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货币哲学/[德]格奥尔格·西梅尔著；于沛沛，林毅，张琪译.—北京：中国社会科学出版社，2007.8

（西方学术经典译丛）

ISBN 978-7-5004-6297-2

Ⅰ.贷… Ⅱ.①格…②于…③林… Ⅲ.货币—哲学 Ⅳ.F820-02

中国版本图书馆CIP数据核字（2007）第097626号

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为了进一步促进中西文化交流，构建全新的西学思想平台，我们出版了这套《西方学术经典译丛》（英汉对照全译本）。本译丛精选西方学术思想流变中最有代表性的部分传世名作，由多位专家学者选目，内容涵盖了哲学、宗教学、政治学、经济学、心理学、法学、历史学等人文社会科学领域，收录了不同国家、不同时代、不同体裁的诸多名著。

本译丛系根据英文原著或其他文种的较佳英文译本译出，在国内第一次以英汉对照的形式出版。与以往译本不同的是，本译丛全部用现代汉语译出，尽量避免以往译本时而出现的文白相间、拗口难懂的现象；另外出于尊重原作和正本清源的目的，本译本对原作品内容一律不做删节处理，全部照译。以往译本由于时代和社会局限，往往对原作品有所删节，因此，本译本也是对过去译本的补充和完善。

为加以区别，原文中的英文注释，注释号用①、②……形式表示；中文译者注释则以〔1〕、〔2〕……形式表示。至于英译本中出现的原文页码和特殊索引等问题，中文译者在“译者后记”中将予以解释、说明。另外，在英文原著或原英译本中，有一些表示着重意义的斜体或大写等字体，考虑到读者可以在英汉对照阅读中注意到，在本译文中没有照样标出，还望读者理解。

中国社会科学出版社

The Philosophy of Money

By Georg Simmel

English Translation

By David Frisby

本书根据 Routledge And Kegan Paul Ltd.1990年版本译出

目录

出版说明

CHAPTER 1 Value And Money

I

Ⅱ

Ⅲ

第一章 价值与货币

第一节

第二节

第三节

CHAPTER 2 The Value Of Money As A Substance

Ⅰ

Ⅱ

Ⅲ

第二章 货币的物质价值

第一节

第二节

第三节

CHAPTER 1 Value And Money

I

Reality And Value As Mutually Independent Categories Through Which Our Conceptions Become Images Of The World

The order in which things are placed as natural entities is based on the proposition that the whole variety of their qualities rests upon a uniform law of existence.Their equality before the law of nature，the constant sum of matter and energy，the convertibility of the most diverse phenomena into one another，transform the differences that are apparent at first sight into a general affinity，a universal equality.Yet on a closer view this means only that the products of the natural order are beyond any question of a law.Their absolute determinateness does not allow any emphasis that might provide confirmation or doubt of their particular quality of beingg.But we are not satisfied with this indifferent necessity that natural science assigns to objects.Instead，disregarding their place in that series we arrange them in another order-an order of value-in which equality is completely eliminated，in which the highest level of one point is adjacent to the lowest level of another；in this series the fundamental quality is not uniformity but difference.The value of objects，thoughts and events can never be inferred from their mere natural existence and content，and their ranking according to value diverges widely from their natural ordering.Nature，on many occasions，destroys objects that，in terms of their value，might claim to be preserved，and keeps in existence worthless objects which occupy the place of the more valuable ones.This is not to say that there is a fundamental opposition between the two series，or that they are mutually exclusive.Such a view would imply a relation between the two series；it would establish，indeed，a diabolical world，determined by values，but with the signs reversed.The case is，rather，that the relation between these series is completely accidental.With the same indifference，nature at one time offers us objects that we value highly，at another time withholds them.The occasional harmony between the series，the realization through the reality series of demands derived from the value series，shows the absence of any logical relationship between them just as strikingly as does the opposite case.We may be aware of the same life experience as both real and valuable，but the experience has quite a different meaning in the two cases.The series of natural phenomena could be described in their entirety without mentioning the value of things；and our scale of valuation remains meaningful，whether or not any of its objects appear frequently or at all in reality.Value is an addition to the completely determined objective being，like light and shade，which are not inherent in it but come from a different source.However，we should avoid one misinterpretation；namely，that the formation of value concepts，as a psychological fact，is quite distinct from the natural process.A superhuman mind，which could understand by means of natural laws everything that happens in the world，would also comprehend the fact that people have concepts of values.But these would have no meaning or validity for a being that conceived them purely theoretically，beyond their psychological existence.The meaning of value concepts is denied to nature as a mechanical causal system，while at the same time the psychic experiences that make values a part of our consciousness themselves belong to the natural world.Valuation as a real psychological occurrence is part of the natural world；but what we mean by valuation，its conceptual meaning，is something independent of this world；is not part of it，but is rather the whole world viewed from a particular vantage point.We are rarely aware of the fact that our whole life，from the point of view of consciousness，consists in experiencing and judging values，and that it acquires meaning and significance only from the fact that the mechanically unfolding elements of reality possess an infinite variety of values beyond their objective substance.At any moment when our mind is not simply a passive mirror or reality-which perhaps never happens，since even objective perception can arise only from valuation-we live in a world of values which arranges the contents of reality in an autonomous order.

Thus，value is in a sense the counterpart to being，and is comparable to being as a comprehensive form and category of the world view.As Kant pointed out，being is not a quality of objects；for if I state that an object，which so far existed only in my thoughts，exists，it does not acquire a new quality，because otherwise it would not be the same object that I thought of，but another one.In the same way，an object does not gain a new quality if I call it valuable；it is valued because of the qualities that it has.It is precisely its whole already determined being that is raised to the sphere of value.This is supported by a thorough analysis of our thinking.We are able to conceive the contents of our world view without regard for their real existence or non-existence.We can conceive the aggregates of qualities that we call objects，including all the laws of their interrelation and development，in their objective and logical significance，and we can askquite independently of this-whether，where and how often all these concepts or inner notions are realized.The conceptual meaning and determinateness of the objects is not affected by the question as to whether they do exist，nor by the question whether and where they are placed in the scale of values.However，if we want to establish either a theory or a practical rule，we cannot escape the necessity to answer these two questions.We must be able to say of each object that it exists or does not exist，and each object must have a definite place for us in the scale of values，from the highest through indifference to negative values.Indifference is a rejection of positive value；the possibility of interest remains inactive but is always in the background.The significance of this requirement，which determines the constitution of our world view，is not altered by the fact that our powers of comprehension are often insufficient to decide upon the reality of concepts，or by the fact that the range and certainty of our feelings are often inadequate to rank things according to their value，especially in any permanently and u_ niversal fashion.Over against the world of mere concepts，of objective qualities and determinations，stand the great categories of being and value，inclusive forms that take their material from the world of pure contents.Both categories have the quality of being fundamental，that is irreducible to each other or to other simpler elements.Consequently，the being of objects can never be inferred logically；being is rather a primary form of our perception，which can be sensed，experienced and believed，but cannot be deduced for somebody who does not yet know it.When this form of perception has once grasped a specific content-by a non-logical act-it can then be interpreted in its logical context and developed as far as this logical context reaches.As a rule，we are able to state why we assume the reality of a particular phenomenon；namely，because we have already assumed another phenomenon with which this one is connected by its specific characteristics.The reality of the first one，however，can be shown only by tracing it in similar fashion to a more fundamental one.This regression requires a final member whose existence depends only upon a sense of conviction，affirmation and acceptance，a sense that is directly given.Valuation has exactly the same relation to objects.All proofs of the value of an object are nothing more than the necessity of recognizing for that object the same value as has been assumed，and for the time being accepted，as indubitable for another object.We will later analyse the motives of this action.Here it will suffice to say that what we consider a proof of value is only the transference of an existing value to a new object.It does not reveal the essence of value，or the reason why value was originally attached to the object from which it is transferred to others.

If we accept the existence of a value，then the process of its realization，its evolution，can be comprehended rationally，because in general it follows the structure of the contents of reality.That there is a value at all，however，is a primary phenomenon.Value inferences only make known the conditions under which values are realized，yet without being produced by these conditions，just as theoretical proofs only prepare the conditions that favor the sense of affirmation or of existence.The question as to what value really is，like the question as to what being is，is unanswerable.And precisely because they have the same formal relation to objects，they are as alien to each other as are thought and extension for Spinoza.Since both express the same absolute substance，each in its own way and perfect in itself，the one can never encroach upon the other.They never impinge upon each other because they question the concepts of objects from completely different points of view.But this disjunctive parallelism of reality and value does not divide the world into a sterile duality，which the mind with its need for unity could never accept-even though its destiny and the method of its quest may be to move incessantly from diversity to unity and from unity to diversity.What is common to value and reality stands above them：namely the contents，which Plato called‘ideas’，the qualitative，that which can be signified and expressed in our concepts of reality and value，and which can enter into either one or the other series.Below these two categories lies what is common to both：the soul，which absorbs the one or produces the other in its mysterious unity.Reality and value are，as it were，two different languages by which the logically related contents of the world，valid in their ideal unity，are made comprehensible to the unitary soul，or the languages in which the soul can express the pure image of these contents which lies beyond their differentiation and opposition.These two compilations made by the soul，through perceiving and through valuing，may perhaps once more be brought together in a metaphysical unity，for which there is no linguistic term unless it be in religious symbols.There is perhaps a cosmic ground where the heterogeneity and divergencie's that we experience between reality and value no longer exist，where both series are revealed as one；this unity either being unaffected by the two categories，and standing beyond them in majestic indifference，or signifying a harmonious interweaving of both，which is shattered and distorted into fragments and contrasts only by our way of regarding it，as if we had an imperfect visual faculty.

The Psychological Fact Of Objective Value

The characteristic feature of value，as it appears in contrast to reality，is usually called its subjectivity.Since one and the same object can have the highest degree of value for one soul and the lowest for another，and vice versa，and since on the other hand the most extensive and extreme differences between objects are compatible with equality of value，there appears to remain only the subject with his customary or exceptional，permanent or changing，moods and responses as the ground for valuation.This subjectivity，needless to say？has nothing to do with the subjectivity that refers to ‘ my perception ’ of the totality of the world.For the subjectivity of value contrasts value with the given objects，regardless of the way they are conceived.In other words，the subject who comprehends all objects is different from the subject who is confronted with the objects；the subjectivity that value shares with all other objects does not play any role here.Nor is his subjectivity merely caprice；independence from reality does not mean that value can be bestowed here and there with unrestrained and capricious freedom.Value exists in our consciousness as a fact that can no more be altered than can reality itself.The subjectivity of value，therefore，is first of all only negative，in the sense that value is not attached to objects in the same way as is colour or temperature.The latter，although determined by our senses，are accompanied by a feeling of their direct dependence upon the object；but in the case of value we soon learn to disregard this feeling because the two series constituted by reality and by value are quite independent of each other.The only cases more interesting than this general characterization are those in which psychological facts appear to lead to an opposite view.

In whatever empirical or transcendental sense the difference between objects and subjects is conceived，value is never a ‘ quality，of the objects，but a judgment upon them which remains inherent in the subject.And yet，neither the deeper meaning and content of the concept of value，nor its significance for the mental life of the individual，nor the practical social events and arrangements based upon it，can be sufficiently understood by referring value to the‘subject’.The way to a comprehension of value lies in a region in which that subjectivity is only provisional and actually not very essential.

The distinction between subject and object is not as radical as the accepted separation of these categories in practical life and in the scientific world would have us believe.Mental life begins with an undifferentiated state in which the Ego and its objects are not yet distinguished；consciousness is filled with impressions and perceptions while the bearer of these contents has still not detached himself from them.It is as a result of a second-stage awareness，a later analysis，that a subject in particular real conditions comes to be distinguished from the content of his consciousness in those conditions.This development obviously leads to a situation where a man speaks of himself as‘I’and recognizes the existence of other objects external to this‘I’.Metaphysics some times claims that the transcendent essence of being is completely unified，beyond the opposition of subject-object，and this has a psychological counter part in the simple，primitive condition of being possessed by the content of a perception，like a child who does not yet speak of himself as‘I’，or as may perhaps be observed in a rudimentary form at all stages of life.This unity from which the categories of subject and object develop in relation to each other-in a process to be examined later-appears to us as a subjective unity because we approach it with the concept of objectivity developed later；and because we do not have a proper term for such unities，but name them usually after one of the partial elements that appear in the subsequent analysis.Thus，it has been asserted that all actions are essentially egoistic，whereas egoism has a meaning only within a system of action and by contrast with its correlate，altruism.Similarly，pantheism has described the universality of being as God，although a positive concept of God depends on its contrast with everything empirical.This evolutionary relation between subject and object is repeated finally on a large scale：the intellectual world of classical antiquity differs from that of modem times chiefly in the fact that only the latter has，on the one hand，developed a comprehensive and clear concept of the Ego，as shown by the significance of the problem of liberty which was unknown in ancient times；and on the other，expressed the independence and force of the concept of the object through the idea of unalterable laws of nature.Antiquity was much closer than were later periods to the stage of indifference in whicn the contents of the world were conceived as such，without being apportioned between subject and object.

Objectivity In Practice As Standardization Or As A Guarantee For The Totality Of Subjective Values

This development which separates subject and object appears to be sustained on both sides by the same theme，but operating at different levels.Thus，the awareness of being a subject is already an objectification.This is a basic feature of the mind in its form as personality.The fundamental activity of our mind，which determines its form as a whole，is that we can observe，know and judge ourselves just like any other‘object’；that we dissect the Ego，experienced as a unity，into a perceiving subject and a perceived object，without its losing its unity，but on the contrary with its becoming aware of its unity through this inner antagonism.The mutual dependence of subject and object is here drawn together in a single point；it has affected the subject itself，which otherwise stands confronting the world as object.Thus man has realized the basic form of his relation to the world，of his acceptance of the world，as soon as he becomes aware of himself and calls himself‘I’.But before that happens there exists-in respect of meaning as well as of mental growth-a simple perception of content which does not distinguish between subject and object and is not yet divided between them.Regarded from the other side，this content itself，as a logical and conceptual entity，likewise lies beyond the distinction between subjective and objective reality.We can think of any object simply in terms of its qualities and their interconnection Without asking whether or not this ideal complex of qualities has an objective existence.To be sure，so far as such a pure objective content is thought，it becomes a conception and to that extent a subjective structure.But the subjective is here only the dynamic act of conception，the function that apprehends the content；in itself this content is thought of as being independent of the act of conceiving.Our mind has a remarkable ability to think of contents as being independent of the act of thinking；this is one of its primary qualities，which cannot be reduced any further.The contents have their conceptual or objective qualities and relationships which can be apprehended but which are not thereby completely absorbed；they exist whether or not they are part of my representation and whether or not they are part of objective reality.The content of a representation does not coincide with the representation of contents.The simple undifferentiated conception that consists only in becoming aware of a content cannot be characterized as subjective，because it does not yet know the contrast between subject and object.Similarly，the pure content of objects or conceptions is not objective，but escapes equally this differential form and its opposite，while being ready to present itself in one or the other.Subject and object are born in the same act：logically，by presenting the conceptual ideal content first as a content of representation，and then as a content of objective reality；psychologically，when the still ego-less representation，in which person and object are undifferentiated，becomes divided and gives rise to a distance between the self and its object，through which each of them becomes a separate entity.

Economic Value As The Objectification Of Subjective Values

This process，which finally produces our intellectual world view，also occurs in the sphere of our volitional practical activity.Here also the distinction between the desiring，consuming，valuing subject and the valued object does not comprehend all aspects of mental life，nor all the objective circumstances of practical activity.Human enjoyment of an object is a completely undivided act.At such moments we have an experience that does not include an awareness of an object confronting us or an awareness of the self as distinct from its present condition.Phenomena of the basest and the highest kind meet here.The crude impulse，particularly an impulse of an impersonal，general nature，wants to release itself towards an object and to be satisfied，no matter how；consciousness is exclusively concerned with satisfaction and pays no attention to its bearer on one side or its object on the other.On the other hand，intense aesthetic enjoyment displays the same form.Here too‘we forget ourselves’，but at the same time we no longer experience the work of art as something with which we are confronted，because our mind is completely submerged in it，has absorbed it by surrendering to it.In this case，as in the other，our psychological condition is not yet，or is no longer，affected by the contrast between subject and object.Only a new process of awareness releases those categories from their undisturbed unity；and only then is the pure enjoyment of the content seen as being on the one hand a state of the subject confronting an object，and on the other the effect produced by an object that is independent of the subject.This tension，which disrupts the naive-practical unity of subject and object and makes us conscious of each in relation to the other，is brought about originally through the mere fact of desire.In desiring what we do not yet own or enjoy，we place the content of our desire outside ourselves.In empirical life，I admit，the finished object stands before us and is only then desiredif only because，in addition to our will，many other theoretical and emotional events contribute to the objectification of mental contents.Within the practical world，however，in relation to its inner order and intelligibility，the origin of the object itself，and its being desired by the subject，are correlative terms-the two aspects of this process of differentiation which splits the immediate unity of the process of enjoyment.It has been asserted that our conception of objective reality originates in the resistance that objects present to us，especially through our sense of touch.We can apply this at once to the practical problem.We desire objects only if they are not immediately given to us for our use and enjoyment；that is，to the extent that they resist our desire.The content of our desire becomes an object as soon as it is opposed to us，not only in the sense of being impervious to us，but also in terms of its distance as something not-yet-enjoyed，the subjective aspect of this condition being desire.As Kant has said：the possibility of experience is the possibility of the objects of experience-because to have experiences means that our consciousness creates objects from sense impressions.In the same way，the possibility of desire is the possibility of the objects of desire.The object thus formed，which is characterized by its separation from the subject，who at the same time establishes it and seeks to overcome it by his desire，is for us a value.The moment of enjoyment itself，when the opposition between subject and object is effaced，consumes the value.Value is only reinstated as contrast，as an object separated from the subject.Such trivial experiences as that we appreciate the value of our possessions only after we have lost them，that the mere withholding of a desired object often endows it with a value quite disproportionate to any possible enjoyment that it could yield，that the remoteness，either literal or figurative，of the objects of our enjoyment shows them in a transfigured light and with heightened attractions-all these are derivatives，modifications and hybrids of the basic fact that value does not originate from the unbroken unity of the moment of enjoyment，but from the separation between the subject and the content of enjoyment as an object that stands opposed to the subject as something desired and only to be attained by the conquest of distance，obstacles and difficulties.To reiterate the earlier analogy：in the final analysis perhaps，reality does not press upon our conscious ness through the resistance that phenomena exert，but we register those representations which have feelings of resistance and inhibition associated with them，as being objectively real，independent and external to us.Objects are not difficult to acquire because they are valuable，but we call those objects valuable that resist our desire to possess them.Since the desire encounters resistance and frustration，the objects gain a significance that would never have been attributed to them by an unchecked will.

Value，which appears at the same time and in the same process of differentiation as the desiring Ego and as its correlate，is subordinate to yet another category.It is the same category as applies to the object that is conceived in theoretical representations.We concluded，in that case，that the contents that are realized in the objective world and also exist in us as subjective representations have，in addition，a peculiar ideal dignity.The concepts of the triangle or of the organism，causality or the law of gravitation have a logical sense，an inner structural validity which indeed determines their realization in space and in consciousness；but even if they were never realized，they would still belong to the ultimate unanalysable category of the valid and significant，and would differ entirely from fantastic and contradictory conceptual notions to which they might be akin in their reference to physical and mental non-reality.The value that is attributed to the objects of subjective desire is analogous to this，with the qualifications required by its different sphere.Just as we represent certain statements as true while recognizing that their truth is independent of our representation，so we sense that objects，people and events are not only appreciated as valuable by us，but would still be valuable if no one appreciated them.The most striking example is the value that we assign to people's dispositions or characters，as being moral，dignified，strong or beautiful.Whether or not such inner qualities ever show themselves in deeds that make possible or demand recognition，and whether their bearer himself reflects upon them with a sense of his own value，appears to us irrelevant to their real value；still more，this un concern for recognition endows these values with their characteristic coloring.Furthermore，intellectual energy and the fact that it brings the most secret forces and arrangements of nature into the light of consciousness；the power and the rhythm of emotions that，in the limited sphere of the individual soul，are yet much more significant than the external world，even if the pessimistic view of the predominance of suffering in the world is true；the fact that，regardless of man，nature moves according to reliable fixed norms，that the manifold natural forms are not incompatible with a more profound unity of the whole，that nature's mechanism can be interpreted through ideas and also produces beauty and grace-all this leads us to conceive that the world is valuable no matter whether these values are experienced consciously or not.This extends all the way down to the economic value that we assign to any object of exchange，even though nobody is willing to pay the price，and even though the object is not in demand at all and remains unsaleable.Here too a basic capacity of the mind becomes apparent：that of separating itself from the ideas that it conceives and representing these ideas as if they were independent of its own representation.It is true that every value that we experience is a sentiment；but what we mean by this sentiment is a significant content which is realized psychologically through the sentiment yet is neither identical with it nor exhausted by it.Obviously this category lies beyond the controversy about the subjectivity or objectivity of value，because it denies the relation to a subject that is indispensable for the existence of an‘object’. It is rather a third term，an ideal concept which enters into the duality but is not exhausted by it.In conformity with the practical sphere to which it belongs，it has a particular form of relationship to the subject which does not exist for the merely abstract content of our theoretical concepts.This form may be described as a claim or demand.The value that attaches to any object，person，relationship or happening demands recognition.This demand exists，as an event，only within ourselves as subjects；but in accepting it we sense that we are not merely satisfying a claim imposed by ourselves upon ourselves，or merely acknowledging a quality of the object.The ability of a tangible symbol to awaken in us religious feelings；the moral challenge to revolutionize particular conditions of life or to leave them alone，to develop or retard them；the feeling of obligation not to remain in different to great events，but to respond to them；the right of what is perceived to be interpreted in an aesthetic context-all of these are claims that are experienced or realized exclusively within the Ego and have no counterpart or objective point of departure in the objects themselves，but which，as claims，cannot be traced either to the Ego or to the objects to which they refer.Regarded from a naturalistic point of view such a claim may appear subjective，while from the subject's point of view it appears to be objective；in fact，it is a third category，which cannot be derived from either subject or object，but which stands，so to speak，between us and the objects.I have observed that the value of things belongs among those mental contents that，while we conceive them，we experience at the same time as something independent within our representation，and as detached from the function by which it exists in us.This representation，when its content is a value，appears upon closer scrutiny as a sense that a claim is being made.The‘function’is a demand which does not exist as such outside ourselves，but which originates in an ideal realm which does not lie within us.It is not a particular quality of the objects of valuation，but consists rather in the significance that the objects have for us as subjects through their position in the order of that ideal realm.This value，which we conceive as being independent of its recognition，is a metaphysical category，and as such it stands as far beyond the dualism of subject and object as immediate enjoyment stands below it.The latter is a concrete unity to which the differentiating categories have not yet been applied；the former is an abstract or ideal unity，in whose self-subsistent meaning the dualism has again disappeared，just as the contract between the empirical Ego and the empirical Non-Ego disappears in the all-comprehending system of consciousness that Fichte calls the Ego.At the moment of complete fusion of the function and its content，enjoyment cannot be called subjective，because there is no counter posed object that would justify the concept of a subject.Likewise，this independent，self-justifying value is not objective simply because it is conceived as independent by the subject who conceives it；although it becomes manifest within the subject as a claim for recognition，it will not forfeit anything of its reality if this claim is not fulfilled.

This metaphysical sublimation of value does not play any role in the valuations of daily life，which are concerned only with values in the consciousness of the subject and with the objectivity that emerges as a counter posed object in this psychological process of valuation.I showed earlier that this process of the formation of values develops with the increase in distance between the consumer and the cause of his enjoyment.The differences in valuation which have to be distinguished as subjective and objective，originate from such variations in distance，measured not in terms of enjoyment，in which the distance disappears，but in terms of desire，which is engendered by the distance and seeks to over come it.At least in the case of those objects whose valuation forms the basis of the economy，value is the correlate of demand.Just as the world of being is my representation，so the world of value is my demand.However，in spite of the logical-physical necessity that every demand expects to be satisfied by an object，the psychological structure of demand is such that in most cases it is focused upon the satisfaction itself，and the object becomes a matter of indifference so long as it satisfies the need.When a man is satisfied with any woman whatsoever，without exercising an individual choice，when he eats anything at all that he can chew and digest，when he sleeps at any resting place，when his cultural needs can be satisfied by the simplest materials offered by nature，then his practical consciousness is completely subjective，he is inspired exclusively by the agitations and satisfactions of his own subjective condition and his interest in objects is limited to their being the causes of these effects.This fact is observed in the naive need for projection by primitive man，who directs his life towards the outside world and takes his inner life for granted.But the conscious wish cannot always be taken as a sufficient index of the really effective valuation.Often enough it is some expediency in the direction of our practical activities that leads us to regard an object as valuable，and it is not in fact the significance of the object but the possible subjective satisfaction that excites us.From this conditionwhich is not always temporally prior but is，so to speak，the simplest and most fundamental and thus in a systematic sense prior-consciousness is led to the object along two roads which finally merge.When an identical need rejects a number of possible satisfactions，perhaps all but one，and when，there fore，it is not satisfaction as such but satisfaction by a specific object that is desired，there begins a fundamental reorientation from the subject to the object.It may be said that this is still only a question of the subjective satisfaction of need，but that in this second case the need is differentiated to such an extent that only a specific object can satisfy it.In this case also the object is only the cause of sensation and is not valued in itself.Such an objection would indeed nullify the difference，if it were the case that the differentiation of the impulse directed it exclusively upon a single satisfying object and ruled out the possibility of satisfaction through any other object.However，this is a very rare and exceptional case.The broader basis from which even the most highly differentiated impulses evolve，and the original diffuseness of need which includes only a drive but not yet a definite single goal，remain as a substratum upon which a consciousness of the individual character of more specific desires for satisfaction develops.The circle of objects that can satisfy the subject's needs is diminished as he becomes more refined，and the objects desired are set in a sharper contrast with all the others that might satisfy the need but are no longer acceptable.It is well known from psychological investigations that this difference between objects is largely responsible for directing consciousness towards them and endowing them with particular significance.At this stage the need seems to be determined by the object；feeling is guided increasingly by its terminus ad quern instead of its terminus a quo ，in the measure that impulse no longer rushes upon every possible satisfaction.Consequently，the place that the object occupies in our consciousness becomes larger.There is also another reason for this.So long as man is dominated by his impulses the world appears to him as an undifferentiated substance.Since it represents for him only an irrelevant means for the satisfaction of his drives-and this effect may arise f om all kinds of causes-he has no interest in the nature of the objects them selves.It is the fact that we need a particular single object that makes us acutely aware that we need an object at all.But such awareness is，so to speak，more theoretical-and it diminishes the blind energy of the impulse which is directed only to its own extinction.

Since the differentiation of need goes hand in hand with the reduction of its elemental power，consciousness becomes more able to accommodate the object.Or regarded from the other aspect：because consciousness is constrained by the refinement and specialization of need to take a greater interest in the object，a certain amount of force is removed from the solipsistic need.Everywhere the weakening of the emotions，that is to say of the absolute surrender of the Ego to his momentary feelings，is correlated with the objectification of representations，with their appearance in a form of existence that stands over against us.Thus，for instance，talking things over is one of the most powerful means for subduing emotions.The inner process is，as it were，projected by the word into the external world；it now stands over against the individual like a tangible structure，and the intensity of the emotions is diverted.The tranquillization of the passions，and the representation of the objective world as existing and significant，are two sides of one and the same basic process.The diversion of inner interest from mere need and its satisfaction to the object itself，as a result of diminishing the possibility of satisfying the need，can obviously be brought about and strengthened just as well from the side of the object，if the latter makes satisfaction difficult，rare，and to be attained only indirectly or by exceptional effort.Even if we assume a highly differentiated desire concentrated upon selected objects，satisfaction might still be regarded as more or less a matter of course so long as there is no difficulty or resistance.What really matters，in order to conceive the independent significance of objects，is the distance between them and our impression of them.It is one of the numerous cases in which one has to stand back from the objects，to establish a distance between them and oneself，in order to get an objective picture of them.This is certainly no less subjective a view than the unclear or distorted picture that is obtained when the distance is too great or too small；but inner expediential reasons of our cognition lay a special emphasis upon subjectivity in the case of these extremes.At first，the object exists only in our relationship to it and is completely absorbed in this relationship；it becomes something external and opposed to us only in the degree that it escapes from this connection.Even the desire for objects，which recognizes their autonomy while seeking to overcome it，develops only when want and satisfaction do not coincide.The possibility of enjoyment must be separated，as an image of the future，from our present condition in order for us to desire things that now stand at a distance from us.Just as in the intellectual sphere the original oneness of perception，which we can observe in children，is only gradually divided into awareness of the self and of the object，so the naive enjoyment of objects only gives way to an awareness of the significance of things，and respect for them，when the objects are somewhat withdrawn.Here，too，the relationship between the weakening of desire and the beginning of an objectification of values is apparent，since the decline of the elemental strength of volition and feeling favors the growing awareness of the self.So long as a person surrenders unreservedly to a momentary feeling and is completely possessed by it，the Ego cannot develop.The awareness of a self that exists beyond its various emotions can emerge only when it appears as an enduring entity amid all these changes，and when the emotions do not absorb the whole self.The emotions must leave a part of the self untouched，as a neutral point for their contrasts，so that a certain reduction and limitation of the emotions allows the self to develop as the unchanging bearer of diverse contents.In all areas of our life Ego and object are related concepts，which are not yet separated in the initial forms of representation and only become differentiated through each other；and in just the same way，the independent value of objects develops only by contrast with an Ego that has become independent.Only the repulsions that we experience，the difficulties of attaining an object，the waiting and the labor that stand between a wish and its fulfillment，drive the Ego and the object apart；otherwise they remain undeveloped and undifferentiated in the propinquity of need and satisfaction.Whether the effective definition of the object arises from its scarcity，in relation to demand，or from the positive effort to acquire it，there is no doubt that only in this way is distance established between the object and ourselves which enables us to accord it a value beyond that of being merely enjoyed.

It may be said，therefore，that the value of an object does indeed depend upon the demand for it，but upon a demand that is no longer purely instinctive.On the other hand，if the object is to remain an economic value，its value must not be raised so greatly that it becomes an absolute.The distance between the self and the object of demand could become so large-through the difficulties of procuring it，through its exorbitant price，through moral or other misgivings that counter the striving after it-that the act of volition does not develop，and the desire is extinguished or becomes only a vague wish.The distance betweensubject and object that establishes value，at least in the economic sense，has a lower and an upper limit；the formula that the amount of value equals the degree of resistance to the acquisition of objects，in relation to natural，productive and social opportunities，is not correct.Certainly，iron would not be an economic value if its acquisition encountered no greater difficulty than the acquisition of air for breathing；but these difficulties had to remain within certain limits if the tools were to be manufactured which made iron valuable.To take another example：it has been suggested that the pictures of a very productive painter would be less valuable than those of one who was less productive，assuming equal artistic talent.But this is true only above a certain quantitative level.A painter，in order to acquire the fame that raises the price of his pictures，is obliged to produce a certain number of works.Again，the scarcity of gold in some countries with a paper currency has created a situation in which ordinary people will not accept gold even when it is offered to them.In the particular case of precious metals，whose suitability as the material of money is usually attributed to their scarcity，it should be noted that scarcity can only become significant above a considerable volume，without which these metals could not serve the practical demand for money and consequently could not acquire the value they possess as money.It is，perhaps，only the avaricious desire for an unlimited quantity of goods，in terms of which all values are scarce，that leads us to overlook that a certain proportion between scarcity and non-scarcity，and not scarcity itself，i& the condition of value.The factor of scarcity has to be related to the significance of the sense for differences；the factor of abundance to the significance of habituation，Life in general is deter mined by the proportion of these two facts：that we need variety and change of content just as we need familiarity；and this general need appears here in the specific form that the value of objects requires，on the one hand，scarcity-that is to say，differentiation and particularitywhile on the other hand it needs a certain comprehensiveness，frequency and permanence in order that objects may enter the realm of values.

An Analogy With Aesthetic Value

I would like to show the universal significance of distance for supposedly objective valuation by an example that has nothing to do with economic values and which therefore illustrates the general principle，namely aesthetic valuation.What we call the enjoyment of the beauty of things developed relatively late.For no matter how much immediate sensual enjoyment may exist even today in the individual case，the specific quality of aesthetic enjoyment is the ability to appreciate and enjoy the object，not simply an experience of sensual or supra-sensual stimulation.Every cultivated person is able to make a clear distinction in principle between the aesthetic and the sensual enjoyment of female beauty，even though he may not be able to draw the line between these components of his impression on a particular occasion.In the one case we surrender to the object，while in the other case the object surrenders to us.Even though aesthetic value，like any other value，is not an integral part of the object but is rather a projection of our feelings，it has the peculiarity that the projection is complete.In other words，the content of the feeling is，as it were，absorbed by the object and confronts the subject as something which has autonomous significance，which is inherent in the object.What was the historical psycho logical process in which this objective aesthetic pleasure in things emerged，given that primitive enjoyment which was the basis for any more refined appreciation must have been tied to direct subjective satisfaction and utility？Perhaps we can find a clue in a very simple observation.If an object of any kind provides us with great pleasure or advantage we experience a feeling of joy at every later viewing of this object，even if any use or enjoyment is now out of the question.This joy，which resembles an echo，has a unique psychological character deter mined by the fact that we no longer want anything from the object.In place of the former concrete relationship with the object，it is now mere contemplation that is the source of enjoyable sensation；we leave the being of the object untouched，and our sentiment is attached only to its appearance，not to that which in any sense may be consumed.In short，whereas formerly the object was valuable as a means for our practical and eudemonistic ends，it has now become an object of contemplation from which we derive pleasure by confronting it with reserve and remoteness，without touching it.It seems to me that the essential features of aesthetic enjoyment are foreshadowed here，but they can be shown more plainly if we follow the changes in sensation from the sphere of individual psychology to that of the species as a whole.The attempt has often been made to derive beauty from utility，but as a rule this has led only to a philistine coarsening of beauty.This might be avoided if the practical expediency and sensual eudemonistic immediacy were placed far enough back in the history of the species，as a result of which an instinctive，reflexlike sense of enjoyment in our organism were attached to the appearance of objects；the physic-psychic connection would then be genetic and would become effective in the individual without any consciousness on his part of the utility of the object.There is no need to enter into the controversy about the inheritance of such acquired associations；it suffices here that the events occur as if such qualities were inheritable.Consequently，the beautiful would be for us what once proved useful for the species，and its contemplation would give us pleasure without our having any practical interest in the object as individuals.This would not of course imply uniformity or the reduction of individual taste to an average or collective level.These echoes of an earlier general utility are absorbed into the diversity of individual minds and transformed into new unique quailities，so that one might say that the detachment of the pleasurable sensation from the reality of its original cause has finally become a form of our consciousness，quite independent of the contents that first gave rise to it，and ready to absorb any other content that the psychic constellation permits.In those cases that offer realistic pleasure，our appreciation of the object is not specifically aesthetic，but practical；it becomes aesthetic only as a result of increasing distance，abstraction and sublimation.What happens here is the common phenomenon that，once a certain connection has been established，the connecting link itself disappears because it is no longer required.The connection between certain useful objects and the sense of pleasure has become so well established for the species through inheritance or some other mechanism，that the mere sight of these objects becomes pleasurable even in the absence of any utility.This explains what Kant calls‘aesthetic indifference’，the lack of concern about the real existence of an object so long as its‘form’，i.e.its visibility，is given.Hence also the radiance and transcendence of the beautiful，which arises from the temporal remoteness of the real motives in which we now discover the aesthetic.Hence the idea that the beautiful is something typical，supra-individual，and universally valid；for the evolution of the species has long ago eliminated from these inner states of mind anything specific and individual in the motives and experiences.In consequence it is often impossible to justify on rational grounds aesthetic judgments or the opposition that they sometimes present to what is useful and agreeable to the individual.The whole development of objects from utility value to aesthetic value is a process of objectification.When I call an object beautiful，its quality and significance become much more independent of the arrangements and the needs of the subject than if it is merely useful.So long as objects are merely useful they are interchangeable and everything can be replaced by anything else that performs the same service.But when they are beautiful they have a unique individual existence and the value of one cannot be replaced by another even though it may be just as beautiful in its own way.We need not pursue these brief remarks on the origin of aesthetic value into a discussion of all the ramifications of the subject in order to recognize that the objectification of value originates in the relative distance that emerges between the direct subjective origin of the valuation of the object and our momentary feeling concerning the object.The more remote for the species is the utility of the object that first created an interest and a value and is now forgotten，the purer is the aesthetic satisfaction derived from the mere form and appearance of the object.The more it stands before us in its own dignity，the more we attribute to it a significance that is not exhausted by haphazard subjective enjoyment，and the more the relationship of valuing the objects merely as means is replaced by a feeling of their independent value.

Economic Activity Establishes Distances And Overcomes Them

I have chosen the above example because the objectifying effect of what I have called‘distance’is particularly clear when it is a question of distance in time.The process is，of course，intensive and qualitative，so that any quantitative designation in terms of distance is more or less symbolic.The same effect can be brought about by a number of other factors，as I have already mentioned：for example，by the scarcity of an object，by the difficulties of acquisition，by the necessity of renunciation.Even though in these economically important instances the significance of the objects remains a significance for us and so dependent upon our appreciation，the decisive change is that the objects confront us after these developments as independent powers，as a world of substances and forces that determine by their own qualities whether and to what extent they will satisfy our needs，and which demand effort and hardship before they will surrender to us.Only if the question of renunciation arises-renunciation of a feeling that really matters-is it necessary to direct attention upon the object itself.The situation，which is represented in stylized form by the concept of Paradise，in which subject and object，desire and satisfaction are not yet divided from each other-a situation that is not restricted to a specific historical epoch，but which appears everywhere in varying degrees-is destined to disintegrate，but also to attain a new reconciliation.The purpose of establishing a distance is that it should be overcome.The longing，effort and sacrifice that separate us from objects are also supposed to lead us towards them.Withdrawal and approach are in practice complementary notions，each of which presupposes the other；they are two sides of our relationship to objects，which we call subjectively our desire and objectively their value.We have to make the object enjoyed more remote from us in order to desire it again，and in relation to the distant object this desire is the first stage of approaching it，the first ideal relation to it.This dual significance of desire-that it can arise only at a distance from objects，a distance that it attempts to overcome，and yet that it presupposes a closeness between the objects and ourselves in order that the distance should be experienced at all-has been beautifully expressed by Plato in the statement that love is an intermediate state between possession and deprivation.The necessity of sacrifice，the experience that the satisfaction of desire has a price，is only the accentuation or intensification of this relationship.It makes us more distinctly aware of the distance between our present self and the enjoyment of things，but only by leading along the road towards overcoming it.This inner development towards the simultaneous growth of distance and approach also appears as a historical process of differentiation.Culture produces a widening circle of interests；that is，the periphery within which the objects of interest are located becomes farther and farther removed from the centre，the Ego.This increase in distance，however，depends upon a simultaneous drawing closer.If objects，persons and events hundreds or thousands of miles away acquire a vital importance for modem man，they must have been brought much closer to him than to primitive man，for whom they simply do not exist because the positive distinction between close and far has not yet been made.These two notions develop in a reciprocal relation from the original undifferentiated state.Modem man has to work in a different way，to apply a much greater effort than primitive man；the distance between him and the objects of his endeavours is much greater and much more difficult obstacles stand in his way，but on the other hand he acquires a greater quantity of objects，ideally through his desire and in practice through his work.The cultural process-which transposes the subjective condition of impulse and enjoyment into the valuation of objectsseparates more distinctly the elements of our dual relationship of closeness and distance.

The subjective events of impulse and enjoyment become objectified in value；that is to say，there develop from the objective conditions obstacles，deprivations，demands for some kind of‘price’through which the cause or content of impulse and enjoyment is first separated from us and becomes，by this very act，an object and a value.The fundamental conceptual question as to the subjectivity or objectivity of value is misconceived.The subjectivity of value is quite erroneously based upon the fact that no object can ever acquire universal value，but that value changes from place to place，from person to person，and eyen from one hour to the next.This is a case of confusing subjectivity with the individuality of value.The fact that I want to enjoy，or do enjoy，something is indeed subjective in so far as there is no awareness of or interest in the object as such.But then an altogether new process begins：the process of valuation.The content of volition and feeling assumes the form of the object.This object now confronts the subject with a certain degree of independence，surrendering or refusing itself，presenting conditions for its acquisition，placed by his original capricious choice in a law-governed realm of necessary occurrences and restrictions.It is completely irrelevant here that the contents of these forms of objectivity are not the same for all subjects.If we assumed that all human beings evaluated objects in exactly the same way，this would not increase the degree of objectivity beyond that which exists in an individual case；for if any object is valued rather than simply satisfying desire it stands at an objective distance from us that is established by real obstacles and necessary struggles，by gain and loss，by considerations of advantage and by prices.The reason why the misleading question about the objectivity or subjectivity of value is raised again and again is that we find empirically an infinite number of objects that are entirely the products of representations.But if an object in its finished form arises first in our consciousness，its value seems to reside entirely in the subject；the aspect from which I bega-nthe classification of objects in the two series of being and value-seems to be identical with the division between objectivity and subjectivity.But this fails to take into account that the object of volition is different from the object of representation.Even though both may occupy the same place in the series of space，time and quality，the desired object confronts us in a different way and has quite a different significance from the represented object.Consider the analogy of love.The person we love is not the same being as our reason represents.I am not referring here to the distortions or falsifications that emotions may produce in the object of cognition；for these remain within the sphere of representation and of intellectual categories，even though the content is modified.It is in a completely different way from that of intellectual representations that the beloved person is an object to us.Despite the logical identity it has a different meaning for us，just as the marble of the Venus de Milo means different things for a crystallographer and an art critic.A single element of being，although recognized as one and the same，can become an object for us in quite different ways：as an object of representation，and as an object of desire.Within each of these categories the confrontation between subject and object has other causes and other effects，so that it leads only to confusion if the practical relation between man and his object is equated with the alternative between subjectivity and objectivity which is valid only in the realm of intellectual representation.For even though the value of an object is not objective in the same manner as colour or weight，it is also not at all subjective in the sense of corresponding with this kind of objectivity；such subjectivity would apply rather to a perception of colour resulting from a deception of the senses，or of any other quality of the object based on a mistaken conclusion，or of a quality suggested by superstition.The practical relation to objects，however，produces a completely different kind of objectivity，because the conditions of reality withdraw the object of desire and enjoyment from the subjective realm and thus produce the specific category that we call value.

Within the economic sphere，this process develops in such a way that the content of the sacrifice or renunciation that is interposed between man and the object of his demand is，at the same time，the object of someone else's demand.The one has to give up the possession or enjoyment that the other wants in order to persuade the latter to give up what he owns and what the former wants，i shall show that the subsistence economy of an isolated producer can be reduced to the same formula.Two value formations are interwoven；a value has to be offered in order to acquire a value Thus it appears that there is a reciprocal determination of value by the objects.By being exchanged，each object acquires a practical realization and measure of its value through the other object.This is the most important consequence and expression of the distance established between the objects and the subject.So long as objects are close to the subjects，so long as the differentiation of demand，scarcity，difficulties and resistance to acquisition have not yet removed the objects to a distance from the subject，they are，so to speak，desire and enjoyment，but not yet objects of desire and enjoyment.The process that I have outlined through which they become objects is brought to completion when the object，which is at the same time remote and yet overcomes the distance，is produced specifically for this purpose.Thus，pure economic objectivity，the detachment of the object from any subjective relationship to the subject，is established；and since production is carried out for the purpose of exchange with another object，which has a corresponding role，the two objects enter into a reciprocal objective relationship.The form taken by value in exchange places value in a category beyond the strict meaning of subjectivity and objectivity.In exchange，value becomes supra-subjective，supra-individual，yet without becoming an objective quality and reality of the things themselves.Value appears as the demand of the object，transcending its immanent reality，to be exchanged and acquired only for another corresponding value.The Ego，even though it is the universal source of values，becomes so far removed from the objects that they can measure their significance by each other without referring in each case to the Ego.But this real relationship between values，which is executed and supported by exchange，evidently has its purpose in eventual subjective enjoyment，that is，in the fact that we receive a greater quantity and intensity of values than would be possible without exchange transactions.It has been said that the divine principle，after having created the elements of the world，withdrew and left them to the free play of their own powers，so that we can now speak of an objective cosmos，subject to its own relations and laws；and further，that the divine power chose this independence of the cosmic process as the most expedient means of accomplishing its own purposes for the world.In the same way，we invest economic objects with a quantity of value as if it were an inherent quality，and then hand them over to the process of exchange，to a mechanism determined by those quantities，to an impersonal confrontation between values，from which they return multiplied and more enjoyable to the final purpose，which was also their point of origin：subjective experience.This is the basis and source of that valuation which finds its expression in economic life and whose consequences represent the meaning of money.We turn now to their investigation.

Ⅱ

Exchange As A Means Of Overcoming The Purely Subjective Value Significance Of An Object

The technical form of economic transactions produces a realm of values that is more or less completely detached from the subjectivepersonal substructure.Although the individual buys because he values and wants to consume an object，his demand is expressed effectively only by an object in exchange.Thus the subjective process，in which differentiation and the growing tension between function and content create the object as a 4 value’，changes to an objective，supra-personal relationship between objects.The individuals who are incited by their wants and valuations to make now this，now that exchange are conscious only of establishing value relationships，the content of which forms part of the objects.The quantity of one object corresponds in value with a given quantity of another object，and this proportion exists as something objectively appropriate and law-determined-from which it commences and in which it terminates-in just the same way as we conceive the objective values of the moral and other spheres.The phenomenon of a completely developed economy，at least，would appear in this light.Here the objects circulate according to norms and measures that are fixed at any one moment，through which they confront the individual as an objective realm.The individual may or may not participate in this realm，but if he wants to participate he can do so only as a representative or executor of these determinants which lie outside himself.The economy tends toward a stage of developmentnever completely unreal and never completely realized-in which the values of objects are determined by an automatic mechanism，regardless of how much subjective feeling has been incorporated as a precondition or as content in this mechanism.The value of an object acquires such visibility and tangibility as it possesses through the fact that one object is offered for another.This reciprocal balancing，through which each economic object expresses its value in another object，removes both objects from the sphere of merely subjective significance.The relativity of valuation signifies its objectification.The basic relationship to man，in whose emotional life all the processes of valuation admittedly take place，is here presupposed；it has been absorbed，so to speak，by the objects，and thus equipped they enter the arena of mutual balancing，which is not the result of their economic value but its representative or content.

In Exchange，Objects Express Their Value Reciprocally

The fact of economic exchange，therefore，frees the objects from their bondage to the mere subjectivity of the subjects and allows them to determine themselves reciprocally，by investing the economic function in them.The object acquires its practical value not only by being in demand itself but through the demand for another object.Value is determined not by the relation to the demanding subject，but by the fact that this relation depends on the cost of a sacrifice which，for the other party，appears as a value to be enjoyed while the object itself appears as a sacrifice.Thus objects balance each other and value appears in a very specific way as an objective，inherent quality.While bargaining over the object is going on-in other words，while the sacrifice that it represents is being determined-its significance for both parties seems to be something external to them，as if each individual experienced the object only in relation to himself.Later on we shall see that an isolated economy also imposes the same necessity of sacrifice for the acquisition of the object，since it confronts economic man with the demands of nature；so that in this case，too，the same relationship endows the object with the same objectively conditioned significance even though there is only one participant in the exchange.The desire and sentiment of the subject is the driving force in the background，but it could not by itself bring about the value-form，which is the result of balancing objects against each other.The economy transmits all valuations through the form of exchange，creating an intermediate realm between the desires that are the source of all human activity and the satisfaction of needs in which they culminate.The specific characteristic of the economy as a particular form of behavior and communication consists not only in exchanging values but in the exchange of values.Of course，the significance that objects attain in exchange is not wholly independent of their directly subjective significance which originally determines the relationship.The two are inseparably related，as are form and content.But the objective process，which very often also dominates the individual's consciousness，disregards the fact that values are its material；its specific character is to deal with the equality of values.In much the same way，geometry has as its aim the determination of the relationship between the size of objects without referring to the substances for which these relationships are valid.As soon as one realizes the extent to which human action in every sphere of mental activity operates with abstractions，it is not as strange as it may seem at first glance that not only the study of the economy but the economy itself is constituted by a real abstraction from the comprehensive reality of valuations.The forces，relations and qualities of things-including our own nature-objectively form a unified whole which has to be broken down by our interests into a multitude of independent series or motives to enable us to deal with it.Every science investigates phenomena that are homogeneous and clearly distinguished from the problems of other sciences，whereas reality ignores boundaries and every section of the world presents an aggregate of tasks for all the sciences.Our practice excludes unilateral series from the outer and inner complexity of things and so constructs the great systems of cultural interests.The same is true for our sentiments.When we experience religious or social sentiments，when we are melancholy or joyful，it is always abstractions from total reality that are the objects of our feeling-whether because we react only to those impressions that can be brought within the scope of some common cultural interest，or because we endow every object with a certain colouring which derives its validity from its interweaving with other colourings to form an objective unity.Thus，the following formula is one way in which the relationship of man to the world may be expressed：our practice as well as our theory continually abstracts single elements from the absolute unity and intermingling of objects，in which each object supports the other and all have equal rights，and forms these elements into relative entities and wholes.We have no relationship to the totality of existence，except in very general sentiments；we attain a definite relation to the world only by continually abstracting from phenomena，in accordance with our needs of thought and action and investing these abstractions with the relative independence of a purely inner connection which the unbroken stream of world processes denies to objective reality.The economic system is indeed based on an abstraction，on the mutuality of exchange，the balance between sacrifice and gain；and in the real process of its development it is inseparably merged with its basis and results，desire and need.But this form of existence does not differentiate it from the other spheres into which we divide the totality of phenomena for the sake of our interests.

The Value Of an Object Becomes Objectified By Exchanging It For Another Object

The decisive fact in the objectivity of economic value，which makes economics a special area of investigation，is that its validity transcends the individual subject.The fact that the object has to be exchanged against another object illustrates that it is not only valuable for me，but also valuable independently of me；that is to say，for another person.The equation，objectivity = validity for subjects in general，finds its clearest justification in economic value.The equivalence of which we become aware，and in which we develop an interest through exchange，imparts to value its specific objectivity.For even though each of the elements in exchange may be personal or only subjectively valuable，the fact that they are equal to each other is an objective factor which is not contained within any one of these elements and yet does not lie outside of them either.Exchange presupposes an objective measurement of subjective valuations，not in the sense of being chronologically prior，but in the sense that both phenomena arise from the same act.

Exchange As A Form Of Life

It should be recognized that most relationships between people can be interpreted as forms of exchange.Exchange is the purest and most developed kind of interaction，which shapes human life when it seeks to acquire substance and content.It is often overlooked how much what appears at first a one-sided activity is actually based upon reciprocity：the orator appears as the leader and inspirer to the assembly，the teacher to his class，the journalist to his public；but，in fact，everyone in such a situation feels the decisive and determining reaction of the apparently passive mass.In the case of political parties the saying is current that：‘I am the leader，therefore I must follow them’；and an outstanding hypnotist has recently emphasized that in hypnotic suggestion-obviously the clearest case of activity on one side and absolute dependence on the other-there is an influence，that is difficult to describe，of the person hypnotized upon the hypnotist，without which the experiment could not be carried out.Every interaction has to be regarded as an exchange：every conversation，every affection（even if it is rejected），every game，every glance at another person.The difference that seems to exist，that in interaction a person offers what he does not possess whereas in exchange he offers only what he does possess，cannot be sustained.For in the first place，it is always personal energy，the surrender of personal substance，that is involved in interaction；and conversely，exchange is not conducted for the sake of the object that the other person possesses，but to gratify one's personal feelings which he does not possess.It is the object of exchange to increase the sum of value；each party offers to the other more than he possessed before.It is true that interaction is the more comprehensive concept and exchange the narrower one；however，in human relationships the former appears predominantly in forms that may be Interpreted as exchange.Every day of our lives comprises a process of gain and loss，of accretion and diminution of life's content，which is intellectualized in exchange since the substitution of one object for another becomes conscious there.The same synthesizing mental process that turns the mere co-existence of things into a systematic relationship，the same Ego that imposes its own unity upon the material world，has seized upon the natural rhythm of our existence and through exchange has organized its elements in a meaningful interconnection.It is above all the exchange of economic values that involves the notion of sacrifice.When we exchange love for love，we have no other use for its inner energy and，leaving aside any later consequences，we do not sacrifice any good.When we share our intellectual resources in a discussion，they are not thereby reduced；when we display the image of our personality，and take in those of other people，our possession of ourselves is not at all reduced by this exchange.In all these cases of exchange the increase of value does not involve a balancing of gain and loss；either the contribution of each party lies beyond this antithesis，or it is already a gain to be able to make it，and we accept the response as a gift which is made independently of our own offering.But economic exchange-whether it is of objects of labor or labor power invested in objects-always signifies the sacrifice of an otherwise useful good，however much eudaemonistic gain is involved.

The interpretation of economic life as interaction in the specific sense of an exchange of sacrifices meets with an objection raised against the equation of economic value with exchange value.It has been argued that even the completely isolated producer，who neither buys nor sells，has to value his products and his means of production，and to form a concept of value independent of exchange if his costs and output are to be properly related.But this fact proves exactly what it is supposed to disprove.The evaluation of whether a particular product justifies the expenditure of a given quantity of work or other goods is exactly the same as the evaluation of what is offered against what is received in exchange.The concept of exchange is often misconceived，as though it were a relationship existing outside the elements to which it refers.But it signifies only a condition or a change within the related subjects，not something that exists between them in the sense in which an object might be spatially located between two other objects.By subsuming the two events or changes of condition that are going on in reality under the concept of‘exchange’，one is tempted to assume that something else has occurred beyond what is experienced by the contracting parties；just as the concept of a‘kiss’，which is also‘exchanged’，might tempt us to regard the kiss as something beyond the movement and experiences of two pairs of lips.So far as its immediate content is concerned，exchange is only the causally connected double event in which one subject now possesses something he did not have before and has given away something he did possess before.Thus，the isolated individual who sacrifices something in order to produce certain products，acts in exactly the same way as the subject who exchanges，the only difference being that his partner is not another subject but the natural order and regularity of things which，just like another human being，does not satisfy our desires without a sacrifice.The valuations that determine his action are generally exactly the same as those involved in exchange.It is of no concern to the economic subject whether he invests his property or labor power in the land or transfers them to another person，if the result for him is the same.This subjective process of sacrifice and gain in the individual mind is in no way secondary to，or imitated from，exchange between individuals；on the contrary，the interchange between sacrifice and acquisition within the individual is the basic presupposition and，as it were，the essential substance of exchange between two people.Exchange is only a sub-variety in which the sacrifice is brought about by the demand of another individual；but it can be brought about with the same result for the subject by the technicalnatural condition of things.It is of great importance to reduce the economic process to what really happens in the mind of each economic subject.One should not be deceived by the fact that the process of exchange is mutual；the natural or self-sufficient economy can be traced back to the same basic form as the exchange between two persons-to the practice of weighing against each other two subjective processes within the individual.This activity is not affected by the secondary question as to whether the stimulus comes from the nature of things or the nature of man，whether it operates in a subsistence or a market economy.Every enjoyment of values by means of attainable objects can be secured only by forgoing other values，which may take the form not only of working indirectly for ourselves by working for others，but often enough of working directly for our own ends.This also clarifies the point that exchange is just as productive and valuecreating as is production itself.In both cases one is concerned with receiving goods for the price of other goods in exchange，in such a way that the final situation shows a surplus of satisfaction as compared with the situation before the action.We are unable to create either matter or force；we can only transfer those that arc given in such a way that as many as possible rise from the realm of reality into the realm of values.This formal shift within the given material is accomplished by exchange between people as well as by the exchange with nature which we call production.Both belong to the same concept of value；in both cases the empty place of what we gave away is filled by an object of higher value，and only through this movement does the object that was previously merged with the Ego detach itself and become a value.The profound connection between value and exchange，as a result of which they are mutually conditioning，is illustrated by the fact that they are in equal measure the basis of practical life.Even though our life seems to be determined by the mechanism and objectivity of things，we cannot in fact take any step or conceive any thought without endowing the objects with values that direct our activities.These activities are carried out in accordance with the schema of exchange；from the lowest level of satisfaction of wants to the attainment of the highest intellectual and religious goods，every value has to be acquired by the sacrifice of some other value.It is perhaps impossible to determine exactly what is the starting point and what is the consequence.For the two elements cannot be separated in the basic processes，which make up the unity of practical life；a unity that we cannot grasp as a whole and that we differentiate into these two elements.Or，alternatively，a never-ending process occurs between the two，in which every exchange refers back to a value，and each value refers back to an exchange.For our purposes it is more enlightening to trace value to exchange，since the opposite seems better known and more obvious.To recognize value as the result of a sacrifice discloses the infinite wealth that our life derives from this basic form.Our painful experience of sacrifice and our effort to diminish it leads us to believe that its total elimination would raise life to，perfection.But here we overlook that sacrifice is by no means always an external obstacle，but is the inner condition of the goal itself and the road by which it may be reached.We divide the enigmatic unity of our practical relation to things into sacrifice and gain，obstruction and attainment，and since the different stages are often separated in time we forget that the goal would not be the same without impediments to overcome，The resistance that we have to overcome enables us to prove our strength；only the conquest of sin secures for the soul the‘joy of heaven’that the righteous man cannot enjoy.Every synthesis needs the analytical principle which it nevertheless negates，for without this principle it would not be a synthesis of different elements but an absolute unity；conversely，every analysis requires a synthesis which it dissolves，for analysis still needs a certain interconnectedness，without which it would be mere unrelatedness：even the most violent animosity is a stronger relationship than mere indifference，and indifference stronger than simple unawareness.In brief，the inhibiting counter-motion，to eliminate which a sacrifice is required，is often，perhaps even always，the positive pre-condition of the goal.The sacrifice does not in the least belong in the category of what ought not to be，as superficiality and avarice would have us believe.Sacrifice is not only the condition of specific values，but the condition of value as such；with reference to economic behavior，which concerns us here，it is not only the price to be paid for particular established values，but the price through which alone values can be established.

Exchange is accomplished in two forms，which I propose to illustrate here with reference to the value of labor.In so far as there is a desire for leisure，or for the use of energy for its own sake in recreation，or for the avoidance of painful effort，all labor is undeniably a sacrifice.However，there is also a certain amount of latent work-energy which either we do not know how to employ or which manifests itself in an impulse to voluntary labor which is not incited by need or by ethical motives.A number of demands compete for this quantity of labor power，the use of which is not in itself a sacrifice，but not all of them can be satisfied.For every use of energy，one or more other possible and desirable uses have to be sacrificed.Unless we could utilize the energy to perform labor A also for labor B，there would not be any sacrifice in doing labor A；the same is true for B if we execute it instead of A.What is sacrificed eudaemonistically is not labour，but rather non-labour；we pay for A not by sacrificing labor-since，as we presuppose，here labour does not involve any disutility-but by renouncing B.The sacrifice that we give in exchange by our labour may be，so to speak，either absolute or relative：the disutility is either directly connected with labour，where this is experienced as toil and pain，or it is indirect in the case where labour is eudaemonistically irrelevant or even of a positive value，but we can acquire one object only by renouncing another.Thus the instance of enjoyable labor can also be related to the form of exchange as sacrifice which characterizes the economy.

The idea that objects have a specific value before they enter into an economic relationship-in which each of the two objects of the transaction signifies for one contracting party the desired gain and for the other the sacrifice-is valid only for a developed economy，but not for the basic processes on which the economy rests.The logical difficulty，that two things can only be of equal value if each of them has a value of its own，seems to be illustrated by the analogy that two lines can be equally long only if each of them has a definite length.But strictly speaking，a line gains the quality of length only by comparison with others.For its length is determined not by itself-since it is not simply‘long’-but by another line against which it is measured：and the same service is performed for the other line，although the result of the measurement does not depend upon this act of comparison but upon each line as it exists independently of the other.Let us recall the category that embraces the objective value judgment，which I termed metaphysical；from the relationship between us and objects develops the imperative to pass a certain judgment，the content of which，however，does not reside in the things themselves.The same is true in judging length；the objects themselves require that we judge them，but the quality of length is not given by the objects and can only be realized by an act within ourselves.We are not aware of the fact that length is established only by the process of comparison and is not inherent in the individual object on which length depends，because we have abstracted from particular relative lengths the general concept of length-which excludes the definiteness without which specific length does not exist.In projecting this concept onto objects we assume that things must have length before it can be determined individually by comparison.Moreover，definite standards have grown out of the innumerable comparisons of length，and they form the basis for determining the length of all tangible objects.These standards embody as it were the abstract concept of length；they seem no longer to be relative because everything is measured by them，while they themselves are no longer measured.The error is the same as if one believes that the falling apple is attracted by the earth，while the earth is not attracted by the falling apple.Finally，we delude ourselves as to the inherent quality of length by the fact that the multiplicity of elements，the relationship of which determines substance，already exists in the individual parts.If we were to assume that there is only a single line in the whole world，it would not have any specific length since it lacks any relation to others.It is impossible to measure the world as a whole，because there is nothing outside the world in relation to which it could have a specific size.This is true of a line so long as it is considered without being compared with others，or without its own parts being compared with each other；it is neither short nor long，but lies outside the whole category.This analogy makes clear the relativity of economic value rather than disproving it.

If we regard the economy as a special case of the general form of exchange-a surrender of something in order to gain something-then we shall at once suspect that the value of what is acquired is not ready made，but rather accrues to the desired object wholly or in part from the extent of the sacrifice required.These frequent and theoretically important instances seem indeed to contain an inner contradiction：would the sacrifice of a value be required for valueless objects？No reasonable person would give away a value without receiving an equal value in return，and it would be a perverted world in which the desired object attained its value only as a result of the price that had to be paid for it.This is an important point so far as our immediate consciousness is concerned，more important than the popular viewpoint will admit.In fact，the value that a subject sacrifices can never be greater，in the particular circumstances of the moment，than the value that he receives in return.All appearance to the contrary rests on a confusion of the value experienced by the subject and the value which the object in exchange has according to other apparently objective forms of appraisal.Thus，during a famine somebody will give away a jewel for a piece of bread because under the given conditions the latter is more valuable to him than the former.It always depends upon circumstances whether sentiments of value are attached to an object，since every valuation is supported by an elaborate complex of feelings which are always in a process of flux，adjustment and change.It is of no significance in principle whether the circumstances are momentary or relatively enduring.If the starving person gives the jewel away he demonstrates unambiguously that the piece of bread is more valuable to him.There is no doubt that，at the moment of exchange，of offering the sacrifice，the value of the object received sets a limit up to which the value of the object offered in exchange can rise.Quite independent of this is the question as to where the object received derives its value；whether it is perhaps the result of the sacrifice offered，so that the balance between gain and cost is established a posteriori by the sacrifice.We shall see in a moment that value often originates psychologically in this seemingly illogical manner.Once the value has been established-no matter how-there is a psychological necessity to regard it as being of equal value with the sacrifice.

Even superficial psychological observation discloses instances in which the sacrifice not only increases the value of the desired object but actually brings it about.This process reveals the desire to prove one's strength，to overcome difficulties，or even simply to be contrary.The necessity of proceeding in a roundabout way in order to acquire certain things is often the occasion，and often also the reason，for considering them valuable.In human relations，and most frequently and clearly in erotic relations，it is apparent that reserve，indifference or rejection incite the most passionate desire to overcome these barriers，and are the cause of efforts and sacrifices that，in many cases，the goal would not have seemed to deserve were it not for such opposition.The aesthetic enjoyment of mountain climbing would no longer be highly regarded by many people if it did not exact the price of extraordinary effort and danger，which constitute its charm，appeal and inspiration.The attraction of antiques and curiosities is often of the same kind.If there is no aesthetic or historical interest attached to them，this is replaced by the mere difficulty of acquiring them；they are worth as much as they cost，which leads to the conclusion that they cost as much as they are worth.Furthermore，moral merit always signifies that opposing impulses and desires had to be conquered and sacrificed in favor of the morally desirable act.If such an act is carried out without any difficulty as a result of natural impulse，it will not be considered to have a subjective moral value，no matter how desirable its objective content.Moral merit is attained only by the sacrifice of lower and yet very tempting goods，and it is the greater the more inviting the temptations and the more comprehensive and difficult the sacrifice.Of all human achievements the highest honour and appreciation is given to those that indicate，or at least seem to indicate，a maximum of commitment，energy and persistent concentration of the whole being，and along with this，renunciation，sacrifice of everything else，and devotion to the objective idea.Even in those cases where，by contrast，aesthetic performance，and the ease and charm that originate from a natural impulse，exercise a supreme attraction，this is also due to the resonance of the efforts and sacrifices that are usually required for such accomplishments.The significance of a connection is often transferred to its opposite by the mobility and inexhaustible power of association in our mental life；as，for example，the association between two representations may take place as a result of the fact that they affirm each other or deny each other.We realize the specific value of what we gain without difficulty and through good fortune only in terms of the significance of that which is hard to achieve and involves sacrifices；the latter has the same value，but with a negative sign，and it is the primary source from which the former value is derived.

Of course，these may be exaggerated or exceptional cases.In order to discover their general type in the economic sphere，it is necessary first of all to distinguish the economic aspect，as a special characteristic or form，from the fact of value as a universal quality of substance.If we accept value as being given，it follows from what has been said previously that economic value is not an inherent quality of an object，but is established by the expenditure of another object which is given in exchange for it.Wild grain，which can be harvested without effort and immediately consumed without any exchange，is an economic good only if its consumption saves some other expenditure.But if all the necessities of life could be obtained in this way without any sacrifice there would be no economic system，any more than in the case of birds or fish or the inhabitants of the land of milk and honey.No matter how the two objects A and B have become values.A becomes an economic value only because I have to exchange it for B，and B only because I can acquire A in exchange for it.It makes no difference whether the sacrifice is accomplished by transferring a value to another person through inter-individual exchange，or by balancing the efforts and gains within the individual's own sphere of interest.Economic objects have no significance except directly or indirectly in our consumption and in the exchange that occurs between them.The former alone is not sufficient to make the object an economic one；only the latter can give it the specific characteristic that we call economic.Yet this distinction between value and its economic form is artificial.In the first place，although the economy may seem to be a mere form in the sense that it presupposes value as its content in order to make the balancing of sacrifice and gain possible，in reality this process through which an economic system is constructed from the presupposed values may be interpreted as the originator of economic values.

The economic form of value lies between two limits：on the one side is the desire for the object，arising from the anticipated satisfaction of possession and enjoyment；on the other side is the enjoyment itself，which is not strictly speaking an economic act.If the previous argument is accepted，namely that the direct consumption of wild grain is not an economic act（except to the extent that it economizes on the production of economic values），then the consumption of real economic values is itself no longer an economic act，for these two acts of consumption are totally indistinguishable.Whether somebody has found，stolen，cultivated or bought the grain does not make the slightest difference for the act of consumption and its direct consequences.The object，as we have seen，is not yet a value so long as it is only the direct stimulant and a natural part of our sentiments inseparable from the subjective process.The object has to be detached from this in order to gain the specific significance that we call value.Desire by itself cannot bring about value unless it encounters obstacles；if every desire could be satisfied completely without a struggle，the economic exchange of values would never have developed，and the desire itself would never have reached a high level.Only the deferment of satisfaction through obstacles，the fear of never attaining the object，the tension of struggling for it，brings together the various elements of desire；the intense striving and continuous acquisition.But even if the strongest element of desire came only from within the individual，the object that satisfies it would still have no value if it were abundantly available.The whole genus of things that guarantee the satisfaction of our wishes would be important to us，but not the limited portion that we acquire because this could be replaced without effort by any other portion.Our awareness of the value of the whole genus would arise from the idea of its being absent altogether.In this case，our consciousness would be simply determined by the rhythm of the subjective wishes and satisfactions without paying any attention to the mediating object.Need and enjoyment alone do not comprehend either value or economic life，which are realized simultaneously through the exchange between two subjects each of whom requires a sacrifice by the other（or its equivalent in the self-sufficient economy）in order to be satisfied.Exchange，i.e.the economy，is the source of economic values，because exchange is the representative of the distance between subject and object which transforms subjective feelings into objective valuation.I mentioned earlier Kant's summary of his epistemology：the conditions of experience are at the same time the conditions of the objects of experience-by which he meant that the process that we call experience and the representations that form its contents and objects are subject to the same laws of the understanding.Objects can be experienced because they are representations within us，and the same power that determines experience determines also the formation of representations.In the same manner we can state：the possibility of the economy is at the same time the possibility of the objects of the economy.The process between two owners of objects（of substances，labour power or rights of any kind）that establishes the relationship called‘economy’-i.e.a reciprocal surrender-raises these objects at the same time into the category of value.The logical difficulty，that values had to exist as values in order to enter the form and movement of the economy，is now eliminated by the significance of the psychic relation which we designated as the distance between us and the object.This psychic relationship differentiates the original subjective condition of feeling into the desiring subject and the opposed object which possesses value.In the economy，this distance is brought about through exchange，through the two-sided influence of barriers，obstacles and renunciation.Economic values are produced by the same reciprocity and relativity that determine the economic character of values.

Exchange is not the mere addition of two processes of giving and receiving，but a new third phenomenon，in which each of the two processes is simultaneously cause and effect.The value that the object gains through renunciation thereby becomes an economic value.In general，value develops in the interval that obstacles，renunciation and sacrifice interpose between the will and its satisfaction.The process of exchange consists in the mutual determination of taking and giving，and it does not depend upon a particular object having previously acquired a value for a particular subject.All that is needed is accomplished in the act of exchange itself.Of course，in an actual economic system the value of objects is usually indicated when they enter into exchange.I am referring here only to the inner，systematic meaning of the concept of value and exchange，which exists only in rudimentary form，or as an ideal significance in the historical phenomena or as their ideal meaning.I refer not to their real form，in the historical genetic sense，but to their objective-logical form.

Theories Of Utility And Scarcity

This transposition of the concept of economic value from the abstract sphere to that of vital relationships may be further elucidated with the aid of the concepts of utility and scarcity which are generally regarded as constituent elements of value.The first requirement for an economic object to exist，based upon the disposition of the economic subject，is utility.To this，scarcity must be added as a second determining factor if the object is to acquire a specific value.If economic values are regarded as being determined by supply and demand，supply would correspond with scarcity and demand with utility.Utility would decide whether the object is in demand at all and scarcity the price that we are obliged to pay.Utility appears as the absolute part of economic values，and its degree has to be known so that the objects can enter into economic exchange.Scarcity is only a relative factor，since it signifies only the quantitative relationship of the object in question to the total available amount.The qualitative nature of the object does not play any role here.Utility，however，seems to exist prior to any economic system，to any comparison or relationship with other objects；it is the substantial factor determining the movement of the economy However，this situation is not correctly described by the concept of utility.What is really meant is the desire for the object.Utility as such is never able to bring about economic processes unless it leads to demand，and it does not always do so.Some kind of‘wish’may accompany the perception of useful objects，but real demand，which has practical significance and affects our activity，fails to appear if protracted poverty，constitutional lethargy，diversion to other fields of interest，indifference to the theoretically known advantage，awareness of the impossibility of acquisition or other positive and negative factors counteract such a development.On the other hand，we desire，and therefore value economically，all kinds of things that cannot be called useful or serviceable without arbitrarily straining ordinary linguistic usage.If the concept of usefulness is to encompass everything that is in demand，it is logically necessary to accept the demand for the object as the decisive factor for economic activity，since otherwise not everything useful is in demand.Even with this modification，it is not an absolute factor and does not eliminate the relativity of values.In the first place，as we have seen，demand is not distinctly conscious unless there are barriers，difficulties and sacrifices between the object and the subject.In reality we exert a demand only when the enjoyment of the object is measured by intermediate stages；when the price of patience，the renunciation of other efforts or enjoyments，set the object in perspective，and desire is equated with the exertion to overcome the distance.Secondly，the economic value of the object based upon the demand for it may be interpreted as a heightening or sublimation of the relativity embedded in the demand.For the object in demand becomes a value of practical importance to the economy only when the demand for it is compared with the demand for other things；only this comparison establishes a measure of demand.Only if there is a second object which I am willing to give away for the first，or vice-versa，does each of them have a measurable economic value.There is originally in the world of practice no single value，any more than there is originally in the world of consciousness a number‘one’.It has often been asserted that the concept of‘two’exists prior to the concept of 4 one’.The pieces of a broken cane require a term for plurality；the whole cane is a cane and there is no reason to call it one cane unless two canes with some relationship to each other are considered.Thus，the mere demand for an object does not yet create an economic value，because it does not include the required measure；only a comparison of demands，i.e.the exchangeability of its objects，assigns a definite economic value to each of them.Without the category of equality-one of those fundamental concepts that shape the world view out of particulars，yet only gradually acquire a psychological reality-no‘utility’and no‘scarcity’，however great，would bring about economic transactions.Whether two objects are equally in demand and equally valuable can only be ascertained-owing to the lack of an external measure-by exchanging them against each other in idea or in reality，while experiencing no variation in value sentiments.In fact，it may be that originally the exchangeability did not indicate equality of value as an objective quality of things，but that equality was simply the term used for exchangeability.The intensity of demand by itself does not necessarily increase the economic value of objects；since value is expressed only through exchange，demand can affect the value only to the extent that it modifies exchange.Even though I crave an object this does not determine its equivalent in exchange.Either I do not yet possess the object，in which case my desire for the object，unless I express it，will not exert any influence upon the demand of the present owner and he will ask a price in accordance with his own or the average interest in the object；or I do possess the object，and in that case my price may be so high that the object cannot be exchanged at all（i.e.it is no longer an economic value），or else I shall have to reduce the price to correspond with the degree of interest shown by a prospective buyer.The decisive fact is that practical economic value is never just value in general，but is by its very nature a definite sum of value；that this sum results from the measurement of two intensities of demand；that the form that this measurement takes within the economy is the exchange of sacrifice and gain；and that，consequently，the economic object does not haveas seems at first sight-an absolute value as a result of the demand for it，but the demand，as the basis of a real or imagined exchange，endows the object with value.

The relativity of value-as a result of which objects in demand become values only through the process of mutual exchange-seems to suggest that value is nothing more than the price，and that no differences in their level can exist；in which case，the frequent discrepancy between price and value would refute the theory.But the theory claims that value would never have been established without the general phenomenon that we call price.That an object is economically valuable means that it is of value to me，that I am willing to give something for it.A value can become practically effective only by being equivalent to other values，i.e.by being exchangeable.Equivalence and exchangeability are reciprocal notions，which express the same state of affairs in two different forms，in a condition of rest and in motion，so to speak.What could possibly motivate us to endow objects，beyond the naive subjective enjoyment that they afford，with the peculiar significance that we call value？It cannot be due simply to their scarcity.For if scarcity existed simply as a fact that we could not alter-as in reality we do not only by productive work but also by changes of ownership-we should accept it as a natural quality of the external world，of which we might not even be aware and which would leave objects without any emphasis beyond their factual qualities.This emphasis arises from the fact that objects have to be paid for by the patience of waiting，the effort of searching，the exertion of labor，the renunciation of other things in demand.Without a price-in the most general meaning of the word-there is no value.A belief of some South Sea Islanders expresses this feeling in a naive way：the cure prescribed by a doctor will not take effect unless he is paid.The fact that one of two objects is more valuable than the other is represented only by the fact that a person is willing to exchange one for the other but not vice-versa.Where practical relationships are still simple and limited in scale，a higher or lower value can only be the consequence or expression of the direct practical will to exchange.And when we say that we have exchanged things because they are of equal value，that is only an example of a frequent conceptual-linguistic reversal，as in the case where we believe that we love somebody because he has certain qualities，whereas we have granted him these qualities because we love him；or where we derive moral imperatives from religious dogmas，whereas we actually believe in the dogmas because the moral imperatives vitally concern us.

In conceptual terms，price coincides with the economically objective value；without price it would be impossible to draw the dividing line between objective value and the subjective enjoyment of goods.From the standpoint of the contracting subjects，the statement that exchange presupposes equality of values is not correct.A and B may exchange their possessions a and p because they are of equal value.But A would not have any reason to give away a if he received only an equal value by acquiring p.（3 must be a greater value for him than a which he owned before；similarly B must gain more than he loses by the exchange.If，therefore，p is more valuable than a for A and p is more valuable than p for B，the differences objectively balance each other as far as an observer is concerned.But this equality of values does not exist for the contracting party who receives more than he gives away.If，nevertheless，he is convinced that he has made a fair deal and has exchanged equal values，this should be stated，in respect of A，as follows：objectively，he has given an equivalent to B，the price（α）for the object（β），but subjectively the value of p is greater for him than the value of a.But the sense of value that A attaches to β is a unit，and the dividing line between the objective value and the subjective surplus is no longer perceptible.Only the fact that the object is exchanged，that it is a price and costs a price，draws this line and determines the quantum of subjective value with which the object enters the process of exchange as an objective value.

Another observation also demonstrates that exchange is in no way conditioned by a preceding representation of the objective equality of values.If one watches how children，impulsive individuals and apparently also primitive peoples，carry out exchange，it is apparent that they will give away any treasured property for an object that they strongly desire to own at a given moment，regardless of whether the price is much too high in the general estimation or even for themselves when they have had an opportunity to think the matter over calmly.This contradicts the notion that every exchange must he consciously advantageous to the subject.This is not the case，because the whole action lies subjectively beyond the question of equality or inequality of the objects exchanged. The idea that a balancing of sacrifice and gain precedes the exchange and must have resulted in an equilibrium between them is one of those rationalistic platitudes that are entirely unpsychological.This would require an objectivity towards one's own desires of which the people I have just discussed are incapable.The uneducated or prejudiced person cannot detach himself sufficiently from his momentary interests to make a comparison；at the particular moment he just wants that one object，and the sacrifice of the other object does not strike him as a reduction of the desired gratification，i.e.as a price.In view of the thoughtlessness with which naive，inexperienced and impulsive people appropriate the desired object‘at any price’，it seems much more probable that the idea of equality is a product of the experience of many exchanges carried out without any proper balancing of gain and loss.The exclusive desire obsessing the mind has first to be pacified by successful acquisition of the object before a comparison with other objects is possible.The tremendous difference in emphasis between momentary interests and all other ideas and valuations which prevails in the untrained and unbridled mind allows exchange to take place before any judgment of value，i.e.of the relation between various desired objects，has been made.When value concepts are highly developed and a reasonable self-control prevails，a judgment as to the equality of values may precede exchange，but this should not be allowed to obscure the probability that the rational relation一as is so often the case-has evolved from a psychologically opposite relation，and that the exchange of possessions originating from purely subjective impulses has only later taught us the relative value of things.（In the realm of the mind too πpöξ is at first φ .）

Value And Price

Value is，so to speak，the epigone of price， and the statement that they must be identical is a tautology.I base this view upon the earlier statement that in any individual ease no contracting party pays a price that seems to be too high under the given circumstances.Ifas in the poem by Chamisso-the robber forces someone at pistol point to sell his watch and rings for three pennies，what he receives under these conditions is worth the price，since it is the only way to save his life.Nobody would work for starvation wages if he were not in a situation in which he preferred such wages to not working at all.The apparent paradox of the assertion that value and price are equivalent in every individual case results from the fact that certain ideas concerning other equivalents of value and price are introduced into it.The relative stability of the conditions that determine the majority of exchanges，and also the analogies that fix the value relationship according to traditional norms，contribute to the notion that the value of a particular object requires as its exchange equivalent another specific object；that these two objects（or categories of objects）have equalvalue，and that，if abnormal circumstances allow us to exchange an object at a lower or higher value，then value and price would diverge，even though they always coincide in relation to the specific circumstances.One should not forget that the objective and just equivalence of value and price，which we regard as the norm for actual particular cases，is valid only under specific historical arid technical conditions and collapses immediately with a change in these conditions.There is no general distinction but only a numerical difference between the norm and the individual cases which are recognized as deviating from or conforming with the norm.One might say of an extraordinarily superior or inferior individual that he is really not a human being，but this concept of a human being is no more than an average which would lose its normative status as soon as a majority of people rose or fell to the level of one of these exceptional types，which would then be accepted as the truly‘human’.In order to realize this fact，however，we have to free ourselves from deeply rooted and practically justified notions of value.Under advanced conditions，these notions encompass two superimposed layers：one of which is formed by social traditions，by habitual experiences，by apparently logical necessities，the other by individual situations，by momentary needs，and by the force of circumstances.The rapid changes within this latter sphere conceal from our perception the slow evolution of the former sphere and its formation by the sublimation of the latter.The second sphere then appears to be empirically valid as the expression of an objective proportion.The discrepancy between value and price is cited whenever the values of sacrifice and gain exchanged in given circumstances are at least equal-for otherwise nobody who compares at all would make the exchange-but are discrepant when measured in more general terms.This is most obvious under two conditions，which are usually found together：first，that a single valuecharacteristic is accepted as the economic value and that two objects are acknowledged as equal values only to the extent that they represent the same amount of that value；and second，that a definite proportion between two values is seen as proper，in moral as well as in objective terms.The idea，for instance，that the essential feature of value is the socially necessary labour time objectified in it has been used in both these senses to provide a measure of the deviation of value from price.But the concept of this uniform standard of value does not answer the question of how labour power itself became a value.This could not have happened unless the activity of labour in producing all kinds of goods had given rise to the possibility of exchange，and the exertion of labour had been experienced as a sacrifice offered in return for its products.Labour power，too，enters the category of value only through the possibility and reality of exchange，regardless of the fact that subsequently it may provide a standard for measuring other values within this category.Even if labour power is the content of every value，it receives its form as value only by entering into a relation of sacrifice and gain or price and value（here in the narrower sense）. According to this theory，if.price and value diverge，one contracting party exchanges a quantity of objectified labour power against a smaller quantity；but this exchange is affected by other circumstances which do not involve labour power，such as the need to satisfy urgent wants，whims，fraud，monopoly，etc.

In a broader and subjective sense，the equivalence of the values exchanged is maintained here，whereas the uniform norm of labour power，which makes possible the discrepancy，does not originate in exchange.

The qualitative distinctness of objects，which means，subjectively，that they are in demand，cannot claim to bring about an absolute value quantity；it is always the interrelation of demands，realized in exchange，that gives economic value to objects.This relativity is more clearly illustrated by the other constitutive element of value-relative scarcity.Exchange is only the inter-individual attempt to improve the conditions that result from the scarcity of goods；that is，the attempt to reduce subjective needs by changes in the distribution of the given supply.This already indicates a general correlation between what is called scarcity value（which has been legitimately criticized）and what is called exchange value.But here it is mote important to see the opposite relationship.I have already emphasized that the scarcity of goods would hardly bring about valuation unless it were alterable by human effort.This is possible only in two ways；either by the application of labour power，which increases the supply of goods，or by the offer of goods already possessed，which would eliminate the scarcity of the object in demand.It may be stated，therefore，that the scarcity of goods conditions exchange objectively in relation to the demand for those goods，and that only exchange makes scarcity an element in value.It is a mistake in many theories of value that，on the basis of utility and scarcity，they conceive economic value-the exchange transactions-as something obvious，as the conceptually necessary consequence of these premises.This is not at all correct.If these premises resulted in ascetic renunciation or in fighting and robbery-as，in fact，is often the case-no economic value or economic life would develop.

Ethnology reveals the astounding arbitrariness，instability and inadequacy of value concepts in primitive culture as soon as anything other than the most urgent present needs is in question.There is no doubt that this comes about as a consequence of，or at least in association with，the primitive man's distaste for exchange.Various reasons have been advanced for this：that he is always afraid of being cheated in exchange，in the absence of any objective and general standard of value；or that he may surrender a part of his personality and give evil powers dominion over him，because the product of labour is always created by and for himself.Perhaps the primitive man's distaste for work originates from the same source.Here，too，a reliable standard for exchange between effort and result is lacking；he is afraid that he will be cheated by nature，the objectivity of which confronts him as an unpredictable and frightening fact until such time as he can establish his own activity as objective，in a regular and verified exchange with nature.Being submerged in the subjectivity of his relationship to the object，exchange-with nature or with other individuals-which coincides with the objectification of things and their value，appears inopportune to him.It is as though the first awareness of the object as such produced a feeling of anxiety，as if a part of the self had become detached.This also explains the mythological and fetishistic interpretation of the object，an interpretation that，on the one hand，hypostatizes this anxiety and makes it comprehensible to primitive man，and on the other hand assuages it by humanizing the object and thus reconciling it with man's subjectivity.This situation explains a series of other phenomena.First，the general acceptance and approval of robbery，as the subjective and normatively unregulated seizure of what is immediately desired.Long after the time of Homer，piracy continued to be regarded，in the backward agricultural areas of Greece，as legitimate business，and some primitive people consider violent robbery more noble than honest payment.This is also understandable；for in exchanging and paying one is subordinated to an objective norm，and the strong and autonomous personality has to efface himself，which is disagreeable.This also accounts for the disdain of trade by self-willed aristocratic individuals.On the other hand，exchange favors peaceful relations between men because they then accept a supra-personal and normative regulation.

There are，as one might expect，a number of intermediate phenomena between pure subjectivity in the change of ownership，exemplified by robbery or gifts，and objectivity in the form of exchange where things are exchanged according to the equal value they contain.This is exemplified by the traditional reciprocity in making gifts.The idea exists among many people that a gift should be accepted only if it can be reciprocated，that is，so to speak，subsequently acquired.This leads on directly to regular exchange when，as often occurs in the Orient，the seller gives the object to the buyer as a‘present’，but woe to him if he does not make a corresponding present in exchange.Work given freely in case of urgent need，the co-operation of neighbours or friends without payment，such as is found everywhere in the world，also has its place here.But usually these workers are lavishly entertained and，whenever possible，given a feast；and it is reported of the Serbs，for instance，that only well-to-do people could afford to call upon such voluntary workers.It is true that even now in the Orient，and even in Italy，the concept of a fair price which imposes limits to the subjective advantages of either buyer or seller does not exist.Everyone sells as dearly and buys as cheaply as he can；exchange is simply a subjective action between two persons，the result of which depends only upon the shrewdness，the eagerness and the persistence of the two parties，not upon the object and its supraindividually determined relation to the price.A Roman antique dealer explained to me once that a deal is successfully transacted when the seller who is asking too much and the buyer who is offering too little eventually meet each other at a point acceptable to both.Here one sees clearly how an objectively appropriate price emerges from the bargaining between subjects，the whole process being a vestige of pre-exchange conditions in a predominantly，but not yet completely，exchange economy.Exchange already exists as an objective action between values，hut its execution is still subjective and its mode and quantities depend exclusively upon a relation between personal qualities.Here，probably，we find the ultimate reason for the sacred forms，the legal regulation and the protection by publicity and tradition which accompanied mercantile transactions in early cultures.It was a way of transcending subjectivity to meet the demands of exchange，which could not yet be established by real relations between the objects.So long as exchange，and the idea of value-equality between things，were quite novel，it was impossible to reach an agreement when two individuals had to make the decision themselves.Consequently，we find well into the Middle Ages not only public exchange transactions，but more specifically a precise regulation of the rates of exchange of customary goods which none of the contractors could disregard.It is true that this objectivity is mechanical and external，based upon reasons and forces that lie outside the particular exchange transaction.A really adequate objectivity discards such a priori determination，and includes in the calculation of exchange all those particular circumstances that，in this case，are disregarded.But the intention and the principle are the same：the supra-subjective determination of value in exchange，which is later established by more objective and immanent means.The exchange carried on by free and independent individuals presupposes a judgment by objective standards，but in an earlier historical stage exchange had to be fixed and guaranteed by society，because otherwise the individual would lack any clue as to the value of the objects.Similar reasons may have been influential in the social regulation of primitive labour，which demonstrates the equality between exchange and labour or，more accurately，the subordination of labour to exchange.The multiple relations between what is objectively valid-both practically and theoretically-and its social significance and acceptance often appear historically in the following manner.Social interaction，diffusion and standardization provide the individual with the dignity and reliability of a style of life which is later confirmed as being objectively just.Thus，the child does not accept an explanation on the basis of inner reasons，but because he trusts the person who explains the situation；he believes not in something but in somebody.In matters of taste we depend upon fashion，that is upon a socially accepted way of doing and appreciating things，until such time，late enough，as we learn to judge the object itself aesthetically.Thus the need for the individual to transcend the self and so gain a more than personal support and stability becomes the power of tradition in law，in knowledge and in morality.This indispensable standardization，which transcends the individual subject but not yet subjects in general，is slowly replaced by a standardization that evolves from the knowledge of reality and from the acceptance of ideal norms.That which is outside ourselves，which we need for our orientation，takes the more easily acceptable form of social universality before we are confronted with it as the objective certainty of reality and of ideas.In this sense，which applies to cultural development as a whole，exchange is originally determined by society，until such time as individuals know the object and their own valuations well enough to decide upon rates of exchange from case to case.This suggests that the socially and legally established prices that control transactions in all primitive cultures are themselves only the outcome of many single-exchange transactions which previously occurred in an unregulated way between individuals.But this objection has no greater validity in this case than in the case of language，mores，law，religion；in short，all the basic forms of life that emerge and dominate within the group，and that for a long time appeared to be explicable only as the invention of individuals.In fact it is certain that，from the outset，they evolved as inter-individual structures，in the interaction between the individual and the multitude，so that their origin cannot be attributed to any single individual.I consider it quite possible that the precursor of socially regulated exchange was not individual exchange but a change in ownership，which was not exchange at all but was，for instance，robbery.In that case inter-individual exchange would have been simply a peace treaty and both exchange and regulated exchange would have originated together.An analogous case would be that of the capture of women by force preceding the exogamic peace treaty with neighbors which regulates the purchase and exchange of women.This newly introduced form of marriage is immediately established in a form that constrains the individual.It is quite unnecessary that particular free contracts of the same kind should precede it；on the contrary，social regulation emerges together with the type.It is a prejudice to assume that every socially regulated relationship has developed historically out of a similar form which is individually and not socially regulated.What preceded it may have been a similar content in a totally different form of relationship.Exchange transcends the subjective forms of appropriation such as robbery and gifts-just as presents to the chief and the fines that he imposes are the first steps towards taxation-and so exchange is socially regulated in the first possible form of supra-subjectivity which then leads to real objectivity.Social standardization is the first step towards that objectivity in the free exchange of property between individuals which is the essence of exchange.

It follows from all this that exchange is a sociological phenomenon sui generis ，an original form and function of social life.It is in no way a logical consequence of those qualitative and quantitative aspects of things that are called utility and scarcity which acquire their significance for the process of valuation only when exchange is presupposed.If exchange，that is the willingness to sacrifice one thing in order to acquire another，is precluded，then no degree of scarcity of the desired object can produce an economic value.The significance of the object for the individual is always determined by the desire for it，and its utility depends upon the qualities that it has；if we already possess the object，then its significance is not affected at all by whether there exist many or few or no other specimens of its kind.（I leave aside here those cases in which scarcity itself becomes a quality of the object，thus making it desirable，as for example postage stamps，curios and antiques which have no aesthetic or historical value.）The sense of difference that is necessary for enjoyment may，of course，depend upon the scarcity of the object，that is upon the fact that it cannot be enjoyed everywhere and at any time.However，this inner psychological condition of enjoyment does not have any practical effects since，if it had，it would result in the perpetuation or increase of scarcity，which，as experience shows，does not occur.What concerns us here，aside from the direct enjoyment of the quality of objects，is the means by which it is accomplished.If the process is long and complicated，requiring sacrifices in the shape of deferment，disappointment，work，inconvenience and renunciations，we call the object‘scarce’.One might formulate it in this way：objects are not hard to get because they are scarce，rather they are scarce because they are hard to get.The inflexible external fact that the supply of some goods is too small to satisfy the desires of all of us is by itself insignificant.There are many things that are actually scarce，which are not scarce in the economic sense.Whether they are scarce in the latter sense is determined by the degree of strength，patience and sacrifice that is necessary to acquire them by exchange-and such sacrifice presupposes a demand for the object.The difficulty of acquisition，the sacrifice offered in exchange，is the unique constitutive element of value，of which scarcity is only the external manifestation，its objectification in the form of quantity.It is often overlooked that scarcity is only a negative condition，which characterizes being through non-being.Nonbeing，however，cannot have any effect；every positive result must be initiated by a positive quality and force，of which the negative is only the shadow.These positive forces are obviously those that are involved in exchange.Their positive character should be regarded as being dissociated from the fact that it is not attached to the individual.The relativity of things has the singular characteristic of going beyond individual cases，and subsisting only in multiplicity，yet being something other than a mere conceptual generalization and abstraction.

The profound relationship between relativity and socialization，which is a direct demonstration of relativity for which mankind presents the material，is illustrated here：society is a structure that transcends the individual，but that is not abstract.Historical life thus escapes the alternative of taking place either in individuals or in abstract generalities.Society is the universal which，at the same time，is concretely alive.From this arises the unique significance that exchange，as the economic-historical realization of the relativity of things，has for society；exchange raises the specific object and its significance for the individual above its singularity，not into the sphere of abstraction，but into that of lively interaction which is the substance of economic value.No matter how closely the inner nature of an object is investigated，it will not reveal economic value which resides exclusively in the reciprocal relationship arising between several objects on the basis of their nature.Each of these relations conditions the other and reciprocates the significance which it receives from the other.

Ⅲ

Before developing the concept of money as the incarnation and purest expression of the concept of economic value，it is necessary to show the latter as part of a theoretical world view，in terms of which the philosophical significance of money can be understood.Only if the formula of economic value corresponds to a world formula can its highest stage of realizationbeyond its direct appearance or rather through this very appearance-claim to contribute to the interpretation of existence.

Economic Value And A Relativistic World View

We usually systematize our disorderly，fragmentary and confused first perceptions of an object by distinguishing a stable and essential substance from the flux of movements，colors and accidents that leave the essence unchanged.This articulation of the world as a stable core within fleeting appearances，and the accidental manifestations of enduring bearers of such appearances，grows into a contrast between the absolute and the relative.Just as we think that we can find within ourselves a being whose existence and character is centered in ourselves，a final authority which is independent of the outside world；and just as we distinguish this being from the existence and character of our thoughts，experiences and development which are real and confirmable only through relations with others-so we seek in the world substances，entities and forces whose being and significance rest exclusively within them.We distinguish them from all relative existences and occurrences-from all those that are what they are only through comparison，contact or the reactions of others.Our physicalpsychological inclination and our relationship to the world determines the direction in which this opposition develops.Even though motion and quiescence，external activity and inner contemplation may be interconnected so that they gain importance and significance only through each other，we nevertheless consider one of this pair of opposites-quiescence，substance，the inner stability of our life's contentas the essentially valuable and definitive in contrast with what is changing，restless，external.Consequently，the goal of our thoughts is to find what is steadfast and reliable behind ephemeral appearances and the flux of events；and to advance from mutual dependence to self-sufficiency and independence.In this way we attain the fixed points that can guide us through the maze of phenomena，and that represent the counterpart of what we conceive in ourselves as valuable and definitive.To begin with an obvious example of this tendency：light is regarded as a fine substance emanating from bodies，heat as a substance，physical life as the activity of material living spirits，psychological processes as being supported by a specific substance of the soul.The mythologies that posit a thundered behind the thunder，a solid substructure below the earth to keep it from falling or spirits in the stars to conduct them in their celestial course-all these are searching for a substance，not only as the embodiment of the perceived qualities and motions，but as the initial active force.An absolute is sought beyond the mere relationships between objects，beyond their accidental and temporal existence.Early modes of thought are unable to reconcile themselves to change，to the coming and going of all terrestrial forms of physical and mental life.Every kind of living creature represents to them a unique act of creation；institutions，forms of living，valuations have existed eternally and absolutely as they exist today；the phenomena of the world have validity not only for man and his organized life，but are in themselves as we perceive them.In short，the first tendency of thought，by which we seek to direct the disorderly flow of impressions into a regular channel and to discover a fixed structure amidst their fluctuations，is focused upon the substance and the absolute，in contrast with which all particular happenings and relations are relegated to a preliminary stage which the understanding has to transcend.

The Epistemology Of A Relativistic World View

The examples given indicate that this trend has been reversed.Whereas almost all cultures originally took such an approach，the basic tendency of modem science is no longer to comprehend phenomena through or as specific substances，but as motions，the bearers of which are increasingly divested of any specific qualities；and it expresses the qualities of things in quantitative，i.e.relative，terms.Science posits，instead of the absolute stability of organic，psychic，ethical and social forms，a ceaseless development in which each element has a restricted place determined by the relationship to its own past and future.It has abandoned the search for the essence of things and is reconciled to stating the relationships that exist between objects and the human mind from the viewpoint of the human mind.That the apparent stability of the earth is not only a complicated movement，but that its position in the universe is established by a mutual relationship to other masses of matter，is a very simple but striking case of the transition from the stability and absoluteness of the world's contents to their dissolution into motions and relations.

But all this，even if carried to its conclusion，would still allow，or even require，a fixed point，an absolute truth.Cognition itself，which accomplishes that dissolution，seems to elude the flux of eternal change and the merely relative determination of its content.The dissolution of the absolute objectivity of what is cognized into modes of apprehension that are valid only for the human mind，presupposes an ultimate point somewhere that cannot be derived from anything else.The flux and the relativity of psychic processes cannot affect those presuppositions and norms according to which we decide whether our cognitions have this or that character.The merely psychological derivation，to which all absolutely objective knowledge is supposed to be reduced，depends nevertheless upon certain axioms which cannot have a merely psychological significance if we are to avoid moving in a vicious circle.This is not only a point of the greatest importance for the general view of things on which the following discussion is based，but also provides a model for many particular aspects，and it deserves closer scrutiny.

There is no doubt that the truth of any statement can be known only on the basis of criteria that are completely certain and general.Such criteria may be limited to specific areas and may be legitimated by higher-level criteria，in such fashion that a hierarchical series of cognitions is constructed，the validity of each one depending upon the preceding one.However，if this series is not to be suspended in the air-and indeed，for it to be possible at all-it must have somewhere an ultimate basis，a supreme authority，which provides legitimation to other members of the series without needing legitimating itself.This is the scheme into which our empirical knowledge has to be integrated，and which relates all limited and relative knowledge to knowledge that is no longer conditional.Yet we shall never know what this absolute knowledge is.Its real content can never be established with the same certainty as can its general，so to say，formal existence，because the process of incorporation within a higher-level principle，the attempt to find an antecedent for what appeared to be the ultimate principle，is endless.No matter what proposition we have discovered as the ultimate one，standing above the relativity of all other propositions，it remains possible that we shall recognize this one too as being merely relative and conditioned by a superior one.This possibility is a positive challenge，which the history of thought has illustrated many times.Somewhere knowledge may have an absolute basis，but we can never state irrevocably where this basis is；consequently，in order to avoid dogmatic thought，we have to treat each position at which we arrive as if it were the penultimate one.

The sum of knowledge does not thereby become tainted with scepticism.It is just as great a mistake to confuse relativism with scepticism as it was to accuse Kant of scepticism because he treated time and space as conditions of our experience.Both standpoints lend themselves to such a judgment if their opposite is accepted outright as the absolutely correct picture of reality，so that every theory that negates this then appears as a perturbation of‘reality’.If the concept of relativity is constructed in such a way that it requires an absolute，it is impossible to eliminate the absolute without self-contradiction.However，the course of our investigation will show that an absolute is not required as a conceptual counterpart to the relativity of things.Such a postulate involves a transfer from the sphere of empirical circumstances-where，indeed a‘relation’between elements which stand outside any such a relation and in that sense are‘absolute’-to a sphere that concerns the basis of all empiricism.If we admit that our knowledge may have somewhere an absolute norm，a supreme authority that is self-justifying，hut that its content remains in constant flux because knowledge progresses and every content attained suggests another which would be more profound and more appropriate for the task，this is not scepticism；any more than it is scepticism when we admit，as is generally done，that while natural phenomena are subject to universal laws，these laws have to be corrected continually as our knowledge increases，that their content is always historically conditioned，and that they lack the absolute character that the concept implies.Equally，the ultimate presuppositions of perfected knowledge cannot be regarded as merely conditioned，and only subjectively or relatively true，but every single presupposition that is available at any particular moment should and must be so regarded.

The Construction Of Proofs In Infinite Series

The fact that every conception is true only in relation to another one-even though the ideal body of knowledge，infinitely remote from us，may include an unconditioned truth-indicates a relativism in our behavior that also extends to other areas.It is possible that norms of practical activity exist for human association which，recognized by a superhuman mind；might be called the absolute and eternal right.This would have to be a causa sui in law，i.e.it would have to be self-legitimating，for if its legitimacy were derived from a superior norm the latter would be the absolute determining factor of the law as valid under any circumstances.There is，in fact，no single legal rule that could claim to be absolutely unalterable；each has only the temporary validity that changing historical circumstances allow.If the legal content is legitimate and not arbitrary，its validity derives from a previously existing legal norm which justifies the setting aside of the former legal content in the same manner as it previously upheld it.Every judicial system contains in itself forces-ideal as well as external-that make for its own alteration，extension or abolition.Thus，for example，the law that assigns legislative power to parliament not only provides the legitimate basis of law A，which abolishes law B enacted by the same parliament，but also makes it a legal act for the parliament to delegate legislative power to another body.This means，regarded from the other side，that the worth of every law depends upon its relation to another law；no law has worth by itself.Just as new and even revolutionary knowledge can be demonstrated only by means of the content，axioms and methods of previous knowledge-though an original truth，which cannot be demonstrated and the self-sufficient certainty of which we shall never be able to attain，has to be assumed-so we lack a self-subsistent right，although the conception of it hovers above the series of relative legal rules，each dependent upon legitimating by another rule.To he sure，our knowledge rests upon first principles which cannot be proved at any given time，because without these we should not arrive at the relative series of derived proofs；but they do not possess the logical dignity of being demonstrated.They are not true in the same sense as that which has been proved，and our thinking accepts them as ultimate points only until it reaches a higher stage at which that which was accepted as axiomatic can be demonstrated.Correspondingly，there are，of course，absolutely and relatively prelegal conditions，in which an empirical right is established by force or other means.This right，however，is not established legally；it is accepted as law as soon as it exists，hut its existence is not a legal fact.It lacks entirely the dignity of that which is based upon law.In fact，every power that establishes such a non-legal right strives for its legitimating or for the fiction of legitimacy，as if in homage to that absolute right，which lies beyond all relativity and is unaffected by it，but which is symbolized for us only by deducing every existing legal rule from a preceding one.

But even if this infinite regress did not still establish our knowledge as conditioned，it would be accomplished perhaps in another fashion.If the proof of a statement is traced to its foundations and these again to theirs，etc.，it becomes evident，often enough，that the proof is only possible，i.e.itself provable，if the original statement itself is assumed to be demonstrated.In any individual case，this renders the deduction illusory since it involves circular reasoning，but it is not inconceivable that our knowledge，taken as a whole，is imprisoned within this pattern.If one considers the vast number of hierarchically ordered presuppositions，stretching into infinity，upon which all particular knowledge depends，it seems actually possible that the statement A is proved by the statement B，and the statement B through the truth of C，D，E，etc.，until finally it can only be proved by the truth of A.The chain of reasoning C，D，E needs only to be sufficiently long so that the return to the starting point cannot be imagined，just as the size of the earth conceals its global form and gives us the illusion of being able to advance straight into the infinite.The interrelationship that we assume in our knowledge of the worldthat from every point we can attain by demonstration every other pointseems to make this plausible.If we do not want to remain dogmatically once and for all with a single truth that needs no proof，it is easy to assume that this reciprocity of proofs is the basic form of knowledge，conceived in its perfect state.Cognition is thus a freefloating process，whose elements determine their position reciprocally，in the same way as masses of matter do by means of weight.Truth is then a relative concept like weight.It is then perfectly acceptable that our image of the world‘floats in the air’，since the world itself does so.This is not an accidental coincidence of words but an allusion to a basic connection.The inherent necessity for our minds to know the truth by proofs either removes the discovery of truth to infinity，or leads it into a circle，so that one statement is true only in relation to another one；this other one，however，eventually only in relation to the first.The totality of our knowledge would then be as little‘true’as would the totality of matter be‘heavy’.The qualities that could be asserted validly about the interrelationship of the parts would lead to contradictions if asserted about the whole.

This reciprocity，in which the inner elements of cognition authenticate the meaning of truth for each other，appears to be upheld by another form of relativity，that between the theoretical and the practical interests of our life.We are convinced that all representations of what exists are functions of a specific physical and psychological organization which do not mirror the outside world in any mechanical way.The images of the world of an insect with its mosaic eyes，of an eagle with its almost inconceivably keen sight，of an olm with its buried，functionless eyes，of ourselves and of innumerable other species，must be profoundly different from each other；and we must conclude that none of them reproduces the content of the external world in its inherent objectivity.Nevertheless these representations，which have been characterized at least negatively，form the presuppositions，the material and the directives for our practical activity，through which we establish a relationship with the world as it exists in relative independence of our subjectively determined representation.We expect certain reactions to our actions，and these usually occur in an appropriate way，i.e.one that is useful to us.The same is true of nature's reaction to animal behavior，which is determined by totally different pictures of the very same world.It seems to me to be a very striking fact that actions carried out on the basis of representations that are not at all identical with objective being nevertheless secure results of a reliability，expediency and accuracy that could hardly be greater if we knew the objective conditions as they are in themselves，whereas other activities based on‘false’representations tend to injure us.We can also see that animals too are subject to deceptions and to corrigible misconceptions.What，then，does‘truth’mean，when it is totally different for animals and for ourselves，does not correspond with objective reality and yet leads to the expected consequences with as much certainty as if it did so correspond？This seems to me explicable only by the following assumption.The difference in organization requires that each species，in order to survive and to attain its essential aims in life，must behave in a way that is distinctive and different from that of other species.Whether an action guided by a representation will have useful consequences cannot be determined by the content of this representation，even though it might correspond with absolute objectivity.The result will depend entirely upon what this representation can accomplish as a real process within the organism，allied with other physical and psychological forces and with reference to the specific needs of life.If we assert that man sustains and supports life only on the basis of true representations，and destroys it by false ones，what does this‘truth’-the content of which is different for each species and which never reflects the true object-mean except that some representation associated with a particular organization and its powers and needs leads to useful results？Initially，truth is not useful because it is true，but vice-versa.We dignify with the name of‘truth’those representations that，active within us as real forces or motions，incite us to useful behavior.Thus there are as many basically different truths as there are different organizations and conditions of life.The sense perception that is true for the insect would obviously not be true for the eagle；this is because this perception，on the basis of which the insect acts properly in relation to inner and outer constellations，would move the eagle，in relation to his conditions，to unreasonable and destructive action.These perceptions do not lack normative stability；indeed，every perceiving being possesses a generally established‘truth’，which his representation may grasp or miss.The law of gravitation remains‘true’whether or not we recognize it，in spite of the fact that it would not be true for beings with a different conception of space，different categories of thought and a different system of numbers.The content that is‘true’for us has the peculiar structure of being totally dependent on our mode of existence-since this is not shared by other beings-but its truth-value is completely independent of its physical realization.On one side a being with its constitution and its needs，on the other side an objective existence is given；thus it is ideally established what is the truth for this being.Since truth for this being means the most favorable representations，a selection takes place among its psychological processes：those that are useful become fixed by the ordinary methods of selection and constitute as a whole the‘true’world of representations.In fact，we do not have any other definitive criterion for the truth of a representation except that the actions based upon it lead to the desired consequences.Once these modes of representation have been finally established as expedient through selection and cultivation，they form among themselves a realm of theory that determines，according to inner criteria，the inclusion or exclusion of every new representation；just as the rules of geometry are built upon each other according to a strict inner autonomy，whereas the axioms and the methodological norms that make this whole structure possible cannot themselves be proved geometrically.The whole system of geometry is not valid at all in the same sense as are its single propositions.The latter can be proved by each other，whereas the whole is valid only in relation to something external，such as the nature of space，our mode of perception and the strength of our ways of thinking.Individual judgments may support each other，since the norms and facts already established substantiate others，but the totality of these norms and facts has validity only in relation to specific physio-psychological organizations，their conditions of life and the furthering of their activity.

The Objectivity Of truth As Well As Of Value Viewed As A Relation Between Subjective Elements

The concept of truth as a relation of representations to each other，and not as an absolute quality of any one of them，is also confirmed in respect of a particular object.Kant asserts that to recognize an object means to bring unity into the multiplicity of perceptions.Out of the chaotic material of our images of the world and the continuous flux of impressions，we distinguish some as belonging together and group them in units，which we then designate as‘objects’.An object has been perceived as soon as we have grouped into an entity the multitude of impressions that belong together.What else can this entity signify but the functional interdependence of those single impressions and materials of perception？The unity of these elements is nothing extraneous to the elements themselves；it is the persistent form of their relationship that they represent.When I recognize the object‘sugar’by forming the impressions that pass through my consciousness-white，hard，sweet，crystalline-into a unity，this means that I conceive these contents of perception as bound together；that under the given conditions a connection or mutual interaction exists，that one quality exists at this point and in this relation because the other exists，and so on reciprocally.In the same way as the unity of the social organism，or the social organism as a unit，signifies only the forces of attraction and cohesion among its individual members，so the unity of the single object，the perception of which is its intellectual realization，is only an interaction between the elements that enter into the perception of it.In what is called the‘truth’of a work of art，the mutual relationship of its elements as against its relationship to the object that it depicts is also probably much more significant than is usually acknowledged.If we disregard the portrait，where the problem is more complicated owing to the purely individual theme，single elements in works of fine art or of literature will not convey an impression of either truth or falsehood；in isolation they stand outside these categories.Or looking at the matter from the other side：the artist is free as regards initial elements from which the work of art emerges；only after he has chosen a character，a style，an element of colour and form，an atmosphere，do the other parts become predetermined.They have now to meet the expectations aroused by the first step，which may be fantastic，arbitrary and unreal.So long as the elaboration is harmonious and consistent，the whole will produce an impression of‘inner truth’，whether or not an individual part corresponds to outward reality and satisfies the claim to‘truth’in the ordinary and substantial sense.Truth in a work of art means that as a whole it keeps the promise which one part has，as it were，voluntarily offered us.It may be any one part，since the mutual correspondence of the parts gives the quality of truth to each of them.Truth is therefore also a relative concept in the particular context of art.It is realized as a relationship between the elements of a work of art，and not as an exact correspondence between the elements and an external object which constitutes the absolute norm.If the apprehension of an object means to apprehend it as a‘unity’，it also means to apprehend it in its‘necessity’. There is a profound relationship between these two things.Necessity is a relation through which the heterogeneity of two elements becomes a unity.The formula of necessity is：if A exists，so does B.This necessary relation states that A and B are the elements of a particular unit of being or occurrence，and‘necessary relation'signifies a completely coherent relation，which is only decomposed and reconstituted by language.The unity of a work of art is obviously exactly the same as this necessity since it develops by the mutual conditioning of the different elements，one of which follows necessarily if another is given，and viceversa.Necessity is a phenomenon of relations not only with reference to interrelated things，but in itself and according to its concept.Neither of the two most general categories that are the basis of our knowledge of the world，being and laws，contains necessity.The existence of real life is not necessary in terms of any law；it would not contradict any logical or natural law if nothing existed.It is also not‘necessary’that natural laws exist；they are mere facts，just as being is a mere fact，and only so far as they exist are the events subjected to them‘necessary’.There can be no natural law that natural laws must exist.What we call necessity exists only as a relation between being and laws；it is the form of their relation.Both are realities that are strictly independent of each other；for being is conceivable without being subject to laws，and the system of laws would be just as valid even if there were no corresponding being.Only if both exist do the forms of being become subject to necessity；being and laws are the elements of unity which we cannot apprehend directly but only through the relation of necessity.This unity binds together being and laws；it is inherent in neither one separately，but rules exist only because laws exist，and give meaning and significance to the laws only because being exists.

From another aspect bearing upon the same question，relativism with reference to the principles of perception may be formulated in the following way：the constitutive principles that claim to express，once and for all，the essence of objects are transposed into regulative principles which are only points of view in the progress of knowledge.The final，highest abstractions，simplifications and syntheses of thought have to renounce the dogmatic claim to be the ultimate judgments in the realm of knowledge.The assertion that things behave in a determinate way has to be replaced，in the context of the most developed and general views，by the notion that our understanding must proceed as if things behave in such and such a way.This makes it possible to express adequately the manner and method of our understanding in its real relation to the world.There corresponds with and originates in the many-sidedness of our being and the onesidedness of any conceptual expression regarding our relation to things the fact that no such expression is universally and permanently satisfactory，but is usually complemented historically by an opposite assertion.This produces，in many instances，an undetermined wavering，a contradictory mixture，or a disinclination to adopt any comprehensive principles.If the constitutive assertions that aim to establish the essence of things are changed into heuristic assertions that seek only to determine our methods of attaining knowledge by formulating ideal ends，this makes possible the simultaneous validity of opposing principles.If their significance is only methodological，they may he used alternatively without contradiction；there is no contradiction in changing from the inductive to the deductive method.The true unity of apprehension is secured only by such a dissolution of dogmatic rigidity into the living and moving process.Its ultimate principles become realized not in the form of mutual exclusion，but in the form of mutual dependence，mutual evocation and mutual complementation.Thus，for example，the development of the metaphysical world view moves between the unity and the multiplicity of the absolute reality in which all particular perceptions are based.The nature of our thinking is such that we strive for each of them as a definite conclusion without being able to settle upon either.Only when all the differences and variety of things are reconciled in a single aggregate is the intellectual and emotional striving for unity satisfied.However，as soon as this unity is attained，as in the concept of substance by Spinoza，it becomes clear that there is nothing one can do with it in understanding the world，and that a second principle at least is necessary in order to make it fruitful.Monism leads on to dualism or to pluralism，but they again create a desire for unity；and so the development of philosophy，and of individual thinking，moves from multiplicity to unity and from unity to multiplicity.The history of thought shows that it is vain to consider any one of these viewpoints as definitive.The structure of our reason in relation to the object demands equal validity for both principles，and attains it by formulating the monistic principle of seeking to bring unity out of multiplicity so far as possible-i.e.as if we ought to end with absolute monism-and by formulating the pluralistic principle of not resting content with any unity，but always searching for yet simpler elements and creative forces，i.e.as if the final result should be pluralism.The same is the case if one explores pluralism in its qualitative significance：the individual differentiation of things and destinies，their separation according to quality and value.Our innermost vital consciousness oscillates between this separateness and the solidarity among the elements of our existence.Sometimes life only seems bearable by enjoying happiness and bliss in complete separation from suffering and depression，and by keeping these rare moments free from any remembrance of less exalted and contradictory experiences.Then again it seems more admirable，and indeed the very challenge of life，to experience joy and sorrow，strength and weakness，virtue and sin as a living unity，each one being a condition of the other，each sacred and consecrating the other.We may seldom be aware of the general principle in these opposing tendencies，but they determine our attitude towards life in our endeavors，our aims and our fragmentary activities.Even when a person's character seems to be completely oriented in one of these directions，it is constantly thwarted by the other tendency，as diversion，background and temptation.People are not divided into categories by the contrast between differentiation and unification of their life experiences.This contrast exists in every individual，although his innerpersonal form evolves in interaction with his social form，which moves between individualization and socialization.The essential point is not that these two trends constitute life，but that they are interdependent in a heuristic form.It seems as if our life employs or consists of a unified basic function which we are unable to grasp in its unity.We have to dissect it by analysis and synthesis，which constitutes the most general form of that contradistinction，and whose co-operation then restores the unity of life.But the singular entity in its separateness makes an absolute claim on us and the unity that comprehends everything singular makes the same demand，so that a contradiction emerges from which life often suffers.This contradiction becomes a logical contradiction since both elements presuppose each other in their existence：neither would have any objective meaning or intellectual interest if the other did not stand in opposition to it.Thus the peculiar difficulty arises-as with many other contrasted pairs-that something unconditioned is conditioned by another unconditioned item which in turn depends on the former.The fact that what we perceive as absolute is nevertheless relative can only be resolved by admitting that the absolute signifies a road stretching to infinity whose direction is still marked out no matter how great the distance we cover.The movement in each segment，so long as it continues，takes a course that appears to lead to a terminal point；this sense of direction remains unchanged even if at some point the movement assumes another direction which is subject to the same norm.

All general and particular systems of knowledge meet in this form of the mutual interdependence of thought processes.If one attempts to understand the political，social，religious or any other cultural aspects of the present time，this can be achieved only through history，i.e.by knowing and understanding the past.But this past，which comes down to us only in fragments，through silent witnesses and more or less unreliable reports and traditions，can come to life and be interpreted only through the experiences of the immediate present.No matter how many transformations and quantitative changes are required，the present，which is the indispensable key to the past，can itself be understood only through the past；and the past，which alone can help us to understand the present，is accessible only through the perceptions and sensibilities of the present.All historical images are the result of this mutuality of interpretative elements，none of which allows the others to come to rest.Ultimate comprehension is transferred to infinity，since every point in one series refers to the other series for its understanding.Psychological knowledge is a similar case.Every human being who confronts us is only a sound-producing and gesticulating automaton for our direct experience.We can only infer that there is a mind behind this appearance，and what processes are going on in it，by analogy with our own mind，which is the only mental entity directly known to us.On the other hand，self-knowledge develops only through the knowledge of others；and the fundamental cleavage of the self into an observed and an observing part comes about only through the analogy of the relation between the self and other persons.Knowledge of ourselves has therefore to find its way through other beings，whose lives we are able to interpret，however，only from self-knowledge.Thus，the knowledge of mental phenomena is an interplay between the I and the You.Each refers to the other，in a constant interchange and exchange of elements against each other，through which truth，no less than economic value，is produced.

And finally，to take a more comprehensive view：modem idealism produces the world from the Ego.The mind creates the world-the only world that we can discuss and that is real for us-according to its receptivity and its ability to construct forms.But on the other hand，this world is also the original source of the mind.From the glowing ball of matter，which we may conceive as the condition of the earth before there was any life，a gradual development has resulted in the possibility of life；and these living beings，at first purely material and without mind，have finally，in ways still unknown，produced the mind.Considered historically，the mind with all its forms and contents is a product of the world-of the same world which is in turn a product of the mind because it is a world of representations.If these two genetic possibilities are rigidly conceptualized they result in a disturbing contradiction.This does not come about，however，if they are regarded as heuristic principles which stand in a relationship of alternation and interaction.Nothing prevents us from attempting to trace any existing state of the world to the mental conditions that have roduced it as a content of representations；just as nothing stands in The way of tracing these conditions to cosmic，historical or social facts which could give rise to a mind equipped with these powers and fornia The image of these facts，external to the mind，may again be derived from the subjective presuppositions of scientific and historical knowledge，and these again from the objective conditions of their origin，and so on ad infinitum. Of course，this knowledge is never realized in a clear-cut scheme；the two tendencies commingle in a fragmentary，interrupted and accidental way.But the principal contradiction is dissolved by an interpretation of both as heuristic principles；this transforms their opposition into an interaction and their mutual negation into an endless process of interaction.

I will introduce here two other examples-one very specific and the other very general-in which relativity，i.e.the reciprocal character of the significance of criteria of knowledge，appears in the form of succession or alternation.The substantial interdependence of concepts and basic elements in images of the world is frequently represented by such a rhythm of reciprocal alternation in time.The relationship between the historical and the scientific method in economics can be interpreted in this fashion.It is certainly true that every economic process can be understood only in the context of a specific historicalpsychological constellation.But such an insight is always based upon the presupposition of definite rule-following relationships.If we did not assume general conditions，universal drives and regular series of effects as a basis for specific cases，there would nor be any historical explanation at all；the whole would disintegrate into a chaos of atomized events.One may admit，nevertheless，that the universal regularities，which make the connection between the specific state or event and its conditions possible，depend in turn upon higher laws，so that they themselves are valid only as historical combinations；other events and forces at an earlier stage have shaped things in us and around us which now appear as universally valid and which give the causal elements of a later period their particular form.Thus，while these two methods，dogmatically stated and each claiming objective truth for itself，enter into irreconcilable conflict and mutual negation，they may assume an organic relationship in the form of alternation.Each becomes a heuristic principle，i.e.each has to be substantiated at every point of its application by an appeal to the other.The same is true for the most universal opposition in the process of cognition：between the a priori and experience.Ever since Kant we know that all experience，except for mere sense impressions，requires definite forms，inherent in the mind，by which the given is shaped into cognition.This a priori ，which is brought by us to experience，must therefore be absolutely valid for all cognition and immune to any changes or to any possibility of correction by accidental sense experience.But the certainty that there are such norms is not matched by an equal certainty as to what these norms are.Much that was once considered a priori has later been recognized as an empirical and historical construct.On the one hand，we have the task of seeking in every phenomenon，beyond the content provided by sense impressions，the permanent a priori norms by which it is formed；but on the other，the maxim applies that we should attempt to trace every single a priori （but not the a priori as such）back to its source in experience.

This mutual correspondence and dependence of methods is something totally different from the cheap compromise attained by combining methods，where the loss one side is usually much greater than the gain on the other.Here we are concerned with the possibility of giving unlimited effectiveness to each part of the contrasted pair.And though each of these methods remains to some extent，subjective，yet together，through the relativity of their application，they seem to express adequately the objective significance of things.Thus they correspond to the general principle in our investigation of value：elements，each of which is subjective in its content，can attain their present objectivity through the form of their mutual relations.As we have seen above，mere sensory perceptions，by being connected with each other，can indicate or establish the object.The personality-a structure so solid that a specific spiritual substance was made its foundation-originates，at least for empirical psychology，through reciprocal associations and apperceptions that occur among the individual conceptions.These occurrences，subjective and fleeting，produce by their interactions what exists independently in none of them；namely，the personality as an objective element of the theoretical and practical world.So objective law develops by balancing the subjective interests and forces of individuals，by determining their place and dimensions，and by attaining the objective form of equity and justice through the exchange of claims and restrictions.In this way，objective economic value also crystallized out of subjective individual demands because the form of equality and of exchange was available，and because these relationships had an impartiality transcending subjectivity which the single elements lacked.Those methods of cognition may well be subjective and heuristic；but they approach-even though by an infinite process of evoking each other-the ideal of objective truth by the fact that each finds its supplement and therewith its legitimation through the other.

Truth means the relationship between representations，which may be realized as an infinite construction，since，even if our knowledge is based upon truths that are no longer relative，we can never know whether we have reached the really final stage，or whether we are again on the road to a more general and profound conception；or it may consist in a reciprocal relation within these systems of representations and its demonstration is also reciprocal.But these two processes of thought are rented by a peculiar division of functions.It is necessary to consider our mental existence under two categories that complement each other：in terms of its content and in terms of the process that，as an event of consciousness，carries or realizes this content.The structure of these categories is extremely different.We must conceive the mental process as a continuous flux，in which there are no distinct breaks，so that one mental state passes into the next uninterruptedly，in the manner of organic growth.The contents，abstracted from this process and existing in an ideal independence，appear under a totally different aspect：as an aggregate，a graduate scheme，a system of single concepts or proposition clearly distinguished from one another.The logical connection between any two concepts reduces the distance between them but not the discontinuity，like the steps of a ladder that are sharply separated from each other but yet provide the means for a continuous movement of the body.The relation among the contents of thought is characterized by the fact that the foundations of thought，considered as a whole，seem to move in circles，because thought has to support itself‘by being suspended’and has no which supports it from outside.The contents of thought provide a background to each other so that each gets its meaning and colour from the other；they are pairs of mutually exclusive opposites and yet postulate each other for the creation of a possible world view.Every particular content becomes the ground of proof for the other through the whole chain of what is knowable.The process of thinking；however，by which this relation is psychologically accomplished，follows a direct and continuous chronological course；it continues according to its own inner meaning，although the death of the Individual brings it to an end.The two categories of our reflection are divided into these two forms，which make knowledge illusory in particular cases but possible in general.Knowledge follows a course of infinite regress，of infinite continuity；of boundlessness，which yet is limited at any particular moment-whereas the contents exhibit the other form of infinity，that of the circle，in which every point is a beginning and an end，and all the parts condition each other mutually.

The process of reciprocal verification is usually hidden from our view for the same reason that we do not notice the reciprocal character of weight.The great majority of our representations are taken for granted and the question of truth is usually applied only to a particular case.A judgment is then made in terms of the consonance or otherwise of this instance with the aggregate of those representations that are assumed to be already established.On another occasion，any representation in the whole complex may become questionable，and the one to be investigated may belong to the determinant majority.The tremendous quantitative disproportion between the number of representations that are questionable and those that are established also helps to conceal the reciprocal relation.In this way，the disproportion of weights caused us，for a long time，to notice the gravitational attraction of the earth upon the apple but not that of the apple upon the earth.Consequently，a body appeared to have weight as an independent quality，because only one side of the relationship was observed.Thus，truth may come to be regarded as a specific quality of an individual representation，because the reciprocal relation between the elements，in which the truth resides，is lost to view on account of the infinitesimal size of the single element in relation to the sum of representations，which are not，for the moment，in question.

The‘relativity of truth’，in the sense that all our knowledge is partial and corrigible，is often stated with an emphasis that is strangely disproportionate to the obviousness of this incontrovertible fact.What we understand here by this concept of the relativity of truth is evidently quite different：relativity is not a qualification of an otherwise independent notion of truth but is the essential feature of truth.Relativity is the mode in which representations become truth，just as it is the mode in which objects of demand become values.Relativity does not mean-as in common usage-a diminution of truth，from which something more might have been expected；on the contrary，it is the positive fulfillment and validation of the concept of truth.Truth is valid，not in spite of its relativity but precisely on account of it.

The great epistemological principles suffer from the difficulty they have-since they also are a form of knowledge-in subjecting their own content to the judgment that they pronounce upon knowledge in general.Thus either they are empty or they negate themselves.Dogmatism may base the certainty of knowledge upon some criterion as upon a rock-but what supports the rock？It must be assumed that certain knowledge is possible if the possibility of certain knowledge is to be derived from that criterion.The assertion of the certainty of knowledge presupposes the certainty of knowledge.Similarly，scepticism may assert as uncontrovertible the uncertainty and unreliability of all knowledge or may even assert the impossibility of any truth-the inner contradiction in the concept of truth；but it must then subject scepticism itself to the findings of this thinking about thought.Here，indeed，is a vicious circle：if all knowledge is fallacious，then so is scepticism itself，and it negates itself.

Finally，critical philosophy may derive all objectivity，all the basic forms of the content of knowledge from the conditions of experience，but it cannot prove that experience itself is valid.The criticism that is leveled at everything transcendental is based upon a presupposition，which cannot be examined in the same critical fashion without having the ground cut away beneath it.Epistemology here encounters a typical hazard.In analysing itself，it judges its own case.It needs a vantage point outside itself，and is confronted with a choice between excepting itself from the test or rule imposed on all other knowledge，thus leaving itself open to attack from behind；or else subjecting itself to the laws and the process which it has discovered and thereby committing an act of circular reasoning，as is clearly illustrated by the self-negation of scepticism.Only a relativistic epistemology does not claim exemption from its own principle；it is not destroyed by the fact that its validity is only relative.For even if it is valid-historically，factually，psychologically-only in alternations and harmony with other absolute or substantial principles，its relation to its own opposite is itself only relative.Heuristics，which is only the consequence or the application of the relativistic principle to the categories of knowledge，can accept without contradiction that it is itself a heuristic principle.The question as to the grounding of this principle，which is not incorporated in the principle itself，constitutes no difficulty for relativism，because the ground is removed to infinity.Relativism strives to dissolve into a relation every absolute that presents itself，and proceeds in the same way with the absolute that offers itself as the ground for this new relation.This is a never-ending process whose heuristic eliminates the alternative：either to deny or to accept the absolute.It makes no difference how one expresses it：either that there is an absolute but it can be grasped only by an infinite process，or that there are only relations but that they can only replace the absolute in an infinite process.Relativism is able to make the radical concession that it is possible for the mind to place itself outside itself.The epistemological principles that remained content with one concept and thus excluded the continuing fruitful development of relations ended in self-contradiction：that the mind is supposed to judge itself，that it is either subject to its own definitive statements or exempt from them，and that equally each alternative destroys its validity.But relativism fully accepts the fact that for every proposition there is a higher one that determines whether this proposition is correct.But this second proposition，the logical authority that we ourselves establish，requires-considered as a psychological process-further legitimating by a higher proposition for which the same process repeats itself ad infinitum ，either by an alternation of the validation between two judgments，or by treating the same content on one occasion as psychological reality，and on another as a logical principle.This view also removes the hazard that other epistemological principles faced，of ending in self-negation by subjecting themselves to their own statements.It is not correct to argue that scepticism，by denying the possibility of truth，must itself by untrue，any more than the pessimistic view of the wickedness of all that exists makes pessimism itself a wicked theory.For it is，in fact，the fundamental ability of our mind to judge itself and to establish its own law over itself.This is nothing but the expression or expansion of the basic fact of self-awareness.Our mind has no substantial unity，but only the unity that results from the interaction between the subject and object into which the mind divides itself.This is not an accidental form of the mind，which could be different without changing our essential qualities.It is rather the decisive form of the mind.To have a mind means nothing more than to execute this inner separation，to make the self an object，to be able to know oneself.That there is‘no subject without an object，no object without a subject，is realized first within the mind，which raises itself as the knowing subject above itself，as the object known；and by knowing this knowledge of itself，the life of the mind proceeds necessarily in the progressus ad infinitum. Its actual form，its cross-section，as it were，is a circular movement.The subject knows itself as an object and knows the object as a subject.Relativism as an epistemological principle proves itself by its subordination to its own principle，a process that proves fatal to many absolute principles.Thus relativism expresses most clearly what it is also able to perform for those other principles：the legitimating of the mind's capacity to judge itself，without making the process illusory no matter what the result of this judgment may be.For this setting oneself outside oneself appears now as the basis of the mind；the mind is subject and object at the same time.Only if this infinite process of knowing itself and judging itself is cut at any one link，which then confronts all the others as an absolute，does it become self-contradictory，in the sense that knowledge judging itself claims exemption for itself from the content of this judgment in order to pass judgment on it.

The relativistic view has often been considered as a degradation of the value，reliability and significance of things，regardless of the fact that only the naive adherence to something absolute，which is here questioned，could put relativism in such a position.In reality，however，it is the contrary that is true；only through the continuous dissolution of any rigid separateness into interaction do we approach the functional unity of all elements of the universe，in which the significance of each element affects everything else.Consequently，relativism is closer than one is inclined to think to its extreme opposite-Spinoza's philosophy-with its all-embracing substantia sive Deus. This absolute，which has no other content than the universal concept of being，includes in its unity everything that exists.Individual things no longer have any existence by themselves，since all being is in reality unified in the divine substance，just as the abstract concept of being forms a unity.All particular continuities and substantial i ties ，all second-order absolutes，are so completely merged in that single absolute that one might say：all the contents of the world view have become relativities in a monism such as Spinoza's.The all-embracing substance，the only absolute that remains，can now be disregarded without thereby affecting the content of reality-the expropriator will be expropriated，as Marx says of a process that is similar in formand nothing remains but the relativistic dissolution of things into relations and processes.The interdependence of things，which relativism establishes as their essence，excludes the notion of infinity only on a superficial view，or if relativism is not conceived in a sufficiently radical way.The contrary is indeed true：a concrete infinity seems to me conceivable only in two ways.First，as a rising or falling series，where every link depends upon another，and a third one is dependent upon it-as may be the case with spatial distribution，causal transmission of energy，chronological sequences or logical derivation.Secondly，what this series presents in an extended form is provided in a succinct circular form by interaction.If the effect that one element produces upon another then becomes a cause that reflects back as an effect upon the former，which in turn repeats the process by becoming a cause of retroaction，then we have a model of genuine infinity in activity.Here is an immanent infinity comparable to that of the circle；for the latter also develops only in complete mutuality，by which each part of the circle determines the position of other parts-in contrast with other lines，which also return to their starting point but in which every point is not determined by the interplay of all parts.If infinity is regarded as a substance，or as the measure of an absolute，it always remains something finite though very large.The finiteness of existence is only transcended through the conditioning of every content of being by another content，which in turn is equally conditioned-either by a third factor which undergoes the same process or by an interaction of the two.

This may suffice by way of allusion to a philosophical standpoint which makes possible a final uniformity of interpretation with reference to the variety of things，and which provides a general context for the interpretation of economic value.Since the basic characteristic of all knowable existence，the interdependence and interaction of everything，also refers to economic value and conveys this principle of life to economic material，the essential quality of money now becomes comprehensible.For the value of things，interpreted as their economic interaction，has its purest expression and embodiment in money.

Money As The Autonomous Manifestation Of The Exchange Relation

Whatever may be the historical origin of money-and this is far from being clearly established-one fact at least is certain，that money did not suddenly appear in the economy as a finished element corresponding to its pure concept.Money can have developed only out of previously existing values in such a way that the quality of money，which forms part of every exchangeable object，was realized to a great extent in one particular object；the function of money was at first still exercised，as it were，in intimate association with its previous value significance.In the next chapter we shall examine whether this genetic connection of money with a non-monetary value has been or can ever be dissolved.At all events，there have been innumerable errors owing to the fact that the essence and significance of money was not conceptually distinguished from the qualities of those values that money evolved by enhancing one of these qualities.We shall first consider money without reference to the material that represents it in substantial form；for the particular qualities that the material adds to money lead to its being subsumed under those goods to which，as money，it stands in contrast.It can be seen at first glance that money constitutes one party，as it were，and the totality of goods bought by money constitutes the other party；so far as its pure essence is concerned，it must be interpreted simply as money，quite apart from all the secondary qualities that connect it with 1 e contrasting party.

In this sense，money has been defined as‘abstract value’.As a visible object，money is the substance that embodies abstract economic value，in a similar fashion to the sound of words which is an acoustic-physiological occurrence but has significance for us only through the representation that it bears or symbolizes.If the economic value of objects is constituted by their mutual relationship of exchangeability，then money is the autonomous expression of this relationship.Money is the representative of abstract value.From the economic relationship，i.e.the exchangeability of objects，the fact of this relationship is extracted and acquires，in contrast to those objects，a conceptual existence bound to a visible symbol.Money is a specific realization of what is common to economic objects-in the language of the scholastics one might call it universal ante rem ，or in re or post rem- and the general misery of human life is most fully reflected by this symbol，namely by the constant shortage of money under which most people suffer.

The money price of a commodity indicates the degree of exchangeability between this commodity and the aggregate of all other commodities.If one conceives of money in the abstract sense，independently of all the consequences of its concrete representation，then a change in money price signifies that the exchange relationship between the particular commodity and the aggregate of all other commodities has changed.If the price of a quantity of A rises from I to 2 marks，while the prices of the commodities of B，C，D and E remain stable，this signifies a change in the relationship between A and B，C，D and E which also could be expressed by stating that the price of the latter had fallen，while that of A remained constant.We prefer the first version because of its greater simplicity，just as we say，if a body changes its position，that it has moved-for example，from east to west-whereas the actual change could be described equally well as a change of the environment（including the observer）from west to east，while the particular body remains still.The position of a body is not a quality of the body itself，but is a relationship to other bodies；and in every change of position，these others，as well as the body itself，may be regarded as the active or passive subject.In the same way，since the value of A consists of its relation to the economic cosmos，it would be equally justified and only less convenient to interpret any change in the value of A as a change in B，C，D and E.This relativity，as practiced for example in barter，becomes crystallized in money as the expression of value.How this can happen，will be examined later.The statement that the value of A is I mark has purified A of everything that is not economic，i.e.not an exchange relationship to B，C，D and E.This mark，considered as value，is the function of A detached from its carrier，in relation to the other objects of the economy.Everything else that A may be，in itself and independent of this relation，is irrelevant here.Every A！or A2 which differs in quality is equal to A inasmuch as its value is also 1 mark，and because it has the same relation to quantitative exchange to B，C，D and E.Money is simply‘that which is valuable’，and economic value means‘to be exchangeable for something else’.All other objects have a specific content from which they derive their value.Money derives its content from its value；it is value turned into a substance，the value of things without the things themselves.By sublimating the relativity of things，money seems to avoid relativity，just as the norms of reality are not subject to the same relativity that dominates reality，not in spite of but because the relations between things，in their independent life，significance and consistency，are the content of these norms.Everything that exists is subject to laws，but the governing laws themselves are not subject to law.It would be to move in a circle to assume that there is a natural law that entails natural laws.I leave it open，however，as to whether this circle is nevertheless legitimate because it is part of the fundamental processes of thought to return to their origin or to aim at an end that lies in infinity.Norms are the types and forms of relativity that develop among，and give form to，the specific phenomena of reality-whether they are termed ideas，as with Plato and Schopenhauer，logoi as with the Stoics，the a priori as with Kant or stages in the development of reason as with Hegel.These norms are not relative in the same sense as the objects subjected to them，because they themselves present the relativity of the objects.Thus it becomes comprehensible that money as abstract value expresses nothing but the relativity of things that constitute value；and，at the same time，that money，as the stable pole，contrasts with the eternal movements，fluctuations and equations of the objects.In so far as money does not accomplish this，it does not function according to its pure concept but as a specific object co-ordinated with all others.It would be erroneous to object that，in the business of money-lending and foreign exchange，money is bought for money；and that therefore money，although preserving the purity of its concept，acquires the relativity of individual objects of value，which it was supposed not to have but merely to represent.The fact that money expresses the value relation of valuable objects exempts it from this relation and places it in a different order.By representing the relationship in question and its practical consequences money itself acquires a value by which it not only establishes a relationship to all kinds of concrete values，but can also indicate relations among value quantities within its own domain which excludes tangible objects.One quantum is offered as present money，another as a future promise；one quantum is accepted in one region，the other in another-these are modifications that produce value relationships，unaffected by the fact that the object with whose quanta they deal represents as a whole the relation between objects whose value significance is quite different.

Analysis Of The Nature Of Money With Reference To its Value Stability，Its Development And Its Objectivity

From this dual role-outside and within the series of concrete values-there result，as I have said，innumerable difficulties in the practical and theoretical treatment of money.To the extent that money expresses the value relationship between goods，measures them and facilitates their exchange，it enters the world of useful goods as a power of entirely different origin；either as an abstract system of measurement or as a means of exchange which moves between tangible objects as does ether between objects possessing weight.In order to perform these services，which depend upon its position outside all other goods，money has to be a concrete or specific value itself；and by performing these services it becomes such a value.In this manner，it becomes one of the links and conditions in the series with which it is，at the same time，contrasted：its value becomes dependent upon supply and demand；its costs of production exert an influence，however slight，upon its value；it appears in qualitatively different values；etc.The payment of interest is a manifestation of this value which results from the functions of money.Or from another aspect：the dual role of money consists，on the one hand，in measuring the value relations of goods exchanged and，on the other，in being exchanged with these goods and thus itself becoming a quantity subject to measurement.Money is measured，by the goods against which it is exchanged and also by money itself.For not only is money paid for by money，as the money market and interest-bearing loans show，but the money of one country becomes the measure of value for the money of another country，as is illustrated by foreign exchange transactions.Money is therefore one of those normative ideas that obey the norms that they themselves represent.All such cases result in first-order complications and circular movements of thought，although these can be resolved：the Cretan who declares that all Cretans are liars，and falling under his own axiom condemns his own statement as a lie；the pessimist who brands the whole world as evil，so that his own theory must be so too；the sceptic who cannot maintain the truth of scepticism because he denies all truth，etc.Thus money stands as the measure and means of exchange above valuable objects；and because its services initially require a valuable representative and give value to their representative，money is ranked with those objects and is subsumed under the norms that are themselves derived from money.

What is eventually measured as value is not money，which is merely the expression of value，hut the objects；and changes in price signify a change in their relations to each other.Money，viewed in terms of its pure function，has not changed its value；but a greater or lesser quantity of money reflects that change itself，abstracted from its representatives and assuming an independent form of expression.This condition of money is obviously the same as what is called its lack of qualities and lack of individuality.Since it stands between individual objects and in an equal relation to each of them，it has to be completely neutral.Here too，money represents the highest stage of development in a continuous series；this series is logically difficult but of great significance for our world view，in which each link，although formed according to the formula of the series and an expression of its inner forces，at the same time differs from the series as a complementing，controlling or opposing power.The starting point of the series is formed by the irreplaceable values whose specific qualities are easily obscured by the analogy with money equivalents.There is a substitute for most things that we own，at least in the widest sense of the word，so that the total value of our existence would remain the same if we were to lose one thing and gain another instead.The sum of happiness can be kept at the same level by a variety of elements.However，in relation to certain objects this exchangeability fails，not only because other possessions cannot give us the same degree of happiness，but because the sense of value is tied to this individual object，and not to happiness，the provision of which the object shares with other objects.It is a mistaken conceptual realism-regarding the general concept as a completely adequate representation of the particular realitythat makes us believe that we experience the value of things by their reduction to a general denominator of value，by reference to a centre of value where values present themselves as quantitatively different，but basically of the same kind.We often value the individual thing because we want exactly this and nothing else，even though something else would perhaps give us the same or even a greater amount of satisfaction.A high degree of sensitivity distinguishes very precisely between the amount of satisfaction that a certain possession provides，through which it becomes comparable and exchangeable with other possessions，and those specific qualities beyond its eudaemonistic effects which may make it just as valuable to us and in that respect completely irreplaceable.This is very well illustrated，with slight modifications，in those cases where personal affections and experiences make a standard and interchangeable object irreplaceable for us.An identical specimen of the same kind does not，under any circumstances，make good the loss.This could better be accomplished by an object belonging to a totally different category of qualities and sentiments，which would not remind us at all of the former object or suggest any comparison！This individual form of value is negated to the extent that objects become interchangeable，so that money-the representative and expression of exchangeability-is the least individual creation of our practical world.To the extent that things are exchanged for money-but not when they are bartered-they share this lack of individuality.The absence of any inherent worth in an object cannot be more distinctly expressed than by substituting for it，without any sense of inadequacy，a money equivalent.Money is not only the absolutely interchangeable object，each quantity of which can be replaced without distinction by any other；it is，so to speak，interchangeability personified.The two poles between which all values stand are：at one extreme，the absolute individual value whose significance does not lie in any general quantity of value that could also be represented by another object，and whose position in our value system could not be filled by any other object；at the other extreme，that which is clearly interchangeable.Between these two poles things are arranged according to the degree of their replaceability，their position being determined by the extent to which they are replaceable and by the variety of objects that can take their place.This can also be represented by distinguishing in each object the irreplaceable and the replaceable part.Most things participate in both qualities，although we are frequently deceived about this，on the one hand，by the volatility of our transactions，and on the opposite side by narrowmindedness and stubbornness.Even those things that are purchasable and replaceable by money probably possess，upon closer scrutiny，qualities whose value cannot be completely replaced by other possessions.The boundaries of our practical world are shown in those cases where one of these qualities is infinitely small：on the one hand，those very few values upon which the individual integrity of out Ego depends，where exchangeability is out of the question；on the other，money-the distilled exchangeability of objects-whose absolute lack of individuality results from the fact that it expresses the relation between things，a relation that persists in spite of changes in the things themselves.

This ability of money to replace every specific economic valuebecause it is not connected with any of these values but only with the relation into which they may enter-assures the continuity of the series of economic events.This series exists in both the production and the consumption of goods.But this is only the material of the series and still leaves the question of continuity and discontinuity open.Every act of consumption initially breaches the continuity of the economic process，and its relation to production is too unorganized，too much a matter of chance，to preserve the continuity of the line of development.One may conceive this line as an ideal which makes its path through the concrete objects in a manner comparable to the direction of a light beam through the oscillating parts of the ether.Into this stream，which pervades the strictly separated objects and controls their value significance，money now enters in order to compensate for the threatened interruption.By giving money for an object that I want to consume，I fill the gap in the value movement that results，or would result，from my consumption.The primitive forms of exchange of possessions-robbery and gifts-do not allow for such a complement of continuity；in their case，the logical connection in the ideal line of the economic process is，so to speak，interrupted.This connection is established in principle only through the exchange of equivalents，and in fact only through money.Money can compensate for the unevenness that exists in any system of barter，and can fill the gap that results from the removal of the object to be consumed.Obviously，money can attain this practical position within the economic series only through its ideal position outside the series.If money itself were a specific object，it could never balance every single object or be the bridge between disparate objects.Money can enter adequately into the relations that form the continuity of the economy only because，as a concrete value，it is nothing but the relation between economic values themselves，embodied in a tangible substance.

This significance of money shows itself further，in an empirical way，as stability of value，resulting from its interchangeability and lack of specific qualities.This is regarded as one of the outstanding and most useful characteristics of money.The length of the series of economic activities，which is a pre-condition for the continuity，the integration，and the productivity of the economy，depends upon the stability of the value of money without which longrange calculations，large-scale enterprises and long-term credits would be impossible.So long as one considers only the price fluctuations of a single object，one cannot determine whether the value of the object changes and the value of money remains stable or vice-versa.Stability of money value becomes an objective fact only when price decreases of a commodity or group of commodities are accompanied by price increases elsewhere.A general rise in prices would indicate a decrease in the value of money，and when that occurs the stability of money value is destroyed.This is only possible because money has certain qualities beyond its function as the indicator of the value relations of specific objects；these distinguishing qualities render money an object of the market and subject it to business cycles，quantitative changes and autonomous movements.They deprive money of its absolute position as an expression of relations and force it into a relative position，so that it no longer reflects a relation，but has relations.Only to the extent that money，true to its essence，is isolated from such influences does it have a stable value；from which it follows that price fluctuations do not signify a change in the relations of money to objects，but only changing relations among objects themselves.This implies that an increase in the price of one object corresponds to a fall in the price of another.In so far as money really has the essential quality of value stability，this results from its function of expressing the economic relations between objects-or the relations that render things economically valuable-in abstract quantitative terms，without itself entering into these relations.Thus，the function of money is all the more important，the livelier and more extensive are the changes in economic values.Wherever the values of goods are definitely and permanently fixed，exchange in kind is easily carried on.Money corresponds to the condition of change in mutual value relations because it offers an exact and flexible equivalent for every change of value.The variability of these relations illustrates most clearly that the economic value of an object consists in the exchange relationship to all other objects；every partial shift requires other balancing movements and makes us aware of the relativity within the whole.Money is nothing but the symbol of this relativity，and thus we can understand the fact mentioned earlier，that the need for money is connected with the fluctuation of prices，whereas barter presupposes fixed prices.

The distinctive significance of money emerges theoretically as well as practically only with a fully developed monetary economy.The symbol that represents money in the first stage of its gradual development keeps it at the same time among those objects whose mere relation to each other it is meant to symbolize.Medieval theory regarded value as something objective.It required the seller to ask the‘just price，for his commodity and occasionally attempted to fix this price by regulation.Value was considered to inhere in the object as a quality of its isolated existence，with which it entered the act of exchange，regardless of the relations between buyer and seller.This concept of value-which corresponds with the substantial-absolutistic world view of the age-is particularly appropriate to a barter economy.A piece of land in exchange for services rendered，a goat for a pair of shoes，a jewel for twenty masses for the dead；these were things with which certain value sentiments were so closely connected that their values might well appear as objectively corresponding to each other.The more direct the exchange and the simpler the circumstances-so that the position of the object is not determined by a multitude of comparable relations-the more does the value appear as a quality of the object.The straightforward assurance with which such an exchange was carried out was reflected in the idea that it was brought about by an objective quality of the things themselves.Only the incorporation of the single object in diversified production and in manysided exchange movements suggests that its economic significance lies in its relation to other objects and is reciprocal；and this coincides with the growth of a money economy.That the meaning of the economic object is constituted by this relativity，and that the significance of money is to become the clear expression of this relativity，are facts that come to be realized by their reciprocal influence.In the Middle Ages，it was assumed that there was a direct relation between object and money-price i.e.a relation based upon the independent value of each，which could and should find a‘just’expression.The error of this substantialist interpretation is the same as that which asserts a direct connection between an individual and the content of any right；as though the nature of the person as such，regardless of any external conditions，would have a‘just’claim to this competency.The individualistic conception of the rights of man provides an example.In reality，right is only a relation between men and is consummated only in relation to the interests，objects and absolute powers which we call a content of law，‘a right，in the narrower sense.Such rights do not have any predictable relation to an individual which might be interpreted as‘just’or‘unjust’.Only when such a relationship develops and has established itself in norms is it possible for the norms-referring to a single person in a specific matter-to characterize that person's power of disposal over something as just.Thus there may be，indeed，a just price for a commodity，but only as the expression of a definite，well-adjusted exchange relationship between this commodity and all others，and not as a consequence of the nature of the commodity itself or the amount of money itself，which stand in no relation to each other and have no reference to the just or the unjust.

The significance of money in representing the economic relativity of objects-which is the source of its practical functions-is not a ready-made reality；like all historical phenomena，it discloses its pure concept-its function and place in the realm of ideas-only gradually.This has its counterpart in the fact that all commodities could be regarded as money in a certain sense.Every object A that is exchanged for B，and in turn for C，plays the role of money independently of its tangible qualities.It expresses the fact that B，A and C are exchangeable with each other and it expresses the rate at which they can be exchanged.This happens with innumerable objects；in fact，the further back we trace cultural development，the larger the number of very different objects we discover that perform the function of money in a more or less rudimentary fashion.So long as objects are measured against each other or exchanged with each other in natura ，their subjective and their economic，objective qualities，their absolute and their relative significance are as yet unrepeated；they cease to be money or to be capable of being money to the extent that money ceases to be an object of use.Money becomes more and more a symbol of economic value，because economic value is nothing but the relativity of exchangeable objects.This relativity，in turn，increasingly dominates the other qualities of the objects that evolve as money，until finally these objects are nothing more than embodied relativity.

If money has its origin in barter，it begins to develop only when a single object is exchanged not against another single object but against several others.If a cow is exchanged for a slave，a garment for a talisman，a boat for a weapon，the process of valuation is not yet separated into its elements；it is not carried out by the reduction of the objects to a common denominator as a basis for calculating the value of each unit of several things.If，however，a herd of cattle is taken in exchange for a house，or ten cut beams against a piece of jewelry，or three drinks for a service of labour，then the unit of these multiples-one cow，one beam or one drink-is the measure，the multiple of which is identical with the other object of exchange.In the case of objects that are indivisible，the psychological sense of value does not easily abandon the unity of the single object.But as soon as bargaining begins-is the value of the piece of jewelry twelve or perhaps only eight beams？-then the value of the jewelry is measured，despite its indivisibility，by the value unit of a beam，and it appears possible to compose it out of the eightfold，the twelvefold and finally the tenfold of our beam.The value of both objects of exchange thus becomes more easily commensurable if one object is divisible；and the value of both objects need not be expressed in terms of one and the same unit.The most developed form of divisibility is attained with exchange against money.Money is that divisible object of exchange，the unit of which is commensurable with the value of every indivisible object；thus it facilitates，or even presupposes，the detachment of the abstract value from its particular concrete content.The relativity of economic objects，which can be recognized only with difficulty in the exchange of indivisible objects-because each of the parties possesses，so to speak，an autonomous value-is brought into relief through the reduction to a common denominator of value，of which money is the most distinctive form.

I have shown earlier that relativity creates the value of objects in an objective sense，because only through relativity are things placed at a distance from the subject.Money is the quintessence and zenith of these two qualities and thus illustrates again their interrelationship.Money can never be enjoyed directly-the exceptions to be treated later negate its specific character！-and it is therefore excluded from any subjective relation.Money objectifies the external activities of the subject which are represented in general by economic transactions，and money has therefore developed as its content the most objective practices，the most logical，purely mathematical norms，the absolute freedom from everything personal.Because money is simply the means to acquire objects，it stands by its very nature at an insurmountable distance from the Ego which craves and enjoys；and in so far as it is the indispensable means between the Ego and the objects，it places the objects，too，at a distance.To be sure，money abolishes this distance again；but by doing so，by transferring the objects to subjective use，it removes them from the objective economic cosmos.

The division that has appeared in the original unity of the subjective and the objective is，as it were，embodied in money；but on the other hand，it is the function of money-in accordance with the above-mentioned correlation of distance and proximity-to move the otherwise unattainable closer to us.Exchangeability is the prerequisite of economic values，through which the latter attain their objective mutual relation.It unites in one act the distance and the proximity of what is to be exchanged.It has acquired in money not only its technically perfect means，but also a separate，concrete existence which embraces all its various aspects.

Money As A Reification Of The General Form Of Existence According To Which Things Derive Their Significance From Their Relationship To Each Other

The philosophical significance of money is that it represents within the practical world the most certain image and the clearest embodiment of the formula of all being，according to which things receive their meaning through each other，and have their being determined by their mutual relations.It is a basic fact of mental life that we symbolize the relations among various elements of our existence by particular objects；these are themselves substantial entities，but their significance for us is only as the visible representatives of a relationship that is more or less closely associated with them.Thus，a wedding ring，but also every letter，every pledge，every official uniform，is a symbol or representative of a moral or intellectual，a legal or political，relationship between men.Every sacramental object embodies in a substantial form the relation between man and his God.The telegraph wires that connect different countries，no less than the military weapons that express their dissension，are such substances；they have almost no significance for the single individual，but only with reference to the relations between men and between human groups that are crystallized in them.Of course，the representation of these relations and connections can itself be regarded as an abstraction，inasmuch as only those elements in it are real whose mutually determined conditions we incorporate in specific concepts.Only metaphysical inquiry，which pursues cognition beyond the limits of empiricism，can possibly eliminate this dualism，by dissolving all substantial elements into interaction and processes，the bearer of which becomes subject to the same fate.But practical consciousness has discovered a form by which the processes of relationship and interaction，in which reality is enacted，can be united with the substantial existence，the necessary form of abstract relations in practice.

The projection of mere relations into particular objects is one of the great accomplishments of the mind；when the mind is embodied in objects，these become a vehicle for the mind and endow it with a livelier and more comprehensive activity.The ability to construct such symbolic objects attains its greatest triumph in money.For money represents pure interaction in its purest form；it makes comprehensible the most abstract concept；it is an individual thing whose essential significance is to reach beyond individualities.Thus，money is the adequate expression of the relationship of man to the world，which can only be grasped in single and concrete instances，yet only really conceived when the singular becomes the embodiment of the living mental process which interweaves all singularities and，in this fashion，creates reality.This significance of money would remain even if the value relativity of economic objects were not an initial fact but a final stage of development.The concept with which we define a phenomenon is often not derived from the phenomenon itself but from a more developed and purer form.We cannot infer the nature of language from the first stammering of the child；and in defining animal life，it will not disconcert us to find that it is only imperfectly represented at the stage of transition from plant life.Similarly，it is only in the highest phenomena of our mental life that we can sometimes discover the meaning of the lower phenomena；although we may perhaps be unable to trace it in these at all.The pure concept of a series of phenomena is often an ideal that is never completely realized，the approach towards which，however，makes possible a valid interpretation of the concept.

The significance of money，that it expresses the relativity of objects of demand through which they become economic values，is not negated by the fact that money also has other qualities that diminish and obscure this significance.In so far as these qualities are effective，it is not money proper.Economic value consists in the exchange relationship of objects according to our subjective reaction to them，but the economic relativity of objects develops only gradually from their other meanings and it can never dominate these meanings entirely in the total representation or the total value of an object.The value that objects acquire by their exchangeability，i.e.the metamorphosis through which their value becomes an economic value，emerges more clearly and strongly with the extensive and intensive growth of the economy-a fact that Marx formulates as the elimination of use-value in favor of exchange value in a society based upon commodity production-but this development seems unable to reach its consummation.Only money，in terms of its pure concept，has attained this final stage；it is nothing but the pure form of exchangeability.It embodies that clement or function of things，by virtue of which they are economic.It does not comprehend their totality，hut it does comprehend the totality of money.In the following chapter I shall examine how far money in its historical manifestations does represent this idea of money，and whether money in operation does not tend，in some degree，towards another point of reference.

第一章 价值与货币

第一节

实在和价值作为彼此独立的范畴，通过它们，我们的观念成为世界的图像

事物作为自然实体而被置于其中的那种秩序，是建立在如下假设基础之上的：事物特性的多种多样决定于存在的一种同一不变的规律：事物在自然规律面前的平等性，物质和能量的不变的总量，相去甚远的现象彼此间的可转换性，把初看起来明显的差异性转变为某种普遍的近似性、某种普遍的平等性。但是更进一步观察，这又仅仅意味着，自然秩序的产物超越了对一种规律的任何设问。它们的绝对确定性不允许有任何可能对强调其独有特性的存在提供证实或表示怀疑。但是我们并不满足于自然科学为事物设定的这种不置可否的规律性，相反，我们不考虑事物在那个系列中所处的位置，而是将其放置在另一个秩序，即价值秩序中进行考虑，在这个秩序中平等性被完全消除、某个点的最高层面与另一点的最低层面相毗邻；在这个系列中，基本的性质不是一致性而是差异性。客体、思想和事件的价值从来不可能仅仅通过它们纯自然的存在和内容来推断，它们依据价值的排序与其自然的排序有很大差别。在很多情况下，自然破坏了那些依据其价值本来可能要求被保留的物体，而把那些毫无价值的物体保存下来，并占据了更有价值的客体的位置。这并不是说这两个系列之间是一种根本对立的关系，或者说它们是彼此排斥的。这样的观点意味着两个系列间的一种关系，甚至会建立一个由价值决定的、具有相反迹象的糟透的世界。我们宁愿认为事实是：这两个系列间的关系是完全偶然的。自然时而为我们提供价值非常高的客体，时而又拒绝给予。很明显，系列间偶然的融洽、源于价值序列的要求通过实在序列得以实现，说明了它们之间没有任何逻辑关系，反之亦然。我们可能意识到同一生活经验既实在又有价值，但是这一经验在两种情形下会具有极其不同的意义。自然现象的系列可以不涉及事物的价值而描述出它们的全部内容；然而我们的价值尺度仍然有意义，无论其客体在现实中经常出现还是从不出现。就像光和影子一样，价值是被完全确定的客观存在的增加物——它并不是事物本身固有的，而是来自于另外的源头。但是，我们要避免一种曲解，即价值观念作为一种心理学的事实，它的形成与自然形成过程是截然不同的。一种超人的意志，可以通过自然规律理解世界上发生的每一件事，也能够理解人们具有价值观念的事实。然而对于一个超越它们心理实在性、仅仅从纯理论角度来考虑它们的人来说，这些将没有任何意义或有效性。价值观念的意义被自然看作是一种机械的因果系统而被否定，但与此同时，使价值成为我们意识一部分的精神体验本身却属于自然世界。评价作为心理上发生的真实事件，是自然世界的一部分；但我们通过评价所指的含义、其概念上的意义，是独立于这个世界的；它不是自然界的一部分，从一个独特的视角来看，甚至可以说它就是整个世界。从意识方面来看，我们很少意识到这样一个事实：我们的整个生活是由价值体验和价值判断组成的，而生活获得意义和重要性的唯一来源是——现实所机械地展现的元素超出了它们的客观物质性，由此拥有了一个无限多样的价值。在任何时候，只要我们的头脑不再仅仅是简单的消极反映现实的镜子时——或许这从来未曾发生，因为客观感知只有从评价中才能发生——我们便生活在一个以某种自主的秩序来排列现实内容的价值世界里。

因此，从某种意义上来说，价值是存在的对应物，并且作为世界观的一个广泛形式和范畴，它与存在是可比较的。正像康德所指出的那样：存在并不是客体的性质，因为即使我指出一个迄今只存在于我的思想当中的客体，它也并不会因此而获得一种新的性质——否则的话，它就不是我所想的那一个客体，而是另一个了。同样的道理，如果我称一个客体是有价值的，它也并没有因此获得一种新的性质；它之所以拥有价值是因为其本身的性质。正是客体整体被确定的存在，使它能够在价值领域中出现。这一点可以通过对我们思想的彻底分析得到证实。我们可以构思我们世界观的内容，而不用考虑它们是不是真的存在。我们可以设想我们称之为客体的性质的集合，包括客观和逻辑意义上的所有相互关联和发展的规律，并且我们可以询问，所有这些概念和内在观念是否可以实现、在什么地方实现、以怎样的频率实现。客体概念上的意义和确定性不会受像“它们是否存在”，或者“它们是否存在于价值范围内以及处于价值范围内的什么位置”这类问题的影响。但是，如果我们想要建立一种理论或实践标准，我们就无法回避这两个问题了。我们必须确定一个客体存在还是不存在，每个客体必须在价值圈内有一个对我们而言是确定的位置，从最高价值到中立再到负价值。中立是对积极价值的一种拒绝，但它保持着虽然不活跃却始终存在于背景之中的兴趣的可能性。这一决定着我们世界观构成的要求的意义不因下述事实而有所改变：我们的理解能力通常不足以决定概念的现实性，我们感觉的范围和确定性通常不足以根据其价值来排列事物——尤其是以任何永恒的普遍的方式来排列。在纯概念性世界、客观性和确定性世界的对面，有着存在与价值这两个重要的范畴，它包括了从纯概念世界获取原料的形式。这两个范畴都具有作为客观存在的基本性质，即不可以彼此相互简化或简化为其他更简单的元素。因此，客体的存在从不能被逻辑地推断出来；毋庸说存在是我们感知的初级形式，可以被感觉、被体验、被确信，但是对一些尚未了解它的人而言是不可推断的。一旦这种感知形式通过某种非逻辑的行为抓住一个特定的内容，它便可以在其逻辑语境中得到解释，并发展到逻辑语境延伸得到的任何地方。作为一个规则，我们能够阐明我们为什么假设一个独特现象的现实，原因即是——我们已经假设了另一个通过独有的特征与其相联系的现象。然而，第一个现象的现实性只有在类似的形式中被追溯成一个更基本的现象才能得以显现。这个演化要求一个最终的项，它的存在仅仅依赖于一种深信不疑的感觉、肯定和接受的感觉，一种直接给予的感觉。评价对于客体有着非常相同的关系。关于一个客体价值的所有论据，都只不过是必须承认客体的价值与预先设定的一样，在其被接受的时候，客体的价值与另一客体的价值不容置疑地相同。我们将在后面分析这种行为的动机。这里只需说明，我们认为价值的论据仅仅是把一个现有的价值转换到一个新的客体中。它没有揭示出价值的本质，或为什么价值最初附着在客体上，而又转移到其他的客体里。

如果我们承认一个价值的存在，那么它的实现过程、它的演变就可以被理性地理解，因为一般情况下它遵循现实内容的结构。但是，价值从根本上存在是一个首要的现象。价值推论仅仅使我们了解价值得以实现的条件，但如同理论论据只不过为肯定或实在的感觉准备了条件一样，这些条件并不能产生价值。就像“存在是什么”这类问题一样，关于“价值究竟是什么”的问题是无法回答的。恰恰因为它们与客体有着相同形式的联系，才使得它们像思想和客观现实对斯宾诺莎那样彼此不同。因为它们都表达了同样绝对的实质，每一个都有着各自的并且相对自身而言是完美的方式，其中一个决不会侵害另一个的完美方式。因为它们是从完全不同的角度去审视客体的概念的，它们从来不会互相影响。但是即使命运及其寻求方式可能不间断地从多样变成统一，又从统一变成多样，实在和价值的这种分离性的平行并没有把世界分割成枯燥无味的二元性，这是有着自身统一需要的头脑决不会接受的，价值和实在的共同性处于它们之上：柏拉图称为“理念”的内容本质可以在我们实在和价值的概念中被表示和表达，它可以进入任何一方或其他系列。在这两个范畴之下隐藏着两者的共同之处——精神，在它神秘的统一中吸纳或创造出另一个。就是说，实在和价值是两种不同的语言，通过这两种语言，在其观念的统一体中，逻辑上相联系的世界中的内容被变成相对于统一精神而言可理解的东西；或者说在此语言中，精神可以表达超越于它们的区别和对立的那些内容的纯粹影像。这两种通过精神创造出来的集合，通过感知和评价，或许可以在某个形而上的统一体中再次汇集，对这个统一体而言，除了它的宗教象征以外，没有任何语言术语。在一个宇宙般广大的场所中我们对实在和价值之间体验到的异质和分歧也许不复存在，两个系列联系显现为一个整体；这个整体没有受到实在和价值这两个范畴的影响，以一种庄严、中立的态度处在这两个范畴之上，它还意味着两者间一种和谐的交织，这种交织只有通过我们不完善的考虑方式才被粉碎成碎片、曲解成对立，就好像我们拥有一种不完美的视觉能力一样。

客观价值的心理事实

价值的个性特征通过其与实在的相对比而显现出来，在这时，它通常被称为主观性的东西。同样的客体可能对一个灵魂有最高的价值，而对另一个却只有最低的价值，反之亦然。由于另一个方面，客体之间最广泛、最极端的不同能够与价值的等同协调一致，在这里仅仅是主体和他的惯例或例外、恒久或变更、情感和回应，被保留下来作为价值范围。毋庸赘言，这种主观性与那种涉及对世界整体之“我的感知”的主观性没有任何联系。这是因为价值的主观性与特定的客体价值相对照，而不管他们被考虑的方式。也就是说，了解全部客体的主体，这与和客体相对抗的主体是不同的；在这里价值与其他所有客体共享的主观性不起任何作用。它的这种主观性是多变的，但这种多变不是简单化的；独立于实在并不意味着价值可以被无限制地、随意自由地到处安放。与实在本身一样，价值作为一个不可改变的事实，存在于我们的意识之中。所以，价值的主观性首先是消极否定的，在一定意义上，价值不是以像颜色和温度那样的方式附着在客体上的。后者尽管由我们的感觉决定，可它们依然伴随着一种直接依赖于客体的感觉；但是在价值这里，我们很快就会习惯于忽视这种感觉，因为这两个分别由实在和价值构成的系列彼此是完全独立的。比此总体特征更有趣的唯一情形是：心理事实似乎导致了一种对立的观点。

无论从经验主义的还是超验主义的意义来说，客体和主体的不同都是可以想象的，价值绝不是客体的性质，而仅仅是保留在主体内的对客体的一种判断。仅仅通过讨论对主体而言的价值，无论价值概念更深刻的意义和内容、价值对于个体精神生活的重要性，还是建立在价值基础之上的社会实践和安排，都不可能被完全理解。对价值的理解方法存在于这样一个领域内：主观性仅仅是暂时的，并且实际上不是很重要。

主体和客体这两个范畴在实践生活和科学世界中有着被公认的分野，但它们的区别并不像我们所相信的那样大。精神生活以一种无差别的状态开始，在这里自我以及它的客体尚未被区分开来；意识中充满了印象和感觉，这些内容的载体尚未从中分离出来。在特定真实情形下的某一主体开始从其意识环境中分离出来，是意识第二阶段的产物、是后面的分析的结果。这种发展很明显会导致这样一种情况：一个人把他自己称为“我”，并且认识到其他客体的存在是处于这个“我”之外的。形而上学时常宣称，存在的超验本质是完全一元化的，它超越了主客体间的对立，这种超验本质的统一性在简单原始的、被某种感知内容占有的存在状态中，有着一种心理上的对应物，就像一个还没有称自己为“我”的孩子，或者在生命所有进程的某种基本形式中可能观察到的东西。这种统一是作为某个主观性的统一呈现在我们面前的，在此统一体中主体和客体范畴得以发展并彼此相关联（这个过程我们将在后面进行考察）。它以主观性呈现是因为，我们是运用后来得到发展的客观性概念来接近它的，我们并没有一个固有的专业术语来描述这类统一，而仅仅是用在后来的分析中所显现出来的局部的要素之一来给它们命名。所以，这就宣称了，所有的行为在本质上都是以自我为中心，然而，利己主义只有处于某种行为系统中，以及和与它相关的利他主义相对照时才具有意义。与此相同，尽管对上帝明确的定义依赖于它与经验性事物的对照，泛神论却已经把存在的普遍性描述为上帝。这种主体和客体间的进化性的关系在很大范围内不可变更地重复：古代正统的理性世界不同于现代，主要是基于这样的事实，就像在远古时代并不为人所知的自由问题之意义所显示的一样，只有后者一方面发展出一个全面、清晰的自我的概念，另一方面通过不可变更的自然规律思想阐释了客体概念的独立和力量。与后来的历史阶段相比，古代更接近于某种中立的时期，在这一时期中世界的内容被认为是中立的，所以不需要在主体和客体间做出区分。

作为主观价值总体的标准化或保证的事件客观性

区分主体和客体的这一发展过程，通过相同主体的两个不同方面都得以持续，只是这一发展运行于不同的层面。所以，作为主体存在着的意识便已成为一种客观的东西。这是作为个体形式的精神的一个基本性质。决定了其本身作为整体形式而存在的我们头脑的基本活动，是我们能够观察、了解和判断我们自己，就像观察、了解和判断其他任何客体一样，是我们作为一个经验统一体可以不丢失整体性把自我解剖为一个感知主体和被感知的客体，相反，正是通过这一内在的对抗意识到它的统一。这里，主体和客体的相互依赖在某个方面被拉到了一起，它已经影响到了主体自身，否则的话，主体自身是会作为客体世界的对立面而存在的。因此，人一开始意识到自我并称自己为“我”的时候，就已经认识到自己和世界之间关系的基本形式以及他接受世界的基本形式。但是从意义和精神成长角度而言，在那种认识发生以前，这里存在着一种对尚未在主客体间区别开来的、也还没有把主客体分开的内容的简单感知。从另一个方面来看，作为一个逻辑的、概念的实体，这个内容自身同样超越于主体和客体实在性的区别之上。我们不必去问这些性质的综合观念是否有一个客观存在物，可以简单地从它的性质及其相互联系来考察任何客体。可以确定，这样的纯粹客观的内容只要被思考，它就会成为一个概念和此意义上的主观结构。但是在这里，主观性仅仅是概念的动态行为、领会内容的功能；它本身是作为独立于此构想行为之外的存在被考虑的。我们的头脑拥有一项非凡的能力，即把内容作为独立于思考行为的东西进行思考，这是使得它不可能被进一步简化的主要性质之一。内容有着它们自己的概念或客观的性质和关系，这些性质和关系可以被了解，但是不会因此完全被理解；这些内容是始终存在着的，不管它们是不是我的表象的一部分，也不管它们是不是客观实在的一部分。表象的内容并不与内容的表象相一致。仅仅存在于某个内容意识中的未区分的简单概念不能被描述成主体性事物，因为它还不清楚主客体之间的对立关系。同样的，客体或概念的抽象内容不是客观的，而是一样逃避了这一差异的形式和它的对立面，并准备通过一方或另一方来表达自己。主体和客体来自同一行为：从逻辑上讲，先把概念性、观念性的内容表达为一种表象内容，然后将其呈现为客观实在的内容；从心理上讲，当这种个人和客体是无差别的尚缺少自我的表象变成分离的，并在自我及其客体之间产生一种距离的时候，双方由此各自变成独立的实体。

作为主观价值客观化的经济价值

这个最终构成我们理性世界观的过程，同样出现在我们意志实践活动的领域。在这里，有着强烈需求的、进行消费的、价值评价的主体和被评价的客体之间的差别并不包含精神生活的所有方面和实践活动的所有客观条件。人类对某一客体产生的愉悦之感是一个完全不可分割的行为。此时，我们有了一种不包括我们对所面临的客体的意识，也不包括不同于当前环境的自我意识的经历。最低级的和最高级的现象在此相遇。无论使用什么样的方法，原始冲动，尤其是非个人的、一般本性的冲动，都要对客体释放自己并且得到满足；意识仅仅关心主体冲动的满足，而丝毫不关注它的载体和客体。另一方面，强烈的审美愉悦以同一形式表现出来。在审美中，我们也忘记了自己，同时不再把艺术作品视为与我们对立的东西了，因为我们的灵魂完全被沉浸其中，已经听任于它并吸收了它。正如其他情况一样，在这种情形下，我们的心理状态还没有被主客体之间的对立所影响，或者说它不再受其影响了。只有某种新的意识过程才能从未受干扰的统一体中把那些范畴释放出来；只有在此过程之后，这种对内容的纯粹愉悦感才会在一方面被视为主体面对客体的一种状态，另一方面被视为独立于主体之外的客体造成的影响。分裂了主客体朴素的实践统一性，并使我们在它们的相互关系中来意识其中一个的这种张力，最初只是通过欲望的事实发生的。当渴望得到我们尚未拥有的或喜欢的东西的时候，我们把欲求的内容置于自身之外。我承认，因为除了我们的意愿，很多其他理论的和情感的事件都对精神内容的客观化有贡献，所以在经验生活中，完成的客体是呈现在我们面前的，也只有因此它才是被需求的。然而，与它的内在秩序和可理解性相关联，在实践世界中，客体自身的起源和它被主体需要是相关的，这也正是将愉悦过程这一知觉整体分离开来的区别过程的两个方面。前面已经指出，我们对客观实体的概念源于客体显现在我们面前的阻力，尤其是通过我们的触觉。我们可以立刻将其运用于实践问题中。我们需要这些客体，仅仅是由于它们没有因我们的需要和喜欢被马上给予我们；从某种程度上说，那是它们在抵制我们的需求。不仅在其不被我们的意志所影响的意义上，我们所需求的内容在其对抗我们的那时候起就变成了客体，并且在其作为尚未被喜欢的东西而与我们保持着距离这层面上也是如此，因为主体方面仍是需要它们的。正如康德所说的那样：因为拥有经验意味着我们的意识从感觉印象中创造出了客体，所以经验的可能性造就了经验客体的可能性。同样的，需要的可能性创造了被需要的客体的可能性。客体通过与主体相分离形成了自己的特性，与此同时主体设立了它并试图以自己的需要来征服它，这样客体便由此形成了，这就是我们所谓的价值。体验自身愉悦的那一刻，主体和客体之间的对立关系便被抹掉了，价值也便被消费了。只有作为对立面，作为与主体相分离的客体，价值才能被重新恢复。像下面这样琐碎的经验，例如我们只有在失去它们以后才会欣赏我们所拥有的价值，例如一味地抑制某个渴望得到的客体，经常会赋予它与其可能产生的任何愉悦感完全不成比例的价值，再例如我们喜爱的客体的远离（无论是事实上的还是喻指的远离）会使它们呈现在一种理想化的光环之下，从而大大增加它们的吸引力——所有这些都只不过是基本事实的派生、变异和混合，这个基本事实便是：价值并非源自于主体获得客体的愉悦时刻完整的统一性，而是源于主体和作为被需要的客体而存在于主体对立面的客体愉悦内容的分离，客体的愉悦内容只有通过征服距离、障碍和困难才能获得。在这里我们重申一下更早的类比：在最后的分析中，或许实体并不通过现象所施加的阻力强加于我们的意识，但是我们仍记录了那些具有抵抗和阻碍（它是与客体相联系的）感觉的表象，这些表象的存在是客观真实的、独立的、外在于我们的。客体不会因为它们是有价值的就难以获得，但是我们仍然把那些抵抗我们想要拥有它们的欲求的客体称为是有价值的。也正是因为欲求遭到抵抗和挫折，客体才获得了一种它们不抑制主体欲望便永远不会获得的意义。

在同一时间、同一分化过程中，作为欲求的自我和它的相关物呈现出来的价值从属于另一个范畴。当其应用于被构思的理论表象中的客体时，它是同一范畴。在那种情形中，我们推断出：在客观世界中被认识，并作为主观表象存在于主体之中的内容还具有一种特殊的观念的尊贵。三角形或有机体的概念、因果关系或地心引力定律的概念都拥有一种逻辑意义、内在结构的有效合理性，这决定了它们在空间和意识中的实现；但是即使它们从来没有被真正了解，它们也仍然属于有效的、意义重大的、最终不可分析的范畴，完全不同于空想的、矛盾的概念，这在它们涉及物质和精神的非实体时可能是类似的。主体需要的客体被赋予的价值与此类似，但是被不同领域的需要所限定。我们感觉客体、人们和实践不仅在被我们欣赏时是有价值的，即使没有人欣赏，它们仍然是有价值的，正如同当我们认识到某些问题的真实性独立于我们的表象时，我们将其表述为真实的。最显著的例子是我们用来确定人们气质或性格的评价，例如：有道德的、有威严的、强壮的或是美丽的。对于我们而言，这些内在品质是否在使它们成为可能或需要被认识的事件中显现自己，或者这些品质的载体是否用自己的某种价值观念去反映它们，与它们真正的价值无关；而且，这种对主体承认的中立，赋予了这些价值个性的色彩。更进一步来看，以下所有这些事实都使我们认为世界是有价值的，而不管这些价值是否被有意识的体验：智力的力量以及它把最隐秘的力量和自然的排列带到意识的光环之下的事实；在个体精神的有限领域之中，即使那种认为在世界上痛苦占有优势的悲观主义观点是真的，与外在世界相比，情感的能量与韵律仍然是最重要的；不管人怎样做，自然都一直根据可靠、固定的规范来运行，多种多样的自然形式与更深层次的统一体是不可调和的，自然机制可以通过观念加以解释并同样创造出美丽和雅致的东西。这提供了我们为任何一个交换的客体确定经济价值的所有方法，即使没有人愿意支付价钱，即使这个客体根本没有人需要、一直没有销路。在这里，头脑的基本才能也变得明显起来：把自己从观念中分离出来，它把这些观念构想和描绘成像独立于它自己的表象一样的东西。我们所体验的每一个价值都是一种情感，然而通过这一观点我们意欲表达的是一个重要的内容，此内容通过这种意见被从心理层面上认识，但它并不与意见等同，也没有被穷尽。很明显，这一范畴超越于价值主观性或客观性的争论之上，因为它否认了这种主体是其客体存在所不可或缺的关系。更恰当地说，它是一个第三方、一个进入了二元性但又没有被它穷尽的主观概念。与它从属的实践范围相一致，它相对于主体有一种特殊的关系形式，而主体并不仅仅因为我们理论概念的抽象内容而存在。这一形式可能被描述为一个主张或需求。价值与任何的客体、人、关系或偶发事件相关，它需要承认。作为一个事件，这个需要仅仅存在于作为主体的我们自己，但是在接受它的过程当中，我们感觉到我们并没有仅仅满足于将一个要求强加于我们自己，或者仅仅承认客体的性质。能唤起我们宗教情感的一个现实象征符号的能力，宣传生命特殊地位或是将它们单独放置在一边、促进或阻碍生命特殊地位的道德挑战，并非仅仅对重大事件保持中立，而是要求去回答它们的责任感，将被感知的东西在美学语境下进行解释的权利——所有这些都是只有在自我中才能被经历和认识的要求，它们在客体本身中没有相似物或分离的对立点，但是作为需要，它既不能被追溯到自我，也不能被追溯到它们所指涉的客体。从自然主义的观点看，这样一个要求可能显现为主体性的，但从主体的观点看，它又显现为客观性的；事实上，它是一个第三范畴，即非得自主体，也不是得自客体，不过我们可以说，它处于我们和客体之间。我前面已经讲到，事物的价值属于那些精神的内容，当我们设想它们的时候，我们同时把它们作为独立存在于我们表象之中的东西来体验，并将它与其赖以存在于主体的功能分离开。当这种表象的内容是某种价值的时候，它可以作为某种需要造成的感觉被更进一步检验。此“功能”并不是一种外在于我们的需要，而是源于我们的某种观念领域，而这一观念领域并非内在于我们。它并非评价客体的一个特殊性质，而是由客体的意义组成，这种意义是客体对于我们的意义，它们通过在观念领域秩序中的位置而获得。这种我们设想为独立于对其的认识的价值是一个形而上学的范畴，就像知觉的愉悦位于其下，它远远超越于主体和客体的二元论之外。后者是一个具体的统一，范畴区分尚未应用于它；前者是一个抽象的或观念的统一，在它的自我存在意义中，二元论再次消失，正如在意识全知系统中（费希特称之为自我），自我经验主义和非自我经验主义之间的对照消失了一样。在功能和它的内容完全融合的时刻，因为已经不存在可以证明主体概念的对立客体，愉悦感便不能被称为是主体的。同样，独立、自我证明的价值不是完全客观的，因为它是通过考虑它的主体才被设想成独立的；虽然它在主体内部表明了被认识的要求，但是即使这个要求没有被实现，它也不会因此丧失其实体的任何东西。

此价值形而上学的升华在日常生活的价值评价中不起任何作用，日常生活关心的仅仅是主体意识中的价值和在价值评价的心理过程中作为一个对立的客体的客观存在性。我在本书的前面曾经指出过，价值形成的这一过程伴随着消费者和其愉悦感之间距离的增加而逐渐发展。在价值评价中的差异不得不被区分为主体的还是客体的，这源于距离上的某种变化，在这里距离消失了，因此这种差异不是以愉悦为条件来测量的，而是以需要为标准的来测量的，它由距离造成并试图超越距离。至少在那些其价值构成经济基础的客体那里，价值与需要相关。就像存在世界是我的表象一样，价值的世界是我的需要。但是，尽管每一个需要都想通过客体得到满足的期望具有逻辑的、物质的必要性，但需要的心理结构是这样的：在大多数情况下，它所关注的是满足本身，只要满足了自身需要，客体就变成了一个无关紧要的东西。当一个男人不经任何个性选择的满足于任何女人的时候，当他吃任何东西（只要他可以咀嚼和消化）时，当他在任何休息的地方都睡觉时，当他的文化需要可以通过自然提供的最简单的物质满足时，他的实践意识是完全主体性的，他完全被他自己主观状态的兴奋和满足鼓动着，他对客体的兴趣被局限于它们作为满足了主体需要这一结果的原因而存在。这一事实可以从原始人的质朴需要中观察到，他把他的生活朝向外部世界，而把内心世界认为是想当然的。但是有意识的愿望并不总是能够被当作真正有效的价值的充分标准。在指示我们的实践活动时，这通常是一些不错的权宜之计，它可以引导我们把一个客体视为是有价值的，实际上，并非客体的重要性而是使我们兴奋的可能发生的主体的满足造成了上述事实。由此看来，此情形不总是暂时优先的，而是最简单、最基本的，因而在系统的感觉中也是优先的，意识沿着最终融合为一体的两条路被引向客体。当一个同样的需要拒绝了很多可能的满足中其他全部时，并且当它不是像这样被满足，而是被某个被需要的特殊客体满足时，就开始了从主体到客体的基本的再定位。或许可以这样说，这仍然仅仅是一个需要的主观性满足的问题，但是在第二个情形中，这一需要在某一程度上被区分，只有一个特殊的客体能够满足它。在这种情形中，客体也仅仅是情感的原因，它自身并没有价值。如果冲动的差异在一个单独令人满足的客体上专门地引导着它，并取消了通过其他任何客体得到满足的可能性，这样一个缺陷也许确实可能取消差异。然而这是非常罕见和例外的情况。即使最大区别的冲动赖以发展的更为广泛的基础以及仅仅包含一个推动力但还没有一个明确单独目标的需要的原始扩散，它们仍然是作为基础存在着，在此基础之上，想要满足更多特殊需要的个体特性的意识得以发展。在主体变得更加精确时，能够满足他需要的客体范围减小了，被需要的客体被放置在一个强烈的对比中，即与所有其他的可能满足主体需要但又不再被接受的客体的对比中。从心理研究中很容易了解这样一个观点，客体之间的差别在很大程度上应该为指引意识指向客体，并赋予它们独特的意义而承担责任。在这个阶段，需要似乎被客体决定；在这个冲动不再冲向每一个可能的满足的量度内，感觉渐渐被它的终点而非起点指引着。因此，客体在我们意识中占有的空间变大了。造成这一结果的还有另一个原因。只要一个人被他的冲动所支配，对他而言世界就只是一些无差别的物质。因为对他来说，它仅仅象征为了满足其冲动的不相关的手段，这一结果可能产生于各种各样的原因，他对客体自身的自然本性没有任何兴趣。正是这个事实，即我们需要一个特殊的单独的客体，使我们强烈地意识到我们从根本上需要客体。但是可以说，这样的意识是更理论化的，它减少了只会导致自我消亡的盲目冲动。

由于需要的差异的减小与其基本力量的减少同步进行，意识变得更能够适应客体了。我们从其他的方面来看：意识被对客体产生更大兴趣的需要的细致化和特殊化所限定，所以某些力量被从唯我主义的需要中分离出。任何地方情感的弱化（也就是自我对它瞬间感觉的完全屈从）都与表象的客体相关联，与它们处于我们相对立位置的存在形式的显现相关联。所以，详尽地讨论事物是征服情感最有力的途径之一。内心过程好像被词语放置到外部世界里；它现在像一个切实的结构那样起来对抗个体，感情的强度随之被改变了。热情的平缓、作为存在的有意义的客观世界的表象，它们是一个相同基本过程的两个方面。如果后者使满足变得困难、罕见，并且使满足只有间接地被得到或者只有通过额外努力才能得到，作为逐渐减少满足需要的可能性的结果，这种内在兴趣的转变，即从单纯的需要和自我满足向客体本身的转变，可以很明显地从客体的一方面被得到加强。即便我们假设一种非常不同的需要集中在某特定的客体上，满足仍然可以或多或少地被视为是理所当然的——只要没有困难和阻力。为了构思客体的独立意义，真正重要的是它们和我们对它们的印象之间的距离。为了建立客体和自己的一个距离，为了获得它们的客观图像，一个人必须退回到客体本身，这是很多情况中的一种。当距离太大或太小的时候，确实没有比我们此时所获得的不清楚或受到扭曲的图像更主观的观点了，但是我们的认识具有一种内在权宜主义的理性，它把特别的强调放在那些极端情况中的主观性上了。最重要的是，客体只在我们和它的关系之中存在，并且它完全被这种关系吸引；仅仅在它离开这一关系的时候，它才成为某种外在并对立于我们的事物。即使是在试图征服它时认识到其独立性的对客体的欲求，也只有当需要和满足不相一致时才得到发展。作为一个未来的想象，愉悦的可能性必须与我们目前的情形分离开，以便得到现在离我们还有一定距离的我们所需要的东西。正如在理性的领域中，我们可以在孩子那里观察到的感觉原始的统一性逐渐地被分离成自我意识和客体意识，所以客体朴素的愉悦仅仅对事物的意义做出让步，并且当客体也做出一些让步时尊重它们。在这里因为意志和情感原始力量的减小有利于自我意识的增强，欲望的减弱和价值客观化的开始之间的关系也是显然的。只要一个人完全屈服于瞬间的感觉、完全被它支配，那么自我就不可能发展。一个存在于它的各种各样的情感之外的自我意识，只有当它作为永恒的实体在所有的变化中呈现时，并且当这些情感不再吸引全部的自我，这种自我意识才得以形成。作为它们相对照的中立点，情感必须留下未触及的自我的一部分，所以情感的某些减少和局限允许自我作为不同内容不变的载体而发展。在我们生活的所有领域，自我和客体都是密切相关的概念，它们在表象的最初形式中并没有被分离，只是通过彼此变得有所差异；同样的方式中，客体独立的价值只有通过与已经独立的自我相对照才能得以发展。只有我们所能体验到的排斥、获得一个客体的困难、处于愿望和它的实现之间的等待和努力，才能促使自我和客体分离，否则的话，在接近需要和满足的过程中，它们仍将是未发展的和无差别的。客体的有效定义源于相对于需要的缺少，源于为获得它而付出的积极努力，毫无疑问，只有在这种方式中，客体和我们之间才能建立起一个距离，它可以使我们给予它一种超出其本身愉悦感的价值。

所以，可以这样说，一个客体的价值确实依赖于主体对它的需要，但是它所依赖的这个需要不再是纯粹本能的。从另一方面说，如果某个客体保持着经济上的价值，那么它的价值就不会变化得如此之大，以至于成为不受限制的。因为获得客体的困难，因为它太过昂贵的价格、因为道德或其他担忧反对着为它做出的努力，自我和客体之间的距离可以变得如此之大，以至于意志的行为不能发展，需要被压制或变成一个含糊不清的愿望。至少从经济学的角度而言，主体和客体之间确定价值的距离有着更低或更高的限制，下面的这个公式，即价值总量等于获得客体时遇到的自然、生产和社会机遇等方面的阻力程度的公式，是不正确。当然，假如我们获得钢铁所遇到的困难同获得呼吸的空气的困难一样大，那么钢铁就不会有什么经济价值；但是如果制造出了能够使钢铁具有价值的工具，那么这些困难就会被控制在一定限度之内。再举一个其他的例子：一个非常多产的画家一件作品的价值相比一个产量较少的画家的一件作品的价值要小——假设他们的艺术才能相同。但是只有在一个特定的数量层次上，这句话才是正确的。为了获得名望，使他的画作的价格上升，一个画家被迫只能画一定数量的作品。再如，黄金在一些使用纸币的国家中的稀缺造成了这样一种情况：即使提供给他们黄金，普通的人们也不愿意接受。在贵重金属的特殊形态中，它们能够适合做货币的材料通常被归因于它们的稀缺性，应当注意的是，这种稀缺性只有当金属达到一定数量时才有意义，否则的话，这些金属就不能服务于对货币的实际需要，因此也就不能获得它们作为货币所拥有的价值。或许，只是对商品数量无限制的贪婪欲求——在这个条件下，所有价值的全部仍是不够的——使得我们忽视了稀缺与不稀缺之间的一个确定的比例才是价值的条件，而非稀缺本身。稀缺的要素必须与其意义差异的重要性相联系；同样地，充裕的因素必须与习惯的意义相联系。总体的生活是被这两个因素之间的比例决定的：即我们需要内容的多样和变化，就如同我们需要对内容的熟悉一样，这个总体的需要是以一种特殊的形式出现在这里的。这种特殊形式源于：一方面，客体价值需要稀缺性，即差异性和特殊性，而一方面，它又需要一定的广泛性、频繁性和持久性，以使客体能够进入价值领域。

与美学价值的类比

我将通过一个例子来显示对于客体价值而言距离的普遍重要性，这个例子与经济价值无关，只阐明其总体原则，也就是美学价值。我们称为对事物的美的愉悦感发展相对晚一些。因为不管在今天的个体情形中存在着多少瞬间的感觉愉悦，审美愉悦的特殊性质始终是欣赏和享受客体的能力，而不仅仅是一种感觉经验或超感刺激。在对一个美女的审美愉悦和感官愉悦之间，每一个文明开化的人都能够从原则上做出清晰的区分，即便在一些特殊的情况里，他或许不能够在其印象中的成分之间划出一条界限。在一种情形中我们屈从于客体，而在另一种情形中客体屈服于我们。虽然像其他的价值一样，美学价值也并不是客体的完整部分，它只是我们感觉的一种投射，但是它也有投射完成的特性。即是说，情感的内容好像被客体吸收了，它对抗着主体，就像具有独立意义、内在于客体的东西一样。如果原始的愉悦是所有的更为细致的欣赏的基础，它已经与直接的主观满足和效用密切相联系，那么这个使事物中客体的审美愉悦形成的心理历史过程是什么呢？或许我们可以在一个非常简单的观察中找到答案。如果任何一种客体为我们提供了很大的快乐或好处，那么我们在以后每次看到这个客体时，即使它现在已经没有任何用处和愉悦感了，都会体验到一种快乐的感觉。这种快乐像回声一样，有一种独特的心理特征，这个特征是由这样一个事实决定的：即我们不再从客体中要求任何东西。代替了前者与客体的具体关系，现在我们唯一关注的是愉快感觉的源头，因为我们的情感只依赖于它的外观，而不是可能在任何意义上被消耗的东西，我们把客体的存在本质放置一边不去触及。简单地说，尽管以前为了我们实践和幸福的目的，客体作为一种方法是有价值的，但是现在它变成了思考的客体，我们通过有所保留的、远远的、不去触动它的观察得到快乐。对我而言，审美愉悦的本质特征在这里预示出来了，但是如果我们追随着情感从个人心理空间到整体空间的变化，这些特征就可以被更明白地显示出来。我们经常努力从效用中获取美，但是作为某种规则，这只会导致美的庸俗化。如果实际的权宜和感官满足的直接性被放置到人类历史上足够远的过去的话，我们的有机体的一种本能的、像条件反射一样的愉悦感便会被附于客体的外观；物理一精神的联系此时就成了遗传的东西，并且在个体那里变得有效，而不需要任何有关客体的实用性的意识——那么或许上述情况是可以避免的。只要看到事件发生了，并且这种性质如同是遗传的就足够了，这里没有必要对这种已获得的联系的遗传性展开论证。因此，对于我们而言，美是曾被证明对人类有用的东西，对它的关照会给我们以愉悦感，这不需要它为作为个别的客体带来任何的实际益处。当然，这并不意味着个体品位的一致或向平均、整体的水平变化。这些初期的一般效用的回声被吸收到个体精神的多样性之中，然后转化成新的独特性质，所以可以说，愉悦感同其最初原因实在性的分离已经最终成为我们意识的一种形态，它彻底独立于最初使其产生的内容，准备着吸纳其他任何相关的精神序列允许的内容。在那些情形中，它提供了现实的愉悦，我们对客体的欣赏不是特别审美性的，而是实用性的；它只有作为距离增加、提取和升华的结果时，才成为审美性的。发生在这里的是一种普遍的现象，它曾经是某种被建立起的特定联系，后来联系的环节因其不再被需要而自行消失。耗尽的意义，就会越多地赋予它一种关系——被它们的某种独立价值的情感替代了的仅仅作为手段的评价客体的关系。

经济行为既创建距离又征服距离

对于那些种类而言，通过遗传或者其他的机制，某些有用的客体和愉悦感之间的联系已经被建立得如此完备，以至于即使这些客体没有任何实用性，只要看到它们就会感到愉悦。这恰恰说明了康德所谓的“美感的中立”，即缺少对一个客体真实存在的关心，而只关心它的“形式”，也就是前面所说的它的视觉效果。由此我们得出美的光彩和卓越性，它源自于现实动机的暂时远离，这时我们从中发现了美。因为，很久以前，人类的进化就排除了在冲动和体验中心灵内在状态任何特殊和个体的东西，由此我们得出美感是一种典型的、超个体的和普遍有效的东西的观念。所以，我们不可能在理性基础上证明美学判断的正确性或对立面，证明它们有时表现为某种对个体而言是有用的和令人愉快的东西。客体从实用价值到美学价值的总体发展是一个客观化的过程。相比于仅仅说它是有用的，当我说一个客体是美的时候，其性质和意义就变得更加独立于主体的安排和需求。如果客体仅仅是有用的，那它们就是可互换的，每一个客体都可以被任何其他能够完成相同工作的东西代替。但是，当它们是美的时候，它们就具有了一种独特的个体存在，即使它可能以自己的方式所表现出与前者相同的美，一个客体的价值也不能被另一个代替。我们不需要把这些有关美学价值起源的简短评论延续到对主体全部分支的讨论中，为了认识到价值的客体化源于某种相关的距离，这种距离形成于在客体价值直接主观起源和我们关于客体的瞬间感觉之间。对人类而言，更为遥远的是最初创造了兴趣和价值而现在却被遗忘了的客体的有用性，更为抽象的是起源于客体纯形式和外观的审美满足。它在我们面前越多地保持自己的尊严，我们就会越多地赋予它一种没有被偶然的主观喜爱所因为当它是一个时间中的距离问题时，我称之为“距离”的客观化结果就显得非常清晰，所以我选择了上面这个例子。当然，这个过程是强烈的和质的方面的，所以在距离的方面，任何数量的指称都或多或少都是象征性的。通过许多其他因素可以带来相同的结果，正如我已经提到的：比方说，通过客体的稀缺、获得中的困难、放弃的必要性。虽然在这些经济领域的重要事例中，客体的意义对我们来说仍然是一种意义，并且它如此依赖于我们的欣赏，但决定性的变化是，客体经过这些发展之后作为独立的力量与我们发生对抗，就像一个由它们自己的性质决定的物质和能量的世界，这些性质决定了它们是否可以、在多大程度上可以满足我们的需要，以及在它们向我们屈服之前我们需要付出努力和辛苦。只有当放弃的问题（放弃真正重要的感觉）出现时，对客体本身的直接关注才成为必要的。这种情形在程式化的形态中是用天堂的概念来表达的，在此情形中，主体和客体、需要和满足彼此还没有被分离开，它并不局限于某一特殊历史时期，而是存在于频繁变化中的任何一处，这种情形注定是要分裂的，并且获得一种新的调和。建立某个距离的目的是为了使它被征服。将我们和客体分离开的渴望、努力和牺牲被假设引导我们走向它们。在实践中退后和接近是两个相互补充的概念，其中的任何一个都以另一个为先决条件；它们是我们与客体的关系的两个方面，我们把它称为：在主观上是我们的需要，而客观上是它们的价值。我们不得不让被喜欢的客体离我们更远一些，以便再一次需要它，在同疏远的客体的联系中，这种需要是接近它的第一步，同它第一个观念上的联系。需要它的双重意义只有在与客体的距离中才能产生，它试图征服这个距离，并预设了客体和我们自己之间的紧密性，以便这一距离能够被客体完全体验，这种双重意义已经被柏拉图在一个论题中很好地表达了，这个论题认为爱是处于占有和丧失两者间的某种中间状态。牺牲的必要性、需要被满足的体验具有某种代价，它仅仅是这种关系的强调和强化。仅仅通过把我们引向超越这一距离的道路，它使得我们更加清楚地意识到我们现在的自我和对事物愉悦感之间的距离。这个有助于远离和接近同时生长的内在发展也是作为一个差异的历史过程出现的。文化造成了不断拓宽利益范围，换句话说，就是利益客体所处于的这个外围越来越远离中心——即自我。但是，这个距离的扩大依赖于一个同时不断靠近的图景。如果对现代人而言，千百英里以外的客体、人们和事件获得了极大的重要性，那么相比原始人，他们与这个现代人要接近得多，对原始人而言，这些距离还不存在，因为近和远的绝对区分还没有形成。这两个概念从最初的无差别状态时起，就是在一种相互作用的关系中发展。现代人不得不通过不同的方法来工作，不得不付出比原始人大得多的努力，因为他与其尽力想得到的客体之间的距离要大得多，在他道路上的障碍、困难也大得多，但是从另一方面来看，通过他主观上的需求和实践中的工作，他得到了更多数量的客体。这个把冲动和愉悦感的主观状态转换成客体的价值的文化过程，更加清楚地区分了我们近与远的双重关系的要素。

冲动和愉悦这些主观事件在价值中被客观化，即是说，从客观条件中发展出了阻碍、丧失、付出某些代价的需要，在这一过程中，冲动和愉悦的动机或内容被首次从我们当中分离出来，并且正是通过这一行为，成为了一个客体、一种价值。关于价值主观性和客观性的基本的概念问题被误解了。价值的主观性被完全错误地建立在下面这个事实之上：因为从一个地方到另一个地方、从一个人到另一个人，甚至从一个小时到下一个小时，价值都在变化着，所以没有客体可以获得普遍性的价值。这种情况混淆了价值的主观性和个性。我想要享受某些事物的乐趣、或者我享受了某些事物的乐趣的事实的确是主观性的，这里不存在这样的对客体的意识或兴趣。但是这时一个完全新的过程开始了：即价值评价的过程。意志和情感的内容假设了客体的形式。现在，这个客体在一定程度上独立地面对主体——既可以屈从于主体，也可以拒绝交出自己，为了获得客体而提出的条件，通过他最初随意的选择被放置在了一个法制的必然的有限制的领域中。这些客观性形式的内容对所有主体并不相同，但在这里，这一点是完全无关紧要的。即使我们假设全部人都用完全相同的方法来评价客体，也并不会使客观性增加到超过存在于个体情形的程度，因为，如果任何客体都绝不是仅仅用简单的满足需要来评价，那它与我们之间便存在一种客观的距离，此距离是通过真实的阻碍和必需的努力、通过获得和失去、通过益处的考虑以及通过代价得以建立的。有关价值客观性和主观性的误导问题屡次出现的原因是，我们以经验为主发现的无限数量的客体全部都是表象的产物。然而，如果一个在它的完成形式下的客体最初出现在我们的意识中，那么它的价值将完全存在于主体之中；从这当中我所开始的方面，即客体在存在和价值这两个系列中的分类，似乎与主体和客体之间的区分是相同的。但是这种观点没有考虑到意志的客体和表象的客体是不同的。即使这两者可能在空间、时间和性质的系列中占有一样的位置，但被需要的客体面对我们的方式也是不同的，并且它与被表征的客体有着完全不同的意义。我们来考虑一下有关爱的类似情况。我们爱的人和我们的理性表象不是同一个存在。在这里，我指的不是在认识客体中情感可能产生变形和歪曲，因为就算内容改变了，这些东西也仍然存在于表象和理性范畴的领域中。理性表象成为我们的客体的方式、心爱的人成为我们的客体的方式，这两者是完全不同的一样。不论逻辑的同一性如何，它对我们而言有着不同的意义，正如米洛斯的维纳斯雕刻品对一个结晶学家和一个美学评论家而言意义是不同的一样。虽然被认为是同一个元素，这个单独存在的元素却可能通过非常不同的方式成为我们的客体：作为一个表象的客体，或者作为一个需要的客体。在这些范畴当中的每一个里，主体和客体之间面对面的冲突都有着其他的原因和结果，所以，如果人和他的客体之间的实践关系与主体性或客体性之间的只适用于理性表象中的二选一的关系相等同，那么它只能导致混乱。因为，即使某个客体的价值在诸如颜色、重量等相同的方式下不是客观的，在与这种客观性相对应的意义上，它也并非就是完全主观的；这种主观性更适用于由某种感官的欺骗产生出来的一种颜色感知、其他任何基于错误结论的客观性质的感知、或通过迷信暗示出的性质的知觉。但是，这种对客体的实践关系产生了一种完全不同的客体性，因为现实环境使欲求和愉悦的客体从主体领域退出了，从而创造了一种特殊的范畴，我们将其称为价值。

在经济领域中，这个过程发展于这样一种方式：即在某个人和他所需要的客体之间提出的牺牲或放弃的内容同时也是其他人需要的东西。一个人必须放弃自己所拥有而又为其他人所需要的东西和愉悦，以便说服后者放弃他所拥有的、前者想得到的东西。我将会说明，一个单独的生产者的生存经济可以简化为一个相同的公式。两个价值形式是交织的，必须把其中一个价值提供出去才可以得到另一个价值。所以，这里有着一种客体价值相互决定的现象。通过被交换，每个客体都经由其他的客体获得了自己价值的现实体现和途径。这是建立在主体和客体间距离之上的最重要的结果和表达。只要客体仍接近主体，只要需要、缺陷、困难和得到它面临的阻力的差异仍然尚未把客体从主体那里移走，就可以说它们是需要和愉悦，但还不是需要和愉悦的客体。当同时远离并且超越了距离的客体为了这个目的被特别地制作出来的时候，我前面已经粗略描述过的、通过它需要和愉悦得以变成客体的这一过程便完成了。这样，纯粹的经济客体性便建立起来了，这种纯经济客体性即客体与从任何主体关系到主体的东西相分离，并且，因为生产是为了与另一个具有相应角色的客体交换的目的而完成的，所以这两个客体进入了一种互相作用的客体关系。这一在交换中被价值采用的形式，把价值放置在了一个超出严格意义的主体性和客体性的范畴中。在交换中，价值成为超主观性、超个体性的东西，但还没有成为一种客观性质和事物自身的真实。超越了其自身固有的实在性，价值作为客体的需要显现出来，它的交换和获得只不过是为了另一个对应的价值。即使是价值的普遍源头，但是因为自我变得如此远离客体，所以在每一个情形中，它们都可以互相度量彼此的重要性，而不用涉及自我。但是，在价值之间的这一被交换完成和支持的真实关系，显然在最终的主体愉悦中有着它的目的，那就是，在现实中，与没有交换活动相比，我们得到了更多数量和更大强度的价值。据说，神的原则是：他在创造了世界的基本要素之后，便就此隐退而让它们凭借自己的能量自由发展，所以我们现在可以谈论客观的宇宙，遵从它自己的关系和规律；进一步说，神的能量选择了这种宇宙过程的独立性，来作为实现自己世界目标的最简便的方法。同样地，我们把一定的价值数量赋予经济客体，当作那是它的一种内在属性，接着把它们移交给交换的过程、移交给由它们的数量决定的机制、移交给价值中的一种非个人的对立，由此它们获得了多样化和最终目标更多的愉悦，这也正是它们起源的基点：主体的经验。这是在经济生活中找到其表达方式、其结果表现着货币意义的价值的基础和源泉。现在，我们将转向对这些内容的探讨。

第二节

作为超越客体主观价值意义之手段的交换

经济事物的技术形态造就一个或多或少完全从主观一个人的基础上分离出来的价值领域。虽然个体购买了他所看中和想要消费的客体，但是他的需求只有在交换中通过某一客体才能够有效地表达出来。如此，这个区别以及功能和内容之间增大的张力得以在其中将客体创造成一个价值的主观过程就变成了一个客体与客体之间客观的、超个人的关系。个体被他们的需求和价值评价所刺激，时而做出这样的交换，时而做出那样的交换，他们仅仅在建立价值关系的时候才有意识，这一价值关系的内容形成了客体的部分。在价值上，一个客体的数量和特定的另一客体的数量相协调，这种比例关系作为某种客观上相适合的、由特定规律决定的东西而存在，它从这里开始并在这里结束，我们也正是用这种相同的方式来思考道德和其他领域的客观价值的。至少，非常发达的经济现象会在这种光亮中显现。在这里，客体按照在任何时候都确定不变的规范和标准流通，通过这一过程，它们作为一个客观的范围与个体相面对。个体有可能参与也有可能不参与到这个范围中，但是如果他想要参与，他也只能以外在于自身的这些决定性要素的代表或实行者的身份才可以。经济往往是朝着进展的某个阶段而发展的，它从不是完全虚幻的，也从没有被完全实现，客体的价值在这里通过某一自动机制被决定，不管有多少主观感觉作为一种预设条件或内容被并入这一机制。一个客体的价值获得好像它自身拥有的观感和确切性是通过这样一个事实：即一个客体被提供给另一个。通过这种相互的平衡，每个经济客体得以在另一个客体中表达自己的价值，这个平衡关系把两个客体从主观意义的范围移出。价值的相对性意味着它的客观性。在人的感情生活中全部价值评价的过程都无可否认地发生了，对人的这种基本关系在这里被预示了；可以说，它已经被客体吸收了，并且客体因此这样附带着它们进入了相互平衡的竞技场，这不是它们的经济价值的结果，而是它的代表或内容。

在交换中，客体相互表现彼此的价值

正因为上述内容，通过赋予客体经济方面的功能，经济交换的事实把客体从它们的主体纯粹主观性的束缚中解放了出来，并且允许它们相互决定它们自己。客体不仅通过自身存在的需要，并且通过对其他客体的需要来获得它的实际价值。价值并不决定于和存在需要的主体间的关系，而是决定于这种关系依赖于主体所牺牲的代价这样一个事实，从另一个方面来说，这个主体是作为一个被享受的价值而显现的，而客体以本身表现为一个牺牲者。这样，客体间彼此相平衡，价值作为客观的、固有的性质以一种非常特殊的方式呈现了出来。当交易中客体在不断运行着的时候，换句话说，即当它所代表的牺牲被决定着的时候，它对于双方的意义似乎是某种外在于它们的东西，似乎每一个个体都仅仅在与自己的关系中才能体验客体。在后面的书中，我们会看到一个独立的经济也利用相同的必要的牺牲来获得客体，因为它是以自然的需求来面对经济上的人，所以，在这种情况下，同样的关系也会赋予客体以同样的客观上有条件的意义，即使交换中只有一个参与者。主体的需求和情感是背后的推动力，但是它不能自己产生价值形式，价值形式是彼此对立的客体相互平衡的结果。经济经由交换的形式传播了全部的价值，在所有人类活动源头的需求和它们得以到达顶点的需要的满足之间，经济创造了中间领域。作为行为举止和交流的一个独特方式，经济的这一特殊性质不仅仅存在于交换价值中，还存在于价值的交换之中。当然，在交换中客体获得的意义并不是完全独立于它们直接的主观意义的——这种主观意义最初决定了彼此关系。两者有着不可分离的关系，就如同内容和形式一样。但是，这个经常决定着个体意识的客观过程忽视了这样一个事实，即价值是它的实质；它的特殊性质是处理价值的等价物。同样的，几何学有着它自己的目的，即决定客体大小之间的关系而不涉及使这些关系有效的物质。一旦人了解到人类行为在每个精神活动范围中运用抽象的程度，那么下面的事实就不会像它第一眼看上去那样这么奇怪了：不仅经济的研究，并且经济本身都是通过一个价值评价的广泛现实性的真实抽象建立的。事物的能量、关系以及性质，包括我们自己的本质，客观上构成了一个统一的整体，但是为了使我们能够处理这个整体，它不得不依我们的兴趣被分解成多种多样的独立系列或主题。每门科学都对同一类的、明显区别于其他科学问题的现象进行研究，但是，现实忽略了这些界线，世界的每个部分都呈现为所有科学任务的一个集合体。我们的实践把单方面的系列排除在事物外部和内部的复杂性之外，这样构建了文化兴趣的主要系统。对于我们的情感而言，同样的情况也是真的。当我们体验宗教或社会情感的时候、当我们忧伤或高兴的时候，它总是被从我们的感觉的客体的整体真实中抽象出来，无论是因为我们仅仅对那些可以在一些共同文化兴趣范围内产生的印象有反应，还是因为我们赋予每个客体一种特定的色彩，这种色彩的有效性源自于它同其他色彩的相互交织并进而形成一个客观的统一体。因此，下面的公式便是人和世界的关系能够被明确表达的一种方法：即我们的实践同我们的理论一样，不断地从绝对统一和客体的混合中抽象出单一的要素，并把这些要素构成相关的实体和完整体系，在这当中，每个客体都支持着其他的客体，所有客体都有着平等的权利。除了在极其一般性的情感中，我们和存在的总体没有关系，我们只是通过从现象中不断地抽象提取才获得了一种和世界的明确的关系，这个抽象的过程与我们思考和行动的需要相一致，它授予这些抽象内容以纯粹内在的联系的相对独立性，而在这里，世界过程连续不断的溪流否认了客观实在。经济体系的确以一种抽象为基础、以交换的相互关系为基础、以牺牲和获利的相平衡为基础，在其发展的真实过程中，它与它的基础和结果、欲求和需要是密不可分的。但是，这个存在的形式并没有把它同其他的范围区分成我们出于我们的利益的缘故把整体现象分割开的那样。

一个客体的价值通过与另一客体的交换而被客观化

在经济价值客观性中使经济学成为一个专门的研究领域的决定性事实是：它的有效性超越了单独的主体。这个事实，即客体必须与另一个客体相交换的事实，说明了它不仅仅相对于我是有价值的，而且独立于我时也是有价值的，也就是说，相对于其他人而言它也是有价值的。等式“客观性=对主体的一般有效性”在经济价值中找到了它最清晰的论证。我们开始意识到的、并在其中通过交换发展某种利益的这种等价给予了价值特殊的客观性。因为即使交换中的每个要素都可能是个人的或仅仅在主观上是有价值的，但是这个事实，即它们彼此是相等的事实是客观的因素，它不包含在这些元素的任何一个之中，也更不处于这些元素之外。交换预设了一个主观价值评价的客观尺度，这个预设不是就时间上的优先意义而言的，而是从两个现象都源自于相同的行动的意义上来说的。

交换作为一种生活形式

我们可以认为，人与人之间的大部分关系都可以被解释成一种交换的形式。交换是一种最纯粹、最发达的相互作用，当它寻找获得物质和内容的时候，它便塑造了人们的生活。我们经常忽视了这样一点，即在多大程度上一个最初显示为单方面的活动实际上是基于互惠基础上的：讲演者似乎作为领导出现，听者聚集到一起，就如同教师之于他的班级、记者之于他的公众；但是事实上，在这样的一种情形中，每个人都感觉到了显然被动的大众的决定性的、坚决的反应。在政党中流行这样一种说法：“我是领袖，所以我必须听从他们”；一个著名的催眠师最近在强调这样一点，即在催眠暗示这种显然是一方绝对依从于另一方的单方面活动的最明显的情形中，有着一种很难描述的被催眠的人对催眠师的影响，没有它，这种催眠的经验就不能实现。每种相互作用都不得不被认为是一种交换：包括每次交流、每份情感（即使是被拒绝的）、每个游戏、每次对其他人的注视等等。在交互作用中一个人可以提供他并不拥有的东西，而在交换中他只能提供他拥有的东西，这种似乎存在着的差异并不是持续不变的。因为，在第一种情况中，与交互作用有关的始终是个人的能量、对个人物质的放弃，但是交换并不是为了他人所拥有的物体被建立的，而是为了满足一个人并不拥有的个人感情。增加了价值总量的正是交换的客体，每个处于交换中的人都向其他人提供了多于他之前所拥有的东西。下面的这种情况也是真实的：交互作用是一个更加广泛的概念，而交换是一个比较狭窄的概念，然而，在人类关系中，前者主要以可以被解释为交换的形式出现。我们生活的每一天都包含了生命内容的获得与失去、增长与减少的过程，因为在交换中，一个客体对另一个客体的代替变成有意识的了，所以这个过程便被理性化了。相同的综合意识过程把事物纯粹的共同存在转化为一个系统的关系、相同的自我利用自己的统一对物质世界施加影响，它们抓住了我们存在的自然韵律，并通过交换在一种意义深长的相互联系中组织了自己的要素。这里最重要的是包括在代价牺牲概念中的经济价值的交换。当我们用爱去交换爱的时候，我们没有额外地运用它的内在能量，也没有牺牲任何利益——在这个过程中我们把任何随后的结果都放到一边。当我们在讨论中分享我们的智力资源时，它们并没有因此减少；当我们展示我们的个人形象、或接受其他人的那些个人形象时，我们自身所拥有的东西没有因为交换有任何的减少。在交换的所有情形中，价值的增加并不牵涉到获得和失去的平衡；或者每个当事方的贡献都超出这个对立面之外，也或者它已经是一个可以构成自a的获得，我们始终认可这样的一个结果，即它作为一个礼物，是独立于我们自己所提供的东西之外而产生的。但是不管是劳动客体的交换，还是投入于客体的劳动力的交换，无论在什么时候，经济交换都代表着对自己有利益的某种价值的牺牲，不过自己却也因此得到了大量的快乐。

在牺牲性交换的特殊意义中，经济生活被解释为一种交互作用，这导致了一种反对把经济价值和交换价值等同的异议的产生。有这样一种争论，即使是完全孤立的生产者（他既不买也不卖），如果他的成本和产量想要被适当地联系起来，他也必须估价他的产品和生产方法，并形成一个独立于交换的价值观念。但是，这个事实严密地证明了被他假定为错误的观点。一个特殊的产品能不能证明一定数量的劳动和其他商品物的花费的估价，在交换中付出的东西和得到的东西的估价，这两者是极其相同的。交换的概念常常被人们误解为一种存在于它所指涉的元素之外的关系。但是，它所意味的仅仅是相关主体中的一种条件或变化，而不是在某种意义上存在于它们之间的东西，在这里一个客体可能在空间上位于两个其他的客体之间。人们通过把两个在现实中进行着的事件或变化纳入“交换”的概念中并把两者联系起来，被吸引去假设发生于超出被体验的事情之外的东西，就像同样被“交换”了的“吻”的概念一样，它能够吸引我们把吻看做超出两对嘴唇的动作和体验之外的东西。只要它即时的内容被注意，交换就仅仅是一个因果联系的双重事件了，在这里一个主体获得了之前他不曾拥有的某些东西，同时付出了他之前拥有的某些东西。因此，为了生产某些产品而牺牲了某些东西的单独个体以一种与交换主体极其相同的方式活动着，唯一不同的是，他的同伴不是另一个主体，而是自然秩序和事物的规律，就如同另一种人类存在一样，没有它没有得到牺牲就不会满足。决定他的行动的价值通常与那些交换中相关的价值是极其相同的。不会有任何人会去关心经济主体是否把他的财产或劳动力投资在土地上，或是把它们转让给其他人——如果结果对于他来说都是一样的话。这种在个人头脑中的付出与得到的主观过程绝对不亚于个体间的交换，也不是对个体间交换的模仿；相反的，个体内付出和获得之间的相互交换是一种基本的假设，好像是两个人之间交换的基本物质。交换仅仅是一种次级多样化的东西，此处付出是通过另一个个体的需要发生的，但是它也可以通过事物自然技术方面的条件而产生对主体相同的结果。把经济过程减少至它在每个经济主体的意识之中实际上发生的程度是非常重要的。我们不应该被下面这个事实欺骗，即交换的过程是相互的；自然经济或自给自足经济可以被追溯到与两个人之间交换相同的基本形式，甚至追溯到个体内部两个主观过程的相互衡量的实践。这个活动不会被次一级的问题影响，例如，这些刺激是来自于事物的本性还是来自人的本性，它是在生存经济中运行还是在市场经济中运行。通过可得到的客体的手段而获得价值愉悦，每一种愉悦都只有在放弃其他价值的情况下才是可靠的，它不仅仅可以通过为别人工作间接为我们自己工作的方式，还经常采用直接为我们自己的目标工作的方式。这同样阐明了这样一个观点，即交换是生产性的和价值创造性的，就像生产活动本身一样。在这两种情形中，人们所关心的是在交换中付出其他商品的价格而得到商品，通过这种方式，最终的情形显示出与此行动之前的情形相比的一种满足的剩余。我们不能够创造物质，也不能创造能量，我们只能够按照既定的方式，尽可能多地把它们从现实领域转化到价值领域。这种在特定物质中的形式转变是通过人与人之间的交换完成的，也是通过与我们称之为产品的自然属性的交换完成的。二者都属于价值的相同概念；在这两种情形里，我们让渡出的空闲的地方被更高价值的客体填满，并且只有通过这种运动，先前与自我合并的客体才能够将自己分离出来，并成为一个价值。作为一个它们相互作用着的结果，价值和交换之间的深刻联系通过这样一个事实被阐明，即它们在实践生活的基础中是相等的。虽然我们的生活似乎被事物的机制和客观性决定着，但是如果没有赋予客体指引我们行动的价值，我们实际上不能进行任何步骤，也不能构思任何想法。这些行动是依照交换的计划来实现的，从最低层面的需要的满足到最高层面的理性和宗教性需求，每个价值都必须通过某些其他价值的牺牲来获得。想要精确地测定起点是什么、结果又是什么或许是不可能的。因为这两个要素在基本过程中不可能被分离，它们组成了实践生活的统一整体，这个统一体是不能作为一个整体被把握的，因此我们将它区别为两个元素。在这一个无限的过程中，我们必须在这两个元素间做出选择，在这里，每次交换都根源于某种价值，每个价值都根源于某次交换。对于我们的目的而言，把价值追溯到交换更具有启发性，因为把交换追溯到价值似乎更为人所知也更显而易见。将价值视为一种牺牲的结果，这揭示了我们生活中的无限财富源自于这个基础的形式。我们的对于牺牲的痛苦经历和我们的减少这种痛苦的努力使我们相信：如果它完全消失，生活将变得尽善尽美。但是，在这里，我们忽视了这样一点，即牺牲绝不始终是一个外在的障碍，而是目标本身的内在条件和可能到达目标的道路。我们与事物的实践关系构成不可思议的统一体，我们把它划分为牺牲和获得、阻碍和到达，因为不同的阶段经常被按照时间分离开，所以我们忽略了一个事实：如果没有障碍需要去克服，那么目标也将不会相同。我们不得不去克服的阻力使我们能够证明我们的力量，只有对过失的征服才能为灵魂保护正直的人所不能享受得到的“天堂的快乐”。每个综合体都需要分析的原则，否则的话它就被否定了，因为如果没有这个原则，它将不再是一个由不同元素组成的综合体；反过来说，每个分析都需要一个综合体，否则的话它就分解了，因为分析仍然需要一个确定的相互连接的整体，如果没有这个整体，它将是一些纯粹不相干的东西：甚至最激烈的仇恨也是一种比单纯的中立更强烈的关系，而中立又要比简单的毫不察觉强烈得多。简单地说，对于消除被需要的牺牲，有抑制作用的相对运动经常、或许甚至永远是目标的积极的前提条件。牺牲一点也不属于它不应该属于的范畴，就如肤浅和贪婪会使我们相信的那样。牺牲不仅仅是特殊价值的条件，还同样是一般价值的条件；在涉及关系到我们的经济行为时，它就不仅仅是为了特定的价值所付出的代价，还是单个价值得以确立的代价。

交换在两种形式中被完成，此处我打算用劳动力价值的理论来阐明这一观点。因为我们有休闲的需要、或者说有为了它自身娱乐的兴趣而使用能量的需要、再或者说有避免痛苦的努力的需要，因此所有的劳动都是一种不可否认的牺牲。但是，这里还存在着一定数量的潜在劳动能量，不仅我们不知道怎样去使用，连它自己也只是在一种自愿劳动的冲动中显示了自己，这种自愿劳动不是需要所煽动的，也不是道德动机所引发的。许多需要在为这种劳动力竞争，这种劳动力的使用价值不在于它自身的牺牲，而在于不是这些需要中的全部都可以被满足。为了能量的每次使用，我们不得不牺牲一种或更多其他可能的和需要的用途。除非我们可以把完成劳动A的能量也用于劳动B，这样的话，在进行劳动A时就不会有任何的牺牲；如果用劳动B代替劳动A，对于B来说也是同样成立的。在幸福论上被牺牲的不是劳动，而是非劳动；我们并不是通过牺牲劳动，而是通过拒绝B来支付A的——因为，正像我们预示的那样，劳动在这里不包含任何的无用性。在交换中我们通过我们的劳动付出的代价可以说是绝对的，也可以说是相对的：无效可以与劳动直接相联系，这一点被作为辛苦和劳苦体验到；在劳动与幸福论上不相关的情况下、甚至在实际价值的情况下，无效也可以与劳动间接相联系，此时我们只能通过与另一客体断绝关系才能获得一个客体。因而，愉快的劳动的情况也可以与决定经济特征的交换形式相联系。

客体在它们进入某经济关系之前（在这种经济关系中，交易中的两个客体的任何一个都表示了交换中的一方想得到的利益和另一方所需要付出的东西），拥有一种特殊价值的这一观点仅仅对于发达经济是有效的，而对于经济停滞的基础过程而言则是无效的。只有两个事物中的每一个都拥有自己的价值时，它们才可能拥有相等的价值，这个逻辑难题似乎可以通过一个类比来说明，即只有当两条线的每一条都有一定的长度时，它们才可能同样长。但是严格地说，一条线只有通过与其他线的比较才能获得长度。这是因为它的长度不是由自己决定的——因为它不简单地是（概念上的）“长”的，——而是通过使其得以衡量的另一条相对应的线决定的：相同的服务也被运用到其他线的测量上，虽然测量的结果并不依赖于这个对比的活动，而是依赖于独立存在于其他线的每条线。让我们回忆一下包含客观价值判断的范畴，我将其界定为形而上学的，从我们和客体的关系中发展出了达到某种判断的规则，但是它的内容并不存在于事物本身。这在判断长度的时候一样是真的，客体本身需要我们判断它们，但是长度的性质不是被客体赋予的，而只能通过我们本身内在的活动被实现。我们没有意识到这样一个事实，即长度只有通过比较的过程才能被确定，长度并不是它所依赖的单独客体与生俱来的，因为我们从个别的相对的长度中抽象出了长度的一般概念，它排除了没有它具体长度就不会存在的明确性。在把这个概念延伸至客体时，我们假设事物在通过对照被个别地确定之前必须拥有长度。除此之外，明确的标准已经从无数的长度比较中发展而来，它们形成了确定所有具体客体长度的基础。这些标准被作为长度的抽象概念具体化了；它们似乎不再是相对的，因为每件事物都由它们来度量，而它们本身不再被度量。这个错误就如同一个人相信落下的苹果被地球吸引，而地球不被坠落的苹果吸引一样。最后，我们在关于长度的固有性质上迷惑了我们自己，这是由于这样一个事实，即元素的多样性以及决定事物实质的关系存在于个体的部分之中。如果我们假设整个世界只有一条线，那么因为与其他线没有任何的关系，它也就不会有任何具体的长度。把世界作为一个整体来测量是不可能的，因为在只有涉及它时才可能有具体大小的世界之外没有任何东西。只要它没有被与其他的线段相比较，并且它自己的各部分之间没有彼此相比较，那这种情况对于线段就也是真的，它既不是短的也不是长的，而是外在于这个整体概念的。此类比并非驳斥了经济价值的相对性，而是使它清楚了。

如果我们把经济看作交换一般形式的一个特殊情形，这一般形式即为了得到某失误而对某事物的放弃，那么我们立刻会产生怀疑，即我们得到的价值并不是提前准备好后才被创造出的，而是全部或局部地从必须牺牲的范围中针对于被需要的客体自然而然地产生出来的。这些频繁发生的理论上的重要实例似乎确实包含着一个内在的矛盾：一个价值会因为没有价值的客体而被要求牺牲吗？没有理智的人会在不能得到同等价值回报的情况下放弃一个价值，一个所需客体仅仅作为不得不付出的价格的结果才能获得它的价值的世界将是一个反常的世界。只要我们即时的知觉意识被涉及，这就是非常重要的一点，它比普遍观点所承认的要重要得多。事实上，在处于某些特殊情况中的时候，一个主体牺牲掉的价值绝不会比他获得的价值回报大。所有的相反情况都源自于一种混淆——对被主体经验的价值与客体在交换中根据其他明显客观形式的评价而拥有的价值的混淆。因此，在饥荒中，有的人会放弃珠宝以求获得一片面包，因为在这种特定环境下，后者比前者对于他来说更有价值。这通常取决于价值情感是否被附于某个客体上，因为每个价值都被始终处于流动、调整和变化过程中的感觉的复杂综合体所支撑。此情况是一时的还是相对持久的，这在原则上没有任何意义。如果饿得要死的人放弃了珠宝，那么就很清楚地证明了这片面包对于他来说更加有价值。毫无疑问，在交换、付出代价的一瞬间，所接受的客体的价值确立了一定的量，它等于所提供的客体在交换中能够产生的价值量。完全独立于此的是这样一个问题，即所接受的客体从那里得到了它的价值，如果它可能是所付出的代价的结果，那么得到和付出之间的平衡关系便通过付出先验性地建立了。我们立刻会看到，在这种表面上不合逻辑的形式下，价值常常会从心理上产生。一旦价值被建立，不管它是怎么被建立的，都会存在一种把它看作是与代价有相等价值的心理需要。

即使是浅薄的心理观察，也可以揭示出一些代价不仅仅增加想得到的客体的价值且实际上还使其产生的实例。这个过程揭示了证明一个人的实力、战胜困难，甚至仅仅是与他人相反的欲望。为了得到某事物而在迂回的路上前进的必要条件通常是一种时机、一种动机，以此来认为它们是有价值的。在人类关系中，显然含蓄、漠视和拒绝激起了战胜这些障碍的最为强烈的欲望，这些障碍恰是努力和牺牲的原因，这种情况在性欲关系中表现最为频繁和显著，在很多情况下，如果目的中没有这样的反对，它似乎就显得不那么值得了。如果登山不需要这些障碍组成其诱人之处、吸引力和刺激性的超常努力和危险的代价，那么它的审美愉悦不会再被很多人那么高度注意了。古董和奇珍异品的吸引人之处通常也是属于相同的种类。如果没有美学的或历史的兴趣附于其上，那么人们对它们的高度注意就是因为获得它们的难度；它们的价值和它们所花费的一样多，这导致了一个结论，即它们花费的等于它们的价值。然而，道德价值却始终表明了，在道德所需要的行为中，相反的冲动和欲求必须被战胜和牺牲。如果这一行为的实现没有任何困难，而只是作为一种自然冲动的结果，那么不管它的客观内容是多么强烈地被需要，它也不会被认为有主观道德价值。道德价值只有通过牺牲较低的但仍是非常吸引人的利益才能被获得，并且吸引力越大、牺牲越大、牺牲的困难越大，道德价值就越大。在所有的人类成就当中，最高的敬重和欣赏被给予了那些象征了（或者至少看起来是象征了）整个人类最高层次的道义担当、最伟大的精力和最持久的恒心，与此同时，它们放弃、牺牲了所有的其他事物，投入了客观意志。甚至在那些美学表演和源于一种自然冲动的自由自在和迷人之处显示出极大吸引力的情形里，这种学说也要归因于被这样的成就需要的努力和牺牲的共鸣。联系的重要性经常被我们精神生活相关的活动和无穷无尽的力量转移到它的对立面，比如说，两个表述之间的联系可能作为它们彼此肯定或彼此否定的这一事实的结果发生。我们认识到：没有经历困难而只是通过好运获得的特殊价值，仅仅按照前述字面上的意义是很难被达到的，而是同样包含着代价的，后者有着相同的价值，但是却包含了否定的标记，它是前者价值产生的主要源头。

当然，这些可能有些言过其实了，或者这只是特殊的情况。为了揭示它们在经济领域内的普遍形式，我们首先必须把作为典型特征或形式的经济的某方面与作为物质的普遍性质的价值相区别。如果我们承认价值是被给予的，那么正如我们先前所说的那样，经济价值不是客体的一种固有的性质，而是通过在交换中为了它而被付出的另一客体的代价来建立的。不用付出努力就可以收获，并且不用任何交换就可以直接被消费的野生谷类，只有在其消费节省了某些其他支出的情况下，它才是一种经济利益。但是如果生活的所有必需品都可以通过这种方式获得而不需要任何的牺牲，那么也就不存在经济体系了，这与鸟、鱼或生活在遍地是牛奶和蜂蜜的地方的居民的情况没什么区别。无论A和B这两个客体是怎样成为价值的，A都仅仅是因为我为了B必须把它交换出去才成为一个经济价值，而B也仅仅是因为我可以获得A来交换它才成为价值。不管牺牲是通过个体内在的交换将一个价值转移给另一个人来实现的，还是通过在个体自身的利益空间中使付出和获得平衡来实现的，这都没有什么区别。经济客体只有直接或间接地处于我们的消费中，并发生在它们中间的交换中时才有意义。单独的消费不足以使客体成为经济客体，只有交换才能赋予它特殊的性质——我们称之为经济的性质。但是，价值和它的经济形式之间的这一区别是人为的。在最开始，虽然经济从下面这层意义上看起来可能只是一个纯粹的形式，即它只是为了使付出和获得相平衡成为可能，而假设了价值就是它的内容，但是在事实上，这个通过它经济体系得以从预设的价值中被建立的过程，可能会被作为经济价值的创造者加以解释。

价值的经济形式存在于两个限度之间：一方面是对客体的需要，这产生于拥有和快乐的预期的满足；另一方面是快乐本身，严格地说它并不是经济行为。如果先前的论点被接受，也就是认为野生谷类的直接消费并不是经济活动（除非它节省了经济价值的生产），那么真正的经济价值的消费也不再是一种经济活动，因为这两种消费活动从总体而言是不能区别的。无论人们是发现、窃取、栽植还是买来谷物，这些对于消费行为和它的直接结果来说都毫无区别。就像我们所看到的，如果客体只是直接的刺激物，只是我们从主观过程中产生的不可分的情感的一个自然部分，那么它就不再是一个价值。客体必须被从这里分离出去以获得我们称为价值的特殊意义。需要不会通过自己产生价值，除非它遭遇障碍。如果每种需要都可以不用努力就能被完全满足，那么价值的经济交换就永远不会发展，需要本身也就永远不会达到一个高的水平。只有通过障碍造成的满足的延缓、对永远得不到客体的害怕恐惧、为它而奋斗的压力，才能把需要的各种各样的元素集合到一起；才能把强烈的斗争和连续的获得集合到一起。然而，即使是需要的最强烈的元素，它也只能来自于个体内部，如果它极其丰富随处可见，那么满足它的客体将不再有任何价值。保证我们的愿望能够满足的所有事物对我们来说都是很重要的，但是这不是指我们获得的那特定的部分，因为这一特定部分可能会轻而易举地被任何其他部分代替。我们全部的价值意识源自于这样一个观念：价值是集体的缺失。在这里，我们的意识被主观愿望和满足的韵律简单地决定了，而没有给予媒介客体任何注意。单独的需要和快乐不能诠释价值和经济生活，它们是通过两主体间的交换被一起认识到的，为了获得满足，这两个主体当中的每一个都需要牺牲另一个主体所需要的代价，或者在自给自足经济中牺牲它的等价物。交换（也就是经济）是经济价值的来源，因为交换是主体和客体之间距离的代表，这一距离将主观感觉转化为客观价值。我前面提到的对康德的认识论的概括：即经验的条件同时也是经验的客体的条件，通过这一论断，他指出我们称为经验的过程和组成它的内容和客体的表象都从属于知性的同一法则。客体之所以可以被体验是因为它们内在于我们的表象，决定着经验的同一力量同样决定着表象的形成。同样地，我们可以说：经济的可能性同时是经济的客体的可能性。在两个包括物质、劳动力，或任何权利的、建立了所谓的“经济”关系，这种“经济关系”就是一种互换的放弃关系，在这种关系中，那些物质、劳动力、权利的拥有者，在产生这些客体的同时，也使它们进入价值领域。为了进入经济形式和运动，价值必须作为价值存在，这一逻辑难题现在被我们将其指定为我们与客体之间距离的精神关系的意义所消除了。这种精神关系区别了感觉最初的主观条件，进入了需要的主体和相对立的拥有价值的客体。在经济中，这一距离的产生是通过交换，以及障碍的两个方面——即阻碍与放弃——的影响而产生的。经济价值是通过相同的互惠和决定价值的经济特性的相对性产生的。

交换不只是付出和获得这两个过程的附加物，而是一个在两过程的每一个中都同时既是原因又是结果的新的第三现象。客体通过放弃而得到的价值因此变成一个经济价值。价值通常在障碍、放弃和牺牲所提出的意愿和满足之间的距离中发展。交换的过程是由取得和给予的相互决定构成的，它并不取决于某个拥有先前已获得的相对于某主体的价值的具体客体。所有被需要的东西都是在交换自身的活动中实现的。当然，在一个真实的经济体系中，客体的价值通常是在它们进入交换时被显示的。我这里所指的仅仅是价值和交换概念所内在的、体系化的意义，它只存在于最原始的形式中，或者作为一种理想的意义存在于历史现象中，或者作为它们的观念意义而存在。在这里，我并非指它们的真实形式，即在历史起源意义上的形式，而是指它们的客观逻辑形式。

实用和稀缺的理论

通过通常被看作是价值的组成部分的实用和稀缺观念的帮助，经济价值的概念从抽象领域到至关重要的关系的转变被更进一步地说明了。根据经济主体的部署，对于一个经济客体的存在而言首先需要的是效用。如果客体想要获得某个特殊的价值，那么缺失必须作为一个次要决定因素被附加其上。如果经济价值被认为是供给和需求决定的，那么供给将和稀缺、需要将和效用相一致。效用将决定客体是否从根本上被需要，稀缺性将决定我们被迫付出的代价。效用作为经济价值的绝对部分呈现出来，效用的程度必须被了解，这样客体才能进入经济交换。稀缺性只是一个相对的因素，因为它仅仅表示客体与可使用总量的数量关系。在这里，客体的自然本质不起任何作用。但是，效用似乎已经预先存在于任何经济体系了，也预先存在于任何同其他客体的比较和关系了，它是决定经济运动的实质因素。

然而，这种情形没有通过效用的概念被恰当地记述。其真正的意思是指对客体的需要。像这样的效用永远不可能产生经济过程，除非它导致需要，而它并不总是那样做。某些种类的“愿望”可能伴随着对有用的客体的感知，但是如果持续的缺乏、本质的无生气、对利益的其他领域的转移、对理论上熟知的有利条件的中立、对获得的不可能性的知晓、或其他积极和消极的方面阻碍着这一过程，那么对我们的行动有着实际意义和影响的真正的需要就会无法体现。尽管如此，另一方面我们却又欲求着、从经济上评价着所有事物，如果不任意改变平常的语言的用法，这些事物很难被称为有用的。假如有效性的概念包括每一个被欲求中的事物，那么就必须在逻辑上承认，对客体的需要是经济行为的决定要素，因为否则的话不是每件有用的事物都处于需要之中的。即便做了这些改动，它也不是一个绝对因素，也并没有消除价值的相对性。首先，正像我们所看到的那样，需要不能被明显察觉到，除非有阻碍、困难和牺牲存在于主客体之间。在现实中，我们只有在客体的愉悦通过中间阶段被度量时才能行使需要，当耐性的代价、对其他努力或愉悦的放弃把客体放置到远景途中时，需要就等于超越这个距离的努力。其次，客体的经济价值是建立在对它的需要的基础上的，这可以被解释为需要中内含的相对性的提高和升华。因为只有当其需要与对其他事物的需要相对比的时候，需要中的客体才能成为对经济有着实际重要性的价值，只有这一对比才能够建立需要的度量。只有这里存在一个我愿意为了第一客体而放弃的第二客体，或者相反的情况，那么它们当中的每一个才能拥有可度量的经济价值。起初在实践的世界中是没有单独的价值的，起初在意识的世界中也是没有数字“一”的。我们通常认为“二”的概念先于“一”的概念而存在。一条破碎的藤条的碎片需要一个表示它的复数术语；整根藤条是一根藤条，但是没有必要称它为一根藤条，除非两根藤条彼此的某些关系被考虑到了。因此，由于它不包括必需的度量，所以对一个客体的简单需要尚不足以创造一个经济价值，只有多个需求的比较，即其客体的可交换性，才能赋予它们中的每个以特定的经济价值。相等的概念是那些从其细节中形成了世界观的基本概念中的一个，但只是逐渐地获得一种心理真实，如果没有这一相等的概念，那么不管它们多么伟大，也不会有什么“效用”和“稀缺”会带来经济贸易。因为没有一个外在的标准，两个客体是否在需要上和价值上是相等的，只能通过在观念上或现实中彼此交换被确定，而同时此过程中是无需经历任何价值情感中的变化的。事实上，起初可交换性并没有把价值的平等表示为事物的一个客观性质，而相等只不过是用于可交换性的术语。需要的强烈程度自身并不会增加客体的经济价值，因为价值只有通过交换才能被表达，需要只有在它改变交换这一范围中才能影响价值。即使我渴望得到一个客体，这也不能决定它在交换中的等价物。在我依然没有拥有这个客体的情况下，我对客体的需求不会对目前拥有者的需求施加任何影响，他将根据他自己的或对客体的平均兴趣程度来要求价格，除非我表达了它；或者我拥有了客体，在这种情况下，我出的价格可能太高，以至于客体根本不能被交换，也就是说它不再是一个经济价值，这时或许我将不得不降低价格来适应预期买者所表现出的兴趣程度。决定性的事实是：实践的经济价值绝不仅仅是普遍意义上的价值，而是由其特别的性质决定的价值的确定总量，这一总量产生于对需要的两种强烈程度的度量，它在经济中采用的形式是牺牲和获得的交换，因此正像第一眼看到的那样，经济客体没有作为对其需要的一个结果而拥有绝对的价值，而是源于需要作为真正的或想象的交换的基础，赋予了客体价值。

价值的相对性导致了需要中的客体只有通过相互交换的过程才能够成为价值，它似乎暗示着，价值仅仅是某种价格，在它们的层面上不存在什么差异，在此情形中，价格和价值之间时常发生的矛盾将反驳这一理论。但是如果没有我们称为之价格的这种普遍现象，那么这个理论将会认为价值永远不会被建立。一个客体在经济上是有价值的，这意味着它对我而言是有价值的，我愿意为它放弃某些东西。一个价值只有通过与其他价值等价，即通过成为可交换的，才能够成为实际有效的。等价和可交换性是互惠的概念，它们用两种不同的方式表达事件的相同状态，可以说，等价是用静止的某一情形来表达，可交换性是用运动的方式来表达。超出了它们所提供的朴素的主观愉悦，可能激发我们赋予客体我们称为价值的这一特殊意义的是什么呢？这不能简单地归因于稀缺性。因为如果稀缺性仅仅作为一个我们不能改变的事实而存在，（而事实上，我们不仅仅可以通过生产性的工作，还可以通过所有权的变化来改变）那么我们应该把它作为一个外部世界的自然性质来接受，这个自然性质甚至可能是我们没有意识到的，并且它不会留下任何超出它们实际性质的强调。这种强调源于这样的事实，即客体的获得不得不通过付出等待的耐性、探索的努力、工作的艰辛以及对其他所需要的东西的放弃。依这个词语最普遍的意义来讲，如果没有价格的话，就没有价值。南海群岛人的信仰用一种朴素的方式表达了这种感觉：除非医生得到了报酬，否则他开的处方是不会有效果的。只有通过一个人愿意用一个客体来交换另一个而不是相反这样的事实，两个客体中的一个比另一个更有价值的事实才能够被表达出来。在实践关系尚是简单的、有限的地方范围内，一个较高或者较低的价值只是想要交换的直接的实践愿望的结果和解释。当我们说我们已经交换了事物，是因为它们有相等的价值的时候，这只是一个时常发生的语言概念上的颠倒的例子，正如在某情况下，我们相信我们爱某个人是因为他具有特定的品质，但是我们往往认为他具备这些品质是因为我们爱他；又如，我们认为道德规范起源于宗教教条，但是事实上我们相信教条是因为道德规范与我们极其相关。

在概念术语中，价格与经济上的客观价值相一致，如果没有价格，就不可能在商品的客观价值和主观愉悦之间画出一条分界线。从合同主体的观点来看，交换预示了价值的相等性这一表述是不正确的。A和B可以交换它们所拥有的α和β是因为它们有相等的价值。但是A没有任何理由去放弃α，如果他通过β得到的仅仅是一个相等的价值。β必须是一个对于他而言比之前拥有的α更大的价值；同样地，B也必须获得比他在交换中付出的更大的价值。所以，如果β对A而言比α更有价值，α对于B而言比β更有价值，只要有一个观察者被涉及，它们之间的差异就可以彼此客观地平衡。但是，对于得到的多于他所付出的合同的当事人而言，这种价值的相等并不存在。然而，假如他深信他完成了一次公平的交易，交换了相等的价值，那么从A的角度而言，这也是可以成立的：客观上他给予B—个等价物，价格（α）对客体（β），但是主观上β的价值对他而言比α的价值更大。但是A依附于β的价值的意义是一个统一体，客观价值和主观过剩之间的分界线不再是显而易见的了。只有客体被交换的事实、它作为一个价格花费了一个代价的事实，绘制了这条线，并决定了客体得以作为一个客观价值进入交换的过程的主观价值的量。

另外一种观察也证明了交换绝不是以前面叙述的价值客观相等的表象为条件的。倘若有人注意一下孩子们、冲动的个人和明显的原始人是怎样完成交换的，那么就会很明显地看到，他们愿意放弃任何珍贵的财产，以得到他们在某一时刻非常想要得到的东西，不管在大体估算中价格是不是过高，也不管当他们有机会冷静地思考这件事的时候对他们而言这个价格是不是过高。这与每次交换必须是对主体主观有利的观点相抵触。其实事实并非如此，因为全部行为在主观上都存在于超出被交换客体的相等与不等的问题之外。牺牲和获得的平衡先于交换存在，并肯定导致它们之间的平衡，这一观点是一种完全的非心理的纯理论的陈词滥调。因为这会要求一种面对一个人的欲望时的客观性，但这是我刚刚讨论过的那些人所不能做到的。没有受过教育的人、或者怀有偏见的人都不能把自己完全从其瞬时的兴趣中分离出来进行一个比较；在特定的时刻，他正好想要那个客体，其他客体的牺牲也就是价格作为付出的代价不能打动他、使他认为他想要得到的满足降低了。从那种认为朴素的、无经验的、冲动的人们为了渴望得到的客体会不惜任何代价的欠考虑的观点上来看，似乎更为可能的情况是：等价的观点是许多无需任何得到和付出的适当平衡就可以实现的交换经验的产物。在与其他客体的比较成为可能之前，通过成功地获得客体，使心灵困扰的独特欲望首先被平静了。对瞬时的兴趣和所有其他观念和估价之间的强调的极大差异，此差异盛行于未经训练和恣意妄为的心灵中，它允许交换可以发生在任何价值的判断被做出之前，也就是在对不同需要的客体的关系做出判断之前。当价值观念被极大地发展、一种理性的自我掌控盛行的时候，作为价值平等的判断便可能先于交换存在，但是这不应该用来模糊这样一种可能性，一种常有的情形，即理性的关系已经从一种心理上的对立关系中得到了进化，财产的交换起源于纯粹主观冲动，只有在后来才教会我们事物的相对价值。（在心灵的领域内，对尘世而言的东西首先产生于自我的本性。）

价值和价格

价值可谓是价格的追随者，它们必须是同一的，这种论断是一种同义反复。我把这种观点建立在早先的陈述的基础之上，即在任何个别情况下，任何合同的当事方都不会付出在那个特定环境下看起来过高的价格。就像在查米索的诗中那样，如果强盗用手枪指着某个人，强迫他以三美分的价钱出售他的手表和戒指，那么在这种情况下，他所接受的就只能值这个价钱，因为这是保护其性命的唯一方法。如果他不是处于一种倘若不选择这个薪水就根本没有工作的情况下，没有人会仅仅为不被饿死的工资而工作。价值和价格在每个个别情况下都是等价的这一论断是明显自相矛盾的，这源于下面的事实，即关于其他价值和价格的等价物的某些观点被介绍进来了。决定多数交换的环境的相对稳定性，以及根据传统标准确定价值关系的类似性都有助于阐明下面这种观点，一个特殊客体的价值需要作为其交换等价物的另一个特殊客体；这两个客体（或者说客体的范畴）有着相等的价值，即使它们处于特殊情况下也总是一致，但是如果反常态的情况允许我们以较低或较高的价值来交换客体，那么价值和价格就相脱离了。我们不能忘记，只有在特定的历史和技术条件下，被我们视为实际特殊情况标准的价值与价格的客观和应有的等价才是有效的，并且一旦条件发生某个变化这种等价关系就会马上瓦解。在标准和被认为是偏离了标准或与标准一致的个别情况之间，不存在普遍的区别，只有具体的差异。人们可能说一个格外出众或者劣等的个体“他真不是人”，但这个关于人的概念只是一个平均的概念，一旦多数人上升或下降到那些例外的标准类型，这个平均概念就将失去它的标准化地位，那么这些例外类型的人也就会被承认为真正的“人”。但是，为了了解这个事实，我们必须把我们自己从根深蒂固的、事实上也被证明是正当的价值观念中解放出来。在更高级的环境中，这些观念包括叠加的两层：一是由社会传统、习惯经验、显然的合理的需要组成的，另一个是由个别情况、瞬间需要、环境的影响组成的。在第二层领域中的迅速变化向我们的感知隐瞒了第一层领域内的缓慢变化，并隐瞒了第一层是通过第二层的升华形成的。于是，作为客观比例的表达，第二个领域看起来在经验上是有效的。被交换的牺牲和获得的价值在特定的情况下至少是相等，因为否则的话，只要稍加比较就不会有人进行交换了，但是当在更普遍的条件下牺牲和获得是有差异的时候，价值和价格之间的矛盾就会被提出来。这在两种时常一起出现的情况下最为明显：首先，一个单独的价值特征被作为经济价值接受，两个客体只有在它们象征相同的价值量时被作为相等的价值承认；其次，在道德和客观条件下，两个价值之间明确的比例都被看作是固有的。价值的本质特征是客观化的社会必要劳动时间，这一观点在两种意义上都被用来提供价值与价格相背离的标准。但是价值的这个统一标准的概念并没有回答劳动力本身是怎样变成一个价值的问题。这不会发生，除非生产所有商品的劳动已经赋予了交换发生的可能性，劳动的努力作为一种为了其产品的回报而提供的牺牲已经被体验到。劳动也只有通过交换的可能性和现实性才能进入价值的范畴，尽管后来它可能在这一范畴内为度量其他价值提供了一个标准。即使劳动力是每个价值的内容，它也只能通过进入付出和获得的关系中才能获得它的价值形式（这里的付出和得到的关系是从狭义上来说的）。根据这个理论，如果价格和价值相背离，那么合同的某个当事方就可以只用更少数量的劳动力，交换一定数量的客观化的劳动力，但是这种交换还要受其他不包括劳动力的条件的影响，例如：紧急需要的满足、一时的兴致、欺骗、垄断等等。

在一个更广泛、更主观的意义上，交换价值的等值在这里被维持下来，但是使矛盾成为可能的劳动力的统一标准并不源自交换。

在主观上意味着它们处于需要之中的客体性质上的不同不能要求产生绝对的价值量，我们在交换中认识到，能够产生绝对价值量的始终是给予客体经济价值的需要的相互关系。这种相对性通过其他的价值构成要素即相对稀缺得到了更加清楚的说明。交换仅仅是改善商品稀缺导致的情况的内在个体的尝试，也就是说，通过改变对所提供的东西的分配，努力降低主观需要。这已经在被合理评价的所谓的稀缺价值和所谓的交换价值之间指明了一种一般的相互联系。但是，这里更为重要的是看到这种相对立的关系。我前面已经强调过，商品的稀缺不能产生价值，除非它通过人们的努力是可以改变的。这种改变只有在两种方式下是可能的，或者通过增加了商品供给的劳动力的运用，或者通过可能消除需要中的客体稀缺的已经拥有的商品的提供。因此，或许我们可以说，商品的稀缺以客观上涉及那些商品的需要的交换为条件，并且只有交换才能使稀缺成为价值中的一个要素。在许多价值理论中存在这样一种错误，即在实用性和稀缺性的基础上，他们把经济价值——贸易交换——看作某些显而易见的东西，这些前提概念上的必然结果。这从根本上就是不对的。如果这些前提导致了苦行的放弃或者战争和抢掠（事实上这是经常的事情），那么就没有任何经济价值或经济生活会发展。

一旦讨论涉及到紧急的眼前需要以外的东西，文化人类学就揭示出了在原始文化中价值概念的令人惊骇的随意性、不稳定性和不充分性。毫无疑问，这是远古人对交换厌烦的结果，或者至少与其相关。这有很多方面的原因：他总是担心在交换中被欺骗，缺乏任何客观的、普遍的价值标准；或者他可能放弃他人格的一部分，听任邪恶力量的控制，因为劳动的产品始终是通过他自己创造的，也是为了他自己创造的。或许远古人对工作的厌烦也是源自相同的原因。在这里，也同样缺乏一个努力和结果之间交换的可信赖的标准，他担心他会被自然欺骗，自然的客观性作为一个不可预知的和令人恐惧的事实处于他面前，直到他可以把他自己的行为建立在成为客观的、处于某种规律中的、处于与自然的可检验的交换中时为止。被湮没在他与客体的关系的主观性之中，与事物客观性和它们的价值相一致的同自然或同其他客体的交换似乎对他而言并不合适。仿佛是对客体的最初意识同样造成了焦虑的情感，仿佛是自己的一部分被分离出去了。这也理解了对客体的神话和迷信的理解，这个理解即是：一方面，使这种焦虑具体化，并让它成为远古人可理解的，另一方面，通过客体的人格化来缓和这种焦虑，从而使它与人的主观相和谐。这种情形也解释了一系列其他现象。首先，对抢劫的普遍接受和认同，像那些对当时想得到的东西的主观的和正常化的无节制的掠夺。在荷马时代之后很长时间，在希腊落后的农业地区，海盗行为依然被认为是合法的行业，甚至一些原始人认为暴力掠夺比诚实的付款更加高尚。这也是可理解的，因为在交换和付款中，个人是从属于一种客观规范的，强烈的、独立的个性不得不抹掉自己，而这是不令人愉快的。这也说明了顽固的贵族派对交易的蔑视。另一方面，交换有利于人们之间的平和关系，因为他们接受了一个超出个性的、标准化的规则。

正像一些人可能希望的那样，在所有权变化的纯粹主观性和交换形式的客观性之间存在着很多中间的现象，所有权变化的主观性可以用抢劫或赠送礼物作为例子，交换价值的客观性可以事物根据它们所包含的相等价值被交换为例。这被在制造礼物中的传统互惠所例证。在很多人当中存在着这样的想法，即只有当一个礼物可以被酬答的时候，也就是说，只有当随后可以有收获的时候，它才会被接受。当卖者把客体作为一个“礼物”送给买者的时候，这直接导致了有秩序的交换（这经常发生在地中海以东各国），但是如果他没有得到相应的礼物作为交换，那么这就会导致他的苦恼。紧急需要情况下免费提供的劳动、邻居或朋友之间不要报酬的合作，正像在世界的任何地方都可以找到的东西，在这里也有它的位置。但是，要是有可能，通常参与这些工作的人都得到了丰盛的款待，被赠予盛宴。例如，据报道，在西伯利亚只有富裕的人才能承担得起请这样的志愿工人。即使是现在，在东方甚至意大利，对买者和卖者主观利益加以限制的公平的价格观念也并不存在。每个人都尽其所能昂贵地卖出、便宜地买进；交换仅仅是两个人之间的一种主观活动，其结果仅仅依赖于两个当事人的机智、热心和坚持，而非客体和它与价格超个人化决定的关系。一个古代罗马的商人曾经解释说，当要价过高的卖方和给价过低的买方最终彼此达成一个他们都能接受的价格时，一次交易就顺利地完成了。在这里，我们可以清楚地看到，一个客观适当的价格是怎样在主体之间的交易中形成的，在一个主要的、但还不是完全的交换经济中，整个过程是一个预先交换的环境的残余。作为一个价值之间的客观活动，交换已经存在了，但是它的完成仍然是主观的，它的模式和数量也完全依赖于个人性质之间的关系。我们可能在这里发现了神圣形式、法定规则、公开和传统的保护的根本原因，它们伴随着初期文化中的商业交易。这是满足交换的需要的超越主体性的一种方式，这种方式仍然不能通过客体之间的真正关系建立。只要交换是完全异常的，并且事物之间价值相等的观念也是异常的，那么当两个个体不得不自己做出决定的时候，想要达到一致就是不可能的。结果，我们不仅在中世纪发现了公开的交换贸易，而且更加奇特的是，我们还发现了没有交易者会轻视的日常商品交换比率的一个精确规则。这种客观性是机动的和外在的，是基于处在特殊交换贸易以外的原因和力量的。一个真正充分的客观性摒弃了这个先验性的决定，并包括了交换的计算之中在这种情况下被忽略的全部特殊情形。然而，目的和原则是相同的：交换中价值的超主观的决定性在后来被更多客观的、固有的方式确立了。交换被自由和独立个体继续着，它通过客观标准假定了一个判断，但是在更早的历史阶段中，交换必须通过社会来巩固和确保，因为否则个人会缺乏对客体价值的任何线索。相似的原因可能也影响着原始劳动的社会规则，它证实了交换和劳动之间的均等，或者更确切地说，它证实了劳动对交换的从属。在事件上、理论上都客观有效的东西与它的社会意义及认同之间存在着多方面的关系，这种关系经常以随后的方式历史地显现出来。社会交往、传播和标准化为个体提供了生活方式的庄严和可信赖性，它是后来才被证明是客观公正的。所以，孩子并不接受以内心理智为基础的解释，但是他信赖解释这种情形的人；他相信的不是某件事务，而是某个人。品味我们依赖于流行时尚的这件事情，即依赖于社会普遍认同地做一件事或欣赏一件事物的方式，直到很久以后，我们学会从美学角度去评价客体。因此，个体超越自己，从而得到的一个比个人的支持和稳固更多的需要，成为了法律、知识和道德中的传统力量。这个超越了单个主体但仍未超越普遍主体的必不可少的标准渐渐被下面的标准取代了，即源于现实知识、源于观念准则认同的标准。外在于我们并且是我们确定方向所需要的东西，作为实在或观念的客观确定性，在我们遇到它之前，就选取了社会普遍性更加简单的可接受的形式。在这种要求文化的发展是作为一个整体的意义上，交换从根本上是由社会决定的，直到个体对客体和他们所拥有的价值了解得足够多，以至能够以此来决定各种情形中的交换比例的时候。这说明了，在所有史前文化中，社会和法律上建立的控制贸易的价格自身只是许多单独交换贸易的结果，而这种交换贸易很早就以一种杂乱的方式存在于个体之间了。但是，与在语言、道德观念、法律、宗教的情形中相比，这个反对在这种情形中并没有更大的有效性；简单地说，生活的所有在集体中形成并占据优势的基本形式，在很长一段时间中，只有作为个体的创造时才表现为可解释的。事实上，从开端来看，在个体和群众之间的交互作用中，它们作为个体之间的结构发展，是无疑的，所以它们的起源不会被归因于任何单独个体。我认为，很可能在全社会中调节交换的先驱不是个体之间的交换，而是根本不是交换的所有权的变更，例如，抢劫。在那里，个体之间的交换仅仅是一个和平的谈判，交换和规范的交换可能都来源于此。一种类似的情形是通过暴力掠夺女人，这存在于规定了女性的购买和交换的与相邻地方的制定和平通婚协议之前。这种最新提出的婚姻形式很快被确立为一种约束个体的形式。相同种类的特殊自由协议应该先于它的这种想法是完全不必要的，相反，社会规则是同它一起形成的。下面这种假设是一种偏见，即假设每种社会规范关系都在历史上发源于一种类似的个体的而非社会规范的形式。先于它存在的可能是一个处于完全不同的关系形式中的类似的内容。交换超越了所占有事物的主观形式，如抢夺、礼物等，就像献给首领的礼物和他强加的罚款形成税收的第一步一样，这样，交换在超主观性的第一种可能的形式中被从社会上规范了，它后来导向了真实的客观性。在个体之间的所有权的自由交换即交换的本质中，社会的标准化是迈向那个客观性的第一步。

根据所有这些情况得出：交换是一种自成一格的社会学现象、一种社会生活的最初形式和功能。它绝不是事物的那些被称为效用与稀缺的性质与数量因素的逻辑结果，仅仅在交换被预设的时候，它们得到了它们的评价过程的意义。如果为了得到一个客体而牺牲另一个客体的活动自动完成，即交换被排除，那么就没有被渴望的客体的稀缺程度可以创造出经济价值了。客体的意义对于个体来说始终被对它的需要决定着，它的效用依赖于它所拥有的性质，如果我们已经拥有客体，那么它的意义就不会被存在着多少其他样品、或是否存在其他样品这一类的问题所影响。（这里，我把一些情况搁置到了一边，在那些情形里，稀缺自身成为客体的一种性质，从而使它成为令人需要的，例如，既没有美学价值也没有历史价值的邮票、古玩和文物。）当然，差异的感觉对愉悦而言是必需的，它可能取决于客体的稀缺，存在于它不可能在任何地点和任何时间都被喜爱这一事实之上。但是，这种愉悦的内部心理条件不产生任何实践影响，如果它有影响的话，那将会导致稀缺的永存或程度增加，但正像经验所显示的，这并没有发生。在这里，除了对客体的性质的直接愉悦以外，与我们相关的是它实现的方法。如果过程是漫长且复杂的，需要暂缓、失望、劳动、麻烦和放弃等形式的牺牲，那么我们把这个客体称为“稀有的”。我们可以用下面这种方法来表达它：客体并不是因为它们稀罕才难得到，而是因为它们很难得到才稀罕。某些商品的供给太少而不能满足我们全部人的需要，这个固有的外在事实本身并不要紧。有许多事实上稀缺的事物就其经济意义而言并不是稀缺的。它们是否在经济意义上是稀缺的，是由在交换中获得它们所必须的力量、耐性和牺牲（这样的牺牲预设了对客体的需要）的程度来决定的。获得的困难、交换中付出的牺牲是价值的唯一构成要素，它的稀缺只是外在表现、数量形式中它的客观化。稀缺只是一种否定条件，它通过不存在来表现存在的特性，这一点常常被我们忽略了。但是，不存在不会有任何结果；每个肯定的结果必须通过一个肯定的存在和力量来产生，否定仅仅是这些存在和力量的阴影。这些肯定的力量很明显是那些被包含在交换中的东西。它们的肯定特性应该被视为从其不附属于个体的事实中分离出的存在。事物的相对性有着超越单独情况的非凡特征，它仅仅存在于多样性，但不仅仅是概念的一般化和抽象。

相对性和社会化之间的深刻关系是人类表达物质相关性的一种直接证明，它在这里被描述了：社会是一个超越个体的结构，但是它不是抽象的。历史生活避免了，或者是发生在个体中的，或者是发生在抽象一般性中的二者选一的情况。社会是普遍的，同时又是具体生动的。从这里发生了特殊意义，即作为事物相对性的经济的、历史的实现，交换是为了社会；交换为个体创造了超出其单一性的明确的客体和它的意义，这不是针对抽象领域而言的，而是针对经济价值之本质的真实的相互作用领域而言的。无论对一个客体的内在属性的研究多么接近，也不会揭示出这种完全处在发生于几个以其属性为基础的客体之间的互惠关系中的经济价值。每种关系都以其他关系为条件，彼此间互换从其他地方得来的意义。

第三节

把货币概念发展为经济价值概念的化身和最纯粹表达以前，我们需要将后者表示为理论世界观的一部分，只有通过此方法，货币的哲学意义才能被理解。只有经济价值的公式与世界价值的公式相一致的时候，通过超越它的直接表面或借助这一表面，其实现的最高层次才能声称对存在的解释有所贡献。

经济价值和一种相对论的世界观

通过从并没有改变事物本质的运动流、色彩流和偶然性流动中区分出一种不变的、根本的实质，我们通常将我们的无秩序的、琐碎的、困惑的对某客体的第一印象进行系统化。这种短暂的外表中的一个稳定核心的世界的呈现，表面恒久不变的承载者的偶然表现，形成了一种绝对的和相对的比照。我们在实际中寻找其存在和意义完全依赖于自身的本质、实体和力量——正像我们所认为的那样，我们可以找到一个生存方式和特性都以我们自己为中心的存在，找到一个独立于外部世界的终极权威，正像我们将这一存在区别于我们思想中、经验中、发展中的存在和特性，这只有通过与其他客体的联系，才能成为真实的、可证明的。我们将它们区分于所有相对存在和偶然事件，只有通过同其他事物的对照、比较或反作用，它们才是它们本身。我们的生理—心理倾向和我们与世界的关系决定了对立方面发展的方向。由于它们只有通过彼此才能得到意义和重要性，所以运动与静止、外部活动与内心思考是相互联系的，但即使如此，我们仍然认为，与变化的、不安的、外在的东西相比，这对相对概念的其中之一，即生活内容的静止、实质、内在稳定性，在本质上是有价值的和确定的。因此，我们思考的目的便是找到瞬息的外表和事件流背后的稳定的和可信赖的东西，将其从彼此依赖发展为自我满足和独立。通过这种方式，我们达到了一个固定的点，它可以引导我们穿过现象的迷宫，代表我们自己看作是有价值的和确定的东西的对应物。我们首先来看这一趋势的显著例子：光被认为是一种从物体发出的细微物质，热被认为是一种物质，自然生命被认为是物质存在的精神活动，心理过程被认为是被精神特殊物质支撑的东西。假设在雷鸣背后存在着一个雷神，在地下存在一个坚固的基础以免它掉下来，或星际间存在着神灵以他们神的过程引导着人们——所有这些都在寻找一种物质，这种物质不仅仅是被认识到的性质和运动的具体化，还是初始的活动力量。超越了简单的客体之间的关系、超越了他们偶然的和暂时的存在的一种绝对的东西被寻找着。早期的思想模式不能使自己顺从于变化、物质和精神生活所有存在形式的来往。每种生命物对它们而言都代表着一种独特创造活动，正像它们今天存在的那样，制度、生活形式、价值评价会永恒和绝对地存在着，世界的现象拥有有效性，这不是只针对人和它的有组织的生活才存在的，这种有效性正像我们所认识到的那样，是其自身拥有的。简单地说，通过思想的最初趋向，我们试图把印象无秩序的流动引向一个有秩序的渠道、发现在其波动中的一个固定的结构，这种趋向被集中于物质和绝对，与它们相比较，所有的特殊事件和关系都被归纳到一个理解必须要超越的初步阶段。

