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PROPAGANDA AND THE GENOCIDE IN INDONESIA

IMAGINED EVIL

Saskia E. Wieringa and Nursyahbani Katjasungkana



Propaganda and the Genocide in Indonesia

In Indonesia, the events of 1 October 1965 were followed by a campaign to annihilate the Communist Party and its alleged sympathizers. It resulted in the murder of an estimated one million people – a genocide that counts as one of the largest mass murders since WWII – and the incarceration of another million, many of them for a decade or more without any legal process. This purge was justified and enabled by a propaganda campaign in which communists were painted as atheist, hypersexual, amoral and intent on destroying the nation. To this day the effects of this campaign continue to be felt, and its victims are denied the right of association and freedom of speech.

This book presents the history of the genocide and propaganda campaign and the process that led to the establishment of the International People's Tribunal on 1965 Crimes against Humanity Indonesia (IPT 1965), which was held in November 2015 in The Hague, Netherlands. The authors, a Dutch academic and an Indonesian human rights lawyer, examine this unique event, which brought these crimes before an international court for the first time, and they consider its verdict. They single out the campaign of hate propaganda that provided the incitement for the murder of so many Indonesians and ask why this propaganda campaign continues to be effective. The first book on this topic, it fills a significant gap in Asian Studies and Genocide Studies.

Saskia E. Wieringa is a professor at the University of Amsterdam, Netherlands, and the Chair of the Foundation IPT 1965 which established a People's Tribunal on the post-1965 crimes against humanity perpetrated in Indonesia.

Nursyahbani Katjasungkana is a human rights lawyer and the national coordinator for the Indonesian Women's Association of Justice. She was previously the Director of the Jakarta Legal Aid Institute, Indonesia and is presently the chair of its Board, She is the general coordinator of the Foundation IPT 1965.

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**Saskia E. Wieringa and
Nursyahbani Katjasungkana**

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Glossary and list of abbreviations and acronyms

30 September Movement On the night of 30 September 1965, a small group of army officers with support from some PKI leaders launched an assassination attack against the top six army generals and one lieutenant was also killed

Abangan Nominal Muslim, Java (literally, red)

AJAR Asian Justice and Rights

AJI Aliansi Jurnalis Independen; Alliance of Independent Journalists

Aksi sepihak One-sided or unilateral action (often just referred to as aksi)

Aliran Social-cultural stream

amicus curiae Latin for ‘friend of the court’

Ansor Youth movement of the Nahdlatul Ulema (NU – Council of Islamic Scholars)

APIK Asosiasi Perempuan untuk Keadilan Indonesia; Indonesian Women’s Association for Justice

Babinsa officers Bintara Pembina Desa non-commissioned village guidance officers

Bakorstanas Badan Koordinasi Stabilitas Nasional; Coordinating Body of National Stability

Balatkom Bahaya Laten Komunis; latent communist danger

Banser Barisan Ansor Serba Guna; Ansor Multi-purpose Brigade

Baperki Badan Permusjawaratan Kewarganegaraan Indonesia; Indonesian Citizenship Consultative Body for Indonesian citizens of Chinese ethnic origin

BTI Barisan Tani Indonesia; Indonesian Farmers’ Union

Buterpra Bintara Urusan Teritorial Pertahanan Rakyat; non-commissioned officers in Territorial and People’s Defence

CAH Crimes against humanity

CGMI Concentrasi Gerakan Mahasiswa Indonesia; Concentration of Indonesian Students Organizations

CIA Central Intelligence Agency (US)

CSIS Center for Strategic and International Studies

Dalang Puppet master

- DI** Darul Islam; House of Islam. Its armed wing was the Tentara Islam Indonesia (TII), the Indonesian Muslim Army
- DPR** Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat; People's Representative Council
- DPRD-GR** Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Gorong Royong; Collaborative People's Representative Council, from June 1960–November 1965
- Dwifungsi** Double task
- Dwikora** Dwi Komando Rakyat; People's Double Command
- ELSAM** Lembaga Studi dan Advokasi Masyarakat; Institute for Policy Research and Advocacy
- ET** ex-Tapol; former political prisoner
- Events of 1965–66** Translation of Peristiwa 65–66, referring to the killing of the generals on the night of 30 September 1965, and the killings which followed during 1965–66
- FBR** Forum Betawi Rempug; Betawi Brotherhood Forum
- FDR** Front Demokrasi Rakyat; People's Democratic Front
- FPI** Front Pembela Islam; Muslim Defenders' Front
- FRETILIN** Frente Revolucionária de Timor Leste Independente; Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor
- G30S** Abbreviation of Gerakan Tiga Puluh September; 30 September Movement
- Gerindom** Gerakan Indonesia Merdeka; Indonesian Freedom Movement
- Gerwani** Gerakan Wanita Indonesia; Indonesian Women's Movement
- Gerwis** Gerakan Wanita Indonesia Sedar; Indonesian Conscious Women's Organization
- Gestapu** Gerakan September Tigapuluh; another term for the 30 September Movement
- Gestok** Gerakan Satu Oktober; October 1 Movement
- GKS** Gereja Kristen Sumba; Christian Church of Sumba
- Golkar** Golongan Karya; Functional Groups. The dominant party of the New Order
- Hadji** A Muslim who has completed the pilgrimage (haj) to Mecca
- Hanra** Pertahanan Rakyat; People's Defence
- Hansip** Pertahanan Sipil; Civil Defence
- HMI** Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam; Association of Muslim Students
- HRC** Human Rights Council
- HSI** Himpunan Sarjana Indonesia; Association of Indonesian Scholars
- HTI** Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia; Indonesian Party of Liberation
- Ibu** Mother, Mrs
- ICC** International Criminal Court
- ICCPR** International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
- ICTR** International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
- ICTY** International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
- IKOHI** Ikatan Keluarga Orang Hilang Indonesia; the Indonesian Association of the Families of the Disappeared
- ILC** International Law Commission

- Inrehab** Instalasi Rehabilitasi; Rehabilitation Installation or Centre
- Intel** Intelligence
- IPKI** Ikatan Pendukung Kemerdekaan Indonesia; Union of Supporters of Indonesian Freedom
- IPPI** Ikatan Pemuda Pelajar Indonesia; Indonesian Students' Youth Association
- IPT 1965** International People's Tribunal on the 1965 Crimes against Humanity
- ISDV** Indische Sociaal Democratische Beweging; Indian Social Democratic Movement
- ISSI** Institut Studi Sejarah Indonesia; Institute for the Study of Indonesian History
- ITB Bandung** Institut Teknologi Bandung; Bandung Institute of Technology
- JAI** Jamaah Ansar al-Tawhid; Community Allies of the Oneness of God
- Jaksa Agung** Attorney-General
- JI** Jamaah Islamiyah; Islamic Community
- Jo** Abbreviation of the Latin word *juncto* (in conjunction with)
- JPIT** Jaringan Perempuan Indonesia Timur untuk Studi Perempuan, Agama, dan Budaya; Eastern Indonesia Women's Network for the Study of Women, Religion, and Culture
- jus cogens** Latin for 'compelling law', peremptory law with no derogation permitted
- KAMI** Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa Indonesia; Indonesian Students Action Front
- KAP Gestapu** Komando Aksi Pengganyangan Gerakan September Tigaruluh; Action Command to Crush Gestapu
- Kasebul** Kaderisasi sebulan, one-month training course
- KASI** Kesatuan Aksi Sarjana Indonesia; Indonesian Scholars Action Front
- KAWI** Kesatuan Aksi Wanita Indonesia; Indonesian Women's Action Front
- KAPPI** Kesatuan Aksi Pemuda Pelajar Indonesia; Indonesian Youth and High School Students Action Front
- Kejawen** Mix of Javanese religion with Hinduism and Islam
- Ketoprak** Traditional popular art form in Java
- KKPK** Koalisi Keadilan dan Pengungkapan Kebenaran; Coalition for Justice and the Revelation of Truth
- Kodam** Komando Daerah Militer; Regional Military Command
- Kodiklat** Komando Pembina Doktrin, Pendidikan dan Latihan Tentara Nasional Indonesia Angkatan Darat, Guidance Command on the doctrine, education and training of the army, the main army training centre, which used to be called *Seskoad*, in Bandung
- Kodim** Komando Distrik Militer; District Military Command
- Kokam** Komando Kesiapsiagaan Angkatan Muda; Resilience Command of the Muhammadiyah Youth
- Komando Aksi** Action Command

- Komnas HAM** Komisi Nasional Hak Asasi Manusia; Indonesian National Human Rights Commission, often referred to as the Commission
- Komnas Perempuan** Komisi Nasional Anti Kekerasan Terhadap Perempuan; Indonesian National Commission on Violence Against Women
- Kontras** Komisi untuk Orang Hilang dan Korban Tindak Kekerasan; Commission for the Disappeared and Victims of Violence
- Kopkamtib** Komando Operasi Pemulihan Keamanan dan Ketertiban; Operational Command for the Restoration of Security and Order
- Kostrad** Komando Cadangan Strategis Angkatan Darat; Army Strategic Reserve Command
- KOTI** Komando Operasi Tertinggi; Supreme Operations Command
- Koter** Komando Territorial; territorial command structure of the army
- KPI** Komisi Penyiaran Indonesia; Indonesian Broadcasting Commission
- Kyai** A learned expert in Islam; leaders of pesantren, Islamic boarding schools
- Laksusda** Pelaksana Khusus Daerah; Special Territorial Administrator
- Lasykar** Irregular fighting units, based on regional, ideological or religious ties
- LBH** Lembaga Bantuan Hukum; Legal Aid Institute
- Lekra** Lembaga Kebudayaan Rakyat; Institute of People's Culture
- Lemhanas** Lembaga Ketahanan Nasional; National Resilience Institute
- LGBTIQ** Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans, Intersex, Queer
- LPSK** Lembaga Perlindungan Saksi dan Korban; Institute for the Protection of Witnesses and Victims, set up on 8 August 2008
- Lubang Buaya** Crocodile Hole, the name of a neighbourhood near Halim Airforce Base on the outskirts of Jakarta
- Ludruk** Popular traditional art form in Java
- Mahmillub** Mahkamah Militer Luar Biasa; Extraordinary Military Tribunal
- Manipol** Manifesto Politik; Political Manifesto
- Masyumi** Majelis Syuro Muslimin Indonesia; Consultative Council of Indonesian Muslims
- MPR** Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat; People's Representative Assembly
- MPRS** Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat Sementara; Temporary People's Consultative Assembly
- Nasakom** Nasionalisme, Agama, Komunisme; Nationalism, Religion, Communism
- New Order** The name President Suharto gave to his regime after displacing Sukarno in 1966
- NII** Negara Islam Indonesia; Indonesian Muslim State, declared in 1949 by Kartosuwiryo, during the Darul Islam rebellion
- Niqaab** Full-face veil
- NU** Nahdlatul Ulema; Council of Islamic Scholars
- Opsus** Operasi Khusus; Special Operations
- P4** Pedoman Penghayatan dan Pengamalan Pancasila; Guide to the Comprehension and Sincere Implementation of the Pancasila

x *Glossary and list of abbreviations and acronyms*

- Pancasila** The state ideology under President Sukarno. The five principles were Belief in one God; Nationalism; Humanitarianism; Democracy; and Social Justice
- PangKopkamtib** Panglima Kopkamtib; Highest Command for Security and Order
- Panglima** Military Commander
- Pepabri** Persatuan Purnawirawan Angkatan Bersenjata; Association of Armed Forces Retired Officers
- Permesta** Piagam Perjuangan Semesta; Charter of Universal Struggle
- Pesantren** Islamic boarding school
- Pesindo** Pemuda Sosialis Indonesia; Indonesian Socialist Youth
- PGB** PKI Gaya Baru; New Style Communist Party
- PII** Pelajar Islam Indonesia; Indonesian Muslim Youth
- PKB** Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa; National Awakening Party
- PKH** Perserikatan Komunis di Hindia; Communist Association in the Indies
- PKI** Partai Komunis Indonesia; Communist Party of Indonesia
- PKS** Partai Keadilan Sejahtera; Prosperous Justice Party
- PMII** Pergerakan Mahasiswa Islam Indonesia; Indonesian Muslim Students' Organization
- PMKRI** Perhimpunan Mahasiswa Katolik Republik Indonesia; Catholic Student Union
- PMS-HAM** Perhimpunan Masyarakat Semarang untuk HAM; Semarang Society for Human Rights
- PNI** Partai Nasionalis Indonesia; Nationalist Party of Indonesia
- PP** Pemuda Pancasila; Pancasila Youth
- PPI** Pemuda Pelejar Indonesia (Indonesian Youth and High School Students)
- PPMI** Perserikatan Perhimpunan Mahasiswa Indonesia, Union of Indonesian Students' Organizations
- PPP** Partai Persatuan Pembangunan; United Development Party
- PR** Pemuda Rakyat, People's Youth
- Priyayi** Elite class of officials in traditional Javanese society
- PRRI** Pemerintah Revolusioner Republik Indonesia; Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia
- PSI** Partai Sosialis Indonesia; Indonesian Socialist Party
- Pusbintal** Pusat Pembinaan Mental; Mental Guidance Centre
- Reog** East Javanese traditional dance
- RRI** Radio Republik Indonesia
- RPKAD** Resimen Para Komando Angkatan Darat; Army Para Military Regiment
- SAB** Staf Angkatan Bersendjata; Armed Forces Staff
- Santri** Student of Islamic schools, a devout Muslim
- Sarbupri** Sarekat Buruh Perkebunan Republik Indonesia; Union of Plantation Workers of the Republic of Indonesia

- Sarekat Rakyat** People's Association
- Sekber Golkar** Sekretariat Bersama Golongan Karya; Collective Secretariat of Functional Groups
- Seskoad** Sekolah Staf dan Komando Angkatan Darat; Army Staff and Command School
- SH** Sarjana Hukum; title for lawyer
- SI** Sarekat Islam; Islamic League
- SKP HAM** Solidaritas Korban Pelanggaran HAM; Solidarity with the Victims of Human Rights Violations
- SOBSI** Sentral Organisasi Buruh Seluruh Indonesia; Central All-Indonesian Labour Organization
- Supersemar** Surat Perintah Sebelas Maret; Order of 11 March
- Syarikat** Masyarakat Santri untuk Advokasi Rakyat; Society of Devout Muslims for People's Advocacy
- Tapol** Tahanan politik; political prisoner
- TAPOL** The name of the human rights organization based in London, which focuses on human rights violations in Indonesia after 1965.
- Tempat Pemanfaatan** Place of Utilization, initial name given to the prison in Buru
- Teperda** Team Periksa Daerah; Regional Investigation Team
- TII** Tentara Islam Indonesia; the Indonesian Muslim Army, armed wing of the Darul Islam (DI)
- TK Melati** Taman kanak-kanak Melati; Melati Kindergarten
- TNI Masyarakat** Tentara Masyarakat; People's Army
- TRC** Truth and Reconciliation Commission
- Tritura** Tri Komando Rakyat; Three Commands of the People
- TUS** Tri Ubaya Sakti; Three Holy Mandates
- UGM** Universitas Gadjah Mada; Gadjah Mada University in Yogyakarta
- UI** Universitas Indonesia; University of Indonesia
- Ulama** Religious leader
- UNPAD** Universitas Padjadjaran, Padjadjaran University in Bandung
- UUPA** Undang-Undang Pokok Agraria; Basic Agrarian Law
- UUPBH** Undang-Undang Pokok Bagi Hasil; Basic Law on Sharecropping
- Waria** Wanita pria; woman-man, MTF transgender
- Wayang** Purwa; shadow puppet play
- YAPHI** Yayasan Pembelaan Hukum Indonesia; Indonesian Foundation for the Defence of Law
- YLBHI** Yayasan Lembaga Bantuan Hukum Indonesia (Foundation of Indonesian Legal Aid Institutes)
- YPKP** Yayasan Penelitian Korban Pembunuhan 1965; Foundation for the Research on Victims

Acknowledgements

In 1972 the Indonesian language underwent a spelling change. We have attempted to use modern spelling as much as possible, except in quotations from other sources, or when modern spelling has never been applied to a particular word or name. So we use u not oe, as in Sukarno, j not dj, as in Jakarta, y not j as in Yogyakarta, and c not tj as in cantik.

Indonesian names do not follow Western patterns. Sometimes people go by one name only, sometimes if they have two names, both names are used. In other cases the first name is commonly used when referring to that person. In the index we generally tried to list people by their surnames, except when those surnames are hardly used or hardly used on their own. In that case the name is listed without a comma to separate the two names.

Preface

This book has two authors, Saskia E. Wieringa and Nursyahbani Katjasungkana. Our roles were different but complimentary.¹ Saskia did the actual writing, but the data collection, analysis and particularly the critical work on the International People's Tribunal on 1965 Crimes against Humanity Indonesia (IPT 1965) were a joint effort. As writing is only the very last phase of our work on the genocide that followed the events of 1 October 1965, its roots and its present-day implications, we feel justified in claiming double authorship. This book is the result of 15 years of collaboration in human, women's and sexual rights in Indonesia and elsewhere in Asia. Nursyahbani is a lawyer and politician, while Saskia sees herself as a militant anthropologist.²

For Nursyahbani, working on this book was a profoundly personal and professional experience. The 1965 massacres have had a deep impact both on the life of the small village where she was living as a primary school-age girl at the time of the genocide, on some of her school friends, and on her own family. For decades she kept those memories to herself. Only when she started working as a lawyer at the Legal Aid Bureau of Jakarta in the 1980s could she reveal some of her experiences. She handled several cases in which Category C prisoners demanded their pension rights and also got to know a number of former prisoners from the slave labour camp on Buru. These experiences taught her lessons which were profoundly different from what she had learnt at school and what she had understood from watching the film *The Betrayal of G30S/PKI*, which had been compulsory viewing ever since it was released in 1984. From the mid-1990s she read about the destruction of the Gerakan Wanita Indonesia (Gerwani – Indonesian Women's Movement) and the sexual slander perpetrated against the girls who were present at Lubang Buaya (Crocodile Hole) on the night the generals were killed and buried there.³ Nursyahbani was a member of the People's Consultative Assembly (1999–2004) and a Member of Parliament from 2004–09. She is a co-founder and the national coordinator of the Asosiasi Perempuan untuk Keadilan Indonesia (APIK – Indonesian Women's Association for Justice) and chair of the Yayasan Lembaga Bantuan Hukum Indonesia (YLBHI – Foundation of Indonesian Legal Aid Institutes) Board of Trustees.

On 22 March 2013 she was given the mandate by Indonesian exiles living in Europe and by a group of survivors of the 1965 genocide to organize a People's Tribunal (the IPT 1965) on the crimes against humanity committed from October 1965 onwards. The Tribunal was convened in The Hague, Netherlands, in November 2015. Her tasks as general coordinator of the IPT 1965 included not only technical preparations, but also the collection of data and evidence, the selection and preparation of the witnesses, and the preparation of the indictment.

When Saskia did her PhD research on *Gerwani* in the early 1980s she was asked by some surviving leaders of the movement to analyse their history and particularly the slander concerning the events at Lubang Buaya. By that time the story lived on in a generally felt feeling that *Gerwani* women were whores and sadists.⁴ Following the initial presentation of the preliminary results of her research she was blacklisted by the Indonesian government. She wrote an academic book, several articles and a novel about the Indonesian genocide and the history of the women's movement but became increasingly dissatisfied that the slander against *Gerwani* continued to be widely believed in Indonesia, even after the fall of the military dictatorship. As chair of the Foundation IPT 1965 since early 2014 and coordinator of the research team she hoped to give the survivors of the events of 1965 a voice and to help to bring about reconciliation in Indonesia through exposing the truth.

This volume has its origins in the research report prepared for the prosecution team of the IPT 1965. While sorting through the material collected by 40 researchers and activists from all over the world, Saskia realized that the propaganda campaign that had incited the violence after the actions of the *Gerakan 30 September* (G30S – 30 September Movement) had played a critical role, and that little had been written about it. As coordinator of the research team Saskia prepared the relevant section in the research report herself. The core editorial team of the research report comprised Jess Melvin, Annie Pohlman, Ratna Saptari, Ayu Wahyuningrum, and Wijaya Herlambang, and Giany Amorita assisted the team.

The following academics and activists contributed material for the report:

Adam Henry, Adrian Vickers, Akihisa Matsuno, Aminah, Atika Nurhaini, Brad Simpson, Coen Holzappel, David Hill, Galuh Wandita, Gerry van Klinken, Helene van Klinken, Ignatius Krisnadi, Ita Fatia Nadia, Jemma Purdey, John Roosa, Kate McGregor, Md Kartaprawira, Mery Kolimon, Roro Sawita, Hersri, Willy van Rooijen, Win Djoyo, Astaman Hasibuan, Olin Monteiro, Artien Utrecht, Alex de Jong, Leslie Dwyer, Matthias Hammer, Dewi Ratnawulan, Fotarisman Zaluchu, Nico Schulte Nordholt, Francisca Pattipilohy, Bonnie Triyana, Utati Koesalah Toer, Maria Pakpahan, Soe Tjen Marching and members of the Yayasan Pembelaan Hukum Indonesia (YAPHI – Foundation for the Defence of Law Indonesia), the Yayasan Penelitian Korban Pembunuhan (YPKP 1965 – Foundation for the Research on Victims) and the Lembaga Studi dan Advokasi Masyarakat (ELSAM – Institute for Policy Research and Advocacy). We especially appreciate the

contribution of Wijaya Herlambang, who was critically ill at the time. Despite this he wrote an important chapter and testified during the hearings. He passed away just after the hearings were concluded.

The IPT 1965 had several organs all of which contributed to the hearings. Apart from Saskia as chair, the other members of the Executive Board were Sungkono and Sri Tunruang (treasurer). The Organizing Committee was coordinated by Nursyahbani Katjasungkana and comprised the following members: Sri Tunruang (finance), Sri Wahyaningrum (secretariat in Jakarta), Artien Utrecht, Ratna Saptari and Helene van Klinken (secretariat in the Netherlands), Annet van Offenbeek (security), Lea Pamungkas (media) and Saskia Wieringa (research).

The International Steering Committee was chaired by Saskia and comprised Artien Utrecht, Ratna Saptari (the Netherlands), Sri Tunruang (Germany), Jess Melvin (Australia), Sri Lestari Wahyuningrum (Indonesia), Annie Pohlman (Australia), Dolorosa Sinaga, Reza Muharam and Wijaya Herlambang (Indonesia), Mulyandari Alisah (France), Ayu Ratih (Canada) and Soe Tjen Marching (UK).

The media team played an important role in the whole process and comprised Lea Pamungkas (coordinator), Lina Sidarto, Aboepriadi Santoso, Joss Wibisono, Yusuf Sudrajat, Arief Kurniawan, Lexy Rambadetta, Theo Pramono, Koes Komo, Henri Ismail in Europe and Dolorosa Sinaga (coordinator), Indra Porhas Siagian, Agnes Indraswari, Valentina Sagala and Olin Monteiro in Indonesia.

The prosecution team comprised Todung Mulya Lubis, Antarini Arna, Sri Suparyati, Bahrain, Uli Parulian Sihombing, Agung Wijaya and Silke Studzinsky.

The Advisory Committee comprised Jan Pronk, Galuh Wandita, Frederiek de Vlaming, Joshua Oppenheimer, Abram de Swaan, Jan Breman, Nico Schulte-Nordholt, Ben White, Martha Meijer, Herlambang Wiratraman and Syamsiah Ahmad.

The panel of judges comprised Geoffrey Nice, Zak Jacob, Helen Jarvis, Shadi Sadr, Mireille Fanon-Mendes-Farncé, John Gittings and Cees Flinterman. They were assisted by a registrar, Szilvia Czevár, and a team of volunteers headed by Sunil Pal, comprising Elaine Barbiers, Patrick Bek, Diana Mudronic, Thomas Veenstra, Barry de Vries and Hammad Sarwar.

In addition to all the above persons who provided critically important contributions to the success of the IPT 1965, many student volunteers from all over Europe came to assist during the hearings. In Indonesia too several institutions provided support. These included Asian Justice and Rights (AJAR), the Komisi untuk Orang Hilang dan Korban Tindak Kekerasan (Kontras – Commission for the Disappeared and Victims of Violence), the Ikatan Keluarga Orang Hilang Indonesia (IKOHI – Indonesian Association of the Families of the Disappeared), APIK, the Yayasan Pembelaan Hukum Indonesia (YAPHI – Indonesian Foundation for the Defence of Law), the Komisi Nasional Anti Kekerasan Terhadap Perempuan (Komnas

Perempuan – Indonesian National Commission on Violence Against Women) and the Jaringan Perempuan Indonesia Timur untuk Studi Perempuan, Agama, dan Budaya (JPIT – Eastern Indonesia Women’s Network for the Study of Women, Religion, and Culture). The Perhimpunan Persaudaraan *Exil Eropa* supported the process. Many individuals assisted at various stages of the process, before, during and after the hearings. Bilven Sandalista played a critically important role in printing and distributing the Final Report of the panel of judges, both in the bilingual and in the Indonesian version.

We cannot name all those who contributed in some way, but special thanks go to Febriana Firdaus and Maria Rita Haugian of *Tempo* magazine. Ben White read through the first draft of the book and provided valuable comments. Steve Russell did a superb job in editing the whole manuscript. We also thank the Routledge team who assisted us from an early stage onwards, Dorothea Schaefer and Lily Brown.

Some organizations deserve to be thanked for their efforts in disseminating the idea of conducting the IPT 1965 and the results of the Tribunal, such as the *Perkumpulan Masyarakat Semarang Untuk HAM* (PMS-HAM – Semarang Society for Human Rights), the Human Rights Centre of Medan State University, IKOHI Medan, KontraS Surabaya, pesantren (boarding schools) in Rembang and Nurul Jaddid in Probolinggo, the International Centre for Aceh and Indian Ocean Studies and the Herbert Feith Foundation. We also thank the Peace Brigade who provided security training, as well as the Lembaga Perlindungan Saksi dan Korban (LPSK – Institute for the Protection of Witnesses and Victims) who provided protection for the victims and the IPT 1965 witnesses before, during and after the hearings.

Saskia would also like to thank her colleagues from the Amsterdam Institute for Social Science Research and from the Amsterdam Research Centre for Gender and Sexuality, both at the University of Amsterdam, for their support and many interesting discussions.

A final note on the eclectic methodology we used in collecting material for this book. In addition to the usual methods of document collection we also conducted various forms of interview (formal, informal, life stories) and interacted with groups of survivors. Data collection took place against the backdrop of the unfolding spectacle of Indonesian politics. Thousands of web pages were collected, documenting the fierce debates between the hardliners who are against any form of reconciliation and who denounce what they call ‘New Style Communism’, and the human rights advocates who keep insisting that human rights are universal and also valid in Indonesia.

Another important source of information came from various forms of social media, Facebook and several WhatsApp groups. Although the latest relevant news usually reached us via WhatsApp, in this book we used regular web pages as much as possible for references. For security purposes we use pseudonyms in a number of cases. This is also the reason why we do not give the name of the small neighbourhood in East Java where Nursyahbani lived as a child.

This book is dedicated to all those who suffered as a result of the crimes committed by the military and their allies in Indonesia following the events of 1 October 1965. This includes the younger generations who grew up in a climate in which history was distorted and critical analysis made suspect.

The Hague, 17 March 2018
Saskia E. Wieringa
Nursyahbani Katjasungkana

Notes

- 1 As general coordinator (Nursyahbani Katjasungkana) and chair of the Foundation IPT 1965 (Saskia Wieringa), respectively.
- 2 The term 'militant anthropology' is used by Nancy Scheper-Hughes (1995).
- 3 The article 'The Perfumed Nightmare' had been in circulation since the late 1980s and was published in 1995. It was later translated into Indonesian as '*Kuntilanak Wangi*'. It was used by Kalyanamitra as feminist training material.
- 4 See the film *The Women and the Generals* in which this story is told.

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1 Propaganda in Indonesian history

Introducing the theme

Introduction

The year 1965 was a watershed in the history of Indonesia. Until October of that year Indonesia could be characterized as a moderately democratic country (since 1959 its form of democracy had been called ‘guided’ by President Sukarno).¹ Among nationalist and socialist groups a feeling of post-colonial optimism prevailed, characterized by the slogans of Sukarno, who promised to lead his country on the path towards ‘revolutionary emancipation’. But there was also a sense of crisis. The economy was in a shambles. The ‘guiding’ hand of the President was felt to be very heavy by his adversaries, who saw Indonesia sliding into authoritarianism. The health of the President was rumoured to be failing. There were strong political tensions between the largely anti-communist army and the *Partai Komunis Indonesia* (PKI – Indonesian Communist Party), and between Muslim groups and the PKI, which had led to some violence. From October 1965 onwards, however, Indonesia made a violent turn to the right, while the PKI, the third largest communist party in the world, was destroyed, and its members killed, imprisoned or persecuted. Meanwhile, Sukarno loyalists were hunted down and murdered, and the position of the President was so weakened that his power gradually ebbed away, until in 1967 Suharto formally took over as the second President of the nation. He ruled with an iron fist. His so-called New Order regime was built on terror and justified by propaganda.²

The turning point was the actions of the *Gerakan 30 September* (30 September Movement or G30S), a group of middle-ranking officers who were deeply loyal to President Sukarno, and chaired by the head of the PKI’s Secret Bureau. They declared that they had planned to abduct seven leaders of the armed forces, and bring them to the President, on suspicion of preparing an action against him. Instead six generals were murdered, the seventh escaped, and in his place his lieutenant was murdered. Various explanations for these events have been put forward. The army immediately declared this a PKI coup and this is the hegemonic version in Indonesia to this day.

In this book we will refer to the actions of the short-lived 30 September Movement as either the G30S affair, or the events of 1965, in order to

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distinguish them from what we see as the real coup, the slow ousting of President Sukarno from power. This was achieved through the massacre of an estimated one million people and other crimes against humanity committed by the military in alliance with right-wing militias. The propaganda campaign centred on the alleged sexual perversion of members of *Gerwani* (*Gerakan Wanita Indonesia* – Indonesian Women's Movement), and depicted communists as atheists and anti-nationalists. These accusations incited both the military loyal to Suharto to purge pro-Sukarno loyalists from the armed forces, and the militias to carry out executions of hundreds of thousands of prisoners. It also aroused massive anti-Sukarno sentiment, leading to his replacement. The combination of physical terror and the soft power of propaganda turned Indonesia into a panoptical state, in which not only the actual victims were murdered, imprisoned and tortured but in which all sectors of the population were under direct or indirect surveillance by a totalitarian state apparatus, assisted by political, religious and other organizations. The manufacturing of consent and compliance ensured the ideological hegemony of the perpetrators of state terrorism.³

A theatre of cruelty and horror was performed, leaving the audience in fear. The gory spectacle did not end well: the villains were rewarded instead of punished, as has happened in other genocidal states such as Germany, Cambodia or Rwanda. The deception, misinformation and mystification surrounding the sheer spectacle of dismembered bodies, and stories about rivers clogged with decaying corpses, created an atmosphere of paranoia and anguish which still reverberates today.

Why does the stigma persist for the hundreds of thousands of survivors and their families? Why is the spectre of communism revived again and again? The victims are old, many of them in poor health, and most of them live in poverty; what danger can they pose to the mighty army or to the millions in Arab attire or in battledress who belong to the right-wing militia? Or are the perpetrators afraid that the children or grandchildren of their victims are thinking of revenge? We suggest that one of the factors for this continuation of persecution by means of propaganda is related to the impunity that the army and the other perpetrators enjoy, and which they do not want to lose. Other reasons include the persistence of fear and hatred in society as a goal in itself. Anxious, resentful people are easy to mobilize and manipulate.

'If the PKI revives, just beat them up [*gebug*]', President Joko Widodo told the assembled press in his palace in Jakarta on 17 May 2017.⁴ Referring to his role as President, he added, 'I have to guard the Constitution, and make sure Indonesia is a state in which the rule of law prevails'. This is a remarkable statement in many ways. The President reminded his audience that the country's Constitution of 1945 guarantees the rights of assembly and association, but added that the prohibition of the Communist Party of Indonesia and the teachings of communism, which came into effect in 1966, apparently still weigh more heavily.⁵ The President explained that organizations which violate the *Pancasila*, the Constitution, the national slogan 'Unity in

Diversity' and the Unitary Republic must be suppressed.⁶ And apparently he feels that the use of physical force is appropriate in that effort. Yet the PKI was a legal, successful party until the 1966 prohibition was issued. How is it that the party is still considered so 'evil', even long after its demise, that it is legitimate to stamp out all its alleged manifestations? The President's words contradict his own promises to deal with the human rights violations of 1965, both in his election campaign and in his programme for the nation – the *Nawacita*.⁷

The central theme of this book is the origin, content and impact of the propaganda campaign that was unleashed immediately after the events of 1965, and the continued stigmatization of the victims of the post-1965 genocide. In order to analyse this campaign we have to go back to the early decades of the twentieth century when the first split between the communists and conservative Muslim leaders occurred. The development of this relationship is a thread that runs through the text. Similarly, we examine the way in which the PKI was portrayed as anti-nationalist. We also look at the mechanics of this campaign. This included the creation of sexual moral panics, both in terms of the sexual slander against *Gerwani*, the progressive women's organization prior to the events of 1965, and the parallel wave of homophobia since 2015.

General Suharto's New Order state was built not only on military terror but also on the complicity or consent of large segments of the Indonesian population. In this book we discuss the massive demonstrations carried out by the student movement in late 1965 and throughout 1966 which helped to create a climate in which the PKI was destroyed and the legitimate President, Sukarno, ousted. The dubious role that some leading academic psychologists played in creating and administering tools to assess prisoners' level of 'communist sympathy' will also be discussed. Their assessments were effectively the only form of 'judgement' the prisoners faced.

Throughout the book power is analysed not only in its physical, oppressive workings, but particularly in the way ideological hegemony is created and enforced – the 'soft power' of the genocidal New Order regime (Althusser 1970; Gramsci 1992). Foucault's insights into the diffused, decentralized, capillary workings of power are relevant here as well (Foucault 1977; see also Rabinow 1991). Once the campaign to overthrow President Sukarno had begun, the Indonesian power holders managed to extend their surveillance of the population into people's private lives, controlling not only the media, educational systems and other institutions but also people's minds.

Political and economic background

At the time of its destruction in 1965–66 the PKI was the third largest communist party in the world. It was established in 1920. In 1926 it organized a revolt against colonial rule which was easily defeated and led to massive arrests and the banishment of hundreds of cadres and leaders. The party went

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underground. Following the surrender of Japan in 1945, the PKI joined the struggle for independence from the Dutch, who wanted to re-establish control over Indonesia. Tensions between right-wing republican forces (led by Vice-President Hatta and Army Chief General Sudirman) and revolutionary PKI-led units led to brief but violent clashes in and around Madiun in 1948. PKI-linked troops were defeated and party leader Musso was killed. This episode was later used to portray the PKI as 'always already' a traitor to the nation. However, controversy remains about the background of the so-called Madiun affair. This was a period of nationalist fervour and many kinds of violent clashes in different regions occurred, both between feudal forces and socialist troops (e.g. in Sumatra) and between secular revolutionaries and those inspired by Islamic values (Crouch 1978; Ricklefs 1993; Sundhaussen 1982).

Under the new leadership of D. N. Aidit the PKI quickly recovered and in the first national elections in 1955 the party came fourth with 16 per cent of the vote. The party supported the President's campaign of nationalizing Dutch assets and in December 1957 socialist trade unions seized control of Dutch-owned companies, which ultimately paved the way for the military to gain control of many plantations and national companies. However, tensions between the right-wing Muslim party *Masyumi* and the PKI increased (McVey 1965). In 1958 and 1959 regional leaders in Sumatra and Sulawesi revolted, assisted by pro-US forces, and the *Pemerintah Revolusioner Republik Indonesia* (PRRI - Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia) was established which immediately began arresting thousands of PKI members in the areas under their control. The PKI supported the efforts by Sukarno to quell the rebellion, including the introduction of martial law. The rebellion was eventually defeated. This was the strongest challenge mounted against the republican unity of Indonesia. *Masyumi* and the *Partai Sosialis Indonesia* (PSI - Indonesian Socialist Party) were banned.

Following the declaration of independence in 1949, Indonesia embarked on a democratic trajectory, in which the power of the President was restricted. This experiment yielded a series of unstable coalition governments, which frustrated President Sukarno. When the regional rebellions were crushed, both the army, which had gained prestige, and the President pressed for a return to the more authoritarian 1945 Constitution. In 1959 President Sukarno dissolved the national assembly and reinstated the 1945 Constitution (Cribb and Brown 1995). His speech on Independence Day of 1959, entitled 'Manipol' (*Manifesto Politik* - political manifesto) became the ideological basis for what came to be known as the system of 'Guided Democracy' (Feith 1962; Lev [1966] 2009). In 1960 Sukarno introduced the slogan *Nasakom*, an acronym for *nasionalisme* (nationalism), *agama* (religion), *komunisme* (communism). Thus, the role of the PKI as a junior partner in the Sukarno polity was institutionalized. Sukarno and the PKI drew closer together, agitating against the imperialist forces which they felt threatened the Republic. This system of 'socialism à la Indonesia' led to a form of state capitalism characterized by rampant inflation, food shortages and self-enriching bureaucrats and military leaders.

As the PKI grew, particularly in the rural areas of East Java, it lost its character as a militant cadre party. The party and its mass organizations put themselves at the service of the poor people, helping peasants, women and labourers, engaging in infrastructure building projects, combating illiteracy, and providing disaster relief (Mortimer 1974; Törnquist 1984). Considerable attention was focused on the so-called unilateral actions that the *Barisan Tani Indonesia* (BTI – Indonesian Farmers' Union) waged with PKI support in 1963–64, in an attempt to enforce the 1960 Sharecropping Law and the 1960 Basic Agrarian Law. In some areas local *kyai* (heads of *pesantren* – Islamic boarding schools) were targeted, which brought the PKI and the BTI into direct conflict with the country's largest Muslim mass organization – the *Nahdlatul Ulema* (NU – Council of Islamic Scholars) and its youth organization *Ansor* (Mortimer 1974).

The party also extended its base beyond Java and Bali, and in some regions it confronted feudal power structures. It called for the formation of a fifth force comprising armed peasants and labourers, but this never came about. Thus, when the mass killings started, the PKI and its associated organizations were totally defenceless and unprepared.

The PKI had expanded its membership base to about 3.5 million by 1965, which made it the largest communist party outside the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China. The party had a firm base in various mass organizations, such as the *Sentral Organisasi Buruh Seluruh Indonesia* (SOBSI – All-Indonesian Central Labour Organization), the *Pemuda Rakyat* (PR – People's Youth), *Gerwani*, the *Lembaga Kebudayaan Rakyat* (Lekra – Institute of People's Culture), the *Barisan Tani Indonesia* (BTI – Indonesian Farmers' Union) and the *Himpunan Sardjana Indonesia* (HSI – Association of Scholars of Indonesia). Estimates claim that the total membership of the party and its frontal organizations reached 20 million people (Mortimer 1974). But the PKI was not the only party to succeed in attracting a large mass following. The army had set itself the same task and was in fact much more successful. It organized conservative trade unions and so-called functional groups, and in 1964 brought them together under the *Sekretariat Bersama Golongan Karya* (*Sekber Golkar* – Collective Secretariat of Functional Groups). Its first chairperson, General Djuhartono, claimed that some 40 million people belonged to one of those groups (Wieringa 2002). These functional groups would later be transformed into the dominant party of the New Order – *Golkar*.

In March 1962 the PKI joined the government. PKI leaders Aidit and Njoto became advisory ministers. Sukarno at the time pursued an aggressive anti-imperialist policy, directed against the formation of Malaysia, a former British colony, which he saw as an imperialist plot. The PKI joined enthusiastically and started training many of its cadres as volunteers for the anti-Malaysia campaign. The military also started training volunteer militias, such as *Hanra* (*Pertahanan – Rakyat* People's Defence) and *Hansip* (*Pertahanan Sipil* – Civil Defence). The atmosphere became heated. In January 1964 the

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PKI started confiscating properties owned by British companies. Around that time the BTI, aided by the PKI and *Gerwani*, staged its so-called unilateral actions, trying to enforce the implementation of the socialist-inspired land reform laws (Utrecht 1966; Wertheim 1966). Although little land was actually redistributed and these actions were mostly over by 1965, they caused a lot of resentment among landowners, particularly the leaders of large *pesantren*. These were mainly followers of the NU. Its youth wing, *Ansor*, would later actively participate in the mass killings.

When Sukarno stalled the democratic process in 1959 by proclaiming 'Guided Democracy' he also blocked the PKI's parliamentary road to power.⁸ In the early 1960s tensions increased between the army and the PKI. The PKI leaders were fully aware of their military weakness, and to compensate for this they wanted at least to be aware of the armed forces' plans. In December 1964 the so-called Bogor Declaration was signed by the major *Nasakom* parties. Aidit proposed that in line with this declaration, *Nasakom* supporters, in the eyes of the army PKI loyalists, would be attached to various departments of the armed forces – a 'Nasakomization' of the army. The army vehemently opposed this policy and drew up its own plans, contained in the so-called *Tri Ubaya Sakti* (TUS – Three Holy Mandates) doctrine and conceptualized in early 1965. According to this doctrine, the army had the double task (*dwifungsi*) of providing defence against external and internal enemies as well as guiding the population in times of war. This doctrine added to the wide powers that the army had held since the regional uprisings, which included meddling in the production of rice. As both the army and the PKI, through its unions and associations which participated in *Nasakom* teams with like-minded groups, had wide interests in the civilian population, strong feelings of competition arose. There was also unrest in the army itself, manifested for instance in the early 1965 revolt of officers at the Surabaya naval base, who intended to bring Admiral Martadinata to President Sukarno for interrogation as he allegedly had neglected the navy (Crouch 2009). Although this plan did not materialize, it showed that the idea of abducting senior officers to explain themselves before the President was in the air.

The political turmoil of the early 1960s was aggravated by an escalating economic crisis. Spiralling inflation led to widespread poverty. Political attacks on the President and rumours about his ill health led to an impending sense that change was in the air. Rumours circulated that the CIA and other Western powers would interfere. More importantly, rumours spread that the army was planning a right-wing *coup d'état* against President Sukarno. The army under General Yani hoped that the PKI would strike first, thus providing an opportunity for the army to launch an attack against the communists. In the morning of 1 October 1965 the G30S group carried out its action, providing the army with its long-awaited 'pretext' to strike at the PKI and replace Sukarno (Roosa 2006). Only in 1998 was President Suharto ousted. Anti-Sukarno student demonstrations played a major role in creating the political climate for Sukarno's loss of power. The new period that was to

restore democracy was enthusiastically called ‘*Reformasi*’ (Budiman *et al.* 1999; Van Dijk 2001; Forrester and May 1998; O’Rourke 2002). However, in 2017/18, as we were writing this book, there was an eerie sense of *déjà vu*: mob violence; intimidation by the armed forces; a complicit judiciary – all of which reminded us of the methods used by the New Order. Apparently, the military caste, which had been in power since General Suharto rounded up the insignificant forces that had backed the actions of the 30 September Movement, still wields enormous influence in the country. However divided they might seem, it is evident that the armed forces are rallying behind the resistance against any effort to deal with the crimes against humanity committed after October 1965 in a judicial manner. The lid should remain on the box – the truth must not be revealed.⁹ Shady political manoeuvres, corruption and the very real threat of Islamist terrorism have created an atmosphere in which the ghost of communism has been revived and anti-communist conspiracy theories flourish.

Similar arguments to those heard in late 1965 are being used to stigmatize certain social groups for ulterior political motives. A mixture of sexual slander, now directed at LGBT groups, and the bogeyman of the revival of communism, has been concocted as a toxic potion to sway Islamic masses to support a particular group that wants to maintain or reinforce its hegemony over the country. As has been the case since the birth of the republic, at stake is the soul of the nation. Until late 1965 President Sukarno promoted his vision of ‘revolutionary emancipation’ which would create a prosperous Indonesia, while the PKI hoped for a form of Indonesian socialism (Legge 1972; Mortimer 1974).

Muslim groups, which had been helping the army to massacre hundreds of thousands of alleged communists, were shoved aside after 1965; they are now asserting their influence, calling for a hegemonic Sharia state. The Islamists, spearheaded by the aggressive Muslim militia *Front Pembela Islam* (FPI – Islam Defenders’ Front), are able to organize huge street demonstrations.

Indonesia’s troubled and opaque political past continues to haunt its present. Why, after almost 20 years of democracy, is it still so difficult to enter into a thorough process of truth finding about the events of 1965 and the ensuing massacres? And why are the survivors and victims of the atrocities of the period seen as guilty (of what?) and not as victims? They have suffered immensely, have lost property, honour and sometimes their families. Those killed or imprisoned for many years have never been tried: why cannot they be rehabilitated, their honour restored, their social position respected? Why cannot their murderers and torturers be shamed and blamed for their acts?

The International People’s Tribunal on the 1965 Crimes against Humanity

How to fight impunity, break the silence and restore the dignity of the victims? A recent effort to address the 1965–66 crimes against humanity and the

continued persecution of the victims was the establishment of a People's Tribunal to draw national and international attention to these violations. Impunity, however, does not only have political and legal aspects. Martha Meijer (2006), who studied the scope of impunity in Indonesia, stresses the cultural aspects which led to the impunity related to the 1965–66 crimes against humanity in Indonesia. She points to the feudal remnants of the Javanese culture in particular (which is still dominant) that supports a culture of violence. This culture is characterized by a tendency to use violence in conflict resolution (instead of debate), the deployment of stigmatizing messages and falsification, and a culture of political corruption. In this feudal culture of violence, critical voices are muted, and the police do not protect those who protest. Open discussion and the open display of dissent is discouraged; reality is fabricated to suit those in power. Human rights violations are considered bad news and are better not discussed. This attitude is propped up by denials, misinformation and propaganda (Meijer 2006: 208–16).

Violence in Indonesia has a specific history and a particular culture. The brutality and arrogance of Dutch colonial power was accompanied by two phenomena: the vigilante violence perpetrated by local gangsters (*jago*) and by private neighbourhood and village watches, and the emergence of vibrant, aggressive youth groups who would spearhead national independence.¹⁰ These groups emerged regularly during the various periods of violence experienced in Indonesia: the Japanese occupation; the chaotic brutality of the national revolution; the (Muslim) rebellions in Sulawesi, West Java and Sumatra in the early 1950s; and the CIA-backed regional uprisings in the late 1950s. Militias and right-wing students appeared side by side again in the extermination campaign against the PKI, this time spurred on and coordinated by the military. The sustained terror campaign of the New Order, and the extreme brutality in East Timor, Aceh and Papua, are other examples of this prolonged history of violence (Anderson 2001; Colombijn and Lindblad 2002).

In 2013 a group of Indonesian exiles, international human rights activists and academics came together after watching Joshua Oppenheimer's impressive documentary *The Act of Killing*.¹¹ They decided that international pressure was needed to make the Indonesian massacres better known and to put pressure on the Indonesian government to acknowledge its responsibility for the genocide. The International People's Tribunal (IPT 1965) was established and Nursyahbani Katjasungkana was given the mandate to coordinate the process (Katjasungkana and Wieringa 2016a; Wieringa 2018). The Foundation International People's Tribunal on the 1965 Crimes against Humanity in Indonesia was formally established in March 2014. The hearings of the Tribunal established by the Foundation IPT 1965 were held in November 2015.

The IPT 1965 aimed to break the silence on the crimes against humanity in Indonesia after October 1965 and to address the impunity of the perpetrators of these crimes. The *Komisi Nasional Hak-Hak Asasi Manusia* (Komnas HAM – National Human Rights Commission) published a report in 2012

which concluded that the atrocities committed during this period must be seen as crimes against humanity.¹² This landmark report, of which only an executive summary is publicly available, is based on the results of an investigation conducted between 2008 and 2012 in six regions (Flores (Maumere), Bali, Maluku (Buru), North and South Sumatra, and South Sulawesi) and the testimonies of 349 witnesses and survivors. Although the report does not attempt to extrapolate the number of victims nationwide, overwhelming evidence is given of widespread and systematic killings, exterminations, enslavement and forced labour, forced evictions and banishments, arbitrary deprivation of freedom, torture, rape and other forms of sexual violence and enforced disappearances. These acts were violations of international criminal law at the time they were committed. Such offences are codified as crimes against humanity in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court to which Indonesia is not yet a party.¹³ The offences also constituted crimes at a national level according to Law No 26/2000 on Human Rights Courts, which closely follows the wording of the Rome Statute. It is this law to which the Komnas HAM report refers.

Komnas HAM acknowledged that the victims were targeted for their alleged links with the PKI, and recognized the Indonesian state as the mastermind behind the crimes, emphasizing that ‘these events were the result of state policy to exterminate members and sympathizers of the PKI which was deemed to have conducted resistance against the state’.¹⁴ The Komnas Ham report was submitted to the Office of the Attorney-General which returned it on procedural grounds. To date the Attorney-General has taken no action. It took the release of *The Act of Killing* in 2012 and subsequent screenings in several countries to make the international community aware of these atrocities. In Indonesia *The Act of Killing* could only be screened in secret. A comprehensive report in *Tempo* magazine (September 2012) on the mass killings helped to raise new awareness in the country about this massacre. Oppenheimer’s second film, *The Look of Silence* (2014),¹⁵ which was widely screened throughout Indonesia, despite a rather belated official ban, also increased public awareness.

As Komnas HAM concluded, the primary responsibility for ending the impunity of the perpetrators and providing justice for the victims lies with the State of Indonesia. However, it has failed over the last 50 years to investigate these crimes, to prosecute perpetrators, to officially and fully apologize, and to provide reparations and other meaningful compensation to the victims and their families. This failure and unwillingness to act has persisted despite repeated demands made by victims, human rights activists and scholars, especially since the end of the Suharto regime in 1998. Instead, the survivors and their defenders face discrimination and violence.¹⁶ There was hope for an apology following the publication of the Komnas HAM 2012 report on those mass crimes, but President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (2004–14) refrained from this. Although the present President (from October 2014) Joko Widodo promised to deal with these and other mass crimes committed by the state, so

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far no such apology has been made. Instead the government has set up a reconciliation committee which is not tasked with truth finding. Nothing more has been heard about this committee since its establishment. One of the staunchest anti-communist militias, the *Front Pembela Islam* (FPI – Muslim Defenders's Front), even declared that it was 'forbidden to apologize to the victims of the 1965 communist purge'. The FPI patron, Muhammad Rizieq Shihab, declared that such an apology could lead to the rise of communist ideology and would 'threaten Muslims'. Furthermore, he feared that the state would have to pay enormous compensation to the victims. For 'if the PKI is not guilty, it means they deserve rehabilitation ... and all assets of PKI members and sympathizers would need to be returned ... including their houses and land'.¹⁷

During the four days of hearings of the Tribunal in November 2015 in The Hague, Netherlands, the prosecution submitted that in international law the inhumane acts committed in Indonesia after the events of 1965 were crimes against humanity. It also argued that under international customary law the prohibition of crimes against humanity is a *jus cogens* norm.¹⁸ Crimes against humanity in customary international law are fundamentally inhumane acts committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack against civilians; they involve acts that are crimes in most national criminal law systems.¹⁹ Written material submitted to the Tribunal was supplemented by witness testimonies.

After some months of deliberation, on 21 July 2016 the panel of judges presented its final conclusions in a report, accompanied by a video in which the presiding judge Zak Yacoob read the major conclusions and recommendations.²⁰ In summary, the judges concluded that the State of Indonesia was 'responsible for and guilty of crimes against humanity consequent upon the commission and perpetration, particularly by the military of that state through its chain of command, of the inhumane acts' (acts which had been presented to the Tribunal by the prosecutors). The judges further ruled that 'all these acts were an integral part of a broad and widespread systematic attack against the PKI, its affiliated organizations, its leaders, members and supporters and their families (as well as those alleged to have been sympathetic to its aims), and more broadly against many people having no connection at all with the PKI, in what became a widespread purge, which included many supporters of President Sukarno and progressive members of the Nationalist Party of Indonesia, PNI'. They stressed that each inhumane act was a crime, in Indonesia and in most civilized countries of the world.

Furthermore, the judges stated that 'the State of Indonesia failed to prevent the perpetration of these inhumane acts or to punish those responsible for their commission'. To the extent that some crimes were committed independently of the authorities, by so-called spontaneous local action, this did not absolve the state from the obligation to prevent their occurrence and to punish those responsible.

Thus, the panel of judges concluded that the State of Indonesian must be held responsible for mass killings, imprisonment, enslavement, torture,

enforced disappearances and sexual violence. These conclusions conform to the charges in the indictment submitted by the prosecution. They are also consistent with the analysis of the 2012 Komnas HAM report.

The prosecution had also laid charges of complicity against other states, notably the United States of America (US), the United Kingdom (UK) and Australia. All three countries had been invited to defend themselves at the hearings, as had Indonesia,²¹ but none of them had accepted this invitation. The judges concluded that the US, the UK and Australia were all complicit to different degrees in the commission of these crimes against humanity and that they were all aware of what was taking place in Indonesia.²² Finally, the Tribunal addressed the issue of whether genocide had been committed. The prosecution had not included the count of genocide in its indictment,²³ although the research report had presented arguments in support of such a charge. The judges concluded that the massacres fell within the definition of genocide.

The *Final Report of the IPT 1965* that was published in 2016 is the first legal document to pay attention to the importance of propaganda in Indonesia. In its indictment the prosecution had put forward to the panel of judges the count of ‘persecution through propaganda as a crime against humanity’. The charge was that ‘the State of Indonesia was responsible for using propaganda and hate speeches as part of the widespread and/or systematic attack against members of the PKI and PKI-affiliated organisations, and/or the civilian population in Indonesia from 1965 onwards’. The judges ruled that ‘the false propaganda campaign was essential to the widespread systematic attack on the PKI and all those deemed to be connected to it’. They stated that ‘the official version of what happened to the prisoners ... was totally false. The true facts were known to the military leadership under General Suharto ... the sustained propaganda campaign against those accused of being linked to the PKI helped to justify the extra-legal persecution, detention and killing of alleged suspects, and to legitimize sexual violence and all the inhumane conduct already described’ (Gittings and Jarvis 2017: 93–94).

This propaganda contributed not only to the denial of civil rights for the survivors of the genocide but also to their continued persecution. Spreading false propaganda for the purpose of preparing the ground for violence is integral to the commission of that violence. The act of preparing for the crime cannot be said to be separate from the crime itself: ‘The false propaganda was the first significant step in the attack and is therefore a crime against humanity’ (Gittings and Jarvis 2017: 93). The judges further noted the ‘significant dehumanizing impact’ of the propaganda campaign, which helped to justify the extra-legal persecution, detention and killing of alleged suspects and particularly to legitimize the use of sexual violence against women’. The panel of judges pointed out that this campaign had gone unchallenged for over three decades, thereby contributing to ‘the denial of civil rights of survivors and the absence of any attempt to remedy injustices against them’ (ibid.: 93–94).

Since the publication of the Final Report of the panel of judges, the Indonesian state has remained reluctant to accept its obligations to hear the voices of the victims, to carry out effective redress and reconciliation, and to provide overdue justice for them. In spite of the wide national and international attention which the IPT process received, not even initial steps have been taken to end impunity for the post-October 1965 crimes against humanity.²⁴ Yet impunity poisons society and breeds new violence. Reconciliation is not possible without truth finding. The IPT 1965 advocates a mix of retributive and restorative ways for the redress and reconciliation of the crimes against humanity that took place from 30 September 1965 onwards. This mix includes, but is not limited to, the following elements: truth finding; retribution or access to justice; restoration and reparation; guarantees for non-recurrence and memorialization. These elements are interlinked.

In Indonesia the immediate reactions from the official side to the hearings and the presentation of the Final Report of the Tribunal were negative. The prosecutors, witnesses and organizers were labelled 'traitors to the nation'.²⁵ Government officials immediately dismissed the Tribunal's verdict. Their comments betrayed a narrow form of nationalism such as the statement made by Coordinating Minister for Law and Security Luhut Panjaitan: 'They are not our bosses. Indonesia has its own legal system. I don't want other people to dictate this nation.' A similar opinion was voiced by Defence Minister Ryamizard Ryacudu: 'Why listen to foreigners? Foreigners should listen to Indonesia' (without further specifying what lessons foreigners could learn from Indonesia's genocidal past). There were even more hateful, belligerent statements, such as from Habieb Rizieq of the FPI: 'We will depose any president who apologizes to the PKI. Even if it means more violence.' Retired Major General Kivlan Zen added: 'Our troops are ready for war'. Journalist Aria Danaparamita aptly summed up the atmosphere of indignation and hurt nationalist pride: 'It is no great honour to rank among the world's greatest when it means being named among the world's greatest criminals. Genocide? Us?'²⁶ Indonesian expert Heryanto lambasted the 'conceited, xenophobic, self-congratulatory, hypernationalistic and narrow views which has penetrated the Indonesian inner character for over half a century.'²⁷ But not all reactions were negative. In a remarkable move underscoring the theme of this book, on 26 August 2016 the Alliance of Independent Journalists which held its 22nd anniversary presented its 2016 Tasrif Award to two organizations, the IPT 1965 and the Forum LGBTIQ Indonesia.²⁸ The latter consists of 20 LGBTIQ organizations from all over the archipelago. During the ceremony, the jury explained that both organizations represented people fighting against heavy stigma, in a social and political environment in which they face severe harassment and where their freedom of organization and expression is under attack. The award for the IPT 1965 was received by Bonnie Setiawan, Chair of the newly formed Forum 1965, consisting of nine victims' organizations of the 1965 mass crimes against humanity, as well as three representatives of the victims, Kusnendar, Haryono and Salam. Through this award the jury

indicated it realized that both groups of people, LGBT activists and survivors of the 1965 genocide and their defenders, are placed outside of the nation, that they are vilified, stigmatized and face great political, social, economic and at times even physical hardship. The jury also indicated that it is an act of courage to fight for human and sexual rights. It also pointed to the connection between the sexual moral panic that emerged during the last months of 2015 and the stepped-up campaign against the spectre of communism. In both cases what is at stake is the imagination of the Indonesian national community, in the face of the boundaries being defined between those who are considered to belong and those who are considered to be ‘abnormal’ or ‘anti-national’.

Propaganda and evil

This book focuses on the role propaganda has played both in the incitement and the justification of the 1965–66 genocide and in the continued stigmatization of its victims. The ‘evil’ that the PKI and its related associations represented first had to be identified before it could be used to legitimize the ban and the violent removal of the party and its associated organizations. How was the volatile political and economic situation in Indonesia around 1965 manipulated to such an extent that the massacres could be presented as ‘spontaneous’? The action in which the army’s top brass were abducted and killed does not in itself provide enough motivation to engage in a killing spree of such a scale. Similar inter-army clashes took place in the 1950s which did not result in wide public unrest (Crouch 1978; Sundhaussen 1982). So far, there is no comprehensive analysis of the mechanics whereby the PKI and all those associated with it, however vaguely, were painted as atheist, anti-nationalist and sexually perverse, although most researchers acknowledge the central role psychological warfare played (see, for example, Roosa 2006; Southwood and Flanagan 1983).

In spite of overwhelming evidence that points to the army’s role in the massacre, popular accounts in Indonesia of the extent and origin of the genocide do not go much beyond the version advanced by the army under General Suharto and parroted by Hughes, namely that it was due to ‘the sudden boiling over of resentment against the Communists’ (1967: 175; see also Conboy 2003). The active role of Suharto’s military is ignored in these views, as is the meddling of the CIA and other foreign intelligence services who supported the army in successfully building up its own mass base prior to 1965 and who buttressed the army thereafter (Robinson 2018; Scott 1985; Simpson 2008; Suroso 2013).

In the early 1980s, while carrying out research in Java on the progressive movement *Gerwani*, Saskia Wieringa often heard people saying ‘*PKI bikin kacau*’ (‘the PKI created trouble’) as a vague allusion to the reason why hundreds of thousands of members and sympathizers of the PKI in East Java were killed,²⁹ particularly by the militant wing *Banser* (*Barisan Serba-guna* –

Multi-purpose Brigade) of the youth movement *Ansor* of the NU. Rural unrest was indeed a major feature of social and economic life in 1965 (as argued by Anderson and McVey 1971 and Wertheim 1979 among others), along with spiralling inflation. Political turmoil also played a major role. But such socio-economic and political tensions cannot fully explain the extent or the nature of the mass murders.

Moreover, nor can cultural factors, advanced by those who insist that such tensions could only be solved by ‘cleansing’ the villages (as NU followers to this day argue), fully justify how in such a short time so many people could be so brutally slaughtered. As Robinson (1995) points out, this view is often premised on romantic, erroneous underlying ideas about Javanese and Balinese people essentially living in harmony with each other. The PKI and its associated mass organizations are then seen as the cultural ‘others’, disrupting ancient traditions. However, as Robinson argues, if harmony is seen as an essential village characteristic, why could this presumed disruption of harmony not be solved harmoniously?³⁰

Both explanations, the politico-economic and the cultural, underestimate the active role of the military, and the wide-ranging impact of the mass propaganda campaign in which the PKI was framed as an inhuman, atheist, anti-nationalist and evil force, as exemplified by the alleged castration, seduction and murder of the generals by the party’s young female members. Wieringa argues that the women’s organization associated with the PKI, *Gerwani*, was singled out for persecution (Wieringa 2002, 2003).³¹ The sexual moral panic engendered by the army and its allies, based as it was on the creation of the myth of women who murder and castrate, was apparently conceived as a successful route to vilify the progressive forces in the country and to destabilize Sukarno, paving the way for the ascendance of General Suharto to the presidency.³² But the propaganda campaign was wider; all mass organizations associated with the PKI were targeted as objects of the army’s hate campaign. Sundhaussen remarked that ‘without the army’s anti-PKI propaganda the massacre might not have happened’ (1982: 210).

