman,

One would become famous for being a *Jiaozong* chairman. It was a highly respected position [amongst the Chinese community], but you also posited yourself at the forefront of the battle. Everything you did must be accountable to the community. At the same time, you were also risking your safety, your official ranking [as a schoolteacher], and

your retirement pension. If the government targeted you, you might end up like Lim Lian Geok, whose citizenship was revoked and teaching permit stripped by the government.<sup>7</sup>

Next, the state exerted control over schoolteachers by incorporating them into the civil servants system. Unlike in the colonial era when the salaries of Chinese schoolteachers had been paid by the school committee, the state financed the salaries and benefits of all schoolteachers in the national and national-type schools. Thus, the state also enjoyed absolute power to appoint, dismiss, or regulate the posting location and ranking of a schoolteacher. Via the 1961 Education Act, the state had also been controlling schoolteachers' training institutions, registration of their teaching permits and distribution of salaries and pensions. Specifically, Part VI, Article 78 empowered the Registrar of Teachers to refuse to register (and deregister) a person if the former had reason to suspect that a teacher was likely to promote unlawful activities in the school or would harm the interests of the Federation, the public or pupils.

In 1962, the state successfully created a rift within *Jiaozong* by manipulating schoolteachers' salary scheme to reduce the latter's capacity to fight back. *Jiaozong* was accused of sacrificing the interests of senior normal graduate schoolteachers (华文高级师范毕业教师) in their negotiations with the Ministry of Education over the terms of salaries for the Chinese schoolteachers. Senior normal graduate schoolteachers had been the pioneers who received formal training from the newly established teachers' training college in Malaya between 1948 and 1957. About 2,000 of them enjoyed a special salary allocation from the British government for their qualification. Therefore, these teachers were angry when the special allocation was cancelled in 1962.<sup>8</sup> The dispute proved to be a lose-lose situation for the Chinese education movement as many of these schoolteachers began to shun *Jiaozong*-related activities. The disputes consequently led to the first major divisions within the Chinese schoolteachers' community when the Malaya Chinese Senior Normal Graduate Teachers Union (马来亚联合邦华文高级师范) was established later that year.

To make matters worse, the National Union of the Teaching Profession (*Kesatuan Perkhidmatan Perguruan Kebangsaan Malaysia*) was formed in 1974 to serve as the public service union for all schoolteachers. Unlike *Jiaozong*, which was open to Chinese schoolteachers only, the national union offered automatic membership to all graduates from the Ministry of Education's schoolteachers' training programme regardless of rank, qualification, ethnicity, religion, training or political affiliation. Moreover,

the National Union of the Teaching Profession was the only official schoolteachers' union recognized by the Ministry of Education. It provided important information on salary schemes, group insurance, welfare, and legal assistance. Operating under the auspices of the Ministry of Education enabled the National Union of the Teaching Profession to be more efficient in protecting and improving the welfare of the teaching profession.

Another strategy used by the government to limit schoolteachers' participation in the Chinese education movement was to prohibit the import of Chinese schoolteachers from China in 1948 and to gradually replace these imported schoolteachers with locally-born counterparts. Unlike the Chinese-imported schoolteachers who were monolingual and mostly not fully integrated into the local community, locally-born Chinese schoolteachers were multilingual and able to adapt quickly to the society and to the changes in the national education system. Therefore, the new generation of locally-born schoolteachers no longer saw *Jiaozong* or the Chinese schoolteachers' association as their sole sanctuary. Slowly but surely, the National Union of the Teaching Profession became the more appealing teachers' union to schoolteachers all over the country.


Lastly, the state's determination to send a clear message about its authority to the supporters of the Chinese education movement was demonstrated in the fate of the outspoken *Jiaozong* Vice Chairman, Loot Ting Yee. In an attempt to reduce Loot's participation in *Jiaozong's* activities, the Minister of Education transferred Loot from Kuala Lumpur to the coastal state of Terengganu in 1981. In protest, Loot resisted the transfer and sued the Ministry of Education. After he suffered an inevitable loss with the lawsuit, the Ministry of Education revoked his teaching permit two years prior to his retirement, effectively stripping him of all of his pension benefits.<sup>9</sup>

In all, these carrot-and-stick strategies effectively dampened morale and depressed the capability of Chinese schoolteachers to function as core agents for *Jiaozong* in the Chinese education movement. Many schoolteachers began to refrain from engaging in open criticisms of the government. Schoolteachers from independent Chinese secondary schools were similarly inactive in the Chinese schoolteachers' association due to their heavy workload, which included fundraising activities, even though they did not face similar constraints under the government civil servant regulations as their counterparts in national-type schools. After the departure (due to old age or death) of the older and more enthusiastic generation of Chinese schoolteachers in the 1980s, the younger generation lacked either the interest or motivation to be actively involved in the Chinese schoolteachers' association.

As elaborated in Figure 3.4, the membership trends of the Chinese schoolteachers' associations developed in five directions between 1982 and 2011. Of the forty associations observed, two associations (5 per cent) showed a reduction in membership; fifteen associations (37 per cent) showed a slow climb; nine associations (22 per cent) had moderate growth; seven associations (18 per cent) showed a steady expansion; and seven associations (18 per cent) proliferated.

Demographical changes, recruitment campaigns, and regular updates to existing membership lists were some of the factors that contributed to the trends shown in Figure 3.4. Although the overall membership of

**FIGURE 3.4**  
**Changes in Membership of the Chinese Schoolteachers' Associations**  
(1982–2011)



Source: Compiled by the author with data extracted from UCSTAM (1987*a*; 1988–2006; 2007*c*; 2008*b*; 2009–12).

the Chinese schoolteachers' associations continued to climb, the associations failed to cultivate new leaders sufficiently capable of taking over the premiership. Facing these challenges, many Chinese schoolteachers' associations had to be presided over by principals of Chinese primary schools who could and did use their schools as bases for the associations' secretariats and the schools' resources to support the association's activities.<sup>10</sup>

The weakened local institutions also caused a more severe problem with leadership at the central level of the Chinese education movement. Due to the lack of suitable new leadership, Sim Mow Yu served as *Jiaozong* chairman for a record length of twenty-nine years (1965–94). Although the longevity of his tenure brought stability to the movement, it also highlighted the reality of the brain drain of a once-influential social force. Sim's multiple attempts at resigning from his post were repeatedly rejected by the movement's supporters. One of the main reasons was that Sim's preferred successor was Loot Ting Yee, who had served as *Jiaozong* vice chairman since 1965. Nevertheless, Loot's fiery resistance style worried the Chinese schoolteachers community. It was as late as in 1994, when Sim reached eighty-one years old, that his resignation was finally accepted. Although Loot was Sim's chosen successor and was the last schoolteacher left standing in *Jiaozong*'s central committee at the time, Loot was defeated by the soft-spoken, nondescript MCA member, Ong Kow Ee (王超群), in the 1994 chairman election.<sup>11</sup> In one of his press statements as the new *Jiaozong* Chairman, Ong remarked,

We do not need to strongly disagree or become emotional to reach our objectives. This approach may be dysfunctional sometimes and does not allow you to reach your objectives... We should try to communicate directly with officials from Ministry of Education. We can also go through MCA or Gerakan to get funding for the [Chinese] schools.<sup>12</sup>

At the time of writing, Ong was still *Jiaozong*'s chairman. His era marked a clear preference by the *Jiaozong* central committee for a softer, more collaborative approach in its dealings with the state. For *Jiaozong* and its central-level leaders, this might be their only available option, given such challenges as the gradual loss of importance of the Chinese schoolteachers' association and the lack of support from most of the Chinese schoolteachers.

## THE TROJAN HORSE

While *Jiaozong* was troubled with the above-mentioned challenges, *Dongzong* was also embroiled in internal partisan politicking by opportunists during the 1990s. Unlike the majority of the school committee members who, although were politically affiliated, but still managed to exercise self-restraint and place communal interest above personal political gains, ill-initiated political opportunists made use of their position as school committees members to control state-level Chinese school committees' associations, with the ultimate aim of taking over *Dongzong* and controlling the Chinese education movement.

The scenario then is best exemplified by the controversial Negeri Sembilan Chinese School Committees Council (森美兰华校董事会联合会)'s election in 1994. Negeri Sembilan MCA Deputy President and Negeri Sembilan Chinese Assembly Hall (森美兰中华大会堂) Chairman Hoo Huo Shan (胡火山) openly challenged the three-time Negeri Sembilan Chinese School Committees Council's Chairman and *Dongzong* Vice Chairman Chin Choong Sang (陈松生).<sup>13</sup> Many believed Hoo's candidacy echoed the call of MCA leaders in Selangor to reform *Dongjiaozong* from within. In the end, although 70 per cent of the 148 representatives who voted for the new committees at the General Assembly were MCA members, Hoo gained only 61 votes.<sup>14</sup> All the other candidates in Hoo's faction lost the election, an unequivocal indication that these representatives preferred to keep partisan politics out of the council.<sup>15</sup>

In order to strengthen its internal institutions, *Dongzong* imposed a series of awareness campaigns and reform strategies. At the primary school level, the *Sample of Working Guidelines for Malaysia Chinese Primary School Committee* (马来西亚华文小学董事会工作手册样本) was published in 1998, while the *Handbook for Chinese Education Workers* (华教工作者手册) and the Chinese translation of the 1961 Education Act were reprinted (Dongjiaozong 1989; 1998). These publications provided detailed information on the rights and duties of Chinese school committees, and were widely distributed to the Chinese school committee communities through the network of state-level associations. Such efforts provided accurate and updated information to the school committees communities; it was also the first systematic reform operation introduced by *Dongzong* to modernize the operations of Chinese school committees nationwide (UCSCAM 1991, p. 29).



*Dongzong* also engaged in nationwide activities to strengthen relations and foster closer bonds amongst independent Chinese secondary schools' communities. Each year, state-level Chinese school committees' associations took turns to organize various sports- and games-related events for the students of independent Chinese secondary schools. Although these activities focused more on students' participation, the event organizers (school committees and schoolteachers) also rode on the hosting opportunities to improve interpersonal bonds and strengthen collective solidarity with peers from other states.

On top of this, *Dongzong* also tried to mend old wounds by promoting collaboration with school communities from converted Chinese secondary schools. In reality, after the mass conversion exercise in 1961, the converted and independent factions were strongly prejudiced against one another.<sup>16</sup> In order to promote dialogue, *Dongjiaozong* initiated the first National Seminar for Converted Chinese Secondary Schools School Committees (全国国民型中学董事交流会) in 1997, and subsequently established the *Dongjiaozong* Converted Chinese Secondary Schools Working Committee (董教总全国国民型中学工作委员会) in 1998. However, fundamental differences in perspectives and approaches in the management of Chinese schools led to the premature dismissal of the working committee in 2001 shortly after its first term (UCSTAM 1997, p. 9). Many conservative Chinese educationalists refused to consider the converted cluster as part of the movement. As explained by former *Jiaozong* Vice Chairman Yeoh Ban Eng (杨万荣),

The converted cluster abandoned the privilege of other Chinese schools when it accepted the conversion in 1961. One must comply with three principles to qualify as a Chinese school: the usage of Chinese in teaching all subjects except Malay and English language, management by the school committee, and the usage of Chinese as the main administrative language in the school. Schools from the converted cluster only taught Chinese language subject in Chinese, and they no longer used Chinese as the main administrative language. Therefore, they were not a real Chinese school.<sup>17</sup>

The converted cluster also refused to bow to *Dongjiaozong's* pressure and maintained firmly that the converted schools system was a more pragmatic and sustainable approach for the continuity of Chinese education in Malaysia.<sup>18</sup> Divisions between these two clusters escalated in October 2003 when the

**TABLE 3.2**  
**Characteristics of a Chinese School**

---

**Defined by *Dongjiaozong***

- The school committee is the highest authority of the school.
  - School uses Chinese as the main medium of teaching.
  - Textbooks should be mostly written in Chinese.
  - Administrative language in the school should be in Chinese.
- 

**Defined by Converted Chinese School Principals' Association**

- School has a Chinese name.
  - Chinese school song and school motto.
  - Rules and regulations for students spelt out in Chinese.
  - School committee plays an important role in school activities.
  - School alumni who identify themselves as "Chinese school graduates".
  - Chinese-qualified teachers hold senior positions in the school.
  - A school principal who speaks in Chinese during school assemblies.
  - Majority of students come from Chinese primary schools.
  - Chinese as a compulsory subject for all students.
  - Students use Chinese as the default language of communication.
  - Active Chinese cultural co-curriculum activities, such as Chinese Association, Chinese Chess Association, amongst others.
- 

*Source:* Compiled by the author with data extracted from MPSSMCM (2006, pp. 8–11) and Yeoh Ban Eng, interview by the author, Penang, 7 January 2009.

Converted Chinese School Principals' Association (国民型中学校长理事会), a united front of all converted Chinese secondary schools established since 1994, suggested to change the name of all converted Chinese secondary schools into "Chinese secondary schools" (华文中学) (MPSSMCM 2006, p. 8).

Technically, the converted cluster shared various characteristics of a Chinese school and should qualify as a Chinese school within *Dongjiaozong's* context (see Table 3.2). However, these suggestions and arguments were resoundingly rejected by *Dongjiaozong*, which perceived the whole name-changing campaign as a move to challenge the hegemony of independent Chinese secondary schools.<sup>19</sup> At the time of writing, these two factions remained disparate in their management and definition of Chinese schools. Their amicableness had been maintained by minimizing interfering and contradicting each other. Maintaining distance was one of the key factors

that led to the prolonged persistence of the Chinese education movement. Although both factions shared a common interest to protect and maintain the identity of Chinese schools, pride had prevented them from forming a more powerful collective representation of *Dongjiaozong*. Hurdles needed to be bridged, prior misunderstandings and blame had to be forgiven and forgotten, before any future collaboration could be achieved.

One of the greatest challenges faced by the Chinese education movement had been the division between school principals who supported *Dongjiaozong* and those who were inclined towards the Ministry of Education. The divisions were best observed during the 1998 incident, when Selangor State Education Department demanded all Chinese school principals to take over authority from their school committees and assume full responsibility for the tender process of school canteens and bookshops. The education department also demanded school principals to include all proceeds from both tender activities in the schools' financial accounts and not those of the school committees.<sup>20</sup>

This new regulation not only ended the last vestiges of management authority of Chinese school committees in Chinese schools, it also removed a significant source of income for Chinese schools. Even though the policy was implemented in Selangor state, the potential threat of similar policies being implemented nationwide could not be underestimated. Aware of the potential consequences, many Chinese school principals who implemented the orders of the Selangor State Education Department tried to uphold the traditional status of school committees and establish the new operating culture of the school committees at the same time. However, there were a few who did not.

School principals were, to some extent, under pressure to fulfil their duty to preserve the identity of Chinese schools by resisting the education department's decisions. School principals who had sided with the authorities faced severe criticisms from the school committee and Chinese community at large. Continuous pressure from the United Chinese School Committees' Association of Selangor and Kuala Lumpur, as well as from *Dongzong*, forced Deputy Education Minister Fong Chan Onn (冯镇安) to intervene. Fong later explained that there was a misunderstanding and the regulation would be implemented in all schools in the country with the exception of Chinese primary schools.<sup>21</sup>

Six years later, the "takeover exercise" returned to threaten the existence of the Chinese school committees — this time by the Penang State

Education Department in September 2004.<sup>22</sup> Chinese school committees in Penang promptly utilized their powerful social and political influence to resist this decision. The protest reverberated throughout the umbrella organizations of Penang and Province Wellesley United Chinese School Management Association (檳威華校董事會聯合會). The protesters demanded intervention by the ethnic Chinese-dominated Gerakan-led Penang state government and its Chief Minister Koh Tsu Koon (許子根) to halt the takeover exercise.<sup>23</sup> The confrontation was quickly resolved by the then Education Minister Hishamuddin Hussein, who explained that the rights of Chinese school committees on the disputed issues should be honoured, and stressed that Chinese schools were excluded from the new regulation.<sup>24</sup> It was believed that the new Education Minister Hishamuddin Hussein who had just been appointed to his position in March 2004 saw no gain in making more enemies out of these influential and potentially beneficial Chinese school committees in Penang.

Although most Chinese school committees had their traditional roles and power restored by 2005, the controversy continued at Kuala Lumpur Chen Moh Chinese Primary School (吉隆坡精武華文小學). The bookshop of Chen Moh Primary School, which was managed by Pustaka Matu Company, had received its tender from School Principal Ye Xia Guang (叶夏光) who executed the order of the state education department. When the order was later recalled and cancelled, Pustaka refused to withdraw from the school. With the intention of getting Pustaka to withdraw on its own accord, Chen Moh Primary School's school committee opened another bookshop in the school premises that offered more competitive prices for its items. Facing competition from the bookshop opened by the school committee, Pustaka demanded that Principal Ye remove the "unauthorized store".<sup>25</sup> The conflict peaked in November 2005 when Chen Moh Primary School's School Committee Chairman Wang Guo Feng (王國丰) pointed to evidence suggesting that corruption might have been involved: Ye had failed to explain the whereabouts of four cheques (total sum of 20,000 ringgit) issued by Pustaka for the development project of Chen Moh Primary School development project (Lim, H.S. 2005). Furthermore, it was revealed that the two other companies that had supposedly competed with Pustaka for the tender of the school bookshop were in fact phantom companies (Lim, H.S. 2006c).

Wang and the school committee successfully pressured the Selangor State Education Department to transfer Principal Ye to another primary school in January 2006. Ye was the third school principal to be transferred

out of the school since May 2003 after Wang took over chairmanship of the school committee.<sup>26</sup> In defence of his fellow school principals, Kang Siew Khoon (江秀坤), who was chairman of the National Union of Heads of Schools (全国校长职工会) from 2004 to 2006, blamed the frequent change of school principals in Chen Moh as a consequence of *Dongzong's* call for school committees to seize the tender rights of the canteen and bookshop back from the Ministry of Education, which had put Chinese primary schools principals in an exceedingly difficult position (Lim, H.S. 2006a).

Kang's comment infuriated Chinese educationalists, especially school committee members. Many were angrier with Kang for brushing aside a more serious issue: corruption committed by a school principal — for the evidence, if proven to be true, suggested that Ye had been receiving bribes through tenders and pocketing the earnings from the sales of school magazines and extra school tuition classes (Lim, H.S. 2006b). Soon, private grouches erupted into a national debate when Malaysia's cable media Astro Asian Entertainment Channel's weekly Chinese forum programme aired a four-episode coverage on the issue of "(Corrupt) Business Opportunities in Chinese Primary Schools" (华小处处商机) in February 2006.<sup>27</sup> Facing increasing attacks and accusations of corruption, the National Union of Heads of Schools Deputy Chairman Yang Qing Liang (杨清亮) publicly reiterated that "*Dongzong* should stop oppressing school principals and deliberately making things difficult for school principals on the issue of the rental rights of school canteens".<sup>28</sup>

In defence, *Dongzong* Chairman Yap Sin Tian (叶新田) released a stinging press statement, which was splashed across the headlines of *Nanyangshangpao* (南洋商报) — one of the largest Chinese newspaper in Malaysia at the time — entitled "Enmity between *Dongzong* and the National Union of Heads of Schools" (董总校长职工会交恶). In this statement, Yap said,

To those individuals or organizations that have accommodated the state's attempts to erode the legitimate rights of Chinese schools by undermining the sovereignty of the school committee for whatever reason — consciously or voluntarily — I would like to warn and advise them to stop acting like the paws of the tiger and stop assisting the enemy in violating the general interests of the Chinese community, or you will be cast aside by the Chinese community (UCSCAM 2006b).

Badmouthing from both sides continued until Kang was replaced by the more soft-spoken Pang Chong Leong (彭忠良), thus narrowly averting

the destruction of the relationship between National Union of Heads of Schools and *Dongzong* (Kok 2006). This incident reflected fundamental problems of the Chinese education movement. Throughout the period during which this controversy unfolded, *Jiaozong* sat on the fence on the issue of corrupt school principals because many of *Jiaozong* supporters were also members of the National Union of Heads of Schools. Moreover, the weakened *Jiaozong* leaders were neither able to constrain nor persuade some of the Chinese school principals from taking an antagonistic stand against the school committees, or to stop them from damaging the interests of Chinese schools.

In the face of these disputes, *Dongzong* launched a working committee in March 2006 to compile the *Management Handbook for Chinese Primary Schools* (华小管理机制指南) and organize the Awareness Campaign for Chinese Primary Schools' School Committees (华小董事觉醒运动) (Dongjiaozong 2006). The handbook was a set of guidelines, jointly compiled by representatives from school principals, school committees, and parents, which aimed to enhance awareness within the school community about their roles, rights, and responsibilities in the management of Chinese schools. The awareness campaign encouraged school committees to register with the Ministry of Education and acquire the certificate of registration requested of schools under Section 88 of the 1996 Educational Act.<sup>29</sup>

Disappointingly, the impact of the handbook and the awareness campaign was relatively poor. Although the handbook detailed basic information on the do's and don'ts, it lacked the legislative machinery and judiciary power to take action — for instance, to conduct investigations and take disciplinary action against those alleged for wrongdoing — should one fail to comply with the guidelines. More critically, the awareness campaign failed to convince Chinese school committees of why they must bow down and comply with the new regulations of the Ministry of Education.

Many Chinese school committees felt that the government should regard and appreciate their contribution as partners who have been providing the necessary infrastructure for schools run by the Ministry of Education.<sup>30</sup> On top of that, Chinese school committees also remained very critical of *Dongzong's* failure to prevent the implementation of the 1996 Education Act in the first place. By 2009, the awareness campaign had been terminated and replaced by the Campaign to Strengthen the Role of School Committees in Chinese Primary Schools (强化华小董监事会运动).<sup>31</sup>

Throughout the entire awareness campaign, *Jiaozong*'s participation remained limited. Other than attendance at formal events and meetings, its contribution to these awareness campaigns was minimal, not to mention its passivity also in mobilizing support and participation from Chinese school principals communities. It was clear that the two "siblings" of the Chinese education movement were moving in different directions. In a press statement in October 2006, *Dongzong* explained that,

[*Dongzong* and *Jiaozong*] have built a strong consensus and mutual understanding with regard to the larger direction of the movement. However, being two independent organizations, having different strategies and approaches in certain issues should be considered as normal (UCSCAM 2006c).

Despite *Dongzong*'s official pronouncement of unity, a comparison of the collective strength of the movement over time shows that both organizations had weakened significantly since the 1960s as a result of the structural constraints imposed by the state. The fact remains that the movement's top office-bearers in the central institutions of *Dongzong* and *Jiaozong* can only represent the interests of the respective groups with support from the larger community of Chinese school committees and schoolteachers. The weakening of the Chinese schoolteachers' associations at the local level not only affected the negotiation power of *Jiaozong*'s top office-bearers in their interactions with the state, but it also prohibited the central institutions from justifying their authority in representing the collective interests of the group and burdened its movement partner, *Dongzong*, with the brunt of the operational and execution work for both organizations. A weakened limb had thus made it more difficult for the Chinese education movement to achieve its aim of securing fair and just treatment for Chinese schools in Malaysia.

## CONCLUSION

By exploring the challenges faced by various levels of the movement's institutions and agencies, this chapter has covered three key issues that have been overlooked by the social movement literature. First, the non-liberal democratic state is a dynamic, complex — yet creative — entity. The state has proven its creativity in manipulating its legitimate power to constrain and suppress social movements through various soft-coercive

approaches, exemplified by its education acts and the distribution of resources for education. Through these approaches, the state avoided taking extreme measures to contain and weaken the movement's local supporters, in particular, schoolteachers and school committee communities. However, due to the existence of many grey areas in the legitimacy of these decisions, they were overridden easily by more superior officers, such as the Education Minister or his deputy. Such flexibility thus provided opportunities for Chinese education activists to overcome the constraints imposed by the education acts and limited resources through interpersonal mediation, negotiation, and persuasion.

The second finding presented in this chapter is the presence of internal factions that hampered the movement. The incorporation of Chinese primary schools and two-thirds of Chinese secondary schools into the national system significantly limited the capacity and flexibility in participating in movement activities of local movement members. *Jiaozong* suffered a massive drain in human and financial resources after Chinese schoolteachers became civil servants. As employees of the state, schoolteachers enjoyed a more secure salary scheme and better welfare coverage, but they also faced more restrictions to participate in anti-government activities. Fortunately, the closure of English primary schools in the 1970s reversed the crisis for the Chinese education movement. It even pitched Chinese primary schools as the most sought after academic institutions in the country.

Fierce competition to enrol into Chinese schools opened up sponsorship and donations as another source of sustainable income, for making sponsorships and donations to one of these popular schools guaranteed entry into them. Schools in rural and less populated areas, however, suffered from low enrolment and faced the threat of closure, which led many to seek assistance from politicians to be relocated to urban areas.

Although formal and institutional rules are important, but when these structural elements are weakened by the state, cultural and historical sentiments become core incentives for movement actors. The third finding of this chapter is that the strong cultural sentiments that Malaysian Chinese attached to their ethnic identity became the force that drove the continuous involvement of the Chinese community in the Chinese education movement. These actors included ethnic Chinese school principles, ethnic Chinese politicians, and ethnic Chinese businessmen. Nevertheless, the movement faced the internal challenge of uniting



members whose cultural sentiments differed albeit being members of the same ethnic and lingual heritage. The division in cultural sentiments may be described as the fraction between the conservatives (represented by the central committee of the Chinese education movement) and moderates (largely those from converted Chinese schools). Most members of the former insisted that the movement should remain exclusive and maintain its narrowly-defined objectives and principles at the risk of losing collective support.

The fourth finding from this chapter is the transformation of the relationship between *Dongzong* and *Jiaozong*, from one of co-existence into a symbiosis. *Jiaozong*'s capacity in leading the Chinese education movement plunged significantly as a result of diminishing participation from Chinese schoolteachers at the grassroots. Strong institutional bonds between these sister organizations based on shared identity and strong inter-leadership collaboration sustained the movement and had helped them survive state oppression. However, *Jiaozong*'s weak capacity in mobilizing and sustaining its movement organizations and supporters was also becoming a burden for the movement. Not only had it been hijacked by political players who held it hostage against *Dongzong*'s open criticisms of the Ministry of Education and the government, it had also become (and will likely continue to be) a potential threat to the continuity of the Chinese education movement. If the movement's current leaders continue to deny that their institutions are crumbling internally or dismiss them as a 'normal' process in collaboration, this could become the single major factor leading to the termination and failure of the movement.

## Notes

1. The author used the term "school committee" to refer to individuals who actively take part in the administration of the revenues or property or in the management of an educational institution. They are defined as school managers (for primary schools) and school governors (for secondary schools and institutions for higher education) under the 1961 Education Act. See FM (1961).
2. Fully assisted schools are schools built on government premises, and are entitled to full financial assistance from the state for capital grants. Capital grant is defined in 1961 Education Act as "a payment from public funds to an educational institution for the provision of land or buildings, the alteration to or extension of existing premises, and the provision of furniture or equipment for new altered or extended premises". Ibid., part 1.2.

3. Chai Yah Han (蔡亚汉) (former chairman, Penang Chinese School Alumni Association 槟州华校校友会联合会), interview by the author, Penang, 17 January 2009; Lim K.C. (pseudonym, retired Chinese primary school teacher), interview by the author, Penang, 24 February 2008; and Lu X.F. (pseudonym, retired Chinese primary school principal), interview by the author, Penang, 10 February 2008.
4. Quек Suan Hiang (former chairman, *Dongzong*), interview by the author, Johore, 23 March 2010.
5. Liu (1986, pp. 19–26); and Yeoh Ban Eng (former vice chairman, *Jiaozong*), interview by the author, Penang, 7 January 2009.
6. Huang K.L. (pseudonym, retired school teacher), interview by the author, Penang, 17 January 2009.
7. Sim Mow Yu, interview by the author, Malacca, 26 March 2008.
8. MLHG SBJZ (1990, pp. 1, 64–78); and *Sinchew Daily*, 22 October 1962.
9. UCSTAM (1987b, p. 576); and Loot Ting Yee, interview by the author, Kuala Lumpur, 24 March 2008.
10. Er Joo Tiong (余裕忠) (senior executive officer, Department of Resource and Research, *Jiaozong*), interview by the author, Selangor, 22 July 2010.
11. UCSCAM (1995, p. 43); and Loot Ting Yee, interview by the author, Kuala Lumpur, 24 March 2008.
12. *Sinchew Daily*, 30 May 1994.
13. *China Press*, 11 April 1994; and *Sinchew Daily*, 12 April 1994.
14. *Nanyangshangpao*, 25 April 1994.
15. *Sinchew Daily*, 25 April 1994.
16. Yeoh L.C. (pseudonym, retired Chinese secondary school principal), interview by the author, Penang, 20 January 2009.
17. Yeoh Ban Eng, interview by the author, Penang, 7 January 2009.
18. Yeoh L.C., interview by the author, Penang, 20 January 2009; and Sim C.T. (pseudonym, retired Chinese secondary school principal), interview by the author, Penang, 15 January 2009.
19. Yeoh Ban Eng, interview by the author, Penang, 7 January 2009.
20. Sim Mow Yu, interview by the author, Malacca, 26 March 2008; and Yeoh L.C., interview by the author, Penang, 20 January 2009.
21. *Sinchew Daily*, 3 November 1998.
22. *Sinchew Daily*, 9 September 2004.
23. *Kwongwahyitpoh*, 22 September 2004.
24. *Oriental Daily*, 15 October 2004.
25. *Oriental Daily*, 17 November 2004; and Chai Yah Han, interview by the author, Penang, 17 January 2009.
26. The previous principals who were forced to leave were Li Yi Qiang (李毅强) in July 2004; Lin Yu Lian (林玉莲) in March 2005, and Ye Xia Guang in January 2006. See Zhang, G.H. (2006).

27. This television programme (就事论事) invited three guest speakers: *Dongzong* chief executive officer Bock Tai Hee (莫泰熙), Democratic Action Party Sungai Pinang state assembly member Teng Chang Khim (邓章钦), and Selangor Petaling Jaya District Chinese Primary Schools Parents Association (八打灵县华小家长会) Vice Chairman Teh Hon Seng (郑云城). See Lim, H.S. (2006b).
28. *Nanyangshangpao*, 19 February 2006.
29. Shum Thin Khee (沈天奇) (head, Department of Organization and Publicity, *Dongzong*), interview by the author, Selangor, 27 February 2009.
30. Leong Tzi Liang (林子量) (retired movement activist), interview by the author, Penang, 17 January 2009.
31. Choong Ee Hoong (钟一泓) (assistant executive officer, Department of Organization Affairs, *Dongzong*), interview by the author, Selangor, 27 July 2010.

## 4

---

# LEADERS, ALLIANCES, AND POLITICS

## INTRODUCTION

While Chapter 3 focused on the challenges and complexity of the intra-movement collaboration, this chapter studies the overall momentum of the Chinese education movement, in particular, the roles of national leaders and inter-movement alliance, within a larger political context. Due to limited access to political institutions, social movements of non-liberal democratic states tend to rely on strong leadership and inter-agency capital to share information, build coalitions, strengthen networks, and mobilize collective support from the larger community to resist the state.

The capacity of a leader is primarily concerned with the bureaucratic ability to implement and consolidate the movement's organizational principles, and with the effectiveness of tactical decision-making (Roche and Sachs 1969, pp. 208–9). Despite differences in styles and preferences in movement campaigns, all movement leaders must rise above given constraints to sustain the movement. The formation of inter-movement coalitions enable movement leaders to maximize pre-existing social structures to facilitate the movement's development, and may lead to enrichment of shared resources, enhancement of public visibility and better coordination of plans (Zald and Ash 1969, p. 475).

This chapter argues that inter-movement coalitions within non-liberal democracies are likely be engaged and sustained through movement leaders' personal ties and capacity, rather than through formal structural

arrangements. Movement repertoires and interactional experiences are not static, but adapt and evolve throughout the movement's trajectories to reduce risks and increase chances of attaining the movement's ultimate objectives.

This chapter begins by analysing strategies adopted by a leader of the Chinese education movement, Lim Fong Seng (林晃升), which were to capitalize on grievances arising from the implementation of the 1971 New Economic Policy to mobilize support from the Chinese community. Such strategies included the independent Chinese secondary schools revival movement (1973), the Merdeka University's petition (1978), and the lawsuit of Merdeka University (1980–86).<sup>1</sup>

The second section of this chapter studies the movement's transformation as it moved out of its comfort zone to form strategic alliances with other Chinese organizations and political parties in response to increasing assimilative policies imposed by the state. As a result, the Chinese education movement began to play an important role in mobilizing the Alliance of Three campaign (1982), the Alliance of Fifteen Leading Chinese Guilds and Associations (1983), the national Chinese primary schools sit-in protest (1987), and the promotion of a dual coalition system with opposition parties (1990).

The third section of this chapter illustrates the shift in the repertoires of the Chinese education movement after the failure of the 1990 dual coalition system campaign. Progressive co-optation by the state successfully weakened alliances within the Chinese community, prompting the leaders of the Chinese education movement to change their original strategy of mobilizing resistances to mobilizing resources, and to channel more efforts towards securing underground collaboration with various government ministers. The chapter ends with an analysis of the movement's repertoires and dilemmas after the political tsunami of 2008, and evaluates if these political opportunities might lead to ultimate success, or mark the beginning of the movement's devastation.

## **POLITICAL PRESSURE, PROCESS, AND OPPORTUNITIES**

When Abdul Razak Hussein became the second prime minister of Malaysia (1970–76), he embarked on a series of social engineering programmes through the New Economic Policy (1971) (GM 1971c). For starters, he geared the government towards the creation of a new political culture with the formation of a BN coalition in 1973 (NSTP 1976, p. 58).

The *bumiputera* equity quota was introduced and forcefully implemented across the public and private sectors, inevitably marginalizing minority groups (Ho, K.L. 1988). Even more controversial of a country proclaiming itself as a democracy was the amendment to the Federal Constitution of Malaysia and introduction of Article 153, which made it an offence to question provisions on the Malay language, Malay special rights, position of the Malay rulers, and the citizenship rights of the immigrant races (GM 1971*d*, pp. 1–7).

Facing increasing assimilative measures from the state, the minority communities grew increasingly insecure about their ability to defend and preserve their ethnic and cultural identities. These extraordinary times, however, saw the rise of ordinary people to become extraordinary leaders of the movement. A mining businessman from Selangor, Lim Fong Seng, was selected as *Dongzong* chairman in 1973 and soon became the movement's most substantive leader. Addressing his supporters at the meeting of the United Chinese School Committees' Association of Selangor and Kuala Lumpur in March 1973, Lim framed the Chinese education movement as follows:

The problems we face at Chinese schools are political problems. The future of Chinese schools and Chinese education depends on the country's political developments and the way to save Chinese education is not to sit around, wait, and do nothing. We must fully mobilize, prepare ourselves adequately, and be effective advocates for our cause (UCSCAM 1988, p. 30; and Zhan 2003, p. 301).

As will be detailed in the next chapter, Lim transformed the successful Perak independent Chinese secondary schools revival movement from a state movement into a national movement. He initiated the Malaysian Independent Chinese Secondary Schools Working Committee in December 1973 to reform the curriculum and academic system of independent Chinese secondary schools in Malaysia. In 1974, Lim, who was also the chairman of Merdeka University Company, proposed the formation of Merdeka College (独立学院) to fulfil one of the movement's missions of establishing an independent Chinese tertiary education institution in Malaysia. However, the proposal was rejected by the ruling regime on the ground that the primary language of instruction, Chinese, was contrary to the 1971 National Educational Policy and the 1971 Universities and University Colleges Act.<sup>2</sup>

The failure to launch Merdeka College forced Lim and his followers to draw back and concentrate on affairs related to independent Chinese secondary schools.<sup>3</sup> In 1975, the Malaysian Independent Chinese Secondary Schools Working Committee proposed to issue the Unified Examination Certificate (华文独中高初中统一考试) as a national examination to assess the academic credentials of the students of independent Chinese secondary schools. However, two months before the examination, the then Education Minister Mahathir Mohamad demanded cancellation of the examination on the ground that the conduct of the Unified Examination Certificate by *Dongjiaozong* "might disrupt the status quo of mainstream national education and causing unnecessary ethnic tensions" (Zhen 2006, pp. 100–5).

*Dongjiaozong* took a firm stand and insisted that the implementation of this examination was not contravening the law. In his defence, Lim, with support from his colleagues from the Chinese education movement, pointed out that the Unified Examination Certificate was intended as an internal examination for students of independent Chinese secondary schools and thus should be deemed as legal as the London Chamber of Commerce and Industry Qualifying Examination, which offered recognition in accountancy.<sup>4</sup> Lim's audacity in engaging in open rebuttal of the state was motivated by frustration of being marginalized by the state after the 1969 ethnic riots, and the urgent need to protect the Chinese identity from being assimilated by pro-*bumiputera* national policies. Therefore, despite warnings and pressure from Mahathir, the examination was conducted at forty-two locations nationwide (including Sabah and Sarawak in East Malaysia) in December 1975.

Motivated by his triumph in the Unified Examination Certificate dispute, Lim decided to put up a fight and demanded approval from the state to establish Merdeka University. He first enhanced the movement's legal capacity by inviting enthusiastic young lawyers, such as Kerk Choo Ting (郭洙镇), Soo Thien Ming (苏天明), Low Sik Thong (刘锡通), and Ngeow Yin Ngee (饶仁毅), amongst others, as the movement's legal advisors. They carefully studied various limitations imposed by the National Education Policy and the Universities and University Colleges Act, and drafted the Petition for Incorporation Order for the Establishment of Merdeka University (呈最高元首请求恩准创办独立大学请愿书).

*Dongjiaozong* mobilized support from 4,238 Chinese guilds and associations to sign the petition, which was submitted to the King in

January 1978, who rejected the petition without a second thought. Dissatisfied with the outcome, *Dongjiaozong* filed a suit against the government and challenged the rights of the Chinese community to establish Merdeka University on constitutional grounds. The One-Person, One-Dollar for Merdeka University Legal Fee (一人一元独大法律基金) fundraising campaign was launched in 1978 and successfully collected a total donation of 292,713 ringgit by 1980.<sup>5</sup> This financial resource enabled *Dongjiaozong* to hire a Queen's Counsel, Michael Beloff, and ten Malaysian Chinese lawyers to file their case at the Kuala Lumpur High Court in September 1980.<sup>6</sup> The hearing began a year later but the court eventually ruled against the establishment of Merdeka University in November 1981 on the following grounds:

1. The proposed university was contrary to the National Education Policy, since the medium of instruction would be in Chinese;
2. It would be set up by a private organization;
3. It would only be admitting students from independent Chinese secondary schools;
4. It violated the 1971 Universities and University Colleges Act, whereby any university, public or private, is a "public authority" and as such, has to use Malay language (*Bahasa Melayu*) for official purposes, which is consistent with the Constitution, Article 152 (1) (MUB 1978*b*, pp. 349, 355, 362; and OCJKL 1981).

By July 1982, the Federal Court ruled against *Dongjiaozong's* appeal (FCKL 1981). Four judges supported the High Court's decision, citing that Merdeka University was a public institution and therefore had no right to use Chinese language as its official language. The fifth, and the only ethnic Chinese judge, opined that the usage of Chinese language was not against the Constitution. A subsequent attempt to appeal the case through the Privy Council in London was unsuccessful due to the involvement of the case with the Constitution, which was beyond the statutory powers of the Privy Council, thus marking the end of the whole court battle.

Many years later, Lim Fong Seng made the following statement in his recapitulation of the Merdeka University lawsuit:

The founding of Merdeka University caused disputes because it was a struggle between ethnic rights activists versus political opportunists and racist politicians; [Merdeka University] was banned, proving the



suppression of vernacular language and education in this country. The lawsuit demonstrated Merdeka University Company's determination to uphold civil rights and the rule of law. The verdict served to expose the flaws of the Constitution's ability to protect the status of Malaysian people's vernacular languages. It is a setback to the civil rights movement in Malaysia (DNICSSDWC 1993, p. 3).

*Dongjiaozong* might have lost the verdict, but the Merdeka University lawsuit won applause from both the Chinese community and recognition by the government for its determination as well as courage in defending its goal. In addition, Tunku Abdul Rahman College (拉曼学院), which was under MCA's patronage, was established as the feeder college for the needy Chinese community in direct response to the Merdeka University episode. Tunku Abdul Rahman College became the most affordable and accessible tertiary education institution for Chinese secondary schools graduates in the 1970s. The first Chinese community-funded college, Southern College (南方学院), was established in Johore twenty years later, after liberalization of the National Education Policy in 1990.

Another important consequence from the Merdeka University lawsuit was the participation of young lawyers in the central decision-making process of the Chinese education movement. Highly appreciated by Lim Fong Seng, these lawyers were given direct access to the movement's central committee as appointed committee members. The injection of much-needed vibrancy and valour of these professional middle-class activists into the movement significantly influenced the movement's repertoires in the 1980s.

### ALLIANCE OF THE CHINESE CIVIL SOCIETIES

The Merdeka University lawsuit highlighted the reality that democratic institutions in Malaysia are at times easily manipulated by the ruling regime, and *Dongjiaozong* would have little chance of success without strong political support; it was this consideration that prompted Lim Fong Seng to participate in electoral politics in 1982. Lim's ambitious plan was, however, strongly opposed by the pro-MCA faction of the Chinese education movement. *Jiaozong* Chairman Sim Mow Yu referred to Lim's plan as naïve, and questioned the logic of an education movement organization getting involved in contentious party politics.<sup>7</sup>

On the other hand, Lim's plan also had strong supporters, many who were politically ambitious and wanted to use *Dongjiaozong* as a stepping stone to a political career.<sup>8</sup> According to movement veteran Loot Ting Yee, Lim and his supporters once considered forming a *Dongjiaozong* political party. However, the plan was foiled due to a lack of resources.<sup>9</sup> Lim launched the Alliance of Three campaign prior to the 1982 General Election and invited collaboration from ethnic Chinese politicians (both from the ruling regime and opposition parties) to defend the rights of the Chinese community (Koh 1986). To his dismay, ethnic Chinese politicians from MCA, the strongest ethnic Chinese party in the ruling government, and Democratic Action Party (DAP), the strongest opposition party at the time, showed little interest in the collaboration.

It was through mediation by MCA-turned-Gerakan politicians, Chen Wing Sum (曾永森) and Lim Keng Yaik (林敬益), that the deal was eventually sealed between *Dongjiaozong* and Gerakan, the multi-ethnic but increasingly Chinese-dominated political party from BN. To officiate this collaboration, Lim Fong Seng led about twenty Chinese educationalists to join Gerakan in March 1982 and made a pledge of "Join BN, Rectify BN" (打进国阵, 纠正国阵) (Chian 1994, p. 82). Amongst them, Kerk Choo Ting and Koh Tsu Koon contested as Gerakan candidates during the 1982 General Election, while Ong Tin Kim (王添庆) and Kang Chin Seng (江真诚) contested in the 1986 General Election.<sup>10</sup>

Kerk contested in Kepong constituency against DAP candidate Tan Seng Giaw (陈胜尧), while Koh competed against DAP candidate Chian Heng Kai (陈庆佳).<sup>11</sup> DAP was particularly unhappy with the line up, as both DAP candidates were also active Chinese educationalists at the local level. Pitting Chinese educationalists against each other was a lose-lose game for both DAP and *Dongjiaozong*. As a result, DAP saw a reduction of its parliamentary seats from fifteen in 1978 to nine in 1982. Gerakan turned out to be the largest winner of this campaign, winning five out of seven parliamentary seats contested — the best performance in the party's history (GM 1983, pp. 132–33; Lim, K.S. 1985; and Mauzy 1983b, p. 501).

*Dongjiaozong* also emerged as a loser from this campaign, as its dream of rectifying BN was badly shattered when all four educationalists who ran for office (Kerk, Koh, Ong, and Kang) were reformed by BN. Not only did they fail to deliver the promise of defending the interests of the Chinese education movement in the BN government, they were muted from criticizing the state's marginalization policies by their desire to

accumulate political capital for themselves within the reality of intra-party power struggle.

In addition, amongst these four candidates, only Kerk was an active member in the *Dongzong* committee. The other three men had brief encounters with *Dongjiaozong*: Kang was a newly appointed member of the Malaysian Independent Chinese Secondary Schools Working Committee; Ong was one of the lawyers in the legal team in the Merdeka University lawsuit; and Koh was totally new to *Dongjiaozong*. Their loose engagement with *Dongjiaozong* meant that their commitment to Chinese education was rather weak, and gradually they began to put the interests of Gerakan and politics before those of the Chinese education movement.<sup>12</sup> Lacking a shared political goal amongst the four also made it impossible for them to overcome the domination of UMNO within BN, despite holding important positions within Gerakan.<sup>13</sup> It was not until 1990 that Lim Fong Seng admitted publicly that the campaign had been “immature” and failed his expectations (Zhan 2003).

Mahathir Mohamad became the fourth prime minister of Malaysia in 1981. In order to boost his popularity within UMNO, Mahathir's administration imposed a series of assimilative policies in the 1980s to strengthen the Malays' domination in the country (Chandra 1989b, pp. 31–35). For example, the narrowly defined National Cultural Policy (*Dasar Kebudayaan Negara*) was implemented in 1981 (GM 1981a). Activities that were perceived as contradictory to Malay culture and Islam were prohibited. Notably, the police refused to release permits for Chinese lion dance performances other than during Chinese New Year. The usage of Chinese text on commercial signboards was also restricted (SCAH 2004, p. 78). To make *Bahasa Melayu* (Malay language) the dominant medium of education in the country, the English-medium Higher School Certificate was replaced by the Malay-medium Malaysian Higher School Certificate (*Sijil Tinggi Persekolahan Malaysia*) in 1982 (GM 1981b, p. 390). In 1983, the Malaysian National Primary Syllabus (*Kurikulum Bersepadu Sekolah Rendah*) was implemented, amongst others (GM 1979; 1981b, p. 403; and MEM 1985b).

All these acts of discrimination fuelled insecurity within the Chinese community, especially amongst the post-independence generation who regarded Malaysia as their homeland and believed that all Malaysian citizens should enjoy equal rights.<sup>14</sup> In response, Selangor Chinese Assembly Hall activist Chong King Liong (张景良), supported by Chairman Khoo Seong Chi (邱祥炽), began to lobby for the support


of Chinese guilds and associations to draft the Memorandum on National Cultural Policy (国家文化备忘录) as a countermeasure against the National Cultural Policy. The memorandum demanded more inclusive and multicultural representation in national cultural policies (Zhang, J.L. 1983). This timely effort received affirmative and encouraging responses from Chinese guilds and associations nationwide. Representatives from all state-level Chinese assembly halls, Chinese chambers of commerce, Chinese school committee associations, and Chinese schoolteachers' associations agreed to overcome their regional, linguistic, kinship, and occupational differences to defend the common interests of the Chinese community.

In March 1983, the first Chinese Cultural Congress (全国华人文化节) was organized in Penang as a platform to establish the Alliance of Fifteen Leading Chinese Guilds and Associations, one of the largest coalitions of the Chinese community in Malaysia (see Map 4.1).<sup>15</sup> During the congress, the alliance endorsed the Memorandum on National Cultural Policy. The memorandum was submitted to Anwar Ibrahim, the then Minister of Youth and Sports, but was rejected on the ground that the National Cultural Policy had already been finalized (SCAH 2004, p. 63).

Facing a regime that rejected bottom-up input to its policymaking highlighted the importance of strong associational bonds amongst the minority communities in boosting their political influence. Therefore, the National Chinese Guilds and Associations Cultural Working Committee (全国华团文化工作委员会) was established in August 1984 to strengthen bonds amongst Chinese guilds and associations. The working committee promoted sharing of intellectual and financial resources, enabled routine interactions and built intimate working relationships amongst leading activists within the alliance. The strengthening of associational links increased the Alliance of Fifteen's capacity to emerge as the most outspoken political pressure group in the 1980s.

In 1985, the Alliance of Fifteen established the Chinese Resource and Research Centre (华社资料研究中心) as a strategic think-tank, whose first and most important contribution was to draft the Joint Declaration of National Chinese Guilds and Associations (全国华团联合宣言) (SCAH 1985). The declaration demanded political reforms, greater democratization, and equal opportunities for all Malaysians, regardless of ethnicity.

MAP 4.1  
The Alliance of Fifteen Leading Chinese Guilds and Associations



Source: The author.

In September that year, the Alliance of Fifteen expanded their lobbying efforts by bridging the Malay-dominated PAS. With Lim Fong Seng representing *Dongjiaozong* in a dialogue of understanding between *Dongjiaozong* and PAS, the PAS Communities Consultative Council was formed. In 1986, the National Chinese Civic Rights Committee (全国华团民权委员会) was established to promote competitive opposition political alliance and formation of the dual coalition system in Malaysia.<sup>16</sup> The alliance also lobbied support from political parties to adopt the 1986 Implementation of the Memorandum of Joint Declaration of National Chinese Guilds and Associations (贯彻华团联合宣言) during the 1986 election (SCAH 1986).

Nonetheless, DAP refused to form an alliance with PAS, which insisted upon an Islamic country in its party's manifesto. BN, which sowed seeds of fear amongst Chinese voters of PAS' proposal of an Islamic country, successfully secured 148 out of 177 contested parliamentary seats in the August 1986 General Election (Lim, K.S. 1986; and SCAH 2004, p. 84). It was a sore defeat for the Alliance of Fifteen: not only did its ambitious campaign of the dual coalition system fail, but its reputation as a defender of the interests of ethnic Chinese in the face of PAS's Islamic state agenda also suffered a huge blow. The *Dongjiaozong*-PAS collaboration, in particular, was heavily criticized by the supporters of the Chinese education movement, in particular those who are also members of MCA.<sup>17</sup> In order to regain the confidence of *Dongjiaozong*'s supporters, Lim announced in September 1986 that,

*Dongjiaozong* will uphold the principle of going beyond political party but not beyond politics (超越政党, 不超越政治). This will allow us to accommodate different political views, and, at the same time, remain alert in critiquing and influencing policymaking. *Dongjiaozong* shall not restrict itself to any political party but it shall not be apolitical, as doing so will cause the organization to detach itself from the reality (Lee, P.K. 2006).

In October 1987, Malaysia witnessed the apex of Chinese political strength and solidarity. More than 3,000 Chinese leaders and representatives from the ruling government, opposition parties and Chinese guilds and associations nationwide participated in the Protest Assembly of National Chinese Guilds and Associations and Political Parties (全国华团政党抗议大会) at *Tianhou* Temple (天后宫), Kuala Lumpur. They protested

against the Ministry of Education's appointment of more than a hundred non-Chinese-speaking teachers to take over senior positions in Chinese primary schools.

The protest assembly had an all-star turnout, with some of the most ardent critics from the Chinese community, such as Chong King Liong (Selangor Chinese Assembly Hall), Lim Fong Seng (*Dongzong*), Sim Mow Yu (*Jiaozong*), Lim Kit Siang (林吉祥, DAP), and others, taking turns to woo the audience with their impassioned speeches.<sup>18</sup> Together with supporters, they uniformly demanded the government to resolve the controversy by removing the "unqualified" schoolteachers within three days, or face a nationwide strike of Chinese primary schools (UCSCAM 1988, p. 9; and *Xinwanbao*, 4 October 1987).

Recognizing the assembly's power, Mahathir Mohamad relented. He appointed Deputy Prime Minister Ghafa Baba to head a mediation committee to put an end to the stalemate. Cabinet members cum Mediation Committee members, Lee Kim Sai and Lim Keng Yaik, acted as the government's bridge, and successfully persuaded the Chinese leaders to compromise and delay the strike. However, due to the lack of prompt and effective communication channels, they failed to terminate the movement at the grassroots level, where anti-government emotions ran high (UCSCAM 1998, p. 10). Eventually, school strikes were carried out in Penang (fourth-six schools), Malacca (seven schools), Kuala Lumpur-Selangor (seven schools), and Perlis (one school).<sup>19</sup> Subsequent strikes spread like wildfire, with at least a quarter of Chinese primary schools in Malaysia joining the strike.<sup>20</sup>

In response, Najib Razak, acting chief of UMNO Youth, organized an anti-Chinese protest with some 7,000 demonstrators at Merdeka Stadium (Case 1996, p. 197). Mounting ethnic tensions created an opportunity for Mahathir to carry out his infamous *Operasi Lalang* to contain escalating political tension.<sup>21</sup> The police detained 107 activists, which included Lim Fong Seng, Sim Mow Yu, Thuang Pik King (庄迪君, vice chairman, *Jiaozong*), Kua Kia Soong (director, Chinese Resource and Research Centre), Lim Kit Siang, amongst others, under the Internal Security Act (UCSCAM 1989, pp. 26–30). The Ministry of Internal Affairs also temporarily revoked the publishing licences of three newspapers, namely, the English-medium newspaper, *The Star*, Malay-medium *Watan*, and Chinese-medium *Sinchew Daily*, on the grounds that they publicized sensitive issues and ignored the possible impact of

these issues on the peace and harmony amongst ethnic groups and on state security.<sup>22</sup>

Leader of the Alliance of Fifteen, Chong King Liong, who narrowly escaped detention, mobilized support from Chinese guilds and associations nationwide to demand the release of these detainees (FLCGAM 1988). However, crippled by fear of a second wave of *Operasi Lalang*, most people hesitated. The fear instilled by *Operasi Lalang* is best exemplified by the refusal of *Dongzong* General Secretary Low Sik Thong — who was by default second in line to lead the organization — to take over. Instead, Lim Geok Chan (林玉静), a movement activist from Selangor state, who at the time of appointment did not hold any position within *Dongzong*, stepped forward to lead *Dongzong* as acting chairman during this critical time.<sup>23</sup>

The controversy ended in April 1988 with the implementation of the Four-One Resolution. The resolution proposed that four senior positions in Chinese primary schools, namely, school principal, first and second deputy principals, and head of the afternoon session, must be equipped with qualifications of Chinese proficiency. The chief of curriculum activities could be exempted from this regulation. After the proposal was implemented, Chinese education movement leaders, Lim Fong Seng and Sim Mow Yu, were released in June the same year, followed by Thuang Pik King and Kua Kia Soong. The last detainee released from the *Operasi Lalang* was DAP father-and-son team, Lim Kit Siang and Lim Guan Eng, who were imprisoned until April 1989 (UCSCAM 1989, pp. 26–30).