一种相对主义世界观的认识论

前面给出的例子显示，这种趋向是被颠倒的。然而，几乎全部文化起初都选择了这种方法，现代科学的基本趋势不再是通过或将其作为具体物质来理解现象了，而是将其作为其载体日益被消除任何特殊性质的运动来理解现象；它用数量的即相对的方式来表达事物的性质。代替了机体的、精神的、道德的和社会的形式的绝对稳定性，科学假设了一个不断的发展，在这里，每个要素都有一个被它自己的过去和将来的关系所决定的限定位置。它放弃了对事物本质的探求，并且从人类精神的观点来看，它顺从了存在于客体和人类精神之间的关系。地球显然的稳定性不仅是一个复杂的运动，而且它在宇宙中的位置是被同其他物质集合的相互关系所构建的，这是从世界内容的稳定性和绝对性到分解为运动和关系的转变的一个非常简单但又显著的情形。

但是，就算考虑到它的结论，所有这些也还是要承认，甚至需要，一个固定的点、一个绝对的事实。完成了分解的自身认识似乎躲避了永恒的变化流及其内容简单的相对决定性。被只对人有效的理解模式所认识的绝对客体的分解预示了一个最终的点，这个点在某些地方是不能够从其他任何事物中得出的。精神过程的涌流和相对性不能影响我们依据其来决定我们的认识是否有这样或那样特征的那些预设和标准。所有完全客观的知识都被认为起源于纯粹心理上的源头，它依赖于某些如果我们想要避免在恶性循环中运动就不可能拥有的纯粹心理意义的公理。对于我们下面的讨论所基于的对事物的普遍观点而言，这不只是一个最重要的点，它还为许多独特的方面提供了一个模型，因此值得更加深入地进行研究。

毫无疑问，只有以完全确定和全面的标准为基础，陈述的真实性才能被认识。这种标准可能局限于特定的范围，也可能因为更高级别的标准变得合理，认识的层次系列在这种方式中被创建出来，每个的有效性都依赖于前面一个的有效性。但是，只要这个系列不是被悬浮在空中的（事实上完全有此可能），那么肯定在某个地方存在一种为这个系列的其他成员提供合法性的最终基础以及至高权威。而这个基础与权威本身并不需要任何合法性的基础。这就是这样一个体系，我们的经验知识必须被综合到此体系中去，它使所有有限的、相对的知识和不再有条件的知识相联系。但是，我们永远也不会知道这个绝对的知识是什么。这是因为在一个更高层次的原理内部的合并过程是无止境的，寻找一个最终原理显现的先驱的努力是无止境的，它的真实内容永远不会被构建得像它的一般存在形式那样明确。不管我们发现了一个什么样的命题作为最终的一个，站在所有其他命题的相对性之上，它都保留了这样的可能，即我们应该把这也看作是被更高级的一个决定的纯粹相对的、有条件的存在。这种可能性是一个思想史已被多次说明的积极的挑战。某些地方的知识可能有着一个绝对的基础，但是我们从未能明确地指出这个基础所在之处；因此，我们必须将每个我们所能达到的位置都视为倒数第二的位置以防止教条思想。

知识总体没有因此被怀疑论感染。正像因为它把时间和空间看作是我们经验的条件而指责康德是怀疑主义，把相对主义和怀疑主义相混淆犯了同样大的错误。这两种观点都为它们自己提供了这样一个判断，即如果作为事实绝对正确的化身，它们的对立面被完全接受，那么每个否定它的理论在那时都似乎是一种对“真实”的动摇。一旦相对性的概念被在这样一种方式中构建，它就会要求一种绝对，想要消除绝对而又不导致自我矛盾是不可能的。然而，我们的研究经过将表明，绝对不作为针对事物相对性的概念相似物而被需要。这个基本原理包括了一个转移，从经验环境的领域到涉及所有经验主义之基础的领域的转移，在经验环境的领域中，诸元素之间的“关系”超出了任何一种经验的关系，在这种意义上，它是“绝对”的。即使我们承认我们的知识可能在某个地方存在一个绝对的标准、存在一个可以自我证明的至高权威，它的内容也仍然处于不断的流动中，这是因为，知识的发展和所能获得的每部分内容都提出了另外的知识，它更加深刻、更加适于这个任务，这并不是怀疑主义；正像通常所做的那样，当我们承认自然现象受普遍规律支配的时候，随着我们知识的增加，这些规律不得不被不断地修正，它们的内容永远是有历史条件的，它们缺乏概念所包含的绝对性。相同的，不仅完美知识的最终假设不能仅仅被视为是有条件的、是主观或相对真实的，而且每个单独的可利用的假设都是如此，在任何特定时刻都应该、而且必须被这样认为。

在无穷系列中的证据建构

即使无限远离我们的知识的完美载体可能包括了一个无条件的真理，任何一个概念也只有在同另一个相比的时候，它才是真实的，这个事实说明了在我们行为当中的一种相对论，这也可以扩大到其他领域。有这样一种可能，即实践活动规范是为了可能被认为是绝对，永恒正确的人类社会而存在的，这被一种超人的精神所承认。因为如果它的合法性源于一个更高级的规范，那么后者将会是一个任何情况下都有效的绝对决定性的法律因素，所以这必须有一个法则上的原因，即是说，它必须具有自身的合法性。实际上，没有能要求绝对永恒的个别法律规则，每个法规拥有的都仅仅是暂时的合法性，它随着历史环境而变化。如果法律内容是合理的、不武断的，那么它的合法性来源于一个预先存在的法律规范，证明了取消前者的法律内容是合理的，就像以前对它的坚持一样。每个司法系统自身都包含着观念的和客观的使得自己变更、扩充或废除的力量。因此，例如，赋予国会立法权的法律不仅为废除了由同一个国会颁布的法律B的法律A提供了合法基础，还使得国会授予另一个团体以立法权的行为成为一种合法行为。从另一方面来看，这意味着每部法律的价值都依赖于它与另一部法律的关系，没有任何的法律通过自己就能拥有价值。虽然不能被证明，且我们永远也不能获得其自我满足的确定性的最初的真理只能被假设，但是，这正如同新的知识、甚至革命性的知识只有通过以前知识的内容、公理和方法才能够被证明一样，所以我们没有自我独立的权力，尽管其概念处于相关法规系列之上，但每个的合法性都是依赖于另一规定的。因为如果没有这些最初法则，我们将无法达到相关系列追溯到的证据，所以我们的知识必定要依赖于在任何特定时期都不能被证明的最初法则，但是它们并不拥有被证明的逻辑严密性。它们和已经被证明的法则的真实不是同一意义上的，只有在达到了一个被公认为自明的它们可以被证明的更高阶段的时候，我们的思想才认同它们为最终的点。与此相对应，当然存在着一些绝对的和相对的预设法律条件，这里一个完全经验性的权利通过暴利或其他方式而建立。这一权利毕竟是非法建立起来的，尽管它从一存在就作为法律被接受，但是它的存在并不是一个合法事实。它完全缺乏建立在法律基础之上的威严。实际上，每个建立了这种非法权利的权力都在为它的合法化或合法性的编造而努力，就好像效忠于超越所有相关性且不受其影响，但只有通过前一个来演绎每个现有的法规对我们而言才是合法象征的绝对权利。

但是，即使这一无限的回归没有将我们的知识作为有条件的东西来确立，它也可能以其他的方式来实现。倘若一个陈述的证明被追溯到它的根基或根基的根基，那么显然，证明就变为仅仅是可能的了，即是说，如果最初的陈述本身被假定为可证明，那么它本身是可证明的。在任何单独事件中，由于陷入了循环论证，致使推论变成幻影，然而我们的知识作为整体被禁锢在这个模式中是可以想象的。如果我们考虑到所有具体知识所依赖的数量无限庞大的分等级排列的假设，那么命题A被命题B证明，而命题B需要通过事实C、D、E等来证明，直到最终它只能通过真理A才能被证明，这一事实就似乎在实际上是可能的。就如同地球的大小隐藏了它的球状形态，给我们可以径直延伸到无限的假象，推理链C、D、E也只需要十分的长，长到返回起点是不可想象的。在我们世界的知识之中所假设的相互关系中，我们可以通过实证从每一点达到任何其他的点，这种相互关系似乎使这变得似是而非。倘若我们不想将此教条地断然归属于某个无需证明的纯粹真理，那么在它的完美状态中构思，将这种证据的互惠假设为知识的基本形式就很容易。因此，认识是一种自由流动的过程，正如同物体质量通过重量的方式给出一样，它们的基础相互决定了彼此的位置。这样，真理便是一个像重量一样的相对的概念。那么，我们的世界图景是“飘浮在天空中”的这一观点就被完全接受，因为，世界本身就是这样。这不是一种字词的偶然一致，而是一种对基本联系的暗示。通过证据认识真理对我们的内在必要性既把真理的发现推向无穷，也将其引向一个循环中，因此，一个命题只有在与另一个的关系中才是真实的，其他的命题最终也只能与第一个相联系。就像物质的总体不具有“重的”特征一样，我们的知识总体也不具有“真的”特征。如果把可以正当地指称部分之间的相互关系的性质用来指称整体，那将会导致矛盾。

在这种相互关系中认识的内在基础彼此鉴别了真理意义，这一相互关系似乎被另一个相对性形式支撑。而这种相对性形式存在于我们生活理论的和实践的兴趣之间。我们确信所有存在的事物的表现都是一种特殊生理和心理机制的功能，此功能不通过任何机械的方式来反映外在世界。一只昆虫镶嵌似的眼睛中的世界影像、一只鹰超常敏锐的眼睛中的世界影像、一只洞螈隐藏的无作用的眼睛中的世界影像以及我们和无数其他物种眼中的世界影像，它们彼此间肯定存在着极大的差异，我们可以断言，它们当中没有一个在其内在客观性之中复制了外在世界的内容。但是，这些已经至少被赋予否定特征的表象为我们的实践活动形成了假设、材料和指示，通过它我们建立了和世界的一种关系，就好像它存在于我们主观决定的表象的相对独立性中。我们期待着对我们行为的某种反应，这些通常发生于一种适当的方式，即有益于我们的方式。大自然对动物活动的反应也一样，这是由同一世界完全不同的图像决定的。对我而言，这似乎是一个极其惊人的事实：行为实现于表象的基础之上，这些表象根本不同于客观存在，但却获得了一个可靠性、方便性、正确性的结果，倘若我们知道它们自身中的客观条件，那么就知道这是最伟大的了，但是，当其他的行为基于“错误的”表象基础上时，它们往往会伤害我们。我们也可以看到，动物同样会受到欺骗的影响，同时它们也会更正误解。当它对于动物和对于我们的意义完全不同的时候，当它与客观现实不一致，却仍然能导致所期望的、有着似乎确实与客观现实相一致的确定性的结果的时候，“真理”的意义又是什么呢？对于我而言，似乎只有通过下面的假定才能被解释。为了生存、为了实现它生命的本质目标，机制的不同要求每个物种必须以一种与其他物种不同的方式来活动。一个被某种表象指引的行动是否会造成有益的结果，这并不是由这个表象的内容来决定的，即使这个表象可能与绝对的客观现实相一致。结果将完全取决于这个表象能够完成的东西——表象作为一个有机体内部的真实过程，同其他的生理的和心理的力量结合，且涉及生命特殊需要所能完成的东西。如果我们坚持说，只有在真实的表象的基础上，人类才能够支撑和维系生命，而错误的表象会破坏生命，那么除了某些表象同某个特殊机制相联系，并且它的力量和需要造成了有益的结果，此时这个内容对于每个物种而言都不同、且从来不反映真实客体的“真理”的意义是什么呢？最初，真理并不因为它是真的就有用，而反过来也是这样。我们以“真理”的名义使那些激发我们做出有益举动的表象显得高尚，它们作为真实的力量和运动在我们内部起作用。因而，基本上不同的真理与不同的生命机制、生命状态一样多。一个官能感知对于昆虫来说是真实的，但可能对于鹰来说就显然不是真的。这是因为，在这个感知的基础上，昆虫在内在及外在关系序列中都可以适当地活动，但是，在涉及鹰的环境时，这个感知却会使鹰做出不合理的、破坏性的举动。这些感知并不缺乏标准化的稳定性，甚至，每个感知的存在都拥有一个普遍确定的“真理”，它的表象也许会抓住这个真理，也可能错过这个真理。不管我们是否承认它，也不管如果用一种不同的空间观念、不同的思想范畴、不同的数字体系来考虑，它对于人类而言将不是真的这一事实，地心引力定律始终是真的。对于我们而言是“真的”内容有着存在的奇特结构，此结构完全依赖于我们的生存方式，这是不被其他存在所共有的，而它的真实价值是完全独立于它的物质实现的。一方面，一个存在有着它的构造和它的需求，另一方面，一个客观存在又是既定的，因此，就在观念上建立了对这个存在而言是真理的东西。这是因为，对于该存在而言的真理意味着最有益的表象，在其心理过程中发生了一个选择：那些有用的东西被普遍的选择方式所固化了，并作为一个整体被建立成表象的“真实”世界。实际上，除了建立在表象之上的行动所导致的被需求的结果，我们没有任何其他权威性的标准来评价表象的真理。一旦这些表象的模式通过选择和培养被最终确立为有利的，那么它们就在自身当中形成了一个理论范围，根据其内在的标准，它决定着包含还是排除任何一个新的表象，这就如同，几何学的规则是根据一种严格的内在自治被彼此建立起来的，而使得这整个结构成为可能的公理和方法标准自身却不能在几何学上被证明。几何学的整个体系和其个别命题的.有效性根本不是同一意义上的。后者可以彼此相互证明，而前者只有在和外部因素的关系中才是有效的，例如空间的性质、我们的感知方式、我们思考方式的力量等。因为已经建立的标准和事实证实了其他的，所以单独的判断可以彼此支持，但是这些标准和事实的总体只有在与特殊生理—心理机制、它们的生命状态及其行为发展的关系中才具有有效性。

真理的客观性和价值的客观性一样被看作某种主观因素之间的关系

作为表象之间的相互关系而非它们当中任何一个的绝对性质，真理的概念也因为某个特殊客体被证实了。康德声称，认识一个客体意味着把统一带进感知的多样性。从我们世界映像的杂乱材料和持续不断的印象流当中，我们辨别出一些在一起的东西，将它们按照单位进行聚合，然后我们指明它们为“客体”。一旦我们把在一起的诸多印象聚合成一个实体，一个客体就被感知了。除了那些单独印象和感知材料的功能的相互依赖，这个实体还能够意味着什么？这些元素的统一体不是元素自身以外的东西，而是元素所象征的关系的持久稳固的形式。当我把经过我意识的印象——白的、坚硬的、甜的、晶体的——形成一个统一体，以此来认识客体“糖”时，这意味着我把这些感知内容作为联系在一起的东西来认识；在特定条件下，某种联系或相互作用存在着，某个性质在此点和此关系中存在着，因为其他的性质相互存在着。社会机构的统一体、或作为一个单位的社会机构也是一样，它只表示了吸引的力量和它的单个成员之间的结合，所以，对其感知是它的理智实现的单独客体的统一体仅仅是进入它感知的元素之间的一种相互作用。在被称为艺术作品的“真理”的东西中，它元素间的相互关系、它和它所描述的客体之间的关系，二者的比较可能比通常认为的更加有意义。倘若我们忽视肖像，那么在这里，由于作品的主体就是纯粹的某个人，问题就要变得更复杂，而杰出艺术作品或文学作品中的单个元素将不能传达任何真实的或虚假的印象，在孤立中，它们处于这些范畴之外。或者，我们从另一个方面考虑一下这个问题：当观察艺术作品得以形成的最初元素时，艺术家是自由的，只有当他选择了一种特性、一种风格、一个颜色和结构的要素、一种气氛之后，其他的部分才成为确定的。他们现在不得不面对被第一个步骤所唤起的可能是奇异的、随意的和虚幻的期待。只要细节是协调的和一致的，这个整体将产生一种“内在真实”的印象，不管单独的部分与外界现实是否一致，也不管它在通常和实质意义上是否满足对“真实”的要求。在一个艺术作品中的真实意味着，作为一个整体，它保持了一个部分所拥有的允诺，宛如自愿地提供给我们那样。这个部分可以是任何一个，因为各部分之间的相互协调把真实的性质赋予了每一个部分。因此，真实在艺术的特殊语境中也是一个相对的概念。它被当作艺术作品元素之间的关系来了解，而非作为元素和组成绝对标准的外部客体之间的严格相符来被了解。如果对一个客体的理解是指把它理解为一个“统一体”，那么这也就意味着在它的“必然性”中去理解它。在这两者之间存在着一种深刻的关系。通过必然性这样一种关系，两种异质的元素成为一个统一体。必然性的公式是：假如A存在，那么B也存在。这种必然联系认为，A和B是存在或事件特殊统一体的要素，“必然联系”表示一种只能通过语言被解构和重构的完全一致的联系。一件艺术作品的统一体显然与这种必然性非常相同，因为它是通过不同元素的相互作用来发展的，如果一个元素被设定，那么另一个也必然随之出现，反过来也是如此。必然性不仅仅是彼此相关的事物之间的一种关系现象，而且也是它自身和依照其概念的关系现象。作为我们世界知识之基础的两个最普遍的范畴，即存在和规律，都不包含必然性。依照任何规律，真实生命的存在都并不是必然的，如果不存在任何事物，那么就不会同任何逻辑和自然规律相矛盾。甚至连自然规律的存在也不是“必然的”，它们仅仅是事实，如同生命存在仅仅是一个事实一样，就它们的存在而言，存在本身只不过是受其“必然”影响的事件。不存在自然规律必须存在的自然规律。所谓的必然性仅仅是作为生命存在和规律之间的联系而存在，是它们联系的方式。它们是彼此完全独立的实体，因为不屈从于规律的存在是可想象的，即使没有一致的存在，规律的体系也是有效的。只有当两者都存在时，存在的方式才开始屈从于必然性。存在和规律是我们不能直接理解，而只能通过必然性联系才能理解的统一体的要素。这个统一体把存在和规律联系在一起，它不是内在于其中任何一方的，而规则仅仅因为规律的存在而存在，仅仅是因为生命存在的存在而把内涵和意义给予了规律。

从另一方面，产生了同样的问题，感知原则的相对论可能被明确地表达于下面这种方式中：想要永远地表达客体本质的既定原则被转换成为调节的原则，它仅仅是知识发展中的观点而已。思想最终的、最高级的抽象、化简和综合不得不放弃教条式的要求，即在知识领域成为终极判断的要求。在发展最充分和最普遍的观点的语境中，事物是在一种确定的方式下活动的这种主张不得不被这样一种观点所取代，即就像事物是以这样那样的方式活动的一样，我们的理解必须继续下去。这使得在其与世界的真实关系中，充分解释我们理解的方式和方法成为可能。这起源于我们存在的多面性和任何关于我们与事物关系的概念表达的片面性，并符合了这样一个事实，没有哪种解释是普遍和永远令人满意的，它们通常都在历史上被一种对立的声明所补充。在许多情况下，这产生了一种不确定的动摇、一个矛盾的混杂、或对采用任何综合性的原则的厌恶。如果打算建立事物本质的基本主张被转换为只寻求通过叙述观点的目标来确定我们获得知识的方法的启发式的主张，那么这将使对立的原则同时发挥有效性成为可能的事情。如果它们的意义仅仅是方法论意义上的，那么它们被二者选一地运用时就可能不存在矛盾了，在从归纳到演绎方法的转换中就不存在矛盾了。只有通过把这样一个教条式的僵化解析为现存的和变动的过程，理解的真实统一体才能够被保护。它的根本原则不是在相互排斥的形式中实现的，而是在相互依赖、相互促进和相互补充的方式中实现的。因此，形而上学世界观的发展就会在绝对实在的统一性和多样性之间运动，所有的特殊感知都以此为基础。我们思想的本质就是，虽然存在着一个我们不能弄清任何一个的明确结论，但我们仍然为它们中的每一个而奋斗。只有当事物的全部不同和多样性都在一个单独集合中被协调的时候，实现统一的理性和情感努力才能被满足。但是，正如斯宾诺莎的物质概念那样，一旦这个统一被实现，那么显然，在理解世界的过程中，我们不能用它来做任何事情，并且为了使它富有成效，无论如何一个第二原则是必需的。一元论导致了二元论或多元论，但是它们再次造成了统一的需要，所以，哲学的发展、个体思想的发展都是从多样到统一，再从统一到多样运动着。思想的历史显示，把这些观点中的任何一个看作是最终的都是愚蠢的。在与客体的关系中，我们的理性结构要求两个原则有平等的有效性，并通过明确地叙述试图从多样性中得出统一的一元论原则（好像我们应该以绝对的一元论来终止），通过明确地叙述不满足于任何统一而总是寻求更简单的元素和创造性力量的多元论原则（好像最终结果应该是多元论）来得到它。如果一个人在它的性质意义上探究多元论，其性质意义即事物和命运个体的差异、它们根据性质和价值的分离，那么也是同样的情形。我们内心最深处的生命意识在我们的存在因素间的分离和统一中摆动。有的时候，只有通过在与痛苦和失望的完全分离中享受快乐和福佑，通过使这些珍贵的瞬间从任何不太兴奋的记忆和矛盾的经历中释放出来，生活看起来才是可承受的。之后，它才能看起来更加美妙，并且充满了挑战，我们体验喜悦和悲痛、强壮和软弱、美德和罪恶，它们作为生活的组成部分，每一个都是他者的条件，每一个都是神圣的，并使他者神圣。我们不常意识到在这些相反倾向中的一般原则，但是它们决定着在我们的努力中、我们的目标中以及我们琐碎的活动中对生活的态度。虽然一个人的性格似乎完全被其中一个方向所引导，但是，它仍然被其他趋势例如转换、干扰或引诱所阻碍。人们没有通过他们生活经验中差异和统一之间的对照被划分为不同的范畴。这一对比存在于每一个体中，虽然他的内在个人形态在与它的社会形态的相互作用中得到了发展，并在个人化和社会化间移动。根本的要点不是这两个趋势构建了生活，而是它们在一种启发形式中是相互依赖的。就好像我们的生活运用了我们在其统一体中不能抓住的基本功能，或者是由这个基本功能组成那样。我们必须通过分析和综合去剖析它，这建立了对比最普遍的形式，它的合作也重建了生活的统一。但是，在其分离中，单一的实体对我们产生了一种绝对的需要，包含了任何单一事物的统一体产生了同样的需要，所以，一个生活常常为其痛苦的矛盾便形成了。这一矛盾因为这两个基础在它们的存在中预示了彼此而成为一个逻辑矛盾：如果另一个不是位于相对立的位置，那么两者都不会有任何客观意义或知性兴趣。由此，一个特殊的难点产生了，正如同许多其他对照一样，某些无条件的事物通过另一个依赖于前者的无条件事物而变成了有条件的。我们认为是绝对的事物实际上不过是相对的，只有通过承认绝对表示了一个不管我们走了多么远，其方向都被标明的伸向无穷的道路，这一事实才能得到解决。只要它继续着，那么它在每个阶段的运动就都选择了一条似乎通向终点的路线，即使在某些点运动假设了从属于同一标准的另一个方向，这个方向感也会保持不变。

全部普遍的和特殊的知识体系都在这种思想过程的相互依赖中相遇。如果一个人试图去理解现代的政治的、社会的、宗教的或任何其他文化的各方面，那么就只有通过历史才能完成，即是说，通过认识和了解过去才能完成。但是，仅仅是以片断的形式呈现在我们面則的这一过去，只有通过无声的证据和或多或少的不可靠的传说及传统才能够到达生活中，并且只有通过目前的直接经验才能够被解释。无论有多少改变和数量变化被需要，作为通向过去不可缺少的钥匙，现在自身也只有通过过去才能被了解，唯一能够帮助我们了解现在的过去也只有通过现在的感知和感觉才是可到达的。所有历史图景都是解释性原理的相互关系的结果，任何一个都不会允许其他的停止。因为一个系列中每个点的理解都牵涉到其他系列，所以最终的理解被转化为无穷的。心理知识是一个类似的情形。每个我们所面对的人类存在对于我们的直接经验而言都仅仅是一个制造声音和做动作的自动机器。我们只能推断出在这个表象背后存在着一种精神，推断出在其中延续着的过程，通过与我们自己的思想相类比，它仅仅是一种直接被我们了解的精神实体。另一方面，自我认识只有通过他人的认识才能发展，只有通过自我和他人之间的关系的比较，把自我分裂为被观察的和观察的部分的这一基本分裂才能形成。所以，我们对自身的认识不得不通过其他生命才能找到其途径，然而，只有从自我认识中我们才能够解释其他生命。因此，精神现象的认知是“我”和“你”之间的相互影响。在持续的相互交换和彼此间元素的交换中，每一个都涉及了另一个，正像经济价值那样，通过它，真理产生了。

最后，从一种更加广泛的观点来看：现代唯心主义从自我中创造出世界。精神创造了我们可以讨论的、对于我们是真实的唯一世界，这是依照它的感受性和它创立形式的能力创造的。但是另一方面，这个世界也是精神的最初源泉。从我们可以将其视为地球有生命以前情形的发光的物质球体中，一种逐步的发展导致了生命的可能性，并且这些最初纯粹物质的、没有精神的生命存在最终以仍然未知的方式创造了精神。从历史上来看，精神和它的所有形式与内容都是世界的产物，这个世界反过来又是精神的产物，因为它是一个表象的世界。如果这两个起源的可能性被严格地概念化，那么它们就会导致一个杂乱的矛盾。然而，如果它们被看作是处于交替和相互作用关系中的启发式原则，上述情况是不会发生的。没有任何东西能阻止我们试图将世界的每一存在状态追溯到已经将其创造成为一个表象内容的精神状态，正如没有任何东西会阻止将这些状态追溯到宇宙的、历史的或社会的能够产生一种具备这些能量和形式的精神的事实。这些事实外在于精神的图景可能起源于科学和历史知识的主观假设，也可能起源于它们产生的客观条件诸如此类，以至无穷。当然，这些知识从未在一种清晰的体系中被认识，这两种趋向在一种破碎的、被中断的、偶然的方式中相混合。但是，这个主要矛盾通过把两者视为启发性原则的说明被解决了，这将它们的对立转化为一种相互作用，将它们的相互否定转化为相互作用的无止境的过程。

在这里，我将介绍两个其他的例子（一个非常特殊，另一个非常普遍），在其中，相对性，即知识标准意义的相互性质，以连续或交替的形式出现。在世界图景中，概念和基本原理本质上的相互依赖往往通过这样一种时间上相互交替的结构来表示。在经济领域中，历史和科学方法之间的关系可以用这种方式来说明。每一个经济过程都只有在特殊的历史一心理序列的语境中才能被了解。但是这样一种见识通常是以明确的副规则关系的假设为基础的。如果我们不将一般条件、普遍动力、有秩序的影响系列假定为特殊事件的基础，那么这里就不会有任何历史解释，整个世界就会分解为原子化的事件而造成混乱。然而，我们可以承认，使得特殊状态或事件和它的情形之间的关系成为可能的普遍规则取决于更高的法则，所以它们自己只有作为历史的结合才是有效的；在更早的阶段，其他事件和力在我们当中或周围形成了事物，它们现在显现为普遍有效的，给予后面阶段的因果原理以特殊形式。因此，当这两种方法被教条化地叙述，且每个都要求自身的客观真理，而进入矛盾冲突和相互否定的时候，它们便可能以交替的形式假设一种有机关系。每种方法都成为以启发式的原理，即每一种方法的运用都必须通过诉诸于另一种方法来证实。

在认识过程中最普遍的对立，即先验和经验之间的对立，也是一样。从康德时期到现在，我们知道除了纯粹的感觉印象，所有的经验都需要一定的形式，这是精神中固有的，通过它已知的东西发展成为认识。因此，被我们带入经验的这一先验对于所有认识都绝对有效，对任何变化或任何被偶然感性经验更改的可能性都是免疫的。但是，这里存在着这种标准的确定性与这些标准是什么的确定性并不相配。很多曾经被看作是先验的构造后来被认为是经验的、历史的构造。一方面，在每种现象之中、在感觉印象提供的内容之外，我们有着寻求使它得以形成的、永恒的先验标准的任务；另一方面，箴言要求我们努力将每个单独的先验（并不是这样的先验）追溯至它的经验源头。

这种方法的相互一致、相互依赖与通过把方法合并在一起而获得的简单的妥协完全不同，在简单的妥协中，一方的损失往往比另一方的获得要大得多。在这里，我们关心的是把无限的效用给予相对比的两者的每一方的可能性。虽然这些中的每个方法在某种程度上仍然是主观的，但是，通过运用的相对性，它们似乎充分地表达了事物的客观意义。这样，它们就和我们在价值研究中的普遍原理相符合了：每个原理在内容上都是主观的，通过相互关系的形式，它们可以获得各自现在的客观性。正如我们前面所看到的，通过彼此相联系，纯粹的感官知觉可以显示和建立客体。个性是一个如此坚固的结构，以至于一种特殊的精神实质成为了它的基础，最起码对于经验心理学而言，它起源于发生在个体观念之中的相互联系和知觉。这些主观的、短暂的发生了的事物产生于它们的相互作用，它们当中任何一个都不是单独存在的，也就是说，个性是理论和实践世界的一个客观要素。因此，客观法则的发展是通过平衡主观兴趣和个体能量、通过决定它们的位置和纬度、通过需要和约束的交换获得平等与公平的客观形式。这样，因为平等和交换的形式是可利用的，因为这些关系拥有单个元素所缺少的一种超越主观的公平性，所以客观的经济价值也可以从个体主观需要中明确体现出来。那些认识的方法或许是主观的、启发式的，但是即使通过一种相互唤起的无限的过程，它们也还是通过下面的事实达到了客观真理的理想，此事实即每个认识都找到了自己的补充，并由此通过他者找到了自己的合法性。

真理意味着可能被作为一个无限的结构来了解的表象之间的关系，这是因为，即使我们的知识取决于不再是相对的真理，我们也永远不会知道我们是否达到了真正的最终阶段、我们是否再次处于通向一个更加普遍和深刻的概念的路上，也或者，它可能由一些表象体系内的相互关系组成，并且它的实证也是相互的。但是这两个思想的过程被一种特殊的功能划分联系起来了。把我们的精神存在放在两个相互补充的范畴之下来考虑是必要的，这两个范畴分别是关于它的内容和过程的，其过程作为一个意识事件，传达或了解此内容。这些范畴的结构是非常不同的。我们必须把这个精神过程看作是一股连续的流，它们之间不存在明显的断层，所以一种精神状态能够以有机生长的方式连续地传递给下一个。内容从这一过程中抽象出来，并在一种理想的独立中存在着，它在一种完全不同的方面中显现出来：即作为明显区分于彼此的一个集合、一个分等级的系统、一个单独概念或命题的体系。任何两个概念之间的逻辑联系都减少了它们之间的距离而并非取消了它们的连续性，就像梯子彼此分割明显，但仍然提供了身体持续运动的途径的梯级一样。思想内容之间的关系是通过下面这个事实来表现其特性的：即作为一个整体来考虑，思想的基础似乎是在循环中运动的，因为思想不得不通过悬浮来支持自己，并且它没有从外部支持它的任何外物。思想内容提供了一个相互的背景，这样，每一个方面的背景都从其他思想内容那里得到了它的意义和风格；它们是彼此排斥的一对相反事物，但为了一个可能的世界观的创造，它们仍然假定着彼此。每一个特殊内容通过那个可知的链条都成为了其他内容的证明范围。然而，这个通过此关系得以在心理上被完成的思想过程跟随着一个直接的、持续不断的年代序列，尽管个体的死亡导致了它的结束，但它仍根据自身内在意义继续着。我们反映的两个范畴被分成两种形式，这使得知识在特殊情形里成为虚幻的，但在一般情形里又成为可能的。知识沿着一个无限回归、无限连续、无边无际的过程发展，但是在任何具体时刻它都是有限的，——然而，内容展示了其他的无限形式、循环形式，在这些形式中，每个点都既是开始又是结束，所有的部分都彼此互为条件。

相互证明的过程通常在我们的视线中被忽视了，这与我们没有注意到重力的相互性是源自一同理由。我们的大多数表象被认为是当然的，并且对真实的询问通常只在一个特殊情形中才是适当的。这样，按照一致或按照那些假设已经被确定的表象的集合的要求，一个判断就被做出了。在另一种情况下，整体中的任何表象都可能变得可疑，被研究的这个表象可能属于决定性的多数。在可疑的表象和那些确定的表象之间的极大的数量上的不均衡同样对隐藏这种相互关系有帮助。这样，在很长时间内，重力的不均衡使我们注意到地球对苹果的重力吸引，而非苹果对地球的吸引。结果，一个物体拥有的重量看起来就成为了一个独立的性质，因为我们观察到的仅仅是关系的一个方面。因此，真理就可能被看作是个体表象的特殊性质，这是因为，由于单个元素无限小的尺码与表象总体的关系暂时没有被考虑，以致我们没有观察到其中蕴含着真理的元素之间的相互关系。

在我们全部知识都是部分的、可改正的意义上，“真理的相对性”常常被强调叙述，这与此无可辩驳的事实的显而易见性不可思议地不相协调。在这里，我们通过真理的这一相对性概念了解到的东西显然是完全不同的：相对性不是一个真理的独立概念性质的另一种表达，而是真理的本质特征。相对性是一种模式，在其中表象成为真理，就像需要的客体成为价值的模式一样。相对性像在通常的用法中那样并不意味着通过其更多的东西可能被期望的真理缩减；相反，它是真理概念的积极完成和积极确认。真理是有效的，它并不是与相对性对立的，而是恰恰基于这种相对性。

伟大的认识论原理遭受了它们在使自身内容顺从自己对于知识整体的断言时所产生的困难，因为它们也是一种知识。所以，它们或者是空洞的，或者是自我否定的。教条主义可能将知识的确定性建立在一些像岩石一样的标准的基础之上，但是支撑岩石的又是什么呢？如果某知识的可能性源自那个标准，那么我们必须假设这个特定的知识是可能的。有关知识确定性的主张假设了知识的确定性。相同地，怀疑主义可能断言所有知识的无可争议的不确定性和不可靠性，甚至可能断言任何真理的不可能性，即真理概念内部的矛盾；但是紧接着，我们就必须使怀疑主义自身屈从于这种思考方法。在这里，确实存在着一个恶性循环：如果所有知识都是不可靠的，那么怀疑主义本身也是不可靠的，这样，它也就否定了自己。

最终，批判哲学可能把所有客观性、所有知识内容的基本形式都归因于经验条件，但是，它并不能证明经验本身是有效的。这种批判针对着每个超验事物，它是建立在一个假设的基础之上的，这个假设不能被相同的批判方式检验而不破坏自身基础。认识论在这里遭遇了一个典型性的危害。在分析自身时，它评判了自己的情形。它需要一个外在于自身的有利点并面临着这样一个选择：或者将自己从对所有其他知识产生影响的测试和标准中排除出去，这样它自身就会遭到来自后面的攻击；或者把自己也置于它发现的法则和过程的影响之中，正像被怀疑主义自我否定明确说明的那样，这样就会陷入循环论证。只有相对主义认识论不要求把自己从它的法则中排除出去，它不会被它的有效性只是相对的这样的事实所破坏。因为，即使只有在和其他绝对或实质原则的交替和协调中，它在历史上、现实上、心理上才是有效的，它与其对立面的关系本身也只是相对的。启发式研究仅仅是相对性原理在知识范畴中的结果和应用，它可以承认它本身是一个启发式原理而不存在矛盾。关于这个原理基础的问题并不包含于原理本身，对相对主义而言，它没有构成任何困难，因为其基础被延伸至无穷。相对主义试图将每一个自我呈现的绝对都融入一种关系中，并且以与绝对一样的方式前行，将自己显现为新关系的基础。这是一个永远不会结束的过程，它的启发性消除了二者择其一的选择：或者否认绝对、或者接受绝对。一个人怎样表达它——或者将其表达为存在着一个绝对，但只有通过无限的过程，它才能被掌握；或者表达为只存在着关系，但是它们只有在一个绝对的过程中才能够代替绝对——是没有区别的。相对主义可以做出根本的让步，即它可以相对于精神将自身处于自身之外。认识论原理保持着某个概念内容，并排斥了各种关系持续富有成果的发展，它在自身的矛盾中结束了：精神应当判断自身，它或者屈从于它自身的限定性命题，或者从这一命题中解脱，这两者当中的每一个都同等地破坏它的有效性。但是相对主义完全接受了这样一个事实，即对于每个命题来说，都存在着一个更高的命题，这个更高的命题决定着该命题是否正确。但是，作为我们自己建立起来的逻辑权威的这第二个命题也要求（它被视为一个心理过程）通过一个更高的命题来获得更深一层的合法性，对于这一点而言，相同的过程不断重复着以致无穷：或者通过两种判断之间的确定的交替，或者通过在一个心理现实情形下或逻辑原理情形下处理相同的内容。这个观点同样祛除了其他认识论原理面对的危险，即在自我否定中通过使自身从属于它们所拥有的命题而结束的危险。认为由于否定了真理的可能性，怀疑主义本身就一定是不正确的，就像认为所有存在都是邪恶的悲观厌世观点使悲观主义本身成为一种邪恶的理论一样，这种观点是不对的。这是因为在实际中判断自身、建立超越自身的法则是我们意识的基本能力。这只不过是自我意识的基本事实的表达和扩展。我们的意识没有物质统一体，它仅仅是源于主体和客体之间相互作用的统一，在这之中意识分离出了自己。这并不是可以在不改变我们基本性质的情况下有所不同的意识的次要形式，而是意识的决定性形式。拥有某种意识意味着的只是执行这一内在分离，使自我成为一个客体，从而能够认识自己。“不存在没有客体的主体，不存在没有主体的客体”，这首先在意识中被认识到，将自身显现为处于自身之上的认识主体、被认识的客体，通过认识自身的这一知识，认识的生命不断延续以至无穷。可以说，它的真实形式、它的横截面是一个循环运动。主体将自身作为一个客体来认识，将客体作为一个主体来认识。相对主义作为一种认识论原理，通过它的次要原理证明了自己，这一过程对于许多绝对原理来说都是非常重要的。因此，相对主义最明确地表达了它也能够为其他原理履行的东西：即意识判断自身的能力的合法化，不管这一判断的结果可能如何，它并没有使这个过程成为虚幻。这一把自身置于自身之外的行为现在似乎成为了意识的基础，意识同时既是主体又是客体。只要这个认识自身和判断自身的无限过程在任何一个环节被切断，之后作为绝对而遭遇所有其他的问题，它就会成为自相矛盾的，为了在这里通过这个判断，知识判断自己时要求把自己从这一判断的内容中排除出去。

相对论观点经常被认为是事物价值、可靠性和意义的一种退化，这忽略了下面的事实，即只有幼稚地坚持绝对才会使相对主义处于这样的位置，而这种绝对在这里是存在疑问的。实际上，相反的情况才是真的，只有通过把每一严格独立不断分解为相互作用，我们才能够接近所有宇宙元素的功能统一，在这里，每个元素的意义都影响着每个其他元素。因此，相对主义比人们通常想象的更加接近它的极端对立面，即在斯宾诺莎的哲学中的包罗万象的“神即自然”。这个内容为存在的普遍概念的绝对包含了每一个存在的事物。个体事物不再有任何的自身存在性，因为，正如存在的抽象概念形成了一个统一，实际上所有的存在都在超凡的本质中统一起来了。所有特殊的连续性和实在性、所有次级绝对性都被完全融入那一单独绝对中，由此我们可以说：所有世界观的内容在像斯宾诺莎那样的一元论中都变成相对的了。无所不包的物质，即存留下来的唯一绝对，现在可以在不影响实在内容的前提下被忽视了——剥夺者将被剥夺，正像马克思所说的形式上类似的过程那样——保留下来的只有事物在关系和过程中的相对分解。相对主义建立了事物间的相互依赖作为它们的本质，这种相互依赖只是在表面上排除了无限的观点，或者说只要相对主义不是以一种极端的方式被设想的，它就只是在表面上排除无限的观点。相反的情况无疑是真的：对我而言，一个具体的无限似乎只有在两种方式中是可以想象的。第一种方式是作为一个上升的或下降的系列，在这里每一个链环都依赖于另一链环，第三个链环也依赖于它——可能显现为以下情形：空间分配、能量的因果传输、年代排列顺序或逻辑出处。第二种方式是，这个系列以一种扩大的形式呈现，其所呈现的内容是在一种简单的循环形式中通过交互作用被提供的。如果一个元素在另一个元素之上造成的结果变成了一个原因，而此原因又作为结果影响前者，之后通过成为反作用的原因又重复这个过程，那么我们就在活动中拥有了一个真正的无限模式。这是一个可以同循环相比较的内在无限，因为后者也只是发展成一种完全的相互关系，通过这种关系，循环的每个部分都决定着其他部分的位置——与其他的线路相比，它们虽然也回到了起点，但是每个点都不再被所有部分的相互影响所决定。如果无限被视为一种实质，或被视为一种绝对的尺度，那么它将一直保留着尽管巨大但仍是有限的东西。存在的有限性只有通过下面这种方式才能被克服：即每一个存在内容都被另一个内容限制，而这个内容反过来又被相等地限制——不管是通过经历相同过程的第三方，还是通过这两者的交互作用。

这可能通过暗示一种哲学立场得到满足，这一哲学立场使关于各种事物的解释达成最终的一致成为可能，并为经济价值的阐明提供了一个普遍的语境。因为所有可知的存在的基本特征、所有事物的相互依赖和相互作用都涉及了经济价值并将生活原理传达给了经济材料，货币的基本性质现在就变得易于理解了。因为被作为事物经济的相互作用来进行解释的事物的价值在货币中拥有了它的最纯粹的表达和体现。

货币作为交换关系的自主表现

不管远没有被明显确定的货币的历史来源究竟是怎样的，至少有一个事实是无疑的：即货币并没有突然间在经济中显现为一种与其纯粹概念相一致的被完成的要素。货币只有从先前存在的价值中以某特定方式才能发展出来，即构成每个可交换客体的部分的货币性质在很大程度上是在一个特殊客体中被实现的，也就是说，货币的功能首先在与其先前价值意义的紧密结合中被运用。在下一章中，我们将考察货币与非货币价值的这一起源关系是否已经被弄明白，或曾经被弄明白。在所有事件中都存在着无数的错误，这是由于货币的本质和意义没有在概念上与那些通过提高其中之一而使货币得到发展的价值的性质相区分。我们将首先在不涉及表现货币物质形式的材料的情况下考虑货币，因为这些材料赋予货币的特殊性质导致了它的存在包含于那些商品之下，但作为货币，它是与之对立的。第一眼看起来，好像货币建立了一个当事方，被货币购买的商品总数建立了另一个当事方，只要它的纯粹本质被考虑，它就一定会被简单地解释为货币，而和所有使其与对照方相联系的次要性质相去甚远。

在这个意义上，货币被定义为“抽象的价值”。作为一个看得见的客体，货币是使抽象经济价值具体化的物质，这与单词的发音相似，它是一个声学一生理学的现象，只有通过它所具有或象征的表象，它对我们才有意义。如果客体经济价值是通过它们可交换性的相互关系建立的，那么货币就是这一关系的独立表达。货币是抽象价值的代表。从经济关系即客体可交换性当中，这一关系的事实被提取出来，并相对于那些客体获得了一个可见符号的概念的存在。货币是经济客体共通之处（在学术语言中，我们可以称之为在事物前、中、后的普遍性）的一种具体实现，人类生活普遍的痛苦被这一符号最充分地反映出来，即被大多数人经历的货币的持续短缺反映出来。

一件商品的货币价格预示了这件商品与所有其他商品集合之间的可交换性的程度。如果一个人在抽象意义上考虑货币，独立于它的具体表现的所有结果来考虑货币，那么在货币价格中的一个变化就意味着，特殊商品和所有其他商品总和之间的交换关系已经改变了。如果A的价格从1马克上升到2马克，而同时商品B、C、D、E的价格保持不变，那么这就说明A与B、C、D、E之间的关系改变了，这也可以通过这样一种陈述来表达，即B、C、D、E的价格下降了，而A的价格保持不变。我们更喜欢第一种说法，因为它更加简易，这就像如果一个物体改变了它的位置，我们说它移动了，例如说从东向西移动了，但是其实这一改变也可以被这样描述，即环境（包括观察者）从西向东移动了，而那个特定物体保持静止。一个物体的位置并不是物体本身的性质，而是与其他物体的一种关系，在位置的每一个变化中，这些其他物体像物体本身一样都可以被看作是主动或被动的主体。同样的，因为A的价值由它与经济世界的关系构成，所以它也应该被平等地判断，只不过将A的价值的变化解释为B、C、D、E中的一种变化没有那么方便罢了。正如在实物交换中所实践的那样，这种相对性在货币作为价值的表现中被明确了。我们将在后面考察这是怎样发生的。A的价值是1马克这一陈述已经使每一非经济事物的，即并非与B、C、D、E的交换关系的A纯粹化。在与其他经济客体的关系中，被视为价值的这一马克是从A的承担者中分离出的功能。可能作为A的存在的每件事物，它自身或独立于这一关系的其他事物，都是无关紧要的。性质不同的每个A1和A2都是和A相等的，因为它们的价值都是1马克，它们与B、C、D、E有相同的数量交换关系。货币只是“有价值的”，而经济价值意味着“可以用来交换其他事物”。所有其他客体都从它们获得价值的地方得到了一种特殊的内容。货币从它的价值中获得了其内容，即价值转化为一种物质，一种没有事物自身的价值。通过升华事物的相对性，货币似乎消除了相对性，就像现实标准并不从属于支配现实的相同的相对性一样，不是不顾及这些相对性而是因为事物之间的关系、事物独立的生活、意义和结合才是这些标准的内容。每个存在的事物都遵循着法则，但是操纵万物的法则自身却不遵循法则。如果假设存在着一个制约自然法则的自然法则，那么就会陷入循环运动。我姑且不考虑这个问题，然而无论如何，这个循环仍然是合法的，因为它是思想返回它们的起源或指向位于无限之中的终点的基本过程的一部分。标准是相对性的类型和形式，它在实在的特殊现象中发展，并给予其形式——无论它们是柏拉图和叔本华的理念、斯多噶学派的逻辑、康德的先验，还是黑格尔理性的发展阶段。这些标准与客体从属于它们的意义并不相关，因为它们自己表达了客体的相对性。因此，货币作为抽象价值仅仅表达了构成价值的事物的相对性这一命题就变得易于理解了，同时，货币作为稳定的一极，与客体永恒的运动、波动和平衡形成对照。就货币并没有实现这一点而言，它不会依照它的纯粹概念起作用，而是会作为一种与所有其他客体一致的特殊客体来起作用。对于客体而言，下面的观点是错误的：在货币借贷和对外交易中，货币是为了货币被购买的，因此，货币虽然保留了其概念的纯粹，但也获得了单独价值客体的相对性，这种单独客体被假定并不拥有价值而只是价值的象征。货币表达了有价值客体的价值关系，这一事实将它从这个关系中解放出来，并放置在一个不同的秩序中。通过表达这一正被讨论的关系和它的实践结果，货币自身得到了一种价值，通过这个价值，它不仅建立了一种同所有具体价值的关系，并且在排除了真实客体的自身范围内说明了价值量之间的关系。一个量被作为当前的货币提供，另一个作为将来的允诺；一个量在一个领域内被接受，其他的被在另一个领域内接受——这些是产生价值关系的变更，它并不被客体和它交易的量作为一个统一体表达了价值意义完全不同的客体之间的关系这一事实所影响。

根据货币价值的稳定性、货币的发展和客观性对货币性质的

分析

由于这种既处于具体价值序列中又处于其外的双重角色，正像我所说的那样，它在对货币的实践和理论处理中造成了无数的困难。在货币表达了商品之间的价值关系、度量了它们、促进了它们的交换这层意义上来说，它作为一个完全不同的起源的力量进入了有用商品的世界；或者作为一个度量的抽象系统、一种在真实客体之间运动的交换方法，就像以太在拥有重量的客体之间运动一样，进入有用商品的世界。为了完成取决于它外在于所有其他商品的位置的这些任务，货币不得不成为一个稳固的或特殊的价值，并通过完成这些任务，成为这样一个价值。通过这种方式，它成为了这个系列中的一个链环和条件，与此同时，跟下列情形相对照：它的价值变得依赖于供给和需求，它的生产消耗对其价值产生了轻微的影响，它呈现为质量上不同的价值，等等。利息的支付是产生于货币功能的价值的表现。从另一角度来看，货币的双重角色一方面由被交换的商品的价值关系的测量组成，另一方面由与这些商品的交换组成，从而使其自身成为一个服从于度量的量。货币通过商品与商品的交换、通过货币本身被度量。因为，不仅货币要通过一个国家的货币也成为了另一个国家货币价值的度量标准，正如国外贸易所说明的那样，而且，正如国外贸易所说明的那样，一个国家的货币也成为了另一个国家货币价值的度量标准。这样，货币便成为了服从它们自己所象征的规范的标准化观念之一。所有这些情况都导致了思想第一次序的复杂化和循环运动，尽管这些都可以得到解决：克里特岛人宣告所有克里特岛人都是说谎者，他们受到自己公理的影响，谴责自己的话是谎言；悲观主义者将整个世界打上邪恶的烙印，所以其理论本身也必定是邪恶的；怀疑论者不能维护怀疑主义的真理，因为他否定了所有真理，等等。因此，货币便作为交换的度量和手段立足于有价值的客体之上。因为它的功能最初需要一个有价值的代表，并将价值赋予它们的代表，所以货币就被归入那些客体，被包含于那些本身得自货币的标准。

作为价值最终被度量的不是仅仅表示价值的货币，而是客体，价格的变化表明了它们之间相互关系的变化。就其纯粹功能而言，货币没有改变它的价值，但是一个更大或更小的货币量却反映了变化本身，此变化被从它的表现中抽象出来，并形成一个独立的表现形式。货币的这种情况很明显地与所谓的性质和个性的缺少是相同的。因为它处于单独的客体之间，并且与它们的每一个都有着同等的关系，所以它不得不是绝对中立的。在这里，货币也代表了一个连续系列中的最高发展阶段，这个系列在逻辑上是困难的，但对我们的世界观有着重要意义，其中的每个链环虽然都是依照这个系列的公式和其内在力量的表达形成的，但同时又作为一个补充、控制或反向的力量区别于这个系列。这个系列的起点是通过不可代替的价值形成的，此价值的特殊性质很容易通过对货币等价物的分析被模糊。我们所拥有的大部分东西都有其替代物，至少就替代物这个词语的宽泛意义而言是这样的，所以，如果我们失去了一样东西，但得到了另一样东西来代替，那么我们的存在物的总量价值将保持不变。快乐的总量可以通过元素的多样性被保持在同一程度。然而，在与特定客体的关系中，这种可交换性就不成立了，这不单单是因为其他的所有物不能给我们相同程度的快乐，更是因为价值的意义被系于此单独客体之上，而非系于快乐之上，对快乐的提供是此客体和其他客体都能够实现的。这是一个错误的概念上的现实主义，它把一般概念视为特殊实在的完全适当的表达，它使得我们相信我们通过把它们化简为一个一般价值分母、通过指涉一个价值显现为数量上不同但基本种类相同的价值中心而体验了客体价值。我们经常赋予个体事物以价值，因为我们需要的就是这个而不是别的，尽管其他的事物或许也可以给我们同样的、甚至更大的满足。在某特定拥有物提供的满足的量之间，更高层次的敏感做出了非常细致的区分，由此它变得可以与其他拥有物相比较或相交换，那些特殊性质超出了它的幸福论效果，这种效果可以使它对我们有价值，并且在那个方面是完全不可替代的。这被在那些案例中略加修改便很好说明了：个人情感与经验使得一个标准的和可互换的客体对我们而言变成不可代替的了。在任何情况下，同一种类的同一样本都不会使利益丢失。通过一个属于完全不同的性质和情感范畴的客体——此客体根本不会使我们想起前面所有的客体，也不会使我们想起任何的对照——这可以被更好地完成。就客体成为可互换的这一意义而言，这个价值的个别形式被否定了，因此，作为可交换性的代表和符号的货币就成了我们实践世界的最小个体创造。在事物为了货币而被交换这一意义上（这里所指的不是它们被交换的时候），这一个性的缺失是为它们所共有的。一个客体中任何内在价值的缺少都不可能比用货币等价物来取代它而不存在任何意义的不充分得到更清楚的表达。货币不仅仅是一种绝对可互换的客体，每一货币量都可以在没有任何差异的情况下被代替，可以说，它是具有人格化的可交换性。所有价值都处于两极之中：在其中一极中，绝对的个体价值的意义不存在于任何价值的总量之内，它也可能通过另一个客体被表现，它在我们的价值体系中的位置不会被任何其他客体填充；在另一极中，它是明显可以互换的。在这两极之间，事物被依照它们可替代的程度来安排，其位置是由通过它们可替代的程度以及可以替代它们的客体的种类来决定的。这还可以通过每个客体内不可代替和可代替的部分的区分来表现。大多数事物拥有这两种性质，虽然在这一点上我们常常被欺骗，一方面是被我们交易的易变性所欺骗，另一相反方面则是被自己的心胸狭窄和倔强所欺骗。通过更仔细的观察可以发现，连那些通过货币可收买、可替代的事物也可能拥有其价值不能被其他所有物完全代替的性质。我们实践世界的分界通过那些其中之一的性质无限小的情形被显示出来：一方面，通过那些非常少的价值，我们的自我个体完整性取决于它，在这里，可交换性是不成问题的；另一方面，通过货币，被提取的客体的可交换性，它的个性的绝对缺失产生于这样的事实，即它表达了事物之间的一种无论事物自身变化与否都持续着的关系。

因为货币的这一取代任何特殊经济价值的功能并不与这些价值的任何一个相联系，而只是与它们可能进入的关系相联系，所以它保证了经济实践系列的连续性。此系列在商品的生产和消费中都存在。但是，这只是这个系列的材料，仍然没有解决连续性和断续性的问题。每个消费活动最初都打断了经济过程的连续性，它与生产的关系之间缺乏组织性，存在着太多的偶然性因素，所以无法保持发展道路的连续性。我们可以把这条线作为一种观念来考虑，使它到达具体客体的路线和一束穿过以太的震荡部分的光的趋向在某种方式下是可以相比较的。为了补偿可能的中断，现在货币进入了这个遍及严格分离的客体，并控制着它们的价值意义的涌流。通过给予货币来支付我想要消费的某个客体，我填平了产生于、或将要产生于我的消费的价值运动中的鸿沟。物物交换的最初形式，如抢劫或馈赠，并不允许这样一种连续性的补充，在这些情形里，可以说，经济过程的观念线条中的逻辑关系被中断了。在原则上，这种逻辑关系只有通过等价物的交换才能得以建立，事实上，它只有通过货币才能建立。货币可以补偿存在于任何物物交换体系中的不平等，可以填平将要被消费的客体的移动所导致的鸿沟。显然，只有通过货币系列以外的观念位置，货币才能够获得经济系列之内的实际位置。如果货币自身是一种特殊的客体，那么它或许永远不能平衡任何单独客体，也不能成为相分离的客体之间的桥梁。货币可以充分进入形成经济连续性的关系之中，这仅仅是因为，作为一个具体的价值，它只不过是一种被真实的物质具体化了的经济价值自身之间的关系罢了。

在一种经验的方式中，货币的这一意义更进一步地将自己表示为价值的稳定性，这种稳定性产生于货币的可交换性和缺少特殊性。这被视为货币的显著的、最有用的特性之一。经济行为系列的长度是经济的连续性、综合性和生产力的前提，它取决于货币价值的稳定性，如果没有稳定性，那么长期的计算、大规模的计划和长久的信用都将是不可能的。倘若人们仅仅考虑单个客体的价格波动，那么人们就不能确定客体的价值是否变动了，以及货币的价值是否保持稳定。只有当一件商品或一批商品的价格降低而别处的价格上升的时候，货币价值的稳定性才能成为一个客观事实。价格的普遍上升指明了货币价值的下降，当此情况发生时，货币的价值的稳定性就被破坏了。因为货币作为特殊客体价值关系的指示剂，拥有了超出它功能的某些性质，所以上述情形仅仅是可能的。这些有区别的性质使货币被还原成一个市场中的客体，并服从于商业循环、数量变化和独立运动。它们使货币丧失了其关系表达的绝对位置，迫使它进入了一个相对的位置，因此它不再反映一种关系，而是拥有了关系。在这个意义上，只有货币从这样的影响中分离出来，它才拥有了一个稳定的价值，这对它的本质而言也是真的，因此，价格的起伏表示的不是货币和客体的关系的变化，而只是客体自身关系的变化。这意味着一个客体价格的上升与另一个客体价格的下降相对应。货币确实有价值稳定的基本性质，这产生于它以抽象数量的术语来表达客体间经济关系的功能，或是说表达使事物拥有经济价值的关系，而自身不进入这些关系的功能。所以，货币的功能就更加重要了，经济价值的变化就更加生动、更加广泛了。只要在商品的价值是明确的、永久稳固的地方，种类中的交换就很容易实现。因为货币给每个价值的变化提供了一个精确的、灵活的等价物，所以货币符合相互价值关系中的变化的条件。这些关系的可变性最清楚地说明了一个客体的经济价值由对其他所有客体的交换关系组成，每个部分的改变都要求其他平衡的运动，这使得我们意识到整体内的相对性。货币仅仅是这种相关性的象征，这样我们便可以理解前面提到的这样一个事实：货币的需要与价格的波动是相联系的，尽管物物交换预示了固定的价格。

在理论上和实践上，货币与众不同的意义的显现总是伴随着一个充分发展的货币经济。这一符号在其逐渐发展的第一阶段表现着货币，同时保持在那些相互之间的唯一关系即是符号应当象征的关系的客体之间。中世纪的理论把价值视为客观的东西。它要求卖者为它的商品寻求“恰当的价格”，有时候还试图通过规则使这一价格得到巩固。价值被认为是客体固有的一个单独存在的性质，由于这一性质，它进入交换行为，不管卖者和买者之间的关系如何。价值的概念与时代的实质——绝对世界观相一致，它尤其适合于物物交换经济。以一块土地交换劳役、以一只山羊交换一双鞋、以一颗宝石为死者交换二十次弥撒，通过这些事情，特定的价值情感被如此紧密地联系在一起，以至于它们的价值可以作为彼此客观相对应的东西而被很好地显现出来。交换越直接、条件越简单，价值就越会作为客体性质出现，也因此，客体的位置不是被可比较的关系的集合所决定的。关于这样一种交换会实现的这种简单断言，被反映在它产生于事物自身客观性质的观念之中。在多样化生产和多方面交换运动中，只有单独客体的结合才能显示出：它的经济意义存在于它与其他客体的关系中，并且是互相起作用的。这和货币经济的发展是一致的。经济客体的意义通过这种相对性被建立起来，货币的意义将成为这一相对性的清晰表达，这些便是通过它们的相互影响而被了解到的事实。在中世纪，人们假定在客体和货币价格之间存在一种直接的关系，即一种以每个客体的独立价值为基础的关系，这种关系能够并且应该找到一个“公正”的表达。这个固有的理论解释是错误的，其错误与断言在个体和任何权利内容之间存在一种直接联系的错误是一样的，在不考虑任何外部条件的情况下，似乎像那样的人的本质需要有一个对这种能力的“公正”的要求。人的权利的个人主义概念提供了一个例子。在现实中，权利只是人与人之间的一种关系，它只能完成于与利益、客体、绝对力量之间的关系中，我们将其称为法律的内容，狭义的“权利”。这种权利与可能被解释为“公正”或“不公正”的个体没有任何可预言的关系。只有当这样一种关系发展并在标准中建立了自己的时候，涉及特殊事件中的单个人的标准才有可能赋予那个人处理某件事的能力以公正性。因此，确实可能有一个某一商品的公正的价格，但是这仅仅是作为在这件商品和其他所有商品之间的一种确定的、被很好地调整的交换关系，而非这件商品本身性质或货币本身数量的一个结果，它没有代替彼此之间的任何关系，也没有涉及公正或不公正。

货币的意义是其实践功能的源头，在对客体的经济相对性的表现中，货币意义并不是现成的事实，它像所有历史现象一样，只是逐渐地揭示了它的纯粹概念，即它在观念领域内的功能和位置。这在下面的事实中有着它的对应物，即在某种意义上，所有的商品都可以被当作货币。每一个交换了B又交换了C的客体A都独立于其真实性质地扮演了货币的角色。它表示B、A、C三者是彼此可交换的，表示了它们可以交换的比率。这发生在无数的客体中，事实上，我们在文化发展中追溯得越远就越会发现更多数量的非常不同的客体，它们或多或少以一种原始形式执行了货币的功能。只要客体实际上彼此计量或彼此交换，那么它们的主观的和经济的、客观的性质，它们的绝对的和相对的意义就仍没有被分离，并且在货币停止作为一种有用客体的意义上，它们就不再是货币或可以成为货币了。因为经济价值只不过是可交换客体的相对性，货币就越来越成为经济价值的象征符号。这种相对性依次、日益支配着客体的其他可以使它发展为货币的性质，直到最终这些客体成为不过是被具体表达了的相对性。

如果货币在物物交换中有它的根源，那么只有当一个单独客体不与另一个单独客体相交换而是与其他多个客体相交换的时候，它才开始发展。如果用一头母牛来交换一个奴隶、用一件衣服来交换一个护身符、用一条船来交换一件武器，那么价值评价的过程就仍然没有被分割成它的元素，它也仍没有通过把客体化简为一个公分母来作为计算这些事物中每个个体的价值基础被实现。然而，如果用一群牛被来交换一间房子，用十根横梁来交换一件珠宝，或者用三杯酒交换一种劳动服务，那么这些多样的个体（如一头母牛、一根横梁、一杯酒）就是度量，它的多样性与交换的其他客体是相同的。在不可分割的客体的情形中，价值的心理意义并不简单地放弃单独客体的统一。但是只要交易一开始，例如一件珠宝的价值是12根还是8根横梁，那么虽然它有着不可分割性，其价值也就会通过横梁的价值单位被度量出来了，我们或许可能以我们横梁的8倍、12倍，最终是10倍来组成它的价值。这样，如果一个客体是不可分的，那么交换的两个客体的价值就变得更容易度量了，这两个客体的价值也就不需要在同一个体意义上被表达了。可分割性最发达的形式通过与货币的交换达到了。货币交换的可分客体，其个体与每个不可分的客体的价值是可以同单位度量的，这样，它便推动甚至预示了抽象价值和它的特殊具体内容的分离。因为当事方的每一方都拥有独立价值，所以经济客体的相对性只有通过不可分的客体的交换中的困难才能够被认识到，它通过化简为一个价值的公分母被显示出来，这个过程中，货币是最与众不同的形式。

我在前面已经指出，在某种客观意义上，相对性创造了客体的价值，这是因为只有通过相对性，事物才被放到了与主体有一段距离的位置。货币是这两种性质的精华和顶峰，由此也再次说明了它们的相互关系。货币从来也不可能被直接享受（后面将会分析的例外否定了它的特殊性质），它也因此被排除出任何主观关系之外。货币使通过经济贸易被普遍表现的主体的外部行为客观化，所以货币作为它的内容从每个个体实践中发展了最客观的实践、最合乎逻辑的完全精确的标准、绝对的自由。因为货币仅仅是获得客体的方式，在与渴望和享受的自我的一个不可超越的距离中，它保持了真正的性质，并且由于它成为自我和客体之间不可缺少的途径，它也把客体放置于一定的距离中。当然，货币再次废除了这一距离，但是通过这样做，通过把客体转移到主观效用，它把客体从客观经济世界中移走了。出现于主观和客观的最初统一中的分裂被用货币具体表达了，但是另一方面，与上面提到的距离和接近的相互关系相一致，货币的功能使那些用其他方式难以实现的关系变得易于实现。可交换性是经济价值的先决条件，通过它，后者获得了它们之间客观的相互关系。它在一种活动中联合了将要被交换的距离和接近。它从货币中已经获得的不仅仅是它技术上的完美方式，更是一种分离的、具体的存在，这些存在包含了它所有的各种各样的方面。

货币是存在的普遍形式的一种具体化，据此，事物从它们的相互关系中得到自己的意义

货币的哲学意义是：它在实践世界中代表所有存在的公式的最可靠的图像和最清晰的体现，据此，事物通过彼此得到了它们的意义，并且它们的存在通过它们的相互关系被确定了。这是一个精神生活的基本事实，即我们通过特殊客体，用符号表现了我们存在的各种元素之间的关系，它们本身是物质实体，但是对于我们而言，它们的意义仅仅是或多或少同它们相联系的某一关系的显著代表。因此，一枚结婚戒指，以至每封信、每个保证、每件正式制服，都是人于人之间某种道德的或理性的、某种法律的或政治的关系的一个符号或代表。每个神圣的事物都在一种物质形式中使人和神之间的关系具体化了。与表达纷争的军用武器一样，连接不同国家的电报线也是这样的物质，它们对单独个体几乎没有任何意义，而只有在涉及人与人之间的关系、人类团体之间的关系时，它们的意义才是明确的。当然，这些关系和联系的表现本身可以被看作是一种抽象，这是因为，只有这些元素才是真实的，它们的相互决定条件是我们在特殊概念中具体表现的。形而上学的质询追求着超越经验主义限制的认识，只有它可以消除这种二元论，通过将所有的物质元素分解为相互作用和过程，它的载体在同样的命运中成为了主体。但是实践意识发现了一种形式，通过这一形式，在其中制定真实的关系和相互作用的过程可以与物质存在、实践中抽象关系的必然形式相一致。

纯粹关系被注入特殊客体是精神的伟大成就之一，当精神被在客体中具体表达的时候，对于精神而言，这些就成为了一种媒介物，赋予它一种更真实的、更复杂的活动。建立这种符号客体的能力在货币中获得了它的最大成功。因为货币以其最完美的形式表现了纯粹的相互作用，它使最抽象的概念变得易于理解，它是一件单独的事物，其本质意义是超越个性。因此，货币是人与世界关系的充分表达，只有在单独和具体的实例之中它才可以被领会，只有当单个实例变成交织着所有个别，以这种方式创造着现实的现存精神过程的具体表现时，它才可以真正被考虑。即使经济客体的价值相对性不是最初的事实，而是发展的最终阶段，货币的这一意义也会保持。我们以某一概念定义一种现象，这个概念通常不是产生于现象本身，而是源自于一个更发达更纯粹的形式。我们不能从孩子最初的口齿不清来推断语言的性质，在定义动物生命时，下列发现不会使我们感到困感：即在从植物生命转化的阶段中，它的表达并不完美。同样地，只有在我们精神生活的最高级现象中，我们有时候才能发现较低级的现象的意义，虽然我们可能在这当中根本不能追溯它。一系列现象的纯粹概念通常是一个理想，一个从未被完全实现的理想，但朝着这一理想前进使对概念的有效阐释成为可能。

货币的意义表达了被需要的客体的相对性，由此它们成为了经济价值，货币的意义并没有因为货币也有着使这种意义减弱或使其模糊的其他性质而被否定。这些性质是有效的，但这并不是货币固有的。经济价值是依照我们对它们的主观反应，由客体之间的交换关系组成的，但是，只有在它们的其他意义中，客体的经济相对性才得到逐渐发展，它永远不会在总的表象或客体的总价值中完全支配这些意义。客体通过它们的可交换性得到的价值，即通过它客体的价值成为一种经济价值的这种变形，伴随着经济广泛和深入的发展，显现得更加清晰、更加强烈，但是这一发展似乎不会达到它的完成。马克思把这一事实明确地表达为：在以商品生产为基础的社会中，为了交换价值而消除了使用价值。从其纯粹概念的意义上来看，只有货币达到了这一最终阶段，除了可交换性的纯粹形式之外，它什么也不是。它具体表达了事物的要素和功能，通过它的作用，事物成为经济的。这并没有概括事物的全体，但是它概括了货币的全体。在下一章中，我将探讨在其历史表现中，货币在多大程度上表现了货币这一观念；在某种意义上，货币在发展中是否并不趋向另一个相关的点。

CHAPTER 2 The Value Of Money As A Substance

Ⅰ

The Intrinsic Value Of Money And The Measurement Of Value

Through all the discussions of the nature of money there runs the question as to whether money，in order to carry out its services of measurement，exchange and representation of values，is or ought to be a value itself；or whether it is enough if money is simply a token and symbol without intrinsic value，like an accounting sum which stands for a value without being one.The whole technical and historical discussion of this question，which involves the most profound issues in the theory of money and value，would be superfluous if it could be decided by a frequently quoted logical argument.A measuring instrument，it is said，has to have the same quality as the object to be measured：a measure of length has to be long，a measure of weight has to be heavy，a measure of space has to have dimensions；consequently，a measure of value has to be valuable.No matter how unrelated two things may be in all other respects，when I measure them against each other they must both have the quality that I am comparing.Any quantitative and numerical equality or inequality that I assert would be meaningless if it did not refer to relative quantities of one and the same quality.Indeed，this identity of qualities must not be of too general a nature；for instance，it is impossible to compare the beauty of a piece of architecture with the beauty of a person，even though both have the quality of beauty.Only the particular architectural or the particular human qualities of beauty make a comparison possible.But even if a common quality is lacking，one might still consider the reaction of the contemplating subject as a basis for comparability.If the beauty of a building and the beauty of a person are comparable in the amount of enjoyment that the contemplation of either one of them affords us，then an identity of qualities might be asserted in spite of the apparent variation.The equal effect upon the same subject reflects the equality of the objects with reference to the relation in question.Two completely different phenomena that give the same pleasure to the same subject have，over and above all their differences，an equal force or an equal relation to the subject；just as when a gust of wind and a human hand break a branch of a tree demonstrate，in spite of the incomparability of their qualities，an equal amount of energy.Thus the substance of money，and everything that is measured by it，may be completely different，but they would have to coincide in the one point that they both have value；and even if value is nothing but a subjective response to the impressions received from things，at least the quality by which they affect the sense of value in men has to be the same in both-even though it cannot be isolated.Thus，it is claimed that money has to have the quality of value because it is compared with values and enters into a quantitative equation with values.

I will contrast this line of argument with another which produces different results.It is true that，in the example given，we can compare the force of the wind that breaks the branch of a tree with that of the human hand doing the same thing，only so far as this force exists as a quantity in both.But we can measure the force of the wind also by the thickness of the branch that it has broken.I admit that the broken branch does not yet express the amount of energy of the wind in the same sense as the energy of the hand may express it；but the comparative force of two gusts of wind，and thus the relative force of each，can be measured by the fact that one has broken a branch which the other was unable to harm.The following example seems to me to be conclusive.The most heterogeneous objects we know，the two poles of the world view which neither metaphysics nor science has succeeded in reducing to each other，are the motions of matter and the states of consciousness.The pure extension of the one and the pure internality of the other have not so far allowed any point to be discovered that could plausibly be regarded as their meeting ground.Nevertheless，the physiological psychologist can measure the relative changes in the strength of conscious sensations by the changes in the external motions that affect our sense organs.Since there is a constant quantitative relation between the two factors，the size of one determines the relative size of the other，without any qualitative relationship or identity having to exist between them.The logical principle that appeared to make the ability of money to measure value dependent upon its own value is thus breached.It is indeed correct that the quantities of different objects can be compared only if they are of the same quality；wherever measurement is done by direct comparison of two quantities it presupposes identical qualities.But wherever a change，a difference or the relation between two quantities is to be measured，it is sufficient for their determination that the proportions of the measuring objects are reflected by the proportions of those measured；and there need be no qualitative identity of the objects.Two objects with different qualities cannot be equalized，but two proportions between qualitatively different things may be.The two objects m and n may have some relationship that has nothing to do with qualitative identity，so that neither one can serve directly as a measure for the other.The relation may be one of cause and effect，of symbolism，of common relationship to a third factor or anything else.Let us assume as given that an object a is known to be a quarter of m ，and an object b is known to be some quantitative part of n. If a relation exists between a and b ，corresponding to the relation m and n ，it follows that b equals a quarter of n. In spite of a qualitative difference and the impossibility of any direct comparison between a and b ，it is nevertheless possible to determine the quantity of one by the quantity of the other.For instance，there is no relation of identity between a certain quantity of food and the acute need for food that might be satisfied by it；but if so much food is available that half of the need is filled，I can accordingly determine that the available quantity of food equals half of the need.Under these circumstances it is sufficient that an overall relationship exists in order to measure the quantities of its parts.If one can now interpret the measurement of objects by money in this fashion，then the idea of their direct comparability and consequently the logical requirement that money itself should possess value becomes untenable.

In order to proceed from this logical possibility to reality，we need only assume a very general relationship between the quantity of goods and the quantity of money，which is illustrated by the connection-often obscured or disrupted-between an increasing supply of money and rising prices，an increasing supply of goods and falling prices.Thus we can form，with qualifications as to their exact scope，the concepts of a total supply of commodities，a total supply of money and a relationship of mutual dependence between them.

Every single commodity is now a definite part of the available sum of commodities；if we call the latter a， the commodity is I/m a. Its price is the corresponding part of the total quantity of money；if we call the latter b ，then the price equals I/m b. If we knew the quantity of a and b ，and the proportion of all saleable goods which a specific object represents，then we should also know its price in terms of money，and vice-versa.A definite amount of money can thus determine or measure the value of an object，regardless of whether money and the valuable object possess any identical quality，and so regardless of whether money itself is valuable.

Problems Of Measurement

It is always necessary to keep in mind the complete reltivity ofmeasurement.Absolute quantities that are equivalent measure each other in a quite different sense from the partial quantities which are in question here.If it is assumed-with certain qualifications-that the total amount of money equals the value of the total amount of commodities for sale，then this equation need not be taken as a measure of one quantity by the other.They are set in a relation of equivalence only through the relationship that both have to the valuing person and his practical purposes.The following quite common cases show how strong is the tendency to treat money and commodities generally as simply corresponding to each other.If a primitive tribe，who use a commodity as a unit of exchange，trade with a more developed neighbour who uses money，then the two units are frequently treated as equal in value.Thus the ancient Irish，when they entered into relations with the Romans，made their own value-unit，the cow，equivalent to an ounce of silver.The wild mountain tribes in Annam，who trade only in kind，use the buffalo as a basic value-unit；in their transactions with the more cultivated inhabitants of the plains the value-unit of the latter-a bar of silver of a particular size-is regarded as equivalent to one buffalo.The same basic approach can be found in a wild tribe of Laos，who live by trade.Their unit of value is the iron hoe，but they also produce gold which they sell to neighbouring tribes and which is the only object they weigh.For the purpose of weighing it they have no other measure than com，and so they sell one com measure of gold for one hoe.One against one is the naive expression of an equivalence between these dubious totalities；since the single commodity in barter exemplifies the value of all commodities just as the single monetary unit represents the idea of the total amount of money，it may be assumed that the relation between single units is，at least symbolically，interpreted as a relation between the totalities.

If the equivalence of these total amounts exists as an effective，though unconscious a priori ，there emerges an objective proportion between the partial quantities apart from that of their subjective fortuitousness.For now there really exists something that is exactly the same on both sides；namely，the division between each of the two partial quantities and the total quantity to which it belongs.If we assume complete equilibrium of prices，then each commodity would be related to its price，within the area of exchange，in the same way as all available commodities were related to the total amount of spendable money.It is totally irrelevant whether money has a conceptual，qualitative relationship to commodities.If a commodity costs 20 m ，this represents 1/n of the total money supply，i.e.its value is I/n of the total supply of commodities.By this means，20 m are able to measure the value of the commodities even though they are generically completely different from them.We have to keep in mind，however，that the assumption of a simple relationship between all commodities and all money is only a preliminary，crude and schematic step.If a single commodity had to be directly equated with a money value，it would be reasonable to insist that the commodity and its measure must have some quality in common.But for the purposes of exchange and valuation it is only necessary to determine the relation of different（or all）commodities to each other（that is，result of the division of the single commodity by all the others），and to equate this with the corresponding fraction of the available supply of money.This requires only that there shall be a numerically determinable quantity.If the commodity n relates to the sum A of all saleable goods，as the money unit a relates to the sum B of all available money units，then the economic value of n is expressed by a/B. The matter is not usually perceived in this way because A as well as B are taken for granted.Their changes are not easily observed and we are not conscious of their function as denominators；we are exclusively interested in the numerators n and a for each individual case.Thus，the idea could emerge that n and a correspond to each other in some absolute and direct way；and if this were so they would indeed have to have some identical quality.If that general element upon which the relationship is based were forgotten，if it operated only practically but not consciously，then it would reveal a profound characteristic of human nature.The limited receptiveness of human consciousness and the economical and expedient manner of its use means that only a small number of the innumerable qualities and aspects of an object that interests us are taken into consideration.It is enough forthe different viewpoints that determine the selection and ordering of the factors that attract our attention that the latter can be arranged as a systematic series.This series begins with a succession of phenomena in which only what is common to all is taken into account，only the basis that all the phenomena share，is considered.At the other end of the scale，only the distinctive features of each phenomenon，the absolute individuality，enter our consciousness，while the general and fundamental elements remain unconscious.Between these two extremes，there exists at various levels those points or aspects of the total phenomenon upon which the greatest attention is focused.In general，it may be said that theoretical interests direct awareness more to generalities，practical interests more to the specific features of things.For the thinker who is interested in metaphysics，the individual differences between things are often regarded as inessential，and he is concerned with such general conceptions as‘being’and‘becoming’which are common to all things.Practical life，on the other hand，requires us to be attentive to the differences，peculiarities and nuances of people and circumstances with which we are concerned；while the general human qualities and the basis that is common to all the problematic conditions seem obvious and not in need of special attention.Indeed，even such attention can only clarify them with great difficulty.For instance，the relations between members of a family develop on the basis of experience of those personal qualities by which each member is distinguished from any other；the general character of these family relations is usually not a subject for particular observation by the members of that family.Only outsiders seem to be able to describe it.However，this does not mean that the general unconscious basis is not psychologically effective.The individual qualities of the members of each family will，in fact，bring about very different conditions according to the general character and the atmosphere that prevail in the family as a whole.This atmosphere provides the basis，often unremarked，upon which the qualities of the individuals develop in their own specific way.The same holds for larger groups.Even though all relationships among men depend upon the particular contribution of each individual，they are actually established in a specific form only because there are universal human phenomena and conditions which form the denominator to which individual differences are added as the numerators to produce the totality of the relationship.Exactly the same psychological relationship may prevail with respect to money prices.The equation between the value of a commodity and the value of a definite amount of money does not signify an equation between simple factors but a proportion，that is an equation between two fractions，the denominator of which，within a given economic area，is on one side the sum total of all commodities and on the other the total amount of money.These two quantities，of course，have to be more strictly determined.The equation is established by the fact that，for practical reasons，these two sums are posed a priori as equivalents；or，to state the matter more precisely，the practical circumstances in which we handle both categories are reflected in our theoretical consciousness as an equation.However，since this is the general basis of all equations between specific commodities and specific prices，it does not enter our consciousness，but provides the unconsciously operating factor without which the individual instances，which alone are interesting and thus enter into consciousness，could not possibly form a relationship.The tremendous importance of that absolute and fundamental equation would make the fact of its remaining unconscious just as probable as in the analogous-cases that I have described.

If we were to assume that money has no substantial value，then the single money price would have no relation to the commodity whose value it was supposed to express，if our observation were restricted to these two factors.One would not know why one object is higher or lower in price，by a definite amount，than another.But if we establish as an absolute presupposition that the sum total of everything saleable is equivalent to the total amount of money-the meaning of‘total amount’to be investigated later-then the price of every single commodity becomes simply the proportion between its value and the total value of commodities，a proportion that is repeated in respect of price and total amount of money.I have to emphasize again that this is not a case of circular reasoning，in the sense that the ability of a definite amount of money to measure the value of a specific commodity is based upon an equation between all money and all commodities which already assumes the measurability of one by the other.The question as to whether every measurement requires the existence of some identical qualities in the object and in that which measures it would then not be relevant to the specific case，but would be absorbed unresolved into the assumptions.A measurement of relative quantities is，however，possible if there is some relation between the absolute quantities，which need not be that of measurability or identity.There is certainly no identity or possibility of measurement between the size of an iron pipe and a given water pressure；but if both are integrated parts of a mechanical system with a specific power output，then it is possible，under known conditions of change in the water pressure，to calculate from changes in the output of power what is the diameter of the pipes in the system.In the same way，commodities and money may not be measurable by each other in general.It is sufficient that both play a part in human life，within the system of men's practical ends，for the quantitative modification of one to become an index of the other.It is not without relevance to this reduction of the significance of every money quantity to a fraction-even if it remains undecided what is the absolute quantity of which it is a part-that the Romans marked their coins（with some well-founded exceptions）according to their relative and not their absolute weight.Thus as signifies only a whole consisting of twelve parts；it may refer to an inheritance just as well as to quantities and weights，to the pound as well as to any part of a pound.The fact that only the relativity of the measure enters consciousness and is effective is not affected by the hypothesis that suggests that in ancient times the as signified a bar of copper of a specific absolute weight.

The Quantity Of Effective Money

We now have to deal more specifically with the qualifications to the concept of the total quantity of money.It is not because of the immeasurable quantitative difference between all available commodities and all available money that it is impossible to assert that there is as much money to spend as there are commodities for sale.There exists no direct relation of less and more between the two，because there is no common measure for them as there would be for objects that have identical qualities.No quantity of commodities is related to a definite quantity of money，since all the purposes of money could，in principle，be attained by a quantity of money reduced as much as desired.The extent to which this can be achieved in practice without bringing transactions to a stop is illustrated by the following recorded fact.Some centuries ago，silver coins existed in Russia of such minute size that it was impossible to take them by hand from the table；they were tipped out of the purse，the amount payable was separated out and both parties proceeded to pick up their share with their tongues and spit it back into their purses.One might say that，whatever the absolute amount of money available，it always remains a lot of‘money’so long as it performs the services of money.All that varies is the quantity of these tokens or pieces in a different respect，namely as material of some kind；their quantity as money need not be affected.Thus，a direct comparison between all commodities and all money does not allow any conclusion.The lack of relationship between the total amounts of money and of commodities-as denominators of the fractions that express value-results from the fact that the total supply of money is turned over much more quickly than is the total amount of commodities.Nobody will leave large sums of money unused if it can be avoided，and usually it can be avoided.But no merchant can avoid keeping a considerable part of his stock for some time before it can be sold.The difference in the velocity of turnover becomes greater still if one includes those objects that are not offered for sale，but are occasionally saleable if there is a tempting offer.If the amount of money required for the sale of the total supply of goods were calculated on the basis of the prices actually paid for these goods，the estimate would vastly exceed the actual supply of money.From this point of view，it can be stated that there is much less money than commodities and that the proportion between the commodity and its price is not at all equal to the proportion between all commodities and all money，but is considerably smaller than this.However，there are two ways in which we can save our basic proposition.First，we might regard as the total quantity of commodities，that quantity that is actually in the process of being sold.To use an Aristotelian concept：the unsold commodity is merely a possible commodity，which becomes a real commodity only at the moment of sale.Just as money is real money only at the moment when it buys something，i.e.when it exercises the function of money，so the commodity becomes a commodity only when it is sold；until that time，it is only a possible object for sale，an ideal anticipation.From this standpoint，it is an obvious and analytical statement that there is as much money as there are objects to be sold-including as money，of course，all those money substitutes provided by the banking and credit system.To be sure，the commodities temporarily excluded from the selling process are not without economic effect，and economic life would be changed tremendously if the total supply of commodities were put completely into circulation as is the supply of money.Upon closer scrutiny，the commodity supply in reserve seems to me to have an influence on actual sales only in three ways：on the rate of circulation of money，on the production of the material of money and money equivalents，and on the relation between money expenditure and the reserves.But these factors have already exercised their influence on the actual turnover；the empirical relation between commodity and price has been formed under their influence and they do not exclude an interpretation of the total quantity of commodities as the actual sales of commodities at a given moment.

Secondly，this can also be regarded as a consequence of the fact that the same amount of money-since money is not consumed as commodities are-can effect an unlimited number of transactions；and that its insignificant quantity at any given moment，when compared with the quantity of commodities，is compensated for by the velocity of its circulation.The higher levels of finance illustrate clearly that the substance of money plays only a very minor role in value transactions.In 1890 the Bank of France had a turnover on current accounts which was 135 times the amount of the money actually deposited（54 billion as against 400 million francs），while at the German Reichsbank the ratio was 190.Within the total sum of money in use，which determines the money price of commodities，the actual amount of money is negligible in relation to the total available as a result of its circulation.

Thus it is possible to assert，with reference to a specific period but not to a single moment，that the total quantity of money in circulation corresponds with the total amount of objects saleable during this period.

The individual also makes his expenditures and accepts the prices for larger purchases not in relation to his momentary disposal of money，but in relation to his total income over a prolonged period.In our equation，the money fraction may attain equality with the commodity fraction through the fact that its denominator is not the quantity of money available as a substance，but is a multiple of this amount determined by the circulation of money during a given period.From this point of view，the antinomy between the stock of available commodities and those commodities that are the value counterparts of money can be solved；and the assertion that no basic disproportion can arise between the total amount of commodities and of money in an autonomous economic area may be upheld.This is true in spite of disagreements about the proper relation between a particular commodity and its price，in spite of the fluctuations and discrepancies that may develop if some definite size of the fractions concerned has become psychologically established while a different one has become more appropriate by reason of objective changes，and in spite of temporary shortages in the means of exchange resulting from a rapid increase in the number of transactions.Imports and exports of metal which are the result of a shortage or excess of money in relation to commodity values in a given country are nothing but adjustments within a larger economic area in which particular countries are the provinces；they indicate that a proper relation between two provinces has been restored after changes have occurred in one of them.Under these circumstances，an answer to the question whether a given price is appropriate or not can be derived directly from the two previous questions：first，what is the amount of money and the sum total of objects for sale at the present time；and，second，what proportion does the object under consideration form of the total quantity of commodities available？The second question is the decisive one.The equation between the commodity fraction and the money fraction can be objectively and quantitatively true or false；whereas the equation between objects in general and money in general is only a matter of expediency，not one of truth in the sense that it can be logically established.The relationship between the totalities has，as it were，the significance of an axiom，which is not true in the same sense as are the statements based upon it；only the latter can be proven，whereas the axiom cannot refer to anything from which it could be logically derived.A very important methodological rule is established here，which I will illustrate from a completely different category of values.The basic assertion of pessimism is that there is in life a considerable excess of suffering over happiness，that living beings，considered as a whole or on the average，experience much more pain than pleasure.It is quite impossible to make such an assertion，which presupposes that pleasure and pain can be directly balanced and set off against each other as two qualitatively equal magnitudes with opposite signs.In reality this is impossible because there is no common measure.When we suffer we cannot experience what amount of pleasure would be necessary to compensate for the suffering.How then can we explain that such comparisons are always being made；that in everyday affairs，in a coherent destiny，in the sum of an individual life，we judge that the quantity of enjoyment has fallen below or has exceeded the amount of pain？It is possible only because the experience of life has taught us，more or less strictly，how fortune and misfortune are actually distributed，how much suffering has to be accepted in order to attain a certain amount of pleasure，and how much of each is man's usual portion.Only when we have formed some notion of this kind，no matter how unconscious and vague，is it possible to say that in a particular case a pleasure has been paid for too dearly-i.e.with too large an amount of suffering-or that in one individual life the pain exceeded the happiness.The average itself cannot be‘disproportionate’because it is the standard by which we determine whether the relation between feelings in an individual case is fair or not.In the same way，it is impossible to say that people on the average are tall or small，since the average provides the standard by which the individual is measured；and it is misleading to say that‘time’passes quickly or slowly，since the passage of time-i.e.the average experienced pace of events-fis the measuring rod by which the quickness or slowness of the passage of single events is measured，while the average itself is neither quick nor slow.Thus，the pessimistic assertion that the average human life contains more suffering than enjoyment is methodologically just as impossible as the optimistic assertion of the contrary.The sensation of the total quantities of pleasure and pain（or，differently expressed，the average of them for an individual or for a period of time）is the original phenomenon，whose components cannot be compared with each other because this would require a measure independent of both and yet comprehending both equally.

This should suffice to characterize the type of knowledge with which we are dealing here.In the areas mentioned，and also in many others，the primary elements are not comparable because they are of different qualities and cannot be measured by each other or by a third factor.But the fact that a certain amount of one element，and a certain amount of the other element，is present provides a measure to be applied to individual cases，events and problems，where both elements are involved.In so far as，in individual cases，the elements repeat the proportions that occur in the total quantities，then the elements have a‘correct’，i.e.normal，average or typical relation，and deviations appear as a‘preponderance’or‘disproportion，of one element.In themselves，the elements in individual cases have no more a right or wrong，an equal or unequal，relation than have the totalities；they acquire such a relation only through the total quantities being established as an absolute，in terms of which the singular，the relative，is calculated.The absolute is not subject to the rules of comparison that it makes possible for the relative.

The relation between the object of sale and its money price could belong to this type.Perhaps they have nothing in common as regards content and perhaps they are qualitatively so unequal that they are quantitatively incomparable.But since everything saleable and the total amount of money together form an economic cosmos，the price of one commodity could be the‘appropriate price’if it constitutes the same part of the total effective amount of money as does the commodity of the total amount of goods.The mutual proportionality need not depend upon the equal‘value’of the object and the specific amount of money.The money price does not have to represent a value at all，or at least not a value in the same sense；it has only to constitute the same fraction of all money as the commodity constitutes of all commodity values.Individual economic transactions illustrate how dependent the money price of a commodity is upon its relation to a total quantity of commodities.We say that we are willing to sacrifice this money-which is rather inconvenient for us-only if we obtain a reasonable equivalent.Every reduction of that sacrifice is counted as a positive profit.But it is a profit only so far as the money can be spent on another occasion.If I had nothing else to do with the money，I would spend all the money I own unhesitatingly on the one object for which it is demanded.The appropriateness of the price means only that I，as an average person，have enough money left to buy the other things that I want.The expenditure on every single object has to be adjusted to the fact that I want to buy other objects besides.If everybody regulates his private expenditures in such a way that the payment for every type of commodity is proportionate to his total income，this means that his expenditure for the single object is related to his total expenses just as the importance of the single object is related to the totality of desired and available objects.This scheme of the private economy of an individual is obviously not only an analogy of the general economy；its general application determines the average prices.The continuous subjective balancing precipitates the objective relation between commodity and price；this relationship depends not only upon the proportion between the total effective supply of goods and the total amount of money，but also-subject to all kinds of modificationson the proportion between the total wants of the individual and his total available money income.

Does Money Possess An Intrinsic Value？

The preceding argument has not yet touched upon the question as to whether in reality money has value or not.It was only meant to show that the function of money in measuring values does not impose upon it the character of being itself a valuable object.However，the mere possibility that it does have value opens the road to understanding not only the historical development of money but，above all，its essential nature.In the primitive stages of the economy，use-values appear as money：cattle，salt，slaves，tobacco，hides，etc.Whatever the way in which money has evolved，in the beginning it must have been a value experienced as such.It is possible to exchange the most valuable things against a printed form only when the chain of purposes is very extensive and reliable and provides us with a guarantee that what is immediately valueless will help us to acquire other values.It is in this manner that one can carry out a series of logical deductions，through impossible or contradictory stages，to a valid and binding conclusion，but only when the process of thought is assured of its direction and its correctness.Primitive and still vacillating thinking would immediately lose its direction at one of the intermediate stages；and it has，therefore，to exercise its functions in statements each of which has to be concrete and obviously correct-at the cost of being less versatile and less comprehensive in its goals.Similarly，the extension of the succession of values by valueless things enormously increases their range and usefulness，yet is possible only with a growing intellectuality of individuals and with the continued organization of the group.Nobody will be stupid enough to exchange a value against something that is valueless，unless he is sure of being able to convert the latter into values again.Exchange was at first necessarily exchange in kind，an exchange between direct values.One assumes that objects that were frequently exchanged and circulated because of their general desirability，and the value of which in relation to other objects was therefore frequently measured，were psychologically most suited to become general standards of value.Apparently in direct contrast with the earlier result，according to which money as such does not have to be of value，we discover here that the most needed and the most valuable object is apt to become money.I do not mean needed in the physiological sense；for instance，the desire for adornment can play a dominant role among the experienced‘necessities’.Indeed，we are told that for primitive people the adornment of their bodies，and the objects used for it，are more valuable than all the things that we consider so much more urgent.The necessity of things is for us only an emphasis that our sentiments attribute to objects that are in themselves equivalent or‘neutral’and depends entirely upon our purposes.Thus，we cannot calculate theoretically what are the values that are immediately urgent and fit to play the function of money.The only indispensable assumption seems to me that the money character is originally attached to those objects that show a particular frequency of exchange against a variety of other things as a result of experienced necessity.Money could not have developed as a means of exchange or as a measure of value unless its material substance had been experienced as immediately valuable.

At the present time，by comparison，money is no longer valuable because its substance is regarded as a necessity，an indispensable value.No European today regards a coin as valuable because it can be changed into a piece of jewelry.The present-day value of money cannot be traced to its value as metal，precisele because precious metals are available in too great quantities to find a profitably use merely for adornment and for technical purposes.The completion of the process conceived by the theory concerning the value of money as a metal would result in such a multitude of objects made of precious metal that their value would be reduced to a minimum.The valuation of money because of the possibility of converting it into other objects is possible only to the extent that this does happen or happens only on a very small scale.Even though at the beginning of the development，i.e.when there is a limited supply of precious metals，the value of money may have been determined by its alternative use for adornment，this condition disappears as production is increased.This argument is further supported by the fact that，although primitive people regard a particular style of self-adornment as a vital necessity，the subsequent elaboration of scales of value actually places this interest in the category of the‘dispensable’or‘superfluous’.In modem culture，adornment does not at all play the social role that we discover with amazement in ethnological and even in medieval accounts.This fact must also contribute to reducing the significance of money based upon the substance of which it is made.It may be said that the value of money moves increasingly from its terminus a quo to its terminus ad quern ，and that metal money stands on an equal basis with paper money as a result of the growing psychological indifference to its value as metal.It would be wrong to consider the valuelessness of paper money as irrelevant on the grounds that it is simply a draft upon metal.This is refuted by the fact that unsecured paper money is still valued as money.Even if one points to the political force which alone imposes the current rate of exchange of paper money，this means precisely that other reasons besides direct material use can give，and actually do give，money value to a particular substance.The increasing replacement of metal money by paper money and the various forms of credit unavoidably react upon the character of money-in roughly the same way as in personal relations when somebody allows himself always to be represented by others，so that finally he receives no greater esteem than is accorded to his representatives.The functional value of money exceeds its value as a substance the more extensive and diversified are the services it performs and the more rapidly it circulates.Modem commerce tends more and more to eliminate money as a substantial embodiment of value，and this trend is unavoidable because，even if the production of precious metals were increased to the utmost extent，it would still be inadequate to allow all transactions to be conducted in cash.Clearing house business on the one hand and international bills of exchange on the other are only the outstanding examples of this general tendency，the earlier features of which will be discussed in the final section of this chapter.

Generally speaking，the less developed the economic concepts，the more strongly does measurement involve a direct physical relation between the values compared.The interpretation outlined earlier，according to which the equality of value between a commodity and a sum of money consists of an equality between two fractions-in which the individual commodity and sum of money are the numerators and the total quantities of all commodities and all money are the denominators～clearly holds universally，because only this interpretation transforms a particular kind of object into money.However，since money evolves only slowly，this mode will also emerge from the more primitive mode of direct comparison of the objects in exchange.The lowest stage is perhaps illustrated by a case reported from the island of New Britain.The natives there use cowry shells strung together，which they call dewarra ，as money.This money is used for purchases according to a linear measure（e.g.an arm-length，etc.）；fish are usually paid for by dewarra equal to their own length.It is also reported from the cowry money region that a type of purchase prevails in which equal measures of two commodities are considered to be of equal value；thus，a measure of grain is worth an equal measure of cowry shells.The direct equivalence of commodity and price has here attained its most complete and simple expression.The comparison of values between which there is no quantitative congruence represents a more highly developed mental process.There are rudiments of such a naive equation of values by equal quantities in the phenomenon that Mungo Park reports of some West African tribes in the eighteenth century.Iron bars circulated there as money and served to designate the quantities of other commodities；thus a certain measure of tobacco or rum used to be called a‘bar of tobacco’or a‘bar of rum’.In this case，the disposition to regard value equality as equality of quantities，which was obviously a powerful element-resulting from sense impressions-in the primitive construction of values has been transposed into a linguistic expression.Several other phenomena，very diversified in appearance，can be attributed to the same general attitude.Old coins of bronze from the city of Olbia on the Dnieper，a colony of Miletus，have been preserved which have the shape of a fish，with inscriptions which probably mean tuna fish and fish basket.It is assumed that this fishing tribe originally used tuna fish as a standard of exchange，and that it was considered necessary when coins were introducedperhaps because of exchange with less developed neighbouring tribesto represent the value of one tuna fish on each coin，thus symbolizing，by using the same form，that it had the same value and exchangeability.In other areas，the same visible association was made less emphatically by impressing a picture of the object（a bull，fish or axe），which was the basic unit of exchange in the period of barter and whose value the coin represented，upon the coin.The same basic sentiment prevails in the Zend-Avesta，when it is prescribed that a physician should ask as his fee for healing a house-owner the value of an inferior ox，for healing a village magistrate an ox of average quality，for curing a town official the value of a high-quality ox，for the governor of a province the value of a carrage-and-four.On the other hand，the physician would be entitled to a female donkey for curing the wife of a village magistrate，a mare for the wife of a patrician，a female camel for the wife of a governor.The identity between the sex of the patient and the sex of the value-equivalent demonstrates the inclination to base the equivalence of values upon a direct external equality.It is just the same with the fact that money originally consisted of large and heavy objects-hides，cattle，copper，bronze-or of large quantities，as in the case of cowry shell money.The first bank note of which we have knowledge，preserved from China at the end of the fourteenth century，is eighteen inches long and nine inches wide.The peasant saving，‘Much gets more’，is still influential，reflecting a natural sentiment which is proven wrong only by a more refined and reflective empiricism.The largest coins even of precious metals are found almost exclusively among less developed peoples where barter still prevails.The largest gold coins are the lool of the Annamese，worth 880 marks，the Japanese obang （220 marks），and the benta of the Ashanti；Annam also has a silver coin worth 60 marks.The same sentiment about the importance of quantity reserved the privilege of minting the largest coins to the highest authorities，while the smaller coins，though of the same metal，were coined by lower authorities.The Persian Emperor coined the large coins，the satraps the small gold coins of less than a quarter the value.This feature of considerable quantity is characteristic not only of the early forms of metal money，but in some cases also of the preceding kinds of money.The Slavs who inhabited the area between Saale and Elbe during the first century AD，and who were a very barbarous primitive race，used linen cloth as money；the exchange value of one cloth was 100 chickens or grain sufficient for ten men for one month.Even in more elaborate money systems it is noteworthy how the concept of money becomes less and less determined by metal values.The medieval guilder was a gold coin worth a ducat，while today it equals only 100 copper farthings；the original groschen was a thick（grossus ）silver coin；the original mark amounted to a pound of silver，the pound sterling equalled seventy marks.Under primitive barter conditions，money transactions took place not for the small needs of everyday life，but only for the acquisition of larger and more valuable objects.The desire for symmetry which characterizes those cultures that are not yet fully developed also regulated money exchange，and a large token of value was demanded for large objects.Only at higher stages of cultural development is it realized that a considerable quantitative inequality still permits equality of power，of significance and of value.Where practical life is based upon the equating of objects，a direct equality is demanded at first as the size of primitive money in relation to the objects for which it is exchanged illustrates.In the same direction，the abstraction which later recognizes a small piece of metal as the equivalent of an object of any size approaches the goal that one side of the equation no longer functions as a value in itself but is only the abstract expression of the value of the other side.The measuring function of money，which is loosely connected with its material content，has therefore varied least through all the changes of the modem economy.

The Development Of The Purely Symbolic Character Of Money

One of the greatest advances made by mankind-the discovery of a new world out of the material of the old-is to establish a proportion between two quantities，not by direct comparison，but in terms of the fact that each of them relates to a third quantity and that these two relations are either equal or unequal.Two performances of entirely different quality are given；they become comparable if they display the same strength of will and self-sacrifice in relation to the required effort.Two destinies reveal very different degrees of happiness；yet they acquire a measurable relation if each is interpreted according to the extent to which its bearer deserved his fate.Two movements with quite different velocities can be related and equated if we observe that the acceleration from the initial stage is identical in each case.A kind of homogeneity emerges-and not only for our feelings-between two elements which，differing in their substance，have an equal relation to a third or fourth element.The one thereby becomes a factor for the calculability of the other.Furthermore，no matter how incomparable two people may be in their ostensible qualities，the relation of each to another person establishes an equality between them；as soon as one of them shows the same degree of love or hatred，domination or subjection，towards a third person as the other does towards a fourth person，these relations have established the separateness of personal identity.As a final example：the perfection of works of art of different kinds could not be compared and their values could not be arranged on a scale，unless each of them first had a definite relation to the particular ideal of its own kind.From the problem，the material and the style of each work of art，there evolves a norm which the actual work approaches more or less closely；and it is this relation that makes it possible to compare even the most diverse works of art.The possible conformity of such relations to a norm produces an aesthetic cosmos，a precise order，an ideal homogeneity in relation to value，from the individual works which are initially quite heterogeneous.This is not only true for the world of art.Out of the material of our isolated valuations there develops a pattern of graded significance.Disharmony is experienced only as a result of the desire for a consistent order and an inner relation of values.We owe this essential feature of our world view to our ability to balance against each other not only two things，but also the relations of these two to two others，and so unite them by judging them equal or similar.Money，as a product of this fundamental power or form of our mind，is not only its most extreme example，but is，as it were，its pure embodiment.For money can express the value relation between things realized in exchange only by equating the relation between a specific sum and some general denominator，with the relation between a corresponding commodity and the totality of commodities available for exchange.Money is not，by its nature，a valuable object whose parts happen to have the same proportion to each other or to the whole that other values have to each other.The significance of money is only to express the value relations between other objects.It succeeds in this with the aid of man's developed intelligence，which is able to equate the relations between things even though the things themselves are not identical or similar.This ability only gradually evolves from the more primitive capacity to judge and express the identity or similarity of two objects directly，which is the source of the phenomena mentioned earlier that reflect the attempt to establish a direct relationship between money and its exchange values.

In modem economies this transition began with the mercantilist system.The efforts of governments to get as much coin as possible into the country were also guided，of course，by the principle‘much gets more’，but the final purpose that these measures were intended to promote was the stimulation of industry and the market.The next stage beyond this was the discovery that the values that sustained this purpose did not result from money as a substance，but from the direct product of labour.It was much the same with the aims of state policy in earlier times，to acquire as much land as possible and to‘populate’it with as many people as possible.Until the eighteenth century it did not occur to any statesman that real national greatness could be promoted in any other way than by the acquisition of new territory.The justification of such aims under particular historical conditions，however，has not prevented the discovery that this kind of abundance is important only as a basis for dynamic development，which needs in fact only limited gains of such objects（land or money）.It has become evident that the physical availability of a money equivalent becomes less and less essential for the increase of production and wealth，even though large amounts of money are sought not so much for themselves as for definite functional purposes.These purposes can be realized by free-floating processes not involving money in a substantial form，as the international exchange of goods illustrates.The significance of money as expressing the relative value of commodities is，according to our earlier discussion，quite independent of any intrinsic value.Just as it is irrelevant whether a scale to measure space consists of iron，wood or glass，since only the relation of its parts to each other or to another measure concerns us，so the scale that money provides for the determination of values has nothing to do with the nature of its substance.This ideal significance of money as a standard and an expression of the value of goods has remained completely unchanged，whereas its character as an intermediary，as a means to store and to transport values，has changed in some degree and is still in the process of changing.Money passes from the form of directness and substantiality in which it first carried out these functions to the ideal form；that is，it exercises its effects merely as an idea which is embodied in a representative symbol.

The development of money seems to be an element in a profound cultural trend.The different levels of culture may be distinguished by the extent to which，and at what points，they have a direct relationship with the objects that concern them，and on the other hand by the extent to which they use symbols.The way of life is radically different according to whether religious needs are satisfied by symbolic services and formulas，or by a direct approach of the individual to God；whether the respect of people for each other is manifested through established rules that indicate relative positions by specific ceremonies，or through informal courtesy，attachment and respect；whether purchases，agreements and contracts are made by simply making their content known，or are legalized and made binding by an external symbol of solemn undertaking；whether theoretical knowledge deals directly with sense reality or with its representation through general concepts and metaphysical or mythological symbols.But of course，these differences are not rigid.Rather，the history of mankind shows a continuous fluctuation between them.On the one hand，the symbolic representation of reality increases，but at the same time，as a countermovement，symbols are constantly analysed and reduced to their original foundation.I will mention a singular example of this.Sexual objects have long been concealed through propriety and shame，while the words referring to them were used without hesitation.Only in recent centuries have the words themselves come under the same interdict.The symbol was thus brought into agreement with the emotional attitude to reality.But in very recent times this connection has begun to be dissolved again.Naturalism in art has drawn our attention to the lack of differentiation and freedom in perception if the same sensations are attached to the word，which is a mere symbol used for artistic purposes，as to the object itself.The representation of indecency is not at all the same thing as an indecent exhibition；and the perception of reality must be distinguished from the symbolical world in which art，including naturalism，exists.Perhaps in these circumstances there emerges a greater freedom among educated people in talking about delicate subjects.So long as an objective and chaste attitude can be presupposed，what was formerly forbidden is now allowed；the sense of shame is restricted more to the matter itself and does not affect the word as a mere symbol.Thus the relation between reality and symbol fluctuates in narrower as well as in more general areas.One is almost inclined to think-though such generalities cannot be demonstrated-that either every stage of culture（and finally every nation，every group and every individual）displays a specific proportion between the symbolic and the directly realistic treatment of its interests，or else that this proportion is generally stable and only the objects that are affected by it are subject to change.But perhaps it may be stated more specifically that a conspicuous prevalence of symbolism is as much part of primitive and naive as of very highly developed and complicated stages of cultural development.It may be that the progressive development frees us from symbols in the realm of cognition，but makes us more dependent on them in practical matters.By contrast with the nebulous symbolism of mythological world views，modem philosophy shows an incomparable directness in its interpretation of objects.On the other hand，the extensive and intensive multiplication of life-experiences has the result that we have to subsume，condense and represent them by symbolic forms to a greater extent than was necessary under simpler and more restricted conditions.Symbolism，which at lower cultural stages often means detours and waste of energy，is expedient and saves energy at the higher stages.

One may think here of diplomatic techniques in the international as well as the party political sphere.Certainly，it is the relation between actual degrees of power that determines the outcome of the struggle between interests.But these are no longer measured against each other directly in a physical fight；they are represented conceptually.Behind the representative of each collective power stands in condensed potential form the real power of his party，and it is just in proportion to the latter that his voice is effective and his interest able to prevail.He himself is the symbol of this power.The intellectual exchange between the representatives of different power groups symbolizes the course that a real battle would have taken，in such fashion that the vanquished accepts the result as though he had really been defeated.I call to mind，for instance，the negotiations between employees and employers to avoid an impending strike.Each party yields just at the point which，according to its estimate of the respective strength of the parties，would be enforced by an actual strike.The ultima rationis is avoided by anticipating its results through imaginative devices.If such a representation and measurement of real strength could always be made accurately by the imagination，then every battle could be avoided.The utopian suggestion to decide the outcome of future wars by a game of chess between the generals is absurd，because the result of a game of chess does not give any indication of what would have been the outcome of a struggle between the armies，and so cannot symbolize and represent it in a valid way.However，a war game in which the whole armed forces，all fortuitous occurrences，all the intelligence of the leaders，found an appropriate symbolical expression，might possibly eliminate the physical struggle if such a game could be conceived.

The multitude of factors-of powers，substances and eventsthat operate in modem life demand a concentration in comprehensive symbols which can be manipulated with the assurance that they will lead to the same result as if all the details had been taken into account，so that the result will be applicable and valid for all particulars.This should be possible to the extent that the quantitative relations between things become，so to speak，independent.The growing differentiation of our representations has the result that the problem of‘how much’is，to a certain extent，psychologically separated from the question of‘what’-no matter how strange this may sound from the logical point of view.It occurred first and most successully in the construction of numbers，by extracting the‘so and so much’out of‘so many things’and making it into independent concepts.The more stable the concepts become with reference to their qualitative content，the more attention becomes focused upon their quantitative relations.Finally，the ideal of knowledge is seen as the dissolution of all the qualitative categories of reality into purely quantitative ones.This specification and emphasis of quantity facilitates the symbolic treatment of things.Since those that differ in content may coincide with respect to quantity，the relations，characteristics and movements of one of them may provide a valid representation of those of another.The simplest examples are the tokens that represent the numerical value of any object，or the thermometer that shows the temperature in degrees.It may appear self-evident today that symbols should be created by segregating the quantitative aspects of things；but this is in fact an achievement of the human mind which has remarkable consequences.The institution of money depends upon it inasmuch as money represents pure quantity in a numerical form，regardless of all the specific qualities of a valued object.An account from ancient Russia illustrates a very characteristic transition from the qualitative to the quantitative symbolic representation.Originally，marten furs served as a means of exchange.As trade developed，the size and quality of individual pelts lost all significance for their exchange value；each pelt simply equalled any other，and only the number of pelts mattered.Eventually only the tips of the pelts were used as money，and finally pieces of leather，probably stamped by the government，circulated as a means of exchange.This clearly illustrates how the reduction to a quantitative viewpoint supports the symbolization of values，which is the basis for the genuine realization of money.

However，it appears that at first ideal money does not meet the higher economic needs，although it is particularly suited for general acceptance，since it has no relation to particular values，but an equal relation to all of them.The extraordinary spread of cowry-moneywhich was used for a thousand years in a large part of Africa，at an earlier time in the region of the Indian Ocean，and in prehistoric times in Europe-would not have been possible if it had not been so genuinely ideal.At the lower economic stages，extreme contrasts of money values exist side by side；on the one hand，there is money which is entirely The Value of Money as a Substance concrete in value，such as cattle or cotton cloth，which circulates when large amounts of money are involved，and on the other，there is completely ideal money such as crowy shells，the bark of the mulberry tree which Marco Polo discovered in China，or the pieces of porcelain with Chinese characters，which circulated in Siam.A certain functional development beyond the types of money with concrete value begins where natural products which are at the same time export articles become means of exchange：tobacco in Virginia，rice in Carolina，cod in Newfoundland，tea in China and furs in Massachusetts.In the case of export articles，value becomes psychologically separated from the immediacy which prevails in the domestic use of money.However，the most useful compromise between abstract kinds of money，such as those just mentioned，and money which has intrinsic value，is still jewelry money，that is，gold and silver；this is neither so whimsical and senseless as the former，nor so crude and singular as the latter.Gold and silver are obviously the forms through which money can most easily and certainly become a symbol.Money has to pass through this incarnation in order to achieve its greatest effects，and it seems unlikely that it will escape from it in the foreseeable future.

As secondary symbols-as they may be called by contrast with the naive symbolism of naive states of mind-increasingly replace the direct substance of things and values in practical life，the importance of intellect in the conduct of life is extraordinarily enhanced.As soon as life no longer moves between particular sense impressions but is determined by abstractions，averages and synoptic views，then，particularly in the sphere of human relations，a more rapid and exact process of abstraction will produce an advantage.If public order today can be secured by the mere appearance of an official，whereas in former times it required physical force；if a mere signature binds us unconditionally，both externally and internally；if a mere hint，or a facial expression，suffices among civilized people to indicate a lasting relationship which，under less developed conditions can be shown only by lengthy explanations or longterm behaviour；if sacrifices can be imposed upon us by written accounts which could be wrested from more ignorant peoples only by the real working of the factors conceived-then this significance of symbolic things and acts is obviously possible only as a result of greatly enhanced intellectuality，and of the existence of such independent mental power that the particular details of phenomena no longer require attention.

I have made these observations in order to clarify the role oi money too in this trend of cultural development.The increasingly influential principle of economizing strength and materials leads to more and more extensive experiments with representatives and symbols that have virtually no relation to what they represent.The same course is followed when operations with values are carried out by a symbol that loses more and more any material relation to the specific phenomena of its area and becomes merely a symbol.This form of life not only presupposes a remarkable expansion of mental processes（consider，for instance，the complicated psychological pre-conditions required to cover bank notes by cash reserves）but also their intensification，a fundamental re-orientation of culture towards intellectuality.The idea that life is essentially based on intellect，and that intellect is accepted in practical life as the most valuable of our mental energies，goes hand in hand with the growth of a money economy，as our further discussion will show plainly.Intellect is also undoubtedly sovereign in the field of commerce，and especially in financial transactions.The growth of intellectual abilities and of abstract thought characterizes the age in which money becomes more and more a mere symbol，neutral as regards its intrinsic value.

Ⅱ

Renunciation Of The Non-monetary Uses Of Monetary Material

It must be kept in mind that thus far we have only established a trend of development which began when the intrinsic value of money was co-ordinated with all other values.Thus，some other conceptions have to be disproved which apparently coincide with our theory that money has no intrinsic value，in so far as they emphasize the distinction between money and all other values and thus seek to prove that money cannot possibly be a value of the same kind.As is so often the case，this establishes in a rigid form and by anticipation what can be established only by endless approximation.In arguing against the dogma of the intrinsic value of money，we should not become victims of the dogma that money is valueless-an error into which the following notions might lead us.It appears that even the most useful object must renounce its usefulness in order to function as money.If，for example，in Abyssinia specifically cut pieces of rock salt circulate as coins，they are money precisely because they are not used as salt.On the coast of Somaliland pieces of blue cotton cloth，each two ells long，used to circulate as money.This was a considerable progress over the use of cloth money that was cut and composed arbitrarily，but nevertheless it indicates a tendency to abandon the use of cloth as cloth.The possible use of gold and silver for technical and aesthetic purposes cannot be realized as long as they circulate as money，and the same is true of all other kinds of money.The various uses that the material of money has for our purposes must all be renounced if it is to be used as money.As soon as such materials reveal their practical，aesthetic or other value they are withdrawn from circulation and are no longer money.All other values may be compared with each other and exchanged according to the measure of their utility in order to acquire a specific value，but money is kept completely apart from this series，For as soon as it is used in the same manner as the value that it buys，it ceases to be money.It may be part of the unique suitability of precious metals as money material that they can easily be restored from some other form to the form of money.Nevertheless，at any given moment they have the choice of being either money or jewelry，that is of functioning either as money or as use value.It may appear that money is then assimilated again to the other categories of value.For if I buy a yard of wood for fuel I value its substance only for the heat that it produces and not for any other possible use.In reality，however，the situation is quite different.If it is claimed that the value of money consists in the value of its material，this means that its value is embodied in the qualities or powers of the substance which are not those of money.The apparent paradox indicates that money does not necessarily have to be based upon substances that are intrinsically valuable，i.e.valuable in some other respect.It is sufficient if the ability to function as money is transferred to any substance，the other qualities of which are quite irrelevant.It remains to be seen whether the abandonment of all those value functions that support the theory that money must possess intrinsic value，justifies the conclusion that money can be only money and nothing but money.

The point in question is the very important phenomenon of an object that has several functions of which only one，to the exclusion of all others，can be realized；and whether this realized function is modified in its significance and its value by the retreat of the others.In order to understand the co-existence of different possibilities，it may be permissible to point out first how the succession of diverse functions affects the one that finally survives.If the repentant sinner is given a higher value in the moral order of the world than the righteous man who has never erred，then this valuation of the moral superiority of the sinner is not derived from the presently existing situation-for the ethical content of this situation is，according to our assumptions，exactly the same as that of the righteous man-but from the preceding situation，in which the moral behaviour was different and from the fact that this situation no longer exists.Again，if freedom and self-determination is restored after there has been obstruction of our activity and external enforcement of its direction，our actions then acquire a particular feeling of well-being and value，which arises not from their content or success，but exclusively from the fact that the form of dependency has been eliminated.The same activity，following an uninterrupted series of independent actions，would lack the attraction that springs simply from the passing of a preceding form of life.This influence of not-being on being appears-somewhat modified and more obvious in spite of the differences of content-in the significance that immediate emotional life has for lyrical or musical art.For even though the lyric and music are based upon the strength of inner emotions，their character as art requires that the immediacy of these emotions should be overcome.Although the raw material of emotion，with its impulsiveness，its personal limitations，its unbalanced fortuitousness，is the prerequisite of a work of art，the purity of art requires a distance，a release from the emotion.This is the essential meaning of art，for the artist as well as for those who enjoy it，namely，that it raises us above the immediacy of its relation to ourselves and to the world.The value of art depends upon our overcoming this immediacy，which then operates as if it no longer existed.And if it is asserted that the attraction of the work of art depends，after all，upon the resonance of that autochthonous emotion，that original agitation of the soul，it will nevertheless be admitted that the specific element of art lies not in what is common to the immediate and aesthetic form of emotion，but in the new colouring which the aesthetic form receives to the extent that the immediate form has faded away.

Finally，let us consider the most decisive and most general instance，which is considered only rarely because it is deeply embedded in our fundamental valuations.It seems to me that a vast number of life experiences that we enjoy derive their intensity from the fact that，for their sake，we leave unexplored innumerable opportunities for other enjoyments and for other ways of proving ourselves.A regal extravagance，a careless grandeur of existence，is revealed by the way that people ignore each other or pass on after a brief encounter，by our total indifference towards many to whom we could give much and who could give much to us.But there also emanates from this unique value of non-enjoyment a new，enhanced and more concentrated charm in what we do actually possess.The fact that this one among innumerable possibilities has become reality gives it a triumphant tone；the shades of the untried，neglected richness of life provide its victor‘s retinue.Moreover，what is given to other people often derives its value from what is retained，or indeed resolutely withheld.A cordial expansiveness，especially towards those of lower status，loses its value if it goes too far，if one shows too little reserve.It is all the more important to the recipient that one even offers a part of oneself，when he feels that one has still kept back something of oneself.In the last resort，it is the same with the significance of our own actions and undertakings.Sudden and compelling demands often make evident to us that we have abilities and powers for tasks that have hitherto seemed remote；that we have energies that would have remained latent if by chance an emergency had not elicited them from us.This shows that，besides the energies that are actually used，there are indeterminate potentialities which lie dormant in everyone，so that each person could have become something different from what he actually became.Life allows only a very limited number among these many possibilities to be realized；consequently，these appear more significant and precious the more we understand that they are a selection from many，that many forms of activity remain undeveloped and have to be sacrificed in order to develop others.Since so many possible achievements have to be sacrificed for the sake of one particular accomplishment，the latter represents，as it were，the quintessence of a much wider range of life-energies.By denying growth to these other energies it acquires significance and sharpness，a tone of distinction and accumulated force，which makes it the focus and representative of our total personality，transcending the area with which it is directly concerned.

Money may be subsumed under this general type of value formation.It is certainly correct that the other values of money9 s substance have to be discarded for the substance to become money；but the value that money has，and that allows it to perform its function，may be determined by those other possible uses which have to be foregone.As in the cases that we have just discussed，the perceived value of the developed function is constituted by its positive content and also by the exclusion of all other functions.What is effective here is not the operation of other functions but the fact that they do not operate.If the value of any object is determined by the fact that something else is sacrificed for it，then the value of the money material is determined by giving up all its other uses so that it can become money.This kind of valuation is，of course，reciprocal；i.e.the value of the money material for other uses will also increase if its use as money is abandoned.The wampum of the North American Indians consisted of mussel shells，which served as money but could also be worn as a decorative belt.These functions are obviously correlated；the role of the shells as jewelry has acquired an air of distinction by virtue of the fact that it requires abstention from using them directly as money.This whole type of value may be regarded as an instance of scarcity value.This usually implies that an object is demanded by more individuals orin greater quantity than the supply is adequate to meet.If different needs that can be satisfied by the same object compete for it-whether these needs occur in a single individual or among several individualsthe situation is naturally affected by the restriction of the supply，which makes impossible the satisfaction of all the needs.Just as the exchange value of grain can be traced to the fact that there is not enough of it to satisfy all those who are hungry，so the exchange value of the money material is the result of the fact that there is not enough to satisfy all those needs for it additional to the need for money.So far from the renunciation of other uses reducing the value of the metal that is used for money to that of quite worthless materials，these unrealized uses of the material instead contribute largely to the value of money.

The First Argument Against Money As Merely A Symbol

There is another argument which seeks to convince us more directly than the one we have just refuted that money cannot be a value.Let us imagine an all-powerful individual with despotic authority within a given group over everything that he desires；one，for example，such as those chiefs in Oceania of whom it is said that they‘cannot steal’because everything already belongs to them.Such an individual would have no occasion to seize the money of the group，since he can in any case take possession of everything that money can buy.If money were itself a value in addition to other available values，then he would desire it as much as those other values.If it is clear that this does not happen in the fictitious case that I have described，then it seems to follow that money is really only a representative of real values，and is unnecessary once the real values are attainable without money.But this simple idea presupposes what it wishes to prove，namely that the substance of money has no value of its own aside from its functioning as money.For if it had such value it would be desired by the wielder of power not so much as money but for its other value as a substance.If such a value does not exist，its absence does not need to be demonstrated again.Leaving aside its logical deficiency，however，this case illustrates what specific kind of value money has.

Money has acquired the value it possesses as a means of exchange；if there is nothing to exchange，money has no value.For obviously，its significance as a means of storing and transporting values is not of the same importance，but is a derivative of the function of money as means of exchange；without the latter，the other functions could not be exercised，whereas its function as means of exchange is independent of them.Money has no value either for a person to whom the goods that it can buy are valueless，or for a person who does not need money to acquire them.In short，money is the expression and the agent of the relationship that makes the satisfaction of one person always mutually dependent upon another person.Money has no place where there is no mutual relationship，either because one does not want anything from other people，or because one lives on a different plane-without any relation to them as it were-and is able to satisfy any need without any service in return.Looked at in this way，the world of money is related to the world of concrete values as thought is related to extension in Spinoza's system：it is impossible that either one should interfere with the other，because each of them expresses the whole world by itself and in its language.Thus，the total amount of value does not consist of the sum total of the value of things plus the total value of money；there is a certain quantity of value that may be realized in either form，as things or as money.

If money were reduced entirely to this value and had divested itself of all co-ordination with valuable things，it would realize，in the field of economics，the extraordinary conception that is the basis of Plato's theory of ideas.Plato was led，by a profound dissatisfaction with the world of experience to which we are confined，to conceive a metaphysical realm of ideas outside space and time，in which the real，harmonious，absolute essence of things existed.Earthly reality，therefore，became void of all real being and significance；but on the other hand，something was reflected back upon it from the realm of ideas；it had at least some part in the glowing realm of the absolute，as its faint shadow，and so it acquired a significance which was at first denied to it.This relationship is repeated and confirmed in the realm of values.The reality of things that confronts the perceiving mind is devoid of values，as we asserted at the beginning of this investigation；it develops in a form indifferent to values，often destroying what is most noble and preserving what is most base，because it does not proceed in terms of a hierarchy of worth，interests or values.We then subordinate this natural objective existence to a hierarchy of values，constructed in terms of good and bad，noble and mediocre，precious and valueless.This construction does not in any way affect being in its tangible reality，but it is the source of all meaning that reality may have for us；and we experience it-in spite of our awareness of its human origin-as being quite the opposite of mere fancy and subjectivity.The value of things-ethical as well as eudaemonistic，religious as well as aesthetic-hovers，like the Platonic ideas，above the world；a realm that is governed by its own alien and intangible inner norms，but that lends relief and colour to reality.Economic value originates by derivation from these primary，directly experienced values，by weighing the objects in which values are incorporated against each other，so far as they are exchangeable.Within this area，however，economic value，no matter how it has constituted itself，has the same peculiar relation to the individual objects as has value in general.It is a world apart，in which the objects are classified and arranged according to particular norms which are not inherent in the objects.Objects that are ordered and related by their economic value form a cosmos that is entirely different from that formed by their natural and immediate reality.If money were really nothing but the expression of the values of things external to money，it would be related to things just as the idea，which Plato conceived also as a substantial，metaphysical entity，is related to empirical reality.The movements of money-balancing，accumulation，outflow-would directly represent the value relationship between things.The world of values，which hovers above the real world apparently unconnected yet without question governing it，would be represented in its‘pure form，by money.And just as Plato interprets the real world，from the observation and sublimation of which the ideas have arisen，as a mere reflection of these ideas，so then do the economic relations，stages and fluctuations of concrete things appear as derivatives from their own derivative，namely as representatives and shadows of the significance that their money equivalent possesses.No other species of values is more favourably situated in this respect than are economic values.Religious values are embodied in priests and churches，ethical-social values in administrators and the visible institutions of state-power，the values of knowledge in the norms of logic；but none of these is more detached than are economic values from concrete valuable objects or processes；none is more completely the mere abstract bearer of value；in none of them is the whole world of relevant values so faithfully reflected.

The development of money is a striving towards the ideal of a pure symbol of economic value which is never attained.At first，as we must clearly remember，money belongs to the same series as allother objects of value，and its concrete material value is balanced against these.With the growing need for means of exchange and standards of value it changes more and more from a connecting link between value equations to a symbol of these equations and thus becomes more independent of the value of its material.Yet money cannot cast off a residue of material value，not exactly for inherent reasons，but on account of certain shortcomings of economic technique.One of these has to do with money as a means of exchange.The substitution of symbolic meaning for the intrinsic value of money is made possible only by a number of factors which we noted earlier.These are that the proportion between the single commodity and the economically effective total quantity of commodities is，with certain qualifications，equal to the proportion between a certain amount of money and the economically effective total quantity of money；that the denominators of these fractions are practically but not consciously effective，since only the changing numerators are of real interest in determining the transactions；and that in this transaction a direct equation between the commodity and the sum of money appears to take place，although of course it is quite a different basis from that of the original equation between the object and the material value of money.Even if this development is accepted，it remains true that the factors arising from the respective total sums of value are situated within fluctuating limits，and the instinctively formed estimation of their size will always be rather inexact.Perhaps that is why it is impossible to do without a direct value equation between commodities and money.The portion of intrinsic material value contained in money provides the support and complementation that we need because our knowledge of the exact proportion is insufficient；otherwise an identity between the measured value and the standard，that is an intrinsic value of money，would not be required.So long as experience and economic practice show that the proposition is imprecise，the measuring process will require a certain qualitative unity of the standard and the values themselves.It may be of interest to point out a corresponding instance in the aesthetic use of precious metals.An expert reported from the London Exhibition of 1851 on the differences between English and Indian gold and silverware.The English craftsman seems to have striven to incorporate the largest possible amount of metal in the smallest possible form；the Indian craftsman however，‘used enamelling，damascene and filigree work，etc.，in such a way as to incorporate the greatest possible amount of highly skilled work in the smallest possible quantity of metal'.Yet even in the latter case it is certainly not irrelevant for the aesthetic significance of the jewelry that the small amount of metal employed is precious metal.Even if this practice is carried to a point where the amount of metal has only a minimal value，this minimum still has to be of precious material for the purpose of decoration and aesthetic pleasure.The intrinsic value of the material is not important，only the fact that the sole adequate bearer of a perfect formal relationship between the pats is a very precious material.

It is，by the way，quite obvious that this attribution of the material value of money to a complementing and supporting principle with reference to the uncertain relations is only an interpretation of processes that occur in the subconscious of the economic subjects themselves.Economic interactions take place with such admirable expediency，by subtly organized dovetailing of innumerable details，that it would be necessary to assume that they were integrated by a superior mind，operating with superhuman wisdom，if one did not fall back upon the unconscious power of adaptation of the human species.The conscious intentions and foresight of individuals would not suffice to maintain the harmony that economic activity displays alongside its fearful discords and inadequacies.We have to assume that there are unconscious experiences and calculations which accumulate during the historical development of the economy and which regulate its course.It should be remembered，however，that unconscious conceptions do not provide a satisfactory explanation，but are only aids to understanding that are actually based upon a fallacy.We arrive at determinate thoughts and actions from particular conceptions，chains of reasoning，etc.But if these consequences emerge without the antecedents，we conclude that the latter nevertheless existed without our being conscious of them.From a logical point of view，this is clearly unwarranted.Surreptitiously，we turn the merely negative fact that we are ignorant of the causative conceptions into a positive assertion that unconscious representations exist.Actually we know nothing of the processes that produce a psychic effect without conscious antecedents，and the notion of unconscious representations，experiences and inferences only expresses the fact that the effects occur as if they were the result of conscious motivations and ideas.The urge to explain has to rest content with investigating these processes and treating them as（unconsciously）effective causes，although they merely symbolize the real course of events.In our present state of knowledge it is unavoidable，and thus legitimate，to interpret the formation of values-their consolidation and fluctuation-as unconscious processes which follow the norms and forms of conscious reasoning.

The Second Argument Against Money As Merely A Symbol

The second reason for not regarding money as being only a symbol is connected with its significance as an element in exchange.Although，in principle，the exchange function of money could be accomplished by mere token money，no human power could provide a sufficient guarantee against possible misuse.The functions of exchange and reckoning obviously depend upon a limitation of the quantity of money，upon its‘scarcity’，as the expression goes.If the proportion between the single amount and the total sum of commodities and of money is accepted as valid，then the proportion appears to be unchanged by an arbitrary increase in the amount of money and is able to retain its significance for the establishment of prices.The money fraction would show a proportionate increase of both the numerator and the denominator，without changing the value of the fraction.In reality，however，these changes do not occur in the same proportions if the amount of money is considerably increased.The denominator of the money fraction is in fact increased，but the numerator is unchanged until all exchange transactions have been adjusted to the new basis.The price，which equals the absolute size of the numerator，is therefore unchanged for the time being，whereas，as a fraction of the total sum of money，it has become much smaller.Consequently，the owner of new quantities of money，and in the first place the government，occupies a highly privileged position in relation to all sellers of commodities.The most serious repercussions upon exchange transactions will follow from this situation，particularly at the moment when the government's own revenues are paid in devalued money.The numerator of the money fraction-the price of commodities-rises proportionately to the increased supply of money only after the large quantities of new money have already been spent by the government，which then finds itself confronted again with a reduced supply of money.The temptation then to make a new issue of money is generally irresistible，and the process begins all over again.I mention this only as an example of the numerous and frequently discussed failures of arbitrary issues of paper money，which present themselves as a temptation whenever money is not closely linked with a substance of a limited supply.This is shown most clearly by an apparently contradictory example.In the sixteenth century，a French statesman suggested that silver should no longer be used for money，and that coins should be made from iron，because the bulk import of silver from America was depriving this metal of its scarcity.The use of a metal that becomes valuable only by official coinage would provide a better guarantee for the required limitations of the quantity of money，since the supply of money would become unlimited if every owner of silver was thereby automatically an owner of money.This peculiar suggestion shows a very distinct understanding of the fact that a precious metal is not as such the proper material for money，but only in so far as it sets a necessary limit to the supply of money.If a metal fails to do this，then it has to be replaced by another substance，the supply of which can be more effectively controlled.The preference for metal as a means of exchange is the consequence of certain functional qualities；if for any reason these are lacking it is replaced by another currency better qualified in this respect.Owing to the poor condition and incalculable variety of coins coming into Genoa in 1673，transactions were based on bills of exchange.Today we know that only precious metals，and indeed only gold，guarantee the requisite qualities，and in particular the limitation of quantity；and that paper money can escape the dangers of misuse by arbitrary inflation only if it is tied to a metal value established by law or by the economy.The following instance illustrates how effective such a restriction is，even in controlling individual speculation.During the American Civil War the circulation of Confederate paper money-‘greenbacks’-was prohibited in the western states，and although they were legal tender，nobody dared to repay in paper money a loan received in gold，by which means he could have made a profit of 150 per cent.In the eighteenth century the situation was similar in respect of the treasury bonds that the French government had issued to meet its pressing need for revenue.It was decreed that only 25 per cent of any payment could be made in these bonds，but nevertheless the value of the bonds soon declined to a very small proportion of their nominal worth.Such cases show the extent to which the significance of specie is sustained by the laws of exchange themselves.This does not happen only in the type of case that I have quoted so far.When the Bank of England ceased to redeem its notes between 1796 and 1819 the fall in the value of gold was only 3-5 per cent，but commodities prices rose 20-50 per cent as a result！Whenever a compulsory rate of exchange leaves only paper money and small coins in circulation，serious harm can be avoided only if the exchange rates show only minimal fluctuation over long periods，and to ensure this the issue of paper money must be strictly limited.This indispensable regulating function of gold，and formerly of silver，is due not to the correspondence between its value and that of the objects for which it is exchanged，but to the relative scarcity of the metal，which prevents the flooding of the market with money and the consequent undermining of the proportion upon which the equivalence of a commodity with a certain amount of money is based.The disruption of this proportion may be brought about from both sides.The excessive increase in money creates pessimism and mistrust among the people，so that they attempt to dispense with money and to fall back upon barter and promissory notes.This reduction of the demand for money leads to a further decline in the value of the money in circulation.The authority responsible for issuing money attempts to counteract the decline in value by further increasing the supply of money；thus supply and demand drift further apart，and the reciprocal effects that we have noted produce a cumulative decline in the value of money.This distrust of the value of money produced by government coinage-in contrast to the confidence in the value of specie-may assume a form in which，as in the later Roman Republic，coin circulates only in the retail trade，whereas large-scale transactions are carried on with money which is reckoned by weight.Only in this fashion，it was believed，could trade be protected against political crises，party interests and government interference.

The Supply Of Money

It may appear from the foregoing that the inconveniences of an unlimited increase in the volume of money are attributable not so much to the increase itself，but rather to the way in which it is distributed.Shocks，hypertrophy and stagnation occur only because the newly created money is initially in one hand and spreads from there in an uneven and inappropriate manner.This might be avoidable if a way could be found of distributing the money equally or according to some principle of equity.Thus，it has been said that if every Englishman were suddenly to find that he had twice as much money in his pocket，all prices would increase correspondingly but no one would gain any advantage；the only difference would be that the pounds，shillings and pence would have to be calculated in larger amounts.This would not only dispose of the objection to token money but would also illustrate the advantages of an increase in the volume of money，arising from the empirical fact that more money means more transactions，greater well-being，power and culture.

There is little to be gained from a discussion of such hypotheses，based upon quite unrealizable presuppositions，yet they lead to a better understanding of the real conditions which render a gradual elimination of the intrinsic value of money impossible.Let us assume an ideal condition in which an increase in the volume of money has brought about an equal increase in what every individual owns：then one conclusion-that nothing has changed because all prices rise equally-contradicts the other-that the increase in the volume of money brings about a stimulation and expansion of trade.It is tempting to assume that the relations between individuals，that is the relative social position of superiors and inferiors，would in this case remain unchanged，while the total sum of objective cultural goods would be increased；that the content and enjoyment of life in an absolute sense would have risen both generally and for each individual，without changing anything in the relationship between wealth and poverty，which mutually determine each other.It might be pointed out that the modem commercial culture has already made available to the poor a number of goods-public amenities，educational opportunities，means of subsistence，etc.-which even well-to-do people did not enjoy formerly，without changing the relative position of rich and poor.The possibility that an increase in the volume of money，distributed proportionately，extends objective culture and also the cultural content of the individual life in absolute terms，while the relations among individuals remain the same，deserves examination.On closer scrutiny，however，it appears that real success can be achieved only by an unequal distribution of the increased supply of money，at least in the first instance.Money，which is entirely a social institution and quite meaningless if restricted to one individual，can bring about a change in general conditions only by changing the relations between individuals.The increased liveliness and intensity of commerce that ensues from a plethora of money can be traced to the fact that the desire for money increases at the same time.The wish to acquire as much money as possible from other people，though always present，evidently becomes sufficiently urgent to lead to extraordinary exertion and diligence only when the individual becomes acutely aware of having less than others；this is the sense of the remark，‘Les affaires-c ’est l'argent des autres ：'If what the above theory presupposes were truenamely，that an increase in the volume of money would leave the relations of people to each other and the relative prices of commodities completely unchanged-there would be no such stimulation of work energies.Moreover，the magical doubling of the volume of money will also affect the relations between individuals because the financial situation of the individuals is different to begin with.The doubling of three different incomes of 1，000，10，000 and 100，000 marks，for instance，changes the relation between the recipients because the objects bought for the second 1，000，10，000 marks，etc.，are not simply duplicates of what was bought for the first 1，000 marks，and so on.In the first case there would be，perhaps，an improvement in nutrition，in the second a refinement of artistic culture，and in the third a greater involvement in financial speculation.If we assume a preceding absolute equality among individuals then no changes would be produced either in the subjective or in the objective aspects of their lives，because if the latter changed then it would be in an unpredictable way；they would show an upswing of activity only if the differences in individual incomes became，or were felt to be，more important than previously.

Even more relevant to our purposes are considerations about the factual implications of this theory；namely，that the doubling of all money incomes would leave everything unchanged，because all commodity prices would be simultaneously doubled.This reasoning is false，because it overlooks a peculiar and decisive characteristic of money，which might be termed its relative inelasticity.This consists in the fact that the distribution of an additional quantity of money in a given economic region does not raise all prices proportionately，but creates new price relationships which do not necessarily result from the power of individual interests.Inelasticity is a consequence of the fact that the money price of a commodity，despite its relativity and the absence of an inherent connection with the commodity，nevertheless acquires a certain stability and appears to be the objectively adequate equivalent.If the price of an object has remained stable within definite limits，then it does not usually change without resistance simply because the value of money has changed.The association-of concepts as well as of interests-between the object and its price has become psychologically so firmly fixed that the seller will not readily admit a decline or the buyer an increase，as would be a matter of course if the balancing of money value and commodity value were accomplished by the same unrestricted mechanism through which the thermometer rises or falls according to the temperature without any disturbance of the exact relation between cause and effect resulting from change in the degree of resistance to the movement.If one suddenly has twice as much money in one's pocket as a short time before，one is not inclined immediately to pay twice the amount for each commodity.Or it may be that with the bravado of the newly rich，reckoning the new wealth by the previous standards，one will not trouble about price at all，However，both the willingness to pay more and the disinclination to pay as much as the new appropriate price show that a proportional regulation of prices is out of the question during the initial period of abundant money，and that the established association between a commodity and a traditional range of prices has a continuously disturbing influence.Furthermore，the demand for commodities will change considerably following an increase or decrease in the quantity of money even if this affects everybody equally.If there is a decrease，for instance，objects that have a sufficiently steady sale may still be sold at half the price up to that amount or even in greater abundance，but beyond a certain limit they may not find any buyers at all.In the case of a general increase in the supply of money，on the other hand，a lively demand will develop for those goods that were desired by the mass of the people，i.e.for goods that are just above their present standard of living.The demand would not increase very greatly for those goods that satisfy basic needs，which can be met by a limited supply，or for those that satisfy the most refined and cultivated needs，which are significant only for a limited，scarcely expanding，circle.Price increases would affect mainly the goods between these extremes where prices would remain relatively stable.There would be no question of the increased supply of money affecting all prices equally.In general terms，the theory that the relativity of prices renders the absolute quantity of money a matter of indifference is incorrect，because this relativity is in practice continuously disrupted by a psychological process which makes the prices of certain commodities rigid and absolute.

It might be argued that these doubts about the harmlessness of an unrestricted increase in the supply of money are valid only for the transitional periods of adjustment between two different price levels.They presuppose that the whole process evolves from a proportional relationship between the quantities of goods and money.It must be possible to establish this relationship at a different level，and future fluctuations could be eliminated just as well as the preceding ones.The doubts can refer only to the period of change，not to the accomplished changes，which cannot be held responsible for the maladjustments，dislocations and difficulties of the transition period.It is impossible to conceive of any means of exchange that would not eventually enforce an adjustment，so that the money price of a commodity expressed the proportion between its value and the value of the total quantity of commodities；and therefore an arbitrary increase in money is unable to disrupt this proportion permanently.This reasoning is quite correct，but it does not prove that the removal of all limitations upon the increase in the supply of money is possible，taking into account the inadequacy of human circumstances.For the transitional period，the instability and difficulties of which are admitted，would then become a permanent condition，and the state of adjustment that is attainable in principle for any quantity of money would never be reached.

Reality And Pure Concepts

This argument may be summarized as follows.Money performs its services best when it is not simply money，that is when it does not merely represent the value of things in pure abstraction.Precious metals are also valuable as jewelry or for technical purposes，but this has to be conceptually distinguished as a primary fact from the secondary fact that they are valuable on account of it；whereas it is the first and only quality of money to be valuable.It is not technically feasible to accomplish what is conceptually correct，namely to transform the money function into a pure token money，and to detach it completely from every substantial value that limits the quantity of money，even though the actual development of money suggests that this will be the final outcome.This is not a contradiction.A great number of processes occur in the same manner；they closely approach a definite goal by which their course is unambiguously determined，yet they would lose precisely those qualities that led them towards the goal if they were actually to reach it.One phenomenon that is eminently characteristic of the money economy may illustrate this point and provide，at the same time，an analogy for the consequences of unlimited money supply with reference to individual circumstances.The striving of the individual to earn more and more money is of the greatest socioeconomic significance.By seeking the greatest possible gain，the stockbroker brings about liveliness of transactions，the adjustment of supply and demand，the introduction of otherwise sterile values into economic circulation.However，very high profits on the stock exchange can usually be realized only when there is excessive fluctuation of the rates of exchange and a preponderance of purely speculative elements.In such conditions，the production and consumption of goods，which is the ultimate interest of society，is excessively stimulated in one area and neglected in another，and in any case is diverted from the course of development which corresponds with its specific inner conditions and with real needs.Here the specific quality of money becomes a basis for the divergence between the individual and the social interest，which has previously coincided up to a point.Only through the fact that the value of things has become detached from the objects and has acquired an independent existence in a specific substance is it possible for money to develop interests，movements and norms that，on occasion，act contrary to those of the symbolized objects.The activities of private enterprise，which are connected with money，promote the social interest of the production and consumption of goods so long as they remain merely endeavours，whereas the final attainment of their ends might undermine the aims of society.This type of situation is most frequently and decisively produced in those cases where emotional impulses strive for a final objective without being aware that all the hoped-for satisfaction is the consequence of relative advances，and may perhaps turn into its opposite when the goal is reached.I would call your attention to love，which receives its content and colouring from the desire for the closest and most permanent union，and frequently loses both when its object is attained；or to political ideals，which provide the strength and spiritual fervour in the life of whole generations but which，once they are realized，do not bring about an ideal condition，but practical materialism，torpidity and philistinism；or to the longing for a peaceful and undisturbed way of life，which is the goal of all effort and labour，yet which once accomplished often ends in idleness and inner dissatisfaction.It has indeed become a platitude to say that even happiness，though it is the object of all our endeavours，would be mere boredom if it were ever achieved as an eternal state.Although our will drives us in this direction，the attainment of such a condition would contradict its striving，and only the admixture of the suffering that we want to avoid can give any sense to the pursuit of happiness.This kind of process may be summed up by saying that the effectiveness of some or perhaps all elements of life depends upon the concurrence of opposing elements.The proportion in which an element and its opposite are combined and cooperate are naturally variable，sometimes in the sense that one element steadily increases while the other declines，so that the trend of the development appears to be one in which one element will finally supplant the other.But as soon as this happened and every trace of the second element disappeared，the sense and effectiveness of the first element would also be paralysed.This happens，for instance，with the opposition between individualism and socialism.There are periods in which the latter determines historical development，not only in reality，but also as an inference from ideal convictions and an expression of a developing conception of society which strives toward perfection.But if，in the party politics of such an age，it is then concluded that，since all progress depends upon the growth of the socialist elements，their triumph will produce the most advanced and ideal state of things，this overlooks the fact that the whole success of socialist measures depends upon the circumstance under which they are introduced into an individualistic economic system.The progress resulting from the relative increase of socialist measures does not justify the conclusion that their complete implementation would represent further progress.It is the same with periods of increasing individualism.The significance of individualistic measures depends upon the fact that centralized socialist institutions continue to exist；these can be progressively reduced，but their complete disappearance would lead to unanticipated results differing widely from those that individualism had previously brought about.In the field of art，the contrary tendencies towards naturalism and towards mannerism show a similar pattern.At each particular moment in the development of art there is a mixture of simple reflection of reality and subjective transformation.From the standpoint of realism，art becomes more perfect through the growth of the objective element.But at the very moment when this became the sole content of a work of art the growing interest would suddenly turn to indifference，because the work of art would no longer be distinct from reality，would lose its significance as a separate entity.On the other hand，although enhancement of the generalizing and idealizing element may refine art for a time，it must reach a point where the relation to reality，which the idealistic movement was supposed to represent in a purer and more perfect form，is completely lost as a result of the elimination of all individualistic contingency.In short，a number of most important processes follow this pattern the growing importance of one element leads to greater success，but the complete hegemony of this element，and the total elimination of the contrasting element，would not result in total success；on the contrary，it would deprive the original element of its specific character.The relationship between the intrinsic value of money and its purely functional and symbolic nature may develop in analogous fashion；the latter increasingly replaces the former，but a certain measure of the former has to be retained because the functional and symbolic character of money would lose its basis and significance if this trend were brought to its final conclusion.

It is not only a formal analogy that is in question here，but the unity of the deeper meaning of life，which is expressed in this external similarity.In practice，we can only cope with the variety of elements and tendencies that make up life by allowing our behaviour，in every context and at every period of time，to be governed by a uniform and one-sided principle.But in this way the diversity of reality catches up with us again and again，and weaves our subjective striving，along with all those factors that oppose it，into an empirical existence which allows the ideal to enter reality.This does not imply a denial of the ideal；life is adapted to such absolute strivings as its elements，in the same way as the physical world is adapted to motions that，if left unimpeded，would have inconceivable consequences，but that，as a result of their meeting with counterforces，produce the orderly world of natural events.If the practical world is formed in such a way that our will is focused upon eternity and only attains the world of reality by being deflected and rebuffed，then here too the structure of practical life has predetermined the theoretical structure.On innumerable occasions，our concepts of things are made so unalloyed and absolute that they do not reflect experience，and only their qualification and modification by opposing concepts can give them an empirical form.However，these concepts are not for that reason thoroughly bad；it is precisely through this unique procedure of exaggeration followed by retraction in the formation of concepts and maxims，that a view of the world which is in conformity with our understanding emerges.The formula through which our mind establishes a relation with the oneness of things，which is not directly accessible，by supplementing and reproducing it，is in practice as well as in theory a primary too-much，toohigh，too-pure.It gains the consistency and scope of reality and truth only by means of restraining contrasts.Thus，the pure concept of money as the mere expression of the reciprocally measured value of things，which has no intrinsic value of its own，remains completely justified，although in historical reality this concept is consistently disparaged and limited by the contrary concept of money as possessing intrinsic value.Our intellect can grasp reality only as a modification of pure concepts，which，no matter how much they diverge from reality，are legitimized by the service they render in the interpretation of reality.

Ⅲ

The Historical Development Of Money From Substance To Function

We have now to consider the historical manifestations of our theoretical constructions.The broad cultural ramifications of the nature and significance of money are to be seen in the movements that lead money towards its pure concept and away from its attachment to particular substances-even though it never attains the goal that determines its course of development.Thus，money is involved in the general development which in every domain of life and in every sense strives to dissolve substance into free-floating processes.On the one hand，money forms part of this comprehensive development；on the other，it has a special relationship with concrete values，as that which symbolizes them.Furthermore，money is influenced by the broad cultural trends，and it is at the same time an independent cause of these trends.We are interested in this interrelation here in so far as the form of money is determined by the conditions and needs of human society.

With the reservation that this process never reaches the goal，I shall now examine the growing importance of money as a function or symbol，which comes to overshadow its significance as a substance.

On a more profound examination，the dissolution of the concept of money as a substance is much less radical than appears at first sight；for，strictly speaking，the substance value of money is also a functional value.No matter how much precious metals are appreciated simply as substances，they are in fact appreciated only because they adorn，distinguish，are technically useful，give aesthetic pleasure，etc.，that is to say，because they perform functions.Their value does not consist in their autonomous being，but always in their performance.Their substance as such，apart from their performance，like the substance of all practical objects，is totally irrelevant to us.It may be said of the majority of objects that they are not valuable，but become valuable；and in order to do so they must continually emerge out of themselves and interact with other objects.Our sense of value is bound up with the effects that objects produce.Even if a particular aesthetic mood were to attribute objective value to the precious metals on the ground that their mere existence，quite apart from all recognition and enjoyment，enriches the world，they would never enter the economic system through this kind of value.In the economy ail value is connected with performance，and it is an arbitrary way of speaking，which conceals the actual condition，to say that precious metals have a substantial value which is distinct from their performance as money.Every value possessed by precious metals as substances is also a functional value，with the exception of their function as money.All the values of the precious metals form a series that is simply a series of functions.This is naturally less easily comprehended，the less lively these functions are in reality.All the misgivings of the Middle Ages about the taking of interest arise from the fact that money then appeared to be，and actually was，much more solid and substantial，more starkly contrasted with other things，than in modem times when it appears and operates in a much more dynamic，variable and pliable way.The adoption of the Aristotelian doctrine that it is unnatural for money to engender money；the condemnation of interest as theft，because the capital repaid equals the borrowed capital；the argument in favour of this interpretation by Alexander of Hales，that money did not wear out by use and that it was not profitable，as were the objects of a lease，to the creditor；the doctrine of Aquinas that in the case of money，whose sole end is to be spent，use and spending were identical，and that therefore the use of money，unlike the use of a house，could not be sold separately-all these doctrines illustrate how inflexible and dissociated from the fluctuations of life money appeared，how little it was regarded as a productive power.The actual insignificance of money's effects concealed its functional character.This is the same basic sentiment concerning money as that which regards it as a metallic substance.This view，like that of the Middle Ages，opposes money as an entity per se to the circulation of economic objects，instead of bringing money into this circulation and recognizing that money，whatever represents it，does not have a function，but is a function.

At the opposite pole from the mentality of the Middle Ages is the credit economy，in which the bill of exchange serves as money.The dominant idea in the Middle Ages was the substance of money，rather than its effects，which were in fact reduced to a minimum，though they could not really be eliminated altogether.In the modem conception of money based upon metal，the vital point is the working of the substance；and finally，in a credit economy there is a tendency to eliminate substance entirely，and to regard the effects as the only important matter.

This superficial view owes something to an earlier scheme of thought which distinguished in all phenomena between substance and accident.Certainly this was historically of tremendous importance：the analysis of every phenomenon into a substantial core and relative，changeable appearances and qualities was a first orientation，a first guiding thread through the mysterious formlessness of things，giving them a structure and subjecting them to a general category that was consonant with our intellect.The mere sense differences that appear at first thus become organized and determined in their mutual relations.But it is the nature of such forms，as of social organizations，to appear and to claim to be eternal.Just as the destruction of one social order in favour of another gives the impression that all order and regularity is being abandoned，so does reconstruction in the intellectual realm.The objective stability as well as the subjective understanding of the world seems to be destroyed when a category that formed the backbone of a world view is abrogated.But money value will be just as little able to resist its reduction to functional value as light，heat and life can retain their particular substantial quality or resist their dissolution into forms of motion.

Social Interactions And Their Crystallization Into Separate Structures

I shall now examine certain structural relationships of the economy.The extent to which it depends upon these relationships and not upon the substance of money，where money really functions as money，may be shown by a negative example based upon a general observation.We notice that，in a relationship between two people，the external form is rarely an adequate expression of its inner intensity.This inadequacy results from the fact that the inner relations develop continuously，while the external relations develop in a spasmodic fashion.Even if the two correspond at any given time，the latter persist in their traditional form whereas the former grow.At a certain point，there is a sudden development of the external relationship，and characteristically this does not usually stop at the point corresponding to the inner relationship but anticipates a more advanced intimacy.The use of the intimate form of address-‘du’-with friends as the final expression of an affection that has existed for a long time is often felt at first to be exaggerated，and it produces suddenly an external closeness which is usually followed only slowly by a corresponding inner intimacy.Sometimes it does not follow at all.Some relationships break down because the form，although to a certain extent justified，overtakes the inner relation.A corresponding phenomenon can be found in the impersonal realm.Social forces which seek expression in certain constellations of law，modes of exchange and conditions of government，often fail because the traditional forms in these areas easily become rigid.If the desired external change nevertheless takes place，then it often goes beyond the state of readiness of the inner forces，and their subsequent legitimation does not always succeed.In some instances，the money economy has been introduced in this way.When the general economic conditions have been tending towards it for a long time，it takes shape as such a powerful phenomenon that the general conditions can no longer accommodate it，and if the growth of the inner economic forces does not catch up rapidly enough with the anticipated forms the new institutions may come to a tragic end.Such was the situation when the Fuggers，and indeed all the great bankers of southern Germany，came to grief.Their financial operations，comparable with those of modem world bankers，took place in an age that had outgrown the barter economy of the Middle Ages but did not yet dispose of the communications，guarantees，or commercial practices that are an indispensable correlate of such transactions.The general conditions were not such that debts could be collected in Spain or from ruling princes without further ado.The new forms of the money economy misled Anton Fugger into extending them far beyond what was justified by the actual conditions in Europe.For the same reasons，the debtors of these financial magnates were no better off.The financial crisis in Spain in the sixteenth century resulted from the fact that，although money was usually available in Spain，it was not available in the Netherlands where it was most needed.Consequently，difficulties，delays and expenses arose which contributed to the ruin of Spanish finances.In other local conditions money functioned in quite a different fashion.The Netherlands had the tremendous advantage in their war with Spain in that their money could be used just where it was available.In the hands of the Dutch it was really‘money’，because it could function unhampered，even though the Dutch actually owned much less money in a material form than did Spain，since their economic life was based upon credit.The function of money can be exercised with less money material，the more favourable are the local conditions；and one might say paradoxically that，the more it is really money in its essential significance，the less need there is for it to be money in a material sense.

Alongside the influence of local conditions，it is the stability and reliability of social interaction or，as it were，the consistency of the economic domain that prepares the dissolution of money as a substance.This is illustrated by the fact that money brings about a continually increasing number of effects while it remains itself immobile.The notion that the economic significance of money results simply from its value and the frequency of its circulation at any given time overlooks the powerful effects that money produces through the hope and fear，the desire and anxiety that are associated with it.It radiates these economically important sentiments，as heaven and hell also radiate them，but as pure ideas.The idea of the availability or shortage of money at a given time produces effort or paralysis；and the gold reserves that lie in the bank vaults as cover for their notes demonstrate clearly that the merely psychological representation of money is fully effective.In this instance，money can truly be described as the‘unmoved mover’.It is obvious that the effect of this merely potential money depends upon the refinement and stability of the economic organization.Wherever social relations are loose，sporadic and sluggish，sales will be made only for cash，and the immobile money will not make use of the many psychological channels through which it can operate.The dual role of money that is lent should also be considered here，first in the ideal but very significant form of active debts，and second as a reality in the hands of the debtor.As a claim it counts among the assets of the creditor，and although it is not immediately available it is still very effective；on the other hand，although it does not form part of the debtor's property he can still achieve the same economic effects as if it did.The lending of money divides its activity into two parts and increases enormously the product of its economic energy.But the intellectual abstraction on which this process rests can attain its results only in a firmly established and civilized social order，in which it is possible to lend money with relative security and to base economic activity on this partial function of money.A certain comprehensiveness and intensity of social relations is required for money to become effective-otherwise it does not differ at all from other goods that are exchanged-and a further intensification of social relations is needed in order to intellectualize its effects.These conspicuous phenomena illustrate clearly that the inner nature of money is only loosely tied to its material basis；since money is entirely a sociological phenomenon，a form of human interaction，its character stands out all the more clearly the more concentrated，dependable and agreeable social relations are.Indeed，the general stability and reliability of cultural interaction influences all the external aspects of money.Only in a stable and closely organized society that assures mutual protection and provides safeguards against a variety of elemental dangers，both external and psychological，is it possible for such a delicate and easily destroyed material as paper to become the representative of the highest money value.In the Middle Ages，characteristically，leather money was very often used.If paper money signifies the progressive dissolution of money value into purely functional value，then leather money may be regarded as symbolizing the first step towards it.Leather money preserves，out of all the qualities that characterize money as a substance，the quality of relative indestructibility；this quality can be surrendered only when the structure of individual and social relations has reached an advanced stage.

Monetary Policy

The theory and practice of monetary policy confirm the course of development from the substantial to the functional significance of money，as well as the dependence of the latter upon sociological conditions.The fiscalism of the Middle Ages，and mercantilism，may be regarded as materialistic monetary policies.Just as materialism incorporates the phenomena and values of spirit into matter，so fiscalism and mercantilism considered the nature and energy of socio-political life tied to the material of money.The same difference exists between them，however，as between the crude and the sophisticated form of materialism.The former claims that perception itself is a material process，that the brain produces thoughts just as the liver secretes bile；the latter asserts that perception itself is not material，but is a form of movement of the material，that thoughts consist of a special kind of oscillation of material elements，as do light，heat or electricity.In accordance with this difference of intellectual outlook，fiscalism discerns the interest of government as being to acquire as much ready money as possible for direct use by the princes for government purposes，wnile mercantilism，on the other hand，lays the greatest stress not upon the accumulation of money but upon the stimulation of economic activity.These materialistic trends of monetary policy are still closely associated with the idea that the money material represents value as such，but the change from a crudely objective to a functional significance of this material is already discernible.The political constitutions of these periods correspond with this situation.Where the medieval fiscal constitution prevails，the prince has only an external，not an organic，relationship to his country，which is established by marriage or conquest and is well indicated by the tendency to extract as much money as possible from the country.The frequent sale of whole territories for money was a logical conclusion of this tendency.The purely monetary connection between ruler and subject demonstrated the absence of any other relationship.The continuous depreciation of the currency by medieval rulers was an appropriate technique within such a sociological relationship；for these methods，which give all the benefits to one side and the entire loss to the other，are possible only when an organic relationship is lacking.The love of ready money，which seems to be an innate characteristic of oriental peoples，has been traced to the fiscal policy of their rulers，who use the royal prerogative of coinage as a means of taxation without concern for the consequences of devaluation.The necessary counterpart of this policy is the passion of their subjects for accumulating ready money in the form of gold and silver.The emergence of the centralized despotic state involved a much closer and more vital relationship among the various political elements；and the idea of an organic whole provides a common basis for the princely ideal，from‘l ’é tat c 'est moi' to the notion of the king as the first servant of his people.Although the interest of the government is still in this case directed towards the import of ample quantities of money material（i.e.bullion），the livelier interaction between the head and the members of the state and the greater animation of political life are reflected in the fact that the ultimate end of acquisition is no longer mere ownership but the nurture and growth of industry by money.When these liberal tendencies had produced a freer flow of political life，an unhampered flexibility and a less stable equilibrium of elements，the material basis was prepared for Adam Smith's theory that gold and silver are merely tools，no different from kitchen utensils，and that their import increases the wealth of a country just as little as the multiplication of kitchen utensils provides more food.When the traditional regulation of money material has been abolished，in order to make way for more anarchistic ideas，this new tendency of monetary theory，as might be expected，leads to another extreme.Proudhon，who wants to abolish all established forms of the state and to recognize only the free and direct interaction of individuals as the proper form of social life，attacks the use of money in general，seeing it as exactly analogous to those forms of authority that absorb the living interaction of individuals and crystallize it within themselves.The exchangeability of values should be organized without money as an intermediary，just as the administration of society should be accomplished by all citizens without the intervention of the king.In the same way as every citizen has voting rights，so every commodity should represent value without the mediation of money.The trend towards this theory of money，which may be characterized as transcendental by contrast with the materialistic theory，began with the views of Adam Smith.While materialism asserts that mind is matter，the transcendental philosophy teaches that matter itself is mind.This does not refer to mind in the spiritualist sense，as a substance，an autonomous being（although of an immaterial kind），but to the knowledge that any object，whether physical or mental，exists for us only in so far as it is conceived by the active process of the mind，or more precisely，in so far as it is a function of the mind.If the materialistic interpretation of money now appears to be an error，historical analysis shows that this error was not accidental but was the appropriate theoretical expression of an actual sociological condition，which had first to be overcome by the real forces before its theoretical counterpart could be overcome in theory.

Social Interaction And Exchange Relations：Money's Functions

There is a further context in which the sociological character of money appears.The interaction between individuals is the starting point of all social formations.The real historical origins of social life are still obscure，but whatever they were，a systematic genetic analysis must begin from this most simple and immediate relationship，which even today is the source of innumerable new social formations.Further development replaces the immediacy of interacting forces with the creation of higher supra-individual formations，which appear as independent representatives of these forces and absorb and mediate the relations between individuals.These formations exist in great variety；as tangible realities and as mere ideas and products of the imagination；as complex organizations and as individual existences.In this way，the objective laws of custom，law and morality developed from the necessities and practices，which originate incidentally in the relations between group members and which eventually become fixed.They are ideal products of human conceptions and valuation，which in our mind now stand beyond the will and action of the individual as‘pure forms’.Thus，in the continuation of this process，the law of the state is embodied in the judges and the whole administrative hierarchy；the cohesive power of a political party lies in its executive committee and its parliamentary representatives；the unity of a regiment is incarnated in its flag，and that of a mystical union rests in its Holy Grail，etc.The interactions between the primary elements that produce the social unit are replaced by the fact that each of these elements establishes an independent relation to a higher or intermediate organ.Money belongs to this category of reified social functions.The function of exchange，as a direct interaction between individuals，becomes crystallized in the form of money as an independent structure.The exchange of the products of labour，or of any other possessions，is obviously one of the purest and most primitive forms of human socialization；not in the sense that‘society’already existed and then brought about acts of exchange but，on the contrary，that exchange is one of the functions that creates an inner bond between men-a society，in place of a mere collection of individuals.Society is not an absolute entity which must first exist so that all the individual relations of its members-super-and subordination，cohesion，imitation，division of labour，exchange，common attack and defence，religious community，party formations and many others—can develop within its framework or be represented by it：it is only the synthesis or the general term for the totality of these specific interactions.Any one of the interactions may，of course，be eliminated and‘society’still exist，but only if a sufficiently large number of others remain intact.If all interaction ceases there is no longer any society.In the same way，a living organism can continue to exist if one or the other of its functions-which is an interaction between parts-ceases，but it cannot live if all functions cease，because‘life’is nothing but the sum of interacting forces among the atoms of the organism.It is，therefore，almost a tautology to say that exchange brings about socialization：for exchange is a form of socialization.It is one of those relations through which a number of individuals become a social group，and‘society’is identical with the sum total of these relations.

The frequently emphasized inconveniences and deficiencies of barter are comparable with those that appear in other social interactions when they are still in the stage of immediacy.If all governmental measures have to be discussed and approved by the whole body of citizens；if the defence of the group against external enemies is still assured by military service for all its members；if collective effort and organization depends entirely upon personal authority and force；if the administration of justice requires the verdict of the whole communityif all these things are necessary then the growing size and complexity of the group will produce all those inadequacies，hindrances and breakdowns that eventually suggest，on one hand，the transfer of these functions to specific organs and，on the other hand，the creation of representative and integrating ideals and symbols.The function of exchange leads in fact to both kinds of structure：to a class of merchants and to money.The merchant is the differentiated representative of the exchange functions，which otherwise are carried out directly by the producers；instead of the simple interaction between producers，a new relationship of each of them to the merchant is established，just as the direct cohesion and control of the group members is replaced by their common relation to the organs of government.Anticipating a more exact knowledge，one may say that money stands between the objects of exchange as the merchant stands between the exchanging subjects.The equivalence between objects of exchange is no longer effected directly，and its fluctuations are no longer concealed；instead，each object acquires a relationship of equivalence and exchange with money.The merchant is the personified function of exchange，and money is the reified function of being exchanged.Money is，as I noted earlier，the reification of the pure relationship between things as expressed in their economic motion.Money stands beyond the individual objects that are related to it，in a realm organized according to its own norms which is the objectification of the movements of balancing and exchange originally accomplished by the objects themselves.However，this is only a preliminary view.For，in the last analysis，it is not the objects but the people who carry on these processes，and the relations between the objects are really relations between people.The activity of exchange among individuals is represented by money in a concrete，independent，and，as it were，congealed form，in the same sense as government represents the reciprocal self-regulation of the members of a community，as the palladium or the ark of the covenant represents the cohesion of the group，or the military order represents its self-defence.All these are instances of a general type，in which a specific feature becomes detached from the primary phenomena，substances or events to which it was bound in the same way that a quality is bound to its substance or action to its subject.This feature then assumes a structure of its own and the process of abstraction is brought to a conclusion when it crystallizes in a concrete formation.Outside exchange，money has as little meaning as have regiments and flags outside the needs of communal attack and defence，or as have priests and temples independently of communal religiosity.The dual nature of money，as a concrete and valued substance and，at the same time，as something that owes its significance to the complete dissolution of substance into motion and function，derives from the fact that money is the reification of exchange among people，the embodiment of a pure function.

The developments in the material of money express its sociological character more and more clearly.The use of simple means of exchange such as salt，cattle，tobacco and grain is determined by a pure individual interest，in a solipsistic fashion；that is to say，they are eventually consumed by a single person since no one else has any interest in them at that particular time.The use of precious metals for jewelry，on the other hand，indicates a relation between individuals：people adorn themselves for others.Adornment is a social need，and precious metals are particularly apt for attracting the attention of others by their glitter.In consequence，certain kinds of ornament are reserved for particular social positions：in medieval France gold was not permitted below a certain rank.Since the whole significance of adornment lies in the psychological process that is incited in other people by the wearer，the precious metals differ fundamentally from the primitive，as it were，centripetal，means of exchange.Exchange，as the purest sociological occurrence，the most complete form of interaction，finds its appropriate representation in the material of jewelry，the significance of which for its owner is only indirect，namely as relation to other people.

If the embodiment of the action of exchange in a particular form is accomplished technically in such a way that each object is first exchanged for this form rather than directly for another object，the question arises：upon closer examination，what is the corresponding behaviour of the people behind the objects？Their general behaviour in relation to merchants，however much it is a cause and effect of monetary transactions，provides only an analogy.It seems clear to me that the basis and the sociological representative of the relation between objects and money is the relationship between economically active individuals and the central power which issues and guarantees the currency.Money serves as an absolute intermediary between all commodities only if coinage has raised it above its character as a mere quantity of metal—to say nothing of simpler kinds of money.The abstraction of the process of exchange from specific real exchanges，and its embodiment in a distinctive form，can happen only if exchange has become something other than a private process between two individuals which is confined to individual actions.This new and broader character of exchange is established when the value of exchange given by one party has no direct value for the other party，but is merely a claim upon other definite values；a claim whose realization depends upon，the economic community as a whole or upon the government as its representative.When barter is replaced by money transactions a third factor is introduced between the two parties：the community as a whole，which provides a real value corresponding to money.The pivotal point in the interaction of the two parties recedes from the direct line of contact between them，and moves to the relationship which each of them，through his interest in money，has with the economic community that accepts the money，and demonstrates this fact by having money minted by its highest representative.This is the core of truth in the theory that money is only a claim upon society.Money appears，so to speak，as a bill of exchange from which the name of the drawee is lacking，or alternatively，which is guaranteed rather than accepted.It has been argued against this theory that metallic money involves credit，that credit creates a liability，whereas metallic money payment liquidates any liability；but this argument overlooks the fact that the liquidation of the individual's liability may still involve an obligation for the community.The liquidation of every private obligation by money means that the community now assumes this obligation towards the creditor.The obligation that arises from a service in kind can be removed in only two ways：either by providing an equivalent service，or by creating a claim for an equivalent service.The owner of money possesses such a claim and，by transferring it to whoever performed the service，he directs him to an anonymous producer who，on the basis of his membership of the community，offers the required service in exchange for the money.The distinction that has been made between paper money which is backed in some way（e.g.by gold）and that which is unbacked，with reference to the credit character of money，is quite irrelevant here.It has been assumed that only unredeemable paper money is really money，while redeemable paper money is only a claim for payment；but on the other hand，it has also been urged that this difference is meaningless for the transactions between buyer and seller，because even the guaranteed paper money does not function as a promise to pay but as final payment，in contrast to the cheque，which is only a promise between buyer and seller.This way of posing the question does not penetrate to the sociological background.Viewed from the sociological perspective，there is no doubt that metallic money is also a promise and that it differs from the cheque only with respect to the size of the group which vouches for its being accepted.The common relationship that the owner of money and the seller have to a social group-the claim of the former to a service and the trust of the latter that this claim will be honouredprovides the sociological constellation in which money transactions，as distinct from barter，are accomplished.

Metallic money，which is usually regarded as the absolute opposite of credit money，contains in fact two presuppositions of credit which are peculiarly intertwined.First，an examination of the metallic substance of the coin is not feasible in everyday transactions.Cash transactions cannot develop without public confidence in the issuing government，or perhaps in those persons who are able to determine the real value of the coin in relation to its nominal value.The inscription on the coins of Malta-non aes sed fides -indicates very appropriately the element of trust without which even a coin of full value cannot perform its function in most cases.The variety of reasons，often contradictory，for accepting a coin indicates that it is not some objective proof that is essential.In some parts of Africa the Maria-Theresa thaler has to be white and clean，in other parts it has to be greasy and dirty，in order to be accepted as genuine.

Secondly，there has to be confidence that the money that is accepted can be spent again at the same value.What is indispensable and conclusive is non aes sed fides- the confidence in the ability of an economic community to ensure that the value given in exchange for an interim value，a coin，will be replaced without loss.No one can make use of a coin without giving credit in these two respects.Only this twofold trust confers upon a dirty and perhaps unrecognizable coin a definite amount of value.Without the general trust that people have in each other，society itself would disintegrate，for very few relationships are based entirely upon what is known with certainty about another person，and very few relationships would endure if trust were not as strong as，or stronger than，rational proof or personal observation.In the same way，money transactions would collapse without trust.There are nuances of this trust.The assention that money is always credit because its value rests upon the recipient's confidence that he will be able to acquire a certain quantity of goods in exchange for it is not entirely adequate.For it is not only a money economy，but any economy，that depends upon such trust.If the farmer did not have confidence that his field would bear grain this year as in former years，he would not sow；if the trader did not believe that the public would desire his goods，he would not provide them，etc.This kind of trust is only a weak form of inductive knowledge.But in the case of credit，of trust in someone，there is an additional element which is hard to describe：it is most clearly embodied in religious faith.When someone says that he believes in God，this does not merely express an imperfect stage of knowledge about God，but a state of mind which has nothing to do with knowledge，which is both less and more than knowledge.To‘believe in someone’，without adding or even conceiving what it is that one believes about him，is to employ a very subtle and profound idiom.It expresses the feeling that there exists between our idea of a being and the being itself a definite connection and unity，a certain consistency in our conception of it，an assurance and lack of resistance in the surrender of the Ego to this conception，which may rest upon particular reasons，but is not explained by them.Economic credit does contain an element of this supratheoretical belief，and so does the confidence that the community will assure the validity of the tokens for which we have exchanged the products of our labour in an exchange against material goods.This is largely，as I have said，a simple induction，but it contains a further element of social-psychological quasireligious faith.The feeling of personal security that the possession of money gives is perhaps the most concentrated and pointed form and manifestation of confidence in the socio-political organization and order.The subjectivity of this process is，so to speak，a higher power of the subjectivity that creates the value of precious metals in the first place.The latter is presupposed，but now it has a practical outcome in money transactions through that two-sided faith.This also illustrates that the development from material money to credit money is less radical than appears at first，because credit money has to be interpreted as the evolution，growing independence and isolation of those elements of credit which already exist in fact in material money.

The Nature Of The Economic Circle And Its Significance For Money

The guarantee for the continuous usefulness of money，which is the essence of the relation of the contracting parties to the whole social group，has，however，a peculiar form.From an abstract point of view，this guarantee does not exist because the owner of money cannot force anybody to give him something for money，even for money that is indisputably good；this becomes evident in cases of boycott.Only where obligations already exist can the creditor be forced to accept money in settlement of the obligation，and even that is not the case in all legal systems.The possibility that the claim that money represents will not be satisfied confirms the character of money as mere credit；for it is the essence of credit that the probability of realizing it is never one hundred per cent，no matter how closely it may approach it.The individual is free，in fact，to transfer his product or other possessions to the owner of money or to retain them，whereas the community is duty-bound to him.This distribution of freedom and bondage，although paradoxical，frequently serves as a category of knowledge.Thus，the advocates of‘statistical laws’have asserted that society，in given conditions，must produce a definite number of murders，thefts and illegitimate births，but that the individual is not thereby constrained to such behaviour and remains free to act morally or immorally.The statistical law does not determine that a particular individual must commit such acts，but only that the social whole to which he belongs must produce a determinate number.Or we may be told that society or the species as a whole have a determinate role in the divine scheme of the universe，in the evolution of being towards its final transcendental purposes；but that the individual representatives of these purposes are irrelevant，are free to distribute the execution among themselves，and that any particular individual may opt out without impairing the total performance.Finally，it has been asserted that the actions of a group are always strictly determined in the manner of a natural law by the direction of their interests，as material masses are determined by gravitation；but that the individual may be misled by theories and conflicts，that he confronts numerous alternatives among which he may choose rightly or wrongly-in contrast with the actions of the collective entity which have no freedom because they are guided by deviating instincts and purposes.We do not have to investigate here whether these ideas are true or false.I want only to indicate that the model of a relationship between the collective entity and the individual is accepted in many different contexts；the former is conceived as being ruled by necessity，the latter as free；the restraint of the former is moderated by the freedom of the latter，and this freedom itself is limited by the collective restraint and adapted to the necessity of the total result.The guarantee of the general usefulness of money，which the ruler or other representative of the community undertakes by the coinage of metal or the printing of paper，is an acceptance of the overwhelming probability that every individual，in spite of his liberty to refuse the money，will accept it.

These circumstances lead to the conclusion that the currency must be of a higher value the larger the group for which it is supposed to be valid.Within a small local group money of inferior value may circulate.This happens in the most primitive culture：in Darfur，local means of exchange-hoes，tobacco，balls of cotton，etc.-circulated within each district；the better currency-cloth，cows，slaves-was valid for all of them.It may even happen that the paper money issued by a state is restricted to a single province；Turkey issued notes in 1853 that were supposed to be valid only in Constantinople.Very small and closely allied associations occasionally come to an agreement to accept any symbol，even a counter，as money.The spread of trade relations，however，requires a valuable currency，if only because the transportation of money over long distances makes it desirable that the value should be concentrated in a small volume.Thus，the historical empires and the trading states with extensive markets were always driven towards money with a high material value.Some contrary trends prove the same rule.The essential advantage of medieval rights of coinage consisted in the fact that the sovereign was allowed to coin new pennies in his domain at any time and to enforce the exchange of all old coins，or foreign coins，that entered the area as a result of trade，against the new ones；with each debasement of his coins he profited by the difference between the new and the exchanged coin.But this advantage depended upon a large domain，for in small areas the privilege of coinage did not pay because the market for the coins was too small.If the profit from debasement of the coinage had not been contingent upon the size of the area，the chaos of coins in Germany would have been much worse，because of the terrible frivolity with which the privilege of coinage was granted to every monastery and every small town.Just because the socioeconomic structure of a domain required stable money，the profit to be had from an enforced inferior money was considerable.This is illustrated further by the fact that the growth of European trade in the fourteenth century led to the acceptance of the gulden as the general unit of coinage，and the replacement of the silver standard by the gold standard.Shillings and pennies，that is the small coins minted by every small state or town for internal transactions，could be as base as desired.The privilege of coinage in the Middle Ages was at first restricted to silver coins；the privilege of minting gold coins needed special permission，which was granted only to the governments of larger territories.It is very characteristic of this relation that the last remnant of the Roman dominion which the Byzantine Court retained until the sixth century，was the exclusive right to mint gold coins.Finally，this relation is confirmed by the following instance.Among the cases of restriction of the circulation of paper money to a particular region within the state that issued it，there is that of France，where at one time paper money was legal tender throughout the country except at the seaports，that is at the points where there was extensive trade.When the scope of trading expands，the currency also has to be made acceptable and tempting to foreigners and to trading partners.The extension of the economic area leads，ceteris paribus ，to a reduction of direct contact；the reciprocal knowledge of conditions becomes less complete，confidence is more limited，and the possibility of getting claims satisfied is less certain.Under such conditions，no one will supply commodities if the money given in exchange can be used only in the territory of the buyer and is of doubtful value elsewhere.The seller will demand money that is valuable in itself，that is to say accepted everywhere.The increase in the material value of money signifies the extension of the circle of subjects in which it is generally accepted，while in a smaller circle its negotiability may be secured by social，legal and personal guarantees and relationships.If we suppose that the usefulness of money is the reason for its acceptance，its material value may be regarded as a pledge for that usefulness；it may have a zero value if negotiability is assured by other means，and it will be high when the risk is great.However，expanding economic relations eventually produce in the enlarged，and finally international，circle the same features that originally characterized only closed groups；economic and legal conditions overcome the spatial separation more and more，and they come to operate just as reliably，precisely and predictably over a great distance as they did previously in local communities.To the extent that this happens，the pledge，that is the intrinsic value of the money，can be reduced.The view of the advocates of bimetallism，that it would be possibly only on an international scale，conforms with this consideration.Even though we are still far from having a close and reliable interrelationship within or between nations，the trend is undoubtedly in that direction.The association and unification of constantly expanding social groups，supported by laws，customs and interests，is the basis for the diminishing intrinsic value of money and its replacement by functional value.

It is significant that the expansion of trade relations，which originally increased the intrinsic value of the means of exchange，leads，in modem civilization，to its complete elimination by the inter-local and international balancing of accounts through banking operations and bills of exchange.The same development occurs in particular sectors of the use of money.Taxes today are levied principally on income，not on property.A wealthy banker who has incurred losses over the past few years pays no tax in Prussia，except for the small property tax recently introduced.It is not the ownership of money，but the profit from its use，the money yielded by money，that determines tax obligations and，in so far as voting rights depend upon tax liability，also determines rights in the community.A glance at the role of money capital in ancient Rome will reveal the general direction of development.Just as money was acquired by unproductive methods，through war，tribute and money-changing，so also it was lent for consumption，not for production.Thus，interest obviously could not be interpreted as a natural product of capital；and the vague，inorganic relationship between capital and interest that emerged from this situation is reflected in the difficulty of coming to grips with the problem of interest，which persisted far into the Christian era.Only the concept and fact of productive capital eventually provided a practical solution.The earlier situation forms a striking contrast with that of the present time，in which the significance of capital depends not on what it is，but on what it performs.It has changed from a rigid element，estranged from production，to a living function within production.

The guarantee，which is the vital nerve of money，naturally loses some of its force when the objective institution representing the community in fact represents only limited segments of the community and its interests.The private bank，for instance，is a relatively objective supra-personal entity interposed in the exchanges between individual interests.This sociological character enables it to issue money，but if its note issue is not soon transferred to a central institution under state supervision，the limitations of the area that it represents will become apparent in the imperfect‘money’character of its notes.The defects of the North American paper money economy result in part from the view that，while coinage is a state matter，the provision of paper money is a responsibility of the private banks with which the state should not interfere.This view overlooks the fact that the difference between metallic and paper money is only relative；that，as money，each consists merely in the substantiation of the exchange function through a common relation of the interested parties to an objective institution，and that money can perform its function only to the extent that the issuing institution represents and expresses the interests of the whole area.Consequently，local rulers sometimes attempt to give their coins at least the appearance of issuing from a more comprehensive institution.Even centuries after the deaths of Philip and Alexander，coins with their names and seals were minted at a number of places，giving the appearance of being royal coins although they were in fact the coins of particular cities.Progressive development strives in reality for the expansion，and consequently the centralization，of the institutions and powers that guarantee money values.It is a significant feature of this development that the treasury bonds that governments issued before the eighteenth century were the first to create a claim upon state revenues as a whole.In this case，the certainty of payment did not depend upon particular circumstances that had to be investigated，but upon a general confidence in the state's capacity to pay.This illustrates the great centralizing tendency of modem times，which does not at all contradict the trend towards individualization.They form parts of a single process of clearer differentiation and new concentration of the two parts of the personality，one of which is turned towards society and the other towards the self.This development eliminates all individualistic and isolating elements from the nature of money，and makes the centralizing forces of the most inclusive social circle the representatives of money.Personal credit as well as state credit profits by this development in the abstract form of money property.Individual princes had little personal credit in the fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries；it was not their own solvency that was considered，but the value of the guarantees and pledges that they gave.Personal credit is based upon the assumption that the total value of a debtor's property is adequate to cover his debt regardless of the changing composition of his property；only when the total value of an individual's property has been appraised in terms of money will he have permanent credit.Otherwise credit depends on the changing character of his property.Even in the eighteenth century，most debts were expressed as specific quantities of specific coins，and this seems to be a stage of transition to the present time.The concept of abstract value detached from any specific form-value that is no longer guaranteed by an objective quality but only by the state or the individual person-was not yet wholly effective.

The Transition To Money's General Functional Character

The main point，however，is that the significance of metal in monetary affairs recedes more and more into the background，as compared with safeguarding the functional value of money through community institutions.For metal is originally always private property，and public interests and public forces can never gain absolute control over it.One might say that money becomes increasingly a public institution in the strict sense of the word；it consists more and more of what public authorities，public institutions and the various forms of intercourse and guarantees of the general public make of money，and the extent to which they legitimize it.It is significant，therefore，that in earlier periods money could not yet be based only on its abstract function：money transactions were tied either to specific enterprises，to the technical production of coins，or to the trade in precious metals.At the beginning of the thirteenth century，the regular business of exchange was carried out in Vienna by the cloth-dyer，in England，and to some extent also in Germany，by the goldsmith.The exchange of coins，which was the core of money transactions in the Middle Ages（because payments everywhere had to be made in local coins），was originally the privilege of the mint itself，of the Miinzer Hausgenossen. Only later，when the towns acquired the right of coinage，did the business of exchange and the trade in precious metals become separated from the mint.The function of a coin is originally bound to its material in what is almost a personal union；but when a public authority guarantees its value it acquires independence and exchange，and trade in the material from which it is made becomes open to everybody，precisely to the extent that its function as money is assured by the collectivity.The growing depersonalization of money and its closer relationship to a centralized and more extensive community are directly and effectively connected with the accentuation of those functions that are independent of the metallic value.The value of money is based on a guarantee represented by the central political power，which eventually replaces the significance of the metal.There is here an analogy with a neglected aspect of valuation.When the value of an object is due to the fact that it makes possible the acquisition of another object，its value is then determined by two factors：the intrinsic value of the object to be acquired，and the degree of certainty that it can acquire that object.A diminution in one of these factors may leave the total value unaffected，within certain limits，if it is accompanied by an augmentation of the other factor.Thus，for example，the significance of one of our perceptions depends both upon its reliability and upon the importance of what is perceived.In the natural sciences，the factor of reliability tends to be more important，in the social sciences the significance of the object perceived；and thus there may be equality in the value of perceptions in these two fields.Only if we follow Aristotle in not doubting the certainty of knowledge can the value of perception be regarded as depending solely upon the value of the object.The value of a lottery ticket is a product of the probability that it will be drawn and of the size of the possible prize；the value of an action is a product of the probability that its purpose will be accomplished and of the importance of this purpose；the value of a bond is composed of the security of the capital and the rate of interest.Money does not function in exactly the same way，for its growing reliability is not associated with a declining value of the object that it can acquire.But the analogy is still valid in so far as the growing certainty that coin will be accepted at its face value makes possible a diminution in the intrinsic value of the metal content without altering the total value.On the other hand，the causes as well as the effects of the sociological position of money bring about a situation in which the relations between the central power of the group and its individual elements become stronger and closer because the relations among these elements themselves are now channelled through the central power.The Carolingian rulers plainly attempted to replace barter and the exchange of cattle by a money economy.They frequently decreed that coins were not to be rejected and they punished rejection severely.Coinage was exclusively a royal privilege，and the enforcement of money transactions meant an extension of the royal power into areas in which private and personal modes of exchange had previously existed.In the same way，the Roman gold and silver coins after the time of Augustus were minted exclusively in the name and at the command of the emperor，while the right to issue small coins was assigned to the Senate and to local authorities.It is only a generalization of the same trend that great princes often created powerful coinage systems，as did Darius I，Alexander the Great，Augustus，Diocletian and others down to Napoleon I.The whole technique which supports a great social power in a barter economy encourages self-sufficiency and the creation of a state within the state，as happened with the large territorial domains from the time of the Merovingians，whereas the equivalent power institutions in a monetary economy have developed and persisted in alliance with the state organization.The modem centralized state，therefore，came into being partly as a result of the prodigious growth of the money economy which followed the opening up of the gold and silver resources of America.The self-sufficiency of feudalism was destroyed by the fact that every transaction depended upon the use of coins，involving a central power and extending the relationships of the contracting parties beyond the coinage itself，with the result that the power of money to bind the individual more closely to the crown came to be regarded as the deeper meaning of the mercantilist system.The fact that the territorial rulers wrested this means of centralization from the German emperors is considered one of the essential reasons for the breakdown of the German empire；the French and English kings of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries，on the other hand，established the unity of their states with the aid of this trend towards money transactions.After the Russian empire was already unified，Ivan III gave sovereignty over parts of the country to his younger sons，but he retained for the central power the rights of coinage and the administration of justice.The area of loose trade relations outside political boundaries grows remarkably in extent and consistency once the stability of the official money makes it generally acceptable and thus enables it to draw all parts of the trading area into a closer relationship with the country in which it originates.The rate of exchange of the English sovereign gave considerable prestige to English trade in Portugal and Brazil and made the trade relations with these countries very close.In Germany soon after the Carolingian period the king granted the right of coinage to various individuals and religious establishments，but retained control over the alloy，quality and form of the coins.Before the twelfth century，however，those who had such rights of coinage were allowed to determine for themselves the standard and form of coinage，and were thus able to make as much profit as they wished.The separation of coinage from the central power goes hand in hand with debasement of the currency；the essential function of money declines the less strongly it is guaranteed by the largest sociological group or its central organ.The reverse process illustrates the same point：the debasement of the currency brought about the dissolution and collapse of the largest group，on the unity of which it depended.A purely formal and symbolic relationship may also have contributed to these phenomena.It is one of the essential characteristics of gold and silver that they are relatively indestructible，and since the amount added by mining is insignificant their total quantity remains almost stable over long periods of time.Whereas most other objects are used up，disappear and are replaced in an unending process，money with its almost unlimited durability remains unaffected by this change of individual objects.As a result，it is raised above these objects，just as the objective unity of a social group is raised above the variation of its individual members.It is precisely the characteristic form of life of these reified abstractions of group functions，that they exist outside their embodiment in real individuals，as stable formations amid the transitory individual manifestations，which are，so to speak，integrated into them，formed by them and then released again.Such，for example，is the immortality of a king，which is independent of the accidents of his personality，his particular acts，or the changing fortunes of his society；the well-nigh indestructible coin with his portrait upon it is a symbol and a demonstration of this fact.The business of finance on a large scale began only in the sixteenth century with the business transactions of princes；the intercourse with princes that followed raised the financiers to a position of royal dignity，while trade in commodities came to appear plebeian.

The hatred that the socialists have for finance，therefore，may not only be directed against the power of the capitalist over the worker in private enterprise；it may also arise from anti-monarchical instincts，for even though the reification of the social whole，which is a prerequisite of money，need not necessarily take a monarchical form，it is in fact monarchy that has most strongly favoured the intervention of a central power in the economic functioning of the group.Moreover，the fixed residences of princes，which require centralization，are possible only with the emergence of money taxes，for taxes paid in kind cannot be transported and they are appropriate only to a wandering court which consumes them as it goes.It is in the same spirit that modem tax policy tends to leave taxes on real property to local authorities，and to reserve income tax for the state.By focusing the tax demands of the central power upon the money income of the individual，it grasps precisely the kind of property with which it has the closest relation.The development of officialdom，with its close relation to finance，is thus only a symptom of the trend towards centralization.Feudal administration was decentralized，and the interest of the vassal with his distant landed property separated him from the central power，whereas regular money payments draw the officials toward the central power，and continually reaffirm his dependence.At the beginning of the nineteenth century the Sublime Porte ，as a result of the continuous debasement of the currency，was obliged to mint coins of double weight for the officials and officers，because it was precisely in its relations with state officials that money of full value was needed.The tremendous growth and differentiation of the civil service became possible only through a money economy；it is，however，only one symptom of the relation that exists between money and the objectification of group cohesion in a special central instituion.In Greek culture this relation was represented not by political，but by religious，unity.All Greek money was once sacred；it emanated from the priesthood，as did other generally valid concepts of measure referring to weight，size and time.This priesthood represented at the same time the unity of the various regions.The earliest associations developed on a religious basis，and in some cases they covered relatively large areas.The shrines had a non-particularistic centralizing significance，and money expressed this by bearing the symbol of the common God.The religious social unity，crystallized in the temple，became active again through the money that was put into circulation，and money acquired a basis and a function far beyond the significance of the metal content of the individual coin.Supported by，and supporting，these sociological constellations，the function of money grew in significance at the expense of its substance.A few examples and reflections will make this process clear.Among the many services of money，I will mention here only the facilitation of trade，the stability of the standard of value，the mobilization of values and the acceleration of circulation，and the distillation of values in a concentrated form.

I would like to emphasize，by way of introduction，that the debasement of the coinage by the sovereign（which I discussed earlier）reveals most clearly，through its defrauding of the masses，the significance of the functional value of money in contrast with its value as metal.What motivated the subjects to accept base coin and to give substantially better coin in exchange was the fact that the former fulfilled the exchange purpose of money.The lords of the mint extorted a disproportionately high recompense for the functional value of money；for the sake of which their subjects had to agree to the exchange of coins，that is to sacrifice the value of the metal.But this only exemplifies the very general phenomenon that money，which by its form serves trade better than anything else，is not superior only by virtue of its material，since it can also transcend the significance of its own material，as in the following case.In 1621，when the value of the reichsthaler rose from 48 to 54 shillings as a result of the debasement of the currency in Lower Germany，the authorities of Holstein，Pomerania，Lübeck，Hamburg and other areas issued a decree according to which the reichsthaler should，from a certain date，be worth only 40 shillings.Although this was generally regarded and accepted as being fair and sensible，the reichsthaler continued to be worth 48 shillings because this was more convenient for division and reckoning.At a more advanced and complicated stage，the same thing may happen when bonds are issued in large and small denominations；the stock exchange quotes the latter at a higher price because they are more in demand and serve transactions in small amounts better，although the value pro rata is exactly the same.Indeed，a committee on the currency in the American colonies stated in 1749 that in countries with an undeveloped economy which consume more than they produce，money should always be of lesser value than that of their wealthier neighbours，since otherwise it would inevitably flow out to these countries.This case illustrates in an accentuated way the fact，mentioned previously，that the suitability of a particular form of money for calculation and settling accounts creates a value for this form that is deliberately raised above the actually valid price.The functional value of money has here outgrown its material value to the point of reversing their significance.We may take as examples of the increase in the functional value as compared with the material value those cases in which inferior coins maintain a scarcely credible price in relation to precious metals.This happens for instance in gold mining districts，where the wealth acquired stimulates vigorous trading，but cash is lacking for everyday transactions.Among the gold miners in Brazil a need for small cash developed at the end of the seventeenth century which the King of Portugal exploited by supplying silver money in exchange for tremendous sums in gold.Subsequently，in California and Australia，it also happened that gold miners had to pay between twice and sixteen times the real value in gold in order to acquire small change.The worst phenomena of this kind are shown by the currency conditions that prevailed until recently in Turkey，but that are now being changed.No nickel or copper money existed；all small change consisted of a wretched silver alloy-altiliks，beschliks and metalliques- the supply of which was totally inadequate.In consequence，the value of these coins，which the government nominally reduced in 1880 by about 50 per cent，has remained unchanged，and the coins are exchanged at parity with gold；the metalliques ，indeed，which are regarded as one of the worst money tokens in the whole world，sometimes rise above parity with gold.This is extremely characteristic；the smallest coin is the most important for exchange and is valued accordingly，so that these small coins are always the first to be debased.The price of metalliques illustrates the paradox that a coin may be more valuable the less valuable it is，because the lack of material value makes it suitable for certain functional purposes by which its value may be increased almost indefinitely.

The objections to a silver standard are based upon the increasing recognition，and the growing role，of the functional significance of money；namely，that convenience in handling is the primary requirement of money.A foodstuff may be retained even though its use is inconvenient，so long as it is nutritious and enjoyable，and an uncomfortable dress may be kept because it is beautiful or warm；but inconvenient money is like unpalatable food or an unbecoming dress，since its main purpose is to provide a convenient means for the exchange of goods.Its difference from other goods arises from the fact that it has，and should have，fewer secondary qualities aside from its principal quality.Because money is an absolute abstraction above all concrete goods，it is encumbered and distorted by every quality outside its original character.

The value of money may be increased or decreased independently of its material value by an expansion or contraction of the function of money，even in the case of its value stability，which is closely connected with its material value.The Roman emperors had the exclusive right to mint gold and silver coins，while copper coins，which were used in everyday transactions，were minted by the Senate or，in the eastern provinces，by the towns.This provided some kind of guarantee that the emperor would not inundate the country with small coins of no substantial value.The final outcome was that the emperors continued their debasement of the silver coinage which led，in due course，to the total collapse of the Roman coinage.This produced a strange reversal of value relationships：as a result of debasement，silver coins became the means for everyday transactions，while copper coins，which had not changed in value，became increasingly the standard of value.The original role of the metals as representatives of money value was reversed by a change in the relative stability of their value.It has been emphasized recently，with reference to the greater importance of stability value as against material value，that a transition from paper currency to the gold standard does not necessarily involve a resumption of gold payments.In a country such as Austria，where the currency notes are at parity with silver，a changeover to the gold standard would bring about the decisive advantage of a stabilization of money value，and would accomplish the vital function of gold without using the material itself.In recent times，the interest in the stability of money value has even led to proposals for abolishing the metal reserve against which notes are issued.So long as such a reserve exists，the various countries belong to a common system which submits domestic transactions in each country to all the fluctuations of political and economic events in all the other countries.Unguaranteed paper money，since it could not be exported，would have the advantage of being available for all kinds of enterprises within the country，and above all of having complete value stability.However much this theory may be open to criticism，the mere suggestion illustrates how the concept of money has been psychologically separated from the concept of a money material and how it is gradually being perfected through the notion of functional services.All these functions of money are obviously subject to the conditions that apply to the general dissolution of money into functions；at any given time they are only partially valid，and the concepts indicate a line of development the goal of which is never reached.The fact that the values that money is supposed to measure，and the mutual relations that it is supposed to express，are purely psychological makes such stability of measurement as exists in the case of space or weight impossible.

The Declining Significance Of Money As Substance

In practice，the stability of value is accepted as a fact when any question arises concerning the repayment of a money loan after the value of money has changed.If the value of money has declined generally so that the same sum is of lesser value when it is repaid，then the law disregards this fact；the identical sum of money is taken to be of identical value.If the coinage has been debased by alloying or by changing the standard，then the law may decide that the debt shall be repaid according to the new standard，or according to the metal content of the new standard，or simply at its nominal value.Generally speaking，the view prevails that money retains its value unchanged.Such stability is，of course，also a fiction where other objects are concerned and no one doubts that，for example，fifty pounds of potatoes lent in the spring may be worth either more or less when they are later returned in kind.In such a case，however，reference can be made to the direct significance of the object；while the exchange value of potatoes may fluctuate，their value in providing satisfaction and nourishment remains unchanged.Money，however，has no value of this kind，but only exchange value，and the assumption of its value stability is thus all the more striking.Reasons of expediency will tend to ensure that this essential fiction becomes true.I have already indicated that in the case of money which is made from precious metals the connection with jewelry helps to maintain stability of value；as the demand for jewelry is highly elastic，it absorbs a larger quantity of the growing supply of precious metals and thus prevents too great a pressure upon their value，and on the other hand a growing need for money can he satisfied by drawing upon the stock of jewelry，from which the required quantity can be taken and a rise in the price of precious metals avoided.The continuation of this trend seems to imply as its goal the complete elimination of the material basis of money.For even a material as suitable as a precious metal cannot altogether avoid fluctuations that result from particular conditions of demand，production and processing，which have little to do with the fact that the metal also serves as a medium of exchange and as an expression of the relative value of goods.Perfect stability of the value of money could be attained only if it were nothing in itself，but only the pure expression of the value relationship between concrete goods.Money would then reach a neutral position which would be as little affected by the fluctuations in commodities as is the yardstick by the different lengths that it measures.The value of money established by the performance of this service would then also reach its maximum stability，because the relationship of supply and demand could be regulated more easily than when it depends upon a substance the quantity of which we can never fully control.This is not to deny that，under particular historical and psychological conditions，the value of money may be more stable if it is tied to a metal than if it is detached from it-as I observed earlier.

Thus，to return to the analogies used previously，while the deepest and most sublime love may be that between two souls，which excludes all carnal desire，so long as such love is unattainable，the sentiment of love will develop most fully where a spiritual relation is complemented and mediated by a close sensual bond.Paradise may fulfil the promise of eternal bliss under conditions in which the consciousness of bliss no longer requires the contrast of opposite emotions，but，as long as we remain human，positive happiness depends upon the contrast with our other experiences of pain，indifference and depression.Thus，although money with no intrinsic value would be the best means of exchange in an ideal social order，until that point is reached the most satisfactory form of money may be that which is bound to a material substance.This condition does not imply a deviation from the persistent trend towards the transformation of money into a purely symbolic representative of its essential function.

A particular stage in the process of differentiation between the functional and the material value of money is indicated by those cases in which a certain kind of money is used as a standard of value but not for actual payments.Money cannot exercise the function of exchange without，at the same time，measuring values；but the latter function is in certain respects independent of the former.In ancient Egypt prices were determined by the uten，a piece of coiled copper wire，but payments were made in all kinds of goods.In the Middle Ages price was often determined in money terms，but the buyer was free to pay in whatever manner was convenient.In many places in Africa at the present day the exchange of goods is carried out according to a monetary standard which is sometimes quite complicated，while money itself for the most part does not even exist.The business of the very important Genoese exchange market in the sixteenth century was based upon the standard of the scudo de，mar chi. This standard was almost entirely imaginary and did not exist in any actual coinage：100 of these scudi were worth up to 99 of the best gold scudi. All obligations were expressed in scudi de，marchi and，as a result of its ideal character，this standard of value was absolutely stable，unaffected by the fluctuations and inconsistencies of actual currencies.The East India Company，in order to counteract the debasement，depreciation and counterfeiting of Indian coins，introduced the rupee current ，a coin that was not minted at all but corresponded to a definite amount of silver，and simply provided a standard by which to measure the value of the actual debased currency.Through the existence of such a stable ideal standard the actual coins also attained a stable relative value.In this way，a state of affairs was very nearly established which a theorist of the early nineteenth century conceived.He regarded all money，whether coined or in other forms，as a claim upon exchangeable goods，and finally arrived at the negation of the reality of money.Money in the strict sense is contrasted with the currency，which is simply the‘claim’expressed in money terms，while money itself is only the ideal standard by which all property values are measured.Here，the principle of the scudo de ’marchi has become a general theory；money has been idealized to a pure form and a concept of relation，so that it is no longer identical with a tangible reality but relates to the latter as does an abstract law to an empirical case.In the cases cited above，the function of measuring value has been separated from its material representative；the coin used for calculation is deliberately set in opposition to the metal coin，in order to establish its position beyond the sphere of the latter.In this relationship the ideal money fulfils the same purposes as‘good money’，which is‘good’only because it is a reliable measure of values.

This leads us to the subject of the representation of money values by equivalents，in so far as this illustrates that one of the essential services performed by money is to make values more mobile.The more the significance of money as a means of exchange，a standard of value and a method of storing value increases in relation to its material value，the more easily it can circulate in the world in a form other than metal.The same development that leads from the rigidity and the substantial determinateness of money to the representation of money occurs also in these representations themselves；for example，in the evolution of the bill payable to the bearer from the promissory note given by one individual to another.The various stages of this development have still to be traced.The stipulation，in the acknowledgment of a debt，that the bearer as well as the original creditor is entitled to collect the money，is found already in the Middle Ages；but its object was to facilitate collection of the debt by a representative of the creditor，not to allow the transfer of the value.This purely formal mobility of paper values was given a more real content in the French billet en blanc which was current on the stock exchange in Lyons.It was still worded to refer to an individual creditor，but without specifying his name；only after a name had been inserted in the vacant space was the individual creditor determined.The trade in bills of exchange was first properly established in Antwerp in the sixteenth century.Initially they were often rejected at the due date if they were not accompanied by a note of transfer，and an imperial order had to be issued asserting their general validity.Here we have a very clear succession of stages.The value in question is，at it were，confined between the creditor and the debtor by the individually designated promissory note.It acquires mobility first of all by becoming payable at least to another person，although still on the account of the original creditor，and this process is then extended by postponing but not yet eliminating the designation of an individual creditor，until finally the value becomes completely mobile with the bearer bill，which can change hands like a coin.This appears as the reverse，or the subjective，aspect of the development that we observed in respect of state treasury bonds.Inasmuch as these bonds were ultimately redeemable from general state revenues rather than specific revenues of the crown，they lost their rigidity from the point of view of the debtor；they emerged from their confined sphere into the general movement of the economy and became much more mobile representatives of value because a test of their particular worth was no longer needed.

The general acceleration in the circulation of values also determines the relationship between the material and the function of money.In opposition to a one-sided interpretation of the relation between money and money substitutes it has been asserted that the latter cheques，bills of exchange，warrants and transfers—do not replace money but only give rise to a more rapid circulation.This function of money representatives is well illustrated by the fact that bank notes change consistently from large and slowly circulating values to smaller values.The Bank of England did not issue notes under ￡20 before 1759，while the Bank of France issued only 500-franc notes up to 1848.The money substitutes make it possible for the individual to dispense with a large reserve of cash，but the main advantage is that the available money can now be used in other ways，for example by the banks.What is economized is not money itself but its use as a passive reserve of cash.It may be noted more generally that credit and cash do not simply replace each other，but that each produces a more lively activity of the other.At times when there is most cash on the market，credit activities also often expand exuberantly，even to a pathological degree，as in the sixteenth century when large imports of precious metals were associated with a vast and insecure expansion of credit and feverish activity in company-promoting in Germany.The fact that the extent of money and credit increase together shows that they render the same services，and when the functions of one of them are enhanced the other is also provoked into more lively activity.This does not contradict the other relation between money and credit，in which credit makes cash superfluous；we are told，for instance，that there was less cash available in England in 1838 than fifty years earlier in spite of the tremendously increased production，and in France there was less than before the Revolution.This dual relationship between two phenomena，which arise from the same motive，on one side to stimulate each other and on the other side to limit or supplant each other，is easily conceivable and not at all rare.I would remind you that the fundamental emotion of love can manifest itself sensually and spiritually in such a way that these two forms strengthen each other，but also in such a way that the one seeks to eliminate the other；and that very often an interplay between the two possibilities expresses the basic emotion most fully and vividly.

I would remind you also that the diverse activities of the quest for knowledge，whether they incite each other or supplant each other，reveal the same unity in the fundamental interest；and finally，that the political energies of a group become concentrated in divergent parties，according to the nature and the milieu of individuals，yet these parties display their strength not only in the passionate struggle against each other but also in their occasional association for common action in the interest of the group as a whole.The significance of credit，both as inciting a greater circulation of cash and as taking the place of this cash circulation，indicates the unity of the service which these two means of exchange render.

The growth of trade leads to a more rapid circulation of money rather than an increase in the money material.I mentioned earlier that in 1890 the Bank of France put into circulation on current account 135 times as much as the amount deposited with it，while the German Reichsbank circulated 190 times as much as its deposits.It is rarely appreciated how incredibly small is the quantity of material with which money renders its services.The striking phenomenon that money disappears without trace on the outbreak of war or other catastrophes only means that there has been an interruption of its circulation，caused or intensified by the reluctance of individuals to part with their money even momentarily.In normal times the money stock seems to be larger than it actually is，because of the velocity of circulation—just as a glowing spark，rotated quickly in the dark，appears as a glowing circle，but dwindles again to a minute speck of material as soon as the movement ceases.This happens most violently in the case of debased money.For money belongs to that category of phenomena in which normal activity has determinate limits and extent，while any deviation or malfunctioning causes vast and almost inconceivable damage.Typical examples are the powers of fire and water.Good money does not have so many side-effects as does base money，and since its use need not be so strictly regulated or supervised，it can circulate more easily and more smoothly than can bad money.The more precise the form in which money renders its services，the smaller is the quantity of money required and the more easily can its place be taken by a more rapid circulation.The increase in transactions can also be accomplished by diminishing the value of coins instead of augmenting the quantity of tangible money in circulation.The trend of coinage is generally from larger to smaller coins.One characteristic example is the English farthing（equal to 0.12 grammes of silver），which was for a long time the smallest coin；only from 1843 were half-farthings minted.Until that time all values below a farthing were excluded from money transactions，and any exchanges that involved values lying between two whole farthings were rendered difficult.A traveller from Abyssinia reported（1882）that trade was considerably hampered because only one coin，the Maria Theresa Taler of 1780，was accepted，and small coins were practically non-existent.If somebody wanted to buy barley worth half a taler ，he was obliged to take other goods for the balance of his coin.On the other hand，trade was reported to be particularly easy in Borneo in the 1860s since the value of the taler corresponded with approximately 4，000 cowry shells and thus poor people had money for even the smallest quantities of goods.It is true that，as a result of the divisibility of the coin，free assistance was no longer given；the loans and mutual help that are the rule in primitive conditions disappear as soon as a money equivalent is available，and consequently demanded，for even the smallest service.But mutual aid，which is at first a social necessity and later a moral obligation or simple kindness，does not yet signify the possibility of a proper economy，any more than does its opposite，robbery.The offering of gifts develops into an economic system only when trade and its objects become reified.This subjective procedure-the exchange of gifts-is certainly of great value，even economic value，but it sets very narrow limits to the economy，and these can be removed only by measures that destroy the values；one such measure is the introduction of small coins.The dissolution of the substance of money into atoms，so to speak，considerably increases the volume of transactions；and by accelerating the circulation of money it increases，in effect，the quantity of money.In other words，the manner in which money functions can be a substitute for an increase in the quantity of money material.

Finally，some of the effects of money have a sense that is incongruous with the nature of the money material itself.It is one of the functions of money to concentrate，as well as to represent，the economic significance of objects in its own idiom.The unity of the sum of money that is paid for an object incorporates the values of all the elements of its uses，extending perhaps over a long period of time，as well as the particular values of its spatially separate parts and the values of all the powers and substances that prepared，and finally ended in，money.A money price，no matter how many coins it includes，is still a unity.The complete interchangeability of its parts confines the meaning of money exclusively to its quantitative sum，and the parts form a total unity which scarcely exists elsewhere in practical life.If one says of an extremely valuable and complex object，for example a country estate，that it is worth half a million marks，then this sum，however many specific presuppositions and considerations it is based upon，concentrates the value of the property into a unitary concept，in just the same way as when a simple，unitary object is valued in terms of a unitary coin concept，for example that one hour of work is worth one mark.This can only be compared with the unity of a concept that brings together the essential characteristics from a number of individual instances.When I use the general term‘tree’，for example，the characteristics that I abstract from very different manifestations in individual trees are not merely assembled side by side but are integrated in a unitary existence.It is the deeper significance of a concept that it is not simply an aggregate of characteristics but an ideal unity in which these characteristics encounter each other and are fused together in spite of their differences；and it is in this fashion that the money price brings together in a concentrated unity the numerous and wideranging economic meanings of objects.It may appear that the purely quantitative character of money would make this impossible；that one mark could never form a unity with a second mark，in the way that elements of an organic body or of a social group do，because any mutual relationship would be lacking and would remain always in mere juxtaposition.But this is not so in those cases where the sum of money expresses the value of an object.Half a million marks are，in themselves，only an aggregate of independent units，but as the value of a country estate they are a unitary symbol，the expression or equivalent of its value.They are not a mere aggregate of mark-units any more than a temperature of 20°is an aggregate of twenty particular degrees rather than a unitary state of heat.This corresponds with the abovementioned ability of money to concentrate values.Money is thus one of the great cultural elements whose function it is to assemble great forces at a single point and so to overcome the passive and active opposition to our purposes by this concentration of energies.We should think of the machine in this context，not only for the obvious reason that machinery directs the forces towards our desired ends，but also because every improvement and speeding up of machinery imposes a greater intensity of work upon the worker.This is precisely the reason why progress in technology and the shortening of working time can and must go hand in hand，because the powers of nature and of man serve our purposes in a more concentrated form through improved machinery.We can observe the same cultural tendency at work in the growing pre-eminence of laws of nature in shaping our world view；compared with the preoccupation with individual phenomena，or the fortuitousness and narrowness of crude empiricism，a law of nature represents a tremendous concentration of knowledge，summarizing in a brief formula the characteristics and movements of innumerable instances.Through laws of nature the mind compresses the vast array of spatial and temporal events into an intelligible system which contains，so to speak，the whole world.

In a quite different sphere，the replacement of hand weapons by firearms shows the same form of development；gunpowder provides an enormous concentration of power，which unleashes with a minimum of muscular effort an effect otherwise unattainable.It may also be that the significance and the differentiation of the individual personality in the historical development that takes place through the organizations of the clan，the family and the association are subject to the same principle.The active forces radiate more and more from individualized，externally limited representatives；they appear to be more concentrated than before，and the elements that decide the destiny of a group，that are distributed over the group as long as the individual is closely connected with it，are now concentrated in the individual himself.The right of self-determination of modem man could not have emerged if an increased quantity of means of activity had not been brought together in the narrow form of personal existence.There is no contradiction in asserting that，at the same time，the functions of those earlier close communities have been transferred，for the most part，to a much more extensive association，the State.From the point of view of its actual achievements，the life of the modem state，with its bureaucracy，its powers and its centralization，is much more intensive than that of small primitive communities.The modem state is based upon an extraordinary collectivization，integration and unification of all political forces；compared with the waste of energy in a nation that is subdivided into small-scale autonomous communities，the free and differentiated personality on the one hand and the modem state on the other represent an unrivalled concentration of forces.In this way the energy of society acquires a form that allows a minimum effort to achieve the maximum effect in face of each particular need.It is interesting to note that money not only conforms with this historical trend towards the concentration of forces by expressing the value of things in the most concise and condensed way；but in addition，it confirms this trend by a direct relationship with many of the instances that belong to quite different spheres.For example，in the early stages of firearms money provided the sinews of war（pecunia nervus belli ）；it wrested weapons from the knights and citizens and handed them over to the mercenary，making the possession and use of weapons a privilege of the owner of wealth.It is hardly necessary to demonstrate how closely the origins and progress of machine technology are connected with the monetary system.But I shall show later that the formation of primary groups which liberated the individual and，concurrently，the development of the State，were very closely related to the emergence of the monetary economy.We can see that the cultural trend towards a concentration of forces has many direct and indirect connections with the money form of values.All the implications of money for other parts of the cultural process result from its essential function of providing the most concise possible expression and the most intense representation of the economic value of things.The conservation and transfer of values have traditionally been regarded as the principal functions of money，but these are only the crude，secondary manifestations of its basic function.This function obviously has no inner relation to the material value of money，and indeed it becomes evident，through this function，that what is essential in money are the ideas incorporated in it，which point far beyond the significance of its material representatives.The greater the role of money becomes in concentrating values-and this occurs not simply through the increase in its quantity，but through an extension of its function to more and more objects and the consolidation of even more diverse values in this form-the less it will need to be tied to a material substance；for the mechanical sameness and rigidity of a substance will become increasingly inadequate compared with the abundance，mutability and variety of values which are projected upon and consolidated in，the concept of money.

This process might be called the growing spiritualization of money，since it is the essence of mental activity to bring unity out of diversity.In the sensible world，things exist side by side；only in the sphere of the mind are they integrated.The elements of a concept form a unity，as do subject and predicate in a proposition；there is no equivalent in the world of directly perceived phenomena.The organism，as the bridge between matter and mind，is the first step towards such an equivalent；interaction merges its elements and it strives constantly for an unattainable perfect unity.Only in the mind，however，does interaction become real integration.The interaction of exchange brings about a mental unity of values.The spatially extended substance is only a symbol of money，because the disconnectedness of what exists as substance contradicts the nature of money as an abstract representation of interaction.Only to the extent that the material element recedes does money become real money，that is a real integration and a point of unification of interacting elements of value，which only the mind can accomplish.

The Increasing Significance Of Money As Value

If the functions of money can be exercised in part side by side with its material，and in part independently of the quantity of this material，and if therefore the value of money declines，then this does not mean that there is a general decline in the value of money，but only in determinate quantities of it.The two things do not coincide，and it might almost be said that the less valuable any given quantity of money becomes，the more valuable is money generally.For only when money is cheap and any given amount of it less valuable can it have the wide diffusion，rapid circulation and general utility that assure its present role.The same relationship between a particular quantity of money and money in general prevails in the individual mind.It is just the spend-thrifts，who part most easily with money for specific purchases，who are at the same time most dependent on money in general.This is one of the meanings of the saying that one can despise money only if one possesses it in abundance.In peaceful times and places，where the tempo of economical life is slow and money circulates sluggishly，a given quantity of money is valued more highly than it is in the economic jungle of modem urban life.The rapid circulation of money induces habits of spending and acquisition；it makes a specific quantity of money psychologically less significant and valuable，while money in general becomes increasingly important because money matters now affect the individual more vitally than they do in a less agitated style of life.We are confronted here with a very common phenomenon；namely，that the total value of something increases to the same extent as the value of its individual parts declines.For example，the size and significance of a social group often becomes greater the less highly the lives and interests of its individual members are valued；the objective culture，the diversity and liveliness of its content attain their highest point through a division of labour that often condemns the individual representative and participant in this culture to a monotonous specialization，narrowness and stunted growth.The whole becomes more perfect and harmonious，the less the individual is a harmonious being.The same phenomenon appears in impersonal things.The charm and perfection of certain poems consists in the fact that the individual words have no independent meaning；they serve the dominant emotion or the artistic purpose of the whole，and all the varied associations that make up the full meaning of the word are excluded，except for those that bear upon the central theme of the poem.The whole poem is artistically more perfect to the extent that its individual elements lose their meaning.Finally，a more trivial example：the costs of production and the aesthetic value of a mosaic are higher the smaller are the single pieces；the colours of the whole are most striking and most subtle when the single piece occupies a small area and is in itself insignificant.

In the sphere of valuation it is not at all unusual for the values of the whole and the parts to develop in inverse ratio.This is not fortuitous，but expresses a causal connection.The fact that a given quantity of money is less valuable today than it was centuries ago is a direct precondition for the enormously increased significance of money in general.This condition itself in turn depends upon the increase in the functional as against the material value of money.It is apparent not only in the case of money in general，but also in various derivative phenomena.For example，the rate of interest was extremely high so long as there were few interest-bearing loans，as a result of the Church's doctrine of usury and the general conditions of a barter economy.The rate of interest declined steadily with the growing importance of interest in economic life.

From a theoretical standpoint it would be a profound mistake to regard the change from substance to function as a process in which money becomes‘valueless’，as though it were similar to depriving a man of his soul.This view misses the main point，namely that the functions into which money is dissolved are valuable in themselves，and that the value that money acquires is a supplementary value in the case of metallic money but the sole value in the case of token money.It is unquestionably a real value，like that of the locomotive whose value in providing transportation exceeds the value of the material from which it is constructed.It is true that money is able to function initially because it has intrinsic value，but subsequently it becomes valuable because it exercises these functions.To equate the value of money with the value of its material is like equating the value of a locomotive with the weight of iron that it contains plus the value of the labour employed in its construction.It may appear that this comparison does in fact disprove the assumption that there is a specific value originating from the function.The price of a locomotive（in this context we need not differentiate between value and price）in fact consists of the value of the material plus the value of the labour invested in it.The fact that a locomotive，like money，brings about the exchange of objects is only a reason for it to be valued at all；its actual value does not depend upon this fact.Similarly，the utility of countless other objects is responsible for their having a market price，but the actual level of market prices is determined by many other factors.Utility establishes，at most，a limit beyond which the price cannot rise，but it has no influence upon the actual price level.If this comparison is valid，then the value of money seems to be removed once again from its functions to its material.But the comparison is not valid in one decisive respect.The fact that a locomotive is priced according to the cost of materials and labour results entirely from the fact that anyone may build locomotives，and that consequently the concept itself，without which material and labour would never produce a locomotive，has no influence upon the formation of price.If there were a patent for the construction of locomotives，then its value，in addition to the value of materials and labour，would be reflected in a higher price.As soon as a concept becomes common property，its realizations in practice are no longer‘scarce’，and only scarcity can give functional significance a special effect upon price.In the case of money there is something that corresponds with a patent，namely the governmental right of coinage，which forbids the realization of the concept of money by unauthorized persons.The‘scarcity’of money is based upon this governmental monopoly，to a limited extent when it consists of precious metals and totally when it is paper money or coinage.The monopoly of the government is formulated with characteristic rigour in a Chinese law which punishes the counterfeiter who uses genuine precious metals more severely than one who uses inferior materials；the former enters into a more improper competition with the government and infringes its prerogative more profoundly.If everyone were allowed to mint coins their value would indeed decline to the value of the material plus labour，and the advantages of monopoly would be eliminated.Thus，ethnologists have observed that the power position of wealthy men and chiefs is easily undermined when everyone can produce money，as in the case of shell money.Conversely，anyone who possesses money shares to that extent in the privilege of the State to coin money，just as the buyer of a patented object shares in the patent of the inventor.The privilege of the central power to coin money，which guarantees the functioning of money as money，ensures that these functions contribute an additional value to the value of the material and labour embodied in money，or，where the latter values are lacking altogether，endow money with its value.One of the decrees of Roman law is very characteristic in this respect.From the time that minted coins replaced weighed quantities of copper as money，the Roman law insisted that these coins be accepted at their face value，regardless of their material value.This independence from the metal content required a further provision，namely that only these coins should be accepted as money，while all other coins should be treated as mere commodities.Only as a claim for this particular coin can an action for debt be pursued in monetary terms；and all other actions for debts have to be formulated，like commodity debts，in terms of real value，independently of their nominal value as money（quanti ea res est ）.This means that the value of other coins was not monetary but material，because the function of money was reserved for the legal coin.Thus，the legal coin acquired a value which other coins could acquire only through the material of which they were made，and this justified its independence from any intrinsic value.Just as a quart measure has economic value，not because it is the product of material and labour-for if it were not useful for some purpose outside itself no one would want it-but because it is used for measuring，so too money has value because it serves as a means of measurement and in other ways.The fact that this value can itself be expressed only in money makes it less easy to recognize than the value of a quart measure，which can be expressed in terms other than itself.The services of money determine its‘use value’，which must find expression in its ‘exchange value’；money is one of these objects whose‘utility value’，which depends upon the government monopoly of coinage，includes its‘scarcity value’which this monopoly establishes.The theory of money as having a material value is opposed to the general trend of knowledge in which the meaning of things is transposed from their terminus a quo to their terminus ad quem. Money has value not on account of what it is，but on account of the ends that it serves；and although an original intrinsic value of money made possible its later functions，it acquires its value subsequently from these functions，and gains at a higher level what it had given up at an earlier stage.

In the development that I have outlined，money tends towards a point at which，as a pure symbol，it is completely absorbed by its exchange and measuring functions.There are many parallels in the history of thought.Our original，untutored interest in phenomena usually comprehends them as undifferentiated wholes.They confront us as a unity of form and content，and our valuations are bound to the form because it is the form of this specific content，to the content because it is the content of this specific form.In higher stages of development these elements are separated and the function as pure form is appreciated in specific ways.The diverse contents of these forms are often treated as irrelevant.Thus，for instance，we appreciate the religious mood while being indifferent to the dogmatic content.We consider it valuable that this elevation，striving and appeasement of the soul，which is the universal element in the many different historical creeds，should exist.Similarly，an exhibition of strength often elicits a respect which is denied to its consequences.Thus，a more refined aesthetic interest turns increasingly towards what is pure art in a work of art，to the form of art in the broadest sense，and is increasingly indifferent towards the material of art；that is，towards its theme and towards the feeling that originally inspired it.The sublimation and objectification of such feelings is the aesthetic function in both the production and the consumption of art.In the same way，we value cognition as a formal function of the mind which reflects the external world，regardless of whether the objects and results of cognition are gratifying or distasteful，useful or merely ideal.This differentiation of value feelings has yet another important aspect.The evolution of the modem naturalistic spirit tends to dethrone universal concepts，and to emphasize singular instances as the only legitimate content of conceptions.In theory and in practice，the universal is treated as something purely abstract which acquires meaning only in its material embodiment.that is in tangible instances.In rising above these concrete instances one seems to enter a void.Yet the sense of the significance of universals，which reached its climax with Plato，has not altogether disappeared；and we should attain completely satisfying relation to the world only if every aspect of our world view reconciled the material reality of singular instances with the depth and scope of a formal universality.Historicism and a sociological world view are attempts to confirm universality and yet to deny its abstractness，to transcend the singular instance，to derive the singular from the general without sacrificing its material reality；for society is universal but not abstract.The valuation of functions as distinct from content has its place here.Function is universal in relation to the purpose that it serves.Religious sentiment is a universal by contrast with the content of a particular creed；cognition is universal as against any one of its particular objects；power is universal by contrast with the specific and varied problems to which it is always applied in the same way.All of these are forms and frameworks which comprehend a great variety of material.Money seems to participate in this trend when valuation becomes independent of the material of money and is transferred to its function，which is universal and yet not abstract.The valuation，which at first concerned a particular functioning substance，becomes differentiated，and while the precious metal continues to be valued，its function，which goes beyond the particular substance with which it is associated，attains a specific value of its own.The form in which money exists for us is that of mediating exchanges and measuring values.A metal becomes money by assuming this form，just as ideas about the supernatural become religion when they are incorporated into the function of religious sentiment，and as the block of marble becomes a work of art when artistic creativity endows it with a form that is simply the expression in space of the artistic function.The refinement of the sense of the original dissolves the interfusion of function and allows each to develop as an independent value.It is true that the functional value of money still needs to be represented.The decisive point，however，is that its value no longer arises from what represents it；on the contrary，the latter is quite secondary，and its nature has no importance except on technical grounds which have nothing to do with the sense of value.

第二章 货币的物质价值

第一节

货币的内在价值和价值的度量

在所有的关于货币属性的讨论中，始终贯穿这样一个问题：为了实现其度量、交换和代表价值的功能，货币是否本身就是或应该是一种价值？再或者，如果货币仅仅是没有内在价值的一种标志和象征符，就如同账目一样，那么它能否代表价值？所有关于这个问题的技术层面和历史层面的讨论，都涉及了在货币和价值理论中最深层的问题，如果仅仅用下面这样一个人们司空见惯的逻辑命题来简单地决定的话，那就显得太肤浅了。这个逻辑命题认为，一种度量工具必须具有与被度量对象相同的性质：例如，长度的度量工具必须本身有一定的长度，重量的度量工具必须本身有一定的重量，空间的度量工具本身必须有一定的维度，所以，价值的度量工具必须有一定的价值。无论两个事物在所有其他方面多么地不相关，当我把两者拿来相互度量时，它们必须在我所比较的方面具有共同的特征。如果涉及的不是同一性质的相关数量的话，那么我所指的任何量的、数的相等或不等都没有意义了。而且，这种同一性还必须不能是某种太过笼统的东西，例如，比较一座建筑的美和一个人的美就是不可能的，尽管他们都有美的特征。只有建筑或人的某一特殊的美的品质才有可能进行比较。但是即使没有共同的性质，我们也可以考虑把主体的反应作为比较的基础。如果一座建筑物的美和一个人的美能够带给我们的心情上的愉悦是可比较的，那么尽管它们的外表相去甚远，二者在性质上的同一性或许是可以确定的。对同一主体产生的相同反应体现了我们所提到的处于关系之中的客体的相同性。两个完全不同但给予同一主体相同愉悦感的现象，超越了它们彼此的不同之处，而产生跟主体相同的作用力，或者说跟主体发生了相同的关系，这就如同一阵风和人的一只手折断树枝体现的是相同的力量，虽然二者的性质是不可比的。因此，货币实体和任何被它度量的事物或许完全不同，但它们在这一点上必须一致，那就是都有价值，即使价值仅仅是从事物那里得到的印象的一种主观反应，而且尽管这种反应不能从事物中独立出来，但至少它们影响人的价值感的这种性质是相同的。因此，我们认为由于货币被用来和价值比较，进入与价值的量的相等中，所以货币必须具有价值。

我将把这种形式的论证和另一种得出不同结果的论证加以对照。的确，在前面给出的例子中，我们可以比较风折断树枝的力量和人的手折断树枝的力量，然而这种比较只有在这两种力量可以被量化的条件下才会发生。我们还可以用风所折断的树枝的粗细来衡量风力的大小。我承认，被折断的树枝无法证明风力的大小，与人手折断树枝所释放的力量是相同的，但是通过一股风折断了一根树枝，而另一股风不能的事实，我们可以度量两股可比较的风力以及每股风相对力量的大小。下面的这个例子对我而言似乎是至关重要的。我们所知道的最不相同的事物是世界观的两极，即物质的运动和意识的状态，不管是形而上学的还是科学的方法都不能成功地使它们彼此相通。一个具有纯粹广延性，另一个具有纯粹内涵性，迄今还没有任何能够找出让人们普遍信服的、可以概括这两者统一性的某个点。然而，心理物理学家却能够通过影响我们感官的外在的运动的变化，来度量意识情感的相对强弱的变化。因为，在这两因素中存在着一种连续的量的相关性，一个因素的大小变化决定另一个因素的大小变化，不需要两者之间存在任何质的相关性或同一'性。这样一来，货币度量价值的能力取决于它本身所具有的价值这个逻辑命题就被打破了。毫无疑问，只有当不同客体具有相同性质时，这两者的量才是可比的；任何两者之间的直接的量的比较都预设了它们要有相同的性质。但是任何时候度量两个量间的某种变化、差异或者关系，只要被度量对象的比例反映出度量者的比例，就足以决定这些度量关系了，而不需要两者质的同一性。两个不同性质的事物不可以对等，但是两个不同性质的事物间的比例关系或许可以等同。m和n可能存在某种关系，但这种关系没有任何质上的同一性，所以我们不能用其中一个直接做另一个的度量尺度。它们之间的关系可能是因果关系、象征关系、与第三因素间的共同关系，或其他任何关系。我们假设给出的条件是：已知a是m的四分之一，b是n的若干分之一。如果a和b之间存在某种关系，而这种关系与m和n之间的关系相对应，那么可知b也是n的四分之一。尽管a与b之间存在着质上的不同，也没有任何直接比较的可能性，但仍然可以通过一个对象的量来决定另一个对象的量。例如：一定数量的食物与需要被满足的食物准确需求量之间没有同一性关系，但是如果这么多食物可以满足一半需求，那么我可以据此推断，可用的食物数量等于食物需求量的一半。在这种情况下，只要存在一定的整体关系，就足以推断测量出局部的量的关系。如果我们用这种方式来阐释货币对对象的测量，那么货币与对象之间的直接可比性的观点，以及由此引申出来的货币本身应该具有价值的逻辑命题就变得不堪一击了。

为了把这种逻辑可能性转化为现实性，我们只需要在商品和货币量之间假定一个非常普遍却又经常被隐瞒或破坏的关系，即货币供应量的增长和价格上涨的联系，以及商品供应量增加和价格下降的联系。这样我们就形成（保留精确的限定性）一种商品总供应量的概念，一种货币总供应量的概念，以及这两者之间相互依存的关系的概念。

每一件单独的商品都是可支配商品总量中的确定的一部分，如果我们称可支配的商品总量为a，那么单件商品就是a的m分之一。与商品价格相对应的就是货币总供应量，如果我们把货币总量称为b，那么单件商品的价格就等于b的m分之一。假设我们已知a与b的量，知道一个特定对象可出售的全部商品所代表的比例，那么我们就可以知道商品的货币价格，反之亦然。因此，一定数量的货币可以确定或度量一个物品的价值，而不管货币和这件有价值的物品是否具有质的同一性，也不必管货币本身是否是有价值的。

度量的问题

我们必须牢记在心中的是度量的彻底相对性。用绝对数量来度量事物之间的等价关系，与此处所讨论的部分数量具有截然不同的意义。假设在某种限定性条件下，货币的总量等于待售商品价值总量，那么这种等量不必被当作是其中一个量对另一个量的度量。我们说二者具有等价关系是建立在这样一个关系的基础上，即二者都以用来度量人及其实践活动。下面这些相当普遍的情况说明，那种把货币和商品简单的对应起来的倾向是多么强烈。假设有一个原始部落，他们用一种商品作为交换的单位，而他们邻近的部落比较发达，使用货币进行交换，那么两个部落之间进行商品交换的时候，这两种交换单位通常被认为是等价的。所以，当古爱尔兰人与罗马人发生交换时，他们把自己的价值单位——奶牛——等价于一盎司白银。在安南偏僻山区，只进行物物交换的部落以水牛作为基本的价值单位，当他们与较开化的平原地区的居民进行交易的时候，后者的价值单位——一块特定大小的白银——就被认为与一头水牛等价值。在老挝一个原始的靠贸易为生的部落中也可以发现相同的情况。他们的价值单位是铁働，也生产黄金卖给相邻的部落，这也是他们称重的唯一的东西。为了给黄金称重，他们除了用谷物来度量别无选择，所以他们出售与一定谷物重量相当的黄金来换一把锄头。在这些大致的总量对等的关系中，一对一是其朴素表达，在物物交换中，单个商品作为范例表达了所有商品的价值，就如同单个货币单位代表所有货币的概念。或许可以这样假设，单个度量单位之间的关系可以被理解为总量之间的关系——至少可以象征性地如此认为。

如果这些总量上的对等是作为一种尽管无意识、但有效的先验性的存在，那么从主观偶然性中分离出来的部分数量关系便可以形成一种客观的比例关系。因为目前在商品和货币间真的存在某种完全相同的东西，各自的部分量与各自的总量的比例。如果我们假设价格完全平衡，那么在交换中每件商品都与其价格相关，就像所有待售商品与可支配的货币总量相关一样。货币是否与商品之间有一种概念的、质的关系是完全无关紧要的。如果一件商品花掉20个m，它代表货币总供应量的n分之一，那么它的价值是商品总供应量价值的n分之一。通过这种方式，20m可以度量商品的价值，即使它们彼此完全不同。然而，我们必须牢记，在全部商品和全部货币之间假定的这种简单关系仅仅是一种初步的、粗略的、框架性的阶段。如果一件单独的商品必须与一种货币价值直接对等，那么坚持认为商品和它的度量工具之间必须具有共同的性质或许是合理的。但是就交换和衡量价值的目的而言，只需要确定不同或所有商品彼此的关系（即单个商品除以其余所有商品量的结果），并把这种关系与可支配的货币供应量相对应的分数部分对等。这仅仅要求有一种数字上的可以确定的量。如果商品n与所有的待售商品总量A相对应，同时货币单位a与所有可支配货币单位总量B相对应，那么n的经济价值就表述为B分之a这种关系一般不会以这种方式被理解，因为A和B总被认为是理所当然的。它们的变化很难被觉察出，我们对它们作为分母的功能也不太清楚，我们仅仅对个别情况下的分子n和a感兴趣。所以，便可能出现这种认为n和a彼此间以某种绝对的直接的方式相联系的观点，如果真的是这样，它们之间就确实需要某种本质的同一。如果上述关系赖以成立的基础，即那些一般因素被遗忘，如果此因素只在实践中起作用、不在意识层面起作用，那么它将揭示出人类本性的深刻特征。人类有限的认知能力以及简约便利的处事方式使得我们只对对象无数特性的某一小部分感兴感，仅把这一小部分纳入考虑范畴。对不同的观点，我们只需确定对引起我们注意的因素的选择和排列，使后者可以组织成一个有系统的序列就可以了。这个序列始于一种连续的现象，这些现象中只有那些它们共通的东西才会被考虑，一切现象共有的基础才会被考虑。在这一范围的另一端，只有每个现象中的特征、绝对的个性的东西，才会进入我们的意识，而那些一般的、基础的要素则在我们的意识之外。在这两种极端之间，存在着总体现象的点和面的多个层次，而人们最大的注意力便集中在这里。总体而言，或许可以说，理论兴趣把意识更多地引向一般性，实践兴趣更多地指向事物的特殊性。对于那些对形而上学感兴趣的思想家，事物间的个性的差别通常被认为是非本质的，他所关心的是像“存在”、“生成”这样的所有事物共有的一般性概念。另一方面，实践生活要求我们关注和我们密切相关的人与环境的差异性、独特性和细微差别，而一般的人类特性和所有问题状况所共同的基础似乎显而易见，不需要特别关注。这样的关注倒是也可以把问题弄清楚，可是需要大费周折。例如，一个家庭的成员之间关系的发展以个性化的经验为基础，通过这些个体特性来使每个人区别于其他的成员。这些家庭关系的一般特征通常不是该家庭成员特别关注的问题。只有家庭以外的旁观者才能描述出这种一般性质。然而，这并不意味着我们没有意识到的一般性基础在心理上不起作用。实际上，每个家庭成员的个性特质都将根据该家庭整体的一般特性和氛围产生非常不同的情况。这种氛围提供了一种通常不被注意的基础，在此基础上，个人的特质得以按照各自独特的方式发展。更大一些的群体也是如此。虽然人与人之间的所有关系都依赖于每个个体的特殊贡献，但是这些关系能够以一种特殊的形式确立起来，恰是因为存在着普遍的人类现象和情况，它们形成了分母，而这个分母就是那些做为分子的个体差异加总起来形成的关系之和。对于货币价格而言，也存在着同样的心理关系。一件商品价值和一定数量货币的价值之间的相等关系，并不意味着某些简单因素的对等，而是一种比例的对等，即两个分数间的对等关系，在一定的经济区域内，它们的分母分别是商品总量和货币总量。当然，这两个数量必须具有更严格的对应关系。这个对等关系是通过下面事实建立起来的，对于实践问题，这两个总量是被提前设定为相等的；或者更严格地说，在我们的理论意识中，我们处理的两种实践环境是作为一种对等关系被反映的。然而，既然构成特殊商品和特殊价格间所有对等关系的一般性基础并没有进入我们的意识，但是它无意间却提供了运行的要素，如果没有这个要素，那些引起我们兴趣并进入我们意识的个别事例不可能形成任何关系。那种绝对的、基础性的对等关系的极端重要性，就如同我描述过的类似情况那样，会使那些无意的情形变成事实。

如果我们假设货币没有物质价值，并且只要我们的观察严格限定在这两个因素上，那么单独的货币价格和被假定可以用货币来表现其价值的商品就不会有任何关系。我们不知道为什么一件物品的价格会比另一件物品的价格高或低一个固定的量。但是如果我们建立这样一个绝对的假设：即待售商品的总量等于货币总量（“总量”的意义将在后面讨论），那么每件单独商品的价格就变成它的价值和商品总价值之间的比率，这种比率又重现于价格和货币总量之间。我必须再次强调的是：这不是一种循环论证，一定量货币度量某件特殊商品的能力是建立在所有货币和所有商品对等的基础上的，这预先假设了一方对另一方的可度量性。每次度量是否都要求被度量对象和度量者之间存在某种质的一致性并以此来进行度量——这个问题将会与特殊情况无关，但是此问题在未解决的情况下会被保留在假设之中。但是，如果在绝对的量之间存在某种关系（绝对的量间并不需要可度量性或同一性），那么相对的量的度量还是有可能的。一个水管的大小和一个特定的水压之间当然不存在度量的同一性和可能性，但是如果两者都是有着特定输出功率的同一台机械系统的组成部分的话，那么如果已知水压的变化条件，就可以从输出的能量的变化计算出系统中水管的直径。同样的，商品和货币在一般意义上可能是不能彼此度量的。但是二者都在人类生活中发挥作用，被包含在人类实践系统中，并且其中一方量的改变成为另一方变化的指针，这样就足够了。罗马人根据相对的而非绝对重量来标记他们的钱币价值（除了一些有事实根据的例外），这种行为与那种把每个货币量的意义归结为一个分数的原理不无关系，虽然这个分数的绝对量及其部分尚未确定。所以，as只代表一个由12个部分组成的整体，它可以指一笔遗产，就如同指数量和重量，也可以指英镑或一英镑的任何部分。我们曾认为在远古时代，as代表一块有特定绝对重量的铜币，但是只有度量的相对性进入意识中并发挥作用的这一事实没有受此假说的影响。

有效货币的量

我们现在必须更明确地来分析货币总量这一概念的限定性。

我们不可能确定与待售商品相等的货币量，这不是因为在所有待售商品和所有可支配货币间存在着不可测量的差异。这两者之间并不存在多与少的直接关系，因为它们之间不存在同质性客体间的共同度量标准。商品的量不会与特定量的货币发生关系，因为从理论上讲，货币的全部目的可以通过任意少数量的货币实现。在不会中断交易的前提下，我们通过下面这个有记载的事实来说明实践中，货币在何种范围内实现其目的。几个世纪以前，在俄罗斯存在尺寸非常小的银币，小到不可能用手从桌子上把它们拿起来的程度，人们把银币从钱袋里倒出来，把应付的分开，双方用舌头把自己的那一份舔起来，然后吐回自己的钱袋。或许有人会说，不管可用货币绝对量是多少，只要货币还行使着它的功能，都应该保留足够多的货币。所有的不同都只是这些钞票或钱币作为某种物质材料方面的不同，它们作为货币的量不会受到影响。所以，在全部商品或全部货币之间的直接比较不会有任何结论。货币总量和商品总量缺少相关性是因为这样一个事实（总量指代表价值的分数的分母）——货币总供应量比商品总量的周转要快得多。如果可能，没有人会留着大量的货币而不使用，而且人们也都有办法避免货币留而不用的情况。但是没有商人不是在商品出售之前先要把商品储存一段时间。如果把只有当有人求购的时候才偶然出售的非待售商品算在内的话，那么周转速度的差别将更大。如果全部待售商品的出售所需要的货币量以实际支付这些商品的价格为基础来计算，那么它将大大超过实际的货币供应量。以这种观点来看，货币量要比商品量少得多，商品和价格之间的比率同总商品量和总货币量的比率也就完全不相等了，而是要小得多。但是，我们有两种方法来挽救我们的基本命题。首先，我们可以把实际销售过程中的商品量看作商品总量。用亚里士多德的观点来说：未销售的商品仅仅是可能的商品，只有在售出的一瞬间可能的商品才变成真正的商品。就像货币只有在购买东西即行使货币功能时，它才成为真正的货币；所以商品只有被售出时才成为商品，在这之前，它只是某种可能被出售的物品、一种观念上的参与物。从这一观点出发，我们可以得到一个显而易见的、分析性的结论：货币量与待售商品量是相等的，当然，还包括银行和信贷系统提供的所有货币替代物。可以肯定的是：暂时被排除在销售过程以外的商品不是没有经济上的影响，如果商品总供应量像货币一样全部进入循环中，那么经济生活将发生重大变化。如果进一步考察，在我看来，储备的商品对实际销售的影响只有通过三种方式：货币流通速度、货币所用的材料和货币等价物的产量以及货币支出和储备之间的关系。这些因素已经对实际周转产生了影响，在它们的影响下形成了商品和价格的经验性关系，它们也并不排除把商品总量解释成特定时期实际销售的商品。

其次，这也可以被看作是这样一个事实的结果：相同数量的货币可以用于无数次的交换（因为货币不像商品那样被消费掉），当与商品量比较时，货币不显著的数量会从其周转速度上得到补偿。较高水平的金融活动清楚地表明：货币实体在价值交易过程中只是扮演了一个微不足道的角色。1890年，法兰西银行活期存款的周转率135倍于其实际存款总额（即活期存款的周转总额与实际存款总额比较，是540亿比4亿法郎），而同期德国帝国银行的这个比率值达到了190。在投入使用的，决定着商品货币价格的货币总量中，作为流通结果的实际货币量相比于货币总量是微不足道的。因此，可以断言：涉及一个特定的时期而非一个单独的时刻，流通中的货币总量总是与同期可出售商品总量成相对应关系的。

同时，个人对大宗商品的开支及其对于商品价格的接受与它暂时性的用钱方式无关，而是与其更长时期内的收入情况相关。在我们的比例式中，货币分数可以通过一个事实与商品分数实现等量关系，即：货币分数的分母不是作为实体的可用货币总量，而是某一特定时期内由货币流通情况所决定的货币总量的一个乘数。从这个观点出发，可用商品存货量与相对应于货币价值的商品总量之间的矛盾就可以得到解决了，同时，在某个经济自给自足的区域内，商品总量与货币总量之间不会发生基本的比例失调这种看法也可以得到相应支持了。尽管，在特殊商品与其价格之间到底是一个怎样的适当关系的问题上还存在争议；尽管存在着由心理已经认定的分数值与随客观变化而产生的更为合理的分数值不相同而引起的波动与失调；此外，当交易量急速增长时，在交易中会出现一个暂时的短缺现象，如此等等。然而就算是存在着这些问题，我们上述结论的正确性依然是无法动摇的。在一个特定国家里，与商品价值相关的、由货币的短缺或是过剩引起的金属的进出口实际上只不过是在一个更大的经济区域内的调整。在这个区域里，特定的国家就好比是一些省份。它们在实践中表明：当两个省中的一个发生变化后，二者之间的正常关系就已经得到了恢复。在此种情境下，关于某个特定价格是否合适这个问题的答案，可以直接从前面的两个问题中得出：其一，货币总量和当前待售商品总量到底是什么？其次，我们所考虑到的构成可用商品总量的那些物品之间形成了怎样的比例关系？其中，后一个问题是关键性的。商品分数和货币分数之间的对应平衡，在客观和数量上都可以是正确的，也可以都是错误的，而在普通商品与普通货币之间的平衡不过是一种暂时或偶然的情况，并不能被当作是一个能从逻辑上正确推演出的真理性结论。总量之间的关系具有某种公理意义，其正确性与建立在其基础上的上述陈述不同：后者可以被证明，而公理却无法通过逻辑上的推演而得出。在此，我们形成了一个十分重要的方法论准则，以下我将从一个完全不同的价值范畴出发来阐明它。悲观主义的基本主张是：生活的苦难大大超过了幸福，无论从整体或是平均水平出发，生活中痛苦的经历都要比快乐大得多。几乎不可能得出这样一个结论，幸福和痛苦能够直接实现平衡；或是作为两个具有完全相反表征、而性质上同等重要的东西，二者可以实现彼此抵消。现实中，由于缺乏一个普遍的衡量标准，这个假定也是完全不可能的。当我们承受痛苦时，我们无法确定需要多少幸福才足以补偿遭受的痛苦。那么，我们又怎样解释人们总是在进行这样的比较呢？在日常事务中，在一以贯之的命运中，在个体生命的总和中，我们又如何判断快乐的总量是低于还是超过了痛苦的总量呢？在或多或少的严格意义上，只有生活的经验告诉我们，幸福与不幸事实上是如何分配的，为了追求幸福需要相应承受多少痛苦以及一个人的份额通常是多少。只有当我们已经形成了这样一些观念，而且不管这些观念是多么无意识的或是含混不清的，我们才能说：在特定的情况下，幸福的代价过于昂贵了，也就是说，伴随快乐而来的痛苦过多了；或是在某个个体的生活中，痛苦的量远远超过了幸福的量。平均水平自身是不能“比例失调”的，因为它是我们确定在个体生活中各种感受之间的关系是否公平的标准。同样的，也不能说人的平均身高是高还是矮，因为恰恰是平均水平提供了衡量个体的标准。与此相类，说时间过得“快”与“慢”也是一个误导。因为时间的流逝，即事件的平均速率，正是这样一个可以衡量单个事件中时间流逝快慢的一个标尺，而标尺本身既不快也不慢。因此，悲观主义者断定在人们平均生活水平中痛苦的含量要远大于幸福含量的说法，在方法论意义上是站不住脚的。同理，乐观主义者的论断也无法成立。对快乐和痛苦（或者以不同的表达方式，对单个个体或是一段时间内的平均水平）总的感受是一种原始现象，它的成分是不能彼此比较的，因为这种比较的成立需要提供一个独立于二者又能同等包含二者的衡量标准。

这已经足够概括我们在此处理的知识类型的特征了。在许多提到过的领域，以及其他一些领域内，基本要素之间是不可比较的，因为它们是不同质的，也无法彼此衡量或是通过第三者来度量。然而，同时也存在这样一个事实：当一个要素的某种数量与另一要素的某种数量，还是为涉及两者的个别情况、事件和问题提供了一个适用的衡量标准。就此而言，在个体的例子中，这些要素再现了总量中发生的比例关系，因而这些要素就有了一个“正确”的，即正常的、平均的或是典型的关系，以至于任何偏离这种关系的情况都显得是某一要素的“失衡”或“不成比例”的状态。就其自身而言，个案中的要素并不比总体具有更多的是与非、等量与不等量的关系，而只有通过一个被作为绝对存在的总量的建立，并在这个基础上，单个或是相关的因素也才可以被具体地计算考量，由此获得了要素与总体间的比较关系。同时，这种绝对的存在也不服从于比较的法则，只有那些相对关系才服从比较法则。

销售对象及其价格之间的关系就可以归于上述这样一种类型。或许在内容方面，两者之间根本不存在任何相同之处，而它们在质的方面的不同状态，使得它们即使在量的方面也是无法相比，但由于每一件可售商品与货币总量在一起构成了一个完整的经济体系，再如果该商品价格占货币总量的比重等于该商品占商品总量的比重，那么这个价格就是一个“适当的”价格。这种相互间的比例关系并不取决于某件商品与一定量的货币之间存在相等的“价值”。货币价格根本无须代表某一价值，或是至少无须代表具有与它自身具有同样意义的某一价值，它只需要像一件商品构成了商品总量价值的一部分那样，构成了货币总量的一部分就可以了。单个经济交易过程说明了一件商品的货币价格是如何取决于其对于商品总量的关系的。我们说：只有在获得了合算的等价物时，我们才愿意出钱购买某种物品（当然我们总是不愿意花钱的）。对这些开支的任何节省，都被视为是一种积极的利润。当然，这种积极利润的定义不是无条件的：只有当这些钱能在其他场合下也能被消费的情况下，它们才成其为一种积极的利润。假如我的钱别无它用，我或许会毫不犹豫地将我所有的钱用于对某种需要的商品的消费上。由此可见，所谓合适的价格事实上只是意味着，我作为一个普通人，在购买这件商品后还能有足够的剩余资金去进行其他必要的消费。任何一个单独的开支都必须依据这样一个事实进行调整，即我同时还有其他商品要买。如果每个人都根据这样一种方式来调节其私人开销，以使其对每种商品的消费所获得的汇报都能与他的总收入成适当的比例关系，这就意味着：如同单个商品的重要性与其需要和能够购买的商品总量之间存在关系一样，他的单个消费与其消费总量相关。这种个人视角的私人经济学模式显然不仅是对一般经济学模式的一种类比，它的一般性应用还决定了平均价格。持续不断的主观平衡调整着商品与价格之间的客观关系，这种关系不仅取决于有效商品供应总量与货币总量之间的比例关系，而且，视各种情况变化而定，也取决于个人总体需求同其收入中全部可用货币总量之间的比例关系。

货币拥有内在价值吗？

上述的论证尚未触及在现实中货币是否具有价值的问题，而只是意在说明货币价值度量的功能并未赋予货币自身以价值物的特性。尽管如此，仅仅是货币具有价值的可能性这一点，就已经为我们开辟了一条不仅可以理解货币发展史，而且能够同时理解货币本质的道路。在经济活动的原始阶段，就像牲畜、盐、奴隶、烟草、皮革一样，使用价值即被视为“货币”。无论货币后来经历了一个怎样的演化过程，最初它一定经历过这样一种表现形式。只是当目的链条极大地扩展，并且是可靠到为我们提供了这样一种保证，即现在无价值的东西能很快地帮我们兑换到其他价值时，使用纸张印刷的货币形式来交换最有价值的商品才具备了可能性。正是通过这样的方式，人们才可能进行一系列的逻辑演绎，在确保这一思维过程的方向性和正确性的前提下，通过不可能的或对立矛盾的阶段，得出一个有效的、有约束力的结论。原始的、摇摆不定的思维方式很容易在某个中间阶段迷失方向，只有当思维中的每一步都是具体和明确无误的时候，这种思维才能发挥其功能，当然，这样做的代价是在思维的变通性和目标的范围选择上要大打折扣。类似的，价值通过无价值物的延伸大大扩展了其适用范围和有效性，但这一切成为可能却必须依赖个体智力水平的不断提高和社会群体持续的组织化进程这个前提条件。没有人愚蠢到会用一个有价值的东西去交换一个无价值的东西，除非他能有把握再用后者去交换另一个有用的价值物。交易首先不可避免地以物物交换的形式出现，也就是在直接价值之间进行交换。有人这样假定：某些物品是广为需要的，因此它们被频繁地交换和流通，它们与其他物品相关的价值也因此被频繁地度量。那么，从心理上说，这些物品就最适合成为衡量价值的普遍标准。我们先前得出的结论是：货币不一定要具有价值，但在从这种同先前结论的直接对比中，我们显然不难发现，还是“最需要的”和“最有价值的”商品容易成为货币。需要注意的是，我并非从生理学的意义上来定义“最需要的”。例如，对装饰品的需要，同样可以在“最需要的”范畴里占有重要位置。事实也正是如此，据说，原始人类把身体的装饰和用于装饰的物品，看得要比我们所认为的所有急需品更有价值。物品对我们的必需性，其实不过是我们将自身的情绪赋予它们而做的一种强调，事实上物品之间并无差别，也可以说物品本身是“中性的”，对必需性的判断则完全取决于我们的目的。因此，我们无法从理论上计算出什么价值是最急需的，以及什么是最适合于行使货币职能的物品。在我看来，某些物品之所以能行使货币的职能，唯一必不可少的前提假设是：同其他各种各样的物品相比，某些物品由于被认为是必需品，因而表现出特别频繁的交换率，货币的特性最初就维系于这些物品之上。只有在货币的物质实体被看作是具有直接的价值时，它才能发展成为一种交换手段或是价值尺度。

就目前而言，通过比较我们可以发现，货币不再具有价值是因为其物质载体被当做是必需品，而必需品有一种不可或缺的价值。今天的欧洲人不会因为货币能够换来一小块珠宝就认为货币是有价值的。如今的货币价值不能仅仅被认作是其本身的金属载体的价值，因为现在有太多的贵金属，它们仅仅通过打造首饰和用于技术的目的之类的目的就能够获得收益。这种通过把货币的价值看作金属的价值这一理论而构想出来的过程所导致的最终的结果是：由贵金属所制造的物品将会不计其数，这将导致这些有贵金属所制成的物品的价值变得微乎其微。货币只能在只存在有限的贵重金属所制成的物品的时候，或者只能在一个能够保证货币的物质质料非常有限的这样一个小的范围内，其价值才有可能转换成其他事物的价值。即使在贵金属充当货币的之初，打个比方说在那个时候只有少量的贵金属的供给，货币的价值可能是由其用在装饰方面的功能所决定，但当金属的产量增加以后这种情况就消失了。下面这个事实也可进一步支持我们的说法：尽管原始人会把那些由货币的物质质料制成的自我装饰物当做是重要的生活必需品，然而，对这些物品价值大小的评估实际上又把这种对这些物质质料看做必需品的兴趣变得“可有可无的”或是“多余的”。在现代文化中，装饰品所发挥的作用根本就不会像我们在文化人类学中发现的那样，也不会像我们中世纪的文献中所发现的那样，它们在当时的社会中都扮演非常重要的角色。这样一个事实也必然导致那些通过物质质料制造而出的货币的意义。或许也可以这样说：货币的价值逐渐地从起点变成了终点，同时，由于从心理上对那些制成货币的金属的价值变得越来越中立了，这就导致了金属币和纸币都能够平等的充当货币的物质载体。如果我们根据这样一种想法，即纸币仅仅是金属货币的一个草图而已，就认为纸币是没有价值的，那么我们就大错特错了。这将遭到这样的事实的驳斥，即无担保的纸币仍然是有价值的货币。即使在有人指出这样一个事实的情况下，即仅靠政治力量就可决定当时的纸币兑换率，那么这一情况也正意味着：除了那些像金属这样就有直接物质用途的质料可以赋予货币价值以外，那些像纸张之类的特殊的物质也能够赋予货币价值，实际生活中也的确产生了纸币。金属货币不断为纸币所代替以及各种形式凭借信用进行贷款之类情形的出现，都不可避免地对货币的特性产生影响，做一个粗浅的对比，即在人际关系中，如果某人允许自己经常被他人所代表的话，那么，这最终会导致这个人所能得到的尊敬不会多于他的代表所得到的尊敬。如果某种物品充当货币的价值要比其自身的物质价值范围更大、方式也更多时，这种货币的流通的速度就会越快。现代商业越来越趋向于提出货币的载体作为一种物质本身所具有的价值，而且这种趋势会愈演愈烈，因为，即使贵重金属的产量增长到了最大的限度，它也始终无法让所有交易都转变成现金交易。房产交易以及国际汇票往来都是这种趋势中较为突出的例子，对于其早期的特征，我们将会在本章的最后一部分中给予讨论。

一般来说，经济概念越是不发达，那么在进行价值比较时，所采用的度量方法就越要涉及那些直接的、物理上的关系。根据我们先前的解释，在两个分数中，一件商品和一定数量的货币的价值之间是相等的——在这两个分数中，个别商品和一定的货币量是分子，而所有商品的总量和所有货币的总量则是分母——很显然，这种解释方法是普遍有效的，因为它把具体的一类事物转换成了货币。然而，既然货币的进化过程相当的缓慢，所以这种模式在更原始而有直接的物物交换中也可以发现。一个来自新不列颠岛事例的报道或许可以说明这种最原始阶段的情况。那里的土著人通过把串在一起的贝壳当作货币，并把这种货币称之为“德瓦拉”。这种货币是依据其长度来购买事物的（比如说，一臂长，等等），通过支付与鱼等长的德瓦拉，我们就能够买到鱼。据说，在这些用贝壳充当货币的地区，还流行着另外一种购买模式，即两件具有相同长度的商品被看作是等值的，因此，一定度量的谷物与相等度量的贝壳等值。通过这种方式，商品鱼价格之间的直接的等价关系找到了它们最为彻底、最为简单的表达方式。那些存在于没有数量一致性的事物之间的价值比较代表了一种更为高级的货币发展阶段。蒙高帕克曾在对18世纪西非部落的研究报告中提及过这样一种情况，这种仅仅通过数量上的相等来确定价值相等的萌芽阶段的货币发展过程。在那里，铁棒能像货币一样流通，并且用来表示其他商品的量，因此，一定量的烟草或是甜酒经常被称之为“一棒多的烟叶”或是“一棒多的甜酒”。在这种情况下，在价值形成的初级阶段，这种把价值的等量看做是数量上的等量的倾向——显而易见，这是来自于感官印象的一种强有力的因素造成的——已经被转换成了语言的表达。在一些别的现象中，那些看起来很不相同的现象也同样可以用一种一视同仁的态度来处理。一种来自于第聂伯河流域的奥尔比亚（米利都的殖民地）的、刻有鱼（可能是金枪鱼）的形象，以及鱼篓图样的古老的铜币被留存至今。据估计，这些以捕鱼为生的部落，最初是把金枪鱼作为物物交换的等价物，并且即使在钱币被引入的时候——可能是因为要与邻近的较不发达的部落进行交换——为了表示一个铜币与一条金枪鱼是等价的，于是他们就用同样刻有鱼以及鱼篓形象的货币来表示金枪鱼，使二者具有同样的价值，并在此基础上进行交换。在其他的一些地方，很少有如此强调视觉关联的情况发生，即很少发生过这种把那些物物交换的基本单位用图像（一头公牛、一条鱼或是一把斧头等）的方式把其价值刻在钱币上。同样的视觉关联也在阿维斯陀古经中出现过，书中规定：一个医生如果是医好了一个房主的病，那么他应收的诊费是一个较为劣等的牛；如果这个医生治好了村长的病，那么他应收的诊费是一头体格健壮的牛，如果这个医生治好了省长的病，那么他应收的诊费是四驾马车。另外，如果医生治好了村长妻子的病，那么他应收的诊费就是一头母驴，如果治好的是贵族妻子的病，那么他应收的诊费是一匹母马，如果治好的是省长太太的病，那么他应收的诊费是一头雌骆驼。病人性别与等价物性别之间的一致性说明了这样一种倾向，即把价值对等直接建立在外部的对等的基础之上。还有一个同样的事实是：货币起初的组成部分常常是那些大且笨重的物品，就像兽皮货币、牲畜货币、铜或青铜货币之类的，或者由那些数量较多的物组成，如贝壳货币之类的。据目前所知，最早的银行票据来自于14世纪末的中国，这种票据有18英寸长、9英寸宽。农民们常说：“越有钱就越有钱”，这种说法仍然是非常具有影响的，它反映了一种自发情绪，然而，在出现了更为精密的、更具有反思精神的经验主义之后，这种自发的情绪却被证明是错误的。外形最大的货币，即使是那些由贵重金属制成的货币，无一例外都发现在那些较为不发达地区，在那些地区物物交换仍然非常普遍。最大的金币包括以下几种，安南地区的路尔（一路尔相当于880个马克），日本的御幕（一御幕相当于220个马克），以及阿散蒂地区的班塔，安南还有一种相当于60马克的银币。这种对数量重视反映了这样一种情感，只有那些最为权威的铸币厂才能够铸造那些最大的钱币，对于那些较低的权力的铸币厂来说，它们铸造的钱币与最权威铸币厂的钱币相比，质地相同但相对较小。举个例子说，波斯皇帝有权铸造最大的金币，波斯地方总督则只能铸造那些较小的金币，这种小金币的价值不足皇帝所铸金币的1/4。重视数量不仅仅是金属货币的早期形式的一种特征，也是早期各种各样的货币的一个特征。公元1世纪居住在萨尔河和易北河之间的斯拉夫人是一支非常原始的部落，他们把亚麻当作货币，一匹亚麻布的交换价值相当于100只鸡的价值，也相当于10名成年男子一个月所吃掉的谷子的价值。即使是在更高级一些的货币体系中，我们也应该注意到货币的概念是怎样越来越不由那些金属价值所决定。中世纪的荷兰盾的价值相当于一个达克特金币，而在今天这种荷兰盾只值100个铜十字币；起初，格罗森币是一种非常厚重的银币；起初，马克的价值相当于一磅重的白银，而英镑的价值则相当于70马克。在原始的物物交换的情况中，货币交易的不是用于日常的那些鸡毛蒜皮的目的，而只是为了交换到那些价值更大、价值更多的物品。原始文化又一个重要的特点那就是对对称性的需求，即较大货币购买较大体积的物品，对这种需求认识的不充分就会限制货币交换活动。只有在那些文化发展的较高阶段，人们才意识到虽然这些事物在数量上与能力、意义和价值十分不相称，但是二者在价值方面却可以具有一致性。如果实际生活是建立在对物体的对等的基础之上，那么人们首先会要求有一种直接的对等性，这就如同要求原始货币的大小要与交换的事物的大小相一致一样。与此相同，这样一种后来出现的抽象性——即认为一小块金属可以充当任何大小的物品的等价物——逼近了这样一种目标：这些一般物品的等价物本身已经不再行使其物质质料所具有的功能，而是仅仅充当那些一般物品的一种抽象的表达。货币的度量功能很少再与其物质质料联系在一起了，因此，在现代经济中的一切变化中，货币自身的变化是最少的。

货币纯粹的符号化特征的发展

人类所实现的最大的进步，就是在旧的物质质料世界中发现了新的物质质料世界，而这一进步是通过建立物质世界与外在于物质世界的新世界二者之间在数量上的比例关系才得以实现的，而且依据事实来看：无论是物质世界的数量还是新世界的数量都要与第三个数量相关，并且这上述的那两个数量之间要么相等，要么不相等。对于两种在品质上完全不同的行为，我们是无法进行比较的，但是如果二者在与所需要付出的努力上都呈现出相同力量的意志和自我牺牲精神，那么二者就具有了可比性。举个例子说，两种不同的命运所揭示的幸福程度是完全不同的，但是如果无论哪一种命运境遇都依据行为主体承受命运的程度来解释的话，这就在这两种之间获得了一种可以建立相互比较的关系。两种具有不同速率的运动可以建立关系并通过这种关系来实现这两种运动之间的换算，只要我们能够观察到这两种运动在初始的加速度上是一致的就可以了。如果两种元素虽然在物质上是不相同的，但都同第三种元素或者第四种元素有着相同的关系，那么这两个不同的元素之间一种同类性就会产生，这种同类性不仅仅是指我们的感觉上的，在实际的情形中，这种同类性也是存在着的。这样，其中的一个元素立刻就可用另一个因素进行计算。此外，不管在两个看起来品质完全不相同的人之间是如何的不具有可比性，但是，这二者中的每一个人都能与另一个人之间建立了一种相等关系，只要他们中的一个对待第三个人，就如同另一个人与第四个人一样，都表现出相同程度的爱与恨，统治与征服，那么通过这些关系，我们就可以实现对个人性格进行分析。最后的一个例子就是：不同类型的艺术作品的完美是无法进行比较的并且它们的价值也无法在同一个尺度下进行排序，但是，在这种情况下是可以进行比较的，即它们中的每一个都与其自身所属的艺术类型的特殊理念之间有一个确定的关系。从问题中我们可以看出来，对于每一件艺术作品的质料与风格，他们都牵涉到一个范式，而那些真正的艺术作品或多或少地都会越来越接近这一个范式。正是这种相互关系使得那些即使是最不相同的艺术作品之间也都有着可比性。这些相互关系与其范式之间的一致性，可能会产生一种美学上井然有序的空间，以及在那些完全不相同的个性作品中，建立一种精确的顺序，一种与价值相联系的理想化的同类性。这不但对艺术的世界是真实的，对现实生活的其他方面也是真实的。在我们孤立的评价体系的物质质料之外，发展了一种等级意义上的范式。只有在我们追求和谐秩序以及内在价值关系时才会产生不和谐的感觉。我们把世界观的本质的特征归结为我们每个人之间的平衡关系。这种平衡关系不仅仅是发生在两个事物之间，也发生在这两个与那两个事物之间，并通过对它们之间的相等与相似的关系的判断而把它们统一起来。货币，作为我们内心世界的基本力量或者基本形式，它不仅仅是一个极端的例子，而且，似乎也是我们内心世界的基本力量及其形式的具体表现。通过货币来表现物与物在交换中实现的货币价值必须建立在这样一个前提上，即在某一定量与某一总量之间存在着一定的关系，与之对应地，在商品与可交换的商品的总量之间也存在着一定的关系。货币在本质上并不是有价值的事物，它的组成部分与别的组成部分之间或者其组成部分与整体之间恰巧与商品的这一部分的价值与其他部分的价值或者这部分价值与整体价值之间有着相同的比例关系。货币的意义不仅仅是表达了不同事物之间的价值联系，而且在人类的高智能的指挥调度之下，货币可以游刃有余地发挥功能，也就是说，货币具有了能在那些即使是根本不相同或者根本不相似的事物之间建立一种平等关系的能力。这种能力是在原始能力——通过建立直接的统一性与相似性来表现和判断价值——的基础上逐渐演化而来，这种对不同事物之间的相同与相似性的判断是我们之前所提到的一种现象——即建立货币与其交换价值之间的直接的联系的尝试——的源泉。