Following independence, the process of nation formation in Indonesia was spurred on by shifting propaganda campaigns. Whereas President Sukarno stressed national unity in this diverse archipelago and argued that nationalism, religion and communism together formed the soul of the nation, coining his famous *Nasakom* formula in the late 1950s, in reality communist and religious forces struggled bitterly for hegemony, with the army, proud of its nationalist credentials, increasingly siding against the communists. In 1965 the army crushed the PKI (and other supporters of Sukarno) but also initially sidelined Muslim groups. However, during Suharto’s 32-year-long military regime, the President increasingly came to depend on Islamic forces for support. This opened space for the proselytizing of Wahabist forces, particularly on university campuses. After democracy was re-established in 1998, Muslim parties regained much of their power. But the army managed to remain the dominant force.³³

The Nazi propaganda that led to the Holocaust counts as one of the most 'successful' propaganda campaigns of all time. So how does propaganda work on people's minds? Propaganda, according to Welch (2014) who studied the Nazi propaganda campaign, is widely defined as the art of persuasion. It has two functions: not only is it meant to change attitudes and beliefs, it is also meant to reinforce existing beliefs. It does so not only through lies but particularly by providing different kinds of truths, by distortion and half-truths, or by presenting certain acts or events out of context. It does not only apply to irrational instincts but also mobilizes rational opinions. This is how feelings of fear and insecurity (for instance in relation to an economic crisis) can be redirected to demonize particular groups.

Hitler studied eclectically to understand the workings of propaganda. His major examples were British World War I propaganda and the Marxists in his native Austria. In *Mein Kampf* he spelled out these lessons: confine the messages to the bare essentials, express them in stereotyped formulas which are endlessly repeated, and aim them at the lowest levels of intelligence to mobilize primary emotions (love, hatred and the like). Yusuf Hasyim, the founder of *Banser*, explicitly referred to Hitler's book when he set up the armed wing of NU's youth organization, which was responsible for the massacres that were carried out in 1965–66 particularly in East and Central Java (according to Hasyim 2007, the choice of the name *Banser* even echoes the German word *Panzer*, tank).³⁴ The object of Nazi propaganda, and similarly the goal of Suharto's propaganda machine, was to unify a nation behind a single idea of patriotism. But Hitler realized that propaganda in itself was not enough to incite the kind of violence he had in mind. It had to be accompanied by physical means of power, both military and political and through an organization, the bureaucracy, to implement directives from above. Control over the media was also essential. Goebbels, Hitler's propaganda minister, said: 'we want to work on people until they are addicted to us' (cited in Welch 2014: 5). It is this engineering of addiction that characterized Suharto's propaganda campaign as well. Immediately after he had dismantled the G30S group he set about gaining control of the mass media (newspapers, radio), to mobilize militias and to purge the army and the bureaucracy of pro-Sukarno forces. The dehumanization campaign that triggered the mass killings and shamed the nation into silence has resulted in those with left-wing tendencies continuing to be vilified, even today.³⁵

An important element of the New Order propaganda campaign is the distortion of history. Not only did the army impose its version of what happened during the G30S affair; it also rewrote the preceding history. In this book we deconstruct some of these stories and provide some of the context that is ignored in New Order ideology. We also present some events which have had their importance minimized, as in an account of the havoc wrought by the *Darul Islam* (DI – House of Islam) rebellion and the dangers posed by the regional uprisings in the late 1950s (Van Dijk 1981). We offer an analysis of the way in which the army continues to impose its version of Indonesian

history, distorting and magnifying certain events, such as the 1948 Madiun affair. Its purpose was, and still is, to present the PKI as a group of atheist, hypersexual people, intent on destroying the foundations of the nation, as presented in the *Pancasila* and the Constitution. For all its emphasis on history, this book is not an alternative version of Indonesian history. In its analysis of the historiography of the New Order and its presentation of events that were neglected by New Order historians, it aims to provide a deconstruction of the way in which Indonesian history has been presented by the New Order ideologues.

'Imagined evil' is the subtitle of this book. This relates primarily to the fact that the PKI and those associated with the party were believed to be devils, whores, atheists and traitors. But the epithet 'evil' is applicable to other actors in this gruesome theatre as well. The perpetrators committed evil acts and the terrorism of the state can also be characterized as evil. So how can we think of 'evil'?

In relation to individual perpetrators of evil the philosopher Hannah Arendt (1963), who studied the Holocaust, distinguishes three gradations. The first category comprises those who are seduced by considerations of career or family welfare and therefore participate in the enactment of evil. The psychologists discussed in Chapter 7 in this volume fall into this category. The second category comprises those who realize that their actions are immoral but who console themselves with the idea that they behave in the same way as others. This applies to members of the militias. Their actions may not have been moral, but at least they were supported by the mores, the customs of the time. The third category comprises those individuals who consciously commit evil acts because they are convinced that their actions serve a higher purpose (for example saving the nation – the excuse that Suharto and his associates always used).

Enlightenment philosophers Kant and Arendt posit an absolute standard of morality that people can access through their principle: do not do to others that which you do not want to be done to yourself. This is ultimately a positive representation of the power of such a ratio (better, more conscious thinking must lead to higher levels of morality). A state should, then, guard that morality and protect its citizens. But a necropolitical state (Mbembe 2002) such as the New Order subverts that morality and posits that it is acceptable to kill certain citizens in order for this particular state form to survive. This type of morality is directed not at the protection of human lives but at the survival of the dominant forces in that state. Under this form of 'terrorist state' (Heryanto 2006), truth and morality are defined by the winners. Yet absolute standards of morality are not totally absent here either. In *The Art of Killing* this is suggested by perpetrator Anwar Congo's nightmares and his retching at the end of the film. Anwar is also troubled when thinking about the children of his victims who would probably curse him. We heard several stories about killers who went mad or who died slowly, screaming that they would go to hell.

Stangneth (2016) stresses that in itself thinking can be 'evil': the excuse of the 'higher goal' can be manipulated and used as a justification for the horrible crimes that certain individuals have committed. It is this form of intrinsic, rational evil that we associate with those who planned the massacres and who developed the New Order propaganda. This also relates to individuals, as evidenced by the extract that appears at the beginning of the chapter regarding by the commander of the camp where Budiarto was imprisoned. Anwar Congo, the protagonist in Oppenheimer's *The Act of Killing* is one such sadistic murderer, demonstrating his skills as a cha-cha dancer after detailing the innovative murder methods he had devised.

Coercion is never absolute. However strong a terrorist state might be, however potent its necropolitics, individuals have a certain measure of choice. Some demonstrate their thirst for blood. Others more or less passively consent. Others manage to evade the pressure or even resist it. During our own research we heard numerous stories of extreme cruelty and sadism, but also of courage and the refusal to give in to the demands of the military.

Pak Husein (pseudonym), a notorious killer and leader of a *Banser* group in East Java that was responsible for the murder of hundreds of prisoners, demanded that those who joined his team presented him with three right ears. These ears might have belonged to a member or sympathizer of the PKI, or to a rival in business or sexual relationships. He had no shortage of recruits.³⁶ But Pak Hadji Amir, a village head in the district of Mojokerto, East Java refused to slaughter his neighbours. He was the local leader of *Banser* and was asked by the military command in Mojokerto to lead the operation of cleansing his village of members or sympathizers of the PKI. In villages all along the plain between the East Javanese mountains and the sea the rivers turned red and countless mass graves were dug and filled. But Pak Hadji said, 'they are my own children, how can I kill them?' Most of the killing in the region took place in mid-1966 and Pak Hadji Amir was arrested and taken to the military prison at Mojokerto. 'Why haven't you killed those communists, as we ordered you?' they asked him. They told him he would be seen as a sympathizer himself. But he was released after two weeks. For not only was he a *hadji* and a member of the NU, he was also known to have special powers, acquired by stringent adherence to meditations and other exercises only known to adherents of *Kejawen* (the eclectic Javanese mix of traditional religion, Hinduism and Islam (Beatty 1999) which made him invulnerable and dangerous to his enemies. The officers all feared his *ilmu* and *shakti* (mystical knowledge and power).³⁷

In this book we focus on the 'evil' associated with the working of the state itself – its necropolitics (Mbembe 2002). What value was accorded to the lives of the numerous people who were killed (Butler 2004)? Why were these people separated from their compatriots, rendered wretched, and cast out beyond the boundaries of the normal perceptions of *salah* (wrong/guilty) often simply by dint of belonging to one of the many organizations that were alleged to be associated with the PKI (or by being in the wrong place at the wrong time).

Why were they deemed to be outside of the social order, which apparently justified their torture and death, when they had all belonged to legal organizations and shared the dreams of the country's first President? And how can a state that murdered hundreds of thousands of its own citizens claim legitimacy based on its own particular distorted narrative of history and identity? What is the basis of its sovereignty?

The necropolitics that the Suharto regime deployed, the use of social, political and military power to dictate how some people may live and how others must die, entailed more than the right to kill, which the army and the militias they trained appropriated for themselves. It also included the right to impose social or civil death, the right to enslave others, and other forms of political violence. The stigma which the survivors and their families still carry are indications of the wide influence of the ideological hegemony of the New Order regime.

Discussing propaganda in this way points to the role of imagination. Just as nation states first have to be imagined before people will fight for them, as Anderson (1983) argues, the evil that the PKI came to represent also first had to be imagined. The Indonesian state's propaganda campaign is probably the longest and in terms of its impact on society one of the most effective propaganda campaigns in modern history. The propaganda campaign not only produced 'soft', cultural, capillary power. The wide acceptance of the myths and lies spawned by the New Order army historians can be seen as a pillar upon which the New Order state also justified its corruption and the brutal exploitation of its workers and peasants, who had lost their defenders in the 1965–66 genocide. And it destroyed the country's strong and vibrant pre-1965 women's movement (Wieringa 2002).

As an example of the capillary power of the New Order this book deals with the important role that the middle classes played in supporting the murderous New Order. The complicity of countless economists, bureaucrats and intellectuals has received little attention to date. These collaborators fall within the definition of the 'banality of evil' coined by the philosopher Hannah Arendt (1963). Their support for a regime that implemented a genocide and that subjected hundreds of thousands of people to torture and slave labour, actions that should be characterized as immoral, are not seen as evil by many of the perpetrators themselves. Had they done so they might have lost the advantages they enjoyed under the regime of dictator and mass murderer General Suharto. An example of such a justification is the exclamation by one of our narrators, a prominent intellectual, that the 'army had the right to do what it did'. No army has the right to torture, to cause people to disappear and to implement extrajudicial killings.

Although in this book we unravel the various strands of the propaganda of the New Order, and where possible analyse some historical dimensions, we envisage the campaign as a whole as an interconnected rhizomatic structure, which was fluid and nomadic, as Deleuze and Guattari (1980) argue. The full weight of the campaign can only be felt when all the individual elements are

conceptualized as intersecting in complex ways. The complexities arise from the content (atheism, anti-nationalism, sexual perversion, communism) as well as from parallel mechanics. In the concluding chapter we reflect on the present-day effects of the New Order propaganda.

Notes

- 1 See for example Lev ([1966] 2009) and Ricklefs (1993).
- 2 See for example Hill (1994), Caldwell (1975) and Southwood and Flanagan (1983). The term 'New Order' was coined for the first time in August 1966 during an army seminar and echoes the names which fascist parties and regimes had used in Portugal, Italy and Nazi Germany (Kammen and McGregor 2012: 12).
- 3 Heryanto defines state terrorism as 'a mode of domination where consent, coercion and narrative are neither separable nor easily distinguishable from one another' (2006: 194).
- 4 See <http://nasional.kompas.com/read/2017/05/17/16433321/jokowi.kalau.pki.nongo.l.gebuk.saja>.
- 5 TAP MPRS No.25/1966 (Decree of the Temporary People's Consultative Assembly), reaffirmed by TAP MPR No.1/2003 (People's Consultative Assembly Decree).
- 6 *Pancasila* refers to the five principles that constitute Indonesia's national philosophy.
- 7 *Nawacita* refers to the President's nine priorities for the nation.
- 8 In local elections in 1957 the PKI had performed even better than in the 1955 national elections (Mortimer 1974).
- 9 As declared by the Chair of the Defence Committee of the National Parliament, Mahfudz Siddiq, who opined that following up the recommendations of the IPT 1965 would cause national political instability. See www.cnnindonesia.com/nasional/20151113155600-12-91508/mahfudz-sidang-1965-bisa-sebabkan-destabilisasi-politik/.
- 10 See Onghokham (2003) on *jago* and Anderson ([1972] 2006) on the rise of *pemuda* (youth) groups. See also Ryter (1998) for the origins of the *Pemuda Pancasila*.
- 11 See <http://theactofkilling.com/>.
- 12 Komnas HAM, *Ringkasan Eksekutif; laporan penyelidikan pelanggaran HAM berat peristiwa 1965–66* [Executive summary; report on the research into grave human rights violations 1965–66, hereafter referred to as the Komnas HAM report] (Komnas HAM RI, 2015). The full report was published by Komnas HAM in 2012.
- 13 The Statute could not be applied retrospectively in any event.
- 14 Komnas HAM report, p 3.
- 15 See <http://thelookofsilence.com/>.
- 16 Personal communication from former prisoners during meetings of the Forum 1965, an alliance of various organizations set up by members and supporters of the Indonesian IPT 1965 team in aid of the victims.
- 17 Ayomi Amindoni, No need to apologize for 1965 communist purge: FPI (*Jakarta Post*, 1 October 2015).
- 18 *Jus cogens* are the fundamental overriding principles in international law from which no derogation is permitted (Bassiouni 2011: 263).
- 19 Article 9 of Law No. 26, Year 2000, Establishing the Ad Hoc Human Rights Court; Article 7 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (1998); Article 5 of the Statute of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (1993); Article 3 of the Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (1994).

20 *Propaganda in Indonesian history*

- 20 For security reasons the Final Report could not be presented at a public seminar attended by representatives of the judges, prosecutors and witnesses in Jakarta. Instead, the video was shown in Amsterdam, Jakarta, Melbourne, Phnom Penh and Stockholm. In Jakarta the venue was kept secret until the last moment. See Wieringa *et al.* (2018) for an analysis of the report. The video is entitled *Road to Justice* (Jakartanicus 2016).
- 21 We asked lawyers from Leiden University to prepare an *amicus curiae* submission stating the position of the government of Indonesia, but they were unable to do so.
- 22 See the Final Report of the IPT 1965, pp. 71–72, 81–82.
- 23 IPT 1965, Indictment (2015). Available at www.tribunal1965.org/indictment-1965-tribunal/.
- 24 For an overview of media coverage after the hearings see the narrative report of IPT 1965 (Katjasungkana and Wieringa 2016a).
- 25 See www.rappler.com/indonesia/113272-pasca-sidang-people-tribunal-1965.
- 26 See Aria Danaparamita, Vice.com (22 July 2016). Available at www.vice.com/en_a_u/read/indonesia-guilty-of-genocide-in-1965-massacre-tribunal-say.
- 27 See Ariel Heryanto, CNN Indonesia (21 July 2016). Available at www.cnnindonesia.com/nasional/20160721090759-21-146043/menghormati-keputusan-pengadilan-rakyat-1965/.
- 28 See www.bbc.com/indonesia/berita_indonesia/2016/08/160826_indonesia_tasrif_awards.
- 29 The former President, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, maintained that the 1965 murders ‘saved’ Indonesia from the threat of communism. See James Balowski, Direct Action (22 October 2012). Available at http://directaction.org.au/yudhoyono_government_says_1965_murders_saved_indonesia (accessed 15 November 2012).
- 30 The cultural arguments relating to the 1966–67 mass murders also ignore the historical evidence of bitter conflicts within and between villages (see Robinson 1995 for an example of this in Bali, and Onghokham 2003 for an example in Java).
- 31 Although *Gerwani* is often seen as an organization of ‘communist’ women, it was actually an independent organization, with strong links to and sympathy for the PKI. When the movement was first established it had both a feminist and a communist wing. The communist wing ultimately got the upper hand, but until October 1965 *Gerwani* was not officially associated with the PKI (Wieringa 2002). We therefore usually refer to the movement as socialist, progressive or leftist, rather than as communist.
- 32 The documentary *The Women and the Generals* by Maj Wechselmann is based on this perspective.
- 33 There is a large literature on these developments. See, for example, Fealy and White (2008); Hilmy (2010); Mietzner (2008) and Wieringa (2015a).
- 34 See also Sunyoto *et al.* (1996) on how *Banser* annihilated the PKI.
- 35 See de Swaan (2014) on the role of dehumanization in genocide.
- 36 Interview with an inhabitant of the same village, 13 February 2017.
- 37 Interview with T. Pak, head of the neighbourhood (*dusun*) of Sendi.

2 Unanswered questions about the G30S

Nursyahbani Katjasungkana meets an old school friend. His father, Bambang Soepeno, belonged to Battalion 530 Para Raiders of the Brawijaya Division. They had been ordered to go to Jakarta with all their weapons in order to take part in the festivities planned for Armed Forces Day, 5 October 1965. The order had come from General Basuki Rakhmat, Chief of the Brawijaya Division, and they were proud to have been selected for the event, where they would be able to parade before their beloved President Sukarno. In Jakarta, the troops were taken over and inspected by General Suharto on 29 September. Unexpectedly the confusing actions of the G30S group, and the Suharto-led backlash, had intervened. All soldiers and officers were imprisoned and dismissed without pension rights. The father of Nursyahbani's school friend spent 15 years in jail without trial and returned home a broken man. The Battalion's intelligence officer, Ngadino, received the death penalty. Nursyahbani's friend was lucky because General Benny Murdani, a school friend of his father, helped him to get into university. But his brother, a school friend of Nursyahbani's brother, was dismissed from the police force when his supervisor found out that he was the son of Bambang Soepeno.

Another of Nursyahbani's school friends, Tatik, experienced a similar fate. Her father, who also had belonged to the army, had been jailed without trial. She was lucky to get a job in the Bureau of Statistics in Surabaya. Because she was intelligent, her supervisor helped her to win a fellowship so that she could pursue higher studies. However, she failed to obtain from the head of her neighbourhood the *Surat Keterangan Bersih Lingkungan (Sampul D)*, the official document certifying one's 'clean environment', namely that she had never been involved in the G30S. As a result, she was never promoted at work and carried the stigma of not being *bersih*, clean, all her life.

Introduction

In Indonesia, up until now, the official version of the events of 1965 is that the PKI masterminded the abduction and killing of the generals and aimed to install a communist government. Yet the PKI as a party was not implicated in this plot. The only PKI leaders involved were probably Aidit, Nyono and a few close colleagues, with Syam (Kamaruzzaman), Bono (Waluyo) and Pono

(Supono Marsudidjojo) acting as their intermediaries in the G30S. Yet it was the PKI as well as people associated with its affiliated organizations and even staunch supporters of Sukarno who were considered *salah* (wrong/guilty), simply by belonging to or feeling sympathetic towards an at the time fully legal entity. By that very fact they were considered fair prey to be eliminated in the macabre and cruel follow-up of these actions. The ‘wrongness’ of PKI members or Sukarno sympathizers is seen to be so immediately linked to the actions of the G30S, that both are often conflated as the ‘1965 tragedy’. However, it is important to distinguish three separate phases in this chain of events.

The first phase is the actions of the G30S, the abduction and murder of the generals and some limited activities elsewhere in the country. There are still many unanswered questions about these events. These are the subject of this chapter. In the next chapter the second phase will be discussed – the genocide – and the mass incarcerations that followed. The third phase is the coming to power of General Suharto which took place at the same time as the massacres were being perpetrated. That process will be succinctly discussed here as well, focusing on the so-called *Supersemar* of 11 March 1966, which is often seen as the de facto transfer of power from President Sukarno to General Suharto.¹

The G30S

In the early morning of 1 October 1965 military units under the leadership of two army colonels, Untung bin Sjamsuri (commander of the palace guard, *Tjakrabirawa*) and Abdul Latief (an officer in the Jakarta military command), attempted to abduct seven top army generals from their homes. Both officers were linked to *Kostrad* (Strategic Army Command) and were under the command of Suharto and the Jakarta military commander General Umar Wirahadikusumah, respectively. Following the news at 7 a.m., Radio Republik Indonesia (RRI) broadcast a message from Untung to the effect that the 30 September Movement was an internal army affair in which troops loyal to the President had taken control of strategic locations in Jakarta, with the help of PKI youth groups. Other officers involved included Air Force Major Suyono and General Supardjo. They proclaimed that this move was to forestall a coup attempt by a Council of Generals aided by the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), which aimed to remove President Sukarno on Armed Forces Day, held on 5 October (Roosa 2006). It was claimed that President Sukarno was under the protection of the movement. Listeners were informed that the generals would be taken to the President so that he could decide what to do with them (Mahmillub 2 1966: 40, 191).

Later that day, after President Sukarno had already issued an order for all actions to cease, having been informed that the abducted generals had been murdered, another radio announcement was made (Decree No. 1) and the formation of a Revolutionary Council was announced. Membership of this

Council, which was to replace the cabinet (but not the President), was drawn from wide sectors of society and supporters of Sukarno's *Nasakom* policy. By the end of the day General Suharto had effectively ended the action, although some limited skirmishes were still taking place at Halim airport as well as in Salatiga, Solo and Yogyakarta.

In addition to Colonel Untung, who was in charge of the actions in Jakarta, Colonel Latief and Air Force Colonel Suyono, who were entrusted with the actions in and around Halim, the G30S group comprised three civilian members, Syam, Bono and Pono. They belonged to the secret Special Bureau of the Central Committee and reported directly to Aidit. Relations between the military and the political wings were not smooth (Roosa 2006). The military troops at the disposal of the G30S were very limited; they were divided into three units, with a total of 2,000 soldiers (*ibid.*: 46). The *Pasopati* unit, led by Lieutenant Abdul Arief, was tasked with arresting the most important generals who supposedly belonged to the Council of Generals.² They were to be brought to a training field near air force base Halim, where the *Pringgodani* unit was waiting for them. The *Bimasakti* unit was entrusted with occupying central places, particularly the areas in front of the presidential palace, the national radio station, and the telecommunications centre around Medan Merdeka (Freedom Square), and with facilitating the planned broadcasts. The central committee of the G30S was located in Halim itself.

The G30S group posted the *Bimasakti* Unit, consisting of 2,000 trained volunteers of the Pemuda Rakyat (PR – People's Youth) and soldiers belonging to two Java-based divisions, along three sides of Jakarta's central Freedom Square early in the morning. They occupied the RRI building, shut down telecommunications and positioned themselves before the presidential palace. Surprisingly they left the east side of the square open, where Suharto's armed forces strategic reserve (*Kostrad*) headquarters were located. This has led many scholars to believe that the plotters assumed that he belonged to or supported the G30S (see, for example, Wertheim 1979).

What exactly happened? Seven detachments of troops in trucks and buses were dispatched by Colonel Untung. They comprised soldiers from Untung's own *Tjakrabirawa* regiment, and a few soldiers of the *Diponegoro* (Central Java) and *Brawijaya* (East Java) divisions. The first to be abducted was General Haryono, who was killed in the skirmish. Army Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Ahmad Yani and Brigadier General D. I. Panjaitan were also murdered at their homes. Three more generals, Major General Soeprapto, Major General S. Parman and Brigadier General Sutoyo, were taken alive, together with Lieutenant Tendean who had been picked up instead of General Nasution, the Coordinating Minister for Defence and Security and Armed Forces Chief of Staff. He had managed to escape by jumping over a wall (Anderson and McVey 1971; Crouch 1978). The generals and the bodies of their dead colleagues were taken to the air force training field, in the neighbourhood of Lubang Buaya, district of Cipayung, where those still alive were shot. This field, where the generals were killed, was situated some 3.5 km from Halim.³ The

bodies of all the victims were then thrown down a disused well. In the following days and weeks all the G30S plotters were arrested or hunted down, apart from Dul Arief, who was never arrested, or at least never brought to trial.

General Suharto himself had ordered the two battalions to come to Jakarta – Battalion 454 from the *Diponegoro* division and Battalion 530 from the *Brawidjaja* division. Other troops ordered to the capital were Battalion 328 from the *Siliwangi* division, a tank unit from Bandung, and a cavalry and an artillery unit from Cimahi. They were all told to report to Suharto on 28 September, combat-ready (Roosa 2006: 35–36; Siregar 1995: 246).⁴ On 29 September Suharto inspected these troops. Why fully armed troops were ordered to come to a parade is unclear – it was very unusual.

Two decrees were broadcast by the G30S. Decree No. 1 was issued after the morning news and can be seen as a communication to the public of the intentions of an attempt to cleanse the army. The second decree (called Decree No. 2) was broadcast in the afternoon. This was ordered by G30S member Syam,⁵ who may have been in contact with Aidit, who was present at Halim that morning. This Decree announced the formation of a Revolutionary Council that was to replace the cabinet. This was interpreted by Suharto and his allies as a coup attempt. However, Untung later claimed that there was no intention to remove the President from his position (Mahmillub 2 1966: 52). In fact, the installation of the Revolutionary Council, to be followed by elections, that was proposed in the second radio announcement, meant a return, in theory, to the days of liberal democracy.

During his trial Untung stressed that the main purpose of the G30S was to safeguard the President. He himself never gave the order to kill the generals, only that they should be taken (*ambil*) and brought before President Sukarno so that they could be interrogated about the Council of Generals' plans (Mahmillub 2 1966: 28–65). The idea of the Revolutionary Council, the members of which had not been previously informed, was to help to cleanse the capital and later the country of members of the Council of Generals. That task fulfilled, full power would be restored to the President.

In the course of the morning Suharto took command of the army via his own troops and the *Resimen Parakomando Angkatan Darat* (RPKAD – Army Paramilitary Regiment) special units. He had been at the army hospital the previous evening with his young son where he was visited by Colonel Abdul Latief, a close family friend. According to Latief's later testimony, the conspirators assumed Suharto to be a Sukarno loyalist, hence Latief went to inform him of the impending kidnapping plan to save Sukarno from the treacherous generals, upon which Suharto offered his neutrality (Latief 2000). The G30S leaders had failed to provide provisions for the soldiers on Medan Merdeka.⁶ They were under the impression that they were guarding the President in the palace. In the course of the afternoon, Suharto persuaded them to give up without a fight. The *Brawijaya* troops reported to *Kostrad* headquarters; the *Diponegoro* soldiers withdrew to Halim. Suharto's troops gave Untung's forces inside the radio station an ultimatum and they also withdrew.

By 7 p.m. Suharto was in control of all the locations previously held by forces belonging to the 30 September Movement. Joined by Nasution, at 9 p.m. he issued a decree, announcing over the radio that he was now in command of the army and that he would destroy the 'counter-revolutionary forces' and save Sukarno. But this was not the first time that Suharto spoke of a 'coup'. Suharto had not only taken over the position of Army Chief (later defying the order of President Sukarno that General Pranoto Reksosamudro should take that post). He had also assumed the position of Commander of the KOTI command structure which had been granted wide-ranging powers in the framework of the confrontation with Malaysia.⁷ Melvin (2018), who discovered a stash of army documents on the massacres in Aceh, notes that as KOTI chief, Suharto had already sent a message in the morning of 1 October to General Mokoginta in Medan that there was 'a coup movement' (ibid.). Therefore, this communication by Suharto was made before Decree No. 1 was issued.

After a minor battle that took place in the early hours of 2 October, the army regained control of Halim. Aidit fled to Yogyakarta, where he went into hiding. Within a few weeks he was discovered and shot by the army, without having made any public statement (Roosa 2006).

The bodies of the murdered generals were publicly exhumed three days later. The autopsy, which took place in the army hospital on 4 October and was carried out by military personnel, was signed off by both General Suharto and President Sukarno. The autopsy details the causes of death as gun shots and trauma possibly caused by blows from guns, and records the damage done to bodies which had been lying for some days in a wet place in the tropics, for which reason the victims' eyes were badly affected. However, the findings of the autopsy were not made public and only after Anderson published them did they reappear in the public arena (Anderson 1987).⁸

But even before the autopsy was read, Suharto and Sarwo Edhie, the commander of the RPKAD, knew exactly what had happened. Well-informed journalist Julius Pour provides some interesting details. When the plotters who came back from the house of General Pandjaitan were racing in their truck towards Lubang Buaya they encountered a single policeman, Sukitman, who was doing his rounds. He was brought to the nearby training field, where he saw how the three generals who were not yet dead were killed and the bodies of all of them thrown into a well. He stayed in Lubang Buaya until he was found in a truck 'in a confused state' in the late afternoon of 1 October by soldiers of the RPKAD. On 2 October he was brought before Sarwo Edhie and managed to draw a map showing the location of the well. On the basis of that information the well was found and the bodies publicly exhumed the next day (Pour 2010: 251–54).

Apart from the befuddled policeman Sukitman, there were others present at Lubang Buaya: some 60 girls mostly belonging to the PR and a few regular *Gerwani* members. In the middle of the night they were woken up by the noise made by the plotters, witnessed the beating up and shooting of the three

generals who had arrived still alive, and the dumping of all the bodies in the well. Most of them fled the location panic-stricken either to their homes or to the *Gerwani* headquarters, where the two members of the leadership who regularly slept there, Ibu Sulami and Ibu Sudjinah, were woken up. Some stayed on until 2 October when they were met by RPKAD soldiers checking out the information Sukitman had provided. Saskia Wieringa collected the testimonies of some of the surviving girls and the *Gerwani* leaders in the early 1980s (2002, 2003; see also Sukartiningsih 2004).

Instead of Sukitman's story and the stories of the girls who had been present in Lubang Buaya, the army propagated a very different account to the outside world. According to this version, the girls seduced the generals by performing a lurid, naked dance (the 'Fragrant Flower Dance'), accompanied by singing the 'communist' song 'Genjer-Genjer', after which they proceeded to castrate the generals and gouge out their eyes.⁹ In this way progressive, politically active women and by association the PKI were linked with acts of unspeakable sexual perversion, as will be described in Chapter 6. The party and its mass organizations were portrayed as inhuman, primitive (*biadab*) and evil.

A failed or successful coup? Who was the *dalang*?

The hegemonic army version of the G30S affair is that it was a 'failed coup' carried out by the PKI. But only when one accepts that the PKI was the *dalang* (puppetmaster) of this affair, as Suharto and his supporters propagated, is it possible to speak of 'failed' in relation to this affair. Given that Aidit was killed extrajudicially, we can only guess what his intentions were and whether he knew that the generals would be killed, and who ordered the killings. Apart from Aidit, Syam, Pono and Bono and only a few other top leaders, the PKI itself was in no way implicated in the actions of the G30S. At his trial Untung stressed that he only wanted to abduct the generals and take them to the President in order to save him from a coup. Why the generals were killed remains a mystery. Was the operation bungled, or were the generals killed on purpose? If Wertheim (1979), Latief (2000) and Holzappel (2014) are correct, and General Suharto moved behind the scenes intending to topple the President, the events of 1965 cannot be regarded a 'failed coup' by the left but rather as an integral part of and the prologue to a successful, extended, creeping coup *against* the left.

PKI: mastermind of the G30S?

The army leadership portrayed the PKI as an organization that was atheist, anti-national, hypersexual, cruel and barbaric. The army historian Notosusanto gave these accusations a scientific image (Notosusanto 1965; Notosusanto and Saleh 1968). In order to highlight the PKI's involvement Suharto and his allies consistently referred to the movement as 'G30S/PKI'. School

textbooks followed the official government line that the PKI, worried about Sukarno's health and concerned about its position should he die, acted to seize power and establish a communist state. The publication of a cartoon and an editorial supporting the 30 September Movement in the 2 October issue of the PKI magazine *Harian Rakyat* ('People's Daily'), after the movement had already collapsed, was also presented as 'proof' of this version of events. It will be discussed below.

Although this version of PKI involvement, in which the whole party and all its mass organizations are held accountable, is the best known one, the army itself actually produced two stories in which the blame was heaped on the PKI (Roosa 2012). The first story blamed the Politburo for entrusting Aidit with the task of collaborating with the progressive officers who wanted to prevent a coup by right-wing generals. In the second version not only the Politburo but the entire 85-member Central Committee was held responsible for the 'failed coup'.

Zhou (2016) provides some insight into what may have motivated Aidit's involvement in the G30S. In 2008 the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs declassified some documents dating from 1961–65. Zhou was able to read some 2,000 pages from 250 files. In 2013 the archives were closed again. These documents contain an account of the meeting between Aidit and Mao Zedong on 5 August 1965. On that occasion Aidit sketched the scenario and the actions that the G30S would later take, but without the killing of the generals. The timing of this planned action remained unclear (*ibid.*: 43–46).

It seems that Aidit saw the plans of the G30S as a shortcut to his goals, which were to gain more power in a democratic way. He may have hoped that by incriminating anti-PKI generals such as Nasution and Yani, pro-PKI elements in the army would become more powerful and support the anti-imperialist agenda of both the PKI and Sukarno. The murder of the generals had no place in this scenario.

Another version of the above interpretation is that the PKI was split. The 1995 report of the *Institut Studi Arus Informasi* (ISAI), entitled *Bayang Bayang PKI* ('Shadows of the PKI') stipulates that Aidit acted rashly and unilaterally given that he was in serious conflict with the very popular Second Deputy Chairperson of the PKI, Nyoto. Although there were indeed tensions between a group that supported the Soviet Union and another group who preferred Mao's China, Sudisman, the sole member of the Central Committee to testify, had stressed that the five most important leaders, Aidit, Nyoto, Sudisman, Lukman and Sakirman, had always acted as brothers (he used the metaphor of the *Pandava* brothers, see Roosa 2006: 140). Nyoto was indeed closer to Sukarno than to the PKI leadership. He was puzzled by the actions of the G30S group, but so were the other party leaders who had no knowledge of the Special Bureau. Aidit seemed to have acted on his own, providing information only to other close colleagues whenever he felt that was useful, but there is no indication that this was because of a major split between the PKI leaders.

Was Sukarno behind the G30S?

Antonie Dake (1973) maintained that President Sukarno was behind the ‘failed coup’, supporting Aidit. Had not the President repeatedly spoken out against the lies engendered by Suharto’s propaganda machine and coined his own name for the group, *Gerakan Satu Oktober* (*Gestok* – 1 October Movement)? Dake maintains that in the end it was Sukarno, realizing that Suharto had won the day, who let down the PKI, thus paving the way for the massacre of PKI members and sympathizers.

This view leaves several questions unanswered. Why would President Sukarno stage a coup against himself? Why would he have destroyed a party that would never pose a threat to the mighty army? A recent version of the view that Sukarno was behind the abduction of the generals is provided by Salim Said (2013), a well-known journalist and pro-Suharto activist in 1965–66. In October 1965 this young journalist was working at the *Angkatan Bersenjata*, one of the two newspapers allowed to appear after the G30S action. His senior at the newspaper was General Sugandhi, who had been an adjutant of Sukarno and at the time was director of the army bureau of intelligence. General Sugandhi conjured up the name *Gestapu* for the G30S, to which Said frequently refers in his book (2013: 18–19).¹⁰ Said maintains that Sukarno wanted to get rid of General Yani because he was frustrating the confrontation policy with Malaysia.

The problems, suggests Said, started when Aidit placed too much trust in Syam, a good friend of his mother-in-law, and ordered Syam to lead the G30S.¹¹ But Syam was not a good soldier. Although they were much more experienced, Untung and Latief followed Syam’s orders without question. As a result, the soldiers were ill-prepared, panicked and murdered the generals instead of just abducting them. It might have ended there, Said argues, if Sukarno had immediately banned the PKI.

Inter-army putsch

In 1971 Benedict Anderson and Ruth McVey published their so-called Cornell Paper, one of the earliest foreign analyses of the G30S. They maintain that it was an internal army affair, as a result of dissatisfaction on the part of junior officers, who found it extremely difficult to obtain promotions and resented the generals’ corrupt and decadent lifestyles. They allege that the PKI was deliberately involved, by bringing Aidit to Halim for example. In this version the putsch was just an inter-army action: the military was divided between a progressive, pro-Sukarno wing and a decadent, corrupt, conservative group.

As noted above, a discussion point in relation to this interpretation is that the PKI newspaper *Harian Rakyat* stressed in its 2 October edition that the movement should be seen as an internal army affair. It is unclear, though, who wrote this statement, in which the Central Committee of the PKI

ostensibly supported the G30S. Anderson and McVey point to the timing of this editorial: the generals had already been killed; the troops of General Suharto were in control; and censorship had been imposed. They suggest that it might have been a fake article, or even a whole fake issue, engineered by the army. Roosa (2006) suggests that the CC PKI may not have been aware of what exactly had been going on but that the article had actually been written by a journalist at the paper on the basis of previous discussions within PKI headquarters.

In Anderson and McVey's version the PKI played only a peripheral role. They conclude that the right-wing generals assassinated on 1 October 1965 were indeed the Council of Generals, planning a coup to assassinate Sukarno and install themselves as a military junta. Central to this interpretation is an examination of the trial of Colonel Abdul Latief, who was both a staunch Sukarno loyalist and a friend of Suharto, and who informed the general of the plot. In this version the role of Syam, the Special Bureau and of Aidit is underestimated.

Collaboration between the G30S, the army and the PKI

Other interpretations have focused on the 1 October coup as a prelude to the actual replacement of President Sukarno by General Suharto in March 1966. In these views the events of 1 October 1965 were either a pretext (for mass murder and the eventual replacement of President Sukarno; see Roosa 2006), or the first stage of a very successful, creeping coup which found its culmination in the 1966 transfer of power.¹²

Historian John Roosa (2006) points out that Suharto never satisfactorily explained the fact that most of the movement's protagonists were army officers. Why, he asks, if the movement was planned by military officers, as alleged in Anderson and McVey's 1971 Cornell Paper, was it so poorly planned? He carefully analyses the many internal problems experienced by the two sides of the G30S, the military and the PKI, pointing to the lack of political astuteness of the military and the lack of military experience of the PKI. He concludes that the movement's leaders were too disparate as a group to find enough common ground to carry out the operation successfully. According to Roosa, a group of top army commanders, including Yani, became convinced by January 1965 that Sukarno's Guided Democracy needed to be brought to an end. Both the Indonesian economic elite, frustrated by the economic crisis, and the US Administration and its allies (the UK and Australia especially), were in agreement about this, given his costly campaign against Malaysia and his increasing closeness to the PKI.

Yani and other officers started a psychological war to make the PKI think that it was going to launch a coup. The aim was to provoke the PKI into taking some sort of rash action that could justify a crackdown on it. The plan was to keep Sukarno as a figurehead president while attacking the PKI, and then gradually strip him of his powers. By mid-1965 the PKI Politburo faced

the question of whether to pre-empt the army coup they had come to expect or to let the coup go ahead and then resist it. The Politburo decided to allow the Chairman, Aidit, to explore the possibility of mobilizing the pro-PKI military personnel to stage a pre-emptive strike against Yani and the army generals thought to be conspiring with him.

Aidit and the Special Bureau developed a plan for what became named the 30 September Movement. He explained this plan to Mao Zedong in Beijing on 5 August 1965, as noted above. The plan for the 30 September Movement was not openly discussed by the Politburo or the Central Committee, let alone agreed by them. Individual PKI leaders were brought into the plan on a need to know basis.¹³

This version also leaves various issues unexplained. For instance, the preparations that must have gone into Suharto's very efficient actions, and the fact that *Kostrad* headquarters, such a strategic centre of military information and command, had been left unguarded by Untung's troops. Another unexplained matter is the speed with which Suharto retaliated against the PKI, in Aceh for example, sending out messages about a coup when Decree No. 1 had not yet been released (Melvin 2018).

Roosa's opinion is widely accepted in the academic community. Suharto was able to defeat the movement because he had prior knowledge of it and because the army had already prepared for such a contingency. However, the extent of Suharto's foreknowledge is not explored in Roosa's book. It also remains unclear why a team of highly trained soldiers could not lift some generals from their beds and abduct them properly, instead of resorting to killing them.

Suharto's role: a creeping coup?

An early paper which points to General Suharto and other generals around him building the 'devilish trap' into which the PKI fell was produced by Wertheim (1979). In his view the coup did not fail, but on the contrary was very successful. Wertheim purported that Suharto engineered the coup via double agents, particularly Syam, who not only infiltrated the army and established contact with Untung and Latief, but also acted as an army spy. At Syam's trial it appeared that he was never tortured (while all the others were) and he readily accused Aidit of masterminding the 'coup'.

A strong indication that Suharto was involved can be found in the visit of Colonel Latief to the hospital to meet Suharto, who was attending to his son (see above), on the eve of the events of 1 October. This meeting was preceded by a visit to Suharto's house two days previously, at which Latief informed his superior of the rumours about the formation of a Council of Generals and the plans to thwart it. At his trial Latief expressed his disappointment that Suharto, who had been informed of and apparently agreed to the action, had suddenly turned against them. This might have been caused, Latief suggested, by Sukarno's appointment of a junior general, Pranoto Reksosamudro, as

caretaker when the President had learned of the death of his army chief, thus passing over Suharto who was next in line.¹⁴ Wertheim points out that this version of the events still leaves many questions unanswered. These include the role played by the Jesuit Father Beek, who exerted considerable influence on Ali Murtopo.¹⁵ Murtopo became the head of the special operations unit within *Kostrad* that specifically dealt with the Malaysia Confrontation, and which later spearheaded the massacre. Ali Murtopo was one of Suharto's closest personal assistants. He was also the adoptive father of Dul Arief.¹⁶

Another analysis of the role of General Suharto in instigating the events of 1965 is provided by Holzappel (2014). He bases his account on an analysis of the sessions in the 1966 military tribunal devoted to the trials of Colonel Untung bin Sjamsuri and member of the CC PKI Politbureau Nyono bin Sastroredjo (Mahmillub 1 and 2, 1966). Both men were condemned to death and executed. Untung testified that in early August 1965 he was informed of the alleged plans of the Council of Generals by General Supardjo, himself a member of this Council (Mahmillub 2 1966: 208). As commander of the Presidential Guard entrusted with the safety of the President he formed a team to investigate these rumours. Syam and Pono were later added by Aidit. On 26 September Untung reported to Subandrio that he had received a tape recording from four civilian men, members of the NU and the IPKI, of a meeting on 21 September 1965 of the Council.¹⁷ This was corroborated by a witness associated with Nasution's office. Untung gave this tape to Subandrio, who took it to Sukarno. It appeared that the tape was recorded during the inaugural meeting of the Council on 21 September 1965. Sukarno summoned Generals Yani and Parman, but before the tape could be discussed they had already been killed (Mahmillub 2 1966: 209; Subandrio 2006).

However, the status of the meeting and the tape remain unclear. During the trials the meeting was also referred to as dealing with internal army matters related to the army's *Tri Ubaya Sakti* doctrine. By mid-September Untung had reported to Suharto, possibly to get troop support, as testified by Subandrio. The troops commanded by Untung (Batallions 454 and 530 *Banteng* Raiders and his own *Tjakrabirawa* place guard) all fell under *Kostrad* (Subandrio 2006).

Nyono reported at his trial that since early August the PKI had been discussing the political situation, including the rumours about the formation of a Council of Generals. Three meetings were held on the matter, discussing whether a pre-emptive strike against the Council or a report to the President were the best options. Eventually the Politburo decided not to support Untung's planned action and to inform the President about it (Mahmillub 1 1966; Roosa 2006: 146). They sent a letter to that effect on 28 August, copied to Subandrio and *Nasakom* members, and awaited further instructions from the President. The President never replied. Maybe the letter never reached him.

Syam reported both to Latief (he was part of the intelligence agency) and to Aidit. In spite of the CC Politburo's decision not to support Untung, Aidit

and Syam did exactly that, and continued making preparations for the abduction of the generals. Nyono, who supported Aidit in defying the decision of the CC Politburo not to side with Untung, agreed to provide support from the mass organizations, which resulted in guard duties by the PR. Nyono, as a leader of the National Front, forwarded this request to Sukatno, chair of the Jakarta branch of the *Pemuda Rakyat* (Holzappel 2014).

Untung testified that the Revolutionary Council was established in order to eradicate supporters of the Council of Generals (Mahmillub 2 1966: 34–35). Untung was a direct subordinate of security tsar Suharto, and Latief of Suharto's close associate, General Umar Wirahadikusuma.¹⁸ All three officers belonging to the G30S were tasked with the security of the President. Untung guarded the President himself; Latief was responsible for security in Jakarta; and Suyono for security at the airport base, Sukarno's escape route should anything happen. At his trial Untung repeatedly stressed that he wanted to save the President, that his plans had to remain secret in view of the various murder attempts on the President, that he just wanted to abduct the generals, and that after removing Council members from state bodies, of course the full powers for running the state would again be entrusted to the President.

The actual abduction and killing of the generals were executed under the command of Latief and Syam. They jointly took the decision to kill them. Syam reported both to Latief and to Aidit, who was taken to Halim on the evening of 30 September, consulting with him on the text of Decree No. 1. This document was hastily drawn up by Aidit and probably brought to Untung via Syam.¹⁹ It was broadcast after the 2 p.m. news. A general election would be held and a new People's Congress based on *Nasakom* principles would be elected. This makes sense, as the PKI had been doing very well in the last elections before Guided Democracy was declared and Aidit may have hoped for continued electoral success.²⁰ However, this went much further than Untung's original idea which was to take the abducted generals to the President. Yet although the Decree ordered the state of siege in order to get its goals realized, and decommissioned the cabinet, it did not stop the continuing operation of the presidential cabinet or the President. However, the setting up of new policies was not allowed, in order not to cross G30S operations. Hence, according to Untung, Sukarno and his cabinet were still functioning and therefore there had been no G30S coup, contrary to General Suharto's statement in the evening (Holzappel 2014).

Aidit's assistants in Untung's team, who were simultaneously Latief's informers, were used during Untung's prosecution and that of further suspects, until they disappeared during the 1980s. The rumour was that they had been executed after all. Holzappel (2014) suggests that it is more likely that their physical appearances were surgically altered and that they were given new names and identities. They had done their job, betraying the PKI and its legacy and leadership, as well as Untung's team and other army and air force members involved in the G30S. This may also have been the fate of Dul Arief, who was never heard of again.

The pro-Sukarno Minister of Foreign Affairs, Subandrio, who was hated by right-wing generals and the US alike, was in Sumatra on a tour of duty on 30 September. He was never linked to the G30S, but became a major target of the student demonstrations and was arrested by Suharto immediately after the general had seized power with the help of the so-called *Supersemar* (see below). The *Mahmillub* (Extraordinary Military Tribunal) sentenced Subandrio to death for subversion. All those tried by the *Mahmillub* who had received the death penalty were imprisoned, and while he was waiting to be executed in the Cimahi prison in Bandung, he regularly met Untung. According to Subandrio, Untung felt deeply betrayed by Suharto when he finally realized he was really going to be executed. He had kept Suharto informed of the plot, and the general had promised to support him, and sent for troops. Untung had always expected that his sentence would be commuted (Subandrio 2006: 53). Subandrio was scheduled to be executed four days later but he received amnesty. Intervention by his foreign friends, including US President Johnson and Queen Elizabeth II, saved him.

A special issue published by *Tempo* magazine in 2015 supports this interpretation of the events of 1965.²¹ Untung went several times to Suharto, namely on 18, 28, 29 and 30 September to discuss the plans of the G30S group. Latief also visited Suharto, as discussed above. Suharto had known both men since his time as head of the *Diponegoro* division. The link to Latief went back even further, to the days of the national independence struggle in Yogyakarta.²² Suharto's relationship with Untung remained so close that Suharto visited him in Kebumen, when Untung got married. Thus, when Untung first informed him of the G30S group's plot, Suharto allegedly agreed, and told him to eliminate the whole group, and not to deviate from this course (Hartono 2013).²³ According to Hartono, citing Hanafie, Suharto also knew Syam well, since the days of the national revolution, when Syam still used another name, Syamsul Qamar Mubaidah. Later Syam set up a union for harbour workers, where he came to know Aidit. Subsequently Syam became a spy for the *Seskoad* where he was given the rank of sergeant major. At that time Suharto was also stationed there, as a punishment for a corruption case in which he had become involved.²⁴

General Suharto, then, sat at the centre of the web of events which took place on the night of 30 September and 1 October. He was a member of the Council of Generals (it comprised 40 members) so he knew that they did not plan to stage a coup (Siregar 1995; Taher 2015: 55). It may be surmised that he was also aware of Yani's psychological warfare intended to provoke the PKI to strike first. And he knew exactly what the G30S group was planning. Subandrio (2001 and 2006) provides more details of the meetings between Latief and Untung with Suharto. Clearly Suharto had ample time to devise his own strategy. He may have prepared various scenarios. The speed and efficiency with which Suharto acted to blame the PKI, organize the civil anti-communist groups and design a propaganda campaign clearly indicates that he was not improvising (Kasenda 2015). What his initial motivations were is

not clear. He knew that the G30S was small, disorganized and easy prey for the RPKAD troops at his disposal, particularly as the bulk of the G30S troops had come to Jakarta under his own orders,²⁵ ostensibly to partake in the festivities planned for Armed Forces Day but in actual fact combat-ready. He had inspected them the previous day. The plan to neutralize his two main competitors, Yani and Nasution, may have suited him. They had sidelined him on a corruption charge. When Nasution escaped and Sukarno had Yani replaced by Pranoto, Suharto's ambition to become Army Chief of Staff, if that was his only ambition, was thwarted. This may have motivated him to go after the PKI and Sukarno. He felt that he had to destroy the PKI because the party might win a regular democratic election. We can call this the passive scenario. Suharto waited until the G30S actions had taken their course. But he could have played a more active role given that he might have controlled Syam, and Latief via Syam.

Was Syam also in league with Suharto when he moved forward with Decree No. 1, which was later used as 'proof' of Aidit's attempt to seize power? Whatever the case, Suharto was well aware that his colleagues were going to be abducted, and he did not warn them. This in itself shows that he supported the G30S. It seems very unlikely that after having heard that Latief was about to order the capture of the generals, he would go to sleep, as he said (Roosa 2006; Subandrio 2006). Instead he checked the positions the soldiers had taken on Lapangan Merdeka and probably went straight to *Kostrad* headquarters. That he was woken up by a neighbour at 5.30 a.m. (when no neighbour of his could have known that military action had taken place), as Suharto himself claimed, is probably a lie (Subandrio 2006).²⁶

His foreknowledge alone makes him complicit to some extent in the actions. That Untung and Latief thought he would assist them seems clear.²⁷ That he later had no qualms in betraying them also cannot be doubted. To blame the PKI for trying to overthrow Sukarno was preposterous. Why would the PKI want to harm the President who protected the party against the hostile army, and when the PKI was in no position to start a fight with that army?

Taher (2010) maintains that Suharto played a double game. If the G30S had won he would have got rid of his army rivals. When it lost he could crush the G30S group and the PKI and sail to victory over their dead bodies. Siregar notes that both Untung and Latief had served under Suharto and that Supardjo was Deputy Chief of *Kostrad* and commander of the troops that fell under the KOTI command in Kalimantan. In August 1965 Suharto had gone to meet Supardjo there. In addition, Suharto also had links with Syam, Suyono and Dul Arief. Siregar suggests that Dul Arief was ordered to kill the generals in order to discredit the G30S and that Syam and Suyono were used to ensure the PKI's involvement (Siregar 1995: 221–25).

So why were the generals killed? Dul Arief needed to testify about that. His disappearance without trace is a mystery. Taher suggests that the order to kill the generals may have come from Ali Murtopo (2015: 25). According to Asvi

Warman Adam, based on an interview with Lieutenant Heru Atmodjo by Carmel Budiarto, Dul Arief fled to Brebes. Thereafter he disappeared. Heru Amodjo claimed that Ali Murtopo had killed Dul Arief. Ali Murtopo was one of Suharto's closest associates, in charge of the *Kostrad* headquarters (Subandrio 2006: x; see also Kasenda 2015). But would Ali Murtopo have had his own adopted son killed?²⁸ Ali Murtopo was in close contact with MI6, the British intelligence service, via the British headquarters in Singapore which instigated a psychological warfare operation, as discussed in Chapter 3 in this volume. This service aimed to 'blacken the PKI in the eyes of the army and the people' by suggesting 'suitable propaganda themes' such as PKI atrocities.²⁹ Ali Murtopo was also one of 'Beek's men', as will be discussed in Chapter 7.

Siregar suggests that Air Force Major Suyono played a dubious role. He introduced Syam to Untung and informed him about the Council of Generals. He also ordered the killings, while he knew the idea was to bring them before Sukarno. Suyono may have convinced Dul Arief not to use the Rapid Deployment Unit of the Air Force, thereby disobeying Untung's request for trained soldiers. Instead, PR members who had been trained by Suyono also joined the abduction teams. Furthermore, Dul Arief changed the order to 'capture the generals and not to let one of them escape' (Mahmillub 2 1966: 59). Instead, he told his soldiers to capture them dead or alive. In order to do all this, Dul Arief must have had strong support from above, argues Siregar. How else can a mere first lieutenant have taken such decisions? (Siregar 1995: 225–27).

Sukarno deposed: *Supersemar*

Much has been written about the way Suharto reached the apex of his power and managed to depose Sukarno (Crouch 1978; Roosa 2006; Sundhaussen 1982). One contributing factor was the deepening economic crisis. As Subandrio (2006) maintains, high prices and hyperinflation were engineered by Suharto. He withheld basic commodities from the open market with the help of two Chinese factories. Between October 1965 and March 1966 inflation soared to 600 per cent. While keeping prices artificially high, Suharto instigated students to agitate against these same high prices (*ibid.*: 70–71). Scott (1985) and Simpson (2008) also implicate the CIA in the destabilization of the Indonesian economy in 1965. Investment by US corporations in Indonesia increased in the months prior to the movement, which indicates US foreknowledge of the plot. Political unrest was further exacerbated by the mass demonstrations of students, scholars, women and secondary school pupils, the brutal ongoing massacres and the terror they instilled.

A curious document, the *Supersemar* sealed Sukarno's fate.³⁰ Sukarno was forced to sign the letter at gunpoint as the palace was surrounded by unidentified troops. The issuing of the *Supersemar* is immortalized in both the Pancasila Sakti Monument and in the monument in Monas.³¹ But what does

it exactly say? This we cannot know for sure. This is because the version of the *Supersemar* that is held by the National Archive is not the original. According to the celebrated historian Asvi Warman Adam, there are three typed copies of the *Supersemar*, with the latest one obtained from a cleric in East Java in 2013. The National Archive itself has carried out forensic research on the copies in its possession, and this has revealed that they are not authentic.³²

The main controversy surrounding the *Supersemar* is whether it was a mandate that Sukarno gave to Suharto which was just an order to restore the country's security, or a transfer of power to Suharto – which is how Suharto interpreted the letter. A televised recording of Sukarno delivering his last state address in August 1966 said that the mandate was not a transfer of authority.³³

Two eyewitness accounts shed light on this issue. In 2015 the memoirs of Hartini, one of Suharto's wives, were published (Nugroho 2015). The *Supersemar* was edited and prepared for publication at her house in Bogor; she was present during the whole process. According to her, and her version is corroborated by another eyewitness, Subandrio (2006: 79), the two-page document contained instructions to Suharto to ensure security in Jakarta, to report regularly to the President, to assure the safety of the President and his family, and to preserve his teachings. Suharto would ignore the three latter orders (see also Kasenda 2015: 142–44). Two versions of the *Supersemar* were one-page documents which omitted the crucial final sentence of the original document, which contained the provision that Suharto should restore power to President Sukarno once the country had been stabilized. Suharto neither reported to the President, nor returned his powers, but used the *Supersemar* as an excuse to grab power. The document was compiled without the collaboration of the navy, air force and police, and the officers of *Brawijaya* and *Diponegoro*, who supported Sukarno. Pro-Suharto forces were still not content, for, as Jusuf Wanandi explained, the *Supersemar* contained an internal contradiction. It would be impossible to restore order if Sukarno's teachings, particularly *Nasakom*, were to remain intact.³⁴

Suharto immediately went into action. On 12 March 1966 the PKI and all its associated organizations were banned. Six days later the first ministers who were loyal to Sukarno were arrested, but without the latter's consent. A total of 21 ministers were arrested during this period (Subandrio 2006: 82–87; Roosa 2006). PKI leaders Aidit, Nyoto and Lukman were arrested and killed. Next Suharto gave himself new powers. By the end of March 1966 the cabinet had been purged of all PKI supporters. General Suharto had become a Deputy Prime Minister, the Minister of Defence, the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces and the Chief of KOTI. He also purged the Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat Sementara (MPRS – Temporary People's Consultative Assembly) of Sukarno loyalists, including the father of Nursyahbani Katjasungkana. When Nasution was appointed chair of the MPRS on 5 July 1966, the stage was set for Suharto to legalize his coup. One of his first

achievements was to get the MPRS to adopt the *Supersemar*, which became state policy. The President (still Sukarno) could no longer withdraw Suharto's mandate. The phrase concerning safeguarding Sukarno's teachings was deleted.³⁵ Suharto was authorized to form a cabinet which he himself chaired. On 7 March 1967 a special session of the MPRS was held in which President Sukarno was forced to abdicate. By that time the MPRS had been purged of another 90 pro-Sukarno government members by Ali Murtopo and Jusuf Wanandi. Sukarno was replaced by Suharto as Acting President (Crouch 1978; Sundhaussen 1982). In March 1968 he was appointed fully as President by the MPRS. With this final scene the last phase of Suharto's coup ended successfully and a brutal military dictatorship was established that lasted until 1998.

Meanwhile, the teachings of the PKI and Marx were banned. General Sucipto, Chair of the Political Department of KOTI (G5), used the draft of the *Supersemar* to immediately prepare the ban on the PKI (Murtopo 2002: 22–23). This was followed by the ban on promoting Marxism/Leninism through Decree No. XXV/1966, which is still valid, and is used as an excuse to prevent discussion about the events of 1965.

Conclusion

From the middle of 1965 onwards the conservative army generals, the PKI and Suharto manoeuvred to secure or improve their own position in the event of Sukarno's health taking a turn for the worse. The country was bogged down in an economic crisis. Ultimately the conservative generals were murdered, the PKI was blamed for the murders and annihilated, and Suharto became President.

Many questions remain. The precise role of General Suharto remains unclear. Yet whether we assume that he played a passive or a more active role, his involvement in the disastrous events that took place on 1 October is clear. He was informed of the plot by both Untung and Latief, and also he had his own intelligence sources in place. He knew Syam well. Did he promise support? Or did he declare that he would remain neutral? What is clear is that he did not inform his superiors, Yani and Nasution, of the impending actions against them. And who ordered the change of plans, that the generals would not be taken to the President for interrogation but would be killed instead? Was it Suyono, Latief or Ali Murtopo? If these orders came from the superiors of Untung and Latief, Suharto did not act opportunistically (the passive scenario), making use of the momentum to advance his own position, but had planned all along to kill the generals, and exterminate the PKI. Yet these considerations are not taught in the nation's schools. There and in wider society the idea that the PKI was to blame and lost (*salah dan kalah*), and was therefore responsible for its own annihilation, is still widely believed.

Notes

- 1 *Surat Sebelas Maret (Supersemar* – letter of 11 March. For an account of various versions of the *Supersemar* see <https://tirto.id/jika-supersemar-palsu-apakah-or-de-baru-tidak-sah-ckvU>.
- 2 The composition of this Council was rather broad. General Suharto was also a member.
- 3 There is also a place called Lubang Buaya within the air force grounds, used as a dropping zone. See Chapter 3.
- 4 In a radiogram on 21 September 1965, T 239/9/1965.
- 5 See Dinuth (1997) for the text of both announcements, documents 21 and 22, respectively.
- 6 According to Siregar (1995) Major Suyono, who was in charge of logistics, had neglected this task.
- 7 *Komando Operasi Tertinggi (KOTI* – Supreme Operations Command). KOTI was set up in 1961 by President Sukarno, initially to lead the struggle for the liberation of West Irian, later to oppose the establishment of the Malaysian Federation. See Melvin (2018) for a discussion of the importance of the KOTI chain of command.
- 8 Professor Dr Arif Budianto (or Lim Joe Thay as he was called at the time), one of the forensic specialists involved, declared in 1999 in an interview with members of the Centre for Information Analysis in Yogyakarta, that Suharto was present while the autopsy was being conducted. As rumours were already circulating that the generals had been castrated and their eyes gouged out, they investigated the penises and eyes with care, even noting which penises had not been circumcised. They had all died because they had been shot. See <https://insulinda.wordpress.com/2012/04/05/suharto-dengan-orde-baru-menghalalkan-semua-cara/>. See also Ticoalu (2015) who interviewed another member of the team, Dr Liaw Yan Siang.
- 9 See for details of this media campaign Wieringa (2002, 2003).
- 10 *Gestapu, Gerakan September Tigapuluh*. The reference to the Nazi Gestapo is obvious.
- 11 At some stage Syam had worked for Mudigdo, Aidit's father-in-law, who was Chief of Police in Pekalongan. See www.berdikarionline.com/Suharto-dan-peristiwa-g30s-1965/.
- 12 See also Holzappel (2014); Wertheim (1970, 1979).
- 13 Roosa summarized his latest views as stated above in an email to the authors on 26 March 2015, for inclusion in the research document that was being prepared for the prosecution team at the IPT 1965 Tribunal.
- 14 Suharto was, according to Sukarno, too stubborn. Pranoto Reksosamudro was a friendly and gentle man who was loyal to Sukarno. Two weeks later Pranoto was replaced by Suharto. Out of spite Suharto later dismissed him and denied him his pension rights.
- 15 On Father Beek see Chapter 7.
- 16 Based on the testimony of Indonesian Air Force Colonel Heru Atmodjo, according to Rudi Hartono, berdikarionline.com (30 September 2013). Available at www.berdikarionline.com/Suharto-dan-peristiwa-g30s-1965/.
- 17 *Ikatan Pendukung Kemerdekaan Indonesia (IPKI* – Union of Supporters of Indonesian Freedom). The *Pemuda Pancasila* belongs to the IPKI (Ryter 1998).
- 18 Suharto was in charge of both the special troops and of the troops under the KOTI command.
- 19 The *Tri Ubaya Sakti* doctrine (Three Sacred Vows) had been formulated during a seminar at the *Sekolah Staf dan Komando Angkatan Darat (Seskoad* – Army Staff and Command School) in April 1965. It postulated an independent political role for the army, in an attempt to counter the growing influence of the PKI via the *Nasakom* policy.