The 1987 mass arrest changed both the Chinese education movement and the BN regime. For the former, new positions, such as deputy chairman and vice chairman, were introduced to strengthen the management efficiency of the movement (UCSCAM 1989, pp. 51–52; 2004a, pp. 45–47). In order to quell anti-government sentiments and to appease its opponents, the BN regime invited 150 representatives from political parties, minority groups, and social organizations to take part in the National Economic Advisory Council (*Majlis Perundingan Ekonomi Negara*) in January 1989 (NEAC 1991, pp. 327–50). Despite knowing that the invitation was more political than economic, *Dongzong*, *Jiaozong*, and Selangor Chinese Assembly Hall represented the Alliance of Fifteen to join the council (UCSCAM 1990, p. 18).



The three organizations proposed the replacement of the ethnic quota in national universities by a merit system, and demanded transparency in state decision-making processes. However, these suggestions were deliberately excluded from the council's report (UCSCAM 1990, p. 3.) The 150 representatives withdrew from the council eight months later, in protest against the discriminatory verbal insults by the council's officers, and the lack of transparency in the council's decision-making processes (UCSCAM 1990, pp. 3, 18–28, 32–33).

Despite this, the BN regime continued to engage the Chinese education movement community through the Education Act Advisory Council (*Majlis Perundangan Akta Pendidikan*) in August 1990. *Dongzong*, *Jiaozong*, Selangor Chinese Assembly Hall, Nanyang University Alumni Association of Malaya (马来亚南大校友会), and Federation of Alumni Associations of Taiwan Universities of Malaysia (马来西亚留台校友会联合会总会) accepted the invitation with mixed feelings.<sup>24</sup> This invitation marked the first official recognition of the status of these two associations. It was a symbolic breakthrough for the Chinese education movement as the BN regime had been refusing to acknowledge the qualifications of graduates from Nanyang University and Taiwanese universities since the 1950s.<sup>25</sup> Although sceptical of the intentions of the council, these Chinese education representatives nevertheless submitted the Proposals on the Draft of the 1990 Education Act (对1990年教育法令草案的修改建议) to the government in March 1991 (UCSCAM 1992c, pp. 21–28; and UCSCAM et al. 1991). Not surprisingly, none of the proposals was included in the 1990 Education Act.

Frustrated, disappointed and feeling helpless from repeatedly hitting the wall, Chinese education movement leader Lim Fong Seng decided to take one of the riskiest decisions in the movement's history: in 1990, he participated in the General Election, and once again, yielded to the formation of the dual coalition system.<sup>26</sup> Although his decision was embraced by *Dongzong* General Secretary Low Sik Thong, *Dongzong* Vice Chairman Chin Choong Sang, and others, the majority of *Dongjiaozong* leaders opposed the decision.<sup>27</sup>

*Jiaozong* Chairman Sim Mow Yu, State of Johore Chinese School Managers and Teachers' Association (柔佛州华校董教联合会) Chairman Quek Suan Hiang, and their supporters, voiced their strong preference for the Chinese education movement to remain politically neutral.<sup>28</sup>

The division forced *Dongjiaozong* to release an official statement in August 1990 to reaffirm its principle of “beyond political party but not beyond politics”:

*Dongjiaozong*, as a social organization (社团), cannot and will not assign representatives to participate in the upcoming elections. However, operating on the principal of promoting democratization through the formation of a dual coalition system in Malaysia, *Dongjiaozong* encourages the participation of Chinese individuals in party politics (UCSCAM 1991, p. 18).

To avoid implicating the Chinese education movement, Lim Fong Seng and twenty-six Chinese educationalists resigned from their positions in *Dongjiaozong* prior to joining DAP.<sup>29</sup> DAP fully utilized the Chinese educationalists to garner support from Chinese voters. Lim Fong Seng was appointed as DAP advisor and former *Dongzong* Chief Executive Secretary Lee Ban Chen (李万千) was appointed as DAP vice president.<sup>30</sup> These former Chinese educationalists joined the People's Coalition (*Gagasan Rakyat*), an opposition front comprising DAP, PAS, *Parti Melayu Semangat 46*, *Parti Bersatu Sabah*, and the All Malaysian Indian Progressive Front, to challenge BN's political domination.<sup>31</sup>

Unfortunately, although DAP successfully acquired twenty parliamentary seats and forty-five state assembly seats in the 1990 General Election, the rejection of *Parti Melayu Semangat 46* by the Malay community prevented the People's Coalition from toppling the BN ruling regime. Lim Fong Seng's legacy in DAP soon ended with his withdrawal from the party in early 1991 prompted by his disagreement on DAP's approaches on the Chinese education (Lai, X.J. 2001). In June 1991, Foo Wan Thot (胡万铎), a former MCA Perak state activist, was selected as the new *Dongzong* chairman. Foo emphasized a negotiation-oriented approach as a more effective way to solve the problems of Chinese education. In order to affirm the stability of *Dongzong's* new leadership, Lim made the following remarks to his supporters in October 1991:

Some have characterized my era as an era of confrontation while Foo's as era of negotiation. *Dongjiaozong* is a pressure group not because of its leaders' objectives or decisions, but rather, the subjective factors influencing decisions at the time.<sup>32</sup>

Foo's diplomatic strategy began with friendly visits and closed door conversations with Gerakan and MCA leaders. The meeting with MCA President Ling Liong Sik (林良实) was particularly promising as it improved *Dongjiaozong*-MCA relationship and restored their collaboration in the development of Chinese education. Two significant commitments were reached by MCA at the meeting: location of funds for the development of independent Chinese secondary schools and recognition of the Unified Examination Certificate as an entrance qualification to Tunku Abdul Rahman College.<sup>33</sup>

Foo's efforts, however, were overshadowed by the 1992 controversy of Lick Hung Chinese Primary School (力行华文小学).<sup>34</sup> This school had shifted to Subang Jaya in 1991 due to a shortage of students at its old premises at Bangsar. The controversy arose after Selangor Education Department ordered the replacement of the school committee with a financial management committee (*lembaga pengurus kewangan*) — a less powerful school authority that had commonly existed in national schools only. Lick Hung's school committee, headed by Chairperson Chew Saw Eng (周素英), protested against the replacement and alleged it as a ploy to transform the school into a national school.<sup>35</sup>

The controversy became more complicated when Chew and her deputy Wang Wen Han (王文汉) each hosted a new school committee. Both claimed that they were the legitimate leaders of the school committee and refused to give in. The dispute snowballed when Chew, who was also *Dongzong*'s treasurer, roped in the support of her colleagues in *Dongzong*, while Wang was backed up by members of MCA's Selangor Branch.<sup>36</sup> Debates between supporters from both parties were intense. By November 1992, Selangor and Kuala Lumpur state-level MCA leaders proposed that MCA members, who constituted about 70 per cent of the Chinese school committees, should enter, rectify, and form a new *Dongjiaozong*.<sup>37</sup>

Fortunately, MCA President Ling Liong Sik's timely intervention successfully prevented further escalation.<sup>38</sup> As a gesture of appreciation to Ling, Foo Wan Thot attended the launch of MCA Langkawi Project in February 1993, much to the displeasure of his fellow *Dongjiaozong* colleagues. Many of Foo's colleagues felt that the Langkawi Project, which involved fundraising for new Chinese villages (新村) and independent Chinese secondary schools nationwide, was yet another political attempt to replace *Dongjiaozong* in the long run.<sup>39</sup> Foo, however, insisted on his

pro-MCA strategy, which subsequently cost him his popularity within the Chinese education movement, particularly amongst followers of former leader Lim Fong Seng. Foo became one of the shortest serving *Dongzong* chairman in the movement's history, and was replaced by Quek Suan Hiang in 1993.

## CHINESE DIVERGENCE

The Lick Hung incident and the call to establish an alternative *Dongjiaozong* exposed the divisions within the Chinese education movement's community. The divisions worsened in the 1990s with an increasing number of politically ambitious, pro-BN individuals taking over the leadership of various Chinese guilds and associations. These pro-BN individuals compromised to external suppression from the state and internal threats from within. Most importantly, the differences in ambitions and agendas amongst those at the helm of Chinese guilds and associations dichotomized the politics of collaboration and politics of pressure of Chinese guilds and associations in Malaysia, and directly impacted the collective support received by the Chinese education movement.

The intra-Chinese rift was widened in the formation of the Unified Federation of Malaysian Chinese Assembly Hall (马来西亚中华大会堂联合会, renamed as Federation of Chinese Associations Malaysia 马来西亚中华大会堂总会 in 1997) (FCAM 1997). Attempts to establish the federation were first proposed by the Alliance of Fifteen in 1982. However, the BN regime delayed its establishment until October 1991, soon after MCA had gained control of almost all state-level Chinese assembly halls (SCAH 2004, p. 59).

Conflicts between the collaborative versus the confrontational factions within the former Alliance of Fifteen community reached boiling point during the first committee election for the federation in December 1991. Those of the confrontational faction did not want the pro-collaborative leader, who was also Selangor Chinese Assembly Hall Chairman Lim Geok Chan, to win the presidency uncontested; so they persuaded Sim Mow Yu, then *Jiaozong* chairman and president of the Malacca Chinese Assembly Hall, to compete.

Ultimately, Lim Geok Chan won by an overwhelming majority (130 votes to forty) and his victory saw the pro-collaborative rift gradually dominating the central leadership of the Unified Federation of Malaysian

Chinese Assembly Hall. Sim's involvement in the politics of power struggle between the two factions caused relationship between *Dongjiaozong* and the federation to deteriorate.<sup>40</sup> The soured relationship reached its nadir when *Dongjiaozong* withdrew from the drafting of the National Chinese Guilds and Associations Cultural Programme (全国华团文化工作总纲领) in 1996.

*Dongjiaozong* was dissatisfied with Lim Geok Chan and his supporters who tried to amend the 1983 Memorandum on National Cultural Policy and the Joint Declaration of National Chinese Guilds and Associations (UCSCAM 1998, pp. 33, 67). *Dongjiaozong* saw these changes as sacrificing the Chinese's interests and the independence of Chinese organizations. In return, Lim accused *Dongjiaozong* of unwelcomed, unsolicited interference in the drafting of the memorandum.<sup>41</sup>

This marked the beginning of the departure of these two organizations from each other. Although *Dongjiaozong* adopted a strategy characterized by a mixture of resistance and negotiation in their interaction with the state, but it was firm in its defence of the original principles of the demands made by the Alliance of Fifteen. On the other hand, vested economic interests and intimate relationship with MCA saw most of the leaders of the federation supporting the authorities unconditionally. As a result, both organizations began to distance themselves from each other and to form new coalitions with their preferred alliances (UCSCAM 1998, pp. 67–70).

## RESOURCE MOBILIZATION

The Chinese education movement entered a new phase when Quek Suan Hiang was selected as the new *Dongzong* chairman in 1993. Amongst the first tasks Quek managed was the ambitious development project of 8.5 acres of land in Kajang. This piece of land was owned by the trustees of Kajang Fah Kiew Chinese School (加影华侨学校产业受托会), and rented to Merdeka University Company in 1974 as the university's campus. UMNO-led Selangor state government reclaimed the land in 1978 but it was "returned" to the trustees in 1981 after successful intervention by Chinese politicians (Huajiaoshenghui 1993, pp. 38, 55–57; and UCSCAM 1992c, p. 331).

In 1989, driven by the fear of losing the land again and by the imperative to boost the spirit of Chinese educationalists after *Operasi*

*Lalang*, Lim Fong Seng proposed to develop the Kajang premises into a new headquarters for the Chinese education movement. To facilitate this project, the land was transferred to Merdeka University Company in 1989 and leased to *Dongzong* for thirty years at one ringgit per annum.<sup>42</sup> Quek and his team transformed the Chinese education movement into a resource-mobilizing engine in the 1990s. A series of fundraising campaigns, such as charity performances, food sales and singing contests, were conducted (Huajiaoshenghui 1993, p. 79). The Chinese Education Torch Relay (华教火炬行) spread across all independent Chinese secondary schools in West Malaysia and raised nearly 2 million ringgit in 1992 (Huajiaoshenghui 1993, p. 74; and UCSCAM 1992c, p. 54; 1993, p. 28; 2002b, pp. 21–25). The completion of the four-storied administrative building was celebrated with an elaborate opening ceremony in December 1993.

With insufficient funds to purchase facilities and equipment for the new building, *Dongzong* used the opening ceremony as a strategic platform to launch a second wave of fundraising campaigns.<sup>43</sup> It started with the tree-planting ceremony (百万松柏献华教) at which more than 2,000 pine trees were planted by donors, and the event generated almost 2.5 million ringgit in donations (UCSCAM 1995, p. 36). The pine tree symbolizes persistency, while tree-planting signifies efforts to provide a better future for the next generation — an apt metaphoric reference to the movement's determination in preserving Chinese schools in Malaysia.<sup>44</sup>

A room adoption programme was launched in 1994 to generate large sums of donations from the generous rich for the development of the headquarters. The programme enabled those who donated more than 20,000 ringgit to name a room in the new administrative building, while those who donated more than 500,000 ringgit could name a floor.<sup>45</sup> Hope Foundation (1 million ringgit), Gerakan (527,561 ringgit), and MCA (500,000 ringgit) topped the list of donors (UCSCAM 1997, p. 19). In particular, the donation from Hope Foundation was delivered by its chairman, Khoo Kay Peng (邱继炳), in a high-profile ceremony witnessed by Deputy Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim — the most senior UMNO politician to have ever attended *Dongjiaozong's* activities (UCSCAM 1995, pp. 7, 42).

Other than being remembered as the chairman who was skilled at mobilizing donations, Quek Suan Hiang was also known for his well-rounded interactions with the BN regime.<sup>46</sup> Quek's good relationship with

ethnic Chinese ministers in the cabinet gave *Dongzong* an advantage in the accommodative political milieu in the 1990s to introduce amicable bilateral negotiations with the regime. Amongst the most significant outcomes from these negotiations were the granting of school registration status to twenty-one independent Chinese secondary schools and the conduct of special schoolteachers' training programmes to overcome the shortage of Chinese primary schoolteachers.

Quek's charisma as a leader shone through during the controversy of Vision Schools Project (*Rancangan Sekolah Wawasan*). Proposed under the seventh Malaysia Plan in 1994, the government recycled the blueprint of the Integrated Schools Project (*Rancangan Sekolah Integrasi*) to promote ethnic integration amongst schoolchildren through sharing of school facilities.<sup>47</sup> However, previous bad experiences with the state's education policies and suspicions of the Vision Schools Project as yet another pretext to systematically eliminate Chinese schools in Malaysia saw strong opposition from the Chinese education movement supporters.<sup>48</sup> Quek's soft, yet determined approach successfully persuaded school committees from all five short-listed Chinese primary schools not to participate in the Vision Schools Project.<sup>49</sup> Collective boycott from the Chinese schools became one of the crucial factors that had led to the cancellation of the project in the 2000s.<sup>50</sup>

In September 1998, a political scuffle between Deputy Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim and Prime Minister Mahathir resulted in the former's expulsion from his political appointments. A few days later, Anwar was arrested on trumped-up charges of corruption and sodomy. The cloud of conspiracy and despotism surrounding Anwar's overnight political demise led to the birth of an anti-Mahathir *reformasi* movement.<sup>51</sup> The movement was supported largely by the Malay middle class engineered from state-sponsored schemes created during Mahathir's twenty-two years' reign. Ironically, these ethnic Malays turned away from their patrons and supported the People's Justice Party, which contested against BN during the 1999 General Election (Khoo 2003, pp. 195–99).

With the Malay voters sturdily divided, BN was forced to depend on non-Malays votes to sustain its political domination. This political opportunity was exploited by the Selangor Chinese Assembly Hall Civic Rights Committee, which initiated the Malaysian Chinese Organisations' Election Appeals Committee (*Suqiu* Committee) (MCOEAC 2002, p. 15).

Quek Suan Hiang was named as the committee's chairman. Quek revealed the little known reason behind his appointment as chairman of the committee at the interview for this study:

As the demands made by the *Suqiu* Committee were related to the collective interests of the Chinese community in this nation, the committee had to be led by leaders from national-level Chinese guilds and associations. Such an arrangement would strengthen the inclusiveness and collectiveness of this committee. Therefore, although Chairman Ngan Ching Wen (颜清文) of the Selangor Chinese Assembly Hall wanted to be the chairman, he was not entitled to do so as he was a leader for one of the state-level Chinese guilds and associations. On the other hand, the leader from the largest Chinese guilds and associations in Malaysia, Federation of Chinese Associations Malaysia [formerly known as Unified Federation of Malaysian Chinese Assembly Hall], had rejected this position, as Federation President Chong Chin Shoong (张征雄) did not want to offend the government. In the end, I, as the chairman of *Dongzong*, was nominated and selected to lead the committee.<sup>52</sup>

The *Suqiu* Committee suggested a reform programme comprising seventeen proposals, including the removal of the *bumiputera* and non-*bumiputera* dichotomy, abolishment of the ethnic quota system, and reform of the affirmative action from ethnic-based into needs-based, amongst others (MCOEAC 2002, p. 15). The Federation of Chinese Associations Malaysia and the Association of Chinese Chambers of Commerce and Industry of Malaysia (马来西亚中华总商会) refused to endorse these proposals on the ground that they were too aggressive and would infuriate the Malays.<sup>53</sup> As a result, only some 2,098 Chinese guilds and associations endorsed these demands, about half of the total that endorsed the 1983 Memorandum on National Cultural Policy.

Mahathir capitalized on the division in the committee by criticizing the committee for "not having the support of all Chinese in Malaysia"<sup>54</sup> and remarking that Malaysian Chinese were being deployed as "a means to pressurize the government" by a small group of people.<sup>55</sup> Despite this, pressures to win the 1999 General Election saw leaders of BN Chinese political parties, namely MCA, Gerakan, and Sarawak United People's Party, make a joint announcement in September 1999 that "the cabinet, in principal, accepted the *Suqiu* Committee demands".<sup>56</sup> BN's timely response




managed to salvage its support from the Chinese community and allow it to maintain its two-thirds majority at the polls, despite a considerable decline (from 65 per cent in 1995 to 56 per cent in 1999) in its overall popular votes (Funston 2000, p. 49).

The fact that UMNO had failed to win Malay-majority support in the 1999 General Election threatened its status quo in BN (Maznah 2003, pp. 67, 77). A leading Malaysian studies scholar, Khoo Boo Teik, correctly pointed out that in his attempts to recapture Malay support, Mahathir resultantly played the card of "the contrivance of a Chinese threat to Malay rights" by attacking the *Suqiu* Committee (Khoo 2003, p. 126). A series of events in August 2000 supported Khoo's observation. The first was the anti-*Suqiu* Committee demonstration, participated by about 200 UMNO Youth members. These UMNO members protested outside Selangor Chinese Assembly Hall to demand the withdrawal of the petition and an apology to the Malay community to be made.<sup>57</sup> The protest was followed by Mahathir's open condemnation of the *Suqiu* Committee in the National Day speech on 31 August 2000. He criticized the committee as being "not much different than communists who tried to destroy the special status of Malays in the country and shared a similar approach to *Al-Maunah*" (Tan, K. 2000). After a series of closed-door negotiations with UMNO, the committee chairman, Quek Suan Hiang, was forced to rescind seven of the committee's appeals.

This was a huge setback for Quek and the *Dongjiaozong*. Quek bore the blame of "bowing down to UMNO pressure" although he was not the progenitor of the demands.<sup>58</sup> *Dongjiaozong* was also blamed for crossing movement boundaries and its former alliance, the Federation of Chinese Associations Malaysia, withdrew its support. In response, *Dongjiaozong* established the Alliance of Seven Chinese Education-Related Guilds and Associations (华教界七华团) in 2002 to strengthen their collectiveness (see Figure 4.1). This Alliance of Seven was led by *Dongzong* and consisted of *Jiaozong*, Federation of Alumni Associations of Taiwan Universities of Malaysia, Nanyang University Alumni Association of Malaya, United Chinese School Alumni Association (华校校友会联合会总会), Malaysian Seven Major Clans Associations (七大多团协调委员会), and Federation of Chinese Associations Malaysia.<sup>59</sup> The Federation of Chinese Associations Malaysia held a symbolic membership and has remained passive from most of the decision-making within the alliance (Ho, K.L. 1992b, p. 5). The roles of this new alliance will be discussed in the next chapter.

FIGURE 4.1

## The Alliance of Seven Chinese Education-Related Guilds and Associations



Source: The author.

## POST-MAHATHIR MALAYSIA

Mahathir retired in October 2003. Abdullah Badawi, who had been known for his amicable Islamic credentials, succeeded the premiership. Abdullah's administration was well received by the rural Malay electorate through the "civilizational and comprehensive Islam" (*Islam hadhari*) programme (Abdullah 2006, pp. 1–29; and Fauwaz 2001). His publicized war on corruption involving arresting and charging several high-ranking officials convinced the urban class of his determination to shape a new and more transparent administration. The timely upturn of the economy after the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome crisis in early 2003 and the constituency delineation of electoral boundaries exercise in April 2003 also significantly maximized BN's political strength (Liöw 2005, pp. 909–12). These factors ensured a landslide victory of more than 90 per cent of the contested parliamentary seats for Abdullah's administration during the 2004 General Election.

Over the same period, new leadership in the MCA and the Chinese education movement also came into power. Ong Ka Ting (黄家定) and Hon Choon Kim (韩春锦) became the new MCA president and deputy president, respectively, in 2003 after the MCA had been troubled by internal party factions.<sup>60</sup> Intensified power struggles within MCA effectively took away the two new MCA leaders' capacity and interest to facilitate demands from *Dongjiaozong*. The relationship between MCA and *Dongjiaozong* did not improve even after Yap Sin Tian succeeded Quek Suan Hiang as *Dongzong* chairman in 2005.

In addition, the rapid rise of Abdullah Badawi's son-in-law, Khairy Jamaluddin, in UMNO Youth was posing a considerable challenge to Hishammuddin Hussein's political position as the chief of UMNO Youth. Hence, in his attempts to assert his domination and superiority, Hishammuddin refused to meet any *Dongjiaozong* representatives in public or respond to the memorandums of the Chinese education movement submitted during the early days of his term as minister of education (2004–09).<sup>61</sup> Lack of support from MCA and cessation of all communication channels from the minister of education forced *Dongjiaozong* to seek new supporters through inter-ethnic collaboration. In 2007, for the first time in the history of the Chinese education movement, *Dongjiaozong* engaged the Tamil Foundation of Malaysia to jointly submit a Memorandum for the Return of Vernacular Education (还我母语教育各忘录) in protest against the implementation of the Teaching and Learning Science and Mathematics in English Programme (*Pengajaran dan Pembelajaran Sains dan Matematik dalam Bahasa Inggeris*).<sup>62</sup>

Two years later, *Dongjiaozong* conducted dialogues with the Malay advocacy group, Movement to Eliminate Teaching and Learning Science and Mathematics in English Programme (*Gerakan Mansuhkan Pengajaran dan Pembelajaran Sains dan Matematik dalam Bahasa Inggeris*) and explored joint strategies to pressure the government to withdraw the programme.<sup>63</sup> The stalemate ended with the withdrawal of the programme after BN suffered a significant political setback in the 2008 General Election.<sup>64</sup>

The political storm that struck Malaysia in 2008 had been brewing steadily since 2007. Although Abdullah's administration had made a glorious entrance into politics, Malaysians were getting increasingly impatient and disappointed with the administration's inability to fulfil its promises. The Malaysians' frustration culminated in the Coalition for Clean and Fair Election (*Gabungan Pilihanraya Bersih dan Adil*) rally in November 2007. More than 40,000 supporters attended the rally to

demand reform in the country's electoral and political system (Xie 2007). A few days later, the Hindu Rights Action Force mobilized a second wave of mass protest over the failure of Malaysian Indian Congress to represent the interests of the Indian community in Malaysia (Case 2009, p. 329; and *Straits Times*, 26 November 2007).

Eventually it was the rise of Anwar Ibrahim, after his release from prison in September 2004, as a *de facto* leader that led to the formation of a strong inter-ethnic opposition political coalition under People's Alliance (*Pakatan Rakyat*, PR). The result was a switchover of an overwhelming number of votes to PR at the 2008 General Election. For the second time in Malaysia's history, BN lost its two-thirds dominance in the parliament. PR also gained control of five state-level governments in the Peninsula.<sup>65</sup> BN's weakened political domination was further threatened by Anwar Ibrahim's landslide victory in the Permatang Pauh parliamentary by-election in August 2008, after Anwar had fulfilled the legal bar to hold political office. The victory marked a comeback for Anwar. The formation of a significant, albeit unstable, dual coalition system for the first time in Malaysia's history was welcomed with a mixture of excitement and anxiety.<sup>66</sup>

The BN-PR competition intensified after Najib Razak succeeded Abdullah as prime minister in April 2009. Najib sought to revive his party and BN coalition by launching the "One Malaysia" campaign that promised economic reforms through the New Economic Model.<sup>67</sup> PR and BN also adopted more accommodative principles towards the demands of various pressure groups, including those from the Chinese education movement.<sup>68</sup> PR state governments offered, for instance, waiver of land taxes for schools, land allocation, and financial aid to vernacular schools in their respective states. Notably, DAP-led Penang government allocated 1 million ringgit in 2009 and 2 million ringgit a year later to five independent Chinese secondary schools in Penang.<sup>69</sup> People's Justice Party-led Selangor government donated a total of 6 million ringgit to the Chinese schools and independent Chinese secondary schools, and the PAS-led Kelantan government donated 2,229 acres of land to Kelantan Chung Wah Independent High School (吉兰丹中华独立中学).<sup>70</sup>

As mentioned earlier, BN agreed to revert to teaching Mathematics and Science in vernacular language in all primary schools with effect from 2012.<sup>71</sup> Najib's administration also responded positively to demands by the Chinese education movement. For instance, Unified Examination

Certificate holders are now allowed to apply for the state education loan starting from May 2010 (PTPTN 2010). Chinese classes have also been introduced in the national schools, marking the formal entrance of Chinese education into Malaysia's mainstream education system. Yap Sin Tian also used the opportunity to foster closer collaboration with MCA ministers, to demand for recognition of Unified Examination Certificate as an entry qualification into the national universities, and to upgrade *Dongjiaozong*-funded New Era College into a full university. Nevertheless, intense conflicts within *Dongjiaozong* had significantly reduced its capacity to exploit this political opportunity to the fullest. This caused the movement to miss a golden opportunity in achieving its ultimate aims of securing the status of Chinese education, Chinese schools, and Chinese language in Malaysia.

## CONCLUSION

The opportunity for movement mobilization varies with the transitioning realities of political circumstances, especially the political circumstances constrained by a non-liberal democratic political context. Due to limited political access, the success of movement strategies is often determined by critical factors in leadership, brokerage, and external networks.

The leadership of the Chinese education movement has been selected through a bottom-up democratic process, and therefore the movement and its leadership have managed to secure legitimacy in mobilizing its supporters and launching various campaigns in resisting state suppression. Strong leadership is not inherited naturally but is structurally created through the leaders' ability to gather think-tanks, utilize their social capital in engaging support from leaders of other organizations, engage with MCA leaders for critical information, and take advantage of their positions as *Dongjiaozong* leaders to mobilize appropriate strategies.

Most importantly, leaders must outsmart external political constraints to sustain the movement's goals by adapting the movement's repertoires according to the changes in the movement supporters' mentalities, as well as according to the state's responses. The impacts of these factors have been shown in this chapter, in particular the shift of movement repertoires adopted by movement leaders, which varied from resistance-oriented to negotiation-oriented approaches. Chinese educationalists led by Lim Fong Seng resisted the state through a series of collective action and mass participation in politics (directly and indirectly) as a means to achieve

their movement objectives in the 1970s and 1980s. However, these efforts failed to garner sufficient support from movement supporters who were divided by their various political affiliations, with many of them viewing such attempts to be too costly, as the state had the power and tendencies to manipulate its law enforcement system to crack down movement supporters.

Learning from past consequences, Foo Wan Thot softened the movement's approach in 1991 and fostered closer collaboration with MCA. However, Foo's pro-MCA strategy was poorly received by the movement supporters. Subsequent leaders such as Quek Suan Hiang and Yap Sin Tian revised their strategies to take on a politically neutral, collaborative, and negotiation-oriented approach. Instead of having a pro-MCA position, Quek was able to work amicably with the authorities through brokerage and facilitation by MCA ministers. Such indirect collaboration was better received by the movement supporters, and the Chinese education movement was also able to deliver its demands for changes effectively. The impact of these lobbying efforts went beyond policymaking to the policy-executing level, and the result of these efforts is promising rewards for the movement.

The movement has also relied on the support of its alliances through networking with other Chinese guilds and associations in the country. This relationship is best exemplified by the Alliance of Fifteen Leading Chinese Guilds and Associations formed in the 1980s in the face of increasing threats of assimilation from the state. The Chinese education movement leaders, Lim Fong Seng and Sim Mow Yu, collaborated with an activist of leading Chinese guilds and association, Chong King Liong, to form a formidable alliance, and the trio led a series of Chinese civic movements in the 1980s. The cause of the Chinese education movement in this era was framed as a fight for the values inherent in a democracy and a fight for human rights, beyond vernacular education rights.

Facing mounting challenges from the Chinese community, the state responded by deploying a series of carrot-and-stick measures. Through cohesive suppression (*Operasi Lalang*) and co-optation (formation of Unified Federation of Malaysian Chinese Assembly Hall), the state successfully weakened the influence of *Dongjiaozong* by breaking up the latter's relationship with the influential leaders of some of the Chinese guilds and associations' leaders. As the once-influential Alliance of Fifteen entered into a decline, the movement was forced to establish new alliances with the other Chinese guilds and associations and non-Chinese

organizations. Although support from the non-Chinese communities held the promise of kick-starting the movement into a powerful momentum, but the exclusive nature of the Chinese education movement has prevented the collaboration from blossoming.

After 2008, the competition between BN and PR has provided valuable political opportunities for the Chinese education movement. BN leader, Najib Razak, who became Malaysia's prime minister in 2009, has adopted a more accommodative approach towards the demands from the Chinese education movement. At the same time, the state governments controlled by PR have also been implementing various pro-vernacular education policies and allocating financial resources to the Chinese schools in their states.

It remains a pity that despite increasing political opportunities for movement mobilization in Malaysia after 2008, mounting internal factionalism within the Chinese education movement has distracted movement leaders from exploiting these political opportunities to their fullest potential as they have been preoccupied with managing and resolving internal movement problems. Perspectives of, and the impacts of internal factionalism on the Chinese education movement will be discussed in Chapter 5.

## Notes

1. For further details on Merdera University Petition, see MUB (1978a).
2. Announced by Education Minister Musa Hitam during UMNO Annual National Assemble on 17 September 1978. See DNICSSDWC (1993, p. 24); and GM (1971b; 1971f; 2006a).
3. The issue was also discussed during the National Independent Chinese Secondary Schools Committees and School Principals Joint Meeting (全国独中董事及校长联席会议) on 10 August 1974.
4. Such consensus was made during an emergency meeting held at Selangor Chinese Assembly Hall on 30 November 1975. The meeting was attended by 142 representatives from state-level Chinese school committees' associations, Chinese schoolteachers' associations, and Chinese school alumni associations.
5. The figure represents the total fund collected by 10 September 1980. See MUB (1978b); and Zhen (2006, p. 86).
6. These lawyers were Ker Kim Tin, Soo Thien Ming, Tan Chek Yoke, J.C. Bernatt, Soo Lim Pang, Lee Shan Too, Ong Tin Kim, Low Sik Thong, Ngeow Yin Ngee, and Siew Yew Ming.
7. Lee, P.K. (2006, p. 56); and *Sinchew Daily*, 21 August 1990.

8. Sim Mow Yu, interview by the author, Malacca, 26 March 2008.
9. Hew (1997); Thock (1994a, pp. 21–27; 1994b); and Loot Ting Yee, interview by the author, Kuala Lumpur, 24 March 2008.
10. During the 1986 General Election, Ong won the Anson parliamentary seat while Kerk won the Taiping parliamentary. Sim Mow Yu, interview by the author, Malacca, 26 March 2008.
11. Chian Heng Kai was an Internal Security Act detainee (1976–81) for criticizing government's discrimination policy on Chinese education. He won the 1978 Batu Gajah parliamentary seat election despite being detained under the Internal Security Act.
12. *Dongjiaozong* criticized Kerk Choo Ting as "no longer took an active interest in Chinese education matters since being appointed a deputy minister". See UCSCAM (1987a, pp. 15–17).
13. Kerk served as Gerakan deputy president for sixteen years before he retired in 2005. Kang was the party deputy vice president prior to retirement in 1999. Ong was appointed as Perak state secretary but passed away in 1997. Koh became the Penang chief minister (1990–2008) and party president since 2008. See Chin, J. (2006, p. 79); Khor and Khoo (2008, pp. 86–87); and Koh (1986, pp. 6–7).
14. Leong Tzi Liang, interview by the author, Penang, 3 February 2010.
15. Chinese assembly hall is the highest Chinese guilds and association authority in a state. Four states (Malacca, Kedah, Perlis, and Pahang) that do not have a Chinese assembly hall are represented by the Chinese chamber of commerce. In total, these two organizations have about 5,000 Chinese guilds and associations under their umbrella. See SCAH (2004, p. 62); and Yen (1981, pp. 62–63; 2000, p. 3). For the origins and development of the Chinese Cultural Congress from 1984 to 2000, see FCAM (2001).
16. *Nanyangshangpao*, 1 September 1986.
17. Sim Mow Yu, interview by the author, Malacca, 26 March 2008.
18. Other speakers in this gathering included Mah Cheok Tat (马卓达, Penang representative), Xu Min Yan (余明炎, Malacca representative), Hou Heng Hua (侯亨桦, Social Democratic Party), Huang Zhen Bu (黄振部, *Parti Sosialis Rakyat Malaysia*), Ong Tin Kim (Gerakan), Lee Kim Sai (李金狮, MCA), and Loot Ting Yee (*Jiaozong*).
19. *China Press*, *Nanyangshangpao*, and *Sinchew Daily*, 16 October 1987.
20. UCSCAM (2001a, p. 243); and Sim Mow Yu, interview by the author, Malacca, 26 March 2008.
21. For the list of the detainees, see Tan, S.G. (1989, pp. 129–33). For the official accounts of this operation, see GM (1988).
22. These newspapers received a new operation permit in March 1988. See DAP (1988, pp. 116–17); and Freedman (2000, p. 83).
23. Sim Mow Yu, interview by the author, Malacca, 26 March 2008.



24. Due to political constraint, Nanyang University alumnus in Malaysia has yet to successfully establish a national association. The alumnus organizations (Selangor, Penang, Kuala Lumpur, Johore, Perak, Malacca, and Sarawak) operate at the state level; while the Kuala Lumpur branch has been the default representative of Nanyang University alumnus in various *Dongjiaozong* related activities due to its strategic logistic location. For more, see Lee, Y.L. (2004, p. 421); NUAAM et al. (1982, pp. 83, 87–102); and UCSCAM (1991, p. 54; 1993, p. 32).
25. Many of these marginalized communities are strong supporters and core components of the Chinese education movement. By 2010, forty out of sixty principals, and one forth of 3,650 teachers who is serving at independent Chinese secondary schools were Nanyang University or Taiwanese universities graduates. See Yau (2008, pp. 6–7); Low Hing King (movement activist), interview by the author, Kuala Lumpur, 23 February 2009; and Yau Teck Kong (姚迪剛) (president, Federation of Alumni Associations of Taiwan Universities of Malaysia), interview by the author, Selangor, 18 February 2009.
26. CMCS (1990); *Nanyangshangpao*, 9 August 1990; *Sinchew Daily*, 9 August 1990; and Thock (1994a; 1994b).
27. *Nanyangshangpao*, 26 July, 1 August, and 4 August 1990.
28. They included Council of Perak Chinese School Committees (吡叻华校董事会联合会) Chairman cum *Dongzong* Deputy Chairman Foo Wan Thot, *Jiaozong* Vice Chairman Loot Ting Yee, and *Jiaozong* Vice Chairman Thuang Pik King. See *China Press*, 15 August 1990; *Nanyangshangpao*, 3 August, 6 August, 7 August, 8 August, and 18 August 1990; *Sinchew Daily*, 18 August 1990; and *Tongbao*, 7 August 1990.
29. These educationalists included Kua Kia Soong, Lee Ban Chen, Ngeow Yin Ngee, Yang Pei Keng (杨培根), Ng Wei Siong (吴维湘), and Chong Joon Kin (张永庆). For more, see UCSCAM (1991, pp. 39–40); *Nanyangshangpao*, 5 August 1990; and *Sinchew Daily*, 7 August 1990.
30. *Nanyangshangpao*, 20 August 1990.
31. This coalition ends in 1996 after the withdrawal of *Parti Bersatu Sabah* and the dissolution of *Parti Melayu Semangat 46*. See Case (1992, pp. 183–205); UCSCAM (1991, p. 37); Lim, K.S. (1990); and *Sinchew Daily*, 8 August and 17 August 1990.
32. UCSCAM (1992c, pp. 35–36); and *Sinchew Daily*, 20 October 1991.
33. *Sinchew Daily*, 16 October and 17 October 1991.
34. Chew Saw Eng (chairperson, Malaysia United Chinese School Alumni Association), interview by the author, Kuala Lumpur, 17 February 2009.
35. *China Press*, 4 May, 8 June and 16 June 1992; *Nanyangshangpao*, 27 July 1992; and *Sinchew Daily*, 5 May and 6 May 1992.
36. *Nanyangshangpao*, 8 August 1992; and *Sinchew Daily*, 17 May 1992.

37. *China Press*, 21 May and 11 August 1992; and *Sinchew Daily*, 27 July and 28 July 1992.
38. *China Press* and *Nanyangshangpao*, 26 May 1992.
39. Chinese New Villages are settlements created during British rule to segregate Chinese communities from the Malayan Communist Party in the 1950s. For more, see Daniel (1995, p. 115); and Loh (2000).
40. *Nanyangshangpao*, 13 February 1992.
41. *Nanyangshangpao*, 25 May 1992.
42. DHLC (2008b); Zhen (2006, p. 257); and Lee Hing (吕兴) (deputy chairman, Merdeka University Berhad), interview by the author, Selangor, 28 July 2010.
43. Quek Suan Hiang, interview by the author, Johore, 23 March 2010.
44. In the same evening, a fundraising dinner (风雨同路为华教万人宴) collected another 43.6 million ringgit. See UCSCAM (1994, p. 33; 1995, pp. 30, 36).
45. Quek Suan Hiang, interview by the author, Johore, 23 March 2010.
46. Sim Mow Yu, interview by the author, Malacca, 26 March 2008.
47. Strong opposition from the Chinese community successfully persuaded the Ministry of Education to replace the Integrated Schools Project with a less controversial Student Integration Programme (*Rancangan Integrasi Murid Untuk Perpaduan*) in 1986. The latter was well-received by the vernacular communities, as it enabled the vernacular schools to retain their original identity, while the students benefited from more effective integration efforts through collectively-organized extra-curriculum activities. For more, see MEM (1985a; 1985b; 1995); *Nanyangshangpao*, 22 August 1985; *Sinchew Daily*, 9 August 1985; UCSCAM (2000a, pp. 2–8; 2001a, pp. 189–219); and *Urusan Malaysia*, 7 August 1985.
48. *Sinchew Daily*, 21 November 2000; and UCSCAM (2000a, p. 2).
49. These schools included Soon Jian Chinese Primary School in Alor Setar, Kedah (循然华文小学); Khing Ming Chinese Primary School in Kuala Kubu Bharu, Selangor (竞明华文小学); Ladang Hillside Chinese Primary School in Negeri Sembilan (丘晒园华文小学); Eng Ling Chinese Primary School (永宁华文小学) and Wai Sin Chinese Primary School in Perak (维新华文小学); and Segamat Central Site Chinese Primary School in Johore (中央华文小学). See Ng, T.E. (2003, pp. 184–204).
50. The Ministry of Education launched five pilot Vision Schools in 2000, namely the Subang Jaya Vision School Complex house the Datuk Jaafar Onn National Primary School, Tun Tan Cheng Lock Chinese Primary School (陈祯禄华文小学), and Tun Sambantan Tamil Primary School. The other four Vision Schools Complexes were located at the Pekan Baru (Parit Buntar, Perak), Taman Aman (Alor Setar, Kedah), Tasik Permai (Penang), and Pundut (Seri Manjung, Perak). However, only the Subang Jaya Vision Schools was successful. The Johore version was terminated due to the presence of

- too many national schools, while the Vision School in Pundut was troubled by the controversy between the administration of the national schools and Tamil schools. See *Nanyangshangpao*, 2 and 10 December 2000; *Star*, 25 May 2002; UCSCAM (1996, pp. 70–78); and Quek Suan Hiang, interview by the author, Johore, 23 March 2010.
51. On *reformasi* pictorial and chronology, see Petra (2001). On analysis of *reformasi* movement and its post-impact on Malaysia politics, see Freedman (2000, p. 52); Ganesan (2004, p. 72); and Loh and Saravanamuttu (2003).
  52. Quek Suan Hiang, interview by the author, Johore, 23 March 2010.
  53. Loh (2009); *Nanyangshangpao*, 9 September 1999; Ng, T.E. (2003, p. 198); and *Sinchew Daily*, 27 and 29 August 1999.
  54. *Sinchew Daily*, 14 September 1999.
  55. *Berita Harian*, 21 September 1999.
  56. *Nanyangshangpao* and *Sinchew Daily*, 24 September 1999.
  57. The event was widely covered (in different perspectives) in both Chinese and Malay newspapers. For the pro-*Suqiu* Committee coverage, see *Nanyangshangpao* and *Sinchew Daily*, 19–23 August 2000. On pro-UMNO coverage, see *Utusan Malaysia*, 18–23 August 2000.
  58. Quek Suan Hiang, interview by the author, Johore, 23 March 2010.
  59. The Malaysian Seven Major Clans Associations comprised of custodian-based clan associations, guilds, occupation- and region-based Chinese guilds and associations: Malaysian Federated San Kiang Association (马来西亚三江总会), Federation of Hainan Association Malaysia (马来西亚海南公会联合会), Guangxi Association Malaysia (马来西亚广西公会总会), Federation of Hakka Association Malaysia (马来西亚客家公会联合会), Federation of Teochew Association Malaysia (马来西亚潮州公会联合会), Federation of Hokkien Association Malaysia (马来西亚福建社团联合会), and Federation of Kwangtung Association Malaysia (马来西亚广东会馆联合会).
  60. Back in 1999, contentions between MCA President Ling Liong Sik's team A (supported by Ong Ka Ting) and Deputy President Lim Ah Lek's (林亚礼) team B (supported by Chan Kong Choy, 陈广才) over the nomination of their respective *protégés* for the presidential post had to be temporarily frozen by Mahathir's "peace formula". Both Ling and Lim had not sought re-election and had agreed to retire in May 2003, paving the way for Ong and Chan's appointment to full ministerial positions. Although Ong won the party president election eventually, the resultant bad blood between the two factions destabilized the party enough to dilute its decision-making influence within BN. See Phoon (2006).
  61. *Sun*, 24 March 2009. The memorandums submitted included the *Dongjiaozong's* overall opinion on the Malaysia Education Blueprint 2001–2010 (董教总对2001至2010年教育发展大蓝图总体意见书) (2002); Suggestions on the Ninth Malaysia Plan (第九大马计划的建议书) (2005); Suggestions on

- the Ninth Malaysia Plan (第九大马计划的建议书) (2005); *Dongjiaozong's* opinion on the Malaysia Education Blueprint 2006–2010 (董教总对2006至2010年教育发展大蓝图总体意见书) (2007).
62. Implemented in all primary schools since January 2003, the programme aimed to raise English proficiency amongst the schoolchildren by enforcing the teaching of mathematics and science in English. Student with little exposure to English language had suffered from this programme. For more, see *Dongjiaozong* (2004); *Nanyangshangpao*, 10 August and 31 October 2002; PPPPK (2007); *Sinchew Daily*, 8 August and 10 October 2002; and Wong, J. (2002).
  63. *Merdeka Review*, 13 March 2009; and Shum Thin Khee, interview by the author, Selangor, 27 February 2009.
  64. *News Straits Times* and *Sinchew Daily*, 9 July 2009.
  65. Better known as the Perak Constitutional Crisis, BN regained control of Perak state after three PR state assembly members quit their parties and BN, together with the support of these three members, won a slim majority of over twenty-eight seats. See *Harakah*, 23 September 2010.
  66. For analysis on the impact of the post-2008 General Election, see Tan and Lee (2008).
  67. Guided by three principles, namely, high income, sustainability, and inclusiveness, the model hoped to improve the country's economic growth in capital and productivity for all Malaysians. See NEAC (2010, pp. 3–30).
  68. Chen (2008); and *Merdeka Review*, 14 March 2008.
  69. *Sinchew Daily*, 25 April 2010.
  70. *Guangming Daily*, 30 August 2009; and *Kwongwahyitpoh*, 21 August 2010.
  71. *News Straits Times* and *Sinchew Daily*, 9 July 2009.

## 5

---

# MOBILIZATION MACHINERY

### INTRODUCTION

After exploring the interactions, alliances, and rivals of the Chinese education movement in the earlier chapters, the focus now turns to the movement's internal institutions and mobilization machinery. This chapter explores three key components of the movement's institutions, namely, the Malaysian Independent Chinese Secondary Schools Working Committee, the *Dongjiaozong* Chinese Primary Schools Working Committee, and the *Dongjiaozong* Higher Learning Centre. Together, these three components play the role of a *de facto* education ministry for the Chinese community in Malaysia, and became the movement's machinery for mobilizing resources. As the size of the movement continues to grow and financial expenses increase, some of the components become more successful and sustainable, while others are not. Over time, the diverse development of these components thus transformed the relationship between *Dongzong* and *Jiaozong* from one of symbiosis into one of commensalism.

Through exploring the power relationships amongst these components, this chapter also analyses the decision-making hierarchy of the Chinese education movement from the 1970s to 2010s. Divided into the managerial (led by the elected committees) and operative (led by the salaried executives) levels, the movement functioned within a bureaucratic system that is predominantly agent-based and formulated around loosely-defined rules. Although professionalism eventually grew out of this hybrid system, the working dynamics and outcomes of the collaboration varied according to the interpersonal relationships.

The chapter ends with a discussion on the impact of the increasing economic value of the Chinese language on the Chinese education movement, transforming the movement from a national into a transnational movement. Even though the movement tried to expand its collaborative networks internationally through the Southeast Asian Chinese Language Teaching Convention (东南亚华文教学研讨会) and the New Era College, the impacts remained limited. This chapter will also evaluate the factors that had divided the movement into two (or more) confrontative factions.

### THE INDEPENDENT CHINESE SECONDARY SCHOOLS REVIVAL MOVEMENT

After implementation of the 1961 Education Act, only sixteen Chinese secondary schools in the Peninsula Malaysia opted not to receive financial aid from the government and operated outside the national education system as independent Chinese secondary schools in order to preserve their authority over the school's management.

To appease angry Chinese communities and protect the social interests of the school committees that had acceded to the conversion project in the 1960s, the Ministry of Education allowed the converted schools to set up new or affiliated independent Chinese secondary schools within a shared school campus.<sup>1</sup> A total of thirty-three affiliated independent Chinese secondary schools (国民型华文中学董事部兼办独立中学) were established under these circumstances in the Peninsula. In Sabah and Sarawak, a total of seventeen new independent Chinese secondary schools were established between 1962 and 1969.<sup>2</sup>

Nevertheless, the development of independent Chinese secondary schools was stalled after the Malayan Secondary School Entrance Examination was abolished in 1963, for the abolishment of this examination resulted in the automatic enrolment of all primary school graduates into secondary schools (Leong and Tan 1997, p. 308). Subsequently in 1964, the implementation of nine years of free education for all citizens also drew new enrolment away from independent Chinese secondary schools that collected fees. On top of that, converted schools (which received financial aid from the government) offering better salaries also drew schoolteachers away from independent Chinese secondary schools.

Unable to surpass these constraints, five out of fourteen independent Chinese secondary schools in Perak were shut down by 1969. The remaining nine independent Chinese secondary schools in Perak, which hosted merely about 1,500 students altogether, were barely surviving in the late 1960s and early 1970s.<sup>3</sup> The threat to survival of independent Chinese secondary schools nationwide meant that the continuity of the Chinese education movement was also under threat. Therefore, as soon as the Emergency Decree was lifted in June 1972, the Grand Three Associations of Chinese Education hosted a nationwide meeting and established the Independent Chinese Secondary Schools Development Committee (独中发展小组) to strategize ways to salvage the plunging status of Chinese schools in Malaysia (UCSCAM 1987*d*, p. 614).

In Perak, Zeng Dun Hua (曾敦化) and Shen Ting (沈亭) from Poi Lam High School (培南独中) laid the groundwork for inter-independent Chinese secondary schools collaboration by gathering all related school principals in November 1972, and extended the invitation to chairmen of school committees a month later. By April 1973, the legendary Perak independent Chinese secondary schools revival movement was kick-started with full support from the Perak state-level Chinese school committees' association, the Council of Perak Chinese School Committees.<sup>4</sup>

The Perak Independent Chinese Secondary Schools Development Working Committee (吡叻州发展华文独中工作委员会) launched a successful fundraising campaign highlighting the concept of *yì* (义), a voluntary and righteous behaviour to protect the weak. Donations were generated through charity campaigns involving sales of food, fishing, trishaw riding, and "One Person, One Dollar" donations, amongst others (Zhen 1996, pp. 46–48). The campaign garnered support from the Chinese community in Perak and nationwide, particularly from those who had suffered under the Emergency Decree and who were dissatisfied with the New Economic Policy system. The 1 million ringgit target was reached and the money was used for the expansion of school buildings and facilities, the hiring of more schoolteachers, and the setting up of scholarships and loans for independent Chinese secondary school students.<sup>5</sup>

The campaign also encouraged and persuaded parents to send their children to independent Chinese secondary schools. Student enrolment

increased from about 2,500 in 1970 to roughly 5,100 in 1976 in the nine independent Chinese secondary schools in Perak (Shen 1975). Encouraged by increasing enrolment and improved public image, all nine schools collaboratively drafted a unified school curriculum and uniform textbooks, with each school responsible for developing a designated subject textbook.<sup>6</sup>


In March 1973, the Seminar on Independent Chinese Secondary Schools (华文独中研讨会) was organized in Selangor to draft the *Guiding Principles of Malaysian Independent Chinese Secondary Schools* (华文独立中学建议书). The draft was later used as the blueprint for reforming independent Chinese secondary schools at the national level. Although Perak was the leading state in the efforts channelled into reforming independent Chinese secondary schools, the dominance of Selangor state-level movement leaders in the *Dongzong* central committee saw the latter overtaking the leadership of the reformation. In December 1973, the national revival movement was inaugurated at the National Conference for Independent Chinese Secondary Schools Development (全国发展华文独中运动大会).

The Malaysian Independent Chinese Secondary Schools Working Committee was established as a *de facto* education ministry for the Chinese community. As it was not registered under the 1966 Society Act, this working committee was subordinated under *Dongzong* to secure operation legality, and safeguard financial resources and properties of the working committee.<sup>7</sup> As illustrated in Figure 5.1, organizationally, the working committee comprises of a general committee, a standing committee, and seven working units. Thirteen representatives each from *Dongzong* and *Jiaozong* formed the general committee; thirteen committee members from the Chinese education movement affiliated organizations would be appointed at the first meeting.

At this first meeting too, committee positions of the fifteen-member standing committee would be decided. Senior positions in the standing committee, such as chairman (主席), general secretary (总务), and treasurer (财政), were classified as reserved positions (当然常务委员) and were held by *Dongzong*'s office bearers by default. The positions for the deputy chairman, deputy general secretary, and deputy treasurer were reserved by default for office bearers from *Jiaozong*. Other positions within the standing committee were decided through elections. The working committee could also assign a maximum of seventeen appointed standing committee members (委任委员务) when necessary.



**FIGURE 5.1**  
**Organizational Chart of *Dongzong* and Malaysian Independent Chinese Secondary Schools Working Committee**



Source: Compiled by the author with reference to UCSCAM (2011, pp. 127–45).