现代经济的转折点开始于重商主义体系。政府所做的一切努力都是为了为本国夺得尽可能多的货币，当然这也是被那种“赚取越来越多的货币”的思想原则所指导的，但是这种重商主义的最终目的在于：加强对整个工业和整个市场的刺激。于是，继之而来的那个超越重商主义的阶段就发现了这样一个事实：即支持这一最终目标的价值并不是来自于作为物质实体的货币，而是来自于劳动产品。这是与早期的国家政策的目标保持一致的，那就是去获得尽可能多的土地并且“移居”尽可能多的人民到那些土地上。下面要讲述的事情在18世纪之前从来都没有发生在任何一个政治家的身上：那就是不通过占领新的领土并人民移居到那里的方法，一个民族照样可以通过别的途径去真正实现民族的伟大。然而，在一个特殊的历史时期下这种正确化的目标，并没有阻止人们去发现这样一个事实，那就是这种新类型的富足的重大的意义在于其动态的发展基础，实际上，这种动态的发展基础指的是只需要有限的土地与货币这样的物质就可以实现经济的发展、民族的伟大。显而易见，货币等价物在物质上的有用性对于生产与财富的增加开始变得越来越不重要了，即使那些对确定的功能性目的的搜寻也已经超过了对大量货币本身的搜寻。这些功能性的目的可以通过独立的过程来实现，而这一过程并不牵涉到在实物形式上的货币，这也正如在国际贸易的货物交换中所体现的那样。货币的意义就如表现商品的相对价格一样，依据我们先前做出的讨论，是与货币的本质价值相独立的。这种货币与其本质价值之间的独立的关系就如同度量空间大小的度量工具是用铁制的、木制的还是玻璃制的一样的不相关，既然我们关心的是货币的这一部分与其他部分之间的关系，那么我们以货币为尺度所决定的或事物的价值自然也就与货币的物质本质没有任何的关系。这种理想化了的货币的重要意义作为商品价值的一个标准以及这种标准的表达方式都是保持不变的，但是其作为中介的特征，作为一种储藏的手段以及价值传递手段在某种的程度上确是有变化的，并且一直处于一种变化的状态之中。货币经历了它一开始所具有的直接的、物质的形式，而后进入了一种实施上述的那些功能的理想化的形式，也就是说，货币发挥它的作用仅仅是以一种理念的形式，这种理念是通过一种具有代表性的符号来具体化。

货币的发展看起来是一种深刻的文化潮流中的一个元素。文化的不同的层次可以通过以下的方式进行区分，这些区分方法包括，一方面他们与他们所关心的客观事物之间，在何种程度上，在那一点上具有一种直接的关系；另一方面，他们是在何种程度上使用这些符号。依据下述的这些区别，可以发现生活方式有着本质的差别：即宗教需求的满足是通过象征性的仪式或者符号来实现的，或者通过个体直接诉诸于上帝的方式来实现；人与人之间的尊重是通过建立好的规则（这种规则是通过特殊的仪式的方式来体现对应关系的）的方式表现出来，还是通过非正式的礼节，友谊和尊重的方式体现出来的；人们的购买协商，签订合同是通过只要大家都能明白的程度来实现，还是通过外在的、有约束力的严肃法律承诺才能实现。但是，毫无疑问那些区别并不是严格的。相反，人类的历史显示出它们之间的一种具有连续性的变化。在另一方面，现实的符号化在增加，但与此同时，与之相反的是，符号化一直在被解释并约简到其最初的基础上去。在这里我们要说一个关于这方面特殊的例子。性器官在长久以来都是被礼节与羞耻感所掩饰着，而与性器官相关的语言文字却在被毫无顾忌地使用着。只有在最近的几个世纪里这些语言文字表述开始受到了某种程度的抵制。符号因此与现实的态度之间达成了一致。但是在最近，这些符号与现实态度之间的一致性又开始了新一轮的消解。艺术中的自然主义使我们的注意力转向了这种区别的消失以及在理解上的自由，这就如同我们把原本对事物的感觉附着到了那些表现艺术目的符号上没有区别了。下流的符号化表征与下流的实际展现不总是相同的，现实的世界必须与艺术，包括自然主义在内的艺术，所栖居的那个符号化的世界区分开来。也许在这种情况下，那些有教养的人会有更大的自由去谈论敏感问题。只要我们事先假定了客观和贞节，那些我们先前被禁止的事物现在也变得被允许了，羞耻感更多的是受事物本身的限制，而并不影响它作为符号词语的使用。因此在现实与符号之间的联系既在一个较小的空间内浮动又在一个较大的空间内浮动。人们总是倾向于这么一种难以言明的通则：要么在文化（最终是每一个民族，每一个团体组织，每一个个体）的发展阶段中对其各种兴趣的符号就与现实方式之间展示出一种特别的比例关系；要么就是事物之间比例关系总体上保持稳定，只有那些受比例关系影响的事物发生变化。但或许应该特别指出，一种普遍流行的符号象征既是文化发展较为原始而又幼稚的阶段的一部分，同时它也是文化发展非常完备而又复杂的阶段的一部分。可能正是由于符号的发展过程使我们自身从认知领域的符号中解脱出来，但是也正是符号发展过程也使得我们在一些特殊的事物上更加的依赖于符号。与充满着无数的象征符号的神话世界相对比，现代哲学在理解客观事物上表现出了一种无可比拟的直接性。在另一方面，生命体验的广袤而又深邃的多样性产生这样一种结果：与那些更加简单与更加充满限制的条件相比，我们必须用符号形式去囊括、浓缩和表现更广的范围中的生活经验。符号化，在一个低级的文化阶段经常是意味着绕远道并且是一种能量的浪费，在一个高级的阶段是有利于保存和节省能量的。有人可能想到那些在国际上以及政党政治集团内的那些纯熟的外交辞令。毫无疑问，现实中，决定不同利益之间的斗争结果是与其实力大小密切相关的。但是，这种实力并不能直接用物理的斗争方式来直接衡量二者的实际情况，它们只是在概念意义上被体现的。在每一个集体权利的代表的背后，有一种隐藏的形式代表了政党的真实力量，正是由于后者在力量对比中占优势，才使得这个政党的声音变得有效，同时这个政党的政治取向才能得到推广。它自身就是一种权利的符号。在不同权力集团之间用智力对比的方式代替了一个可能发生的真正的战争，在这种情形下，那些消失了的符号本身已经接受了这样一个结果，就如同符号所代表的实体在现实中被打败了一样。举个例子来说，我们设想一场雇工与雇主之间的为避免罢工而举行的谈判。每一方都会依据如果罢工真的发生了将会对其所在的群体产生何种影响来对双方的实力进行估算，在估算的基础上做出妥协的一方，可能就是在真正的罢工中被驱使或打败的一方。只通过想象的方式就可以化解现实中的矛盾。如果这样一种对现实力量的再现与度量都可以通过想象的方式而准确实现的话，那么所有的现实中的战争都可以避免了。空想家们建议通过双方将军之间的兵棋推演游戏来决定一场未来的战争的胜利从而避免真的战争发生，这看起来是非常荒唐可笑的，这是因为兵棋的结果并不一定能够给出所有的两队的对战中的可能影响结果的所有的暗示，因此根本就不存在一种有效的符号化或者象征化的方式替代真实的情形。然而，如果在一个战争游戏中，所有的军事实力、所有的偶然因素都被考虑在内，所有的统治者的智力都能找到了一个合适的符号化的表达的话，那么这种符号、象征性的战争有时是有可能解除一场真正的战争，但前提是这种兵棋游戏能够被设计出来。

因素的多样性——力量、物质以及情形的多样性——在现代生活的运行中，要求在符号体系中有一个集合，这可以保证使用这些符号所产生的结果与把所有的要素都被考虑在内后产生的结果是相同的，这样就使得这个结果能够对所有的特殊的例子都可用而且有效。这种符号所产生的结果与现实结果之间的一致性只有在事物之间的数量关系是相互独立的情形下才是有可能的。我们所使用的符号之间的越来越大的差异性会产生这样一种结果，在某种程度上讲，“多少”的问题与“什么”的问题在心理上已经开始分离——不管这种问题有多么的稀奇古怪，但从逻辑思维的角度来看却是合理的。数字的构造是这种分离的第一次成功例子，也是最为成功的例子，通过把“多少东西”从“这么多东西”中抽离出来，并使二者化为独立的概念，这种成功才得以实现的。建立在数量关系上的概念变得越来越深入人心，就会使得人们把更多的注意力投向他们的数量关系。最后，知识的最终的理想可以看作是把所有的现实中的那些按品质进行划分的关系都简化成一种纯粹的数量关系。这种对数量的特殊化和强调更加方便了我们用符号化的方式来处理客观事物。既然那些内容上不同的事物可以在数量方面实现一致，那么事物之间的相互关系、特征以及他们的运动就可以为别的事物提供一种有效的表现。最简单的例子就是纸币，纸币可以代表任何事物的数值价值，或者是温度计可以通过度数的方式来表现温度。符号可以通过事物的数量方面的积累而被创造出来，这在今天看来可能是显而易见的。但是这是人类心灵世界的成就，而且这种成就将会有令人震惊的结果。货币的形成要依靠这种数字化的形式，这是由于货币代表的是纯粹的以数字的形式来表现数量关系，而不在乎所有的有价值事物的特殊品质。一个来自于古罗马的解释揭示了一个符号表征从数量关系到质量关系的转换。起初，毛皮作为一种交换的工具，随着交易的发展，个体毛皮的大小与数量失去了它们在交换中的所有的意义。每一个毛皮只是简单地等于另一个，并且只有毛皮的数量是与事物的价值相关。终于，只有那些小片的毛皮被用作了货币，到了最后，一片皮革盖上了政府的印章之后，被作为一种流通工具而使用。这就很清楚的解释了精简为数量的观点是如何的支持了价值的符号化，而这正是货币真正实现的基础。

然而，既然这些早期的理想化的货币没有特殊的价值，并且它们之间也都是等价的，那么这些早期的货币已经适应了公众的接受能力，但是看起来那些他们并没有适应较高的经济发展的要求。这种异乎寻常的流通着的贝壳货币——已经在非洲的很多地区使用了上千年，在早期的时候它在印度洋地区被使用，并且在史前时期它在欧洲也被使用——如果不是因为这种贝壳货币是如此的理想化，那么它在非洲、印度洋地区以及欧洲是不可能被使用的。在经济的低级阶段，货币价值的强烈对比比比皆是；在另一个方面，存在着非常的具体的价值形式，如牲畜和棉布等，当涉及大额的货币的时候，这些具体的价值形式就开始流通，并且在一方面，也存在着一种完全理想化的货币像珠贝，以及马可波罗在中国发现的桑树皮，或是流通在暹罗的有汉字的瓷片。当某种事物的特殊的功能的发展超出了其本身所具有的那种使用价值，并开始成为一种货币一样的交换工具的时候，这种事物往往既是土产品同时又是出口产品：弗吉尼亚的烟叶，卡罗林那的稻米，纽芬兰的鳕鱼，中国的茶叶以及马萨诸塞州的毛皮等等。在出口产品中，这种事物在心理意义上的价值与其在国内的直接的使用价值是相分离的。然而，在我们已经提到过的抽象化的货币与那些本身就有价值的货币之间，能够产生最为有效的妥协物就是珠宝货币，换句话说就是黄金和白银；这种黄金白银既没有像先前的那些货币那样稀奇古怪且没有意义，也不会像后者一样那么粗糙与独特。显而易见，黄金和白银就是这样一种形式，通过它们货币可以很轻易而且是理所当然地转变为一种符号。为了使货币真正地实现它的更大的效用就必须通过这种具体化，并且，在可以预见的将来，货币是不可能从这种具体化中逃离出来的。

当二级符号——它们之所以如此称呼是相对于初始的心灵状态下的初始符号体系而言的——逐渐地取代了在实际生活中的事物和价值的直接物质性的时候，智力在指引我们生活方面的重要性就被强化了。只要生活不再徘徊于特殊的感觉印象之间，而是由那些抽象的，一般的以及概要式的观点所决定的时候，那么，尤其在人际关系这个范畴之内，更多的、更加准确的抽象过程将会具有优势。如果当今的公众秩序可以仅仅通过一个官员的露面来保证的话，那么在以前的时候，同样的问题是要通过物质的力量来保证；如果仅仅是一个签名就不但在外部无条件地束缚住我们的生活，而且就在内部这种象征性地签名也同样能束缚我们的手脚；如果对于那些有教养的人来说，仅仅是一个提示或者是一个面部的表情，就足以暗示他们建立起一个持久的关系，而这些对于那些很少经过文明开化的人来说，要建立这样一个持久的关系只有通过冗长的解释或者长期的行为才能得到；如果说祭祀活动仅仅是通过书写的解释就可以实现了的话，那么对于那些无知的人们来说只有通过构造出真实地，真正起作用的元素的方式才能够费力地实现——那么事物以及行为符号化的意义很显然只可能是智力水平极大提升后，以及这种独立的精神力量存在后的结果，而且正是这种独立的精神力量使得我们不再关注特殊的细节。

我做的这些观察就是为了澄清货币在这种文化发展潮流中的作用。经济力量以及对物质质料的限制原则使得符号与象征变得越来越普遍，而这些符号与其实际表现得的内容之间是毫无关系的。随着价值的运作的符号化形式的普及，那么将会发生这样一个过程，即那些符号将越来越失去与其所在的领域的特殊现象之间的物质联系而变得仅仅是一个符号。这种形式的生活，不仅仅预示了一个心灵过程的不同寻常的扩张（举个例子来说，我们可以想象用银行支票取代现金储蓄所需要具备的那个复杂的心理上的前提条件），而且这种符号化的生活形式也预示着它将会愈演愈烈，它预示了文化在朝向理智型发展中的根本性的调整。这种理念：生活在本质上是建立在智力的基础上的，以及智力在现实生活中是被当作我们精神力量中最为有价值的部分，这两者与我们的货币经济的发展齐头并进，在后面我们将用简单的方式进行解释。智力也无疑是商业领域的君主，尤其是在金融的交易当中。智力能力的发展以及抽象思维的发展成为了这个时代的特征，在这个时代当中，货币开始变成了一种越来越纯粹化，越来越中立化的符号，这正如货币的本质价值一样。

第二节

对货币质料非货币使用的放弃

我们必须要牢记的是：迄今为止，我们只是确立了一种发展趋势，这一发展趋势始于货币的内在价值与其他所有价值相互协调一致的时候。因此，另外的一些概念强调货币与其他所有的价值之间是有差别的，并以此企图强调货币不可能与其他事物是同一性质的价值。这些概念显然与我们的关于货币没有内在价值的理论方面是一致的，但是我们仍然需要将其证伪。这种例子是极为常见的，它只是通过僵化和预期的形式证明了那些只能通过无穷接近的方式才会被确立起来的东西。在反对货币内在价值论的教条的同时，我们也不应该成为这种货币无价值论的牺牲品——下面所要谈的关于道德的这种说法，可能会导致这种错误。一般的看法认为：为了履行其作为货币的职能，即便是最有用的事物也必须被放弃它的用途。举例来说，在阿比西尼亚，人们把盐坨按照特殊的方式切成小块，让其充当流通中的货币；这时货币就是合适的货币而非他物，因为这些盐坨此时已经根本不再作为一种盐而被使用了。在索马里海岸地区，每一块大约有两厄尔的长蓝色棉布片充当了流通中的货币。对于这种布质货币的使用是一个值得思考的过程，这些布质的货币是被任意地裁剪和拼贴的，但是这一过程却也暗示了当这种布成为货币时，其作为布的用途就不存在了。同样的道理，只要黄金和白银仍然被用作流通中的货币，那么它们所具有的技术上的以及艺术审美上的各种可能的用途也就无法实现了，这一点对于所有种类的货币都是适用的。一旦被选为行使货币的功能，那么货币质料的其他各种各样的用途就都必须被放弃。而只要这种质料恢复其实际用途上的、艺术审美上的或是其他方面的价值时，它又将不得不退出流通领域，不再担当货币的职能。为了获得其特殊的价值，所有其他价值都可以依据其用途的不同在相互间进行比较和转换，但是货币的价值与其他用途之间却是完全没有这种关系。这是因为，只要货币与其要购买的物品的价值是以同样的方式被使用的，那么它就停止行使作为货币的职能。在某些程度上，这可能要归功于贵金属独一无二的稳定性，与作为货币的其他的形式相比，贵金属作为货币质料可能更容易贮藏。然而，在任何一个特定时刻，贵金属都可以有要么成为货币要么成为珠宝的选择，也就是说它可以随时选择行使货币的价值或是行使其使用价值。照此看来，货币似乎与其他的价值范畴又是具有相似性的。如果我买了一码长的木料用作燃料，那么我只会根据这个木料所产生的热量而不是根据它的其他可能的用途来衡量其价值。然而，在现实中，情形是非常不同的。如果有人声称货币的价值是由其质料价值所决定的，这就意味着，货币的价值是由它的质地或者是不作为货币时所具有的能量而非其货币本身的质地和能量所决定的。这种明显的矛盾表明：货币的价值不是必须建立在那些具有内在价值的——比方说，这种质料具有其他的用途——质料之上的。如果行使货币职能的功能被转移到了其他事物上，我们可以肯定地说，这种质料的其他功能也已经变得无关紧要了。用放弃所有那些价值功能来支持货币具有内在价值这一理论，看起来仍然证实了货币只能是货币而不能是其他别的东西这一结论。

这个问题的关键是客观事物的一个非常重要的现象，对于一件客观事物所具有的几个功能，其中的一个与其他所有的功能是排斥的，但是这一个功能仍然可以实现。并且这个已经实现的功能会不会因为其他功能的消退而在意义与价值上有所修改。为了理解这种不同可能性的共存，我们也许可以首先通过指出那些不同的功能是如何影响这个最后剩下的功能的方式来理解。如果在道德序列中，一个悔过的罪人在被给予相比于那些从来没有犯过错的正直的人更高的地位，那么，对这个罪人道德的高评价并不是来自于现在的情况——因为依据我们的假设，在伦理道德内容上，现在的情况，与那些正直的人的情形是完全相同的——而是一方面来自于先前的情况，在先前的情况中，正直的人与罪人之间的道德品质是完全不同的；另一方面，来自于这种先前的情况已经不存在了这样一个事实。此外，如果自由和自我决定的恢复，比方说，我们的活动以及这个方向的外部力量的阻碍被清除，那么我们会产生一种自己的行为更加完善、更加有价值的感觉。这种感觉不是由行为的内容以及这种行为获得的成功而引起的，而仅仅是由于这样一个事实：造成依赖的情况已经被消除了。相比较而言，同样的行为如果处于独立的、一直未被打断的过程中，就不会有如此之大的吸引力，而仅仅是简单的从已经逝去的先前生活向现今的生活的过渡。这种由非存在者对存在者施加的影响——尽管在内容上略有不同，但在某种程度上也更加明显——的意义就像抒情艺术与音乐艺术所具有的那种直接的情感那样。这是因为，尽管抒情艺术和音乐艺术是建立在内心强烈情感的基础之上的，但其作为艺术的特征却要求它们战胜那种直接的情感。尽管情感的初始状态与其所具有情感的冲动、个人的情绪限制、情绪的不稳定这些偶然的要素是艺术作品的先决条件，但是纯粹的艺术是需要一种距离存在的，是需要从情感中解脱出来的。对于那些艺术家以及那些艺术的爱好者，这才是艺术的本质意义。也就是说正是这种距离与解脱把我们超越了与我们自身以及我们所处的现实世界相关的直接情感。艺术的价值正是依赖于我们对这种直接情感的克服，以至于仿佛这种直接性根本没有发挥作用一样。如果可以肯定地说艺术作品本身的魅力毕竟来自于与自身原始情感的共鸣以及在灵魂深处的激发，那么，在另一方面我们也要承认，艺术的特殊之处不在于与那些直接的美学的情感形式的共同之处，而在于当直接情感已经远离后艺术品所获得的新色彩。

最后，让我们来考虑一下这个最具有决定性意义、最具普遍性的例子，这个例子之所以很少被人考虑到，仅仅是因为它已经深深地植根于我们最基本的价值体系之中了。在我看来，许许多多的人生经验在本质上都源于这样一个事实：为了得到经验本身，我们总是会留下无数可以享受的机会而不去享受，也会留下证明自己的机会而不去证明。一种帝王式的奢侈或是一种被忽视的高傲尊贵的生活方式是通过人们之间相互忽视对方的存在以及碰面时的那种擦身而过的态度表现出来的，或者是藉由用冷漠地对待原本可以给予更多帮助的人们的方式显示出来的。但是，正是从这种独特的不愉快的评价经验中，我们同时也获得了一种真正的、升华了的和更加浓缩的快乐。事实上，在无数的可能性中仅取其一种可能的经验事实给予了他胜利者的感受，而那些生活中没有尝试过的以及被忽视了的丰富性就如同一种背景的陪衬，从而也就成为了那些胜利者的随从。更进一步地说，给予别人的东西经常是因为有所保留，或者是因为其价值对于某些人是完全保留的，才具有价值。尤其是对于那些低收入阶层的人来说，一种诚恳的赞助，如果做得太过分，或者是一个人表现得毫无保留，那么这种赞助就会反而失去它的价值。最为重要的是：一个人即使倾其所有给予了接受者，接受者也仍然还会认为这个资助者是有所保留的。最后要说的是，这些对于我们自己的行为和承诺也是同样重要的。唐突的和强迫性的要求往往能够使我们具有去完成那些与现实相比非常遥远的任务的特殊能力和力量，而这些能力和力量如果没有因为一些意外的紧急事件而被激发出来的话，它就始终是处于一种潜伏和隐藏状态的。这就表明了，除了我们在通常情况下所使用的能量以外，还有一些不确定的潜在能量沉睡在我们体内，因此，每个人或许都可能成为与现在截然不同的人。生活只会让那些可能性中极其有限的部分成为现实。那么，如果我们能了解到那些成功者是众多选择之后的结果，他们还有许多别的活动形式仍然没有机会展示，这些活动形式往往为了实现别的部分还要牺牲自身。由于如此多的可能成就要为了一个特殊的成就而不得不牺牲自己，那么也就是说这种特殊的成就代表了一个更广泛意义上的生命能量的精华。这种能量精华是通过否定那些其他的能量的成长，而使得自己变得更加重要和锐利，获得一种特殊的意义，一种与众不同的凝聚的力量，这也使它能够成为我们人格的中心和代表，并使得它能够超越其所在的那个维度。

货币或许也可以属于这个价值形成的一般类型。货币要成为真正的货币，货币质料的其他价值就必须被放弃掉，这一点是确定无疑的；但是，使货币具有价值以及使其功能形式成为可能的，也许正是货币的那些已经遗忘了的先前可能的用途。正如我们先前已经讨论过的那些情形，这种发展起来的货币职能所拥有的可以察觉到的价值既是由它的积极内容决定的，也是通过对其他所有功能的排斥来获得的。这里发挥作用的不是那些有为者，而恰恰是那些无为者。如果说，任何事物的价值都是由这样一个事实决定的，即这种价值是通过牺牲别的功能来实现的，那么我们也可以说，货币质料的价值正是通过放弃别的用途才使得它成为货币的。当然，这种评价方式也是双向的，举个例子来说，货币之为货币的价值如果被放弃了的话，那么货币质料作为其他用途的功能也就同时会被强化。在北美洲，印第安人所使用的贝壳念珠是由一些贝壳串在一起组成的，它们既可以被当作货币使用，也可以用作装饰性的物品来佩带。这些功能显然是密切相关的。作为首饰的贝壳由于不得不放弃直接作为货币的用途，从而获得了一种独特性。这种价值的整体形态可能会被看成是物以稀为贵的一个例证。这通常也意味着，一种被更多人或更大数量需求之物通常是供不应求的。如果对于同一件物品来说，用它来满足一种需求需要通过同其能满足其他需求的可能性进行竞争来实现的话——不管这些需要是发生在单个人身上还是很多人的身上——对这种物品的需求在本质上都自然地是要受到供给限制的影响的，这种有限供给使得多种需要不可能同时得到满足。正如以谷物作为一般等价物的例子中，谷物作为货币可以被追溯到这样一个事实，即没有足够多谷物来满足所有饥饿的人们的需要；同样的货币质料的交换价值是由于这样一个事实，即除了把这种质料作为货币用途之外，没有足够多的这种东西来满足所有的人对它的需求。迄今为止，我们已经看到，如果那些能够降低质料作为货币价值的别的用途如果没有被放弃掉，并最终使这些用途变得没有价值的话，那么，这些未被实现的用途就不可能对促成质料的货币价值的实现做出贡献。

反对货币作为一种符号的第一个理由

对于我们刚才已经否定了的那个论断，即货币不能是一种价值的说法，还存在着另一种力求更加直接地说服我们的说法。让我们想象一下，在一个特定的群体里，一个拥有着暴君式权威的全能独裁者，他支配着一切他想要得到的东西，举个例子来说，就像大洋洲的那些部落酋长们，据说他们“不能偷窃”，因为那里的一切都已经是属于他们的了。既然他可以在任何的情况下拥有货币可以买到的所有东西，那么像这样的个人将不会有机会去攫取其他部落的东西。如果除了别的有用价值外，货币本身也是一种价值，那么这些酋长们就将会像渴望得到钱一样的，渴望得到其他的价值。如果很清楚地明白了这一切都不是发生在我所描绘的这个虚幻情形里的话，那么我们就会得到这样一个结论：货币只是实际价值的一种象征，如果实际价值在没有货币的情形下仍能得以实现的话，那么货币就没有必要存在了。但是这个简单的想法已经预设了它想要证明的结论，也就是货币的质料除了它作为货币的功能以外本身没有价值。因为，如果货币拥有货币的功能以外的价值的话，那么它将不免会被那些当权者所觊觎，不是因为它们是货币，而是因为它所拥有的别的作为质料的价值。如果这些价值根本不存在的话，那么也就没有必要特别地昭示出它的不存在。但是，且不管它在逻辑上的错误，这种情形毕竟也揭示了货币所具有的其他特殊价值。货币已经具有了作为交换手段的价值，如果没有任何事物可用以交换，那么货币也就失去了价值。货币作为贮藏手段和转移支付手段的功能，与交换手段相比并不是同等重要的，它们只不过是交换功能的一种衍生品，这些是很明显的。如果没有了价值交换功能，那么其余的功能将无法实现，然而，货币的价值交换功能又是与其他两个功能相互独立的。如果一个人有能力购买某种商品，但这种商品对于他来说却是没有价值的，甚或这个人根本就不需要通过货币来获得这种商品，在这两种情形下，货币就都是没有价值的。总而言之，货币是这样一种关系的表现和载体，这种关系使得一个人需求的满足总是取决于与他相互依靠的另一个人。货币在没有相互关系的地方是无立足之地的，要么是因为这个人并不希望从别人那里得到任何东西，要么是因为这个人生活在一个迥异的环境中——就像不需要跟任何人有来往那样——并且他能够满足自己的一切所需，而无需他人提供任何的服务。以这种方式来观察，货币的世界是与具体价值的世界相关联的，就仿佛是斯宾诺莎思想体系中的内容与其延伸相互关联一样：任何人都无法干涉别人，因为其中每一个都用彼此不同的自己的语言表达了他对整个世界的看法。因此，价值的总量不是由事物的价值总量加上货币价值总量所构成的，存在着特定数量的价值，它们可能是以实物的形式存在，也可能是以货币的形式存在。

如果货币在价值总量中被完全地约减或者除去了它本身与有价值事物之间的一切联系，我们将会意识到：在经济学的领域，货币将成为一种特别的概念，而这种特别的概念正是柏拉图理论的基础。柏拉图是被如此引导的：他由对拘泥我们的经验世界的深刻的不满足，构造出了一个独立于时间与空间的形而上的理念王国，在这个理念国度里，有着真实、和谐和事物的绝对存在。因此，世俗的现实开始变得缺乏真实性与重要性。但是，另一方面，一些来自理念王国的东西也需要世俗的现实来映射，现实中至少有某些部分是在绝对王国的照耀之下的，就像那个绝对王国所投下的模糊影子一样。与此同时，现实也获得了起初所不具备的重要性。这种关系在价值领域中被反复地验证。正如我们在这个观察的开头已经说过的那样，可感知的思想所遇到的事物的现实性是没有价值的，它以与价值无关的方式发展着，并没有按照价值、利益的等级制度来进行，因此也经常会危害到那些最为高贵的事物，而保留那些最为卑贱的事物。然后，我们就把这种自然的客观存在归属于由好坏、卑贱、有用无用等意义上所构造出来的价值的等级制度。这种构造在任何方面都不会影响人类的现实存在性，但是这种构造是现实所给人类的一切意义的源头，尽管我们意识到了这种构造可能源自于人为的因素，但我们却仍然将其视为与虚幻和主体相对立的经验。事物的价值——既是伦理学范畴的又是幸福论范畴的，即是宗教意义上的也是美学意义上的——就像柏拉图的理论一样，在世俗的上空盘旋，这个王国被一种独立的且不可知的内在规范所掌控，但是它仍然给现实性以解脱和色彩。经济价值的产生源于对那些最初直接经验价值的衍生，它通过比较事物之间在哪些方面的价值是相互冲突的方式来实现，当然，前提是这些事物必须是可以交换的。在这个领域里，经济的价值不管它本身构造如何，它与单独客观事物之间都具有特殊的联系，就好像其具有一般性价值一样。这是一个别样的世界，在此客观事物被按照特殊的规范分类和归总，这种规范不是客观事物本身所固有的。按照经济价值来进行划分的客观事物，它们建立的规范完全不同于那些通过自然的直接的现实所形成的规范。如果货币除了是那些货币之外的事物价值的表现之外什么都不是的话，那么货币与事物相关联的方式，就如同柏拉图所构建的本体性的、形而上学的理念与经验世界相关联的方式一样。货币的运动——收支平衡、资本的增益以及货币的外流——将会直接反映事物之间的价值关系。价值的世界盘旋于现实世界之上，与现实的世界没有明显的关联，但是毫无疑问，价值的世界操纵着现实的世界，价值的世界通过其纯粹货币的形式而存在。这正如柏拉图解释的现实世界：理念从观察和提炼中得来，现实世界只是这些理念的一个反映，所以这些具体事物的经济关系、发展阶段以及波动看起来就像是它们自己的衍生物的衍生物，也就是说，作为与货币有等价意义的事物的反映和影子。没有别的种类的价值能比经济价值在这方面更适合的了。宗教的价值是通过象征化的教士以及教堂来表现的，伦理社会价值是通过管理者以及可见的政权管理机构来表现的，知识的价值是通过逻辑的规范来表现的。但是，它们任何一个都不像经济价值与具体的有价值的事物或财产那样，分开得如此彻底，它们当中没有任何一个能像经济价值那样成为更加完全的价值的抽象化符号，也没有任何一个能向经济价值那样如此真实地反映与之相关的现实世界的价值。

货币的发展正在朝着成为经济价值的一个更加理想化的纯粹符号的方向发展，虽然这种趋势从未成为现实。首先，我们必须清楚地记住——货币与那些别的事物的价值是属于同一个系列的，并且它的具体的质料与此保持着平衡。随着日益增长的交换需要以及作为价值交换的尺度的需要，这种紧密等价物与符号化的等价物之间的联系开始发生越来越大的变化，并且因此而变得越来越与质料的价值相独立。然而，货币不能丢掉其质料价值的残余物，不是因为存在着某种固有的原因，而是因为经济技术存在着一定的缺陷，其中之一就与货币作为交换工具有关。用符号化的意义来代替货币的本身价值只有通过我们先前提到的那些因素才有可能。这些是单个商品和经济上有效的商品总量之间的一个比值，在特定的条件下，它等于一个特定数量的货币与经济上有效的总货币数量的比值，在这两个分数中分母的效用是实际存在但又难以观察得到的。尽管在事物与货币价值质料之间的初始平衡的基础是不同的，但是商品与货币总量之间的直接等量关系似乎是存在的。即使这种等式的发展是可以接受的，由各自的价值总量引起的因子也还会在有限的区间内浮动，并且对总量规模的自然形成的估计也将会相当的不精确。也许这正是为什么不可以抛开一个商品与货币之间的直接价值对等。包含在货币内的内在质料价值部分为我们的需要提供了知识和补充，我们之所以需要这些是因为我们关于确切的比值的知识是不充分的。否则的话，被测度的价值与标准价值的同一也就没有必要了。只要我们的经验和经济的实际情况通知我们这个比值是不准确的，我们的度量过程就需要在标准和价值本身之间寻找一定质的统一。举一个在美学上运用的重金属的相关例子可能是比较有益的。有一位专家1851年在伦敦的一个博览会上谈到银器在印度与英国的不同。英国的工匠总是在力图把尽可能多的金银融入到一个尽可能小的造型中；然而，印度的工匠运用“涂釉、镶花和金丝装饰工艺等方式尽可能把更多的技艺与尽可能少的金银融合到一起”。但即使在后一种情况中，所采用的小块贵金属仍然发挥这作用，这一点对珠宝的美学意义仍是不可缺少的。尽管这种工艺只是在一小块具有极小价值的金属上进行雕琢，但是为了装饰和美感的目的，这种极小价值的金属也必须是贵金属。金属的本质价值是不重要的，使各个部分达到统一、完美的形式的载体必须是贵金属，这一事实才是最重要的。

顺便说一句，把货币的质料价值归因于一种涉及不确定关系的补充的和支持的原则，很显然，这只是对发生在经济主体之间的潜意识过程的一种解释。经济的相互作用通过对无数微妙细节的井然有序的整合，具有了非凡的合理性，如果人们不诉诸于人类适应性的潜意识能量，那么这种经济相互作用必定是被高等的智慧整合而成的。通过有意识的个人意向和预见能力来保证这种经济活动的和谐是不够的，其结果必然陷入可怕的紊乱和无效。我们不得不假设潜意识经历和计算的存在，它们不断地积累并调整着经济的历史发展过程。然而，我们应该记得，潜意识的概念无法提供令人满意的解释，也只是助长了那些实际上是建立在错误的基础上的理解。我们获得确定的思想是从特殊的概念以及推理的过程等方面得到的。但是，如果这些结论的出现没有先兆，我们就会得出结论，那些我们虽然没有观察到的先兆，却是真实存在的。从逻辑的角度上来看，这明显是没有依据的。我们仅仅是秘密地把我们所忽略的因果概念的反面事实转换成一种正面的论断，即无意识表现活动是存在的。实际上，我们对于无意识表现活动所产生的无法察觉的先兆以及无意识表现的概念没有任何的了解；我们的经验和推理只能表达这样一个事实：实际效果的发生，就好像它们是有意识动机和想法所产生的结果一样。对于解释的需要不得不借助于把对于这个过程的调查和处理看做是（无意识）的原因，尽管它们仅仅是实际运动过程的一个符号。在我们现在所处的知识状态，不可避免地，当然也就是合情合理地把价值的形成（它们的稳定与波动）解释为按照规范和有意识推理形式进行的无意识过程。

反对货币仅是符号的第二个理由

不把货币仅仅看作是符号的第二个原因是与其在交换中作为一种因素的重要性相关的。尽管，在原则上，货币的交换职能可以只通过纸币来实现，但是没有人能够提供足够的保证使它不会被滥用。货币的交换职能和计算功能明显的依赖于货币数量的有限性，即正如人们通常所说的货币的“稀缺性”。如果商品和货币的单个数量与总量之间的比值被认为是有效的，那么即使通过主观增加货币的数量，这个比值看起来也应该是固定不变的，并且这个比值因为能建立价格而变得有意义。货币的比率分数在分子和分母都相应增加的情况下，仍会保持币值不变。但实际上，如果货币的数量有相当大的增长，货币币值的分子与分母并不是总保持同样的比率变动。事实上当货币比值分数的分母增加了，但是在所有的交易活动并没有调整到新的基础上时，货币比值的分子保持不变。价格是与分子的绝对规模相等的，因此在刚开始时也是不变的，但是作为货币总量的一个比率分数，价格却已经降低了。结果，新的货币的拥有者（首先是政府），相比于与之相关的其他购买者，处于较高的特权位置。大多数在交易互换中的严重的反应也往往由此产生，尤其是在政府自己的收入也是用贬值的货币支付的时候。货币币值的分子——商品的价格——在政府已经花费了相当多数量的新货币之后，顺应了货币供给的增加而上升，然后，政府会再一次发现自己面临着货币供给的减少。再一次发行新货币的企图变得越来越无法遏制，这个过程周而复始。我所提到的这种情况只是作为一个被频繁讨论了无数次的任意发行纸币而造成失败的例子。在任何时候，如果货币与有限供给的货物的联系不是那么紧密的话，过度的发行纸币就变得有诱惑力。这一点可以通过一个对立的例子清楚地表现出来。在16世纪，法国的政治家提出银子不能再用作货币，硬币应该用铁制成，因为从美洲大量涌入的银子破坏了这种金属的稀缺性。对有价值的金属的使用只能通过政府的铸币，这样才能保证货币数量的有限性。因为如果每个银子的拥有者都自然而然地成了货币的拥有者，那么货币的供给量就会变得没有限度。这个特别的建议表明了一个非常特别的理解：贵金属不仅不是货币的合适材料，而且在控制货币供给方面它是很难设立一个必要的限度的。如果一个材料无法做到这些，那么它将会被其他的物质所代替，而这种代替它的物质的供给是可以被有效的控制的。对于作为交换工具的这种金属的选择是一定的功能限制条件的结果。如果一种金属因为任何原因而少了这种功能的话，那么它将被在这方面更加合适的其他货币所代替。在1673年的热那亚，由于恶劣的环境以及各种各样数不清的货币的涌入，交易只好根据银行的票据来进行。今天我们知道贵金属（其实只有黄金）才能保证所需要的品质，尤其是特定条件下对货币量的限制。如果想要避免陷入通货膨胀所引发的纸币的任意发行和滥用，只有把纸币与通过法律或者经济所建起来的金属价格紧密联系起来。下面的例子揭示了这样的限制是怎样发挥作用的，甚至在控制个人的投机行为方面也是如此。在美国国内战争时期，南方联邦发行的纸币“绿背纸币”在西部是被禁止的，尽管它是法定货币，但是没有人敢用它来偿还过去用金子得到的借款，因为通过这种方式他们将获得150%的利润。在18世纪，这种情形同样发生在国库券方面，法国政府迫于财政需要而大量地发行国库券。按照法令那些债券只有25%是可以偿付的，即使这样，那些债券的价值仍然迅速贬值到最低点。这样的例子表明硬币的重要性在某种程度上是通过其自身的交换规律来保证的。这种情形远远不止发生在我所举的这些例子里。在1796—1819年间的英格兰银行停止偿付纸币，黄金的价格下降了3至5个百分点，但是商品的价格却上升了20至50个百分点。无论什么时候，当强制兑换率使得流通中只存在纸币和小面值硬币时，就会发生严重的后果，只有保证在一个较长的时间里交换比率只在一个较小的区间浮动并且纸币的发行被严格的控制，那些严重的伤害才有可能避免。这种对金子以及先前的白银的不可或缺的调节功能不是源于它的价值与其等价物之间的相互关系，而是源自它的相对稀缺性杜绝了其在货币市场上的泛滥，也杜绝了随之而来的对一定商品与一定的货币为基础的等值比例的破坏。这种对比值的破坏可能源于双方的原因。货币的过度增加会引发公众的悲观情绪以及不信任，因此他们将会极力分散掉手中的货币而退回到物物交换和票据交换上来。这种对货币需求的减少将导致流通中的货币的价值进一步衰减。负责货币发行的当权者为了抵消货币的贬值，将会更进一步地扩大货币的供给。因此，货币的供给与需求的差距变得越来越大，并且我们提到过的相互作用也将会使货币价值累积性衰减。这种对于货币价值的不信任是由政府的铸币制度产生的——这与人们对硬币价值的信心形成了鲜明的对比——这可能会造成曾在罗马共和国后期出现过的一种情形，那就是货币仅限于实现零售交易，而大规模的交易是通过货币的重量来实现的。据说，只有这种方式下，贸易才能被保护而不受政治危机、政党利益以及政府干预的影响。

货币供给

从前面的论述中我们也许会发现，货币数量的无限增加所带来的不便和麻烦是由于这种增加本身，而不是归因于货币是以何种方式被分配的。震荡、过分增大以及停滞的发生只是由于新创造的货币在起初产生于某人之手，然后以不均衡和不恰当的方式扩散开来。如果我们可以找到公平的分配货币的方法或者依据一定的公平原则来分配货币的方法，那么就可以有效地减少这种由货币供给过多所引发的麻烦。因此，正如前面已经说过的，如果每个英国人突然发现他们口袋里的货币是过去的两倍了，那么所有的物品的价格也都会相应地增加，这不会给任何人带来好处。唯一不同的是英镑、先令和便士将不得不以更大的数量进行计算。下面这一经验事实也许不但能够消除人们对于纸币的厌恶，而且能够发现货币数量上升所带来的好处：从实际事实来看，更多的货币意味着更多的交易、更大的福利、权力以及文明。

这样的假说所基于的是一个不现实的前提，从这种假设的争论中我们不会有什么收获。但是它能够引导我们更好地理解那些使得货币可能的内在价值不能够被逐渐消除掉的真实情况。让我们假设一种真实的情形，在这种情形中，货币数量的增加将会带给每一个人所拥有货币的等量增加，那么下面这样一个结论，即因为所有的价格都等量上升而实际上什么都没有改变，这与另外一个货币数量的增加将带来贸易的激发与扩大的结论是相矛盾的。人们尝试着去假设，在我们所举的这个例子中，个人之间的相互关系是保持不变的，即社会地位中的尊贵及低贱是不变的，但客观的文化商品的总量将会增加，生活的内容和乐趣在绝对意义上不管是对个人还是对社会整体也都是有所增加的，而这并不需要改变社会中的相互制约的富有及贫苦之间的相互关系。或许应该指出：现代的商业文化已经为穷人提供了相当多的商品，例如公共娱乐、受教育的机会、生活资料，等等。在过去，如果不改变贫富地位关系的话，即使是过去那些上等社会的人也未必能够拥有这些东西。如果货币在数量上有所增加，而在分配上又比较合理，那么它将会在绝对意义上扩大客观的文化发展，并且也会对个人生活文化有所拓展，同时这两者之间的关系又都保持原有的状态不变，这种可能性是否存在是值得我们深究和检验的。然而，经过仔细的研究，我们可以发现：真正的成功只需要通过不公正的分配那些增加了的货币供给量就可以实现，至少在第一个例子里是这样的。货币是一种完全的社会性规则，如果把货币局限于个人的范畴，那么它将变得毫无意义。货币可以通过改变个体之间的相互关系，从而带来整个社会状况的改变。过多的货币将引起越来越活跃与越来越密集的商业活动，这些都可以追溯到与此同时人们对货币需求量的增加。这种想要获得尽可能多的货币的愿望，尽管时时刻刻、时时处处都存在着，但是，尤其是当个体敏锐的察觉自己所拥有的货币比别人拥有的要少的时候，他们就会很明显且迫不及待地投入更多的精力与勤劳，并借此追求更多的货币。这正好说明了下面这句话的意义：“Les affairs—c’estl’argent des autres”（商业就是要赚别人的钱）。如果上述理论的预示是正确的，也就是说，货币在数量上的增加将不会改变人与人之间的相互关系，而且商品之间的相对价格也会保持不变，那么也就不会有被激发的工作能量了。此外，货币数量魔术般的翻番将会影响人与人之间的相互关系，这是因为个体金融地位的起点是不相同的。举个例子来说，把1000马克，10000马克，以及100000马克三种不同收入的起点翻一番，将会改变接受者之间的相互关系，因为第二个1000马克并不仅仅是第一个1000马克所能购买的商品的简单重复，第二个10000马克也不是第一个10000马克所购买的商品的简单重复，等等。在第一种货币翻番的情况下，可能把大部分的增加货币用于购买营养品，而在第二种翻番的情况下，可能就会把增加的货币用于艺术教育的培养，而在第三种情况下，可能更多的货币会被用于金融投机。如果我们假定在个体之间存在着最初的绝对平等，那么无论在主体方面还是在客体方面都将不会有任何变化的产生，这是因为，如果后者改变了，那么它将会以一种不可预测的方式变化。无论在现实中，还是在感觉上，只有在个人的收入差距变得很大时，才会激发出人们追求更多货币的激情。

与我们目的更为相关的是对这些理论的实际内涵的一种考虑，也就是说，所有货币收入的翻一番将不会使任何事情发生改变，这是因为，所有商品的价格都会相应地翻一番。这种逻辑是错误的，因为这种理论忽视了货币所具有的特殊的决定性特征，那就是货币相对意义上的缺乏弹性。这种缺乏弹性存在于这样一个事实，在一个假定的经济范围，额外数量的货币的分配不会引起所有商品价格成比例的增加，但是将会创造一种新的价格体系，而且这种价格体系并不一定产生于个体的利益驱动。缺乏弹性还是这样一个事实的结果：那就是，尽管商品的货币价格是相对的，而且与商品之间并没有与生俱来的固有关系，但是它具有一定的稳定性，并且它看起来是商品的客观的而又充分的等价物。如果事物的价格在一个明确适当的范围内保持稳定，那么，即使货币的价值已经变化了，这种价格也不会没有抵抗力的轻易变动。这种客观事物与价格的联系——既是概念上的也是利益上的——在心理学上已经变得非常的牢固，以至于出售者没有做好准备去接受价格的下降，而购买者也没有做好准备去迎接价格的上升。如果货币价值以及商品价值的平衡是通过同样的没有限制的机制来实现的，正如体温计标示的上升与下降依据温度的变化一样，而没有任何阻力来抵抗产生的变化并进而引起对这种精确因果关系的干扰那样，那么这种货币与商品价值的平衡过程就可能有问题了。如果一个人口袋里的钱在极短的时间里突然地变成原来的两倍，这个人不会立刻迫切地以双倍价格去购买那些想要购买的商品。当然在某些特殊情况下，这也是可能的，比如一个穷人在这种突如其来的新财富下，他会用先前的标准重新估量自己的财富，而根本不去考虑价格的变化。然而，这两种心态都表明了，在货币充足的最初阶段，对价格的成比例的管制是不可能的，与此同时，商品与传统价格波动之间已经建立起来的联系具有持久的影响。此外，商品的需求将会跟随着货币数量的增加与减少发生改变，即使这种货币数量的增加与减少对每个人的影响是相同的。举个例子来说，如果货币的数量减少了，那么对于那些有着充足且稳定的销售量的商品来说，它们会通过半价销售的方式来达到和过去一样多，甚至是更大的销售数量，但是，一旦超出了某个一定的限度，这些商品将会可能根本找不到任何的购买者。另一方面，举个例子来说，如果是在货币的供给量整体增加的情形下，那些大众一直非常渴求的、而又刚好超出了他们原有购买力的商品，才是这些暴富之人所争先恐后地追捧的对象。但是对于那些满足基本生活要求的商品这种需求并不会有极大的增加，因为对于这种商品而言只要有一定的供给就足够了；同样的，对于那些高雅而又精致的需求，其增加也是极其有限的，它们也是明显的只对有限的小圈子比较重要。价格的上升将主要影响那些在这两种极端情况之间的商品，这些商品的价格是相对稳定的。货币数量的增加将会对所有商品的价格产生同样的影响，这一点是毫无疑问的。从总体看来，下面这一原理，即价格变动与货币绝对数量是没有关系的，也就是价格的相对性使得货币绝对量保持不变，是不正确的，这是因为这种价格方面的相对性一直都被心理过程所干扰，而这种心理过程使得商品的价格变得僵化而又绝对。

人们可能会对那些疑问提出争议，例如说只有在两种不同价格体系的过渡调整阶段中，这种无限制增加货币的供给才会真的没有危害性。它们的假设前提是：整个过程是由商品与货币之间成比例的关系进化而来的。在不同的程度上建立这种关系是有可能的，而且就像先前的波动被摒弃掉一样，未来的波动也照样会被摒弃掉。上述的疑问只是针对变动的时期，没有牵扯到已经实现变动的时期，那些已经实现了的变动不能被看作是转换时期的失调、混乱以及困难的原因。构想任何别的有可能最终强化这种调节的交换工具是不可能的，因此，商品的货币价格表达了货币的价值与所有商品总量价值之间的比值关系，也因此，主观任意地增加货币不可能长久性地破坏这种比值关系。这种推理是完全正确的，但是当考虑到人类所处环境的匮乏情况的时候，除掉所有的货币供给增长的限制又是有可能的，而这种推理并没有对这一点进行论证。对于过渡时期来说，如果这种不稳定性以及困难如果被接受了的话，那么将会变成一种永久性的条件，那些任何数量的货币在理论上都可以实现的调节状态，在现实中将永远不能被实现。

现实性与纯概念

这个论断可以用以下的方式进行概括。当货币不只是简单的货币的时候，即货币不仅仅在纯粹的概念意义上表示事物价值的时候，货币能够更好地完成它的职能。贵金属在作为珠宝或者为其他的技术目的服务的时候也是有价值的，但是，贵金属必须在概念上被看作是首要事实，这与从属事实是有区别的，从属事实即在首要事实基础上具有的价值，然而，首要事实是货币之所以具有价值的首要的且唯一的限制条件。要在技术上实现那些在概念上是正确的事情是不可行的，也就是说，把货币的功能转换成纯粹的纸币，并且把货币从质料——这种质料要保证其稀缺性——的价值中彻底分离出来，尽管货币的实际发展情况显示这可能是最终的结果。这并不是一个悖论。大量的过程都是以这样的方式发生的。它们渐进达到一个明确的目标，通过这种方式它们的过程清晰地确定出来。但是，如果它们真的到达了这个目标，却可能恰好会失去一些引导它们到达这一目标的一些独特条件。这种现象是货币经济中的一个不寻常的特征，它可以解释这一点，并且，在论及与个体境遇相关的情况时，这种现象为货币供给数量无限制增加的结果提供了一个类比。个人为了获得更多的钱而不断地努力奋斗，这也许是社会经济学的最大的意义所在。通过寻求收入的最大化机会，股票经纪人带来了交易的生机与活力、供给与需求的调整，同时也会把无用的东西带入到经济的流通当中。然而，在股票交易中，只有当交换比率出现过大的浮动并且纯粹的投机因素占据主导地位的时候，才可能实现这种股票交易的高利润。在这种情况下，作为社会最大利益的商品生产与销售会在一个领域中被过度地刺激，而在另一个领域可能会被遗忘。不管在何种情况之下，这种商品的生产与销售都会被发展过程——这个发展过程是与特殊的内在条件以及实际需求相关的——所转移。在这里货币的特殊限制条件变成了个体利益与社会利益的分歧的基础，然而在这之前这两种利益是结合在一起的。只有通过这样一个事实——事物的价值已经与客观事物相脱离并且通过特殊的质料拥有了独立存在性——货币发展它的利益、运动以及规则才是有可能的，并在某些场合与被符号化了的客观事物相违背才是有可能的。只要与货币紧密相连的私人企业能够保持努力的势头，其活动就会提高整个社会的商品生产与消费，但是，其目标的最终实现可能会破坏整个社会的目标。这种类型的情况最经常并且最具有决定意义地发生在这样一些例子中：人有时单凭情感冲动动争取实现最终目标，而没有意识到所有期望的满足都是相对进步的结果，当这些目标实现之后，它们很有可能转变成其对立面。在这里我们要关注一下“爱”的问题，爱渴望着最亲密、最永久的结合，由此获得内容与色彩，但是当这个目标实现以后，爱的内容与色彩又经常会失去。从政治理想来看，它为几代人的生活提供力量和热情，是所有的努力与奋斗的目标，但是它一旦被实现了，就只剩下实用的唯物主义、萎靡不振以及庸俗主义，除此之外一无所有，根本不会再带来一个理想状况。对安宁生活的向往是一切努力和奋斗的目标，但是，一旦这个目标被实现，就只剩下懒惰和内心的失望。在人们中间有这样一种常见的说法，甚至已经成为了陈词滥调，即尽管幸福是我们所有奋斗者的理想，但是一旦它成为一种永不磨灭的状态，那么它也就只剩下倦怠无聊了。尽管我们的理想驱动我们朝那个方向努力，但是这种理想状态的实现又会与我们的奋斗相抵触。只有那些我们一直尝试着去避免的痛苦它会给我们最为纯净的幸福感。这里所说的一切可以通过这样的话来进行概括：某些也可能是所有的生活中的因素依靠它的对立因素而存在着。一种因素与其对立的因素组合并且协作的比例在本质上是可以改变的，有的时候一种因素会稳定地增加而另一种因素则会下降，以至于发展的趋势看起来更像是其中一种因素要最终取代另一种因素。但是一旦这种情况发生了，而且第二种因素的一切踪迹都消失了，那么第一种因素的作用与意义也将处于瘫痪状态。举个例子来说，在个人主义与社会主义的对立中这样的事情就会发生。在某些时期，社会主义不仅在现实中决定了历史的发展，而且是对理想信念推断的结果，是一种力求完美的社会发展概念的表达。但是，如果在这样一个政党政治的时代，因为所有的进程都有赖于社会主义元素的发展，我们就断定它们的胜利将会产生最为高级与理想的状态，那么这种论断便会忽视这样一个事实：社会主义方针的总体上的成功有赖于这样一个氛围，即个人主义的经济体系。这种由社会主义方式的相对增加引发的过程并不能证明下面这样的一个结论是正当的，即社会主义的完全实现就代表了更大的进步。对于个人主义飞速发展的时期也是一样。个人主义方式的意义有赖于这样一个事实，即中央集权化了的社会主义机构依然存在。这是可以逐步被减少的，但是它们的完全消失将会导致无法预料的结果，这种结果将在很大程度上不同于过去的个人主义带给我们的结果。在艺术的领域，自然主义与风格主义也表现了相似的范式。在艺术发展的每一个特殊的时期，都存在着简单的反映现实与主观变形之间的融合。从现实主义的观点来看，艺术通过客观元素的增加会趋近于完美。但是当这变成了艺术作品的唯一内容的时候，这种日渐壮大的现实主义兴趣就会开始变得冷淡起来，这是因为，如果艺术作品与现实世界之间不再有任何区别的话，那么，艺术作品将会失去其作为一个独立的实体所具有的真正意义。在另一方面，尽管概括性和理想化元素在一段时间内可能会对艺术作品起到装饰的作用，但是它仍然要保持文学作品与现实世界的联系，一些浪漫主义运动本来应以更加纯粹而又完美的艺术形式来体现这一关系，但是这些浪漫主义运动最终彻底失败了，这是因为它们摒弃了所有个体的偶然性。简而言之，一些重要的过程遵循了这种发展模式，其中一个元素的日渐重要将会引导整个过程走向更大的成功，但是，当这种元素处于完全的霸权地位的时候，就不再可能把整个过程引向完全的成功。相反，它可能使最初的元素丧失其特性。货币的内在价值与它的纯粹功能化、符号化的货币本质之间的联系可能会以一种类似的方式进行表述。纯粹的功能化、符号化的本质取代货币的内在价值，但是对于货币内在价值的一些特定的度量方法还是需要保留的，这是因为如果这种趋势发展到了极端，它们都将会失去基础和意义。

这种外部的相似性不但是对于这个问题的一个形式上的类比，而且也是对深层次的生活意义的统一。在实际生活中，在任何的语境以及任何的时代，我们都必须允许一个统一的、单方面的理论原则来统辖我们的行动，这样，我们才可以应付那些各种各样形形色色的元素和历史发展趋势。但是在这种情况下，现实的多样性一次又一次的影响我们，并且改变我们的主观努力，使我们的主观努力随着那些对立因素的方向进入一个经验的存在，这种经验的存在促使理念得以最终进入现实。这并不是意味着对理念的否定；现时的生活已经适应了把这种绝对的奋斗作为其组成元素，正像物质世界已经适应了运动一样，而如果运动没有任何阻力的话，那么将会产生无法预想的结果。运动只有在作为与反作用力的合力相结合才会产生自然事件的有序世界。如果现实世界是以这样的方式形成的，那么我们的意志就会集中于永恒，并且只能通过歪曲的和拒绝的方式来获得世界的现实性，在这里，现实生活的结构已经事先预示了理论的结构。在无数的情形下，我们关于事物的设想形成得如此纯粹与绝对，而根本没有反映实际经验，并且只有在被它的对立概念修改和限定时，这些关于事物的概念才会反映我们的实际经验。当然，这些概念不会因为上述的原因就变得糟糕透顶，恰恰相反，只有通过这一独特的夸张过程（这个夸张过程是与概念和公理的形成相伴随的）同我们的观念一致的世界观才会形成。通过某个公式，我们的精神世界与事物的唯一性之间搭起了桥梁，这并不是通过补充和反复就可以直接完成的，它在实践和理论中是一种初始状态的过多、过高、过于纯粹，只有通过保留其对立面的方式，才可能获得现实性范畴与理论性范畴的一致性。因此，纯粹的货币概念作为事物之间相互度量价值的表达方式，虽然其自身并没有内在的价值，但是保留着其存在仍然正当的理由，尽管在历史的现实当中，这一个概念一直被拥有内在价值的对立的货币概念所贬低和限制。我们的智慧只有在对纯粹概念进行修正的时候，才能够把握现实，不管它与现实的差距有多大，它都会凭借其解释现实的功能而合法化。

第三节

货币从物质到功能的历史发展

现在，必须来考察一下我们的理论建构的历史表现。在货币的运动中，我们可以发现由货币的本质和意义产生的广泛的文化衍生物，而且货币的这种运动引导货币朝着纯粹概念的方向发展，从而逐渐脱离开对特殊物质的依赖，尽管它从来也没有达到过其预定目标。因此，货币被卷入了那种一般性的发展过程当中，这种过程在每一个生活领域内，在每一种意义上都竭力趋向于把物质消解于自由流动的过程中。一方面，货币构成了这个综合发展过程的一部分；另一方面，同那些使货币符号化了的价值一样，货币与具体的价值之间还存在着一种特殊的关系。更进一步说，货币还受到更广范围内的文化发展趋势的影响，同时它本身也成了影响文化发展趋势的一个独立的原因。在谈到货币的形式是由人类社会的条件和需要决定的时候，我们也对货币与文化趋势间的这种相互关系产生兴趣。尽管受到这一过程从未达到其预定目标的限制，我现在仍将考察一下作为一种功能或符号的货币日益增长的重要性，这种重要性逐渐掩盖了货币作为一种物质的意义。

如果进行更加深刻的考察，我们就会发现，对货币概念的分解使作为物质的货币的概念与我们对其的最初印象相比，并不显得那么极端，因为，从严格的意义上说，货币的物质性价值同时也是一种功能性价值。仅仅作为物质，无论贵重金属被人们如何重视，它们事实上只是因为其装饰功能、独特性、在技术方面的用途以及能为人们提供审美角度的愉悦等价值才被人们所欣赏重视，也就是说，这种欣赏重视只是因为它们能行使某些功能。贵重金属的价值并不在于其自身独立的存在，而是始终依靠其功能的行使。离开了这一点，它们的物质性会像所有其他现实物品的物质性一样，与我们完全无关。可以说，绝大多数的物品自身原本没有价值，但是后来却变得有价值，为了达到这一目的，它们就必须不断地超出自己的范围，与其他物品相互作用。我们对于价值的感受与物品所产生的效用之间有着紧密联系。比如对于贵重金属，如果我们抛开所有认知和愉悦的因素，认为仅仅是其自身存在赋予了它以独特的审美情趣，从而丰富了我们这个世界，那么，它们仍然无法通过这种价值进入到经济体系中来。在经济活动中，所有的价值都同其运作相联系。有一种说法认为，贵重金属具有一种完全不同于其作为货币时所具有的物质性价值，这种说法掩盖了真实的情况，实际上是一种随意武断的观点。除了作为货币的功能性价值之外，贵重金属作为物质所具有的每一种价值也都是一种功能性价值。贵重金属的所有价值构成了一个序列，而这个序列就是一个功能的序列。这种说法自然不太容易理解，而在现实中，序列里的这些功能也往往不那么活跃。在中世纪，所有对获得利息的疑惑都源于这样一个事实：货币在当时似乎是——实际上也确实是——更稳固、更具有物质性、更赤裸裸地与其他东西形成鲜明对照；相对而言，在现代，货币则更具活力、多样性和易变性。中世纪文化接受了一系列的教条，如采纳了亚里士多德关于以钱生钱是不正常的说教；由于偿还的资金与借贷的本金相等，而把收取利息谴责为偷窃行为；按照亚历山大·哈莱斯乌斯的观点所做的论证：货币像出租的物品那样，不会因为使用而损耗，因此对于债权人来说并不是一种有利可图的工具；以及阿奎那的教条——对于货币来说，它唯一的目的就是被花费，使用和花费在这里是同一个概念，因此对货币的使用不同于对房屋的使用，它是不能被单独出售的。所有这些教条都说明货币是多么的不驯服，它与生活的波动是多么的没有联系，以及货币是如何不被看作是一种生产力。货币在现实中无关紧要的效用掩盖了它的功能性特征。当货币被视同为一种金属物质时，也存在着同样的基本情绪。像在中世纪一样，这种观点把货币作为一种独立存在物与经济物品的流通对立起来，而不是把它引入到流通中去，并且承认：无论表征什么，货币都不是拥有功能，而是其本身就是功能。

与中世纪的思想截然对立的另一极是信贷经济的思想。在信贷经济中，汇票是被作为货币使用的。中世纪占主导地位的思想是强调货币的物质性，而非其效用性，尽管货币的效用性还没有被完全地消除掉，但事实上，它已经被减小到最低程度。在以金属为基础的关于货币的现代概念中，最关键的一点是物质的运作；最终，在信贷经济中存在着这样一种趋势，它试图彻底去除货币的物质性，只把效用视为唯一重要的事情。

这种肤浅的看法可以被部分归咎于早些时候的一种思想框架，这种思想框架在所有现象中都区分出实体与偶然性。的确，这种区分在历史上是极为重要的：把每一种现象都分解为物质性的核心和相对的、可变的表象而且品质分析是首要的定位之举，也是贯穿在事物的神秘无形中的首要引导线索，它可以给出一个结构，并把事物归并到一种一般性的范畴中，这才是容易为我们的理智所接受的。如此，最初的单纯的感觉差异就变得井然有序，并且彼此相互制约。但是如此这般的形式及社会组织的本性就显现并且被声称成是永恒的。正如摧毁一种社会秩序而肯定另一种社会秩序时，给予人们一种好像所有的秩序都被抛弃了的印象一样，在理智领域里的重构也面临着相同的情况。与对世界的主观理解相同，当形成世界观支柱的范畴被废弃时，客观的稳定性也似乎被摧毁了。但是就好像光、热和生命很难保持其特别的物质性特质或是很难抵御其被消解为运动的形式一样，货币价值也将很难抗拒被归结为功能性价值。

社会互动及其结晶为独立结构

我现在将要考察经济活动所具有的特定结构性关系。下面这个从一般性观察中得出的否定性例子或许能够说明：货币之作为货币所行使的功能，究竟是在何种程度上依赖于这些经济关系而非依赖于货币的物质性。我们注意到：在两个人的关系当中，外在的形式很少能够恰如其分地表达其内在关系的强度。这种不充分性源于这样一个事实：内在关系总是在持续地发展着，而外在关系的发展却是时断时续的。即使这两者在任何的特定时间里都保持一致，当前者不断发展时，后者却仍然只是在其传统形式中延续着自身。或许在某一点上，外在关系会有一个突然的发展变化，但其特点却是：这种发展通常并不停留在与内在关系相对应的某一点上，而是期望着达到更高程度的亲密关系。在与朋友说话时所使用的亲密形式，就是对已经长期存在的友情的最终表达形式，但在一开始使用的时候总是让人觉得有些夸张，它突然产生了一种外在的接近，而接下来与之对应的内在亲密却总是姗姗来迟，甚至有的时候根本就没有内在亲密的来临。有的友情中途就破裂了，因为尽管在某种特定的范围内，这种关系被证明并无问题，但是外在形式却过早地走在了内在亲密的前面。我们可以在一些非个人的领域中发现类似的现象。寻求表达自身诉求的社会力量，在特定的法律框架体系、交易模式和政府环境中，常常会遭遇失败，因为在这些领域中传统的形式很容易变得冥顽不化。如果我们所期望的外在变化仍然发生的话，那么通常它总是超越了内在力量的有准备状态，其随之而来的合法性也并不总是能获得成功。在有些例子中，货币经济就是通过这种方式被引进的。当一般性的经济状况已经长时间朝着货币经济发展的时候，它所采取的外在形式就表现为这样一种强有力的现象——一般的经济条件已经不再能适应它了，如果内在经济力量的增长不能尽快地赶上外在形式的预期的话，新的体制就可能要遭遇到悲剧的结局。而这就是富格尔家族——事实上也是所有德国南部地区的大银行家——倒霉时所遭遇到的情况。他们的金融运作方式可以与现代世界的银行家相媲美，但是这种运作却偏偏发生在那么一个时代——金融运作已经超出了中世纪式的物物交换形式，但却尚不能抛弃掉与那些与此种交易有着不可分割的关联性的交流、担保或商业实践方式。总的状况并不像从西班牙或是其他的领主的领地里收债那么简单。新形式的货币经济误导了安东·富格尔，使他把这种经济延伸到了超出当时欧洲现实状况所能允许的地步。由于同样的原因，这些金融业巨头的债务人的财政状况也非常不好。发生在16世纪西班牙的金融危机起源于这样一个事实：尽管在西班牙通常并不缺少货币，但在最需要货币的地方——尼德兰却很缺少货币，结果，各种困难、延误和损失接踵而至，最终导致了西班牙金融的崩溃。在其他一些当地条件下，货币以一种颇为不同的方式在发挥着作用。在与西班牙的战争中，尼德兰人获得了巨大的收益，因为他们的货币可以随处使用。在荷兰人手里，钱才真叫“钱”，因为它能够畅通无阻地被使用，尽管因为他们的经济生活是建立在借贷基础上的，这使得单从物质形式的意义上看，荷兰人的钱要远比西班牙人的钱要少得多。当地的状况越是有利，货币的功能就越少以货币的物质形式发挥。也许还会有人似非而是地说：货币越是在本质意义上称其为货币，人们就越不会在一般物质意义上需要货币。

除了地区状况的影响之外，社会互动的稳定性和可靠性——即经济领域中的连续性——也为物质意义的货币的消解做好了准备。这可以通过一个事实得到阐明：货币带来了大量的、持续增长的效果，却同时保持了自身的稳定。有一种观念认为，货币的经济意义仅仅是源于其自身的价值和在特定时刻流通的频率，这种说法忽略了货币通过与此过程相联系的那些希望、恐惧、欲求和焦虑等心理现象所产生的强有力的效果。这些心理现象所辐射出的重要的经济意义上的情绪，就像天堂和地狱同样辐射出的效果那样，只不过这种效果是纯粹观念范围内的。在特定的时期里，有钱或没钱的意识会催生出努力或麻木不仁的行为，而作为纸币价值保证者的那些躺在银行金库里的黄金储备就清楚地证明了：仅是货币的心理符号就足以发挥作用了。在这个例子中，货币的确是可以被表述为所谓的“不动的推动者”的。很显然，仅仅作为一种潜在的货币，它所依赖的是经济组织的精密化和稳定性。不管哪里的社会关系是松散、零碎和迟滞的，那里的销售就将只依赖现金才能进行，而静止的货币也就不能利用原本可以发挥作用的心理渠道了。在此，借来的钱所具有的双重角色也应该被考虑在内：首先是货币的理想化的但却很有意义的一种形式，即有息债务的形式；其次是货币被掌握在债务人手中的现实。一方面，从索取权来看，被借的钱是债权人资产的一部分，尽管它不是可以被立刻使用，但却仍然非常有效；另一方面，尽管被借的钱并不构成债务人财产的一部分，但他仍然可以使用像其本人的动产一样使其发挥作用。借贷这种行为将自身分为了两个部分，并且极大地增加了它的经济能量所能产生的结果。对这一过程的理智上的抽象，只有在稳定和文明的社会秩序被建立起来后才能获得成果，只有在这样的社会秩序里，才可能有相对安全感地借钱，同时把经济活动建立在货币的这一部分功能的基础之上。货币要想发挥效用就必须要求社会关系有一定的综合性和强度——否则它就与其他交换物没有什么区别了——而为了使这种效用进一步理智化，还需要更进一步地强化社会关系。这些显著的现象清楚地说明了货币的内在性质只是松散地与其质料基础联系在一起，因为货币完全是一种社会学上的现象，是人类互动的一种形式，其特性越是脱颖而出，社会关系就越是集中、可靠和和谐。的确，文化互动的普遍稳定性和可靠性影响了货币的所有外在方面。只有在一个稳定和组织严密的社会中，双方才可以相互保护并提供抵御各种各样自然力危险的保证，只有在这样的社会中，才有可能使像纸币这样一种脆弱的、极易被摧垮的材料能够在外在的和心理的双重意义上，成为货币价值的最高表现形式。中世纪的一个明显特征就是频繁使用皮革货币。如果说纸币意味着货币价值被逐渐消解到其功能性价值当中去的话，那么，皮革货币或许可以象征着朝向这种趋势发展所迈出的第一步。在物质性货币的所有特质中，皮革货币保存了相对不可被破坏的特质，这种特质只有在个体与社会的关系结构达到一个高级阶段时，才能结束其历史使命。

货币政策

货币政策的理论和实践肯定了货币从物质意义货币到功能意义货币的发展过程，以及后者对社会学上的条件的依赖性。中世纪的财政主义和后来的重商主义或许可以被视为唯物主义的货币政策。正如唯物主义把精神的现象和价值结合到物质中去一样，财政主义和重商主义也把社会——政治生活的性质和活力同货币的材料联系在一起。然而，财政主义与重商主义之间的差别，正如朴素的唯物主义与老练的唯物主义之间的差别一样。前一种唯物主义宣称认知自身就是一种物质过程，大脑产生思想的机理与肝脏分泌胆汁的机理是一样的；而后一种唯物主义则断言认知自身并不是物质，而只不过是物质运动的一种形式，思想的产生就像声、光、电那样，只是源于物质元素的一种特殊的振动。与这两种理论观点上的差别一样，一方面，财政主义认为政府的目的就是要从诸侯那里得到尽可能多的现金来直接满足政府的使用；而在另一方面，重商主义不是把重点放在金钱的积聚上，而是放在对经济活动的激励上。货币政策的这些唯物主义倾向仍然与那种认为货币代表着自身价值的观点相联系，但是这种粗陋的客观资料向功能性意义转变的趋势，已经变得清晰可辨了。在这些时期里，财政体制与这种情况是相符的。在中世纪财政体制盛行之处，诸侯与其国家之间只存在一种外在的而非内在有机的关系，这种关系通常是通过婚姻或是征服建立起来的，并且总是表现为这些诸侯想方设法从国家那里攫取尽可能多的金钱。为了钱的目的而频繁出售领土就是这种趋势合乎逻辑的必然结果。在统治者和被统治者之间纯粹的货币联系表明一切其他关系的缺失。在这样一种社会关系中，中世纪统治者不断地使货币贬值就是一种适当的手段，因为，这样的方法使所有的利益都集中到一边，而把损失完全施加给另一方，这只有在缺乏有机联系的社会条件下才是可能的。对现金的热爱——这恐怕是东方民族天生的一种性格——可以从其统治者的财政政策那里找到根源，这些统治者把铸币这一皇室的特权作为一种征税的手段，毫不顾及货币贬值的后果。与这种政策必然对应的是其臣民以黄金和白银的形式积累现金的热情。中央集权独裁统治涉及不同政治因素之间更为紧密和活跃的关系；而关于有机整体的观念则为君主式的理想提供了共同基础，即从“朕即国家”到把国王看作是人民的第一公仆。尽管在这种情况下，政府的兴趣仍然是进口大量的货币材料（即金条），但国家首脑和国家成员之间的更为活跃的互动和政治生活都反映在这样一个事实中：现在获取货币的终极目的不再仅仅是为了拥有，而是要通过货币来扶植和促进工业增长。当这些自由趋势已经产生了一种更为自由的政治生活潮流，一种不受阻碍的灵活性，以及元素间的平衡变得不太稳定的时候这就已经为亚当·斯密的理论做好了物质基础准备——黄金和白银仅仅是工具而已，同厨房用品没什么两样，进口黄金白银增加不了国家的财富，犹如增加厨房用品无法提供更多的食品那样。当对货币材料的传统式调整被废弃之后，为了给更具有无政府主义色彩的观念让路，这种新的货币理论的趋势——或许会如我们所预期的那样——将走向另一个极端。蒲鲁东主张废除所有已建立的国家形式，只承认个体之间自由、直接的互动关系才是合理的社会生活形式，他从根本上反对货币的使用，认为货币的使用是这样一种权威的精确类比：即吸收个体之间的互动关系并将其结晶。就像社会的管理应该在没有国王的干预下由全体公民来直接组织一样，价值的可交换性应该在没有金钱这种中介条件的组织过程中得到体现。正如每一个公民都有投票权那样，每一件商品都应该直接表征价值，而无需货币作为媒介。这种货币理论的倾向大致可以被概括为是与唯物主义理论针锋相对的超验主义，其根源最早可以追溯到亚当·斯密那里。唯物主义认为精神是物质，而超验主义哲学则认为物质本身就是精神。这并非在唯灵论意义上把精神视为一种实体和一种自主性的存在（尽管它是一种非质料性的东西），而是说任何对象，不管是物质的还是精神的，对于我们来说都只在其可以为精神活动过程所认识的这一点上才是存在的，或者更准确地说，它的存在只是因为它是精神的一种功能而已。如果唯物主义对货币的解释现在看起来是一个错误，那么历史的分析则表明：这种错误并非偶然，而是对现实的社会状况的一种恰当的理论表述，在其理论摹本被从理论上克服掉之前，它将不得不被实际的力量克服。

社会互动与交换关系：货币的功能

货币的社会学特征看起来还有更深层的背景。个体之间的互动是所有社会构成的起点。虽然社会生活实际的历史起源仍然晦暗不明，但不管怎样，一种系统的发生学分析一定要从这个最简单、最直接的关系出发，即使到了今天，这种关系也仍然是无数新的社会构成的源泉。更进一步的发展创造了更高的、超越个体的构成形式，从而取代了互动作用力的直接性，这些构成吸收和调和了个体之间的直接关系，并以这些互动力的直接代表的形式出现。这些构成形式的存在极其多样：它们是可感知的实体，同时也是纯粹的观念和想象的产物；它们是复杂的社会组织，同时也是个体性的存在。通过这种方式，习俗中的客观规则、法律和道德都从需求和实践发展而来，这些实践和需要最初是偶然地起源于群体成员的关系并最终被固定下来的。它们是人类观念和评价活动的理想化产物，在我们心中，直到今天，它们仍然以“纯粹形式”超越我们的个体意志和行动。因此，在这一过程的持续发展中，国家的法律就体现在法官和整体的行政管理等级体系中：一个政党的凝聚力取决于执行委员会及其议会代表；军团的统一被具体化在其旗帜上；而神秘团体的力量则有赖于其圣物的象征力量，如此等等。原初要素之间的互动曾经造就了社会存在的单元，但现在却要被取而代之：这些要素中的每一个都在与一个更高级或中介的机构间建立了一种独立的关系。货币就属于这种物化的社会功能的范畴。作为个体之间直接的互动，交换功能成为了结晶于货币这种形式中的一种独立结构。劳动产品或任何其他的财产的交换，显然是人类社会化过程中最纯粹、最原始的形式之一，这不是从“社会”已经存在并带来了交换行为这个意义上说的，相反的，交换是创造了人与人之间内在联系的功能之一——社会，只不过是替代了单纯的个体集合罢了。社会并不是这么一种绝对存在物，非得它先存在，以便让其成员的个体关系——高低贵贱的地位、凝聚、模仿、劳动分工、交换、普通的攻击与防卫、宗教社团、政党的形成，诸多其他等等——能够在其框架中发展或者由它来表征：社会只是对所有这些明确的活动关系总体的综合或是一个总的名称而已。当然，这些互动关系中的任何一个都可以被剔除出去，而“社会”却依然存在，但是只有足够数量的其他互动关系依然存在，“社会”的这种存在才能得到保证。如果所有的互动关系都终止了，那么“社会”也就不再存在了。同样，如果某一活的机体功能（即此机体中各部分之间的互动）中的一个或其他几个功能终止了，这个机体可能仍然存活，但是如果所有的功能都终止了，那么这一机体也就寿终正寝了，因为“生命”不是别的，而是机体原子之间互动作用力的总和。因此，我们在此重申一遍：正是交换产生了社会化，因为交换是一种社会化的形式。交换是那些用于使大量个体构成一个社会群体的诸多关系之一，而“社会”则等同于这些关系的总和。

我们一再强调的物物交换的种种不便和不足，可以与那些仍处在直接交换阶段的社会互动相比较。如果所有的政府措施都必须由全体公民来讨论和认可的话，如果一个群体对外部敌人的防卫都必须由为全体成员服务的军事力量来保证的话，如果集体的努力和组织都完全依赖于个人权威和力量的话，如果司法的管理都要由全社会来加以裁判的话——如果所有这些都是必需的话，那么群体日渐增长的规模和复杂性将会造成所有的那些不适应、阻碍和瘫痪，这最终就会产生两个要求：一方面，要求这些功能向特殊机构进行转换；另一方面，要求创造出表征性和整合性的规范和符号。交换功能在事实上导致了两种组织：一个是商人阶层，另一个就是货币。商人是交换功能分化了的象征，没有他们，交换就必须在生产者之间直接进行，就像群体成员之间的内聚力和关系调节被他们与政府机构之间的普遍关系所取代了那样，生产者之间进行的直接互动的方式被取代了，在每个生产者与商人之间建立起了新的联系。如果要更精确一些，有的人或许会说，货币处于交换物品之间的位置与商人处于交换主体之间的位置相仿。交换物之间的对等已经不再直接实现，其波动也不再被隐藏；相反，每一件物品都要求与货币建立起一种对等和交换的关系。商人是交换功能的人格化体现，而货币则是被交换功能的物化体现。如我前面所述，货币是表现在经济运动中的物与物之纯粹关系的物化形式。货币超越了与之相关的个别物，其所在的领域是根据其自身的规范来组织的，这种规范是交换与平衡运动的客观化，而这原本是由它们自己来完成的。尽管如此，这毕竟只是一种初步的看法。因为，从最后的分析来看，不是物而是人在实现着这些过程，物与物之间的关系实际上就是人与人之间的关系。个体之间的交换活动是由货币以一种具体的、独立的、似乎是凝固的形式予以再现的，正如政府再现了社会成员相互的自我调节，守护神或约束象征着一个集体的凝聚力，战时编制象征着自我防卫一样。所有这些都是一般性的例子，在这些例子中，某些个别特征被从其原初的现象、实体或事件中分离出来，而在过去，这种个别特征与这些现象、质料或事件结合的方式与某种质料或某种行为与其主体相结合的方式是一样的。于是这种特征就呈现出某种它自己的结构，同时当被凝固到一种具体的构成中以后，这种抽象的过程也就得出了一个结论：即在交换之外，货币没有什么意义可言，就好像离开了集体的进攻与防守，军团和军旗便没有什么意义可言，或犹如独立于摄取宗教活动之外，牧师和寺庙就没有什么意义一样。货币的双重本性——它是一种具体的、被衡量的物质实体，同时，它又是使其自身的意义取决于把物质性彻底消解于运动和功能之中的这样一个过程——源自这样一个事实：货币是人与人之间交换活动的物化，是一种纯粹功能的具体化。

货币质料的发展越来越清楚地表达了它的社会学特征。对简单交换手段的使用——如盐、骆驼、烟草和谷物等——取决于纯粹的个人兴趣，可以说是一种唯我论的风格，也就是说，它们最终是被单个的个体所消费，因为其他人在那一特定时刻对其没有兴趣。把贵重金属当做首饰来用，另一方面是为了表明个体之间的关系，即所谓“女为悦己者容”。装饰品是一种社会需要，而贵重金属特别适合通过它的金光闪闪来吸引别人的注意。结果，特定的装饰品被用来为特定的社会阶层服务：在中世纪的法国，特定等级以下的人们是不允许拥有和使用黄金的。因为装饰的所有意义都在于它的心理过程，这个心理过程是由佩带者在他人心中所唤起的，所以贵重金属从根本上说，就如同在轴心一般与原始的交换手段有所不同。作为最纯粹的社会学事件和最完整的互动形式，交换在首饰的材质中找到了自己合适的表达方式，首饰对于首饰的拥有者来说，其意义仅仅是间接的，也就是说是一种与他人的关系。

如果某一种特殊形式的交换行为的具体化在技术上是以下面这种方式来完成的——每一个对象都首先与这种形式的东西进行交换，而不是与另外一个对象进行直接的交换——那么就存在一个问题：在更仔细的考察之后，究竟人类的哪些行为是与其背后的客观事物相对？他们与商人相关的一般行为，不管在怎样的程度上可以视为货币交易的原因和结果，都只提供了一种类比。对于我来说，有一点似乎很清楚——物品与货币之间的关系的基础和社会学表现，就是存在于具有经济活力的个人与发行并保证货币流通的中央权力之间的关系。只有当铸币行为使货币超越了其单纯的金属特性之后，货币才会作为所有商品之间的绝对中介来行使其功能，当然更不用提那些更简单的货币种类了。把交换过程从具体而又实际的交易中抽取出来，以及对这种交换过程独特的具体化，它们的发生都有一个必要条件——交换已经成为不是存在于两个个体之间那种局限于个体行动的私人过程。当一方所给出的交换价值对另一方并没有直接价值意义，而仅仅是表明了对其他一定量价值的拥有所有权时，上述交换行为的一个新的和更广泛的特征才得以建立起来。这种可能性取决于作为一个整体的经济社会或是作为其代表的政府。当物物交换被货币交易所取代的时候，第三种因素就被引入到了上述双方之间，这种因素就是社会整体，它提供了一种与货币相对应的价值。于是这时，双方互动的核心就从双方直接的接触线上撤退，转移到了下面这种关系上来——双方中的每一方都通过自己对货币的兴趣而与经济社会发生关系，后者接受货币，并通过拥有由最高当局所铸造的货币而把这一事实表现出来。有种理论认为：货币只是一种宣称其对社会拥有权利的声明，上面所说的即是这一理论的真理性核心之所在。可以这么说，货币表现得就像没有受票人的汇票一样，或者换种方式说，货币被担保了，但却没有被接受。有人反对这一理论，他们认为金属货币涉及借贷，借贷产生了债务，而金属货币的偿付还清了任何债务，但是这种说法忽略了一个事实：对个人债务的清偿仍然可能涉及对社会的义务。通过货币来实现个人义务的流动转移意味着社会现在假定这种义务是指向债权人的。这种以某种服务方式所产生的义务可以通过两种方式来去除：或者是提供直接等值的偿付，要么就是为这种等价偿付创造一种要求权。货币的拥有者就拥有后一种手段，并且通过把这种要求权转让给随便什么可以提供这种偿付的人，他就把自己引向了一个匿名的生产者那里，这个匿名生产者在自己的经济社会成员资格的基础上，为交换中的货币提供必要的偿付。在谈到货币的信用特征时，我们在纸币和非纸币之间做了一个区分，即前者以某种东西作为支撑（即黄金），而后者则没有，但这种区分在这里并没有多大关系。我们已经假定：只有当纸币不可兑取时，它才是真正的货币，而当其能够被兑取的时候，它只不过是一种应当被偿付的要求权。但在另一方面，也有人强烈主张这种区分对于买卖双方来说并没有多少意义，因为，即使是有担保的纸币也不是作为一种支付的承诺而发挥功能的，相对的，它其实就是最终的支付本身，与支票对比，后者仅仅是买卖双方间的一种承诺而已。这种提出问题的方式并没有洞察到社会学的背景。在社会学的视野里，金属货币毫无疑问也是一种承诺，它与支票的唯一区别只是在于，能保证接受它的群体规模有大小之别。货币拥有者及商品销售者针对社会群体具有一种共同的关系——前者声称对某项服务的权利，而后者相信这种可能的权利将会得到兑现——这种共同的关系提供了社会学意义上的格局，在这个格局中，与物物交换不同的货币交易得以实现。

金属货币——它通常被视为与信用货币截然对立的一种形式——事实上这种认识包含了两个对信用的含糊的预设。第一，在日常交易过程中对钱币的金属质料进行检查是不可行的。现金交易活动离开了公众的信任就根本无法进行，这种信任既可以是对政府的，也可以是对其他任何能够决定钱币价值与其票面价值关系的人。马耳他钱币上的铭文——“此乃信用，而非铜币”。——正非常恰当地说明了信用因素的重要性，离开了这种信用，即使是一个足值的钱币，在大多数场合下也难以行使其职能。那些五花八门的、经常是自相矛盾的接受某种钱币的理由表明：一些客观的证据往往并不是本质性的。在非洲的某些地区，玛利亚·特蕾西亚银币必须是洁白无瑕的，而在另外一些地区，则必须是污渍斑斑的，只有分别达到这样的要求，银币才会被看做是真货而被接受。

第二，除此之外，还必须有一种信用——即被接受的货币能以同样的价值被再次花掉。必要的、结论性的东西正是“此乃信用，非铜币”，这是建立在对经济体的这样一种信心的基础上，即钱币在与中间价值进行交换时不会发生错失。离开上述这两个方面的保证，没人敢使用货币。也只有这种双重的信任才赋予一枚肮脏的或者已经是辨认不清字迹的钱币以某种特定量的价值。离开了人们之间的一般信任，社会自身将变成一盘散沙，因为几乎很少有什么关系能够建立在对他人确定的基础之上。如果信用不像理性证据或是个人经验那样强烈或者比它们更强烈，也就很少有什么关系能够维持下去。同样，离开了信用，货币的交易也将陷于崩溃。此外，这种信用还有极其微妙之处。有一种看法认为：货币一直是一种信贷，因为它的价值取决于接受者对它的信任，即意味着接受者相信自己能够在交易过程中凭借这些货币去获取一定数量的商品。这种看法并不完全恰当，因为不仅是货币经济，而是任何一种经济都依赖于这种信用。如果一个农民对他的土地还能够像前一年那样出产那么多粮食缺乏信心，他就不会去播种；如果一个商人不相信公众会需要他的商品，他就不会提供这些商品，如此等等。这种信任只是推理性知识的一种较弱的形式。但在借贷的例子里，以及在对他人信任的例子里，还有另外一个难以描述的因素，它突出体现在宗教信仰里。当某人说他相信上帝的时候，这与其说表明他对上帝的了解尚处于一个不完善的阶段，不如说这是一种完全与了解无关的精神状态，它既比了解少，也比了解多。如果只说“信仰某人”，而不管或不知道这种“信仰”为何物，那么这句话就成了对成语微妙而又深奥的运用。它表达了这样一种情感：在我们关于存在的思想和存在本身之间存在着一种确定的联系或整合的关系，在我们关于这个存在的概念中存在着一种特定的连续性，在自我对这个概念的顺服中存在着一种确信和顺从。这可能依赖于某些特殊的理性，但却无法通过它们自身来得到解释。经济上的信用不包含这种超理论的信仰因素，我们对于社会的信任也是同样，我们不知道社会是否会保证货币符号的有效性，而已经用自己的劳动换得了这些货币。如我已经说过的那样，这大体上只是一种简单的推论，但是它包含着一种更深的、社会心理学的、准宗教信仰的因素。拥有货币所带来的在个人安全感方面的感受或许是最集中和最直截了当的，并且它也说明了对社会——政治组织和秩序的信心。这个过程中的主体性可以说是比那种首先创造了贵重金属价值的主体性具有更高级的力量。后者是预先设定的，但它现在已经通过双方的信任在货币交易中产生了实际的结果，这也说明了从质料性货币到借贷性货币的发展并不像先前所显示的那样极端，这是因为借贷货币必须被解释成这些信用因素的演化，而那些日益的独立和孤立的信用因素事实上早已存在于质料货币当中了。

经济循环的本性及其对于货币的重要意义

对货币的持续有用性的保证是把社会组织收缩为一个完整的社会的本质所在，但是，这种保证却有着特别的形式。从一种抽象的观点来看，这种保证并不存在，因为货币的持有者不能强迫任何人为了货币而给他点什么，即使对那些无可争议的优良货币也不例外，这在那些联合抵制的例子中表现得最为明显。只有在债务已经存在的情况下，债权人才能被迫接受货币作为抵偿债务的手段，即使是上述的那种情况也不是在所有的法律体系中都能行得通的。货币所代表的要求权将不会得到满足的可能性证实了货币作为纯粹信贷所具有的特征，因为信贷的本质就是：它实现的可能性从来就不是百分百的，无论这种可能性能够多么地接近百分百。事实上，个人拥有把他的产品和其他财产转让给货币持有者或是继续保留它们的自由，而社会则对货币的持有者承担义务。这种自由与束缚的分配尽管是矛盾的，但却经常地作为一种知识的范畴而起作用。因此，“统计法则”的提倡者已经肯定了：在任何特定条件下，社会必然产生出一定数量的杀人犯、盗贼和私生子，但是个人并不因此一定会去这样做，他们仍然有选择做道德或不道德的事的自由。统计法则没决定一个特定的个人必须去干这些举动，只有他所属的社会整体才必然产生出确定数量的这种行为。或者，我们也可能被告知：作为整体的社会或种族在宇宙的神圣安排中，在人类朝向其终极超越目标的进化过程中，具有某种已被决定了的角色，但是这在与其在个人身上的表现则毫不相关，个人自由地在社会整体中各行其是，任何特定的个人都有自由对整体的行为作壁上观而并不会削弱整体的表现。最后，我们可以肯定地说：群体的行为总是受由其利益引导的自然律的严格控制，就像有质量的物体永远都受重力的作用一样，但是个体可能被理论和冲突所误导，他会遇到多种选择，而他的选择可能对、也可能错——相反，集体行为是没有自由的——因为这些个体的是被背离常轨的本能和目的所引导的。在此我们没有必要去追究这些观念是对还是错。我只想指出：集体与个体之间关系的模式是在许多不同环境下被接受的，前者被看作是由必然规律所左右的存在，而后者则是自由的存在；前者的限制是通过后者的自由来调节的，而这种自由本身又要受集体的限制并且要适应整体结果的必然规律。货币的一般有用性的保证是由统治者或是所处社会的其他代表者通过铸造金属货币或发行纸币来承担的，这种保证是对一种不可抗拒的可能性的接受，尽管每个个人都有拒绝使用货币的自由，但到了最后，他还是将不得不接受货币。

上述这些情况引出了一个结论：货币有效适用的群体规模越大，货币的价值也就越高。在一个小的、地区性的群体中，流通的可能是较低价值的货币。这种情况发生在大多数最原始的文化中：比如在达尔富尔，地区性的交换手段——働头、烟草、棉球等等——都只在某一特定区域内流通，好一些的货币——布匹、奶牛和奴隶等——则在所有地区都适用。甚至还可能发生只由国家发行的纸币被限制在某一个单独的省份内流通的情况：土耳其在1853年发行了一种纸币，它仅仅在君士坦丁堡才被认定是有效的。那些规模非常小、联系又十分紧密的团体偶尔也会同意接受某种符号，甚至某种筹码作为货币。但是，贸易关系的扩展要求一种有价值的货币，原因无非是长距离的货币运输要求价值应该被尽量集中在体积较小的货币身上。因此，历史上有着广大市场的帝国和贸易国家总是被驱使着向使用较高质料价值的货币的方向发展。有些对立的趋势也证明了同样的原则。中世纪铸币权的最基本好处在于这样一个事实：君主或诸侯在任何时候都可以在他的领地里铸造新货币，以便加强旧币以及由于贸易原因而进入这一地区的外国货币与新币的交换，每当他的货币贬值一次，他都会通过新币与被交换币之间的差额而受益。但这种好处取决于拥有较大的领地，在那些较小的地区，因为货币的市场太小，这种铸币特权会使其拥有者得不偿失。因为在德国，有铸币权的修道院和每一个小镇对铸币权的恣意滥用已经到了十分可怕的地步，所以如果不是依据从铸币贬值所带来的收益需要与该地区的大小一致这条原理的话，那里货币的混乱状态恐怕还会更严重。正因为领地的社会经济结构要求有稳定的货币，所以强化低级货币所带来的收益才是相当可观的。通过下面的这个事实，这一观点将得到进一步的阐明：在14世纪的欧洲，贸易的增长导致了把古尔登币作为货币的一般单位来接受，同时以金本位制取代了银本位制。由小国或小镇为了内部的交易而铸造的小面值货币——先令和便士，可以被随意贬值。中世纪的铸币特权首先限制在铸造银币上；铸造金币的特权则更需要有特别的许可，只有拥有大面积领土的政府才能行使铸造金币权。在这种关系上非常具有典型性的一个例子是：拜占庭宫廷一直保留到公元6世纪的象征罗马主权的最后遗迹就是铸造金币这个唯一的特权。最后，这种关系通过以下这个例子得到了证实。在这些例子中，对纸币的流通总是被限制在发行这种货币的国家中的某一个特别区域内，就比如法国。曾经有一个时期，纸币在法国被作为法定货币而流通，但其流通范围却不包括海港地区，因为在那里存在广泛的贸易。当贸易范围扩展了的时候，就必须使货币同时也可以吸引外国人以及贸易合作伙伴，并被他们所接受。同样地，经济地域的扩展也导致了直接接触的减少，双方彼此对环境条件的知识更不完备，信任更加有限，要想使拥有的权利得到更加令人满意的实现的可能性也就变得更不那么确定。在这种情况下，如果在交换中提供的货币只能在买方的领土上使用，而其价值在其他地方则变得十分可疑，那么就没有人会愿意拿商品来交换它。卖方将会要求自身具有价值的货币，也就是在任何地域都能被接受的货币。货币质料价值的增加使得主体循环范围的扩展具有了意义，在这样大的范围内，货币一般都可以被接受，然而在较小的范围内，货币的可流通性则可能要由社会、法律以及个人的担保和人际关系来保证。如果我们假定货币的有用性是其可以被接受的理由的话，那么其质料价值或许会被看作是对那种有用性的一种担保；如果可流通性是由其他手段来加以保证的话，那么它的价值就可以是零，相对的，价值越高，风险也就越大。尽管如此，扩张的经济关系最终还是被扩展了（最终这种扩展会是国际范围的），并产生出了原本仅仅在封闭群体内所具有的特点，经济和法律条件越来越克服了空间的隔离，它们现在远距离上运作的可靠性、精确性和可预见性不逊于先前其在地区性社区内的表现。当这样的事情发生后，作为货币内在价值的保证的重要性现在就可以被降低了。复本位制的提倡者认为，只有在国际范围内，才可能发生上述的事情，这也同我们的说法是一致的。即使在国家内部或国际间，我们还远远没有建立起一种紧密的可信的相互关系，但毫无疑问，它的趋势仍然是朝着这个方向发展的。由法律、风俗和利益所支撑的，不断扩展的社会诸群体之间的联系和整合，是货币内在价值日益萎缩，及被其功能性价值取而代之的基础。

重要的是，贸易关系的扩展最初使交换手段的内在价值得到增加，而在现代文明中，通过银行和汇票等手段来实现地区间和国际间的账目平衡的方法，最终使这种内在价值被完全去除掉。同样的发展也出现在使用货币的部分特殊地区。在今天，税收原则上是根据收入，而不是财产的多少来进行调节的。在普鲁士，如果一个富裕的银行家在过去的几年里遭受了损失，那么除了新近开始征收的小额财产税之外，他是不用交税的。不是根据对货币的所有权，而是要看你从这些钱上获得了多少利、由钱生了多少钱，才决定了你付税的义务，就像选举权取决于付税义务，同时它也决定了纳税人在社区里的权利。我们简单地看看货币资本在古罗马的作用，将会发现这种发展的一般方向。正如货币可以通过非生产性方式，例如战争、捐款和货币兑换等来获得一样，货币的借贷也可能只是为了消费而不是生产。因此，利息在此显然不能被解释为是资本的自然产物，从这种情况中显现出来的存在于资本与利息之间的模糊、无机的联系反映在利息问题难以把握这一困难之中，这种困难一直延续到基督教纪元后。只有生产性资本的概念和事实才最终提供了一种实践的解决方案。当前的情况与早先的情况构成了鲜明的对比反差，在现代，资本的意义不是取决于它是什么，而是依赖于它在行使着什么功能。资本已经由一种僵化的、脱离生产的因素，演变为一种在生产中有着十分活跃功能的因素。

担保是货币最敏感的神经，当代表着社会的公共机构事实上只代表这个社会有限的集团及其利益时，货币的担保就自然地失去了部分力量。例如，私人银行是在个人利益交换基础之上建立的一种超个人的、相对的客观存在。这一社会学特征使它能够发行货币，但是如果它的钞票发行不能很快地转移到由国家监控的某一中央机构之下，它所代表的地区性限制就会在其发行的纸币的“货币”不完美性上非常明显地体现出来。北美纸币经济的缺陷就部分地来源于这样一种观点，这种观点认为：铸币是一种国家事务，而提供纸币则是私人银行的责任，对此国家不应该干涉。这种观点忽视了一个事实：金属货币与纸币之间的差别仅仅是相对的，每一种货币都仅仅依赖于其交换功能得到证明，这种交换功能是通过在利益群体与一个客观机构之间的共同关系而实现的，货币行使其功能只能有一定的限度，即货币发行机关需要代表和表达整个地区的利益。结果，地方统治者有时会尝试让他们的货币至少在表面上看起来像是由一个更具广泛性的机构所发行的。即使在腓力和亚历山大死后几个世纪里，有他们名字和印玺的钱币依然在许多地区被铸造，给人以皇家钱币的印象，尽管它们事实上只是一些个别的城市的货币。在现实中，渐进的发展一直在为国家机构的扩张并最终形成集权以及确保货币价值的权力而努力。这种发展中一个最重要的特征是：政府在18世纪以前发行的国库券是最早创造出来用作对整个国家税收要求权形式。在这个例子里，可获得偿付的确定性不依赖于那种非得查明的特别情况，而是依赖于对国家偿付能力的一般信赖。这说明了现代的中央集权化的大趋势，这种趋势与个人化的趋势之间根本就不是一种对立的关系，它们构成了越来越明显的个别化和新的中心化组成的同一过程的两个部分，其中之一指向社会，而另一个则指向自我。这一发展从货币的性质中取消了所有个人化和孤立的因素，从而使包容了最广泛社会领域的中央集权化力量成为货币的代表。个人信贷就像国家信贷一样，都是通过货币财产的抽象形式的发展而获益。15世纪和16世纪早期，单个的诸侯都只有很少量的个人信贷，这并非考虑到他们的偿付能力有限，而是因为他们提供的保证和担保物的价值存在问题。个人信贷是基于这样一个假设：无论借贷人财产的具体构成会有什么变化，其全部价值都能够偿付其债务，只有当以货币为标准对个人资产的全部价值进行了全面评估之后，他才能进行长期借贷，否则，借贷就得以他的财产特征的不断变更为依据。即使是在18世纪，大部分的债务也都被表示成特定钱币的特定数量，这似乎可以被看作是向现代转变的一个过渡阶段。在那时，从任何特殊的形式中提取出来的抽象价值的概念——即价值不再通过一种客观的质料予以担保，而仅仅是由国家或者个人来担保——尚未完全发挥作用。

货币向其一般性功能特征的过渡

然而，与通过社会机构对货币的功能性价值进行的保护相比，最主要的还是金融事务中金属的重要性正在日益退到幕后。因为金属最初向来是私人财产，即使是公共利益和公共力量也永远不能完全控制它。有人也许会说：货币这个词在词汇的严格意义上正在逐渐成为一种公共制度，公共权威、公共机构和公众对待货币的各种各样的交往以及担保的形式，还有他们使之合法化的范围和程度，都越来越被包含在货币涵义当中。因此，早期的货币尚不能仅以其抽象功能为基础这一点，是非常重要的：那时，货币交易与特殊行业、铸币技术或是贵重金属的交易都紧密联系在一起。在13世纪初期，维也纳的日常交换业务是通过染匠进行的，在英格兰及德国的某些地区则是通过金匠来进行的。钱币交换在中世纪是货币交易的核心（因为任何地方都不得不使用当地的货币作为支付手段），它最早是铸币厂自己的特权，是“铸币厂伙计们”的特权。只是到了后来，当各城镇也要求铸币权利的时候，贵重金属的交换和贸易事务才从铸币业中分离出来。钱币的功能本来是与其质料联系在一起的，这差不多是一种个性化单位，但当一个公共权威担保了钱币的价值之后，它就获得了独立性以及兑换的权利，同时，用于制造货币的物质质料交易也就向每一个人都开放了，在其作为货币的功能得到集体担保这一点上，就更是如此。货币日益增长的个人化，以及它与日益中央集权化和扩张的社会之间更加紧密的联系，都直接地、有效地与对独立于货币金属价值之外的那些功能的强调联系在一起。货币的价值以中央政治权力的担保为基础，这最终取代了金属质料本身的重要性。在此，有一个与价值评估中被忽略的那一方面的类比。某件物品之所以有价值，是因为它可能被用来获得另外一个物品，此时，这件物品的价值就是由这样两个因素所决定的：将被获得的那一物品的内在价值，以及对能够获得那个物品有把握的程度。在特定界限内，如果这两个因素中的一个有所增长，那么与此同时，另一个因素的缩小可能不会影响到整体的价值。对此我们可以举一个例子：我们的感知内容的意义，是同时依赖于它的可靠性和被感知者的重要性的。在自然科学当中，可靠性因素正在变得越来越重要，而在社会科学中，则是被感知者的意义变得越来越重要，因此，在这两个领域中的感知内容的价值可能具有对等性。只有当我们遵循亚里士多德的思路不去怀疑知识的确定性的时候，感知内容的价值才能被看作是唯独依赖于对象的价值。一张彩票的价值是其中彩可能性的产物，也是其中奖奖金额度的产物；一个行动的价值也是其目标完成的可能性与此目的具有的重要性所决定的产物；一个债券的价值则是由资产和利息率的稳定性所构成的。货币并非以同样严格的方式发挥其功能，因为它持续增长着的可靠性不是与其所能获得的对象正在降低的价值联系在一起的。但是，我们的类比还是有效的，理由是：正在增长着的钱币将被按照其面值接受的确定性，使得在不改变其整体价值的前提下，货币金属内容固有价值的减少成为可能。另一方面，货币社会学地位的原因和结果一样带来了这样一种情况：即群体的中央权力与其个体要素之间的关系变得越来越强烈和紧密，这是因为现在这些要素彼此之间的关系是通过中央权力来沟通的。加洛林王朝曾明确尝试以货币经济来取代物物交换和牲畜交换。其统治者频繁地颁布命令，对拒绝使用钱币者给予严厉的惩罚，使得他们的钱币不至于被拒绝使用。铸币是皇家独享的特权，加强货币交易意味着皇家权力在那些先前依靠个体或私人的交易模式的地区里的扩展。同样的，在奥古斯都时代后的古罗马帝国，只能以皇帝的名义，根据皇帝的命令来铸造金银币，而较小面值的货币的发行权力则可被赋予元老院和地方政府。那些伟大的君主如从大流士一世、亚历山大大帝、奥古斯都、戴克里先等，一直到拿破仑一世，都经常创造出强有力的铸币体系的这一现象，只是上述趋势的普遍化而已。在物物交换经济中，支撑一个巨大社会权力的整套方法鼓励自给自足和国中之国的建造，例如，从墨洛温王朝开始，这种情况就发生在那些较大的领地里，相较而言，货币经济中对等的权力机构则在与国家机构保持一种联盟的关系中得到发展延续。因此，现代的中央集权国家就部分地成为了伴随着美洲金银资源的开发而来的货币经济巨大的增长的产物。封建制度的自负被每一次交易都依赖于钱币的使用这一事实所无情地粉碎，钱币的使用涉及一个中央集权的权力和对超越铸币自身、相互接触的各方面关系的扩展，伴随而至的结果是货币的力量使个人与王权的联系愈加紧密，这一后果被视为是重商主义制度的深层次含义。各级领主从德国皇帝那里争夺对这种中央集权手段这一事实被看作是导致德意志帝国土崩瓦解的根本原因之一；另一方面，13世纪和14世纪的法国和英国国王却借助于这种货币交易发展潮流的帮助，建立起了统一的国家。在俄罗斯帝国已经统一之后，伊凡三世把他国家的部分主权分封给自己年轻的儿子们，但他却始终为中央保留了铸币权和司法管理权。一旦法定货币最终使自己被普遍接受，并使所有贸易地区与作为贸易源头的国家之间建立起了更紧密的关系之后，行政边界以外的那些松散的贸易关系都会有显著的发展。英镑的兑换率在英国与葡萄牙和巴西的贸易中贏得了相当好的声誉，从而使得英国与这些国家的贸易关系变得十分密切。在德国，加洛林王朝时代过后不久，国王就把铸币权赋予不同的个人和宗教机构，但是他却仍然保留着对货币的金属成色、质量和形式的控制权。然而，在12世纪以前，那些有铸币权的人被允许自己确定铸币的形式和标准，因而他们能够凭借这种权利随心所欲地获利。铸币权与中央权力的分离伴随着货币的贬值，货币的本质功能也随之弱化，变得不如它在被最大的社会群体或者其中央机构所担保时那样强有力了。相反的过程也说明了同样的问题：货币的贬值引发了它原来所依赖的最大的统一群体的解体和崩溃。一种纯粹形式化、符号化的关系也可能对这些现象的产生起过作用。相对的不可销毁性是黄金和白银这两种金属的本质特征之一，并且由于采矿业所增加的这两种金属的数量微不足道，所以其总量在相当长的时间内几乎一直保持稳定。当大多数其他物品在一个无限循环的过程中被消耗殆尽、销声匿迹、被取而代之的时候，货币却几乎是以其无限的耐久性而保持自身不受个别物品变化的影响。结果，就像一个社会群体的客观统一体超越于其各种各样的个体成员之上一样，货币超越于这些物品之上。这恰恰是那些从被具体化了的群体功能中抽象出来的生命的特征形式，它们存在于具体化的个体之外，是在转化着的个体表现当中所具有的稳定的构成形式，也就是说，它们被结合于其中，形成它们并被最后释放出来。例如，所谓国王的不朽就是如此，这种不朽是独立于国王个性的偶然因素、特殊的行为或是他所在的社会的命运沉浮之外的，铭刻着国王肖像的近乎不可毁坏的货币就是这一事实的一个符号象征和表现。大规模的金融事务直到16世纪才在诸侯的商业交易中开始出现。随之而来与诸侯们的交往，使金融家们的地位有了一种高贵的皇家色彩，而同时日用品的贸易则显得更为平民化。因此，社会主义者对金融所产生的仇恨，就不仅仅是指向在私人企业中盘踞于工人头顶上的资本主义的权力，它同样可能是来自于其反对君主统治的本性，因为尽管社会整体的具体形式这是货币存在的前提条件——不一定必然要采用君主政体的形式，但事实上，君主制最喜欢的就是在群体的经济功能运作中凭借中央权力进行干预。而且，君主们居所的固定——这就需要中央集权化——只有在有货币税收出现的条件下才成为可能，因为以实物形式支付的税收不便于运输，它们只适合于被缴纳给那些游牧王朝，因为他们可以很快地将其消费掉。现代税收政策倾向于把不动产税归当地政府，把收入税归国家，体现了同一种精神。通过对个人工资收入的收税权力的强调，中央权力准确地把握了那些与之有密切关系的财产。因此，官僚主义的发展，以及它与金融的密切关系，只不过是中央集权化趋势的一种象征而已。封建性的管理是分散型的，远在边陲拥有财产的诸侯的私人利益使他与中央权力分离开来，相反，定期的金钱报酬却把公务员们吸引到中央权力的周围，并持续强化了他们对于中央权力的依赖性。在19世纪初期，土耳其的高门政府由于其货币的不断贬值，不得不依靠铸造双倍重量的铸币来支付公务员和官员的薪水，这是因为在公务员与国家的关系中需要的是足值的货币。行政部门惊人的扩张和分化只有通过货币经济的条件才是可能的，然而，这只是存在于一个特殊的中央机构中，货币与群体凝聚的客观化表现之间的那种关系的症候之一。在古希腊文化中，这种关系不仅表现在政治上的统一中，而且还表现在宗教上的统一中。所有的希腊货币曾经都是神圣的，这是因为它们就像其他普遍有效的度量概念——比如重量、大小和时间等一样，都是由祭司阶层决定的。同时，祭司的身份象征着不同地区的统一。人们的早期联系是在宗教基础上得到发展的，在有些例子中，这种联系覆盖了相对较为广大的地区。神殿有一种非特殊性的中心化的意义，而货币通过铭刻共同的神的符号表明了这一点。宗教性的社会统一体——凝固在神殿上——通过进入流通过程的货币又再次变得活跃起来，而货币也获得了远远超出单枚钱币的金属内容意义之上的一个基础和一种功能。通过社会学框架的支持和它反过来对社会学结构的支持，货币的功能通过牺牲其物质性而更具意义。一些例子和反思将会更加清楚地说明这一过程。对于货币的诸多作用，在此我将仅仅谈一下其对于贸易的促进、其作为价值标准的稳定性、其价值的流动性和其对流通的加速作用，以及货币以凝聚的形式所表现出来的价值精华。

这里我想通过介绍的方法来强调：君主对于新币的贬值（这一点我在前面讨论过），明确地揭示了，通过对大众进行盘剥，货币的功能价值的意义同货币的金属价值的意义截然对立起来。驱使老百姓们在交换中接受低级的货币却支付价值更高的货币，是基于前者满足了货币的交换目的的需要这样一个事实。铸币业的把持者凭借货币的功能性价值，勒索了不成比例的高额利润，为了这种价值，他们的臣民不得不同意进行货币交易，从而牺牲了他们的货币的金属价值。但这只是一种非常一般的现象的例证，即：货币从形式上来说比任何其他的东西都能更好地为贸易服务，但它并不单纯因为其质料性就有什么优越的地方，因为就像下面提到的这个例子中所说明的那样，它也可以超越自身的质料意义。在1621年，作为其在低地德国地区贬值时的后果，德国泰勒从值48个先令上升到值54个先令，荷尔斯泰因、波美拉尼亚、吕贝克、汉堡和其他一些地区发布了一项政令，根据这项政令，从某个时期起，德国泰勒只能值40个先令。尽管这项规定被普遍接受并被认为是公平和明智的，但是德国泰勒却仍然继续保持其48个先令的价值，因为这样更方便找零和计算。在更高级和更复杂的发展阶段，当债券以大的和小的面值发行的时候，也可能会发生同样的事情；股票交易中以较高的价格对小面值债券进行报价，因为它们更为急需，并能凭借其小面值更好地为贸易服务，尽管按股份计算，两者的价值是完全一样的。事实上，在1749年，北美殖民地的一个委员会就曾经声称：在那些人们的消费要超过生产的经济欠发达的国家里，货币的价值向来要比他们那些较为富裕的邻居为小，否则的话，这些贫穷国家的货币将不可避免地流向那些较为富裕的国家。这个例子以更明确的方式说明了我们前面曾经提到过的一个事实：以计算和结账为目的的货币特殊形式的适应性为这种形式创造了一种价值，这种价值被有意地提到了其实际有效价格之上。在这里，货币的功能性价值大大地超过了其质料性价值，以至于它竟完全颠倒了双方的重要性。我们可以以价值性功能的增长为例，来与质料性价值进行比较。在这些例子里，较低等的货币在与贵重金属的关系中保持了一种令人难以置信的价格。这样的事情发生在诸如金矿一类的地区，在那里财富刺激了活跃的贸易，但是在日常交易中，现金却显得较为缺乏。在19世纪末的巴西金矿矿工中，对小额现金的需求增长极快，于是葡萄牙国王就提供白银货币来交换大量的黄金，以此剥削矿工们。随后，在加利福尼亚和澳大利亚也发生了金矿矿工们不得不用两倍到十六倍价值的黄金进行支付，以换取价值较小的零钱。这类现象中糟糕至极者表现在一直延续至今的土耳其的货币流通状况中（但这现在也已经有所改观了）。在那里，根本就没有镍币和铜币存在，所有较小额的硬币都由质量低劣的白银合金打造而成——比如阿尔梯利克、波什利克、迈塔利克这些钱币——它们的供应是完全不够的。结果，虽然在1880年政府名义上让这些硬币的价值贬值一半，但实际上其价值却始终保持不变，并仍在与黄金进行等值的交换，事实上，迈塔利克这种被认为是世界上最差的货币符号的价格，甚至在有的时候反而超过了黄金。这是一种最具典型意义的例子，最小的货币成了交换中最重要的货币，并且其价值也由此决定，以至于这些小面值的货币总是最先被贬值。迈塔利克的价格说明了这样一个悖论：一种钱币实际上可能会比原本更具价值，因为质料价值的缺乏会使它更适合于某些功能性目的，如此一来，这种钱币的价值几乎就不会无限制地增加。

对银本位的反对建立在对货币功能性意义和地位的逐渐增长的认识基础上，也就是说，使用上的方便性是对货币首要的要求。一种粮食只要有营养和可口，就可能会被保存，即使它使用起来不太方便；一种服装只要漂亮或是保暖，就可能会被保留，即使它是不太适合买主心意的。但是不方便使用的货币就像不可口的食物或不合身的衣服一样，因为货币主要的目的是为商品的交换提供方便手段。货币与其他商品不同源自于这样一个事实，即除了其主要特质之外，它具有并且应该具有较少的次要特质。因为货币是超越于所有具体商品之上的一种绝对抽象，这种绝对抽象会因为任何在其原始特性之外的次要特性而遭到妨碍或扭曲。

通过对货币功能的扩展和压缩，货币的价值就可能会增加或减少其对于质料价值的独立性，即使在货币价值与其质料价值有更密切的关系的价值稳定的情况下也是如此。罗马帝国的皇帝们有着独一无二的铸造金银币的特权，而在日常交易中使用的铜币却是由元老院铸造，而在东部省份是由城镇一级的参议院来铸造的。这提供了某种保障——皇帝将不会让缺乏实质价值的钱币在他的国家里泛滥。但最后的结果是：皇帝在此原理的引导下继续着他们对银币的贬值，在这个可预期的过程中，罗马的铸币业终于彻底崩溃了。这在价值关系上也导致了一种奇怪的逆转：作为贬值的结果，银币成为日常交易的手段，而价值上没有发生变化的铜币却逐渐成为了价值的标准。金属价值所具有的相对稳定性所发生的变化，扭转了作为货币价值象征的金属的最初角色。在谈到与质料性价值相对立的价值稳定性所具有的更大意义的问题时，最近有人已经在强调：从纸币到金本位制的转换不一定非得涉及重新起用黄金作为支付手段。在像奥地利这样的国家里，纸币与白银是等值的，所以向金本位的转变将会带来货币价值稳定的决定性的好处，并且可以在不使用质料本身的条件下，实现黄金的最重要功能。最近，对货币价值稳定性的兴趣甚至导致人们提出废除担保发行的纸币价值的金属储备的建议。因为只要这样的储备还存在，不同的国家就仍然属于一个共同的体系，这样的体系使每个国家的国内交易活动都受到所有其他国家政治和经济事件波动的影响。因为没有担保的纸币是不能出口的，所以它们将适合于为那些国家所有的国内企业都带来益处，并且首要的是，能完全保持货币的稳定性。无论这种理论面临多少批评，它最起码的意见说明了：在心理意义上，货币的概念是怎样与货币质料的概念分离开的，以及它是怎样通过对其功能性作用的关注而逐渐变得完善起来的，货币的所有这些功能都显然服从于那些使得货币逐渐被大体上消融到其功能性存在当中去的那些条件。在任何特定的时刻，它们都只是部分的有效，上述这些概念展现出一条永远也达不到其终点目标的发展线索。货币度量的价值和它所要表达者之间彼此的关系是纯粹心理学意义的，这样的事实使其度量之稳定性的存在不可能像对空间和重量的度量那样稳定。

货币的物质性意义的下降

在实践中，当已改变价值后的货币被用来偿付欠款而导致任何问题时，价值的稳定性是作为一种既成事实而被接受下来的。如果货币的价值已经在总体上下降了，以至于同样数量的货币在偿付欠款时，价值上已经不足，那么这个规律就忽视了同等数量的货币仍具有同等价值的事实。如果钱币已经通过加入合金成分或改变铸造标准的方式而被贬值了的话，那么根据这个规律或许可以决定所欠债务是应该根据新的标准来偿付，还是按照新标准的金属内容的价值偿付，或是干脆直接根据其票面价值来偿付。一般说来，货币保持其自身价值不变的观点还是颇为流行的。当然，这样的稳定性也是一种虚构，在这种虚构中，涉及了一些其他的物品，并且，没有人会怀疑，例如春季里借出的五十镑土豆在被以实物方式偿还时可能会值更多的钱，也可能会值更少的钱。但是，在这样的情况下，我们可以谈论物品的直接意义：当土豆的交换价值可能波动的时候，它们在给予人们的满足和营养方面的价值是保持不变的。然而，货币并不具有这一类的价值，而只具有交换价值，并且关于其价值稳定性的假设也因此备受关注。倾向于采取权宜之计的理由会确保这种基本的虚构成为现实。我已经指出过：在货币由贵重金属铸造而成的情况下，它与首饰的联系有助于保持其价值的稳定性，因为对首饰的需求具有很大弹性，它吸纳了大量的、增长着的贵重金属的供应，因而防止了对它们价值的过大的压力；另一方面，对货币增长着的需求可以通过使用首饰的库存而得到满足，这既使得需求的数量得到满足，同时也避免了贵重金属价格的上涨。这种趋势的持续似乎是在表明彻底去除货币物质质料这一目标。因为，即使是像贵重金属这样合适的质料也不能同时避免由需求、生产和加工工艺过程中的特殊条件所造成的波动，而且这种波动对金属发挥交换中介的作用，作为商品相对价值关系的表现这一事实并无太大关系。货币要想取得其自身价值的完美稳定性，它自身就必须什么也不是，而只是具体商品之间价值关系的纯粹表达。这样，货币就将取得一种中性的地位，这种地位将很少受到商品波动的影响，就像尺子不会受到它所度量的不同长度的影响一样。通过这种功能的行使而建立起来的货币价值就将达到其最大限度的稳定性，因为我们永远都难以完全控制货币质料的量，而与之相比，供求关系就能够更容易地被调节。这并不是否定在特定的历史和心理条件下，当货币价值附着于金属时比它脱离金属时更加稳定——正如我在前文所观察到的事实那样。

因此，回到先前所说的类比上，虽然说最深沉、最崇高的爱可能是两个灵魂之间排除了一切肉体的欲望的爱，但只要这样的爱是不可企及的，那么爱的感情就只有在一种精神关系被以一种亲密的肉体欲望的纽带予以补充和调停的时候，才会得到充分的发展。天堂乐园可能会履行对永恒极乐的承诺，但条件是不能有与这种持久幸福相对立的逆叛情绪，只要我们还是人，积极的幸福就取决于它跟我们把它同其他一些诸如痛苦、冷漠和沮丧这样的体验的对照。因此，尽管没有内在价值的货币会是理想的社会秩序中最好的交换手段，但在建立理想的社会秩序的目标实现之前，货币最完美的形式或许总是要与某种质料联系在一起的。这一条件并非意味着货币偏离了那种一直持续发展的趋势，即货币转向其本质功能的一种纯粹符号的载体。

一些例子说明，在于货币的功能性价值和质料性价值分离的特殊阶段中当中，某种特定种类的货币被用做价值尺度，但却并不充当实际的支付手段。与此同时，离开了它的度量性价值，货币就不能行使其交换功能，但在某些特定方面，后一种功能却是独立于其前一种功能之外的。在古埃及，价格是由尤顿——即一段卷曲的铜线——来决定的，但是支付过程却是通过各种各样的商品来进行的。在中世纪价格经常是以货币的名义来决定的，但是买方却有自由以任何方便的形式来进行支付。在今天非洲的许多地区，商品交换根据某种货币的标准来实现，这种货币标准有时非常复杂，然而在大多数情况下，货币本身却可能根本就是不存在的。在16世纪的热那亚，有一种非常重要的交易市场是建立在以斯秋道为标志的价值单位体系标准上的。在这一标准体系中，100个斯秋道最多值99个最好的金斯秋道。但事实上，这种标准差不多完全是虚拟的，在实际中根本就不曾存在过这样的铸币。所有的义务或责任都通过斯秋道价值标准体系的形式来表示，由于这种理想化的特征，价值的标准是绝对稳定的，完全不受实际流通的货币的波动性和矛盾之处的影响。东印度公司为了抵消人们贬低、蔑视和伪造印度钱币的影响，引进了卢比——即一种根本没有被铸造过，但却与一定数量的白银相对应的货币，通过卢比来提供一种可以度量实际流通中被贬值货币的价值的标准。通过这种稳定的理想化标准的存在，实际流通中的货币也确实获得了一种相对稳定的价值。凭借这种方式，一种为一位19世纪早期的理论家所构想的事物几乎就被建构出来了。他把所有的货币——不管它们是硬币还是其他的什么形式——都看作是对可交换商品的要求权，从而最后达到否定货币现实性的目的。货币在其严格意义上来说是与通货相对立的，后者只是以货币名义来表达的“指令”，而货币自身则是一种理想标准，通过这种标准，所有财产的价值都能得到度量。在此，“斯秋道价值单位体系”原则已经成为了一种一般性的理论，货币已经被理想化为一种纯粹形式和一种关于关系的概念，以至于它已经不再与感性的现实保持一致，它与后者之间发生关系的方式就是抽象规律与经验特例发生关系的那种方式。在上述的例子当中，度量价值的功能已经被从其质料符号中分离出来，用于计算的钱币被有意地同金属货币对立起来，以便建立起它能够超出后者范围之外的地位。在这种关系中，理想的货币实现了与“优质货币”同样的目的，之所以说它是“优质”的，只是因为它是一种可靠的价值尺度。

货币所行使的基本功能之一是使价值更具流动性，上述说法说明了这一点：就此而言，这一说法也把我们引向了以等价物代表货币价值这个主题上。在与质料价值的关系中，作为交换手段、价值尺度和储存价值方式的货币，其重要性越是有所增加，它就越容易以一种非金属的形式在世界上流通。同样的发展——即从货币的僵化性和质料规定性发展为货币的符号象征性——也发生在这些表征物自己身上，例如，在这一进化过程中，一个人给另一个人的债据就发展成为了持有者手中的不记名债券。当然，这种发展的不同阶段仍然还需要追溯到更早时期。在中世纪就已存在着认定债务的契据，在这种契约中，契据持有者与原始债权人都被赋予了收债的权力，但是，这种契据的目标只是为了方便债权人的代表去收债，而不是允许应收价值的转让。这种纸币价值的纯粹形式化的流动性在当时法国里昂的股票交易中使用的“空白欠据”中被赋予了更实际的内容。在欠据的词句上仍然提到债权人，但却没有具体的人名，只是当欠据上的空白处被填上具体人名以后，债权人才算是被确定下来。汇票交易最早在16世纪的安特卫普被完善地建立起来。最初，如果它们没有和转让票据被一同交递，这些汇票就常常在到期时被拒绝接受，所以，政府不得不颁布一项王室法令来肯定其普遍有效性。在此，我们已经看到了一系列非常清晰的连续性阶段。也就是说，在此问题中所讨论的价值通过个人指定的信用契据而被限定在债务人与债权人之间。它首先要求一种至少可以支付给另外某人的流动性，尽管这仍然是出于对原始债权人要素的考虑，体现在这个过程虽然通过延期得以扩展，但仍然指明某个个体债权人。但到了最后，债务票据与无记名债券一样，其价值成为完全可流动的，它也就可以像钱币一样易主了。这好像是与我们在考察国库券的相关问题时所看到的发展过程的相反或是主观的方面。因为这些债券在最终是从一般性国家税收中而不是从国王的特别税收中体现出是可偿还的，所以从债务人的角度来看，它们就不再具有僵化性，它们从受限制的领域发展进入到一般性的经济运动中去，并成为更具流动性的价值符号，因为此时已经没有必要对它们的特殊价值进行检测了。

价值流通的普遍加速也决定了货币质料与功能之间的关系。与那种片面地解释货币和货币替代物之间关系的观点相对立，人们已经确认了：货币的替代物——如支票、汇票、保单、转让书等——并没有取代货币，而只是加快了流通速度。有一个事实很好地说明了这种货币符号的功能：银行的钞票连续地从较大而流通缓慢的价值额度转向较小的价值额度。英格兰银行在1759年以前不发行20英镑以下的钞票；而法兰西银行直至1848年以前，只发行500法郎的钞票。货币的替代物使个人有可能放弃大量的现金储备，但是它主要的好处还在于使现在流动中的资金可以以其他方式被使用，例如被银行使用了。被经济化的不是货币自身，而是其作为被动的现金储备的用途。人们可能会普遍注意到：借贷和现金并没有简单地取代对方，相反却在彼此身上产生了更活跃的结果。当市场上存在着较多现金的时候，借贷活动通常也相应较多，甚至后者的数量会达到一种病态的程度，就像在16世纪的德国，大量的贵重金属进口就与大量的缺乏保障的借贷、狂热扩大借贷以及企业规模的活动联系在一起。货币和信贷范围同时增长的事实表明它们在发挥着同样的作用，而当其中的任何一种功能增强的时候，另一者都会因受到刺激而变得更有活力。这一事实与货币和信贷间的另一个关系——即信贷使现金变得多余——并不产生矛盾，例如，据说在1838年的英格兰，尽管生产产品的数量比起50年前已经有了巨大的增长，但可用现金反而变少了，而在法国，可用现金的数量也比大革命前有所减少。这种存在于两种现象之间、源自同一动机的双重关系，一方面彼此刺激对方，另一方面也相互限制和排斥对方，而这种情况是很容易被观察到的，一点也不罕见。我想提醒读者注意的是：爱的基本情绪可以以感性和精神两方面彼此加强的方式来展示自身，但也同样可以以一方试图排除另一方的方式来达到同样的效果，而且在大多数情况下，正是这两种可能性的交互作用最丰富、最生动地表现了爱的基本情绪。

我也想提醒您注意：不管追寻知识的多种多样的活动是相互刺激还是相互排斥，都揭示了其基本旨趣的同一性，一个群体的政治能量，最终是根据其个体的性质和环境，被注入到存在政见分歧的党派当中去的，但是这些党派不仅是通过相互之间的情绪化争斗来展示他们的力量的，而且这种力量的展示还体现在为了整体的公共利益而采取共同行动的偶尔的联合上。信贷的意义既是对更大规模的资金周转的刺激，同时也是一种对这种资金周转的代替，这表明这两种交换手段所提供的服务的统一性。

贸易的增长导致了货币更加快速地流通，而不是增加了货币质料的数量。我在前面曾经提到过：1890年，法兰西银行因当时的原因投入流通过程的资金是其存款的135倍，而德国帝国银行的货币流通量则是其存款的190倍。人们很少能体会到货币为行使其功能所需的质料量少到了什么地步。在战争爆发或其他灾难发生时，货币了无痕迹地销声匿迹是一种惊人的现象，但这只意味着货币的流通过程出现了中断，这种中断是由于个人想使流通过程与货币产生暂时分离的意愿所引起和强化的。从而，在正常时期，货币储备的数量看起来似乎要比其实际数量更大，这是因为流通速度就像一点闪亮的火星，当它在黑暗中飞快地旋转的时候，看上去就像一个闪光的圆圈，但当它一停下来，便又缩回成一点闪亮的火星。这种现象在货币贬值的情况下表现得最为剧烈。因为货币属于这样一种现象的范畴：在这种范畴中，正常活动决定了界限和范围，而任何偏离或功能失调都会导致巨大的、几乎难以想象的损失，典型的例子就是水与火的能量。纯正的货币没有低级货币那么多的副作用，并且因为它的使用不需要被很严格地调节和管理，它可以比劣质货币更容易和更平稳地流通。货币发挥其功能的形式越是精确，其必需的货币量就越少，它也就越容易为更快速的流通所取代。交易量的增长也可以通过减小货币的价值而非增加流通中的实际货币的数量来实现。货币铸造总的趋势是钱币的由大面值到小面值。一个很典型的例子是英国的法寻（相当于0.12克的白银），它在很长的时间里一直是英国最小的币值单位，只有从1843年开始，1/2法寻的硬币才被铸造出来。在那以前，所有低于一法寻的价值都被排除在货币交易之外，并且任何在两个整的法寻之间的价值交换也都有困难。一个从阿比西尼亚回来的旅行家报道说（1882年），在那里，只有一种钱币，即铸造于1780年的玛利亚·特蕾西亚泰勒可以被接受，而那些再小些的钱币根本就不存在，贸易因而受到了相当大的阻碍。如果一个人想要买价值半个泰勒的大麦，他就不得不同时买一些其他的东西来抵偿应该找给他的零钱。而另一方面，据说在19世纪60年代的婆罗洲，贸易活动特别容易，因为一个泰勒的价值差不多相当于4000个宝贝贝壳，因此穷人可以有钱来购买最少数量的商品。确实，由于钱币的可分割性，使得免费的帮助不复存在，一旦搞得到一种货币的等价物，并且使它成为甚至对最小的交易也是必需的必需物的时候，原始条件下的贷款及互助规则就消失了。但是作为最初社会必需物的双方互助，后来又成为一种道德义务或单纯善意的行为，而这种原始互助并不比与它对立的行为——强抢——表现得更具有可能的经济意义。只有当贸易及其目标变得具体化的时候，礼品馈赠行为才会发展成为一种经济体系。礼品的交换这种主观的程序肯定具有很大的价值，甚至会是一种经济价值，但是它却为经济设定了一个非常狭窄的界限，而这些只能通过可以摧毁这一类价值的手段才能去除，这种手段之一就是引入小面值钱币。货币物质实体分解为小的单位，可以说是极大地增加了交易量，通过加速货币流通，这种分解实际上增加了货币的数量。换句话说，货币发挥功能的方式可以替代货币质料在数量上的增加。

最后，某些货币实效具有了与货币质料自身性质不协调的含义。货币的功能之一，就是以自己特有的方式浓缩并表征物品的经济意义。用于物品支付的货币总量统一体把货币所使用的所有要素的价值，还有那些在空间上相互分离的特殊价值，以及所有为货币铺路并最终形成货币的力量与物质都整合起来，这些过程可能都延续了一个相当长的时期。不管一个货币的价格包含了多少钱币，它仍然是一个统一体。货币各个部分之间的完全的可替换性把货币的意义唯一地限定在其总量上，而它们形成了整个的统一体，这在实际生活中的其他地方都很少存在。如果有人说到某个极有价值的、复杂的物品，如一个价值50万马克的乡村庄园，那么，不管这个价值总量是建立在多少前提和考虑的基础上的，它都把这个财产的价值凝聚进了一个唯一的概念里，就像一个单一物品是以一个单一的钱币概念来表达的一样，例如说一小时的工作值一马克。这只能与某种从数个个别例子中把它们的本质特性集中起来的概念的统一性相比。例如，当我使用“树”这一个共性名称的时候，我从每一棵非常不同的树的表象中抽象出来的特性不是单纯地排列在一起，而是被整合在一个单一整体存在当中。概念的深层含义是：它不是一种简单的特性集合，而是一种理念的统一，在这一统一过程中，这些特性触及了其他概念并互相融合，尽管它们各不相同，货币价格就是以这种方式把对象的各种不同的、较大范围内的意义都集中在一个凝聚的统一体内。乍看上去，似乎货币纯粹的数量特性会使这一点的实现变得不可能，比如，一个马克怎么也不会以作为一个有机体部分或一种社会组织的方式，与另一个马克构成一个统一体，因为它们将总是保持一种单纯的并列关系，而不会出现任何双向的关系。但这与用货币总量表达一件物品价值时的情况有所不同。50万马克自身只是一些独立单位的集合，但如果作为一个乡村庄园，它们就是一个符号统一体，是其价值等价物的表现形式。它们不仅仅是一些马克单位的简单堆积，就像摄氏20度的温度不是20个特定温度的堆积，而是一种热状态的统一体一样。这与上述货币凝聚价值的能力都是一样的。因此货币是伟大的文化要素之一，它的功能就是把巨大的力量凝聚到一点上，并通过这种能量的凝聚，战胜与我们目的相对立的各种消极和积极的对立者。说到这里，我们应该想到机器，不仅仅是因为机器把它的力量作用于我们欲求的目的，而且也是因为机器的每一次改进和速度的提高都迫使工人以更大的劳动强度工作。这正是为什么技术的进步和工时缩短能够并必须同时实现的原因，因为自然和人的力量通过改良机器，从而以一种更加集中的形式为我们的目的服务。在塑造我们的世界观时自然规律的作用显得越来越突出，在这里我们可以观察到同样的文化趋势在起作用，与对个别现象的关注或原始经验的偶然性和片面性相比，一个自然规律代表了一种对知识的高度浓缩，它在一个简略的公式中概括了无数例子的特点和运动。通过自然规律，心灵把空间和时间的大量事件都压缩进一个可被理解的系统，而这个系统可以说就包含了整个世界。

在一个迥然相异的领域里，枪炮取代了冷兵器体现了同样的发展形式，黑色火药提供了的巨大能量集聚，我们只需以最小的肌肉运动就可以释放出其他方式绝不可能达到的效果。还有一个例子，在历史的发展中，个人取代了宗族组织、家庭和行会，它的意义和分化可能也遵循同样的原理。积极的力量越来越从个体化的、表面上看来受到限制的形式中辐射出来。它们似乎比过去更为浓缩，在过去，只要个体是与群体紧密联系着的，那些决定群体命运的要素就都分布在群体之中，但现在却凝聚在个体自身之内。如果一种活动手段的日益增加的数量尚未被整合到某一个体存在的凝聚形式当中，那么现代人自我决定的权利就不能显现出来。然而，这与下面这种说法并不矛盾，即些早期的、较紧凑的团体的功能已经被大部分转移到了某种更具广泛性的联系，即国家当中。从其实际成效的视角来看，现代国家的生活，包括它的官僚制、它的能量和集权化，要比过去较小规模的社群强化得多。现代国家建立在一个所有政治力量都特别集体化、高度整合和统一的基础上，在那些分成许多小规模自治区的国家里，有很多能量的浪费，与此相比，自由和分化了的人格在一方面，而现代国家在另一方面，都代表了一种无与伦比的力量的凝聚。以这种方式，社会能量就需要有一种形式，它允许所有最小的努力在面对每一个特别需要的时候都能取得最大的成效。最令我们感到有趣的是：货币不仅通过用最简明、最凝聚的方式表达事物价值的方式来实现顺应力量集中这一历史潮流，以与这种积聚力量的历史趋势保持一致，而且，它还通过与其他许多极不相同领域内特别情况的直接关系，进一步确定了这一历史趋势。例如，在枪炮发展的早期阶段，金钱为战争提供原动力，它把武器从骑士和市民手中夺过来交到雇佣兵手中，从而使对武器的拥有和使用成为有钱人的一种特权。我们几乎用不着说明机械技术的起源和进步与货币体系是如何紧密联系在一起的。但是我将在稍后说明那些曾给予个人以自由的最原始群体的形成，以及国家的发展都与货币经济的出现有很密切的关系。我们可以看到：力量积聚的文化发展趋势与价值的货币形式有着许多直接和间接的联系。货币对文化过程的其他部分提供的所有暗示都来自于它的本质功能——为事物的经济价值提供最简明的可能表达形式和最浓缩的象征。传统的看法把价值的贮藏和转移功能视为货币的主要功能，但其实这只是货币基本功能中较粗糙和次要的表现。价值贮藏与转移功能显然与货币的质料价值没有内在联系，但有一点也确实是通过这一功能而变得明显的，即通过这种功能，货币的本质所在正是那种结合于其中的思想，这远远超越了货币物质质料所象征的意义。货币在集聚价值方面的角色越是重要，——这种变化不是简单地通过增加其数量而实现的，而是通过使其功能延伸到越来越多的客体上，以及以这种方式对更加多样性的价值进行的整合来实现的——它就越是不需要与物质实体紧密联系起来。这种现象的原因是，与投射和整合到货币概念中的价值丰富性、易变性及多样性比较起来，物质质料的机械单调性和僵化性已经变得越来越不合时宜。

这一过程或许可以被称作是货币日益增长的精神化过程，因为它是从多样性中带来统一的精神活动的本质。在感性世界里，事物都是作为个体而存在，只有在精神领域里，它们才会被整合起来。一个概念的各个元素形成了一个统一体，就像在一个陈述句里的主语和谓语那样，在直接被感知的世界中是没有类似情况存在的。作为物质和精神的桥梁的有机体是迈向这种统一体发展的第一步，互相融合了有机体的各个元素，有机体也在持续地向着一种最终无法实现的完美统一前进。只有在精神世界里，互动才真正成为一种整合。交换的互动产生了价值在精神上的一种统一。在空间上延展的物质实体只是货币的一个符号而已，因为作为物质实体而存在的事物的非连续性，与作为一种互动的抽象表征的货币本性是相互对立的。只有在质料要素退化的意义上，货币才真正成其为货币，那是只有靠精神才能成就的价值互动要素的一种真正的结合和统一。

货币价值意义的上升

如果货币的功能可以部分地与其质料共同实现，而部分地又独立于其质料的数量，并且，如果货币的价值因此而下降，那么，这并非意味着货币价值有一种一般性的下降，而只是意味着有限数量的货币在价值方面的下降。这二者并不一致，并且，我们或许可以这样说：任何特定数量的货币其价值变得越少，货币在总体上反而变得越有价值。因为只有当货币便宜和任何特定数量的货币价值较少时，它才会有更广的扩散、更快的流通以及更为通用的性能，这些都保证了其目前的角色。在货币的特别量与一般意义上的货币之间所存在着的关系同样也盛行于个体精神中。比如说挥霍这种行为，它最容易为了购买而购买，但同时它又最依赖于一般意义的货币。这就是通常那种说法的意义之一：只有腰缠万贯，才能挥金如土。在和平年代的环境里，经济生活的节奏较慢而货币的流通也较为迟缓，一定数量的货币比现代城市生活中经济竞争市场上的货币更具价值。货币的快速流通导致人养成了消费和获取的习惯，它使得特定数量的货币在心理意义上更缺少意义和价值，而在一般意义上的货币则变得愈发重要，因为有关金钱的事务现在比它们在一种较缺乏活力的生活方式中更能使个人充满活力。我们在此遇到一个非常普遍的现象，即某物的整体价值增加到了某种程度，而它的个体组成部分的价值则下降了同样的程度。例如，一个社会群体的规模和重要性越是增加，其个体成员生活和利益在价值上就被评判得越低，客观文化及其内容的多样性和活跃性通过劳动分工达到了它们的最高点，劳动分工常常把这种文化中的个体代表和参与者贬低为一种单调的专业化、狭隘性和不良生长的产物。整体越是完美和协调，个体就越是成为缺乏和谐性的存在。同样的现象也表现在非私人性的事物当中。某些诗歌的魅力与完美性就在于其中的个别单词没有独立的意义，它们服务于整首诗的主导性情绪或艺术目的，除了那些承担了诗歌的核心主题者以外，构成单词完整意义的各种组合都被排除在外。从艺术角度说，整首诗在内容上越完美，其个别元素就越失去了自身的意义。最后还有一个更浅显的例子：马赛克的产品价格和美学价值越高，每一单片马赛克的面积就越小，而单片马赛克所占面积及其自身重要性越小，整体马赛克的色彩就越是引人注目和精致。

在价值评价领域，整体和部分的价值以相反的比率发展根本就不是什么稀奇的事。这不是偶然，而是表现出一种必然的因果联系。现在一定数量的货币与几个世纪前相比更不具有价值，这个事实是一般意义上货币日益增加的重要性的直接先决条件。反过来，这一条件本身又依赖于与货币质料价值相对立的功能性价值的增长。这不仅在一般意义上有关货币的案例中显而易见，就是在各种各样具体的不同现象中也仍然如此。例如，只要有息借贷仍属少见——这是教会教义对高利贷的贬斥及物物交换经济下的一般条件所造成的后果——那么，借贷的利息率就仍然会惊人地高。随着利息重要性在经济生活中的逐步增长，利息率也在稳步地下降。

从理论的观点来看，认为货币从物质实体到功能的变化过程中变得“没有价值”了，就好像一个人被抽走了灵魂一样的观点就大错特错了。这种观点忽略了一个要点，即货币消融于其中的各种功能本身就具有价值，货币所获得的价值在金属货币的情况下是一种补充价值，而在象征性的货币中却是唯一的价值。毫无疑问这是一种真实的价值，就好比一辆机车，它提供运输功能的价值超过了在建造过程中所耗费材料的价值。不错，货币在最初能够行使功能是因为它具有内在价值，但随后它具有价值却是因为它在发挥着这些功能。把货币的价值与货币质料价值对等起来，就好比把机车的价值与机车中包含的钢铁以及建造机车所耗费的人力价值等同起来一样。这种相提并论似乎在事实上否认了那种认为有一种特别的价值起源于功能的假设。机车的价格（在此我们无需区分价值和价格）事实上是由质料价值加上投入建造过程中的人力价值所组成的。像货币一样，一辆机车引发了物品的交换，这只不过是它被衡量的原因而已，其实际价值并不取决于这一事实。类似的，无数其他物品的功用使它们具有了市场价格，但是市场价格的实际水平却是由许多其他因素所决定的。功用性在最大程度上建立了一种限度，超过此限度，价格就不能再有所增加，但是它对实际的价格水平却没有什么影响。如果这个比较是有效的，那么货币的价值看起来似乎就再一次从它的功能上转移到了质料上。但是，这个比较在一个关键性的考虑上恰恰是无效的。机车是根据建造其所耗费的材料和人力而被赋予价格这一点完全是因为另外一个事实，即任何人都可能制造机车，从而这个概念自身——离开它而光有材料和人力是制造不出机车来的——对价格的形成没有什么影响。如果有一个造机车的专利，那么专利的价值，再加上材料和人力的价值，将会反映在一个更高的价格之上。一旦一个概念变成了公共财产，它在实践中的实现就不再是“稀有”的了，而只有稀有性才能影响到价格而使其具有功能性的意义。在货币的例子里，有些方面与专利问题是一样的，即政府铸币的权力，这种权力禁止未被授权者把货币的概念变为实际的存在。在一个有限的范围内，即当它是由贵重金属组成时和总体上当它是纸币或铸币时，货币的“稀有性”就是建立在这种政府垄断的基础之上的。政府的垄断特权以极具特点的严格性表现在一条中国法令里，它在惩罚假币制造者时，对那些使用成分较纯的贵重金属的人的惩罚要比那些使用劣质材料的人的惩罚来得更重，因为前者参与了一个与政府进行的更为不适当的竞争，以及这种行为更严重地侵犯了政府的特权。如果每一个人都被允许铸币的话，那么钱币的价值就确实下降到了其材料加上人力价值之和，垄断的好处也将荡然无存。因此，人种学家已经注意到这样一个事实：就像在使用贝壳钱币时所发生的情况一样，富人和首领的权力地位在人人都能铸币的时候最容易受到损害。而反过来说，就像购买了专利产品的人分享着发明者的专利一样，任何拥有货币的人都在那种情况下分享着国家铸币的特权。保证了货币之作为货币行使其功能的中央权力铸币的特权，也确保了在这些功能具体化于货币中的材料价值和人力价值之外又具有了一种额外的价值，或者说，正是因为货币完全缺少了质料价值和人力价值，才使它具有了自身的价值。罗马法的律条之一在这方面非常典型。从铸造的钱币取代了以重量计算的青铜作货币时开始，罗马法就一直坚持这些钱币必须按照其面额被接受和使用，而不管其材料的价值如何。这种对金属内容的独立性要求有一个进一步的规定，即只有这些钱币才能被接受为货币，而所有其他的钱币都应被当做仅仅是一种商品而已。只有作为对这种特别钱币的要求权，人们才能根据货币来采取讨债的行为，所有其他的债务行为，就像对待商品债务那样，都必须以与货币面值无关的实际价值的名义来表述。这意味着其他钱币的价值不是货币的价值，而只是一种材料的价值而已，因为货币的功能是法定钱币所专有的。因此，相比于其他钱币只能通过铸成这种钱币的材料才能获得的价值来说，法定货币具有了另外一种价值，同时法定钱币的这种特性使这种价值独立于任何内在价值之外变得合理合法。就像一夸脱的度量具有经济价值，并不是因为它是材料和劳动产品——如果它不对某些外在于它自身的目的有用的话，那就没有人愿意要它——而是因为它是用来做度量的。货币具有价值是同样因为它在以度量手段和其他一些方式发挥着作用。这种价值自身只能以货币的方式来被表达，这个事实使它与一夸脱的度量价值相比更不容易被承认，一夸脱的度量可以用其自身以外的方式来表达。货币的功能决定了其“使用价值”，其“使用价值”必须在其“交换价值”中找到自己合适的表达形式，货币是这样一种东西——它的“功用价值”依赖于政府对铸币的垄断，包括建立在这种垄断基础上的它的“稀有价值”。具有质料价值的货币理论与知识的一般趋势相对立，在这一趋势里，事物的意义在本源与目的之间交换了位置。货币具有价值并不是因为它本身是什么，而是由于它所服务的最终目的，尽管货币的原初内在价值使其后来的功能成为可能，但是它还是随后从其功能中才获得了自身的价值，并在更高水平上重新获得了它在初期阶段所放弃的东西。

在我已经描述的发展中，货币趋向于这样一点：作为一种纯粹的象征符号，它完全被其交换和度量功能所同化。这在思想史上有许多相同的例子。我们对现象的原初和质朴的兴趣，通常会使我们把现象当作整体去理解。它们使我们面对形式和内容的一个整体，而我们的评价与形式联系在一起是因为其是特别内容的形式，与内容联系在一起则是因为这种内容是特殊形式的内容。在发展的较高阶段，这些要素被分离开来，作为纯粹形式的功能被以特殊的方式受到重视。这些形式的不同内容经常是被当做互不关联的东西而加以处理的。因此，比如，我们欣赏宗教的情绪，但却对宗教信条的内容毫不关心。宗教中灵魂的提升、奋进和抚慰——它们在诸多不同的历史信条中都是普遍的要素——应该存在，这在我们看来是有价值的。类似的，一种力量的展示通常能引起尊敬，而其后果却常常是被否定的。因此，一种更精致的美学兴趣就越来越转向了艺术品中纯艺术的方面，转向最宽泛意义上的艺术形式，并且越来越对艺术品的材料漠不关心，也就是说，是转向了最初激发艺术创作的艺术品主题和情感。这种情感的升华和客观化就是同时并存于艺术的生产和消费过程中的审美功能。以同样的方式，我们把认知评价为心灵的一种形式化的功能，它反映了永恒的世界，不管认知的对象和结果是令人满意还是令人厌恶的，是有用的，还是仅仅是一种理想而已，结果都是相同的。这种在价值情感方面的分化还有另外一个重要的方面。现代自然主义精神的发展倾向于颠覆普遍性概念，而强调个案是概念的唯一的合法内容。在理论和实践中，普遍的东西被当作某种只有从其具体的物质表现者身上才能获取意义的纯粹抽象的东西来对待，它们是可以被具体感知的实例。通过超越这些具体特例，人们似乎进入了一个虚无的世界里。但是普遍之物的意义——在柏拉图那里这种意义达到了顶峰——并没有一起消失殆尽，只有当我们世界观的每一方面都在个别情况的物质现实性与形式普遍性之深度与广度之间达到了调和，我们才会与世界达成一种完全令人满意的关系。历史主义和社会学的世界观试图肯定普遍性而同时否定其抽象性，去超越那些个案，从一般中抽取出个别而又不牺牲其物质现实性，因为社会是普遍的而不是抽象的。在此，对与内容不同的功能的评价有其一定的地位。在功能与其为之服务的目的两者的关系中间，功能是普遍性的。与特定的宗教信条的内容相对照，宗教情感是普遍性的。与任何一种特定对象相对比，认知本身是普遍性的。同样的，与使用过程中的特殊和多样的问题相比，权力本身是普遍的。所有这些都是综合了质料的广泛多样性的形式和框架。当价值评价独立于货币质料以及被转移到功能当中来的时候，——这是普遍的但却不是抽象的——货币似乎也参与到这种趋势中来了。价值评估首先关注的是一个特殊功能性物质实体，现在则开始分化，而当贵重金属继续被看作是有价值的时候，它就超越了与之联系着的特殊物质实体进而取得了它自己的特殊价值。货币为我们而存在的形式就是交换的中介和度量的价值。一种金属成为货币是通过采取这种形式而完成的，就像关于超自然的观念被整合到宗教情感的功能当中时，它们就成为宗教；或是像大理石块在艺术创造活动赋予了它一种作为艺术功能在空间上的表现形式时，就成为艺术品一样。对原始情感的提炼与升华，消解了功能的彼此融合，并允许其中的每一个都发展成为一种独立的价值。但货币的功能性价值仍然需要被表征。尽管如此，关键的一点在于，它的价值已不再来自于它所表征的是什么，相反，所表征的东西成为第二位的了，这种第二位的东西除了与价值没有什么关系的技术角度上的重要性之外，其本质没有什么重要性可言。

封面

书名页

版权页

出版说明

目录

CHAPTER 1 Value And Money

I

Ⅱ

Ⅲ

第一章 价值与货币

第一节

第二节

第三节

CHAPTER 2 The Value Of Money As A Substance

Ⅰ

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第二章 货币的物质价值

第一节

第二节

第三节

目录

CHAPTER 3 Money In The Sequence Of Purposes

I

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第三章 在目的序列中的货币

第一节

第二节

第三节

CHAPTER 4 Individual Freedom

Ⅰ

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第四章 个体自由

第一节

第二节

第三节

CHAPTER 3 Money In The Sequence Of Purposes

I

Action Towards An End As The Conscious Interaction Between Subject And Object

The great antinomy in the history of thought-whether the contents of reality are to be conceived and interpreted in terms of their causes or their consequences（i.e.the opposition between a causal and a teleological approach）-finds its original expression in a distinction within our practical motivations.The feeling that we call‘instinct’appears to be tied to a physiological process in which stored up energies strive for release.The instinctual drive terminates when these energies find expression in action.If it is simply an instinct then it is‘satisfied’as soon as it has dissolved into action.In contrast with this direct causal process，which is reflected in consciousness as a primitive instinctual feeling，are those actions that arise，so far as our consciousness is concerned，from a representation of the ends that they will achieve.In this case we experience ourselves as being drawn rather than driven.The feeling of satisfaction，therefore，does not arise from the action alone，but from the consequences that the action produces.If，for instance，an aimless inner unrest drives us to furious activity，then this belongs to the category of instinctual behaviour；if we undertake the same activity in order to attain some precise kind of well-being，then it belongs to the category of purposive behaviour.Eating exclusively to satisfy hunger falls within the first category；eating to enjoy the flavour of the dishes falls within the second.Sexual intercourse as an animal instinct belongs to the first category，but as an activity directed to the attainment of a particular kind of pleasure it belongs to the second.This distinction seems to me vital in two respects.To the extent that our actions are purely instinctual，that is causally determined in the strict sense，there is a fundamental incongruity between the psychological state，which is the cause of action，and the ensuing consequences.The state that moves us to action has no more significant qualitative relation to the action and its result than has the wind to the falling of the fruit that it blows from the trees.On the other hand，when the conception of an end is experienced as a motive，cause and effect are congruous in their conceptual and perceptible content.Nevertheless，in this case too，the cause of action is（even though this cannot be defined in a strictly scientific way）the real force of the conception or of its physical correlate，and this force or energy must be rigorously distinguished from the intellectual content of the conception.The content itself，as an ideal representation of action and events，has absolutely no force；it possesses only conceptual validity and can become real only to the extent that it is endowed with real energy，in the same way as justice and morality，as ideas，have no historical influence until they are adopted as determinants of action by real powers.The controversy over the relevance of causality or teleology to human action may thus be decided in the following way.Since the consequences of action exist in a psychologically effective form before they acquire an objective existence，a strict causal relation can be upheld.Only those intellectual conceptions that have become psychological forces need be taken into account，and thus cause and effect are entirely distinct，whereas the identity between the intellectual content of motive and consequences has absolutely nothing to do with the actual production of events.

Another difference between instinctual drives and purposive striving is still more significant for the present problem.To the extent that our action is simply causally determined（in the strict sense），the whole process comes to an end when the turbulent forces are discharged in activity，and the feelings of tension and constraint disappear as soon as the instinct culminates in action.The instinct consumes itself by its natural continuation in action and the whole process remains confined within the individual.The process that is guided by a conscious purpose is entirely different.It is directed to a definite objective result of action，and it attains its final end through the reaction of this result upon the subject or of the subject upon the result.The fundamental significance of purposive action is the interaction between subject and object.Our mere existence involves us in this interaction，and purposive action is therefore rooted in the nature of the mind.Our relationship to the world may be represented as an arc that passes from the subject to the object，incorporates the object and returns to the subject.It is true that every fortuitous and mechanical contact with things displays the same external character，but as purposive action it is suffused and held together by the unity of our consciousness.As natural beings we are in constant interaction with the world of nature，and co-ordinated with it.It is only in purposive action that the self as personality differentiates itself from the natural elements within and outside itself.Or regarded from another aspect，it is only when a purposive agent is distinguished from the purely causal system of nature that the unity of the two can be re-established at a higher level.This theoretical relationship is to be found，with some modifications，in the difference that is supposed to exist between the labour of civilized and primitive peoples.The former is said to be regular and methodical，the latter irregular and spasmodic；in other words，the former involves deliberate overcoming of our resistance to work，while the latter is only a release of nervous energy.

This does not meant that the real purpose of all purposive action is located in the acting subject，that the reason for attaining an objective always lies in the feelings that are retroactively aroused by the object.This may be the case in egoistic actions proper，but there are innumerable other actions in which the identity of motive and result is concerned only with the result in the sense of attaining the object，with the non-subjective happening.The inner energy which determines our action frequently takes into account consciously only the objective result，and excludes from the teleological process any further retroactive effects upon ourselves.Yet unless the result of our activities ultimately produced an emotion in us，the conception of it would not generate any motive force to bring it into existence.This final link in the chain of action is not，however，its final purpose；our teleologically determined volition ends very often with the objective result and does not consciously inquire beyond this point.Purposive action in contrast to causal-instinctive action（it remains to be seen whether this distinction is，so to speak，only one of approach or method）may be formulated thus：purposive action involves the conscious interweaving of our subjective energies and the objective world，and a double impact of reality upon the subject；first，in an anticipation of the content of reality in terms of subjective intention，and second，in a retroactive effect of the realization of the object in terms of a subjective emotion.The role of purpose in life evolves from these conditions.

It follows from this that so-called unmediated purposes contradict the very Concept of purpose.If purpose means a modification within objective being，this modification can be achieved only by an action that transmits the inner acceptance of the purpose to the realization of the modification.Our actions are the bridge that makes it possible for the content of the purpose to pass from its psychological form to a real form.Purpose is necessarily bound up with its means.It differs in this respect from a mere mechanism and its psychological correlate，instinct-in which the energies of each moment dissolve in the immediate result without pointing to a further stage；the next stage arises only from the immediately preceding one.Purpose has three elements whereas mechanism has only two.On the other hand，purpose also differs，by virtue of its dependence upon means，from what one might call‘divine action’.In the case of a god，it is impossible that there should exist a temporal or material interval between the will and the deed.Human action that is interposed between these two elements is only the vanquishing of obstacles that cannot exist for a god；unless we think of him in terms of terrestrial imperfection，his will must be already the reality of whatever he wills.One may speak of God's final purpose for the world only in a very qualified sense，namely as the ultimate temporal condition that concludes its destiny.If this divine decree were related to the preceding stages as a human purpose is related to its means-namely as the only thing that is valuable and desired-then it would be incomprehensible why God did not bring it about directly，without those useless and retarding intermediate stages；for he does not need the technical means that we，confronted with an autonomous world and possessing only limited strength which must accept compromises，delay and laborious achievement，require.In other words，God can have no purpose because He employs no means.

The Varying Length Of Teleological Series

This contrast makes clear the specific significance of what was emphasized above，that purposive action is an interaction between the committed self and external nature.The mechanism that exists between the will and its satisfaction constitutes，on the one hand，a bond and，on the other，a separation between them.This mechanism signifies the impossibility for the will to gain satisfaction by itself；it represents the obstacle that the will has to overcome.Purposefulness is essentially a relational concept since it always presupposes something alien to the purpose that has to be transformed.If such a transformation were not necessary，if the will contained its realization within itself，there would be no formation of purposes.Our own action in pursuit of our purposes is the first case in which we become aware of the dual character of the means；in such action we experience both the resistance of external reality and the directing energy which overcomes it，and the two experiences enter into consciousness，each developing its particular character.If our action is unable to produce the object of our purpose immediately，but must first bring about another external event which eventually produces the desired result，then the intermediate happenings have the same quality as our own action；both are mechanisms，but both are also mechanisms that connect mind with mind；both have a continuity in producing the arc of events which begins and ends in the mind.The average number of links in this are within a given form of life indicates the degree of knowledge and control of nature，as well as the breadth and refinement of the way of life.It is here that social complexities begin which culminate in the creation of money.

The following interconnections are evident：if a purpose D is to be attained and a chain of mechanical processes A，B，C has to be produced so that B is caused by A，C by B and D only by C，then this series，the content and direction of which is determined by D，depends upon the knowledge of the causal relationship between the members.If I did not know that C can produce D，B can produce C and so on，I should be helpless in my desire for D.A teleological chain can never occur unless the causal connections between its elements are known.The purpose repays this service by providing the psychological impulse to seek out causal relations.Thus，the factual and logical possibility of the teleological chain depends upon the causal relation，but the interest of this causal chain，its psychological possibility，arises from the pursuit of an end.This interaction，which expresses in a general sense the relation between theory and practice，results in the fact that the more profound awareness of causality goes hand in hand with a more profound awareness of teleology.The length of the series of purposes depends on the length of the causal series；and on the other hand，the possession of suitable means produces very often not only the realization but also the very idea of a purpose.

In order to understand the significance of this interweaving of natural and mental life，one must bear in mind the apparently obvious fact that we can attain more，and more essential，ends with a long series of means containing numerous elements than with a short series.Primitive man，who has only a limited knowledge of natural causes，is consequently restricted in his purposive action.For him，the arc of purposive action will contain as intermediate links little more than his own physical action and the direct effect that he can have upon a single object.If the expected effect does not follow from this action，then the appeal to a magical authority，who is expected somehow to produce the desired result，will appear less as a prolongation of the teleological series than as a proof that the end is unattainable.Whenever this short series proves inadequate，therefore，the purpose will be abandoned or，more likely，will not be formed at all.The prolongation of the series means that the subject，to an increasing extent，makes the force of the objects themselves work for him.As the most basic needs are satisfied，the more links are needed in the teleological series，and only a very sophisticated knowledge of causation can then succeed in reducing the number of links by discovering more direct connections and shorter paths within the natural order of things.This may lead to a reversal of the natural relationship：in relatively primitive periods，the simple necessities of life are procured by simple series of purposes，while the satisfaction of higher and more differentiated needs require more roundabout methods；but the progress of technology usually provides relatively simple and direct means of production for the latter needs while the provision for the fundamental needs of life encounters growing difficulties which have to be overcome by more complicated means.In short，cultural development tends to prolong the teleological series for what is close to us and to shorten the series for what is remote.

The Tool As Intensified Means

Here，the very important concept of the tool must enter into our consideration of purposive action.The primary form of the teleological sequence is that in which our action produces reactions in an external object，and these reactions，following a course determined by their own nature，culminate in the desired effects.The use of tools involves interposing another factor between the subject and this object，a factor that occupies an intermediate position not only in terms of space and time but also in terms of its content.For on the one hand a tool is a mere object which is mechanically effective，but on the other hand it is also an object that we not merely operate upon ，but operate with ，as with our own hands.The tool is an intensified instrument，for its form and existence are predetermined by the end，whereas in the primary teleological process natural objects are only later made to serve our purposes.The person who plants a seed in order to enjoy the fruit of the plant at a later date，instead of being satisfied with wild fruits，acts teleologically，but the purposive action is limited to his hand.If，however，he uses a spade and hoe he removes himself further from the point at which natural processes operate by themselves，and he enhances the subjective factor in relation to the objective factor.By using tools we deliberately add a new link to the chain of purposive action，thus showing that the straight road is not always the shortest.The tool is typical of what we might call our creations in the external world；on the one hand it is formed exclusively by our own powers，and on the other it is devoted entirely to our own purposes.Because the tool is not itself an end it lacks the relative independence that the end implies，either as an absolute value or as something that will produce an effect upon us：it is an absolute means.The principle of the tool is not only effective in the physical world.Where self-interest is not focused directly upon material production，but mental conditions or non-material events are involved，the tool attains a still more refined form，inasmuch as it is now really the creation of our will and does not have to compromise with the attributes of a material substance that is fundamentally alien to purpose.The most typical instances of this kind of tool are perhaps social institutions，by means of which the individual can attain ends for which his personal abilities would never suffice.Membership of a state provides the protection that is a prerequisite for most individual purposive action；but leaving aside this most general aspect，the particular institutions of civil law make possible for the individual achievements that would otherwise be denied to him.In the roundabout legal forms of contract，testament，adoption，etc.，the individual possesses a collectively established tool that multiplies his own powers，extends their effectiveness and secures their ends.Fortuitous elements are eliminated and the homogeneity of interests makes possible an increase in the services rendered；from the interaction of individuals there develop objective institutions which become the junction of countless individual teleological sequences and provide an efficient tool for otherwise unattainable purposes.It is the same with religious rites，which are tools of the Church，serving to objectify the typical emotions of the religious community.They are，no doubt，a digression from the ultimate end of religious sentiment，but a digression by means of a tool which，in contrast to all material tools，serves exclusively those ends that the individual is otherwise unable to attain.

Motley As The Purest Example Of The Tool

Here，finally，we reach the point at which money finds its place in the interweaving of purposes.I will begin with some generally accepted facts.All economic transactions rest upon the fact that I want something that someone else owns，and that he will transfer it to me if I give him something I own that he wants.It is obvious that the final link in this two-sided process will not always be present when the first link appears；on many occasions I want the object A which A possesses，but the object or service B which I am willing to give in return does not interest A；or else the goods offered are acceptable to both parties but no agreement can be reached about the respective quantities.Thus，it is of great value in the attainment of our purposes that an intermediate link should be introduced into the chain of purposes；something into which I can change B at any time and which can itself be changed into A-in much the same way as any form of power，from water，wind，etc.，can be transformed into another form of power by means of a dynamo.Just as my thoughts must take the form of a universally understood language so that I can attain my practical ends in this roundabout way，so must my activities and possessions take the form of money value in order to serve my more remote purposes.Money is the purest form of the tool，in the category mentioned above；it is an institution through which the individual concentrates his activity and possessions in order to attain goals that he could not attain directly.The fact that everyone works with it makes its character as a tool more evident than was the case in the examples given earlier.The nature and effectiveness of money is not to be found simply in the coin that I hold in my hand；its qualities are invested in the social organizations and the supra-subjective norms that make this coin a tool of endlessly diverse and extensive uses despite its material limitations，its insignificance and rigidity.It is characteristic of the State and of religious rites that，since they are constituted entirely by mental powers and do not have to compromise with any independent material objects，they can express their purpose fully in themselves.Yet they are so close to their specific purposes，indeed almost identical with them，that we often hesitate to recognize that they are tools（which would make them instruments without value in themselves，brought to life only by the will behind them）and regard them as ultimate moral values.In the case of money，its character as an instrument is very rarely obscured.By contrast with the other institutions mentioned earlier，money has no inherent relation to the specific purpose the attainment of which it aids.Money is totally indifferent to the objects because it is separated from them by the fact of exchange.What money mediates is not the possession of an object but the exchange of objects.Money in its perfected forms is an absolute means because，on the one hand，it is completely teleologically determined and is not influenced by any determination from a different series，while on the other hand it is restricted to being a pure means and tool in relation to a given end，has no purpose of its own and functions impartially as an intermediary in the series of purposes.Money is perhaps the clearest expression and demonstration of the fact that man is a‘tool-making’animal，which，however，is itself connected with the fact that man is a‘purposive’animal.The concept of means characterizes the position of man in the world；he is not dependent as is an animal upon the mechanism of instinctual life and immediate volition and enjoyment，nor does he have unmediated power，such as we attribute to a god，such that his will is identical with its realization.He stands between the two in so far as he can extend his will far beyond the present moment，but can realize it only in a roundabout way through a teleological series which has several links.Love，which according to Plato is an intermediate stage between possessing and notpossessing，is in the inner subjective life what means are in the objective external world.For man，who is always striving，never satisfied，always becoming，love is the true human condition.Means，on the other hand，and their enhanced form，the tool，symbolize the human genus.The tool illustrates or incorporates the grandeur of the human will，and at the same time its limitations.The practical necessity to introduce a series of intermediate steps between ourselves and our ends has perhaps given rise to the concept of the past，and so has endowed man with his specific sense of life，of its extent and its limits，as a watershed between past and future.Money is the purest reification of means，a concrete instrument which is absolutely identical with its abstract concept；it is a pure instrument.The tremendous importance of money for understanding the basic motives of life lies in the fact that money embodies and sublimates the practical relation of man to the objects of his will，his power and his impotence；one might say，paradoxically，that man is an indirect being.I am here concerned with the relation of money to the totality of human life only in so far as it illuminates our immediate problem，which is to comprehend the nature of money through the internal and external relationships that find their expression，their means or their effects in money.I shall add here to the functions previously discussed one that shows with particular clarity how the abstract character of money is transposed into practical reality.

The Unlimited Possibilities For The Utilization Of Money

I noted earlier that the representation and provision of means does not always depend upon an already formed purpose；the availability of materials and forces often provokes us to form certain purposes which these means will enable us to attain.Once a purpose has engendered the idea of means，the means may produce the conception of a purpose.This relationship，frequently modified but enduring，may be seen in the case of tools，which I characterized as the purest kind of means.While ordinary，simple means are entirely used up in achieving the purpose，a tool continues to exist apart from its particular application and is capable of a variety of other uses that cannot be foreseen.This is true not only for thousands of cases in daily life that need not be exemplified，but also in much more complicated situations.How often are military organizations，which were intended for external deployment，used by a dynasty for internal political ends？How often does a relationship among individuals which was originally established for a particular purpose grow beyond this and become the bearer of altogether different contents，with the result that one may say of all enduring human associations-familial，economic，religious，political or social-that they have a tendency to acquire purposes for which they were not originally conceived？It is obvious that a tool will be more significant and valuable-ceteris paribas -if it has various and extensive uses.At the same time，it must then become more neutral and colourless，more objective in relation to particular interests and more remote from any specific purpose.Money as the means par excellence fulfils this condition perfectly；from this point of view its importance is enhanced.The matter can be put as follows.The value of a given quantity of money exceeds the value of the particular object for which it is exchanged，because it makes possible the choice of any other object in an unlimited area.Of course，the money can be used ultimately only for one of the objects，but the choice that it offers is a bonus which increases its value.Since money is not related at all to a specific purpose，it acquires a relation to the totality of purposes.Money is the tool that has the greatest possible number of unpredictable uses and so possesses the maximum value attainable in this respect.The mere possibility of unlimited uses that money has，or represents，on account of its lack of any content of its own，is manifested in a positive way by the restlessness of money，by its urge to be used，so to speak.As in the case of languages such as French，which have a limited vocabulary，the need to employ the same expression for different things makes possible a wealth of allusions，references and psychological overtones，and one might almost say that their wealth results from their poverty；so the absence of any inner significance of money engenders the abundance of its practical uses，and indeed provides the impulse to fill its infinite conceptual categories with new formations，to give new content to its form，because it is never a conclusion but only a transitional point for each content.In the last analysis，the whole vast range of commodities can only be exchanged for one value，namely money；but money can be exchanged for any one of the range of commodities.By contrast with labour，which can rarely change its application，and the less easily the more specialized it is，capital in the form of money can almost always be transferred from one use to another，at worst with a loss，but often with a gain.The worker can hardly ever extricate his art and skill from his trade and invest it somewhere else.By comparison with the owner of money he is at a disadvantage so far as free choice is concerned，just as the merchant is.Thus，the value of a given amount of money is equal to the value of any object for which it might be exchanged plus the value of free choice between innumerable other objects，and this is an asset that has no analogy in the area of commodities or labour.

This surplus value of money appears all the more important if one considers the nature of the decision to which this power of choice leads in reality.It has been asserted that a commodity that is limited in quantity and has alternative uses will be valued by its owners with respect to its most important use；all other uses will appear uneconomic and unreasonable.On the other hand，a supply of goods that is sufficient or more than sufficient for all possible uses，so that the goods compete to be used，will be valued according to its least important use.The most important use becomes the measure of the object if there are competing uses.This is most fully and effectively demonstrated by money.Since money can be used for any economic purpose，a given amount of it can be used to satisfy the most important subjective need for the moment.The choice is not limited，as is the case with all other commodities，and，because human desires know no limit，a great variety of possible uses is always competing for any given quantity of money.Since the decision will always be in favour of the good that is desired most intensely，money must be valued at any moment as equivalent to the most important interest experienced at that moment.A supply of wood or a building plot that is adequate only for one of several desired uses，and which is therefore valued according to the most valuable of those uses，cannot have a significance beyond the region of things of its own kind.Money，however，has no such limitation，and so its value corresponds with the most important universal interest of the individual that can be satisfied with the available supply.

The opportunity of choice which money as an abstract instrument provides applies not only to the goods offered at any one time，but also to the date when it can be used.The value of a commodity is not determined simply by its practical significance at the moment of its use.The relative freedom of choice in timing the use is a factor that can increase or diminish considerably the value placed upon the commodity.The first of these possibilities of choice results from the coexistence of different uses，the second from the existence of alternative uses over time.Other things being equal，that commodity is more valuable which I can but do not have to use immediately.The range of commodities falls into a graduated series of values between two extremes：at one end is the commodity that can be enjoyed later but not now.If，for example，fish caught during the summer is exchanged for furs that are going to be worn in the winter，then the value of the fish is increased by the fact that I can consume it immediately，whereas the value of the furs is affected by the fact that the delay in using them involves the risk of damage，loss or devaluation.On the other hand，the value of the fish is diminished because it will no longer be fresh tomorrow，and the value of the furs is increased because they will still be serviceable at a later date.An object used as a means of exchange is most suitable for money，if it possesses both of these value-enhancing qualities.Money as a pure instrument represents their highest possible synthesis because it has no specific quality for a specific use，but is only a tool for acquiring concrete values，and because the opportunities for using it are just as great at any point of time and for any object.

The superiority of the owner of money over the owner of commodities results from this unique quality of money as being unrelated to all particular characteristics of things or moments of time，dissociated from any purpose，and a purely abstract means.There are some exceptions to this，such as the refusal to sell on ideological grounds，boycotts and cartels，but these arise only when the objects of exchange in that particular situation cannot be replaced by other objects.The freedom of choice and also the particular advantage that money confers upon its owner are then eliminated precisely because there is a single object of desire instead of a choice.In general，the owner of money enjoys this twofold liberty and he will demand a recompense if he relinquishes it in favour of the owner of goods.This is shown，for example，by the economically and psychologically interesting principle of the‘supplement’.When goods that can be measured or weighed are purchased the merchant is expected to‘measure liberally’，that is to add at least one additional unit，and he usually does so.It must be taken into account that a mistake is more likely in measuring goods than in counting money，but the important feature is that the buyer has the power to enforce an interpretation of this possibility in his own favour even though the chances of advantage or disadvantage are equal for both parties.It is significant that the advantage is given to the buyer even when the other party is also dealing in money.The customer expects the banker，the insured expects the insurance company in case of a claim，to deal‘fairly’，that is to give a little more，even if only in a formal way，than what is enforceable by law.The bank and the insurance company also trade only in money，but the customer for his part does not think of being‘fair’or‘liberal’；he only offers what has been agreed upon beforehand.The sums of money offered on each side have in fact quite a different significance.For the banker and the insurance company the money with which they operate is simply a commodity that they can use only in this particular way；for the customer it is‘money’in the sense with which we are here concerned，namely a value that he can，but need not necessarily，use for stock exchange business or insurance.The freedom to use the money for diverse purposes gives the customer an advantage which is compensated by the‘fairness’of the other party.Where a supplement is given by the owner of money，as in tipping waiters and taxi-drivers，this merely expresses the social superiority of the giver，which is the presupposition of tipping.Like all other monetary phenomena these are not occurrences isolated from the rest of human life；they display in a particularly clear and obvious manner a fundamental characteristic of life，namely that in every relationship the individual who has less interest in the substance of the relationship is at an advantage.This may appear paradoxical，since the more intense the desire to possess something or to establish a relationship，the more intense and passionate is the enjoyment of it.It is indeed the anticipated enjoyment that determines the strength of our desire.Yet it is just this situation that gives an advantage to the less interested party，for it is in the nature of things that the one who benefits less should be compensated by some concessions from the other party.This is apparent even in the most refined and intimate relations.In every love relationship，the one who is less involved has an advantage，because the other renounces from the very beginning any exploitation of the relationship，is more ready to make sacrifices，and offers a greater measure of devotion in exchange for the greater satisfaction that he derives.Equity is thus established：since the degree of desire corresponds with the degree of enjoyment it is right that the relationship should provide the individual who is less involved with a special gain，which he is able to exact because he is more hesitant，more reserved and more ready to make conditions.Thus the profit of the one who gives money is not altogether unfair；since he is usually less interested in the commodity money transaction，an agreement between the two parties is brought about by the one who is more interested in the transaction giving to the other a gain over and above the objective equivalence of the exchange values.It should also be borne in mind that the owner of money has this advantage not because he possesses money，but because he is prepared to part with it.

The profit that accrues to money because it is detached from any particular content or process of the economy is also shown in other ways，and particularly in the fact that owners of money usually profit from violent and ruinous economic upheavals，often to an extraordinary extent.However many bankruptcies and business failures result from price slumps or from commodity market booms，experience has shown that the big bankers usually make a steady profit out of these dangers that confront sellers and buyers，creditors and debtors.The services of money，as the neutral tool of economic processes，have to be paid for regardless of the direction or pace of these processes.Of course，money has to pay something for this freedom；the uncommitted nature of money means that contradictory demands are made upon the dispenser of money from different sides，and that he excites the suspicion of betrayal more easily than does the individual who deals in specific commodities.In early modem times，when the great financial powers-the Fuggers，the Welsers，the Florentine and Genoan bankers-entered the political arena，particularly during the great struggle between the Habsburgs and the French monarchy for European hegemony，they were regarded with permanent mistrust by all parties，including those to whom they had lent vast sums of money.One never could be sure of the financiers，whose money transactions did not commit them beyond the present moment；and even the enemy against whom they had lent their financial support did not regard this as an obstacle to approaching them himself with requests and propositions.Money has the very positive quality that is designated by the negative concept of lack of character.The individual whom we regard as a weak character is not directed by the inner worth of persons，things or thoughts，but by the external pressure that is brought to bear upon him.The fact that money is detached from all specific contents and exists only as a quantity earns for money and for those people who are only interested in money the quality of characterlessness.This is the almost logically necessary reverse side of the advantages of finance and of the over-valuation of money in relation to qualitative values.The superiority of money is expressed first in the fact that the seller is more interested and eager than the buyer.A very significant feature of our whole attitude towards objects is involved here；namely，when two opposing classes of values are considered as a whole，the first class may be distinctly superior to the second，while the individual objects or representatives of the second group may be superior to those of the first.Faced with a choice between the totality of material goods and the totality of ideal goods，we should probably be obliged to choose the first，because to renounce it would be to negate life，including all its ideal contents；but on the other hand，we might not hesitate to give up any single material good in exchange for an ideal good.In our relations with other people we do not question that one relationship is much more valuable and indispensable than another，when viewed as a whole；but on particular occasions and in particular aspects the less valuable relationship may be more enjoyable and attractive.This is how matters stand in the relation between money and concrete objects of value；a choice between the objects as a whole and money as a whole would immediately reveal the intrinsic valuelessness of the latter，which provides us only with means，not with an end.Yet when a given sum of money is set against a given quantity of commodities，the exchange of the latter for the former is usually demanded much more strongly than vice-versa.This relationship exists not only between commodities and money in general，but also between money and particular categories of commodities.A single pin is almost worthless，but pins in general are almost indispensable and‘worth their weight in gold’.The case is similar with many kinds of commodities；the ease with which a single specimen can be supplied in return for money devalues it in relation to money，which now appears as a ruling power disposing over the object.But the significance of the class of object as a whole seems incommensurable with money；it has a value independent of money which is often concealed from our notice by the fact that the single specimen can so easily be replaced.However，since our practical economic interests are almost exclusively concerned with single units or with a limited number of units，our sense of the value of objects generally employs the measuring rod of money.This is evidently connected with the overriding interest in possessing money rather than commodities.

The Unearned Increment Of Wealth

This leads to a more general phenomenon，which might be termed the surplus value of wealth and which resembles the unearned rent of land.The wealthy man enjoys advantages beyond the enjoyment of what he can buy with his money.The merchant supplies him more reliably and more cheaply than he does poorer people；everyone he meets，whether likely to profit from his wealth or not，is more deferential；he moves in an ideal atmosphere of unquestioned privilege.One can observe everywhere all manner of small privileges being granted to the purchaser of expensive goods and to the first-class traveller；privileges that have as little connection with the objective value as has the friendly smile of the merchant with the more expensive goods that he is selling.These privileges are a gratuitous supplement，and their most painful feature is perhaps that the consumer of cheaper goods，who is denied them，cannot complain that he is being cheated.This can be best illustrated by a very minor instance.The streetcars in some cities have two separate classes which differ in price，although the more expensive class offers no material advantage in the way of greater comfort.What the traveller buys with his first-class ticket is the right to join the exclusive company of those who pay such a higher price in order to be separated from the second-class passengers.Thus the well-to-do individual can acquire an advantage simply by spending more money，without necessarily receiving a material equivalent for his expenditure.

Viewed from the outside，it may seem that this is the opposite of an unearned increment，because the well-to-do individual receives relatively less，not relatively more，for his money.But the unearned increment of wealth appears here in a negative，but pure，form；the rich man gains an advantage without recourse to an object and exclusively by virtue of the fact that other people cannot spend as much money as he can.Wealth，indeed，is often regarded as a kind of moral merit，as is indicated by the term‘respectability’and by popular references to the well-to-do as‘upright citizens’or‘the betterclass public’.The same phenomenon is shown from the other side by the fact that the poor are treated as if they were guilty，that beggars are angrily driven away，and that even goodnatured people consider themselves naturally superior to the poor.When it was decreed in 1536 that the journeyman locksmiths in Strasbourg who earned more than eight kreuzer should have a holiday on Monday afternoons，a bonus was given to those who were better off，when moral logic suggests that it should have been given to the needy.It is not uncommon for the unearned increment of wealth to attain such a degree of perversity：practical idealism，when it is manifested in the unpaid scientific work of a wealthy man，is generally more highly esteemed than is the work of a poor schoolteacher.This usurious interest upon wealth，these advantages that its possessor gains without being obliged to give anything in return，are bound up with the money form of value.For those phenomena obviously express or reflect that unlimited freedom of use which distinguishes money from all other values.This it is that creates the state of affairs in which a rich man has an influence not only by what he does but also by what he could do；a great fortune is encircled by innumerable possibilities of use，as though by an astral body，which extend far beyond the employment of the income from it on the benefits which the income brings to other people.The German language indicates this by the use of the word Vermögen ，which means‘to be able to do something’，for a great fortune.These possibilities，only a small number of which can be realized，are nevertheless put to account psychologically.They convey the impression of an indeterminate power which is not confined to the achievement of a particular result，and this impression is all the stronger the more mobile and more easily available for any purpose the possessions are；that is to say，the more the fortune consists of money or is convertible to money，and the more distinctly money itself has become a tool and a point of transition without any purpose of its own.The pure potentiality of money as a means is distilled in a general conception of power and significance which becomes effective as real power and significance for the owner of money.It is like the attraction of a work of art，which is produced not only by its content and the associated psychological reactions，but by all the accidental，individual and indirect complexes of feeling that it makes possible.Only the indeterminate sum of these feelings circumscribes the whole value and significance of a work of art.

The Difference Between The Same Amount Of Money As Part Of A Large And Of A Small Fortune

If this interpretation of the unearned increment of wealth is correct，then the increment will be greater when the circumstances of the owner provide better opportunities and more freedom to use it.A poor man has the fewest opportunities，because his money income is adequate only for the basic needs of life and allows almost no latitude in the choice of uses.This latitude increases with increasing income，and each unit of the growing income becomes more valuable to the extent that it differs from those units that are necessary for the satisfaction of basic and predetermined needs；that is，each additional unit of income includes a larger proportion of unearned increment，though of course this is only the case up to a relatively high level of income，beyond which each unit of income is equal in this respect.Here the phenomenon we are considering can be seen in a particular context，and in a way that seems to me especially fruitful.Many commodities are available in such abundance that they cannot all be consumed by the well-to-do members of society and they have to be offered to the poorer strata of society if they are to be sold at all.The prices of such goods cannot be higher than these strata are able to afford.One might refer to this as‘the law of consumer's price limitation’，according to which the price of a commodity can never exceed the amount that the social strata to whom the available supply must be offered is able to pay.This may be interpreted as an application of marginal utility theory to the social scene；instead of the least urgent need that can still be satisfied by a commodity，it is the need of those with the least ability to pay that becomes decisive for price formation.This phenomenon involves a tremendous advantage for the well-to-do，since the indispensable goods are now available to him at a much lower price than he would be willing to pay if necessary.Because the poor man has to buy the simple necessities of life he makes them cheap for the wealthy man.Even if the latter had to spend the same proportion of his income as the poor man for his basic needs（food，shelter and clothing），he would still have more money left for luxuries.Instead，he has the additional advantage that he can satisfy his basic needs with a relatively smaller part of his income，and with the remaining part he has freedom of choice in the use of his money，which makes him an object of respect and deference beyond his actual economic income.The pecuniary resources of the poor are not surrounded by this sphere of unlimited possibilities，because they immediately and undoubtedly terminate in very definite purposes.For the poor，these resources are not simply‘means’at their disposal in the same pure and abstract sense as they are for the rich，because the purpose is already embedded in them and colours and directs them.The German language very subtly terms those who own a considerable amount of money bemittelt ，that is，equipped with means.The freedom associated with such resources leads to yet another unearned increment.Wherever public functionaries are unpaid，it is only well-to-do people who are able to hold the leading positions.The general of the Achaean League，just as much as the English member of Parliament-at least until recently-had to be well off.For this reason，in countries that paid their officials very little，a complete plutocracy，a form of hereditary concentration of high officials in a few families，often developed.Whereas it seems that unsalaried positions separate money interests from the interest in service，the positions of officials，with all the honour，power and opportunities associated with them，become an annex of wealth.It is obvious that this situation is best served by the money form of wealth because its teleological indifference allows the personage completely free disposal of his time，his place of residence and the direction of his activities.The honours acquired by wealth and the moral esteem that it enjoys is condensed，through the unsalaried official functions，to a centre of power in leading offices that is unattainable to the poor.This is，in turn，related to a further unearned increment，associated with the fame of service to one's country，which，though often quite deserved，is granted on other than ethical grounds，namely on the purely technical grounds of mere money ownership.We observe the same situation at a higher level，when，at the end of the Middle Ages in Lübeck，wealthy people liked to join several fraternities to make their salvation more secure.The technical means for the attainment of religious blessing in the medieval Church were often such that only the wealthy could use them.Aside from their transcendental purpose，and as an unearned discount，they brought with them a certain amount of worldly prestige and advantage such as the membership in several fraternities.At the psychological level，the overstepping of the property boundary outlined above produces the following unearned increment：the question of how much a desired object costs in many cases plays no role at all for those who are extremely wealthy.This means much more than is usually associated with this everyday expression.As long as the income is tied to definite purposes，every expenditure is unavoidably burdened with the thought of the required costs；for the majority of people the question of‘How much？’stands between a desire and its satisfaction.It implies a certain materialization of things that does not exist for the real financial aristocrat.Whoever owns money beyond a certain level thereby gains the additional advantage of being allowed to be contemptuous of it.The way of life that does not have to consider the money value of things has an extraordinary aesthetic charm.The acquisition of things can be determined exclusively by objective points of view，dependent only on the content and the significance of the objects.Although the domination of money may depreciate the specific qualities of things and the awareness of them in so many respects，there are undeniably other phenomena that money enhances.The qualities of objects have at least the psychological chance，even though rarely realized，to be more in evidence，if what they have in common-economic value-is projected on to and localized in another form which lies outside them.Every way of life that does not have to take money into account avoids the distractions and shadows that arise for the purely objective quality and valuation of things through which these internally completely alien relations arrive at their money price.Wherever the less well-to-do person is able to purchase the same object as the very rich person，the latter enjoys the psychological unearned increment of ease and directness.Unlike the less prosperous person，the very rich person is not distracted in his acquisition and enjoyment by the problem of sacrificing money.In a contrary manner，we shall see later that the bias attitude deadens the particularity and specific charms of things and reduces them to shadows of monetary wealth.Yet far from disproving the other relation，it merely illustrates the essential qualities of money：through its distancing from every specific determination，money is able to take up the threads of internal and external life that run in completely opposite directions and to act as a tool of decisive cultural and representational importance for any one of them.This is the incomparable significance of money for the evolutionary process of the practical mind；it achieves the utmost reduction of the specific qualities and the onesided character of all empirical forms.What one might term the tragedy of human concept formation lies in the fact that the higher concept，which through its breadth embraces a growing number of details，must count upon increasing loss of content.Money is the perfect practical counterpart of such a higher category，namely a form of being whose qualities are generality and lack of content；a form of being that endows these qualities with real power and whose relation to all the contrary qualities of the objects transacted and to their psychological constellations can be equally interpreted as service and as domination.

The unearned increment of the ownership of money is nothing but a single instance of what one might call the metaphysical quality of money；namely，to extend beyond every particular use and，since it is the ultimate means，to realize the possibility of all values as the value of all possibilities.

Money's Congruence With Those Who Are Marginal

I wish to extract from the sphere of activity of these relations a second series of relations.The importance of money as a means，independent of all specific ends，results in the fact that money becomes the centre of interest and the proper domain of individuals and classes who，because of their social position，are excluded from many kinds of personal and specific goals.The emancipated Roman slaves were predisposed towards monetary transactions because they lacked any chance of achieving complete citizen status.Already in Athens，at the very inception of pure monetary transactions in the fourth century，the wealthiest banker，Pasion，had started his career as a slave.In Turkey the Armenians，a despised and often persecuted people，are frequently merchants and moneylenders，as，under similar circumstances，were the Moors in Spain.In India these circumstances are a frequent occurrence.On the one hand，the socially oppressed and yet cautiously advancing Parsee are mostly money-changers or bankers，while on the other hand in some parts of southern India，money business and wealth are in the hands of the Chetty，a mixed caste，who，because of imperfect caste purity，have very little prestige.Similarly，the Huguenots in France，like the Quakers in England，applied themselves with the greatest intensity to money acquisition because of their explsed and restricted position.To exclude someone in principle from the acquisition of money is almost impossible because all possible paths constantly lead to it.Money transactions require less technical training than any other trade and therefore more easily evade control and interference；in addition，people who require money are usually in desperate need and are willing both to contact people who would normally be despised and to go to normally shunned hiding places.Because the outlawed cannot be kept away from the sphere of pure money interests，there develops an association between these two factors operating in different directions：on the one hand，the person dealing merely with money is threatened with becoming socially délassé ，which usually he can escape only through his power and indispensability，and on the other hand the vagabonds of the Middle Ages，who were in other respects legally discriminated against，were treated impartially before the law in money matters.The same result will occur if the exclusion of social groups from the full rights and benefits of citizenship is enforced not through legal or otherwise imposed regulations，but through voluntary renunciation itself.After the Quakers had already attained full political equality，they themselves rejected the interests of others：they did not take an oath and therefore could not accept a public office；they refused everything that was associated with the adornment of life，even sport；they even had to give up farming because they did not want to pay tithe.Thus，in order to retain an external life interest，they were directed towards money as the sole interest in life to which they had access.In the same way，it has been pointed out that in the Herrenhuter community its members lack all interest in the sciences，the arts and cheerful sociability and that，aside from religious interest，only naked acquisitiveness as a practical impulse remains.The industry and greed of many Herrenhuter and pietists was not，therefore，a symptom of hypocrisy but of a degenerate Christendom，decaying cultural interests and of a piety that does not tolerate the superior values of this world，but only those associated with the baseness of the world.Indeed，even at the opposite levels of the social scale，it is ominous that the interest in money remains the last，the most dogged and persistent interest after all others are gone.The French aristocracy of the ancien régime withdrew from its social obligations because of the growing centralization of the State which had taken over the administration of the rural areas.Since the State had taken away all tangible and valuable functions of domination from the aristocracy，land ownership lost all significance save as a basis for making money.This was the last remaining point of interest，and everything that formerly had been a living bond between aristocrat and peasant was now reduced to money interests.Whereas money transaction becomes the ultima ratio of the socially disadvantaged and suppressed elements，the power of money contributes positively to the attainment of positions，influence and enjoyments wherever people are excluded from achieving，by certain direct means，social rank and fulfilment as officials or in professions from which they are barred.Because money is indeed a mere means，though on an absolute scale，and since money lacks all particularity derived from whatever actual determinations，it is the unconditional terminus quo to everything，as well as the unconditional terminus ad quem from everywhere.Therefore equivalent circumstances emerge where sections of groups are not excluded from the sequence of purposes，and the identical teleological formation is valid for the whole group.The Spartans，to whom the pursuit of any economic interest was strictly forbidden，are reported to have been very greedy.It seems that the passion for possessions，whose distribution had been impractically systematized by the Lycian constitution，burst out precisely where ownership possessed the least specific character and where restrictions were least able to be imposed.It has also been mentioned that over a long period in Sparta there was no difference between the poor and the wealthy with regard to the practical enjoyment of possessions，and that the wealthy did not live any better than did the poor.Thus，acquisitiveness had to focus all the more on the possession of money.The same state of affairs came about when，as one of the Ephoros-the Spartan magistrates-reports，Aegina became a similar major trading place because the poor quality of the soil suggested trade to the inhabitants-and Aegina was the first place in Greece proper where coins were minted！Because money is the common point of intersection of the sequence of purposes that stretches from every point of the economic world to every other，it is accepted by everyone from everyone.At the time when the curse of‘dishonesty’weighed most heavily on certain occupations，people still accepted money from the hangman even though they were looking for an honest person to handle it first.Aware of this overriding power of money，Macaulay defended the emancipation of the Jews on the grounds that it would be nonsense to withhold political rights from them，because money already gave them the substance of power.They could buy voters or control kings；as creditors they could dominate their debtors，so that political rights would be nothing but the formal acknowledgment of what they already possessed.In order to really deprive them of their political rights one would have to kill them and rob them；if they kept their money-‘so we may take away the shadow，but we must leave them the substance’，a very characteristic expression for the teleological inversion of the concept of money-then，in purely factual terms，one would certainly be inclined to characterize social，political and personal positions as possessing a real and substantial value while money-in itself the empty symbolization of other values-would be seen as a mere shadow！

There is no need to emphasize that the Jews are the best example of the correlation between the central role of money interests and social deprivation.I only want to mention two viewpoints as particularly important for the basic significance of money.Because the wealth of the Jews consisted of money，they became particularly sough-after and profitable object of exploitation，for no other possessions can be expropriated as easily，simply and without loss.Just as one can rank economic goods in the light of their acquisition through labour on a scale of greater or less utility，so one can do the same for their acquisition by robbery.If one deprives somebody of his land，it is impossible-except by turning it into cash-to realize the benefit right away，since time，effort and expenses are required.Personal effects are naturally more practical to cope with，although here too differences exist：in medieval England，for instance，wool was most useful in this respect，since it was a sort of circulating medium used by Parliament to grant taxes to the king and used by the king to squeeze money from the merchants.Money is the extreme point of this scale.The same specific character of money as lacking in any specific determinacy which made it the most suitable and the least refusable source of income for the Jews in their position as pariahs，also made it the most convenient and direct incentive for exploiting them.If，with regard to the medieval pogroms，we are informed that in some cities the persecution was directed against the wealthy while in others against the poor Jews，then this is surely no counter-evidence，but is rather the other side to the growing power of money.

The relationship of Jews to money in general is more evident in a sociological constellation that gives expression to that character of money.The role that the stranger plays within a social group directs him，from the outset，towards relations with the group that are mediated by money，above all because of the transportability and the extensive usefulness of money outside the boundaries of the group.The relation between the nature of money and the stranger is already noticeable among some primitive people.Money consists there of tokens that are imported；for instance，in the Solomon Islands and among the Ibo on the Niger a kind of industry exists that manufactures tokens out of shells or other monetary symbols.These tokens circulate as money not in the place of production but in the neighboring areas to which they are exported.This calls to mind fashion，which is so often particularly valued and powerful if it is imported.Money and fashion are forms of social interaction and it seems that social elements，just like the focusing of our eyes，sometimes converge best on a point that is not too close.The stranger as a person is predominantly interested in money for the same reason that makes money so valuable to the socially deprived：namely，because it provides chances for him that are open to fully entitled persons or to the indigenous people by specific concrete channels and by personal relationships.It has also been emphasized that it was strangers who，in front of the Babylonian Temple，threw money to the native girls who then prostituted themselves for it.There is another connection between the sociological importance of the stranger and of money.The pure monetary transaction is obviously something secondary；the basic interest in money expresses itself first and foremost in trade.For good reason，the trader is usually a stranger at the beginning of economic development.As long as the economic spheres are small and do not yet pessess a highly developed division of labour，direct exchange or purchase suffices for necessary distribution；the trader is required only for the provision of goods produced in far-away areas.The decisiveness of this relationship is demonstrated by its reversibility：not only is the trader a stranger，but the stranger is also disposed to become a trader.This becomes evident as soon as the stranger is not only temporarily present in the society but settles and looks for permanent support within the group.Thus，the citizens in Phto's Laws are prohibited from owning gold and silver，and all trade and manufacturing is specifically reserved for strangers.The fact that the Jews became a trading people is due not only to their suppression but also to their dispersal throughout all countries.The Jews became familiar with money business only during the last Babylonian exile，prior to which time it was unknown to them.This is emphasized by the fact that it was particularly the Jews of the Diaspora who followed this profession in large numbers.Dispersed peoples，crowded into more or less closed cultural circles，can hardly put down roots or find a free position in production.They are therefore dependent on intermediate trade which is much more elastic than primary production，since the sphere of trade can be expanded almost limitlessly by merely formal combinations and can absorb people from outside whose roots do not lie in the group.

The basic trait of Jewish mentality to be much more interested in logicalformal combinations than in substantive creative production must be understood in the light of their economic condition.The fact that the Jew was a stranger who was not organically connected with his economic group directed him to trade and its sublimation in pure monetary transactions.With a most remarkable insight into the Jewish situation，a statute of Osnabrück at the turn of the thirteenth century permitted the Jews to take 1 per cent interest per week and thus per cent yearly，whereas the usual rate was to per cent per year at the most.It was of particular importance that the Jew was a stranger not only with regard to the local people，but also with regard to religion.Since the medieval ban on taking interest was therefore not valid for him，he became the recognized person for money lending.The high interest rate charged by Jews was the result of their being excluded from land ownership：mortgages on landed property were never safe for them，and so they always feared that a higher authority would declare their claims null and void（as did King Wenzel for Franken in 1390，Charles Ⅳ in 1347 for the burgrave of Nuremberg，and Duke Henry of Bavaria in 1338 for the citizens of Straubing）.

The stranger needs a higher risk premium for his enterprises and loans.This connection is not only valid for the Jews，but is deeply rooted in the essence of trade and of money and is just as important for a series of other phenomena.I will refer here only to those in modem times.The world stock exchanges of the sixteenth century，Lyons and Antwerp，gained their distinctive character through strangers on the basis of almost unlimited freedom of trade which the alien merchant enjoyed here.This again is bound up with the money transactions characteristic of these places：a money economy and free trade possess a deep inner relationship，no matter how often it may be obscured by historical accidents and mistaken principles of governments.The role of the stranger in financial transactions illustrates their inter-relationship clearly.The financial importance of some Florentine families during the Medici period was based on the fact that they were banished by the Medici or deprived of their political power.In order to regain strength and importance，they were dependent on financial transactions，since they could not pursue any other business away from home.It is worth observing how，on closer scrutiny，other concurrent but apparently contradictory events reveal the same relationship.When Antwerp in the sixteenth century was the undisputed centre of world trade，its importance rested upon the strangers，the Italians，Spaniards，Portuguese，British and Germans，who settled there and sold their merchandise.The native people of Antwerp played a very restricted role in trading and were employed mainly as commission agents and as bankers in financial business.In this international society unified by the interests of world trade，the native people played the role that is otherwise often played by the stranger.What is decisive here is the sociological relationship between a large group and some estranged individuals.The latter，because they do not have any direct relationship with more concrete interests，turn towards financial transactions.In most cases such a relation develops between the native people and strangers；when the Anglo-Saxons had absorbed the British population whom they had not expelled they called them‘the strangers’；wherever，as in Antwerp，strangers represent a large cohesive group and where it is the native people who are the dispersed minority，then the result shows that the same sociological cause has the same effect，whereas the question as to which of the elements is locally born and which is foreign is of no importance.Regardless of the private motives of the individual stranger within a group for choosing trade and particularly financial transactions，the first major transactions of modem bankers during the sixteenth century take place abroad.Money is emancipated from the local restrictedness of most teleological sequences，because it is the intermediate link from any given starting point to any given final point.And if，as one might put it，every element of historical existence searches for the form of activity in which it can express its specific quality and its genuine strength in its purest form，then the earliest modem substantial capital，like the expanding urge of youthful spirits，presses for investments which most strongly reveal its all-embracing power，its all-embracing usefulness and its impartiality.The hatred of the people for the major financial houses rested primarily on the fact that the owners and also their agents were usually strangers：it was the hatred of national sentiment against internationalism，the opposition of one-sidedness which，being aware of its specific value，feels overpowered by an indifferent，characterless force whose essence seems to be personified by strangers.This fully corresponds to the aversion of the conservative Athenian masses for the intellectualism of the Sophists and of Socrates，for this new uncanny power of the mind，which，neutral and heartless like money，often showed its strength first of all in the demolition of the surviving pockets of ridiculed power.Moreover，as if objectifying this tendency of money，the enormous expansion of financial transactions originated in endless wars，between the German Kaiser and the French King，the religious wars in the Low Countries，Germany and France，etc.War，which by itself is only pure unproductive movement，gained complete control of money funds，and the solid trade in goods-which is largely locally confined-became overgrown by financial trade.Indeed，in this way the transfer of financial capital into foreign countries actually became subversive.French kings have engaged in wars with Italy with the support of Florentine bankers：they have taken away Lorraine，and later Alsace，from the German Empire with the assistance of German money；the Spaniards have been able to use Italian financial power to dominate Italy.Only during the seventeenth century did France，England and Spain attempt to set an end to this fluttering to and fro of finance capital，which thereby disclosed its character as a pure means，and to satisfy the capital needs of governments within their own country.If finance in the most recent period has again become international in many respects，then it certainly has a completely different significance：‘strangers’in the original sense no longer exist today；trade relations，the customs and laws of even very remote countries，have come to form a more and more uniform organism.Money has not lost the character that originally made it a domain of the stranger，bur has intensified it more and more into abstraction and colourlessness through the multiplication and variation of the intersecting teleological purposes that exist in it.The contrast that existed between the native and the stranger has been eliminated，because the money form of transactions has now been taken up by the whole economic community.The significance of the stranger for the nature of money seems to me to be epitomized in miniature by the advice I once overheard：never have any financial dealings with two kinds of people-friends and enemies.In the first case，the indifferent objectivity of money transactions is in insurmountable conflict with the personal character of the relationship；in the other，the same condition provides a wide scope for hostile intentions which corresponds to the fact that our form of law in a money economy are never precise enough to rule out wilful malice with certainty.The desirable party for financial transactions-in which，as it has been said quite correctly，business is business-is the person completely indifferent to us，engaged neither for us nor against us.

Ⅱ

The Psychological Growth Of Means Into Ends

In the preceding analysis we have presupposed one aspect of the sense of value whose self-evidence can easily obscure its significance for us.Money is valuable to us because it is the means for the acquisition of values：but one could just as well say that it is only the means.For it does not appear to be logically necessary that the emphasis of value that rests on the ultimate ends of our action is transferable to the means，which，in themselves and without reference to the teleological sequence，would be completely estranged from value.This value transference on the basis of purely external connections arranges itself in a very general form of our mental processes which one might call the psychological expansion of qualities.If an actual sequence of objects，forces or events contains a link that brings about certain subjective reactions in us，e.g.pleasure and displeasure，love or hate，positive or negative value sentiments，then not only do these values seem attached to their immediate representatives，but we also allow the other unspecified mental links of the series to participate in them.This is true not only for teleological sequences whose ultimate link reflects its significance on all the causes of its realization，but also for other regular linkages of the elements：all members of a family participate in the honour or degradation of one of its members；the insignificant works of a great poet enjoy an undeserved appreciation because his other works are important；preference and rejection of the individual in party politics extends to those points of the party programme that may otherwise be met with opposite feelings or with indifference；love for a human being originating from sympathy with one of his qualities finally encompasses his total personality，and therewith all kinds of qualities and utterances，with the same passion that would be unjustified without such a connection.In brief，wherever a number of people and objects exist as a unit through whatever connection，the sense of value derived from a single element is also transmitted by the common root of the system to the others，which by themselves do not provoke such feelings.Precisely because the sense of value has nothing to do with the structure of things but possesses its impassable realm beyond them，valuation does not strictly adhere to its logical boundaries but evolves liberally beyond the objectively justified relations to things.There is something irrational in the fact that the relatively high points of our mental life tinge the contiguous moments that do not have those qualities，but this reveals the whole happy wealth of the soul which wants to live out its interest in the oncesensitive significant elements and values，even according to the full measure of its inner resonance to things，without anxiously asking for the legitimate reason for their sharing this value.

The most rational and most plausible of all the forms of such expansion of qualities is certainly that of the sequence of ends.Yet this too does not seem to be absolutely necessary.The significance that the indifferent means acquires by realizing a valuable end does not have to consist of a transferred value.Rather，it could be a specific category grown out of the extraordinary frequency and importance of this configuration.However，the psychological expansion is in fact based on the value quality，the only difference being that the value of the end may be called absolute and the value of the means relative.The value of things is absolute-here in the questionable practical sense-where a process of the will definitely stops.This stopping naturally does not need to be an extensive pause in time，but only the end of a series of innervations so that the continued life of the will manifests itself in new innervations after the sense of satisfaction has been exhausted.On the other hand，an object is relatively valuable if the sense of its value is thereby conditioned by the realization of an absolute value；the relativity of its value is demonstrated by the fact that the value is lost at the moment when another means for the same end is discovered which is superior and more easily attainable.This contrast between absolute and relative value does not coincide with the contrast between objective and subjective value，since the former may evolve in both of these forms of value.I have used the concepts of value and purpose here as largely identical；in this context，they are in fact only different aspects of one and the same phenomenon：the actual conception which，according to its theoretical-emotive meaning，is a value is a purpose from a practical-volitional point of view.

The psychic energies that posit one or the other kind of values and purposes are of a very different nature.The creation of a final purpose is，under all circumstances，possible only by a spontaneous act of the will，whereas the relative value of a means can only be adjudged by way of theoretical knowledge.The setting of the goal arises from the character，from the mood and from the interest，but the road is determined by the nature of things.The notion that we are free with regard to the first step but slaves with regard to the second is nowhere more applicable than in the teleological sphere.However，this opposition，which discloses the great variety of relations between our inner forces and objective being，in no way hinders one and the same content from shifting from one category to the other.It is precisely the spontaneity in setting the final purpose，together with the fact that the means psychologically participate in the value of their goal，that enables the means to acquire the quality of a definite autonomous value for itself in our consciousness.This is possible only because the final authority of our will is independent of all rational logical foundation，yet the fact itself serves the expediency of the end even though it appears to run counter to it.It is in no way certain，but rather can only be valid at a cursory glance，that we attain our purposes best if we conceive them clearly.The concept of‘unconscious purpose’may seem difficult and imperfect，yet the fact that，on the one hand，our actions in their most precise adaptation are focused on certain final objectives and are incomprehensible without any effectiveness，whereas on the other hand our consciousness is unaware of it，repeats itself so often and is so crucial for our whole mode of existence that we cannot do without a specific term for it.The expression‘unconscious purpose’is intended not to explain this phenomenon，but merely to designate it.The problem becomes clearer if we constantly keep in mind the fact that our actions are never caused by a purpose-by something that will happen-but always only through it as a physio-psychic energy which exists prior to action.Consequently，we may assume the following state of affairs.On the one hand，all our activities are directed by the central forces of our innermost self；on the other they are directed by the coincidence of sense impressions，moods，external stimuli and determinations.Both sets of factors occur in very varied combinations.Our actions are more appropriate to the extent that the first factor prevails，by turning all the various given elements in the direction of the energies which emerge from the mental self in its restricted sense.If we have accumulated a considerable quantity of suspended energy to such an extent that its discharge persistently follows in the predominant direction-a constellation which，in its form，is realized identically in secondary and objectionable interests-then this real physio-psychic power，if it is mirrored in our conceptual consciousness is called purpose.The awareness of the purpose，as the mental reflection of this suspended energy，can disappear during the actual process of the further development of the purpose，because its real foundation is conceived as dissolving；by being slowly transposed into action it continues to exist only in its effects.Even though it is true that，according to the structure of our memory，the original notion of purpose may survive any real foundation and continue to exist in our consciousness，this is not necessary for the actions that seem to be permeated and guided by this foundation.Further，if this construction is correct，then it follows that，to deal with teleological sequences，only the presence of the original unit of energy，that is the original existence of purpose as such，is required.The substantial force of energy survives in the succeeding action，which remains guided from the outset by the purpose，regardless of whether or not the awareness of purpose accompanies the practical sequence any longer.

If the consciousness of purpose remains alive then it is not only something purely ideal，but also a process that consumes the organic strength and intensity of consciousness.The general practicality of life will therefore tend to eliminate it，since-apart from any complications and diversions-it is basically no longer necessary for the teleological guidance of our actions.This seems to make clear the phenomenon found in our experience，namely that the ultimate link of our practical sequences，which can be realized only through the means，will be all the better realized the more our strength is focused and concentrated on producing these means.The real practical question is then the production of means.The more it is completely solved，then the easier it is for the final purpose to dispense with the effort of the will，and this can be accomplished as the mechanical result of the means.If we are constantly conscious of the final purpose，then a certain amount of strength is withdrawn front the labour by the means.The most expedient attitude is that of the complete concentration of one's energies on that stage of the sequence of purposes that should be realized next；in other words，one cannot promote the final purpose any better than to treat the means as if it were the end itself.The distribution of psychological stress that is required when the available forces are limited does not coincide with the logical organization；whereas for the latter the means is completely indifferent and the whole emphasis is on the end，practical expediency requires the direct psychological reverse of this relationship.This apparently irrational fact is of immeasurable value to mankind.In all probability，we would never have advanced beyond the setting of the most primitive tasks if our consciousness had been preoccupied with them，and we would never have been free to develop a greater variety of means；or we would have experienced an unbearable and crippling fragmentation if we had had to be constantly aware of the whole sequence of means for the ultimate purpose while working on each subordinate means.Finally，we would have had neither the strength nor the interest for the immediate task，if we had realized the logical insignificance of the means in relation to the ultimate ends and if we had not focused the whole collective strength of our consciousness on what is necessary at any one time.It is obvious that this metempsychosis of the final end occurs more frequently and thoroughly，the more complicated are the technics of life.With increasing competition and increasing division of labour，the purposes of life become harder to attain；that is，they require an ever-increasing infrastructure of means.A larger proportion of civilized man remains forever enslaved，in every sense of the word，in the interest in technics.The conditions on which the realization of the ultimate object depends claim their attention，and they concentrate their strength on them，so that every real purpose completely disappears from consciousness.Indeed，they are often denied.This is encouraged by the fact that in culturally developed relations the individual is born into a teleological system composed of many links（for example，with reference to customs that are taken as categorical imperatives，whose origin as a pre-condition for social purposes no one questions any more）；the individual accepts collaboration for long-established purposes，while even his individual goals are frequently seen as self-evidently given by the surrounding atmosphere and gain their validity more in his actual existence and self-development rather than through a clear consciousness.All these circumstances contribute to the fact that not only the final goals of life as such but also those within life are allowed to rise only imperfectly into the stream of consciousness and to concentrate and direct consciousness towards the practical task of the realization of means.

Money As The Most Extreme Example Of A Means Becoming An End

It is surely obvious that this antedating of the final purpose in its most comprehensive and radical form takes place not in the intermediate instances of life but rather in money.Never has an object that owes its value exclusively to its quality as a means，to its convertibility into more definite values，so thoroughly and unreservedly developed into a psychological value absolute，into a completely engrossing final purpose governing our practical consciousness.This ultimate craving for money must increase to the extent that money takes on the quality of a pure means.For this implies that the range of objects made available to money grows continuously，that things submit more and more defencelessly to the power of money，that money itself becomes more and more lacking in quality yet thereby at the same time becomes powerful in relation to the quality of things.Its growing importance depends on its being cleansed of everything that is not merely a means，because its clash with the specific characteristics of objects is thereby eliminated.Money's value as a means increases with its value as a means right up to the point at which it is valid as an absolute value and the consciousness of purpose in it comes to an end.The inner polarity of the essence of money lies in its being the absolute means and thereby becoming psychologically the absolute purpose for most people，which makes it，in a strange way，a symbol in which the major regulators of practical life are frozen.We are supposed to treat life as if each of its moments were a final purpose；every moment is supposed to be taken to be so important as if life existed for its sake.At the same time，we are supposed to live as if none of its moments were final，as if our sense of value did not stop with any moment and each should be a transitional point and a means to higher and higher stages.This apparently contradictory double demand upon every moment of life，to be at the same time both final and yet not final，evolves from our innermost being in which the soul determines our relation to life-and finds，oddly enough，an almost ironical fulfilment in money，the entity most external to it，since it stands above all qualities and intensities of existing forms of the mind.

Money As An End Depends Upon The Cultural Tendencies Of An Epoch

The extent to which money becomes absolute for the consciousness of value depends on the major transformation of economic interest from primitive production to industrial enterprise.Modem man and the ancient Greek have such different attitudes toward money largely because formerly it served only consumption whereas now it essentially serves production.This difference is of extreme importance for the teleological role of money which is the true index of the economy as a whole.Formerly，general economic interest was directed much more towards consumption than to production；agricultural production predominated and its simple and traditional stationary technology did not require as much expenditure of economic consciousness as did constantly changing industry.This consciousness as therefore predominantly focused on the other side of the economy，namely consumption.The development of labour as a whole reflects the same pattern.Native peoples work almost exclusively for immediate consumption and not for possessions，which would be the next stage further towards acquisition.Thus it is that the so-called socialist tendencies and the ideals of antiquity centre around an organization of consumption but not of productive labour：Plato's ideal state in this respect resembles the Athenian democracy which he sought to attack.One of Aristotle's arguments illustrates this particularly clearly.If political functions were to receive payment，then this would result in predominance of the poor over the wealthy in a democracy，because the poor would be less occupied by private business and have more time to exercise their public rights，which they would do if they received payment for it.Here it is taken for granted that the poor are less busy.If this situation，in contrast to later centuries，is not a matter of chance but rather is based in principle on the form that the economy takes，then it follows that the interest of the masses was simply in having enough to survive on.A social structure that presupposes the unemployment of the poor must basically possess an interest in consumption rather than production.The moral rules of the Greeks concerning the economic realm almost never refer to acquisition，perhaps if only because the numerically predominant primary producers，the slaves，were not the object of social or moral interest.It was Aristotle's opinion that only expenditure and not production provided the opportunity to develop a positive morality.This coincides with both Aristotle's and Plato's opinions on money，which was considered by both to be only a necessary evil.Money reveals its indifferent and empty character particularly clearly where the value emphasis is exclusively upon consumption because here it is immediately confronted with the final purpose of the economy，whereas，as a means of production，it is both more removed from the final goal and surrounded by other means in comparison with which it possesses a totally different relative significance.This distinction in the meaning of money can be traced back to the ultimate decisions in the spirit of each epoch.The conscious over-estimation of the interest in consumption over that in production has its origin in the predominance of agrarian production.Landed property，the relatively safe possession protected by law，was the only possession that could guarantee for the Greeks the continuity and unity of their awareness for life.In this respect，the Greeks were still Orientals，in that they conceived the continuity of life only if the fleetingness of time was supplemented by a solid and constant content.It is thus the adherence to the concept of substance that characterizes the whole of Greek philosophy.This does not at all characterize the reality of Greek life，but rather its failures，its longing and its salvation.It reflects the tremsendous scope of the Greek mind in that it not only sought its ideals in the extension and completion of the given，as happened with lesser-spirited people，but further reflected this scope in their attempt to complete their passionately endangered reality-always disrupted by party strife-in another realm，in the secure bounds and quiet forms of their thoughts and creations.The modem view，in total contrast，views the unity and coherence of life in the interplay of forces and the law-like sequence of moments that vary their content to the utmost.The whole diversity and motion of our life does not dispose of the feeling of unity-at least not usually，and then only in cases where we ourselves perceive deviations or deficiencies；on the contrary，life is sustained by it and brought to fullest consciousness by it.This dynamic unity was foreign to the Greeks.The same basic trait that allowed their aesthetic ideals to culminate in their forms of architecture and plastic arts and that led their view of life to be one of a limited and finite cosmos and the rejection of infinity-this trait allowed them to recognize the continuity of existence only as something substantial，as resting-upon，and realized in，landed property，whereas the modem view of life rests upon money whose nature is fluctuating and which presents the identity of essence in the greatest and most changing variety of equivalents.Moreover，commercial transactions based on money were further discredited in the eyes of the Greeks by the fact that such transactions are always somewhat longsighted and operate on the calculability of the future.Yet to the Greeks the future was，in principle，something unpredictable；hope for the future was extremely delusive，even presumptuous，and such insight might provoke the wrath of the gods.

All these internal and external moments of life formation interact in such a way that one cannot designate any one of them as the unconditional fundamental one.The character of an agrarian economy is determined，on the one hand，by its reliability，by a small and less variable number of intermediate links，by the emphasis on consumption rather than production，and on the other by an attitude focused on the substance of things，and by an aversion to the unpredictable，the unstable and the dynamic.On the one hand，all these qualities are various broken rays of a unified historical basic formation refracted by the medium of differentiated interests.We cannot directly grasp or name these rays with the dissecting mind；perhaps they belong to those formations to which the question of priority is not applicable，because their essence basically rests upon the interaction of mutual dependence in an infinite process and in a circle that is defective as to the knowledge of the details but essential and unavoidable in its basic motives.No matter how we interpret it，the fact remains that，for the Greeks，the ends and means of the economy had not drifted so far apart as they did later；further，that the means had not the same psychological independent existence and that money had not developed so obviously and without inner resistance into an independent value.

Psychological Consequences of Money's Teleological Position

The importance of money as the outstanding and most perfect example of the psychological raising of means to ends becomes most apparent when the relationship between means and ends is inspected more closely.I have already mentioned a number of occasions in which we hide the real goals of our actions from ourselves，so that our will is in reality focused on goals other than we ourselves assume.Thus，it seems legitimate to search further for purposes beyond those reflected by our consciousness；but where does the limit to our search lie？If the teleological sequence does not terminate in the last consciously conceived link，then does that not open up the way to its continuation to the infinite？Is it not then necessary to be dissatisfied with any given purpose on which our action rests，and to search for a further reason for it in a purpose beyond the acknowledged one？In addition，no gain or condition attained grants us the final satisfaction which is logically bound up with the concept of an ultimate purpose.Rather，every point arrived at is actually experienced as only a transitional stage to a definitive one-both in the realm of the senses，because it is in constant flux and every enjoyment is followed by a new need；and in the realm of the ideal，because the demands are never fully met by empirical reality.To summarize，it appears as if what we call the ultimate purpose is floating above the teleological sequence，yet stands in the same relation to the horizon as the earthly paths that always lead towards it，yet which，after the longest wanderings，never seem to be any closer than at the outset.The question is not whether the ultimate purpose can be attained，but whether its form of presentation may be given any content.The teleological sequences，to the extent that they are directed towards what can be realized in this world，come to a standstill not with their realization but rather in accordance with their inner structure.Instead of the fixed point that each of them seems to have in its ultimate purpose，only the following heuristic regulative principle is offered：namely，that one should not consider any individually willed goal as the final one，but that one should leave the possibility open for a step to a higher purpose.In other words，the ultimate purpose is only a function or a request.Viewed as a concept，it is nothing other than the condensation of the fact that at first it seemed to nullify：that the path of human endeavour and valuation leads to infinity and that no points reached on that path can，in retrospect，escape being considered as a mere means，no matter how much it appeared to be definite before it was reached.The elevation of the means to the dignity of an ultimate purpose thereby becomes a much less irrational category.Certainly in the individual case，irrationality cannot be eliminated，but the nature of the totality of teleological sequences differs from that of the limited phases.That the means become ends is justified by the fact that，in the last analysis，ends are only means.Out of the endless series of possible volitions，self-developing actions and satisfactions，we almost arbitrarily designate one moment as the ultimate end，for which everything preceding it is only a means；whereas an objective observer or later even we ourselves have to posit for the future the genuinely effective and valid purposes without their being secured against a similar fate.At this point of extreme tension between the relativity of our endeavours and the absoluteness of the idea of a final purpose，money again becomes significant and a previous suggestion is developed further.As the expression and equivalent of the value of things，and at the same time as a pure means and an indifferent transitional stage，money symbolizes the established fact that the values for which we strive and which we experience are ultimately revealed to be means and temporary entities.In so far as the most sublimated means of life become the most sublimated purposes of life for most people，it forms the most unambiguous evidence that whether a teleological moment will be interpreted as a means or as an end depends only on one's standpoint一 a proof whose extreme decisiveness corresponds to the completeness of a test case.

There is no period of time in which individuals have not been greedy for money，yet one can certainly say that the greatest intensity and expansion of this desire occurred in those times in which the modest satisfaction of individual life-interests，such as the elevation of the religious absolute as the ultimate purpose of existence，had lost its power.At present-as in the period of decline in Greece and Romeand far beyond the inner state of the individual，the whole aspect of life，the relationships of human beings with one another and with objective culture are coloured by monetary interests.It may appear as an irony of history that，as the moment when the satisfying and ultimate purposes of life become atrophied，precisely that value that is exclusively a means and nothing else takes the place of such purposes and clothes itself in their form.In reality，money in its psychological form，as the absolute means and thus as the unifying point of innumerable sequences of purposes，possesses a significant relationship to the notion of God-a relationship that only psychology，which has the privilege of being unable to commit blasphemy，may disclose.The essence of the notion of God is that all diversities and contradictions in the world achieve a unity in him，that he is-according to a beautiful formulation of Nicolas de Cusa-the coincidentia oppositorum. Out of this idea，that in him all estrangements and all irreconcilables of existence find their unity and equalization，there arises the peace，the security，the all-embracing wealth of feeling that reverberate with the notion of God which we hold.

There is no doubt that，in their realm，the feelings that money excite possess a psychological similarity with this.In so far as money becomes the absolutely commensurate expression and equivalent of all values，it rises to abstract heights way above the whole broad diversity of objects；it becomes the centre in which the most opposed，the most estranged and the most distant things find their common denominator and come into contact with one another.Thus，money actually provides an elevated position above the particular and a confidence in its omnipotence，just as we have confidence in the omnipotence of a highest principle to grant us the particular and the baser at any moment and to be able to transform itself into them.The specific ability and the interest of the Jews in the nature of money has certainly been related to their‘monotheistic schooling’.The temper of a people who for thousands of years became used to lifting their eyes up to a single supreme being，to finding in him-especially as he possessed only a very relative transcendence-the goal and intersection of all particular interests，would be suited to devoting itself to the economic sphere and especially to that value which presents itself as the encompassing unity and the common focal point of all sequences of purposes.Nor does the wild scramble for money，the impulsiveness that money-in contrast with other central values，for example landed propertyspreads over the economy and indeed over life in general at all contradict the final pacification in which the effect of money approaches that of a religious mood.Not only is the whole excitement and tension in the struggle for money the pre-condition for the blissful peace after the conquest，but that calmness of the soul that religion provides，that feeling of standing at the focal point of existence，attains its highest value for consciousness only at the price of having searched and struggled for God.Augustine's comment on the business man，Merito dictum negotium，quia negat otium ，quod malum est neque quaerit veram quietem quae est Deus ，is quite valid for the industriousness which，constantly compiling means of acquisition，strives for the final goal of financial gain，which is no longer negotium but is its outlet.The frequent animosity of the religious and clerical mentality towards money matters may perhaps be traced to its instinct for the similarity in psychological form between the highest economic and the highest cosmic unity and to its awareness of the danger of competition between monetary and religious interest a danger that has been shown to exist not only where the substance of life is economic but also where it is religious.The rejection of the rate of interest in Canon Law reflects the general rejection of money as a whole，since the interest rate represents monetary transactions in their abstract purity.The principle of interest rates as such did not yet in itself reflect the full measure of sinfulness-it was frequently believed in the Middle Ages that this was avoided by paying interest in the form of commodities rather than money-but rather it reflected the fact that interest rates were the interest on money paid in money，which implied that the abolition of interest would hit the essence of money at its root.Money all too often easily gives the impression of being the final purpose；for too many people money signifies the end of the teleological sequences，and lends to them such a measure of unified combination of interests，of abstract heights，of sovereignty over the details of life，that it reduces the need to search for such satisfactions in religion.All these connections show that something more than the familiar points of comparison exist.Thus Hans Sachs，already a representative of popular opinion，concluded that‘Money is the secular God of the World’.This refers back to the basic reason for the position of money，which is that it is the absolute means which is elevated to the psychological significance of an absolute purpose.It has been stated-in a not altogether consistent manner-that the relativity of things is the only absolute，and in this respect money is indeed the strongest and most immediate symbol.For money is the embodiment of the relativity of economic values.It embodies the significance of each particular value as a means for the acquisition of another value-but really this mere significance as a means is detached from its particular concrete representative.Despite this，money can become，psychologically，an absolute value，because it does not have to fear being dissolved into something relative，a prospect that makes it impossible for many substantial values to maintain the claim to be absolute.To the extent that the absolute of our existence（I am not speaking here of the ideal meaning of things）dissolves into motion，relation and development，the latter replace the former with regard to our need for values.The economic sphere has exemplified this historical type perfectly in the psychologically absolute value character of money.To avoid popular misunderstanding on this point it must be noted that the formal uniformity of this development in all spheres does not imply the claim that it is uniformly welcome.

Greed And Avarice

If the character of money as an ultimate purpose oversteps that intensity for an individual in which it is the appropriate expression of the economic culture of his circle，then greed and avarice emerge.I specifically wish to emphasize the dependence of these concepts on the current specific economic conditions，because the same degree of passion in acquiring and holding on to money may be quite normal for the particular importance of money in one context but may belong to the hypertrophied categories in another.Generally speaking，the threshold for the beginning of a real greed for money will be relatively high in a developed and lively money economy，but relatively low at primitive economic levels，whereas the reverse is true for avarice.Whoever is considered thrifty and reasonable in spending money under restricted circumstances little affected by the money economy will appear to be avaricious under conditions of a quick turnover and easy money.This already illustrates what will be made more evident later，namely that greed and avarice are not identical phenomena although they have a common basis in the evaluation of money as an absolute purpose.Like all phenomena that have their origin in money，both represent specific stages in the development of tendencies whose lower or higher levels also become visible with reference to other contents.Both manifest themselves，with reference to concrete objects and regardless of their monetary value，in some people's most remarkable psychological mania for accumulation，a trait that often leads people to compare them to hamsters：such people pile up precious collections of any kind without getting any satisfaction from the objects themselves，frequently without even caring about them.In such cases，value is located not in the subjective reflex of ownership that is normally the reason for acquisition and possession，but in the simple objective fact，unaccompanied by any personal consequences，that merely having these things in their possession is valuable for such people.This phenomenon，which is quite common in a limited and less extreme form，is usually interpreted as egoism since it shares with it the negative side of the common form of egoism-the exclusion of all others from ownership.However，it does differ from it in one respect which is explored in the following digression.

It must always be emphasized that the contrast between egoism and altruism in no way fully embraces the motivations for our actions.In fact we have an objective interest in whether certain events or things are realized or not，and this is so regardless of the consequences for the human subject.It is important to us that a harmony，an order based on ideas，and a significance-which does not have to fit the usual schemes of ethics or aesthetics-prevail in the world.We feel ourselves obliged to co-operate in this without always asking whether it gives pleasure or will be of advantage to any person，that is，whether it is of interest to oneself or to another.The three motivations come together to some extent in the religious sphere where the position of objective motivation is made quite clear.Compliance with religious commandments can occur out of purely egoistical reasons，either in a crude manner，out of fear or hope，or in a somewhat refined manner，for the sake of a good conscience or the feeling of inner satisfaction.Furthermore，it can be of an altruistic nature：the love of God，the surrender of our heart，may make us obey His commandments，just as we fulfil the wishes of a person we love because their joy and satisfaction is our greatest concern.Finally，we can be motivated by a feeling for the objective value of a world order in which the will of the highest principle continues uninterrupted in the will of all individual elements；the objective relation between God and ourselves can demand of us this obedience as its adequate expression or its inner necessary consequence，withour any consequences for ourselves and without the joy and contentment of God entering this motivation.In many cases，then，the consciousness of purpose stops short of objective reality，and does not borrow its value primarily from its subjective reflexes.I will leave every psychological and epistemological interpretation of this impersonal motivation undecided here.It is，in any case，a psychological fact which only enters into a variety of combinations with the sequence of purposes of a personal nature.The collector who shuts away his valuables from everyone else and who does not even enjoy them himself，yet watches most jealously over them，colours his egoism with an admixture of supra-subjective valuation.Generally speaking，it is the function of possessions to be enjoyed and we may contrast this not only with those objects that one enjoys without wanting to own them，like the stars，but also those whose value is independent of all subjective enjoyment like the beauty，order and significance of the universe，whose value persists independent of human response.In the case of such possessive people，there exists an intermediate or mixed phenomenon：possession is certainly necessary，yet it does not extend to its regular subjective consequences but is experienced as a worthwhile and valuable goal without them.Here it is not the quality of the object that is the genuine bearer of value；rather，however much quality is indispensable and determines the measure of the value，the true motivation is the fact of its being possessed，the form of the relationship in which the subject stands to the object.The real value，at which the teleological sequence comes to an end，lies in this form-which is realizable only in a specific content：it lies in this ownership by the subject which exists as an objective fact.

The process of becoming an absolute economic value，the disruption of the teleological sequence before returning to the subject，is in a peculiar way illustrated by a certain significance of landed property which blends with its real economic significance in various ways-though often only as an overtone.Landed property would not have acquired a value except for the fact that it brought in a subjective gain in utility for the owner.Thus，its value is not completely created by such accountable value factors as its yield，the greater security of immobile possessions，the social power connected with it，etc.Over and above all these factors，though bound up with them，there often exists a certain ideal value，and the feeling that it is valuable in itself，that man has a relation of sovereign power over the soil，that he possesses such a close personal relationship to the basis of human existence.Landed property thus possesses and grants a certain dignity which distinguishes it from all other types of possession，even if their resultant utility is equal or greater for the owner.This accounts for the fact that it has often been preserved by sacrifices that are only made in a similar way for an objective ideal.An element of absolute value is therefore hidden in the significance of landed property；it is，or at least it was，connected with the idea that it is valuable to be a landowner even if this value is not expressed in terms of utility.The commitment to landed property may thus possess religious overtones as，for example，at the high point of Greek civilization.At that time，to sell landed property was an offence not only against the children，but also against the ancestors，because it disrupted the continuity of the family.The fact that the supply of land could not easily be increased favoured its function as the symbol of family unity which transcended individuals and was sacrosanct.Particularly in the Middle Ages，landed property was ranked as an absolute value to a far greater extent than today.Even though it was sought after，in the first place，because of its yield and the enjoyment of this yield，and thus represented a relative value，it had-over and above its role in the money economy-a specific importance both in and for itself since it was not constantly being turned into money and taxed according to monetary value.One might say that landed property had no equivalent；the sequence of values in which it stood terminated with landed property.Whereas movable objects might be exchanged against one another，immobile property was-cum grano salis -something incomparable：it was value as such，the immovable ground above and beyond which real economic activity was carried on.It was probably not only the economic-relativistic interest that motivated the Church to appropriate it：at the beginning of the fourteenth century，almost half of English soil，and at the time of Philip II more than half of the Spanish soil，is supposed to have been owned by the clergy，and even today two-thirds of all productive landed estates in the religious state of Tibet belong to the clergy.Just as the Church provided the stable，apparently externally grounded norms of life in the Middle Ages，so it seemed appropriate，in the real as well as the symbolic sense，that it encompassed in its hands that value which was the foundation for all other values.The inalienability of the Church's landed property was only the conscious and legal manifestation of this inner character.It demonstrated that the movement of values terminated here and that the ultimate limit and finality of the economic sphere had been attained.If one can compare the mort main with the lion's den，to which all footsteps lead but from which none emerge，then this is also a symbol of the all-embracing absolute and the timelessness of the principle on which the Church is founded.

This development of goods into a final purpose whose absolute value extends beyond that of the mere enjoyment of their benefits is found represented most clearly and decisively in avarice and greed，those pathological deformations of the interest in money which increasingly tend to draw in the other cases of the same type.Money that has become an ultimate purpose does not tolerate the co-ordinated definite values even of those goods that are of a non-economic nature.Money is not content with being just another final purpose of life alongside wisdom and art，personal significance and strength，beauty and love；but in so far as money does adopt this position it gains the power to reduce the other purposes to the level of means.This reorganization is all the more valid for actual economic goods.To insist on keeping them as if they were incomparable values must appear stupid as long as one can get them back for money at any time，and above all as long as the precise expressibility of their monetary value has robbed them of their existing individual significance and their significance outside the purely indifferent economy.The abstract character of money，its remoteness from any specific enjoyment in and for itself，supports an objective delight in money，in the awareness of a value that extends far beyond all individual and personal enjoyment of its benefits.If money is no longer a purpose，in the sense in which any other tool has a purpose in terms of its useful application，but is rather a final purpose to those greedy fur money，then it is furthermore not even a final purpose in the sense of an enjoyment.Instead，for the miser，money is kept outside of this personal sphere which is taboo to him.To him，money is an object of timid respect.The miser loves money as one loves a highly admired person who makes us happy simply by his existence and by our knowing him and being with him，without our relation to him as an individual taking the form of concrete enjoyment.In so far as，from the outset，the miser consciously forgoes the use of money as a means towards any specific enjoyment，he places money at an unbridgeable distance from his subjectivity，a distance that he nevertheless constantly attempts to overcome through the awareness of his ownership.

Where the character of money as a means makes its appearance as the abstract form of enjoyment which，none the less，is not enjoyed，the individual's appreciation of ownership-to the extent that it is preserved intact-has a touch of objectivity about it.It couches itself in the subtle fascination of resignation which attends all objective final purposes and which unites the positive and negative aspects of enjoyment in a unique and inexpressibly unified fashion.In avarice both moments achieve their most extreme opposition to one another because money，as the absolute means，provides unlimited possibilities for enjoyment，while at the same time，as the absolute means ，it leaves enjoyment as yet completely untouched during the stage of its unused ownership.In this respect the significance of money coincides with that of power；money，like power，is a mere potentiality which stores up a merely subjectively anticipatable future in the form of an objectively existing present.The notion of‘possibility’actually contains two aspects which are usually not sufficiently distinguished from one another.If one asserts that one‘can’do something，then this means not only the mental anticipation of a future event，but an already existent state of energy，physical and psychic co-ordinations，definite locations of existing elements；whoever‘can’play the piano，even if he does not do so，is different from someone who is unable to do so，not only in a future moment，but even at the present moment on account of the specific present state of his nerves and muscles.Secondly，this state of ability，which in itself contains nothing of the future，leads to the realization of what can be done only by meeting with further conditions whose occurrence we are unable to predict.This moment of uncertainty and that sense or knowledge of a certain strength or state make up the elements of what can be done，in a mixture of very diverse quantities.It commences，for example，with：‘I can play the piano’-where the moment of reality is paramount and the uncertainty of the other required conditions is at a minimum；it extends to：‘the next throw can be all the nines’- where the given and known conditions are，at the moment，in a minority in relation to the completely uncertain factors required for any success.Money represents，in a unique combination，the crystallization and embodiment of these two elements of capability.What one really possesses of this capability at the precise moment of possession is nothing，The decisive factor that ensures valuable results is completely extraneous to money.Yet the degree of certainty that it will materialize at the right moment is extremely high.Whereas，as a rule，the measure of reliability and unambiguousness contained in capabilities is determined by what actually exists at the present time，what will happen in the future is uncertain.With regard to money，however，this latter uncertainty has completely disappeared，whereas the actual possession in the present is，as such，of no account.The specific sense of capability is thereby sharply intensified：it is really nothing but capability，in the sense of chances for the future，which gives significance to what we presently own；but it is real capability in the sense of absolute certainty about the realization of such a future.

The certainty of satisfaction is further enhanced by the particular relationship between wish and fulfilment which money assumes in contrast to other objects of our interest.The subjective consequences of a fulfilled wish are not always the exact complement of the state of deprivation that originally brought about the wish.The desire for an object is not like a hole that is filled by the possession so that everything remains as it was before the wish.This is the way Schopenhauer presents it，since to him every satisfaction is only something negative，the elimination of a painful condition of deprivation.But if one accepts that satisfaction is something positive，then our wish fulfilment is not only the elimination of a negative state by a corresponding positive one，enhanced by a feeling of happiness；rather，the relation of the wish to its fulfilment is an infinitely diverse one，because the wish almost never allows for all aspects of the object and its effect upon us.Reality almost never corresponds to the wish as a category of possibility of wanting to possess.The trivial wisdom that the possession of something we wanted usually disappoints us is，for better or worse，correct and we become conscious of this otherness in possession only as a fact unaccompanied by any feelings.However，money takes on an exceptional position in this respect.On the one hand，it pushes to its limit any incommensurability between the wish and its object.Any endeavour that has been focused on money only finds in it something completely indeterminate，something that cannot satisfy a reasonable demand and to which we have no specific relation because it has no substance.If our wish does not extend beyond money towards a concrete goal，then a deadly disappointment must follow.Such a disappointment will always be experienced where monetary wealth，which has been passionately desired and considered an unquestionable happiness，reveals what it really is after it has been acquired：money is merely a means，whose elevation to an ultimate purpose cannot survive after it has been acquired.Whereas here the greatest discrepancy between wish and fulfilment exists，the exact reverse takes place if the psychological character of money as a final purpose has become permanently solidified and greed，too，has become a chronic condition.In this case，where the desired object is supposed to grant nothing but its possession，and where this limitation of desire is not only a passing self-deception，every disappointment is dropped.All objects that we want to possess are expected to achieve something for us once we own them.The often tragic，often humorous incommensurability between wish and fulfilment is due to the inadequate anticipation of this achievement of which I have just spoken.But money is not expected to achieve anything for the greedy person over and above its mere ownership.We know more about money than about any other object because there is nothing to be known about money and so it cannot hide anything from us.It is a thing absolutely lacking in qualities and therefore cannot，as can even the most pitiful object，conceal within itself any surprises or disappointments.Whoever really and definitely only wants money is absolutely safe from such experiences.The general human weakness to rate what is longed for differently compared with what is attained reaches its apogee in greed for money because such greed only fulfils consciousness of purpose in an illusory and untenable fashion；on the other hand，this weakness is completely removed as soon as the will is really completely satisfied by the ownership of money.If we desire to arrange human destiny according to the scheme of relationship between the wish and its object，then we must concede that，in terms of the final point in the sequence of purposes，money is the most inadequate but also the most adequate object of our endeavours.

The powerful character of money，to which I again return，appears at its most noticeable，at the least at its most uncanny，wherever the money economy is not yet completely established and accepted，and where money displays its compelling power in relations that are structurally antagonistic.The reason why money seems to have reached the pinnacle of its power at the highest stage of culture is due to the fact that innumerable，formerly unknown objects are now at its disposal；but from the very outset they are concerned with being obedient to money.There is nothing of that friction that the whole type and mode of evaluation of more natural conditions opposes to the alien nature of money and whose elimination the consciousness of power must particularly be concerned with.Since money is the value of values，an expert of Indian life terms the Indian village banker，the money-lender，‘the man of all men in the village’-his Indian name means‘the great man’·It has been emphasized that，when larger amounts of capital were first amassed during the thirteenth century，capital became a means of power which was as yet unknown to the mass of the people.Thus，to this effect was added the psychological compensation of the unprecedented and the supra-empirical.Quite apart from the fact that the Church and the people considered money transactions completely objectionable 一 even a patrician from Cologne in the thirteenth century confessed to support the clerical principle，mercator sine peccamine vix esse potest -the utilization of such a mysterious and dangerous power as capital necessarily appeared as immoral，as criminal misuse.Just as so often the mistaken prejudices promote their justification，so the descendants of the trading aristocracy of that period indulged in a ruthless misuse of their power，whose form and extent was possible only because of the novelty of monetary capital and the freshness of its impact on relationships that were differently organized.Thus it was that the masses-from the Middle Ages right up to the nineteenth century-thought that there was something wrong with the origin of great fortunes and that their owners were rather sinister personalities.Tales of horror spread about the origin of the Grinaldi，the Medici and the Rothschild fortunes，not only in the sense of moral duplicity but in a superstitious way as if a demonic spirit was at work.

In so far as the contradictory types of capacities embodied in money lend it a sublimated sense of power before it is spent-the‘fruitful moment’has，as it were，come to a halt-avarice is one form of the will to power that is not transformed in its exercise and its enjoyment，thereby illuminating the character of money as an absolute means.This is an important factor in explaining the avarice of old age.Such a tendency certainly may be expedient as provision for the next generation-although this motive is usually not in the mind of the miser，since the older he gets the less he is willing to part with his treasures.Subjectively，what is basic in old age is that，on the one hand，the sensual enjoyment of life has lost its charm，and on the other the ideals lose their agitating power through disenchantment and lack of nerve；thus there remains，as the last goal of the will and of life，only the power that manifests itself partly in the inclination of old people to tyrannize and in a mania for‘influence’on the part of elderly people in high positions.In part，however，this results in avarice because the same abstract‘power’seems to be embodied in the possession of money.I consider it a mistake to envisage every miser as being busy with the anticipation of all available enjoyments，all the attractive possible uses of money.Rather，the purest form of avarice is that in which the will does not really go beyond money；nor is money treated as a means for something else，not even in the imagination.On the contrary，the power that money-stored-up represents is experienced as the final and absolutely satisfying value.For the miser，all other goods lie at the periphery of existence and from each of them a straight road leads to the centre，to money.The whole specific sense of enjoyment and power would be misinterpreted if one were to reverse this direction and wished to lead it back again from the terminal point to the periphery.For the power of the centre would be lost as power if it were to be transposed into the enjoyment of specific things.Our essential nature is based on the duality of dominating and serving，and we develop relations and forms that do justice to both these complementary drives in a variety of combinations.In contrast to the power that money confers，the lack of dignity in avarice is well expressed by a poet of the fifteenth century who stated that whoever serves money is‘his slave's slave’.Actually avarice is the most sublimated，one could almost say caricatured，form of inner subjugated existence in that it makes us a servant of an indifferent means as if it were the highest purpose.Yet on the other hand，avarice is supported by the most sublimated feeling of power.Here too，money displays its fundamental nature，namely，to permit an equable decisiveness and purest presentation of our antagonistic endeavours.In money，the mind has created a form of the greatest scope which，operating as pure energy，increasingly separates the poles of the mind，the more unified it represents itself-that is，as mere money，which rejects every specific determinateness.

It is very characteristic of the mastery that money attained over the general way of thinking that we are accustomed to designating a series of phenomena as avarice-in the sense of greed for money-which in reality are its exact opposite.Such phenomena are manifested in people who use a burned-out match again，who carefully tear off empty letter pages，who don’t throw away a piece of string and who spend a lot of time in searching for every lost pin.We call these people‘avaricious’because we have grown accustomed to considering the money price of things quite naturally as their value.Actually，however，they do not think of the money value of these objects；rather，the strength of their feeling is applied to the practical value of things，which is not at all proportionately reflected in their money value.In many cases，it is not the fraction of a penny that the thrifty person is concerned to save；often they have no consideration for the money by which the object itself could be easily replaced，but instead merely value the object itself.In this category belong peculiar，but not altogether rare，people who give away a hundred marks without hesitation，but give away a sheet of paper from their writing desk，or something similar，only with true selfconquest.We encounter here the exact opposite of avarice：to the avaricious person the objects are of no concern-except to the extent that they represent money value-because money has robbed them of their character as ultimate purposes，whereas the behaviour of these other people would be totally senseless if it were determined by the money value of things.Yet it can also become unreasonable again by leaving money value completely out of account.Because of the purpose，these people forget the means that would make the purpose attainable，whereas the means make the avaricious person forget the purpose that alone gives significance to the means.Furthermore，there are those phenomena that-although they coincide in their outer form with practical thriftiness-help to clarify further the teleological character of money by the inner divergence from thriftiness.Many‘thrifty’people think it proper that everything that is paid for is also consumed，and even then not only if another necessary expenditure were to be saved，but also in relation to luxury goods which，in the meantime，have proved to be unenjoyable.The purpose has once more not been attained，but in order to make up for the failure another sacrifice is made.This kind of behaviour is illustrated by the German proverb，‘Lieber den Magen verrenkt als dem Wirt einen Kreuzer geschenkt ’（‘Better to strain your stomach than tip the host’）.Such behaviour，which is taken seriously by many people，is caricatured in the thrifty mother who was teased by her children that she would take the remains of unused medicine after illness in the family because she did not wish to waste it.In this case，consumption of the object is indifferent or worse than indifferent；the motive for such action cannot be not letting the object be wasted，for it has gone to waste since the need for it，and therefore its significance for the subject，has passed.Actually the object consumed is not the same as the intended object，but another which lacks the quality of motivation.The only possible motive for consuming it is at least to find an equivalent for the expenditure.Money has thus arrived at its next purpose；and with it a feeling of satisfaction and a peak in the teleological sequence is reached，aside from the failure of its subjective final purpose as a thing for itself which does not diminish that satisfaction.This trivial and basically uninteresting phenomenon reveals a very peculiar teleological constellation of money value.Although it is usually not in evidence in valuable objects and therefore appears to be bourgeois and insignificant，it is perhaps the most extreme expression of the role of money as an intermediary overgrowing the real final purpose.Not only is the genuine sense of economizing eliminated here as it is in avarice，but also the attraction of power and of the possibilities that enrich the idle possession of money are eliminated.The object，which has lost whatever might have been the meaning and purpose of its consumption，is consumed under conditions of discomfort and harmfulness merely because the money spent has bestowed an absolute value upon it.Not only is the purposive process arrested here by money but，in addition，it becomes retrogressive and perverse in so far as the valuation，which is purposive in itself，is realized by a procedure directly lacking in purpose.

Extravagance

By means of two negative instances，I now want to explore the extent to which money takes on the character of an independent interest beyond its role as a mere intermediary.Extravagance is more closely related to avarice than the opposition of these two phenomena would seem to indicate.It must be noted here that where the primitive economy exists the thrifty conservation of values is incompatible with their nature，with the very limited transferability of agricultural products.One rarely finds a genuine avaricious hoarding of products if they cannot easily or self-evidently be turned into unlimitedly transferable money；wherever agricultural products are immediately produced and consumed，a certain generosity often prevails，particularly in relation to guests or to the needy-a generosity that is probably less marked in a money economy since money can be more easily stored up.Peter the Martyr thus praised the sacks of cocoa that served as money to the ancient Mexicans，because they could not be secretly preserved and hoarded for long periods and therefore prohibited an avaricious attitude.Similarly，natural conditions limit the possibility and the attractiveness of extravagance.Aside from senseless destruction，the limit to lavish consumption and frivolous waste in a group lies in the capacity of its members and strangers for consumption.But the main point is that monetary extravagance possesses an altogether different meaning and a completely new aura when compared with extravagance with regard to concrete objects：the latter implies that its value for the rational sequence of purposes of the individual is simply destroyed，whereas the former implies that value is，in an inexpedient way，transposed into other values.The only type of squanderer in the money economy who is significant for the philosophy of money is not a person who senselessly gives away money in natura ，but rather one who uses it for nonsensical purchases that are unsuited to his circumstances.The pleasure associated with squandering is attached to the moment of spending money upon any object whatsoever，and has to be distinguished from the pleasure provided by the fleeting enjoyment of objects，from the snobbery to which it is related，from the stimulating change between acquisition and use of objects；rather it relates to the pure function of squandering without regard for its substantial content and attendant circumstances.For the spendthrift，the attraction of the moment of squandering surpasses both the proper appreciation of money as well as of the objects.This specifically highlights the position of the spendthrift in relation to the sequence of purposes.If the final point of the sequence is enjoyment through the ownership of the object，then the first basic intermediate stage is the possession of money，the second is the expenditure of money upon the object.For the miser，the first stage becomes an enjoyable end in itself，for the spendthrift the second stage is the enjoyable one.To the spendthrift money is as important as it is to the miser，though not in the form of owning it but in squandering it.The spendthrift's sense of value depends on the moment of transposition of money into other forms of value，to such an extent that he is willing to pay for the enjoyment of this moment at the price of squandering all more concrete values.

It is therefore very noticeable that the indifference towards money value，which constitutes the essence and attraction of extravagance，presupposes this value as something experienced and appreciated.For，obviously，throwing away what is indifferent would itself be completely indifferent.The following case is typical of the wild extravagances of the ancien régime. When Prince Conti sent a diamond valued at 4，000-5，000 francs to a lady and it was returned to him，he ordered it to be crushed so that he might use it as writing sand for the letter he wrote to her in reply.Taine adds to this story the following remark about the conventions of that period：‘On est d ’autant plus un homme du monde que l 'on est moins un homme d'argent ’（‘The less one cares about money，the more a man of the world one is’）.However，this implied a degree of self-deception，for the conscious and emphatic negative attitude towards money is based-as in a dialectical process-on its opposite，which alone can give it significance and attraction.The same is true of certain shops in big cities which，in contrast to those that attract customers by cheap prices，stress with ostentatious selfindulgence that they have the highest prices.They thereby appeal to the finest circles of society who do not ask about prices.What is remarkable about this is that they do not emphasize the main point-the object itself-but rather its negative correlate，that the price is not important；and thereby they unconsciously place money in the foreground of interest again，even though in a negative manner.Because of its close relationship to money，extravagance very easily gains an immense increase in momentum and robs those who are subject to it of all reasonable standards，since the regulation that is given through the measure of receptivity of concrete objects is lacking.

Precisely the same extravagance characterizes the avaricious greed for money：instead of seeking out the enjoyment of real entities，it searches for the intangible，which extends to the infinite and has no external or internal reasons for its restriction.Wherever external positive fixations and barriers are absent，greediness discharges itself quite formlessly and with a growing intensity.This is the reason for the particular relentlessness and embitteredness of inheritance disputes.Because the individual's claim is not determined by work or by a concretely grounded measure，neither party is inclined a priori to acknowledge the claim of the other.There are thus no inhibitions to restrain the claim and any interference with it is felt to be a completely groundless injustice.The lack of inner relationship between the wish and any measure of its object，which in this case derives from the personal structure of inheritance relations，derives，as far as greed is concerned，from the structure of the object.

A revolt against new coinage in Brunswick in 1499 highlights the lack of principles that increases with greed and prevents the reduction of the claims.The authorities thought that，in the future，base money should be replaced by good coinage.And yet the same people who wanted good coinage for their products and as their wages revolted because others refused to accept their payments in base coinage！The frequent coexistence of good and base coinage provides the greatest possibilities for the inner excess of money mania-compared with which，other intense passions always seem to be psychologically based.We know that even in China revolutions occurred because the government paid in base coinage but requested taxes to be paid in good coinage.I assume，purely hypothetically，that this lack of moderation that is part of mere money interest itself is also the hidden root of a peculiar phenomenon found at the stock exchange，namely that the small grain speculators，the outsiders，almost without exception speculate for a rise in market prices.It seems to me that the logically correct but，in practice，irrelevant fact that gains in bear operations are limited，whereas in bull operations they are not，is the psychological motivation for such behaviour.Whereas the major grain speculators who actually have to deliver the object calculate the chances of both sides of the market，mere money speculation as is found in speculation in futures is interested in speculating in the one direction，which is potentially infinite.This tendency，which constitutes the internal form of the movement of financial interest，is even better represented by the following.In the period 1830-80，German agriculture produced steadily increasing annual returns，which gave rise to the idea that this was an infinite process；therefore，estates were not bought for a price that corresponded to their current value，but to the expected future profit-this is the reason for the present distressed condition of agriculture.It is the money form of profit which distorts the notion of value.Wherever profit appears only in terms of‘use-value’and where only its immediate concrete quantity is taken into account，then the idea of its growth is confined to sober limits，whereas the possibility arid anticipation of money value grows infinitely.This is the basis for the essence of greed and squandering，since they both reject in principle the measurement of value that alone can secure a limit and a boundary to the sequence of purposes，namely by the final enjoyment of objects.The genuine spendthrift should not be mistaken for an Epicurean or somebody who is merely frivolous，although all these elements are mixed up in the individual representative.The spendthrift is indifferent towards the object once he possesses it；his enjoyment is doomed never to find repose and permanency；the moment of his possession of an object coincides with the negation of its enjoyment.In this respect，life has the same demonic form as for the avaricious：every goal attained arouses a thirst for more which can never be satisfied，for this whole tendency searches for satisfaction，as it flows out of an ultimate purpose，within a category that denies any purpose from the outset and limits itself to the means and to the penultimate moment.The miserly person is the more abstract of the two.His consciousness of purpose halts at an even greater distance from the final purpose，whereas the spendthrift comes closer to the objects since his movement towards a rational goal stops at a later stage in order to annex it，as if it were the final goal itself.On the one hand，this formal identity of the complete opposition of visible results，and，on the other the lack of a regulating concrete purpose which，with reference to the equal senselessness of both tendencies，suggests an uncertain interplay between them，explains the fact that avarice and extravagance are therefore often to be found in the same person，be it in their distribution over different spheres of interests or in connection with changing moods.Contraction and expansion of these moods is expressed in avarice and squandering as if，each time，the impulse were the same and merely its valency differed.

The dual significance of money for our will is the result of the synthesis of two tasks performed by money.The more pressing and general the need for food and clothing，the more is the desire for them limited by nature；there may be sufficient quantities，particularly of what are necessities，which originally therefore are the most intensely desired.In contrast with our natural needs，the demand for luxury goods is unlimited.The supply of luxuries will never exceed the demand for them.For example，precious metals，in so far as they are the materials for jewelry，have an unlimited number of uses.This is the result of their basic superfluousness.The closer values stand to our basic life and the more they are conditions of bare survival the stronger，but also the more limited as to quantity，is the direct demand and the more likely it is that the point of satiety is reached at an earlier stage.On the other hand，the more removed values are from primary needs，the less is their demand measured in terms of a natural need and the more they continue to exist relatively unchanged with regard to their available quantity.The scale of our needs moves between these two poles：either it is one of immediate intensity but then certainly limited by nature，or else it is the need for luxuries，in which case the lack of necessity is replaced by unlimited possibilities for their expansion.Whereas most cultural goods exhibit a certain mixture of these extremes，such that the approximation to the one corresponds to a growing distance from the other，money combines the maximum of both.Because it serves to satisfy the most indispensable as well as most dispensable needs of life，it associates the intense urgency or desire with its extensive unlimitedness.Money carries within itself the structure of the need for luxuries，in that it rejects any limitation upon desire for it-which would be possible only through the relation of definite quantities to our capacity to consume.Yet money，unlike a precious metal used for jewelry，does not need to balance the unlimited desire for it by a growing distance from direct needs，because it has become the correlate of the most basic needs of life as well.This remarkable dual character of money with reference to desire for it is presented in a detached form by avarice and extravagance，since in both instances money has dissolved into pure desire for it.Both exhibit the negative side of what we have also observed as a positive side to money，namely that money enlarges the diameter of the circle in which our antagonistic psychic drives flourish.What avarice exhibits，as it were，in material paralysis，extravagance reveals in the form of fluidity and expansion.

Ascetic Poverty

On another level than extravagance and in contrast to greed and avarice，there exists a second negative phenomenon-poverty as a positive value，poverty in itself as a satisfying purpose of life.The growth of one link of the sequence of purposes to absolute importance has been transplanted in a direction completely different to avarice and greed.Whereas they come to a halt with the conversion of means to final ends，poverty persists regardless of the absence of means or moves into the section that lies behind the final purpose inasmuch as it is the result of the terminated sequence of purposes.Poverty，like avarice and greed，appears in its purest and specific form only at a certain stage of the money economy.In natural conditions which are not yet regulated by a money economy，and as long as agricultural products do not circulate merely as commodities，that is as money values，the total destitution of an individual is less common.Even in recent times，Russia prided herself on there being no personal poverty in those areas less affected by a money economy.As a general phenomenon，this may be attributed not only to the easier availability of what is absolutely necessary without having to depend upon money，but also to the fact that humane and sympathetic feelings towards poverty are more easily aroused in these circumstances than where what the poor lack and what one can help them with is not what is most immediately necessary to them.In purely monetary relationships，sympathetic feelings have to make a detour before they reach the point of their genuine interest.They often flag during this detour.For this reason，practically helpful and charitable people prefer to come to the aid of the poor with food and clothing rather than with money.If poverty emerges as a moral ideal，then correspondingly the possession of money is detested as the most dangerous temptation，as the primary evil.

Whenever the salvation of the soul is conceived as the final purpose，poverty is at the same time interpreted in many doctrines as a positive and indispensable means which rises above this position to the dignity of a value that is important and valid in itself.This may happen at different stages in the sequence of purposes and for different reasons.In the first place，the mere indifference towards all worldly enjoyments and interests may lead to it.This burden is removed from the aspiring soul as from itself without requiring a will which is specifically directed towards it.The first Christians may frequently have behaved in this way，that is，not directly antagonistic and aggressive towards tangible goods，hut simply lacking any relation to them，just as to things that we cannot perceive because we lack the necessary organ.Therefore，the sporadic communism of early Christianity is fundamentally opposed to the attempts at modem communism since the former originates from indifference towards worldly goods，the latter from the greatest evaluation of them.A mixture of both occurred in the intervening period：the socialist-revolutionary movements at the end of the Middle Ages certainly struggled against poverty，but they were in part supported by ascetic movements with their ideal of complete frugality.However，at least with regard to money，ascetism has to abandon its mere dismissal of material interest and to acquire more positive and resolute forms，since one continually confronts it on the road to the most indispensable and since its acquisition requires more attentiveness and activity of the will than the resultant concern with subsistence.Whoever wished to be so indifferent to this interest that，like the Father of the Church who ate axle grease for butter without noticing it，can none the less，if he wants to exist at all in a period of money transactions，not permit the smallest amount of his consciousness to be distracted in this manner for its acquisition.Therefore，where in principle only indifference to everything external predominates，this，in contrast with money，will easily transform itself into real hatred.Second，the tempting character of money has an even more distinctive effect upon it.Because it is ready to be used at any moment，it is the worst snare of a moment of weakness，and since it serves all activities，it offers the soul its most tempting aspect at that time.All this is of even greater danger since money，as long as it really exists merely as money in our hands，is the most indifferent and innocent thing in the world.But for ascetic modes of sensibility it becomes the real symbol of the devil who seduces us under the mask of innocence and simplicity，so that the only safeguard against both the devil and money is to keep them at a distance and reject any relation to them，no matter how innocent it may appear to be.

This attitude found its general expression in the earliest Buddhist communities.The monk who joins the community surrenders his possessions as well as his family relations and his wife and he is not allowed-with occasional exceptions-to own anything but the little things of daily use，and even these only if they accrue to him as alms.The fundamental importance of this regulation is indicated by the name the monks chose to call themselves：the community of beggars.In as far as they begged for what they needed daily-though not even by asking for alms but by quietly expecting them none the less-attachment to any property was completely impossible.Just as certain Arab nomadic tribes were prohibited by law from sowing grain，from building a house，or similar things in order to avoid disloyalty to the tribal tradition by becoming settled，so the Buddhist monks accepted the same rules by a change of spirit.The monks，who liken themselves to the birds who do not carry anything with them but their wings wherever they fly，are not allowed to accept arable land，cattle or slaves as a present.But this prohibition is most severe with regard to gold and silver.The benefactor who has intended to give money to the monks cannot do so and has to give it to an artisan or trader instead，who thereupon hands over to the monks the value of the money in kind.If a monk does accept gold or silver he has to do penance before the community and the money is given to a friendly layman to purchase basic necessities since the monk himself is not allowed to provide them.If no layman is in the neighbourhood，then the money is given to the monk to be thrown away，and even then only to a monk who is‘free of desire，free of hatred and free of delusion’and who can be relied upon to throw it away.Here，money has become an object of fear and horror-although with the peculiar anaemic faintness of these benumbed souls-and poverty has become a jealously guarded possession，a precious part of the inventory of value in an existence estranged from the diversity and the interests of the world.Money represented the unified value，the rejection of which meant the rejection of the diversity of the world.

The inner formation that culminated in the elevation of poverty to an absolute value is represented most distinctly，and with unique passion，by the early Franciscan friars.Their order is not only a reaction against the intolerable secularization of the Italian Church in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries，which found its most articulate expression in simony-everything was attuned to money and available for money，from the election of the pope to the appointment of the most wretched country parson，from the spectacular establishment of a monastery to the enunciation of the formula by which the Florentine priests expiated and restored the wine in which mice had been drowned.The reform movement，which had never completely disappeared since the fifth century，had already proclaimed poverty as the ideal demand for the clergy because it would cut off both the root and the crown of the secularization of the Church.But it was the Franciscans who first made poverty an autonomous value and a correlate of the deepest innermost needs.An expert on the earliest period of the order states：‘The gente poverella found security，love，and freedom in poverty.It is no wonder then that all the thoughts and endeavours of the new apostles focused solely on the preservation of this precious treasure.Their glorification of poverty was boundless；every day they wooed anew their beloved with the full fervour of nuptual passion.’Poverty thus became a positive possession，which on the one hand mediated the acquisition of the supreme goods while on the other performed the same service as money does for worldly and contemptible goods.Like money，poverty was the reservoir which the practical series of values led to and from which they were nourished again.On the other hand，poverty was already quite clearly one side or expression of the fact that，in a higher and supreme sense，the world belongs to he who renounces，even though he does not really renounce；rather，in poverty he possesses the purest and finest extract of things，just as money possesses the same for the avaricious.Just as the Buddhist monks said，‘We who do not own anything live in an ecstasy of happiness；joyfulness is our nourishment as it is for the celestial Gods’，so the Franciscans were characterized as nihil habentes，omnia possidentes. Poverty has here lost its ascetic essence.The values of the soul，for which poverty is the negative condition，have come directly to them；the renunciation of the means，which is usually the full representative of their final purposes，of the world，is similarly elevated to a final value.The tremendous and wide-reaching power of the process by which money is elevated from its intermediary position to absolute importance is best illuminated by the fact that the negation of its meaning is elevated to the identical form.

Cynicism

I want to close the circle of phenomena that illustrate and clarify the nature of money by two processes that are almost endemic to the heights of a money culture-cynicism and a bias attitude-both of which are the results of the reduction of the concrete values of life to the mediating value of money.They are，so to speak，the reverse of avarice and greed in that，whereas this reduction manifests itself in them in the growth of a new ultimate value，in the case of cynicism and the blase attitude it is manifested in the disparagement of all old values.The negativity of the teleological sequence，which money had already brought about in extravagance and the desire for poverty，is now completed by seizing upon not only the particularity of values，which are merely crystallized in money，but upon the existence of values as such.Although the attitude that we today term cynicism has nothing to do with the Greek philosophy from which the term originates，there exists none the less，one might say，a perverse relationship between the two.The cynicism of antiquity had a very definite ideal in life，namely positive strength of mind and moral freedom of the individual.This was such an absolute value for cynicism that all the differences between otherwise accepted values paled into insignificance.Whether a person is a master or slave，whether he satisfies his needs in an aesthetic or unaesthetic manner，whether he has a native country or not，whether he fulfils his family obligations or not-all this is completely irrelevant for the wise person，not only in comparison with any absolute value，but also in that this indifference is revealed in their existence.In the attitude which we nowadays characterize as cynical，it seems to me decisive that here too no higher differences in values exist and that，in general，the only significance of what is highly valued consists in its being degraded to the lowest level，but that the positive and ideal moral purpose of this levelling has disappeared.What was a means，or a secondary result，for those paradoxical adherents to Socratic wisdom is not central and in the process has completely altered its meaning.The nature of the cynic-in the contemporary sense-is most clearly demonstrated in contrast with that of the sanguine enthusiast.Whereas the curve of evaluation of the enthusiast moves upwards and lower values strive to be raised to the importance of higher values，the evaluation curve of the cynic moves in the opposite direction.His awareness of life is adequately expressed only when he has theoretically and practically exemplified the baseness of the highest values and the illusion of any differences in values.This mood can be most effectively supported by money's capacity to reduce the highest as well as the lowest values equally to one value form and thereby to place them on the same level，regardless of their diverse kinds and amounts.Nowhere else does the cynic find so triumphant a justification as here，where the finest，most ideal and most personal goods are available not only for anyone who has the necessary money，but even，more significantly，where these goods are denied to the most worth if he lacks the necessary means，and where the movements of money bring about the most absurd combinations of personal and objective values.The nurseries of cynicism are therefore those places with huge turnovers，exemplified in stock exchange dealings，where money is available in huge quantities and changes owners easily.The more money becomes the sole centre of interest，the more one discovers that honour and conviction，talent and virtue，beauty and salvation of the soul，are exchanged against money and so the more a mocking and frivolous attitude will develop in relation to these higher values that are for sale for the same kind of value as groceries，and that also command a‘market price’.The concept of a market price for values which，according to their nature，reject any evaluation except in terms of their own categories and ideals is the perfect objectification of what cynicism presents in the form of a subjective reflex.

The Blasté Attitude

The other meaning of levelling，which refers to the differences in the nature of things rather than to their different evaluation-inasmuch as the central position of money focuses interest on what things have in common rather than on their particular level of development-finds its personal expression in the blasé attitude.Whereas the cynic is still moved to a reaction by the sphere of value，even if in the perverse sense that he considers the downward movement of values part of the attraction of life，the bias person-although the concept of such a person is rarely fully realized-has completely lost the feeling for value differences.He experiences all things as being of an equally dull and grey hue，as not worth getting excited about，particularly where the will is concerned.The decisive moment here-and one that is denied to the blasé-is not the devaluation of things as such，but indifference to their specific qualities from which the whole liveliness of feeling and volition originates.Whoever has become possessed by the fact that the same amount of money can procure all the possibilities that life has to offer must also become blasé.As a rule，the blase attitude is rightly attributed to satiated enjoyment because too strong a stimulus destroys the nervous ability to respond to it.Yet this does not yet close the circle of phenomena associated with the bias attitude.The attrac-tion of things is not the only cause of practical activity intent on gaining them；on the contrary，the kind and amount of practically necessary endeavours to acquire them often determines the depth and liveliness of their attraction for us.All individual particular strivings，all the tortuous turns on the way and all specific demands that the acquisition of the object imposes upon us-all are transferred to the object itself as particular qualities of its nature and its relation to us，and all are invested in the object as its fascination.In the opposite instance，the more the acquisition is carried out in a mechanical and indifferent way，the more the object appears to be colourless and without interest，just as everywhere it is the case that not only does the goal determine the way，but also the way determines the goal.Therefore their acquisition by money，which equalizes procurement and does not reserve specific methods for any object，makes the objects necessarily more indifferent.This is all the more the case where more and more objects are encompassed by wealth and their value differences are actually reduced.As long as we are not yet in a position to buy things，they affect us with their particular distinctive charms.Yet as soon as we easily acquire them with our money，those charms fade away，not only because we now own and enjoy them，but also because we acquired them by an indifferent method which effaces their specific value.This influence is，of course，almost unnoticeable in individual cases.But in the relationship of the wealthy person to the objects acquired by money，indeed，even in the total colouring which the public mind now attributes to these objects，this influence has grown considerably.Thus，cynicism and the bias attitude are the answers to two different，sometimes to some extent mixed，natural dispositions to the same state of affairs.For the cynical disposition，the experience of how much can be obtained for money and the inductive conclusion that finally everything and everybody is purchasable excites a definite pleasurable sensation，whereas the same picture of reality viewed from a bias attitude destroys all possibilities of being attractive.While，as a rule，the cynic does not wish to change his inner condition，the reverse is often the case for the bias person：his membership of the human species demands the attractions of life that his individual condition makes intangible for him.Out of this there emerges the craving today for excitement，for extreme impressions，for the greatest speed in its change-it is one of the typical attempts to meet the dangers or sufferings in a situation by the quantitative exaggeration of its content.The satisfaction of such cravings may bring about a temporary relief，but soon the former condition will he re-established，though now made worse by the increased quantity of its elements.What is more important is that the modem preference for‘stimulation’as such in impressions，relations and information-without thinking it important for us to find out why these stimulate us-also reveals the characteristic entanglement with means：one is satisfied with this preliminary stage of the genuine production values.The search for mere stimuli in themselves is the consequence of the increasing bias attitude through which natural excitement increasingly disappears.This search for stimuli originates in the money economy with the fading of all specific values into a mere mediating value.We have here one of those interesting cases in which the disease determines its own form of the cure.A money culture signifies such an enslavement of life in its means，that release from its weariness is also evidently sought in a mere means which conceals its final significance-in the fact of‘stimulation’as such.