- 20 In the 1955 national elections the PKI came fourth with 16 per cent of the vote. The party came first in elections in Central Java in 1957 (Hindley 1964).
- 21 6 October 2015. See <https://magz.tempo.co/konten/2015/10/06/LU/30720/>.
- 22 See also Subandrio (2001) and Hartono (2013).
- 23 ‘*Sikat saja, jangan ragu-ragu*’ (Hartono 2013).
- 24 On the advice of Nasution he would have been brought before a military tribunal that would have marked the end of his career. Instead, however, Sukarno granted him amnesty and sent him to the *Seskoad* in Bandung. See Subandrio (2006) and the 2015 *Tempo* special issue on the events of 1965, which quotes Taher (2015).
- 25 Hartono (2013) cites Supardjo on the messy military preparations of the G30S.
- 26 But Jusuf Wanandi corroborates this story. The neighbour, Mashuri, had a friend in the RRI who heard gun shots when he passed the house of Nasution on his way home. Interview conducted on 18 January 2018.
- 27 See also Subandrio (2006: 22). Up until the day of his execution Untung believed that Suharto would save him.
- 28 According to Hartono (2013). Heru Atmodjo was head of the Air Force Intelligence Service.
- 29 Citing Alec Adams, political advisor to the Far East Commander-in-Chief. See www.independent.co.uk/arts-entertainment/how-we-destroyed-sukarno-1188448.html.
- 30 Semar is a popular *wayang* figure, both a loyal servant of hero Arjuna, and the wise messenger of the gods.
- 31 Central square in Jakarta.
- 32 See http://nasional.kompas.com/read/2015/03/10/15060091/Arsip.Supersemar.1966?utm_source=RD&utm_medium=inart&utm_campaign=khiprd.
- 33 <http://nasional.kompas.com/read/2016/03/10/19451281/Tiga.Kontroversi.di.Balik.Supersemar.11.Maret.1966>.
- 34 Interview, 18 January 2018. See also Murtopo (2002).
- 35 Decision No. IX /1966.

3 The International People's Tribunal on the 1965 Crimes against Humanity in Indonesia

A whole ship with prisoners that had departed from the island of Sabu disappeared. The military had filled two ships to transport the prisoners to Kupang. In the middle of the sea the soldiers moved all the prisoners to one ship and sank that. They themselves sailed on to Kupang in the other one. Hundreds of people were drowned. Among them were many teachers.¹

Introduction

One of the persistent forms of obfuscation around the genocide and other crimes against humanity committed in Indonesia as a result of the actions of the G30S is that it was a horizontal conflict spurred by spontaneous actions by groups of people enraged by the treachery and barbarism of the PKI. This discourse, which is still repeated today, masks the agency and intent of the army. In this chapter we discuss the involvement of the army. This ranged from the actual massacre of members of the PKI and its associated organizations as well as Sukarno's supporters, to setting up, training, arming and protecting various militias. Our focus is the Final Report published in 2017 that gives the findings of the panel of judges of the International People's Tribunal on the crimes against humanity committed after 1 October 1965. Special attention will be given to international complicity and the legal arguments used in the discussion of whether the massacres that took place in Indonesia during the twentieth century constitute a genocide.

The army as perpetrator

The intent and agency of the military to annihilate the PKI is convincingly proven by Melvin's study of Aceh (2017, 2018). She discovered a stash of 3,000 classified military documents in which phrases regularly pop up such as 'exterminate the PKI to the roots' (*menumpas PKI sampai ke akar-akarnya*); a party, it has to be stressed again, which was legal and defenceless. The documents Melvin studied allowed her to establish a timeline of events in Aceh and the chain of command. The massacres were far from 'spontaneous'.

This is just a phrase to deny the centralized, deliberate character of the extermination campaign.

Roosa (2006: 189–91) among other authors noted that the military leadership started to prepare and intensify its anti-PKI action from the early 1960s onwards. Sukarno's Crush Malaysia campaign had provided the military with the means and the justification to intensify its military preparations down to the local level and to set up paramilitary structures. The powers that the military acquired to implement Sukarno's *Dwikora* programme amounted to a virtual state of martial law (Melvin 2017: 490).² As Aceh is close to Malaysia it was a good location for the military to test their new KOTI command structure. Its command structure could be mobilized straight away to annihilate the PKI immediately after 1 October and onwards.

As noted above, prior to the issuing of Decree No. 1 by the G30S, which is usually seen as the first indication of what Suharto and his allies later called a 'coup' or a 'coup attempt', Suharto had already sent a telegram to the military commander of North Sumatra, Mokoginta, that a 'coup movement' had occurred in the capital (Melvin 2017: 491). Mokoginta, who was the KOTI commander for Sumatra, reacted immediately. In a speech given on that same night he called on all members of the armed forces to 'resolutely and completely annihilate this counter-revolution and all acts of treason'. He accepted the temporary leadership of General Suharto's army (thus ignoring an order from President Sukarno issued at 4 p.m. on 1 October that Suharto should step down).³ As a result of this order not only the army but also militias trained by the army for the confrontation with Malaysia were mobilized.

Mobilized by Mokoginta, Aceh's military commander Djuarsa toured the region, exhorting the civilian population to kill members of the PKI or else they themselves would be targeted (i.e. killed). The coordination of the campaign remained under military control, and the manner of involvement of the civilian population depended on the availability and capacity of militias. In Central Java, similarly to Aceh, members of the *Hansip* (*Pertahanan Sipil* – civil guards) and the *Hanra* (*Pertahanan Rakyat* – people's guards) were trained by the army to track down and kill suspected communists and their sympathizers. Other militias that took part in the massacres included *Pemuda Pancasila*, *Ansor/Banser* and *Pemuda Marhaen* in Bali (Robinson 2018).

Melvin found evidence that the massacres took place in four stages: preparation (in Aceh this took a relatively short time); the public display of corpses (in Aceh between 7 and 13 October); the genocide itself (from 14 October onwards); and finally the purging of the bureaucracy. In East Java, the region with which we are most familiar, a similar sequence can be noted although within a different time frame. There the preparation phase took longer, although the *Ansor/Banser* units were already on high alert owing to the tensions around rural conflicts in the previous years (although when we asked in our own neighbourhood, where a *Banser* group had been involved in grisly murders, everybody denied that there had been any rural conflicts in the area).⁴ The purging continued well into 1967.

As Melvin describes in her study, the killings took place in military-controlled jails, detention centres and killing sites. In Aceh the PKI was systematically wiped out. The pro-state paramilitaries did not only do much of the dirty work but also provided a justification for the denial of army intent and organization. The outsourcing of the killing and the manufacturing of ambiguity were an integral part of the genocidal process. Following the material presented in the previous chapter, we can conclude that obfuscation, ambiguity and denial of responsibility were part of the preparations for genocide even before the G30S affair. And as we will see in the following chapters, the secrecy and denial continue up to today.

A fifth stage can be added to Melvin's four stages: shaming, terrifying and humiliating whole families. The military did not cease to be a political actor after the PKI was destroyed. In a continuing process of intimidation and stigmatization the families of the actual victims were targeted, and this included the families of ardent supporters of Sukarno. They were unable to obtain the required documents for employment in the government, or for attending university. Given that breadwinners were frequently arrested and/or killed, entire families were plunged into poverty. Their property might be destroyed, stolen or ransacked. Those who were purged from their jobs did not only lose their salaries but also their pension rights. Offices and school buildings that belonged to the PKI or its associated organizations were destroyed or taken over by the military or associated militias. This happened for instance to the many *Baperki* schools, and to the *TK Melati* that were set up by *Gerwani*, which were confiscated by the NU's women's organization, *Muslimat*.⁵ Like the PR and *Gerwani*, since November 1964 *Muslimat* had received training in the use of weapons and marching on a *Hansip* training field in Cibubur.⁶

Kasenda (2015) analysed the progress of the red berets of the RPKAD led by Sarwo Edhie in Central Java. As the RPKAD was understaffed, Sarwo Edhie asked for permission to arm volunteers of the PNI and NU youth groups. They were trained for two to three days and then began to purge the countryside in groups, led by a member of the RPKAD. This method was used all over Central Java, East Java and Bali: 'In each village the PKI was trapped and detained. After a short interrogation those who were considered activists were killed and the passive supporters were detained', all under the control of the army (Kasenda 2015: 82–83). As *Kodam Diponegoro* in Central Java and *Kodam Brawijaya* in East Java were seen to have been infiltrated by the PKI (ibid.: 83–85), Suharto had to operate carefully: these units had to be purged first. Local *kyai* (leaders of Islamic boarding schools) mobilized their students. For young *santri* (students), spilling communist blood was seen as a kind of coming of age ceremony (ibid.: 86). Suryawan (2007) analysed the massacres in Bali (see also Robinson 1995).

West Java was spared from the worst killings. The DI movement and the *Tentara Islam Indonesia* (TII) had only been suppressed in 1962 (see Chapter 4). The military did not consider it wise to arm the Muslim youth. But in Central

Java tens of thousands of people were brutally murdered and their bodies thrown into mass graves, rivers or caves which were linked directly to the South Sea via underground rivers (Kasenda 2015: 87–88). When the RPKAD arrived in the Central Javanese region of Salatiga a paramilitary group was formed from right-wing members of youth organizations called the *Pasukan Garuda Pancasila* (Garuda Pancasila Troops). RPKAD soldiers were ordered to shoot on sight (Jenkins and Kammen 2012: 93). They provided training, transport and the guarantee of impunity to the militias who received weapons and proceeded to arrest PKI members and sympathizers, each group accompanied by a member of the army. *Banser* was the most active group. It had long been competing with the PKI, in political meetings, traditional arts and in relation to land reform (Kasenda 2015: 89–90).

In East Java the regions of Kediri, Probolinggo, Pasuruan, Situbondo and Banyuwangi were the most affected areas (Kasenda 2015: 93). Hefner (1990) compared the geocultural differences between the lowland areas of Pasuruan, where there was a large peasant class and where Muslim parties are strong, with the Tengger highlands, inhabited by adherents of the *Kejawen* religion, many of whom voted for the PNI. The rivalry between *abangan* Muslims and *santri* led to higher numbers of people being killed in lowland Pasuruan than in the mountains.

The 2012 film *The Act of Killing* by Joshua Oppenheimer provides a chilling example of how in Medan, North Sumatra, the *Pemuda Pancasila* (PP), a right-wing youth organization to which the protagonist Anwar Congo belonged, was employed to assist in the slaughter of progressive individuals (and ethnic Chinese). In his 2014 film *The Look of Silence*, the *Komando Aksi* (Action Commands) feature prominently in the massacre. The *Komando Aksi Pemuda* had already been formed by the military on 2 October in Medan. Similarly to other militias they received their training and weapons from the military (Tsai and Kammen 2012: 138). The army in Medan under the leadership of Kemal Idris encouraged the slaughter (Cribb 1990). According to Young (1990), possibly 100,000 leftist activists were murdered in and around Medan.

As discussed further in Chapter 6, the slander against *Gerwani* played a major role in inciting these militias to murder. In the film *Kado untuk Ibu* (produced by Syarikat in 2004), about a women's prison called Plantungan in Central Java, the women report that they were sexually tortured, asked whether they had performed the 'Fragrant Flower' dance at Lubang Buaya and were checked for markings on their buttocks or thighs, possibly a tattoo, to demonstrate that they had been involved in the 'inhuman' activities of *Gerwani*.⁷

The total number of victims is still unclear because most were buried in unmarked mass graves or simply dumped in rivers, and official numbers were never released. The killing had yet to end in 1967 and 1968. Among the hundreds of thousands detained after the initial waves of killing, many died in prison in later years due to starvation or torture (Kammen and Zakaria 2012). Cribb (1990) published the first full-scale study of the extent of the

murders and concludes that the death toll was probably around 500,000. Amnesty International (1977) had earlier suggested a number of around one million. On his deathbed RPKAD chief Sarwo Edhie is alleged to have told Permadi, a well-known diviner, that during this period some three million people had been killed, and most of them on his orders (Naipospos 1995: 59). The well-connected Indonesian journalist Julius Pour remarks that this number may well be true; after all he was known to be an ‘honest guy’ (Pour 2010: 273).⁸

It is clear that there are many gaps in the count of how many were murdered. The best authority should be the Komando Operasi Pemulihan Keamanan dan Ketertiban (Kopkamtib – Operational Command for the Restoration of Security and Order). This extra-constitutional security service was announced by Suharto on 10 October 1965 and formally established on 6 December 1965. It had wide-ranging powers to detain, interrogate, torture and murder all those it considered to be linked to the PKI. It was also responsible for the screening of individuals and the purges in the bureaucracy (Crouch 1978). It was directly involved in the extermination campaign of the PKI in Kalimantan and East Indonesia (Melvin 2018). It seems that the Command produced a report in 1966 which was never made public, and which quotes a figure of one million deaths by that time (cited in Cribb 2002: 557, who never saw the report).⁹ Wherever regional research is done on the topic, figures crop up which were probably never counted in any official way. The investigations carried out by the JPIT research team in East Indonesia, headed by Mery Kolimon, for example, found that on the tiny island of Alor alone a minimum of 380 people were murdered (Kolimon *et al.* 2015). In the nearby island of Flores between 800–2,000 people were murdered between February and March 1966 (Wejak 2015: 84). In this book we consider it likely that one million people were murdered including those who died in prison in later years and those massacred in remote places.

A new way of estimating the total number of those massacred after October 1965 is presented by the demographer Chandra (2017). He calculated the change in population in East Java that occurred in 1965–66, via a population loss method, using census data, and concluded that possibly more than 150,000 people were killed during that period in East Java. This method also yielded other revealing information, in line with Hefner’s work comparing the geocultural differences between the coastal and mountainous regions in East Java. Regions with the highest level of political support for the two major Muslim parties in the area (the NU and *Masyumi*) show a high decline in population which is not accounted for, while the mountainous regions with a higher percentage of supporters of the PNI and the PKI show an increase in population. People on the run from the murder squads fled to safer areas, particularly to the wild south-eastern parts of Banyuwangi on the eastern tip of Java.¹⁰ The *Kejawen* population were far more peaceful, while in the coastal regions, where anti-PKI sentiments ran high, higher numbers were killed. These findings support the link between NU and Ansor and the mass

killings (see also Fealy and McGregor 2012) This does not mean that the NU acted independently of the army, Chandra warns.

More recently Robinson (2017, 2018) also points to the pivotal role of the army leadership in the Indonesian genocide. He analysed the distinctive geographical and temporal patterns and variations. The army's organizational and logistical capacity was the major factor that gave rise to a 'violence of such staggering breadth and brutality' (ibid. 2017: 456). The army provided the logistics, the small weapons, the trucks on which students were transported to their demonstrations, and victims to their execution sites, as well as the hit lists which the militias used. Robinson estimates that hundreds of thousands of militia members must have been trained by the army (2017: 472).

Robinson points to the critical role played by the army psychological teams. The teams operated under the control of the *Kopkamtib* which had been given the power to 'restore the authority of the Government by means of physical-military and mental operations' (Van Langenberg 1990: 51; see also Southwood and Flanagan 1983). The *Kopkamtib* also sent into the regions investigation teams which were tasked with producing 'proof' of slander directed at *Gerwani* and the stories of caches of weapons found. Wherever the teams (*Teperda*, derived from *Team Periksa Daerah*) landed, prisoners were tortured until some of them confessed to a story that the investigator wanted to hear.¹¹ This was then presented in the media.¹² But, as Robinson points out, no 'proof' was ever presented during the trials.

While there is overwhelming evidence of the army's central role in the mobilization of civilians, the hatred against the PKI was deep and widespread. The NU and *Ansor* needed little prodding. The mother of Gus Dur, the formidable Nyai Solichin Wahid Hasyim, chair of the Muslimat NU, was the first to sign the Declaration of the PBNU on 2 October to dissolve the PKI (Fauzan 2015: 17).

While the killings in Aceh were underway (Aceh was the first area said to be 'free of the PKI'), Suharto made a speech on 10 November to call upon the people of Java to help the army and particularly the RPKAD. 'We already succeeded in annihilating the largest part of the *dalang* and leaders of G30S. RPKAD has come in your midst on my orders as *Panglima Operasi Pemulihan Keamanan dan Ketertiban* ... to liberate you from the threat of terror of the G30S' (Dinuth 1997: 137).

Melvin's study provides proof of the centralized coordination of the extermination campaign. She concludes that under the leadership of Suharto the military controlled the anti-PKI campaign. He headed the four major command structures involved in the campaign, the KOTI Command (Sumatra), the *Kopkamtib* (mostly effective in Kalimantan and East Indonesia) and the RPKAD troops responsible for the slaughter in Java and Bali and he was Chief of Staff of the army (Melvin 2018: 300–01).

An illustration of how civilians in an ordinary village became involved, and the role that rumours about rural unrest played in the making of a murderer, is provided by the following story from the insightful website of Ingat 65

(Remember 1965) in which the third generation shares their memories of 1965.¹³ Kim Al Ghozali recounts how her grandmother told her about the hill Sempenan close to their home in the village of Resongo, Probolinggo in East Java. It contains a big mass grave of members or sympathizers of the PKI, a well-kept public secret. At a different location on the same hill 11 Chinese men and women were killed. They were tied together and then burnt alive. The flames were visible from afar, her grandmother remembers. A neighbouring village was known as a ‘red village’, Kim’s village was from the opposition (probably the NU, according to Saskia Wieringa). One year before *Gestok* a riot started at their mosque.¹⁴ The rumour was that Kim’s neighbourhood would be attacked by inhabitants from the PKI village, to steal their land and kill the *kyai*. In anticipation of the attack the villagers began to pray, with their weapons ready; a few climbed the trees on a hill that looked in the direction of the ‘red village’. Nothing happened. But because of this rumour many villagers became butchers. The elders later called them gangsters (*bajingan*) or cattle thieves. After the events of 1965 occurred they were recruited by the security services (*aparats*) to comb through the neighbouring villages. They arrested people whose names were on a list. The prisoners were escorted to Sempenan Hill where they ended up in the mass grave. Those who were murdered were believed to have no religion and to enjoy killing *kyai* and stealing land.

All the elements of the propaganda machinery in the countryside are present in this story: a false rumour from the mosque, about land conflicts and *kyai* being killed. The villagers are told that they must murder these atheists, and the army recruited the future butchers, equipping them with lists, and protecting them afterwards. The mass graves are now almost forgotten, but the stories live on in the victims’ grandchildren, who grew up in fear of something unknown to them, were lied to in their schools, and had to go to great trouble, such as Kim Al Ghozali, to understand what really happened around and after *Gestok*. While here a few elders still remember what happened, sometimes nobody is left to report the atrocities. Hasibuan (2015) testified during the hearings of the Tribunal that in North Sumatra, where the labour union of plantation workers, *Sarbupri*, was strong, whole villages were wiped out.¹⁵

Final Report of the panel of judges of the IPT 1965

Komnas HAM carried out an investigation into the grave human rights violations committed after 1 October 1965, between 1 June 2008 and 30 April 2012. An ad hoc team was established to undertake this task, in conformity with its duties and authority as stipulated in Articles 18, 19 and 20 of Law 26/2000 on Human Rights Courts, under the powers of Law 39/1999 on Basic Human Rights. This report is based on 349 interviews with victims from six regions in Indonesia: Maumere, Denpasar (Bali), South Sumatra, South Sulawesi, Buru and Medan. These cases are representative of what took place all over the archipelago.

The overall conclusion of the Komnas HAM report is that there is adequate initial evidence of the following crimes against humanity: killings, extermination, enslavement, enforced evictions, arbitrary deprivation of freedom, torture, rape and other forms of sexual violence, persecution and enforced disappearances. These actions were part of an attack against the civilian population, as a consequence of the policy of the authorities in power (Komnas HAM 2015). The full report was rejected several times by the Office of the General Prosecutor and still awaits public disclosure.

As this report is still under embargo it could not be used as the basis for the research report for the prosecution team of the IPT 1965. A new report had to be prepared in which the above-mentioned charges were included. New issues raised are the plight of the exiles, international complicity and genocide. More attention was also paid to the effects of the propaganda campaign and international complicity. The Final Report of the IPT 1965 provides the details of the legal arguments used by the panel of judges of the IPT 1965. A major conclusion is, in line with the above, that the crimes were committed under a vertical system of military control and under the direct authority of General Suharto (Gittings and Jarvis 2017: 50).

The counts of mass killing, imprisonment, enslavement, torture and enforced disappearance

The conclusions of the Final Report of the IPT 1965 are discussed in Wieringa *et al.* (forthcoming). Here we summarize the main findings. On the count of mass killings, the judges found that although the precise number of those killed is not known, as discussed above, the massacres count as murder and extermination as crimes against humanity both in the Rome Statute of 2000 and in Indonesian domestic law (Art. 9 (a) and (b) of Law No. 26/2000 (Gittings and Jarvis 2017: 62–63). As Melvin (2018), Hammer (2013), Robinson (2018) and others have documented, the first wave of killing was public and intended to instil terror. But after the first wave of terror killings was over, Suharto preferred to act in secrecy. On 8 November 1973 the Attorney-General's Office issued an instruction to local prosecutor offices in Indonesia not to prosecute the cases on killings against the members of the PKI and/or the members of the PKI-affiliated organizations.¹⁶ They were to consult with local military units in order to provide evidence that would justify the killings against the PKI members and/or the PKI-affiliated organizations. Also, they were requested by the Attorney-General's Office not to involve the media.

The total number of detainees is not known either, as conflicting figures are given. An Amnesty International report cites former Indonesian Prosecutor-General, General Sugih Arto, who explained in September 1971: 'it is impossible to say how many political prisoners there are. It is a floating rate, like the Japanese yen vis à vis the dollar' (1977: 42). Local commanders were empowered to arrest and interrogate suspects, who could be held for an

unlimited period of time. They were not obliged to inform the central command in Jakarta (ibid.: 41). The Final Report of the IPT 1965 concluded that arbitrary and unlawful imprisonment are proscribed under international customary law and also violate Article 9(e) of Indonesia's Law 26/2000 (Gittings and Jarvis 2017: 67).

Many prisoners were sent to slave labour camps such as the one on the island of Buru (which held over 11,000 people), or in Moncongloe, Sulawesi (Adam forthcoming; Ahmad 2012; Taufik 2009). Prisoners in other detention centres were sometimes also sent to work for free, as has been reported to be the case in Palu, where prisoners built the central park, roads and bridges (Wahyuningrum 2013). Prisoners were also made to work for their guards; this included providing sexual services. Others had to work for free on plantations or infrastructure projects (Gittings and Jarvis 2017: 69). *Plantungan* was a special camp for women prisoners (Bustam 2008; Lestariningsih 2011). The 2012 Komnas HAM report provides many examples of such forms of enslavement. As many intellectuals, writers and artists were sent to the island of Buru, there are several testimonies available written by former prisoners, such as Pramodya Ananta Toer (1988) and Hersri (2003, 2005).¹⁷ The artist Gregorius Suharsoyo painted some graphic scenes depicting life in Buru.¹⁸ The panel of judges of the IPT 1965 came to the conclusion that the material brought before them was evidence that the prisoners were subjected to enslavement in the labour camps, thus violating the 1930 Convention concerning Forced or Compulsory Labour and violating Indonesian national law (Gittings and Jarvis 2017: 70).¹⁹

The IPT 1965 Research Report provided ample evidence of torture. Researchers from AJAR (Asian Justice and Rights) such as Galuh Wandita and Indria Farnida presented their data on the forms of torture they encountered in their research. These included burning parts of the body; applying electric shocks and various forms of water torture; pulling out nails; forcing prisoners to drink soldiers' urine; rubbing chilli into the eyes of the victims; tying victims inside a sack containing a snake; and cutting victims' ears and forcing them to consume them (Gittings and Jarvis 2017: 71). The Komnas Ham 2012 report also provides many details of prisoners being tortured. In the detention centre on Jalan Gandhi in Medan, North Sumatra witnesses testified to having seen prisoners being whipped, kicked, beaten with truncheons, given electric shocks and tortured in other ways. Torture was a routine part of interrogation cycles. These occurred at the beginning of the detention period but also corresponded with the arrival of *Teperda* teams from the *Kopkamtib*.

These lists can be easily extended; whenever we met former prisoners we asked them what they experienced. Here follows a typical story from a meeting with survivors:

Pak Idham (pseudonym) had been imprisoned on the island of Nusa Kambangan. Some of them were forced to eat raw snails – and these are

poisonous to humans – you have to boil them first. So these prisoners died. Many others died of starvation: the rations were very small and the island was very far from where people's families lived so they received very few food parcels. From Sumatra they heard a story that prisoners were buried up to their necks in the ground in public places, just their heads sticking out. They were left to die; when somebody tried to give them some water, these people were also buried and left to die. They all had to dig their own graves first.²⁰

Indonesia only ratified the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment on 28 September 1998 (it was enacted in 1984). However, torture is also considered a crime under international customary law. The Indonesian Constitution (Article 28G(2)) and the 2000 National Human Rights Law also prohibit torture.

The Komnas HAM interviews indicated that the arrests were mostly carried out by security personnel, or in other cases militias formed their own squads. Rarely did they meet resistance. When the father of Nursyahbani Katjasungkana was about to be arrested by a *Banser* squad (he was a staunch follower of Sukarno, a member of the MPRS, ousted before the 1966 session) he immediately grabbed a rusty gun, told them to get lost or else he would shoot them. Fortunately they backed down. But most were not so lucky; they ended up in the underground rivers, or in mass graves all over the country. Others were eventually released from the Indonesian gulag and managed to return home; they continue to face stigma even now. Apart from the cruel fate of the disappeared themselves, the suffering of their relatives must be acknowledged. We heard so many stories of family members who have continued to search for their lost relatives. There can be no closure for them until they know the fate of their loved ones.

The Final Report refers to the 1992 United Nations (UN) General Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance²¹ which means enforced disappearances are incorporated into international customary law (Gittings and Jarvis 2017: 74–75).

Other counts: sexual violence, exile and propaganda as persecution

As indicated in the 2007 report of Komnas *Perempuan* and by the studies of Pohlman (2015, 2017) and Kolimon *et al.* (2015), there is overwhelming evidence that sexual violence was committed, primarily against women and also some men. This included rape, gang rape and other sexualized forms of torture, enforced prostitution, enforced pregnancy, wife-taking and sexual slavery.²² For the Research Report of the IPT 1965 Pohlman analysed 300 cases from various sources including over 30 cases of sexual violence collected by the Komnas HAM research team.²³ There is overwhelming evidence that the perpetrators were adult men, members of the security services and their civilian proxies.

The prosecution also introduced a count of the many exiles who were abroad at the time of the G30S affair and who could not return to Indonesia. This includes those who were in China at the time to attend the festivities relating to the anniversary of the proclamation of the People's Republic of China (1 October 1949), as well as students and embassy personnel. They were later screened for links to the PKI and loyalty to Sukarno. The passports of those who refused to report to the embassies and those who failed the tests were revoked.²⁴ The two factual witnesses for this count at the hearings of the tribunal testified behind a screen, one of them under pseudonym, as they still feared repercussions for their families. The Final Report concludes that 'many Indonesians were subjected to forcible exile, which constitutes deprivation of the right to free passage, the right to return and the enjoyment of full citizenship rights (fundamental rights laid down in international customary or treaty law) and this may well reach the same level of gravity as other forms of persecution as a crime against humanity' (Gittings and Jarvis 2017: 85).

Another count submitted by the prosecution concerned the propaganda campaign, as well as the hate speech 'as part of the widespread and/or systematic attack against the members and sympathisers of the PKI and PKI-affiliated organisations, and/or civilian population in Indonesia from 1965 onwards by spreading hate propaganda via various instruments'.²⁵ The Prosecution Brief focused on two elements, the accusation that the PKI was the mastermind behind the G30S affair, and the slander against *Gerwani*. What interests us here is how the panel of judges of the tribunal approached the material. They asked two questions:

- 1 Was this version of events substantially true or substantially false? If so, did those advancing it know that it was false?
- 2 Did the dissemination of this version of events incite or encourage people who heard it to commit mass murder or other crimes, and could those who disagreed with this version argue against it?

(Gittings and Jarvis 2017: 87)

The panel of judges concluded that 'the false propaganda campaign was indeed essential to the widespread systematic attack on the PKI ... [it] was the first significant step in the attack and is therefore a crime against humanity' (ibid.: 93). They noted further that the campaign had a 'significant dehumanizing impact, helping to justify the extra-legal persecution, detention and killing of alleged suspects and particularly to legitimize the use of sexual violence against women' (ibid.: 93–94).

Genocide

The prosecution did not include the count of genocide in its brief for the judges. Yet the research report argued at length that a specific national group had been targeted for annihilation, and that the massacres had led to

enormous social and political impacts. Human rights lawyer and IPT coordinator Nursyahbani Katjasungkana, and one of the prosecutors, Parulian Sihombing, had prepared the count, but in the end the decision was taken not to include it. Arguments used were both political (fear that the prosecutors would be targeted for attack by hardline militias) and legal (preference to stay within the conventional limits in the interpretation of the 1948 Genocide Convention, in which only extermination on racial, ethnic and religious grounds is included).²⁶ Yet the Final Report concludes that the massacres in Indonesia after the G30S affair 'include acts that fall within those enumerated in the Genocide Convention' (Gittings and Jarvis 2017: 121).

The panel of judges based its conclusion on the IPT 1965 Research Report which was submitted to them and on the analysis of case law with particular reference to Argentina (Gittings and Jarvis 2017: 113–14). At the end of the hearings, when the final statement was read which included the provisional conclusions, the panel of judges reserved their right to go beyond the counts contained in the Prosecution Brief. This they did, and when the Final Report appeared in July 2016, genocide was included.

This was the first time that the Indonesian genocide was discussed in legal terms. Activists and scholars had long argued that this was the case, but the Komnas HAM report did not include the count of genocide. Cribb (2001) was the first leading scholar to call the 1965–66 killings a case of genocide given that an 'ideologically constructed national group' was targeted. Since then other scholars such as Melvin (2013) have argued the case, usually supported by reference to the massacres of ethnic Chinese.

An obstacle in the Indonesian case is that the country, almost alone among important countries of the world, has not signed and ratified the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.²⁷ Nevertheless, the Final Report states that under International Customary Law the State of Indonesia is bound by the provisions of the 1948 Genocide Convention (Gittings and Jarvis 2017: 121). Genocide is defined as 'acts committed with the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial or religious group' (Article II). The formulation 'in whole or in part' is important. Perpetrators need not to intend to destroy the entire group. Destruction of only a part of a group (such as its educated members, or in the case of Indonesia the leaders and cadres of the PKI and its associated organizations) also counts as genocide.

- The Research Report argued that in 1965–66, as in Argentina and Cambodia, victims were for the most part killed not because of their ethnicity, nationality or racial or religious identity but because of their alleged political beliefs. In Indonesia, most Chinese were murdered because they belonged to the *Baperki*, an association of Chinese Indonesians associated with the PKI, but ethnic motives played a role in mass killings of Chinese-Indonesian citizens as well, particularly in Medan, Makassar and Lombok (Purdey 2006).

- Feierstein (2007, 2012) considers the use of ‘national group’ applicable to Argentina because the perpetrators proposed to destroy a specific structure of social relations with the aim of altering the life of the entire society. He argues that the Convention for the Prevention and Sanction of the Crime of Genocide includes the category of ‘racial group’, based not on a positive discrimination between races, but on the imaginary construction of the concept of race as a metaphor for the notion of ‘otherness’. This argument can be extended to Indonesia. Members of the PKI and their allies were ‘othered’ to the extent that they were portrayed as atheist, devilish, hypersexual beings, intent on destroying the nation. Furthermore, the existing social order was radically redefined, implicating not only the present, but also the past (history was rewritten) and the future (social justice was relegated to the sidelines of the political imaginary).
- Intent to commit genocide can be inferred from a systematic pattern of coordinated acts. The statements or orders to kill and/or to torture/commit inhuman treatment against the members of the PKI and/or the PKI-affiliated organizations can be found by following orders issued by the Highest Command for Security and Order (the *PangKopkamtib*), namely General Suharto. The position of *PangKopkamtib* had been confirmed on 1 November 1965 and given its mandate, to keep security and order in Indonesia, by President Sukarno. Subsequently the *PangKopkamtib* issued a directive (KEPI/KOPKAM/12/1965) on 21 December 1965 ordering local military leaders to compile lists of PKI members and/or members of PKI-affiliated organizations, who were then ‘exterminated’.

International complicity

The organizers of the tribunal invited not only representatives of Indonesia but also of the US, the UK and Australia.²⁸ They did not respond to the invitation and did not attend the hearings. The Prosecution Brief included the count of the complicity of these countries. The panel of judges considered both acts of omission (failure to protect civilians) and commission (support for an army busy murdering its fellow citizens). The panel concluded that the ‘US gave sufficient support to the Indonesian military, knowing well that they were embarked upon a programme of mass killings, for the charge of complicity to be justified’ (Gittings and Jarvis 2017: 106). They noted that for the UK and Australia the position was less clear-cut.

Scott (1985), Simpson (2008) and Henry (forthcoming) analysed the financial, military and ideological involvement of the US, Australian and British intelligence services in the Indonesian genocide. In this book we focus on the domestic aspects of propaganda around 1965, but here we examine briefly the involvement of international actors.

So far there is no proof that the US or any other nation was directly involved in the G30S affair. There is evidence, however, of extensive foreign

support for the Indonesian military both prior to and after the G30S affair. The US, for instance, trained Indonesian army specialists in psychological warfare, and provided funds, as well as small arms and radio communications equipment to Suharto's forces. The US embassy also supplied the army with a list of approximately 5,000 PKI cadres who then became targets. The embassy did this knowing full well that the army and its allies were engaged in murdering hundreds of thousands of innocent civilians. UK and Australian involvement was primarily focused on spreading army propaganda (Henry forthcoming).

Financial support was limited, as the US embassy could not be seen to be providing support to a group opposing the President, while relations between the two countries were strained. Yet the aid was strategic. The US financed the KAP-*Gestapu* group via Adam Malik and a Japanese businessman.²⁹ The Japanese Prime Minister Sato gave money directly to Sofian Wanandi, according to Dewi, one of Sukarno's wives (Kurasawa 2013; Suroso 2013).

US involvement with Indonesian politics and the army dated from the late 1940s, related to the policy of the containment of communism, the so-called Truman Doctrine (Suroso 2013: 43). Thereafter the US trained thousands of Indonesian officers in anti-communist and psywar tactics, in Fort Leavenworth, Fort Benning and Fort Bragg. These included Ahmad Yani and Sarwo Edhie.³⁰ By the end of the 1950s, at the height of the Cold War, the US was actively using its bases in the Philippines to assist the Pemerintah Revolusioner Republik Indonesia (PRRI – Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia)-Permesta revolt (see Chapter 4). When this was discovered, it became more difficult for the US to effect overt military aid to Indonesia. But when the Americans realized that the army was a better anti-communist ally than the PRRI rebels, the US resumed offering military assistance to Indonesia (Simpson 2008; Suroso 2013). The head of army intelligence, Achmad Sukendro, was in direct contact with the CIA. Within Indonesia a counter-revolutionary training school – *Seskoad* – was set up in Bandung as part of the CIA-sponsored 'Civic Mission' of the army. Aid was provided by the Pentagon, the CIA, the right-wing think tank RAND, and Ford. RAND consultant Guy Pauker trained officers at the Berkeley end.³¹ Suwanto, the vice-commander of *Seskoad*, was a good friend of Pauker.³² General Suharto was trained at *Seskoad*. From this school in 1964 the *Tri Ubaya Shakti* doctrine emerged, and was used to oppose the *Nasakom* formula (Rahardjo 2002: 269).

At *Seskoad* the officers were trained in civilian affairs, such as economy and administration. The collaboration between the so-called Berkeley mafia (economists trained by, among others, Pauker, who went on to become the architects of Suharto's economic policies) and military men originated there. The economists were primarily related to the Economics Faculty of the University of Indonesia, after the Dean Sumitro Djojohadikusomo returned from exile in Singapore.³³ Anti-communist Muslim leaders in Indonesia met regularly with the US embassy (Massad 2015; Simpson 2008).

The list of names provided to the Indonesian army is a striking example of US involvement in the massacres.³⁴ In 2001 *Tempo* journalists interviewed Robert Martens, who was appointed as intelligence officer and head of the Political Department at the CIA's Jakarta office in 1963.³⁵ He had compiled a list of the leaders of the PKI and its affiliated organizations from public sources, such as the organization's own newspaper, the *Harian Rakyat* (*People's Daily*). The American journalist Kathy Kadane had revealed that the US embassy had handed over this list to the Indonesian army, and those who appeared on it were then killed; the embassy monitored this (*Tempo* 2015: 45–46; see also Robinson 2018: 203).

In a 2001 interview in the same journal, Bernardo Hugh Tovar, at the time Chief of the Jakarta CIA office, acknowledged that the CIA had agreed to the request of the Indonesian army for communication equipment (*Kasenda* 2015: 55). This equipment was very important both for internal army communication in the vast archipelago, and for the spread of the propaganda campaign. The radio was often the only and the most influential media of mass communication at the time (*Tempo* 2015: 46). The radio communication apparatus that Suharto received was also an important instrument in cleansing the army of supporters of Yani and Sukarno and personnel with leftist sympathies (Rahardjo 2002: 273).

An interesting specification of the kind of equipment the US gifted to Suharto is provided by radio amateur Geerken (2015), who listened daily to the radio traffic between the CIA base in the Philippines and the US embassy in Jakarta. Not only did the US send jeeps and small arms which were used for the executions, but also single-sideband modulation (SSB) transmitters, the strongest transistors at the time. Geerken maintains that they played a critical role in the hunt for communists, as without these transmitters the army would not have been able to communicate directly with all their divisions all over Java and the outer islands (*ibid.*: 32). He concludes that the CIA had made extensive preparations: vehicles, radio sets and weapons were stockpiled for use in Indonesia in case the army needed the equipment to destroy the PKI (2015: 29).

A major objective of the efforts of the foreign intelligence services was to maintain secrecy about the massacres and to portray the PKI as the vile mastermind of the murders of the generals, even though they had only circumstantial evidence linking the PKI to the G30S. As Norman Reddaway, a British officer stationed in Singapore, wrote, 'we should have no hesitation in doing what we can to surreptitiously blacken the PKI in the eyes of the army and the people of Indonesia' (Henry 2014: 160). Reddaway had been sent to Singapore in late October 1965 allegedly to help the effort in getting rid of Sukarno. In the context of the Cold War the three Western powers discussed here each had their own special interests. The US was embroiled in the Vietnam War and did not want to see Indonesia turn into a communist country; the British wanted to get rid of Sukarno's costly confrontational policy towards Malaysia; and all three had their eyes on Indonesia's potential

wealth. Both the Australian radio services, the Voice of America and the BBC transmitted 'black propaganda' messages that the PKI was the *dalang* of a 'failed coup', and later the lies about *Gerwani*; the radio services remained silent on the massacres that were unfolding (Henry forthcoming, see also Roosa 2006 and Robinson 2018).

In a letter dated 24 March 1966 to Harry Stanley, head of the Joint Malaysia/Indonesia Department in Whitehall, UK, Reddaway confirmed that 'we have deliberately withheld information about the massacres because we thought it would harm the generals who were likely to be more favourable to us than Sukarno/Subandrio'.³⁶ In an earlier letter to Ambassador Gilchrist he wrote that 'advertising the bloodbath' might reduce 'the chances of getting a new management in Indonesia'.³⁷ Yet Gilchrist was aware at the time of the extent of the massacres. In a letter dated 23 February 1966 he refers to a conversation with the Swedish ambassador who felt that Gilchrist's own suggested figure of 400,000 murdered is a 'very serious underestimate'.³⁸ Secret documents from the US embassy which were declassified in 2017 are also clear proof that the embassy approved of the killings. For instance, it noted with satisfaction on 26 November 1965 that 'the PKI was slaughtered in East Java, including many *ludruk* actors'.³⁹ Until this day the international community has not been interested in a discussion about the guilt of the perpetrators about the genocide that they have kept secret.

Not surprisingly the embassies of the three countries discussed here were pleased with how the political situation had unfolded in Indonesia at the time. The British Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in a top-secret memorandum dated 3 December 1965, noted that the 'Indonesian situation seems to be developing favourably'.⁴⁰ On 6 December 1965 the US embassy reported that the army was allowing 'the economy to slide towards chaos to blacken the image of its adversaries' and describes the atmosphere as akin to a 'fresh breeze ... blowing'.⁴¹

The CIA also promoted its anti-communist agenda with the help of cultural programmes. Through the Ford Foundation many anti-communist books were published and anti-communist authors supported. Ford also funded groups that were important to the CIA. The Foundation had its own publishing enterprise, Inter-cultural Publications. The CIA set up front organizations which posed as independent cultural associations and human rights groups. The agency defined the Cold War as a battle for men's minds via cultural propaganda. Its definition of psychological warfare was 'the planned use by a nation of propaganda and activities other than combat which communicate ideas and information intended to influence the opinions, attitudes, emotions and behaviour of foreign groups in ways that will support the achievement of national aims' (Saunders 1999: 4). The CIA penetrated and influenced a vast array of cultural organizations through its front groups and friendly philanthropic organizations like Ford and Rockefeller who had to support the 'cultural Cold Warriors'.⁴² McGehee (1983, 1990) refers to the CIA's role in the campaign about the 'hysterical Gerwani women', referring to

Indonesia as ‘Ford country’(see also Ransom 1975). This cynical campaign was meant to ignite the anger of the public and thus instigate the massacre. The CIA itself has called this genocide ‘one of the worst mass murders of the twentieth century ... along with the Soviet purges of the 1930s, the Nazi mass murders during the Second World War, and the Maoist bloodbath of the early 1950s’.⁴³

The immediate acceptance by the US, British and Australian intelligence services of the falsified autopsies suggests great coordination in the first confusing days after the actions of the G30S. Yet much remains unclear about the precise contact of the CIA with various generals prior to 1 October 1965. Did General Sucipto of KOTT’s Political Affairs desk, who on 2 October formed the Action Front for Crushing the 30 September Movement, and who was the mastermind of the anti-*Gerwani* slander, coordinate his actions with any of the foreign intelligence services?⁴⁴ And did the army information department get any help when on 5 October it had already presented a 130-page report to the army headquarters on the G30S affair?

Conclusion

As discussed in the first part of this chapter, it is clear that the army played a pivotal role in planning and executing the genocide, and in committing other crimes against humanity, as outlined in the Final Report of the IPT 1965. This extends to its attempt to conceal its agency and intent, by using militias trained as its proxies. The Indonesian genocide was not a spontaneous outburst of violence – it was orchestrated vertically. As such the army was the main perpetrator of the crimes against humanity committed after 1 October 1965.

The IPT 1965 Tribunal generated much interest, both in Indonesia and internationally. As the hearings were streamed live it was possible for activists and students all over the world to witness the proceedings. All over Indonesia *nobar* (*nonton bareng* – watching together) sessions were held, some with invited speakers who gave background information. Some such sessions were disturbed, as in Yogyakarta.⁴⁵ It was clear to all that the IPT 1965 was a moral and political intervention, an attempt to break the silence around the massacres, not a judicial exercise. Yet state representatives reacted as if they had been stung by bees. Vice-President Jusuf Kalla sneered that this was a pseudo court (*pengadilan semu*).⁴⁶ Attorney-General Prasetyo derided the results and told the press that ‘we solve our own problems’.⁴⁷ And Mahfud MD, the former Chief of Constitutional Court disparagingly quipped that this was just a joke (*dagelan*).⁴⁸

The propaganda campaign was crucial. Suharto and his associates immediately blamed the PKI as masterminds of the 30 September Movement. With the support of the army, and fuelled by horrific tales of the alleged torture and mutilation of the generals at Lubang Buaya, anti-PKI demonstrations and violence soon broke out. The PKI and its associated mass organizations

were effectively destroyed. The PKI was framed not only as inhuman and encouraging sexual perversity, but also as atheist and ‘always already’ an enemy of the nation and its ideology the *Pancasila*.

Another rationale behind this campaign was to clear the ground for a thorough restructuring of society, to replace President Sukarno and all that he stood for. As part of this campaign both the bureaucracy and the army had to be cleansed of left-leaning people in general. The removal from office of Sukarno loyalists took place throughout 1966. The army, the bureaucracy, the political parties and the parliament were gradually brought under Suharto’s control.

The US, and to a lesser extent Australia and the UK, actively helped Suharto’s troops to achieve their aims. While the world watched, hundreds of thousands of innocent women and men were brutally slaughtered or detained in inhumane conditions.

Notes

- 1 Fieldnotes from a visit to Kupang, and discussion with members of *Jaringan Perempuan Indonesia Timur untuk Studi Perempuan, Agama, dan Budaya* (JPIT – Eastern Indonesia Women’s Network for the Study of Women, Religion and Culture), 26 July 2015.
- 2 *Dwikora*, from *Dwi Komando Rakyat* – Double Command of the People, namely crush Malaysia and defend the revolution.
- 3 See Mokoginta (1966: 152). See also Melvin (2017: 491). Suharto, of course, was chiefly responsible for this subversion, when he himself refused to relinquish the powers he had seized during the day. See Melvin (2018) for an analysis of this chain of events.
- 4 See Chapter 5 for further analysis of the rural unrest.
- 5 *Baperki* (*Badan Permusyawaratan Kewarganegaraan Indonesia* – Deliberative Association for Indonesian Citizenship) was a left-leaning association of Chinese Indonesians. TK (Taman Kanak – kindergarten) *Melati* were set up all over the country by members of *Gerwani*.
- 6 See Hamid Baidlowi (1993: 83) on *TK Melati Aisyah*. See also *Majalah jejak islam* no 2 des 2015 https://issuu.com/.../docs/majalah_jejak_islam_no2_des_2015. Muslimaat NU: Dedikasi untuk Negeri. See Purdey (2006) and Siauw (2018) on *Baperki* schools.
- 7 *Syarikat* was an organization set up from within the NU in 2000 that sought reconciliation between the NU and the victims of the 1965 massacres. See Chapter 8 for more details. See also the interview with *Syarikat* chair Imam Aziz (Chloe Oliver, *Inside Indonesia*, 77, Jan. –March 2004). See Chapter 6 for further details about the ‘Fragrant Flower’ dance.
- 8 Pour reminds his readers that the memoirs of Sarwo Edhie who was known to keep detailed notes of his activities, mysteriously disappeared without trace when they were about to be published (2010: 273).
- 9 The historian Asvi Adam wonders when the archives of *Kopkamtib* will be opened so this number can be checked. See http://nasional.kompas.com/read/2016/07/21/14223871/asvi.Kopkamtib.pernah.sebut.jumlah.korban.tragedi.1965.mencapai.1.ju.a?utm_campaign=related&utm_medium=bp-kompas&utm_source=news&.
- 10 The PKI was very strong in the region of Banyuwangi. One of the very few instances where PKI members defended themselves took place in that region. On

- 18 October 1965 PP members in Cemetuk tried to attack a PKI village but they were driven back. On their way home their cars were stopped by PKI members, and a fight ensued in which 62 PP members were said to be killed, and their vehicles set on fire. Interestingly in 1994 a monument was built by the inhabitants of the village. It is officially called Pancasila Jaya, and commemorates the deaths of 62 members of the PP. As is the case with the Pancasila Monument in Jakarta, it features a huge Garuda bird. A mural has been placed on the lower part, which shows male PKI members (probably *Pemuda Rakyat*), killing their adversaries. On the mural the words *Lubang Buaya* but Cemetuk. A neighbour, however, recalls that the people in the neighbourhood tell a story in which it is not PP members who are killed, but *Ansor* members, and not by male PKI members but by members of *Gerwani*. This indicates both a sense of victimization of Muslim groups, with a substitution of a non-religious entity for a Muslim entity, and the persistence of the myth that the generals were killed by members of *Gerwani*, even in this far-away village in a fight in which women did not feature at all. See the blog by Mohammad Ulil Abad (7 May 2016). Available at <https://banyuwangi.merdeka.com/pa-riwisata/wisata-sejarah-di-monumen-lubang-buaya-cemetuk-banyuwangi-1605079.html> (accessed 10 January 2018).
- 11 See also Hammer (2013).
 - 12 In the original interviews held by members of the Komnas HAM team several of these stories surfaced. The interviews are not publicly available but have since been leaked. Saskia Wieringa was able to read them.
 - 13 See <https://medium.com/ingat-65/bukit-sempanan-dan-sejarah-nya-yang-merah-4db0ed97d50> (accessed 11 January 2018).
 - 14 *Gestok* (*Gerakan Satu Oktober*) is the name Sukarno gave to the G30S.
 - 15 *Sarekat Buruh Perkebunan Republik Indonesia* (*Sarbupri* – Union of Plantation Workers of the Republic of Indonesia).
 - 16 Nomor instr-007/JA/11/1973.
 - 17 There is also a 2016 documentary film about Hersri's experiences, *Pulau Buru, Tanah Air Beta* (directed by Rahung Nasution).
 - 18 Goenito (2016).
 - 19 Indonesia ratified this Convention on 12 June 1950.
 - 20 Field notes, 21 January 2017.
 - 21 Resolution 47/133 of 18 December 1992. The International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance was adopted by the UN General Assembly in December 2006. It has not yet been ratified by Indonesia.
 - 22 Kolimon *et al.* (2015) also mention various cases of women (and men) having their heads shaved, which was considered very humiliating, due to the association with sexual debauchery.
 - 23 These were analysed by Saskia Wieringa, based on the original interviews.
 - 24 See Hill (2014) for the background to these tests. See also Saptari (2029 forthcoming).
 - 25 Prosecution Brief, para. 154, as cited in Gittings and Jarvis (2017: 86).
 - 26 See for a further discussion of the process Jarvis and Wieringa (forthcoming).
 - 27 More than 130 nations have ratified the Genocide Convention and over 70 nations have made provisions for the punishment of genocide in domestic criminal law. The text of Article II of the Genocide Convention was included as a crime in Article 6 of the 1998 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court.
 - 28 On Dutch diplomatic relations with Indonesia around 1965 see Van Mourik (2016).
 - 29 Telegram 1628 from the US Embassy in Jakarta to the US Department of State, 2 December 1965. Source: Foreign Relations of the United States Vol. 26, Indonesia, Malaysia-Singapore; Philippines, released in 2001. Washington: Government

- Printing Office, pp. 378–80. It concerned the sum of 50 million rupiah, about US \$200,000. This was authorized by Ambassador Green, as Simpson testified during the 2015 hearings of the IPT 1965 Tribunal. *Komando Aksi Pengganyangan Gestapu* (KAP-Gestapu – Action Command to Crush the Gestapu).
- 30 William Colby, Chief of the East Asia Division of the CIA, established the so-called Phoenix Programme, carrying out anti-communist actions in Vietnam and the Philippines.
 - 31 Pauker was also involved in preparing a scenario for the CIA to force the pro-communist elements in the army to stage an abortive coup before the PKI was fully organized. Ong suggests that Syam also belonged to this group (2015: 267–67). See also Budiawan (2006). Pauker himself also stated his views on the PKI and Indonesian politics (1968, 1969).
 - 32 Trained by Pauker in Fort Leavenworth, 1959.
 - 33 He was a prominent PSI leader and involved in the PRRI-Permesta (Djojohadikusumo 2014).
 - 34 See also Scott (1985), citing Kathy Kadane, who had interviewed William Colby, who said that he asked for the list of names to be compiled to fill a gap in intelligence.
 - 35 See Tempo (2015), special issue.
 - 36 FO 1101/5 Reddaway to Stanley 24 March 1966.
 - 37 FO 1101/5 Reddaway to Gilchrist 8 February 1966.
 - 38 1011.66 DH 1015/80.
 - 39 Document Telegram of the Embassy of Jakarta, action No. 183, dated 24 November 1965.
 - 40 FM 1016/63/G.
 - 41 Document A-408, dated 21 December 1965, and classified as secret.
 - 42 See also Ransom (1975), who called Indonesia ‘Ford country’.
 - 43 Scott (1985), citing the CIA, *Indonesia 1965: The Coup that Backfired*, US Government, Washington, 1968. p. 71.
 - 44 According to an anonymous source, the lawyer Sucipto concocted the lies about the dancing and castrating girls.
 - 45 For an overview of the media attention on the IPT 1965 until the end of 2015, see Katjasungkana and Wieringa (2016a). Most of the hearings can be found on YouTube.
 - 46 CNN Indonesia (11 November 1965). Available at www.cnnindonesia.com/nasional/201511111518-20-91088/jusuf-kalkla-soal-sidang-rakyat-1965-itu-pengadilan-semu (accessed 15 August 2016).
 - 47 www.cnnindonesia.com/nasional/20160722151219-20-14378/kejaksaan-tolak-rekomen-dassi-keadilan-rakyat-1965 (accessed 15 August 2016). Prasetyo repeatedly returned the report of the Komnas HAM team and refused to engage in an official investigation.
 - 48 <https://nasional.tempo.co/read/789398/tragedi-1965-disebut-genosida.mahmud-md.itu-hanya-dagelan> (accessed 21 July 2016).

4 The nation betrayed

History revisited

Introduction

The 1965 genocide is the culmination of a cycle of violence. When did this cycle start and how? Revenge? Could the 1965 genocide be attributed to revenge? If so, when did the cycle of violence start and how was it spurred on? In this chapter we discuss some major historical moments that saw the main actors in the Indonesian drama come together and part again violently. Interpretations of these episodes vary widely. It is not our purpose here to investigate which version contains the sole truth. Instead we examine the historiography of the events discussed. Who claims which truth? Are alternative readings of history possible? We also review some events in Indonesian history that receive relatively little attention. History consists not only of what is remembered, but also of what has been forgotten or downplayed. In this way we reveal parts of the rhizomatic configuration of stigmatization of the PKI. Episodes examined are the anti-colonial 1926 uprisings, the 1948 Madiun affair, the DI movement and the TII, as well as the regional uprisings of the *Pemerintah Revolusioner Republik Indonesia* (PRRI – Revolutionary Government of the Indonesian Republic) and *Permesta*.

The main narrative of those who defend the Indonesian genocide is that the PKI had ‘always already’ been a bunch of irreligious traitors to the nation, victimizing ‘innocent’ Muslims, who could only be saved by the heroic army. The sociologist Iwan Gardono advances the view that considering the death count of the regimes of Stalin and Mao, it is a good thing that the ‘PKI *kalah dan salah*’ (lost and is proven wrong). The army carried out a pre-emptive strike, for the PKI had the potential, as demonstrated by the 1948 Madiun incident, to establish another Nazi or Pol Pot regime. Furthermore, the massacres demoralized those dangerous three million PKI members, just as the atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki prevented more casualties on the side of the Allies in the Second World War.¹ Gardono’s views are very influential; they are frequently repeated by conservative army generals and used as the basis of training material for the army (see Chapter 9).

The NU leadership goes even further back in time. NU leader Mun’im (2013), writing about the relationship (*benturan* – clash) between the NU and

the PKI, presents the 1926 uprising as a PKI-originated plot which seduced religious leaders into participating in the rebellion, after which they were arrested and religious schools and mosques destroyed by the Dutch colonists. On pages 96–97 of the book is a picture of an *arit* (sickle), onto which dates have been inscribed, in chronological order, showing the timeline of the PKI's *pemberontakan* (revolt). The purpose of the publication is clear: after this long history, starting in 1920 when the PKI was born (after it had first 'hidden its identity' in the red *Sarekat Islam*, SI – Islamic League), was not the NU justified in helping to exterminate the party? The last dot on the tip of the sickle, representing the year 2000, indignantly mentions that the party accused both the NU and the army of being butchers (*penjagal*), and that it even demands an apology!

The first 'modern' anti-colonial uprising in 1926/67

Were the communists parasites on the body of the SI, as the conservative faction within the NU seems to think (Mun'im 2013)? Did they seduce unsuspecting Muslims into joining an uprising in 1926 which caused destruction in Muslim circles? To assess the situation at the time we need to understand the nationalist awakening in the Dutch East Indies (Blumberger [1931] 1987; Kahin 1952). In 1911 Muslim batik traders in Surakarta founded the *Sarekat Dagang Islam* (Muslim Trade Association), which became the Muslim association, the SI, in the following year.² The SI grew rapidly and soon attracted a mass following under the dynamic leadership of Tjokroaminoto. It agitated against Chinese batik traders, the feudal *priyayi*, or elite class of officials and Dutch colonizers (Korver 1982). The appeal of local SI groups was particularly strong in rural areas (Kartodirdjo 1973). Tram and railway workers began to organize themselves (Tichelman 1985).

Around the same time a modernist Muslim reform movement grew in West Sumatra, spearheaded by scholars who had returned from Arabia. Later, this movement spread to West Java and Yogyakarta, where in 1912 Kyai Haji Ahmad Dahlan set up the modernist Muslim mass movement *Muhammadiyah*. In 1914 the *Indische Sociaal Democratische Vereeniging* (ISDV – Indian Social Democratic Association) was founded by the Dutch socialist Sneevliet (Petrus Blumberger [1931] 1987: 106–29).³ From the beginning this movement, which initially almost entirely comprised Dutch people, tried to establish links with the SI, because the organization had a large mass base (Tichelman 1985). The brilliant young railway worker Semaoen served as a link between the two organizations, stimulating Tjokroaminoto to condemn 'sinful capitalism' at the 1917 SI congress. The rapidly expanding SI soon became divided into a communist wing, inspired by the 1917 Russian revolution, and a wing leaning towards the pan Islamic movement, which was headed by Haji Agus Salim. In 1918 and 1919 the colonial government cracked down on the ISDV, and Sneevliet and other Dutch radical activists were exiled.

In 1920 the small ISDV, which was now led by Indonesians, changed its name to *Perserikatan Komunis di Hindia* (PKH – Communist Association in the Indies), with Semaoen as Chair. In 1924 it became the PKI (Kahin 1952; McVey 1965). Rather than stressing Marxism-Leninism, the party emphasized its roots in earlier rebellious moments, such as the Java War, with its strongly millenarian character (1825–30). At the 1921 SI congress a motion on ‘party discipline’ was adopted which forced members to choose between the PKH and the SI. The SI began to split, a process which was formalized in 1923 when the ‘red’ SI branches were called *Sarekat Rakyat* (Petrus Blumberger [1931] 1987). The ‘white’ SI was led by H. A. Salim and Abdoel Moeis in Yogya, while the ‘red SI’ was chaired by Semaoen and Alimin in Semarang. The *Sarekat Rakyat* also had a women’s wing, the *Sarekat Istri* (Wives’ Association), founded by Raden Soekaesih.⁴

In an atmosphere of increasing social unrest, marked by strikes and arrests, the PKH began to disintegrate. At the 1923 congress ‘red’ Haji Misbach stressed that Islam and Marxism had much in common. This statement was given credibility by the strong support of the PKH for religious freedom, against a colonial policy of restrictions against Islam.⁵ But while Misbach tried to find common ground, hardliners such as Ali Archam pushed for the Leninist idea of Marxist leaders as a vanguard of workers and peasants, and emphasized that the communists should lead all proletarian struggles. In 1924 the *Sarekat Rakyat* dissolved. Suroso considers this a major mistake, for the PKI lost its access to the proletarian masses as it could not attract poor peasants on its own (2013: 142–53).

In 1921 Tan Malaka became chair of the PKH, but he was soon arrested by the Dutch. In 1923–24, both Haji Misbach and Ali Archam were arrested, due to rural unrest they were associated with. In the face of a Dutch crack-down on communist activity the party decided not to steadily organize a cadre structure but to go all out for revolutionary activity (McVey 1965). At the June 1924 congress of what was now called the PKI, the proposal was made to strive towards a government of Soviet Indonesia, inviting more repression from the colonial power. In 1925 Haji Misbach was exiled to Manokwari, Irian (where he died in 1926). Many leftist leaders were arrested. During this period of increasing tension in December 1925 a conference was held in Prambanan, where the decision to organize mass strikes and armed action was taken. A national revolt was called for (Latif [1965] 2014).

But the actions that followed were few and were quickly dispersed. In November 1926 a rebellion broke out in Banten, Batavia and Priangan, which was swiftly crushed. In January 1927 a revolt erupted in Sumatra, which lasted for less than a week. The consequences were severe. The PKI was destroyed and would not be resurrected for almost 20 years. Many leaders were shot or hanged, thousands were arrested, and 1,308 loyalists were sent to the notorious concentration camp in Digul, Irian (Benda and McVey 1960; Kahin 1952; McVey 1965; Ricklefs 1993).

The above is a condensed account of the first stirrings of socio-political consciousness of both Muslims and socialist-minded people. To different degrees the enemies are identified as the colonial state, capitalist exploitation and the feudal *priyayi* class. This first planned anti-colonial rebellion proved that colonial power was assailable. Although it failed, it inspired later nationalist groups.

The second reason why this episode was important in Indonesian history is that in many ways Muslim and communist interests were found to converge. Muslim communists and communist Muslims could collaborate, on the basis of affinity. They found that they had the same enemy, colonial power holders, who were classified as *kafir* (infidels) by the Muslims and as imperialists by the communists.⁶ A number of PKI leaders were pious Muslims. The two regions where the first nationalist uprisings took place were Muslim bastions, Banten and West Sumatra. Haji Mohammad Misbach in Surakarta and Haji Achmad Chatib in Banten were convinced there were no fundamental contradictions between Islam and communism (see also Budiawan 2004). In Banten a number of *ulama* (religious leaders) were actively spreading propaganda for the PKI. To them the PKI was their natural ally against the *kafir* Dutch (Williams 1990). Owing to the influence of activist *hadji*, both in Banten and Sumatra, communism was Islamized (for Sumatra see Kahn 1984). According to Hadji Misbach, a true Muslim takes social inequality seriously and should not exploit fellow Muslims (Budiawan 2004: 94; see also McVey 1965). This brought Hadji Misbach into conflict with *Muhammadiyah* followers, whom he called Muslim *lamisan* (Islam *semu* – pseudomuslims) (Budiawan 2004: 101), because they engaged in non-Muslim practices such as usury. According to Misbach, the true Islam needs a revolutionary spirit in order to fight against capitalist exploitation, and as the communists were specialists in that, it was very profitable for Muslims to associate themselves with the PKI.

There were also strong disagreements between these two wings of the nationalist movement. The SI remained wary of communism after the uprisings, while the *Muhammadiyah* had always refused to accept communism. They believed, in the words of the prominent Muslim scholar and politician Deliar Noer, that communism ‘sees religion as its enemy and denies the existence of God. It is their aim to destroy family relations, ignore all regulations on marriage and reject private property ... all this is not in line with Islam’ (quoted in Budiawan 2004: 105). On the other hand, communist hardliners arrogantly saw themselves as the vanguard who were destined to lead the Muslim masses.