The functions of these committees were briefly deliberated on the three-page *Organizational Rules and Regulations of the Malaysian Independent Chinese Secondary Schools Working Committee* (董教总全国发展华文独立中学运动工作委员会组织规章).<sup>8</sup> For example, the terms of service for all positions were biannual but renewable without maximum limits (UCSCAM 1987*d*, p. 614; 2012, pp. 127–29); and UCSTAM 1983*c*, p. 25). However, the general guidelines said nothing about the commitments and responsibilities of committees, which were thus subjected to individual discretion. Intimate interpersonal connections between the members, who were highly familiar with the abilities, characters, and limitations of one another, had thus far secured bonds, built trust and prevented free riders.

Appointment of new committee members, in particular, was based on recommendations, in addition to the candidate's social reputation and commitment to serving the development of Chinese education.<sup>9</sup> The tried and tested success of the selection process could be seen in the success of the Unified Curriculum Subcommittee (独中统一课程编委会). *Dongzong* chairman Lim Fong Seng handpicked Kerk Choo Ting to head the subcommittee in 1976. Kerk identified and invited committed schoolteachers, university academics and subject experts to form the think-tank that formulated the first unified curriculum and examination system for independent Chinese secondary schools in Malaysia (UCSTAM 1983*c*, p. 26).

Despite the lack of structured institutional guidelines, the working committee had achieved a few important benchmarks thus far. For example, the Unified Curriculum Subcommittee, through specialization of work in the Department of Curriculum (课程局) and Department of Publications (出版局), had been designing textbooks custom-made for independent Chinese secondary schools since 1979. By 2011, the Unified Curriculum Subcommittee had designed more than 280 textbooks that served as reliable teaching materials for independent Chinese secondary schools (DNICSSDWC 2005; and UCSCAM 1987*d*, p. 619).

Another yardstick of the success of the Malaysian Independent Chinese Secondary Schools Working Committee was the worldwide recognition of the Unified Examination Certificate as an academic credential. Coordinated by the Unified Examination Subcommittee (独中统一考试委员会) and administrated by the Department of Examination (考试局), this examination was prepared and evaluated collaboratively

**FIGURE 5.2**  
**Distribution of Unified Examination Certificate Candidates**  
 (1973–2011)



*Source:* Compiled by the author with data extracted from UCSCAM (2011, p. 290; 2012, p. 61).


by an extensive network of schoolteachers of independent Chinese secondary schools. Divided into three levels, namely, the senior, junior, vocational and technical levels, the examination was a unified academic assessment and credential of the students of independent Chinese secondary schools.

As illustrated in Figure 5.2, the popularity of this examination can be seen by the increase in the number of candidates taking the examination. By 2011, an accumulative total of 481,598 candidates had taken the three categories of examinations since it was first introduced in 1975. Senior-level candidates had risen dramatically, from 1,993 students in 1975 to 6,748 students by 2011. Candidates for the junior-level examinations also increased from 4,150 to 11,259 students over the same period. The vocational and technical candidates climbed comparatively slower, from 167 students in 1993 to 277 students in 2011.

By 2011, milestones continued to be made as Unified Examination Certificate holders were qualified for exemption from entrance examinations at all universities in Singapore; it was recognized as a qualification for high school education in the United States, and as the equivalent of the Ordinary Level of the General Certificate of Education in Britain.<sup>10</sup> These milestones boost parents' confidence on the academic quality of the independent Chinese secondary schools.

As such, the number of students enrolled in independent Chinese secondary schools had increased from 28,318 students in 1973 to 66,968 students by 2011, an impressive 136 per cent growth over thirty-nine years, as illustrated in Figure 5.3. Sustainable student enrollments also stabilized the number of independent Chinese secondary schools at sixty since the launch of the revival movement.<sup>11</sup>

**FIGURE 5.3**  
**Distribution of Independent Chinese Secondary School Students**  
**in Malaysia**  
(1973–2011)



Source: UCSCAM (2012, p. 316).

By 2005, the *Guiding Principles of Educational Reform of Malaysian Independent Chinese Secondary Schools* (独中教育改革纲领) was introduced as a new blueprint for these schools, with the aim of making the curricula more comprehensive, scientific, and less exam-oriented (DNICSSDWC 1997).

The achievements and operation of the national independent Chinese secondary schools revival movement does not come free. Although the committee members worked on a voluntary basis, the hiring of executives, purchase of materials, and administration of decisions cost money. To ensure there were sufficient funds to support the revival movement, the National Independent Chinese Secondary Schools Development Fund (全国华文独中发展基金) was launched in March 1974. The working committee rode on the extensive network of the Chinese education movement and launched one of the most successful fundraising campaigns in the history of the Chinese education movement. Almost 3 million ringgit was collected within the first nine months after the launch of the fundraising campaign (UCSCAM 1987*d*, p. 616). The extensive mobilization power demonstrated by the supporters surprised state authorities, which subsequently prohibited all media (Chinese newspapers in particular) from covering news related to the fundraising campaign.<sup>12</sup>

To solicit donations and encourage participation from movement supporters on a more regular and on-going basis, the Independent Chinese Secondary Schools Development Sponsorship Programme (全国华文独中发展基金常年赞助人) was introduced in 1984 (UCSCAM 1987*b*, p. 617). Unfamiliar and foreign to such a fundraising mechanism, responses from movement supporters were unremarkable, with about 350 sponsors yearly. A “direct sales” networking strategy was adopted by the programme in 1996 and successfully boosted the number of sponsors and donations for the programme. In a year’s time, the pool of sponsors broke the thousandth mark, with the total donations received skyrocketing from 36,055 ringgit in 1996 to 167,994 ringgit in 1997 (see Table 5.1). To enhance transparency and to instil public confidence, all donations received through the programme were detailed at the Malaysian Independent Chinese Secondary Schools Working Committee and *Dongzong* annual working reports. The financial expenses reports were also audited and checked by sponsors at the annual sponsors meeting.<sup>13</sup>

**TABLE 5.1**  
**Malaysian Independent Chinese Secondary Schools**  
**Working Committee Sponsorship Programme**  
 (1985–2011)

Year	Number of Sponsors	Donations Received (ringgit)
1985	634	50,030
1986	394	31,120
1987	375	31,562
1988	343	28,529
1989	379	31,430
1990	324	28,110
1991	289	27,650
1992	262	25,030
1993	328	31,830
1994	297	83,610
1995	298	64,529
1996	382	36,055
1997	1,796	167,994
1998	1,402	160,383
1999	1,159	141,059
2000	1,083	116,746
2001	731	113,641
2002	n.a.	209,710
2003	n.a.	108,000
2004	n.a.	123,000
2005	n.a.	490,956
2006	n.a.	177,060
2007	n.a.	281,218
2008	n.a.	238,000
2009	n.a.	136,090
2010	n.a.	209,674
2011	n.a.	168,616

*Note:* *Dongzong* no longer made public the number of sponsors after year 2002. Therefore the data is listed as not available (n.a.).


*Source:* Compiled by the author with data from UCSCAM (1988–91; 1992*c*; 1993–99; 2000*b*; 2001*b*; 2002*a*; 2003*b*; 2004*d*; 2005; 2006*a*; 2007; 2008*a*; 2009–12).

## GREY ZONE POWER STRUGGLES

*Dongzong* hired very few salaried executives in its early days. Li Da Ting (李达庭), one of the first salaried staff of the movement, served as the sole general officer (座办) from 1953 to 1973. Like many general officers of the smaller Chinese guilds and associations in Malaysia, Li had to manage all the operational and administrative duties alone (UCSCAM 1987*b*). The success of the Unified Education Certificate examinations and production of independent Chinese secondary schools' textbooks saw an increasing need for additional staff to assist in administrative work. Profits from the sales of textbooks and from the collection of examination fees provided sustainable financial resources for the movement to hire qualified candidates with more attractive compensation packages.<sup>14</sup>

All executive matters of the Malaysian Independent Chinese Secondary Schools Working Committee were managed and administrated by the *Dongzong* executive branch. The executive branch expanded quickly after the mid-1970s. As illustrated in Figure 5.4, staff member in the executive

**FIGURE 5.4**  
**Growth of *Dongzong*'s Executive Branch**  
(1953–2011)



Source: UCSCAM (2012, p. 316).

branch grew from 21 in 1982 to 109 in 2011, and became the largest executive branch amongst social movements in Malaysia. Divided broadly into the General Affairs and the Education Affairs sections, more than one hundred staff served in thirteen departments. General Affairs attended to *Dongzong's* managerial and mobilization needs, while Education Affairs executed matters related to independent Chinese secondary schools.<sup>15</sup>

The executive branch operates in a Western-style bureaucratic system formulated around loosely defined rules, although having a constitution and regulated systems (such as staff benefits, salary ranking and staff training programmes) have edged the traditional management operating style towards modernity. Recruiting professional executives has helped overcome the potential free rider problems that could arise from the movement's large and extensive grassroots support base.

Despite this, the decision-making process remained top-down and leader-centric (UCSCAM 1997, p. 21). Such an arrangement enables the movement to be more responsive and to achieve more result-oriented outcomes in the ever-changing political hothouse of Malaysia. Interpersonal capital and trust between the leaders and their subordinates dominated decision-making processes, as exemplified by the collaboration between movement leader Lim Fong Seng and movement executives with whom he worked side-by-side, such as Lee Ban Chen, Kua Kia Soong, and Chong Joon Kin. Together, they veered away from the failing traditional approach of seeking compromises through brokerage, towards bold and antagonistic resistances against state suppression.<sup>16</sup>

Unfortunately, relational capital is a double-edged sword: over-reliance on relational capital stunts institutional development, for flexibility is a loophole that can erode an institution internally. The lack of carefully written guidelines on the limits to the power an executive can have resulted in the shift in the balance of power from the committee to the executive branch. The antagonistic reality of power struggles is best observed in the power struggle between Lim's successor, Foo Wan Thot, and the executives from Lim's era.

Foo's inability to work with his predecessor's team of executives, in addition to the pressure placed on him by the pro-MCA controversy discussed in the earlier chapters, forced Foo to step down after only one term in office.<sup>17</sup> The dispute was kept low profile for the sake of preserving the movement's unity and "saving face" despite growing dissatisfaction from amongst the movement supporters. The dispute, which exposed a fundamental institutional weakness in the Chinese education movement,



was left unresolved and eventually led to a more complicated controversy a few years later.

The infamous incident involved Chief Executive Officer Bock Tai Hee and *Dongzong* Chairman Yap Sin Tian. Bock had joined *Dongzong* as a junior executive officer in 1981 but rose through the ranks quickly to become the head of the executive branch just four years later. Bock's power and influence accelerated during the administration of Chairman Quek Suan Hiang, who led the movement from 1993 to 2005. As Quek was residing in Johore, he was unable to personally oversee the activities of the movement headquarters in Selangor on a daily basis. Therefore, Bock was entrusted and empowered to manage the executive branch during Quek's absence. Moreover, as most of the other Selangor- and Kuala Lumpur-based *Dongzong* office bearers were also busy with their own full-time occupation, they visited the movement headquarters only to sign documents. Eventually, the role of the committee eroded from that of a decision-maker to a mere "rubber stamp" (DNICSSDWC 1995, p. 12).

This vacuum allowed Bock to make decisions on behalf of *Dongzong* and the Malaysian Independent Chinese Secondary Schools Working Committee. From staff appointments, salary scales, contents of press statements, preparation and allocation of annual budget, Bock exercised his power as chief of the executive branch to the fullest. Assisted by the heads of all departments in the executive branch, Bock established one of the most robust and professional executive branches of a social movement organization in Malaysia.

Problems started to arise in 2005 when Quek's successor, Yap Sin Tian, who sought to reinstall to the committee's authority and retake control of power from the executives to the movement committee. Fearful of the changes that Yap would introduce after Bock's retirement (which had been delayed since 1999) and eager to vie for the position of chief executive officer, some executive members exploited Bock's retirement as an issue to attack Yap.<sup>18</sup> To resolve the dispute, Yap compromised to establish a committee (comprising of three senior officers from the executive branch) to take over the duties of the chief executive officer for six months before a new candidate was appointed.<sup>19</sup> Bock also agreed to officially retire from his position in January 2007.<sup>20</sup>

After the transitional period, Yap quickly consolidated his position by installing the soft-spoken Kuang Hee Pang (邝其芳) as chief executive officer, accompanied by a series of major changes in the chain of command of the executive branch. The heads of departments in the executive branch

must report directly to the chairman of the Malaysian Independent Chinese Secondary Schools Working Committee, a position dominated by the chairman of *Dongzong*, making Yap the key — not a phantom — decision-maker. These changes effectively reduced the executive branch to a subordinate body within the system. It also undermined the confidence and limited the performance of the staff members.<sup>21</sup> Staff morale was low as they felt they were treated as “salaried staff” and no longer appreciated as “contributors” to the movement.<sup>22</sup> In response to the changes, five heads of department and more than thirty staff members resigned from the executive office in 2007.<sup>23</sup>

One thing, however, remained unchanged for the executive branch: decision-making was still top-down and person-centred. Yap continues to dominate the chairmanship of *Dongzong* at the time of writing, and the Malaysian Independent Chinese Secondary Schools Working Committee will need to put in extra efforts in hiring the right people and not be constrained by Yap to hire only the people he knows or prefers. It is only with healthy competition and more transparency in all decision-making processes (such as in hiring and promoting staff members) that the factions within *Dongzong* would find a common ground. In the meantime, the reformist faction that was forced to leave the executive branch, comprising Bock and his supporters, have been trying to establish the Independent Chinese Secondary School Principals Association (独中校长理事会) and the Independent Chinese Secondary Schools’ Education Alliance (独中教育联盟) as alternative organizations to *Dongzong*.<sup>24</sup>

### **DONGJIAOZONG CHINESE PRIMARY SCHOOLS WORKING COMMITTEE**

The development of independent Chinese secondary schools can only be successful with the continued existence and development of Chinese primary schools. The importance of Chinese primary schools to independent Chinese secondary schools was recognized as early as in 1974 during the Perak independent Chinese secondary schools revival movement (Shen 1975, p. 73). Council of Perak Chinese School Committees took the lead in organizing state-level working committees for the development of Chinese primary schools.

The mission to protect Chinese primary schools as the foundation of Chinese education became a national endeavour after *Dongzong* established the *Dongjiaozong* Chinese Primary Schools Working Committee in 1977.


Lim Fong Seng from *Dongzong* was selected as the leader of the Chairmen Group (主席团). Chairmen from all state-level Chinese school committees associations, Chinese schoolteachers associations, and Chinese school alumni were automatically enrolled as members of the Chairmen Group (UCSCAM 1987*d*, p. 638; and UCSTAM 2008*a*). It was hoped that by consolidating power, it could attract more individuals — especially youths — outside of *Dongjiaozong* to defend the use of Chinese as the medium for teaching and administration in Chinese primary schools (UCSCAM 1987*d*, p. 639).

However, the Chinese Primary Schools Working Committee was not as successful as many had expected. Unequal distribution of Chinese primary schools in each state and county made it difficult to establish uniform mobilization. The Chinese population in Kelantan and Terengganu was too small, while Malacca and Perlis housed a limited number of Chinese primary schools. Schoolteachers and school committees in Sabah and Sarawak had already been collaborating for years at the state level and therefore did not see the need to establish yet another working committee. However, Chinese educationalists in Penang found a better working platform under the Penang Chinese Education Working Committee (槟城州华文教育工作委员会), which received financial assistance from the state government.

Thirty years later, in July 1993, the *Dongjiaozong* Chinese Primary Schools Working Committee was “reintroduced” by *Dongjiaozong* as a subordinate unit of *Jiaozong*. It was believed that this move would enable funding to be channelled from the more successful Malaysian Independent Chinese Secondary Schools Working Committee to *Dongjiaozong* Chinese Primary Schools Working Committee, and thus help to support *Jiaozong*’s activities.<sup>25</sup> The new Chinese Primary Schools Working Committee was headed by a central-level committee with various state-level working committees. The state-level working committees were administrated independently by the respective state’s Chinese school committees associations, and only collaborated with the central-level working committee in large-scale fundraising campaigns. Thus far, only Johore, Perak, Selangor, and Pahang have had a functional state-level working committee (PJCPDWC 2004).

The central-level working committee comprised of a general committee, a standing committee, and six working units. Seven representatives each from *Dongzong* and *Jiaozong* formed the general committee. The positions of chairman, general secretary, and treasurer in the standing committee

**FIGURE 5.5**  
**Organizational Chart of *Jiaozong* and the *Dongjiaozong* Chinese Primary Schools Working Committee**



*Notes:* \*Quota of association representatives depend on total members of the association: 100 members (two representatives), 101 to 200 members (three representatives), 201 to 300 members (four representatives), 301 to 400 members (five representatives), 401 to 500 members (six representatives), 501 to 600 members (seven representatives).

*Source:* Compiled by the author with resources provided by *Jiaozong*.

were held by *Jiaozong*'s office bearers; the positions for the deputy chairman, deputy general secretary, and deputy treasurer were reserved for office bearers from *Dongzong*. Other positions within the standing committee were decided through elections. The working committee could also appoint additional committee members when necessary.

All administrative matters of the working committee were managed by *Jiaozong* executive branch, which numbered about fifteen full-time staff. From 1985 till 2006, the executive branch also served all administrative

matters of the Lim Lian Geok Cultural Development Centre.<sup>26</sup> This tiny executive branch played key roles in organizing the annual Chinese Education Festival (华教节) held in December to commemorate the demise of former *Jiaozong* Chairman Lim Lian Geok.<sup>27</sup> The festival hosted activities such as a memorial ceremony, seminars, fundraising dinners, and the Lim Lian Geok Award (林连玉精神奖) presentation ceremony, as symbolic reminders of the continuous struggle of the Chinese education movement. The fundraising dinner, in particular, generated a key source of income to sustain *Jiaozong* and its executive branch.

However, after the Lim Lian Geok Cultural Development Centre was declared as an independent organization in 2006, *Jiaozong* had been having an annual deficit of some 20,000 ringgit, in addition to having its executive staff reduce to about one fourth of its former strength.<sup>28</sup> Unlike its sister organization, the Malaysian Independent Chinese Secondary Schools Working Committee, which had a steady income, the expenses of the *Dongjiaozong* Chinese Primary Schools Working Committee was generated through public donations during events and under the Sponsorship Programme for Chinese Primary Schools Development (全国华文小学发展基金常年赞助人), which averaged about 10,000 ringgit annually (see Table 5.2).<sup>29</sup>

Having very little financial income, the *Jiaozong* administration had to conduct movement activities by way of carefully-planned budgets to prevent the organization from running into a deficit. However, the organization's commitment to movement-related programmes, and the pressure to sustain continuous visibility made it difficult to do so. For example, seminars on important topics such as teaching methods for new schoolteachers and sustainable psychological health for teachers were conducted with minimal registration fees. Attended by an annual average of 1,500 schoolteachers, these activities aimed to "return to the fundamentals of education and reintroduce *Jiaozong* to the schoolteachers community as an organization that supports the Chinese community".<sup>30</sup>

Nonetheless, the pressing need to sustain the movement's everyday expenses financially *vis-à-vis* the need to maintain supporters' confidence is, in practice, difficult to balance. Too much emphasis on soliciting financial resources from supporters may be perceived as exploitative and raise questions about the sincerity of the movement's ultimate goal; yet, having insufficient resources had placed the movement and the executive officers in a position where they had to make the impossible possible.

**TABLE 5.2**  
**Sponsorship Programme for Chinese Primary Schools**  
**Development**  
 (1989–2011)

Year	Number of Sponsors	Donations Received (ringgit)
1989	176	53,374
1990	156	41,688
1991	120	27,091
1992	139	19,094
1993	109	15,322
1994	109	30,308
1995	61	7,350
1996	65	7,215
1997	47	6,265
1998	52	22,980
1999	88	36,900
2000	9	10,751
2001	81	14,488
2002	56	14,307
2003	42	4,000
2004	59	6,500
2005	102	14,150
2006	128	21,691
2007	144	24,505
2008	114	15,950
2009	108	13,130
2010	93	12,690
2011	99	13,970

*Source:* Compiled by the author with data extracted from UCSTAM (1990–2006; 2007*c*; 2008*b*; 2009–12).

As a result of financial constraints and insufficient human resources, the executive branch and *Jiaozong* at large no longer sought to challenge state authorities contentiously, as “it is beyond our current ability” as Yap Hon Kiat remarked.<sup>31</sup> Not only does Yap’s lamentation reflect his frustrated ambition to do more for the office, but it reflects the fact that, very often, the potential of the executive office to achieve the goals of the Chinese education movement is limited by internal operative constraints, limited resources, and the conservativeness of its leaders.

## DONGJIAOZONG HIGHER LEARNING CENTRE AND NEW ERA COLLEGE

One of the ambitions of the Chinese education movement is to establish a complete Chinese education system in Malaysia. However, the BN regime has, time and again, rejected the movement's proposal to establish Merdeka University and Merdeka College, as the proposed medium of instruction, that is, Chinese, violated the 1971 Universities and University Colleges Act. The act was liberalized in the 1990s after Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad proposed the Vision 2020 campaign. To meet the call of Vision 2020 for Malaysia to be a developed, industrial state by year 2020, the regime began to allow the formation of non-Malay-speaking private universities. It was under this backdrop that the first Chinese community-funded college, Southern College, was established in the state of Johore. This breakthrough and the growing importance of the Chinese language with China's rapid economic ascendancy gave hope to *Dongjiaozong* leaders of the possibility of establishing a movement-sponsored tertiary education institution in Malaysia.

The *Dongjiaozong* Higher Learning Centre was established in 1994 as the maiden company for New Era College (UCSCAM 1994, p. 53). Consisting of representatives from Merdeka University Company, *Dongzong*, and *Jiaozong*, this was the largest cross-organization collaboration in the history of Chinese education movement. The Merdeka University Company leased the plot of land at Kajang as New Era's premises for minimal fees; *Dongzong* provided an interest-free loan of 100,000 ringgit to Higher Learning Centre and allocated four annual study loans of 5,000 ringgit for New Era College' students in 1995 (UCSCAM 1996, p. 24; 1998, p. 28). *Jiaozong*, despite not being able to contribute financially, supported the project as a collaborator.

After four years of continuous lobbying and brokerage efforts by MCA cabinet members, the Ministry of Education approved the operation of the New Era College in 1997 (DHLC 2008b, p. 40; and UCSCAM 1995, p. 305). According to Quek Suan Hiang, former *Dongzong* Chairman who was also the head of the centre and college board,

The most challenging task after we received the operating licence was to ensure sustainable development for the college within the competitive private tertiary education market in Malaysia. *Dongjiaozong* was an empty box and had limited resources. Therefore, we had a difficult beginning. Having only 148 students at its first intake, the college

had a deficit of about 300,000 ringgit in the first year. Most lessons were conducted in temporary containers in 1998, as fundraising for the construction of the college building was still underway.<sup>32</sup>

The overwhelming need for financial resources saw Quek spend all his three terms as *Dongzong* chairman fundraising for the movement. Amongst the largest fundraising campaign he conducted was the campaign held in collaboration with the United Chinese School Alumni Association, which generated some 1.5 million ringgit.<sup>33</sup> Substantial donations were generated from large organizations and wealthy individuals through the lobbying efforts of movement leaders. Notable examples were 600,000 ringgit donations by the Lee Foundation (李氏基金) and 30,000 ringgit by Chiew Swee Peow Chinese Education Trust Fund (周瑞标教育基金) (UCSCAM 2002*b*, p. 75). These funds were critical for the construction of New Era's teaching building and student dormitory, which were completed in 2002 (DHLC 2008*b*, p. 33).

The Chinese community, however, was beginning to show signs of fatigue at having to pay a "second income tax" — a term used to refer to donations made to Chinese education activities — due to the continuous line-up of fundraising campaigns. In order to generate financial donations from the community in a sustainable way, the *Dongjiaozong* Higher Learning Centre and New Era College Development Fund (董教总教育中心基金, 新纪元学院建设及发展基金) and the New Era College Sponsorship Programme (新纪元学院发展基金赞助人) were launched in 1998 (see Table 5.3).<sup>34</sup> The sponsorship programme amassed an average donation of about 170,000 ringgit annually, which covered a significant part of the expenses for the college's operation and infrastructure. Another significant source of income was derived from the centre's role as the sole overseas representative for the Higher Education in China Exhibition (中国高等教育展) in Malaysia and the official student enrolment representative for Xiamen University in China in 1996.<sup>35</sup>

As an academic institution, the best source of income — and the most sustainable — is derived from having sufficient intake of students each year. However, due to the lack of accreditation from the National Accreditation Board (*Lembaga Akreditasi Negara*) and Malaysian Qualifications Agency (*Agensi Kelayakan Malaysia*), the New Era College was not able to issue bachelor degrees to its students during its early days. Graduates had to continue their studies with affiliated universities to obtain a full bachelor degree. In order to compete with other private universities and colleges in Malaysia, New Era offered lower school fees, provided numerous scholarships



**TABLE 5.3**  
**New Era College Sponsorship Programme**  
 (1998–2011)


Year	Number of Sponsors	Donations Received (ringgit)
1998	1,400	109,172
1999	2,400	209,751
2000	679	49,999
2001	523	89,341
2002	1,178	222,351
2003	1,384	229,375
2004	1,306	208,390
2005	1,331	216,774
2006	1,245	193,014
2007	1,140	195,686
2008	1,088	175,757
2009	769	120,416
2010	822	142,673
2011	733	129,869

*Source:* Compiled by the author with data extracted from DHLC (1999–2008a; 2009–12).

and loans, and more importantly, targeted Chinese-speaking students from independent Chinese secondary schools for recruitment.

Movement leaders, such as Quek Suan Hiang, utilized their extensive personal networks in China to establish collaborations with universities in China, such as Beijing Normal University (北京师范大学), South China Normal University (华南师范大学), for academic credit transfer (DHLC 1999, p. 20; and UCSCAM 1995, p. 8). By 2011, about ninety universities worldwide, including forty universities in China and thirty-one universities in Taiwan, had signed memorandums of understanding for credit transfer with New Era College.<sup>36</sup> The college also provided on-the-job training for schoolteachers of independent Chinese secondary schools, especially those who did not have prior education-related training, under the Professional Teaching Programme (教育专业系). These strategies paid off, with the number of new enrolment rising above 1,000 students in 2002, and from then onwards, the college began to generate income, as illustrated in Figure 5.6.<sup>37</sup>

**FIGURE 5.6**  
**Distribution of New Era College Students**  
 (1998–2011)




Source: Compiled by the author with data extracted from DHLC (1999–2008a; 2009–12).

Renewed interest in Chinese language in the 1990s saw the gradual liberalization of policies on the teaching of Chinese language by the governments in the Southeast Asia region (UCSCAM 1998, p. 73; Leo 2007, pp. 335–36; and Lin, H.D. 2000). Riding on the opportunity, *Dongjiaozong*, as the leading and the most established Chinese education institution in the region, played a crucial role in sharing its experiences and assisting neighbouring affiliations in their establishment efforts.<sup>38</sup> In 1995, the *Dongjiaozong* Higher Learning Centre organized the first Southeast Asian Chinese Language Teaching Convention to promote exchanges on the teaching of Chinese, provide platforms on exchanges of information, and strengthen collaboration between participating organizations (see Map 5.1).

This biennial regional conference, hosted in rotation by the convention's members, had been attracting participation of representatives from Chinese educationalists and advocates from Southeast Asia, as well as government officials from China, since its inception.<sup>39</sup> *Dongzong's* executive branch acted as the convention's secretariat and was responsible for publishing

# Southeast Asian Chinese Language Teaching Convention



Source: The author.

the annual newsletter — *Southeast Asia Chinese Education Bulletin* (东南亚华文教育通讯), and the convention's seminar papers (东南亚华文教学研讨会特辑).

Although the convention successfully launched a regional platform for *Dongjiaozong*, its influence remained limited. In order to create international appeal for the Chinese education movement in Malaysia, the movement still needed to establish a (successful and reputable) Chinese university in Malaysia. The opportunity came in 2000, when Vintage Heights Private Limited donated 100 acres of land located in Bandar Sepang Putra as premises for the future New Era University campus.<sup>40</sup> In addition, Hong Leong Group (丰隆集团) pledged a donation of about 2 million ringgit, while GuocoLand and Hume Industries donated 1.163 million ringgit altogether (Fauwaz 2008). Hong Leong Finance, which was designated as the project manager of the New Era University-Sepang Campus development, raised 3.38 million ringgit from donation boxes set up at its branches and from a high profile fundraising concert in 2001.

Vintage Heights, GuocoLand and Hume Industries were subsidiaries of the politically well-connected businessman, Quek Leng Chan (郭令灿), and his extensive Hong Leong Group empire (Gomez and Jomo 1997, pp. 66–72). This was a win-win collaboration for both *Dongjiaozong* and Hong Leong, as the former could now realize its ambition of developing the first Chinese university in Malaysia, while the latter earned great respect from the Chinese community as generous contributors to the development of vernacular education. Hong Leong also secured the potentially lucrative development of Bandar Sepang Putra. Unfortunately, all these efforts grounded to a halt when the BN-dominated Selangor government ordered the cancellation of the Sepang Project Ground Breaking Ceremony in August 2001. Hong Leong Finance withdrew from this project soon after (DHLC 2002, p. 32). “This was perceived by many as an act of political suppression”, said Loot Ting Yee, former *Jiaozong* vice chairman.<sup>41</sup> Having lost a strong ally, *Dongjiaozong* faced tremendous financial pressure to sustain the cost of developing the university, whose estimated construction costs for the first phase of development was at least 16 million ringgit.

*Dongjiaozong* was later caught in a legal deadlock with Hong Leong over the contract of transfer of the donated land. It contained a clause stipulating that “all land not developed by August 2007 must be returned to the developers”.<sup>42</sup> A new memorandum of understanding was signed

between the two on 19 February, two weeks prior to the 2008 General Election, in a high-profile ceremony at MCA headquarters. Witnessed by Selangor Chief Minister Mohd Khir Toyo, attended by Quek Leng Chan and MCA politicians, Yap Sin Tian, and the key members of *Dongjiaozong* conceded to being used for political gains for the sake of salvaging the Sepang campus.<sup>43</sup>

At the same time, the centre also collaborated closely with Hou Kok Chung (何国忠), the deputy minister of higher education, in upgrading New Era to a university.<sup>44</sup> Compared with other colleges that have successfully been granted university status, New Era faced more than its share of obstacles. Not only did it fall short of having sufficient academic calibre, variety in its academic programme, and a complimentary upgrading plan, past controversies involving Merdeka University between the movement and the BN regime also made the approval by the BN government of such status difficult.<sup>45</sup>

The presence of Principal Kua Kia Soong in New Era College, who was known for being outspoken about his anti-BN views, did not help resolve the controversies surrounding the upgrade of New Era (DHLC 2002, p. 15). Kua's opinions on the college's management and development also conflicted with those of the college's board.<sup>46</sup> For example, Kua refused to execute the Xiamen University Nanyang Research Institute Project (厦门大学南洋研究院研究计划案), a collaborative research project initiated by the New Era Board of Governors.<sup>47</sup> According to Kua, "[the project] was too expensive [about 300,000 ringgit] and there was no real academic advantage for the college" (Kua 2009, pp. 7–8). In response, Quek Suan Hiang criticized Kua for not understanding the sentiments behind the collaboration with Xiamen University, which was set up by the prominent Chinese Malayan philanthropist, Tan Kah Kee (陈嘉庚).<sup>48</sup>

Tensions between Kua and the board of directors escalated in 2008, when the new head of board and chair of the college senate, Yap Sin Tian, refused to renew Kua's contract. Although Kua reached the legal retirement age in 2005, but his retirement was delayed in search of a suitable and qualified successor from amongst senior staff. Yap's decision threatened the status quo of the college and the interests of the senior staff,<sup>49</sup> resulting in heated internal fights. More than twenty staff signed a petition and mobilized students to conduct sit-ins in protest over Yap's decision.

To quell one of the worst internal conflicts to have occurred in the history of the Chinese education movement, movement veterans, such as Foo Wan Thot, Quek Suan Hiang, Sim Mow Yu, and Loot Ting Yee,

called for self-restraint amongst the stakeholders. Four highly respected figures among movement supporters, Khew Khing Ling (丘琮润), Yoong Suan (杨泉), Tan Yew Sing (陈友信), and Toh Kin Woon (杜乾焕), were appointed as mediators, but they failed to get both parties to reach a consensus.<sup>50</sup>

To break the deadlock, representatives of Chinese school committees' associations from Malacca, Negeri Sembilan, and Johore jointly called for a *Dongzong* Extraordinary Delegates Meeting — the first in the history of the movement.<sup>51</sup> In this Extraordinary Delegates Meeting, *Dongzong* members voted (ten to three) in favour of hiring a new principal. Due to differences in opinion between the chairmen of state-level Chinese school committee associations and some state delegates, the votes, which were cast in confidence by the chairman, were not necessarily representative of the entire association; rather, they were more reflective of the personal inclinations of individual delegates.<sup>52</sup> In addition, some argued that the results of the extraordinary meeting represented only the views of *Dongzong*, and neglected inputs from other stakeholders of the *Dongjiaozong* Higher Learning Centre.

Failing to renew his contract, Kua left New Era in December 2008. In protest, five heads of department resigned, citing that they were acting on the principle of "death is better than life with humiliation" (士可杀不可辱).<sup>53</sup> Pua Eng Chong (潘永忠) became New Era's third principal in January 2009 and continued his predecessors' work until New Era College was eventually upgraded to a full-fledged university.<sup>54</sup>

With the departure of Bock, Kua and their supporters from the movement, Yap began to rebuild the Chinese education movement with his trusted team members in the hopes of establishing a more inclusive, representative, and internally democratic movement. Nevertheless, Yap's autonomy continued to be challenged by his fellow colleagues at the local and state levels: Yap lost the Kuala Lumpur Confucian School Committee re-election in 2008, but was able to defend his leadership at the United Chinese School Committees' Association of Selangor and Kuala Lumpur, as well as at the *Dongzong* election in 2009.

## CONCLUSION

The formation of the Malaysian Independent Chinese Secondary Schools Working Committee in the 1970s successfully gathered experts and academics from the Chinese community to revive and reform the curriculum

and educational system for independent Chinese secondary schools. The *Dongjiaozong* independent Chinese secondary schools revival movement created and transformed the image of independent Chinese secondary schools into that of a popular private secondary school, especially in the central and southern regions of West Malaysia. It also generated important sustainable financial resources for *Dongzong* through the sales of textbooks and collection of fees for the Unified Examination Certificate examinations. These financial resources enabled *Dongzong*, as the caretaker of working committee, to expand the size and strength of the Chinese education movement. As the work of the working committee grew, so did the need for more full-time staff. The movement hired and cultivated full-time, salaried and highly-educated (university degree holders) professional executives to sustain various operational and mobilization needs of the movement.

Nevertheless, the lack of a clear delineation of roles, boundaries, and authority allowed the executive officers of the Malaysian Independent Chinese Secondary Schools Working Committee to manipulate their commitments to their own ends, resulting in a precarious power imbalance between the executive officers and the committee members during the post-Lim Fong Seng era. Lacking clarity of rules and a systematic division of work, the leaders of the Chinese education movement were overburdened by multiple roles within the movement. This eventually put a noticeable strain on their effectiveness and commitment in the delivery of their responsibilities. Such reliance on individual capacity rather than on a carefully planned and executed structured system is a common phenomenon in social movements situated within non-liberal democratic states. Although such a lax and flexible system allowed social movement leaders to deal with the unpredictability of non-liberal democratic states more promptly and effectively, the system also allowed opportunists to abuse their close relationships with the leaders to fulfil their personal agendums.

Another point worth noting is the failure of the movement to sustain the *Dongjiaozong* Chinese Primary Schools Working Committee in the 1980s despite having adopted a working structure similar to the Malaysian Independent Chinese Secondary Schools Working Committee. *Jiaozong* had been significantly weakened by shrinking membership and low participation rate at the local as well as national level. In an effort to revive the weakening *Jiaozong*, the *Dongjiaozong* Chinese Primary Schools Working Committee was re-introduced in 1994 to assist with the organization's administrative and secretariat work.

Although efforts in terms of financial and human resources were injected into the *Dongjiaozong* Chinese Primary Schools Working Committee, these efforts did not solve *Jiaozong*'s fundamental problems of declining membership and lack of sustainable financial resources. *Jiaozong*'s activities became less appealing in particular after Lim Lian Geok Cultural Development Centre no longer came under *Jiaozong* management since 2004. When Yap Sin Tian became *Dongzong* chairman in June 2005, he led a transformation to strengthen the role of the movement central committee. Thus, the pressure to sustain and strengthen its relationship with the authorities in return for political assistance to upgrade New Era College into a full university also necessitated a clean-up within the social movement organization.

Overbearing executive officers, such as Bock Tai Hee, Kua Kia Soong and others, left the movement. Many talented staff members also left due to their inability to adapt to the new leadership because the latter regarded the executive staff as "salaried members" and no longer a comrade of the movement. The internal changes in the Chinese education movement disappointed many; however, in the opinion of the current leadership, it was the only way to secure trust from state authorities, and to obtain approval for the upgrade of New Era College.

Though the Chinese education movement was openly divided into two (or more) factions at the time of writing, there are many lessons to be learnt from the personal controversies that plagued the movement and its social movement organizations in 2006 and 2008. The controversies indicated that the capability of the Chinese education movement to make demands for vernacular rights was thwarted by individuals who turned the movement organizations into battlegrounds for personal gains. The controversy also revealed that the current movement institution lacked an appropriate mechanism to manage internal conflicts. The New Era crisis highlighted the need to establish a commission of enquiries empowered to arbitrate internal disputes and pass judgement.

Many movement veterans expressed their dismay over the future of the movement. However, competition for power and control over leadership of the movement would only intensify within the movement's national institutions (*Dongzong*, Merdeka University Company, and *Jiaozong*), amongst its state-level networks, as well as in the schools. What these bickering parties failed to realize was that continued internal fighting and regrouping into factions would only benefit their common enemy, that is, the state authorities, to the detriment of the movement in the long run. Movement veteran, Lee Hing, commented,



We have donated our time, money and effort to the Chinese education movement. In so doing, we should exercise self-restraint and not engage in personal politics. However, what has been happening [to the Chinese education movement] in the past years is disappointing. If things get too complicated, and everyone has to choose a camp, then I would rather spend more time with my grandchildren at home than to face all this nonsense.<sup>2955</sup>

Perhaps it is time for the leaders of the Chinese education movement to review the system to strengthen its mechanisms for checks and balances. The movement has been riding on state suppression and depending on external suppression to foster solidarity amongst its supporters. Despite the movement's successful persistence over the years, the lack of efforts in developing a more structured movement institution to enhance its internal strength has seen the movement troubled by factionalism. In order to be successful in mobilizing the necessary support to achieve its ultimate objectives, a movement should be inclusive, both internally and externally. The issues of academic institutions aside, *Dongjiaozong* must tackle the more fundamental goal of installing the Chinese language with official status in the Federal Constitution of Malaysia, as doing so is the only way to secure and develop Chinese schools and Chinese universities as part of the educational landscape in Malaysia.

## Notes

1. By 1998, twenty-one converted schools had set up affiliated independent Chinese secondary schools, sharing school facilities such as libraries, school halls, fields and canteens with their converted counterparts. The number of independent Chinese secondary schools eventually rose from sixteen in the 1961 into sixty nationwide by 2008. A majority of dropouts from the Chinese converted schools were those who failed the English-medium Lower Certificate for Education after completing Form Three, and therefore did not qualify for enrolment into Form Four. For more, see Shen (1975, p. 8); Tay (1998c, pp. 266, 271–73); and Sim Mow Yu, interview by the author, Malacca, 26 March 2008.
2. For the list of these schools, see Appendix 3.
3. These schools are Sekolah Menengah Yik Ching Yik Ching (育青中学), Shen Jai High School (深斋中学), Sekolah Menengah San Min (Suwa) (安顺三民独中), Tsung Wah Private Secondary School (崇华中学), Sekolah Tinggi Nan Hwa Ayer Tawar (南华独中), Hua Lian High School (太平华联中学), Sekolah Menengah Pei Yuan (Private) KPR (培元独中), Poi Lam High School, and Yuk Choy High School (Private) (育才独立中学).

4. *Sin Chew Daily*, 10 April 1975.
5. Straits dollar was replaced by Malaysian dollar in 1967 as the currency for Malaysia. It was later replaced by ringgit in 1975. See Loh, Phang, and Saravanamuttu (1981, pp. 61–62).
6. Chinese language by Pei Yuan, English language by Yuk Choy, Malay language by Nan Hwa, mathematics by Hua Lian, history by San Min, geography by Yik Ching, commerce by Shen Jai, and science by Poi Lam. See Zhen (1996, p. 82) and Lim, G.A. (2004).
7. Choong Wei Chuan (钟伟前) (head, Department of Resource and Information Affairs, *Dongzong*), interview by the author, Selangor, 17 March 2008.
8. UCSCAM (2012, pp. 127–29). For earlier version of the constitution, see DNICSSDWC (1990; 1995).
9. Sim Mow Yu, interview by the author, Malacca, 26 March 2008.
10. See UCSCAM (2004c) for the detailed description of the curriculum planning for science (pp. 39–47), commerce (pp. 48–57), and technical education (pp. 58–68). For the list of *Dongzong* in-house publications, see UCSCAM (1997, pp. 93–97). For further discussion on the Unified Examination Certificate, see DNICSSDWC (1997); and UCSCAM (1989, p. 34).
11. Comparatively, independent Chinese secondary schools in the central and southern region of West Malaysia are doing much better than those located at the northern region of West Malaysia, Sabah, and Sarawak. At the time of writing, there are twenty-four medium-scale (with 300 to 1,000 students) and fourteen small-scale (less than 300 students) independent Chinese secondary schools nationwide that still need further assistance from the working committee to achieve sustainable growth. Continuous lobbying efforts by the movement activities and timely political opportunities in 1999 have led to the establishment of Foon Yew High School (宽柔中学). It was the first independent Chinese secondary school to be approved by the Ministry of Education after a long freeze since 1969. See UCSCAM (1991, p. 30; 1992b, p. 32; 1999, pp. 60–61).
12. Sim Mow Yu, interview by the author, Malacca, 26 March 2008.
13. These sponsors also received a certificate of appreciation, newsletter on Chinese education (华教导报), annual working reports, and were rewarded as members with the Chinese Education Card (华教卡), which allowed them to enjoy discounts on *Dongjiaozong's* publications.
14. Together, the Department of Examination and the Department of Curriculum generated about 40 per cent of total incomes annually. These financial resources sustained the expenses of other non-profit making departments, especially the departments that maintained the movement operational needs. *Dongzong* uses eight units in its salary scheme according to academic qualifications and years of service. Therefore, a senior officer such as the chief executive officer who has served more than fifteen years can earn up to 9,000 ringgit per month. On top of that, all heads of department enjoy a special allowance of 500 ringgit per month. See UCSCAM (2008b, p. 10).

15. There were six departments at the General Affairs section (executive officer, finance, association affairs, personnel and human resources, resource and information, property management and maintenance) and seven departments at the Education Affairs section (examination, curriculum, students affairs, teachers' education, vocational and technical education, publications, computer). Details of the ages and education qualifications of the executive staff can be found in Appendix 4. For more, see UCSCAM (1987*b*, p. 208; 1987*c*, pp. 381, 616; 1996, pp. 8–14; 1997, pp. 13, 26).
16. Sim Mow Yu, interview by the author, Malacca, 26 March 2008.
17. Loot Ting Yee, interview by the author, Kuala Lumpur, 24 March 2008.
18. Liu D.C. (pseudonym, executive officer, *Dongzong*), interview by the author, Selangor, 27 July 2010.
19. Members of this three-person committee included Li Yue Tong (李岳通) (Head, Department of General Affairs), Choong Pai Chee (庄白绮) (Head, Department of Meeting and Organization), and Zhang Xi Chong (张喜崇) (Head, Department of Curriculum). See UCSCAM (2008*a*, p. 35).
20. *Merdeka Review*, 20 October 2006.
21. Eng L.O. (pseudonym, executive officer, *Dongzong*), interview by the author, Selangor, 29 July 2010.
22. Choong Woei Chuan, interview by the author, Selangor, 17 March 2008.
23. The heads who resigned were Zhang Xi Chong from the Department of Curriculum, Liang Sheng Yi (梁胜义) from the Department of Student Affairs, Chen Li Qun (陈利群) from the Department of Personnel, Li Hui Jin (李惠衿) from the Department of Teachers' Training, and Lin Mei Yan (林美燕) from the Department of Technical Education. See *Oriental Daily*, 10 December 2007.
24. *Malaysiakini*, 2 October 2009.
25. UCSTAM (1994, p. 15); and Loot Ting Yee, interview by the author, Kuala Lumpur, 24 March 2008.
26. Prior to 1994, all *Jiaozong*'s administrative work is conducted by the Education Research Centre (教育研究中心). Former executives who served this centre included Yow Lee Fung (姚丽芳), Tang Ah Chai (陈亚才), and Liew Kan Ba (刘崇汉). See KLCSTAAMEC (2000, pp. 661–63); and UCSTAM (1983*b*, p. 636).
27. The Department of Executive organized and executed *Jiaozong* meeting decisions, facilitated work on propaganda, fundraising, finance and human resource; Department of Resource and Research collected and compiled data; Department of Teachers' Training conducted training programmes; Department of Students Activities conducted annual Chinese-speaking competitions, holiday camps and seminars; Department of Publication and Promotion was responsible for in-house publications; Department of Early Childhood Education conducted parenting and pre-school education programmes. See UCSTAM (2007*c*, pp. 12, 14, 177, 198).

28. Yap Hon Kiat (叶翰杰) (chief administrative secretary, *Jiaozong*), interview by the author, Selangor, 22 July 2010; and Er Joo Tiong, interview by the author, Selangor, 22 July 2010.
29. Donations were generated during Sim Mow Yu's eightieth birthday celebration in 1992, and *Jiaozong's* fifty-fifth anniversary celebration in 2006. Each of these occasions generated anywhere from 60,000 to 80,000 ringgit, sums large enough to sustain the organization's annual expenses for about three to five years. Yap Hon Kiat and Er Joo Tiong, interview by the author, Selangor, 22 July 2010.
30. Yap Hon Kiat, interview by the author, Selangor, 22 July 2010.
31. Ibid.
32. Quek Suan Hiang, interview by the author, Johore, 23 March 2010.
33. State-level fundraising dinner generated 158,000 ringgit; United Chinese School Alumni Association at Perak, Selangor, Malacca and Johore donated 20,000 ringgit each; Thousand Men Fundraising Dinner in December 1996 (1214千万心宴) generated a total of 1.34 million ringgit. For details of these events, see UCSCAM (1996, p. 29; 2002*b*, pp. 75–77, 85–103); and *Nanyangshangpao*, 18 December 1996.
34. Those who donated more than 1,000 ringgit were named honorary sponsors (荣誉赞助人), 500 ringgit as permanent sponsor (永久赞助人), and 50 ringgit as normal sponsors. See UCSCAM (1998, pp. 145–49).
35. Back in 1998, the college only consisted of four departments (accounting, finance and business, Chinese language and literature, information technology). By 2012, the college consisted four schools (business, humanities and social sciences, media and creative arts, science) and eight departments (business, Chinese business in society, Chinese language and literature, education, guidance and counselling psychology, arts and design, drama and visual, media studies, information sciences, and computing studies).
36. According to the college's Public and International Relation Office in 2011, New Era's Memorandums of Understanding partners includes universities in China (forty), Taiwan (thirty-one), United Kingdom (ten), Malaysia (eight), Australia and New Zealand (two each), and Hong Kong (one).
37. Wong Wai Keat (黄伟豪) (executive officer, Department of Student Enrolment, New Era College), interview by the author, Selangor, 27 July 2010.
38. For example, the centre donated a set of textbooks to Chinese schools in Cambodia, and waived copyright fees to allow these schools to reprint the books for use in the country. New Era also introduced a programme titled Teaching of Chinese Language to Non-Chinese Teachers (对外汉语教学) to train non-Chinese school teachers (mainly those from Indonesia and Thailand) in teaching Chinese in their vernacular language. Hong Woan Ying (孔婉莹) (head, Public and International Relation Office, New Era College), interview by the author, Selangor, 26 July 2010. See DHLC (2009, pp. 105–15).

39. The convention normally begins with reports and country overview of Chinese language teaching, and paper presentations and discussions on Chinese ontology, materials, teaching methods, teachers' training, and evaluation.
40. Vintage Heights was a joint venture amongst GuocoLand (Malaysia) Limited, Selangor Development Corporation (*Perbadanan Kemajuan Negeri Selangor*) — a state development agency controlled by UMNO Selangor state government prior to 2008, Hap Seng Consolidated Limited, Crescent Capital Private Limited, and Cheltenham Investments Private Limited.
41. Loot Ting Yee, interview by the author, Kuala Lumpur, 24 March 2008.
42. *Star*, 20 February 2008.
43. *Sinchew Daily*, 20 February 2008.
44. Ministry of Higher Education separated from Ministry of Education on March 2004 to become a full ministry responsible for all higher education-related matters with the aim of transforming Malaysia into a centre of excellence for higher education.
45. Ministry of Higher Education required that a university must have at least 20 per cent doctorate holders and 60 per cent master degree holders as staff. However, New Era had only three Ph.D. holders amongst the 125 staff members. By December 2009, only fifteen out of thirty-four programmes received the stamp of approval from the Malaysian Qualifications Agency (with ten of them under provisional accreditation), and three received full accreditation from the Ministry of Higher Education. See DHLC (2010, pp. 66, 242–47).
46. Chai Yah Han, interview by the author, Penang, 17 January 2009.
47. New Era College Board of Governors consisted of seven representatives from *Dongjiaozong* Higher Learning Centre, the college principal and deputy principal, and two representatives each from the college academics, alumnus, and students. For details regarding the project, see UCSCAM (1996, p. 287). For details regarding the board's structure, see DHLC (2001, p. 7).
48. Quek Suan Hiang, interview by the author, Johore, 23 March 2010.
49. Lim Ming King (林明镜) (executive committee member, *Dongzong*), interview by the author, Malacca, 6 February 2009.
50. Chai Yah Han, interview by the author, Penang, 17 January 2009.
51. These representatives are Yang Yin Chong (杨应俊) and Pang Siew Fian (冯秋萍) from Malacca Chinese Education and Progressive Association (马六甲华校董事会联合会), Tew Say Kop (张志开) from Negeri Sembilan Chinese School Committees Council, and Tan Tai Kim (陈大锦) from the State of Johore Chinese School Managers and Teachers' Association.
52. Lim Ming King, interview by the author, Malacca, 6 February 2009.
53. They are Zhan Yuan Rui, Chong Joon Kin, Zhang Ji Zuo, and Liang Sheng Yi.
54. Pua Eng Chong (principal, New Era College), interview by the author, Selangor, 27 February 2009.
55. Lee Hing, interview by the author, Selangor, 28 July 2010.

## 6

---

# SOCIAL MOBILIZATION IN NON-LIBERAL DEMOCRACIES

## INTRODUCTION

This study has identified two institutions, namely, structural and relational institutions, that have been crucial to the mobilization capacity and persistency of the Chinese education movement in Malaysia. As democratic institutions within non-liberal democracies are often constrained and easily manipulated by the ruling regime, social movements in these states rely instead on relational institutions to channel their needs and demands for change. The flexibility of relational institutions based on informal interpersonal networks compliment the rigidity of their structured counterparts, thus enabling social movements in non-liberal democracies to persist in pushing its agenda despite facing ongoing constraints imposed by the state.

Dynamic state-movement interactions result in movement mobilization mechanisms and repertoires that are adapted to the local political environment, indigenous norms and cultural influences. Although these mechanisms and repertoires may differ from those practised in liberal democratic societies, they have proven to be enduring in sustaining movements in suppressive states. Using the Chinese education movement in Malaysia as a case study, this study has demonstrated that despite rapid industrialization and urbanization, primordial-based social movements — of which the Chinese education movement is a type — remain a significant social force in Malaysia.

This concluding chapter is divided into three sections. It first summarizes each of the previous chapters and details their significance to the main argument of the study. The second section explores three significant trends

on social mobilization identified from studying the Chinese education movement: (1) the strategies and sustenance of resource mobilization efforts of the Chinese education movement activists; (2) the role of brokers and interpersonal networks in sustaining movement-regime interactions within a non-liberal democratic setting; and (3) the challenges faced by the movement in sustaining unification.

In the final section, the role of institutions, in particular the non-formal relational institutions, is evaluated in terms of the institutions' impact on the endurance of social mobilization within a suppressive regime. This section emphasizes the importance of adapting movement repertoires and mobilization mechanisms, especially those that have evolved through interactions with the regime over the years, as the key drivers of the movement. As one of the oldest nationwide social movements in Asia, the Chinese education movement is an instructive example from which important lessons may be drawn and shared with activists of similar movements within non-liberal democratic settings.

## CHAPTER SUMMARIES AND THEIR SIGNIFICANCE

Chapter 1 laid the foundation of the book and traced the rise of social movement studies in non-liberal democratic contexts. The roles of extra-institutional variables in the execution of structural institutions were delivered in three perspectives: the intra-movement relationship explored the roles of social movement organizations and movement leaders in mobilizing movement activities; the movement-state relationship was characterized by dynamic interactions of these conflicting parties through constant adaptation of movement and suppression repertoires; the inter-movement perspective asserted the importance of interpersonal bonds in engaging networks and building alliances with other social movements in the country.