Ⅲ

I have mentioned before that greed and avarice，although they appear in most cases in unison，must none the less be precisely distinguished both conceptually as well as psychologically.There are，in fact，phenomena that illustrate them separately.The speed on the route towards money is often completely independent of the speed on the route away from money，not only with reference to greed and avarice in the narrow sense，but already on those levels on which the inner movements have not yet overstepped the boundary of the normal.This is largely brought about by that illegitimate elevation of money in the series of ends which，because it contains no objective standards，often changes the significance of the series，so that money，as long as it can still be gained，arouses different value sentiments than when it is considered for the purpose of spending upon further objects.The discrepancy between value sentiment and money on the path towards money declines once it has been obtained.This discrepancy is also expressed by the observation that，as consumers，most people do not economize as carefully as they do in business.Perhaps a regulation in ancient Jewish law has its origin in this experience that we are more strict，more exact and less careless in acquiring than in spending money.According to this law，the oath always had to be taken by the defendant in cases of disputes concerning money.Only the grocer was occasionally allowed，according to one passage of the Talmud，to swear on the entry in his account book.Under certain circumstances，the change in contraction and remission of the valuation of money emerges from the attitude of princes who，like Louis Ⅺ and many others，were very severe in collecting their revenues but very liberal in spending them.However，generally speaking，one cannot deny a proportionate relationship between the speed of acquisition and the speed of expenditure.Nobody spends money more light-heartedly and frivolously than the gambler，the gold-digger 1d the demi-monde. Spain's ruinous fiscal policy since Charles Ⅴ has been attributed to the relative ease with which precious metals of America fell to the Spaniards.The saying，‘Easy come，easy go’，refers not only to the objective structure of the economy where the security of what has been acquired is usually only the reward of a certain solidity in the process of acquisition.The objective circumstances in those professions in which particularly easy and quick profits can be made also provide channels that favour the natural tendency and chance for spending them.But a more effective argument for the proverb lies in the following psychological state：the faster the teleological series terminates at the point of monetary gain，the less the sentiments of energy and importance are concentrated in this point.Thus，the more superficially and therefore more easily separably monetary gain clings to the centre of value，the more we are willing to let it go.Even though the upward and downward leading sections of the series have a common characteristic of greater or lesser tension，there remains a difference between them，namely that money，before it has been acquired，has the value of a final purpose，which it loses as soon as it is gained and experienced in its role as a mere means-unless avarice prohibits this process.

The Quantity Of Money As Its Quality

I have emphasized this turning point between the two sections of the teleological series because it reveals a most essential quality of money.As long as money serves in our consciousness as the only and closest goal of our endeavours it still possesses a quality.We would be hard pressed to formulate what kind of quality it is，but the interestedness of the will，the concentration of thoughts on it，the liveliness of the attached hopes and emotions shine on it with a warmth that lends it a colourful glow and renders the concept of money significant regardless of its amount.All our practical wishes develop in this way.As long as they stand before us unachieved，the whole genera attracts us，so that we often labour under the illusion that the smallest amount of it，inasmuch as it represents only this object and this concept，would satisfy us permanently.Our desire is concentrated on the qualitative character of the object and the interest in quantity usually asserts itself only after the quality has been realized and experienced to a certain extent.This typical evolution of our interests takes possession of money in a specifically modified form.Since money is nothing but the indifferent means for concrete and infinitely varied purposes，its quantity is its only important determination as far as we are concerned.With reference to money，we do not ask what and how，but how much.This quality or lack of quality of money first emerges in all its psychological purity，however，only after it has been acquired.Only when money is transformed into positive values does it become evident that the quantity exclusively determines the importance of money，namely its power as a means.Until the teleological series reaches this point，and as long as money is a mere object of desire，its purely quantitative character recedes from its general and，to a certain extent，qualitatively experienced nature on account of the emotional overtones attached to money as a general concept.This relationship is chronic for avarice，because avarice does not permit the teleological series to go beyond this critical point，with the result that the avaricious person constantly attaches sentiments to money as if it were a substance of qualitative and specific attraction.The limitation of the interest in money to the question‘How much’-in other words，the fact that its quality consists exclusively in its quantity -has， many important consequences for our analysis.

In the first place，the quantitative differences of money ownership imply the most considerable qualitative differences for the owner.This is such a trivial fact of experience that to emphasize it would seem meaningless，were it not for the constant temptation to reverse the interpretation of the purely quantitative character of money and to conceive its importance and its effectiveness mechanically，that is to conceive of the more important as the multiplication of the less important.I wish first to mention a quite superficial case as proof of how drastically quantitative differences in the concentrations of money intervene in its qualitative consequences.The issue of small-denomination bank notes has a character totally different from the issue of large ones.People with a small income，who are usually the owners of small notes，cannot as easily present them for redemption as the owners of large notes can.On the other hand，if a panic breaks out，the former press for redemption more violently and thoughtlessly or give the notes away at any price.The following more general considerations support my basic argument.

Subjective Differences In Amounts Of Risk

All money outlays for the purposes of acquisition fall into two categories-with risk and without risk.Viewed abstractly，both forms exist in every single outlay if one excludes gambling.Even the wildest speculation must reckon with a very considerable loss of value，though it need not fear a nullification of the object of speculation，whereas on the other hand even the safest act of acquisition always contains an element of risk.In many cases the latter risk can be practically disregarded as an infinitely small factor，so that one can say of every transaction either that there is no risk at all or that a definite portion of the invested capital-in other words the assets of the subject-is at stake.It seems reasonable to determine the size of this possible risk by two objective factors：the probability fraction of the loss and the size of the possible profit.It is obviously unreasonable to invest 100 marks in a business where the chances of loss are 50 per cent and the highest possible gain is 25 marks.Under any circumstances it would appear rational to wager 20 marks on the same terms.But this objective calculation is not sufficient for calculating the reasonableness or unreasonableness of risking a definite amount.A personal factor must also be considered.In every economic situation，a certain fraction of one's possessions should not be risked at all，regardless of how large and how probable the chances of profit might be.The desperate risk of the final gamble，which is usually justified by the statement that one‘has nothing more to lose’，indicates by this very argument that any vestige of rationality has been deliberately abandoned here.If，however，one presupposes rationality，then the question of the objective probability of the success of a speculation should be raised only for that part of the assets that lies above a certain fraction.The amount below this limit should，rationally，not be risked，even where a large sum might be gained with a very low probability of loss.The objective factors which otherwise determine the reasonableness of risk are totally irrelevant here.The money form of values easily tempts one to misjudge this economic dictate because it subdivides values into very small portions and so tempts the person with slender means to take a risk that，in principle，he ought to avoid.This has been typified，for example，in the gold shares to the value of one pound，which were issued by mining companies in the Transvaal and western Australia.In view of their relatively low value and the very high chance of gain，this share has been bought by people who normally have nothing to do with stock exchange speculations.A similar state of affairs is created in the Italian lottery.However，in many countries，modem legislation relating to shares attempts to counteract this danger to the welfare of the people by establishing a fairly high minimum for the nominal value of any share offered.If a speculative value-of an enterprise or a loan-is offered in very small shares，its objective insignificance in relation to the total amount easily deceives the buyer that its subjective value-that is，in relation to the buyer's assets-is considerable.And the further fact that it is possible to make a speculative profit with such a small sum makes people forget that their circumstances do not permit them to risk this sum.The tragedy in all this is that people whose income provides only the minimum level of existence，and who therefore should not risk anything at all，are most strongly subjected to such temptations.Not only is the profit that is based on probability denied to those whose situation places them in most need of it and who are prevented from obtaining it by the logic of their situation，but their security against losses based on probability is also denied them-and it is precisely these people who can least bear such losses.Often，many less well off families do not make use of the insurance which，for a relatively small premium，provides care for the servants in case of sickness.To take care of sick servants may be difficult but they would rather run that risk，because at a very low income even low fixed costs seem less tolerable than the mere chance of much higher costs-no matter how irrational such calculations may be.Clearly，within an income or fortune the limits beyond which the risk is economically justified are all the lower-that is，a larger part is free for speculative purposes the better the person is situated，not only in terms of an absolutely larger amount-which is obvious-but also in terms of a relatively larger amount in proportion to the total income.Not only does such a difference exist between very high and very low financial circumstances，but also more minor differences may already indicate the justification of different amounts of risk.This is a further contribution to the unearned increment of wealth which was discussed earlier，since obviously a fortune has a greater chance of increasing，the larger the portion of it that may be invested in speculation without endangering the economic existence of its owner.This situation also illustrates how money takes on a completely different qualitative character through mere differences in quantity and how it subjects monetary matters to qualitatively different forms.The completely external and，indeed，even the inner importance of a sum of money is different，depending on whether it lies below or above any dividing line.Whether it does lie above or below this line depends solely upon the total assets of the owner.Changes in the quantity of money produce totally new qualities.

The Qualitatively Different Consequences Of Quantitatively Altered Causes

Finally，all this fits into a very general form of the behaviour of things，the most striking instance of which can be found in the sphere of psychology.A quantitative increase in phenomena that are operating as causes does not always call forth a proportionate increase in their consequences.Rather，the augmentation of a cause that resulted in a definite augmentation of the consequence cannot be sufficient for the same purpose on a higher stage of the scale；a much greater influence will be required in order to attain even the same effect.I remind you of the frequent phenomenon whereby the working capital that produces a definite return in a newly developed area of acquisition has later to be expanded considerably in order to continue to yield the same return.We might also point to the effect of medication which，in the beginning，can be increased，by a small increment of the doses，whereas later exactly the same additional applications produce much reduced effects；or we may point to the joy brought about under strained financial circumstances by a profit which，however，will no longer produce a joyous reaction if it is continuously repeated.The most common example refers to the so-called threshold of consciousness：external stimuli that affect our nerves are unnoticeable below a certain strength；but when this threshold is reached the stimuli suddenly evoke sensations，and the stimuli's merely quantitative increase brings about an effect of qualitative determinateness.In some cases，however，the increase has an upper limit with regard to this effect，so that the simple continuation of an increase in the stimulus beyond this threshold results in the disappearance of the sensation.This points to the most extreme form of discrepancy between cause and effect which is brought about by the mere quantitative increase of the cause，namely，the direct transformation of the effect into its opposite.With reference to the example of medication，it should be specifically mentioned that homeopathic experiments have demonstrated a direct contrast in the effects that a purely quantitative change in the doses can bring about in one and the same patient.With reference to electric shock treatment，it has been observed that frequent repetition may turn the result into its opposite and again into the opposite of the opposite.It is an everyday experience of major and typical importance that almost all pleasureaffording stimuli can，after an original increase in pleasurable sensation，lead to its arrest and even to positive pain.Finally，the incommensurability of objective causal stimuli and the subjective sensation evoked is also illustrated in the following way.Very low economic values，which are values none the less，often do not incite us to behaviour that would otherwise correspond to economic values as such.There are objects of money value，such as stamps，whose money value is not at all taken into account and does not operate as a factor in dealing with these objects.We expect replies to inquiries from far-off people of whom we would or could not demand a penny，and who themselves have no interest in the issue.If the recipient of the letter is of equal social status，wewould not dare to enclose a stamp for the reply.Someone who is thrifty with pennies in other matters is usually less concerned about thriftiness with regard to stamps or bus fares.It would appear that a threshold of economic awareness exists that varies according to the wealth and temperament of the subject，so that economic appeals below that level are not experienced as economic ones.This is probably a phenomenon common to all higher spheres.For such spheres emerge when already existing and perceptible elements converge towards a new form and are thereby elevated to a new and，as yet，unknown importance.In this way，things become objects of law，of aesthetic enjoyment and of philosophical interest things whose well-known content attains a new aspect.In order that this may occur，a definite quantity of such elements is also presupposed in many cases，and if they remain below this quantity，then they do not enter that higher，more difficult to excite，stratum of consciousness in which these categories live.For instance，certain colours or combinations of colours may be visible in all their clarity，and yet they do not incite an aesthetic pleasure if the space which they cover does not have considerable dimensions；prior to that，they are simple entities which certainly overstep the threshold of sensory awareness but not that of aesthetic awareness.There is also a threshold of historical awareness which creates the remarkable disproportion between personal energies and their historical consequences.There have been many Indian ascetics who taught a similar doctrine to Gotama，but only he became Buddha；there were certainly many Jewish teachers whose sermons did not differ much from those of Jesus，but only he has influenced world history.This phenomenon can be seen everywhere.The importance of personalities forms a continuous scale，but there is a point above which the historical significance of a personality commences，whereas those who remain below this threshold of significance have not merely a lesser effect but none at all and they sink into oblivion.At a higher level，perhaps，lies the threshold of philosophical consciousness.The same phenomena that in minute quantity belong to the transitory irrelevancies of everyday life，and which，perhaps in somewhat greater quantity，provoke aesthetic interest，can become subjects of philosophical and religious reflection if they emerge in powerful and exciting dimensions.In a similar way，there exists a quantitative threshold regarding the sentiments of tragedy.All kinds of contradictions，futilities and disappointments that are negligible as single events of daily life，or that even have a humorous trait，take on a tragic and deeply disquieting quality when we become aware of their tremendous diffusion，the unavoidability of their repetition and their colouring not only of a single day but of life in general.In the legal sphere，the threshold is marked by the principle：minima non curat praetor. The theft of a pin is quantitatively too insignificant-even though qualitatively and logically it constitutes a theft-to set the complicated psychological mechanism of legal consciousness into motion.This too has a threshold，and stimuli that remain below this threshold，although they may stimulate other areas of consciousness，cannot arouse a psychic-legal reaction-let alone a reaction by the State.

The Threshold Of Economic Awareness

The fact that economic awareness is also equipped with a specific threshold explains the general inclination to prefer a continuous series of small expenses that each pass‘unnoticed’to a single，once-andfor-all larger one.When Pufendorf suggested to the prince that it would be preferable to impose a modest tax on many objects rather than a high tax on a single object，on the grounds that people do not like to part with money（fort dur ala desserre ），he did not mention the crucial point of this argument.Even though the people have to hand over their money in one form or the other，only in one form does handing over the money remain below the threshold of economic consciousness and the single sum of money that is handed over is not elevated into the category of economie calculation，sensation and reaction-just as two weights，each of them below the threshold of awareness of pressure，do not produce any sensation when placed on the hand one after the other，but do produce one if placed on the hand at the same time.

This may be interpreted as a passive resistance on the part of our simple or complicated sensations，which first has to be overcome in order to transfer the influence to our consciousness.This resistance can，however，be an active one.One can imagine that our receptive physical-psychic organs are，at any moment，in a state of agitation so that the effect of a new stimulus depends on the relation between the direction and strength of the new and the preceding inner movement.The effect can he in the same direction，spreading without restraint，or it can be in the opposite direction，becoming totally or partly counterbalanced so that the receptive organ can move in the proper direction only after overcoming a definite resistance.This kind of conduct also encounters what we term differential sensitivity.Our sensitivity measures not absolute，but only relative amounts；that is，we can determine the amount only by the difference of one sensation from another.This experience-whose modification can here be disregarded，since it is valid for us only in so far as its critics are willing to admit its validity-is obviously the foundation of the series of phenomena discussed above.This experience may be illustrated by a very simple example.If a motion in the tactile nerves of the strength of one has increased by one-third，then this is the same as if the motion of the strength of two had increased by two-thirds.The fact that we attach the same reaction to the relatively equal difference in the scale of sensations results in the fact that objectively equal stimuli have very different subjective consequences.The farther the sensation of a new stimulus deviates from the original state of that sensation，the stronger and the more obviously will we become conscious of it.As we might expect，this clashes with the fact that often the stimulus must first overcome an opposing disposition of our physical-psychic organs before it can affect our consciousness.For whereas the stimulus is-according to differential sensitivity-all the more noticeable the further it deviates from the preceding condition，it is-according to the other principle-less noticeable，up to a certain point，the more the direction differs from the inner motion in operation.This is associated with the observation that，if the stimulus is stable，sensations require a certain time，however short，before they reach their peak.Whereas the first sequence of phenomena can be traced to fatigue-the nerve no longer reacts to the second stimulus with the same energy because it is fatigued by the first stimulus-the latter sequence shows that fatigue does not immediately follow the reaction to the stimulus，but that this reaction accumulates almost autonomously if the stimulus reaches an adequate level，from which，however，it declines again through subsequent fatigue.This dualism of effects is also very much in evidence in complicated phenomena.An occasion for joy，for instance，will be experienced by a generally unhappy individual with a passionate reaction and the release of unused eudaemonistic energies，and this occasion will stand out boldly from the dark background of his previous existence.On the other hand，we also notice that a certain stimulus to happiness may not be fully responded to if the mind is already adjusted to continuously contrasting experiences.The especially delicate charms of life at first recoil without effect from a rhythm of life that is determined by misery and sorrow，and the strength of the experience that，by contrast，was supposed to be strong comes about only after the extended influence of the eudaemonistic moments.If they do persist and the overall state of the mind is eventually transposed in a corresponding rhythm or structure，then the amount of the stimuli which could not be completely perceived before-will now also go unnoticed because of the opposite constellation since the mind has now become accustomed to eudaemonistic conditions and the necessary difference goes unnoticed.

Differential Sensitivity Towards Economic Stimuli

The major teleological significance of this antinomy is also manifested in economic life.The differential sensitivity drives us from every given state of affairs to the acquisition of new goods，to the production of new objects of enjoyment.The limit to this differential-through the passive or active resistance of the existing organic constitution-forces us to pursue this new direction with persistent energy and to continue to acquire more and more goods.However，the differential sensitivity sets an upper limit to this increase，because it weakens the inurement to a certain stimulus and finally becomes so indifferent to any increment that it moves on to qualitatively new stimuli.Just as the regular quantitative increase of objects here brings about an alternation of internal consequences，so the simple increase in the money value of objects may lead to a reversal in the demand for them.In the beginning，an object that does not cost anything or is available at a minimum price is often not valued and not in demand at all.As soon as its price rises，however，its desirability increases；its desirability，in turn，increases parallel to the price for a while up to its ultimate point of attraction.If the price continues to increase so that acquisition is no longer possible，then the first stage of this abandonment will perhaps exhibit the greatest desire.Subsequently，however，an adjustment will be made and the useless longing will be overcome，indeed even a direct aversion to the unattainable-a‘sour grapes’attitude-may develop.In many spheres such a change of positive and negative behaviour is the result of the quantitative change of economic demands.The pressure of taxation on the Russian peasant is offered as an explanation for his poor，primitive and less intensive agriculture，since it would not pay him to be industrious because he does not retain anything save his bare livelihood.Obviously somewhat less pressure，which would make industrious work profitable，would motivate him to intensify cultivation；but if taxation were reduced considerably he might return to his former indolence if the return were sufficient to satisfy all the needs of his cultural level.To take a further example：if a social class or an individual is condemned to a low standard of living and therefore knows only crude and ordinary entertainments and forms of relaxation，then a somewhat higher income will only have the effect of extending these enjoyments still further.Yet if income rises dramatically，the demands for entertainment will move into a completely different sphere.If，for example，a bottle of gin is the main pleasure，then higher wages will lead to an increased consumption of gin；but if wages are raised still further and more considerably，then the desire for very different categories of enjoyments will follow.The fact that the threshold of awareness for different pleasure and pain sensations have totally different levels here leads to complications that defy any analysis.Recent research in physiology has demonstrated the enormous difference in sensitivity to pain between the nerves of various parts of the body；for some，the threshold is six hundred times higher than for others，and it is characteristic that even the threshold value of sensitivity to pressure on the same place possesses no constant relation to them.A comparison of the threshold value for different higher and non-sensory feelings is very dubious because the factors that give rise to them are completely heterogeneous and cannot be quantitatively compared in the same manner as mechanical or electric stimuli of sensory nerves.But in spite of the fact that measurement seems impossible at this level，one must concede the different sensitivity of the realm of higher sentiments and also-since the life situations under discussion always refer to a plurality of areas-the enormous theoretically incomprehensible variety of relations between external conditions and the internal sequence of feelings.

The fate of sentiments determined by money ownership permit an approximate insight into these threshold values and proportions.Money operates as a stimulus to all kinds of possible sentiments because its unspecific character，devoid of all qualities，places it at such a great distance from any sentiment that its relations with all of them are fairly equal.This relation is only rarely a direct one since it requires intermediate objects that are partly-in so far as they can be purchased for money-unspecific，but which，viewed from the other side，are also specific because they evoke certain sentiments.Inasmuch as money makes us anticipate the enjoyment value of particular objects obtainable by money，the attraction of these objects is transferred to money and represented by money.Thus，money is the only object in relation to which the threshold values of various sensitivities to enjoyment are in any way comparable.The reason why measurement none the less seems impossible is obvious：it is the extraordinary diversity in the money value of those things that，in different spheres，produce seemingly equal amounts of satisfaction.If the threshold of enjoyment on the monetary scale lies at totally different levels for a gourmet，a book collector or a sportsman，then this is not due to any difference in sensitivity to enjoyment，hut to the fact that the various objects of attraction have very different prices.Yet it is conceivable that the fortuitousness of the threshold values tends towards a balance between amounts of money and eudaemonistic effects，at least in the sense that it becomes obvious to individuals，or even to types，what money value those purchasable objects or impressions possess that overstep the threshold of enjoyment.This development is brought about by the fact that our intuitive appraisal of the fairness or unfairness of the price of an object is a consequence not only of the price demanded for the object elsewhere，but also of the completely different absolute prices of qualitatively very different types of goods.The balancing of these factors signifies the evolution of a general standard of money prices which is certainly the final result of many subjective and fortuitous deviations.From what we know，for instance，of the economic circumstances of the Palestinian Jews in an earlier period，it seems that they were struck by the extraordinary cheapness of certain articles and enormous prices of others.Since the relationship to present prices is so varied that it defies rational analysis，one cannot say-and this is perhaps true of any period of antiquity-that the general money value at that time differs by such and such an amount from the present.Actually，a general money value did not formerly exist at all.This phenomenon has been tentatively explained by the economic gulf between rich and poor which was not reduced by any ambitions on the part of the poor with regard to their standard of living.This was due to the lower strata，s great and stable contentedness，with the result that they generally did not have any desire for certain goods.Therefore，two totally different standards of money prices evolved：one for what the poor were able to pay and one for the domain of the rich to whom money did not matter.This might have been the case among all ancient peoples.In this connection，it must be emphasized that，according to recent social views，the middle classes wish to be equal to the upper classes，and the lower classes to be equal to the middle classes with regard to clothing，food，comfort and entertainment.For the first time，this has opened up the possibility of a uniform and general money value.General economic culture，in view of this development，may be said to tend towards making what were originally cheap objects more expensive and vice-versa.This levelling process is first displayed in an objective manner，and finds its truly astounding manifestation in the‘average rate of profit’.Through an almost unbelievable and unconscious process of mutual adjustment of all the economic factors concerned，industrial enterprises which in a developed economy are independent of each other and quite different as to materials，labour conditions and rates of return，nevertheless yield，ceteris paribus ，the same rate of interest in relation to.the capital invested in them.Any similar adjustment of the subjective eudaemonistic results of money values is obviously out of the question in view of the individual differentiation of human beings.However，a somewhat similar adjustment might be reached in the cultural process because all objects will gradually become expressible in money terms，and a general standard of money prices，that is the uniform importance of money for all commodities，will gradually be established.On the scale of the quantity of money，certain points might possibly emerge as the equivalents of those objects that mark the economic，enjoyment or blasé threshold for a specific individual or type.In the sphere of threshold phenomena-a sphere that is the most difficult to examine in view of its complications and individualizations-money remains the only object which，through its purely quantitative character and its uniform response to all differences between things，provides the possibility of arranging the manifold sensitivities in one uniform series.In addition，however，certain occurrences indicate the very direct importance that money has for the threshold of economic awareness，in the sense that our consciousness responds as specific economic awareness only to a pecuniary stimulus.Bourgeois narrow-mindedness often refuses to give an object away for altruistic reasons on the grounds that it has cost money-and this is perceived as the justification for proceeding according to the rigid egoistical principle of sheer economy！In the same way，foolish parents attempt to hold their children back from wilful destruction by asserting that the things they wish to destroy cost money！Instead of explaining to their children the value of the object itself，they immediately react economically only to the idea of money spent.Two totally different phenomena illustrate this in a very characteristic way.Presents are often valued only if the giver has spent money on them；to make a present out of one's own possessions seems to be shabby，illegitimate and inadequate.Only very refined and superior people will appreciate a present most if the giver has owned it.In the former case，the awareness of a sacrifice on the part of the giver develops in the receiver only if the sacrifice is made in terms of money.On the other hand，a money present seems to be incompatible with the standards of the upper circles of society，and even servants，coachmen or messengers often appreciate a cigar more than a tip of perhaps three times its value.The decisive fact here is that the gift should not appear as economically significant or at least that，allowing its economic nature to recede into the background，it should bring about considerable cordiality.In all these cases，only the money form of value stimulates economic awareness，and the same procedure will be desired or rejected depending on the sentiments evoked.Even though the fully developed money economy arranges economic objects in a continuous series，there remains such a general difference between these objects and money-a fact that is less true for barter economies-that the emergence of a threshold of awareness that reacts only to the money value becomes quite understandable.

Relations Between External Stimuli And Emotional Responses In The Field Of Money

There is another reason that specifically relates the phenomena of the threshold of awareness to money.The existence and accumulation of causes whose real proportional effect is excluded are more likely to prevail above a certain limit，and，to push the limits of these effects still higher，the more stable and motionless is the whole system that surrounds the occurrence.As is well known，water can be cooled considerably below zero point without freezing it if it is protected from any motion，whereas the slightest vibration immediately causes it to ice up.Similarly it is possible to keep one's hand in gradually heated water much longer than it would otherwise be bearable if one avoids any motion.Thus，in higher and more complicated areas，numerous influences and circumstances evoke corresponding sensory reactions only when our whole being is aroused，perhaps from a totally different angle.In the same way，the possession of values as well as the privation of values or the unworthiness of certain situations can exist for a long time and even gradually grow before we become aware of their importance.There must first be an impulse that causes the internal elements to dash into one another in order for us to become aware of their real strength through their newly discovered relations or through the difference of relations to all other elements.Indeed，emotions like love and hate may live inside us for a long time，and accumulate below the surface，exercising certain disguised effects，until some occurrence-most often the interruption of the formal regularity of a relationship-causes the emotions to explode into our consciousness and thus first provides the unfolding and the profusion of their consequences.Social developments take a similar course.Senselessness and abuses not only creep into once consolidated states of affairs but also accumulate and increase below the threshold of social awareness，often to the extent that their endurance is no longer conceivable from that moment when the general process of putting things in order-which often has its origins in totally different impulses-brings about an awareness of these disturbances.As is well known，the convulsions of a country experiencing a foreign war first openly reveal the contradictions and the total defects of a state.This explains，for instance，our earlier observation that very crass social differences and the insurmountable distance between classes usually go hand in hand with social harmony.The call for egalitarian reforms or for revolutions is usually raised only after the rigidity of class barriers has been alleviated and a livelier movement within society has brought about certain intermediate transitional phenomena and a degree of contact between the social orders which allows mutual comparison.As soon as this happens，however，the lower classes become aware of their subjugation and the upper classes of their moral responsibility as well as their interest in defending their position，and social harmony is disrupted.Within the money economy，that turbulence in the system of life that incites the awareness of differences and thresholds is particularly widespread and lively.The consolidation of relationships that prevents the consequences of this growing inducement from taking effect in the reactions of consciousness is constantly interrupted by being based upon money.This is because all such relationships are somewhat unstable and resistant to stabilization，particularly since money has no objective relation to personalities and does not-as does a status or lack of it，an occupation or a moral value，an emotional relation or an activity-become a part of personality.All relations based on these other life-contents have some sort of stability because of the relative constancy with which they belong to the person.They resist the influence of elements of change which can take effect only after considerable growth.Money，however，lacking any quality and lacking any relation to a qualitatively determined personality as such，moves from one personality to the other without any internal resistance，so that the relations and situations that pertain to it can easily and adequately adjust to any change.Or，to formulate the problem in terms of our present interest，the fact that money can be accumulated，which reflects the mere quantitative character most clearly，means that it will most frequently and distinctly make itself felt on the determinate content of life.The threshold phenomena，so frequently associated with money，explain its basic character，part of which is also the unearned increment.Indeed，this is only one of the phenomena characterized in this way.For it testifies not only that the importance of more money lies in a proportional multiple of the importance of less money，but that this differential importance represents an abrupt change-despite the purely quantitative change in its basis-in qualitatively new，indeed opposite，results.

Significance Of The Personal Unity Of The Owner

This fact is based on an obvious presupposition which nevertheless requires further explanation.It can be expressed in the following way.Every sum of money has a different qualitative significance if it belongs to a number of people rather than to one person.The unit of the personality is thus the correlate or the pre-condition for all qualitative differences of possessions and their importance；here the assets of legal persons are，in terms of their function，on the same level because of the uniformity of their administration.Similarly，we may speak of a nation's wealth only if we conceive of the nation as a unified possessing subject.That is to say，we have to conceive the assets owned by the individual citizens as being unified by their interaction within the national economy，in the same way as the fortune of one individual comes together as a practical unity through such interactionsfor example distribution，the relation of individual expenditures to the total，balance between income and expenditure，etc.Money，whose importance as a value rests on its quantity，appears as many single quantities standing side by side，so that every sum，in order to operate as a unity，requires an extraneous principle which forces the partial quantities into a relationship and interaction，that is，into a unity.Just as the image of one world emerges from the separate contents of perception which are integrated into a personal unity of consciousness，and just as the sum of the elements of the world becomes more than a mere sum，and the whole attains a new significance beyond its separate parts，so，in the same manner，the personal unity of the owner affects money and confers upon its total quantity the possibility of realizing more or less of it in its qualitative importance.The contribution of this fact to our knowledge can perhaps be made clearer if we refer to a proposition in marginal utility theory.Every unit of quantity of a supply of goods has the value of that unit which is valued least，that is，which is used for the most inessential purpose.For if any unit were lost，the remainder would naturally be used for all more important needs and only the least important would remain unsatisfied.Thus，whichever unit would have to be foregone would be the least important.The value of a supply of goods is therefore determined not by the uses to which the goods might be put，that is not by the sum of the very diverse uses of individual units，but by the use of the least useful unit，multiplied by the number of units of the same size.One exception to this theory is generally admitted，and that is in the case where a sum of goods forms a unity and as such provides a certain utility effect which is not the same as the sum of uses of its individual parts.For instance，the existence of a forest，so we are given to believe，has an influence on the climate and weather，and therewith also on soil fertility，the health of the population and the stability of part of the national wealth，etc.In short，the forest as a whole has a value which would remain totally outside our calculations if we were to estimate the utility of individual trees.Similarly，the value of an army cannot be judged according to the marginal utility of the individual soldier，nor can the value of a river be judged according to the marginal utility of a single drop of water.This distinction is also valid for the assets owned by an individual.Not only does one million marks in the possession of a single individual accord him a status and a social qualification that is totally different from the thousandfold multiple of its corresponding significance to the owner of one thousand marks.Rather，at the basis of this subjective consequence，it is also true that the objective economic value of one million marks cannot be calculated in terms of the marginal utility of its thousand parts at a thousand marks each.On the contrary，it forms a comprehensive unit in the same way as the value of a living creature，acting，as a unit，differs from the sum total of its individual organs.In the previous chapter I argued that the money price of an object，no matter how many coins it consists of，is none the less a unit.I stated there that one million marks are，as such，a mere aggregate composed of unconnected units.Yet as the value of a landed estate they are the unified symbol，expression or equivalent of the amount of its value and not at all a mere agglomeration of single-value units.This practical determination has its personal correlate.The quantity of money is realized in relation to the unity of a person as a quality and its extensiveness is realized as intensity-a process that could not be achieved by the mere summation of its constituent parts.

The Material And Cultural Relation Of Form And Amount

Perhaps we can also express this in the following way.As a purely arithmetical addition of value units，money can be characterized as absolutely formless.Formlessness and a purely quantitative character are one and the same.To the extent that things are considered only in terms of their quantity，their form is disregarded.This is most evident if they are weighed.Therefore，money as such is the most terrible destroyer of form.No matter what the reason is that the forms of things a，b and c cost the same price of m，their differentiation-the specific form of each of them-does not affect their fixed value at all but is submerged in the m which equally represents a，b and c.Form is not a determining factor within economic valuation.As soon as our interest is reduced to the money value of objects，their form-even though it may have brought about their value-becomes irrelevant just as it is irrelevant to their weight.This may also explain the materialism of modem times which，in its theoretical significance，necessarily has a common root in the money economy.Matter as such is simply formless，the counterpart of all form，and if it is accepted as the only principle of reality，reality is submitted to broadly the same process that the reduction to money value exercises on the objects of our practical interest.I shall come back to the problem of how money in extraordinarily great quantities-and fundamentally in connection with the threshold importance of money quantitiesattains a particular and，at the same time，more individual form，thereby removing it from its empty quantitative nature.The formlessness of money declines relatively and even outwardly the more its quantity increases：the small coins of the earliest Italian copper currency remained shapeless or had only a crude round or cubical form；the biggest pieces，however，were usually cast in a foursided ingot form and provided with a mark on both sides.But the universal formlessness of money as money is certainly the root of the antagonism between an aesthetic tendency and money interests.Aesthetic interests are so much focused on pure form that，for instance，design was considered to be the primary aesthetic value of all fine arts，because as pure form it can be realized unchanged in any amount of material.This is now known to be an error；indeed，we must go further and admit that the absolute size of a form of art considerably influences its aesthetic significance，and that this significance is readily modified by the very smallest change of dimensions even if the form remains the same，Nevertheless，the aesthetic value of things remains attached to their form，for example to the relation between its elements，although we now know that the character and the effect of this form is essentially co-determined by the amount of its realization.Perhaps it is no coincidence that a great many proverbs，but only a few of the innumerable folk songs，appear to deal with money despite its predominant importance.Thus，when a rebellion broke out owing to a change in coinage，the folk songs generated by the people on this occasion by and large disregarded the coinage problem.The irreconcilable and，for all aesthetic interests，decisive antagonism always remains in the emphasis placed on whether we value things according to their form or ask for the amount of their value.This value is a merely quantitative one which replaces all quality by a mere sum of equal units.

One can even say that the more the value of an object rests on its form，the more irrelevant is its monetary value.If the greatest works of art that we possess-for example，the Delphic charioteer and Praxiteles’‘Hermes’，Botticelli's‘Spring’，the Mona Lisa，the Medici tombs and Rembrandt's selfportrait-existed in a thousand identical copies，then it would make a big difference to the happiness of mankind，but their ideal，objectively aesthetic value or their value in the history of art would in no way be enhanced above the point that a single，already existing copy represents.It is certainly different in the case of handicraft works where the aesthetic form and the practical purpose are completely unified，so that often the most perfect realization of this practical purpose is its real aesthetic attraction.Here it is essential，for the whole value created in this way，that the object is also used and therefore its ideal importance grows with its popularity.If the object makes room for value elements other than form，then the number of times the object is created becomes important.This is also the basis of the deepest connection between Nietzsche，s ethical value theory and his aesthetic frame of mind.According to Nietzsche，the quality of a society is determined by the height of the values achieved in it no matter how isolated they may be；the quality of a society does not depend on the extent to which laudable qualities have spread.In the same way，the quality of an artistic period is not the result of the height and quantity of good average achievements but only of the height of the very best achievement.Thus the utilitarian，who is interested solely in the tangible results of action，is inclined towards socialism with its emphasis on the masses and on spreading desirable living conditions，whereas the idealistic moralist，to whom the more or less aesthetically expressible form of action is crucial，is usually an individualist，or at least，like Kant，someone who emphasizes the autonomy of the individual above all else.The same is true in the realm of subjective happiness.We often feel that the highest culmination of joie de vivre ，which signifies for the individual his perfect self-realization in the material of existence，need not be repeated To have experienced this once gives a value to life that would not，as a rule，be enhanced by its repetition.Such moments in which life has been brought to a point of unique self-fulfilment，and has completely subjected the resistance of matter-in the broadest sense-to our feelings and our will，spread an atmosphere that one might call a counterpart to timelessness，to species aeternitatis- a transcendence of number and of time，lust as a law of nature does not derive its significance for the state and coherence of the world from the number of its instances but from the fact that it exists and is valid，so the moments of the highest transcendence of the self have meaning for our life because they once occurred.No repetition that did not add anything to their content could enlarge this meaning.In brief，the concentration of our evaluations on form brings about an indifference towards its quantitative moments，whereas it is precisely its formlessness that points towards its decisiveness fur value.

As long as an innumerable sequence of purposes does not yet intersect in money as at the height of a culture based on a money economy，and as long as the specific structure of a culture is not yet atomized and converted to absolute flexibility，we encounter phenomena in which money still displays specific forms.This is the case if greater sums cannot be replaced by the addition of smaller ones.Traces of this phenomenon are exhibited in barter transactions.Among some peoples，cattle can be exchanged only against iron or cloth，but not against tobacco despite its easy exchangeability.Elsewhere，on the Island of Yap for example，the extraordinary variety of types of money（hones，mother of pearl shells，stones，pieces of glass，etc.）are graded.Despite the fact that the relationship between lower and higher kinds of money is well established，certain valuable objects such as boats or houses cannot be paid for with an equivalent amount of many pieces of money with a low denomination，but have to be paid for by a specific kind of money which stands high in rank order of types of money.This same restriction to money of a specific quality is also to be found in the purchase of women and cannot be replaced by a larger quantity of other kinds of money.The reverse is also true：in some places gold is never used to pay for large quantities of goods of small value，but is used exclusively to buy particularly expensive things.This group of phenomena does not correspond to the regulation of our gold standard in which payments above a certain level can be asked for in gold whereas other metals have to be accepted for smaller amounts.Such a fundamental and technical distinction between money as a standard and token money does not seem to exist for every usage.Rather，different kinds of money appear to form a unified series in which only the upper units link their quantitative content to a particular form of value that cannot be expressed quantitatively.This is an excellent means of preventing the trivialization of the function of money which is the necessary consequence of its purely quantitative character，and of preserving the sacred character that money originally so often conveys.It is also an indication that the importance of such forms or qualities of money belongs to a primitive epoch in which money is not only money but，in additon，is something else.This nuance，in a much weaker form and dying away，is still present in a very few phenomena at the highest stages of development.The following habit probably goes back to the significance of money as a form.The French prefer to speak of 20 sous instead of I franc，or piece de cent sous instead of a 5 franc piece，etc.；also one can not very easily speak of half a franc，so this sum is expressed in sous and centimes.The same sum，represented in this form rather than in any other，seems to provoke other reactions of sentiment to some extent.When ordinary people prefer to use the name of a coin，a specific form of money-instead of the abstract word‘money’-even if they refer exclusively to money as a quantity-it still has the same meaning：for example，‘No Schiweizer without a Kreuzer ’；‘Whoever knocks with the taler has all doors opened for him.’It is also apparent that when ordinary people are calculating low values they prefer to denote certain amounts of money by adding small sums rather than dividing large ones.Not only does the sum derived from the multiplication of a familiar unit seem to provide a more wide-ranging and distinctive expression of its significance，but also this subjective moment is objectified in a feeling as if the sum thus expressed has more weight than if it presents itself in other factors.Differences of this kind could be observed in northern Germany when the taler was replaced by the mark.During the transitional period‘300 marks’was frequently accompanied by totally different psychic overtones than‘100 taler ’；the new form in which the identical content was expressed appeared more comprehensive and plentiful than the other，which on the other hand seemed to be more concise and specific.Such are the phenomena in which form，which is so essential for all other objects，is at least limited in relation to money；and the otherwise unconditional identity of money with the sum，regardless of the form in which it is borrowed，is here，to some extent，interrupted.

What else in money might be generally characterized as form comes out of the unity of the personality which transforms discretely separated parts of a fortune into a unity.Hence，a fortune，particularly a large one，does not possess the aesthetic awkwardness of money.This is due not only to the aesthetic possibilities that wealth provides.Rather-partly in addition to these possibilities and partly by giving them a basis-the image of a fortune lies in the form that money attains through its relationship to a personal centre，which differs completely from the abstract notion of money.This form clearly indicates its character as form by the difference between such a unified fortune and the same amount of money distributed among many people.The extent to which personal ownership determines and emphasizes its form is illustrated not only by money.The hide of land held by the old Germanic freeman was indivisible because it was identical with membership of the mark community.The ownership of this land flowed from the person and thus possessed the same qualities of unity and indivisibility as he did.If we consider English landed property in the Middle Ages，and the fact that the complete equality of lots always indicated bonded possession-a rational distribution of land by a lord to the small farmer-even here it was the unified personality，though unindividual and unfree，that imparted the distinctiveness and form to the possession.The reification of possessions，their detachment from the person，meant at the same time the possibility，on the one hand，of uniting the portions of land of many people in the hands of a single owner and，on the other，of breaking up single pieces of land at will.The stability as well as the importance of the form of land ownership was lost with the disruption of the personal relations；the form of land ownership fluctuated，it was continuously dissolved and reshaped through practical circumstances（which naturally also imply personal circumstances），whereas the identity of the possession with the person had been penetrated by the internally constituted form and unity of the individual self.Life in earlier times seems much more closely tied to established unities，which means nothing less than that it was controlled by a rhythm which in modem times is dissolved into an arbitrarily divisible continuum.The contents of life-as they become more and more expressible in money which is absolutely continuous，rhythmical and indifferent to any distinctive form-are，at it were，split up into so many small parts；their rounded totalities are so shattered that any arbitrary synthesis and formation of them is possible.It is this process that provides the material for modem individualism and the abundance of its products.The personality clearly creates new unities of life with this basically unformed material and obviously operates with greater independence and variability compared with what was formerly done in close solidarity with material unities.

The Relation Between Quantity And Quality

Within the historical-psychological sphere，money by its very nature becomes the most perfect representative of a cognitive tendency in modem science as a whole：the reduction of qualitative determinations to quantitative ones.This reminds us of the oscillations of indifferent media which are the objective cause of our senses of colour and sound.Purely quantitative differences in oscillations determine whether we perceive such qualitative differences as green or violet，or hear the contra A or the high C.Within the objective reality that affects our consciousness casually and incoherently only by fragments，everything is arranged by amount and number，and the qualitative differences in our subjective reactions correspond quantitatively to their actual counterparts.Perhaps all the infinite diversity of substances，which becomes evident in their chemical relations，are only different oscillations of one and the same basic material.Wherever mathematical science penetrates certain given materials，qonstellations and causes of motion，it tends to express structures and developments by purely quantitative formula.The same basic tendency is apparent in another form and area of application，namely in all those cases where the earlier assumptions of original forces and formations is now replaced by the theory of the mass effect of otherwise known but unspecified elements.Thus，for example，the formation of the earth，s surface is now explained not as the result of sudden and unique catastrophes，but in terms of the slow aceretia and infinitesimal consequences of an immense variety of effects which the continuously observable forces of water，air，plants，and changes in temperature exert.The same viewpoint can be observed in the historical sciences：language，the arts，institutions and cultural products of any kind are interpreted as the result of innumerable minimal contributions；the miracle of their origin is traced not to the quality of heroic individual personalities but to the quantity of the converging and condensed activities of a whole historical group.The small daily events of the intellectual，cultural and political life，whose sum total determines the overall picture of the historical scene，rather than the specific individual acts of the leaders，have now become the object of historical research.Where any prominence and qualitative incomparability of an individual still prevails，this is interpreted as an unusually lucky inheritance，that is as an event that includes and expresses a large quantity of accumulated energies and achievements of the human species.Indeed，even within a wholly individualistic ethic this democratic tendency is powerful and is elevated to a world view，while at the same time the inner nature of the soul is deprecated.This corresponds to the belief that the highest values are embedded in everyday existence and in each of its moments，but not in a heroic attitude or in catastrophes or outstanding deeds and experiences，which always have something arbitrary and superficial about them.We may all experience great passions and unheard-of flights of fancy，yet their final value depends on what they mean for those quiet，nameless and equable hours when alone the real and total self lives.Finally，despite all appearances to the contrary and all justified criticism，modem times as a whole are characterized throughout by a trend towards empiricism and hence display their innermost relationship to modem democracy in terms of form and sentiment.Empiricism replaces the single visionary or rational idea with the highest possible number of observations；it substitutes their qualitative character by the quantity of assembled individual cases.Psychological sensualism，which considers the most sublime and abstract forms and faculties of our reasons to be the mere accumulation and intensification of the most ordinary sensual elements，corresponds to this methodological intention.It would be easy to multiply the examples that illustrate the growing preponderance of the category of quantity over that of quality，or more precisely the tendency to dissolve quality into quantity，to remove the elements more and more from quality，to grant them only specific forms of motion and to interpret everything that is specifically，individually and qualitatively determined as the more or less，the bigger or smaller，the wider or narrower，the more or less frequent of those colourless elements and awarenesses that are only accessible to numerical determination even though this tendency may never absolutely attain its goal by mortal means.The interest in how much，although it has a given real meaning only in connection with what and how and by itself is only an abstraction，belongs to the basis of our intellectual makeup，and is the envelope that contains the note on our interest in qualities.Although only both types of interests together provide a texture，the exclusive emphasis upon one of them，even though it cannot logically be justified，is certainly psychologically one of the major factors of differentiation between periods，individuals and mental provinces.What separates Nietzsche from all socialist evaluations is most distinctly characterized by the fact that，for him，only the quality of mankind has any significance，so that a single highest example determines the value of an era，whereas for socialism only the degree of diffusion of desirable conditions and values is relevant.

The examples mentioned above of the modem quantitative tendency clearly indicate two different types.Firstly，the objective substances and events，which are the basis for the qualitatively different subjective conceptions，are，for their part，only quantitatively different.Secondly，the mere accumulation of elements and forces produces subjective phenomena whose character differs both specifically and according to value standpoints from those that are quantitatively conditioned.In both directions，money is the example，expression or symbol of the modem emphasis on the quantitative moment.The fact that more and more things are available for money and，bound up with this，the fact that money becomes the central and absolute value，results in objects being valued only to the extent to which they cost money and the quality of value with which we perceive them appearing only as a function of their money price.Their high or low money price has two consequences.Firstly，money arouses contradictory emotions in the human subject，the deepest sorrow and the highest bliss as well as all intermediate stages between these poles，just as it is arranged by others into the equally diversified scale between contemptuous indifference and subservient devotion.In another dimension，money radiates equal value significance in both directions of plenty and of scarcity：the typical modem man appreciates things because they cost very much and also because they cost very little.That the significance of money is substituted for the significance of things cannot be more radically expressed than by the effect-in the same direction although not in the same direction in every particular case-of much and of little money.The more centrally a thought or a value controls its sphere，the more will its positive as well as its negative character have an equal force.On the other hand，objectively，the increase in the quantity of money and its accumulation in individual hands brings about an improvement in practical culture，the production of goods，enjoyments，and forms of life，the qualities of which cannot be attained through less or differently distributed quantities of money.Indeed，one is tempted to consider the quantitative tendency to be more radically realized in money than in any other empirical area.For whenever we retrace qualitative actualities back to quantitative relations，the elements-of a physical，personal，psychic kind-whose quantity more or less determines the specific result remain in some measure qualitative ones.It is possible to push this determination further and further back，so that what yesterday appeared to be an insoluble quality of the element today becomes a modification that is recognizable by amount and number.But this process can go on infinitely，and at any moment leaves a qualitative determination of the elements intact and the question of quantity unanswered.Only metaphysics can construct entities completely lacking in quality，which perform the play of the world according to purely arithmetical relations.In the empirical world，however，only money is free from any quality and exclusively determined by quantity.Since we are unable to grasp pure being as pure energy in order to trace the particularity of the phenomena from the quantitative modifications of being or energy，and since we always have some kind of relationship-even though not always exactly the same one-with all specific things，their elements and origins，money is completely cut off from the corresponding relationships that concern it.Pure economic value has been embodied in a substance whose quantitative conditions bring about all kinds of peculiar formations without being able to bring into being anything other than its quantity.Thus，one of the major tendencies of life-the reduction of quality to quantity-achieves its highest and uniquely perfect representation in money.Here too，money is the pinnacle of a cultural historical series of developments which unambiguously determines its direction.

第三章 在目的序列中的货币

第一节

主客体之间的有意识互动的目的性活动

在思想发展史中存在的一个很大的悖论——即实在的内容是应该用其原因的方式还是应该用其结果的方式来进行构造和解释（换句话说，就是因果的方式和目的的方式之间的对立）——这一悖论在我们实践动机的区别中找到了它的最初的表达方式。我们所说的“本能”似乎是与一种心理过程紧密联系在一起的，在这一心理过程中，本能中的那些被积攒起来的能量迫切需要释放出来。当这些能量在行为中得到释放以后，本能就终止了。如果它仅仅是简单的内在情感，那么一旦它在行为中得到消融，这种情感就被“满足”了。这种直接的因果过程，是作为原始的内在情感反映在意识中的，与它产生明显对比的是那样一些行为（涉及到我们的意识被察觉）这些行为源于其将要实现的目的的表现。在这种情况下，我们是以一种被拉动而不是被推动的状态来体验我们自身。因此，这种满意的感觉不是源于这种行为本身，而是源于这种行为所产生的结果。举个例子来说，如果一个没有目标的发自内心的不安驱使着我们做出一种狂暴的行为，那么这就属于本能行为的范畴；如果我们为实现一些确定的良好的目标来采取同样地行动的话，那么这就属于目的性行为的范畴。只是为了解决饥饿而进食属于第一个内在的本能性范畴，但是，如果吃饭是为了享受饭菜的口味，那么，这就属于第二个目的性行为的范畴。性交作为一种动物的本能属于第一个范畴，但是作为一种以实现某种愉悦为目标的行为却应属于第二个目的性范畴。在我看来这种区别在两个方面是非常重要的。就我们的行为作为纯粹的内在的本能这个方面来讲，也就是严格意义上的由因果性决定的，作为行动的原因心理状态与接下来的行为结果之间有着本质上的不一致。这种使我们产生行动的心理状态、行动以及行动产生的后果三者之间的质的关系并不比风与风吹掉果实这一事件中存在的关系多。在另一方面，当目的的概念被体验为原因动机的时候，原因和结果在它们的概念以及知觉的内容方面就是一致的了。然而，在这种情况下，虽然这种行为的原因不能以一种极为科学的方法进行定义，但这种原因却是一种现实的力量，观念的或自身相关物。这种力量必须与其思想内容严格区分开来。作为行为与实践的理想化表述，内容本身是绝对没有力量的。它拥有的只是概念的有效性，并且这种有效性只有在被给予一种现实的能量的时候才会变得真实。这与公正、道德是一致的，公正、道德如同思想一样，直到它们被现实的力量用做一种行为的决定性因素的时候，它们才会具有历史意义。关于人类行为的原因或者目的的相关性的争议可能也是通过用以下的方式来决定的：既然行为的结果在它获得客观的存在性之前，是以一种心理学上的积极有效的形式存在的，那么这种因果关系的严格性是可以保持完整的。只有那些已经变成心理力量的观念上的内容才需要被考虑在内，因此，原因和结果完全不同，并且原因与结果在观念内容上的一致性与实际结果之间是绝对没有关系的。

在本能的驱动与目的性努力之间的另一种明显的区别也会对现在所面临的问题的解决有着更为重要的意义。就我们的行为（在严格意义上）仅仅是由因果关系决定的而言，当狂躁的力量在实际的行动中被发泄出来的时候，整个过程也就接近尾声了。只要这种内在的行为达到了顶点，那么这种紧张的限制的感觉也就消失得无影无踪了。这种内在的本能是通过其行动中的自然的连续性被消耗掉的，而整个的心理过程被限制在个体自身的范畴之内。由意识目的引导的心理过程则完全不同，这种心理过程是指向某一行为的确定的客观结果，并且是通过这种结果在主体上的反应或者主体对于这种结果的相互作用来实现它的最终目标。目的性行为的最重要的意义在于主体与客体之间的相互作用。只要我们存在，我们就会被卷入到这种主体与客体的相互作用之中去，目的性行为也就因此扎根于我们思想的本质。我们与现实世界的相互关系可以用连接主体与客体的弧线来代表，它吸纳了客体然后返回主体。所有事物之间的偶然的和机械的联系的确展示了同样的外部特征。但是，作为目的性行为，它是通过我们意识的整体性来进行扩展并结合在一起的。作为自然性存在的人类，我们在不断地与自然界进行着互动、进行着相互之间的协作。只有在目的性行为中，作为人格的主体才把其自身与其自身所存在的内在的外在的自然因素区分开来。或者从另一个方面来考虑，只有当目的性行为与纯粹的自然因果系统区分开来的时候，人格因素与自然因素的统一性才能在一个高的水平上被重建。这个已经有些改进了的理论可以在先前所假设的存在于文明人与原始人的劳动之间的不同中被发现。文明人的劳动据说是以一种有秩序的、有系统的方式进行的而原始人的劳动是没有规律的和盲目的，换句话说，前者涉及到有意识地克服我们与劳动之间的矛盾而后者只是一种能量的宣泄。

这并不是意味着所有的目的性行为的真正目的只存在于行为的主体之中，同时，也不意味着一个目标的实现总是存在于那些被客体逆动地激起的情感中。在自我中心主义的行动中这种情况可能是适合的，但是还有许许多多的别的行为，在这些行为当中，动机与效果的明确性只与实现目标的结果密切相关，这是一种非主体的意外事件。这种决定我们行为的内在本能时常只是有意识地把客观的效果考虑在内，而把所有的可以追溯到我们自身的效果从目的论进程中排除出去。然而，除非我们行为的结果最终在我们心中产生一种情感，否则这种关于我们行动的概念就不能产生出动机性的力量并使其成为现实。然而，在行为链上的最后一环不是它的最终目的。我们的目的性论而决定的决断力经常是以客观的结果而结束，并且也不有意追问超过这一客观结果的任何问题。目的性行为不同于因果的内在行为（这种区分是否仅仅是一种途径或方法还是仍然需要观察的），它或许可以被这样进行阐明：目的性行为涉及到我们主体能量与客观世界的有意识的交叉，并且还涉及到现实性作用于主体身上的双重影响力。首先，从主体的意图的角度来说，这种目的性行为是一种现实内容的预想；其次，从主体情感方面来说，这种目的性行为是一种客观目标实现对主体的逆动性影响。目的在生活中的作用就是从这些条件中发展而来的。

如果行为的目的依据的是所谓的未经修正的目的，那么就会产生直接性的目的与目的的概念之间的冲突。如果目的意味着对客观存在的调整，那么这种调整只有通过那种把内在对目的的接受转化为在现实中实现这种调整的行动来实现。我们的行为是一座桥，它使得目的的内容从心理形式过渡到现实形式成为了可能。目的与它的手段必须紧密相连。在这个方面，目的与单纯的机械程序以及目的的心理对应物——本能——是不相同的。在单纯的机械程序以及目的的对应物那里，每一时刻的能量都消融在即刻的结果中，而不会指向下一个阶段。下一个过程只是由前一个即时的过程引起。目的具有三个要素，而机械程序只有两个。从另一方面说，通过对手段和工具的依赖，目的与我们所谓的“神圣过程”是有区别的。以神为例，在神的意志与行为之间存在一个时间上和物质上的间隔是不可能的。人的行为处于这两个要素之间，而这种行为也正是一种障碍的克服，而这种障碍对于神来说，是根本不存在的。除非我们用尘世的不完整性来思考神，否则不管他的意志是什么样的，那都将成为现实。也许我们再谈到神的目的时只使用那些限定性的意义，也就是说，注定了其命运的终极的世俗的条件。如果神的指令与前一个过程相关，就像人类的目的与他的工具和手段一样的相关——也就是说，被人看作是有价值的和想要的唯一的东西的时候一那么，令人无法理解的是为什么神不摒弃那些无用的拖泥带水的中间过程，而让其直接发生。这是因为神并不像我们那样需要实现目的的技术性手段，我们面对的是一个自治的社会，而我们所拥有的能力又是有限的，因此我们必须有所让步，通过等待和劳动才能有所收获。换句话说，神没有目的，是因为他不使用实现目的的手段和工具。

目的序列的不同长度

这种对比使我们上面所要强调的那种观点的特殊意义变得更加的清晰，这个特殊的意义就是：目的性的行为是一种自觉自愿的自我与外在自然的一种相互作用。存在于意志与意志的实现之间的机制一方面是联系二者的纽带，另一方面也可能会造成二者的分裂。这种机制其实是代表了一种意志将要战胜的障碍。因为合目的性总是假定存在某些与目的不相容的、必须被转化的事物，所以合目的性本质上是一种关系型概念。如果这种转化是不必要的，如果意志包含了它自身的实现，那么就根本不会产生目的。我们追求自身目的的主体行为就是第一种情形，在这种情形中，我们意识到了手段的二重性。在我们的这种行为之中，我们同时体验到外部现实的反抗和那些用来对付外部现实的指引性的能量，以及这两种体验同时进入我们的意识，并发展形成各自不同的特征。如果我们的行为不能立即产生出我们目的的对象，却需要引发另一种外在的环境，这种环就能最终产生我们想要的结果，那么，这个中介事件就与我们的活动具有了同样的意义。这两者都是必要的机制，都是连接心灵与心灵的机制，在产生出那些源于我们的心灵又止于我们的心灵的各种事件所构成的弧线方面，这两者是有连续性的。在一个特定生活方式中，这些环节的平均数暗示着知识的程度以及对自然控制的程度，同时也暗示了生活方式的广度以及精确度。就是在这里，社会的复杂性开始了，并在货币的创造中达到了顶峰。

接下来的这些相互联系是明显的：如果要实现目的D，而且必须要产生一个机械化的过程A、B、C，以便B由A引起，C由B引起，而D只能由C引起，由D决定内容与发展方向的这个序列就要依靠各要素之间的因果关系。如果我并不知道C可以产生D，B可以产生C等等，那么我在实现我想要的D的时候就会变得孤立无援。除非各个元素之间的因果联系被我们完全的掌握了，否则的话，一个目的性的链条是无法发生的。目的通过提供心理上的冲动以寻求因果联系的方式来回报这种服务。因此，一个目的性链条在事实上与逻辑上的可能性就都依赖于这种因果联系，然而这种因果链条的旨趣，也就是它心理上的可能性，产生于对最终目的的追求。这种在一般意义上表达了理论与实际联系的相互作用导致了这样一个事实：对因果性认识度越深刻，我们对目的的认识也就越深刻。目的序列的长度有赖于因果序列的长度；而在另一方面，对适当手段的掌握不但会经常性的实现我们的目的，而且会产生关于我们目的的观念。

为了理解这种自然的与心灵生活相互交织的意义，我们必须记住这样一个明显的事实：相比一个包含了极少数元素的序列，在一个包含了相当多元素的序列中，我们可以实现更多、更加本质的目的。原始人只有有限的关于自然因果的知识，他们经常地被目的性行动所局限。对他们来说，目的性行为的弧线与他自己的身体活动以及他作用于单个事物所产生的直接效用相差无几。如果预期的结果没有随着这一行动而出现，那么原始人就会诉求于巫术的权威，人们希望能够借此以某种方式得到想要的结果，然而这种诉求不像是目的序列的延伸，而更像是证明目标无法实现的证据。无论在什么时候，只要这种短的序列被证明是不充分的，那么，这种目的就会被放弃，甚至根本建立不起目的。序列的延伸意味着，主体在一个不断增加的范畴内，会使用客体自身的力量为自己服务。当最基本的需要被满足的时候，就会产生对于目的序列更多的环节的要求，并且只有拥有关于因果性的非常精密的知识，才能够通过揭示更多的直接联系和存在于事物的自然秩序中的更短的路径，才能成功地减少序列环节的数目。这可能会导致自然关系的倒置：在相对原始的阶段，生活中的简单的必需品是通过简单的目的序列来产生的，而这种更加高标准的以及更加不同的需要只能够通过更加复杂的方法来实现。但是，技术的进步通常为后来的更高的多样化的需要提供相对简单与直接的生产手段，而生活中的基本需要的提供遇到了越来越多的困难，而这些困难需要更加复杂的手段来解决。简而言之，文化的发展倾向于把那些离我们很近的目标在目的序列延伸，而把离我们很遥远的目标的目的序列缩短。

工具作为被强化的手段

在这里，工具这一十分重要的概念必须纳入我们对于目的性行为的考虑范畴。在目的性序列的最初形式中，我们的行为产生了对外部事物的反应，并且这些反应依据一个由其自身本质决定的过程，在我们欲求的结果中达到顶点。对工具的使用涉及到在主体与客体之间插入另一个要素，这种要素不仅在时空层面上获得一种中介地位，而且在内容层面上也获得一种中介地位。这是因为，一方面，工具仅仅是一个机械有效的客体，而在另一方面，它不但是一种被我们所操作的工具，而且是一种要与我们相互协作的工具。这种工具是一种被强化了的工具，因为它的形式与存在是由目的事先决定下来的，而在原始的目的过程中，自然的事物是事后服务于我们的目的的。一个人播下种子是为了日后能够享受到植物的果实，而不是去吃那些野果，这种行为是有目的的，但是这种目的性行为要被他的双手所限制。但是，如果他使用了铁锹或者是锄头，那么他就使自己超越了自然过程的自身劳作，并且在与客体的相互关系中强化了他的主体因素。通过使用工具，我们有意识地在目的性行为链条中增加了新的环节，因此，这也表明了那些直的路并不都是最短的路。这些工具是我们在外部世界进行创造的典型代表。一方面，它们的形成完全是依靠我们自己的力量，而在另一方面，它们也是完全为我们的目的而服务的。因为工具本身并不是目的，它缺乏目的显示出的相对独立性，工具作为一种绝对的价值，或作为一种内在的、能对我们产生作用的事物，是一种绝对意义上的手段。工具原理不仅仅在物质的世界中发挥效用，当我们的兴趣不是直接在那些物质产品上，而是精神状态或者非物质的事件也参与其中时，工具就获得了一种更为精致的形式，这是因为它现在是我们意志的产物，并且也不必妥协于与目的完全无关的物质实体的特性了。这类工具的最典型的例子可能是我们的社会机构，通过求助于社会机构，个人可以实现自己依靠自身能力永远也无法实现的目标。联邦成员身份提供的保护是大多数人目的行为的先决条件。但是把这个最普遍意义上的先决条件搁在一边，民法的特别法则使得个人目标的实现成为了可能，否则他们连得到的权利都没有。在合同、证明、指定财产转让等等的迂回的法律形式中，个人获得了一种集体建立起来的工具，这种集体建立的工具增强了个人自身的力量，扩大了他们的能力，并且保护了人们的目的。偶然的因素被排除了，相同的兴趣使所提供的服务的增多成为了可能。从个体之间的相互作用中发展出了客观的组织机构，这些机构成为了数不尽的个体目的序列的连接点，并且为那些如果没有这些组织机构就根本无法实现的目的提供了一种有效的工具。这同宗教的仪式是一样的，这些仪式是教会的工具，是为了把宗教团体中的典型化情感变得客观化。无疑，这些宗教仪式是对宗教情绪的终极目的一种偏离，但是这种偏离借助于与所有物质性工具不同的工具，能够独一无二地为个体的那些目的服务，如果没有这种工具的话，那些目的是根本不可能实现的。

货币：最纯粹的工具

在这里，我们得出的最终结论是：货币就是在目的的相互作用中发挥作用。我将从一些普遍接受的事实开始。所有经济上的交易活动都取决于这样一个事实，即我想得到别人所拥有的事物，而且如果我给予他一些我所拥有的且他所需要的事物，那么，他就会愿意把他所拥有的那些我想要的事物交换给我。显而易见的是：当第一个环节出现时，这个双向过程的最终环节并不总是会出现，在许多的情况下，我想要得到A所拥有的事物A，我希望作为报答把其事物或服务B交换给A，但是，A并不需要我想与之交换的B；还有另一种可能，双方能够接受所提供的商品，但是二者在各自提供的商品数量上无法达成共识。因此，在实现我们的目的过程中，把一个中介环节引入这个目的的链条中有着重大的价值。在任何时候，我们都可以将B变为这种中介物，而这种中介物又可以把自己变为A，这个过程在很多方面有点类似于能量的任何形式，像水能形式、风能形式等等，可以借助发电机转换为另一种形式的能量。正如我的思想必须采取一种通用的可以理解的语言来表达，这样我才能通过一种迂回的方式来实现我的现实目的；同样，为了实现我的更加遥远的目的，我的行为和财产必须借助于货币价值的形式。在我上面所提到的范畴中，货币是一种最为纯粹的工具。货币是一种组织，个人可以通过这种组织把他们的行为与财产集中起来以实现那些不能够直接实现的目标。与我们先前提到的那个例子相比，每个人都要通过货币这种中介来完成工作的事实，使得货币的工具属性变得更加明显。货币的本质以及有效性不仅仅是通过我手中所拥有的硬币表现出来的，它的品质特征还表现在社会机构以及超越主体的规范上。这种社会机构以及超超主体的规范使得货币这种工具超越了它本身物质质料的局限性、无意义性以及僵化性，而成为一种具有无尽变化和广泛应用的工具。国家与宗教仪式也是非常有特点的——因为这些国家与宗教仪式完全是由精神力量构成的，不必妥协于任何独立的物质客体，它们可以用其自身来充分的表达它们的目的。然而，它们是如此接近那些特殊的目标，实际上几乎与那些目标是完全一致的，这就使得我们很难意识到它们是一种工具（这将使他们自身成为无价值的工具，只有通过这种工具背后的意志力才能来指引生活），也很难把它看作我们的终极道德价值标准。以货币为例，它作为一种工具的特性是非常模糊的。与我们先前提到的那些别的工具的对比，货币与那些要帮助去实现的目的并没有与生俱来的联系。总体来说，货币是与客观事物毫不相关的，因为通过交换这一事实货币与客观事物完全的分开了。货币为事物提供中介服务，不是要获得事物的所有权，而是要交换这种事物。纯粹形式的货币是一种绝对的手段，一个方面，这是完全由目的性决定的，不会被任何别的目的序列所影响；在另一个方面，它又被限制为一种特定的工具手段，而这种特定的工具手段是与特定目的相关的，它并没有自身的目的，只是无私地作为一个目的序列中的中介发挥功能。货币或许是这样一个事实——人类是一种会“制造工具”的动物——最清楚的表达与实证，然而，这也是与人类是一种“目的性”的动物这一事实相联系的。工具的概念刻画了人类在世界中的地位，人类既不像动物那样依赖于本能的生命机制和那种瞬间产生而又瞬间消失的意志力与冲动和快乐，也不像我们所幻想的那些不需要中介的力量就可以实现目标的神，因为对于神来说，他们的意志与他们目标的实现是一致的。人类是居于动物与神之间的，人类可以使自己的意志超越目前所处的状态，但只能通过一个具有多环节的目的序列以一种迂回的方式来实现这种超越现实的目的。爱，依据柏拉图的理论，是拥有与未拥有之间的一个中介阶段，爱存在于我们内心的主体生活，但是爱的手段存在于外部的客观世界。对于人来说，永远都在奋斗、没有满足，并且总是在变化，爱是人的真实的存在条件。从另一个方面讲，手段以及手段的高级形式——工具，是人类种族的一种代表性符号。这种工具手段体现了或者说是凝聚了人类的意志的伟大之处，同时也体现了人类意志的局限性。这种在我们自身与我们的目标之间引进一个目的序列的中间过程的需要，可能会给予我们一个过去的概念，也因此会赋予人类关于生命的以及这种意志的延伸与局限的一种特殊感觉，这就像是过去与现在的分水岭。货币是手段的最纯粹的具体化形式，它也是一个具体的工具，它完全与它的抽象概念融为一体，它是一种纯粹的工具。货币对于理解生命的基本动机的巨大作用存在于这样一个事实：货币具体化并升华了人的实际关系，即人与他的意志、力量及无能为力的对象的关系。人们或许会诡论式的说：人是一种间接的存在，我在这里所关心的是货币与整个人类生活之间的关系，这样做是由于货币能帮助我们理解这个问题，并且可以通过内外的关系来理解货币的性质，无论是内部关系还是外部关系，它们都在货币中找到了自己的表达方式、手段以及作用。对于前面已经提到过的货币的作用，有必要做一点补充，因为这一点补充能够极为清楚地展现货币的抽象的特性是如何转化到现实的实践中去的。

货币使用的可能性的无限性

我之前已经提到过了，工具的表现与提供并不总是依赖于一个事先已经形成了的目的，物质材料以及力量的有效性经常诱导我们形成特定的目的，此目的是我们通过这些手段可以达到的。一旦某个目的产生了关于手段的想法，那么这种手段也会产生关于目的的概念。这种经常被修改但是始终存在着的相互关系可以在我称之为最纯粹的手段的一类工具的例子中进行观察，对于工具来说，除了那些它所拥有的其他的特殊用途，它还能够转化为无法预料的别的用途，由此一直存在下去，而那些平常的简单的工具可以在实现目的的过程中被完全的消耗尽。毋须举例，这存在于日常生活中成千上万的例子中，而且在那些更加复杂的情形中也是如此。军事组织是被用作外部调度的，但是有多少次它是被内部的政治目的所利用？个人之间的相互关系起初是由于特殊目的的发展而建立起来的，但是有多少次它超越了这个界限而成为了那些不同事物的承担者？这样的结果是：我们会说现存的人类关系——家庭的、经济的、宗教的、政治的或者社会的——它们倾向于去获得那些他们起初并不具有的目的。如同工具，如同其他的情况一样，也具有了不同的和延伸了的用途，那么很显然，工具就会变得更有意义，更有价值。与此同时，工具在与特殊利益之间的相互关系中，就必须变得更中立、更没有感情色彩，即变得更加客观，与特殊目的变得更遥远。作为最出色的工具的货币完全满足这个条件。从这个观点的角度上来讲，货币的作用被强化了。事实可以通过下面的方式展开，被给定数量的货币其价值超过了那些用货币进行交换的特殊的事物的价值，这是因为，货币使得在无限领域内对任何物品的选择成为了可能。当然，货币最终只能用于其中的一种物品，但是这种货币所提供的选择本身就是一种惠赐，这种选择无疑会增加货币的价值。因为货币根本不与某个特殊的目的相关，所以它就获得了一种与整体目的相关的联系。货币是一种工具，并且这种工具手段具有根本无法从数量上进行估算的功能，也因此在这一方面拥有了可能实现的最大价值。由于货币缺少与自己相关的任何内容，因此它所具有的或者是代表的仅仅是可能性的无限能力的用途通过货币的不安分的特点——也就是说货币通过其将被使用的动因——以一种积极的方式被表现出来。以一些语言为例，那些对于不同事物同一表达方式的需要，使得像法语这种词汇有限的语言必须有丰富的象征关联以及心理暗示，有人可能会说，是因为这些暗示、关联的丰富导致了词汇的相对匮乏。同样的道理，货币由于不具有任何的内在意义，所以造就了它如此丰富的实际用途，并且的确甚至还提供了一种冲动促使人们用新的形式来填充这种无限的概念性的范畴，因为这从来就不是终点，它只是每一个内容的一个转换点。在最后的论述中，这种广泛排列的商品可以一种价值方式进行交换，那就是货币。劳动很难改变它的应用对象，而且分工越细，这种转化就越不容易实现。与劳动力相比，货币形式体现的资本几乎总是从一种用途转换到另一种用途，最糟糕的后果是有所损失，然而事实却常是有利可图而不是遭受损失。工人很难把他的技艺和技术从他所从事的贸易与投资活动中解脱出来。在面对自由选择时，工人与商人是一样的，与货币的拥有者相比，他们总是处于不利地位。因此，如果被给定了一定数量的货币就相当于给定了一系列他们想要进行交换的事物的价值，同时它还增加了一个对其他无数的事物的选择权。这是在商品与劳动领域中没有东西能与之相媲美的一种资产。

如果一个人认为，决定的本质是由现实中的选择权所引起的，那么对他来说，货币的这种额外的价值看起来比其他所有的价值都重要。我们已经提到过，商品是有数量限制的，并且它往往会有不同的用处，商品的价值会被它的拥有者按照他所认为的最重要的用途决定，他们会按自身的需求来决定这个事物是否有价值以及具有多大价值。拥有者所不关注的那些额外的用途将被看做是不经济的、不合理的。在另一方面，如果商品的供给对于这种商品的所有用途来说都是充足的甚至是过多的，以至于，这些商品要在竞争中决定谁被使用，那么商品的价值就将会由它最不重要的用途来决定。这一点通过货币得到了最充分最有效的说明。由于货币可以被用于任何经济目的，因此一个给定数量的货币可以被用于满足在那个时刻最为重要的主观需求。这种选择不是有限的，就像对其他所有商品的选择没有限制一样，这是因为人类的欲望是没有限制的，对于一定数量的货币而言，各种各样的可能性用途都要通过自身的竞争来得以实现。因为最后的决定总是与那些最强烈地想要得到的商品是一致的，所以货币在任何时候都必须与在那个时候所体验到的最为重要的兴趣在价值上保持一致。一种木材或者是房地产的供应，只是能够满足几个想要的用途中的一个，因此这些木材与房地产是依据这些用途中最有价值的那个来进行衡量的，它的意义无法超出这一类物品的范畴。然而，货币并没有这样的限制，它的价值是与个体的最为重要的普遍的兴趣相关的，这种兴趣是可以通过货币的供给来得到满足的。

货币作为一种抽象的工具所提供的不仅是对在任何时刻所提供的商品的选择机会，它为何时使用这种工具也提供了一个选择机会。商品的价值不是简单的由它在使用时刻的实际用途决定的。这种与之相关的在使用时间上的自由选择的权利也是一个因素，这种在时间上的自由选择权可以对增加与减少商品的价值起重大的作用。这种选择有价值的第一个可能性原因在于它能同时存在于不同用处中，第二个原因在于在一段时间内所存在的可相互替代的不同用途。像其他一切事物一样，如果我们可以使用某种商品，并且不必立即使用它，那么这种商品就会变得更加有价值。商品的范围可以在两个极端之中分为等级不同的价值系列，一端是那些可以在未来而不是现在使用的商品。举个例子来说，如果在夏天我们用抓到的鱼，来交换那些将要在冬天才会被使用的毛皮，那么鱼的价值将随着我可以立即消费掉它这样一个情形而增加它的价值，但是毛皮的价格将会被另一种情况所影响，那就是这种被推迟了的使用可能会带来损坏、丢失以及贬值的风险。在另一个方面，鱼的价值的下降是由于到了明天它将不再新鲜了，而毛皮的价值将会上升，那是由于在以后它可能会有用。如果一个事物能够具有双重的价值强化功能，那么这种事物是最适合用作交换的工具了，而货币恰恰就是这样一种工具。作为一种最纯粹手段的货币，代表了可能最好的综合体，这是因为货币没有用作特殊用途的专门的功能，它只是一种获得具体价值的工具，同时也是由于对于任何时刻，任何物体，货币都有最大可能的使用机会。

与商品拥有者相比，货币拥有者的优越性产生于货币独一无二的品质——货币与事物的任何特别的用途都没有任何的关系，与时间也没有关系，与任何的目的也没有关系，只是一种纯粹的抽象的工具。一些例外也是存在的，例如，建立在意识形态、联合抵制卡特尔基础上的对出售的拒绝，但是这种拒绝只有在用于交换的事物在一个特殊的形势下——即这种事物无法被其他的商品所替代——才会出现。在上述这种情况下，货币所给予其拥有者的选择的自由权利以及特殊的有利条件被完全的消除了，这只是因为只存在一个唯一的渴望得到的东西而不是一个选择。总体上来看，货币的拥有者享有两方面的自由，并且如果货币的拥有者赞同了商品的拥有者而放弃这两个权利，那么他将获得补偿。举个例子来说，经济学与心理学的有趣的“补偿”原理就是这种情况的一个表现。当那些可以被度量或者权衡的商品被买去的时候，人们总会认为商人会进行“自由的度量”，也就是说，至少额外附加一个度量单位的利润，通常他们也是这样做的。发生在商品度量上的错误要比发生在货币度量上的错误多，这一点我们必须考虑到，但是，一个很重要的特征就是：即使在好坏对于买卖的双方是均等的时候，买者也有权利按照自己的喜好去对这种可能性进行解释。即使交易的另一方也同样是用货币进行交易，买者也仍然有利可图，这是非常重要的。顾客希望银行家能够“公平”处理，同样购买保险者希望保险公司在索赔中也能够“公平”处理，即使是通过正当的方式，他们仍然希望被给予的东西能够比法律强迫执行所给的更多一些。银行和保险公司也只是以货币为唯一手段进行交易的，但是，从顾客自身的角度来看，他们并不认为这是“公平”与“自由”的；然而，对于应赔偿的货币的数量，保险公司只能按照事前已经协商好的协议进行赔偿。事实上，所给予货币的数量对每一方而言，都有非常不同的意义。对于银行家和保险公司而言，他们所运作的货币仅仅是一种简单的商品，他们只能把这种商品以这种独特的方式使用。但是对于顾客而言，这里的货币也是我们所关注的那个意义上的货币，也就是说，这里的货币是一种具有选择权的货币，一方面它可以用来购买股票和保险，但另一方面，它又拥有其他的选择权，即不一定必须用于股票的交易或者是购买保险。这种把货币用于不同目的的自由给予了顾客一种利益，那就是它可以通过另一方的“公平性”来获得补偿。货币的拥有者给予补偿的地方，如给侍者以及出租车司机的小费，就恰好体现了赠予者的社会优越感，这种优越感预示了它将给予小费。就像所有的货币现象一样，这些事情的发生不是与人类的生活相分离的，它们以一个特别清晰与明显的方式展示了人类生活的本质特征，也就是说，在所有的关系中，那些对关系的本质兴趣较少的人将处于有利地位。这可能看起来有些自相矛盾，如果想要得到某种事物或者建立某种关系的欲望越强烈，那么就应该产生更加强烈，也更有激情的快乐。事实上也的确如此，被预期的享受决定了我们欲望的强烈程度。然而正是这样一种情形给予了那些兴趣较少的那部分人一种有利条件，这是因为在事物的本质上，那些利益较少的人会被另一个部分人通过让步的方式来给予一定的补偿。即使在最精致、最亲密的关系中，这也是非常明显的。在每一个爱的关系中那个很少涉及到爱的人将处于有利地位，这是因为在爱中陷得很深的人从一开始就放弃了在这种关系中的自私的想法，他们更倾向于去奉献，并且，他们将会在相互的交换中提供比他所得到的满足数量上多得多的奉献。公平研究因此建立起来了：既然，欲望的程度是与满足程度一致的，那么这种相互关系就应该为那些很少涉及到的个人提供一种特别的收获，他能够有所求，是因为他更加的犹豫不决，更加的有所保留，有更多的准备去提出条件。因此，给钱的那个人所获得的利益并不都是不公平的，由于他在商品与金钱的交易中的兴趣更少，因此，两者之间的一致性应该是由交易中兴趣更大的一方提出，这一方给予兴趣较少的一方的盈利是超过公平价值之上的收益。有一点必须牢记在心，货币的拥有者处于优势地位不是因为它拥有货币，而是因为他准备放弃货币。

货币所能带来到的利益是不断攀升的，这是因为货币是与经济中任何特殊的目的与过程相分离的，同时这种利益也可以通过另一种方式显示出来，尤其在这样一个事实中，这种利益也就更加明显了，即货币的拥有者经常会从经济剧烈的、且具有破坏性的变革中获得利益，而且这种剧变经常达到令人难以置信的程度。尽管，一些破产和商业的失败常常是由于价格的大幅下跌以及经济过热引起的，但是，经验告诉我们，那些大的银行家不同于那些卖者与买者，债权人与债务人经常会获得超出那些危险的稳定的利润。作为经济过程中的中立的工具，不管这一经济过程的方向与步调如何，货币的作用都能够得到补偿。当然，货币也要为其自身的自由进行支付。货币不受约束的本性意味着相互矛盾的需求是由那些来自于不同倾向的人们对货币的分配所引起的，并且，与那些处理特殊商品的人相比，他们更容易引起这样一种怀疑，即这些与钱打交道的人可能会背叛。在现代化的早期，比较大的金融实力——富格尔家族、威尔士家族、佛罗伦萨与热那亚的银行家们——进入到了政界，尤其是在哈布斯堡王朝与法兰西王朝对欧洲霸权的争斗中，这些大的金融实力被所有的团体看作是永远都不值得信任的一群人，这些不值得相信的人中也包括他们提供了大量借款的那些人。没有人能够对这些金融家深信无疑，他们的金钱交易使他们无法对他们超越现实的行为承担责任。并且即使那些金融家曾经给予金融支持的那些人的敌人，也不会把这种敌对关系当作是一种去接近这些金融家并向他们提出建议的障碍。货币拥有者非常积极的作用，那就是，它是自身缺乏特征的负面性概念。我们所认为的性格软弱的个体不是由这个人的内在价值决定的，而是由这个人所要承受的外部压力决定的。事实上，货币是与所有特别的内容与存在相分离的。货币只是作为一种货币收入数量的形式而存在，并且对于那些只对货币感兴趣的人而言，货币的品质是没有任何特点的。上述的例子可能是与品质的价值相联系的金融与货币的高评价的一个必要的逻辑上的反例。货币的优越性首先表现在这样一个事实中，那就是，与购买者相比，那些出售者拥有更大的兴趣与期望。我们对待客观事物的一个总体的特征被牵涉在其中，当两个对立等级的利益被认为是一个整体的时候，第一个等级可能明显地优于第二个等级，但是第二个等级中的个别事物或者代表可能会优于第一个等级。面对着物质性商品的总体性以及理想性商品的总体性之间的选择，我们很有可能不得不选择第一个，这是因为放弃第一个就有可能放弃生活以及所有的理想性内容；但是在另一方面，我们可能会毫不犹豫地放弃任何单个的物质的商品而去交换一个理想的商品。在我们与别人的相互关系中，当我们把他们看作是一个整体的时候，我们并不追究一个关系是不是比另一个关系更加有价值，以及是否更加的不可或缺。但是在特殊的情况下以及在特殊的方面，那些价值相对比较少的关系可能更加有趣，更加有吸引力。在货币与具体的价值客体之间的事情也正是如此，在作为客体的整体与货币的整体之间的选择可能会很快地揭示出作为整体的货币的无价值性，这种货币的整体所给予我们的只是一种工具而不是一个目的。但是当我们把一定数量的货币与一定数量的商品放在一起的时候，用一定数量的商品交换一定数量的货币的需求相比反过来地交换会更加强烈一些。这种关系不仅存在于商品与货币的总体之间，它也存在于货币与特定分类的商品之间。单个的别针几乎没有价值，但是对于总体来说，别针又是不可或缺的，可以说“别针与金子同样的重要”。这个例子与许多类的商品都是相似的。当一种样品很容易用钱进行购买时，它就会贬值，在现在看来就像是，货币在通过一种内在规定性的力量分配事物。但是，当事物作为整体商品的一个部类时，其意义就无法用货币进行比较。货币具有一种价值上的独立性，这经常会被这样一个事实——个体的样本很容易被替代——所掩盖。如果我们的实际兴趣只关注于那些个体的事物或者有限数量的物品，那么，我们对事物价值的感觉就总是会采用货币度量功能这个方面。很明显，这是与拥有货币的主导兴趣而不是拥有商品的主导兴趣联系在一起的。

财富的自然增值

上述事实把我们引向了一个更加普遍的现象，这种现象可能被称为财富的剩余价值，这有点像自然增长的地租。那些有钱人所享受的优越感不仅仅限于他们通过货币购买那些别人无法享用到的商品，真正的优越感是超越这种货币带来的享受的。相比于那些穷人来说，商人为那些有钱人提供了更加可靠的并值得信赖的产品。那些有钱人所遇到的人，不管这些人能不能从那些有钱人那里获得好处，他们都是非常恭顺的。毫无疑问，他们生活在一个拥有优越感的氛围之中。随时随地我们都可以观察到：那些奢侈品的购买者以及上流社会的旅行者，他们无时无处不在显示着他们所拥有的各种各样的优越感。与客观价值并没有联系的优越感，对于正在购买被出售的奢侈品的有钱人来说，他们从商人那里得到的笑容也同样与优越感没有关系。那些优越感是免费提供的，并且它最令人不愉快的特征可能就是那些廉价品的消费者，他们不拥有这项优越感，也就没有办法抱怨他们正在被欺骗。这可以通过一个非常小的例子最好地表现出来。在一些城市中，路面电车有两个不同等级，这两个等级的收费是不相同的，尽管贵的那个等级并没有被通过更加舒服的方式来提供物质利益。这些购买第一个等级的票的人获得了一种权利——加入到这一个排他性的群体中来，在这个排他性群体中每一个人都付了较高费用，目的就是与第二个等级分开来。这样富裕的个体就可以通过多支付货币的方式获得一种特权，尽管他的这种额外的开销并没有给他带来相应的等价物。

在外部看来，这好像是货币自然增长的对立面，这是因为那些有钱的个体从货币中获得了相对少的而不是相对多的东西。但是在这里，这种财富的自然增长看起来是以一种负面的但却纯粹的形式进行的。这些有钱人获得了一种特权，而这种特权并不需要求助于一种客观事物，而只是借助于这样一个事实——那就是别人不可能像他这样能够花费如此多的钱。实际上，财富是作为一种道德品质的象征，正如“值得尊敬的人”这类的词语以及与那些有钱人相关的“政治的市民”、“良好的阶级”等一些流行的说法。同样的现象通过另一方面的事实——贫困者常常像罪人一样被对待，那些乞丐常常遭到愤怒的驱赶，并且甚至是那些性格端正的人也会认为自己天生就比那些穷人优越。在1536年曾颁布的法令规定：在斯特拉斯堡的那些技艺高超的锁匠，如果谁能赚到8个十字币的话，那么他就会得到周一下午的假期。换句话说，当我们的逻辑提示我们应该把东西分给那些最需要它的人们的时候，他却把这种东西给予了那些表现最好的人。财富的自然增加产生了这样一个反常并不是不正常的：在实践的理想主义中，有钱人做不计报酬的工作，总体上来说，要比一个贫穷的教师同样的不计报酬的工作更能得到高的敬意。这种由财富带来的高额利息，以及作为财富的拥有者可以获得的这种优越感都是与价值的货币形式联系在一起的，这种优越感几乎是免费的，即他们不必非得以报答的方式进行补偿，这些现象很明显地表达和反映了这样一种情况——货币相比于其他别的价值有着明显的区别，那就是它可以拥有无限的自由。这种自由会产生这样一种事物状态，在这种状态下，有钱人不但影响了他们做什么，还影响了他们能够做什么。巨大的财富被无数的可能的用途包围着，就像被无数的星体包围着一样，这些可能性的用途远远超过了收入本身所能带给收入者的利益。在德语中用“Vermögen”来表达这一点，它的意思是说，为了巨大的财富，“就能去做一些事”。在这种可能性中只有少数能得以实现，但是它们可以用心理学的方法来解释。这种可能性是通过一种力量的形式表现出来的，而且这种力量是不确定性的，也就是说这种力量不只是局限于去实现某个特定的结果。这种不确定性力量的形式就是：对于任何目的而言，财富都具有更加强大、更加灵活、更加简单有效的特点。换句话说，拥有越多由货币构成的财富或者可以转化为货币的财富，那么很显然，就有越多的货币自身变成一种工具或是一种转换点，而且这种工具与转换点并没有自身的目的。货币作为一种工具，它的纯粹的潜力在性被提炼为一种一般性的力量和意义的范畴，对他的拥有者来说，这种概念就像真正的力量和意义一样发挥着作用。这就像艺术作品的吸引力一样，艺术作品不仅是通过它的内容以及与其内容相联系的心理过程的反应而产生的，还是通过偶然性的、个体的、间接的复杂的情感而产生的。只有这些非决定性的情感的总和才限定了艺术作品的全部价值和意义。

一大笔财富中与一小笔财富中的等额数量的货币之间的差别

如果对于财富自然增长的解释是正确的话，那么，在下述这种情况下——即货币的所有者为货币的使用提供了更好的机会以及更大的自由的情况下——财富的自然增长幅度将变得更大。穷人拥有的机会很少，这是因为，他所拥有的货币仅够基本的生活保障，并且几乎没有可以进行选择的余地。随着收入的增多，这种选择余地也随之而增大，并且，增加的每一单位的收入都更有价值，这不同于满足基本的生活和前提保证的那些范畴的货币单位。换句话说，这每一单位的货币增加都包含着更大比例的财富自然增长。然而，这种货币单位的增加引起的财富的自然增长当然只存在于这样一种情况中，即货币的增加不超过某一个特定高度的收入水平，因为一旦超过了这个水平，那么，货币单位的增加对财富增加的作用将是相同的。我们在这里考虑到的现象可以在一种特殊的情形当中体现出来，并且，这些现象对我来说在某种程度上是以极其富有成效的方式体现的。有许许多多的商品数量非常充足，这些商品不可能被那些社会中收入高的富人们完全消费掉，如果想要把这些商品卖掉的话，就需要社会中的低级阶层来消费掉其中的一部分，因此，这些商品的价格不能够太高，不能够超过买得起它们的那些社会阶层成员的支付能力。有人可能会把这种情况与“消费价格限度定理”联系起来，依据这个定理，一种商品的价格永远不会超过它所必须供给的社会成员所能提供的支付水平。或许可以用边际效用理论来解释这种社会现象。我们仍然可以用商品来满足那些最不紧迫的需求，但是对价格的形成起决定性作用的因素是那些支付能力最低的人的需求。对于那些收入较高的富人来说，这种现象涉及到一个非常大的便宜，因为，相比于这些富人在需要这些商品的情况下所愿意付出价格，这些商品可以以一个低得多的价格被得到。这是因为，穷人不得不购买那些简单的生活必需品，他们的这种行为就使得这些生活必需品的价格对于那些富人来说变得非常便宜。即使富人们对于他们的基本需求（食品、住所以及衣物）要花费与穷人相同比例的收入，他们也仍然会有更多的货币留下来去购买奢侈品。从另一方面来讲，这些富人们还拥有另一个额外的便宜，也就是说，他们可以用其收入中相对较少的一部分来满足自己的基本需求，对于那些剩下的货币，他们有着自由选择使用方式的权利，这两方面使得他们获得了一种超出其实际经济收入的敬意与尊重。对于那些在金钱资源上贫穷的人来说，他们的金钱资源不是被这种无限可能的范围划定的，这是因为，他们总是要即刻地、毫无疑问地在一个极其有限的确定性目的上花掉自己的金钱。对于那些穷人来说，在他们支配使用这些资源的过程中，他们并不能像那些富人那样可以随意支配所拥有的货币，这是因为，目的已经被置于货币之中，货币的使用方式和方向已经被决定了。在德语中，人们用一个极其神秘的词“bemittelt”来定义那些大量金钱的拥有者，而这个词本身就具有手段的含义。然而，那些与货币资源相联系的自由同样会导致另一种的财富的自然增长。在任何一个没有报酬的公务员职位中，只有富人们能够处于领导地位。亚加亚联盟中的领导，同英国议会中的成员一样（至少现在是这样），必须是富人。正是由于这个原因，在一些官员工资极少的国家里，某种彻底的财阀统治——即一种高级官员是世袭的，并且集中于极少数家族中的统治形式——经常会得到发展。然而这样看起来，不计报酬的官职把货币的利益与公共服务的利益分开了，与尊敬、权利、机会联系在一起的政府职位就成了财富的顶峰。显然，货币形式的财富最适合作用于这种情形，这是因为，货币目的性漠不关心的中间性使得那些人能够完全自由地分配他的时间、他的居住地，以及他行为活动的方向。通过不计报酬的政府职能，富人们用财富所获得的道德和荣誉，被浓缩于一种重要职能的权力中心，这对于穷人来说是无法实现的。而在另一方面，这与一个人在国家中效劳的声誉相关，还将会引起他的货币财富的进一步增加，尽管这种名声通常的确是当之无愧的，但这种名声的赐予不是建立在道德伦理的基础上的，而是建立在货币拥有者身份这一纯粹技术性的基础上的。我们还可以从更高的高度上观察到相同的情况：在中世纪末的卢卑克，富人们喜欢加入几个宗教团体，这样是为了使他们的救赎更加有保证。在中世纪教会中，只有富人才能使用获得宗教赐福的技术方法。排除那些超越经验的目的，这种技术性方法作为一种财富自然增长所获得的折扣，正如加入几个宗教团体这类方法一样，给这些富人们带来了一定数量的特权与利益。在心理水平上，以上所描绘的那些对财富界限的跨越，使得财富以下面这种形式自然增加：对于那些极其富有的人来说，在许多情况下，一个想要得到的商品需要花费多少钱根本就不是一个问题。只要是收入与特定的目的相联系，每一次开销就都不可避免地要被那些需要支出的成本所累；对于大多数的人来说，“有多贵”这个问题总是徘徊于欲望与其满足之间的。这个问题暗示了一定程度上的事物的现实化，然而对于那些真正的金融财阀来说，这个问题根本就不存在。不管是谁，只要他拥有超过一定数量的货币，这个人就会因此被赋予一定的能够蔑视货币的额外权利。不需要考虑事物货币价值的生活方式会具有一种非比寻常的美学魅力。事物的获得仅仅是由客观的看法决定的，也就是说，事物的获得只取决于事物的内容与意义。尽管货币支配主宰的现象有可能会在很多方面降低事物的特殊价值以及人们在这些方面的洞察力，但是不可否认的是，一些其他现象可以通过货币得到增强。如果事物特性的共同之处，也就是经济价值，被投射或放置于某种外在于自身的形式中，那么事物的品质至少具有在心理上变得更加明显的机会，即使这种机会很少被实现。各种各样的把金钱置之度外的生活方式，都避免了由事物的纯粹客观品质以及价值评价所引起的分心和阴影，借助于此，事物的客观品质与价值评价之间内在的完全异质的关系最终表现为货币价格的形式。不管在什么地方，当那些不富有的人可以与那些极为富有的人一样购买相同的事物时，那些不富有的人便会在心理上享受到一种舒适感，这是一种由财富带来的价值自然增长。与那些不富有的人不同，这些非常富有的人是不会因为获得或享用某些事物而需要牺牲货币之类的问题感到烦扰的。在另一个相反的方面，我们会看到，那些富有的人对享受的厌倦态度降低了事物的特性和独特魅力，使它们成为货币财富的阴影。然而，这并没有否认其他的关系，而只是揭示了货币的本质特征：货币通过远离那些特殊的目的，把朝着完全相反的方向运行的内部和外部关系串联起来，并且对其中的任何一个都起着决定性的文化上和表现上的重要作用。这是货币在时间思维的进化过程中所能够起到的无可比拟的重要作用；货币实现了所有实际经验形式的特殊品质和单方面品质的最大程度上的简化。人们有可能会认为概念的形成是一种灾难，这是因为存在着这样一个事实：越高层次的概念，越要通过它的广度包括数量越来越多的细节，因此它必须依靠内容的不断减少。货币的概念对于这样一个较高范畴来说是一个极为贴切的现实对应物，也就是说，货币特性的存在形式就是：外延是非常之宽泛的，而它的内容又是相对贫乏的。这种存在形式赋予了货币特性真正的力量，货币与那些被交易的客观事物的对立特质之间的关系，货币与心理格局的相互关系，都可以同样被解释为一种服务，或者被解释为一种统治。

货币拥有者财富的自然增长只不过是我们可能称之为货币的形而上品质的一个单独的例子，除此之外，它的自然增长什么也不是。也就是说，因为货币是一种终极手段，其形而上品质超出了货币的所有特殊用途的范畴，这种形而上的品质就是要把那些所有可能的价值变为现实。

货币与边缘事物的一致性

我希望能够从那些关系的活动氛围中提炼出第二种关系序列。作为工具的货币的意义与所有的特殊的目的都是相互独立的，这样会导致货币成为个人与社会阶层的利益的中心和特有的领地，这些个人与社会阶层，由于它们的社会地位，被排挤出了许多类的个人的、特殊的生活目标。被解放的罗马奴隶仍然要被货币买卖，这是因为他们没有任何可以获得市民地位的机会。在雅典，早在刚刚开始出现纯粹的货币交易的4世纪，最富有的银行家陪深就是由一个奴隶发展起来的。在土耳其，亚美尼亚人是一群被侮辱与被迫害的人，他们经常从事着商人或贷款人的职业，在西班牙的摩尔人也是如此。在印度，这种情形也是经常发生的。一方面，被社会挤压的、并且仍然小心谨慎地寻求发展的帕西人，大多数都从事着货币交换或者银行家的职务，但是另一方面，在印度南部的一些地方，货币生意以及财富是掌握在切特人的手上的，这是一个混杂的种姓，他们由于种姓的不纯洁性而拥有着极少的特权和名誉。同样地，法国的胡格诺派教徒、英国的贵格派教徒，他们也都集中力量于货币的获得，这是因为他们没有保证且受限制的社会地位。要把任何人从赚钱的活动中排除出去，都是不可能的，这是因为所有可能的固定路径都可以通向货币。货币交易与其他别的交易相比，需要比较少的技术上的培训，因此很容易逃避控制和干预。此外，通常人们总是非常迫切地需要获得货币，并且愿意与那些正常情况下比较令人鄙视的人去交谈，也会去那些正常情况下都会回避的一些隐蔽的场所去进行联系。由于那些违法之人也不能使他们远离纯粹货币范畴的诱惑，这就建立起了两个方向相反的因素之间的联系：一方面，只与金钱打交道的人会受到沦为社会底层成员的威胁，这种威胁通常只有通过个人的力量以及不可或缺性来获得解除，另一方面，中世纪的流浪者，他们在一些别的方面是被法律歧视性对待的，但在货币事物上他们是被公正无私地对待的。如果把一个社会阶层从具有完全的权力与利益的市民身份中排除出来，并且这种市民身份的排除不是通过自身的放弃来实现的，而是通过法律或者其他强加的法规形式来实现的，那么与上述同样的情况就会发生。在英国的贵格派教徒在已经完全实现了政治上的平等之后，拒绝对别人或别人的事发生兴趣：他们拒绝进行宣誓，因此就不接受公共职责；他们拒绝任何与改善生活有关的任何事情，甚至是体育；他们甚至要为了避免需要缴纳的什一税而放弃耕作。因此，为了获得外部生活的兴趣，这些贵格派教徒们直接把货币作为了他们的唯一的兴趣，这种生活是他们已经实现了的。有人曾经指出，与之相同的是，在黑恩胡特群体中的成员缺乏对科学、艺术、令人愉悦的社会交往的兴趣，并且除了宗教的兴趣，只有那种对货币的赤裸裸的追求作为一种现实的冲动被依然保留着。因此，许多黑恩胡特和虔信派教徒的勤劳与贪婪不是伪善的象征符号，而是一种退化的、躲避文化兴趣的基督教世界的征兆，以及容纳不下任何高雅价值、只与那些现实世界底层相联系的虔诚的表现。实际上，即使在社会阶层的对立的层面，也存在着相同的现象，这是一种不祥的预兆，即在所有别的兴趣都消失之后，对于货币的兴趣仍然会是最后存在的、最顽固的、最持久的兴趣。在法国大革命以前，法国的贵族放弃了他们的社会义务，这是因为越来越中央集权化的国家已经占据了农村地区的统治权，国家把贵族手中所有的可以操作的有价值的管理功能全部收走了，土地的拥有者失去了作为获取货币的基础的全部意义。这是最后仅存的利益，在这之前联系着贵族与农民的所有关系现在都被约减为货币关系了。然而，货币交易变成了社会中被剥削、被压迫成员的最后手段，无论什么地方，当人们被剥夺了通过一定的直接手段、社会地位、以其成就或者是职业为方式来获得那些被禁止的事物的权利的时候，货币的力量便对实现社会地位、获得影响力，以及得到享受产生了积极的贡献。由于货币的确仅仅是一种工具手段，尽管是在一个绝对意义上的尺度，并且，由于货币缺乏那些来源于实际规定的一切特性，所以，货币是任何事物无条件的终极来源，在任何地方也都是无条件的终极目标。因此，在那些整体中的没有被排除在目的序列之外的部分，并且在统一的目的论构成对整体都有效的地方，同类的情况也会发生。对于斯巴达人来说，那些对于经济利益的任何的追求都是要被严格限制的，据说他们曾经是极其贪婪的。这样看来，拥有者——他们的分配通过利西亚的宪法被不切实际地系统化了——的热情正好在那些所有权拥有最少的明确性，以及限制最微弱的地方爆发出来了。在某些文献中有这样一种说法，在斯巴达，曾经有很长的一段时期，从拥有的财产所产生的实际快乐来看，并没有穷人与富人之分，并且那些富人的生活状况并不比那些穷人好。因此，对钱财的欲求不得不全部集中于对货币的拥有上来。在爱琴纳岛也发生过同样的事情，正如一名爱佛（斯巴达的长官）报道说，爱琴纳岛似乎成为了一个主要贸易地，这是因为他们的土壤很贫瘠，当地的居民只能从事贸易，爱琴纳岛也因此成为了希腊的第一个合法的铸币地！由于货币是目的序列中的一个共同的交汇点，在其中，经济世界的每一个点与另一个点之间都有不断延伸着的目的序列，这就使得货币被每一个人所接受。当“不诚实”的诅咒被最为沉重地压在了某种职业上的时候，人们仍然能够接受那些来自刽子手的钱，即使这些人起初可能希望寻找诚实的人来做这些事情。麦考利意识到了货币的这种高于一切的力量，他开始在这个基础上来为犹太人进行辩护，即抑制犹太人的政治权力是没有意义的，因为货币已经给予了他们实质的权力。他们可以收买投票者或者操纵国王，就像作为债权人操纵着债务人一样，所以，政治权力除了正式通知某件事情已经被通过以外什么都不是。如果想要真正剥夺他们的政治权力，那么就应该去杀掉他们，或者抢夺他们的财产，只要他们手中有货币，“那么我们带走的就只能是阴影，而留给他们的却是实物”，这句话非常有特征地表达了货币概念在目的论上的循环。在纯粹的实际术语中，我们有可能倾向于把社会的、政治的，以及个人的关系刻画为拥有实际的与本质的价值，而货币——本身只是其他价值的空洞的符号——将会被看作是纯粹的影子！

去强调犹太人是货币影响力的核心部分与社会性剥夺之间联系的最好的例子是没有必要的。我在这里只想提及可以表达货币意义的独特重要性的两种观点。犹太人的财富是由货币组成的，于是，他们就成为了被剥夺的猎物以及可以获取利益的对象，这是因为没有其他别的财产可以像货币这样如此轻易、如此简单，而又没有损失地被剥夺掉。正如可以通过在一个或大或小的范围进行劳动来获得商品，可以按照这些获得来给那些经济产品进行排序一样，我们同样可以给以抢劫的方式得来的东西进行排序。如果一个人剥夺了他人的土地，除非立刻把这片土地转变为货币，否则他是不可能立刻实现自己的利益的，因为，时间、精力以及花销都是有必要的。尽管存在着太多的差异，但是在处理这些事情的时候，个人的努力本质上应该是更加实用的。举个例子来说，在中世纪的英格兰，羊毛在这个阶段是最有用的，羊毛作为一种流通的媒介，可以被议会用作向国王缴纳的税收，而国王又用它来从商人那里榨取货币。货币是这一尺度的极点。在犹太人的地位沦为贱民的时候，货币缺乏特定的目的性这一特点，就使得货币成为最适合、最不会被拒绝的收入来源，但同样也成为了他们被剥削的最方便的途径、最直接的动机。在中世纪的大屠杀中，在一些城市中，迫害是指向那些富人们的，而在另一些城市中，迫害则是指向那些贫穷的犹太人，但是这些并不能成为否定我们观点的证据，而只是说明了处于成长中的货币力量的另一方面。

从社会学的角度来考虑的话，犹太人与货币的一般关系对货币特征的解释更加明显。正是通过货币使其从外部与某个群体发生关系，一个陌生人才能够在一个社会团体中发挥作用，所有的这一切都是由于：货币的超界限的转换性、用途的延展性，使得它能够突破群体关系的界限。这种货币的本质与陌生人的关系在原始人当中也是非常明显的。在那里，货币是用外面运来的代用币构成的。举个例子说，在所罗门群岛以及西非尼日尔的伊布人中间存在着这样一个产业，他们用贝壳或者其他代用币来生产货币。这些代用币像货币一样的流通，但是它并不是在生产地使用，而是出口到邻近的地区去。这也让我们回想起了时尚这种东西，如果某些时尚的东西是由进口所得，即从外地引进的，那么它们立刻就变得尤为珍贵与有力。货币与这些时尚产品都是社会互动的形式，看起来就像是一些社会的元素，如同我们的眼睛一样，我们总是会把光聚于离我们并不是很近的一件物体上去，才能够最好地集中视力。那些同样是人的外乡人对于货币也必定有着浓厚兴趣，对于那些在社会中被剥夺的人们来说，货币变得更加有价值，也就是说，通过特殊的具体渠道以及一定的人际关系，那些具有正常名分的人或本地人具有了货币为他们提供的一种机会。正如之前已经被强调过的那样，那些在巴比伦神庙面前，只有那些外乡人才会给当地的那些女孩钱，之后那些女孩为了报答他们而委身于这些外乡人。在外乡人的社会学意义以及货币的社会学意义之间还存在着另一种关系，纯粹的货币交易很明显的是次要的东西，货币的基本功能首先主要是要在交易表现它自身。由于合理的原因，在贸易发展的初期阶段，贸易者通常是由那些外乡人充当的。只要经济的氛围是小的，并且还没有经历一个劳动分工高度发展的过程，那么直接的交换或者购买对于那些必要的分配而言就已经是足够了的，贸易者只需要提供那些来自遥远的地方的产品。这种关系的决定性是通过它的逆反关系表现出来的：不仅贸易者都是外乡人，而且外乡人也都愿意成为贸易者，当出现下面将要提到的这种情况的时候，这种关系就会变得很明显，这种情况就是陌生人不仅仅是临时性出现在这个团体，而且定居下来，并且寻找着来自这个团体的永久性的支持。因此，在柏拉图的《法律篇》中，市民是不允许拥有黄金与白银的，而所有的贸易与手工业都专门留给了外乡人。这就导致了这样一个事实，那些犹太人变成了贸易者，不仅仅是因为他们受到了压迫，而且还因为他们分散在所有的城邦之间。犹太人只是在最后一次巴比伦之囚以后才开始变得熟悉货币交易，在这之前的时间，他们是不熟悉货币交易的。这一点被下面这样一个事实体现了出来：在大流散中的犹太人多数从事了这一职业。离散的人们，无论他们和文化圈的关系或密或疏，都很难扎下根，也很难在生产行业中找到自由位置。所以他们不得不从事中介性的贸易行业，因为相对于原始生产来说，这种中介行业更具有弹性。之所以说中介性的贸易更具有弹性是因为，他们仅仅通过形式上的联合就能无限地拓展贸易范围，并且可以吸收那些不扎根于群体的外乡人为成员。

犹太人精神的基本特征就是对那些实实在在的创造性的生产不太感兴趣，而对逻辑一形式更加感兴趣。这一点可以从他们所处的经济环境来理解。犹太人是一群外乡人，他们与其所处的经济群体并没有什么有机的联系。正是这样一种情况指引他们走向了贸易，并且刺激他们进行纯粹的货币交易。对犹太人的生存状态做出最为引人注目的洞察的是在13世纪之交的奥斯纳布吕克法令，这个法令允许犹太人每周获得1%的利息，那么一年他就可以获得36.119%的利息，然而这是通常每年最大利率的百分比。另一点尤为重要的是，犹太人作为陌生人，不仅仅是相对于那些本地人来说的，也是相对于宗教来说的，这一点的意义非常特殊。因为中世纪的法令在获取利息方面的禁令对犹太人来说是无效的，所以他们就成为了进行货币借贷的有组织的一群人，成为公认的放贷者。被犹太人收取的高利息是他们被排挤出土地所有权以外这样一种情况的结果：土地财产的抵押对他们来说永远都是不安全的，他们总是担心像在1390年文策尔国王对法兰克人的所作所为，1347年查理四世对纽伦堡世袭领主的所作所为，在1338年巴伐利亚的亨利公爵对斯特拉宾市民的所作所为那样，那些高层的权力者宣称他们的债权是无效的。

外乡人对他们的事业与借款需要更高额的风险保障费用。这种商业行为与高风险保障金的联系不仅仅对犹太人是有效的，并且，它深深地扎根于贸易与货币的本质当中，对一系列别的事情也是同样重要的。16世纪的世界股票交易中，正是由于通过建立几乎没有限制的自由贸易，那些外来的商人都非常喜欢来这里，这也使得里昂与安特卫普这两个城市获得了与众不同的特征。这种货币特征与城市的货币交易特征紧密联系在一起，不管政府的错误原则和历史的偶然事件如何掩盖这一紧密联系，货币经济和自由贸易间的深刻内在联系都是不难看出的。外乡人在金融交易中的作用清晰地揭示了这种关系。在美第奇家族时期，佛罗伦萨的一些金融家族的重要性取决于这样一个事实：他们有的被美第奇家族流放，也有的被美第奇家族剥夺了政治权利。为了再一次获得力量与重要性，这些沦落的家族开始依靠金融交易，因为他们远离家乡之后，没有力量去从事别的商业。经过仔细的检查，那些别的同时代发生的但又明显的与相互矛盾的事件，揭示了同样的相互关系，这一点是值得我们注意的。16世纪的安特卫普是无可争议的世界贸易的中心，它的重要意义取决于那些外乡人，如意大利人、西班牙人、葡萄牙人、英国人，以及德国人，这些外乡人定居在安特卫普，并在那里出售他们的商品。安特卫普的本地居民在贸易中发挥着相当有限的作用，他们主要被雇来担任佣金代理人或金融机构的雇员。在这样一个通过世界贸易的利益联合起来的国际化的社会，本地人本应该发挥的作用被外地人代替了。在这里，具有决定性作用的是一些大的团体与一些疏远的个体之间的社会关系。对于疏远的个体而言，他们并没有与更加具体的利益有任何直接关系，因此他们只能够转向金融交易。在大多数情况下，这种关系是在本地居民与陌生人之间发展的。当盎格鲁一撒克逊人吸收了那些未被他们流放的英国人时，这些英国人也被盎格鲁一撒克逊人称为“外乡人”。就像在安特卫普一样，无论在什么地方，如果那些外乡人代表了一个大的联合的群体，而且那些本地人又是些分散的小团体，那么从社会学的角度来看，同样的社会化原因会产生同样的社会化结果，而在这种情况下，我们提出“哪些因素是本地人所与生俱来的”，“哪些因素是外地人所拥有的”这类问题就没有意义了。撇开那些个体的外乡人在一个群体中选择贸易与特殊金融交易的自私动机不说，有一点是不可否认的，那就是16世纪现代银行家所做的第一个较大的交易是发生在国外的。货币从大多数的目的序列的地域限制中解脱出来，这是因为，它是一个特定的初始点与一个特定的最终结果之间的中介联系。正如有人提出来的那样，如果历史存在的所有元素都在寻找活动的形式，而在这种活动形式中，所有的元素都可以通过一种最为纯粹的形式来表达自己的特殊品质和本质力量，那么最早期的现代真实资本，就像年青的精神一样有一种扩大的渴求，它会急切地希望投资，这种投资是它无所不能的力量、它的无所不能的用途，以及它的公平性的体现。那些对主要的金融性的机构憎恨的人们主要基于这样一个事实：那就是这些金融机构的主人以及它们的代理人通常都是外乡人，这种憎恨是一种民族主义情感对国际主义的一种片面性的抵触，这种情感已经开始意识到了金融货币的独特价值，并且逐渐被一种中立的、没有特征的力量所压制，而这种力量的本质似乎就是通过外乡人被人格化的。这与保守的雅典大众对诡辩家与苏格拉底等人的知性主义的厌恶，以及他们对那些新兴的、神秘的精神力量——这种力量就像货币一样是中立的、没有感情色彩的，对自身力量的显示通常首先是从摧毁那些荒唐可笑的残存力量的限制开始的——厌恶，具有着完全的一致性。此外，正如这种货币趋势的客观化一样，金融交易的大规模扩张引发了无尽的战争：例如那些发生在德国皇帝与法国国王之间的战争，发生在那些海拔较低的国家、德国以及法国之间的宗教战争等等，这些战争本身只是场纯粹的非生产运动，但是却获得了对货币资金的完全控制，并使得商品货物交易（主要是地区性贸易）开始被金融贸易超过。与此同时，以这种战争的方式进行的金融资金由一个国家向另一个国家的转移的确变得更具有颠覆性了。法国的国王曾经依靠佛罗伦萨银行家的支持与意大利进行过战争；他们又借助德国货币的帮助从德国皇帝手中把洛林以及后来的阿尔萨斯抢走了；西班牙人通过使用意大利的金融力量来操控意大利。只有在17世纪，法国、英格兰以及西班牙才尝试着去结束这种金融资本的浮动和反复，而这种尝试也正揭示了货币作为一种纯粹工具的特性，从而满足了这些政府在本国的资金需求。如果在最近一段时间里，金融业在许多方面再一次变得国际化，那么这当然就会有完全不同的意义：在地域范畴意义上的“外乡人”如今已不再存在；贸易关系、风俗习惯，以及律法（即使是那些非常遥远的国家的律法），也都将形成一个越来越统一的有机体。货币并没有失去那些在一个外乡人范畴上建立起来的特征，但是，通过存在于货币之间的交叉的哲学目的论意义上的目的所发生的连续不断的繁衍与变化，这种货币特征越来越被强化于它的抽象性和无色彩性中了。因为货币的交换形式现在已经被整个经济社会所代替，所以存在于本地人与外乡人之间的对比也就逐渐地被消除了。对于货币的本质而言，外乡人的意义在我看来似乎可以通过我所听到的一个建议被概括在一个缩影中：那就是，在涉及金融贸易问题时，千万不要同两种人打交道——朋友与敌人。在与朋友进行金融贸易时，货币交易的毫不相关的客观性与朋友关系的亲密性之间有着不可调和的矛盾；在与敌人进行金融贸易时，同样的情形为一个充满敌意的企图提供了一个广阔的空间，而这种充满敌意的企图是与事实相一致的，这个事实就是：我们在货币经济中的法律形式从来没有非常准确地把那些存心的恶意排除在外。就像我们常说的那样，在金融交易中，生意就是生意，所以金融交易中称心如意的贸易伙伴是与我们完全没有感情的人，他们既不是要帮助我们，也不是要反对我们。

第二节

手段变为目的的心理发展过程

在前面的分析中，我们已经预示了价值意义的一个方面，其自明性可以轻易掩盖它对我们的重要性。货币对于我们来说是有价值的，是因为它是获取价值的手段，但是会有人因此说它也只是一个手段而已。价值是建立在我们行动的终极目的之上的，强调这种价值手段的可转移性似乎并没有逻辑上的必然性，因此，就其手段自身而言，以及若不谈及目的论意义序列的话，手段将会与其价值完全无关。这种价值转移建立在纯粹外在联系的基础之上，是以我们精神过程中的非常一般性的形式——我们或许可以称这种精神过程为质的心理扩展——来处理和安排自己。如果一个由物体、力量或时间构成的实际序列所包含着的某一个环节，可以在我们身上引发某种主观上的反应，例如快乐和痛苦、爱和恨、积极的和消极的情绪，那么这些价值就似乎不仅只与其直接的符号象征直接关联，而且我们还会让此序列中其他未被指明的精神环节也牵涉进来。事实上，不仅在那些目的论序列中，而且在其他那些常规要素之间的联系上，其目标得以实现的各种原因都因最后的环节而获得了意义。例如：一个家庭中的所有成员都需要分担其中任何一个成员的荣辱；一位伟大的诗人无关紧要的作品也会得到不应有的赞誉，只因为他的其他作品是重要的；在政党政治中，个人的好恶会延伸到这个政党程序的其他要点上去，从而影响到原本可能是对立的或冷淡的情绪；对某人的某一种品质的认同之爱，最后就要扩展到那个人的整个人格上去，以至于喜爱他的所有品质和言谈，如果没有上述关联的存在，这种爱屋及乌的感情就是不可理喻的。总之，只要存在一些人或事物是通过一些关联而以整体的形式而存在的，那么从单个要素中提取出来的价值的意义就会通过系统的共同基础而传递到其他要素上去，而单靠这些要素自己是不能引发这种感受的。正因为价值的意义与事物的结构没有任何的关系，而是拥有一种超越这些结构的、自身独特的领域，所以价值判断并非严格地依赖其逻辑的界限，而是会自由地发展并超出它与事物所具有的那些客观合理的关系。我们精神生活中的相对高峰时刻会波及那些不具有高峰特质的临界时刻，尽管这一事实有非理性的地方，但却揭示出灵魂整体所具有的快乐财富，即灵魂总是想要以那些曾经具有敏感意义的要素和价值来实现自己的旨趣，它甚至会根据其对事物内在共鸣的完整尺度来这样做，而不会迫切寻求它们分享这些价值所需的合法理由。

在这种质的扩展的一切形式中，最合理、最似是而非的肯定是由各种目的所构成的序列，但这看起来似乎也不是绝对必然的。中立的手段通过实现某一目的的价值而获得的意义并不包含有某种转移过来的价值，相对而言，它更可能是一种产生于由这种序列结构所产生的特殊频率及重要性的特别范畴。但实际上，这种心理上的扩展是建立在价值质量基础上的，它们之间唯一的区别是：目的的价值可能会被说成是绝对的，而手段的价值则可能会被说成是相对的。事物的价值是绝对的——这是就现在尚存疑问的实践意义上来说的——正是在这一点上，意志的进程明确止步不前了。这种停止自然不必是时间上延展的停顿，而只是一系列神经支配活动的结束，这样，当满足感逐渐消失以后，意志持续的活力将会体现在新的神经支配活动中。另外，如果对一个客体的价值感受服从于对某一绝对价值的实现，那么，这个客体所具有的价值就是相对的，其价值的相对性是通过这样的事实表现出来的：对于实现同样目的的手段来说，如果人们发现了另一种更高级的、更易于获得的手段，那么，现有的这个手段就会立刻失去它的价值。这种在绝对价值和相对价值之间的对比并不与客观价值和主观价值之间的对比相对应，因为前者可能是于这两种价值形式中同时发展的。我在此是在大致相同的意义上使用价值与目的这两个概念的；在这种情况下，它们实际上只是同一现象的不同方面而已：实际的概念从理论一情感上来看是一种价值，从实践一意志的角度来看则是一种目的。

设定这一种或其他种类的价值和目的的精神能量在本性上是很不同的。在任何情况下，对最终目的的创造都只可能有通过一种意志的自发行为才能实现，而一种手段的相对价值则只能通过理论知识的方式才能予以判定。目标的设定源于个性、情绪和旨趣，但是通向目标的道路却取决于事物的本性。所谓“我们迈出第一步时是自由的，而迈出第二步时就是奴隶了”的这种说法再没有比在目的论领域内更为适用了。这种对立揭示了我们的内在力量与客观存在之间极富多样性的关系，但无论如何，它并不能妨碍某一种内容以及相同的内容从一种范畴转换到另一种范畴。正是设定最终目标的自发性与手段从心理上参与到其目标的价值中的事实一起，使得手段能够在我们的意识中为其自身获得一种确定的自我规定的价值特性。这种现象成其为可能，原因只有一个：即我们意志的最终权威独立于所有理性和逻辑的基础之外，即使看上去好像与目的有所抵触，但上述事实本身却为目的的实现提供了便利。一般认为：我们对目的考虑得越清楚，就越能最好地实现它，其实这是毫无根据的，毋宁说它是一种粗略的感觉意义上有效的印象罢了。“无意识的目的”的概念似乎显得不容易理解和不尽完美，但却表现了这样的事实：一方面，我们的行动如果有精确的适应性的话，那么它们总是集中在确定的终极目标上，并且也难以想象它们没有任何实效；另一方面，我们的意识对上述现象并无察觉。这一事实反复地出现，它对我们整个生存模式都极为关键，以至于我们必须要找到一个专门的用语来指称它。“无意识的目的”这一表达方式并不是要解释这种现象的原因，而只是为了指称它而已。我们的行动绝非由某种目的而引起的，即不是由某种将会发生的事所引起的，而总是通过这种优先于行为的生理—心理能量而使行动得以发生。如果我们始终牢记这一事实的话，那么问题就会变得更加清楚。所以，我们或许可以假定在此之后的情况是这样的——一方面，我们的一切活动都是由我们的内在自我的核心力量所引导的；另一方面，它们又被与此一致的感官印象、情绪、外在刺激和决断所引导。这两个因素系列都是在非常多样性的联结中发生的。我们的行动在第一种因素的有效范围内更为适合，在这个范围内，它把所有不同的特定因素都转向从心灵自我（就其严格意义而言）中涌现出来的能量的方向上。如果我们已经积聚相当数量的待释放的能量达到了这些能量的释放必定要持续遵循预定的方向的程度——这是一种事情发生的必然格局，它甚至使附带的、不正当的旨趣也获得了在外在形式上的同步实现——那么，只要这种实际的生理—心理力量反映在我们的概念意识中，它就被称之为“目的”。作为对上述待释放能量在精神上的反映，对这种目的的意识，会在这一目的进一步的发展过程中消失掉，这是因为人们认为目的的实际基础正在逐渐地消失；通过慢慢将其置换为行动的方式，最后它就只存在于其实际结果中了。根据我们记忆的结构，对目的的最初的关注或许会比任何实际基础延续的时间更长，并一直存在于我们的意识当中，即使这是真的，对于那些似乎由这种基础贯穿始终并由之引导着的行动来说，这也不是必然的。更进一步说，如果这种构想是正确的，那么就会引出这样的结论：为了处理目的论的序列，只有最初那个单位的能量，也就是我们此处所说目的最初存在形式的出现才是必需的。能量的实质力量会一直保持在接下来的行动当中，从一开始它就是由目的所引导的，不管对目的的意识是否仍然伴随着实践的序列，情况都是如此。

如果这种对目的的意识始终都保持活跃状态的话，那么，它不仅是一种纯粹的观念，而且也是一种消耗意识的有机能量及其强度的过程。生命的一般性实用就会因此而趋向把它去除掉，因为在排除掉任何复杂因素和变化性的情况下，对于我们行动的目的论指导来说，它基本上已不再是必需的了。这似乎让我们在自己的经验中发现的现象变得更为清晰了，这就是说，对于只能通过手段来实现的我们实践序列的最终环节来说，我们越是把力量集中和聚集到这些手段的生产中去，实践序列的最终环节就越能更好地实现。因此，真正的实践问题就是手段的生产问题。这一问题越是得到彻底的解决，终极目的就越容易省却意志力，这可以作为手段的机械结果而被完成。如果我们总是对最终目的有所意识，那么，手段就要把一定数量的力量从我们的劳动中抽取出来。最为有利的态度是：把我们的能量全部集中于目的序列中本应下一步才实现的那一阶段；换句话说，没有什么方法能比把手段作为目的自身来处理，更能促进最终目的实现。当可使用的力量有限时，所需的对心理重心的分配与逻辑结构并不一致，对于后者来说，手段完全是无关紧要的，全部的重点都在目的上，而实践中的权宜却要求对这种关系进行一个直接的心理上的反转。这种看上去显然是非理性的事实，却对人类有着不可估量的价值。在所有的可能性中，如果我们的意识已经预先被最初目的的设定所占据，那么，我们就永远也不可能超越这个阶段，我们也永远不能自由地去发展更多样化的手段；或者，如果我们在处理每一个次要手段的时候，总是不断意识到为最终目的服务的整个手段序列，那么我们将会体验到一种不堪忍受和支离破碎的感觉。最终，如果我们意识到在与终极目的的关系中的逻辑意义无关紧要，并且没有把意识的全部力量都集中到任何一个时刻所必需的事情上去的话，那么我们将会既没有力量，也没有兴趣去完成手边的任务了。很显然，这种终极目的的轮回发生得越为频繁和彻底，生活的技术就变得越是复杂化。随着竞争的加剧和劳动分工的增加，生活的目的也变得越来越难以实现，也就是说，它们需要能让手段保持持续增长的基础存在。就对技术的兴趣而言，技术这个词的每一个含义都说明：有相当比例的文明人仍然处在永恒的被奴役的状态当中。终极目的实现所依赖的条件需要人们集中注意力，他们也把精力集中到了这些条件上，以至于每个真实的目的完全从我们的意识中消失了。的确，他们也经常遭到拒绝，但这种情况受到一个事实的鼓励：在文化意义上的发达的关系中，个人天生就处在一个由许多环节所构成的目的论体系当中（例如，对于风俗来说，它被看作是绝对命令，这种绝对命令的起源是作为人们不再质疑社会目的的先决条件而存在的）；个人为了早已确定的目的而接受协作，与此同时，即使是他的个人目标，也经常被看做是由周围环境所赋予的、不言自明的目标，这种目标的合法性更多地来自于个人的现实存在和自我发展，而非来自于清醒的意识。所有这些环境共同促成了这样一个事实——不仅这种生活的终极目标，而且还有那些生活过程中间的目标，也都被允许在不完美的状态下进入到意识流中，并集中和直接将意识引向手段所要实现的现实任务中去。

目的序列中的货币：货币作为手段变成目的的最极端的例子

很明显，终极目的以这种最综合、最极端的形式提前发生，不是在生活过程的中间事件中，而是在货币当中。从来没有一个对象能够像货币一样，拥有作为完全排斥手段的自身价值，其可变性能够转化为更明确的价值，彻底地和毫无保留地发展成为一种完全的心理上的价值，一种控制我们实践意识、牵动我们全部现实注意力的终极目的。这种对货币的终极期望必然要发展到这样一种程度——货币担负起了作为纯粹手段的特质。因为这意味着货币可支配对象范围在持续增加，所以，事物也在越来越毫无防范地屈服于货币的力量，而货币自身也变得越来越缺少个性。但与此同时，货币在与事物品质的关系中却正好因此而变得越来越强有力。货币增长着的重要性依赖于它剔除一切非手段性因素的过程，因为这样一来它与对象的特殊性之间的冲突就因此被消除了。货币作为手段的价值是通过作为其手段的价值的提升而提升的，并且一直提升到这样一个界限上：在此界限上，它作为一种绝对价值发挥效力，并且货币中所包含的目的的意识也宣告完结。货币本质的内在两极性取决于这样的原因：即货币是一种绝对的手段，并因此在心理上成为大多数人的一种绝对目的。这使得货币以一种奇特的方式成为一种符号，在这种符号中，实际生活的主要调节者不再有所作为了。我们应当把生活中的每一刻都当作最终目的那样来对待；每一时刻都如此的重要，似乎生命就是为了这个缘由才存在的。同时，我们还应当这样生活——就好像没有一个时刻中是最终目的，就好像我们的价值感不会停留在任何一个时刻上，而每一个这样的时刻应该是一个通往更高阶段的过渡点和手段。显然，生活中每一时刻的冲突的双重要求——既是终极目的又不是终极目的的要求——都来自于我们的内心深处。在那里，灵魂决定了我们与生活的关系，并且灵魂相当奇妙地、也几乎不无讽刺地在货币这个最外在于灵魂的实体中得到了自我实现，因为灵魂超越了现存的心灵形式所具有的一切特质和强度。

作为一种目的的货币的特性取决于时代的文化趋向

对于价值意识来说，货币绝对化的程度取决于经济兴趣从原始生产转向工业企业这种重要的转型。现代人与古希腊人对钱的态度区别如此之大，主要是因为古代的货币仅仅服务于消费，而现代的货币在本质上是服务于生产的。对于作为整体的经济体系真正的索引的货币目的论意义的角色来说，这种区别极为重要。在古代，经济的兴趣更多的是指向消费而非生产；农业生产占据主导地位，它的简单、以及其传统和一成不变的技术，使其不需要像处在持续变动中的工业生产那样支出太多的经济意识。因此，这样的意识就主要集中于经济的其他方面，即消费方面。整体意义上的劳动发展史反映了同样的发展模式。古代人的劳动几乎全是为了当前的消费，而不是为了拥有——这是进一步指向获取的下一个阶段。因此，这就是所谓以消费组织而非生产劳动为中心的社会主义倾向和古代理想：柏拉图的理想国在这方面和他竭力攻击的雅典民主制颇有相似之处。亚里士多德的一个论点对于这一点说明得特别清楚：如果政治性功能就是接受报酬，那么就会导致民主政体中穷人对富人的统治，因为与富人相比，穷人的时间更少被私人事务所占据，假如他们再因此有报酬可得的话，就会有更多的时间来行使公共权利。在这里，人们都承认的事实是：穷人比富人更悠闲。与后来的时代相比，如果这种情况不是一个由机会多少所造成的问题，而是一个原则上由经济所采取的形式的基础所造成的问题的话，那么，随之而来的结论便是：大众的兴趣很简单，就是如何能够拥有充足的东西维持生计。一种预示了穷人失业的社会结构一定会在根本上对消费而不是对生产有兴趣。在经济领域，古希腊人的道德原则几乎从来就没有触及获取的问题，或许这只是因为在数量上众多的主要生产者——奴隶，不是引起社会或道德的兴趣关注的对象。亚里士多德的观点是：只有消费而非生产才为一种积极道德的发展提供了机会，这与柏拉图和亚里士多德对货币的看法是相吻合的，他们二人都认为货币只是一种必需的恶。当价值重点专门地落脚于消费时，货币尤其清楚不过地揭示了其冷漠无情和空洞无物的特性，因为正是在消费中，货币立即面对着经济的终极目标。而货币作为一种生产的手段，它却越发地远离了终极目标而被其他的手段所包围，与这些手段相比，货币拥有一种完全不同的相对意义。货币意义的这种区别可以追溯至每一时代精神中的那些终极抉择。这种有意把对消费兴趣的评价置于对生产兴趣评价之上的现象源于农业生产的主导地位。受到法律保护的相对保险的财产——土地财产是在古希腊人对生活所具有的意识中，它是唯一能够保证连续性和统一性的东西。在这一点上，古希腊人仍然是东方人，因为只有当时间的飞逝性被一种实在的、持续的内容所补充时，他们才能想象出生活连续性的存在。所以，对实体概念的坚持表现了整个古希腊哲学的特点。但这完全没有因此使古希腊生活的现实具有什么特色，而毋宁说是生活现实的失败、企盼和救赎。它反映了古希腊人精神世界的广阔范围，在这个世界中，古希腊人的心灵不仅要在外在的既定事实中追寻他们的理念，就像那些不够成熟和较为保守的人所做的那样，而且还反映出他们还尝试在另外一个领域内完成他们那狂热的危险的本性（这种尝试常常为党派之争所打断），也就是在安全的界限内和平静的形式中完成他们的思考和创造。与之总体上相反的是，现代人的观点是在那些内容极度变化的力量的交叉作用和时间的有规律的序列中，看到生活的统一性和连续性。我们生活的全部多样性和运动并没有放弃对统一性的感觉——至少不是经常如此——而只是在我们自己感觉到偏离与不足时才会发生这种情况。相反，生活正是被这种统一性支撑着，并由它带来最充分的意识。古希腊人对这种动力学上的统一性感觉很陌生。同样的原因也使他们能够在建筑和雕塑艺术的形式中贮存积累美学理念，这些东西使他们的生活观点成为一个程度和数量上都是有限的宇宙，并拒绝无限性——这种特点使他们把存在的连续性只看做是某种实体性的静止不动的存在，类似于建立在土地财产基础之上所实现的理念那样。而现代人的生活观点是建立在货币基础之上的，货币的本性是起伏不定的，它在各种货币等价物最大的、最变化无常的多样性中展现出其本质的同一性。而且，建立在货币基础之上的商业交易在古希腊人眼中也是更不体面的事，他们认为这种交易总是某种对未来有长远算计的行为。而对古希腊人而言，从原则上来说，未来是某种不可预知的东西，对未来的希望完全是虚幻，甚至是不自量力的，而这样的想法必然要激起众神的愤怒。

所有这些生活构成中的内在和外在因素以这样一种方式互动，以至于我们不可能指出其中哪种因素是无条件的、基础性的存在。农业经济取决于两种因素：一是农业经济强调可靠性，较少有或者根本缺少多样性的中介联系，注重消费而非生产；二是注重事物实体的态度，以及对那些不可预见的、不稳定和动态的东西的反感。一方面，所有这些特点都是以各不相同的兴趣为中介折射出来的统一的、历史性的基本构成的各种的破碎的光线。我们不能以解剖的心态来直接把握或指称这些光线，或许它们属于那样一些构成——先验性问题对于它们来说是不适用的，因为它们的本质基本上是建立在一个无限的或是循环的过程中的相互倚赖着的双方互动上的。对于细节性知识来说这是有缺陷的，但在其基本动机中却是本质性的、不可避免的。不管我们怎样来诠释，事实都是这样一对于古希腊人来说，经济的目的与手段并没有像后来那样分离得太远。此外，手段也不具有在心理上同目的相同的独立性，货币还没有如此明显地、毫无内在阻力地发展成为一种独立的价值。

货币目的论地位的心理后果

当我们更加仔细地考察手段与目的之间的关系时，作为由手段在心理上提升为目的的最杰出和完美的例子，即货币的重要性，就变得最明显不过了。我已经讲到这样一些情况：在这些情况中，我们总是故意对自己行动的真实目的视而不见，这样我们的意志就可以在事实上集中于那些并非我们自己设想的目的上面。因此，寻找超越于我们意识所反映的目的的行为似乎就是合理的了。但是，我们这种寻找的界限应该在那里呢？如果目的论序列并没有终止于意识所最终意识到的环节中，那么就不能向其通往无限的连续性敞开道路吗？那么就没有必要对作为我们行动基础的那些既定目的感到不满足，并因而探寻超越于既定者之外的那些目的存在的更进一步的理由吗？此外，没有任何实现了的目标和条件能够给我们最终的满足，而在逻辑上，它们似乎是与终极目标的概念联结在一起的。进一步说，每一个已达到的点，在实际上都只是被体验为通向最后阶段的过渡阶段——在感性领域和理性领域都是如此。在感性领域，是因为这些可实现的点总是处于持续的流动变化当中，而每一个实现的快乐都有新的需要紧随其后；在理性领域，则是因为经验的现实永远也不能完全满足要求。概括起来说，被我们称为终极目的之物似乎是漂浮于目的论序列之上的，而它与地平线的关系却又类似于那些指向它的尘世之路与地平线的关系，但尘世之路即使经过再长的跋涉也不会使它在起点处与终极目的之间的距离更靠近。这里的问题不在于终极目的是否能够实现，而是表现终极目的形式能否被赋予任何内容。目的论序列所指向的是其在这个世界中可以实现的某处，就这一点来说，它最后停止的原因不在于其最终得到实现，而是与其内在结构相一致。被提供的不是一些在这一序列的终极目的中似乎存在着的确定的点，而只是如下的启发性调节原理，即不应该把任何个别的意愿目的视为终极目标，而只能为走向更高目标的步骤敞开一种可能性。换句话说，终极目的只是一种功能或者要求。如果被看作是一种概念的话，它就只是这样一个事实的浓缩：最初它似乎是无价值的——人类通向无限的努力和价值衡量的道路，以及在这条道路上所达到的每一点，不管在实现之前它们看起来是多么的确定，在将来被回顾的时候，都没有一个能够逃避仅仅被视为手段的这一命运。由手段到终极目的的尊贵地位的提升因此就成为一个不那么具有非理性色彩的范畴了。的确，在单个的例子中，非理性是不能被排除的，但是目的论序列整体性的本质却与有限阶段的本质不同。有一个事实证明了手段成为目的的合理性，这就是：在最后的分析中，目的只是手段而已。可能的意志、自我发展的行动及其满足，在这些无限的序列中，我们几乎是武断地选定了其中一个环节来作为终极目的，对它来说，前面的一切都只是一个手段而已。一个处于客观位置的观察者或是到后来甚至我们自己，都不得不为未来设定一个真正有效和可靠的目的，而不考虑使其免于遭受同样的命运。在我们的努力具有相对性和关于终极目的的理念具有绝对性这两者之间产生极度紧张的关系的紧张点上，货币再次变得很有意义，我们在前面所提出的一个论点在此也可以得到进一步的发展。作为事物价值的表达和对等物，同时也作为一种纯粹的手段和中性的过渡阶段，货币象征了这样一个既定事实——我们为之奋斗和体验到的价值最终都被证明只不过是一种手段和暂时存在的实体而已。货币由生活中最理想化的工具一跃而变为生活中大多数人最理想化的目的，就此而言，货币形成了最具歧义性的证据，它证明了：不管一个目的论的环节是否将被解释为一种手段或是一种目的，都仅仅取决于我们的立场观点——即货币是这样一种证据：它的最终决断和一个典范的完成是一致的。

在任何时代个人对金钱都是贪婪的，但我们可以肯定地说：最强烈的、最膨胀的金钱欲望只发生在一些特定的年代里，在这些时代里，个人生活兴趣适度的满足，例如把宗教意义上的绝对存在当作生活的终极目的已经不够了，已经失去了其力量。在当前——犹如在古希腊和古罗马的衰弱时期——以及在远离个人内心世界的地方，生活的所有方面、人类相互之间的关系以及它与客观文化之间的关系都沾上了铜臭。当人们的生活的满足和终极目的开始出现萎缩的时候，正是那种原本专门属于一种手段的价值取代了这些目的的位置，并为自己披上了这些目的形式的外衣，这一切似乎都是一种历史的反讽。心理形式意义上的货币，作为绝对手段因而也作为无数目的序列的整合点，实际上与对上帝的观念有一种重要的关系，这种关系只有心理学才能揭示出来，因为心理学有一种特权：它不会被指责有亵渎神明的罪名。上帝观念的本质在于世界上所有的多样性和对立都在他那里达到了一种统一，根据库萨的尼古拉美妙的描述，上帝乃是一种对立者的协调一致。从这一观念出发，存在的所有相异的和不可调和都在上帝那里找到了它们的统一和对等，平和、安全、感情中包含着的一切财富，都是从我们所持有的上帝的观念中产生出来的。

毫无疑问，在它们的领域中，货币所激发的感觉与对上帝的观念具有心理上的类似性。就货币成为绝对相等的表现形式和一切价值的等价物这一点来说，在事物整体的多样性之上，货币达到了一种抽象的高度，它成为了一个中心，那些最为对立者、最为相异者和最为疏远者都在货币这里找到了它们的公约数，并且彼此发生了联系接触。因此，货币事实上就提供了一种凌驾于特殊性的高高在上的地位，以及对其无所不能的信心，这就好比我们对某种最高原理的全能性所持的信心一样，我们相信这个最高原理在任何时刻都赋予我们以独特性和存在的基础，也相信它能够把自身转变为这些独特性和基础。犹太人对金钱本质所具有的特别能力和兴趣肯定与他们所受到的“一神论训练”有关。如果在数千年当中，某个民族的性格已经习惯于总是仰望某个独一无二的崇高对象，并在其中找到所有个别兴趣的目标和交会点的话（尤其是当他只拥有非常相对的超越性的时候），那么他们将会适应于把这种性格应用到经济领域中去，特别是针对那些将其自身表现为所有目的序列的包容性的统一体和共同交会点的价值。不管是人们对金钱的疯狂攫取欲，还是货币（对比于其他支配性的价值，如土地财产）本身所具有的那种扩展到整个经济领域及一般生活领域的冲动，都与货币所最终呈现的、效果类似于宗教情绪的那种调和作用相一致。不仅人们在为金钱而奋斗时所体验到的全部激动和紧张是在征服之后所体验到的福乐平安的先决条件，而且在宗教中，宗教所提供的灵魂平静、站在生存的转折点上的感觉，都是在追寻上帝并为之奋斗而付出代价之后，才使意识实现了其最高价值。奥古斯丁对商人的评价商业就是繁忙、否定安闲，而安闲就是平安，平安乃是侍奉上主，所以商业就是罪恶。”也同样很适用于勤勉：所谓勤勉，就是不断地积聚获取的手段，为金融的某些最终目标而奋斗。这时的勤勉已经不再是繁忙，而是其自身的最终目的。宗教和神职人员经常会对有关金钱的事务产生某些怨恨心理，这或许可以追溯到这种心态中一种本能性的直觉，即意识到在最高的经济统一与最高的宇宙统一之间在心理形式上存在着某种相似性。还可以追溯到对金钱与宗教的兴趣之间存在竞争危险的意识，这种危险不仅已经体现在经济生活中，而且也体现在宗教生活中。教会法对利息率的排斥反映了对货币作为一个整体的一般性排斥，因为利息率代表了具有抽象纯粹性的货币交易。诸如此类的利息率原理与其说尚未反映出原罪的最大限度——中世纪的人通常相信，这种罪过可以通过以商品而非货币的形式支付利息而避免——还不如说它反映了这样的事实：即利息率是以金钱支付的由金钱本身所产生的利息，这暗示着，废除利息将从根本上击中货币的要害之处。货币也经常容易很轻易地给人一种它就是终极目的的印象，因为对于大多数的人来说，货币象征着目的论序列的终点，并提供给他们以各种兴趣统一联合的一个尺度、一种抽象的高度、对生活细节的统合，以至于它竟然减少了人们在宗教中寻求满足的需要。所有这些联系都表明：在那些我们所熟悉对比存在的要点之外，还有某种东西在发挥着作用。因此，汉斯·萨克斯把一种已经广泛流行的观点概括为：“金钱是世界上永远的上帝。”这里所指的回到了关于货币地位的基本理由是：货币是被提升为一种绝对目的的心理意义的绝对手段。已经有人用不那么肯定的语调说过：事物的相对性是唯一具有绝对性的东西，在这一考虑中，货币确实是最有力和最直接的符号，因为货币是经济价值相对性的化身。作为获取另一种价值的手段，它所具体化的是每一个特殊价值的象征。但在事实上，这种单纯作为手段的意义脱离了它特别具体化的表达方式。尽管如此，货币还是可以在心理上成为一种绝对的价值，因为它不用担心会被消融于某种相对的事物中，货币所具有的这种可能性使得许多实体性价值都不可能具有同样的绝对性。我们存在的绝对性会消融于运动、关系和发展中（在此我不是在说事物的观念性意义），考虑到我们对价值的需要，后者便取代了前者。在货币的心理意义上的绝对价值特征中，经济领域已经完美地证明了这种历史类型。在这一点上，为了避免流行的误解，必须要申明的是：这一发展在所有领域中的形式统一性，并不暗指它受到一致的欢迎。

贪财和吝啬

如果作为终极手段的货币的特性超过了一个个体所能承受的强度——在这个强度之内，货币是它的社会圈子的经济文化适当的表现形式——贪财和吝啬就会显现出来。我特别希望强调一下，这些概念取决于当时特殊的经济形态，因为对于获取和保有金钱的同样程度的热情，在一种环境中就金钱的特殊意义来说可能是很正常的，但在另一种环境下却可能属于过分的类别范畴。一般而言，对金钱真正贪婪的起点值在一个发达和活跃的货币经济环境中会相对较高一些，而在原始的经济水平上则会相对较低一些，对于吝啬来说则正好相反。在一个较多限制、较少受到货币经济影响的环境中，那些在金钱开销方面考虑节约和合理性的人，在资金周转迅速和银根放松影响的条件下就成了吝啬鬼了。这已经说明了这样一个事实（稍后将会变得更为明显）：尽管对于作为绝对目的的货币，它们在价值衡量上具有共同的基础，贪婪和吝啬却并非是同一现象。像所有源于货币的现象一样，贪婪与吝啬表现了各种趋势发展的特殊阶段，在这些趋势中，或高或低的发展水平在涉及其他内容时也明显可见。贪婪与吝啬都显著地表现在对具体物品和不问其价值多少的不正常的心理性狂热积聚行为上，这一特点经常使人们把他们比作仓鼠——这样的人积聚任何一种贵重的东西而不问他们自己是否能从这些东西中获得满足，并且经常是在积聚之后对它们连看都不看上一眼。在这些情况中，价值不是来自于对所有权的主观反映——这通常是获取和拥有的原因——而是来自于一个简单的客观事实，而且不伴随有任何个人的影响：对于这样的人来说，光是把这些物品揽入囊中就是有价值的。如果以有限制的、不是很极端的形式来看，这种现象就是很普遍的，通常它被解释为自我中心主义，因为它与自我中心主义普通形式的消极方面有共通之处——即把其他所有人从占有权中排斥出去。尽管如此，它也有一个方面区别于自我中心主义，我们将在下面的题外话中探究这一点。

有一点需要时刻强调：自我中心主义与利他主义的比照绝对没有完全包含我们行为的各种动机。事实上，我们对特定事件或事物是否成为现实具有一种客观兴趣，而并未考虑它对于主体的人的后果如何。对于我们来说，和谐，一种建立在理念之上的秩序以及某种意义盛行于这个世界上是重要的，它们不一定非要符合伦理学和美学的通常框架。我们能够感受到自己不得不与之进行合作，而不会去问这是否能给任何人以满足或好处，或它是否符合自己或他人的利益。在某种程度上，有三种动机一起汇聚于宗教的领域，在这个领域内，客观动机的地位表现得更加明显。首先，对宗教戒律的顺从能够源自于纯粹自我中心主义的原因，它既可以是因为恐惧或希望而以一种质朴的方式表达出来，也可以是因为对良心或内在的满足感而以一种较为文雅的方式表达出来。其次，它也可以是一种利他主义性质的：对上帝的爱及我们心灵的顺服，都可以使我们服从于上帝的诫命，就像我们在一个我们所爱的人身上实现了我们的愿望一样，因为他们的欢乐和满足就是我们最在乎的事。最后，我们的动机也可以是出于一种对世界秩序的客观价值的感受，在这种感受中，最高原则的意志在所有个体要素的意志中贯穿始终。上帝与我们自身之间的客观关系可以要求我们有这种顺服，以此来作为对这种关系的适当表达或是其内在必然的结果，而不用管它对我们自身是否有任何结果，也不必管上帝的快乐与满意是否进入到了这种动机当中。因此，在许多情况下，对目的的意识就在尚未成为客观现实的地方止步不前了，同时也没有从根本上从其主观反映中来获取其价值。在此，我将不触及对这种非个人动机的每一个心理学和认识论的解释。在任何情况下，这都只是一种进入了一种个人性质的目的序列所具有的各种联系中的心理事实。有这样一类收藏者，他的有价值的东西从来密不示人，甚至连他自己也从来不享用这些收藏品，但是他还是像守财奴那样地看管着这些东西，这为他的自我中心主义涂上了一层超越主观性评价的混合色彩。一般说来，占有财物的功能是为了从中得到快乐，我们或许可以把这一点与两种现象进行比较：一种是我们从中得到快乐，但却没有想到要占有它们，诸如像星星一样的东西；另一种是具有独立于所有主观快乐的对象，比如像美、秩序或是宇宙意义之类的对象，它们的价值始终独立于人类的反应而存在。对于这一类的占有者来说，存在着中间性的或是混合起来的现象：占有肯定是必需的，但是这种占有并未延伸到其通常的主观结果上去，而是在没有这种结果的时候仍然被体验为有价值的行为。这里，与其说价值的真正承担者不是对象的特质，不如说无论这种特质有多少是不可或缺的并且它们怎样决定了价值的大小，真正的动机都在于这些对象被拥有这一事实，在于主体与客体之间所处关系的形式。一个目的论序列最终结束于某种真实的价值，这一真实的价值源于这样一种形式——这种形式只有在某种特殊的内容中才能实现——即只作为客观事实而存在着的源于主体的占有者身份。

在返回到主体之前，这种过程成为一种绝对经济价值的过程，它与目的论序列的断裂都是通过土地财产的特定意义而以一种很特殊的方式而表现的，这种意义以各种各样的方式与真正的经济意义混合在一起——尽管通常仅仅是作为一种渲染而已。除非土地财产能为拥有者带来主观上的实际好处，否则是不会获得价值的。因此，它的价值不是完全由一些可解释的价值因素，如土地的收成、不动产的较大安全性以及与之联系着的社会权力等等，所创造出来的。除了这些相关因素之外，还经常存在着某种理念性的价值以及一些主观感受，如感受到自身具有价值、感受到人对土地所具有的统治权力、感受到他与人类的生存基础有着如此紧密的个人联系。土地财产因此具有并赋予人以某种特定的尊严，这种尊严把它与所有其他类型的财产区分开来，尽管那些财产也对其拥有者产生了同样甚至是更大的功用。这一点解释了这样一个事实：即土地常常通过祭祀的方式被保存下来，而一般都只是针对某个客观性理想才会采用类似的祭祀方式。绝对价值要素因此隐藏在土地财产的意义当中。它与一种观念联系在一起（或者至少在过去是这么做的）：即做一个地主是有价值的，即使这种价值不是以功用的形式表现出来的。对土地财产的义务可能因此具有一种宗教色彩，例如在古希腊文明的高峰时期那样。在那个时代，卖掉土地不仅会祸及子孙，而且更是对祖宗的犯罪，因为这种行为中断了家族的连续性。土地的供给是无法轻易被增加的，这一事实所发挥的正是土地超越了每一个个人的，作为家庭统一符号所具有的神圣不可侵犯的功能。尤其是在中世纪，土地财产作为一种绝对价值所具有的地位要远远超过今天。尽管由于土地收益以及对土地收益的享受使它成为人们最先追逐的目标，并因此表现出了一定的相对价值，但是除了它在货币经济中的角色之外，土地还在其自在和自为的意义上同时具有一种特别的重要性，因为它不是经常地被转化成货币和依据货币的价值被课税。或许有人会说：土地财产没有等价物可言；其价值序列终止于土地财产本身。然而动产是有可能彼此进行交换的，即使有所保留地说，不动产也不可以与之相提并论：真正的经济活动正是在超越类似于不动产这样的价值基础上才得以实现运作的。刺激教会去占有土地的动机或许不仅仅是经济的一相对论的兴趣：在14世纪之初，英国差不多有一半的土地为教会神职人员所拥有；同一时期在西班牙的腓力二世时代，这个数字超过了一半；即使在今天，在西藏的宗教政体下，所有具备生产能力的土地财产中，也有2/3归喇嘛所有。在中世纪，正因为教会提供了稳定的、显然是从外部奠定其基础的生活规范，所以在实际的和象征的意义上，教会才似乎看起来更适合于掌握作为所有其他价值基础的那种价值。教会地产的不可转让性只是对这种内在特性的有意识的、法律上的表现而已。它表明价值的运动终止于此，经济领域也于此达到了终极的界限和定局。如果有人可以把教会的永久营业比作狮子的洞穴：所有的足迹都被引向狮子的洞穴，但却没有一个足迹从洞穴里走出来，那么，这也就是教会以之为基础的各项原则无所不包的绝对性和永恒性的一种象征。

在这种由商品发展为最终目的的过程中，其绝对价值的延伸超越了单纯对其收益的享有，这种现象尤其是在吝啬与贪婪中得到了最清楚和最有决定性的表现，这两种对货币的病态畸形兴趣，开始逐渐蔓延到其他人的情况当中。已经成为终极目的的货币不能容忍与其他商品具有同等确定的价值，即使是那些非经济性质的商品也不例外。货币不会只满足于那种成为终极目的之一，而会与生活中的另外诸多终极目的，如智慧和艺术、个人的意义和力量、美和爱等实现共存的局面，但既然货币具有了这样一种特殊的地位，它就已经取得了一种能够把其他目的简化到手段层面的力量。这种重组对于实际的经济商品总是更有效的。只要我们在任何时候都可以把它们再换回货币，最重要的是，只要它们的货币价值的精确可表达性已经剥夺了它们现存的个别意义以及它们在纯粹中性的经济之外保有的意义，那么，坚持把这些经济商品留在手中，就好像它们是无可比拟的价值的做法，就一定显得很愚蠢。货币的抽象特征、其远离任何确定的享有感的自在自为的疏离性，在一种远远超越了对其收益的一切个别的、个人的享有感的价值意识中，支撑着对货币的一种客观的喜悦。如果货币不再是目的了，也就是说，它不再具有像其他任何一种工具因其实用而具有的目的性，而是具有那种贪婪对金钱的终极目的性的话，那么甚至在享有本身所产生的快乐的意义上，货币也不是一种终极目的了。相反，对于守财奴来说，货币被置于这种个人的范围之外，这个范围对于他来说是一种禁忌；对于他来说，金钱是一个值得谦卑地顶礼膜拜的对象。守财奴对于金钱的爱就像一个人对某位德高望重者的爱一样，这个人只需通过其存在，以及只需使爱他的人知道这一点并与他同在，就会使我们感到极大的幸福，而不需要我们与他个人之间存在什么能以某种形式给我们带来具体快乐的关系。就此而言，守财奴从一开始就有意识地放弃了把货币作为指向任何确定快乐的手段，他把货币置于一个与他的主观性之间有着不可逾越距离的位置上，但他又通过意识到他对钱财的所有权，不断尝试着克服这个距离。

货币作为手段的特性使其呈现为享有感的抽象形式，但实际上这一抽象形式依然没有被享有，与此同时，个人对货币拥有权的欣赏——假使这种拥有权被完整地保留着——为它涂上了一层客观性的色彩。货币也使自己呈现出一种有所不为的高雅风度，这种风度一直伴随着所有客观性的终极目的，并以一种独一无二、不可言传的传统风格把对货币享有感中积极和消极的两方面都整合到一起。在吝啬的现象中，两种要素的相互对立达到了最大的程度，因为作为绝对意义上的手段，货币为享有感提供了无限的可能性，而在同时，同样是作为一种绝对意义上的手段，在尚未被使用的拥有阶段，货币所造成的快感实际上还没有完全实现。从这方面来讲，货币的意义就有些类似于力量这种东西，像力量一样，货币仅仅是一种潜力，它只是以一种客观上存在的当下形式贮藏一种仅仅在主观上可预见的未来。“可能性”的说法实际上包含了两个方面，对这两个方面的区分通常是很不够的。如果我们断言一个人“能够”做某事，那么这不仅仅意味着一种对于未来事件的心理预期，而且也意味着一种已经存在着的能量状态、一种心理和生理上的协调以及对存在基础的明确位置。任何一个人，如果说他“能够”弹钢琴，那么即使他现在没有弹，他也与一个不会弹钢琴的人迥然不同，因为他们的神经和肌肉处于不同的准备状态，这使得不仅在将来的意义上，而且即使在当前的意义上，两者也是不同的。其次，这种能力状态自身不包含任何未来的因素，它只有通过满足进一步的条件才能让可以做的事情成为现实，而我们无法预测这些条件是否会发生。这种不确定的要素与我们对某种确定的力量或状态的感觉或知识，以一种数量多样的混合体形式，共同构成了那件我们所能做的事的基础。例如，在“我能够弹钢琴”这个表述中，现实的要素占了绝对上风，其他必要条件的不确定性则处在最低限度上。再进一步说假如：“下一掷肯定会一举中九柱”，说这话的时候，既定的和已知的条件与任何成功所要求的完全不确定的因素相比都是少数。货币以一种独一无二的结合方式表现了对能力这两种要素的结晶化和具体化。一个人对这种能力的实际拥有，其实在拥有的那一刻它什么也不是，确保会产生有价值结果的关键性要素与货币完全无关。但是，在恰当的时刻，它将要现实化的确定性程度却是非常高的。通常，可靠性和不明确性的衡量尺度包含在此时此刻被现实存在所决定的能力中，相比较而言，将来将要发生的事则是不确定的。但对于货币来说，后者的不确定性已经完全消失了，而当下的实际拥有也似乎是无关紧要的了。能力的特别意义因此就被极大地强化了：就未来机会的意义而言，它只不过是能力而已，是它赋予我们当下拥有的东西以意义，但是，就这样的未来肯定是会实现的意义来说，它又是真实的能力。

愿望与现实之间的特别关系使得满足的实现更有保证，通过与我们其他兴趣对象的对比，货币设定了这种关系。一个被实现了的愿望在主观上的结果，并不总是对最初引起这种愿望的匮乏状态的确实补充。对某一对象的欲求并不像一个能被拥有物填满的洞，因此每一样东西都还和愿望实现之前一样。这是叔本华的表达方式，因为对于他来说，每一种满足都只是消极的感受，是对被剥夺感下的痛苦状态的祛除。但是，如果我们接受了那种认为满足是某种积极感受的说法，那么与其说我们愿望的满足不仅仅是通过相应的积极的东西对消极状态的祛除，是通过某种幸福感而得到加强的，还不如说愿望与其实现之间的关系是具有无限多样性的，因为愿望几乎从来都不会顾及到对象的所有方面以及它施加于我们身上的效果。现实性几乎从来不会与作为一种意欲占有的可能性的范畴的愿望相呼应。对某种想要的东西的占有通常会让我们感到失望，认识到这一点只不过是一种微不足道的智慧，但不论好坏，这种认识都是正确的；同时我们也意识到在我们所拥有的东西中，存在着一种异类的、不伴随着任何感情色彩的事实。但是在这方面，货币却采取了一种非同一般的立场。一方面，它把愿望与对象之间的任何不可通约性都推到了极致。贯注于货币之上的任何努力都只是在货币中才发现了某种完全不确定的东西，因为货币是不具有实体的，所以这种东西不能满足理性的要求，我们与之也没有特殊的关系。如果我们的愿望不能超越货币而达到某种具体目标的话，那么，极度的失望必定会随之而至。货币财富这种曾经被狂热追求并被视为理所当然的幸福的东西，如今在愿望实现之后，却露出了它的本来面目：即金钱不过是一种手段罢了，它被提升为终极目的的过程在目的实现之后就终止了，所以那种失望将会一直伴随着我们。这里，在愿望与实现之间存在着最大程度的差异，与此同时，如果作为终极目的的货币所具有的心理特性变成了永久固化的东西，并且贪婪也成为了某种习以为常的状态的话，那么就会发生相反的情况。在这种情况下，欲望的对象被认定除了占有之外不会给我们带来任何东西，并且这种对欲望的限制也不仅是一种暂时的自欺，而是使每一种失望的程度都有所降低。一旦我们拥有了我们想要得到的对象，我们就都被期待着从中能获得些什么。在希望与实现之间通常是悲剧性的、滑稽性的不可通约性源于对我刚才所说的这种获取的不恰当的期待。但对于贪婪者来说，除了占有权之外，货币并没有被期待能被从中获取任何东西。我们对货币的了解多于其他任何东西，因为在货币当中不存在什么需要我们去了解的，所以货币也不能对我们隐藏任何秘密。货币是一件绝对缺乏任何特质的东西，而这连那些最可怜的物品也是在某种程度上可以具备的。隐藏在其中的任何令人惊异和失望的东西，是任何的确只想得到金钱的人所绝对体会不到的。人类有一个一般性的弱点，就是总是计算欲求之物与已得之物的差异，这个弱点在对金钱的贪婪方面达到了顶点，因为这样的贪婪只是以一种虚幻的、不现实的方式实现了意识的目的；从另一个角度说，如果意识一旦完全满足于对货币的占有话，这种弱点就被彻底克服了。如果我们想根据愿望与其对象之间的关系框架来安排人类命运的话，那么，我们就必须承认：从目的序列的终点上来看，货币既是最适合同时也是最不适合担当这一重任的对象。

现在，我再次回过头来谈谈货币那种强有力的特性，在货币经济尚未被完全建立和接受的地方以及货币在与那些结构上敌对的关系中展现其强制性力量的地方，这种特性尤其表现出它最引人注目的，或至少也是最离奇的一面。在文化发展的最高阶段，货币似乎达到了其力量的颠峰，其原因就在于：无数过去不为人知的事物现在都服从于货币的摆布，而自遥远的开端以来，这些事物却是对货币拒不从命的。更为自然的演化的整体类型和模式与货币殊为不同的本质之间虽然对立但却并无摩擦，意识的力量也无须特别关注对此种摩擦的消除。因为货币是各种价值的价值，所以一位对印度生活颇有研究的专家才把印度的乡村银行家（也就是放债人）称做“村里的人上人”，而他们的印度语名称就叫做“伟人”。已经有人强调过：在13世纪开始出现大量的原始积累的时候，资本就成为了力量发挥的手段，而大众对这一点却还不甚明了。于是，在这种结果之上又添加上了前所未有的、超验的心理补偿。当时的教会和大众都把金钱交易看做是彻头彻尾卑鄙无耻的，例如在13世纪时，甚至有一个科隆的贵族公开承认对一条教会原则的支持：即“商人皆有罪”；也就是说，对像资本这样神秘和危险的力量的使用必然会显得不道德，显得是一种对金钱有罪的滥用。正如错误的偏见屡屡提升其正当的理由一样，在那一时期的商业贵族的后裔们都沉溺在对其所拥有的金钱力量的无端滥用之中，这种力量的形式与使用范围之所以成为可能，仅仅是因为货币资本的新颖性及其对以不同方式组织起来的关系所施加影响的新奇性。因此，从中世纪一直到世纪，认为巨额财富的来源一定有某些不对劲的地方，并且认为这些财富的拥有者肯定具有阴险人格的正是大众。关于格里马尔迪、美第奇及罗斯希尔德等家族财富所流传的恐怖传言不仅是意指他们在道德上的表里不一，而且也是通过一种迷信的方式，指出仿佛有什么魔鬼的灵力在起作用。

在货币被消费掉之前——在某种程度上可以说：“收获的时刻”暂时停止了——体现在货币中的各种对立类型的能力就借给货币一种理想化意义的力量，贪婪就是强力意志的一种形式，这种意志不能通过实践和对其的享受实现转化，因而，这也说明了货币作为一种绝对手段的特性。这是解释旧时代中的贪婪现象的一个重要因素。这样一种倾向对于给下一代留下预备财富肯定是有利的——尽管守财奴们心里通常并没有这种动机，因为他年纪越大，他就越是不愿意离开他的钱财。从主观上说，人到老年基本会发生两种结果：一方面是生活的感性趣味已经失去了其吸引力；另一方面是理想已经通过解散失去了其激动人心的力量，也不再那么令人心神不安了，因此，就只剩下了一种作为意志和生活终极目标的力量，它部分地表现在老年人那种独断的倾向和代表整个老一代以高高在上的姿态来发挥“影响”的癖好。但是，这种现象也部分地导致了吝啬现象的发生，因为同样抽象的“力量”看起来似乎被具体化在了对金钱的占有中。有人认为所有的守财奴都在憧憬着所有可能获得的快乐或是金钱可能具有的一切引人入胜的可能的用途，但我认为这种想法是错误的。实际上，吝啬最纯粹的方式是：在吝啬中，意志并未真正地超越于货币本身；货币也没有被视为是获得另外某物的手段，对于后面这一点，守财奴们甚至连想都没有想过。相反的，贮藏于货币中的力量被看做是最终的、绝对的可令人满足的价值。对守财奴们来说，所有其他的商品都位于存在的边缘上，而任何一个商品那里都有一条笔直的路引向一个中心——金钱。如果谁想倒转这个方向，希望从终点再回到边缘，那么快乐和力量的全部明确意义就都将被曲解。因为如果中心力量被转化为对某种特殊对象的享受的快乐，那么它也就不再成其为力量了。我们的本性是建立在主宰和服从的二元性基础上的，并且我们还发展出了某些关系和形式，它们在多样的联系中对主宰和服从这两种互补的驱动力都同样地公正。与货币赐予的力量截然相反，吝啬中的无尊严感被15世纪一位诗人极好地表达了出来，他说：任何效力于金钱的人都是“他的奴隶的奴隶”。实际上，吝啬的确是内在地被征服的存在的最纯粹的、人们几乎可以说它是具有某种讽刺意味的形式，它使我们成为一种冷漠无情的手段的奴仆，就好像这个手段是最高目的似的。然而在另一方面，吝啬又是由最纯粹的力量感所支撑着的。在此，货币又一次展现了它的基本特性，即：它允许对我们相互对峙的努力有一种同等的决断和纯粹的表达。心灵在货币中创造了一种范围最广的形式，这种形式就像作为纯粹的能量那样运转着，逐渐把心灵中的两极分离开来，也使其自身表现得更具统一性——仅仅作为单纯的货币，它拒绝任何明确的规定性。

非常有特点的是，货币对一般性思维方式占据着主导地位，就对金钱的贪欲而言，我们已经习惯于把一系列的现象称为吝啬，而实际上金钱与吝啬这两者正是对立的。被我们称为吝啬的现象表现在这样一些人的身上：他们用烧过了的火柴，小心翼翼地撕空白的信纸，舍不得扔掉一个绳头，花很多时间去寻找每一个丢失的别针。我们把这种人叫做“吝啬鬼”，因为我们已经习以为常地、自然而然地把事物的价格等同于它们的价值。但是实际上，守财奴们是想不到这些物品的货币价值的，或者更进一步说，他们的感受力是用在了物品的实际使用价值上，这些价值根本就不能被成比例地反映在其货币价值中。在许多情况下，节俭的人想要节省的方式不是一分钱掰成两半花，他们通常考虑不到钱，而钱可以轻而易举地用来买东西；相反，他们所考虑的仅仅只是物品本身的价值。这种人很奇怪，但并不少见——他们可以毫不犹豫地送人100马克，但是想从他们的书桌上拿走一张白纸或是类似的东西就相当费劲了。我们在此又遇到了吝啬的真正对立面：对于吝啬的人来说，物品并不重要——除非它们在一定程度上代表了货币的价值——因为货币已经剥夺了它们作为终极目标的所有个性，而在这些人当中，如果有谁的行为是被物品的货币价值所左右的话，这些行为就将显得完全没有意义了。但是如果完全不考虑货币的价值，那也会变得不合理。因为有这种目的的存在，使得那些吝啬鬼们忘记了能够达到这些目的的手段，而手段又使得吝啬鬼忘记了目的可以单独赋予手段以意义。再进一步说，还存在着这样一些现象，尽管它们在外在形式上和实践中的节俭有相一致的地方，通过它们与节俭之间存在的内在差别的对比，能够有助于使货币的目的论特性更加清晰。许多“节俭者”认为：每一件用钱买来的东西都应该被用掉，这样一来，就不仅要考虑另一笔开销是否应该被节省，而且奢侈品就更是要被节省掉了，因为它们已经被证明在消费的过程中也不能给人带来什么快乐。这一目的一旦没有被达到，那么为了弥补这一失败，就要有另外一种消费来当作其牺牲品。有一句德国谚语最能说明这种行为：“宁可撑破肚皮也不能便宜了主人。”许多人都是正经八百地如此行事的，这种行为被漫画化地表现在一个节俭的母亲的形象里：孩子们嘲笑母亲过日子节俭，以至于会把家里人病好之后剩下的药吃掉，以免浪费。在这个例子中，对物品的消费是盲目的，甚至比盲目还要糟糕。这种行为的动机并不能避免对物品的浪费，因为从物品被需要开始，它就已经注定要被浪费掉了，而它对主体的意义也正因此成为明日黄花。的确，被消费的对象与意向的对象有所不同，它已经缺少了动机性的特质。消费唯一可能的动机至少是要为消费寻求一个等价的补偿。货币因此就达到了它的下一个目标，这样就以此达到了一种满足感和目的论序列中的一个巅峰，除了货币在主观上作为自为之物的终极目的失败，尽管这个失败并没有削弱满足感。这种琐碎而且从根本上是无趣的现象揭示出货币价值的一个相当特殊的目的论架构。尽管这种现象在有价值的物品中表现得通常并不是很明显，并会因此而显得有些俗气和无意义，但是它可能是对货币的角色——即货币作为中介压倒了真正的终极目的——最极端的表现。在此，不仅节俭真正的意义犹如它在吝啬中所表现的那样被排除了，而且凝聚在被占有的闲置不用的货币中的力量的和可能性的魅力也被排除在外了。已经丧失了任何可能曾经有过的消费意义和目的的对象，在令人不快的、有害的状态下被消费，原因仅仅是：货币的花销已经赋予了这个对象一种绝对价值。不仅目的性过程被货币阻拦于此，而且，这个过程已经倒退和僵化，因为价值度量活动——它自身是目的性的——是通过缺乏目的的、直截了当的程序而实现的。

奢侈

通过两个否定性的例子，我现在想探究的是：货币在超越其单纯的中介角色而获得一种独立旨趣的特性方面，其范围和程度到底有多大。需要指出的是：尽管奢侈与吝啬这两种现象之间看上去似乎是对立的，但实际上二者之间有着更加紧密的联系。这里我们必须注意到：在原始经济存在的地方，对各种价值的节俭式保存与这些价值的本性同农产品间非常有限的可转换性之间的关系是不相匹配的。如果贮藏的产品不能轻易地或者显而易见地被转化为可无限转换的货币的话，我们就将很少见到那种真正守财奴式的产品囤积；在任何农产品可以被直接生产和消费的地方，肯定会流行一种慷慨的风气，在与客人或是有需要的人之间的关系中尤其如此——这种慷慨大概是一种极少沾染上货币经济色彩的行为方式，因为只有货币才更容易贮藏。殉道者彼得因此称赞古代墨西哥人把成袋的可可当作货币使用，因为这些可可不能被秘密隐藏起来和长时间地贮藏，所以防止了对其贪婪的态度，同样的，自然条件也限制了奢侈的可能性和吸引力。除了无意义的毁坏之外，在一个团体中对恣意挥霍和愚蠢浪费的限制要视其成员以及外人的消费能力而定。但关键之处在于货币性的奢侈与对具体物品的奢侈行为相比，具有一种完全不同的意义和全新的气息：后者意味着具体物品在个人目的的合理序列中所具有的价值被简单地毁掉了，而前者则意味着价值以一种不恰当的方式被转移到了其他价值当中。在货币经济中挥霍者唯一的类型一也是对货币哲学有意义的——不是那种无意义地恣意挥霍金钱者，而是那些用金钱进行无意义的购买的人，他们的购买对于其处境来说是不合适的。与挥霍行为相伴随的快感依赖于花钱买东西的那一时刻，买的是什么无所谓。但这种快感必须与享受物品所提供的短暂快乐区分开来，也必须要与这种行为相关的势利行为区分开来，还必须要与对物品的获取和使用之间的激励性转换区分开来。实际上，它更与挥霍行为的纯粹功能相关，而不考虑其实质内容及相伴的环境。对于挥霍者来说，挥霍那一时刻的吸引力同时超过了对物品和货币的合理欣赏。这特别突出强调了挥霍行为在目的序列中的地位。如果这一序列的终点是通过对物品的占有而获得的那种快乐的话，那么，首要的基本中介阶段就是对货币的拥有，其次是把货币消耗在某些物品上的消费。对于守财奴们来说，前一阶段本身就成为了一种值得享受的目标，而对于挥霍者来说，值得享受的则是后一阶段。对挥霍者来说，金钱也像对守财奴们那般同样重要，尽管这不是以占有而是以挥霍的形式表现的。挥霍者手中的价值的意义取决于把货币转移到其他价值形式中去的那一时刻，在这个范围内，他乐意为了这一欢乐的时刻，以挥霍掉所有更具体的价值为代价。

因此，对货币价值的冷淡态度就显得格外引人注目了，这种态度构成了挥霍行为所具有的本质和吸引力，预示着这一价值被作为了某种被体验和被欣赏的东西。因为很显然，扔掉某种被认为是与自己无关的东西这种行为本身就是完全冷漠的。下面这个例子是在法国大革命前的旧制度时代那种疯狂的奢侈行为的典型表现。当康蒂王子送给一位夫人价值4000法郎至5000法郎的钻石而被回绝的时候，他便命人把这块钻石打碎研磨成粉，使他可以用这些粉给那位夫人写一封回信。泰纳曾经就那个时期的这种习惯，给这一故事加上了如下的评论：“一个人越是不在乎钱，他就越是这个世界的男人。”但是，这种行为也表明了一定程度的自欺欺人，因为对金钱有意的和强烈的否定态度——正如在一种辩证过程中所表现的那样——正是建立在其对立面基础上的，其自身就可以单独赋予那种态度以意义和吸引力。同样的情况也可以在大城市的某些商店中看到，与那些以便宜价格来吸引顾客的商店不同，这些商店强调的是虚荣式的自我放纵，即强调他们有最高价格的商品。这些商店因此吸引了社会中最贵族化的圈子——那些人买东西从来不问价格。这种情况的引人注目之处在于他们所强调的重点不是物品本身，而是与物品自身相关的否定性的反面，在那里价钱是不重要的，因此，尽管这是以一种否定性的方式来进行的，那些人无意间又把金钱推回到了兴趣的前台。由于与金钱的密切关系，奢侈极容易在动力方面变得越来越强，以至于剥夺掉它所支配的那些物品的全部合理标准，因为现在已经没有了通过对具体对象的接受性的标准所给予的规定。

对金钱吝啬性的贪婪正好也同样具有这种奢侈的特点：与那种在真实存在物中寻求乐趣的行为不同，吝啬性的贪婪是在寻求一种看不见、摸不着的东西，这种东西可以无限延伸，并且不受任何外在或内在原因的限制。只要在什么地方缺少了外在的、主动的定位与限制，贪婪就会以不断增长的强度无形地被释放出来。这就是为什么会在遗产纠纷中出现那么多的残酷无情和痛苦的原因。由于个人对遗产的主张权不是由他所付出的工作或由有具体依据的衡量标准来决定的，所以，争执的双方都不会优先承认对方的拥有权。因此，并没有什么东西来限制人们对遗产所声称的所有权，而任何的干涉都会被感觉是一种毫无根据的不公正举动。对于贪婪而言，在愿望与任何对其对象的衡量之间缺乏一种内在的联系，这种缺乏源于对象的结构，而在我们所举的关于遗产的例子里，则是源于遗传关系所带来的人与人之间的关系结构。

在1499年的布伦瑞克曾经爆发的针对新铸币政策的暴动，凸显了由于缺乏根本原则所造成的问题会随着贪婪的增加而增加，并且也会阻止对于主张权的限制。当局以为：成色不好的钱币将来应该被成色更好的货币所取代。但正是那些希望能以成色好的钱币来支付自己产品和工钱的人却起来造反，这是因为其他人拒绝接受他们以成色不好的货币进行支付。优劣不一的钱币经常共存的事实为没有内在限制的疯狂的敛财癖者提供了最大的可能性，与此相比，其他的强烈情绪看起来则总是在心理层面逊色一筹。我们知道，在中国叛乱发生的原因是政府以劣质的货币来支付，却要求人民以好的货币来缴税。我有一个纯粹假设性的推断：一部分仅仅针对金钱的兴趣就是缺乏这种节制，而节制的缺乏也是我们在股票交易市场上所发现的那些奇特现象背后的根源所在，即：小的谷物投机者以及旁观者们，差不多无一例外地总是在市场价格上涨时进行投机。有一个在逻辑上正确但在实践上不一定适用的事实：在股票的熊市操作中，获利是有限的，而在牛市的操作中获利则是无限的，在我看来，这个事实似乎是上述行为的心理动机所在。大宗谷物的投机者实际上不得不有送货的麻烦，他们要计算市场上双方的机会，而单纯的货币投机者——比如像在期货投机中所见到的那样——只对单一方向上的投机感兴趣，而这个方向具有无限的潜力。这一倾向构成了金融利益运动的内在形式，它在下面这个例子中表现得更加充分。在1830年至1880年间，德国农业的年利润稳步增长，以至于让人们认为好光景会一直持续下去，因此，买卖庄园的价格就不是与它们当时的价值相符合的了，而是根据其中包含的对未来利润的预期——这也是当今农业方面的状况令人感到沮丧的原因。正是货币的利润形式扭曲了人们对于其价值的观念。在任何地方，只要利润只以所谓的“使用价值”形式呈现出来，以及只要人们所考虑的仅仅是直接的具体数量，那么人们对于利润增长的想法就会被限制在清醒的界限范围内，否则，货币价值的可能性以及对它的预期就会无限地膨胀。这是贪婪和挥霍行为本质的基础，因为这二者都从原则上拒绝对于价值的度量，而这种对价值的度量自身就能够给目的序列划定一个界限和边界，也就是通过对对象的最终享有而实现这一点。真正的挥霍者不应该被视为是伊壁鸠鲁主义者或是某种浅薄轻狂之徒，尽管所有的这些要素都被混合在个人的表现中。对于挥霍者来说，一旦拥有了对象，他就变得兴味索然了；他的快乐注定永远不会找到安息和永恒之所；他拥有某一对象的时刻总是伴随着对其快乐的否定。与吝啬相比，生活在这方面同样具有邪恶的一面：每一个已经到手的目标总是激起希望得到再多一些的欲望，可是欲壑难填，原因就在于，这种行为的整个倾向都是在一种特定的范畴内寻求满足，仿佛它来自于一个终极目的似的，这个特定的范畴从一开始就拒绝任何目的，并把自身限制为手段，同时也永远不期望走到最终的一刻。在这二者当中，守财奴是其中的更为抽象者。与挥霍者相比，他的目的意识停止之处要距离终极目标更为遥远；而挥霍者向对象则要走得更近一些，因为他朝向合理目标的运动最后停止在一个更靠后的阶段上，他想要得到它，就好像它本身就是终极目标一样。一方面，这两种我们可以看到的结果之间的完全对立在形式上具有同一性，另一方面，就涉及到这两种倾向都同样是无意义的这一角度，它们都缺少对具体目的的规定，这表明了在两者之间存在着不确定的相互影响，这说明了为什么我们会经常在同一个人身上发现吝啬与挥霍这两种现象的事实，它可能会表现在他们在不同利益领域的分配上，也可能会表现在同变化着的情绪之间的联系上。这种情绪的减弱与扩散都表达在吝啬与挥霍行为中，就仿佛每一次的冲动都是相同的，仅仅是其表达的符号有所不同而已。

货币对我们意志所具有的双重意义源自于对货币所担当的双重任务的综合。对衣食的需求越是紧迫和普遍，对它们的欲望就越是受到自然的限制，这方面的供应量或许是非常充足的，特别是对于原本正是人们最想得到的生活必需品来说尤其如此。与我们的自然需求相比，对奢侈品的需求则是没有止境的。奢侈品的供应永远都难以填平欲壑。例如，作为打造首饰的材料，贵重金属具有无限的用途。这都是由其基本的过剩性所造成的结果。价值越是贴近我们的基本生活，它们就越是维持基本生存和发展所必需的条件，当然其在数量上也就越有限，而同时我们对它的直接要求也就越强烈，对它们满足的程度也就越是可能在早期阶段上得以实现。另一方面，价值越是被从原始需要上分离开，对它们的要求就越少根据自然的需要而得到衡量，从它们的可用数量上来讲，它们也就越是能保持相对不变地存在下去。我们种种需求的标尺在这样的两极之间移动：一极是直接的强烈的但也是肯定因此而受到自然限制的需求；另一极是对奢侈的需求。在这种情况中，必需品的匮乏被需求扩张的无限可能性所取代。大多数的文化商品中都表现出对这两种极端在一定程度上的混合，因此，向一极的靠近就意味着对另一极的远离，而货币则在最大程度上把两者联合起来了。因为货币既是为满足我们生活中最不可或缺的需要服务的，同时也是为满足我们生活中最不必要的需求服务的。它把强烈的急需或欲望同其广泛的无限性联系在一起。货币自身具有满足奢侈需要所必备的结构，在这种结构中，它排斥任何对于奢侈欲望的限制——这种限制只有通过特定消费数量与我们消费能力之间的关系才可能得以实现。但是货币不像用来打造首饰的贵重金属，它不需要通过增加与直接需要之间的距离来平衡对货币无限的欲望，因为它也已经成了生活最基本需要的相关物。货币这种引人注目的双重特性，以及关于对货币的欲望，通过吝啬与奢侈而表现在一种超然的形式中，因为在这两种例子中，货币已经消融为对货币纯粹的欲望。这两者展现了我们也曾经视为是货币积极面中的消极的一面，即：货币使得我们原本对立的心理驱动力发挥作用的领域的直径得以延长。吝啬似乎在物质上的麻木不仁中得到体现，而奢侈则展现在流动性和延展性的形式中。

禁欲式的贫困

存在于另一个不同于奢侈的层面上，并与贪财和吝啬针锋相对的，是第二种消极的现象——把贫困视为一种积极的价值，也就是把贫困自身当作令人满足的生活目的。在目的的序列中，与绝对重要性之间某种联系的发展被移植到了一个与吝啬和贪婪完全不同的方向上。在贪财、吝啬以及奢侈等现象中，手段转化成了终极目的，因此它们也便止步不前了，但贫困现象却与此有所不同，因为它是终结了的目的序列的结果，所以贫困不在乎缺乏手段而依然可以持久，或是继续向着终极目的背后的领域前进。如吝啬和贪婪一样，贫困只是以其纯粹和特殊的方式出现在货币经济的特定阶段。在那些尚未被货币经济所规范的自然经济领域中，只要农产品还没有纯粹地被作为日用品而流通，也就是说还没有被作为货币的价值而被流通的话，个人总体上贫困潦倒的现象就不会那么普遍。甚至在最近，俄罗斯还有一个颇引以为自豪的地方，那就是：在那些较少受到货币经济影响的地区，不存在个人的贫困现象。作为一种普遍的现象，这或许不仅可以归因于生活的绝对必需品不用依靠货币就能被轻易地得到，另外也可以归因于在这种环境下比在其他那些穷人所缺少的和人们可以帮助他们的都不是穷人所最直接、最必需之物的环境下，更容易激起人类对贫困的仁慈感和同情心。在纯粹的货币关系中，同情心在达到其真正旨趣所在点之前必须要拐个弯，结果经常是它在半途就力竭而衰。正是因为这个原因，在实际中助人为乐的人们宁可用食物和衣服来救济穷人，也不会用钱来这么做。如果贫困是伴随道德理想而出现的，那么相应的，对货币的占有就会被当作是最危险的诱惑或最原始的罪恶而遭到憎恶。

任何时候，当对灵魂的拯救被看作是终极目的时，贫困就同时会被许多教义解释为一种积极的、不可或缺的手段，这种手段超越了自己的地位而获得崇高的价值，而这种崇高的价值本身就是重要的和有效的。这种情况可能发生在目的序列中的不同阶段，而且其原因不尽相同。首先，对所有世俗享乐和兴趣纯粹的漠不关心可能会导致贫困。但根本无需那样明确地要求贫困的意志，就好像是从贫困自身中被除去一样，这种负担被从有抱负的灵魂中祛除了。早期的基督徒们可能经常这样行事，即他们不是直接对抗或者冒犯实际的商品，而只是简单地不与之发生任何关系，犹如对有些东西我们根本就没法察觉到它们，是因为我们根本就不具备感觉到它们所必需的器官。所以，发生在早期基督徒中的零星的共产主义现象从根本上与现代的共产主义是相互对立的，因为前者源于对世俗商品的冷漠，而后者则来自于对世俗商品的最高度的评价。二者的混合发生在中间阶段：在中世纪末期发生的社会主义革命运动无疑是为反抗贫困所进行的斗争，但是其中也部分地得到了具有彻底节俭理想的禁欲主义运动的支持。然而，至少就货币而言，禁欲主义不得不放弃对物质兴趣纯粹的否定，而采取更为积极和坚定的形式，因为我们在获取最不可或缺的生活资料的道路上不断地遇到货币，也因为禁欲主义的实现并不像生存本身的需要那样是自然而然产生的结果，它要求有更强的意志力和更多的意志活动。但是，任何人如果希望能够对世俗兴趣持冷漠态度的话——比如像那些把车轴上的油当作黄油来吃而浑然不觉的教父们——那么假如他想要在货币交易时代生存下去，他仍然不能允许自己为了赚钱而分散其在这种行事方式上的丝毫注意力。因此，如果从原则上说只有那种对任何外在事物都十分冷漠的态度成为主流的话，那么与对货币的冷漠相比，这种对物的冷漠态度就将轻而易举地转化为实际的怨恨。其次，货币所具有的诱惑特性甚至对此有更明显的效果。因为货币随时随地均可使用，所以它也是在人软弱时面对的最糟糕的陷阱，同时，因为它可以效力于所有活动，所以它在那一时刻向灵魂提供了其最具有诱惑力的一面。所有这些甚至可以更具危险性，因为只要货币仅仅是作为我们手中所持有的钱而实际存在着的话，那么它就是世界上最不偏不倚、最清白无辜的东西。但是对于禁欲主义的感性模式来说，货币则成为了带着纯洁清白的面具来引诱我们的魔鬼的真正的象征符号，因此既能抵御魔鬼又能抵御货币的安全手段就是不管它们表面上看起来有多么冰清玉洁，都拒之于千里之外而不与之发生任何关系。

我们可以在早期的佛教社团中发现这一态度一般性的表现。凡是加入社团的僧人都必须主动放弃其所拥有的财产、家庭并终结同妻子的关系，除了拥有日常生活所必需的极少量东西的偶然例外之外，他们不可以拥有任何属于自己的东西，而且甚至这些必要的生活必需品也是作为别人对他的施舍而得来的。这种戒律最基本的意义可以从僧人们为他们自己选择的名称上体现出来：托钵僧群体。在这种对日常生活必需品的化缘中，任何对财产的拥有关系都是不可能的，甚至连这一点的化缘也不是通过主动的要求，而是通过静静的等待来得到的。正如在某些阿拉伯游牧部落中，种植谷物、修建房屋之类的事情都是被明令禁止的，为的是防止其部落成员由于定居而对部落传统不忠，佛教的僧人也借助于心灵的改变而接受了同样的规则。这些僧人把自己比作小鸟，无论飞到何处，除了一对翅膀之外一无所有。他们不被允许接受作为礼品馈赠的耕地、牲畜或是奴隶。而这种禁令在对金银的接受方面表现得最为严厉。任何想施舍金银的施主都不能直接这样做，而必须把金银先交给一位工匠或是商人，经由他们之手再以某种货币在实物上的形式转交给僧人。如果一个僧人接受了黄金或白银，他就必须在社团面前忏悔赎罪，那些金银会被交给某位关系较近的居家俗人去购买一些生活必需品，因为僧人自己是不允许去提供这些东西的。如果在附近找不到这样的居家俗人，那就只好把金银交给一位僧人去扔掉，而只能是已经达到了“无贪、无嗔、无痴”境界的僧人才能够被信赖去做此事。在此，货币已经成为了一种令人感到恐惧和厌恶的对象——尽管伴随着这种恐惧感的是这些麻木的灵魂罕见的贫血式的衰弱无力——并且贫困成为了一种被谨小慎微地看护起来的财产，一种远离多姿多彩和生趣盎然的世界的、与世隔绝的价值序列中弥足珍贵的部分。而货币代表着统一的价值，对它的拒绝就意味着对世界多样性的拒绝。

在贫困上升为一种绝对价值的过程中达到顶点的内在形式，以举世无双的激情最清楚不过地表现在早期的圣方济各会修士的身上。圣方济各会不仅仅是对12、13世纪意大利教会中令人难以容忍的世俗化现象的反应。这种世俗化在买卖圣职的活动中有着最清晰不过的表现：从教皇的选举到最卑微的乡村牧师职位的任命，从宏伟壮丽的修道院的修建到宗教告解书的发布（佛罗伦萨的牧师们用它来赎洗和重新净化溺死过老鼠的酒），每一样东西都受金钱的支配，任何东西都可以用金钱买到。自5世纪以来，宗教改革运动就从来也没有消失过，这个运动已经声称贫困是对神职人员的理想要求，因为贫困可以同时斩断教会世俗化的头和脚。但也正是圣方济各会的修士们第一次把贫困造就成一种自主的价值和内心最深处所需要的对应物。一位早期教会戒律史的研究专家宣称穷人从贫困中找回了平安、爱和自由。难怪当时的新的布道者们所有的思想和努力都单纯地集中到了对这种美德的保持上。他们从贫困中获得的荣耀是无限的，每一天他们都会以饱满的、如新婚一般的激情狂热地一再追求所爱。”贫困因此成为了一种积极的拥有，它一方面是获得至上之物的中介，另一方面却又行使着与货币在世俗世界中对那些可鄙的商品所行使的同样的功能。像货币一样，贫困是一个蓄水池，价值的实践序列流向它，中得到滋养后又流出去。另外，很清楚的是：贫困在一种更高或最高的意义上，已经清楚地表达了一个事实，或是这个事实的一个方面：这个世界属于与它断绝了关系的人，尽管事实上他并没有真正摒弃这个世界，更准确地说，他在贫困中拥有了事物最纯净、最美好的精华，就像金钱对于吝啬鬼那样。正如佛教僧人们所说的那样：“我们这些一无所有的人生活在大喜乐中，喜乐是我们的营养，就像它是天上众神的营养一样。”因此，圣方济各会修士们被描绘成“一无所有而又无所不有”。贫困在此已经失去了它的禁欲本质。灵魂的价值本来是以贫困为消极条件的，现在却直接指向了贫困。在这个世界上，手段通常是其终极目的最全权的代表，而现在对手段的摒弃却已经差不多被提升到了终极价值的地位。这一使货币从其中介的地位被提升至绝对意义的过程巨大而无所不及的力量，由如下事实再好不过地说明了：对这一过程意义的否定被提升成为了与此意义本身相同的形式。

犬儒主义

至此，我想通过两个过程来为阐明货币本性的各种现象划上一个句号，这两个过程几乎是货币文化发展到鼎盛时期所特有的通病——犬儒主义和因过分享受而产生的厌世态度——它们都是由于把生活中的具体价值约简为货币的中介价值而产生的结果。也可以说，它们是对吝啬和贪财的逆转。在吝啬与贪财现象当中，这种约简则以新的终极价值的增长来表现自己，在此情况下，犬儒主义和厌世态度也被表现在了对所有旧价值的蔑视中。目的论序列的消极性已经被货币带到了奢侈和安贫乐道的态度中，现在这种消极性则获得了最终的完成。这种完成不仅是通过利用价值的特殊性来实现的——因为这种特殊性仅仅被结晶化于货币中——而且还是利用这些价值的存在本身来实现的。尽管我们今天称之为犬儒主义的态度与作为这一名词起源的古希腊哲学之间没有什么关系，但我们依然可以说：在这两者间存在着一种反常的关系。古代的犬儒主义对生活有一种非常确定的理想，即具有一种精神上的积极力量和个人的道德自由。对于犬儒主义者来说，这是一种绝对的价值，以至于其他被接受的价值之间的所有差异都变得无足轻重了。不管一个人是主人还是奴隶，不管他满足自己需要的方式是美学的还是非美学的，不管他有没有祖国，也不管他是否尽到对自己家庭的义务——所有这些对于有智慧的人来说，都完全是无关紧要的，这不仅仅在与任何绝对价值的对比当中是如此，而且还表现在他们的生活本身就透露出一种中立的态度。在我看来，在我们今天称之为愤世嫉俗的那种态度里，关键之处在于这里仍然不存在着价值上更高的差异，并且，一般说来，那些在价值上被高度评价的东西唯一的意义就在于其被降低为最低水平的价值，而这种夷平价值差异的方式的积极的与理想的道德目的已经销声匿迹了。对于那些盲目追随苏格拉底式智慧的人来说，什么曾经是手段或者什么曾经是次要的结果都不是中心问题，并且它们在发展过程中也完全改变了自己的意义。犬儒主义者的本性——就其当代意义而言——在与享乐主义者的对比中表现得再清楚不过。当后者的价值衡量曲线上升，以及较低水平的价值在努力争取被提升为较高水平的价值时，犬儒主义者的价值衡量曲线却在沿着相反的方向运动。只有当他在理论上和实践上都做到了对最高价值的贬低并把价值之间的差异都视为幻觉的时候，他的生活意识才能充分地表现出来。货币具有一种能把最高和最低的价值都同等地归纳为一种价值形式并因此把它们都置于同一水平上，而不管它们有多少种类和数量的特殊能力，犬儒主义的情绪从中得到了最有效的支持。犬儒主义者在任何其他地方都再也找不到像货币这样成功的证据了——最佳的、最理想的、最具个人性的货物不仅被提供给任何能够支付必需的钱的人，甚至更为意味深长的是，如果最富有的人缺乏必要的手段，这些货物也被一视同仁地拒绝出售给他，货币的活动构成了个人价值与客观价值之间最荒谬的联结。因此，最容易滋生犬儒主义的温床就是那些资金大量周转的地方，像股票市场上的交易就是最好的例子，在那里，金钱以极大的数量轻易地在所有者之间转手。货币越是成为兴趣的唯一中心，人们就越是会发现：荣誉与信用、才智与价值、美与灵魂拯救都可以交换成金钱，而一种可笑的、轻浮的态度也就越容易在与那些更高价值之间的关系中发展出来，在这种关系中，就像杂货店里货物的价值可以被出售那样，更高的价值也是可以出售的，因为这些价值也拥有了一种“市场价格”。价值的本性拒绝任何不按自己的范畴和理念进行的价值衡量，对于价值来说，市场价格的概念是对犬儒主义呈现于主观反映形式里的东西最完美的客观化。

乐极生厌的态度

夷平差异的其他意义——因为货币的核心立场是把兴趣集中于事物的共性而非其特殊的发展水平上，所以这里指的是事物本性中的差异而非对它们的不同价值评价——在乐极生厌的态度中找到了其最具个人性的表现方式。犬儒主义仍然是在价值领域内所做出的一种反应，即便这种反应是以扭曲的意义来进行的，即犬儒主义者把价值的向下运动看作是生活魅力的一部分——尽管我们在实际中难以找到彻底体现这种概念的人——已经完全丧失了对价值差别的感觉。在他眼中，生活中的一切都是一样的枯燥无味，都笼罩着一层灰暗的颜色，都不值得为之激动不已，特别是在涉及到意志的地方。在这里，关键的环节——也是乐极生厌者所拒绝的——不是对诸如此类事物的贬低，而是对事物明确的特质的漠然，正是从这些特质中，衍生出来了感觉和意志的全部活力。同样数量的金钱可以买到生活所提供的所有可能性，不管是谁被这样一个事实所摆布，他都必然会成为一个乐极生厌者。作为一条规律，乐极生厌的态度被恰如其分地归结为过分的享乐，因为过强的刺激摧毁了神经对这种刺激的反应能力。然而这还不是为与乐极生厌态度相关的现象划上了一个句号。事物的魅力并不是意欲得到此物的实践活动发生的唯一原因，相反，大部分的情况是，正是要得到这些快乐而在实践上必须付出的努力的种类和数量，决定了这些事物对我们所具有的魅力的深度和活力。所有人的个别努力、所有在前进道路上的曲折以及所有获得对象的意愿对我们所提出的要求——这一切都被当作对象本性的特质和它与我们的关系而被转移到了对象自身中，所有的一切也都被当作对象的魅力而投放到了对象自身中。在相反的例子里，获得对象的活动越是以一种机械和中性的方式实现，对象也就越显得没有特色和了无生趣。其实这种情况随时可见——不仅目标决定了获得它的方式，反过来说，获得对象的方式也决定了目标。靠钱来获得目标使一切收获行为都等同划一了，没有为任何对象保留任何特别的获得方式，因此，也就使对象必然变得更加无关紧要。当越来越多的对象被金钱所包围的时候，以及它们在价值上的差异实际上也被化约了的时候，这种情况就发生得越多。只要我们还没有用钱去购买事物，它们就会以其独特的、与众不同的魅力来影响我们。但一旦凭借我们手中的金钱轻而易举地得到了它们，它们的魅力也就随之丧失殆尽，这不仅是因为我们现在占有它们并从它们那里得到快乐，还因为我们是以一种不偏不倚的方式得到它们的，这就冲淡了这些商品的价值。当然，这一切影响在个案中几乎都是难以察觉的。但是在富人与其购得物之间的关系中，甚至是在公众意识现在所赋予这些对象的整个色调里，这种影响都有了大幅的增长。因此，犬儒主义的性格和乐极生厌的态度是对同一情境所造成的不同的两者——在某种程度上说也是对两者混合的——从自然的立场上进行的回答。对于犬儒主义者的气质来说，对用钱能买到多少物品以及由此引出的结论——最终每一样东西、每一个人都是可以用钱买到的——这种体验会激发起一种特定的愉悦感；而同样一幅场景对于乐极生厌者则常常是正好摧毁了所有使其成为吸引力的可能性，一般来说，愤世嫉俗者不愿意改变他的内在条件，这与乐极生厌者恰恰相反。前者作为人类的一员对生活的魅力有所渴求，但是他的个人状态却使这种魅力成为他求之不得、视而不见的东西。正是从乐极生厌的态度中，出现了当今那种追求刺激、追求极端印象和追求变化的最大速度的现象——这是在某种情境下想要满足危险与痛苦感的各种尝试中非常典型的一种，其使用的手段是对内容从数量上加以扩大。对这种渴望的满足或许可以得到片刻的缓解，但原来的情境很快就又会出现，而且会因为其构成要素的数量更大了，而在现在变得更糟。更为重要的是，现代人只选择了在上述经验、关系和信息中的“刺激”，而不去考虑这些刺激为什么对于我们是重要的。这一点也揭示了上述现象与手段之间那种颇具特色的纠缠不清的关系：人们满足于真正的价值生产的最初级阶段。在自身中需求单纯的刺激是日渐增长的乐极生厌态度的结果，而自然而然的激动反倒由此而日渐消退了。这种对刺激的追求源自于伴随着一切明确价值逐渐消亡于一种纯粹的中介性价值的货币经济过程。现实中存在着许多疾病决定治疗的有趣例子，上述情况只是其中之一。一种货币文化指的是这样一种货币手段对生活的奴役，以至于从这种货币文化的疲敝中获得解脱也不言而喻地意味着从一种纯粹的、被掩盖了其最终意义的手段中——即在不折不扣的“刺激”的事实中——寻求获得。

第三节

我在前面提到过：贪婪与吝啬仍必须从概念上和心理上加以精确地区分，虽然它们似乎在大多数情况下是一致的。事实上，这里存在着许多可以分别说明它们的现象。不仅仅对于狭义的贪财和吝啬，并且在那些内心运动尚未超越的常态界线的水平上，通向货币的道路上的速度通常也都完全独立于远离货币的道路上的速度。这在很大程度上是由在目的序列中货币不合理的上升导致的，因为它不包含任何客观标准，常常改变序列的意义，所以，只要货币仍然可以被获得，那么相对于它用来购买更多客体的目的而言，它就会引起不同的价值情感。在通向货币的道路上，一旦货币被获得，价值情感和货币之间的矛盾便会减少。这种矛盾还可以通过这样的观察被表达，即大部分人作为消费者时不如做生意时那么节省、谨慎。或许远古犹太法中的规则在这种经验中也有其根源，我们在获得金钱时往往比花费金钱时更加严谨、更加精确、更加仔细。依照这一法律，在涉及金钱争端的案例中，被告通常必须宣誓。根据犹太法典的一段内容，只有杂货店主才偶尔被允许以他账本中的条目来宣誓。在某些情形下，货币价值评价的收缩和免除源于王侯的态度的改变，如路易十一和其他很多人，他们在收税时非常严厉，而在消费的时候非常奢侈。然而，一般而言，我们不能否认在获得金钱的速度和花费金钱的速度之间存在着一种成比例的关系。没有人比赌徒、淘金者和风流社会中的人花钱更加随心所欲。招致西班牙毁灭的财政政策从查尔斯五世开始被归因于美洲贵重金属流入西班牙的轻松容易。这一谚语“来得容易，去得容易”所指的不仅仅是经济的客观结构，在这里已经获得的东西的安全性通常只是在获得的过程中的一个特定稳固性的奖赏。在那些可以很容易很快地获得利润的行业中，其客观环境同样提供了使金钱的花费也很容易的途径。不过，这个谚语的一个更加有效的论据存在于下面这种心理状态：目的论序列越快到达金钱获得的点而结束，能量和重要性在这一点的感受就越微弱。这样，可分离的货币的获得与价值中心的联系越肤浅越容易，我们就越愿意让它流走。虽然这个序列向上和向下的引导部分有着一个或大或小的张力的共同特征，但是在它们之间仍然存在着差异，即在货币被得到之前，它拥有一个终极目标的价值，这个价值在货币被获得的一瞬间就立刻消失了，从而被作为了一种纯粹的手段来体验，除非吝啬取消了这一过程。

货币的量即为货币的质

我在前面已经强调过目的序列的两个部分之间的这个转折点，因为它揭示了货币最根本的性质。只要货币是作为我们竭尽全力的唯一的、最接近的目的服务于我们的意识，那么它就仍然拥有某种性质。我们很难明确地表达这一性质是哪种，但是意愿的兴趣、思想对它的关注、附于希望和情感之上的活力，都使它闪耀着温暖，这给予了它一层多彩的光芒，赋予了它货币意义的概念，而不必考虑货币的数量。我们的所有实践愿望都是在这种方式中发展的。只要它们仍然没有被完成，那么整个货币的类属就会吸引着我们，以至于我们常常会在这样一种幻觉中劳动：即因为它代表了我们所欲求的这一客体和这一概念，最小数量的货币也永远会使我们感到满足。我们的欲求集中于客体的性质特征，通常只在性质被认识到并在某个特定范围体验到之后，对数量的兴趣才显示出来。我们兴趣的这种典型发展过程把对货币的占有放置到了一种特定变化的方式中。因为货币仅仅是实现具体和无限多样的目的的中立的手段，所以它的数量是我们所关心的唯一重要的东西。对货币而言，我们不需要去问“它是什么”、“它是怎样的”，我们要问的是“有多少”。货币的这种性质或货币性质的缺失首先在它的全部心理上的纯粹性中形成，然而只有在它业已被获得之后才可以。只有当货币被转化为实际的价值的时候，量绝对地决定着货币意义，货币的手段就是它的能量。这一事实才变得明显，在目的论序列达到这一点之前，以及，只要货币还仅仅是欲求的纯粹客体的时候，它的纯粹数量特征就会由于附着在货币上的作为一种普遍概念的感情色彩而从它的一般性的、在某种范围内被体验为质的性质中退回。这种关系对于吝啬的人来说是长期慢性的，因为吝啬者并不允许目的论序列超出这一临界点，这造成的结果是，吝啬的人不断地把情感寄予货币，就好像货币是一种性质上的、有特殊吸引力的物质。“多少钱”的问题限制了对货币的兴趣——换句话说，货币的性质完全由它的数量决定——对于我们的分析而言，有着重要的结果。

首先，对所有者而言，货币占有的数量的不同意味着相当大的质的不同。如果不是有持续的诱惑要扭转对货币的纯粹数量性质的解释，并机械地看待它的重要性和它的效用，即将较重要的东西看做不重要的东西的若干倍的话，那么这将是一个微不足道的经验事实，强调这一点毫无疑义。我想先提及一个十分表面化的实例作为下列问题的证据，即集中在货币中的数量上的不同是如何剧烈地影响它的性质的结果的。小面值钞票拥有一种完全不同于大面值钞票的性质。收入少的人通常是小面值钞票拥有者，他们很难像大面值钞票拥有者那样进行兑换。另一方面，如果大恐慌爆发，前者会更加激烈、更加欠考虑地要求兑换，或以任何价格抛出这些钞票。后面更全面的考虑将支持我的这一基本论证。

风险机率的主观差异

所有为了实现目的而花费的金钱都可以纳入两个范畴：有风险和没有风险。抽象地来看，如果我们把赌博排除在外，那么这两种形式就存在于每一个花钱的行为中。即使是最疯狂的投机买卖，也必须要估计可能的价值损失，虽然它并不担心投机行为的客体会毫无价值；而另一方面，即使是最安全的获利活动，通常也包含着冒险的因素。在很多情形中，后一种冒险行为作为一个无限小的因素，几乎可以被忽略，因此，我们可以说在每一次交易中都存在着两种情况，或者根本没有风险，或者投资的一部分资金即主体的资产是有风险的。通过下面这两个客观因素来确定这种可能的风险的大小似乎是合理的：一个是损失的可能性，另一个是可能的利润的大小。如果在一笔交易中投资100马克，损失的概率是50%，而最多获利25马克，那么很明显这个投资是不明智的。在其他条件相同的情况下，如果只需投资20马克，那么这就是明智的。但是，这种客观估计不足以计算出冒一定量的风险是合理的还是不合理的。某种个人因素也必须考虑进去。在任何一种经济情形下，不管可能获得的利润有多少、盈利的机会有多大，一个人财产中的特定部分也根本不应该被用来冒险。决胜性赌博的不顾一切的冒险通常以“没有任何其他东西可以输了”这样的借口为理由，这说明了在这里所有的理性都已经被故意抛开了。但是，如果我们假设存在理性，那么某一投机成功的客观可能性问题将会显现出来，这仅仅是为了存在于超出某一特定比例的那部分资产。从理性的角度来讲低于这个限度的数量不应该被冒险，即使可以获得很大的利润而亏损的可能性非常小。以其他方式决定着风险合理性的客观因素在这里完全无关紧要。价值的货币形式很容易使人们错误地判断这种经济形式，因为它将价值再分成非常小的部分，以此来使有着小额资产的人们用较小的手段去冒险，而原则上这种冒险是应该避免的。例如，在由德兰士瓦省和澳大利亚西部的矿业公司发行的一英镑价值的黄金股票中，这种情形被体现了出来。由于它们相对较低的价值和非常高的获利可能性，这种股票甚至被那些通常不去涉及股票投机交易的人们所购买。在意大利的彩票业也存在着类似的情形。然而，在许多国家，与股票相关联的现代法律的制定都在试图通过给任何发行的股票面值制定一种相对高的最低下限来阻止这件事情可能会对人们的安定生活造成的威胁。如果一个企业或一笔贷款的投机价值是由非常小的股份组成的，那么在同总体数量的关系中，它的无足轻重性就非常容易给买者造成一种假象，让买者认为与他的资产相关的主观价值是相当大的。一个更深层的事实是，用这样小的一个金额来获得投机利润是可能的，这使人们忘记了他们的环境不允许他们去拿这部分资金来冒险。在所有这些情形中隐藏着一个灾难，那些收入仅仅能维持最低生存水平的人，他们根本不应该去冒任何风险，但是他们却最强烈地受到这种诱惑的影响。这种建立在或然率基础上的利润拒绝了那些人，他们的处境将他们置于最需要这种利润的位置上，而他们又必然被他们的这种处境所限制而得不到这一利润，同时基于或然率的避免损失的保险也拒绝了他们，这些人又恰恰是最不能承受这样的损失的人。通常，那些不太富有的家庭都不买那些保险，因为这些相对较小的保险金只在生病的情况下才提供补偿。照看病人或许确实很难，但是他们宁愿冒这个险，因为他们的收入太微薄了，甚至难以支付非常少的固定花费，而生病所需的费用虽然很高，但发生的概率很小——不管这样的计算是多么不符合理性。显然，在某笔收入或财富中存在着某种风险限度，超出这一限度以外的风险在经济学上被证明是正当的，这种风险限度总是很低，即投机的自由空间很大，投机的空间越大人们就越觉得舒服，不仅对绝对较大部分而言很明显是这样，对在总收入中占相对较大比例的部分而言也是如此。这样的一种差异不仅存在于非常好和非常差的财政环境中，更细微的差异可能已经表明了不同风险数量的合理性。这是前面讨论过的财富自然增值的另一来源，因为，一笔财富增值的机会越大，可能投资于投机买卖而又不会危及资金拥有者的经济生存的那部分的比例就越大。这种情况也说明了货币是如何通过纯粹数量的差别获得一种完全不同的性质特征的，以及是如何使性质不同的形式掌握货币的内容的。货币在量上的完全外在的、甚至内在的意义都是不同的，这取决于它是处于某个分界线之上，还是处于某个分界线之下。而它是处于这个分界线之上还是之下只依赖于拥有者的资产总量。货币数量上的改变创造了全新的性质。

由于量变的原因造成质的不同结果

最后，所有这些都符合一种事物行为的非常普遍的形式，这一论断最显著的例子可以在心理学领域中被找到。现象中数量的增长作为起作用的原因不总是引起结果的一定比例的增长。更准确地说，造成结果明确增加的原因的增加不足以使它在此范围的一个更高阶段达到相同的目的；为了达到相同的结果，我们需要一个更大的影响。我想提醒大家注意一个时常发生的现象，即运转资金在最新发展的投资领域中会产生一定的回报，后来却需要投入更多的基金来获得相同的回报。我们还可以考虑一下药物治疗的结果，开始的时候，药物只需增加很小的剂量，而到后来，增加完全相同的剂量所产生的效果却减小了。或者，我们还可以看一下这样一种情况，在财政情况紧张时，一定的利润会带来某些快乐，但是，如果我们不断重复地获得利润，那么它将不再会造成同样的快乐反应。最普遍的例子是所谓的意识临界点：外部刺激作用于我们的神经，在它处于一定强度以下的时候是很不明显的，但是一旦达到这个临界点，这个刺激就会突然间引起我们的感觉，这样，外部刺激单纯的数量的增长就导致了质变的结果。然而，在某些情况下，对结果而言，增长会有一个上限，刺激因素的简单持续增长超出这一临界点，就会导致感觉的消失。这指出了在原因和结果之间存在着的由原因单纯的数量增长带来的不一致的最极端形式，也就是，结果向其对立面的直接转化。在药物治疗的例子中，需要特别提及的是顺势疗法的实验论，它证实了剂量上的纯粹数量的变化在同一个病人身上产生的不同效果的一种直接对比。在电击疗法中，不断的重复可能使结果转向其对立面，再转向其对立面的对立面。这是一种主要的典型的日常经验，在快乐感觉的最初增长之后，几乎所有提供快乐的刺激都会导致不愉快，甚至是绝对的痛苦。最后，作为原因的客观刺激和它所唤起的主观感觉之间存在着不可比较性，这也在下面这种方式中得到了说明。非常低的经济价值也仍然是价值，它一般并不能促使我们采取行动，而那些较大的经济价值便可以刺激我们。有这样一些具有货币价值的客体，如邮票，我们在与这些客体交易的时候，它们的货币价值根本没有被考虑在内，其货币价值也没有作为一个要素起应有的作用。我们期望回复远方的人的问题，但我们不会对他们或不能对他们要求一美分，并且他们自己也不会考虑这个问题。如果信件的接受方有着平等的社会地位，那么我们是不敢贸然在信中装入一张邮票以获得回信的。有些人虽然对其他事情非常节约，但是通常很少关心对邮票或公共车票的节省。这里存在着一个经济意识的临界点，它依照主体的财产和性情而不同，因此低于那一层面的经济需求不会被体验成经济需求。这可能是所有较高领域内的一个普遍现象。当已经存在并显而易见的因素朝向一个新的形式集中，并且因此被提高到一个新的、尚且未知的意义上的时候，这样一个较高的领域就出现了。通过这种方式，事物成为了法律的客体、美学愉悦的客体、哲学兴趣的客体，它们的广为人知的内容得到了一个新的形式。在许多情况下，此现象的发生是以一定量要素的存在为前提的，如果它们达不到这一数量，那么它们就不会进入那个更高的意识层面，更不会激起这一层面上的意识，而上述范畴正是存在于这一层面上的。例如，特定的颜色或颜色的组合可能是完全清晰可见的，但是，如果它们没有覆盖相当大的维度的话，那么它们就不能激起某种美学上的愉悦。在这一界限之内，它们只是简单的实体，虽然确实超出了感官意识的临界点，但还没有超出美学意识的临界点。在历史意识中也存在着一个临界点，这个临界点造成了个人能量和历史结果之间的一种显著的不协调。曾经有许多印度禁欲者传授与乔达摩相似的学说，但是只有乔达摩成为了佛。当然也曾经有许多犹太先知，他们的训诫与耶稣的并无太大差异，但是只有耶稣影响了世界的历史。这类现象可以在任何地方看到。个人的价值形成一个持续不断的范围，但是这里也存在着一个点，超过这个点，一个人的历史意义便开始了，反之，那些达不到这个意义的临界点的人就根本没有任何影响，而不仅仅是影响比较小的问题，于是他们沉入了被遗忘的洪流。在更高的层面上，或许存在着哲学意识的临界点。以微小的数量呈现的相同的现象只是日常生活中的转瞬即逝的无关紧要的东西，但是如果它以较大的数量来呈现，那么就会激起审美兴趣。如果上述现象以强有力而又令人兴奋的特点出现，那么它们将可能成为哲学和宗教思索的主题。与此类似，在悲剧情感中也存在着一个数量的临界点。当我们开始意识到它们的极大扩散、意识到它们的循环往复的不可避免性、意识到它们不只为单独的某一天涂上色彩而是为普遍意义上的生活涂上色彩的时候，就会认识到，那些作为日常生活单独事件的可以忽略的所有矛盾冲突、无用和失望，甚至那些具有幽默特点的单独事件，都呈现出一种悲剧的、深深令人不安的性质。在法律领域内，这个临界点是通过这样的原则来标记的：大法官不会为较小的事情操心。一根针的偷窃在数量上太无关紧要了，以至于没有必要实施法律的复杂的心理一逻辑机制——尽管从性质和逻辑上它都构成了偷窃。这里也存在着一个临界点，低于这个临界点的刺激尽管可能刺激了意识的其他领域，但是它们不能产生心理一法律的反应，更谈不上国家的反应了。

经济意识的临界点

经济意识也存在一个特殊的临界点的这一事实解释了一种普遍的倾向，即人们更喜欢选择一种连续较小费用的方式，通过这些“不引人注意的”支付形成一个单独的、最终的较大支付。对许多物品征收适度的税要比对单一物品征收较高的税更可取，因为人们不喜欢与金钱分离——当普芬道夫向国王提出这样的建议的时候，他并没有提及这个问题的至关重要的点。尽管人们不得不以这种方式或其他方式交出他们的货币，但是只有采取这一种方式，才能保证在低于经济意识临界点的前提下交出货币，才能保证被交出的单独数量的货币不被纳入经济计算、经济感觉和经济反应的范畴。这就如同两个重量，每一个都低于重量感的临界点，当它们被一个个分别放到手上的时候，不会造成任何的感觉，但是如果把两个同时放到手上，那么就会造成压力的感觉。

就我们简单的或复杂的感觉而言，这可以被解释成一种被动的抵抗，我们必须首先克服它，才可以使外在刺激转化为对我们意识的影响。然而，这一抵抗也可以成为积极的因素。我们可以设想：我们有感知能力的生理—心理器官在任何时候都处于一种兴奋的状态，因此一个新的刺激的影响取决于这个新的刺激因素与之前我们内心活动的方向及强度之间的关系。这种影响可能处于相同方向，毫无节制地扩散；它也可能处于相反方向，成为全部或局部的平衡力，使感知器官只有在克服这一特定的阻力之后才可以朝着适当的方向运动。这种行为也遇到了差异感受性的问题。我们的感受性所感受到的不是绝对的量，而是相对的量，即我们只有通过一种感觉与另一种感觉的区分才可以确定这个感觉的程度。在这里，这种体验的误差可以被忽略，因为只有当它的批评者愿意承认其有效性的时候，它对于我们而言才是有效的。很明显，这种体验是前面讨论过的一系列现象的基础，它可以通过一个非常简单的例子来说明。如果一个强度为1的触觉神经运动被增强了1/3，那么这与强度为2的触觉神经运动被增强2/3是相同的。相对同等差异强度的感觉会引起相同的反应，这一事实导致了客观上相等的刺激有着非常不同的主观结果。一个新的刺激的感觉越是偏离那个感觉的最初状态，我们对它的意识就越强烈、越明显。就像我们可能认为的那样，这与下列事实发生了冲突：刺激通常必须首先克服我们的生理—心理器官的反向的作用力，然后才会影响我们的意识。依照差异感受性，刺激越是偏离之前的状态，它就越是引人注意；而依据另一原理，刺激的方向越是不同于正在运行中的内心运动，它就越是不明显（一直到一个特定点）。这与下面这个事实相联系，即如果刺激是稳定的，那么在它们到达高峰之前，感觉需要一个确定的时间——尽管这个时间很短。第一个现象序列可以导致疲乏（也就是说神经不再对第二种刺激做出相同强度的反应，因为它被第一个刺激弄得疲乏了），而后面的序列却显示，疲乏并不是在对刺激做出反应之后就马上出现，相反，如果刺激达到了一个足够的水平，那么对刺激的反应就会自动地积聚，然后从这个水平再次下滑，接着出现新的疲乏。这种结果的二元论在一些复杂的现象中也经常会显现出来。例如，一次偶然的快乐会给一个通常不快乐的个体带来激情的反应，使他释放出从未使用过的幸福的能量，这种情形同他以前存在的背景相比将会显得非常明显。另一方面，我们也注意到了，如果头脑已经适应了不断变化的经验，那么一定程度的幸福刺激可能就并不足以引起相应的反应。生活中乍一出现的极其美妙的刺激在被痛苦和悲伤决定的生活节奏那里不起任何作用，相反，只有幸福的瞬间影响持续扩大之后，人们认为具有强烈刺激的经验才会发生作用。如果真是这样，且精神的全部状态都最终转化为一种相对应的节奏或结构，那么因为精神现在已经变得习惯于幸福环境，某些必要的区别变得不引人注意了，所以之前不会被完全感觉到的刺激量也会由于一个相反的格局而逐渐变得难以察觉。

对经济刺激的差异感受性

这一矛盾的主要目的论意义在经济生活中也有所体现。差异感受性驱使我们从每个特定的事物状态转向新商品的获得、享受产品的生产。通过现存有机结构所具有的被动或主动的抵抗对这一差异的限制，促使我们以持续不断的能量去追求这一新的方向，继续获得越来越多的商品。但是，这种差异感受性给这种持续增长设置了一个上限，因为它使我们对特定刺激的适应性变弱，最终对任何刺激的增强都变得如此麻木不仁，以至于它必须去继续寻找新的刺激。这就如同通常客体的数量增长会导致内在结果的变化一样，客体货币价值的纯粹增长也可能导致对它们的需要的相反情形。在开始的时候，不需花费任何费用或以非常低的价格就可以购得的客体通常不被人们以价值来衡量，对它们也根本没有什么需求。但是，一旦它的价格上涨，对它的需求就会增加，反过来，对它的需求又会随价格的增长而增长，直到它吸引力的极限。如果价格持续上涨，以至于对它的获得变得不再可能，那么最初阶段的放弃行为将可能再次成为人们最想做的事。而其结果是，随后将会出现一种平衡调整，无用的渴望将被克服，甚至会显示出一种对得不到的事物的直接厌恶，这是一种“吃不到葡萄说葡萄酸”的态度。在一些领域中，积极和消极行为的这样一种变化是经济需求的数量变化的结果。俄罗斯农民的贫穷、原始和分散的农业状况可以归因于他们的税收压力，因为这种税收压力使他们得不到任何东西来维持基本的生计，他们的辛劳得不到相应的回报。显然，在某种程度上稍微减轻这种压力会使辛勤劳动有所回报，因此会激励人们努力耕种，但是如果税收减少过多，回报足够满足他们文化水平的全部需要，那么人们又会回到之前的懒散中去。再举一个例子：如果一个社会阶级或一个个体不得不过一种低水平的生活，并且只知道简单原始的享受和娱乐形式，那么一个略高的收入也只能使他们的这些原始娱乐形式的范围有所扩展。然而，如果收入大幅度增加，那么对娱乐的要求也将会发展到一个完全不同的领域。如果最初一瓶杜松子酒是主要的乐事，那么较高的工资会使对杜松子酒的消费有所增长；但是如果工资继续增长，而且增长更多的话，那么对完全不同种类的娱乐方式的需求便会随之产生。下面这一事实，即意识临界点在不同的快乐和痛苦感觉中有着完全不同的标准，这导致问题变得复杂，难以解释。目前的生理学研究证明了身体各部分神经对疼痛的感觉有巨大的不同，对于一部分神经来说，它的临界点比其他部分要高六百多倍，即使在相同的部位，压力感受性的临界值与这些部位也没有稳定的关系。对于不同等级和不同感受性的感觉来说，临界值的比较是不确定的，因为使它们产生的因素是完全不同种类的，这些因素不能用感官神经的机械化或电动化刺激的方式在数量上进行比较。但是，虽然在这个层面上的度量看起来似乎是不可能的，但是我们不得不承认：较高级的感觉领域中存在着不同的感受性，并且因为我们所讨论的生活境遇通常指涉及种种领域的多元性，在外部环境和内心感觉结果之间的关系中存在着理论上难以理解的多样性。

取决于货币所有权的感受结果允许对这些临界值和比例进行一个大概的观察。货币可以对所有种类的可能的情感产生刺激，这是因为，它的不确定的特性，缺乏任何特质把它放置到离任何情感都如此远的位置，以至于它同所有这些情感的关系都变得相当平等了。这种关系很少是直接的关系，因为它们需要中间的客体作为媒介，就它们可以用货币购买而言，这些客体是局部不明确的，但是从另一个角度来看，它们又是明确的，因为它们引起了某些特殊的情感。由于货币使我们产生了对那些通过货币可以得到的特殊客体预期的快乐值，所以这些客体的吸引力被转移到了货币上，并通过货币被表现出来。如此一来，在与货币的关系中，各种对快乐的感受性的临界值都是可以通过某种方式来进行比较的，货币就成了能够达到这一点的唯一客体。可是度量看起来似乎仍然是不可能的，其原因是显而易见的：那些物体在不同领域虽然产生了表面上数量均等的满足，但是它们的货币价值是非常多样化的。假如对于一个美食家、图书收藏家、运动员而言，快乐的临界点在货币领域中处于完全不同的水平，这并不是因为对快乐感受性的任何差异，而是因为不同的吸引人的事物有着非常不同的价格。但是，临界值的偶然性试图在货币的量和幸福的结果之间寻求一个平衡；对于个体甚至群体而言，那些可以买到的客体或表象所拥有的货币价值超越了快乐的临界值，这一点变得非常明显，至少在这个意义上，上述命题是成立的。这种发展是由下面的事实造成的，即我们关于一个客体价值公正或不公正的直觉评价是一个有着双重原因的结果，其原因不仅包括这个客体在别处所需要的价格，还因为性质不同的各种各样的商品的绝对价格是完全不同的。这些因素的平衡意味着货币价格的一般标准的发展，这一价格标准是许多主观的和偶然的背离的最终结果。例如巴勒斯坦地区的犹太人在早期阶段的经济状态，似乎他们会因某些商品的出人意料的廉价和另外一些商品的昂贵价格感到震惊。因为这些价格与当前的价格相差太远了，以至很难对此做出合理解释，我们不能说——或许对任何古代的历史时期都是这样——在那个历史阶段的一般货币价值与我们现在的一般货币价值可以用这样或那样的数量区分开来。事实上，在以前那些历史阶段根本就不存在一般货币价值。这一现象已经在富有和贫穷之间的经济鸿沟那里得到了暂时的说明，就贫穷的人的生活水平而言，穷人表现出来的任何雄心壮志都没有缩小这一鸿沟。这要归因于较低的社会阶层所具有的强大的、稳定的满足感，这造成的结果是他们通常不会对某些特定的商品产生任何的欲求。这样，两种完全不同的货币价格标准得到了发展：一种是贫穷的人能够支付得起的价格标准，另一种是富人领域的价格标准，对他们而言，钱不是问题。这可能是曾经存在于所有古时候的人们中间的情况。在这种联系中，我们必须要强调的是：依照新近的社会观点来看，中产阶级希望能够与上层阶级享有平等的衣、食、舒适和娱乐水平，而下层阶级希望能够与中产阶级享有平等的生活水平。这首次为统一的货币价值的形式开辟了可能性。以发展的观点来看，我们可以说，一般的经济文明朝着使最初便宜的客体变得昂贵，而使最初昂贵的客体变得便宜的方向发展。这个使价格趋于平衡的过程最开始是以一种客观的方式来展示的，并在“平均利润率”那里找到了它的真正令人惊骇的体现。通过对所有相关的经济要素的一种几乎难以置信的、很难意识到的相互调节的过程，处于某个发达经济中的彼此独立的工业部门，并且在原料、劳动条件和利润率各个方面都存在着巨大差异的工业部门，在其他条件相等的情况下，这些企业竟然从它们所投入的资金中得到了相同的利润率。从人类存在的个体差别的角度来看，任何对货币价值的主观幸福感的类似的调节都很明显是不可能的。然而，在文化发展过程中，我们可以达到一个某种程度上类似的调节，因为所有的客体将逐渐可以用货币来表示，并且货币价格的一个普遍标准将逐渐地被建立，这个标准是货币对于所有商品所具有的统一性的意义所在。在一定的货币数量规模上，某些特定的点可能会作为那些事物的等价物而呈现出来，对于特殊个体和种群来说，这些事物标志着经济、快乐或乐极生厌的临界点。在临界点现象的领域中，要考察其复杂性和个体化是非常难的，货币依然是通过其纯粹的数量特征和它对事物间所有差异的统一的反应，能够提在一个统一的序列中安排多种形式的感受性的可能性的唯一客体。但是，除此以外，我们的意识作为特殊的经济意识仅仅对金钱的刺激做出了反应，就这一点而言，某些特定的事件显示了货币对于经济意识临界点的非常直接的意义。由于中产阶级的狭隘意识，他们经常拒绝为了有利于他人而拿出某件东西，因为那些东西是需要花费金钱的。根据完全以经济为中心的严格的自我主义原则，这种行为被认为是正当的！与此相同，愚蠢的父母在试图阻止他们的孩子任性的破坏的时候，对他们的孩子说那些他们将要破坏的东西是花了钱的！在孩子们破坏东西时，他们立刻反应到的仅仅是经济上花费的金钱，而不是去向他们的孩子们解释那件东西本身的价值。两个完全不同的现象以一种独特的方式解释了这个问题。只有当赠送礼物的人在礼物上花费了金钱的时候，这个礼物才是有价值的；而没有花费送礼物者的金钱、自己制作的礼物则显得破旧、寒酸和不适当。只有非常优雅的人、社会阶层较高的人才会欣赏别人自己制作的礼物。在前面的那种情形中，只有当送礼物者的礼物是用金钱买来的时候，接受礼物的人才会觉得送礼者做出了某种牺牲或付出了某种代价。而在后面的这种情形中，从上层社会的标准来看，一个花费了金钱的礼物看起来是不适合的，即使是仆人、车夫或信差通常也更愿意接受一支雪茄，而非比雪茄的价值多三倍的小费。在这里，决定性的事实是：礼物不应该被从经济意义上来评价，或者至少不应该只从经济意义上来评价，我们应该将它的经济性质放到幕后，让它所代表的真挚情感显现出来。在所有的这些实例中，只有价值的货币形式刺激着经济意识，相同的过程是被需要还是被拒绝取决于这一刺激所引起的情感。虽然充分发展了的货币经济把经济客体安排在了一个连续的序列中，但是这里仍然存在着在这些客体和货币之间的一种普遍的差异（客体与货币之间存在一般性差异的事实对于物物交换的经济而言是不太切实的，此处我们是就货币经济而言），这使得仅仅对货币价值有所反应的意识临界点的出现成为完全可以理解的。

在货币领域中外部刺激和情感反应的关系

这里还存在着使意识临界点现象和货币相联系的另外一个原因。其真正相应的结果是被排除在外的这些原因的存在和积聚更可能在一个特定的限度之上发挥作用，也更可能把这些影响的限度推到更高的位置，围绕这一事件的整个系统也就更加稳定。正像我们所熟知的那样，如果水不发生任何运动，那么，它可以被冷却到零度以下而不结冰，在这个时候，最轻微的颤动都会马上导致水结成冰。同样的，把一个人的手放在逐渐加热的水中，让手保持静止不动要比让手在水中运动支持更长的时间。因此，在更高级、更复杂的领域内，只有当我们全部的存在都被唤起的时候，或许从一个完全不同的角度来看，各种影响和环境才会引起相应的感觉反应。与此相同，在我们开始意识到它们的重要性之前，价值的占有和价值的丧失或某些情况下无价值一样，可以存在很长一段时间，甚至可以逐渐地增长。这里首先必须存在一个使内部因素彼此冲撞的刺激，这样，我们通过它们最新发现的关系，或通过所有其他因素之间的关系的差异，才能开始意识到它们的真正强度。实际上，感情，如爱和恨，可以在我们心中存在很长的时间，它在执行着某种伪装影响的表层之下不断积聚，直到某件偶然事件——大多数情况下是一种关系的正式的规律的中断——使我们的感情在意识层面爆发，从而，首次显示出它自己以及其结果的丰富性。社会发展采取了相似的过程。愚蠢和陋习不仅仅蔓延到曾经稳固的事件中，而且还在社会意识的临界点之下积聚和增加，这两者有着完全不同的内在驱动力，然而，从那种使各事物有序运转的一般性过程的角度根本意识不到它们的干扰。正像我们所熟知的那样，一个国家经历国际战争时候的那种动乱首先向人们揭示了这个国家隐藏的矛盾和全部缺点。这恰恰说明了我们前面所做的那种观察，存在于各个社会阶级之间的非常大的社会差异和不可超越的距离通常与社会的协调同时并存。通常只有在阶级矛盾有所缓和，社会上的一种活跃运动带来了某些中间过渡现象，并允许相互对照的社会规则之间产生一定程度的基础之后，人们才会产生对平等主义的改革或革命的要求。但是，在这种情况发生的那一瞬间，社会的下层阶级便会意识到他们所受的压迫，而社会上层阶级也开始意识到他们的道德责任感和他们维护其地位的重要性，这样一来，社会的和谐便会随之打破。在货币经济中，生活体系的紊乱激起了人们对差异和临界点的意识，这种生活体系的紊乱是非常普遍和活跃的。为了避免这种不断增强的刺激的结果造成对意识的反作用，既定的社会关系具有一种稳固性，而这种稳固性常常会被以货币为基础的存在打破。这是因为，所有的这些关系都存在着某些不稳定的东西，甚至是抵抗社会关系稳定的因素，而其中最显著的原因是，货币与个体之间没有某种客观的关系，它也并不能像某种地位、职业、道德价值、感情关系或行动那样成为个体的一部分。所有建立在那些其他生活内容的基础之上的关系都有着某种稳定性，因为它们具有某种使它们从属于个人的相对不变的状态或性质。它们抵抗着社会变化因素的影响，这些变化只有在一定程度的发展之后才可以发生作用。但是，货币没有任何特质，与具有质的规定性的个体之间没有任何关系，它毫无保留地从一个个体移动到另一个个体，因此，属于货币的那些关系和情形可以非常容易地、充分地适应任何的变化。或者，如果用我们现在的兴趣术语来明确地说明这个问题的话，那么可以这样进行阐释：货币是可以被积累的，这清晰地反映了它的纯粹数量的性质，这一事实意味着，它将最频繁、最清楚地使它自己在生活的确定的内容上被感觉到。临界点的现象常常与货币相联系，它揭示了货币的基本性质，这种基本性质的一部分正是财富的自然增值。其实，这只是通过这种方式被表现的诸多现象之一。因为它所证明的不仅仅是较大数量的货币的意义与较小数量的货币的意义是成相应倍数关系的，而且证明了这种具有差异性的意义表现了一种强烈的变化，虽然在它的基础层面所发生的仅仅是纯粹的数量上的变化，但它在性质上全新的、甚至相反的结果中表现出来的确是断裂性的变化。

所有者的人格统一性的意义

上文提到的这一事实是建立在一个显而易见的假设的基础之上的，所以它仍然需要更进一步的说明。它可以通过下面这种方式进行阐释。如果若干笔货币是属于很多不同的人，而不是属于同一个人，那么这每笔数量的货币就会有着不同的性质意义。因此，人格统一性是财产及其意义的一切质的差异的对应物或前提条件。在这里，从法人的资产的功能上来看，由于对它们的管理是相同的，所以它们是处于相同的水平的。同样地，只有当我们将某个国家看作一个统一的拥有财产的主体的时候，我们才可以讨论“一个国家的财产”。也就是说，我们必须将单个个体公民所拥有的财产看作国家经济内部的相互关系统一起来的存在，就像单个个体的财产通过这种相互作用集中起来成为一个实际的统一体一样，这种相互作用包括很多种，例如：分配、个体支出和整体支出的关系、收入和支出之间的平衡，等等。货币作为价值的意义取决于它的数量，它以许多单独数量并排的形式呈现出来，所以，为了作为一个整体来运行，每笔数量的货币都要求一种外在的原则，这种原则促使部分的数量被纳入和整体的关系及相互作用中。这就像一种世界图景是由彼此分离的感觉内容所组成的一样，这些感觉内容被综合起来，成为个人意识的整体；像世界诸多要素的总和不仅仅是一个单纯的总和一样，这些要素的总和作为一个整体获得了一种新的意义，这种新的意义超越了它的各个分离的部分。所以，与此相同，货币所有者的单独个体影响着货币，使它的总数量获得一种可能性，即或多或少地从它的性质意义上来认识它的可能性。这一事实对我们的知识有着非常大的贡献，如果我们使用边际效用理论来进行讨论，那么便可以更清楚地看到这种贡献。每次商品供给的每个数量单位都有一种最低价值，即这种单位被用于最不本质的目的时的价值。因为，如果失去了任何一个单位，那么剩下的数量单位将会自然地被运用于所有更重要的需要，只有那些最不重要的需要才会得不到满足。因此，无论哪一个单位不得不被放弃，它都将是最不重要的单位。商品供给的价值不是由商品可能被放置到的那种用途决定的，也不是由个体单位各种各样的不同用途的总和决定的，而是由最没有用处的单位的用途决定的，由大小相同的单位的数量决定的，确切地说，这种单位的数量使货币供给的价值增加。在这个理论中存在着一个被普遍承认的例外，当一定数量的商品形成一个整体并因此提供了一种特定的效用时，这种效用便会不同于组成这个统一体的各个单独部分的效用的总和。举例言之，我们承认一片森林的存在会对气候、天气产生一定的影响，与此同时还会对土壤的肥沃、人们的健康和国家的部分财富的稳定性等造成一定的影响。简单地说，如果我们去估价作为个体的每棵树的用途，那么森林作为一个整体存在着的这种价值将会完全超出我们的计算。同样的，一个军队的价值不能依照单个战士的边际效用来判断，一条河的价值也不能根据每滴水的边际效用来判断。个人所拥有的资产的问题也可以用这种区别来说明。一个个体所拥有的100万马克会赋予此人相应的地位和社会身份，这种地位和身份与1000马克对其拥有者的相应意义的1000倍是完全不同的。更确切地说，从这种主观结果的基础来说，100万马克的客观经济价值不能够以组成这100万马克的每个1000马克的边际效用来计算。与此相反，它形成了一个综合体，就像一种存在着的、活动着的生物，它作为一个整体的价值并非是它的单个器官所具有的价值的总和。在上一章里，我论述了这样一个观点，即一个客体的货币价格仅仅是一个单位，与它包含多少硬币没有任何关系。在那里我曾经说过这样的话：这样的100马克是毫无联系的单位的纯粹积聚。但是，作为一种不动产的价值，它们是一种统一的象征符或其价值数量的等价物，不仅仅是一种单个价值单位的简单积聚。这种实践的决定性有其人格方面的对应物。货币的数量在它同作为质的人格统一体关系中实现，它的广度在这种关系中以一种密度的形式被实现，仅仅通过它的诸多因素部分的简单相加，这个过程是不能完成的。

形式与数量在物质和文化上的关系

或许我们还可以通过下面的这种方法来解释上述情形。作为价值单位的一种纯粹数量上的增加，货币可以作为绝对无形式的东西来进行描述。无形式性和纯粹的数量的性质是同一的。假如我们仅仅从事物的数量方面来考虑它们，其形式是可以被忽略的。如果物体被拿来称重，那么这一事实会体现得最为明显。所以，货币是对形式的最严重的破坏者。不管有着怎样的原因使得事物a、b、c的形式需要人们花费相同的价格m，它们的区别，即它们当中的每一个具有的特殊形式，根本不会影响它们的固定价值，而是淹没在平等地代表了a、b、c的价格m当中。形式并不是经济价值评价中的一个决定性的因素。一旦我们的兴趣被转移至客体的货币价值，它们的形式便开始变得无足轻重，就如同它们的质量是无关紧要的一样，虽然这些形式可能制造了它们的价值。我们也可以用这种方式来解释从唯物主义理论的意义上来看与货币经济有着共同的根源的现代唯物主义。像这样的物质是完全无形式的，是所有形式的对立物。如果物质被作为现实世界的唯一原则而接受的话，那么现实便会服从于一种在宽泛意义上相同的过程——使得我们的实践感兴趣的客体被转化为货币价值的过程。下面，我将返回这样一个问题，即数量非常大的、与货币数量的临界点意义有着根本联系的货币是怎么样获得一种特殊、同时又更加个性化的形式的，随后又是怎样将自己的形式从空虚的数量性质当中移出去的。货币的无形式性会随着货币数量的增加而相对地下降，甚至是非常明显地下降：最皁的意大利铜币流通时期的小硬币还依然是没有固定形状的，或者只是有一种粗糙的圆形形状或立方体的形状，但是最大的硬币通常被铸成有四个面的锭的形状，并且在两个面上都铸有标记。但是，货币的普遍的无形式性是美学倾向和货币兴趣之间的对抗的根源。美学兴趣全部集中于纯粹的形式，比如，构思设计被认为是所有杰出艺术品的首要的美学价值，因为美学构思设计作为一种纯形式，它可以在任何数量、任何物质材料中被毫无变化地完成。然而，现在人们认为这是错误的，实际上，我们还必须更进一步地考察，承认这样一个事实，即一种艺术形式的绝对的尺寸大小对其美学意义的影响非常大，即使一件艺术品的形式保持不变，但只要它的尺寸大小发生一点点非常小的变化，它的美学意义就会非常容易地被改变。但是，事物的美学意义一直附着在它们的形式之上（例如说，美学意义可以附着在它与其诸多因素之间的关系中），尽管我们现在知道：从本质上来看，这一形式的特性和影响是由它在实现过程中的数量共同决定的。有很多箴言的出现都涉及货币，但是只有数量非常小的民间歌谣是涉及了货币的，这种现象或许并不是一种偶然的巧合，虽然金钱有着非常重要的意义。当货币制度的变化造成了社会动乱的时候，老百姓当中产生的民间歌曲在这种情形下就不会再去涉及货币制造的问题。对于所有的美学兴趣来说，这种不可协调的、决定性的对抗通常总是把强调的重点放在这样一个位置上，即我们评价事物时是依据它们的形式，还是诉求于它们的价值量。这种价值仅仅是一种数量上的价值，通过相等的诸多单位的简单相加，这种数量上的价值取代了所有的性质。

甚至，我们还可以说：一个客体的价值对它的形式的依赖程度越大，这个客体的货币价值就越是无关紧要。我们拥有很多非常好的艺术品，这当中最伟大的艺术品有：德尔斐神庙中的战车手、伯拉克西列斯的《赫尔墨斯》、波提切利的《春》、《蒙娜丽莎》、梅第奇坟墓和伦勃朗的自画像，等等。如果我们所拥有的这些最伟大的作品有上千件相同的复制品，那么这些艺术品能够给人们带来的快乐程度肯定会有非常大的差别，但是它们的理念、客观的美学价值，或它们在艺术史上的价值绝对也永远不会超越那件唯一的真品所能达到的高度，尽管目前已经存在着很多的复制品。当然，手工艺品的情形与上述情况存在着明显的差异，在手工艺品领域中，手工艺品的美学形式和使用目的被完全统一了，因此，实用目的的最完美的实现恰恰就是这件手工艺品的真正的美学吸引力所在。在这里，对于所有以这种方式创造出来的价值而言，存在着一个基本的问题，即这个客体是被使用着的，所以它的理念意义随着它的普及而增加。如果这个客体并非为价值的形式留出空间，而是为价值因素留出了空间，那么这个客体被创造的次数就变得非常重要了。这也正是尼采的伦理价值理论和他的美学框架之间最深层次的联系的基础。根据尼采的理论来看，一个社会的性质并非取决于那些值得称赞的性质的传播范围，而是取决于在社会中所能达到的价值的高度，不管它们多么曲高和寡。同样的，一个艺术阶段的性质并不是由艺术作品平均成就所达到的高度和数量决定的，而是由最好的作品达到的高度决定的。所以，那些只对行动的实际结果感兴趣的功利主义者倾向于强调大众、强调理想生活环境的普及的社会主义；而对唯心主义者而言，行动的或多或少的美学上的表现形式是至关重要的，他们通常是个人主义者，或者至少像康德一样强调个体自由超越其他一切。在关于主观幸福的领域也是如此。我们经常会觉得对幸福的体验的最高顶点不需要再三重复，它意味着个体在存在的质料中的完美的自我实现。只要体验过一次这种幸福的顶点，就会赋予我们的生活一种价值，重复的体验不会使这种价值像规律的价值那样被提高。在某一个时刻，生命被带到了一个独特的自我实现的点，它使广义上的物质抵抗完全服从于我们的感觉和愿望，这个时刻传播了一种氛围，我们将它称为永恒的等价物、永恒的状态，这是一种超越了数量和时间的状态。自然法则对世界的状态和一致的意义并非来自其实例的数量，而是产生于这样一个事实：即自然法则存在着，并且发挥着作用。所以自我最高层次的超越时刻对我们的生活有意义的原因是：它们曾经发生过。不能给它们的内容增加任何东西的重复不会扩大这一意义。简单地说，我们对形式的价值评价的集中导致了对它的数量因素的漠不关心，然而，恰恰是它的无形式性指出了它对价值的决定性意义。

当基于货币经济的基础之上的变化发展到鼎盛阶段的时候，无数的目的序列就会交叉于货币之中，并且只要文化的特殊结构并没有完全分解并转化为绝对的自由，那么我们就会遭遇到这样一种现象，即货币具有特殊的形式的现象。如果大数量的货币不能被小数量的货币的合成物替代，那么上述现象就会出现。在物物交换中，便体现出了这种迹象。在一些民族当中，骆驼只能与铁器或布匹交换，而不能与烟叶进行交换，尽管烟叶更具有可交换性。然而，以雅普岛为例，货币的种类极其繁杂，兽骨、珍珠母贝壳、石头、玻璃片等被分为不同的等级。尽管事实是，在较低与较高种类的货币之间的关系已经建立起来了，但是，特定的有价值的事物（像小船、房屋等等）是不能够通过相同价值的大量的处于低级阶层的那些货币来进行支付，而必须用那些具有特殊用途的处于高级阶层类型的货币来进行支付。这种对货币的特殊品质的限制也可以在女人的购买中看出来，在这种交易中的货币不能够被别的类型的货币所代替，即使其他种类货币的数量再多也不可以。反过来也是如此：在一些地方，黄金永远也不能用来支付那些数量较大的但价值较小的商品，而只可以专门用于购买那些极其贵重的商品。这一系列的现象与我们对金本位制的管制并不一致，在金本位制中，超过一定程度的支付可以请求使用黄金，但是别的金属只能适用于那些较小的数量的商品的交易。这种标准的货币与符号货币之间的这些在本质上以及技术上的差别并不是在每种用途中都存在。然而，不同种类的货币看起来形成了一个统一的序列，在这一个序列中，只有上层的单位能够建立它们数量上的内容与那些不能够用数量表示的特殊形式的价值之间的联系。这是一种非常优秀的方法，这种方法可以防止货币纯粹的数量特征所导致的货币功能的琐碎化，也可以保留货币早期经常传递出的稀有的品格。这也是一种暗示：货币这种形式或品质是属于初始时期的，在那个时期货币不仅仅是货币，同时在另一方面它也是别的事物。这种细小的差别已经变得很微弱，或是已经消失，但在货币发展的最高阶段，在一些非常少的情况下也会存在。接下来的习惯很有可能要追溯到货币作为一种形式的意义上来。法国人宁愿说20个苏也不愿意说一法郎，或宁愿说100个苏也不愿意说五法郎，等等；同样，人们也不会轻易地说半个法郎，这一数量通常还是通过苏或者是生丁来表示。同样的数量，用一种方式来表达而不是用另一种方式来表达，似乎在一定程度上激起了情感上的另外一些反应。当普通人都喜欢用硬币这个名称时，这种特殊的货币形式——而不是抽象的词语“货币”——就仍然还具有相同的意义，虽然它们仅仅是指作为量的货币。举个例子来说，“每个瑞士人都有十字币”，以及“如果你用泰勒去敲门的话，所有的大门都将为你敞开”，等等。还有一些很明显的现象，当普通人在计算较低的价值的时候，他们情愿通过把小数目的金钱累加起来的办法，也不愿意把用大数目金钱拆分的方式来指明一定数量的货币。货币总和的计算，如果是通过我们所熟悉的单位相乘得到的，就会为货币的意义提供一个更大范围以及更加有特色的表达。而且，这种片刻的主观也被客观化在一种情感中了，似乎以这种方式表达的货币的总和比用其他因素表达的总和更加具有分量。这类的差别可以在德国的北部，在德国的泰勒被马克所代替时被观察到。在泰勒与马克的转换时期，“300马克”相比于“100泰勒”，经常会被完全不同的心理暗示所伴随着。在这种新形式所表达的内容与旧形式表达的内容相同时，这种新形式与别的形式相比看起来更加广泛与丰富，而在另一方面，又显得更加精练与专业化。在这样一种现象中，该形式至少在与货币的关系上仍然有所限制，而这种形式对所有别的事物来说又都是具有本质意义的；另一方面，在某种程度上，货币总量的无条件的统一性，不管它的形式是从何处借用而来的，在这里都被打断了。

货币中那些别的可以整体上被称为形式的东西源于人格上的统一性，这种统一性会把那些财富中离散的个别部分转换为一个整体。因此，一笔财富，尤其是那些较大额的财富，并不具有货币在美学上的尴尬。货币不具备美学上的尴尬并不仅仅是由于财富所提供的美学上的可能性造成的。另外，还有别的更为重要的原因，这个原因是对前面所说的可能性的补充，也是该可能性的一个基础，货币的形象依赖于它的形式，这种形式的获得是通过它与人格中心的关系来实现的，这使得财富与抽象概念的货币完全不相同。作为一种货币形式，通过这样一个整体的财富与相同数量的货币被分配给许多人之间存在着的不同，很清楚地揭示了货币的特征。私人财产在某种程度上决定并且强调了它的形式，这不仅仅是通过货币来体现的。那些过去的德国自由人所拥有的隐瞒的土地是不可分割的，因为这是与马克货币群体的成员资格相一致的。土地的所有权是从个人那里产生的，并因此拥有了同样的统一性的品质以及不可分割性。如果我们考虑到英国中世纪时期的土地所有权，以及这样一个事实，即土地份额的完全的平等权总是暗示了土地的抵押权，也就是，土地的所有者可以把自己的土地合理地分配给那些小的农户，那么，即使在这种情况下，那些被抵押的土地的独特性和形式也仍然是完整人格所赋予的，虽然这种完整的人格并不是非个人性的，也不是自由的。财产的具体化，以及它们与个人的分离，都同时意味着下述这样两种可能性，一种可能就是，把那些小块的土地从许多人的手中整合到一个人的手里，另一种可能性就是，对单个土地进行随意分割。土地产权形式上的稳定性以及重要性随着人际关系的破坏而消失了；土地产权的形式是变动的，通过实践环境自然也是个人所处的环境，它被不停地溶解与重塑，而内在构成形式和个体自我的统一也就渗透到个人财产的统一中来了。早期的生活看起来与已经建立起的统一性有着密切的联系，这意味着它至少受某种节奏的控制，而这种节奏在现代被溶解到了可任意分割的统一体中。生活的内容变得越来越可以用金钱来表达，而金钱是绝对连续的、有节奏的，与任何有特色的形式无关的，正如上述情况一样，生活内容似乎正在分裂成很多的小块，它们浑然一体的完整性现在是如此的分散，以至于任意的综合以及重构都是有可能的。正是这种分散而综合的过程为现代的自由主义及其丰富产物提供了原材料。人们用这些基本上不成形的材料清楚地创造出生活的新的统一体，并且很显然，与先前的那个与原材料单位紧密团结的整体相比，这个新的生活整体的运行具有更大的独立性和变化性。

质与量之间的关系

在历史一心理领域，货币在整体上凭借其特有的本质特征成为了现代科学领域中的认知趋势的最完美的体现，也就是，把性质的决定性作用约减为量的决定性作用。这让我们想起了中性媒介的振动性，而正是这种中性媒介的振动性成为了我们对色彩与声音的感觉的客观原因。在振动中的纯粹的量上的不同决定了我们感知客体的差异，这种差异就如同绿色与紫罗兰色，或者是低音A还是高音C。客观事实只能通过一些碎片，偶然地、没有条理性地影响我们的自觉意识，所有的事物都是通过数量以及数字来进行排列的，并且在我们主观反应中的性质上的差异与其真实的对应物的数量方面的差异是一致的。物质的无限多样性在它们的化学关系中是十分明显的，很有可能所有这些都只是在一个同样的基本质料的振动性上有所不同而已。在任何一个地方，只要用数学科学来解释一些给定的物质材料、物质构成，以及运动原因的话，那么数学科学就会倾向于通过纯粹的数理方程的形式表达结构和进程。同样的倾向在另一个形式和应用领域中也是很明显的，换句话说就是，在所有的例子中，我们先前所假设的初始力量以及构成，现在都被一种总体效果理论所代替，这些总体效果理论是由那些以另一种方式被感知但却无法指名的要素产生的。举个例子来说，地球表面的形成现在不再被解释为是由突然的、独特的大灾难所引起的，而被认为是通过诸多的、各种各样的影响缓慢合成的，是通过那些无限变化的微小结果的积聚所导致的，这种影响力又是那些连续的、可以观察的水、空气、植物和气温变化所释放出来的。在历史科学中也可以观察到同样的观点：语言、艺术、机构和各种各样的文化产品，它们都被解释为那些无限微小的贡献的共同作用结果。关于它们起源的奇迹不再被追溯到英雄的个人的品质中，而是要追溯到一个完整的历史群体聚合和浓缩的活动量之中。在精神的，文化的以及政治上的人类生活中，决定了历史场景的整个画面的是那些日常生活中很小的事件的总和，而不是某个领袖特定的个体行为，正是这种群体的力量、日常小事（而不是英雄的个体的力量）现在成为了历史的研究对象。在有些地方，个人的杰出作用以及无可比拟的品质仍然是占据主导地位的，这种个人主义的风行可以解释为这个杰出的个体幸运地继承了遗产，作为一个事件，这种遗产实际上包含并且表现了相当大数量的人类集聚而成的能量和成就。实际上，即使在一个完全的个人主义的道德观中，这种民主主义的趋势也是很有力量的，并且被提升到世界观的高度，尽管与此同时灵魂的内部特征是遭到排斥的。这种现象是与一种信仰相一致的，这种信仰就是：最高的价值存在于每天的生活当中，甚至是每天生活的每一个瞬间当中，而不是存在于那些英雄式气概、大灾难，抑或是那些令人瞩目的英雄行为或者体验之中，因为这些对于最高的价值来说显得过于主观武断和肤浅。我们可能都体验过极大的激情和前所未闻的突发奇想，然而，这种激情与想像力的最终目标取决于它们对于那些安静、普通和正常的时刻所意味着的东西，每一个真实的、整体自我就存在于这种平静普通的时刻。最后，尽管表面看起来都是相反的，并且所有的批评看起来都是合情合理的，但是，从整体上来看，现代仍然可以被概括为一种朝向经验主义的趋势，并因此通过形式与情感的方式展现了它们与当代民主的内部关系。经验主义以最高数量的观察取代了单一的空想或者是理性的观念；经验主义用个别事例的数量的集合代替了单一空想以及理性主义观念的那些性质特征。心理感觉主义与前面提到的方法论目的一致，它认为最崇高、最抽象的形式以及我们抽象的本领仅仅是那些最为平常、最为世俗的事物的聚集和强化。要举出更多的这样例子来证明下述不断增强的倾向应该是很容易的，这些倾向就是，相比于质量关系而言，数量关系越来越占据优势地位，或者更加精确地说，就是把那些质量关系溶解在数量关系中了；元素越来越趋于数量化的方向，仅仅赋予这些元素特殊形式的运动；把所有的那些特殊的、个体化的、质量上的事物都解释为那些无特色的因素与意识，它们就像多与少、大与小、宽与窄、频繁与不频繁等等一样，只是通过数量化的方法来进行约定，即使这些趋向可能永远也不能通过这种数量化的方法完全实现。人们在“多少”这个问题上的兴趣只有在与“是什么”和“如何”这些问题的关系当中才具有某种特殊的现实含义，尽管如此，但是它仍属于我们理智结构的基础，是包含着我们对品质的兴趣之外的一层包装。虽然只有把质上的兴趣与量上的兴趣结合起来，才能够为我们提供一个有结构性的东西，但是，强调它们中的任何一个，都仍然无可置疑地是一种区分不同时期、不同的个人，以及不同的精神区域的主要元素，即使这种强调无法在逻辑上证明是正确的。能够把尼采与其他所有的社会主义价值理论最为明显地加以区别的是这样一个事实：对于尼采来说，只有人类的品质才是具有任何意义的，以至于个体的最高的情形就决定了整个时代的意义，然而，在社会主义看来，只有理想的环境与价值的扩散才是重要的。

上面所提到的关于现代的数量化倾向的例子很清楚地表现为两种不同的类型。第一种类型，就其自身而言，客观的事物和物质（它们是主观概念中事物具有不同的质的基础）仅仅是数量上的不同。第二种类型，元素与力量的单纯的聚集将会产生主观的现象，依据特定角度和价值立场来看，这些现象的特征都是与那些以数量为条件的现象不相同的。在这两种方向中，货币就是现代强调数量因素的这种倾向的最好例证、体现和象征符号。现代社会的事实就是，货币可以购买越来越多的事物，并且与这种现象相联系，货币成为了核心的、绝对的价值，这也导致了事物只有通过它们花费了多少货币的方式来进行评价，而对于它们的价值的性质，我们仅仅是把它们看作是其货币价格的一个功能。事物或高或低的货币价格产生了两个结果。第一个结果是：货币引起了作为主体的人的两种相抵触的情绪，即最为沉重的悲哀和最为高贵的幸福，以及在这两种极端情况之间的所有的中间阶段，就像在另外一些人那里，相同的多样化范畴表现在另外两种极端对立的情绪之中，例如：鄙夷的冷漠与卑躬屈膝的恭敬。从另一个维度来看，货币在富足与匮乏两个方面都呈现出平等的价值意义：现代人喜欢某些事物的典型现象有两个原因，要么因为这些事物是他们花了很多钱买到的，要么是因为这些事物花了很少的钱。货币的意义可以用来替代实物的意义，这一点可以用值钱多或值钱少造成的效果从根本上得到表达，值钱多或值钱少所造成的效果是指向同样的方向上的，尽管不是所有的特殊例子都保持同样的方向。一种思想或者一种价值越能控制它所在范围的其他事物，它的积极作用和消极作用就越可能具有同样的实力。在另一方面，客观上货币数量的增加、以及在个人手中所积累的货币数量的增加，都会促进很多方面的发展，例如带来现实文化的提高，促进商品的生产，提高享受的水平以及生活的形式等，还有那些通过较少的货币以及在个人手中分配的货币较少的情况下无法实现的品质。实际上，人们倾向于认为，相比于其他的经验主义领域，数量化的倾向在货币领域会被更加彻底地实现。当我们从质的现实去追寻量的关系的时候，这些物质上的、个人的以及心理上的元素（它们的数量或多或少地决定了特殊的结果）多少保留了质上的特性。把这种数量上的决定性做进一步的回溯是有可能的，所以，那些昨天看起来无法解决的质的元素，今天就得到了某种修改，而这种修改是可以通过一定的数量关系进行识别的。但是，由于这个过程可以无限地发展下去，并且在任何一个时刻上都会为质的规定性留下一定的空间，因此还有一些无法解答的数量上的问题。只有形而上学才能够构建完全缺乏质的存在的实体，而这种存在的构造是依据纯粹的算术上的关系来实现整个世界的运转的。然而，在经验世界中，只有货币才能从它的质中独立出来，并且只由数量来决定。因为我们不能够像纯粹的能量那样把握纯粹的存在，只有通过对这些存在或者是能量做数量上的修改，才能够搜寻到这些现象的特性，并且，因为我们与所有的特殊事物、它们的元素，以及它们的起源一直都有着一系列的关系（即使不总是同一种关系），所以货币与其自身相关的相应关系的联系被完全地割断了。纯粹的经济价值已经被具体化到一个实体当中，这种实体的数量条件产生了各种各样的特殊的构成形式，而实体本身不需要是任何其他存在，它只需是自己的量就可以了。因此，我们生活中的一个较大的趋势，即把质量简约为数量，在货币当中得到了最为完备并且独一无二的表现。在这里，货币又一次成为了文化的和历史的发展序列中的顶峰，而这一点也正决定了货币的发展方向。

CHAPTER 4 Individual Freedom

Ⅰ

Freedom Exists In Conjunction With Duties

The development of each human fate can be represented as an uninterrupted alternation between bondage and release，obligation and freedom.This initial appraisal，however，presents us with a distinction whose abruptness is tempered by closer investigation.For what we regard as freedom is often in fact only a change of obligations；as a new obligation replaces one that we have borne hitherto，we sense above all that the old burden has been removed.Because we are free from it，we seem at first to be completely free-until the new duty，which initially we bear，as it were，with hitherto untaxed and therefore particularly strong sets of muscles，makes its weight felt as these muscles，too，gradually tire.The process of liberation now starts again with this new duty，just as it had ended at this very point.This pattern is not repeated in a quantitatively uniform manner in all forms of bondage.Rather，there are some with which the note of freedom is associated longer，more intensively and more consciously than with others.Some accomplishments that are no less rigidly required of some than of others and that are generally no less demanding on the powers of the personality none the less seem to allow the personality a particularly large amount of freedom.The difference in obligations which leads to this difference in the freedom compatible with obligations is of the following type.Each obligation that does not exist with regard to a mere idea corresponds to the right of someone else to make demands.For this reason，moral philosophy always identifies ethical freedom with those obligations imposed by an ideal or social imperative or by one's own ego.The other person's demands can consist of the personal actions and deeds of the person under obligation.Or they can be realized at least in the immediate outcome of personal labor.Or，finally，it need only be a certain object，the use of which someone can rightly lay claim to，although he has no influence whatsoever concerning the manner in which the person under obligation procures this object for him.This scale is also that of the degrees of freedom that exist with the performance of a duty.

The Graduations Of This Freedom Depend On Whether The Duties Are Directly Personal Or Apply Only To The Products Of Labour

Naturally，every obligation is generally resolved through the personal actions of the human subject，but it makes a great deal of difference as to whether the rights of the person entitled to some service extend directly to the person under obligation himself or simply to the product of the latter's labor or，finally，to the product in itself-regard less of whether the person under obligation acquired the product through his own labor or not.Even if the advantages of the entitled person remained objectively the same，the first of these forms of obligation would completely bind the obligated person，the second would permit him a little more latitude and the third considerable latitude.The most extreme example of the first type is slavery；in this case，the obligation does not involve a service that is in some way objectively defined，but instead refers to the person himself who performs the service.It includes the employment of all the available energy of the human subject.If，under modem conditions，duties that involve the whole capacity to work as such but not the objectively defined result of this capacity-as with certain categories of workers，civil servants and domestic servants-do not offend against freedom in too crass a manner，then this is a result either of the temporal restriction in the periods of service or of the possibility of selecting the people whom one wishes to be obligated to，or a result of the magnitude of what is offered in return，which makes the obligated person feel，at the same time，that he too has rights.The bondsmen are about at this level，as long as they belong completely，and with their entire working capacity，to their lord's domain，or rather，as long as their services are‘unmeasured’.The transition to the second level occurs when the services are temporally limited（but this does not imply that this level was always later historically；on the contrary，the deterioration in peasants'freedom very often leads from the second to the first level of obligation）.This second level is definitely reached when，instead of a fixed amount of labor time and energy，a specific product of labor is required.At this level，one can observe a certain gradation，namely，that the manorial serf had to hand over either an aliquot part of the yield from the soil-for example，every tenth sheaf of corn-or a permanently fixed amount of com，cattle，honey，etc.Although the latter arrangement might possibly be the more severe and more difficult，it none the less creates great individual freedom for the obligated person，for it makes the lord of the manor more indifferent towards the peasant's type of husbandry.If the serf only produces what is sufficient for his payment to the lord of the manor，then the latter has no interest in the total yield.But this is most important in the case of the aliquot payment，where supervision，coercive measures and oppression are the consequences.The fixing of payments with regard to an absolute rather than to a relative quantity is in itself a transitional phenomenon which suggests that it will be replaced by money.In principle，at this level as a whole，the complete freedom and release of the personality as such from the relationship of obligation could，in fact，be realized，for the person entitled to some service is concerned only with receiving a given objective payment，regardless of where the obligated person procures it.But in view of the economic organization it can actually only be procured by the latter through his own labor，and it is upon this basis that the relationship is constructed.The employment of the person was clearly determined by a person's obligations.This is typically the case wherever in a barter economy the performance of a service commits someone to perform one in return.Service and personality，however，soon diverge to such an extent that the person under obligation would，in principle，be entitled to withdraw his personality completely from the service and perform it in a purely objective manner by producing it，for instance，through the labor of another person.But in reality this is virtually ruled out by the economic system and by means of the product which must be given in payment.In this product the human subject himself remains under obligation and his personal energy is still confined in a certain direction.To what extent the principle of objectivity none the less represents a development towards freedom when compared with the principle of personality is shown，for example，by the greatly increased capacity of estate officials to hold a fief during the thirteenth century.For，as a result，their previous personal dependency was transformed into a merely objectified[dingliche ]one and thereby placed under common law；that is，they were given freedom in all matters except those connected with feudal service.One finds a similar phenomenon today when talented people，who are forced to work for a wage，prefer to work for a company with its strictly objective organization rather than for an individual employer；or when a shortage of domestic servants occurs because girls prefer factory work to service with people of authority，where they are certainly in a better position materially but feel themselves less free in their subordination to individual personalities.