After 1926/27 the PKI went underground; the *Muhammadiyah* could expand its membership uncontested. In 1945 *Muhammadiyah* leaders set up *Masyumi* as an anti-communist party, which strove to turn Indonesia into an Islamic state. The PKI would return to mainstream politics only during the war of independence.

The 1948 Madiun affair

Two days after the surrender of Japan, on 17 August 1945, Sukarno and Hatta declared independence. A power vacuum followed, in which revolutionary youth took over institutions and attacked those they considered spies, mainly Eurasian, Menadonese, Moluccans and Chinese. This was a period of much cruelty and bloodshed, called *Bersiap* (Cribb 2001; Frederick 2012). The Dutch announced their intention to regain control but it took a while before their army arrived.

Sukarno and Hatta tried to achieve the independence of the large archipelago through diplomatic means. Officers trained by the Dutch or the Japanese set up regular fighting units. The irregular units, *lasykar*, also proliferated; they were based on regional, ideological or religious ties. In the five years it took until Sukarno and Hatta achieved full control over the *Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia* (NKRI – Unitary State of Indonesia) several strong tensions surfaced. Here we focus on the conflict between those who wanted to establish a regular disciplined army (Hatta, General Nasution and General Sudirman) and the local *lasykar* which had established a number of military and civil administrations in their regions. Ideologically there were strong disagreements about what the character of the new state should be – secular, national, Islamic or communist? Social tensions also surfaced; in several regions the *lasykar* had destroyed the local elites and they were not keen to see them resurface in support of the republic, or to see leaders from other islands, especially Java, take control.⁷ Politically there were many who resented the diplomatic path which Sukarno and Hatta had taken and who preferred to fight it out.

The major socialist militia was formed by the socialist youth organization *Pemuda Sosialis Indonesia* (*Pesindo* – Indonesian Socialist Youth), established by Amir Syarifuddin and Sumarsono in November 1945, as a merger of several youth organizations. When Amir Syarifuddin became Minister of Defence in October 1945, joining a cabinet under his then ally Sutan Syahrir, *Pesindo* was given a prominent role to play in the wide range of armed groups that fought the Dutch colonial forces. They gave political training to the more regular army units. Their influence was resented by Hatta, and when he assumed power in 1948 he singled them out for demobilization (Soeliar 2016).

In January 1948 the Renville Agreement was concluded. The Dutch, who by that time had grudgingly accepted the existence of the republic, tried to establish a federal construction, in which they would maintain control over large territories. The Republican government had to withdraw to Yogyakarta. The Agreement sparked wide unrest, as it was considered unfavourable to the Republican side. The strong *Siliwangi* Division, which belonged to West Java, had to withdraw to Republican territory in Central Java (Kahin 1952; Reid 1973). Prime Minister (since July 1947) Amir Syarifuddin was blamed for the Agreement and resigned. A more right-wing cabinet was formed under Hatta and *Masyumi* leader Natsir. The left wing (*Sayap Kiri*) that Amir Syarifuddin

had built up lost its political space and the left-wing military that Syarifuddin had formed, the *Tentara Masyarakat* (People's Army), lost support (Kahin 1952; Kreutzer 1984; Sugiyama 2011). On 26 February 1948 the left-wing *Front Demokrasi Rakyat* (FDR) was formed outside of the government.

Both the government and the FDR engaged in propaganda. The FDR distributed land and clothes among the peasants in Central Java, while the government tried to convince the population of the dangers that the FDR posed via radio and *wayang* (shadow puppet plays). They also handed out pamphlets, for instance after Musso's return from the Soviet Union, portraying the new FDR leaders as foreign agents (Poeze 2012: 291).

The official narrative of the New Order ignores the PKI's active anti-fascist work during the Japanese period, its involvement in the Proclamation of Independence, and the early years of the war of independence (Sekretariat Negara Republik Indonesia 1994). Although the PKI was still illegal until the beginning of independence, it operated via various front organizations (Reid 1973: 83). A year after Musso's return to Indonesia in 1935, the Central Committee of the illegal PKI was re-established, with an anti-fascist agenda. Towards the end of 1944 Aidit, Lukman and others founded a strongly anti-fascist pro-independence organization called *Gerakan Indonesia Merdeka* (*Gerindom*). The PKI ordered all its cadres to resist the Japanese (Latif [1965] 2014: 7–10; Suroso 2013). Anti-Japanese sentiments were so strong that some PKI cadres, such as Amir Syarifuddin, chose to collaborate with the Allies, as noted by the virulently anti-PKI CIA consultant Pauker (1969).⁸ Wikana, a leading member of the still illegal PKI, was involved in the abduction of Sukarno and Bung Hatta to Rengasdengklok to read the Proclamation. Armed PKI groups, led by Sumarsono who would play a critical role in the Madiun affair, were active in the violent clashes that took place in Surabaya on 10 November 1945 (Suroso 2013: 11).

When Hatta became the new Prime Minister in January 1948 the young republic faced many challenges. For Muslims, the inclusion of the so-called Jakarta Charter in the Constitution was important. Secular nationalists and socialist groups opposed it.⁹ Relations between the FDR and Hatta's cabinet deteriorated in 1948. FDR member associations organized strikes in places such as Solo and Delanggu (Sugiyama 2011). Other tensions arose when Hatta rejected the invitation to establish consular ties with Russia. Instead he opted to accept US assistance, because he felt that the US would be a better ally in the war against the Dutch.¹⁰ In return, he promised to help to establish an international anti-communist front (Kahin 1952; Kreutzer 1981).

On 10 August 1948 Musso returned from exile in Moscow, fully intending to 'put some order' into the national revolution, as he told his old friend Sukarno (2012: 29). His first task was to unite the various scattered leftist groups. By 1 September all the socialist-oriented groups (apart from Syahrir's PSI) had agreed to merge together, and Musso assumed the leadership of the PKI, which included the FDR. Amir Syarifuddin and the PKI leaders of the 1920s accepted the authority of Musso who pursued a Stalinist line, known as

the New Road (*Jalan Baru*). Only Tan Malaka followed his own path and led his own militia, the *Barisan Banteng*. Musso promptly labelled him a Trotskyist. Amir, Musso and other leaders embarked on a tour of the countryside during which they rallied support for the new policy (Poeze 2012: 143–51). They meant to form a national, anti-imperialist cabinet which was to be led by the workers, with the PKI as their vanguard.

Hatta, faced by economic problems and a bloated army, for which there were not enough weapons and ammunition, embarked on a programme of army reorganization and rationalization (which included some 400,000 volunteers) and mass demobilization (Kahin 1952), called the Re-Ra policy. Resistance came from both Muslim and communist militias or army units.¹¹ The FDR strongly opposed the demobilization of the TNI *Masyarakat* (Kreutzer 1984; Kreutzer 2016: 105). The left-leaning *Senopati* Division in Surakarta was relegated to the role of a reserve division, under the strong and professional *Siliwangi* Division. Half of the 5,000 members of *Senopati* were affiliated with *Pesindo*. Things came to a head when the *Senopati* Division, led by Colonel Sutarto, defied orders to ‘rationalize’ themselves (Kreutzer 1984). Colonel Sutarto was murdered on 2 July 1948, and several officers belonging to his Division were abducted and disappeared. *Pesindo* groups from East Java marched into Solo and clashes occurred between them and the *Siliwangi* Division, assisted by the *Barisan Banteng*.¹² On 8–9 September 1948 and again on 16 September the headquarters of *Pesindo* in Surakarta were attacked, leaving it destroyed, while many *Pesindo* members were killed. The survivors withdrew to Madiun which was the sole remaining FDR base. Afraid that *Siliwangi* troops would disarm the FDR troops, with reports coming in of clashes between *Siliwangi* units and the military police against striking workers, the FDR in Madiun decided to strike first. In the early morning of 18 September 1948 it took over government institutions. This was quickly accomplished without much bloodshed.¹³ Kahin (1952) estimated that two people were killed and four wounded. Musso and Syarifuddin rushed to Madiun. They declared a National Front government of Madiun, which was followed by other regions in East and Central Java.

In an angry speech on 19 September 1948 President Sukarno called upon the people to choose between him and Musso’s Soviet-style government. Musso reacted furiously that same evening and announced that he would fight to the finish. On 20 September *Masyumi* Chair Sukiman chimed in and called on the radio for a *perang sabil* (holy war) against the PKI (Aidit 1954). Not all PKI leaders agreed with Musso. The following day they attempted a reconciliation with the official Indonesian Government. Sumarsono, the military leader, denied that a coup had taken place in Madiun and Amir Syarifuddin stated that the leaders had accepted the Indonesian Constitution, the Indonesian flag and the national anthem (Kreutzer 1984; Kahin 1952).

Far from trying to placate the irate Sukarno, Musso made it clear that in his vision the Indonesian revolution was not a national nor a socialist revolution but that in this phase progressive bourgeois people still had a role to

play. However, he disparaged the national bourgeois leaders, calling Sukarno the Indonesian Chiang Kai-shek. He berated Sukarno and Hatta for having collaborated with the Japanese.¹⁴ He used the slogan ‘destroy (*basmilah*) Sukarno, Hatta and their slaves’ (Poeze 2012: 190–02). He wanted to annihilate the feudal bourgeoisie, turn the army into a people’s army, and to have all means of production controlled by the workers. The role the PKI carved out for itself was that of vanguard.

This belligerent language was the signal for pro-republican forces to support Hatta’s confrontational policy. *Siliwangi* troops were sent into Madiun and the FDR forces were quickly defeated. Retreating FDR forces killed probably around 100 *Masyumi* leaders; in retaliation many FDR combatants were killed. Some 35,000 leftist people were arrested (Rahardjo 2002: 118). Ricklefs estimates that a total of 8,000 people were killed, most of them communists (Anderson 1976; Ricklefs 1993; see also Vickers 2005). Soeliar concludes that after Madiun, *Pesindo* had lost its leaders, its militia and its political influence (2016: 119). The FDR/PKI leaders went on the run, but many were captured and executed extrajudicially. Musso was killed on 31 October. Amir Syarifuddin was executed together with a number of other FDR/PKI leaders on 19 December 1948. Tan Malaka was killed the following year. Sumarsono managed to flee.

After the FDR troops had been chased out of Madiun, the Government published horror stories about mass graves filled with the victims of communist troops, such as government officials and Muslim leaders (Poeze 2012: 288). The number of victims of communist troops was not given. The Madiun affair was discussed several times in the *Komite Nasional Indonesia Pusat* (KNIP – Central Indonesian National Committee) (Noer and Akbarsyah 2005: 212–17). Sumarsono stresses that the Minister of Justice decided on 7 December 1949 not to prosecute the PKI (2008: 220–21).

In the face of the second large-scale military attack by the Dutch in 1948 most prisoners from the Madiun affair were released. The Madiun affair was discussed again in the DPR in October 1950 and January 1951, when a request was made to produce a report in which the facts would be revealed as well as the number of victims on both sides. However, this report never materialized.

In 1953 the group *Bekas Pejuang Islam Indonesia* (Former Muslim Indonesian Fighters) issued a statement that the anniversary of the Madiun affair (18 September) should be remembered by flying the national flag at half-mast. Aidit defended the PKI case in the court of Jakarta as he was accused of slandering the good name of Vice-President Hatta. He argued that the Madiun affair was a provocation and demanded that Hatta should appear before the court to explain the red drive proposal (Suroso 2013).¹⁵ The court agreed that the PKI was not accused of treachery. Aidit was sentenced to a three-month provisional sentence with a six-month probation period, so he was never imprisoned (Poeze 2012: 323–24). His defence speech was widely publicized. Thus, it seems that the Madiun affair was closed politically and

legally within a few years of its occurrence. Yet its spectre is called up again and again, with Muslim groups and the army portraying the incident as a Soviet plot.¹⁶

Only in 1950 did the PKI manage to revive itself under the dynamic leadership of Aidit, Lukman and Nyoto. In that year the cultural association *Lekra* was also set up, chaired by Aidit, Lukman, Nyoto and Jubaar Ajud. The women's organization Gerwis was also established (Wieringa 2002) and Pesindo held its third and final congress at which it decided to change its name to *Pemuda Rakyat*. Leaders included Francisca Fanggidey, Sukatno and Iskandar Subekti. In January 1951 the Politburo of the CC PKI was established, with Aidit, Lukman, Nyoto and Alimin in charge.

Conflicting views on the Madiun affair.

Muslim groups portray the affair as treachery by the PKI which wanted to establish a Soviet-style government. The title of the chapter in the book *Benturan* (*Clash*, namely between the NU and the PKI from 1948–65) which deals with the Madiun affair (Mun'im 2013) indicates the main concern of the NU: 'the massacre of *kyai* in Madiun 1948'. NU leader Mun'im posits that during the Japanese period Amir Syarifuddin collaborated with the Dutch and accepted funds and ammunition, which lasted until the revolt in Madiun (ibid.: 36). In this way the one-time Indonesian Prime Minister is labelled as an 'always already' traitor of the national cause. There is no mention in *Benturan* about PKI resistance against the Dutch following the Japanese surrender, nor of Amir Syarifuddin's consistent anti-fascist position. Hatta's policies of rationalization of the army and his alliance with the US are not discussed either. Instead, the author stresses the danger presented by the PKI, especially after the return of Musso. A number of incidents are listed (both before and after his return) in which some *kyai* were apparently killed (there is no mention of possible PKI victims). Strikingly the inter-army clashes in Solo and the abduction and murder of leftist officers are ignored. The PKI is associated with 'terror', even with ordinary criminal activities such as robbery, while the Muslim militias are portrayed as 'protectors' of society (ibid.: 37–44).

Mun'im ignores the problems associated with the Re-Ra policy and states that Sumarsono and his troops attacked when they believed the situation to be 'ripe'. They formed a National Front government whose mandate was to establish a 'Madiun Soviet State.' This move was accompanied by a 'slaughter' (*pembantaian*) both in Madiun and the surrounding areas (2013: 44–46). Sukarno's initial angry speech is not mentioned, but Musso's fiery reaction is quoted at length. Musso called Sukarno a 'Romusha dealer and quisling [traitor] ... who capitulated to the Dutch' (ibid.: 47). This speech is presented as 'proof' of PKI terror. Only then is Sukarno's prior speech mentioned, so that it seems that Sukarno reacts to Musso instead of the other way round. *Benturan* records the assistance given to the army by the Muslim *lasykar* (irregular armed units) *Hizbullah* and *Sabilillah* (ibid.: 49) and relates stories

about *kyai* who were arrested and killed and *pesantren* destroyed (ibid.: 52–59). There is no mention of the disunity within the FDR leadership and the attempts at reconciliation by Amir Syarifuddin, Sumarsono and others. The book concludes that thousands of innocent *ulama*, *santri*, officials and ordinary Muslim became victims (ibid.: 66) but gives no sources for or breakdown of this number and pays no attention to the thousands of FDR members killed. The section on the Madiun affair ends with a warning that the government at the time gave amnesty to the PKI and did not ban the party. Only the leaders were captured, while the ordinary members were left alone, so ‘they could still carry out sabotage’ (ibid.: 63).

The army’s perception of the Madiun affair is presented by the authors of *Sekneg RI* (who are not named, thus suggesting that the book is hardly the work of humans but instead it reflects the one and only unassailable truth). *Sekneg* records that Amir Syarifuddin, Minister of Defence at the time, tried to control the army in 1947 by setting up the TNI *Masyarakat* (People’s Army) which was opposed by army chief Sudirman and later by Vice-President Hatta whose plan to rationalize the army incorporated efforts to control the communists. The narrative then takes a surprising turn when it deals with the clashes in Solo: ‘The disturbances by the PKI in Solo were coloured by abductions, killings and armed terror. Colonel Soetarto, the chief of Division IV/Senopati was killed because he didn’t agree with the plan for revolt of the PKI’ (1994: 21).

This interpretation of the events in Solo is not supported by scholars. To this day, the killer of Sutarto is not known, but it is very clear that he opposed the rationalization plans of Hatta and the *Siliwangi* Division which had come to Solo to implement them (Anderson 1976; Kreutzer 1984; Swift 1989). The unrest in Java prior to the Madiun affair is described by Kreutzer as ‘small skirmishes between pro-Hatta and FDR-oriented armed units’ while ‘the official army supported by ... Masyumi *lasykars* was proceeding to disarm the leftist army units and *lasykars* and resorted to kidnapping or murdering leftist officers’ (Kreutzer 1984: 16).

Sekneg RI (1994) reports that FDR/PKI troops took the initiative in Madiun on 18 September 1948 when they announced the establishment of an ‘Indonesian Soviet republic’. These are the actual words of Sukarno. At the time, the military FDR leader, Sumarsono, only said that with Madiun the victory would begin (Swift 1989).

Retired General Soetanto elaborates this army version. He puts the full blame for the Madiun affair on Musso, who returned from Moscow with instructions to form a strong class-based communist party to take the lead in the Indonesian national revolution, according to the ‘orthodox Stalinist doctrine’ he had picked up during his years in asylum (2006: 75). Soetanto, who bases his analysis on interviews with a number of officers from the *Siliwangi* Division, defends their actions in Solo and blames the FDR/PKI for organizing a ‘Wild West’ situation in the city. When that failed, the FDR and the retreating *Pesindo* units launched an attack on Madiun, a premature action

perpetrated by second-tier officers while the leaders of the PKI were still touring Java to garner support for their New Road policy. When Musso assumed the leadership on his return to Madiun, it became a full-scale rebellion, which troops loyal to the government were soon able to suppress. This more sophisticated army version of the Madiun affair ignores any civilian casualties which feature so prominently in today's social media account of the affair. Both the Muslim side and the army concluded that there was unfinished business after the 1948 Madiun affair, thus preparing the ground for a more thorough 'solution' later on.

Pro-PKI authors refer to imperialist provocation as the root cause of the Madiun affair. In his analysis of the overthrow of President Sukarno, Suroso (2013) devotes several chapters to the origins of the Cold War and Truman's policy of containment. This is in line with the subtitle of his analysis of the Madiun affair: 'the realization of the Truman Doctrine in Asia' (ibid. 2010). He views the Madiun affair as the result of provocations by the Hatta Government (ibid. 2013: 15). Following Aidit's (1958) analysis of the events in Solo, he dwells on the abduction and killing of Colonel Sutarto.¹⁷ But he ignores the earlier skirmishes in which, according to Mun'im, several Muslim Islamic leaders were killed.

Aidit maintains that the abductions and killings in Solo had created a tense atmosphere in Madiun. He defends the decision to appoint FDR member Supardi as acting resident, because the other power holders were either absent, ill or inactive. This was reported to the cabinet in Yogyakarta, he stresses, and instructions were awaited, so this step could not be seen as a revolt. Yet the Hatta Government judged it to be a coup and 'used Sukarno's mouth' to pronounce a speech in which these troublemakers were strongly denounced (Aidit 1958: 10–12). Pro-PKI authors such as Sumarsono (2008) suggest that the Madiun affair was driven by internal military tensions, involving troops which resisted Hatta's rationalization plan, in which the leftist military units in particular would be disbanded. Sumarsono denies that the FDR/PKI were engaged in a revolt, asserting there was no proof that the idea was to make Musso President and Amir Syarifuddin Prime Minister. Had not Syarifuddin declared that they respected the Constitution, the Indonesian flag and the national anthem?

He discloses that Lieutenant Colonel Suharto was sent from Yogyakarta by Army Chief Sudirman to inspect the situation in Madiun and that he did not see any Soviet flags that were rumoured to be flying. On his tour through Madiun he found that there had been only five victims, not the streams of blood as Hatta had propagated. He even made a radio statement (*Gelora Pemuda*) to that effect (2008: 51–53). Together with Sumarsono he wrote a report for Sudisman (Sumarsono 2008). But that report never reached the TNI chief. It stated that everything was quite normal in the city. When Suharto returned to Yogyakarta, he carried letters from Musso and possibly Sumarsono asking for the confrontation to be brought to an end and to unite

against the Dutch.¹⁸ This is why Aidit later spoke of ‘the Madiun affair’ as a ‘spectre’ (Rahardjo 2002: 79–90).

In summary, the Muslim side as represented by Mun'im ignores the larger political picture and sees itself as the major victim. The army side in this New Order version puts itself squarely behind the Hatta cabinet. Both sides blame only the FDR/PKI for the unrest. They ignore the split in the FDR between Musso and the likes of Amir Syarifuddin who did not want a confrontation with the government. The FDR/PKI lost not only militarily but also politically, and unilaterally blamed Hatta, who chose to implement the red drive proposal of the US. Writers sympathetic to the position of the FDR/PKI ignore the anger of Sukarno and the tactless role of Musso. Yet the latter had been absent from Indonesia for decades, had not gone through the hard years of the Japanese occupation and the first years of independence, arrived straight from Moscow and embraced his friend Sukarno to tell him that he, Musso, had come to put things in order.¹⁹ Sukarno was immensely popular, so when Musso provocatively demanded (in response to Sukarno's call) that the Indonesian people choose between him and Sukarno, the PKI leader grossly miscalculated his chances. Neither Suroso nor Aidit reflected on the disastrous effects of the inflammatory speeches of Musso.

The 1948 Madiun affair was a traumatic event. The *sayap kiri* had been dealt a decisive blow, the FDR/PKI's relations with the Muslim bloc seemed irreparably broken and the anti-communist generals such as Nasution, head of the victorious *Siliwangi* Division, had come out on top (Anderson 1976). The framing of the PKI as ‘always already’ treacherous became cemented from that period onwards.

Horror stories about what the FDR/KPI would have done at that time continue to appear in Muslim-controlled media. In 2016, for instance, the daily newspaper *Republika* carried a story about a survivor of the ‘massacre’ of the PKI in 1948, Kyai Haji Khoirun, which bore all the rhetorical elements of the 1965 Lubang Buaya slander. The *kyai* resides in the area of Banyuwangi (at the eastern tip of Java) and had witnessed that 43 NU members had been ‘poisoned, massacred and mutilated’. He and his friends had been tortured and thrown in a hole (*lubang*) 12 metres deep which the PKI had already dug. He acknowledged that he himself had killed nine women members of the PKI, who had come to his house pretending that they were pregnant and members of the women's department of the NU. The good *kyai* allowed them to stay, and *lho!* One day a terrible odour emanated from the well. The women had thrown poison in the well! So Khoirun killed those cruel women immediately.²⁰

Darul Islam and the Tentara Islam Indonesia

The TNI *Masyarakat* was not the only *lasykar* affected by the rationalization drive, nor was the Madiun affair the first confrontation with the Sukarno-Hatta Government. The *Darul Islam* (DI – House of Islam) movement in

West Java started earlier, lasted much longer and most likely had a much higher death toll. Van Dijk (1981), in his comprehensive study of the movement, argues that the two uprisings had the same origins, the rationalization of the army, and opposition to the Renville Agreement. Yet the DI and its armed wing, the *Tentara Islam Indonesia* (TII – Indonesian Muslim Army) are seldom referred to as traitors against the nationalist state. The hasty demobilization of guerrilla soldiers left many young men disgruntled, who were easily recruited by the TII. The DI was not one single movement but a complex mosaic of various rebel groups which were based mainly in three areas: West Java (extending to Central Java), South Sulawesi and Aceh. Although there were overlapping traits, the three movements each had their own characteristics. Due to limitations of space we only discuss the ‘original’ group, in West Java, and its charismatic and mystical leader Sekarmadji Maridjan Kartosuwiryo, usually referred to as SMK or Kartosuwiryo.

The nationalist leaders who would fight so bitterly after Independence had been close friends prior to the Japanese occupation. Both Musso and Kartosuwiryo were Sukarno’s comrades. Sekarmadji Maridjan Kartosuwiryo was a pupil of Tjokroaminoto, as Sukarno and Semaoen (PKI) had been. But their paths diverged. On 24 March 1940 Kartosuwiryo founded the so-called Suffah Institute for religious (for which read Muslim), military and political training (Tempo 2011: 32–33).²¹ This became the training centre for the *Hizbullah* and *Sabilillah* guerrilla units.²² It was destroyed by the Dutch in 1948.²³ The *Hizbullah* had already been set up in 1944, and *Sabilillah* a year later with Japanese permission.²⁴ Both *lasykar* primarily fought the Dutch, but there were also clashes with *Pesindo* groups.

On 7 November 1945 Sekarmadji Maridjan Kartosuwiryo co-founded *Masyumi*, with the goal to establish a state based on Islam. He became First Secretary. However, he fell out with that party and the government following the Renville Agreement in January 1948. He refused to pull back his *lasykar* behind the agreed demarcation line and established the DI. The Dutch de facto only controlled the cities, while Kartosuwiryo controlled the mountains. In 1948 he set up a rudimentary administrative structure and formed the *Majelis Islam* (Muslim Council) in West Java. Kartosuwiryo came to view himself as the ‘overlord of West Java’ (Van Dijk 1981: 89), demanding that all guerrilla troops should report to him. Following the Dutch attack in late 1948, the Renville Agreement was no longer valid, so the *Siliwangi* Division returned to West Java. Kartosuwiryo demanded that they join the TII (ibid.: 90–91). Should they refuse they would be seen as a ‘rebel army’. On 25 January 1949 violent clashes between *Siliwangi* and TII occurred. On 7 August 1949 Kartosuwiryo proclaimed the *Negara Islam Indonesia* (NII – Indonesian Muslim State) with its own legal system, the *Kanun Azasy*, which, however, never came into effect as the *imam* retained the highest powers (ibid.: 92–93).

As time went on Sekarmadji Maridjan Kartosuwiryo developed his mystical powers. He carried with him a magic *keris* (dagger), *Ki Dongkol*, and a sword, *Ki Rompang*, in the widely accepted belief that as long as the two were

together he could not be defeated (when he was eventually wounded, many followers deserted him because they believed that his mystical powers had left him). Mixing *tasawuf* (Sufi mysticism) with *kebatinan* (Kejawen mysticism), he prided himself on having fasted for 40 days, as had the Prophet, so that he received the *wahyu cakraningrat* (the light of royal rule), which allowed him to claim that he was a *khalifatyullah* (deputy to Allah), as well as a *ratu adil* (a just (Hindu) king) (Tempo 2011: 37–39). Kartosuwiryo was waging a holy war against the Sukarno Government, which he classified as *kafir*.

At the height of its power in 1957 the TII in West Java had about 13,000 armed men (Van Dijk 1981: 102) who controlled large areas in the Priangan and beyond, primarily Garut, Tasikmalaya and Ciamis. They attacked republican forces, and raided villages which were not loyal to them, but which supported the republic or had communist leaders, setting fire to houses and mosques. For a long time, the road between Jakarta, Bogor and Bandung was very unsafe. Vehicles were stopped and passengers robbed or killed. On the popular Puncak pass houses were frequently raided (ibid.: 103). Thousands of people were killed and hundreds of thousands became refugees. Van Dijk estimates that up until 1961 more than 1,500 people were killed annually, and tens of thousands of homes were set on fire (1981: 105). DI cruelty was notorious. Pak Dharmawan Isak, an eye witness, recalls that by 1960 in Garut DI/TII members would cut the throats of their victims, beat them to death with a hoe, strangle them with wire, or knives would be inserted into their mouths.²⁵ Tempo mentions that at the trial of Kartosuwiryo the prosecutor accused him killing 22,895 people and setting fire to 115,822 homes during the period 1953–1960 (2011: 90).

In 1955 the NII controlled an area covering large parts of West Java, Aceh, South Sulawesi and South Kalimantan under the combined leadership of Kartosuwiryo, Kahar Muzakkar and Daud Beureu'eh. Its members had different ideas about what the NII should look like. Kahar Muzakkar dreamed of a caliphate. He wanted to do away with all the remnants of feudalism, and the people should not be allowed to wear gold or silver or expensive clothes, nor eat food bought in the cities (Tempo 2011: 69). Daud Beureu'eh wanted autonomy for Aceh, while Kartosuwiryo felt he headed a state.

In the late 1950s the fighting became increasingly ugly. Kartosuwiryo engaged in an all-out war against anybody suspected of supporting the republic, declaring that nobody should be spared (Van Dijk 1981: 124–25). It took the army 13 years to defeat the TII, as several *Siliwangi* members cherished sympathies for the DI and were reluctant to fight. The DI also had a lot of popular support. When Kartosuwiryo was captured he still had about 50,000 followers (Tempo 2011: 35). The *imam* of the DI was finally defeated in *Operasi Pagar Betis*, in which villagers were used to encircle rebel areas. The campaign started in April 1962. On 4 June 1962 Kartosuwiryo was captured and sentenced to death after a three-day trial. He was executed together with four other DI members who had plotted to assassinate President Sukarno (Van Dijk 1981: 126).

The NII therefore exercised a reign of terror that the government could not control during the 1950s, ruining the economy of the regions they commanded. Arguably they wreaked more havoc, in terms of lives lost and material damage, than the short-lived and contained Madiun affair. Yet the republican army and the government felt that a peaceful compromise must be sought, promising amnesty to its leaders and fighters. They fell short of integrating them into the regular army, which many of the rebel units had hoped for. In contrast to the execution of Amir Syarifuddin, which was extrajudicial, Kartosuwiryo was given a trial. In relation to the treatment received by family members of victims of the 1965 genocide, it is interesting to note how Kartosuwiryo's family was treated. They were first held under house arrest in Bandung but received good food and medical care plus money. Later their facilities included a car with a driver (Tempo 2011: 84–86).

The defeat of the various DI groups was not the end of the idea of a DI. Since its collapse, many offshoots have sprung up. In the early 1970s President Suharto offered full amnesty to DI leaders if they would not commit any more acts of terror, which apparently they continued to engage in. They were, for example, offered seats in the *Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah* (DPRD – regional representative council) if *Golkar* won the 1971 elections (Tempo 2011: 103). At the time there was a group called *DI Fisabillah* which engaged in armed struggle. *Pesantren* were also set up with a similar ideology, such as *Pesantren Al-Zaytun* in Indramayu, which was to become the largest *pesantren* in Central Asia. Its leader, Panji Gumilang, in 1998 called himself leader of the DI (ibid.: 113–15). Another offshoot of the DI is the *Jemaah Islamiyah* which was set up in 1995, under the leadership of Abu Bakar Ba'asyir (Temby 2010). This group is associated with several terrorist acts and included the Bali bombers, Hambali, Ali Ghufron and Amrozi, among its members, who declared that Kartosuwiryo was their hero. The group sent over 2,000 cadres to Afghanistan to support the Taliban (Tempo 2011: 118–23). As the International Crisis Group noted: 'Every time the older generation seems on the verge of passing into irrelevance, a new generation of young militants, inspired by DI's history and the mystique of an Islamic state, emerges to give the movement a new lease on life' (cited in Temby 2010: 2).

PRRI-Permesta

On 1 December 1956 Vice-President Hatta, who was very popular in Sumatra and Sulawesi, resigned from the cabinet, so that the *Dwitunggal*, the unity between Sukarno and Hatta which had lasted since the proclamation of independence, was broken. In protest, a number of councils were set up in Sumatra: the *Dewan Banteng* (Banteng Council) in Central Sumatra on 20 December 1956 under the leadership of Lieutenant Colonel Ahmad Hussein; the *Dewan Gajah* (Elephant Council) in East Sumatra on 22 December 1956 under Colonel Mauluddin Simbolon; and the *Dewan Garuda* (Garuda Council) in South Sumatra on 15 January 1957 under Lieutenant Colonel Barlian.

The councils also wanted to regain control over the income from their regions. Their own trade networks were increasingly dominated by civil servants from the central government, and had been rebranded as smuggling. When in February 1957 Sukarno proposed a cabinet which included PKI members, on 8 September of that year regional leaders in Sulawesi and Sumatra came together in Palembang, where they summarized their grievances in the *Piagam Palembang* (Palembang Charter). They wanted to restore the *Dwitunggal* of Sukarno and Hatta to curb the influence of the PKI. They also demanded the prohibition of communism. As long as the PKI still played an important role in Jakarta, they refused to accept it as the seat of the government of the republic (Sinolungan 2016: 226–35). A new, parallel government, the PRRI was proclaimed on 15 February 1958 by Lieutenant Colonel Ahmad Hussein (Suroso 2013; Van Dijk 1981). Its President was Syafruddin Prawiranegara (*Masyumi*) while the brilliant economist Soemitro Djohadikoesoemo (PSI) was Minister of Trade.

The *Permesta* (*Perjuangan Semesta* – Universal Struggle) movement was declared by Colonel Ventje Sumual on 2 March 1957 in Manado, North Sulawesi. On 17 February 1958 the *Permesta* rebels joined forces with the PRRI. Government forces under General Nasution acted quickly in Sumatra and were able to subdue the PRRI forces within a short time. The army then attacked Manado in June 1958. The air force bombed the city on 22 December 1958, effectively ending the *Permesta*. However, the rebels continued their resistance, fighting a bloody guerrilla campaign against central government troops until the last remnants surrendered and were granted amnesty in 1961.

The CIA had actively supported the PRRI since February 1958 (Sinolungan 2016: 169). CIA support of the *Permesta* rebels came in the form of 15 B-26 bombers and some P-51 *Mustang* fighters which formed the insurgent air force *Angkatan Udara Revolusioner* (AUREV), large amounts of weapons and equipment, significant funds, plus some CIA agents.²⁶ The rebels conducted a series of air strikes against cities in Sulawesi and Maluku which were loyal to the central government, such as Balikpapan and Makassar. On 15 May 1958 insurgent planes bombed the marketplace of Ambon, killing large numbers of civilians who were attending Ascension Sunday services.

A series of air raids by the *Angkatan Udar Republik Indonesia* (AURI – Indonesian Air Force) on Manado destroyed most of the rebel B-26 planes. Meanwhile, a rebel B-26 bomber was shot down on 18 May 1958. The pilot, the American CIA agent Allen Pope, was captured alive, exposing the agency's deep involvement in the rebellion. His public trial in Jakarta generated considerable anti-US feelings and eroded support for the PRRI-*Permesta*. Consequently the CIA began to withdraw its support for the rebellion, having regretted giving its assistance to a group of insurgents who had established a counter-government, as this damaged its relations with Sukarno and drove him to accept arms from the Soviet Union (Conboy and Morrison 1999; Kahin and Kahin 1995). When, however, they realized that the army was

actually an anti-communist ally, they gave support to the President in this matter, and the CIA had to rebuild their relations with the army in a covert way.

In his memoirs *Permesta* leader Sinolungan sets out to prove that PRRI-*Permesta* was not a revolt. The main reason for the establishment of the *Permesta* was its anti-communist stance, he asserted, which he described as a ‘foreign ideology’ (2016: 280). Despite being a defeated leader in a resurrection that caused great loss of life and material damage, he went on to build a good career. He received a doctorate degree at IPIK Bandung, became the rector of IKIP Manado and started to draw his pension in 2008. In his book he never regretted the revolt and proudly detailed how former *Permesta* and PRRI members were very active in the crushing of the communists after Lubang Buaya. They asked to be armed to destroy the PKI. Sinolungan relates how they took part in various action groups to help to bring the Sukarno era to an end (ibid. 2016: 281).

As a result of their support for the regional uprisings, *Masyumi* and the PSI were banned. Some leaders were arrested, including PSI leader Syahrir, who had not supported the armed actions against the national government. This caused widespread resentment (Boland 1982: 103). The movement’s leaders managed to negotiate with Nasution, who they trusted, as it was widely known that he was strongly anti-communist. Far from being killed extrajudicially as was the fate of the leaders behind the Madiun Affair, they were put under house arrest in areas far from their homes. They were released after the G30S affair (Suroso 2013). How many victims the various uprisings under the banner of the PRRI-*Permesta* cost is not clear. But that this was only a phase in a dangerous cycle of violence was obvious. After their defeat the perpetrators of these crimes remained resentful, as their demands for regional autonomy and in some cases Sharia law, had not been met, for which they blamed the PKI.

Conclusion

Since the establishment of the New Order government, Indonesian history has been presented in a way in which the army emerges as the saviour of the nation, and Muslim groups are victimized by communists. Yet in the first nationalist revolt against the Dutch, Muslim and communist groups did not always operate in such an antagonistic way. The present-day representation of communist *hadji* as victims of the devious PKI is not supported by historical analysis.

During the period after the declaration of independence the 1948 Madiun affair is singled out as the major betrayal of the republic. Wertheim, an astute contemporary observer, devotes roughly the same attention to the DI movement as to the Madiun affair (Wertheim 1956). Similarly Boland and Van Dijk who wrote impressive accounts of the revolts in that period do not pay special attention to the Madiun affair. It was one event among many in which

a particular group tried to influence the republican government but refused to follow the orders of that government.²⁷ It was not the bloodiest, longest-lasting or most dangerous rebellion. That was perpetrated by the DI movement.

The Madiun affair must be analysed in the context of the complex conditions of the time. Various tensions were surfacing: on the nature of the state; deep resentment about the rationalization policy of Hatta and Nasution; regional unrest caused by the messy demobilization process of the hundreds of thousands of *lasykar* members; as well as political and economic strains between the central government and the outer islands. To different intensities the above-mentioned issues played a role both in the Madiun affair, the various regional rebellions including the DI movement, and in the PRRI and *Permesta* uprisings.

During the four years of the war of independence and up until the end of the 1950s, there was enormous bloodshed and cruelty on many sides within Indonesian. The *Bersiap* period stands out for the brutality with which tens of thousands of civilians were murdered. FDR units attacked mosques and religious leaders; DI groups fought with the republican army and raided and murdered communists and pro-republican Muslims. PRRI and *Permesta* troops armed by the CIA murdered communists, after which they suffered when the republican army defeated them.

How can the cycle of violence and revenge be broken. The tensions mentioned above still play a role in Indonesian society. We argue that instead of focusing on one incident in that period, all rebellions or uprisings are investigated to deepen our understanding of the origins of critical issues such as the role of the army, secular-religious clashes, and regional autonomy.

Two topics are striking. From the outset, the FDR in Madiun was attacked vehemently. Sukarno himself called for the group to be destroyed. There was no space for negotiation, nor was an amnesty offered. The FDR leaders were killed while they were fleeing. Yet as we have shown, both the PRRI/*Permesta* and even the DI groups engaged in negotiations with the government. Those leaders who were killed usually fell in battle, while some were executed following trial. Second, anti-communist distrust, which in the case of *Masyumi* dated from before the Japanese occupation, united the army and the DI and PRRI/*Permesta* rebels after the latter had laid down its arms. Both in 1948 and during the PRRI era the CIA offered help. The demands of the regional separatists have gradually been met, particularly since regional autonomy has been declared. But there is no longer any space in Indonesian society to fight for the issues the PKI stood for.

Both the DI movement and the PRRI/*Permesta* declared an Islamic State of Indonesia and attacked its character as a secular state based on the *Pancasila*. They did not want the country to be divided up into individual states, but sought a federal structure or some form of regional autonomy. This includes the Sundanese of West Java (Van Dijk 1981: 353–55). The FDR never challenged the sovereignty of the republican government but tried to influence its character. The party did not question its secular character but

wanted the Indonesian state to be based on socialist ideas of equality and welfare. The Soviet model that some of its leaders promoted was not widely supported, however. Other political and economic issues played a role as well. Not only the FDR, but the regional DI groups too fought against the power of the local traditional elite groups. The PRRI/*Permesta* elite were resentful that the profitable trade and barter networks which the local leaders had established were rebranded by the Javanese bureaucracy, which tried to control import and export trade themselves, as smuggling routes.

The extreme sensitivity with which losses on the Muslim side are dealt with is not helpful in unravelling the complexities of the period. All sides suffered great losses. Numbers of victims cannot be compared, and the few figures that are in circulation are without a firm foundation. Many groups with divergent interests tried to impose their agendas on the struggling republican state. The Madiun affair represents just one such attempt.

Notes

- 1 *Kompas* (27 July 2016). This article is based on Gardono's 1992 PhD thesis.
- 2 This was preceded by similar organizations founded in Batavia in 1909 and in Bogor in 1910.
- 3 See the biography of Sneevliet by Max Perthus (1976).
- 4 She was deported to Digul in 1927 and released in 1931.
- 5 See Chapter 5 on the PKI *hadji* committee, an initiative of Tan Malaka, which helped the SI in Semarang to protest against the restrictions the colonial government had imposed, intended to limit the number of people going on the *haj*, the pilgrimage to Mecca.
- 6 Chapter 6 contains a more detailed presentation of the ideas of Hadji Misbach and other Muslim communists.
- 7 Van Dijk mentions that one of the complaints of Kahar Muzakkar and Daud Beureu'eh was directed against what they called 'the imposition of Javanese Hinduism' (1981: 353).
- 8 Amir Syarifuddin kept his membership of the illegal PKI hidden until after his resignation as Prime Minister.
- 9 The Jakarta Charter is contested to this day. It entails the obligation for Muslims to abide by Sharia law.
- 10 According to Rahardjo, Indonesian leaders agreed at a secret meeting to help with the red drive proposal of the US and received US \$56,000 (2002: 63).
- 11 The resistance of Muslim militias to the demobilisation programme will be dealt with below.
- 12 The Barisan Banteng was a militia associated with the Murba party established by Tan Malaka.
- 13 Kreutzer, on the basis of his interviews, asserts that only one captain was killed by a stray bullet (1981: 19).
- 14 Musso in a speech on 21 September 1948 (Poeze 2012: 191).
- 15 Suroso (2013) quotes from Aidit's speech: 'D.N. Aidit menggugat Peristiwa Madiun. Pidato pembelaan di depan pengadilan Negeri Jakarta, 24th februari 1955'.
- 16 See also Suroso (2010) on the long-lasting trauma of Madiun.
- 17 This had already happened in July; he was shot in the back (Anderson 1976).
- 18 See Ann Swift (1989) for various accounts of Suharto's trip.

- 19 See also Rahardjo (2002: 68).
- 20 See <http://khazanah.republika.co.id/berita/dunia-islam/islam-nusantara/16/05/25/o7ovkq385-kisah-pki-memusuhi-kalangan-santri>.
- 21 See the article on Kartosuwiryo (Tempo 2011: 32–33).
- 22 Women were also admitted. They received ‘special training’ such as sewing (Tempo 2011: 61).
- 23 But this was not the end of such schools. In 2011 Tempo reported that there were already 50 such schools in Indonesia.
- 24 *Hizbullah* was established as a kind of reserve corps to the Japanese-trained PETA units, but they were not trained by the Japanese and only armed with bamboo spears. The *Sabilillah* was intended as a kind of citizen’s militia. In practice both groups often fought together and were hard to distinguish from one another (Van Dijk 1981: 72–73). After 1946 they became bloated, incorporating as many as 300,000 members according to Van Dijk (ibid.: 75), while according to Kahin (1952) some 20,000–25,000 men formed the actual fighting units. See also www.islamnusantara.com/perjuangan-para-ulama-dan-santri-jihad-membela-tanah-air/.
- 25 Interview with Pak Dharmawan Isak, 13 March 2016.
- 26 Details of the negotiations by PRRI Minister of Trade Sumitro Djojohadikusumo in Singapore are published in his 2014 biography.
- 27 See Lucas (1991) for an analysis of the major domestic fault lines during the war of independence.

5 Rural unrest, religion, culture and the *Pancasila*

We asked Pak Sakimin, who as a boy had been forced to watch the killings in Purwodadi (East Java), why all these people were murdered. Had there been serious clashes between the PKI and the NU? No, he replied, the situation was tense in the area but there had been no major conflicts. The *Pemuda Rakyat* (PR – People’s Youth), *Gerwani* and the BTI were far outnumbered by *Ansor* and *Banser*. They often held festivals, where they would march in their uniforms, that of *Banser* black, with their sharp knives tucked into their belts. Every village had their own *Ansor* group, all of which competed with each other on to see which marched in the most tough-looking way. Then the radio broadcasts came that the PKI had carried out extremist actions, so that all organizations with which the PKI was affiliated must be exterminated (*dibumi-hanguskan*) and that the PKI was an atheist organization. We also heard that *Gerwani* members had joined in the killing of the generals, that they had been dancing naked and singing the song ‘Genjer-Genjer’. This is actually a song from the nearby region of Banyuwangi, and is popular among school children (he starts singing it). Military officers visited our *kyai* and told them to prepare the *Ansor* groups (*lasykar*) to defend the nation. The militias were instructed to wipe out (*dibasmi*) all PKI associations in the region. Koramil already had all the names of the leaders who had to be killed. Everyone knew where the local PKI groups gathered and who the leaders were. In November 1965 they were abducted and brought to the Koramil office. In February the mass killings occurred, and by March it was all over.¹

Introduction

The PKI had fared well in the parliamentary elections, but Guided Democracy closed that road to power (Feith 1962; Lev [1966] 2009). Sukarno’s *Nasakom* policy, however, offered some communist leaders access to power. By the mid-1960s the party was trying to gain more influence via a strategy known as ‘re-tooling’ whereby anti-communist high-ranking officials were replaced with people who were more sympathetic to the PKI cause. This caused deep resentment among those who were replaced and their supporters, many of whom were Muslim or right-wing nationalist officials. Clashes

occurred in the countryside and in urban areas where hardship had grown due to the economic crisis. Tensions increased at the cultural level too. In this chapter we discuss the rural unrest and the cultural clashes that took place in October 1965 and during the New Order era. The imposition of the New Order's interpretation of the *Pancasila* is also examined.

During the early years of the republic the character of Indonesia as based on the *Pancasila* was questioned primarily by Muslim parties such as *Masyumi* and the DI movement. Aidit always insisted that Indonesia needed the *Pancasila* as a tool to unite the nation, in view of the great diversity of the country and its people (Suroso 2013: 212–15). After 1965, however, the PKI was consistently portrayed as being against the *Pancasila* as well as being atheist. A trope that is always mentioned in this regard is the alleged violence of the PKI/BTI in relation to the land reforms. The one-sided actions of the BTI, the PR and *Gerwani* are cited as being directed against the highly revered *kyai* and were therefore by definition anti-Islam.

The PKI as atheist?

The classification of PKI members as atheist is in contradiction with both the origin of the PKI, the repeated speeches of Aidit himself, and the religious lives of the party membership. Even a notorious hardliner such as *Banser* leader Hasyim (2007) acknowledges that 'communists at the elite level were generally Muslim or Christian but with a very meagre understanding of religion' (2007: 16). Thus, they were not atheists, they just had an insufficient understanding of religion. As some of them were brought up in very religious families, even this qualification of the leaders' knowledge of religion may be doubted. On the whole members of the PKI can be considered no less religious than their neighbours who belong to, for instance, the NU or Christian/Catholic groups. In East Java, members of the NU and sympathizers of the PKI were generally described as '*abangan*', mixing Islam with elements of *Kejawen*.² The NU counted also many *santri* (students at *pesantren*, led by *kyai*) among its members. As the *pesantren* partially survived on the income derived from large landholdings they became a target of the one-sided actions of the BTI, the PKI and *Gerwani*. Thus, there were great tensions between the NU and the PKI but that does not necessarily mean that PKI members were atheist.

The same goes for Christianity. As Kolimon *et al.* (2015) conclude from an analysis of events in Eastern Indonesia PKI members were not atheists. On the contrary, following the G30S affair, relatives of PKI members were sidelined and prohibited from joining church services, and their children were not allowed to be baptized, which caused great distress among those affected. Wejak (2015) comes to a similar conclusion based on research carried out in Flores. He has analysed the various forms of religious terror unleashed by the propaganda machine of the New Order, particularly fuelled by an anonymous document written in 1967 by a member of the Jesuit order which stressed that

communists were atheists, and which explained that killing communists would protect the church and God.³ On the basis of this propaganda Wejak estimates that in Flores between 800 and 2,000 people were murdered between February and March 1966 (*ibid.*: 84).

The former prisoner Harsutedjo provides an interesting account of his religious origins. He was raised in Wlingi, a small village in East Java. His father was a religious communist and was involved in the uprisings in 1926 in West Java. He was imprisoned by the Dutch and later hailed as a hero. He wonders whether his father would have been seen as a communist in his time, or rather as a person who adhered to the *Kejawen* belief, who ‘referred to the fortunes foretold by Joyoboyo based on the interpretations of the poet Ronggowarsito’ (2013: xviii).⁴

Nationalism, religion and communism: the early years

So, what was at stake during the early years of the PKI? The 1926–27 revolt against Dutch colonial rule saw the alliance of two social groups who would become enemies after independence (Williams 1982). Both communist Muslims and traditional Muslim leaders competed over who should be seen as a ‘true Muslim’. An eloquent man like Hadji Misbach fulminated against those false Muslims who ‘sucked the blood’⁵ of members of the community, referring to the widespread practice of usury. In the early 1960s the BTI likewise campaigned against these usurers, listing them among the ‘village devils’. By then they had few Muslim allies left. But in the early 1920s many communist leaders liberally quoted the Quran in their speeches.⁶ Hadji Misbach saw public welfare as a Muslim ideal and opined that communism could help to reach that goal by fighting for collective property and fair labour conditions. He maintained that Islam needed communism to concretize the mission of Islam.⁷

Haji were among the first to resist colonialism (Laffan 2003). Religious pilgrimage led to one stream of the nationalist awakening which went hand in hand with the socialist stream and the more secular nationalist group. In Mecca, thousands of Indonesians from all over the archipelago met and because they stayed for a long time they exchanged ideas about the oppression of their religion in their motherland. The PKI promised to respect and protect religion. This appealed to religious leaders, as they suffered the repression of so-called political Islam, which the Dutch contrasted with ‘cultural Islam’, to which they had no objection.⁸ The PKI even had a *hadji* committee, established by Tan Malaka and the Semarang branch of the Sarikat Islam (SI – Islamic League) in 1921. It succeeded in loosening the restrictions which the Dutch colonial government had imposed on going on the *hajj*.⁹

The leadership in Banten was almost entirely composed of *ulama* and other religious leaders, who traditionally had led the revolts in the nineteenth century in that area. Some of the *haji* were quite active propagandists such as

Haji Usman who held propaganda meetings in *langgar* (prayer houses) and mosques, and Hadji Mohammad Jaisin, who was said to visit people's homes after evening prayers. Their religious practice was mixed with older Javanese customs; the *haji* also conducted invulnerability rites and provided amulets (Williams 1982).

Following the Japanese occupation, there were still a few *haji* within the PKI who tried to build a bridge between the two streams, such as Hasan Raid who recalls a conversation in the late 1940s with the old Hadji Datuk Batuah, after his return from exile in Boven Digul, his revolutionary fervour undiminished. They quoted various verses from the Quran which supported their argument that a 'true' Muslim must fight for justice and against the exploitation of his fellow countrymen.¹⁰ In a radio speech Hasan Raid insisted that religion was a private matter, as there was no force in religion, and that the exploited must fight their exploitation themselves, as the PKI was doing.

Raid never said that his Islam was the only true Islam, as Misbach had proclaimed, but he did expose the hypocrisy of *Masyumi*, calling them 'blood suckers, exploiters of humankind' (Budiawan 2004: 152). When *Masyumi* mounted a campaign during the 1955 elections asserting that communism was atheist and that the PKI was anti-religion and its members *kafir*, Raid accused *Masyumi* members of supporting the evictions of squatters, most of whom were orphans or poor (ibid.: 152–55).

By the beginning of the war of independence the PKI still spoke about a *perang sabil* (holy war) against the Dutch. Following the Madiun affair, the cautious rapprochement between Muslim and communist groups was destroyed. Aidit would later speak of 'immature' political dealings at the time.¹¹ Thereafter Muslim groups proclaimed that Islam and communism could never be combined. In daily life, however, communist members continued to practise their faith. Aidit never spoke out against PKI members who harboured religious beliefs, as even the anti-communist journalist Hughes acknowledged (Budiawan 2004: 114).

Some communist Muslims focused on the anti-capitalist aspects which both ideological streams shared. Others regarded their own brand of communist Islam as superior, or were Muslim communists who saw their Marxism reflected in the Quran. Furthermore, others took a more instrumentalist approach, using Islam to achieve socialism or the other way round. A sore issue were the one-sided actions by the PKI and the BTI. How to classify the land belonging to the *pesantren*? Should the *kyai* be seen as landlords, who by law had to give up their excess land? Or should that land, often given to the *pesantren* in the hope of favours in the afterlife, be seen as communal land that should not be redistributed?

Aidit on religion

PKI party chair D. N. Aidit, born into a staunchly Muslim family,¹² realized that the only way to gain influence in Indonesia was by adhering to President

Sukarno's *Nasakom* policy, the fine balancing act between nationalism (*nas*), religion (*agama*) and communism (*kom*) through which, from 1957 onwards, the President tried to steer his complex country into the kind of permanent revolution that, he hoped, would ultimately lead to prosperity (Vickers 2005). According to Sukarno, the PKI was designed to spearhead that revolution, which the party did by being the most progressively modern of the political parties, reaching out to help peasants, workers, and women with their daily needs. In view of the economic crisis (including a severe drought in the eastern part of the country) a lot of people readily accepted that help (Mortimer 1974; Törnquist 1984). PKI numbers swelled but after the 1965 affair many of these common, poor people paid a terrible price for having their names listed as having received seed or fertilizer, or for having enlisted their children in the *Melati* kindergarten which *Gerwani* had set up all over the country, when they were swept up by the anti-communist pogroms in their villages and city neighbourhoods.

For Aidit, religion was an integral part of the nation. In 1962, in response to NU fears about the increased power of the PKI, he stated that the principle of 'belief in one God' was an 'objective fact and that communists, as materialists, must accept this objective fact ... The communists recognize that accepting the Pantja Sila, one of the silas of which is One Divine Omnipotence, includes the understanding of not being allowed to make anti-religious propaganda in Indonesia ... But on the other hand, the communists do also demand that because of the other silas religion may not be imposed on people, since this is not in line with humanitarian feelings, not in harmony with democracy and justice' (Mortimer 1974: 93–94).

Aidit constantly had to defend his views on religion against accusations that communism was inherently atheist. In 1964 he elaborated his position in an interview with Solichin Salam: 'If religion is used to crush colonialism, feudalism and capitalism, then only idiots would say that religion is opium for the people'.¹³ In the same interview he stated that the PKI accepted the *Pancasila* in its entirety. 'Only in that way can the *Pancasila* function as a unifying tool. We resist the tearing apart (*pemretelan*) of the *Pancasila*'. The PKI accepted the first pillar, 'belief in one God', in the framework of a unified *Pancasila*. In Indonesia, he stressed, there can be no anti-religious propaganda. Only when religion is used to maintain the neocolonial position of the US can we say it is used as the opium of the people.

Aidit therefore accepted only 'revolutionary' Muslim parties. His speeches were not supported by liberal quotations from the Quran, as were those of Haji Misbach and Hasan Raid, and would not have been very reassuring to conservative Muslim leaders who feared the PKI's growing political influence. Instead the party started to use terminology that was considered insulting and painful to religious (Muslim) leaders, particularly after Sukarno swept away democracy and installed his own version of authoritarian leadership, 'Guided Democracy', in 1959.¹⁴ In its revolutionary offensive the PKI singled out its enemies, such as the bureaucratic capitalists (*kabir*) and feudal landlords.

This was in line with Sukarno's increasingly fiery and hegemonic rhetoric on the national revolution and the obstacles both the President and the PKI detected in achieving economic prosperity. Of particular importance was the slow implementation of the two agrarian reform laws promulgated at the time, the 1959 Basic Law on Sharecropping (UUPBH – *Undang-Undang Pokok Bagi Hasil*) and the 1960 Basic Agrarian Law (UUPA – *Undang-Undang Pokok Agraria*), drafted by a team from the Gajah Mada University.¹⁵ These laws imposed a limit to the amount of land a farmer might possess, entailed the prohibition of absentee landlordism, and stipulated that this land should be redistributed, and that land that had been pawned (*digadaikan*) should be returned. They also included a fairer sharecropping arrangement by which all the cash costs of cultivation should be shared equally between owner and sharecropper.

Unilateral BTI actions

Spearheaded by the BTI the PKI engaged in a series of one-sided or unilateral actions, thereby antagonizing other members of the *Nasakom* family. These actions brought it into direct conflict with two powerful interest groups: the religious leaders, many of whom were landlords (some of whom in anticipation of the new law had been dividing up their land among relatives and their religious institutions which were exempt from the limit set by the law); and the army, which had taken control of the large plantations established by the Dutch (Lyon 1970; Mortimer 1974). Ultimately the PKI emerged as the losers of these *aksi sepihak* (one-sided actions) which cost the party dearly, not only in terms of loss of life and property, but particularly in fanning anti-communist feelings among the Muslim masses in the countryside.

These unilateral actions are often mentioned as leading to the post-October 1965 violence. They were so violent, right-wing NU leaders say to this day, that it became clear that after October 1965 we had to kill them or they would have killed us. But how violent were those actions? From 1963 onwards, frustrated with the continual blocking of the land reforms, the PKI became increasingly verbally provocative in attacking anti-communist forces, and encouraged its followers to begin implementing the land reforms the government had approved in 1959 and 1960. As the land reform laws were rather complicated, neither the landlords nor the landless peasants initially really understood them. In the early years after their promulgation landlords learnt how to find the loopholes, just as the landless peasants, frustrated because many of them had still not been allocated any land, at times over-stretched the boundaries of the law. While the peasants were mobilized, the landlords became very irritated and called in the help of the police and *Ansor/Banser* groups.¹⁶ In each case, these attempted land seizures resulted in violent clashes with rich religious leaders, local aristocrats and their protectors.

The unilateral actions initiated by the BTI and the PKI, with support from *Gerwani* and *Lekra*, only lasted a relatively short time but had a large impact

on Indonesian history, extending to the present day.¹⁷ Already in the late 1950s the PKI had started mobilizing peasants. Party cadres were encouraged to go to the villages (*turba*, from *turun bawah*, go down), to live with the peasants. At the April 1959 Peasants' Conference it was decided to start a large research programme, which had the dual goal of giving the cadres something useful to do while they were in the villages and of collecting much-needed data on socio-economic conditions. There was widespread distress in the countryside caused by crop failures and droughts in the early 1960s. Aidit himself led the research. It resulted in an analysis of the various forms of exploitation the peasants faced, by the so-called seven village devils, including evil landlords, money lenders, *tukang idjon*,¹⁸ middlemen and bureaucratic capitalists (Aidit 1964a). *Hadji* were not explicitly mentioned, but as many of them were rich farmers or money lenders, they were implicitly associated with the above seven devils. Initially only evil landlords (associated with the DI or PRRI/*Permesta* movements) were targeted.

The first land occupation in 1963, in Jengkol, Kediri, was a spontaneous action. The army fought against the squatters: 38 people were killed and many were imprisoned (Kartodirdjo 1977; Wieringa 2002).¹⁹ The party decided that it had been 'too leftist', while *Gerwani* members travelled in vain to Jakarta to plead the case of their brothers and sisters in Jengkol.

Only in late 1963 did the party agree to act unilaterally and the *aksi* themselves started to follow suit. Instead of waiting for the *Nasakom* coalition partners to help to implement the Sharecropping and Land Reforms Laws, the PKI decided to go it alone. By the end of 1964 the *aksi* were already scaled down, as it had become clear that the PKI was being beaten (Mortimer 1974; Utrecht 1966). The implementation of the land reform laws indeed faced enormous problems, caused both by bureaucratic hurdles and by obstruction from the landlords (Kartodirdjo 1977). Following a mass meeting in Klaten in Central Java in April 1964, where slogans appeared such as 'land to the tillers' (a demand which went beyond the stipulations of the land reform law) and 'crush the seven village devils', the first planned one-sided *aksi* took place. There had always been strong tensions between *Masyumi* and the PKI in Klaten. In this case not only Muslim groups but also wealthy PNI leaders were antagonized. Later the *aksi* shifted to East Java and Bali. The rural class struggle intersected with party-political and primordial relations. In Cirebon, for instance, landowners had hired some former DI fighters to attack the peasants who had implemented an *aksi* (Achdian 2009: 92–94). Another example is an *aksi* in Trenggalek, where the BTI tried to impose the legal crop-sharing arrangements, as well as occupying excess land. The landowners were angry because this was not 'according to tradition'. Together *Ansor* and the police forced the BTI to back down (Mun'im 2013: 99–100). If *kyai* were attacked in the *aksi sepihak*, they were targeted in their capacity as big landlords (Budiawan 2004; Fealy and McGregor 2010).

In East Java, the NU managed to mobilize the Muslim peasantry in large numbers, thus defeating the PKI strategy of organizing on a class basis. This

was achieved by accusing the PKI of attacking religious schools and insulting Islam. NU leaders had already been disappointed by the banning of the one party that had consistently fought to meet Muslim demands, *Masyumi*, and more in general because their hopes to establish a Sharia-based state had been crushed. They were not prepared to suffer being defeated by the 'atheist PKI'. By September 1964 it became clear that the PKI had been defeated; cadres were being arrested and killed, and property was being destroyed. On 3 December Aidit admitted that the enemies of the PKI had succeeded in dividing the peasants and when on 2 December Sukarno declared that land conflicts should be dealt with through consultation and consensus, the PKI concurred that unilateral actions should be scaled down (Mortimer 1974: 317–22).

It is estimated that in East Java the *aksi* resulted in the deaths of four PKI/BTI members, while 43 farmers were wounded and 409 imprisoned. Fifty hectares of land had also been ruined and 13 homes belonging to members of the BTI burnt down (Kasdi 2001). According to Sulistyó (2011), by April 1964 2,223 farmers had been incarcerated in prisons all over Indonesia because of these actions. Sulistyó makes no mention of NU members being killed. In no sources could we find numbers of victims belonging to the side of *Ansor/Banser*, who on the other hand killed and wounded the 'plundering' red peasants.²⁰ This is in line with what Yusuf Hasyim, who founded *Banser*, wrote:

[B]y early 1964 we concluded that the Communists could not be confronted by ordinary means. They were spreading rumors about 'village devils' ... capitalists in rural areas ... At the time the only source of Islamic power remaining was the Nahdlatul Ulama's youth wing, Ansor ... we were studying Hitler's *Mein Kampf* and how he had developed a power base through the Nazi party. We believed we had to fight fire with fire ... Banser was almost the same as the Hitler Youth, its name inspired by the famous armored Panzer Divisions ... I declared that if the PKI used the slogan 'Grab the land first and deal with the consequences later' then as a leader of Ansor I would respond with our own slogan 'Strike first, deal with the consequences later' ... fighting broke out in East Java, Central Java and to a limited extent in West Java ... In 1965 ... General Suharto asked: 'What is going on with Ansor running amuck? I want this stopped!'