Chapter 2 demonstrated the path-dependent qualities of the Chinese education movement during Malaya's transition from a British colony to independence. Intimate collaboration between the movement and the MCA under the framework of the Grand Three Associations of Chinese Education successfully procured political compromises from the Malay political elites to incorporate Chinese schools into the national education system (rather than face extermination), and accommodate more political rights for Chinese immigrants as citizens of Malaya in the 1950s. In return, the Alliance coalition government received support from Chinese voters (and other vernacular communities) and succeeded in gaining independence

from the British in 1957. Nevertheless, constitutional deadlocks over the installation of the Chinese' vernacular language as an official language resulted in the most severe setback for the Grand Three. Pro-vernacular MCA leaders were forced to leave the party; movement leaders were punished; and the movement's capacity was significantly weakened by a series of discriminative regulations imposed by the gradually oppressive UMNO-dominated regime. All these forced the Chinese education movement to form an alliance with Chinese guilds and associations outside the MCA to continue its self-help mission to defend the distinctiveness of Chinese culture in Malaysia.

Chapter 3 analysed the dynamic interactions between the ruling regime and the Chinese education movement following the 1969 ethnic riots. Although an elected government was restored after two years of emergency rule under the National Operation Council, pro-Malay policies, such as the New Economic Policy in 1970, were also imposed. Chinese schools were marginalized by the national education system, and received little financial support to sustain their development or to maintain their facilities. Movement leaders from *Jiaozong* were punished by the authorities, instilling fear amongst the movement communities and supporters. Meanwhile, Chinese schoolteachers were incorporated as civil servants, resulting in a massive drain of both human and financial resources for *Jiaozong*. The Chinese education movement was revived when leaders from *Dongzong*, the sister organization of *Jiaozong*, took over leadership. *Dongzong* launched the national-level independent Chinese secondary schools revival movement to mobilize the Chinese community to support the movement. More importantly, the timely forced closure of all English primary schools by the state in the late 1970s turned the wheels of fortune in favour of the movement — not only did it increase the popularity of Chinese primary schools, it also reinstated the role and importance of the Chinese school committees, which had traditionally been acting as the management arm of Chinese primary schools.

Chapter 4 revealed the role of leaders, brokers, and alliances in mobilizing the movement within Malaysia's testing political landscape. This chapter in particular traced the movement repertoires adopted by four leaders, namely, Lim Fong Seng, Foo Wan Thot, Quek Suan Hiang, and Yap Sin Tian, which varied from competitive resistance to cooperative collaboration. The variation in strategies often relied on each leader's capacity to engage support from Chinese politicians in the ruling regime and the opposition parties, the capability of the movement to mobilize participation and



financial resources from supporters, and the strength of the leader's alliance with Chinese guilds and associations.

Chapter 5 was dedicated to evaluating and affirming the movement's capability for learning and adaptation, which resulted in the creation of the Malaysian Independent Chinese Secondary Schools Working Committee, the *Dongjiaozong* Chinese Primary Schools Working Committee, and the *Dongjiaozong* Higher Learning Centre as the movement's mobilization machinery. The machinery was organized in terms of national, state and thematic working committees, with extensive support from full-time executive branches to maintain the everyday needs of the movement. Through systemic intra-movement networks as well as alliances with Chinese guilds and associations, the machinery has been critical to the mobilization of participants for the Chinese education movement.

Chapter 5 also detailed the success of the Independent Chinese Secondary Schools Working Committee in generating financial resources for the movement. However, its success also resulted in the domination of *Dongzong* leaders in the movement. Overburdened by multiple roles within the movement, the leaders manifested noticeable strain in their effectiveness and commitment in delivering their responsibilities, which, in turn, resulted in the increasing domination of the executive staff in maintaining the movement's daily activities. Delayed efforts to restore the balance of power resulted in open conflict between the factions and consequent division of the movement community.

## SOCIAL MOBILIZATION IN NON-LIBERAL DEMOCRACIES

Thus far, the study has pondered over the survival of social movements in repressive states and questioned the role of institutions in sustaining social movement activities, prolonging their existence, and increasing their opportunities for success. This section identifies three criteria, namely, constant resource mobilization, relationship with the non-liberal democratic regime, and unification of diversity, as key variables to such understanding.

### Constant Resource Mobilization

Resource mobilization has been one of the most visible yardsticks for measuring the popularity of a movement and the influence of its leaders. Constant needs for financial resources to sustain the development of

Chinese schools at the local level and to maintain movement activities at the national level resulted in the evolution of various mobilization mechanisms that have been adapted to the political norms in twentieth-century Malaysia.

Although all Chinese primary schools and converted Chinese secondary schools have been incorporated into the national system and are thus entitled to state's education budget, promotion of Malay-medium national schools by the BN ruling regime as the school for all Malaysians has resulted in unequal distribution of state resources. As discussed in Chapter 3, the Malay-medium schools have become the sole beneficiary of the national budget since independence, while other vernacular schools have been facing severe financial scarcity in sustaining, let alone developing, themselves.

Such structural constraints have forced Chinese schools to depend on public donations to survive. Education is an expensive enterprise. Although teachers' salaries are supported by the government, other expenses are not. These expenses require substantial sums of money annually and therefore involve constant, wearying fundraising. The contribution from the Chinese communities in Malaysia, ranging from wealthy business entrepreneurs to the urban-middle-class and working-class citizens, varied according to their economic capacity.

Chinese schools, as the most autonomous yet fundamental units of the Chinese education movement, depend on two primary mechanisms to mobilize the local Chinese community to contribute financially: school committees and fundraising campaigns. Chinese schools rely on members of school committees to contribute a "second income tax" as the schools' core financial income. The willingness of school committee members to donate stems from culturally-, socially-, economically- and politically-driven motivations. Culturally, individuals with financial resources or political connection are expected to take the lead in safeguarding the community's common goods. Communal pressure, which could be self- or other-imposed, has ensured the continuous commitment of community elites in supporting the needs of Chinese schools. Such expectations are strongly felt, especially within dense Chinese communities, where the ties remain intimate and are based predominantly on interpersonal interactions. The benefits of paying a "second income tax" are multiple. School committee members generally receive respect and praise from the community for their altruism. Social recognition strengthens social capital and expands business opportunities. As many Chinese entrepreneurs are constrained by *bumiputera* economic policies in Malaysia, they have to rely on interpersonal relationships and

day-to-day social connections to sustain and expand their small- and medium-sized enterprises.

While financially-advantaged businessmen are still the dominant forces in Chinese school committees, interaction between the business and middle classes has increased since the 1980s. As a result of Malaysia's rapid industrialization and urbanization, more Chinese have moved from rural areas to cities for work and business opportunities. At the same time, the state's promotion of national schools stalled the development of vernacular schools. Therefore, the Chinese community faced fierce competition to enrol their children into Chinese schools in urban neighbourhoods, most of which were already overcrowded. To ensure successful enrolment into their preferred schools, many urban middle-class parents sought to establish patronage relationships with school committees to have the upper hand over the school committees' quota for recommending new enrolments.

The other mechanism most Chinese schools have been depending upon for income is the fundraising campaign. The income resulting from these activities go towards maintaining school equipment (such as tables, chairs, and library facilities), developing school facilities (such as computer room, school hall, and sports complex), expanding school premises and so on. Middle-class parents have been willing to support these donation campaigns primarily to ensure that their children have access to better facilities and thus, a head start in a competitive and result-oriented education system. However, the participation of these parents in the donation campaigns is at best passive and limited. Most of them donate to the school that hosts their children, and are less committed to support other Chinese schools. They are willing to donate financially but rarely organize or participate as members of fundraising committees, and many of them tend to stop donating to the school upon their child's graduation.

Although the financially- and socially-inferior working-class communities are on the periphery of the Chinese schools' structure, they have been the most loyal and fervent supporters of the local mobilization campaigns. Albeit contributing a much less significant amount compared with their business-class counterparts, their participation rate has been disproportionately higher, as was demonstrated in the success of the "one-person, one-dollar" donation campaign popularized in the 1950s. The campaign remains as one of the most popular fundraising repertoire today. Although novices in social movements, working-class supporters are driven by the simple desire to ensure their children and future generations of the Chinese community in Malaysia have access to Chinese education.

While the financial needs of Chinese schools at the local level have been met through periodic fundraising campaigns and donations from the school committees, those of the movement headquarters at the national level are met through national mechanisms. Over the course of the past six decades, *Dongzong* has grown from a conceptual national collaboration between Chinese school committees to one of the largest, most well-established, and most resourceful social movement organization in Malaysia. The success of the independent Chinese secondary schools revival movement in the 1970s and 1980s has generated a sustainable source of income to support the executive expenses of *Dongzong*.

In contrast, the weaker partner of the Chinese education movement, *Jiaozong*, continues to face annual financial deficits in its operations. The reintroduction of the Chinese Primary Schools Working Committee in 1994 failed to generate a sustainable source of income for *Jiaozong*. Plagued by conservative leaders and passive members who constrained *Jiaozong's* potential for expansion, the fading Chinese schoolteachers organization failed to produce new appealing issues to compete with other Chinese organizations for resources and support. In 2001, *Jiaozong* also lost its key source of income from the annual fundraising dinner of the Lim Lian Geok Cultural Development Centre's Chinese Education Festival after the latter declared its "independence" from *Jiaozong*.

Facing mounting deficits year after year, executive officers at *Jiaozong* had to rely on sporadic and piecemeal fundraising programmes for public donations. For example, it conducts small-scale seminars, which have been the only visible activities that kept *Jiaozong* connected to its remaining audience, namely, Chinese schoolteachers. The content of the seminars usually centre on motivation, training, and topics closely related to the contemporary needs of Chinese schoolteachers. A minimal registration fee is collected to cover the cost of the activities. Although the seminars harness great potential as a means to generate income to replenish *Jiaozong's* bleeding coffers, the non-profit nature of *Jiaozong* has prevented it from exploiting these activities as a source of income. As for the movement's executives, they would rather *Jiaozong* remain in the red than risk being perceived to be profit-driven by its few remaining supporters.

In the history of the Chinese education movement, various fundraising campaigns at the national level have been conducted when significant sums of money were needed. A series of campaigns was conducted in the early 1990s to support the construction of the movement organization's new headquarters in Kajang. Movement leaders were responsible for planning the campaigns and tapping on their social capital to garner support

from the community at large. The execution and administration of these fundraising campaigns fell on full-time executive officers at *Dongzong* and *Jiaozong*, which totalled about 120 staff members. The organized networks and processes enabled the central branches of both organizations to mobilize extensive support from grassroots members for the fundraising campaigns.

The collective cultural identity represented by the Chinese education movement has been a key factor to the successful mobilization of resources nationwide over the years. *Dongjiaozong* has always framed itself as a defender of Chinese culture to attract ardent support from the Chinese-speaking community. It employs repertoires that are closely identified with the elements and trappings of Chinese culture in all of its campaigns. As this study has demonstrated, fundraising dinners, bazaars, traditional plays and similar events that highlight the concept of charitable, voluntary and righteous actions to protect the weak, have attracted extensive community participation. Large amounts of donations have also been collected through the “one-person, one-dollar” campaign and during ceremonial events such as anniversaries, weddings and religious celebrations. These campaigns generate amongst the participants much passion and a sense of renewed awareness of the importance of preserving Chinese education.

Nevertheless, it became apparent in the mid-1990s that fundraising was taking a toll on the two organizations as some campaigns fell short of their targeted amount. As time wore on and the movement aged, ossification set in and the movement repertoires became less impulsive and more rigid. Movement leaders, in particular those who had come into power in the 1990s, preferred to work within moderate- and low-risk settings rather than in settings that were extreme or aggressive. The preference stemmed from the leaders’ experience that these moderate settings had survived the narrow and fluid liberal civil space in Malaysia. Taking a moderate stance has not irritated the regime, and thus far, it has been the most effective approach for delivering the movement’s demands within the political setting of contemporary Malaysia.

The movement also tried to publicize the positive results of its campaigns in the Chinese vernacular press from time to time — visual, physical, or symbolic — to boost the morale and confidence of its supporters. Publicizing the results of its campaigns also highlighted the movement organization’s transparency and check-and-balance mechanisms to instil public confidence. In spite of these efforts, the aging movement, overwhelmed by the impact of ossification, bureaucratization and centralization, is slowly losing

its dynamism and momentum. Since the 2008 General Election, the movement has been presented with increasing political opportunities as the BN ruling regime began to show signs of relent in its approval of the establishment of the New Era University, and re-installation of independent Chinese secondary school in Pahang. At the time of writing, MCA senior politicians continue to broker between the BN regime and leaders of the Chinese education movement led by Yap Sin Tian on these matters. However, the vast amount of resources needed to support these massive projects divided movement leaders, as some questioned the ability and capacity for the movement to run a university or establish an independent Chinese secondary school.

In addition, there are calls from movement supporters, especially the reformist cluster, to re-examine the movement's goals, directions and strategies in the face of globalization and changing needs of the Chinese community. If the New Era University project were to go ahead, the movement must confront the pressing need to change its approach to be more inclusive, and to engage support from non-ethnic Chinese populations in Malaysia, as well as ethnic Chinese from Southeast Asia and the rest of the world.

### **Relationship with the Non-Liberal Democratic Regime**

Opportunities for movement mobilization vary with the changing realities of political circumstances. Social movements constrained under a non-liberal democratic political context and an oppressive state face more difficulties in encapsulating their demands. The Chinese education movement has been able to co-exist with the heavy-handed state by exploiting the limited space in the non-liberal democratic system of Malaysia, manoeuvring to have its interests represented through brokerage by MCA politicians, and drawing opportunities by constantly adapting its movement strategies.

The movement has been condemned by the BN ruling regime, in particular, the Malay-ethnic political party, UMNO — a dominant partner in BN — as a threat to national unity. Demands from the movement have threatened the interests of ethnic Malays, forcing the UMNO-led regime to face considerable political pressure to maintain its image as the guardian of the Malay community's "inherent" rights in the country. Over the years, the regime has imposed constraints on the movement through various strategies: threats, manipulation (by way of resource distribution, retraction of schoolteachers' teaching permits and citizenship), and co-optation of

movement leaders, amongst others.

Although the regime can, and has been, manipulating the electoral procedures to its own advantage to narrow the room for contenders to curb politicking, it cannot limit civil liberties outright by arresting and incarcerating opponents and civilians. Thus, the electoral system remains a significant mechanism in legitimatizing the regime's domestic power. As the majority of the constituencies in Malaysia are mixed, contesting parties need the support of voters from all ethnic groups to secure victory in the elections. Therefore, although tensions between the movement and the state have sometimes been high, the BN ruling regime risks offending the larger Chinese community in Malaysia — thus losing their electoral support — if it employs overly coercive measures to suppress or terminate the movement.

Moreover, long-term confrontation between the regime and the Chinese-dominated MCP from 1949 to 1989 had been a costly battle for the regime, economically and politically. To discourage the Chinese community from supporting the communists, the regime allowed it to express its grievances through non-violence means, such as by participating in its education movement. Thus, the state tolerated the movement during the years of battling the communists, which in turn explained the movement's continued existence.

While social movements in matured democratic states can demonstrate and adopt explicit anti-state stances to express grievances in achieving demands, these forms of resistance tend to provoke strong reactions from the state. The BN regime, for example, has been containing, co-opting and suppressing movements by proactive, albeit often covert, repressive measures or through counter-movement strategies. In turn, the Chinese education movement activists have learnt to adapt their repertoires in order to lower risks. This is the second factor that led to the movement's prolonged existence.

Chapter 4 also showed how the movement developed parallel institutions in reaction to opportunities available within the tightly contended political environment. The onslaught of discriminative and assimilative state-imposed policies gave the movement leaders little choice but to move out of their comfort zone in the 1980s to form strategic alliances with larger, more comprehensive, Chinese civic societies. *Dongjiaozong* collaborated with Gerakan in the Alliance of Three campaign in 1982 and established the Alliance of Fifteen Leading Chinese Guilds and Associations in 1983. The collaborations led to the height of the Malaysian Chinese civic movement at the mass assembly at *Tianhou* Temple in 1987.

In the face of the rising of a powerful social force from the Chinese civic community and mounting challenges from a severe internal faction within UMNO, Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad decreed the infamous *Operasi Lalang* in 1987 to contain escalating political tension. Four activists from the education movement were amongst the 107 detained for purportedly fanning anti-government sentiments and threatening national security. *Operasi Lalang* not only enabled Mahathir to freeze political challenges and divert focus away from internal party faction to inter-ethnic relations, it was also an important wake-up call for the movement. After 1987, the Chinese education movement embarked on strengthening the movement's internal structural institution. Overwhelming pressure from the regime also prompted the movement's chairman, Lim Fong Seng, to form a political alliance with the leading opposition party, DAP, to challenge BN in the 1990 General Election. Nevertheless, political alliance (with ruling regime or opposition parties) failed to garner sufficient support from the movement community, which was affiliated to different political parties.

There were times when *Dongjiaozong* successfully pressured the state into compromising on these demands, best exemplified by the issue over the tender rights of school canteens and cooperative shops in the late 1990s, and the Vision School project in the early 2000s. More often than not, the movement was able to obtain only limited concessions from the state, as was the case with the controversy in the early 2000s regarding the use of English as the medium of instruction for mathematics and science in schools. The credit for the successful endurance of the Chinese education movement also has to go to MCA, and to some extent, Gerakan, for their brokerage efforts. Conflicting interests between UMNO and *Dongjiaozong* had limited the degree of trust between these two stakeholders. Therefore, the role of brokers, especially those from BN, was important. MCA politicians shuttled between UMNO and *Dongjiaozong* to mediate interactions, bridge the needs of both sides, and enable compromises through negotiations. In doing so, MCA has established a working relationship with the Chinese education movement leaders and even exploited the relationship as a political model for MCA to gain support from the Chinese community. Through this approach, the movement found the most efficient channel for having its interests represented and for influencing and pressuring for change in the state's process of agenda-setting. The UMNO-led BN regime has also contained the movement and its leaders by occasionally responding to the movement's demands.



During the peak of consociational politics between the Alliance coalition government in the 1950s, the impact of brokerage is exemplified by the successful efforts of MCA's first president, Tan Cheng Lock, who persuaded UMNO's president, Abdul Rahman, to attend a secret negotiation with the movement's leaders at Tan's residence in Malacca in 1955. The negotiation led to a social contract between the movement and the Alliance coalition government. As head of the Grand Three, Tan also solidified his status amongst the Chinese education movement community.

MCA's second president, Lim Chong Eu, was an equally progressive broker for the movement. The pressure to garner support from Chinese voters in competition against the growing socialist front forced Lim and his team to be more committed to accommodating the demands of the Chinese education movement, such as advocating for a more open and inclusive education policy and according official status to the Chinese language in the Federal Constitution. Lim achieved substantial success in excluding the regime's controversial ultimate objective of making Malay as the main medium of instruction in all schools as stated in Article 12 of the 1957 Education Ordinance. His success is a key factor that ensured the continued existence of Chinese schools in post-independence Malaysia. Expectedly, such a pro-movement and pro-Chinese community stand became a great threat to UMNO and non-Chinese-speaking MCA elites. The reality that Malaysian politics is elite-based forced Lim to resign. He was replaced by a more submissive, pro-UMNO leader, Tan Siew Sin, in 1962.

The fall of the Alliance coalition in 1969 marked the end of the consociational model of mutual respect in Malaysia politics. Since then, although there had been no lack of passionate sympathizers of the movement who came into power in MCA, the weakening of MCA within the BN coalition limited the impact of brokerage significantly. These intermediate agencies could only act as buffers, providing timely tip-offs and strategic suggestions that helped the movement obviate state suppression. For example, the MCA National Education Bureau would process memorandums based on the proposals drafted by Chinese education movement activists. MCA ministers would then bring these documents to the BN cabinet's meetings for negotiation. Although the contents of these memorandums were essentially the same, the BN regime, however, had been more willing to accede to the demands of its component parties than those made directly by movement activists.

By the beginning of the 1990s, MCA had grown increasingly reliant on Chinese education-related issues to gain political support from Chinese voters. To gain support from Chinese voters in the general elections, MCA

reported regularly on the number of rural Chinese schools that had been successfully relocated to urban areas and the special funds received by the Chinese schools from the state. Although such “self-advertisement” was successful in the 1990s, its effects gradually faded.

The interactions between the state and the movement had been neither rigid nor linear; instead, they had evolved through continual interactions. In the 2008 General Election, the Chinese community harshly criticized MCA’s over-reliance on its intermediate political strategies as insufficient to secure the minority’s rights. As a result, BN lost its traditional two-thirds dominance of the parliament in 2008, and MCA suffered one of its worst and most humiliating battles since independence, or at least since 1969. Although the BN regime has never been supportive of the Chinese education movement, to date it has yet to terminate the movement by force.

The movement’s prolonged existence is proof that a movement can co-exist successfully with a suppressive regime. Facing a state that has the power and tendencies to manipulate its law enforcement system to crack down on anti-state social movements, the Chinese education movement activists have learnt that it is strategic to adopt a negotiation-oriented rather than a resistance-oriented approach. However, even though a negotiation-oriented approach effectively reduces the risks and costs of sustaining the movement and therefore prolongs the movement’s existence, it decreases the movement’s capacity to reach its ultimate aims.

## Unification of Diversity

As one of the largest social movements in Malaysia, the Chinese education movement is supported by a vast number of heterogeneous agencies. The vast numbers of supporters, each playing different roles, have varied levels of commitment to, and expectations from the movement, which impeded the movement’s efforts in unification. The internal divisions that plagued the Chinese education movement are, namely, (1) the division between *Dongzong* and *Jiaozong*, (2) problems of movement exclusiveness, and (3) tensions between the conservatives and the reformists.

The movement is commonly perceived by its supporters and the public as a collaboration between the national umbrella association of *Dongzong* and *Jiaozong*. However, power relationships between these two sister organizations have not been equal. Outspoken *Jiaozong* leaders successfully led the movement’s resistance in the 1950s and 1960s. However, strong suppression from the state — such as the revocation of *Jiaozong* chairman, Lim Lian Geok’s citizenship; deportation of *Jiaozong* advisor, Yan Yuan

Zhang; and the dismissal of *Jiaozong* vice chairman, Sim Mow Yu, from all political positions in MCA, amongst others — drastically reduced *Jiaozong*'s leadership capacities.

*Jiaozong*'s activities plunged dramatically when the state drafted all Chinese schoolteachers into the civil servant system and limited their involvement in anti-state activities. The establishment of the officially-recognized National Union of the Teaching Profession in 1974 replaced *Jiaozong*'s role as the sole representative organization for schoolteachers. Failing to overcome these changes, *Jiaozong*'s role in the movement weakened from that of a leader to that of a collaborator in the 1980s. The collaborative relationship between *Jiaozong* and *Dongzong* was forged during the 1980s when they were housed under the same roof in the *Jiaozong* building in downtown Kuala Lumpur. Movement-related activities were conducted within a shared workspace, enabling like-minded individuals to develop emotional bonds and trust that helped to strengthen and unify the movement. Strong interpersonal relationships amongst leaders, through which information, human resources and financial resources were shared, solidified the movement.

Unfortunately, the disparities in resource capacities between *Jiaozong* and *Dongzong* magnified with the growing accomplishment of the latter in the 1990s. Rising as the leader of the movement, *Dongzong* continued to make milestones with the completion of a larger and better equipped movement headquarters at Kajang. In contrast, with dwindling membership and resources, *Jiaozong*'s significance amongst Chinese schoolteachers continued to fade, leading to the domination of the Chinese school principals in *Jiaozong*. Today, *Jiaozong* has become a mere shadow of its past. It has softened its approach in its dealings with the state to protect the interests of Chinese schoolteachers. By adopting a less risky and more moderate approach, the *Dongzong*-led Chinese education movement is often perceived as conservative by many, but such an approach remains the best way to resolve the dilemma between the sister organizations.

Another obstacle to movement unification has been the division between conservatives and reformists. The former comprised core leaders of the movement, while the latter comprised predominantly senior members of the movement's executive branch. In the 1970s, thematic working committees were established to facilitate the needs of the independent Chinese secondary schools revival movement. Since then, increasing numbers of full-time and professional personnel joined the executive branch to meet

the managerial and operational needs of the movement. The participation of these dynamic non-business and non-teaching individuals was significant in sustaining the movement.

With the successful establishment of this executive community, decision-making in the movement was divided into two levels: the leadership branch consisting of elected movement committee members dealt with external matters, and the salaried executive branch that managed day-to-day operations of the movement. These two levels of decision-making successfully generated amicable social capital between the Chinese guilds and associations and the Chinese education movement's activists in joint pursuit of their shared goal of furthering the interests of Chinese Malaysians.

Conflicts between the conservatives and the reformists began to surface after *Dongzong* chairman, Lim Fong Seng's retirement from the movement. Failure of the dual coalition system campaign with DAP in 1990 resulted in a clear division between the pro-MCA and pro-DAP supporters. Members of both factions — the former dominating the leadership branch and committees, and the latter dominating the executive branch — began to manipulate the unwritten norms of the movement to exert their influence on the movement's organization. Although the movement developed characteristics of a matured structured institution over time, such as written constitutions, rules and regulations, these institutional characteristics only served to fulfill procedural needs and were symbols of formality, rather than channels for meaningful participation. Unwritten norms dominated the actual implementation of the movement.

Quek Suan Hiang was able to accommodate the interests of both sides by focusing most of the movement's attention on accumulating financial resources to support the construction of the movement's headquarters in Kajang. Nevertheless, the tug of war between the factions continued in the 2000s. To consolidate power and control of the institutions and operations of the movement, both factions installed their preferred candidates as new committee members of the movement. By 2008, competition for power between the reformists and the conservatives had escalated into a full-blown conflict that eventually led to the departure of the reformist faction. The conflict divided the movement largely into three factions. The first comprises conservatives who now control *Dongjiaozong*. The second comprises reformists who were forced to leave *Dongjiaozong* and were later reassembled under the Lim Lian Geok Cultural Development Centre and demanded for structural reform of the Chinese education movement. The third faction — mostly veterans of the movement — comprises those who were frustrated by the

power struggle between the former two factions. Although the reformists have yet to succeed in overthrowing the core leaders of *Dongjiaozong* at the time of writing, infighting nevertheless has had a destructive influence on the movement.

Ironically, factionalism stems in part from the movement's exclusiveness. To strengthen internal unity, sustain collective identity, and justify its legitimacy as defenders of the Chinese community, the movement's leaders constructed the movement's activities based on the injustice and discrimination suffered by the Chinese community. The exclusiveness of the injustice frame has been effective in mobilizing support from the Chinese community. The greater the suppression by the state, the higher the mobilization capacity and support the movement received from the Chinese community nationwide. Continuous attempts from the state to convert Chinese schools into a Malay-dominated national system in the 1980s unwittingly led to unification of the political power of the Chinese-speaking community, apparent in the demonstration staged at *Tianhou* Temple in 1987.

To enhance and maintain the movement's exclusiveness, the Chinese education movement has been staffed exclusively by ethnic Chinese-educated Chinese. Preference is given to graduates from institutions that are not yet recognized by the state, such as independent Chinese secondary schools, Nanyang University or Taiwanese universities. Many outsiders see this as a form of Chinese chauvinism, stemming from inferior complex and a lack of appreciation of the multicultural reality of the Malaysian society. In fact, the policy of exclusion has isolated many individuals with great potential from accessing the movement's leadership.

The domination of an exclusive community within the movement has also prevented the movement from establishing interethnic alliances. The language barrier has been the hardest hurdle to overcome as most members of the Chinese education movement lack the linguistic capacity to reach out to supporters of other linguistic groups. Moreover, as one of the oldest social movements in Malaysia, the disparity in strength may have made it more difficult for the Chinese education movement to collaborate with other smaller, newer social movements.

Although the support of non-ethnic Chinese individuals in the controversy over the use of English as the medium of instruction for science and mathematics had presented great potential for interethnic collaboration, leaders of the Chinese education movement failed to capitalize on this opportunity. By 2008, while other movement groups in Malaysia had

taken advantage of the political opportunity to broach a number of issues ranging from human rights, equal opportunities for minority groups and state reformation, *Dongjiaozong's* response — or rather, the lack of response — was disappointing.

Factionalism may potentially create more space for democracy, competition, dynamism and choice. However, failure to manage internal rivalry may do more harm. Burdened by exclusiveness, conservatism and internal faction, *Dongjiaozong* failed to extend itself beyond a contained pressure group to play a more significant role in domestic contentious politics, despite its longevity.

## CONCLUSION

This study has demonstrated that the capacities for social mobilization and endurance of a social movement depend on structural and relational institutions. The former delineate the roles and responsibilities of each agency within the movement, install legitimate status upon social movement leaders to lead the movement, and enable these leaders to mobilize support from movement members and the larger community.

As social movements comprise large numbers of agencies and individuals, having formal structural institutions is on its own insufficient for inducing strong inter-agency commitment to the movement. Here is where relational institutions, with their more organic, dynamic and adaptive nature, can supplement and fill the gaps of structural institutions.

Due to the lack of access to democratic institutions, social movement leaders develop working relationships with members of the ruling regime to achieve their demands through brokerage efforts. Brokers enable an informal but important channel for conflicting parties to seek common grounds. Through bridging and enabling constructive interactions between conflicting parties, brokers strengthen their political significance within the regime's entity and receive support from the movement community for putting forth the movement's demands to the state's core decision-making bodies. However, the impact of brokerage is supplementary rather than primary, for brokerage alone seldom procures the ultimate goals of a social movement.

Movement repertoires may vary from aggressive to collaborative, manifest to latent. Unlike social movement activists in democratic states who enjoy freedom from fear to express their demands openly, the choice of movement repertoires in non-liberal democratic states are determined by the lessons

social movement activists learnt from their previous interactions with the state. As interactions between social movement and the state are considerably influenced by the local political structure and social environment, social movement activists adjust their activities and repertoires according to the local milieu. Therefore, movement leaders who are constrained by a non-liberal democratic setting have to choose the most efficient, most rewarding and least risky approach to mobilize support from the community.

The rigidity and ineffectiveness of democratic institutions within suppressive states has also given rise to strategies that rely on interpersonal relationships to meet the movement's demands rather than through formal channels. Movement leaders expand their influence through social capital, and form networks and alliances with like-minded individuals and organizations. Although this form of collaboration may be fragile and can collapse upon changes in leadership, it remains the most accessible and fastest approach for social movements to form a strong anti-state alliance under oppressive conditions.

Although political opportunities and resources available to a social movement may be scarce, the internal movement solidarity is the most significant factor to successful social mobilization. Tensions between factions are unavoidable; therefore, it is vitally important for a movement to be equipped with the ability to manage these challenges through a well-structured institution or through a well-respected and authorized leader. A united movement will be able to resist strong repression from its traditional enemy, the state, but a divided movement will be too fragile and easily torn apart by disunity from within.





# **APPENDICES**



**APPENDIX 1**  
**List of *Jiaozong's* Members**

<b>Year Registered</b>	<b>Name</b>
1937	Batang Padang Chinese Schoolteachers' Association 马登巴冷华校教师公会
1939	Muar Chinese Schoolteachers' Association 麻坡华校教师公会
1940	Malacca Chinese Schoolteachers' Association 马六甲华校教师公会
1940	Penang Chinese Schoolteachers' Association 槟城华校教师会
1940	Sarikei Chinese Schoolteachers' Association 泗里街华人教师公会
1940	Sibu Chinese Schoolteachers' Association 诗巫华人教师公会
1945	Meradong Chinese Schoolteachers' Association 马拉端华小教师公会
1946	Batu Gajah Chinese Schoolteachers' Association 华怡乡区华校教师公会
1946	Ipoh Chinese Schoolteachers' Association 怡保市华校教师公会
1946	Manjung Chinese Schoolteachers' Association 曼绒华校教师公会
1946	Negeri Sembilan Chinese Schoolteachers' Association 森美兰华校教师公会
1946	Northern Perak Chinese Schoolteachers' Association 北吡叻华校教师公会
1947	Hilir Perak Chinese Schoolteachers' Association 下吡叻区华校教师公会
1947	Perak United State-Level Chinese Schoolteachers' Association 吡叻州华校教师会联合会
1948	Segamat Chinese Schoolteachers' Association 昔加末华校教师公会

## APPENDIX 1 (Cont'd)

Year Registered	Name
1949	Kampar and Gopeng Chinese Schoolteachers' Association 金宝务边区华校教师公会
1949	Kuala Lumpur Chinese Schoolteachers Association 吉隆坡华校教师公会
1949	Northern Kedah Chinese Schoolteachers' Association 吉北华校教师公会
1950	Central Kedah Chinese Schoolteachers' Association 吉中华校教师公会
1950	Raub Chinese Schoolteachers' Association 劳勿华校教师公会
1951	Perlis Chinese Schoolteachers' Association 玻璃市华校教师公会
1952	Kluang Chinese Schoolteachers' Association 居鑾区华校教师公会
1952	Southern Johore Chinese Schoolteachers' Association 柔南华校教师公会
1953	Eastern Pahang Chinese Schoolteachers' Association 东彭华校教师公会
1953	Selangor Chinese Schoolteachers' Association 雪兰莪华校教师公会
1953	Southern Kedah Chinese Schoolteachers' Association 吉南华校教师公会
1955	Temerloh and Bera Chinese Schoolteachers' Association 淡马鲁暨百乐县华校教师公会
1955	Terengganu Chinese Schoolteachers' Association 登嘉楼华校教师公会
1957	Kuala Lipis Chinese Schoolteachers' Association 立卑华校教师公会
1961	Pontian Chinese Schoolteachers' Association 笨珍华校教师公会

## APPENDIX 1 (Cont'd)

Year Registered	Name
1962	Central Johore Chinese Schoolteachers' Association 柔中区华校教师公会
1968	Kelantan Chinese Schoolteachers' Association 吉兰丹华校教师公会
1969	Johore United State-Level Chinese Schoolteachers' Association 柔佛州华校教师公会联合会
1974	Bentong Chinese Schoolteachers Association 文冬华校教师公会
1979	Pahang United State-Level Chinese Schoolteachers' Association 彭亨州华校教师公会联合会
1980	Cameron Highlands Chinese Schoolteachers' Association 金马仑华校教师公会
1984	Jerantut Chinese Schoolteachers' Association 而连突华校教师公会
1995	Kuala Kangsar Chinese Schoolteachers' Association 江沙县华校教师公会
1997	Kuching and Samarahan Chinese Primary Schoolteachers' Association 晋汉省华小教师公会
1999	Sri Aman Kuching and Samarahan Chinese Primary Schoolteachers' Association 斯里阿曼木中省华小教师公会
2002	Sarawak United State-Level Chinese Primary Schoolteachers' Association 砂拉越华小教师会联合会
2005	Sabah Chinese Schoolteachers' Association 沙巴州华校教师总会
2007	Bintulu Kuching and Samarahan Chinese Primary Schoolteachers' Association 民都鲁华小教师公会

Source: The author.

**APPENDIX 2**  
**List of *Dongzong*'s Members**

<b>Year Registered</b>	<b>Name</b>
1949	State of Johore Chinese School Managers and Teachers' Association 柔佛州华校董教联合会
1952	Council of Perak Chinese School Committees 吡叻华校董事会联合会
1953	Negeri Sembilan Chinese School Committees Council 森美兰华校董事会联合会
1953	Penang and Province Wellesley United Chinese School Management Association 檳城华校董事会联合会
1954	United Chinese School Committees' Association of Selangor and Wilayah Persekutuan Kuala Lumpur 雪兰莪暨吉隆坡联邦直辖区华校董事会联合会
1954	Kelantan Chinese School Committees and Teacher's Association 吉兰丹华校董事教师联合会
1955	Malacca Chinese Education and Progressive Association 马六甲华校董事会联合会
1956	United Chinese School Committees' Association of Kedah 吉打华校董事会联合会
1979	United Association of Private Chinese Secondary School Committees Sabah 沙巴华文独立中学董事会联合会总会
1988	Sarawak United Association of Private Chinese Secondary School Management Committee 砂拉越华文独立中学董事会联合会总会
1989	United Chinese School Committee of Managers Pahang 彭亨华校董事会联合会
1990	Sarawak United Association of Chinese Primary Aided School Committee 砂拉越津贴华文小学董事联合
1996	United Chinese School Committees' Association of Perlis 玻璃市华校董事会联合会
2001	United Chinese School Committees' Association of Terengganu 登嘉楼华校董事会联合会

Source: The author.

**APPENDIX 3**  
**List of Independent Chinese Secondary Schools in Malaysia**

	Refused Conversion Offer	Converted and Established Affiliated School	New School in the 1960s
<b>Johore</b> 1. Chinese High School, Batu Pahat 峇株吧轄華仁中學 2. Chung Hwa High School 中化中學 3. Foon Yew High School 寬柔中學 4. Kluang Chong Hwa High School 居鑾中華中學 5. Pei Hwa High School 利丰港培華獨立中學 6. Sekolah Menengah Chong Hwa S.B.R. 新文龍中華中學 7. Sekolah Menengah Pei Chun 培群獨中 8. Yong Peng High School 永平中學	*  *  *  *  *  *	*     *  *	
<b>Kedah</b> 9. Keat Hwa High School 亞羅士打吉華獨立中學 10. Sekolah Menengah Sin Min 亞羅士打新民獨立中學 11. Sekolah Menengah Sin Min Sungai Petani 新民獨立中學		*  *  *	
<b>Kelantan</b> 12. Kelantan Chung Hwa Independent High School 吉蘭丹中華獨立中學		*	

## APPENDIX 3 (Cont'd)

	Refused Conversion Offer	Converted and Established Affiliated School	New School in the 1960s
<b>Kuala Lumpur</b>			
13. Chong Hwa High School 吉隆坡中华独立中学		*	
14. Confucian Private Secondary School 尊孔独立中学		*	
15. Kuen Cheng High School 坤成中学	*		
16. Tsun Jin High School 吉隆坡循人中学	*		
<b>Malacca</b>			
17. Pay Fong High School 培风中学	*		
<b>Negeri Sembilan</b>			
18. Chung Hua High School Seremban 芙蓉中华中学	*		
19. Sekolah Menengah Chung Hua Port Dickson 波德申中华中学	*		
<b>Penang</b>			
20. Chung Ling Private High School 钟灵独立中学		*	
21. Han Chiang High School 韩江中学	*		
22. Jit Sin Independent High School 大山脚日新独立中学		*	
23. Penang Chinese Girls' Private High School 槟华女子独立中学		*	
24. Phor Tay Private High School 菩提独立中学		*	



APPENDIX 3 (Cont'd)

	Refused Conversion Offer	Converted and Established Affiliated School	New School in the 1960s
<b>Perak</b>			
25. Hua Lian High School 太平华联中学		*	
26. Sekolah Menengah Pei Yuan (Private) KPR 培元独中		*	
27. Poi Lam High School 培南中学		*	
28. Sekolah Menengah San Min (Suwa) 安顺三民独中		*	
29. Sekolah Menengah Yik Ching 育青中学	*		
30. Sekolah Tinggi Nan Hwa Ayer Tawar 南华独中		*	
31. Shen Jai High School 深斋中学	*		
32. Tsung Wah Private Secondary School 崇华中学		*	
33. Yuk Choy High School (Private) 育才独立中学		*	
<b>Sabah</b>			
34. Beaufort Middle School 保佛中学			*
35. Kian Kok Middle School 建国中学			*
36. Lahad Datu Middle School 拿笃中学			*
37. Papar Middle School 吧巴中学			*
38. Pei Tsin High School 古达培正中学			*

## APPENDIX 3 (Cont'd)

	Refused Conversion Offer	Converted and Established Affiliated School	New School in the 1960s
39. Sabah Chinese High School 斗湖巴华中学			*
40. Sabah Tshung Tsin Secondary School 沙巴崇正中学			*
41. Tenom Tshung Tsin Secondary School 丹南崇正中学			*
42. Yu Yuan Secondary School 育源中学			*
<b>Sarawak</b>			
43. Batu Kawa Min Lit Secondary School 石角民立中学			*
44. Catholic High School 诗巫公教中学			*
45. Chung Hua Middle School No. 1 古晋中华第一中学	*		
46. Chung Hua Middle School No. 3 古晋中华第三中学	*		
47. Chung Hua Middle School No. 4 古晋中华第四中学	*		
48. Citizen Middle School 诗巫公民中学			*
49. Guong Ming Middle School 诗巫光民中学	*		
50. Kai Dee Middle School 民都鲁开智中学	*		
51. Kiang Hin Middle School 诗巫建兴中学	*		
52. Ming Lik Secondary School, Sarikei 泗里奎民立中学			*
53. Pei Min Middle School 培民中学			*

APPENDIX 3 (Cont'd)

	Refused Conversion Offer	Converted and Established Affiliated School	New School in the 1960s
54. Riam Road Secondary School 廉律中学			*
55. Serian Public Secondary School 西连民众中学			*
56. Wong Nai Siong Secondary School 诗巫黄乃裳中学			*
<b>Selangor</b>			
57. Hin Hua High School 巴生兴华中学	*		
58. Kwang Hua Private High School 光华独中		*	
59. Pin Hwa High School 滨华中学	*		
60. Sekolah Menengah Chung Hua Klang 巴生中华独立中学		*	
Subtotal	22	21	17
Total	60		

Source: The author.

**APPENDIX 4**  
**Distribution of Dongzong Executive Branch Staff by Academic Qualification, Age, and Years of Service**  
 (1995–2011)

Year	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	Average
Total Staff Members	114	101	122	103	98	92	100	108	115	114	115	123	102	92	101	103	109	107.5
<b>Academic Qualification</b>																		
Ph.D.	1	1	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.2
Master	1	2	7	4	5	5	5	7	8	9	9	9	7	9	9	9	10	6.8
Bachelor	35	38	42	41	36	32	34	39	44	45	47	54	51	35	38	41	43	40.9
Certificate	15	10	12	11	13	9	10	12	14	15	16	23	18	19	18	13	19	14.5
Form VI	56	46	55	43	39	42	45	43	40	35	33	35	23	24	32	40	37	39.3
Form III	6	4	4	4	5	4	6	7	9	10	10	2	5	5	4	4	37	9.5
<b>Age</b>																		
< 30	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	68	64	46	29	35	33	34	44.1
31–40	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	21	36	32	37	34	35	37	33.1
41–50	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	15	15	16	16	18	19	20	17.0
51–55	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	6	3	4	5	6	10	10	6.3
> 56	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	5	5	4	5	8	6	8	5.9
<b>Years of Service</b>																		
< 1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	18	24	15	19	24	15	13	11	9	12	16.0
1–5	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	33	36	44	43	48	35	25	33	36	41	37.4
6–10	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	30	30	26	28	20	18	15	18	16	17	21.8
11–15	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	16	15	14	12	19	19	16	16	16	12	15.5
16–20	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	3	3	6	4	5	8	11	10	12	16	7.8
21–25	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	2	1	2	2	2	1	7	2	4	5	2.8
> 25	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	6	6	7	7	5	6	5	3	3	6	5.4
Contract	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	7	—	—

Source: Compiled by the author with data extracted from UCSCAM (1988–91; 1992c; 1993–99; 2000b; 2001b; 2002a; 2003b; 2004a; 2004d;

## BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Abdul Fauzi Abdul Hamid. "Political Dimensions of Religious Conflict in Malaysia: State Response to an Islamic Movement". *Indonesia and the Malay World* 28, no. 80 (2000): 32–65.
- Abdul Rahman. *Looking Back: Monday Musings and Memories*. Kuala Lumpur: Pustaka Antara, 1977.
- . *Lest We Forget: Further Candid Reminiscences*. Petaling Jaya: Eastern Universities, 1983.
- . *Malaysia: The Road to Independence*. Petaling Jaya: Pelanduk, 1984.
- . *Challenging Times*. Petaling Jaya: Pelanduk, 1986a.
- . *Political Awakening*. Petaling Jaya: Pelanduk, 1986b.
- Abdullah Ahmad Badawi. *Islam Hadhari: A Model Approach for Development and Progress*. Selangor: MPH, 2006.
- Abraham, Collin. *Divide and Rule: The Roots of Race Relation in Malaysia*. Kuala Lumpur: INSAN, 1997.
- Adams, Jacqueline. "Art in Social Movements: Shantytown Women's Protest in Pinochet's Chile". *Sociological Forum* 17, no. 1 (March 2002): 21–26.
- Alberoni, Francesco. *Movement and Institution*. Translated by Patricia C. Arden Delmoro. New York: Columbia University Press, 1984.
- Anderson, Benedict. *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*. 2nd ed. London, New York: Verso, 1991.
- Anderson, Lisa. *The State and Social Transformation in Tunisia and Libya, 1830–1980*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986.
- Andrain, Charles and David Apter. *Political Protest and Social Change: Analyzing Politics*. London: Macmillan, 1995.
- Andrews, Kenneth. "Creating Social Change: Lessons from the Civil Rights Movement". In *Social Movements: Identity, Culture and the State*, edited by David Meyer, Nancy Whittier, and Belinda Robnett. New York: Oxford University Press, 2002.
- Armony, Ariel and Hector Schamis. "Babel in Democratization Studies". *Journal of Democracy* 16, no. 4 (October 2005): 113–28.
- Bandy, Joe and Jackie Smith, eds. *Coalitions Across Borders: Transnational Protest and the Neoliberal Order*. Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield, 2005.

- Bashevkin, Sylvia. "Interest Groups and Social Movements". In *Comparing Democracies*, edited by Lawrence LeDuc, Richard Niemi, and Pippa Norris. California: Sage, 1996.
- Benford, Robert. "You Could Be the Hundredth Monkey: Collective Action Frames and Vocabularies of Motive Within the Nuclear Disarmament Movement". *Sociological Quarterly* 34 (1993): 195–216.
- Berita Harian*. "Barisan Tidak Akan Layan Ugutan: PM" [Prime Minister: Barisan will not respond to threats]. 21 September 1999.
- Blumer, Herbert. "Collective Behavior". In *An Outline of the Principles of Sociology*, edited by Robert Ezra Park. New York: Barnes and Noble, 1939.
- Boudreau, Vincent. "State Repression and Democracy Protest in Three Southeast Asian Countries". In *Social Movements: Identity, Culture and the State*, edited by David Meyer, Nancy Whittier, and Belinda Robnett. New York: Oxford University Press, 2002.
- . *Resisting Dictatorship: Repression and Protest in Southeast Asia*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004.
- Bourdieu, Pierre. "The Forms of Capital". In *Handbook of Theory and Research for the Sociology of Education*, edited by John G. Richardson. Westport: Greenwood, 1986.
- CACE (Central Advisory Committee for Education, Federation of Malaya). *Minutes of Meetings, file no. 31/51*. Kuala Lumpur: Central Advisory Committee for Education, 1951.
- Callaghy, Thomas. "The State and the Development of Capitalism in Africa: Theoretical, Historical and Comparative Reflections". In *The Precarious Balance: State and Society in Africa*, edited by Donald Rothchild and Naomi Chazan. Boulder: Westview, 1988.
- Campbell, John. *Institutional Change and Globalization*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004.
- Camroux, David. "State Responses to Islamic Resurgence in Malaysia: Accommodation, Co-Option and Confrontation". *Asian Survey* 36, no. 9 (September 1996): 852–68.
- Carey, John. "Parchment, Equilibria and Institutions". *Comparative Political Science* 33, nos. 6–7 (2000): 735–61.
- Carothers, Thomas. "The End of the Transition Paradigm". *Journal of Democracy* 13, no. 1 (January 2002): 5–21.
- Case, William. *Semi-Democracy in Malaysia: Pressures and Prospects for Change*. Canberra: Australian National University Press, 1992.
- . *Elites and Regimes in Malaysia: Revisiting a Consociational Democracy*. Australia: Monash Asia Institute, 1996.
- . "New Uncertainties for an Old Pseudo-Democracy: The Case of Malaysia". *Comparative Politics* 37, no. 1 (October 2004): 83–104.
- . "How's My Driving? Abdullah's First Year As Malaysian PM". *Pacific Review* 18, no. 2 (2005): 137–57.

- . "Electoral Authoritarianism in Malaysia: Trajectory Shift". *Pacific Review* 22, no. 3 (2009): 311–33.
- . "Transition from Single-Party Dominance? New Data from Malaysia". *Journal of East Asian Studies* 10 (2010): 91–126.
- CC (Constitutional Commission). *Report of the Federation of Malaya Constitutional Commission 1957*. London: Her Majesty's Stationary Office, 1957.
- Chai, Hon Chan. *Education and Nation Building in Plural Societies: The West Malaysian Experience*. Canberra: Australian National University Press, 1977.
- Chan, Heng Chee. "The Malayan Chinese Association". Master's thesis, University of Singapore, 1965.
- Chandra Muzaffar. *Islamic Resurgence in Malaysia*. Petaling Jaya: Penerbit Fajar Bakti, 1987.
- . *Challenges and Choices in Malaysian Politics and Society*. Penang: Aliran, 1989a.
- . *The NEP: Development and Alternative Consciousness*. Penang: Aliran, 1989b.
- Cheah, Boon Kheng. *Red Star Over Malaya*. Singapore: Singapore University Press, 1983.
- . *Malaysia: The Making of a Nation*. Singapore: Institute for Southeast Asian Studies, 2002.
- Chen, Shaua Fui 曾薛霏. "Xinzhengju You Xinguandao Fanying Huajiao Wenti, Yexintian Zanyang Minlian Zhouzhengfu Xinzuofeng" 新政局有新管道反映华教问题, 叶新田赞扬民联州政府新作风 [New political situation provides new opportunity to reflect Chinese education related problems, Yap Sin Tian compliments Pakatan Rakyat state governments new approaches]. *Merdeka Review*, 8 April 2008 <<http://www.merdeka-review.com/news.php?n=6463>> (accessed 9 September 2013).
- Cheong, Yuen Keong. "Gerakan Pendidikan Cina Di Malaysia: Satu Kajian Tentang Perjuangan Dong Jiao Zong (1970–2002)" [Chinese education movement in Malaysia: Case study on Dong Jiao Zong (1970–2002)]. Ph.D. dissertation, Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences, University of Malaya, Malaysia, 2007.
- Chew, Kong Huat. "Chinese Education in Malaysia". In *Sociology Working Paper*, edited by Steward Gardner. Penang: Penerbit Universiti Sains Malaysia, 1975.
- Chian, Heng Kai 陈庆佳. *Yanshou Gangwei: Wode Zhenglunxuan* 严守岗位: 我的政论选 [Dedications and commitments to my roles and positions: Collection of my political essays]. Kuala Lumpur: Oriengroup 东方企业, 1994.
- Chin, B.N. Christine. "The State of the 'State' in Globalization: Social Order and Economic Restructuring in Malaysia". *Third World Quarterly* 21, no. 6 (December 2000): 1035–57.
- Chin, James. "New Chinese Leadership in Malaysia: The Contest for the MCA and Gerakan Presidency". *Contemporary Southeast Asia* 28, no. 1 (2006): 70–87.
- Chin, Peng. *My Side of History*. Singapore: Media Masters, 2003.
- China Press* 中国报. "Binnisishi De Jiaoyu Baogaoshu" 宾尼斯氏的教育报告书 [Barnes' Education Report]. 12 June 1951.

- . “Mahuagonghui Suo Changjian Zhi Daxue Xianxiu Yuanxiao Jihua Wancheng Gongbu” 马华公会所倡建之大学先修院校计划完成公布 [Announcement on the completion of the pre-university college established by Malaysian Chinese Association]. 15 July 1968.
- . “Bingzhou Bake Huaxiao Jizengzhi Liushijian, Bake Hanglie Gengzhuangda” 槟州罢课华小激增至六十间, 罢课行列更壮大 [The number of Chinese primary schools participating in the school strike at Penang reaches sixty]. 16 October 1987.
- . “Dongjiaozong Yaocuisheng Liangdangzhi, Zhichi Huatuan Renshi Jiaru Minxing Canxuan” 董教总要催生两党制, 支持华团人士加入民行参选 [Dongjiaozong wants to mobilize the formation of dual coalition system and supports individuals from Chinese guilds and associations to participate in the elections under Democratic Action Party]. 15 August 1990.
- . “Zanzhuren Yao Zhuijiu Huaxiao Dahui Xiaozhang Zixing Gaiqi” 赞助人要追究华小大会校长自行改期 [School sponsors want to investigate why the school principal rescheduled the date of school general meeting without prior notice]. 4 May 1992.
- . “Xiaocuoren Yitu Nandecheng Dongzong Jianjue Zhichi Lixing Huaxiao Dongshihui” 小撮人意图难得逞 董总坚决支持力行华小董事会 [United Chinese School Committees' Association of Malaysia vows to support the school committee of Lick Hung Chinese Primary School]. 21 May 1992.
- . “Lutingyu: Yingsheli Gongzhenghui Rang Youguanzhe Bianjie” 陆庭瑜: 应设立公证会让有关者辩解 [Loot Ting Yu: Should establish public hearing session to provide explanation opportunities for the affected parties]. 26 May 1992.
- . “Pingjing De Chitangli Youeyu, Xinjiaoyu Faling Xiuding Dongzong Yu Wu Diaoyi Qingxin” 平静的池塘里有鳄鱼, 新教育法令修订董总吁勿掉以轻心 [There are crocodiles under the still water ponds, United Chinese School Committees' Association of Malaysia warns not to underestimate the new Education Act]. 8 June 1992.
- . “Shishi Xinjiaoyu Faling Dongshibu Bian Caiwuzu” 实施新教育法令董事部变财务组 [The new Education Act changes school committee into a financial management committee]. 16 June 1992.
- . “Mahua Minzheng An Guozhao” 马华民政暗过招 [Malaysian Chinese Association and Malaysian People's Movement Party are competing in secret]. 11 August 1992.
- . “Huhuoshan Youyi Wending Sendonglianhui Zhuxi” 胡火山有意问鼎森董联会主席 [Hu Huo Shan is interested in being the chairman of Negeri Sembilan Chinese School Committees' Association]. 11 April 1994.
- Chwe, Suk Young Michael. “Structure and Strategy in Collective Action”. *American Journal of Sociology* 105 (1999): 128–56.
- Clutterbuck, Richard. *Long Long War: Counterinsurgency in Malaya and Vietnam*. New York: Praeger, 1966.