Money Payment As The Form Most Congruent With Personal Freedom

The third level，where the person is actually excluded from the product and the demands no longer extend to him，is reached with the replacement of payment in kind by money payment.For this reason，it has been regarded，to some extent，as a magna Charta of personal freedom in the domain of civil law.Classical Roman law declared that，if a payment in kind were refused，then any demand for payment could be met with money.This is，therefore，the right to buy oneself out of a personal obligation by means of money.The lord of the manor who can demand a quantity of beer or poultry or honey from a serf thereby determines the activity of the latter in a certain direction.But the moment he imposes merely a money levy the peasant is free，in so far as he can decide whether to keep bees or cattle or anything else.Formally，in the sphere of personal labor services，the same process takes place with the right of appointing another person as a substitute，and the other party has to accept the latter unless his competence is in doubt.This right，which sets the whole conception of the relationship on a new basis，must often be fought for since it is felt that，like the right to make payment in money，it is a step on the way towards a dissolution of the entire obligation.The authors of the Domesday Survey characteristically selected terms for the peasants who replaced their socages by regular money payments which were intended to show that they were neither totally free nor totally subordinate.For a long time，however，the names of the money levies continued to reveal their origin in payments in kind：kitchen tax，barrel money，lodging money（instead of the provision of accommodation for the lords of the manor and their officials as they traveled around），honey tax，etc.，were all levied.It is often the case，in a transitional phase，that the original payment in kind was estimated in money and that this sum was demanded as a substitute.This transitional phenomenon also occurs in relationships that are far removed from the example dealt with here.In 1877 in Japan all levies and taxes were still either paid in rice or calculated in rice and paid in money .Similarly，under Elizabeth I，the rent for certain estates belonging to the universities was fixed in terms of corn although payment was apparently made in silver.At least the identity of the value of the obligation is still emphasized in this manner，but any personal bondage resulting from rigidly fixed contents has already been thrown off.If the ius primae noctis had really existed anywhere，then its development would have followed analogous steps；every one of the feudal lord's rights extended to the whole of the obligated person who had to forfeit his most fundamental possessions or rather his being.This would have been the price at which the lord would have granted his female subjects the right to marry.The next stage is that he grants this right-which he can deny at any time-in exchange for a sum of money；the third stage is that the lord's veto as such is abolished and the subject is now free to marry if he or she pays the lord of the manor a fixed sum：bridewealth，marriage money，bridal money，etc.Personal liberation is certainly linked with money，though not exclusively at the second stage，since the approval of the lord of the manor still had to be won and could not be attained by force.The relationship is completely depersonalized only when no factors other than money payment are involved in the decision.Before the abolition of every right of this nature that the lord of the manor possesses，personal freedom cannot rise any higher than when the obligation of the subject is transformed into a money payment which the lord of the manor has to accept.Consequently，the reduction and eventually the complete replacement of peasants'services and payments frequently took place through their transformation into sums of money.This connection between a payment of money and liberation can perhaps be regarded by the person entitled to some service as being so effective that he himself suppresses the liveliest interest in cash payments.The transformation of peasant socages and payments in kind into money levies took place in Germany from the twelfth century onwards and the process was interrupted simply because in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries the feudal lords also fell prey to capitalism.For they realized that payments in kind were far more elastic and susceptible to arbitrary extension than were money payments，which-once they had been quantitatively and numerically fixedcould not be altered.This advantage of payments in kind seemed，in their eyes，great enough to make them seize it in their greed at the moment when otherwise money interests were predominant.It is precisely for this reason that people were completely unwilling to allow the peasant to become rich.The English copy-holder was not generally allowed to sell any cattle without the special permission of his lord.For by selling cattle he obtained money with which he could acquire land elsewhere and extricate himself from his obligations to his previous lord.The greatest step forward in the process of liberation is achieved through a development within money payment itself when a single capital payment replaces the periodical levy.Even if the objective value is identical in both forms of payment，the effect upon the human subject is quite different.As we have pointed out，the various payments levied certainly give the obligated person complete freedom in terms of his actions，provided that he obtains the money required.But the regularity of the payments forces such action into a fixed scheme，imposed by an alien power，and so it is only with the capitalization of the payments that the form of all kinds of obligations is attained which corresponds to the greatest personal freedom.

Thus，it is only with the capital payment that the obligation is entirely converted into a money payment，whereas the money levy with its regular recurrence still preserves at least a formal element of bondage over and above the value required in payments.This distinction is manifested in the following manner.In the thirteenth century and later the English Parliament often decided that the counties had to provide a certain number of soldiers or workers for the king.The representatives of the counties，however，regularly replaced the provision of men with a money payment.But no matter how much personal freedom was saved in this manner，there is a fundamental distinction between this and the rights and freedoms that the English people purchased from their monarchs through single votes on money.If the person receiving the capital is then freed from all the insecurities to which he is subjected in the case of individual levies，then the corresponding equivalent on the side of the obligated person is that his freedom is converted from the unstable form that it possesses when recurrent payments have to be made into a stable form.The freedom of the English people with regard to their monarchs depends partially upon the fact that，by means of capital payments，the people had settled matters with their king once and for all with respect to certain rights：a document from Henry Ⅲ states，for example，‘pro hac concessions dederunt nobis quintam decimam partem omnium movilium suorum ’.It is not in spite of but precisely because of the fact that such an agreement concerning the freedoms of the people reveals a somewhat brutal，external and mechanical character that it implies the most complete antagonism contrary to the feelings of the king that‘no piece of paper should come between him and his people，.Yet precisely for this reason it also constitutes a radical abolition of all the imponderables of more emotional relations which，when freedoms are attained in a form less tied to money transactions，often provide the means for revoking them or making them illusory.A good example of the gradual development in which the substitution of money payment for payment in kind secures the liberation of the individual is revealed in the obligation upon subjects，citizens and copy-holders to accommodate and feed their monarchs，civil servants，patrons and manorial lords in the course of their travels.This burden stemmed from the old service to the monarch and achieved great significance in the Middle Ages.The first step towards an objectification and depersonalization of this obligation occurs when it is strictly defined.Consequently，we can find，even at an early date，an exact specification of how many knights and servants have to be accommodated，how many horses and dogs can accompany them and how much bread，wine，fish，dishes，tablecloths，etc.，must be provided.Nevertheless，the moment that accommodation and feeding were actually required，on the one hand the limits to the services provided must easily have become vague and，on the other，such services definitely reflected the character of a personal relationship.In contrast，we are dealing with a more developed stage when we find that mere deliveries of payments in kind took place without any accommodation.In such cases，the measurement of the quantity could be much more precise than if people had to be accommodated and their appetites satisfied.We learn，for instance，that Count von Rieseck was to receive a certain payment of corn：‘From this corn bread must be baked for his retinue when he is in the village of Krotzenburg so that he will not molest or harm the poor people in the village any further.’Another consequence of this development is that fixed money payments are stipulated for the occasions when people of high rank appear on their travels or at court sessions.Eventually even the variable and personal element that is still present here is removed when these services are commuted into permanent levies which are imposed in the form of subsistence money，masters’daily allowance，mercenary money，even when the former official journeys of the judges，etc.，were replaced by completely different organizations.It was in this way that services of this kind were ultimately completely abolished and were absorbed into the general tax contribution of the lower orders.This development was，as it were，one that lacked any specific form and is，therefore，the correlate of personal freedom of modem times.

In such cases of the replacement of natural services by money payments the advantage is usually mutual.This is a most remarkable fact which calls for an analysis within a wider context.If one starts out from the assumption that the quantity of goods available for consumption is limited；that this quantity does not satisfy the given demands；that，finally，‘the world has been given away’，that is，that in general every good has its owner，then it follows that whatever is given to one person must be taken away from another.Even if one disregards all cases where this obviously does not hold，there still remain countless others where the satisfaction of one person's needs is at the expense of that of another.If one were to consider this as the，or as one，characteristic or basis of our economic life，then it would accord with all those world views that hold as immutable the total amount of values given to mankind-such as ethics，happiness，knowledge-so that only the forms and agents of these values can change.Schopenhauer is inclined to assume that the amount of suffering and joy that each individual experiences is predetermined by his essential nature，that this amount can neither be exceeded nor remain void，and that all extraneous circumstances to which we are accustomed to ascribe our situation only represent a difference in the form in which we experience that unchangeable amount of happiness and sorrow.If one extends this individualistic conception to mankind as a whole，then it appears as if all our striving for happiness，all evolution of material conditions，all the struggle for possessions and being is a mere shifting back and forth of values whose total amount cannot be changed in this way.As a result，all changes in distribution merely reflect the basic phenomenon that one person now owns what the other，voluntarily or not，has given away.This conservation of values obviously corresponds to a pessimistic-quietistic view of life；for the less we consider ourselves able to produce really new values，the more important it is that none are really lost.The widespread notion in India that，if a holy ascetic yields to temptation his merits are transferred to the tempter，teaches this with paradoxical consistency.

But exactly opposite phenomena must also be considered.In all those emotional relationships where happiness lies not only in what one receives but just as much in what one gives，where each is mutually and equally enriched by the others，there develops a value the enjoyment of which is not bought by any deprivation on the part of an opposite party.Similarly，the communication of intellectual matters does not mean that something has to be taken from one person so that another can enjoy it.At least，only an almost pathological sensibility can bring about a feeling of deprivation if an objective intellectual idea is no longer an exclusive personal property but is also shared by others.Generally speaking，one may assert that intellectual property-at least to the extent that it does not extend into economic property-is not gained at the expense of others，since it is not taken from a limited supply but，even though its content is given，ultimately has to be produced by the thought process of whoever acquires it.This harmonization of interests，which emanates from the nature of the object，should obviously also be provided in those economic spheres where competition for the satisfaction of individual needs is gained only at the expense of someone else.There are two types of means for transferring this situation into a more perfect one.The nearest at hand is the diversion of the struggle against fellow men towards the struggle against nature.To the extent to which further substances and forces are incorporated into human uses from the available supply of nature，competition for those that are already obtained will be reduced.The thesis of the preservation of material and energy is，luckily，valid only for the absolute total of nature，but not for that section of it which human purposive action designates.This relative total can，indeed，be multiplied indefinitely by bringing more material and forces into a form that accords with our purposes，that is by annexing them.A progressive technology teaches us to gain even more uses for things，even from what is already completely occupied.The transition from an extensive to an intensive economy is applicable not only to the cultivation of the land，but to any substance that can be subdivided into smaller and smaller parts for more and more specific usages or to the substance's latent forces that are to be released to an even greater extent.The extension of human spheres of power in a variety of dimensions，which belies both the statement that the world is given away free and that the satisfaction of needs is tied to theft of whatever sort，could be termed the substantive progress of culture.Alongside this，there is what might be termed functional progress.The concern here is with finding the appropriate forms that make it advantageous for both parties to exchange ownership of specific objects.Such a form can originally have been attained only if the first owner had the physical power to keep the object wanted by others until he was offered a corresponding advantage，because otherwise the object would simply have been taken away from him.Robbery，and perhaps the gift，appear to be the most primitive stages of change in ownership，the advantage lying completely on one side and the burden falling completely on the other.When the stage of exchange appears as the form of change in ownership，or as stated earlier as a mere consequence of the equal power of both parties，then this would be evidence of the greatest progress that mankind could have made.In view of the mere differences of degree that exist in so many respects between man and the lower animals，many have often attempted to establish the specific difference that separates mankind unmistakably and unequivocally from other animals.Thus，man has been defined as the political animal，the tool-creating animal，the purposeful animal，the hierarchical animal-indeed，by a serious philosopher，as the megalomaniac animal.Perhaps we might add to this series that man is the exchanging animal，and this is in fact only one side or form of the whole general feature which seems to reflect the specific qualities of man-man is the objective animal.Nowhere in the animal world do we find indications of what we term objectivity，of views and treatment of things that lie beyond subjective feeling and volition.

I have already indicated how this reduces the human tragedy of competition.Such is the civilizing influence of culture that more and more contents of life become objectified in supra-individual forms：books，art，ideal concepts such as fatherland，general culture，the manifestation of life in conceptual and aesthetic images，the knowledge of a thousand interesting and significant things-all this may be enjoyed without any one depriving any other.The more values are transposed into such objective forms，the more room there is in them，as in the house of God，for every soul Perhaps the wildness and embitterment of modem competition would be completely unbearable were it not accompanied by this growing objectivation of the contents of existence which remain untouched by all ôte-toi que je m 'y mette .It is surely of deep significance that whatever separates man on the purely factual and psychological level from lower animal species，namely the capacity for.objective contemplation，the disregard of the ego with its impulses and conditions in favor of pure objectivity，contributes to the noblest and most ennobling result in the historical process：to build a world that may be acquired without conflict and mutual repression，to possess values whose acquisition and enjoyment by one person does not exclude that of another，but opens the door a thousand times for him to acquire such values as well.This problem，which is successfully solved in the world of objectivity in a substantial form，comes close to a solution in a functional form.

In contrast to the simple taking-away or gift，in which the purely subjective impulse is enjoyed，exchange presupposes，as we saw earlier，an objective appraisal，consideration，mutual acknowledgment，a restraint of direct subjective desire.It does not matter that originally this may not be voluntary but enforced by the equal power of the other party；rather，the decisive，specifically common factor is that this equivalence of power does not lead to mutual theft and struggle but to a balanced exchange in which the one-sided and personal possession or desire for possession enters into an objective concerted action arising out of and beyond the interaction of the subjects.Exchange-which to us appears to be something entirely self-evident-is the first，and in its simplicity really wonderful，means for combining justice with changes in ownership.In so far as the receiver is，at the same time，the giver，the mere one-sidedness of advantage that characterizes changes of ownership dominated by a purely impulsive egotism or altruism disappears-though this does not imply that the latter relationship is always the first stage of development.

The Maximization Of Value Through Changes In Ownership

But the mere justice that is implied in exchange is certainly only formal and relative：any one person should have neither more nor less than any other.Over and above that，exchange brings about an increase in the absolute number of values experienced.Since everybody offers for exchange only what is relatively useless to him，and accepts in exchange what is relatively necessary，exchange effects a continuously growing utilization of the values wrested from nature at any given time.If the world were really‘given away’and as activity consisted only in the mere moving back and forth of an objectively unalterable quantity of values，then exchange would nevertheless produce，as it were，an intercellular growth of values.The objectively stable sum of values changes through a more useful distribution，effected by exchange，into a subjectively larger amount and higher measure of uses experienced.This is the great cultural task of every new distribution of rights and duties，which always implies an exchange.Even in the case of an apparently quite one-sided transfer of advantages，a truly social procedure will not disregard them.Thus，for example，it was essential during the liberation of peasants in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries not only to ensure that the landowners forfeited what the peasants were supposed to gain，but also to find a mode of distributing property and rights which enlarged the total amount of utilities.

There are two qualities of money that，in this respect，suggest that the exchange of goods or services is best served by money：its divisibility and its unlimited convertibility.The former ensures that an objective equivalence between service and its return can take place.Natural objects can seldom be so determined and scaled in value that their exchange has to be accepted as completely just by both parties.Only money-because it is nothing but the representation of the value of other objects ，and because there is almost no limit to its divisibility and accretion-provides the technical possibility for the exact equivalence of exchange values.However，this represents only the first stage in the progressive development away from the one-sidedness of exchange of ownership.The second quality of money derives from the fact that exchange in kind seldom gives both parties the desired object to an equal extent or is able to release them from equally superfluous ones.As a rule，the more lively desire will be on the side of one party to the transaction while the other party will enter into the exchange only by being forced to do so or where they receive a disproportionately high compensation for doing so.In the case of the exchange of services or benefits against money，however，one party receives the object that they especially need while the other receives something that anyone in general desires.Because of its boundless usefulness and therefore its permanent desirability，every exchange becomes，at least in principle，equally advantageous to both parties.The one who takes the object will certainly do so only if he needs it at this point in time；the person who takes money will accept it because he can use it at any time.Exchange against money makes possible an increase in satisfaction for both parties，whereas with exchange in kind it is frequently the case that only one party will have a specific interest in the acquisition or disposal of the object.Thus exchange against money is so far the most perfect form of solution of the great cultural problem that evolves from the one-sided advantage of exchange of possessions，namely，to raise the objectively given amount of value to a greater amount of subjectively experienced values merely through the change in its owners.This，alongside the original creation of values，is clearly the task of social expediency as part of the general human task：to set free a maximum of the latent value that lies in the form that we give to the contents of life.Wherever we see money serving this purpose，the technical role of money also reveals that exchange is the essential social mode of solving this problem and that exchange itself is embodied in money.

The increase in the amount of satisfaction that in principle is always made possible through the commodity-money exchange processand despite its eudemonistic devaluation by virtue of other consequences-does not rest solely on the subjective state of one or the other parties involved in the exchange.Obviously the objective，economic fruitfulness and the intensive and extensive growth in the amount of goods in the future depends upon the manner in which any given quantity of goods is distributed at the present time.The economic consequences will be completely different depending upon who disposes of the various quantities.The mere transfer of goods from one hand to the other can subsequently considerably modify the quantity of goods in an upward or downward direction.We can even say that the same quantity of goods in different hands means a different quantity，just as the same seed in different soils produces different results.This result of the variation in distribution is most marked with regard to money.However changeable the economic importance of a landed estate or a factory may be for different owners，these variations in returns，over and above quite insignificant amounts，bear the mark of chance and abnormality.Yet the fact that the same amount of money in the hands of a stock exchange speculator or a renter，or the State or the large industrialist produces extraordinarily different returns is a normal phenomenon that corresponds to the incomparable scope which the ownership of money provides to objective and subjective，to good and bad factors for its realization.One can at least say，with regard to the sum total of money owned by a group，that the inequality and change in its distribution is only a change in form that leaves its significance for the whole unchanged.This very change in form produces in this material the most fundamentally diverse results for the economy and for wealth as totalities.It is，furthermore，not merely a question of quantitative differences but rather of differences in quality that on the one hand are absolutely basic to our problem at hand，and on the other also lead back to the question of quantity.In general，the same commodity in different hands implies，economically，only a quantitative difference in the money return，whereas the same amount of money in different hands signifies a qualitative difference in its objective effects.The social expediency that is undoubtedly at work here explains why modern wealth tends to remain for much shorter periods of time in any one family than was formerly the case in non-money economies.Money，so to speak，seeks out the more profitable hand，and this is all the more conspicuous and must result from all the more compelling reasons because the ownership of money may be enjoyed more tranquilly，safely and passively than any other form of property.Since money，by virtue of its mere distribution at a given moment，displays a minimum as well as a maximum of economic profitability，and，further，since change in the ownership of money does not bring about as much loss through clashes and loss of time as do other objects，economic usefulness here possesses a particularly wide scope for its task of attaining a maximum of its total importance by means of the type of distribution of ownership.

We are here especially concerned to resume our interrupted investigation of how far the money economy is able to increase individual liberty to its fullest extent，that is to release it from that primary form of social values in which one person has to be deprived of what the other receives.In the first place，the purely surface phenomenon of the money economy indicates this bilateral advantage.The everyday exchange of commodities in which the commodity is directly inspected and handed over obliges the buyer to undertake in his interest a careful and expert examination of the commodity because the seller-after having offered this opportunity-1

may reject any later complaint.When trade has developed to the extent that purchases are made on the basis of samples，responsibility is transferred to the seller not only for the exact concurrence of the sample with the delivery，but also for any error，since the buyer will naturally profit ruthlessly by any error that he may find in the quality of the sample.Transactions carried out at our modem commodity exchanges have taken on a form that relieves both parties of these responsibilities by being carried out not according to samples but by generally accepted standards that are set once and for all.In this case，the buyer no longer has to rely upon a preliminary testing of the whole or upon the sample with all its chances of error；the seller too is no longer required to supply，according to the individual，the relatively arbitrary sample which entails all kinds of risks.Rather，both now know exactly，when they agree to a contract for a certain standardized quality of wheat or petrol，that they are obliged to deliver an objectively fixed standard of the commodity a standard that has no regard for personal uncertainties and deficiencies.There has thus been established a mode of bargaining at the peak of the money economy which lightens the burden of responsibility for both parties but transposes the subjective basis of the transaction into an objective one and alleviates the disadvantage of one party at the expense of the other.Credit transactions exhibit an exact parallel to this.In the Middle Ages it was very difficult to ascertain the credit-worthiness of an individual businessman，a difficulty that impaired and hampered both his actions and those of the creditors.Only at the stock exchanges of the sixteenth century，particularly at Lyons and Antwerp，were the bills of exchange of certain trading houses considered safe from the very outset.At these exchanges the concept of absolute credit-worthiness emerged，which gave an objective interchangeable value to obligations that were independent of personal considerations of credit-worthiness.None the less，trading houses might still vary in their qualifications，but they were reliable as far as their money obligations were concerned，and such obligations-adequate for this objective purposewere thereby severed from any other individual characteristics.Just as the stock exchange raises the essence of money to its purest form，so it has，through the creation of the general and objective concept of being‘credit-worthy’，typically developed a relief for one side that is not outweighed by a burden for the other but which，on the contrary，provides the same facilities to the creditors as to the debtors by transforming uncertain individual assessments into an objectively valid quality.

Cultural Development Increases The Number Of Persons On Whom One Is Dependent

The importance of the money economy for individual liberty is enhanced if we explore the form that the persistent relations of dependence actually possess.As already indicated，the money economy makes possible not only a solution but a specific kind of mutual dependence which，at the same time，affords room for a maximum of liberty.Firstly，on the face of it，it creates a series of previously unknown obligations.Dependency upon third persons has spread into completely new areas ever since a considerable amount of working capital，mostly in terms of mortgages，had to be sunk into the soil in order to wrest from it the required yield.Such dependency upon third parties also spreads once tools that were directly produced with raw materials are produced indirectly by certain amounts of prefabricated components and once the laborer uses means of production which he does not own.The more the activity and life of people becomes dependent upon objective conditions by virtue of a complicated technology，the greater necessarily is the dependence upon more and more people.However，these people gain their significance for the individual concerned solely as representatives of those functions，such as owners of capital and suppliers of working materials.What kind of people they are in other respects plays no role here.

This general fact，the significance of which we shall examine later，presupposes the process by which a person acquires a definite personality in the first place.It is obviously a result of the fact that a majority of qualities，characteristic traits and forces coalesce in a single person.Even though this person is，relatively speaking，a unity，this unity can become real and effective only by unifying a variety of determinants.Just as the essence of the physical organism lies in the fact that it creates the unity of the life-process out of the multitude of material parts，so a man's inner personal unity is based upon the interaction and connection of many elements and determinants.Each individual trait，viewed in isolation，bears an objective character；that is，it is，in and for itself，still not something personal.Neither beauty nor ugliness，neither the physical nor the intellectual centers of power，neither occupations nor intentions，nor indeed all the other innumerable human traits，unambiguously determine a personality as such.For each of them may be combined with any other quality，even with mutually incompatible elements，and may still be found in the make-up of an unlimited variety of personalities.Only the combination and fusion of several traits in one focal point forms a personality which then in its turn imparts to each individual trait a personal-subjective quality.It is not that it is this or that trait that makes a unique personality of man，but that he is this and that trait.The enigmatic unity of the soul cannot be grasped by the cognitive process directly，but only when it is broken down into a multitude of strands，the re-synthesis of which signifies the unique personality.

Such a personality is almost completely destroyed under the conditions of a money economy.The delivery man，the money-lender，the worker，upon whom we are dependent，do not operate as personalities because they enter into a relationship only by virtue of a single activity such as the delivery of goods，the lending of money，and because their other qualities，which alone would give them a personality，are missing.This，of course，only signifies the ultimate stage of an on-going development which，in many ways，is not yet completedfor the dependency of human beings upon each other has not yet become wholly objectified，and personal elements have not yet been completely excluded.The general tendency，however，undoubtedly moves in the direction of making the individual more and more dependent upon the achievements of people，but less and less dependent upon the personalities that lie behind them.Both phenomena have the same root and form the opposing sides of one and the same process：the modem division of labor permits the number of dependencies to increase just as it causes personalities to disappear behind their functions，because only one side of them operates，at the expense of all those others whose composition would make up a personality.The form of social life that would evolve were this tendency to be completely realized would exhibit a profound affinity to socialism，at least to an extreme state socialism.For socialism is concerned primarily with transforming to an extreme degree every action of social importance into an objective function.Just as today the official takes up a‘position’that is objectively pre-formed and that only absorbs quite specific individual aspects or energies of his personality，so a fully fledged state socialism would erect，above the world of personalities，a world of objective forms of social action which would restrict and limit the impulses of individual personalities to very precisely and objectively determined expressions.The relationship of this world to the former is similar to that of the relationship of geometric figures to empirical bodies.The subjective tendencies and she whole of the personality could then turn into activity by restricting themselves to one-sided functional modes into which the necessary societal action is subdivided，fixed and objectivated.The qualification of acts of the personality would thereby be completely transferred from the personality，as the terminus a quo ，to objective expediency，the terminus ad quem. Thus，the forms of human activity would stand far above the full psychological reality of man，like the realm of Platonic ideas above the real world.Traces of such formations do frequently exist：often a function in the division of labor confronts its holders as an independent imaginary formation so that they，no longer individually differentiated，simply pass through this function without being able or allowed to put their whole personality into these rigidly circumscribed individual demands.The personality as a mere holder of a function or position is just as irrelevant as that of a guest in a hotel room.In such a social formation，taken to its logical conclusion，the individual would he infinitely dependent；the one-sided determination of his performance would make him dependent upon supplementation by the action of all others and the satisfaction of needs would result not so much from the specific abilities of the individual but rather from an organization of work which confronted him externally and which was conceived in accordance with a completely objective standpoint.If state socialism were ever to develop to its fullest extent then it would pave the way for this differentiation of life-forms.

Money Is Responsible For Impersonal Relations Between People

The money economy，however，exhibits such differentiation in the sphere of private interests.On the one hand，money makes possible the plurality of economic dependencies through its infinite flexibility and divisibility，while on the other it is conducive to the removal of the personal element from human relationships through its indifferent and objective nature.Compared with modem man，the member of a traditional or primitive economy is dependent only upon a minimum of other persons.Not only is the extent of our needs considerably wider，but even the elementary necessities that we have in common with all other human beings（food，clothing and shelter）can he satisfied only with the help of a much more complex organization and many more hands.Not only does specialization of our activities itself require an infinitely extended range of other producers with whom we exchange products，but direct action itself is dependent upon a growing amount of preparatory work，additional help and semi-finished products.However，the relatively narrow circle of people upon whom man was dependent in an undeveloped or under-developed money economy was established much more on a personal basis.It was these specific，familiar，and at the same time irreplaceable people with whom the ancient German peasant or the Indian tribesman，the member of a Slav or Indian caste，and even medieval man frequently stood in economic relations of dependency.The fewer the number of interdependent functions，the more permanent and significant were their representatives.In contrast，consider how many‘delivery men’alone we are dependent upon in a money economy！But they are incomparably less dependent upon the specific individual and can change him easily and frequently at any time.We have only to compare living conditions in a small town with those in a city to obtain an unmistakable though small-scale illustration of this development.While at an earlier stage man paid for the smaller number of his dependencies with the narrowness of personal relations，often with their personal irreplaceability，we are compensated for the great quantity of our dependencies by the indifference towards the respective persons and by our liberty to change them at will.And even though we are much more dependent on the whole of society through the complexity of our needs on the one hand，and the specialization of our abilities on the other，than are primitive people who could make their way through life with their very narrow isolated group，we are remarkably independent of every specific member of this society，because his significance for us has been transferred to the one-sided objectivity of his contribution，which can be just as easily produced by any number of other people with different personalities with whom we are connected only by an interest that can be completely expressed in money terms.

This is the most favorable situation for bringing about inner independence，the feeling of individual self-sufficiency.The mere isolation from others does not yet imply such a positive attitude.Stated in purely logical terms，independence is something other than mere nondependence just as，say，immortality is something other than nonmortality；stone and metal are not mortal but it would not be proper to call them immortal.Even the other meaning of isolation loneliness-reflects the erroneous impression of pure negativity.If loneliness has a psychological reality and significance then it in no way refers merely to the absence of society but rather to its ideal and then its subsequently negated existence.Loneliness is a distant effect of society，the positive determination of the individual through negative socialization.If mere isolation does not produce a longing fur others or satisfaction at being remote from others-in brief，a dependency of feelingthen man is placed completely beyond the question of dependency or freedom and actual freedom takes on conscious value because it lacks its opposite-friction，temptation，proximity to differences.If freedom means the development of individuality，the conviction to unfold the core of our being with all its individual desires and feelings，then this category implies not a mere absence of relationships but rather a very specific relation to others.These others have to be there and to be experienced as there in order to become irrelevant.Individual freedom is not a pure inner condition of an isolated subject，but rather a phenomenon of correlation which loses its meaning when its opposite is absent.If every human relationship consists of elements of closeness and distance，then independence signifies that distance has reached a maximum，but the elements of attraction can just as little disappear altogether as can the concept of‘left’exist without that of‘right’.The only question is then one of what is the most favorable concrete formation of both elements for promoting independence，both as an objective fact and as a subjective awareness.Such a situation seems to exist when，although extensive relations to other people exist，all genuinely individual elements have been removed from them；as in the case of mutual influences which are，however，exerted anonymously or regulations established without regard for those to whom they apply.The cause as well as the effect of such objective dependencies，where the subject as such remains free，rests upon the interchangeability of persons：the change of human subjects-voluntarily or effected by the structure of the relationship-discloses that indifference to subjective elements of dependence that characterizes the experience of freedom.I recall the experience referred to at the beginning of this chapter，namely that a change in obligations is often experienced as freedom；it is the same form of relationship between obligations and freedom that continues here only in the individual obligation.A simple example is the characteristic difference between a medieval vassal and a serf：the vassal could change his master whereas the serf was unalterably tied to the same one.This reflects an incomparably higher measure of independence for the vassal compared with the serf，even though their obligations，considered by themselves，would have been the same.It is not the bond as such，but being bound to a particular individual master that represents the real antipode of freedom.Even the modem status of domestic servants is characterized by the fact that employers can choose by references and personal recommendations，whereas the servant has neither the chance nor the criteria for making similar choices.Only in most recent times has the scarcity of domestic servants in large cities occasionally provided the possibility of turning down a position for imponderable reasons.Both sides consider this a major step towards the independence of servants，even though the actual demands of the job are no less heavy than they previously were.If we consider the same form of relationship in an altogether different area，we can say that if an anabaptist sect justifies polygamy and the frequent change of wives on the grounds that this destroys the inner dependency or the female role then this is merely the caricature of a basically sound observation.Our overall condition is at any moment composed of both a measure of obligation and a measure of freedom，such that，within a specific sphere of life，the one is to a greater extent realized in its content，the other in its form.The restraints imposed upon us by a specific interest are felt to be less oppressive if we can choose for ourselves the objective，ideal or personal authorities to whom we are obliged without reducing the degree of dependence.A formally similar development emerges for wage laborers in a money economy.In view of the harshness and coerced nature of labor，it seems as if the wage laborer is nothing but a disguised slave.We shall see later how the fact that they are slaves of the objective process of production may be interpreted as a transitional stage towards their emancipation.From the subjective aspect，however，the relationship to the individual employer has become much more loose compared with earlier forms of labor.Certainly the worker is tied to his job almost as the peasant to his lot，but the frequency with which employers change in a money economy and the frequent possibility of choosing and changing them that is made possible by the form of money wages provide an altogether new freedom within the framework of his dependency.The slave could not change his master even if he had been willing to risk much worse living conditions，whereas the industrial worker can do that at any time.By thus eliminating the pressure of irrevocable dependency upon a particular individual master，the worker is already on the way to personal freedom despite his objective bondage.That this emergent freedom has little continuous influence upon the material situation of the worker should not prevent us from appreciating it.For here，as in other spheres，there is no necessary connection between liberty and increased wellbeing which is usually automatically presupposed by wishes，theories and agitations.The absence of such a connection is largely the result of the fact that the freedom of the worker is matched by the freedom of the employer which did not exist in a society of bonded labor.The slave-owner as well as the lord of the manor had a personal interest in keeping his slaves and his serfs in a good and efficient condition；his authority over them entailed his obligation to them in his own interest.Either this is not the case for the capitalist in relation to the wage laborer or，wherever it may be so，it is usually not realized.The emancipation of the laborer has to be paid for，as it were，by the emancipation of the employer，that is，by the loss of welfare that the bonded laborer enjoyed.The harshness or insecurity of his present condition is very much an indication of the process of emancipation which begins with the elimination of individually determined dependence.Freedom in a social sense，like lack of freedom，is a relationship between human beings.Its growth implies that the relationship changes from one of stability and invariability to one of liability and interchangeability of persons.Since freedom means independence from the will of others，it commences with independence from the will of specific individuals.The lonely settler in the German or American forests is non-dependent；the inhabitants of a modem metropolis are independent in the positive sense of the word，and even though they require innumerable suppliers，workers and cooperators and would be lost without them，their relationship to them is completely objective and is only embodied in money.Thus the city dweller is not dependent upon any of them as particular individuals but only upon their objective services which have a money value and may therefore be carried out by any interchangeable person.In that the purely money relationship ties the individual very closely to the group as an abstract whole and in that this is because money，in the light of our earlier deliberations，is the representative of abstract group forces，the relationship of individual persons to others simply duplicates the relationship that they have to objects as a result of money.By means of the rapid increase in the supply of commodities，on the one hand，and through the peculiar devaluation and loss of quality that objects undergo in a money economy on the other，the individual object becomes irrelevant，often almost worthless.In contrast，not only does the whole class of these objects retain its significance，but as that culture develops our dependency on these and a steadily increasing number of objects grows；one particular pin is just as good or as worthless as any other but the modem civilized individual could not manage without pins.Finally，the significance of money develops according to this very same tendency.The enormous cheapening of money makes specific amounts of money increasingly less valuable and important，while the role of money as a whole becomes more and more powerful and comprehensive.Within the money economy，as these phenomena illustrate，the specificity and individuality of objects becomes more and more indifferent，insubstantial and interchangeable to us，while the actual function of the whole class of objects becomes more important and makes us increasingly dependent upon it.

This development is part of a much more general pattern which is valid for an extraordinary number of aspects and relationships of human life.These usually have their origin in an integral unity of the material and the personal.This does not mean-as it appears to us today-that the contents of life such as property and work，duty and knowledge，social position and religion possessed some kind of independent existence，a real or conceptual independence，and that they entered any close and solidaristic union only after they had been taken up by the personality.Rather，the primary state is a complete unity，an unbroken indifference which is completely removed from the opposition of the personal and objective sides of life.At lower levels of human development，for example，imagination is as yet unable to distinguish between objective，logical truth and subjective，psychological formations.Both the child and primitive man immediately conceive of the psychological forms of the transitory moment，the fantasy，and the subjective impression as reality.The word and the object，the symbol and what it represents，the name and the person are identical，as has been shown by innumerable ethnological findings and by child psychology.This process does not derive from the fact that two separate series mistakenly converge and become confused.Rather，a duality does not yet exist at all，either abstractly or in any concrete manifestation.The notional contents appear from the outset as a completely undivided whole whose unity does not lie in the dissolution of opposites but in their being passed over in silence.Thus，the contents of life-as mentioned above-develop immediately in a personal form.The emphasis on the Ego on the one hand，and the object on the other，evolves from the originally naive unified form as the result of a long，neverending process of differentiation.The way in which the personality grows out of the state of indifference to the contents of life，the way in which，from the other side，the objectivity of things evolves，is at the same time the process of the emergence of freedom.What we term‘freedom’has such a close relationship to the principle of personality that moral philosophy frequently proclaims both terms to be identical.That unity of psychic elements，their tendency to convergence in one centre，that fixed distinctness and uniqueness of the entity that we term‘personality’actually means independence from and exclusion of all extraneous factors，and development exclusively according to the laws of one's own being which we call freedom.Both concepts of freedom and personality contain，in an equal measure，emphasis upon an ultimate and fundamental point in our being which stands opposed to all that is tangible，external and sensual，both within and outside our own nature.Both are but two expressions of the single fact that a counterpart to the natural，continuous and objectively determined existence has emerged that indicates its distinctiveness not only in the claim to an exceptional position vis-à-vis that existence but equally by striving for reconciliation with that existence.If the notion of the personality as counterpart and correlate must grow in equal measure to that of objectivity，then it becomes clear from this connection that a stricter evolution of concepts of objectivity and of individual freedom go hand in hand.Thus we can observe the distinctive parallel movement during the last three hundred years，namely that on the one hand the laws of nature，the material order of things，the objective necessity of events emerge more clearly and distinctly，while on the other we see the emphasis upon the independent individuality，upon personal freedom，upon independence（Fürsichsein）in relation to all external and natural forces becoming more and more acute and increasingly stronger.Even the development of art in recent times exhibits the same dual character.The naturalism of Van Eyck and Quattrocento is，as it were，an elaboration of what is most individual in phenomena.The simultaneous appearance of satire，biography and drama in their first forms exhibit a naturalistic style that centers upon the individual as such.This occurred，by the way，at a time when the money economy began perceptibly to display its social implications.Even at the high point of Greek culture we find a quite objective view of the world that is close to the laws of nature as one side of their view of life，the other side of which embraced the complete inner freedom and self-directedness of the personality.To the extent that the Greeks lagged behind in the theoretical formulation of the concept of freedom and the self，a corresponding shortcoming prevailed in the rigorousness of their theories of nature.Whatever difficulties metaphysics may find in the relationship between the objective determination of things and the subjective freedom of the individual，as aspects of culture their development runs parallel and the accentuation of the one seems to require the accentuation of the other in order to preserve the equipoise of inner life.

And here these general reflections touch upon the specific problems with which we are concerned.In the economy，too，the personal and objective sides of work are originally not yet separated.At first，the indifference slowly splits into opposites and the personal element increasingly recedes from production，product and exchange.This process，however，releases individual freedom.As we have just seen，individual freedom grows to the extent that nature becomes more objective and more real for us and displays the peculiarities of its own order so that this freedom increases with the objectivities and depersonalization of the economic universe.Just as the positive sense of individual independence is not awakened in the economic isolation of an unsocial existence，then neither is it awakened in a world view which is as yet unfamiliar with the law-like regularity and strict objectivity of nature.The sense of a distinctive force and of a distinctive value of being independent is a concomitant of this opposition.Indeed，even with regard to our relationship to nature，it appears as if，in the isolation of a primitive economy-in other words，in the period of ignorance of the laws of nature in the modem sense-a much stronger bondage was reinforced by the superstitious interpretation of natural processes.Only through the growth of the economy to its full capacity，complexity and internal interaction does the mutual dependence of people emerge.The elimination of the personal element directs the individual towards his own resources and makes him more positively aware of his liberty than would be possible with the total lack of relationships.Money is the ideal representative of such a condition since it makes possible relationships between people but leaves them personally undisturbed；it is the exact measure of material achievements，but is very inadequate for the particular and the personal.To the discriminating consciousness，the restrictedness of objective dependencies that money provides is but the background that first throws the resulting differentiated personality and its freedom into full relief.

Ⅱ

Possession As Activity

One is accustomed to understanding the dynamics of life，especially where they relate to external objects，as either acquisition-within which，in its broader sense，we also include labor-or as the enjoyment of things.The possession of things，however，does not appear as movement but as a stationary and，as it were，substantial condition that relates to those other dynamics just as being relates to becoming.In contrast with such a notion，I believe that one must also characterize possession as an action if one wishes to grasp the whole depth and breadth of its meaning.The habit of considering possession as something passively accepted，as the unconditionally complying object which，to the extent that it is really possession，does not require any activity on our part，is false.This fact，misjudged in the realm of being，has taken refuge in the ethical realm，as is the case for instance of pious wishes，whenever we hear it as an exhortation that we should acquire what we want to own，that every possession entails at the same time an obligation，that one should make the most of one's opportunities，etc.At most，it will be conceded that one has to do something further with one's property.On its own，however，it is supposed to be something static，a terminal point，perhaps a point of departure for action but not action itself.If one looks more closely，this passive concept of property proves to be a fiction，a fiction that is particularly well illustrated in certain primitive circumstances.In ancient northern Peru and ancient Mexico too，the tilling of the fields-redistributed every year-was a common task，but the yield was privately owned.Not only was no one allowed to sell or give away his share，but he also completely lost his share if he voluntarily traveled to other parts and did not return in time for the cultivation of his tract of land.In the same way，the possession of a tract of land in the ancient German marches did not yet signify that one was a real member of the march；in order to be a full member on also had to till the soil oneself and，as was stated in early judicial sentences，make use of water and grazing facilities and have one's own hearth.Ownership that is not to some extent activity is a mere abstraction.Ownership as the point of indifference between the movement that leads towards it and the movement that leads beyond it shrinks to zero.The static concept of property is nothing but the active enjoyment or treatment of the object transposed into a latent condition，and the guarantee for the fact that one can at any time enjoy it or act upon it.The child wants to‘have’every object that interests him；one should‘give’it to him.This only means that the child wants to do something with the object，frequently only to look at it and touch it.The concept of property among primitive peoples is not at all characterized by the permanence or the fundamental timelessness of our concept of it.Rather，it encompasses only a momentary relationship of enjoyment and action with the object which is often，in the next instant，given away or lost with complete indifference.Thus，ownership in its original form is much more unstable than stable.Every higher form of ownership develops as a gradual increase in durability，security and permanency of the relation to the object.Mere commentaries of the object transforms itself into a permanent possibility of falling back upon it without the content or the realization of the object meaning anything other or more than a series of individual undertakings or fructifications.The notion that ownership means something qualitatively new and substantial in contrast to individual acts of disposing with things belongs to the class of typical errors which，for instance，has become so important in the history of the concept of causality.After Hume had called attention to the fact that any factually necessary connection that we term cause and effect could never be established，that the empirically real is only the temporal succession of two events，Kant seems to preserve the security of our image of the world by the proof that the mere sense perception of a temporal sequence is not yet experience as such；rather this experience，even in the empiricist's sense，presupposes a real objectivity and necessity of causal sequences.In other words，whereas in the first case perception was to be confined merely to subjective and individual impressions，Kant pointed to the objective validity of our knowledge independent of the individual case and the individual perceiving subject-just as property exists over and above its individual usage.What is at issue here is an application of the very same category by which we sought to establish the essence of objective value in the first chapter.Beyond the specific contents of our consciousness-perceptions，impulses and emotions-lies a realm of objects，in the awareness of which there hovers the thought that they have a lasting objective validity，independent of their singularity and chance of being perceived.The enduring substance of things，the regular order of their fate，the steadfast character of men and the norms of morality，the demands of the law and the religious meaning of the whole universe-all this has，as it were，an ideal existence and validity which can only be expressed in terms of the independence of the individual faces in which that substance and lawfulness presents itself or in which those demands and norms are or are not satisfied，Just as we distinguish the permanent character of a person from the individual acts by which he expresses himself or which may even contradict him，so the moral imperative exists in unbroken dignity regardless of whether or not it is obeyed in practice.Just as a geometrical proposition is valid independently of the individual figures that represent it more or less exactly，so the substance and powers of the world as a whole exist regardless of which parts of it are alter nately conceived by human perception.

Of course，epistemology must distinguish the eternal law of nature from the temporal sum of its realizations.But I do not see what iris supposed to achieve within the activity of cognition except the determination of every single possible realization.The objective entity certainly has to be distinguished from the subjective perceptions in which it is reflected.Yet its importance lies only in the fact that it unambiguously determines every possible perception of the object.It is true that the ethical norm lies beyond those individual actions to which it may be positively or negatively applied，but its sole meaning is to determine the value of any such action，and if there were to exist or could exist no individual actions at all to which it referred，then its actual significance would be zero.Briefly，the category of these substances and values is generally different from each individual case and from the relative sum of these cases，no matter how large it may be.Its absolute sum total，however，is its exact equivalent.Apart from their metaphysical meaning，they are nothing but the abbreviated expression for the totality of individual events，perceptions and actions.One should not be misled by the fact that certainly no empirical series of particulars-which is always incomplete and relative-covers or exhausts the contents of these categories.

This is the form in which the concept of property is employed.Both conceptually and legally property must clearly be distinguished from individual rights and from the enjoyment of the object's benefits.What anybody will do with their property can never be so determined beforehand that one could say that this sum of actions and enjoyments coincides with hisproperty rights.But the totality of possible and actual uses is nevertheless equal to it.No matter how much the jura in re aliena may differ from property rights，there is only a difference of degree between them in terms of their content：property is nothing but a sum total of rights over the object.Even such an apparently unified and circumscribed possession as the Roman partici pate consisted-in terms of the history of law-of access to a series of offices acquired in different ways，just as the lord of the manor owned the serf as‘property’only in the sense that the lord exerted a sum total of individual，slowly expanding rights over him.Yet property expresses and guarantees not a relative sum but，in principle，the absolute sum total of rights over an object.It is precisely for this reason that property as a reality-even though not as a conceptual abstraction-presupposes，as a necessary corollary，action on the part of the proprietor.Static possession exists only in the imaginary aftermath of the processes that precede it，and in the imaginary anticipation of future enjoyment or use.If one disregards these processes which one falsely considers to be only secondary，then nothing remains of the concept of property.

The Mutual Dependence Of Having And Being

The various kinds of this subjective movement that is termed ownership are，to some degree，dependent upon the quality of the object concerned.Money，however，is the object of possession that suffers least from this dependency.Acquisition and use of objects other than money depends upon particular forces，specific qualities and endeavors.It follows directly from this that the specific possession，in turn，exercises an influence upon the quality and activity of the owner.Whoever owns an estate or a factory，in so far as he leaves the management to somebody else and becomes a renter and invests his money in a picture gallery or training stables，no longer has a completely free existence.This means not only that his time is governed in a particular way and form：above all it means that a specific capacity is presupposed as well.Specific material possession entails，at the same time，a retrospective predestination.The possession of different objects is a different type of ownership as soon as it is a question of more than the juridical meaning of property.The ownership of a distinctive object which seeks to be more than the abstract concept of property is nothing that cannot be immediately attached，as if from outside，to every personality.Rather，it exists through an interaction between the forces or qualities of the subject and those of the object and this interaction can only emerge out of a certain relationship of both，that is out of a definite capacity of the subject as well.This is only the reverse of the notion that the owner is determined by the effect of the possession upon him.Just as the possession of specific objects is all the more genuine and active the better and more certainly the human subject is suited for it，so the reverse is just as true：the more fundamentally and intensively the possession is really owned，that is made useful and enjoyed，then the more distinct and determining will be the effects upon the internal and external nature of the subjects.Thus there is a chain from being to having and from having back to being.Marx's question of whether the consciousness of men determines their being or their being determines their consciousness is here answered in one sphere of existence since men's being in Marx's sense includes having.This peculiar connection，by means of which a person，through a specific investment，is directed towards a particular possession which，on the other hand，determines his being，is tighter or looser depending upon the object that forms its pivot.In the case of objects of a purely aesthetic importance，economic values that are determined by an advanced division of labor and objects that are hard to acquire and utilize，the connection will be very strict，and it will be more and more relaxed along the scales of increasingly indeterminate objects，until it finally seems to disintegrate altogether in relation to money.

The Dissolving Of This Dependency By The Possession Of Money

The independence of being from possessing and of possessing from being that is accomplished by money is first illustrated in its acquisition.Because of the abstract nature of money，it is the end of all possible investments and activities.Just as all roads lead to Rome-Rome being conceived as lying beyond every local interest and as standing in the background of every individual action-so all economic roads lead to money.Just as Irenaeus called Rome the compendium of the world，Spinoza called money the omnium rerum compendium .It is at least the constant by-product of ail different kinds of production.The peculiarity of money lies in its being acquired by dealing successfully with other objects.The able farmer will produce many fruits of the earth，the diligent shoe-maker lots of shoes；but lots of money is gained by efficiency in any specific trade.To earn money，therefore，does not require those specific qualities by which the acquisition of other objects is tied to the subject's being.There are，it is true，personalities that exhibit a specific ability for dealing with the money side of all transactions.However，since economic transactions are generally expressed in money，the persistent general commercial ability presents itself as a talent for making money.On the other hand，our interpretation is strengthened precisely by the fact that some people are conspicuous for their lack of understanding of all money matters.That such persons are so much in evidence-more than those who，for example，have no talent for agriculture or for literary or technical tasks-itself illustrates that making money refers to a wider circle of qualities than the production of any other value.The fact that money completely divests itself of its origins-that is，the specific activity by which it is deserved，both in the economic as well as the moral sense of‘deserve’-explains why the enjoyment of a well-deserved fortune easily appears to be snobbish and produces a feeling of hatred in the proletarian that does nor arise out of other prerogatives，such as birth，office，superiority，unless more embittering and aggravating factors are added to them.

On the other hand，an analogous exception may be observed at the very peak of the money economy.The expert may perhaps recognize the‘hand’of a certain personality at work in the transactions of the great financier or speculator，a specific style and rhythm that characteristically distinguishes the actions of the one from those of another.However，we must first of all take into account what has yet to be demonstrated in the case of other phenomena，namely that in the case of extraordinarily large sums of money the purely quantitative character of money actually provides a place for a nuance of qualitative distinctiveness.The indifference，the refinement and banality that are peculiar to money that is constantly circulating do not affect，to the same extent，these rare and spectacular concentrations of immense fortunes in a single hand.It is also essential to point out here that money as a whole takes on a very distinctive character in specific monetary transactions；that is，when it does not function as a medium of exchange to other objects，but as the central content，as the object of a transaction sufficient to itself.Money is an end in itself in the purely bilateral financial operation not only in the sense that it has suspended its qualities as a means，but also in the sense that it is，from the outset，the self-sufficient centre of interest，which also develops its own distinctive norms and，at the same time，completely autonomous qualities and a corresponding technique.Under these circumstances in which money possesses its own coloring and specific qualifications，a personality may be expressed more readily in the management of this money than when it is the colorless means to altogether different ends.Most important of all in such a case is the fact that money requires a quite specific and actually highly developed technique and only such a technique enables the personality to develop its own individual style.Only when the phenomena of a specific category emerges in such abundance and internal isolation that a special technique evolves to master them，only then does the material become so malleable and pliable that the individual is able to express his own style when handling it.

The particular conditions of these cases in which a specific relationship between money and personality springs up，should not be interpreted as contraducing money's alleged function，namely the separation of having and being.This function presents itself from the point of view of utilization in the following way.As we have seen，what distinguishes property from instantaneous enjoyment is the guarantee that use in any direction and at any time can result from property.The fact of ownership of an object is equal to the sum total of all its uses and enjoyments.The form in which this fact appears at any particular moment is the guarantee for all future enjoyments，the certainty that no one else may use and enjoy this object without the consent of its owner.Under prelegal conditions-and also，naturally，in those areas within our civilization that lie outside any direct legal control-such a guarantee is secured only through the strength of the owner to protect his property.As soon as this strength diminishes，the owner can no longer exclude others from the enjoyment of what was hitherto his property，and it will be transferred without further ado to another person to whom it will belong，as long as his strength in turn serves to guarantee the exclusive use of the object.There is no need for such personal strength where laws do exist inasmuch as the totality of owners guarantee to the owner permanent ownership and the exclusion of all others from such ownership.In this case we can say that property is the socially guaranteed potentiality for the exclusive enjoyment of an object.This concept of property is enhanced，as it were，if it is realized in terms of money.For if somebody owns money he is assured by the constitution of the community not only of the possession of the money，but thereby of the possession of many other things as well.If the ownership of an object means only the possibility of some specific use of that object that the nature of this object permits，then the possession of money implies the possibility of the enjoyment of an indefinite number of objects.With regard to all other possessions，public order can only guarantee what the particular type of object is endowed with.The public order can guarantee to the landowner that nobody else is allowed to reap the fruits of his land，that he alone may till the soil or let it lie fallow；to the owner of the forest that he may cut timber and hunt game，etc.By minting money，however，the community guarantees to the owner of money that he can acquire grain，wood，game，etc.，with his money.Money thus produces a higher potential of the general concept of property，a potential for which the specific character of any other type of property is already dissolved by law and the money-owning individual is confronted with an infinite number of objects the enjoyment of which is equally guaranteed by public order.This means that money alone，unlike one-sidedly determined objects，does not determine its further use and fructification.What applies to states，namely that they are preserved only by the same methods on which they were founded，in no way applies to money-even though it is valid for many other possessions，particularly intellectual ones，and also for various possessions acquired by money，which can be preserved only by the very same interest that led to their acquisition in the first place.The complete independence of money from its origins and its eminently ahistorical character is projected in the complete indeterminacy of its use.Hence it seems to us completely unfounded and eccentric to imbue money with personal significance such as resulted from the church's prohibition of interest.Even in the sixteenth century a merchant considered it a sin to practice usury with his own money though not with other people's money which he had borrowed.This distinction appears to he possible only if there exists an inner ethical relationship between money and personality as such.Yet the impossibility of understanding this distinction demonstrates the absence of such a relationship.Wherever such a relationship occurs none the less，it exists not in relation to money as a whole but only with reference to differences in its quantity.It is true that the effect of other kinds of property on the owner and his effect on them is different depending upon their respective amounts；for example，in the case of land the difference between a small farm and a large estate.Yet even here a certain equality of interests and necessary talents exists through which the quality of what is possessed becomes the bond between the owner's possession and his existence.But wherever a definite connection exists between the person and the ownership of money，it is the sheer quantity ），of money itself that operates as the characteristic cause or effect，whereas in the case of other possessions mere quality is incidental to specific personal causes and effects.Only the possession of an enormous amount of money gives a decisive direction to the life of its owner which the wealthy person can hardly escape from.Otherwise，there are only very rare and awkward phenomena that illustrate the personality's direct relationship to money.It has been stated，for instance，that a miser as well as a spendthrift lies hidden in every human being.This means that every individual deviates from the purely average spending pattern of his cultural sphere both downwards as well as upwards.It is almost unavoidable that it appears to the individual，from his subjective sense of values，as if others spend too much or too little on certain items.The reason for，his is obvious.The difference in the valuation of specific objects bought with money is，however，not the sole reason；in addition，the person's individual attitude towards money as such has to be considered.This comprises whether someone is inclined to spend a large amount of money at once or prefers a number of smaller expenditures；whether the gain of a large sum induces him to wastefulness or to greater economy；whether he is apt to go off the deep end in spending such that every expenditure psychologically facilitates the next one，or whether every purchase leaves behind it an inner obstruction so that a justified purchase is made only reluctantly.All these are individual differences rooted in the depths of the personality that become most apparent or appear at all only in a money economy.But here，too，the source of this expression lies in mere quantity.All these differences in behavior with regard to money only reflect a matter of degree，In complete contrast to the differences between personalities which we find in their various relationships to things and people.In general it remains true that any possession other than money places more definite demands upon the individual and exerts more definite effects upon him in such a way that it appears to the individual as a determination of or shackle upon his life.Only the possession of money provides complete freedom in both directions，at least up to a very remote and rarely attained point.

For this reason，those professional classes whose productivity lies outside the economy proper have emerged only in the money economythose concerned with specific intellectual activity such as teachers and literary people，artists and physicians，scholars and state officials.As long as a barter economy prevails there are only very few of them and then mostly on the basis of substantial land ownership.This is the reason why，during the Middle Ages，the Church，and to some extent the nobility，were the supporters of intellectual life.The rank of this category of professional people depends upon the uncompromising question that determines the whole value of their personalities，namely whether they strive for their own betterment or for the realization of an objective goal.Wherever acquisitive activity basically has no other motive than acquisition itself，such a criterion does not exist and may be replaced only through the alternative of ruthless egotism and a reasonable fair-mindedness-though here it would have a basically prohibitive effect.Curiously enough，money，although or rather because it is the most sublimated economic value，may release us from economic bondage-though only，it is true，at the price of confronting us with that relentless question of those activities whose meaning does not lie in economic success.Just as the differentiation of life at a higher stage of development produces new units that form new syntheses，so we already see here that the monetary alienation of possession and the core of the personality provide a new significance for each other.

For the practical content of the activity of the artist，the official，the preacher，the teacher and the scholar is measured against an objective ideal and gives subjective satisfaction to the performer according to these standards.But then there is also the economic success of these activities，which as we know is not always a constant function of their objective and ideal success.Not only can the economic success of these activities be pushed by the lowest dispositions so much into the foreground that it relegates the objective ideals merely to a means；but also，for more sensitive and idealistic people，the material success of the performance may be a consolation，a substitute，a salvation for the insufficiency that is felt with regard to the primary goal.At the very least，it will be something like a respite and a momentary shift of interest which will finally channel new strength into the main objective.Much more difficult and dangerous is the lot of those who do not make any money with their activities，but can only evaluate them objectively and in accordance with their inner demands.They lack the beneficial diversion and consolation of the thought that they have，at least in the economic sense，held their own and have received acknowledgment for it.They feel themselves confronted with an‘all or nothing’ideal and have to adjust to a law that recognizes no extenuating circumstances.Such is the compensation for the advantage of those who are envied because money is of no concern to them and who can devote themselves to a cause.They have to pay fir this advantage by the fact that the value of their action is determined by only one type of success.If their action fails they do not have the comfort，however small，that they at least accomplished a tangible secondary success.Since this success is embodied in the form of money earned，it thereby greatly facilitates the gaining of such importance.First，it demonstrates in the unambiguous manner the fact that the achievement，in spite of falling short of its own or the objective final value，must still he of value to other people.Furthermore，the structure of money is particularly well suited to operating as a relatively satisfactory substitute for an absent ideal major success because，by virtue of its tangibility and its quantitative determination，it provides a certain support and psychological release from the oscillations and fluctuations of qualitative life-values，particularly where these are still in a state of being conquered.Finally，the complete inner estrangement of money from ideal values prevents an entanglement of the sense of values Which would be extremely disquieting to sensitive people.Both consequences remain completely separate，the one may sometimes gain a certain inner importance when the other fails，but they do not mix with one another.Money thus succeeds-after having made the purely intellectual professions possible through the separation of having and being-in supporting，through a new synthesis of what is differentiated，the production of purely intellectual values，not only，as it were，on an absolute，but also on a relative level-precisely where one is not yet accustomed to the indeterminacy of that decision.

Lack Of Freedom As The Interweaving Of The Mental Series

It is precisely through this fundamental separation that the money economy contributes towards the realization of a concept of freedom that is worthy of consideration.Man's lack of freedom is characterized only superficially by the fact that he is dependent upon external powers.This external dependency has its counterpart in those internal relations that intertwine our interests and our actions so closely with other people's that their independent movement and development is hindered.The external lack of freedom often extends to the inner personality.It gives to one psychic realm or energy an unwarranted emphasis such that it interferes with the development of other abilities and cripples their own autonomy.Of course，this constellation may have other causes than that of external dependence.If moral philosophy seeks to define moral freedom as the independence of reason from sensual-egotistic impulses，then this is just a one-sided instance of the whole general ideal of freedom that exists in the specific evolution，the independent living to the full，of a single energy of the soul in relation to all others.Sensuality，too，is‘free’if it is no longer bound up in the norms of reason，that is，no longer restrained by them.Thought is free when it only follows its own inner motives and has detached itself from its involvement with emotions and volitions that influence it in a direction that is alien to it.Thus，one may define freedom as an internal division of labour，as a mutual detachment and differentiation of impulses，interests and capacities.That man is a free person whose various individual energies develop and are alive exclusively for their own purposes and norms.This includes freedom in the ordinary sense of independence from external forces.When closely analysed，the lack of freedom that we endure means nothing other than that the inner strength to combat it，the realm of the soul committed to an imposed purpose，involves other energies and interests which would otherwise not be taken up.We would not view work imposed upon us as lack of freedom unless it hindered us in other activities or enjoyments；we would never view an imposed privation as lack of freedom unless it distorted or suppressed other normal or desired sensual energies.The old saying that freedom means living according to one's own nature is nothing but the concise and abstract expression for what is meant here in a specific concrete sense.Since man consists of a variety of qualities，strengths and impulses，so freedom signifies the independence and evolution of each one of them according to their own laws of life.

The avoidance of the mutual influence of the individual psychic sequences can never be complete；its limit lies in the actual and indispensable psychic connections by which man，with all the diversity of his being and action，ultimately appears as a relative unity.The complete differentiation or freedom of an inner series is an inconceivable concept.The form that may be attained in this respect is that the entanglements and bonds affect increasingly fewer individual points of the series.Wherever one series is unavoidably connected with another psychic sphere，it will achieve its most independent formation if it is bound up with this sphere only generally，but not specifically with each of its elements.Whereas，for example，intelligence is closely connected with the will in such a way that its greatest depths and achievements depend upon the energetic vitality of the latter，thinking will deviate from its own norms and from the independence of its inner consistency as soon as the will that drives it possesses a specific colouring，a special content.Intelligence definitely requires fusing with general life-energy.However，the more it coalesces with specific，forms of that energy，for example，religious，political，sensual，etc.，the more it is in danger of being unable to develop its own independent direction.Thus，artistic production at the levels of particular refinement and spirituality depends on a higher degree of intellectual training；but it will be able to profit by that development，or even to bear it，only if the training is not too specialized but rather unfolds its range and its depth only in more general fields of knowledge.Otherwise，the independence and purely artistic motivation of production experiences distortions and constraints.For instance，the feeling of love may have the most intimate knowledge of the beloved person as a cause or as an effect or simply as an accompanying phenomenon.Yet the enhancement of the emotions to their limits and their capacity to remain there will easily be handicapped if consciousness is focused one-sidedly on some particular quality of the other person.Rather，only if the overall picture of the beloved determines the consciousness of them，and thereby offsets every specific and one-sided quality they possess，does it become a basis on which the feeling of love can unfold its strength and sincerity undisturbed，and can follow its own impulse.The unavoidable coalescence of psychic energies impedes the free development of the particular energies if they are connected not with a specialized side or stage of development of the other，but rather with its general character.Only in this fashion can the distance be established that enables each of them to develop on their own.

Its Application To limitations Deriving From Economic Interests

The case that interests us here is of the same type·The purely intellectual sequences of the psychic process cannot be completely separated from those That carry economic interests whose basic character prevents such a separation，that carry economic interests whose basic character prevents such a separation，not so much in individual or exceptional cases but in the general context of individual and social life.If this restricts the absolute independence and freedom of purely intellectual labour，the it will be more unlikely to do so，the less the bond concerns a specific economic object.If it is possible，in this context，to base the sequence of economic interests solely upon their most general interest，then the intellectual sequence will gain a distance from it which could not be maintained if the sequence of economic interests were to center around a specific object requiring specific attention.In this respect，the most suitable kind of property was，for a long time，the ownership of land·Its kind of management，the immediate utility of its products and their regular marketability all permit a relative differentiation and uninterruptedness of intellectual energies.Yet only the money economy heightened this quality to such an extent that someone could be an intellectual worker and nothing else.Money is so much an exclusively economic value and is so far removed from any economic specificity that，within psychological contexts，it grants the greatest amount of freedom to purely intellectual activity.The latter's diversion is minimized；differentiation of the inner series，which here too may be termed‘being and having’，is maximized.Thus，a complete concentration of consciousness upon non-material interestst makes possible the independence of intellectuality within the division of labour，which in turn results in the evolution of the above-mentioned classes of purely intellectual production.The intellectual flowering of Florence in comparison with Genoa and Venice，which were equally wealthy and endowed with talents，has been attributed partly to the fact that these two had become rich during the Middle Ages largely through commerce，whereas the Florentines，ever since the thirteenth century，had become rich mainly as bankers.The nature of banking required less specific work and left them more freedom for the development of higher interests！

One phenomenon that at first glance seems to contradict money 's emancipatory effects is the development of direct taxation.It seems to contradict them because it intensifies the relationship of the person to money while nevertheless eventually having the same importantce.During the early decades of the nineteenth century，direct taxes were all tied to the object：land，buildings，enterprises，possessions of all kinds bore the tax regardless of the personal circumstances of the owner or manufacturer，regardless of whether he was in debt or really managed to secure a normal profit.This type of tax is no more commensurate with the individual than is the poll tax which is the most impersonal of all known forms of taxation.The bearer of the tax on real estate and trading capital is the owner of the object who is somehow determined individually by this ownership and differs from others who do not own exactly the same object.Even in the Middle Ages in Germany there was a distinction between the dependent and the more privileged tenant farmer；the former paid a per capita rent，every member of the court or the district the same，while in the case of the latter individually arranged rents were raised and were differentiated according to the objective situation.The tax on objects，which forms systematically，though not historically，the second stage the moves toward personalism，is followed historically by taxes on social classes.Their basis was not yet the real individual income of the citizen，but rather was formed according to the main social and economic differences between the major classes within whose wider limits the individual was placed according to his overall social and edonomic circumstances.Only the present state tax seizes upon the exact personal income，so that all that is individually specific is reduced to mere elements which are not decisive at all.Viewed more closely，this increasingly precise adjustment of tax to one's personal situation in a growing money economy implies increased personal freedom.For this process belongs to the trend towards that differentiation of life processes by which each single one remains strictly within its own area and leaves every other as far as possible unaffected.The most objective principle，the poll tax，most thoughtlessly ignores personal differences in circumstances.Every other tax that is not an exact function of individual income but has to be paid out of this income also transgresses its proper sphere and enters into others where it does not at all belong.As is so often the case，the same process that we observed between the economic and other spheres of life repeats itself among the various elements of the economy.Such a relationship was already present when it was demanded，at the first dawning of liberal ideas in the eighteenth century，that the individual's minimum level of subsistence be free of taxation and that the minimum level of existence of the different estates be set accordingly.Here too we find the tendency for taxes to be adjusted-at first negatively by what they exempted-to particular circumstances while leaving purely personal existence completely untouched.And if recently property taxes have reversed this trend to some extent by being imposed on money and physical assets regardless of the income they produce，then this has its origin in the social standpoints that are quite alien to the interest in individual liberty.Both positive and negative instances illustrate the fact that，with the growing importance of money，taxes-as the shadow of propertyare located in an increasingly differentiated manner in their appropriate series and，through pliant flexibility，leave as much liberty as possible to the totality of economic life and to life in general.

The fact that the relationship of the State to its citizens is determined basically by a monetary relationship has its origin primarily in taxation.This refers to a correlation which is important in the present context and may be presented in the following manner.If social strata are primarily differentiated by their money income，then a policy based on the various strata is very restricted because the most divergent objective interests are bound up with the same money income，and therefore any measure taken in the interests of one stratum unavoidably harms many interests within that particular stratum.It is，for instance，impossible to have a uniform middle-class policy if one understands by middle-class levels of income those between 1200 and 3000 marks.For those who are included in this group-businessmen，manual workers，peasants，artisans，white-collar workers，people of independent means and civil servants have almost no parallel interests in other points of legislation.The problems of tariff policy，of the protection of labour，of rights of association，the furthering of wholesale or retail trade，of trade regulations including those of residence requirements and of sabbath observance will be answered in the most contradictory manner within this complex.The same is true for big business and large landed estates which，in terms of their income，belong to the same stratum but，in terms of political interests，belong to completely different camps.The fusion of any one class on the basis of the formal criterion of money income thus loses practical，political significance altogether.The State thereby becomes more dependent upon measures that fit the totality and diversity of interests.This development may be diverted or covered over by countless countervailing forces.However，in principle，one consequence of the replacement of groupings in terms of vocation and birth by groupings in terms of income is that the qualitafive interests that are inexpressible in quantitative terms destroy the external significance of status complexes and thereby direct public policy towards an objective level that exists above any kind of classification.This is part of a very typical correlation between the most perfect objectivity and the most perfect consideration of the subjective which has been revealed by the development of taxation.

Furthermore，I wish to show that money provides the technical possibility for the creation of this correlation in basle social relationships as well I have emphasized several times the medieval theory which gave to every commodity a just，price，that is an objectively fair price，an arithmetical equilibrium between money and real value，and which sought to regulate legally against its upward or downward movement.The result had to be subjective in the worst sense of the word-an arbitrary，inadequate valuation that made a momentary constellation into a fetter for future developments.A just and appropriate price could not be brought about through a process of direet levelling but rather by taking account of the overall state of the economy，the many-sided forces of supply and demand，the fluctuating productivity of people and objects as price-determining factors.Although this excluded，the individually binding fixing of prices，and had to abandon to the individual the estimation of a continually changing situation，prices were now determined by.much more real factors and were，as a result，objectively more commensurabte and just.This development could be improved upon still further.A thoroughgoing ideal of fairness would shape prices，not only by co-determining the complications and changes of supra-individual moments but also the extent of the state of the personal assets of the consumers.Individuals’circumstances，too，are ohjective facts that are very important for the carrying out of individual purchases.However，in principle they do not find any expression at all in price formation.None the less，the fact that one can readily observe this gives this notion its basic paradoxicality.This paradoxicality confronts us in a very obvious manner within the phenomena that I earlier termed the superadditum of wealth：the poor paid more for the same commodity than the rich.On many occasions，however，the contrary is also the case：the poor person often understands his needs to be cheaper and no more difficult to satisfy than the rich person.In a certain sense，the regulation of the price of a doctor's fee appears to he determined according to the circumstances of the consumer.Within certain limits，it is legitimate for the patient to pay the doctor‘according to his circumstances’.Of course，this is particularly justified by the fact that the sick person finds himself in a situation of constraint；he must have a doctor and this must therefore be organized from the outset on the basis of unequal payment for the same services.The citizen too finds himself in a similar situation of constraint in relation to the State whose services be cannot dispense with or even，if he wished，refuse.Therefore it is not surprising that the State takes from the poor a lower compensation for its services and less in taxes，and this not only because it offers greater benefits to the more wealthy.This external objectivity in adjusting reciprocal services has long been recognized as inappropriate and has been replaced by the principle of financial circumstances.The new equation is no less objective than the old one；it is only that it also incorporates personal circumstances among its elements.The new equation has a more appropriate objectivity because the elimination of the general economic circumstances of the individual from price formation particularly where indispensable items are concerned-seems rather arbitrary and disregards the state of things.The variation in the fee for lawyers according to the value of what is contested points in the same direction.Whoever engages in a lawsuit over 20 marks may ask from the lawyer the same effort as a person in a position to contest a case concerning many thousands.In this way，the lawyer is also paid‘according to circumstances’even though they appear in a more objective form than in relation to the doctor.This principle is the basis for further suggestions which will be dealt with in detail later：for example，that the law fixes fines not on a general level but according to level of income，or that the value of the object of litigation which is set as a limit for appeal to the highest court is no longer，as it was previously，an absolute amount but rather a percentage of the yearly income of the plaintiff.Indeed，the system of unequal prices corresponding to the means of the consumer has recently been declared a general remedy in social policy which would possess the advantages of socialism without its shortcomings.We are interested here not in the correctness but only in the existence of this proposal，which signifies in a peculiar way the completion of the economic development of trade.We saw its beginnings in the purely subjective-personal change of possession-through gifts and theft.By placing objects rather than people in relation with one another，exchange achieves a level of objectivity.At first it is rigidly formal and realized by fixed naturalistic quantities of exchange or by publicly imposed prices which，despite their objective form，remain completely subjective and arbitrary in their content.The more liberal trade of modem times enlarged this objectivity by incorporating all variable elements resulting from accidental circumstances into price formation.The objectivity of trade became more elastic and thus more comprehensive.The above suggestion finally attempts to objectify the most individual factors，such that the economic circumstances of the individual buyer are supposed to modify the price of those objects that he needs.This would be a counterpart or at least an extension of cost theory which claims that prices depend on the conditions of production.Now it would become dependent on the conditions of consumption，or at least vary according to them.If the latter conditions were to hold then the interests of the producers would be secured-which，though utopian，is still logically possible-and prices then would adequately express at every sale all the individual circumstances on which they were based.Everything subjective would have become an objective-legal element of price formation.Such a development would correspond to a philosophical view of the world which sees all original objective data as subjective formations.But through this absolute retracing to the Ego，it would gain the unity，cohesion and palpability that give meaning and value to what we call objectivity.Just as in this case the subject would transcend its antithesis to the object which it has completely absorbed and transcended，so，in the other case，the antithesis is overcome by the fact that the objective behaviour has swallowed up all subjectivity without leaving a residue upon which the antithesis could survive.

What is important in this context is that this ideal formation and the fragmentary approximations to reality are made possible by the concept of money.The sum total of economic situational elements can be fully used for price determination only if there is a uniform equivalent expression of value.Only the reduction to a common denominator provides that uniformity among all elements of an individual situation，which would allow their concurrence for the determination of prices according to just standards.Money's remarkable achievement is to make possible the most adequate realization and effectiveness of every individual complication through the equalization of the greatest diversity-as if all specific forms must first be returned to the common primary element in order to secure complete freedom for individual reorganization.This achievement is the pre-condition for a line of development that will eliminate from the prices of things everything rigid that might distort the individual situation and which is expressed with a certain vehemence in the social principle of unequal prices.These prices，however，possess a relative equality in relation to consumer's circumstances and thereby form the subjective pre-conditions-through their total inclusion-according to a principle of complete objectivity.We first become conscious of objectivity through its absolute contrast with the subject.The distinction can in no way be sharp enough to release the object from its naive or confused identity with the subject.Only the higher level of intellectual development encompasses once more the comprehensive concept of objectivity which includes the subject within it.It no longer requires the immediacy of the contrast to be fixed and clear，but rather it raises the subject to a component part of an objective view of the world or to one of its aspects.

In the earlier formulation-which also includes this development-of the situation in which money favours the separation of owning and being，money clearly expresses and correspondingly concludes a process that had already developed on other levels of historical life.As long as the social order was based on the clan，a stable connection between the individual and the soil prevailed.For the clan was the overall owner of the soil，and its interests were identical with those of the individual.The clan formed the tie that connected being and owning before owning became individualistic.The subsequent transformation of the soil into private property-although it appeared to connect the person with his possession-nevertheless loosened any fundamental connection between them in so far as any arbitrary action with regard to the possession was now possible.The emergent money economy，first of all in the medieval cities，brought about a situation in which land could be mortgaged and rents received from it without affecting the owner personally or reducing his social position.The money economy separated the soil and its owner as a person to such an extent that a limitation upon the full property ownership-as indicated by the mortgage-would no longer be interpreted as the degradation of the owner.Mortgaging and selling appear only as the most extreme consequences of that separation between the person and the soil that is first made possible by money.However，this process had already commenced before money existed and at the moment when the institution of the clan dissolved.There is a similar process in the later development which transformed the patriarchal order into the constitutional state with equal rights before the law for all citizens.It also means the detachment of being from owning and of owning from being.Social position is no longer determined by landed property，and property，for its part，is no longer determined by membership of the nobility.This is the result of a whole variety of social movements such as the weakening of the nobility by the numerical increase in the lower strata；the division of labour among the lower strata which on the one hand creates a kind of aristocracy and on the other makes them indispensable to the landed aristocracy；the greater freedom of movement of those strata not tied to the land，etc.All these forces were in operation，for example，at the end of the‘Greek Middle Ages’，when maritime trade and colonialism developed and Athens gained the upper hand economically from the seventh century onwards.When the money economy develops it only completes this process.The landowner too now needs money to keep up with the wealthy upstart.Money as a mortgage，as the proceeds from produce or even from land itself moves between the landowner and his property and，by making him more independent of the specific quality of his property and by depriving it of its individual flavour，brings about a growing equality between nobility and other strata.The principle of equal rights for all which finally predominated in the Greek democracies dissolves the mutual dependence of owning and being.But here，too，the money economy only presents itself as the most powerful，and at the same time as the most obvious，factor and expression of a much more broadly based movement.In Germany in the earliest times we see that landed property was not an independent object but the result of the personal membership of the individual to his local community.Land in itself was not the kind of qualified object whose ownership would have given the individual his significance and his following.Rather，because the person possessed this specific importance he was endowed with a specific piece of landed property.This personal tie had already disappeared in the tenth century and had been replaced by an independence of land and soil that might almost be termed a personification of it.This led to the tendency to split up the land and to draw it into the restlessness of economic life.When this tendency was finally checked by the stability inherent in the soil，it was replaced by money，by the most personally estranged economic object.Yet money was the most suitable substance for the clear expression of that separation of being and owning that had already started to affect the conditions of land ownership.Finally，the same phenomenon was displayed from its other side and from the other end of the social ladder in the thirteenth century.In this period，the peasantry had gained a very high level of freedom，particularly in the eastern German provinces，which had been colonized by free peasants in close connection with the then relatively highly developed money economy.However，after a short period of time a sudden reversal occurred：the manorial system was extended，particularly east of the Elbe，and successfully endeavored to bind the peasant to the soil.At the same time，however，monetary exchange was once more replaced by barter.The binding of the peasants to their economic position，the binding of their existence to their possessions，runs parallel to the decline of the money economy.And even though the money economy has been interpreted as the cause of manorial estates，it is certainly only the most striking of a whole complex of causes which led to the formation of manorial estates at that time.If money as such is considered as an object of property，separated and isolated to some extent from the owner's existence，then，in the historical relations between owning and being，money represents the most definite and decisive and，I would say，the most symptomatic among the factors that bring about the worldhistorical changes in the contraction and the loosening of that relationship.

Freedom As The Articulation Of The Self In The Medium Of Things

If freedom indeed means the ability to bring about the independence of being from owning，and if money ownership most decisively loosens and breaks the dependence of the one upon the other，then there exists another contrasting and more positive concept of freedom which ties being and owning together again on a higher plane，and yet still finds its strongest realization in money.I refer to the earlier assertion that ownership is not，as it superficially appears to be，a passive acceptance of objects but an acting with and upon them.Ownership，however comprehensive and unlimited，can do with things nothing other than provide an opportunity for the will of the Ego to find its expression in them.For to own something actually means that the object does not resist my intentions，that they can prevail over it.If I state that a person‘belongs’to me，it means that he yields to my wishes，that by natural harmony or suggestive compulsion my being and willing continue to be effective in him.Just as my body is mine and‘mine’to a higher degree than any other object because it obeys my psychic impulses more directly and completely than any other object and because these impulses are almost completely expressed in it，so，to the same extent，every object for which this is valid is mine.The fact that one can‘do what one wishes’with an object is not only a consequence of ownership but actually means that one owns it.Thus，the Ego is surrounded by all its possessions as by a sphere in which its tendencies and character traits gain visible reality.Possessions form an extension of the Ego which is only the centre from which impulses extend into things.The objects are mine if they yield to the right and the strength of my Ego to shape them according to my will.This close relationship to the Ego-as if ownership were，at the same time，its sphere and its expression-is not only embodied in ownership as long as it is retained and persists；rather，it is compatible with our conception of ownership as a sum of activities that the giving away of values ，whether it is in exchange or as a gift，may heighten the feeling of personal relation to the possession-the attraction that is bound up with self-deprivation and self-sacrifice and which，in a roundabout way，in a reduction in the Ego implies a strengthening of the Ego.Possessive ties are often realized only when the property is given away；just as one experiences a part of one's body most strongly at the moment of extirpation.The fascination of owning is so intensified at the moment of giving property away-painfully or joyfully-that it is not possible to do so without paying this price.This instant-just like the moment of making a profit-is an eminently‘fruitful moment’.The ability of the personality that ownership represents appears visibly intensified by disposing of what is owned，just as，with some modification，also occurs in the urge to destroy.It is said that among the bedouin Arabs begging，giving presents and plundering are interchangeable concepts and necessarily interrelated actions.This shows，particularly in the light of the individualistic character of these tribes，how all these diverse actions with regard to ownership express-with different premises and in different directions-one and the same importance and value of all objects of possession，namely that the personality expresses，reveals and expands itself in possession.To understand the concept of property it is decisive to recognize that the rigid demarcation between it and the self，between internal and external life，is quite superficial and that it should be made more fluid for the purpose of a deeper interpretation.On the one hand，the whole significance of property lies in the fact that it releases certain emotions and impulses of the soul，while on the other hand the sphere of the Ego extends both over and into these‘external’objects just as the process in the mind of the violinist or the painter is continually transferred to the movement of the violin's bow or the brush.Just as the possession of any external object would be meaningless if it did not have a psychic value，so，at the same time，the Ego would collapse and lose its dimensions if it were not surrounded by external objects which become the expression of its tendencies，its strength and its individual manner because they obey or，in other words，belong to it.It seems probable to me that the development of private property originally and most intensively did not take up the products of labour as such but the tools of labor，including weapons.For tools function most directly as extensions of the limbs，and the resistance of the objects against our impulses is usually experienced only at their end-point.The activity factor present in owning tools is greater than for other possessions and therefore，next to the body，they are the possession that is most completely incorporated into the Ego.Such an interpretation of property indicates the way in which the world views of idealism and freedom are complemented by their counterparts：objects must enter into the Ego，just as the Ego enters into objects.

One might say that the acquisition of property also reflects a growth of the personality beyond the individual-just as procreation has been characterized as such a growth.In both cases，the sphere of the individual extends beyond its original limits，and extends into another self which，however，in a wider sense，is still‘his’.In some Malayan tribes，the father owns only those children who are born after bride wealth has been paid，while those born earlier-though undoubtedly to the same parents-belong to the mother's family.The reason for this rule is naturally a purely practical one，namely，that the children represent objects of value which are given away to the husband by the daughter's marriage but which are retained until the price of the mother has been paid.And yet this custom reveals the deep relationship between possessions and their proliferation.The husband has，as it were，a choice as to whether he wishes to widen his sphere of power by owning his children or retain the values due to his wife's parents.With reference to the earliest Brahmin monks，the Veda states：‘They leave off their activities to strive for sons and to strive for property.For the striving for sons is also the striving for possessions.Both are equally aspirations.’In itself this statement does not yet express the identical content of both endeavors.But it is certainly significant that both examples are chosen to illustrate the identity of all endeavors.In the creation of equals the Ego translates its original limitations on to itself，just as when the Ego is in control of property it enforces the form of its will upon that property.This concept of property as a mere enlargement of the personality is not refuted but rather is strongly confirmed by cases in which the self-awareness of the personality has been transposed from the core of the Ego to its surrounding layers，to property.In the same way，the interpretation of proliferation and of family formation as an expansion of the Ego is not affected by the fact that direct self-interests can recede behind the children's interests.In medieval England it was a mark of bondage if one was not allowed to give away one's daughter or sell an ox without the lord's permission.In fact，whoever was entitled to do so was considered to be free，even if he had to render personal services.That self-awareness has transcended its immediate boundaries，and has become rooted in objects that only indirectly concern it，really proves to what extent property as such means nothing other than the extension of the personality into the objects and，through its domination of them，the gaining of its sphere of influence.This explains the strange phenomenon that sometimes the sum total of possessions appears to be identical with the totality of the personality.There was a certain class of serfs in medieval France whose legal right it was to enter the state of freedom if they gave over all their property to the lord.

Such an interpretation has a number of consequences for the understanding of different types of property.If freedom means that the will may be realized unhampered，then we seem to be freer the more we own，since we have accepted as the meaning of property that we‘can do whatever we want’with its content.We do not have‘freedom’to do so with other people's property or with objects which cannot be possessed at all.Therefore the Latin，and for a long time also the German，language associated the meaning of the word‘freedom’with that of privilege，or of a special favor-precisely in the sense of our interpretation of freedom.Only the nature of the object owned limits this freedom itself.This is already manifest in relation to our body which we consider our own totally unrestricted property.The body obeys psychic impulses only within the laws of its own constitution and certain movements and performances cannot be requested by our will with any success at all.Such is the case with all other objects.The freedom of my will in relation to a piece of wood that I own extends as far as my being able to carve all kinds of tools out of it，but as soon as I want to make a tool that requires the elasticity of rubber or the hardness of stone my freedom diminishes.What our will is able to do with things is comparable with what an artist can elicit from his instrument.No matter how deeply his emotions and artistry may penetrate his instrument，no matter whether the limits of his powers are predetermined，somewhere such limits do exist.Beyond a certain point，the structure of the instrument does not permit any further yielding to the power of the soul.That is the point at which things no longer‘belong’to us.At the present time，we easily overlook the fundamental limits of ownership when our disrupted adaptations and unbridled strivings after freedom and possessions cause us to demand of objects innumerable things which they cannot possibly provide by virtue of their own and our nature.I recall here the lack of understanding-which has only very recently been corrected-of the substance of art，and the fact that we increasingly tend to expect happiness and peace of mind predominantly from external conditions of life，true culture from technological progress，and contentment and perfection of the individual from the objective structure of society.

By and large，the will is so adjusted to our conditions of life that it does not expect from objects what they cannot perform，and the limitation of our freedom by the inherent laws of possession does not result in positive experiences.Despite this，it would be possible to construct a scale of objects based on the extent to which the will can take command of them and the point on this scale at which they become impenetrable，or the extent to which they can really be‘possessed’.Money would be located at the extreme end of such a scale.That unattainable entity that other objects，as it were，reserve for themselves and which is denied to even unlimited ownership，has completely disappeared in the case of money.Money lacks that structure by which other specific objects，even if we legally own them，refuse to yield to our will.It adjusts with equal ease to every form and every purpose that the will wishes to imprint it with.Obstacles may spring only from the objects that lie behind it.Money itself complies equally with every directive with regard to the object，the extent of expenditure，the speed of spending or retaining.In this manner，money grants to the self the most complete freedom to express itself in an object，although only within the limits set by its own lack of specific qualities.Such limits，however，are merely negative and not a result of money's own positive nature，as is the case with all other objects.All that money is and has to offer is given without reservation to the human will and is completely absorbed by the will.When money can no longer achieve this，then this is due to the fact that nothing remains of money beyond that limit which，for all other objects，represents a reserved and unyielding part of their existence.

Formally，money is both the most responsive and，because of its complete emptiness，the most irresponsive object.Since the money we own belongs to us absolutely and without reservation，we are unable，in other words，to extract anything more from it.In general it is true to say that an object can mean something to us only by being substantially something in itself；only then，to the extent that the object sets limits to our freedom，does it give way to our freedom.This logical antithesis，in whose tension the unity of our behavior towards objects is realized，reaches its maximum in money.Money means more to us than any other object of possession because it obeys us without reservation-and it means less to us because it lacks any content that might be appropriated beyond the mere form of possession.We possess it more than anything else but we have less of it than all other objects.

The flexibility of money，as with so many of its qualities，is most clearly and emphatically expressed in the stock exchange，in which the money economy is crystallized as an independent structure just as political organization is crystallized in the state.The fluctuations in exchange prices frequently indicate subjective-psychological motivations，which，in their crudeness and independent movements，are totally out of proportion in relation to objective factors.It would certainly be superficial，however，to explain this by pointing out that price fluctuations correspond only rarely to real changes in the quality that the stock represents.For the significance of this quality for the market lies not only in the inner qualities of the State or the brewery，the mine or the bank，but in the relationship of these to all other stocks on the market and their conditions.Therefore，it does not affect their actual basis if，for instance，large insolvencies in Argentina depress the price of Chinese bonds，although the security of such bonds is no more affected by that event than by something that happens on the moon.For the value of these stocks，for all their external stability，none the less depends on the overall situation of the market，the fluctuations of which，at any one point，may for example make the further utilization of those returns less profitable.Over and above these stock market fluctuations，which even though they presuppose the synthesis of the single object with others are still objectively produced，there exists one factor that originates in speculation itself.These wagers on the future quoted price of one stock themselves have the most considerable influence on such a price. For instance，as soon as a powerful financial group，for reasons that have nothing to do with the quality the stock，becomes interested in it，its quoted price will increase；conversely，a bearish group is able to bring about a fall in the quoted price by mere manipulation.Here the real value of the object appears to be the irrelevant substratum above which the movement of market values rises only because it has to be attached to some substance，or rather to some name.The relation between the real and fin I value of the object and its representation by a bond has lost all stability.This clearly shows the absolute flexibility of this form of value，a form that the objects have gained through money and which has completely detached them from their real basis.Now value follows，almost without resistance，the psychological impulses of the temper，of greed，of unfounded opinion，and it does this in such a striking manner since objective circumstances exist that could provide exact standards of valuation.But value in terms of the money form has made itself independent of its own roots and foundation in order to surrender itself completely to subjective energies.Here，where speculation itself may determine the fate of the object of speculation，the permeability and flexibility of the money form of values has found its most triumphant expression through subjectivity in its strictest sense.

The Possession Of Money And The Self

In the light of this，the extension of the self that the possession of money signifies is a very distinctive one.In one sense it is the most complete extension that can be derived from an object；in another sense it is a very limited one because money's flexibility is only that of an extremely liquid body which takes on any form，and does not shape itself but receives any form it may possess only from the surrounding body.This constellation explains psychological facts of the following type.Somebody told me that he felt the urge to buy everything that he liked very much，but not for himself or in order to possess it；his only concern was to give an active expression to his liking of the things，to let them pass through his hands and，in so doing，to set the stamp of his personality upon them.Money thus provides a unique extension of the personality which does not seek to adorn itself with the possession of goods.Such a personality is indifferent to control over objects；it is satisfied with that momentary power over them，and while it appears as if this avoidance of any qualitative relationship to objects would not offer any extension and satisfaction to the person，the very act of buying is experienced as such a satisfaction，because the objects are absolutely obedient to money.Because of the completeness with which money and objects as money-values follow the impulses of the person，he is satisfied by a symbol of his domination over them which is otherwise obtained only through actual ownership.The enjoyment of this mere symbol of enjoyment may come close to the pathological，as in the following case related by a French novelist.An Englishman was a member of a bohemian group whose enjoyment in life consisted of his sponsorship of the wildest orgies，though he himself never joined in but always only paid for everybody-he appeared，said nothing，did nothing，paid for everything and disappeared.The one side of these dubious events-paying for them-must，in this man's experience，have stood for everything.One may readily assume that here is a case of one of those perverse satisfactions that has recently become the subject of sexual pathology.In comparison with ordinary extravagance，which stops at the first stage of possession and enjoyment and the mere squandering of money，the behavior of this man is particularly eccentric because the enjoyments，represented here by their money equivalent，are so close and directly tempting to him.The absence of a positive owning and using of things on the one hand，and the fact on the other that the mere act of buying is experienced as a relationship between the person and the objects and as a personal satisfaction，can be explained by the expansion that the mere act of spending money affords to the person.Money builds a bridge between such people and objects.In crossing this bridge，the mind experiences the attraction of their possession even if it does in fact not attain it.

This relationship also forms one side of the very complex and important phenomenon of avarice.To the miser who finds his happiness in owning money without ever getting round to the acquisition and enjoyment of particular objects，his sense of power must be more profound and more valuable than any control over specific things could ever be.For every possession-as we saw earlier has its own limitations.The greedy soul who seeks complete satisfaction and wants to penetrate the ultimate，innermost and absolute nature of things，is painfully rejected by them.Objects are，and remain，something for themselves which resists their complete integration into the sphere of the self and allows the most passionate ownership to end in dissatisfaction.The possession of money is free of this hidden contradiction that exists in all other kinds of possession.At the price of not attaining the objects at all and of removing all specific enjoyments that are dependent upon specific things，money can provide a sense of power that is far enough removed from specific empirical objects that it does not come up against the limitations of ownership.It is only money that we own completely and without reservations；it is only money that merges completely into the function we assign to it.The miser's pleasures must be aesthetically similar to this.For such pleasures lie beyond the impenetrable reality of the world and cling to its light and glimmer which are fully accessible to the mind and can fuse completely with it.However，the phenomena associated with money are but the purest and most transparent parts of a series that also realizes the same principle in other forms.I once met a man who，though no longer young and a well-to-do family man，spent his whole time in learning all kinds of things such as languages without ever using them-dancing without doing it，and skills of all sorts without making use of them or even intending to do so.This is precisely the miserly type-gaining satisfaction from having fully acquired potentialities without ever conceiving of their actualization.Here，too，the attraction must be associated with aesthetic attractions：the control over the pure form and ideal of things or of action in the light of which any progress towards their realization has to be viewed as a decline through unavoidable obstacles，reverses and insufficiencies which must reduce the enjoyment of perfect control over things.Aesthetic contemplation-which as a mere function is possible with regard to any object though is particularly easy with respect to the‘beautiful’-most thoroughly removes the barrier between the self and the objects.To aesthetic contemplation，the notion of the objects unfolds so easily，effortlessly and harmoniously as if they were solely determined by the basic laws of the self.Hence the feeling of liberation which is part of the aesthetic mood，the release from the dull pressure of things，the expansion of the joyful and free self into things，the reality of which usually oppresses it.Such must be the psychological flavor of the enjoyment of merely owning money.It means a peculiar coalescence，abstraction and anticipation of actual ownership and gives to consciousness that free scope，that ominous self-extension through an unresistant medium，that selfabsorption of all possibilities without doing violence or denying reality，all of which are part of any aesthetic enjoyment.The definition of beauty as une promesse de bonheu also points to the similarity between the psychological form of aesthetic attraction and the attraction of money；for where else can the latter lie if not in the promise of pleasures that money may provide？

There are，incidentally，attempts to combine the attraction of a still unformed value with that of a formed value.This is one of the ways in which jewelry and precious stones are important.The owner appears as a representative and master of potentially very valuable assets，which on the one hand represent a concentrated power at his disposal and on the other reveal that the absolute liquidity and mere potentiality that this significance otherwise entails is already congealed into a certain determinate form and specific quality.A particularly striking example of the attempt to combine these two functions is found in India where it has long been customary to save money in the form of jewelry；that is，the rupees were melted down and manufactured into jewelry（this involved only a small loss in value）and then stored in order to spend again as silver in an emergency.Such value obviously has a more concentrated effect and is richer in quality.By giving value a specific quality and eliminating its atomistic structure，it appears to belong more closely to the individual.This is very clearly illustrated by the fact that，since Solomon's day，the royal hoarding of precious metals in the form of utensils has been based on the belief that the treasure was thereby most closely tied to the family，and safe from the enemy's grasp.The direct use of coins as jewelry frequently means that one wishes to have one's assets immediately by one's person and under control.Jewelry exists as an irradiation of the personality and it is therefore essential that it is something valuable when it radiates the personality.Its ideal as well as its practical importance rests upon its close relationship to the self.It has been pointed out that，in the Orient，all wealth is conditional upon the fact that the owner is able to flee with it，to make it，as it were，absolutely dependent upon what may happen to him.On the other hand，the enjoyment of money ownership undoubtedly contains an idealistic element.To stress this element appears to be paradoxical only because，on the one hand，the means of making money usually lacks this element，and on the other，the person who utters the joy usually does so in a form altogether different from the idealistic one.This should not disguise the fact that the pleasure of money ownership as such is one of the most abstract enjoyments and is most remote from sensual immediacy since it is exclusively experienced through a process of thought and fantasy.It resembles the joy of victory which is so strong in some people that they do not even ask what they gain by such a victory

The peculiar way in which money ownership represents the extension of the personality and which is inherent in any possession，is supported and complemented by the following observation.Every sphere of objects that I imbue with my will is limited by laws inherent to the objects，by laws that my will is unable to break.Such a limit is set not only by the passive resistance of the object but also，from the other side，by the limitations on the capacity of the subject to expand.The range of objects that obey the will may be so large that the self is no more able to fulfill its task.If we say that possession equals freedom；if my freedom-that is，the predominance of my will-increases with the quantity of my possessions，then this is really possible only up to a certain point，beyond which the self is unable to exert and enjoy its potential control over objects.Of course，greed may pass beyond this point，but it reveals its absurdity both in the lack of satisfaction that is part of its own fulfillment，and in the occasional constraint and restriction with which an excess of possessions turns into the opposite of their original character and goal.This leads to such phenomena as that of unprofitable property because the activity of the owner is insufficient to realize a return on it；the despot who becomes tired of ruling his slaves，because his will to power ceases at the unconditional surrender and the lack of resistance which would make him aware of himself；the property-owner who has neither the time nor the strength for the enjoyment of his property because both are completely spent in the administration and nurture of that property.The objects differ only as to the question of what amount of the personality they can absorb at the same time，that is at what point possession becomes meaningless，because the self is able to control it only up to this point.Here，too，money occupies a special position.One might say that the administration，control and enjoyment of money requires less of the person than do other possessions，and that therefore the size of the possessions he may control and build up to an economic sphere of his personality is larger than it is for other forms of property.

Apart from real enjoyment，the appetite for all other things is also，as a rule，limited by the receptivity of the subject，regardless of whether the limitations of both coincide and regardless of how far the distance between them may be.It is only money-as we stated in another context-that does not remain within the bounds that assert themselves as the limitations of the appetite for the object.Naturally，this is all the more the case，the more money is really nothing but‘money’，-that is a pure medium of exchange without any directly enjoyable value of its own.As long as cattle，food，slaves，etc.-that is，consumer goodsfunction as money，its ownership means lavish consumption rather than an expanding purchasing power.In other words，here are two different formulae for the extension of the personality alongside one another.In the case of primitive barter，it consists of the acquisition of objects by immediate consumption.One might say that the self extends continuously from the centre，whereas in the case of abstract metal money，to say nothing of credit，these direct stages are of no consequence and are omitted.In contrast with the‘wealthy’man in the barter economy，a rich person in modem society may lead the most modest and restricted life without any gratification in the direct sense.One can，for example，in the culinary sphere discover two tendencies that are a consequence of a developed money economy；namely that，apart from festivities，rich people tend to eat more simply，and that the middle class at least in the cities eats much better.Through the distant effects of money，the self may enjoy his power，his satisfaction and his will in relation to the remotest objects in as far as he neglects and passes over the more direct strata which wealth，in a less developed society，puts at his sole disposal.The ability of the individual to expand，which is limited by his own nature，exhibits a greater elasticity and freedom in relation to money than to any other possession.The difference between this and our earlier considerations is this：earlier it was the specific character of objects that broke down the expansion of the self，whereas here it is the limitations in personal power that must diminish after a certain quantity of possessions has been reached，even with the complete elasticity of the objects.This is a phenomenon that is postponed if the possessions take the form not of specific objects but of money.

Ⅲ

Differentiation Of Person And Possession

In the history of ideas we are confronted with a development which，despite its simple outline，belongs to the most significant forms of intellectual life by virtue of its comprehensive and penetrating realization.Certain areas are originally completely dominated by one characteristic trait.In the course of time，the unity is split into more and more sub-sections，one of which represents the character of the whole in a limited sense and contrasts with the other parts.Formulated differently，despite any relative contrast between two elements of a whole，both may none the less exhibit the character of one of them，though in an absolute form.For instance，the moral-philosophical justification of egoism may be correct in claiming that we cannot possibly act other than in our personal interest and for personal satisfaction.But then one would have to differentiate between egoism in the narrower and in the broader sense.Whoever satisfies his egoism in the well-being of others，possibly by sacrificing his own life，we must undoubtedly continue to call an altruist and to distinguish from a person whose actions are detrimental and repressive towards others.Such a person would simply be an egotist，even though egoism in its absolute and broadest sense as reflected in any action may also be included in the former.Furthermore，the epistemological assertion that all cognition is a purely subjective process that is exclusively experienced and determined by the Ego may be correct.None the less，we distinguish such conceptions that are objectively true from those that are only subjectively true and are the result of fantasy，arbitrariness and deception of the senses，even though，taken absolutely，this more objective knowledge may also be of merely subjective origin.The trend is towards an increasingly basic and more conscious separation between objective and subjective conceptions which originally moved in a vague psychological state of indifference.This kind of progress seems to repeat itself in the relationship of man to his possessions.Generally speaking，every possession is an extension of the self，a phenomenon within subjective life，and its whole meaning lies in the conscious and emotional reflexes that are the mind's response to the self's relations to objects.In the same sense，everything that happens to possessions is a function of the subject who imposes his will，his emotions，his way of thinking upon them and finds his expression in them.However，historically，this absolute importance of practical as well as intellectual possessions is first embedded in a state of indifference which，located beyond the opposition of the self and the objects，unites them both.The ancient Germanic constitution which tied property directly to the person；the later feudalism which，conversely，tied the person to the property；the close connection with the group as a whole which allows its members a priori to grow into their economic positions；the hereditary character of occupations by means of which activity and position on the one hand，and the familial person on the other，became interchangeable terms；every organization of society based on estates and guilds that is conditioned by an organic interplay of the person with his economic position-all these are instances of the lack of differentiation between property and person.Their economic contents or functions and those that represent the self in a more limited sense are very closely and mutually dependent.Such a relationship is observable in the ancient custom of allowing the personal belongings to go with the dead into their grave.It was present too，while this custom existed，when the Anglo-Saxon king had a claim to his vassal's armour when he died，since it was due to the king as a vestige and substitute for the person bound to him.Generally speaking，just as the thought of primitive peoples has no separate categories for distinguishing merely subjective imaginings and the objectively true conception，so it is unable to distinguish clearly in practice between the particular lawfulness of things（wherever this is recognized it readily appears as the personified form of a divine principle）and the self-centered personality that is independent of external factors.The development beyond this stage lies in the separation of these elements.All more advanced economic technology rests upon an increasing independence of economic processes.These processes become detached from the immediacy of personal interests；they function as if they were ends in themselves；their mechanical process becomes less and less disturbed by the irregularities and unpredictability of the personal element.On the other hand，the personal element becomes more and more independent，the individual becomes capable of developing more independently，not of his economic situation as a whole but of the a priori factors that determine it.In the course of this distinctive development that separates the objective and subjective elements of practical life，the fact that，in the last analysis，the totality of this practice is based on human subjectivity naturally remains hidden.The organization of mechanical equipment or a factory，even though it accords with objective laws，is，after all，enclosed in personal purposes by the subjective intelligence of man.But this general and positive character is，in a relative sense，focused on one of the elements in which the whole of the area has become fragmented.

Spatial Separation And Technical Objectification Through Money

If we investigate the role of money in this process of differentiation，it first of all becomes apparent that the role of money is associated with the spatial distance between the individual and his possession.The owner of shares who has absolutely nothing to do with the management of the company；the creditor of a state who never visits the indebted country；the owner of a large landed estate who has leased his lands-they all leave their property to purely technical management，with which they have nothing to do，even though they reap the rewards from their property.And this is possible only by means of money.Only if the profit of an enterprise takes a form that can be easily transferred to any other place does it guarantee to property and the owner，through their spatial separation，a high degree of independence or，in other words，self-mobility.It enables the property to be managed exclusively according to objective demands while it gives its owner a chance of leading his life independently of the specific demands of his possessions.The power of money to bridge distances enables the owner and his possessions to exist so far apart that each of them may follow their own precepts to a greater extent than in the period when the owner and his possessions still stood in a direct mutual relationship，when every economic engagement was also a personal one，and when every change in personal direction or position meant，at the same time，a corresponding change in economic interests.For primitive peoples in all parts of the world，the solidarity between the person and his possession is expressed in the custom that the possession，to the extent that it is personal，conquered or acquired by work，goes into the grave with the owner.It is obvious from such customs how much objective cultural development，whose progress depends upon the continuous accumulation of inherited goods，became retarded.It is only through inheritance that possessions reach beyond the boundary of the individual and begin to lead an objective and independent existence.The personal type of property，firmly united with the owner，is exemplified in early German law，which stated that every gift could he revoked in cases of ingratitude on the part of the recipient，and in some other cases too.The completely personal character of early forms of ownership is rarely illustrated so acutely：a purely individual-ethical relationship between giver and receiver has a direct legal-economic consequence.The money economy resists such a mode of interpretation even in its external form.The natural gift can be returned in kind whereas the money gift very rapidly becomes not‘the same’，but only equal in value.Thus the emotional relationship that might have continued between the natural gift and the giver，and that might have been the basis for the counter-demand，is weakened or negated.A gift in the form of money distances and estranges the gift from the giver much more definitely.Because of this separation of object and person，the ages of highly developed and independent technology are also the epochs of the most individualistic and subjective personalities.The beginning of the Roman Empire and the last 100-150 years are both periods of a highly developed money economy.The technically refined character of legal concepts is also a corollary of that abstract individualism that goes hand-in-hand with the money economy.Prior to the time when Roman law was adopted in Germanyat the same time as the money economy was also adopted-German law had the concept neither of representation in legal affairs，nor of the institution of the juristic person，nor of property as an object of free individual will，but only as a representative of rights and obligations.A legal system that operates with such concepts is no longer possible once the individual has been separated from his fusion with the particular conditions of possession，of social position and of the material contents of existence and has become completely free and self-reliant，and yet has become conceptually divorced from all specific existential tendencies that belong solely to a money economy.Thus，those life interests that have become purely objective may be abandoned legal techniques of Roman law.The relationship between land and its owner in Germany has gone through several stages.First，landed property was the result of personal position in the community，and then，conversely，the person was determined by his property，until finally the independence of landed property took on a totally different meaning，one in which，at the opposite extreme，the personality was allowed to emerge as completely independent of it.In primeval times the personality covered and absorbed the objective relations，while during the patrimonial period the reverse was the case.The money economy differentiates them both，and possession and personality become independent opposites.The culmination that this formal process experiences in money itself is most clearly illustrated by the expression that appears in the most fully developed money economy，namely that money‘works’，that is，that it exercises its functions according to forces and norms that are in no way identical with those of its owner but are relatively independent of them.If freedom means only obeying one's own laws，then the distance between property and its owner that is made possible by the money form of returns provides a hitherto unheard-of freedom.The division of labor between subjectivity and the norms of the object is now complete；each has to solve its tasks as they are given by its very nature and this is done free from determination by internally alien elements.

The Separation Of The Total Personality From Individual Work Activities

This differentiation by means of money and this individual freedom brought about by differentiation affects not only the renter.The labor relationship too develops similar features although they are more difficult to recognize.Earlier economic organizations and their present remaining forms in crafts and the retail trade rest upon relationships of personal subordination of the apprentice to the master，the employee to the store-owner，etc.At such levels economic activity is carried out through the interaction of factors that are entirely of a direct personal nature.In each case，this activity is carried out in the spirit of the leading personality and with the subordination of all others to his subjectivity.Through the growing superiority of technical and objective dements over personal ones this relationship takes on a different character.The production manager and the labourer，the director and the salesman in the large department store are now equally subordinated to an objective purpose，and only within this common relationship does subordination continue as a technical necessity in which the requirements of production as an objective process are expressed.Even though this relationship may be harder on the worker in some essential personal respects，it none the less contains an element of freedom in that his subordination is no longer ofa subjective-personal nature but is now a technical one.It is now clear that any basic liberation that ties in the transition of subordination into an objective form is very closely related to the complete effectiveness of the money principle.As long as the wage labour relationship is interpreted as a contractual one it certainly contains an element of subordination of the labonrer to the employer，because the working person is hired-as is still most drastically the case with our domestic servants，in reality，the person as a total，unlimited complex of labour power is hired and thus enters the relationship of dependence and subordination to another personas a complete person.However，as soon as the labour contract emerges as the purchase of labour as a commodity-and this is the final result of the money economy-we are dealing with the offer of a completely objective work activity which，as has been stated，is introduced as a factor in the process of co-operation and is thus combined and Co-ordinated with the work of the employer.The growing self-confidence of the modem worker is the result of the fact that he no longer feels subordinate as a person，but rather contributes only an exactly prescribed amount of workprescribed on the basis of its monetary equivalentwhich leaves the person as such all the more free，the more objective，impersonal and technical work and its regulation become.The established money economy has similar consequences for the manager inasmuch as he now produces for the market ，that is for totally unknown and indifferent consumers who deal with him only through the medium of money.His work is thus objectified in a way that is less concerned with and less dependent upon the individual person than was the case when local and personal considerations for particular buyers-especially where natural exchange relationships still prevailed-affected it.The development of personal freedom for domestic servants too is just as much the result of the increased importance of money.The personal bond that is reflected in domestic servants’‘unmeasured’services is basically connected with their being members of the household.It seems unavoidable that，if the servant lives under the same roof with his master，is fed and sometimes clothed by him，his services will be quantitatively undetermined and dependent only upon the changing needs of the domestic situation，and that he has also to conform to the general rules of the household.Increasingly the tendency seems to be towards transferring different services to people outside the household who have only to contribute quite specific services and who are paid solely in cash.The dissolution of the natural economic household community would therefore lead，on the one hand，to an objective fixing of service and to the moretechnical nature of services，and，as a direct consequence of this development，to the total independence and selfreliance of servants.

If the development of working conditions continues to proceed in this direction-one made possible by monet-then the elimination of certain abuses may perhaps he achieved，abuses for which the modem money economy has largely been blamed.The hostile rejection of relations of superordination and subordination is the motive for anarchism，and although socialism replaces this formal motive hy a more material one it is nevertheless one of socialism's basic tenets to remove the differences in human conditions that entitle one person to command and force the other to obey.To a mode of thought that takes the degree of freedom to he the measure of everything socially necessary，the abolition of superordination and subordination is a self-evident demand；but a social order based on superordination and subordination would in itself be no worse than one based on a constitution of complete equality if sentiments of oppression，suffering and degradation were not connected with the former.If socialist theories possessed more psychological clarity with regard to themselves，then they would reflect an awareness of the fact that the equality of individuals is not at all the absolute ideal or the categorical imperative，but only the means for removing certain feelings of affliction for promoting certain feelings of well-being.The only exceptions are those abstract idealists to whom equality is a formal，absolute value demanded at the price of all kinds of possibly practical disadvantages，even at the price of pereat mundus. Wherever the significance of a demand does not lie in the demand itself but in its consequences it is in principle always possible to rephce it，since the same consequences may be attained by very different causes.Such a possibility is very important in this context since all experience has so far shown that superordination and subordination are quite indispensable means of organization and their disappearance would destroy one of the most fruitful forms of social production.It is thus our task to preserve superordination and subordination as long as they have these positive consequences，while at the same time eliminating those psychological consequences that make such relationships abhorrent，This goal is clearly approached to the extent to which all superordination and subordination become merely technical forms of orgsnization，the purely objective character of which no longer evokes any subjective reactions.The point is to separate the organization and the person in such a way that the objective requirements of the organization leave the individuality，freedom and essential life-experience of the person completely undisturbed，no matter what his position in the processes of production and circulation may be.One aspect of such a condition is already realized within a status order-that of the officer corps.Blind subordination to one，s superiors is not experienced as degrading since it is nothing but a technically indispensable requirement for military purposes to which every superior is also subjected in the same strict and objective manner.Personal honor and dignity are completely separate from this super-and subordination，which is only attached to the uniform and is merely an objective condition that has no reflection upon the person.Such differentiation also appears，in a different form，in connection with purely intellectual activities.There have always been persons who，despite the total subordination and dependence of their external positions in life，have preserved complete intellectual freedom and individual productivity，particularly in those periods when well established social orders were traversed by the influx of new cultural interests.The old orders continued to exist while the new interests created altogether new internal hierarchies and categories-as in the age of humanism and in the last stages of the ancien régime. It is possible to conceive of a situation in which these casually evolving and onesided conditions become the form of social organization as a whole.Super-and subordination in all its possible forms is now the technical pre-condition for society accomplishing its goals.Yet it also reflects upon the intrinsic significance of the person，upon his freedom to develop，upon his personal relationship with other individuals.By dissolving this amalgamation，all upper and lower positions，all commanding and obeying would become a purely external technique of the social order，which could throw neither light nor shade upon an individual's position and development.Furthermore，all the resentment that is due to the too-close association of the formalities and mere expediency of the social hierarchy with the personal-subjective qualities of the individual，and which calls for an abolition of that hierarchy，would disappear.Through this objectification of performances and its organizational pre-conditions one could preserve all the technical advantages of the latter and avoid the disadvantages for subjectivity and freedom which today are the source of anarchism and，to some extent，of socialism.This is the direction of culture for which，as we have seen，the money economy paved the way.The separation of the worker from his means of production，the ownership of which is considered the focal point of social misery，would in a completely different sense appear as a salvation.This would be true if such a separation were to mean the personal differentiation of the worker as a person from the purely objective conditions in which the techniques of production placed him.Thus，money would bring about one of those frequent developments in which the importance of one factor turns into its opposite as soon as it has unfolded a basic，consistent and all-pervasive effectiveness out of its original limited efficiency.Money，by driving a wedge between the person and the object，not only goes on to destroy the beneficial and supporting connections，but also paves the way for the independence of both from each other so that each of them may find its full satisfactory development undisturbed by the other.

Wherever the organization of labor，or rather social relationships in general，change from the personal to the objective form-and，parallel with this，from a barter to a money economy-we find first of all，at least partially，a deterioration in the position of the subordinate.Payment in kind，in spite of its dangers，undoubtedly possesses certain advantages for the worker compared with money wages.For the greater external exactitude of money wages-in other words，their logical precision-is outweighed by the greater uncertainty of their final value.Bread and shelter possess an absolute value for the worker which，as such，remains the same at all times.The fluctuations in value，which is a general inescapable phenomenon，are at the employer's expense and thus relieve the worker from this risk.The identical money wage，however，may mean something altogether different today than it did a year ago-the chances of fluctuation are shared by the payer and the receiver.This uncertainty and irregularity，which often enough may be quite tangible，is the unavoidable corollary of freedom.The manner in which freedom presents itself is as irregularity，unpredictability and asymmetry，This is why liberal political constitutions like the British are characterized by internal anomalies，lack of organization and systematic structure，whereas despotic compulsion culminates in symmetric structures，uniformity of elements and avoidance of anything that is improvised.Price fluctuations，from which the worker receiving money wages suffers more than if he is paid in kind，have a profound connection with the life-form of freedom whose corollary is the money wage，just as payment in kind reflects a life-form of bondage.According to the maxim，‘where there is a freedom there is also a tax’，whose relevance extends far beyond politics，the worker pays the tax，in the form of the instability of money wages，for the freedom made possible by the introduction of money wages.We may observe a corresponding case where，conversely，the contributions of the socially subordinate pass from contributions in kind to money payments.Payment in kind provides a more informal relationship between the beneficiary and the indebted.The serf's labor power is directly embodied in the grain，the fowl and the wine that he delivers to the manor house.They are parts of himself，not yet fully separated from his past and his interests.Correspondingly，they are directly enjoyed by the receiver，who has an interest in their quality and who receives them as personal contributions just as they are given as such.There is，therefore，a much closer relationship here between the obligated and the entitled person than is the case in monetary contributions where the personal element disappears on both sides.Thus we find that duringthe early Middle Ages in Germany，the custom of alleviating the contributions of the serfs by little favors prevailed.Upon delivering their dues they would receive a small gift in return，at least food and drink.Such a benevolent and，one might even say，gracious treatment of the bondsman has largely disappeared to the extent that money payments increasingly replaced contributions in kind and more severe officials replaced the lord of the manor who lived close to the serfs.The appointment of officials indicated the objectification of management.The official managed according to impersonal technical requirements which were supposed to produce maximum objective results possible；he stood between the serf and the lord with the same depersonalizing effect as money moves between the service of one and the enjoyment of the other.This separate independence of the mediator is also illustrated by the fact that the change from services in kind to money payment provided the bailiff with new opportunities for dishonesty in relation to the absent lord of the manor.However much the peasant profited from the personal character of the relationship，and in this respect suffered from its objectification and transformation into a money relationship，it still remained the indispensable road to the abolition of serfdom as a whole.

Alongside this series of phenomena that tend toward this final goal，there stands another series which，at first glance，has quite opposite consequences.It appears，for example，as if piece wages rather than hourly wages would more readily correspond to the development of a society based on money relationships.Hourly wages stand much closer to the bondage of the whole person with his total but not clearly determinable powers than do piece wages by which the individual，precisely determined and completely objectified service is paid for.Yet at present the worker is，in general，better off with hourly wages-except，for example，where technical advances such as machinery with greatly increased productivity is introduced and piece rates are paid-precisely because payment is not tied to the performance with the same rigidity as are piece rates.Hourly wages remain the same even if stoppages，slow-downs，or mistakes alter the output.Thus，the hourly wage seems more worthy of human beings because it presupposes a greater trust and also grants somewhat more actual freedom within the work situation than do piece wages，in spite of（or rather because of）the fact that the whole person becomes part of the labor process and thus the relentlessness of the purely objective standard is mitigated.The enhancement of this relationship is to be seen in the‘appointment’，in which individual performance hardly provides the direct standard of payment；rather，the sum total of performances，including the chance of any interference owing to human deficiencies，is paid for.This is best illustrated by the position of the higher civil servant whose salary no longer has any quantitative relationship to his various achievements，but is supposed to grant him an appropriate standard of living.A recent court decision cancelled part of the salary of a Prussian civil servant who，through his own responsibility，has been unable to function for some time；the Supreme Court rescinded the verdict on the grounds that the salary of an official is not a pro rata compensation for his services but an‘annuity’assigned to secure for him a standard of living that corresponds to his social position.Payment is here focused on the personal element and excludes an exact objective equivalent.It is true that these salaries are always fixed for longer periods；so that if the value of money fluctuates，then the stability of living is threatened by the stability of the income，whereas payment on the basis of individual achievement may be more easily adjusted to changes in money value.But this hardly refutes my interpretation，which emphasizes the decisive independence of the personal from the economic element.That the salary is generally fixed and not adjusted to individual fluctuations in economic development certainly signifies the detachment of the person as an independent unit from the particularity of economically assessable work activities.The stable salary relates to the changing level of its particular uses just as the whole personality relates to the necessarily changing quality of its individual performances.The most extreme stage of this series of phenomena-though not always recognizable as such-is remuneration for those ideal functions whose incommensurability with any amount of money renders the notion of‘appropriate’fees illusory.The importance of such payments can only be to contribute so much as is necessary to provide a proper standard of living to the performer，but not to provide an objective equivalent between payment and performance.Therefore，an honorarium is paid to the artist whether or not the portrait turns out well；an admission fee is paid to the musician even if he plays badly；a fee is paid to the physician whether the patient gets well or dies.In contrast，at lower levels，payment is more directly and precisely related to the quality of the work performed.The extent to which the objective relation of the performance and its equivalent is here discarded is illustrated，at first glance，by the disproportion in the various amounts of money paid.If someone pays twice the amount for one portrait，theatre ticket or lecture，as for another and assumes he has paid the appropriate amount in either case，then he certainly cannot say that this picture is exactly twice as beautiful as the other，or that this lecture is twice as true as the other.Even if one wished to relate the payment-independently of objective measurements-to the different quantities of subjective enjoyment，one could not logically claim an exact relationship as indicated by money equivalents，and the higher one moved up the scale of achievements the less satisfactory would be the assessment.Finally，the complete irrelevance of remuneration to performance is vividly illustrated when one pays a few marks for the performance of a music virtuoso which lifted us to the highest levels of our senses.The only meaning we can give to such an equivalent lies not in our supposing it to be equal to the value of the performance，but in its contributing to the artist's support as a proper basis for his performance.For the highest productions the general trend seems to be reversed.The money equivalent is no longer related to individual performance without reference to the person standing behind that performance but is now related directly to this person as a whole regardless of his individual performance.

On closer scrutiny，however，this series of phenomena tends towards the same point as the other series which found its ideal in the pure objectivity of the economic position Both of them equally culminate in a complete，mutual，independence of economic achievement and personality.For this is surely the meaning of the fact that an official or an artist is not remunerated for his specific activity but is given an honorarium to allow him a certain personal standard of living.In any case，and in contrast to the former series，the personal element is here connected with the economic，but in such a manner that the achievements for which-in the last analysis-the equivalent is given are very sharply contrasted with the total person as the basis of the achievement.The liberation of the personality that is secured by its differentiation from the objective achievement is carried out in the same maimer.This liberation commences either from the growing objectivities of the achievement，which finally enters into economic circulation on its own account and leaves the person outside it，or from the honorarium or support of the person as a whole，from which the individual achievement emerges without a direct and individual economic equivalent.In both cases the person is liberated from the constraints that would be imposed on him by a direct economic linkage with the particular objective achievement.

The second series certainly seems to be less conditioned by the money economy than the first.If the mutual independence between person and achievement is the result of emphasis upon the latter，then money has to play a greater role than if the person is，so to speak，the active element in the process of separation.For money，because of its impersonal character and its unconditioned flexibility，has a strong affinity with the individual achievement as such and has a specific power to accentuate it.In contrast，the level and security of the standard of living，which is equivalent to the success of the person as a whole，could just as well be secured in more primitive economic forms by granting to the person a piece of land or some kind of regalia.The specific importance of money within this series arises not out of the part played by the receiver，but that played by the giver.For money enables us to compare the total equivalent for the life-work of a single worker with the contributions of many people ，whether these contributions are the entrance fees of concert-goers or the expenditures of book-buyers or the taxes of citizens from which the civil servants are paid.This is particularly evident in the connection which the money economy evidently has with the emergence of mechanical reproductions.After the invention of book printing，the same price per sheet of paper is paid for the most miserable trash as for the most sublime poem；after photography had been invented，a copy of the Bella di Tiziano is no more expensive than that of a cabaret singer；after the mechanical production of utensils was developed，utensils in excellent taste are no more expensive than those in poor taste.If the creator of one kind makes more money than the other，then this is only the result of the larger number of buyers who all pay the same price regardless of quality.Herein lies the democratic character of money when compared with giving gifts to honored persons as in forms of feudalism or patronage.In contrast，the anonymity of the person who gives money certainly supports the subjective independence and free growth of the person who offers the goods.The rapid growth of mechanical modes of reproduction in particular，and consequently the tendency of money prices to become independent of the quality of the product，breaks the bond that a specific payment for a specific achievement had created between buyer and producer.In the process of differentiation between the person and his achievement，money supports the independence of the person regardless of whether the separation of the originally intertwined elements has its origins in the growing independence of the person or of the achievement.

The Development Of The Individual's Independence From The Group

If we look back to the beginning of our analysis，then the whole process of separation between person and object appears predominantly as a differentiation of the person.His different interests and spheres of activity gain relative independence through the money economy.When I stated that money separates economic achievement from the total personality and that，taken absolutely，the achievements always remain a part of the personality，then，on the other hand，this no longer means his total entity，but rather only those psychic contents and energies that remain after the economic ones have been excluded.Thus，one may characterize the effect of money as an atomization of the individual person，as an individualization that occurs within the person.This is，however，a general tendency of the whole society that extends inside the individual.Just as money affects the elements of the individual，so it also acts primarily upon the elements of society，that is upon individuals.This latter consequence of the money economy is often emphasized and is associated with the fact that money is a transfer to the achievements of others.Whereas in the period prior to the emergence of a money economy，the individual was directly dependent upon his group and the exchange of services united everyone closely with the whole of society，today everyone carries around with him，in a condensed latent form，his claim to the achievements of others.Everyone has the choice of deciding when and where he wants to assert this claim，and therefore loosen the direct relations of the earlier form of exchange.The extremely significant power of money to lend to the individual a new independence from group interests is manifested not only in the basic differences between a barter and a money economy but also within the money economy itself.Towards the end of the sixteenth century the Italian writer Botero wrote，‘We have two flourishing Republics in Italy，Venice and Genoa.The Venetians who deal with trade in goods are only fairly wealthy as private citizens，but they have developed an extremely great and wealthy state.The Genoans，on the other hand，are totally devoted to monetary transactions，and in so doing have increased their private fortunes whilst impoverishing their state.’Inasmuch as interests are focused on money and to the extent that possessions consist of money，the individual will develop the tendency and feeling of independent importance in relation to the social whole.He will relate to the social whole as one power confronting another，since he is free to take up business relations and co-operation wherever he likes.Those who trade in general merchandise，however，even if geographically extended as far as that of the Venetians，have to look much more for co-operation and employees within adjacent groups since its complicated and substantive techniques impose local bonds from which money transactions are free.This difference is even more decisive in the relationship between landed property and money.It is a tribute to the depth of this sociological connection that，a hundred years after Botero's statement，men were led to observe that the State would be greatly endangered if the possessions of the ruling class consisted largely of movable personal property which could be removed in times of public emergency，whereas the landowner's interests were inextricably bound up with their native state.The increasing share of industrial wealth as against loaded property in England has been held responsible for the decline in ruling class communal social interests.The original self-government was based on personal participation of this class which has now given way increasingly to organs of the State.Mere money taxes，to which we are now reconciled，illustrate the connection between the growing pecuniary character of all relationships and the decline of the old social obligations.

New Forms Of Association Brought About By Money

Money not only renders the relations of individuals to the group as a whole more independent，but also makes the content of that particular association and the relationship of its members to it undergo a completely new process of differentiation.The medieval corporation embraced the whole individual：a guild of cloth-makers was not an association of people who merely represented the interests of cloth-making，but a living community in technical，social，religious，political and many other respects.Even though such an association was centred around objective interests，it rested directly on its members and they were absorbed in it.In contrast to this unified form，the money economy has made possible innumerable associations that either only take money contributions from their members or tend to pursue merely monetary interests.This is particularly true of the joint stock company whose shareholders are united solely in their interest in the dividends，to such an extent that they do not even care what the company produces.The objective lack of connections between the subject and the object in which the individual has a merely monetary interest is reflected in his personal lack of connection with other human subjects with whom he shares only money interests.Here we have one of the most effective cultural formations，namely the possibility of the individual participating in associations，the objective purpose of which he wants to promote and enjoy，without that connection implying any commitment on his part.Money has made it possible for people to join a group without having to give up any personal freedom and reserve.This is the fundamental，extremely important divergence from the medieval form of unification which did not distinguish between man as such and man as a member of an association.It enclosed within its sphere the general economic，religious，political and familial interests alike.The permanent association at that early stage did not yet know the form of a mere‘contribution’，least of all the provision of its main funds from them and from‘limited liabilities’.By and large，and with the reservations necessary for such a general assertion，one might say that the relationships between people were formerly more close，less modified by mediations，mixtures and reserve，and that there were less problematical and noncommittal relationships.The relationship of the individual to the association stood under the banner of‘all or nothing’；it did not tolerate a divisibility by which only a small particle of the otherwise independent personality might enter into it；and it did not find its ideal in giving and receiving money as the sole bond of association.This is valid not only for the individual but also for collective individuals.The money form of common interests also ensures that associations have the possibility of joining a higher unit without its members having to forgo their independence and distinctiveness.After 1848 in France，syndicates of workers'associations of the same trade grew up，each of them delivering its indivisible fund to this syndicate and thereby providing an indivisible common fund whose main purpose was wholesale purchasing and offering of loans，etc.It was never the purpose of the syndicates，however，to unite the participating associations in a single unit；rather，each of them was supposed to preserve its particular organization.This case is particularly instructive since，at that time，workers had a genuine obsession for forming associations.If they expressly rejected this amalgamation，then there must have been particularly strong reasons for mutual reserve；and yet they found a way of realizing the existing unity of their interest in that communality through the mere possession of money.Certain associations were made possible only on the basis of this completely subjective freedom which is guaranteed to the members of an association by their money contributions.The Gustav-Adolf Association，the large community for the support of needy evangelical congregations，could never have come into existence and into operation unless the character（or rather lack of character）of money contributions had blurred the contributors'doctrinal differences.Lutheran，Reformed and United congregations would have been unwilling to take part in any other form of amalgamation.The same is true when the common monetary interest becomes，as it were，a passive one.Until well into the Middle Ages，the English clergy did not form a unified group.In particular，the bishops as feudal lords belonged to the lords and were socially and politically distinct from the lower clergy.This was true as long as taxes were imposed only on landed property，of which the lower clergy had no part.As soon as the special taxation of all clerical income was introduced，a common interest for the whole stratum was created，either in terms of their opposition to it or acceptance of it.An expert on that period considers this event to be one of the most important bonds that first made the clergy a unified estate.With the beginning of a money economy，economic associations developed out of the same basic motive.The increase in capital and its growing importance from the fourteenth century onwards made it necessary to keep it undivided within the family.By keeping the shares of all the heirs together the shares became much more profitable to each heir than they would have been had they been apportioned.In Germany，the participation of all heirs in the undivided legacy began to take place，as well as the continued existence of the old enterprise under joint ownership.This had two consequences.The separation of the household economy from the enterprise evolved within the family so that members of the family in which the domestic economy and other capital were separated could remain partners in an undivided‘firm’.While the importance of money capital had dissolved the traditional family economy，it now created a new unification of these separate elements，in which pure objectivity-released from specific private interests-entered into the interests of capital.Secondly，this communal mode of interests was also taken over by others who did not even have family relations.After the‘business’had been severed from the household economy，the unifying form of working capital was also chosen by people unrelated to each other，so that by the beginning of the fifteenth century the general partnership was already in use.Only after the money economy became prevalent did purely corporate property develop in which the commonly owned capital was objectified in an independent unit and legal entity over and above the various partners，who participated in it with only a limited part of their assets and not as individual persons.Only money could bring about such associations which in no way prejudiced the individual member；only money could create，in its pure form，the association for particular purposes-a type of organization that united individuals'non-personal elements in a project.Money has provided us with the sole possibility for uniting people while excluding everything personal and specific.

The disintegrating and isolating effect of money is not only the general precondition and corollary of this conciliatory and unifying quality；under specific historic conditions，money simultaneously exerts both a disintegrating and a unifying effect.For instance，the organic unity and narrowness of family life has on the one hand been destroyed as a consequence of the money economy，while，acknowledging this as a fact，it has been emphasized that the family has become almost nothing more than an organization for inheritance.If，among several interests that determine the cohesion of the group，one of them has a destructive effect upon all the others，then this interest will survive the others and become the only bond between the different elements whose other relationships it has destroyed.It is not only because of its immanent character，but precisely because it destroys so many other kinds of relationships between people，that money establishes relationships between elements that otherwise would have no connection whatsoever.Today there probably exists no association between people that does not include some monetary interest，even if it is only the rent for a hall for a religious association.

The more the unifying bond of social life takes on the character of an association for specific purposes，the more soulless it becomes.The complete heartlessness of money is reflected in our social culture，which is itself determined by money.Perhaps the power of the socialist ideal is partly a reaction to this.For by declaring war upon this monetary system，socialism seeks to abolish the individual's isolation in relation to the group as embodied in the form of the purposive association，and at the same time it appeals to all the innermost and enthusiastic sympathies for the group that may lie dormant in the individual.Undoubtedly，socialism is directed towards a rationalization of life，towards control of life's chance and unique elements by the lawlike regularities and calculations of reason.At the same time，socialism has affinities with the hollow communistic instincts that，as the residue of times long since past，still lie in the remote comers of the soul.Socialism's dual motivations have diametrically opposed psychic roots.On the one hand，socialism is the final developmental product of the rationalistic money economy，and on the other it is the embodiment of the most basic instincts and emotions.The distinguishing feature of its power of attraction lies in rationalism as well as a reaction to rationalism.Socialism has found its inspiring ideal in the ancient clanhood with its communistic equality，while the monetary system leads the individual retrospectively to concentrate upon himself and to leave as objects of personal and emotional devotion on the one hand only the closest individual relations，such as family and friends，and on the other the most remote spheres such as the mother country or mankind.Both social formations are completely estrangedeven though for different reasons-from the objective association for specific purposes.One of the most comprehensive and fundamental sociological norms is in operation here.One of the few rules that may be established with some degree of generality concerning the form of social development is this：that the enlargement of the group goes hand in hand with the individualization and independence of its individual members.The evolution of societies usually commences from relatively small groups which hold their elements in strict and equal bonds and then proceeds to a relative larger group which affords freedom，independence and mutual differentiation.The history of family formations such as that of religious communities，the development of economic co-operatives and political parties all illustrate this type.The importance of money for the development of individuality is thus very closely related to the importance that it possesses for the enlargement of social groups.This latter role requires no further elaboration here.I have previously analyzed the interaction between the money economy and the size of the economic unit.The more people develop relationships with one another，the more abstract and generally acceptable must be their medium of exchange；conversely，if such a medium exists，then it permits agreements over otherwise inaccessible distances，an inclusion of the most diverse persons in the same project，an interaction and thereby a unification of people who，because of their spatial，social，personal and other discrepancies in interests，could not possibly be integrated into any other group formation.

General Relations Between A Money Economy And The Principle Of Individualism

How close the relationship is between the money economy，individualization and enlargement of the circle of social relationships is exemplified by the character of commercial trade，which stands in an obvious relationship on the one hand to the advancing money economy and on the other to the enlargement of relationships that extend beyond the close，self-sufficient group of primitive times.Therefore，trade has a distinctive character because-except at its highest levels it possesses no techniques that are as complicated as the crafts or as traditionally established as agriculture.The merchant is，to a lesser extent than other economic pursuits，dependent upon training-which always involves a closer and closer relationship with the direct environment-or upon personal and objective tradition-which levels individual specialties-or upon inheritance-upon which the crafts were originally dependent and upon which land ownership still is dependent.It is reported from India that the hereditary nature of occupations is less decisive in commercial trade than it is in manufacturing.It is the techniques of trade that enable the traveling merchant-：the pioneer of the money economy who breaks the boundaries of the group-to resist the equalization and amalgamations of other vocations and to insist on his individual ability and risk-taking.I can demonstrate the same correlation in a somewhat far-fetched case.It makes a great deal of difference whether the winner of a competition is awarded an honorary or a money prize.The money prize pays him off；he receives what he deserves.The honorary prize has further consequences；it gives distinction to the whole person（which，under specific circumstances，a money prize may also do，although it is not part of its nature）·The money prize refers to the performance，the honorary prize to the performer.But in this latter sense，a tribute to a person is often possible only within a relatively small circle.Such honor，which implies no distinction for the individual，originates only within a small group that keeps itself closed，powerful and unassailable by means of the distinctly defined integrity of its members-as，for instance，the officer's honor，the merchant's honor，the honor of the family，even the often-cited rogue's honor.Every kind of honor is originally the honor of an estate or class，and the honor of man in general or of the single individual only places such demands upon the person as are agreed upon by all the smaller groups within the larger.The honor that does not subordinate its representative to others but brings him into prominence also requires a certain narrowness and solidarity of the group；the name of the victor at the Olympics resounded through the whole of that part of Greece that was closely knit together by this interest.The money prize has an egotistic quality which suggests itself to members of a large group.The nepotistic character which corresponds to the solidarity of the small group is most beautifully symbolized by the custom that the golden wreath presented by the Athenian Council of the Five Hundred for good administration was set aside in the temple.Within smaller and closed interest groups，as for instance for sport affairs or for industrial experts，the honorary prize is fully justified even today.But in so far as the restriction and homogeneity of the group is replaced by openness and heterogeneity，the honorary prize，which reflects the co-operation of the whole group，has to be replaced by the money prize，which reflects the ultimate recognition of the performance.The enlargement of the social group requires the transition to expressing merit in money terms because it means the inescapable atomization of such a group.Since it is impossible to provoke the same sentiment in the same manner in a large group as in a small one，distinction within a large group requires a means by which the recipient is no longer dependent upon the agreement and co-operation of the whole group.

It may be emphasized in this context that money has just as close a relationship to the widening of the social group as to the objectification of the contents of life.This parallel is no mere coincidence.What we term the objective significance of things is，in practice ，their validity for a larger circle of subjects.In that they outgrow their first connection with the individual person or a small group，and the fortuitousness of subjective interpretation，their perception or formation becomes valid and significant for an increasingly large circle（even if in reality the obstacles in the situation make their general acceptance impossible）.In the course of this development，they gain what we call their objective reality or their objectively adequate form-even though the actuality of the ideal validity that is indicated by these concepts rejects all relations with becoming or not becoming recognized.In both respects，the importance of money confirms the closeness of this correlation，which asserts itself in many specific areas.Commercial law in the Middle Ages in Germany was originally only the co-operative law of the individual merchant groups.It developed into a common law on the basis of the universalistic notion that the whole merchant class of the German empire，or even of the world，in fact formed a huge guild.Thus，the common law of the merchant class developed into a common law of commercial transactions.This development clearly shows how the law，in its extension from a narrow to a much wider group，detaches itself from a relationship to mere persons and becomes a law of objective transactions.It was this development that was favored by and that also favored an increasing extension of money transactions.

Whereas the technical difficulty of transporting the values of a barter economy over long distances already restricts it to a relatively small number of individual economic spheres，money，by virtue of its perfect mobility，forms the bond that combines the largest extension of the economic sphere with the growing independence of persons.The concept that mediates this correlation between money on the one hand and the extension of the group as well as the differentiation of individuals on the other is often private property as a whole.The small group with a barter economy tends towards common property.Every enlargement of such a group forces it towards the allocation of portions of property.With the very considerable growth in the number of participants，the administration of common property becomes so complicated and conflict-laden，the probability of quarrelsome individuals pressing for escape from communistic restrictions grows to such an extent，the division of labor that conflicts with communal property and a higher degree of efficiency become such a necessity，that one is justified in interpreting private property as a direct consequence of the quantitative increase in the group.A twelfth-century Irish manuscript states that the distribution of land was carried out because the number of families had grown too large，while in Russia，where we still have occasion to observe the transition from communal to private property，it is quite clear that the mere increase in population favors and accelerates this process.However，money is clearly the best-suited foundation for the private and personal form of property.The distribution in separate parts，the fixing of property rights，the realization of individual claims has been made possible only by money.Exchange as such is the primary and purest scheme for the quantitative enlargement of the economic spheres of life.Through exchange，the individual fundamentally extends himself beyond his solipsistic circle-much more so than by robbing or giving presents.Exchange in its basic features is possible，however，only with private property.All collective property tends towards mortmain ，whereas the specific wishes of the individual and his need of supplementation make exchange necessary for him.Possessions must first be concentrated in the individual for them to spread out from there through the process of exchange.Money as the absolute representative and embodiment of exchange becomes-by means of private property，with its dependence upon exchange-the vehicle for the expansion of the economy，for the inclusion of innumerable contracting parties through the giveand-take of the exchange process.In so doing，however，money resists-and this is the reverse side of the same fact-certain collectivist arrangements that are quite natural in a barter economy.During the Middle Ages the theory prevailed that money payment could be demanded only from those who had personally promised it；therefore the members of the estates that had not been present in the voting assembly often refused to pay.In early thirteenth-century England，it was not yet officially decreed that the decision of the Supreme Council of estates should be binding with respect to taxation for all subjects and against the will of individuals.When，towards the end of the Middle Ages，the provincial estates in Germany formed a corporation that acted as a single unitoften in opposition to the feudal lordand when its decisions were not the sum total of individual decisions but a decision of all the estates，the former interpretation remained valid for a long time with regard to the granting of taxes.The totality of estates was for a long time considered to be only the sum total of individuals，so that any individual could withdraw himself from the common decision.The same motive becomes effective under very changed circumstances where，with the growing centralization of state administration，local associations none the less remain relatively free concerning their financial policy.German legislation in recent decades，for example，has tended to restrict the social，political and moral obligations of local communities and to reduce them to local organs of the government，while，in contrast，the communities have been given considerable autonomy regarding financial administration.Similar considerations prevail if one emphasizes as the main disadvantage of money fines that money is economically less useful in the hands of the State than in those of the individual.Therefore it is more expedient to grant a certain degree of freedom with reference to the handling of money to whomever is limited in all other respects-a somewhat disguised practical consequence and form of the difficulties with which collectivistic disposal of money has to cope.

Such a difficulty exists despite money's suitability for representing the common interest for the unification of otherwise incompatible individuals.Both aspects may ultimately be traced back to one and the same effect of money，namely to grant separation and mutual independence to those elements that originally existed as a living unity.On the one hand，this disintegration concerns individual personalities and thereby makes possible the convergence of similar interests however divergent and irreconcilable-in a collective form.On the other hand，this disintegration also affects the communities and makes internal and external communalization difficult for the now sharply differentiated individuals.The form that this contradiction takes permeates the whole of social life far beyond this particular case.It has its origin in the fact that the individual is only one element and member of the social unity，while at the same time being himself a whole entity，whose elements form a relatively closed unity.The role of the individual as a mere organ will frequently clash with the role that he can or wants to play as a separate organism.The same influence that affects both the social entity composed of individuals and the individual as a whole entity，produces the same formal effects in both cases.This often results in actual opposition，since the individual represents these two completely heterogeneous consequences.Therefore it may be a practical though not insoluble logical contradiction that money brings about the differentiation of elements in society just as much as in the individual.In society's case，money impedes；in the individual's case it facilitates the same phenomenon.The impediment of the collectivistic disposal of money is，in general，connected with this.All other possessions refer to a certain type of usage by virtue of their technical condition；the freedom of disposition over them therefore has an objective limit.Money's usage completely lacks such a limitation and its common arrangement by many people therefore provides the broadest scope for opposing tendencies.Thus，the money economy stands in decisive contrast to the living conditions of small economic groups who are frequently dependent upon common orders and uniform regulations.One might say-though greatly simplifying the case that the small group supports itself through individualization and the division of labor.Money as an abstract form evolves out of the economic interactions within a relatively large circle and at the same time，through its merely quantitative character，permits the most exact mechanical expression of every specific demand，of the value of every individual work activity，of every personal tendency.In so doing，money first completes in the economic sphere the general sociological correlation between the expansion of the group and the development of individuality.

The relationship of money to private property and thereby to the free development of the personality is largely conditioned by its mutability，and this becomes particularly obvious in its opposite，the ownership of land.Landed property extends beyond the connection with the individual in two directions：breadthwise because，more than anything else，it is suited to the collective property of a group，and depth wise because it is the best object for inheritance.If the whole property of a primitive group consisted of landed property，then development would take place in two main directions.First，by producing food from property it gains a more mobile character；as soon as this happens，private property emerges.As a rule，nomadic peoples hold land as common property of the tribe and assign it only for the use of individual families；but livestock is always the private property of these families.As far as we know，the nomadic tribe has never been communistic with regard to cattle as property.In many other societies too movables were already private property while land remained common property for a long period thereafter.On the other hand，the origin of private property is connected with those activities that are independent of land as a factor of production.In the law of the Indian extended family，the notion developed that whatever had been acquired independently of the family fortune which consisted predominantly of land-did not have to be incorporated into it.The acquisition of an individual skill-for example learning a craft-is mentioned as the main method for acquiring property and personal independence.The craftsman who carries his skill with him has thereby acquired a mobile commodity which-just like the ownership of cattle，though in a different fashion-severs the individual from landed property and from its collectivistic character.Finally，the transition from a communal to an individual form of life is auseful means for preserving the co-operation that resulted from it after the barter economy dissolved.Until the thirteenth century，the assets of the religious communities consisted largely of landed property and their management was based on the principle of the social economy.The decline in farming profits led to a serious economic crisis，but the emergent money economy that had brought about this crisis also provided a remedy.The revenues of the benefactors and even of the monasteries were more or less extensively split up into salaries and benefactions；and now more of them，from various distant areas，could be given to a single person because the revenue was calculated in money terms.In this way it was still possible-with sinking total revenues-to maintain the income of at least the leading and representative persons of the communities at the same level，although this occurred at the expense of the lower clergy who now had to serve the community as hirelings.This chain of events clearly shows how the declining importance of land pushes even those groups such as the Church-that are specifically intended for co-operation and unity from collectivistic to individualistic forms of life and how the intruding money economy forms the cause just as much as the means for this process-by the subdivision and mobilization of land.The reason why the peasant today is the most unyielding adversary of socialistic tendencies lies firstly in the fact that，in practical contrast with the techniques of his trade，he is extremely conservative.Since private property now exists he clings to it，just as he did centuries ago to the German mark community and much later still to mixed crop farming.Modem socialism has one main feature which is totally antipathetic to the earlier collectivism of landed property and quite alien to the farmer's impulses in life，namely the complete control of production by reason，the will and the organizing calculations of man.The organization of the factory and the construction of machinery demonstrates daily to the industrial worker that efficient movements and effects can be accomplished with absolute accuracy and that personal and other internal disturbances must be avoided at all costs.This attainment of ends by a transparent and controllable mechanism paves the way for a social ideal that seeks to organize the social totality with the supreme rationalism of the machine and the exclusion of all private impulses.In contrast，the peasant's work and its success is dependent upon independent and unpredictable powers，and his thoughts are concerned with a favor that is not subject to reason and with the respective utilization of irregular conditions.Thus his ideals are opposed to those of socialism which aims not at favors but at the elimination of all that is fortuitous and at an organization-impossible in agricultural pursuits that makes all elements of life calculable.The complete control of total production by reason and willpower is technically possible only with total centralization of the means of production in the hands of‘society’-but it is obvious how different the ancient collectivity of a primitive economy is in its core and in its meaning from socialism，whose ideal grew out of the most mobilized property conditions determined by the money economy.This is true in spite of the fact that primitive collectivism as an instinct and as a nebulous ideal may have contributed to the driving forces of socialism.

Historically at any rate，the correlation between the primitive economy and collectivism and，on the other hand，the mobilization of possessions and their individualization does exist.Closely associated with its character as a collective good，land also possesses a distinctive character as inherited property.If we analyze the economic content of family organizations we often discover that the difference between inherited property and self-acquired property coincides with the difference between immovable and movable assets.In the north-western districts of India，the same word（jalm ）covers the right of both primogeniture and landed property in the narrower sense.In the contrary case，the connection between movable property and the individual may be so close that among primitive and often very poor tribes the transference of property by inheritance is not carried out at all.Rather，as is reported from many parts of the world，the belongings of the deceased are destroyed.Mystical ideas undoubtedly play a role here：as if the spirit of the dead might he tempted by these things and might return to do damage！However，this merely testifies to the close relationship that exists between the individual arid his possessions such that superstitions dwell upon it.It is reported that in the Nicobar Islands it is considered wrong to inherit from kinsfolk and therefore，except for trees and dwellings，assets are destroyed.Trees and dwellings have the character of immovable property，so their connection with the individual is a loose one and they are thus suitable for being transferred to others.We have a dual relationship to things；man persists and things change，and things remain and men change.Where the former predominates，as in movable property，the accentuation is on man，and one is inclined to emphasize the individual as the essential clement.Where，in contrast，the objects persist and survive in relation to man，the individual recedes in importance.Land appears as the rock upon which individual life，like the wave，rises and runs off.Therefore immovable property is disposed towards allowing the individual to move into the background，his relationship to the collectivity here being analogous to his relationship to objects.This also accounts for the close relationship of landed property and aristocracy based on the principle of inheritability.I again recall how much，in ancient Greece，the aristocratic principle of family continuity ，supported by religion，interacted with the central position of landed property.To sell landed property was a violation of duty not only towards one's children，but to a higher degree towards one's ancestors！It has also been pointed out that royal fief age was merely in kind，as in early medieval Germany-whereas in countries somewhat closer to a money economy，vassalages could be based also on other benefices-and favored an aristocratic character of the whole institution.The principle of inheritance is，by and large，opposed to the principle of individuality.It ties the individual person to the sequence of generations，just as collectivism ties him to his contemporaries.In biology inheritance similarly guarantees equality to the generations.The principle of inheritance acts as a barrier to economic individualization.During the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries the individual German family was economically emancipated from‘ancestry’and acted as an independent subject with regard to property.But that was also the end of its differentiation.Neither the father，nor the wife，nor the children had clearly defined individual property rights；the assets remained common property to that particular generation of the family.The various members of the family were not yet individualized in this respect.The emergence of economic individuality begins at the point where inheritance ends.It commences with the individual family and it ceases where inheritance still prevails-within the individual family.Only in modem times，where property consists mostly of movables，does this aspect of inheritance with its individualistic consequences predominate over its anti-individualistic nature.Even practical exigencies are powerless against the latter if the property consists of land.Some drawbacks of the peasant's inheritance rights could be remedied in specific cases if the peasants disposed of their property by means of a will.But they do not do this very often.The will is too individualistic when compared with intestate inheritance.To dispose of his property according to personal wishes that differed from tradition and general customs would subject the peasant to too great a strain.Everywhere the immovability of property-whether connected with the collectivity or with inheritance-testifies to the obstacle whose removal would permit a corresponding progress in differentiation and personal freedom.Money，as the most mobile of all goods，represents the pinnacle of this tendency.Money is really that form of property that most effectively liberates the individual from the unifying bonds that extend from other objects of possession.

第四章 个体自由

第一节

自由和义务是并存的

每一人类命运的发展都可以表现为束缚和释放、义务和自由之间的一种连续不断的交替。尽管这种最初的描述向我们呈现的是一种差别，然而，这种差别的对立分裂通过我们更进一步的研究被缓和了。我们所认为的自由事实上经常只不过是义务的另一种形式，当一种新的义务替代了我们一直承受到现在的旧义务的时候，我们最先感觉到的就是：所有旧的负担被移开了。因为迄今没有承担重量而使得我们的肌肉变得异常强壮有力，以至于我们在最初承担新的义务的时候并不会感觉到它的存在，所以当我们从旧的义务当中解放出来的时候（其实此时已经有新义务压在了身上），我们看起来似乎是完全自由的，直到我们由于肌肉的逐渐疲劳而感觉到新义务的重量。解放的过程现在以这种新的义务为开端再次开始，正像它也曾在这个特定的点结束一样。这个模式并不是以某种数量上的统一方式在所有的束缚形式中来重复的。更准确地说，在这里存在着一些能够使得对自由的注释更深远、更集中、更自觉的形式。我们对某些义务的履行的要求非常严格，严格的程度不比对其他任何别的义务的履行的要求低。这些义务的履行通常也需要个体具备一定的能力，而对这种能力的要求也并不比其他义务的履行对个人能力的要求低——尽管如此，它仍然为个体提供了一个特别大的自由空间。不同义务之间的差异导致了与义务相协调一致的自由的差异，这种义务的差异属于下面的类型。任何一个非纯粹观念性的义务都与另外的某个人满足其需要的权利相对应。由于这个原因，道德哲学始终把伦理自由和那些通过某种理念的或社会的诫命、或者通过某人的自我强加在身上的义务看作是一样的东西。可能其他人的需要可以由承担着某义务的个人的活动和行为组成；可能这些需要至少可以在个人劳动的直接成果中能得到满足；也可能，最终它仅仅需要是一个特定的客体，某个人可以正当合理地提出对这个客体的用途的要求——尽管他对承担着义务的这个人获得这个客体的方式没有任何的影响。这也正是与某一义务的执行相对应的自由程度的模式。

自由的程度取决于义务是直接针对个人的还是针对劳动产品的

毋庸置疑，一般来说，每个义务都是通过作为人类主体的个体的行动来完成的，但是这些义务的完成又都存在着很大的差异，例如：有资格享受某些服务的这个人的权利是直接延伸到了承担义务的这个人本身，是仅仅扩展到承担义务的人的劳动产品上，还是最终只停留在这件产品本身，而不考虑承担义务的人是不是通过自己的劳动来获得这件产品。即使有资格享受别人服务的人在客观上所获得的东西是一样多的，他们采取不同的方式所提供的自由也是非常不同的：如果他采取第一种义务形式，那么将完全束缚承担义务的人的自由；如果采取第二种义务形式，那么会给予承担义务者稍微多一些的自由；如果采取第三种形式的话，那么会给予承担义务者相当大的自由空间。第一种形式的最极端的例子是奴隶制度，在奴隶制的社会中，义务不是包含在客观确定的某种具体服务中，而是牵涉到完成这种服务的人自身，这包括了隶属于他的这个人的所有可利用的能量的使用。在现代社会环境中，某些情况下仍然存在着像这样的义务，承担义务的人需要把所有的力量和才能都用来工作，并且对其劳动结果没有客观的规定，比如某些特定类别的工人、公务员和家庭仆人，但是这样的义务并没有被认为是以粗暴的方式侵犯了自由，这是因为：在承担这种服务的时候，对服务的期限有时间上的限制；或者，承担这一义务的人可以选择他愿意承担义务的对象；或者，提供给承担此项义务的人的回报非常巨大，这使得承担了这一义务的人感觉自己也同时拥有了权利。只要奴隶完全隶属于他们的奴隶主，并且他们的全部的劳动力也都隶属于奴隶主，或者说，只要他们的服务是“无法度量的”，那么他们就属于第一种义务形式的层面。当服务在时间上有所限制的时候，第一种义务形式便开始向第二种义务形式发生变化。但这不意味着第二种义务形式总是在历史上比第一种出现得晚，相反的，农民的自由的退化恰恰经常致使第二阶段的义务形式向第一阶段的义务形式转化。第二阶段的义务形式的完成需要这样的条件，即我们需要的是一件特殊的劳动产品，而不是一定量的劳动时间和能量。在这一义务形式层面上，我们可以观察到一个特定的等级顺序，即庄园中的农民必须按一定比例上缴他们在土地上耕作所获得的产品的一部分，例如说一捆谷物的1/10，或者上缴固定数量的谷物、家畜、蜂蜜等。虽然上缴固定数量收获物的这种方式可能更加严苛和困难，但是它依然为承担义务的人创造了更大的个体自由，因为这使得庄园中的领主对农民的农业管理形式更加漠不关心了——只要农民生产的农产品足够上交给庄园领主那部分固定的地租，那么庄园领主便不会对总体的产量有任何兴趣。但是，在按固定比例收取农产品为地租的情形下，总体产量对庄园领主最为重要，所以他便会对农民实施监督、采取强制措施、进行压迫。不再依据相对的数量来确定地租，而是依据一个绝对的量把地租固定下来，这本身就是一种过渡，即货币地租即将代替实物地租的过渡。从原则上来说，在这种义务形式作为一个整体的第二个阶段中，这样的个体事实上可以从义务的关系中获得完全的自由和解放，因为有资格享有这些服务的人关心的仅仅是收取特定的客观地租，他们对承担义务的人在什么地方得到它毫不关心。但是，从经济组织的视角来进行考察，农民事实上只有通过他们自己后来的劳动才能够获得用以缴纳地租的产品，并且，正是在这个基础上，双方的义务关系才得以建立。某个人的工作是由他的义务来明确决定的。在物物交换经济中，存在着这样一种典型的情况，即一项义务的履行把完成这项义务的任务交给某个人。但是，义务和个体之间很快就在某种程度上相互脱离了，在原则上被规定应当履行某种义务的人有权利把自己的个性从义务中彻底解放出来，它能够以一种纯粹的客观形式来完成它，例如，通过另一个人的劳动来进行生产。然而，在现实生活中，这种情况发生的可能性事实上被经济体系和在支付中给出的生产方式排除了。在现实生产中，人们主观的自身仍然是承担着某种义务的，他们的个人的能量仍然被限定在一个特定的方向。从某种意义上来说，当客观性的原则与个性的原则相比较的时候，客观性的原则依然在某种程度上象征着一种朝向自由的发展趋势，这一点可以从以下事实中得到体现，比如，在13世纪的时候，庄园管理者掌握某块封地的权利越来越大，地位越来越高。这一事实之所以能够体现自由的发展趋势是因为：随着他们权利的增大、地位的提高，他们以前的人身依附关系转化成了一种纯客观化的关系，从而被置身于共同法之下，也就是说，除了那些与封建义务相关的事物，他们在其他所有的方面都被给予了自由。我们在今天也可以发现相同的现象：在现代社会中存在着一些不得不为获得一份工资而去工作的有才能的人们，他们宁愿去一个有着严格客观管理组织的公司工作，也不愿意去为个体雇用者工作；目前家庭劳务工作者出现了短缺的现象，这是由于女孩们更愿意到工厂去工作，而不想去为那些权威的雇主做家务，尽管如果她们选择从事家庭劳务工作的话，她们工作的物质条件肯定要好得多，但是家庭劳务会使她们处于一种雇主的个人权威之下，使她们感觉自己的自由变少了。

货币支付作为与个人自由最相符的形式

在第三个阶段的义务形式中，承担义务的人事实上从生产中解放了出来，雇主的要求不再延伸至承担义务者本身，实物地租被货币地租所取代，第三种义务形式也随之完成。正是因为这个原因，在某种程度上，在民法中以货币的形式来缴纳地租被视为个体人身自由的一项基本宪法。古典罗马法规定，如果实物地租被拒绝的话，那么任何地租都以货币形式来缴纳。这是一种用货币的形式购买自由、使个体从个人义务关系中解放出来的权利。如果庄园主向农民征收一定数量的啤酒、家禽、蜂蜜，那么这就决定了农民的生产劳动必须在庄园主规定的特定范围内来进行。但是，如果庄园主以纯粹货币的形式向农民征收地租，那么农民便获得了自由，他们可以自己决定是养蜜蜂、养牛，还是养其他的东西。在形式上，个人劳动义务领域内发生了相同的过程，承担义务的人有权利委任另一个人来代替他完成这项工作，雇佣方则必须接受这个代替者，除非怀疑他不能胜任。这种委任别人来代替自己完成工作的权利使整个义务关系的概念建立在一种新的基础之上，就像人们需要去捍卫用货币的形式来缴纳地租的权利一样，人们也必须经常去捍卫让别人代替完成义务的权利，因为这一权利被认为是迈向完整的义务关系瓦解的一步。《末日宣判书》的作者们特意为那些用定期的货币地租代替农役租佃的农民选择了一些术语，他们的目的是想借此说明，这些农民既不是完全自由的，也不是完全隶属的。然而，在很长一段时间内，货币税收的名目仍然显示出其实物租税的根源：厨房税、桶税、寄宿税（这里所指的不是在庄园主和他们的管理者巡视时为他们提供的住宿）、蜂蜜税等等。在过渡阶段，人们通常的做法是把最初要交纳的实物地租以货币的形式来进行估算，并把这一相应数量的货币作为实物地租的替代品。在与现在所指出的例子相去甚远的情形中，也同样存在着这种过渡现象。例如，在1877年，日本全部赋税都仍然是用稻米缴纳，或者是以稻米计算而用货币缴纳。同样地，在伊丽莎白一世时期，各大学所属的土地的租金都是以谷物的形式来进行确定的，虽然他们交纳地租时显然用的是银质货币。至少这种义务价值的同一性仍然在这一方式中被加以强调，但是产生于严格确定的内容的任何个人的束缚关系都已经被抛弃了。如果初夜权真的在某个地方存在过，那么其发展过程将沿着以下类似的步骤进行：在第一阶段，封建领主的任何一项权利都可以延伸至义务承担者的全部生活，领地中的义务承担者不得不交出他最主要的财产，甚至是他的自身存在，正是在这种情况下，领主给予领地中隶属于他的女性结婚的权利，而初夜权是她们结婚所要付出的代价。在第二个发展阶段中，他准予领地上的人结婚的权利而放弃初夜权，前提是要以一笔钱来作为交换——但是领主也可以在任何时候否定这一权利。在第三个阶段中，领主的否决权被废除了，只要结婚的人缴纳给领主一定数量的钱（比如说新娘的嫁妆、结婚税、婚礼税等），她们就可以自由地结婚了。在第二个阶段中，个人的解放虽然还不是仅仅与货币相联系——因为人们还必须获得领主的批准才可以结婚，而不能以武力的方式来获得——但是它确实已经与货币密切相关了。只有当除货币以外的所有因素都不再在决定中起作用的时候，这种义务关系才会完全失去个性。在领主拥有的所有这种性质的权利被废除以前，个人的自由只能停留在这样一个层面上，即领地中人们的义务被转化为一笔领主不得不接受的货币地租。因此，农民的服务和地租的简化和最终被完全替代常常是通过将它们转换为一定数量的货币来完成的。在有资格享有某种服务的人那里，货币地租和解放之间的联系能被看作是一种非常有效的关系，这种关系使得他自己不得不去抑制对现金租税的浓厚兴趣。在德国，农民农役租佃和实物地租向货币地租的转化过程从12世纪以前就开始了，但由于14、15世纪封建领主也受到了资本主义的影响，这个过程被打断了。因为他们认识到，与货币地租相比，实物地租更加有弹性、更加容易随便增加，而货币地租一旦在数量上和数字上被确定下来，就不容易改变了。在他们眼中，实物地租的这个优点似乎足以使封建领主们紧紧抓住它，以便满足他们的贪欲，而在其他的方面，他们对货币的兴趣仍然非常突出。正是由于这个原因，他们根本不愿意让农民变得富有。在英国，如果没有领主的特殊允许，农民通常不可以出售任何家养牲畜，因为通过出售家养牲畜农民可以赚到钱，他们可以利用这笔钱去其他的地方购买土地，这样便把自己从与先前领主的义务关系中解放了出来。在个体解放的过程中，向前迈进的最重要的一步是通过货币地租自身内部的发展来实现的，即一笔单独的货币地租替代了定期的征税。即使这两种地租形式所支付的客观价值是相等的，它们对人类主体的影响也是截然不同的。正像我们前面所指出的那样，在某种程度上，就其行动而言，各种各样的地租的征收的确给承担义务的人带来了彻底的自由——只要承担义务的人可以获得所要被征收的货币。但是，地租的定期征收将这种行为变成一种固定的形式，通过外力强加给义务承担者，因此，只有当地租资金化之后，与最大限度的个体自由对应的所有种类的义务形式才可以完成。

由此观之，只有采用资金地租的形式，义务关系才可以完全转变为一种货币地租，而货币地租的定期不断征收仍然至少保留了一种形式上的束缚因素，这个束缚的因素超过了地租本身所需要的价值。资金地租和定期的货币地租之间的区别体现在下面的方式中：在13世纪和随后的一段时间，英国国会经常做出这样的决定，即各个郡县必须为国王提供一定数量的士兵和工人，而这些郡的首领通常以货币来代替这种人的役税。但是，不管这样的方式使人们获得了多大程度上的人身自由，它仍然与英国人民通过专门的纳税表决从他们的君主那里得到的权利和自由有着根本的区别。如果某个义务的受益者在得到某笔资金后，会从收取那些单独税收时所遭受的所有的不安全感中解放出来的话，那么承担义务的人那里也会发生与此相对应的情形，即他以前必须定期缴纳税收，因此其自由会有一种不稳定性，而如果前面假设成立的话，他的自由便从一种不稳定的形式转化为一种稳定的形式。如果将他们的君主考虑在内，英国人的自由部分地取决于这样一个事实，即他们以资金交税的方式彻底解决了他们与国王之间的一些涉及特殊权利的问题，例如来自亨利三世的一部公文声称：“他们将全部动产的1/10上缴给我们，以此特许。”恰恰是因为人们的自由是得自这样一份协议，这份关于人们自由的协议暴露出了某些残忍的、表面的、呆板的特征，它暗示了国王的感情的最完全的对抗性，即“在国王和他的人民之间不应该存在任何的协议”的想法和他实际上接受了这一协议之间的矛盾对抗。正是因为这个原因，这个协议使得所有不可估计的更加情感化的关系被从根本上废除了，当自由被以另一种与货币交易不太相关的方式获得的时候，这些感情化的关系通常提供了取消自由或使自由不稳定的途径。在一种逐步发展的过程中，货币地租取代实物地租保护了个体的自由，这个过程中的一个很典型的例子就是，从属者、市民、不动产拥有者为他们的君主、官员、资助人和庄园主的旅行过程提供住宿和饮食。这种义务源自于对君主的一种古老的义务，这种义务在中世纪的时候获得了非常重要的意义。在这项义务被严格地确定的时候，它就迈出了通向客观化和去个性化的第一步。所以，我们可以看到，甚至在早期阶段，就出现了关于这项义务的极其详细的说明，例如需要为多少骑士和官员提供住宿，他们可以带多少马和狗，要提供多少面包、酒、鱼、餐具、桌布等。然而，当真的要为他们提供住宿和饮食的时候，一方面服务的提供范围必定很容易变得含糊不清，另一方面这样的服务又会明确地反映出个人关系的特征。相反，当我们只需要交付实物地租，而不再需要提供住宿的时候，我们便处于一个更发达的阶段了。在这种情形中，对物品数量的估算要比为他们提供住宿、使他们的胃口得到满足精确得多。例如，我们可以看到，冯·里泽克收取一定数量的谷物来充当地租：“当他住在克罗岑堡村的时候，可以用征收来的这些谷物为他的随从人员烘烤面包，这样，他就不会去打扰或掠夺村子里的穷苦农民了。”这一发展阶段的另一个结果是，在某些情况下规定了固定的货币地租，例如当有着高贵身份的人旅行或出席法庭开庭的时候。即使在上一阶段中的那些易变的、个人的因素在这里还仍然存在着，但是最终，当这些义务被转换成为以实际货币的形式、雇主每日津贴的形式、雇佣金的形式交纳的永久的税收的时候，甚至在法官最初的正式巡回等被完全不同的组织替代了的时候，这些因素被移除了。正是在这种方式下，这种性质的义务被最终完全废除，并被纳入到较低序列的一般税收中。这个发展过程似乎没有任何具体形式，所以它是与现代个体自由相联系的。

在实际义务被货币地租替代的案例中，通常双方都会获得益处，这是一个非常显著的事实，需要放到一个更广阔的语境中来分析。如果我们从下面这样一个假设出发，即可用于消费的商品数量是有限的，而这个数量不能够满足人们的既定需要，最终“世界被分割完毕”，也就是说，每一件东西都有它的主人，那么得出的结论将是：给予任何一个人的任何一件东西都必须是从另一个人那里抢来的。即使人们忽略了所有明显不同于这里所说的情况，在那里也仍然会存在无数的其他情形，即某一个人的需要的满足要以另一个人需要的牺牲为代价。如果我们把这种情况看作我们经济生活的典型特征或基础，或者把这些看作我们经济生活的特征和基础之一，那么它将与所有这样的一些世界观相符合，这种世界观即是：人类所拥有例如道德、幸福、知识等的价值总量是永恒不变的，改变的仅仅是这些价值的形式和载体。叔本华倾向于这样一种观点，他认为每个个体经历的痛苦和快乐的数量都已经被他的自然本质预先确定了，这个数量既不可能被超越，也不可能被消除，虽然我们通常将我们的境遇归咎于外部环境，但是一切的外在环境都仅仅是形式上的差异，我们在其中体验到的快乐和痛苦的数量是不会有任何改变的。如果我们把这种个人主义的概念延伸至整个人类的话，那么我们为追求幸福付出的所有努力、对物质条件的所有改进、为了财富和生存进行的所有奋斗，就似乎仅仅是价值单纯的来回转移，而价值总体数量不会在这种方式中有任何的改变。所以，分配中的所有变化都只不过反映了这样一个基本的现象，即某一个人现在所拥有的价值便是其他人自愿或不自愿放弃的价值。这种价值守恒很明显与一种悲观一寂静主义的人生观是相符合的，因为，我们越是认为我们自己不能创造出真正的新价值，强调我们实际上什么也没有失去就显得越为重要。印度有一种流传甚广的观点，即如果一个圣洁的修行者被诱惑了，那么他修行得到的成果就会被转移到诱惑他的人身上，这种观点以一种似是而非的一致性说明了上述道理。但是，我们还必须考虑到相反的现象：在所有的那些情感关系中，幸福并不取决于一个人得到的东西，而是取决于他所付出的东西，每个人都会通过使他人富足而达到自身彼此同等的富足，这里便逐渐发展出了一种价值，对这种价值的享受不需要通过剥夺另一方的任何价值。同样地，智力内容的交流也是如此，它并不意味着一个人必须失去某些智力内容另一个人才可以得到。至少只有病理学上的敏感者才会产生这样一种感觉，当一种客观的智力内容不再被他所独有，而被其他人分享的时候，他就会有一种智力内容被剥夺的感觉。一般来说，我们认为智力财富不是通过牺牲他人来获得的，至少在它延伸至经济财富之前，它不会对他人造成任何损害。因为尽管智力财富的内容是既定的，但它的获得并不来自某种有限的供给，并且，这些智力内容最终必须通过接受主体的思想加工才可以被真正获得。这种源自对象的本质利益的和谐，显然应该被同样运用到只有以牺牲他人为代价才可以使个人的需要得到满足的经济领域。有两种方法可以使经济领域的情况转化为更理想的状态，最简单易行的一种方法就是：把针对同类的人本身的竞争转化为针对自然的竞争。人们从自然的可用资源中获得物质和能量为己所用的程度越高，他们为已经获得的资源进行竞争的程度就会越低。所幸的是，保护物质和能量的原理只适用于自然的绝对整体，而不是针对人类有目的的活动所涉及的那部分。但是人类有目的的活动所涉及的自然的相对整体实际上可以被无限地扩大，因为我们可以使更多的物质和能量转化为符合我们意图的某种形式，即把它们纳入到人类活动所涉及的相对整体中。不断进步的科学技术教会我们从事物本身获得更多的用途，甚至是从已经完全被占有的事物上获取新的用途。从粗放型经济到集约型经济的转化不仅仅可以应用于土地耕种，还可以应用于任何一件为了越来越多的特殊用途而可以被细分为越来越小的部分的事物，或者是应用于可以在更大程度上得到释放的物质的潜在能量。人类能量范围在各个层面上不断地拓宽，这给人们造成了下面这两种假象：即世界被自由地分割了；需要的满足与任何一种偷窃行为相联系。但实际上，人类能量范围的不断拓宽恰恰说明了文化的实质性发展。伴随着文化的实质性发展，产生了功能上的进步。在这里，我们所关心的是找到能够使交换特殊客体所有权的双方都获得益处的适当形式。在最初的时候，只有当客体的首位所有者拥有足够强大的身体力量，能够在有人愿意拿出相应的条件来交换之前保护好这个别人也在渴望的客体的情况下，这种交换双方都可以获益的形式才可能得以实现，因为否则的话，这个客体在交换之前就会被从它的所有者那里抢走。抢劫或者赠与似乎是所有权改变的最原始的阶段，利益完全归其中一方，而负担完全由另一方承担。当交换的阶段主要呈现为所有权交换的形式的时候，或者像前面所说的那样，作为有着相同力量的交换双方一个纯粹结果而发生的时候，这种交换将是人类可能取得的最伟大的进步的证明。在人与低级动物之间存在着如此多方面的等级差异，由于这一点，很多人常常试图建立某种可以将人类和其他动物清楚明白地加以区分的特定界线。这样一来，人便有了各种各样的定义：例如被定义为政治动物、创造工具的动物、有目的的动物、有等级的动物，甚至被严肃的哲学家定义为狂妄的动物。或许我们可以在这一系列的定义之上在增加一项，即人是进行交换的动物。实际上，这只是人类整体普遍特征的一.个方面或形式，这种整体特征反映了人类的特殊性质——人是客观的动物。在动物世界中，我们无论在何处都找不到任何客观性的迹象，找不到任何超出主观感觉和意志之外的事物的迹象。

我在前面已经阐述了客观性是怎样减少人类竞争悲剧的这一问题。使越来越多的生活内容在超越个体的形式中被客观化，这就是文化的教化作用。这种超越个体的形式包括书籍、艺术品、像祖国这样的概念、综合文化、生活在概念和美学图像中的表现、关于数以千计的有趣味和有意义的事物的知识等等，所有这些都可以在不剥夺任何其他人的情况下被享用。有越多的价值被转换成这种客观的形式，就会有越大的空间提供给每个灵魂，就像神殿中一样。如果不是伴随着不受彻底的“不关你的事，从我这里走开”这种态度影响的存在内容的不断客观化，那么或许现代竞争的野蛮和痛苦会让人完全无法承受。无论怎样从纯粹的事实和心理层面上对人类和较低等动物进行区分，都是有着非常深刻的意义的。人类有着客观的分析能力，为了纯粹客观性而忽视自我和本身的冲动和条件。这些都有助于在历史进程中创造出最高尚、最崇高的结果：例如建立一个没有斗争和相互镇压的世界，拥有某个不必排斥他人就可以被个人所获得和享有的价值，并且，一打开门就有成千上万个这样的机会令他获得这样的价值。这个问题在客观性世界中被以一种实质化的形式成功地解决了，它开始接近在功能形式中的解决方法。

正像我们前面所看到的那样，与享受纯粹主观冲动的简单的抢劫或赠送相对比，交换预设了一种客观的评价、思考、相互承认，预设了一种对直接主观欲求的克制。尽管最初这种交换可能并不是自愿的，而是被有着相同力量的另一方强迫进行的，但是这些其实无关紧要，问题决定性的、特定的共同要素在于，力量的均等没有导致相互之间的偷窃和斗争，而是导致了一种和谐公平的交换，在这种和谐公平的交换中，某一方面的个人的占有欲或需求被纳入了一个客观确定的行为中，这种既定的行为源自于主体的相互作用，并超越了这种相互作用。对我们来说，交换似乎是一种完全不证自明的东西，它以一种非常简单的方式，第一次把公正和所有权的交换结合在一起。利益倒向一边的现象是纯粹自我主义或利他主义的冲动引导下的所有权交换行为的特征，当接受者同时又是给予者的时候，这种利益纯粹倒向一边的现象就不会发生了，虽然这并不意味着利益倒向一边的这种交换关系一直是交换发展的第一个阶段。

所有权的交换引起了价值的最大化

但是，在交换中包含的这种“任何一个人所拥有的东西都不应该比任何其他人所拥有的东西更多或更少”的纯粹公正，实际上只是形式上的、相对的。远远超出这个简单纯粹的公正之上的是：交换引起了我们所体验的价值的绝对数量的增加。这是因为，在交换中，每个人用来交换的东西都仅仅是对他自己而言相对无用的，而得到的是对他来说相对有用的东西，交换使得人们在任何特定时期对从自然中获取的价值的利用不断增加。即使假设世界真的“被分割完毕”，所有的活动都只不过是客观上不可能有任何变化的价值数量的简单来回转移，交换也仍然能够引起价值的些许增值。通过一种由于交换的作用而更加有效的分配，价值客观固定的总量变成主观上更大的一个数量，其效用也在更高的程度上被体验。这是每一个新的权利和义务分配的重要文化任务，每次分配都意味着一种交换。即使在利益十分明显地倒向一方的情形中，一种真实的社会程序也不会袖手旁观。例如，在18、19世纪的农民解放运动中，关键的问题不仅仅是保证地主交出农民本来应该获得的东西，而是还要寻找到一种分配财产和权利的模式使财产效用的总体数量有所扩大。

从这样的考虑出发，货币的可分割性和无限可兑换性这两种性质显示：商品或服务的交换通过货币可以得到最好的实现。货币的可分割性保证了在义务和它的回报之间可以存在一种客观的等价。自然物体的交换几乎很少被这样用货币的手段决定和衡量价值，以至于它们的交换不得不被交换双方认为是完全公平的。只有货币为价值交换的精确等价提供了技术上的可能性，因为货币本身就仅仅是其他客体的价值体现，而且对货币的分割和增加几乎没有任何限制。然而，正如我在本书前面所强调过的那样，这代表的仅仅是从所有权变化中一边倒的情形脱离出来之后，开始向前发展的第一个阶段。货币的第二属性，即它的无限可兑换性，源于这样的事实：物物交换几乎不能在同等程度上给予交换双方各自想要的东西，也不能把交换双方从同等程度的过剩物品中释放出来。现实生活中存在着这样一则规律：在交易中，一方的交换欲望往往比较强烈，而另一方之所以进入交换仅仅是由于被强迫这样做，或者他们这样做会得到一个远远高于所付出价值的回报。然而，在使用货币进行服务或利益的交换的情形中，交换的一方所获得的是他们特别需要的客体，而另一方所获得的是任何人都普遍希望得到的东西，即货币。因为货币拥有无限的有用性，以及由此获得的人们对它的永久需求性，所以每次交换就都变得至少在原则上对双方同样有利。在交换中得到某件物体的人当然只有在他需要这件东西的时候才会进行交换，同时，因为货币可以在任何时候使用，在交换中得到货币的人当然也会接受这样的交换。货币交换使得交换双方的满意程度都得到提高，而物物交换中则通常出现这样的情况，即只有交换的其中一方对物品的获得或出售有着明确的兴趣。因此，货币交换是到现在为止解决前面提到的那个重大的文化问题的最理想的方法，这个文化问题源自于所有权交换中利益倒向一边的情况，货币交换用以解决这个问题的方法便是：通过单纯的物品所有者的改变，把客观上确定的价值数量提高到一个更大的主观上经历的价值。伴随着价值的最初创造，将存在于我们赋予生活内容的形式中潜在价值在最大限度地释放出来，无疑成为社会发展的一个任务，成为人类普遍任务的一部分。无论在什么情况下，只要我们看到货币在为这个目标服务，那么货币的技术作用就说明了这样的事实，即交换是解决这个问题的根本的社会方式，而且交换本身就是以货币的形式被具体表达的。

不管商品一货币交换过程的享乐价值是否被其他的结果降低了，它始终使得满足量的增加在原则上是有可能的，但是这种增加的可能性并不仅仅取决于交换中的一方或另一方的主观情形。很明显，未来的客观的经济繁荣、商品数量的增加和扩展，都取决于现阶段对既定数量的商品的分配方式。经济结果将会由于对这些商品数量进行分配的人的不同而完全不同。把货物从一个人手中简单地转移到另一个人手中，可以使货物的数量随即发生相当大的改变——或者是向上增加，或者是向下减少。我们甚至可以说，相同数量的货物在不同的人手中所意味的数量是不同的，这就好像相同的种子在不同的土壤中会结出不同的果实。由于分配的不同所导致的结果的变化在货币上表现得最为显著。不管一块地产或一个工厂对于不同的所有者有着多么不同的经济价值意义，这些利润的变化（这里所指的变化是远远超出那些无关紧要的变化的较大变化）都具有某种偶然性和异常性的特征。然而，在那些股票交易的投机者、靠股息生活的人，或者国有企业主或大型企业主手中，相同数量的货币会产生非常不同的利润，这是一个正常的现象，其原因是，货币的所有者为其实现的客观和主观因素、有利或不利的因素提供了无法进行比较的余地。在讨论一个组织所拥有的货币总量的时候，我们至少可以说货币分配的不平等和变化仅仅是一种形式上的变化，这不会对整体意义造成任何改变。而恰恰是货币的这种形式上的变化为总体经济和财富创造出了最根本的不同结果。这种不同的结果不仅仅是数量上存在差异的问题，更是质上存在差异的问题，一方面，这对我们现在讨论的问题而言是绝对本质化的，而另一方面，它又同样导致了向量的问题的回溯。一般而言，在不同的人手中，相同的商品在经济上所意味的仅仅是一种货币利润数量的不同，而相同数量的货币在不同的人手中却意味着客观影响上的某种质的不同。在这里，社会的权宜之计毫无疑问是起作用的，它说明了为什么往往现代社会财富停留的时间比较短，与非货币经济时代相比，现代财富在任何一个家庭中停留的时间都要短得多。可以说，货币追求的是更加有利可图的手段，这一点越是显著，它就越是会产生于一种更加必然的原因，因为与所有其他形式的财产相比较，货币的所有权可以被更加安静、安全、被动地享受。因为通过货币在某一个特定时期进行简单分配的功能，货币可以表现出经济收益的最大值和最小值，更进一步说，交换其他客体会因为时间的冲突和浪费造成大的损失，而货币所有权的交换不会造成这种情况，所以，在这里，经济有效性——即通过所有权的各种分配方式来实现任务在总体意义上的最大化——拥有着广阔余地。

此处，我们尤其关心的是继续对下面这个曾经被中断的问题的考察，即货币经济可以在多大程度上增加个体自由，使其接近它的最高程度，也就是货币经济可以在多大程度上把个体从社会价值的最初形式中解放出来，在社会价值的最初形式中，一个人不得不失去其他人得到的东西。首先，货币经济的纯粹表面的现象显示出了双方之间相互的利益。在商品的日常交换中，商品被直接检查和交出去，这使得买方为了自身利益仔细、专门地对商品进行检查，因为卖方在为买方提供这次检查的机会之后，会拒绝任何投诉。当交易发展到这样一种以样品为基础的程度的时候，责任就转移到卖方这里了，卖方不但要保证所交的货品要与样品完全一致，还要保证不出现任何差错，因为一旦买方在抽出的货品中检查到任何质量上的毛病，买方就会丝毫不留情面地以此来获得好处。在现代的商品交换中，我们在交易时采取了一种能够减轻买卖双方的责任的方式，即不再根据样品制定标准，而是根据被人们普遍接受的标准来作为永恒的标准。在这样的情况下，买方不必再依靠最初对样品或货品总体的检查来找出货品可能存在的毛病，卖方也不必再根据买方的个别要求提供相对专断的、承担各种风险的样品。现在，交换双方都清楚地知道，一旦他们就小麦或汽油的某一特定质量标准达成协议，他们就都要承担起这样一种义务，即提供一种客观固定的商品的标准，这个标准要超越任何的个人的不确定性和不足。这样，在货币经济发展的最高阶段，就可能出现这样一种交易的模式，这种模式能够使交易双方承担的责任都有所减轻，能够使交易的主观基础转化为一种客观的东西，减少一方不利因素的同时也不损害另一方的利益。信用交易显示了与此模式极为类似的情况。在中世纪，我们很难确定一个单独商人的信誉，这个难题削弱和限制了买卖双方的所有活动。在16世纪的股票交易中，尤其是在里昂和安特卫普，某些特殊交易所的汇票从开始就被认为是安全可靠的。在这些交易中，绝对的信誉概念形成了，它给予债券一种客观的可交换的价值，独立于个人对信誉的看法。或许证券交易所在其资格方面依然不断变化着，但是，在涉及其债券时，它们仍是可信赖的，并且这些债券足以实现这种客观目的，所以它们可以与任何其他个别特性严格区分。正像证券交易把货币的本质提升到它最纯粹的形式那样，通过普遍、客观的“信誉良好”的概念的创造，证券交易极具特色地发展出了一种减轻一方负担而又不把负担转嫁在别人身上的方法。相对而言这种方法通过把不确定的个人评价转化为一种客观有效的性质，为债权人和债务人提供了相同的便利。

文化的发展增加了人们可以依赖的人的数量

如果我们去考察持久稳固的依附关系实际上所拥有的形式，那么对于个体自由来说，货币经济的意义就会大大增加。正像我们前面已经指出的那样，货币经济不仅为个体自由问题的解决提供了可能性，还使一种特殊的相互依赖关系成为可能，这种相互依赖关系同时也为自由的最大化提供了空间。首先，从这种相互依赖关系的表面上来看，它创造了一系列前所未闻的义务。一旦为了从中获得必需的收益，大部分来自于抵押贷款的数量相当大的生产资金必须被投入到土地中，对第三方的依赖关系就进入到了一个全新的领域。一旦以前直接用原材料生产的工具被用某些预先制造好的配件间接生产出来，一旦劳动者开始使用他并不拥有的生产方式，这种依赖关系也会进入到全新的领域。人们的活动和生活越是依赖于复杂的技术所创造的客观环境，他们就越是必须得依靠越来越多的人。但是，这些人之所以获得他们对个体的意义，仅仅因为他们是某些功能的载体，例如资金的所有者、生产原料的提供者等等。至于这些人在其他方面是怎样的，在这里并没有任何意义。

这个普遍事实假设了一个人首先获得明确的个性的发展过程，对于这个普遍事实的意义我们将在本书的后面进行考察。这个假设很明显是从下面这样一个事实中得出的：即大部分品质、个性特征、力量集中在某个单独的个体身上。虽然相对而言，这个人是一个整体，但是，只有在统一了各种各样的决定性因素之后，这个整体才是真实的和有效的。这就像自然有机体的本质一样，它们的本质基于这样的事实，即它是从许多物质部分中创造出生命过程的整体的。所以，一个人内在个性的整体要以许多的元素和决定性因素的相互作用和联系为基础。孤立地来看，每个单独的特性都有着某种客观的特征，也就是说，就它自身而言，这些特性还不是属于他个人的某种东西。能够明确决定一种性格的既不是美丽也不是丑陋，既不是物质力量的集中也不是精神力量的中心，既不是职业也不是目的也不是所有其他数不清的人类特性。因为，这些特性中的每一个都可能与其他任何品质相结合，甚至与彼此矛盾的因素相结合，并且每一个都有可能在无限多样的某一个性的塑造中被找到。只有当几个特征在某个焦点结合并融合在一起的时候，才形成一种个性，之后，这个个性反过来给予每个单独特征一种个人一主观的特点。并不是这个或那个特征构成了一个人独特的个性，而是他本身就是这个或那个特征。灵魂神秘复杂的整体性无法通过我们的认知被直接把握，只有当灵魂被分解为一条条光束的时候，我们把这些光束重新聚合在一起，才会发现灵魂的确显示出了独特的个性。

在货币经济条件下，这样的个性似乎完全被破坏了。运输工人、放债人、工人这些我们日常生活依赖的人并不是作为有个性的人在进行工作，因为他们借以进入人际关系的仅仅是某一单个方面的行动，例如运送货物、出借货币等，与此同时，他们的其他特性被忽略了，而正是这些特性才能够赋予他们完整的个性。当然，这种情况只有在持续发展过程的最终阶段才会发生，而这个过程到目前为止在很多方面还没有全部完成，因为，人与人之间的相互依赖关系还没有变成完全客观化的东西，个人因素还没有被完全排除在外。然而，毋庸置疑，总体的趋势是朝着这样的方向发展的，它使得个体越来越多地依赖于人们的成果，而却越来越少地依赖成果背后的人。这两种现象有着相同的根源，形成了同一过程相互对立的两个方面：现代社会的劳动分工使得处于相互依赖关系中的人的数量不断增加，正像它使得人的个性在他们的功用背后消失了一样，因为在相互依赖的关系中，只有人的某一方面在发挥作用，所有的其他方面的特性都被忽略了，而恰恰是这些被忽略的特性才能够组成一个完整的人。如果这种发展趋势被完全实现，那么不断发展的社会生活的形态将显示出与社会主义的深层次的密切关系，至少是与极端国家社会主义的密切关系。因为，社会主义主要关注的就是，把每个有着社会意义的活动都极端地转化为一种客观功能。就像今天的公务员担任某个职位一样，这个职位是客观上提前制定好的，对想要就此职位的人的要求仅仅是非常具体明确的个体特性的某些方面或某种能力，所以一个完全发展完备的国家社会主义将在个人世界之上构建一个社会活动的客观形式的世界，这个客观形式的世界将约束和限制个体特性的活跃，把它们纳入一个非常精确、客观确定的表达中。这个世界和前者的关系类似于几何图形和实际物体的关系。通过将它们自身限制在某个单方面的功能模式中，使必要的社会活动被细分、固定和客观化，主观倾向和个性整体能够转变为一种活动。这样，对个人行为进行判定的标准就将完全从作为出发点的个体特性转变为作为终点的客观功用。所以，就像柏拉图的理想国超越于现实世界之上一样，人类活动的形式远远超越于整体的个人心理现实之上。这种形式的痕迹随处可见，通常劳动分工的功能对于分工劳动能力的拥有者来说是一种独立想像的形态，因此，他们不再是相互区别的个别个体，而是在不能或不被允许把他们的整体个性放置到这些被严格限制的个体需要中的情况下，仅仅完成了这项功能。就像居住在一家旅馆中的某个客人一样。个人作为纯粹的某种功能或地位的拥有者，其个性是无关紧要的，在这样一种社会形态中，按照其逻辑结论来看，个体将无限地依赖他人，他职务的单方面的决定性将使他依赖于所有其他人的活动的补充，需要的满足将不再那么大程度上依赖于个体的特殊能力，而是更加依赖于一个工作团体，这个团体在表面上与他相对立，人们依照完全客观的观点来对它进行思考。如果国家社会主义可以发展到它理想的程度，那么它将为这种生活形式的分化铺平道路。

对于人与人之间非个人的关系而言，货币是可以依赖的

但是，在私人利益范围内，货币经济显示出了如上所述的分化。一方面，货币通过自身无限的灵活性和可分割性，使得各种经济上相互依赖的关系成为可能；另一方面，凭借其中立的客观的性质，货币有利于从人类各种关系中摆脱掉个人的因素。与现代人相比，在传统或原始经济中的社会成员仅仅依赖于数量极其有限的其他人。在现代社会，不仅我们的需要范围变得相当广，而且，就连那些在任何历史时期人类生存的基本必需品，例如食物、衣服、住所等，也只能在一个复杂得多的组织和更多双手的帮助下才可以得到满足。不仅我们活动的专业化本身需要与我们交换产品的其他生产者的范围无限延伸，而且直接的行动自身也依赖于不断增多的准备工作、额外的帮助和半成品。但是，在尚未发展或发展水平较低的货币经济中，人们所依赖的人际圈非常狭窄，这些相对狭窄的人际圈更多地建立在个人的基础之上。古代德国农民或印度商人、斯拉夫人或印度人的等级社会中的成员、甚至中世纪的人，正是与这些特殊的、熟知的、同时又是不可代替的人们经常性地处于经济上的依赖关系中。人们之间彼此相互依赖的功能越少，这些功能的代表者就越持久、越重要。但是，当我们想到在货币经济时代我们需要依靠大量“送货员”的时候，就会发现相反的情况，他们几乎很少依赖于某个具体的个体，并且可以在任何时候毫不费力地、频繁地换人。我们只需要把小城镇的生活情形和大城市的生活情形作一下比较，就可以得到这一发展的清晰无误的例证，尽管这个例证只是在一个比较小的范围内。在较早的时期，人们为了自己数量不多的依赖关系，需要付出人际关系狭窄的代价，他们的个人通常是不能够替代的，而在现代，我们拥有数量非常多的依赖关系，作为补偿的是，我们不用去关心单独的个人，并且可以根据自己的愿望自由地换掉他们。因为我们的需求的复杂性，以及我们的能力的专门化，所以，与那些可以在非常狭窄孤立的团体中生活的原始人比起来，我们更多地依赖于这个整体社会。虽然我们更多地依赖社会，但是我们非常明显地不依赖于这个社会的任何一个具体成员。这是因为，对于我们而言，任何一个具体成员对于我们的意义都已经被转化为其贡献的单方面的客观性，而这一贡献可以很容易地由任何一个有着不同个性的人来完成，我们和他们之间只不过是通过一种利益关系相联系，而这种利益关系可以完全用金钱来表示。

这是内在独立性和个体自足感产生的最有利的情形。当然，简单地与他人相隔绝并不意味着可以产生这样一种积极的态度。我们用纯粹的逻辑术语可以对其进行这样的阐述，即独立性并不是某种简单的不依赖性，就像不朽并不是某种简单的不会死亡，虽然石头和金属是不会死亡的，但是它们不会被人称为不朽。即使是孤立所包含的另外的孤独的含义所反映出的也是完全消极的错误印象。如果孤独拥有某种心理学的实际内容和意义，那么它绝对不是仅仅指社会中的缺席，而是指它的理念和它随后被否定的存在。孤独是由于与社会的疏远造成的一种结果，是通过否定的社会化方式对个体的肯定规定。如果简单的孤立并没有造成对他人的渴望或某种远离他人的满足，简而言之，就是没有产生某种依赖感，那么人就完全处于超越了依赖或自由问题的位置，而实际的自由没有任何可以意识到的价值，因为它缺少像反向摩擦、诱惑、接近这样的与它对立的东西来与之相互区别。如果自由意味着个人特性的发展，意味着对用所有的个体需要和感觉来阐释我们存在的内核的深信不疑，那么自由这一范畴所意味的就并非简单的人际关系的缺失，而是指和他人的一种极其明确的关系。这些他者必须存在于某个地方，并且被在那里体验到，这样他们才可以变得无关紧要。个体自由并不是某种纯粹孤立的内在状态，而是一种现象或相互关系，如果没有了与其相对立的因素，它也就失去自身的意义了。如果每一种人与人之间的关系都包含着吸引和分离的要素，那么独立性所指的就是分离的要素达到了最大化，但吸引的要素并没有完全消失不见，就像“左”的概念不可能完全脱离“右”的概念一样。因此，现在我们唯一要考虑的问题就是：如果想要促进独立的形成，分离的要素和吸引的要素作为客观事实和主观意识的最有利的具体状态是什么。似乎只有当所有真正的个体要素都被从这些依然存在着的与其他人的广泛联系中排除出去的时候，这个最有利的具体状态才能够存在，正如同下面的这种情况：相互之间的影响被匿名地显示出来，或在不考虑适用人群的前提下制定规则。在这种客观的依赖关系中，主体是保持自由的，这种依赖关系的原因和结果取决于个人的可交换性，自愿地、或者由于关系结构的影响而造成了主体的改变，这种改变表现出了对依赖关系中的主观要素的中立，而这恰恰表现了对自由的体验的特征。我想起了在本章开始的时候谈论到的那种体验，即义务的变化经常会被体验为自由。然而在这里，义务和自由之间的这种类似的关系形式只在个体义务中得到延续。一个非常简单的例子就是中世纪的一个家臣与一个农奴之间的典型差异：家臣可以改变他们的领主，而农奴则只能永远隶属于同一个人。这反映了与农奴相比，家臣拥有着无与伦比的、更高的独立标准——尽管在这些家臣自己看来，他们的义务和农奴是一样的。真正与自由相对立的不是束缚本身，而是被束缚在一个具体特定的主人身上。现代社会中家佣的情形也表现了这一点，雇主可以根据介绍信和个人推荐信挑选佣人，而佣人则没有选择的机会和类似的选择标准。只有在最近这段时间，由于大都市中家庭佣人的短缺，家佣才偶然地获得了选择的可能性，他们可以因某些不可估计的理由拒绝接受某个职位。双方都认为这是迈向家佣独立性的重要一步，虽然实际要求被完成的工作并不比他们以前要完成的少。我们来对一个与之完全不同的婚姻领域中的相同关系形式进行一下考察，如果一个再洗礼教派证明一夫多妻、以及频繁地更换妻子是正当的，而这一论点所基于的理由是这样可以打破婚姻中的内在依赖关系或女性的地位，那么我们可以说，这只不过是拙劣地模仿了一个原则上合理的言论。在任何时候我们的总体环境都是由一定程度的义务和一定程度的自由构成的，只是在某个具体的生活领域中，其中一方面的内容实现的程度更高些，而另一方面的形式实现的程度更高些。如果我们可以为我们自己选择目标、理想、我们需要服从的个人权威的话，那么尽管这并不会降低我们的依附程度，但是我们仍然会觉得被特定的利益强加在我们身上的限制不再那么让人难以承受了。在货币经济中，雇佣劳动者出现了一种在形式上与上述情况相似的发展。就劳动的艰辛和被强迫的本质而言，雇佣劳动者似乎简直就是被伪装的奴隶。但是，雇佣劳动者是客观生产过程中的奴隶这一事实，可以被认为是他们走向解放的一个过渡阶段，在本书的后面，我们将看到这一点是如何实现的。从主观方面来看，现在雇佣劳动者与个别雇主的关系要比在初期的劳动形式中的宽松得多。虽然工人仍然被固定在工作上，农民依然被固定在土地上，但是，在货币经济中，雇主可以被频繁地更换，并且通过货币工资的形式，工人有了频繁选择和更换雇主的可能性，这为工人在其依附关系框架内提供了一种全新的自由。奴隶即使愿意冒险接受更差的生活条件，他们也不可以更换主人，而产业工人即雇佣劳动者在任何时候都可以这样做。所以，当不可改变地依附于某个特定主人的压力被解除之后，工人就已经走上了通向个体自由的道路，虽然在工人身上仍然存在着客观的束缚。这种新出现的自由对工人工作的物质条件几乎没有任何持续影响，但是这不会妨碍我们对它的注意。因为，和其他领域一样，在这里，自由与不断增加的安乐之间并没有必然的联系，这种联系通常是由愿望、理论和鼓动自动预设出来的。这个联系的缺失在很大程度上是下面这样一个事实的结果，即工人的自由是与雇主的自由相对应的，在一个劳动形式受到束缚的社会里，雇主的自由也将不复存在。奴隶主和封建领主一样，对使他们的奴隶或农奴保持较好的、有效率的工作状态有着某种个人的兴趣，他的权力是凌驾于奴隶之上的，这种权力使得奴隶为了奴隶主自己的利益而去承担一定的责任。但是，对于资本家和雇佣劳动者的关系而言，情况并不是这样的，或者即使如此，通常也不会被实现。劳动者的解放似乎将必须以雇主的自由作为代价，也就是说，劳动者要获得解放，必须失去附庸劳动者可以享有的福利。雇佣劳动者目前处境中的艰难和不安全正是解放过程的一种标志，这个解放过程以消除单独确定的依附关系为开端。在社会意义上，自由和没有自由一样，都是人与人之间的一种关系。自由的发展暗示着这种关系从稳定的、永远不变的形式转变为不稳定的、可以相互变换的形式。自由意味着独立于他人的意志，它以不倚赖于特定的个人意志为开端。德国或美国森林中的孤独的殖民者是不依赖他人的；现代都市中的居民是不依赖他人这个词的某种积极意义上也是如此，虽然这些居民需要数不清的供应者、工人、合作者，如果没有他们，现代都市中的人会不知所措，但是都市人与这些劳动提供者之间的关系是完全客观的，这种关系仅仅是靠金钱来表达的。因此，都市人不把他们当中的任何一个人当作特定的个体来依赖，而只不过是依靠他们的客观的服务，这种服务拥有某种金钱价值，可以由任何一个可替换的人来完成。因为纯粹的货币关系把个体非常紧密地联结成抽象的整体的集体，并且，根据我们在本书前面的讨论，货币是抽象的集体力量的代表，所以单独个体与他人的关系仅仅是在复制人与事物之间的关系，这种关系是货币造成的结果。一方面由于商品供给的迅速增长，另一方面由于客体在货币经济中遭到的特殊的贬值和性质的丧失，单独的客体变得没有意义，通常几乎是没有任何价值的。与个体失去意义相反的是，这些客体的整体序列不但仍然保持着意义，而且文化的不断发展使我们对这些客体的依赖越来越深，也使我们所依赖的客体的数量越来越多。所以，一个单个的别针与其他任何别针一样有用，或者它与其他任何别针一样毫无价值，然而，现代社会的文明个体没有别针很难应付生活。最终，货币的意义按照下面这一趋向不断发展，即货币的大幅度贬值使得单独某笔货币的价值和重要性越来越小，而与此同时，货币作为一个整体所发挥的作用越来越大，发挥作用的范围也越来越广泛。在货币经济中，正像这些现象所说明的那样，客体的特征和个性对我们来说变得越来越无关紧要、越来越无实质意义、越来越可以随意调换，而客体的整体序类变得越来越重要，我们对它的依赖程度也越来越深。

这种发展是一个适用于人类生活的各个方面和各种关系的更加普遍的模式的一部分，这些人类生活的方面和关系通常源于物质世界和个人世界的整体统一。正如我们今天所看到的那样，这并不意味着像财产、工作、义务、知识、社会地位、宗教信仰这样的生活内容拥有了某种独立存在的性质，并不意味着它们具有某种现实或概念上的独立性，而是意味着只有当这些生活内容被个人吸收之后，它们才会产生某种密切相关的联系。最初的状态是一个完全的统一体、一个不偏不倚的中间状态，这种状态完全超出生活中个人方面和客观方面的对立。例如，在人类发展水平较低的阶段，想象力还不能够分清客观的、逻辑的事实和主观的、心理的形式，小孩儿和原始人都把短暂瞬间的心理形式、幻想和主观印象直接当作现实。正像无数的人种学研究和儿童心理学研究所显示的那样，字词和客体、符号和它所象征的意义、名字和它所指代的人是同一的。这一过程并不是源于两个截然不同的系列的错误结合和由此造成的混乱，相反，不管在抽象层面上，还是在任何具体表现中，二元性根本就还没有存在。观念内容从最初出现的时候就是一个完全的不可分割的统一体，这个统一体的整体性并不存在于各对立面的相互融合，而存在于对这些对立面的视若无睹。正因为这个原因，如本书前面所述，生活内容是直接以一种个人形式发展的。一方面对个人的强调和另一方面对客体的强调是从最初的朴素的统一性中发展出来的，它是一个长期的、无止境的区分过程的结果。个性从对生活内容的不偏不倚的中立状态中逐渐发展形成的过程、以及事物的客观性发展形成的过程，也正是自由形成的过程。我们所说的“自由”的概念与个性的原则有着非常紧密的联系，以至于道德哲学通常宣称这两个概念是相同的。趋向集中于某一中心的精神要素的统一、以及我们称之为“个性”的实体明确的差异性和独特性，实际上意味着独立于和排除所有的外在因素、依照我们称之为“自由”的自身存在法则的独立发展。自由和个性的概念都在同一程度上强调了我们存在的一个最终的、基本的点，不管在我们的本性之内还是之外，它与所有切实的、外在的、感觉的东西相对立。这两个概念仅仅是下面这样同一个事实的两种表达方式，即自然的、持续的、客观确定的存在的对立物逐渐形成了，这个对立物不仅在对自己与客观存在的对峙地位的主张中显示了自己的独特性，并且还通过与那些存在相协调的努力显示了其独特性。如果作为客观存在对立物的个性概念必须与客观性同等程度发展，那么，从这一联系出发，显而易见，客观性和个体自由的概念会一同朝着更严格的方向发展。因此，我们才会从过去的300年中观察到极具特色的平行运动：一方面，自然规律、事物的具体秩序、各种事件的客观必然性都显现得越来越清晰、越来越确切，同时另一方面，我们发现对独立个性、个体自由、相对于所有外在自然力量的独立性的强调也变得越来越敏锐、越来越强烈。甚至，现代的美学发展也呈现出相同的双重特征，比如说，爱克兄弟和15世纪文艺复兴初期的自然主义是对最个体化的现象的集中体现，而与此同时，讽刺文学、传记、戏剧艺术也以最初的形式展示出了同样的以个体化为中心的自然主义的风格。顺便说一下，这一现象正好发生在我们察觉到货币经济开始表现出其社会含义的时候。即使在希腊文化发展的巅峰阶段，我们也可以发现一种十分客观的世界观，这种世界观与自然规律密切相关，是古希腊人的生活观的一个方面，其生活观的另一个方面包括完全的内在自由和个性的自我支配。希腊人对自由和自我概念的理论表达并不完备，就这方面来说，与此相对应的是，他们对自然理论的表述的严密性也普遍存在着不足。不管形而上学在事物的客观确定性和个体主观自由之间的关系中会发现什么样的困难，作为文化的内容，它们的发展始终是彼此平行的，对其中一个方面的强调要求对另一方面的强调，这样才可以保持内心生活的平衡。

这里的这些概括性的反思触及到了我们关注的具体问题：在经济领域中，劳动的个人方面和客观方面最初也是不相互区分的。首先，这种中立慢慢分裂成相对立的两个方面，其中的个人因素日益从生产、产品、交换中退出来，而这个过程释放了个体的自由。正像我们所观察到的那样，个体自由发展的程度越高，对我们而言自然就变得越来越客观、越来越真实、越来越显示出它自身规律的特性，自由的增长和经济世界的客观性、去个人化的增长是同步的。正如个体独立性的积极感觉并没有被某种非社会存在的经济孤立唤起，同样的，这种感觉也不会被尚不熟悉自然规律性和严格客观性的世界观唤起。而伴随这种对立产生的是对独立性的一种与众不同的力量和价值的感觉。的确就我们与自然的关系来说，似乎在原始经济的孤立状态中，换句话说，就是在对现代意义上的自然规律的无知阶段，由于对自然过程的迷信解释，使得束缚变得更加牢固了。只有通过经济的全部能量、复杂性、内在相互作用的发展，人与人之间的相互依赖才会形成。在这种依赖关系中，个人因素慢慢被去除，这将个体引向其自身的才能，使得他更加积极地意识到他的自由，如果完全没有这些关系的话，他积极地意识到自由的可能性要小得多。货币是这一状态的理想代表，这是因为，货币使得人与人之间的关系的形成成为可能，而同时又避免了个人的干扰；货币是物质成果的精确度量标准，但对特殊的、个体的东西进行度量时又是不充分精确的标准。对有差别的意识而言，货币所提供的客观依赖性的局限只不过是一个背景，它使得因而发生的相互区别的个性和自由得到完全的释放。

第二节

占有是一种行动

人们习惯于把生活的动力（尤其是与外部客体有关的情况下）理解为获得或者对事物的享用，这里的获得是广泛意义上的，我们把劳动或者说是对做事情的享受也包括在其中。然而，对事物的占有看起来似乎并不是动态的，而仿佛是静止的、稳固的状态，它与其他那些动态之间存在着一种关系，这种关系正像存在和生成之间的关系一样。与这种观念相反，我认为，如果一个人想要领会“占有”的全部深度和广度的意义，那么他必须赋予占有某种动态的特征。那种认为占有是某种被动接受的东西、是某种无条件顺从的事物（就其是真实的占有物而言，它不需要主体的任何活动）的习惯是错误的。这一在存在领域被错误判断的事实，在道德领域中得到了正确的判断，比如说虔诚的愿望，不论什么时候，我们都把它当作一种劝诫：我们应该获得我们想要拥有的东西，每一笔财产的继承权同时也是一种义务，一个人应该尽最大努力把握自己的机会，等等。除此之外，人们最多会认为应该用这些财产来做点什么，但是财产本身仍被认为是某种静态的东西、一个终结点，或许被认为是一个行动的起点，而它本身绝不是一个行动。如果我们进行更深入细致的观察，那么就会发现，这种消极的财产概念只是一种假象，这个假象在某些特定原始条件下会表现得非常显著。在古代的秘鲁北部和墨西哥，田地是每年都要重新分配的，种田是一项公共活动，但是收获的粮食是归个人所有的。当时不但不允许任何人买卖或让出他的土地，并且，如果他自愿迁移到其他地方，而没有按时返回耕种他自己原来的土地的话，那么他就会完全失去他的这块地。与此相同，在古代的德国边境，拥有某块耕地并不意味着这个人可以成为真正的自由农民，根据早期的判决文书，如果他想要成为真正的自由农民，他必须自己耕种土地、自己兴建利用灌溉和畜牧设施，并且拥有自己的炉膛。如果所有权不以某种行动来表达的话，那么它只是一个纯粹的抽象概念。在指向对财产的占有的运动和超越对财产的占有的运动之间存在着一个中立的点，所有权作为这个点逐渐缩小为零。财产的静态概念只不过是把对客体的积极主动的享有或处理转化为一种潜在的状态，这保证了这样一个事实，即人们可以在任何时候享有它、使用它。孩子希望“拥有”每一件引起他兴趣的客体，我们就把这个客体“给”他——这仅仅意味着，这个孩子想要对这件东西做些什么，而他所要做的通常也只不过是看一看它或摸一摸它。原始人的财产观念根本不能用我们现代人的财产观念的持久性或永恒性的特点来进行描述，相反，他们对财产的认识仅仅是享有客体和使用客体的一种短暂的关系，在这之后，他们通常就完全不在乎地把这件东西送给别人或丢掉了。因此，所有权的最初的形式并非是稳定的而是极其不稳定的，它的每一个更高级的形式都是朝着所有者与财产关系的持久性、安全性、稳固性不断增强的方向发展的。客体的纯粹暂时性将自己转化为一种可以返回它的永久可能性，这种转化不需要客体的内容或实现有任何其他的意义，也不需要其意义大于一系列的单独承担或实施。那种认为所有权是某种在性质上全新的、具体存在的东西，而不是对事物的个体占有行为的观念属于典型的错误范畴，在因果关系概念的发展史上，这个错误范畴已经变得非常重要了。休谟曾经唤起了人们对下面这样一个事实的注意，提出了这样的观点，即或许我们从来没有建构过任何我们称之为因果的客观必然的联系，我们所体验到的被认为有因果联系的事实只不过是两个事件在时间上相继发生而已。在休谟提出此观点之后，康德通过一个证明维护了我们世界观的安全稳定性，这个证明就是：时间上相继发生的纯粹感官感觉还并不像人们所认为的那样是真正的经验，因为，即使在经验主义的意义上，经验也都预先设定了一种因果联系的真实客观性和必然性。换句话来说，在第一种情形中，认识应该仅仅局限于主观和个人的印象，康德指出，我们的感觉的客观有效性独立于单个事件和单个认识主体，就像所有权的存在超越于对它的单独使用一样。这里涉及的问题是对同一范畴的使用，在本书第一章中，我们曾经试图通过使用这一范畴来建构客观价值的本质。在我们意识的具体内容之上，例如感觉、刺激、情感等，存在着一个客体的领域，在对这一客体领域的意识中，有着这样一种思维，即这些客体拥有一种永久的客观有效性，它超越了客体所有被感觉到的单一性和偶然性。事物的永久实质、其命运的规律秩序、人们坚定品质、道德伦理规范、法律的要求、整个宇宙的宗教意义等，所有这些都似乎有着一种观念的存在性和有效性，这一存在性和有效性只能通过单独事实的独立性来表达，在这些事实中，事物的实质和规律性得以呈现，需要和规范或者得到满足、或者得不到满足。正像我们将某个人的固定性格和他表现自我或与自我相矛盾的个别行为区别开来一样，不管道德规范在实践中有没有被遵守，它的威严都不会受到任何的损害。正像一个几何定理的有效性并不依赖于单个图形是不是正确体现这个定理一样，不管作为整体的世界的物质和能量的哪个部分在被人们反复思考和认识，它的存在都不会受到任何影响。

当然，认识论必须把自然的终极规律与这一规律的暂时实现的总量加以区分。但是，我看不出在自然规律的认识活动中需要做些什么——除了对每个可能的单个实现做出规定之外。客观实体当然也必须同反映它的主观认识相区分，但是这一区分的重要意义仅仅在于，它清楚地规定了对客体的每一种可能的理解。道德伦理规范应该超越于那些个体行为之上，它可能被肯定地运用于个体行为，也可能被否定地运用于个体行为，但是，此伦理规范的唯一意义就是，确定每一个这样的行为的价值，如果这里根本不存在、或根本不可能存在与伦理规范相关的任何个体行为，那么它的实际意义将为零。简单地说，这些物质和价值的范畴通常不同于任何个别事件，也不同于这些事件的相对总和，不管这个相对总和有多么大。然而，这些个别事件的绝对总和与这个范畴完全相等，除了形而上学的意义，它只不过是对个别事件、感觉、行为的总和的简化表达。我们不应该被下面这样一个事实误导，即细节的经验序列肯定总是不完整的、相对的，没有细节的经验系列可以涵盖或穷尽这些范畴的内容。

这就是财产概念使用的形式。不管在概念上，还是在法律上，财产都明显必须同个人权利区别开来，也必须同对客体好处的享用区别开来。某个人将会怎样处置他的财产，这绝不会被预先确定，所以，我们可以说，这一行为和享用的总和与他的产权是一致的。对财产的可能使用和对财产的实际使用的总和就等于产权，不管对别人的东西的权利可能多么地不同于产权，但就它们的内容而言，在它们之间存在的仅仅是程度上的不同：产权仅仅是处置客体的权利的总和。即使是像罗马元首统治时期那样非常统一封闭的占有，在法律发展史的范畴中，也是由一系列以不同方式获得的职责的入口组成的，就像庄园主把拥有的奴隶作为自己的“财产”一样，那只不过意味着庄园主把个人的、慢慢扩大的权利的总和强加到农奴身上罢了。产权所表现和保证的不是一个相对的总和，而是在原则上针对某一客体的权利的绝对总和。正是因为这个原因，作为实体而非抽象概念的产权预示了所有者的行为，把它作为产权的必然结果。静态的占有仅仅存在于先前的占有过程的想象结果当中，或对未来享有、使用的想象预期当中。如果一个人忽略了这些占有财产的过程，错误地认为占有过程只不过是次要的，那么产权的概念就什么都不剩了。

拥有和存在的相互依赖

在某种程度上，被我们定义为“占有”的各种各样的此类主体活动依赖于所涉及的客体的性质。但是，虽然货币是占有的客体，可它很少受制于这种依赖关系。对其他客体的获得和使用不同于对货币的占有和使用，前者依赖于特殊的力量、特殊的性质和努力。由此可以直接得出这样的结论，即这种具体的占有反过来会对占有者的性质和活动产生影响。不管谁拥有一份不动产或一个工厂，只要他没有把管理权交给其他人，成为一个靠收租生活的人，并将自己得到的钱投资到一个画廊或驯马房），那么他就不再拥有完全自由的生活了。这不仅仅意味着他的时间被以一种特殊的方法和形式占有了，更重要的是，这还意味着一种特殊的能力被预先设定了。特定的物质占有包含了一种回溯的预定。如果占有成为一个高于产权的法律意义的问题，那么对不同的客体的占有便会是不同的占有类型。对一个颇有特色的客体的占有意味着比任何抽象的产权概念都要多的东西，这种占有似乎不能直接从外部依附于每个个体之上，而是存在于主体的力量、性质和客体的力量、性质之间的相互作用之中，这种相互作用只在两者的特定关系中显现出来，即从主体的某一明确能力中显现出来。上述观点仅仅是下面这种想法的对立面，即占有者是通过占有物对他的影响来确定的。正像被占有的特定客体越是真实、积极，人类主体就越是较好地、确切地适于它，所以，把这个命题颠倒过来也是正确的：越是想从根本上强烈地把财产真正地据为己有，即越是从根本上完全使用和享有了财产，对主体内在和外在性质的影响就越明显和具有决定性。因此，从人类存在到拥有财产，再从拥有财产到人类存在，这之间存在着一个链条。马克思关于“是意识决定存在，还是存在决定意识”的问题在存在的一个领域内被回答了，这是因为，在马克思的认识中，人类存在包括拥有。存在和拥有的特殊联系或紧密或松散地依赖于形成其支点的客体。通过这种存在和拥有的特殊联系，一方面人们凭借一项特定的投资指涉一笔特定财产，而另一方面这份财产又决定着他的存在。在客体只有纯粹美学意义、经济价值由高级的劳动分工决定、客体很难被获得和运用的情况下，存在和拥有之间的关系将变得非常紧张；而随着不确定的客体范围的不断扩大，这种联系会变得越来越松，直到最后，当它所指涉的对象是货币时，这一联系就完全破裂了。

通过对货币的占有，这种依赖关系被消除了

存在独立于占有，占有也独立于存在，这是通过货币来实现的，这种关系最初在对货币的获得中表现出来。因为货币所具有的抽象性质，使得所有可能的投资和行为都集中于它。俗话说：“条条大路通罗马”，人们认为罗马超越了所有局部利益，是所有单独行为的背景。因此，正像条条大路通罗马一样，所有的经济道路都通向货币。就像伊里奈乌斯将罗马称为世界的缩影，而斯宾诺莎把货币叫作万事万物的清单。即使货币不是“万事万物的清单”，它也至少是所有各式各样的生产活动的同一副产品。货币的特殊性在于，人们要通过和其他客体的成功交易来获得它。能干的农民可以在土地上种植出很多的收成，勤劳的鞋匠能做出很多鞋子，但是，如果想要赚到很多钱，需要的是在任何一个具体的交易中的精明。因此，赚钱并不需要那些特殊的品质技能，通过那些特殊品质技能，其他客体的获得和主体的存在被联系在一起。确实有一些人显示出某种特殊的能力——即在所有交易中与货币打交道的能力。然而，因为经济贸易通常都要用货币来表示，所以，持久稳固的、全面的商业贸易能力就体现为赚钱的能力。而下面这个事实恰恰从另一方面强化了我们刚才阐述：即有一些人明显地对所有与货币相关的事务方面缺乏理解。这些人如此之明显，比那些不会种田、不懂文学或不擅长技术工作的人要突出得多，这一事实本身说明，赚钱所涉及的能力范围比任何其他价值的创造的能力范围更加广泛。货币完全把自己从其根源中摆脱了出来，这里即指经济意义，也指道德意义上使人们获得应得货币的特殊活动。这一事实解释了下面的问题：为什么对应得财富的享用容易被看作是在炫耀，会引起无产阶级的一种仇恨情绪，而其他特权（例如，出身、职务、优越等），除非再添加更多的令人怨恨和愤怒的因素，否则是不会引起无产阶级的这种仇恨情绪的。

另一方面，在货币经济发展的巅峰阶段，我们能够观察到一个可以加以比较的例外情况。在大金融家或大投机商人的交易中，专家可以认出特定个人的“手”，这是因为，它有着一种独特的风格与节奏，这种风格和节奏可以使一个人的行为极具特色地区别于他人。然而，我们必须首先对在其他现象中被论证的东西加以考察，即在货币数量格外巨大的情况下，货币纯粹数量的性质实际上为货币性质特征的细微差别提供了一个空间。持续流通的货币所具有的奇特的中立、精致、平凡，在某种程度上并不影响巨额财富罕见地、让人惊叹地集中到一个单独的人手中。在这里，我们需要指出的本质性的问题在于，货币作为一个整体，在具体的货币贸易中呈现了一个非常特殊的性质，也就是说，货币并不是作为与其他客体交换的中介在发挥作用，而是作为交易的中心内容、完全指代自己的客体在发挥作用。在纯粹的双边的金融活动中，货币本身成为了最终目的，这不仅仅意味着货币暂停了它作为交换手段的性质，还意味着货币从一开始就是利益自我满足的中心，它逐步形成了自己独具特色的规范，同时也形成了完全独立的性质、和相应的方法。在这些情形下，货币拥有了自己的色彩和特殊的资格，与那种货币仅仅是通向完全不同的目的的情况相比，个性在对货币的管理处置中的表达要容易得多。在这样一种情况下，最重要的是：货币需要一种非常特殊、并且在现实中高度发展的技术，只有具有了这样的技术，才可以使个体形成自己的个人风格。只有当一个特殊范畴的现象达到丰富充裕的数量、并且相互独立的时候，一种特殊的技术才会得到发展以管理它们；只有当物质材料变得有延展性、并且有柔韧性的时候，个体才能够在处理它的过程中表现出自己的风格。

在这些情形下，在货币和个体之间产生了一种特殊的关系，我们不应该把货币在这些情形中的特殊状态理解为与货币将拥有及存在分离开的功能相矛盾。这一功能以下面这种方式从效用的角度得到了体现。正像我们所看到的那样，把产权同瞬间的享用区分开的是产权提供的一个保证，即保证了所有者可以从任何方面、在任何时候对财产进行使用。拥有某个客体的所有权，就等于拥有对它的全部使用和享用的总和。在任何一个特定时刻，产权的事实都是以这种形式出现的，即保证将来所有的享用，如果没有得到所有者的允许，任何人都不能使用和享有这件物体。在前法律的状态下，即在那些文明还处于自然状态，没有任何直接的法律约束的区域里，这样一种有关财产的保证只能通过所有者保护自己财产的力量来确保。一旦保护财产的力量减弱了，所有者就不再能够阻止其他人享用到目前为止仍属于他的财产了，这份财产将很快被转让给另一个人，只要这个人的力量能够保证独享财产、不让任何人来使用和享有这份财产。在存在法律的情况下，就不再需要这样的个人力量了，因为所有者的整体保证了他们的永久产权，并把所有其他人排除在所有权之外。在这种情形下，我们可以说，产权是对完全享用一个客体的潜在可能的社会性保障。如果财产是通过货币来实现的，那么这种产权概念似乎就被提高了。因为，如果某个人拥有货币，那么按照国家宪法的规定，他所拥有的不仅仅是货币所有权，还包括了许多其他东西的所有权。如果对一件物体的所有权所指的仅仅是这件物体的性质允许的某些特定的使用的可能性，那么对货币的所有权指的就只是享有不确定数量的客体的可能性。对于货币之外的所有其他财产，公共秩序所能保障的仅仅是对该客体的特定类型的用途。公共秩序可以为土地所有者提供这样的保证，即任何其他人都不允许收割他土地上的产物，只有他才可以耕种或休耕这块土地；对森林所有者，公共秩序可以保证他能够在此伐木、打猎，等等。然而，后来通过铸造货币，政治共同体向货币拥有者保证，他们可以用自己的货币买到谷物、木料、猎物等。由此，货币具有了一种比普通产权概念更高的潜能，对这种潜能来说，任何其他种类财产的特殊性质都已经被依法溶解了，拥有货币的个体所面对的是数量无限多的客体，对这些客体的享用同样受到公共秩序的保障。这意味着，与那些被单方面确定的客体不同，唯有货币没有确定它未来的用途和结果。人们只会用与创立国家相同的方式来保护国家，这些适用于国家的东西，绝对不适于货币——尽管对很多其他财产来说，尤其是思想财富，这种情形是有效的；对于各种各样的可以用钱买到的财产而言，它也是有效的，这些财产只能通过最开始导致他们获取该物的那种相同的兴趣才可以保存下来。货币完全独立于它的根源，它的独特的非历史性特征在其使用的彻底不确定性上得到了体现。因此，在我们看来，像教会禁止人们收取利息那样，把人的意义施加到货币身上是完全没有根据的、非常古怪的。即使在16世纪，商人还认为用自己的钱放高利贷是有罪的行为，而用从别人那里借来的钱放高利贷则是无罪的。只有当货币与个人之间存在一种内在的伦理关系的时候，这种区分似乎才是可能的，而如果对这一区分的理解是不可能的，就证明这种伦理关系是不存在的。不管这种关系发生在什么地方，它的存在都不会与整体意义上的货币相关，而只与货币数量上的不同相关。其他种类的财产对拥有者的影响和拥有者对财产的影响，会由于它们各自数量的不同而有所差异，例如，在涉及地产的情况中，一个小农场与一个大庄园之间有着很大不同。然而，即使在这种情况下，在利益和必需的才能之间也存在着一种特定的等同性，通过它，所拥有的财产的性质就变成了所有者财产和他的存在之间的纽带。但是，无论在什么情况下，只要个体与货币所有权之间存在着一定的联系，那就是货币自身的纯粹数量作为特定的原因或结果在发挥作用；而在其他财产的情况中，纯粹数量的性质常常伴随着特定的个人原因或结果。只有拥有庞大数量的货币才会给予货币所有者一个决定性的生活方向，这个生活方向是富人很难摆脱掉的。相反，只有非常罕见和棘手的一些现象说明了个性与货币的直接关系。举个例子来说，每个人的内部都隐藏着既是守财奴又是挥霍者的潜质。这意味着每个个体都偏离了他所在的文化圈中的绝对平均的花费模式——或者向上偏离，或者向下偏离。几乎不可能避免的是，就个人对价值的主观感觉而言，好像其他人在特定事物上花费的货币不是太多就是太少。原因非常明显：人们对用货币买到的具体物体的估价会有所不同，但这并不是唯一原因，除此之外，我们还必须考虑到人们对货币这类东西的个人态度。对货币的态度有很多种，有些人喜欢一次花出数量很大的一笔钱，而有的人喜欢每次花较少的钱；有的人赚到一大笔钱时会想要挥霍一下，而有的人会更加节省；有的人在花钱时喜欢仓促行事，每次消费都从心理上推动了下一次消费，而有的人每一次买东西都会留下了内在的心理障碍，以至于连合理的消费他也不情愿。所有这些都体现了个体之间的差异，它们根深蒂固地存在于在个体之中，在货币经济中，这些差异变得极其明显，也或者说，只有在货币经济中才会出现这样的差异。但是，这里的这种表现也是源于纯粹的数量。所有这些关于货币的个体行为的差异所反映出的都仅仅是程度上的不同而已，与之形成鲜明对照的是个性之间的差异，这是我们在个人与事物和他人的各种各样的关系中发现的。一般来说，任何货币以外的财产都对个体提出了更加确切的要求，通过这样一种方式，对个体施加了更加明确的影响，对个体而言，这种方式似乎是一种其生活的决定性因素，或是强加在其生活之上的枷锁。只有货币财产至少在一个非常遥远，且极少被触及的界限下为这两个方面都提供了完全的自由。

由于这个原因，只有在货币经济时期，才会出现那些从事经济以外的生产活动的专业阶层，他们所从事的是特殊的智力活动，例如教师、文艺工作者、艺术家、物理学家、学者、国家公务员等。在物物交换经济盛行的时期，这样的智力工作者数量非常少，即使是为数不多的那些智力工作者的存在，大多数也都是建立在坚实的土地所有权的基础之上的。这就是为什么在中世纪教会（在某种程度上也包括贵族）是智力生活的支持者的原因。专业人员的范畴的等级取决于这样一个决定了他们个性整体价值的不容妥协的问题：即他们是为了自己过得更好而奋斗，还是为了某个客观目标的实现而奋斗。无论在什么情况下，获取的活动都根本不会有获利自身以外的任何其他动机，然而，这个标准在专业人士的智力活动范畴并不存在，它被通过对无情的自我中心主义和理性公正的思想的选择取代了，尽管这种选择在这里起了根本的抑制作用。令人好奇的是，虽然货币是最理想化的经济价值，它可以将我们从经济束缚中解放出来，但是我们必须要为此付出代价，即我们要被迫面对那些其意义并不存在于经济成果中的智力活动的无情问题。正像较高发展阶段的生活的差异产生了新的单位，这些新单位逐渐形成了新的综合体一样，所以，我们在这里已经可以看到的是，在占有和个性核心之间的金钱异化为它们彼此提供了一个新的意义。

艺术家、公务员、传教士、教师、学者活动的实践内容是以一个客观的理念来衡量的，并根据这些标准给予实践者主观上的满足感。但是这些实践活动也能获得经济上的成功，正像我们所知道的那样，这种经济上的成功并不总是它们客观和理念的成功的一个不变函数。这些活动在经济上获得的成功不仅可能是在最低层次的处理的推动下取得的，以至于使得客观理念成为一种单纯的手段，而且，对于较为敏感和理想化的人来说，这种行为带来的物质成果仅仅是一种安慰、一个替代品、一种救助，以此来弥补对原来的目标感到的不满足。物质的成功至少像是一种暂时和瞬间的兴趣转移，它最终会把新的力量引导到主要目标上去。有很多人的活动赚不到任何钱，他们困难得多、也危险得多，但是，我们只能从客观上、根据他们的内在需求来评价这些活动。虽然他们至少在经济意义上可以自给自足，并且因这一点得到承认，但是他们并不能从这种想法中获得有益的慰藉和安慰。他们感觉自己所面对的是一种“全有或全无”的观念，因此不得不使自己遵守这样一条规则：不存在任何情有可原的情况。这样，那些被人羡慕的人的优势就被抵消了，因为金钱对他们来说无关紧要，他们可以将自己全身心投入到事业中去。这些被人羡慕的人不得不通过下面这一事实为其有利条件付出代价，即他们行动的价值只能依照一种类型的成功来确定：如果他们的行动失败，他们不能够用“我们至少获得了一次虽然比较小但是切切实实的成功”这样的话来安慰自己，不管这种安慰多么微不足道。因为这种成功是以挣得货币的形式来表达的，货币形式使这种意义的获得变得非常容易。首先，货币明确地说明了这样一个事实，即尽管这种成功落后于它的自身价值或客观的终极价值，但是它对其他人来说肯定仍然是有价值的。除此之外，对于一种不在场的理想的主要成就来说，货币的结构特别适合于作为某种相对满意的代替品来发挥作用，因为，根据货币的确切性和数量上确定性的特点，它提供了一种特定的支持和心理上从性质上的生命价值的起伏波动中解脱出来的解放，特别是那些仍然处于一种被压制的状态的生命价值。最后，货币和理念价值的完全内在的疏离避免了价值感觉的纠缠，对敏感的人来说，这种价值感觉的纠缠会使他们极度不安。这两种结果是完全分离的，其中一种结果有时会获得一种特定的内在意义，而另一种结果则不会获得内在意义，但它们不会相互混淆。所以，通过拥有和存在的分离，纯粹的智力职业成为可能，在这之后，货币通过将被区分的东西进行一种新的综合，成功地支持了纯粹智力价值的创造，这种价值的创造既是绝对层面上的，又是相对层面上的，而这个相对层面正好是人们不适应货币这个决定物不确定性的地方。

自由的缺乏是精神序列的相互交织

正是通过占有与存在的这一基本性的分离，货币经济对一种很有思考价值的自由概念的实现做出了贡献。人缺乏自由仅仅浅显地表现为这样一个事实：即他倚赖于外部的力量。这种外部的依赖性在那些内部的关系中有着自己的对应物，这些内部关系使我们的兴趣或行为与他人的兴趣或行为紧密地交织在一起，以至于这些兴趣与行为独立的行动和发展被这种相互交织所阻碍。外部的不自由常常扩展到内在个性中，它给予精神领域或力量一种无根据的强调，因此阻碍了其他能力的发展，削弱了它们所拥有的独立性。当然，这种序列的形成可能有着外部束缚以外的其他原因。如果依照道德哲学的寻求，把伦理的自由定义为相对于自我中心主义的感性冲动的理性的独立性，那么这只是存在于一种灵魂力量（相对于所有其他力量）特殊的发展中、完全不受限制的任意发展中的自由的整体一般概念的一个方面而已。如果感性不再受到理性规范的束缚，不再受理性规范的限制，那么，它同样也是“自由的”。如果思想只跟随着自己内在的动机来运行，将自己从影响思维方向（使它偏离原来的方向，甚至背道而驰）的情感和意志中摆脱出来，那么，思想也是自由的。因此，我们可以把自由定义为一种内在的劳动分工，把它定义为刺激、兴趣、能力的相互分离和区分。一个自由的人是指，他的各种个性力量都是只为它们自身的目的和规范来发展和存在的。这就在独立于外在力量的通常意义上概括了自由的含义。当我们仔细分析时，就会发现，我们忍受的不自由所意味的是：对抗它的内在力量、灵魂领域都效忠于一个强加的目标，它们把其他力量和兴趣都包含在其中，而这些力量和兴趣本来是不会致力于这样一个目标的。我们不会把加诸于我们身上的工作看成是不自由，除非这个工作妨碍了我们其他的活动或娱乐；我们永远不会把贫穷看成不自由，除非它扭曲或压抑了其他正常的或渴望的感性力量。有一句古话是这样说的：自由意味着按照自己的本性生活，这句话简明概括地表达出了我们在这里所说的“自由”的具体含义。因为人是由很多种品性、力量、冲动构成的，所以，自由就意味着这些构成元素各自的独立性，以及它们依照自己的生活法则进行发展。

个体的心理序列之间的相互影响永远不可能完全避免；它的局限性在于实际的、不可缺少的精神上的联系，尽管人的存在和行为是多种多样的，但是这些精神上的联系使人最终成为一个相对的统一体。一个内在序列的完全分离或完全自由是一个很难想象的概念。在这方面可能达到的形式是，阻碍和束缚对这个序列中单个点的影响越来越小。无论在什么情况下，每个序列都不可避免地与另一个心理范畴相联系，只要它与这个范畴的联系只是一般性的，而不是每个要素都特定地彼此密切联系，那么这个序列就会形成其最独立的形式。然而，举例来说，虽然智力与意志的联系非常紧密，以至于智力在最深层次上、在成果的取得上都依赖于意志的积极推动，可是，只要推动智力的意志具有了一种特定的色彩或内容，思维就会偏离自己本身的规范，偏离其内在逻辑的独立性。智力必定要与一般的生活能量相融合。但是，如果智力是与宗教的、政治的、感性的形式等生活能量的具体形式联系在一起，那么它们之间的联系越是紧密，就越是存在智力不能按自己的独立方向发展的危险。所以，异常精致、有灵性的高水平的艺术作品依赖于一种更高程度的智力训练，但是，只有当这一训练不是太专业化的时候，当训练展开的范围和深度都停留在较为一般的知识领域的时候，艺术创作才能够从训练中得到益处，或者甚至是忍受这种训练，否则的话，创作的独立性与纯粹的美学动机就会受到扭曲和约束。举例来说：爱的感觉可能包含着被爱的人最亲密性的认识，这可能是产生爱的原因，也可能是爱的结果，或者仅仅是爱情的一个伴生现象。然而，如果这种意识仅仅单方面地集中于其他人的某些特殊品性，那么要想把爱的限度提高，想要把保持爱的能力提高，就会很难。只有当被爱的人的总体形象决定对他（她）们的意识的时候，这种总体形象抵消了他们所拥有的每一个具体的、单方面的品性，它才能够成为爱的基础，在这个基础上，爱的感觉才可以不受干扰地显露出它的强度和真挚，才可以追随自己的心愿去爱对方。如果一种力与另一种力不是在某个特殊具体的方面或具体发展阶段相结合，而是在一般特征上相结合，那么精神力量的必然结合就不会阻碍特殊能量的自由发展。只有在这种情况下，各种力量之间才可以建立起一定的距离，使得每一种力量都能够在自己的道路上独立发展。

把不自由应用于源自经济兴趣的局限性

在这里，引起我们兴趣的情况属于同一类型。心理过程中纯粹的思想序列不可能完全脱离那些承载经济兴趣的序列，正是由于这些承载经济兴趣的序列的基本特征才避免了这样一种分裂，这并不是个别或例外的情形，而是在个体与社会生活的一般背景下十分常见的现象。假设这一关联会限制纯粹脑力劳动的绝对独立和自由，那么此关联越少涉及某个特定经济客体，这种限制也就越不可能发生。在这一语境下，如果可能把经济兴趣序列单独建立在最一般的兴趣的基础之上，那么思想序列将会获得和经济兴趣序列的一个特定的距离，这个距离在经济兴趣的序列是围绕着某个要求特别注意的具体客体的情况下是不可能保持的。从这一点来考虑的话，很长时期以来，最适当的一种产权就是对土地的所有权。对土地的管理方式、农作物的直接可用性、对这些农作物有规律的可销售性，所有这些都促进了智力能量的相对分化和连续性。但是，只有货币经济把脑力活动的这种特性提高到了这样一个层次，使得一些人成了纯粹的脑力工作者。货币是一种非常独特的经济价值，它摆脱了所有的经济具体性，这使得它在心理学语境下给予了纯粹的脑力活动以最大程度上的自由。脑力活动的转移被最小化，内在序列之间的分化达到了最大化，内在序列在这里也可以被称作“存在与财产拥有”。这样，意识的焦点便彻底集中在非物质的兴趣上，这使得理智性通过劳动分工独立出来成为可能，而这反过来这又导致了上述纯粹脑力劳动阶层的发展。尽管热那亚和威尼斯也非常富裕，那里的人也很有才能，但与热那亚和威尼斯相比较，佛罗伦萨的思想活动更加繁荣，人们把这种繁荣部分地归因于下面这样一个事实：热那亚人与威尼斯人在中世纪大多是通过商业贸易而致富的，但佛罗伦萨人从13世纪开始就主要是作为银行家而变得富有的。银行业的本质便是对具体性的工作要求较少，而为人们更高层次兴趣的发展保留更多的自由！

在我们的社会中存在着这样一种现象，从表面上看这种现象似乎与货币解放自由的作用相抵触，这就是直接征税的发展。直接征税的现象之所以看起来与之相抵触，其原因是税收强化了人对货币的依赖，但是实际上，征税最终的意义与货币是相同的。在19世纪初的几十年中，直接征税是与财产相联系的，不管财产所有者或企业生产者的个人情况如何，也不管他是负债，还是确实获得了正常利润，土地、建筑、公司、所有种类的财产都必须纳税。这种征税方式与人头税一样，丝毫不考虑个人情况，而人头税是已知的所有税种当中最不考虑个人情形的。拥有房地产和贸易资本的人要承担相应的课税，是特定客体的所有者，他们被这种产权关系个别地确定下来，并以此与其他那些不拥有相同客体的人相区分。即使在中世纪的德国，依附农与具有更多权利的佃农之间也已经有了区分：依附农缴付的是平均地租，庄园或辖区内的每个人都交纳相同数额的地租；而在后一种情况中，佃农的地租比较高，是按各人的情况来交纳的，并且依客观情况不同而有所差异。按物品征税形成了系统中个体化征税的第二个阶段（这里所说的“第二阶段”并非是就时间顺序而言），在历史上随后出现的是按照社会阶层征税。按社会阶层征税的基础不是市民的实际个人收入，而是主要阶层之间重要的社会经济差异，在社会阶层这种更宽的范围中，个人的位置是由所属阶层的社会和经济状况来决定的。只有现在的国家课税才是依照精确的个人收入来征收的，这样一来，所有那些个别的客观的东西都被简化成不再起决定作用的单纯因素。如果我们进行更深入的考察就会发现，在逐渐成熟的货币经济中，国家征税越来越注重根据个人情况进行精确的调节，这意味着人们的自由在不断提高。这是因为，这一过程从属于指向生活过程不断分化的趋势，通过生活过程的不断分化，每个单独的序列都严格地保留在自己的领域中，尽可能远离任何其他序列，不受其干扰。人头税是最客观的原则，恰恰是这种最客观的原则，最欠考虑地忽视了各种情况下个人之间的差异。任何一种不精确依照个人收人征收、而又必须从个人收入中征收的其他税收，都超越了自己固有的领域，并进入了其他根本不属于它的领域。正像通常所发生的情形那样，我们观察到的在经济和其他生活领域之间的这一相同过程，也在各种经济要素中重复着自己。在18世纪自由主义思想开始发展的初期，当人们要求对维持个体最低生活水平的物品应该免税，维持个体最低生存水平的不同房屋的征税也应该相应减免的时候，这种关联就已经出现了。在这里，我们也发现了根据具体情况进行调整的趋势，这种调整最开始是以免税的形式消极地反映出来的，完全没有触及纯粹的个人生存状态。最近的财产税强行对货币和有形资产进行征税，而不管这些财产产生了多少收入，如果说这种税收在某种程度上改变了上述趋势，那么其根源就是与个体自由的利益完全背道而驰的社会立场。肯定和否定两方面的例子都说明了这样一个事实，即由于货币的意义越来越重要，税金像财产的影子一样，以越来越多样的形式在适合的序列中固定下来，并借助其极强的适应性，为经济生活和一般意义上的生活留下了尽可能多的自由空间。

国家和它的公民之间的关系通过一种货币关联被从根本上确定了，这一事实的根源主要在于税收。这里所指的国家和公民之间的关系是一种相互关系，它在当前语境中非常重要，我们可以用下面的方式对它加以说明。如果社会阶层的主要划分标准是人们的货币收入水平，那么建立在各种社会阶层基础之上的税收政策就会非常受限制，因为最有分歧的客观利益与相同的金钱收入联系在一起，所以，任何以某一个社会阶层的利益为依据的衡量，都无法避免地会损害这个特殊阶层的许多利益。举例来说，如果我们假设中产阶级就是收入水平在1200马克到3000马克之间的人，那么，制定一个统一的针对中产阶级的政策是不可能的事情。这是因为，那些包含在这个团体中的人，如商人、手工工人、农民、技术工人、白领工人、享有年金者、公务员等，他们在法律的其他方面几乎没有任何相同或类似的利益。关税政策的问题、劳工保护的问题、联合权利的问题、是促进批发还是零售的发展的问题、包括居住要求和遵守安息日的贸易法规的问题等，这些都要在这种复杂的关系中以最矛盾的方式被回答。对于大商人和大土地所有者来说情况也是如此：根据其收入来划分的话，他们属于同一个社会阶层；但是按照其政治利益来说，他们却属于完全不同的阵营。因此，任何一个以金钱收入为统一标准划分和融合的阶层，都失去了实际的、政治的意义。所以，国家开始更多地依赖于这样的标准，这个标准既适应了利益的整体性，又适应了利益的多样性。这个过程可能会被无数相互对抗的力量改变方向，甚至会被这种力量淹没。但是，从原则上来说，用以收入为标准来划分社会阶层的方式取代以职业和出身为标准来划分社会阶层，这造成的结果是，利益性质（它是无法用数量来体现的）摧毁了社会等级综合体的外在意义，并将公共政策引向一个客观的水平，这个发展水平超越于任何的阶级划分。这是一种最完美的客观性和最完美的主观思考之间非常典型的相互关系，这种相互关系通过税收的发展过程显示出来。

除此之外，我还想说明的是，在基本社会关系中，货币为这种相互关系的创造提供了技术上的可能性。我在上文中已经多次强调了一种中世纪的理论，这种理论给予每件商品某一合理的价格，这是一个客观上公平的价格，是货币和真实价值之间的一种算术上的平衡，这种中世纪理论试图从法律上对价格的上涨和下跌进行调节。但是，实际上它造成的结果却是非常片面的主观臆断，是一种任意专断的、不适当的估价，这种估价形成了对未来发展造成束缚的一个瞬时序列。我们不可能通过一个直接平均的过程获得公平适当的价格，想要获得一个公平适当的价格，需要考虑经济的整体情况、供给和需求多方面的力量、作为价格决定因素的人和物品的波动的生产力等等。虽然这种进行价格估价的方法没有考虑个体对价格的约束，不要求个体估算不断变化的环境情形，但是由此确定的价格却是由更多的客观真实的因素决定的，因而，在客观上更加可以同单位度量、更加公平。这种价格调节的过程还可以更加完善。有一种更加完善的公平观，这种观点认为，价格的形成不仅仅是由超个人因素每一时刻的错综复杂和变化决定的，还是由包括消费者个人资产的情况这一内容所决定的。个人的经济状况也是一个对实现个人消费非常重要的客观事实。但是，在目前的价格构成中，根本找不到在原则上个人经济状况的任何体现。人们可以非常容易地观察到这种忽略个人经济状况的事实，这使得公平的价格观变得自相矛盾。在我们前面提到的价值增值的现象中，这一自相矛盾性也以一种非常明显的方式呈现在我们面前，即在购买相同的商品时，穷人所付的钱多于富人所付的钱。然而，在许多情况下，又出现了相反的情形，即穷人通常认为自己的需要比富人的低廉，比富人更容易满足。在某种特定意义上，医生诊费的价格的制定似乎是根据病人的个人经济情况决定的；在特定限度内，病人“根据自己的个人经济状况”支付给医生诊费是合法的。当然，如果从下面这一事实来看，这种做法就尤其显得正当合理：病人自己处于一种非常窘迫的状态下，而他必须要去找医生就诊，所以，从一开始，看医生的活动就必然建立在对相同服务支付不同费用的基础上。公民自己与国家的关系也处于一种相似的境遇中，公民对国家的义务是不可免除的，即使公民想拒绝也是拒绝不了的。所以，国家向穷人收取较少的义务补偿、征收较少的税金一点都不奇怪，这不仅仅是因为国家为有着更多财产的人提供了更大的利益。这种在对彼此义务调节中的表面上的客观性长期以来被认为是不合理的，它已经渐渐被财政状况的原则所取代。新平衡关系并不比旧平衡关系缺少客观性，它只不过把个人经济状况也作为因素之一考虑进来。新的平衡关系具备了一种更为合理的客观性，因为把个人的总体经济状况从价格构成的要素中排除出去似乎是相当武断的，也是相当忽视客观实际情况的，尤其是涉及必不可少的方面的时候。按照这一观点的方向来考虑的话，律师费应根据诉讼标的价值不同而有所变化，在一个律师费为20马克的诉讼案件中当事人要求律师付出的努力，与在一个几千马克的案件中当事人要求律师付出的努力，二者是相同的。在这里，律师也是根据当事人的个人经济状况来收取费用的，尽管这看起来似乎比前面提到的医生收取诊费的情况更加客观。这一原则是更加深入的提议的基础（在后面我们会对这一提议详细论述）：举例来说，法律并没有把罚款确定在一个固定的水平上，而是根据人们的收入水平来确定；诉讼案件的费用除了在上诉至最高法院时会有所限定之外，不再像从前那样设置一个绝对的数量了，而是根据起诉人每年收入的一定百分比来确定。的确根据消费者的消费方式来确定不同价格的体系近来被宣称是社会方针政策的一个万灵药，这一社会政策具有社会主义的优点，全无社会主义的不足。在这里，我们感兴趣的不是这种说法的正确性，而仅仅是这个说法的存在本身，它以一种特殊的方式说明了贸易在经济意义上的发展的完成。我们可以看到，贸易开始于纯粹主观——个人的财产所有权变化，其方式主要是馈赠和偷窃，随后，通过把事物而非进行交换的人放置到彼此的相互关系中，交易达到了一个客观的水平。最初，交换以固定的自然数量进行交换，或者以公开的强制价格进行交换，借助于此来非常严格地遵循它的形式，虽然这样的交换方式有着客观的形式，但是它们的内容仍然是完全主观和任意的。现代社会更为自由的贸易通过把意外情况产生的所有不定因素都合并到价格构成当中扩大了这种客观性。贸易的客观性变得更加有弹性，因而也更加广泛。上面提到的那个提议最终试图把最具有个人主观性的要素客观化，这使得个体购买者的经济状况理应可以改变那些他所需要的客体的价格。这是与声称价格取决于生产条件的成本理论非常类似的一个说法，或者至少它是这一理论的延伸。目前，价格的构成将依据各种消费条件来确定，或者至少是根据消费条件变化的。下面这种想法虽然有些理想化，但它在逻辑上仍然是可能的：如果消费条件保持不变，那么生产者的利益就会得到维护，并且，在每一次销售中，价格都会充分地体现出其赖以形成的所有个体的经济状况，每一件主观的东西都将变成价格构成中的客观合法的要素。这一发展符合了一种哲学世界观，这种世界观把所有最初客观的事物都看成主观构成。然而，通过这种对自我的绝对回归，世界获得了统一性、凝聚性和可触知性，这些性质把意义和价值赋予了我们所谓的客观现实。正像在这种情况下，主体将克服它与已经完全被它吸收和超越了的客体之间的对立那样，在另一种情形下，这一对立被如下事实超越了，即客观的行为已经淹没了一切主观的东西，没有留下任何可以使这个对立继续存在的因素。

对于我们这里所要阐释的问题非常重要的是，这种理想的构成、它与现实断断续续的接近，要通过货币的概念才可能实现。只有当这里存在一种价值的统一均衡的表现形式的时候，我们才能够充分运用各种各样的经济状况因素的总体规定价格；只有将其化成一个公分母，才可以为个人经济状况中的全部要素提供那种统一性，这样才会允许这些要素根据公平的标准共同完成价格的规定。货币最显著的成果就是：通过把最大的多样性均等化，使每个单独的复杂状况都被最充分地实现和发挥作用，就好像是所有具体形式都必须首先返回共同的原始要素，这样才能使个别的重新创造的形式获得完全的自由。货币的这一成就是下面这条发展线路的前提条件，此发展线路是，排除物品价格中所有会歪曲个人经济状况的僵化刻板的因素，这种因素在那种价格不能平均化的社会原则中强烈地表现出来。但是，在涉及与消费者的经济状况的关系的时候，这些不等价格就具有了相对的平等性，并根据一种完全客观性的原则，通过其包罗万象的整体性，构成了主观的前提条件。通过客观性与主体的绝对的对立，我们才最初意识到客观性，主体与客体之间的区别绝不可能明确到可以把客体从朴素的或复杂的主客体的同一中释放出来。只有较高水平的思想发展过程才能再一次包括客观性全面广泛的概念，这一概念将主体包涵在其中。客体不再需要把它和主体的直接对立固定和明确下来；相反，客体将主体抬升为世界的客观图景的一个组成部分，或者是它的一个方面。

对货币促进了占有和存在的分离这一情形较早的表达中也包含了这一发展，在此表达中，货币清晰地表现、并相应地总结了一个在历史生活的其他阶段已经得到发展的过程。只要社会秩序是建立在氏族基础之上的，个人与土地之间的稳定关系就会占据主流。因为氏族是土地的最高所有者，它的利益完全与个人利益是一致的。在财产私有化之前，氏族成为了连接存在和财产占有之间的纽带。后来，土地转变为私人财产，虽然这看起来是把个人与其财产联系在一起，但是实际上，这一转变却使它们之间的任何根本性的联系都松弛了，以至于任何与财产相关的行为现在都是可能的了。必然发生的货币经济首先出现在中世纪的城市中，它导致了这样一种情况，即土地可以被抵押，土地所有者可以从中获取租金，而不会影响到他的人身状态，也不会降低他的社会地位。货币经济把土地和作为个人的土地所有者分离开，分离的程度如此之大，以至于把完全的财产所有权进行限定（如抵押），不再被认为是对财产所有者的降格。人与土地的分离首先是通过货币才可能实现的，抵押和出售仅仅是这种分离的最极端的结果。然而，在货币存在之前，在氏族结构瓦解之时，这一分离过程就已经开始了。在后来的发展中，出现了一个类似的过程，父权社会转变成所有公民在法律面前具有平等权利的法制国家。这还意味着存在脱离了财产占有，财产占有也脱离了存在，一个人的社会地位不再由他占有的土地财产来决定，而财产也不再由贵族阶层的成员资格来决定。这一结果是由一系列各种各样的社会运动造成的，例如：低层阶级的人数不断增加，由此削弱了贵族阶级的力量；社会低层阶级的人实行劳动分工，一方面这造成了一种贵族体系，另一方面，又使拥有土地的贵族不可避免地依赖于社会低层阶级的人；那些无需依靠土地的阶层获得了更大的自由，等等。在“希腊的中世纪”末期，所有这些力量都在发挥作用，当时海上贸易与殖民主义活动正在发展，从7世纪时起，雅典就获得了经济上的主导地位，到货币经济得到发展的时候，它只不过是彻底完成了这一过程。现在，土地所有者仍然需要资金来保持与有钱的暴发户平起平坐。通过土地抵押得到的钱、通过在土地上种植农作物所得的钱、甚至在土地自身上得到的钱，这些钱在土地所有者和他的财产之间不断转移，使得他更加不受财产的特定性质的束缚，也使财产失去了个人色彩，由此造成的结果是，贵族阶层与其他阶层之间的权利越来越均等。所有人的权利一律平等的原则最终在希腊的民主政治中占据了主导地位，瓦解了财产占有和存在状态之间的相互依赖关系。但是，在这里，货币经济将自己呈现为一种运动的最有力的、同时也是最明显的要素和表达方式，是一个基础更加宽广得多的运动的要素和表达方式。我们发现在早期德国，土地资产不是一个独立的客体，而是个体获得当地社会成员身份资格的结果。土地本身不属于那种有资格的客体，对土地的占有不能给予个体意义及后果；相反，一个人先要拥有这种特殊的意义，才会被给予一块特定的土地财产。在10世纪的时候，这种人身束缚关系已经消失了，并且已经被土地的独立性取代，这或许可以被称为一种土地的个人化。这种个人化导致了一种土地分割的潮流，土地被卷入经济生活的不安宁之中。当土地与生俱来的稳定性将这种趋势最终遏制住时，它便被货币取代了，被这种离人最遥远的经济客体取代了。然而，货币仍是能够清楚地表现存在状态与财产占有的分离的最合适的物质，这一分离已经开始影响到土地所有权的状态了。最终，在13世纪，从其他方面、从社会阶梯的另一端，相同的现象被展现了出来。在这个阶段，农民已经获得了非常高水平的自由，尤其在德国东部的一些地区，这里已经被自由的农民殖民化了。这种自由的获得与相对当时发展程度已经很高的货币经济有紧密的联系，但是，这种情况持续了一段时间之后，发生了一个突然的逆转：领主土地制度被延伸，特别是在易北河的东部，农民被成功地束缚在土地上，而与此同时，货币交换再次被实物交换所取代。农民被紧紧地束缚在他们的经济地位上，他们的存在被紧紧地束缚在他们的财产上，这一现象与货币经济的衰败是平行的。虽然货币经济被解释为领主土地制度的原因，但是实际上，它只不过是那个时候导致这一制度形成的复杂原因当中最显著的一个罢了。如果货币被当作一种在某种程度上被从所有者的存在中分离和独立出来的财产，那么，在财产占有和存在状态之间的历史关系中，货币就代表了最明确、最具决定性、最具征兆性的要素，这些要素造成了财产占有与存在状态这一关系的紧密和松弛的世界历史性变化。

自由是在对事物的占有中形成清晰的自我

如果自由的确意味着使存在状态独立于财产占有的能力，如果货币所有权最明确地减少和打破了存在状态和财产占有中一方对另一方的依赖，那么就会存在另一种与此相对照的、更积极的自由概念，一种把存在状态和财产占有在一个更高层面上重新联系在一起的自由概念，而这种自由最强有力的实现仍然要借助于货币。我所指的是本书前面曾提到的对所有权的界定，即它并不像表面看上去那样是对客体的被动接受，而是主动的对客体采取的行为。不管所有权多么全面广泛、多么不受限制，它能够对客体做的也只不过是为自我的意愿在客体中得到表达提供一个机会。因为，占有某件物品实际上所包含的意义就是，被占有的这件物品不能够抵抗所有者的意愿，即所有者的意愿可以凌驾于这件物品之上。如果我声称某个人“属于”我，那么也就是说，他要屈从于我的意愿，我的存在和意志持续不断地作用于他，其方式可以是简单自然的协调，也可以是暗示性的强迫威胁。正如我的身体是属于我的，身体的“属我”程度比其他任何客体都要高，因为它对我的心理冲动的服从更加直接、更加彻底，这些冲动几乎完全在身体上得到了体现，所以，以此类推，如果这种情况对某一个事物有效，那么这个事物就是在同等程度上属于我的。一个人可以对某个客体“为所欲为”这一事实不仅是所有权导致的结果，而且还在实际上包含了这样的意义：即这个人占有了它。这样，自我被其所拥有的所有占有物环绕起来，被一个范围环绕起来，在这个范围内，自我的癖好和性格特征都得到了显而易见的实现。占有物构成了自我范围的延伸，自我只是这个范围的中心，欲望冲动从这个中心延伸至事物上。如果客体屈从于我的自我的权利和力量之下，依照我的意愿来塑造它们自己，那么它们就是属我的。财产占有既是自我的范围，又是自我的表达，只要客体与自我的紧密关系在保持和延续着，那么它就不仅仅只体现在对事物的占有当中，还体现在对事物的放弃当中。因为，个体与自我的紧密关系与我们把产权看作诸多行动的总和的概念是相协调一致的，不管是以交换的方式放弃价值，还是把价值当作礼物送出去，都会强化个人对占有物的情感，即与自愿放弃和自我牺牲相关联的吸引力、以迂回的方式减弱自我而实际上增强自我的吸引力。通常只有在财产被放弃的时候才会体验到与财产的占有关系，这就如同只有在人们身体的某一部分被割除的瞬间，人们才会最强烈地感觉到它。占有的魅力在交出财产的一瞬间被加强了，以至于不管交出财产时是痛苦的还是喜悦的，如果对方不支付财产占有者要求的价钱，他就不可能交出该物。交出占有物的时刻是一个特别的“收获的时刻”，就像获得利润的时刻一样。所有权体现的个人能力似乎被对所有物的处理明显地强化了，正像在稍微有些不同之处的毁坏财产的强烈欲望中所表现的一样。据说，在阿拉伯的贝督因人中，乞讨、赠送礼物和抢劫是可以相互置换的概念，也是必然相互联系的行为。根据这些部落强烈的个人主义特征来看，上述事实尤其显著地说明了所有这些与产权相关的不同行为是如何在不同的前提之下、遵循着不同的方向体现所有占有物的同一意义和价值的，也就是个性是如何在占有物当中表达、显示和展现自己的。要真正理解财产的概念，关键性的一点是要认识到：把财产与自我进行严格划分，把内在生活与外在生活进行严格划分是非常肤浅的，如果想要更深入地阐释财产概念，这种严格划分就应该更具灵活性。一方面，财产的整体意义存在于这样一个事实当中，即它释放了心灵的特定感情和冲动，而另一方面，自我的范畴既扩展至这些“外在”客体之上，又深入到这些“外在”客体之中，这就如同小提琴演奏者或画家的心灵过程不断转化为小提琴弓或画笔的运动一样。正像如果对任何外部客体的占有不具备任何精神价值，那么对该客体的占有就是没有任何意义的，这样看来，如果自我没有被外部客体所环绕，那么自我就会倒塌、失去自己的维度，因为这些外部客体服从于、或者说属于自我，是自我癖好、力量和个性风格的表现。在我看来，在私有财产发展的最初阶段和最繁荣时期，财产占有极有可能并非占有劳动产品之类的东西，而是占有劳动工具，包括武器。因为工具的功能是作为四肢功能最直接的延伸和扩展，事物对我们的欲望冲动的抵抗通常正是在它们的终结点被体验到的。与占有其他物体相比，在占有工具中所体现出的活动要素更多，工具与身体最接近，它们是最彻底地与自我融为一体的财产。这种对财产的解释指出了这样一种方式，在这种方式中，唯心主义世界观、自由主义世界观通过它们的对应物被补充完善，这种方式就是：客体必须成为自我的一部分，正像自我必须成为客体的一部分一样。

我们可以这样说：对财产的获得也反映了超越于个体之上的个人的成长，就像生殖繁衍反映了这样一种成长一样。在这两种情况当中，个体的范畴超出了最初的限度，延伸至另一个自我，然而，在一个更宽泛的意义上，这另一个自我仍然是“属他”的。在马来半岛的一些部落中，只有丈夫还清新娘的嫁妆之后所生的孩子才是属于父亲的，而那些在此之前所生的孩子，虽然毫无疑问也是同一父母所生，但仍然属于母亲家。当地的人们之所以会做出这样一条规定，自然是出于一种纯粹实际的考虑，即孩子所代表的是一种价值客体，此价值客体是通过女儿的婚姻给予男方的，但是在还清嫁妆之前，它仍属于娘家。这种风俗揭示了财产占有和繁衍后代之间的深刻关系。丈夫似乎可以进行这样的选择：是愿意通过拥有孩子来扩大自己的势力范围，还是把这些孩子留给妻子的父母。吠陀经记载了某些有关早期婆罗门僧侣的情况：“他们停止了自己的活动，去争取儿子、争取财产。因为争取儿子就是争取财产。他们对这两者的渴望程度是相同的。”这句话本身并没有表达这两种争取内容的同一性，但是，被引用的两个例子说明所有对财产的争取都是一致的，这一点才是至关重要的。在相似物的创造过程中，自我把自己最初的局限性转移到了自我的相似物身上，正如当自我控制着财产的时候，会把自我的意志形式强加到财产上一样。财产是一种纯粹的个人扩展，下述情况并没有驳倒这一概念，反而为它提供了强有力的证明，这个情况就是：个人的自我意识被从自我的核心那里转移到了它周围的层面上，即转移到了财产上。与此类似，我们可以把繁衍后代和构建家庭理解为自我的延伸，这一观点也不会受到下述事实的影响：即直接的自我利益隐藏在孩子的兴趣之后。在中世纪的英格兰，人身束缚的标志是：如果没有得到领主的首肯，任何人不得抛弃女儿或者出售牛。事实上，任何有权这么做的人都被认为是自由的，即使他仍然还要为领主服务。自我意识超越了它的直接界线，开始扎根于仅与自我间接相关的客体，这确实证明了，像这样的财产在何种程度上都意味着个人在客体中的延伸，以及个体通过对客体的控制对客体影响范围的获得。这解释了一种奇怪的现象：有的时候，财产总量似乎与个体存在的总体相等。在中世纪的法兰西，存在着一种特殊的农奴阶层，他们的法定权利是：如果他们把所有财产都交给领主，那么就可以获得自由。

这样一种解释会造成对不同种类的财产的理解的许多结果。如果自由意味着意愿被毫无阻碍地实现，那么我们拥有的财产越多，似乎就越自由，因为我们已经接受了这样的财产定义，即我们可以对拥有的财产“为所欲为”。然而我们没有“自由”对其他人的财产、或对那些根本不可能获得的财产为所欲为。所以，很长一个时期里，在拉丁语中，以及在德语的中，“自由”的含义是与特权的意义相联系的，或者是与特殊优待的意义相联系的，这正好与我们对自由的阐释相似。只有被占有的客体的本质自身限制了自由本身。这一点在我们与被认为是完全不受限制的财产的自己身体之间的关系中已经得到说明。只有在其自身构造中，身体才服从于精神冲动，我们的意志不可能总是能够在身体上造成相应的动作和行为。对于所有其他客体而言也是一样。对于我所拥有的一块木头来说，我的意志能发挥的自由仅仅限于用它雕刻出各种工具，但是，如果我想做一件有橡胶弹性或有石头的硬度的工具的话，那么我的自由也就所剩无几了。我们的意志对物体所能做的事情，与一个艺术家可以用他的工具做的事情，这二者是类似的。不管他的情感和艺术天分多么深入地渗透到他的艺术工具上，不管他的力量限度是否已经预先确定，在某个地方，这样的限制确实存在着。如果超出某一特定点，艺术工具的结构本身就不再允许它更深入地服从于精神力量。这个特定点就是事物不再“属于”我们的一个界限。在如今的时代中，我们很容易忽视财产占有的基本限度：我们的适应能力已经被破坏，随心所欲地争取自由和财产，这使得我们要求客体为我们提供无数的东西，而由于事物和我们本身的性质，这些东西是客体不可能提供给我们的。这使我想起我们对艺术实质的理解的缺乏，这种艺术理解力的缺乏只是到最近才被克服；此外，这还使我想起这样一个事实：我们越来越趋向于希望从外部生活环境中得到心灵的快乐与平和，希望从技术进步中得到真正的文明，希望从社会的客观结构中得到个体的满足和完善。

一般来说，当意志与我们的生活条件相协调的时候，我们的意志就不会期望客体完成它不可能做的事情了，因为财产内在固有的规律而造成的对我们自由的限度就不会引起肯定的经验了。虽然如此，但是仍然有可能依据意志可以掌握客体的程度、意志不再能够渗透到客体的临界点、以及客体可以真正被“占有”的程度来建立一种客体的等级，而货币将被定位于这样一个等级的终极点。其他客体为自己所保留的、否定了无所限制的占有的那种不可能性，在货币这里完全不存在。其他客体都有这样一种结构，这一结构可以使其他特定客体拒绝服从于我们的意志，即使我们合法地占有它们，而货币则没有这种结构。货币可以很容易地适应意志期望它达到的每种形式、每个目的。只有存在于货币背后的物体才会产生障碍。货币自身无差别地服从于意志的每一个指示，例如：购买哪个物品、支出的范围、花费的速度、存钱的速度，等等。以这种方式，货币赋予了自己在某一客体中表现自我的最彻底的自由，虽然这种最彻底的自由还只是局限于它本身缺乏特殊性质造成的界限内。然而，这一界限并不像所有其他客体的界限那样，它只是被动的，不是货币本身的积极性质的结果。货币所指的东西和货币所拥有的东西，全部都被毫无保留地提供给人的意志，并被意志完全吸收。如果某个时候，货币不再能做到这一点了，那么这将归因于下述事实：超过那个对所有其它客体来说代表了其存在中有所保留，不肯屈服的部分的界限，货币中就什么也剩不下了。

从形式上来看，货币是最顺从的客体，然而，因为它内容的空虚，货币同时又是最不顺从的客体。这是因为，我们占有的货币是完全地、毫无保留地属于我们的，换句话说就是，我们不能再从货币上获取任何更多的东西了。通常我们会这样认为：只有当一个客体存在某些实质内容的时候，它对我们来说才是有一定意义的；因此，只有当这个客体对我们的自由设定一个界限的时候，它才会给我们的自由提供实现的方式。在这种逻辑矛盾的张力中，我们针对客体的行为整体被实现，这一逻辑矛盾在货币中达到了最大化。货币对我们的意义比我们所拥有的任何其他客体的意义都要多，因为它毫无保留地服从我们；同时，货币对我们的意义又比我们所拥有的任何其他客体的意义都少，因为它没有任何的内容，可以被拥有的、超越财产的纯粹形式的内容。所以，我们占有货币所拥有的东西比占有其他任何客体所拥有的东西都要多，同时又比占有其他任何客体所拥有的东西都要少。

像货币的各种其他性质一样，货币的灵活性在证券交易中得到了最明显、最强烈的体现：在证券交易中，货币经济结晶为一个独立的结构，正如政治组织结晶成为国家一样。股价的波动常常显示了主观一心理动机，就这些动机不成熟和独立的运动而言，它们与客观因素的关系中是完全不成比例的。但是，如果单单用价格的波动很少反映股票所体现的性质的真实变化，来解释上面提到的情形的话，那么这肯定是肤浅的。因为，诸如国家、啤酒厂、矿山、银行等客体对市场的意义并不仅仅在于它们的内在性质，还在于这些客体与所有其他市场证券和状况的关系。所以，就算阿根廷的经济大萧条使中国的证券价格下跌，这也并不会影响到它们的实际基础——虽然说阿根廷经济大萧条对这些证券造成的影响并不比在月球上发生的事情造成的影响大。因为，这些证券的价值、它们的全部外在稳定性，仍然取决于市场的整体情况，而证券市场整体状况的波动可以在任何时候对证券价值和稳定性进行调节，例如使那些证券利润的进一步利用不那么有利可图。虽然证券市场的波动预先假设了单个客体是与其他客体结合在一起的，但是客观上股市的波动依然会发生，这是因为，超越于这些证券市场的浮动之上，还存在着一个影响因素，即来自投机买卖自身的因素。对某支股票将来走势的赌博投机本身会对这支股票的价格造成非常大的影响。举例来说，如果某个实力雄厚的财团由于某些根本与股票性质不相关的原因，对某支股票感兴趣，那么这支股票的价格就会上升；相反，一个引起跌风的财团只要进行简单的操作手段，就可以使一支股票的价格下跌。在这里，客体的真实价值似乎是不相关的底层土壤，市场价值的运动之所以发生在这底层土壤之上，仅仅是因为它不得不依附于某种物质上，或者是依附于某种物质的名义。客体的实际价值、最终价值与它通过证券的代表之间的关系失去了全部稳定性。这明显地体现了价值的这种形式的绝对灵活性，这一形式是客体通过货币获得的，它把客体从其现实基础中完全分离出来。现在，价值几乎毫无反抗地服从于人们心理上的欲望，如愤怒、贪婪、不切实际的主张等，并且价值对心理欲望的服从是以一种非常突出的方式来实现的，因为客观环境的存在可以提供精确价值评价标准。然而，为了使自己完全服从于主观能量，以货币形式存在的价值已经使自己独立于其根源和基础之外。在这里，投机买卖自身可以决定被投机对象的命运，价值货币形式的渗透性和灵活性通过它最严格意义的主观性找到了它最成功的表达。

对货币的占有和货币对自我的服从

依据上文所述，货币占有意味着自我的扩展，这种自我扩展是一种极其特别的扩展。在某种意义上，这是一个我们可以从某个客体那里获得的最完全的扩展；而从另一种意义上来说，这又是一个非常受到限制的扩展，因为货币的灵活性只不过是一种非常易变的物体的特性，它可以采用任何一种形式，但自身并不能被塑造成某一形式，只能从周围的物体身上中得到它可能获得的所有形式。这一序列结构解释了心理事实的如下类型。有人曾经告诉我，他会感到强烈地想要去购买他非常喜欢的每一件东西的欲望，但是并不是为了自己，也不是为了拥有这件东西，他所关心的仅仅是：他要把他对这些东西的喜爱主动表现出来，他要在这些东西在自己手中经过时，把自己的个性特征印在它们身上。这样的话，货币就可以提供一个个性的独特扩张，这种扩张不必寻求用对物品的占有来装饰自己。这样的个人不再对控制客体感兴趣，他只对超越于客体之上的瞬间权力感到满足，并且，这样的个人与客体之间没有任何性质上的联系，这一事实似乎不会给予个人任何的扩展和满足，但购买行为本身就是一种满足体验，因为所有的客体都完全服从于货币。因为货币和有货币价值的客体完全顺从个体心理欲望，所以个体所支配的这些客体的象征符号就可以使他得到满足，如果没有上述货币和有货币价值的客体对心理欲望的完全服从，个体的满足感只能够通过实际占有来获得。对这种单纯象征符号的享受可以达到一种病态的程度，就像一位法国小说家所叙述的一个例子那样。这个例子就是，有个英国人，他是一个生活豪放不羁的艺术家组织的一名成员，他生活中的乐趣就是拿出钱来让人们纵酒狂欢，尽管他自己从来不参与，而只是为所有人付钱：他出现在这里，什么话也不说，什么事情也不做，为所有人买单，然后离开。在这种令人疑惑的事情中，其中的一个方面，即为那些人付账，对这个英国人来说，肯定意味着一切，也就是说，他从为别人付账这一行为中获得心理上的满足。我们很容易认为这是一种不正常的获得满足感的现象，这种不正常的满足感已经成为新近的性病理学的研究主题。普通的铺张一般只是停留在占有、享用、以及单纯挥霍金钱这样的初级阶段，与此相比，这个为他人付账的人的行为就显得非常古怪，因为，在这个例子中，通过货币等价物所体现出的享受对他的诱惑如此切近、如此直接。一方面，这个人不主动地去占有事物和使用事物，另一方面，这种单纯的购买行为又被体验成为人与客体之间的一种关系，被体验成一种个体的满足，这一现象可以通过自我扩张来解释，这种个人的扩张是花费金钱的单纯举动提供给个人的。货币在这样的人和客体之间搭建了一座桥梁，在跨越这座桥的过程中，人们的灵魂感受到了他们所拥有的物体的吸引力，尽管他们实际上还没有获得它。