(Hasyim 2007: 16–17)

Mortimer (1974) concludes that the PKI had overplayed its hand. It had hoped that by mobilizing the peasantry, its position at the national level would be strengthened. But the party leaders had severely underestimated the mobilizing potential of the NU and the strength of *aliran* loyalty (Mortimer 1974: 326–27).²¹ Slamet-Velsink, who had been involved in the team at the Marxist Academy of Social Sciences (Aliarcham) which had carried out the earlier PKI research on the conditions in the countryside, reflected that:

religion ... became a (quite formidable) weapon against the left when seized upon as a tool by the PKI's enemies. ... When they started the unilateral actions for the implementation of the land reform laws the reaction was much more violent than the communists had expected also because in some cases the peasants went beyond the law and tried to implement the principle of land to the tillers.

(1988: 37–42)

Slamet-Velsink reports: 'Genjer-Genjer became popular because in the Banyuwangi area a group of 135 members of the BTI had sung it when confronted with a group of 2,000 bandits with knives and daggers. But at the time the song was so popular that also fanatical Muslims were humming it for instance when walking home from a reog performance given by the PR' (ibid.: 48).²²

Among the many stories about so-called PKI cruelty that keep being repeated in social and print media, two stand out, the Bandar Betsy and the Kanigoro affairs. Recent books such as *Ayat-Ayat yang Disembelih* ('Slaughtered Verses') by Anab Afifi and Thowaf Zuharon (2015) provide numerous horror stories which are endlessly repeated on WhatsApp groups of hardline militias.²³ A rambling book on the history of communism by Taufiq Ismail, *Matine Gusti Allah, Riwayat Palu Arit Sedunia Menajiskan Tuhan dan Agama* ('The Death of God, The Story of How Hammers and Sickles around the World Defile God and Religions') insists that communism has claimed some 100–120 million victims, suggesting that if the PKI had won the same could have happened in Indonesia. The title refers to a provocative play staged by *Lekra* members, which hurt Muslim feelings deeply. In both books an analysis of the Indonesian context at the time is lacking, sources are often dubious, and the search for some semblance of truth seems not to have been a priority of the authors.

In the Bandar Betsy affair of 14 May 1965, in North Sumatra, hundreds of farmers defended the former plantation land on which they had squatted. The union of plantation workers (*Sarbupri*) was strong in that area. The unilateral actions threatened the interests of the army, which had taken over the management of many nationalized estates in the province from 1957 onwards. In the skirmishes Lieutenant Soejono was killed.

The Kanigoro affair in Kediri is seen as the ultimate humiliation of religion by the PKI and is a major scene in the New Order G30S/PKI propaganda film. On 13 January 1965, when a training session of *Pemuda Islam Indonesia* (PII – Indonesian Islamic Youth) in *Pesantren Al-Jauhar* ended, a group of PR youth clashed with them. In the film a group of black-clad PR members is shown entering the building where innocent Muslims are praying. They strike the people with their sickles and they are shown trampling the holy Quran. In reality, however, no PII members were slain, and the Quran was safe in a burlap sack during the entire proceedings. What the film and the hardliner religious literature forget to mention is that this was not so much a religious

as a political problem. A local committee comprising both NU and PKI members had decided that a member of the prohibited party *Masyumi*, Samelan, should not preach there. But apparently Samelan trained the PII members despite this (Adam 2016). A mass of 3,000 PR and BTI members attacked the group of 127 participants. In retaliation *Banser* units set off in eight trucks to destroy the BTI and the PR headquarters (Hadi 2017: 131–34).²⁴ The violence of the post-1965 massacres in the areas where the *aksi* took place is to a large extent due to the animosity of the *kyai* and other rich landlords. An example of the bloodthirsty way in which *Ansor* members murdered their fellow villagers is provided by Sulisty, based on interviews with several perpetrators:

[*Ansor*] members ordered them to drink the blood of their victims as it was believed that that was the fastest way to liberate themselves from the [negative] symptoms and it was believed that it was an effective step to prevent the soul (arwah) of the victims from chasing them ... But what happened after they had drunk the blood of their victims was that they were possessed by a devilish feeling to continue killing their victims, one, two, three, four, five and so on. These butchers sometimes also cut off their genitals, ears or fingers, as ways to spread terror, or to carry them around as signs of their bravery.

(2011: 205)

Some of the *Ansor* members we spoke to remain proud of murdering so many of their adversaries even to this day. Others are traumatized.

What happened to the peasants who received land during this period? As land reform had become synonymous with communist policy, the beneficiaries were associated with the PKI. In Soge village in Indramayu, West Java, hundreds of agricultural workers had legally been prioritized as beneficiaries of the 1960 land reforms. After 1965 the landlords used the pretext of the so-called PKI coup to take over the land and enrich themselves. The village leaders took the land titles from the workers who were accused of being PKI members and sold the land to local landlords. The peasants were imprisoned and evicted (Safitri 2018). Similarly the Banyuwangi implementation of the land reform law resulted in the redistribution of land that exceeded the maximum stipulated in the law, and also some land held by absentee landlords. After 1965 a counter land reform took place. Land was taken by the former owners, or by the military or village leaders. The tenants who had profited from the land reform were either killed or expelled from the area (Luthfi 2018).

All over the country stories like this can be heard. In East Kupang a programme of land aid for landless farmers had been set up. The land procured was distributed via the PKI. All those who had received land were arrested after 1965 and accused of being communists. They were then 'processed' by the PKI Annihilation Team set up by the army. If they were found to be

members or leaders of the PKI they were executed and thrown into mass graves. Elsewhere in NTT farmers who had been recipients of aid in the form of food, seed and agricultural tools were branded as communists (Kolimon 2015: 244–74).

Religious contestations

Although the *aksi sepihak* were ostensibly a class struggle, the conflict was mainly waged in moral-religious terms. The PKI indoctrinated poor peasants who were attempting to claim their fair share of land, or their fair share of the crop, with a fiery dose of rhetoric about the anti-capitalist, anti-feudal struggle. The enemies of land reform were classified as the ‘seven village devils’, and the plantation managers styled as the ‘city devils’ (Mortimer 1974). This hurt religious feelings deeply. In the Javanese context the term the ‘ten-faced devil’ with which the BTI/PKI characterized the ‘evil *hadji*’ is the most wicked and greedy character in the popular *wayang* play.²⁵ In many performances of popular groups at the time (*wayang*, *ketoprak* or *ludruk*) the character of the dishonest and greedy *hadji* became a common way of heaping criticism on local figures.²⁶ In *Benturan*, the 2013 NU ‘white book’, the moral-religious struggle is also a dominant theme, with outcries about *Lekra* performances which were allegedly offensive to Muslim sentiments. *Ansor* groups attacked such performances en masse, and several players and spectators were killed.²⁷ The *aksi* were also deeply political, and can be viewed as an attempt by the PKI to mobilize the peasantry in order to give the party more leverage in national politics. This tragically backfired. First because the PKI/BTI suffered considerable losses, and second because the *aksi* sparked enormous hatred, and helped to set the stage for the subsequent genocide.

Just as in Java *Kejawen* practices became suspect after the sustained anti-communist campaign, in other regions also traditional religions were deeply affected. In West Java the traditional *Wiwitan* religion came under attack.²⁸ Initially the Christian churches were also vehemently anti-communist (but in later years they were among the first to help the victims, as many former prisoners testified). As Kolimon (2015) reports, even in faraway East Sumba the anti-PKI forces, particularly the *Gereja Kristen Sumba* (GKS – Christian Church of Sumba), were happy to exterminate the PKI so that there ‘would be no Lubang Buaya in East Sumba’. They took the opportunity to persuade those who still cleaved to the ancestral belief system, known as *Marapu*, to join the ‘official religion’. Imprisoned women were always also sexually tortured. All this strengthened a cult of aggressive masculinity; the killers, members of the Christian youth movement, were regarded as courageous, *jantan* (manly) (Kolimon 2015: 41–43). According to Kolimon, after the G30S affair local religions in NTT were viewed with suspicion and hatred. Christians who had formerly been more tolerant now distanced themselves further from them, and followers of local religions became Christians in order to avoid being branded as atheists. Local culture too disappeared in those areas

or at least went underground, owing to the fact that local religion and local culture are linked (ibid.: 256–57). In Java mass conversions to Christianity also took place (Nugroho 2008).

In West Timor similar processes occurred. Farram (2002) noted that post-1965 traditional animist beliefs deteriorated as in some cases the PKI had become associated with adherents of such beliefs. In this respect the droughts in 1964 and 1965 gave rise to cargo cults. The PKI brought relief to people and was embraced; people joined out of gratitude. When the massacres started, the army insisted that all those who did not belong to any of the recognized religions were atheists and thus communists and therefore had to be killed, so many people rushed to be converted. Some areas went from 80 per cent animist to 100 per cent Christian overnight, also because church officials denied that there were any ‘heathens’ in their area (ibid.).

The Bugis in Sulawesi likewise have a rich cultural and religious history. Of special importance is the role of the *bissu*, priests who embody both feminine and masculine traits. The Bugis are characterized by a five-gender system: male, female, *calalai* (transgender female) and *calabai* (transgender male), with the *bissu* having elements of the other four (Davies 2010). The *bissu* were considered to be intermediaries between the gods and humans. They played an important role in the royal courts and were in charge of religious ceremonies. Their position was undermined when Islam took hold in the area in the seventeenth century. Muslim officials took over some of their roles. Serious persecution started when Kahar Muzakkar rebelled and attempted to establish a puritanical Muslim state as part of the DI. The *bissu* were considered remnants of a feudal era, many of them were murdered, their ritual objects burnt or thrown into the sea. The persecution was intensified when New Order troops hunted down communists. This time the *bissu* (who were religious specialists!) were considered to be atheists, *syirik* (adherents of polytheism), and accused of being communists – and so were killed (Darmapoetra 2014: 27). The institution experienced a revival when the harvest failed post-1965 and people feared that this might have been caused because the old rituals, presided over by the *bissu*, were no longer being held. At present they are no longer seen as religious but more as cultural experts, thus boosting the image of the region: from being proud and revered religious specialists they have been marginalized and impoverished, objects for the tourist market (ibid.).

Culture wars: *Lekra* and the Cultural Manifesto

From the early 1960s the PKI had also stepped up its militancy in the cultural field. Aidit’s speech before a meeting of the CC PKI entitled ‘*berani, berani, sekali lagi berani*’ (‘courageous, courageous once more courageous’) was meant to instil a more revolutionary spirit in PKI sympathizers and members. With parliamentary discussions sidelined, the whole society became a political arena. Literature and the arts were expected to propagate the party

line. Writers and artists who objected to this pressure were labelled counter-revolutionaries. People's art such as *ketoprak*, *ludruk* and *wayang purwa* flourished. *Lekra* painters and sculptors worked in social realist style (Foucher 1986). The painter Misbach Thamrin, for instance, opposed abstract art, as it did not contribute to the revolution. The party had to tread a fine line between supporting local people's arts and ensuring that it did not maintain feudal *adat* (customs) and court culture, but that it contributed towards the revolution (Hadi 2017).

The chair of *Lekra*, Nyoto, enthusiastically responded to Aidit's call for cultural activism. But *Lekra* was not the only cultural association. Culture was used as a weapon by both sides. The NU's *Lesbumi* and the PKI's *Lekra* were pitted against each other. In the 1960s *Lekra* actively propagated art for the people at village level. Anti-feudalist and other socialist themes came to dominate traditional performances. For example, the popular story of Suminten Edan in *Trenggalek* had to be given a different ending. Originally the story told of how Prince Subroto, after some adventures, marries two women. As the PKI propagated an anti-polygamy line the Prince now had to make do with one wife. In *Ponorogo* the traditional *reog* performance also saw adaptations as *reog* and *ketoprak* groups enthusiastically joined *Lekra*.²⁹ There were also special plays produced by *Lekra*. Instead of mystical themes, a play might deal with real social issues such as labourers not receiving their wages. For instance, in spite of its provocative title, the play *Matine Gusti Allah* ('The Death of God') was actually a simple story about the difficult conditions of poor people in the villages, meant to celebrate the crucifixion of Jesus and Easter. *Banser* members reacted violently. Mun'im (2013) mentions only one performance of the play. McGregor (2009) writes that it was 'frequently performed', citing interviews with *kyai*. The same *Lekra*-affiliated *ketoprak* group that performed *The Death of God* also had a play about the marriage of the Pope in its repertoire, and this caused great offence to Catholic groups (Said 2013: 27–28).

Throughout 1965 *ludruk* and *ketoprak* groups became more active. On 17 January 1965 *Lekra* staged a *ludruk* performance entitled *Gusti Allah Dadi Manten* ('The Marriage of Allah') in Jombang, an NU stronghold. This was seen as blasphemy and *Banser* broke it up. The story of *Malaikat Kimpoi* ('Angels Make Love') dealt with the theme of land reform, with the angels taking the side of the peasants. The *kyai*, who feared angels, were not amused. (Tempo 2013: 97–99). Particularly in East Java these and similar performances caused great unrest. Pipit Rochiat (1985) captures the atmosphere of the time in his account of the impact that these rural clashes had on him as a young man.

Lekra grew exponentially. Aidit reported that in August 1965 *Lekra* had five million members, while the PR and *Gerwani* each had three million members, and the PKI and Sentral Organisasi Buruh Seluruh Indonesia (SOBSI – Central All-Indonesian Labour Organization) three and a half million members (Mortimer 1974: 366). It is likely that these figures included

many cases of dual membership as members of the PKI and its associated organizations were encouraged to become culturally active. Young people were often attracted to join *Gerwani* or the PR because of the movements' cultural work in collaboration with *Lekra* musicians and artists.

The revolutionary slogans and the cultural policies of the PKI and *Lekra* were not exceptional. By the mid-1960s Sukarno's vocabulary had become so hegemonic that all the parties and associations used them. When *Lekra* prohibited films from Hollywood, they followed Sukarno's cultural line. But while many artists enthusiastically embraced the social realism which *Lekra* artists promoted, others felt that their creativity was being stifled. The resentment sparked by the pressure to produce social realist art increased anti-communist sentiments (Wanandi 2012). In September 1963 a number of prominent writers published the Cultural Manifesto in the literary monthly journal *Sastra*.³⁰ Although couched in Sukarno's terminology it attempted to steer clear from the hegemony of his thinking and from social realism as the only form of artistic expression, dominated by political slogans which were endlessly repeated. As Gunawan Mohamad, one of the signatories wrote, 'less and less writers were able to treat the language as a source of adventure and originality' (1988: 4). Sukarno and the PKI reacted furiously. Some of the signatories were fired from their jobs. Sukarno disparagingly called the Manifesto '*Manikebu*', literally 'sperm of the buffalo'.

After the actions of the G30S group the atmosphere changed dramatically. *Lekra* artists were hunted down. Many of them were murdered, such as Hadi Sampang, a poet from Sampang, Madura, and the secretary of the Surabaya branch of *Lekra*, or ended up in Buru, such as Pramoedya Ananta Tur and Hersri. The art forms they had promoted were destroyed or sidelined. In East Java the surviving *ludruk* players were taken under the control of the army. Instead of opening a performance with the song 'Genjer-Genjer', now a salvo was fired, to demonstrate the changing of the guard. Umar Kayam, a supporter of the Cultural Manifesto, became the director-general of RRI-TV in 1966 and reversed the ban on Western films. An outspoken critic of Sukarno, he played the role of the ailing President in the film *Betrayal of G30S/PKI*. During the New Order era writers and artists were compelled to propagate its 'truth' and ideology (Herlambang 2013). Critical discussions of the film were prohibited. This film and other documentaries which glorified Suharto and the army were produced under the control of *Kopkamtib*'s own Department of Documentaries. This department was established on the orders of the then *Kopkamtib* chief on 15 April 1969.³¹

The PKI and the *Pancasila*

After 1 October 1965 the PKI and its alleged sympathizers were immediately, consistently and continuously framed as inhuman (*biadab*) and as trying to destroy civilized society, which was described as *Pancasila* society. The *Pancasila* describes the five pillars of society, conceived by the nation's founding

fathers, Sukarno and Hatta (Cribb and Brown 1995). It comprises five principles that are held to be inseparable and interrelated:

- 1 Belief in the one and only God (*Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa*).
- 2 Just and civilized humanity (*Kemanusiaan Yang Adil dan Beradab*).
- 3 The unity of Indonesia (*Persatuan Indonesia*).
- 4 Democracy guided by the inner wisdom of the unanimity arising out of deliberations among representatives (*Kerakyatan Yang Dipimpin oleh Hikmat Kebijaksanaan, Dalam Permusyawaratan dan Perwakilan*).
- 5 Social justice for all the people of Indonesia (*Keadilan Sosial bagi seluruh Rakyat Indonesia*).

Since its formal proclamation there have been clear differences of emphasis between the PKI and hardliner religious groups. For the PKI, national unity, democracy and social justice had priority, while for conservative religious groups the first principle was the most important one, eclipsing the other four. Immediately after the declaration of independence, the PKI put itself squarely behind the *Pancasila*. In the preamble to its constitution it says: ‘the PKI accepts and defends the 1945 Constitution which in its opening statement locates the *Pancasila* as the basis of the state and has as its objective to build a society that is just and prosperous, according to the identity of the Indonesian people’ (Suroso 2013: 17). As discussed elsewhere the DI movement demanded a Sharia-based state and rejected the elevation of the *Pancasila* as the foundation of the nation. When in 1956 the *Konstituante* was established, tasked with writing a new Constitution, bitter tensions erupted between those in favour of and those opposed to the *Pancasila*. *Masyumi* and other Islamic groups insisted on a Sharia-based state. On 27 May 1956 Aidit gave a speech in which he defended the *Pancasila* and strongly attacked Isa Ansajari who had threatened that the DI movement’s mandate would not be over until Islam became the basis of the state. Aidit defended the rights of all religious groups in Indonesia. *Masyumi*’s Natsir, on the other hand, stressed that the *Pancasila* had no roots in society nor in the hearts (*kalbu*) of the people (Mortimer 1974; Suroso 2013: 177).

To the very end Aidit defended the *Pancasila* as the basis of the Indonesian nation. In a 1964 booklet entitled *Aidit Defends the Pancasila* he posited that ‘Marxists welcomed the Pantjasila in its entirety, without reserve, as it is the tool to unite Indonesia ... Those who prioritise one *sila* and thus not accept the Pancasila in its entirety rupture Indonesia’s unity ... The Pancasila is based on the acceptance of different religions, philosophies, *aliran* and ethnic groups’ (1964b: 3–15). Aidit repeated this principle in many speeches made during the period, stressing that while the *Pancasila* was the unifying philosophy in the country, it was not the only philosophy. He maintained that Indonesia embraced Catholicism, Islam, Buddhism, Protestantism and communism as well as various mystical *aliran*. Therefore, he argued, there would always be diversity, and the *Pancasila* would always be needed.³²

For a speech he wrote for the 45th anniversary of the PKI on 23 May 1965, Aidit couched his position on the *Pancasila* in the language of that era: ‘with the Front National which has workers and farmers as its central pillars [*bersokoguru*], and the axis of Nasakom and the Pancasila as its basis, we will finish the national democratic revolution, and go forward to Indonesian socialism’.³³ What exactly a form of Indonesian socialism based on the *Pancasila* would look like remained vague and just as opaque as the grandiose words of the President of the Republic.

Hardliner Muslims, however, have never believed Aidit’s words. He only claimed to defend the *Pancasila*, they declare, but the *Pancasila* must be put into practice. And what was the practice of the PKI? A year after he published his thesis on defending the *Pancasila* he betrayed the *Pancasila* by killing the generals!³⁴ They accuse Aidit of speaking with a forked tongue. All *sila* of the *Pancasila*, they reason, are reconciled with the Quran. Thus, people who diligently fulfil their religious obligations are already good followers of the *Pancasila*. But not all who adhere to the *Pancasila* are religious people, they may be false adherents of the *Pancasila*.³⁵ In the eyes of Muslim hardliners Aidit will remain a hypocrite, who captured *ulama* while preaching the *Pancasila*.

A Pancasila state

Suharto’s New Order described itself as a *Pancasila* state, with the *Pancasila* almost being elevated to the status of a civil religion, complete with its handbooks, interpretations, rituals, symbols and places of commemoration/worship (Kasenda 2015; McGregor 2003, 2007; Roosa 2006). The ‘holiness’ of the *Pancasila* was laid squarely on the first pillar, belief in one God. The other pillars, such as social justice and democracy, were ignored by the New Order rulers. The role of Sukarno in creating the *Pancasila* on 1 June 1945 was minimized (McGregor 2007).³⁶ During the New Order era that day was not celebrated. Instead 1 October was ordained to be the designated day to celebrate national unity, by venerating the slain generals as martyrs for the nation. By emphasizing their murder as the big national trauma, the genocide that followed was ignored. And by putting all the blame on the PKI, the army, Muslim parties and militias were exonerated. Suharto was portrayed as the hero who fulfilled the ultimate ideological promise of the *Pancasila* and the army was seen as the natural leader of the people.

The *Pancasila Sakti* (Holy Pancasila) Monument on the site where the generals were thrown into a well became an almost sacred place. Ritual speeches were held there on 1 October, after the film *The Betrayal of the G30S/PKI* was shown on all TV stations the previous night. The film was also compulsory viewing for school children (Herlambang 2013; McGregor 2007). During the New Order the vast terrain of the Holy Pancasila Monument used to swarm with children and adults in Muslim dress. After *Reformasi* the number of visitors dwindled, but it has remained a place that Muslim groups

visit. At the base of the huge statues of the murdered generals a bronze mural has been placed which depicts the post-independence history of Indonesia according to Suharto. The museum complex itself comprises a series of dioramas and a relic room.³⁷ The dioramas contain scenes of alleged PKI cruelty (such as in Kanigoro) and army courage. The relic rooms are interesting, because the painstakingly preserved uniforms of the generals are on display, after they were dug up from the well. Blood stains around bullet wounds are still visible, but they are nowhere to be found where one might expect them in view of the alleged mutilations.

The New Order rulers established a military state, in which the chain of command extended to the village level. It was sustained by an ideology which stressed harmony as an essential national characteristic, a huge family with the severe but essentially benign figure of the 'Father of Development' Suharto at its head. The subordination of women (as exemplified on the *Pancasila Sakti* mural by two women with bent, sedately coiffured heads under the authoritarian, outstretched arm of Suharto) was seen as a precondition of social order (Wieringa 2002, 2003). Suharto in this model is presented as the saviour of the nation, the protector of the *Pancasila* against the godless communists who tried to destroy it. The military were positioned as the guardians of this family and demanded respect for that role. It was the strengthening of this model that was the basis of the army version of Indonesian history that army historian Nugroho Notosusanto saw as his task to promote (McGregor 2007). The militarization of New Order society is characterized not only by the tight control of the military over social and political life, but also by the transmission of its values (hierarchy, blind devotion to the nation, aggressive masculinity) through the institutions it controlled, including trade unions, women's organizations, organizations of civil servants as well as schools and the Scouts Movement.

Compulsory *Pancasila* courses were set up. These courses had been promoted since 1976–77 in various speeches by the President. They were first rolled out in the universities (early 1970s), a few years later in schools, and from 1978 civil servants were obliged to follow them. The so-called P4 courses (*Pedoman Penghayatan dan Pengamalan Pancasila* – Guide to the Comprehension and Sincere Implementation of the *Pancasila*) became enshrined in decision No. II/MPR/1978, in spite of resistance by the PPP (combination of Muslim parties) faction (Kasenda 2015: 93–95).³⁸ On 19 February 1985 the DPR in law No. 3 1985 obliged all political parties to accept the *Pancasila* as its main principle (*asas tunggal*). Therefore the PPP also had to change its bylaws, while its basic principle – Islam – had to be replaced by the *Pancasila*. Following the passage of law No. 8 1985, all mass organizations had to accept the *Pancasila* as their *asas tunggal* as well.

For any former political prisoners and their families the *Pancasila*-based New Order state was a particularly cruel place. Siregar (1995) lists the consequences. Many of the returned prisoners were physically and mentally broken. The intellectuals among them, teachers, journalists, artists, had lost

their ability to engage in critical and creative thinking. They and their families were desperately poor. Many thousands who were purged from the military and the bureaucracy were also plunged into poverty as they had lost their pension rights. The former prisoners never really became free. When they were released they had to pledge an oath in the name of Allah that they would not take part in activities aimed at spreading communism and Marxism-Leninism. Nor could they commit treason against the people and the Indonesian Republic (implying that they had already done so) and they had to promise to be always ready to be called to give information and to become witnesses in court cases. They also pledged to fully accept any steps that *Kopkamtib* would take to secure order as a result of the rebellion and treason that was carried out by the G30S/PKI. They had to promise never to bring any charges against the Indonesian Republic.

Five conditions were set for their release. The prisoners had to be mentally prepared, must have already demonstrated that they followed the *Pancasila* while in prison, and their families had to be ready to receive them, as well as their former neighbours. The last condition was that they must be prepared to fill any work vacancies offered to them. They could not work immediately, however, as after their release the former prisoners were placed under house arrest for six months; for six months afterwards they had to stay in their village or city. They were not allowed to take jobs in the government or in sectors considered of vital national importance. In order to control their movements, a system called *Siskamling* (*Sistem Keamanan Lingkungan* – System for the Security of the Environment) was set up, in which neighbours were forced to spy on each other.

The former prisoners' families also had to sign a document stating that they were prepared to receive a prisoner who had been detained on the accusation of being involved in the G30S/PKI. Families had to promise to ensure that the former prisoner would not engage in prohibited political activities nor receive guests who did not belong to the family, and to make sure that the prisoner did not leave the village or town without permission from officials.

The obligation to report to the police once a month or once a week affected over 900,000 people. They had to report whether they had received guests, where the guests had come from, what was discussed, whether they had received any letters, what was in them, or any telephone calls, particularly if they were long distance or came from abroad. This was humiliating, and also prevented former prisoners from working. The visits also gave the police an opportunity for bribery.

Family members suffered the consequences as well. Each person had to have a *Surat Bersih Diri* (SBK – document stating that they were clean) and a *Surat Keterangan Bersih Lingkungan* (SKBL – document stating that they had a clean environment). The children and grandchildren of former prisoners were not allowed to go to university or to work in the government sector. In the second half of the 1980s *Kopkamtib* Chief Admiral Sudomo tightened the reins.

Screening exercises were introduced into the workplace which focused on the character of a person; as a result a number of teachers, trade union members, civil servants in Central Java, lawyers and even prosecutors were fired.

In June 1988 *Kopkamtib* ordered a re-examination of the files of half a million former prisoners, checking their whereabouts and their current 'attitude'. It stated that there were signs that the PKI was staging a comeback, by writing and publishing books, infiltrating organizations, and becoming village heads and entrepreneurs (Siregar 1995: 400–33). Even more letters were required. People who wanted to move to a new location had to present a *Surat Tanda Kelakuan Baik* (document certifying good behaviour) and a *Surat Tanda Melaporkan Diri* (letter stating that one had reported oneself). Both documents required the person involved to state where they had been on the night of 30 September 1965 and whether they or any member of their family had any connection with the PKI or its affiliated organizations.

The term *Balatkom* (*Bahaya Laten Komunis* – communist latent danger) had already been coined in 1978 by *Lemhanas* (*Lembaga Ketahanan Nasional* – National Resilience Institute). This national vigilance watchdog regularly gave refresher courses on the dangers posed by *Balatkom*. As it was a latent danger, there was no evidence needed to 'prove' a suspicion. The wide use of the term justified continued military domination to fight the spectre of communism. Anybody could be accused (Honna 2013: 109–13).

If all this sounds very militaristic and fascist, that is because the New Order *Pancasila* state indeed did possess characteristics of an aggressive right-wing exploitative state. For reasons of space we cannot discuss the political configuration that was dominated by functional groups. We can, however, point to the way in which both foreign and domestic companies profited from the possibility of accessing the cheap labour offered by the vast population who could not obtain the required documents. Former political prisoners were forced to accept any vacancy offered, or else they might be transmigrated (Southwood and Flanagan 1983). With its restrictive policy on prisoners' family members, the government in fact declared that however defined 'PKI-ness' amounted to a hereditary or contagious trait. The stigma, defined by Goffman as a 'discrediting attribute', that renders people 'tainted, not quite human' (1963: 138), affected and continues to affect millions of people.

In 1988 *Kopkamtib* changed its name to *Bakorstanas* (*Badan Koordinasi Stabilitas Nasional* – Coordinating Body of National Stability). In 2000 the institution was abolished by President Abdurrahman Wahid. Until then it had been responsible for the implementation of the 'special review' (*penelitian khusus, litsus*) that in 1990 had replaced the SKBL. The *litsus* had a similar objective – the screening of civil servants (Robinson 2018: 254).

Conclusion

General Suharto gave himself the right to interpret the *Pancasila* in the same way as had President Sukarno during Guided Democracy. A compulsory

course on the army version of Indonesian history accompanied the P4 course held at schools and universities.³⁹ In this version, produced by army historian Nugroho Notosusanto, the history of the archipelago is presented as a long-drawn out struggle in which the army always conquers the enemies of the nation (Kasenda 2015; McGregor 2007).

The moderate General Agus Widjojo, a son of one of the generals murdered by the G30S group, and currently the Governor of *Lemhanas*, summarized in an interview with the BBC the general opinion on the reasons why the PKI was destroyed:

You have to consider the background [of the massacres], the PKI engaged in murdering in 1948. Since the 1960s the PKI took a revolutionary strategy. They became very wild. They were close to President Sukarno, and strongly supported his policies, such as land for the people, one-sided actions, intimidating Muslim organizations, parties, students etcetera.⁴⁰

In spite of clear pronouncements by Aidit that he would never engage in anti-religious propaganda, and fully supported the *Pancasila* (in its entirety), the PKI is still framed as anti-religion and anti-*Pancasila*. Aidit is presented as a 'false Pancasilaist', and a deliberately distorted version of Indonesian history is enforced through educational and cultural mechanisms as the only possible truth.

The particular interpretation that Suharto gave to the *Pancasila* aimed to set the regime he created apart from that of the previous President. In itself the name New Order already implied that the previous regime was outdated and people were invited to call it the Old Order (which is precisely why we do not use that term). In the eyes of the New Order, interpretations of the *Pancasila* by the previous regime were chaotic, disordered, economically unstable and morally debauched. In the New Order on the other hand, order reigns, the economy is back on track, with welfare promised for all, and its morals are sound (as symbolized by its subservient women). How these women came to be tamed we will discuss in the next chapter.

Notes

- 1 Extract from an interview with Pak Sakimin (pseudonym) held on 9 August 2014. See also Wieringa (2016b).
- 2 *Abangan* comes from the Javanese word *abang*, red. *Abangan* is a term used by Geertz, for the Javanese Muslim population who practise Islam in a more syncretic way. After 1965 it became a word of abuse and is hardly used any more.
- 3 This was the order to which the communist-hating Father Beek belonged, see Chapter 7.
- 4 Joyoboyo was a twelfth-century King of Kediri, the archetypal *ratu adil* (just king).
- 5 Budiawan (2004), n. 25, p. 96, quoting Takashi Shiraishi (1990), who quotes the first nationalist Indonesian journalist Marco Kartodikromo. In 1926 he was exiled to Digul, where he died in 1932.
- 6 See <https://m.tempo.co/read/news/2015/11/20/058720705/bongkar-tabu-kementerian-n-agama-teliti-gerakan-komunisme-islam-di-solo>.

- 7 See also Muhammad Al-Fayyadl in the editorial of the website Islambergerak, on 22 October 2015.
- 8 Budiawan (2004: 90–91). The Dutch administrators followed the analysis of anthropologist Snouck Hurgronje.
- 9 www.berdikarionlinme.com/pki-dan-komite-haji/.
- 10 Raid (2001) and Watson (2006).
- 11 Swift (1989); Aidit (1958, 1960).
- 12 His father, Achmad Aidit, was a muezzin on the island of Belitung. See <http://nasional.republika.co.id/berita/nasional/umum/13/08/25/ms28qw-kisah-aidit-sang-muazin>.
- 13 The interview with Solichin Salam appeared in the journal *Pembina* on 12 August 1965. See *Historia*, no. 15 (January 2017). Available at <http://historia.id/modern/wawancara-dn-aidit-pki-menentang-pemretelan-terhadap-pancasila>.
- 14 See for instance Smith (1969) on the suppression of the press under Sukarno.
- 15 See the blog by Hasan Kurniawan (12 September 2016). Available at <https://daerah.sindonews.com/read/1138550/29/landreform-dan-aksi-sepihak-bti-mengganyang-etan-desa-1473599156>. See also Mortimer 1974.
- 16 See Törnquist (1984) and Mortimer (1974) for more details.
- 17 For the involvement of *Gerwani* in the *aksi sepihak* see Wieringa (2002). Half of the peasants imprisoned were women.
- 18 Traders who buy up the harvest at an early stage against a low price.
- 19 See also Kasdi (2001), who stresses that although this action ended in a bloody defeat, it became the model for subsequent *aksi*. *Aksi* is short for *aksi sepihak*, one-sided action (namely land reform).
- 20 Said (2013).
- 21 An *aliran* is a socio-cultural stream in Indonesia.
- 22 *Reog* is a traditional dance form, mostly found in Ponorogo, East Java.
- 23 This book even cites the Jengkol affair, in which only BTI members were killed, as part of a cruel plot by the PKI.
- 24 See also <https://mojok.co/muhidin-m-dahlan/esai/pki-vs-pii/>.
- 25 Budiawan (2004: 122–23).
- 26 *Wayang*, *ketoprak* and *ludruk* are traditional forms of theatre on Java.
- 27 Mun'im (2013).
- 28 www.thejakartapost.com/longform/2018/04/02/how-sunda-wiwitan-survives-injustice.html.
- 29 Special issue of *Tempo* magazine on *Lekra* (30 September – 6 October 2013).
- 30 www.bbc.com/indonesia/indonesia-41451321.
- 31 See the special issue of *Tempo* (1–7 October 2012), entitled *Pengakuan Algojo 1965*. For an analysis of these and other films produced under military control see Herlambang (2013) and McGregor (2007).
- 32 See, for example, a speech by Aidit on 19 October 1964, *Bintang Merah Tahun XX 1964*: 7–15 (Mortimer 1974).
- 33 *Harian Rakyat*, 7 May 1965.
- 34 See www.portal-islam.id/2017/06/dulu-aidit-juga-klaim-pembela-pancasila.html?m=1 (posted on 2 June 2017).
- 35 *Ibid.*
- 36 Notosusanto wrote that Muhammad Yasin was actually the first to propose the *Pancasila* (Kasenda 2015; McGregor 2007).
- 37 The central scene in the mural features the betrayal by the PKI and the lurid dance of the *Gerwani* girls (see Chapter 6).
- 38 *Partai Persatuan Pembangunan* (PPP – United Development Party), the only Islam-based political party allowed under the New Order.
- 39 *Pendidikan Sejarah Perjuangan Bangsa* (PSPB – Course on the History of the Struggle of the Nation).
- 40 See www.bbc.com/indonesia/indonesia-41662408 (posted on 19 October 2017).

6 Women's degradation and homophobia

Two sexual moral panics

Introduction

In modern-day Indonesia two sexual moral panics have taken place. In both instances particular groups were or are being scapegoated to engineer fear and disgust in order to serve a political agenda. This diversion of politics into the realm of the moral has proved to be an effective method to mobilize people for ulterior political gains (Wieringa 2009, 2017). Nazism also made extensive use of sexual metaphors, associating 'sexual Bolshevism' with Jews (Herzog 2005). In Indonesia the first panic was created by demonizing the progressive women's organization *Gerwani*, in order to depict the entire communist movement and supporters of President Sukarno as sexually perverse, and ultimately to mobilize religious, mainly but not exclusively Muslim militias, to assist the military in its massacres and in the campaign to oust President Sukarno. The second sexual moral panic was still ongoing at the time of writing. One of the goals of the campaign that started in 2015 was to discredit whatever was left of the communist movement. Another goal was to support the agenda of hardline Muslim groups and the 'green' army, the conservative part of the army allied with radical Muslim groups. The scapegoated group is the LGBT community.

The sexual moral panic involving *Gerwani*: did an orgy take place at Lubang Buaya?

The myth of the singing, dancing, castrating members of *Gerwani* was at the core of the army's propaganda campaign which transformed an apparent inter-army clash (with heavy political meddling) into a gruesome genocide in which the PKI and left-wing people in general were dehumanized and the government of President Sukarno swept away. The sexual moral panic created by the army shamed the nation into silence, while its pornographic content simultaneously incited them. What happened in Lubang Buaya? What did *Gerwani* stand for and what were the effects of the campaign of sexual slander against them?

The generals thrown into the well at the Lubang Buaya training field were killed by soldiers. Yet soon after the burial of the victims, stories were circulated via the army-controlled press and radio that a wild sexual orgy had taken place that night, that the girls who were present had performed the Fragrant Flowers dance naked while singing the song 'Genjer-Genjer', that they had sexually assaulted the prisoners, and had even castrated them, gouged out their eyes and tortured them to death (Wieringa 2002, 2003).¹ Total nonsense, but very effective, because this story is still believed even today; scary images of evil witchlike women are etched onto people's consciousness. Yet even a curator in the museum at the site, M. Yutharyani, acknowledges that no sexual violence had taken place, nor had any girls been dancing naked there.² This insidious fantasy was embellished in the months after the actions of the G30S group, in many variations. For instance, the reputable journal *Kompas* reported on 13 December 1965 that some 200 girls had been ordered to dance naked, watched by some 400 young men, after which they engaged in 'free sex'.³

The field belonged to the Indonesian Air Force and was located in the neighbourhood (*kelurahan*) of Lubang Buaya, in the district (*kecamatan*) of Cijantung, but not at the airport itself. It had been used since July 1965 for the training of volunteers of the PR, *Gerwani*, the BTI or SOBSI for the Malaysia campaign. The training that was taking place at the end of September was being held for the third time, organized by a colonel from the air force, Suyono (Sukartiningsih 2004; Wieringa 2002). Similar training camps were established all around the country by various other mass organizations, such as the NU's women's wing, the *Muslimat* NU. They received their training in Cibubur, as mentioned in Chapter 3. The training was conducted in the framework of Malaysia Confrontation (*Dwikora*), not on the initiative of the PKI. It included political indoctrination and military training with light arms supplied by the air force. The political elements were not Marxism, but the *Panca Azimat Revolusi*, the moral guidelines that Sukarno felt were needed to achieve the kind of revolution he envisaged. Recruitment had been via *Nasakom* lines, but Suyono had preferred training communist youth; he was reprimanded for that and told to include religious and nationalist youth as well (Siregar 1995: 159).

In the early 1980s Saskia Wieringa conducted research into the history of *Gerwani* and interviewed some of the surviving girls who had been present that night at the training field. They said that they were wakened in the middle of the night by the noise made by the soldiers, witnessed the beating and shooting of the three generals who had arrived still alive, and the dumping of all the bodies in the well. In a panic most of them fled the location either to their homes or to *Gerwani* headquarters, where they woke up the two members of the leadership who regularly slept there, Ibu Sulami and Ibu Sujinah (Wieringa 2002). Some stayed on until 2 October where they were met by RPKAD soldiers checking out the information provided by policeman Sukitman, who had been picked up by the plotters when he was doing his

rounds.⁴ The following testimony of one of the girls who was present at Lubang Buaya was given in 1983, after she had just come out of prison:

I was 16 and a member of Pemuda Rakyat ... I witnessed the soldiers kill the generals and ran home. I was arrested at nine o'clock in the morning and put in prison for two weeks. I was beaten and interrogated. They forced us to undress and dance naked in front of them while they took pictures. Then I was released. After a little while I was captured again and released again. In total I was captured five times before they finally decided to keep me in prison. That was at the beginning of November 1965. I was released in December 1982.

(Wieringa 2002: 296)

This young woman spent 17 years in jail and was never brought to trial. None of the girls and women present at Lubang Buaya were ever arraigned. Apparently the military could not afford to have their true stories come out. For instead of the stories of Sukitman and the girls present in Lubang Buaya, the army propagated a very different account to the outside world.⁵ Progressive, politically active women and by association the PKI and even Sukarno were linked to unspeakable sexual perversions. The party and its mass organizations were portrayed as inhuman, primitive (*biadab*) and evil. This association helped people to form the conclusion that belonging to the PKI or any organizations associated with it was *salah* (wrong), and in some occult way this justified their members being tortured and killed.

The newspapers also produced 'interviews' based on 'confessions' of captured *Gerwani* members. Sometimes these 'confessions' were based on cases of mistaken identity. For example, Emy and Atikah were two members of *Gerwani* who were present at Lubang Buaya. They fled when they understood what they were accused of. Neither were ever captured. However, in their stead women with the same names were picked up. One of these was a prostitute called Emy.⁶ She had no idea what *Gerwani* was.

While fleeing Atikah changed her name to Jamilah. The military started searching for a Jamilah. One of the women they found was called Jemilah, not Jamilah. The story of Jemilah, nicknamed the '*Srikandi* of Lobang Buaya' is corroborated by women such as Ibu Sujinah who had been in the same prison, Bukit Duri, and who had known Jemilah.⁷ It was reported that Jemilah confessed that *Gerwani* women had been 'stabbing with small knives at the genitals of the generals, until they were dead'. This story appeared in all army newspapers in exactly the same wording. It was clearly a prepared text (Wieringa 2002). Jemilah herself has passed away. After her death her second husband, R. Juki Ardi, a writer who had been imprisoned on Buru Island, wrote her story down (Ardi 2011).⁸

On the advice of her first husband, a SOBSI leader, young Jemilah, just married and three months' pregnant, went home in the first week of October. She was intercepted by soldiers who asked her name. They had orders to look

out for a woman called Jamilah and arrested her immediately, in spite of her protests that she was called Jemilah, not Jamilah. The soldiers (with red berets, so RPKAD) stole her money and all her possessions. She was brought to the KOTI office, beaten till she was almost unconscious and ordered to sign a statement as Atika Jamilah, which she refused. Later she was brought to the Corps Polisi Militer. There she was again brutally beaten, stripped naked and humiliated. Several rape attempts were made, which she somehow successfully fought off, Ardi reported. She was tortured so badly that she had given up all hope of living and indeed would have rather died. She almost went mad. Women imprisoned with her tried to support her. Ultimately she was sent to the women's prison Bukit Duri where she was held for 14 years without ever being brought to trial.

Young Jemilah was ignorant about politics. Her first husband did not feel it necessary to enlighten her about national politics and his role in it. She had never even heard of the PKI, let alone *Gerwani*, yet during her interrogations she was often called '*lonte Gerwani*', Gerwani whore (Ardi 2011: 70–71). She was tortured so badly that she miscarried.

Apart from the heavy torture inflicted on her, including sexual torture, Jemilah was forced to hold a rubber-tapping knife (*arit*). This was the kind of knife the generals were said to be killed with. Her torturers told her: 'Gerwani dog ... you can choose ... I rape you or you follow our orders'. Jemilah had never seen this kind of knife before. It resembled the knife her father used for cutting the rice, but it was smaller. 'Take it. This is the tool you used to cut out the eyes of the generals in Lubang Buaya', the soldiers snarled. She had no idea what was expected of her, but picked up the knife and was brought outside under a rambutan tree, where she was photographed as 'proof' that she had participated in the events at Lubang Buaya (*ibid.*: 77–78).

The campaign was designed to associate communism with wild, perverse, rapacious and murderous women and to present the army as the virile saviours of a nation on the brink of destruction. It was the intention of the myth-makers and their henchmen to not only smear *Gerwani* through sexual slander and therefore brand the PKI as sexually perverse, but also to attack the President. The journalist Simatupang mentions that on 15 January 1966 demonstrating students wrote 'with letters as big as elephants' on the walls of the house in Bogor belonging to one of Sukarno's wives, Hartini: 'Here is the lair of syphilis. Hang Great Gerwani'.⁹ Simatupang, a fiery anti-Sukarnoist writing at the time (24 January 1966), describes the alleged orgies of Sukarno and his ministers. 'The rancid small Neros and Caligulas ... are continuously drunk. All sorts of *obat kuat* (aphrodisiacs) and condoms are to be found in the bags of their diplomats ... Bung Karno still shies away from dissolving the PKI as he is afraid that his relations with China will be broken ... as he fears that the supply of *obat kuat* from China will be interrupted ... this is more important than the prestige of our people ... Revolution cannot be equated with pornography and obscenity' (2013: 216–18).

The consequences for those close to President Sukarno were great. Take, for example, the life story of Nani Nurani Affandi (2010). Born in 1941 into a traditional aristocratic family in Cianjur, West Java, she rose to become one of the best-known singers and dancers of classical Sundanese art. President Sukarno, who loved classical art, invited her often to entertain his numerous guests. The 'Golden Voice' from Cianjur did not only sing for the President. On another occasion she performed at the celebrations for the 45th anniversary of the PKI in June 1965, in her place of residence, Cianjur. Ironically she was prevented from performing some dramatic scenes, as the *Gerwani* members involved were against this kind of diversion for their husbands. She never joined a political party or organization, apart from the Sundanese Art Group (*Seni Budaya Sunda*). The tense situation after 1 October prompted her move to Jakarta. Slowly she realized that she was associated with the slander concerning the events at Lubang Buaya and that there were accusations that she was involved with the G30S group.

For three years Nani managed to remain under the radar. Finally in 1968 she was arrested. She was still so famous that she herself was not tortured, but she heard the cries of those who were being tortured in another room. She spent seven years in jail, without any formal legal process. She was accused of having been at Lubang Buaya, a place she never knew existed, and of reading a ballad when General Ahmad Yani was on the threshold of death (which is ludicrous, as Yani was killed in his own house). At one time she was even accused of being a lover of Aidit, whom she only met once at a public reception at the palace. Even the elderly and highly respected Ibu Salawati Daud, the first female mayor (of Makassar, famous for having confronted the mass murderer Captain Westerling), was accused of dancing naked in Lubang Buaya, of being a prostitute and of being one of Aidit's lovers.

After the army press started publishing the stories about *Gerwani* at the end of 1965, all over the country women who had never heard of Lubang Buaya were portrayed as devils who had tortured the generals. Tens of thousands of women who had lived honourable lives in their villages suddenly were beaten up, thrown into prison and killed. Innumerable women from various left-wing organizations, after being savagely raped, had their breasts cut off. They were labelled as witches, atheists, sexual maniacs and perverts.¹⁰

What did *Gerwani* stand for?

Although *Gerwani* is often seen as an organization of 'communist' women, it was actually an independent organization, with strong links to and sympathies with the PKI. *Gerwani* was established in 1950, under the name of *Gerwis* (*Gerakan Wanita Indonesia Sedar* – Movement of Conscious Indonesian Women) by young women freedom fighters and some more senior progressive women. During the national revolution women's political participation was welcomed. The first President of the Republic, Sukarno, called the women's movement the 'second wheel' on the chariot of the

national revolution.¹¹ However, after independence had been won women were expected to return to the 'kitchen, bed and well', (*dapur, kasur, sumur*, the three places in which women were supposed to excel, according to traditional gender ideology). *Gerwis*, which became *Gerwani* in 1954, insisted that women still had another revolution to fight: freedom from subordination as women and for their right to act in the political arena. After the mid-1950s the organization built up a women's mass movement. At the local level *Gerwani* members worked hard to alleviate women's problems, generally defined as illiteracy, low and unequal wages, inadequate social security, the scarcity of crèches, the many problems faced by female farmers, unequal marriage rights and high prices (Wieringa 2002).

As members of the 'left family', these 'militant mothers' (Wieringa 2002) assisted women workers, and farmers, male and female, who had been imprisoned owing to their involvement in the *aksi sepihak*. At large demonstrations they protested about the increasingly deplorable economic situation and demanded equal wages for women. They denounced violence against women and polygyny, advocating equal marriage rights. The organization was never formally associated with the PKI but, when it was obliged in early 1965 to align itself with other parties, as all mass organizations had to, it decided to formally join the PKI family.¹² That decision was to have been ratified at the organization's December 1965 congress, which due to the political upheaval never took place.

Gerwani's political and social activities antagonized the more traditional women's organizations, and conservative groups in general, though at the local level cooperation was usually good. *Gerwani* started as an independent organization of motivated and politically conscious women interested in both national and women's liberation. Gradually the struggle between its two factions, the feminist and the communist wing, intensified. By mid-1965 the communist wing had gained the greatest influence, particularly at the national level.

Throughout its history *Gerwani* fiercely supported the politics of President Sukarno, who increasingly veered towards the socialist camp in the Cold War. But it also criticized him on several occasions, protesting against his disastrous economic policies. Until the very end they kept fighting for women's emancipation and for affordable food prices. No other women's organization has met with so much success in Indonesia.¹³

By 1965 *Gerwani*, with one and a half million members, was one of the largest women's organizations in the world. Based on a nationalist, socialist and feminist ideology, it opposed the restoration of the traditional roles of Indonesian women as loyal wives, homemakers and devoted mothers, and demanded space for women in the public sphere.

Ideologically the PKI's short-term political interests often intervened in the movement's more feminist work. The close relationship with Sukarno, whose womanizing was notorious, undermined *Gerwani's* long-standing campaign for a 'democratic marriage law' which would outlaw polygamy and remove

the ease with which Muslim men could obtain a divorce. The organization also advocated for heavier penalties for rape and abduction (Wieringa 1988: 78). Male leaders of the PKI and associated organizations could count on fierce opposition from *Gerwani* members if they took a second wife, a common perk for successful men.

A well-known case is that of the famous *Lekra* painter Sindoadarsono Sudjojono, who was married to Mia Bustam and had eight children with her. When he became a PKI Member of Parliament, he asked Mia to accept a second wife, Rose Pandanwangi. Mia refused, supported by *Gerwani* which agitated on her behalf, and finally he was fired from the party in 1957. In 1959 Mia divorced him. This saved his life, for he was never arrested. He even did a painting showing a demonstration of student activists carrying a banner bearing the words '*ganyang PKI*' ('annihilate the PKI'). Mia Bustam remained a member of *Lekra*, a well-known painter in her own right and was imprisoned from 1965 until 1978.¹⁴

Wild spinach

As the song about wild spinach (*genjer*) played such an important role in the slander campaign, it is worthwhile discussing the background in more detail. *Genjer* is the name of a weed that grows along the edges of fields. During the Japanese period it became a poor people's vegetable in Banyuwangi, East Java. At that time a song was composed by a local musician, Muhamad Arief, whose wife used to make a tasty dish from it. He was then a member of the NU; he was also a friend of Nyoto, the chair of *Lekra*. On his way to a meeting in Bali in 1962 Nyoto passed through Banyuwangi, where Arief entertained him with a cultural performance. Nyoto realized the widespread appeal that the song 'Genjer-Genjer' might have and popularized it nationwide. From the 1950s onwards it had already been well-liked particularly in East Java. After 1963 popular singers such as Bing Slamet and Lilis Suryani brought out their own LP versions, which were mellifluous and crooning.¹⁵ Together with other Indonesian folksongs it was promoted as part of a cultural campaign against Western imperialism and the perfidious influence of what Sukarno called '*ngik-ngak-ngok* music' (see also Wieringa 2002). It was widely aired on national TV and radio. Muhamad Arief rose to some prominence and became a member of the regional council, representing the PKI.¹⁶ Although the song had nationwide appeal, it became linked to the struggle going on in the countryside between poor farmers and rich (Muslim) landlords. *Gerwani* members sang it frequently, but they were not the only ones; village children in East Java staged performances, dressed as farmers.¹⁷

An alternative version was produced, sung by the anti-communist students. It was first published in the journal of Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa Indonesia (KAMI – Indonesian Students Action Front), who, inspired by Father Beek and trained by Sarwo Edhie, staged many violent demonstrations during the last months of 1965 and the beginning of 1966.

First the text of the song composed by Muhamad Arief is presented below, and then the army version. They are both written in a form of Javanese (Osing, mixed with Madurese).

Genjer-genjer nong kedo'an pating keleler (2x)
Ema'e thole teko-teko mbubuti genjer (2x)
Oleh satenong mungkur sedot si thole-thole
Genjer-genjer saiki wis digowo mulih

Genjer-genjer esuk-esuk didol neng pasar (2x)
Dijejer-jejer diuntingi podo didasar (2x)
Ema'e jebeng podo tuku gowo welasar
Genjer-genjer saiki wis arep diolah

Translation (by the authors):

Genjer-genjer, it is all over the field (2x)
The boy's mother has picked one basket (2x)
She comes home to breastfeed her boy
And she took it home

In the morning she brought it to the market (2x)
She neatly arranged it for the buyers (2x)
The mother of a girl bought it and put it in her bag
Now the genjer is being prepared

The KAMI version:

Jendral Jendral nyang ibukota pating keleler (2x)
Emake Gerwani, teko teko nyuliki jendral (2x)
Oleh sak truk, mungkur sedot si thole-thole
Jendral Jendral saiki wes dicekeli

Jendral Jendral isuk-isuk pada disikso (2x)
Dijejer-jejer ditaleni lan dipulosoro (2x)
Emake Gerwani, teko kabeh melu ngersoyo
Jendral Jendral maju terus dipateni

Translation (by the authors):

The generals are all over the capital (2x)
Gerwani (members) came to abduct them (2x)
They got a truck and went home to breastfeed their children
The generals had already been captured

In the morning the generals were tortured (2x)
They were displayed, tied up and made miserable (2x)

Gerwani members came to take part in their torture
Then the generals were killed.

In a perverse turn of events after the actions of the G30S group the army accused *Lekra* and *Gerwani* of having used the song to train *Gerwani* members to kill and castrate the generals. Were not the women swinging their sharp sickles to accompany their singing? The song was prohibited; singing it became associated with unspeakable communist-inspired perversions.¹⁸

The Lubang Buaya story becomes widespread

The lurid stories of dancing, singing, sexually depraved girls were spread all over Indonesia. In Bali, as Robinson (1995; 2018) notes, the success of the media campaign which portrayed the PKI through the slander of its women's organization as morally depraved was such that the population was put into a frenzy which permitted the carnage. The campaign exacerbated long-standing political and social tensions which in themselves would not have led to neighbours slaughtering each other. As Robinson writes:

Later investigations purportedly revealed that Gerwani members in Bali had been instructed to 'sell' themselves to ABRI men in order to obtain weapons for the PKI and having done so, to murder and castrate the soldiers they had seduced. Like the fabricated stories about Gerwani women performing a naked dance while castrating and gouging the eyes of the captured generals on October 1 these revelations served to make PKI members to appear not merely as simple political traitors but as immoral, debauched and inhuman. This tactic made the delegitimation of the party and the murder of alleged members very much easier than they otherwise might have been' (1995: 293). He quotes a local newspaper: 'After scraping as much profit as possible from their shameless sexual activities, Gerwani members were supposed to murder and at the same time cut off the genitals of their victims'.

(1995: n. 70)

These stories circulated in Medan too, and Anwar Congo, the protagonist in Oppenheimer's film *The Act of Killing*, is haunted by them. Yan Parulian Lubis, a founder of the notorious *Pemuda Pancasila*, maintains that two bodies of PP members who had gone missing during the action in the village, namely those of Adlin and M. Yacub, were found in Kampung Kolam. When five days later their bodies were found 'a part of their eyes and of their genitals had already disappeared as a result of the torture'.¹⁹

In the small island of Sabu, which lies some distance offshore from the eastern part of Indonesia, the leader of *Gerwani* who was in Kupang at the time of the generals' murder, was accused of having been in Jakarta and to have participated in the naked dances.²⁰ The report of the human rights

organization AJAR (2015) provides numerous examples of women prisoners being searched for *Gerwani* tattoos or being accused of having danced at Lubang Buaya.²¹ The Indonesian state military exported its violent methods to East Timor.²²

Female artists, particularly singers, were singled out for the association of perverse sexuality with their art, such as Ibu Nani. Female singers (*sinden*) accompanying traditional art forms such as *wayang* performances, fell under suspicion. Weintraub (2004) analysed how they were sexualized in West Java after 1965.

Who were the spin doctors who disseminated this story about the madly dancing and castrating women? Is it possible that religious specialists such as the fiercely anti-communist NU leader Subchan or the Jesuit priest Father Beek, who were both closely involved in the student movement, played a role? After all they were specialists in sin and sex. In the 2016 novel *The Crocodile Hole* Saskia Wieringa plays with this suggestion. It is also possible that the inspiration was found in the popular novel *Germinal* by Emile Zola which had been translated into Indonesian in the mid-1960s. In this novel a bourgeois rent seeker is castrated by a group of enraged female workers. This is often suggested in meetings that Saskia Wieringa and Nursyahbani Katjasungkana held with the victims.

But the main actors are found in the political and security sectors of the army. An anonymous source, very close to Suharto at the time, revealed that these stories originated from Sucipto S. H., the head of the political section (G5) of the KOTI command chain.²³ They were further spread via the Chief of the Army Information Centre, General Ibnu Subroto, who controlled the press and the radio. From this group the fabrications emerged that framed the PKI as the sole *dalang* (puppeteer) of the 30 September Movement. They also coined the acronym *Gestapu*, to be added to PKI, an acronym of *Gerakan September Tigapuluh*, a clear reference to the Nazi Gestapo.

These stories were widely believed in the frenzied political and religious atmosphere of the time. In a remarkable show of harmony, right-wing Muslim and Catholic forces combined to destroy the PKI. The chair of the KAP/*Gestapu* and later the *Pancasila* Front was NU cleric Subchan, and its secretary the Catholic leader Harry Tjan Silalahi.²⁴ The Dutch Jesuit priest, Father Beek, a close associate of Ali Murtopo, Chief of Opsus, the intelligence division of Suharto's *Kostrad*, was also involved.²⁵

Next the lies had to be propagated. According to Sunario Sunarsal, editor of the army newspaper *Berita Yudha*, already on 4 October Army Information Chief General Ibnu Subroto, and lead editor of *Berita Yudha*, had appealed to the paper's staff to write about the PKI in such a way that the people would hate the party. This order caused the 'journalists to forget one important thing, the result of the autopsy carried out by the doctors headed by General Dr Roebiono Kertopati' (Pour 2010: 259).²⁶ It was echoed by the military all over the country, and heeded by the national radio and local newspapers. Ibrahim Sinik, in *The Act of Killing*, also makes it very clear that

his job as an editor in Medan at the time was to make the people hate the communists.

A guide published by Ibnu Subroto gives an indication of the content of the campaign (Puspenad 1965). This 447-page text is divided into three parts. The first part is dated 5 October 1965 and concludes with the events that took place two days after the bodies were exhumed.²⁷ The third part is dated 5 December. In his preface General Ibnu Subroto states that this text is intended as 'troop information', while the investigation was still ongoing (ibid.: 5). The use of the English word 'troop' suggests that this form of counter-intelligence was picked up in one of the training camps that senior officers attended in the US but nowhere in the text can we learn anything about more direct CIA influence.

The third part incorporates a list of 97 so-called facts that are supposed to prove that the PKI was the *dalang* (puppet master) of G30S. Amid mention of various boxes of *alat tjukil mata* (tools designed to cut out eyes but in fact ordinary rubber knives) or weapons for the PR or *Gerwani*, *Gerwani* is specifically mentioned several times. In the first story *Gerwani* members are accused of procuring young girls from Tassik (Tasikmalaya) for prostitution in Jakarta and Bandung (as prey for womanizers, *mangsa nafsu hidung-hidung belang*; see Pusat Penerangan 1965: 343). After having thus framed *Gerwani* as both prostitutes and pimps, in another 'fact' the plotters are accused of having set up various 'Black Cat' ('*Kutjing Hitam*') and *Genjer-Genjer* groups (ibid.: 379–80). In a subsequent item the theme of the Black Cat is further elaborated. In Blora PKI members were said to have prepared holes in their houses into which the dead bodies of their (unspecified) adversaries could be thrown, and in which weapons, such as bamboo sticks with poisoned points, were allegedly found. Documents were also discovered that 'proved' that a unit of *Kutjing Hitam* had been formed and tasked with abduction and murder. They were also meant to poison the wells (ibid.: 381–82). In one of the last items on this list of perversities the authors turn to the alleged role of *Gerwani* in 'poisoning' (both morally and through the use of various powders) the nation's children in the many kindergartens set up by *Gerwani* around the country (ibid.: 386).²⁸ From other sources we know that these so-called Black Cat groups were allegedly set up to train *Gerwani* members to carry out castrations and maimings (Wieringa 2002).

The millions of schoolchildren who were forced to watch Arifin C. Nor's eponymous 1983 film *The Betrayal of the G30S/PKI* every year had this memory of 'communist women' as devilish, cruel whores etched on their minds. To their despair women who had legally and enthusiastically carried out many social, educational and political activities as proud members of the 'socialist family' in Indonesia, and who had been imprisoned for many years under inhuman conditions, came home to find their children and grandchildren also asking them whether they had been murderers and prostitutes. The anti-*Gerwani* propaganda was so effective that both the released women and their family

members kept silent, as they were afraid that they might be associated with anti-government behaviour (see also Sukartiningsih 2004).

The Act of Killing: the story of Arsan and Amina²⁹

An illustration of the deep impact of the sexual moral panic created around *Gerwani* is provided in Oppenheimer's 2012 documentary *The Act of Killing*. This film provides a rare insight into the psyches of some of the mass murderers involved in the Indonesian genocide. It also demonstrates that in Medan and separated in time by at least 40 years, the myth of the castrating *Gerwani* women still lives on. Oppenheimer's film offers a chilling portrait of present-day Indonesian society, the banality or normality of the violence and sadism during the massacre, and emphasizes the persistent silence surrounding it.