- CMCS (Centre for Malaysian Chinese Studies 华社研究中心), ed. *Lun Huatuan Renshi Canzheng* 论华团人士参政 [Debates on the participation of individuals from Chinese guilds and associations in politics]. Kuala Lumpur: Selangor Chinese Assembly Hall, 1990.
- Coleman, James. "Social Capital in the Creation of Human Capital". *American Journal of Sociology* 94 (1990): S95–120.
- Coy, Patrick, ed. *Research in Social Movements, Conflicts and Change*. Greenwich: JAI, 1978.
- Crouch, Harold. "Authoritarian Trends, the UMNO Split and the Limits to State Power". In *Fragmented Vision: Culture and Politics in Contemporary Malaysia*, edited by Joel Kahn and Loh Kok Wah Francis. Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1992.
- . "Malaysia: Neither Authoritarian nor Democratic". In *Southeast Asia in the 1990s: Authoritarian, Democracy and Capitalism*, edited by Kevin Hewison, Richard Robison, and Garry Rodan. Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1993.
- . *Government and Society in Malaysia*. Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1996.
- Daniel, G.P. *Dr Ling Liong Sik and the Politics of Ethnic Chinese Unity*. Selangor: Times, 1995.
- DAP (Democratic Action Party). *The Real Reason: Operation Lalang ISA Arrests October 27, 1987*. Petaling Jaya: Democratic Action Party, 1988.
- . *25 Years of Struggle: Milestones in DAP History*. Petaling Jaya: Democratic Action Party, 1991.
- Davis, Gerald, Doug McAdam, W. Richard Scott, and Mayer Zald, eds. *Social Movements and Organization Theory*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005.
- de Tarde, Gabriel. *On Communication and Social Influence: Selected Papers*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969.
- della Porta, Donatella and Manuela Caiani. *Social Movements and Europeanization*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2009.
- della Porta, Donatella and Mario Diani. *Social Movements: An Introduction*. London: Blackwell, 1999.
- DHLC (Dongjiaozong Higher Learning Centre 董教总教育中心). *Dongjiaozong Jiaoyu Zhongxin Feiyingli Youxian Gongsi Dongjiaozong Xinjiyuan Xueyuan 1998 Nian Gongzuo Baogaoshu* 董教总教育中心非营利有限公司董教总新纪元学院 1998年工作报告书 [Dongjiaozong Higher Learning Center and Dongjiaozong New Era College 1998 working report]. Selangor: Dongjiaozong Higher Learning Center, 1999.
- . *Dongjiaozong Jiaoyu Zhongxin Feiyingli Youxian Gongsi Dongjiaozong Xinjiyuan Xueyuan 1999 Nian Gongzuo Baogaoshu* 董教总教育中心非营利有限公司董教总新纪元学院 1999年工作报告书 [Dongjiaozong Higher Learning Center and Dongjiaozong New Era College 1999 working report]. Selangor: Dongjiaozong Higher Learning Center, 2000.
- . *Dongjiaozong Jiaoyu Zhongxin Feiyingli Youxian Gongsi Dongjiaozong Xinjiyuan Xueyuan 2000 Nian Gongzuo Baogaoshu* 董教总教育中心非营利

- 有限公司 董教总新纪元学院 2000年工作报告书 [Dongjiaozong Higher Learning Center and Dongjiaozong New Era College 2000 working report]. Selangor: Dongjiaozong Higher Learning Center, 2001.
- . Dongjiaozong Jiaoyu Zhongxin Feiyingli Youxian Gongsi Dongjiaozong Xinjiyuan Xueyuan 2001 Nian Gongzuo Baogaoshu 董教总教育中心非营利有限公司 董教总新纪元学院 2001年工作报告书 [Dongjiaozong Higher Learning Center and Dongjiaozong New Era College 2001 working report]. Selangor: Dongjiaozong Higher Learning Center, 2002.
- . Dongjiaozong Jiaoyu Zhongxin Feiyingli Youxian Gongsi Dongjiaozong Xinjiyuan Xueyuan 2002 Nian Gongzuo Baogaoshu 董教总教育中心非营利有限公司 董教总新纪元学院 2002年工作报告书 [Dongjiaozong Higher Learning Center and Dongjiaozong New Era College 2002 working report]. Selangor: Dongjiaozong Higher Learning Center, 2003.
- . Dongjiaozong Jiaoyu Zhongxin Feiyingli Youxian Gongsi Dongjiaozong Xinjiyuan Xueyuan 2003 Nian Gongzuo Baogaoshu 董教总教育中心非营利有限公司 董教总新纪元学院 2003年工作报告书 [Dongjiaozong Higher Learning Center and Dongjiaozong New Era College 2003 working report]. Selangor: Dongjiaozong Higher Learning Center, 2004.
- . Dongjiaozong Jiaoyu Zhongxin Feiyingli Youxian Gongsi Dongjiaozong Xinjiyuan Xueyuan 2004 Nian Gongzuo Baogaoshu 董教总教育中心非营利有限公司 董教总新纪元学院 2004年工作报告书 [Dongjiaozong Higher Learning Center and Dongjiaozong New Era College 2004 working report]. Selangor: Dongjiaozong Higher Learning Center, 2005.
- . Dongjiaozong Jiaoyu Zhongxin Feiyingli Youxian Gongsi Dongjiaozong Xinjiyuan Xueyuan 2005 Nian Gongzuo Baogaoshu 董教总教育中心非营利有限公司 董教总新纪元学院 2005年工作报告书 [Dongjiaozong Higher Learning Center and Dongjiaozong New Era College 2005 working report]. Selangor: Dongjiaozong Higher Learning Center, 2006.
- . Dongjiaozong Jiaoyu Zhongxin Feiyingli Youxian Gongsi Dongjiaozong Xinjiyuan Xueyuan 2006 Nian Gongzuo Baogaoshu 董教总教育中心非营利有限公司 董教总新纪元学院 2006年工作报告书 [Dongjiaozong Higher Learning Center and Dongjiaozong New Era College 2006 working report]. Selangor: Dongjiaozong Higher Learning Center, 2007.
- . Dongjiaozong Jiaoyu Zhongxin Feiyingli Youxian Gongsi Dongjiaozong Xinjiyuan Xueyuan 2007 Nian Gongzuo Baogaoshu 董教总教育中心非营利有限公司 董教总新纪元学院 2007年工作报告书 [Dongjiaozong Higher Learning Center and Dongjiaozong New Era College 2007 working report]. Selangor: Dongjiaozong Higher Learning Center, 2008a.
- . Xinjiyuan Xueyuan Jianxiao Shinian Jinian Zhuangji 新纪元学院建校十年纪念专辑 1998–2008 [Commemoration magazine of New Era College's tenth anniversary]. Selangor: Dongjiaozong Higher Learning Center, 2008b.
- . Dongjiaozong Jiaoyu Zhongxin Feiyingli Youxian Gongsi Dongjiaozong Xinjiyuan Xueyuan 2008 Nian Gongzuo Baogaoshu 董教总教育中心非营利有限公司 董教总新纪元学院 2008年工作报告书 [Dongjiaozong Higher Learning Center and Dongjiaozong New Era College 2008 working report]. Selangor: Dongjiaozong Higher Learning Center, 2008c.

- 有限公司 董教总新纪元学院 2008年工作报告书 [Dongjiaozong Higher Learning Center and Dongjiaozong New Era College 2008 working report]. Selangor: Dongjiaozong Higher Learning Center, 2009.
- . *Dongjiaozong Jiaoyu Zhongxin Feiyingli Youxian Gongsi Dongjiaozong Xinjiyuan Xueyuan 2009 Nian Gongzuo Baogaoshu* 董教总教育中心非营利有限公司 董教总新纪元学院2009年工作报告书 [Dongjiaozong Higher Learning Center and Dongjiaozong New Era College 2009 working report]. Selangor: Dongjiaozong Higher Learning Center, 2010.
- . *Dongjiaozong Jiaoyu Zhongxin Feiyingli Youxian Gongsi Dongjiaozong Xinjiyuan Xueyuan 2010 Nian Gongzuo Baogaoshu* 董教总教育中心非营利有限公司 董教总新纪元学院 2010年工作报告书 [Dongjiaozong Higher Learning Center and Dongjiaozong New Era College 2010 working report]. Selangor: Dongjiaozong Higher Learning Center, 2011.
- . *Dongjiaozong Jiaoyu Zhongxin Feiyingli Youxian Gongsi Dongjiaozong Xinjiyuan Xueyuan 2011 Nian Gongzuo Baogaoshu* 董教总教育中心非营利有限公司 董教总新纪元学院 2011年工作报告书 [Dongjiaozong Higher Learning Center and Dongjiaozong New Era College 2011 working report]. Selangor: Dongjiaozong Higher Learning Center, 2012.
- Diamond, Larry Jay. *Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999.
- . "Thinking About Hybrid Regimes". *Journal of Democracy* 13, no. 2 (April 2002): 21–35.
- Diani, Mario. "Social Movements and Social Capital: A Network Perspective on Movement Outcomes". *Mobilization: An International Journal* 2, no. 2 (1997): 129–47.
- DiMaggio, Paul J. and Walter Powell. "The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields". *American Sociological Review* 48 (1983): 147–60.
- DNICSSDWC (*Dongjiaozong* National Independent Chinese Secondary School Development Working Committee 董教总全国华文独中发展工作委员会). *Duda Shiliaoji* 独大史料集 [Documentary collection of Merdeka University]. Kuala Lumpur: Merdeka University Berhad, 1993.
- . *Dongjiaozong Quanguo Huawen Duzhong Gongzuo Weiyuanhui Zuzhi Xize* 董教总全国华文独中工作委员会组织细则 [Organizational Rules and Regulations of the Malaysian Independent Chinese Secondary Schools Working Committee]. Office document. Kuala Lumpur: United Chinese School Committees' Association of Malaysia, 1990.
- . *Dongjiaozong Quanguo Huawen Duzhong Gongzuo Weiyuanhui Zuzhi Xize* 董教总全国华文独中工作委员会组织细则 [Organizational Rules and Regulations of the Malaysian Independent Chinese Secondary Schools Working Committee]. Office document. Selangor: United Chinese School Committees' Association of Malaysia, 1995.

- . *Duzhong Jiaogai Chutan: 1996 Nian Tanta Huawen Duzhong Xuezh, Kecheng Yukao Shi Gexin Fangxiang Gongzuoying Ziliao Huibian* 独中教改初探: 1996年探讨华文独中学制、课程与考试革新方向工作营资料汇编 [Preliminary evaluation of independent Chinese secondary school education reforms: Collection of materials on the Workshop on Education System, Curriculum, and Examination Evaluation and Reforms for Independent Chinese Secondary Schools 1996]. Selangor: United Chinese School Committees' Association of Malaysia, 1997.
- . *Malaixiya Huawen Duli Zhongxue Jiaoyu Gaige Gangling* 马来西亚华文独立中学教育改革纲领 [Guiding principles of educational reform in Malaysian independent Chinese secondary schools]. Selangor: United Chinese School Committees' Association of Malaysia, 2005.
- Dongjiaozong 董教总. *Huajiao Gongzuozhe Shouce* 华教工作者手册 [Handbook for Chinese education workers]. Kuala Lumpur: United Chinese School Committees' Association of Malaysia, 1989.
- . *Malaixiya Huawen Xiaoxue Dongshihui Gongzuo Shouce Yangben* 马来西亚华文小学董事会工作手册样本 [Sample of working guidelines for Malaysia Chinese primary schools' school committees]. Selangor: United Chinese School Committees' Association of Malaysia, June 1998 <<http://www.djz.edu.my/resource/images/doc/JueXing/zhangcheng02.pdf>> (accessed 4 September 2013).
- . "Dongjiaozong Muyu Jiaoyu Xuanyan" 董教总母语教育宣言 [*Dongjiaozong's* declaration on mother tongue education]. Memorandum. 1999.
- . "Xiaoxue Shuli Yinghua Shijian Gaoquanguo Huaxiao Jiazhangshu Dongjiaozong Fandui Huaxiao Yi Yingyu Jiaoshou Shulike De Wendalu" 小学数理英化事件 告全国华小家长书 董教总反对华小以英语教授数理科的问答录 [List of questions and answers on *Dongjiaozong's* opposition on the teaching of Science and Mathematic subjects with English language at Chinese primary schools]. In *Dongzong 50 Nian Tekan: 1954–2004* 董总 50 年特刊: 1954–2004 [Commemoration magazine of United Chinese School Committees' Association of Malaysia's fiftieth anniversary: 1954–2004], edited by United Chinese School Committees' Association of Malaysia. Selangor: United Chinese School Committees' Association of Malaysia, 2004.
- . *Huaxiao Guanli Jizhi Zhinan* 华小管理机制指南 [Management handbook for Chinese primary schools]. Selangor: United Chinese School Committees' Association of Malaysia, 2006.
- . "Dongjiaozong Yu Mahuagonghui Dui Yixia Shuxiang Huajiao Keti Jinxing Jiaoliu" 董教总与马华公会就以下数项华教课题进行交流 [Discussions between *Dongjiaozong* and Malaysian Chinese Association on the following Chinese education related topics]. Office document. 13 April 2010 <[http://www.djz.edu.my/resource/images/pic/wenxian/20100413\\_DJZ%20&%20MCA.pdf](http://www.djz.edu.my/resource/images/pic/wenxian/20100413_DJZ%20&%20MCA.pdf)> (accessed 4 September 2013).

- DSGM (Department of Statistics, Government of Malaysia). *Buku Tahunan Perangkaan Malaysia 2011* [Yearbook of Statistics Malaysia 2011]. Putrajaya: Department of Statistics, Malaysia, 2011.
- Durkheim, Emile Durkheim. *The Rules of Sociological Method*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1938.
- Edelman, Marc. "Social Movements: Changing Paradigms and Forms of Politics". *Annual Review of Anthropology* 30 (2001): 285–317.
- Escobar, Arturo and Sonia Alvarez, eds. *The Making of Social Movements in Latin America: Identity, Strategy and Democracy*. Boulder: Westview, 1992.
- Evans, Peter. "Predatory, Developmental and Other Apparatuses: A Comparative Political Economy Perspective on the Third World State". *Sociological Forum* 4, no. 4 (1989): 561–87.
- Farish Noor. *The Hindu Rights Action Force (HINDRAF) of Malaysia: Communitarian Across Borders?* Singapore: S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, 2008.
- Fauwaz Abdul Aziz. "PM: ACA to Be Fully Independent". *Malaysiakini*, 28 April 2001 <<http://www.malaysiakini.com/news/81664>> (accessed 9 September 2013).
- . "Old Project 'Revived' As MCA Election Goody". *Malaysiakini*, 19 February 2008 <<http://www.malaysiakini.com/news/78265>> (accessed 2 September 2013).
- FCAM (Federation of Chinese Associations Malaysia 马来西亚中华大会堂总会). "Quanguo Huatuan Wenhua Gongzuo Zonggangling" 全国华团文化工作总纲领 [Guiding principals of National Chinese Guilds and Associations Cultural Program]. 22 June 1997.
- . *Malaixiya Huaren Wenhua jie Ziliao ji* 马来西亚华人文化节资料集 [Collection of materials on Malaysian Chinese Cultural Festival]. Kuala Lumpur: Federation of Chinese Associations Malaysia, 2001.
- FCKL (Federal Court Kuala Lumpur). *Civil Appeal no. 236 of 1981. Merdeka University Berhad v. Government of Malaysia* <[http://ilms.agc.gov.my:88/online/uploaded/fc/\[1982\]%201%20LNS%201%20MERDEKA%20UNIVERSITY%20BERHAD%20v.%20GOVERNMENT%20OF%20MALAYSIA%20.pdf](http://ilms.agc.gov.my:88/online/uploaded/fc/[1982]%201%20LNS%201%20MERDEKA%20UNIVERSITY%20BERHAD%20v.%20GOVERNMENT%20OF%20MALAYSIA%20.pdf)> (accessed on 11 September 2013).
- Fishman, Joshua. "National Languages and Languages of Wider Communication in Developing Nations". *Anthropological Linguistics* 11, no. 4 (April 1969): 111–35.
- FLC (Federal Legislative Council). *Educational Policy: Statement of the Federal Government on the Report of the Special Committee on the Implementation of Educational Policy Together with the Report of That Committee*. Kuala Lumpur: Government Press, 1954.
- FLCGAM (Fifteen Leading Chinese Guilds and Associations of Malaysia 全国十五华团领导机构). "Yaoqiu Shifang Huayi Lingxiu Beiwanglu" 要求释放华裔领袖备忘录 [Memorandum to demand the release of ethnic Chinese

- leaders]. Memorandum submitted to Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad. 11 March 1988.
- FM (Federation of Malaya). *Chinese Schools and the Education of Chinese Malaysians: The Report of a Mission Invited by the Federation Government to Study the Problem of the Education of Chinese in Malaya*. Kuala Lumpur: Government Press, 1951a.
- . *Report of the Committee on Malay Education, Federation of Malaya*. Kuala Lumpur: Government Press, 1951b.
- . *Report on the Barnes Report on Malay Education and the Fenn-Wu Report on Chinese Education*. Kuala Lumpur: Government Press, 1951c.
- . *Education Ordinance 1952*. Kuala Lumpur: Government Press, 1952a.
- . *Report of the Registrar-General on Population, Births, and Deaths*. Kuala Lumpur: Government Press, 1952b.
- . *Report of the Special Committee Appointed on the 20th Day of September, 1951*. Kuala Lumpur: Government Press, 1952c.
- . *Report of the Special Commission Appointed by the High Commissioner in Council to Consider Ways and Means of Implementing the Policy Outlined in the Education Ordinance 1952, in the Context of Diminishing Financial Resources of the Federation 1954 (Council Paper no. 67 of 1954)*. Kuala Lumpur: Government Press, 1954.
- . *Report by the Chief Minister of the Federation of Malaya on the Baling Talks*. Kuala Lumpur: Government Press, 1956a.
- . *Report of the Education Committee, 1956*. Kuala Lumpur: Government Press, 1956b.
- . *Education Ordinance 1957*. Kuala Lumpur: Government Press, 1957a.
- . *Population Census of the Federation of Malaya (Report no. 14)*. Kuala Lumpur: Government Press, 1957b.
- . *Report of the Education Review Committee 1960*. Kuala Lumpur: Government Press, 1960.
- . *Education Act 1961*. Kuala Lumpur: Government Press, 1961.
- FMCGA (Federation of Malaya Chinese Guilds Association 马来亚华人行业社团总会). "Quanma Huaren Zhuhe Shetuan Daibiao Dahui Zhengqu Gongminquan Xuanyan" 全马华人注册社团代表大会争取公民权宣言 [The Memorandum to Acquire for Citizenship by the National Convention of Chinese Registered Guilds and Associations in Malaya]. 26 April 1956.
- Forsyth, Timothy. "Environmental Social Movements in Thailand: How Important is Class?". *Asian Journal of Social Sciences* 29, no. 1 (2001): 35–51.
- Foster, George. "The Dyadic Contract: A Model for the Social Structure of a Mexican Peasant Village". *American Anthropologist* 63 (1961): 1173–92.
- Foweraker, Joe. *Theorizing Social Movements*. London: Pluto, 1995.
- Freedman, Amy. *Political Participation and Ethnic Minorities: Chinese Overseas in Malaysia, Indonesia and the United States*. New York, London: Routledge, 2000.

- Fujio, Hara. "The Japanese Occupation of Malaya and the Chinese Community". In *Malaya and Singapore during the Japanese Occupation*, edited by Paul Kratoska. Singapore: Singapore University Press, 1995.
- Fukuyama, Francis. "Democracy's Future: The Primacy of Culture". *Journal of Democracy* 6, no. 1, (January 1995): 7–14.
- Funston, John. "Malaysia's Tenth Elections: Status Quo, Reformasi or Islamization?". *Contemporary Southeast Asia* 22, no. 1 (April 2000): 23–59.
- Furnivall, John Sydenham. *Colonial Policy and Practice: A Comparative Study of Burma and Netherlands India*. London: Cambridge University Press, 1948.
- Gamson, William. *The Strategy of Social Protest*. Homewood: Dorsey, 1975.
- Ganesan, Narayanan. "Malaysia in 2003: Leadership Transition with a Tall Shadow". *Asian Survey* 44, no. 1 (January–February 2004): 70–77.
- GM (Government of Malaysia). *National Language Act 1963*. Kuala Lumpur: Government Press, 1963.
- . *National Educational Policy 1971*. Kuala Lumpur: Jabatan Cetak Kerajaan, 1971a.
- . *National Language Act (Revised) 1971*. Kuala Lumpur: Jabatan Cetak Kerajaan, 1971b.
- . *New Economic Policy 1971*. Kuala Lumpur: Jabatan Cetak Kerajaan, 1971c.
- . *Parliamentary Debates on the Constitution Amendment Bill 1971*. Kuala Lumpur: Jabatan Cetak Kerajaan, 1971d.
- . *Second Malaysia Plan 1971–1975*. Kuala Lumpur: Jabatan Cetak Kerajaan, 1971e.
- . *University and University Colleges Act*. Kuala Lumpur: Jabatan Cetak Kerajaan, 1971f.
- . *Third Malaysia Plan 1976–1980*. Kuala Lumpur: Jabatan Cetak Kerajaan, 1976.
- . *Cabinet Committee Report on the Implementation of Education Policies*. Kuala Lumpur: Jabatan Cetak Kerajaan, 1979.
- . *Dasar Kebudayaan Negara 1981* [National Cultural Policy 1981]. Kuala Lumpur: Jabatan Percetakan Negara, 1981a.
- . *Fourth Malaysia Plan 1981–1985*. Kuala Lumpur: Jabatan Percetakan Negara, 1981b.
- . *Report of the Malaysian General Elections, 1982*. Kuala Lumpur: Jabatan Percetakan Negara, 1983.
- . *Fifth Malaysia Plan 1986–1990*. Kuala Lumpur: Jabatan Percetakan Negara, 1986.
- . *Ke Arah Memelihara Keselamatan Negara* [Towards the protection of National Security]. Kertas Perintah 14, tahun 1988. Kuala Lumpur: Jabatan Percetakan Negara, 1988.
- . *Akta Pendidikan 1990* [Education Act 1990]. Kuala Lumpur: Jabatan Percetakan Negara, 1990.

- . *Sixth Malaysia Plan 1991–1995*. Kuala Lumpur: Jabatan Percetakan Negara, 1991.
- . *Rancangan Malaysia Ketujuh 1996–2005* [Seventh Malaysia Plan 1996–2005]. Kuala Lumpur: Jabatan Percetakan Negara, 1995.
- . *Rancangan Malaysia Kelapan 2001–2005* [Eighth Malaysia Plan 2001–2005]. Putrajaya: Jabatan Percetakan Negara, 2001.
- . *National Language Acts 1963/67*. Kuala Lumpur: Jabatan Percetakan Negara, 2006a.
- . *Rancangan Malaysia Kesembilan 2006–2010* [Ninth Malaysia Plan 2006–2010]. Putrajaya: Jabatan Percetakan Negara, 2006b.
- Goldstone, Jack, ed. *States, Parties and Social Movements*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003.
- Gomez, Edmund Terence. *Political Business: Corporate Involvement of Malaysian Political Parties*. Queensland: James Cook University of North Queensland Press, 1994.
- Gomez, Edmund Terence and K.S. Jomo. *Malaysia's Political Economy: Politics, Patronage and Profits*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997.
- Goodwin, Jeff, James Jasper, and Jaswinder Khattri. "Caught in a Winding, Snarling Vine: The Structural Bias of Political Process Theory". *Sociological Forum* 14, no. 1 (March 1999): 27–54.
- GTACE (Grand Three Associations of Chinese Education 三大机构华文教育中央委员会). "Benbang Huaren Dui Jiaoyu Zongyaoqiu" 本邦华人对教育总要求 [Memorandum of Demands on Chinese Education by Chinese Citizens in the Federation]. *Jiaoshi Zazhi* 教师杂志 [Teacher's Journal] 1, no. 5 (1960): 24–26.
- Guangming Daily* 光明日报. "Pizhengfu Zeng 9 Duzhong Qianqing Tudi, Yidi Yangxiao Lirun Chong Xingzheng Jingfei" 霹政府赠9独中千顷土地, 以地养校利润充行政经费 [Perak state government donates one thousand hectares of land to nine independent Chinese secondary schools in the state, profits generated from these lands will be used to support school administrative expenses]. 30 August 2009.
- Gusfield, Joseph. "The Reflexivity of Social Movements: Collective Behavior and Mass Society Theory Revisited". In *New Social Movements: From Ideology to Identity*, edited by Enrique Larana, Hank Johnston, and Joseph Gusfield. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1994.
- Hara, Fujio. *Malayan Chinese and China: Conversion in Identity Consciousness 1945–1957*. Tokyo: Institute of Developing Economies, 1997.
- Harakah*. "Revisiting the Perak Crisis". 23 September 2010.
- He, Baogang. *The Democratization of China*. London: Routledge, 1996.
- Heinz, John, Edward Laumann, Robert Nelson, and Robert Salisbury. *The Hollow Core: Private Interest in National Policy Making*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993.



- Helmke, Gretchen and Steven Levitsky. *Informal Institutions and Democracy: Lessons from Latin America*. Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 2006.
- Heng, Pek Koon. "The Social and Ideological Origins of the Malayan Chinese Association". *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies* 14, no. 2 (September 1983): 290–311.
- . *Chinese Politics in Malaysia: The History of the Malaysian Chinese Association*. Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1988.
- Hew, Kuan Yau 丘光耀. *Disantiao Daolu: Malaixiya Huaren Zhengzhi Xuanze Pipan* 第三条道路: 马来西亚华人政治选择批判 [The third option: Criticism on the Malaysian Chinese political selection]. Selangor: Diquacun Wangluo 地球村网络, 1997.
- Hilton, Matthew. *Choice and Justice: Forty Years of the Malaysian Consumer Movement*. Penang: Penerbit Universiti Sains Malaysia, 2009.
- Hirofumi, Hayashi. "Massacre of Chinese in Singapore and Its Coverage in Postwar Japan". In *New Perspectives on the Japanese Occupation in Malaya and Singapore 1941–1945*, edited by Akashi Yoji and Yoshimura Mako. Singapore: National University of Singapore Press, 2008.
- Ho, Khai Leong. "Accountability in the Malaysian Bureaucracy: Politics and Administration". Working Papers 18. Department of Political Science, National University of Singapore, 1988.
- . "Aggrandizement of Prime Minister's Power: The Transformation of the Office of the Prime Minister in Malaysia". *Internationales Asienforum* 23, nos. 1–2 (1992a): 227–43.
- . "The Malaysian Chinese Guilds and Associations As Organized Interests in Malaysian Politics". Working Papers. Department of Political Science, National University of Singapore, 1992b.
- Ho, Kin Chai. *Malaysian Chinese Association: Leadership Under Siege*. Kuala Lumpur: Ho Kin Chai, 1984.
- Hodgson, Geoffrey. *The Evolution of Institutions: Agency, Structure and Darwinism, American Institutionalism*. London, New York: Routledge, 2004.
- Horowitz, Donald. *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985.
- Huajiaoshenghui Gongweihui Shiliaozhanzu 华教盛会工委史料展组. *Huaguang Yongyao* 华光永耀 [Glory of Chinese education will shine forever]. Kuala Lumpur: United Chinese School Committees' Association of Malaysia, 1993.
- Huang, Guan Qin 黄冠钦. "Malaixiya Jiaoyu Zhengce Yu Huawen Jiaoyu Wenti Zhiyanjiu" 马来西亚教育政策与华文教育问题之研究 [Education policies in Malaysia and its contentions with the Chinese education]. Master's thesis, Chinese Culture University, Taipei, 1984.
- Huang, Xue Jing 黄雪晶, ed. *Zhangyashan De Huajiao Gushi* 张雅山的华教故事 [Teo Gah San' contributions to Chinese education]. Selangor: United Chinese School Committees' Association of Malaysia, 2002.

- Huang, Zhao Fa 黄招发, ed. *Huajiao Bainian Kankelu: Shalauyue Huawen Zhongxue Fendoushi* 华教百年坎坷路: 砂劳越华文中学奋斗史 [Hundred years of difficult journey of Chinese education: History of Chinese secondary school development in Sarawak]. Sarawak: Law Yew Muk 刘友光, 2004.
- Hunt, Scott and Robert Benford. "Identity Talk in the Peace and Justice Movement". *Journal of Contemporary Ethnography* 22 (1994): 488–517.
- Huntington, Samuel. *Political Order in Changing Societies*. New Heaven: Yale University Press, 1968.
- Hussin Mutalib. *Islam in Malaysia: From Revivalism to Islamic State?* Singapore: Singapore University Press, 1993.
- Ingham, Barbara and Colin Simmons, eds. *Development Studies and Colonial Policy*. London, Totowa: Frank Cass, 1987.
- Jain, Ravindra K. *Indian Transmigrants: Malaysian and Comparative Essays*. Gurgaon, Haryana, India: Three Essays Collective, 2009.
- Jenkins, J. Craig and Charles Perrow. "Insurgency of the Powerless: Farm Worker Movements 1946–1972". *American Sociological Review* 42 (1977): 249–68.
- Jennet, Christine and Randal Stewart. "Introduction". In *Politics of the Future: The Role of Social Movements*, edited by Christine Jennett and Randal Stewart. Australia: Macmillan, 1989.
- Jesudason, James. "Malaysia: The Syncretic State". In *Political Oppositions in Industrialising Asia*, edited by Garry Rodan. London: Routledge, 1996.
- Johan Saravanamuttu. "Malaysian Civil Society—Awakenings?" In *Risking Malaysia: Culture, Politics and Identity*, edited by Maznah Mohamad and Wong Soak Koon. Bangi: Penerbit Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia, 2001.
- Jomo K.S. and Patricia Todd. *Trade Unions and the State in Peninsular Malaysia*. Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1994.
- Jones, David Martin. *Political Development in Pacific Asia*. Cambridge: Polity, 1997.
- Jopple, Christian. *East German Dissidents and the Revolution of 1989: Social Movement in a Leninist Regime*. London: Macmillan, 1995.
- K.J. Ratnam. *Communalism and the Political Process in Malaya*. Kuala Lumpur: University of Malaya Press, 1965.
- Kerkvliet, Benedict. *The Power of Everyday Politics: How Vietnamese Peasants Transformed National Policy*. Singapore: Institute for Southeast Asian Studies, 2005.
- Kessler, Clive S. "Malaysia: Islamic Revivalism and Political Disaffection in a Divided Society". *Southeast Asia Chronicle* 75 (October 1980): 3–11.
- Key, Valdimer Orlando. *Politics, Parties and Pressure Groups*. 5th ed. New York: Crowell, 1964.
- Keylor, William. *A World of Nations: The International Order Since 1945*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2003.

- Khoo, Boo Teik. "Democracy and Authoritarianism in Malaysia Since 1957: Class, Ethnicity and Changing Capitalism". In *Democratization in Southeast and East Asia*, edited by Anek Laothamatas. Singapore: Institute for Southeast Asian Studies, 1997.
- . *Beyond Mahathir: Malaysian Politics and its Discontents*. London: Zed Books, 2003.
- Khor, Jin Kong and Khoo Kay Peng. *Non-Sectarian Politicians in Malaysia: The Case of Parti Gerakan Rakyat Malaysia*. Kuala Lumpur: Trafalgar, 2008.
- Kinkwok Daily News 建国日报. "Huawu Jiaoyu Baogaoshu Pingyi" 华巫教育报告书平议 [Reviews on the Chinese and Malay education reports]. 12 July 1951.
- Kitschelt, Herbert. "Landscapes of Political Interest Intermediation. Social Movements, Interest Groups and Parties in the Early Twenty-First Century". In *Social Movements and Democracy*, edited by Pedro Ibarra. Houndsmill, Basingstoke: Palgrave-MacMillan, 2003.
- Klandermans, Bert. "A Theoretical Framework for Comparisons of Social Movement Participation". *Sociological Forum* 8, no. 3 (September 1993): 383–402.
- Klandermans, Bert and Sjoerd Goslinga. "Media Discourse, Movement Publicity and the Generation of Collective Action Frames: Theoretical and Empirical Exercises in Meaning Construction". In *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements*, edited by Doug McAdam, John McCarthy, and Mayer Zald. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.
- Klandermans, Bert, Hanspeter Kriesi, and Sidney Tarrow. *From Structure to Action: Comparing Social Movement Research Across Cultures*. Greenwich: JAI, 1988.
- KLCSTAAMEC (Kuala Lumpur Chinese Schoolteachers' Association Anniversary Magazine Editing Committee 吉隆坡教师公会纪念特刊编委会). *Jilongpo Jiaoshi Gonghui 1949–1999 Wenxian Ji Shiliao Huibian Jingxi Huiqing Jinian Tekan* 吉隆坡教师公会1949–1999文献及史料汇编—金禧会庆纪念特刊 [Commemoration magazine of Kuala Lumpur Chinese Schoolteachers Association's fiftieth anniversary with collection of articles and materials from 1949 to 1999]. Kuala Lumpur: Kuala Lumpur Chinese Schoolteachers Association, 2000.
- Knight, Jack. *Institutions and Social Conflict*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992.
- Koh, Tsu Koon 许子根. *Xuzigen Boshi Canzheng Sinian Yanlun Xuanji Zhiyi* 许子根博士参政四年言论选集之一 [Selection of speeches from Dr. Koh Tsu Koon's first four years in politics 1]. Penang: Syarikat Perniagaan Toh and Tan, 1986.
- Kok, Wah Ying 郭华盈. "Dongxiao Fengbo Jieshu, Jianli Guanli Shoufei Jizhi Dujue-Lanquan" 董校风波结束, 建立管理收费机制杜绝滥权 [The end of the controversy between school committee and school principal, establishment of financial management institution to prevent corruption in the future]. *Merdeka Review* 独立新闻在线, 18 March 2006 <<http://www.merdekarreview.com/news.php?n=1376>> (accessed 4 September 2013).

- Koopmans, Ruud. "Movements and Media: Selection Processes and Evolutionary Dynamics in the Public Sphere". *Theory and Society* 33, no. 3/4 (June–August 2004): 367–91.
- Kriesi, Hanspeter, Ruud Koopmans, and Jan Duyvendak. *The Politics of New Social Movements in Western Europe: A Comparative Analysis*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1995.
- Ku, Hung Ting 古鸿廷. *Jiaoyu Yu Rentong: Malaixiya Huawen Zhongxue Jiaoyu Zhi Yanjiu, 1945–2000* 教育与认同: 马来西亚华文中学教育之研究, 1945–2000 [Education and identity: Research on Chinese secondary schools' education in Malaysia, 1945–2000]. Xiamen: Xiamen University Press 厦门大学出版社, 2003.
- Kua, Kia Soong. *The New Era College Controversy and the Betrayal of Dong Jiao Zong*. Kuala Lumpur: Oriengroup, 2009.
- Kwongwahyitpoh 光华日报. "Xuexiao Shitang Zhaobiao Zhuquan Jiaoxianjiaoju, Duqianhuan Jiangwei Huaxiao Zhenghui Quanyi" 学校食堂招标主权交县教育局, 杜乾煥将为华校争回权益 [Surrender of rental rights of school canteen to the district education department, Toh Kin Woon will retrieve these rights for the Chinese schools]. 22 September 2004.
- . "Mahanshun: Pi 9 Duzhong Yidi Yangxiao, Zhouzhengfu Bokuan Jiang Shouhui" 马汉顺: 霹9独中以地养校, 州政府拨款将收回 [Ma Han Shun: Nine independent Chinese secondary schools in Perak will sustain the school expenses through profits from land, the state government will revert financial aid]. 21 August 2010.
- Lai, Suat Yan. "Participation of the Women's Movement in Malaysia: The 1999 General Election". In *Civil Society in Southeast Asia*, edited by Lee Hock Guan. Denmark and Singapore: Nordic Institute of Asian Studies and Institute for Southeast Asian Studies, 2004.
- Lai, Xiao Jian 廖小健. "Malaixiya Liangxianzhi Chubu Xingcheng" 马来西亚两线制初步形成 [The formation of dual coalition system in Malaysia]. *Dangdai Yatai* 当代亚太 [Contemporary Asia Pacific] 4, no. 4 (2001): 19–23.
- Laothamatas, Anek. "Development and Democratization: A Theoretical Introduction with Reference to the Southeast Asian and East Asian Cases". In *Democratization in Southeast and East Asia*, edited by Anek Laothamatas. Singapore: Institute for Southeast Asian Studies, 1997.
- LCHR (Lawyers Committee for Human Rights). *Malaysia: Assault on the Judiciary*. New York: Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, 1990.
- Lee, C.H. Julian. *Islamization and Activism in Malaysia*. Singapore: Institute for Southeast Asian Studies, 2010.
- Lee, Kam Hing. "The Political Position of the Chinese in Post-Independence Malaysia". In *The Chinese Diaspora: Selected Essays 2*, edited by Wang Ling Chi and Wang Gung Wu. Singapore: Times Academic, 1998.
- Lee, L.M. Raymond. "Patterns of Religious Tension in Malaysia". *Asian Survey* 28, no. 4 (April 1988): 400–18.

- . “The State, Religious Nationalism and Ethnic Rationalization in Malaysia”. *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 13, no. 4 (October 1990): 482–502.
- Lee, Leong Sze 利亮时. “Malaixiya Huawen Jiaoyu De Shanbian 1945–1970” 马来西亚华文教育的嬗变 1945–1970 [Transformation of Chinese education in Malaysia 1945–1970]. Master’s thesis, National University of Singapore, 1999.
- Lee, Phun Koon 李亚逮. “Linlianyu: Xiaoxiao De Kaoju” 林连玉: 小小的考据 [Lim Lian Geok: Some criticism]. In *Zhuhun Linlianyu Xubian* 族魂林连玉续编 [Soul of Malaysian Chinese Lim Lian Geok continuation edition], edited by Lee Phun Koon. Selangor: Lim Lian Geok Cultural Development Center 林连玉基金会, 2005.
- . *Wanjie Piaoxiang Xubian* 晚节飘香续编 [Biography of Sim Mow Yu 2]. Selangor: United Chinese Schoolteachers’ Association of Malaysia, 2006.
- Lee, Yip Lim 李业霖. *Nanyang Daxue Shilunji* 南洋大学史论集 [Collection of articles on Nanyang University]. Selangor: Nanyang University Alumni Association of Malaya 马来亚南大校友会, 2004.
- Leo, Suryadinata. “Ethnic Chinese Political Participation and the Revival of Chinese Culture: Post-Suharto Developments”. In *Chinese Diaspora Since Admiral Zhenghe*, edited by Leo Suryadinata. Singapore: Chinese Heritage Centre, 2007.
- Leong, Choon Heng and Tan Siew Hoey. “Malaysia: Social Development, Poverty Reduction and Economic Transformation”. In *Development with a Human Face: Experiences in Social Achievements and Economic Growth*, edited by Santosh Mehrotra and Richard Jolly. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997.
- Levitsky, Steven and Lucan Way. “The Rise of Competitive Authoritarianism”. *Journal of Democracy* 13, no. 2 (April 2002): 51–65.
- Lew, Bon Hoi 廖文辉. *Huaxiao Jiaozong Ji Qirenwu (1951–2005)* 华校教总及其人物 (1951–2005) [The United Chinese Schoolteachers’ Association of Malaysia and its activists (1951–2005)]. Selangor: United Chinese Schoolteachers’ Association of Malaysia, 2006.
- Lew, Bon Hoi and Loot Ting Yee 陆庭谕, eds. *Shenmuyu Shiji Xinian* 沈慕羽事迹系年 [Life story of Sim Mow Yu]. Kuala Lumpur: United Chinese Schoolteachers’ Association of Malaysia, 1997.
- Lijphart, Arend. “Typologies of Democratic Systems”. *Comparative Political Studies* 1 (1968): 3–43.
- . “Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method”. *American Political Science Review* 65, no. 3 (September 1971): 682–93.
- . “Non-Majoritarian Democracy: A Comparison of Federal and Consociational Theories”. *Publius* 15, no. 2 (Spring 1985): 3–15.
- . *Thinking About Democracy*. London and New York: Routledge, 2008.
- Lim, Guo An 林国安. “Malaixiya Huawen Duli Zhongxue Kecheng Mubiao Yanjiu” 马来西亚华文独立中学课程目标研究 [Study on the curriculum objectives of independent Chinese secondary schools in Malaysia]. *Malaixiya*

- Huawen Jiaoyu* 马来西亚华文教育 [Chinese education in Malaysia] 2 (December 2004): 6–19.
- Lim, Hong Siang 林宏祥. “Jingwu Dongshizhang Jubao Xiaozhang Juankuan Cunru Buzhiming Hukou” 精武董事长举报校长捐款存入不知名户口 [Chairman of Chen Moh’s school committee reveals that the school principal deposited donations into an unknown bank account]. *Merdeka Review*, 24 November 2005 <<http://www.merdeka-review.com/news.php?n=122>> (accessed 4 September 2013).
- . “Jingwu Huaxiao Dongshihui Yu Xiaozhang De Jiaoli” 精武华小董事会与校长的角力 [Disputes between Chen Moh’s school committee and school principal]. *Merdeka Review*, 3 March 2006a <[http://www.merdeka-review.com/news\\_v2.php?n=1287](http://www.merdeka-review.com/news_v2.php?n=1287)> (accessed 4 September 2013).
- . “Xiaozhang Tanwu Zhengduan: Jianyan Zhongwen Baozhang Zhenmianmu” 校长贪污争端: 检验中文报章真面目 [Disputes on corrupted school principal: The truth about Chinese press]. *Merdeka Review*, 9 March 2006b <[http://www.merdeka-review.com/news\\_v2.php?n=1327](http://www.merdeka-review.com/news_v2.php?n=1327)> (accessed 4 September 2013).
- . “Sizhang Zongzhi Erwan Zhipiao Xialuo Buming, Jingwu Qiongzhu Bushe Bizou Jiaoyu Juzhang?” 四张总值二万支票下落不明, 精武穷追不舍逼走教育局长? [Unable to explain the whereabouts of four cheques with total sum of RM20,000, pressure from Chen Moh forces the departure of the Head of the Education Department]. *Merdeka Review*, 19 June 2006c <<http://www.merdeka-review.com/news.php?n=1954>> (accessed 4 September 2013).
- Lim, Kit Siang. “Call on Malaysian Chinese to be Aware of New Election Gimmicks Like Merger or Joint Councils to Bring About a Repeat of the 1982 General Elections Results”. Speech. 10 March 1985 <<http://bibliotheca.limkitsiang.com/1985/03/10/call-on-malaysian-chinese-to-be-aware-of-new-election-gimmicks-like-merger-or-joint-councils-to-bring-about-a-repeat-of-the-1982-general-elections-results/>> (accessed 9 September 2013).
- . “Call on Tung Chiau Chung Officials Responsible for the 1982 Strategy of ‘Attack into the Barisan Nasional to Recrify Barisan Nasional’ to Admit the Grave Error of Their Decision, and to Direct these like Ker Choo Ting, Koh Tsu Koon and Others Who joined Gerakan on This Mission to Withdraw from Barisan or to Lose All Forms of Tung Chiau Chung support”. Speech. 28 May 1986 <<http://bibliotheca.limkitsiang.com/1986/05/28/call-on-tungchiauchung-officials-responsible-for-the-1982-strategy-of-attack-into-the-barisan-nasional-to-recrify-barisan-nasional-to-admit-the-grave-error-of-their-decision-and-t/>> (accessed 9 September 2013).
- . “Two-Coalition System to Crush the Monopoly of Political Power and Save Democracy in Malaysia”. Speech. 18 August 1990 <<http://bibliotheca.limkitsiang.com/1990/08/18/two-coalition-system-to-crush-the-monopoly-of-political-power-and-save-democracy-in-malaysia/>> (accessed 9 September 2013).

- Lim, Lian Geok 林连玉. "Wo Weishenme Shiwang" 我为什么失望 [Why I was disappointed]. *Jiaoshi Zazhi* 教师杂志 [Teacher's Journal] 1, no. 5 (1960): 3.
- . *Huiyi Pianpianlu* 回忆片片录 [My memoir]. Kuala Lumpur: United Chinese Schoolteachers' Association of Malaysia, 1965.
- . *Fengyu Shibanian Shangji* 风雨十八年上集 [Eighteen years of challenges 1]. Kuala Lumpur: United Chinese Schoolteachers' Association of Malaysia, 1988.
- . "Linlianyu Gongminquan An" 林连玉公民权案 [Civil rights of Lim Lian Geok]. Kuala Lumpur: Lim Lian Geok Cultural Development Center, 1989.
- . *Fengyu Shibanian Xiaji* 风雨十八年下集 [Eighteen years of challenges 2]. Kuala Lumpur: United Chinese Schoolteachers' Association of Malaysia, 1990.
- . *Linliang Gong'an* 林梁公案 [Controversies between Lim Lian Geok and Liang Yu Gao]. Kuala Lumpur: Lim Lian Geok Cultural Development Center, 1998.
- Lin, Hua Dong 林华东. "Zouxiang Shiji De Dongnanya Huawen Jiaoyu Yu Jiaoxue" 走向21世纪的东南亚华文教育与教学 [Chinese education and teachings in Southeast Asia towards the Twenty-First Century]. *Journal of Quanzhou Normal College* 泉州师范学院学报 18, no. 5 (2000): 35.
- Lin, Wu Cong 林武聪 Wang Zong Lin 王宗麟, and Xu De Fa 许德发, eds. *Xiankai Huaxiao De Ditan: Xiaozhang Shetan Zhengyiji* 掀开华小的地毯: 校长涉贪争议集 [Controversy over alleged corruption among Chinese Primary Schools' principals]. Kuala Lumpur: Suirensi 燧人氏事业, 2006.
- Linz, Juan José. "Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes". In *Handbook of Political Science* 3, edited by Fred Greenstein and Nelson Polsby. Reading: Addison-Wesley, 1975.
- Liow, Joseph. "The Politics Behind Malaysia's Eleventh General Election". *Asian Survey* 45, no. 6 (November-December 2005): 907–30.
- Lipsky, Michael. "Protest As a Political Resource". *American Political Science Review* 62 (1968): 1144–58.
- Liu, Bo Kui 刘伯奎. *Xingtian Ershinian: Zhongzhong Ershinian* 杏坛二十年: 中中二十年 [Twenty years at Zhonghua High School]. Singapore: South Seas Society 南洋学会, 1986.
- Loh, Kok Wah Francis. *The Politics of Chinese Unity in Malaysia: Reform and Conflict in the Malaysian Chinese Association 1971–1973*. Singapore: Institute for Southeast Asian Studies, 1982.
- . "Chinese New Villages". In *The Chinese in Malaysia*, edited by Lee K.H. and C.B. Tan. Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 2000.
- . *Old vs. New Politics in Malaysia: State and Society in Transition*. Petaling Jaya: Strategic Information and Research Development Centre and Aliran, 2009.
- Loh, Kok Wah Francis and Johan Saravanamuttu, eds. *New Politics in Malaysia*. Singapore: Institute for Southeast Asian Studies, 2003.
- Loh, Kok Wah Francis and Khoo Boo Teik, eds. *Democracy in Malaysia: Discourses and Practices*. Surrey: Curzon, 2002.

- Loh, Kok Wah Francis, Phang Chung Nyap, and Johan Saravanamuttu. *The Chinese Community and Malaysia-China Ties: Elite Perspectives*. Tokyo: Institute of Developing Economics, 1981.
- Lomperis, Timothy. *From People's War to People's Rule: Insurgency, Intervention and the Lessons of Vietnam*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1996.
- Lounsbury, Michael and Bill Kaghan. "Organizations, Occupations and the Structuration of Work". *Research in the Sociology of Work* 10 (2001): 25–51.
- Lyon, Margo. "The Dakwah Movement in Malaysia". *Review of Indonesian and Malayan Affairs* 13, no. 2 (1979): 34–45.
- Mackie, Jamie A.C. *Konfrontasi: The Indonesia-Malaysia Dispute 1963–1966*. Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1974.
- Mainwaring, Scott. "Introduction: Democratic Accountability in Latin America". In *Democratic Accountability in Latin America*, edited by Scott Mainwaring and Christopher Welna. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003.
- Makmor Tumen. *Wanita di Malaysia: Perjuangan Menuntut Hak* [Women in Malaysia: Struggles for rights]. Kuala Lumpur: Penerbit Universiti Malaya, 2006.
- Malay Mail*. "Tan Siew Sin: It Would Be Easier for Hell to Freeze Over Than for Merdeka University to Be Established under the Prevailing Circumstances in Malaysia". 17 April 1969.
- Malaysiakini*, "Motaixi Changzu 'Duzhong Jiaoyu Lianmeng', Dongzongping: Tu Cuanduo Huajiao Lingdaoquan" 莫泰熙倡组“独中教育联盟”,董总抨: 图篡夺华教领导权 [Bock Tai Hee proposes the establishment of the Independent Chinese Secondary Schools Education Alliance, United Chinese School Committee's Association of Malaysia criticises it as an attempt to overtake the leadership of the Chinese education movement]. 2 October 2009 <<http://www.malaysiakini.com/news/114087>> (accessed on 3 November 2013).
- March, James and Johan Olsen. "The New Institutionalism: Organizational Factors in Political Life". *American Political Science Review* 78 (1984): 734–49.
- Marsden, Peter. "Brokerage Behavior in Restricted Exchange Networks". In *Social Structure and Network Analysis*, edited by Peter Marsden and Nan Lin. Beverly Hills: Sage, 1982.
- Marsh, Ian. "Introduction". In *Democratization, Governance and Regionalism in East and Southeast Asia: A Comparative Study*, edited by Ian Marsh. New York: Routledge, 2006.
- Mason, Frederic. *The Schools of Malaya*. Singapore: Donald Moore, 1954.
- Mauzy, Diane. *Barisan Nasional: Coalition Government in Malaysia*. Kuala Lumpur: Marican and Sons, 1983a.
- . "The 1982 General Elections in Malaysia: A Mandate for Change?". *Asian Survey* 23, no. 4 (April 1983b): 497–517.



- Mauzy, Diane and Robert Stephen Milne. "The Mahathir Administration in Malaysia: Discipline through Islam". *Pacific Affairs* 56, no. 4 (Winter 1983): 617–48.
- Maznah Mohamad. "The Contest for Malay Votes in 1999: UMNO's Most Historic Challenge?". In *New Politics in Malaysia*, edited by Loh Kok Wah Francis and Johan Saravanamuttu. Singapore: Institute for Southeast Asian Studies, 2003.
- . *Paradoxes of State Islamization in Malaysia: Routinization of Religious Charisma and the Secularization of the Syariah*. Singapore: Asia Research Institute, 2009.
- MCACEB (Malaysian Chinese Association Central Education Bureau). "Mahua Gonghui Quanguo Huaxiao Xiaodi Diaocha Baogao" 马华公会全国华小校地调查报告 [Report on Chinese primary schools' land ownership status, a national survey conducted by Malaysian Chinese Association]. *Sinchew Daily*, 16 October 2008.
- McAdam, Doug. *Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency, 1930–1970*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982.
- . "The Framing Function of Movement Tactics: Strategic Dramaturgy in the American Civil Rights Movement". In *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures and Cultural Framings*, edited by Doug McAdam, John McCarthy, and Mayer Zald. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.
- McAdam, Doug, John McCarthy, and Mayer Zald, eds. *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures and Cultural Framings*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.
- McAdam, Doug, Sidney Tarrow, and Charles Tilly. "Toward An Integrated Perspective on Social Movements and Revolution". In *Comparative Politics: Rationality, Culture and Structure*, edited by Mark Irving Lichbach and Alan Zuckerman. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997.
- . *Dynamics of Contention*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001.
- McCarthy, John, Jackie Smith, and Mayer Zald. *The Trend of Social Movements in America: Professionalization and Resource Mobilization*. Morristown: General Learning, 1973.
- McCarthy, John and Mayer Zald. "Resource Mobilization and Social Movements: A Partial Theory". *American Journal of Sociology* 82 (1977): 1212–41.
- MCOEAC (Malaysian Chinese Organisations' Election Appeals Committee 马来西亚华人社团大选诉求委员会). *Malaixiya Hwaren Shetuan Daxuan Suqiu Ziliao Huibian* 1999–2001 *Dier Fence* 马来西亚华人社团大选诉求资料汇编 1999–2001 第二分册 [Collection of documents on the Malaysian Chinese Organisations' Election Appeals Committee 1999–2001 vol. 2]. Selangor: United Chinese School Committees' Association of Malaysia, 2002.
- Means, Gordon. "Public Policy toward Religion in Malaysia". *Pacific Affairs* 51 (Fall 1978): 384–405.