这种关系还形成了既十分复杂又十分重要的贪财现象的一个方面。守财奴的快乐就是占有着金钱却永远不把钱拿出来购买和享用具体的客体，对他而言，这样做所体验到的权力感肯定比占有任何特定客体所能够获得的权力感都更加深刻、更加有价值。因为，正像我们在本书前面所看到的那样，每一种财产占有都有它自身的局限性。贪婪的灵魂试图获得完全彻底的满足，它想要穿透事物最终的、最内在的、绝对的本质，但是，它却痛苦地被这些事物拒绝。每种事物都是自为的东西，并且一直都是自为的东西，它们拒绝完全融入主体自我的范围，往往使得最强烈的占有欲到最后也得不到满足。对货币的占有摆脱了这种隐藏在所有其他财产形式中的对立。由于货币根本没有获得客体，并且排除了所有取决于具体事物的具体享乐，所以，与此相对应，货币就能够提供一种权力感，这种权力感是具体的可感知的客体不可能具备的，同时它不会受到财产占有形式的限制。我们可以完全地、毫无保留地占有的客体只有货币，能够完全彻底地行使我们所指派的任务的客体也只有货币。守财奴所体验的快乐在美学意义上大概与此类似。因为这种快乐超越了世界上难以渗透的现实，遵循着只有精神才能完全理解的光芒，完全彻底地与它融合。然而，与货币相关的现象是这个序列中最纯粹、最明晰的部分，这个序列在其他形式中也实现了形同的原则。我曾经遇到一个人，他已经不再年轻，是一个小康之家的户主，他把他的全部时间都用在学习各种各样的东西上，但却从来不学以致用，例如他学习许多语言，却从不使用它们：他学习舞蹈，但跳舞时从不使用学到的东西；他学习各种各样的技能，但也从来不使用它们，甚至从来不打算这样做。这完全属于守财奴的类型：他完全占有某些可能性，但从来不想让它们实现，从这种做法当中获得满足感。在这里，吸引他们这么做的原因肯定跟美学上的吸引力有关。美学的魅力就是掌握纯粹的形式和事物或行动的理念，任何通向其实现的过程都被看作是一种衰落，一种因不可避免的障碍、倒退和不足导致的衰落，这些因素必定会造成绝对掌控客体所能获得的愉悦感的减少。审美观照是一种纯粹的功能，它可以观照任何客体，尤其适用于观照“美”，这种审美观照最彻底地消除了存在于自我和客体之间的阻碍。对审美观照来说，客体的观念被阐明得如此容易、自在、和谐，似乎它们仅仅由自我的基本法则决定一样。因此，作为审美情绪的一个组成部分的自由感、从事物阴暗的压力中的释放、快乐和自由的自我向事物的扩张，所有这些的实现通常都会受到压制。那种仅仅占有货币而不消费的快乐在心理上的倾向肯定也是这样的。这意味着对实际占有权的一种奇特的合并、抽象和预期，给予意识那种自由的空间、通过毫无抵抗的中介实现的预期的自我扩展、不需要使用暴力或否定现实而对所有可能性的自我吸收，所有这些都是审美快乐的组成部分。“美是快乐的许诺”这一定义也指出了美学魅力在心理上的形式和金钱的诱惑力的心理形式的相似之处，这是因为，如果金钱的诱惑力不在于它能够提供快乐的许诺，那么它的诱惑力还能存在于哪呢？

顺便说一下，有的时候，人们会试图把一个还没有形成的价值的吸引力和已经形成的价值的吸引力结合在一起，这就是珠宝和玉石有着重大价值的原因之一。珠宝玉石的所有者似乎就是某种潜在的、非常有价值的资产的代表和主人，一方面，这象征了他支配这些珠宝玉石的集中权利，另一方面，这也揭示出某种绝对的流动性和纯粹的潜在性，这种流动性和潜在性是它们本身具备的，已经被凝结成一种确定的形式和明确的性质。上述试图把这两种功能结合到一起的情形，可以在印度找到一个非常明显的例子，这个国家有一个持续了很长时间的风俗，即把货币以首饰的形式储存起来，也就是，人们把银币熔化并制成首饰，这仅仅会使价值有非常微小的损失，然后储存起来，这样便可以在遇到突发事件时再次当作银子花出去。这样的价值很明显具有一种更加集中的作用，在性质方面也更加丰富。通过给予价值某种具体的性质，消除价值的原子结构，它似乎更进一步地属于个人了。这一点在下列事实中得到了非常清晰的说明，从所罗门时代开始，王室就把贵重金属制造成器具的形式储存起来，他们之所以会这样做是基于这样一个信念：这样的做法会使得财宝最牢固地掌握在王室家族手中，避免敌人的掠夺。把硬币作为首饰直接使用，这通常意味着这个人想要马上占有、掌控他的这些财富。首饰作为一种个性的光芒存在着，所以，从本质上来说，只有当首饰放射出个性光芒的时候，它才是有价值的东西。对首饰的观念，与它的实际意义一样，都取决于它与自我的紧密关系。据说，在东方，所有财富都是以下面这样一个事实为条件的，即财富所有者能够在逃往时带上这些财产，不管发生什么事情，财富所有者都能够使这些财富绝对地跟随他。然而，毫无疑问，这种占有金钱的快乐包含了一种理想主义的因素。对这一因素的强调看起来似乎是自相矛盾的，这仅仅是因为：一方面，赚取金钱的手段通常没有任何理想主义的因素，另一方面，表达快乐的人所选择的方式通常完全不同于理想主义方式。然而，这并不会掩饰这样一个事实，即像这样的占有货币的快乐是最抽象的快乐之一，这种快乐离直接感官快乐的距离最远，因为它完全是通过思考和想象的过程被体验到的。这就像胜利的快乐一样，对某些人来说，这种感觉非常的强烈，以至于他们甚至不会去问：自己从这次胜利中获得了什么。

货币的占有以一种奇特的方式体现了个性的延伸，这种方式是任何财产占有都与生俱来的，我们将在下面的考察中对此进行证实和补充。我把自己的意志渗透到其中的每一个客体领域都受到了客体自身规律的限制，这些规律是我们的意志无法打破的。这种限制不仅仅是由于客体的被动抵抗造成的，从另一个方面来说，它还是由于主体扩张能力的局限性造成的。客体对意志的服从范围可能会非常之大，以至于自我不再可能完成这一任务。我们假设占有就等于自由，假设我的自由（即我的意志的优势）随着我所占有的财产的数量的增加而越来越大，但这些假设实际上只在某个特定限度之内是可能的，如果超出这个限度，自我就不能够实现和享受控制客体的潜力了。当然，贪婪可能会超越这一界限，但是贪婪本身具有某种荒谬性，在它的永不满足当中（这是它本身实现的组成部分）、偶然的限制和约束当中（由于这种限制和约束，无节制的占有财富变成了其最初性质和目的的对立面），都体现了这种荒谬性。这导致了下面这样一系列的现象：出现了不能够获利的财产，因为拥有这些财产的人的行为不足以获得利润；专制君主变得对统治他的奴隶感到厌倦，因为当奴隶绝对服从于他、不进行任何反抗的时候，能够使他感觉到自己的权力意志消失了；财产所有者既没有时间也没有精力来享用他的财产，因为他把所有的时间和精力都花费在对其财产的经营和管理上了。只有在涉及它们可以在同一时间吸纳多少个性这一问题的时候，也就是涉及财产的占有在哪个临界点将变得没有意义这一问题的时候，各种客体才会彼此不同，因为只有在这个限度之内，自我才能够控制财产。在这里，货币再次占据了一个特殊的地位。我们可以说，与对其他财产的占有相比，对货币的管理、支配和享用对个人的要求更少，所以，与其他的财产形式相比，他可以掌控和建构成自己个性的经济范围的货币财产的规模更大。

实际的快乐、以及对所有其他事物的欲望，都会像一条不变的规则一样，受到主体接受能力的限制，不管两者的限制是否一致，也不管它们之间的距离会有多远。正像前面我们在本书另一个地方所说的那样，只有货币不会被局限在这个自称为对客体的欲望的界限的范围之内。当然，情况越是这样，金钱就越只不过是“金钱”，就越只不过是一种纯粹简单的交换媒介，本身没有任何可以直接享受的价值。当家养牲畜、食物、奴隶等生活消费品被当做货币使用的时候，对它们的占有所意味的就是铺张的消费，而不是购买能力的扩大。换句话说，在这里同时存在着两种不同的个性扩展方式。在原始的物物交换经济中，个性的扩展方式就是通过直接消费占有客体，我们可以将其描述为：自我从中心不断地向外扩展。然而，在抽象的金属货币交换经济中，这种通过直接占有客体的个性扩展方式就失去意义了，变得可以被完全忽略，在信用消费经济中更是如此。与物物交换经济中的“富”人相比，现代社会的富人可能过着没有任何直接的官能上的满足的最适度、最有限制的生活。举例来说，我们可以在烹饪饮食领域中发现发达货币经济导致的这样两种趋向：除了宴请外，富人通常吃得比较简单，而中产阶级，至少城市中的中产阶级，反而吃得更好一些。通过货币的分离作用，自我可以在距离自己最遥远的客体那里感受到他的力量、满足和意志，这样就使得自我忽略、不在乎更加直接的阶层身份。然而，在不太发达的社会中，对财产的控制是要以这种更加直接的社会阶层身份为基础的。个体扩展的能力受个人自身性质的限制，当这种能力与货币相关联时，它所展示出的弹性和自由相比与任何其他财产关联时都更大。这与我们在本书前面的想法之间存在着差异，在前面，我们认为客体的具体特性破坏了自我的扩展，而在这里，我们却发现，在一定数量的财产占有被实现之后，即使客体本身具有完全的弹性以供自我扩展，个人力量的局限性也会使它变小，也就是说，限制自我扩展的是个人力量的局限性。如果财产占有所采取的不是具体客体的形式，而是货币的形式，那么这种现象会被稍微延迟。

第三节

个人与财产占有的分化

在思想史中，我们面临这样一种发展进程，虽然这个发展过程只是简单的框架，但是，它仍然属于思想生活中最意义重大的形式，这是因为它具有广泛而敏锐的实现功能。某些特定领域最初完全被一种典型特征决定，在这之后，随着时间的推移，这个统一体分裂成越来越多的次级领域，在这些次级领域中，只有其中一个在狭义上表现了其整体特征，并且与其他部分形成对照。以另一种不同的方式来进行明确表达的话就是，不管在一个整体的两个要素之间存在着怎样的相对差异，这两者都依然可以体现出其中一个特征，尽管采取的形式是绝对的。举例来说，道德哲学声称我们在做某件事情时不可能不考虑自身利益和自身欲望的满足，这一对利己主义的辩护可能是正确的。但是，接下来，我们必须对狭义的利己主义和与广义的利己主义加以区分。无论是谁，只要他在满足其利己主义的同时也给他人带来了幸福，甚或是通过牺牲自己的生命来这样做，那么，我们必定毫不迟疑地继续把他称为利他主义者，把他和那种其行为对他人有害的人、压榨他人的人区分开来。这样的一个有害他人、压榨他人的人，被我们称为完完全全的利己主义者，虽然说就利己主义绝对的、最宽泛的意义而言，体现在任何行为当中的利己主义也都会包括利他主义的因素在内。除此之外，下面这种认识论的说法或许也是正确的，该认识论声称所有的认识都只是一种纯粹主观的过程，这种纯主观过程完全是通过自我来经历和决定的。虽然如果从绝对意义上来说，那些更加客观的认识或许也是以纯粹的主观性为来源的，但是，我们还是会把诸如此类的客观上真实的概念与那些只是在主观上真实的概念相区别，这些仅仅在主观上真实的概念是幻想、任意猜测、感官错觉所造成的结果。主观观念和客观观念在最初的时候是以一种模糊的无差别的心理状态进行活动的，这种倾向越来越把主观和客观的观念从根本上、更加有意识地分离开来。在某个人和他所占有的财产之间的关系中，这种发展似乎再次出现了。一般来说，每种财产占有都是自我的一种延伸，是主体生命内部的一种现象，它的全部意义都存在于意识和情感的反映当中，这些反映是灵魂对自我和客体之间的关系做出的回应。在同一意义层面上，在财产占有身上发生的每一件事情都是主体所发挥的一种作用，主体把他的意志、他的感情、他的思考方式施加于财产之上，并在其中找到自我的表达。但是，从历史意义层面来说，和精神财产的绝对意义一样，实际财产的绝对意义最初也是呈现为一种无差别的状态，这一无差别状态超越了自我和客体的相互对立，将两者联结在一起。古代的德国习俗惯例直接把财产和个人相联系；后来的封建制度把这种联系颠倒过来，即把个人与财产相联系；作为一个整体的与团体之间的紧密关系允许它的成员预先发展他们的经济地位；通过职业的世袭特性，一方面的活动、地位与另一方面的家庭中的个人，成为了可以相互替换的术语；每一种社会组织都是以阶层和行会为基础的，通过个人和他的经济地位之间的某种有机的相互影响得以形成——所有这些都是财产与个人之间的无差别状态。财产的经济内容或功能和那些在更加有限的意义层面上代表了自我的东西之间有着非常紧密的相互联系。这样的关系可以在古代陪葬的风俗习惯中观察到，这种陪葬的习俗让作为主人财产的人为死去的主人殉葬。还有一种我们现在仍然可以看到的一种沿袭至今的类似的习俗：在盎格鲁一撒克逊国王去世的时候，要求他的封臣的盔甲一同陪葬，因为盔甲是归属于国王的封臣的一种象征和代替品。就一般意义来说，对于纯粹的主观想象和客观的真实概念，原始人的思维没有单独的认知范畴可以对它们加以区别，正因如此，在任何对事物自身的特殊合法性有所认识的地方，它都很容易表现为一种神圣原则的人格化形式，对于这种事物自身的合法性和独立于外在因素的以自我为中心的个性，原始人不能够在他们的实践中明确地阐明。当这些要素被区分开来的时候，发展进程便超越了这一原始阶段。所有更加发达的经济技术都取决于经济过程不断增加的独立性。这些过程变得与直接的个人利益相分离，它们似乎只是为了自身的目标在运行，个人因素的无规则性与不可预测性对它们的机械过程的干扰变得越来越少。在另外一个方面，个人因素变得越来越独立自主、不受约束，个体变得可以更加独立地发展，这种独立发展不是指独立于个体总体的经济状况，而且指独立于决定经济状况的先验要素。这个颇具特色的发展过程将实践生活的客观因素和主观因素分离开来，在这一发展过程中，归根到底，下面这个事实，即实践的总体是建立在人类主观性的基础之上的，被自然地隐藏起来了。即使对一部机械设备或一个工厂的组织管理与客观法则相一致，它也毕竟通过人的主观思想被包含于个人的目的之中。但是，在某种相对意义上，这个一般的、肯定的特性集中于那些在其中总体区域已经碎片化了的因素之一当中。

由货币导致的空间分离和技术客观化

如果我们对货币在主客体分化的过程中所扮演的角色进行分析的话，首先就会发现，下面这一事实变得异常明显，即货币所起的作用和个体与他的财产占有之间的空间距离是相互联系的。那些拥有公司股票的人完全不去参与公司的经营管理，拥有某国家债券的债权人从来没有拜访过负债的国家，大量土地财产的拥有者将他的土地租借出去，这些股东、债权人、土地拥有者都把他们的财产委托给纯粹的技术经营管理，他们本身不需要去做任何相关的事情，即使这样他们也能够从他们的这些财产中获得利润。当然，只有借助于货币的手段，上述情况才可能实现。只要一个企业的利润所采取的是可以很容易转移到任何其他地方的形式，那么就能够确保财产和财产所有者通过各自空间的分离获得一种较高程度的独立，或者换句话说就是，能够确保财产和财产所有者获得一种自我机动性。这使得我们可以完全依据客观要求对财产进行经营管理，而与此同时，还给予了财产所有者这样一个机会，即他的生活可以完全独立于其财产的特殊要求。制造距离的货币的力量使得财产所有者和他的财产在相距很远的地方各自存在，由此，财产所有者及其财产可以在更大程度上遵循自身的规则，以至于双方都可以在更大程度上遵循的规律，此财产所有者与财产之间具有直接的相互关系时达到的程度更大，比经济贸易还只是个人的事情时程度更大，比个体方向或地位的改变同时也意味着相应经济利益的文化时程度更大。对于世界各地的原始人来说，个人和他的财产之间的稳定性都在他们的习俗中得到了表达，他们有关财产的习俗是：只要财产是个人的、被征服获得的、或是通过劳动获得的，那么这些财产就要作为主人的陪葬品。显而易见，由于这种习俗，客观文化的发展在很大程度上受到了限制，变得发展迟缓，这是因为，客观文化的进步依赖于可传承的物品持续不断的积累。只有通过遗产继承的形式，财产才可以超越个人的限定，才可以成为一种客观的、独立自主的存在。牢固的系于所有者身上的个人形式的财产在早期的德国法律中可以找到例证，当时的法律规定，如果接受礼物的一方不知恩图报，那么赠送礼物的人有权利收回礼物，在某些其他情况下也是如此。财产占有的初期形式具有完全的个人化特性，这种特性很少被如此鲜明地表达：赠送礼物者和接受礼物者之间的纯粹的个人一伦理关系有着某种直接的法律一经济结果。即使只就外在形式而言，货币经济也是拒绝这种表达方式的。自然形式的礼物可以用实物形式的礼物来作为回赠，但是，如果用货币形式的礼物来回赠的话，那么就会马上变得不仅仅是“近似”，而是在价值上相同。这样，自然礼物和赠送礼物者之间可能继续存在的情感关系，可能已经是相反需要的基础的情感关系，被削弱或否定了。一件货币形式的礼物更加明确地使礼物远离和疏远了赠送者。因为这种客体和人的分离，技术高度发达、独立的时代，也正是个人主义和主观个性最突出的时代。在罗马帝国的开始阶段，以及罗马帝国最后的100年到150年间，是货币经济的高度发展阶段。法律概念技术上的精确性也就是抽象个人主义的必然结果，这种抽象的个人主义是与货币经济共同发展的。在德国采用罗马法之前，同时也是采用货币经济之前，德国法律只不过是权利与义务的一种代表，既没有法律事务中的代表观念，没有法人制度的概念，更没有财产作为自由的个人意志的客体的观念。个体同他的财产、社会地位和存在的物质内容之间是相互融合的，当个体从这种融合中分离出来，变得完全自由、完全依赖自身，并且在观念上与所有属于货币经济的具体存在倾向相分离的时候，依靠前面提到的那些观念运作的法律体系将不再可能存在或发生。因此，那些变得纯粹客观的生活兴趣可能会被罗马法的法律技术放弃。在德国，土地和它的所有者之间的关系经历了若干个发展阶段。最初，土地财产是社会中个人地位的结果，在这之后，这种关系逆转了过来，个人地位是由他所占有的土地财产决定的，直到最后，土地财产的独立性具有了一种完全不同的意义，在这种意义中，从极端对立的意义上来说，个性可以完全独立于其土地财产而形成。在原始时期，个性涵盖和吸收了物权关系，然而，在财产世袭阶段，情况恰恰相反。货币经济使土地财产和所有者彼此分化，财产和个人变成独立的对立面。这一形式的演化过程在货币中达到了顶峰，在最发达的货币经济条件下的表现形式中，这一顶峰自身得到了最明晰的说明，货币“发挥着作用”，即货币依据力量和标准行使自己的功能，它所依据的力量和标准绝对不等同于、而是独立于货币拥有者的力量和标准。如果自由仅仅意味着遵循某个人自身的法律，那么，通过货币的回报形式提供的一个迄今为止闻所未闻的自由，财产和财产所有者之间的距离就会变得有可能实现。主观性和客体规范之间的劳动分工现在被完成了，它们必须各自完成自己的任务，因为这些任务是通过它们各自的自然本性来分配的，并且这些任务的完成是自由独立的，不受内在异质因素的决定。

总体的个性与个体劳动分离开来

通过货币手段所造成的分化，以及通过分化所造成的这种个体自由，不仅仅对食利者有影响，劳动关系也在它们的影响下逐步显示出类似的特征，虽然我们更加难以识别出这些特征。初期的经济组织，以及这些经济组织在手工作坊和零售业中保留至今的形式，它们所依赖的是师傅和学徒之间、店主和雇佣工人之间的人身依附关系。在这样的经济发展水平下，经济活动是通过各要素之间的交互作用来实现的，这些要素完全是直接个人性的。在任何一种情形下，这种经济活动都要通过居领导地位的人的精神来完成，其他的所有人都服从于领导人的主观性。随着技术和客观要素的不断发展，这些要素逐渐超越了个人因素，这种关系具有了一种不同的特性。生产经理和劳动工人、大型商场的主管和售货员，他们现在都同等地从属于同一个客观目标，只有在普遍关系中，这种从属关系才会作为一种技术必要性得以继续保持，在这里，生产需求作为一个客观过程被表现了出来。就某些基本的个人体验来说，虽然这种关系对劳动者可能更加严格，但是它却依然包含了某种自由的元素，因为现在他的从属关系不再是主观一个人性质的，而已经是技术性质的了。现在，我们可以清晰地看到，存在于从属关系向客观形式的转化过程中的任何基础性的解放，都与货币原则的完全有效性非常紧密地联系在一起。只要人们把工资劳动关系解释为契约关系，那么它就肯定会具有一种从属关系的因素，即劳动者从属于雇主的因素，这是因为，就像我们在家庭佣人那种对此表现很清晰的情况中所看到的一样，这个进行劳动的人是被雇用的。在现实生活中，被雇主雇用的作为一个整体的、其综合劳动能力可以无限制地发挥的人，因此，被雇用者作为一个完整的人进入了依赖、从属于另一个人的关系中。但是，货币经济发展的最终结果是把劳动当作一种商品来购买，一旦劳动合同的形成把劳动作为一种商品来购买的话，那么我们所要处理的就是提供一种完全客观的劳动行为，这种客观的劳动行为正像我们在前面已经指出过的那样，是作为共同合作过程的一个要素被提出来的，因此也是与雇主的劳动联系在一起、相协调一致的。现代劳动者不再觉得自己是隶属于别人的人，而是单纯地贡献某种严格的确定数量的劳动的人，这种确定数量的劳动是指在其货币等价物的基础之上确定的劳动，劳动本身和对劳动的规章变得越客观、越不涉及个人、越技术性，劳动个体就越自由，正是由于这样一个事实，才使得现代劳动者的自信心不断增强。建立起来的货币经济已经对经营管理者造成了相同的结果，这是因为，他现在是为了市场生产产品，也就是为完全不认识的、无差别的消费者生产产品，这些消费者与经营管理者只有通过货币这个中介才会发生关系。因此，经营管理者的工作被以某种方式客观化了，与那种当对特定购买者的地区性和个人化考虑影响到工作时的情况相比，尤其是与自然交换关系仍然盛行的地方相比，这种方式更少地考虑到单独的某个人，也更少地依赖于单独的某个人。家庭佣人的个人自由的发展也是货币重要性不断上升的一个结果。家庭佣人的人身依附关系在其服务的“无法计算性”中反映出来，这种依附关系与他们被当作雇用他们的家庭的成员有着根本上的联系。佣人与他的主人生活在同一个屋檐下，为主人做饭、洗衣，这样一来，就出现了一个似乎不可避免的现象，那就是佣人的劳务数量很难确定，只能取决于这个家庭不断变化的需求，并且佣人还不得不服从这个家庭的普遍家规。现在雇请家佣出现了这样一个越来越明显的趋势，人们逐渐越来越倾向于请家庭以外的人来提供各种不同家务，这些人只需要提供非常明确具体的某种服务，雇用他们的人用现金来支付他们的全部劳动。自然经济的家族共同体逐渐解体，这一方面导致了一种客观上固定的家庭服务的产生，使得服务更加具有技术性，另一方面，作为上述发展趋势的直接结果，这导致了服务人员的完全独立性和自信心。

如果劳动情形继续沿着货币使其发展成为可能的这一方向发展，那么某些特定的弊端将有可能被消除，这些弊端主要是已经被人们普遍指责的现代货币经济所造成的。强烈反对尊卑贵贱的社会关系是无政府主义的动机，虽然社会主义替换了这一形式上的动机，代之以一种更加物质化的动机，但是社会主义的基本信条之一仍然是消除人们之间的地位差异，这种人与人之间的地位差异造成了这样一种情况，即某些人可以去命令别人，而另一些人必须服从他。对于那种把自由的程度作为衡量每一件事物的社会必要性的尺度的思想模式而言，它的一个不言而喻的要求就是取消尊卑贵贱的地位，但是，与那种在完全平等的基础上建立起来的体制相比，只要这种社会秩序并没有与压迫、痛苦、耻辱相联系，那么以尊卑贵贱的不平等地位为基础建立起来的社会秩序本身并不一定就更糟糕。就社会主义理论本身而言，如果它在心理学方面条理比较清晰的话，那么它们将会反映出对下面这样一个事实的意识：个体之间的平等根本不是绝对理念或无条件律令，它只是去除特定痛苦感、促进特定满足感的纯粹手段。唯一的例外是那些不切实际的空想主义者，对他们来说，个体之间的平等是一种形式上的绝对价值，为了达到这种平等，可以付出任何可能的实践代价，甚至是以世界的毁灭为代价。某个要求的意义在任何情况下都并不取决于要求本身，而是取决于它的后果，从原则上来说，这个要求是可能被替代的，因为非常不同的原因可以造成相同结果。这种可能性对于我们目前讨论的问题非常重要，因为到目前为止的所有经验都表明了这样一点，即尊卑贵贱的等级关系是社会组织不可缺少的手段，如果取消这种关系，那么将会破坏最有效果的社会生产方式之一。因此，只要它们能够产生某些积极效果，我们就需要继续保留这种尊卑贵贱的等级关系，与此同时，还要消除那些造成人们排斥这种关系的心理结果。在某种程度上，这个目标显然已经被达到了，所有尊卑贵贱的等级关系都已经成为了组织结构的一种纯粹的技术形式，这种等级关系的纯粹客观特性不会再引起任何主观上的反作用了。问题的关键之处在于要把组织机构和个人区别开来，通过这种方式，不管一个人处于生产或流通过程中的什么位置，他的个体性、自由、基本的生活体验完全不会受到组织机构的客观要求的破坏。在某种地位等级的秩序中，这种状态的一个方面已经实现，那就是衔接体系。人们已经不再把对长官的盲目遵从看作是有失体面的事情，因为，要实现军事目的，那是在技术上不可缺少的要求，而每一位长官也以同样严格客观的方式服从于这一军事目的。个人的荣誉、尊严与他的地位高低完全没有任何关系，地位的高低仅仅附着在制服上，只不过是一种不反映任何个人情况的客观状态。在与纯粹的思想活动的联系中，也以另一种不同的方式体现了这种个人与地位的分化。在社会生活中总是存在着这样一些人，虽然他们外在的生活地位是完全从属他人、完全依赖他人的，但是他们却保持了绝对的思想自由与个体创造力，特别是在那些稳定的社会秩序与新的文化兴趣潮流交替的阶段更是如此。在这样的历史阶段中，旧秩序依然存在，而新的文化兴趣已经创造出了新的内部层级和范畴，比如人文主义时期、法国大革命的最后阶段，等等。我们可以构想这样一种情形，在其中，这些偶然进化而来的、单方面的状态成为了作为一个整体的社会组织的形式。虽然以所有可能的形式存在的等级关系现在都成了社会实现其目标的技术前提条件，但是，它仍然会影响到个人的内在本质意义、个人的自由发展、以及个人与其他个体的人际关系。通过对这一融合的消解，所有的上级和下级地位、所有命令和服从，都将成为社会秩序的一种纯粹外部技术，这种纯粹技术既不会给个体的地位和发展带来光明，也不会为其带来阴影，也就是说，它不会对个人地位和发展产生任何影响。除此之外，社会等级体系的形式以及纯粹目的性和个体的个人——主观性质之间存在着过于紧密的联系，由于这种过于紧密的联系而导致的怨恨，以及取消这种等级体系的要求，所有这些都将消失。人们可以通过这一做法和组织机构前提条件的客观化保存组织机构所有技术上的有利条件，避免对主体性和自由造成不利影响，它对主体性和自由的这种不利影响是当今无政府主义的根源，在某种程度上，也是社会主义的根源。正如我们在本书前面所看到的那样，货币经济为文化发展的方向铺平了道路。生产手段的所有权被认为是社会贫穷的焦点，工人与其生产手段的相互分离将是一种完全不同的意义上的拯救。如果这种分离所意味的是作为一个人的工人与纯粹客观条件（这里指生产技术放置在他身上的纯粹客观条件）的分化，那么上述做法才可能是真正的拯救。因此，货币将带来一种时常发生的发展过程，在这一过程中，一个要素的意义会转变为它的相反方面——只要它从最初的有限功效中展示出一种基本的、协调一致的、普遍存在的效力。通过在人和客体之间钉进一个楔子，货币不仅仅破坏了他们之间相互受益、相互支持的关系，还为它们彼此之间的独立铺平了道路，这样一来，它们各自都可以找到使自己完全满意的发展道路，而又不会影响到另一方。

无论在什么情况下，只要劳动关系从个人形式转变为客观形式，或者更确切地说，一般社会关系从个人形式转变为客观形式，与此平行发展的是实物交换经济转变为货币经济，那么我们首先发现的将是从属地位的退化，至少部分如此。虽然用实物来支付劳动者的劳动有一定的危险，但是与用货币工资的形式相比较，它毫无疑问有着某些特定的优势。这是因为，尽管货币工资在表面更具有精确性，换句话说，就是更具有逻辑上的精确性，但是其代价却是，这些工资最终的价值具有更大的不确定性。对工人而言，面包和住处有着某种绝对的价值，它们在任何时候都是相同的东西，而价值的波动是一个非常常见、且不可避免的现象，在实物支付劳动者的情况下，如果发生价值波动，那么受损失的是雇主的利益，劳动者不会有任何风险。然而，相同数量的货币工资，它在今天所意味的价值与一年前所意味的价值可能是完全不同的，因此，在以货币工资的形式支付劳动者的情况下，价值波动的风险是由雇主和受雇员工共同承担的。这种不确定性和无规律性是自由造成的不可避免的必然结果，通常很难把握。自由体现自己的方式就是无规律的、难以预料的、不平衡的，这一点也正是出现如下现象的原因：像英国那样的自由政治体制呈现出的特点是内部毫无规律，缺乏组织和系统的结构，而专制体制内部结构高度对称，各要素高度统一，避免了任何的临时性、随意性。获得货币工资的劳动者比获得实物工资的劳动者要承受更多的价格波动造成的风险，价格波动与自由的生活方式有着一种深刻的关系，自由的生活方式的必然结果就是货币工资，正如实物工资反映了一种束缚的生活方式。“有自由的地方也肯定会有税收”，这句格言的意义和适用性远远超出了政治学范畴，根据这句格言，劳动者为了获得只有通过引入货币工资才可能实现的自由，他们必须付出相应的代价，即以货币工资的不稳定性方式来交税。我们可以在历史发展中看到一个相对应的情况，相反的，在社会地位上处于从属位置的人向主人交纳奉养的次序是从提供实物逐渐转变为货币支付。实物支付使得接受者与提供者之间形成了一种非正式的、较随意的关系。在农奴交付给领主的谷物、家禽、葡萄酒中，他的劳动力得到了直接具体的表达，这些东西是农奴自身的组成部分，并没有与他的过去、他的利益完全分离开。与此相对应，交纳上来的这些实物被接受者直接享用，他们所关心的是这些实物的质量，就像交纳者是把这些实物作为个人性的贡献物缴纳上去的一样，接受者也是把它们作为个人性的贡献物来接受的。所以，在承担义务者和有资格享受义务的人之间存在的关系比货币上缴形式中两者之间的关系更加紧密，在以货币形式上缴应交纳部分的情形中，交纳者和接受者双方的个人因素都消失不见了。因此，我们会在中世纪初期的德国发现这样一种非常盛行的习俗，即庄园主们通过用一些小小的恩惠来减轻农奴的负担，庄园主会在农奴交纳应付的地租时回赠给他们一份小礼物，至少是食物或者饮品。从某种程度上来讲，由于货币支付逐渐取代了实物交租，更加严厉的官员取代了与农奴生活在一起的庄园主，对待农奴的这种慈善的、或者说亲切的方式基本上已经消失了。官员的指派说明了管理的客观化，他们依照非个人化的技术要求进行经营管理，这些技术要求应该尽最大可能生产出客观的结果，正如货币在农奴的劳动和庄园主的享用之间来回转移一样，官员们也以一种相同的去个人化效果立足于农奴和庄园主之间。在下面这个事实中也体现了中间人的独立性：因为实物地租已经被货币支付所替代，如果庄园主不在的话，那么执行者便有了不诚实的、欺上瞒下的新机会。不管农民在原来那种双方联系非常紧密、交纳实物地租的关系的个人性特征中获得了多少益处，也不管他们在双方关系的客观化、转变为货币地租的关系中遭受了多少损失，这仍然是从整体上废除农奴制度的必由之路。

伴随着这一系列趋向这个最终目标的现象，存在着另一个系列的现象，第一眼看上去，这两个系列的现象有着完全相反的结果。举例来说，与计时工资相比，似乎计件工资更容易和在货币关系基础之上的社会发展相对应。在计件工资中，个体是按其精确确定的、完全客观化的服务被支付工资的，然而，与计件工资相比，计时工资对人的束缚要紧得多，它把作为整体的个人与他全部的、但尚未非常清楚地确定下来的力量束缚在一起。但是，除非出现某些特殊情况，例如极大提高生产力的机械设备这样的技术进步因素被引进、计件比率被支付等，否则的话，一般来说，现在以计时工资的形式领取薪金的工人的境况比较好，这是因为，计时工资并没有像计件工资那样与劳动成果严格相联系，即使出现了停工、减慢速度、失误这些影响到产量这样的情况，计时工资仍然不会发生任何变化。因此，计时工资看起来更有益于人类存在，因为与计件工资相比，它预示了一种更大的信任，在工作情形中也给予人们更多实际自由，尽管在计时工资中，作为整体的个人成为了劳动过程的一部分，但是也正由于这个原因，纯粹的客观标准的无情性被减弱了。这种关系的增强可以在劳动者的“聘用”中观察到，在员工的聘用中，个人的劳动成果几乎不能为薪水的确定提供任何直接标准，相反，员工个人劳动成果的整体总量都被支付了薪水，被支付的劳动报酬中也包括了任何由于人的不足造成干扰的几率。这一点通过高级国家公务员的地位得到了最好地说明，他们的薪水不再与他的各种政绩有任何数量关系，而是这份薪水应该提供给他们适当的生活标准。一份最近的法院决议取消了一个在某些时候不能履行自己职责的普鲁士公务员的部分薪水，因为他没有承担自己的责任，然而，最高法院废除了这份判决，其理由是，国家公务员的工资并不是对他的劳动按比例的偿付，而是为了保证与他的社会地位相对应的生活标准而分派给他的“年金”。在这里，工资聚焦于个人因素上，排除了一种精确的客观等价物。这些公务员的工资水平通常在很长一段时间内确实都很固定，所以，只要货币价值有波动，他们生活的稳定性就会因工资的固定不变而受到威胁，然而，如果以个人业绩为根据来支付工资的话，就很容易适应货币价值的波动。我之前的论述曾经强调个人因素越来越具有决定性的独立，逐渐从经济因素中分离出来，此论述并没有被上述固定薪水的情况推翻。一般情况下，薪水都是被固定下来的，并不会随着经济发展中的个别波动而进行调整，这肯定意味着作为一个独立个体的人与在经济上可估价的劳动行为的分离。固定的工资与它不断变化的特殊用途之间的关系，也就是固定工资与其不断变化的实际具体价值之间的关系，和整体的个人与不断变化的个人劳动成果质量之间的关系是一样的。我们并不是总能够辨别出此现象序列最极端的发展阶段，这一发展阶段就是为那些观念性的工作支付酬金，这种观念性工作不能够用任何数量的金钱来衡量，致使用“量身打造”的方式来支付酬金变得无法实现。支付诸如此类工作的酬金的唯一重点在于，要为工作者提供一个适宜的生活水平，而不是要在酬金和劳动成果之间提供一种客观的对等。所以，无论某个画家的肖像画画得好不好，要求画像的人都要支付给他酬劳；即使某个音乐家演奏得非常糟糕，听众也要交纳入场费；不管病人是痊愈了还是死了，病人或病人家属都要交付给医生诊费。与此相对，在较低级的发展阶段，酬金更加直接、更加精确地与劳动成果完成的质量相联系。劳动成果和它的等价物之间的客观关系的内容在这里被一定程度上取消了，乍一看来，其取消的程度在货币支付的酬金数量与实际劳动成果的不均衡中得到了说明。如果某个人为了一幅肖像画、一张剧院入场券、或一次讲演支付了双倍于其他同类事物的酬金，即使假设他在每一件事上所花费的钱都是合理适当的，那么他也肯定不能说，这幅画正好非常精确地比另一幅画好看两倍，或者说这场演讲正好比另一场演讲生动两倍。即使一个人希望独立于客观的评价之外，把支付的酬金和不同数量的主观愉悦联系在一起，他也不会在逻辑上宣称自己的主观愉悦与货币等价物象征的东西有着某种精确的对应关系，人们越是拔高劳动成果，对评价方法的满意程度就会越低。最终，报酬和劳动成果之间的完全无关联性在下述事实中得到了鲜明生动的说明：一个音乐家的演奏把我们推向了感觉的最高潮，引起了我们情感上的共鸣，而我们只给了他很少的几马克。我们所能给予音乐家的这几个马克并不意味着我们认为他演奏的价值就是这些，而是在于这几个马克可以对这个音乐家的生活有所帮助，这是他演奏的适当基础。对于最高级的生产来说，这种普遍的趋势似乎被颠倒了。以前货币等价物不关涉劳动成果背后的个人，只与个人劳动成果有关系，而现在，货币等价物不再与个人劳动成果相关联了，而是直接与作为一个整体的个人相关联，不管他的个人劳动成果如何。

但是，如果进行更进一步的详细考察，我们会发现，这个现象序列，与另外一个在经济地位的纯粹客观性中找到了自己理想的现象序列，二者是趋向于同一个点的。在经济成就和个性的一种完全彻底的、相辅相成的独立中，两个现象序列都同样达到了顶点。这的确正是下面这个事实的意义，公务员或艺术家并不是因为自己的特殊行为而被付与酬金的，而是因为要使得他们达到一个特定的个人生活水平。无论如何，与前面所说的现象序列相反，在这里，个人因素仍然与经济因素相关联，但是它们是以另一种方式相联系的。在前面的分析中，个人劳动成果与货币等价物对应相关，总体的个人是个人劳动成果的基础，但是在这里，个人劳动成果与总体的个人非常尖锐地对立。通过与客观劳动成果的分化，劳动者的个性解放得到了保证，这一个性解放是以同一种方式被实现的：要么是从个人劳动成果的不断客观化开始，最终基于自己的目的进入经济循环，把个人排除在外；要么是从把个人看作一个整体为其支付酬劳或生活费开始，不给予个体劳动成果任何直接的、单独的经济等价物。在这两种情形中，个人都从通过与具体客观劳动成果的一种直接经济联接强加在劳动者身上的某种强制性中解放了出来。

与第一个现象序列相比，第二个现象序列似乎的确更少地以货币经济为条件。相比个人是分化过程中的积极因素的情形而言，如果个人及其劳动成果之间的相互独立是对后一个现象序列进行强调的结果，那么，可以说，货币就不得不扮演一个更重要的角色、发挥更重要的作用。因为货币的非个人性和它的无条件适应性，它与诸如此类的个体劳动成果有着某种强烈的密切关系，对个人劳动成果的强调有着某种特殊的力量。相反，生活标准的水平和稳定与作为一个整体的个人的成功是等价的，它可以被很容易地被获得，正像在更加原始的经济形式中，通过给予某个人一块土地或某种形式的特权就可以使他获得较好的生活和稳定性。货币在这个现象序列中的特殊意义不在于接受者所发挥的作用，而在于支付货币者所发挥的作用。这是因为，货币使我们能够把个别劳动者一生劳动成果总体价值的货币等价物与很多劳动者的贡献进行比较，不管这些贡献是音乐会听众的入场费，是图书购买者所花销的书费，还是公务员从中获取工资的公民上缴的税款。伴随着机械复制的出现，它与货币经济的明显联系更加显著。在图书印刷术发明之后，对于最糟糕的、最没有价值的作品和最高雅的诗歌来说每一页纸的价格都一样，在摄影术被发明之后，贝拉德·蒂齐亚诺的照片与一个酒店歌手的照片的价格没什么不同；在器皿的机械化生产得到发展之后，拥有卓越品位的器皿与那些品位很差的器皿在价格上也没有什么不同。如果某件事物的发明者赚到的钱比别人更多的话，那只不过是这样一个事实的结果，即不管质量如何，只不过是有更多的购买者都付出了相同的价格。当我们把货币与封建制度或保护人制度送给德高望重者礼物的方式进行比较的时候，货币的民主性质就体现得非常明显了。相反地，交付货币的人即买主的匿名性，毫无疑问地促进了提供货物的人的主体独立性和自由的发展。机械复制模式的飞速发展，因此导致的货币价格越来越独立于产品质量的倾向，打破了以某笔特定的报酬支付某项特定劳动成果的做法所造成的购买者与生产者之间的联系。在个人及其劳动成果的分化过程中，不管那些最初相互交织的因素的分化是源自个人独立性的增强，还是源自劳动成果独立性的增强，货币都促使了个体的独立。

个体从集体中独立

如果我们对最初的分析做一个回顾，那么个人与客体的分离完整过程看起来就主要表现为个体的分离过程。借助于货币经济，个体之间具有的各种各样的兴趣以及活动方式获得了相对的独立性。当我指出货币把经济成就从个体的总的品质中分离出来，并且把经济成就彻底地看作个性的组成部分的时候，那么，在另一方面，这就意味着我们不再把个体性格看作是一个完整的统一体，自从经济方面的内容从个体的总的品质中被排除出来以后，就只有那些心理内容和心理力量被留存下来。因此，人们可以把货币的作用刻画为个体的人的原子式的分化过程，或者也可以把这种作用刻画为在个人内部发生的一个个体化过程。然而，这种个体的分化过程只不过是整个社会发展的普遍趋势在个体内部的延伸。正如货币对个体内容产生的影响一样，货币首先影响社会的组成要素，换句话说就是个体。货币经济对个体所产生的影响时常被人强调，而且这种影响也常常被与这样一个事实联系起来：即货币是不同劳动者劳动成果之间的交换器。然而在货币经济出现之前的那个时期，个体被直接地束缚在他所在的群体之中，劳务的交换把个体与整个社会紧密地联系在一起。在今天，我们周围的每一个人都在以一种浓缩的、潜在的方式要求别人的劳动成果。每个人都可以选择何时何地提出要求，因此这使得早期的交换形式中的直接联系变得松散。货币的极为重要的力量能够使个体获得一种来自集体利益的全新的独立性，这种力量不仅表现在物物交换和货币经济的根本差异中，而且在货币经济自身中也能够体现出来。16世纪末期，意大利作家博特罗写道：“我们意大利有两个繁荣的共和国，那就是威尼斯与热那亚。威尼斯人从事商品贸易，虽然市民个人的富裕程度仅处于中等水平，但是他们建造了极其伟大而又富庶的国家。在另一方面，热那亚人完全投身于货币交易之中，这种方式导致了私人财富的剧增，然而国家却变得越来越贫穷。”由于兴趣都集中于货币，甚至达到了财产完全由货币构成的程度，所以个人就会产生具有独立意义的趋势和感觉，而这种独立意义是与社会整体相联系的。既然个人可以自由地、无限制地从事其所喜欢的贸易和商业合作，那么个人就会以一种与社会整体相抗衡的姿态与社会整体建立关系。但是，那些从事普通的商品贸易之人，即使他们把生意做到了地理位置极为遥远的威尼斯，他们也不得不在周围的群体中寻找足够多的合作与雇员，普通货物贸易所需要的复杂且实质性的技术会给这种商品交易附加一种区域性的束缚，而对于金融交易来说，这种束缚是根本不存在的。在土地所有权与金钱之间的关系中，这种差异性更具有决定性意义。对于深入了解土地所有权与货币在社会学意义上的关系，下面的陈述是十分重要的：在博特罗做了那番陈述之后的百年的时间里，在这番陈述的引导之下，人们观察到如下的事实，即如果统治阶层所拥有的财产主要都是个人性动产，也就是说，在国家面临紧急状况的时候可以把这些个人财产转移走，那么这就会极大地损害国家的利益，然而，地主的利益却是与国家的利益紧密联系在一起的。英国上层社会对公共社会兴趣的降低，正是由于工业财富相对于土地财富的比重的上升而引起的。起初英国的自治政府是建立在上层阶级的个人积极参与管理国家事务的基础之上的，而现在个人参与正逐渐地被国家的机构管理所取代。对于现在人们早已习惯了的纯粹的货币税收说明了这样一种情形：一切关系变得越来越货币化与传统的社会责任的下降之间是有完全的联系的。

货币带来了新的联合方式

货币不仅仅使得个体相对于整个群体的关系变得越来越独立，而且它还使这种特别的联合的内容以及这个联合中的成员与这个联合之间的关系都经历了一个彻底更新的分化过程。中世纪的行会所拥有的是一个完整的人：一个裁缝行会不仅仅是那些以制衣为生的人的一个简单的联合，而是一个囊括了技术、社会、宗教、政治等多方面因素的一个有生命力的共同体。虽然这种联合形式仍然围绕着实际利益这个中心，但是，这种联合直接地由其成员决定，并且这些成员也都被吸收到了行会之中。与行会这种统一的形式相比，虽然货币经济也与各种各样的形式有着千丝万缕的联系，但是，货币经济只是为了从其成员那里获得劳动成果，或者只是为了追求纯粹的货币利益。货币经济的这种特征在股份公司中表现得尤为明显，在股份公司中，持股人仅仅是因为股息和红利而形成了一个统一体，在某种程度上讲，他们根本就不在乎这个公司生产何种产品。在这种只关心金钱利益的货币经济中，主体与客体缺乏客观实际的联系，这反映了在这些经济活动的主体之间并没有任何人际关系，在这个统一体里他们所共有的仅仅是金钱上的利益。在货币经济中，我们发现了最为有效的文化形式之一，即个体参与联合形式的可能性，在这种联合形式中，成员们只希望提升和享受联合形式的客观目的，且没有那些需要承担责任的关系。货币之所以能够让这种联合形式成为可能，是因为货币使得成员不必牺牲一点个人自由与保留之物就可以加入这样一个联合。这是货币经济所产生的新的联合形式，这与中世纪行会式的联合形式有着本质上的且极为重要的差别，在中世纪的联合形式中，作为人的人与作为行会成员的人之间是没有差别的。经济的、宗教的、政治的、家庭的等等诸如此类的普遍的利益统统都被囊括到货币经济的范畴之中。早期阶段的那些持久的联合方式根本就不了解这种纯粹的“捐献”形式，更不用说从会员以及“有限责任”中获取主要的资金供给。大体上来说（对这样一般性的结论是要有所保留的），在这之前，人与人的关系更为亲密，较少地受到中介、混杂的事件以及保留之物的影响，并且那些有问题的以及不负责任的人际关系也相对较少。个体与行会的关系是旗帜鲜明的，“要么存在要么不存在”；这种关系无法忍受分裂，这是因为只要存在针尖大小的分裂，就会导致其余部分的独立。那种把分钱和收费当作是联合统一体内部成员的唯一的纽带的方法，在行会看来并不是其理想的联合形式。这种联合方式不仅对单独的个体是有效的，对集体中的个体也是同样有效的。货币形式的共同利益的形式确保了这样一个事实：行会有可能在使其成员在不放弃其独立性和特殊性的条件下，加入一种更为高级的统一体中。1848年之后，在法国，从事相同工作的工人联合组成辛迪加，每个工人协会都要必须向他们所在行业的辛迪加缴纳一笔资金，因此就形成了一笔不可分割的共同资金，这笔共同资金的主要目的在于一方面大规模地吸纳资金，另一方面提供大规模信贷等等。然而，辛迪加的目的从来都不是把那些参与进来的行会联合成一个统一体；恰恰相反，每一个行会都要求保留其特殊的组织。既然在那个时候工人对建立这种联合形式是非常着迷的，因此，这个例子尤其具有指导意义。如果当时这些工人明确地反对辛迪加的联合形式，那么每一个行会就有充分的理由去要求保留其特殊的组织；但是，在那个共同体中，通过对货币的纯粹占有，他们发现了实现利益统一的方法。某些特定的行业协会有可能仅仅是建立在彻底的主体自由的基础之上，而这种彻底的主体自由正是通过团体的成员交纳会费的方式得以保证的。如果不是采用了货币捐助这种方式（或者说是借助了货币的缺乏特征性）使得捐款人的信仰差异变得模糊的话，那么古斯塔夫-阿道夫协会——这个资助贫困的新教会组织的大型团体——永远也不可能存在并运转下去。路德教、新教以及一体论教派不会愿意加入其他形式的宗教并组成一个联合形式：当共同的货币利益看起来不那么积极时，这些教派就会如此。直至完全进入中世纪，英国的神职人员仍未形成一个统一的组织。尤其是，主教作为世袭的地主从属于地主阶层，无论在社会地位还是政治地位，他们与那些低级神职人员都是有差别的。只要存在着土地财产税的征收，这种差别就一直存在，这是因为那些低级的神职人员并没有土地。只要对所有神职人员的收入征收特别税出现时，那么对整个教士阶层的共同利益也就产生了，他们要么全都反对征收特别税，要么全体接受特征税。一位研究这段历史时期的专家认为，对所有的教士征收特别税是最重要的纽带之一，因为它首次使英国神职人员结成了一个统一阶层。随着货币经济的兴起，从同样的基本动机中发展出了经济上的联合形式。自14世纪以来，资本的增加及其日益增加的重要性使得在家庭范围内把资金聚拢起来变得越来越必要。通过把所有继承人所拥有的份额集中起来的方式，对于那些继承人来说，相比于那些单独地份额来说，这些总资产中的份额变得更加有利可图。在德国，就出现了这样一种情形，所有继承人共同拥有一份不分割的遗产，与此同时共同所有的老式企业也会继续存在。这产生了两种后果。首先，从企业中分离出来的家庭经济仍旧在家庭内部发展，以至于家庭各成员虽然在家庭经济以及其他的资本方面是分离的，但是他们在一个不可分割的“企业”中仍是合伙人。在货币资本的意义导致了传统的家庭经济四分五裂的时候，它同时也为这些分解了的家庭经济要素创造了一种新的联合形式，在这种联合形式之中，从具体的私人利益中释放出来的纯粹的客观性转变为资本利益。其次，这种利益的共享模式甚至被那些没有家庭经济关系的人所采纳。当“商业活动”从家庭经济中分出去后，那些营运资本的联合形式也被那些彼此不相关的人所采纳，以至于到15世纪初，合伙制的企业形式已经被广泛地接受了。只有在货币经济普遍流行的时候，一种纯粹的合资形式才得到发展，在这种纯粹的合资形式中，共同所有的资本才以一种独立整体和法人实体的形式被客观化，而且也使得这个法人实体的地位凌驾于那些各不相同的合伙人之上，在合伙制的企业形式中，合伙人不过是拿出他们资产中的有限的部分入股，而不是以个人的身份参股。唯有货币才能带来这种不偏不倚地对待每个合伙人的联合形式；只有货币才能以其纯粹的形式为特殊的目标营造出那样一种联合方式，在这种类型的组织形式中，个体的非人性化的因素被统一到某个计划之中。在如何把人联合为一个整体形式的过程中，货币为我们提供了一种独一无二的可能性，在这个过程中，一切个人的以及特性的东西都被排除在外。

货币的分裂和孤立作用不仅仅是其调和与统一的品质的一般的先决条件和必然结果；在特定的历史条件下，货币同时发挥了分裂与统一这两种作用。举个例子说，一方面，家庭生活的有机统一性以及狭隘性的破坏是由货币经济所造成的，当这种情形作为一个事实被公布于众时，需要强调的是家庭除了作为一个继承的组织之外，已经几乎什么都不是了。如果在一个团体的联合是由多种利益因素所决定的，而且其中的某种利益因素会对其他的因素产生毁灭性破坏作用时，那么这个因素就会决定其他因素的命运，同时它也将成为在那些其他关系被破坏之后，这些不同的要素联系在一起的唯一纽带。不仅因为货币内在的特性才使得各种因素之间的联系得以建立，更确切的说是因为货币破坏了各种各样的人际关系，否则它们就根本不可能产生什么联系。直到今天，人和人之间如果不是还保留着一些金钱利益关系的话，恐怕他们之间可能早就不存在任何联系了，即便这种关系不过就是替宗教社团缴纳场地费的租金而已。

社会生活的联合的纽带越是具有为特殊目的而联合的特征，这种纽带就会变得越冷漠无情。金钱的彻底的冷漠无情在那些仅由货币决定的社会文化中得以反映。从某种程度上讲，也许社会主义理想的力量就是对这种社会文化的一种反作用力。通过向金钱体制宣战这种方式，社会主义极力尝试废除个体的孤立，在这种孤立情形下，个体与集体之间的关系仅仅是因为某种特殊的目的而形成的联合，与此同时，社会主义希望通过借助潜伏在个体内心中的对集体发自肺腑的热烈情感来实现其目的。毫无疑问，社会主义倾向于生活的理性化，倾向于通过像法律一样的规则以及理性的计算方法来控制生活中偶然性因素、以及异常因素。与此同时，社会主义与空想共产主义的本质之间有着密切的关系，这种本质作为过去的漫长岁月的残余，还留存在灵魂中某些偏远的角落里。社会主义的双重动机之间有着截然相反的精神根源。一方面，社会主义是理性的货币经济发展的最终结果，而在另一方面，它又是人最为基础的本能与情绪的具体体现。社会主义的吸引力的最引人注目的特征就在于：它既是理性主义，同时也是理性主义的对立面。从那些具有共产主义式平等的原始氏族社会中，社会主义找到了启发性的灵感，而货币体系却导致个体的注意力都集中在个体自身之上，并且只把少数对象作为个性以及情感的倾诉对象，这些对象包括两个部分，一方面，个体只与诸如家人和朋友之类的对象保持着最为亲密的个人关系，而另一方面个人也会与最遥远的概念范畴保持亲密的关系，诸如祖国或人类。虽然这两种社会形式完全是出于不同的理由，但是二者都与那种为了特殊目的而联合起来的客观迥然不同。一个最为广泛、最为根本的社会学准则在这里发挥作用了。在某种程度上讲，为数不多的几个社会学准则可以为社会发展的形式建立起普遍性，其中有这样一个准则：即集体规模的扩大与集体内部成员的个体化和独立化齐头并进。社会的进化通常发生在那些相对较小的团体中，在这些小团体中，各个组成要素以严格的、平等的方式联合在一起，接下来，这些小团体就发展成一个相对较大的团体，这个团体为其成员提供了自由、独立性和相互间的差别。家庭的形成史如同宗教团体的形成史、经济合作组织的形成史以及政党的形成史一样，都说明了这一发展模式。因而，货币对个性发展的意义与社会团体规模的扩大所具有的意义非常紧密地联系在一起。后一种作用在这里就不多说了。在这之前，我曾分析过货币经济与经济单位的规模之间相互的作用。如果有越来越多的人与他人之间产生关系，那么他们就越需要那些更加抽象，更为一般的交换中介；反过来说，如果这样一种抽象与一般的交换工具真的存在，那么，它就需要越过相当长的距离使人们达成一致意见，并把不同的人囊括到同一个计划以及互动之中，因而，那些在空间上、社会上、个人以及兴趣方面差异很大的个体，才有可能被融入到任何一种组织形式之中。

货币经济与个人主义原则的一般关系

货币经济、个体化、社会关系圈的扩大之间关系的密切程度，是通过商业贸易的特征表现出来的，这种商业贸易活动的特征，一方面代表着高速发展的货币经济，另一方面代表着社会关系的扩大，即社会关系超出了原始社会的那种封闭的、自给自足的关系团体。因此，除了在商业贸易发展到最高水平的情形以外，商业贸易活动不像工匠那样需要复杂的技艺，也不像农业那样需要传统技术的积累，这也是商业贸易活动的一个与众不同的特征。在某种程度上讲，相比于其他的经济利益追求者来说，商人所需要的专业培训相对较少，而这种专业培训与直接环境之间有着一种越来越密切的关系；商人很少依靠个人的或客观的传统，而这样的传统将磨平个人性格上的棱角；商人很少依靠手艺的传承，而那些手工艺最初都要依靠这些手艺的传承；同时商人也很少依靠那些从祖上传下来的土地所有权。据说，在印度，相比于制造业，商业贸易领域中，职业祖传的特性所发挥决定性的作用更少。旅行商人作为打破团体界限的货币经济先驱，正是通过贸易技巧才使得他们有能力抵制履行商人这一职业与其他行业的平等化和结盟，并保留了他们的个性化与冒险精神。我可以用一个稍微牵强的例子来论证这种相互关系。是给比赛的优胜者颁发荣誉证书，还是通过向他们分发奖金的方式以示鼓励，这二者之间有着天壤之别。优胜者因为其在比赛中获胜而获得奖金，他得到了他应得的。荣誉证书则具有更加深远的影响；它是对优胜者整个人所具有的优异能力的一种奖赏（在特定情况下奖金也能有这种效果，尽管这并不是奖金的本质的部分）。奖金所涉及的是优胜者在竞赛中的表现，而荣誉证书涉及的则是行为者作为一个整体的人所具有的非凡的能力。但是就后一种奖励来说，它通常只可能颁发给那些在一个相对较小的社会圈子里的人。然而，这种只能在较小的社会圈子里颁发的荣誉，对个人而言，也就不再意味着什么卓越之处了，这种常设概念与较小圈子的荣誉就会使得其自身被封闭起来，而且这种封闭性看起来非常的强大且坚不可摧，这样在小圈子中的例子很多，像公务员荣誉奖、商人荣誉奖、家庭荣誉奖，甚至是屡屡被加以引用的恶棍荣誉奖之类的都是这种情况。各种各样的荣誉最初都源于社会阶层和社会等级而产生的荣誉感，对于那些一般意义上的人的荣誉以及那些单独的个体的荣誉都只不过是把其所在的社会阶层的荣誉移加到个人身上而已，这就如同把一个大的团体的意见移加到那些小团体身上一样。这种只会使那些优胜者的名声变得显赫，而不会给团体中的其他非优胜者也带来同样声誉的荣誉，要求他所在的团体规模较小且团结一致；奥林匹克运动会上优胜者的名字给所有的那些对这项运动感兴趣的希腊人都带来了荣誉。奖金则具有一种自我中心的品质，而且这种品质暗藏在这个团体的所有人的心中。大公无私的品质是与小团体的团结一致相符合的，这种品质通过下面的这种风俗极为优美地表现出来了，为了对政府的优质的管理提出表扬，雅典500人议事会向其颁发了金花环，而这个花环也被留在了庙中。在那些利益关系紧密的较小的团体中，举个例子说，在运动员与那些技艺熟练的工人之间，即使在今天，对他们的杰出成就颁发荣誉奖也是十分合情合理的。然而，只要团体的限制性、同质性被开放性、异质性所取代，那么体现了整个团体相互协作精神的荣誉奖就不得不被奖金所取代，奖金所体现的只是对优胜者行为的最终认可。社会团体规模的扩大需要通过货币的方式而不是以荣誉的方式来对优胜者提出奖赏，这种转化是因为奖金的形式意味着社会团体无法避免的原子式分裂。既然我们无法在大的团体中以相同的方式唤起在小的团体中的同样的感情，那么，对于那些大的团体中的优胜者而言，他们就需要有一种不再依靠整个团体的同意与合作的新的方式。

在这种情形之下需要强调的是，货币与社会团体规模扩大之间有着密切的关系，与之相同，货币与生活内容的客观化之间也有着密切的关系。这种类似的关系绝不仅仅是巧合。在实践中，我们所说的事物的客观意义指的就是它们对更大社会圈中的主体的有效性。既然在社会生活中首先产生出的是个体之间或者小团体之间的联系，然后才产生出主体在解释方面的偶然性、事物的概念或概念的形成等对大的团体的日益增加的有用性以及重要意义（即使在现实中，这种情形下存在的障碍也能使这些偶然性以及概念无法被普遍接受）。在这一发展过程中，即使我们已经通过这些概念——拒绝所有那些正在被辨认出的或没有被辨认出的关系——得知了理念是否有效，这些偶然性与概念获得了那些我们所说的客观现实性或客观上恰当的形式。在这两个方面中，货币的意义均证实了这种密切的联系，而且这种联系在许多具体的情形之下也证实了其自身的存在性。在中世纪的德国，商法原本只不过是为了规范个别商人相互协作关系的法律。通过把这种具体的、个别的法律上升到普遍概念的高度的方法，并在此基础上发展出商法，实际上，这是由整个德意志帝国甚或全世界的商人阶级共同建立起的一个庞大的行会。因此，商人阶层的商法最终发展成为了商业贸易的习惯法。这一发展过程清楚地显示了：法律的适用范围在由较小的到较大的群体范围的扩张过程中，是如何超越单独个体的关系，从而上升为一个客观的交易法则。这个发展过程离不开货币交易的支持，同样地，商法的扩张过程也为商业贸易的扩张提供了帮助。

在物物交换的经济中，长距离运送有价值的商品在技术上是有难度的，这就把物物交换限制在为数不多的个别经济领域中，然而，通过货币自身所具有的完美的灵活性，货币使得最大范围的经济交换与日益增长的个人独立性联系在一起。从总体上看，调节这两者的相互关系——即货币与团体规模的扩大和个体的分化这二者的关系——的概念通常就是私有财产。对于那些带有物物交换经济色彩的小团体来说，他们倾向于占有公有财产。这种小团体规模的每一次扩大都会迫其自身走向重新分配财产的比例。随着小团体的参与者的人数的剧增，对公有财产的管理变得异常复杂而且充满着矛盾，在某种程度上来看，喜欢争论的个体可能越来越迫切希望摆脱共产主义式的束缚，以及随着与公有财产相冲突的劳动分工和对高的劳动生产率的需求等情况的产生，人们开始觉得用团体人数扩大作为直接原因来解释私有财产的产生是合情合理的。据一份12世纪的爱尔兰手稿记载，由于家庭的数量增长过猛，导致了政府被迫实行土地的分配，同时，在俄国我们也有机会观察到这种公有财产向私有财产的转变，它同样非常清楚地显示了，恰恰是由于人口的增加，促进并加速了这一转变过程。然而，显而易见是，货币是财产私有以及个人形式拥有的最适合的基础。财产在从整体分离出来的部分之间的分配、产权的固定、个人权利之实现，都只有通过货币才得以实现。同样地，交换是经济生活范围在数量上得以扩张的最为原始和最为纯粹的方法。通过交换，个体使自己从根本上超越了以自我为中心之一的圈子，这种超越的程度要比抢劫或赠礼等方式大多了。然而，就交换的本质特征而言，只有私有财产才可被用作交换。所有集体财产都倾向于永久营业，然而个体的特殊愿望及其对补充的需求，使得交换对他来说是必不可少的。财产首先必须集中在某个人手里，只有这样它才能通过交换过程，而拓展到别的地方去。货币作为交换过程的绝对的载体和化身，借助于那些可以用于自由交换的私有财产，货币成了经济扩张的媒介，货币也成了公平交易的交换过程所包含的那些不计其数的合同双方的媒介。然而，通过这样的方式，货币在这样做的时候抵制了那些在物物交换的经济中自然而然形成的集体主义式的解决办法，而这种抵制本身也是对集体主义的一种促进。在中世纪时，一种普遍流行的理论认为，只能从那些个人承诺要缴纳税款的人身上收取赋税，因此，那些没有亲自出席表决议会的地主就常常拒绝交纳赋税。早在13世纪初的英格兰，对征税尚无证实的规定出台之前，英国的最高委员会就做出决定，要求对所有的民众征收不动产税，这是违背公众意愿的，对此，最高委员会是有不可推卸的责任的。到了中世纪末期，德国的乡绅阶层组成了一个独立行事的联合体，他们时常反对封建地主的所作所为，并且当这个联合体的决议不再是个人意见的总和而是所有阶层的决定时，在涉及不动产税的问题时，前一种情况中的阐释在很长一段时间内仍然是有效的。在很长一段时间里，不动产的总和只被看作是不动产所有者数量的总和，所以任何人都可以从公共决议中退出。同样的动机在另一种变化了的情况下——随着国家统治的日益集权化，地方团体在涉及到地方财政政策时仍旧保留了相对的自由——同样有效。举个例子说，最近几十年以来，德国的立法已经倾向于严格限制地方社团在社会方面、政治方面以及道德方面的责任义务，并把这些责任义务简化到地方的政府机构的工作中去，同时与此相反的是，在涉及财政管理的地方，地方社团仍被赋予了相当大的自主权。如果按照上述的逻辑推理，那么我们可以根据国家手中的货币相比于个人手中的货币其经济用途更少这个角度指出货币罚金的缺点，而且这样的想法也会很普遍。因此，更加有利的做法是，无论货币归谁处置，在这一方面都要给其一定程度的自由，而在其他一切方面则都给予限制，这是一个在某种程度上被掩盖了的实际后果和困难，这就为对货币处置的集体主义的方式带来了一定的难度。

尽管货币非常适合于代表共同利益能把那些别的方法很难协调的个性统一在一起，然而，困难却仍是确实存在的。这两个方面也许最终都要追溯到货币所发挥的某个相同的作用之中，也就是说，货币使得那些原本以统一的形式而存在的各种因素彼此分裂，互相独立。一方面，统一体的分裂牵扯到个体的个性，因而使得那些相似兴趣的聚集成为了可能，虽然在这些相似的要素的集合形式中，也会存在分歧与难以调和的矛盾。另一方面，这种分裂也会影响到统一的联合体，使得现在明显分化的个体在内部和外部实现统一化也是很困难的。这种矛盾的形式贯穿于社会生活的整个发展过程之中，因此，这种矛盾性绝不会只是这么一个特例而已。这种矛盾的根源存在于这样一个事实中：个体只是社会统一体中的一个元素和成员，然而，与此同时，人本身也是一个由相对封闭的要素组成的一个整体。作为社会统一体基本组成部分的个体所发挥的作用与作为一个个体有能力成为或者希望成为的那个独立的有机体所发挥的作用之间，将会产生非常频繁的冲突。作为由个体组成的社会统一体以及作为整个社会统一体的组成部分的个体，二者在遭受相同因素的影响的时候，所产生的作用在形式上是相似的。由于个体代表这两种完全异质的结果，那么这必然会常常导致内容上的冲突。因此，货币在带来社会中的各种因素的分化的同时，它同样也会引起个体的分化，这种矛盾或许是一种实际中的矛盾，而不是那些在逻辑上、理论上无法解决的矛盾。在货币对社会产生影响的例子中，货币在造成社会因素分化的同时，也遏制了其分化；集体主义处置货币的方式所产生的障碍，一般来说是与上述的原因紧密相连的。除了货币之外的所有其它的财产形式指的是凭借其技术条件而具有特殊用途的那类财产，因此对这些财产在处置上的自由就要受到某些客观因素的限制。而我们在使用货币的时候则完全不会遇到这样的限制，它可以听从很多人的摆布，因而这就为相互对立的倾向提供了最为广阔的空间。因此，在生存条件方面，货币经济与小规模经济有着决定性的差异，一般来说，小规模经济要依赖共同的秩序和统一的规则。有人也许会说，小规模经济是依靠个性化以及劳动分工来维持自身生存的，这种说法虽然过于简单化，但也是事实。作为一种形式抽象的事物，货币是从那些相对大一些的经济社会圈子的经济互动中进化而来的，与此同时，凭借着其自身所具有的纯粹的数量特性，货币能够最为精确地、机械地表现任何一种具体的要求、个人劳动成果的任何一种价值、以及任何一种个人倾向。通过这种方式，货币第一次在经济领域中实现了团体规模扩张与个体性扩展，二者在普遍的社会学意义上的相互关系。

货币与私有财产的关系，以及个性的自由发展，在很大程度上都是以货币的灵活性为条件的，而这种条件关系在货币占有形式的对立面（即土地所有权）中尤为明显。土地所有权在两个方向上超出了货币与个人的联系：从横向看是因为，与其他任何形式的财产相比，土地都是更适合充当一个团体的集体财产的；从纵向看是因为，土地是最佳的继承对象。如果在一个原始部落中，作为整体的财产是由土地所构成的，那么土地所有权将会朝着两个主要的方向发展。首先，通过从土地中收获农作物，这种所有权可以变得更加具有灵活的特征；只要事情是按照这个方向发展下去，那么私有产权就会出现。通常来说，游牧民族把土地视为部落的公共财产，部落只会把土地的使用权而不是所有权交给每一个家庭，但牲畜一直都是家庭的私有财产。众所周知，游牧民族不会把牲畜当作是具有公共物品特征的财产。在许多别的社会形态之中，那些具有活动性的物品都已经成为了私有财产的时候，土地在那之后的很长一段时间仍被视为公共财产。另一方面，与私有财产的起源息息相关的是：这些生产要素的活动独立于土地之外。印度的法律超越了家庭关系，在这种法律中阐发出这样一种观念：所获得的一切独立于家族财产之外的物品都不必充公，而这些家庭财产主要是由土地构成的。个人技能的取得，举个例子说，学会一门手艺，被看作是获得财产的主要途径，同时也是争取个人自立性的主要途径。所以，当手工匠有一技在身的时候，也就因此拥有了某种具有流动性的商品，拥有这种商品就如同拥有牲畜一样，虽然二者在占有的方式上有所不同，这也就导致了这些能工巧匠能从土地财产及其集体所有制特征中自动分化出来。最后，公有的生活形式向私有生活形式的转变对于保留合作精神是一个非常有效的办法，而这种合作精神正是来源于物物交换经济的土崩瓦解。直至13世纪，宗教团体的财产主要是由土地构成的，而这些宗教团体对土地的管理则是建立在社会经济原则的基础之上的。对这些主要靠土地所有权谋生的宗教团体来讲，农产品的经济利润的下降无疑会给教会组织带来严重的经济危机，然而给宗教团体带来经济危机的货币经济同时也为危机提供了某种补救措施。通过捐赠者而得来的收入，甚至僧侣们的收入也都或多或少被广泛地分割为捐赠与薪水两部分，而且现在的大部分收入，虽然来自各个不同的地方，但都能被以货币的形式计算出来一并交给一个单独的人。在总收入降低的时候，通过这种方式，至少可以把教会的领袖和代表性人物的收入维持在同一个水平之上，然而，这种上层阶级收入的维持是以牺牲低级神职人员为代价的，因为后者现在不得不以雇员身份为教会服务。这一连串事件清楚地表明，随着土地的重要性的不断下降，即使那些强烈要求团结合作的组织，例如像教会那样的组织，都被迫从集体主义的生活形式向个人主义生活形式转变，同时这一事件也清楚地展现了，货币经济的涌入是如何影响了这一生活形式的转变过程以及这种转变是通过何种途径来得以实现的——这种途径就是通过土地的进一步细化与现金化的方式。在今天，之所以农民成为了最不屈不挠地反对社会主义的人，其原因首先存在于这样一个事实中，与实践生活中所需要的技术水平相比，农民是极为保守的。既然现存的私有土地财产是农民赖以生存的根本，所以，农民对社会主义的不满，就如同一个世纪以前人们对德国马克共同体提出了反对一样，也如人们对后来的谷物混合耕种提出的反对一样。现代社会主义的一个主要的特征就是它与古代土地财产中的集体主义有着本质的区别，而且它对农民生活中的需求也是相当的陌生，也就是说在现代的社会主义中，人们是根据理性、意志以及对人的有组织的计算的方法来彻底地控制生产活动。工厂的组织和机器的构造每天都在提示着工人，只要使用绝对精确的方法，而且必须不惜一切代价地避免个性因素以及其他内在因素所带来的紊乱。那么有效果的生产活动以及劳动成果就都可以实现，这种最终目标，是要借助于那些透明化的、可以操纵的机制来达到的，而正是这种机制为这样一种社会理念一通过机械化的、最高级的理性主义来组织整个社会，并排除一切私人欲望——铺平了道路。与此相反，农民的劳动及其劳动成果则要受到那些独立的、无法预测的力量的影响，而且农民的思想一方面集中于从那些不属于理性的因素里获得利益，另一方面集中于那些毫无规律可言的条件各自的用途。因此，农民的理想与社会主义的理想背道而驰，社会主义的目标不在于那些小恩小惠，而在于消除一切的偶然性，以及建立这样一种组织：即把生活中一切可能的因素都纳入计算的范畴之中，而这对于那些仅有一点农业上的追求的农民来讲是根本就不可能的。通过理性和意志力来彻底地控制整个生产在技术上是可行的，然而这种可行性必须建立在这样一个前提条件之下，即所有的生产工具全部集中在“社会”的手中。但是显而易见，原始经济中的集体主义无论从其内核上看，还是从其含义上看，都是与社会主义大相径庭的，社会主义的理念产生于极具有流动性的财产状态，而这种财产状态也正是由货币经济所决定的。正如我在前面所提到过的那样，尽管原始的集体主义与社会主义有天壤之别，然而作为一种本能、作为一种朦胧的理想可能对社会主义产生起推动作用，事实也确实如此。

至少在历史的观点看来，一方面自然经济与集体主义之间的联系，以及另一方面财产的流动性以及个人化的之间的联系，两个方面都是确实存在的。与土地作为一种集体财产的特征紧密相连的是土地所具有的另一个鲜明的特点，即土地的世袭特征。如果我们分析家庭组织的经济内容，我们时常会发现这样一个事实，即继承所得的财产与凭借自身努力而挣得的财产之间的差别与动产与不动产之间的差别是一致的。在印度的西北部地区，jalm这个词包含着两种意思，其一是长子继承权，另一个是狭义上的土地所有权。从相反的例子中，动产与个体之间的联系是如此的紧密以至于在那些十分原始通常也是十分贫穷的部落中，通过遗产的方式来实现财产转移从来都没有发生过。相反，据说，在世界的许多地方，死者的财产都会被破坏掉。毫无疑问，这里是那些神秘的观念在作祟：仿佛就像死者的灵魂可能会被其先前所用之物而吸引，然后死者就很可能返回来把自己的财产毁灭掉！然而，这只不过证实了在个体与其私有财产之间存在着密切的关系，而他生前的那些财产自然而然就成了迷信思想的滋生之地。据说，在印度的尼科巴群岛，从亲属那里继承财产被认为是大错特错，因此，除了树木和住所以外，死者生前的财产将全部被毁掉。树木与住所具有不动产的性质，因此它们与个人之间的关系比较松散，以至于它们适合于被转让给他人。人与事物之间具有双重关系：人保持不变，而事物却发生了变化；或者事物保持不变，而人却发生了变化。当前者处于优势地位的时候，动产就是这样一个例子，那么重点就在人身上，人们就倾向于强调个体的人是本质的因素。然而在相反的情况下，即物体是保持不变的，而且在于人的关系中，物体也总是存在着的，那么个体的重要性就要下降。土地看起来就像是岩石，而个体的生命就像是岩石上的海浪一样，忽起忽落。因此，在处理不动产问题时，个体好像转变为背景一般，个体与集体之间的关系与个体与不动产之间的关系有类似之处。这也解释了土地所有权与建立在世袭原则上的贵族统治之间的密切关系。这再一次让我回想起，在古希腊的时候，——由宗教所支撑的家族世袭基础上的贵族统治原则与占据中心地位的土地所有权之间的结合程度有多么紧密。出卖地产是一种责任的违背，这不仅仅是对子孙后代不负责任，从更高程度上讲，这更是对列祖列宗的不负责任！还有一个事实需要被指出，就像中世纪早期的德意志一样，皇室的世袭封地是一种实物形式的，并且在这整个封建统治中，倡导的都是一种贵族化的特征，而在那些更加接近货币经济的国家中，封臣则可以受到其他形式的封赏。总体上说，世袭制的原则是与个体性原则背道而驰的。世袭制原则把个体的人附着在家族的辈份序列之中，这就如同集体主义把个体及其同龄人附着在一起是一样的。在生物学的遗传中，同样保证了代与代之间的平等性。世袭制的原则对经济的个性化是一种障碍。在13世纪和14世纪，个体的德国家庭在经济方面已经从“血统”中解放出来了，在涉及财产问题时，这些家庭也扮演了独立主体的身份。然而，这也是家庭分化的结束。在这种个体的家庭之中，无论是父亲、母亲，还是孩子，他们都无法对个体所有的财产权进行清楚地界定，在具体到这一代人的时候，家庭财产却又转变成了公共财产。在这一方面，家庭财产并没有因为不同的成员而产生个体性分离。经济个体性是在世袭制消亡的时候出现的。经济个体性是与个体家庭同时出现的，而且这个在世袭制时期普遍流行的经济个体化分离在个体家庭的内部嘎然而止了。只有到了现代社会，当财产主要由动产构成时，动产的继承凭借其个体性优势战胜了继承制度反个体化的本质。如果财产是由土地组成的，那么即使一些实践中的紧急情况也是无力反抗那些反个体化的继承制度的。在这些特殊情况下，如果农民借助遗嘱这种方式来处理其生前的财产，那么农民的继承权中的某些缺点是可能被弥补的。然而，一般来说农民通常是不立遗嘱的。当与未立遗嘱的情形相比，遗嘱继承权是非常具有个性化的。按照个人意愿——这是与传统与习俗截然对立的——来处理他的财产会使农民过度紧张。无论在哪里，不管是与集体主义相关的财产的不动性，还是与世袭制度相关的财产不动性，二者都被视为一种障碍，如果能够移除这种障碍，那么就会给分化与个人自由带来相应的进步。在所有的形式的财产中，货币是最富有流动性的，它代表了这个前进趋势的顶点。货币确实是这样一种形式的财产，它最有效地把个人从那种主要是从其他形式的财产中发展延伸而来的统一的束缚中解放出来。

封面

书名页

目录

CHAPTER 3 Money In The Sequence Of Purposes

I

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第三章 在目的序列中的货币

第一节

第二节

第三节

CHAPTER 4 Individual Freedom

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第四章 个体自由

第一节

第二节

第三节

目录

CHAPTER 5 The Money Equivalent Of Personal Values

I

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第五章 个人价值的货币等价物

第一节

第二节

第三节

CHAPTER 6 The Style Of Life

Ⅰ

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第六章 生活风格

第一节

第二节

第三节

译者后记

CHAPTER 5 The Money Equivalent Of Personal Values

I

Wergild

The importance of money within the system of appreciation is measurable by the development of the money fine.We first encounter in this area，as its most peculiar manifestation，the atonement of murder by payment of money-an occurrence so frequent in primitive cultures that it makes specific examples unnecessary，at least for its simplest and most direct form.Less appreciated，however，is not so much the frequency as the intensity with which the relationship between human value and money value dominates legal conceptions.In early Anglo-Saxon England a wergild -the atonement of murder by money payment，a manbote—was even attached to killing the king；a law set it at 2，700 shillings.Such a sum was，for that period，totally imaginary and impossible to obtain.Its real meaning was that，in order to compensate for the deed，the murderer and his whole family had to be sold into slavery，though even then，as one interpreter of the law suggests，the difference remained so large that-as a mere money debt！-it could be cleared only by death.Only by resorting to the money fine was it possible to fix upon the person the magnitude of the crime.Thus within the same culture，at the time of the Seven Kingdoms，the typical wergild for an ordinary free man was 200 shillings and that of members of other estates was calculated according to this norm either in fractions or multiples. This indicates，in a different manner，the way in which money provided a quantitative concept of the value of human beings.Thus one finds，even at the time of the Magna Carta，the statement that the knight，baron and earl relate to each other as shilling，mark and pound，since these are the proportions of their escheat-a conception that is as typical as its basis is inaccurate.For it illustrates that the tendency to reduce the value of man to a monetary expression is so powerful that it is realized even at the expense of objective accuracy.This tendency not only makes money the measure of man，but it also makes man the measure of the value of money.From time to time，we come across a monetary unit as the sum to be paid for homicide.According to Grimm，the‘perfect skillan’means：I have killed or wounded，therefore I have become penitent.The solidus was the basic fine according to which payments were calculated in common law.On the basis or the meaning of‘skillan’we can assume that the word‘shilling’means a simple fine.The value of the human being is considered here so be the principle of class ifiction for the monetary system and as the determinate basis for the value of money.This is similar to the situation where the standard rate of wergild among the bedouin-whom Mohammed incorporated into Islam-is one hundred camels，and this rate is at the same time used as the typical ransom money for prisoners and also as dowry money.The same role of money is in evidence where fines are imposed not only for murder but for any offence.In the Merovingian period the solids was no longer 40 but was only 12 denari. One may speculate that the reason for this change was that the fine at that time imposed according to solidi should be reduced and it was decreed that whenever a solidus was required the fine should be no longer 40 but 12 denari. From this there evolved the solidus fine of 12 denari which finally became the generally accepted one.And it is reported that in the Palau Islands any kind of payment is simply called a fine.Here it is not the different coins that determine the scale against which the relative seriousness of the offence is measured，but rather the contrary，that the valuation of the offence creates a measure for establishing money values.

This way of looking at things-in so far as it relates to atonement for murder-is based on a sentiment of general importance.Since the very essence of money rests upon quantity，since money in itself without the determining factor of‘how much’is a completely empty concept，it is of the utmost importance and quite essential that each monetary system possesses a unit，the multiple or part of which represents each specific money value.This original determination without which no monetary system is possible，and which becomes technically refined as a‘standard of coinage’，is，as it were，the absolute foundation for the quantitative relations in which money transactions operate.Conceptually speaking，of course，the size of this unit is quite irrelevant，for whatever it may be the necessary amount may be obtained by division or multiplication.Especially in later centuries，the fixing of this unit is actually only partly determined by historicalpolitical or by technical reasons with regard to the coinage.And yet，that amount of money that stands as the measure of all others whenever money is mentioned，and which is，as it were，the representative of money as a whole must have some relationship to man's central sense of value in order to be used as the equivalent for an object or performance that stands uppermost in his mind.This may also explain the often mentioned fact that in countries with a high monetary unit the cost of living is higher than in countries with a lower unit-thus，ceteris paribus ，dearer in dollar countries than in mark countries，dearer in mark countries than in franc countries.The value of many necessities of life is expressed in these units or some multiple of them，regardless of their absolute size.Yet，both as a cause and a consequence，the monetary unit within a social circle none the less has profound relations with the economically explicable type of life values-no matter how irrelevant this unit seems to be because it can be divided and multiplied at will.It was as a consequence of this connection that the first French Constitution of 1791 adopted the daily wage as the standard of value.Every fully qualified citizen had to pay a direct tax of at least three days’work，and，in order to vote，required an income of 150-200 labor days.Thus，there emerged the notion in value theory that the absolute standard of value was equal to the daily necessities that is，that which had the most basic value for men-in relation to which precious metals and all money as commodities rose or fell in value.The suggestion of‘labor money’as the basic unit that ought to be equal to the labor value of one hour or one day points in the same direction，namely of using a central limited object determined by an essential human interest as the unit of value.There is only a quantitative difference between this approach and using the equivalent of the human being，the wergild， as the basic money unit.

The Transition From The Utilitarian To The Objective And Absolute Valuation Of The Human Being

The origin of wergild is obviously purely utilitarian，and even though it does not altogether pertain to civil law it none the less belongs to that state of indifference with regard to private and public law with which social development begins.The tribe，the clan and the family demanded a substitute for the economic loss which the death of one of its members implied and was willing to accept it instead of an impulsive vendetta.This transformation finally occurs in cases where the vendetta，which was supposed to be superseded，would itself be impossible.Among the Goajiro Indians，someone who accidentally hurt himself had to compensate his own family because he shed the blood of the family.Among some Malayan peoples it is common for the word for‘blood money’to also mean：to get up，to stand up.It reflects the idea that by imposing blood money the slain person is resurrected for his people，that the void created by his death is filled again.In addition to the payment to relatives，a special payment for disturbing the peace of the community was imposed very early on，at least among the Germans.In the same vein，in some Anglo-Saxon kingdoms wergild for the family of the king was demanded a second time from the people for the life of their king.Similarly，wergild in India was transferred from the royal family to the Brahmins.In the light of such further developments of wergild ，severed from its private economic origins，it contained from the very beginning an objective supra-individual element since the amount was determined by custom and law，even though it differed according to social status.Thus the value of each person was fixed from birth onwards，quite regardless of his real value to his relatives.Not only was the person thereby valued as substance in contrast to the sum of his concrete achievements，but also the notion was introduced that he，by himself and not only for others，was worth such and such an amount.A characteristic transitional phenomenon from a subjectiveeconomic to an objective evaluation is illustrated in the following instance.In the Hebrew state of around the third century，the regular price for a male slave was 50 schekel ，for a female slave 30 schekel. But as atonement for the killing of a slave one had to pay 30 sela （almost twice the amount）since the Pentateuch maintained that the amount was 30 schekel and this was mistakenly considered to be 30 sela. They clung not to the calculable economic value of the damage done，but rather to a regulation that stemmed from non-economic sources which contrasted considerablyin size as well as lack of differentiation-with the former.The notion that the slave had a definite value，regardless of his utility to his owner，was not yet firmly established.Only the difference between the slave's price which expressed this utility and the atonement payment for killing him-even though brought about by a theological misinterpretation-suggested，none the less，that a specific economic value of a person might be derived from an objective order which revealed his valuation out of the merely private utility for those entitled to it.This transition is facilitated to the extent to which wergild becomes purely an institution of the State.In many cases the value of the legal oath was estimated to be proportional to the amount of the wergild. And it is significant that sometimes only the freeman has wergild ，but not the serf.In the Middle Ages in the area around Florence we find many gradations of serfs as coloni ，sedentes ，quilini ，inquilini ，adscripticii ，censiti ，etc.，whose bondage was probably in reverse relation to their wergild so that there was no wergild at all for the totally dependent.Even as late as the thirteenth century such a long outdated and merely formal criterion was put forward before the courts in order to grade testimonies accordingly.From the standpoint of individualistic utility，wergild should have been maintained all the more strongly，the more someone was the property of a third person.The fact that it happened differently，and that the rank order functioned as a symbol for the weight to be attached to personal testimony，serves to underline the point at which wergild became an expression of the objective value of the person.

This development，which elevated the valuation of man from a merely utilitarian to an objective price valuation，reflects a very common mode of thinking.If all human subjects receive one and the same impression of an object，then it seems to be explained only by the fact that the subject in itself possesses this specific quality that is the content of the impression.Very different impressions may，in their differentiation，originate in the subjects who absorb them，but the identity of impressions-if we exclude the most improbable chances-can spring only from the fact that the object of these qualities is reflected in our minds，while admitting of course that this is only a symbolic expression that requires further supplementation.Within the sphere of valuation，this process repeats itself.If the same object is valued differently in different cases and by different persons，then the whole valuation appears as a subjective process which consequently produces different results according to personal circumstances and dispositions.If，however，the object is valued equally by different persons，the conclusion seems unavoidable that the object is worth that much.If，therefore，the relatives of a murdered person demanded different amounts of wergild， then it was clear that they wanted to replace their personal loss.As soon，however，as the amount of wergild for one particular estate is fixed once and for all，and the same payment is made even for widely different persons and cases，the notion was formed that the man in himself was worth such and such an amount.This indifference to personal differences no longer allows a person's value as a whole to consist of what other individuals enjoy and lose by them；their value is，as it were，embodied in themselves as an objective quality expressible in money.The fixing of wergild carried out in the interests of social peace and in order to avoid endless feuds therefore seems to be the psychological origin of the transformation of the originally subjective utilitarian valuation of human life into the objective notion that man has this specific value.

The idea，which is so very important in cultural history，that man as such can be compensated for by money is actually realized in only two or three phenomena：certainly in blood money and in slavery，and perhaps also in bridal purchase，which we shall consider later.The tremendous difference in views that make slavery and blood money quite alien to our thought today might，none the less，from the standpoint of purely economic concepts，be considered to be only a gradual and quantitative difference.For in purchasing slaves，the sum total of their labor services is paid for by money and yet we also pay for various units of those services today by money.The equivalent for the money expended nowadays is，as it was formerly，the labor of man，the difference being that formerly it was acquired as a whole，and now it is acquired from case to case；and formerly the price was paid not to the worker but to another person-apart from cases of one's voluntarily selling oneself into slavery.With regard to blood money too，there is nowadays no contradiction between such payments and our feelings that money compensation be fixed for minor injuries，be they of a physical or mental nature such as slander or breach of promise.Even today，a whole range of less serious crimes are expiated by money according to some penal codes as，for instance，is the case in the state of New York，in the Netherlands and in modem Japan.From the purely economic standpoint，the killing of a person may be considered to be a merely gradual extension of such partial paralyses and reductions of energies and trials in the same way as death has been seen physiologically as an intensification and spreading of processes that are also to be found to a certain extent，or limited to specific areas of the body，in the‘living’organism.

However，this economic perspective is not the common one.Actually the whole development of the value of life out of predominantly Christian doctrine is based on the idea that man has an absolute value.Over and above all the details，relativities，particular forces and expressions of his empirical being stands‘man’，as something unified and indivisible whose value cannot possibly be measured by any quantitative standard and cannot be compensated for merely by more or less of another value.This is the basic notion that negates the ideal basis of blood money and slavery，because they place the whole and absolute man in an equation with money，with a relative and merely quantitatively determinable value.That such heightening of the value of human beings occurred is，so to speak，to the credit of Christianity，whose views were anticipated in many other appraisals while at the same time the historical development of its consequences was postponed for a long time；for the Church did not fight against slavery as energetically as it was really obliged to do and it actually supported the atonement for homicide by wergild ，if only for public peace and in order to avoid bloodshed.Yet despite this removal of human value from any relativity，from any merely quantitatively determined sequence，it corresponds to the mentality of Christianity.What distinguishes a higher culture from a lower one is the multiplicity as well as the length of teleological series.The needs of primitive man are limited in number，and if they are satisfied at all then this is accomplished by a relatively short chain of means.A developing culture not only increases the demands and tasks of men，but also leads the construction of means for each of these individual ends even higher，and already often demands merely for the means a manifold mechanism of interlocking preconditions.Because of this relationship，the abstract notion of ends and means develops only at a higher cultural level.Only at that level，and because of the numerous purposive sequences striving for some kind of unification，because of the continuous removal of the specific purpose by a larger and larger chain of means-only then does the question of the ultimate purpose，that lends reason and dignity to the whole effort，and the question of why emerge.In addition，the life and actions of civilized man pass through an infinite number of purposive systems of which he can control，or even conceive，only a very small part，so that，compared with the simplicity of primitive existence，a frightening differentiation of the elements of life emerges.The idea of an ultimate purpose in which everything is again reconciled，but which is dispensable to undifferentiated conditions and men，stands as peace and salvation in the disunited and fragmentary character of our culture.The further the elements of existence are set apart by qualitative differentiation，the more removed on an abstract plane must that final purpose be which enables us to experience life as a unity.Such longings need not be articulated in a conscious formulation but may exist，no less strongly，as a faint desire，longing or dissatisfaction on the part of the masses.At the beginning of our era，Greco-Roman culture had obviously arrived at this point.Life had become such a finely woven tissue of purposes that，as its result and focus imaginaries ，a feeling arose with tremendous power：what is the ultimate purpose of this whole，the final end of which does not-as does everything else we strive for-reveal itself as a mere means？On the one hand，the resigned or resentful pessimism of that period，its senseless indulgence-which in its momentary existence certainly did not look for a transcending purpose-and on the other the mystical ascetic tendencies are all the expression of the unconscious search for an ultimate purpose of life，and of an anxiety as to the ultimate purpose of the whole diversity-and hardship of its apparatus of means.To this end，however，Christianity brought a glorious fulfillment.For the first time in Western history，a real ultimate purpose for life was offered to the masses，an absolute value of existence，quite independent of all the details，fragments and contradictions of the empirical world：salvation of the soul and the kingdom of God.Now there was room in God's house for every soul，and every single one，the meanest and the lowest as well as the soul of the hero and the sage，because each was infinitely valuable by being the representative of its eternal salvation.Through their relationship to the one God，all significance，absoluteness and transcendence was reflected back upon them.The tremendous authoritative dictum that preached an eternal destiny and infinite significance of the soul suspended with one stroke all that was merely relative，all merely quantitative differences in worthiness.The idea of an ultimate purpose which Christianity tied to the absolute value of the soul has clearly undergone a peculiar transformation.Just as every need becomes more permanent the more it is satisfied，so Christianity has ingrained to a large extent the need for an ultimate purpose by its continuous consciousness of it over a long period，so that those who now reject the doctrine shall leave behind them the heritage of an empty longing for a definite purpose of their whole existence：the need has outlived its fulfillment.In so far as Schopenhauer's metaphysics proclaimed the will to be the substance of existence-a will that must necessarily remain unfulfilled because，as the absolute，there is nothing apart from itself that might satisfy it and so can only continue to grasp itself-this metaphysics is the perfect expression of this cultural situation which has retained the vehement need for an absolute final purpose but has lost its compelling content.The weakening of religious sentiments and，at the same time，the vital reawakening need for such sentiments are both a consequence of the fact that modem man is deprived of an ultimate purpose.But what this notion has achieved for the evaluation of the human soul has not been lost but may be counted to the credit of its inheritance.In that Christianity proclaimed the human soul to be the vehicle of God's grace，it became incommensurable with all wordy measures and has remained so.No matter how remote and alien this interpretation really is for actual human beings，its repercussions cannot be avoided where the whole person is at stake.His individual fate may be of no concern，but the absolute sum total cannot remain so.Actually，Hebrew law had already directly proclaimed the religious value of man to be irreconcilable with slavery.If destitution compels an Israelite to sell himself as slave to a clansman，then he shall treat him-as Jahveh commands-as a wage labourer and not as a slave‘for those are my servants whom I have led out of Egypt，they should not be sold as one sells slaves’.

But the value of the person，which makes him incommensurable with the purely quantitative scale of money，may have two very different meanings.It may refer to man as man in general or to man as this particular individual.If one states，for instance，that the human personality possesses the highest scarcity value，because it is not interchangeable but is absolutely irreplaceable，then the question remains as to which other values it is isolated from in this way.If the specific qualities of a person-which are different from those of any other person-determine his value，then this scarcity refers to the individual person in relation to all the others.This interpretation，which in part is common to antiquity and modem individualism，leads inescapably to a grading of humanity，and only to the extent that the representatives of the lowest values come into contact with the representatives of the highest values do they participate in the absoluteness of these values.This is the reason why the classical view that slavery is justified is taken over by some modem individualists.The viewpoint of Christianity，the Enlightenment of the eighteenth century（including Rousseau and Kant）and ethical socialism is totally different.From these standpoints，value lies in human beings merely because they are human beings；the scarcity value refers to the human soul as such in contrast to everything else.What is decisive here is that the absolute value of all men is the same.This view is thus that of abstract individualism‘abstract’because it attaches the whole value，the whole absolute importance to the general concept of man and only transfers it from there to the individual members of the species.In contrast，the nineteenth century since the Romantics has given a totally different content to the concept of individualism.Whereas the contrast from which the individual as such gained his specific significance during the eighteenth century was that of the individual and the collectivity and bonds of the State，Church，society and guild，so that the ideal was the free independence of the individual，the meaning attached to the subsequent individualism lies in the differences between individuals and their qualitative peculiarities.It is the former mode of interpretation，upon whose basis‘human dignity’and‘human rights’have developed，that marks most decisively the development that made every sale of human beings for money，and atonement for their death by money impossible.This is a development whose origins must lie in the situation in which the collectivistic bonds of the earliest social forms wear thin，where the individual raises himself out of the merging of interests with his group companions and insists upon his independence.

Punishment By Fine And The Stages Of Culture

I have traced the development of expiation of murder up to the point at which，out of the restitution of actual damage to the survivors calculated according to their status，the notion evolved that the value of man，as a member of a particular estate，was equal to a specific wergild. Out of this a further development commences whose result is that the expiatory sacrifice of the criminal is interpreted not as compensation for the destroyed value，but as punishment-and this is true not only for murder but also for other serious offences.Every punishment，as a pain imposed by the idea of expediency，can，as far as I can see，possess only two starting points：the protection of society and the obligation to indemnify for the damage done to society or the victim-no matter how far their subsequent idealistic meanings are removed from these original ones.For if one traces punishment back to vengeance，then it seems to me that vengeance itself requires further explanation.This can be found only in the need for protection which forces man to get the criminal out of the way，a process that can often occur only through the imposition of pain or death.This kind of utility and necessity has developed into an independent impulse such that the damage to those who have done damage，originally merely a means of ensuring against further damage，has become satisfactory in itself，and has given rise to an impulse that is independent of its utilitarian roots.Finally，the origin of punishment as revenge can be traced back to the need for protection.It is this need that makes intelligible the fact that highly civilized ages request the criminal should be rendered harmless，whereas less civilized ages are satisfied with a milder compensation.For nowadays murder is usually committed only by completely corrupt and morally deprived persons，whereas in rougher or more heroic ages it was also committed by people with quite different qualities，whose superiority and energy in conserving society was in everyone's interest.Thus，it is the difference in the basic traits of the murderer at various stages of historical development that，for reasons of social self-preservation，requires sometimes the destruction and at other times an expiation of the culprit's life.Here we are interested mainly in the other origin of punishment-compensation for damages.As long as or in so far as the consequences of an act of damage for the perpetrator are carried out by the victim himself，it will-apart from impulses of vengeance-be restricted to compensation of the victim.The victim is not interested in the personal situation of the criminal；his action is determined by utility and not by consideration for the person.This situation changes as soon as an objective power，such as the State or the Church，takes over the responsibility for the expiation of the crime.Because the damage to the victim is now no longer a personal event but rather a disturbance of public order or a violation of an ethical-religious law，the condition of the criminal becomes the final purpose of the action taken，whereas formerly his situation was only an indifferent accident for the person who sought compensation.Only here can we talk about punishment in the full sense of the word.

The purpose is now to affect the subject himself，and any penalty as practical action is merely a means towards this end.Money fines thus take on a totally different meaning from the former monetary compensation for wounding and killing.They are not supposed to compensate for the damage done，but to inflict pain upon the culprit.Hence modem law，in cases of insolvency，replaces it with imprisonment which not only brings in no money to the State but also requires considerable expense by the State.In so far as fines are imposed because of the subjective reflexes with which the criminal experiences them，fines can，in fact，produce an individual trait that is alien to money as such.This trait is documented by some qualities that make fines superior to other kinds of punishment：it can be well graded，it can be completely cancelled；and it does not，as did imprisonment or even mutilation in former times，paralyse or reduce the labour power of the delinquent，but rather encourages the delinquent to make up for the loss.This personal element that accrues to money fines，however，does not have very far-reaching effects，if they are intended to cause pain and be more than just a substitute for it.This is illustrated，for example，by the fact that nowadays being sentenced to pay the highest possible fine does not endanger the social position of the person it is inflicted upon as much as does even the shortest imprisonment.Only where self-respect is not yet highly developed，as for instance，among the Russian peasantry，is corporal punishment preferred over the fine by the criminal himself.The weakness of the personal element in money fines is further displayed in the fact that-at least as it has been dealt with so far-its basic gradation is not at all adjusted to actual individual circumstances.The law generally sets lower and upper limits to fines，but there is no doubt that the minimum is a much harsher punishment for the very poor than is the maximum for the very rich.Whereas，because of a line of one mark，the very poor person perhaps has to go hungry for one day，a fine of several thousand marks to which the very rich person may be sentenced does not impose the slightest deprivation upon him.In the one case，the subjective purpose of the punishment is exaggerated and in the other it is not accomplished at all.In order to attain a more effective individualization of fines，it has therefore been suggested that the law should not set definite limits to money fines at all，but rather percentage amounts of the guilty person's income.However，it has rightly been objected that the punishment of a minor violation of the law would be several thousands for a multi-millionaire，which would undoubtedly be considered to be objectively disproportionate to the offence.This internal contrad-iction in the attempt to achieve a genuine individualization of fines，which seems desirable in the light of major differences in standards of living，illustrates how much lower its subjective suitability is for a highly developed economic culture with pronounced differences of wealth than for more primitive and equitable conditions.Finally，it must be emphasized that fines are completely inadequate where only man's innermost relationships are concerned-from the seventh century onwards penance could be absolved in money.The Church had taken over a large part of the administration of criminal law which was really the State's domain，and the traveling bishop as a judge punished the sinner from the viewpoint of the violated divine order.Therefore，the moral improvement of the soul ，the turning away from sinful pursuits，was the real intention of the punishment and was based on a deep-seated and effective tendency in religious morality.This resulted in the paradox that the positive moral obligation of man lay in gaining his own salvation，whereas secular morality transposes its final goal out of the self and on to the other person and his condition.As a result of this tendency to internalize and individualize punishment，even crimes such as murder and perjury were punished by penance through fasting.But，as noted above，these religious punishments could very soon be absolved by the payment of money.That such payment was later considered to he totally insufficient and inappropriate penance testifies not against but in favour of the growing importance of money.It is precisely because money represents the value of incommensurable things and has become more colorless and indifferent that it cannot be used as an equivalent in very special and uncommon conditions where the innermost and most basic aspects of the person are concerned.This is not in spite of the fact that one can obtain almost anything for money，rather，it is precisely for this reason that money was no longer used to settle the moral-religious demands upon which religious penance rested.The increasing valuation of the human soul with its uniqueness and individuality meets with the opposite trend in the development of money and in so doing accelerates and secures the abolition of penance as a fine.Money first attains the quality of cool indifference and complete abstractness in relation to all specific values to the extent that it becomes the equivalent of increasingly diverse objects.As long as the objects that may he acquired by money are limited in number，and as long as an essential part of economic values is excluded from being purchasable（as was the case，for example，with landed property over very long periods），money itself retains a more specific character and is not yet indifferent to either side.Under primitive circumstances，money may even possess the exact opposite quality of its real nature，namely sacred dignity，the quality of an exceptional value.I refer to the strict norms mentioned earlier which reserved certain kinds of money exclusively for important or ceremonial transactions，and specifically to evidence from the Caroline Islands.The islanders，it appears，do not need any money to support themselves because they all are self-sufficient.And yet money plays a significant role，because the acquisition of a wife，membership of the local state and the political significance of the community are all dependent upon the ownership of money.From such circumstances we can understand why money is not as common there as in our society in which it satisfies the lower needs rather than the higher ones.Certainly，the merely quantitative fact that there is not yet enough money to slip continuously through one's fingers delays-during periods of production for one's own requirements-the emergence of its prevalence and its precision.Therefore，it seems more apt to serve as a satisfactory equivalent for extraordinary objects such as human life.The progressive differentiation of people and the equally progressive indifference of money combine to make expiation for murder and other serious crimes by money completely impossible.

The Increasing Inadequacy Of Money

It is interesting to note that awareness of this intrinsic inadequacy of money is aroused at a very early stage.In the earliest periods of Jewish history，when money was already used in exchange for women and for atonement，contributions to the temple always had to be delivered in kind.Whoever，because of his remoteness from the shrine，brought his tithe in money had to exchange it again into commodities at the appropriate place.Similarly，in Delos，the ancient sacred shrine，the ox remained for a long time the standard unit of monetary value.Among the medieval journeymen's associations，the older，church-related brotherhoods imposed punishments for specific offences in terms of wax（for holy candles）；the secular associations，on the other hand，imposed punishments mostly in money.In the same vein is the ancient Hebrew regulation that stolen domestic animals have to be replaced in duplicate，but if they are no longer available they have to be paid for in money four or five times their value.Only a disproportionately inflated fine could substitute for the replacement of the original goods.Long after cattle money in Italy had been replaced by metal coinage，fines were still calculated，at least formally，in terms of cattle.Among the Czechs，where cattle had originally been the medium of exchange，they continued to serve for a long time later as the standard for penance for murder.The same kind of phenomenon was found among the Californian Indians，where，even after shell money had been taken out of circulation，it remained the gift to the dead for the Happy Hunting Grounds.The religious flavour of atonement or payment as a whole in its archaic form already at this stage of development takes current money to be inadequate for the sacredness of the events.It leads to the same debasement of money as the contrary movement mentioned earlier，and at a later stage it further severs the value of man from the value of money，thereby producing one of the most important factors in the development of the importance of money.

I want to mention here just one more manifestation of this trend.The medieval prohibitions upon taking interest rest on the assumption that money is not a commodity.On the contrary，money was considered to be inflexible or unproductive and therefore it was deemed a sin to demand a price for its use as one would for the use of a commodity.During the very same period，however，it was considered not in the least sinful to treat a person as a commodity.If one compares this standpoint with the practical and theoretical notions of modem times，then it becomes clear how the concepts of money and of man move continuously in exactly opposite directions；the oppositeness of the directions remains the same，however，whether the concepts，with reference to a specific problem，develop towards or away from each other.

The dissociation of the value of the person from the value of money which is expressed in the down-grading of fines to the most minor offences is itself counteracted by another tendency.The legal retribution for injustice and injury that one person inflicts upon another becomes more and more restricted to cases in which the interest of the victim is expressible in money terms.If we survey the sequences in the stages of culture，then it will be seen to be less frequent at a lower level than at a higher one，and here again less than at the next higher one.This is especially noticeable in urban life，where circumstances ascribe considerably greater importance to money than do rural circumstances in those instances in which the general level of both remains relatively low.In modem Arabia，for instance，the vendetta prevails amongst desert-dwellers，whereas wergild is paid in the cities.In urban areas dominated by economic interests，the value of a human being is more likely to be interpreted in terms of a sum of money.This culminates in a situation in which damage measured in money terms is granted a specific claim to expiation by criminal law.The concept of fraud which could be clearly defined only in a social order based on money，illustrates this point very clearly.German criminal law recognizes an act to be criminal fraud only if somebody misrepresents the facts‘with the intention of procuring an illegal advantage for himself or somebody else，.There are only two or，at most，three other cases in which German law punishes the misrepresentation of facts and in which individual damage inflicted upon a person is the grounds for punishment-the seduction of a girl by the promise of marriage，marriage with fraudulent concealment of impediment to marriage，and the intentionally false denunciation.In all other instances where fraudulent cases are threatened with punishment，the damage is done not to the individual but to the interests of the State-perjury，falsification of elections，false excuses by witnesses and jurors，giving wrong names and titles to proper officials，etc.Even in these instances involving the interests of the State，the punishment in general，or its amount，is often dependent upon the fact that the culprit was motivated by an economic interest.Thus，the falsification of passports，work rosters，etc.，are subject to punishment where they are falsified for reasons of‘improving one's position’.Typical in this respect is the fact that the falsification of personal status（substitution of a child，etc.）is punished by a prison sentence of up to three years，but‘if the action was done for reasons of economic profitJ，with imprisonment of up to ten ears.Even though the substitution of a child may undoubtedly occur for more immoral and criminal reasons than economic profit，so that the worst criminal receives less punishment because he has no money interest，it none the less generally remains true that numerous fraudulent misrepresentations may destroy people's happiness，honour and belongings without ever being punished unless the swindler attempts to gain a‘pecuniary advantage’.In that financial interests are involved from the outset in the concept of fraud，this gives to penal practice the simplicity and clarity that is inherent in the reduction to money，but at the price of leaving the sense of justice very much unsatisfied.Out of the whole group of damages that may be inflicted by fraud，only that which can be expressed in money is subject to criminal prosecution and is thus specified as the one that requires expiation from the standpoint of the social order.Since it must be the intention of the law to punish every fraudulent destruction of personal values，this can be based only on the assumption that all such destructible values possess a money equivalent.The concept of wergild is again relevant here，though in a rudimentary form.If a negation of a personal value can be compensated for by giving money to the injured party，then it must be presupposed that this value can be reduced to money.None the less，modem criminal law rejects the conclusion that fraudulent damage is sufficiently expiated by the exchange of money；yet with reference to the object of the act，the notion prevails that any fraudulently acquired value may be represented by a sum of money.

Just as the need for greater explicitness in legal norms has led to the enormous restriction of personal values that can be protected against fraud to those expressible in money terms while the other values are reduced to negligible quantities，so the same need leads to corresponding regulations in civil law.Breach of promise and chicanery which may involve someone in considerable inconvenience and losses are，according to German law，no basis for a claim by the injured party unless the money value of the damage can be proven.I need mention here only some cases pointed out by lawyers themselves：the landlord who does not permit the tenant to use the garden despite his contractual right to do so，the traveller to whom the hotel owner refuses lodging despite written assent，the school principal with whom the teacher breaks his contract without being able to secure a substitute.All these people，although their claim to compensation is as clear as daylight，cannot raise this claim because the damage cannot be equated with a specific amount of money.Who could demonstrate the precise money equivalent of these subjective and objective inconveniences and impairments？If such a proof is not given，then the damages in question are only negligible quantities to the judge；they do not exist as far as he is concerned.In a tremendous number of instances in life the injured party has no rights at all；he has neither the moral satisfaction of seeing the person responsible for the damage prosecuted by the law nor the economic satisfaction of being compensated for his losses and his troubles.It must be emphasized once more that the presumption of the law is to secure all individuals’possessions against illegal damage，but this assurance does not include a whole series of goods whose value cannot be realized in money terms.It follows that the whole of this legal interpretation is based on the assumption that all personal goods do possess a money equivalent，with the obvious exception of the inviolability of the body and，in some respects，of matrimony which are also guaranteed by law.The extraordinary simplification and uniformity of the legal system which this reduction to money interests implies has，in association with its actual domination，led to the fiction of the autocratic rule of money-a fiction that also corresponds to the peculiar practical indifference towards those values that cannot be expressed in money terms，even though they are theoretically recognized to be the highest values.

It is interesting to observe how Roman law，in its middle period，took the opposite view in this respect.Monetary conviction，the same as was established in civil suits，was a penalty that went beyond the value of the object and was awarded to the injured party in order to compensate him for the particular insidiousness or malice from which he had to suffer by the defendant.The deposit that had been malevolently denied，the money held in trust for a ward by the guardian and similar obligations，were not simply refunded；in addition the judge，and under certain circumstances the plaintill，was entitled to determine compensation not only for the objective damage directly equivalent to a certain amount of money，but for malevolent violation of the personal legal sphere as a whole.Such regulations reflect the feeling that the personal values that the law is supposed to guarantee are not confined to the money value of the object.Rather，their violation requires a penalty over and above that.At the same time，however，this expiation is achieved by offering a certain amount of money，so that the damage that extends beyond the objective money interest is made good by money.In the one instance，money here plays a lesser role，but in the other a more important one，than is the case today.For that very reason，the present situation displays a combination of both of those typical tendencies that modem culture imposes upon the function of money.On the one hand，it gives money an importance that，as it were，makes it the world soul of the universe of practical interests and which，in continuing its motion beyond its proper limits，stifles personal values as well.On the other hand，however，modem culture distances money from these personal values，makes its significance less and less compatible with all that is really personal，and suppresses the assertion of personal values rather than accept such an inadequate equivalent.Our sense of justice is less satisfied by the momentary effect of the concurrence of these two tendencies than it was in the Roman period，but this should not prevent us from being aware that we are concerned here with the combination of much more advanced cultural tendencies that reflect the antagonism and the irreconcilability of their directions in the insufficiency and low standards of some phenomena in which they are both simultaneously effective.

Marriage By Purchase

There are some analogies to the earlier state of affairs in which the whole person was compensated for by money in the particular development connected with the monetary purchase of women.Marriage by purchase，its extraordinary frequency in the history of civilized nations and today in less civilized countries，the extent of its variations and forms are all well known.We are interested here only in the conclusions that can be drawn from the facts as to the nature of values that are purchased.The feeling of degradation that modem man possesses concerning the purchase of a person for money or money equivalents is not always justified with reference to earlier historical circumstances.We have seen that，as long as the person has elevated himself above his species kind，and as long as money value has not yet been generalized into a completely colorless entity，both，as it were，stand in close proximity to one another；and the personal dignity of the early Germans certainly did not suffer from the fact that they permitted its value to be expressed in wergild. Marriage by purchase is a similar case.Ethnological data show that marriage by purchase is neither solely nor chiefly to be found only at the lowest stages of cultural development.One of the best experts in this area states that the uncivilized peoples who are unfamiliar with marriage by purchase are usually extraordinarily barbarous races.No matter how degrading the purchase of women may appear to be in higher cultures，it may enhance women's status under primitive conditions for two reasons.In the first place，marriage by purchase never occurs-as far as we knowin any kind of individualistic economy.Even at the very lowest level of culture，marriage by purchase is tied to rigid forms and formulas，consideration of family interests，exact conventions about the kind and amount of payment.The whole way in which it is carried out has a definite social character.This is evident from the fact that the groom is often entitled to demand a contribution to the price of the bride from each clansman and that this is often distributed among the bride's relatives-just as among the Arabs，for example，the expiation money for a murder was collected from the whole tribe，from the clanship of the murderer.Among one Indian tribe，the suitor who has only half the necessary price for the bride is entitled to a‘partial marriage’；that is，instead of taking the woman as slave in his own house he must live in her house until he has paid in full.In many instances in which patriarchal and matriarchal conditions coexist the patriarchal form is valid only after payment of the price for the bride，while the poor man has to accept the matriarchal form.There is no doubt that this businesslike attitude completely suppresses the individuality of the persons and their relationships.And yet the organization of marriage affairs as found in marriage by purchase signifies considerable progress when compared with the more brutal conditions of marriage by robbery or of completely primitive sexual relationships which，although not completely promiscuous，were none the less probably carried out without that stabilizing norm that was supplied in the socially regulated purchase of a wife.Time and time again，the development of mankind reaches stages at which the suppression of individuality is the unavoidable transitional point for its subsequent free development，at which the mere externality of the determinations of life favors spiritual growth，at which oppressive formation results in a reservoir of forces that later emerge as personal quality.Viewed from the ideal of fully developed individuality，such periods certainly appear to be brutal and undignified.However，they not only plant the positive germs of later higher development，but are in themselves manifestations of the spirit in its organizing control of the material of fluctuating impulses，activities of specifically human expediency that creates for itself，no matter how brutal，extraneous，or even stupid，the norms of life instead of merely receiving them from natural forces.Nowadays there are extreme individualists who are none the less in practice adherents of socialism because they consider socialism to be the indispensable preparation and even the severe training for a purified and just individualism.Thus the relatively stable order and external standardization of marriage by purchase was a first，very violent and eminently nonindividual，attempt to give a certain mould to the marriage relationship which was just as appropriate for primitive stages as the more individualistic marital form is for more highly developed stages.The importance of marriage for social cohesion is already indicated by the exchange of women，which，as a barteragreement，might be considered a preparatory stage to the purchase of women.Among the Australian Narinyeri，marriage is conducted by the exchange of the sisters of two men.If，instead of this arrangement，one of the girls elopes with a lover，then not only is she considered to be socially inferior，but she also loses the claim for protection which the clan into which she was born otherwise owes her.This clearly illustrates the social significance of this non-individual type of marriage.The clan no longer protects the girl；it severs its relationship with her because it has not received an equivalent for her.

Marriage By Purchase And The Value Of Women

The transition to the second culturally advanced motive for marriage by purchase commences here.The fact that women are useful objects of possession，that their acquisition requires sacrifices，ultimately makes them appear to be valuable.It has been stated that possession universally engenders love of possessing.One not only makes sacrifices for what one loves，but also one loves that for which one has made sacrifices.If motherly love is the source of innumerable sacrifices for the children，then so too the trouble and worries that the mother endures for the child form an ever closer bond with the child.This explains why sick or handicapped children，who require the greatest devotion on the part of the mother，are often the most beloved ones.The Church has never hesitated to demand the greatest sacrifices for the love of God，since it was well aware that we become all the more closely tied to a principle the more sacrifices we have made，the more capital-so to speak-we have invested in it.I lowever much the purchase of women directly expressed their suppression，exploitation and valuation solely as an object，the woman nevertheless gained value both for the parents，who received the purchase price，as well as for the husband，to whom she represented a relatively high sacrifice and who therefore had to treat her considerately in his own interest.Compared with modem standards，her treatment was still miserable enough，and certainly the better aspects of the purchase of women could become so paralyzed by the humiliating aspects that women found themselves in the most wretched and slave-like position.But it remains equally true that the purchase of women has given meaningful and eloquent expression to the fact that women are valuable-and，in the psychological context，not only to the fact that they are purchased because they are valuable，hut that they are valuable because one has to pay for them.Therefore it is understandable that among certain American tribes the giving away of a girl without payment is considered a great deprecation of the girl and her whole family，so much so that their children would be considered to be nothing better than bastards.

Although the purchase of women always implies a tendency towards polygamy and thereby the degradation of women，the necessity of spending money，on the other hand，sets a limit to such trends.The pagan Danish kind Frotho is reported to have legally prohibited the vanquished Ruthenians from contracting any marriages except by the purchase of women.His intention was to suppress lax morals since he saw the purchase of women as a guarantee of stability.Indirectly，by necessarily restricting the polygamous instincts with which it has affinities，the purchase of women must lead to a higher appreciation of the woman owned.Not only is the stability a consequence of appreciation of the wife；but conversely，her valuation is a consequence of the established stability，just as it is the consequence of direct expenses.It is of the utmost importance that the differences in prices-in the socially controlled as well as the free market prices-reflects the difference in value of the women.It is said that the Kaffir women do not consider being sold to be in the least way humiliating.On the contrary，the girl is proud of it，and the more bulls and cows are paid for her the more valuable she considers herself to be.One may frequently notice that a certain category of objects acquires a stronger awareness of value if each single one has to be appraised individually and if considerable differences in prices develop an increasing sense of value.At other levels of evaluation however-as in the case of wergild -the identical nature of the compensation favors the objective significance of the equivalent value.The purchase of women is one of the first，though very crude，methods of emphasizing the individual value of a particular woman and also-according to the psychological rule of valuation the value of women in general.Even when the woman is sold as a slave，the variation in prices is probably much greater than it is for male slaves.The male slave，as a mere working animal，has at the same age about the same conventional price（in ancient Greece and in Ireland equal to three cows），whereas the female slave，who serves purposes other than work，changes in value according to her personal attractiveness-although the impact of this aesthetic factor is not very great among primitive people.In any case，at the lowest stage of development the price is usually fixed by custom，as in the purchase of women among several African tribes.

All these instances strongly underline the fact that a woman is treated as a mere genus，an impersonal object.This is itself，bearing in mind all the qualifications mentioned earlier，the distinguishing feature of marriage by purchase.Therefore among some people，particularly in India，the purchase of women is considered dishonorable，while in other areas it may take place，but the term is avoided and the price paid to the parents is interpreted as a voluntary present.The difference between money proper and other contributions is relevant here.The Laplanders are said to give their daughters away in return for presents，but they consider it improper to take money for them.If one takes account of the other very complicated conditions that determine the position of women，it seems as if purchase for money degrades them more than being given away in return for presents or in return for personal services to their parents on the part of the suitors.The gift contains something more personal-because of the indeterminateness of the gift's value and the individual freedom of choosing，even if governed by conventions than a definite sum of money with its uncompromising objectivity.In addition，the gift builds the bridge to that later form which is the transition to the dowry，where the gifts of the suitor are matched by the gifts of the bride's parents.The unconditional disposal of the woman is thereby broken，because the value that the man has accepted implies a certain obligation and he is now no longer merely the creditor since the other side also has a claim.It has also been asserted that the acquisition of women by labor tasks instead of by direct purchase represents a higher marital form.Nevertheless，it seems that this is the older and uncivilized form which does not rule out the possibility that it is associated with better treatment of women.For the emergent money economy has often worsened the condition of women，just as it has worsened the situation of weaker groups as a whole.Among present-day primitive peoples we sometimes find both forms existing side by side.This proves that there is no essential difference in the treatment of women here although，by and large，the sacrifice of such a personal value as service elevates the acquisition of a woman over that of a slave in a very different manner than purchasing her for money or substantial money value.It must be emphasized here that what is generally true is that the degradation and humiliation of human value decreases if the purchase prices are very high.For money value in very great sums contains an element of rarity which makes it more individual and less interchangeable and thus more appropriate as an equivalent of personal values.Among the Greeks in the heroic period，a bridegroom's gifts to the bride's father-which do not appear to suggest direct purchasing-were quite common，while the position of women was particularly favorable.But it must be emphasized that these gifts were quite considerable.Although it appears degrading if the essence or the whole of a person is made equivalent to a sum of money，an unusually large sum offered may，as later examples clearly demonstrate，somehow counterbalance this，particularly in view of the social position of the person concerned.We know that Edward Ⅱ and Edward Ⅲ gave their friends away as hostages for the repayment of their debts and in 1340 it was planned to send the Archbishop of Canterbury to Brabant-not as a guarantor，but as a pawn for the debts of the King.The size of the respective sums averted the disparagement that would have affected these persons if only a negligible amount of money had been at stake.

Division Of Labour Among The Sexes，And The Dowry

The transition from the principle of marriage by purchase，which was probably prevalent among most peoples at some time，to its opposite，the principle of the dowry，probably evolved when the bridegroom's gifts to the parents were passed on to the bride as a means of providing a certain amount of economic independence.The provision of the woman's dowry by her parents continued to exist and to develop further even after its original basis-the purchase money paid by the suitor-had disappeared.It is not worth while tracing this evolution here，about which we know very little.But it is safe to assume that the general custom of the dowry commences with the emergent money economy.The connections between the two may be as follows.Under primitive conditions，where the purchase of women prevails，the wife is not only a glutton for work-that is also true later onbut also her work is not yet specifically‘domestic’，as is that of the woman in the money economy who has to organize the household consumption of whatever the husband has acquired.The division of labor is not yet sufficiently advanced in such periods.The wife still participates more directly in production and therefore represents a more tangible economic value to her possessor than she does subsequently.This connection has occasionally been confirmed in much more recent times.Whereas Macaulay regarded the performance of agricultural work by women in Scotland as a symptom of the barbaric low position of the female sex，an expert emphasized，in contrast，that it gave them a certain degree of independence and prestige among men.In addition，under primitive circumstances，children possess an immediate economic value for the father，whereas in a more advanced culture they are often an economic burden.The original owner，the father of the clan，has no reason to abandon this value to others without compensation.At this level，not only do women provide their own subsistence，but also the husband may extract her purchase price directly from her work.This situation changes when the economy is no longer based on the family household and consumption is no longer restricted to home production.In this new situation，the household's interests split off in a centrifugal and a centripetal direction.Money makes possible separate production for the market and for the household economy and this separation initiates a more rigorous division of labor between the sexes.For very obvious reasons，the wife takes over the domestic activities and the husband the activities outside the home，the domestic activities becoming more and more an administration and application of the proceeds from the latter.In so doing，the wife's economic value loses，as it were，its substance and its obviousness since she now appears to be supported by the work of her husband.Not only do the grounds for asking and obtaining a price for her disappear，but she becomes-at least from a superficial standpoint-a liability which the husband takes over and has to cope with.Thus the basis is laid for the dowry which will accordingly become more extensive the more the spheres of activity of husband and wife are separated in this way.Among peoples like the Jews，whose men-because of a restless temperament and other reasons-are very mobile and whose women，as a necessary corollary，are more strictly confined to the home，the dowry as a legal requirement was to be found even before the money economy became fully developed，and before it had time to produce the same result.Only the money economy brings together in the sphere of production the objective technology，the spread and wealth of relationships and at the same time the one-sidedness of the division of labour，through which the earlier state of indifference between home interests and interests in acquisition becomes split and a specific representative becomes necessary for each of them.Under these circumstances，there can be no doubt about the roles of husband and wife.Similarly，the price for the bride by which the man purchases the productive capacity of the woman is replaced by the dowry，which compensates for his having to support the wife or which is supposed to give her an independence and security side by side with her productive husband.

The Typical Relation Between Money And Prostitution

This close connection between the dowry in the money economy and the whole constitution of married life-be it to secure the husband 's or the wife's position-serves to explain the fact that in Greece as well as in Rome the dowry became the distinguishing attribute of the legitimate wife in contrast to the concubine，who had no further claim on the husband so that both compensation for her as well as security measures for her would be out of place.This leads on to the problem of prostitution，which places the significance of money in the relationship between the sexes in yet another light.Whereas all the gifts of the man for or to the wife-including the dowry and the pretium virgiuitatis- may take the form of a gift in kind or in money，the price paid for sexual relations outside marriage usually takes the form of money.Only a monetary transaction corresponds to the character of a completely fleeting inconsequential relationship as is the case with prostitution.The relationship is more completely dissolved and more radically terminated by payment of money than by the gift of a specific object，which always，through its content，its choice and its use，retains an element of the person who has given it.Only money，which does not imply any commitment，and which in principle is always at hand and welcomed，is the appropriate equivalent to the fleetingly intensified and just as fleetingly extinguished sexual appetite that is served by prostitution.Money is never an adequate mediator of personal relationships-such as the genuine love relationship，however abruptly it may be broken off-that are intended to be permanent and based on the sincerity of the binding forces.Money best serves，both objectively and symbolically，that purchasable satisfaction which rejects any relationship that continues beyond the momentary sexual impulse，because it is absolutely detached from the person and completely cuts off from the outset any further consequences.In as far as one pays with money，one is completely finished with any object just as fundamentally as when one has paid for satisfaction from a prostitute.Since in prostitution the relationship between the sexes is quite specifically confined to the sexual act，it is reduced to its purely generic content.It consists of what any member of the species can perform and experience.It is a relationship in which the most contrasting personalities are equal and individual differences are eliminated.Thus，the economic counterpart of this kind of relationship is money，which also，transcending all individual distinctions，stands for the speciestype of economic values，the representation of which is common to all individual values.Conversely，we experience in the nature of money itself something of the essence of prostitution.The indifference as to its use，the lack of attachment to any individual because it is unrelated to any of them，the objectivity inherent in money as a mere means which excludes any emotional relationship-all this produces an ominous analogy between money and prostitution.Kant's moral imperative never to use human beings as a mere means but to accept and treat them always，at the same time，as ends in themselves is blatantly disregarded by both parties in the case of prostitution.Of all human relationships，prostitution is perhaps the most striking instance of mutual degradation to a mere means，and this may be the strongest and most fundamental factor that places prostitution in such a close historical relationship to the money economy，the economy of‘means’in the strictest sense.

This is the basis for the fact that the terrible degradation that is inherent in prostitution is most clearly expressed by its money equivalent.It certainly signifies the nadir of human dignity if a woman surrenders her most intimate and most personal quality，which should beoffered only on the basis of a genuine personal impulse and also only with equal personal devotion on the part of the male-in so far as this might have a different importance for the man compared with the woman-for a totally impersonal，purely extraneous and objective compensation.We experience here the fullest and most distressing incongruity between giving and taking.More accurately，we can say that the degradation of prostitution lies in the fact that it so degrades a woman's most personal possession，one that is dependent upon the greatest reserve，that the most neutral value devoid of all personal qualities is considered to be an appropriate equivalent.The foregoing characterization of prostitution in terms of money payment leads，however，to certain contradictory considerations which have to be explored in order to place the significance of money into full relief.

There seems to be an inconsistency in emphasizing，on the one hand，the personal，intimately individual nature of the sexual surrender of a woman and on the other the fact that the merely sensual relationship between the sexes is of a generic character and that it is something we have in common with the animal kingdom in which the personality and individual inner feelings are extinguished.If men are so inclined to speak of women‘in the plural’，to judge them by lumping them all together in the same pot，then one of the reasons is certainly that the men of crude sensuality are interested in a quality of women that is identical for the seamstress and the princess.Thus，it seems out of the question to find a specifically personal value in this function.All the other functions of a similar level of generality，such as eating，drinking，the regular physiological and even psychological reactions，the instinct of self-preservation and the typical logical functions，are never strongly entwined with the personality as such.One is never inclined to imagine that the practice or presentation of what is indistinguishably common to all men would express or exhaust his innermost，essential and comprehensive nature.Yet such an anomaly does exist with regard to the sexual surrender of women.This completely general act that is identical for people of all strata is experienced，at the same time-at least for the woman-as an extremely personal and intimate one.This anomaly may be understood on the basis of the opinion that women as a whole are more deeply rooted in the species type than are men，who are more greatly differentiated and more specifically individualized.It would follow from this view that the species and the personal elements coincide more readily in women.If，in fact，women are more closely and more deeply rooted in the dark primitive forces of nature than are men，then their most essential and personal qualities must also be rooted in those natural，universal functions that guarantee the uniformity of the genus.Furthermore，it follows that the uniformity of the female sex，in whom the general qualities are less clearly distinguished from individual traits，is also reflected in a greater uniformity in the nature of each individual woman.Experience seems to confirm that the various forces，qualities and impulses of the woman are more directly and closely connected with each other than are those of men，whose qualities are more independent，so that the development and fate of each are relatively independent.Women，however-at least according to general opinion-live under the sign of all or nothing；their inclinations and actions are more closely associated and it is easier，commencing from a single point，to arouse the whole of their being，with all its emotions，volitions and thoughts.If this is indeed the case，then there is a certain justification in the supposition that a woman gives herself up more completely and unreservedly by surrendering this one part of her self than does the more differentiated man under the same circumstances.The significance of this difference for both is already evident at a more harmless stage of the relationship between man and woman.Even primitive peoples request a different payment for the bridegroom and the bride respectively for dissolving an engagement.Among the Bakaks，for example，she has to pay 5 and he to guilders，while among the inhabitants of Bengkula the disloyal bridegroom pays 40，the bride only to guilders.The significance and the consequences that society attaches to the sexual relations between man and woman are correspondingly based on the presupposition that the woman gives her total self，with all its worth，whereas the man gives only a part of his personality in the exchange.Society therefore denies to a girl who has once gone astray her whole‘reputation’；society condemns the adultery of the wife much more harshly than that of the husband，of whom it is supposed that an occasional sexual extravagancy is still reconcilable with loyalty to his wife in all its inner and essential elements；society irredeemably renders the prostitute déclassé ，while the worst rake can，as it were，still save himself from the morass by other facets of his personality and can rise to any social position.The purely sexual act that is at issue in prostitution employs only a minimum of the man's ego but a maximum of the woman's-if not in every particular case，then certainly taking all cases together.This relationship explains the role of the pimp as well as the frequently reported cases of lesbianism among prostitutes.Because the prostitute has to endure a terrible void and lack of satisfaction in her relations with men，she searches for a substitute relationship in which at least some other qualities of the partner are involved.Neither the notion that the sexual act is something universal and impersonal，nor the fact that，on the face of it，men and women are equally involved in it changes this relationship in which the stake of the woman is infinitely more personal，more essential，encompassing more of her ego than that of the man and for which，therefore，a money equivalent is most unsuitable and inadequate，the giving and taking of which means the extreme abasement of the female personality.The degradation of the woman by prostitution is not in itself explained by its polyandric character，or by the fact that she has sexual relationships with many men.Genuine polyandry often gives a decisive superiority to the woman as，for instance，among the relatively highcaste Nayars in India.What is important here is not that prostitution means polyandry，but that it means polygamy，which degrades the personal value of women and causes the woman to lose her scarcity value.Viewed superficially，prostitution combines polyandric with polygamic features.But the advantage of the person who gives the money over the person who provides the commodity grants a tremendous superiority to the male and determines the character of prostitution as polygamous.Women consider it embarrassing and degrading to take money from their lover under circumstances that have nothing to do with prostitution，whereas this feeling often does not extend to non-monetary presents.On the contrary，women find pleasure and satisfaction in giving money to their lovers.It has been said that the reason for Marlborough's success with women was that he accepted money from them.The superiority of whoever gives over whoever takes money，which in the case of prostitution has brought about the most terrible social distance，gives to the woman in these contrary instances the satisfaction of imposing dependency upon those whom she would otherwise consider her superiors.

But we are confronted with the remarkable fact that in many primitive cultures prostitution is not considered to be humiliating or socially degrading.For instance，it is reported that in ancient Asia the girls of all classes prostituted themselves in order to obtain a dowry or an offering for the temple，and we hear of the same custom being practiced for reasons of marriage among certain African tribes.The girls，often including the prince's daughter，do not lose their reputation in the eyes of the public，nor is there subsequently any prejudice against them in their later married life.This profound difference from our own feelings indicates that the two factors-women's sexual honour and money-are basically related in a different way.Prostitution in our culture is characterized by an unbridgeable gulf，by the total incommensurability of these two values；but under circumstances that develop a different view of prostitution，they must be closer to each other.This is similar to the results of the development of wergild ，the money atonement for homicide.The rising value of human life and the declining value of money conspired to render wergild impossible.The same cultural process of differentiation that gives to the individual a special significance which renders him relatively unique and irreplaceable makes money the standard and equivalent of such a divergent range of objects that the growing indifference and objectivity makes it increasingly less suitable as an equivalent of personal values.That disproportion between commodity and price that gives prostitution its character in our culture does not yet exist to the same extent in lower cultures.When travellers report that the women of many barbaric tribes display a striking physical and often mental similarity to men，then this is because they lack that differentiation which lends a value to the more highly civilized woman and to her sexual honour that cannot be compensated for in money terms，even though she may appear comparatively less differentiated and closer to the species type than a man of the same status.The attitude towards prostitution thus undergoes the same changes which may be observed in ecclesiastical penance and in blood money.In primitive epochs，man and his inner values do not yet bear the mark of individuality，whereas money，because of its scarcity and its limited use，possesses a relatively more unique value.In so far as cultural development rends both of these positions asunder，it thus renders the compensation of the one by the other impossible or-where that relationship persists，as in prostitution-it leads to a terrible degradation of personal value.

Marriage For Money

Of the great variety of opinions concerning‘marriage for money？，the following three are important with reference to the development of the importance of money.Marriages based exclusively upon economic motives have not only existed in all periods and at all stages of development，but are particularly common among primitive groups and conditions where they do not cause any offence at all.The disparagement of personal dignity that nowadays arises in every marriage that is not based on personal affection-so that a sense of decency requires the concealment of economic motives-does not exist in simpler cultures.The reason for this development is that increasing individualization makes it increasingly contradictory and discreditable to enter into purely individual relationships for other than purely individual reasons.For nowadays the choice of a partner in marriage is no longer determined by social motives（though regard for the offspring may be considered to be such a motive），but rather pertains to the personal and inner directed part of the relationship，in so far as society does not insist upon the couple's equal social status-a condition，however，that provides a great deal of latitude and only rarely leads to conflicts between individual and social interests.In a quite undifferentiated society it may be relatively irrelevant who marries whom，irrelevant not only for the mutual relationship off the couple but also for the offspring.This is because where the constitutions，state of health，temperament，internal and external forms of life and orientations are largely the same within the group，the chance that the children will turn out well depends less upon whether the parents agree and complement each other than it does in a highly differentiated society.It therefore seems quite natural and expedient that the choice of the partner should be determined by reasons other than purely individual affection.Yet personal attraction should be decisive in a highly individualized society where a harmonious relationship between two individuals becomes increasingly rare.The declining frequency of marriage which is to be found everywhere in highly civilized cultural circumstances is undoubtedly due，in part，to the fact that highly differentiated people in general have difficulty in finding a completely sympathetic complement to themselves.Yet we do not possess any other criterion and indication for the advisability of marriage except mutual instinctive attraction.But happiness is a purely personal matter，decided upon entirely by the couple themselves，and there would be no compelling reason for the official insistence on at least pretending love as the sole erotic motive for marriage it society did not have an interest in it regarding its advisability for the descendants.No matter how much love may be misleading-particularly in the higher strata，whose complicated circumstances often retard the growth of the purest instincts-and no matter how much other conditions may affect the final result，it remains true that，with reference to procreation，love is decidedly superior to money as a factor of selection.In fact，in this respect，it is the only right and proper thing.Marriage for money directly creates a situation of panmixia-the indiscriminate pairing regardless of individual qualities-a condition that biology has demonstated to be the cause of the most direct and detrimental degeneration of the human species.In the case of marriage for money，the union of a couple is determined by a factor that has absolutely nothing to do with racial appropriateness-just as the regard for money often enough keeps apart a couple who really belong together-and it should be considered as a factor in degeneration to the same extent to which the undoubted differentiation of individuals makes selection by personal attraction more and more important.This case too illustrates once more that the increasing individualization within society renders money increasingly unsuitable as a mediator of purely individual relationships.

The second view of marriage for money is that it is a variation on prostitution，in a different form but subject to the same observations as on prostitution.This view holds that it is polyandric just as much as it is polygamic but because of the social superiority of the male only the consequences of the polygamous clement，the degradation of the female，takes effect in marriage for money.Thus it seems as if marriage for money，as a means of permanently prostituting oneself，would degrade either partner that is motivated by money，regardless of whether they were male or female.However，this is usually not the case.The woman，by marrying，submits the whole of her interests and energies to this relationship most of the time and offers her personality，both the centre and the periphery，without reservation.In contrast，the married man is from the outset customarily granted much greater freedom of movement while in addition withholding the essential part of his personality that is taken up by his professional interests.In accordance with the relationship that exists between the sexes in our culture，the man who marries for money does not give away as much as the woman who marries for the same reasons.Since she belongs to her husband more than he belongs to her，it is more fatal for her to enter into a marriage relationship without love.I am inclined to believe-and empirical material must be replaced by psychological interpretation here-that marriage for money has more tragic consequences，particularly where sensitive natures are concerned，if it is the woman who is bought.Here，as in many other instances，the characteristic quality of money relations is displayed，namely that the potential superiority of one party leads to the radical exploitation and even aggravation of the other.Such，in fact，is the tendency in every relationship of this kind.The position of the primus inter pares very easily becomes that of a simple primus； the advantage once gained in any sphere forms the stage for a further advantage that heightens the contrast；again，a privileged position is often the easier achieved the higher the initial rank.In brief，positions of superiority usually develop in growing proportions，and the‘accumulation of capital’as an instrument of power is but a particular instance of a very general norm that is valid in many other non-economic spheres of power.There are，however，certain reservations and counterbalancing forces that set limits to the avalanche-like growth of superior power，such as，for example，tradition，reverence，law and the inherent limits to the expansion of power.But money，with its absolute flexibility and lack of quality，is least suited to put a stop to such a trend.Where a relationship based on money interests exists in which superiority and advantage rest from the outset on one side，these tendencies may grow further，more radically and more thoroughly in this direction，as if other motives of a more objective and objectifying nature are the basis for this relationship.

The third view of marriage for money is very clearly illustrated by that very peculiar phenomenon-the advertisement for a marriage partner.The fact that it plays a very small role that is limited to the middle classes might appear strange and regrettable.For despite the individualization of the modem personality which we mentioned earlier，and despite the resultant difficulties in choosing a partner，there is undoubtedly a partner of the opposite sex for everybody-no matter how unique-a partner who has complementary qualities and who would be the‘right’partner.The whole difficulty，however，lies in how the two people who are，so to speak，predestined for each other manage to find each other.The tragic absurdity of the human lot is nowhere better illustrated than by the remaining single or by the unhappy marriage of two estranged people，who cannot make one another happy because they did not learn to understand each other.There is little doubt that the proper use of marriage advertisements would rationalize these conditions based on chance.Advertising in general is one of the most powerful cultural factors because it provides the individual with an infinitely higher chance of achieving satisfaction than if he were to depend upon the chance of finding the object directly.It is the increasing degree of individualization of needs themselves that makes advertising necessary as a means of enlarging the range of offers.Yet，particularly in the stratum of more differentiated people，who，generally speaking，seem to be the most dependent on it，advertising for marriage is completely out of the question.There must be a positive reason for such a repudiation of this means of finding a partner.In analysing the published marriage advertisements one discovers that the financial status of both parties is the real，though sometimes disguised，centre of interest.This is quite logical.All other qualities of the person cannot be stated in an advertisement with any degree of accuracy.Neither the outward appearance nor the character，neither the degree of affability nor the intelligence can be described in such a way that a clear picture emerges which will incite a direct individual interest.The only factor that can be given with complete exactness in all cases is the financial situation of the persons concerned and it is a basic trait of the human imagination to consider that quality of an object among others to be the most decisive that can be stated and recognized with the greatest exactitude and precision.This peculiar，as it were，methodological merit of money ownership really renders the marriage advertisement impossible for precisely those social strata who would need it most，because it implies the admittance of mere money interests.

With regard to prostitution we find that，beyond a certain quantity，money loses its dignity and ability to be the equivalent of individual values.The abhorrence that modem‘good’society entertains towards the prostitute is more pronounced the more miserable and the poorer she is，and it declines with the increase in the price for her services，to the point at which even the actress whom everybody knows is kept by a millionaire is considered presentable in their salons，although she may be much more extortionate，fraudulent and depraved than many a streetwalker.This is also the result of the general attitude of allowing the really big thieves to go free and of hanging the small ones，and of the fact that the big success engenders a certain respect relatively independently of its sphere and content.Yet the basic and more fundamental reason is that the exorbitant price saves the object for sale from the degradation that would otherwise be part of the fact of being offered for sale.Zola，in one of his stories of the Second Empire，tells of the wife of a man in a high position who was generally known to be worth 100，000-200，000 francs.Zola narrates an incident，which must be based on historical fact，in which not only did this woman herself move in the highest social circles，but where to be known as her lover ensured a man an outstanding reputation within this society.The courtesan who sells herself for a very high price thereby acquires a‘scarcity value’.For not only do scarce objects have a high price，but so also do those whose value is determined by any other reason，even if it is only a fashionable whim.As with many other commodities，the favours of some courtesans are greatly appreciated and in great demand only because they have the courage to ask quite extraordinary prices.There must be a similar basis for English legal judgment when it grants money compensation to a husband whose wife has been seduced.There is nothing that more contradicts our feelings than this procedure which reduces the husband to being his wife's procurer.Yet these fines are extraordinarily high.I know of a case in which the wife had intercourse with several men and each of them was sentenced to pay compensation of 50，000 marks to the husband.It seems as if here too one tries to compensate through the size of the sum for the baseness of the principle of making amends for such values by money.It may also have been that，in a rather naive way，one wishes to express respect for the husband's social position by the size of the sum.Certainly，the author of the Junius letters reproaches a judge that，in a law suit concerning a prince and the wife of a lord，he had not taken the status of the offended husband into account when assessing the compensation.

Bribery

The significance of this viewpoint is shown most clearly in instances of the‘purchase’of a person in the commonly accepted sense of the word，namely in bribery.I wish to discuss this phenomenon in its specific monetary form.There is，in a certain sense，a justification for this if it concerns persons in relatively comfortable economic circumstances.Here one assumes that the mind that is unable to resist a small temptation must be particularly niggardly and weak，whereas to succumb to a large temptation may happen to a stronger mind as well！Similarly，bribery-that is the purchase of office or assurances-is judged to be so much more contemptible if it is carried out for small amounts.Thus，bribery is in tact interpreted as the purchase of a person according to whether he is‘unpurchaseable’，expensive or cheap.The justice of the social evaluation seems to be guaranteed here，since it is only the reflection of the self-evaluation of the subjects concerned.The strange dignity that the person open to bribery uses to preserve or at least hide his position originates in bribery's relationship to the whole person.It is reflected either in his being inaccessible to smaller sums or（where even this does not exist）in a certain grandeur，a strictness and superiority of behaviour which seems to reduce the giver to the role of the receiver.Such external behaviour is supposed to present the person as someone who is unassailable and aware of his own value.Inasmuch as it is a charade-since the other party enters into compliance with it by tacit agreement-it provides a certain inner reflex and protects the bribable person against selfnegation and self-devaluation which would result from his sacrificing his personality for a certain amount of money.Among the ancient Jews，and often in the Orient even today，such buying and selling is carried out by exchanging civilities as if the buyer were taking the object as a present.The peculiar dignity of the oriental would appear to favour hiding a genuine interest in money，even in the case of such legitimate transactions.

Such an attitude among bribable persons and in the whole phenomenon of bribery as such is most readily facilitated and encouraged to spread through the money form itself.Money，more than any other form of value，makes possible the secrecy，invisibility and silence of exchange.By compressing money into a piece of paper，by letting it glide into a person's hand，one can make him a wealthy person.Money's formlessness and abstractness makes it possible to invest it in the most varied and most remote values and thereby to remove it completely from the gaze of neighbours.Its anonymity and colorlessness does not reveal the source from which it came to the present owner：it does not have a certificate of origin in the way in which，more or less disguised，many concrete objects of possession do.Whereas for the owner himself the fact that values can be expressed in money provides a clear and unveiled insight into the state of his possessions，for other people it allows a concealment and disguise of possessions and transactions that would be impossible for other tangible forms of property.The concealability of money is the symptom，or the extreme form，of its relationship to private ownership.Compared with all other goods，money can be made invisible and non-existent to others and thus has affinities with intellectual possessions.Just as the private and，as it were，solipsistic character of mental possessions both begins and ends with keeping silent，so the private individualistic nature of money finds its complete expression in the possibility of keeping it secret.Herein undoubtedly lies a great danger for those who have claims and interests in the management of the economy without being able to control and influence it themselves.Modem law requires publicity for the financial policy of governments and corporations in order to try to avoid the dangers inherent in the money form of management with its case of concealment，its misleading estimates and its illegitimate use.Such dangers are of concern to all outsiders with an interest in these affairs and can only be prevented to a certain extent by giving general publicity to such management.A general cultural trend towards differentiation is thus reflected both within and by means of money relationships-what is public becomes more public；what is private becomes more private.This differentiation was unknown to smaller groups in former times，in which the private circumstances of the individual could not be so well concealed，or so well protected against the interference of others as the modem way of life permits.On the other hand，the representatives of the public interest in those small circles disposed of more mystical authority and concealment than those of large groups in which the extension of their area of authority，the objectivity of their techniques and their distancing from the individual person allowed them to tolerate the public nature of the behavior of the authorities.Thus politics，administration and the law lose their secrecy and inaccessibility to the same extent as the individual gains the possibility of even greater withdrawal and of exclusion of all outsiders from his private affairs.One need only compare English with German history or survey the cultural history of the last two centuries in order to recognize this correlation.Even in the religious sphere，this process of differentiation is distinguishable，especially during the Reformation.Whereas the Catholic Church wraps authority in a mystical form that reigns from above over the faithful and refuses any questions，any critique and any co-operation，it does not itself permit them undisturbed religious independence，but makes its followers into confidants and itself a constantly interfering authority on their religious circumstances.Conversely，the Reformation gave to church organization publicity，accessibility and control，and rejected in principle all concealment and entrenchment before the eyes of individual believers.They，for their part，also gained the undisturbed liberty of religious inner feelings；their relationship to God became a private one and they did not have to account for it to anyone.

We now return from the privacy and secrecy that，in accordance with the general cultural trends，become part of the economic conditions in the money economy back to the sale of people，to bribery，which reaches its highest form through the specific qualities of the money economy.Not only can a bribe in the form of a piece of land or a herd of cattle not be concealed from the eyes of the neighbours，but also the bribed person himself cannot behave as if nothing at all had happened by pretending ignorance in the manner in which-as characterized earlier-the representative dignity of bribery requires.With money，however，one can bribe a person，as it were，behind his own back；he can pretend-even to himself-not to know anything about it，since it is not specifically and personally connected with him.Secrecy，undisturbed representation，the continuation of all other relationships in life is more completely secured by bribery with money than even by bribery with a woman's favour.Even though the latter form is completely exhausted by the act，so that，viewed from the outside，less is attached to the person than is the case with a present of money，the inner consequences none the less leave a greater mark upon the person than is the case with bribery by money.In the case of money bribes，the giving and receiving of the money terminates any relationship between the people involved，whereas in the case of bribery by offering a woman's favours，aversion，remorse or hatred rather than indifference are more likely to ensue.This advantage of bribery by money is，however，usually counterbalanced by the drastic degradation of the people concerned if the case becomes known.There is a distinctive parallel here with theft.Servants steal money less frequently，that is only where they are extremely demoralized，than they do food or other trifles.Some such experiences indicate that they flinch from stealing amounts of money that are equal to a bottle of wine or a toilet article which they would appropriate without any scruples.Accordingly，from this standpoint，our penal code considers stealing a small amount of food and consumer goods for direct use to be only a slight violation of the law whereas the theft of an equivalent amount of money would be severely punished.It is obviously assumed that in the case of a momentary need the availability of the respective commodity is so tempting that to succumb is too human a frailty to be punished severely.The more the object is distanced from its immediate use and the longer the detour necessary to satisfy the need，the weaker is the attraction，and the greater is the degree of immorality involved in satisfying the impulse to steal it.Therefore，according to a decision of the highest court，heating material，for example，is not considered to be in the same category as food and is not subject to the same reduction of punishment.Undoubtedly，the need for heat may be just as urgent a need and just as necessary for survival as bread.But its use is certainly less direct than that of bread.There are more intermediate stages on the way to survival，and it is only fair to assume that the tempted person has more time for reflection than would otherwise be possible for more immediate needs.Money is the farthest removed from such direct enjoyments；the interest is always focused on what lies behind it，so that the temptation that，as it were，radiates from it is not a natural instinct and does not possess the force of such an instinct to act as an excuse for succumbing to it.Therefore，just as with the theft of money，so bribery by money appears-as opposed to an immediately enjoyable value-as the symptom of shrewder and more thoroughly corrupted moral standards，so that the secrecy that the nature of money makes possible acts as a kind of protection for the subject.Inasmuch as it represents a tribute to the sense of shame，it belongs to a familiar type：that immoral behaviour is combined with a set of moral factors，not in order to reduce the total amount of immorality，but rather to be able to realize it.Here too it is evident that money that exceeds a certain quantity changes its qualitative characteristics.There are gigantic briberies that expediently change that security device and dispense with secrecy，to the extent that it is technically impossible to uphold it，by giving them an official character.During the twenty years between the granting of legislative and administrative independence of Ireland and the union with England，the English ministers were confronted with the apparently insoluble problem of governing two different states with a uniform policy and of establishing harmony between two independent legislatures.They found a solution in permanent bribery.All the various trends in the Irish parliament were brought together into the desired unity simply by buying the votes.Thus one of the greatest admirers of Robert Walpole stated：‘He himself was absolutely incorruptible；but to attain his political ends，which were wise and just，he was willing to bribe the whole lower house，and he would not have recoiled from bribing a whole nation.’How the clearest conscience with regard to bribes，a conscience proud of its own moral standards，can coexist together with the passionate condemnation of bribery is indicated by the statement of a Florentine bishop at the height of the medieval struggle against simony-he wished to buy the papal chair，even at the price of a £ 1，000，only in order to drive out the cursed Simonists！And perhaps the most striking example of the fact that it is the tremendous measure of sums of money that removes the stigma of shamelessness and of secrecy from bribery-as it does from prostitution-is this：the biggest financial transaction of early modem times was the procurement of financial means that Charles V required in order to bribe the people for his election as emperor！

In addition，the extraordinary height of purchase prices for goods that should not be subject to such trade often provides a certain guarantee that the public interest does not suffer too much damage.The fact that English kings used to sell the important public offices at least had the effect that the buyer strove to behave well.It was stated that a man‘who had paid £ 10，000 for the seals was not likely to forfeit them for the sake of a petty malversation which many rivals would be ready to detect’.Just as I stated earlier that the secrecy of bribery is a safety device for the subject，so publicity is a corresponding safety device for public interests.This is the corrective through which these gigantic corruptions were legitimized to some extent-they were not allowed to be hidden and thus one could，as it were，come to terms with them.For this reason，bribes are easier to bear under simple circumstances.It has been emphasized as something unheard of that Aristides，despite his many discretionary powers，died a poor man.In the small ancient city-states，the dishonesty of a single person did not yet shake the foundations of the whole society，because only a very small part was based on a money economy and because relationships were transparent and uncomplicated and could easily be kept in balance.Therefore it has been rightly said that the fate of Athens was every day dependent upon the decisions on the Pnyx.Under the modem highly complex circumstances of public life with its innumerable subterranean forces of the money economy that extend in all directions，the bribery of officials has much more detrimental effects.

In all the cases mentioned so far，we have dealt with the sale of values of a personal but not subjective nature and，by safeguarding them，the person experiences an objective value in them-in contrast to the values of subjective enjoyment.That the complex of life-forces that are vested in marriage thereby coincide with the direction of our own instincts；that the woman surrenders only if the man responds with similar emotions；that words and deeds are the corresponding expression of convictions and obligations-all this signifies not so much a value that we have but a value that we are.By surrendering all this for money，one exchanges one's being against one's possessing.Certainly both concepts are interrelated；for all the contents of our existence present themselves to us as possession of that purely formal，insubstantial centre that we experience as our centrifugal，Ego and as the owning subject，in contrast to the objects owned in terms of qualities，interests and emotions.On the other hand，possessions are，as we saw，an extension of our sphere of influence，a power of disposal over objects which thereby enters into the circle of our Ego.The Ego，our desires and feelings，continues to live in the objects we own.On the one hand，the innermost core of the Ego-inasmuch as it is a single definite capacity-is located outside the centre as an objective ownership belonging to its central point；on the other，even the most extraneous factors，if they are true possessions，rest within the Ego.In owning the objects，the Ego becomes competent to deal with them and without any one of them it would change into something else.Looked at logically and psychologically，it would therefore be arbitrary to draw a dividing line between being and owning.If we none the less consider it to be objectively justified，then this is because being and owning，in terms of the distinction between them，are not theoretical objective concepts，but value concepts.If we designate our being as being different from our owning，we attribute a certain kind of value and standard of value to our contents of life.If one interprets those that lie close to the enigmatic centre of the Ego as our being and the more remote ones as our owning，then their arrangement in this series-excluding，of course，any sharp demarcation-is only produced through the diversity of feelings of value that accompanies both of them.If in any transaction we allocate what we give away to our being and what we receive to our owning，then this is only an indirect expression of the fact that we have exchanged a more intensive，more durable sense of value which permeates the whole sphere of life for a more direct，urgent and momentary one.

Money And The Ideal Of Distinction

If the sale of personal values implies a diminution of this specific being-in the sense used here-and the direct opposite of‘self-respect’，then we may term a personal ideal which can serve as a decisive yardstick for those modes of behaviour one of distinction [Vomehmheit ].This value is decisive because it signifies the most radical criterion in money matters.Measured against it，prostitution，marriage for money and bribery are the extreme points of a aeries that commences with the most legitimate forms of money transactions.To explain this phenomenon we have first to define the concept of distinction itself.

The usual division of our objective norms of valuation into logical，ethical and aesthetic norms is quite incomplete when viewed in the light of our practical judgments.To take a very striking example，we value the distinct formation of individuality，the mere fact that a personality possesses a specific and concise form and power.We experience as valuable the incomparability and uniqueness with which a person represents，as it were，only his own idea as valuable to us，often indeed in contrast to the ethical and aesthetic inferiority of the content of such a phenomenon.We are interested not in the completion of that system of norms but rather in pointing out that the systematic approach as such is just as erroneous here as it is with regard to the five senses or the twelve Kantian categories of reason.The development of our species continuously creates new possibilities for responding to the world both sensually and intellectually and new categories for evaluating it.And just as we constantly form new and effective ideals，so our growing consciousness discloses ever new ones of which we were unconscious，even though they were already effective.

I believe that among the senses of value with which we respond to phenomena there is one that we can characterize only as the evaluation of‘distinction’.The independence of this category is indicated in the fact that it emerges in connection with phenomena of a totally different kind and value：with ways of thinking as well as works of art，with lineal descent as well as literary style，with highly developed taste just as much as with the corresponding objects，with the manners of high society as well as an animal of noble stock-all these we may term‘distinguished’.Even though this value bears some relationship to those of morality and beauty，it remains essentially independent of them since it appears to the same degree in combination with very varied ethical and aesthetic levels.The social meaning of distinction such as an exceptional position set apart from a majority；the separation of the individual phenomenon within its autonomous area，which would be immediately destroyed by the intrusion of any heterogeneous element-all this obviously provides the model for all the concept's applications.The actual bearer of the value of distinction establishes a quite specific kind of distinction.On the one hand，the distinction accentuates the positive exclusion of being interchangeable，of the reduction to a common denominator and of‘common activity’；on the other，the distinction should not be so conspicuous as to entice what is distinguished away from its independence，its reserve and its inner selfcontainment and to transpose its essence into a relationship to others，be it only a relationship of difference.The distinguished person is the very person who completely reserves his personality.Distinction represents a quite unique combination of senses of differences that are based upon and yet reject any comparison at all.It seems to me that a conclusive example is that the House of Lords not only is recognized to be the sole judge of each of its members，but in 1330 it explicitly rejected the suggestion that it should sit in judgment on persons other than peers-so that even an authority relationship to persons other than of its own rank was interpreted as degradation！Yet the more money dominates interests and sets people and things into motion，the more objects are produced for the sake of money and are valued in terms of money，the less can the value of distinction be realized in men and in objects.Various historical phenomena point to this negative connection.The ancient aristocracies of Egypt and India detested maritime trade and considered it to be incompatible with the purity of the castes.Like money，the ocean is a mediator，it is the geographical version of the means of exchange.In itself it is completely characterless and therefore，just like money，it is utilizable for the interaction of the most diversified things.Ocean traffic and money transactions are historically very close and the reserve and rigid exclusiveness of the aristocracy has to fear a wearing away and leveling from both phenomena.Thus，at the heights of aristocratic rule，trade was forbidden to the Venetian aristocracy and only in 1784 did a law authorize noblemen to trade under their own name.Previously they could do so only as sleeping partners of the business of the cittadini ，that is at a distance and under cover.In Thebes there once existed a law that only allowed those who had not participated in any market transactions for ten years to be eligible for state offices.Augustus prohibited the senators from participating in customs monopolies and in shipping trade.If Ranke characterizes the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries of German history as the‘plebean’age，then this refers to the emergent conditions of a money economy that are represented by the cities that were antagonistic to the traditional aristocracy.Already at the beginning of the early modem period in England，it was found that the differences in wealth prevailing in the city could never produce such a decisively closed aristocracy as did the barriers between the estates in the country.The poorest apprentice could hope for a prosperous future if this future lay only in money ownership，whereas a completely rigid line separated landed aristocracy from the yeomanry.The existence of the infinite，quantitative grading of money ownership permits the levels to merge into one another and removes the distinctive formations of aristocratic classes which cannot exist without secure boundaries.

As with the aesthetic ideal that I mentioned earlier，so the ideal of distinction is indifferent to quantitative evaluation.The question of quantity completely recedes when faced with the secluded detachment of the value that is conveyed in its participating essence.The purely qualitative significance of this ideal is relatively unaffected by whether more instances achieve this level or not.What is decisive is that life has succeeded in accomplishing distinction，and to be its single valid representative in itself gives the specific character to the distinguished being-whether human or subhuman.Yet at that moment at which things that are viewed according to their money value are so evaluated，they are removed from the realms of this category，their qualitative value is subordinated to their quantitative value and their total independence-the dual relationship to others and to itself-that we experience on a certain level as distinction has lost its basis.The essence of prostitution，which we recognized in money，is imparted to the objects that function exclusively as its equivalent，perhaps to a more noticeable degree because they have more to lose than money is able to.That extreme opposite of the category of distinction-doing things in common with others[Sichgemein-machen ]-becomes the typical relationship of objects in a money economy because all things are connected by means of money as through a central station，all float with the same specific gravity in the constantly moving current of money，and all，since they are on the same level，are distinguished only by the size of the pieces that they cover.

The tragic consequence of any leveling process inescapably takes effect where the higher level is pulled down to a greater extent than the lower level can be raised.This is obvious in the relationship between people.Where an area of communication is formed-particularly of an intellectual kind-in which a majority of people find understanding and common ground，the standards must be considerably closer to the person of the lowest than of the highest level.For it is always easier for the latter to descend than it is for the former to ascend.The circle of thoughts，information，strength of will and shades of feelings of the less perfect person can be covered by that of the more perfect person but not vice-versa；the former circle is common to both，but the latter is not.Apart from certain exceptions，the base of common interests and actions among the higher and lower elements can be accomplished only if the higher elements are able to disclaim their individual superiority.The same result also follows from the fact that the level of common ground cannot be as high for equally outstanding personalities as for each of them existing independently.For it is precisely the highest attainments of different people that are usually differentiated according to very diverse aspects，and they meet only on a much lower general level，beyond which the individually significant potentialities often diverge to such an extent that any communication-at all becomes impossible.What is common to peoplein the biological aspect；the oldest and therefore the most secure inheritance-is，in general，the cruder，undifferentiated and unintellectual clement of their nature.

In the typical relationship in which the contents of life must pay for their common elements，their service to understanding and conformity by their relatively low standards，in which the individual has to reduce himself to what is common to all and has to renounce his personal level，either because the other person has lower standards or because，although their standards are the same，they apply to another field-the form of this relationship is illustrated by objects no less than by persons.The only difference is that what in this case is a process in real entities in the other case happens not to the objects themselves but to the conceptions of their value.The fact that the most refined and unique object can be had for money just as much as the most trivial and crude one creates a relationship between them which is foreign to their quality，and occasionally it may result in a trivialization and a loss of the specific valuation of the unique object，whereas the trivial one has neither anything to lose nor to gain.The fact that the one is expensive and the other cheap is not always a compensation，particularly for general valuations which do not lend themselves to individual comparisons.Nor can it be offset by the undeniable psychological occurrence that the common denominator of money itself sets individual differences between objects more sharply into relief.The levelling effect of the money equivalent becomes quite evident as soon as one compares a beautiful and original but purchasable object with another equally significant one which is not purchasable.We feel from the outset that this latter object possesses a reserve，an independence，a right to be exclusively evaluated according to the objective ideal-in short，it possesses a distinction that the other object cannot attain.Even for the best and most exquisite object，the characteristic of being available for money purchase is a locus minoris resistentiae that cannot resist the importunity of the inferior searching for contact with it.For in so far as money，because it is nothing by itself，gains greatly in，value by this possibility，so，conversely，is the individual significance of different objects of equal value degraded through their exchangeability-however indirectly or imaginary this may be.After all，this is probably the underlying motive for the way in which we characterize certain things such as well-worn phrases，modes of behavior，musical tunes，etc.，somewhat contemptuously as‘negotiable currency’.It seems that coinage-the most negotiable object of all-calls not only for negotiability as the point of comparison and as its expression；sometimes，at least，the factor of exchange must be added.Everyone accepts them and everyone uses them again，without any specific interest in their content-just as is the case with money.Everyone has it in his pocket，in stock；it does not require any transformation to serve its purpose under any circumstances.Whether given or received，its relation to the individual does not obtain any individual coloring or specific qualities；it does not-as do other contents of speaking or acting affect the style of the personality，but slips through it unaltered like money through a purse.Leveling is the cause as well as the effect of the exchangeability of objects，just as certain words may be exchanged without further ado because they are trivial and they become trivial because they are usually exchanged without further ado.The coldness and frivolity that so much distinguishes the present from earlier treatment of objects is certainly due，in part，to the mutual de-individualization and leveling brought about by the common levels of money value.

The exchangeability that is expressed in money must inevitably have repercussions upon the quality of commodities themselves，or must interact with it.The disparagement of the interest in the individuality of a commodity leads to a disparagement of individuality itself.If the two sides to a commodity are its quality and its price，then it seems logically impossible for the interest to be focused on only one of these sides：for cheapness is an empty word if it does not imply a low price for a relative good quality，and good quality is an economic attraction only for a correspondingly fair price.And yet this conceptual impossibility is psychologically real and effective.The interest in the one side can be so great that its logically necessary counterpart completely disappears.The typical instance of one of these cases is the‘fifty cents bazaar’.The principle of valuation in the modem money economy finds its clearest expression here.It is not the commodity that is the centre of interest here but the price-a principle that in former times not only would have appeared shameless but would have been absolutely impossible.It has been rightly pointed out that the medieval town，despite all the progress it embodied，still lacked the extensive capital economy，and that this was the reason for seeking the ideal of the economy not so much in the expansion（which is possibly only through cheapness）but rather in the quality of the goods offered；hence the great contributions of the applied arts，the rigorous control of production，the strict policing of basic necessities，etc.Such is one extreme pole of the series，whose other pole is characterized by the slogan，‘cheap and bad’-a synthesis that is possibly only if we are hypnotized by cheapness and are not aware of anything else.The levelling of objects to that of money reduces the subjective interest first in their specific qualities and then，as a further consequence，in the objects themselves.The production of cheap trash is，as it were，the vengeance of the objects for the fact that they have been ousted from the focal point of interest by a merely indifferent means.

All this has probably clearly illustrated what a radical contrast exists between a money economy and all its consequences and the values of distinction that have been sketched out earlier.Money thoroughly destroys that self-respect that characterizes the distinguished person and becomes embedded in certain objects and their appreciation；it forces an extraneous standard upon things，a standard that is quite alien to distinction.By arranging things in a series in which only quantitative differences are valid，it deprives them，on the one hand，of their difference and distance of one from another and on the other of the right to reject any relationship or any qualification by comparison with others-these are precisely the two factors whose combination determines the peculiar ideal of distinction.The enhancement of personal values that characterizes this ideal seems to be so transcended，even in its projection into objects，as far as the effectiveness of money is concerned，that the objects are made‘common’in every sense of the word and are thus completely opposed，even in terms of language，to distinction.In contrast with this concept of distinction，the effect of money becomes evident among the whole range of purchasable goods，an effect that prostitution，monetary marriage and bribery have illustrated in a personally accentuated form.

Ⅱ

The Transformation Of Specific Rights Into Monetary Claims

We have demonstrated in the chapter on individual freedom how much the transformation of obligations in kind into money payments are to the advantage of both parties，and to what extent particularly the dependent person gains liberty and dignity.Money's importance for personal values must now be extended by a line of development in the opposite direction.

The favorable result of that transformation was due to the fact that the obligated person had hitherto contributed a personal strength and individual determinateness to the relationship without receiving a proportional equivalent.What the other party offered him was of a purely impersonal nature.The rights that he received from the relationship were relatively impersonal；the obligations that he accepted were completely personal.In that these obligations became depersonalized by taking on the form of money payments the disproportion between them was removed.However，the result will be completely different if the obligated person cannot simply be paid off with a concrete return，hut if he has acquired a right，an influence，a personal importance through this relationship；and this is precisely because he contributes such a definite personal service to that relationship.Under such circumstances，the objectification of the relationship brought about by changing to the money form of payment will have unfavourable results just as in the first case the results were favorable.The subjugation of Athens’allies into a more or less direct position of dependency commenced with changing their tribute from ships and troops into mere money payments.This apparent liberation from their more personal obligations also included the renunciation of their own political activity，which by implication could be claimed for only on the basis of the sacrifice of a specific contribution，of the deployment of actual power.The original obligation still contained direct rights such as that the war-power delivered could not be used against their own interests as was possible with the money that they supplied.In Kantian terms，provision in kind consists of the obligations as its form and of the specific content and object as its substance.However，this substance may have certain side-effects.For example，as the statute labor of the peasant it may considerably restrict his freedom of person and movement but it may also，as the natural contribution to the military undertakings of a supreme power，enforce a certain regard for the contributors.Whereas the obligation itself is the same in both cases，the substance that determines its form will make things difficult for the obligated person in one case and relatively favorable in the other.However，if money payment replaces contributions in kind，then the substantive clement is virtually eliminated；it loses every effective quality so that only the purely economic obligation，in its most abstract realization possible，remains.In the first case，this reduction in obligations will imply the elimination of a burden，in the second the elimination of a relief；and the obligated person will be as elevated in the one case as he will be subjugated in the other.Therefore we more frequently encounter the transformation of forced labor into money payment as a conscious political move by which the power position of the obligated person is supposed to be reduced as，for instance，when Henry II of England decided that the knights，instead of following him to the continental wars，could discharge their obligations by money payments.Many may have accepted the proposal because，at first sight，it appeared to be an alleviation and liberation of this obligation.In fact，however，it brought about a disarmament of the feudal faction which the King had reason to fear most，and this was precisely because of its belligerent qualities upon which he himself had hitherto been dependent.Since such an equivalent specific factor did not exist for the enrolment of men in the districts and towns，the result for them was quite the opposite they gained liberty by discharging their obligations in money.What makes all these phenomena so important is the fact that one can derive from them the connection between very basic sentiments in life and completely extraneous facts.It is also essential to realize that the qualities by which money is able to mediate these connections are apparent in money in their purest and most precise form，even though not in money alone.The historical constellations that are intrinsically supported by this implication can be arranged in an ascending series in which each link，in accordance with the particular relations between the elements，provides room for their freedom as well as for their suppression.It is clear that the purely personal relationship may be represented just as much by the harshness of personal subjugation to a person as by the dignity of free association.Both elements change if the determining factor has an impersonal character，whether this impersonality is the material one of an external object or a majority of persons in which the subjectivity of the individual disappears.The previous chapter has shown how the transition operates in this case as liberation and how often people prefer subordination to an impersonal collectivity or a purely objective organization to subordination to a person.I only wish to mention here that slaves，as well as serfs，used to have a relatively easy time if they belonged to the State，that the employees in modem warehouses with impersonal management are usually better situated than in small business units where they are personally exploited by the owner.Conversely，where very personal values are engaged，the change to impersonal forms is experienced as loss of dignity and liberty.The aristocratic voluntary devotion，including extreme sacrifices，has often been replaced by a feeling of humiliation and degradation，where the sacrifices，even at a reduced level，were changed to objective legal obligations.Even during the sixteenth century，the princes of France，Germany，Scotland and the Netherlands met with considerable resistance when they ruled through trained substitutes or administrative bodies.Authority was experienced as something personal to which one was willing to comply solely for reasons of personal devotion，whereas，in relation to an impersonal body，there was only subjugation.

The last link of this series consists of relationships based on money，the most objective of all practical institutions.Depending upon their origin and content，money payments represent either complete liberty or total suppression.Therefore we find that they are also occasionally resolutely refused.When Peter IV of Arragon asked the Arragon estates for money credit，they replied that this was not customary and that though his Christian subjects would be willing to serve him personally，to offer money would be a matter for Jews and Moors.In Anglo-Saxon England，too，the king had no right to impose direct taxation，instead，the old Teutonic principle prevailed that the commonwealth was based on personal service in the army and the court.When the king raised Danegeld，ostensibly as a protective measure against new invasions，this signified the decay of the State.In so far as it is in their power，the people under obligation accept a change from personal service to money payments only if their traditional position does not imply participation in the sphere of power of the beneficiaries.Different sections of the same group often take a very different attitude according to this point of view.The territorial rulers in medieval Germany who were entitled to conscript freemen and serfs for purposes of war later frequently raised taxes instead.However，the lords of the manor remained free from this tax because they themselves performed cavalry service，that is，‘they served with their blood’.This is the origin of the old legal rule：‘The peasant earns his goods with the sack，the knight with the horse.’If the modem state has re-introduced military service for its subjects instead of raising taxes and hiring mercenaries，then such a substitution of money payments by direct service is an adequate expression of the growing political importance of the individual citizen.Thus，to state that universal suffrage is the corollary of compulsory military service is justified by the relationship of money payments to personal services.

The Enforceability Of Demands

The fact that despotic tendencies strive to reduce all kinds of obligations to money payments can be deduced from very basic relationships.The concept of coercion is mostly used in an indistinct and loose fashion.One usually says that somebody has been‘coerced’if his action is motivated by the threat or fear of a very painful consequence punishment or loss，etc.-should he not perform the act.In fact，in all such cases no real coercion exists.For if somebody is willing to take the consequences，he is completely free to abstain from the action that he is supposed to be coerced into performing.Real coercion is exclusively that which is immediately exercised by physical power or by hypnotic suggestion.For instance，I can be forced to give my signature only if somebody stronger than me takes my hand and performs the writing with it，or if I do it by hypnotic suggestion.But no threat of death can compel me to do it.It is therefore inaccurate to say that the State enforces compliance with its laws.The State cannot actually compel anybody to serve his military service，or to respect the life and property of others，or to testify，as long as the person is ready to accept the punishment for breaking the law.What the State can do in such circumstances is only to ensure that the guilty person accepts the punishment.Only with respect to one single category of the law is the enforcement of positive compliance possible，namely liability to taxation.The discharge of this duty can be enforced in the strict sense of the term-as can monetary private legal obligations by-removing the appropriate value from the liable person by force.Certainly it is true that this compulsion refers only to money payments and not even to economic services of any other kind.If someone is obliged to give a definite contribution in kind，he can never really be coerced into delivering it if he does not wish，under，any circumstances，to produce it.However，something else that he owns can be taken away from him and transferred into money.For any such object has a money value and can replace the other in this relationship，even though perhaps it can do so in no other.The despotic constitution that aims at the unconditional compulsion of subordinates should probably，for reasons of expediency，request only money payments from them right from the outset.In relation to the demand for money，there is nothing like the resistance that may develop on the occasion of a claim for other contributions that are impossible to enforce.It is therefore internally and externally useful to reduce claims that may meet any kind of resistance solely to money.Perhaps this is one of the more basic reasons why，in general，the despotic regime is often associated with the promotion of the money economy（the Italian despots，for example，usually tended to sell their domains），and why the mercantilist system，with its greatly increased evaluation of money，developed at the time of unlimited monarchical power.Of all demands，the demand for money is the demand whose fulfillment is the least dependent on the good will of the obligated person.In contrast，that freedom which exists with reference to all other demands and whose substantiation and confirmation depends only upon the willingness to resist declines.This in no way contradicts the fact strongly underlined earlier that the conversion of contributions in kind into money payments usually implies a liberation of the individual.For the shrewd despot will always choose a form for his demands that grants to his subjects the greatest possible freedom in their purely individual relationships. The terrible tyrannies of the Italian Renaissance are，at the same time，the ideal breeding ground for the most unrestricted growth of the individual with his ideal and private interests；and at all times-from the Roman Empire to Napoleon Ⅲ political despotism has been found to be accompanied by a licentious private libertinism.For its own benefit，despotism will restrict its demands to what is essential for it and will make its measure and kind endurable by granting the greatest possible freedom for everything else.The demand for money payments unites the two viewpoints in the most practical way possible.The freedom that is granted in purely private affairs in no way prohibits the disfranchisement in the political sphere which it has so often achieved.

The Transformation Of Substantive Values Into Money Values

Alongside this type of instance in which the monetary discharge of obligations corresponds to a degradation of the obligated person，there stands a second supplementation of the results analyzed in the last chapter.We have seen what progress it meant for the serf if he could discharge his obligations by money payments.The opposite result occurs for him when the change in his relationship to money is instigated by the other party，that is when the lord of the manor buys from him the piece of land which he hitherto possessed with more or less extended rights.The grounds for the prohibitions issued in the eighteenth century and far into the nineteenth in the area of the old German Empire against the buying out of the peasant are，it is true，basically associated with fiscal or very general agricultural policy.Yet occasionally the sentiment seems to have prevailed that it was unjust to the peasant if land was taken away from him even in exchange for a very fair monetary compensation.Certainly it is possible to experience the transformation of a tangible possession into money as liberation.With the aid of money，we can convert the value of the object that was hitherto fixed in one form into any other；with money in our pocket we are free，whereas previously the object made us dependent upon the conditions for its conservation and realization.In principle，obligation to an object seems to be no different from the obligations to a person，for the object determines our activities no less rigidly than does a person if we want to avoid the worst consequences.Only the reduction of the whole relationship to money-whether we receive it or give it away-releases us from the determination that comes to us from something outside ourselves.So it is true that the frequent conversion of obligations into money payments in the eighteenth century gave to the peasants a monetary freedom.Yet such conversions took away from him what cannot be bought by money and what primarily gives freedom its value-the trustworthy object of personal activity.To the peasant，the land meant something altogether different from a mere property value；for him it meant the possibility of useful activity，a centre of interest，a value that determined his life，which he lost as soon as he owned only the money value of his land instead of the land itself.The reduction of his landed property to its mere money value pushes him on the road to proletarianization.A different level of agricultural social relations exhibits the same form of development.On the farms in Oldenburg，for example，the hired labor relationship often prevails.The hired laborer is obliged to work a certain number of days per year for a lower wage than the day wage laborer；in exchange，he receives from the farmer his dwelling，use of land，transport，etc.，for less than the going price.This is，at least in part，an exchange of values in kind.It has been pointed out that this relationship is characterized by social equality of the farmer and the hireling，who does not feel inferior by being forced to work for wages on account of less favorable property conditions.At the same time，however，it has been stated that the emerging money economy destroys this relationship，and that the transformation of the natural exchange of services into money payments degrades the hireling-even though he would，in this way，gain a certain freedom of action concerning his work contract，in contrast to being restricted to receiving a definite amount of goods.In the same area，the same development is evident in another respect.As long as the threshers on the farms were paid by a certain share of the threshing they had a lively personal interest in their master's successful management of the farm.The threshing machine displaced this type of payment，and the money wage that replaced it does not favor a personal relationship between master and laborer，who gained more self-respect and moral support from it than from a higher cash income.

The Negative Meaning Of Freedom And The Extirpation Of The Personality

Money's importance in gaining individual freedom serves to illustrate a very far-reaching definition of the concept of freedom.At first glance，freedom seems to possess a merely negative character.It only has meaning in contrast to a form of bondage；it is always freedom from something and corresponds to the concept by expressing the absence of obstacles.However，the concept of freedom is not confined to this negative meaning.Freedom would be without meaning and value if the casting off of commitments were not，at the same time，supplemented by a gain in possessions or power：freedom from something implies，at the same time，freedom to do something.Phenomena in many varied spheres confirm this.In political life，wherever a party demands or attains freedom the issue is not at all one of freedom as such，but those positive gains，increases and spreading of power from which the party was previously excluded.The importance of the‘freedom’which the French Revolution gave to the Third Estate was that a Fourth Estate was in the making which could now be required to work‘freely’for that estate.The freedom of the Church means the direct extension of its sphere of influence，for example，that with reference to its‘freedom of instruction，the State permits its citizens to be exposed to and influenced by the Church's suggestions.The liberation of the peasant-serfs all over Europe was followed up by endeavors to make the peasant the owner of his plot of land-just like the ancient Jewish regulations，which requested that the indebted slave had to be liberated after a certain number of years，while adding that he should be handed over some property，preferably that which he formerly owned.Wherever the purely negative sense of freedom operates，freedom is considered to be incomplete and degrading.Giordano Bruno，in his enthusiasm for the unified regular life of the cosmos，considered free will to be a defect that characterized man in his imperfection since God alone was subject to necessity.After this very abstract，example we can give a very concrete one.The land of the Prussian cottagers was located outside the community farmland where the various holdings lay in mixed strips.Since such strips could be cultivated only according to common rule，the cottager had much more individual freedom.Yet since he stood outside the community，he possessed not the positive freedom to participate in decisions concerning the fields，but only the negative freedom of not being bound by communal decisions.This is the reason why the cottager，even with considerable property，remains in a subjugated position with very little social prestige.In itself，freedom is an empty form which becomes effective，alive and valuable only in and through the development of other lifecontents.If we analyze the events by which freedom is gained，we always notice，alongside the formal and pure concept of freedom，a substantively determined content which，however，by giving it a positive significance，also contains a certain limitation，a directive as to what has to be positively accomplished by this freedom.All the actions by which freedom is gained may be arranged on a scale on the basis of how much greater its material content and gain is in relation to its formal and negative moments of freedom from former bondage.For example，to the young man who，released from the pressures of school，enters the free life of a university student，the latter moment is the more acute.The new substance of life and aspirations that forms its positive side is at first very indefinite and ambiguous，so that the student，because mere freedom is something completely empty and unbearable，voluntarily accepts a constraint of the most rigid kind-the German student's code of behaviour.The situation for a businessman who is released from a troublesome commercial restriction is altogether different.Here，the new activity that makes that freedom valuable is definitely determined in content and orientation；he not merely accepts freedom but knows immediately how to make use of it.To the girl who leaves the confined order of her parents’home to make herself economically independent，freedom has a more positive meaning as to quantity as well as quality than if she gets married.In the latter case，the essence and purpose of the freedom leads to the management of her own household.In short，every act of liberation exhibits a specific proportion between the accentuation and extension of the situation that has been surmounted and the situation that is thereby acquired.If one were to construct such a series according to the slowly growing preponderance of the one moment over the other，then the freedom gained by exchanging an object against money would be placed at one extreme，at least if the object had hitherto determined the content of life.Whoever exchanges his landed estate for a house in the city is thereby freed from the troubles and anxieties of agricultural pursuits，but this freedom means that he now has to devote himself to the problems and chances that urban property ownership confers.However，if he sells his property for cash then he is really free；the negative factor of the liberation from former burdens predominates，and his newly created situation as a money-owner entails only a minimum of specific directives for the future.The positive factor in the liberation from the constraints of an object has been reduced to its marginal value.Money solves the task of realizing human freedom in a purely negative sense.

Thus the extreme danger for the peasant of being‘liberated’by cash payments is part of the general pattern of human freedom.It is true he gained freedom，but only freedom from something，not liberty to do something.Apparently，he gained freedom to do anything-because it was purely negative-but in fact he was without any directive，without any definite and determining content.Such freedom thavours that emptiness and instability that allows one to give full rein to every accidental，whimsical and tempting impulse.Such freedom may be compared with the fate of the insecure person who has forsworn his Gods and whose newly acquired‘freedom’only provides the opportunity for making an idol out of any fleeting value.The tradesman who，burdened and worried by his business，urgently wants to sell it at any cost meets with the same fate.But when finally，cash in hand，he is really‘free’，he often experiences that typical boredom，lack of purpose in life and inner restlessness of the renter which drives him to the oddest and most contradictory attempts to keep busy in order to give a substantive content to his‘freedom’.A similar situation often confronts the official who wants，as quickly as possible，to attain a position whose pension will enable him to lead a‘free’life.Thus，amidst the torments and anxieties of the world，the state of repose often appears to us as the absolute ideal until we learn by experience that peace from specific things is valuable or even bearable only if it is，at the same time，peace to engage in specific things.Whereas the peasant who has been bought out，the merchant who has become a renter or the pensioned civil servant seem to have freed their personalities from the constraints that are hound up with the specific conditions of their property or their position，in reality the opposite has occurred in the instances cited here.They have exchanged the positive contents of their self for money which does not offer any such contents.A French traveller relates a very characteristic story of Greek peasant women，who do embroidery and are very attached to their toilsome products：

‘They give them away，they take them hack，they look at the money，then at their job，then again at the money.The money finally is always the right thing and they are shattered to find themselves so rich.’Because the freedom that money offers is only a potential，formal and negative freedom，to receive money in exchange for the positive contents of life implies the selling of personal values-unless other values take their place immediately.For this reason，the Prussian distribution of communal land in the early nineteenth century greatly favored the growth of a shiftless and rootless stratum of day wage laborers.The natural rights to the use of the woods and meadows were an aid to the standard of living of the poorer peasants for whom in abstract there was no equivalent.If compensation for the removal of these rights were to be paid in money，then it would soon disappear；if it were to be paid in land，then it would be too small to yield results.Thus，such compensations for land were quickly changed to money and they increased rather than reduced the trend towards proletarianization and the loss of the substance of life.An exact parallel with the behavior of the Greek peasant women is，as ethnologists report，the extreme difficulty in buying commodities from native people.This has been explained by the fact that each object has a decidedly individual stamp of originality with regard to its origin and use.The tremendous labor applied to producing and decorating it and its exclusive personal usage makes it part of the person himself.To part with it thus meets with the same resistance as parting with a limb of the body，so that instead of an expansion of the Ego-which the endless‘possibilities’of money ownership temptingly but vaguely suggest-a contraction takes place.Once we clearly recognize this it is not without significance for the understanding of our times.Ever since money has existed，everyone is by and large more inclined to sell than to buy，As the money economy expands，this inclination becomes stronger and increasingly affects those objects which are not meant to be sold but which have the character of permanent possessions and seem to be destined to be tied to the personality rather than to break loose from it in a rash exchange：businesses and factories，works of art and collections，landed property，rights and positions of all kinds.An extraordinary amount of freedom is realized by the fact that，where all this remains the property of one person for an increasingly shorter period，the person changes the specific conditions of such property more quickly and frequently.However，since money with its indeterminateness and its inner lack of direction is the other side of these processes of liberation，they often do not advance beyond this uprooting，and fail to sink new roots.In fact，since under very rapid money transactions possessions are no longer classified according to the category of a specific life-content，that inner bond，amalgamation and devotion in no way develops which，though it restricts the personality，none the less gives support and content to it.This explains why our age，which，on the whole，certainly possesses more freedom than any previous one，is unable to enjoy it properly.Money makes it possible for us to buy ourselves not only out of bonds with others but also out of those that stem from our own possessions.It frees us both when we give it away and when we take it.Thus the continuous processes of liberation occupy an extraordinarily broad section of modem life.At this point，too，the deeper connection of the money economy with the tendencies of liberation is revealed，exhibiting one of the reasons why the freedom of liberalism has brought about so much instability，disorder and dissatisfaction.

However，since so many objects continuously detached by money lose their direction-giving significance for us，there develops a practical reaction to the change in our relationship to them.If that insecurity and disloyalty in relation to specific possessions which is part of the money economy has to be paid for by the very modem feeling that the hoped for satisfaction that is connected with new acquisitions immediately grows beyond them，that the core and meaning of life always slips through one's hand，then this testifies to a deep yearning to give things a new importance，a deeper meaning，a value of their own.They have been worn away by the easy gain and loss of possessions，by the transistorizes of their existence，their enjoy ability and their change.In short，the consequences and correlations of money have made them void and indifferent.Yet the lively motions in the arts，the search for new styles，for style as such，symbolism and even theosophy are all symptoms of the longing for a new and more perceptible significance of things-regardless of whether it is that each thing has its own more valuable and soulful emphasis，or gains such an emphasis through establishing a connection by release from its atomization.If modem man is free free because he can sell everything，and free because he can buy everything-then he now seeks（often in problematical vacillations）in the objects themselves that vigor，stability and inner unity which he has lost because of the changed money-conditioned relationship that he has with them.Just as we saw earlier that，through money，man is no longer enslaved in things，so on the other hand is the content of his Ego，motivation and determination so much identical with concrete possessions that the constant selling and exchanging of them-even the mere fact that they are saleable-often means a selling and uprooting of personal values.

The Difference In Value Between Personal Achievement And Monetary Equivalent

The money economy will increasingly gloss over the fact that the money value of things does not fully replace what we ourselves possess in them，that they have qualities that cannot be expressed in money.Wherever it is undeniable that the valuation and abandonment of the object for money cannot save it from the cheapening banality of daily transactions，we search，at least sometimes，for a form of money that is far removed from the everyday kind.The oldest Italian coin was a piece of copper without definite form which was therefore not counted but weighed.And until the period of the Roman Empire，by which time money matters had already reached a stage of refinement，this formless piece of copper was favored for use in religious offerings and as a legal symbol.It is quite evident that the value of things none the less exacts recognition over and above their money value if a personally performed task rather than a substance is sold，and if this task possesses an individual character not only in its external realization but also in its content.The following group of phenomena may make this clear.When money and performances are exchanged，the buyer claims only the specific object，the circumscribed performance.The actual performer，on the other hand，requests，or at least hopes in many cases，for more than just money.Whoever attends a concert is satisfied with their money outlay when they hear the expected programmer with the expected perfection.The artist，however，is not satisfied with the money；he also expects applause.Whoever wants a portrait of himself is satisfied if he receives it，whereas the painter is not content if he gets the price agreed upon，but rather only if，in addition，he receives subjective recognition and supra-subjective fame.The minister asks not only for his salary，but also for the gratefulness of the ruler and the nation；the teacher and the priest demand not only their salary，but also reverence and loyalty；even the better class of businessman not only wants money for his wares，but also wants the buyer to be satisfied-and even then not only to ensure that the customer returns.In short，many performers of specific tasks—apart from money which they objectively recognize to be a sufficient equivalent for their achievement-also demand a personal acknowledgment，some kind of subjective token from the purchaser that exists quite apart from the agreed money payment and that will be a contributory complement to the full equivalent of his achievement.Here we have the exact opposite of the phenomenon that I described in the third chapter as the superadditum of money ownership.In that case，the buyer received something more than the exact equivalent of his expenditure because of money's capacity to extend beyond every particular object's value.But it is precisely the nature of money that，of all empirical things-to quote Jakob Böhme-it combines movement and countermovement，and expresses this adjustment.Personal performances demand something over and above their money equivalents.Just as on the part of money，so here too on the part of the achievement，the claim that exceeds direct exchange expresses itself in a sphere that surrounds the person as the geometric focus of his demands and exists independently of each individual demand.The balance in favor of the performer，which develops in this manner with the exchange of money and personal performance，may be considered to be so paramount that the acceptance of a money equivalent appears to disparage both the performance and the person.This is as if one were to accept in money terms what would be written off from that immaterial payment from which one allows no deductions.We know that Lord Byron accepted fees from publishers only with the greatest embarrassment.Wherever the activity of money-making itself already lacks prestige，as in classical Greece（because the social significance and productivity of money capital was not yet known，money was believed to serve only egotistical consumption），the degradation increases，particularly with reference to personalintellectual achievements.Thus，to teach or to engage in intellectual work in general for money appeared to be a degradation of the person.As to all those activities that have their source in the core of the personality，it is superficial and unreal to assume that one could be paid for them in full.Is it at all possible completely to remunerate a person for the sacrifices of love by some other action，however equally valuable it may be and however much it may spring from equally strong emotions？A relationship of total personal obligation always remains，a relationship that perhaps is mutual but that none the less basically resists the balancing of accounts by that mutuality.In the same way，no subjective offence can be atoned for as if it had not happened，as is the case with external damages.Jf the guilty person feels he is completely rehabilitated after he has suffered the punishment，then this is the result not of the offence being equal to the punishment，but of an inner transformation which destroys the roots of the sin.That mere punishment alone is incapable of really wiping out the misdeed is indicated by the persistent distrust and degradation to which the sinner is exposed despite having undergone the punishment.I showed earlier that between qualitatively diverse elements there is no direct equivalence as there is between the debit and credit side of a balance sheet.This is most conclusively confirmed by the values that are embodied in the individual personality and it becomes invalid to the extent that these values lose their roots and take on an independent objective character.Such values unendingly draw towards money as the absolutely commensurable entity because it is absolutely objective in contrast to the absolutely incommensurable personality.On the other hand，there is something dreadful about realizing the profound mutual inadequateness of the things，achievements and psychic values which we constantly weigh against each other like real equivalents；on the other，it is precisely this incommensurability of these elements of life that gives them the right not to he compared with any particular equivalent and that gives to life an irreplaceable charm and wealth.One of the reasons for the numerous injustices and tragic situations in life may be that personal values cannot be balanced by or equated with the money that is offered for them.Yet，on the other hand，the awareness of personal values，the pride in individual aspects of life arises precisely through the knowledge that they cannot be outweighed by any amount of merely quantitative values.As is so often recognized，this inadequacy is modified by very large sums as equivalents because they，for their part，are imbued with that‘superadditum’，with fantastic possibilities that transcend the definiteness of numbers.They correspond to the personality incarnated in but yet transcending every individual achievement.The willingness to offer certain objects or performances for a very large amount of money seems justified；but if this cannot be obtained then one would rather make a present of them than take a small amount of money for them.Only the latter would be degrading，not the former.For this reason，among refined and sensitive people presents that are meant to pay tribute to a person must make the money value imperceptible.The fleeting perishability of flowers and candy that one may venture to give to a lady of distant acquaintance indicates the elimination of any substantial value.

The difference in value between a particular task and its money equivalent is neither always noticeable nor，even when that is true，always expressible，as in the earlier instances of the artist and the physician，the official and the scholar.If the activity is a very unindividual one and the performer an average person，as for example the unskilled worker，then the point of incommensurability is lacking，as is the process of expressing a unique personality recognizable by distinctive qualities in the work.On the other hand，whether the performer receives a compensation for the excess value rests，in principle，on whether his social position allows such ideal acknowledgments；wherever they are absent because of his general subordinate position he is all the more degraded the more personal is the value he is forced to offer for money and only for money.Thus，the reason why medieval minstrels were looked down upon was accounted for by the fact that they sang cheerful as well as sad songs upon request and thereby prostituted their personal emotions by taking money instead of honorable recognition.In order to exclude any ideal compensation，it was therefore quite consistent with this fact that they were treated very correctly at least with regard to their economic wage in order to exclude non-material compensations.Although the minstrels by and large fared badly，they were treated impartially，particularly with reference to what was due to them.Wherever genuine personal values have to be offered for money without any further non-material compensation，one finds that a loosening，almost a loss of substance in individual life，takes place.The feeling that personal values are exchanged in monetary transactions for an inadequate compensation is certainly one of the reasons why money transactions have so often been rejected with horror by proud and highminded people and why agriculture，its opposite，has been praised as the only proper pursuit.For example，this was the case among the nobility in the Scottish Highlands who，until the eighteenth century，led an isolated and purely autochthonous life-one that was guided，however，by the ideal of greatest personal freedom.Yet however much money encourages such freedom，it cannot be denied that，from the standpoint of a free，independent and self-sufficient existence，the exchange of property and achievements for money depersonalizes life after a tight network of transactions originally enclosed and intertwined people.If the subjective and objective sides of life have been separated，then depersonalization，by increasingly concentrating on the objective side，might serve the pure elaboration of the subjective side.Conversely，in a more primitive and uniform existence，it must appear unreasonable and as a loss if property and achievement，hitherto only personally enjoyed and personally granted，are reduced to a mere element of monetary transactions and to an object of its objective laws.In the transition from the medieval manorial estate to modem farming we find that the concept of the knight's status is thereby enlarged.In addition to military activity，gainful activity is now considered permissible for him-yet this refers only to the management of his own estates，a type of acquisition whose peculiarity made him look down on the merchant and the tradesman even more than had been the case previously.Here，the specific impression that monetary transactions are undignified is brought clearly into relief since both economic forms are now pushed close to each other.One of the most general sociological phenomena is that the contrast between two elements appears most clearly if they have developed out of a common soil.Sects of the same religion hate each other more intensely than totally different religious communities；the antagonism between small neighboring city-states was always more passionate than that between large countries with their spatially and objectively different spheres of interest；in fact，it has been claimed that the most fervent hatred that exists is that existing among blood relatives.This increase in antagonism out of a background of a community of interests in some cases seems to reach a peak when the common interest or similarity is in the process of increasing.Thus there is a danger that the difference and contrast，the preservation of which is in the interest of at least one of the parties，will become blurred.The more a lower and a higher element approach each other，the more vigorously will the latter emphasize the points of difference that still exist and the higher will it value them.Hence passionate and aggressive class hatred does not emerge where the classes are separated by an unbridgeable gulf，but rather at that moment at which the lower class has already begun to rise，and when the upper class has lost some of its prestige and the leveling of both classes can be discussed.The lord of the manor，during the process of becoming a managing estate farmer，therefore felt an increased need to distinguish himself from the money-minded merchant.He managed the estate but originally only for his own needs，and did not sell his produce for money.If he did do so then it was only his own product；he was not in the service of the money lender，as is the merchant with his direct personal skill.For a similar motive-although in co-operation with others-the Spartan citizen was allowed to own land，but not to farm it himself.It was very important for aristocratic interests to emphasize any difference with other sellers because money transactions have democratic leveling consequences，especially if the person in the higher social position takes the money，and the person in the lower position takes the product，since both parties are easily considered to he‘equal’to one another.Therefore the aristocrat considers money transactions degrading，whereas the peasant，if he pays the lord of the manor in money rather than in goods，thereby experiences an elevation of his position.

The sale of personal values for money also illustrates the unique quality of money which，with its own indecision and lack of content，cultivates all the opposites of historical-psychological possibilities and moulds them into definite entities.In such an increasingly practical world money，the embodiment of the relativity of things，appears，as it were，to be the absolute which embraces and upholds the oppositions of all that is relative.

Ⅲ

‘Labor Money’And Its Rationale

The importance of the money equivalence of work has been referred to so often in these pages，both directly and indirectly，that here I only wish to examine one more question of principle that is relevant to it，namely，whether labor itself is indeed the value that actually forms in concreto the element of value in all economic items to the same extent that it is expressed in abstract。 through money.The attempts to derive all economic values from a single source and to reduce them to a single expression-such as labor，costs，uses，etc.would certainly not have arisen had not the convertibility of all these values into money，into a unit of their essence，suggested it and had it not served as a security for the recognizability of precisely this unit.The concept of‘labour money’that arises in socialist plans expresses this connection.Thus，work performed as the sole value-creating factor alone gives the right to claim the products of others’labor，and for this one knows of no other form for characterizing the symbol and recognition of a specific amount of labor than money.Therefore，money must itself be conserved here as a unified form of value whereas its momentary character will be rejected because its own existence prevents it from being the adequate expression of the fundamental power of value.If one permits nature as well as labor to be a creator of value，so that labor also possesses value out of the material extracted from nature and thus，as the saying goes，although work is the father of wealth，earth is the mother，then the socialist line of thought must none the less lead to labor money.For since the treasures of nature should no longer be private but common property，and a priori each should，in the same manner，be the accessible basis of economic life as such，then that which each person has to give in exchange is thus ultimately only his labor.Of course，if he has exchanged a valuable product of nature with the aid of his labor and exchanged it once more，an individual can take its material value into account.Yet the amount of its value is still only the same as the value of his labor for which he has acquired it and this thus forms the measure of its exchange value for the product of nature in question.If labor is thus the ultimate authority to which all the value determinations of the object must be referred，then it is inappropriate and a diversion to measure it in terms of an alien object such as money.Rather，one must certainly search for a possibility of expressing the pure and immediate unity of labor in a symbol that functions as a means of exchange and measurement，that functions as money.

Without pronouncing on which of the proposed unifications of value is the sole legitimate one，I wish to assert that the labour theory of value is，at least philosophically，the most interesting theory.The material and intellectual aspects of human beings，their intellect and their will gain a unity in work that remains inaccessible to these potentialities so long as one views them，as it were，in peaceful co-existence.Work is the unified stream in which they mix like river sources，extinguishing the diversity of their nature in the similarity of the product.If work was really the sole agent of value，then the latter would thus be submerged in the specific point of unity of our practical nature，and this would have to choose the most adequate expression that it can find in external reality.It seems to me，in the light of this importance of work，that it is a secondary question as to whether or not one has to deny that，as a result，labour itself first produces values-just like the machine that works on a material that does not yet itself possess the form that it confers upon it.Certainly，if one only accords value to the products of human labor，then labor can not itself possess value it is a physiological function-rather，only labor power possesses value.Clearly，this can be produced only by human beings，namely through the means of subsistence which in turn stem from human work.That it is then transposed into real work clearly does not require more work and thus itself implies no value；rather，this only adheres to the products of such labor.None the less，I take this to be a basically terminological issue.For since labor power is certainly not a value if it remains latent，and if it is not transposed into real work but rather only operates in this value-forming work，then one can employ labor for all purposes of calculation and expression.Furthermore，this situation is not changed by the consideration that the values consumed as subsistence are not produced by labor but by labor power and therefore only labor power as the bearer of these values can itself be a value. Therefore，the means of subsistence cannot be the sufficient cause of the value realized by human beings because this value exceeds that invested in the former since it can otherwise never supply an increase in value.The division between labor power and labor is important only for the purposes of socialism，because it illustrates the theory that the worker retains only a part of the value that he produces.His work produces more values than are invested in his labor power in the form of means of subsistence.In so far as the employer purchases the whole of the labor power for the value of the means of subsistence，he profits from the whole of the surplus by which the ultimate product of labor exceeds this value.But even viewed from this standpoint，it seems to me that one could，instead of labor power，characterize labor itself as value and separate out from one another the amounts whose values comprise，on the one hand，a wage to the worker and，on the other，the employer's profit.I wish not to go into this any further here but to investigate in what follows only the more immediate evaluation with which the labor theory of value confronts us so frequently.It searches for a concept of labor that is equally valid for manual and mental labor and，in so doing，actually appeals to manual labor as the primary value or value-producing entity that is valid as the measure of work as a whole.It would be erroneous to see in this merely proletarian spite and fundamental depreciation of intellectual achievements.On the contrary，deeper and more varied causes are at work here.

The Unpaid Contribution Of Mental Effort

With regard to the share of the intellect in work，it is first of all asserted that it is not a‘cost’，since it requires no compensation owing to depreciation and therefore does not raise the costs of the product.Thus，only manual labor is left as the foundation of exchange value.If，on the contrary，one emphasizes that mental energy is also creative and must be maintained and compensated for by nourishment to exactly the same degree as labor power，then the element of truth is overlooked that this theory may be the basis for this view，even if only as an instinctive feeling.The share of the intellect in a product of labor implies two aspects that must be sharply distinguished.If a joiner makes a chair according to a well tried model，then this is certainly not accomplished without a share of mental activity.The hand must be directed by the mind.Yet this is by no means all the mental activity that is invested in the chair.It could also not be produced without the mental activity of those who，perhaps generations ago，had invented such a design.The mental energy used here also forms a practical precondition for this chair.However，the content of this second mental process exists in a further form that no longer involves any mental expenditure of energy，namely as tradition，as objectiviated thought which anyone can take up and reflect upon.In this form it affects the production process of the contemporary joiner and forms the content of the real mental function，which，of course，must be carried on and completed by its subjective power and by means of which it enters into the product as its form.The two mental activities of which I first spoke are quite certainly subordinated to the depreciation and the necessity of physiological compensation：both that of the joiner and that of the inventor of the chair.But the third mental factor that is certainly decisively important for the present production of the chair is indeed removed from potential consumption，and on the basis of the plan of this chair thousands of copies can be produced.The plan itself thereby suffers no depreciation，requires no restoration and certainly does not increase the cost of such chairs even though it constitutes the form-giving，material-intellectual content of each individual chair of this type.If one distinguishes with the necessary precision between the objective-mental content contained in a product and the subjective-mental function that produces the product according to the model of its content，then one can see the relative justification for the assertion that mental activity has no cost.One can，of course，also see the relative injustice of this assertion，since this uncompensatable and unusable notion of the object is itself realized not in products but only by means of an intellect which demands this idea of the appropriate functioning of organic energy and contributes to the cost value of the product on the same grounds as does manual labor even though the mental expenditure that is associated with such a preformed content is much less than if it had，at the same time，originally produced this content.The difference between the two is the gratuitous achievement of the mind.And it is this ideal factor that so completely distinguishes mental from economic possession in two respects：on the one hand，it can be so much more basic；on the other，it can be so much less accepted than the latter.The thought that has been once expressed can no longer be captured again by any amount of power in the world；its content is irrevocably the public property of all who apply the mental energy necessary to recall it.By the same token，however，once it has appeared，it cannot be stolen again by any amount of power in the world.Once expressed，the thought remains indivisibly bound up with the personality as a constantly reproducible content in a manner that has no analogy in the economic sphere.In so far as，in terms of its content，the intellectual process possesses this supraeconomic importance，and as such constitutes the psychological process，we are obviously concerned here only with the latter，with the question of the role that the mental expenditure of energy plays in the creation of value alongside manual labor.

The reduction of the importance of mental labor to that of physical labor is ultimately only one side of the whole general tendency to produce a unified concept of labor.What has to be discovered is the common factor in all the diverse types of labor-a much broader and more differentiated diversity than is expressed in the mere opposition of physical and mental labor.If this were achieved，then an extraordinarily large theoretical and practical gain would be made，as much in fact as the gain from the existence of money.One would then gain the general，qualitative unit on the basis of which all value relationships between the results of human activity could be expressed purely quantitatively through greater or smaller amounts.In all spheres this has implied the basic progress of knowledge，namely that the qualitative weighing of objects one with another，which always remains a relatively uncertain and inexact process，is transferred to a quite unambiguous quantitative process in which a universal internal unit is secured in the objects.This unit is universally the same and self-evident and no longer has to be considered in the calculation of the relative importance of individual elements.From the socialist standpoint，this is clearly a mere extension and consequence of the attempt to reduce all values as a whole to the economic sphere as their starting point and their substance.Such an attempt must necessarily follow from this standpoint if its leveling tendency is thought out to its conclusion.For in the economic sphere one can at least conceive of an equality of individuals as being possible；in all other spheres the intellectual，emotional，character，aesthetic，ethical，etc.-the quality of the‘means of labor’is，from the very outset，hopeless.If，none the less，one wishes to undertake this task，then there is no other possibility than to somehow reduce these interests and qualities to that which alone permits an approximate uniformity of distribution.I am well aware that present-day scientific socialism rejects mechanical-communist egalitarianism and merely wishes to establish an equality of conditions of work out of which the diversity of talent，strength and effort would also lead to a diversity of position and satisfaction.Despite the present situation in which hereditary descent，class distinction，the accumulation of capital and all the possible chances of economic opportunities produce much greater corresponding distances than do individual differences in activities，this would，in fact，mean not only a basic equalization in every respect but also the equalization of the elements of ownership and satisfaction which seem to me today still to be the genuine effective means of agitation for the masses.If historical materialism is made the scientific demonstration of the socialist doctrine，then what is of concern here，as so often，is the systematic construction of the path that is the reverse of that of the creative movement of thought.Therefore socialist theory has not been logically derived from the independendy established historical materialism；rather，the practically established socialisticcommunistic tendency must furthermore first produce the only base that is possible for it：it must declare economic interests to be the source and common denominator of all others.Once this has taken place，however，the same tendency in the economic sphere must itself then be pursued，and the diversity of its contents reduced to a unity which，over and above all individual achievements，asserts the possibility of an equalization and an externally verifiable equitableness.

Differences In Types Of Labour As Quantitative Differences

For the assertion that the value of all valuable objects rests upon their labor costs still does not suffice for this purpose.It would still be possible to unify the qualitative diversity of labor in such a manner that a smaller amount of higher labor formed a similar or higher value to a considerably larger amount of lower labor.In so doing，however，a completely different scale of value would be introduced than the one considered here.The decisive qualities of specialization，intellectuality and complexity would certainly still be produced both with and in labor，but would be realized as a mere attribute of that labor.Yet the element of value itself would rest no longer upon labor as labor but upon the order of qualities constructed according to a quite independent principle for which labor as such，which is the general element of all labor qualities，would still be only the irrelevant agent.In this way，the labor theory would be confronted with the same dilemma that underlies the doctrines of moral philosophy，namely that the production of happiness is the absolute ethical value.That is，if trade is really moral to the extent that it results in happiness，then this means a breakdown of principle and the introduction of new specific elements of value if the purer，more intellectual，more exclusive happiness is priced as being the more valuable.For then one could conceive of the situation in which such happiness，though quantitative-i.e.considered as mere happiness-would be less than that of a lower，sensuous，selfish happiness，despite the fact that the former would be morally more worth striving for.The ethical theory of happiness is therefore consistent only when all the ethical distinctions between moral and intellectual，epicurean and ascetic，egotistic and altruistic happiness in the last instance-all accompanying and related-phenomena—are taken into account as the mere quantitative distinctions of one and the same-qualitatively always the same-type of happiness.Equally，a consistent labor theory must be able to sustain the view that all the unambiguously experienced and indisputable value distinctions between two achievements that appear both as labor-extensive and intensive only means，in the last instance，that more labor is concentrated in the one than in the other，that only a first and fleeting glance would take them to be the same amounts of labor，but thata deeper penetrating view actually reveals more or less labor as the basis of their greater or lesser value.

In fact，this interpretation is not as deficient as it at first sight appears to be.One need only interpret the concept of labor widely enough.Firstly，if one views labor solely with reference to its individual agents，then it is evident that in some‘higher’labor product it is in no way the case that only that amount of labor is invested in it that can be directly applied to this particular product.Rather，the whole prior efforts without which the present relatively easier production would be impossible must be included in the calculation on a pro rata basis as labour necessary for its production.Of course，the‘work’of a musical virtuoso at an orchestral concert is often less in relation to its economic and ideal assessment.However，the situation is completely different if one includes in the calculation the efforts and the extent of the preparation as the precondition for the immediate performance of this amount of labor.Thus，in countless other instances of higher labor，a form of more labor is implied.Yet this does not lie in the sensory perceptibility of momentary exertion but rather in the condensation and accumulation of previous achievements and the present performance of exertions so conditioned；in the playful ease with which the master solves his tasks an infinitely greater labor effort can be embodied than in the sweat that the bungler must shed in order to perform a much lower task.However，this interpretation of the qualitative distinctions of labor as quantitative ones can be extended to the merely personal pre-conditions.For certainly this interpretation is inadequate for reducing，in the specified manner，those qualities of labor that gain their high estimation through an inherited gift or through the good will of the objective pre-conditions that offer themselves.At this point，one must make use of a hereditary hypothesis which of course，here as elsewhere，where it specifically enters into inherited qualities，only offers a very general line of thought.If we were to accept the enlarged explanation of instinct，namely that it emerges out of the accumulated experiences of ancestors，that these have led to specific efficient co-ordinations of nerves and muscles and are inherited in this form by the offspring in such a manner that for them the efficient effect upon the necessary nervous stimulation results purely mechanically and without requiring their own experience and practice-if we were to accept this explanation，then one could view the particular inborn inheritance as an especially fortuitous instance of instinct.This example is one in which the accumulation of such physically assimilated experiences resolutely results in a specific direction and in such a stratification of the elements that the slightest disturbance calls forth a fruitful interaction of important and efficient functions.The fact that a genius needs to learn so much less than the average person for a similar achievement，that a genius knows things that they have not experienced-this wonder seems to indicate an exceptionally full and easy impressive co-ordination of inherited energies.If one traces this inheritance sequence far enough back and makes clear that all experiences and accomplishments within the same series can be gained and developed further only through real labours and through practicing，then the individual distinctiveness of the genius's achievement also appears as the condensed result of the work of generations.The‘well-endowed’person would，consequently，be the one in whom a maximum of his predecessors’work is accumulated in a latent form that is designed for further accumulation.Thus，the higher value that the labor of such a person possesses because of its quality also rests，in the last instance，upon a quantitatively larger amount of labour that of course he personally does not have to perform but rather that the quality of its organization makes possible further results.If we presuppose the same actual labor effort on the part of the individual，then the achievement would be distinctively higher in so far as the structure of its psychic-physical system embodied with noticeably greater ease a distinctively greater sum of experiences and abilities gained by the ancestors.And if one were to express the amount of value of the achievements not through the amount of labor necessary but through the‘socially necessary labor time’for their production，then this too would not avoid the same interpretation：that the higher value of achievements containing special endowments means that society must always live through and function for a specific longer period before it can again produce a genius.It requires the longer period of time，which determines the value of the achievement，not，in this case，for its immediate production but for the production of-though appearing only in relatively longer intervals-the producers of such achievements.

The same reduction can also result in objective change.The higher valuation of the results of labor from the same subjective effort occurs not only as a result of personal talent；rather，there are specific categories of labor which，from the outset，represent a higher value than others，so that the individual achievement within one category requires neither more effort nor more talent than is contained within another in order，none the less，to acquire a higher status.We are well aware that countless work activities in the‘higher professions’in no way place higher claims upon the subject than they do upon‘lower1 ones；that workers in coal mines and factories must often possess a circumspection，a capacity for resignation，a defiance of death which raises the subjective value of their achievement far above that of many bureaucratic occupations or those requiring education；that the achievement of an acrobat or a juggler requires exactly the same perseverance，proficiency and talent as that of some pianists who do not ennoble their manual dexterity with an admixture of spiritual depth.None the less，it appears to be the case not only that we reward the one category of labour much more highly in relation to the other，but also that in many cases a socially unprejudiced sense of value goes in the same direction.With full awareness of the same or higher subjective labor that a product requires，one will none the less award the other a higher status and value so that it at least appears as if other elements than the amount of labor determine its evaluation.This illusion is certainly not insuperable.One can，for instance，place the working capacities of higher cultures on a series of levels according to what amount of labor is already accumulated in the objective，technical pre-conditions on the basis of which individual work is at all possible.In order for there to be higher positions at all in a hierarchy of officials，an immense amount of work in administration and in general culture must，first of all，already have been achieved，a labor whose spirit and results increase the possibility of a necessity for such positions.Secondly，each individual activity on the part of higher functionaries presupposes the preparatory work of many subordinates that is concentrated in it.Thus，the quality of such work can emerge only through a very large amount of work that has already been carried out and which contributes to the higher form.Certainly，compared with‘unqualified’labor，all qualified labor as such in no way rests solely upon the higher education of the worker but rests equally upon the higher and more complicated structure of the objective conditions of work，of materials and the historical-technical organization.Similarly，however mediocre the pianist may be，he requires such an old and broad tradition，such an immense supra-individual supply of technical and artistic labor products，that of course these，in their collective ennoblement of his work，extend far beyond the possibly subjectively much more considerable talents of the tightrope walker or the conjurer.The same is true more generally.What we treasure as the higher achievements-viewed solely according to the category of the occupation and without personal elements affecting their level-are those achievements that，in the development of culture，have been relatively conclusively and almost completely prepared over a long period of time.Within such achievements is included a maximum amount of work on the part of predecessors and contemporaries rather than of their technical pre-conditions，however unjust it may be to award a particularly high payment or estimation for the fortuitous holder of such talents that are derived from this emergent value in view of the completely supra-personal origins of the objective performance.It is also quite evident that this measure is not closely adhered to.The valuation of performances and products based upon such talents are transferred to others unworthy of this title-whether because of external-formal similarity，because of historical association with them，or because the holders of the particular occupation use a social power that flows from other sources in order to increase its estimation.Without considering such coincidences that result from the complexities of historical life，it would he not at all possible to maintain a single basic connection in social matters.It seems to me that，by and large，one can maintain the view that the diverse valuation of qualities of performance embodying the same subjective labor effort none the less expresses the diversity of amounts of labor that are contained in the particular achievements in a mediated form.In this manner，the gain for the theoretical unification of economic values，from which the labor theory commences，is provisionally secured.

In this way，however，only the general concept of labor becomes relevant and the theory therefore rests upon a very artificial abstraction.One could counter it with the view that it rests upon the typical illusion that original labor and fundamental labor as such exist，and exist primarily，to a certain extent as second-order determinations，and its specific qualities enter into it in order to make them determine it；as if those qualities by means of which we characterize an action as labour as such did not，with their remaining determinations，form a complete unity，as if each distinction and rank order did not rest upon a completely arbitrarily drawn demarcation line！It is just as if man was straightaway man as such and then，in real distinction from this，was straightaway the determinate individual！Of course，this is a common error and has been made the basis of social theories.The concept of labour with which the whole previous argument is concerned is，in fact，only determined negatively as that which remains after one has removed everything from all types of labor that distinguishes them from each other.In fact，however，what remains left over in no way corresponds to the physical concept of energy-as a tempting analogy might suggest-which，in its quantitative invariateness，can sometimes appear as heat，as electricity，as mechanical motion.Indeed，a mathematical expression is possible here which represents the common element of all these specific phenomena and represents them as expressions of this one basic fact.In general，however，human labor permits no such abstract but none the less determinate formulation.The assertion that all labor is simply labor and nothing else means，as the basis for the equal valuation of such labor，something so inconceivable，so abstractly empty，as the theory that each person is merely a person and therefore all are of equal value and qualify for the same rights and obligations.Thus，if the concept of labor-which in its hitherto accepted generality has given a vague feeling rather than adefinite content to its meaning-is to acquire such a definite meaning，then it requires that a greater precision be given to the real process which one understands as labour.

Manual Labor As the Unit Of Labor

I now wish to return to what has been asserted to be this ultimate concrete element of labour，namely manual labour.We investigated the accuracy of this assertion and limited its validity in the light of the evidence for the absence of a cost for mental labor.From the outset I admit that I do not simply rule out the possibility that in the future the mechanical equivalent as well as the psychic activity will be discovered.Of course，the importance of its content，its factually determined position in logical，ethical and aesthetic contexts is completely separate from all physical movements，roughly in the same manner as the meaning of a word is quite separate from its physiological-acoustic sound.Yet the energy that the organism must expend upon the thought of this content as a cerebral process is，in principle，just as calculable as that necessary for a muscular exertion.If this were to be achieved one day，then one could at least make the amount of energy necessary for a specific muscular exertion a unit of measurement on the basis of which the mental use of energy would be determined.Mental labor would then be dealt with on the same footing as manual labor，and its products would enter into a merely quantitative balancing of value with those of the latter.This，of course，is a scientific utopia which can only prove that the reduction of all scientifically calculable labor to manual labor does not itself need to contain，even for a by no means dogmatic-materialistic standpoint，the basic absurdity with which the dualism of intellectuality and corporality appears to strike this attempt.

In a somewhat more concrete manner，the following conception seems to approach the same goal.I start out from the fact that our means of subsistence is produced through physical labor.Yet no work is purely physical；all manual labor becomes a practical achievement only through an effective consciousness，so that the work that prepares the pre-conditions for higher mental labor itself already contains an admixture of an intellectual kind.However，this psychic achievement of the manual laborer is，for its part，made possible only through the means of subsistence.Specifically，the more mental the worker is，that is the more negligible the intellectual element of his work is in relation to manual activity，the more is his means of subsistence（in the broadest sense）produced by essentially physical labor-with one exception that pertains to the modem period and which is to be dealt with in the next chapter.Since this relationship is repeated only in these two categories of labor，this results in an infinite series out of which mental labor can certainly never vanish but in which it is pushed back further and further.Thus the means of subsistence of the highest categories of labor also rests upon a series of labor activities in which the mental admixture of each member is borne by a member of purely physical value，so that each，at the last stage，approaches the marginal value of zero.It may also be imagined that，in principle，all external pre-conditions for mental labor are expressible in quantities of manual labor.If the old theory of cost value were recognized as being valid，then the value of mental labor，in so far as it equals the costs of its production，would be the same value as certain manual activities.Perhaps this theory is tenable in a modified form.The value of a product is certainly not to be equated with its costs，although the values of two products could relate to one another as those of their conditions of emergence.A psyche，fed and stimulated by the means of subsistence，will yield products，the value of which may exceed that of their used up pre-conditions by many times.In this way，however，the value relationship of two complexes of pre-conditions could still be the same as that of two products-just as the values of two crop yields，of which each is a multiple of its seed，can so relate to one another like the values of the seeds；for the factor that increases value could be a constant for the average of persons.If all these presuppositions were true，then the reduction of mental to physical labor would be achieved in the sense that one could certainly express not the absolute but the relative value importance of that of the former through specific relations of the latter.

Yet the assumption that the level of value of mental activity should relate proportionally to the value of the means of subsistence appears to be completely paradoxical，even meaningless.None the less，it pays to seek out the point at which reality at least approximates to it because this reaches down into the internal and cultural relationships of intellectual values to their economic preconditions and equivalents.We must surely imagine that，as the focal point of organic development，a very large amount of energy lies stored up in the brain.The brain is certainly capable of giving out a large amount of energy which，among other things，explains the astonishing efficiency of weaker muscles which can be set in motion by mental impulses.The great exhaustion of the whole organism after intellectual labors or changes also indicates that mental activity，viewed from the standpoint of its physical correlate，consumes a very large amount of organic energy.The restoration of this energy is achieved not only through a mere increase in the level of the subsistence that the manual worker requires，since the capacity of the body is quite considerably restricted with regard to the amount of nourishment it can consume，and for predominantly mental labor this is reduced rather than increased.Therefore the restoration of energy，just like the necessary nervous stimulation of mental labor，can as a rule be achieved only through a concentration，refinement and individual adaptation of the means of life and the general conditions of life.Two culturally and historically significant elements are important here.Our daily means of existence were selected and developed in a period in which the common life conditions differed sharply from the present ones for intellectual strata in which manual labor and fresh air predominated over nervous tension and a sedentary mode of life.The countless direct and indirect digestive illnesses on the one hand，the hasty search for concentrated and easily assimilable foodstuffs on the other，indicate that the adaptation between our bodily constitution and our means of nourishment has broken down to a considerable extent.From this very general observation it is obvious how justified it is for people with very different occupations to require different nourishment and that it is not merely a matter of gastronomy but of the health of the people for the most highly developed worker to secure the means for an above-normal，specialized diet that is also determined by personal needs.More important，however，and at the same time more concealed，is the fact that mental labor extends much more into the whole of life and is surrounded by a much wider periphery of mediated relationships than is manual labor.The conversion of bodily energy into work can，as it were，occur immediately，whereas mental energies in general can achieve their complete task only if，quite apart from their immediate-real milieu，the whole complicated system of bodily-mental dispositions，impressions and impulses are contained in a specific organization，tone and proportion of rest and movement.Even to those who，in principle，wish to reduce mental and manual labor to the same level，it would appear trivial to say that the higher reward for the intellectual worker is justified by the physiological pre-conditions for his activity.

In this context，it is evident that the modem intellectual person seems to be so much more dependent upon his milieu than was the case previously，and this is true not only in the sense that，educationally，he is qualitatively more specialized but also in the sense that the development of his specific energies，his internal productivity，his personal quality is not possible without particularly favorable conditions of life that suit him as an individual.The unbelievably humble circumstances under which，in earlier times，a highly intellectual life often developed would be oppressive to the vast majority of presentday intellectual workers.They would not find in such circumstances the encouragements and stimulants that they need-sometimes each one—different from the other-for their individual production.This is completely at odds with any epicureanism and perhaps arises—as the genuine pre-condition for achievement——on the one hand out of the enlarged sensitivity and weakness of the nervous system and on the other out of the accentuated individualization which cannot react upon that simple，that is，typical general life-stimulus，but rather emerges only out of specifically individualized stimuli.If the most recent times have implemented the historical milieu theory as the most decisive，then here too real circumstances，through their exaggeration of one element，may have opened up to us the view of its reality at the levels of its more limited development-in exactly the same way as the real increased importance of the masses in the nineteenth century first became the occasion for making us scientifically aware of their importance in all earlier epochs as well.In that these circumstances exist，there really is a certain proportion between the values that we consume and those that we produce；that is，the latter，as intellectual achievements，are functions of muscular inputs which are invested in the former.

The Value Of Physical Activity Reducible To That Of Mental Activity

However，this possible reduction of the values of mental labor to those of physical labor is very soon confronted with limitations from many sides.First of all，this proportion is certainly not reversible.Very considerable personal expenditures belong to specific achievements，but such expenditures for their part do not everywhere produce these achievements.The untalented person，transposed to equally favorable and refined living conditions，will none the less never achieve what the talented person can achieve under the same conditions.The series of products thus could be a constant function of the series of expenditures only if the latter resulted in the circumstance of natural personal talents.Yet if the impossible itself were to occur-namely that personal talents were permitted to be exactly produced and an ideal adaptation，measured exactly according to this establishment of the means of subsistence，were to be made the index of the extent of achievements-then this undertaking would always find its limits in the lack of equivalence in the conditions of existence which themselves exist between persons qualified for the same performances.Herein lies one of the major limitations upon social justice.Just as it is certain that，in general，the higher intellectual achievement also requires better living conditions，so human talents in the very claims that the development of their highest energies make are themselves extremely unequal.Of two natures that are capable of an objectively similar achievement，the one must necessarily，according to its level，have a completely different milieu，completely different material preconditions，completely different stimuli for the realization of this possibility compared with the other.This fact，which establishes an irreconcilable disharmony between the ideals of quality and justice and the maximization of tasks，is still by no means sufficiently taken into account.The diversity of our.physicalmental structures，the relationships between efficient and restricting energies，the interaction between the intellect and the nature of the will results in the fact that the achievement，as a product of the personality and its living conditions，finds a highly inconsistent factor in the former，so that，in order to produce the same result，the other factor must also suffer particularly large variations.And it certainly seems as if these natural differences in relation to the conditions of realization of their inner possibilities are more considerable the higher，the more complex and the more intellectual is the sphere of achievement.The people who possess only muscle power for a specific work activity will require for its realization roughly the same nourishment and general standard of life.However，where leading，intellectual abstract activities are in question，the diversity between all those who ultimately could achieve the same comes to the fore as being important.

Personal talent is so variable that the same external circumstances act upon it，produce the most diverse end results and thereby make the comparison of one individual with another，of each value proportion between the material conditions of life and the mental achievements built upon them completely illusory.Only where major historical epochs or whole classes of people can be compared with one another as averages can the relative extent of physically creatable conditions exhibit the same relationship as that of mental achievements.Thus，for example，one can observe that，where very low prices for necessary foodstuffs prevail，the culture as a whole progresses only slowly and luxury articles，in which a considerable amount of mental labor is invested，are extremely dear.In contrast，increases in the price of basic foodstuffs usually go hand in hand with a reduction in the price and further increase in luxuries.It is characteristic of lower cultures that indispensable foodstuffs are very cheap whereas higher means of life are very expensive，as is still the case，for example，in Russia in comparison with central Europe.The cheapness of bread，meat and shelter，on the one hand，does not create the pressure that forces the worker to struggle for higher wages，whereas the expensiveness of luxury goods，on the other hand，pushes these goods completely out of his view and prevents their dissemination.It is primarily making dear what was originally cheap and making cheap what was originally dear-I have already shown the connection between the two that implies and brings about an increase in intellectual activities.Beneath all the enormous incommensurability of individual elements，these proportions none the less reveal a general relationship-one that takes effect in these individual elements-between physical and mental labor that would certainly allow the amount of value of the latter to be expressed through the former if its effectiveness were not drowned out by the much stronger force of individual differences in talent.Finally，there is a third standpoint from which the reduction of all labor value to the value of manual labor reveals its crude and plebeian character.If we look more closely upon what it is that really makes physical labor valid as value and expenditure，then it follows that this is certainly not a pure physical achievement of strength.By this I do not mean what has already been referred to，namely，that as such this would be quite useless for human purposes without a certain intellectual guidance.From this standpoint，however，the mental element remains a mere value admixture and the genuine value could still reside in the purely physical except that，in order to receive the necessary guidance，it would require this additional element.Rather，I mean that physical labor acquires its whole tone of value and valuable ness only through the expenditure of mental energy embodied in it.If all work，viewed externally，implies the overcoming of obstacles，the formation of matter into a form that it did not originally possess but that it at first resisted，then the internal side of work exhibits the same form.Work is certainly effort，burden and difficulty.Therefore，where it is none of these things it is usual to assert that it is not really work at all.Viewed from the standpoint of its meaning for the emotions，work consists of the progressive overcoming of the impulse towards laziness，enjoyment and the relaxation of life.In this context it is irrelevant that this impulse，if one really continuously gave way to it，would similarly make life into a burden.For the burden of not working is experienced only in the rarest exceptional cases whereas the burden of working is almost always felt.Therefore no one is accustomed to taking on the pain and effort of work upon themselves without receiving something for it in exchange.What is actually rewarded for work，the legal title on the basis of which one demands a reward for it，is the mental expenditure of energy that is required in order to discipline oneself and overcome the internal feelings of constraint and aversion.

Language well illustrates this state of affairs in that it characterizes both the external economic and the internal moral results of our action as earnings.For in the latter sense too this certainly already enters into the situation if the moral impulse has overcome the restrictions of temptation，egoism and sensuousness but not if the moral action stems from a completely self-evident drive that，from the very outset，excludes the possibility of its opposite.Thus，in order for the moral ideals not to deny the moral earnings，the structure of myth among peoples everywhere allows their religious founder to conquer a‘temptation’and every Tertullian holds the glory of God to be greater si laboravit. Just as the real moral value connects with the restriction that is overcome in a contradictory impulse，so too does economic value connect in the same way.If man performed his work in the same way as the flower performs its flowering or the bird its singing，then no remunerative value would be attached to it.The reason for this lies not only in its external appearance，in the visible act and result，but also，in the case of physical labor，in the expenditure of will，in emotional reflexes-in short，in the conditions of the soul.Thus we gain the completion of the basic knowledge at the other end of the economic series，namely that all value and all the importance of objects and their possession lies in the feelings that they evoke；that their possession would be indifferent and meaningless as a mere external relationship if it did not include internal factors，emotions of desire，the elevation and expansion of the self.In this way the visibility of economic goods is limited from both sides-that of obtaining them and of enjoying them-by mental facts which alone ensure that an equivalent is demanded for the single achievement.However inessential and unconnected an object of possession that does not extend into a psychic emotion may be to us，it would be the suitable action for us if it did not arise out of an internally felt state of affairs whose aversion and sense of sacrifice alone bore within itself the demand for a remuneration and its measure.With reference to value，one can thus say that physical labor is mental labor.An exception to this could only be those forms of work that man accomplishes as a competitor to the machine or animals.For although these，like all others，conduct themselves in relation to internal exertion and the mental expenditure of energy，they none the less have no reason to improve in any way upon this internal achievement，since the only external effect that is important to them is also attainable through a purely physical potentiality，and cost-conscious production will never be rewarded so long as a cheaper one is possible.But at a slightly deeper level，perhaps this exception to the all-inclusiveness of the external may also be traced back through the soul.What is rewarded in the achievements of a machine or an animal is certainly the human achievement which is inserted into the invention，manufacture and control of the machine，and the rearing and training of the animal.Thus one can say that any human work is not rewarded in the same way as this physical sub-human work，but on the contrary the latter is，as it were，indirectly valued as mental-human work.This is only a practical extension of the theory that ultimately we also interpret the mechanism of inanimate nature according to the feelings of strength and exertion that guide our movements.If we insert our own essence into the general order of nature in order to understand it in its context，then this is possible only because we already place the forms，impulses and feelings of our intellectuality in nature in general and connect the‘underlay’and the‘cover’inevitably in a single act.When we extend this relationship to the world to our practical question of whether to compensate the performance of sub-human energies only through the counter-performance of human achievement，then the basic borderline becomes visible between that human work whose reward rests upon its mental element and that which，because of the similarity of its result with purely external-mechanical work，appears to reject this basis for its reward.One may therefore assert in very general terms that，from the standpoint of the value to be compensated，the distinction between mental and manual labor is not one between mental and material nature；that rather the reward is ultimately required in the latter case only for the internal aspect of work，for the aversion to exertion，for the conscription of will power.Of course，this intellectuality，which is，as it were，the thing-in-itself behind the appearance of work and which forms its interior value，is not really intellectual but resides in emotion and the will.It follows from this that it is not co-ordinated with mental labor but rather is its basis.For at first the objective content of the intellectual process，the result separated off from the personality，the demand for reward is produced not in it but in the subjective function guided by the will that it embodies，the work effort，the expenditure of energy that it requires for the production of this intellectual content.In that an act of the soul is revealed to be the source of value not only from the standpoint of what is taken up but also of what is achieved，physical and‘mental’labor contain a common-one might say，morally value grounding base through which the reduction of labor value as such to physical labor loses it philistine and brutal materialistic appearance.This is roughly the case with theoretical materialism which acquires a completely new and more seriously discussable basis if one emphasizes that matter itself is also a conception ，not an essence which，outside us in the absolute sense，stands opposed to the soul but which in its cognoscibility is completely determined by the forms and presuppositions of our intellectual organization.From this standpoint，on the basis of which the basic distinction between material and mental phenomena becomes a relative instead of an absolute one，the claim to search for the explanation of mental phenomena in the restricted sense in their reduction to material phenomena is much less unacceptable.Here，as in the case of practical value，the external must only be freed from its rigidity，isolation and opposition to the internal in order for it to form the simplest expression and unit of measure for higher‘intellectual’things.This reduction may or may not be successful.Yet its assertion is at least compatible，in principle，with methodological demands and the fundamental composition of value.

Differences In The Utility Of Labor As Arguments Against‘Labor Money’

These comments not only prove that the equivalent for work is exclusivelyrelated to the amount of muscular activity but also eliminate certain considerations that are commonly brought against this connection.None the less，a difficulty is encountered which seems to me to be insurmountable.This has its origin in the quite trivial objection that valueless，superfluous work also exists.For the refutation，according to which one naturally subsumes under labour as the fundamental value only efficient work justified through its result，contains an admission that is fatal for the whole theory.That is，if valuable and valueless labour exist，then undoubtedly intermediate stages，amounts of labor undertaken also exist which contain some but not distinct elements of purpose and value.Thus，the value of a product which，it is presupposed，is determined by the labour invested in it is greater or smaller according to the efficiency of this labour.This means，however，that the value of labour is measured not by its amount but by the utility of its result！And here the method sought to deal with the quality of labour is no longer helpful.The higher，more specialized，more intellectual labour indeed implies，compared with lower labour，more labour；it implies an accumulation and concentration of exactly the same general‘labour’of which crude and unqualified labour only represents，as it were，a larger dilution，a lower potentiality.For this distinction of types of labour was an internal one which allowed the question of utility to be left completely aside and one in which the utility Of the labour in question was always presupposed to exist in it in increasingly similar amounts.From this perspective，the work of the street-sweeper is no less‘useful’than that of the violinist and its lower estimation arises out of its inner quality as mere labour，out of the lower condensation of labour energies in it.This shows，however，that this presupposition was too simple and that the diversity of external utility did not allow the distinc tions in the evaluation of labour to be independent of their merely internal determinations.If one could create and produce from the world the useless labour，or more accurately the differences in the usefulness of labour，and show that labour is more or less useful to precisely the same extent to which it is more or less concentrated and uses energy，in a word is a greater or lesser amount of labour，then it would certainly be demonstrated that physical labour is still not the sole creator of value.However，labour as such could then exist as the standard of value of objects since its other element，that of utility，would always be the same and the value relations would no longer alter.Yet differences in utility do indeed exist，aud it is a fallacy to reversethe postulate that is perhaps ethically groundable in the statement that‘all value is labour’into the one‘all labour is value’，that is，of equal value.

This demonstrates the fundamental connection between the labour theory of value and socialism，for socialism in fact strives for a constitution of society in which the utility value of objects，in relation to the labour time applied to them forms a constant. In the third volume of Capital ，Marx argues that the precondition of all value，of the labour theory too，is use value.Yet this means that so many parts of the total social labour time are used in each product as come in relation to its importance in use.It thus presupposes a qualitative unified total societal need-accordingly，to the motto of the labour theory，that labour is indeed labour and as such is of equal value，is here added the further motto，that need is indeed need and as such of equal value-and the equivalence of utility for all labour is reached only in so far as only that amount of labour is performed in eaeh sphere of prodrction that exactly covers the part of each need that is circumscribed by it.On the basis of this presupposition of course no labour Would be less useful than any other.For if one holds，for example，that today piano playing is a less useful task than locomotive construction，then the reason for this lies merely inthe fact that more time has been applied to it than the real need subsequently required.If it were limited to the measure outlined here，then it would be just as valuable as locomotive construction-just as the latter would also be useless if one applied more time to it，that is built more locomotives than are subsequently needed.In other words，there is，in principle ，no distinction in use value at all.For if a product momentarily possesses less use value than another（that is if the labour applied to the former is tess valuable than that applied to the latter），then one can simply continue to reduce labour to its category，that is the quantity of its production，until the need for it is just as great as that of the other object，that is until the‘industrial reserve army’is completely wiped out.Only under these conditions can labour truly express the amount of value of a product.

The essence of all money， however，is its unconditional interehangeability，the internal uniformity that makes each piece exchangeable for another，according to quantitative measures.For there to be hbour money，labour must create this interchangeability，and this can occur only in the manner already described；that is，it creates exactly the same degree of utility and this，in turn，is attainable only by the reduction of labour for each production need to that amount by which the subsequent need is exactly as great as that of any other.Of course，in so doing the actual labour time could be valued still higher or lower.But now one would be certain that the higher value，derived from the greater utility of the product，indicated proportionally more concentrated amount of labour per hour.Or conversely，it would be the case that as long as the hour partook of a higher value in the concentration of labour，it would also contain a higher amount of utility.However，this obviously presupposes a completely rationalized and providential economic order in which each labour activity regularly resulted from the absolute knowledge of needs and the labour requirements for each product-that is，an economic order such as socialism strives for.The approximation to this completely utopian state of affairs seems to be technically possible only if，as a whole，only the immediately essential，unquestionably basic life necessities arc produced.For where this is exclusively the case，one work activity is of course precisely as necessary and as useful as the next.In contrast，however，as long as one moves into the higher spheres in which，on the one hand，need and estimation of utility are inevitably more individual and，on the other，the intensity of labour is more difficult to prove，no regulation of the amounts of production could bring about a situation in which the relationship between need and labour applied was everywhere the same.On these points，all the threads of the deliberations on socialism intertwine.At this point it is clear that the cultural danger with reference to labour money is in no way so direct as it is usually judged to be.Rather，it stems from technical difficulties in holding constant the utility of things，as its basis for evaluation in relation to labour and as its agent of value-a difficulty that increases in relation to the cultural level of the product and a difficulty whose avoidance，of course，must limit production to that of the most primitive，most essential and most average objects.

This result of labor money，however，throws light most clearly upon the nature of money as such.The importance of money lies in the fact that it is a unit of value that is clothed in the plurality of values.Otherwise，the quantitative differences in the unit of money would not be equivalently experienced as the qualitative differences of things.However，this often occurs in a quite unjust manner and personal values are specifically attired in a power that extinguishes their nature.Labor money strives to escape from this condition of money and wishes to undermine money with a concept that，though it is certainly even more abstract，is none the less closer to concrete existence.By means of labour money，an eminently personal，one could even say，the personal value would become the standard of value as such.And yet it is clear that labor money，because it should none the less possess the qualities of all money-unity，fungibility，universal validity-would be more threatening to the differentiation and personal creation of life's contents than money as it already exists！If it is the incomparable power of money not to oppose the exact opposite of a desired result，if we see it serve on the one hand the suppression and on the other the often much exaggerated accentuation of personal differentiation，then it denies the attempt to make it both more concrete and even more general；it denies the attempt to establish its position，as it were，above the parties and places it on the one side of the alternative to the exclusion of others.However much one must recognize the tendency for labor money to place money back into a closer relationship to personal values，each consequence none the less shows how closely the hostility to this is bound up with its essence.