A major part of the film consists of a film-within-a-film, with the main characters, such as self-confessed mass killer Congo Anwar, acting out a fictional, at times surreal story, based on their experiences and Anwar's nightmares. This story centres around Arsan and Aminah. Arsan, a young man with right-wing tendencies, is played by Anwar, while Aminah, his communist girlfriend, is played by his potbellied assistant Herman, wearing grotesque drag. Anwar relives and re-enacts the past he is still so proud of and which he wants future generations to remember. In a telling scene the freshly murdered Arsan lies beside Aminah, mouth smeared with the red juice of some berries. Aminah laughs loudly, madly, and eats a piece of raw liver, shouting that it is Arsan's liver which she has just ripped out. Next she produces an oblong piece of stuffed cloth, approximately 20 cm in length, also dripping with berry juice and proceeds to stuff that into the mouth of Arsan, (who, although dead, is gagging) shouting 'this is your penis, eat it'.

Later, when Herman and Anwar watch this scene being screened, Anwar muses that this should be shown at the beginning of the film, so that people would understand why he committed murder. The brutal murderer Anwar and his cronies represent an aggressive form of masculinity, the type called *jago* (literally rooster; see Onghokham 2003). Fearless, callous, swaggering, boastful, womanizing – this is the kind of masculinity that of old has been sported by the musclemen of power holders.

From this angle the sexual orgy invented by Suharto and his advisors, epitomized in the hate-inspiring picture of the aggressive, sexually promiscuous women of Lubang Buaya, can be read as a tactical move in a wider struggle, a clash of masculinities. The female counterpart of the gender order in which the masculinity of *jago* thrives is a docile, sexually subservient woman; this figure belongs within the patriarchal, militarist New Order of Suharto. *Gerwani* belonged to the realm of the patriarchal pre-1965 government, of the PKI and Sukarno. At that time women's emancipation was ostensibly applauded, but the social struggle was seen as being more important (Wieringa 2002, 2011). *Gerwani*, in its insistence on women's public visibility and

agency, came to symbolize not only all that was un-Islamic, but by extension was also curtailing new-found post-colonial masculine power. In other words *Gerwani* members were viewed as castrators. The PKI, although patriarchal in its relations with *Gerwani*, precisely because of its support for the movement, represented in this view the kind of abject masculinity that the army and right-wing Islamic groups despised (Wieringa 2003).

In *The Act of Killing* this struggle is acted out on various levels. Several dance sequences are shown, as part of the film-within-the-film about Arsan and Aminah. The association with the 'Dance of the Fragrant Flowers' is imbricated by allusions to present-day TV shows and by the Hollywood dreams of Oppenheimer's protagonists. The sexual politics underlying the construction of the PKI as evil and barbaric are portrayed most clearly in the lurid scenes in which Anwar's friend, Herman Koto, is dressed up as an ageing transvestite (modelled after the popular transvestite TV actor and comedian Tessy, aka Kabul Basuki, who is typically portrayed with heavy make-up, thick protruding lips and glittering jewellery). His/her acting is associated with *Srimulat*, a humorous, low-brow Javanese form of theatre (particularly popular in cities such as Surabaya and Solo) which is transgressive of both class and gender.³⁰

Herman, who in *The Act of Killing* is shown to be subservient to Anwar, in drag becomes even more his 'wife', exposing a same-sex intimacy which suggests another layer to the homosocial atmosphere of the film. In his role as 'spouse', Herman, who murders and castrates his boss and 'husband' Anwar and eats his liver, mouth dripping with blood, evokes the overthrow of the normative gender order, which *Gerwani* was accused of.

Herman adds gaudy revealing clothing to his character (although in his case his huge stomach and thick coarse legs don't suggest feminine attractiveness). The grotesque drag clothing of Herman/Aminah sends another message as well. The multicoloured feathers and his revealing clothing suggest a vulgar kind of sexuality which is made all the more repellent by the boorish masculinity of Herman. He is never convincing as a female character; instead it seems as if his rudeness is exaggerated to demonstrate that *Gerwani* women were actually crude masculine characters. Thus, instead of a male-to-female gender reversal we also watch a female-to-male drag scene which evokes the alleged masculinity, or at least the unfemininity of the castrating, murderous *Gerwani* members. Another association is that Herman/Aminah, madly shouting, portrays the PKI as being out of control, and therefore as unmanly and feminine (and in a witchlike way capable of performing gory, outrageous acts of perversity).

These images are juxtaposed with scenes portraying actual sexual torture. If the Arsan/Aminah story is fantasy, the scene in which the gangster Safit Pardede reminisces about his raping of young socialist girls ('hell for you, but heaven for me') reminds one only too well of the actual horrors of the time.

Homophobia and the revival of a red scare³¹

A new wave of communist phobia has swept over Indonesia since the end of 2014. A Front Pembela Islam (FPI – Muslim Defenders' Front)-related group led by Syeik Misbahul Anam Attijani produced a book with 'proof' that the PKI was organizing itself underground. The book accused this PKI *Gaya Baru* (PGB – New Style Communist Party) of linking up with the 'liberal movement' so that it could disseminate books, hold seminars and show films. Therefore, it was proposed, the FPI and the army should work together to stem the growing influence of the PGB.³² In spite of overwhelming evidence that hundreds of thousands of PKI members and supporters of Sukarno were murdered in 1965–66, and that many others perished in prisons and slave camps without due legal process, conservative groups insist that Muslims were victims too. 'Not only the PKI were victims, also the religious leaders were', declared Vice-Chair of the *Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat* (MPR – People's Consultative Assembly) Hidayat Nur Wahid, a member of the right-wing Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (PKS – Prosperous Justice Party). 'For there were also *ulama* and generals killed ... If the government has to be judged, then the PKI as well'.³³ By May 2016 bookstores selling leftist books were being raided, and the public was warned that if they saw any left-wing pamphlets, T-shirts or stickers they should report them to the authorities.³⁴ The President initially supported these raids.³⁵ The hardliners accused the PKI of poisoning the soul of the nation, and thus all PKI attributes wherever they were found had to be destroyed (although nobody knows where they suddenly came from), and meetings of victims violently dispersed. They claimed that because it had imported an 'alien' ideology the PKI deserved to be destroyed, and the victims deserved to be murdered. These people must be cleansed from 'normal' Muslim society.

This hate campaign runs in parallel with a continuing virulent homophobic campaign that began at the end of 2015. Both campaigns promote the 'othering' of groups that are not supposed to belong to the nation, and the cleansing of them from society. The homophobia campaign started as a crusade to ban LGBTI organizations from Indonesian university campuses and then spread to condemn LGBTI organizations in general. This episode has exposed many prominent political figures as either ignorant (LGBT is a disease that can be cured) and/or homophobic (it is against our culture and religion and must be prohibited). Even highly educated political leaders have joined the chorus.

Not surprisingly the same generals who have been voicing anti-communist threats also feature in the homophobic campaign. Minister of Defence Ryamizard Ryacudu declared in February 2016 that 'the emergence of a pro-LGBTIQ movement among Indonesia's youth' was 'a proxy war on the nation and poses a larger threat than nuclear warfare'.³⁶ Human rights activists are again singled out for defending these anti-nationalist groups by introducing foreign practices into an 'innocent' Indonesia. In a similar vein

the LGBTIQ movement is seen as a threat that undermines the nation's youth and threatens national sovereignty.³⁷

Homosexuality has never been illegal in the penal code, which was inherited from the Dutch. However, under the influence from Wahabi Islam (which spread via the *dakwa* (proselytizing) movement in the 1970s) fundamentalist Islamic thought has been on the rise. Here are just a few examples. The first university to ban a discussion on LGBTI rights was the Diponegoro University (Undip) in Semarang, on 13 November 2015.³⁸ On 24 January 2016 the Rector of the prestigious National University of Indonesia prohibited the presence on campus of the Support Group and Resource Center on Gender and Sexuality Studies. The Minister of Research, Technology and Higher Education, M. Nasir, agreed: 'a university campus must guard morality'. He continued, 'the presence of a LGBT group on campus harms the morality of the people'.³⁹ A politician belonging to the fundamentalist Muslim PKS, Nasir Djamil, concurred, stressing that 'the LGBTI community was a serious threat to the nation'.⁴⁰ According to Djamil, they should not be allowed to hold academic discussions. In March the Indonesian Psychiatrists' Association classified homosexuality as a mental illness, defying broad, international scientific consensus that rejects such classifications.⁴¹

Political leaders have continued to use hate speech. The prominent politician Hidayat Nur Wahid (former chair of the Wahabist party PKS, vice-chair of the MPR) warned that the very basis of the state, the *Pancasila*, was at stake. It was 'threatened by amongst others communists and LGBT [people]'.⁴² 'LGBT people must be banned just like we banned communism and drug trafficking', added Hanura Party Secretary-General Berliana Kartakusumah in a discussion at the House of Representatives on 4 March 2015.⁴³

Criminalization of homosexuality is taking place at various levels (Katjasungkana and Wieringa 2016b).⁴⁴ Several right-wing political parties have announced that they are preparing an anti-LGBT bill to be submitted to parliament.⁴⁵ The position of the anti-LGBT Muslim parties is summarized by Hidayat, who thanked Allah that many Muslim political parties speak with one voice in supporting a law that seeks to reject LGBT people.

LGBT people can be classified as waging an asymmetrical war, the kind of war that tries to influence people with the goal of destroying the moral foundation of society ... It is a cheap war, thus asymmetric. It is not a physical war ... but when the morality of the people is destroyed, the country has no morality any more, no vision of the future, its glorious ideals are destroyed so that the country collapses.⁴⁶

Restrictions on the portrayal of LGBT people on TV were announced in March 2016 by the *Komisi Penyiaran Indonesia* (KPI – Indonesian Broadcasting Committee). There has been a long-standing practice of MTF transpeople (*waria*) depicting comical characters in several popular TV shows.

Although this kind of portrayal was very stereotypical it was also good-humoured. And it gave *waria* dancers and singers an opportunity to demonstrate their skills to a wider public. Traditionally transgender performance artists have been a common feature in several cultural theatre and dance forms. Following a public outcry against this way of 'promoting homosexuality' the KPI issued a circular prohibiting the appearance of feminine-looking men on TV.⁴⁷

Groups intolerant of gay rights took their case to the Constitutional Court. In August 2016 a group of 12 academics from the *Aliansi Cinta Keluarga* (Family Love Alliance) petitioned Indonesia's highest court to redefine existing laws. Three articles of the penal code are under review. Article 292, inherited from the Dutch (but which has since been revoked there) criminalizes same-sex relations of an adult with a minor. Seeking to appeal to morality and religion the plaintiffs proposed to delete the phrase 'with a minor' so that all forms of homosexuality will become illegal, regardless of age, even if they are consensual, and punishable by up to five years in jail. They lost their case, and now support efforts to criminalize homosexuality (and all forms of extramarital sexuality) in parliament.⁴⁸

Comparing both campaigns

A 2016 survey conducted by the Indonesian Survey Institute and the Wahid Foundation found that the LGBT community was the minority group most disliked by Muslim people in Indonesia, with the communists coming second.⁴⁹ Yenny Wahid, a daughter of late President Abdurrahman Wahid, the Director of the Foundation, explained that the survey was conducted in April 2016, 'when the LGBT issue went viral on social media. Therefore, the respondents were influenced to name LGBT people as the most disliked'. Although the communists were the people viewed with most contempt during the New Order era, in 2016 most people declared that they did not want LGBT people as their neighbours.

The sexual slander against *Gerwani* established a pattern in which deviant sexuality came to be defined as a threat to the nation. Women had to be taught how to be obedient in patriarchal heteronormative families, defined as *sejahtera* (prosperous) during the New Order era and as *sakinah* (the Arabic word for happy) during the increasingly religiously conservative post-1998 *Reformasi* period.⁵⁰ The indoctrination and propaganda over decades as well as the killing and silencing of thousands of the nation's most progressive teachers and artists led to a climate of intellectual apathy, breeding the kind of stupidity and warped reasoning that still characterizes much of the present-day campaigns.

Comparing the campaigns, it can be seen that in both cases the nation has to be defended against alleged threats to its integrity and morality, defined as attacks on the *Pancasila* and the Muslim religion. In both cases science is distorted. Homosexuality is confused with paedophilia and is seen as

contagious, and orientation (homosexuality) with behaviour. Both politically active women and LGBTI people are viewed with a 'pornographic gaze'. The PKI is accused of being 'always already' a rebellious party, spreading sexual perversion and immorality, while the history of violence among hardline Muslim groups in Indonesia is ignored. Defenders of human, sexual and women's rights are seen as secular, liberal people who do not uphold Muslim values and who may also spread LGBTI propaganda and communist ideas. It is striking too that in both cases the movement is seen to be more threatening than LGBTI or communist individuals. Communists and LGBTI people are othered, rejected and dehumanized, in order to present the nation as pure, religious and not based on (mob) violence and exploitation. In the process violent scripts are naturalized and people are seduced to become addicted to the 'moral' but intolerant, fragile national state.

The anti-LGBTI and anti-communist propaganda is in many ways similar to the Nazi propaganda, which almost perfected the 'art of persuasion' (Welch 2014). Its effectiveness is situated not so much in the imposition of new ideas as in the distortion of existing moral anxieties. Lingering sexual-moral apprehensions are mobilized and strengthened. Fear of LGBTI communities and of an alleged revival of the PKI is stirred up as these groups are presented as a threat to the nation, its religion and its *Pancasila* ideology. This nation is apparently so vulnerable that it needs a strong army and vicious militias to protect it.

Another effect of these parallel and almost simultaneous present-day campaigns is that the abjection of the individual groups is strengthened. Somehow the stigma of communism rubs off onto the LGBTI community, while the victims of the 1965 genocide, already associated with sexual perversion, are now also tainted with the stigma of homosexuality. Are not both groups treacherously undermining the state's morality and weakening its vigilance? Their epistemic proximity is strengthened as they are often mentioned together on one banner during the many demonstrations by hardline groups.

This struggle for the soul of the nation is intended to result in an obedient, religious society from which all 'abnormal' elements are banned. This is clearly in the interest of the army which sees its political power strengthened and its economic interests secured. The current weak President seems to be unable or unwilling to stem the aggressive move towards the restoration of army hegemony, with its privileges and financial power. The simultaneous stirring up of communist phobia and homophobia produces a toxic mix of Indonesian exceptionalism, in which globally accepted standards of human, women's and sexual rights are ignored, resulting in humiliation and fear, as well as economic distress of countless Indonesian citizens whose rights are violated. As in 1965–66, the army comes out victorious and democracy suffers. Unlike in 1965–66, victory is shared with hardline Muslim groups. Whipping up a fear of communist guerrillas about to jump out from the jungles and the slums where they are supposed to be hiding and of LGBTI

people infiltrating pious Muslims' bedrooms, it seems only the brave army is able to prevent the nation from sliding into an Armageddon.

Conclusion

A striking feature of the slander against *Gerwani* is that it is cast as the principal torturers, mutilators and executioners of the generals murdered during the G30S affair, despite the fact that there is incontrovertible evidence that they had nothing to do with the murders.⁵¹ The architects of this psywar realized that the sadism and sexual perversion attributed to *Gerwani* would be particularly effective in demonizing the PKI. The PKI was not only presented as the *dalang* behind the murders of the country's top brass but also as wilfully perverting the nation's women. Thus its alleged callous capacity to commit atrocities and its wanton sexual behaviour was presented as one of the most vicious of the PKI's crimes (see also Drakeley 2007). Even alleged orgies were presented as being personally orchestrated by PKI leader Aidit.⁵² The real perversion was seen to lie in the PKI's advocacy of equal rights and women's political and sexual agency (Wieringa 2002). The very foundation of civilization and of religious morality was therefore turned upside down, and was only restored by Suharto's brutal restoration of the old gender regime. This was an order in which women were supposedly innocent of perversion and sadism (qualities which apparently were 'natural' for men?) and which was seen as the bedrock of Indonesia's social stability (Wieringa 2003). *Gerwani* women were portrayed as witches, as female monsters, she-devils and 'mothers of evil'. Since then '*Gerwani* whore' has become an epithet for all politically active women.

Indonesia is not unique. Chinese nationalists also found that the 'charge of sexual immorality was an extremely effective weapon for discrediting communist party organizers (Wieringa 2000: 453, citing Gilmartin 1994). And Goebbels too used sexual metaphors in his anti-Semitic hate speech.

The two sexual moral panics discussed in this chapter were created to influence the way in which the Indonesian nation imagines itself. Overall the level of (feigned) ignorance, prejudice, outright lying and political opportunism is staggering. Voices supporting LGBTI or 1965 victims' groups, or drawing attention to scientific and historical arguments, are drowned out. The pornographic campaign of sexual slander against *Gerwani* has not only affected those directly accused, just as the present-day homophobic campaign has wider ramifications. When Jemilah was released at the age of 28 years, her life was ruined. She died in abject poverty, the stigma of '*Gerwani* whore' still upon her – and on her children. This happened to tens of thousands of women who didn't even know where the Crocodile Hole was located but were nonetheless accused of having danced there. The campaign of sexual slander against them incited the genocide and other crimes against humanity committed by the military and its henchmen in the form of the many militias that assisted in murdering their own neighbours.

It has also changed the texture of society. The capillary circulation of power generated by these campaigns produces forms of knowledge in which homophobia and communist phobia become naturalized, because both are associated with sexual perversion. They are engraved onto the collective consciousness of Indonesian society. The present wave of homophobia is grafted onto the earlier campaign and continues it, now to discredit human, women's and sexual rights defenders. The dehumanization campaign that triggered the mass killings still results in the dehumanization of leftist people and human rights defenders in general.⁵³ The present-day homophobic campaign feeds into these fears. Both social and human rights activists who are accused of building up the PGB and sexual rights activists, are singled out for persecution, in the interest of the army, which does not want to be called to account for the human rights violations it committed, and hardline Muslim groups, who want to impose their hegemonic version of Islam and stamp out the diversity and pluralism which characterizes the huge archipelago.

Notes

- 1 See for the role of the press in the New Order Hill (2007).
- 2 www.cnnindonesia.com/nasional/20160928084414-20-161689/meniti-lorong-waktu-lubang-buaya-pusat-petaka-30-september. But he adds that they had been dancing and singing.
- 3 *Kompas*, 13 December 1965: 2. Other journals also carried this story, such as *Sinar Harapan* (8 December 1965).
- 4 See Pour (2010) for the role of Sukitman.
- 5 See Wieringa (2002; 2003) for details of this media campaign. See also Drakeley (2007).
- 6 A fictionalized account of this story can be found in the novel *The Crocodile Hole* (Wieringa 2007, English translation 2016).
- 7 She was interviewed several times in the early 1980s by Saskia Wieringa.
- 8 See also Wieringa (2015b).
- 9 Hartini was called *Gerwani Agung* (Great Gerwani) by anti-communist groups because she was believed to have been a supporter of *Gerwani*.
- 10 For examples see Komnas Perempuan (2007), AJAR (2015), Pohlman (2015) and Sukartiningsih (2004).
- 11 In his book *Sarinah*, first published in 1947.
- 12 When the formal decision was taken by the board of *Gerwani* in May 1965, prominent socialist feminist labour leader S. K. Trimurti resigned. This saved her life.
- 13 *Gerwani's* loyalty to the President went so far that it hardly opposed the polygynous marriage of Sukarno with Hartini in 1954. Here Perwari bravely took the lead, for which the movement suffered heavily (Wieringa 2002).
- 14 Conversation in the National Gallery in Jakarta with the painter Misbach Thamrin (27 November 2015). Paintings of Soedjojono's two wives are hanging in the National Gallery. That of Mia Bustam is entitled *Ibu menjahit* ('Mother Sews'). The other of Rose Pandanwangi is entitled *Isteriku* ('My Wife'). See also Bustam (2013).
- 15 See, for example, *Genjer-Genjer, pembelokan sejarah yang tercecceer*. Available at www.Agunghariyadi37.blogspot.nl/2012/genjer-genjer-pembelokan-sejarah-yang-tercecceer (accessed 8 February 2013). Or see *Sejarah dan misteri lagu Genjer-Genjer*.

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- Available at www.pbb-palestina.blogspot.nl/2008/01/sejarah-dan-misteri-genjer-genjer.html.
- 16 After the G30S affair he fled to Malang where he was captured and disappeared without a trace – as did so many of Indonesia's artists and intellectuals.
 - 17 Nursyahbani Katjasungkana witnessed this herself in her village.
 - 18 See also Susanti (2006).
 - 19 Ryter mentioned that since then an obelisk monument had been erected on the spot where the bodies were found (1998: 56). According to Ryter, surviving residents had no memory of the PP bodies, they only remember their own men being rounded up.
 - 20 Interview on 26 July 2015 with Martha from the women's research group in Kupang, who interviewed the former Sabu Gerwani leader.
 - 21 This happened also in prisons in Jakarta, as Ibu Utati Toer testified, interview 11 September 2014.
 - 22 Indonesia brutally occupied East Timor between 1975–99, massacring, starving and torturing to death about one third of the total population. Aditjondro (cited in Loney 2016: 67) suggests that the high level of sexual violence is related to the association of the politically active East Timorese women with the demonization of *Gerwani*. Loney elaborates that the Frente Revolucionária de Timor Leste Independente (FRETILIN – Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor) was stigmatized as atheist and immoral, evoking the New Order's depiction of communist women as a threat to morality. She provides examples where East Timorese women were forced to dance when interrogated, a practice reminiscent of the torture of Indonesian women activists, who were accused of having danced at Lubang Buaya and were made to enact their alleged lurid dance movements in prisons all over the country.
 - 23 Interview held in early 2018. S. H. stands for *Sarjana Hukum* (lawyer). Sucipto studied law at the University of Indonesia.
 - 24 This group was initially called the *Kesatuan Aksi Pengganyangan Gerakan 30 September* or KAP *Gestapu*/PKI (Pour 2012: 164). Pour quotes from Soemarno Dipodisastro's 1977 book *Tritura dan Hanura*.
 - 25 Ali Murtopo was an expert in psywar methods; by his own confession he already played a double role during the war of independence (Lucas 1991). He remained an aide and confidant to Suharto and later became deputy head of the *Badan Intelijen Nasional* (BAKIN – national intelligence coordinating agency) Mujiburrahman 2006).
 - 26 Ticoalu (2015) interviewed Dr Liaw Yan Siang, one of the forensic doctors who carried out the autopsy. When he realized the extent of the lies presented in the army's propaganda he believed that his life might be in danger and fled to Ohio, US. Being a Chinese man, he feared he might be implicated and accused of lying about the autopsy in order to whitewash Chinese involvement. He made it clear that no eyes were gouged out and no penises dismembered.
 - 27 The precise publication date of the text remains unclear, although it is evident that it was published while events were still unfolding.
 - 28 This is probably the source of the various stories of *Gerwani* poisoning children or wells that still appear in right-wing Islamist propaganda texts.
 - 29 See for an in-depth account Wieringa (2014).
 - 30 See also Barbara Hatley (2008).
 - 31 See Katjasungkana and Wieringa (2016b) for a broader analysis of the criminalization of LGBT rights and Wieringa (2000, 2017) for a further analysis of communism and homophobia.
 - 32 www.topikviral.com/2016/05/fpi-bekerjasama-dengan-tni-siap.html?m=1.
 - 33 See <https://nasional.tempo.co/read/news/2016/04/19/078763898/tragedi-1965-hidaya-t-wahid-pki-juga-harus-minta-maaf>.

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- 49 With 26.1 per cent compared with 16.7 per cent, respectively.
- 50 See Wieringa (2015a) for an analysis of the transition from *sejahtera* to *sakinah* families.
- 51 Sukarno protested against these lies in a speech on 12th December 1965 to the journalists of *Antara*. See Siregar (1995: 757–61) for the full text of Sukarno's speech.
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7 The complicity of the middle class

Melbourne, Monash University. We have given a presentation on the results of the hearings of the IPT 1965 and discussed the moving testimony of Kinkin Rahayu (pseudonym). She had mentioned the name of her most sadistic torturer, Lukman Sutrisno. Sutrisno, who had already passed away, enjoyed a good reputation as a critical scholar at the Gajah Mada University (UGM) in Yogyakarta. A young woman dressed in a jilbab jumped up agitatedly. 'I cannot believe that Lukman Sutrisno, from UGM, has been one of the worst torturers committing sexual torture on the witness from Yogyakarta. I am a close friend of his wife and knew him well. He was such a kind person. And why do you have to dig up the past?'¹

Introduction

The direct perpetrators of the massacres and other crimes against humanity after the G30S affair were the military and members of the murderous militias trained by the military. But they were not the only ones involved in these crimes. If we also consider the millions of people whose interests were invested in the necropolitical New Order, many other groups of people were in one way or another complicit in the Indonesian genocide, and the military dictatorship established by it, thus revealing the rhizomatic structure of the New Order military bureaucracy.

Complicity refers to the involvement in an activity which one knows to be unlawful or morally wrong. Extrajudicial killings, torture and imprisonment without trial are clearly both unlawful and morally wrong. Yet many of those who contributed to these crimes in Indonesia, or who in one way or another abetted these crimes, justified their actions to themselves. Many of them went on to become respected members of society, critical scholars even, such as Lukman Sutrisno. There are more categories of complicity. Millions of Indonesians supported the military dictatorship established by General Suharto and his henchmen, by their consent and their silence in the face of the violence which they knew had happened, and their denial or even justification of this violence, their docility and compliance or their wilful ignorance. Arendt

(1963) coined the phrase the ‘banality of evil’. She studied how it is possible that bureaucratically minded officials can perform murderous deeds with a clear conscience. In her analysis complicity is a sliding scale: at one end are the murderers, and at the other end those who neither tortured nor killed, and who never had any intention of doing so, but who through their silence, or their support for particular aspects of the murder machinery, assisted in its workings. This sliding scale demonstrates the capillary workings of the propaganda machinery of the New Order. Many apparently honourable citizens abetted genocide and other crimes against humanity.

In this chapter we discuss two such cases. First, we look at the students who through their violent mass demonstrations created the climate in which Sukarno could be deposed. Their actions took place during the first phase of the massacres. The demonstrations helped to create the climate in which the massacres became intelligible. Second, we consider the psychologists who designed and implemented the tests which determined the category of the prisoners or the conditions and timing of their release. In the absence of a judicial process their actions replaced legal criteria. They legitimized the imprisonment of hundreds of thousands of people under inhumane conditions, by the scientific labels generated by their dubious activities (in the sense of both methodology and ethics).

Recent discussions on complicity in genocide have largely focused on the criminal responsibility of those concerned (Van den Herik and Van Sliedregt 2004; Van den Wilt 2006). Apart from the ambiguity of the definitions used in the cases where this issue has been discussed (such as in the case of Rwanda) these legal matters are not our concern here. This is also because international case law provides insufficient guidance. In this chapter we focus on the moral aspects.

The student movement

Far from being spontaneous outbursts of popular violence, the student mass demonstrations which led to the overthrow of President Sukarno had been well prepared and were orchestrated by the army. But the army had allies. A conservative Catholic group, guided by the Jesuit priest Father Beek, had been particularly active in the first stages of mobilization. In using the students to stir up mass unrest the army waged a kind of proxy war (Conboy 2003; Wanandi 2012). The students, many of whom were genuinely appalled by the mass poverty they saw around them,² masked the involvement of the Resimen Para Komando Angkatan Darat (RPKAD – Army Para Military Regiment) which could not be seen to act too openly against Sukarno, who still had a lot of support among the navy and air force (Kasenda 2015).

Right-wing Muslim students belonging to the *Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam* (HMI – Association of Muslim Students) formed the majority of the demonstrators. They had been engaged in a bitter rivalry with the left-leaning *Con-sentrasi Gerakan Mahasiswa Indonesia* (CGMI – Concentration of Indonesian

Students Organizations), established in 1956. The latter organization had the support of President Sukarno, who had wanted the universities to become a major resource for his revolutionary aspirations. In the end the conservative students turned against him and the CGMI was destroyed, and its members killed, imprisoned or disappeared.

Although the student leaders held many of their meetings at military headquarters, their nexus with the military had to remain covert. Yet they were armed by *Kostrad* (Wanandi 2012: 59).³ The strong relationship between the Catholic and Muslim students was one of the success factors. The former student leader Wanandi provides an illuminating inside account of the Catholic student movement which had prepared itself long in advance with printing presses and safe houses (2012: 189). By October 1965 they had between 2,000–3,000 trained cadres, equipped with typewriters, stencil machines and paper (Supriatma 2016).

As Cosmas Batu Bara said in an interview, long before they had set up KAMI, the anti-communist students had had contact with conservative army generals. Cosmas himself had often visited ‘Pak Nas’ (General Nasution) in his office at the Ministry of Defence. The generals had always said ‘don’t be afraid if the PKI fights, we will “finish them off”’ (*kita habisin*; ISAI 1995: 42). After the actions of the G30S group they also had contact with *Kostrad*. The army leader they were closest to was Ali Murtopo. Cosmas, originally from the *Perhimpunan Mahasiswa Katolik Republic Indonesia* (PMKRI – Catholic Student Union) was also a leader of the umbrella anti-communist student federation *Perserikatan Perhimpunan Mahasiswa Indonesia* (PPMI – Union of Indonesian Students’ Organizations). He became the Chair of the Presidium of the KAMI. Father Beek trained them in anti-communist tactics. ‘How else could we fight CGMI?’ asked Cosmas (*ibid.*: 43).

The immediate strong reaction of the anti-communist forces after the actions of the G30S is not surprising therefore. In the home of the Catholic students’ organization in Menteng, Jalan Ratulangi, one day after *KAP-Gestapu* was set up (on 3 October), the decision was taken to unify the scattered student organizations. They held their first public rally on 4 October 1965. Protestant activists were initially reluctant to join in but later on did so anyway (Mujiburrachman 2006: 24). On 25 October an alliance of nine student organizations, known as KAMI, was formed. *KAP-Gestapu* was led by the NU politician Z. E. Subchan and the Chair of the PMKRI, Harry Tjan Silalahi (Kasenda 2015: 31). Not only Muslim groups harboured anti-Communist sentiments. Hardline Catholic priests and organizations also considered the PKI to be atheist and were deeply involved in the mass killings. A striking example is the Jesuit priest Father Beek.⁴

Father Beek

Since the early 1950s Father Beek had been giving his most promising Catholic students a one-month cadre training session (*kaderisasi sebulan*) in

Yogyakarta in Asrama Realino. When he moved to Jakarta the training was delivered in Wisma Samadi, East Jakarta. The sessions included a combination of physical training and anti-communist indoctrination (Giebels 2005: 198). Among his most promising students were Cosmas Batubara and Harry Tjan Silalahi. Father Beek wanted to train young people who later would wield great influence in parliament and government. Father Beek moulded his students mentally and physically to fight against communism. He would punish them severely for minor offences, including administering corporal punishment. Of the 100 youths in any session (usually about 90 of them were young men, and the others young women) generally 25 left or were sent home. The others retained a lifelong loyalty to him and would regularly report back to him (Mujiburrahman 2006: 139).

Beek was an intellectual and motivating force behind KAMI and helped to formulate its three demands, or *Tritura* (*Tri Tuntutan Rakyat* – Three Demands of the People), namely: (1) ban the PKI; (2) effect a change of government; (3) lower prices. Beek was also behind the establishment on 9 February 1966 of the Kesatuan Aksi Pemuda Pelajar Indonesia (KAPPI – Indonesian Youth and High School Students Action Front), which he compared with the monkey army of the Ramayana. But Beek not only influenced the Catholic students. General Nasution had asked him to train the Muslim students of the Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam (HMI – Association of Muslim Students) as well.⁵ It can therefore be said that Father Beek, along with Colonel Sarwo Edhie of the RPKAD, were the brains and the driving force behind the massive violent student demonstrations which helped to prepare the overthrow of President Sukarno, and the slaughter of the communists.

It was not just the student leaders who took part in Father Beek's training sessions. By the time that G30S had taken place, Beek had already succeeded in building a strong Catholic component in the army. Relations between the Catholic church and the military had started to become closer by the early 1960s (Mujiburrahman 2006: 134). This move was engineered by Father Beek, who was worried about the possibility of a 'Communist takeover and tried to prepare a standby underground Catholic movement to anticipate this threat' (ibid.: 135). Beek established contact with Ali Murtopo who was chief of *Operasi Khusus* (*Opsus* – special operations, the intelligence division of *Kostrad*) at the time and other *Kostrad* officers. He was also close to Sudomo, who later became chief of *Kopkamtib*. Between them they supplied the students with what they needed for their actions, such as transport. And when the palace guard *Tjakrabirawa* chased the students, they found a safe haven at the *Opsus* headquarters in Kebon Sirih.

In January 1966 the Front *Pancasila* was established or actually re-established, for Father Beek had already formed a Front *Pancasila* prior to the G30S affair. Again, Harry Tjan was Secretary, while NU leader Subchan was chair. They decided not to attack Sukarno directly, but directed their actions at the PKI first in order to weaken Sukarno (Giebels 2005: 199). Working behind

the scenes, Beek controlled both the Front *Pancasila* and KAMI, the leaders of which came to him for instruction before taking to the streets.

Preparations for the mass demonstrations included economic sabotage. To weaken the national economy and fuel the anger of the students, a parallel economy was created. The army collected money from rice traders, rubber manufacturers and cigarette factories as ‘protection money’. Around the beginning of February 1966 Suharto and his staff convinced the oil producer Caltex that the army needed to import goods for its own needs. The company agreed to pay 60 per cent of its regular taxes from oil to a nameless account in the Netherlands, not to Bank Indonesia. A similar agreement was negotiated with the tyre and rubber company Goodyear (Kasenda 2015: 32). The army could therefore buy loyalty from its own soldiers and ruin the economy for the people, so that the Sukarno Government could be accused of not fulfilling people’s needs (Kasenda 2015; see also Crouch 1978 and Simpson 2008). All this with the tacit agreement of the US and the UK, as discussed in Chapter 3.

According to the Dutch journalist Van den Heuvel:

[Father Beek] was teaching at the University of Jakarta. From there he had already for years manoeuvred important people towards key positions within society and collected ‘wizz kids’ around him, with whom he formed students’ cells. And as was proved shortly before and after the *coup d’état*, the students grew into an enormous power. Every time difficulties threatened the military of Sukarno, tens of thousands of students streamed onto the streets to hold demonstrations.

(Paraphrased from VPRO Radio, 1 February 2009)

All of it was, according to Van den Heuvel, stage-managed by the cleric’s followers: ‘[The direction of the coup] was not possible without Suharto, the army and the CIA’. According to Van den Heuvel, Father Beek also had indirect contact with the CIA (Wertheim 1995: 301).

Subandrio was one of the few people who understood the role that Beek was playing at the time and he tried to have the priest assassinated. When Beek heard of these plans he fled the country. Following the capture of Subandrio, Beek returned.⁶ He actively promoted the slogan ‘to kill or be killed’, thus creating an atmosphere as if the *Bharata Yudha* was about to happen.⁷

According to Van den Heuvel, Beek knew everything that was going on. He knew Suharto personally and wielded considerable influence on him via his direct assistants such as the Wanandi brothers. He also wrote many of Suharto’s speeches (Giebels 2005; Wertheim 1995). Another Jesuit priest, Father Heuken, agrees. The latter even sent a letter to the Vatican in 1967, in which he complained that Beek was far too heavily involved in the massacres which were taking place. An envoy was sent and Beek was briefly recalled.⁸

Beek had many international contacts, including Father Ladania (or Laszlo Ladany) who was most probably a CIA agent (Aditjondro 1998). According

to the prominent historian Asvi Warman Adam, Beek actively disseminated anti-communist literature which was financed by the CIA.⁹ He was also collaborating with the Freemasons and with the CIA directly, for instance via agent Martens with whom he helped to compose the list containing the 5,000 names of PKI cadres who had to be killed (Sembodo 2009). Another influential contact was the Australian Bob Santamaria, the founder of the anti-communist Pacific Institute (Supriatma 2016). Long before the G30S affair Beek regularly sent him reports, which found their way to the Australian intelligence service, and from there on to the CIA (ibid.). By that time Beek headed up the Jesuit Documentation Bureau. This think tank was probably most up to date regarding the PKI at the time. Beek had succeeded in planting a spy in the top of the PKI, as an assistant to Sudisman (Wanandi 2012). This Bureau became the model for the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a major think tank for Suharto's New Order.¹⁰ It is possible that Beek went to Australia and met Bob Santamaria when he was fleeing from Subandrio's wrath. It is equally possible that he received money to support the anti-Sukarno demonstrations.¹¹

The students take to the streets

Initially the main demonstrations departed from the buildings of the *Universitas Indonesia* (UI – University of Indonesia) in Salemba Raya. Catholic students, taking the advice of Father Beek, were the strategists, while the Muslim students from the HMI formed the majority of the participants.¹² Within a few weeks after KAMI was formed, branches sprang up throughout the whole country. The students were transported in trucks made available to them by the army and their leaders were protected from arrest by forces loyal to Suharto. The main campaign started on 10 January 1966. Sarwo Edhie gave a speech at the UI Salemba campus. He and his troops were hailed as heroes, having just returned from their campaign of mass slaughter. He propagated the *Tritura*, cooked up by Beek. On 15 January 1,000 students were brought on army trucks to the palace in Bogor (Kasenda 2015: 127–53).

Tensions ran high. On 24 February a student, Arief Rachman Hakim, was killed during a demonstration. He was immediately proclaimed a martyr. To calm the situation down Sukarno demanded that KAMI be dissolved. Supported by Sarwo Edhie and Ali Murtopo the students immediately resurrected their movement in the form of the paramilitary *Lasykar Arief Rachman Hakim* (ARH) on 4 March 1966 at the UI. It consisted of seven battalions. This *lasykar* ransacked the Foreign Office, while KAPPI students attacked the Ministry of Education and Chinese institutions. Both ministries were headed by progressive ministers. The students even considered abducting several ministers who they considered to be left leaning, particularly Minister of Foreign Affairs Subandrio (Kasenda 2015: 127–42). On 7 March 1966 Sarwo Edhie ordered his men to mingle in a student demonstration in civilian clothes (Conboy 2003: 151). Anti-Sukarno university lecturers also organized

themselves: the lawyers Haryono Tjitrosoedono and Buyung Nasution set up the *Kesatuan Aksi Sarjana Indonesia* (KASI – Indonesian Action Front of Scholars) (Giebels 2005: 205). Sukarno had lost his grip on the nation and his fall was clinched by the *Suparsemar*, discussed previously in this volume.

The students pressed on. With the help of General Kemal Idris and Sarwo Edhie, KAPPI and the *Lasykar* ARH abducted four ministers on 16 March. These included the Minister of Justice (Astrawinata) and of Education (Priyono). The next day the Minister of Foreign Affairs Subandrio was also arrested. They were all brought to *Kostrad* headquarters. Ultimately 15 ministers were captured (Kasenda 2015: 151–53).

The atmosphere in the country had totally changed during these few months. A new regime of disciplinary power had been created. Nursyahbani Katjasungkana experienced this herself. In 1965 she was in the fifth grade of primary school, and had joined in the merry dances of the time, singing the popular song ‘Genjer-Genjer’. As she had skipped a year she was just about to start at her new school in September 1966 at the age of 11 years. Nursyahbani and a boy in the class above her had taken part in the KAPPI demonstrations against the boy’s father, a PKI member. When it became obvious that the boy was courting her, her schoolmates teased her by celebrating their ‘engagement’, carrying flowers they had picked and branches they had torn from trees. They were singing. But Nursyahbani wept and shouted, ‘I don’t want to go out with the son of a PKI member’. His father was the village head; he had run away after he heard that his two brothers had been killed in the botanic garden (*kebun raya*). Up until this day nobody knows what happened to him.¹³ The boy witnessed his two uncles being forced to shuffle on their haunches to the botanic garden, where one of the largest mass graves in the country is located, their hands chained behind their backs.

The alliance between Catholic and Muslim students was a purely instrumental affair. The conciliatory mood lasted until the Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat Sementara (MPRS – Temporary People’s Consultative Assembly) session in 1966 when Muslims demanded the introduction of Sharia law (Kasenda 2015). They were opposed by secular and Christian/Catholic parties. On 1 October 1967 the HMI in Makassar, led by present Vice-President, Jusuf Kalla, went on a rampage and destroyed nine Protestant churches, four Catholic churches, one nunnery, the offices of the Catholic Party and two Catholic schools (Mujiburrahman, 2006: 39).

Aftermath: an intellectual genocide

Following the violent actions of the conservative student movement and the elimination of the CGMI, what were the consequences for university life? Abdul Wahid has been researching the immediate and long-term effects of the events of 1965 on Indonesian academia.¹⁴ He maintains that the screening and purging of both left-wing students and academics amounted to an

intellectual genocide which caused fundamental changes to take place in the academic life of Indonesian universities. The impact can be assessed by considering the number of students and staff purged (killed, imprisoned, disappeared or fired), the number of institutes closed or destroyed, the reaction of the academic leadership, the changes in the curriculum and the content of the libraries, as well as the general academic and research climate.

Of the ten universities Wahid investigated, the Universitas Gadjah Mada (UGM – Gadjah Mada University in Yogyakarta) had the highest number of lecturers and students purged or disappeared: 115 and 3,006, respectively (these figures represented a quarter of the total number of students at UGM at the time). The military had played only a small role, and the university leadership at the time had proudly managed all this on its own.¹⁵ For its good services it received a diploma, signed by Sarwo Edhie on 25 December 1965; he thanked the university for helping him in the ‘*Operasi menumpas Gestapul PKI di Djawa Tengah*’ (‘operation to annihilate the *Gestapu*/PKI in Central Java’). In 2015 this diploma was still proudly displayed in the main university building. Activist students took pictures and spread it via social media. Debates were held, in which the university was reminded of the moving testimony of Kinkin Rahayu. Despite the diploma, the Rector, Dwikorita Karnawati, refused to take responsibility, claiming that this purge was the action of a few individuals.¹⁶ During the discussion, the students also alleged that the curriculum had been changed dramatically.

In a seminar on 11 August 2016 Wahid revealed that following the G30S affair 16 academic institutes had been closed. On 10 October 1966 KOTI issued a command to screen the university campuses.¹⁷ All Marxist literature was removed from university libraries. Staff engaged in self-censorship, minimizing attention to social issues and reorienting the curriculum. A generation of progressive teachers and students had disappeared, never to return.

The repression of university life continued after these first waves. University lecturer Oetomo (2007) noted three ways in which intellectuals were controlled during the New Order era: screening, silencing and terror. Like other civil servants they were subjected to the various screening methods discussed earlier. They had to hand over the usual documents to ‘prove’ that they and their family members were ‘clean’ in terms of having no links with the PKI. They had to repeat this procedure every time they applied for an exit permit to go abroad. Naturally this hampered the exposure of excellent academics to international contacts. As an intellectual Oetomo is also very irked about the *Pancasila* course that the academic staff had to follow, as its logic is *kacau balau* (totally confused) (ibid.: 179). Not only were these courses an insult to their intellectual capacities, but they were implemented in an atmosphere of intimidation. During the New Order era, research permits (also for foreign researchers) were difficult to obtain, permission had to be sought at village to national level. Topics that were felt to disturb stability and order were prohibited. Public lectures were sometimes prohibited, books were banned and the rectors’ and deans’ offices were controlled by the army territorial

command structure. Added to this was the constant threat of arrests, abductions, imprisonment and disappearances of student activists (Oetomo 2007), for the students had long given up being the willing pawns of the military.

Denial or complicity?

How do former student activists look back on their participation in the violent demonstrations, while the mass murders were going on under their very eyes? In this section we discuss three reactions: early criticism; justification and a mild sense of guilt; and amnesia followed by a deep sense of grief and guilt.

The first student activist to publicly acknowledge his involvement in the demonstrations was Soe Hok-Gie who died in a mountaineering accident in 1969. *Tempo* (10–16 October 2016) devoted a special report on him. In 1983 his diary was published (*Catatan Seorang Demonstran* – ‘Annotations of a Demonstrator’). He professed himself to be both an ardent critic of Sukarno, who had caused so much suffering to the people, and of the brutal actions of Suharto. His early death represented a great loss to what remained of an independent intellectual life. In 2005 a film directed by Riri Riza was made about his life.¹⁸

He was deeply disturbed by the mass murders and in 1968 called on the government to free all political prisoners by the end of 1969 if they could not be proven guilty in court (*Tempo* 10–16 October 2016: 16). Prior to this, in 1967 he researched the mass murders in Purwodadi, Central Java and Bali. He documented a case in which the perpetrators severed the hands and feet of a regional chief. As the victim lay dying, they dragged the wife towards the scene and raped her in front of him (*ibid.*: 25). In a letter to Daniel Lev in 1968 he wrote that he was afraid that he would suffer a guilty conscience if he did not speak up. He also realized that many student leaders were paid by *Opsus* (*ibid.*: 22).

If Gie was close to the Partai Sosialis Indonesia (PSI – Indonesian Socialist Party), the Wanandi brothers, Hashim and Jusuf, were ‘Beek’s men’. Curiously this fact is not mentioned in Jusuf Wanandi’s 2012 memoirs, *Shades of Grey*. This book is essential reading for those who want to understand the background behind the student demonstrations from a Catholic point of view, but this omission is remarkable.¹⁹ The secrecy Beek demanded stretches over his grave. Jusuf Wanandi went on to become an important figure in *Golkar* (part of the team that helped Suharto to win the 1971 elections) and co-founded the CSIS that year.

He too feels guilty about the massacres but to a much lesser extent than Gie. ‘Who knows what the commies would have done to us if they had won’, he muses (2012: 190). His way of dealing with it is to minimize the extent of the massacres; the number murdered might have been around 200,000, he estimates. We ‘heard about the killings’ he admits, but we did not react to those ‘barbaric acts’ (*ibid.*: 82). It was a ‘horrible mistake’ he concludes, for

which both Sukarno and Suharto must accept responsibility (ibid.: 79). He tried to atone for these crimes by working towards the release of the Category C prisoners, some 600,000, who were ‘detained – for nothing’ (ibid.: 190). He only started his efforts after Suharto had obtained his victory, so that he could safely say that ‘there was no way to condone this anymore because we had won’. So he talked to the head of *Kopkamtib*, Sudomo, and by 1974 some 550,000 prisoners had been released (ibid.). It took more time to lobby Sudomo to release the Category B prisoners too, which they eventually were via the International Red Cross in the late 1970s. While he keeps protecting Suharto (who, he writes, may not have known everything that happened, and anyway when the killings were going on Sukarno was still President) he now advocates a truth and reconciliation committee. Human rights, he admits, were not on our agenda at the time – we were only concerned with our own survival.

Paul Mudigdo was an important figure in the Indonesian human rights world. A lawyer by training he introduced the concept of structural legal aid. Together with his mentor and friend Buyung Nasution he co-founded the *Lembaga Bantuan Hukum* (Human Rights Institute) and become a mentor for many young human rights lawyers and criminologists who were taking great risks in the days of the New Order. That he had also been an ardent activist in the anti-Sukarno movement and had co-founded KASI in Bandung, nobody knew. Pak Paul himself never mentioned it. ‘Amnesia’, he explained during a series of interviews we held with him in 2015 and 2016, prior to his death.

He had only realized with a jolt during a congress in Leuven, Belgium, in 2000, where he was the main speaker, criticizing the New Order, that he had actually supported the brutal military actions to destroy the PKI that led to the end of the Sukarno regime. Therefore, he was complicit in these events! In the last interview we held with him, on 23 March 2016, he attempted to explain to himself and to us how all that had happened. He wept at the time, imploring us to continue with the search for justice, and he expressed his ardent support for the IPT 1965.

He was named after his aunt, the mother-in-law of Aidit, Ibu Moedigdo. Father Beek was a family friend, but the young Paul never liked him. He grew up with strongly nationalist ideas and initially joined the CGMI when he was a student at the UI. Later he went to teach at the Universitas Padjadjaran (UNPAD – Padjadjaran University in Bandung). His closest friend was the university Dean, Muchtar Kesumaatmaja, who became a very corrupt Minister of Justice during the New Order. Muchtar was banned from teaching, following student unrest in 1963 for which he was held responsible. A false accusation, according to Pak Paul, for at the time Muchtar was only interested in academic affairs. Angry about this injustice Paul turned against Sukarno and co-founded KASI in Bandung, which comprised scholars from the two leading academic institutes in the city, the Institut Teknologi Bandung (ITB – Bandung Institute of Technology) and UNPAD. By that time the massacres had already started. Paul composed the founding statement of KASI,

arguing for truth and justice. Paul was the second chair. In the interviews with us he realized that the military involved them for its own ends (*'menggarap kita'* – 'they cultivated us'). 'With KASI', he told us, 'we wanted to establish democracy. We held demonstrations and distributed pamphlets and pressurized the political parties with our *Tritura* demands. With our propaganda we justified what was going on'. In 1965 he attended a congress on *Hukum Acara Pidana* (Criminal Procedure Law) when the killings had already started. The participants rejoiced in that. They all supported General Nasution who called upon people to destroy the PKI. That was the atmosphere of the day.

Psychological testing

The enormous number of detainees after the G30S action raised the question of how to deal with them. As mentioned in Chapter 3, accounts vary as to the exact number of prisoners held during the period (Kammen and Zakaria 2012; Van der Kroef 1976). In an interview with Dutch TV on 9 October 1976 (Abrahamse and Disse 1980: 155) *Kopkamtib* Chief, Admiral Sudomo, referred to 750,000 prisoners. According to Fealy's (1995) estimate, between one and one and a half million people had been detained at any one time between 1965 and 1979. Pohlman (2017) estimates that women counted for approximately 15 per cent of the prisoners.

In the absence of any legal means to distinguish between prisoners' degrees of involvement, the army leaders decided to classify them in terms of degrees of 'communistness'. An important criterion was the rank the prisoner held within the PKI or its affiliated organizations. Leaders were considered more dangerous than ordinary members. But it was felt that more information was needed. This they sought to acquire by administering psychological tests. As no legal charges could be made and therefore no judicial processes could be initiated, classification came to substitute for law. A classification of B rather than C might mean the difference between life and death. Category C prisoners were released much earlier than the Category B prisoners.

The number of people belonging to the various categories varied. Tapol (1976) provides the following breakdown: in Category C there were 1,375,320 prisoners who spent less than ten years in prison; the 34,587 Category B prisoners were kept in prisons or slave labour camps for more than ten years; and of the Category A prisoners, 426 were put on trial, some received death sentences, others were sentenced to life imprisonment.²⁰ A 1995 armed forces official account gives different figures: 1,887 prisoners were classified in Category A, of whom 1,009 were eventually tried, while the others (878 prisoners) were reclassified to Category B.²¹ Siregar, quoting General Try Sutrisno, reports that Category A comprised 814 people, who were all sentenced, while Category B consisted of 37,670 prisoners who were never tried. The largest category, C, consisted of 860,338 people. Category A prisoners might have been classified as Category B prisoners in order to lighten the workload of the courts. But if the concentration camps, for instance Buru, needed able-bodied

young men to work in the fields, Category C prisoners might be classified as Category B and sent to Buru (Siregar 1995: 365).

Psychologists were deployed to develop and administer these tests. This is a clear example of what Foucault (1977) calls bio-power, the abuse of science to justify repression – in this case crimes against humanity. Comparable examples can be found in the abuse of psychiatry during the Nazi Holocaust (Breggin 1993) and in the USSR (Szasz 1991). While these cases are well documented, little is known about the abuse of psychology in Indonesia. Yet in Indonesia too psychologists helped a murderous regime. Apart from acting as substitute judges, the prestige of these psychological experts was abused to justify the lengthy incarceration of communists – after all were they not perhaps mentally unstable? And was not the government acting responsibly by having all these people examined? The medical association was further strengthened by the renaming of the concentration camp on Buru, which by the time the prisoners were being screened to see if they were fit for release, had been changed from *Tempat Pemanfaatan* (*Tefaaf* – Place of Utilization) to *Instalasi Rehabilitasi* (*Inrehab* – Rehabilitation Centre).

An international scandal

In 1978 an international scandal erupted. In an interview with the *New York Times*, Admiral Sudomo told the journalist Henry Kamm that all Category B prisoners would be released but that the state of their communist ideology had to be checked first. The responsibility for these tests lay with General Sumitro, head of the Army Psychological Service in Bandung, who, with the help of Indonesian psychologists and foreign scientists in the US and the Netherlands, had been able to develop tests to determine on a scientific basis the level of ‘communistness’ of political prisoners. These tests were meant to determine the moment of release and the level of surveillance the prisoners required in the eyes of the military following their release.²² It had taken *Kopkamtib* two years to develop these tests; around 29,000 prisoners had already taken the tests, for instance on the island of Buru, which were administered by 200 assistants (see also Abrahamse and Disse 1980: 150 and Tanter 1991: 297–98). Admiral Sudomo added that when applied to Category B prisoners, as on Buru, there was a 70–80 per cent assurance of detecting communists. Two Indonesian psychologists Fuad Hassan and Katarina (pseudonym) had helped to compile these tests.

The involvement of Dutch psychologists in the development of these psychotests sparked widespread protests, especially in Nijmegen, where the tests had been initially developed. The protests were successful to the extent that the original purpose of the tests to ‘screen out diehard communists’ and withhold them from the release programme was defeated (Tanter 1991, n. 44). The University of Nijmegen was involved, as was the Free University of Amsterdam. In Indonesia the UI, the UGM and the UNPAD took part in this project.²³

Although they denied it, the Nijmegen psychologists who were involved in this project must have been aware of the military element of the project through their collaboration with UNPAD and the UI.²⁴ Professor Jaspers, in a letter dated 30 January 1979, confirmed that tests were used for the selection of political prisoners in Indonesia. He declared that they were compiled by Dr Sumitro and consisted of an intelligence test, the Edwards Personal Preference Schedule (EPPS), to measure firmness of convictions and ability to influence others, and the tough-tendermindedness scale of Eysenck.²⁵ Also involved in compiling the tests were Katarina and Sumarto.²⁶

The Indonesian psychologists were led by Fuad Hassan, the first Dean of the newly established Faculty of Psychology at the UI, and included Katarina, who worked on the list of questions (after a visit in 1974 to the island of Buru), Sudirgo Wibowo, who worked on the item-analysis for the interviews, Enoch Markum, and other students of Katarina. Both Katarina and Markum, when interviewed for this book, denied any knowledge of the use by the military of the tests they had been working on, although Katarina admitted she had visited the slave labour camps of Buru and Plantungan.

The Faculty of Psychology at UNPAD in Bandung was closely linked to the Army Psychological Service, and at UNPAD Professor Ma'rat was involved (Dean of the Faculty of Psychology since 1976), and also Mrs Yusuf Nusjirwan (who investigated the attitude of women inmates at the Bukit Duri prison in 1966) and Sumarto. All three UNPAD psychologists had links with the army. Nusjirwan was linked to both the UI and the Army Psychological Services from 1963 until 1967. Ma'rat was linked to the security services in West Java. Both he and Sumarto had been involved in the screening of political prisoners in Buru. Sumarto was a colonel at the time and later became a brigadier general and the head of the Army Psychological Service. He coordinated the activities of *Kopkamtib* to develop these tests, as confirmed by Katarina, who in turn was informed by Admiral Sudomo (*Haagsche Post*, 3 March 1979).

Two other tests were developed specifically for Indonesia. Major General Sumitro, head of *Pusbintal* ABRI, explained that these tests were complemented by interrogation files and observations and eventually yielded a classification of four categories, from 'diehard' through 'not so hard', a degree below that and finally to zero. The tests were applied on a wide scale. The Nijmegen team leader Professor Mönks remarked in 1979 that 'all Indonesian psychologists over the age of forty have taken part in formulating the tests for political prisoners' (*Tapol Bulletin* 34, 1979: 15). This was denied by all the Indonesian psychologists we interviewed. Several former political prisoners from Buru, such as Pramudya Ananta Tur (1988) and Hersri Setiawan (2004), have written about their experiences with these tests, to which they were subjected several times. Pramudya related that apart from assessing the religious knowledge of the prisoners, the psychological testing was primarily used to evaluate the political views of the detainees. He recalls a visit by a team of psychologists led by Fuad Hasan in 1973. The visiting psychologists cynically

commented on the spiritual growth of the prisoners in this slave camp and told them to keep faith and not to lose hope.

Katarina explains that she had talked to the wives of the political prisoners in the *desa* (village) Savanajaya where they lived with their husbands.²⁷ The wives resisted demands to change their status from *tapol* to transmigrants (Setiawan 2004: xviii). This demonstrates that they were perfectly aware of the compulsory character of their status. Katarina also mentions the torture and sexual violence that they experienced. Yet she never questions why the prisoners were detained, as if it is logical that when you are a member of an organization that became banned after a political event, that makes you guilty and liable to be tortured, detained, enslaved and humiliated.

Three waves of testing

On the basis of the material that is publicly available, roughly three waves in this process of testing can be distinguished.²⁸ The first wave of testing coincided with the development of the psychology departments at the UI and UNPAD and involved the initial classification of prisoners. The first purge attempt was aimed at those linked to the G30S itself. On 10 October 1965 an instruction was issued by Major General Pranoto Reksosamudro (who would later be purged himself) which stipulated that those involved in or sympathetic to the G30S had to be deactivated.²⁹ Around the same time Suharto, as head of *Kostrad*, sent a radiogram to all branches of the armed forces in which *Kostrad* had the power to appoint members of investigative teams (T-0265/G-5/1965) for purging the counter-revolutionary movement, and to 'conduct questioning of all prisoners/detainees to find any materials needed to destroy the adventurism of the G30S gang' (Djakababa 2013: 31).

On 12 October 1965 this was followed by a new radiogram instructing the KOTI apparatus, cabinet ministers and other civilian leaders to temporarily discharge any civil servants who had been absent without clear reason on 30 September 1965. Thus the first criterion to arrest/purge was involvement with G30S. The next criterion was absence from work on that date: all over the vast archipelago people were arrested whose whereabouts on the night of 1 October could not be accounted for satisfactorily (Djakababa 2013).

An urgent task for Suharto, as the newly appointed head of *Kopkamtib*, was to ensure that the armed forces owed their loyalty to him personally.³⁰ The PKI tactic of finding military personnel interested in social equality had been so successful that there were many supporters of the PKI within the military ranks, particularly within the air force and the Marines. General Nasution gave the starting sign for the cleaning-up operation of the armed forces in a speech on 25 October 1965:

It is clear who the enemies are within ... because in every institution, including the SAB [*Staf Angkatan Bersendjata* – armed forces staff] the cleaning and regulating processes are currently going on. The elements of

these *petualang* [adventurers] or their supporters are being swept out, and now people are ... hunting them down everywhere.

(Quoted in Dinuth 1997: 101–03)

In spite of what this quote suggests, however, it was not the common people who were chasing PKI members or sympathizers in the ranks of the armed forces; this was very much a process directed from above. And those doing the sweeping at the time were mostly military personnel themselves. On 12 November 1965 General Nasution, Minister of Defence, issued INS-1015, the first directive to provide a detailed classification of the people who had to be secured. Three categories were distinguished:

Category A. Those who were clearly directly involved:

- 1 In planning or those who knew about the counter-revolutionary plan but who did not report it to the authorities;
- 2 Those who were aware of the Movement's goals and who had implemented activities in order to assist in achieving them.

Category B: Those who were clearly involved in an indirect way:

- 1 After finding out about the counter-revolutionary movement, the person/group showed attitudes, either in their acts or in what they said that indicated agreement with the movement.

Category C: Those who could be presumed to be involved directly or indirectly:

- 1 The person was a regular active member or officer in an organisation that was directly involved with the PKI and its mass organisations, or other mass organisations that had a relationship with the PKI, or its mass organisations and who did not attempt to condemn the counter-revolutionary movement, but who also did not belong to the A or B Categories;
- 2 According to the previously known antecedents, person/s who had some involvement in the Madiun affair or the counter/revolutionary movement but who didn't condemn it;
- 3 A person who is a member of an organisation mentioned under point 1 but is not actively involved in it.

(Djakababa 2013: 18–19)

With this classification system the leaders of the various branches of the armed forces were supposed to rid themselves of communist elements. In this way clashes between the various parts of the armed forces were prevented. The air force and the Marines in particular had many PKI members or sympathizers. Suharto expanded on this policy, when he issued the directive 22/KOTI/1965 on 15 November 1965, signed by President Sukarno, insisting that PKI elements would be purged from the whole government apparatus.

These two orders became the basis for a similar system for political prisoners. General Suharto issued Presidential Instruction 09/KOGAM/1966 in May 1966, from ABRI headquarters. Three categories were developed, in relation to their perceived involvement with the actions of the G30S group, roughly along the lines set out by General Nasution. Category A was assigned to those who were deemed to be 'hardcore members of the PKI', who were 'directly involved' or who knew of the plan but didn't report it to the authorities, and against whom sufficient evidence existed to bring them to trial. Category B comprised those who were 'clearly indirectly involved', mainly alleged PKI functionaries or members or sympathizers of the PKI-affiliated mass organizations, at cadre level. They might also have expressed 'approval' of the G30S group or demonstrated an 'attitude' which expressed opposition to the suppression of the coup movement (Van der Kroef 1976: 628). In 1972 Admiral Sudomo clarified that upon release this particular group of prisoners were considered to pose a 'risk to national security' (ibid.) and therefore had to remain in detention. During the second wave Category B was divided into subcategories, such as B(T), for *tokoh* (leader; these people had to be killed and disposed of silently) and B(S), for *saksi* (witness, for instance Sudisman or the other PKI leaders; these prisoners were to be kept alive).³¹

Category C applied to anyone who was 'reasonably suspected of being directly or indirectly involved', be it minimally. This might be anyone who was a member of the PKI or its affiliated organizations. This might also include persons who had been involved in the Madiun affair. Category C was further subdivided into C1, C2 and C3, according to the level of involvement of the person concerned in the activities of the above-mentioned organizations. In June 1966 an instruction (no. 9) was issued by the *Komando Ganyang Malaysia (KOGAM)* that the more than one million prisoners must be classified as Category A, B or C (Taher 2015: 10–15).

The psychologist Mrs Yusuf Nusjirwan coordinated the first wave of testing. She stated that virtually all Indonesian psychologists in 1965–66 were involved in testing the political prisoners on the basis of the criteria spelled out above. The first test involved a simple Rohrschach test. This notoriously unreliable test was used as a basis to determine which prisoners could be released, or had to be further detained and interrogated (which involved severe torture). If they were classified as Category B prisoners many of them were later sent to one of the many concentration camps. Nusjirwan herself investigated the attitudes of female political prisoners in Bukit Duri in 1966 (Tapol 1979).