- . *Malaysian Politics: The Second Generation*. Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1991.
- Melucci, Alberto. "The New Social Movements: A Theoretical Approach". *Social Science Information* 19, no. 2 (1980): 199–266.
- . "The Symbolic Challenge of Contemporary Movements". *Social Research* 52 (1985): 789–816.
- . *Nomads of the Present: Social Movements and Individual Needs in Contemporary Society*. London: Hutchinson Radius, 1989.
- . *Challenging Codes, Collective Action in the Information Age*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.
- MEM (Ministry of Education Malaysia). *Educational Statistics of Malaysia 1974/1975*. Kuala Lumpur: Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka, 1978.
- . *Draf Buku Panduan Rancangan Integrasi Murid-Murid* [Draft guidebook for Student Integration Program]. Kuala Lumpur: Kementerian Pelajaran Malaysia, 1985a.
- . *Sukatan Pelajaran Sekolah Rendah 1983* [Integrated Curriculum for Primary Schools 1983]. Kuala Lumpur: Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka, 1985b.
- . *Educational Statistics of Malaysia 1980–1985*. Kuala Lumpur: Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka, 1986a.
- . *Perangkaan Pendidikan Malaysia 1986* [Educational Statistics of Malaysia 1986]. Kuala Lumpur: Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka, 1986b.
- . *Perangkaan Pendidikan Malaysia 1987* [Educational Statistics of Malaysia 1987]. Kuala Lumpur: Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka, 1990.
- . *Perangkaan Pendidikan Malaysia 1991* [Educational Statistics of Malaysia 1991]. Putrajaya: Ministry of Education Malaysia, 1991.
- . *Sekolah Wawasan: Konsep dan Pelaksanaan* [Vision School: Concepts and implementations]. Kuala Lumpur: Jabatan Pelajaran Malaysia, 1995.
- . *Perangkaan Pendidikan Malaysia 2007* [Malaysia Educational Statistics 2007]. Putrajaya: Ministry of Education Malaysia, 2007.
- . *Perangkaan Pendidikan Malaysia 2008* [Malaysia Educational Statistics 2008]. Putrajaya: Ministry of Education Malaysia, 2008.
- . *Perangkaan Pendidikan Malaysia 2009* [Malaysia Educational Statistics 2009]. Putrajaya: Ministry of Education Malaysia, 2009.
- . *Perangkaan Pendidikan Malaysia 2010* [Malaysia Educational Statistics 2010]. Putrajaya: Ministry of Education Malaysia, 2010.
- . *Perangkaan Pendidikan Malaysia 2011* [Malaysia Educational Statistics 2011]. Putrajaya: Ministry of Education Malaysia, 2011.
- Merdeka Review*. "Motaixi Qingchu Biaoming Buliuren, Yangyungui: Buxuyue Nai Changwei Jueding" 莫泰熙清楚表明不留任, 杨云贵: 不续约乃常委决定 [Bock Tai Hee indicates that he will not stay, Yang Yun Gui says that the decision of not renewing Bock's contract was made by the Standing Committee]. 20 October 2006 <<http://www.merdeka-review.com/news.php?n=2799>> (accessed 2 September 2013).

- . “Liangxianzhi Fazhan Shi Quanmin Shengli, Dongjiaozong Ti Qida Jiaoyu Yaoqiu” 两线制发展是全民胜利, 董教总提七大教育要求 [The development of dual coalition system is a victory for all people, *Dongjiaozong* proposes seven educational demands]. 14 March 2008 <[http://www.merdekarereview.com/news\\_v2.php?n=6250](http://www.merdekarereview.com/news_v2.php?n=6250)> (accessed 2 September 2013).
- . “Bada Huatuan Yu Hashanamo Jiaoliu, Yizhi Tongyi Huifu Muyu Jiaoshuli” 八大华团与哈山阿末交流, 一致同意恢复母语教数理 [Eight Chinese guilds and associations exchange ideas with Hassan Ahmad and mutually agree to restore the teachings of Mathematic and Science subjects using mother tongue]. 13 March 2009 <<http://www.merdekarereview.com/news/n/9067.html>> (accessed 2 September 2013).
- Meyer, David and Sidney Tarrow. “A Movement Society: Contentious Politics for a New Century”. In *The Social Movement Society: Contentious Politics for a New Century*, edited by David Meyer and Sidney Tarrow. Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield, 1998.
- Migdal, Joel. *Strong Societies and Weak States*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988.
- Milne, Robert Stephen. “Malaysia”. *Asian Survey* 4, no. 2 (February 1964): 695–701.
- . “Malaysia and Singapore, 1975”. *Asian Survey* 16, no. 2, part II (February 1976): 186–92.
- Milne, Robert Stephen and Diane Mauzy. *Malaysian Politics under Mahathir*. London: Routledge, 1999.
- MLHGSBJZ (Malaiya Lianhebang Huawen Gaoji Shifan Biye Jiaoshi Zhigonghui 马来亚联合邦华文高级师范毕业教师职工会). *Gaoshi Sishinian (1949–1989) Malaiya Lianhebang Huawen Gaoji Shifan Biye Jiaoshi Zhigonghui Jinian Tekan* 高师四十年 (1949–1989) 马来亚联合邦华文高级师范毕业教师职工会纪念特刊 [Commemoration magazine of Senior Normal Graduate Schoolteachers Association's fortieth anniversary (1949–1989)]. Kuala Lumpur: Malaiya Lianhebang Huawen Gaoji Shifan Biye Jiaoshi Zhigonghui, 1990.
- Mohamad Abu Bakar. “Islamic Revivalism and the Political Process in Malaysia”. *Asian Survey* 21, no. 10 (October 1981): 1040–59.
- Mohamed Salleh Abas. *May Day for Justice: The Lord President's Version*. Kuala Lumpur: Magnus Books, 1989a.
- . *The Role of the Independent Judiciary*. Kuala Lumpur: Promarketing, 1989b.
- Morrill, Calvin. *The Executive Way: Conflict Management in Corporations*. Chicago: University Chicago Press, 1995.
- MPSSMCM (Majlis Pengetua Sekolah-Sekolah Menengah Conforming Malaysia 全国华中校长理事会), ed. *Malaixiya Guominxing Huawen Zhongxue Zhinan* 马来西亚国民型华文中学指南 [Directory of Conforming Chinese Secondary Schools in Malaysia]. Kuala Lumpur: Majlis Pengetua Sekolah-Sekolah Menengah Conforming Malaysia, 2006.

- MU (Malayan Union). *Annual Report on Education in the Malayan Union for the Period 1st April 1946 to 31st December 1946*. Council Paper no. 53 of 1946. Kuala Lumpur: Government Press, 1947.
- MUB (Merdeka University Berhad 独大有限公司). "Cheng Zuigaoyuanshou Qingqiu Enzhun Chuangban Duli Daxue Qingyuanshu" 呈最高元首请求恩准创办独立大学请愿书 [Petition Submitted to Yang Dipertuan Agong of Malaysia for Incorporation Order for the Establishment of Merdeka University]. 30 January 1978a.
- . *Duda Wengaoji* 独大文告集 [Collection of articles on Merdeka University]. Kuala Lumpur: Merdeka University Berhad, 1978b.
- Nanyangshangpao* 南洋商报, "Ping Baien Weiyuanhui Baogaoshu" 评拜恩委员会报告书 [Review of the Barnes Report]. 13 June 1951.
- . "Huawen Jiaoyu Baogaoshu Zhengyi De Zhuzhang" 华文教育报告书 正义的主张 [The rightful position of the Chinese Education Report]. 9 July 1951.
- . "Lun Muyu Jiaoyu De Zhongyaoxing" 论母语教育的重要性 [Discussion on the importance of mother tongue education]. 19 July 1951.
- . "Zailun Huawen Ying Liewei Guanfang Yuwen" 再论华文应列为官方语文 [Another discussion on instating Chinese language as official language]. 20 October 1954.
- . "Fangyan Jiaoyu Yu Guomin Jiaoyu" 方言教育与国民教育 [Vernacular and national education]. 23 October 1954.
- . "Zhengyi Yongqi, Zuihou Jueze" 正义勇气, 最后抉择 [The final option]. 10 November 1954.
- . "Wei Weihu Huawen Jiaoyu Er Fendou" 为维护华文教育而奋斗 [Striving to protect the Chinese education]. 15 November 1954.
- . "Shoujian Zonghe Xiaoxue Kaishi Shangke" 首间综合小学开始上课 [First integrated school starts operation]. 22 August 1985.
- . "Sanjiehe Yu Liangge Zhenxian Gainian Shutu Tonggui, Junwei Kangju Zhongzu Zhuyi, Dongzong Zhuxi Linhuangsheng" 三结合与两个阵线概念殊途同归, 均为抗拒种族主义, 董总主席林晃升 [United Chinese School Committees' Association of Malaysia Chairman Lim Fong Seng: The alliance of three and the dual coalition shares the goal of opposing racism]. 1 September 1986.
- . "57 Jian Huaxiao Quanmian Bake, Binjiapoxuezhi Yu Sanwan Xuesheng Wei Shangke" 57间华小全面罢课, 檳甲坡雪直逾三万学生未上课 [Fifty-seven Chinese primary schools participate in the protest, more than 30,000 students in Penang, Malacca, Perlis, Selangor, and Kuala Lumpur skip school]. 16 October 1987.
- . "Xingdongdang, Siliu, Huatuan Quxiang Dajiehe, Liuhuajiao Renshi Cheng Huojian Shangzhen" 行动党, 四六, 华团趋向大结合, 六华教人士乘火箭上阵 [Unity of Democratic Action Party, Semangat 46, and the

- Chinese guilds and associations, six Chinese educationalists will contest in the general elections under Democratic Action Party]. 26 July 1990.
- . “Xinshengdai De Zhengzhi Linian He Shijian” 新生代的政治理念和实践 [Political ideas of the new generation and its implementation]. 1 August 1990.
- . “Lianhe Xuanyan Xia Zhengzhi Daohuoxian, Huatuan Canxuan Yijian Fenqi” 联合宣言下争执导火线, 华团参选意见分歧 [Disputes over joint manifesto, conflict of opinions on the participation of Chinese guilds and associations in general elections]. 3 August 1990a.
- . “Pidonglianhui Yu Zhouduzhong Gongweihui, Mingtian Zhaokai Tebie Lianxi Huiyi Shang Huajiao Renshi Canzheng Xuanshi” 霹董联会与州独中工委会, 明天召开特别联席会议商华教人士参政参选事 [Perak Chinese School Committees' Association and Perak State Independent Chinese Secondary Schools Working Committee will hold a special joint meeting tomorrow to discuss the issue of Chinese educationalists' participation in politics]. 3 August 1990b.
- . “Quanguo Dongzong Fuzhuxi: Gongping Duidai Huajiao Canxuan Renshi” 全国董总副主席: 公平对待华教参选人士 [Deputy chairman of United Chinese School Committees' Association of Malaysia: Treat the Chinese educationalists who participated in general elections with justice]. 3 August 1990c.
- . “Zantong Benbao Shelun Kanfa, Dui Huajiao Renshi Canxuan Wenti Bufang Yi Kaifang Xionghuai Kandai—Chensongsheng Lushi” 赞同本报社论看法, 对华教人士参选问题不妨以开放胸怀看待—陈松生律师 [Chen Song Seng agrees with the opinions posted in *Nanyangshangpao* on being open to the participation of Chinese educationalists in politics]. 4 August 1990.
- . “Huajiao Jigou Buzhanran Zhengzhi Secai: Dongjiaozong Chengyuan Canxuan Xucizhi” 华教机构不沾染政治色彩: 董教总成员参选须辞职 [Chinese education institutions will not associate with politics: *Dongjiaozong* members must resign]. 5 August 1990.
- . “Linhuangsheng Biaoming Yuan Canxuan, Dongzong Zhuxi Fenxi Xingshi Zhi Zhizhengdang Taiqiang, Huajiao Renshi Jiaru Fanzhen Keqi Junheng Zuoyong” 林晃升表明愿参选, 董总主席分析形势指执政党太强, 华教人士加入反阵可起均衡作用 [Lim Fong Seng announces his willingness to compete in the general elections, the current ruling regime is too powerful, Chinese educationalists may help to balance the situation by joining the opposition]. 6 August 1990.
- . “Laijie Daxuan Shiyu Liutaisheng Jiangzai Fanduidang Qixia Chuzhan” 来届大选十余留台生将在反对党旗下出战 [About ten Taiwanese university graduates will participate in the upcoming general elections as candidates of the opposition parties]. 7 August 1990.
- . “Senzhonghua Gongshang Lianzong Shuli Huizhang Lizun Renwei, Ruowei Canxuan Er Chanzheng, Shexian Mou Zhengzhi Sili” 森中华工商联总署

- 理会长李俊认为, 若为参选而参政, 涉嫌谋政治私利 [Negeri Sembilan Chinese Chamber of Commerce Deputy President Li Zun thinks that those who participated in the general elections in order to enter politics are highly suspicious of seeking personal advantages]. 8 August 1990.
- . “Qian Dongzong Zhixingmishu Liwanqian, Juchuan Jue Jingxuan Bajili Guoxi” 前董总执行秘书李万千, 据传决竞选峇吉里国席 [Former United Chinese School Committees' Association of Malaysia Chief Executive Officer Lee Ban Chen may be contesting at Bakri parliamentary constituency]. 9 August 1990.
- . “Jiaoyu Xieshang Lishihui Mingdan Puguang Zhengdang Shou Yao Dong Jiao Zong Shang Bang” 教育协商理事会名单曝光: 12政党受邀董教总上榜 [Twelve political parties are invited to participate in *Dongjiaozong's* Education Negotiation Committee]. 18 August 1990.
- . “Linhuangsheng Ren Xingdongdang Guwen, Liwanqian Dang Quanguo Fuzhuxi” 林晃升任行动党顾问, 李万千当全国副主席 [Lim Fong Seng appointed as Democratic Action Party advisor and Lee Ban Chen as the vice president]. 20 August 1990.
- . “Huazi Yijiao Wenti Xuehuatang You Juanru Jiufen, Linyujing Cheng Douzheng Jiaodian” 华资移交问题雪华堂又卷入纠纷, 林玉静成斗争焦点 [Another dispute on the transfer of Huazi Resource and Research Centre to Selangor Chinese Assembly Hall, Lim Geok Chan becomes dispute's focal point]. 13 February 1992.
- . “Sanhuatuan Danwei Zhendui Wuyueshiri Yian Fanan, Tanglian Weixin Shoutiaozhan” 三华团单位针对五月十日议案发难, 堂联威信受挑战 [Three Chinese guilds and associations challenge the prestige of Unified Federation of Malaysian Chinese Assembly Hall by criticising the meeting on 10 May]. 25 May 1992.
- . “Shoubangshi Lihang Huaxiao Fengbo Shimo” 首邦市力行华小风波始末 [The whole story on the controversy of Lick Hung Chinese Primary School]. 26 May 1992.
- . “Huwanduo: Ruguo Huaxiao Dongshihui Diwei Bubao Dongjiaozong Kaolu Fanan” 胡万铎: 如果华小董事会地位不保董教总考虑发难 [Foo Wan Thot: *Dongjiaozong* will revolt if the status of the Chinese primary schools' committees are threatened]. 27 July 1992.
- . “Qianji Quanguo Huaxiao Dongshihui Zhuquan Wenti Dongzong Jue Jieshou Chuli Lihang Fengbo” 迁及全国华小董事会主权问题董总决接手处理力行风波 [United Chinese School Committees' Association of Malaysia decides to intervenes in the Lick Hung controversy as the issue will affect the authority of all Chinese primary schools committees in Malaysia]. 8 August 1992.
- . “Sendonglianhui Chuxuan, Huhuoshan Jumoxi, Chensongshengpai Dahuo Quansheng” 森董联会初选, 胡火山居末席, 陈松生派大获全胜 [Elections of Negeri Sembilan Chinese School Committees' Association, Hoo Huo Shan

- ranked at the bottom most, Chin Choong Sang's fraction won all contested seats]. 25 April 1994.
- . "Qianzhi Lazhu Dianran Huajiaoxin" 千支蜡烛点燃华教心 [Thousands of candles light up the heart of Chinese education movement supporters]. 18 December 1996.
- . "Zhi Jizhe Cuowu Quanshi Tanhua, Zhangzhengxiong Fourean Pingji Suqiu" 指记者错误诠释谈话, 张征雄否认评击诉求 [Chong Chin Shoong blames the reporters for misinterpreted his conversation and denies that he criticized the Malaysian Chinese Organisations' Election Appeals Committee]. 9 September 1999.
- . "Guoquanqiang Ganxie Neige Guanzhu, Yanjiu Ruhe Luoshi Suqiu" 郭全强感谢内阁关注, 研究如何落实诉求 [Quek Suan Hiang appreciates the attention from the cabinet and will research on the implementation of the appeals]. 24 September 1999.
- . "Xiechunrong: Chuncui Wuhui, Suqiu Gongwei Wuxu Daoqian" 谢春荣: 纯粹误会, 诉求工委无须道歉 [Ser Choon Ing: It is merely a misunderstanding, Malaysian Chinese Organisations' Election Appeals Committee does not need to apologize]. 19 August 2000.
- . "Disanzhe Yu Wuqing Jieqia, Anpai Yu Gongweihui Xieshang" 第三者与巫青接洽, 安排与工委会协商 [Third party will contact United Malays National Organisation Youth to broker negotiation platform with the Malaysian Chinese Organisations' Election Appeals Committee]. 20 August 2000.
- . "Suqiu Gongwei Yao Jingfang Guanzhu Dongyan Fen Xuehuatang Kouhao" 诉求工委要警方关注恫言焚雪华堂口号 [Malaysian Chinese Organisations' Election Appeals Committee demands the police to pay attention on the threats to burn down the Selangor Chinese Assembly Hall]. 21 August 2000.
- . "Huatuan Huashe Song Hualan Mianli Suqiu Gongweihui" 华团华社送花篮勉励诉求工委会 [Chinese guilds and associations sent flower baskets as support to Malaysian Chinese Organisations' Election Appeals Committee]. 22 August 2000.
- . "Suqiu Gongweihui Zhihan Xisang, Yaoqiu Yu Wuqing Duihua" 诉求工委会致函希桑, 要求与巫青对话 [The Malaysian Chinese Organisations' Election Appeals Committee sends letter to Hishamuddin and demands dialogue opportunities with United Malays National Organisation Youth]. 23 August 2000.
- . "Zhengfu Zunzhong Yiyuan, Zanting Guchui Bumianqiang 5 Huaxiao Hongyuan Xuexiao" 政府尊重意愿, 暂停鼓吹不勉强5华小宏愿学校 [The government will not force five shortlisted Chinese primary schools to participate in the Vision Schools Program]. 2 December 2000.
- . "Jiaorong Jihua Jingfeida, Quanmian Luoshi Burongyi" 交融计划经费大, 全面落实不容易 [Full scale implementation of the Integration Program may not be possible due to expensive cost]. 10 December 2000.

- . “Guozhuzhen: Xu Jiaqiang Yingwen Jiaodao, Minzheng Zhichi Huawen Jiao Shuli” 郭洙镇: 须加强英文教导, 民政支持华文教数理 [Kerk Choo Ting: Malaysian People’s Movement Party supports the teaching of Mathematic and Science subjects in Chinese, but must enhance the teaching of English subject]. 10 August 2002.
- . “Linjingyi: Sidang Tongyi 2-3-3 Fangan, 8 Jieke Jiao, 3 Xinkemu” 林敬益: 四党同意2-3-3方案, 8节课教, 3新科目 [Lim Keng Yaik: Four political parties agreed at the 2-3-3 resolution, eight periods to teach three new subjects]. 31 October 2002.
- . “Yangqingliang: Jiu Xuexiao Shitang Zhaobiao, Dongzong Buying Weinan Xiaozhang” 杨清亮: 就学校食堂招标, 董总不应为难校长 [Yang Qing Liang: United Chinese School Committees’ Association of Malaysia should not oppress school principals and making things difficult for school principals on the issue of the rental rights of school canteens]. 19 February 2006.
- NEAC (National Economic Advisory Council). *Laporan Majlis Perundingan Ekonomi Negara* [Report of the National Economic Advisory Council]. Kuala Lumpur: Jabatan Percetakan Negara, 1991.
- . *New Economic Model for Malaysia 2010*. Putrajaya: National Economic Advisory Council, 2010.
- News Straits Times*. “New Deal for Education: Policy Reversed but English Hours Extended for Schools”. 9 July 2009.
- Ng, Choon Sim Cecilia. “The Women’s Movement: Towards Multi-Cultural Dialogue and Peace Building”. In *Building Bridges, Crossing Boundaries: Everyday Forms of Inter-Ethnic Peace Building in Malaysia*, edited by Loh Kok Wah Francis. Jakarta: Ford Foundation, 2010a.
- . *The Hazy New Dawn: Democracy, Women and Politics in Malaysia*. Singapore: Asia Research Institute, 2010b.
- Ng, Choon Sim Cecilia, Maznah Mohamad, and Tan Beng Hui. *Feminism and the Women’s Movement in Malaysia: An Unsung (R)evolution*. Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon; New York: Routledge, 2006.
- Ng, Tien Eng. “The Contest for the Chinese Votes: Politics of Negotiation or Politics of Pressure?”. In *New Politics in Malaysia*, edited by Loh Kok Wah Francis and Johan Saravanamuttu. Singapore: Institute for Southeast Asian Studies, 2003.
- NOC (National Operations Council). *The May 13 Tragedy: A Report*. Kuala Lumpur: National Operations Council, 1969.
- Norani Othman, ed. *Muslim Women and the Challenge of Islamic Extremism: Sisters in Islam*. Petaling Jaya: Vinlin, 2005.
- North, Douglass. *Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990.
- NSTP (News Straits Times Press), ed. *Seluruh Hidupnya untuk Malaysia*. [All his life for Malaysia]. Kuala Lumpur: New Straits Times Press, 1976.



- NUAAM et al. (Nanyang University Alumni Association of Malaya 马来亚南大校友会, Nanyang University Alumni Association of Perak 吡叻南大校友会, Nanyang University Alumni Association of Penang 檳城南大校友会, Nanyang University Alumni Association of Johore Bahru 新山南大校友会, and Nanyang University Alumni Association of Sarawak 砂劳越南大校友会), eds. *Jinian Nanyang Daxue Chuangxiao 25 Zhounian Tekan* 纪念南洋大学创校25周年特刊 [Commemoration magazine of Nanyang University's twenty-fifth anniversary]. Kuala Lumpur: Nanyang University Alumni Association of Malaya, Nanyang University Alumni Association of Perak, Nanyang University Alumni Association of Penang, Nanyang University Alumni Association of Johore Bahru, and Nanyang University Alumni Association of Sarawak, 1982.
- O'Balance, Edgar. *Malaya: The Communist Insurgent War, 1948–1960*. Hamden: Archon, 1966.
- Oberschall, Anthony. *Social Movements: Ideologies, Interests and Identities*. New Brunswick: Transaction, 1993.
- OCJKL (OCJ Kuala Lumpur). 2 MLJ 356. *Merdeka University Berhad v. Government of Malaysia*. 1981. <[http://ilms.agc.gov.my:88/online/uploaded/fc/271112030905MERDEKA\\_UNIVERSITY%20BERHAD%20v%20GOVERNMENT%20OF%20MA.pdf](http://ilms.agc.gov.my:88/online/uploaded/fc/271112030905MERDEKA_UNIVERSITY%20BERHAD%20v%20GOVERNMENT%20OF%20MA.pdf)> (accessed 11 September 2013).
- Offe, Claus. "New Social Movements: Challenging the Boundaries of Institutional Politics". *Social Research* 52, no. 4 (1985): 817–68.
- Oliver, Pamela and Gerald Marwell. "Mobilizing Technologies for Collective Action". In *Frontiers in Social Movement Theory*, edited by Aldon Morris and Carol McClurg Mueller. New Haven, London: Yale University Press, 1992.
- Olson, Mancur. *The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965.
- . *The Rise and Decline of Nations*. New Haven, London: Yale University Press, 1982.
- Ongkili, James. *Nation Building in Malaysia, 1946–1974*. Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1985.
- Oriental Daily* 东方日报. "Jiaozhang, Quanli Jiaohui Dongshihui, Shitang Zhaobiao Huifu Yuanzhuang" 教长, 权力交回董事会, 食堂招标恢复原状 [Minister of Education restores the rental rights of school's canteen to the school committee]. 15 October 2004.
- . "Jingwu Huaxiao Fanmaibu" 精武华小贩卖部 [Cooperative shop of Chen Moh Chinese Primary School]. 17 November 2004.
- . "Dongzong Dadizhen Xingzhengbu 7 Ju Zhuren Cicheng" 董总大地震 行政部7局主任辞呈 [Seven head of departments of United Chinese School Committees' Association of Malaysia administrative office resigned]. 10 December 2007.

- Ottaway, Marina. *Democracy Challenged: The Rise of Semi-Authoritarianism*. Washington: Brookings Institution and Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2003.
- Panizza, Francisco. "Human Rights in the Processes of Transition and Consolidation of Democracy in Latin America". *Political Studies* 43 (August 1995): 168–88.
- Park, Robert Ezra. *Society: Collective Behavior, News and Opinion, Sociology and Modern Society*. Glencoe: Free Press, 1955.
- Parsons, Talcott. *The Structure of Social Action*. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1937.
- Peattie, Mark. "Nanshin: 'The Southward Advance' 1931–1941, as a Prelude to the Japanese Occupation of Southeast Asia". In *The Japanese Wartime Empire, 1931–1945*, edited by Ramon Hawley Myers, Mark Peattie, Zhou Wan Yao, and Peter Duus. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996.
- Petra Kamarudin. *The Reformasi Trail*. Kuala Lumpur: Raja Petra Kamarudin, 2001.
- Phatharathananunth, Somchai. *Civil Society and Democratization: Social Movements in Northeast Thailand*. Denmark: Nordic Institute of Asian, 2006.
- Phoon, Wing Keong 潘永强. "Mahuagonghui Paixi Zhengzhi Chutan (2000–2003)" 马华公会派系政治初探 (2000–2003) [A preliminary study of fractional politics in Malaysian Chinese Association (2000–2003)]. *New Era College Academic Journal* 3 (July 2006): 63–88.
- PJCPDWC (Petaling Jaya Chinese Primary Schools Development Working Committee 八打灵发展华小工委). *Badaling Fazhan Huaxiao Gongweihui 2001–2004 Nian Huodong Xilie Ji Lianhuan Wanhui Tekan* 八打灵发展华小工委 2001–2004 年活动系列暨联欢晚会特刊 [Special magazine of Petaling Jaya Chinese Primary Schools Development Working Committee with records of activities conducted from 2001 to 2004]. Selangor: Petaling Jaya Chinese Primary Schools Development Working Committee, 2004.
- Powell, Walter and Paul DiMaggio, eds. *The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991.
- PPPPK (Pertubuhan-Pertubuhan Pendidikan Pelbagai Kaum). "Huanwo Muyu Jiaoyu" 还我母语教育 [Restoration of mother tongue education]. Memorandum submitted to Prime Minister Abdullah Ahmad Badawi. 27 November 2007.
- PTPTN (Perbadanan Tabung Pendidikan Tinggi Nasional). "Pengecualian syarat lulus Sijil Pelajaran Malaysia untuk memohon pembiayaan pendidikan bagi pelajar-pelajar kelulusan Unified Examination Certificate di Institusi Pendidikan Tinggi Swasta" [Educational loan application exemption conditions for Unified Examination Certificate holders who study at Private Higher Education Institutions]. Surat pekeliling Perbadanan Tabung Pendidikan Tinggi Nasional bilangan 2 tahun 2010 [Perbadanan Tabung Pendidikan Tinggi Nasional circular letter no. 2 year 2010]. 3 May 2010.
- Purcell, Victor. *The Chinese in Malaya*. London: Oxford University Press, 1948.
- . *Malaya: Communist or Free?* London: Victor Gollancz, 1954.
- . *The Chinese in Malaya*. Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1967.

- Purdue, Derrick. "Conclusion: Civil Society, Governance, Social Movements and Social Capital". In *Civil Societies and Social Movements: Potentials and Problems*, edited by Derrick Purdue. London and New York: Routledge, 2007.
- Putnam, Robert. *Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community*. New York: Simon and Schuster, 2000.
- PWCRCAGM (Protem Working Committee of Representatives of Chinese Associations and Guilds of Malaysia 马来西亚华人注册社团代表大会筹备工作委员会). "Wei Zhengqu Huawen Diwei Xiang Shouxiang Dongguadulaman Chengsong Beiwanglu" 为争取华文地位向首相东姑阿都拉曼呈送备忘录 [Memorandum to the Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman for a rightful place of the Chinese language]. Kuala Lumpur, 4 November 1965.
- Pye, Lucian. *Lessons from the Malayan Struggle against Communism*. Cambridge: Massachusetts Institute for Technology, 1957.
- Ramakrishna, Kumar. "Transmogrifying Malaya: The Impact of Sir Gerald Templer 1952–1954". *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies* 32, issues 1 (February 2001): 79–92.
- . *Emergency Propaganda: The Winning of Malayan Hearts and Minds 1948–1958*. Surrey: Curzon, 2002.
- Ramasamy, Nagiah and Chris Rowley. "Trade Unions in Malaysia: Complexity of a State-Employer System". In *Trade Unions in Asia: An Economic and Sociological Analysis*, edited by John Benson and Ying Zhu. London: Routledge, 2008.
- Roche, John and Stephen Sachs. "The Bureaucrat and the Enthusiast: An Exploration of the Leadership of Social Movements". In *Studies in Social Movements: A Social Psychological Perspective*, edited by Barry McLaughlin. New York: Free Press, 1969.
- Roff, Margaret. "The Malayan Chinese Association, 1948–1965". *Journal of Southeast Asian History* 6 (1965): 40–53.
- Roger, Kershaw. "Within the Family. The Limits of Doctrinal Differentiation in the Malaysian Ruling Party Election of 1987". *Review of Indonesian and Malaysian Affairs* 23 (1989): 125–93.
- Roy, Kartik and Jörn Sidera. "Institutions, Globalisation and Empowerment: An Overview of Issues". In *Institutions, Globalization and Empowerment*, edited by Kartik Roy and Jörn Sideras. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2006.
- Rudner, Martin. "The Malaysian General Election of 1969: A Political Analysis". *Modern Asian Studies* 4, no. 1 (1970): 1–21.
- S.M. Mohamed Idris. *Malaysian Consumers and Development*. Penang: Consumers' Association of Penang, 1986.
- Sandhu, Kernial Singh. "Emergency Resettlement in Malaya". *Journal of Tropical Geography* 18 (1964): 157–83.
- SCAH (Selangor Chinese Assembly Hall 雪兰莪中华大会堂). "Quanguo Huatuan Lianhe Xuanyan" 全国华团联合宣言 [Joint declaration of Chinese guilds and associations in Malaysia]. Unpublished document. 12 October 1985.

- . “Guanche Huatuan Lianhe Xuanyan Diyijieduan Jiudamubiao” 贯彻华团联合宣言：第一阶段九大目标 [Implementation of the joint declaration of Chinese guilds and associations in Malaysia]. Memorandum. 18 May 1986.
- . *Xuelane Zhonghua Dahuitang Bashi Zhounian Tangqing Jinian Tekan 1923–2003* 雪兰莪中华大会堂八十周年堂庆纪念特刊 1923–2003 [Commemoration magazine of Selangor Chinese Assembly Hall’s eightieth anniversary 1923–2003]. Kuala Lumpur: Selangor Chinese Assembly Hall, 2004.
- Schedler, Andreas. “The Menu of Manipulation”. *Journal of Democracy* 13, no. 2 (April 2002): 36–50.
- Scheingold, Stuart. *The Politics of Rights: Lawyers, Public Policy and Political Change*. 2nd ed. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2004.
- Scott, James. *The Moral Economy of the Peasant: Rebellion and Subsistence in Southeast Asia*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1976.
- . “Resistance without Protest and without Organization: Peasant Opposition to the Islamic Zakat and the Christian Tithe”. *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 29, no. 3 (July 1987): 417–52.
- Shamsul A.B. “Religion and Ethnic Politics in Malaysia”. In *Asian Visions of Authority: Religion and the Modern States of East and Southeast Asia*, edited by Charles Keyes, Laurel Kendall, and Helen Hardcores. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1994.
- Sheila Nair. “Constructing Civil Society in Malaysia: Nationalism, Hegemony and Resistance”. In *Malaysian Studies I: Rethinking Malaysia*, edited by Jomo K.S. Kuala Lumpur: Malaysian Social Science Association, 1999.
- Shen, Ting 沈亭. *Bilizhou Huawen Duzhong Fuxingshi* 吡叻州华文独中复兴史 [History of the Perak independent Chinese secondary schools revival movement]. Perak: Perak Independent Chinese Secondary Schools Working Committee 吡叻州独中工委, 1975.
- Shevtsova, Liliia Fedorovna and Mark Eckert. “Russia’s Hybrid Regime”. *Journal of Democracy* 12, no. 4 (October 2001): 65–70.
- Sia, Keng Yek. *S.R.J.K. (Cina) Dalam Sistem Pendidikan Kebangsaan: Dilema dan Kontroversi* [Chinese primary schools in the national education system: Dilemmas and controversies]. Kuala Lumpur: Penerbit University Malaya, 2005.
- Silcock, Thomas and Ungku Abdul Aziz. “Nationalism in Malaya”. In *Asian Nationalism and the West: A Symposium Based on Documents and Reports of the Eleventh Conference Institute of Pacific Relations*, edited by William Holland. New York: Octagon, 1953.
- Sinchew Daily* 星洲日报. “Fenni Jiaoyu Diaochatuan De Ketu” 芬尼教育调查团的课题 [Topics related to the Fenn-Wu education survey committee]. 8 July 1951.
- . “Huaxiao Yuwen Yu Jiaocai Wenti: Sanlun Fenni Wudeyao Huawen Jiaoyu Baogaoshu” 华校语文与教材问题：三论芬尼吴德耀华文教育报告书

- [Problems on Chinese schools' medium of teaching and teaching materials: The third discussion on Fenn-Wu Education Report on Chinese Education]. 10 July 1951.
- . "Huajiao Jiaoyu Jichu De Tantao" 华教教育基础的探讨 [Exploration on the foundation of Chinese education]. 31 October 1954.
- . "Wanjiu Lianhebang De Huaxiao Jiaoyu" 挽救联合邦的华校教育 [Saving the Chinese education in the Federation of Malaya]. 9 November 1954.
- . "Huajiao Dahui Bimu, Tongguo Cheng Beiwanglu Qing Lianmeng Mingnian Daxuan Zhenggang Jiang Huawen Liewei Guanfangyuyan" 华教大会闭幕, 通过呈备忘录请联盟明年大选政纲将华文列为官方语言 [Closing of the Chinese Education Convention, will submit a memorandum to the Alliance government to demand instating of Chinese language as an official language in the Alliance's election manifesto next year]. 23 September 1958.
- . "Dafu Binwei Gaoshi Jiaoshi Zhigonghui Fenhui Yijianshu" 答复槟威高师教师职工会分会意见书 [Response to Penang Senior Normal Graduate Schoolteachers Association's opinion letter]. 22 October 1962.
- . "Huajiao Gongzuo Weiyuanhui Yitongguo Huawen Daxue Mingcheng Dingwei Duli Daxue" 华教工作委员会会议通过华文大学名称定为独立大学 [Chinese Education Committee will name the new Chinese university as Merdeka University]. 25 February 1968.
- . "Pizhou Dongshi Lianhehui Yuezhong Jiang Huishang, Choumu Baiwanyuan Jijin Zhu Zhounei Duzhong Fazhan" 霹州董事联合会月中将会商, 筹募百万元基金助州内独中发展 [Perak Chinese School Committees' Association will raise financial aid to support development of independent Chinese secondary schools in the state]. 10 April 1975.
- . "Dongjiaozong Huyu Gejie Miqie Guanzhu Jiaoyubu Tuixing Zonghe Xuexiao Jihua" 董教总呼吁各界密切关注教育部推行综合学校计划 [Dongjiaozong calls the public to be vigilant on the Integration School Program introduced by the Ministry of Education]. 9 August 1985.
- . "Tiaopan Butiao Chuxian Xiaoliwai: Jiaoyu Wenti Bei Yanbianwei Zhongzu Jiufen, Bingzhou Maqing Baojing Yaozhuo Shandong Fenzi" 挑畔布条出现校篱外: 教育问题被演变为种族纠纷, 槟州马青报警要捉煽动份子 [Banners with provoking messages are hung outside schools: Penang Branch of Malaysian Chinese Association Youth files police report to arrest provoking parties]. 16 October 1987.
- . "Xinshan Liutai Tongxuehui, Zhichi Liutaisheng Canxuan" 新山留台同学会, 支持留台生参选 [Johore Bahru Taiwanese Universities Graduates Association supports formal Taiwanese Universities graduates to contest in the general elections]. 7 August 1990.
- . "Linhuangsheng Deng 27 Ren Jiaru Xingdongdang" 林晃升等27人加入行动党 [Lim Fong Seng and twenty-seven individuals joined Democratic Action Party]. 8 August 1990.

- . “Kejiaxun: Duoming Huatuan Renshi Youyi Canzheng, Zhizai Xiezhuzhuangda Fanduidang, Foujue Guozhen Sanfener Xiwei” 柯嘉逊: 多名华团人士有意参政, 旨在协助壮大反对党, 否决国阵三分二席位 [Kua Kia Soong: Many individuals from the Chinese guilds and associations have indicated their interest to participate in politics in order to strengthen the opposition parties and to reject Barisan Nasional's two thirds majority in the parliament]. 9 August 1990.
- . “Linhuangsheng Chengren Dangnian Neianling Xia Beikou, Shi Jueding Canzheng Cuihuaji, Gengzhuyao Yuanyin: Tuidong Liangxianzhi Shixian” 林晃升承认当年内安令下被扣, 是决定参政催化剂, 更主要原因: 推动两线制实现 [Lim Fong Seng admits that being arrested under the Internal Security Act has motivated him to participate in politics, more importantly he wants to mobilize the formation of a dual coalition system]. 17 August 1990.
- . “Linhuangsheng Biaoming You Xingdongdang Jueding Shifou Chulai Jingxuan, Weiba Dongjiaozong Zhaopai Guazai Shenshang” 林晃升表明由行动党决定是否出来竞选, 未把董教总招牌挂在身上. [Lim Fong Seng clarifies that he did not exploit *Dongjiaozong* for personal political gain and will follow the decision of Democratic Action Party about his possibility to contest in the general elections]. 18 August 1990.
- . “Shenmuyu: Huatuan Renshi Canzheng, Xiangzheng Yizhong Minzu Qiyi” 沈慕羽: 华团人士参政, 象征一种民族起义 [Sim Mow Yu: Participation of individuals from Chinese guilds and associations in politics can be perceived as an ethnic-based uprising]. 21 August 1990.
- . “Xiang Zhengfu Zhengqu Zizhu Ji Tigong Jiaoxue Xunlian: Dongzong Yaoqiu Mahua Zhu Duzhong” 向政府争取资助及提供教学训练: 董总要求马华助独中 [United Chinese School Committees' Association of Malaysia requests Malaysian Chinese Association to assist independent Chinese secondary school in securing financial aid and teachers trainings assistance from the government]. 16 October 1991.
- . “Jianli Wengu De Xieshang Jichu” 建立稳固的协商基础 [Formation of a strong and dependable foundation for negotiation]. 17 October 1991.
- . “Zhengqu Quanyi, Lajin Zhengdang Guanxi, Dongzong Gai Paodao Xieshang Luxian” 争取权益, 拉近政党关系, 董总改跑道协商路线 [United Chinese School Committees' Association of Malaysia adopts negotiation approach, closer ties with political parties to secure benefits]. 20 October 1991.
- . “Lixing Huaxiao Ling 14 Ming Zanzhuren Buchengren Xindongshihui” 力行华小另14名赞助人不承认新董事会 [Fourteen school sponsors from Lick Hung Chinese Primary School refused to acknowledge the new school committee]. 5 May 1992.
- . “Lutingyu Yi Lixing Huaxiao Shijian Weili Yu Quanguo Huaxiao Dongshibu Guanzhu Mingcheng Shifou Youbian” 陆庭谕以力行华小事件为例吁全国

- 华小董事部关注名称是否有变 [Loot Ting Yee uses the Lick Hung Chinese Primary School as an example to remind all Chinese school committees to check if the status and name of their organization has changed]. 6 May 1992.
- . “Lixing Huaxiao Dongshibu Renwei Wuxu Zaikai Zanzhu Dahui Yimian Zhengzhi Jinyibu Hunluan” 力行华小董事部认为无需再开赞助大会以免争执进一步混乱 [To avoid further disputes and confusion, the school committee of Lick Hung Chinese Primary School will not host another school sponsors meeting]. 17 May 1992.
- . “Buman Huaxiao Dongshibu Bian Caiwu Xiaozu Dongzong Yu Mahua Minzheng Quebao Huaxiao Bubianzhi” 不满华小董事部变财务小组董总吁马华民政确保华小不变质 [United Chinese School Committees' Association of Malaysia is dissatisfied with the replacement of school committee by financial management committee and requests Malaysian Chinese Association and Malaysian People's Movement Party to protect the original identity of Chinese schools]. 27 July 1992.
- . “Jijian Huaxiao Dongshihui Yibiancheng Caiwu Xiaozu? Fengzhenan Jinxing Diaocha” 几间华小董事会以变成财务小组? 冯镇安进行调查 [Fong Chan Onn will investigate how many Chinese primary school's school committee have been replaced by financial management committee]. 28 July 1992.
- . “Lixing Shijian Shi Daohuoxian Zhiyi, Jingxuan Sendonglian Zhuxi Huhuoshan Xishuo Yuanwei” 力行事件是导火线之一, 竞选森董联主席, 胡火山细说原委 [Hoo Huo Shan explains that Lick Hung controversy was one of the motivations for him to compete in the Negeri Sembilan Chinese School Committees' Association's chairmanship election]. 12 April 1994.
- . “Sendonglianhui Gaixuan Jin Yiren Luobai, Chensongshengpai Jihuo Quansheng Huhuoshan Yi Zuidifen Depiao Jishen Chuxuan Lishi” 森董联会改选仅一人落败, 陈松生派几获全胜胡火山以最低分得票跻身初选理事 [Only one person lost in the election of Negeri Sembilan Chinese School Committees' Association, Chin Choong Sang's fraction won almost all contested positions, Hoo Huo Shan entered the committee with the least votes]. 25 April 1994.
- . “Jiaozong Mubiao Buhui Gaibian, Wangchaoqun Ni Gongzuo Fangzhen” 教总目标不会改变, 王超群拟工作方针 [Objectives of United Chinese Schoolteachers' Association of Malaysia will not change, Ong Kow Ee will identify new working direction]. 30 May 1994.
- . “Fengzhenan: Shu Dongshibu Zhuquan, Huaxiao Shitang Yizhao Chuantong Zhaobiao” 冯镇安: 属董事部主权, 华小食堂依照传统招标 [Fong Chan Onn: Rental rights of school canteen belongs to the school committee]. 3 November 1998.
- . “Wufa Zantong Tichu Shiji Ji Biaoda Fangshi, Shanglianhui Buqian Suqiu” 无法赞同提出时机及表达方式, 商联会不签诉求 [United Chinese Chambers of Commerce Association will not sign the Malaysian Chinese Organisations'

- Election Appeals as the association disagrees with the approach and timing of the appeals were presented]. 27 August 1999.
- . “Buhui Naru Huazong Jianyi, Suqiu Neirong Buxiugai” 不会纳入华总建议, 诉求内容不修改 [Will not include suggestions proposed by Federation of Chinese Associations Malaysia, contents of the Malaysian Chinese Organisations' Election Appeals will not be amended]. 29 August 1999.
- . “Xuelonghangzong Buqian Suqiu, Yu Shuxia Tuantu Bufa Yizhi” 雪隆行总不签诉求, 吁属下团体步伐一致 [Selangor and Kuala Lumpur Occupational Associations refused to endorse the Malaysian Chinese Organisations' Election Appeals]. 14 September 1999.
- . “Yu Neige Xiaozu Jiaoliu Qude Chengguo, Suqiu Gongweihui Gan Xinwei” 与内阁小组交流取得成果, 诉求工委会感欣慰 [The Malaysian Chinese Organisations' Election Appeals Committee is satisfied with the fruitful outcomes from the seminar with Cabinet subcommittee]. 24 September 1999.
- . “Gongweihui Shangxin Neirong Beiqujie, Bushouhui Suqiu Bu Daoqian” 工委会伤心内容被曲解, 不收回诉求不道歉 [The committee is saddened with the misinterpretation of the appeals but insists that they will not apologize or revoke the appeals]. 19 August 2000a.
- . “Kangyi Suqiu Qingxujiang, Wuqing Xuehuatangwai Shiwei” 抗议诉求情绪将, 巫青雪华堂外示威 [United Malays National Organisation Youth protested outside the Selangor Chinese Assembly Hall and accused the Malaysian Chinese Organisations' Election Appeals for triggering sensitive issues]. 19 August 2000b.
- . “Wuqing Xian Huatuan Yizhounei Feichu Suqiu Daoqian” 巫青限华团一周内废除诉求道歉 [United Malays National Organisation Youth requests the Chinese guilds and associations to withdraw the appeals and apologize within one week]. 19 August 2000c.
- . “Caitianqiang: Liyong Tequan Wenti, Wutong Zhuanyi Renmin Shixian” 蔡添强: 利用特权问题, 巫统转移人民视线 [Chua Tian Chang: United Malays National Organisation is using the special rights issues to divert people's attention]. 20 August 2000a.
- . “Mahua Tiaojieren Juese Bucunzai, Chenguangcai: Huatuan Wuxu Daoqian” 马华调解人角色不存在, 陈广才: 华团无须道歉 [Chan Kong Choy: No broker from Malaysian Chinese Association, there is no need for the Chinese guilds and associations to apologize]. 20 August 2000b.
- . “Wuqing Baoan Zhisuqiu Shandong, Wengshijie: Gongweihui Ruo Ganshou Weixie Kebaojing” 巫青报案指诉求煽动, 翁诗杰: 工委会若感受威胁可报警 [United Malays National Organisation Youth filed police report and accused the Malaysian Chinese Organisations' Election Appeals Committee for offending the Sedition Act, Ong Tee Keat comments that if the committee felt threatened they can also report to the police]. 20 August 2000c.



- . “Zhendui Wuqingtuan Xingdong, Xuehuatuan Shengan Yihan” 针对巫青团行动, 雪华团深感遗憾 [Selangor Chinese Assembly Hall is deeply repentant by the actions of United Malays National Organisation Youth]. 20 August 2000*d*.
- . “Gongweihui Jushouhui Suqiu, Layishi: Han Zhengzhi Yitu” 工委会拒收回诉求, 拉益士: 含政治意图 [Rais: Political intension is the main reason for the committee to refuse revoking the appeals]. 21 August 2000*a*.
- . “Wuqing Kouhao Ju Weixiexing, Suqiu Gongweihui Xiang Jingfang Beian” 巫青口号具威胁性, 诉求工委会向警方备案 [The committee files police report as slogans posted by United Malays National Organisation Youth are threatening]. 21 August 2000*b*.
- . “Zhi Wuqing Yinqi Jinzhang Jushi, Huazong Yaoqiu Fukui Chashou” 指巫青引起紧张局势, 华总要求副揆插手 [Federation of Chinese Associations Malaysia requests intervention from the deputy prime minister]. 21 August 2000*c*.
- . “Renmin Songhualan, Shengyuan 2 Tuanti” 人民送花篮, 声援2团体 [Support from the people for the two organizations]. 22 August 2000.
- . “Jianyi She Tuanjie Zilihui, Jiejue Gezu Maodun Zhengduan” 建议设团结咨理会, 解决各族矛盾争端 [Form a unity advisory committee to solve conflicts between ethnic groups]. 23 August 2000.
- . “Zhendui Hongyuan Xuexiao Jihua, Jiaozhang Yuanyu Dongzong Huitan” 针对宏愿学校计划, 教长愿与董教总会谈 [Minister of Education is willing to discuss the Vision Schools project with *Dongjiaozong*]. 21 November 2000.
- . “Linliangshi: Jiyu Zhengdang Shijian Diaocha, Neige Weishang Yingyu Jiao Shuli” 林良实: 给予政党时间调查, 内阁未商英语教数理 [Lim Liong Sik: The Cabinet is providing time for the political parties to conduct research on the issue of teaching of Science and Mathematics in English]. 8 August 2002.
- . “Huaji Zhengdang Jianyi Tuixing 2-3-3 Fangchengshi, Huaxiao Shang 8 Jie Yingyu Jiaodao Kemu” 华基政党建议推行2-3-3方程式, 华小上8节英语教导科目 [Chinese based political parties suggest to implement a 2-3-3 formula, Chinese primary schools will have eight periods of classes using English to teach the subjects]. 10 October 2002.
- . “Binhuaxiao Shitang Zhaobiaquan Beiduo, Jiao Xianjiaoyuju Chuli, Donglianhui Fandui” 槟华小食堂招标权被夺, 交县教育局处理, 董联会反对 [Penang Chinese School Committees' Association objects the involvement of district education department to manage the school canteen rental rights controversy]. 9 September 2004.
- . “Mahuagonghui Fenglong Jiang Choukuan 300 Wan, Xinjiyuan Xinxiao Niannei Donggong” 马华公会丰隆将筹款300万, 新纪元新校年内动工 [Malaysian Chinese Association and Hong Leong will collect a donation of

- RM3 million, New Era College's new campus will be constructed within this year]. 20 February 2008.
- . "2012 Nian Yingyu Jiaoshuli Feichu" 2012 年英语教数理废除 [Abolishment of the teaching of Science and Mathematics subjects in English by 2012]. 9 July 2009.
- . "Zanyang Zhiduhua Bokuan Duzhong, Xiaoyou Lianzong Kending Bingzhengfu" 赞扬制度化拨款独中, 校友联总肯定槟政府 [United Chinese School Alumni Association complements Penang state government for institutionalized financial aid for the independent Chinese secondary schools]. 25 April 2010.
- Skocpol, Theda. *States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia and China*. Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1979.
- . "Bringing the State Back in: Strategies of Analysis in Current Research". In *Bringing the State Back In*, edited by Peter Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985.
- Smelser, Neil. *Theory of Collective Behavior*. New York: Free Press, 1963.
- Smith, Anthony. "State-Making and Nation-Building". In *States in History*, edited by John Hall. New York: Blackwell, 1986.
- Smith, Jackie. *Social Movements for Global Democracy*. Maryland: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2008.
- Snow, David, E. Burke Rochford Jr., Steven Worden, and Robert Benford. "Frame Alignment Processes, Micro Mobilization and Movement Participation". *American Sociological Review* 51, no. 4 (August 1986): 464–81.
- Snow, David and Robert Benford. "Ideology, Frame Resonance and Participant Mobilization". *International Social Movement Research* 1 (1988): 197–217.
- . "Master Frames and Cycles of Protest". In *Frontiers in Social Movement Theory*, edited by Aldon Morris and Carol McClurg Mueller. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992.
- Snyder, David and Charles Tilly. "Hardship and Collective Violence in France, 1830–1960". *American Sociological Review* 37 (1972): 520–32.
- Springhall, John. *Decolonization Since 1945: The Collapse of European Overseas Empires*. New York: St. Martin's, 2000.
- Staggenborg, Suzanne. "The 'Meso' in Social Movement Research". In *Social Movements: Identity, Culture and the State*, edited by David S. Meyer, Nancy Whittier, and Belinda Robnett. New York: Oxford University Press, 2002.
- Star. "Encouraging Response to First Vision School Project". 25 May 2002.
- . "Sepang Picked As Site of New Era College". 20 February 2008 <<http://www.thestar.com.my/Story.aspx?file=%2F2008%2F2%2F20%2Felection2008%2F20382065&sec=Election2008>> (accessed 2 September 2013).
- Steinberg, Marc. "The Talk and Back Talk of Collective Action: A Dialogic Analysis of Repertoires of Discourse among Nineteenth-Century English Cotton Spinners". *American Journal of Sociology* 105, no. 3 (1999): 736–80.