第五章 个人价值的货币等价物

第一节

偿命金

通过罚金的发展历程，货币在评价体系中的重要性是可以被测度的。我们首先要接触的就是这样一个领域，这个领域通过它自身的特殊形式来表现货币在评价体系中的重要性，即用货币来补偿谋杀罪——这种货币的补偿在原始文化中发生如此的频繁，以至于没有必要去举出那些特殊而又具体的例子，至少对其最简单、最直接的形式而言是没有必要的。然而，人们没有充分关注的并不是人的价值与金钱价值的关系支配法律概念的频率，而是它支配法律概念的程度。在早期英格兰盎格鲁一撒克逊人时代，偿命金——就是用金钱来赔偿杀人罪，也就是给遇害家属的赔偿金——甚至可以用于国王被谋杀这种情况，某法令规定只要杀人者能够支付2700先令就可以抵偿杀死国王的罪行。在那个时候，这样一笔金钱根本就是一个天文数字，是没有办法得到的。这条法令所要表达的真正意图就是，为了对杀死国王的这种行为做出补偿，杀死国王的人和他的全家都要卖身为奴隶，即使如此，正如此法令的某位解释者曾经说过的那样，变身为奴隶所能产生的补偿与死去君主的价值之间的差额是如此的巨大，以至于只有——仅仅作为货币上的债务——通过死才能抵偿。只有通过货币罚金，才能决定一个人的罪行的大小。因此，在相同的文化圈中，“七国之治”时期，一个普通自由人的典型的偿命金是两百先令，其他各阶层人员的偿命金则在这一个标准的基础上以约减或者叠加的方式计算出来。这种偿命金通过不同的方式表明，货币为人类的价值提供了一种数量上的概念。因此，即使在英国大宪章时期，人们还会发现这样的说法，骑士、男爵、伯爵之间的相互关系就如同先令、马克、英镑之间的关系一样，这是因为骑士、男爵、伯爵是按照此比例从领主那里承受和转归土地的；这种比例的概念——正如这种比例概念产生的基础一样非常典型——又是不精确的。之所以这样说，是因为这种比例的概念揭示了把人的价值简约为一种通过货币来表现的这样一种趋势是如此的强大而有生命力，以至于为了这种比例关系我们不得不损害那些客观的精确度。这种人的价值简约为货币的趋势不仅使得货币成为人的尺度，而且也使得人成为了货币价值的尺度。有时我们会碰到这样一种情况，即货币的单位被用作一个总量来为杀人者进行赔偿。按照格林的说法，“理想的杀人犯赔偿金”就意味着：我已经杀了人或者伤害了别人，因此，我成为一个悔过者。按照习惯法中那些赔偿的计算，先令是一种基本的罚金。从“skillan”的词源或者是它的意义中，人们可以推断“先令（shilling）”这个词本身就意味着一种简单的惩罚。在偿命金里，人的价值被认为是罚金体系中等级划分的原则，同时也是货币价值的决定性基础。这有些类似于这样一种情形：在贝都因人——穆罕默德把他们并入伊斯兰教——那里，偿命金的标准化比率是100头骆驼，同时这个标准化比率也被用做那些比较典型的罪犯的赎金以及婚嫁时的费用。很显然，货币罚金的作用不仅仅是被强加在那些杀人犯的身上，在那些非杀人的冒犯性行为中，罚金也起着相同的作用。在法兰西王国墨洛温王朝时期，1先令不再是40便士而只是12便士。人们也许能够推测出这一变化的原因，在那个时候，先令为单位而定的罚金被减少了，法律规定无论何时被征收1先令罚金时，罚款不是40便士，而是12便士。从这里就演变出了1先令等于12便士的说法，以至于后来这种说法被普遍接受。据说在帕劳群岛，任何形式的交款都被称为罚金。在帕劳群岛，人们不是用不同数量的货币来作为决定违法犯罪严重程度的度量，恰恰相反，是通过对违法行为的评价产生了货币价值得以建立的尺度。

这种观察事物的方式——就谋杀的赎金而言——是建立在一种具有普遍意义的感觉的基础上的。由于货币本身缺乏像“值多少钱”这样的决定性的因素，因此它是一个完全虚空的概念，这样就决定了货币的本质属性只能完全地取决于货币的数量，对于货币本身而言，至关重要的，并且最为本质的是：每一种货币体系都拥有它的货币单位，而这种货币单位的增加或者分裂就代表着具体的货币价值。如果没有了这种货币的数量对货币的本质属性的决定关系，什么货币体系也建立不起来，在技术上这种决定性被优化为“货币制度标准”，它是构成货币数量关系的绝对基础，在这种基础上，才可能进行货币交易。当然，从概念上讲，货币单位的尺度大小是完全不重要的，这是因为，不管我们需要什么样的货币数量，我们都可以通过对货币单位的拆分或者增加的方式得到。尤其在最近几个世纪，对货币单位之大小的固定，实际上部分是因为那些与该货币制度有关的历史政治原因或技术原因。然而，货币单位的数量代表了那些无论什么时候都与货币相关的所有其他事物的尺度，它实际上是整体意义上的货币的代表，为了使这种货币单位的数量能够成为它最能够体现的事物或者行为的等价物，它的大小必须与人感觉到的“中心价值”有所关联。货币单位数量的大小与人的“中心价值”相关也可以用来解释一个经常被人提及的事实，那就是，货币单位值较高的国家的生活开销比货币单位值较低的国家的生活开销要高，因此，在其他情况均为相同的条件下，使用美元的国家的生活开销比使用马克的国家昂贵，而使用马克的国家的生活开销比使法郎的国家昂贵。许多生活必需品的价值，不管其绝对值究竟是多少，就表现在这些美元、马克、法郎之类的货币单位中，或者这些不同的货币种类的组合中。货币单位既作为原因又作为结果，在一定的社会圈里依然与经济上可以解释的类型的生活价值有着深刻的关联，不管货币单位看起来与这些可以解释的生活价值之间是多么的不相干，之所以看起来不相关，是因为它可以随心所欲地增加或者拆分。1791年第一部法国宪法的相关规定正是货币单位与生活价值之间的这种联系所产生的一个结果，在这部法国宪法中，采纳了日薪作为价值标准。每一名完全符合规定的公民都必须直接交纳至少三个工作日的所得税，如果公民希望拥有投票权，那么他就需要交纳150至200个工作日的个人所得税。因此，就产生了价值理论中的一个概念，即价值的绝对标准等于他每天生活必需的花费——这种每日的必需开销对一个人来说，是其最基本的价值——它与贵重金属以及所有货币化商品价格的升降相联系。“劳动力货币”作为一种基本单位就应该等于一个小时或一天的劳动的价值。此内涵与这样一个价值单位——即由人的本质兴趣决定的一个核心的、有限定的对象——之间具有同样的意义。这种方法与使用偿命金等的人的等价物来作为基本的货币单位之间仅仅是数量的差异而已。

对人的估价从功利主义的向客观的、绝对的估价的变迁

很明显，偿命金的起源是纯粹功利主义的，虽然它不完全属于民法的范畴，它也依然属于这样一种状态，即在涉及私法与公法的时候是保持中立的，而社会的发展也正是起源于公法与私法这两种法律。部落、氏族或者家庭对于他们中的一个成员的死亡要求经济上的赔偿以作替代品，而它们愿意接受经济赔偿而不是逞一时之气进行冲动的报复。这种转化最后发生在这样一种情形之下，即那些被认为是终将会被取代的仇杀本身已经变得不可能了。在瓜希罗印第安人部落中，一些族人如果不小心伤及自身，必须要对他的家庭做出补偿，因为他流的是家族的血。在一些马来人当中，“血钱”这个词是如此的司空见惯，意为起床，站起来。“血钱”这个词反映了这样一种观念，那就是在你支付了这笔钱之后，那个被杀害的人就在他的家族中复活了，而由他的死亡所造成的空白也就被填补上了。除了给死者的亲戚一笔赔偿金之外，杀人由于破坏了众人的安宁，因此，他还需要向死者所在的群体支付一笔特殊的费用，这种做法可以追溯到很早的时候，至少日耳曼人就是这样做的。无独有偶，在一些盎格鲁一撒克逊人的王国，为了国王的生活的需要，对那些国王的家人的偿命金百姓也是需要缴纳两次的。与之相类似的就是印度的偿命金，它从王室过渡到了婆罗门阶层。随着偿命金的进一步深入发展，它偏离了私有经济起源，从一开始偿命金就包容了一种客观的、超乎个人内容之上的要素，因为它的数量是由风俗以及法律决定，尽管偿命金的数量会根据被害者社会地位的不同而变化。因此，每个人的价值从他降临的那天起就已经被确定下来了，完全无视他对亲戚而言的那种真正的价值。偿命金与通过自身做出的具体成就的数量来评价一个人的方式是有区别的，它把人当成物质来进行估价，不仅如此，偿命金还引入了这样一个概念，即不仅对他人，就是对他自身而言，他也就值这个数。对人的经济上的估价从主观到客观方式转变的这种典型现象可以通过下面的例子来进行说明。在公元三世纪左右的希伯来国家，一名男奴隶的正常价格是50舍客勒，而一个女奴隶是30舍客勒。但是由于摩西五书中提及到的奴隶值30舍客勒，而这30舍勒却被人误认为是30舍拉，于是就造成了杀死一个奴隶需要支付偿命金30舍拉（Sela）（这几乎是正常价格的两倍）。这种偿命金的规定并不是通过所造成的经济损失来计算的，而是依据非经济根源的规则——这种规则不把他们区别对待——与那种按照经济损失来缴纳偿命金的方法相比差别是巨大的。奴隶有一个确定的价值——而不管他对主人的用处是什么——的这种观念还没有稳固地建立起来。在表示奴隶用处的价格与杀死他需支付的赔偿金之间存在着不同，虽然这种区别是由于神学上的曲解造成的，但是只有它仍然暗示着一个人的特殊的经济价值可能会从一个客观的秩序中派生出来，这种客观的秩序通过那些被奴隶主所奴役的奴隶的私人用途可以派生出来对人的价值的评价。这样的一种转变现象很容易拓展到偿命金彻底变成了国家制度的情形。在许多情况中，法庭宣誓的价值被认为是与偿命金数量相对应的。并且还有一点很重要，那就是有时只有自由人才有偿命金，而农奴没有。在中世纪佛罗伦萨附近地区，我们发现对农奴有诸多不同的等级身份划分，比如说，coloni，sedentes，quilini，inquilini，adscripticii，censiti等等，主人对他们的奴役程度很有可能和偿命金恰恰是相反的，所以像这种完全依附于主人的奴役根本就没有偿命金可言。甚至晚至13世纪，为了验证证人证词的可靠性，法庭上仍然使用着这种长期以来已经过时的，并且纯粹形式化的个人价值的标准。从个人主义的功利性立场出发，如果某人越是第三者所拥有的财产，那么第三者就应该越强硬地为偿命金辩护。然而事实的发展却完全不同于此。事实是这样的：身份级别最为一个象征物与权衡个人的证词的真实性联系在一起，这都强调了偿命金已转变为个人之客观价值的表现。

这一发展过程把通过个人的功利性用途来评价个人价值的方法提升为一种客观的价值评估，而这一个过程正反映了极为常见的思维模式。倘若所有主体的人对某一客体产生的印象都是相同，那么这样一种现象只能通过这样一个事实来解释，那就是：这个被解释的主体本身就具有某种特殊品质，而这种特殊的品质就是主体所产生的那个相同的印象的内容。那些有明显区别的印象的不同之处，可能源于主体吸收了不同的对象，但是对于那些相同的印象——如果我们排除极其不可能的偶然性——只有可能产生于这样一种事实：那就是，这些客体的品质被反映到主体的头脑中，同时当然也要承认这样一个过程，那就是这只是需要进一步补充的符号化的表达。在对人的价值进行估价的领域内，这一个过程在不断地重复着。如果同一个客体在不同的情况下，不同的人对它的评价是完全不同的，那么整个评价体系看起来就像是一个随意的主观过程，这个过程会依据个人所处的环境以及性情的不同而相应的产生出不一样的结果。然而，如果不同的人对这个客体的评价是相同的，那么这样的一个结论似乎就是不可避免的了，即这个客体就值这么多。因此，如果被害人的亲属索赔的偿命金数目不一致，那么很明显表明了对这些亲属来说，他们需要弥补的个人损失是不相同的。然而，一旦对于某一个特殊阶层的偿命金数额被最终固定下来了，对那些区别很大的个人和案例都是赔同样数额的金钱，那么，在这个基础上，这个人就值这么多钱的这种观念也就产生了。索赔金额的大小在这种情形下与个人的差异性是完全无关的，这就不再允许个人在整体意义上的价值由其他人感觉到的得失来组成。人的价值就好像一种客观的品质一样存在于人的自身之中，并且可以通过货币来表达。实行固定不变的偿命金就是为了整个社会和平，同时也是为了避免那些无休止的仇杀，因此，这种目的看起来就成了对个人生命估价由最初的主观功利主义方式过渡到这样一个客观概念——人具有客观特定价值——的心理学起源。

正如我们上面所说，各种人的生命价值都可以用钱来赔偿的这种观念在人类文化史上是至关重要的，而这种观念真正转化为现实，实际上也只存在于下面的几种现象当中：这种观念毫无疑问存在于血钱和奴隶制当中，也许再加上新娘的嫁妆，而对于新娘嫁妆的问题我们稍后将会讨论。对血钱和奴隶制等问题在观念上的巨大差异使得我们目前对它们的想法变得相当陌生，而站在纯粹的经济学的立场上，这些差异巨大的观念仍可以被视为某种渐进的、数量上的差异。之所以有上述的观点——观念上的巨大差异仅仅是一种渐进的、数量上的差异，是因为在奴隶的购买过程中，奴隶的所有劳动性的服务都被奴隶主所买断，在今天的社会里，我们仍然是用钱来购买这些各式各样的不同单位的服务。在当今社会中，人们用钱去购买的仍旧是人的劳动，这种情况和先前的奴隶买卖是没有什么区别的，二者的区别在于：先前的奴隶要为我们提供完整的服务，而在当今社会，我们所要求的是一项一项的服务；还有一个区别就是：除了某人自愿卖身为奴隶这种情况以外，奴隶买卖中价钱不是支付给奴隶而是付给另一个人。当我们考虑血钱这个问题时，情况也是相同的，在当今社会中，这种赔偿金的方式与我们的感受之间没什么抵触，比如那些对身体或精神的轻微伤害的赔偿金是固定的，如诽谤或违约。甚至在当今社会中，依据某种刑法典那些不太严重的所有的违法行为都可以用钱来抵罪，举个例子来说，在纽约州、荷兰、现代日本都是这样的。从纯经济学的立场来看，杀人可以被看作是一个身体局部的麻木、能量的衰减逐渐延伸的过程，在生理学上，我们也是用同样的方式来验证死亡，就是把死亡看作是一个激烈的、延伸的过程，这个延伸的过程也有可能在“有生命的”有机体中达到某种特定的程度或者局限在身体的具体部位。

然而，这种经济学的角度并不普遍。实际上，生命价值的完全发展源于那些主流的基督教教义，并认为生命的价值是建立在人具有绝对价值的观念之上的。首先，人的经验所具有的一切细节、相对性、特别力量和表达方式都体现了“人”这种事物，“人”是一个统一而不可分割的事物，并且人的价值不可能以任何量化的标准来测度，也不可能仅仅通过另一种价值的增增减减得到补偿。因为，在血钱和奴隶制之中，他们是把人的价值与那些仅有相对的、纯数量的价值货币完全地而又绝对地等同起来，所以上述观点正是一个否认血钱和奴隶制理想基础的基本观点。可以这样说，正是由于基督教的威望，才使得人的价值得到了如此的凸显，并且基督教的观点在许多别的评价中也被预示出来了，与此同时这种对人的看法的重要性在历史上的发展过程又在很长一段时间被拖延了。这是因为教会并没有像它理应做的那样积极地反对奴隶制，实际上，教会却出于对公众和平以及避免流血牺牲等方面的考虑，反而支持用偿命金为杀人行为赎罪。虽然基督教使得人类价值变得远离那些任何的相对性以及一系列的仅仅依靠数量决定的事物，但这种远离实际上是符合基督教精神的。当我们需要辨认一种文化是高级文化还是低级文化的时候，我们只需看看用目的序列的数量和原始人的生活需要屈指可数，并且如果这些原始人要完全满足这些需求长度。只需要完成一个相对较少的一段手段序列就可以了。而对于那些不断发展的文化而言，不仅仅人们的生活需求和目标的增加，而且还引导他们去实现每一个体目标的那些手段构建也开始变得越来越高明，他们已经经常地要求这个手段是一个由前提条件连锁而成的多种形式的机制。正是由于这种关系，目的与手段这类抽象概念只能在高级文化水平上才能得以发展。只有在这种高级文化的水平上，由于难以计数的一系列目的都在寻求某种程度的整合，由于那些具体的目的不断地被那些越来越长的一系列的工具手段所移走，只有到了那时不遗余力地表现出理性与尊严的最终目标的问题以及为什么的问题才会出现。此外，文明人的生活与行为经过的是一个无穷尽的目标体系，而对于这样一个无穷的目标体系而言，他们只能掌握，甚至构想其中的一小部分，所以与原始人的那种简单素朴的存在方式相比，现代的生活的内容开始出现了令人吃惊的差异性。在终极目标的理念中，所有的事物再一次被调和在一起，但是这种终极的目标对于那些生活在混沌一片、无所区分的状态下的人而言却又是无足轻重的，对于我们这个以不统一的、碎片式的文化为特征的社会而言，终极目标代表的是和平与拯救。生存的内容被它们品质上的差异分得越散，抽象层面的东西就会越多的被移除，因此，使我们能够把生命当作一个整体来体验的终极目标之类的抽象事物也必须被移除。对终极目标的渴望不一定能通过有意识的程式清晰地阐述出来，但是这种有意识的程式却是可能存在的，它是如此的强烈，这正如存在于芸芸众生之间的那种模糊的欲望、渴望或不满足感。很明显，在人类时代的开始，古希腊一罗马文化曾经达到过这一高度。生活变成了一片由各种目的编织而成的精美纱巾，作为其结果以及人类幻想的焦点，一种伴随着巨大的力量的情感开始升腾：什么是整个生活的终极目标，最终目标会不会——如同我们追寻的所有别的事物一样——揭示出它本身就是一种纯粹的手段呢？一方面，流行于那个时代的听天由命或愤世嫉俗的悲观主义完全无意识地沉沦于那些世俗的且瞬间即逝的事物，他们根本不会去寻求一种超越经验的目的，另一方面，神秘的禁欲主义倾向是对那些完全无意识地追寻人类生活的终极目标的全面表现，同时它也是对达成终极目标可以通过的各种各样地甚至是非常艰苦的手段的一种渴望。在对这种终极目标的追寻上，基督教取得了辉煌的成就。在西方历史上，基督教第一次把一种真正的生活终极目标赋予了大众，这种终极目标是一种绝对的价值存在，完全独立于那些存在于我们的经验世界当中的所有的细节、碎片以及自相矛盾：这种基督教的终极目的就是拯救灵魂以及遵循上帝的旨意。在基督教之中，因为每一个灵魂在获得其各自的永恒不灭的拯救之后，都会具有无限的价值，所以在上帝的国度中，所有的灵魂，所有单独的个体的灵魂，即使是那些最为卑劣最为低贱的灵魂也如同那些英雄先贤的灵魂一样有着他们的空间。通过唯一的上帝对每一个灵魂的救赎关系，一切的意义、绝对性与超验性都被反映出来了。这种巨大的权威的教义宣扬了一种永恒的命运，以及灵魂具有无限的意义，而这一下子就终止了所有的那些纯粹相对的以及在价值上纯粹的数量差异。那些被基督教与灵魂的绝对价值绑在一起的终极目标的理念很明显也经历了一种特殊的转变。这正如一种需要越能得到满足，它存在的越恒久一样，基督教通过在一个相当长的时间内使人们持续不断地意识到终极目标的存在，造成人们对终极目标的根深蒂固的需求。因此，那些现在仍然拒绝基督教教义的人对于明确目标的完整存在所能留有的可能仅仅是空洞向往：也就是说这些拒绝基督教教义的人对终极目标的需求比终极目标的实现更长久。叔本华的形而上学哲学中宣称：意志是存在的本质，意志必须保持未完成的状态，因为意志是绝对的，没有什么能从事物的自身中分离出来并且还会满足它本身，并仅仅通过这样的方式来继续地掌握这种事物。叔本华的这种形而上学是对这种文化状态的非常完美地表达，这种文化状态对一个绝对的终极目的有着强烈的需求，却并没有终极目标所必需具备的内容。宗教感情的弱化，以及与此同时对此类感情极其重要的再度觉醒的需求，此二者都是这样一个事实产生的结果：即现代的人类丧失了最终目标。但是，如果我们还坚持说终极目标的涵义对人类价值的成功评价尚未失去的话，那也只能归功于基督教遗产的荣誉而已。基督教的教义宣称人的灵魂是上帝恩典的载体，所以人类的灵魂就无法用任何世俗的尺度来进行衡量，过去是这样，现在也是如此。不管这种对灵魂的解释在实际中对现实生活中的人来说是多么遥远与陌生，但是人类危如累卵之时，这种对人类灵魂的解释的影响却是无法忽视的。也许个人的命运我们可以不加考虑，但是对于人类的绝对总量我们却不能同样地不加考虑。实际上，古希伯来法律已经很明确地宣称了：人类的宗教化价值与奴隶制是完全不相容的。如果贫困迫使一名以色列人把自己变卖为族人的奴隶，那么这买主应该把这个奴隶当做是——依据雅赫威的命令——雇工而不是一个奴隶，“对于那些我所带领着走出埃及的我的仆人们，他们是不应该被当作奴隶卖掉的”。

人的价值使得无法通过纯粹的数量化的货币尺度来对人进行衡量，但是，人的价值应该有两层完全不同的涵义。人的价值一方面可以涉及一般意义上的人，而另一方面又可以涉及具体意义上的个人。比方说，因为人的个性无法进行相互间的交换时，是绝对无法替代的，所以人们就认为人的个性具有着最高的稀缺性价值，如果是这样的话，那么剩下的问题仍然是：个性价值通过这种方式是从哪些其他价值中分离出来的。倘若一个人的特殊品质是与其他所有人都不一样的，而这种特殊的品质也正决定了他的价值，那么这种稀缺性涉及的就是个体与所有其他人的关系。这种解释在部分古代和现代个人主义中是很普遍的，它不可避免地导致了对人性的等级划分。只有在这样一种情况下，人们才真正地参与到价值的绝对性之中，那就是，最低价值的代表遭遇到了最高价值的代表的情形。这也正是一些现代个人主义者为什么会对那些认为古代奴隶制是正当的看法很着迷的原因。基督教，18世纪启蒙时代（包括卢梭与康德），以及伦理的社会主义三者对人的价值的观点是截然不同的。上述的三个立场上都认为，人之所以有价值就是因为他们是人；稀缺性价值所涉及的是人的灵魂，而灵魂与任何不是灵魂的东西截然对立。在这里最至关紧要的是所有人的在绝对价值方面全都一样。因此，这个观点应该是抽象个人主义的观点——之所以“抽象”是因为它把人类总体的价值以及人类总体的绝对意义与一般概念上的人紧密联系在一起了，然后将其转移到人类的个体成员。与此相反的是，自从19世纪浪漫主义运动以来，个人主义被赋予了完全不同的内容。这种个人主义对立是这样一种情形：在18世纪个体获得了他特有的意义，而在19世纪却变成了个体与集体关系以及国家、教会、社会、行会对个人的束缚，因此19世纪对个人主义的理念就变成了个体的自由和独立，与这层涵义相联系的是接下来的个人主义强调个体之间的差异以及个人品质上的独特性。正是基于对个人主义的前一种解释模式的基础之上，“人格尊严”和“人权”才得到了发展，也正是第一种解释模式极大地决定性地为以下的情况的发展画上了句号，即为了钱出卖每一个人，以货币作为杀人的赔偿。这个个人主义的发展过程的源头一定就蕴藏在如下情形中，其中早期社会形式中的集体的束缚变得薄弱，并且在这个情形之下个人开始从同伴群体的利益中分化出来，坚持了自身的独立性。

罚金与文化发展阶段

我已经把谋杀赔偿金的发展过程追溯到了这样一种情形之下，对幸存者的实际损失的补偿应该根据幸存者的社会地位来计算，这种理念使人们逐渐形成这样一种观念：作为一个特定阶层成员的人，他的价值就等于一笔特定的偿命金。由此，该观念又有了进一步发展，其结果就是人们会产生这样一种认识——罚金不是针对其已破坏的价值而是针对其犯罪行为所出的补偿，这样一种解释不仅仅对谋杀是有效的，对于其他的严重违法行为也同样是有效的。每一种惩罚出于这种私利观念而产生的强加在罪犯身上的痛苦，不管它们后来的空想的含义离这个最初的出发点有多远，在我看来，都只有两个出发点，那就是：其一，维护社会稳定，其二，这种犯罪行为对社会和个人所造成的损失所必须履行的义务。如果人们要把惩罚追溯到报仇行为，那么在我看来报仇现象本身需要进一步的解释。这种解释仅仅从我们对自我保护的需求中就可以发现：正是这种自我保护才会迫使人们不恰当地报复那些罪犯，并且通常希望罪犯被迫接受痛苦或死亡。报仇的实用性和必要性后来发展成了某种不受约束的冲动，例如对那些搞破坏的人进行报复，这种起初仅仅是为了保护自我以免受到更大的伤害的举措，后来却演变为一种自我满足，并产生与功利主义根源完全不相干的一种冲动。最终，作为惩罚的起源的报复还可以回溯到对自己进行保护的这样一种需求之下。正是这一需求使得下面的事实可以为人所理解，即高度文明的时代要求罪犯应该表现的对人无害，而比较不文明的时代则满足于通过比较适度的赔偿金来进行补偿。在当今社会，谋杀通常是那些完全腐化堕落和道德沦丧之徒所犯下的罪行，然而在更粗鲁或更英雄主义的年代，那些杀人犯可能具有完全不同的品质，在这些人看来，他们更加感兴趣的是这样一种状态，即只有那些更加优秀而且有能力的人才应该在社会中生存。因此，在历史发展的不同阶段杀人犯的基本特征也是不同的，出于社会自我保护的原因，有时就需要处死杀人者，有时就需要通过支付偿命金来赎回犯人的性命。在这里我们所感兴趣的主要是对于损害所进行的惩罚——补偿所出现的另一个根源，即对损害的金钱赔偿。只要对犯罪者的行为结果所造成的损失是由受害人自己来实施，受害者的行为就会——除了报复的冲动之外——限定在索要对受害者的赔偿上。受害人是不会对罪犯的个人处境感兴趣的，受害人的行为将会完全被功利性所驱动，他根本不会为罪犯做任何的考虑。但是，只要某种客观的力量，诸如国家或教会之类的，开始对犯罪补赎的责任进行管理，那么上述的情况就要发生变化。因为原本仅仅是对于受害者的损失，现在已经不再仅仅是一个私人的问题了，而是上升为扰乱公众秩序或违反道德一宗教律法的公共问题了，把罪犯置于何种处境已经转变成了要采取的行动的最终目的，然而在前一种情况中，对于希望寻求赔偿的人来说，罪犯的处境是无关紧要的。只有在后一种情形中我们才谈到了完全意义上的惩罚。

现在惩罚的目的是为了影响罪犯主体自身，并且任何的实际行动的惩戒也只不过是实现这一目标而采取的手段而已。因此，与先前的因伤人和杀人而进行的货币赔偿相比，现在的罚金已经具有了完全不同的意义。现在的罚金不是为了能够对罪犯造成的损害进行补偿，而是为了使罪犯遭受痛苦。因此，在无力偿还的案例中，现代法律以监禁替代了罚款，这种变换不仅不能给国家带来货币上的收入，而且还需要国家进行相当大数量的额外支出。至于罚金仍然还会被征收，由于罪犯感受到了罚金会给他们带来主体上的反映，事实上，罚金与货币本身具有了完全不同的个体特性。这一特性被一些特殊的品质所记录，这也使得罚金产生了比其他种类的惩罚更加优秀的地方：罚金可能很高，也可能被完全废除掉，但是它不会像以前的监禁甚至更加残暴的刑法那样，使违法者变成残疾，或者使那些玩忽职守的人的劳动能力衰减，罚金反而会鼓励那些罪犯为自己造成的损失作出弥补。如果人们希望把罚金不仅仅看做是犯人罪行的替代品，而且更希望通过罚金来增加犯人的痛苦的话，那么在罚金上增添的个人内容将不会产生那样深远的影响。这种情况可以通过这样一个事实来进行阐明，举个例子来说，在当今社会之中，被判罚支付高昂的罚金并不会危及到被罚人的社会地位，并且罚金使人遭受的痛苦与最短时间监禁的刑罚相比没多大的区别。只有在自我尊严还没有高度发展的地方，比方说农奴制社会时的俄国，对于罪犯而言，他们才会宁愿承受身体的惩罚也不愿意缴纳罚金。罚金在个人内容方面的缺点在下面的事实中进一步得到了展现——至少到目前为止，就罚金所处的状态而言——罚金的基本等级根本没有适应个人实际所处的状况。法律一般都会规定罚金的上限和下限，但毫无疑问，那些极度贫困的人对最小数额罚金的支付要比那些富人对最高额罚款的支付要困难得多。支付一马克的罚金会使那些极度贫穷的人不得不忍受一整天的饥饿，而几千马克的罚款对那些极其富有的人而言可能只是强加在他们身上的最微不足道的惩罚。在一种情况下，惩罚的主观目的被夸大了，而在另一种情况下，惩罚的目的根本就没有完成。为了能够使每个个体的罚金对他们来说更加有效，存在着这样一种建议，那就是法律根本不应该对罚金设立明确的界限，相反应该根据罪犯的收入百分比来设定罚金。然而，这个建议也很快被合情合理地否决了，因为对于一个身价数百万的富翁而言，他很轻微地触犯法律的处罚也可能会招致高达几千块钱的罚金，毫无疑问，这种处罚在客观上也是比例严重失调的。尝试着建立一种真正的个人化罚金的过程也是一个相互抵触的过程，由于人们在生活水平上存在着极大的差异，把罚金个人化似乎是我们都期待的，然而罚金个人化本身存在的矛盾也正揭示了与更原始、更平等社会相比，一个经济文化高度发达同时又伴随着显著贫富差异的社会中处罚的主观适用性更加的低。最后还必须要强调的是，对那些只涉及人的最内在关系的地方，罚金是完全无能为力的，但从七世纪以来，那些用来赎罪的苦修就可以用金钱来进行赎买。在那时，本来应该是国家进行管理的刑罚使用权，很大部程度上是由教会所操纵。巡回主教就如同法官一般，他们根据罪人是否违反了神的秩序来进行判罚。因此，灵魂在道德上的提高，厌弃那些违法犯罪行为是宗教惩罚的真正意图，而且这种道德上的提高是建立在宗教道德非常牢固、并且十分有成效这样一种趋势的基础之上的。然而这种道德判罚的目的却产生了一种悖论，那就是人类积极的道德责任是为了获得自身的拯救，而世俗的道德却把这个自我救赎这个终极目标从个人自身中移出并转移到别人身上以及别的情形之上。这种把惩罚内在化和个人化的趋势的结果就是：即使像谋杀以及作伪证这样的罪行的惩罚都可以用像禁食一类的苦修式的悔罪来代替。但是，正如我们上面所说的那样，这些宗教悔罪的苦修很快就被通过支付罚款之类的方式所取代。这类的罚款在后来被认为是极其不充分，极其不合时宜的悔罪形式，同时这也正说明了这样一个事实：用金钱代替苦修并不是对罚金日益增长的重要意义的否认，而且恰恰相反是对它的赞同。也正是由于货币再现了那些无法度量的各种事物的价值，所以货币才会变得越来越中立，越来越没有感情色彩，这种中立性使得货币在十分特殊而又不同寻常的情况下，也就是在涉及人最内心的以及最基本的内容的地方，不能当作人的等价物。尽管一个人可以用钱得到几乎所有的东西，但是也正是由于相同的理由，使得它不可能再被用以满足建立在宗教忏悔基础上的伦理一宗教需求。由于人类灵魂的独特性以及个性，对灵魂日渐上升的评价开始与货币的发展趋势背道而驰，在这种情况之下，也就自然而然地加速并确保了罚金断不能充当宗教忏悔。货币首先实现了这种对所有具体价值保持极为冷漠的中立，以及完全抽象的品质，在这个意义上，货币已经成了日渐丰富多彩的客观事物的等价物。只要那些可以用钱买到的事物在数量上是有限的，并且只要经济价值中最为本质的一部分是无法用钱来进行买卖的（举个例子来说，较长时期内的土地所有权就是这样一种情形），那么货币自身就仍然还保持着一种更为具体的特征，对任何一方都不是那么中立；在原始社会的环境里，货币甚至可以拥有和其真实的本性完全相反的特性，换句话说就是神圣的尊严，一种相当特别的价值特性。我上文所涉及的是那些严格的社会规范，正是这些社会规范使得特定种类的钱币得以保留，这些货币只有再进行重大或仪式性的交易的时候才会被使用，加罗林群岛上发现的证据明确地证明了这一点。因为这些岛上的居民是完全自给自足的，所以他们似乎完全不需要用钱来维持他们的生活。但货币在加罗林群岛仍然具有着重要的意义，这是因为如果想获得自己的妻子，成为当地的政界一员，以及所在团体的政治地位都取决于他们所拥有的货币的多少。由此，我们就可以理解，为什么货币在这些群岛上不像在我们的社会中这么普及，在我们的社会里，货币满足的是较低水平的需求，而非较高水平的需求。的确，仅仅从数量这一事实情况来看，他们的钱还不至于多到可以不断地从指缝里溜掉，在人们只生产满足自己生活所需要的必需品的阶段，这一事实推迟了货币开始普遍流行并且变得更加精确性这样一个阶段的出现。因此，货币似乎更倾向于充当等同于那些特别事物的合适的等价物，比方说等价于人的生命。伴随着人类不断分化的过程，货币也变得越来越中立，这二者结合在一起就使得用钱来弥补谋杀罪和其他严重罪行变得完全不可能了。

货币越来越明显的不充分性

我们注意到了一件非常有趣的事情：在一个十分漫长的发展时期中，人们就已经意识到了货币在表现人的内在性方面是不够充分的。在犹太人的历史最初期的阶段，人们可以用钱交换到妇女，并可以用钱去赎罪，但他们在向神庙交纳的贡品的时候却必须是实物。对于那些离神庙非常遥远的人来说，他们随身携带的是货币形式的宗教什一税，但是他们也必须在合适的地方把钱再换成实物。与此相似的是，在希腊的洛斯岛的古代神庙中，公牛在很长一段时间内一直都充当了这里的货币价值的标准单位。在中世纪的工匠行会中，那些更为古老的、与教会关系情同手足的行会对特殊的违法行为是通过让违法者交纳石蜡（做神庙蜡烛之用）的方法来施加惩罚的，而其他那些世俗的行会主要是以货币的形式来施加惩罚的。同样的惩罚方式也发生在古希伯来的律法中，律法规定对被偷窃的家畜小偷要双倍偿还，如果小偷手里没有家畜可以偿还的，那么就需要支付相当于家畜价值四倍到五倍的货币。只有高得超出比例的罚款才能作为补偿原来的货物的替代品。尽管家畜充当的货币在意大利已经被金属充当的钱币所取代了很久，但是罚金仍旧以家畜为单位来计算，至少在形式上是这样的。在捷克人当中，最初家畜就是作为货物交换的中介，在很长一段时间之后，他们仍然用家畜来作为谋杀罪赔偿的计算单位。在加利福尼亚的印第安人中我们可以发现同样类型的情况，即使在贝壳充当的货币已经从流通中退出了很久之后，他们仍旧把贝壳货币当作是吊唁那些在快乐狩猎场中死去的人的礼物。在早期发展阶段，作为一个整体的悔罪或赔偿的古代形式具有了某种宗教意味，人们认为流通的货币对于处理这种神圣的事务是不合适的。这如同我们之前提到过的相反运动趋势导致了货币能力的贬低一样，这种货币的不充分性同样贬低了货币的能力，在后来的发展阶段中，这种宗教的神圣事物进一步促进人的价值与货币价值的分离，也正是因为上面的情况产生了货币发展史当中一个最重要的要素。在这里我想提及的是这种发展趋势的一个更为明显的表现形式。中世纪禁止收取利息，这取决于这样一个前提：即货币并非商品。与商品相反，货币被看成是一种固定不变的，不具有生产性的事物，因此，如果人们对货币的使用像对商品的使用一样还需要支付价钱的话，那么他就会被认为是有罪的。然而同时也是在中世纪，把人当作商品买卖绝不会认为是犯罪。如果把这种观点与现代的那些实际应用的以及理论上的观念做一下对比的话，货币的概念与人的概念是如何持续不断地向完全相反的两个方向发展的情况就会变得非常的清晰。不论两个概念在涉及具体问题时是相互都朝一个方向发展，还是背道而驰，这两个方向的完全相反趋势始终是不变的。

人的价值与货币价值的分道扬镳使得罚金在等级的降低中得以表现，即只在那些极其微小的违法行为中才被征收罚金，但是这种被降格的趋势本身却被另一个发展趋势抵消了。法律对于一个人所遭受的由另一个人造成的对他的不公正和伤害的赔偿越来越限定在这样一种情况下，即受害人的利益的补偿是通过罪犯赔偿的货币来表现的。如果我们仔细调查各文化发展阶段的序列，那么我们就会发现在在低级文化里比在高级文化中所发生的交纳赔偿金的频率要低，并且数额也比在次高级文化中出现得少。这一点在都市生活中尤为引人瞩目，在城市和乡村里的赔偿金的总体水平都还相对比较低的时候，货币对于那些生活在都市环境中的人来说要比生活在乡村环境中的人所受到的货币影响大得多。举个例子说，在现代的阿拉伯半岛，对于这些沙漠中的居民来说仇杀是十分普遍的，然而在城市中，人们更愿意支付偿命金。都市地区主要受经济利益所支配，一个人的价值更有可能用一笔钱的数额的方式来进行换算。偿命金在这样一种情况下会达到一个顶点：即刑法规定的对于损失赔偿的具体的索赔是用货币来度量的。欺诈的概念只有在一个建立在货币基础上的社会秩序中才能够被清楚地定义，这种对欺诈的定义也正清楚地说明了这一点。德国刑律规定只有这种情形下才可以认定一个行为是欺诈行为：即有人“有意识地为自己或他人谋求不合法利益”并曲解事实。因此在德国的法律中，只有两种至多三种案例被认定为曲解事实并加以惩罚，其基础是个人已经对他人造成了损失，比如说，以欺诈性的、或者故意隐瞒自身障碍性的方式来骗取婚姻，以及有企图地公开进行诽谤。在所有其他情况下，对欺诈案例进行惩罚式的威吓并不是因为欺诈危害了个人利益，而是因为它危害了国家利益，如作伪证，选举中的舞弊行为，人为地推辞做目击证人以及陪审员的义务，在正式的文书上使用假姓名和头衔，等等。即使在这些涉及国家利益的案例中，一般来说，惩罚的方式以及罚金的数量通常都取决于罪犯受某种经济利益驱动的事实。因此，在护照、出勤记录上做手脚等行为都将受到惩罚，凡是存在为了“提高人的地位”而弄虚作假的行为都将受到惩罚。这方面的典型案例就是：如果个人身份地位（如儿童调包，等等）弄虚作假，罪犯会被判处最多三年的监禁，但是“如果这种行为是为了获得某种经济上的利益”的话，那么罪犯的监禁就会高达十年。毫无疑问，虽然与为了获取经济上的某种利益而进行的犯罪相比，儿童调包的做法存在着更多的不道德和罪恶的原因，但即使如此，儿童调包这种最为糟糕的犯罪却只受到较轻的惩罚，这是因为他没有被经济利益所驱动。而且这样一个事实依然存在着：即只要那些罪犯未曾想获得“钱财上的利益”，那么即使他所捏造的那些数不胜数的事实会破坏人们的幸福、名誉和财产，也不会被惩罚。由于欺诈概念从一开始就涉及金钱利益，这使得刑罚实施变得更加简单化、清晰化了，缴纳罚金似乎就变得与生俱来了，但这种简单明了是以人们法律公正的感觉的差强人意为代价的。在由欺诈所造成的全部损失中，只有那些可以通过货币的方式表现出来的部分才可以进行刑事起诉，因此从社会秩序的观点出发，也只有这一部分损失可以被列入要求得到赔偿的名单之中。如果法律希望能够对所有由欺诈引起的个人价值上的损失做出惩罚的话，那么法律就必须建立在所有被毁坏的价值都有货币等价物的假设前提之上。尽管偿命金是一种基础的形态，但在欺诈这里，再次牵扯到了偿命金的概念。如果对个人价值的否定可以通过对受伤的一方付钱来实现补偿的话，那么这个结论必须建立在个人价值可以归纳为货币这样一个假设前提的基础之上。欺诈的损失可以用钱来完全地弥补——这样的结论在现代刑法中依然是被排斥的。然而在涉及欺诈行为的承受者的时候，流行的观念则是：一切通过欺诈行为获取来的价值都可以通过一定数额的货币来表现。

正所谓：对法律规范更加清楚明白的需求导致了对各种个人价值巨大的限制。这是因为法律规范只对那些在诈骗的损失中可以用货币形式表现出来的价值进行保护，而对于其他的价值则会被简化到忽略不计，所以对法律简单明了的需求导致了民法中相应规则的出台。根据德国法律，只有在损失的价值可以得到证明的情况下，受到损害的这一方才有理由提出诉讼，否则即使违约和诡计会让某人陷入巨大的麻烦并蒙受巨大的损失，受害方也无权提出诉讼。在这里我需要提到的只是一些由律师自己提出的案例：地主不许佃户使用花园，虽然按照合同规定佃户有权这么做；旅店店主不许那些旅行者存放东西，即使明文规定是允许的；教师撕毁了与学校校长签订的合同，但却没为学校找一个称职的代课老师。尽管上述的这些人有得到补偿的权利，这犹如青天白日一般明显，但是他们却无法要求索赔，因为他们的损失不能够与一笔具体数量的货币等价起来。谁能够指出这些客观上与主观上的不便与损害的准确无误的货币等价物呢？如果这样的证据无法给出的话，那么这些正被讨论的损失对法官而言就是可以忽略不计的，对法官所关心的案件而言这种无法用货币进行等价的损失是根本不存在的。这类案例在现实生活中数不胜数，蒙受损失的一方根本没有任何权利要求索赔；他既看不到那些肇事者受到法律起诉而获得道德上的满足感，也没有因他所遭受损失与麻烦被补偿后获得经济上的满足。需要再一次强调的是，法律的假定是保护所有的个体财产不受非法的侵害，但是这种法律假定的保证不包括那些无法通过货币的形式来表达其自身价值的一系列事物。整套法律解释是建立在所有个人财产的的确确都有着自己在货币上的等价物的基础上的，随之而来的就是，法律显然排除了人身的不可侵犯性，而且在某些方面还排除了由法律担保的婚姻的不可侵犯性。法律体系被完全精简为金钱利益就意味着：法律体系变得异乎寻常的简单明了与整齐划一，当法律与货币结合起来共同实现统治的时候，将会产生出货币的独裁原则的神话——这种神话也对应了货币对那些无法以货币形式表现的价值是非常实际的漠不关心，即使这些无法用货币表现得价值在理论上被认为是至高无上的价值。

能观察到这样一个事实是非常有趣的：罗马法在其中级阶段对此问题采取了完全相反的态度。货币性定罪与在民事案例中所建立的规定一样就是罚款，而且判给那些受害方的罚金超过了所遭受损失的事物自身的价值，这主要是为了弥补受害者所遭受的来自于被告方的非常阴险、邪恶的犯罪行为所造成的损失。如果由监护人和相同责任人托管的被监护人的保证金被恶意否认掉，那么这笔保证金就不会仅仅是返还给当事人这么简单了，除了法官，原告在一定的情况下也有权决定赔偿，这种赔偿不仅包括对直接的客观上的损失，还有对恶意侵害人整体的合法权利的赔偿。此法律规定反映出这样一种感受：法律所要保护的各种个人价值不只限于那些可以用货币表示的事物的价值。反之，那些侵害了个人价值的犯罪需要更大的惩罚。然而，与此同时，这种赔偿也是通过支付一定数额的钱来实现的，所以那些超出了客观的金钱利益之外的损害也要用钱来进行妥善补偿。在有的例子中货币发挥的是次要作用，但是在别的例子中货币发挥的重要作用比现在货币发挥的作用有过之而无不及。正是出于这样一种原因，目前情况呈现出的是上述两种典型趋势的融合，而现代文化正把这两种典型的趋势强加在货币功能之上。一方面，现代文化赋予货币某种意义，货币俨然成为了整个客观利益世界的灵魂，当货币越过合理的界限并继续向前移动时，他就会把个人价值给扼杀掉。然而另一方面，现代文化又使得货币与个人价值之间的距离变得更加遥远，使得货币的意义与所有的那些真正个人化的东西越来越不相容了，它压制个人价值的主张，而不是接受货币这样一种不充分的个人价值的等价物。与罗马时期相比，我们通过这两种趋势同时发生所产生的转瞬即逝的效果所带来的关于法律公正性的感觉程度降低了，但这无法阻止我们意识到这样一种情形：在这里我们关心的是如此之多的高级的文化发展趋势的融合，这一文化趋势折射出了存在于那些发展不充分和低标准现象中的文化发展方向上的对抗性与不可调和性，而在这些现象中，这两种文化发展倾向同时起作用。

买卖婚姻

在人类发展的初期，人的整个生命都是可以用货币来进行度量的。而这个特殊历史事件的发展与后来买卖妇女的现象有某些雷同之处。在历史上的文明古国，以及在当今一些落后的国家中，频率高得异乎寻常的买卖婚姻，以及买卖婚姻花样繁多的变化种类和形式是众所周知的。在这里，我们所感兴趣的只是，这是从关于婚姻被买卖的价值之本质的事实中得出的结论。在涉及用钱或其他等价物品买卖人口时，现代人会觉得这是对人格的贬低，其实这种感觉并不是在考察了那些先前的历史氛围之后得出的正确的结论。我们都知道，只要人把自身凌驾于其他物种之上，只要价值还没有被归结为一种完全没有感情色彩的事物，那么以上这两种情况就仿佛会处于一种相当亲近的关系之中。在早期的德国人当中，他们的个人尊严不会因为他们允许用偿命金表现自我的价值而受损。买卖婚姻也同样如此。人种学的数据显示，婚姻买办的现象并非仅仅主要出现在文化发展的最低级阶段。在这个领域研究做得最好的一位专家说，那些未经文明开化的人们通常都是些不懂得买卖婚姻的非常野蛮的族人。不管妇女的买卖在较为高等文化里是多么有辱人格，但是有两个原因在那种原始的氛围下却会使得这种妇女的卖买有利于提高妇女的地位。首先，据我所知，买卖婚姻从未出现在任何一种形式的个人主义式的经济里。即使在极为落后的文化发展阶段，买卖婚姻也必须有严格形式和规范，会考虑到家庭的利益，对于支付的种类和数量的那些极为详尽的规定也要考虑在内。实施买卖婚姻的一整套方式都具有明确的社会特征。从如下事实来看这种社会性是非常明显的：通常新郎有权要求每位同族成员应当分担多少交给新娘的聘礼，而这些聘礼通常是在新娘的亲属之间被分摊。这与阿拉伯人的情况有些相似，举个例子来说，对于一个杀人犯的赔偿金会从杀人者所在的部落中征收，从杀人者所在的氏族中征收。在某些印度部落中，对于那些只能支付一半迎娶新娘所必要的结婚聘礼的求婚者来说，他们有权利结一种“局部性的婚姻”，也就是说，除非他付清了全部聘礼，否则他不但不能够把这名女子当做奴隶一样带回自己的家，而且还会反而被要求居住在女方的家里。在父权制与母权制度并存的社会形态中有许多这样的例子，只有在新郎交清了新娘聘礼的情况下父权才有效，相反，如果男方一贫如洗的话，那么他只能被迫接受母权形式的婚姻。毫无疑问，这种如同做生意般对待婚姻的态度完全压制了当事人的个体性以及他们的人际关系。可是与抢婚或者那些纯粹的原始的性关系等更粗野的状态相比，正如我们婚姻买卖中所看到的，婚事的族组织仍是巨大的进步。尽管抢婚和原始性关系并不完全是男女滥交，但是他们这些行为的事实很可能依然没有那些通过卖妻行为而产生的固定的行为规范。历史就是这样不断循环的，当人类发展到压抑个性的这样一个阶段，那么将不可避免地成为接下来的个性自由时期的过渡点。在这个压抑个性的阶段，生命纯粹的外在性的决定因素支持精神的成长，同时，这种处于压抑形式的外因使各种力量得以储蓄下来，后来就会呈现为个人的品质。从个性充分发展这样一个理念来看，这样一个个性压抑的阶段确实残忍，且有损尊严。然而，这些个性压抑的阶段不仅为后来更高阶段的发展播下了积极的种子，而且就它们自身而言，显示出精神有秩序、有组织地控制了那些摇摆不定的欲望，人类为个人特殊的便利而产生的行为，无论它他看起来是多么粗野、外在，甚或愚蠢，生活规范都不会仅仅从自然力中接受这些行为。当今社会中，存在着一些极端的个人主义者，因为他们认为社会主义是为实现纯粹而又公正的个人主义不可缺少的准备阶段，甚至是严格的训练，所以这些极端的个人主义者在实践上是社会主义的信徒。因此，有买卖婚姻所产生的相对稳定的秩序和外部标准是第一次非常强暴的、而又异乎寻常的做法，它试图给婚姻关系套上一个模子，就像更个人化的婚姻形式与更较高发展的文明阶段相一致一样，买卖婚姻是与原始阶段相适应的。婚姻对社会凝聚的意义已经在交换妇女中得到了说明，妇女的交换如同建立在契约基础上的物物交换一样，可被视为买卖妇女的预备阶段。对澳大利亚的纳里涅里人而言，婚姻是通过交换两个男人的姐妹来完成的，如果不同意这种安排，比方说其中一个姑娘抗婚和情人私奔了，那么她不仅被视为社会地位低下的人，此外她也将失去得到族人保护的权利，虽然这种权利是与生俱来的。这清楚地表明了这种非个人化的婚姻形式的社会意义。由于部族并没有收到与这个女子等价的东西，所以部族不再保护这个女子，切断了与她的关系。

买卖婚姻与妇女价值

对于买卖婚姻来说，第二种文明程度上更为高级的动机的转折点就从这里开始肇端。事实是这样的：女人是财产中非常有用的对象，以至于要得到她们就必需有所牺牲；这样一个事实使女人最终看起来好像是有价值的东西。在这之前已经提到过了，你所拥有的财富会产生对更多财富无时无刻的热衷。人们不但会为他所热爱的东西作出牺牲，而且还会热爱那些为了得到某种事物而所牺牲掉的东西。如果说母爱是为孩子所做出的不胜枚举的所有牺牲的根源，那么母亲为孩子所忍受的那些痛苦与担忧则成了她与孩子间更为亲密的纽带。这就解释了为什么有疾病或残疾的小孩——由于他们需要母亲付出最大的牺牲——通常是最受疼爱的。教会正是由于清楚地意识到人们越紧紧团结在这一种信仰的周围，付出的牺牲就会越多，换句话说，人们投入的资本也就越大，因此教会毫不犹豫地要求信徒为了对上帝的爱而付出最大的牺牲。无论买卖妇女多么赤裸裸地表现了对女人的压迫、剥削以及仅把女人视为客观物体一样的评头品足，然而，女人却因此为父母和丈夫挣回了她们的价值。她的父母得到了聘礼，对她的丈夫来说也是一样，她代表着丈夫所做出的相对较高的付出，因而丈夫不得不从自身的利益考虑，体贴地对待他的妻子。与现代对待妇女的标准相比，买卖婚姻中妇女的待遇的确要痛苦许多，这使得买卖妇女的过程中所产生的一些积极作用也因其困苦不堪的生活而变得毫无意义。但即使如此，买卖妇女本身就为“女人是有价值的”这一论断提供了意义深远且富于雄辩的说明。从心理学范畴讲，不是因为人们花钱买女人才说明她们有价值，而是因为女人有价值，所以人们才花钱买。因此下面的例子就可以被理解了：在某些美洲部落，不要支付货币而白送一名女孩被认为不仅是对这个姑娘的鄙视，而且还涉及对整个家族的极大鄙视，以至于这个女孩与她丈夫的孩子并不比私生子好到哪里去。

尽管买卖妇女总是暗含着一夫多妻制的趋向，并且这种倾向会贬低妇女的地位，但是由于买女人必须要掏钱，所以反过来又会对这种一夫多妻制设定限制。据说，异教徒的丹麦国王弗罗索就曾在法律上规定，除了那些用货币购买的鲁塞尼亚妇女以外，其余被征服的鲁塞尼亚人不允许缔结任何形式的婚姻。既然他洞察到买卖妇女保证了婚姻的稳定性，那么他的这种立法的目的就是要以此来抑制懈怠的道德行为。这种限制一夫多妻制的转弯抹角而又非常有必要的方法与这样一个事件充满着密切的关系，即这种通过买卖得来的婚姻能够间接地造成对占有妇女更高程度的评价。这种对妻子的较高评价不仅会产生婚姻稳定这样一种结果，而且从逆向的角度来说，对她们的较高的评价也是已经确立的稳定婚姻的产物，这与通过花钱来达到婚姻稳定的结果是一样的。无论是在社会调控下的价格差异，还是在自由市场中所形成的价格差异，都有着极为重要的意义：那就是价格的差异反映了妇女的价值不一样。据说，在卡菲尔族，女人根本不认为被卖掉是最不人道的事情。相反，女孩们都为自己能被卖掉感到自豪，并且对方为了买她而付出的公牛母牛越多，她就越觉得自己有价值。人们可以经常注意到这样一种情形：对某个范畴内各种事物的特定分类将会使人们产生更加强烈的价值意识。如果必须对那些事物进行一个个单独地估价，并且如果这些事物在价格上的差别又是巨大的话，那么这种差距越大就会使人感觉它们愈发地值钱。然而，以偿命金为例，从其他层面对人进行估价，价值赔偿上的一成不变就意味着那些价值相等事物在实际上的意义也是相同的。妇女的买卖尽管是非常粗鲁的，但它第一次强调了一个具体的女人的个人价值，而且根据对人进行评价的心理学规则也是一种强调在总体上的女人价值的方法。即使在女人被卖身为奴的时候，它们价格上的波动也可能比男性奴隶在价格上的波动更大。对于仅仅用来劳作的男性奴隶来说，他们如果年纪相同的话价钱也就按照惯例是相等的（在古希腊和爱尔兰他们等于三头牛），然而，女性奴隶除了工作之外还可做其他目的之用，尽管审美因素对原始人还没有那么大的影响力，但她们在交换中价格的波动会很大，却完全是由于她们个人魅力的不同而造成的。无论如何，在最低级的文明阶段中，就和现在某些非洲部落的妇女买卖一样，妇女买卖的价格通常由习俗固定下来。

所有这些例子强有力地凸显了这样一个事实：女人被当作一个单独的种类，一个非人化的客观事物。如果我们还能把我们之前曾提到的所有限定条件牢记在心的话，我们就会发现把女人当做非人化的客观事物本身就是买卖婚姻最突出的标志。所以才会有一些人，特别是印度人，认为买卖妇女是对人的不尊重。其他地区也会有买卖妇女这种现象，但他们避免用买卖婚姻这个词，并且付给女方父母的钱也被解释为自愿送上的礼物。纯粹给钱的方式与别的捐献方式的不同在这里是很重要的。据说，拉普兰人会献出女儿换取别人的礼物，但是如果女方的父母要的不是礼物而是礼金的话，就会被认作是不合适的。如果我们把那些别的极为错综复杂的决定女性地位的条件也纳入考虑的范畴之内，那么，父母为了钱把女儿嫁出去似乎要比为了得到求婚者的礼物或者他们对女方家人所提供的服务而把女儿嫁出去更能降低女人的人格。相比于那些一定数目的毫不含糊的很客观的礼金来说，即便是按照惯例来送礼，由于礼品的价值以及个人能根据自己的判断而对礼物进行自由的选择使得礼品具有了很大的不确定性，这样就使得礼品包含着一些更加人性化的东西。此外，礼品为后来向嫁妆形式过度搭建了的桥梁，在嫁妆形式中，求婚者的礼物通过娘家父母的礼物得到回报。由于男方在接受这些嫁妆的价值的同时也意味着他要履行特定的义务，既然女方对他也同样有权利要求，使得男方现在不再是一个纯粹的债权人了，因此，男性对女性绝对的处置权被打破了。也有人曾提出过，女方家长接受男方劳务方式的婚姻形式相当于直接购买女人，代表了更高级的婚姻形式。然而，似乎正是买卖婚姻这种更为古老的、更未经文明开化的婚姻形式保留了男性会更好地对待女性的可能性。正如新兴的货币经济总是损害弱势团体一样，这使得妇女地位不断地恶化。在那些如今仍然存在的原始部族中，有时我们会发现劳务换婚与买卖婚姻这两种婚姻形式并存。在这里，这两种方式的并存正说明了他们对待女人方面并没有本质性的区别，尽管提供劳务之类的方式所需要的个人价值方面的牺牲，大概看来，要比那些用钱或用本质上是金钱的价值的东西买女人的方式——这种方式是把女人作为奴隶一样看待——更能提高妇女的地位。这里必须要强调的是，一般来说这样一个事实是正确的：即如果买女人所花的价钱非常高的话，对女人人格的侮辱贬低的程度就降低了。因为相当大数量的货币本身就会包含着一定的稀缺性，这种稀缺性会使得货币变得更有个性化色彩，并很少能够用来交换，因此它也更适合充当个人价值的等价物。在古希腊的英雄主义时代，新郎送给新娘父亲的礼物是如此的平常以至于看起来根本就不像是直接买女人，同时女性的地位备受人推崇。但还需要强调的是新郎送给岳父的礼物是相当可观的。尽管一个人的本质或他的全部是与一笔钱价值相同的这的确看来有损人格，但是正如我们在下面会对这样一种情况给出清楚地证明那样：即如果一个人的价值与非同寻常的一笔巨款相当时，那么那种有损人格的感觉就会在某种程度上被抵消，尤其是考虑到当事人所处的社会地位的时候，情况就更是如此了。我们都知道，爱德华二世和爱德华三世为了偿还债务把他们的朋友当作人质送给债主，1340年坎特伯雷大主教不是作为担保人，而是国王欠债的抵押人质被送到布拉班特去。大到令人尊敬的数量的货币就可以避免让人瞧不起，这也会打动那些作为抵押品被送出的人质，但是如果是一笔小得可以忽略不计的款项，恐怕那些人质是不愿意被送出去的。

男女性别的劳动分工，以及嫁妆

在某段历史时期绝大多数的民族当中，占据着统治地位的买卖婚姻的原则可能就过渡到了它的反面，即嫁妆原则。尤其是在当新郎的那些交给新娘父母的礼物，作为保障一定程度上的经济独立性的手段而转到了新娘手里的时候，这种由买办原则向嫁妆原则进化的可能性就更大了。即使婚嫁的根源——即由求婚者出钱购买女方——消失以后，由女方父母提供女儿嫁妆也会继续存在，并得到进一步发展。然而在这里追寻婚嫁原则历史演进的可能是没有意义的，毕竟我们对这个历史过程所了解的仅仅是皮毛。但是如果我们假设，嫁妆习俗的普及是从货币经济出现之后才开始的，这种假设是成立的。嫁妆习俗与货币经济之间的关系可能是这样的：在妇女买卖非常普遍的原始状态下，妻子不仅是酷爱劳动之人，实际上，她们在后来也的确就是这样的，而且她的劳动并不像货币经济里的妇女所做的那样，根据丈夫赚来的工资来安排家庭开销之类的“家务劳动”。在那个阶段，男女的劳动分工还不是十分的发达。妻子仍需要比较直接地参与到生产活动中，因此，对于她的所有者而言，在那个时候的妻子与她们在后来的作用相比，代表了一种更为有形的经济价值。而在最近的时期内，这种联系却只有在偶尔才得以证实。然而，麦考利把苏格兰干农活的妇女看作是女性地位仍处于粗野的低级阶段的表现，相反，另一位专家却不这么认为，他强调妇女干农活会赋予妇女与男人一样的独立性和尊严。此外，在原始社会的环境中，对父亲来说孩子拥有着直接的经济价值，而在那些较为高级的文化中，孩子却常常被看作是经济上的负担。在家族当中，父亲是孩子最初的主人，他没有理由毫无补偿地放弃这值钱的东西交给别人。正是在这个层面上讲，妇女不仅养活她们自己，而且丈夫也直接地从妇女的劳动中抽取出购买妻子时付出的礼金。但是，在经济不再以家庭生活为基础并且消费品也不能仅仅限于家庭生产的时候，这种形势就发生了变化。在新的形势下，一家人的利益沿着离心和向心这两个方向开始发生分裂。货币使得以市场为目的的生产和以家庭经济为目的的生产具有了分开的可能性，并且这种分离导致了一种不同性别之间的更为严格的劳动分工。分工的原因是显而易见的，妻子掌管了家庭内部事务，而丈夫则开始处理家庭外部的事物，而且家庭内部事务越来越倾向于管理和使用由家庭外部事物所获得的收入。这样一种分工使现在妻子就像是被在外工作的丈夫所养活着，因此，她们的经济价值无论从实质上还是从外在表现上看似乎都已经丧失了。这样一来，在买卖婚姻中，不仅是女方索要并且获得的那笔礼金失去了其依据，而且女性，至少表面看来，已经成为了丈夫接管下来却又不得不处理的负担。正是这个原因，为嫁妆的产生埋下了基础，并且如果丈夫和妻子的劳动范围按照女性管理家庭事务而男性处理家庭外事务的这种方式分裂得越大，那么嫁妆原则也就相应地会变得越广泛。比如像犹太人，他们的男人由于一种不安分的气质或其他原因非常活跃好动，而他们的女人，作为一种必然结果，就只能被更加严格地拘禁在家里，因此，即使在货币经济发展尚不充分的阶段，在货币经济完全发展起来之前嫁妆原则会作为一种法律规定被建立起来。只有货币经济才可能把实际中的技术、社会关系的延伸以及社会关系的资源整合到生产的范畴之下，同时这种整合也会造成劳动分工的片面性，通过这一整合过程，先前的那种家庭内部利益与在家庭之外获得的利益之间的融合开始分裂，并且开始由男性与女性分别代表各自的利益。在这种情况下，男性与女性的作用也就变得毋庸置疑了。同样，男人要为自己的新娘支付货币，这种支付使得他们得到女人生殖能力，可是这比货币又被娘家的嫁妆取代了，因为嫁妆是用来补偿丈夫不得不通过家庭之外的劳动来养活自己的妻子的，还有一种可能就是，嫁妆是要给自己的女儿一种与她能赚钱的丈夫一起生活的某种独立性与安全感。

货币与卖淫现象的典型关系

如果说嫁妆能够保证丈夫或妻子的地位变得稳固的话，那么货币经济中出现的嫁妆与婚姻生活的整个构成之间存在的密切联系就可以用来解释这样一个事实：在希腊以及罗马，嫁妆成了合法妻子区别于情妇的一个突出的特点，由于情妇对男人没有更进一步的权利要求，以至于无论是对情妇的货币上的补偿还是对她安全方面的保障都是不合适的。这就引出了卖淫问题的话题，卖淫使货币对两性关系的意义移入了完全不同的一个方向。然而，男人把所有礼物包括嫁妆以及处女的价钱送给妻子或者交付给娘家的时候，这些礼物可能会采用实物的形式，也可能采用货币的形式，而对那些婚外性关系的支付则通常是采用的货币形式。唯有货币性交易能与卖淫现象的稍纵即逝特点相联系，而卖淫嫖娼这类情况中的关系也正需要具有这样的特点。相比于送具体的礼物这种方式来说，通过货币这种方式能够使这种关系更加干脆彻底而且又毫无瓜葛地被解决掉，这是因为送礼物时要涉及礼品的内容，赠送者的精挑细选以及礼品的用途等问题，因此赠送者个人性的因素就会保留在礼品里。只有货币不会表明任何责任，并且货币大体上总是非常便利的，每个人都十分愿意接受它，因而货币就能够为卖淫服务，并成为了能在瞬息之间变得极为热烈而又在瞬息之间平息的情欲最适合的等价物。货币从来都不是那些像真正的爱情关系之类的个人关系的合适的调停者，不管这种个人关系会如何突然地破裂，它都存在着打算要把这种个人关系长久维持下去的目的，并且个人关系是建立在真心诚意这种约束力的基础之上的。无论从其客观实际上来讲，还是从它的符号化的象征意义上讲，货币能为购买性满足提供最佳服务，这种可以买到的满足对任何超出这种在超瞬息之间存在而在又瞬息之间消失的性冲动的私人关系都会产生抵触，因为这种货币关系是完全与人相脱离的，从一开始就彻底切断了这种购买性关系的双方任何进一步发展的可能。只要这个购买者付清了钱，那么他就彻底结束了同任何对象的关系，这种关系的结束就如同某人在妓女那里得到满足之后付清了费用并结束关系一样的彻底。既然在卖淫过程中，两性关系中十分具体地限定在性行为上，那么两性关系就可以简化成纯生物属性的内容。这种关系是由生物种群的所有的可以扮演并经历这样的关系的成员组成的。卖淫是这样一种关系，即原本最势不两立的个性开始变得平等，并且存于个体间的差异也消除得无影无踪。所以这类可购买的性关系在经济上的对应物就是货币，货币也同这种关系一样超越了所有的个性差别，象征着种类的经济价值，货币是所有个别价值中共通的内容的代表。反过来说，我们在货币的本质中体味到卖淫活动的某种本质。由于货币与任何一个人都没有关系，所以谁在使用它是没有区别的，同时货币对于任何个体都没有关系，货币与生俱来的客观性，如同纯粹的工具一般，排除了任何情感上的联系，我们上面所述说的这一切都在货币与卖淫现象之间产生了不祥的类似性。在康德关于道德的论述中，他从来都没有把人看作是纯粹的工具，而总是把人看作存在于他们自身的目的，与此同时，接纳他们，对待他们；然而康德的这种做法被卖淫关系的双方公然地抛弃掉了。在所有人类关系中，卖淫也许是双方相互之间都把自己贬低为纯粹的工具最突出的例子，这种对人的贬低可能是卖淫活动最为强烈、最为本质的特征了，同时这也是经济中的货币这种“工具”最为精确的本质了，它把卖淫活动与货币经济放在了一个如此紧密的历史关系中。

这是这样一个事实的基础：即卖淫活动中所与生俱来的对人格可怕的贬低是通过它的货币等价物最清楚地表现出来的。如果一个女人完全是出于非人性化的，纯粹的外在的以及实际的补偿考虑呈现出了她最为隐秘的、最为个人化的品质的话，那么她精准确无误地表明了人类的尊严已经降到了最低点。因为女人的这种最为隐秘的、最为个人化品质的呈现应该建立在她们是出于个人真情实感的冲动，并且在男性也是出于同样的真情实感的基础之上，虽然与女人相比，这种品质的呈现对于男人本来就有非常不一样的意义。在卖淫现象里，我们在给予与索取之间感受到的是最为彻底而又最令人痛苦的不相称。更加准确地说，卖淫对于人格的贬低存在于这样一个事实，卖淫贬低的是女人所拥有的最为人性化的事物以及女人所能依靠的最大限度的保留，这种贬低还存在于这样一个事实，排除了所有人性内容的最无感情色彩的货币价值被看做是女人所拥有的最大财富的等价物。然而，对于之前所说的用货币形式进行支付为特征的卖淫活动还可能引出某些完全对立的思考，我们必须对这种对立的思考做进一步的发掘，因为只有这样才能够使货币的意义完全地浮现出来。

一方面，我们强调女人的性委身行为应该具有个人性、隐秘性的个人化本质特征，另一方面却存在着这样一种事实，即两性之间纯粹的性关系具有种类特征，并且这种类的特征是我们与动物世界是共通的，在种类意义的性关系上，个性和个体的内在性消失了，这便存在着某种悖论。如果男人们如此倾向于谈及“复数”形式而存在的女人，并把她们混为一个整体后再进行评论，那么他这样做的理由之一肯定是，男人原始的情感会对女人身上的某一品质感兴趣，不论她是女裁缝还是公主，她们身上所具有的这种品质都是一致的。因此，通过这种功能来发掘某种个别而又具体的个人价值似乎绝无可能。所有别的类似的一般性层面的功能，诸如吃饭，喝水，有规律的生理反应甚至心理反应，自我保护的本能，以及有代表性的逻辑推理能力等等，都无法与个性之类的东西紧紧地纠缠在一起。人们从来也不会指望那些毫无区别的共同的实践以及行为表现能够体现出他们最内在的、最根本的、最复杂的本性。然而，当我们涉及女人的性委身时，却的确存在这样一种异常的现象。性行为是一种彻底的一般化行为，所有阶层的人对性行为的体验都是一致的，但同时，至少对女人来说，它又被体验为一种极端私人性的隐秘行为。这一异常的现象只有基于这样一种观点——即女人作为一个整体，她们比男人们更深地扎根于物种类群之中，但是同时她们之间又有着巨大的差异，因而能更具体地分化出每一个个体的女人——才能为人所理解。由这种观点我们可以得出这样一个结论，同类所共有的因素与女人所独有的个人化因素在女人身上更容易调和为一体。事实上，如果说女性比男性更接近并且更深刻地植根于那些模糊的原始的自然力量的话，那么她们最为本质最为个人化的品质也同样会植根于这些普遍的自然力量之中，而正是这种自然力量保证了女性类群统一性。此外，我们还可以得出这样一个结论：即虽然在女性的统一性里，女性的一般品质与个人特质很少可以清楚地区分出来，但是女性的统一性能在每个个体女人的本质基础上的更大的统一性中得以反映。经验仿佛证实了这样一个事实：与男人相比，女人的各种各样的力量、品质和欲望相互之间更加直接、更加紧密地联结在一起，而男人各种本质之间更加独立，以至于他们每个人的发展，每个人的命运都相对比较独立一些。然而，至少按一般的观念来看，女人生存在有或无这两种状态下，她们的爱好与行为能够更加紧密地联系在一起，但从某点开始，要唤醒女人所拥有的一切包括她所拥有的感情、意志以及思想是比较容易的。如果实际情况真的是这样的话，那么这样一种假设前提——即在同样一种情形之下，与区分性较大的男人相比，女人可以通过其自身的那部分感情、意志以及思想的屈从来实现更加彻底、更加毫无保留的自我牺牲——就有一定的正当理由。在男女两性间都相安无事的阶段，这样的两性差异的意义对双方都是很明显的。对于婚约的解除，即便是原始部族的人也要求新郎和新娘分别做出价格不等的赔偿。举个例子说，在巴塔克人当中，新娘解除婚约只须付5古尔登而新郎则要付10古尔登，在明古鲁的居民中，如果由于新郎不忠而引起婚约的解除，那么新郎要赔付40个古尔登，而新娘只需付10个古尔登。社会把男女的两性关系与它的意义及结果粘连起来，并把这种意义与结果相应地建立在这样一个假设的基础上，即女人在性关系中付出了她的全部包括她所有的价值，而男人在这一交换中只是交出他个性的某一部分。因此，女孩的全部“名声”一旦步入歧途，那么社会就会拒绝她；社会通奸中对妻子一方谴责的严厉程度要远甚于对丈夫这一方的谴责，因为对于男人我们总是这样认为，他们偶尔在性行为方面出轨与他内心、以及本质上对妻子的忠诚之间仍是可以调和的。社会十分固执地认为妓女是没有社会地位的，然而即使那些最放荡的纨绔子弟似乎也总能凭借着个性中的其他方面在泥沼中明哲保身，并可以重新赢得社会地位。在纯粹的性行为当中，只要不是在极为特殊的情况下，我们都可以把这类行为归结为：男人在性关系的买卖中只使用了最低限度的自我，女人则献出了最大限度的自我。通过这种关系我们就可以理解男妓扮演的角色，以及那些被频繁报道的妓女中的女同性恋关系。由于妓女们在与男人发生关系的时候不得不忍受一种可怕的空虚以及满足感的缺失，于是她们需要为这种空虚与缺失寻求一种替代关系，一种至少可以把对方的其他品质牵扯进来的性关系。既不是因为性行为的定义是普遍的且没有情味的，也不是因为这样一个存在且还要面对的事实：即男人和女人虽然在进行性交换时是平等的，但女人下的赌注是那些没有办法使之更具有人性、更加根本、更加广泛的自我的内容，因此对女人而言，把女人的付出用货币来等价是非常不合适的，也是非常不充分的，金钱的给予与索取在性关系中是对女人个性极度贬低。由卖淫而引起的对女人的贬低是不能仅仅通过卖淫所具有的一妻多夫的特征来解释的，它也不能由她与多名男子发生性关系这样一个事实来解释。真正的一妻多夫制给予女人的常常是出于决定性地位的优越感，举个例子说，在印度等级地位较高的纳亚尔就是如此。在这里，卖淫并不意味着一妻多夫，而意味着一夫多妻这才是重要的，也正是这个原因贬低了妇女的个人价值，并使得女人失去了她们的稀缺价值。从表面看来，卖淫把一妻多夫与一夫多妻的特征结合在一起了。但实际上，那些付钱的人所处的地位要远远地优于那些提供商品的人，这种优势地位就赋予男性以巨大的优越感，这就决定了卖淫具有的是一夫多妻的特征。当女人从情人身上获取金钱的时候，即使这种情形与卖淫毫无瓜葛，她们也会觉得尴尬和下贱，然而只要在不涉及金钱的时候，她们这种羞耻感就不会产生。恰恰相反，当女人拿钱给情人的时候，她们会感到快乐与满足。据说，马尔伯勒在征服女人方面的成功源于他接受女人的钱。不管是谁，只要是给钱的人他就会比那些收钱的人有优越性，在卖淫这个情形下这种优越性产生了最令人恐惧的社会距离，如果情况反过来，当女人付钱给男人时，她们就有了之前只有男人才有的那些由于自身独立感的增加而引起的满足感。

然而，我们面对的是一个非常明显的事实，即在许多原始文化中，卖淫并未被认为是贬低人格，并被社会所看不起的行为。例如，据说，古代亚洲所有阶层的女孩都自发卖淫，她们这样做是为了赚取嫁妆或者完成她理应交给神庙的祭品，我们听说在某些非洲部落中，也有着同样的习俗，即为了结婚而卖淫。在这些卖淫的姑娘当中，时常还出现贵族的女儿，她们既不会失去公众眼里的名声，也不会在接下来的婚姻生活中招致针对她们的偏见。公众对她们的感觉与我们对她们的感觉之间的深刻差异表明了，与现代相比，女人性方面的尊严与货币这两个要素是以一种完全不同的方式关联的。在我们现代文化看来，卖淫是以女人的尊严与货币之间有着不可逾越的鸿沟，并且二者之间完全没有可比性为特征的；但是在另一种卖淫观念中，尊严与货币之间的关系要接近得多了。这类似于偿命金演变与发展的结果，即用钱为杀人赎罪。人的生命价值的上升与货币价值的下降共同导致了用货币来赔偿人的价值变得不可能。相同文化的分化进程给予个体的一种特殊意义在于，它使个体变的独一无二，不可替代，也正是这样一个分化过程使货币成为了那些分歧很大的事物的标准和等价物，而货币的这种越来越中立与客观的特性使它越来越不适合充当各种个人价值的等价物。在我们现代的文化中，商品与价格不成比例，就如卖淫所体现出来的那种特征一样，然而这种不成比例的关系并非同样存在于较为低级的文明中。据旅行者说，许多蛮族的女人在生理上呈现出跟男子相似的生理特征，这种相似有时也会表现在精神上，而这正是由于她们没有经历文化分化的过程，在较高的文明中，文化的分化使她们的价值及性的尊严无法用金钱来补偿，即使她们与处于相同阶层的男人相比，她们也有可能看起来分化程度相对较低，更近似于一个类群。对卖淫的态度也因此经历了同样的变化过程，这个变化过程可以从教会的赎罪金和血钱中观察到。在原始社会，人及其内在价值并未打上个性化的烙印，并且由于货币的稀缺性，使得它的使用是极为有限的，相对具有了较为独特的价值。只要文化发展到人的价值和钱的价值二者相分离的时候，就产生了这样两种可能：要么不可能用一种事物来补偿另一个；要么如同卖淫一样，保持二者的关系，这将使得个人价值出现令人恐惧的贬低。

为钱而结婚

在涉及“为钱而结婚”时，会有各种各样的不同意见，接下来的三种说法是很重要的，因为它们关系到货币内涵的发展。首先，仅仅以经济动机为基础的婚姻不仅存在于货币发展的所有时期，所有阶段，而且在原始部落及原始状态下也尤其普遍，在那个时候，这种婚姻根本不会对人格造成任何的冒犯。在当今社会，只要不是建立在个人情感基础上而缔结的婚姻都会贬低个人尊严——以至于婚姻要通过庄严感来掩饰其经济动机——这在那些较为朴素的文化中是不存在。这种演变进程的原因在于现代文化越来越个性化，这种个性化的文化对于不是出于纯粹个人化的理由而发展某种纯粹的个人关系越来越感到反感，越来越感到丢脸。在当今社会中，对于伴侣的选择不会再由社会动机所决定（虽然对结婚生子的考虑可以被视为这样一种动机），而是由双方关系属于个人化的以及感情驱使的那种关系所决定，以至于社会不再坚持夫妇双方必须门当户对，这样一种氛围提供了相当大的自由，并且很少引起个人与社会利益上的冲突。在一个区分十分不明显的社会里，相对说来，谁和谁结婚是无关紧要的，这种无关紧要不仅限于夫妻双方的相互关系，而且包括夫妻双方与子女的关系。因为，在同一个群体当中，他们生活的组成部分、他们的健康状况、气质以及其生活的内部和外部形式和取向大部分是雷同，与那些高度分化的社会相比，孩子茁壮成长的机会较少地依赖于父母是否协调一致并互相补充。正是这个原因，使得对于结婚对象的选择应该由理性决定而不是仅靠个人的情感来决定。这看起来是那么的自然与便利。然而，在高度个人化的社会，由于男女之间个性的和谐变得越来越难，因此人与人之间的相互吸引力就开始起决定性作用了。日渐下降的结婚率在文明高度发达的环境中随处可见，毫无疑问，这种下降是，至少部分上是由这样一个事实引起的：即高度分化的人们总体上都很难给自己找到完全称心如意的另一半。除了男女双方本能的相互吸引之外，我们无法为明智的婚姻找到任何别的标准和暗示。然而，幸福完全是私人的事情，完全是由夫妻双方自己决定的，如果社会对于婚姻能够传宗接代这样的理智都失去了兴趣的话，那么我们就会失去所有的有吸引力的理由来坚持爱情，至少我们不必坚持那些以掩饰婚姻单纯出于情欲的动机的虚假的爱情。无论爱情可能会在多大程度上对人产生多么大的误导——尤其是对那些处于较高阶层的人，纷繁复杂的环境往往会 拖延他们最为纯真的情感——也不论其他条件会在多大程度上影响婚姻最终的结果，事实终究是事实：即涉及子孙繁衍时，作为影响选择的因素的爱情要绝对性地压倒金钱。实际上，就子孙繁衍而言，选择爱情是唯一正确而又合适的。为了钱而结婚直接产生了一种随机交配的局面，即无视个体的品质不加选择地配对，而这种局面已经被生物学所证实为导致人种退化的最为直接，最有害的因素。在为了钱而结婚这种情形之下，夫妻双方的结合是由与人种是否合适绝无关系的这样一种因素决定的，正如对于金钱的考虑也足以使一对原本彼此真爱的夫妻分手的情形一样，它同样导致了如下事实：个体之间毋庸置疑的差异使得根据个性相吸的原则来进行配偶的筛选变得越来越重要。这个例子再清楚不过地说明了，日益增长的个体化倾向在当今社会中使得货币越来越不适合充当纯粹个人关系的中介。

关于为了钱而结婚的第二种观点是，为了钱而结婚是卖淫的一种转换形式，二者虽然形式不同，但所考察到的事实相同。这种观点认为，为钱而结婚是一种一妻多夫现象，同时它也是一夫多妻现象，但由于男性在社会中处于的优势地位，因此只有贬低女性的一夫多妻制在为钱而结婚中发挥作用并产生结果。因此，为了钱而结婚就像是女人长期出卖自己肉体的一种方式，被金钱利益所驱使的婚姻中的每一方都会遭受人格的贬低。然而，这种观点通常与事实之间有所出入。通过结婚这种形式，女人在绝大部分的时间里是把自己全部兴趣和精力都交给了婚姻关系，并且女人的个性，不管是中心的还是边缘的，她都毫无保留地奉献出来了。与之形成对比的是，已婚男人通常从一结婚就被给予了较多的活动自由，并且，除此之外，他们还保留了个性中最本质的部分，因为这一部分是被职业兴趣所牢牢掌控的。在我们的文化中，与存在于两性之间的关系相协调的是，为了金钱而结婚的男人与同样为了金钱而结婚的女人相比，他们并不需要付出女人所付出的那么多的东西。既然妻子对丈夫的依赖程度远超过了丈夫对妻子的依赖程度，那么，对妻子来说，如果她们迈进了一桩没有爱情的婚姻关系，那将是更为致命的。我倾向于认为：为金钱而结婚相比于其他的婚姻形式将上演更多的悲剧，尤其是对那些本性多愁善感的被出卖的女子来说，这种婚姻将是更大的悲剧，并且总有一天这些经验事实会被心理学阐释的。和其他别的情况一样，在为钱而结婚这一现象中，典型的货币关系的特征被展现出来了，也就是说具有潜在优势的一方会对另一方进行彻底盘剥，从而使另一方的劣势地位更加恶化。实际上，这种发展趋势存在于所有诸如此类的关系中。相对第一的位置很快就会消失并进而演变为绝对第一的地位，在任何领域中获得了好处将会为攫取更多的好处铺平道路，这将强化双方力量的差距。无独有偶，一个已经拥有特权的位置常常更容易获得更高的特权地位。简而言之，优势的地位通常是以不断增长的比例在发展，以作为一种权利手段的“资本的积累”为例，它只不过是极为普遍的规则中的一个特例而已，这个极为普遍的准则在许多非经济的权力领域也同样是有效的。然而，特定的限制与制衡力量为这种优势地位滚雪球式地急剧增长设置了限制，这种限制与制衡力量包括传统、对人的尊重、法律、这种增长本身存在的局限性等等。但是对于拥有着绝对的灵活性且少有约束的货币而言，货币的不断增长趋势是最不容易制止的。在以金钱利益为基础的关系里，利益属于那些一开始就占有优势并处于有利地位的一方，而且这种利益的增长方式将会沿着这一个方向以更加激进更加彻底地方式发展，就仿佛这一关系的基础是某种更加客观的、或更客观化的其他动机似的。

对为钱而结婚的第三种观点可以通过一种非常特殊的现象来解释清楚——即征婚广告。实际上，征婚广告发挥的作用不大，并且这种作用仅局限于中产者阶级，而正是这一点看起来非常奇怪且令人遗憾。因为，尽管我们在之前提到过现代人的个体化倾向，配偶的选择也由于人的个性化而产生了种种的困难，但毫无疑问的是，不管这个人的性格是多么稀奇古怪，都可以找到性格互补并“称心如意”的异性伴侣。可是，我们可以这样认为，找对象的所有困难存在于这两个前世注定要结婚的人如何能找到自己的另一半。没有比单身，或两个彼此陌生的人所建立的不幸福的婚姻能更好地说明人类命运中的悲剧性荒诞性的事情了，那些缔结婚姻关系的陌生人之所以不能给对方幸福，是因为他们没有学会相互理解。恰当地使用征婚广告可以让那些建立在偶然因素基础上的婚姻变得更加合理化，这是毫无疑问的。从总体上看，与直接靠运气找到合意的对象的几率相比，广告为个人提供了无限高的满足需求的机会，从这个意义上讲，广告是一种最强大的文化载体。正是因为人们自身越来越个性化的需求才使得广告有必要成为一种扩大供应范围的手段。一般来说，尤其是那些个性更加独立的人，他们本应该是最依赖广告的群体，但实际上，他们根本不用登广告征婚这种方式。他们对登征婚广告找对象的态度的批判一定存在着某种合理的理由。通过分析这种公之于众的征婚广告，我们就会发现：尽管应征的双方有时都有意掩盖他们的经济地位，但是经济地位仍是他们真正的兴趣焦点。这也是情理之中的。一个人除了经济地位之外其他所有的品质是无法通过一则广告精确地表现出来。无论是外貌还是性格，无论是这个人容易相处的程度还是智力水平都不可能用广告描述出来，因而无法形成一幅能引起个人直观兴趣的清晰的图像。在所有的这些因素中，唯一可以能够准确无误地给出的就是与这个人相关的经济地位，并且人类的想像力的一个基本特质就是认为，如果事物的某种品质相对于其他品质而言可以被精确无误地加以说明和认识，那么这种品质就是对这一事物而言最具有决定性的品质。因为征婚广告只承认纯粹金钱的利益，而似乎正是货币的这种纯粹的工具性的特征使得征婚广告恰恰不可能为那些最为迫切需要它的社会阶层所用。

在涉及卖淫现象时，我们发现了，当货币的数量超过某个度之后，他就无法对人的尊严进行评价，即无法等价于个体的价值。妓女地位越是悲惨、贫困潦倒，现代的“好”社会就会对她们表现出越发明显的厌恶感，但是这种厌恶感会随着妓女所提供的服务的价格的攀升而降低，甚至只要价格上升到某种程度，那些被某个百万富翁包养的尽人皆知的妓女，尽管她可能比许多街头徘徊的妓女更会勒索钱财，更会欺诈，更加堕落，但她们可以体面地出席富翁们的沙龙。这也是窃钩者诛，窃国者诸侯这一通常的态度导致的结果，同时也是这样一个事实所导致的结果：即不管采用什么样的方式、什么样的内容取得巨大的成就都会赢得了人们的尊重。然而本质的更为基础的原因是：高得离谱的价格把待售的事物从贬值中解救出来，否则它们将是这样一种境遇，即被降价出售。在左拉的一部关于法兰西第二帝国的小说中，他讲述了一个身居高位的男人的妻子的故事，这个女人身价10万到20万法郎是众所周知的。左拉讲述的这个故事是建立在历史事实的基础之上的，在这个故事中，不仅这个女人自己出入于最上流的社交圈，而且她的那些路人皆知的情人们也都是在上流社会中名声显赫之人。这位交际花因其以昂贵的价格出售，而获得了一种“稀缺价值”。这是因为：不仅那些稀缺性的物品价格会变得昂贵，就连那些由自身价值被别的因素所操纵的人也会因其稀缺性而变得身价百倍，即便这种价格的变动只是被一时的潮流趋势所引起。跟其他商品一样，因为那些价格昂贵的交际花有胆量索要高得离谱的价格，所以人们才会对那些价格昂贵的交际花的趋之若鹜，由此造成了对她们过高的估价以及过高的需求。对于那些妻子红杏出墙的丈夫，英国的法律会判给他们一笔赔偿金，想必也是出于同样的理由。世上再也没有什么能比这样的事情更让人情感上接受不了了，这无异于使丈夫沦为妻子的皮条客。然而对这类事件的罚金也是高得离谱的。我知道有一个案例，某太太与好几名男子均发生了性关系，每一名男子都被判定赔给那位丈夫5万马克。在这个案件中，这看起来似乎也是试图通过赔偿金额的数量来对那些降低人格的事情进行补偿。从一个相当不成熟的角度来看，人们希望用金钱的数量来对遭受损失的丈夫的社会地位表示尊重。的确，朱尼厄斯信件的作者就是这样谴责一位法官的：在一件牵涉到一位王子与贵妇人的案子里，法官在计算损失赔偿费的时候没有把受到冒犯的丈夫的处境纳入考虑的范畴。

贿赂

这种观点的意义在对人的“收买”这样的例子中可以清楚地展示出来，用大家普遍接受的说法就是贿赂。我希望通过贿赂的那些具体的货币形式来讨论贿赂这种现象。如果某人有相对比较优越的经济地位，他仍然收取贿赂，在某种意义上说，这种贿赂是具有正当的理由的。在这里，我们所假定的是，不能够抵御小诱惑的思想必定是那些小气而又懦弱的思想，而按照这样的推理，那些屈从于巨大诱惑的人却很有可能是那些有较坚强意志且志向远大的人！类似地，贿赂就是要买通官方或者买到某种承诺，如果只是进行较小数目的贿赂，相比于大数额的贿赂，会被认为是更加卑鄙的行为。因此，实际上，贿赂应被理解为：按照某人是“不可收买的”、昂贵的还是廉价的三种等级来对这些人进行收买。既然社会评价只是受贿者的自我评价的一种反映，那么在贿赂行为中，社会评价的公正性似乎就得到了保证。对于公开接受贿赂的人，他们奇特的自尊心是被用作保护他的地位的，最起码也要起到隐藏地位的作用，而这种奇特的自尊心源于贿赂过程所涉及的与受贿人相关的那些关系。这种关系能通过受贿者对较小数额的贿赂的拒绝得以反映，也能通过受贿者对贿赂所表现出的那种庄重（也许这种庄重根本就不存在）、谨慎以及有优越感的行为得以体现，而且正是受贿者的这些行为使得那些行贿者反倒更像是受贿者了。能够表现出这样行为的人应该是那些无法通过贿赂来收买，并且意识到自我价值的人。由于贿赂就像是一个文字游戏一样——既然行贿者通过默许的方式接受了这种文字游戏——它将给受贿者提供某种内心的反射，并对收取贿赂者进行保护，使他们不会产生自我否定和自我贬值的感觉，而这种自我的贬低与否定是受贿者接受贿赂而引起的个性的牺牲。在古代的犹太人当中，甚至在现在的东方世界中，像贿赂这样的买卖交易常常是通过有礼节的交换来实现的，就好像是买者所带去的不是贿赂而是礼物。东方人特殊的尊严感看起来是在有意识地把对钱币真正的喜爱掩藏起来，即使在合法的交易中也是如此。

在可以被收买的人中，以及所有的贿赂现象中，这样一种对货币的喜爱遮遮掩掩的态度最容易被人用货币的形式所利用，并且会像受到鼓励一样蔓延开来。与其他任何形式的价值相比，货币更有利于使那些秘密的、不为人所知的、一声不响的交易成为可能。通过把货币挤压成一张纸，并让它滑到某人手里，我们就可以使这个人变成一个富有的人。货币没有特定的形态和抽象的品质，这使其有可能投身到那些最变化多端、最遥远的价值中去，并因此彻底地逃离邻居们的监视。货币是匿名的并且没有任何的感情色彩，因此它不会暴露出现在所有者手中的货币从何处而来：货币没有办法证明它从何处而来，而对于那些具体的物品而言，即使它们做了某种程度的掩盖，都能够找出其来源。就财产的主人自身而言，用货币形式表现的价值会为这位主人提供关于其资产状况的一个清晰且毫无遮掩的视角，而对其他人而言，货币却可以对财产及其交易的情况进行隐瞒甚至作假，而这种隐瞒与作假对其他有形资产来说是不可能的。货币的欺瞒性是货币与其所有权关系的一个象征，或者说是这种关系的一种最为极端的形式。与其他商品相比，货币对别人来说是不可见的，是不存在的，正是这个原因使得货币与思想财富之间产生了密切的关系。正如思想财富的私人性和唯我性仿佛都是在沉默中开始并在沉默中结束的一样，货币的私人专有的本性也在保密的可能性中得以彻底地表现出来。在这种情况下，毫无疑问货币对于那些自身没有能力控制影响经济，但却对经济的管理感兴趣并有权对经济进行管理的人来说，存在着很大的危险。由于货币形式具有欺瞒性，它可以误导评估并有可能被非法使用，因此为了避免货币形式的管理所固有的风险，现代法律要求政府和公司要公开金融政策。这种危险涉及所有对货币形式管理有兴趣的门外汉，因此，只有通过把对货币形式的管理公布于众的方式，才能在某种程度上杜绝此类危险。因此，趋向分化的一个基本文化发展潮流既能在货币关系之内得以反映，也能够通过货币关系得以反映，这种货币关系可以使那些公开的东西变得更加公开，而使那些私人的东西变得更加私人化。在早些时候，这一分化过程在对于那些较小的社会组织而言是陌生的，在先前的环境下，个体的私人状况既无法很好地隐藏起来，也不能像现代社会所允许的那样很好地被保护起来不受他人的干扰。在另一方面，相比较大团体中的代表，在那些小团体中的公众利益的代表的权利表现得更加神秘，他们也更倾向于隐藏，而较大团体中的代表的权力范围、技术的客观性以及他们与个体之间的距离，使得这些较大团体的权威可以忍受其行为的公开程度。因此，政治学、管理学、法学失去了其隐秘性和难以接近的特征，正是在这个意义上，个人甚至获得了更大的隐退，排除了所有与他的私人生活不相干的可能性。如果想要辨认出公众生活与私人生活的相互关系，那么我们仅需要比较一下英国历史和德国历史，抑或浏览一下最近两个世纪以来的文化史就可以了。即使在宗教领域，这一分化的过程也是非常明显的，尤其是在宗教改革时期。天主教通过一种神秘的形式把权威包裹起来，他们高高在上掌控着所有的信徒，他们拒绝任何问题、任何的批评与指责，甚至也拒绝任何合作。教会并不允许信徒有不受他人干扰的宗教独立性，而是让那些信徒成为彼此间的亲密知己，并让教会本身成为可以不断干涉宗教事宜的权威。相反，宗教改革则是要让教会组织变得公开化，容易接近，可以控制，并且在原则上不允许教会在每个信徒眼皮底下弄虚作假、建立鸿沟。对于信徒，他们也获得了内心的宗教感情不被干扰的自由，他们与上帝的关系变成一件私人的关系，他们没有必要向任何人解释。

隐私和秘密与一般的文化趋势相一致，并成为货币经济中经济状况的一部分，我们现在从隐私与秘密中回到收买个人和贿赂上来，通过货币经济的一些特性收买个人和贿赂完成了它的最高形式。贿赂如果是使用一块土地或一头家畜的方式的话，那么它不仅无法瞒过邻居的眼睛，而且受贿的人也不可能装作若无其事的样子，而这种若无其事的方式，在早期阶段就是贿赂所需要的典型的尊严。然而，通过钱这种方式就可以使贿赂变得神不知鬼不觉。既然钱与他没有任何具体的、个人的关系，那么受贿人可以假装——甚至对自己都装做——若无其事的样子。用钱行贿相比于用女色行贿的方法更有效，这是因为受贿人的所有的关系的秘密性、不被干扰的存在性，以及连续性都可以得到更加彻底地保障。即使在女色行贿这种形式中，随着双方的性行为的结束行贿就结束了，以至于相比于金钱行贿与人的联系就更少了，但是，相比于金钱行贿，女色行贿这种方式将会在受贿人的内心留下了更为深刻的印记。在用金钱行贿这种方式中，礼金的收受结束了行贿与受贿双方所牵扯的所有关系，而在女色的行贿方式中，受贿人将会出现厌恶、悔恨或仇恨等情绪，而不会是无动于衷。但是，以金钱行贿的好处也常常会被他对人身价值的巨大的贬低所中和，一旦东窗事发，牵连到的人名声便会一落千丈。收取贿赂与偷窃行为之间有着明显的可比性。与偷吃或偷取其他小玩意儿相比，家里的佣人很少会偷钱，除非他们是道德极其败坏之人。一些同样的经验表明，佣人们可以毫无顾忌地盗用一瓶酒或一个化妆品，但是如果让他们去偷等于一瓶酒或等于一个化妆品的钱时，他们就会变得畏首畏尾。同样是从这样一个立场出发，我们的刑法规定，如果以直接的使用为目的而盗取少量的食物和消费品只是轻微触犯法律，而盗取同样价值的钱则会受到严厉处罚。刑法的这种规定显然是基于这样一个假设，那种突然之间产生的对个别商品的用途的需求是如此的诱惑人，以至于使人抵挡不住这种诱惑，这种对诱惑的无法抗拒是由人的意志薄弱而引起的，因而不必严厉地惩罚。物体越是远离它的直接用途，对这种物体的需求的满足就需要绕越长的路，这个物体对人的吸引力也就会变得越来越弱，因而与通过偷窃某物来满足某种冲动相关的不道德的程度就会越大。因此根据最高法院的判决，举个例子说，供暖材料与食物并不算是同一类，二者在减轻处罚上也不会是相同的。毫无疑问，人们对热量的需求有可能是非常急切，就如同快要饿死的人对面包的渴求一样急切。但是，可以很确定地说，热量的用途确不如面包那么直截了当。偷面包与偷供暖材料的不同在于，相比饥饿，寒冷对存活的过程的影响还有较多的中间阶段，并且按照这样的逻辑推理假设才是公平的：相比于那些受到更直接的诱惑的人而言，那些不是很直接的需要某种事物的人则有更多的时间去考虑是否应该偷窃。货币离直接需求的距离最远，人对金钱的需求的焦点是存在于货币之外的，金钱所辐射出来的诱惑，并不是一种来自于其自身属性的诱惑，因此，对于偷窃金钱这一行为，人们仍以屈服于某种本能之下为借口希望获得原谅的方法就行不通了。因此，与偷钱一样，用钱行贿看起来是与获得金钱的直接可享用到的价值背道而驰的，因而这种行贿方式看起来似乎是更精明的、更加彻底的道德标准腐败的象征，以至于由钱的本性所决定的用钱行贿的隐秘性就成了行贿受贿者的保护伞。虽然用钱行贿为羞耻感披上了一层光滑的外衣，但是实际上它们都属于那种为众人所不齿的类型：即不道德的行为与一系列道德的因素联系在一起，这么做的目的不是为了减少不道德行为的总量，而是为了能够实现这些不道德的行为。在这里，再一次表现了这样一个事实：即超出了一定数量的货币将改变其质的特征，在某种意义上讲，如果要使那些数额庞大的贿赂出于便利方面的考虑而改变对安全的考虑，也就是说不需要再考虑金钱行贿的隐秘性了，那么想要对这种数额巨大的行贿在技术上给以支持的话，只有一种办法，那就是把贿赂变成官方的贿赂。在爱尔兰被赋予独立的立法权与管理权以及爱尔兰与英格兰统一的20年间，英格兰的大臣们面对着一个非常棘手的问题：即如何以一套统一的政策统治两个截然不同的国家并在两种独立的立法体系中建立一种和谐。他们在永恒存在的贿赂当中找到了这个棘手问题的解决之道。通过简单地买选票的方式，在爱尔兰议会中，各种各样的不同的意见倾向就融合成了他们想要的统一的意见。因此，华尔波尔的一个狂热的崇拜者写道：“他自己是绝对清廉的，但是为了实现政治上明智而又公正的目的，他愿意贿赂整个下院，即使要贿赂整个国家他也决不会退缩。”这是对贿赂多么清醒的良知，并且这种良知在他自己的道德标准看来是非常自豪的，并且这种自豪的良知可以与对贿赂行为强烈的谴责共存。一位佛罗伦萨主教的例子就能很好地说明对贿赂的自豪与谴责共存的这种情况：在中世纪与买卖圣职作斗争的高峰时期，只为了把那些邪恶的买卖圣职者统统逐出教会，他甚至宁愿花掉1000英镑来买下教皇的位子。这里存在着这样一个事实：即数量庞大的货币将抹去由贿赂所带来的令人羞耻的污名以及源于贿赂的那种见不得人的污名，这些与卖淫嫖娼的例子是一样的。对于这样一个事实最惹人注目的例子是：在近代初期，最大宗的金钱交易发生在查理五世，他为了荣登王位竟要求动用财政手段来收买臣民。

此外，那些要价特别昂贵的商品的买卖应该从属于这样一个贸易类别：即这种贸易通常需要提供一种特别的保证，即公众利益不会遭受太大的损失。事实上，英国国王们过去争先恐后地购买要职至少产生了这样一种的效果：即买官者力争要当好官。很明显，“付了一万英镑买了官印的人，不可能为了贪污某种蝇头小利就丧失了自我，毕竟他那些竞争对手很轻易地就会把这种贪污行为调查出来。”如同我在之前所说的，秘密的贿赂是出于对受贿人安全的考虑，因此把贿赂公开相应的就是保证公众利益安全的一种手段。这是那些大宗腐败行为在某种程度上被合法化时做出的纠正，这种某种程度上的合法化就意味着这些行为不能再藏着掖着了，所以这看起来就像是受贿人所作的妥协与让步。正是这个原因，在简单的环境中贿赂行为更容易存活。亚里斯泰迪斯尽管生前拥有许多不受约束的权力，但他死时却十分贫穷，这简直是前所未闻的事。在那些小的古代城邦中，一个人不诚实是不会动摇整个社会的根基的，这是因为社会中只有非常小的部分是建立在货币经济的基础之上的，而且人际关系简单透明、不复杂且容易保持平衡。因此人们曾恰如其分地指出，雅典人每一天的命运都取决于他们特定的集会场所。而在现代高度复杂的公众生活环境中，货币经济难以计数的潜在力量的触角延伸到社会的各个角落，官场的贿赂行为就具有了大得多的负面影响。

到目前为止我们所提到的所有情况中，我们讨论了收买一个非主体意义上的人的价值，通过对这些价值的保护，人们所体验到的是一种截然不同于主观享受到的价值的一种客观价值。因而，从属于婚姻的综合生命力和人的本能运动的方向是一致的；只有在男人做出和女人一样的情感反应时，女人才委身于他；人的语言与行为是对其信念和责任的相应表达——这一切所指的并不是我们拥有某种价值，而是指我们自身就是一种价值。当我们说我们为了钱放弃了自己时，我们指的并不是我们放弃了那些我们所拥有的价值，而是我们放弃了我们自身的价值。毋庸置疑，存在与占有这两个概念是相互关联的，因为我们存在的一切内容都是通过对纯形式的、非实在的中心的占有方式呈现在我们面前的，而这个中心就是那个被我们体验为有离心倾向的自我和自在主体的事物，这种自我和自在主体与拥有性格、兴趣和情感的客体是截然不同的。但另一方面，正如我们所看到的那样，占有是我们影响所及范围的一种延伸，以及支配客体事物的某种力量，客体事物也因此进入了主体自我的圈子。自我，我们的欲望和感受继续存在于所占有的客观事物中。一方面由于自我最内在的核心是一种单一的确定的能力，所以它处在客观的占有关系的中心之外，而这种客观的占有关系从属于它自己的中心点；另一方面，即便是来自最外层的因素，只要它们是真实的占有物，那么它就会存在于自我之内。在拥有客体事物的过程中，自我开始变得越来越有能力应付这些客体事物，这些客体事物中的任何一个都不会变成别的事物。因此，从逻辑学和心理学的角度来看，将存在与占有区分开来将是十分武断的。如果我们依然坚持认为这种区分的做法在客观上是正确的，那是由于就存在与拥有二者的区分而言，二者不是理论意义上的客观概念，而是价值概念。当我们认定我们的存在与占有这两种状态之间存在着差别的时候，就已经给生活的内容赋予了特定的价值和价值标准。如果有人把那些距离自我的高深莫测的中心较近的部分解释为我们的存在，而把距离中心较远的那些解释为占有的话，当然要在排除存在与占有二者之间的任何的明显区分的情况下，那么按照与中心的距离来进行的排序也许只有在不同的价值感中才会出现，价值感伴随着这两个概念的左右。在任何的交易中，如果我们都划分出这样两部分：一部分是那些我们给出去的东西，而另一部分是我们所接受的东西，那么这只是间接地表达了这样一个事实，即我们用贯穿于整个生命过程中的较为强烈、较为持久的一种价值去交换了一个较为直接、较为急迫并且转瞬即逝的价值。

货币与区分的理念

假如个人价值的出卖意味着个人价值的具体的存在——在此处的意义上——被缩小了，并且和人的“自尊”直接对立，作为那些行为模式的一个关键性标尺的个人性理念皆可以被称之为一种区分。这种区分的价值之所以具有决定性意义是因为它体现了货币事物中最极端的标准。与这种区分的价值相比，卖淫、为钱而结婚、贿赂这一系列极端的例子，均是从货币交易的最合法的形式开始的。要解释那些极端的现象，我们首先必须定义区分这一概念本身。

我们的客观评价标准通常是按照是否符合逻辑、是否符合伦理、是否符合美学原则之类的方式进行细分的，然而这种划分方式在我们的实际判断中又是相当不完整的。举个非常明显的例子，我们重视个性独特的形成过程，但事实上我们的这种重视仅仅停留于某一个性所具有的一种特定的、简洁的形式和力量。我们认为，一个人所体现出来的不可比拟性、独一无二性是有价值的，照此看来，对一个人来说，似乎只有他自己的观点是有价值的，但事实上，这样一种现象的内容常常是与其在伦理和美学意义的低劣表现形成鲜明对比的。我们感兴趣的不是补充完善这些评价体系，而是要指出像这样的体系化的评价方式是错误的，而且这种错误就好比认为体系化方法与五种感官或是康德的12个知性范畴相关一样荒谬。人类的发展就是持续不断地创造出与世界既感性又知性地相对应的新的可能性，并且创造出新的范畴评价这个世界。正如人在不断地形成新的且行之有效的理念一样，我们日益增长的知觉把先前我们并没有意识到的各种新的知觉也发掘出来了，虽然这些新的知觉可能在我们没有发掘它之前早就对我们产生影响了。我确信人们在我们借以对现象作出反应的众多的价值感觉中，存在着一种我们将其描述为“区分”的评价方法。这个评价范畴的独立性，可以通过下面的事实加以说明，即这种评价范畴的出现是与种类和价值完全不相同的现象紧密相连的：既与思维方式相连又与艺术作品相连，既与直系血统相连也与文学风格相连，既与高雅品位相连又有与高雅品位相关的事物相连，既与上流社会的礼仪相连又与具有高贵血统的某只动物相连——所有这些，我们均可以称之为“非比寻常”。虽然这种区分价值与道德价值和美学价值具有一定的联系，虽然它和富于变化的伦理层面、美学层面价值在某种程度上是融合在一起的，但它仍会与道德价值和美学价值保持着本质上的独立。就如同特殊的地位一样，区分的社会意义是从大多数人当中分离出来；在个人自主范围里，个别现象的分离可能立刻被任何一种异己因素侵袭而破坏，很明显，这些都为区分这一概念的使用提供了模式。区分价值的实际承担者建立了十分具体的区分种类。一方面，区分强调的是把存在相互交换关系的、可以简化成公分母的和可以具有“一致行为”的做法都排除在外；另一方面，区分应该只是一种不同的关系，而不应该如此明显地引诱那些鹤立鸡群的事物远离其内在的独立不羁、矜持、自给自足，并把它的本质调换成一种与其他事物的关系。杰出人物恰恰就是那些完整地保留其个性的人。区分代表的是种种不同感觉的一种融合，而这种融合又是非常独特的，因为在这种融合中，不同的感觉是建立在比较的基础上的，然而他们又从根本上反对任何的比较。在我看来一个具有决定性的例子就是，英国上议院不仅被看作是可以审判每个上议院议员的唯一的法官，而且在1330年上议院还明确地拒绝了这样一个建议：即它应该针对议员的个人身份而不是针对其贵族身份来进行审判，所以，一种针对个人而非针对个人等级的管辖权关系被当做是一种人格的侮辱！然而，钱所能左右的利益越多，就会有越来越多的人力物力为了钱投入，就会有越来越多的事物产生，也就会有越来越多依据钱的尺度而定的事物，而在人和事物身上所体现的区分的价值可能就会越来越少。复杂多变的历史现象指出了这一种负面的关联。古埃及和古印度的贵族统治讨厌海上贸易，并把海上贸易看作是与等级制度的纯洁性无法兼容的事物。像货币一样，海洋也是个中介者，它是地理形式的交换手段。就海洋本身而言，它是毫无个性的，因此，为了实现各种极为不同的事物间的互动，海洋就像钱一样被人们所用。在历史上，海上贸易和货币交易非常相近，封闭而又森严的贵族统治不得不对这两种具有削弱等级制度的事物产生恐惧。因此，在贵族统治的巅峰时期，海上贸易在威尼斯的贵族中是被禁止的，直到1784年，法律才授权贵族用自己的名义进行海上贸易。在这之前，这些贵族只能通过城市居民的匿名合伙人的身份进行海上贸易，也就是说，他们必须与海上贸易保持一定的距离并且是偷偷摸摸地做生意。在底比斯，曾存在这样一条法律，只有那些参与任何形式的市场交易不满十年的人才有资格出任地方官员。奥古斯都禁止元老院议员介入到关税垄断和运输业中。倘若兰克把德国历史中的14、15世纪描述为“平民”时代，那么这种说法是与当时的以城市为代表的新兴货币经济状态相联系的，而这种新兴的货币经济与传统的贵族统治水火不容。早在近代的开端，在英国，人们就已经发现，城市中普遍流行的贫富不均永远也不可能产生像乡村的各种城堡的壁垒一样封闭的贵族统治。即使是那些最贫穷的学徒们，只要这个手艺能有钱可赚，他们就能指望有一个飞黄腾达的未来，然而存在于拥有土地的贵族和自耕农之间的却是严格的界限。只要拥有无限多的货币，他们就可以从一个阶级进入到另一个阶级，这就把贵族统治的阶级的构成移除了，没有了这种构成，保证等级制度的界限也就不复存在了。

如同之前我们提到过的审美理念一样，区分的理念对量化的评价也是中立的。当面对从共同的价值属性中所传递出来的那种超然独立的价值的时候，量的问题就彻底隐退了。这一区别理念的纯粹质的含义不会被是否在数量上有足够多的例子达到这一区别水平所影响。起决定性作用的是，存在成功地实现了脱颖而出，并成为其自身唯一有效的表现，这种有效的表现给这些特殊的存在赋予了具体的特征——要么是人的、要么是比人低级的。然而，当对事物的看法是通过其货币价值来评价的时候，它们就失去了区别价值，它质的价值由量的价值所决定，它们完整的独立性——这是它们跟他者和跟自身的双重关系——即在某种意义上，被我们体验为这一事物区别于其他事物的地方也就失去了存在的基础。我们通过货币认识到的卖淫的本质，它是通过这样一个事实被揭露出来的，货币的功能使它可以充当卖淫行为的等价物，也许卖淫的本质比他的货币等价物更加地明显，这是因为相比于货币所能够失去的，他们在卖淫中失去的东西更多。区别范畴中最极端的反面——与别人做的一样——成了在货币经济中，客观事物之间的典型关系，因为所有事物都通过货币——就像通过中央车站一样——互相关联，具有相同重量的事物都在金钱的浪潮中漂浮，并且它们都漂浮在同一水平面上，正因为如此，所以这些事物之间的区别就仅仅局限于它们在金钱的浪潮中所能覆盖的尺寸大小的差异而已。

任何消除差别的过程中出现的悲剧性后果均不可避免地产生了这样的影响，二者在最终达到同一高度的过程中，较高水平下降的幅度要比较低水平上升的幅度大。这一点在人与人的关系中是极为明显的。在一个地区建立起的沟通中，尤其是思想层面的沟通，如果大多数人都能找到相互的理解的共同点，那么沟通的标准就在相当大程度上越来越接近最低水平的人，而不是越来越接近最高水平的人。其根源是从高处往下降总比从低处往上爬要容易得多。对于不甚完美的人而言，他们的思想、信息、意志力、各种感情所产生的集合可以被更完美的人的集合所覆盖，但反过来却是行不通的。前者的集合对二者来说是共通的，但后者的集合却并非如此。除了某些特例，如果要在较高和较低的内容之间建立起共同的兴趣和行为的基础，只有一种办法，那就是较高的内容放弃它们独有的优越性。从下面这一事实也可以推导出同样的结论：即同样优秀的人所建立的有共同基础的水平绝不会比他们每个人独自存在时的水平高。这是因为，对不同的人来说，他们最高的成就通常也是不同的，这是与他们处在不同的领域息息相关的，他们只在那些较低的一般水平的成就上是相通的，除了这种较低的一般水平以外，对个体非常紧要的潜在能力之间的分歧是如此之大，以至于他们之间想有任何沟通都是根本不可能的。人们在生物学意义上共有的品质——即最古老因而也是最可靠的遗传因子般来说，就是他们本性中比较原始的、比较中立的且没有智力差别的内容。

在这种典型的关系中，生命的内容必须为它们共通的要素付出代价，也就是说，只有通过建立相对低级的标准，才能实现人与人之间的相互理解和相互一致；在这种典型关系中，个体不得不把自己减化为与所有人都相同的事物，并且还不得不摒弃掉个人层面的东西，这要么是因为其他人的水准较低，要么是因为尽管他们的水平是相同的，但要适应另一个领域。除了人以外，这种典型的关系在客观事物之间的关系中也有所体现。但是人与人之间的关系与客观事物之间的关系的唯一的差别就是，客观事物之间的关系是客观实在的实体之间的一个过程，而人与人的关系不是发生在实实在在的客观事物上而是发生在这些客观事物的价值概念之上。事实上，世间最为精妙绝伦的事物我们也可以花钱买到，并且我们花钱买这种东西与我们花钱去买那些最微不足道的、粗制滥造的东西没什么区别，人们在这两种东西间营造出了一种与它们的品质完全不相关的关系，并且有时，这种关系会导致那些精妙绝伦的事物沦落成庸俗之作，并失去其特有的价值，但是微不足道的、粗制滥造的东西却既不会有价值上的损失，也不会有价值上的所得。事实上，罕见独特的东西贵，无足轻重的东西便宜并不总是一种补偿机制，尤其是对于那些不进行对个别性的比较的一般性评价而言，情况就更是如此了。这个事实也不会被发生在心理上的那种无法抗拒的作用所补偿，心理上感觉到的是货币的公分母使客观事物间的尖锐鲜明个别差异减弱了。货币等价物的这种消除差别的作用通过这样一个事实明显地表现出来了：即把一件美丽而又有独创性且可以花钱买得到的事物与另一件同样重要却无法用钱买到的事物做个比较。从一开始我们就觉得无法用钱买到的重要事物是有所保留的，也是有其独立性的，而且它还可以根据客观存在的理念被单独拿出来进行评判——简而言之，它具有其他事物无法比拟的区分性。即便是最为精妙绝伦的事物，只要它具有可以用钱买到这一特性，就仍属于一种低级物品之列，因为它不能把应要与之建立联系的低级货币拒之门外。至于货币，由于它自身什么都不是，却能凭借与高级的东西挂上钩的可能性而获得其价值，所以反过来看，货币与不同事物的个体意义是等价的，而这种等价值却由于客观事物之间相互交换的性质而遭到贬低，尽管它们的交换性可能只是间接的或虚构的。事物可以交换价值就降低了，这可能就是我们把像陈词滥调、行为模式、音乐旋律之类事物的特征略带轻蔑地描述为“可流通货币”背后所隐藏的动机。货币作为所有事物中最富有流通性的事物，它不仅要求相对意义上的流通性，还要求对流通性的表现，有些时候它甚至要求把交换的要素也加入进来。每个人都接纳货币，每个人都在不断地使用着货币，但没有人会对其内容产生特别的兴趣，正如拥有货币的情形一样。每个人的口袋里都装着现成的钱，在任何情况下，货币在履行其职能的时候都必须转化成其他形式。无论是给予货币还是接受货币，货币与个体的关系不包含任何的个人感情色彩或特殊的品质；货币与说话内容或行为的内容不同，它会从个人风格旁悄悄溜掉，而不对个人的风格产生任何影响，仿佛从一个钱包流到另一个钱包里的钱自己并无改变一样。消除差别既是客观事物之间相互交换的原因，也是它们相互交换的结果，这就好像闲话会不费周折地就被流传开是因为这些话说的都是些微不足道的琐事，而之所以这些话说的都是微不足道的琐事却是因为它们常常可以不费周折地流传出去。现在我们对待客观事物时常常表现出的冷淡与轻率态度，这与更早的时候相比有着很明显的差别，这种前后的差异至少在部分上是由客观事物之间的反个性化和消除差别所引起的，而客观事物个性化和消除差别却是由货币价值的共同标准而引致的。

货币表现出的交换性一定会不可避免地对商品自身的属性产生影响，或者在货币的交换性与商品属性之间产生相互作用。对一件商品个性的兴趣的降低将引起对商品本身的个性的贬低。如果说一件商品包括两个方面，其中一方面是它的品质而另一方面则是它的价格，那么我们只把兴趣集中在其中一方面似乎在逻辑上不太可能：因为如果一个商品仅仅是价格比较低而在其品质方面是没有保证的话，那么便宜只不过就是一个空洞的概念而已，而高品质只有对应着公平的价格时才有经济上的吸引力。但是那些概念上的不可能，在心理意义上却是真实有效的。对商品所具有的某一方面的兴趣足够大时，它在逻辑上所对应的另一半就可以彻底消失了。在这方面的一个典型例子就是“五分钱杂货店”。现代货币经济中的估价原则在这个例子中找到了最清楚的表达方式。在这个例子中，我们的兴趣焦点不是商品，而是价格，在较早的时候，关注价格而不关注品质的原则不仅被认为是可耻的，而且还被认为是绝对不可能出现的。曾有人恰如其分地提出，尽管中世纪的城镇已经囊括了所有进步的特点，但还是缺乏广泛的资本主义经济的特征，并且还指出，这也正是下列事实的原因，即中世纪并非在生产的扩张中寻求经济理想这种扩张只有通过低廉的价格才可以实现，而是在提供的货物质量中寻求，因此，它们在实用工艺、对生产的严格控制、对生活必需品的严格管制等方面有巨大的贡献。这个例子是这一类现象中的一个极端，而另一端的特征可以通过“便宜没好货”的标语得以描述，只有在我们完全沉醉于低廉的价格，以至于无暇顾及其他因素的情况下，我们才会选择那些便宜且质量差的产品。当事物之间的差异性被消除为货币数量上的区别的时候，首先降低的将是主体对客观事物特殊品质方面的兴趣，进而造成的后果是降低客观事物本身的品质。因为存在这样一个事实：即通过一种完全中立的方式，客观事物就从主体的兴趣的焦点中被驱逐出去了，所以生产便宜的垃圾货就像是对客体事物的报复。

这一切也许已经清清楚楚地展示了，货币经济及其造就的所有后果与区别价值之间存在着一种根本上的对立，我们在之前已经对这种对立有过粗浅的刻画。货币彻底地摧毁了自尊，它刻画出了非凡之人所具有的特征，深深地扎根于特定事物以及对事物的欣赏评价当中；它把一个完全异质的外在标准强加在事物之上，这个标准与客观事物的区别价值完全背道而驰。货币把事物安排到区别价值约减为数量上的差异这样一个序列中，通过这种方式，一方面它剥夺了客观事物品质上的差异性和事物之间的距离，另一方面剥夺了一种客观事物与另一种客观事物在关系上和品质上进行比较的权利——恰恰是这两方面要素的结合决定了区别价值理论的特性。个人价值刻画了区分理念的特征，而个人价值的不断增加看起来太过超然，甚至投射到事物中去时也是如此——考虑到我们已经提到过的货币具有的消除差异性的作用——以至于无论从哪个意义上讲，这些客观的事物都是共同的，所以即便在语言方面，这些客观事物的区分性也已经彻底地消失了。货币与区分的概念形成了鲜明的对比，在那些所有可以通过金钱来买到的商品的范畴中，货币的作用是如此的明显，诸如卖淫行为、买卖婚姻、贿赂等等都通过强化了的个人化方式表现了货币的作用。

第二节

从内容确定的权利向支付货币需求的转化

在论及个体自由的第四章中，我们曾经论证了实物义务向货币租税的过渡如何使义务双方均得到好处，尤其是其中人身依附者一方在何种程度上获得了自由和尊严。现在，货币对各种个人价值的重要性必须沿着一条相反方向的线索而被进一步地扩展。

这一过渡过程之所以产生了有利的结果，是源于这样一个事实：即承担义务的人迄今为止都在实物义务关系里坚定不移地投入了个人精力，但却没有拿到与之成对应比例关系的等价回报。对方支付给他的事物是纯粹非个人性的自然存在物。承担义务者在此关系中所享受到的权利是相对非个人性的，而他所要完成的义务却完全是个人性的。通过采纳货币支付的方式，这些义务祛除了个人性，从而双方关系不对称的现象也被消除了。但如果承担义务者不甘心只得到物质上的具体返还就了事，而是还想通过这种义务关系获得一种权利、一种影响力、一种个人的重要性，那么，整个结果就会截然不同了。他之所以提出这种要求恰恰是因为，在这种义务里他贡献出的是一种明确的个人性劳动。在这种情形下，通过转化为货币支付形式，义务关系被客观化，从而造成不利的后果，就像它在第一种情况中产生了有利结果那样。雅典盟国被征服，成为不同程度意义上的直接附庸国的地位，正是肇始于它们从进贡船只军队改为仅仅进贡金钱。表面上这些盟国从更多进贡实物的义务中解放出来的过程，实际上却包括它们自动放弃了自己政治活动的意义，这暗示了它们要求参与政治的权利只能建立在奉献物质性的贡品和牺牲实际权力的运作的基础上。最初的义务仍然含有直接的权利要求，例如附庸国贡献出的战斗力不能被用来打它们自己，但如果奉送给人家的是金钱，那么就可能会被自己的钱砸了脚。用康德式的术语来说，实物贡献是由作为其形式的义务和作为其内容的具体物质和对象所组成的。尽管如此，这种物质性内容也许也有某种副作用。举个例子来说，如果实物义务是农民的法定义务，或许就会相当地限制他的人身和行动自由，但是如果它是给某位统治者的军事行动提供的实物给养，反而会迫使统治者在一定程度上关心提供给养者。在这两种情形中，义务本身没有改变，但是决定其形式的物质内容却使第一种情况下的服役者感到事情变得很棘手，而在另一种情况中他则感到相对要好得多。不过，倘若货币租税取代了实物贡献，物质性的内容实质上也就已经被取消了，它丧失了任何发挥效力的特性，以至于只有在最抽象的意义上才能变为现实的纯粹经济意义上的义务被保留了下来。我们上面所说的第一种义务被简化为货币租税，就意味着服役者一个负担的消失，而第二种义务转化成货币租税时则意味着服役者慰藉感的消失，服役者在前一情形中所感到振奋的程度跟他在后一情形中所感到的被压抑的程度是一样的。所以，我们在历史上更频繁地遇到使强制性劳役转化为货币纳税这样一种有意识的政治行动，通过这种转化，承担义务者的实力地位就将会被降低。譬如，英国的亨利二世就曾决定，骑士们只要交钱抵消他们需履行的义务，就不必跟从国王参加欧洲大陆的战争。许多骑士也许会接受这个提议，因为表面上看它好像意味着使骑士们从军役中被解脱出来，减轻了他们的负担。但实际上并非如此，这个提议实际上是解除了他们的武装，因为国王最担心的是各封建派系之间的斗争，而解除其武装的原因恰巧是国王迄今为止依靠的就是封建派系的好战性。既然有无好战性不再是各地区和城镇中人们参军入伍的特殊要素，对这些地区和城镇中的人们来说结果就恰恰相反：他们通过钱代替了军役，获得了自由。使得所有这些现象显得如此重要是这样一个事实，即在这些现象里，人们可以从中得到非常基本的生活感情与全然外在的事实之间的联系。认识到如下这点也很重要：货币能够凭借某些性质居中协调这些联系，由此，这些性质也显现出最纯粹和最精确的形式，尽管不单单是货币如此。历史的格局从本质上是由这一含义支撑着的，它可以被排列成一个呈上升趋势的序列，按照其中各要素的特定关系，这个序列中每一个历史环节都在为诸要素提供了自由发展空间的同时也起到了抑制其自由发展的作用。很清楚的是，纯粹的人身关系或许表现为对某人严酷的个人征服，或许表现为保持了尊严的自由结合。如果决定性要素具有了非个人性的特征，那么两边的情形就都改变了，无论这种非个人性指的是某个外在对象的物质性，还是指大多数人的主体性个个都消失殆尽。前面两章已经阐明了解脱人身束缚关系的转变过渡是如何进行的，比起臣服于某个个人，人们往往更愿意服从于某个非个人性的集体或某个纯粹客观的组织机构。这里我只想提一提，过去的奴隶以及农奴，但凡他们是属于国家的，就会过着相对较舒适的生活；现代大商店里在非个人的管理方式下的雇员的境遇，也往往会比小作坊里受作坊主个人盘剥的雇工要好一些。反过来看，在涉及种种个人价值的时候，转化成非个人的形式常常会体现为人的尊严和自由的丧失。在即便是最低标准的献身也被转化成了客观的法定义务的情况下，贵族化的自愿奉献，包括最极端的为国捐躯经常会被一种屈辱和被贬低的感觉所取代。甚至在16世纪期间，当法国、德国、苏格兰以及荷兰的诸侯们通过训练有素的代理人或行政管理机构来统辖其臣民时，就会遇到相当剧烈的反抗。当时的人们认为统治权威是某种个人性的东西，人们为了献身于某个人，自愿地全心全意地服从统治者，然而与之相比，若是某个非个人的机构来充当权威的话，就只会出现征服镇压了。

这一序列现象的最后一个环节是由奠基于货币——它是一切实在构造物中最客观的东西——之上的各种关系组成的。依照种种货币租税的起源和内容，它们表现的要么是彻底的自由，要么是完全的压制。所以，我们发现人们偶尔也会坚决抵制缴纳货币租税。当阿拉贡的彼得四世要求阿拉贡各阶层的人缴纳货币租税时，他们答复说这样做是不合习俗的，按照习俗，虽然信仰基督教的臣民愿意为他本人服务，但用货币纳税是犹太人和摩尔人的事。在盎格鲁一撒克逊人统治下的英格兰，国王同样也没有权利来直接征税，当时盛行的反而是古代日耳曼人的原则，即整个国家是建立在个人为军队和为法庭服役的基础上的。当国王开始征收丹麦金时，表面上看起来是为了抵抗新的外族侵扰而实行的保护措施，实质上却暗示着国家的衰败。鉴于个人义务就是老百姓的权力，只有当承担义务的人的传统身份并非意味着进入到受益人权力的势力范围中来的时候，他们才会答应把个人义务改成交纳货币租税。根据这一观点来看，同一群体中的不同派别常常会采纳截然不同的态度。中世纪德意志的领主有为应战而征募自由民和农奴从军的权利，但后来却往往以课税代替。不过庄园领主们却仍然可以免交此税，因为他们自己服了骑兵役，即“他们用他们的鲜血服了役”。这就是那条古老法则的起源：“农民带着他的口袋讨生活，骑士则依靠他的马。”假如现代国家重新为其公民引入军役制度，而不是靠征税和招募雇佣兵来服军役，那么，以直接服役替代纳税就是公民个人日渐增长的政治重要性的一个充分表现。因而，对国家来说，货币纳税转向个人义务的关系就证明了普选权是强制军役所带来的必然后果这一说法是正当的。

需求的强制性

专制的倾向总是力图把所有类型的义务简化成交纳货币租税，这一事实可以从各种非常基本的关系中推导出来。强制的概念通常都被以一种含糊不清和不精确的方式使用。如果一个人的行为动机是由于如果不这么做就会遭致的非常痛苦的后果，如受到惩处或遭受损失等等的威胁和恐惧；那么，人们就常说这个人是受到了“胁迫”。事实上，在所有这样的情况下都不存在真正意义上的强制。因为，倘若有人愿意承担后果的话，他是完全可以自由选择不去做这个他假定被强迫去实施的行为的。真正的强制是别无选择，它诉诸武力或心理暗示而即刻实施。譬如说，只有当比我更有力量的人强迫抓着我的手去签名，或者我在催眠的暗示下，才会被迫去签上名字。但除非以死相逼，否则我不会这么做。所以，那种说国家强迫人们遵守法律的观点是不太正确的。只要某个人做好了接受违法惩罚的准备，国家实际上不能迫使任何人去服军役，要求他尊重别人的生命财产，或是要求他在法庭上做证。国家在这种情况下所能做的无非是确保使违法犯罪者受到法律制裁。唯有某项专门领域的法律才是可能迫使人们主动守法的力量，这就是纳税的义务。正如币值的私法义务是强制性的一样，就强制这个词最严格的意义而言，这一义务的履行是强制性的，纳税就是以强制手段从纳税人那里扣除相应的价值。当然，这种强制性仅仅指涉货币纳税，它甚至不是指称其他任何形式的经济义务。如果某人履行的是交纳某种特定实物的义务，而他无论如何也不想生产这种实物，那么他也不会真的被逼一定要交出自己生产的这种东西。然而，他所拥有的其他财产可以被拿去换成钱来履行义务。因为任何这样一种实物对象都具有货币价值，能够通过这种与货币的关系被换成钱以代替其他实物，即使或许在其他义务关系里就不可能这么做。专制制度的目标旨在强迫臣民应该无条件地绝对服从，为此私利的原因，从一开始它就只要求臣民以交钱纳税的权利。联系到对货币需求，不会像偶然地征收某种实物税那样，会发生什么抵制交钱纳税的事情，而实物税是不可能被强制征收的。因而无论从内在还是外在方面来看，把会遭到任何形式抵制的实物征税简化成货币征税是非常切实有效的。或许这正是产生如下现象的更为根本的原因之一，一般来说，专制政体通常被和货币经济的振兴联系在一起（例如，意大利的独裁者常常趋向于出售其领土），同样，伴随着对货币价值评估的极大提高，重商主义体系及其对货币的高度评价，在君主制权力无限膨胀的时期得到了蓬勃的发展。在所有强制性要求中，对金钱需求的满足最不依赖于承担此义务者的信誉。与之形成对比的是，那种与所有其他强制性要求相关联而存在的自由，那种只能依靠自觉自愿地抵抗强制才能被证实和确认的自由衰弱了。这与我们在上文中所极力强调的事实，即实物租税向货币租税的转变往往意味着个体的解放，决不是矛盾的。因为精明的专制君主总是要为他的强制性要求选择一种形式，这就是赐予臣民在纯粹个人性的人际关系中以最大限度的自由。意大利文艺复兴中那些最可怕的暴政，同时也是个体的自我观念和私人利益最无拘无束滋长的理想温床。在任何一个历史时代，从罗马帝国到拿破仑三世时期，人们已经发现政治专制主义一向与放浪形骸的私人化自由主义思想相伴始终。为了自身的利益，专制主义会把它强制性的要求局限在最本质的方面，而在其他方面则尽可能地赐予自由，从而使独裁的措施和方式对其臣民来说还尚可忍受。缴纳货币税款的要求以最切实可行的方式综合了这两点。人们在纯粹的私人事务上被赋予的自由绝对不会阻止在政治领域里对公民权的剥夺，而专制制度也确实常常达到了这一目标。

实物价值转化为货币价值

伴随着用钱履行义务相应地贬低了承担义务的人的情况出现的，是对本书将在最后一章分析的这些后果的第二种补充情况。我们已经看到，对于农奴而言，倘若他可以用交钱纳税履行其义务，这将意味着何等的进步。但是，当改变农奴与货币关系是由另一方所引发的，也就是说当庄园主把农奴迄今为止或多或少还拥有权利的那块土地从他那里买过来时，就会产生截然不同于前面的后果。古德意志帝国地区在18世纪一直到19世纪颁布的法律里都禁止从农民手中购买土地，其理由的确是和财政政策或者一般化的农业政策在根本上有关联的。然而有时也会偶然盛行这样一种观点：就算拿走农民的土地时支付给他相当合理的金钱补偿，这对农民仍然是不公平的。诚然，人们可能会把有形的财产转变成金钱当作一种解脱。有了钱的帮助，我们就可以把到目前为止只能以一种形式被固定在物体内的价值转化成别的任何价值。兜里有钱我们是自由的，而先前没有转化成金钱的固定的实物则迫使我们依附于保存它和实现它的各种条件之上。从原则上讲，对某件物体的义务与对某个人履行的义务没什么区别，因为，假如我们希图避免得到最坏的后果，物体对我们行为的限定与某个人对我们行为所施加的限制同样严格。唯独把这个义务关系简化成货币关系——不论我们是收钱的一方，还是交钱的一方——才能够把我们从这种限定性中解脱出来，这种限定是外在的非我强加在我们身上的。因此18世纪从劳役到货币租税的频繁转化，的确给予了农民某些金钱方面的自由。然而这样的转化却也从农民那里夺走了金钱所买不到的东西，夺走了从根本上赋予自由以其价值的东西——即个人活动可信赖倚靠的对象。对农民而言，土地的意义完全不能等同于一个纯粹的财产价值，土地对于他意味着从事有价值活动的可能性，是他兴趣的一个核心，是决定他生命的一种价值，而一旦农民拥有的仅仅是其土地的货币价值而不是土地本身，他也就失去了生命的依托。把农民的土地财产简化成单纯的货币价值把农民推上了赤贫化的道路。农业社会关系的另一个不同的阶段展现了类似的发展形式。比方说，在奥尔登堡的农场里经常盛行着雇佣劳动关系。每个雇工被责成在每年一定数量的工作日里所得到的日薪要比按日薪计酬的工人的收入低一些，作为补偿，他可以从农场主那里得到以低于时价的价钱为其提供的住宿、土地使用、交通等等。这种关系中至少还有一部分属于一种实物价值交换。有人曾指出，这种雇佣关系的特征被描述为农场主与雇工的社会地位的平等，雇工并不觉得由于他更差的经济条件因而被迫为了薪水劳动而感到比农场主低人一等。然而同时被指出的是，新兴的货币经济破坏了这种雇佣关系，从劳役的自然实物交换转化为支付薪水的形式降低了雇佣工人的地位——即便在与实物交换的雇佣关系中他只限于拿到一定数量的实物相比，雇工通过这种方式，会根据他的劳动合同得到一定程度的行动自由。就在这同一个地区，同样的发展趋势在另一个方面也很明显。只要农场是以一定份额的脱粒谷物来支付打谷工人的酬劳的，工人们就会对农场主卓有成效地管理农场这件事产生浓厚的个人兴趣。打谷机的使用使支付打谷工人薪水的方式取代了原先这种酬劳支付方式，但这并不会使农场主与雇工之间形成一种亲密的私人关系，与更高的现金收入相比，打谷工曾在这种私人关系中得到过更多的自尊和道德鼓励。

自由的负面意义和个体性的彻底消除

货币对于获取个体自由的重要性适合于阐明一个影响深远的自由概念的定义。乍看上去，自由似乎只具有纯粹的负面特性。只是在与束缚奴役的形式相比较时，自由才会显得有意义。自由一向是指不做某件事的自由，符合这一自由概念的是通过无所阻碍而表达出来的。然而自由的概念并不限于这层负面的含义。如果在解脱义务的同时没有补充进对财产或权力的占有的话，自由就会变得毫无意义和价值。不做某事的自由同时暗示的是去做某件事的自由。在诸多纷繁复杂的领域里的现象证实了这一点。在政治生活里，无论一个政党在什么领域里需求或是达到自由，主题根本就不在于这个自由本身，而在于该政党从它先前被排斥的领域里所获得的积极的成果，以及权力的增长和扩展。法国大革命给予第三等级的“自由”的重要意义就在于一个第四等级正在发展壮大之中，并且它现在可以要求为第三等级“自由地”工作。教会的自由就意味着其势力范围的直接扩大，例如，与教会的“教育自由”相关的是国家允许其公民接触教会教义并受其影响。伴随着遍及全欧的农奴解放运动的是竭力使农民能够成为他自己那一小块土地的主人，这正如古代犹太人的律法所要求的那样，欠债的奴隶在替债主工作一定年限后必须要重新获得自由，同时这条律法也补充要求债主应该移交给奴隶一些财产，最好是这个奴隶以前所拥有的。但凡在自由的纯粹负面含义发挥作用的地方，自由就被认为是残缺不全和有辱人格的。乔尔达诺·布鲁诺热衷于宇宙整齐划一的有规律生活，他认为自由意志是一种缺陷，是人类不完美的一个特征，因为唯独只有上帝支配着必然性。除了这个非常抽象的例子之外，我们再举一个非常具体的例子。普鲁士佃农们住在村社的农地之外，村社里的农田都是混杂分散的，因为佃农只依据公共惯例耕种这些农田，佃农就有非常多的个人自由；然而也是因为佃农独立于村社之外，因此他所拥有的不是足以参与有关田地的决策的积极自由，而仅仅是不被村社的决策所束缚的消极自由。这就是佃农们即使腰缠万贯却仍旧处于一个被支配的、没有什么社会声望的地位的原因。自由本身只是一个空洞的形式，只有通过其他生活内容的发展它才会变得卓有成效、生机勃勃和富有价值。假如我们分析上述种种取得自由的事件，就会注意到：伴随着自由形式化的、纯粹的概念的是一种实质上被限定的内容，这样的内容在赋予自由以积极意义的同时也还包含着一定的限制性，即它发出关于通过这种自由必须要积极地完成什么事的指示。获取自由的一切行为，或许都可以在与之相关联的自由的物质内容与获得物与从先前束缚中形式化的、消极的自由契机之间谁更重要的比例关系基础上得以被排列划分。譬如，对于一个年轻人来说，摆脱了中学的压力，步入大学自由自在的生活，后一个机遇显得更加突出重要。构成生活积极方面的新内容和志趣起初是非常含糊不清和不明确的，因而由于纯粹的自由是某种彻底的空虚和不堪忍受的东西，德国大学生自愿接受了一种最严格的约束：德国大学生行为规范。从沉重的商业限制中解脱出来的商人的情况就完全不同了。在此，商人使得自由具有价值的新行为在内容和方向上都是被明确地加以确定的；商人不仅接受了自由，而且他立刻明白了该如何去利用这种自由。对女孩子而言，离开了父母家庭生活的限定规范，在经济上获得独立，这样一种自由比结婚拥有的自由无论在量还是质上都更具有积极的意义；若是她选择了后者的话，伴随着获得的自由的本质与目的的还有操持家务。总之，每一步自由解放都显示出在已被克服的那种境遇的强化扩大与由此而获得的境遇的强化扩大之间一个特定的比例。假若某人想按照一个机遇对另一个机遇逐渐上升的优势，建立这样一种通过用钱交换事物而获得的自由将处于某种状态的极端体系，那么，至少在事物迄今为止曾决定了生活内容的情况下是如此。无论谁用他农庄的田产换了城里的一所房子，他都因此而摆脱了农耕的种种烦恼和焦虑，但是这种自由也同时意味着他现在又不得不使自己卷入到因为占有城市房产而引起的一系列难题和可能性当中。然而要是他卖掉田产获得现金，那么他就真正自由了；这种从传统支配负担下解放出来的自由的负面因素，以及他作为一个货币拥有者的全新建立起来的境遇，只是给予了他的未来生活以最少的具体指示。由于货币交易，在摆脱某一事物制约的解放中的积极要素已经被简化到了这一自由的边缘价值。在纯粹消极的意义上，货币解决了实现人类自由的任务。

因此，对于缴纳现金租税而获得“解放”的农民而言，极端的危险其实是构成人类自由一般模式的一个部分。农民确实得到了自由，但那只是不做什么事的自由，而非可以做什么事的自由。从表面上看，农民获得到了做任何事情的自由——因为自由在此是单纯粹负面意义的——但事实上他却不知所措，在其意识中没有任何确定无疑的内容。这种自由的状态是空虚和缺乏稳定性的，使得人们完全地放纵在一种一时性起的、反复无常和具有诱惑力的冲动当中。这种自由可以与因弃绝其神祇而缺乏安全感的人的命运相比较，后者因为其行为而重新获得的“自由”，只是为他提供了从一切短暂易逝的价值之外制造出一个偶像崇拜物的机会。商人整天为他的生意忧心忡忡，迫切希望无论如何也要把货物出手，他所遭遇到的是与弃绝神祇的人同样的命运。但是，当最后商人的钱到手而真正“自由”之后，他却常常体会到食利者那种典型的百无聊赖、缺乏生活的目标和内心里的烦躁不安，这种感受驱使商人以极端反常和最自相矛盾的方式竭力保持终日的忙忙碌碌，其目的只是为了给他的“自由”填充进一种实质性的内容。公务员也常常面临着同样的情况，他想要尽快地爬到一个能够获得足以使他过上“自由自在”生活的退休金的职位上。因此，当我们置身于这个世界的痛苦和忧虑当中时，安宁的状态往往才像是绝对的理想，这种感觉直到我们从自己的经验中才能了解到：在做特定的事情时忙里偷闲才是有价值的；甚至如果这种安宁同时也是忙着做特定事情时得到的宁静，那么就只有这种安宁才是可以忍受的。出钱获得解放的农民、变成食利者的商人、领退休金的公务员，这些人看起来似乎都把他们的个体性从与他们财产或地位特定的具体状态紧密相关的限制中解放了出来，但事实上，在此所列举的例子当中，却发生了截然相反的情况。他们用货币交换了其个体自我中具有积极含义的内容，而货币却无法提供这样的积极内容。一名法国旅游者讲述了一个十分有代表性的希腊农妇们的故事，她们做刺绣，同时非常依恋那些她们付出了辛苦劳动的刺绣品：“她们把刺绣品送出去，又拿回来，她们考虑到钱，又考虑到她们的劳动，然后还是回到考虑钱。最后她们认为钱总是好东西，并且非常吃惊地发现自己竟是如此地富有。”因为货币所能提供的自由仅仅是一种潜在的、形式化的、消极的自由，用获取货币来换取生活的积极内容暗示着对个人价值的出卖——除非有其他的价值立即填补上它们的位置。由于这一原因，普鲁士19世纪初期的公社土地分配，极大地促进了生活颠沛流离、居无定所、以赚取日薪维持生计的雇工阶层的发展。对生活在更为贫困的标准上的农民来说，对于森林和草场的自然使用权是一种补助，对他们而言，绝对无法用一个抽象意义上确切的对等物来补偿这些权利后的损失；如果用货币来作为交换这些权利的一种补偿，货币不久就会被用光；如果用的是分配土地来补偿，那么分得的土地面积又可能太小以至于无法从中获得什么收益。因此，这种对土地的补偿费很快地被转化为货币，这加剧而非减弱了农民赤贫化和丧失生活资料的趋势。与希腊农妇的表现恰好类似的一个现象，就是被人种学者所报道的，要从原始部族成员那里购买商品是极端困难的。这一现象通过这样一个事实而得到了解释，即每件物品在创造时都被打上了一个关于其来源和用途的确定的个人印记，生产加工这件物品时所付出的巨大辛劳，以及滞留在物品上的独一无二的个体的使用方法都使得物品成为了个体自身的组成部分。因此，要迫使个体与该物品分离开来，就像要把一个肢体从身体上拆下来一样，将会遇到同样的抵抗，结果货币拥有权所带来的充满诱惑但却含糊不清的无穷无尽的“可能性”，不是暗示了自我的膨胀，而是暗示了自我的萎缩。一旦我们清楚地认识到了这一点，它对于理解我们这个时代就不再是无关紧要的了。自从货币存在以来，每个人基本上都倾向于多卖少买。随着货币经济的扩展，这一趋势越来越强烈，越来越影响了某些本来就不是要卖出而是具有永久性特征的物品。各式各样的生意与工厂、艺术品与收藏品、土地财产、权利与地位，它们似乎注定了要和个体紧密地拴连在一起，而不是在草率的交易中轻易地摆脱这种羁绊。当所有这些东西留在某个人手里成为其财产的时间期越来越短时，他就会愈发迅速频繁地改变财产的具体状态，从而实现了一种特别大的自由。然而，既然带有不确定性和缺乏内在方向性的货币是这些自由解放过程的另一方面，那么，这些过程停止了连根拔除以求解放的做法，往往不会全部转移到新的根源里去。实际上，由于在瞬息万变的货币交易中，不再根据特定的生活内容的范畴来划分财产类别，就绝不可能再发展内存于具体财产中的那种内在约束、融合和投入，虽然它们限制了个体，却依然支撑着个体，赋予个体以内容。这就阐释了，为什么在我们这个时代里，尽管总体而言的确拥有比先前任何年代更多的自由，但我们却无法好好地享受这种自由。货币使我们不仅从他人对我们的束缚中，而且也从由我们自己的占有物而带来的束缚中购买自身的自由成为可能。无论是付钱的还是赚钱的，我们都得到了自由。因此，这一持续不断的自由解放过程在现代生活中占据了一个格外广阔的领域。同时也是在这一点上，货币经济与自由主义倾向之间更为深刻的关联被揭示了出来，展示了自由主义的自由是产生了如此多的不稳定、无秩序和令人不满的状况的一个原因。

然而，由于诸多事物被货币不断地拆离，失去了给我们指明方向的意义，因此在我们与事物的关系中，针对这一变动，就出现了一种实际的反作用。如果与对具体财产的情况针锋相对，作为货币经济一部分的不安全感和背信弃义就必将造成十足的现代情绪的恶果：即人们对得到某件满心希望占有的东西的满足感，往往伴随着一瞬间立刻生出的超出这件东西的欲望；也就是说生命的内核与意义总是从人们手中滑落，这就证实了人们有一个希望赋予事物一种新的意义，一种更加深刻的意义，一种属于事物本身的价值的深切愿望。占有物可以轻而易举地获得和失去，通过昙花一现的短暂存在，它们给予人们以愉悦感，同时自身也千变万化。总之，货币造成的后果和相互关系，已经使得这些占有物变得空洞无物和无关紧要了。然而，艺术中活跃的各种骚动，对新风格的探索，以及如此这般的诸多类型，如象征主义乃至通神论，所有的这些均是渴望了解一种新的、更易被察觉的事物意义的征兆——而不管每一事物自身是否就拥有了更具价值的、更精神性的着重点；或每一事物是否通过摆脱原子分裂状态而建立起关联，从而获得了这样的着重点。如果说现代人是自由的——说他自由是因为他可以卖任何一件东西，同时说他自由也是因为他可以买任何一种东西——那么现在他在对象自身当中寻求的（往往是带有几分疑惑的踌躇不决）则是那种活力、稳定性和内在的统一；现代人已失去了这些东西，因为他与这些对象的关系以货币为条件而发生了改变。正如我们早已看到的那样，凭借着货币，人不再被事物所役使，因而另一方面，个体自我的内容也同样不为事物所役使，动机与决心和具体占有物之间是如此地保持步调一致，以至于连续地出售交换具体财产——即使它们仅仅是适于销售的——就常常意味着种种个人价值的被出卖和被彻底根除。

个人劳动成果与货币等价物之间的价值差异

货币经济将日益掩盖这样一个事实，即事物的货币价值无法全部取代我们自身可以从中占有的东西，事物还具有那些无法通过货币表现出来的品质。无论如何也不可否认的是，用货币对物体进行或褒或贬的评价，都无法把它从遭致贬低的日常交易的平庸性中拯救出来，因此至少在某些时候，我们就会去寻求一种远不同于日常所见的货币形式。最古老的意大利钱币是一种形状不规则的铜币，因此它不是被用来计数的，而是被用来称重量的。直至罗马帝国时期，那时的金融事务已经发展到了一个精准的阶段，这种不规则形状的铜币就往往用于宗教祭祀过程当中，以及被当做法律的一个象征物。如果被出售的并非是某件物体而是个人完成的工作，如果这些工作不仅在其外部表现形式而且在其内容上也具备了个体性特征时；那么很显然，除了物体的金钱价值之外，它本身的价值依然急需得到认可。下述一系列现象将使这一点变得十分清晰。当货币和工作成果之间发生交易关系时，一方面，买家要买的只是具体的物品，即客观上被限定好了的工作成果；而另一面，卖方所要求的，或起码是在许多情况下所希望得到的，则不仅仅只是金钱而已。不管谁去听一场音乐会，当听到所期待的节目，并且这个节目如同预想的那么精彩时，他们就会觉得花的钱物有所值。然而，音乐表演艺术家却不仅仅满足于金钱，他还期待着掌声。无论哪个想拥有一幅个人肖像画的人，当他收到画的时候就已经心满意足了；然而，画家拿到预先定好的工钱时却不见得满意，除非他还额外获得了主观上的认可和超主观的名声。部长大臣想要的不仅是他的薪水，还有统治者和国家对他的感激。教师与牧师想得到的也不止是他们的报酬，还有人们对他的尊敬与忠诚。甚至连较高层次的生意人也不想仅仅用产品赚钱，而是还想让顾客满意——即使这样做也不只是为了拉回头客。总之，许多具体工作的承担者除了钱以外——钱只是在客观上对他们的工作成就的一个充分认可——还要求个人的认可，要求买家流露出某种主观的承认，这种主观的承认独立于双方商谈好的价钱之外，它将是一种完全等价于其工作成果的贡献的补足感。在此我们看到的是和我在第三章所描述的货币所有权的自然增值现象所截然对立的现象。在自然增值现象中，买家得到的东西之所以大于其花费的确切等价物，是因为货币拥有超越每一件具体物品价值的能力。但货币的本性恰恰就是，在所有的经验事物中——引用伯麦的话——货币结合了正向和反向运动，并表现出双方的调和；个人行为要求某种超出其货币等价物之上的东西。就如同代表货币这一方的权利要求一样，代表个体工作成果一方的权利要求也超越了直接交换之外，个体是其权利要求的几何中心点，代表个体的权利要求既在围绕着个体的这一领域中表现出来，又不受任何单个权利要求的影响而存在。这种平衡对于承担工作的个体一方是有利的，以这种方式交换钱与工作成果被视为是极为重要的，以至于对货币等价物的接受看起来都被当作对工作和个人的贬低。这就好像是某人从账面上不存在的无形报酬里牟取了一笔钱，而他并未从中扣除分文。我们知道拜伦勋爵在从出版商那儿拿到稿酬时，所拥有的仅仅是极为尴尬的感觉。无论在哪里，赚钱的行为本身都没有什么好名声，如同在古希腊一样（因为当时货币资本的社会意义和生产力尚不为人知，货币只是被看作用于自私自利的消费），人们越来越鄙视这种行为，特别当它涉及个人的智力成果时。因此，为了钱去当老师或去从事一般的智力工作看起来好像是一种对人的贬低。至于其他所有那些源自于个性内核的活动，如果有人完全可以为了钱财做这样的事情，那么他简直就是肤浅的和不切实际的。人们在根本上怎么可能拿其他行为酬谢为爱情做出牺牲的人呢？不管该行为的价值是不是和爱情同等；不管该行为是不是出自于和爱情同样强烈的感情。全然个体化的义务关系一直是存在的，这种关系或许是相互之间的，但是它仍旧在根本上拒绝通过这种相互关系而达到的收支平衡。与遭到外在损害的情况一样，无论事后如何弥补主观的犯罪行为，也没有办法使它恢复到不曾发生过的状态。如果有罪的人感到自己在接受惩罚之后已经完全彻底恢复成为正常人，那么这并非是因为其受到的惩罚等量于犯下的罪行，而是由于摧毁了罪的根源的内心转变所带来的后果。仅仅有惩罚是不能真正铲除违法犯罪行为的，这一点在人们对那些尽管已经受到了惩罚的罪犯仍然抱有的持续不信任和蔑视的态度中得到了证明。我在前文中曾表明，正如收支账目上的借方与贷方之间不存在等量价值一样，性质上千差万别的东西之间也是不存在直接的等量价值的。这一点是通过体现在个体个性中的各种价值而得到最彻底的证实的，但当这一点对其范围不再是有效的时候，这些价值也就失去了根基，表现出独立自主的客观特性。这些价值不断地向货币这一绝对可以通约的实体靠拢，因为货币是绝对客观的，与绝对不可通约的个性恰巧是针锋相对的。另一方面，有点麻烦的则是我们认识到了物体、个人成就以及精神价值之间是不适合做深刻的相互比对的，但我们却不断地把它们当作真正的等价物一样来彼此衡量；而恰恰是这些生活要素的不可通约性赋予它们以不去同任何特定等价物比对的权利，并由此给予了生活一种无可替代的魅力与财富。生活中存在着不胜枚举的不公正和悲剧的原因之一恐怕就在于个人价值无法由提供给它们的那些货币来平衡或者用货币来换算。然而在另一方面，对各种个人价值的意识，以及对生命的个体方面内容的自豪感，恰恰是因为了解到它们是不能被任何纯粹数量上的价值来权衡超越而引起的。就如人们常常公认的那样，数量大得惊人的等价物修正了它们与个人价值之间不恰当的关系，因为它们中间浸透着那种“自然增殖现象”，充斥着那种超越了数字确定性的奇异可能性。这些等价物对应的是既具体化为每一个个人成果，但又超越了个人成果的个体性。为了一大笔钱而愿意提供特定的事物或个人成果看起来是正当的，但是如果拿不到这么一大笔钱，那么人们就宁可把东西当成礼物送出去，而不会只拿区区一笔小钱。只有这后一种做法会为人所不齿，而前者则不会。出于这一原因，在为了向有教养和敏感的人当中的某一个人表示敬意而送礼时，必须使礼物的金钱价值不易为人所察觉。有人冒昧地送给陌生女士鲜花与糖果，这种短暂易逝的礼物就显得没任何实质性的价值。

一项特殊工作与其货币等价物在价值上的不同既非那么向来容易察觉，也不是——即便当这种不同确实存在的时候——从来都表达得那么明白无误，这就像前面所提到的艺术家与医生、政府官员与学者的情况那样。如果这种活动是十分非个人化的，同时承担此工作者是一名普通人，就比如说像不熟练的工人，那么，这样的工作就没什么不可通约的地方，这正如表现了其独特个性的工作过程可以通过它在运作中与众不同的特质而被辨认出来一样。另一方面，承担特殊工作的人是否可以凭借其额外的劳动价值而拿到额外的酬劳原则上是取决于他的社会地位是否允许接受这样一种理想化的答谢。无论在什么地方，只要承担特殊工作的人由于其一般的从属社会地位而没有得到这种认可和答谢，那么他被迫为了钱以及仅仅为了钱所付出的个人人性价值越多，他的人格也就越低贱。所以，中世纪时期的吟游诗人被人看不起的原因就在于，他们应客人的要求一会儿唱欢快的曲子一会儿唱悲伤的曲子，拿他们的个人感情强颜卖笑，“把钱看作赞誉领受”。吟游诗人得不到任何非物质的酬谢是十分合情合理的，他们受到了恰如其分的对待，起码他们拿到了经济上的酬劳。虽然吟游诗人们大都境遇不佳，但他们仍然得到了公平的对待，尤其是在考虑到什么才是他们应得之物的情况下。为了金钱而牺牲真正的个人价值，是没有任何其他多余的非物质性回报的。无论这种情形出现在什么地方，人们都会发现一种个人生活的懈怠以及几乎是财富的损失。对在货币贸易中各种个人价值被用于交换不恰当的补偿物的感觉，的确就是为什么货币交易会常常被骄傲而情操高尚的人以极端厌恶的态度拒之于门外，以及为什么作为货币交易对立面的农业耕作曾经被赞誉为是唯一恰当的事业追求的原因之一。例如，苏格兰高地贵族就是如此，直至18世纪，他们仍然处于一种与世隔绝的、纯粹乡土式的生存状态之下，但这种生活方式却是由最大限度的个人自由理想所引导的。无论货币在多大程度上促进了这样的个人自由。不容否认的是，从这样一种自由、独立、自给自足的存在的立场上来看，把财产和工作成果拿去换钱，就原来附着和缠绕在人们关系中的交易网络而言，就使人的生活失去了个性化。如果生活的主观和客观方面已然分裂开来了，那么生活非个人化的过程通过日益集中于客观面，就可能会仅仅适应于主观方面的纯粹细节。与之相反的是，在更为原始和始终如一的存在方式中，如果迄今为止只为个人所享受和承认的财产与劳动成果，被简化成为单纯只是货币交易的一个要素和交易的客观规律作用的一个对象，那么这种情况看上去就一定是不合情理的，是人的一种损失。在从中世纪庄园不动产向现代农业的转化过程当中，我们发现骑士阶层的概念因此而被扩大了。除了军事活动之外，现在骑士也被允许从事盈利性活动，——然而这只是指对他个人财产的经营管理，这种获取收益的比较特殊的类型使得骑士甚至比先前更加蔑视商人和零售商。在此，由于骑士和商人所从事的这两种经济形式之间的距离彼此已经很接近了，因此在骑士的鄙视态度里，货币交易是有损尊严的这一印象被清晰地凸显出来。一个最为普遍的社会学现象就是，源自于同一片土壤的两个因素之间的对立似乎是最明显不过的了。同属于一个宗教的各教派间彼此憎恶的强烈程度尤甚于对一个完全不同的宗教的憎恨。毗邻的小城邦之间的对抗性也一向比在利益领域里空间和客观范围都大相径庭的大国之间的敌视来得更加激烈。事实上，据说现存于世的最疯狂的仇恨即是存在于血亲之间的仇恨。随着共同利益或近似利益的日益增加，从这些利益衍生出来的敌意也逐渐增加，在某些情况下仿佛达到了顶点。因此，当彼此之间的差异和对立变得模糊不清时，——对这些差异与对立的保留起码是各个派别中一个派别的兴趣所在——危险也就临近了。一种低级因素和高级因素彼此越是接近，后者就越是会乐此不疲地突出强调二者间仍旧存在的差异，并且对这些差异的评价也就越高。由此观之，激烈好斗的阶级仇恨不会在各个阶级被不可逾越的鸿沟隔离开的地方体现出来，而是会出现在下层阶级已经开始往上攀升，上层阶级已经丧失了某些威望，而消除两者之间的差异已经开始被提及之际。所以，当庄园主演变成经营管理田地的农夫时，他就会越来越觉得有必要把他自己同唯利是图的商人区分开来。他经营土地最初仅仅是为了满足他自己的需要，并不会拿他的农产品来卖钱。假如他确实开始这样做了，那也仅是用他自己生产的作物。他不会像商人那样，用自己的个人技术来为出钱的人提供服务。出于同样的动机——虽然是与其他人合作——斯巴达公民被允许拥有土地，但却不许他们亲自来耕种。对贵族利益而言，强调贵族与其他出售商品者之间存在的任何一丁点差别都是十分重要的，因为，货币交易产生了民主式的夷平阶级差别的后果，尤其如果是由社会地位较高的一方靠卖东西赚钱，而社会地位较低的人来购买产品时，交易双方很容易因此而被视为是彼此“平等的”。所以，贵族认为货币交易贬低了人格，而农民如果向庄园主缴纳租税时所付的是货币而非实物时，他反而会觉得自己的地位上升了。

为钱出卖各种个人价值也说明了货币的一种独特性质，这一独特性质以自身的不确定性和缺乏内容，催生了历史一心理学可能性的一切对立面，并且把这些可能性塑造成明确的实体。在这个逐渐变得实际的世界里，货币——这一事物相对性的具体体现——似乎就像是一个包容和支持着所有那些相对的事物及其对立的绝对之物。

第三节

“劳动货币”及其基本原理

货币等价于劳动的意义已经在这几页中，已经被直接或间接地、反反复复地提到好多回，所以接下来我只想考察一个与货币等价物相关的原理的问题：也就是说，劳动本身是否确实是价值的问题。劳动一方面具体地构成了所有经济分类中的要素价值，而在另一方面，劳动价值的表现形式却又是通过货币的方式抽象表现出来的。如果不是所有这些经济价值都可以通过一种统一的单位的方式转换为货币形式的话，如果这种简化的做法没有为辨认出货币这种统一的单位提供保证的话，那么，把所有类型的经济价值追溯到某个单一的源头，并把各种经济价值简约成某种如劳动、成本、用途之类的单一的表现形式，这样的理论尝试肯定是不会出现的。由社会主义的蓝图构想出来的“劳动货币”的概念就表现了经济价值与其单一的表现形式之间的关联。这样一来，劳动就成为了价值创造的唯一要素，有权利对别人的劳动成果提出要求，因为人们知道，除了货币没有其他形式能成为具体劳动数量的象征，同时，除了货币没有其他的形式可以用来辨认具体的劳动数量。因此，在“劳动货币”中，货币作为价值的统一形式被保留了下来，然而货币所具有的转瞬即逝的特性却被剔除了，因为正是由于这种货币的瞬间即逝的特性的存在阻碍了货币更加充分地表现价值的基本潜能。如果有人认为自然和劳动都是价值的创造者，以至于劳动也拥有了超脱于从自然提取的物质材料的价值之外的价值，正如谚语中所说的那样：劳动是财富之父，土地是财富之母，那么社会主义式思路就依然会得出劳动货币的概念。这是因为，既然自然的财富不应该是私有财产而应该是公共财产，按照这样的方式进行推理，每一个自然物都同样应该是可以实现的经济生活的基础，那么，最终每个人在交换时所需要付出的就只有他的劳动了。诚然，如果一个人靠劳动交换到一个有价值的自然之物，并且此人把这个自然之物再一次交换出去，那么他就可以把这个产品的物质价值计算在内。这个自然之物的价值量仍然只等于这个人为了得到该物品所付出的劳动的价值，正是因为这个原因，劳动价值成了我们所讨论的这个自然物品的交换价值的衡量尺度。如果我们把劳动看作是决定一切客观事物交换价值所必需追溯到的最终权威，那么我们把像货币之类的，连我们自己都很陌生的事物看作是衡量一切客观事物价值的尺度就是很不合适的了，同时这种方法还会把我们引入歧途。与此相反，人们注定必须去确定这样一种可能性：即能否通过某种符号的方式来表现整个劳动的纯粹性与直接性，而且这种符号能够像货币一样，发挥价值交换和价值尺度的作用。

声明所提到的这些价值统一理论哪一个是唯一合情合理的，是根本没有必要的，我只能断言的是，至少在哲学意义上，劳动价值理论是最令人感兴趣的理论。人的物质层面与精神层面、人的思想和意志将会在劳动中实现统一，但是，如果我们用一种不去干扰这些潜能，并让他们平静地共存的方式去观察他们的话，我们会发现单凭它们自身是不可能实现上述的统一的。就像一条汇聚的河流把各种不同的支流汇聚到一起一样，劳动把人的各种潜能统一到一起，在这种汇聚中，它们各自的特立独行的品质消逝在它们的相似性中。如果劳动真的是价值唯一的代表，那么价值就会因此淹没在我们统一的而又具体的实践活动的本质中，这使得价值只能在外部现实中寻找它所能找到的最充分的表达方式。在我看来，由于劳动是极为重要的，因此人们是否要从最终结果上否认劳动本身首先产生了价值只是一个次要问题，这正如加工材料的机器本身并不具备它施加在材料身上的那种形式一样。诚然，如果人们只把价值与人的劳动产品等同起来，那么劳动本身仅仅作为一种生理学技能，是不可能有价值的，拥有价值的只是劳动力。很显然，这种劳动力只有人才能够拥有，也就是说，劳动力是通过对生产资料的使用产生出来的，而劳动中所使用的生产资料反过来又产生于人类的劳动。当劳动力转化成实际的劳动并生产劳动产品的时候，很显然劳动力没有耗费额外的劳动，因此，这也就意味着劳动力自身并不具有价值，更确切地说，劳动力只是与所生产的劳动产品保持一致。基本上我仍把这看做是一个方法论的问题。这是因为，只要劳动力处于一种潜在的，并且只要劳动未被激发而转化为真正的劳动，那么劳动力就不是一种价值，但是一旦劳动力处于激发状态，并转化成实际的劳动，在形成价值的劳动过程中起过作用的话，那么人们就可以对那些处于各种目的而雇佣的他人的劳动进行计算和评估。更进一步说，劳动力不是价值的这种情形不会因为我们考虑了下面这种情况而有所改变：即作为生存资料而被消耗掉的价值不是由劳动创造的，而是劳动力产生的，故此，作为这些价值的承担者的劳动力才可能是一种价值。既然人类通过使用生产资料而实现的价值大大超出了我们所投入的生存资料的价值，而且单凭生存资料本身而言，它从来都没有引起过价值的上升，因此，生存资料作为一种工具，它本身不足以引起人类价值的实现。只有在社会主义看来，劳动力与劳动的分离才是有重大意义的，因为社会主义提出了如此的理论：工人只拥有他所创造的价值的一部分。工人劳动创造的价值比以生活资料的形式投入到他的劳动力身上的价值要多得多。只要雇主按照工人的生活资料的价格来购买了工人全部的劳动力，那么，雇主就一定能够获得利润，因为工人所提供的最终的劳动产品的价值要远大于雇主所支付的工人的生活资料的价格。但是即使从这个立场出发，在我看来，我们仍可以把劳动本身刻画为一种价值而不是把劳动力刻画为价值，并且把劳动的价值量分为两个部分，其中的一部分是付给工人的工资，而另一部分则是雇主的利润。这里我并不想把这个问题做更加深入的探讨，而是要继续考察通过什么样的方法来对劳动价值理论中经常困扰我们的事物进行一个更为直截了当的评价。在劳动价值论中所追求的劳动概念可以有效地等价于体力劳动和脑力劳动，如果按照这样的思路进行推理，那么体力劳动就可以成为劳动的这个整体的一个有效的衡量手段，体力劳动就成了首要的价值或是价值的创造者。如果我们用这种纯粹的无产阶级式的有色眼镜以及从根本上鄙视脑力劳动成果的态度来看待问题的话，我们可能就会大错特错。与此相反，我们的任务是要找到那些更为深刻、更加丰富的原因。

无偿的脑力劳动成果

在论及脑力劳动在整个劳动中的贡献时，劳动价值理论首先指出，脑力劳动的消耗不应该算做是“成本”，因为脑力劳动中所产生的消耗并不需要补给，因而并未提高产品的成本。所以，只有体力劳动被留存下来，并作为交换价值的基础而存在。正好相反，如果某人强调：脑力劳动也是具有创造性的，并且也会像体力劳动一样，必须对脑力上的消耗进行养分的补给，这样才能够维持脑力劳动的可持续性，那么这个人就忽略了劳动价值理论的真正的内容，而这个内容正是劳动价值理论的观点得以存在的基础，虽然这种内容只是一种本能的感觉罢了。脑力劳动在某个劳动产品中的贡献暗示了两个方面，而这两个方面必须明显地区分开来。若一个工匠按照事先设计好的模型做了一把椅子，那么如果没有脑力劳动在整个劳动产品制作中的贡献的话这件事是完成不了的，手一定是由人的头脑指挥调度的。然而，这种对体力劳动的智慧与调度绝不是花在这把椅子身上的所有脑力支出。如果不是我们的前辈在过去就曾经设计好了椅子的图形的话，仅仅靠我们现在的这点脑力劳动，这把椅子很有可能同样也做不出来。工人们用大脑来指挥我们的体力劳动这的确构成了这把椅子出现的一个实际的条件，而这也只是第一方面的脑力劳动。不过，相比于第一种脑力劳动而言，第二种脑力活动过程的形式更进一步了，他更不需要任何智力上的消耗：也就是我们称之为传统的这种事物，这是一种被客观化的思想，以至于任何人都可以学习传统，从传统中汲取思想营养，又可以对传统进行反思，并进行进一步的创造。传统通过这种方式来影响当代工匠们的产品生产过程，并形成了脑力劳动的实际运转的功能，毫无疑问，一方面，要借助于人的主观能力这种方式。另一方面，还要借助于传统以劳动产品形式的方式进入到产品之中的这种方式，人的脑力劳动实际运转的功能才得以真正而又彻底地实现。毫无疑问，我之前所提及到的脑力活动的这两个方面的确有脑力上的消耗以及生理补给的必要：这两者共同构成了工匠们以及那把椅子图案的设计者们的脑力活动。此外，还存在着第三种智力因素，它对当代的椅子生产起着最至关紧要的决定性作用，但是，这第三种智力因素实际上却与任何潜在的脑力消耗以及生理上的补给无关，并且它是建立在这把椅子设计图的基础之上而制造出成千上万把椅子。因此，即便这种款式的每一把椅子所具有的形式以及与智力相关的内容都是根据设计图而来的，由于已经设计好的设计图本身不再存在任何脑力上的消耗，也不需要营养上的补给，自然也没有脑力消耗成本方面的任何提高。假如人们把包含在劳动产品之中的客观智力内容与依据产品的模型生产制造产品的主观脑力活动之间做一个必要而又精确的区分，我们就可以看出劳动价值理论所断言的——脑力上的消耗是不需要成本的——这样一种说法是有相对的合理性的。毫无疑问，我们也可以看到在劳动价值中对脑力劳动的看法有偏颇之处，既然脑力劳动的这种无偿的、未使用的这种想法并不是在劳动产品中实现的，而只能借助于智力活动才得以实现，而这种智力活动所产生的想法需要有机体正常运行的能量才能实现，虽然那些事先已经成型的内容相比于之前对这项内容进行独创性地创造时，在脑力的消耗方面要少得多，但是脑力劳动和体力劳动一样，都会对产品的成本产生影响。体力劳动与脑力劳动之间的差额就是无偿的脑力劳动的贡献。正是这种观念性的内容把智力上的财富与经济上的财富从两个方面彻头彻尾地区别开来：一方面，思想上的财富要比经济上的财富更加基础；另一方面，思想上的财富无法向经济上的财富那样被广泛地接受。只要某种思想已经被表达出来了，那么人们就可以不费吹灰之力地再次抓住这种思想；思想内容一旦已经公之于世，就无法再收回；它是一种公共财富，不管是谁只要能把这种思想回想起来，那么它就具有了这种思想的能量。反过来，也是出于同样的原因，一旦思想公之于世，人们花多少力气也不能再把它据为己有。被表达出来的这种思想与个人密不可分地结合在一起，并且这种思想会以一种永不磨灭的形式而存在，这样一种方式在经济领域中是无可比拟的。正是由于这种在经济领域的无可比拟性，使得思想的内容在思维过程中就具有了一种超经济的意义，并且思维过程构成了心理的过程。显而易见，在这里我们所关心的仅仅是后面的那个心理过程，我们的问题就是在价值创造当中，和体力劳动一起的脑力劳动的消耗究竟发挥了何种作用。

劳动价值论的一个普遍倾向就是要形成一个统一的有关劳动的概念，而把脑力劳动的意义约减为体力劳动的意义，最终不过是这种普遍倾向中的一个方面而已。这种劳动的概念必须在各种不同类型的劳动中找到共同的因素，因为，相比于体力劳动与脑力劳动之间的简单的对比而言，各种不同的劳动类型所表现出来的差异性和多样性是更加宽泛的，同时也是五花八门的。如果这种劳动概念能够在各种不同类型的劳动中找到共同的因素，那么他一定可以获得非凡卓越的理论和实践成果，这种理论的出现将会和货币的出现一样，获得同样非凡卓越的成果。这样，人们就可以有一种普遍的、性质上的标准，在这个基础上，不同的人类活动所产生的所有价值上的成就，它们之间的一切价值关系都可以通过数量的大小来表示它们的纯数量关系。在所有领域当中，这都意味着知识的基本发展过程，也就是说，事物在性质方面进行相互衡量的过程，它是这样一个过程：即由那些相比较来说，充满着不确定性，不准确性的知识发展阶段转化为一个明确的数量阶段这样一个过程，这样一个明确的数量阶段也就是指存在着某个普遍的、内在的标准来度量客观对象的阶段。这种度量单位在任何地方，任何情形之下都是相同的、不证自明的，并且在计算个别因素的相对意义时，并不需要把这种度量单位也考虑在内。站在社会主义的立场上看，这种度量单位是这种尝试的简单明了而又纯粹的进一步延伸，也是这种尝试所产生的后果，即把所有的价值作为一个总体，并把它们都简化为经济意义上的价值，并以此作为其出发点和主旨——如果社会主义者希望最终结果就是消除各种差距的话，那么它一定必须得遵循这一立场而向下继续发展。如果我们在经济领域里起码可以假设存在着相同的个体，但是在除经济领域以外的其他所有领域——诸如思想领域、情感领域、性格领域、美学领域、伦理领域等等中，对于这种完全一致的劳动手段的假设从一开始就是子虚乌有的。如果有人依然希望实现一个目标——即在各个领域中，他们的劳动都简化为完全一致的经济意义上的价值，那么除了在某种程度上把这些领域里的利益和品质简化为社会主义者所特许的那种大致统一的利益分布以外就别无他法了。我已经彻底地意识到：当前的科学社会主义拒绝机械共产主义所主张的那种人人平等，而仅仅是希望建立起各种平等的劳动环境，而不去考虑那些由人才种类的不同、能力的高低、努力程度的差异而造成的社会地位以及满足程度的差异。尽管当前的社会情形是世袭血统、阶级差异、资本积累以及经济变迁中的一切可能性的机遇将会造成的个人之间的相应距离比社会活动所造成的个人之间的差异要大得多，但这事实上不仅意味着在各个方面基本的平等化趋势，还意味着所有权与满足感的平等化倾向，因此，在我看来即使在今天，主张社会主义平等仍然是煽动大众的一种真正行之有效的手段。如果历史唯物主义是对社会主义学说的科学性的阐述，那么正如经常发生的那些对独创性的思想的逆向思维这样一种思路一样进行体系化地构建是我们这里所要考虑的。因此，在逻辑上，社会主义理论并不是从独立构建起来的历史唯物主义中衍生出来的，而是建立在实践基础之上的社会主义——共产主义必须先具备二者存在的基础：即它必然宣称经济利益是其他领域一切利益的源泉与公分母。然而，如果经济利益真的成了其他领域一切利益的源泉与公分母，那么在经济领域中也必然会追逐同一种发展趋势，各个领域的不同的内容都会简化成一种统一的经济单位，这种经济单位凌驾于一切个人成就之上，并断然宣称了某种平等的可能性，以及可从外部进行证实的公平的可能性。

劳动量的差异所导致的劳动类型的不同

社会主义劳动价值理论中所强调的一切有价值的物体的价值都取决于所花费的劳动仍无法实现其目的。因为在这种论调中，把那些品质上差别很大的劳动统一起来的可能性依然存在，也就是这样一种情形，即数量较少的高级劳动创造的价值等于或高于数量较多的低级劳动所创造的价值。然而如果按照这样的例子来推理，一种与我们实现预想的截然不同的的价值尺度将会被重新引入。在劳动中，劳动的专业化分工、劳动的知识含量、劳动的复杂程度的决定性品质肯定在劳动当中被产生出来，并且伴随在整个劳动过程中。但是它们只是作为劳动的某种纯粹的属性而被实现。价值要素本身不再取决于作为劳动本身的劳动，而取决于按照某种尤为独立的原则而产生出的各种劳动特性的秩序，对于这一原则，诸如此类的劳动，都是所有不同品质的劳动的共同之处，劳动仅仅是毫无意义的载体。如果是这样，那么社会主义的劳动价值理论就会面临与道德哲学学说相同的困境，即制造幸福是纯粹的伦理价值。这就是说，如果交易是建立在合乎道德的基础上的，那么就会给人带来幸福，并且如果更加纯粹的、更富有理性的、更为高级的幸福被以更高的价格表现出更大的价值的话，那么这就意味着我们需要打破旧的原则并引入了新的明确的价值要素，从而提高人的幸福程度。因为这样一来，人们可以设想到这样的情形，在这种情形之下，假如幸福可以通过纯粹的数量关系来表示，尽管某种幸福在道德水准上更值得去追求，但是由于这种幸福在数量上比那种较为低级的、感觉上的、自私的幸福要少，我们仍然不会追求这种较高道德水准上的幸福。因而，如果要保持伦理学说在幸福问题上的一致性以及连贯性，就只能假定与伦理相关的这些合乎道德的幸福与合乎理性的幸福、享乐主义的幸福与禁欲式的幸福、利己主义的幸福与利他主义的幸福是一种相伴相生的现象，它们之间的区别都仅仅是数量上的差异而已，对于各种各样的幸福，它们的性质都是一样的。同理，一个具有一致性与连贯性的社会主义劳动价值理论必然能够支持这样的论点：技术密集型与劳动密集型的两类劳动成果的确存在着十分明显而又无可否认的差别，但是这两种方式所引起的价值生产上的差别最后只不过意味着：在技术密集型的劳动中所投入的劳动量要比在劳动密集型的劳动投入量多，如果我们刚开始只是对这种内涵草率地一瞥，那么我们可能会以为它们的劳动量是相等的，但只要做进一步地深入观察，我们就会发现这样一个观点：劳动量的多与少是劳动价值大与小的基础。

事实上，对劳动价值理论的这种解释并不像它表面上看起来那么的漏洞百出。人们只需要把劳动的概念解释得更加宽泛一些，那么这些缺陷就不会那么明显了。首先，如果人们认为劳动仅仅与个体的劳动者有关，那么“高级”劳动产品就绝不能仅仅通过直接投入在这种特殊产品的生产上的劳动量进行计算，这一点是十分明显的。与之相反，所有先前所做的努力都必须对生产这种“高级”产品所需要的劳动按照某种合适的比例计算出来，因为如果没有先前的努力，目前这种相对较容易生产的“高级”劳动产品是根本就不可能制造下去的。当然，一位音乐大师在某场管弦乐音乐会里付出的“劳动”通常与其在经济上的评价相关性极小。然而，如果把这位音乐大师为准备这场音乐会所付出的劳动都考虑在内的话，情况就会变得完全不同了，而这些前期的准备活动也正是音乐会的现场表演的前提条件。故而，在那些数不尽的别的较为高级的劳动中，它们都包含了一种简单劳动的附加形式。较为高级的劳动不是一种存在于感觉上的可觉察到的一种转瞬即逝的劳动，而是浓缩与积累了之前的准备活动以及与建立在这个准备活动的基础之上的当前的发挥。与那些音乐大师们从容自如的演奏那些高难度的曲目相比，那些初出茅庐的演奏者即使在演奏难度低得多的曲目时也会手忙脚乱、满头大汗，这是因为，音乐大师在进行这种高级劳动之前付出了比后者大得多的准备活动。然而，这种用劳动量的不同来解释劳动的性质的高级与低级的差异的这种阐释方法可以延伸并使用于纯粹的个体这样一个前提假设之下。毫无疑问，由于存在这样的情形：即某些劳动可以通过某种遗传的天赋，或者通过为它提供的良好的客观前提条件而得到了很高的评价，因此，在处理这些问题时，这种用一种特定的数量的方法来降低劳动的性质的做法是不合适的。在处理这个问题上，我们必须利用遗传的假设，这种无论在哪里都只是具体地探讨了通过遗传而获得的某种品质的遗传假设，毫无疑问，只能给出处理这类问题的一条大致的思路。如果我们真地接受这种把人的本能拓展开的这种说法，也就是认为人本能的拓展来自于我们前辈的经验的累积，并且这些经验能使神经与肌肉之间产生特别有效的协调配合，而且子孙后代可以通过遗传的方式继承这种来自前辈的经验，那么通过这种方式，子孙后代必要的神经刺激就会产生纯粹的、机械的活动，且这种活动并不需要依靠子孙后代自己的生活经验实践来得到，如果我们接受这种解释的话，那么就会把特殊的先天遗传视为本能的某种极为偶然的例子。在这一例子中，人们在身体上所积累的经验无可避免地将导致一种特定的方向，并且导致身体要素出现分层化，通过这种分层化使得那些即使对身体来说最为轻微的干扰也会引起身体的那些重要而又有效的机能产生富有成效的互动。事实上，对于一个类似的成绩，天才所要知道的东西比一个资质平庸的人少得多，因为天才知道一些平庸的人所没有体验过的事情——这样的事情似乎预示了遗传的能力与天才之间的令人印象深刻的异常完美而又轻松自如的协调配合。如果把一遗传序列追溯得足够久远，并且清楚地认识到，在这个遗传序列中所有的经验和成就都只有通过真正的劳动并通过实践，才能够产生并获得进一步的发展，那么天才的令人瞩目的成就看起来正是他的前辈在真正的劳动实践中所获得的经验与成就的浓缩。如果按照这个逻辑推理，那么，那些“天赋极好”的人就是把前辈所积累的那些以潜在形式存在并处于不断积累状态的劳动经验以及劳动成就发挥到极致的那个人。因此，这些劳动者所拥有的较高的价值一方面取决于劳动的性质，但最终仍是取决于劳动数量的较大的积累，这么大的劳动量并不是凭天才的一己之力就能够完成的，而是要通过劳动被有效组织起来的这种性质才可能产生更多的成果。由于天才的心理一生理结构的系统很明显地包含着能够使自己很轻易地从祖先那里获得数量上更为巨大的经验和能力的优势，因此，如果我们假设劳动主体——天才与平庸之人一都付出同样多的实际努力，那么天才的劳动成果会特别的大。如果劳动成果的价值量不是通过必要劳动的数量来计算，而是通过生产这些劳动产品所需要的“社会必要劳动时间”来计算，那么得出同一种解释是无法避免的：那些饱含了天赋的较高的价值成就相当于社会在获得这样一位天才之前，要经历并运行一个相当长的时期才行。产生天才所需要的时期的长短就决定了天才的劳动成就价值的大小，尽管天才只出现在相对较长的时间间隔中，但在这种情况下，这么长的时间并不仅仅是为了那点瞬间即逝的成就，而是为了让那些能够做出天才成就的人出现。

劳动性质同样的降低也可能导致实际的变化。同样的主观上的付出，但劳动成果却能获得更高的评价，这种情况的发生不是仅仅凭借个人的能力就能造成的。恰恰相反，某些特殊类型的劳动打从一开始就表现出比其他劳动更高的价值，以至于个人要在这种特殊类型的劳动中获得成功既不需要付出比别人更多的努力，也不需要比别人高得多的天分，但是在那些除此之外的其他劳动中，要想获得更高的地位就与努力和天分十分相关了。我们从那些无数多的例子中可以很清楚地发现，相比那些“高级劳动”，工作活动对劳动者所提出的要求根本就不比那些“低级劳动”中对劳动者所提出的要求更高。煤矿工人以及煤厂的工人必须做到小心翼翼、临危不惧，来自死亡的威胁使得他们成就中的主观价值远远高于那些官场中人所做出的成就，也高于那些需要教育的职业所做出的成就。那些杂技演员以及变戏法的人也需要像某些钢琴家一样，有毅力、技艺娴熟，并且也要有天分，但他们却不能像钢琴家那样，把他们手指的灵活性与心灵的深度密切地结合。但情况看起来依然是这样，我们不仅对某一领域的劳动所支付的酬金可能会远远高于另一种领域的劳动，而且在很多的情况下，与这种报酬上的差异保持一致性的竟是社会上对价值的这种一视同仁的公正感。即使人们十分清楚这样一个情况：即某一个产品与另一个产品的生产相比，所需要的劳动者的主体劳动是相同的甚至是更多的，但人们依然会赋予后者更高的社会地位和更高的价值，以至于，至少在表面看起来，就像劳动价值是由某些非劳动的因素决定的一样。毫无疑问，这种幻觉不会是坚不可摧的。举个例子说，人们可以根据实在的技术前提条件下那些较高文化水平的劳动累积了多少简单劳动，来把较高文化水平的工作能力置于一系列水准之上，只有建立在这个前提的基础上，对个人劳动的衡量才有可能实现。在公务员等级体制中，如果想获得更高的职位，首先必须去完成大量的行政管理工作和一般文化水平的工作，这种工作会影响劳动力的精神风貌和提高劳动者的工作经验，从而提高劳动者攀升到更高职位的可能性。其次，任何一个较高级的行政人员，他们的工作都是建立在众多下属大量的前期准备活动的基础之上的，高级劳动是众多较为低级的劳动的凝聚。因此，下属所从事的这种繁多的准备工作的品质只有通过这些数量庞大的较为低级的工作被完全实施并对那些较为高级的工作做出贡献的时候，这些繁多的低级劳动才能浮现出来。毫无疑问，与那些“无条件限制的”劳动相比，一切有条件限制的劳动绝不会仅仅取决于工人是否受过较为高等的教育，而是取决于实际的工作条件、实际的物质料以及历史一技术组织诸如此类的更为高级、更为复杂的结构。类似的，无论一个钢琴演奏家是多么的平淡无奇，他都需要这样一种古老而宽泛的传统，这种古老而又宽泛的传统就包括大量的超出个体之上的技术和艺术产品，这些传统所包含的技术以及艺术品的集合使钢琴家的演奏变得更加的高贵，相比于那些走钢丝的或变戏法的人，他们在主观上有着要高得多的卓越的才华。对于那些更普遍的情况，事实也同样如此：在我们看来是更为高级的文化——仅仅是通过职业的分类来判定的，并不考虑那些影响成就高低的个人因素——就是那些在文化发展史中是一种相对的总结性的文化，并且这些高级的文化通常是经历了一个相当长的历史阶段才得以实现的。在这种具有总结性的较为高级的成就中，包含了前辈和今人的最大的劳动量，但并不是在他们的技术条件下的最大劳动量，然而，就那些拥有这种天分的幸运儿完全超越个体的实际表现来说，那些高得离谱的酬劳以及评价显得非常不公平，毕竟这种天分仅仅源于某种稍纵即逝的价值。同样显而易见的是，这一衡量标准并不总被人们严格地遵守。不管这是出于外形的相似的原因，还是出于与那些有天分的人之间存在着的历史联系的原因，抑或是由于从事特殊职业的人运用其他源头而来的社会力量来提升自己的身价的原因，根据人的天分来对人的表现以及劳动产品进行评价的方法也转移到那些其他不配有天赋这一称号的人身上去了。如果不把那些由错综复杂的历史生活所引起的偶然因素纳入到考虑范围之中的话，要在社会事务中保持单一的基本的关联是完全没有可能的。在我看来，大体上可以持这样的观点：对劳动成果之本质的评价使得同等程度的主体劳动变得具体化，并且对劳动成果之本质评价的巨大差异性依然表现了劳动数量上的差异，而劳动量也以一种间接的形式包含在那些只由特殊天赋才能成就的劳动之中，通过这样的方式，我们就获得了经济价值在理论上的同一性，并且这种收获也暂时性地固定下来了，而社会主义劳动价值理论也正是从这里展开和拓延的。

但是，通过这样的方式，劳动价值理论就只与劳动的一般性概念相关了，因此，劳动价值理论所依靠的是一个完全人为的抽象概念。反驳这种观点的人可能会持如下观点：认为劳动价值理论所依靠的是典型的幻觉，这种幻觉指的是劳动价值理论认为存在所谓原始劳动和基础劳动之类的东西，从某种意义上讲，原始劳动与基础劳动主要还是第二级的规定性因素，而一类劳动的具体特性会融入到一般意义的劳动之中，其目的就在于是由它们来规定一般意义上的抽象劳动的性质。我们根据原始劳动与基础劳动的特性将一种行为归结为劳动或是非劳动，但是，这种原始劳动与基础劳动的那些特性好像并没有和它们剩余的规定性共同形成一个整体，同时对劳动的每一个区分和等级界定也好像并非取决于一个完全人为规定出的界线。这种做法恰恰类似于这样一种情况：起初，我们说人就是人，然后在其他情形之下，我们又可以说人是确定的个体！这当然是一个普遍的错误，并已经成为了某些社会理论的基石。实际上，劳动的概念以及与之相关的所有先前讨论过的那些劳动价值论中的观点都是被消极地界定下来的，这种劳动的概念和劳动观就似乎从各种各样的劳动类型中排除了那些各自所具有的特色之后所残留的事物。然而，实际上，这种排除特色之后的残余与物理上的能量概念是毫不相关的——如一种诱人的推论所暗示的那样——物理上的能量在数量上是守恒的，但在其表现形式上却是多样的，时而表现为热能，时而表现为电能，时而表现为机械运动。物理上能量的概念确实可以通过数量化的方式进行表现，物理上的能量的确代表了所有这些具体现象的普遍性及一般性，它也是对其所表现的那些基本事实的各种各样的现象的一种抽象。一般来说，人的劳动不会这么抽象，它仍是有确定的表现形式的。有这样一种断言：所有的劳动就是简简单单的劳动而已，绝不会再有别的什么含义，如果把这种断言作为对劳动公正评价的基础，那么这种断言将会如此令人难以置信、如此的抽象空洞，以至于它就如同下面的理论一样：每个人除了是人以外什么都不是，所以每个人的价值是相等的，每个人都有资格享有同样的权利并承担同样义务。因而，如果迄今为止劳动概念仍然是一种一般意义上的概念，也就说，这种概念只能给人某种抽象的、虚无的感觉，而不是某种确定无疑的内容的话，那么，人们用来理解劳动的那个真正的过程就需要更大程度上的精确性。

体力劳动作为计算劳动的单位

现在我希望回到那个曾有过的关于体力劳动的说法，即体力劳动是劳动的最终的具体要素。我们考察过这种说法确切的程度，并对它的有效性进行了限制，之所以要对其有效性进行限定是因为其论据即体力劳动没耗费脑力。从一开始我就承认，我不会简单地排除这样一种可能性，即在未来，我们也许真的能够找到与脑力劳动相当的体力与机械方面的等价物。毫无疑问，这种脑力劳动在体力与机械方面的等价物在其内容意义上，以及它在逻辑方面的、伦理方面的以及审美的语境中被实际确定下来的位置是与它在所有物理运动中的意义和地位完全独立的，这有点类似于一个单词的内容意思与从生理学一声学角度发出这个单词的声音是完全独立的一样。原则上，在脑力活动中，有机体思考问题时所必须消耗的能量如同肌肉运动必须耗费的能量一样都是可以计算出来的。如果某天我们真的能够实现这种对脑力劳动进行的能量换算的话，那么人们至少可以把某种具体的肌肉所必需的能量计算出来当作计量的单位，在此基础上脑力能量就能确定下来了。如果真的可以做到这一点，那么脑力劳动与体力劳动就可以站在同一个起跑线上了，而且体力劳动的产品可以通过纯粹的数量关系来权衡脑力劳动的产品的价值。毫无疑问，这只是一个理想中的完美境界，它只能用来证明，即使对那些非教条的唯物主义者来说，把一切科学中可计算的劳动化简为体力劳动的做法本身并不必然包含着那种基本的荒诞性，而这种荒诞性似乎正是精神性与肉身性的二元学说用来驳斥这种理论的。

接下来的概念似乎是以某种更为具体的方式去实现同一个目标。我以这样一个事实——即生存资料是由体力劳动创造的作为出发点。任何一个劳动都不可能是纯粹的体力劳动；所有的体力劳动都只有通过积极的思考才会转变成实际的劳动成就，以至于，为更高级的脑力劳动所做的前期准备活动本身就是体力劳动与脑力劳动相结合的产物。就体力劳动自身而言，只有凭借物质生存资料才能实现体力劳动中的脑力成果。具体地说，劳动者越是没有经过文明开化，在其劳动中所体现的脑力劳动与体力劳动的关系就越是微不足道，那么，（从最宽泛的意义上说）他的物质生存资料就越多地依靠体力劳动的方式被生产出来，但是有一个例外，这个例外与现代社会有关，我们会在下一章涉及这种情况。既然这种关系只在这两种类型的劳动当中反反复复地出现，而且这种反复的关系引出了一个无限的序列，并且在这个序列中，脑力劳动的确永远也不会销声匿迹，而是永远都存在于这个无限的序列中，并把这个序列推得越来越远，以至无限；所以，最高级别的劳动中的物质生存资料也同样取决于一个序列的劳动，在这个序列中，每一个成员都是通过与智力因素相结合而产生的，而且这种与智力因素的结合物要靠纯体力价值的劳动才得以出现，因此，到了最后阶段智力部分的边际价值接近于零。原则上也可以这么设想，脑力劳动的一切外在的前提条件都是通过体力劳动的数量关系表现出来的。如果古老的价值成本理论仍被认定有效，那么只要脑力劳动的价值与生产活动的成本相当，脑力劳动的价值就会与特定的体力活动等值。也许只有对这个古老的价值成本理论进行一定的修正才能够使它站得住脚。两个产品的价值可能要在彼此互相关联，这个前提的基础上才能实现，但某个产品的价值的确不必然等于生产这种产品所消耗的成本。通过物质生存资料所喂养并促使其生长的某种精神上的东西会创造出劳动产品，这种劳动产品的价值也许会超出那些被多次使用且接近枯竭的前提条件的价值。然而通过这样的方式，两个前提条件的综合体的价值关系可能仍然会与两种劳动产品的价值关系一样——这正如这样一个例子，虽然每一种庄稼的价值都是其种子价值的若干倍，但是两种农产品所产生的价值之间的关系，可以像其种子的价值之间的关系一样彼此关联。这是由于对于每一个平均的个人而言，提升的价值是一个不变的常数。如果上述所有的这些假设都成立的话，那么把脑力劳动简化为体力劳动在某种意义上就是可以实现的，即人们可以准确无误地表达出来的不是一种绝对价值而是一种相对价值，而且绝对价值的意义只有通过绝对价值与相对价值之间的具体的关系才能够实现。

然而这样一种假设，即脑力劳动价值的水平应该与物质生存资料的价值之间保持某种比例关系，看起来是极其荒谬的，甚至是毫无意义的。但是，对这一问题的进一步探讨仍然是值得的：至少这种说法很接近实际情况，因为这种说法已经向下延伸到了智力价值转变成经济上的前提条件和等价物这样一种内部的、文化的关系之中了。我们肯定会存在这样一种想象，即有机体发展的一个焦点就是相当多的能量都在大脑中储存下来。毫无疑问，大脑的确能够释放出巨大的能量，这种现象存在于很多的例子当中，这也可以用来解释为什么那些较为虚弱的肌体在受到某种精神的冲击之后可以表现出令人吃惊的能量。在脑力劳动以及智力发生变化之后，整个有机体会变得精疲力竭，从体力劳动大量消耗之后所表现的虚弱与精疲力竭之中，以及从这二者的关系中，我们可以发现脑力活动的确消耗了有机体大量的能量。身体所能发挥的能力在很大程度上要受到身体所能消耗食物的数量的限制，而且由于用脑后所需的食物量非但不需要增加反而要减少，所以脑力的消耗不仅仅是像体力劳动那样单纯依靠增加物质生活资料就可以补偿。因此，脑力的恢复，就像脑力活动必须有必要的神经刺激这个规律一样，只能通过集中精力、修身养性以及个人对生活资料、一般生活条件的适应这样的方式来实现。两种文化上和历史上都十分重要的因素在这里变得至关重要。我们日常的物质生存资料是在某个历史时期被选择并发展起来的，在那个时期，对于智力阶层而言，他们的普遍流行的生活状态与今天智力阶层普遍的生活状态有天壤之别，对于现在的智力阶层而言，体力劳动与新鲜的空气是他们舒缓紧张的神经和长期蜷坐的筋骨的主要手段。现代的智力阶层患有难以计数的直接和间接的消化系统毛病，而另一面他们又忙于寻找那些容易吸收的压缩食品，这都表明了我们的身体机制与食物之间的互相适应已经在很大程度上被打破了。从这个十分普遍的观察中可以看到，很显然，各种不同职业的人需要不同种类的营养是多么的合情合理，这不仅仅是一个美食的问题，也是出于对个人的健康问题的考虑，因此，对于那些最高层次的劳动者来说，就要确保其营养品是非同一般的、专门化的、取决于个人需要的日常饮食。但是，更为重要同时也是更加隐蔽的是这样一个事实：即与体力劳动相比，脑力劳动更深地涉及整个生活的内容，同时也被更加宽泛的间接关系包围着。体力似乎可以直接转变成劳动，但一般而言，似乎只有在远远超出其直接现实的环境之外，囊括了性情、印象、欲望的完整的身心状况的复杂体系，并且包含在某种特定的组合、色调以及动与静的比例之内的时候，脑力才能彻底完成任务。即使对那些在原则上希望把脑力劳动简化成与体力劳动处于同一水平的人来说，由于脑力劳动生理学上的前提条件脑力劳动者被支付较高的酬劳是合情合理的这一说法也会显得毫无意义。

在这样一个背景之下，一种情况是很明显的：即现代的知识分子似乎比先前的知识分子更加地依赖周围的环境，这种情况的真实性不仅反映在教育方面，现代知识分子的性质变得越来越专业化，而且，从某种意义上说，如果没有特别舒适的生活条件来配合这些既富有个性又极具专业特征的个体，那么他们的特殊作用、他们内心的创造力以及他们的个人品质的发展就变得不可能了。对今天绝大多数的脑力工作者来说，早期的高级知识活动通常就是在那些令人难以置信的简陋的环境下发展的，如今这种简陋环境使人倍感压抑。由于那些高级知识分子的各种需要有时是极为个性化的，差异很大，因此，在这样一个过于简陋的环境中，那些高级知识分子找不到进行个性化创造所必需的鼓励和刺激。这种个性化的要求与享乐主义没有任何的关系，这种个性化的环境是现代社会中的高级知识分子进行脑力成果创造的真正的前提条件，而这种环境的产生一方面是由现代人的神经系统的敏感性与脆弱性造成的，另一方面则是由这种日益重要的个体化倾向导致的，而这种个体化倾向不可能对那些典型而又普遍的生命刺激做出反应，它只能是诞生于那些具体的、个性化的刺激之中。如果现代人已经把历史环境论作为最具有决定性意义的理论而贯彻实施了，那么通过对现实中某一个因素进行夸张的方法所产生的过于真实的历史环境会在我们面前呈现这样一种情形：即现实的发展正在遭受更大的制约，这与19世纪的大众在现实中的地位越来越重要一样，都使我们科学地意识到群众在之前的历史时代中所起到的重要作用。正是因为这种环境的存在，使得我们消耗的价值与我们创造的价值之间确实存在着某种特定的比例关系；也就是说，以脑力劳动成果的形式出现的后者是我们投在前者的体力劳动成果的表现。

脑力劳动的价值简化为体力劳动价值

然而，把脑力劳动的价值简化为体力劳动的价值的可能性很快就遭遇到了各个方面的限制。首先，脑力劳动与体力劳动在价值方面的比例关系肯定是不可逆的。相当多的个人消费支出都是花在具体的劳动产品上，但这些消费支出就其本身而言无论在哪里都无法创造出劳动产品。那些缺乏才能的庸人即使被安置在同样舒适与精美的环境中，也依然不能像那些有天分的人那样创造出相同的成就。只有在一系列支出的花销能够产生一个制造个人天赋的环境时，产品系列才能因此成为一系列支出的一个不变的功能。如果那些不可能的事成为了现实，也就是说，环境正好造就出个人天赋，并且严格地按照制定的物质生存资料为指标衡量个人对环境的适应取得了一定程度以上的成就，那么这项措施就总能发现自身在生存条件方面缺乏等价物的局限性，这样的生存条件只存在于那些有资格创造出同样的劳动成就的人们中间。因此，在这里就存在了阻碍社会正义的最大绊脚石。毫无疑问，笼统说来，较高的脑力劳动的成就要求较好的生活条件，所以，对于那些要求自身能量得到极大的发挥的天才来说，天生禀赋的差异本来就是存在的。如果存在着两种天性的人都有能力去实现相似的实际成就，那么对于这两个人来说，他们为了把可能性化为现实，实现实际中的成就，就必然会按照自身的水准，要求拥有与另一个人完全不同的环境、截然不同的物质条件以及激励因素。这里存在着这样一个事实：即追求平等与公正的理想与最大程度地实现成就之间存在了一种无法调和的分歧，而这样一个事实仍旧没有被纳入考虑范围。我们的身心结构，促进性能量和制约性能量之间的关系，智力与意志的本性之间的相互作用将导致如下的事实，即作为个人及其生活条件的产物的劳动成果在上述关系中发现了一个非常不协调的要素，以至于要得到一样的结果其他要素就必须发生极大的变动。看起来毫无疑问的是，天性的差别是与实现天性内在可能性的条件相关的，而且天性的差别越大，天性就会越高，而这些天性创造的成就所涉及的领域就越复杂、越富有智力因素。对于那些只需要消耗体力去进行具体劳动的人而言，也许他们所需要的食物大致上都是相同的，对于生活标准他们的要求也是比较普遍与一般的。然而，涉及我们所讨论的这种抽象的智力活动占据首要位置的情形，对于那些通过脑力劳动能完成最终相似的任务的人来说，他们之间的多样差异性就变得至关重要。

个人的天赋之间的差别是如此之大以至于相同的外部环境作用于它身上时所产生的结果确实千差万别的，故此，要比较一个人与另一个人的差别的大小，以及对比物质生活条件与物质生活条件基础上产生的脑力劳动成果二者各自在价值中所占的比例是根本不可能的。只有在某个主要的历史时期，或者把某个阶层的人看做是一个整体来取平均数，通过这个平均数来比较各个不同的阶层之间的差别这两种情况之下，人们所创造的物质条件的成就才能与脑力创造的成就一样展示同样的关系。举个例子说，人们可以观察到在生活必需品价格比较便宜的地方，他们的文化作为一个整体的发展过程是比较迟缓的，而对于那些奢侈品的生产来说，就需要投入大量脑力劳动，因而也会变得极其昂贵。反过来说，生活必需品价格的攀升通常是与奢侈品价格的升降息息相关的。低级文化的一个典型的特征就是，不可或缺的生活必需品的价格极其廉价，而高级生活用品却相当昂贵，举个例子说，我们从俄国与中欧的比较中就能发现这种情况。在俄国，情况是这样的，面包、肉、以及住房等生活必需品价格低廉，这种低廉的价格不会给工人施加压力促使他们去为赚更高的工资而努力奋斗，而在中欧，奢侈品昂贵的天价使得工人根本没有能力购买，这也就阻碍了这些奢侈品的流通。从根本上讲，这会使得那些起初很便宜的东西变得昂贵，而起初昂贵的东西变得便宜——我已经展示了这两方面的联系——这也预示了脑力劳动地位的上升，而且这种预示终将变为现实。在这些无法比较的个人因素的背后，只要脑力劳动与体力劳动之间的比例关系的有效性没有被充满着差异性的个人天赋这种更为强大的力量所吞噬，那么这些体力劳动和脑力劳动之间的比例就仍旧揭示了二者的一个基本关系，这种关系的确允许脑力劳动的价值量通过体力劳动表现出来，而在这一关系中，那些个人因素的确发挥着作用。

最后，还存在着第三种观点，从这种观点中，我们可以发现把一切劳动价值都简化为体力劳动价值的某些原始而又卑俗的特征。如果我们对那些真正能使体力劳动有效地转变成为价值和消费支出的事物做更加深入细致的观察时，那么我们就会发现，把体力劳动转化为价值形式的绝对不是那些纯粹依靠的体力所产生的劳动成果。我这里所指出的决不是那些早已被人提及过的这样一个事实，即如果没有某种智力方面的引导，各种体力劳动对人类的目的来说将是毫无用途的。可是，从第三种观点的立场来看，脑力的要素仅仅是作为价值的混合物而存在，真正的价值扔然存在于纯粹的体力劳动之中，出于体力劳动要接受智性因素必要的指导的考虑，前者才会需要附加的脑力因素。与此相反，我认为只有通过产品生产过程中所消耗并使其具体化的精神能量，体力劳动才能获得整个的价值，并因而变得贵重。从外部看来，如果所有的劳动都意味着克服重重阻碍，并形成事物，而且这个事物的形式是事物起初并不具备甚至有些抵制的一种形式，那么劳动的内在一面将展现出同样的形式。毫无疑问，劳动是辛苦的、是一种负担与困难。因此，如果某种事物并不是上述的这些情形，人们常常就会认为这种事物根本不是劳动。从情绪的意义的角度来看，劳动是由那些不断克服生活中的懒惰、享受以及懈怠的冲动组成的。在这样的背景下，如果某个人真的不断地释放这种克服懒惰、享受以及懈怠的冲动，也同样会使生活同样变成一种负担，然而这种情况同样是无足轻重的。毕竟，不劳动却能感到负担的压力的情况是少之又少，所以人们通常所能感觉到的还是那些由劳动所引发的负担。因此，不会有这样一种人存在，即他们只是习惯于承受劳动所带来的痛苦和艰辛而不图在交换中能获得某种回报。对劳动实际上的回报，也就是对某个人的需求的一种合法的补偿，其实就是人们在脑力上的能量支出，为了约束自己并克服由懒惰、享受以及懈怠所引起的内心的拘束感和反感，人们需要消耗智力上的能量。

语言很好地说明了这一事实情况，因为语言刻画了我们赚取收入的活动在外部产生的经济后果以及在内心的道德中所产生的后果的特征。如果道德的冲动克服了诱惑、自我中心主义和感官享受的局限，而不是源于一种完全自觉的动机，即这种道德活动从一开始就排除了像诱惑、自我中心主义和感官享受等相反的动机存在的可能，那么赚取收入的活动在道德上产生的后果肯定也成了这一事实情况的组成部分。因此，为了使道德理想不否定那些符合道德的收入，各个民族的神话在其结构上都有这样的情节，即他们的宗教创建者都需要被设定去征服“诱惑”，并且每一个德尔图良式的人物都无比信仰：上帝的荣耀比上帝的工作更伟大。经济价值和真正的道德价值一样，它们都需要与那些克服如诱惑、自我中心主义和感官享受之类的冲动的自我约束相联系一样。如果一个人的劳动就像花儿绽放花朵、鸟儿清脆鸣唱一样无拘无束，那么人类任何形式的劳动都不可能是有利可图的了。因此，我们在计算劳动的价值时，不仅仅要考虑劳动的外在形式以及可以观察得到的那些劳动行为和劳动产品，就体力劳动而言，我们还要考虑意志的消耗、情绪的反应等等，简而言之，就是要把精神状态考虑进去。所以，我们从经济序列的另一端完成T这一基本认识，也就是说所有的价值、所有的客观事物的意义以及这些客观事物的占有物的意义都存在于它们所唤起的感觉中；如果把对上述的这些事物的占有仅仅看做是一种外部关系，不包含人的内在因素、欲望情感、自我的提升和扩张的话，那么，这种占有就会变得毫无感情色彩、毫无意义。通过这种方式，经济商品将在获得商品和享用商品两个方面受到脑力因素的限制，因为脑力因素只能保证单独的劳动成果需要与体力同等的脑力。尽管某种客观事物可能是非本质的、毫无关系的，并且对这种客观事物的占有根本无法激发心理情绪，但只要占有它时不是出于这样一种内心感受——与对报酬的估价和要求所相伴相生的只有厌恶和牺牲了自身利益的感情，那么这种占有行为对我们就是适合的。因此，在涉及价值的时候，我们可以说体力劳动就等价于脑力劳动。但也有可能存在着唯一的特例，即人跟机器或动物竞争的那些劳动形式。尽管这类形式的劳动也像其他劳动者一样会涉及到内在能量的使用以及脑力的消耗，但他们仍然没有任何理由以任何方式来提高劳动的内在成就，这是因为在这种形式的劳动中，只有外在效果对他们是至关重要，而这种外在效果也只能通过一种纯粹的身体潜能才会获得；而且还有另一个原因，即只要能以更廉价的成本进行同样的生产，那些成本昂贵的生产活动就永远也无法得到回报。可是，如果我们沿着精神的路线来追溯，在那些稍微深入一点的层面上，我们或许可以发现包含所有外在条件的特例。事实上，对某部机器或某种动物所实现的劳动成就的犒赏包含在对人的劳动的报酬之中了，在人的报酬中已经包含了人的发明、人对机器的制造与操作、对动物的饲养与驯化这几个部分。因此，我们可以说，对任何人的劳动成果的犒赏都不同于那些对比人低级的机器或动物的劳动成就进行的犒赏，但这些比人低级的机器或动物的劳动看起来像人的脑力劳动一样都是间接地拥有了价值。这只不过是对这个理论——指引我们进行劳作的力量以及使用程度来对无生命的机械运动做出最终的阐释——在实际中的延伸。如果为了理解自然语境下的自然，我们把人的本质嵌入普遍的自然秩序里，那么对于自然的理解是有可能的，这是因为我们已经把人的知性的各种形式、各种欲望、各种感觉放在了普遍意义下的自然语境之中，所以“衬垫物”和“覆盖物”之间必然联结成一个单一的行为。当把这种方法延伸扩展到我们的实际问题中去的时候，即是否只能通过把比人低级的机器或动物的劳动看做非人类的劳动来进行补偿，人的劳动与比人低级的劳动二者之间的根本界线就会清晰可见，因为前者的劳动回报取决于人的脑力因素，而对于后者其劳动成果类似纯外部的机械劳动所以拒绝把脑力因素作为其酬劳的基础。人们可能会因此而宽泛地断言：从价值被补偿的角度来看，脑力劳动和体力劳动之间的差别并不是精神性和物质性的差别，相反，人类的体力劳动所获得的犒赏最终取决于劳动的内在方面，取决于人们对使用体力的厌恶，取决于人们对意志力的使用。当然，这种知性就如同劳动的表象之后的自为之物一样，它构成了劳动的内在价值，这种知性并不是真正智力上的，而是存在于情感和意志之中的。由此，我们可以得出这样一个结论：即知性并非等于脑力劳动，但却是脑力劳动的基础。从一开始知性过程的客观内容，其从个性中分裂出去的结果，以及对报酬的需求这几个方面就不是在知性当中产生的，而是产生于某种意志指导下的主观功能、劳动强度以及产生这种知性内容所需要耗费的精力，但这种意志是通过执行而变得具体化的。既然我们不仅可以从那些刚开始着手的劳动中发现精神行为被揭示为价值的源泉，而且可以从那些已经完成的劳动中发现同样的结论，那么，我们也许可以从道德的角度讲，体力劳动和“脑力”劳动包含着一种共同的价值基础，通过这种价值基础，我们就可以把诸如此类的劳动价值全简化为体力劳动价值，而且这种简化不再有庸俗而又野蛮的唯物主义的外衣。理论唯物主义这边的情况大致是这样的，如果有人强调物质本身也是一种概念，物质不是绝对地存在于我们之外、与精神进行对持的实体，但是在物质的可认知性方面完全由我们知性结构的形式和先决条件而定的话，那么唯物主义就需要一个全新的，可以以严肃的方式进行讨论的依据。从这种观点出发，在这个基础上，物质现象与精神现象的基本区别就变成了相对的差别而不是绝对的差别，而唯物主义理论所断言的，在被限定的意义下把精神想象简化为物质现象的解释就不那么让人无法接受了。在唯物主义的理论里，与实践价值的情形一样，如果希望外在的东西能够成为更高级的“知性”事物的最简单的表达方式和度量单位，那么它只有通过一种途径才能实现，即把外在的东西从它自身的呆板、孤立以及它与内部的对峙中解脱出来。唯物主义的这种把脑力劳动简化为体力劳动的方法能否成功尚无定论。然而，至少在原则上，唯物主义理论的观点与它的方法论要求和价值的基本设定是相容的。

劳动实用性的差异作为反对“劳动货币”的观点的论据

唯物主义的解释不仅证明了劳动的等价物仅与肌肉的劳动量是相关的，而且也消除了那些反对把这二者联系在一起的某些想法。然而，在我看来，这种唯物主义的观点依然会碰到一个无法解释的困难。这种无法解释的困难源于那些极为琐碎的相反的观点，这种相反的观点认为存在着毫无价值的多余劳动。然而根据那些反对的观点，人们本能地只会承认那些通过对劳动成果的检验而得出的有效的劳动才是有根本价值的劳动，而这种本能地承认，对于整个唯物主义理论来说，是十分致命的。致命之处就在于，如果有价值和无价值的劳动均存在的话，则毫无疑问也就存在着有价值与无价值之间的中间阶段，而这个中间阶段包含了某些特定的、但又并不是十分明确的目的因素和价值因素。因此，在劳动者的劳动生产率给定的情况下，我们预测一个生产成品的价值是由投入到产品生产中的劳动的多寡而定的。然而，这意味着劳动价值不是根据劳动量来衡量，而是由劳动成果的效用来衡量的！这也意味着唯物主义理论用体力劳动的量决定劳动性质的方法失去了作用。与那些低级劳动相比，那些较为高级、更加专业和更富有智力因素的劳动的确意味着更多数量的劳动，它意味的恰恰是那些普遍的一般“劳动”的积累和压缩，而那些较为低级的，不合格的劳动看起来更多的是起到分化和冲淡那些普遍的一般的劳动的作用，表现了一种更低的能力。因为，对不同劳动类型所作的这种区分把效用问题彻底地分离出来，是一种内部化的区分，在这种内部化的区分中，我们所讨论的劳动效用问题一直被事先假设为愈发趋同的量存在于劳动中。从这个立场来看，清洁工人的劳动“价值”并不比小提琴演奏家的劳动价值少，然而，我们对清洁工的劳动评价较低主要是因为清洁工人的劳动的本质是纯粹的体力劳动，因此，这种纯粹的体力劳动中所累积与凝聚的劳动力就相对较少。然而，这种前提假设过于简单，虽然劳动效用在表面看来是多种多样的，但对劳动评价却是一致的，而且不考虑劳动纯粹的内在规定性。如果真的有人可以进行那种一无是处的劳动，或者更准确地说是生产不同的劳动效用，并且展现了劳动的有用程度与所耗损的人的能量的大小，即简而言之，就是劳动量大小的程度相同，那么毫无疑问，这可以用以证明体力劳动依然不是唯一的价值创造者。可是，由于劳动的其他要素，即效用要素总是相同的，同时也由于价值关系也是保持不变的，所以这类的劳动也因此可以作为各种客观实物的价值评价标准。然而，毋庸置疑，劳动效用的差异是确实存在着的，如果把在伦理学上被证明为合理的观点，即“一切价值都是劳动”转变为“一切劳动都是价值”（即价值相等）简直是荒谬的。

因为社会主义实际上追求的是一种社会的构造，即与投入到客观事物的劳动时间相关的一种各种客观事物的实际价值，是一个不变的定量，所以这也就解释了劳动价值理论与社会主义的之间的根本的联系。在《资本论》的第三卷中，马克思提出：使用价值是一切价值的前提，也是其劳动价值理论的前提。但这还意味着制造每一件产品都消耗了如此多的社会总劳动时间，而且产品的实际意义同样与社会总劳动时间有关。因此，马克思的劳动价值理论的前提已经假设存在某种定性的、统一的社会需求——因此在劳动理论的信条即劳动就是劳动自身，而且各种劳动价值相等之上，还需要补充更深层次的一个信条：即需求就是需求自身，而且各种需求价值相等，到目前为止，只有在各个生产领域的劳动都实现之时，即生产刚好完成了每一种由生产所限定的需求之时，才能够实现劳动的效用相同。毫无疑问，在此假设的基础之上，将不存在某种相比于其他种类的劳动的效用更小的劳动。举个例子说，如果现在有人认为钢琴弹奏比火车制造的用处小，那么这一想法仅仅是因为这样一个事实：即练习钢琴耗费的劳动时间比接下来的真正演奏时花的时间更多。如果把钢琴弹奏的时间限制在一个粗略的范围之内，那么钢琴弹奏就会和火车制造具有同样的价值，这就如同这样一个事实，即如果火车制造所耗费的时间过多，即超过了后来的所需要的时间，那么火车制造就会变得毫无意义。换句话说，使用价值在原则上根本就没什么不同。这是因为，如果一件产品暂时比另一件的使用价值少一些（也就是说，投入到前者的劳动没有投入到后者的劳动那么有价值），那么人们完全可以继续把劳动简化成劳动类别，即产品的数量，直到对该产品的需求和别的产品一样强烈，也就是说直至“工业储备部队”被彻底耗光。只有这样，劳动才真的只表现了一件产品的价值量。

然而，一切货币的本质都是无条件限制的可相互交换性以及内在统一性，从而使每一枚硬币都可以按照一定的数量测度和另一枚硬币进行交换。如果能够出现劳动货币，那么劳动就必须创造出这种可互换性，而这种可互换性只有通过我们已经描述过的那种方式才可能实现：即劳动正好创造了同等程度上的效用，反过来，只能通过把对于每一个产品的生产所需要的劳动减少到某个特定的量，这种互换性才能实现，而这种特定的劳动量就是使随后对该产品的需求恰好与其他一切产品的需求一样大的劳动量。当然，即使这样做，我们仍然能够判断出实际花费的劳动时间的多与少。但现在有一点可以明确的是，由某件产品的更加广泛的用途所引起的这种产品的较高价值表明的是每小时强度更大的劳动量。或者，反过来看，如果是由每小时的较高强度的劳动量引起了较高价值的话，那么这种劳动产品中就会包含更高的劳动效用。然而很显然，这假设了存在着一种彻底的理性化的、预先制定好了的经济秩序。在这种经济秩序中，每一项劳动行为都是有章可循的，它们都产生于对该产品的需求和劳动要求的绝对知识——这也正是社会主义所向往并为之奋斗的一种经济秩序。只要能在总体上生产出即刻必需的、无疑最基本的生活必需品，那么这种接近于完全乌托邦式的状态似乎在技术上就是可行的。因为只有在这种情况真正转化为现实的情形之下，一件劳动行为才能跟接下来的劳动一样都刚好是必需的、有用的。然而，与这种情况形成对比的是：一旦劳动进入了较为高级的范畴，一方面，人的需求以及对劳动效用的评价将不可避免地变得越来越个性化；另一方面，劳动的强度更难被证明，生产量的无规律性将会带来这样一种情形，即人的需求与使用的劳动二者之间建立了一种何时何地都保持一致的关系。正是在这一点上，对社会主义的所有思路都盘根错节地纠缠在一起了。还有一点是清楚的，即与劳动货币的理论相连的文化危害绝不会像我们通常认为的那么直接。反之，这种文化危害产生于一种技术上的困难，这种技术上的困难就是始终坚持事物的效用与劳动相关，并且是评价劳动的基础，是价值的载体——这样，一种与劳动产品的文化水平相关的困难就不断增大了，毫无疑问，要避开这个困难必须把生产劳动限定在最原始、最根本、最一般的客观事物上。

然而，劳动货币理论的这一结论把货币之类东西的本质解释得相当清楚。货币的意义存在于这样一个事实当中：它是一个穿着各种各样价值的外衣的一个整体。否则，货币单位在数量上的差异就不能作为客观事物质的差异的等价物。可是，货币的意义却时常以一种不合理的方式发生，尤其是个人价值穿上了消除其本性的力量的外衣时，这种不合理就更频繁地发生。劳动货币在极力地逃避货币的这种状态，并希望破坏货币的这种概念，尽管货币概念的确非常抽象，但它更接近具体的存在。借助于具有不同寻常的个人价值劳动货币，我们甚至可以说，那些特定的个人价值也有可能成为价值标准。并且，还有一点也是很明显的，即由于劳动货币依然拥有货币所应有的所有的属性，如统一性、可互换性、普遍有效性等，因而，这就使得劳动货币比那些已经存在的货币更能威胁到生活内容的分化和个人的创造。如果货币无与伦比的力量并不反对我们想要的结果的相反面，再如果我们发现货币一方面在压制个性差异，而另一方面又时常非常夸大地强调个性差异，那么这就否定了那种既要把货币变得具体化，又希望把货币变得更加一般化的企图，否定了那种使货币的地位看起来凌驾于其他各方之上的企图，并把货币放置到仅能二选一的境地中。也许人们在辨认的程度上有差别，但人们还都可以辨认出，劳动货币倾向于使货币回归到与个人价值更为密切的关系中，但结果仍表明，对这一倾向的反对的激烈程度是与劳动货币本质紧密联系在一起的。

CHAPTER 6 The Style Of Life

Ⅰ

The Preponderance Of Intellectual Over Emotional Functions Brought About By The Money Economy

We have frequently mentioned in these investigations that intellectual energy is the psychic energy which the specific phenomena of the money economy produces，in contrast to those energies generally denoted as emotions or sentiments which prevail in periods and spheres of interest not permeated by the money economy.Above all，this is the consequence of money's character as a means.All means as such imply that the conditions and concatenations of reality are incorporated in the process of our will.They are possible only because we possess an objective image of actual causal relationships，and certainly a mind that commands a perfect view of the total situation would also master the most appropriate means for every purpose and from every starting point.Yet this intellect that had a perfect knowledge of the appropriate means would not yet be able to transpose them into reality because their use is dependent on setting a purpose ，only in relation to which those actual energies and connections acquire the status of means. For its part，a purpose can be created only by an act of will.Just as nothing is purposeful in the objective world unless there is a will，so too in the intellectual world，which is only a more or less perfect representation of the content of the world.It has been correctly stated，but mostly misunderstood，that the will is blind.The will is not blind in the same sense as Hödhr or the blinded cyclops who rush at a venture；the will does not produce anything irrational，in the sense of the value concept of reason.Rather，it is unable to effect anything at all unless it gains some kind of content that is completely external to it.For by itself，the will is nothing but one of the psychological forms（such as being，duty or hope，etc.）which make up the content of our life.It is one of those categories-probably realized psychologically by concomitant muscular or nervous reactions-by which we comprehend the ideal content of the world in order to give it a practical significance for us.Just as the will-the mere name of the form raised to a certain degree of independence-does not by itself choose any definite content whatsoever，so too the mere awareness of the word's content，that is from an intellectual standpoint，does not bring about any purposefulness.Rather，the contents of the world are completely neutral，but at one point or another they unpredictably become coloured by the will.Once this occurs，one finds that the will is transferred in a purely logical objective manner to other conceptions that are causally related to the earlier ones and that now possess the status of‘means’to that‘final purpose’.Wherever the intellect leads us，we are completely dependent，since it leads us solely through the actual connections between things.The intellect is the mediator through which volition adjusts itself to independent being.If we conceive of a rigid conception of the calculation of means and abide by it，then we are purely theoretical，absolutely non-practical beings when we act in this manner.Volition only accompanies the series of our considerations like an organ pedal note or like the general presupposition of a domain in whose peculiarities and conditions it does not interfere，yet which alone can give life and reality to it.

The number of means and the length of their series which form the content of our activity thus develop in proportion to intellectuality as the subjective representative of the objective world order.Since every means is，as such，completely indifferent，so all emotional values are in practice tied to the ends，to the critical point of action whose attainment radiates no longer upon our activity but only on the receptivity of our souls.The more such termini we have in our practical life，the stronger will be the emotional function in relation to the intellectual.The impulsiveness and emotional intensity so frequently reported among primitive peoples is probably connected with the shortness of their teleological series.Their life work does not possess that cohesion of elements which is prevalent in higher cultures，where an‘occupation’uniformly pervades life.Rather，their activity consists of a simple series of interests which，if they attain the end at all，do so with relatively few means.In this connection，the direct effort to obtain food is an important contributing factor which，in higher cultures，is replaced by an almost continuous multi-linked series of purposes.Under these circumstances，the conception and enjoyment of final goals is relatively frequent；the awareness of objective connections and of reality，that is intellectuality，operates less frequently than emotional connotations which characterize both the immediate conception as well as the real emergence of final purposes.Even during the Middle Ages there existed a larger number of specific points of satisfaction for purposive action than at present，and this was due to the prevailing production for one's own needs geared to the various kinds of craftsmen's establishments，to the variety and closeness of associations particularly through the Church.Today，when roundabout ways and preparations for such moments of satisfaction have become endless，the goal of the moment more usually lies beyond that moment，or even beyond the horizon of the individual.This extension of the series is brought about by money because money creates a common，central interest for otherwise unrelated series，thereby connecting the different series so that the one series can become the preparation for another which is objectively quite unrelated（for example，where the money returns of one series and therewith the whole series itself，serves as the basis for financing another series）.However，the crux of the matter is the general fact，the emergence of which has been discussed earlier，that money is everywhere conceived as purpose，and countless things that are really ends in themselves are thereby degraded to mere means.But since money itself is an omnipresent means，the various elements of our existence are thus placed in an all-embracing teleological nexus in which no element is either the first or the last.Furthermore，since money measures all objects with merciless objectivity，and since its standard of value so measured determines their relationship，a web of objective and personal aspects of life emerges which is similar to the natural cosmos with its continuous cohesion and strict causality.This web is held together by the all-pervasive money value，just as nature is held together by the energy that gives life to everything.Like money，energy appears in innumerable forms，but the uniformity of its very nature and the possibility of transforming any specific form into any other results in a relationship between all of them and makes each of them a condition of any other.Just as every emotional accentuation has disappeared from the interpretation of natural processes and has been replaced by an objective intelligence，so the objects and relationships of our practical world，inasmuch as they form increasingly interconnected series，exclude the interference of emotions.They become merely objects of intelligence and appear only at the teleological terminal points.The growing transformation of all elements of life into means，the mutual connection of sequences that previously terminated in autonomous purposes with a complex of relative elements，is not only the practical counterpart of the growing causal knowledge of nature and the transformation of its absolutes into relativities.Rather，since the whole structure of means is one of a causal connection viewed from the front，the practical world too increasingly becomes a problem for the intelligence.To put it more precisely，the conceivable elements of action become objectively and subjectively calculable rational relationships and in so doing progressively eliminate the emotional reactions and decisions which only attach themselves to the turning points of life，to the final purposes.

Lack Of Character And Objectivity Of The Style Of Life

This relationship between the significance in life of the intellect and money characterizes the epochs or spheres of interest where both predominate.It does this firstly in a negative way：by a certain lack of character.If character always means that persons or things are definitely committed to an individual mode of existence as distinct from and excluding any other，then the intellect is in no way affected by such factors.For the intellect is the indifferent mirror of reality in which all elements enjoy equal rights，because here their rights exist in nothing other than their mere existence.To be sure，people's intellects have different characteristics，but strictly speaking these are either only differences of degree-depth or superficiality，breadth or narrowness-or they are differences originating in the addition of other mental energies，of emotion or volition.The intellect，as a pure concept，is absolutely lacking in character，not in the sense of being deficient in some necessary quality，but because it exists completely apart from the selective one-sidedness that determines character.There is obviously a lack of character in money too.Just as money per se is the mechanical reflex of the relative value of things and is equally useful to everyone，so within money transactions all persons are of equal value，not because all but because none is valuable except money.However，the lack of character of both intellect and money transcends this purely negative meaning.We demand-perhaps not always rightly so-that all things have a definite character and we resent purely theoretical people who，because they understand everything，are inclined to condone everything：an objectivity that would certainly befit a god but never a man，since man places himself in obvious contradiction both with his nature and with his role in society.Thus we resent the money economy offering its central value as a fully compliant instrument for the meanest machinations.This is not compensated for by the fact that the high-minded enterprise gets the same credit as the meanest；rather，the completely fortuitous relationship between the series of monetary operations and the series of our higher value concepts，and the meaninglessness of the one measured in terms of the other，is most glaringly illustrated.The peculiar levelling of emotional life that is ascribed to contemporary times in contrast to the forthrightness and ruggedness of earlier epochs；the ease of intellectual understanding which exists even between people of the most divergent natures and positions（whereas even such an intellectually outstanding and theoretically committed person as Dante tells us that one should respond to certain theoretical opponents not with arguments but only with the knife）；the trend towards conciliatoriness springing from indifference to the basic problems of our inner life，which one can characterize at its highest level as the salvation of the soul and as not being soluble by reason-right up to the idea of world peace，which is especially favored in liberal circles，the historical representatives of intellectualism and of money transactions：all these are positive consequences of the negative trait of lack of character.This colorlessness becomes，as it were，the colour of work activity at the high points of money transactions.There are a large number of occupations in modem cities，such as certain categories of general and trading agents and all those indeterminate forms of livelihood in large cities，which do not have any objective form and decisiveness of activity.For such people，economic life，the web of their teleological series，has no definite content for them except making money.Money，the absolutely entity，is for them the fixed point around which their activity circulates with unlimited scope.It is a peculiar kind of‘unskilled labour，compared with which what is usually characterized as unskilled is still highly qualified.The essence of this latter type of work consists in mere muscular work where the amount of energy employed completely outweighs the form of its expression.Yet this kind of work，even among the lowest laborers，retains a specific colouring without which the recent attempts in England to organize such labour into trades unions would not have been possible.Those people who pursue the most divergent opportunities to make money lack that predetermined distinctiveness in their lives to a much higher degree than the banker，for whom money is not only the final purpose but also the raw material of his activity，and as such can in time give rise to specific，prescribed directives，particular constellations of interests，and traits of a specific professional character.But in those problematical means of livelihood the routes to the ultimate goal of money have strayed from any actual unity or affinity.There is only a minimum of resistance to the levelling process which money as a goal exerts on various activities and interests.The determination and colouring that might affect the personality through his economic activity disappears.Obviously such a livelihood can be successful or even possible only with a superior intellectuality in a form that one terms‘shrewdness’，which means severing prudence from any determination by objective or ideal norms and making it absolutely subservient to relevant personal interests.As might be expected，uprooted people in particular are disposed towards these‘occupations’-ones that lack the‘professional existence’，that is the fixed ideal line between the person and his life-and equally they meet with the suspicion of being unreliable.Even in India the name of a commissioner or agent has sometimes become the name for someone‘who lives by cheating his fellow-creatures’.Those products of an urban existence whose sole aim is to make money by any means possible therefore need the intellect as a general function all the more because specialized knowledge is out of the question for them.They form a major contingent of that type of insecure personality which can hardly be pinned down and‘placed’because their mobility and their versatility saves them from committing themselves，as it were，in any situation.These phenomena presuppose that money and intellect possess the common traits of neutrality and lack of character.They could develop only where these two factors coexist.

The Dual Roles Of Both Intellect And Money：With Regard To Content They Are Supra-Personal

The intensity of modem economic conflicts in which no mercy is shown is only an apparent counter-instance of such features of the money economy since these conflicts are unleashed by direct interest in money itself.For it is not only that they take place in an objective sphere in which the importance of the person lies not only in his character but also in his embodiment of a particular objective economic potential，and where the deadly antagonistic competitor of today is the cartel ally of tomorrow.Rather，what is of primary importance is that the rules established within one sphere may be totally different from those considered valid outside that sphere but which are none the less influenced by them.A religion，for instance，can preach the gospel of peace to its members and still be very belligerent and cruel towards heretics and towards neighbouring spheres of life.Similarly，a person may provoke in another emotions and thoughts that are completely antithetical to his own philosophy so that he gives what he himself does not possess.A movement in art may be completely naturalistic according to its own precepts and artistic ideas，and have a direct relation to nature and aim at the mere reproduction of it，yet the fact that there is such a loyal devotion to the appearance of reality and an artistic endeavor to reflect it represents an absolutely ideal moment in the system of life that，compared with its other constituent element，far transcends any naturalistic reality.Just as the acrimony of theoretical-logical controversies does not affect the principle of conciliation inherent in intellectuality-for as soon as the dispute has shifted from the contrast of emotions or volitions，or the undemonstrable axioms based on sentiments，to theoretical discussion it can，in principle，be resolved-so equally the conflict of interests in the money economy does not affect the principle of neutrality that raises the controversy above personal involvement and that ultimately provides a basis for mutual understanding.Certainly there is something callous about the purely rationalistic treatment of people and things.Yet this is not a positive impulse but simply results from pure logic being unaffected by respect，kindness and delicacies of feeling.For this reason，the person who is interested solely in money is also unable to comprehend why he is reproached with callousness and brutality，since he is aware of the logical consistency and pure impartiality of his behavior but not of any bad intentions.It must be borne in mind here that we are dealing only with money as the form of economic transactions which，on the basis of very different substantive motives，may acquire quite divergent features.The fact that life，regardless of all other consequences of intellectuality that sharpen conflicts and of the money economy that intensifies these conflicts，is thus no longer determined by the distinctness of character may be designated as the objectivity of the life-style.This is not a trait that is added to intelligence；rather it is the very essence of intelligence itself.It is the only way open to man of acquiring a relationship to things that is not determined by the arbitrariness of the subject.Even if we presuppose that the whole of objective reality is determined by the functions of our mind，we still identify as intelligence those functions of our mind through which reality appears to us as objective in the specific sense of the word，regardless of how much intelligence itself may also be enlivened and directed by other forces.The most brilliant example of this is Spinoza，in whose philosophy we see a most objective attitude towards the world；every single act of inwardness is required to be a harmonious continuation of the inevitability of existence；nowhere are the incalculabilities of individuality allowed to break through the logicalmathematical structure of the unity of the world.The function that this concept of the world and its norms serves is a purely intellectual one.This world view is itself subjectively built upon the mere understanding of things，and understanding suffices to fulfil its demands.This intellectuality itself is，however，based on a deep religious feeling，upon a completely supra-theoretical relationship to the foundation of things which，however，never intervenes in the autonomous intellectual process.Generally speaking，the Indian people display the same combination.It is said of the most remote as well as the most modem times that the peasant could till his land undisturbed by the fighting armies of Indian states or by a hostile party.For the peasant is the‘common benefactor of friend and foe’.Clearly this is an extreme instance of the objective treatment of practical affairs.What appear to be natural subjective impulses are completely eliminated in favor of a practice concerned only with the objective importance of the elements.The differentiation of behaviour is governed only by its objective expediency，not by personal passion.But this nation was also fully attuned to intellectuality.It was at all times superior to others in strict logic，in the meditative profundity of its interpretation of the world，even in the austere intellectuality of both its most gigantic fantasies and its highest ethical ideals；yet it was inferior to many in radiating warmth of sentiments and in will power.It became a mere spectator and a logical designer of the course of the world，but this rested ultimately upon emotional decisions，upon the immensity of suffering out of which grew a metaphysical-religious sense of its cosmic necessity，because the individual cannot cope with it，either in the emotional sphere or by diverting it into a vigorous life practice.

This same objectivity of living conditions is itself also a result of their relationship to money.I have pointed out in an earlier context why trade represents such a considerable improvement over the originally undifferentiated subjectivistic of man.There are still peoples today in Africa and Micronesia who know of no other change in ownership than in the form of theft and the gift.However，just as for more advanced peoples objective interests are joined by and transcend the subjectivity impulses of egoism and altruism-alternatives in which ethics unfortunately still confines human motivations-and just as devotion and commitment to such interests has nothing to do with the relationships among human subjects，but deals with objective expediency and ideals，so exchange evolved a change of ownership according to criteria of objective correctness and fairness transcending the egoistical impulsiveness of theft and the no less altruistic impulsiveness of the gift.Money represents the moment of objectivity in exchange activities，as it were，in pure isolation and independent embodiment，since it is free of all the specific qualities of the individual things exchanged and thus per se has no biased relationship to any subjective economic element.Similarly，theoretical laws represent the independent objectivity of nature，in relation to which every individual case appears to be accidental-the counterpart to the subjectivity of man.The fact that，none the less，different people have very different relationships to money demonstrates money's complete independence from any subjective particularity.Money shares this quality with the other major historical forces which can be compared to large lakes from which one may draw from any side and draw all that the available receptacle allows according to its form and size.The objectivity of human interaction-which，however，is only a formation of material originally offered by subjective energies，but one that ultimately takes on its own independent existence and norms-finds its highest expression in purely monetary economic interests.Whatever is sold for money goes to the buyer who offers most for it，quite regardless of what or who he is.Where other equivalents play a role，where a possession is given away for reasons of honour，service or gratitude，then the character of the person who receives it is taken into consideration.Conversely，whenever I buy for money's sake it is irrelevant from whom I buy what I want as long as it is worth its price.But wherever one pays for something with a service or personal commitment of an internal or external kind，then one carefully checks the person one is dealing with because we do not wish to give away to anybody anything that belongs to us except money.The statement on bank notes to the effect that their value is paid to the bearer‘without proof of identity’typifies the absolute objectivity with which money transactions operate.Within this area，there is a counterpart to the Hindu peasant's exemption from acts of war even among a much more emotional people.Among some American Indian tribes the trader is permitted to move freely a-mong tribes who are at war with his own！Money places the actions and relations of men quite outside of men as human subjects，just as intellectual life-in so far as it is purely intellectual moves from personal subjectivity into the sphere of objectivity which it only reflects.This obviously implies a relationship of superiority.Just as he who has money is superior to he who has the commodity，so the intellectual person as such has a certain power over the more emotional，impulsive person.For however much the latter may be more valuable as a whole person，and however much his powers may ultimately surpass the other，he is more one-sided，more committed and prejudiced than the intellectual person；he does not have the superior view and the unlimited possibilities of the use of all practical means that the purely intellectual person has.It is this factor of superiority，common to both money and intellectuality by virtue of their objectivity towards any particular life contents，that prompted Comte to place bankers at the head of secular government in his utopian state，because bankers formed the class with the most general and abstract functions.This interrelationship is already discernible in the medieval journeymen's associations in which the treasurer was，at the same time，the head of the association.

The Dual Roles Of Intellect And Money：With Regard To Function They Are Individualistic And Egoistic

This explanation of the correlation between intellectuality and the money economy，based on the objectivity and indeterminacy of character that was common to both，may be seriously challenged with a powerful counter-argument.Alongside the impersonal objectivity inherent in the content of intelligence there exists an extremely close relationship between intelligence and individuality and the whole principle of individualism.Money，for its part，no matter how much it translates impulsive-subjective modes of behaviour into supra-personal and objective normative modes，is none the less the breeding ground for economic individualism and egoism.Here we obviously confront the ambiguities and complexities of concepts that must be clearly distinguished in order to understand the style of life that is designated by them.The dual role which both the intellect and money play becomes intelligible if one distinguishes their essentially objective content from their function or，in other words，from the uses to which they are put.In the first sense，the intellect possesses a levelling，one might almost say communistic，character；first，because the essence of its content is that intellect is universally communicable and that，if we presuppose its correctness，every sufficiently trained mind must be open to persuasion by it.There is absolutely no analogy to this in the realms of the will and the emotions.In the case of the intellect，every transference of the same inner constellation depends upon the individual's given frame of mind and any compulsion will be only conditionally submitted to.In the case of the will and the emotions，there are no proofs like those which，at least in principle，the intellect commands in order to spread the same conviction among the public at large.The ability to learn which belongs solely to the intellect implies that one is on the same level as anyone else.In addition，the contents of the intellect，leaving aside quite fortuitous complications，do not possess the jealous exclusiveness that is common in the practical contents of life.Certain emotions，for example involved in intimate personal relationships，would completely lose their significance and value if others were entitled to share them.It is also essential for certain objectives of the will that other people are excluded from both pursuing them as well as gaining them.It has been rightly suggested that theoretical notions，on the other hand，are like a torch whose light does not become dimmer by igniting innumerable others from it.Inasmuch as their potential boundless dissemination has no influence whatsoever upon their importance，they elude private ownership more than any other contents of life.Finally，they present themselves in a way that，in principle，excludes all individual contingencies from the assimilation of their content.We have no possibility of formulating emotional changes and energies of the will in such a clear and unambiguous way that everyone can refer back to them at any time and use their objective structure to continually reproduce the same inner process.In contrast，only in intellectual matters do we possess an adequate means that is relatively independent of individual disposition，and this is found in language that proceeds through concepts and their logical interrelationship.

But the significance of the intellect develops in a totally different direction as soon as real historical forces begin to channel these abstract objectivities and possibilities.First of all，it is precisely the general validity of knowledge and its consequent forcefulness and irresistibility that makes intelligence such a powerful weapon for its outstanding representatives.One can offer resistance to a superior will if one does not possess a suggestible nature，but one can elude a superior logic only by a stubborn‘I don’t want to’，which implies a confession of inferiority.Furthermore，the daily struggle for existence and possessions is decided by a certain measure of intelligence，even though the great decisions among men originate from supra-intellectual energies.The power of superior intelligence rests upon the communistic character of its quality：because，in terms of its content，intelligence is universally valid and everywhere effective and recognized，the mere quantity of intellectual endowment of the individual confers a more unconditional advantage than can any more individual possession，which，because of its individuality，cannot be universally used or cannot find some domain for itself anywhere in the practical world.Here，as elsewhere，it is precisely the basis of equal rights for all that brings individual differences to their full development and utilization.It is because the mere intellectual conception and organization of human relations，which disregards the irrational emphases of volition and emotion，recognizes no a priori difference between individuals that it has just as little grounds for curtailing differences a posteriori. This might be attained subsequently as so often happens through a sense of social duty and the feeling of love and pity.This is why the rationalistic interpretation of the world-which，as impartial as money，has also come alose to the socialist image of life-has become the advocate of modem egoism and the ruthless assertion of individuality.According to the usual and not exactly profound point of view，the Ego is，in practice no less than in theory，man's obvious basis and unfailing primary interest.Any selfless motives appear not to be natural and autochthonous but secondary and，as it were，artificially implanted.As a result，only self-interested action is considered to be genuinely and simply‘logical’.All devotion and self-sacrifice seems to flow from the irrational forces of feeling and volition，so that men of pure intellect treat them ironically as a proof of lack of intelligence or denounce them as the disguise of a hidden egoism.This is certainly mistaken since even the egoistic will is just as much a will as the altruistic will and can just as little be squeezed out of merely rationalistic thought.Rather，as we saw，rationality can only supply the means for either of them；it is totally indifferent to the practical purposes which either of them choose and realize.Yet this connection between pure intellectuality and practical egoism is none the less broadly accepted and it may have some basis in reality，if not in terms of the logical immediacy claimed for it then in some indirect psychological manner.Yet not only genuine ethical egoism but social individualism too appears as the intellect's necessary corollary.Any collectivism that establishes a new living unity transcending its individual constituents seems to the sober intellect to contain an element of impenetrable mysticism，in so far as it is not reducible to the mere sum of its individual members-just like the living unity of an organism，in that the intellect cannot understand the unity as a mechanism of the parts.Hence the rationalism of the eighteenth century，which culminated in revolution，is bound up with a strict individualism and only the opposition to rationalism from Herder to the Romantics has，in acknowledging the supra-individual emotional potential of life，thereby also recognized the supra-individual collectivities as unities and historical realities.The universality of intellectuality，in that it is valid for each individual intellect，brings about an atomization of society.By means of the intellect and viewed from its standpoint，everyone seems to be an enclosed self-sufficient element alongside every other，without this abstract universality somehow being resolved into the concrete universality in which the individual person only forms a unity in combination with others.Finally，the inner accessibility and reflectiveness of theoretical knowledge which cannot basically be withheld from anybody，as can certain emotions and volitions，has a consequence that directly offsets its practical results.In the first place，it is precisely because of their general accessibility that factors quite independent of personal capacities decide on the factual utilization of knowledge.This leads to the enormous preponderance of the most unintelligent‘educated’person over the cleverest proletarian.The apparent equality with which educational materials are available to everyone interested in them is，in reality，a sheer mockery.The same is true of the other freedoms accorded by liberal doctrines which，though they certainly do not hamper the individual from gaining goods of any kind，do however disregard the fact that only those already privileged in some way or another have the possibility of acquiring them.For just as the substance of education-in spite of，or because of its general availabilitycan ultimately be acquired only through individual activity，so it gives rise to the mot intangible and thus the most unassailable aristocracy，to a distinction between high and low which can be abolished neither（as can socioeconomic differences）by a decree or a revolution，nor by the good will of those concerned.Thus it was appropriate for Jesus to say to the rich youth：‘Give away your goods to the poor’，but not for him to say‘Give your education to the underprivileged’.There is no advantage that appears to those in inferior positions to be so despised，and before which they feel so deprived and helpless，as the advantage of education.For this reason，attempts to achieve practical equality very often and in so many variations scorn intellectual education.This is true of Buddha，the Cynics，certain currents in Christianity，down to Robespierre's‘nous n ’avons pas besoin de savants '.In addition，there is the very important fact that the location of knowledge in speech and writing-which，viewed abstractly，are a manifestation of its communal nature-makes possible its accumulation and，especially，its concentration so that，in this respect，the gulf between high and low is persistently widened.The intellectually gifted or the materially independent person will have all the more chances for standing out from the masses the larger and more concentrated are the available educational materials.Just as the proletarian today has many comforts and cultural enjoyments that were formerly denied to him，while at the same time-particularly if we look back over several centuries and millennia-the gulf between his way of life and that of the higher strata has certainly become much deeper，so，similarly，the rise in the level of knowledge as a whole does not by any means bring about a general levelling，but rather its opposite.

I have analysed this phenomenon at length because the contrasts in meaning which the concept of intellectuality exhibits are completely analogous to those found in money.The understanding of the essence of money is not only facilitated by its interaction with intellectuality，which gives them a formal similarity，hut perhaps also by an underlying common principle that is manifested in the similarity of their development-perhaps by reference to the fundamental condition or disposition of those historical elements which，by giving them form，constitute their style.We have pointed out in the preceding chapters how much money，on the basis of its general availability and objectivity，none the less facilitates the growth of individuality and subjectivity，how much its unchanging uniformity，its qualitatively communistic character，leads to each quantitative difference becoming a qualitative one.This extension of the power of money that is incomparable with that of any other cultural factor，and which gives equal rights to the most contradictory tendencies in life，is manifested here as the condensation of the purely formal cultural energy that can be applied to any content in order to strengthen it and to bring about its increasingly purer representation.I therefore propose to emphasize only some specific analogies with intellectuality in terms of its content，to the effect that the impersonality and universal validity of its abstract objective nature，at least with reference to its function and use，supports egoism and differentiation.The rational and logical character that is displayed by egoism also adheres to the full and ruthless exploitation of the possession of money.Earlier，we pointed to the distinctive feature of money compared with other forms of property，namely that it does not point to any specific use and therefore implies no inhibition as to its use.Money is completely adaptable to any use without any relationship of its quality to that of the real objects thereby bringing about any specific encouragement or obstruction.Money is therefore similar to the forms of logic which lend themselves equally to any particular content，regardless of that content's development or combination.It thus grants the same chances to representation and formal correctness to the objectively most nonsensical and detrimental contents as it does to the most valuable.Furthermore，money is also analogous to the schemes of law which often enough lack safety devices for preventing the most serious injustice from being endowed with an unimpeachable formal righteousness.This unrestricted possibility for fully exploiting the power of money appears not only as a justification but also，as it were，as a logical-conceptual necessity for doing so.Since money intrinsically contains neither directives nor obstacles，it follows the strongest subjective impulse that within all money matters appears to be the egoistic impulse.The inhibiting notion that certain amounts of money may be‘stained with blood’or be under a curse are sentimentalities that lose their significance completely with the growing indifference of money-that is，as money increasingly becomes nothing but mere money.Money's purely negative quality，that its use，unlike other forms of ownership，is in no way restricted by objective or ethical considerations，inevitably develops into inconsiderateness as a completely positive kind of attitude.Money's flexibility，which follows from its being detached from particular interests，origins and relations，entails as a necessary logical consequence the invitation to us not to restrain ourselves in those spheres of life in which money predominates.The absolute objectivity that results from the elimination of all one-sided objectivity makes a clean sweep in favour of egoism，as did pure intellectuality，for no other reason than because this guiding principle is logically the simplest，the closest at hand，so that the purely formal and indifferent forces of life attain in it their primary，as it were，natural，and congenial fulfilment.

Money's Relationship To The Rationalism Of Law And Logic

It is not only，as I mentioned earlier，that the form of law in general，together with intellectuality and money transactions，disregards the objectively and morally most perverse contents，but rather it is that this discrepancy between form and real content culminates in the principle of equality before the law.All three factors-the law，intellectuality and money-are characterized by their complete indifference to individual qualities；all three extract from the concrete totality of the streams of life one abstract，general factor which develops according to its own independent norms and which intervenes in the totality of existential interests and imposes itself upon them.In that all three of them have the power to lay down forms and directions for contents to which they are indifferent，they necessarily inject those contradictions into the totality of life which concern us here.Wherever equality impinges upon the formal foundations of human relationships，it serves to express individual inequalities most pointedly and farreachingly.By observing the limits imposed by formal equality，egoism need no longer concern itself with internal and external barriers.It possesses，in the general validity of that equality，a weapon which，by serving anyone，may also be used against anyone.The forms of legal equality are the typical forms that intellectuality as well as money share：their general availability and validity；their potential communism which removes for everyone，those of higher，lower and equal position alike，certain barriers that resulted from the a priori， statusrelated demarcation of types of property.As long as landed property and the professions were in the hands of certain classes，they entailed certain obligations toward the lower orders，solidarity with others of the same class，and clear limits to the ambition of outsiders.Yet an‘enlightened’rationalism has no reason for retaining these any longer if every property can be transferred into a value，the unlimited acquisition of which is，in principle，denied to no one.This，of course，does not answer the question as to whether the total amount of egoism increases or decreases in the course of history.

Finally，I want to refer to the very characteristic fact that the accumulation of intellectual achievements，which gives a disproportionate and rapidly growing advantage to those who are favored by it，also has its analogy in the accumulation of money capital.The structure of monetary relationships，the way in which money yields returns and profits，is such that，beyond a certain amount，money multiplies without a corresponding effort on the part of the owner.This corresponds to the structure of knowledge in the cultural world which requires，beyond a certain point，decreasing self-acquisition on the part of the individual，because the cognitive content is increasingly offered in a condensed and，beyond a certain level，concentrated form.The highest stages of education require less effort for every step further than the lower stages，and yet at the same time produce greater results.Just as the objectivity of money permits‘work，that is ultimately relatively independent of personal energies and the accumulating returns lead automatically to more accumulation in growing proportions，so the objectification of knowledge，the separation of the results of intelligence from its process，causes these results to accumulate in the form of concentrated abstractions，so that，if only one stands high enough，they may be picked like fruits that have ripened without any effort on our part.

As a result of all this，the tendencies in favor of general equality most decisively reject money，even though it is by nature a basically democratic leveling social form that excludes any specific individual relationships.Here we have the same result，for the same reason as we observed with regard to intellectuality.Universality in a logicalsubstantive sense and universality in a socialpractical sense fall asunder in the two spheres.In other spheres they often enough do coincide.For instance，it has been stated-regardless of whether this is an exhaustive definition-that the essence of art is to represent in its content the typical general features of phenomena so as to appeal to the typical human emotions that reside in us，and that art's principal claim to subjective acceptance is based on the exclusion of all fortuitous and individual elements from its object.In the same manner，the forms of religion transcend all temporal particularity to the level of the absolute and universal and，in so doing，secure a relationship to what is most common to all individuals and to what unites them in the human world.By their all-embracing unity，the forms of religion release us from our merely individual attributes，by relating them back to the basic traits that are felt to be the common roots of everything human.The same is true of morality as conceived by Kant.The mode of action that may be logically generalized without contradicting itself should also be the moral law for everyone regardless of his identity.The criterion operating here is that one might conceive of the practical maxim as natural law，such that its conceptual，objective universality establishes the universality for all subjects，for whom it becomes a moral imperative.In contrast to these forms，modem life in other spheres seems rather to increase the tension between objective universality of content and universality of personal relationships.Certain elements gain an increasingly larger universality of content；they become more significant for an increasing number of details and relationships；their definition includes，directly or indirectly，an increasingly larger part of reality.This is true，for example，of law，the processes and results of intellectuality，and money.It is accompanied by their elevation to subjectively differentiated forms of life，by the utilization of their all-embracing importance for the practice of egoism，and by the full development of personal differences on the basis of this levelling material，since it is generally accessible and valid and therefore offers no resistance to any individual will.The confusion and the feeling of secret self-contradiction which in so many points characterizes the style of modem life is partly based on this imbalance and tension between the content and objective significance of these spheres and their personal use and development with regard to universality and equality.

The Calculating Character Of Modern Times

I want to mention a final trait in the style of contemporary life whose rationalistic character clearly betrays the influence of money.By and large，one may characterize the intellectual functions that are used at present in coping with the world and in regulating both individual and social relations as calculative functions.Their cognitive ideal is to conceive of the world as a huge arithmetical problem，to conceive events and the qualitative distinction of things as a system of numbers.Kant believed that natural philosophy was scientific only to the extent that mathematics could be applied in it.Yet it is not only the physical world that has to be intellectually conquered by measuring and weighing；for pessimism as well as optimism wishes to establish the value of life by balancing pleasure and pain and its ideal is the quantitative calculation of both factors.The frequent determination of public life through majority votes is a manifestation of the same trend.To subject the individual to majority decision through the fact that others-not superior，but equal-hold a different opinion is not as natural as it may appear to us today.It is unknown in ancient German law，which states that whoever does not agree with the decision of the community is not bound by it；outvoting did not exist in the tribal council of the Iroquois，in the Cortes of Aragon up to the sixteenth century，or in the parliament of Poland and other communities；decisions that were not unanimous were not valid.The principle that the minority has to conform to the majority indicates that the absolute or qualitative value of the individual voice is reduced to an entity of purely quantitative significance.The corollary or the presupposition of this arithmetical procedure whereby the numerical majority or minority of unspecified units expresses and guides the inner reality of the group is the democratic leveling where everyone counts as one and no one counts for more than one.This measuring，weighing and calculating exactness of modem times is the purest reflection of its intellectualism which，however，on the basis of abstract equality，also favours the egoistical impulses of the elements.Language，with fine instinctive subtle insight，interprets a‘calculating’person simply as one who‘calculates’in an egoistic sense.Just as in the use of‘reasonable’or‘rational’，so here too the apparently non-partisan formalism of the concept is basically a disposition to cover over a specific biased content.

This psychological feature of our times which stands in such a decisive contrast to the more impulsive，emotionally determined character of earlier epochs seems to me to stand in a close causal relationship to the money economy.The money economy enforces the necessity of continuous mathematical operations in our daily transactions.The lives of many people are absorbed by such evaluating，weighing，calculating and reducing of qualitative values to quantitative ones.Gauging values in terms of money has taught us to determine and specify values down to the last farthing and has thus enforced a much greater precision in the comparison of various contents of life.Where objects are conceived in their direct relationship to other objects，that is where they cannot be reduced to the common denominator of money，a much more spontaneous evaluation，a comparison of one unit against another，is to be found.Exactness，precision and rigour in the economic relationships in life，which naturally affect other aspects of life as well，run parallel to the extension of monetary matters，though not exactly for the benefit of a superior style of living.The ideal of numerical calculability has been made possible in practical，and perhaps even in intellectual，life only through the money economy.Viewed from this standpoint，the institution of money appears as a mere intensification and sublimation of the economic sphere in general.With regard to commercial transactions between the English people and their kings，when，particularly in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries，all kinds of rights and liberties were bought，a historian writes，‘This made possible a practical solution to difficult problems which seemed theoretically insoluble.The king has rights as the ruler of his people，the people have rights as free men and as estates of the realm that the king personifies.Though the determination of the rights of each of them is extremely difficult in principle，it became easy in practice as soon as it was reduced to a question of buying and selling.’This means that，as soon as a qualitative relationship of practical elements is represented by their significance as a part of business transactions，it gains an exactitude and possibility of precise determination that remains denied to the phenomenon as it stands，with all its qualitative differences.However，this process does not yet make money indispensable since such transactions are often carried out through payment in kind，for example in wool.Yet it is evident that money can accomplish in a much sharper and more exact manner what commercial transactions contributed to the accuracy of values and demands.In this respect，one could perhaps say that monetary transactions relate to commercial transactions as a whole as money relates to the exactness and relationship of objects before exchange existed.Money expresses，as it were，the purely commercial element in the commercial treatment of things，just as logic represents comprehensibility with reference to comprehensible objects.Since the abstract form that represents the immanent value of objects takes the form of arithmetical precision and thus of unequivocal rational accuracy，its characteristics must reflect upon the objects themselves.If it is true that the art of a period gradually determines the way we look at nature，and if the artist's spontaneous and subjective abstraction from reality forms the apparently immediate sensuous picture of nature in our consciousness，then so too will the superstructure of money relations erected above qualitative reality determine much more radically the inner image of reality according to its forms.The mathematical character of money imbues the relationship of the elements of life with a precision，a reliability in the determination of parity and disparity，an unambiguousness in agreements and arrangements in the same way as the general use of pocket watches has brought about a similar effect in daily life.Like the determination of abstract value by money，the determination of abstract time by clocks provides a system for the most detailed and definite arrangements and measurements that imparts an otherwise unattainable transparency and calculability to the contents of life，at least as regards their practical management.The calculating intellectuality embodied in these forms may in its turn derive from them some of the energy through which intellectuality controls modem life.All these relationships are brought into focus by the negative example of those types of thinkers who are most strongly and fiercely opposed to the economic interpretation of human affairs：Goethe，Carlyle and Nietzsche on the one hand are fundamentally anti-intellectual and on the other completely reject that mathematically exact interpretation of nature which we recognized as the theoretical counterpart to the institution of money.

Ⅱ

The Concept Of Culture

If we define culture as the refinement，as the intellectualized forms of life，the accomplishment of mental and practical labour，then we place these values in a context in which they do not automatically belong by virtue of their own objective significance.They become manifestations of culture to us inasmuch as we interpret them as intensified displays of natural vitality and potential，intensified beyond the level of development，fullness and differentiation that would be achieved by their mere nature.A natural energy or allusion，which is necessary only in order that it may be surpassed by actual development，forms the presupposition for the concept of culture.From the standpoint of culture，the values of life are civilized nature ；they do not have here the isolated significance that is measured from above，as it were，by the ideals of happiness，intelligence and beauty.Rather，they appear as developments of a basis that we call nature and whose power and intellectual content they surpass in so far as they become culture.Therefore，if a cultivated garden fruit and a statue are both equally cultural products，then language indicates this relationship in a subtle manner by calling the fruit tree‘cultivated’，whereas the bare marble block is not‘cultivated’to produce a statue.For in the first case one assumes a natural driving force and disposition of the tree to bear these fruits which，through intelligent influence，grow beyond their natural limits；whereas we do not presuppose a corresponding tendency as regards the statue.The culture embodied in the statue constitutes an enhancement and refinement of certain human energies whose original manifestations we term‘natural’.

At first glance，it seems reasonable to describe impersonal objects as cultured only as a figure of speech.For to develop through will and intelligence what is naturally given beyond the limits of its merely natural capacities is reserved for ourselves or such objects whose growth is connected with our impulses and，in their turn，stimulate our feelings.The material products of culture-furniture and cultivated plants，works of art and machinery，tools and books-in which natural material is developed into forms which could never have been realized by their own energies，are products of our own desires and emotions，the result of ideas that utilize the available possibilities of objects.It is exactly the same with regard to the culture that shapes people's relationships to one another and to themselves：language，morals，religion and law.To the extent that these values are interpreted as cultural，we distinguish them from such levels of growth of their innate energies that they may accomplish，as it were，by themselves，and that are only the raw material for the process of civilization，like wood and metal，plants and electricity.By cultivating objects，that is by increasing their value beyond the performance of their natural constitution，we cultivate ourselves：it is the same value-increasing process developing out of us and returning back to us that moves external nature or our own nature.The fine arts reflect this concept of culture most clearly because they display the greatest tension between these opposites.For the shaping of the object seems completely to escape being adapted to the process of our subjectivity.The work of art interprets the meaning of the phenomenon itself，whether it is embedded in the shaping of space or in the relations of colours or in the spirituality that exists，as it were，both in and beneath the visible.Yet everything depends on discovering the meaning and secret of things in order to represent them in a form that is purer and clearer than their natural development-not，however，in the sense of chemical or physical technology，which explores the law-like nature of objects in order to incorporate them into human purposes that are intrinsic to them.Rather，the artistic process is completed as soon as it has succeeded in presenting the object in its unique significance.This，in fact，also fulfils the purely artistic ideal，since the perfection of the work of art is an objective value in itself，completely independent of its success in our subjective experience.The slogan‘I，art pour I‘art ’characterizes perfectly the self-sufficiency of the purely artistic tendency.But from the standpoint of a cultural ideal the situation is different.Here it is essential that the independent values of aesthetic，scientific，ethical，eudaemonistic and even religious achievements are transcended in order to integrate them all as elements in the development of human nature beyond its natural state.More accurately，they are the milestones which this development has to pass.At each moment cultural development is located somewhere along this road；it never can proceed purely formally and independently of some content even though it is not identical with this content.Cultural contents consist of those forms，each of which is subordinate to an autonomous ideal，though here they are viewed from the standpoint of the development of our energies or our being beyond the degree considered to be purely natural.In refining objects，man creates them in his own image.The cultural process，as the supra-natural growth of the energies of things，is the manifestation or embodiment of the identical growth of our energies.The borderline at which the development of specific lifecontent passes from its natural form into its cultural form is indistinct and is subject to controversy.But this is merely one of the most universal difficulties of thought.The categories under which specific phenomena are subsumed in order to incorporate them into knowledge，its norms and relationships，are marked off from each other and often gain their meaning only from this contrast.These concepts form sequences with discontinuous levels.Yet the particulars that are supposed to be covered by these concepts usually cannot be located with the same degree of certainty.Rather，their quantitative characteristics often determine whether they belong to the one or the other concept so that，because of the continuity of everything quantitative and the everpossible intermediate position between two entities，each of which corresponds to a specific category，the specific phenomenon may well be placed sometimes with one，sometimes with the other.Thus there seems to be an indeterminacy between them，even a mixture of concepts which，according to their actual meaning，exclude one another.The fundamental certainty of the demarcation between nature and culture，that the one starts where the other leaves off，is just as little affected by the uncertainty as to where to locate individual phenomena as are the concepts of day and night which do not merge into one another because dawn and dusk may sometimes he attributed to the one，sometimes to the other.

The Increase In Material Culture And The Lag In Individual Culture

I will now contrast this discussion of the general concept of culture with a specific relationship within contemporary culture.If one compares our culture with that of a hundred years ago，then one may surely say-subject to many individual exceptions-that the things that determine and surround our lives，such as tools，means of transport，the products of science，technology and art，are extremely refined.Yet individual culture，at least in the higher strata，has not progressed at all to the same extent；indeed，it has even frequently declined.This does not need to be shown in detail.I only wish，therefore，to emphasize some aspects of it.Linguistic possibilities for expression，in German as well as in French，have become much more refined and subtle in the last hundred years.Not only do we now have Goethe's language，but in addition we have a large number of refinements，subtleties and individual modes of expression.Yet，if one looks at the speech and writing of individuals，they are on the whole increasingly less correct，less dignified and more trivial.In terms of content，the scope of objects of conversation has been widened during that time through advances in theory and practice，yet，none the less，it seems that conversation，both social as well as intimate and in the exchange of letters，is now more superficial，less interesting and less serious than at the end of the eighteenth century.The fact that machinery has become so much more sophisticated than the worker is part of this same process.How many workers are there today，even within large-scale industry，who are able to understand the machine with which they work，that is the mental effort invested in it？The same applies to military culture.The work of the individual soldier has essentially remained the same for a long time，and in some respects has even been reduced through modem methods of warfare.In contrast，not only the material instruments but，above all，the completely impersonal organization of the army have become extremely sophisticated and a real triumph of objective culture.In the purely intellectual sphere，even the best informed and most thoughtful persons work with a growing number of ideas，concepts and statements，the exact meaning and content of which they are not fully aware.The tremendous expansion of objective，available material of knowledge allows or even enforces the use of expressions that pass from hand to hand like sealed containers without the condensed content of thought actually enclosed within them being unfolded for the individual user.Just as our everyday life is surrounded more and more by objects of which we cannot conceive how much intellectual effort is expended in their production，so our mental and social communication is filled with symbolic terms，in which a comprehensive intellectuality is accumulated，but of which the individual mind need make only minimal use.The preponderance of objective over subjective culture that developed during the nineteenth century is reflected partly in the fact that the eighteenth century pedagogic ideal was focused upon the formation of man，that is upon a personal internal value，which was replaced during the nineteenth century，however，by the concept of‘education’in the sense of a body of objective knowledge and behavioural patterns.This discrepancy seems to widen steadily.Every day and from all sides，the wealth of objective culture increases，but the individual mind can enrich the forms and contents of its own development only by distancing itself still further from that culture and developing its own at a much slower pace.

How can we explain this phenomenon？If all the culture of things is，as we saw，nothing but a culture of people，so that we develop ourselves only by developing things，then what does that development，elaboration and intellectualization of objects mean，which seems to evolve out of these objects，own powers and norms without correspondingly developing the individual mind？This implies an accentuation of the enigmatic relationship which prevails between the social life and its products on the one hand and the fragmentary life-contents of individuals on the other.The labor of countless generations is embedded in language and custom，political constitutions and religious doctrines，literature and technology as objectified spirit from which everyone can take as much of it as they wish to or are able to，but no single individual is able to exhaust it all.Between the amount of this treasure and what is taken from it，there exists the most diverse and fortuitous relationships.The insignificance or irrationality of the individual's share leaves the substance and dignity of mankind's ownership unaffected，just as any physical entity is independent of its being individually perceived.Just as the content and significance of a book remains indifferent to a large or small，understanding or unresponsive，group of readers，so any cultural product confronts its cultural audience，ready to be absorbed by anyone but in fact taken up only sporadically.This concentrated mental labour of a cultural community is related to the degree to which it comes alive in individuals just as the abundance of possibilities is related to the limitations of reality.In order to understand the mode of existence of such objective intellectual manifestations，we have to place them within the specific framework of our categories for interpreting the world.The discrepant relationship between objective and subjective culture，which forms our specific problem，will then find its proper place within these categories.

The Platonic myth implied that the soul had seen the pure essence，the absolute significance，of worldly objects during its pre-existence，so that the subsequent knowlede of it is but a remembrance of this truth emerging through sensory stimuli.The prime motive underlying this myth is the perplexity as to the origins or our knowledge if one denies its origin，as Plato does，in experience.However，this metaphysical speculation-aside from the specific cause of its emergence-basically indicates an epistemological attitude of the mind.Whether we interpret our cognition as a direct result of external objects or as a putely internal process in which everything external is an immanent form or relationship of mental elements，we always conceive of our thought—to the extent that it is accepted as the truth—as the fulfilment of an objective demand，the reproduction of an imaginary model.Even if our cognition were an exact reflection of the objects as they are in themselves，the unity，correctness and completeness that knowledge approaches by mastering one thing after another would not derive from the objects themselves.Rather，our epistemological ideal would always be their content in the form of ideas ，since even the most extreme realism wishes to gain not the objects themselves but rather knowledge of them.If we describe the sum total of fragments that make up our knowledge at any one moment in relation to the goal we want to attain and which determines the significance of each stage，then we can do so only by presupposing that which lies at the basis of the Platonic doctrine：that there is an ideal realm of theoretical values of perfect intellectual meaning and coherence，that coincides neither with the objects-since these are only its objects-nor with the psychologically real knowledge that has been attained.On the contrary，this real knowledge only gradually and always imperfectly approximates to that realm which includes all possible truth.It is trueonly in the sense that it is successful in doing this.Plato seems to have accepted this basic feeling that our knowledge at any moment is only a part of a complex of knowledge that exists only in an ideal form and invites and demands psychological realization on our part.Yet he expressed this as a decrease in real knowledge from the former grasp of this totality，as a‘no-longer’，instead of our present-day interpretation of it as a‘not-yet’.But the relationship itself can obviously be experienced in both interpretations as basically the same-just as the identical number may be derived by subtractions from a higher number or by addition of lower numbers.The mode of existence peculiar to this cognitive ideal that confronts our real cognitions as a norm or as a totality is the same as the totality of moral values and prescriptions that confront the actual behavior of individuals.Here，in the ethical realm，we are more aware of the fact that our behavior corresponds well or badly to an intrinsically valid norm.This norm-which may differ in its content for different people and for different periods of their lives-is not to be found in time and space，nor does it coincide with moral awareness，which is instead conscious of being dependent upon that norm.Ultimately，the formula of our life as a whole，from the trivial practice of everyday to the highest peak of intellectuality，is this：in all that we do，we have a norm，a standard，an ideally preconceived totality before us，which we try to transpose into reality through our actions.This refers not to the simple generalization that our will is guided by some kind of ideal；rather，it refers to the specific，more or less distinct，quality of our actions，which can only be described in the following way：in our action，regardless of whether its value contradicts ideals，we follow some prefigured possibility and，as it were，carry out an ideal programme.Our practical existence，though inadequate and fragmentary，gains a certain significance and coherence，as it were，by partaking in the realization of a totality.Our actions，even our total being，beautiful or ugly，right or wrong，great or petty，seem to be drawn from a wealth of possibilities such that，at every moment，they relate to its ideally determined content just as the concrete object relates to the concept that expresses its immanent law and its logical essence without the significance of this content thereby being dependent upon whether，how and how often it is realized.We cannot conceive of cognition in any other way except as the realization in our consciousness of those conceptions which were，so to say，waiting to be conceived at that particular point in question.The fact that we term our knowledge necessary knowledge，that is that there is only one specific way in which its content can exist，is only a different expression of the conviction that we consider it to be the mental realization of the pre-established ideal content.This one specific way does not mean that there is only one truth for the great variety of minds.Rather，if on the one hand a definitely structured intellect and，on the other，a certain objective reality is given，the‘truth’for this mind is objectively pre-formed in the same way as is the answer to a calculation if its factors are given.With every change in the endowed mental structure，the content of this truth changes，without being any the less objective or more dependent upon the awareness of this mind.The unswerving conclusion that we derived from certain facts of knowledge，that other facts of knowledge also have to be assumed，is the accidental cause that illustrates the nature of our comprehension：every single piece of knowledge means becoming aware of something that is already valid and established within the objectively determined context of the contents of knowledge.Finally，from the psychological point of view，this is associated with the theory according to which everything held to be true is a certain feeling which accompanies a mental image；what we call proof is nothing other than the establishment of a psychological constellation which gives rise to such a feeling.No sense perception or logical derivations can directly assure us of a reality.Rather，they are only the conditions that evoke the supra-theoretical feeling of affirmation，of agreement or whatever one may call this rather indescribable sense of reality.It forms the psychological mediator between the two epistemological categories：between the valid purpose of things，brought forth by its inner coherence that assigns each element to its proper place，and our perception of things that signifies their reality for a human subject.

The Objectification Of The Mind

This general and basic relationship is paralleled to a lesser extent in the relationship between the objectified mind and culture，and the individual.Just as，from an epistemological standpoint，we draw our life-contents from a realm of objectively valid entities，so，viewed historically，we draw the major part of them from the stock of accumulated mental labour of the species.Here too we find preformed contents that are ready to be realized by individual minds but yet preserve their determinateness which does not coincide with that of a material object.For even where the mind is tied to matter，as in tools，works of art and books，it is never identical with that part of them that is perceptible to our senses.The mind lives in them in a hardly definable potential form which the individual consciousness is able to actualize.Objective culture is the historical presentation or more or less perfect condensation of an objectively valid truth which is reproduced by our cognition.If we can say that the law of gravity was valid before Newton formulated it，then the law itself does not rest in the substance of matter.Instead，it only illustrates the manner in which the relations of matter present themselves to a specifically organized mind，and the validity of the law is independent of the fact that matter exists in reality.If this is the case then the law resides neither in objective things themselves nor in the subjective mind，but in that sphere of the objective spirit which，stage by stage，is condensed into reality by our sense of truth.Once this has been accomplished by Newton with respect to the law in question，that law has been incorporated into the objective historical mind，and its ideal significance within that mind is now，in its turn，basically independent of its reproduction by particular individuals.

By establishing this category of the objective mind as the historical manifestation of the valid intellectual content of things in general，it becomes clear how the cultural process that we recognize as a subjective development the culture of things as a human culture-can be separated from its content.This content，by entering that category，acquires，as it were，another physical condition and thus provides the basis for the phenomenon of the separate development of objective and personal culture.The objectification of the mind provides the form that makes the conservation and accumulation of mental labor possible；it is the most significant and most far-reaching of the historical categories of mankind.For it transforms into a historical fact what is biologically so doubtful：hereditary transmission.If to be not only a descendant but also an heir denotes the superiority of man over animals，then the objectification of the mind in words and works，organizations and traditions is the basis for this distinction by which man takes possession of his world，or even of any world at all.

If this objective mind of historical society is its cultural content in the widest sense，then the practical cultural significance of its individual elements is measured by the extent to which they become factors in individual development.If we presuppose that Newton's discovery was only preserved in a book which no one knew，it would still be part of the objectified mind and a potential possession of society，but no longer a cultural value.Since this extreme case can occur on countless levels，it follows that in society at large only a certain proportion of objective cultural values become subjective values.If one looks at society as a whole，that is if one arranges the objectified intellectuality in a temporalobjective complex，then the whole cultural development，assuming it has a uniform representative，is richer in content than each of its elements.For the achievement of each element is incorporated in the total heritage，but this heritage does not permeate each element.The entire life-style of a community depends upon the relationship between the objectified culture and the culture of the subjects.I have already mentioned the significance of numerical factors.In the small community of a lower culture，this relationship will be almost one of perfect equality；the objective cultural possibilities will not extend much beyond the subjective cultural reality.An increase in the cultural level-particularly if it coincides with an enlargement of the group-will favour a discrepancy between both.The unique situation of the golden age of Athens was due to the fact that it was able to avoid this，except perhaps with reference to philosophy at its peak.Yet the size of the social circle does not yet in itself fully explain the divergence of the subjective and the objective factor.On the contrary，we must now search for the concrete，effective causes of this phenomenon.

The Division Of Labour As The Cause Of The Divergence Of Subjective Arid Objective Culture

If we wish to confine the cause and its present magnitude in a single concept，then it is that of the division of labour ，in terms of its importance within production as well as consumption.With regard to production，it has been emphasized often enough that the product is completed at the expense of the development of the producer.The increase in psycho-physical energies and skills，which is the result of specialized activity，is of little value for the total personality，which often even becomes stunted because of the diversion of energies that are indispensable for the harmonious growth of the self.In other cases，it develops as if cut off from the core of the personality，as a province with unlimited autonomy whose fruits do not flow back to the centre.Experience seems to show that the inner wholeness of the self basically evolves out of interaction with the uniformity and the completion of our life task.

The unity of an object is realized for us only by projecting our self into the object in order to shape it according to our image，so that the diversity of determinations grows into the unity of the‘ego’.In the same manner，the unity or lack of unity of the object that we create affects，in a psychological-practical sense，the corresponding formation of our personality.Whenever our energies do not produce something whole as a reflection of the total personality，then the proper relationship between subject and object is missing.The internal nature of our achievement is bound up with parts of achievements accomplished by others which are a necessary part of the totality，but it does not refer back to the producer.As a result，the inadequacy that develops between the worker's existential form and that of his product because of greater specialization easily serves to completely divorce the product from the laborer.Its meaning is not derived from the mind of the producer but from its relationship with products of a different origin.Because of its fragmentary character，the product lacks the spiritual determinacy that can be easily perceived in a product of labour that is wholly the work of a single person.The significance of the product is thus to be sought neither in the reflection of a subjectivity nor in the reflex of a creative spirit，but is to be found only in the objective achievement that leads away from the subject.

This relationship is equally well illustrated by its extreme opposite，the work of art.The nature of the art work completely resists a subdivision of labour among a number of workers，none of whom on his own achieves a whole unity.The work of art，of all the works of man，is the most perfectly autonomous unity，a self-sufficient totality，even more so than the State.For the State，though it may be autonomous under specific circumstances，does not envelop all its elements so completely that each may not lead a separate life with its own interests：only one part of our personality is interwoven with the State，while the other parts may revolve around other centers.Art，however，does not grant significance to any of the elements within the context in which they are set；the individual work of art destroys the manifold meanings of words and of tones，of colours and of forms in order to preserve in our consciousness only such aspects as are relevant to the work.This autonomy of the work of art，however，signifies that it expresses a subjective spiritual unity.The work of art requires only one single person，but it requires him totally，right down to his innermost core.It rewards the person by its form becoming that person's purest reflection and expression.The complete rejection of the division of labour is both cause and symptom of the connection between the autonomous totality of the work and the unity of the spirit.Conversely，where the division of labor prevails，the achievement becomes incommensurable with the performer；the person can no longer find himself expressed in his work；its form becomes dissimilar to the subjective mind and appears only as a wholly specialized part of our being that is indifferent to the total unity of man.Where the work is based on a marked division of labour and achieved with an awareness of this division it thrusts itself inherently towards the category of objectivity.It becomes more and more plausible for the worker to consider his work and its effect as purely objective and anonymous，because it no longer touches the roots of his whole life-system.

The more completely an entity composed of subjective components absorbs the parts，and the more the character of each part serves only as a part of the whole，then the more objective is that whole and the more is its life independent of the subjects who produced it.Generally speaking，a broadening of consumption corresponds to the specialization of production.Even the most intellectually and occupationally specialized people today read the newspaper and thereby indulge in a more extensive mental consumption than was possible a hundred years ago，for even the most versatile and widely interested person.The broadening of consumption，however，is dependent upon the growth of objective culture，since the more objective and impersonal an object is the better it is suited to more people.Such consumable material，in order to be acceptable and enjoyable to a very large number of individuals，cannot be designed for subjective differentiation of taste，while on the other hand only the most extreme differentiation of production is able to produce the objects cheaply and abundantly enough in order to satisfy the demand for them.The pattern of consumption is thus a bridge between the objectivity of culture and the division of labour.

Finally，the process that is characterized as the separation of the worker from the means of production and which is itself also a kind of division of labor clearly operates in the same direction.In that it is the function of the capitalist to acquire，organize and allocate the means of production，these means acquire a very different objectivity for the worker than for those who work with their own material and their own tools.This capitalistic differentiation fundamentally separates the subjective and the objective conditions of work，a separation for which there was no psychological reason as long as both were united in the same hands.In so far as work itself and its direct object belongs to different persons，the objective character of these objects must loom extremely large in the worker's consciousness，all the more so as labour and its materials themselves form a unity and their usual proximity makes the present polarity all the more noticeable.This process is continued and reflected in the fact that，in addition to the means of production，work itself is separated from the worker.This is the significance of the phenomenon indicated in the statement that labor power has become a commodity.Where the worker works with his own materials，his labour remains within the sphere of his own personality，and only by selling the finished products is it separated from him.Where there is no possibility for utilizing his labour in this way，the worker places his labor at the disposal of another person for a market price and thus separates himself from his labour from the moment it leaves its source.The fact that labour now shares the same character，mode of valuation and fate with all other commodities signifies that work has become something objectively separate from the worker，something that he not only no longer is ，but also no longer has. For as soon as his potential labour power is transposed into actual work，only its money equivalent belongs to him whereas the work itself belongs to someone else or，more accurately，to an objective organization of labour.The process by which labour becomes a commodity is thus only one side of the far-reaching process of differentiation by which specific contents of the personality are detached in order for them to confront the personality as objects with an independent character and dynamics.

Finally，the result of this fate of the means of production and labour power is also exhibited in its product.The fact that the product of labour in the capitalist era is an object with a decidedly autonomous character，with its own laws of motion and a character alien to the producing subject，is most forcefully illustrated where the worker is compelled to buy his own product if he wishes to have it.This general pattern of development is valid far beyond the situation of the wage-labourer.The immense division of labour in science，for instance，results in a situation in which only very few scholars are able to procure for themselves the prerequisites for their work；innumerable facts and methods have simply to be accepted from outside as objective materials，as the intellectual property of others that is to be used for further research.I recall that in the sphere of technology even at the beginning of the nineteenth century，when the most spectacular inventions in textile and iron industries followed one upon the other，the inventors not only had to produce the new machines by their own hands and without the help of other machines，but most of the time they had to devise and produce the necessary tools for doing so.In a broader sense，and in any case in the sense implied here，the present situation in science can be designated as a separation of the worker from his means of production.For in the actual process of scientific investigation the objective material of the producer is certainly separated from the subjective process of his work.The less differentiated the scientific process was，the more the scholar had to work out the presuppositions and materials for his work himself and the less apparent was the contrast between his subjective achievement and awhole world of objectively given scientific facts.This contrast also extends to the product of his work：even the result itself，no matter how much it is the fruit of subjective effort，becomes elevated to the category of an objective fact independent of the producer，the more the work of others is already contained and combined in the final result.Therefore we can also observe that，in the disciplines with the most limited division of labour such as philosophy（and particularly metaphys cs），on the one hand the objective material used plays only a secondary role，and on the other the product is the least detached from its subjective origin.Rather it appears entirely as the achievement of a single person.

The division of labour，understood in its widest sense to include the division of production，the differentiation of work processes and specialization，separates the working person from the work produced and endows the product with objective independence.Something similar happens in the relationship between production based on the division of labour and the consumer.The aim here is to derive the psychological consequences from well known concrete facts.Custom work，which predominated among medieval craftsmen and which rapidly declined only during the last century，gave the consumer a personal relationship to the commodity.Since it was produced specifically for him，and represented，as it were，a mutual relationship between him and the producer，it belonged，in a similar way as it belonged to the producer，also to him.Just as the radical opposition between subject and object has been reconciled in theory by making the object part of the subject's perception，so the same opposition between subject and object does not evolve in practice as long as the object is produced by a single person or for a single person.Since the division of labor destroys custom production-if only because the consumer can contact a producer but not a dozen different workers-the subjective aura of the product also disappears in relation to the consumer because the commodity is now produced independently of him.It becomes an objective given entity which the consumer approaches externally and whose specific existence and quality is autonomous of him.The difference，for instance，between a modem highly specialized dress store and the work of a tailor who worked at the customer，s house sharply emphasizes the growing objectivity of the economic cosmos and its impersonal independence in relation to the individual consumer with whom it was originally closely identified.It has been emphasized that，with the splitting up of work into increasingly specialized partial operations，exchange relations become increasingly complicated and mediated with the result that the economy necessarily establishes more and more relationships and obligations that are not directly reciprocal. It is obvious how much this objectifies the whole character of transactions and how subjectivity is destroyed and transposed into cool reserve and anonymous objectivity once so many intermediate stages are introduced between the producer and the customer that they lose sight of each other.

This autonomy of production with reference to the consumer is connected with another very common aspect of the division of labour，the significance of which is not yet appreciated.The simple notion generally prevails，derived from earlier forms of production，that the lower strata of society work for the upper strata；that the plants live from the soil，the animals from the plants and man from animals.It is assumed that this is repeated-with or without moral justification-in the structure of society.The more superior the position of individuals，both socially and intellectually，the more their existence is based on the work of those lower down the scale，in exchange not for their work but for money.This notion，however，is totally wrong nowadays since the needs of the subordinate masses are satisfied by large enterprises which have engaged countless scientific，technical and managerial energies of the upper strata in their service.The eminent chemist who reflects in his laboratory upon the description of dyed colours is working for the peasant woman who buys the most colourful scarf at the haberdasher；if the wholesale merchant，through global speculations，imports American grain to Germany，then he is the servant of the poorest proletarian；a cotton mill that employs people of the highest intelligence is dependent on customers in the lowest social strata.There are innumerable examples today of this feed-back of services，whereby the lower classes purchase the labor products of the higher classes；they affect our whole culture.This phenomenon is possible only through the objectification of production which has set it apart from the producing and the consuming individual and has thus placed production above social and other differences.This commissioning of the services of the highest cultural producers by the lowest consumers means that there is no relationship between them，but rather that an object has been thrust between them.On the one side of this object one group works on it while others on the other side consume it；the object separates them both and at the same time establishes a connection between them.The basic reason for this is obviously the division of labour：the techniques of production are so specialized that the handling of its different parts is transferred not only to more but also to increasingly more diverse people until the point is reached at which one part of the work on the humblest necessities is performed by individuals of the highest rank.Conversely，the subdivision of work by machine technology brings about a situation in which the roughest hands collaborate in the production of the most sophisticated products（one need mention here only the present printing press in contrast to the production of books before the invention of printing）.This inversion of the typical relationship between the upper and lower strata of society indicates most clearly that the division of labour causes the upper strata to work for the lower strata.The only form，however，in which this may occur is through the complete objectification of the productive process itself in relation to both groups.This inversion is nothing other than a final consequence of the relationship that exists between the division of labour and objectification of culture.

So far the division of labour has been interpreted as a specialization of personal activities.Yet the specialization of objects themselves contributes no less to the process of their alienation from human subjects，which appears as an independence of the object，as the individual's inability to assimilate it and subject the object to his or her own rhythm.In the first place，this is true of the means of production.The more differentiated these means are，the more they are composed of a multitude of specialized parts，the less is the worker able to express his personality through them，and the less visible is his personal contribution to the product.The tools that the artist uses are relatively undifferentiated and thus afford the personality the widest scope for releasing all its capacities.They do not confront the artist as does the industrial machine，whose specialized complexity itself possesses a form of personal solidity and cohesiveness so that the worker is unable to imbue it with his personality as he can with other less elaborate tools.The tools of the sculptor have not changed for thousands of years in their total lack of specialization.Wherever the artistic tools have changed decisively，as with the piano，its character too has become quite objective.It has become much too autonomous and has set a more rigid limit to the expression of subjectivity than has，for instance，the violin，which is technically much less differentiated.The automatic character of modem machinery is the result of a highly advanced breakdown and specialization of materials and energies，akin to the character of a highly developed state administration which can evolve only on the basis of an elaborate division of labour among its functionaries.In that the machine becomes a totality and carries out a growing proportion of the work itself，it confronts the worker as an autonomous power，just as he too is no longer an individual personality but merely someone who carries out an objectively prescribed task.One has only to compare the worker in a shoe factory with the craft shoemaker in order to see to what extent the specialization of tools paralyses the effectiveness of personal qualities，whether superior or inferior，and allows both object and subject to develop as basically independent entities.Whereas the undifferentiated tool is merely a prolongation of the arm，the specialized tool is elevated to the pure category of an object.This process also operates in a very typical and obvious manner with reference to military equipment；its pinnacle is the most specialized and most perfect piece of machinery-the warship.With the warship，the process of objectification has advanced to such a degree that in a modem naval war almost the only decisive factor is the mere relative number of ships of equal quality！

The process of objectification of culture that，based on specialization，brings about a growing estrangement between the subject and its products ultimately invades even the more intimate aspects of our daily life.During the first decades of the nineteenth century，furniture and the objects that surrounded us for use and pleasure were of relative simplicity and durability and were in accord with the needs of the lower as well as of the upper strata.This resulted in people's attachment as they grew up to the objects of their surroundings，an attachment that already appears to the younger generation today as an eccentricity on the part of their grandparents.The differentiation of objects has broken down this situation in three different respects，with the same result in each case.First，the sheer quantity of very specifically formed objects makes a close and，as it were，personal relationship to each of them more difficult：a few and simple utensils are more easily assimilated by the individual，while an abundance of different kinds almost form an antagonistic object to the individual self.This is expressed both in the housewife's complaint that the care of the household becomes a ceremonial fetishism and in the occasional hatred on the part of persons of a more serious disposition of the innumerable articles with which we encumber our lives.The former case is very typical of our culture because the caring and sustaining activity of the housewife was formerly more extensive and strenuous than it is today.But a sense of dependence upon the objects never developed because the work was more closely united with the personality.A woman could express her individuality more easily with the few undifferentiated objects than she could when confronted with the independence of a host of specialized objects.We experience their independence as an antagonistic force only when we are at their service.Just as freedom is not something negative but rather is the positive extension of the self into the objects that yield to it，so，conversely，our freedom is crippled if we deal with objects that our ego cannot assimilate.The sense of being oppressed by the externalities of modem life is not only the consequence but also the cause of the fact that they confront us as autonomous objects.What is distressing is that we are basically indifferent to those numerous objects that swarm around us，and this is for reasons specific to a money economy：their impersonal origin and easy replaceability.The fact that large industrial concerns are the breeding ground for socialist ideas is due not only to the social conditions of their workers，but also to the objective quality of their products.Modem man is so surrounded by nothing but impersonal objects that he becomes more and more conditioned into accepting the idea of an antiindividualistic social order-though，of course，he may also oppose it.Cultural objects increasingly evolve into an interconnected enclosed world that has increasingly fewer points at which the subjective soul can interpose its will and feelings.And this trend is supported by a certain autonomous mobility on the part of the objects.It has been pointed out that the merchant，the craftsman and the scholar are today much less mobile than they were at the time of the Reformation.Both material and intellectual objects today move independently，without personal representatives or transport.Objects and people have become separated from one another.Thought，work effort and skill，through their growing embodiment in objective forms，books and commodities，are able to move independently；recent progress in the means of transportation is only the realization or expression of this.By their independent，impersonal mobility，objects complete the final stage of their separation from people.The slot machine is the ultimate example of the mechanical character of the modem economy，since by means of the vending machine the human relationship is completely eliminated even in the retail trade where，for so long，the exchange of commodities was carried out between one person and another.The money equivalent is now exchanged against the commodity by a mechanical device.At another level，the same principle is also at work in the five cents store and in similar stores where the psycho-economic process runs not from the commodity to the price，but from the price to the commodity.The a priori equivalence of prices for all commodities will eliminate the numerous deliberations and examinations of the buyer，the numerous efforts and elucidations of the seller，so that the economic transaction will very quickly and indifferently pass through its personal channels.

This concurrent differentiation has the same effect as consecutive differentiation.Changes in fashion disrupt that inner process of acquisition and assimilation between subject and object which usually does not tolerate a discrepancy between the two.Fashion is one of those social forms which combines，to a particular degree，the attraction of differentiation and change with that of similarity and conformity.Every fashion is essentially the fashion of a social class；that is，it always indicates a social stratum which uses similarity of appearance to assert both its own inner unity and its outward differentiation from other social strata.As soon as the lower strata attempt to imitate the upper strata and adopt their fashion，the latter create a new one.Wherever fashions have existed they have sought to express social differences.Yet the social changes of the last hundred years have accelerated the pace of changes in fashion，on the one hand through the weakening of class barriers and frequent upward social mobility of individuals and sometimes even of whole groups to a higher stratum，and on the other through the predominance of the third estate.The first factor makes very frequent changes of fashion necessary on the part of leading strata because imitation by the lower strata rapidly robs fashions of their meaning and attraction.The second factor comes into operation because the middle class and the urban population are，in contrast to the conservatism of the highest strata and the peasantry，the groups in which there is great variability.Insecure classes and individuals，pressing for change，find in fashion，in the changing and contrasting forms of life，a pace that mirrors their own psychological movements.If contemporary fashions are much less extravagant and expensive and of much shorter duration than those of earlier centuries，then this is due partly to the fact that it must be made much easier for the lower strata to emulate these fashions and partly because fashion now originates in the wealthy middle class.Consequently，the spreading of fashion，both in breadth as well as speed，appears to be an independent movement，an objective and autonomous force which follows its own course independently of the individual.As long as fashions，and we are talking here not only of dress fashions，lasted longer and held relatively restricted social circles together，it was possible for a personal relationship to exist，as it were，between the individual and the particular content of the fashion.But the speed of change，that is its consecutive differentiation，and the growing extension of fashion dissolve this connection.What has happened to some other social shibboleths in recent times has also happened to fashion：it becomes less dependent upon the individual and the individual becomes less dependent upon fashion.Both develop like separate evolutionary worlds.