Thousands of investigation teams were set up all over the archipelago. In distant towns such as like Ende in Flores, for instance, this might take some time. Although the instructions dated from October 1965, the team in Ende only became fully operational in 1967, as Djakababa found:

The main interrogator, Mr S, admitted that interrogation was merely a formality; the questioning was not done to determine whether a person

was guilty or innocent, but to find a reason to eliminate the prisoner ... Prisoners often 'admitted' whatever the interrogators wanted to hear when they were continuously exposed to physical and mental torture.

(2013: 30–31)

Following a series of raids in 1968, a new Category X was introduced.³² In this instruction regulations were made for the use of prisoners for construction labour, re-education and resettlement.

Kopkamtib was directly responsible for the political prisoners, including their interrogation. A 1977 Amnesty International report stated that initially interrogation was intended as revenge and meant to terrorize people. Women in particular were targeted: 'Many women now in detention are known to have suffered severe torture during their interrogations by military intelligence officers. The torture inflicted included beatings, attacks with knives and daggers, burning with cigarettes, sexual assault and electric shocks' (Amnesty International 1977: 21). According to this report, doctors (who advised when beatings had the maximum effect) and psychologists were involved. The Rorschach test they used was intended to measure psychological deviations. The use of this test suggests that communism was seen as a psychological shortcoming.³³

The second wave of testing used new quantitative methods. Nusjirwan was one of the first to study at the University of Nijmegen. She was a colleague of Fuad Hasan, the first Dean of the Faculty of Psychology at the UI, and Katarina. Another psychologist directly involved with the validation of these tests and their application for the purpose of testing political prisoners was Sumarto (Haagsche Post, 3 March 1979). The Nijmegen psychologists who collaborated in the so-called KUN/2 project which entailed the upgrading of the psychological faculties of the UI and UNPAD were aware that both Nusjirwan and Sumarto had links to the army. However, Professor Katarina, in an interview with us on 11 January 2015, denied any knowledge of the association with the army of her close colleague Nusjirwan. Professor Ma'rat, Dean of the Faculty of Psychology at UNPAD at the time, also visited Nijmegen in relation to the same project. He was associated with the security services of West Java. Both Sumarto and Ma'rat were involved with the screening of political prisoners on the island of Buru from 1973 onwards. Fuad Hassan's involvement in this second wave of testing was particularly intense, given that he visited the prison camp on Buru twice, in 1971 and 1973.

The women's concentration camp Plantungan was also visited by psychologists. The former prisoner Sumiyarsi remembers the visit by a joint team from the UI including Katarina, UGM staff, General Sumitro and the chief of the Army Psychological Service, Kartosudjono. On the first day of the visit they carried out a psychological test which actually mostly consisted of testing one's religious knowledge. On the second day Katarina herself gave a

lecture in which she marvelled at the physical and psychological health of these women, after nine long years in prison (Lestariningsih 2011: 247–52).

The third wave of testing was associated with the release of prisoners. From 1975 onwards most Category B prisoners were released due to intense international pressure from both Amnesty International and the British Human Rights Organization TAPOL (Fealy 1995). Visits by the International Committee of the Red Cross to Plantungan and Buru had brought international attention to the plight of the prisoners. Psychological tests helped to determine whether the prisoners were fit to be released. The prisoners were divided according to their level of ideological consciousness, from K (*keras*, hard) to L (*lunak*, weak), using the categories L0, L1 and L2 (Lestariningsih 2011: 258). Prisoners in the L0 Category were released first. The prisoners were monitored every six months, to see if those classified as K, who were forced to undergo indoctrination programmes, had moved on to a lower category. After several rounds of such testing in Plantungan, 45 women prisoners (among them Mia Bustam) were classified as K (diehards) and transferred to the harsh Bulu prison in Semarang (*ibid.*: 259). On Buru similar regular screening sessions were held. The camp had its own division of mental guidance which carried out screening tests conducted by trained *asisten pembinaan mental* (*asbintal* – mental guidance assistant) (Krisnadi 2001).

In the concentration camp on Buru another screening process had taken place. Suharto had ordered the transmigration of the prisoners' families, but prisoners could only be reunited with their families if it was assumed that they were to be rehabilitated. Thus certain prisoners had to be selected whose families would be able to join them in their forced exile. Once reunited their families would not be allowed to return. Prisoners could refuse to invite their family members to join them, as Pramudya Ananta Tur did, who would not allow his family to undergo the brutality and humiliation he himself suffered (Toer 1988). Again psychologists were involved in the selection of the candidates for family reunion, for it was decided that 'diehard communists' must be distinguished from prisoners who could still be rehabilitated. These tests were developed by Fuad Hassan and Katarina. From 1971 onwards all 10,000 prisoners were tested. Although *Kopkamtib* organized this whole testing process, the scientific supervision was in the hands of Fuad Hasan. In these tests the political background of the prisoners was charted, and knowledge of Marxism and of the *Pancasila* were tested. Among the list containing hundreds of questions were numerous questions about religion (Abrahamse and Disse 1980: 167).

Case studies

In the absence of archival documents or the accounts of the psychologists who designed and implemented the testing, accounts of the victims who underwent testing are an important source of information. Below we set out three such stories.

In January 2017 we interviewed Pak Warno, a stocky, wizened old man. He went on the run when he learnt of the massacres but was eventually captured, brutally tortured and ultimately sent to Nusa Kambangan, the island from whence thousands of prisoners were sent on to the island of Buru for hard labour. He stayed, doing hard slave labour there, weeding with his bare hands and building roads. They were not permitted to use tools, certainly not the *arit* (sickle) so his hands were persistently blistered and covered in wounds. He was never tried but underwent psychotests, in the form of multiple-choice questions. These included questions such as what food did they like most? *Tahu* or *tempe*? Chicken or meat? But they were also asked do you like Sukarno or not? Or America? Imperialism? Illiterate people were also made to tick the boxes, which they did at random, as nobody bothered to read the questions to them. Apparently Warno was classified as Category B, and he remained in prison for 13 years.³⁴

Hersri Setiawan was captured in Jakarta by the Marines. He was the chair of *Lekra* in Yogyakarta. Soon after his capture, he received the classification B(T). All B(T)s were meant to be sent back to their place of origin and were ultimately massacred. His younger brother was an officer in the Marines and managed to keep him in Jakarta and to remove the 'T' from his files. That turned out to have saved his life.³⁵

The journalist Ibu Rusiyati worked for the National News Agency ANTARA. She was arrested on 15 October 1965 and spent 13 years in jail without any formal judicial process. The following translation from part of an interview with her by Kerry Brogan details the ways in which she was interrogated and tested, and her category determined:

Sometime in 1966 I was again called to the interrogation room. This time I was met by some pretty women wearing nice clothes, and I was asked to sit down. In a friendly way they took turns asking me questions. The next day I heard that they were psychologists who were employed to screen the *tapol* to assess how far the prisoners were affected by communist ideology ... according to the military officer I was classified as C and I would soon be released.³⁶

Denial

In 2014 and 2015, in preparation for the research report for the prosecutors of the IPT 1965, we held interviews with staff of the psychology departments of UNPAD and the UI and a series of interviews with Katarina, accompanied by an email exchange with her.³⁷ In these interviews and the emails we find a number of arguments about their involvement in the psychotests, ranging from outright denial, to putting the blame elsewhere, to justification of the massacres and mass imprisonments by the army.

After the first interview with Katarina I had sent her photocopies of some of the articles that had appeared in the Dutch press about the involvement of

psychologists in designing tests for the military. 'These are all a bunch of lies', she declared. She said that she herself had never been involved in such activities. This was the task of the Army Psychological Service, which was linked to UNPAD.³⁸

She stressed the context, namely the inauguration of the Department of Psychology in the University of Indonesia. In 1961 psychological techniques had recently switched to a quantitative approach, and tests had been developed. These tests had to be translated and validated for Indonesia. 'We were all involved in that', Katarina agreed, 'but *Kopkamtib* developed them for and applied them to the prisoners'. She denied that she ever tested prisoners. She also denied that she knew that her close senior colleague Nusyirman had a background in the military.

She admitted that two of her students, Sarlito Sarwono and Enoch Markum, had been involved in testing prisoners. When we interviewed Katarina's former students in September 2014, in turn they denied any knowledge of and involvement in these tests. Both had become full professors in the meantime.

Katarina visited two of the most notorious concentration camps of the New Order regime: Buru and Plantungan. Her motive was humanitarian, she stressed in the interviews we held with her. She denied that she had been involved in testing on Buru. During her visit in 1974 she had 'only interviewed' the wives of the *tapol*, on why they wanted to stay on Buru Island. The invitation came from *Kopkamtib* chief Sumitro. He was a good friend of her husband, who was a member of the so-called Berkeley mafia that designed Suharto's economic policy (Simpson 2008). Could she have refused? Probably not, but in the interviews with us she insisted that she was not put under pressure. She is not known to have commented on the conditions under which the prisoners toiled, and the torture they had undergone, though she must have been aware of this. The former prisoner Tedjobayu recounted how on such visits the women would walk over planks laid on the bent backs of the prisoners, as there was no pier.³⁹ Fuad Hasan was the team leader (Setiawan 2004). Though Katarina admitted that Fuad Hasan was probably engaged in testing the prisoners, she insisted that she herself was never involved. In the interview with us Katarina stressed that she had only gone to provide 'moral support' to Plantungan.

None of the psychologists we contacted for this research wanted to discuss the topic. They all denied responsibility, although their names came up in various documents in the 1970s. Katarina, in an email, wrote that she had 'no recollection of using those tests for the purposes as mentioned in the article. Your letter reminds me that those tests exist but I have completely forgotten about them'.⁴⁰ Another case of amnesia. For Katarina developing the tests was a case of 'academia as usual', entirely related to the building up of the faculty of psychology. That students administered those tests in the many prisons at the time was mainly for purposes of training.

It is clear that *Kopkamtib*, the darkest institution of the necropolitical New Order state, was behind this testing. There was no formal legal basis for the A and B Categories since they were based on decrees of the extra-constitutional *Kopkamtib*, and were not published. Only Category C was eventually officially regulated with Presidential Decree No. 28/1975 (Bedner 2015). The psychological tests were a substitute for a legal procedure and provided a scientific edge to a cruel and arbitrary process. They had far-reaching consequences for those tested. All those involved must have been aware of the use to which these tests were put. None interviewed expressed any interest in thoroughly investigating this serious breach of academic ethics. 'After all', said Katarina 'the army had every right to develop tests to screen prisoners'.⁴¹

How many prisoners were ultimately tested is unclear. As Djakababa concludes, the categorization of the prisoners 'was one of the most prominent characteristics of the purging policy' (2013: 27). It is also one of the most infamous examples of academics assisting in crimes against humanity.

Conclusion

Students and psychologists alike knew about the massacres, the extrajudicial killings, the torture, the slave labour, and the inhuman conditions in the prisons and concentration camps. They knew that these constitute crimes against humanity. At the time they justified their complicity either through critique of Sukarno (the economic chaos, the authoritarianism of his regime) or through communist phobia. The political and economic turmoil coupled with the impact of the Cold War were cited as reasons why highly educated intellectuals condoned and participated in actions that must be seen as contradicting all academic principles. In different ways they helped to create a climate in which the crimes against humanity committed by the army became intelligible and acceptable.

The three leaders of the mass demonstrations discussed above to different degrees reflected on their complicity, trying to understand their amnesia, or the time in which all this occurred. None of the psychologists we interviewed demonstrated a similar inclination to reflect on their past complicity. They denied their involvement, kept giving justifications for their actions, or shifted the blame on to 'others'. In our interviews with Katarina we felt a deep anxiety: what does this denial mean for Indonesian society as a whole? Yes, the murderers and torturers were the army and the militias working for them. But that whole machinery depended on the complicity, the denial, the silence, the consent of millions of others. From the Nazi Holocaust we have learnt to distrust the '*wir haben es nicht gewußt*' ('we did not know'). Before the inhabitants of Indonesia can confidently say '*nie wieder*' ('never again'), the disciplinary power that imposes this silence and denial has to be ruptured. The psychological tests also implied that those who underwent this procedure somehow suffered from a mental illness, which could be bad for you if you were a 'staunch communist', or less so if you subscribed to the army's

interpretation of the *Pancasila* and demonstrated that you adhered to a subversive order. The ‘cure’ consisted of an indoctrination course and religious instructions. Thus, being *salah* and consequently torturable and killable was not based on a legal criterion, but on ideological, moral and religious characteristics.

Notes

- 1 Seminar at Monash University, Melbourne, on the crimes against humanity in Indonesia (10 December 2015).
- 2 See also the account of Soe Hok-Gie’s motives to become a student leader (*Tempo* 10–16 October 2016).
- 3 When they tried them out in the Puncak it turned out that these weapons did not work. Interview with Jusuf Wanandi, 18 January 2018.
- 4 See the Dutch radio programme *Het spoor terug* (1 February 2009) and the Dutch VPRO TV programme *Brandpunt* (25 September 2015). See also Soedarmanta (2008) and Supriatma (2016).
- 5 Interview with Father Heuken by Saskia Wieringa, 12 September 2014.
- 6 See the 2009 VPRO radio programme in n. 3.
- 7 The major battle between the Pandava and the Kaurawa in the Hindu epic *Mahabharata*.
- 8 Ibid. See the 2009 VPRO radio programme and the interview with Father Heuken, 12 September 2014.
- 9 See www.rempo.co/read/kolom/2015/11/06/2328/sukarno-kembali-dituduh-dalangi-g-30-s.
- 10 Now under attack from the Islamist side. See www.kompasiana.com/pepadutulen/csis-biang-kerok-mandegnya-reformasi-sebuah-telaah-sederhana_54f5fd08a3331183118b45d2.
- 11 See the memoirs of Frank Mount, cited in Supriatma (2016). See also *Tempo*, 2 July 2017, p. 99.
- 12 The PKI strongly suspected that by that time former *Masyumi* leaders were heavily involved in the HMI (Mortimer 1974: 318).
- 13 The boy was sent away by his mother, who did not want to lose her son to the killer squads. He remained in hiding until quite recently, but all the time he was searching for his father.
- 14 <https://events.unimelb.edu.au/events/7117-was-it-an-intellectual-genocide-the-elimination-of-leftist-elements>.
- 15 www.arahjunag.com/2015/11/27/sejarawan-ugm-genosida-intelektual-memberangs-ideologi-dan-kaum-kiri-di-kampus-pasca-1965.
- 16 www.thejakartapost.com/new.2015/11/17/ugm-not-involved-in-1965-anti-communist-purge.
- 17 *Instruksi* TNI No. 22/KOTI/1965, followed by a ministerial instruction, SK 24/10/1965.
- 18 See Badil *et al.* (2009) for a series of articles on Soe Hok-Gie. See also Maxwell (2001).
- 19 The address of Beek’s Documentation Bureau is frequently mentioned, but not the name of the priest himself.
- 20 *Tapol Bulletin* no. 80, April 1987: 2.
- 21 ABRI (1995: 119). See also Kammen and Zakaria (2012).
- 22 *New York Times*, 12 and 28 April 1978, cited in *Haagsche Post*, 3 March 1979.
- 23 The project was entitled KUN-2, and ran from 1968–76. See also Dyah Ayu Kartika (2016) ‘The politicization of psychology; the role of psychologists in

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- Indonesia's detention camps during the New Order era'. MA thesis, Institute of Social Studies, The Hague.
- 24 These included Mönks (project leader), Heymans, Boon van Ostade, Kempen, Levelt and Jaspars (*Haagsche Post*, 3 March 1979; Abrahamse and Disse 1980).
- 25 *Sense and Nonsense in Psychology*, Pelican 1957, pp. 302–07; letter quoted in Editors, 1980, pp. 142–43. See also *Tapol Bulletin* 34, 1979, p. 15.
- 26 *De Psycholoog* Nr VIII/7, pp. 421–27, as cited in Editors, 1980, p. 144.
- 27 This is the name of one of the units of the concentration camp.
- 28 We visited the psychology departments of both the UI and UNPAD and were told that there was no material pertaining to the tests in the university archives. We had no way of verifying this claim. The archives of *Kopkamtib* are not open to the public.
- 29 As stipulated in Decision 1145/10/1965.
- 30 *Kopkamtib*, established on 10 October 1965, had total power to investigate and control all political activities in Indonesia. It issued licenses or prohibitions to hold demonstrations, or meetings, and was responsible for censorship of the media. Initially Suharto himself headed *Kopkamtib*, a few years later General Sumitro became its head, until the Malari riots in 1974. Suharto took over again and in 1976 Admiral Sudomo became its head.
- 31 Interview with Hersri Setiawan, 14 January 2015.
- 32 PELAK-002/KOPKAM/10/1968, see Kammen and Zakaria (2012).
- 33 See also *Universiteitskrant* Groningen, 23 April 1978, Abrahamse and Disse (1980: 161). According to the testimony of Professor Mönks in 1965–66, most Indonesian psychologists were involved in these tests, for which Yusuf Nusjirwan was responsible. The Nijmegen psychologist Heymans confirmed this. He had visited Indonesia in 1974 and 1976 (Abrahams and Disse 1980).
- 34 Interview, 27 January 2017.
- 35 Interview with Ita Nadia and Hersri Setiawan, 14 January 2015.
- 36 Interview by Kerry Brogan, *Kompasiana*, 1 October 2010, translation from Indonesian by the authors.
- 37 Interview held on 6 September 2014 at the Department of Psychology of the UI, with Sarlito Sarwono and Enoch Markum. Interview held on 19 September 2014 with Kus Dwi Ratri and Suryana at the Faculty of Psychology, UNPAD. The first interview with Katarina was conducted on 14 August 2014.
- 38 Interview, 11 January 2015.
- 39 During discussions on the results of the IPT 1965 hearings, November 2015, Jakarta YLBHI.
- 40 Email to Saskia Wieringa, 8 September 2014.
- 41 Interview, 11 January 2015.

8 Transitional justice and memory work

The highway that extends from Surabaya to Malang on East Java is one of the busiest and most dangerous roads in Indonesia. The stretch from Lawang to Purwodadi which is close to our places of residence is particularly hazardous. Recently the brakes on a huge truck failed; it smashed into nine cars before ending up in the small river by the edge of the road. Fourteen motorcycles were also hit, sending their passengers crashing onto the asphalt. To avert further accidents our neighbours organized a prayer meeting by the side of the road.

Shortly after 7 a.m. on 29 January 2017 the ceremony started. Religious songs were played praising the Prophet Muhammad in Arabic. Banners across the stage and along the highway announced the purpose of the event. One read that falling on the asphalt is worse than falling in love. When the music stopped the main *ustadz* started reciting all the 99 names of God. Prayers followed, and the local religious recitation group accompanied its musical performance with four *terbangan* – a kind of *rebana*. The religious elements of the event were interspersed with talks about road safety.

When the ceremony was over the same Arabic music was played again. The committee members invited us to hand out roses and leaflets to drivers. Snacks were divided and the two modest *tumpang* (cones) of rice and accompanying side dishes laid out on the stage were quickly consumed. On the surface then this ceremony that called for the well-being of the road users had all the signs of an Islamic ritual known as an *istiqhosah* in the context of a secular programme of educating villagers to comply with traffic rules. But the *tumpang* already indicated that elements of the older Javanese religion, *Kejawen*, were involved as well.

For below this Islamist-modernist surface, other forces were playing a role. This was not the first time so many calamities had happened on this road. In the years after the massacres of 1965–66, gruesome accidents took place. Everybody who was alive at the time remembers the case of the touring car of the bus company Makmur Jaya which ended up in the river beside the road – all the passengers died. Those who did not witness the carnage had heard the story numerous times. The driver survived. He said that all of a sudden he realized that the road veered sharply to the left and so he turned his steering wheel as well till the bus crashed. Other unfortunate drivers who survived a crash told stories of figures suddenly appearing in front of them on the road, forcing them to apply their brakes vigorously and smashing into the side of the road.

For the villagers it was very clear this was all related to the *arwah* (spirits) of the people murdered in those grisly months in 1965–66 when hundreds of people were massacred. Those who were old enough at the time had seen decapitated bodies floating in the river running alongside the highway. They all knew of groups of prisoners forced to shuffle on their haunches to the botanic garden 2 kilometres further down the road towards Purwodadi. Hundreds of prisoners were murdered there, and their bodies left to rot in the mass graves in the garden. Since then people tried to avoid entering the botanic garden. Nobody doubted that the *arwah* of the dead lingered there, unhappy that they had not received the proper prayers, and had not been buried in their own graveyards. For that is where *arwah* belong, and where they can have their meetings or whatever else they do to while away the time till all *arwah* are called to the *padang mahsyar* (meeting place) on the *hari qiamat* (Day of Judgement), when Allah, assisted by His/Her angels, will set everybody on either the road to Heaven or to Hell, according to his/her deeds when they were alive. If *arwah*, properly buried, but not protected by the proper prayers, can already experience misery because of devils or malevolent *djinn* who may tease them or send snakes or poisonous caterpillars to torture them, how much more will the *arwah* of people suffer who have not been buried in the appropriate manner at all, let alone received the correct prayers? Understandably they complain and may cause mischief.

When I asked a villager whether he was happy with the ceremony, he nodded and added with a shy smile, 'let us hope they won't disturb us any more'. It does not do to speak too openly about *arwah*. In addition, fanatics may suspect that this is a group which practises polythesism (*syirik*), an accusation which may nowadays lead to unpleasant encounters with hardliners.¹

Introduction

Transitional justice, including memory work and efforts to end the impunity of the perpetrators of the 1965 crimes against humanity, is the topic of this chapter. The enduring propaganda campaign that stigmatizes the victims and glorifies the perpetrators, sustains impunity. The government is dragging its feet on a promised reconciliation process, but at the local level several initiatives have been made.

Impunity involves a 'failure by States to meet their obligations to investigate violations; to take appropriate measures in respect of the perpetrators, particularly in the area of justice, by ensuring that those suspected of criminal responsibility are prosecuted, tried, and duly punished; to provide victims with effective remedies and to ensure that they receive reparation for the injuries suffered; to ensure the inalienable right to know the truth about violations; and to take other necessary steps to prevent a recurrence of violations'.² It is imperative to fight impunity for past serious crimes against humanity, such as the Indonesian genocide, as impunity poisons a society and breeds new violence. Via a process of transitional justice, a society can be built that is more peaceful, tolerant and democratic, in which human rights

and the rule of law are guiding principles. The concept of transitional justice entails two elements: retribution and reparation or restoration.³ In the case of Indonesia a mix of retributive and restorative ways for the redress and reconciliation of the post-30 September 1965 crimes against humanity seems relevant. This mix would include, but might not be limited to, the following elements: truth finding; retribution or access to justice; restoration and reparation; and guarantees for non-recurrence. These elements are interlinked.

In this chapter we discuss several responses of the survivors during the process of sharing their traumatic experiences. Karstedt (2016) suggests that a combination of the sharing of trauma and of legal processes helps towards the emotional relief and the recovery that victims seek. The language of justice offered in the Final Report provides the much-needed cognitive response.

Truth finding

The relationship between truth finding and transitional justice is not self-evident. Truth telling in itself does not automatically lead to reconciliation and healing, as Clark (2011) found. The specific needs and conditions for truth finding and reconciliation are dependent on context. In Indonesia, however, we maintain that the silence of the government, the constant denial of responsibility on the part of the perpetrators, as well as the continued stigmatization and blaming of the victims do require a systematic process of truth finding, ideally led by the state. However, successive governments have only made feeble and contradictory attempts to address the post-1965 crimes against humanity.

The 2012 report prepared by Komnas HAM on the 1965 crimes against humanity was the first national effort at truth finding. The major recommendation was that the Attorney-General's Office should conduct further investigations, and effect non-judicial remedy via a Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) to provide a sense of justice for victims and their families. It also advocated that perpetrators be brought to court. The Attorney-General's Office, however, has not yet acted on this recommendation, and has made no effort to assess the truth about the crimes against humanity. The report is still under embargo and has not yet been made public.

Retribution and the right to justice

In 1999 the last political prisoners were released. The Election Law of 1999 restored the right of former political prisoners to vote in elections. Since 2003 former political prisoners can also stand as electoral candidates. In 2011 the Supreme Court abolished all restrictions on the citizenship rights of former political prisoners.⁴ However, the Criminal Code was also changed. In 1999 a number of clauses were added which criminalized the dispersal of communist teachings (Bedner 2015). Given that support for the massacres within the NU

had been systematic and organized,⁵ it came as a surprise when in 2000 President Abdurrahman Wahid apologized for the mass killings of alleged communists carried out by the youth organizations of the NU, which he had chaired for many years. He proposed to set up an investigation into the massacres that followed the actions of the G30S group on 1 October 1965, and lifted the Presidential Decree on the screening and registration of political prisoners. In vain he called for the revocation of the Decision in 1966 of the MPRS (TAP MPRS 25/1966) in which communism was prohibited.⁶ In 2003, under the presidency of Megawati, parliament decided to uphold that decree. In 2011 the Supreme Court virtually lifted all regulations limiting the citizenship rights of former political prisoners. Yet the ban on the teaching and dispersal of communist ideology remains firmly in place (Bedner 2015).

Since then there have been no efforts by the government to deal with the 1965 human rights violations in a judicial way; neither an ad hoc court nor a TRC has been established. Sadly, following the publication of its brave report on the 1965 massacres, in late 2016 Komnas HAM agreed to collaborate with the government in attempting to address the Indonesian genocide via non-judicial means, and accepted the National Harmony Council (discussed in Chapter 9).

Rehabilitation and reparation

At the national level no President has made a formal apology for the crimes against humanity. In 2000, Abdurrahman Wahid, the country's fourth, and its first democratically elected President (from 1999–2001), came closest to issuing an apology during a TV programme in which he stated that he had already apologized to the victims, and that he advocated a judicial process. He had spoken in his capacity as the former chair of the NU, not as President. However, he did not follow this up with a presidential apology nor with initiating a judicial process, after a storm of protest arose. But his words and his progressive stance have made an impact. When Komnas HAM submitted its report in 2012, hopes were raised that the then President, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, would make a formal apology. However, this did not come to pass, again due to strong opposition from both NU leaders and conservative army generals. During his presidential election campaign Joko Widodo promised to redress the country's past human rights violations. This was explicitly mentioned in his electoral manifesto, called the *Nawacita* (nine aspirations). However, he too has not yet issued an apology to the victims.

Following the November 2015 hearings of the IPT 1965, in April 2016 a two-day national symposium was held in Jakarta, instigated by the Coordinating Minister of Security, Political and Legal Affairs, General Luhut Binsar Panjaitan. General Agus Widjojo was the chair of the organizing committee. He was advised by among others a member of the Presidential Advisory Council, Sidarto Danusubroto. This was the first time that the abuses had

been discussed nationally. Supporters of the New Order, victims and researchers and activists spoke out. This symposium triggered a flood of reactions both in the mainstream and on social media.⁷ Minister and General Luhut Panjaitan made it clear in his opening speech that the President was not going to issue a formal apology but that the government was at the same time committed to resolving past human rights abuses. He ruled out that a criminal investigation would be held. In reaction to this national symposium a counter-symposium was organized on 1–2 June by retired generals (supposedly to uphold the *Pancasila*). This was accompanied by a strong backlash against anything and anybody deemed ‘communist’. Activists wearing red T-shirts emblazoned with the letters PKI were arrested,⁸ and a few raids on bookshops were carried out.⁹

Very limited progress has been made in relation to compensation for the victims. The enactment of the Law on Witness and Victims Protection (Law No. 13/2006) was a positive sign. It was accompanied by the provision of a health allowance for witnesses and victims, including those involved in the ‘events of 1965’. The law is implemented by the *Lembaga Perlindungan Saksi dan Korban* (LPSK – Institute for the Protection of Witnesses and Victims) set up on 8 August 2008. A few local authorities (such as those in Palu and Solo), as well as the church in Kupang, have recognized this provision. Victims’ organizations such as the Yayasan Penelitian Korban Pembunuhan 1965 (YPKP – Foundation for the Research on Victims) have instigated various meetings to inform their members of the procedure; these meetings are often interrupted by members of anti-communist groups. In principle this law should provide some relief for the many sick and desperately poor victims.

On 9 December 2014 we attended a meeting at the *Yayasan Pembelaan Hukum Indonesia* (YAPHI – Foundation for the Defence of Law Indonesia) in Solo, with victims of the 1965 atrocities and a representative from the LPSK. Some 60 people showed up. The LPSK official outlined the kind of help that the Institute can offer, including social and psychological services, and assistance in finding jobs or education. Compensation might be provided when a person has died or disappeared. The extent of the services and the number of people to benefit has to be decided in a legal process, which can take time. Komnas HAM has to certify that they are genuine victims.

Non-recurrence

Very limited steps have been taken on the path towards non-recurrence. Indonesia has not yet ratified the 1948 Genocide Convention, but in 2006 it acceded to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). Its implementation is supervised by the Human Rights Committee (HRC), a treaty body composed of 18 experts. In 2013 the HRC examined the first report by Indonesia under the ICCPR.¹⁰ The HRC concluded that gross human rights violations committed before 2006 (including those after 1 October 1965) should be investigated because they are ongoing, continuing

violations of human rights. It set out a list of concerns and recommendations.¹¹ Indonesia has not followed up on these recommendations. In the Universal Periodic Review of the Human Rights Council of 2017 no progress was reported.

Indonesia has also not ratified the Rome Statute (in which the International Criminal Court was instituted) but the 2006 Human Rights Law incorporates most provisions. Thus, both under its own human rights law and under present-day international human rights law, in particular the ICCPR, the Indonesian state is obliged to investigate gross human rights violations, to prosecute those responsible and to punish them if found guilty, as well as to provide reparations for the victims. This includes the 1965 genocide.

The first official effort to start a process of reconciliation was the drafting of a law concerning the TRC in 2004, which was expected to deal with past cases of human rights violations. However, after being passed in parliament, this bill was revoked after a judicial review by the Constitutional Court because of the law's inadequacies. The law empowered the TRC to award amnesty to perpetrators of past crimes and barred victims from taking any future legal action against them. Reparations to victims were made contingent upon victims signing formal statements exonerating the perpetrators. The Court declared that provisions of the TRC law violated Indonesia's international obligations and domestic laws. The decision came after two years of legal challenges by Indonesian human rights groups. Since then nothing has been heard of this draft law.

In 2000 a Human Rights section was included in the Constitution. Some oversight agencies have been established (Ombudsman, Judicial Commission, Police Oversight Commission, Prosecutor Oversight Commission). The military are prohibited from involving themselves in politics and the police force has been separated from the military. This, however, does not prevent the military from claiming a leading role in politics, particularly on the issue of the rights of the victims of the events of 1965. The subject of human rights has been included in the curriculum of training courses and internal regulations of the police and the military but communist phobia among the armed forces is rife. Moreover, overall implementation of progressive legal and institutional changes has been poor.

Transitional justice at the local level

Although civil society initiatives cannot replace the responsibility of the government, even if only because of the sheer size of the genocide and the huge number of prisons and genocide sites, at the local level several important efforts at truth finding have been undertaken. The most extensive research was done in East Indonesia. In Kupang since 2010 a women's study group called *Jaringan Perempuan Indonesia Timur untuk Studi Perempuan, Agama, dan Budaya* (JPIT – Eastern Indonesia Women's Network for the Study of Women, Religion, and Culture) has collected oral testimonies of women

survivors from various ethnic and religious backgrounds. The goal was the reconciliation of victims with church members who were among the perpetrators of the human rights violations. The researchers were related to the two main Protestant churches and they were all female ministers or ministers in training. The book based on their research was published in 2012 and led to a formal apology by church leaders (Kolimon *et al.* 2012).

Pastor Mery Kolimon was the driving force behind this research.¹² Her late father was a police officer who was ordered to take part in the executions of communists. She discovered his secret when she was at high school and later exposed the story in a contribution to the anthology 'Breaking the Silence'.¹³ The research revealed how husbands, fathers, brothers and sons were rounded up and shot, their bodies buried or dumped at sea.¹⁴ Only a few of the victims were members or supporters of the PKI. Some women were even found 'guilty' by association (if their husbands were alleged to be PKI sympathizers), imprisoned, tortured, sexually abused and they had their heads shaved, which is considered a deep humiliation. The book also analyses the complicity of the church. The English translation of the book was to be launched at the 2015 Ubud literary festival, but the event was prohibited.¹⁵

This process of truth finding has led to reconciliation. Regular prayer meetings are held by female victims which constitute at the same time a safe space to tell their stories. It helped the 'oma-oma 1965' (grandmothers) to share their experiences, participate in the research and to become more active in society and in their church, from which they had previously been excluded.

Some victims' organizations have also carried out their own investigations. Their data is not yet public. On 7 April 1999 the YPKP, the first victim's organization, was established. It published a journal, *Soeara Kita* ('Our Voice'), with the subtitle *Untuk kemanusiaan, keadilan dan kebenaran* ('For humanity, justice and truth'). The Foundation was established by seven prominent former political prisoners, Pramudya Ananta Tur, Hasan Raid, Kusalah Subagyo Tur, Sulami Sumini Martono, Ribka Tjibtaning and Suharno. They declared that their organization was based on the *Pancasila*, human rights, the law and religious teachings on proper conduct towards other people.¹⁶

The victims' organizations have collected data on the number of victims, the conditions of their arrest, the places where they were held or disappeared, the treatment they received and the locations of mass graves. On 2 May 2016 Bedjo Untung, chair of the YPKP 1965 handed over to Komnas HAM a list of 122 mass graves across Java and Sumatra which contain possibly the bodies of at least 13,900 victims of the 1965–68 massacres.¹⁷ This number, although high, might only be the tip of the iceberg. The list includes graves in 12 provinces across the archipelago; the highest number is in Central Java with 50 graves alone. But already in Tuban, East Java, the site of one of the case studies discussed in this chapter, informants said they knew the location of 20 mass graves.¹⁸ Only a few mass graves in Kalimantan, Sulawesi, Bali or further to the east of the archipelago have been included on the list, which

suggests that there are many more than the ones included in the list produced by the YPKP 1965.¹⁹

Memory work

Commemoration helps to define the past and construct the future. This ‘memory work’ (Nandy 2015) is disrupted for those whose histories are abjected, whose memories of trauma are ejected from the cultural archive. In the process they are not only excluded from their own past, but also of the period in which they and their organizations were respected. They are denied their part in the present and the future of their communities. Indonesia has to come to terms with its genocidal past, so that these atrocities may ‘never again’ happen. In order for that to happen the survivors of the Indonesian genocide need to (re)appropriate their memories, rebuild their families and their communities, and share their defiant memories with the public.

Personal memories are unreliable, shifting and tendentious. But transformed into collective memory they turn into, as Ricoeur (2004) maintains, the ‘bedrock of history’. How is this collective memory produced and reproduced? If they are hegemonic memories, they are consolidated in textbooks, street names, TV shows and other cultural, political and legal products. As Nandy observes, vulnerable, silenced communities have shared memories also where privileged truths are contested. The survivors of the 1965 genocide in Indonesia can be seen as a mnemonic community which, assisted by human rights activists, continues to engage with their traumatic past. These ‘memory banks ... wait for appropriate moments to return as a form of resistance, to outmanoeuvre the certitudes of policy elites, official histories and familiar canons of scholarship’ (ibid. 2015: 598). Through violence, sustained propaganda and a hegemonic cultural praxis the memories of the suffering of the victims of the 1965 massacres are not so much obliterated as replaced. This defiant memory is essential for selfhood in order to remind the victims that they are not evil, or less than human as the perpetrators have portrayed them (Stone 2010). Or, as Nandy says, ‘the mnemonic does not obediently dissolve itself’ (2015: 599). These rebellious mnemonic processes can be brought to life by genocide sites such as mass graves. This is one of the main reasons for the opposition to their exhumation.

The denial of the existence of mass graves by Minister Luhut Panjaitan in the April 2016 National Symposium highlights both the silence around the existence of such mass graves, as well as the importance they have for both survivors and right-wing deniers of the genocide. Mass graves are both proof of the extrajudicial killings that were carried out and as genocide sites also potential *lieux de mémoire* (Nora 1984). So far in Indonesia the locations of only a limited number of mass graves are known, and even fewer have been publicly acknowledged or excavated. The bodies disposed in them were concealed, and their names were not released to their relatives. This is a violation of the Geneva Conventions. Under International Customary Law the dead

must be buried, if possible, according to the rites of the religion to which they belonged and, in principle, burial should be in individual graves.²⁰ These graves should also be respected, marked and protected, and made accessible to relatives. None of this is the case in Indonesia.

The army hides behind the fiction that the murders took place in a situation of 'horizontal conflict'. There is no institutional, discursive, legal and political space to build counter-memories to the hegemonic discourse of the army (Herlambang 2013; McGregor 2007). Even if at the national level memories of atrocities are ignored or even denied, at the personal level the enduring silence, the stigma, fear and trauma cannot be wiped out so easily, particularly when the actions of the many anti-communist militias serve to remind the population of the terror they experienced (see also Wahyunin-groem 2013 and Zurbuchen 2002). In that sense the hateful actions of the militias can also be said to belong to the category of 'memory work'. They are not directed towards reconciliation but at strengthening the power of the victors. They keep communism alive not as a struggle for social justice, but as a spectre.

The genocide sites in Indonesia have remained unmarked, the atrocities committed there unremembered or at least unacknowledged, leaving the perpetrators free to commit more crimes; the sites could even be re-used with impunity. This happened for instance in the cave of Luweng Grubuk, in Gunung Kidul, where possibly thousands of people were murdered and thrown into the 90-metre-deep fissure in 1966. Many bodies were washed out to the sea by the underground river that runs at the bottom of the fissure, but remains still lie scattered on the rocks. For many years after 1966 the local people refrained from collecting seaweed on the nearby beach of Baron, for fear of coming upon rotting corpses or bones. In the 1980s the location was seen as a convenient spot for the extrajudicial killings of criminals in nearby Yogyakarta, the so-called Petrus (*penembak misterius* – mysterious shootings) killings (Bourchier 1990; Van der Kroef 1985).²¹ When climbers discovered the bodies, they were found to be victims of both the 1965 and 1983–84 murders, with bullet wounds to the back of their heads.

Although the exact number of mass graves in Indonesia is not known, the existence of genocide sites is an open secret (Roosa 2016). It is likely that local people all over the archipelago know of many sites, but such knowledge has not been collected at the state level. Witnesses have kept quiet for fear of retaliation from the army or militias and many of them have died in the meantime, taking their stories with them. Occasionally mass graves are detected when corpses are discovered, such as in Jembrana, Bali, October 2015.²²

After the first wave of mass terror killings was over, the actions of the perpetrators of the genocide were stealthy. Pits were dug at night, people arrested, collected from prisons and murdered in the dark.²³ During the New Order era mention of the killings was censored and public discussions prohibited (Vickers 2010). Until now the brutal reactions against meetings of

victims and efforts at truth finding such as those of the IPT 1965 are intended to prevent the hegemonic army version of history from being disrupted.²⁴ These memory wars serve to keep the New Order 'cultural archive' intact (Said 1993).

The Indonesian military power holders and right-wing religious groups are invested with the denial of the existence of the mass graves. If they were publicly acknowledged, as *lieux de mémoire*, as sites where prayers for the dead could be said and flowers strewn, the perpetrators could no longer pose as victims of allegedly evil communists. Instead inevitably commemorating the murder victims would call attention to the perpetrators. The clearly defined New Order ideology of victim-hero would be reversed. What glory is there for an army to shoot unarmed civilians in the back? What religious justification for slashing the throats of neighbours whose hands are tied by their thumbs?

The silence of the dead gives those muted by the New Order machinery the mandate to speak. Memorialization is also a process of bearing witness to the atrocities committed. This motivated Sulami, a survivor of torture and unspeakable humiliation during her 20 years in prison, former leader of the women's organization *Gerwani*, to document the truth about the massacres.²⁵ The YPKP which she chaired until her death, was set up on 10 March 1999 as a legal entity, with its office in her house in Tangerang. The establishment of the YPKP was met with strong reaction from conservative Muslims. Banners with anti-communist slogans appeared on the streets (Budiawan 2004: 69) and the office of the YPKP in the house of Ibu Sulami was attacked by a Muslim gang who attempted to set fire to it. Documentation of the mass graves was a priority of the YPKP. In Blora they found a grave in which possibly 800 people were buried, but they did not manage to excavate it.²⁶ Sulami led the first exhumation of a mass grave in the village of Dempes, Wonosobo, Central Java in 2000.²⁷ A list of those murdered at the site was available, as well as a family member of a victim. With the help of a forensic specialist (Dr Handoko from the UI) several bodies could be identified.²⁸ The investigation proved that the prisoners were shot with rifles used by the military. Unfortunately the group did not manage to get the collaboration of the relevant authorities, so the exhumation did not fulfil legal forensic requirements, aborting this effort as a step towards a judicial process, one of the aims of the YPKP (McGregor 2012).²⁹

The remains of the identified victims were returned to their families to be reburied. The remains of the other victims were due to be reburied one year later, but the process was brutally disrupted by a mob of militia members. Coffins were broken open and remains scattered and burnt (Adhivira 2016; Zurbuchen 2002: 579–80). As McGregor (2012) suggested, the military was wary of a possible future trial and of the scope for memorialization that the new burial site might provide. Yet the initial exhumation was preceded by a careful process of negotiation with religious and local authorities.³⁰

Unfortunately the possibility of reconfiguring history and memory was only partially realized in those early years of *Reformasi*. The most obvious remnants of the mnemonic technologies of the New Order had been removed (for instance, the atrocious film on the G30S affair produced during the New Order was no longer shown on TV and in cinemas, whereas it had been compulsory viewing for the nation and particularly its schoolchildren since 1983). Yet the military caste has remained in control and educational reform has been halted, stultifying the capacity of the younger generations to critically explore their own past (Leksana 2009; Van Klinken 2005).

Mass graves are sites for research, for truth finding and for memorialization, both for the direct survivors and for younger generations. They can provide proof of particular overriding patterns followed by the perpetrators. They can also become genocide sites for transgenerational education. For the relatives of those murdered they are sites of healing where they are able to honour the dead and conduct proper burial rites. Thus they are both possible sites for the reconstruction of crimes and for mnemonic excavation. These are complex processes and do not necessarily lead to reconciliation or justice. As Müller warns, ‘a shared truth might be impossible as long as political opponents remain trapped in collective memories of trauma and victimhood – or alternatively in the defensiveness and self-righteousness of the perpetrators’ (2002: 32).

Hundreds of mass graves still await exhumation, but this can only be done when the safety of the excavators can be guaranteed and when adequate forensic expertise is available. Following the widespread reports about the violence which accompanied the attempt to rebury the remains of the unidentified bodies in the mass grave in Wonosobo, victims’ organizations worked in silence to document the locations of mass graves. We visited three mass graves, in Plumbon, near Semarang, in Tuban and in Purwodadi, East Java.

Rituals are important to commemorate the dead, even when the whereabouts of their graves is not known. As Hobart (2014) asserts, writing about Bali, death rituals have a regenerative aspect to liberate the troubled spirits. If neglected, the deceased can become unruly demons, *buta cuwil*; in Java they are called *arwah*. Another purpose of memorialization is to rescue the tragic dead from oblivion so that they can become ancestors that can be worshipped. Giving the dead the proper rites means that the dead are no longer invisible, ungrivable; they are returned to their communities and in a wider sense to humanity as a whole.

Plumbon, Semarang

Yunantyo Adi S. is the coordinator of the *Perhimpunan Masyarakat Semarang untuk HAM* (PMS-HAM – Semarang Society for Human Rights) and an IPT activist. Together with a group of students from various universities in Semarang he conducted research relating to a mass grave, the existence of

which was made public in 2014.³¹ From villagers they learnt that 24 people, including two women, had been brought on a truck by soldiers wearing the red berets of the RPKAD.³² Before being shot in the back the prisoners were told to sing 'Genjer-Genjer'. Ibu Mutiah, *Gerwani* leader and a well-known *dalang*, was said to possess great powers, so the bullets could not kill her. As she wanted to prevent the soldiers from burying her alive, she directed them to shoot her via her vagina, the only place where bullets could penetrate her. Similarly to other locations of mass graves, the one in Plumbon was known to the villagers as a haunted (*angker*) place.³³ When it was raining softly a woman's cries could be heard. She was identified as having long hair that covered her back. This must be Ibu Mutiah. Visitors came from afar to make offerings and ask for her advice on lucky lottery numbers.³⁴

The activists reported their findings to Komnas HAM so that the mass grave could be exhumed in a legally valid way, but Komnas HAM did not react. The group then wanted to rebury the bodies, in the prescribed way, but that proved impossible. In the end they managed to mark the grave and put up a headstone bearing the names of the victims that they had been able to ascertain.

For eight months Yunantyo Adi S. and his group of volunteers visited every house in the hamlet (*dusun*) close to the grave, as well as religious leaders and village and city officials, arguing that this was a humanitarian issue, that the dead must be respected and remembered. Finally these leaders and the villagers agreed that the grave should be marked. Although supportive, the national forest agency, owner of the land, remained wary and did not allow any trees to be cut to make space for more visitors or the path to be paved. The civil and religious leaders (Muslim, Catholic and *Kejawen*) whom they had approached attended the ceremony during which the simple headstone was erected on 1 June 2015, as did several police officers.³⁵ Also in attendance were a number of relatives of the murdered victims.³⁶ The Catholic priest who attended the ceremony, Father Aloysius Budi Purnomo, spoke about the need for reconciliation. Even the leader of *Banser* of Central Java, Hasyim Ashari, attended the event. The religious scholar, Kyai Hambali, and the priest offered prayers, the latter accompanying the event with his tenor saxophone. Flowers were strewn. The *kyai* also uttered conciliatory words, but added that 'even terrorists and drug traffickers' get proper burials, so these people should be buried properly as well.³⁷ As Adhivira writes, although silent, the mass graves are speaking witnesses. They tell competing discourses, that of the New Order and that of the families of the victims. In Plumbon the group of activists could not rebury the victims but they succeeded in giving them their names back, and thus their subjectivity and their humanity (Adhivira 2015).³⁸

East Java: mass graves in Kebun Raya, Purwodadi

It is well known that there is a huge mass grave in the botanic garden of Purwodadi, East Java. The villagers believe the place to be haunted.

Journalist and novelist Nusya Kuswatin, who grew up nearby, said in the documentary 'The Women and the Generals' that she had been forbidden to play there when she was a young girl.³⁹ But until we heard the story of Pak Sakimin (pseudonym) we had not known the exact location of the grave in the vast gardens.

Pak Sakimin was first told to join a group of his elder brother's friends to murder the popular Pak Asiong, the trainer of the soccer team of the *Pemuda Rakyat* of the village. He was accused of having refused to train the rival team of *Ansor* members who now came to take revenge. He was dragged out of his house and brutally slaughtered in front of the subdistrict office. After this gruesome night Pak Sakimin was 'invited' again to join the gang of murderers. He was told he would be murdered himself if he refused. For one month he had to join the gang of *Banser* murderers, tasked with carrying the big oil lamp to light the way to the scene of slaughter. Every night for at least 30 days in the months of February and March 1966 a truck load of people, between 20 and 30 men and women would arrive, their mouths gagged, their hands tied to their back by their thumbs. They were sent by military headquarters from nearby villages and the *Koramil* office in Purwodadi, where some *Banser* members would join in loading them onto confiscated trucks. They were unloaded from the open truck at midnight, in the middle of the botanic garden.

They were made to kneel and their throats were slit. Sometimes their ears and noses, or their genitals, would also be cut off. Sometimes their eyes would be gouged out. Thus, hacked to death, they would be thrown forward over the edge of the grave, in a neat row. Many football players belonging to Pak Asiong's team were among the victims.

Pak Sakimin passed away in May 2015. Prior to this he took us to the locations of three more mass graves in the tea plantation of Wonosari (on the slope of the Arjuna volcano that towers above the nearby village of Lawang) where he had worked his whole life. We were told that another mass grave exists in the botanic garden, but we have not yet been able to find the exact location.

Thus, around the neighbouring villages of Lawang and Purwodadi a minimum of five mass graves are located, among them a very big one, containing 600–800 bodies. The locations are still known to plantation workers and villagers. People speak in whispers and under conditions of anonymity. The fear of reprisal, 50 years after the mass killings, is still great. Not one of the bodies has been exhumed, so hardly any names of the dead are known. Research in the villages closest to the mass graves has not yet been carried out.

Genocide sites in Tuban, East Java

Supported by a small grant from a private group of Dutch feminists we were able to organize a day out with a group of women survivors in Surabaya. They decided their priority was to visit the site where most of them had been

imprisoned in Lamongan, and a nearby mass grave in Tuban, where relatives and comrades had been buried. After their release they had never visited those places again.

The preparations took many months. Ibu Dewi (pseudonym), the informal leader of the group, travelled to Tuban a few times, with Pak Gus (pseudonym). We gradually became aware of the difficulties they faced. The problems derived first of all from external factors. The former political prisoners were all under surveillance by neighbours or even family members. They feared not only for their personal safety, but also for the rejection that their children and other family members might experience. If it became known that a group of former political prisoners was visiting mass graves the trip might be stopped through violent means. Therefore all the logistical arrangements were taken care of by *teman*, literally friends, in this case people belonging to the families of the victims or sympathetic rights activists. But there were also internal difficulties to resolve. Ibu Dewi's tightly knit group mostly comprised former teachers, who trusted each other. Outside of this circle, however, there had been stories of betrayal. Relations with the *teman* in Tuban first had to be built and a safe mass grave selected from among the many which villagers and survivors knew to exist in the area. The first stop was the location of a notorious rice warehouse in Lamongan where the women had been imprisoned under inhuman circumstances for many years. Dewi herself was 19 years old when she was arrested; she had just started her first job as a kindergarten teacher in a nearby village. The prisoners were tortured and starved there. From the road nothing reminds one of the atrocities committed behind the row of houses and restaurants. We would have passed it if Dewi and the others had not known the exact location. The front is taken up by a parking space and beyond that is a line of offices and a well-known restaurant selling *soto Lamongan* (chicken soup).

Before we arrived at the mass grave first we had to pick up some *teman* from Tuban who would take us to the village where sympathetic inhabitants knew the location of one of the largest graves in that district. The father of the present owner of the teak plantation had heard the trucks and the gunshots. His son brought us to the place, deep into the woods, and cut away the secondary forest which had grown over the grave site. We prayed and distributed the flowers we had bought on the way. One of the survivors said his elder brother was killed here. Their grandfather was one of the soldiers on duty that night. When he saw his grandson among the prisoners who were about to be killed, he asked permission to shoot him himself, so that he would not have to harbour a grudge against one of his colleagues. He would rather bear the grief himself. The *teman* in Tuban know the locations of 20 mass graves.

Reconciliation: *Syarikat* and Palu

Under President Gus Dur hopes were raised that a process of reconciliation for the 1965 massacres might be possible. Young Muslim intellectuals were

inspired by his ideas. The progressive NU leader Imam Aziz established the organization *Syarikat* in 2000 with the goal to facilitate reconciliation between NU members and victims of human rights violations.⁴⁰ Imam Aziz promoted a 'restorative justice' process of community-level reconciliation. He argued that the 1965 massacres were not a horizontal conflict but were incited by the army. Not only *Ansor*, he argued, but many other groups joined the killings, such as the *Pemuda Marhaen* in Bali, and Christian groups in NTT, under similar pressure. *Syarikat* approached both perpetrators and victims. It helps victims with small-scale economic projects, for instance in Blitar, Salatiga, Semarang and Yogyakarta.

Getting this issue recognized by the NU was, however, very difficult, due to strong opposition from powerful conservative *kyai*, such as Hasyim Muzadi and Asad Ali; the latter is seen as the representative of the national security services within the NU. Progressive people within the NU felt that the organization was manipulated by the military; they also saw themselves as victims of the military regime, without denying the role that *Ansor* and particularly *Banser* had played. They organized so-called *silaturahmi* gatherings between victims and perpetrators, in Yogyakarta and Central Java (Wahyuningroem 2013: 1340).

Syarikat published the autobiographies of two Muslim PKI leaders, Hasan Raid (one of the founders of the YPKP) and Achmadi Moestahal. The organization adopted a cultural, grassroots approach (see also McGregor 2008). Following the Yogyakarta earthquake in 2004 the group became paralysed, and they were also sidelined within the NU by the conservative faction led by Hasyim Muzadi. They had hoped for an apology from the Indonesian President and at the local level they lobbied for a monument (*tugu*) or a street name to commemorate the massacres, and for the recognition of the mass graves in their area, so that the villagers and relatives could deal with the spirits still lingering there. They actively tried to reduce the stigma which survivors still face.⁴¹

Although *Syarikat* is no longer active, Imam Aziz, who became the chair of the *Muktamar* (Congress) of the NU, still fights for reconciliation. A small group of younger NU leaders, such as Aan Anshori, Muhammad Al-Fayyadl and Roy Murtadho, are assembled in the group *Gusdurian*, basing themselves on the inspiring example of their pluralist and tolerant leader, President Abdurrahman Wahid, popularly called Gus Dur.⁴² They realize that the majority of the NU members is not prepared to accept the results of the IPT 1965. So, they argue, the best way forward would be to accept that NU members also see themselves as victims, namely that they were forced by the army to kill, or at least seduced by the slogan 'kill or be killed'.

These progressive young NU members have set up the website *Islambergerak*, named after the newspaper of Hadji Misbach in Surakarta at the time, called *Islam Bergerak*. Inspired by Hadji Misbach and other like-minded communist Muslims, they emphasize that Islam should be concerned with the welfare of the people, and with social justice. They also try to reverse the

trend in history books to present only the New Order version of history, paying attention to leaders who have been written out of mainstream history books, such as Amir Syarifuddin, whose role as the driving force behind the *Sumpah Pemuda* (Youth Pledge) has to be remembered, and Sumarsono, a leader of the November 1945 clashes in Surabaya, before he became engulfed in the Madiun affair.⁴³ They deplore the fact that present-day Islam has embraced capitalism and seems less concerned with social justice.

Another well-known example of local reconciliation has taken place in the city of Palu, Sulawesi.⁴⁴ In 1965 Rusdi Mastura was 15 years old and a boy scout. He was tasked with guarding prisoners in the late 1960s, and was later a member of the *Pancasila* Youth as well as a regional leader of the *Golkar* party. As Mayor of Palu he formally apologized to the victims on 24 March 2012. He issued a regional regulation (No 25/2013) offering support for the victims, after verification of their status. This followed in the wake of pressure from activists and victims. A day of public reconciliation was held, sites of human rights abuse were marked, and a programme of reparation and restitution was set up: free health care was announced for survivors and family members, as well as scholarships and government grants for economic cooperatives. Descendants of victims could apply for start-up funding. In 2013 Palu declared itself as a 'City of Human Rights Consciousness' with a broad mandate to help victims.⁴⁵

There was less resistance to these efforts at reconciliation than elsewhere, perhaps because relatively few people were killed or disappeared in Palu. In Palu approximately 17 people were murdered or disappeared, some 1,000 others were taken prisoner and had to do forced labour, building roads and bridges as well as the central park of Palu. Nurlaela A. K. Lamasitudju, the coordinator of the group *Solidaritas Korban Pelanggaran HAM* (SKP HAM – Solidarity with the Victims of Human Rights Violations) in Palu started by gaining the trust of Islamic leaders (Wahyuningroem 2013). She then compiled a report which was published on 17 May 2015. It contained the names of 768 victims.⁴⁶ These prisoners were captured in four phases. By the end of 1965 the leaders of PKI and its mass organizations had been detained. The second wave took place in 1966–67 and concerned ordinary members of these organizations. The third wave was in 1969–70 when members of Battalion 711 from the *Brawijaya* division were arrested because they were seen to be sympathetic to the PKI. The last wave was in 1975 when activists belonging to the PNI in particular were targeted because they were alleged to belong to the so-called PGB. The local leaders she had enlisted helped her later when resistance had erupted, particularly by members of the local branch of the PP. Once the secretariat of the SKP-HAM was even pelted with stones during a meeting with victims.⁴⁷

The strong leadership of Mayor Rusdi Mastura was an important factor in this case. As Wahyuningroem (2013) argues, bottom-up approaches like those in Palu might help to 'seduce' the state into initiating a process of transitional justice. With the Balinese poet Putu Oka Sukanta as editor, 14 life stories

have been collected from Palu, detailing the conditions of the post-October 1965 crimes against humanity (Sukanta 2013). The stories reveal the brutal conditions under which the prisoners were forced to build roads and bridges.

To date the only case in which a former prisoner has sued the state to try and obtain her legal rights is that of the well-known Sundanese singer Nani Nurani, who was arrested for being close to Sukarno, and for having performed at a PKI event (see Chapter 6). When she was released in 1975 she was shocked, weak, and gingerly tried to rebuild her life. Not only did she have to report regularly, the stigma associated with being a political prisoner remained. Furious at being denied her rights she embarked upon a long struggle to get a citizenship card that did not bear the hated stamp ET (former political prisoner), and a passport. The fall of President Suharto did not immediately resolve her problems. She had to apply to the High Court, which only in 2008 finally granted her all the rights which other Indonesian citizens enjoy.⁴⁸

Women's discussion circles

Several human rights organizations were involved in the *Lingkar Tutur Perempuan* (Women's Discussion Circles) in which women spoke out about the post-1965 traumas.⁴⁹ The Discussion Circles, held between 2001 and 2005, gave women the identity of political actors, stepping beyond the boundaries of victimhood. As Ratih (2006) maintains, remembering their histories of abuse can become an act of resistance against the annihilation of their identities. An important theme of these Circles for the women was the deconstruction of the slander that *Gerwani* women were immoral and sexually perverse. They were still burdened by the realization that their alleged immorality had provided the justification for the annihilation of the PKI: 'the label *Gerwani* stamped on them has undermined their motherly authority and deprived them of the traditional role as the bearers of wisdom' (ibid.: 543). The former leaders of *Gerwani* also wanted respect for their roles as leaders, their organizational skills, and recognition that they had been struggling for the interests of women at the time (ibid.). The space that the Circle meetings offered for women to share their stories is important as men tend to dominate the discussions in the victims' organizations.⁵⁰

In a similar vein the human rights umbrella organization *Koalisi Keadilan dan Pengungkapan Kebenaran* (KKPK – Coalition for Justice and the Revelation of Truth) held a series of events in five locations, called *Dengar Kesaksian* (DK – Listen to Testimonies), in which victims spoke out (Wahyuningroem 2013). More hearings were held in 2013, the *Tahun Kebenaran* (Year of Truth), and concerned various human rights violations, including the 1965 genocide.⁵¹ Both ELSAM and Komnas HAM conducted large-scale oral history projects on the victims of the 1965 genocide (Roosa *et al.* 2004).⁵²

Cultural memory work

In the cultural field, on a limited scale, memorialization activities have been instigated by individuals and non-governmental organizations working on the 1965 genocide. This can be in small centres, such as the *taman* (garden) 1965 Bali set up near Denpasar by a group of young people, forming the 1965 Community Garden (Dwyer 2010). This memory site contains a small library. During the hearings of the People's Tribunal in November 2015 they opened the centre for *nobar* (*nonton bareng* – watching together) so that people could watch the hearings live. They also released the CD *Prison Songs* with lyrics written by former political prisoners.

There are too many books, documentaries and other cultural products to give a comprehensive overview in this chapter. Apart from the films already mentioned earlier in this book, perhaps the best-known examples of this cultural memory work are the two films by Joshua Oppenheimer, *The Act of Killing* (2012) and its sequel *The Look of Silence* (2014). Maj Wechselmann's *The Women and the Generals* (2012) debunks the slander against *Gerwani*. At the national level too, several documentary films have been produced such as *Jembatan Bacem* (ELSAM 2013) about the mass murders in Solo. In 2016 a documentary film about the concentration camps in Buru, *Tanah Air Beta*, was released.

Several authors have written novels, such as *Amba* ('The Colour of Red') by Lakshmi Pamuntjak (2012), and *Pulang* ('Return') by Leila Chudori (2012). The powerful novel *Cantik itu luka* ('Beauty Is a Wound') by Eka Kurniawan (2002) also has the events of 1965 as a central theme. A few foreign authors have written about the events of 1965, such as Richard Lewis in 2012 (*Bones of the Dark Moon in Bali*) and Saskia Wieringa in 2016 (*The Crocodile Hole*). In 2003 the well-known actress and playwright Ratna Sarumpaet produced the play *Anak-anak kegelapan* ('Children of Darkness').

Former political prisoners themselves have also taken up the theme of the Indonesian genocide.

Foremost among them is Pramudya Ananta Tur, with his 1995 scathing account of his experiences in the concentration camp on Buru, *Nyanyi seorang bisu* ('A Mute's Soliloquy').

Hersri Setiawan published his Buru memoirs in 2003 and 2005. Sulami (1999) also wrote recollections about her experiences of prison life.

Sculptors such as Dolorosa Sinaga and painters such as Andreas Iswinarto have been producing work related to the 1964 massacres as well. Of special interest is the commemorative art of Dadang Christanto. His work reflects his search for his father, Tan Ek Tjioe, who disappeared when Dadang was only eight years old. As Dadang says 'this horrifying ... event in Indonesian history ... carries permanent wounds in our heart and memory ... as the blood and the tears of its victims were never measured' (Turner and St John Barclay 2011: 377).

On 17 August 2016, coinciding with the celebration of the country's 71st year of independence, Yesnowave released *Dunia Milik Kita* ('The World Is Ours') by the choir *Dialita* (*Di Atas Lima Puluh Tahun – Over 50 Years Old*). This choir is made up of women whose parents, relatives or friends were captured, tortured and exiled during the 1965 anti-communist pogrom in Indonesia.

The need to establish a museum for human rights in which students can learn about past human rights violations including the 1965 genocide has long been felt. The so-called Jefferson building in Yogyakarta was suggested as a possible site for the new museum. This had belonged to the United States Information Services (see Saunders 1999); it had been ransacked during the anti-US demonstrations in 1964. During the first years of Suharto's reign of terror it became a torture centre. It is considered a haunted building.⁵³ Even before some activists had discussed the plan among each other, the *Gerakan Bela Negara* of Yogyakarta (GBN-DIY – Movement to Defend the Country) demonstrated with banners in which they protested against the plan to turn the building into a 'museum for the PKI'.⁵⁴ As we will discuss in the next chapter, the *Bela Negara* groups are a militia set up and trained by the military, and are fanatical and dangerous.