- Stenson, Michael. *Industrial Conflict in Malaya: Prelude to the Communist Revolt of 1948*. London, New York: Oxford University Press, 1970.
- Stockwell, A.J. "Imperialism and Nationalism in South East Asia". In *The Oxford History of the British Empire*. Vol. 4 of the Twentieth Century, edited by Judith Brown and William Roger Louis. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999.
- Straits Times*. "Kuala Lumpur Rally Poses Challenge to Leading Indian Party". 26 November 2007.
- Sun. "Hishamuddin: Dong Jiao Zong Needs to Change". 24 March 2009.
- Tan, Ai Mei 陈爱梅. *Dama Huaxiao Zouxiang Hefang: Cong Dongxiao Fengbo Kan Huaxiao Jianglai De Fazhan* 大马华小走向何方: 从董校风波看华小将来的发展 [The future of Chinese primary schools in Malaysia]. Selangor: Strategic Information and Research Development Centre 策略资讯与社会研究中心, 2006.
- Tan, Beng Hui and Ng Choon Sim Cecilia. "Embracing the Challenge of Representation: The Women's Movement and Electoral Politics in Malaysia". In *New Politics in Malaysia*, edited by Loh Kok Wah Francis and Johan Saravanamuttu. Singapore: Institute for Southeast Asian Studies, 2001.
- Tan, Jun E and Zawawi Ibrahim. *Blogging and Democratization in Malaysia: A New Civil Society in the Making*. Petaling Jaya: Strategic Information and Research Development Centre, 2008.
- Tan, Kevin. "PM Likens Suqiu's Actions to Communists and Al-Ma'unah". *Malaysiakini*, 30 August 2000 <<http://www.malaysiakini.com/news/465>> (accessed 13 October 2013).
- Tan, Kim Hong. *The Chinese in Penang: A Pictorial History*. Penang: Areca, 2007.
- Tan, Lee Ooi. *Dinamik Ruang Siber dalam Gerakan Reformasi di Malaysia* [The roles of dynamic cyber space in Malaysia's reformasi movement]. Selangor: Penerbit Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia, 2010.
- Tan, Liok Ee. "Politics of Chinese Education in Malaya, 1945–1961". Ph.D. dissertation, Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences, Universiti Malaya, 1985.
- . "Tan Cheng Lock and the Chinese Education Issue in Malaya". *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies* 19, no. 1 (1988): 48–61.
- . *The Politics of Chinese Education in Malaya, 1945–1961*. Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1997.
- Tan, Nathaniel and John Lee, eds. *Political Tsunami: An End to Hegemony in Malaysia?* Kuala Lumpur: Kinibooks, 2008.
- Tan, Seng Giaw. *The First 60 Days: The 27th October ISA Arrests*. Petaling Jaya: Democratic Action Party, 1989.
- Tan, Yao Sua. *Politik Dongjiaozong dalam Pendidikan Vernakular Cina di Semenanjung Malaysia, 1960–1982* [Politics of Dongjiaozong in vernacular Chinese education in Peninsula Malaysia 1960–1982]. Pulau Pinang: Penerbit Universiti Sains Malaysia, 2005.

- Tang, Tze Ying 陈子鸚. "Malaixiya Huawen Zhongxue Gaizhi: Wangyongnian yu Zhongling Zhongxue Weili" 马来西亚华文中学改制: 汪永年与钟灵中学为例 [Conversion of Chinese secondary schools in Malaysia: An example of Wang Yong Nian and Chung Ling High School]. Master's thesis, Graduate School of Southeast Asian Studies, National Chi Nan University, Taiwan, 2004.
- Tarrow, Sidney. *Power in Movement: Social Movements, Collective Action and Politics*. Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994.
- Tay, Lian Soo 郑良树. "Dulihou Huawen Jiaoyu" 独立后华文教育 [Chinese education after independence]. In *Malaixiya Huarenshi Xinbian Dierce* 马来西亚华人史新编第二册 [History of Malaysian Chinese new edition 2], edited by Lin Chooi Kwa 林水濠, Ho Khai Leong 何启良, Hou Kok Chung 何国忠, and Lai Kuan Fook 赖观福. Kuala Lumpur: Federation of Chinese Associations Malaysia 马来西亚中华大会堂总会, 1998a.
- . *Malaixiya Huawen Jiaoyu Fazhanshi* 马来西亚华文教育发展史 [History of Chinese education in Malaysia] 1. Kuala Lumpur: United Chinese Schoolteachers' Association of Malaysia, 1998b.
- . *Malaixiya Huawen Jiaoyu Fazhanshi* 马来西亚华文教育发展史 [History of Chinese education in Malaysia] 2. Kuala Lumpur: United Chinese Schoolteachers' Association of Malaysia, 1998c.
- . *Malaixiya Huashe Wenshi Lunji* 马来西亚华社文史论集 [History of Chinese community in Malaysia]. Johore: Southern College 南方学院, 1999.
- . *Malaixiya Huawen Jiaoyu Fazhanshi* 马来西亚华文教育发展史 [History of Chinese education in Malaysia] 3. Kuala Lumpur: United Chinese Schoolteachers' Association of Malaysia, 2001.
- . *Malaixiya Huawen Jiaoyu Fazhanshi* 马来西亚华文教育发展史 [History of Chinese education in Malaysia] 4. Kuala Lumpur: United Chinese Schoolteachers' Association of Malaysia, 2003.
- . *Malaixiya Huawen Jiaoyu Fazhan Jianshi* 马来西亚华文教育发展简史 [Simplified history of Chinese education development in Malaysia]. Johore: Southern College 南方学院, 2005.
- Teoh, Ai Ling. "Pertubuhan Dong Zong: Struktur dan Fungsi" [Organization of Dong Zong: Structures and functions]. Master's thesis, Faculty of Social Sciences and Humanities, Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia, 1999.
- Thelen, Kathleen. "Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics". *The Annual Review of Political Science* 2 (1999): 381–99.
- . *How Institutions Evolve: The Political Economy of Skills in Germany, Britain, the United States and Japan*. Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004.
- Thock, Kiah Wah 祝家华. "Cong Nahan, Panghuang Dao Fanpan: Pingdeng De Mengmo" 从呐喊, 彷徨到反叛: 平等的梦魇 [From frustration, hesitation to rebellion: The nightmares of just]. In *Dangdai Dama Huaren Zhengzhi Shengsi* 当代大马华人政治省思 [Contemporary political reflections of Chinese in

- Malaysia], edited by Ho Khai Leong 何启良. Kuala Lumpur: Huazi Resource and Research Centre, 1994a.
- . *Jiegou Zhengzhi Shenhua Dama Liangxian Zhengzhi De Pingxi 1985–1992* 解构政治神话: 大马两线政治的评析 1985–1992 [Analysis of the dual political alliance in Malaysia 1985–1992]. Kuala Lumpur: Huazi Resource and Research Centre, 1994b.
- Thomas, Clive, ed. *Political Parties and Interest Groups: Shaping Democratic Governance*. Boulder: L. Rienner, 2001.
- Tilly, Charles. *From Mobilization to Revolution*. New York: Addison-Wesley, 1978.
- . *The Contentious French: Four Centuries of Popular Struggle*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1986.
- . *Popular Contention in Great Britain 1785–1834*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1995.
- . *Social Movements 1768–2004*. Boulder: Paradigm, 2004.
- Tongbao* 通报. “Zhiyou Tuanjie, Huaren Cai Youdejiu, Shenmuyu Canjia Dahui Yuanyou Ji Yanjiang” 只有团结, 华人才有得救, 沈慕羽参加大会缘由及演讲 [Chinese can survive if they are united, the reason for Sim Mow Yu to speak and participate in the convention]. 9 February 1971.
- . “Zhuangdijun Tan Huajiao Renshi Canzheng, Xubanyan Jiding Juese, Dongjiaozong Buyi Chanzheng” 庄迪君谈华教人士参政, 须扮演既定角色, 董教总不宜参政 [Thuang Pik King: United Chinese School Committees' Association of Malaysia needs to perform its established role and therefore is not suited to participate in politics]. 7 August 1990.
- Torii, Takashi. “The Mechanism for State-led Creation of Malaysia's Middle Classes”. *The Developing Economies* XLI, no. 2 (June 2003): 221–42.
- Touraine, Alain. *The Return of the Actor*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1988.
- Truman, David. *The Governmental Process: Political Interests and Public Opinion*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1951.
- UCSCAM (United Chinese School Committees' Association of Malaysia 马来西亚华校董事联合会总会). *Dongzong Huixun* 董总会讯 [United Chinese School Committees' Association of Malaysia Newsletter]. 15 March 1987a <[http://www.djz.edu.my/v2/daobao/hui%20xun%20\(1987-03-15\).pdf](http://www.djz.edu.my/v2/daobao/hui%20xun%20(1987-03-15).pdf)> (accessed 8 September 2013).
- . *Dongzong Sanshinian* 董总卅年 [United Chinese School Committees' Association of Malaysia's thirtieth anniversary magazine] 1. Kuala Lumpur: United Chinese School Committees' Association of Malaysia, 1987b.
- . *Dongzong Sanshinian* 董总卅年 [United Chinese School Committees' Association of Malaysia's thirtieth anniversary magazine] 2. Kuala Lumpur: United Chinese School Committees' Association of Malaysia, 1987c.
- . *Dongzong Sanshinian* 董总卅年 [United Chinese School Committees' Association of Malaysia's thirtieth anniversary magazine] 3. Kuala Lumpur: United Chinese School Committees' Association of Malaysia, 1987d.

- . *Malaixiya Huaxiao Dongshihui Zonghui Dongjiaozong Huawen Duzhong Fazhan Gongzuo Weiyuanhui 1987 Nian Gongzuo Baogaoshu* 马来西亚华校董事会总会 董教总华文独中发展工作委员会1987年工作报告书 [United Chinese School Committees' Association of Malaysia and *Dongjiaozong* Independent Chinese Secondary Schools Working Committee 1987 working report]. Kuala Lumpur: United Chinese School Committees' Association of Malaysia, 1988.
- . *Malaixiya Huaxiao Dongshihui Zonghui Dongjiaozong Huawen Duzhong Fazhan Gongzuo Weiyuanhui 1988 Nian Gongzuo Baogaoshu* 马来西亚华校董事会总会 董教总华文独中发展工作委员会1988年工作报告书 [United Chinese School Committees' Association of Malaysia and *Dongjiaozong* Independent Chinese Secondary Schools Working Committee 1988 working report]. Kuala Lumpur: United Chinese School Committees' Association of Malaysia, 1989.
- . *Malaixiya Huaxiao Dongshihui Zonghui Dongjiaozong Huawen Duzhong Fazhan Gongzuo Weiyuanhui 1989 Nian Gongzuo Baogaoshu* 马来西亚华校董事会总会 董教总华文独中发展工作委员会1989年工作报告书 [United Chinese School Committees' Association of Malaysia and *Dongjiaozong* Independent Chinese Secondary Schools Working Committee 1989 working report]. Kuala Lumpur: United Chinese School Committees' Association of Malaysia, 1990.
- . *Malaixiya Huaxiao Dongshihui Zonghui Dongjiaozong Huawen Duzhong Fazhan Gongzuo Weiyuanhui 1990 Nian Gongzuo Baogaoshu* 马来西亚华校董事会总会 董教总华文独中发展工作委员会1990年工作报告书 [United Chinese School Committees' Association of Malaysia and *Dongjiaozong* Independent Chinese Secondary Schools Working Committee 1990 working report]. Kuala Lumpur: United Chinese School Committees' Association of Malaysia, 1991.
- . *Malaixiya De Huawen Jiaoyu Diyiqi Zhi Dibaqi Hedingben* 马来西亚的华文教育第一期至第八期合订本 [Bound edition of Chinese education in Malaysia 8 vols.]. Kuala Lumpur: United Chinese School Committees' Association of Malaysia, 1992a–2008.
- . *Malaixiya Huawen Duli Zhongxue Ziliao Diaocha Baogaoshu* 马来西亚华文独立中学资料调查报告书 [Survey report on independent Chinese secondary schools in Malaysia]. Kuala Lumpur: United Chinese School Committees' Association of Malaysia, 1992b.
- . *Malaixiya Huaxiao Dongshihui Zonghui Dongjiaozong Huawen Duzhong Fazhan Gongzuo Weiyuanhui 1991 Nian Gongzuo Baogaoshu* 马来西亚华校董事会总会 董教总华文独中发展工作委员会1991年工作报告书 [United Chinese School Committees' Association of Malaysia and *Dongjiaozong* Independent Chinese Secondary Schools Working Committee 1991 working report]. Kuala Lumpur: United Chinese School Committees' Association of Malaysia, 1992c.

- . *Malaixiya Huaxiao Dongshihui Zonghui Dongjiaozong Huawen Duzhong Fazhan Gongzuo Weiyuanhui 1992 Nian Gongzuo Baogaoshu* 马来西亚华校董事会总会 董教总华文独中发展工作委员会1992年工作报告书 [United Chinese School Committees' Association of Malaysia and *Dongjiaozong* Independent Chinese Secondary Schools Working Committee 1992 working report]. Kuala Lumpur: United Chinese School Committees' Association of Malaysia, 1993.
- . *Malaixiya Huaxiao Dongshihui Zonghui Dongjiaozong Huawen Duzhong Fazhan Gongzuo Weiyuanhui 1993 Nian Gongzuo Baogaoshu* 马来西亚华校董事会总会 董教总华文独中发展工作委员会1993年工作报告书 [United Chinese School Committees' Association of Malaysia and *Dongjiaozong* Independent Chinese Secondary Schools Working Committee 1993 working report]. Selangor: United Chinese School Committees' Association of Malaysia, 1994.
- . *Malaixiya Huaxiao Dongshihui Zonghui Dongjiaozong Huawen Duzhong Fazhan Gongzuo Weiyuanhui 1994 Nian Gongzuo Baogaoshu* 马来西亚华校董事会总会 董教总华文独中发展工作委员会1994年工作报告书 [United Chinese School Committees' Association of Malaysia and *Dongjiaozong* Independent Chinese Secondary Schools Working Committee 1994 working report]. Selangor: United Chinese School Committees' Association of Malaysia, 1995.
- . *Malaixiya Huaxiao Dongshihui Zonghui Dongjiaozong Huawen Duzhong Fazhan Gongzuo Weiyuanhui 1995 Nian Gongzuo Baogaoshu* 马来西亚华校董事会总会 董教总华文独中发展工作委员会1995年工作报告书 [United Chinese School Committees' Association of Malaysia and *Dongjiaozong* Independent Chinese Secondary Schools Working Committee 1995 working report]. Selangor: United Chinese School Committees' Association of Malaysia, 1996.
- . *Malaixiya Huaxiao Dongshihui Zonghui Dongjiaozong Huawen Duzhong Fazhan Gongzuo Weiyuanhui 1996 Nian Gongzuo Baogaoshu* 马来西亚华校董事会总会董教总华文独中发展工作委员会1996年工作报告书 [United Chinese School Committees' Association of Malaysia and *Dongjiaozong* Independent Chinese Secondary Schools Working Committee 1996 working report]. Selangor: United Chinese School Committees' Association of Malaysia, 1997.
- . *Malaixiya Huaxiao Dongshihui Zonghui Dongjiaozong Huawen Duzhong Fazhan Gongzuo Weiyuanhui 1997 Nian Gongzuo Baogaoshu* 马来西亚华校董事会总会 董教总华文独中发展工作委员会1997年工作报告书 [United Chinese School Committees' Association of Malaysia and *Dongjiaozong* Independent Chinese Secondary Schools Working Committee 1997 working report]. Selangor: United Chinese School Committees' Association of Malaysia, 1998.

- . *Malaixiya Huaxiao Dongshihui Zonghui Dongjiaozong Huawen Duzhong Fazhan Gongzuo Weiyuanhui 1998 Nian Gongzuo Baogaoshu* 马来西亚华校董事会总会董教总 华文独中发展工作委员会1998年工作报告书 [United Chinese School Committees' Association of Malaysia and *Dongjiaozong* Independent Chinese Secondary Schools Working Committee 1998 working report]. Selangor: United Chinese School Committees' Association of Malaysia, 1999.
- . *Jianjue Fandui Hongyuan Xuexiao Jihua* 坚决反对宏愿学校计划 [Determined opposition on the Vision Schools Program]. Selangor: United Chinese School Committees' Association of Malaysia, 2000a.
- . *Malaixiya Huaxiao Dongshihui Zonghui Dongjiaozong Huawen Duzhong Fazhan Gongzuo Weiyuanhui 1999 Nian Gongzuo Baogaoshu* 马来西亚华校董事会总会 董教总华文独中发展工作委员会1999年工作报告书 [United Chinese School Committees' Association of Malaysia and *Dongjiaozong* Independent Chinese Secondary Schools Working Committee 1999 working report]. Selangor: United Chinese School Committees' Association of Malaysia, 2000b.
- . *Fengyun Jidang Yibaibashinian: Malaixiya Huawen Jiaoyu Tupianji* 风云激荡一百八十年: 马来西亚华文教育图片集 [180 years of history: Pictorial collection of Chinese education in Malaysia]. Selangor: United Chinese School Committees' Association of Malaysia, 2001a.
- . *Malaixiya Huaxiao Dongshihui Zonghui Dongjiaozong Huawen Duzhong Fazhan Gongzuo Weiyuanhui 2000 Nian Gongzuo Baogaoshu* 马来西亚华校董事会总会 董教总华文独中发展工作委员会2000年工作报告书 [United Chinese School Committees' Association of Malaysia and *Dongjiaozong* Independent Chinese Secondary Schools Working Committee 2000 working report]. Selangor: United Chinese School Committees' Association of Malaysia, 2001b.
- . *Malaixiya Huaxiao Dongshihui Zonghui Dongjiaozong Huawen Duzhong Fazhan Gongzuo Weiyuanhui 2001 Nian Gongzuo Baogaoshu* 马来西亚华校董事会总会 董教总华文独中发展工作委员会2001年工作报告书 [United Chinese School Committees' Association of Malaysia and *Dongjiaozong* Independent Chinese Secondary Schools Working Committee 2001 working report]. Selangor: United Chinese School Committees' Association of Malaysia, 2002a.
- . *Shinian Huajiao Qingyuan, 1991–2001 Shinian Juanxian Dongjiaozong Jiaoyu Zhongxin Jijin Xinjiyuan Jianshe Yufazhan Jijin Zhengxinlu* 十年华教情缘, 1991–2001十年捐献董教总教育中心基金新纪元建设与发展基金征信录 [List of donors who donated to *Dongjiaozong* Higher Learning Center and New Era College Development Fund from 1991 to 2001]. Selangor: United Chinese School Committees' Association of Malaysia, 2002b.
- . *Malaixiya De Huawen Jiaoyu Yundong: Malaixiya Huawen Jiaoyu 184 Nian Jianshi 1819–2003* 马来西亚的华文教育运动: 马来西亚华文教育184年



- 简史 1819–2003 [Simplified history of Chinese education movement in Malaysia 1819–2003]. Selangor: United Chinese School Committees' Association of Malaysia, 2003a.
- . *Malaixiya Huaxiao Dongshihui Zonghui Dongjiaozong Huawen Duzhong Fazhan Gongzuo Weiyuanhui 2002 Nian Gongzuo Baogaoshu* 马来西亚华校董事会总会 董教总华文独中发展工作委员会2002年工作报告书 [United Chinese School Committees' Association of Malaysia and *Dongjiaozong* Independent Chinese Secondary Schools Working Committee 2002 working report]. Selangor: United Chinese School Committees' Association of Malaysia, 2003b.
- . *Dongzong 50 Nian Tekan: 1954–2004* 董总50年特刊: 1954–2004 [Commemoration magazine of United Chinese School Committees' Association of Malaysia's fiftieth anniversary: 1954–2004]. Selangor: United Chinese School Committees' Association of Malaysia, 2004a.
- . *Malaixiya Huawen Jiaoyu* 马来西亚华文教育 [Chinese education in Malaysia]. Selangor: United Chinese School Committees' Association of Malaysia, 2004b.
- . *Malaixiya Huawen Jiaoyu* 马来西亚华文教育 [Malaysia Chinese education] 1 (June 2004c).
- . *Malaixiya Huaxiao Dongshihui Zonghui Dongjiaozong Huawen Duzhong Fazhan Gongzuo Weiyuanhui 2003 Nian Gongzuo Baogaoshu* 马来西亚华校董事会总会 董教总华文独中发展工作委员会2003年工作报告书 [United Chinese School Committees' Association of Malaysia and *Dongjiaozong* Independent Chinese Secondary Schools Working Committee 2003 working report]. Selangor: United Chinese School Committees' Association of Malaysia, 2004d.
- . *Malaixiya Huaxiao Dongshihui Zonghui Dongjiaozong Huawen Duzhong Fazhan Gongzuo Weiyuanhui 2004 Nian Gongzuo Baogaoshu* 马来西亚华校董事会总会 董教总华文独中发展工作委员会2004年工作报告书 [United Chinese School Committees' Association of Malaysia and *Dongjiaozong* Independent Chinese Secondary Schools Working Committee 2004 working report]. Selangor: United Chinese School Committees' Association of Malaysia, 2005.
- . *Malaixiya Huaxiao Dongshihui Zonghui Dongjiaozong Huawen Duzhong Fazhan Gongzuo Weiyuanhui 2005 Nian Gongzuo Baogaoshu* 马来西亚华校董事会总会 董教总华文独中发展工作委员会2005年工作报告书 [United Chinese School Committees' Association of Malaysia and *Dongjiaozong* Independent Chinese Secondary Schools Working Committee 2005 annual working report]. Selangor: United Chinese School Committees' Association of Malaysia, 2006a.
- . "Zhendui Meiti Baodao Quanguo Xiaozhang Zhigonghui Maliujia Fenhui Zhuxi Yangqingliang Xiaozhang Biaoshi 'Yuqing Dongzong Tingzhi Zaixuexiao Shitang Zhaobiao Yishishang, Daya He Weinan Xiaozhang' De Tanhua Fabiao

- Wengao” 针对媒体报导全国校长职工会马六甲分会主席杨清亮校长表示‘吁请董总停止在学校食堂招标一事上, 打压和为难校长’的谈话发表文告 [Press statement in response to National Union of Heads of Schools Malacca Branch’s Deputy Chairman Yang Qing Liang’s comments on ‘United Chinese School Committees’ Association of Malaysia should stop oppressing school principals and deliberately making things difficult for school principals on the issue of the rental rights of school canteens’]. 19 February 2006b.
- . “Youguan Dongzong Yu Jiaozong Guanxi De Wengao” 有关董总与教总关系的文告 [Press statement on the relationship between United Chinese School Committees’ Association of Malaysia and United Chinese Schoolteachers’ Association of Malaysia]. 14 October 2006c.
- . *Malaixiya Huaxiao Dongshihui Zonghui Dongjiaozong Huawen Duzhong Fazhan Gongzuo Weiyuanhui 2006 Nian Gongzuo Baogaoshu* 马来西亚华校董事会总会 董教总华文独中发展工作委员会2006年工作报告书 [United Chinese School Committees’ Association of Malaysia and *Dongjiaozong* Independent Chinese Secondary Schools Working Committee 2006 working report]. Selangor: United Chinese School Committees’ Association of Malaysia, 2007.
- . *Malaixiya Huaxiao Dongshihui Zonghui Dongjiaozong Huawen Duzhong Fazhan Gongzuo Weiyuanhui 2007 Nian Gongzuo Baogaoshu* 马来西亚华校董事会总会 董教总华文独中发展工作委员会2007年工作报告书 [United Chinese School Committees’ Association of Malaysia and *Dongjiaozong* Independent Chinese Secondary Schools Working Committee 2007 working report]. Selangor: United Chinese School Committees’ Association of Malaysia, 2008a.
- . “United Chinese School Committees’ Association of Malaysia Statement of Income and Expenditure for the Year Ended 31 December 2008”. Office document. Selangor: United Chinese School Committees’ Association of Malaysia, 2008b.
- . *Malaixiya Huaxiao Dongshihui Zonghui Dongjiaozong Huawen Duzhong Fazhan Gongzuo Weiyuanhui 2008 Nian Gongzuo Baogaoshu* 马来西亚华校董事会总会 董教总华文独中发展工作委员会2008年工作报告书 [United Chinese School Committees’ Association of Malaysia and *Dongjiaozong* Independent Chinese Secondary Schools Working Committee 2008 working report]. Selangor: United Chinese School Committees’ Association of Malaysia, 2009.
- . *Malaixiya Huaxiao Dongshihui Zonghui Dongjiaozong Huawen Duzhong Fazhan Gongzuo Weiyuanhui 2009 Nian Gongzuo Baogaoshu* 马来西亚华校董事会总会 董教总华文独中发展工作委员会2009年工作报告书 [United Chinese School Committees’ Association of Malaysia and *Dongjiaozong* Independent Chinese Secondary Schools Working Committee 2009 working report]. Selangor: United Chinese School Committees’ Association of Malaysia, 2010.

- . *Malaixiya Huaxiao Dongshihui Zonghui Dongjiaozong Huawen Duzhong Fazhan Gongzuo Weiyuanhui 2010 Nian Gongzuo Baogaoshu* 马来西亚华校董事会总会 董教总华文独中发展工作委员会2010年工作报告书 [United Chinese School Committees' Association of Malaysia and *Dongjiaozong* Independent Chinese Secondary Schools Working Committee 2010 working report]. Selangor: United Chinese School Committees' Association of Malaysia, 2011.
- . *Malaixiya Huaxiao Dongshihui Zonghui Dongjiaozong Huawen Duzhong Fazhan Gongzuo Weiyuanhui 2011 Nian Gongzuo Baogaoshu* 马来西亚华校董事会总会 董教总华文独中发展工作委员会2011年工作报告书 [United Chinese School Committees' Association of Malaysia and *Dongjiaozong* Independent Chinese Secondary Schools Working Committee 2011 working report]. Selangor: United Chinese School Committees' Association of Malaysia, 2012.
- UCSCAM et al. (United Chinese School Committees' Association of Malaysia 马来西亚华校董事联合会总会, United Chinese Schoolteachers' Association of Malaysia 马来西亚华校教师会总会, Federation of Alumni Associations of Taiwan Universities of Malaysia 马来西亚留台校友会联合会总会, Nanyang University Alumni Association of Malaya 马来亚南大校友会, United Chinese School Alumni Association 华校校友会联合会总会, Malaysian Seven Major Clans Associations 七大乡团协调委员会, and Federation of Chinese Associations Malaysia 马来西亚中华大会堂总会). "Huifu Yi Muyu Zuowei Xiaoxue Shulike Jiaoxue Meijieyu Beiwanglu" 恢复以母语作为小学数理科教学媒介语备忘录 [Memorandum to revert the teaching of Mathematics and Science subjects at primary schools using mother tongue]. Memorandum submitted to the Deputy Prime Minister cum Minister of Education. 26 May 2009.
- UCSCAM et al. (United Chinese School Committees' Association of Malaysia 马来西亚华校董事联合会总会, United Chinese Schoolteachers' Association of Malaysia 马来西亚华校教师会总会, Selangor Chinese Assembly Hall 雪兰莪中华大会堂, Nanyang University Alumni Association of Malaya 马来亚南大校友会, and Federation of Alumni Associations of Taiwan Universities of Malaysia 马来西亚留台校友会联合会总会). "Dui 1990 Nian Jiaoyu Faling Caoan De Xiugai Jianyi" 对1990年教育法令草案的修改建议 [Proposals on the Draft of 1990 Education Act]. Proposal submitted to Education Act Advisory Council. 7 March 1991.
- UCSTAM (United Chinese Schoolteachers' Association of Malaya/Malaysia 马来(西)亚华校教师会总会). "Lianhebang Huaxiao Jiaoshi Zonghui Xuanyan" 联合邦华校教师总会宣言 [Declaration of United Chinese Schoolteachers' Association of Malaya]. Unpublished document. 3 February 1952a.
- . "Quanma Huaxiao Dongjiao Ji Mahua Daibiao Dierci Lianxi Huiyi Jilu 1952" 全马华校董教及马华代表第二次联席会议记录 1952 [Meeting minutes of the Second Joint Conference of Chinese School Committees and

- Chinese Schoolteachers Representatives with Malayan Chinese Association Representatives 1952]. Kuala Lumpur: United Chinese Schoolteachers' Association of Malaya, 1952*b*.
- . "Jiaozong Fandui Gai Fangyuan Xuexiao Wei Guomin Xuexiao Xuanyan" 教总反对改方言学校为国民学校宣言 [Memorandum submitted by the United Chinese Schoolteachers' Association of Malaya in opposition of the conversion of vernacular schools into national schools]. Unpublished document. 18 October 1954.
- . *Jiaoshi Zazhi Duli Daxue Zhuanhao* 教师杂志独立大学专号 [Teacher's Journal Special edition on Merdeka University] (1968).
- . *Jiaoshi Zazhi* 教师杂志 [Teacher's Journal] 10, no. 1 (1975).
- . *Jiaoshi Zazhi* 教师杂志 [Teacher's Journal] 11, no. 2 (1976).
- . *Jiaozong Chengli Sanshisian Nian Huawen Jiaoyu Shiliao* 教总成立三十三年: 华文教育史料 [United Chinese Schoolteachers' Association of Malaysia's thirty-third anniversary: Collection of materials on Chinese education] 1. Kuala Lumpur: United Chinese Schoolteachers' Association of Malaysia, 1983*a*.
- . *Jiaozong Chengli Sanshisian Nian Huawen Jiaoyu Shiliao* 教总成立三十三年: 华文教育史料 [United Chinese Schoolteachers' Association of Malaysia's thirty-third anniversary: Collection of materials on Chinese education] 2. Kuala Lumpur: United Chinese Schoolteachers' Association of Malaysia, 1983*b*.
- . *Jiaozong Chengli Sanshisian Nian Huawen Jiaoyu Shiliao* 教总成立三十三年: 华文教育史料 [United Chinese Schoolteachers' Association of Malaysia's thirty-third anniversary: Collection of materials on Chinese education] 3. Kuala Lumpur: United Chinese Schoolteachers' Association of Malaysia, 1983*c*.
- . *Malaixiya Huaxiao Jiaoshihui Zonghui Dongjiaozong Quanguo Fazhan Huaxiao Gongweihui 1986 Nian Gongzuo Baogaoshu* 马来西亚华校教师会总会董教总全国发展华小工委1986年工作报告书 [United Chinese Schoolteachers' Association of Malaysia and Dongjiaozong Chinese Primary Schools Working Committee 1986 working report]. Kuala Lumpur: United Chinese Schoolteachers' Association of Malaysia, 1987*a*.
- . *Malaixiya Huaxiao Jiaoshihui Zonghui Qingzhu 33 Zhounian Jinian Tekan* 马来西亚华校教师会总会庆祝33周年纪念特刊 [Commemoration magazine of United Chinese Schoolteachers' Association of Malaysia's thirty-third anniversary]. Kuala Lumpur: United Chinese Schoolteachers' Association of Malaya, 1987*b*.
- . *Malaixiya Huaxiao Jiaoshihui Zonghui 1987 Nian Gongzuo Baogaoshu* 马来西亚华校教师会总会1987年工作报告书 [United Chinese Schoolteachers' Association of Malaysia 1987 working report]. Kuala Lumpur: United Chinese Schoolteachers' Association of Malaysia, 1988.

- . *Malaixiya Huaxiao Jiaoshihui Zonghui 1988 Nian Gongzuo Baogaoshu* 马来西亚华校教师会总会1988年工作报告书 [United Chinese Schoolteachers' Association of Malaysia 1988 working report]. Kuala Lumpur: United Chinese Schoolteachers' Association of Malaysia, 1989.
- . *Malaixiya Huaxiao Jiaoshihui Zonghui 1989 Nian Gongzuo Baogaoshu* 马来西亚华校教师会总会1989年工作报告书 [United Chinese Schoolteachers' Association of Malaysia 1989 working report]. Kuala Lumpur: United Chinese Schoolteachers' Association of Malaysia, 1990.
- . *Malaixiya Huaxiao Jiaoshihui Zonghui 1990 Nian Gongzuo Baogaoshu* 马来西亚华校教师会总会1990年工作报告书 [United Chinese Schoolteachers' Association of Malaysia 1990 working report]. Kuala Lumpur: United Chinese Schoolteachers' Association of Malaysia, 1991.
- . *Malaixiya Huaxiao Jiaoshihui Zonghui 1991 Nian Gongzuo Baogaoshu* 马来西亚华校教师会总会1991年工作报告书 [United Chinese Schoolteachers' Association of Malaysia 1991 working report]. Kuala Lumpur: United Chinese Schoolteachers' Association of Malaysia, 1992.
- . *Malaixiya Huaxiao Jiaoshihui Zonghui 1992 Nian Gongzuo Baogaoshu* 马来西亚华校教师会总会1992年工作报告书 [United Chinese Schoolteachers' Association of Malaysia 1992 working report]. Kuala Lumpur: United Chinese Schoolteachers' Association of Malaysia, 1993.
- . *Malaixiya Huaxiao Jiaoshihui Zonghui Dongjiaozong Quanguo Fazhan Huaxiao Gongweihui 1993 Nian Gongzuo Baogaoshu* 马来西亚华校教师会总会董教总全国发展华小工委会1993年工作报告书 [United Chinese Schoolteachers' Association of Malaysia and Dongjiaozong Chinese Primary Schools Working Committee 1993 working report]. Kuala Lumpur: United Chinese Schoolteachers' Association of Malaysia, 1994.
- . *Malaixiya Huaxiao Jiaoshihui Zonghui Dongjiaozong Quanguo Fazhan Huaxiao Gongweihui 1994 Nian Gongzuo Baogaoshu* 马来西亚华校教师会总会董教总全国发展华小工委会1994年工作报告书 [United Chinese Schoolteachers' Association of Malaysia and Dongjiaozong Chinese Primary Schools Working Committee 1994 working report]. Selangor: United Chinese Schoolteachers' Association of Malaysia, 1995.
- . *Malaixiya Huaxiao Jiaoshihui Zonghui Dongjiaozong Quanguo Fazhan Huaxiao Gongweihui 1995 Nian Gongzuo Baogaoshu* 马来西亚华校教师会总会董教总全国发展华小工委会1995年工作报告书 [United Chinese Schoolteachers' Association of Malaysia and Dongjiaozong Chinese Primary Schools Working Committee 1995 working report]. Selangor: United Chinese Schoolteachers' Association of Malaysia, 1996.
- . *Malaixiya Huaxiao Jiaoshihui Zonghui Dongjiaozong Quanguo Fazhan Huaxiao Gongweihui 1996 Nian Gongzuo Baogaoshu* 马来西亚华校教师会总会董教总全国发展华小工委会1996年工作报告书 [United Chinese Schoolteachers' Association of Malaysia and Dongjiaozong Chinese Primary Schools Working Committee 1996 working report]. Selangor: United Chinese Schoolteachers' Association of Malaysia, 1997.

- . *Malaixiya Huaxiao Jiaoshihui Zonghui Dongjiaozong Quanguo Fazhan Huaxiao Gongweihui 1997 Nian Gongzuo Baogaoshu* 马来西亚华校教师会总会 董教总全国发展华小工委1997年工作报告书 [United Chinese Schoolteachers' Association of Malaysia and *Dongjiaozong* Chinese Primary Schools Working Committee 1997 working report]. Selangor: United Chinese Schoolteachers' Association of Malaysia, 1998.
- . *Malaixiya Huaxiao Jiaoshihui Zonghui Dongjiaozong Quanguo Fazhan Huaxiao Gongweihui 1998 Nian Gongzuo Baogaoshu* 马来西亚华校教师会总会 董教总全国发展华小工委1998年工作报告书 [United Chinese Schoolteachers' Association of Malaysia and *Dongjiaozong* Chinese Primary Schools Working Committee 1998 working report]. Selangor: United Chinese Schoolteachers' Association of Malaysia, 1999.
- . *Malaixiya Huaxiao Jiaoshihui Zonghui Dongjiaozong Quanguo Fazhan Huaxiao Gongweihui 1999 Nian Gongzuo Baogaoshu* 马来西亚华校教师会总会 董教总全国发展华小工委1999年工作报告书 [United Chinese Schoolteachers' Association of Malaysia and *Dongjiaozong* Chinese Primary Schools Working Committee 1999 working report]. Selangor: United Chinese Schoolteachers' Association of Malaysia, 2000.
- . *Malaixiya Huaxiao Jiaoshihui Zonghui Dongjiaozong Quanguo Fazhan Huaxiao Gongweihui 2000 Nian Gongzuo Baogaoshu* 马来西亚华校教师会总会 董教总全国发展华小工委2000年工作报告书 [United Chinese Schoolteachers' Association of Malaysia and *Dongjiaozong* Chinese Primary Schools Working Committee 2000 working report]. Selangor: United Chinese Schoolteachers' Association of Malaysia, 2001.
- . *Malaixiya Huaxiao Jiaoshihui Zonghui Dongjiaozong Quanguo Fazhan Huaxiao Gongweihui 2001 Nian Gongzuo Baogaoshu* 马来西亚华校教师会总会 董教总全国发展华小工委2001年工作报告书 [United Chinese Schoolteachers' Association of Malaysia and *Dongjiaozong* Chinese Primary Schools Working Committee 2001 working report]. Selangor: United Chinese Schoolteachers' Association of Malaysia, 2002.
- . *Malaixiya Huaxiao Jiaoshihui Zonghui Dongjiaozong Quanguo Fazhan Huaxiao Gongweihui 2002 Nian Gongzuo Baogaoshu* 马来西亚华校教师会总会 董教总全国发展华小工委2002年工作报告书 [United Chinese Schoolteachers' Association of Malaysia and *Dongjiaozong* Chinese Primary Schools Working Committee 2002 working report]. Selangor: United Chinese Schoolteachers' Association of Malaysia, 2003.
- . *Malaixiya Huaxiao Jiaoshihui Zonghui Dongjiaozong Quanguo Fazhan Huaxiao Gongweihui 2003 Nian Gongzuo Baogaoshu* 马来西亚华校教师会总会 董教总全国发展华小工委2003年工作报告书 [United Chinese Schoolteachers' Association of Malaysia and *Dongjiaozong* Chinese Primary Schools Working Committee 2003 working report]. Selangor: United Chinese Schoolteachers' Association of Malaysia, 2004.

- . *Malaixiya Huaxiao Jiaoshihui Zonghui Dongjiaozong Quanguo Fazhan Huaxiao Gongweihui 2004 Nian Gongzuo Baogaoshu* 马来西亚华校教师会总会 董教总全国发展华小工委2004年工作报告书 [United Chinese Schoolteachers' Association of Malaysia and *Dongjiaozong* Chinese Primary Schools Working Committee 2004 working report]. Selangor: United Chinese Schoolteachers' Association of Malaysia, 2005.
- . *Malaixiya Huaxiao Jiaoshihui Zonghui Dongjiaozong Quanguo Fazhan Huaxiao Gongweihui 2005 Nian Gongzuo Baogaoshu* 马来西亚华校教师会总会 董教总全国发展华小工委2005年工作报告书 [United Chinese Schoolteachers' Association of Malaysia and *Dongjiaozong* Chinese Primary Schools Working Committee 2005 working report]. Selangor: United Chinese Schoolteachers' Association of Malaysia, 2006.
- . “30 Ren Huo Yixia De Weixing Huaxiao Diaocha Baogao” 30人或以下的微型华小调查报告 [Survey report on Chinese schools with less than thirty students]. Office document. Selangor: United Chinese Schoolteachers' Association of Malaysia, 2007a.
- . “Huaxiao Jianxiao, Qianxiao He Weixing Huaxiao Ziliaoji” 华小建校、迁校和微型华小资料集 [Collection of information on constructions and relocations of Chinese primary schools and schools with less than thirty students]. Office document. Selangor: United Chinese Schoolteachers' Association of Malaysia, 2007b.
- . *Malaixiya Huaxiao Jiaoshihui Zonghui Dongjiaozong Quanguo Fazhan Huaxiao Gongweihui 2006 Nian Gongzuo Baogaoshu* 马来西亚华校教师会总会 董教总全国发展华小工委2006年工作报告书 [United Chinese Schoolteachers' Association of Malaysia and *Dongjiaozong* Chinese Primary Schools Development Working Committee 2006 working report]. Selangor: United Chinese Schoolteachers' Association of Malaysia, 2007c.
- . “Dongjiaozong Quanguo Fazhan Huawen Xiaoxue Gongzuo Weiyuanhui Jianzhang” 董教总全国发展华文小学工作委员会简章 [Simplified constitution of *Dongjiaozong* National Chinese Primary Schools Development Working Committee]. Office document. Selangor: United Chinese Schoolteachers' Association of Malaysia, 2008a.
- . *Malaixiya Huaxiao Jiaoshihui Zonghui Dongjiaozong Quanguo Fazhan Huaxiao Gongweihui 2007 Nian Gongzuo Baogaoshu* 马来西亚华校教师会总会 董教总全国发展华小工委2007年工作报告书 [United Chinese Schoolteachers' Association of Malaysia and *Dongjiaozong* Chinese Primary Schools Working Committee 2007 working report]. Selangor: United Chinese Schoolteachers' Association of Malaysia, 2008b.
- . *Malaixiya Huaxiao Jiaoshihui Zonghui Dongjiaozong Quanguo Fazhan Huaxiao Gongweihui 2008 Nian Gongzuo Baogaoshu* 马来西亚华校教师会总会 董教总全国发展华小工委2008年工作报告书 [United Chinese Schoolteachers' Association of Malaysia and *Dongjiaozong* Chinese Primary Schools Working Committee 2008 working report]. Selangor: United Chinese Schoolteachers' Association of Malaysia, 2009.

- . *Malaixiya Huaxiao Jiaoshihui Zonghui Dongjiaozong Quanguo Fazhan Huaxiao Gongweihui 2009 Nian Gongzuo Baogaoshu* 马来西亚华校教师会总会 董教总全国发展华小工委2009年工作报告书 [United Chinese Schoolteachers' Association of Malaysia and *Dongjiaozong* Chinese Primary Schools Working Committee 2009 working report]. Selangor: United Chinese Schoolteachers' Association of Malaysia, 2010.
- . *Malaixiya Huaxiao Jiaoshihui Zonghui Dongjiaozong Quanguo Fazhan Huaxiao Gongweihui 2010 Nian Gongzuo Baogaoshu* 马来西亚华校教师会总会 董教总全国发展华小工委2010年工作报告书 [United Chinese Schoolteachers' Association of Malaysia and *Dongjiaozong* Chinese Primary Schools Working Committee 2010 working report]. Selangor: United Chinese Schoolteachers' Association of Malaysia, 2011.
- . *Malaixiya Huaxiao Jiaoshihui Zonghui Dongjiaozong Quanguo Fazhan Huaxiao Gongweihui 2011 Nian Gongzuo Baogaoshu* 马来西亚华校教师会总会 董教总全国发展华小工委2011年工作报告书 [United Chinese Schoolteachers' Association of Malaysia and *Dongjiaozong* Chinese Primary Schools Working Committee 2011 working report]. Selangor: United Chinese Schoolteachers' Association of Malaysia, 2012.
- Utusan Malaysia*, "Program Sekolah Integrasi" [Integration school program]. 7 August 1985.
- . "Jangan Personal Hak Istimewa Melayu-Aziz" [Aziz: Do not question the special rights of the Malay]. 18 August 2000*a*.
- . "Kerajaan Tidak Akan Berundur Walau Satu Langkah Pun, PM: Hak Melayu Dipertahan" [Prime Minister: The government will defend the Malay rights]. 18 August 2000*b*.
- . "Mencabar Kewibawaan Melayu" [Challenging the Malay authority]. 18 August 2000*c*.
- . "Najib: Jangan Bermain Api Perkauman" [Najib: Do not play with fire on ethnic related issues]. 18 August 2000*d*.
- . "Rakyat Berhak Membuat Tuntutan-Hadi" [Hadi: The people have the right to make claims]. 18 August 2000*e*.
- . "Hak Melayu: Usah Lupa Sejarah" [Malay rights: Do not forget the past]. Headlines. 19 August 2000*a*.
- . "Hentikan Kenyataan Jejas Keharmonian" [Stop all statements that will disrupt harmony]. 19 August 2000*b*.
- . "Pelbagai Pihak Mahu Kerajaan Mempertahankan Hak Melayu" [Multiple parties requested the government to defend the Malay rights]. 19 August 2000*c*.
- . "Rafidah: Jangan Lagi Persoalkan Isu Perkauman" [Rafidah: Stop questioning ethnic related issues]. 19 August 2000*d*.
- . "Gerakan Sokong Hak Keistimewaan Orang Melayu" [Movement to support Malay special rights]. 20 August 2000*a*.
- . "PM: Hak Melayu Ditahan" [Prime Minister: Malay rights are being held hostage]. 20 August 2000*b*.



- . “Hak Melayu Tetap Dipertahan Selagi UMNO Berkuasa” [Malay rights will be defended as long as United Malays National Organisation remains in power]. 21 August 2000*a*.
- . “Melayu Kini Dianggap Lemah” [Malays are perceived as weak]. 21 August 2000*b*.
- . “Melayu Rasa Terancam” [Malays feel threatened]. 21 August 2000*c*.
- . “Pertahankan Kuota Kemasukan Ke University” [Defending the quota for university enrolment]. 21 August 2000*d*.
- . “Tuntutan 17 Perkara Melampaui Batas” [The seventeen appeals exceeded boundaries]. 22 August 2000.
- . “PAS Tuduh Isu Hak Istimewa Melayu Lakonan” [PAS accused the Malay special rights issues as a performance]. 23 August 2000.
- Veltmeyer, Henry. *Civil Society and Social Movement: The Dynamics of Intersectoral Alliances and Urban-Rural Linkages in Latin America*. Geneva: United Nations Research Institute for Social Development, 2004.
- Vlieland, C.A. *British Malaya: A Report on the 1931 Census and on Certain Problems of Vital Statistics*. England and Malaya: Office of the Crown Agents for the Colonies and Malayan Information Agency, 1932.
- von Vorys, Karl. *Democracy without Consensus: Communalism and Political Stability in Malaysia*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975.
- Walker, Jack Jr. *Mobilizing Interest Groups in America: Patrons, Professions and Social Movements*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1991.
- Wang, Shiow Nan 王秀南. *Xingma Jiaoyu Fanlun* 星马教育泛论 [On education in Malaysia and Singapore]. Singapore: Union Book 友联书局, 1970.
- Wazir Jahan Karim. *Women and Culture: Between Malay Adat and Islam*. San Francisco and Oxford: Westview, 1992.
- Weiss, Meredith. *Protest and Possibilities*. California: Stanford University Press, 2006.
- Weiss, Meredith and Saliha Hassan, eds. *Social Movements in Malaysia*. New York: Taylor and Francis, 2003.
- Wilkinson, Paul. *Social Movement*. London: Paul Mall, 1971.
- Willford, Andrew. *Cage of Freedom: Tamil Identity and the Ethnic Fetish in Malaysia*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2006.
- Wilson, John. *Introduction to Social Movement*. New York: Basic Books, 1973.
- Wong, James Wing On. “Language Switch: Imminent UMNO and MCA-Gerakan Showdown”. *Malaysiakini*, 21 October 2002 <<http://www.malaysiakini.com/opinions/21904>> (accessed 9 September 2013).
- Wong, Loon. “The State and Organised Labour in West Malaysia”. *Journal of Contemporary Asia* 23, no. 2 (1993): 214–37.
- Xie, Jing Jing 谢晶晶. “Yi Ganrao Gongzhong Dichu Yinshuafa Weiyou Jingfang Zutuijie Huangse Xingqiliu” 以干扰公众抵触印刷法为由警方阻推介黄色星期六 [Police stopped the launch of Yellow Saturday Campaign on the basis that it will cause public disturbance and it has violated the Printing Act]. *Merdeka Review*, 17 November 2007 <[http://www.merdekareview.com/print\\_news.php?n=5388](http://www.merdekareview.com/print_news.php?n=5388)> (accessed 2 September 2013).

- Xinwanbao* 新晚报. "Quanguo Huaxiao Yaobake, Xian Anhua 14 Tian Nei Jiejue" 全国华小要罢课, 限安华14天内解决 [All Chinese primary schools in Malaysia will participate in the strike, Anwar is given fourteen days to solve the problem]. 4 October 1987.
- Yau, Teck Kong 姚迪刚, ed. *Liutailianzong Tongxunlu 2008–2010* 留台联总通讯录 2008–2010 [Contacts directory of the Federation of Alumni Associations of Taiwan Universities of Malaysia 2008–2010]. Selangor: Federation of Alumni Associations of Taiwan Universities of Malaysia 马来西亚留台校友会联合会总会, 2008.
- YCSHEC (Yuk Choy School History Editorial Committee 百年育才校史编委会), ed. *Bainian Fengyun: Bainian Yucai Juaner* 百年风云: 百年育才卷二 [Challenges faced: History of Yuk Choy School 2]. Perak: School Committee of Yuk Choy High School 吡叻育才中学独立董事部, 2008.
- Yen, Ching Hwang. "Early Chinese Clan Organizations in Singapore and Malaya, 1819–1911". *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies* 12, issue 1 (March 1981): 62–91.
- . "Historical Background". In *The Chinese in Malaysia*, edited by Lee Kam Hing and Tan Chee Beng. New York: Oxford University Press, 2000.
- Yeok, Kim Yew. "Education, National Identity and National Integration: A Survey of Secondary School Students of Chinese Origin in Urban Peninsular Malaysia". Ph.D. dissertation, California Stanford University, 1982.
- Zainal Abidin Ahmad. "Educational Reform and Ethnic Response: A Historical Study of the Development of a National System of Education in West Malaysia". Ph.D. dissertation, Los Angeles University of California, 1980.
- Zakaria Ahmad. "Malaysia: Quasi Democracy in a Divided Society". In *Democracy in Developing Countries: Asia 3*, edited by Larry Diamond, Juan J. Linz, and Seymour Martin Lipset. Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1989.
- Zald, Mayer. "Looking Backward to Look Forward: Reflections on the Past and Future of the Resource Mobilization Research Program". In *Frontiers in Social Movement Theory*, edited by Carol Mueller and Aldon Morris. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992.
- Zald, Mayer and Roberta Ash. "Social Movement Organizations: Growth, Decay and Change". In *Studies in Social Movements: A Social Psychological Perspectives*, edited by Barry McLaughlin. New York: Free Press, 1969.
- Zeng, Rong Cheng 曾荣盛 et al. *Malaixiya Fujianren Xingxue Banxiao Shiliaoji* 马来西亚福建人兴学办教史料集 [Collection of materials on the founding and maintaining of Chinese schools by Hokkien Chinese in Malaysia]. Kuala Lumpur: Federation of Hokkien Associations Malaysia 马来西亚福建社团联合会, 1993.
- Zhan, Yuan Duan 詹缘端. "Linhuangsheng, Malaixiya Huawen Jiaoyu De Wuming Yingxiong" 林晃升, 马来西亚华文教育的无名英雄 [Lim Fong Seng, the unknown hero of Chinese education movement]. In *Chuangye Yu Hugen*:

- Malaixiya Huaren Lishi Renwu Rushangpian* 创业与护根: 马来西亚华人历史与人物儒商篇 [Malaysian Chinese history and personalities: The entrepreneurial elites], edited by Lim Chooi Kwa 林水濠. Kuala Lumpur: Centre for Malaysian Chinese Studies, 2003.
- Zhang, Guo Hao 张国豪. "Yixiaocuo Xiaozhang Jiegu Xiang Dongzong Kaihuo De Muhou Yuanyin" 一小撮校长借故向董总‘开火’的幕后原因 [Hidden factors that prompt some school principals to attack the United Chinese School Committees' Association of Malaysia]. *Merdeka Review*, 27 February 2006 <[http://www.merdekareview.com/print\\_news.php?n=1260](http://www.merdekareview.com/print_news.php?n=1260)> (accessed 4 September 2013).
- Zhang, Jing Liang 张景良, ed. *Memorandum Kebudayaan Kebangsaan Keluaran Khas (Bahasa Cina, Bahasa Inggeris dan Bahasa Malaysia)* 国家文化备忘录特辑: 华文、英文及国文 [Special edition on Memorandum on National Cultural Policy in Chinese, English, and Malay]. Kuala Lumpur: Fifteen Leading Chinese Guilds and Associations of Malaysia, 1983.
- Zhen, Gong 甄供. *Boxia Chunfeng Wanli: Bilizhou Huawen Duzhong Fuxing-yundong Jishi* 播下春风万里: 吡叻州华文独中复兴运动纪实 [Documentary of Perak independent Chinese secondary schools revival movement]. Selangor: United Chinese School Committees' Association of Malaysia, 1996.
- . *Huajiao Chunlei Linhuangsheng* 华教春雷林晃升 [Lim Fong Seng: The exceptional leader of Chinese education movement]. Selangor: United Chinese School Committees' Association of Malaysia, 2006.
- Zhuan, Zhao Sheng 庄兆声. *Malaixiya Jichu Jiaoyu* 马来西亚基础教育 [The fundamental education in Malaysia]. Guangzhou: Guangdong Jiaoyu 广东教育, 2004.
- Zirakzadeh, Cyrus. *Social Movements in Politics: A Comparative Study*. London: Longman, 1997.
- Zurcher, Louis and Russell Curtis. "A Comparative Analysis of Propositions Describing Social Movement Organizations". *The Sociological Quarterly* 14, no. 2 (Spring 1973): 175–88.



## GLOSSARY OF NON-ENGLISH TEXT

affiliated independent Chinese secondary schools  
(国民型华文中学董事部兼办独立中学)

Alliance of Fifteen Leading Chinese Guilds and Associations  
(全国十五华团领导机构)

Alliance of Seven Chinese Education-Related Guilds and Associations  
(华教界七华团)

Alliance of Three campaign (三结合)

appointed standing committee members (委任委员务)

Association of Chinese Chambers of Commerce and Industry of Malaysia  
(马来西亚中华总商会)

Awareness Campaign for Chinese Primary Schools' School Committees  
(华小董事觉醒运动)

Beijing Normal University (北京师范大学)

Bock Tai Hee (莫泰熙)

Campaign to Strengthen the Role of School Committees in Chinese  
Primary Schools (强化华小董事会运动)

Cantonese (广东话)

Centre for Malaysian Chinese Studies (华社研究中心)

Chai Yah Han (蔡亚汉)

Chairman (主席/董事长)

Chairmen Group (主席团)

Chen Li Qun (陈利群)

- Chen Wing Sum (曾永森)  
Cheng Ho University (郑和大学)  
Cheng Ji Mou (陈济谋)  
Chew Saw Eng (周素英)  
Chian Heng Kai (陈庆佳)  
Chiew Swee Peow Chinese Education Trust Fund (周瑞标教育基金)  
Chin Choong Sang (陈松生)  
Chin Peng (陈平)  
Chinese (华文)  
Chinese Cultural Congress (全国华人文化节)  
Chinese Education Card (华教卡)  
Chinese Education Festival (华教节)  
Chinese Education Torch Relay (华教火炬行)  
Chinese Education Working Committee (华教工作委员会)  
Chinese guilds and associations (华人社团)  
Chinese new villages (新村)  
Chinese primary schools (华文小学)  
Chinese Resource and Research Centre (华社资料研究中心)  
Chinese schoolteachers' associations (华人教师公会)  
Chinese secondary schools (华文中学)  
Chinese Solidarity Conventions (全国华人团结大会)  
Chong Chin Shoong (张征雄)  
Chong Joon Kin (张永庆)  
Chong Khoon Lin (张崑灵)  
Chong King Liong (张景良)  
Chong Min Chang (钟敏章)  
Choong Ee Hoong (钟一泓)  
Choong Pai Chee (庄白绮)  
Choong Wei Chuan (钟伟前)  
Chung Hwa Confucian High School (孔圣庙中华中学)  
Chung Ling High School (钟灵中学)  
Civilisational Islam (*Islam hadhari*)  
Coalition for Clean and Fair Election (*Gabungan Pilihanraya Bersih dan Adil*)

- Confucian Secondary School (尊孔中学)
- Convention of Chinese Guilds and Associations Against the Invasion of Rights (华团反侵略大会)
- Converted Chinese School Principals' Association (国民型中学校长理事会)
- converted Chinese secondary schools (国民型华文中学)
- Council of Perak Chinese School Committees (吡叻华校董事会联合会)
- David Chen (陈充恩)
- death is better than life with humiliation (士可杀不可辱)
- Department of Curriculum (课程局)
- Department of Publication (出版局)
- Ding Pin Song (丁品松)
- Dongjiaozong* (董教总)
- Dongjiaozong* Chinese Primary Schools Working Committee (董教总全国发展华小工作委员会)
- Dongjiaozong* Converted Chinese Secondary Schools Working Committee (董教总全国国民型中学工作委员会)
- Dongjiaozong* Higher Learning Centre (董教总教育中心)
- Dongjiaozong* Higher Learning Centre and New Era College Development Fund (董教总教育中心基金, 新纪元学院建设及发展基金)
- Dongjiaozong's* opinion on the Malaysia Education Blueprint 2006–2010 (董教总对2006至2010年教育发展大蓝图总体意见书)
- Dongjiaozong's* overall opinion on the Malaysia Education Blueprint 2001–2010 (董教总对2001至2010年教育发展大蓝图总体意见书)
- Dongzong* (马来西亚华校董事联合会总会)
- Education Act Advisory Council (*Majlis Perundangan Akta Pendidikan*)
- Education Research Center (教育研究中心)
- Eng Ling Chinese Primary School (永宁华文小学)
- Er Joo Tiong (余裕忠)
- Federation of Alumni Associations of Taiwan Universities of Malaysia (马来西亚留台校友会联合会)
- Federation of Chinese Associations Malaysia (马来西亚中华大会堂总会)
- Federation of Hainan Association Malaysia (马来西亚海南公会联合会)
- Federation of Hakka Association Malaysia (马来西亚客家公会联合会)

Federation of Hokkien Association Malaysia (马来西亚福建社团联合会)

Federation of Kwangtung Association Malaysia (马来西亚广东会馆联合会)

Federation of Malaya Chinese Guilds Association  
(马来西亚华人行业社团总会)

Federation of Malaya Chinese Senior Normal Graduate Teachers' Union  
(高师职总)

Federation of Teochew Association Malaysia (马来西亚潮州公会联合会)

financial management committee (*lembaga pengurus kewangan*)

Fong Chan Onn (冯镇安)

Foo Wan Thot (胡万铎)

Foon Yew High School (宽柔中学)

general officer (座办)

general secretary (总务)

Goh Chee Yan (吴志渊)

going beyond political party but not beyond politics  
(超越政党, 不超越政治)

Grand Three Associations of Chinese Education  
(三大机构华文教育中央委员会)

Grand Three Associations of Chinese Education's National Convention  
of Chinese Education in Malaya (三大机构华文教育中央委员会全国  
华文教育大会)

Gu Hsing Kuang (顾兴光)

Guangxi Association Malaysia (马来西亚广西公会总会)

*Guiding Principles of Educational Reform of Malaysian Independent Chinese  
Secondary Schools* (独中教育改革纲领)

*Guiding Principles of Malaysian Independent Chinese Secondary Schools*  
(华文独立中学建议书)

Hainanese (海南)

Hakka (客家)

Han Chiang High School (韩江中学)

*Handbook for Chinese Education Workers* (华教工作者手册)

*hanyupinyin* (汉语拼音)

Harmony and Union University (协和大学)

Higher Education in China Exhibition (中国高等教育展)



- Hokkien (福建话)
- Hon Choon Kim (韩春锦)
- Hong Leong Group (丰隆集团)
- Hong Woan Ying (孔婉莹)
- Hoo Huo Shan (胡火山)
- Hou Heng Hua (侯亨桦)
- Hou Kok Chung (何国忠)
- Hua Lian High School (太平华联中学)
- Huang Guan Qin (黄冠钦)
- Huang Yun Yue (黄润岳)
- Huang Zhao Fa (黄招发)
- Huang Zhen Bu (黄振部)
- Independent Chinese secondary schools (华文独立中学)
- Independent Chinese Secondary Schools Education Alliance  
(独中教育联盟)
- Independent Chinese Secondary Schools Development Committee  
(独中发展小组)
- Independent Chinese Secondary Schools Development Sponsorship Program  
(全国华文独中发展基金常年赞助人)
- Independent Chinese Secondary Schools Principal' Association  
(独中校长理事会)
- Integrated Schools Project (*Rancangan Sekolah Integrasi*)
- Jiaozong (马来西亚华校教师会总会)
- Join BN, Rectify BN (打进国阵, 纠正国阵)
- Joint Conference of Chinese School Committees and Schoolteachers'  
Representatives in Federation of Malaya with MCA Representatives  
(联合邦华校董教代表及马华公会代表联席会议)
- Joint Declaration of National Chinese Guilds and Associations  
(全国华团联合宣言)
- Kajang Fah Kiew Chinese School (加影华侨学校产业受托会)
- Kakyo Shukusei* (purge through purification)
- Kang Chin Seng (江真诚)
- Kang Siew Khoon (江秀坤)
- Kelantan Chung Wah Independent High School (吉兰丹中华独立中学)

- Kerk Choo Ting (郭洙镇)  
Khew Khing Ling (丘琼润)  
Khing Ming Chinese Primary School (竞明华文小学)  
Khoo Kay Peng (邱继炳)  
Khoo Seong Chi (邱祥炽)  
Kluang Chong Hwa High School (居銮中华中学)  
Koh Tsu Koon (许子根)  
Ku Hung Ting (古鸿廷)  
Kua Kia Soong (柯嘉逊)  
Kuala Lumpur and Selangor Chinese Assembly Hall  
(吉隆坡暨雪兰莪中华大会堂)  
Kuala Lumpur Chen Moh Chinese Primary School (吉隆坡精武华文小学)  
Kuala Lumpur University (吉隆坡大学)  
Kuang Hee Pang (邝其芳)  
Kuen Cheng High School (坤成中学)  
*Kuomintang* (国民党)  
*Kwongwahyitpoh* (光华日报)  
Ladang Hillside Chinese Primary School (丘晒园华文小学)  
Lau Pak Kuan (刘伯群)  
Lee Ban Chen (李万千)  
Lee Chang Jing (李长景)  
Lee Foundation (李氏基金)  
*Lee Hau Shik* (李孝式)  
Lee Hing (吕兴)  
Lee Kim Sai (李金狮)  
Lee Leong Sze (利亮时)  
Lee San Choon (李三春)  
Lee Thean Hin (李天兴)  
Leong Tzi Liang (林子量)  
Leong Yew Koh (梁宇皋)  
Leung Cheung Ling (梁长龄)  
Lew Bon Hoi (廖文辉)

- Li Da Ting (李达庭)  
Li Hui Jin (李惠衿)  
Li Yi Qiang (李毅强)  
Li Yue Tong (李岳通)  
Liang Sheng Yi (梁胜义)  
Lick Hung Chinese Primary School (力行华文小学)  
Liew Kan Ba (刘崇汉)  
Lim Chong Eu (林苍佑)  
Lim Fong Seng (林晃升)  
Lim Geok Chan (林玉静)  
Lim Keng Yaik (林敬益)  
Lim Kit Siang (林吉祥)  
Lim Lian Geok (林连玉)  
Lim Lian Geok Award (林连玉精神奖)  
Lim Lian Geok Cultural Development Center (林连玉基金会)  
Lim Ming King (林明镜)  
Lin Mei Yan (林美燕)  
Lin Wu Cong (林武聪)  
Lin Yu Lian (林玉莲)  
Ling Liong Sik (林良实)  
Liu Bo Kui (刘伯奎)  
Liu Huai Gu (刘怀谷)  
Loot Ting Yee (陆庭瑜)  
Low Sik Thong (刘锡通)  
Mah Cheok Tat (马卓达)  
Malacca Chinese Education and Progressive Association  
(马六甲华校董事会联合会)  
Malacca Chinese Schoolteachers' Association (马六甲华校教师公会)  
Malaya Chinese Senior Normal Graduate Teachers' Union  
(马来亚联合邦华文高级师范)  
Malaya in Oppose on the Conversion of Vernacular Schools into  
National Schools (教总反对改方言学校为国民学校宣言)

- Malaysian Chinese Association (马来西亚华人公会)
- Malaysian Chinese Organisations' Election Appeals Committee  
(马来西亚华人社团大选诉求委员会)
- Malaysian Federated San Kiang Association (马来西亚三江总会)
- Malaysian Independent Chinese Secondary Schools Working Committee  
(董教总全国发展华文独立中学工作委员会)
- Malaysian National Primary Syllabus (*Kurikulum Bersepadu Sekolah Rendah*)
- Malaysian People's Movement Party (*Parti Gerakan Rakyat Malaysia*)
- Malaysian Qualifications Agency (*Agensi Kelayakan Malaysia*)
- Malaysian Seven Major Clans Associations (七大乡团协调委员会)
- Management Handbook for Chinese Primary Schools* (华小管理机制指南)
- MCA Central Working Committee (马华中央工作委员会)
- Memorandum for the Return of Vernacular Education  
(还我母语教育各忘录)
- Memorandum of Demands on Chinese Education by Chinese Citizens  
in the Federation (本邦华人对教育总要求)
- Memorandum of Joint Declaration of National Chinese Guilds and  
Associations (贯彻华团联合宣言)
- Memorandum on National Cultural Policy (国家文化备忘录)
- Memorandum Submitted by the United Chinese Schoolteachers'  
Association of Malaya in Opposition of the Conversion of Vernacular  
Schools into National Schools (教总反对改方言学校为国民学校宣言)
- Memorandum Submitted by the United Chinese Schoolteachers'  
Association of Malaysian Higher School Certificate  
(*Sijil Tinggi Persekolahan Malaysia*)
- Memorandum to Acquire for Citizenship by Representatives of  
Chinese Associations and Guilds in The Federation of Malaya  
(马来亚联合邦华人社团代表争取公民权宣言)
- Memorandum to the Prime Minister for a Rightful Place of the  
Chinese Language (为争取华文地位向首相东姑阿都拉曼呈送备忘录)
- Merdeka College (独立学院)
- Merdeka University (独立大学)
- Merdeka University Formation Working Committee  
(马来西亚独立大学筹备工作委员会)
- Merdeka University Founders' Assembly (马来亚独立大学发起人大会)

- Merdeka University (Limited) Company (独立大学有限公司)
- Movement to Eliminate Teaching and Learning Science and Mathematics in English Program (*Gerakan Mansuhkan Pengajaran dan Pembelajaran Sains dan Matematik dalam Bahasa Inggeris*)
- Muslim Youth Movement of Malaysia (*Angkatan Belia Islam Malaysia*)
- Nanyang University (南洋大学)
- Nanyang University Alumni Association of Malaya (马来亚南大校友会)
- Nanyangshangpao* (南洋商报)
- National Accreditation Board (*Lembaga Akreditasi Negara*)
- National Chinese Civic Rights Committee (全国华团民权委员会)
- National Chinese Guilds and Associations Cultural Program (全国华团文化工作总纲领)
- National Chinese Guilds and Associations Cultural Working Committee (全国华团文化工作委员会)
- National Conference for Independent Chinese Secondary Schools Development (全国发展华文独中运动大会)
- National Convention of Chinese Schoolteachers' Associations in Malaya (全马教师公会代表大会)
- National Convention of Chinese School Committees and Schoolteachers (全国华校董教大会)
- National Convention on Expansion of Chinese Education (全马华文教育扩大会议)
- National Cultural Policy (*Dasar Kebudayaan Negara*)
- National Economic Advisory Council (*Majlis Perundingan Ekonomi Negara*)
- National Front coalition (*Barisan Nasional*)
- National Independent Chinese Secondary Schools Development Fund (全国华文独中发展基金)
- National Seminar for Converted Chinese Secondary Schools' School Committees (全国国民型中学董事交流会)
- National Union of Heads of Schools (全国校长职工会)
- national-type primary schools (国民型小学)
- Negeri Sembilan Chinese School Committees Council (森美兰华校董事会联合会)
- Negeri Sembilan Chinese Schoolteachers' Association (森美兰华校教师公会)

- New Era College (新纪元学院)
- New Era College Sponsorship Program (新纪元学院发展基金赞助人)
- Newsletter on Chinese education (华教导报)
- Ng Wei Siong (吴维湘)
- Ngan Ching Wen (颜清文)
- Ngeow Yin Ngee (饶仁毅)
- Ong Ka Ting (黄家定)
- Ong Keng Seng (王景成)
- Ong Kow Ee (王超群)
- Ong Tin Kim (王添庆)
- One-Person, One-Dollar for Merdeka University Legal Fee  
(一人一元独大法律基金)
- Organizational Rules and Regulations of the Malaysian Independent  
Chinese Secondary Schools Working Committee  
(董教总全国发展华文独立中学运动工作委员会组织规章)
- Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party (*Parti Islam Semalaysia*)
- Pang Chong Leong (彭忠良)
- Pang Siew Fian (冯秋萍)
- Penang and Province Wellesley United Chinese School Management  
Association (槟威华校董事会联合会)
- Penang Chinese Education Working Committee  
(槟城州华文教育工作委员会)
- Penang Chinese Girls' High School (槟华女中)
- Penang Chinese School Alumni Association (槟州华校校友会联合会)
- Penang Chinese Schoolteachers' Association (槟城华校教师会)
- People's Alliance (*Pakatan Rakyat*)
- People's Coalition (*Gagasan Rakyat*)
- People's Justice Party (*Parti Keadilan Rakyat*)
- Perak Independent Chinese Secondary Schools Development Working  
Committee (吡叻州发展华文独中工作委员会)
- Perak United State-Level Chinese Schoolteachers' Association  
(吡叻州华校教师会联合会)
- Petition for Incorporation Order for the Establishment of Merdeka  
University (呈最高元首请求恩准创办独立大学请愿书)

- pine tree-planting ceremony (百万松柏献华教)
- Poi Lam High School (培南独中)
- presidential association (主席区)
- Professional Teaching Program (教育专业系)
- promotion of the dual coalition system (两线制)
- Proposals on the Draft of the 1990 Education Act  
(对1990年教育法令草案的修改建议)
- Protest Assembly of National Chinese Guilds and Associations and  
Political Parties (全国华团政党抗议大会议)
- Pua Eng Chong (潘永忠)
- Quek Leng Chan (郭令灿)
- Quek Suan Hiang (郭全强)
- Red Bands of the Holy War (*Sabillah*)
- Reform (*reformasi*)
- Sample of Working Guidelines for Malaysia Chinese Primary School  
Committee* (马来西亚华文小学董事会工作手册样本)
- Second Conference of the Pan-Malayan Chinese Schoolteachers'  
Association (全马教师公会第二次代表大会)
- Second Joint Conference of Chinese School Committees and  
Schoolteachers' Representatives in Federation of Malaya with MCA  
Representatives (联合邦华校董教代表及马华公会代表第二次联席会议)
- Segamat Central Site Chinese Primary School (中央华文小学)
- Sekolah Menengah Pei Yuan (Private) KPR (培元独中)
- Sekolah Menengah San Min (Suwa) (安顺三民独中)
- Sekolah Menengah Yik Ching Yik Ching (育青中学)
- Sekolah Tinggi Nan Hwa Ayer Tawar (南华独中)
- Selangor Chinese Assembly Hall (雪兰莪中华大会堂)
- Selangor Development Corporation (*Perbadanan Kemajuan Negeri Selangor*)
- Selangor Hokkien Association (雪兰莪福建会馆)
- Selangor Petaling Jaya District Chinese Primary Schools Parents  
Association (八打灵县华小家长会)
- Seminar of National Chinese Leaders in Malaya (全马华人领袖座谈会)
- Seminar on Independent Chinese Secondary Schools (华文独中研讨会)
- senior normal graduate schoolteachers (华文高级师范毕业教师)

- Sha Yun Yeo (沙渊如)
- Shen Jai High School (深斋中学)
- Shen Ting (沈亭)
- Shum Thin Khee (沈天奇)
- Sinchew Daily* (星洲日报)
- social organization (社团)
- Sons of the earth (*bumiputeras*)
- Soo Thien Ming (苏天明)
- Soon Jian Chinese Primary School (循然华文小学)
- South China Normal University (华南师范大学)
- Southeast Asia Chinese Education Bulletin (东南亚华文教育通讯)
- Southeast Asian Chinese Language Teaching Convention  
(东南亚华文教学研讨会)
- Southern College (南方学院)
- Sponsorship Program for Chinese Primary Schools Development  
(全国华文小学发展基金常年赞助人)
- state level Chinese assembly halls (华人大会堂)
- state level Chinese school committees' associations (董事联合会)
- State of Johore Chinese School Managers and Teachers' Association  
(柔佛州华校董教联合会)
- Suggestions on the Ninth Malaysia Plan (第九大马计划的建议书)
- Tan Ai Mei (陈爱梅)
- Tan Cheng Lock (陈祯禄)
- Tan Cheng Lock University (陈祯禄大学)
- Tan Kah Kee (陈嘉庚)
- Tan Seng Giaw (陈胜尧)
- Tan Siew Sin (陈修信)
- Tan Tai Kim (陈大锦)
- Tan Tiong Hai (陈东海)
- Tan Yew Sing (陈友信)
- Tang Ah Chai (陈亚才)
- Tang Tze Ying (陈子鹦)
- Tay Lian Soo (郑良树)



*Teachers' Journal* (教师杂志)

Teaching and Learning Science and Mathematics in English Program  
(*Pengajaran dan Pembelajaran Sains dan Matematik dalam Bahasa Inggeris*)

Teaching of Chinese Language to Non-Chinese Teachers (对外汉语教学)

Teh Hon Seng (郑云城)

Teng Chang Khim (邓章钦)

Teochew (潮州)

Tew Say Kop (张志开)

Thousand Men Fundraising Dinner in December 1996 (1214千万心宴)

Thuang Pik King (庄迪君)

*Tiananmen Square* (天安门广场)

*Tianhou Temple* (天后宫)

Toh Kin Woon (杜乾煥)

Too Joon Hing (朱运兴)

Torch Movement (火炬运动)

Treasurer (财政)

Tsun Jin High School (循人中学)

Tsung Wah Private Secondary School (崇华中学)

Tun Tan Cheng Lock Chinese Primary School (陈祯禄华文小学)

Tunku Abdul Rahman College (拉曼学院)

Tunku Abdul Rahman University (拉曼大学)

Unified Curriculum Subcommittee (独中统一课程编委会)

Unified Examination Certificate (华文独中高初中统一考试)

Unified Examination Subcommittee (独中统一考试委员会)

Unified Federation of Malaysian Chinese Assembly Hall  
(马来西亚中华大会堂联合会)

United Chinese School Alumni Association (华校校友会联合会总会)

United Chinese School Committees' Association of Malaysia  
(马来西亚华校董事联合会总会)

United Chinese School Committees' Association of Selangor and Kuala Lumpur (雪兰莪暨吉隆坡联邦直辖区华校董事会联合会)

United Chinese Schoolteachers' Association of Malaysia  
(马来西亚华校教师会总会)

United Malays National Organisation (*Pertubuhan Kebangsaan Melayu Bersatu*)

Vision Schools Project (*Rancangan Sekolah Wawasan*)

Wai Sin Chinese Primary School in Perak (维新华文小学)

Wang Guo Feng (王国丰)

Wang Siow Nan (王秀南)

Wang Wen Han (王文汉)

Wang Yoon Nien (汪永年)

Weeding Operation (*Operasi Lalang*)

Wen Tien Kuang (温典光)

Wong Wai Keat (黄伟豪)

Wu Teh Yao (吴德耀)

Xiamen University Nanyang Research Institute Project  
(厦门大学南洋研究院研究计划案)

Xu Min Yan (余明炎)

Yan Yuan Zhang (严元章)

Yang Pei Keng (杨培根)

Yang Qing Liang (杨清亮)

Yang Ya Ling (杨雅灵)

Yang Yin Chong (杨应俊)

Yap Hon Kiat (叶翰杰)

Yap Sin Tian (叶新田)

Ye Hong En (叶鸿恩)

Ye Xia Guang (叶夏光)

Yeoh Ban Eng (杨万荣)

yi (义)

Yong Xu Ling (杨旭龄)

Yoong Suan (杨泉)

Yow Lee Fung (姚丽芳)

Yuk Choy High School (Private) (育才独立中学)

Zeng Dun Hua (曾敦化)

Zhang Xi Chong (张喜崇)

# INDEX

## A

- Abdul Rahman, 4, 21–22, 48–51, 53–54, 57, 60–61, 63, 67, 105, 115, 177
- Abdul Razak Hussein, 22, 48, 52, 61, 101
- Abdullah Badawi, 22, 122–23
- affiliated independent Chinese secondary schools (国民型华文中学董事部兼办独立中学), 134
- Alliance of Fifteen Leading Chinese Guilds and Associations (全国十五华团领导机构), 35, 101, 108, 109, 126, 175
- Alliance of Seven Chinese Education-Related Guilds and Associations (华教界七华团), 121, 122
- Alliance of Three campaign (三结合), 35, 101, 106, 175
- Anwar Ibrahim, 25, 108, 118–19, 124
- appointed standing committee members (委任委员), 136
- Association of Chinese Chambers of Commerce and Industry of Malaysia (马来西亚中华总商会), 120
- Awareness Campaign for Chinese Primary Schools' School Committees (华小董事觉醒运动), 94

## B

- Barisan Nasional*, 1, 21, 22, 23, 25, 30, 61, 83, 101, 106, 107, 110, 112, 113, 114, 116, 118, 119, 120, 121, 123, 124, 127, 151, 156, 157, 170, 174, 175, 176, 177, 178
- Barnes Report (*Report of the Committee on Malay Education*), 3, 28, 43, 44, 45
- Beijing Normal University (北京师范大学), 153
- Bock Tai Hee (莫泰熙), 145, 160
- bottom-up leader selection system, 6
- Boudreau, Vincent, 13, 14
- bumiputera* equity quota, 102, 120
- Business Opportunities in Chinese Primary Schools (Corrupt) (华小处处商机), 93

## C

- Cambridge School Certification, 59
- Campaign to Strengthen the Role of School Committees in Chinese Primary Schools (强化华小董事会运动), 94
- Cantonese (广东话), 31
- Centre for Malaysian Chinese Studies (华社研究中心), 32
- Chen, David (陈充恩), 44

- Chen Moh Chinese Primary School  
(吉隆坡精武华文小学), 92
- Chen Wing Sum (曾永森), 106
- Chew Saw Eng (周素英), 115
- Chian Heng Kai (陈庆佳), 106
- Chiew Swee Peow Chinese Education  
Trust Fund (周瑞标教育基金),  
152
- Chin Choong Sang (陈松生), 88, 113
- Chin Peng (陈平), 40
- Chinese Cultural Congress (全国华人  
文化节), 108
- Chinese Education Central  
Committee, 45, 46, 47, 49, 50,  
62
- Chinese Education Festival (华教节),  
149, 172
- Chinese education movement, 1-7,  
24, 38, 51
- challenges, 71-97
- corrupt school principals, 92-94
- cultural sentiments, 96-97
- decision-making hierarchy, 133-34
- fundraising campaigns, 80-81, 118,  
172-73
- internal divisions, 178
- limit schoolteachers' participation,  
85
- removal of influential leaders, 83
- resource mobilization, 169-74
- setbacks, 62
- strategy of leaders, 101
- studies on, 26-31
- turning point, 79-83
- type of writings, 27-28
- Chinese Education Torch Relay (华教  
火炬行), 118
- Chinese Education Working  
Committee (华教工作委员会),  
59
- Chinese guilds and associations (华人  
社团), 31, 35, 38, 39, 43, 54,  
57, 58, 63, 103, 108, 110, 112,  
116, 120, 126, 143, 168, 169,  
180
- Chinese primary schools (华文小学),  
28, 34-35, 73, 79-80, 83,  
87-88, 91-94, 96, 101, 111-12,  
115, 119, 133, 146-50, 168,  
170, 172
- Chinese Resource and Research Centre  
(华社资料研究中心), 108
- Chinese schools, 43
- challenges, 72
- characteristics of, 90
- control and constraints on, 73-78
- conversion, 55
- corruption, 92-93
- critical turning point, 72
- fundraising campaigns, 80-81, 118
- government's special allowances,  
55-56
- lack of financial support, 74
- non-Chinese students in, 79-80
- principals, 91-93
- relocate to cities, 82, 96, 178
- sponsorship programme for primary  
schools development, 150
- taming schoolteachers, 83-87
- unwitting favour to, 72
- Chinese Schools and the Education  
of Chinese Malaysians* (Fenn-Wu  
Report), 43
- Chinese schoolteachers, 3, 27, 44, 49,  
71-72, 96-97, 168, 172, 179
- association, changes in membership,  
86
- salaries and pensions, 84, 96
- taming, 83-87
- Chinese secondary schools (华文中学),  
29-30, 34, 52-53, 55-56, 73,  
89-90, 96, 134
- Chinese Solidarity Conventions (全国  
华人团结大会), 61
- Chinese university in Malaysia, 156
- Chong Chin Shoong (张征雄), 120

- Chong Joon Kin (张永庆), 144  
 Chong King Liong (张景良), 107, 111–12, 126  
 Chung Hwa Confucian High School (孔圣庙中华中学), 52  
 Chung Ling High School (钟灵中学), 52  
 civil servants system, 84  
 civilizational and comprehensive Islam (*Islam hadhari*), 122  
 Coalition for Clean and Fair Election (*Gabungan Pilihanraya Bersih dan Adil*), 123  
 Confucian Secondary School (尊孔中学), 52  
 constant resource mobilization, 169–74  
 contemporary social movement, 7–8  
 Convention of Chinese Guilds and Associations Against the Invasion of Rights (华团反侵略大会), 57  
 Converted Chinese School Principals' Association (国民型中学校长理事會), 90  
 converted Chinese secondary schools (国民型华文中学), 34, 59, 89–90, 170  
 corruption in Chinese schools, 92–93  
 Council of Perak Chinese School Committees (吡叻华校董事会联合会), 135, 146
- D**  
*Darul Arqam*, 25  
 “death is better than life with humiliation” (士可杀不可辱), 158  
 Democratic Action Party (DAP), 106, 110, 114, 124, 176, 180  
 support from Chinese voters, 114  
 Ding Pin Song (丁品松), 48  
*Dongjiaozong*, 4, 29, 32–33, 35, 60, 79, 83, 88–91, 94, 103–107, 110, 113–17, 121, 123, 133, 146–61, 169, 173, 175–76, 180–82  
*Dongjiaozong* Chinese Primary Schools Working Committee (董教总全国发展华小工作委员会), 35, 133, 146–50, 159–60, 169  
*Dongjiaozong* Converted Chinese Secondary Schools Working Committee (董教总全国国民型中学工作委员会), 89  
*Dongjiaozong* Higher Learning Centre (董教总教育中心), 32, 35, 133, 151–58, 169  
*Dongzong*, 4, 27–28, 30–32, 34–35, 38, 46, 50–51, 58–60, 62, 71, 73, 88–89, 93–95, 107, 109, 111–21, 133, 136–38, 141–48, 158–59, 168–69, 172–73, 178–80  
 extraordinary delegates meeting, 158  
 growth of executive branch (1953–2011), 143–44  
 organizational chart, 137  
 dual coalition system, 113
- E**  
 Education Act  
 1961, 29, 55, 73, 84, 88, 97, 134  
 1990, 113  
 1996, 73, 94  
 Education Act Advisory Council (*Majlis Perundangan Akta Pendidikan*), 113  
 Education Ordinance  
 1952, 45, 47  
 1957, 54, 71, 73–74, 77, 81, 177  
 English schools and Torch Movement, 49  
 ethnic riots, 57, 60, 103, 168  
 exclusive-based social movements, 23–25

**F**

- Federation of Alumni Associations of Taiwan Universities of Malaysia (马来西亚留台校友会联合会总会), 113, 121–22
- Federation of Chinese Associations Malaysia (马来西亚中华大会堂总会), 116, 120–22
- Federation of Malaya Chinese Guilds Association (马来亚华人行业社团总会), 50–51, 54, 58
- Federation of Malaysia (1963), 21, 57
- Fenn-Wu Report (*Chinese Schools and the Education of Chinese Malaysians*), 43
- Fong Chan Onn (冯镇安), 91
- Foo Wan Thot (胡万铎), 114–16, 126, 144, 157, 168
- fundraising campaigns, 80–81, 118, 172–73

**G**

- General Ne Win's military regime (Burma), 21
- Gerakan, 22, 30, 61, 92, 106–107, 115, 118, 120, 175–76
- Goh Chee Yan (吴志渊), 48
- going beyond political party but not beyond politics (超越政党, 不超越政治), 110
- Grand Three Associations of Chinese Education (三大机构华文教育中央委员会), 4, 45–49, 52, 54, 59, 62, 71, 135, 167
- Grand Three Associations of Chinese Education's National Convention of Chinese Education in Malaya (三大机构华文教育中央委员会全国华文教育大会), 53
- grassroots movement (Thailand), 14–15
- Gu Hsing Kuang (顾兴光), 62

- Guiding Principles of Educational Reform of Malaysian Independent Chinese Secondary Schools* (独中教育改革纲领), 141
- Guiding Principles of Malaysian Independent Chinese Secondary Schools* (华文独立中学建议书), 136
- GuocoLand Industries, 156

**H**

- Han Chiang High School (韩江中学), 52
- Handbook for Chinese Education Workers* (华教工作者手册), 88
- hanyupinyin* (汉语拼音), 33
- Higher Education in China Exhibition (中国高等教育展), 152
- Hindu Rights Action Force, 26, 124
- Hokkien (福建话), 31, 44
- Hon Choon Kim (韩春锦), 123
- Hong Leong Group, 156
- Hoo Huo Shan (胡火山), 88
- Hope Foundation, 118
- Hou Kok Chung (何国忠), 157
- Huang Guan Qin (黄冠钦), 29
- Huang Yun Yue (黄润岳), 56
- Huang Zhao Fa (黄招发), 27
- Hume Industries, 156
- hybrid regimes, 12–13

**I**

- inclusive-based social movements, 23–24
- independent Chinese secondary schools (华文独立中学), 56, 134–42
- achievements and operation, 141
- organizational chart, 137
- student distribution in Malaysia, 140
- three levels of schoolteachers, 139

- Independent Chinese Secondary  
Schools Education Alliance (独中  
教育联盟), 146
- Independent Chinese Secondary  
Schools Development Committee  
(独中发展小组), 135
- Independent Chinese Secondary  
Schools Development Sponsorship  
Program (全国华文独中发展基  
金常年赞助人), 141
- Independent Constitutional Survey  
Commission, 50
- Integrated Schools Project (*Rancangan  
Sekolah Integrasi*), 119
- inter-movement relations, 19–21
- intra-movement relations, 16–18
- J**
- Jammat Tabligh*, 25
- Jiaozong*, 3, 4, 27, 31, 32, 34, 35, 38,  
44, 45, 48, 50, 51, 52, 54, 55,  
56, 58, 59, 60, 62, 63, 71, 73,  
83, 84, 85, 87, 88, 89, 94, 95,  
96, 97, 112, 113, 133, 136, 147,  
149, 150, 151, 159, 160, 168,  
173, 178, 179
- Chinese primary schools working  
committee, organizational chart,  
148
- source of income, 172
- visits to seek new students, 49
- Join BN, Rectify BN (打进国阵, 纠正  
国阵), 106
- Joint Conference of Chinese School  
Committees and Schoolteachers'  
Representatives in Federation of  
Malaya with MCA Representatives  
(联合邦华校董教代表及马华公  
会代表联席会议), 45
- Joint Declaration of National  
Chinese Guilds and Associations  
(全国华团联合宣言), 108, 110,  
117
- K**
- Kajang Fah Kiew Chinese School  
(加影华侨学校产业受托会),  
117
- Kang Chin Seng (江真诚), 106
- Kang Siew Khoon (江秀坤), 93
- Kelantan Chung Wah Independent  
High School (吉兰丹中华独立  
中学), 124
- Kerk Choo Ting (郭洙镇), 103, 106,  
138
- Kerkvliet, Benedict, 14
- Khew Khing Ling (丘琼润), 158
- Khoo Kay Peng (邱继炳), 118
- Khoo Seong Chi (邱祥炽), 107
- Kluang Chong Hwa High School  
(居鑾中华中学), 80
- Koh Tsu Koon (许子根), 92, 106
- Ku Hung Ting (古鸿廷), 29
- Kua Kia Soong (柯嘉逊), 28, 111–12,  
144, 157, 160
- Kuala Lumpur Chen Moh Chinese  
Primary School (吉隆坡精武  
华文小学), 92
- Kuang Hee Pang (邝其芳), 145
- Kuen Cheng High School (坤成中学),  
52
- Kuomintang*, 41
- Kwongwahyitpoh*, 32
- L**
- Lee Ban Chen (李万千), 114, 144
- Lee Foundation (李氏基金), 152
- Lee Hau Shik (李孝式), 58
- Lee Hing (吕兴), 160
- Lee Kim Sai (李金狮), 111
- Lee Leong Sze (利亮时), 30
- Lee San Choon (李三春), 58
- Lee Thean Hin (李天兴), 48
- Leung Cheung Ling (梁长龄), 48
- Lew Bon Hoi (廖文辉), 27
- Li Da Ting (李达庭), 143
- liberal regimes, 11

- Lick Hung Chinese Primary School (力行华文小学), 115
- Lim Chong Eu (林苍佑), 4, 48, 54, 63, 177
- Lim Fong Seng (林晃升), 101–2, 104–7, 111–14, 118, 125–26, 144, 147, 159, 168, 176, 180  
in General Election, 113
- Lim Geok Chan (林玉静), 112, 116–17
- Lim Keng Yaik (林敬益), 106, 111
- Lim Kit Siang (林吉祥), 111–12
- Lim Lian Geok (林连玉), 26, 55–56, 83–84, 149, 160, 172, 178
- Lim Lian Geok Award (林连玉精神奖), 149
- Lim Lian Geok Cultural Development Centre (林连玉基金会), 149
- Lin Wu Cong (林武聪), 28
- Ling Liong Sik (林良实), 115
- Liu Bo Kui (刘伯奎), 27
- Loot Ting Yee (陆庭瑜), 85, 87, 106, 156–57
- Low Sik Thong (刘锡通), 103, 112–13
- M**
- Mahathir Mohamad, 1, 21–22, 103, 107, 111, 151, 176
- Malacca Chinese Schoolteachers' Association (马六甲华校教师公会), 44
- Malaya: Communist or Free*, 28
- Malayan citizenship for Chinese, 51
- Malayan Communist Party (MCP), 39, 62, 118  
gain support from Chinese voters, 83
- Malayan People's Anti-Japanese Army (MPAJA), 39, 62
- Malayan Races Liberation Army, 40
- Malayan Secondary School Entrance Examination, 134
- Malaya's first Federal Election (1955), 49–50
- Malay-medium national schools, 74, 77, 79, 170
- Malaysia, 1  
chinese civic movements, 44  
chinese population, 57  
distribution of primary schools and students (1970–2011), 77–78  
exclusive-based, 23–24  
inclusive-based, 23–24  
medium of instruction in schools, 42–43
- Muslim Youth Movement (*Angkatan Belia Islam Malaysia*), 25  
political backdrop, 49  
politics and social mobilization, 21–23  
scheme to eliminate Chinese schools, 47  
social movements in, 23–26  
types of school systems, 42  
women's movement, 23–24
- Malaysia Plan, funds allocated (1972–2010), 75–76
- Malaysian Certification of Education, 59
- Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA) (马来西亚华人公会), 2–4, 28, 30, 41–42, 45, 48–51, 54, 58, 60–61, 63, 72, 78, 82–83, 87–88, 105–106, 114–15, 123, 125, 167–68, 174, 176–80
- Malaysian Chinese Organisations' Election Appeals Committee (Suqiu Committee) (马来西亚华人社团大选诉求委员会), 119
- Malaysian Chinese schools education system, 28
- Malaysian Independent Chinese Secondary Schools Working Committee (董教总全国发展华文独立中学工作委员会), 35, 102–3, 107, 133, 136–38,



- 141–43, 145–47, 149, 158–59, 169
- sponsorship programme (1985–2011), 142
- Malaysian Indian Congress, 42, 124
- Malaysian National Primary Syllabus (*Kurikulum Bersepadu Sekolah Rendah*), 107
- Malaysian People's Movement Party (*Parti Gerakan Rakyat Malaysia*), 2
- Malaysian Qualifications Agency (*Agensi Kelayakan Malaysia*), 152
- Malaysian Seven Major Clans Associations, 121–22
- Management Handbook for Chinese Primary Schools*, 94
- MCA Central Working Committee (马华中央工作委员会), 58
- MCA Youth Division, 58. *See also* Sim Mow Yu
- medium of instruction in schools, 42–43, 56–57
- Memorandum to Acquire for Citizenship by Representatives of Chinese Associations and Guilds in The Federation of Malaya (马来西亚联合邦华人社团代表争取公民权宣言), 51
- Memorandum of Demands on Chinese Education by Chinese Citizens in the Federation (本邦华人对教育总要求), 53
- Memorandum of Joint Declaration of National Chinese Guilds and Associations (贯彻华团联合宣言), 110
- Memorandum on National Cultural Policy (国家文化备忘录), 108, 117, 120
- Memorandum to the Prime Minister for a Rightful Place of the Chinese Language (为争取华文地位向首相东姑阿都拉曼呈送备忘录), 58
- Memorandum for the Return of Vernacular Education (还我母语教育各忘录), 123
- Memorandum Submitted by the United Chinese Schoolteachers' Association of Malaya in Opposition of the Conversion of Vernacular Schools into National Schools (教总反对改方言学校为国民学校宣言), 47
- Memorandum Submitted by the United Chinese Schoolteachers' Association of Malaysian Higher School Certificate (*Sijil Tinggi Persekolahan Malaysia*), 47
- Merdeka University, 59–60, 101–2
- fundraising campaign, 104
- lawsuit, 105, 107
- official language, 104
- Merdeka University (Limited) Company (独立大学有限公司), 59–60, 102, 151
- Merdeka University Formation Working Committee (马来西亚独立大学筹备工作委员会), 59
- Merdeka University Founders' Assembly (马来亚独立大学发起人大会), 59
- Movement to Eliminate Teaching and Learning Science and Mathematics in English Program (*Gerakan Mansuhkan Pengajaran dan Pembelajaran Sains dan Matematik dalam Bahasa Inggeris*), 123
- Muslim Youth Movement of Malaysia (*Angkatan Belia Islam Malaysia*), 25
- N
- Nanyang University (南洋大学), 113, 121–22, 181

- Nanyang University Alumni Association of Malaya (马来亚南大校友会), 113, 121–22
- Nanyangshangpao* (南洋商报), 93
- National Accreditation Board (*Lembaga Akreditasi Negara*), 152
- National Chinese Alliance Movement, 62
- National Chinese Civic Rights Committee (全国华团民权委员会), 110
- National Chinese Guilds and Associations Cultural Program (全国华团文化工作总纲领), 117
- National Chinese Guilds and Associations Cultural Working Committee (全国华团文化工作委员会), 108, 117
- National Conference for Independent Chinese Secondary Schools Development (全国发展华文独中运动大会), 136
- National Convention of Chinese School Committees and Schoolteachers (全国华校董教大会), 62
- National Convention of Chinese Schoolteachers' Associations in Malaya (全马教师公会代表大会), 44
- National Convention on Expansion of Chinese Education (全马华文教育扩大会议), 53
- National Cultural Policy (*Dasar Kebudayaan Negara*), 107–8
- National Economic Advisory Council (*Majlis Perundingan Ekonomi Negara*), 112
- National Front coalition (*Barisan Nasional*), 1
- National Independent Chinese Secondary Schools Development Fund (全国华文独中发展基金), 141
- National Language Bill, 59, 79
- National Seminar for Converted Chinese Secondary Schools' School Committees (全国国民型中学董事交流会), 89
- national-type primary schools (国民型小学), 48
- National Union of Heads of Schools (全国校长总工会), 93–94
- National Union of the Teaching Profession (*Kesatuan Perkhidmatan Perguruan Kebangsaan Malaysia*), 84–85
- nationwide Chinese citizenship registration movement, 51
- Negeri Sembilan Chinese School Committees Council (森美兰华校董事会联合会), 88
- Negeri Sembilan Chinese Schoolteachers' Association (森美兰华校教师公会), 44
- New Economic Policy, 29, 39, 61, 63, 101, 135, 168
- New Era College (新纪元学院), 28, 35, 125, 134, 151–58, 160
- distribution of students (1998–2011), 154
- sponsorship programme, 152–53
- Ngan Ching Wen (颜清文), 120
- Ngeow Yin Ngee (饶仁毅), 103
- non-governmental organization, 24, 25, 26
- non-liberal democratic states, 2–3, 7, 11–16, 18, 20, 100, 159, 182
- social mobilization, 166–82
- social movements, 11–16, 167
- O**
- “One Malaysia” campaign, 124
- One-Person, One-Dollar for Merdeka University Legal Fee

- (一人一元独大法律基金)  
campaign, 104, 135, 173
- Ong Ka Ting (黄家定), 123
- Ong Keng Seng (王景成), 57
- Ong Kow Ee (王超群), 87
- Ong Tin Kim (王添庆), 106
- Onn Jaafar, 50
- Operasi Lalang*, 83, 111, 112, 126, 176. *See also* Weeding Operation
- Organizational Rules and Regulations of the Malaysian Independent Chinese Secondary Schools Working Committee (董教总全国发展华文独立中学运动工作委员会组织规章), 138
- P**
- Pan-Malayan Chinese Schoolteachers' Association, second conference of (金马教师公会第二次代表大会), 44
- Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party (*Parti Islam Semalaysia*), 22, 25, 26, 61, 110, 114
- Pang Chong Leong (彭忠良), 93
- partially-assisted schools, 74
- peasant movements (Vietnam), 14
- Penang Chinese Education Working Committee (槟城州华文教育工作委员会), 147
- Penang Chinese Girls' High School (槟华女中), 52
- Penang Chinese Schoolteachers' Association (槟城华校教师会), 44
- Penang and Province Wellesley United Chinese School Management Association (槟威华校董事会联合会), 92
- People's Alliance (*Pakatan Rakyat*), 22, 124, 127
- People's Coalition (*Gagasan Rakyat*), 114
- People's Justice Party (*Parti Keadilan Rakyat*), 22, 119
- People's Republic of China (1949), 41
- Perak Independent Chinese Secondary Schools Development Working Committee (吡叻州发展华文独中工作委员会), 135
- Petition for Incorporation Order for the Establishment of Merdeka University (呈最高元首请求恩准创办独立大学请愿书), 103
- Phatharathananunth, Somchai, 14
- pine tree-planting ceremony (百万松柏献华教), 118
- Poi Lam High School (培南独中), 135
- political opportunities, 10, 13
- The Politics of Chinese Education in Malaya, 1945-1961*, 28
- President Ferdinand Marcos' martial law regime (Philippines), 21
- presidential association (主席区), 44
- principals, Chinese school, 91-93
- corruption, 93
- Professional Teaching Program (教育专业系), 153
- promotion of the dual coalition system (两线制), 35
- Proposals on the Draft of the 1990 Education Act (对1990年教育法令草案的修改建议), 113
- Protest Assembly of National Chinese Guilds and Associations and Political Parties (全国华团政党抗议大会议), 110
- Pua Eng Chong (潘永忠), 158
- Pustaka Matu Company, 92
- Q**
- Quek Leng Chan (郭令灿), 156-57
- Quek Suan Hiang (郭全强), 80, 113, 116-18, 120-21, 123, 126, 145, 151, 153, 157, 168, 180

## R

- Rahman Talib Report, 54, 55  
 Razak Report, 48, 49, 52, 54, 55  
 Red Bands of the Holy War  
   (*Sabillah*), 39  
 Reformasi movement, 22, 25, 119  
 Reid, William, 50  
 Report of the Committee on Malay  
   Education, 3. *See also* Barnes  
   Report  
 Report of the Education Committee, 48.  
   *See also* Razak Report  
 strike by Chinese students (1957), 52  
 Report of the Education Review  
   Committee, 54. *See also* Rahman  
   Talib Report  
 Report of the Federation of Malaya  
   Constitutional Commission 1957,  
   51

## S

- Sample of Working Guidelines for  
 Malaysia Chinese Primary School  
 Committee* (马来西亚华文小学  
   董事会工作手册样本), 88  
 school sponsorship system, 81  
 Second Conference of the Pan-  
   Malayan Chinese Schoolteachers'  
   Association (全马教师公会第二  
   次代表大会), 44  
 second income tax, 152, 170  
 Second Joint Conference of Chinese  
   School Committees and  
   Schoolteachers' Representatives in  
   Federation of Malaya with MCA  
   Representatives (联合邦华校董教  
   代表及马华公会代表第二次联  
   席会议), 46  
 Selangor Chinese Assembly Hall  
   (雪兰莪中华大会堂), 45, 57,  
   107, 109, 111–13, 119, 121  
 Selangor Hokkien Association (雪兰莪  
   福建会馆), 44  
 Seminar on Independent Chinese  
   Secondary Schools (华文独中研  
   讨会), 136  
 Seminar of National Chinese Leaders  
   in Malaya (全马华人领袖座谈会),  
   61  
 senior normal graduate schoolteachers  
   (华文高级师范毕业教师), 84  
 Sha Yun Yeo (沙渊如), 48  
 Shen Ting (沈亭), 135  
 Sim Mow Yu, 58–59, 83, 87, 105, 113  
*Sin Chew Daily* (星洲日报), 32, 111  
 Singapore People's Action Party, 57  
 Sisters-in-Islam movement, 26  
 social mobilization, non-liberal  
   democratic states, 166–82  
 social movement organization, 9, 16  
   extent and sophistication, 16–17  
   leaders and regime, 19  
   in non-liberal democratic states, 16  
   role, 9  
 social movements, 8  
   exclusive-based, 23–24  
   inclusive-based, 23–24  
   and interest groups, 8  
   leaders and regime, 19  
   literature, 15  
   in non-liberal democratic states,  
     11–16, 18  
   organizations, role of, 9  
   and political parties, 8  
   and state relations, 18–19  
   and strong associational alliance,  
     20–21  
 social organization (社团), 112, 114  
 Soeharto's New Order (Indonesia), 21  
 sons of the earth (*bumiputera*), 40  
 Soo Thien Ming (苏天明), 103  
 South China Normal University  
   (华南师范大学), 153  
*Southeast Asia Chinese Education  
 Bulletin* (东南亚华文教育通讯),  
 156

- Southeast Asian Chinese Language Teaching Convention (东南亚华文教学研讨会), 134, 154-55
- Southern College (南方学院), 105, 151
- sponsor-recommended enrolment system, 81
- State of Johore Chinese School Managers and Teachers' Association (柔佛州华校董教联合会), 113
- state level Chinese assembly halls (华人大会堂), 49, 108, 116
- state level Chinese school committees' associations (董事联合会), 47, 88-89
- Suqiu* Committee, 120-21. *See also* Malaysian Chinese Organisations Election Appeals Committee (马来西亚华人社团大选诉求委员会)
- T**
- Tamil Foundation of Malaysia, 123
- Tamil schools, 74-79
- Tan Ai Mei (陈爱梅), 28
- Tan Cheng Lock (陈祯禄), 21, 41, 45-46, 50, 177
- Tan Kah Kee (陈嘉庚), 157
- Tan Seng Giaw (陈胜尧), 106
- Tan Siew Sin (陈修信), 54, 60, 63, 177
- Tan Yew Sing (陈友信), 158
- Tang Tze Ying (陈子鸚), 29
- Tay Lian Soo (郑良树), 27
- Teachers' Journal* (教师杂志), 56
- Teaching and Learning Science and Mathematics in English Program (*Pengajaran dan Pembelajaran Sains dan Matematik dalam Bahasa Inggeris*), 123
- Thuang Pik King (庄迪君), 111-12
- Tiananmen Square demonstrations, 14
- Tianhou* Temple, 110, 175, 181
- Toh Kin Woon (杜乾煥), 158
- Too Joon Hing (朱运兴), 48
- Torch Movement (火炬运动), 49
- Tsun Jin High School (循人中学), 52
- Tunku Abdul Rahman College (拉曼学院), 60, 105, 115
- U**
- unification of diversity, 178-82
- Unified Curriculum Subcommittee (独中统一课程编委会), 138
- department of curriculum (课程局), 138
- department of publication (出版局), 138
- Unified Examination Certificate (华文独中高初中统一考试), 103, 115, 124-25, 138-40, 159
- Unified Examination Subcommittee (独中统一课程编委会), 138
- Unified Federation of Malaysian Chinese Assembly Hall (马来西亚中华大会堂联合会), 116, 120, 126
- United Chinese School Alumni Association (华校校友会联合会总会), 121-22, 152
- United Chinese School Committees' Association of Malaysia (马来西亚华校董事联合会总会), 3, 122, 137, 148. *See also* Dongzong
- United Chinese School Committees' Association of Selangor and Kuala Lumpur (雪兰莪暨吉隆坡联邦直辖区华校董事会联合会), 45, 91, 102, 158
- United Chinese Schoolteachers' Association of Malaysia (马来西亚华校教师会总会), 3, 122, 137, 148. *See also* Jiaozong

*The United Chinese Schoolteachers' Association of Malaysia and Its Activists* (华校教总及其人物), 27  
 United Malays National Organisation (UMNO), 1, 38, 41  
 unqualified schoolteachers, 111  
 urban Chinese schools, 72

## V

vernacular schools, 3, 30, 34, 43, 47–49, 53, 55, 72, 74, 77, 79, 124, 170–71  
 Vintage Heights Private Limited, 156  
 Vision 2020 campaign, 151  
 Vision Schools Project (*Rancangan Sekolah Wawasan*), 119

## W

Wang Guo Feng (王国丰), 92  
 Wang Siow Nan (王秀南), 27

Wang Wen Han (王文汉), 115  
 Wang Yoon Nien (汪永年), 57  
 Weeding Operation, 83. *See also* *Operasi Lalang*  
 Wen Tien Kuang (温典光), 45, 48  
 Wu Teh Yao (吴德耀), 43

## Y

Yan Yuan Zhang (严元章), 56  
 Yang Ya Ling (杨雅灵), 93  
 Yap Hon Kiat (叶翰杰), 150  
 Yap Sin Tian (叶新田), 145, 157, 174  
 Ye Hong En (叶鸿恩), 59  
 Ye Xia Guang (叶夏光), 92  
 Yeoh Ban Eng (杨万荣), 89–90  
 Yoong Suan (杨泉), 158

## Z

Zeng Dun Hua (曾敦化), 135

## ABOUT THE AUTHOR

**Ang, Ming Chee** wrote *Institutions and Social Mobilization: The Chinese Education Movement in Malaysia, 1951–2011* as her doctoral dissertation at the National University of Singapore. She is now a postdoctoral fellow at Lund University, Sweden and continues researching on politics, people, and protests in Southeast Asia. Her works consists of rich indigenous and important bottom-up empirical evidence, with a special focus on collective identity based on ethnicity, culture, and religion. Her other works include “Social Mobilization of the Underdogs: The Damansara Save Our School Movement in Malaysia”, *Pacific Affairs* 85, no. 2 (June 2012): 313–33. She can be contacted at [angmingchee@gmail.com](mailto:angmingchee@gmail.com).