Until now there has been no place to commemorate the victims of the human rights violations that occurred in Indonesia. Yet there are many monuments built by the adversaries of the PKI, such as the army (for example the huge *Pancasila Sakti* monument in Jakarta) or various radical Muslim groups. The 'cruelty of the PKI' with respect to the 1948 Madiun affair for instance is commemorated in Magetan (Rejosari sugar factory), and at the Soco Well there is the Soerjo Monument on the road between Ngawi and Solo. There is also a monument in the village of Kresek at Fort Willis and a monument at the *pesantren Sabilil Muttaqin Takeran* (Afifi and Zuharon 2015: 62–79).

The victims and survivors of the 1965 massacres and their supporters have come together in the Forum 1965. This Forum comprises representatives of nine victims' organizations. The group's coordinators have held several meetings with Komnas HAM in which they urged the commissioners to not follow the government line of settling for a non-judicial process or transitional justice.

Young activists skilled in the use of social media have set up the website *Ingat 1965* (Remember 1965). It features stories about members of the third generation, about missing family members, gaps in their historical knowledge, or the continuing stigma under which third-generation descendants of former political prisoners also suffer. It is a very professional website, and the stories are carefully edited. The website allows this forgotten generation to speak out, and it provides accessible information for members of their own generation.

Concluding remarks

In this chapter we discussed the major elements of transitional justice in Indonesia after the 1965 massacres. Truth finding and memory work are

important elements in the struggle to counter the propaganda of those who maintain the spectre of communism and invest it with sexual slurs for their own ulterior motives. So far there has been no nationwide effort to investigate and document the people who were murdered or who disappeared, or the conditions under which this happened. Nor have the voices of the victims been recorded and their memories preserved at the national level. Individual researchers have carried out some oral history projects. The archives of *Kop-kamtib* and other institutions, both civil and army-related, which were involved in the mass crimes against humanity, have not yet been opened and made available for researchers.

Of the three mass graves discussed here only one, in Plumbon near Semarang, can be visited by the public. Although it is not easily accessible, it is a place of commemoration. Those who were buried there will be remembered. Their relatives and other survivors can honour and mourn them. Making the names of those murdered known to the public also allows the victims themselves to emerge from anonymity and from the uncertainty as to whether they are alive or dead. As disappeared people, their fate is unknown. These people were killed and buried in a mass grave, and their deaths can be spoken of as a crime; thus they become witnesses to the genocide in which they were murdered. The memorialization then, the turning an anonymous, haunted place into a *lieu de mémoire*, gives the survivors space to mourn and the victims a voice.

The sharing of the stories of those whose lives ended in the mass graves may contribute to some form of reconciliation. Maybe not in relation to the direct perpetrators, but to the many people who abetted the genocide: those forced to dig pits or to light the way to the places of execution, the guards, the administrators, judges, doctors and others who have so far not spoken out, might be incited to share their horrific, guilt-ridden stories with the survivors and come to some kind of closure. This kind of memory work is needed to establish mnemonic communities within which reconciliation can be attempted, even if only at the local level.

Research into mass graves can bring to light overriding patterns. Even the few examples discussed above are revealing. In their similarities they clearly suggest common patterns, directed from above. These relate to the secrecy of the operations (care was taken to hide the evidence of the mass murders), the methods of killing (only the army had firearms, while the militias used sharp weapons, and the way in which the killings were organized (usually trucks were confiscated, and prisoners were systematically selected from the overcrowded prisons where they were being held). Preliminary conclusions that can be drawn from these mnemonic excavations point to a chain of command, an army hierarchy in which the militias played the role of implementing orders from above, just like the ordinary soldiers who were ordered to kill in other genocide sites. The precautions that must be taken to visit the sites and make them public expose the continued dominance of New Order ideology and institutions. The site in Plumbon is hidden from view, in contrast to

the glaring monuments erected to celebrate the victory over what was the third largest communist party in the world.

Trauma relief is only partial when state responsibility is not examined, and perpetrators continue to enjoy impunity. The hegemonic narrative of 1965 supports an aggressively chauvinistic and increasingly fundamentalist present-day politics. The defiant memories of the mnemonic community of survivors can help to disrupt the army propaganda campaign.

Notes

- 1 Field notes, 29 January and 11 February 2017.
- 2 Orentlicher (2005: 7).
- 3 See, for example, Zehr (2014).
- 4 See Bedner (2015).
- 5 See McGregor (2009) and Fealy and McGregor (2010).
- 6 *Kompas*, 15 March 2000, *Terhadap Korban G30S/PKI Gus Dur: Sejak Dulu Sudah Minta Maaf*.
- 7 See, for example, www.thejakartapost.com/news/2016/04/19/1965-symposium-indonesias-way-to-face-its-dark-past.html.
- 8 For example, activists wearing T-shirts emblazoned with the words 'PKI – Pecinta Kopi Indonesia' (Indonesian Coffee Lovers), with the cup and spoon image depicted resembling the hammer and sickle emblem.
- 9 See, for example, www.thejakartapost.com/academia/2016/05/20/from-red-bogey-to-anti-intellectualism.html.
- 10 The previous year Indonesia reported to the Human Rights Council, which is composed of representatives of United Nations member states, for the Universal Periodic Review, from 21 May–4 June 2012. A national report was submitted in accordance with paragraph 5 of the annex to Human Rights Council resolution 16/21 A/HRC/WG.6/13/IDN/1. The recommendation of the ICCPR HRC can be found under No. CCCPR/C/IDN/CO/1.
- 11 For instance that a joint investigation team be set up between the Attorney-General's Office and Komnas HAM. This was not followed up.
- 12 Field notes, November 2014. Mery Kolimon has since been elected as Synod Moderator for the church in NTT.
- 13 Edited by the Balinese poet, filmmaker and former political prisoner Putu Oka Sukanta (2011).
- 14 www.sr-indonesia.com/web-exclusives/view/confronting-pain-and-shame.
- 15 As were all events related to the 1965 massacres, including the English translation of the novel by Saskia Wieringa on the events of 1965. The publishers, Jurnal Perempuan, decided to hold a book lunch instead of a book launch which was interrupted three times by security forces (Wieringa 2016a).
- 16 Soeara Kita, No. 2 December 1999.
- 17 www.thejakartapost.com/news/2016/05/03/activists-report-122-mass-graves-of-1965-victims-across-java-and-sumatra.html. YPKP 1965 was formed after YPKP, established in 1999 by Sulami and Pramudya Ananta Tur, split. Tur went on to lead the LPKP. For a map showing the approximate locations of the mass graves see also <https://x.detik.com/detail/investigasi/20160516/Menelusuri-Kuburan-PKI-Cincin-Sudjijem-Tertanggal-28-6-1965/index.php>.
- 18 Interview with a group of survivors in Tuban, 14 February 2017.
- 19 In Bali, for instance, only one mass grave is mentioned, while Leslie Dwyer testified before the Tribunal that she and Degung Sandikarma knew of some 80 mass graves on that small island alone.

- 20 https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_cha_chapter35_rule115.
- 21 See the documentary film *Luweng Grubuk*, 2006.
- 22 www.tribunal1965.org/id/pembongkaran-kuburan-massal-di-jembrana/.
- 23 See, for example, the films *The Act of Killing* and *The Look of Silence* (Oppenheimer 2012 and 2014, respectively), and *Jembatan Bacem* (ELSAM 2013).
- 24 See the Narrative Report of the hearings of the Tribunal of IPT 1965 on the website (www.tribunal1965.org) for an overview of the disrupted meetings (Katjasungkana and Wieringa 2016a).
- 25 See Wieringa (2002) for a history of *Gerwani*. See also Sulami (1999).
- 26 Interview with Ibu Sulami in the Dutch periodical *Trouw*, 15 December 1999.
- 27 Previously they had tried to excavate the mass grave in Blora, but this failed (McGregor 2012: 237).
- 28 The exhumation took place on 16, 17 and 18 December 2000. Ringgo Widagdo in a letter to the authors, dated 30 November 2000, details the findings of Dr Handoko, the forensic specialist.
- 29 On 20 December 2000 Ibu Sulami received the fourth Tji Hak-soon Justice and Peace Award from the Asian Human Rights Commission, as Chair of YPKP after the dehumation in Wonosobo.
- 30 This exhumation is well documented. For instance, Jakartanicus (this is his pseudonym) produced a documentary film in 2002 entitled *Mass Grave*. See also McGregor (2012, 2015).
- 31 <http://metrosemarang.com/kuburan-massal-korban-tragedi-1965-ditemukan-di-ma-ngkang>. See also Eickhoff *et al.* (2017).
- 32 For the account of eyewitness Pak Sukar see www.merdeka.com/peristiwa/ini-p-engakuan-mbah-super-saksi-mata-pembantaian-pki-di-semarang.html.
- 33 In Pati, for example, villagers reported having seen headless ghosts at the site of a mass grave there. See <http://jateng.tribunnews.com/2016/05/11/lokasi-kuburan-massal-ini-dikenal-angker-warga-sering-melihat-penampakan-tubuh-tanpa-kepala>.
- 34 From interviews with the activists. See also <https://x.detik.com/detail/investigasi/20160516/Menelusuri-Kuburan-PKI-Cincin-Sudjijem-Tertanggal-28-6-1965/index.php>. Eickhoff *et al.* (2017) mention that she was the mistress of the regent of Kendal and was falsely accused of being a PKI member.
- 35 See for a video of the ceremony www.youtube.com/watch?v=tCe65TLuEgw (uploaded by Yunantyo Adi). See also www.merdeka.com/peristiwa/ditemukan-makam-24-korban-pembantaian-1965-di-semarang.html.
- 36 See also McGregor (2015).
- 37 See <http://kebumenykp65.blogspot.nl/2015/06/makam-korban-1965-disarankan-di-buka.html>.
- 38 See also Adhivira 2015 and his 2016 article, available at <https://komunitaspayung.org/2017/03/27/kuburan-massal-1965-segera-usut/>. On 25 November 2015 we visited the site itself.
- 39 She is the author of *Lasmi*, a novel about an East Javanese leader of the women's organization *Gerwani*.
- 40 *Syarikat* is an acronym for *Masyarakat Santri untuk Advokasi Rakyat-Santri* (Santri Society for People's Advocacy).
- 41 The source is a written statement in July 2015 by a *Syarikat* leader, Dewi Ratnawulam, to Nursyahbani Katjasungkana, and several informal conversations with former *Syarikat* members.
- 42 A pun on Gus Dur and the name of a sweet-tasting but foul-smelling fruit (*durian*).
- 43 Muhammad Al-Fayyadl, in an editorial on the website *Islambergerak*, 22 October 2015. The 1928 Youth Pledge is an important moment in the history of Indonesian nationalism. Participants of the Second Youth Congress pledged to fight for one motherland, one nation and one language. Nursyahbani Katjasungkana's father,

Raden Katja Sungkana, was the chair of *Pemoeda Indonesia*, one of the nine participating youth organizations.

44 See Lamasitudju (2014).

45 www.nytimes.com/2015/07/13/world/asia/a-city-turns-to-face-indonesias-murderous-past.html?_r=0.

46 www.spk-ham.org/768-name-korbam-pekanggaran-ham-1965/66-di-palu.

47 Interview, 4 December 2016.

48 See www.cnnindonesia.com/nasional/20160419103959-20-124942/kesaksian-pilu-na-ni-dituduh-menari-telanjang-di-lubang-buaya/ome/Nasional/Berita Peristiwa, and her book.

49 Some of the stories were collected by Hersri Setiawan (2006). See also Nadia (2007).

50 On 8 December 2014 we spoke to several participants in the Circles. They said that these meetings had become their *obat* (medicine).

51 See Ayu Wahyuningroem (26 July 2016). Available at www.insideindonesia.org/justice-denied.

52 See Komnas Perempuan (2007).

53 See the account of this period by John Hughes (1967).

54 www.zonasatu.co.id/2016/10.gbn-diy-tolak-rencana-komnas-perempuan.

9 New Style Communism?

The National Symposium on 1965 held in April 2016 demonstrated the effects of the continuous communist phobic campaign. Witaryono Reksoprodjo, a son of the Minister of Energy who was detained by Suharto, told the audience that if you are labelled an *anak PKI* (PKI child) at school it is a worse disgrace (*lebih nista*) than being called a bastard (*anak haram jadah*).¹ Women testified that the stigma surrounding *Gerwani* still haunts the former female prisoners; some are even now not allowed to attend the neighbourhood meetings (*arisan*).² In front of the building the Front Pancasila held a large demonstration, with slogans such as *Ganyang PKI* (destroy the PKI), *PKI musuh rakyat* (PKI enemy of the people), *tolak gerakan Komunis Gaya Baru* (prohibit the New Style communist movement). The latter banner was held aloft by women in *nikaab*.³

Introduction

The stigma by association with communism lingers, it can even be inherited, as the above case indicates. After the actions of the G30S people could be considered guilty by association, due to the sheer fact of their having belonged to or sympathized with the PKI or Sukarno. It seems that at present having a parent or grandparent who was considered *salah* (wrong) is enough to be bullied at school.⁴ The military's necropolitical domination of social life with the help of aggressive militias is a constant reminder of the post-1965 terror. The alleged sexual predilections of *Gerwani* members that were the core of the army's propaganda campaign were turned into the palimpsest of New Order culture. Although it retreated into the depths of public memory after *Reformasi*, the pattern is still noticeable as it is now overlaid by vicious waves of homophobia.

There is still widespread social agreement that the army did the right thing in massacring communists, possibly because so many people were complicit in this through their silence or through their active support of or profiting from Suharto's reign of terror. In this concluding chapter we examine some current manifestations of the power of propaganda. Propaganda, as discussed in the first chapter, is the manipulation of emotion through the use of various means

of communication; in 1965 this was primarily the radio and the controlled press and are now chiefly the social media. A case study is the attack on the building of the *Yayasan Lembaga Bantuan Hukum Indonesia* (YLBHI – Foundation of Legal Aid Institutes) in September 2017. We will also point to the dominant role of the army, via its new *Bela Negara* (Defend the Nation) programme, which continues under the cloak of democracy.⁵ The army might resort to bloodshed again, as in 1965, threatened retired General Kivlan Zen, reflecting on how the April 2016 symposium had made ‘the victims feel good’.⁶ The way in which army recruits are indoctrinated will be illustrated by an analysis of a training document. Another document is directed at youth training in mosques. We note the constant surveillance of people via the mass media in which both consent and compliance are manufactured. These tactics culminate in hate politics, as evidenced by the mass mobilization in the Jakarta gubernatorial elections of 2017. The result is a dangerous form of moral policing which masks political and economic interests, and which threatens to violate basic human rights on privacy, association and the freedom of speech, which are contained in the Constitution and can be derived from the *Pancasila*.

Continued intimidation

During 2016 and 2017 numerous meetings of 1965 victims, progressive art festivals, film screenings and university discussions were disrupted or prohibited.⁷ ELSAM recorded that at least 20 times a cultural event had been broken up by the security apparatus. The well-known sculptor Dolorosa Sinaga, one of the organizers of the *Belok Kiri* festival, which aimed to educate youth on the events of 1965, aptly stated that critical thinking had to be stimulated ‘to uphold justice ... and to correct history’.⁸

As mentioned in Chapter 1, President Jokowi said that if someone could point out communists to him, he would ‘clobber them’.⁹ And ‘clobber’ they did: this was one of the slogans heard during the attack by a radical Muslim mob on the YLBHI office in Jakarta. On 16–17 September 2017 a group of activists and victims organized a seminar to discuss the many unclear aspects about the G30S and the genocide that followed. The main organizer was the Forum 1965, an umbrella association of various organizations of victims of this genocide. Co-organizers were members of the International People’s Tribunal 1965. The venue for the seminar was the office of the YLBHI. Well-known researchers such as Asvi Warman Adam, Baskara Wardaya, Kusnanto Anggoro, Abdul Wahid and others, as well as some of the country’s best-known human rights lawyers including Nursyahbani Katjasungkana and Todung Mulya Lubis were invited. It was to be a modest, closed symposium for which, because it was held in an office, and with less than 50 participants, no permit was needed. Such seminars are regularly held in the YLBHI office without any difficulty. But this seminar turned toxic.¹⁰

The evening before the seminar Rahmat Himran, coordinator of the *Aliansi Mahasiswa dan Pemuda Anti Komunis* (Anti-Communist Students' and Youth Alliance) had met with the hardline retired General Kivlan Zen and representatives of several radical Muslim militias including the Pergerakan Mahasiswa Islam Indonesia (PMII – Indonesian Muslim Students' Organization). They decided to break up the seminar and contacted the police.¹¹ Rahmat Himran is also a leader of the so-called 313 militia, an organization set up in 2016 to force the popular Governor of Jakarta, the Chinese Christian Basuki Tjahaja Purnama, popularly called Ahok, to step down. They organized a mass rally on 31 March 2016, the start of a campaign of mass demonstrations that eventually saw the governor imprisoned on a trumped-up charge of blasphemy and thereby losing his campaign for re-election to his conservative Muslim rival. Rahmat Himran had also been at the forefront of the virulent anti-LGBT campaign which erupted in late 2015.¹²

On the morning of 16 September 2017, when the first participants arrived at the venue of the seminar, they found it cordoned off by the police. Outside the gate members of the PMII, the *Laskar Merah Putih* (Red White Militia) and *Ansor* had gathered, calling out slogans to eliminate the PKI and to dissolve this seminar which, they asserted, sought to revive the banned PKI. They were well prepared, carrying banners, the attributes of their respective organizations and wearing their uniforms. They had also come in a pick-up truck equipped with megaphones and loudspeakers. This mob had come from a demonstration against the crimes against humanity committed by the Myanmar government against the Rohingya.¹³

During the negotiations with the police, activists alerted the chair of *Ansor*, Gus Yaqut. He immediately called back its members because he had not authorized them to join the demonstration. This is an interesting development, given that members of *Ansor* and its militant unit, *Banser*, had participated in the mass killings in 1965–66. At present, however, the moderate Muslim mass organization NU, of which *Ansor* is the youth wing, is engaged in struggles against radical Muslim groups which want to control the Muslim population. These latter groups operate via front organizations such as the PMII. The Secretary-General of *Ansor*, Abdul Rochman, issued a statement that said that *Ansor* wants the truth to come out and actually supports a seminar like this. Support also came from the HMI branch of UGM.¹⁴ Later, in order to show their solidarity with the embattled human rights defenders, members of *Ansor* as well as of KOKAM, the youth organization of the *Muhammadiyah*, as well as many other organizations which are commonly assisted by lawyers of the LBH, such as those of paralegals and domestic workers, helped to clean up the mess resulting from the attack on the YLBHI building.

In the afternoon police stormed the building, rushing right up to the top floor, where the old survivors were gathering. The police accused them of holding the seminar after all. Their suspicion was aroused as some organizers and victims had returned to the building at around 3 p.m. They had been

evacuated to a safe place but as they had come from all over Indonesia they wanted to evaluate the event. The police did not act on their own initiative. Apparently Kivlan Zen and his associates had received information about the discussions being held inside the building (during the TV programme the *Indonesia Lawyers Club* aired on 19 September, he waved his mobile phone, saying 'I may be retired, but I get enough intelligence').

On Saturday evening indignant activists held a press conference denouncing what they called the 'emergency of democracy' and called for activists and artists to join them the next day at 10 a.m. to celebrate a cultural festival of free speech, *Asik Asik Aksi*.¹⁵ About 200 people eventually turned up, including singers, poets and musicians. If we cannot speak the truth, we will celebrate it through art, was the message. When by the beginning of the evening the art fair was over and the participants wanted to go home, all of a sudden demonstrators entered the grounds and filled the streets around the building of the YLBHI. It turned out that a hoax had been circulating on social media, conveying the message that a PKI meeting was going on after all and that they were singing 'Genjer-Genjer'.¹⁶ Around 1,000 aggressive protesters shouted slogans like 'long live the army, disband the PKI, it is permitted by Islam to drink their blood, burn them alive, Allah is great'.¹⁷ They would 'clobber the PKI', they announced, parroting President Jokowi's words. The protesters this time included members of the large militias of the *Forum Betawi Rempug* (FBR – Betawi Brotherhood Forum),¹⁸ and the FPI, as well as from the smaller *Majelis Rasulullah*.¹⁹ These are very well-organized vigilante groups that are well-funded, well-equipped, well-trained, and known for their violence.²⁰ They had been mobilized via their WhatsApp groups and other forms of social media.

They tried to storm the building. This time the police had to protect the participants. They explained to the protesters this was not a PKI seminar, just a cultural festival, and denied that the song 'Genjer-Genjer' was being sung.²¹ To no avail. The protests grew increasingly violent. Stones and bottles were hurled at the police and at the building, injuring officers and smashing the windows. Inside the building the participants barricaded the doors with chairs and desks. The gate was damaged, the grounds were trampled, doors ruined. The police used tear gas and water cannons to sweep the streets clear, but the protesters kept coming. Finally, just after midnight, the first participants of the festival were able to be evacuated in police buses, and by 3 a.m. the last convoy of buses left the premises.

While the attacks on the YLBHI office were taking place, another discussion was going on. The Chief of Staff of the Army, General Gatot Nurmantyo, had ordered that the notorious propaganda film *The Betrayal of G30S/PKI* would be shown again to the army and to the millennial generation, in order to teach them about history.²² It is this film that contains the scene in which alleged *Gerwani* members were happily performing naked the 'Dance of the Fragrant Flowers', singing the song 'Genjer-Genjer', castrating the generals and gouging out their eyes, as discussed earlier in this volume. The film

also ‘proved’ that the PKI had planned to betray the nation, and that the air force and President Sukarno were complicit in this.²³ This film had not been shown since 1998, partly because the air force had protested against the way in which it was portrayed in the film.

Interestingly, in the same TV show in which Kivlan Zen boasted of the efficiency of his intelligence operation, Sukmawati Sukarnoputri reminisced about a discussion she had held with the producer of the propaganda film, Arifin C. Noer. He had acknowledged that the film had been ordered and paid for by the army, which had kept close control on the production process. He was well aware that many scenes contained historical distortions.²⁴

Clearly the history of 1965 is an important topic for the army. The disruption of the history seminar is not so much related to the idea that the history of 1965 must not be discussed. Rather, the army still wants to impose its own version of the history of that period. Hardline Islamist politicians such as Amien Rais and lawmakers of *Golkar* and the PKS immediately chimed in to support the showing of the film.²⁵ On social media images appeared of the FPI, and other militias such as the group *Bang Japar* and the hate-mongering Senator Fahira Idris and her supporters, which organized viewings of the film.²⁶ The President remained silent about the violations to the right of assembly and free speech, but attended a showing of the army film with General Gatot Nurmantyo, thereby legitimizing its reintroduction.²⁷

Post-truth? Hoaxes as political manipulation

The biggest of all hoaxes in present-day Indonesia is the black propaganda against *Gerwani*. This was accompanied by hate speech against the whole PKI which had to be dehumanized for the victorious group to justify its violence.²⁸ It is even effective 52 years after it was conjured up, as evidenced in the hoax that mobilized 1,000 aggressive youth. Before you know it, is the message, these activists are singing ‘Genjer-Genjer’ and the *Gerwani* witches may start castrating again.

The *Gerwani* hoax was not the only slander that was going around as we were writing this book. In August 2017 the Saracen group was dismantled, which for payment spread hoaxes, fake news and hate speech.²⁹ It has been suggested that this group may have been involved in the 2014 presidential campaign, in which then candidate Jokowi was accused of being anti-Islam, of Chinese origin, Christian and a communist. Fake photos and fake certificates were circulated.³⁰ In February 2018 another group was uncovered; it ran a WhatsApp account called the ‘Family MCA (Muslim Cyber Army)’ which spread fake news about the revival of the PKI and about alleged kidnappings of Muslim *ulama*.³¹ With regional elections scheduled to take place in 2018 and presidential elections in 2019 the spread of hoaxes is being stepped up. An editorial in the *Jakarta Post* on 1 March 2018 stated that already some 40,000 hoaxes on various social media had been found.³²

The ghost writers of these hoaxes and all others who compose hate speeches about the so-called revival of the PKI are fed by writers who provide more substantive historical distortions. We discuss two such texts, one designed for the army, the other directed at the education of the youth in mosques. The army text is a PowerPoint presentation entitled 'An Analysis of the Threat of New Style Communism in Indonesia'. It was produced for the *Komando Pembina Doktrin, Pendidikan dan Latihan Tentara Nasional Indonesia Angkatan Darat* (Kodiklat – Guidance Command on the doctrine, education and training of the army) the main army training centre, which used to be called *Seskoad*, in Bandung.³³ The last slide bears the slogan of the national security apparatus (BIN – Badan Intelijens Nasional), '*velox et exactus*' (speed and precision).³⁴ The presentation starts by juxtaposing Stalin, Mao Zedong, Hitler, Lenin, Mussolini and Pol Pot as the global socialist-communist leaders who created havoc. The subsequent slides contain a warning about China which, with the help of a 'smiling diplomacy' and via their new silk roads, is building its power. The presentation goes on to state that new style communism is using just this type of soft power, by influencing religion, the media and social movements, particularly by promoting pluralism and diversity. Its goal is to create a republic based on communism, the conditions for which are being prepared by social movements that advocate human rights. The concrete threat that communism poses is depicted through the three times that the PKI 'revolted' (in 1926, in the Madiun affair of 1948 and in 1965); the middle of this particular slide features an ominous oval that reads '100,000 weapons'. This is a reference to the so-called fifth force, which in reality never took off (the rifles must have become quite rusty in the meantime wherever they may be now).³⁵ In the American-style threat analysis (in which English words are used), a total score of 16.55 is presented, which means that the threat of a communist revival is 'high'. This threat analysis includes the following: the existence of a wide network; the deployment of a discourse of human rights and democracy; the positioning of adherents as 'victims' to gain the sympathy of the public; the desire to break down the army's territorial structure; and the use of social media.

The conclusion of this analysis is that the army must be strengthened and the above-mentioned dangers carefully mapped out. Concrete threats are the alleged support of China for communism, as well as poverty and the weakness of the so-called Z generation which can, supposedly, be easily brainwashed. As a closing statement it is proposed that the army should carefully analyse any policy or law that may threaten the interests of the army and carry out a parliamentary lobby if it detects such a threat; consolidate the territorial command structure; and build a 'grand strategy' to fight new style communism, for instance by conducting a cyber war, as well as holding seminars in schools and universities to influence the Z generation, and public discussions.

The second document was written by Dr Iman Rudy and contains a 'study of the history and rise' of the PKI.³⁶ It is intended for the education of the

youth in mosques. Here Charles Darwin and Karl Marx are presented as the fathers of communism. Hitler, the Japanese military and Zionism (which ‘has similarities with China’ and adherents of which have issued ‘their own holy book, the Talmud’) are seen as the precursors. As an illustration of what took place in Madiun, well-known pictures are shown of PKI members being killed, but the document’s subtitle is ‘killing of *ulama*, *santri*, and members of the army’. A subsequent slide deplores the fact that at the time the PKI was not prohibited. The following slides portray the rise of the PKI and its associated mass organizations. In a slide depicting the situation in 1965, the ‘killings and abductions’ by the PR and the ‘expropriation of land’ by the BTI, the PR and *Gerwani* are mentioned.

The next part of this presentation is dedicated to the alleged dangers posed by the revival of communism. The portraits of ten people considered to be exponents of this movement are followed by some examples of ‘PKI propaganda’.³⁷ Next a list of some of the indications that communism is being revived is presented, such as the removal of the obligation to watch the army film about the G30S and the abolition of the screening of civil servants. The films of Joshua Oppenheimer are mentioned, as are various ‘leftist’ festivals (where ‘the song ‘Genjer-Genjer’ is heard again’). Another indicator is the defence of human rights by liberal and international non-governmental organizations (NGOs). The last slide is particularly interesting. Here Dr Iman Rudy himself has put together a graphic presentation of the current dangers facing the Indonesian Republic. The national emblem – the national mythical bird, the eagle *Garuda* – situated above the map of Indonesia, is threatened by a huge claw. Its five talons represent (1) drugs and alcoholic beverages; (2) foreign powers (the US, Australia, Singapore, the People’s Republic of China and Iran); (3) Shia; (4) (Indonesian) Chinese (*aseng*); and (5) communists (neo PKI). On the claw the acronym FMKZ is written, which stands for four Arabic words: *Faikun*, *Munafikun*, *Kafirun* and *Zolimun* (destroyers (of religion),³⁸ hypocrites, unbelievers and polytheists).

In both documents we see the various rhetorical tools at work that are commonly used to fabricate hate speech, the distortion of truth, the presentation of half-truths, the omission of unwelcome facts (such as the terror exercised by the DI) and the repetition of outright lies. Dr Iman Rudy’s presentation is a clear indication of the direction in which Indonesian society is being steered: its enemies are foreign powers, including ethnic Chinese (people of Arab descent are never confronted with their ‘foreign’ origins); adherents of non-Sunni forms of Islam; and as the acronym FMKZ indicates, even non-fundamentalist Muslims and adherents of other religions. It is surprising how easy it is to conflate communism with human rights, and it is a struggle to defend the pluralism and diversity that used to characterize Indonesia.

The army document draws parallels between the communists and human rights defenders. It has become a bit ridiculous to see any danger in the timid, frail, poorly dressed octogenarians, who are the survivors of the massacres and prison camps of the army and the militias which assisted them. But now

their descendants are seen as the danger – the many millions of them. They have inherited the ‘communist virus’, it is suggested, and they may rise up any time. Social media messages which appeared during the attack on the YLBHI office read ‘YLBHI is the nest of the PKI’. Images appeared showing the participants at the discussion held in the building, over which a hammer and sickle and the letters PKI have been pasted, all of it dripping with blood.

What interrelated interest groups are involved in this ongoing propaganda? Below we briefly discuss the army, economic power holders, Muslim hardliners and political leaders.

The armed forces

The army has its own interests to pursue. In particular it seeks to retain a monopoly on its own version of the events of 1965–66. In his shrill aggressive voice Kivlan Zen in the aforementioned TV programme the ‘Indonesian Lawyers’ Club’ repeated all the old lies about the murder of the generals, the presence of *Gerwani* women, the eye gouging, and the weapons that the PKI had allegedly stashed away (if they had all these weapons, why not use them to defend themselves when they were slaughtered?). The general called human rights defenders the ‘new PKI’, suggesting that they awaited the same fate that had befallen PKI members in 1965–66. He was supported by various lawmakers who hypocritically called for a ban on discussions about 1965 as that would only ‘cause frictions’ in society.³⁹ Thus, activists are blamed for provoking the stone-throwing mob.

This attack on human rights defenders cannot be viewed separately from the conclusions of the International People’s Tribunal on the crimes against humanity committed in 1965–66. Although the government and the military brushed away this verdict, it renewed discussions on this dark period in Indonesian history. In the April 2016 seminar both perpetrators and victims related their versions of the events. Millions of people for the first time heard the harrowing stories of survivors of the genocide.⁴⁰ The results of this seminar were never released. On 1 and 2 June 2016 Kivlan Zen and his colleagues held a counter-seminar in Balai Kartini, Jakarta, and the social and political climate became increasingly repressive.⁴¹

The army must remain relevant to Indonesian society and must therefore be seen to defend national interests. If not, its budget might be sacrificed. In the absence of real enemies, ‘proxy’ enemies are created which include alleged communists, LGBT people, as well as drug users and NGOs in general.⁴² Army interests include its own economic pursuits, which are best served by preserving the territorial command structure (*Koter, Komando Territorial*). Following the fall of Suharto, the army managed to stave off attempts to dismantle the lucrative *Koter* system, by aggressively defending these so-called internal issues. This system of territorial control forms the basis of the army’s power over society and has allowed commanders to form lucrative alliances

with economically powerful groups (Kammen 2007).⁴³ During the New Order era *Kopkamtib* gathered its intelligence via the territorial structure.

At present the territorial structure has two tentacles in society, the *Babinsa* officers and the *Bela Negara* groups. *Babinsa* officers (*Bintara Pembina Desa* – village guidance officers) are active at the village level. These officers have to ensure security, but also collect levies from private enterprises (if these enterprises do not pay up, labour unrest may follow) (Kammen 2007). These non-commissioned officers are also made responsible for boosting rice production.⁴⁴ Why police officers in Indonesia are considered incapable of ensuring security at the village level, and why agricultural extension specialists are not involved in agricultural issues, so that *Babinsa* officers must be employed for these two tasks, can only be explained by referring to the legacy of the authoritarian New Order and by the profits that the army derives from its presence in the villages.

The need for the *Bela Negara* programme can also only be understood by the continued wish of the military to play a political role. This new militia was established in 2015 by the then Minister of Defence, Ryamizard Ryacudu. The Minister of Research and Technology, Mohammad Nasir, declared that the *Bela Negara* programme had been incorporated in university curricula since 2016. He explained that this measure was taken to ‘control the spread of radical views on campuses’.⁴⁵ Not only students are enlisted for these paramilitary-style trainings, there are also indications that *preman* (thugs) belonging to the FPI or ordinary criminal gangs are being trained.⁴⁶ In Bali *preman* were given uniforms and arms training ‘so they would not become bored’.⁴⁷ So clearly the *Bela Negara* programme has both an ideological and a military aspect. It is an eerie reminder of the training the army gave to civil society militia in 1965, the *Hanra* and *Hansip* groups.

If Mietzner in his 2008 book on military politics in Indonesia is optimistic about the army’s willingness to adapt to the new democratic system, it is clear that at present the ‘political soldier’ is very much back in town, especially when General Gatot Nurmantyo served as Army Chief (July 2015–December 2017).⁴⁸ He actively promoted the idea that shadowy forces are undermining the republic, warning that both the PKI and LGBT groups are behind this ‘proxy war’. Along roads huge billboards read that the people and the army are united. This kind of rhetoric justifies the army’s training of civilian militias and its meddling in regional politics.

Economic interests

Another group interested in keeping the spectre of communism alive is the economic elite. Since the PKI and the farmers’ and trade unions associated with it have been destroyed, capitalist exploitative practices have been able to continue unchecked. Both corruption and crony capitalism blossom.⁴⁹ The links between the military and the civil ruling groups had become very strong in the New Order, a legacy that did not fundamentally change after Suharto’s

abdication. Here too communism can usefully serve as bogeyman. Protests about labour issues or the destruction of nature by unscrupulous mining companies for instance are quickly suppressed, as the local activist Heri Budiawan found. He led a demonstration against a gold mine that was destroying his native forest in the Banyuwangi area in East Java and was arrested. He was charged with 'spreading communism', as apparently a banner had been seen in a demonstration he led with the hammer and sickle logo. It was unclear who had put up that banner. It is known that in some cases the military themselves do this.⁵⁰ Ultimately he was sentenced to ten months, even though the offending banner could not be found anywhere (and was listed as absent proof).⁵¹ Only human rights defenders have protested against forced evictions, illegal land grabs and violations of labour rights. They are often confronted by right-wing militias. These thugs, as is clearly demonstrated in the film *The Act of Killing* by Oppenheimer, are often paid by rogue capitalists, who are happy to turn them loose on those who oppose their shameless self-interest.

Foreign interests, particularly those of the US, the UK and Australia, played a role in the 1965–66 destruction of the PKI, the removal of Sukarno and the purge of his supporters, as discussed in Chapter 3.⁵² Since Suharto came to power foreign investment has increased, under the pro-Western economic lobby called the 'Berkeley mafia'. The concessions which Freeport, for example, got for extracting copper and gold were highly profitable for the company and for the US. President Jokowi has pledged to attract more foreign investment, in an effort to boost the country's economy. Toothless trade unions and cheap labour make Indonesia very attractive. But the country's politicians and generals who may be behind the mass demonstrations ultimately shoot themselves in the foot by encouraging and/or financing these riots; investors do not like the anarchy of Muslim mobs out on the streets.

Economic interests play out in other ways as well. The 1965–66 genocide not only resulted in an enormous loss of life. Many people also profited economically. Property owned by murdered or imprisoned supporters of Sukarno and the PKI was seized. Those who gained their wealth in this way (the army included) do not want to compensate the families of the victims for their losses. More broadly, corruption is rampant in Indonesia, involving high-profile political leaders. At the time of the attack on the YLBHI building the Corruption Eradication Committee had been investigating some top leaders, including the then House Speaker, Setya Novanto. The director of the National Institute, Andy Sinaga, has suggested that this kind of mob violence could be used as a smokescreen to divert attention away from these investigations.⁵³

Muslim groups

The red scare is used to mobilize the Muslim masses. They are easily swayed by the hate speech based on primordial identity politics directed at them. The

two sexual moral panics discussed earlier are a perfect vehicle for this. During 2016 and 2017 banners appeared in several places stating that a particular local or religious organization opposed both communists and LGBT persons. As discussed above several persons prominently visible in the YLBHI attack, such as Rahmat Himran and Fahira Idris, also featured in the homophobic campaign which has swept the nation since late 2015.⁵⁴ The same groups of thugs which demonstrated in the past were trying to destroy the YLBHI building. In a 2015 article in the newspaper *Kompas*, the younger brother of Gus Dur, *kyai* Salahudin Wahid, from the prestigious Pesantren Tebuireng, gives an overview of the present fault lines within the NU. The first group is against reconciliation with the PKI. According to the author, this is a small group. The second group is ready to reconcile with the PKI, as both were considered victims of the army. From this perspective the state can apologize for the crimes against humanity it committed, but only to the victims, not to the PKI as a whole. The third group accepts the involvement of NU members in the massacres. This group, which includes the members of *Gusdurian*, agrees that there should be a legal process and the ban on the PKI, as contained in the TAP MPRS XXV 1966, should be lifted.⁵⁵

However, so far the hardline *kyai*, who are vehemently opposed to any discussion about the role of the NU at the time of the massacres, and actively oppose efforts to encourage the respective Presidents (both SBY and Jokowi) to express their regrets about the genocide, have the upper hand. If the latter group refers to the mass killings at all they point out that the army had the leading role.

On Friday 2 December 2016 we watched on TV all day the unfolding of the huge demonstration in which Muslim masses from all over the country were called together to demand that Jakarta's Governor Ahok be arrested. After the Friday sermon (*khotbah*) by the FPI leader Rizieq Shihab, President Jokowi and several of his ministers were seen to kneel in front of this self-styled Imam Besar of the FPI, who also calls himself *Mufti Besar Kesultanan Darul Islam Sulu* (title: *Datuk Paduka Maulana Syar'i Sulu*).⁵⁶ This reference to the DI movement is strengthened by the many protesters who came on foot from Garut, a core DI stronghold. Not only did the demonstrators openly call for a Sharia-based Islam, they also exposed the intrinsically misogynist nature of their movement. Several sexual assaults were reported against women who happened to be in the proximity of the protest site and who were deemed not to be wearing 'Islamic clothing' by some male protesters.⁵⁷

If these are public demonstrations of the muscular, masculinist power of right-wing Islam, the DI movement and its ideology also lives on in various underground offshoots such as the *Jamaah Islamiyah* (JI) and *Jamaah Ansar al-Tawhid* (JAT). The activists belonging to these movements see the Indonesian Government as *kafir* (infidels) and *thaghut* (idol worshipers) and some of them have engaged in terrorist acts.⁵⁸ The JI was implicated in the 2002 Bali bombings.

Victimhood is another tactic. Although Muslims form the majority in Indonesia and increasingly dominate civil society institutions and social and political life, they keep presenting themselves as victims. During the YLBHI attack a list of possible topics for the new film on G30S proposed by President Jokowi was circulated on social media, which counted more than ten examples of so-called PKI cruelty, mostly incidents from around 1945. This was indeed a bloody period in Indonesian history in which various groups struggled to impose their interpretation of what the nation state should be characterized by, as discussed earlier in this book. Typically, violent acts by Muslim groups perpetrated on their socialist adversaries, such as during the long-drawn-out and bloody DI rebellion, are ignored.⁵⁹ During the raid on the YLBHI this claim of suffering victimization came with a reversal of the truth. On social media the violent demonstrators asked indignantly, ‘why do the police target us? We are not killers like the PKI was in 1965’. This is shorthand for saying that the generals were murdered by the PKI, ignoring the fact that armed forces personnel carried out the killings and that hundreds of thousands who had nothing to do with this crime were slaughtered by other units of the same army assisted by Muslim militias and other vigilante groups. They also paid no heed to the obvious truth that the people killed by the G30S group were generals, not Muslim leaders. And of course they ignored the fact that they themselves were smashing the windows, not the terrified survivors of the events of 1965 who were inside the building.

The presumed unity of the Muslim *umma* (community) is threatened in other ways as well. The growing inequality in the country, with an extremely wealthy and corrupt elite, a middle class whose aspirations are rising faster than the resources they have access to, and an enormous mass of desperately poor people, has given rise to widespread frustration and discontent. Poor urban youth can easily be recruited for a meal and a daily allowance to wage violent demonstrations (rent-a-mob); poor rural youth happily join the adventure of an all-paid outing to the capital. The middle classes, products of the inadequate, bigoted education that the New Order initiated, take refuge in a xenophobic piety (capitalism, LGBT and women’s rights are seen as coming from the West).

As noted above the NU is currently playing a moderate role. It is opposed to right-wing Muslim forces, both those who advocate a caliphate and terrorist groups. With the help of the moderate Muslim party *Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa* (PKB – National Awakening Party), and its chair Muhaemin, they are advocating a form of Islam called ‘*Islam Nusantara*’. An Islam, they stress, that is sensitive to Indonesian values and that is not ‘Arabized’. The switch from an NU that was opposed to the Javanized form of Islam (the communist ‘*abangan*’) to a ‘*Nusantara Islam*’ is interesting and warrants more study. In general, radical Muslim groups stand to gain from militant actions. By flexing their muscles, they hope to garner even more political, social and cultural concessions.

Political interests

Although the participants in the YLBHI history seminar were actually doing the work that President Jokowi promised to do, namely investigating past human rights violations, the President has not condemned the violations of the participants' constitutional rights and the violence of the mob. Apparently he did not have the political support to stand firm for democracy. If he defended free speech he would be seen as anti-Islam, and could lose the support of the military, who might turn the radical Muslim mobs on him. Exposing Jokowi's inability to stand for human rights may be one of the tactics of his political adversaries to try to weaken him in the presidential elections scheduled for 2019. Demonstrating their power to organize street violence may act as a warning: remember what we did to Ahok, who is now in jail and lost his election.

The only argument he had to support diversity and pluralism was insisting that Indonesia is a *Pancasila* democracy.⁶⁰ As well as opposing New Style Communism the *Pancasila* is now also being deployed as an ideological weapon against radical Muslims such as the *Hizbut Tahrir* (HTI – Indonesian Party of Liberation) who want to join an imaginary global Islamic caliphate, are quite vocal, and who are actively proselytizing in universities.⁶¹ Both groups are identified as disrupting national unity. In order to counter both threats the President issued a special regulation (Perppu No. 2/2017) which allows for the dissolution of mass organizations which threaten national unity based on the *Pancasila*.⁶² As the PKI has already been banned, under this regulation only the HTI has been dissolved. Although human rights defenders have protested, fearing that this might lead to even greater violations of the Constitution, the *Muhammadiyah* and the NU have supported this move. At the end of October 2017 this Presidential Regulation was enshrined in law by parliament.⁶³

An encouraging step by the President is that for first time since 1965, 1 June 2015 was celebrated as *Pancasila Sakti* day. A year later he made it a national holiday, and the national flag was not flown halfway down the pole, as had been the custom during the 1 October celebrations, but at the top. The *Pancasila*, Jokowi said, 'is in every drop of our blood and every beat of our heart. [It is] the cement of our national unity. I am Jokowi. I am *Pancasila*.'⁶⁴ This was a symbolic step to separate the army-controlled celebration of 1 October from the proclamation of *Pancasila* by Sukarno.

The political scene is very much divided, with supporters of President Jokowi and Ahok (Jokowers and Ahokers) pitted against those who voted for Prabowo (who lost the 2014 elections) and Anies Baswedan, who won the Jakarta 2017 elections, with a campaign that was heavily driven by the radical Muslim militia FPI and supported by Prabowo.⁶⁵ In this bitter political climate identity politics play a major role. Indonesian society as a whole has become more religiously conservative and no candidate can afford to be seen as opposing 'good Muslims'.

Competition about who can be classified as a ‘good Muslim’ is fierce. It is clear which characteristics fall outside of this category: PKI supporters; LGBT people; ethnic Chinese and people adhering to other religious denominations; as well as liberals in general and human rights defenders more specifically. In this respect the victory of Anies Baswedan is an ominous sign. Although not known for extremist views himself, he has paved the way for the acceptance of support from hardline militias. And he owes them a debt. This increases their credibility and may lead to impunity for the kinds of crimes and violations they are known to commit.

Yet in spite of this powerful lobby of military and Islamist groups, the majority of the Indonesian population do not believe that the PKI is being revived. According to the results of a survey conducted in the first half of September 2017 by the Saifulmujani Institute, only 12.6 per cent of the population believed that the PKI was being restored. The majority of that group belongs to the neo-Salafist PKS and to *Gerindra*, both parties supporting Anies Baswedan and Prabowo.⁶⁶ But it is also clear that certain political groups will do all they can to keep the spectre of communism alive. It is a convenient bogeyman behind which they can hide their political games.

Indonesian politics is characterized by a paradox. At the national level Islamist parties do not dominate parliament or government. Yet at the sub-national level hundreds of regional regulations have been imposed which entail the Sharia-ization of society. These regulations typically target women and LGBT groups and enshrine anti-communist policies.⁶⁷ They are promulgated by local leaders who vie for the Muslim vote, often in areas where Islamist rebellions were waged in the late 1950s against the national state. Although at present the idea of an Indonesian caliphate is openly demanded by only one organization, the banned HTI, at the regional level these Muslim leaders have managed to impose all kinds of regulations that restrict women’s freedom of movement and other rights. ‘Muslim’ (for which read Arab) dress codes have been imposed, with the contradictory phrase that women must wear ‘traditional’ Muslim dress (traditional dress in Indonesia did not include the *hijab* (veil) and might consist of tight blouses – or none at all).

Conclusion

The spectre of communism, with its associations of atheism, sexual perversion and anti-nationalism, is used again and again by those who feel that their interests are served by it. Only a handful of critical journalists, intellectuals and human rights activists try to dissociate the history of the PKI from these qualifications and to insist on unearthing the truth about the events of 1965 and the ugly pages in Indonesian history that followed, with its massacres, slave labour, torture and sexual violence. Even the President himself seems to believe the version of events presented in the film *Betrayal of the G30S/PKI*, when he said on 1 October 2017, ‘don’t let the PKI cruelty happen again’.⁶⁸ Yet as Herry Priyono argues, we are not confronted with a revival of

communism, but with the ‘marriage of religious tribalism and militarism’.⁶⁹ In this marriage, apparently, the bogeyman of communism serves as a useful bridesmaid. The military, as discussed above, is eager to revive the power it enjoyed during the Suharto period and resists any form of justice seeking. With religious fundamentalism on the rise, a dangerous cocktail of violent intolerance is again brewing. Politicians, eager to win lucrative political posts, ride on the rising tide of populism.

Attitudes about communists and the LGBT community switch in the surveys which try to measure which one is the most abject, depending on which hate-mongering campaign is strongest in a particular year.⁷⁰ The anti-LGBT and anti-communist propaganda is in many ways similar to the Nazi propaganda analysed by Welch (2014, 2015). With the help of the ‘soft power’ of propaganda, a docile population is created (seduced); existing moral anxieties, residues of the sexual-moral propaganda of the New Order, are mobilized and strengthened in the interests of a conservative, Wahabist Islam and the army. A particular group (communist survivors and their descendants, LGBT people) is cordoned off and placed outside the bounds of the moral. Aggressive militias, as well as the presence of *Babinsa* officers in the villages, and the widely publicized training of thousands of youth in the *Bela Negara* programme, remind people of the terror of the late 1960s and in the New Order era in general.

The simultaneous stirring up of communist phobia and homophobia produces a toxic mix of Indonesian exceptionalism, in which globally accepted standards of human, women’s and sexual rights are ignored. Nothing more has been heard about the *Dewan Kerukunan Nasional* (National Harmony Council) that was installed in early 2017 by the Coordinating Minister of Political and Security Concerns, General Wiranto.⁷¹ The Minister, indicted by UN prosecutors for alleged gross human rights violations during the Indonesian occupation of East Timor, declared at the time that this Council would only deal with reconciliation in a non-judicial way. But even that it never did.

In this way moral matters related to sexual and religious norms steer a politics interested only in power, not in the ideals which Indonesia’s founding fathers had. Perversely these same politicians in their turn are engaged in regulating morality. At the time of writing this conclusion a revision of the country’s penal code was being discussed in parliament that if accepted would mean all forms of extramarital consensual sexual relations would be criminalized, including consensual same-sex relations among adults, in the name of tradition and morality.⁷² This entails a great loss to Indonesia; its immense and diverse history is distorted, its rich traditions reinvented as ‘always already’ Wahabist. This is the reverse of what is needed to strengthen Indonesia’s fragile democracy. Instead of taking a major step backwards towards criminalizing behaviours that were not illegal previously, the country should move forwards to support human rights and the development of a critical population. The ban on communist teaching should be lifted and the truth about the country’s dark past should be unveiled.

This book concentrates on the domestic aspects of the propaganda campaign relating to the Indonesian genocide, unravelling its roots in the early 1920s, up until 2018. It focuses on the dynamics that have fuelled and continue to fuel the internecine violence in Indonesia. It does not say that the propaganda in itself led to the Indonesian genocide. Clearly the motor of the massacres was the army (see also Melvin 2018 and Robinson (2018)). We have stressed the domestic forces behind this campaign, without ignoring the role that foreign intelligence services played, which facilitated and encouraged the Indonesian army. One of the ways in which international actors supported the Indonesian army is by covering up the horrendous crimes being committed. This silence continues today. Apart from a handful of activists and academics, the international human rights world maintains an icy silence on the topic of Indonesia's hidden genocide, while comparable genocides in Rwanda and Cambodia have received much more attention.⁷³

What can historians and human rights activists do to reach the hysterical masses who are still swayed by communist phobia? Academics and activists do not have the massive sums of money necessary to counter hoaxes which are on a scale sufficient to reach fanatical groups. Still, we must keep speaking truth to power, however much an uphill and at times dangerous journey this may turn out to be. Researchers must keep digging up more facts about human rights violations. Activists may insist on a renewed emphasis on the various *sila* of the *Pancasila* to uphold democracy, human rights and social justice. The appeal to primordial forces by the military-Islamist groups is strong. The concepts of human rights for all and the rule of law are relatively unfamiliar in many circles and are made to seem suspect. This book is meant to support those who fight for the upholding of human rights in Indonesia, both inside and outside the country.

Notes

- 1 <http://historia.id/modern/pelabelan-pki-stigmatisasi-paling-kejam>.
- 2 www.cnnindonesia.com/nasional/20160418202343-20-124849/intimidasi-tokoh-gerwani-masih-berlanjut-di-arisan/.
- 3 www.cnnindonesia.com/nasional/20160418142054-22-124712/mereka-yang-menolak-membedah-tragedi-1965/.
- 4 See also for the psychological effects of this stigma the impressive 2010 film by Robert Lemelson, *40 Years of Silence*.
- 5 See Crouch (2009) on the limited political reforms after 1998.
- 6 In an interview with investigative journalist Allan Nairn, published on 12 April 2017. Available at <https://theintercept.com/2017/04/18/trumps-Indonesian-allies-in-bed-with-isis-backed-militia-seeking-to-oust-elected-president>.
- 7 Read, for example, the various Amnesty International reports on Indonesia, such as www.amnesty.nl/.../indonesia-stop-intimidating-participants-in-events-concerni.
- 8 See Hairil Halim, Jakarta Post (3 January 2016). Available at <http://thejakartapost.com/news/2016/03/01/raids-put-intellectual-freedom-risk.html>. The *Belok Kiri* festival was banned on 27 February 2016.

- 9 This remark was widely reported. See, for example, <https://news.detik.com/berita/d-3519225/jokowi-tunjukkan-pada-saya-mana-pki-saya-akan-gebuk> (posted on 3 June 2017).
- 10 Some of the extracts that appear here were published by Saskia Wieringa as an article in *Inside Indonesia* (3 November 2017). Available at www.insideindonesia.org/when-a-history-seminar-becomes-toxic.
- 11 See <https://tirto.id/rapat-sebelum-menyербу-gedung-ylbhi-cwSG>. See also www.suaraislam.co/inilah-sosok-rahmat-himran-korlap-penyerang-ylbhi-korlap-gerakan-tan-gkap-ahok/.
- 12 See <https://news.detik.com/berita/d-3650087/koordinator-aksi-di-lbh-sempat-dikabarkan-hilang-ternyata>. For details about his long involvement in the campaign against the LGBT community see <http://nasional.harianterbit.com/nasional/2016/02/25/57556/86/40/Sebarkan-Kelainan-Komunitas-LGBT-Bisa-Kena-Sanksi-Penjara>.
- 13 See <https://news.detik.com/berita/d-3645929/amien-rais-bicara-cebong-dan-pki-di-aksi-bela-rohingya>. Ironically the chair of the YLBHI foundation and general coordinator of the IPT 1965, Nursyahbani Katjasungkana, was about to depart to join the panel of judges of the Permanent People's Tribunal on the Rohingya, in Kuala Lumpur.
- 14 See <http://hmfisipolugm.or.id/rilis-sikap-hmi-komisariat-fisipol-ugm-mengecam-pembubaran-seminar-dan-penyerangan-di-lbh-ylbhi-jakarta/>. This is also noteworthy, because prior to 1965 the HMI and the student organization associated with the PKI, the CGMI, often clashed.
- 15 A play with words: *asik* or *asyik* means 'passionate' and is an anagram of *Aksi*.
- 16 <https://tirto.id/hoax-pki-penyerbuan-dan-kericuhan-senin-dini-hari-di-ylbhi-cwSW>.
- 17 There were also specific calls, with pictures of particular activists, to burn people alive. For security reasons we have not provided their names.
- 18 An ultraconservative Islamist group combining cultural and criminal activities.
- 19 This youth group is mostly known for the spreading of ultraconservative Islamist teachings.
- 20 See also <https://tirto.id/dari-mana-1000-an-orang-yang-mengepung-lbh-jakarta-cwT9>.
- 21 One of the protesters called out to a female participant at the art fair: 'Hey, cadaver (*bangke*), devil. If you are true then you undress'. This is a clear reference to the slander against *Gerwani* which is still, 52 years after it was invented, used to incite hatred.
- 22 See <http://nasional.republika.co.id/berita/nasional/politik/17/09/18/owh1q2354-nobar-film-g30spki-panglima-tni-perintah-saya-mau-apa>.
- 23 See, for example, McGregor (2007) for an analysis of this film.
- 24 As spoken by Sukmawati on the TVOne programme 'ILC Indonesia Lawyer's Club', on 19 September 2017. Available at www.youtube.com/watch?v=86gYmZ_wwFg.
- 25 See <https://kumparan.com/pranamyadewati/amien-rais-saya-gembira-seminar-pki-di-ylbh-jakarta-dibubarkan>.
- 26 See <https://sketsanews.com/news/fahira-idris-hukum-tegas-igbt/>. Fahira Idris is well known for her virulent hate speech against LGBT organizations. This group also joined the attack on the YLBHI building.
- 27 www.cnnindonesia.com/nasional/20170930001458-20-245149/jokowi-dan-panglima-tni-nobar-film-g30s-pki.
- 28 See Timmermann (2005) and Welch (2014, 2015).
- 29 www.thejakartapost.com/news/2017/08/31/police-investigate-saracens-motives.html.
- 30 It is alleged that one of the funders of the Saracen group is Prabowo Subianto, Jokowi's rival. See <http://obsessionnews.com/rob-allyn-guru-saracen/> (posted on 31 August 2017).

- 31 See www.thejakartapost.com/news/2018/02/27/police-uncover-provocative-issues-syndicate.html.
- 32 See www.thejakartapost.com/academia/2018/03/01/editorial-combating-cyber-lies.html.
- 33 See www.kodiklat-tniad.net/.
- 34 We received the presentation via the IPT 1965 WhatsApp group, which circulated it in February 2017.
- 35 This is echoed by retired General Kivlan Zen. See www.mediapribumi.com/2016/08/mayjen-kivlan-ungkap-pki-sudah-punya.html.
- 36 www.slideshare.net/.../pki-dan-kekejaman-terhadap-ulama.
- 37 Not all ten people are mentioned by name. The names given are Professor Miriam Budiarjo, Ribka T. Proletariati, Rike D. Pitaloka, Budiman Sujatmiko, Teten Masduki, Dita Indah Sari and Pius Lustrilanang. They are a mixture of activists, intellectuals and political leaders.
- 38 The word *faikum* does not actually exist. It is probably misspelt, and should have been written as *fasikun*, destroying (religion).
- 39 www.thejakartapost.com/news/2017/09/18/lawmakers-want-discussion-on-1965-purge-banned.html.
- 40 On book bans and other anti-leftist reactions triggered by the April symposium, see *Tempo*, 16–22 May 2016, which ran a series of articles under the heading ‘Haunted by the past: fears of a Communist revival threatens rights and freedoms’.
- 41 They are united through the *Persatuan Purnawirawan Angkatan Bersenjata (Pepabri* – Association of Armed Forces Retired Officers). This is an influential group of conservative retired generals.
- 42 www.thejakartapost.com/new/2017/01/09/a-case-against-the-militarys-newfound-poxy-war-obsession.html.
- 43 This territorial structure is a legacy of the many local *lasykar* that sprang up during the national revolution.
- 44 See www.insideindonesia.org/in-the-name-of-food-security.
- 45 See www.thejakartapost.com/new/2017/05/06/new-regulation-to-prevent-spread-of-racism-on-campus.html.
- 46 See www.thejakartapost.com/academis/2017/10/06/no-glory-for-the-political-soldier-enemy-of-democracy.html.
- 47 See www.dw.com/id/bela-negara-militer-akan-latih-preman-di-bali-sebagai-kader-a-19321338.
- 48 See <https://thediplomat.com/2017/10/is-indonesias-military-chief-making-a-new-political-power-play/>.
- 49 See Hill (1994) and Ricklefs (1993) for an analysis of the New Order economy.
- 50 See www.smh.com.au/world/gold-mine-protester-tried-for-spreading-communism-as-rad-scare-sweeps-indonesia-20171012-gyzqad.html (posted on 12 October 2017).
- 51 See <https://nasional.tempo.co/read/1053301/dianggap-sebarkan-komunisme-aktivis-lingkungan-divonis-10-bulan>.
- 52 See Simpson (2008).
- 53 See <http://hukum.rmol.co/read/2017/09/18/307528/Penyerangan-Kantor-LBH-Pengalihan-Isu-Di-KPK->.
- 54 See the report by Nursyahbani Katjasungkana and Saskia E. Wieringa (2016b) on the creeping homophobia in the country. Available at www.outrightinternational.org/sites/default/files/CreepingCriminalisation-eng.pdf.
- 55 *Kompas*, 29 September 2015.
- 56 See <http://wisbenbae.blogspot.com/2013/04/subhanallahhabib-rizieq-ternyata-mufti.html>. The Sulu archipelago lies between the Philippines and Indonesia, and is a hotbed of radical Islam.
- 57 www.thejakartapost.com/academia/2016/12/15/where-were-the-women-in-212-protest.html.

- 58 There is a large literature on radical Islam after *Reformasi*. An accessible overview is the edited collection by Fealy and White (2008).
- 59 See Anderson (2006) on the national revolution and Van Dijk (1981) on the DI movement.
- 60 See www.voaindonesia.com/a/presiden-jokowi-harus-dipertahankan-dan-dijaga/4090767.html.
- 61 See www.thejakartapost.com/news/2017/06/01/pledges-for-pancasila-renewed-as-bigotry-haunts-nation.html.
- 62 See www.cnnindonesia.com/nasional/20170726075651-20-230346/pembubaran-hti-dan-kekhawatiran-persekusi-ala-pki/ (posted on 26 July 2017).
- 63 See www.merdeka.com/peristiwa/ini-isi-perppu-ormas-yang-sudah-disahkan-menjadi-undang-undang.html. The speed with which this happened is remarkable, as the Indonesian parliament is not known for its efficiency. It is clear that the government felt that this was an important issue, and might assist in preventing the spread of extremist ideologies that could threaten the unity of the country. However, the 2013 law on mass organizations already made it possible to ban certain mass organizations, but only after due legal process. This is now no longer necessary.
- 64 See www.thejakartapost.com/academia/2017/05/31/editorial-a-pancasila-holiday.html.
- 65 This retired officer, former son-in-law of Suharto, has been associated with human rights violations, particularly in East Timor. He is the Chairman of the Gerindra Party.
- 66 Saifulmujani, research and consulting company. *Isu kebangkitan PKI; sebuah penilaian publik nasional; temuan survey, September 2017*.
- 67 See Katjasungkana and Wieringa (2016b) on the creeping criminalization of LGBT groups and women's morality and bodies in Indonesia. Available at www.outrightinternational.org/sites/default/files/CreepingCriminalisation-eng.pdf.
- 68 See <http://nasional.kompas.com/read/2017/10/01/09403511/jokowi-jangan-sampai-kekejaman-pki-terulang-lagi>. He even posted this sentence on his Facebook page. Available at https://m.facebook.com/story.php?story_fbid=768582436663941&id=390581294464059.
- 69 *Manajemen Belok Kanan*, by B. Herry Priyono. *Kompas*, 28 September 2017.
- 70 See <https://nasional.tempo.co/read/1055349/survei-wahid-foundation-komunis-dan-lgbt-paling-tak-disukai>.
- 71 See <http://nasional.kompas.com/read/2017/01/04019041911/pemerintah.akan.bentuk.deqwan.kerukunan.nasional>.
- 72 Stephen Wright, Indonesia's Parliament May Criminalize Sex Outside Marriage, *Time* (2 February 2018). Available at <http://time.com/5129860/indonesia-premarita-l-sex-ban-lgbt/>.
- 73 See, for example, Straus (2013) on the Rwandan genocide and Kiernan (2008) on the regime of Pol Pot in Cambodia.

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