The concurrent and consecutive differentiation of omnipresent aspects of culture helps to establish their independent objectivity.I wish now to elaborate on one of the factors that brings about this development.I refer to the multitude of styles that confronts us when we view the objects that surround us，from the construction of buildings to the format of books，from sculptures to gardens and furniture with their juxtaposition of Renaissance and Japanese styles，Baroque and Empire，the style of the Pre-Raphaelites and realistic functionalism.This is the result of the enlargement of our historical knowledge，which in turn is associated with modem man's penchant for change mentioned earlier.All historical understanding requires a flexibility of the mind，a capacity to empathize with and reconstruct casts of mind altogether different from one's own.For all history，however much it may deal with the visible，has meaning and becomes intelligible only as the history of the basic interests，emotions and strivings that lie at its roots.Even historical materialism is nothing but a psychological hypothesis.In order to grasp the content of history，a plasticity and pliability of the perceiving mind，a sublimated liking for change is necessary.The historicizing preference of our century，its unique ability to reproduce and bring back to life the most remote entities，both in time as well as in space，is only the internal aspect of the general development of its adaptability and its wide-ranging mobility.This is the root of the bewildering plurality of styles that are absorbed，presented and appreciated by our culture.If every style is like a language unto itself，with specific sounds，inflexions and syntax for expressing life，then as long as we know only a single style that forms our environment we are not aware of style as an autonomous factor with an independent life.No one speaking his mother tongue naively senses the objective law-like regularities that he has to consult，like something outside of his own subjectivity，in order to borrow from them resources for expressing his feelings-resources that obey independent norms.Rather，what one wants to express and what one expresses are，in this case，one and the same，and we experience not only our mother tongue but language as such as an independent entity only if we come to know foreign languages.In the same way，people who know only one uniform style which permeates their whole life will perceive this style as being identical with its contents. Since everything they create or contemplate is naturally expressed in this style，there are no psychological grounds for distinguishing it from the material of the formative and contemplative process or for contrasting the style as a form independent of the self.Only where a variety of given styles exists will one detach itself from its content so that its independence and specific significance gives us the freedom to choose between the one or the other.Through the differentiation of styles each individual style，and thus style in general，becomes something objective whose validity is independent of human subjects and their interests，activities，approval or disapproval.The fact that the entire visible environment of our cultural life has disintegrated into a plurality of styles dissolves that original relationship to style where subject and object are not yet separated.Instead，we are confronted with a world of expressive possibilities each developed according to their own norms，with a host of forms within which to express life as a whole.Thus these forms on the one side，and our subjectivity on the other，are like two parties between whom a purely fortuitous relationship of contacts，harmonies and disharmonies prevails.

Broadly speaking，this is the orbit in which the major process of objectification of modem culture is carried out through the division of labour and specialization in both its personal and objective sense.The total picture is composed of all these phenomena，in which the cultural content becomes an increasingly conscious objective mind in relation not only to recipients but also to producers.To the extent to which this objectification increases，the strange phenomenon from which we started our investigation becomes more comprehensible，namely that the cultural growth of the individual can lag considerably behind the cultural growth of tangible as well as functional and intellectual objects.

The Occasional Greater Weight Of Subjective Culture

The fact that the opposite occasionally occurs demonstrates that both forms of the mind have become mutually independent.The following phenomenon illustrates this in a somewhat disguised and modified manner.The peasant economy in north Germany seems to be able to survive only if one kind of hereditary succession to an undivided estate prevails，whereby one of the heirs succeeds to the estate and the other heirs are compensated by an amount that is smaller than the corresponding market value.If the property were to be appraised according to its market value-which is at present much higher than its value based on returns-then it would be burdened with mortgages to such an extent that only a much reduced and impoverished enterprise would be possible.Yet the modem individualistic sense of justice requires such a mechanical equality of rights in terms of money for all heirs and does not give to one single offspring any benefit even though this is the pre-condition for an objectively viable enterprise.This procedure has undoubtedly often improved the cultural standards of particular individuals at the price of leaving behind the objective culture.Such a discrepancy is distinctly discernible in actual social institutions whose evolution takes place at a more sluggish and conservative pace than does that of individuals.This is the case，for instance，where the relations of production，after having existed for a definite period，are outstripped by the forces of production which they themselves have developed，so that these forces are no longer permitted an adequate expression and utilization.These productive forces are to a large extent personal in nature：people's abilities and justified ambitions can no longer find a place in the objective forms of the enterprise.The necessary transformation occurs only when the pressing factors have become overwhelming.Up to that point，the objective organization of production lags behind the growth of individual economic energies.Many reasons for the women's movement may be explained by this process.The advances of modem industrial technology have transferred an extraordinarily large number of economic household activities previously incumbent upon women to outside the home，where they can be produced more cheaply and more expediently.Consequently，many middle-class women have thus lost the core of their activity without having it replaced by other activities and goals.The frequent‘dissatisfaction’of modem women，the waste of their energies，which may bring about all kinds of disturbances and destruction；their partly sound，partly abnormal search to prove their worth outside the home，is all the result of the fact that technology with its objectivity has progressed more independently and more quickly than have the possibilities for human development.The widespread unsatisfactory character of modem marriages may he traced back to similar circumstances.The fixed forms and habits of married life that are imposed upon individuals run counter to the personal development of the partners，particularly to that of the wife，who may have completely outgrown them.Individuals are now said to be inclined towards a freedom，a mutual understanding，an equality of rights and training，for which traditional married life does not provide any scope.One might say that the objective spirit of marriage lags behind its subjective spiritual development.The same is true of jurisprudence：developed logically on the basis of certain fundamental facts，laid down in a code of definite laws and represented by a particular stratum，it acquires a rigidity towards the changing conditions and needs of life which is passed on like an eternal illness，in which reason becomes nonsense and a blessing becomes a curse.As soon as the religious impulses have crystallized around a wealth of specific dogmas and these are represented，through the division of labour，by a corporate entity that is reserved for the faithful，religion meets the same fate.If one bears in mind this relatively independent life with which objective cultural forms，the result of elementary historical dynamics，confront human subjects，then the question of progress in history loses much of its perplexity.If every interpretation may be proved and disproved with equal plausibility，the fault may often lie with the fact that they do not centre around the same object.For instance，one may assert with equal justification the progress or the unchangeability of the moral order，depending upon whether one focuses upon the stabilized principles，the organization and the imperatives that have been absorbed in the community's consciousness，or upon the relationship of the individual person to these objective ideals，to the adequacy or inadequacy of the moral behavior of individuals.Progress and stagnation may exist side by side，not only in different spheres of historical life but in one and the same sphere，depending upon whether the evolution of individuals or institutions is focused upon；for the institutions，although they have grown out of contributions of individuals，have acquired an independent objective spiritual life of their own.

After establishing the possibility that the evolution of the objective mind may outpace the subjective mind but that the reverse of this may also occur，I wish to return now to the significance of the division of labor for the realization of the former case.Stated briefly，the twofold possibility arises in the following manner.The fact that the objectified mind，incorporated in all kinds of production，is superior to the single individual is due to the complexities of the mode of production which presupposes an extremely large number of historical and material factors，forerunners and collaborators.As a result，the product may contain energies，qualities and additional potentialities that lie quite outside the grasp of the individual producer.This is particularly common in specifically modem technology as a result of the division of labour.As long as the product was manufactured by a single producer or by a relatively unspecialized form of co-operation，the content of mind and power objectified in the product could not greatly exceed those of the individuals involved.Only a sophisticated division of labour imbues the individual product with energies derived from a very large number of individuals，so that the product，viewed as a unity and compared with single individuals，is bound to be superior in many different respects.This accumulation of quality and excellence in the object that formstheir synthesis is unlimited，whereas the growth of individuals in any period of time and by their very nature has quite definite natural limits.Yet although the fact that the objective product absorbs many qualities of a number of persons and provides supreme possibilities for development，it none the less forfeits that perfection which can only be the result of the synthesis of energies of a single human subject.The State，especially the modem State，is the clearest illustration of this.When rationalism denounces as logically contradictory the situation in which the monarch，who is after all only a single individual，rules over an extremely large number of other people，this criticism overlooks the fact that the people，to the extent that they constitute this monarchic State，are not‘human beings’in the same sense as the monarch.They participate in the State only with a small fraction of their existence and their energies；the remainder extends to other groups and the whole of their personality is in no way incorporated in any one of them.But the monarch does identify himself with the State and engages himself in it more than any of his subjects.As long as the regime is an absolute one，in the sense that the ruler has unlimited power of disposal over his subjects，this discrepancy will exist.In contrast，the modem constitutional State delineates precisely the area in which people are committed to the State；the State differentiates people in order to constitute itself by certain selected elements.The greater this differentiation is，the more distinctly does the State as an objective institution-whose form contradicts personal individuality-differ from the individual.The State thus becomes a synthesis of the differentiated elements of its subjects，an entity that obviously stands both below and above the individual person.The same is true of all institutions of the objective mind that are based on the combination of differentiated individual efforts.For however much they may surpass the individual intellect in objective intellectual content and evolutionary potential，we none the less conceive of them in the same way as we do a mere inanimate and soulless mechanism to the extent that differentiation and the number of co-operating factors increase.The difference between mind and soul comes to the fore here.Mind is the objective content of what the soul becomes aware of as a living function.The soul is，as it were，the form that the mind，that is the logical-conceptual content of thought，assumes for our subjectivity，as our subjectivity.The mind in this sense，therefore，is not tied to the formation of a unity without which no soul exists.It is as if the mental contents are somehow dispersed in their existence and only the soul assembles them as a unity，almost as inorganic matter is incorporated into an organism and the unity of its life.Herein lies the greatness as well as the limitation of the soul in relation to the individual contents of consciousness when looked at in terms of their independent validity and objective significance.Plato depicted the realm of ideas in glowing perfection and complete self-contentedness.These ideas are nothing other than the objective contents of thought detached from all the arbitrariness of their actual representation，and so the soul of man with its pale，vague and chimerical reflection of things of true significance appeared to him imperfect，conditioned and obscure.Yet for us such graphic clarity and logical determination of form are not the only evaluative standards for ideals and realities.For us personal unity，towards which the consciousness of the objective intellectual meaning of things also leads，is of supreme value.Only here does that friction that is life and strength develop；only here do those mysterious strands of warmth of feeling develop that have no place and no sympathy in the clear perfection of purely objectively determined ideas.The same is true of the mind which，as the objectification of our intelligence，is juxtaposed to our soul as an object.Certainly，distance between both increases to the extent that the object is the result of the co-operative division of labour of a growing number of people；for it becomes increasingly impossible to incorporate the total personality，which is part of the value，the life-blood and the distinctiveness of the soul，into the product.Because of modem differentiation，and closely connected with this the mechanical nature of our cultural products，the objective mind lacks this spirituality.This may be the ultimate reason for the present-day animosity of highly individualistic and sensitive people to the‘progress of culture’.Certainly，the more objective culture，determined by the development of the division of labour，is a part or consequence of the general phenomenon，the more it is true that，in our present epoch，important things are carried out not by individuals but by the masses.The division of labour actually produces a situation in which even the individual object is a product of the mass.The breakdown of individuals into their particular energies which is determined by our organization of the labour process，and the reintegration of what has been differentiated into an objective cultural product，results in the object being deprived of a soul，the more people participate in its manufacture.The splendour and greatness of modem culture possesses some analogy with Plato's radiant realm of ideas in which the objective spirit of things exists in unblemished perfection，but yet lacks the values of the particular personality that cannot be dissolved into objectivities.This is a deficiency that persists despite any amount of awareness of the fragmentary，irrational and ephemeral character of these values.Indeed，personal spirituality possesses a value as mere form that asserts itself despite all the mediocrity and counteridealism of its content.It retains its particular significance for our existence and，in contrast to all its objective aspects，even for those instances from which we commenced，where individual subjective culture declines while objective culture progresses.

The relationship between objectified mind and its evolution to the subjective mind is of extreme importance to every cultural community and especially with reference to its style of life.For if the importance of style lies in its ability to express any number and variety of contents in related forms，then the relationship between objective and subjective mind with reference to quantity，size and pace of development can be the same，even for quite different contents of the cultural mind.The general way of living，the framework that the social culture offers to individual impulses，is circumscribed by the following questions：is the inner life of the individual close to or estranged from the objective cultural evolution of his age？Does the individual experience this evolution，of which he has only a marginal comprehension，as superior，or does he consider his personal value to be higher than that of all reified mind？Are the objective，historically given elements an autonomous power within his own mental life，so that they and the specific core of his personality develop independently of each other？Is the soul，so to speak，master in its own house，or is there at least a harmony with regard to standards，meaning and rhythm established between its innermost life and what it has to absorb into that life as impersonal contents？These abstract formulations indicate the outline of innumerable concrete daily and lifelong interests and moods，and in so doing also denote the extent to which the relationships between objective and subjective culture determine the style of life.

The Relation Of Money To The Agents Of These Opposing Tendencies

If the present form of this relationship is sustained by the division of labour，then it is also an offshoot of the money economy；first，because the splitting up of the productive process into a large number of partial operations requires an organization that functions with absolute precision and reliability which，since the end of slave labour，has only been possible if workers are paid in money.Any other mediated relationship between employer and worker would entail incalculable elements，partly because payment in kind cannot be so easily provided and determined and partly because only the pure money relationship possesses the exclusively objective，automatic character that is the prerequisite for highly specialized and complex organizations；second，because the essential reason for the emergence of money becomes more and more pressing as production becomes more specialized.For it is the essence of economic transactions that one person gives up what another person desires，provided this other person acts in the same manner.The moral rule that one should do unto others as one would have done unto oneself finds the clearest example of its formal realization in the economy.If，for instance，a producer finds a purchaser for the object A which he wishes to exchange，then it is often the case that object B，which the purchaser wishes to offer in return，is not what the producer desires.That such a difference in the demand of two persons does not always coincide with the difference in the products they have to offer requires，as is well known，the intervention of a means of exchange.Thus，if the owners of A and B are unable to agree on a direct exchange，one can exchange A for money with which he can obtain the C that he desires，and the owner of B can procure the money to buy A by means of a similar transaction with a third party.Since money is required because of the diversity of products，or of demand for products，its role becomes obviously greater and more indispensable the greater the variety of objects that are included in the transaction.Or，conversely，a considerable specification of operations can evolve only if direct exchange is no longer necessary.The chance that the buyer of a product has to offer an object that is equally desired by the producer declines as the specialization of products and of human wants increases.So far there is nothing new about the way in which modem differentiation is connected with the predominance of money.Rather，the interrelationship between both cultural values is to be found at their very roots；and the fact that the interactions between the conditions of specialization and the money economy form a historical entity is only the gradual intensification of a synthesis that is inherent to both of them.

By means of this connection，the style of life too，in so far as it is dependent on the relationship between objective and subjective culture，is tied up with money transactions.The nature of this relationship is clearly revealed by the fact that money transactions represent the preponderance of objective over subjective mind，as well as the reverse，independent enhancement and autonomous development of the subjective mind.The superior power of the culture of objects over the culture of individuals is the result of the unity and autonomous self-sufficiency that the objective culture has accomplished in modem times.Production，with its technology and its achievements，seems to be a cosmos with definite and，as it were，logical determinations and developments which confront the individual in the same way as fate confronts the instability and irregularity of our will.This formal autonomy，this inner compulsion，which unifies cultural contents into a mirror-image of the natural context，can be realized only through money.On the one hand，money functions as the system of articulations in this organism，enabling its elements to be shifted，establishing a relationship of mutual dependence of the elements，and transmitting all impulses through the system.On the other hand，money can be compared to the bloodstream whose continuous circulation permeates all the intricacies of the body's organs and unifies their functions by feeding them all to an equal extent.Thus money，as an intermediate link between man and thing，enables man to have，as it were，an abstract existence，a freedom from direct concern with things and from a direct relationship to them，without which our inner nature would not have the same chances of development.If modem man can，under favorable circumstances，secure an island of subjectivity，a secret，closed-off sphere of privacy-not in the social but in a deeper metaphysical sense-for his most personal existence，which to some extent compensates for the religious style of life of former times，then this is due to the fact that money relieves us to an ever-increasing extent of direct contact with things，while at the same time making it infinitely easier for us to dominate them and select from them what we require.

These counter-tendencies，once started，may press forward to an ideal of completely pure separation in which all the material contents of life become increasingly objective and impersonal，so that the remainder that cannot he reified becomes all the more personal，all the more the indisputable property of the self.A typical individual instance of this trend is the typewriter.Writing，an external concrete activity but one that still has a typically individual form，can now abandon this form in favour of mechanical uniformity.On the other hand，this has a dual advantage：first，the written page now conveys only its pure content without any support or disturbance from its written form，and second，it avoids revealing the most personal element which is so often true of handwriting，in superficial and unimportant as well as in the most intimate communications.No matter how socialistic all such mechanical contrivances may be，the remaining private property of the intellectual self becomes all the more jealously guarded.Clearly the expulsion of subjective spirituality from everything external is as hostile to the aesthetic ideal of life as it may be favorable to pure introspectiveness.Such a combination may explain why it is that aesthetically minded people despair of the world today as well as why a slight tension develops in subterranean forms-quite unlike those in the age of Savonarola-between these people and those who are concerned only with inner salvation.In so far as money is the symbol as well as the cause of making everything indifferent and of the extemalization of everything that lends itself to such a process，it also becomes the gatekeeper of the most intimate sphere，which can then develop within its own limits.

Whether this will lead to personal refinement，distinctiveness and introspection or whether，on the contrary，the subjugated objects，in view of the ease with which they may he acquired，will gain control over men，depends no longer upon money but upon man himself.Here again the money economy reveals its formal affinity to a socialist society.For what is expected of socialism-release from the individual struggle for survival，secure access to life's necessities and access to the higher economic values-would probably exercise the same differentiating effect，such that a certain sector of society might rise to unprecedented heights of spirituality far removed from earthly concerns，while another sector might plunge into a correspondingly unprecedented practical materialism.

Money，by and large，is most influential in those parts of our life whose style is determined by the preponderance of objective over subjective culture.That it may also support its converse places the nature and extent of its historical power in the clearest light.In some respects，money may be compared to language，which also lends itself to the most divergent directions of thought and feeling.Money belongs to those forces whose peculiarity lies in a lack of peculiarity，but which，none the less，may colour life very differently because their mere formal，functional and quantitative nature is confronted with qualitatively determined contents and directions of life，and induces them to generate qualitatively new formations.The significance of money for the style of life is not negated but enhanced，not refuted but demonstrated by the fact that it favors both possible relations between the objective and the subjective mind.

Ⅲ

Alterations In The Distance Between The Self And Objects As The Manifestation Of Varying Styles Of Life

We rarely realize to what extent our notions of spiritual processes possess a merely symbolic importance.The basic needs of life have forced us to consider the tangible external world as the first object of our attention.The concepts by which we conceive of an existence perceived outside the observer are therefore valid primarily for its contents and conditions；it is the class of objects in general，and every perception that is to become an object for us has to adjust to its forms.This demand refers to the mind itself which becomes the object of its own observation.First of all，however，the observation of the‘You’suggests itself as certainly being the most imperative prerequisite for communal life and individual self-assertion.But since we are never able to directly observe the other person's soul，and since all our perceptions are never anything more than our sense impressions，all psychological knowledge is nothing but an interpretation of the processes of consciousness that we perceive in our own mind.

We transfer such an interpretation to the other person when confronted by physical impressions of them，even though this transference，focused as it is exclusively on its goal，is unaware of its point of origin.When the mind becomes an object of its own understanding，then this is possible only through images of spatial processes.When we speak of impressions and their relationships，of their elevation into consciousness and their sinking below the threshold of consciousness，of inner propensities and inhibitions，of mood with its elations and depressions，each of these expressions，and countless more，is clearly taken from observations of the external world.We may be quite sure that the laws that govern the life of our mind are of a totally different nature to those that govern an external mechanism，primarily because our mind lacks the clear circumscription and secure recognizability of its individual elements.Yet we unfailingly apprehend these‘conceptions’as a kind of essence that enters into the mechanical relationships of connecting and separating，or rising and falling.We are thus convinced，and experience confirms it，that this interpretation of the mind according to visible processes represents the inner reality of the mind，just as，for the astronomer，the movement of the stars is so successfully represented by his written computations that their outcome represents the picture that is verified by the outcome of the real forces.

This relationship is also valid in the opposite direction，namely in the interpretation of external events according to the contents of our inner life.I do not mean to say that the former is nothing but a world of notions，but that，once a relatively external phenomenon confronts a relatively internal one on some kind of epistemological basis，the specific internal phenomena serve to form the external phenomena into a comprehensible image.Thus it is that the object as a whole is realized by the sum of its qualities that it presents to us only by our lending it the unified form of our ego.In so doing，we basically experience how a wealth of determinations and fates may be attached to a fixed entity.The same may be true，as has often been suggested，of energy and the causality of external objects：we project the feelings of physic-psychic tension，impulses，willful action，on to the objects，and if we place these interpretative categories behind their immediate perceptibility，then we orientate ourselves towards them according to the emotional experiences of our inner nature.Perhaps this is how one comes across the opposite interrelationship as soon as one hits the substantiality of a deeper stratum below that primary symbolization of the inner life.If we characterize a mental experience as an association of conceptions，then this knowledge is achieved according to spatial categories.Yet perhaps this category of association itself gains its meaning and significance in a merely internal and in no way visible process.What we characterize as association in the external world，that is as entities somehow unified and existing in each other，actually always remain adjacent to each other，and in referring to this association we mean something that we can project only from within ourselves into the object，something that is incomparable to everything external，namely the symbol for what we are unable to state and what cannot immediately be expressed.Thus there exists a relativism，an unending process between internal and external life：the one as the symbol of the other，making it conceivable and representable，being neither the first nor the second，but realizing the unity of their-that is，our being by their mutual dependency.

The mental and physical aspects of existence are all the more open to this mutual symbolizing interpretation the simpler they are.In the simple processes of association，fusion and reproduction of notions we can adhere to the idea of a general lawfulness of form that calls for an analogous response from both the inner and the outer world and thus makes the one the suitable representative of the other.Characterization in terms of analogies of spatial vividness becomes more difficult for more complicated and distinctive mental forms.It becomes more dependent upon its applicability to a large number of instances，in order not to appear arbitrary and playful and in order to possess a secure，though only symbolic，relationship to psychological reality.Starting out from itself，this psychological reality will find the comprehension of things，the interpretation of their own meaning and significance，all the more difficult and uncertain the more specialized or complex arc the processes on both sides.For the mysterious identity of form in internal and external phenomena，which provides a bridge from the one to the other，becomes less probable and more difficult to conceive.This is intended as an introduction to considerations that should encompass a series of various internal cultural phenomena and thereby make it clear that they all belong to one and the same style of life，because they all allow for an interpretation according to one and the same illustrative analogy.

One of the most frequent images that is used to illustrate the organization of life's elements is their arrangement in a circle with the individual at its centre.There is a type of relationship between this self and objects，people，ideas and interests that we can characterize only as distance between the two.Whatever our object may be，it can，with its content remaining unchanged，move closer to the centre or to the periphery of our sphere of interests and concerns.But this does not bring about a change in our inner relationship to this object；on the contrary，we can characterize certain relationships between the self and its contents only by the illustrative symbol of a definite or changing distance between the two.From the very outset，a symbolic expression for a verbally inexpressible state of affairs is created when we divide our inner existence into a central self and a surrounding array of contents.In view of the tremendous differences in sensory-external impressions of things according to their distance from our sensory organs-differences not only in distinctness，but also in the quality and whole character of the images received-an extension of this symbolization suggests itself whereby the diversity of the innermost relationship to objects is interpreted as a diversity in our distance from them.

From among the phenomena that，from this standpoint，form a unified series，I first wish to emphasize that of art.The inner significance of artistic styles can be interpreted as a result of the differences in distance that they produce between ourselves and objects.All art changes the field of vision in which we originally and naturally place ourselves in relation to reality.On the one hand，art brings us closer to reality；it places us in a more immediate relationship to its distinctive and innermost meaning；behind the cold strangeness of the external world it reveals to us the spirituality of existence through which it is related and made intelligible to us.In addition，however，all art brings about a distancing from the immediacy of things；it allows the concreteness of stimuli to recede and stretches a veil between us and them just like the fine bluish haze that envelops distant mountains.There are equally strong attractions on both sides of this duality of effects.The tension between them，their distribution over the wide variety of demands upon the work of art，gives a specific character to each artistic style.Indeed，the mere existence of style is in itself one of the most significant instances of distancing.Style，as the manifestation of our inner feelings，indicates that these feelings no longer immediately gush out but take on a disguise the moment they are revealed.Style，as the general form of the particular，is a veil that imposes a barrier and a distance in relation to the recipient of the expression of these feelings.Even naturalism which specifically aims at overcoming the distance between us and reality，conforms to this basic principle of all art：to bring us closer to things by placing them at a distance from us.For only by self-deception do we fail to recognize that naturalism is also a style，that is，that it too organizes and remodels the immediacy of impressions on the basis of quite definite presuppositions and demands.This is irrefutably demonstrated by the course of art history in which everything that one era considers to be a faithful and true picture of reality is recognized by a later period to be highly prejudiced and falsified，whereas this later period now claims to present things as they really are.Artistic realism makes the same mistake as scientific realism by assuming that it can dispense with an a priori ，with a form that-springing from the inclinations and needs of out nature provides a robe or a metamorphosis for the world of our senses.This transformation that reality suffers on its way to our consciousness is certainly a barrier between us and its immediate existence，but is at the same time the precondition for our perception and representation of it.Indeed，in a certain sense naturalism may bring about a quite distinctive distancing from things if we observe its preference for the objects of everyday life，for the trite and the banal.For since naturalism is undoubtedly a stylization too，this style is more appreciated by a refined artistic sense-which sees art as lying in the work of art and not，by whatever method it may be represented，in its object-if it is executed on some immediate，raw，earthly material.

Modem Tendencies Towards The Increase And Diminution Of This Distance

On the whole，the aesthetic interest of recent times has tended towards an increase in the distance produced by transposing objects into art.I have in mind the tremendous attraction that artistic styles far removed both in time and space have for the artistic sense of our time.Many lively，stimulating notions are aroused by what is far away and this satisfies our many-sided need for stimulation，although，because of the absence of any relationship to our most personal and direct interests，all these strange and distant notions have a faint ring about them and are therefore more than a comforting stimulation for weakened nerves.What we today call the‘historical spirit’perhaps not only is a favorable condition for this phenomenon，but also has the same origin.Through the wealth of inner relationships to spatially and temporally far removed interests，the historical spirit makes us more sensitive towards shocks and confusions that come to us from direct proximity and contact with people and things.The flight from the present is made easier，is less of a loss and is to some extent justified if it leads to the recognition and enjoyment of concrete realities，even though they are far away and can be experienced only very indirectly.Out of this process there springs the present vividly felt charm of the fragment，the mere allusion，the aphorism，the symbol，the undeveloped artistic style.All these forms，familiar to all the arts，place us at a distance from the substance of things；they speak to us‘as from afar’；reality is touched not with direct confidence but with fingertips that are immediately withdrawn.The most extreme refinement of our literary style avoids the direct characterization of objects；it only touches a remote comer of them with the word，and grasps not the things but only the veil that envelops them.This is most clearly demonstrated by the symbolistic tendencies in the fine arts and in literature.Here，the distance that art already places between ourselves and the objects is extended yet a stage further，in that the notions that form the content of the ultimately stimulating psychic experience no longer have a visible counterpart in the work of art itself，but are only provoked by perceptions of quite a different kind.In all this we discover an emotional trait whose pathological deformation is the so-called‘agoraphobia’：the fear of coming into too close a contact with objects，a consequence of hyperaesthesia，for which every direct and energetic disturbance causes pain.The delicacy，spirituality and differentiated sensitivity of so many modem people therefore finds expression in a negative taste；that is，they are easily offended by the unacceptable，they determinedly reject what they find unsympathetic，they often abhor much if not most of what is offered to them as attractions；whereas the positive taste，the energetic affirmation，the cheerful and unreserved acceptance of what they like-in short，the actively appropriating energies-are decidedly lacking.

Yet this inner tendency that the symbol of distance represents extends far beyond the aesthetic realm.Philosophical materialism，for instance，which believed that it could apprehend reality directly，today again gives way to subjectivist or neo-Kantian theories which allow objects to be reflected or distilled by the medium of the mind before they may become cognitions.The subjectivism of modem times has the same basic motive as art：to gain a more intimate and truer relationship to objects by dissociating ourselves from them and retreating into ourselves，or by consciously acknowledging the inevitable distance between ourselves and objects.When confronted with a stronger selfawareness，this subjectivism inevitably leads to an emphasis upon our inner nature，while on the other hand it is associated with a new，deeper and more conscious modesty，a delicate reticence towards expressing the ultimate，or towards giving a naturalistic form to a situation that would constantly reveal its innermost foundation.In other scientific areas，for instance，and with regard to ethical considerations，the trite utility as the evaluative standard of volition recedes still further.Here we can see that this characterization of action only refers to those relationships that are nearest at hand，and that therefore，in order to raise it beyond its mere technique as a means，it has to obtain its specific general instructions from higher and often religious principles that are unrelated to sensual immediacy.Finally，in the case of specialized detailed work，the call for integration and generalization arises from all sides；that is，a call for that distance which commands an overview of all concrete details，for a bird's-eye view in which all the restlessness of the present is transcended and where what was previously only tangible now also becomes intelligible.

Perhaps this tendency would not be so effective and noticeable were it not for the fact that it is accompanied by the opposite trend.One can interpret the intellectual relationship of modem science to the world in two different ways.It is true that the infinite distances between ourselves and objects have been overcome by the microscope and the telescope；but we were first conscious of these distances only at the very same moment in which they were overcome.If one adds to this the fact that every problem solved throws up more than one new one，and that coming closer to things often only shows us how far away they still are from us，then one has to admit that the period in which mythology predominated，in which there was a very general and superficial knowledge of an anthropomorphism of nature，made possible，from a subjective standpoint and with reference to sensations and beliefs（however mistaken），a shorter distance between men and objects than exists at present.All those ingenious methods by which we penetrate the internal aspects of nature can only very slowly and in a piecemeal manner replace that intimate familiar closeness that was secured for the mind by the Greek gods，by the interpretation of the world according to human impulses and emotions，by their being linked to a personally efficacious god with a teleological concern for the welfare of man.We could first of all characterize this difference by saying that，the more the distance in the external world is conquered，the more it increases the distance in the spiritual world.The justification for this symbolic expression can again be shown by applying it to a completely different sphere.Modem man's relationship to his environment usually develops in such a way that he becomes more removed from the groups closest to him in order to come closer to those more remote from him.The growing dissolution of family ties；the feeling of unbearable closeness when confined to the most intimate group，in which loyalty is often just as tragic as liberation；the increasing emphasis upon individuality which cuts itself off most sharply from the immediate environment-this whole process of distancing goes hand in hand with the formation of relationships with what is most remote，with being interested in what lies far away，with intellectual affinity with groups whose relationships replace all spatial proximity.The overall picture that this presents surely signifies a growing distance in genuine inner relationships and a declining distance in more external ones.Cultural development brings about the fact that previously unconscious and instinctive accomplishments later occur with clear accountability and fragmented consciousness.On the other hand，what originally required careful attention and conscious effort becomes mechanical routine and instinctive matter-of-factness.Thus，correspondingly，the most remote comes closer at the price of increasing the distance to what was originally nearer.

The Part Played By Money In This Dual Process

The extent and intensity of the role that money plays in this dual process is first manifested as the conquest of distance.It is not necessary to elaborate upon the fact that only the translation of values into the money form makes possible those associations of interests in which the spatial distance of the interested parties is absolutely negligible.To give hut one of hundreds of possible examples：only by means of money is it possible for a German capitalist and also a German worker to be actually involved in a ministerial change in Spain，in the profits of African gold mines，and in the outcome of a South American revolution.However，money as the agent of the opposite tendency seems to me to be of greater significance.The loosening of family ties has its origin in the special economic interests of its individual members，which is possible only in a money economy.Above all，it brings about a situation in which the means of livelihood can be based on completely individual talents.For only their equivalent money form makes possible the evaluation of very specialized tasks，and without their conversion into a general value they could hardly arrive at mutual exchange.The money form of equivalents makes individual relations with the outside world and entrance into unfamiliar groups that are interested only in the money value of tasks or the money contributions of their members more easy.The family，whose structure is based on collective ownership，particularly upon land ownership，is the exact opposite.Collective ownership resulted in a solidarity of interests which sociologically represented a continuity in the connections between family members；whereas the money economy makes possible，indeed even enforces，a mutual distancing.Certain other forms of modem existence，aside from those of family life，rest upon the distancing brought about by money transactions.Money transactions erect a barrier between persons，in that only one of the two parties to the transaction receives what he actually wants，what corresponds to his specific needs，whereas the other party to the transaction，who only receives money，has to search for a third party to satisfy his needs.The fact that both enter the transaction with a completely different kind of interest adds a new element of estrangement to the antagonism that is already brought about by opposing interests.In the same manner，it has already been suggested that money results in a universal objectification of transactions，in an elimination of all personal nuances and tendencies，and，further，that the number of relationships based on money is constantly increasing，that the significance of one person for another can increasingly be traced back，even though often in a concealed form，to monetary interests.In this way，an inner barrier develops between people，a barrier，however，that is indispensable for the modem form of life.For the jostling crowdedness and the motley disorder of metropolitan communication would simply be unbearable without such psychological distance.Since contemporary urban culture，with its commercial，professional and social intercourse，forces us to be physically close to an enormous number of people，sensitive and nervous modem people would sink completely into despair if the objectification of social relationships did not bring with it an inner boundary and reserve.The pecuniary character of relationships，either openly or concealed in a thousand forms，places an invisible functional distance between people that is an inner protection and neutralization against the overcrowded proximity and friction of our cultural life.

The same function that money has for the style of life also penetrates even more deeply into the individual human subject，not as the distancing from other persons but from the material objects of life.The mere fact that wealth today arises out of the means of production instead of out of the means of consumption as in primitive epochs indicates an enormous degree of distancing.Just as an increasing number of stages are introduced into the production of cultural objects themselves-in that the finished product becomes more and more removed from the raw material-so property ownership places the owner technically，and therefore also personally，at a much greater distance from the ultimate goal of all wealth than during the period when wealth merely meant an abundance of immediate possibilities for consumption.The division of labor，conditioned by its interaction with the monetary system，supports similar internal consequences in the sphere of production.The less each individual produces a complete final product，the more his activity appears to he merely a preliminary stage，and the more the source of his activity seems to be removed from the ultimate meaning and purpose of his work.Stated directly：just as money intervenes between person and person，so it intervenes between person and commodity.Since the emergence of a money economy we are no longer directly confronted with the objects of economic transactions.Our interest in them is disrupted through the medium of money，their own objective significance becomes dissociated from our consciousness because it is more or less excluded from its proper position in our constellation of interests by their money value.If we recall how often awareness of purpose is arrested at the level of money，then it becomes clear that money and the enlargement of its role places us at an increasingly greater mental distance from objects.This often occurs in such a way that we lose sight of their qualitative nature so that the inner contact with their whole distinctive existence is disrupted.This is true not only of cultural objects；our whole life also becomes affected by its remoteness from nature，a situation that is reinforced by the money economy and the urban life that is dependent upon it.To be sure，the distinctive aesthetic and romantic experience of nature is perhaps possible only through this process.Whoever lives in direct contact with nature and knows no other form of life may enjoy its charm subjectively，but he lacks that distance from nature that is the basis for aesthetic contemplation and the root of that quiet sorrow，that feeling of yearning estrangement and of a lost paradise that characterizes the romantic response to nature.If modem man finds his highest enjoyment of nature in the snowbound regions of the Alps or on the shores of the North Sea，then this can hardly be explained solely in terms of the heightened need for excitement.It is also to be explained by the fact that this inaccessible world，which actually rejects us，represents the extreme enhancement and stylization of what nature as a whole still means to us：a spiritual distant image that confronts us even in moments of physical proximity as something internally unattainable，a promise that is never fully kept and an entity that responds to our most passionate devotion with a faint resistance and strangeness.Landscape painting，which as an art depends upon distance from the object and upon a break in our natural unity with it，has only developed in modem times as has the romantic sense of nature.They are the result of that increasing distancing from nature and that particularly abstract existence that urban life，based on the money economy，has forced upon us.This in no way contradicts the fact that it is precisely the possession of money that has allowed us to take flight into nature.For the very fact that nature can only be enjoyed by urban people under these conditions thrusts an entity between them and nature-no matter in how many transformations and mere after-effects which forms a link between the two at the very same time that it separates them.

Credit

This significance of money is much more evident in its extended form as credit.Credit extends the series of conceptions still further and with a greater awareness of their unrestricted breadth than does the intermediate instance of cash.The pivot of the relationship between creditor and debtor lies，at it were，outside the straight line of contact between them and is set at a farther distance from them：the individual's activity and transactions thereby gain the qualities of farsightedness and enhanced symbolism.In that the bill of exchange or the concept of money debt in general represents the values of distant objects，they are condensed，as it were，in the hill just as the view over a spatial distance condenses the contents of the view by a perspective shortening.And just as money places a distance between ourselves and objects，and also brings them closer to us-thereby displaying its specific indifference in these contrasting effects so too the instrument of credit has a dual relationship to our total assets.On the one hand，it has been pointed out that cheque transactions are a palliative against extravagance；some people are more easily inclined towards unnecessary spending when they have cash in hand than if the money is deposited with a third party and can be used only by drawing a cheque.On the other hand，it seems to me that the temptation to imprudence is particularly strong if one does not have all the disposable money before one's eyes but can dispose of it merely by the stroke of a pen.On the one hand，the form of cheque transactions，through the multiple mechanism that we have set in motion，dissociates us from money，while on the other it makes the transaction easier，not only because of the technical convenience but also psychologically，because money as cash gives us a visual impression of its value and makes it harder for us to part with it.

I wish to cite but one instance of the relevant features of credit transactions which，although not common，is none the less very apposite.A traveler relates that an English businessman once gave this definition：‘The common man is one who buys goods by cash payment；a gentleman is one to whom I give credit and who pays me every six months with a cheque.’It is primarily the basic attitude that is worthy of note here：namely that it is not necessary to be a gentleman in order to obtain credit，hut rather that whoever demands credit is a gentleman.That credit transactions seem to reflect greater distinction may be traced back to two different sentiments.First，they demand trust.It is the essence of distinction not to demonstrate its views and their value but simply to presuppose adherence to them.Similarly，this is also the reason why the ostentatious display of wealth is a sign of lack of distinction.Certainly，any trust always implies a risk；persons of distinction demand that one takes this risk in doing business with them，the implication being that they do not recognize a risk and are unwilling to pay a premium for it because they consider themselves to be absolutely reliable.This attitude is reflected in Schiller's epigram，that noble characters pay only with what they are and not with what they do.It is understandable that mere payment in ready cash suggests something petty bourgeois to this businessman，since in this instance the stages of the economic series are anxiously compressed，whereas credit creates a distance between them that he controls on the basis of trust.It is a feature of higher stages of development everywhere that the original closeness and immediate unity of the elements is dissolved in order to unite them，as independent and distinct entities，in a new，more abstract and comprehensive synthesis.In credit transactions the immediacy of value exchange is replaced by a distance whose poles are held together by trust in the same way as religiosity is more intense the greater is the distance-in contrast to anthropomorphism and all sensual conceptions between God and the individual soul in order to call forth the most considerable degree of belief so as to bridge the distance between them.The reason why the clement of distinction in credit is no longer felt in larger transactions in the business community is because credit has become an impersonal organization and trust has lost its specific personal character-without which the category of distinction cannot be applied.First，credit has become a technical form of transaction either with or without very much reduced psychological overtones.Second，the accumulation of small debts up to the final payment by cheque brings about a certain reserve on the part of the buyer in relation to the trader.The continuous and direct interaction that is common to cash payments is eliminated.Viewed from the outside and，as it were，aesthetically，delivery by the businessman has acquired the form of a tribute，of an offering to the powerful that is accepted，at least in individual cases，without a corresponding return.Since payment at the end of the credit period is made not from person to person but by a cheque，by an order，as it were，to the objective account at the bank，this reserved behavior persists on the part of the individual.Thus，from all sides the distance that is the basis of the concept of the‘gentleman’and the appropriate expression for this kind of transaction is accentuated between the‘gentleman’and the tradesman.

I will content myself with this singular example of credit's distancing effect on the style of life and only add one of its very general traits that refers back to the significance of money.Modern times，particularly the most recent，are permeated by a feeling of tension，expectation and unreleased intense desires as if in anticipation of what is essential，of the definitive of the specific meaning and central point of life and things.This is obviously connected with the overemphasis that the means often gain over the ends of life in mature cultures.Aside from money，militarism is perhaps the most striking example in this respect.The regular army is a mere preparation，a latent energy，a contingency，whose ultimate goal and purpose not only very rarely materializes but is also avoided at all costs.Indeed，the enormous buildup of military forces is praised as the only means of preventing their explosion.With this teleological web we have reached the very pinnacle of the contradiction that lies in the drowning out of the end by the means：the growing significance of the means goes hand in hand with a corresponding increase in the rejection and negation of the end.And this factor increasingly permeates the social life of the people；it directly interferes with personal，political and economic relationships on a large scale and indirectly gives certain age groups and social circles their distinctive character.

The Pre-eminence Of Technology

The tendency towards making final ends illusory appears less crass，hut more dangerous and insidious，in the advances and evaluation of technology.If the relationship of technological achievements to the meaning of life is，at best，that of a means or an instrument or very often no relationship at all，then，from among the many causes of the failure to recognize technology's role here，I only wish to mention the splendor that it has autonomously developed.It is one of the most common and almost unavoidable human traits to confuse the height，magnitude and perfection that has been achieved within the boundaries and internal presuppositions of a particular sphere with the significance of the sphere as a whole.The wealth and perfection of individual parts，the degree to which the sphere approximates to its own immanent ideals，is all too easily interpreted as a value and dignity in itself，and in its relationship to other elements of life.The realization that something might be outstanding within its genre and in relation to the demands of its type，while this genre and type is itself evaluated as something minimal and low-this realization presupposes，in each individual case，a very astute mode of thought and a differentiated sense of values.How often do we submit to the temptation to exaggerate the importance of our own achievements by ascribing an extravagant significance to the whole sphere to which they belong，by elevating their relative superiority to that of an absolute！How often does the possession of an exquisite detail of any kind of value-from the objects of the collector's mania to the specialized knowledge of a specific scientific discipline-deceive us into thinking that this particular kind of value is as valuable within the context of all values as the individual piece is in relation to its particular sphere！Basically，this derives from the same old metaphysical mistake：to transfer the attributes that the elements of a whole possess in relation to each other to the whole.It is this mistake through which，for example，the demand for a causal foundation valid for all parts of the world and their relationship to one another is also raised with reference to the whole world.It will probably appear most strange to the enthusiasts of modem technology that their attitude is based on the same formal mistake as that of the speculative metaphysician.And yet such is the case：the relative height that the technical progress of our time has attained in comparison with earlier circumstances and on the basis of the recognition of certain goals is extended by them to an absolute significance of these goals and this progress.It is true that we now have acetylene and electrical light instead of oil lamps；but the enthusiasm for the progress achieved in lighting makes us sometimes forget that the essential thing is not the lighting itself but what becomes more fully visible.People's ecstasy concerning the triumphs of the telegraph and telephone often makes them overlook the fact that what really matters is the value of what one has to say，and that，compared with this，the speed or slowness of the means of communication is often a concern that could attain its present status only by usurpation.The same is true in numerous other areas.

This preponderance of means over ends finds its apotheosis in the fact that the peripheral in life，the things that lie outside its basic essence，have become masters of its centre and even of ourselves.Although it is true to say that we control nature to the extent that we serve it，this is correct in the traditional sense only for the outer forms of life.If we consider the totality of life，then the control of nature by technology is possible only at the price of being enslaved in it and by dispensing with spirituality as the central point of life.The illusions in this sphere are reflected quite clearly in the terminology that is used in it and in which a mode of thinking，proud of its objectivity and freedom from myth，discloses the direct opposite of these features.To state that we conquer or control nature is a very childish formulation since it presupposes some kind of resistance，a teleological element in nature itself，an animosity towards us.Yet nature is merely indifferent and its subjugation does not affect its own regularities.In contrast，all notions of domination and obedience，conquest and subjugation have a proper meaning only if an opposing will has been broken.This is merely the counterpart to the expression that the effectiveness of natural laws exerts an inescapable coercion upon things.In the first place，however，natural laws do not act at all since they are only formulae for the activity of specific materials and energies.The naivety of this misunderstanding of natural scientific methods-the assumption that natural laws direct reality as real forces just as a sovereign controls his empire-is on the same level as believing in God's direct control over our earthly life.The alleged coercion ，the necessity to which natural events are supposed to be subject，is no less misleading.But the human mind feels chained to laws under these categories only because stirrings that seek to lead us in another direction exist.Natural events as such are not subject to the alternatives of freedom and coercion，and the‘must’injects a dualism into the simple existence of things that only makes sense to the conscious mind.Although all this seems to be just a matter of terminology，it does lead astray those who think superficially in the direction of anthropomorphic misinterpretations and it does show that the mythological mode of thought is also at home within the natural scientific world view.This concept of human control over nature supports the self-flattering delusion of our relationship to nature which could be avoided，even on the basis of this comparison.Indeed，the objective picture certainly suggests a growing domination of nature by man；but this does not yet determine whether the subjective reflex，the psychic significance of this historical fact，cannot run in the opposite direction.One should not be misled by the tremendous amount of intelligence that created the theoretical foundations of modem technology and which，indeed，seems to put Plato's dream of making science reign supreme over life into practice.Yet the thread by which technology weaves the energies and materials of nature into our life are just as easily to be seen as fetters that tie us down and make many things indispensable which could and even ought to be dispensed with as far as the essence of life is concerned.It has been asserted with reference to the sphere of production that the machine，which was supposed to relieve man from his slave labor in relation to nature，has itself forced him to become a slave to it.This is even more true of the more sophisticated and comprehensive internal relationships：the statement that we control nature by serving it implies the shocking obverse meaning that we serve it in so far as we dominate it.It is quite erroneous to believe that the significance and intellectual potential of modem life has been transferred from the form of the individual to that of the masses.Rather，it has been transferred to the form of the objects：it lives in the immense abundance，the marvelous expediency and the complicated precision of machines，products and the supraindividual organizations of contemporary culture.Correspondingly，the‘revolt of the slaves’that threatens to dethrone the autocracy and the normative independence of strong individuals is not the revolt of the masses，but the revolt of objects.Just as，on the one hand，we have become slaves of the production process，so，on the other，we have become the slaves of the products.That is，what nature offers us by means of technology is now a mastery over the selfreliance and the spiritual centre of life through endless habits，endless distractions and endless superficial needs.Thus，the domination of the means has taken possession not only of specific ends but of the very centre of ends，of the point at which all purposes converge and from which they originate as final purposes.Man has thereby become estranged from himself；an insuperable barrier of media，technical inventions，abilities and enjoyments has been erected between him and his most distinctive and essential being.

There has never been an age in which such an emphasis on the intermediate aspects of life in contrast to its central and definite purposes was totally alien to that age.Rather，since man's mind is completely focused upon the categories of ends and means，it is his lasting fate to oscillate between the contradictory demands of means and ends.The means always implies the internal difficulty of using a force and awareness that are not really meant for it but for something else.However，the meaning of life does not really lie in realizing the permanent reconciliation of conditions for which it strives.In fact，the vitality of our inner life may indeed depend upon the continuation of that contradiction，and the styles of life probably differ fundamentally in terms of the intensity of this contradiction，the preponderance of the one or the other side and the psychological form of either one.In the case of the present age，in which the preponderance of technology obviously signifies a predominance of clear intelligent consciousness，as a cause as well as an effect，I have emphasized that spirituality and contemplation，stunned by the clamorous splendor of the scientifictechnological age，have to suffer for it by a faint sense of tension and vague longing.They feel as if the whole meaning of our existence were so remote that we are unable to locate it and are constantly in danger of moving away from rather than closer to it.Furthermore，it is as if the meaning of life clearly confronted us，as if we would be able to grasp it were it not for the fact that we lack some modest amount of courage，strength and inner security.I believe that this secret restlessness，this helpless urgency that lies below the threshold of consciousness，that drives modem man from socialism to Nietzsche，from Böcklin to impressionism，from Hegel to Schopenhauer and back again，not only originates in the bustle and excitement of modem life，but that，conversely，this phenomenon is frequently the expression，symptom and eruption of this innermost condition.The lack of something definite at the centre of the soul impels us to search for momentary satisfaction in ever-new stimulations，sensations and external activities.Thus it is that we become entangled in the instability and helplessness that manifests itself as the tumult of the metropolis，as the mania for traveling，as the wild pursuit of competition and as the typically modem disloyalty with regard to taste，style，opinions and personal relationships.The significance of money for this kind of life follows quite logically from the premises that all the discussions in this book have identified.It is only necessary to mention here the dual role of money.Money stands in a series with all the means and tools of culture，which slide in front of the inner and final ends and ultimately cover them up and displace them.Money is most important in illustrating the senselessness and the consequences of the teleological dislocation，partly because of the passion with which it is craved for，and partly because of its own emptiness and merely transitional character.However，in this sense，money is only the highest point on the scale of all these phenomena.It carries out the function of imposing a distance between ourselves and our purposes in the same manner as other technical mediating elements，but does it more purely and completely.Here，too，money shows itself to be not an isolated instance but rather the most perfect expression of tendencies that are also discernible in a series of lower phenomena.Yet in another respect，money stands outside this whole series by frequently being the agent that brings about the transformations in the sequence of purposes.Money interweaves this sequence as the means of means，as the most general technique of practical life without which the specific techniques of our culture could not have developed.Indeed，even in this respect，money exhibits the duality of its functions through whose unification it repeats the form of the greatest and the deepest potentialities of life：on the one hand，it is an equal member or even a first among equals in the series of human existence，and，on the other，it stands above them as an integrating force that supports and permeates every single element.In the same way，religion is a force in life，one interest among others and often opposed to them.It is one of those factors that are the constituents of life and yet，on the other hand，it expresses the unity and the basis of our whole existence-on the one hand it is a link in life's organism，and on the other it stands opposed to that organism by expressing life through the self-sufficiency of its summit and inwardness.

The Rhythm Or Symmetry Of The Contents Of Life

I now move on to a second determinant of the style of life that is characterized，as is distancing，not by a spatial analogy but by a temporal one.Since time encompasses internal just as much as external events，so reality is characterized more directly and with less recourse to symbolism than in the former case.We are concerned here with the rhythm ，in which life's contents advance and recede，with the question as to what extent different cultural epochs themselves favour or destroy the rhythm of their course，and whether money takes part in this process not only through its own movements but also through its influence on the strengthening or weakening of the periodicity of life.All the sequences of our life are regulated by upward and downward rhythm；the undulation that we immediately recognize in nature and as the basic form of so many phenomena also holds sway over the soul.The alternation of day and night which determines our whole form of life indicates rhythm as a general scheme.We are unable to pronounce two meaningfully co-ordinated terms without giving a greater emphasis to the one than to the other：thus，for example，‘truth and poetry’is something totally different from‘poetry and truth’.And if，out of three elements，the third is co-ordinated to the second，it cannot be completely realized psychologically；but rather the modulating form of the psychic tends to give an accent to the third that is similar to the first.Thus，the meter Vermap cannot be expressed absolutely correctly，but rather the third syllable is inevitably somewhat more accentuated than is the second.The proportioning of sequences of activity，both large and small，into rhythmically repeated periods serves to conserve energy.By means of the change within each period，the physically or psychologically active organs are alternately spared，while at the same time the regularity of the rotation favors an adjustment to the whole complex of movements，whose regularity makes each repetition easier.Rhythm satisfies the basic needs for both diversity and regularity，for change and stability.In that each period is composed of different elements，of elevation and decline，of a quantitative or qualitative variety，the regular repetition produces a reassurance，uniformity and unity in the character of the series.Simplicity or complication of rhythm，the length or brevity of its individual periods，its regularity and its interruptions provide，as it were，the abstract scheme for individual and social，objective and historical life-sequences.Within the cultural development under discussion here we first encounter a series of phenomena that takes a rhythmical course in its earlier stages but a continuous or irregular course in its later stages.Perhaps the most striking of these phenomena is that man，unlike most other animals，for whom periods of sexual excitement and indifference are distinctly separated，no longer has a definite mating period，though primitive peoples still exhibit aspects of this periodicity in their behavior.The difference in the mating period of animals is basically determined by the fact that birth has to take place during seasons that are the most favorable with regard to feeding and climatic conditions for the raising of the young；indeed，some very primitive Australian aborigines，who possess no domestic animals and are therefore regularly faced with famines，have children only at a definite time of the year.Through his control over food and protection against the weather civilized man has become more independent，so that，with regard to mating，he can follow his individual rather than his general，necessarily rhythmically determined impulses.Hence the above-mentioned variations in sexuality have been transformed into a more or less fluctuating continuum.In any case，it has been established that the still observable periodicity in the maximal and minimal number of births is more marked in agricultural than in industrial areas，in the country than in cities.Furthermore，the child lives in an insurmountable rhythm of sleeping and waking，of activity and relaxation，and something similar may be observed in rural areas.Conversely，the regularity of these needs（and not only their satisfaction！）has long been disrupted for city-dwellers.And if it is true that women represent a less highly differentiated stage of human development and one that is still closer to nature，then the periodicity of their physiological life would serve to confirm this.As long as man is directly dependent upon the harvest or the fruits of hunting and also upon the arrival of the pedlars or periodic fairs，life in many respects has to move in a rhythm of expansion and contraction.For some nomadic tribes who are already more developed than the Australian aborigines-for instance some African peoples the seasons in which no pasture land is available mean to them an annually recurring period of semi-famine.And even where no specific periodicity exists，the primitive subsistence economy exhibits its essential characteristic with regard to consumption as the direct change from one contrast to another，from want to surplus and from surplus to want.The leveling effect of culture is quite obvious here.It not only ensures that the necessities of life are available throughout the whole year in roughly equal quantity，but also reduces wasteful consumption by means of money.For now a temporary surplus can be transferred into money and its enjoyment can be evenly and continuously distributed over the whole year.

Finally，I wish to mention here-though only as a characteristic symbol of this development and quite independent of the economy-that in music too the rhythmic element is the first distinct and most accentuated element in its primitive stages.A missionary in Ashanti is impressed by the marvelous way in which the musicians keep time despite the chaotic disharmony of the music；Chinese theatre music in California-although an unmelodious noise that grates upon one's ears-is supposed to possess rigid rhythmic measures；a traveler says of the festivals of the Wintun Indians：‘Then come songs in which each Indian expresses his own emotions，and in which，strangely enough，they keep time perfectly.’If we move further down the scale of development we find that certain insects produce a sound that consists of one and the same sharp，rhythmically repeated note in order to enchant the female；in contrast，the more highly developed birds produce love songs whose rhythm is quite subservient to the melody.And at the highest levels of music one notices that the recent trend seems to be to move away completely from the rhythmical，not only in Wagner's music but also in that of certain of his opponents who choose texts that do not lend themselves to rhythm and put the Letter to the Corinthians and Solomon's sermons to music；the acute change from raising to lowering the tone gives way to more balanced or more irregular forms.If we apply this analogy to economic and general cultural life，then it becomes more easily comparable，since it is possible to buy anything at any time for money and so the emotions and stimulations of the individual need no longer to cling to a rhythm that would enforce a periodicity in order to satisfy them.When critics reproach the present economic order for its regular change between overproduction and crises，what they wish to indicate by this is that it is still imperfect and that a continuity of production and consumption ought to be established.At this point I would point to the extension of means of transport which have progressed from the infrequency of the mailcoach to the almost uninterrupted connections between the most important places and to the telegraph and telephone which makes communication possible at any time；the improvement of artificial lighting which increasingly eliminates the difference between day and night and，as a result，the natural rhythm of life；printed literature，which provides us，at any suitable moment and independent of the natural alternation in thought processes between exertion and rest，with thought and stimuli.In short，if culture，as one is accustomed to saying，overcomes not only space but also time，then this means that definite periods of time no longer determine the compelling framework for our activities and enjoyments，but rather they now depend only upon the relationship between the will and our ability and upon the purely objective conditions for carrying them out.Thus，the general conditions of life are freed from rhythm；they are more even and provide individual freedom and possible irregularity.The elements of regularity and diversity that are united in rhythm are now separated by means of this differentiation.

It would，however，be quite wrong to reduce the development of the style of life to the temptingly simple formula that it proceeds independendy of any framework from the rhythm of its contents to a realization of its content.This is valid only for certain periods of development which require more profound and complex interpretations.Therefore，I first wish to investigate the psychological and historical significance of rhythmic while omitting its purely physiological conditioning which only repeats the fluctuations of external nature.

The Sequence And Simultaneity Of Rhythm And Symmetry

Rhythm may be defined as symmetry in time，just as symmetry is rhythm in space.If one draws lines to represent rhythmical movement then they become symmetrical；conversely，the study of symmetry implies a rhythmic conception.Both are different forms of the same basic motif.Rhythm is for the car what symmetry is for the eye at the start of all formations of raw material.In order to imbue things with an idea，a meaning and harmony，one has to form them symmetrically，organize the parts within the whole and order them evenly around a central point.Thus，the creative power of man when confronted with the arbitrariness and chaos of merely natural formations is illustrated in the quickest，most visible and direct manner.Symmetry is the first indication of the power of rationalism to relieve us of the meaninglessness of things and to accept them as they are.Therefore，the languages of primitive people are also often much more symmetrical than those of civilized people，and even the social structure exhibits-for instance，in the‘hundreds’，which form the organizational principle of the most diverse primitive peoples-the symmetrical arrangement as a first attempt by the intellect to place the masses in a readily visible and controllable form.The symmetrical structure is completely rational in origin；it facilitates the control of the multitude from one vantage point.Impulses are transmitted further with less resistance，and are more readily calculable through a symmetrically structured medium than where the inner structure and the boundary of the parts is irregular and fluctuating.If objects and men are brought under the yoke of the system-that is，if they are arranged symmetrically-then they can best be dealt with rationally.For this reason，both despotism and socialism possess particularly strong inclinations towards symmetrical constructions of society.This is true of both of the n because they imply a strong centralization of society that requires the reduction of the individuality of its elements and of the irregularity of its forms and relationships to a symmetrical form.To give a practical manifestation of this：Louis XIV is supposed to have endangered his health by having doors and windows arranged symmetrically.Similarly，socialist utopias always construct the local units of their ideal cities or states according to the principle of symmetry：localities and buildings are arranged in the form of either circles or squares.In Campanella's Sun-state，the design of the capital is mathematically measured with compasses，as are the daily arrangements for the citizens and the gradation of their rights and obligations.Rabelais's order of Thelemites，in contrast with More's utopia，displays an absolute individualism-no clocks are allowed in this utopia but rather everything is supposed to happen according to need and occasion.Yet the style of unrestricted calculability and rationalization of life nevertheless tempts him to arrange the buildings of his ideal state in a distinctly symmetrical manner：a gigantic building in the shape of a sex-tangle，a tower at each comer，sixty steps in diameter.The stonemasons’lodge of the medieval association of builders with its strictly regulated，standardized mode of life and constitution was built in the form of a square.This general trait of socialist projects indicates in a crude form the deep attraction of a notion of the harmonic，stabilized organization of human activity that has overcome the resistance of irrational individuality.The symmetricalrhythmic formation emerges as the first and simplest structure，through which，as it were，reason stylizes the material of life，and makes it controllable and assailable.It is the first framework by means of which reason is able to penetrate things.But this also indicates the limits to the meaning and justification of this style of life.It is oppressive in two respects：first，in relation to the human subject whose impulses and needs always arise only in a happy，fortuitous harmony with a fixed scheme rather than in a preestablished harmony；and second，and no less significantly，in relation to external reality whose powers and relationships to us can only he forcibly integrated into such a simple framework.With due regard to the different areas of validity，one might formulate this in terms of an apparent paradox：nature is not as symmetric as the mind would like it to be and the mind is not as symmetric as nature would like it to be.All the acts of violence and inadequacies that a systematic method imposes upon reality are also due to the rhythm and symmetry in the formation of the contents of life.Just as the individual person's assimilation of people and objects by imposing upon them the form and law of his own being testifies to a considerable strength，and just as the more superior person，too，does justice to the uniqueness of objects and shows regard for them in the process of making them subservient to his ends and his power，so it is an eminently human quality to force the theoretical and practical world into a framework that is provided by us.But it is more noble to recognize the specific laws and requirements of things and to integrate them into our existence and activities by following them.For this not only demonstrates the much greater capacity for expansion and malleability of the latter，but it also can make much more creative use of the wealth and possibilities of objects.Thus it is that we observe in some spheres of life that rhythm as the rationalistic-systematic principle appears as the later stage of development，whereas in other spheres this stage is resolved according to circumstances，and the rigidity of the framework is adjusted to the changing requirements of the conditions themselves.For instance，we observe that only at a higher cultural level does the institution of regular meals divide the day rhythmically，whereas a number of regular daily meals is unknown among primitive peoples.On the contrary，we have already mentioned that they often have a regular cycle of periods of privation and times of frivolous jubilation that has been completely abolished by more advanced economic technology.However，this regularity of daily meals achieves its stability at very high levels of development but perhaps not at the highest levels of the social and intellectual scale.It is discontinued by the highest strata of society on account of their professional and social obligations，and complicated considerations of all kinds.The changing requirements of objective circumstances and the mood of the day may also cause the artist and the scholar to do the same.This already indicates how much the rhythm of meal times，and its opposite，corresponds to the rhythm of work.Here too different sequences exhibit quite different relationships.Primitive man works just as irregularly as he eats.Tremendous exertions of energy，brought about by need or whim，are followed by periods of complete laziness which alternate with the former quite fortuitously.It is probably correct to assume that，at least in northern countries，a fixed order of activities，a meaningful rhythm of exertion and relaxation of strength，first commences with ploughing in agriculture.This rhythm reaches its highest degree in more complex factory work and in office work of all kinds.At the peak of cultural activity-in scientific，political，artistic and commercial work-it tends to decrease considerably.For instance，if we learn that a certain writer picks up his pen and puts it down again at the very same minute every day，then we suspect that this stationary rhythm of production lacks inspiration and inner significance.But among wage-earners too this development leads at a later stage to irregularities and unpredictability even though for completely different reasons.With the advent of large-scale industry in Britain，the workers suffered greatly from the fact that any slump in sales disturbed a large enterprise to a far greater extent than it had disturbed the many smaller enterprises previously，because previously the guild would have distributed the losses.Formerly，the craftsman continued to work in bad times in order to accumulate a reserve，but now workers were simply discharged；formerly，the wages were fixed by the authorities，but now every decline in prices led to a reduction in wages.Under these circumstances it is reported that many workers preferred to continue to work under the old system，rather than to work for higher wages at the cost of the greater irregularity of work.Capitalism and the economic individualization that corresponds to it have，at least in part，made work as a whole-and therefore its content too！much more insecure and have subordinated it to many more fortuitous constellations than existed at the time of the guilds when the greater stability of working conditions imparted a much stricter rhythm to other aspects of life during the day and the year.Recent investigations have shown that，whereas the arrangement of the content of work formerly had a predominantly rhythmic character，particularly in the case of primitive cooperative work，and was accompanied by songs，with the perfection of tools and the individualization of work this rhythmic character was subsequently lost.The modem factory，it is true，still possesses strong rhythmic elements，but，to the extent that they require regularly repeated motions，they possess an altogether different subjective significance than do the earlier work rhythms.Whereas this earlier rhythm corresponded to the inner demands of physiological-psychological energies，the present rhythm is related either directly to the indifferent objective movements of the machine or to the necessity for the individual worker who performs only a small part of the process to keep pace with the other members of the workgroup.Perhaps this brings about a deadening of the sense of rhythm as such.The old guild associations struggled，just like modem trade unions，for a reduction in hours of work.But whereas the journeymen's associations accepted a working day from 5 or 6 am to 7 pm，that is for the whole day until bedtime，and as compensation pushed strenuously for one whole day off，trade unions today demand a shorter working day.The period of regular change between work and rest has become shorter for the modem worker.For the earlier workers，the sense of rhythm was enduring enough for them to be satisfied with a weekly period.Today，however，more frequent stimulation is needed-perhaps as a consequence or expression of declining nervous energy-and the alternation between work and rest has to become speeded up in order to produce the subjectively desired effect.

Analogous Developments In Money

The development of money as an institution follows the same pattern.It exhibits certain rhythmic phenomena as a kind of intermediate stage.From the chaotic fortuitousness that must have characterized its first appearance，money passed through a stage that at least reflects a principle and a meaningful form，until，at a still further stage，money gains a continuity in availability through which it is able to adjust itself to all objective and personal needs，free from the constraint of a rhythmic and，in a deeper sense，still fortuitous framework.For our purposes it is necessary here only to illustrate the transition from the second to the third stage with some examples.Even in the sixteenth century，in a city like Antwerp，in which a tremendous number of money transactions took place，it was almost impossible to get hold of a considerable amount of money outside the regular fairs where bills of exchange were bought and sold.The extension of this availability to any time when a person requires money indicates the transition to the establishment of a fully developed money economy.Yet it is typical of the fluctuation between rhythmical and non-rhythmical forms of money transactions and of people's awareness of them that the transactions at Antwerp were called‘the permanent fair’by those who were used to the difficulties and irrationality of money transactions in a medieval economy.Furthermore，as long as the businessman makes and receives all payments in cash，he must secure a considerable amount of cash whenever larger sums are due，and on the other hand he has to know how to invest such sums efficiently at times when his receipts arrive.The concentration of money transactions in large banks relieves him of the periodic necessity of accumulating and disposing of money.For since he and his business colleagues use the same clearing bank，assets and liabilities are now simply balanced by transferring the necessary amount from one account to another，so that the individual businessman needs only a relatively limited and stable amount of cash for daily expenses while the banks too need relatively less cash than the individual businessman did formerly because the credits and debits of different customers offset one another.Finally，I wish to give one more example.The more or less periodic fluctuations between scarcity and abundance in a period in which a money economy is not yet fully developed produces a corresponding periodic fluctuation in the interest rate from extreme cheapness to exorbitant expensiveness.The perfection of the money economy tends to eliminate these fluctuations，so that the rate of interest，in comparison with earlier periods，remains stable.Hence a change of I per cent in English discount rates becomes an event of major significance.In this way，the arrangements of the individual businessman become more easily adjustable and independent both of fluctuations that are beyond his control and of those fluctuations that often reluctantly forced him into bad forms of business practice.

The forms that rhythm or lack of rhythm bestow upon the contents of existence finally lost their form as alternating stages of development and present themselves simultaneously.The two principles of life that one can characterize with the symbols rhythmic-symmetrical and individualistic-spontaneous are two profoundly different trends whose opposition is not，as in previous examples，always reconcilable through integration in the course of development，but rather ultimately characterizes the permanent character of individuals and groups.Not only is the systematic form of life-as I emphasized above-the technique of centralizing tendencies，whether of a despotic or a socialistic kind，but also it gains an independent charm.The inner harmony and external conciseness，the harmony of the parts and the calculability of their fate，confer an attraction upon all symmetrical-systematic organizations，the effects of which exert a formative power that extends far beyond politics to countless public and private interests.Such organizations are supposed to give the individual contingencies of existence a unity and transparency that transposes them into a work of art.It is the same aesthetic attraction that is aroused by the machine.The absolute regularity and reliability of the movements，the complete removal of oppositions and frictions，the harmonious dovetailing of the smallest and largest parts，imparts to the machine，even at superficial glance，a distinctive beauty.It is this beauty that is repeated，to a greater extent，in the organization of the factory and which the socialist state is supposed to give the widest possible application.But this attraction，like all aesthetics，is based upon an ultimate direction and significance of life，upon an elemental quality of the soul.This aesthetic attraction or verification is manifested only in tangible material.We do not possess that elemental quality as we do its aesthetic，moral，social，intellectual，eudemonistic manifestations in practical life，but rather we are that quality.These ultimate decisions of human nature cannot be put into words，but can only be sensed in those individual representations as their ultimate and guiding force.Therefore，it is impossible to argue about the relative attractions of opposing forms of life in the experience of which the aristocratic and individualistic tendencies-no matter which area of our interests is affected-confront one another.Historically，aristocracies prefer to steer clear of systematics，of the general form that places the individual in a structure that is external to him.Genuine aristocratic sentiment demands that every form of a political，social，objective or personal nature develops independently and thus proves its own value.The aristocratic liberalism of English life therefore finds the typical and，as it were，organic expression of its innermost motives in asymmetry，in freeing each individual case from the prejudices formed by similar cases.Macaulay，the enthusiastic liberal，specifically emphasizes this as the genuine strength of English constitutional life when he says：‘We do not think of symmetry，but rather of expediency；we never remove an anomaly merely because it is an anomaly；we do not set up other norms than those which are required by the specific case under consideration.These are the rules which have guided the considerations of our 250 Parliaments from King John to Queen Victoria.’The ideal of symmetry and logical roundness，which relates the meaning of every single event to a central point，is here rejected in favor of the ideal that permits every element to develop independently according to its own circumstances and allows the whole to appear as an irregular and unbalanced phenomenon.It is obvious that this contrast profoundly affects personal styles of life.On the one hand，there is the systematization of life，with its different provinces organized harmoniously around a central point，with all interests carefully graded and each content of these interests permitted only to the extent that the system makes allowance for.These comprise specific regularly alternating activities，a fixed alternation between activity and rest-in short，a rhythm in both co-ordination and sequence-that makes no allowance either for fluctuations in needs，energies and moods or for the chance of extraneous stimulations，situations and incidents.Instead，the form of existence that is established is completely secure because it excludes everything that does not accord with it or could not be successfully adjusted to its system.On the other hand，there is the formation of life from case to case，establishing the most favorable relationships between theinner demands of every moment and the corresponding exigencies of the external world，a continuous readiness for experiencing and acting combined with a constant respect for the autonomous life of things in order to do justice to their representations and requests as they arise.In this way，the calculability and secure equilibrium of life is indeed sacrificed and so is the style of life in the narrower sense.Life is not controlled by ideas whose application always leads to systematization and strict rhythms；rather，it is formed out of individual elements regardless of the symmetry of the whole，which is experienced only as a constraint rather than as an attraction.The essence of symmetry lies in the fact that every element of a whole derives its position，its justification and its significance only in relation to other elements and to a common centre.Conversely，if every element follows its own impulse and evolves autonomously and only for its own sake，the whole becomes necessarily asymmetrical and fortuitous.This conflict，in view of its aesthetic reflex，is the basic motif of all processes that are played out between a social whole-of a political，religious，familial，economic，social or any other kind and its individual members.The individual strives to be an organic totality，a unity with its own centre from whence all the elements of his being and his action derive a coherent and consistent meaning.But if the supra-individual whole is supposed to be independently coherent and to realize its own objective notion of itself with self-sufficient significance，then it cannot possibly tolerate any independence on the part of its members.Hence it is impossible to expect a tree growing out of different trees，but only out of cells，or a painting out of other paintings，but only out of strokes of the brush not one of which on its own possesses any completeness，independent life or aesthetic significance.The totality of the wholealthough it gains practical reality only in certain actions of the individual and perhaps even only within the individual-stands in eternal conflict with the totality of the individual.The aesthetic expression of this struggle is particularly impressive because the charm of beauty is always embedded in a whole，no matter whether it has immediate distinctiveness or a distinctiveness that is supplemented by fantasy as in the case of a fragment.The essential meaning of art lies in its being able to form an autonomous totality，a self-sufficient microcosm out of a fortuitous fragment of reality that is tied with a thousand threads to this reality.The typical conflict between the individual and supra-individual existence can be interpreted as the irreconcilable striving of both elements to attain an aesthetically satisfying expression.

Money，however，seems to serve the expression of only one of these two contrasting forms.For money itself is completely formless：it does not contain within itself the slightest suggestion of a regular rising and falling of the contents of life；it offers itself at every moment with the same freshness and efficiency；by its far-reaching effects and by reducing things to one and the same standard value，that is by leveling out countless fluctuations，mutual alternations of distance and proximity，of oscillation and equilibrium，it levels out what would otherwise impose far-reaching changes upon the possibilities for the individual's activities and experiences.It is significant that we term money in circulation‘liquid’money：like a liquid it lacks internal limits and accepts without resistance external limits that are offered by any solid surroundings.Thus，money is the most decisive and completely indifferent means for transposing the supra-individual rhythm in the conditions of life into the harmony and stability that allow a freer，more individual and more objective confirmation of our personal energies and interests.Yet it is precisely this insubstantial nature of money that enables it to support the systematization and tempo of life wherever the level of development or personal trends press for it.While we have observed that there is a close correlation between liberal constitutions and the money economy，it is just as worthy of note that money provides an extremely efficient technique for despotism，as a means for incorporating the most remote places into its rule which，in a barter economy，always tend to separate and become autonomous.And whereas the individualistic society of England has developed and become a major power through the growth of its financial system，money is also the precursor of socialistic forms of society not only through the dialectical process of turning liberalism into its negation，but also quite directly because，as we have seen，specific monetary conditions present the blueprint or type of social form that socialism strives to establish.

Money here becomes a category among the forces of life whose distinctive characteristic is that their essence and meaning is to rise above the antagonisms that exist within their respective sphere of interests and to be quite indifferent towards them while at the same time participating in these antagonisms by taking sides where once they had been unconcerned or judges.First，this is true of religion which man needs in order to reconcile the dichotomy between his wants and their satisfaction，between his moral demands and his practice，between his ideal notion of the world and reality.If such conciliation is accomplished，however，religion no longer remains upon the heights that its highest moments have achieved but steps down to the battle arena and identifies with one side of the dualism of existence which it had previously unified.On the one hand，religion confronts what we experience as our whole life as an equivalent power；it is a totality that exists above all the relativity of human nature.On the other hand，religion is part of life as one of its elements，and the whole of life depends on its interplay with all other elements.Thus，religion is both a whole organism and at the same time a single organ；it is a part of existence and at the same time existence itself on a higher internalized level.The same form is disclosed by the behavior of the State.It is certainly in the nature of the State to stand above parties and their conflicting interests；the power of the State owes its unimpeachabilit and its position as the highest authority in society to this abstract level.Though the State is imbued with all these qualities，it none the less participates in the struggle of specific social forces，supports the party of one group against that of the other，which，in a narrower sense，confronts the State as another force，although in a wider sense it is a part of it.It is this dual position of the highest‘authorities that repeats itself in metaphysics wherever，for instance，the totality of existence is interpreted as a spiritual essence and the absolute-which creates and manifests itself in all phenomena-as a spiritual substance.Yet this absolute must，at the same time，be recognized as something relative.For in reality the spirit is confronted not only with a corporality，such that in this opposition it first realizes its own essence，but also with spiritual phenomena of an inferior kind such as wickedness，indolence and hostility.Such a metaphysics will not consider these qualities to be part of the spirit which is the absolute substance of being.Instead，the spirit is juxtaposed to all worldly and imperfect existence as a party，a balancing factor，a specific value，even though spirit as an absolute incorporates everything.This dual existence is most radically effective in the concept of the self.The self who conceives the world confronts all the specific contents of the world on an equally high level，independent of all qualities，differences and conflicts that exist within the individual，as it were，as his own private affair.But our actual sense of life does not permit the individual to remain at this high level，but identifies with certain contents more than with others just as religion has God interfere at some points，whereas He should be equally effective at all other points.The self becomes identical with a particular content of itself，it differentiates itself，positively or negatively，aligns itself at a high or low level against the rest of the world and its distinctive features，whereas the meaning of the self had placed it above all these.

This then is the kind of form that money，in relation to its sphere of domination，shares with these other forces that are so different in terms of their content.The essence of money also lies in the abstract height to which it raises itself above all individual interests and styles of life；it gains its significance in and through the movements，conflicts and the balancing of all these，as an impartial entity which does not reveal the slightest clue for or against serving a particular interest.And then，supplied with all the unique qualities of being able to transcend distances，of concentrating power and of penetrating everywherequalities that are the result of its distance from all that is specific and one-sided-money enters the service of specific wants or forms of life.And here，despite all the general similarities that money as a form shares with religion，the State and metaphysical thought，a remarkable difference emerges.All these forces，where they identify themselves with particular interest and standpoints，become distinctly partisan with regard to one side of the conflict and opposed to the adversary；they align or identify themselves with one of the specific differences to which they were previously indifferent，and in so doing exclude the other differences.Money，however，offers its services equally to almost every purpose within its sphere of influence.It does not exist in an antagonistic relationship to other things as do the other forces as soon as they transform their general meaning into a particular one.Money actually preserves the comprehensive quality of its general meaning by the uniformity with which it serves protagonists when they use their general relation to money in order to work out their differences and to fight out their conflicts.In practice，the objectivity of money is not something that lies above oppositions so as to be subsequently used illegitimately by one side against the other，but is rather，from the very outset，of service to both sides of the conflict.

In so doing，however，money does not belong to the broad category that includes air，which is breathed equally by the most diverse living organism，or weapons，which are used equally by all parties to a conflict.Yet money is the most all-embracing instance of the fact that even the most radical differences and antagonisms in the human world always leave room for similarities and community of interests.But money is more than this.The other types of nonpartisan entities simply remain aloof from the inner purposes that they serve.Money，however，no matter how alien it is as an abstract entity to all subjectivity and qualities，and as the economic abstract of the full extent of the universe of values，frequently displays the mysterious capacity for serving the distinctive essence and orientation of two antagonistic parties.The one extracts from the general reservoir of values that money represents those forces，means of expression，possibilities of communication or independence that are appropriate for its specific nature，while the opposite party receives monetary support that is no less flexible and pliable and no less helpful to its inner nature.The importance of money for the style of life lies in the fact that，precisely because of its complete detachment from all one-sided entities，it may be used by any one of them as its own instrument.Money is the symbol in the empirical world of the inconceivable unity of being，out of which the world，in all its breadth，diversity，energy and reality，flows.The indiscernible structure of things has to be subjectively interpreted by metaphysics in such a manner that the contents of the world form a merely spiritual context，that they exist in a mere ideality and that only then-of course not in a temporal process-does existence emerge above them.It has been expressed in this manner：that the‘what，gains its‘thatness’.No one is able to say what this being actually is，which qualitatively determines the difference between the real object and the merely logically valid objective content.And this being，however empty and abstract its pure notion may be，appears as the warm stream of life，flowing into the schemata of concepts of things，allowing them to blossom and unfold their very essence，no matter how diverse or antagonistic their content and attitude may be.And yet this is nothing extraneous or strange to them，but rather it is their own essence which accepts being and develops it into an effective reality.Of all external practical things-for which any analogy to the absolute is only partially validmoney comes closest to this power of being.In its very essence it too is quite external to things and completely indifferent to their differences，so that each entity can fully absorb it and develop its specific nature to its fullest extent.I have particularly emphasized the significance of money for the development of the rhythmical and the specific-objective styles of life，because the incomparable depth of their opposition illustrates very clearly this kind of activity on the part of money.

The Pace Of Life，Its Alterations And Those Of The Money Supply

Finally，there is a third influence by which money contributes to determining the form and order of the contents of life.It deals with the pace of their development，which is different for various historical epochs，for different areas of the world at any one time and for individuals of the same group.Our inner world extends，as it were，over two dimensions，the size of which determines the pace of life.The greater the differences between the contents of our imagination at any one time-even with an equal number of conceptions-the more int ensive are the experiences of life，and the greater is the span of life through which we have passed.What we experience as the pace of life is the product of the sum total and the depth of its changes.The significance of money in determining the pace of life in a given period is first of all illustrated by the fact that a change in monetary circumstances brings about a change in the pace of life.

It has been asserted that an increase in the quantity of money whether through the import of metals or the debasement of currency，through a positive balance of trade or through the issue of paper money-would leave the internal situation of a country completely unchanged.For aside from the few people whose income is fixed and not multipliable，every commodity or piece of work would increase in money value if the supply of money increased；but since everyone is a producer as well as a consumer，then the individual would earn only that much more as he had to spend，and the situation would remain unchanged.Even if such a proportionate increase in prices were the objective effect of an increase in money supply，quite basic psychological changes would occur.No one readily decides to pay a higher price for a commodity than he did hitherto even if his income has increased in the meantime；on the other hand，everyone is easily tempted by an increased income to spend more，without considering that the increased income is balanced by price increases in daily needs.The mere increase in the supply of money that one has in one's hand intensifies-quite regardless of any awareness of its mere relativitythe temptation to spend money，and in so doing promotes a greater turnover in commodities，an increase，acceleration and multiplication in economic conceptions.The basic human trait of interpreting what is relative as an absolute conceals the transitory character of the relationship between an object and a specific amount of money and makes it appear as an objective and permanent relationship.This brings about disturbance and disorientation as soon as one link of the relationship changes.The alteration in what is active and passive is in no way immediately balanced by its psychological effects.When such changes occur the awareness of the economic processes in their previous stability is interrupted from every side and the difference between present and previous circumstances makes itself felt on every side.As long as the new adjustment does not occur，the increase in the quantity of money will cause a constant sense of disorder and psychic shocks，and will thus deepen the differences and the comparative disparity between current conceptions and thereby accelerate the pace of life.It would therefore be to invite misinterpretation were one to infer a‘consolidation of society’from the continuous increase in income.It is precisely because of the increase in money income that the lower strata become agitated，a condition that-depending upon one's political viewpoint-is interpreted either as rapacity and mania for innovation，or as healthy development and energy，but which in any case is avoided where a greater stability of income and prices exists.The latter implies at the same time the stability of social distances.

The accelerating effects of an increase in the supply of money on the development of the economic-psychic process are most conspicuously displayed by the after-effects of debased paper money，in the same way as some aspects of normal physiology are most clearly illustrated by pathological and abnormal cases.The unnatural and unfounded influx of money brings about，first of all，a shaky and illogical increase in all prices.The first plethora of money only suffices to satisfy the demand for certain categories of goods.Therefore one issue of unreliable paper money is followed by another，and the second issue by yet another.‘Any pretext’-it was stated of Rhode Island at the beginning of the eighteenth century-‘served for the additional multiplication of notes.And if paper money had driven all coins out of the country，the scarcity of silver would have been an additional reason for further paper money issues.’The tragic consequence of such operations is that a second paper money issue is unavoidable in order to satisfy the demands that are the result of the first issue.This will make itself felt all the more where money itself is the immediate centre of the movements：price revolutions that are the result of the inundation of paper money lead to speculation，which in turn requires constantly growing supplies of money.One might say that the acceleration in the pace of social life that is brought about through an increase in the supply of money is most clearly discernible when the purely functional importance of money，without reference to its substantial value，is in question.The acceleration in the whole economic tempo is here raised to a still higher pitch，because，as it were，its origin is purely immanent；that is，it first manifests itself in the acceleration in the printing of money.This interrelationship is demonstrated by the fact that，in countries with a rapid pace of economic development，paper money is particularly apt to increase in quantity.A monetary expert states with reference to North America：‘One cannot expect people who are so impatient with small gains，so convinced that wealth can be produced out of nothing or at least out of very little，to be willing to impose upon themselves the self-restrictions which in England or Germany reduce the dangers of paper money issues to a minimum.’In particular，however，the acceleration in the pace of life that is brought about through an increase in the supply of paper money results from the upheaval in ownership.This is clearly discernible in the North American paper money economy prior to the War of Independence.The abundantly printed money which had originally circulated at a high value suffered tremendous losses in value.Whoever was wealthy yesterday could be poor today；and conversely，whoever had secured fixed values for borrowed money paid his debts back in devalued money and thus became rich.Not only did it become everyone's urgent interest to transact his economic operations as quickly as possible，to avoid long-term transactions and to leam to take up opportunities immediately；but also，these fluctuations in ownership brought about a sense of continuous change，sudden rifts and convulsions within the economic scene that spread to many other areas of life and were thus experienced as the growing intensity in the trend of economic life or as a quickening of its pace.Compared with stable money，debased money has even been considered to be of specific utility：it has been claimed that it is desirable to have debts repaid in debased money，because debtors are generally active economic producers，whereas creditors are mostly passive consumers who contribute much less positively to economic transactions.The fiduciary note-issue was not yet legal currency at the beginning of the eighteenth century in Connecticut and at the beginning of the nineteenth century in England，yet every creditor was obliged to accept it in payment of debts.The specific significance of money for the pace of economic life is further substantiated by the fact that the crisis that occurs after the excessive issue of paper money retards and paralyses economic life to a corresponding degree.Here too the role of money in the objective development of the economy corresponds to its functions as a mediator in the subjective aspect of that development：for it has been rightly pointed out that exchange is slowed down by the multiplication of the means of exchange beyond what is actually required，just as the increase in the number of brokers eases transactions up to a certain point beyond which，however，it operates as a barrier to transactions.Generally speaking，the more mobile money is，the less secure is its value because everyone tries to get rid of it as quickly as possible.The obvious objection，that trade requires two people and that the ease with which base money is given away is paralyzed by the hesitancy to accept it，is not quite valid，because base money is still better than no money at all（and the same cannot always be claimed for poor merchandise）.The interest in money as such has to be discounted against the distaste for base money on the part of the seller of merchandise.Hence the interest of the buyer and the reluctance of the seller to exchange commodities for base money do not exactly balance since the latter is weaker and cannot adequately limit the acceleration of circulation through the former.On the other hand，the owner of base money，or money that is valuable only under specific circumstances，has a lively interest in the preservation of the circumstances that give value to his possessions.When in the middle of the sixteenth century the princes，debts had grown to such an extent that there were widespread national bankruptcies，and when in France the sale of annuities was practiced to an excessive extent，then it was stated in their defence-since they were very insecure-that in so doing the loyalty of the citizen as an owner of annuities to the king and his interest in saving him would thereby be greatly strengthened.It is significant that the term‘partisan’originally referred to a money-lender who was party to a loan to the Crown，while later，owing to the solidarity of interests between such bankers and the minister of finance under Mazarin and Fouquet，the term acquired the meaning of an‘unconditional supporter，and it has preserved this meaning ever since.This occurred during the period of greatest unreliability in the French finances，whereas during their improvement under Sully the partisans（moneylenders）moved into the background.And later Mirabeau，when introducing the assignat （paper currency），emphasized that wherever the currency existed the desire for its reliability ought to exist：‘You consider a defender necessary for the measures taken and a creditor interested in your success.’Thus，such money creates a specific grouping of interests and，on the basis of a new tendency towards inertia，a new animation of contrasts.

However，this assumption that these consequences of an increasing amount of money in circulation make themselves felt to a greater extent in so far as cheaper money affects producers and consumers to the same extent is far too simple.In reality such phenomena are much more complicated and volatile.This may be seen，first of all，in objective terms.The increase in the supply of money at first brings about an increase in the prices of only some commodities and leaves others as they were.It has been assumed that because of the influence of American precious metals the prices of European goods since the sixteenth century have risen in a definite and slow order of succession.The increase in the supply of money within a country always at first affects only a specific group that takes care of the flood of money.First and foremost，a rise in the prices of those goods will occur for which members of this group compete，whereas other commodities，the price of which is determined by mass consumption，will remain cheap.The gradual influx of larger supplies of money leads to attempts to balance them out，the previous price relationship of commodities is disrupted，and the budget of each household becomes accustomed to disturbances and shifts.In short，the fact that any increase in the supply of money affects the prices of goods unevenly necessarily has a disturbing effect upon the process of interpretation of the situation on the part of economically active persons.It leads to widespread experiences of differentiation，to the breakdown of existing parities and to demands for attempts to balance them out.It is certainly true that this influence-partly accelerating，partly retarding is a result not only of the unevenness of prices but also of the unevenness within money values themselves.That is，it is the result not only of the devaluation of money but，perhaps even more so，of the continuous fluctuation in the value of money.It has been said of the period prior to the great English coinage reform of 1570 that‘if all shillings had been reduced to the value of grouts，transactions would have adjusted themselves relatively easily.But the fact that one shilling equaled 6 pence，another to，and a third one 8，6 or even 4 pence made every exchange a controversy！’

The unevenness in the prices of commodities results in a situation in which certain persons and occupations profit by a change in money values in a quite specific manner while certain others suffer considerably.In former times this was especially true of the peasantry.Towards the end of the seventeenth century，the English peasant，ignorant and helpless as he was，actually became squeezed between those people whoowed him money and paid him its face value，and those to whom he owed money and insisted on payment by weight.Later the same was true in India at every new devaluation of money：if the farmer sold his harvest，he never knew whether the money received would suffice to pay the rent for his mortgage.It has long been known that wages are the last to be adjusted to a general increase in prices.The weaker a social group is，the slower and more sparingly does the increase in the amount of money trickle through to it.Frequently，an increase in income is attained only after an increase in the prices of that strata's consumer goods has long been in force.Out of this process，shocks and agitations of all kinds emerge.The growing differences between the strata require constant alertness because，in view of the new circumstances，conservative and defensive attitudes are no longer sufficient.Instead，positive struggle and conquest are required in order to preserve the status quo ante with regard to the relationship between the strata as well as the standard of living of individual strata.This is one of the basic reasons why every increase in the quantity of money，has such a disturbing effect upon the pace of social life，since it produces new differences on top of the existing ones and divisions，even in the budget of the individual family，that must constantly accelerate and deepen the level of awareness.It is quite obvious that a considerable decline in the amount of money will bring about similar effects except that they will be in reverse.The close relationship between money and the pace of life is illustrated by the fact that an increase as well as a decrease in the amount of money，as a consequence of its uneven diffusion，brings about those manifestations of differentiation that are mirrored psychologically in breakdowns，irritations and the compression of mental processes.This implication of changes in the quantity of money is only a phenomenon or an accumulation of the significance of money for the relationship of objects，that is for their psychic equivalents.Money has brought about new equations between objects.We compare them，one with another，according to their utility value，their aesthetic，ethical，eudaemonistic and labor value，with reference to hundreds of relationships of quantity and quality，so that their identity in one of these relationships may coincide with total lack of identity in another.Thus，their money value creates an equation and comparison between them that is in no way a constant function of other values，yet is always the expression of some notions of value that are the origin and combination of others.Every value standpoint that orders and ranks things differently and cuts across the usual mode of ordering things provides，at the same time，a new vitality for their relationship，a suggestion of asyet unknown combinations and syntheses，of the discovery of their affinities and differences.This is because our minds are constantly endeavouring to counterbalance what is irregular and to force differentiation upon the uniform.In so far as money confers upon things within a given sphere a sameness and differentiation to a greater extent than any other value standpoint，it thereby stimulates innumerable endeavours to combine these with the ranking derived from the other values in the sense of these two tendencies.

The Concentration Of Monetary Activity

In addition to the results of changes in the supply of money，which suggest that the pace of life is，as it were，a function of those changes，the compression of the contents of life is evident in another consequence of monetary transactions.It is a peculiar feature of monetary transactions that they tend to concentrate in a relatively few places.As far as local diffusion is concerned，it is possible to establish a scale of economic objects.Here I shall indicate only some of the characteristic levels.The scale commences with agriculture，which by its very nature resists every attempt to concentrate its different areas；agriculture is inevitably bound up with the original dispersal of space.Industrial production can be compressed to some extent：the factory is a spatial condensation compared with artisan production and domestic industry while the modem industrial centre is a manufacturing microcosm，in which every kind of raw material in the world is transformed into objective forms，whose origins are dispersed throughout the world.The most remote link in this scale is money transactions.Owing to the abstractness of its form，money has no definite relationship to space：it can exercise its effects upon the most remote areas.It is even，as it were，at any moment the central point of a circle of potential effects.On the other hand，it also enables the largest amounts of value to be condensed into the most minute form such as the S to million cheque that was once signed by Jay Gould.To the possibility of condensing values by means of money and of condensing money by means of its increasingly abstract forms，there corresponds the possibility of condensing monetary transactions.In so far as the economy of a country is increasingly based upon money，financial activities become concentrated in large centers of money transactions.In contrast to the country，the city has always been the seat of money transactions and this relationship also holds for comparisons between small towns and cities.An English historian has stated that in its whole history London，though it never functioned as the heart of England but sometimes as its brain，always operated as its purse.Similarly，it was said that already at the end of the Roman Republic every penny that was spent in Gaul entered the books of financiers in Rome.This centrifugal force that finance possesses supports the interest of both parties：that of the borrowers because they can obtain cheaper money because of the competition of inflowing capital（the interest rate in Rome was 50 per cent lower than the average in ancient times），and that of the creditors because，although money does not have such a high value as in outlying areas，they are sure of chances for investment at any time，which is more important than lending the money at a higher rate in isolated areas.As a result，it has also been pointed out that contractions in the central money market can be more easily overcome than at the various outlying points on the periphery.Through the process of centralization that is inherent in money，the preliminary stage of accumulation in the hands of scattered individuals has been surmounted.The centralization of monetary transactions on the stuck exchanges counteracted the superior power that individuals could wield by monetary means.For instance，even though the stock exchanges of Lyons and Antwerp brought enormous gains to individual money magnates during the fifteenth century，they objectified the power of money in a central institution that was superior to the power and rules of even the most powerful individuals，and they prevented the situation from arising in which a single financial house could determine the trend of world history to the extent that the Fuggers had once done.

The more basic reason for the evolution of financial centers is obviously to be found in the relativity of money.This is because，on the one hand，money expresses only value relationships between commodities，while on the other the value of every definite quantity of money cannot be as directly ascertained as can that of any other commodity；it has significance only in comparison with the total amount that is offered.Therefore，the maximum concentration of money at one point，the continuous competition of huge amounts，the balancing of a major part of supply and demand as such，will lead to the more accurate determination of its value and to its greater utilization.A bushel of grain has a particular importance at any one place，no matter how isolated and regardless of its money value.A certain quantity of money，however，is important only in relation to other values.Hence，in order to attain a stable and just valuation，money has to be confronted with as many other values as possible.This is the reason why not only‘everything presses for gold’-men as well as things-but also why money itself presses for‘everything’.It seeks to come together with other money，with all possible kinds of values and their owners.The same interrelationship operates in the opposite direction：the convergence of large numbers of people brings about a particularly strong need for money.In Germany，one of the main demands for money arose out of annual fairs organized by local lords in order to profit from the exchange of currency and the tax on goods.Through this enforced concentration of commercial transactions at a single point in a larger territory，the inclination to buy and sell was greatly increased and the need for money thereby first became a general necessity.Wherever increasingly large numbers of people come together，money becomes relatively that much more in demand.Because of its indifferent nature，money is the most suitable bridge and means of communication between many and diverse people.The more people there are，the fewer are the spheres within which they can base their transactions except through monetary interests.

The Mobilization Of Values

All this illustrates to what great extent money symbolizes acceleration in the pace of life and how it measures itself against the number and diversity of inflowing and alternating impressions and stimuli.The tendency of money to converge and to accumulate，if not in the hands of individuals then in fixed local centers；to bring together the interests of and thereby individuals themselves；to establish contact between them on a common ground and thus，as determined by the form of value that money represents，to concentrate the most diverse elements in the smallest possible space-in short，this tendency and capacity of money has the psychological effect of enhancing the variety and richness of life，that is of increasing the pace of life.It has already been emphasized elsewhere that the modem concept of time-as a value determined by its usefulness and scarcity-first became accepted with the growth of capitalism in Germany when，during the fifteenth century，world trade and financial centers developed together with the quick turnover of cheap money.It was in this period that the church clocks began to strike at every quarter of an hour；and Sebastian Franck，who was the first to recognize the revolutionary significance of money even though in a most pessimistic manner，first called time an expensive commodity.The most characteristic symbol of all these correlations is the stock exchange.Economic values and interests are here completely reduced to their monetary expression.The stock exchange and its representatives have achieved the closest possible local assembly in order to carry out the clearance，distribution and balancing of money in the quickest manner possible.This twofold condensation of values into the money form and of monetary transactions into the form of the stock exchange makes it possible for values to be rushed through the greatest number of hands in the shortest possible time.The New York Stock Exchange，for instance，has a turnover every year that is five times the amount of the cotton harvest through speculation in cotton，and even in 1887 fifty times the total yearly production of oil was sold there.The frequency of the turnover increases with fluctuations in the quoted price of a particular value.Indeed，the fluctuations in the rate of exchange was the reason why regular stock exchange dealings in royal promissory notes [ Korugsbriefen ] developed at all in the sixteenth century.For these notes，which reflected the changing credit status of，for instance，the French Crown，provided a completely different inducement to buying and selling than had previously existed with stable values.Changes in valuation are greatly increased and even often brought about by the flexible quality of money to express them directly.And this is the cause as well as the effect of the fact that the stock exchange is the centre of monetary transactions.It is，as it were，the geometrical focal point of all these changes in valuation，and at the same time the place of greatest excitement in economic life.Its sanguinecholeric oscillations between optimism and pessimism，its nervous reaction to ponderable and imponderable matters，the swiftness with which every factor affecting the situation is grasped and forgotten again-all this represents an extreme acceleration in the pace of life，a feverish commotion and compression of its fluctuations，in which the specific influence of money upon the course of psychological life becomes most clearly discernible.

Finally，the relative speed of circulation of money in relation to all other objects must immediately increase the general pace of life wherever money becomes the general centre of interest.The roundness of coins which makes them‘roll’symbolizes the rhythm of the movement that money imparts to transactions.Even where coins originally possessed comers，their constant use must have smoothed the comers and rounded them off；physical necessity has thus provided the most useful form of instrument for the intensity of transactions.For centuries in the countries bordering on the Nile there even existed globular money composed of glass，wood or agate-the differences in the material used suggests that its form was the reason for its popularity.It is no coincidence that the principle of‘rounding off’is applied with reference to large sums of money，since this principle corresponds to the expanding money economy.‘Rounding off’is a relatively modem term.The most primitive form of cheques payable to the English Treasury were tallies for any irregular amount and they frequently circulated as money.Only in the eighteenth century were they replaced by endorsable paper bills which represented rounded-off amounts from £ 5 upwards.It is surprising how little attention was formerly paid to rounding off，even for large amounts of money.That the Fuggers in 1530 agreed to pay 275，333 florins and 20 crowns to the Emperor Ferdinand，and that Emperor Maximilian II in 1577 owed them 220，674 florins，are not isolated cases.The development of the institution of shares followed a similar course.The joint stock of the East India Company in the Netherlands in the seventeenth century could be split up into any proportions that might be desired.Only the acceleration of transactions finally brought about the situation in which a fixed unit of 500 Flemish pounds became the only possible unit of ownership or‘share’in its trade.Even today in the retail trade，monetary transactions are calculated in rounded off amounts in places with a considerable volume of money transactions，whereas prices in more remote regions would appear to be rarely rounded off.

The above-mentioned development from inconveniently large to smaller coins and money orders clearly has the same significance for the acceleration of the speed of transactions as the rounding off process，which itself suggests a physical analogy.The need to have money in small amounts increases with the speed of transactions.In this context，it is significant that in 1844 an English bank note circulated on average for fifty-seven days before being redeemed，whereas in 1871 it circulated for only thirty-seven days！If one compares the velocity of circulation of landed property with that of money，then this immediately illustrates the difference in the pace of life between periods when the one or the other was the focal point of economic activity.One thinks，for example，of the character of tax payments with reference to external and internal fluctuations depending on the object on which they were levied.In Anglo-Saxon and Norman England taxes were imposed exclusively upon land ownership：during the twelfth century levies were imposed on the possession of cattle；shortly afterwards，certain portions of mobile property（the fourth，seventh and thirteenth parts）became taxable.The objects of taxation became more and more diverse until finally money income was made the proper basis of taxation.In so doing，taxation attains a hitherto-unknown degree of flexibility and adjustability，and the result is a much greater variability and yearly fluctuation in the contribution of individuals，combined with a greater stability of the total revenue produced.The direct significance of and emphasis upon landed property or money for the pace of life may explain the great value that very conservative peoples place upon agriculture.The Chinese are convinced that only agriculture secures the peace and perpetuation of states，and perhaps for this reason they have imposed a huge tax upon the sale of land，so that most sales of land are carried out privately and without official registration.But where the acceleration of economic life that is instigated by money has asserted itself，it seeks to impose its rhythm upon the resistant form of landed property.During the eighteenth century the state of Pennsylvania provided mortgages for private land purchase and permitted the bills to be circulated as paper money.Benjamin Franklin stated that these bills were，in reality，coined land. Similarly，in Germany it has been asserted by conservatives that the legislation of recent decades concerning mortgages will bring about a liquidation of landed property and will transform it into some kind of paper money that could be given away in bills of any desired amount so that，as Waldeck also puts it，landed property would seem to exist only in order to be sold by auction.Not surprisingly，modem life too mobilizes its contents in the most superficial sense and in several less well known respects.In medieval times and also during the Renaissance，what we today term‘movables’or furnishings in the strict sense were little in demand.Wardrobes，sideboards and benches were built into the paneling；tables and chairs were so heavy that they were often immovable，and small movable fixtures were almost nonexistent.Subsequently，furniture，like capital，has become mobile.

Finally，I wish to illustrate by means of a legal regulation the power of the trend in the money economy to subject other contents of life to its own pace.It is an old legal precept that an object that has been taken away from its legal owner has to be returned to him in all circumstances，even if the present owner has acquired it legitimately.Only with reference to money is this precept invalid：according to Roman as well as modem law，money that has been stolen cannot be taken away from a third person who has acquired it in good faith and returned to the original owner.This exception is obviously necessitated by the practice of business transactions which would otherwise be considerably handicapped，disturbed and disrupted.But recently，however，this restitutory dispensation has been extended to cover all other objects that come under rule of the commercial code.This implies that the acceleration in commercial transactions makes every commodity similar to money.It allows them to function only as money value and subjects them to the same regulations that money itself requires for the purpose of facilitating its transactions！

Constancy And Flux As Categories For Comprehending

The World The following consideration may serve to characterize the contribution that money makes to the determination of the pace of life by its specific nature and in addition to its technical consequences that have already been mentioned above.The more precise analysis of the concepts of constancy and change reveals a dual opposition in the form in which they are realized.If we consider the substance of the world，then we easily end up in the idea of an εvxaiπāv of an unchangeable being，that suggests，through the exclusion of any increase or decrease in things，the character of absolute constancy.If，on the other hand，we concentrate upon the formation of this substance，then constancy is completely transcended；one form is incessantly transformed into another and the world takes on the aspect of a per petuum mobile. This is the cosmologically，and often metaphysically interpreted，dual aspect of being.However，if a thoroughgoing empirical method is applied，this contrast between constancy and flux takes on a different aspect.If we observe the image of the world as it immediately presents itself to us，then there are certain forms that do persist through time，whereas the real elements of which they are composed are in continuous motion.Thus，for example，the rainbow persists despite the constantly changing position of the water particles；the organic form persists despite the constant exchange of material of which it is composed.Indeed，in every inorganic object only the relationship and the interaction of the smallest parts persist，whereas the parts themselves，hidden to our eyes，are in constant molecular flux.Thus，reality itself is in a restless flux，and though we are unable to observe this because，as it were，we lack the sharpness of sight，the forms and constellations of movements solidify in the appearance of the enduring object.

As well as these two contrasts in the application of the concepts of constancy and flux to the world as it is perceived，there exists a third.Constancy may have a meaning that goes beyond any extended period of time.The simplest，but in this context a sufficient，instance of this is the law of nature：The validity of the law of nature rests on the fact that a certain constellation of elements necessarily results in a definite effect.This necessity is totally independent of when the preconditions present themselves in reality.Whether it be once or a million times，at this moment or in a hundred thousand years hence，the validity of the law is eternal in the sense of timelessness.Its essence and very notion exclude any change or motion.It does not matter，at this point，that we cannot ascribe unconditional validity with unconditional certainty to any single law of nature.This is not only because our comprehension，which cannot distinguish between the recurrent but fortuitous combination of phenomena and actual causal relationships，is necessarily subject to corruptibility，but rather，and above all，because each law of nature is valid only for a definite state of mind，whereas for another one the truth would lie in a different formulation of the same factual state of affairs.However，since the human mind is liable to develop no matter how slowly and indiscernibly，there can be no law that is valid at a given moment that is not subject to change in the course of time.Yet this change refers only to the perceptible content of the law of nature and to its meaning and concept.The notion of a law-which exists regardless of any instance of its imperfect realization but which none the less justifies the idea and gives it meaning-rests upon that absence of all motion，upon that validity that is independent of all given conditions because they are changeable.There must be a corresponding phenomenon in the form of motion to this distinctive absolute form of persistence.Just as constancy may extend over any extent of time，no matter how long，until any relationship to a specific moment of time is simply dissolved by the eternal validity of the law of nature or the mathematical formula，so too change and motion may be conceived of as absolutes，as if a specific measurement of time for them did not exist.If all motion proceeds between a‘here’and a‘there’，then through this absolute motionthe species aeternitatis in reverse-the‘here’completely disappears.Whereas timeless objects are valid in the form of permanency，their opposites are valid in the form of transition，of non-permanency.I am in no doubt that this pair of opposites is comprehensive enough to develop a view of the world out of them.If，on the one hand，one knew all the laws that control reality，then reality would actually be reduced to its absolute contents，to its eternal timeless significance.This would be true even though reality could not yet be constructed on this basis since the law as such，according to its ideal content，is completely indifferent towards any individual instance of its realization.But it is precisely because the content of reality is completely absorbed in these laws，which constantly produce effects out of causes and simultaneously allow these effects to operate as causes，that it is possible，on the other hand，to perceive reality，the concrete，historical，experiential appearance of the world in that absolute flux that is indicated by Heraclitus'symbolic formulation.If one reduces the view of the world to this opposition，then everything of duration，everything that points beyond the immediate moment，is extracted from reality and assembled in the ideal realm of mere laws.In reality itself things do not last for any length of time；through the restlessness with which they offer themselves at any moment to the application of a law，every form becomes immediately dissolved in the very moment when it emerges；it lives，as it were，only by being destroyed；every consolidation of form to lasting objects-no matter how short they last-is an incomplete interpretation that is unable to follow the motion of reality at its own pace.The unity of the whole of being is completely comprehended in the unity of what simply persists and what simply does not persist.

Money As The Historical Symbol Of The Relative Character Of Existence

There is no more striking symbol of the completely dynamic character of the world than that of money.The meaning of money lies in the fact that it will be given away.When money stands still，it is no longer money according to its specific value and significance.The effect that it occasionally exerts in a state of repose arises out of an anticipation of its further motion.Money is nothing but the vehicle for a movement in which everything else that is not in motion is completely extinguished.It is，as it were，an actus purus ；it lives in continuous self-alienation from any given point and thus forms the counterpart and direct negation of all being in itself.

But perhaps it represents，no less as a symbol，the opposite form，that of defining reality.The individual amount of money is，in fact，by its very nature in constant motion.But this is only because its value relates to the individual objects of value，just as the general law relates to the concrete conditions in which it realizes itself.If the law，which itself stands above all motions，none the less represents the form and basis of all motions，then the abstract value of wealth that is not subdivided into individual values and that is represented by money is，as it were，the soul and purpose of economic activities.As a tangible item money is the most ephemeral thing in the externalpractical world；yet in its content it is the most stable，since it stands as the point of indifference and balance between all other phenomena in the world.The ideal purpose of money，as well as of the law，is to be a measure of things without being measured itself，a purpose that can be realized fully only by an endless development.Money expresses the relationship that exists between economic goods.Money itself remains stable with reference to the changes in relationships，as does a numerical proportion which reflects the relationship between many and changing objects，and as does the formula of the law of gravity with reference to material masses and their infinitely varying motion.Just as the general concept in its logical validity is independent of the number and modification of its realizations，indicating，as it were，their lawfulness，so too money-that is，the inner rationale by which the single piece of metal or paper becomes money-is the general concept of objects in so far as they are economic.They do not need to be economic；but if they wish to be，they can do so only by adjusting to the law of valuation that is embodied in money.

The observation that this one institution participates equally in the two basic forms of reality may explain the relationship of these two forms.Their significance is actually a relative one；that is，each finds its logical and psychological possibility for interpreting the world in the other.Only because reality is in constant motion is there any sense in asserting its opposite：the ideal system of eternally valid lawfulness.Conversely，it is only because such lawfulness exists that we are able to comprehend and grasp that stream of existence that would otherwise disintegrate into total chaos.The general relativity of the world，at first glance familiar to only one side of this opposition，in reality also engulfs the other side and proves to be its mistress where it only appeared to be a party.In the same way，money transcends its significance as a single economic value in order to represent abstract economic value in general and to entwine both functions in an indissoluble correlation in which neither is the first.

Money，as an institution of the historical world，symbolizes the behavior of objects and establishes a special relationship between itself and them.The more the life of society becomes dominated by monetary relationships，the more the relativistic character of existence finds its expression in conscious life，since money is nothing other than a special form of the embodied relativity of economic goods that signifies their value.Just as the absolutist view of the world represents a definite stage of intellectual development in correlation with the corresponding practical，economic and emotional conditions of human affairs，so the relativistic view of the world seems to express the momentary relationship of adjustment on the part of our intellect.More accurate，it is confirmed by the opposing images of social and subjective life，in which money has found its real effective embodiment and the reflected symbol of its forms and movements.

第六章 生活风格

第一节

通过货币经济实现的理智功能对情感功能的优势

在一些研究中我们经常提到，相比于被统称为情感或情绪的那些心理力量，智力力量是由货币经济这一特殊现象所引起的心理力量，而在货币经济尚未普遍流行的时期以及领域，情感或情绪是占据着主要地位。首先，这是货币被当作工具手段的特性造成的后果。货币的所有的工具手段都意味着：现实中的环境与关联与我们的意志过程是融为一体的。正是由于我们拥有了真实的因果关系的客观映像，这一融合过程才成其为可能，而且，毫无疑问，能够看到全局的精神当然也能够控制从任何起点出发的，用以实现任何目的最为合适手段。尽管这种智力能量包含着某种十分完美的手段工具，但却未必能把这种十分完美的手段工具转化为现实，这是因为要使这些手段发挥作用，必须依靠某种目标的确立；只有与这个目标建立联系，这些真正的力量和关系才能成为手段工具。就目标本身而言，它只有通过意志行为才能被创造出来。除非有意志存在，否则，客观世界是不会有什么目的性的；理智世界也是这样的；理智仅仅是对世界内容是否完美这一情况的再现。意志是盲目的，这句话说得很对，但也常常被误解了。意志的盲目与霍德或瞎眼的塞克拉普斯一样的无目的地乱撞有着截然不同的含义。从理性的价值观来看，意志不会做出任何非理性的事；相反，除非意志获得某种完全与其自身不相关的内容，否则它根本无法改变任何事物。因为就意志自身而言，它不过如存在、义务、希望等等一样是一种心理形式，而正是这些心理形式构成了我们的生活内容。意志只不过是这样一种范畴的事物一即可能通过相应的肌肉反应或神经反应在心理上得到实现——借助于这种范畴的事物，我们理解世界的观念上的内容，并以此来给我们的实践赋予某种的意义。意志仅仅是达到一定独立自主程度的形式的名字，并未自主地选择任何一种确定的内容，因此，站在理智世界的立场上，世界内容的纯粹意识也很少能确定任何目标。世界内容不是完全中性的，恰恰相反，世界的内容会被意志以某种无法预知的方式染上个人的感情色彩。一旦世界具有了某种感情色彩之后，人们就会发现意志以纯粹逻辑化的方式转变成别的概念，而正是这种概念，它一方面与之前的概念保持某种因果关系，在另一方面，现在的这些概念有时会变成了通向“最终目标”的“手段方法”。既然只有理智引领我们穿越事物之间客观的联系，因此无论理智把我们引向何方，我们都要彻底地依靠它。通过理智这种中介，意志调整自己以适应那些不以意志为转移的存在。如果我们能构想出某种计量工具的严格方法并遵守这个方法，那么当我们按这种方法方式采取行动的时候，我们就成了纯粹理论的、完全非实际的存在。意志一直与我们一系列的思考相一致，就如同是低声部的长音一样，或者如同某个领域的普遍前提条件一样，而这个普遍前提条件并不影响这个领域的特性以及环境，但它只会给这个领域带来生命与现实。

方法的数量以及序列构成了我们的活动内容，而方法数量的多少以及序列的长短却是与主观地表现客观世界秩序的理智性成比例发展的。既然诸如此类的方法本身都是完全中立的，那么，在现实中，所有的情感价值都是与行动的目的地、行动的关键点紧紧联系在一起的，如果这个目的地与关键点得以被发现，那么它就不再对我们的行动产生影响，而只能影响我们心灵的感受能力。在现实生活中，这样的目的地越多，那么与理智有着密切联系的情感功能就会愈加强烈。据说，原始人类的强烈的欲望与冲动的情绪可能是与他们目的序列比较短有关。原始人其一生所从事的劳动中缺乏具有凝聚型的元素，而这种元素在较为高级的文明却是比比皆是，即一种“职业”始终如一地贯穿人的一生。恰恰相反，原始人的活动都是由单纯的兴趣序列组成的，这些序列只需凭借相对较少的手段就可完全实现其目的。在这种兴趣序列组成的联系中，获取食物的直接效用是其生活中的重要的实质性要素，但在高级文化里这种重要作用却几乎被一系列连续的、多方面联系的目的而代替了。在这种环境中，终极目标的概念向往出现的相对比较频繁；理智性——对客观联系的意识以及对现实的意识——产生作用的次数比情绪化内容发挥的作用的次数要少，情绪化的内涵是构成终极目标的直接概念的典型特征，也是终极目的直接显现的典型特征。即使在中世纪，那也存在着比现在还要多的满足目的性行动的具体方面，这是因为当时的人们建立了各种各样的手工作坊，使得满足个人自身需要的生产占主导地位，另外还有一个特殊的原因就是，通过教会联系起来的行会的多样性和封闭性。这种在中世纪直截了当且瞬间就可以满足的需求，而在现在却需要通过那些拐弯抹角的方式以及无限漫长的准备时间才能得以满足，现在的目的通常是要超越那一时刻，甚至要超越个体的需求。相比于古代而言，序列的延伸首先是由货币通过下面的方式实现的：货币在起初毫无瓜葛的各个序列之上塑造了一种共同的核心兴趣，从而把它们联系在一起，所以，一个序列可以为其自身变成另一个实际上与之毫不相关的序列做准备（举个例子说，某一序列的货币利润以及整个序列的货币利润都被变成了另一系列的资金援助的基础）。然而，关键在于一个普遍的事实——而对于这一事实的出现，我们之前也已经分析过了——BP，当货币时时处处都被当作是目的的时候，这会使得许多真正目的性的事物被迫降格为纯粹的手段。可是既然货币本身是无处不在的手段工具，那么我们存在的各种各样的要素就会处于一种无所不包的目的论关系中，在这个关系中存在的各种各样内容既没有最重要的也没有最不重要的。更进一步讲，既然货币对一切客观事物都是以一种中立的不偏不倚的客观性衡量标准，而且还由于这样来衡量的价值标准决定了与各种对象的关系，那么一张由生活内容编织而成的网就出现了，而且这个网就像按自然规律运行的宇宙一样，不断地聚合，并严格地遵守因果关系。就像自然通过赋予所有的事物以生命的方式把万事万物紧密联结在一起一样，这张网也被无处不在的金钱价值紧密地联系在一起了。跟货币一样，能量看起来也有各种各样的形式，而这些各种各样的形式的质的统一性及其能由任意一种具体形式转化为另一种形式的可能性，导致了这样一种关系的产生，即各种形式相互关联起来，使所有形式都互为条件。正如在对自然过程的理解中，任何偏重情感的解释都已经销声匿迹，被一种客观理智的解释取代一样，由于我们生活世界里的客观事物及其相互关系组成了日益相互联系的系列，这也使情感的影响变得销声匿迹了。情感变为了纯粹的理智的产物，而这种转变似乎只有在目的论的终点才会发生。生活的组成部分日渐转变为手段工具，各个序列在此之前是以一种自治的方式结束的，而如今这些序列相互联结并形成了一个由相对要素组成的综合体，而这种变化不仅仅是对自然的因果关系不断增多的认识的对应物，以及自然的绝对成分转变为相对成分在实际生活里的对应物。恰恰相反，既然手段的整个结构在先前看来是一种因果关系，那么对理智力来说，现实世界将成为一个越来越麻烦的问题；更准确地说，可想象的行为内容在客观和主观上都成了推算得出的理性关系，并且如果不断地把这种做法持续下去，那么只附着在生活的转折点和终极目标上的带有感情的强烈反应和决定将被排除出去。

生活风格的缺乏特征性及客观性

理智的意义和货币对生活的意义二者之间的这种关系确定了此二者都处于支配地位的那些时代的特征以及兴趣范围的特征。而且这些特征的确立起初是通过否定的方式开始的：即通过对特性的某种缺乏开始的。如果说特性一直意味着人或物通过远离或者排斥他者的方式来实现其独特的存在方式的话，那么我们可以说理智是绝不受这些因素的左右的。因为，理智是现实的不带任何感情色彩的镜子，在现实中，所有的人或所有的物都享受同等的权利，它们的权利就在它们的现实存在之中。可以很确切地说，人的理智性有着各种不同的特征，但严格地讲，这些特征要么只是程度不同——既深刻或者肤浅，宽泛或者狭窄，要么是因为其他心理力量如情感或意志等的添加而引起了区别。作为纯概念的理智是绝对没有特征的，这并不是意味着它缺乏某些必需的性质，而是由于它的存在彻底摆脱了有选择的片面性，而正是片面性决定了特性。很显然，货币也存在着同样的缺乏特征性。货币本身只是事物相对价值的机械反映，对任何人的用处都一样，因此，在金钱交易中人人价值相等，这不是因为人人都有价值，而由于除了钱别的都毫无价值。但是，理智和货币的缺乏特征性都超出了这纯粹的否定性含义。我们要求所有的事物都具有明确的特征性，也许这样的要求并不总是恰当的，并且为此我们埋怨纯粹的理论家，他们由于理解一切东西所以他们总是倾向于宽容一切：客观性对上帝来说可能是合适的，但对人来说却从来都不是适合的，因为客观性会使人陷入既明显地违背他的本性又违反其在社会中所扮演的角色的双重矛盾之中。由于货币经济的核心价值常常沦为最卑鄙的阴谋诡计一种百依百顺的工具，所以，我们也常因此而怨恨货币经济；然而，这一切的怨恨是不能通过这样一个事实来弥补的：即高尚的行动和卑劣的行为一样，货币经济都为其提供了一种百依百顺的工具。相反，一系列的金钱操作与我们的一系列的高级价值概念之间的偶然关系也被明显地揭露出来了，而且这种事物衡量另一种事物的无意义性也被明显地揭示出来了。由于当代的货币经济所引起的情感生活的特征差异消除的现象与之前时代的人在情感生活上所表现的直率与粗野形成了鲜明的对比；甚至于那些在本性与地位方面有着极大的差别的人们都可以轻而易举在理智上相互理解，然而在过去的时代，即使是但丁这种理智超群且专注于理论思考的人也曾说过，对待某些论敌，我们的回应应该用刀子而不是用理由；这种相互理解的趋势源于我们对内在生活的基本问题漠不关心，有人可能会把这些问题当做是灵魂拯救的最高层面的问题，对此理性是无能为力的。这样的趋势一直上升到世界和平的观念，这个观念尤其受自由主义者们的青睐，而这些自由主义者们恰是那些理智主义者以及金钱交易推崇者的历史代表。所有这一切都是缺乏特征性这一否定性命题所产生的正面后果，这种不带感情色彩的中立性反而变成了达到顶点的金钱交易的职业活动的特色风格。在现代城市中，有相当多数量的特殊职业，这些职业既没有客观的形式也没有确定性的活动，比如说，某些行业的代理人和经纪人，以及大城市里所有不确定的谋生形式，依靠各种各样碰运气的赚钱机会而生存。对这些人来说，那个由一系列目的所编织的像网一样的经济生活，除了赚钱之外，再无任何具体的确定性的内容。对于这些没有确定的谋生形式的人来说，货币这个绝对不固定事物却变成了一个固定的目的，他们就是在以货币为中心的一个无限宽广的领域里活动的。这种“没有技术含量的工作”是非常特别的，这是因为，它与我们通常所说的那些没有技术含量的工作相比仍旧是很有技术性的。我们通常所说的那些没有技术含量的工作在本质上无非是指纯粹的体力劳动，并且在这种体力劳动中，耗费的劳动量完全比表现这种劳动的形式更重要。若没有这种类型的体力劳动，最近英国希望把这样的工人组织成工会的尝试就不可能发生了，因此，这种类型的体力劳动，即使在最低级的工人中，也仍然保留着其特色。那些通过尽可能夺得方法去捞钱的人，他们在生活中缺乏任何的事先的确定性，而且这种缺乏的程度远甚于那些银行家，对银行家而言，货币不仅是终极目标也是他们进行活动的原材料，货币同样可以产生出具体的、早已指明了的方向、特殊的兴趣序列，以及某种专门职业特性的特征。但是，在那些有问题的谋生方式中，通向货币这个最终目标的路却偏离了实际的统一体及关系。作为终极目标的货币对各种各样的活动和兴趣产生的夷平过程在这里只是遭到最为无力地抵抗，通过个人的经济活动来影响个体的那些确定性和感情色彩也消失得无影无踪了。显而易见，只有当人们拥有了一种更高的理智性——也就是我们所说的“明智”——的时候，这样的生活方式才会获得成功，或者说才会变得可能。可以把这种更为高级的理智性称做“明智”，这意味着理智与从任何客观的或主观的标准而来的决定的都被切断了，绝对地服从于相关的个人利益。或许有人已经预料到了，那些背井离乡的人尤其愿意从事那些缺乏“职业存在形式”的工作，而这种“职业存在形式”正是个人与其生活内容之间固定的观念上的联系，所以，这些背井离乡之人也常被怀疑为不可靠的人。在印度，那些佣金代理人以及代理商甚至成了“以欺骗同伴为生的人”的代名词。他们是些都市生活的产物，其唯一的目标就是用一切可能的手段和方法去赚钱，所以他们更需要的是一般意义上的理智，因为对他们来说，拥有专业知识是根本不可能的。他们成为了都市中不稳定的那一类人的一个主要的分支，这些不稳定的人很难被正确地加以约束和“安置”，因为他们的流动性和多功能型使得他们看起来就像是无法被束缚于任何环境之下。这些现象预示了：货币与理智一样，拥有非事先的确定性和无特性的一般特征。只有在非事先的确定性和无特性两种因素同时存在的情形下，货币与理智才能得到发展。

理智与货币的双重角色：关于二者超越个体的内容

现代经济的冲突残忍无情，而且这种强烈的冲突与货币经济的这些属性背道而驰，这是因为，人们对货币的赤裸裸的兴趣使得经济冲突得以释放出来。这种强烈的冲突，不仅是由经济的冲突发生在这样一个客观领域——在这个客观领域中，个人的意义不是取决于他的性格，而是取决于他体现着一种确定的实际的经济潜能，而且还有一个原因那就是，在这样一个客观的领域里，你今天的对手很有可能在明天就成为了你的盟友。更进一步讲，更为主要的意义在于：某一领域内设立的各种规则仍旧会受到在该领域之外的、完全不同于该领域的、却被认为是有效的那些规定的影响。比方说，一种宗教从其教义宣讲的内容以及其对教徒的要求的角度看来很可能是和平的福音，但对异教徒和相邻的领域看来，他们却是极富侵略性与凶残性的；与之相似的，一个人可能会受一种与他自己的人生哲学完全背道而驰的另一种感情和思想所激发，以至于在这种截然对立的思想与情感中，得到他原本所不具备的东西；从某种艺术本身的概念以及艺术理念来看，这种艺术可能是完全自然主义的，直接联系自然，并把纯粹的再现自然作为这种艺术理念的最高目标，然而，事实却是这样的：这种忠实地献身于现实的表现以及并热心于反映现实的艺术努力，与其他组成生活的内容相比，却代表了生活体系中一种绝对理想的内容，而这种理想主义的内容远远超越了所有的自然主义的现实。正如理论——逻辑上的尖锐对立并不会对理智特有的调和原则产生影响一样，——这是因为只要能把这种理论逻辑上的对立从情绪的对立，或意志的对立，以及建立在感情基础上的难以证明的公理的对立，转移到了理论上的对立的话，那么在原则上争端就可以得到解决——货币经济中利益的冲突也很少会对货币所特有的不带感情色彩的中立性原则产生影响，货币所具有的特性能够使对立的双方超越了真正的个人因素，并最终提供互相理解的基础。毫无疑问，以纯理性主义的方式对待人和事物看起来有些过于冷漠。然而，这种解决对立的方式不是一种积极主动的方式，而仅是纯粹的逻辑产生的结果，这种纯粹的逻辑是与尊重、善良和微妙的感情毫无瓜葛的。下面这种情况也是出于同样的原因，既然在这些只关心金钱的人看来自己的行为与其自身的逻辑是一致的，他的行为也是完全公正的，且没有任何坏念头的，那么，他自然就无法理解为什么人们谴责他们是冷酷而又凶残的。有一点必须铭刻在心，那就是，我们这里所涉及的只是作为经济交易活动中的货币，这是因为，这类货币会由于其他各种各样实质性的动机，而可能会产生出完全不同的特征。事实上，不考虑理智性所引起的冲突的加剧以及货币经济所带来的矛盾冲突的其他任何后果，那么，生活将不再由我们称之为生活风格的客观性的这一种特定的规定性所决定。这种特征不是额外附加在理智之上的，恰恰相反，是理智与生俱来的本性。理智是人类所拥有的唯一的一种可以不借助主观的武断地判断来理解人与事物的关系的手段。即使我们假设所有的客观现实都是由我们的思想的功能所决定，我们依然会把思想的功能看作理智，并通过思想的功能，使我们感受到世界在其具体的意义上是客观的，而不去理会理智在何种程度上是由其他力量所激起，并受其他力量所引导。对于上述情况的最为典型的例子就是斯宾诺莎，在他的哲学中，我们看到了一种对世界的最为客观的态度；每一个单独的个体在其内在本性上都需要有其和谐连续的存在必然性；那些无可计数的个体的希望打破世界统一的逻辑数学结构的行为是不允许的。这种世界观及其原则的功能就是一种纯粹的理智功能。这种世界观本身也是主观地建立在对事物的单纯理解的基础之上，而且这种理解对于实现他们的世界观的要求是足够的。然而，这种理智性本身是建立在一种强烈的宗教情感的基础之上的，也是一种建立在完全超越现实基础的理论性的关系之上，而且现实的基础从来都不会干涉理智的独立的过程。总体来看，印度民族表现出类似的结合关系。据说，无论是在最遥远的过去还是在最为熟悉的现代，无论是交战双方对印度农民来说是友方还是敌方，这些农民都可以安然地耕自己的田，不受任何敌对一方的干扰，因为农民是“朋友和仇敌共同的资助者”。显而易见，这是用客观态度来处理实际事件的一种极端的例子。那些看起来很自然的主观冲动被彻底清除掉了，而实际考虑所关注的就只有那些有实际意义的内容。这种把主观的冲动与实际的内容进行区分的行为的是对客观利弊的考虑的结果，而非个人的一时冲动的产物。但印度整个民族也是完全理性化的。在严格的逻辑方面，在解释世界的冥思的深刻性方面，甚至在最宏大的幻想以及最高的伦理理念中所表现出的那种严格理性方面，印度在那个时候超过了其他所有民族，然而，这也使得印度在表达温馨的情感方面、在表现意志力方面又不如其他所有民族。这个民族完全变成了世界发展过程中的旁观者，一个极富有逻辑性的设计者，但印度这个民族所具有的这种特征最终取决于情感的决定，取决于他们所遭受的巨大的痛苦，而宇宙必然性的一种形而上的宗教感情正是从这样一种巨大的痛苦中产生出来的，这是因为个体无论在情感领域里，还是在化悲痛为力量的生命实践里，都没有抵御这种痛苦的能力。

同样，生活环境客观性本身也是生活环境与货币的关系所产生的结果。在这之前的文章中我已经指出过，为什么相比于原始社会无差别的主体性，贸易使生活环境有了相当大的提升。直到今天，在非洲和密克罗尼西亚群岛上的人仍然认为除了抢掠和赠礼之外，没有其他的方式可以实现产权的变更。不幸的是，直到今天，伦理学仍然认定人的动机只有两类：一类是利己主义，一类是利他主义。然而，对于那些文化上更为高级的人而言，实际利益一方面是利己和利他主义这两种主观冲动结合而成的，而另一方面，实际利益又会超越这两种冲动，正如为实际利益奉献的行为以及负责的行为二者与主体间没有任何联系，只涉及实际的利益和理念，所以，交换依据客观正确性和公正性的标准进化成一种新的产权变更方式，这种方式一方面超越了抢劫的利己主义动机，另一方面又与赠礼的利他主义动机存在差别。货币通过纯粹地隔离以及独立的化身的方式表现了交换活动的客观性的意义，既然货币完全不具备那些被交换的个别物体的所拥有的一切具体的品质，那么，在本质上，货币与任何主观经济内容的关系都应是不偏不倚并保持公正的。与此相似，理论规律体现的是自然之物的独立客观性，与这种独立的客观性相比，每一种个别的情形看起来都是偶然的，与这种偶然性相对应的是人的主观性。事实是这样的，不同的人与货币之间的内在关系是各不相同的，恰恰证明了货币彻底地独立于任何主观特殊性之外的特征。货币与其他主要的历史作用力共同拥有这种性质，我们可以把这种主要的历史作用力比做一个较大的湖，人们可以按照可以使用的容器的尺寸以及形状，从湖的任何一边盛湖中的水。在纯粹的货币经济利益中，人与人之间相互作用的客观性获得了最为充分地表达，这是因为，客观性起初仅仅是由主体力量所赋予的物质的一种外形，但最终它获得了独立的存在和规范。无论买家是谁，无论他从事何种工作，那些被出售的东西无论是何物，最终都将归入出价最高的买家的囊中。在其他等价因素发挥作用的情形之下，也就是说在荣誉、劳务、感激之情的之类的货币的等价物发生作用的情形之下，获得财产者的品性也需要被纳入考虑范畴。反过来说，当用钱买东西的时候，只要这件商品的价格是我所能够接受的，那么，我从何人那里买到我想要的商品就变得不重要了。但是，当某人通过出售一项劳务而获得想要的商品的时候，或者是在涉及内在或外在的个人义务的时候，他会对那个与他做交易的人进行仔细的检查，这是因为除了钱以外，我们不希望随便把我们所拥有的那些东西交付给任何人。银行票据上所注明了这样一种效用，即对持票人而言，他“无须身份验证”就得到款项，这典型地体现了处理金融交易事务上绝对的客观性。在理性的印度民族中，农民可以免遭战争各方的骚扰，然而，在金钱事务范围中，那些即便是比印度人更为情绪化、非理性的民族也会出现与印度相类似的情形。在一些美洲的印第安部落中，那些商人可以在交战的部落中自由走动！货币把人的行为和关系完全置于主体之外，正如智力生活一样，在涉及是纯粹理智的时候，它就会摆脱个人的主观性，并进入到理智所反映的客观的范畴之中。很明显，这暗示了一种具有优越感的关系。这和那些有钱的人要比有商品的人更具有优越感是一个道理，因此，像这样富有理智之人就会拥有某种力量，而正是这种力量使他们超越了那些情绪化的、好冲动的人。尽管从人的意义上讲，那些情绪化的、好冲动的人，是更有价值的；尽管他们的力量最终可能会超越那些富于理智的人，但是，就目前来看，这些人相比于那些富于理智的人而言是更片面、更容易受影响、更容易产生偏见的。他们和那些纯粹理性的人不同，他们无法拥有更高的视野，并运用一切可能的实际手段，而那些纯粹理性的人却可以做到这些。正是由于这种优越感——即货币与理智性都是借助客观性，来对一切特殊的生活内容都构成了优势——促使孔德在他的理想的国家中把银行家放在了现实政府的首要位置，这是因为，在他看来，银行家是具有最普遍、最抽象职能的阶级。从中世纪的行会中，我们也可以发现银行家与现实政府之间的相互关系，在当时，行会的出纳同时是行会的首领。

理智与货币的双重角色：关于个人主义和利己主义的功能

客观性和缺乏特征性是理智与货币经济的共同品质，而在这个共同品质基础上而产生的对理智与货币经济的相互关系的解释可能会遭遇到来自相反观点的严峻而又十分有力的挑战。在理智的内容之中，除了其固有的非个人化的客观性内容之外，理智和个性以及整个的个人主义原则之间存在着一种极其密切的关系。就货币自身而言，无论它是如何把行为所存在的那些主观冲动状态转化为超越个人的客观标准状态，货币都是经济个人主义和经济自我中心主义的温床。显而易见，在这里我们面对的是这些概念的模糊性以及复杂性，为了能够理解那些通过这些模糊而又复杂的概念所代表的那些生活风格，我们必须把它们清清楚楚地区分开来。如果有人能够把理智与货币的本质内容与二者的作用区分开来，换句话说就它们能在何处使用这些问题清清楚楚地区分开来，那么，理智与货币扮演的双重作用也就一目了然了。理智的第一层意义就是，理智具有一种消除差别的作用，这可以说理智具有共产主义的特征；首先，这是因为理智的内容的本质就是，理智是可以普遍交流的，并且如果我们假定理智的内容是正确的，那么每个受到足够多文化洗礼的思想都会被理智所说服。然而，在意志和情感领域里，绝对不会发生类似的情况。在理智这种情况下，每一次相同的心理状态的传递都取决于个体的既定的心境，而且这种心理状态只会有条件地屈从于任何一种外界压迫。而在意志和情感的情形下，就没有类似的例子，至少在原则上，没有发生过意志为了使那些公众的心目中相同的信念能在更大的范围传播与情感而操纵理智的例子。理智特有的学习能力意味着每个人都和他人一样处于同一水准。除此之外，理智的内容除了在极为偶然的复杂情形以外，不会具有那些因嫉妒而产生的排他性，而这种由嫉妒而生成的排他性在实际生活的内容中却是普通平常之事。举个例子说，对于那些涉及隐秘的个人关系的情感，如果其他人要是也有权利分享的话，那么这些隐秘的情感关系就彻底失去其意义和价值。对于意志的特定的目标而言，这也是非常重要的、非常本质的，即要把追求这些目标的其他的人从这种追求中排挤出去，让他们根本不可能实现这些特定的目标。另一方面，有人曾经打过这样一个恰如其分的比喻，即思想理论就如同火炬一样，它的光芒并不会因为点燃 了无数其他火炬而变得黯淡。正是因为思想理论这种潜在的没有边界的传播对自身的意义而言没有任何的影响，所以，相比于其他所有的生活内容而言，它们更加反对私有。理论在原则上要排除所有个人的偶然性，或把这些个人的偶然性同化，而理论最终要通过这样一个抹杀个性、同化个性的方式展现出来。把感情的活动以及意志的力量通过一种清晰而明确的方式记录——这种记录甚至清晰到任何人，在任何时候都可以再回到这种记录中去，并利用其客观结构不断再创造出类似的内在过程——是不可能的。与之对比，只有在理智的内容中，我们才会拥有一种较为充分的工具，这种工具相对独立于个人的偏好，这种工具就是语言，它通过概念及其逻辑关系而产生并完善的。

但是，只要现实的历史力量开始为理智的抽象客观性和可能性开辟道路，那么理智的意义就会朝着截然不同的方向发展。首先，恰恰是由于知识的普遍的有效性、知识的力量以及无法抗拒性，使得理智这种强有力的武器成为了知识的杰出代表；只要不是那种耳根软的人都可以抵抗那些处于优势地位的意志，但是如果人们仅仅是通过说“我不想”这种方式来抵抗那些处于优势地位的意志，那么这种方式本身就暗示了此人已经承认自己处于劣势地位。更进一步地讲，为生存和财产而每天付出的那些努力是由某种理智的手段决定的，即使这些日常努力中的某些重大决策产生于超理智的力量。较为高级理智的权力取决于这种理智品质中的共产主义特征：这是因为在理智的内容中，理智是普遍有效的，时时处处都有效并且是被广泛认可的。所以，相比于个体所拥有的财产而言，单从数量上讲，个体拥有的理智天赋赋予了个体一种更加绝对的优势，这是因为，个体所拥有的财产是有个性的，不能被普遍使用，或者说是这种个性使得个人财产无法在世界的每个角落都建立起自己的辖区。如同别的地方一样，这恰恰就是个体差异能充分发展、充分利用的平等权利的基础。正因为人与人关系的纯粹理智的概念以及组织结构抛弃了意志和情感强调的非理性的东西，所以才不敢承认个体之间存在的先天的差别，而且也鲜有理由去缩小实际存在的差异。然而借助于社会责任感、爱以及怜悯之心，这种差别的消除也是有可能被实现的。这就是为什么理性主义的世界观——像货币一样的公正、中立，并且很接近社会主义的生活图景——既宣扬近代的自我中心主义，也毫不遮掩地宣扬个性主张。根据一种大众化的、不很深刻的观点来看，自我毫无疑问是人的根本也是人经久不衰的兴趣所在，这一点，无论在实践中还是在理论上都是如此。任何无私的动机看起来都不是自然且本身固有的，看起来就像是人为移植的一样。结果，只有那些自我利益为中心的行为才被看作是真正完全符合“逻辑”的行为。所有的奉献和自我牺牲的行为似乎都是源自那些情感与意志之类的非理性力量，以至于那些纯粹理性之人对这种无私的行为进行讽刺，认为这是这些人缺乏智慧的表现，或者谴责他们是潜藏在心中的自我中心主义的一种伪装。既然利己主义的意志与利他主义的意志一样都是一种意志，而且二者都很难从纯理性主义的思维中被提炼出来，那么毫无疑问，我们之前所提到的对奉献与自我牺牲的认识是错误的。更确切地讲，正如我们所看到的那样，理性思维只能为利己主义与利他主义二者中的某一个提供手段，而不能同时为双方提供手段；而且理性对于在二者之间做出何种选择以及如何实现这种选择是毫无作用的。然而纯粹的理智性与现实的自我中心主义之间的这种联系依然是被广泛接受的，并且二者的关系在现实中也是有某种基础的，如果二者之间的关系不是一种直接的逻辑的方式的话，那么它就只能是某种间接的心理方式。然而，不仅真正伦理学上的自我中心主义是理性的必然产物，就连社会上的个人主义看起来也都像是理性的必然产物。集体主义超越了个别组成部分、并建立起一种新的生活存在统一体，这看起来就像是冷静的理智性包涵了某种无法理解的神秘因素，以至于这样的统一体不能被还原成个别要素在单纯的数量上不存在加减关系，这正如一个有机体的生命统一体一样，因此就不能把集体主义理解为各个组成部分的机械式的拼凑。因此，18世纪的理性主义在法国大革命期间发展至顶点，与这种理性主义紧密联系在一起的是一种严格的个人主义，并且从赫尔德开始一直到浪漫主义的反对者也把超越个体的集体视为统一和历史现实，而这种认可是通过承认生命的超越个体的情感的潜能的方式实现的。因此，既然理性对每一个个体来说都是有效的，那么理性的普遍性将会给我们带来社会的原子化。借助于理智，并从理智的立场来看，每个人似乎都是一个完整而又自给自足的元素，而且在这种元素周围有其他同类的元素相伴，如果没有这种抽象的普遍性，那么这个整体就会被无缘无故地分解为具体的普遍性，而且在这种具体的普遍性里个体与他人结合形成了一个统一体。最后，与某些感情和意志形成了对比，具有内在的可获得性与反思性理论知识根本不能拒绝任何人，这就产生了直接抵消实际结果的一种后果。首先，恰恰因为理论知识的普遍性决定了对理论知识的实际运用，而理论知识的这种普遍性是与个人能力之间相互独立的。这就使那些最不聪明的“受教育者”相比于那些最聪明的为受教育者具有了巨大的优势。教育资源出现在每个想得到它的人面前，在表面看来这是平等的，但是这种平等在实际情况面前遭到了彻底地嘲讽。对于那些遵守自由主义教条的自由主义者来说，这种表里不一的情形同样也实存在的，他们确实不会妨碍个人去追求各种各样的利益，然而这样一种事实却不能被忽视，那就是，只有那些已经拥有了这样或那样的特权的人才有可能获得那些各种各样的利益。正因为教育资源——不管它是普遍有效的，或者由于它是普遍有效的——最终只能通过个体活动才能获得，因而它就会导致一种无形的而且难以攻破的等级制度，同时也导致上层与下层之分，而且这种等级差别的消除不能像社会经济差异的消除那样，仅仅靠一条法令或一次革命，抑或靠有关人员的良好意愿就可以实现。因此，耶稣对那些富有的年轻人说下面的话也是合适的，即“把你的财产分给贫穷之人”，而不是说“把你的教育送给贫穷之人。”没有哪种优越感能像教育一样使这些地位低下的人感到如此自卑，在教育面前这些被剥夺权利的人感到如此失落与无助。正是由于这个原因，那些希望实现真正的平等的努力时常以各种各样的方式表现出对理智教育的鄙视：从佛陀，犬儒学派，基督教中的特定流派，直到罗伯斯庇尔主张的“我们不需要知识”，也都是这样的。除此之外，一个十分重要的事实是，抽象看来，用语言和写作的形式把知识固定下来是知识共享品质的一种表现形式，这种把知识固定下来的方式有利于知识的积累，尤其是有利于知识的集中，从这个角度来看，这种知识的积累与集中使得上层社会与下层社会之间的鸿沟在不断地拓宽。随着知识的不断拓宽、不断集中，那些有智力方面的天赋的人或者那些衣食无忧的人就会有越来越多的从平凡的大众中脱颖而出的机会。我们可以用当代的无产者做个类比，现在的无产者虽然可以拥有更多的享受以及文化上的满足，而在这之前，这些满足与享受与无产者是无缘的，然而，如果我们可以回顾几个世纪、几千年以前的情形，我们就会发现，这些无产者的生活方式与上层社会的人的生活方式之间的鸿沟的确变得越来越深了，因此同样的，整体的知识水平的提高绝不会消除普遍的差异，而只会加剧这种差异。

我之所以要详细地分析理智这种现象，就是因为理智概念所展现出的意义上的对立，是货币概念中所呈现的意义上的对立的一个充分的类比。对货币本质的理解不仅可以通过货币与理智性的相互作用来获得，因为这种相互作用给予二者一种形式上的相似性，而且还可能通过二者在发展过程中的类似性所彰显出的某种潜在的共同原则的方式来获得，对于二者的发展过程或许还要牵涉历史要素的基本特性或倾向，而且正是这种历史要素的特性与倾向赋予了货币以形式，并形成了其风格。在前几章中，我已经指出过，建立在普遍的有效性以及客观性基础之上的货币，在何种程度上促进了个体性和主观性的发展，以及其保持不变的统一性和共产主义特征的品质在何种程度上能使得那些事物之间用数量上的差异来表示品质上的差别。货币权力的扩张是其他任何文化因素都无法比拟的，而且这种扩张赋予了那些最为矛盾的生活发展趋势以平等的权利，在这里，货币权力的扩张是通过纯粹的形式上的文化能量的凝聚体现出来的，为了能够强化这种文化的能量，并且使它产生越来越纯粹的表现，我们可以把这种文化力量运用到任何一种内容中去。因此，我也只打算强调货币与理智性在内容方面的一些特别的相似之处，而且我也承认货币的这样一个作用：即货币抽象客观本质的非个人性以及普遍有效性，至少在涉及货币的功能和使用中，会支持自我中心主义和分化。通过自我中心主义所表现出来的理性、合乎逻辑的特点也是与彻底地而又粗野地剥削货币财产权保持一致的。在此之前，我们就指出过，货币与其他形式的财产不同的一个显著的特点就是：它从来都不是被局限在某种具体的用途之上，因此，这意味着人们在使用货币时，可以排除那些更偏远、更困难的使用方式的阻碍。货币完全适应任何一种用途，其性质与客观事物的性质之间没有任何的关系，因此也就不会产生任何具体的促进或阻碍作用。因此，货币与逻辑的形式有相似之处，逻辑的形式平等地对待任何具体的内容，不管这些具体的内容如何发展或是如何结合的。因此，从客观角度看，无论是那些毫无意义而且最有害的内容，还是那些最富有价值的内容，逻辑形式都会赋予同等机会准确地表述这些内容。更进一步讲，货币与法律体系也很类似，法律在下面的情形下时常是无可奈何的，即那些披着无懈可击的外衣的严重的违法犯罪行为。全面地发掘货币的力量的无限制的可能性不仅被认为是合情合理的，而且这样做看起来也是有逻辑和概念上的必要的。既然货币本质上既不包含方向性也不包含障碍物，那么它所追随的就是最强烈的主观冲动，而所有的与货币相关的冲动看起来都是自我中心主义的冲动。诸如某些钱是“被血玷污”的，或者某些钱是被诅咒了的之类的约束性的概念都是情绪化的产物，随着货币变得越来越中立的时候，换句话说，就是货币除了是钱什么都不是了的时候，这些约束性的概念就彻底失去了意义。货币的用途决不会像其他所有权的用途那样受到目标或伦理道德的束缚，因此，其纯粹的负面品质也不可避免地发展以一种完全积极的态度，并且完全不顾及个人的感受。货币的灵活性是来自于它与具体的利益、根源和关系的分离，这也使得我们必须承担这样一个逻辑上的后果，即在货币控制的生活范围中，我们不再受什么束缚。绝对客观性源于对一切片面的客观情况的摒弃，这为自我中心主义铺平了道路，这如同纯粹的理智一样，只有一个原因，那就是这个指导原则在逻辑上最简单，最容易获得，以至于生活中的纯粹形式上的、中立的生活力量在货币中实现了看上去很重要、很自然、很称心如意的满足。

货币与法律、逻辑的理性主义的关系

正如之前我所提过的那样，与其说法律、理智和金钱交易仅仅是在一般形式摒弃了客观的、道德上的最不公正的内容，不如说形式与真正的内容之间的矛盾在法律面前人人平等这一原则那里达到了顶峰。法律、理智以及货币三者的共同特征就是对个体的品质保持中立、不偏不倚；这三者都是从生活的各种具体的潮流的汇总中提炼出一个抽象的、一般意义上的内容，而且这种抽象的内容是按照其自身独立的准则而发展，并且介入到那些存在着利益的各种具体的生活潮流的汇总中，并把自身的准则强加于这个总体。既然这三者都有这样一种能力，即能够为了它们中立性的内容而放弃形式和方向，它们就必然把那些形式与内容间的矛盾注入到我们所关心的生活的总体性之中。无论平等在何处与人际关系的形式基础发生冲撞，它都会最尖锐地且最深远地表现出个体的不平等。通过观察形式上的平等所造成的局限性，自我中心主义就不必再关心其自身内在和外在的障碍了。自我中心主义在形式上平等的普遍有效性中拥有了一件武器，它可以为任何人服务，也可以用来对抗任何人。法律平等的形式就是和理智以及货币共同享有的一种典型形式：它们普遍的实用性与有效性，它们潜在的共产主义特征——即这种特征能为任何人移除诸如上层社会与下层社会地位差别之类的差异性，同时也能够移除那些由财产类别的差异性所引起的先天的阶级差别之类的特定障碍。只要土地所有权以及某些职业仍被一些特定的阶层所控制，那么这些特定阶层之人就会使那些较低阶层的人承担特定的义务，并与那些与之相同的阶层勾结起来，并昭然若揭地限制非本阶层之人。然而，一个“开明的”理性主义没有理由再把这种明显的阶级差异保持下去，如果每一种财产都可以转变为价值，那么，在原则上，没有人再被限制，任何人都可以无限制地去获得财产。毫无疑问，这并没有回答这样一个问题，即在历史的发展过程中，自我中心主义的总量是增加了还是减少了。

最后，我想谈及的是这样一个极富特点的事实，即理智成果的积累赋予了那些在理智方面有特权的人以不成比例且迅猛增长的优势地位，无独有偶，在货币资本的积累中也曾发生过类似的情况。货币性关系的结构，货币产生回报和利润的方式是这样的：当货币超出一定的数量以后，在其所有者不做出任何相应的努力的情况下，货币也会不断增加。这与文化领域中的知识的结构是相一致的，当知识的获取超过了某个阶段之后，就个体而言，其靠自身力量来获取知识的必要性也就降低了，这是因为认知内容是以超越了某种程度的浓缩与集中的形式被提供给了个体。在教育的最高阶段，每前进一步所需要付出努力都比较低阶段时少了，而与此同时却能做出更大的成绩。正如货币的客观性允许那些“劳动”——其最终相对地独立于个人能力——存在，而且不断积累的回报自动地以不断增大的比例去获取更多的积累，所以，知识的客观化，智力的成果与过程的分离，促使这些成果以一种浓缩的抽象形式积累起来，以至于只要我们能站得足够高，那么我们就可以不费吹灰之力地像摘取果实一样地获取知识。

虽然货币在本质上是一种民主的、消除差异的形式，并且要排除了任何具体的个人关系，但是所有这一切的结果就是，支持普遍的平等的发展趋势果断地抛弃了货币。当我们考察理智的时候，我们会发现正是同样一个原因导致了理智像货币一样被抛弃了。在逻辑一存在意义上的普遍性与社会一实践意义上的普遍性在货币与理智这两个领域中被搞得四分五裂。而在其他领域中，这两种普遍性却常常保持着一致。举个例子说，据说——不管这是不是一个详尽的定义——艺术的本质就是要在艺术的内容中表现现象的一般典型特征，并希望以此来调动起埋藏在我们心中的典型的人类情感，出于主体接受能力的考虑，艺术提出的原则性要求是建立在对客体的所有的偶然性、以及个别因素排除的基础上。与艺术的方法相同，宗教的形式超越了所有的世俗的特殊性，而上升到绝对的、普遍的水平上，通过这种方式，宗教就确立了一种对所有个体都普遍共有的关系，这种关系把所有的个体都融为一个整体。通过这种关系无所不包的统一性，宗教把我们从纯粹个体的属性中解放出来，并把这些属性归结为某种基本特征，而这种基本特征就成了万事万物的共同基础。康德所构想的道德与宗教有异曲同工之妙。那些在逻辑上可以被普及化，而在普及的过程中又不会引起自相矛盾的行为模式就是被看做是那些人——不管你是何等身份——的道德法则。在这里发挥作用的标准可以被人们看做是自然法则的在现实生活中的规定，诸如其概念的、客观的普遍性为所有主体都建立了一种的普遍性，对他们而言它就变成了一个道德戒命。与这些形式迥然不同的是，现代生活在其他领域看起来激化了内容的客观普遍性与个人关系的普遍性之间的紧张。某些内容获得了日益增大的内容上的普遍性，对不断增加的细节和关系来说，这些普遍性的内容变得越来越重要；不管是以直接的方式，还是以间接的方式，这些普遍性内容的概念都包含了越来越多的现实内容。举个例子说，法律、理智的过程和结果以及货币都是这样一种情况。诸如法律、理智以及货币之类的事物，它们一直伴随着其对主体的区分形式的评价、利用其无所不包的意义为自我中心主义的实践服务，以及个性在消除差异的物质基础上的全面发展，既然它们是可以被普遍接受且有效的，因此，它不会为任何个人意志设置门槛。疑惑以及隐秘的自我矛盾的感受在许多方面形成了现代生活风格的特征，而且，在某种程度上，这些感受是建立在这些领域在内容和实际意义上的不平衡和紧张的基础之上，也有可能是建立在这两者在普遍性和平等性方面的个人化的用途以及发展的基础上。

现代的算计特征

我想提到现时代的生活风格的最后一个特征——它的理性主义特点清楚地显露出了受货币影响的迹象。现代人们用于以应付世界，以及用于同时调节其个人的和社会的之间的关系的精神功能，大部分可被称之为算计功能。这些功能的认知理念是把世界想象成一个巨大的算术问题，把发生的事件和事物质的区别当成一个数字系统。康德相信，自然哲学达到科学性的程度只是取决于数学可以被应用到其中的程度。然而并非只有物质世界才必须通过计量和权衡的方式而在思想上被征服；悲观主义和乐观主义一样希望用乐与悲的彼此抵消来确立生活的价值，其理想就是计算欢乐与痛苦的数量。时常发生的通过多数人投票来对公众生活进行表决就是这种发展倾向的表现。凭借着其他人——他们是平等的，而非地位更高者——持有不同意见这一点，就要使个人服从多数人的决定，这样的现象并不像今天我们看起来那么自然而然。这在古代日耳曼人的法律里是闻所未闻的，它规定：无论是谁不同意部落的决议就可以不受这项决议的约束。在易洛魁人的部落会议中，一直到16世纪的阿拉贡地区议会中，在波兰国会和其他社会的国会中，都没有多数票否决的情况存在；在这些地方，没有被一致通过的决议并不生效。少数必须服从多数的原则表明，个体声音的绝对价值或质上的价值被化约成一种纯粹数量意义上的单位。在这种计算方法里，未被详细指明的单位在数字上的多寡表达和引导了这个群体的内在现实，这一计算程序的必然结果或前提假设就是民主式的平均化，每个人均被计算为1，并且没有任何人被计算为大于1。现代的这种计量、权衡和精打细算的精确性是其唯理智论最纯粹的反映；尽管如此，以抽象的平等为基础的唯理智论也支持各种因素的利己主义欲望。语言凭借精细的本能洞察力，把一个“算计的”人直接理解为就是在自私自利的意义上“算计”得失的人。正如在使用“合理的”或“理性的”这些概念的时候一样，“算计”这个概念在这里虽然表面上看起来是全然中立的形式主义，但从根本上却可看出这里面充满了一种保护其具体偏好内容的处理倾向。我们时代的这种心理特点与古代更加易于冲动的、更大程度上是被情绪所决定的特点针锋相对，在我看来它与货币经济有非常紧密的因果关系。货币经济迫使我们在日常交易中必须不断地进行数学计算。许多人的生活充斥着这种对质的价值进行评估、权衡和算计，并将它们简化成量的价值的行为。按照金钱对价值的斤斤计较教会了我们把价值确定和具体到最后一厘，并且因此在对比各种各样的生活内容时给它们强加上更大的精确度。当某些事物被认为与其他事物有直接的关系时，也就是当它们不能被简化成货币这个公分母时，就会产生很多自发的评估赋值的做法，以及一个单位与另一个单位的价值对比。生活中经济关系的准确、精密、严格——这自然也会影响到生活的其他方面——与货币事务的扩张携手并进，虽然它们对生活高尚风格的形成并无裨益。只有货币经济，才给实践生活，或许甚至还在理论生活中，带来了数字计算的理念。从这个观点上来看，货币体制看起来只不过是一般经济领域的强化和升华。关于英国人民与他们的国王之间进行的贸易交易，尤其在13世纪和14世纪，他们正是凭借这种方式买到了所有种类的权利和自由。一位历史学家写道：“这种方式使得从实际上解决那些理论上无法解决的难题成为可能。国王有权利作为他的臣民的统治者，人民则有权利成为这个王国领域内——国王是这个王国的人格化体现——的自由民和自由的社会阶层。虽然在原则上确定二者中任何一方的权利极其困难，但是一旦把它简化成买卖问题，在实践中就变得简单易行多了。”这意味着，一旦实际生活因素的某种质的关系被当做生意往来的一部分来表现其意义，它就获得了一种精确性，以及精确地确定下来的可能性，而在具有一切质的差异的现象中直接表现出这种精确性和确定下来的可能性仍然是行不通的。然而，这样的过程还并没有使货币变成不可或缺之物，因为这种交易常常通过实物付款——比如用羊毛——的方式进行。但不言而喻的是，货币可以以一种更加清楚明白和准确无误的方式来达成商业贸易对价值和需求的精确性所做的贡献。在这方面，人们或许可以说，货币交易与商业贸易在整体上的关系就好比货币与交换之前存在的确定性的关系或者事物间关联的关系一样。正如逻辑所表现的是可理解的事物的可理解性那样，货币所表现出的仿佛是商业事务处理中纯粹商业性的内容。既然代表了事物内在价值的抽象形式具有算术上的精确形式，并因而具有毫不含糊的理性方面的精确性，那么抽象形式的特点就一定会反射到物体身上去。如果一个时期的艺术确实逐渐决定了我们审视自然的方式，如果艺术家从现实形式中自发而主观的提取物在我们的意识里构成了非常直接的感觉图像，那么凌驾于质的现实之上的货币关系的上层结构也将根据其形式越发从根本上决定现实的内在形象。货币精打细算的本性在生活的各种因素的关系中间浸透进了一种精确性，一种判定相等和不等的可靠性，一种一致和排列的毫不含糊性，这正如怀表的普遍使用对日常生活产生了同样的结果。正如货币确定了抽象价值，时钟确定了抽象时间，货币为最详细、最明确的事务安排和权衡提供了某种模式，这一模式为接受它的生活内容——起码为生活内容在实践上的管理——赋予了某种透明度和可计算性，若非如此则无法达到这种透明度和可计算性。算计的理智性就体现在这些形式中，这些形式反过来也会从这种理智性中衍生出部分力量以掌控现代生活。所有这些关系之所以引人注目是因为某些反面情况——即激烈地、充满敌意地反对以经济学来阐释人类事务的那种类型的思想家的存在——的存在：如歌德、卡莱尔和尼采等。一方面，他们从根本上是反唯理智论的，但另一方面他们则彻底地抵制了对自然进行数学计算式的精确解释，而我们却认为这样的自然观是货币制度在理论上的对应物。

第二节

文化的概念

如果我们把文化定义为优雅的言谈举止，生活的精神化形式，以及精神和实践劳动的劳动成就；那么，我们就是把这些价值置于一个特定的连接视角的位置上，而这些价值不会自动凭借其客观意义归属于这一位置上。对我们而言，这些价值是文化内容的表现，我们将其理解为自然活力和潜能的强烈显现，这一强烈程度达到了超过它们纯粹的自然本性所能够发展、丰富、分化的水平。一种自然赐予的能量，或它所暗指的东西——它之所以必需，仅仅是为了被实际的发展超越——构成了文化概念的前提假设。从文化的角度来看，生活的各种价值就是被文明化了的自然；在此，这些价值并没有那种孤立的涵义，这种孤立的涵义似乎是从幸福、智慧、美丽等高高在上的理念出发来对它们进行衡量的；相反，这些生活价值是我们称之为自然的这一基础的进一步发展，它们超越了自然的力量及其理念上的内容由此变成了文化。因此，如果说在花园里栽种的一枚果实和一尊雕像同样是文化产品的话，那么语言则以微妙的方式说明了这种关系，它把果树称作“被培育的”，但却绝不会说光秃秃的大理石块是被“培育”成雕像的。在第一种情况里，人们预先假设果树有一种结出这些果子的自然驱动力和生长趋势，经过精心的照料，果树的成长超越了自然的限制；而对于大理石，我们就不会预先假定它有产生雕像的相应倾向。具体化在雕像里的文化意味着人的特定能力的提高和升华，而对于人的这种能力的原始表现，我们则称之为“自然的”力量。

初看起来，把非人格的事物表述为被文化所塑造的事物，这种说法只有被当成一种比喻时似乎才是合情合理的。因为自然所赐予的东西借助意志和理智超越了那些为我们自身所保留的纯粹自然的、任意发展的界限；或者说，那些事物的成长发展和我们的欲念紧密相关，反过来它们又刺激了我们的情感。在文化的物质产品，诸如家具和园艺植物、艺术作品和机器、工具和书籍里，天然的材料被塑造成靠它们自身的能量绝对无法实现的种种形式，这些文化产品就是我们自己的欲望和情感的产物，是观念利用对象可利用的可能性所产生的结果。这恰恰与文化毫无二致，后者形成了人与他人、人与自己的关系：如语言、道德、宗教和法律。就我们把这些价值理解为文化这个范围而言，我们把这些价值同它们自身先天的能量（据说这些价值靠自己就可以获得这样的能量）的成长水平区分开来了，就像木材、金属、植物和电那样，能量其实只是文明化进程中的原材料。我们培育事物就是把事物的价值提升到超过其自然机体结构所能实现的范围，并且通过培育它们，也培育了自己：这是同一个价值增值的过程，它既从我们出发，又返回到我们自身，这个过程改变了外在于我们的自然或我们自己的自然属性。造型艺术最清楚地反映了这种文化概念，因为它们表现了这些对立中的最大张力。对塑造艺术对象而言，似乎要彻底避免的就是适应我们主观性的过程。而这些艺术品恰恰向我们解释了现象本身的意义，无论此意义是深埋在空间造型、色彩关系上，还是若隐若现地存在于精神性当中。但一切取决于发掘出事物的意义和秘密的行动都旨在用一种比事物的自然成长更纯粹、更清晰的方式再现事物。尽管如此，这使用的却不是在化学或物理技术意义上的方式，这些技术探究物体的自然规律性，为的是把物体并入到人的目标里去，而这对他们来说是本质的。与之相反，一旦艺术品成功地呈现了物体独特的意义，艺术过程也就大功告成了。这实际上也实现了纯粹的艺术理想，因为艺术品臻于完美是一种对其自身的客观价值，完全独立于它是否能够成功地激发起我们的主观经验感受层面的意义。“为艺术而艺术”的口号完美地表现了纯粹的艺术倾向的自足性特征。但是从文化理想的立场来看，情况又该另当别论了。文化理想最根本的问题是要扬弃审美的、科学的、伦理的、幸福论的乃至于宗教成就的各自独立的价值，并旨在把这些组成要素整合到人类超越其自然状态的发展过程的基础当中去。更确切地说，它们是这一发展过程所必经的里程碑。文化发展的每一瞬间都位于这条道路的某个地方，文化永远都不可能不带一定的内容而以纯粹的形式单独地向前发展，即使它和该内容并非完全一致。文化内容由这些形式构成，每个形式都附属于一个独立自主的理念，虽然说在此我们是从一个独特的视角来看待这些文化形式，而这个视角就是我们的能量或存在的发展超越了被认为是纯粹自然状态的程度。在提纯客体的时候，人按照自己头脑中的映象创造了客体的形象：文化进程作为客体的能量超自然的发展，就是我们的能量同样的发展过程的表现或具体化身。诚然，具体的生活内容从其自然形式到文化形式的发展过程的分界线并不明显，而且也颇有争议。但这只不过是最普遍的思维困难之一罢了。这些范畴一为了更好地了解某些现象，发现其规则理顺其关系，而把这些现象囊括于此范畴之下——都在彼此之间截然划清了界线，并且通常它们首先只是从这种相互的对照中获得了各自的意义。这些概念断断续续地构成了某些序列。然而被假定涵盖在这些概念范畴下的细节部分却常常不可能根据同样的确定性而被定位；相反，通常是细节在数量上的特性决定了它们是归属于这个还是那个概念名下，所以，由于一切数量的持续性以及分属于两个实体之间经常可能存在的中间状态的存在，每一个单独的现象可能时而适合这个范畴里，时而又适合于那个范畴。故而，各范畴之间仿佛有某种不确定性，即便就其实际意义来看，互相混合的概念间也有彼此排斥之处。自然与文化有基本明确的分界线，即一个正好从另一个结束的地方开始。不像个别现象无法确定其归属那样，它们如同白昼与黑夜的概念，并没有因为黎明和黄昏有时归于白昼，有时属于黑夜，而把两者彼此混淆在一起。

物质文化的上升和个体文化的滞后

现在我将把对一般文化概念的讨论与现代文化内的一种独特关系进行一个对照。如果把我们当代的文化与100年前的文化比较一下，那么人们肯定会说——当然也存在许多个别的例外——在现实中决定并包围我们生活的事物，比方说工具、交通手段、科学产品、技术产品和艺术品等，都达到了无法用言语形容的精致程度。然而对于个体文化，至少是在较高层次上的个体文化，却根本没有取得同等程度的进步，事实上，它们甚至常常反而是衰弱了。这无须通过详细的举例说明，所以我只希望强调其中的某些方面。在德语和法语中，语言表达的可能性自过去百年以来均已变得日益精致、微妙。现在我们不仅有歌德式的语言，还有不胜枚举的文雅精致、蕴藏着微妙含义、个性突出的语言表述方式。但是，如果有人去观察一下个人的言谈和写作，从整体上来看它们却越来越不准确、不高雅和显得更加琐碎。在内容上，人们的话题范围在这一时期已经借助于理论和实践的进步而得到了扩展，但如今的交流——包括社会的和私人的对话以及信件往来——比起18世纪末来，似乎显得更流于肤浅、更加无趣、更不庄重。同属这一发展过程的事实还有，作为同样一个生产流程的组成部分，机器变得比工人更加熟练了。如今即便在大型工业中，又有多少工人能理解工作时使用的机器，也能懂得融入到机器中的智慧成就？同样这一理论也适用于军事文化。借助于现代作战的方式，长久以来单个士兵的任何在本质上是相同的，但是通过现代的战争方式就使某些关系甚至已经被简化了。在军事上与此形成鲜明对照的是，不仅是物质装备，而且首先是完全非个人性质的军队组织的复杂程度简直达到了闻所未闻的程度，这成为了客观文化确实的巨大胜利。在纯粹的思想领域，即使是知识渊博、深思远虑的人也开始使用起越来越多的观念、概念和命题，但对这些观念、概念和命题的准确含义和内容，他们却未必完全了解。客观上可获得的知识材料急剧膨胀，它们允许甚至是强迫我们使用这样的表达方式：这种表达方式像密封的容器一样一代代传承下去，而密封在里面浓缩的思想内容却实际上并没有被打开呈现在个体使用者的面前。我们的日常生活被越来越多的事物包围着，我们无法想象有多少智慧被倾注于它们的生产过程当中，如出一辙的是我们的思想的内在交流和社交活动充斥着具有象征意义的形式，它们在其中累积了广泛的思想智慧，但是个体的思想只需要使用其中最小的一部分。19世纪发展起来的客观文化对主观文化的优势，某种程度上反映在如下的事实里：18世纪的教育理想重点是对人的塑造，也就是说在于培养一种个体性的内在价值；到了19世纪，它却被全部培养客观知识和行为模式这层意义上的“教育”概念取而代之。这种分歧似乎正逐渐变得越来越大。每时每地，物质文化的财富都在日益增长，而个体思想却只能通过更加远离这种文化和以一种更慢的步伐来发展自己而丰富其自身发展的形式和内容。

我们如何来阐释这一现象呢？假如如我们所见，一切物质的文化都不过是一种人的文化而已，以至于我们只能通过培养事物来发展自我，那么，事物的发展、苦心经营的成果以及其意义的精神化——它们仿佛是依靠着这些事物自身的力量和规范，而却没有同时伴随着个体的灵魂得到相应的发展而演化出来的——又意味着什么？这意味着对一边是社会生活及其产品，另一边是碎片化的个体的生活内容这两者之间高深莫测的关系的强调。无数代人的劳动蕴藏在物化的精神，如语言和习俗，政治体制和宗教信条，文学和技术等当中；每个人都可以按其所需、尽其所能取用其中的一部分，但却没有任何单个个人能把这些精神产品消耗殆尽。在这一财富的数量和从中取用的数量之间存在着最为错综复杂和偶然的关系。个人取用的份额的微不足道或是缺乏理性，都丝毫无损于整体的实质和尊严，正如一切实体的存在不管是否被人察觉都一样独立地存在着一样。一本已出版的书，其内容和意义对于读者群是大是小、是使他们产生共鸣还是令他们无动于衷，都是无所谓的；同样，一切文化产品面对其文化听众时，虽然它乐意于被任何人理解吸收，但事实上，它却总是仅仅零零星星地被人理解。文化共同体的这种浓缩的脑力劳动同它在个体中的活跃程度的关系，一如丰富的可能性与现实的局限性的关系一样。为了理解这些客观精神内容的存在方式，我们不得不把它们放到用于阐释世界的范畴的具体框架当中。客观文化和主观文化之间的矛盾关系——在此它们构成了我们的具体问题——将在这些范畴中找到其恰如其分的位置。

在柏拉图的神话中，灵魂看见了世间物体存在于世之前的纯粹本质和绝对意义，所以灵魂后来的知识就是经过感官刺激而出现的对这种真理的一种回忆。假如人们像柏拉图那样否认知识来源于经验的话，那么在这个神话下面隐藏的最初动机就是我们对于知识起源的迷惑不解。然而，这种形而上学的思辨——超出它出现的偶然原因之上——还是深刻地表明了我们灵魂中的一种认识论态度。无论我们把认知解释为外部事物直接作用的后果，还是一种纯内心的过程（在其中任何外在的东西都是精神要素内在固有的形式或关系），只要我们把被认定为是真实的思想设想为对一种客观要求的满足，以及对一种预定观念的临摹再现；那么即便人的认知反映事物之准确无误就如同事物自身那般，认识把握一件又一件事物而渐渐接近的统一、正确、完整也不会来自于客体本身。与之相反，我们认识的理想一向是披着观念形式外衣的内容，因为即使是最极端的唯实论希望把握的也不是事物本身，而是对它们的认识。倘若我们对在任何一刻构成知识的全部碎片，从其发展——知识追求这一发展，正是依照其发展，知识的各个阶段才有了意义——出发来加以说明，那么我们就只能靠奠定柏拉图学说基础的东西来作为假设前提：即存在一个拥有完全理智意义与关系的理论价值王国——理想国。它既不是种种客体，因为客体都是它的对象；而且也非已经获得的、在心理上成为现实的知识。相反，这后一种知识只能够逐渐地，且总是不太完美地近似于那个包含了一切可能的真理的理念王国。只有在这种知识成功地做到了这一点的意义上，它才是真实的。柏拉图似乎已经接受了这种基本的观念：我们在任何时刻的认识，都只是单单以理念形式存在的一种知识综合体的组成部分，它鼓励并要求我们从心理上实现它。但他认为，从以前对理念王国的总体性的把握到获得实际的知识都是一种下降沉沦，是“不再可能回到从前”，而不像我们如今所理解的“尚未到达”。但是显而易见，在这两种理解中所能体验到的关系本身从根本上说是一模一样的，正如同一个数字可以是源于大数字减去小数字或是小数字相加这两种方法的结果一样。这种认知理念特有的存在方式作为一种规范或是总体性，与我们实际上的认知是相对的，一如道德价值和规定的总体性是跟个人的实际行为相对的那样。在此，我们在伦理范畴中能更多地意识到这样一个事实：即我们的行为就是或好或坏地符合某个具有内在效力的规范。这个规范——其内容对不同的人，以及他们生活的不同时期会大相径庭——在时空当中无处可以寻觅到，并且也不与人的道德意识相吻合，反而是道德意识受制于这个规范。最终我们整个生活的模式——从每天鸡毛蒜皮的事情到智力的巅峰——就是：我们所做的一切事情当中均有一个规范、一个标准、一个观念上预设好了的凌驾于我们之上的总体性，我们试图通过我们的行为活动把这种总体性转化为现实。这并不是指我们的愿望都受某类理想指引的这种简单的概括归纳，而是指人的这些行为活动特定的、或多或少较为独特的性质，这种性质只能通过下面的这种方式来描述：即不管我们的行为价值是否与理念相抵触，我们仍遵循着某种预先确定的可能性，就好像在贯彻执行某个理想的计划一样。我们实际的存在尽管是不充分的和零碎的，但是只要分担了总体性的实现过程，它似乎就获得了一定的意义和一致性。我们的行为乃至于我们全部的存在，无论美丑、对错、伟大或渺小，似乎都取自于上述这种可能性的宝库中；所以，在每一时刻，我们的行为都与观念上确定的内容之间建立起了联系，就好像具体的物体与其概念的关联一般，概念表现出其固有规律和逻辑本质，但其内容的意义却不取决于它是否被实现，如何被实现以及多么经常被实现。我们只能这样来设想认知：即把认知看做是实现我们对这些概念的意识，可以说这些概念正在出现问题的特定点上等待着意识来实现它们；此外别无他法。我们把自己的知识都称作是必然的知识，也就是说知识的内容只能以一种特定的方式存在，这也只不过是用不同的方式对同一个确信的事实的表达：即我们认为知识乃是先于认识确立的观念内容在智力方面的实现。这样一种特定的方式并不意味着对千差万别的思想来说只有一种真理；恰恰与之相反，如果一方面给定一种被明确建构的理智，另一方面又给定一种确定的客观事实，对这种思想来说，“真理”在客观上就预先形成了，而其方式就跟给定了运算数目后，运算结果就已经确定了一样。随着被赋予的精神结构所产生的任何一种变化，真理的内容也随之发生改变，而真理的客观性并不会因此有任何的减少，也不会因此更加依赖对这种思想的了解。我们从某些关于知识的事实——这里也不得不假设有其他的知识事实存在——当中得出的坚定不移的结论，就是阐明了我们认识之本质的偶然原因：每一小块单独的认识均意味着它已意识到了在客观确定的认识内容的内部关联中，它已经是有效力的和已经被确立的。最后，从心理学的视角来看，这与这样一种理论有关，根据该理论，一切被认为真实的东西都是伴随着某种观念内容的一种特定感觉；我们举出的证据不外乎是产生这样一种感觉的心理格局的建立。感官知觉或逻辑推导都不能直接为我们确证一种真实，更准确地说，它们其实只是唤起肯定和赞同主张的超理论感觉，或是某人无论如何都难以形容出来的对于真实的感受的条件。这形成了在两个认识论范畴之间的心理学中介：一个是有效的事物的目的，它产生于事物的内在关联，这种关联给事物的每个要素都分配了适合的位置；而另一个则是我们对于事物的观念，它对主体的人而言意味着真实。

思想的物化

这种一般和根本性的关系在较小程度上类似于物化的思想和文化与个体之间的关系。从认识论的角度来看，我们从客观的切实有效的实体领域中提取我们的生活内容；与之类似，从历史的角度来看，我们则是从种种人类脑力劳动累积的库存中提取它们。在此，我们也会看到预先形成的某些内容，它们即将被个人的思想所实现，但它们却还保留其规定性，以致于绝不会与一个物质对象的规定性混为一谈。因为即使在精神依赖于比方说工具、艺术品和书籍这样的物质的情况下，它也永远不会与我们的感官在对象中能感受到的那部分物质等同起来。精神是以某种几乎不能被确定的潜在形式蕴藏于这些对象当中的，唯有个体的意识能够使其成为现实。客观文化是历史的表达，或者或多或少是一种客观有效的、为我们的认知所复制出的真理较完美的浓缩形式。如果我们能够声称，万有引力定律在牛顿把它阐述出来之前就已经是有效的；那么，这一定律本身就并不存在于物质实质当中，相反它只是阐述了这样一种方式：即事物之间的关系凭借一种独特的组织化的思想而得以将其自身呈现，以及这种定律的有效性是独立于实质是存在于现实中的这一事实之外的。若是这样的话，那么万有引力定律既不存在于客观事物中，也不存在于主观思想中，而是在客观精神这个领域，我们对真理的意识一步一步地将其浓缩成真实。就正被讨论的万有引力定律而言，一旦它已经被牛顿所证实了，这条定律就被融合到了客观历史精神当中；同时反过来说，现在它在这一思想中的理念意义，也就根本独立于它被特定的个人重新发现之外了。

通过把这种客观精神的范畴确立为一般事物的有效的精神内容在历史中的体现，被我们视之为是主观发展——物质文化成为人类文化——的文化过程就很显然可以从其内容中分离出来了。而这种内容通过进入该范畴后，就似乎获得了另一种物质形态，从而为客观文化与个人文化分道扬镳的发展提供了基础。思想的客观化提供了一种可以将脑力劳动保存并累积的可能性；它是最重要和影响最为深远的人类历史的范畴。因为思想的物化把生物学上如此令人怀疑的东西例如遗传变成了历史事实。如果人不仅是一般意义上的某个物种后代，而且还是表明人之高于动物的优越性的继承者；那么，在语言、作品、组织和传统中的思想的物化，就是人与动物之间分野的基础，人类凭借这一基础将他的世界，乃至把所有的世界都据为己有。

假如历史社会的这种客观思想是其广义上的文化内容，那么历史社会各单独组成部分的实际文化意义就是由它们成为个体发展因素的程度来衡量的。如果我们假设牛顿对万有引力定律的发现只是保存在一本谁也不知道的书里，虽然它仍旧是客观思想的组成部分和社会的一种潜在的财产，但它却不再是一种文化价值了。因为这种极端的情况可能发生在无数的层面上，所以随之而来的就是，在全社会范围内只有一定比例的客观文化价值被变成主观文化价值。假如把社会看成是一个整体，即把客观化的知性排列进一个时间上是客观的综合体中，那么整个文化的发展——假设它具有一个统一的表现形式——在内容上就比其内容中的每个文化因子来得丰富得多。这是因为每个文化因子的成就都融入到了整体的文化遗产中，但是反过来文化遗产的成就却没有渗透到每个因子中去。一个共同体的整体生活方式取决于客观化了的文化与主体文化之间的关系。在上文中我已经提到了数量要素的重要性。在一种低级文化的小型社会群体中，主客观文化的这种关系几乎完全是平衡的，客观文化发展的可能性不会大举扩张以至于超过了主观文化的现实。而文化水平的上升——尤其是当它与所在的社会群体的扩大同步发生之际——却促成了主客观文化之间的分崩离析。雅典黄金时代的独特情形不同于此，这应当归功于雅典有能力避免主客观文化之间的分裂，除了同时期达到巅峰状态的雅典哲学之外。社会圈子的规模大小本身无法充分地解释主客观因素之间出现分歧的原因。相对的，我们现在所必须探寻的则是这一现象具体和有效的原因。

劳动分工是主客观文化之间彼此分歧的原因

如果我们希望用一个单独的概念来界定这一现象的原因和 它目前出现的巨大数量，那么这个概念就是劳动分工，依据是劳动分工在生产和消费当中的重要性。在生产方面通常被充分强调的是，产品是以牺牲其生产者的发展为代价完成的。从事专门性劳动的结果是心理一生理活力和技能的提高，这对作为整体的个人而言毫无价值，甚至还经常因为专门性劳动转移了对自我的和谐成长必不可少的个人精力的方向，而使其成长受到阻碍。在其他情况下，它发展得好像是一个拥有无限自主权的省份不把其收入上缴给中央政府那样断绝了它与个体核心的关系。经验似乎还表明了，自我内在的完整性在根本上是源于我们毕生事业的始终如一和完整性之间的相互作用。

对我们而言，一个对象只能通过我们把“自我”投射到那个对象中去，旨在按照我们的映象来塑造对象的方式而实现其统一性，因此多种多样的规定性最终演变成了“自我”的统一性。以同样的方式，我们所创造的对象具有的统一性或缺乏统一性的结果，则是在心理一实践意义上对相应的我们个性的塑造发挥作用。无论何时，只要我们的力量没有创造出某个作为整个个性的映象的东西，那么我们就失去了主客体之间适当的关系。我们劳动成果的内在本性是与作为整体十分必要部分的他人的成果的那些部分捆绑在一起的，两者一起建构出整体性，但这种整体性却不会再返回到生产者那里。由于大规模的专门性生产过程所造成的，在工人的存在形式和其产品的存在形式之间发展出来的不恰当关系很容易导致产品与工人的完全分离。产品的意义不是源自于其生产者的心灵，而是产生于它和别的渊源不同的产品之间的关系。由于其碎片化的特点，专门化生产出的产品缺乏那种在一件完全由单个劳动者所完成的劳动产品中很容易看到的精神性特征。因此专门化生产出的产品的意义既非源自于对主体性的反映，也不是创造性精神的反映，而只能在远离主体的客观成就中找到。

这种关系在与劳动产品最极端的对立面——艺术品当中，同样得到了很好的说明。艺术品的本性就是彻底地抵制大量工人的劳动细化分工，因为这些工人当中谁也无法独自完成整件作品。艺术品在一切人所创造的作品中是最完美的自主统一体，是最自足的整体，甚至连国家也无法与之比肩。对于国家而言，即使它在特定情况下可能是自主的，但它却不会完全囊括所有的组成部分，使每个组成部分都不能按其利益过自己独立的生活：我们的个性中只有一部分与国家交融在一起，而其他部分则可能围绕着其他核心运转。然而，艺术对在其设定的范围之内存在的任何要素，都不会赋予其意义，单个的艺术品破坏了词汇、音调、颜色和形式的多重含义，其目的是旨在我们的意识中只保留那些跟艺术品有关的方面。不过，艺术品的这种自主性指的是它表达了一种主体的精神统一性。艺术品只针对单个个人提出要求，但是它要求的却是他的全部，直到他灵魂内心的最深处。艺术品对这个人的回报是它成为这个个人的最纯粹的反映和表达的形式。所以，对劳动分工的彻底拒绝既是形成艺术品自主整体性与人的精神统一性之间联系的原因，也是这一联系的标志。反过来，但凡是劳动分工盛行之处，劳动成果都使劳动者再也难以与之比肩而立，他在劳动产品中再也不能发现自己被表现出来，产品的形式与所有主观精神上的东西都不相似，它似乎只是我们与作为人的完整统一体无关紧要的存在中一个非常片面的组成部分。只要劳动产品的基础是显著的劳动分工，并且是由这种分工意识完成的，那么它在本质上就把自己强行推入了客观性的范畴。生产者把他的劳动及其效果当成纯客观的和无名无姓的，这种想法似乎变得越来越合情合理，因为它们不再触及到生产者整个生活体系的根基。

由主观成分构成的某个实体越是完整地把其组成部分吸收进来，每个组成部分的特征就越只是作为整体的一部分而起作用；那么，这个整体也就越客观，其生命就也越独立于生产它的主体之外。一般而言，与消费的扩大相对应的是生产的专门化。如今即使是在精神活动和职业领域最专业化的现代人也读报纸，从而沉浸在一种比几百年前更为广泛的精神消费中；在那时，即使是最博学多才、涉猎广泛的人也不可能有如此广泛的精神消费。然而，消费的扩大是取决于客观文化的增长的，因为一个产品越是客观，越是非个性化，它也就越适合于更多的人。这样的消费资料为了要让非常多的个体都可以接受并享用，它就不能按照千差万别的主观口味来设计。在另一方面，只有生产流程采取最严格的分化才能够生产出满足人们需要的既便宜又充足的产品。因此，消费模式是联结文化的客观性和劳动分工的纽带。

最后，被描述为工人与生产资料分离的过程——它也是一种劳动分工——清楚地按照同一个方向而运作。由于资本家起的作用就是获取、组织和分配生产资料，所以这些资料对工人而言就拥有了一种非常不同的客观性，一种彻底区别于那些依靠他们自己的材料和工具进行生产的人的客观性。这种资本主义的劳动分化从根本上使劳动的主客观条件分开，只要主客观劳动条件还被合并集中在同一主体手中，它们二者的分裂就没什么心理原因好讲。劳动本身和直接的劳动对象分属于不同的个人，这些对象的客观特点必须被极为明确地呈现在工人的意识中；另一方面，劳动以及劳动资料更构成了一个统一体，它们之间通常的接近越发使得当前的这种两极对立的特征引人注目。这个过程还继续发展并映在如下事实中：除了生产资料，劳动本身也与工人相分离了。这就是“劳动力已经成为了商品”这一论点所说明的现象的意义。当工人用自己的原材料工作时，他的劳动仍然保留在他自己的个性领域内，只有当他把完成的产品售出，产品才会和他分离开来。但是当工人不再可能以这种方式利用自己的劳动时，他就以市场价把他的劳动提供给另一个人；因此，在劳动离开了其来源的那一瞬间，工人就同他的劳动相分离了。劳动现在与所有其他商品共有同样的特征、评价方式和命运，这标志着劳动已经变成了某种与劳动者相分离的客观的东西，他不仅不再是劳动，而且也不再拥有劳动。一旦工人潜在的劳动力被转化成了实际的劳动，那么只有劳动的货币等价物才是属于他的，而劳动本身则已经归属于别人，或者更确切地说归属于某个客观的劳动组织了。因此，劳动成为一件商品的过程只不过是影响深远的分化过程的一个方面，通过这个分化过程，个性的各种具体内容被拆开来，以使它们成为与个性形成对比的具有独立特征和动力的客体，。

最终，生产资料和劳动力的这种命运的结果还表现在其劳动产品当中。资本主义时期的劳动产品是这样一种客体：它具有明确无疑的自主特征，具有它自身的运动规律和一种对于生产它的主体也是相当陌生的特征。对于这一事实最强有力的说明就是，工人如果想拥有他自己生产的产品，那他就不得不用购买的方式来实现这一愿望。这一普遍的发展模式的有效范围远远超过了雇佣劳动者的情况。比方说在科学领域里，极大的分工就导致了这样一种情况：只有极少数研究者有能力获得进行他们自己工作的先决条件；而许多人却只是简单地把数不胜数的事实和方法作为客观资料和他人的精神财富从外部接受过来，用于进一步的研究。我回想起在技术领域里，甚至一直到了19世纪初，当纺织和钢铁工业最为辉煌壮观的发明一个个接踵而至时，那些发明者不仅必须要在没有别的机器辅助的条件下靠他们自己的双手来亲自制做新机器，而且在大多数时候他们不得不先设计和制造出制造新机器所必需的工具。在广义上，也就是这里所指的任何情况下，当今科学发展的情况可以被称之为是工人同其劳动资料相分离的过程。在科技研发的实际过程中，相对于生产者的客观材料被确实地从他劳动的主观过程中分离出来。科学过程分化的程度越小，科学家就越必须为他自己的工作亲自动手创造出先决条件和材料，他的主观成就与客观上被给定的科学事实的整体世界之间的对立也就越不明显。这种对立也延伸到科学家的劳动产品中：即使是劳动成果本身，只要它已经包含了他人的劳动，并将其结合到最终产品中；那么，不管它在多大程度上是主观努力的结果，它也要被提升到不受生产者制约的客观事实范畴中去。因此，我们也能观察到，在分工程度最为有限的学科譬如哲学（尤其是形而上学意义上的哲学）中，一方面，被采用的客观材料发挥的只是次要作用；而另一方面，产品却绝少脱离其主观的根源。因此，哲学看起来更完全是一个个人所创造的成果。

劳动分工，在其最广泛的意义上，也包括生产分工、劳动过程的分化和专业化，割裂了劳动者同其所生产的劳动产品之间的联系，并且赋予了产品以客观的独立性。某些与此类似的情况也发生在以劳动分工为基础的生产与消费者的关系上。在此我们的目标是从众所周知的具体事实中推导出心理上的逻辑因果关系。在中世纪的手工业中占据主导地位的定制服务只是到了上个世纪才迅速衰落了，这种服务使消费者与商品之间具有了一种个人的关系：既然商品是为他特别定做的，并且似乎体现着他与生产者之间的相互关系；那么，这些东西就以属于其制作者一样的方式，也同样地属于这个消费者。就像通过使客体成为主体感觉的一部分，主体与客体之间的根本对立就已经在理论上得到了调和；只要客体是由单个主体所创造的、或者是为单个主体所创造的，主体与客体之间类似的对立在实际中就不会得到发展。既然劳动分工破坏了定制服务的形式，——如果仅仅是因为在后一种情况下，顾客可以与一个手工业师傅，而不是一打分工合作的工人之间建立起联系——对消费者而言，笼罩在产品之上的主观光环也就随之消失了，因为这件商品的生产现在不是单独为他而生产的了。产品变成了客观上的给定实体，消费者只能从外部接近它，其存在与性质是自足的，完全独立于消费者之外。例如，高度专门化的现代时装店同在主顾家里做工的某个裁缝的工作之间的差异，就突出强调了经济世界里日益增长的客观性，以及在经济世界与个体消费者的关系中不受个人影响的独立性，而原先经济世界是与消费者紧密合一的。人们已经强调过，当劳动被分割成越来越专业的局部操作，交换关系就变得越来越复杂，也越来越需要通过经济必要地建立起的越来越多并非直接相关的关系和责任来作为中介。很明显的是，一旦在生产者和消费者之间被引入如此之多的中间环节，使他们二者彼此看不到对方，这会在多大程度上使交易活动的整个特征客观化，以及主体性会在多大程度上受到破坏而被置换成冷漠的矜持和匿名的客观性。

涉及消费者的这种生产自主性还与另一种劳动分工非常普遍的现象联系在一起，而其重要性尚未为人所知。有一种简单的观念广为流行，它是从早期的生产形式，即社会中较低的阶层为较高阶层劳动、植物靠土壤、动物靠吃植物、人靠吃动物而生存的生产形式中派生出来的。人们假设这种形式是循环往复的，——不管它带有或是不带有道德上的正当性——在这一社会结构中，个人的社会地位和精神地位越高，其生存就越依赖以那些在等级上比他们低的人的劳动作为基础。他们不是用劳动、而是用金钱进行交易。但如今看来，这种说法是彻头彻尾地错了，因为现代社会是由雇佣了无数较高阶层的人运用他们的科学、技术和管理能力为其服务的大型企业去满足居于从属地位的大众的需求。在实验室里思考染色表现形式的杰出化学家，也是在为一个从纺织品经销商手里购买了五颜六色围巾的农妇而工作；如果批发商通过全球化的投机生意而把美国谷物出口到德国，那么他也是为最贫穷的无产者服务的仆人；雇佣了高智商者的棉纺厂的生意依靠的是社会最底层的消费者。现代社会中已经出现了不胜枚举的这种反向服务，即较低阶层的人购买了较高阶层的人的劳动产品的事例，它们影响了我们整个的文化。这种现象可能仅仅是由于生产的客观化所造成的——这种客观化使生产脱离了生产主体和消费主体——并且因而使生产凌驾于社会差别和其他差别之上。最高层的文化生产者为最底层的消费者服务，这意味着他们之间不存在相互关系，而只不过有一个客体被强行插入了两者中间。生产者一方忙着在这个客体的一边劳动，而消费者一方则在这个客体的另一边来消费它。这个客体把他们二者分离开来，同时又在他们之间建立起了一种有机联系。这一现象的基本原因显而易见就是劳动分工：生产技术达到了如此专业化的程度，以至于不仅是越来越多的人，而且还是越来越千差万别的人掌握了技术操作的不同部分，直到达到这样的程度：即最低贱的消费品中的一部分是由最高等级的人来生产的。相反的，机械技术进行的劳动细分工导致了这样一种情形：最粗糙的手在生产最精密的产品时一起通力合作（只需要想想印刷术发明之前书籍的制作与现代印刷机的对比就够了）。社会高层和低层的典型关系的倒置最清楚不过地表明了劳动分工会导致上等阶层为下等阶层劳动的事实。然而这种现象可能发生的唯一形式就是通过生产劳动过程彻底客观化的过程，而生产劳动过程自身是与这两个社会群体存在关系的。这种倒置不过是劳动分工与文化内容客观化之间存在的联系的最终结果罢了。

迄今为止劳动分工都被阐释为个人活动的一种专业化。然而事物自身的专业化也同样为使其与人类主体的分离起到了不小的作用，这一过程似乎被看成事物的一种独立性的体现，以及主体在吸收事物并使之服从于自己的主观节奏方面的缺乏能力。首先，生产资料就是这样的。生产资料越是千差万别，越是由众多专门化的部分所组成，工人就越少有能力去借助它们来表达自己的个性，而他对这件劳动产品的个人贡献也就越是难以从中显现出来。艺术家所使用的工具相对没有那么分化，因此这也给个人尽情发挥他所有的能力提供了最为广阔的空间。艺术家的工具同他的关系不像工业机械同工人那样是两者相互对立的，工业机械通过其专业复杂性，自身就具备了一种个人的可靠性和内聚性的形式，所以工人无法像他使用其他不那么精密的工具时能做到的那样，把自己的个性浸透到机械中。雕刻家的工具全然是非专业化的，这一点几千年以来都没有变化。就算有些艺术工具果然发生了变化，比如钢琴，但它的特点也已经变得相当客观了。钢琴自身已经变得太过于独立自主了，因此相比其它一些乐器，诸如小提琴，它在对主体性的表达中有着更严格的限制，而前者在技术上的差异比钢琴小得多了。现代机器的自动化特性是材料和技艺高度发达的细化分类和专业化产生的结果，这近似于高度发达的国家行政机构的特点，行政机构之所以得到发展，也只能是以其职能部门的精细分工作为基础。机器渐渐变成了统一体，并在劳动中完成了越来越多的工作，因而机器仿佛成为了某种自主的力量而与工人对峙起来，似乎他不再是一个单独的个体，而只不过是执行客观上规定好的劳动的执行者而已。要想看看工具的专门化到底在多大程度上使个人技艺（不管其是优是劣）的有效性陷于瘫痪，使客体与主体都本质上发展成为相互独立的实体；只消比较一下鞋厂工人与手工制鞋匠的区别就足够了。没有分化的工具仅仅不过是手臂的延长部分而已，而专门化的工具则上升到客体的纯粹范畴当中。就军事装备而言，这一发展过程也是以一种非常具有典型性的、十分明晰的方式来运作的，其巅峰之作就是最专业化的、最完美的机器——战舰。战舰的客观化过程已经达到了如此之高的程度，以至于在一场现代海战中，几乎是唯一发挥决定性作用的因素就是质量相等的军舰单纯在数量上的多寡！

在专门化基础上的文化内容的客观化进程导致了主体及其产品之间日益疏离，这一过程最后甚至侵入到了我们日常生活更为隐私的方面。19世纪的头几十年，家具设施、我们四周的实用物品和装饰品还相对比较朴素耐用，也都同时符合较低阶层以及较高阶层人的需求。这就导致人们同其周围的物品“连生”的现象，这在今天的年轻一代看来简直已经成了其祖父一辈人的怪癖。客体的分化在三个不同的方面打破了这种情况，每一个方面所产生的后果都是一样的。首先，形状各异的物品的大量涌现使得主体想和它们中的每一个建立起亲密的个人关系显得越发困难：个体更容易适应于少量的简单用具，而数量庞大、品种不同的用具几乎变成了和个体自身相对立的一方。这在成为一种拜物教仪式的家庭主妇们对照料家庭的抱怨，以及部分性情比较严肃的人对于我们过分装饰生活的无数小玩意儿偶尔萌生出的恨意中都得到了体现。前者是我们文化中非常典型的情况，因为相比于今天，从前的家庭主妇们所操持和承担的家务活动要比现在广泛和辛苦得多。但那时从来没有产生过针对客体的不自由的依赖感，这是由于客体和个人更为紧密地融为一体了。相比她面对着一大堆专业化的、独立的器具时，一个主妇可以更容易地用几件较少分化的用品来表达其个性。只有当我们为物所奴役时，才把它看作是与人敌对的力量。就像自由不是什么消极的东西，而是把其自我扩张到服从于它的客体里；相反的情况则是，假如我们所面临的是自我无法吸纳的客体，我们的自由就被削弱了。人们被现代生活的外部事物所压抑的感觉不仅是这些事物作为独立自主的客体对抗我们的结果，而且还是其原因。令人烦恼的是，对这些云集在我们周遭的大量事物，我们根本就无所谓，这也是货币经济所特有的原因：它们产生的根源是非个人性的，而且可以轻易地就被替换掉。大工业之所以是孕育社会主义思想的温床，不仅要归功于大工业工人的社会环境，而且也要归结于大工业产品的客观特性。现代人被包围在缺乏个性的事物当中，以至于他变得越来越习惯于接受一种反个人的社会秩序的观念，虽然他也可能反对这一观念。文化客体日益发展演化成一个互相连接的封闭世界，这个世界越来越少地指向带有能提出其意愿和感情的主体灵魂。支撑这一发展趋势的是客体某些部分的特定自主灵活性。人们已经指出，现代的商人、手工匠、学者远没有他们在宗教改革时期的前辈那么活跃。物质形式和精神形式的客体如今都在独立行事，无需个人的载体或传送者。事物和人各行其是。思想、劳动成果、技艺通过它们日益增长的以客观形式的具体表现，诸如书籍和商品中，具有了独立行动的能力。交通工具在现代的进步只是这一趋势的实现或表现而已。借助于其独立性和不受个人影响的灵活性，客体完成了它们从人那里分化出来的最后阶段。现代经济的机械性特征最彻底的实例就是自动售货机，因为有了自动售货机，即使在零售业中——长期以来，零售业中商品的交换是在一个人与另一个人之间进行的——人与人的关系也被彻底消除掉了。现在货币等价物凭借着一种机械装置转变成了商品。在另一个层面上，相同的原则也同样在五分钱商店以和类似的店铺里发挥作用，在这些地方，心理经济学的流程不是从商品流向价格，而是从价格流向商品。所有商品预先定好的价格全都一样，这将会一笔勾销顾客的各种权衡考虑，并且无需售货员劳费唇舌对其进行解说，以至于经济交易活动将会非常迅捷地、不带丝毫感情地通过了它的个人渠道。

这个同时并发的分化过程与前后相继的分化过程所产生的效果相同。时尚的更替瓦解了主客体之间吸收和同化的内在过程，该过程通常不能容忍它们二者之间存在分歧。时尚是这样一种社会形式：在某种程度上，它把差异与变化的吸引力与相似性与统一性结合起来。每一种时尚在本质上都是社会阶层的时尚，也就是说，时尚通常都显示着某个社会阶层的特征，这个社会阶层凭借其统一的外表声称同时存在于其内在的统一性和外在的东西是有别于其他阶层的。一旦地位较低的阶层试图模仿较高阶层和追求吸纳他们的时尚时，后者就会去创造出一种新时尚。只要是存在时尚的地方，它们无一例外地被用于展现社会的区别。然而近几百年来的社会变革已经加速了时尚改变的步伐，一方面是通过弱化阶级壁垒以及经常发生的众多个体（有时甚至是整个群体）上升成为较高阶层的社会流动性；另一方面则是通过第三等级所占据着的优势地位。前一个因素使得时尚十分频繁的更替对占主导地位的社会阶级来说非常必要，因为较低阶层老是迅速地仿效他们，从而夺走了时尚的意义和魅力。第二个因素之所以会起作用，是因为与上流社会和农民阶层的保守主义相比，中产阶级和城市居民大不相同，他们是最变化莫测的阶层。不安分的、迫切要求变化的阶层和个人，在时尚以及变幻不定、相互对立的生活形式中，找到了折射出他们自身心理运动的一种步调。如果说当今流行的时尚远不如前几个世纪的时尚那么奢侈和昂贵，持续时间也要短得多；那么，部分的原因应归咎于现代时尚必须使社会低层的人更容易模仿它，而另一部分原因则在于现代时尚是发端于富有的中产阶级的。因此，时尚的扩展就广度和速度来说似乎都是一场独立的运动，是一种遵循独立于个人约束之外的路径的客观自主的力量。只要时尚——我们在这里谈的绝不只是服装时尚——持续时间更长一些，把相对较小的社会圈子凝聚在一起，个人与时尚的具体内容之间就可能存在着一种个人关系。但是时尚的日新月异——即其前后继替的分化——以及日益广泛的传播瓦解了其与主体之间的这种联系，并且正如同在一些其他现代社会的符号口令一样：时尚较少地依赖于个体，个体也较少地依赖于时尚，它们各自的内容都发展成为单独进化、互不相干的两个世界。

文化无所不在的方面同时并发和前后相继的分化，有助于构成它们独立的客观性。现在，我希望详细阐述一下导致这一结果产生的因素之一。我指的是我们可以发现的每天围绕在我们四周的客体都带有的众多的风格，从房屋结构到书籍版式，从雕塑到花园以及家居装饰，都可以看到文艺复兴风格、日本风格、巴洛克风格和法兰西第一帝国风格、前拉斐尔派风格和现实功能主义风格相互之间的毗邻并存。这是我们的历史知识扩大化产生的结果，而这一结果反过来又和上文所提到的现代人易于变化的倾向相互关联。一切历史理解都需要头脑的灵活性，需要一种能够并领会与自身全然不同的精神状态，并且在自己身上重构这一精神状态的能力。因为一切历史——不管在多大程度上它处理的是直观材料——只有当历史根源由基本兴趣、情感、追求等方面的历史构成时，它才具有了意义，并成为人们所理解的历史。即使是历史唯物主义也不过就是一种心理的假设罢了。为了把握住历史内容，认知的灵魂必须具备一种可塑性和模仿性，一种对变易性的内部升华。我们19世纪的历史化倾向，以及其从时间和空间上再现出最遥远的古代东西并使其生命复活的无与伦比的能力，都只是其适应性以及广泛应用的灵活性普遍发展的内在方面而已。这就是令人眼花缭乱的多元风格的根源所在，这种多元风格被我们的文化所接纳、呈现和仿效。如果每一种风格本身就是一种语言，有其特定的声音、词形变化和句法来表达生活的话；那么，只要我们知道一种单独的风格，并用它构筑我们周围的环境，我们就不会意识到这个风格是一个具有独立生命的自主力量。没有人在说母语时会幼稚地觉得他必须求助于客观的语法规则，就像是求助于某种独立于他自己主观性之外的东西那样，以便他从中借鉴符合独立规范的、他用以表情达意的办法。相反的，人们在说母语时想要表达的东西与被表达出来的东西合而为一，如果我们懂外语的话，那么我们所体验到的独立的、与我们相对立的实体就不仅有我们的母语，而且首先就是语言本身。通过同样的方式，如果人们只了解到一种渗透到他们整个生活中的、始终如一的风格，他们将会把这种风格与其内容当作同一回事。既然他们所创造或构思出的任何东西都自然而然地以这一种风格表现出来，就不存在任何要把风格同塑造和构思的材料区分开来，或者把风格视为独立于自我之外的形式的心理上的理由。只有当存在各式各样的既定风格时，人们才会把风格从其内容里脱离开来，为的是风格的独立性和特殊意义给我们以选择这一风格或是其他风格的自由。通过风格的分化，每一种个别的风格以及一般意义上的所有风格，都变成了客观的东西，风格的有效性不受作为主体的人及其兴趣、行为和赞赏与否的束缚。我们的文化生活的全部直观内容都已经分裂为多元的风格，这瓦解了主客体在风格当中尚未被分离的最初关系。相反，我们所面对的是一个富有表现可能性的世界，每一种可能性按照自身的规范形式——这些形式用以表现生活整体——发展。因此一边是这些形式，另一边是我们主体，二者就像两个党派一样，它们之间存在的是一种纯粹偶然的关系：由接触、和谐和不和谐所交替主宰。

大体而言，这就是现代文化客观化的主要进程的发展轨迹，这一进程是通过劳动分工和专业化（就其个人意义以及客观意义而言）而实现的。所有这些现象构成了这样一整幅图景，文化内容在这幅图景中变成了，越来越有意识的客观精神，这种精神不仅与文化接受者存在关系与文化生产者也存在关系。随着客观化程度日益提高，我们刚开始考察时所察觉到的奇怪的现象变得更加容易理解，也就是说，个人文化的发展可能远远滞后于物质（无论在功能还是精神上）文化的进展。

主观文化偶尔的优势

相反的情况在文化进程中偶尔也会发生，这说明了思想的两种形式彼此之间是相互独立的。下面的现象以略为隐蔽和变化的形式说明了这一点。德国北部的农村经济似乎只有通过单独继承地产权的形式才能保存下去，即地产不分割，由一个继承人来继承地产，其他继承人则以小于地产相应的市场价格的数额来获得补偿。如果财产被按其市场价格来估价——市场价格在目前远比其利润收益要来得高——那么，这样的补偿就会使地产负担很重的抵押额，以至于只有价值不大的企业才能被保存下来。然而，现代对公平的个人主义的意识仍然要求按货币计算出所有继承人机械的平等权利，不会单独给某个子嗣以任何优惠，即便这种优惠是财产继承里的一个客观可行的前提条件。毋庸置疑，这套程序常常提升了单个主体的文化标准，付出的代价则是它落在了客观文化的后面。主客观文化的这种分歧可以在现实的社会体制中清清楚楚地看到，社会体制的进化比个人进步的步伐更加迟缓和因循守旧。与此模式类似的还有这样的情形，比如生产关系在已经存在了一定时间后，从生产关系当中产生的生产力超过了生产关系本身，以至于原有的生产关系不再具有适合生产力正确表达和使用的方式。这些生产力在很大程度上具有人的本质：在企业的客观形式下人的能力以及正当的权利欲求难以找到合适的位置。只有当迫切要求变化的要素变成了势不可当的力量时，才会发生必要的转型。到了这个时刻，生产的客观组织机构就落在个人经济力量发展的后面了。妇女解放运动的诸多原因都可以通过这一过程来解释。现代工业技术的进步把先前由妇女所承担的大量繁重的经济家务活动转移到了家庭之外，在那里她们可以更便宜更方便地解决家务。结果是许多中产阶级妇女从而失去了她们原来活动的核心内容，又没有其他社会活动和生活目标可以取而代之。于是现代妇女反复出现的“不满足”和浪费精力（可能会给她们带来各式各样的紊乱和毁灭），她们部分合理地、部分则反常地寻求她们在家庭之外存在价值的证明，其实都是这一事实的后果：即比及人的发展机会而言，带有客观性的技术能更加独立、更加迅速地向前发展。现代婚姻中广泛存在的不满意的特点也可以追溯到同样的情形。婚姻生活强加在个人身上的固定形式和生活习惯，与夫妻双方，尤其是与妻子这一方的个人发展背道而驰，她的个性发展已经远远地超越了婚姻的这些形式。个体现在据说是倾向于接受一种自由，一种相互的理解，以及一种权利与教育的平等；而传统的婚姻生活却不能够为这些提供足够的空间。所以可以说，婚姻的客观精神在发展上落后于其主观精神。法学也同样如此：以特定的基本事实为基础按照逻辑发展起来，并在一套条文确定的法典中记载下来，并且以一个特定的社会阶层为代表，法学对于生活情况和生活需求所要求的是一成不变的特性；这种特性就像永恒的疾病一样被传承下去，在其中，理性沦为胡言乱语，祝福沦为诅咒。在宗教这方面，一旦宗教的冲动被明确为大量言之凿凿的教义，并且这些教义被通过神职人员的劳动分工以及为信徒保留的一个社团机构作为其信仰的载体；宗教就遭遇了相同的命运。如果人们留心到生活的这种相对独立性——客观化的文化形式，即历史基本运动的后果，以这种独立性同主体的人相对峙——那么，历史的进步问题就不那么令人困惑不解了。假如每一种解释都可以被同样似是而非地证明或是反驳，这种谬误就可能常常在于二者说的不是同一个事物。譬如，一个人可能同样以理由宣称历史是进步的，或者道德秩序是不可改变的，这取决于其理由是集中于已经被社群意识所吸收和确立的一成不变的原则、机构、律令，还是集中于个体的人与这些客观理念之间的关系，取决于个体道德行为的恰当或不恰当。进步和停滞有可能同时并存，它们不仅并存于历史生活的不同领域中，而且也在同一个领域中也会并存，这取决于人们关注的是主体的进步还是制度的进化。对于制度而言，尽管是从个体的贡献中发展而来，它们却已经获得了自身独立的客观精神的生命。

客观精神进展的速度可能比主观精神快，但是相反的情况也可能发生，在考虑了这样的可能性之后，我现在希望回到对劳动分工实现前一种可能性的意义的分析。简而言之，这双重可能性是以下面所说的方式发生的。包含在各式各样的生产中的客观化精神超出单个个人之上，这是由生产方式的复杂性所造成的，这种复杂性是以数量极多的历史因素和物质因素、先驱者和合作者的成就作为先决条件的。结果是生产的产品所凝聚的能量质量，及额外的潜质可能早已超出了单个生产者能力所及的范围。这种情况是劳动分工导致的结果，即现代技术中是再普通不过的了。只要产品是由单个生产者或者经过不太专业化的合作形式制造的，产品中被客观化了的精神和力量的含量就不可能大幅度地超过所涉及的主体的精神力量的含量。只有精密复杂的劳动分工才在单个产品中渗透了大量从众多个体生产者中提取出的能量，所以被视为统一体和与单个个体进行比较的产品就注定了要在各个不同的方面都超出了个体。质量和完美在客体身上的这种积累形式——它们综合在一起成就了客体——是没有尽头的，但个体的成长在任何时期都受到其自然本性明确无疑的自然规定性的限制。虽然客观的产品吸收了众多人的品质，同时也为发展提供了极大的机会，但它仍旧丧失了作为一个单独的主体能量综合的结果所能达成的那种尽善尽美。国家，尤其是现代意义上的国家是对这一点最清楚的说明。当理性主义学说公开谴责君主制在逻辑上是自相矛盾的——即君主单独一个人却统治着数量如此庞大的其他人——时候；这种指责却往往忽视了这样一个事实：即在他们构成这个君主制国家的范围内，这些老百姓和君主本人作为“人”的意义完全是不一样的。老百姓只将很小一部分的生活和力量投入到参与国家事务中，剩余的部分则伸展到其他的领域中去，他们不会将其完整的个性绝对地单独投入到其中任何一个领域中。然而君主的确把他自己与国家合而为一了，他所投入的比任何一个臣民都多。但凡一个政体是君主集权制的，集权的意义就是说统治者拥有对其臣民无限制的支配权力，而上述这种矛盾差异也就会存在。与此相反的是，现代宪法国家精确地勾勒出了不同的人民服从于国家的范围，国家区分出人民的这些范围，目的是为了从中选择特定的要素来构成国家本身。这种区分的程度越大，国家作为一种客观的制度——这一形式是与个人的个性相抵触的——也就越和个体相对立。因此，国家就成了其主体不同要素所构成的综合体，这一实体显而易见地在综合性上既低于个体，又高于个体。客观精神的一切构型——其基础是对各不相同的个人成就的综合——均是与国家类似的。不管它们可能在客观精神含量和进化的潜力上多大程度地超过了个体的理智，我们仍旧把它们看作是一种无生命、无灵魂的单纯机制，只不过在其范围内，分化和合作性因素的数量有所提高罢了。在此，精神与灵魂的区别被摆到了台面上来。精神是灵魂作为一种活跃的功能所意识到的客观内容；灵魂则仿佛是精神——即思维在逻辑一概念上的内容——作为我们的主体性而为我们的主体性所采用的形式。因此，在此意义上的精神并不非要构造出一个统一体，而离开了这一统一体灵魂就无法生存。就好像精神内容不知何故散落在各处，只有灵魂才把它们汇聚成一个统一体一样——如无机物质被融合到有机体和生命的统一体中一般。相对于意识的诸种个别内容，就其独立有效性和客观意义而言，灵魂既有其伟大之处也有其局限性。柏拉图把理念王国描绘成熠熠生辉的、完全自满自足的完美世界。这些理念不是别的，而恰恰就是摆脱了它们实际表现的主观随意性的思想的客观内容；因此，人的灵魂以一种苍白、虚无和空想性质的反映事物的真实意义对他自己来说，似乎是不完美的、受条件限制的和晦涩的。然而对我们来说，这样一种轮廓分明、逻辑明确的形式确定性不是评判理念和现实的唯一标准。我们认为个性统一性——对事物客观精神意义的意识也汇聚于此——具有至高无上的价值。只有在这里，生命与力量彼此之间才发生了摩擦；只有在这里，感情隐秘的脉脉温情的线索才得以发展.而所谓纯粹的客观确定的观念在其清楚的完善过程中既没有给这些感情的线索预留空间，也不对它们抱以同情。精神的情况与此类似，精神借助于我们理智的客观化，作为客体与灵魂相并列存在。的确，只要对象是越来越多的人分工合作的产物，精神与灵魂之间的距离就肯定会增加；因为已经越来越不可能把完整的个性——即灵魂的价值、活力、特性的组成部分——熔铸到产品中。由于现代的分化，以及与之紧密相连的我们文化产品的机械本质，客观精神失去了这种精神性。这或许是现在高度的个人主义的和天性极度敏感的人对“文化进步”抱有敌意的最终原因。的确，由劳动分工发展所决定的客观文化越是普遍现象的部分或结果，下面这一点也就越真实：在我们这个时代，非常紧要的事情不是靠个人而是靠大众才得以实现。劳动分工实际上造成了这样一种情形，甚至连个别客体也是大众的产物。把个别物体分解为它们的特殊能量——这一过程是由我们劳动过程的组织所决定的——然后把分化后的东西重新聚合成客观的文化产品，这种做法导致的结果是参与产品生产制做的人越多，单个产品里就越缺少灵魂。现代文化的伟大辉煌和柏拉图熠熠生辉的理念王国具有某些类似之处，在其中，事物中的客观精神是存在于毫无瑕疵的尽善尽美中的，但是它却缺乏无法溶化于客观性中的特殊个性价值。正是客观精神的这一缺陷使人们完全意识到了，个性的这些价值的特性就是碎片化的、非理性的和短促的。的确，个人的心灵作为一种纯粹的形式拥有一种价值，它坚持自己的价值，而不管其内容是如何地平庸和违背理想主义。人的心灵保持着它对于自身存在的一种固有意义，而与存在的一切客观方面势不两立，即使对那些我们一开始就着手讨论的情况——即个体的主观文化衰落了，而客观文化却在不断进步——它自身也仍然保有这种意义。

客观化的精神与其向主观精神的演化之间的关系对每一个文化共同体，尤其是在涉及这个共同体的生活风格时，都具有极端重要的意义。如果风格的意义在于它有能力以相关的形式表现出任何数量和种类的内容；那么，在涉及数量、大小和发展步伐意义上的主观和客观精神之间的关系也同样如此，即使是对于文化精神的千差万别的内容。生活的一般方式，即社会文化给个体欲望冲动提供的框架，也被下列的问题限定在一定范围内：个体的内在生活是接近、还是远离了他所处这个时代客观文化的发展进程？个体是觉得这种对他来说只是一知半解这种文化发展进程超过了自身，还是认为他的个人价值超过了一切物化的精神？客观的、历史上既定的要素是不是他的精神生活中独立自主的力量，以至于这些要素同他的个性内核各自为政、独立发展？或者说，是灵魂掌管了一切，还是在这二者——灵魂的内在生命与灵魂所必须吸收的那些不涉及个人内容而建立起的标准、意义及节奏——之间建立了一种和谐关系。这些抽象的阐述勾勒出了无数具体的日常的及终身的兴趣和情绪的图像轮廓，也因此而表明了客观文化同主观文化的关系是在多大程度上决定了生活风格。

货币与这些相对立运动的载体的关系

如果说这种主客观文化关系目前的形式是由劳动分工来维持的，那么同样的它也是货币经济的衍生物。这是因为：首先，生产过程被分割成大量的局部作业，这就要求有一个拥有着绝对精确度和可靠性功能的组织；自从奴隶劳动终结以来，只有被付给货币薪水的工人才可能组成这样的组织。雇主与工人之间任何其他形式的中介关系都会承担难以估计的因素，这部分是由于实物支付方式不那么简便和具有确定性；另一部分则是由于只有纯粹的金钱关系才具有独一无二的客观自主的特征，而这正是高度专业化和错综复杂的组织产生的先决条件。其次，生产变得越来越专业化之际，要求货币出现的实质性理由也就越来越紧迫。这个理由就是经济交易的本质其实是一个人交出另一个人想要的东西，只要后者也以同样的方式给前者以回报。一个人推己及人这样的道德准则在形式上的实现在经济领域中找到了最清楚不过的例子。例如，如果某个生产者为他希望用来交换的产品A找到了某个顾客，那么，通常会出现反过来这个顾客希望提供来用于交易的物品B却并非那个生产者想要的这样的情况。两人在需求上的差异并不总是与他们提供的产品的差别恰好吻合，在这种情况下，众所周知，这就需要交换手段的干预。因此，假如物品A和B的拥有者不能在一次直接交易中达成共识，那么前者可以用产品A交换成他所能获得的钱，并以此来购买他想要的产品C；而后者也可以用以同样的方式与第三者交易筹措到的钱来购买产品A。由于产品存在的多样性，或是对产品需求的多样性，人们因此而需要货币；而交易中所包含的对象品种越多，货币的作用也就明显地变得越发重要，越发不可或缺；或者，反过来说，只有当直接交换不再是必要的时候，才出现了对支付款项的详细说明。当产品和人的需求越来越特殊具体时，某件产品的买主恰好可以提供给这件产品的生产者以其同样需要的某件物品的几率也就下降了。所以在这方面，现代分化过程与货币的优势地位紧密联系在一起的方式没出现什么新花样；相反，双方之间文化价值的相互联系已在其真正的根源处被发现了；而且，专业化状况与货币经济之间的相互作用构成了一种历史的实体这一事实，只不过是二者所固有的一种综合趋势的逐渐激化。

借助于这种联系，生活风格——就它取决于主客观文化之间的联系而言——也和货币交易紧密联系在一起。这一层关系的本质被这样一个事实清晰地揭示出来：那就是货币交易体现着客观精神对主观精神的优势，以及它的相反面，即主观精神独立的增加与自主的发展。物质文化成为凌驾于个体文化之上的力量，是物质文化在现代成为了一种统一体、一种自主自足的封闭体所造成的后果。现代生产，连同其技术和成就，就像是一个具有明确的、所谓符合逻辑的规定性及无穷发展的宇宙，它跟个体彼此面对的方式就宛如命运面对我们变化无常、毫无规律的意志时的方式一样。这种形式上的自主性，这种内在的强制性——把文化内容统一成对自然关系像镜子里的映像般的真实写照——只有凭借货币才能得以实现。一方面，货币在这个系统中的作用犹如有机体中的关节一般，它使机体的各部分可以移动，建立了这些部分之间彼此互相依赖的关系，同时还借着关节系统来传递所有的推动力。另一方面，货币好比是血流，它从不间断地循环着，渗透到身体器官所有的末端，通过供给它们全体以同样程度的给养而实现其功能的统一。因此，货币作为人与物之间的中介环节，仿佛使人成为了一种所谓抽象的存在，而我们的内在本质一旦离开了一种摆脱了直接关涉物体、直接和物体产生关系的自由，就将不再拥有同样的发展机遇。假如现代人在某些有利情况下可以为其最个性化的存在（不是社会意义上的而是更深层的形而上意义上的）获得一片对其主体性的保护区，获得一个隐秘的离群索居的独处领域，那么，这在某种程度上就是对古代宗教生活风格的弥补，这可以归功于这样一个事实：即货币使得我们越来越无须直接接触事物，同时，货币也使我们极为容易地支配着事物，并从中选取我们所需之物。

这些相反的发展趋势一旦开始，就迫不及待地追求一种彻底分离的理念，在这个理念中，生活的一切物质内容变得越来越客观，越来越变得非个性化，以至于残留下来所剩无几的无法被物化的东西则变得更为个性化，更加成为了自我无可争议的财产。这种发展趋势的一个典型的实例就是打字机。写作虽是一种外在的具体活动，但却仍然具有一种代表性的个体化形式，而现在使用打字机却可以置这一形式于不顾而唯独青睐机械化的千篇一律。从另一方面来看，使用打字机具有双重的好处：首先，写下的东西只传递出纯粹的内容，而不会受到任何写作形式的支持或干扰；其次，无论是在表面的、无足轻重的还是最隐私的通信往来中，它都避免了泄露出最个性化的东西，而手写的方式却常常透露出这些东西。不管所有这些机械化的发明物是多么地社会主义化，残留下来的精神自我的私有财产却更加令人嫉妒地被保护起来。很明显，主体的精神性被从每一种外在的事物中驱逐出去，这对审美生活理想的不利正如它可以有利于人的纯粹内省一样。这样一种相反趋向的结合或许可以解释，为什么恰恰是具有审美意向的人对当今的世界感到绝望，以及为什么在这些人的灵魂同那些只关注内心拯救的人的灵魂之间会以隐蔽的形式——非常不同于萨沃那洛拉的时代——演变出一种轻微的紧张关系。在这个范围内，货币是万事万物变得一模一样和外在化的象征，也是导致它们如此的原因；同时，货币也成了最内在领域的看门人，从而使得该领域能够在自己的限制内独自发展。

无论这使个人变得举止优雅、与众不同和进行内心自省，还是被征服的客体正是由于可以被人不费吹灰之力地占有而反过来倒统辖了人，都不再是取决于货币而是取决于人本身。在此货币经济再一次显示出了与社会主义社会在形式上的关联。因为人们对社会主义所期望的东西——从个人为求生存的挣扎中被解放出来，保证可以获得生活必需品，以及更高的经济价值——或许同样也可能产生分化的效果，以至于社会的某一部分人可能上升到史无前例的精神高度，从而远离世俗的考虑，而社会的另一部分人则相应地陷于空前的实用物质主义当中。

在我们的生活风格取决于客观文化对主观文化的优势的这些部分里，货币的影响总体上最为深远。当然，货币也可以支持其相反的方面，这一点把货币历史性力量的本质和发挥作用的范围展露无遗。在某些方面，货币可以被比作是语言，后者也引导自己投入到最为彼此分歧的思想和感情的方向上来。货币属于这样一些力量，其特性在于其根本就没有特性，但它却仍旧给生活染上了五颜六色的色彩，因为这些纯粹形式上的、功能上的和数量上的规定性是与由质量规定的生活内容和方向相对抗的，并且还诱使它们从质的意义上产生出新的构成形态。货币同时促成了客观精神和主观精神之间的两种可能的关系，但货市对于生活风格的意义不但没有被这样的事实否决，反而被增强了；不但没有被驳倒，反而得到了证实。

第三节

自我与事物之间距离的变化——千差万别生活风格的表现

我们很少认识到在何种程度上我们对灵魂过程的观念仅仅具有纯粹的象征意义。生活的基本需求迫使我们可以感触的到的外部世界当做第一个引起我们注意的客体来加以考虑。那些我们通过它们来构想出一种外在于观察主体、而不能为其察觉的到的存在的概念首先对于世界的内容和关联而言是有效的；这就是一般意义上的客体类型，任何观念要成为我们的客体的话就必须符合客体类型的形式。这一要求指向的是灵魂本身，后者变成了为它自己所观察的对象。然而，首先的确是对“你”的观察才暗示着这一观察是公共生活和个体保持自我最必要的先决条件。但是，既然我们永远也不能直接地观察到其他人的灵魂，既然我们的一切知觉只不过就是我们自己的感觉印象而已，那么，一切心理认识也就因此不过是对我们自己的灵魂所感觉到的意识过程的阐释说明罢了。

当我们面对事物而产生感官印象时，就把这样一种阐释传递给了另外一个人，即使这种传递的兴趣似乎太过于集中在其目标上，而没有对其起源做出解释。灵魂如果要成为它自身理解的客体，那么只有借助于空间过程的映像才有可能。当我们谈论着种种印象及其相互关系，谈论着印象上升为意识和沉没到意识界限之下，谈论着内在的倾向和禁忌，谈论着欣喜和沮丧的心情的时候，这些表现及其不胜枚举的更多表现，其中的任何一个都清清楚楚地来自于对外部世界的感知。我们或许会相当肯定地认为，支配我们灵魂生活的规律与那些统辖外在机构的规则之间存在着天壤之别，主要的原因就是因为我们灵魂的单个元素缺乏清晰的界限和可靠的可辨识性。但我们仍然不知疲倦地把这些“观念”理解为一种本质，一种参与到连接与分割、上升和降落的机械关联中的本质。我们因此而确信，并且经验也证实了这一点——即依据直观过程的类型而对灵魂进行的阐释体现了精神的内在意义，正如对于天文学家来说，星球的运动轨迹是如此成功地被其纸面上的计算所再现出来，这些运算结果所再现的天文图景已经被真实的力量导致的后果所验证。

这一关系在相反方向上也同样有效，也就是说根据我们的内心生活的内容来对外部进行阐释。我的意思并不是说前者只是一种世界观，而是认为一旦某个相对外在的现象面对某个在某种认识论基础上的、相对内在的现象时，这个特定内在现象的用处就是把外部现象构筑成一幅易于理解的图像。因此，由于整体意义上的对象是由其全部性质来实现的，所以这个对象就只有通过屈从于我们的自我的统一形式之下才能呈现在我们面前。这样一来，我们就从根本上体验到了大量的规定性和命运是怎样附属于一个固定的统一体的。如常言所道，外部对象的能量和因果关系也无不如此：我们把生理一心理上的紧张感、冲动感、有意志的行为的感觉投射到对象身上，并且如果我们把这些阐释性范畴置于对象的直接可感知性的背后时，我们就依照自己内在本性的感觉经验在对象身上认清了我们自己的方向。或许，这就是为何一旦某个人碰到了一个在我们内在生活的首要最初象征物之下的、更深层的实体的时候，他就会与彼此对立的相互关系不期而遇。如果我们把一个精神的体验描述为种种观念的相互关联，那么获得这样一个认识靠的就是空间的范畴。然而也许这种关联的范畴本身是在一种纯粹内在的、绝非直观的过程中获得其含义和意义的。我们所描述的外部世界的关联性，就是实体不管以什么方式实现统一，彼此共存，实际上也就是在外部世界里总是保持着相互毗邻的状态，而对这里的关联性我们的意思则是指那些单单从我们的内在向外投射到对象上的某种东西，是外界的任何东西都无法比拟的某种东西，也就是某种我们对它无以名状、无法直接表达的那种东西的象征。因此这里存在的是一种相对主义，一种内在生活和外在生活之间无始无终的过程：在此过程里，一个东西是另一个的象征，使其成为可设想的和可表现的，这不是通过一个东西对另一个东西居于优势地位的情况，而是根据它们彼此依赖成为统一体的过程来实现的——即由它们的相互依赖而实现的我们的存在。

存在的灵魂和肉体方面的内容越是向这种相互象征化的阐释敞开，它们也就越简单。在这个简单的关联过程中，我们对观念的融合和再现可以坚持一种普遍的法定形式的理念，这一理念要求内心世界和外在世界中的类似的关联，并因而使其中一个世界成为另一个世界的恰当的表现。对那些较为复杂、与众不同的精神形式而言，要按照空间上栩栩如生的类似物来描述它们就显得越发困难。这越来越取决于是否能适用于众多的情况，为的是不要显得太武断和随意，而为的是要和灵魂的现实性保持一种安全可靠的（尽管只是象征性的）关系。从自身出发，这种灵魂现实性将会发现两边的过程越是专门化，或者越是由众多元素组合而成；它对事物的理解、对事物自身的涵义和意义的阐释就变得越困难、越无法确定。因为出现在内外两种现象中的形式上的神秘相似性（这种形式上的相似性为沟通两个现象提供了桥梁）就变得越来越不可能、越来越难以想象。以上是对下面这些看法的一个有意的导论，这些看法应该结合了多种多样的内在文化现象的一个系列，并且由此显而易见的是，这些不同的现象都归属于同一相似的生活风格，因为它们都可以依照同一种类似的直观的类似物来阐释其意义。

一个经常用以描述生活要素构成的形象，是把它们排列成一个圆圈，圆圈的中心是真正的自我。有一种关联的模式存在于这个自我同事物、他人、观念、兴趣之间，我们可以将其概括为这两方面之间的距离。无论我们的客体是什么，它都能够在内容保持不变的情况下更靠近我们视野和兴趣领域的中心或者外围。但是这不会使我们与该客体的内在关系发生任何变化；相反，我们只能凭借着对两者的距离的一种确定的或变化的直观的象征，来描述自我与其内容间特定的关系。当我们把我们内在的存在分裂为一个处于中心的自我和一系列围绕在其四周的内容时，从一开始，我们就已经为这个难以言传的事态创造了一种象征性的表达方式。根据事物离我们的感觉器官的远近不同，事物的感官一外观印象有着惊人的差异——这种差异不仅有显而易见的，而且也可感受到形象的性质及整体特征的差异——有鉴于此，这种象征化的表现的扩展自身就表明了，为何人与种种事物最内在的关联的多样性被理解为二者之间亲疏远近的距离的多样化。

从距离这一角度出发，有一些现象构成了一个统一的系列，其中我首先要强调的是艺术现象。艺术风格的内在涵义可以被解释为各种艺术风格在我们与事物之间产生的距离远近不同所造成的后果。一切艺术均改变了我们原初地、自然地置身于与现实的关系中的视野。一方面，艺术使我们离现实更近，它使我们与现实独特的最深层的含义之间产生了一种更为直接的关系；艺术向我们揭示了隐藏在外部世界冰冷的陌生性背后的存在之灵魂性，通过这种灵魂性，存在与人二者被联系起来，并为人所理解。然而在此之外，一切艺术还产生了与事物的直接性的疏离；艺术使刺激的具体性消退，在我们与艺术刺激之间拉起了一层帷幕，仿佛就像是笼罩在远山上的细细的淡蓝色薄雾。艺术拉近和疏离人与现实的距离的这两种效果上有着同样强烈的吸引力。它们二者之间的张力，这种张力在多种多样的对艺术品的要求中的分配，赋予每一种艺术风格以具体的特色。的确，仅仅是风格的存在这一事实本身就是距离化最重要的一个例证。风格作为我们的内心过程的表现，指出了这些过程不再即刻喷涌而出，而是在其呈现之时就已经披上了伪装。风格作为个别细节的一般形式，对这些细节而言它就是一层面纱，这层面纱强加给那些这种情绪的表现形式的接受者以一道壁垒和一段距离。即使是自然主义艺术——其明确的目的就是克服我们与现实之间的距离——也遵守一切艺术所奉行的这条基本原则：使事物与我们保持一定距离，以此方式来让我们更接近它们。只有自欺欺人者才不会承认自然主义也是一种风格，即自然主义在十分确定的前提条件和艺术要求基础上也组织和重构了印象的直接性。这一点无可辩驳地由艺术史的发展历程得到了论证，在艺术史中，某个时代认为忠实于现实、精确地摹写了现实形象的任何一件东西，在随后的时代都被认为是极度带有偏见的和有失真实的，尽管后来的这个时代也声称他们现在的东西才是如实地呈现了事物。艺术现实主义犯的错误和科学唯实论一样，它们的假设是：没有一种从我们的本性的倾向和需要中产生的先验性和形式也能过得去，因为这种先验性或形式为我们感觉的世界身上披上了一层遮盖的罩袍，或是使它产生了一种变形。现实屈从于我们的意识而产生的变形确实是在我们与现实的直接存在之间的屏障，但是同时这也是认知现实、再现现实的先决条件。在某种意义上，如果我们观察到自然主义偏爱于描摹日常生活的对象以及一些陈旧和老套的东西；那么，自然主义的确可能产生针对事物的一种相当与众不同的距离化。既然自然主义无疑地也是一种风格化，那么假如这种风格化是在一些直接的、原始的、世俗的材料上面展开的话，这种风格化在为一种更为高雅的艺术感觉所欣赏的时候——这种艺术感觉认为艺术存在于艺术品中，而非存在于其对象之中，而无论它是用哪种艺术手法来表现的——就越能被感觉得到。

距离增大和距离缩小的现代趋势

总体来看，现代的审美兴趣延长了事物转化成艺术时所产生的距离。在我脑海里出现的就是那种在时间和空间上都非常遥远的艺术风格成为了我们现代的艺术感觉的非比寻常的魅力。那种遥远的东西唤起了许多活跃的、刺激的观念，并且还满足了我们对刺激的多方面的需求；虽然由于所有这些陌生的、疏远的观念同我们最为个人的、最直接的兴趣没有什么关系，它们只是隐隐约约地围绕着这些兴趣，因而对变得脆弱的神经而言，它们不过是安慰性的刺激而已。我们这个时代所称的“历史精神”或许不仅是这种现象的一个有利的起因，而且与这种现象系出同源。通过大量的与时间空间上非常遥远的兴趣之间的内在关联，历史精神使我们对于在近处以及直接接触人和物时所感受到的震惊和困惑更加敏感了。飞进非现时当中变得更轻而易举了，也很少有什么损失，某种程度上甚至是正当合法的，只要这样做所导致的是对具体现实的认知和享受，尽管这些具体现实遥不可及，并且只能被非常间接地体验到。从这一过程中产生了诸如片断、纯粹的暗示、格言、象征、拙朴的艺术风格等形式，而这些形式在目前都产生了一种活灵活现的魅力。所有这些形式（在一切艺术中都为人所十分熟悉）使我们与事物的整体之间产生了一种距离，事物“仿佛是在遥远的地方”在同我们对话；在这些形式中，现实不是被非常有信心地表现出来的，而好像是只要用指尖轻轻碰一下就马上又缩回去了似的。我们最为讲究的文学风格往往回避对对象的直接描写，而只用言辞轻触遥远的对象外缘，这种文学风格所把握到的绝非事物，而仅仅是罩在其上的面纱而已。这最清楚不过地在造型艺术和文学的象征主义倾向中得到了表现。在这种象征主义的风格中，已然被艺术设置于我们和事物之间的距离又扩大了一步，因为由最终被激起的精神体验的内容所构成的观念在艺术品自身当中再也没有一个明显的感觉上的对应物，而只是通过内容完全不同的可感觉性来唤起人对这些观念的联想。在所有这类现象中有一种感觉上的显著特点，其病理学上的行为表现就是所谓的“畏触病”，即害怕过近地接触物体，它是一种触觉过敏的后果，每一次直接和用力的接触都会导致疼痛的感觉。现代芸芸众生微妙的精神上的和存在差异的敏感性，因此在一种否定性的爱好中找到了其表现方式，他们很容易被无法接受的东西所冒犯，他们坚决拒绝令其感到不快的东西，他们通常还非常反感许多由别人提供的刺激之物；反之，那种肯定性的爱好，他们可以提出积极的主张，满心欢喜、毫无保留地接受的他们所喜欢的东西——简而言之，就是适当的能量——却表现出决定性的匮乏状态。

距离所象征的这种内在倾向的存在范围远远超出了美学范畴。例如，哲学上的唯物主义——它自信能够直接把握理解现实——如今已让位于主观主义或新康德主义的种种理论，后两者认为在事物可能成为认知之前，可以通过灵魂的中介来反映或者蒸馏提取出事物。现代的主观主义的基本动机与艺术同出一辙：为了获得和事物更亲密更真实的关系，就通过将我们自身与事物的关联从中分离出来而回归我们自己，或者是有意识地承认我们与事物间总是存在着无法避免的距离。当这种主观主义面对着一种更为强烈的自我意识时，它就不可避免地倾向于强调我们的内在性；而另一方面，当这种主观主义要表现终极的东西，或者是要给一种不断地揭露其最内在根基的东西赋予自然主义形式的时候，它也总是和一种新的、更深刻的、更自觉的谦逊，一种委婉的缄默结合起来。在其他科学领域，例如在伦理学的思考当中，陈旧的实用性作为意愿的价值评判标准进一步退到了幕后。我们在此可以看到，在实用性当中，行为的特征只涉及那些最靠近眼前的关系，所以为了使它超越其作为手段的纯粹技巧，它就必须从层次更高，并且通常是与感官直觉性毫不相关的宗教原则那里得到特有的指示。最后，在专业化的具体劳动的情况下，四面八方都兴起综合和一般化的呼声，也就是要求一种总揽所有细枝末节的距离的呼声，在一种鸟瞰的视野之下，所有对现实产生的不安均被超越了，而以前只能触摸得到的东西现在也成为可以理解领会的了。

如果距离扩大的趋势没有相反的倾向相伴随的话，那么也许它就不会如此发挥功效、令人瞩目了。人们可以用两种截然不同的方式来阐释现代科学与世界在精神上的关系。诚然，在我们自身与事物之间无穷无尽的距离已经借助于显微镜和望远镜被克服了；但是我们只是在克服这些距离的那一瞬间，才首次意识到了它们的存在。假如再加上这样一个事实，即被解决的谜团总比营造出的新问题更多，接近事物常常不过是向我们表明了它们距离我们仍旧有多么遥远；那么，人们就不得不承认：在神话占据统治地位的时代，在那个对于自然的认识还停留在相当一般化、表面化的神人同形同性论的时代，人们从主观视角和在涉及感觉和信仰（无论多么荒谬）的方面才有可能维系了人与物之间一种比如今的时代要近的距离。我们渗透进自然的内在方面所凭借的这一切聪明办法，只能非常缓慢地、零碎地取代古人与自然熟稔的亲近关系，这种亲近关系被赋予灵魂是通过希腊神灵、通过依照人的欲望和情感对这个世界进行的解释、通过把对人类福祉的目的论思考和某个对个人有影响的联结在一起而实现的。我们首先也可以把这种差异描述为：相对来说，外在世界中被征服的距离越多，精神世界里增加的距离也就越大。当这个象征性的表述被应用于另一种全然不同的领域中时，其正当性才会再次显示出来。现代人与其周围环境的关系通常以这样一种方式发展：即他越来越远离同他最亲近的圈子，目的是为了更靠近那些曾经离他比较远的圈子。维系家庭的纽带日益四分五裂；当被束缚在最亲密的关系中时，难以忍受的感觉日益逼近在这样的圈子里，忠诚常常和解放一样是悲剧性的；对最断然地从直接的环境中脱颖而出的个体性的日益重视；跟这整个距离化的过程齐头并进的是和最遥不可及东西的关系构成，是对远处偏僻的东西抱有兴趣，是和某些圈子（其关系取代了一切空间上的接触）在思想上的结合。呈现在我们面前的全景图当然意味着真正内在的关系中距离的日益增大和外在关系中距离的日渐缩小。文化的发展产生了这样一个事实，即以前无意识地、本能地做出的事情后来出现时都带上了清清楚楚的可计算性，以及支离破碎的意识。而另一方面，起初需要小心翼翼和自觉地努力才能获得的东西在现代变成了机械式的例行公事和本能的理所当然之物。因此，最遥远的东西在这里相应地离人近了，而付出的代价则是原来和人亲近的东西变得越来越遥不可及。

货币在这一双向发展过程中发挥的作用

货币在这个双向过程中所起作用的广度和强度，首先表现为货币对距离的克服。只有把价值转化成货币形式才能使那些利益——即利益攸关方之间的空间距离被绝对地忽略不计——的结合成为可能，这一点自不必赘述。在成百上千个可能存在的例子中我只举一个例子：即只有通过货币的手段，某个德国资本家和某个德国的工人才可能被实际地卷入到西班牙的一桩内阁人事变动，涉足非洲金矿的利润，或是一次南美洲革命的成果中去。然而，在我看来更有意义的，似乎是货币作为相反发展倾向的载体。家庭纽带的松散是源于其个体成员经济上的特殊利益，这种现象只有在货币经济中才可能发生。家庭关系的松散首先带来的就是这样一种情况：即生存手段完全以个人才能为基础。只有和个人才能等价的货币形式才可能评估出相当专业化的劳动的价值，而如果不把它们转换成一种普遍的价值，它们之间就很难进行相互的交换。等价物的货币形式使个人更容易与外界接触，更容易进入到那些他所不太熟悉的、只对具有金钱价值的成就或者更容易对其成员在金钱上的贡献感兴趣的圈子里。家庭却恰恰是按相反的结构形成的，其基础主要是集体所有制，尤其是在地产所有方面的集体所有制。集体所有制带来的结果是家庭利益的团结一致，在社会学上这表现了家庭成员的联系中的一种连贯性，而货币经济非但使一种彼此之间距离的扩大化成为可能，而且甚至无疑还强化了这一趋势。除了家庭生活形式之外，其他的现代生存形式也都取决于这种由金钱交易所产生的距离化。金钱交易在人与人之间树立起了一道屏障，交易双方中只有一方得到了他确实想要的东西，得到了与其具体需求相对应的东西，而另一方只换到了钱，所以后者必须寻找第三方来满足自己真正的所需。进入交易的双方的兴趣截然不同，这在已经二者对立的兴趣所造成的对抗性之外又增添了一种新的疏离因素。同样，上面已经提到，货币导致了交易普遍的客观化，一笔勾销了所有个人的细微差别和倾向性，并且更进一步，以货币为基础的人际关系的数量持续不断地攀升，一个人对于另一人的意义越来越可以被追溯到（尽管常常是以隐蔽的形式）金钱方面的利益。以这样的方式，人与人之间产生了一种心理上的距离，然而对现代生活形式而言这一道屏障又是不可或缺的。因为如果没有这层心理上的距离，大都市交往的彼此拥挤和杂乱无序简直会令人不堪忍受。因为当代都市文化的商业、职业和社会交往迫使我们跟大量的人在物理意义上会走的很近，如果这种社会关系特征的客观化不与一种内心的设防和矜持相伴随的话，神经敏感而紧张的现代人就会完全堕入到绝望中去。种种关系的金钱特征——要么公开地，要么以上千种形式隐蔽起来——在人与人之间塞入了一种无形的、发挥作用的距离，它是对我们文化生活中过分的拥挤接近和磨擦的一种内在保护与协调。

货币对生活风格发挥的类似作用甚至也更深入地向下渗透进了个别主体的人自身当中，但这种作用不是指个人与其他人的疏离，而是指人疏远了生活的物质对象。起码的事实是如今财富不像原始时期是产生于消费资料，而是从生产资料中聚敛，这说明了疏离化的一种惊人程度。正如文化客体自身的生产中被引入了越来越多的中间环节，——因为成品离原材料越来越远——因此如今财产占有的方式使得所有者在技术上，因而相比于财富仅仅意味着充足的直接消费的可能性那个时代来说，现在我们个人与财富的终极目的之间的距离要大的多。和货币体系互相作用的条件下的劳动分工，在生产领域中产生了相似的内在性后果。每个个体对完成一件完整的成品参与得越少，其活动就越显得像是处于纯粹的初级阶段，其活动的根源也就距离其劳动的意义和目的越远。直截了当地说，一如货币横亘在人与人之间，它也横亘在人与商品之间。自货币经济出现以来，我们就不再直接面对经济交易的对象了。我们对商品的兴趣通过货币这个中介被瓦解了，商品自身的客观意义被与我们的意识分离开来，这是因为它通过商品的货币价值或多或少地被排斥在我们的兴趣序列中的合适位置之外。假如我们回想一下，目的意识是多么频繁地被抑制在金钱水平上，那么这就表明，货币及其扩大距离的作用不断使我们与事物之间的心理距离越来越远。这种情况还常常是以这样一种方式产生，即我们忽视了品质性的内涵，以至于我们和事物完整的、与众不同的存在之间的内在关联被瓦解分裂了。这不仅仅是针对文化客体而言，我们整个的生活也受到了远离自然本质的影响，货币经济以及依附于其上的都市生活则加剧了这一趋势。诚然，这种独特的对自然具有审美的和浪漫的体验只有经过远离自然的过程才成其为可能。任何人只要直接同自然接触，而不了解其他形式的生活，都可能从主观上享受到自然之魅力；但是他与自然之间缺乏距离，而只有在距离的基础上，他才可能对自然产生真正的审美观照，此外通过距离还可以产生那种宁静的哀伤，那种渴望陌生的存在和失去天堂的感觉，这种感觉就是那种浪漫的自然感觉的特征。如果现代人经常发现他最高的自然享受莫过于欣赏银装素裹的阿尔卑斯山和北海之滨，那么就很难仅仅把这解释成对强烈的刺激的需求。也可以通过这样一个事实来解释，即这个难以接近的、实际上把人拒之门外的世界代表的是整个自然之于人的意义的极度强化和风格化，自然之于人的意义乃是：一个精神上遥远的形象，即便在身体上接近的那一刻，出现在我们面前的仍旧是一种从内在意义上无法接近的东西，一个永远不能兑现的诺言，以及一个对我们最热情的献身只报之以淡淡的拒绝和冷漠的实体。风景画（作为一种艺术，风景画取决于与对象保持一种距离，取决于打破人与风景的自然合一）只有在现代才会作为一种对自然的浪漫感觉而发展起来，它们都是人日渐疏离自然，尤其是那种被以货币经济为基础的都市生活强加于人身上的抽象存在所产生的后果，这与以下的事实绝不矛盾，即正是占有了金钱才使我们可以逃避而纵情于大自然山水之间。都市人恰恰只有在这样的条件（即总是在他与自然之间硬塞入这种东西）下才能享受自然，这表明——无论自然有多少变形和后效——这种东西都连接了，同时也分裂了都市人与自然。

信贷

货币的这种意义在其扩展形式即信贷中表现得更为明显。和金钱作为中介所能达到的程度相比，信贷使货币的一系列观念扩展得更宽，并对其无限制的适用范围产生了更明确的意识。债权人和债务人关系的支点似乎在这二者之间直线的联结范围之外，并且它距离二者的距离还越来越远了：个体的活动同个体的交易因此而获得了远见卓识的性质和被强化的象征性。由于汇票或一般的金钱债务的概念所代表的是距离较远的客体的价值，因此价值就仿佛是被浓缩在票据里，正如从一定空间距离之上俯瞰的风景在透视法收缩的表现手法中压缩了这段距离的内容一样。货币既在我们与事物之间制造距离，又使事物与我们更加接近——从而表现出货币对这些截然对立的效果明确的中立性——与此类似的是，信贷手段与我们的财产总量之间也存在双重关系。一方面，人们指出支票交易能够缓和对钱财的奢侈挥霍；因为某些人有现金在手时更容易倾向于不必要的消费，但如果钱被存在第三者手中，只有通过一张支票才能取钱时，他们则较少乱花钱。然而从另一方面来看，如果眼前确实没有大笔可以随意处置的现金，但只要用笔在支票上轻轻一划就可以花钱时，轻率花钱的诱惑似乎也显得特别强烈。支票交易的形式——通过我们已经设定的多重机制来运作——在一方面割裂了我们与货币的关联，而另一方面也使得交易活动更加轻而易举，这不仅是因为技术上的便捷，而且也是因为心理上的作用，作为现金的货币的价值直观地呈现在我们眼前，使我们更难与之割舍。

对信贷交易的相关特征我只想举一个例子来说明，这个例子虽然不是很普通，却依然是非常适当的。根据一位旅行者的叙述，一个英国商人曾经下过这样一个定义一个普通人就是用现金付款买东西的人，而一名绅士就是我允许他赊账，并且每隔6个月他用支票结清的人。”这里首先值得注意的是其基本的态度：即并非是当了一名绅士才可以赊账，而是要求赊账的人必须是一位绅士。信贷交易似乎反映出那种更为巨大的突出性，这种突出性可以追溯到两种不同的情感方向上。首先，这种交易需要信任。非凡卓越的本质不在于证明其观点正确与否及其自身是否有价值而只需预先假设他总是正确，总是有价值的就可以了。同样地这也是为什么炫耀财富引人注意是如此缺乏非凡卓越品质的一种标志的原因当然，任何信任都暗藏着一种风险；有突出身份地位的那些人要求同他们做生意的人冒这个风险，潜台词就是他们不认为这是风险，不会为此支付所谓的保险费，因为他们认为自己是绝对可以被信任的。那句席勒的格言反映出了这种基本的态度：高贵的人物只凭他们是什么人，而非他们做什么事来付账。可以理解的是，对这种商人而言，仅仅用现金来付账的方式意味着某种小气市侩，因为在这种情况下，经济序列里的各个阶段都被令人不安地一起压缩到狭小的空间里，而信贷交易则在这些阶段之间创设了一种距离，这个商人可以基于信任来控制距离的大小。在任何地方更高级的发展阶段的模式是：各种因素原初的毗邻和直接的统一分崩瓦解了，它们彼此成为相互独立和截然不同的实体，目的是在一个新的、更加抽象、更加全面的综合体中重新实现聚合统一。在信贷交易中，价值交换的直接性被一种距离所取代，这种距离的两极由信任支撑在一起；正如上帝与个体灵魂之间不可估量的距离——有别于一切神人同形同性论和一切感觉论——越大，宗教性就越高，距离这么大的目的是为了唤起最大程度的信仰来沟通二者之间的这一距离。在商业团体比较大宗的交易里面，不再会感到信用交易的突出性要素，其原因就在于信贷已经变成了一种与个人无关的组织，信任已经丧失了其明确的个人特征，而没有这种特征，突出性的范畴就无用武之地。首先，信贷变成了一种技术性的交易形式，哪怕是十分微弱的一点心理暗示也是或有或无。第二，买主欠贸易商的小额债务累积到最后用支票付账，使买主一方在与贸易商的关系中产生了一定程度的矜持，现金支付中司空见惯的买卖双方连续不断地、直接地打交道的过程被取消了。从外表上看，即从所谓的审美角度来看，贸易商的交货接受了一种贡献的形式，一种向某个强有力者呈献的形式，至少在个体交易的情况下，这个强有力者只接受东西，而不给相应的回报。既然在信贷交易的最终阶段，支付方式不是由一个人把钱付给另一个人，而是通过支票、汇款单付给银行里似乎很客观的户头，那么主体的矜持就会一直持续下去。因此从各方面来看，“绅士”与生意人之间的距离更加突出了，距离是“绅士”概念的基础，同时也是信贷交易这种方式恰当的表现。

我感到非常满意，仅仅用这一个例子就可以说明信贷对生活风格的距离化效果，现在只需要再补充一下这种效果的一个非常普遍的特征，这个特征追溯到了货币的意义。近代以来，尤其是在最近的当今，到处弥漫着一种紧张、期待、无法排解的强烈欲望的感觉——就仿佛预感到最确定的东西，预感到生活与事物的真正意义和中心点一般。这显然与在较为成熟的文化里时常有的对手段的过分强调超过生活目的有关。除货币之外，军国主义也许是这方面最为突出的例子。常备军只是一种纯粹的准备、潜伏的力量和应付可能发生事态的预备，其最终目的和意图不仅绝少付诸实施，而且它也不计代价地避免其实施。事实上，大规模的军备只是在被作为防止战争爆发的手段时才备受称赞。在这个目的论的圈套中，我们已经达到了以手段颠覆目的这一自相矛盾的最高顶峰：与手段日渐发展的意义携手并进的恰恰是对目的相应的越来越多的拒绝和否认。这一因素越来越弥漫在人们的社会生活中，它在最大范围内直接地干预了人际关系、政治和经济关系，，并且间接地赋予了特定的年龄层和特定的社会群体以与众不同的特征。

技术的奖励

通过技术的进步和评估而使得终极目的变得虚幻的发展趋势似乎不那么明显，但却更加危险并且是潜滋暗长的。如果说现实的技术成果对于生活的意义来说，最多只不过是一种手段或工具，甚或在两者之间根本就没有什么关联；那么，在错误地判断技术的作用的各种各样诱因当中，我只想提到的是由技术自身发展出来的蔚为壮观之势。人类最司空见惯且几乎是无法避免的特征之一，就是把在某个特殊领域内和某个内在的前提条件下所达到的高度、广度和完美程度的意义，同整个领域的意义混为一谈；个别部分的价值和完美程度，以及该领域在何种程度上接近其自身内在理想，都常常过于轻率地被理解为其自身的价值和尊严，以及它跟其他生活内容的关联。有这样一种认识，认为某物可能在其所属的种类当中，与类型的要求相比显得十分出类拔萃，而同时这一种类和类型本身却被评价成微不足道和低级的东西——这种认识预先假定了对于每一种个别情况的一种异常敏锐的思维方式和一种区别对待的价值判断。我们常常经不起这样的诱惑，即通过把这个成就被夸大的重要性归因于其所属的整个领域，把我们的成就由相对高度拔高到绝对的高度，从而夸大我们自己成就的重要性。当占有任何一种价值性质的某个突出的个别部分——从收藏家癖好的收藏品到一门特殊学科的专门化知识——时，会多么经常地诱使我们以为，这一特殊类型的价值作为整体对于价值宇宙所具有价值的程度，跟该个别部分对于其所属的领域的价值程度一样高！基本上，这是源自于那样一种古老的形而上学的谬误：即把某个整体的特定要素所具有的，跟其他要素彼此有关的属性转变成该整体的属性。也是通过这一谬误，譬如说，对因果关系根据的要求——它对世界上所有部分以及它们彼此的关系均有效——也被拔高成对世界整体的要求。对热衷于现代技术的人来说可能最为奇怪的是，他们的态度同沉思冥想的形而上学者是建立在同样的形式谬误的基础之上的。同样如此的情况还有：在承认特定目标的基础上，我们时代的技术进步已经达到的相对高度，相对于更早时期的状态而言，被扩展成为了这些目标和这种技术进步的绝对意义。的确，现在我们用乙炔灯和电灯替代了油灯，但是热衷于照明技术取得的进步有时却使我们忘记了最根本的事情不是照明本身，而是要使我们能够把东西看得更清楚。人们对电报和电话的成功倍感狂喜，这常常使他们忽略了真正要紧的是人们所说的话的价值，与此相比，交通方式的快或慢通常是只能靠篡夺才能获得其目前的地位的一件事情。其他诸多领域的情况也莫不如此。

手段对于目的的优势在如下的事实中得到了概括和极致的表现，即生活的边缘以及在其基本要素之外的事物，已经变成了操纵其中心乃至于我们自己的主人。虽然我们在服务于自然的范围内控制自然的说法没有错，但是在传统意义上，它只是针对生活的外部形式而言才是正确的。如果考虑到生活的整体，那么我们通过技术手段对自然的控制只有在付出了被技术奴役，放弃作为生活中心的精神性这样的代价才成其为可能。这一领域中的这些幻觉一清二楚地反映在这些表达方式里，它们服务于这一领域，并且靠着它们一种为其客观性和免于虚构的自由而自豪的思维而揭露出这些优越性的直接对立面。说我们征服或支配了自然的说法是一种非常幼稚的表述，因为它预先假定了一种阻力，一种自然本身的目的论因素，一种对我们的敌意。但事实上自然只是冷漠的，它的可屈服性并不影响到其自身的规律性。与之相反的是，所有统治与顺从、征服与臣服的观念只有在一个对抗的意志被粉碎时才有严格的意义。只不过与这种表达方式相匹配的另一种表达即是，自然规律的有效性对事物施加了无可逃避的强制作用。首先，自然规律根本没有起作用，因为它们只是针对那些具体的物质和能量的公式。对自然科学方法的这种误解——就是假设自然规律就如同君主统辖其帝国一样，作为现实的力量直接指导现实——其天真的程度如同相信上帝会直接控制我们尘世的生活一样幼稚。所谓的强制性，即自然活动应该遵循的必然性，也同样容易使人误入歧途。但是在这些范畴下，人的灵魂感受到受规律的束缚，仅仅是因为存在着试图把我们引导向另一个方向的感情冲动。诸如此类的自然活动并非一定得在要自由还是受强制压迫的两种抉择当中二者选其一，“必须如此”把一种二元论强行注入到了事物单纯的存在状态中，但这种二元论只对有意识的头脑才有意义。虽然这一切看来只是表达方式方面的问题，但它的确把那些浅薄的神人同形同性的认识引入了歧途，并且它还表明，神话虚构的思维方式与自然科学的世界观之间也能相处融洽。人类控制自然的这种概念支撑着那种对我们与自然的关系沾沾自喜的错觉即便是在人与自然两相对比的基础上也不是不可避免的。诚然，客观的图景的确暗示着日渐增长的人对自然的支配作用，然而对于主观的反射作用以及这一历史事实的精神意义是否就不会朝着相反的方向发展还尚且无法确定。人们不应该被数量惊人的、创制了现代技术的理论基础的聪明才智所误导，它似乎把柏拉图的梦想变成了现实：以科学统治生活。那些线索——技术用它们把自然的能量和物质编织进我们的生活——也同样很容易被视为枷锁，它们束缚我们，使许多事物对我们而言成为不可或缺的，但对于生活的本质，这些东西本是可以、甚至必须是被弃之不用的。在涉及生产的领域里，人们已经断言机器本应该将人从与自然相关的奴隶般的劳动中解放出来，但事实上却迫使人成为了机器本身的奴隶。在更加细微、更加广泛的内在关系中，这一点甚至显得更加真切：我们靠服务于自然的方法来控制自然这句话暗含着可怕的正面含义，即我们是靠控制自然的方法来为自然效劳。相信现代生活的意义和精神潜能已经从个体的形式转化到了大众的形式是相当错误的；恰恰相反，它其实已经转变成了实物的形式：这种实物形式存在于无限巨大的充裕中，不可思议的便利中以及机器、产品和当代文化超越个体的组织形式的复杂精密性中。相应地，威胁要推翻专横独裁和强有力的个体的循规蹈矩性格的“奴隶起义”并非是大众的起义，而不过是实物的暴动。正如我们一方面变成了生产过程的奴隶一样，在另一方面，我们已经成为了产品的奴隶：也就自然凭借着技术的手段为我们所提供的东西现在成为了凌驾于自我主宰之上，凌驾于生活的精神中心之上的主人，这一过程的具体方式有无止境的习惯适应，无止境的娱乐消遣，以及无止境的表面化需求。因此，手段的统治所占据的不仅仅是具体的目的而恰好是目的的中心，是一切目标的汇聚点，而终极目的正是发源于此。人类因此变得和他自身疏远开来，在人与其最为与众不同的、最本质的存在之间，树立起了一道来自媒体、技术成就、本领才干和享乐的无法逾越的障碍。

从来还没有过哪一个时代像这样一个时代一样，如此突出生活的中介手段方面，而与生活的中心的、明确的意义针锋相对——这对于这样的时代来说是完全陌生的。更确切地说，既然人的精神完全集中在了目的与手段的范畴之上，人类持久的厄运也就彷徨于目的与手段自相矛盾的要求之间。手段向来暗含着一种内在的困难，即手段所运用的力量和意识并非真的打算为它服务，而是为了一种别的什么东西。尽管如此，生活的意义并不是真的在于实现它孜孜以求的永久和谐的状态。事实上，我们内在生命的活力也许确实取决于手段与目的之间相冲突的要求的延续，按照其冲突的剧烈程度，按照手段这一边或者目的这一边及其相应的心理形式占据上风，二者轮流登台，或许生活的风格根本就是千姿百态的。在当前时代的情况下，技术的优势地位显然表明了清醒的理性意识（它既是技术优势的原因也是其后果）的优势地位，我曾经强调过，精神性和沉思在这个科学技术时代喧嚣的繁华中已经变得麻木了，茫然地追求某种模糊感的恶果，是造成了这样一种感觉：即使人们感到我们存在的完整意义是如此遥不可及，以至于我们无法确定它，并常常处于不断地远离而非靠近它的危险之中。此外，生活的意义又仿佛同我们迎面相对，就仿佛我们本来可以伸出手抓住它，如果不是我们总是恰好缺乏适度的勇气、力量和内心安全感的话。我相信，存在于意识极限之下内心深处的这种隐秘的不安，这种无助的强烈欲望，驱使着现代人从社会主义走到尼采，从勃克林走到印象主义，从黑格尔走到叔本华然后又折返回来，这不仅是现代生活的紧张忙碌和骚动所致，而反过来，这种现象通常还是这种内心最深处心理状态的表现、征兆和爆发。在灵魂的中心缺乏确定的东西，驱使我们在一种不断更新的刺激、感觉和外在的行动中追寻短暂的满定。因此，就这方面而言，我们首先被卷入了那种混乱的动摇不定、不知所措中，它将自己表现为大都市中的喧嚣骚动，对旅行的疯狂嗜好，对竞争的狂热追求以及现代典型的与品位、风格、思想、人际关系的不忠实。货币对这种生活的意义是十分合乎逻辑地从本书所有讨论所确定的前提中推导出来的。这里只需提及货币的双重作用：货币与所有文化手段和文化工具站在同一个系列中，该系列挤到了内在目的和终极目的前面，最终掩盖了这些目的并取而代之。货币在阐述目的论的错位所导致的无意义和后果方面也是最重要的，部分是因为人们渴求金钱的激情，另一部分则是由于货币自身的空洞无物以及纯粹的过渡特性。然而，就这方面而言，货币也是所有这些现象范围内唯一的至高点。货币实现了在我们与我们的目的之间制造出一段距离的功能，与其他技术中介手段所做的同出一辙；但它干得更纯粹、更彻底。在此，货币也表明了自己绝不是孤单单的，只不过它是对在一系列低级的现象中也可以看到的距离化倾向最完美无缺的表达而已。但在另一个方面，货币又置身于这一整个系列之外，因为货币通常就是带来了目标序列的转化的载体。货币作为手段的手段，作为实际生活中最普遍的技术编织着这个目标序列，没有它我们文化中具体的技艺本来就不可能发展。事实上，甚至在这一作用方向上，货币也展示出了其功能的双重性，通过其联合的作用，货币重复了最伟大、最深刻的生命潜能形式：一方面，货币在人类存在的各种序列中是一个跟其他因素平起平坐的要素，或者甚至在其中排名第一；但另一方面，货币作为支撑和渗透进每个单独因素的联结力量，它又超出各种因素之上。同样，宗教也是这样一种生活力量，宗教与其他的生活兴趣并驾齐驱，又时常同它们截然对立。宗教是一种这样的要素，它既是构成生活的要素，另一方面它自身又表现着我们完整存在的统一性和基础。宗教一方面是生活有机体的一个环节，另一方面又与该有机体相对立，因为宗教是通过其巅峰状态和内在性质中的自满自足来表现生活有机体的。

生活内容的节奏或对称，及其对立面

现在我开始继续分析第二种生活风格的确定因素，同距离化不一样，它是被一种时间上的、而非空间上的类似所表现出来的。而且，因为时间所包含的内在活动同外部活动一样多，所以这里分析的现实的特征比前面距离化的情况下表现得更为直接，更少诉诸于象征主义。我们在此所关注的就是节奏——生活内容按节奏前进和后退——通过这样一个问题，即在何种程度上不同的文化时代会保持或破坏自身进程的节奏，并且是否货币不仅通过自己的运动而且还通过它强化或削弱生活的周期性影响而参与到这个过程中去。我们生活的一切序列均是由向上和向下的节奏来进行调整的；波动——我们在外部的自然中马上感受到了它，并且这种波动还是诸多现象的基本形式——也会使得灵魂摇摆不定。规定我们的整个生活形式的日夜交替向我们显示出了一般模式的节奏。我们无法宣称两个并列概念的意义同等重要，而不在心里偏重于强调其中的一个：比如，“真实与诗歌”跟“诗歌与真实”就是完全不同的两种表述。并且，如果要在三种因素中使第三个与第二个并列，这在心理学上也是不可能完全实现的。灵魂的波动形式会倾向于把着重点放在与第一个因素相似的第三个因素上。譬如说，扬抑抑格的音步就无法绝对精确无误地被诵读出来，第三个音节总是不可避免地要比第二个音节稍微重读一些。把大的和小的活动序列引入到节奏上重复的时间段里，就可以节省能量。通过每一个阶段里内在的交替变化，在身体上或精神上活跃的器官轮流得到休养，与此同时，交替轮作的规律性促成了对整个运动综合体的调整，综合体有条不紊的规律性使得每一次的重复变得更为容易。节奏满足了对多样性与规律性、对变化与稳定双方面的基本需求。构成每个阶段内容的是各不相同的因素，是兴衰沉浮，是数量上、质量上的多种多样，定期的循环重复在这个序列的特性中产生了镇静、整齐划一和统一性。节奏的单调或复杂，单个节奏周期的长或短，节奏的整齐规律，节奏的间断，甚或是没有节奏，似乎都为个人的和社会的、现实的和历史的生活序列提供了抽象的模式。在此处所讨论的文化进程中，我们首先面对的是一种现象的序列，它们在早期阶段的发展中富有节奏感，但是其后期的发展进程则是连续的或是无规律的。或许在这些现象中最突出的就是人不再有一个确定的交配期。人不像其他动物那样，性兴奋与性冷淡的时期是截然分开的，尽管原始部族成员的性行为仍旧显露出这一周期性的残留。各种动物的交配季节之所以不一样，基本上是由于这样一个事实：即生育必须在那些具备最有利于喂养幼崽的和温度适宜的气候条件下才能进行。的确，一些非常原始的澳大利亚土著人没有家畜并因此定期面临饥荒，所以他们只能在一年的特定时间里生孩子。通过对食物的控制和不受气候突变的侵害，文明人因而在交配方面变得更加独立，他可以根据个人的欲望随心所欲，而不必遵循一般的、也就是按节奏确定好的必然的性冲动。以上所论述的性欲的种种变化转变成了一个波动程度或大或小的连续统一体。在任何情况下都已经被确定的是，仍然可以观察到的最大生育量和最小生育量的周期性在农业地区比在工业地区显得更为突出，在乡村比在城市更加明显。此外，只有乡村地区的小孩子才会遵守有条不紊的睡眠和起床、活动和休息的生活节奏，在乡村地区还可以观察到与此类似的一些情况。与此截然相反的是，对城市居民而言，生活作息（不仅仅是令他们满意的事！）的规律性长期以来已经陷于一片混乱中了。假如妇女代表着一种不是高度分化的、仍然直接跟自然融为一体的人类发展阶段的说法是正确的话，那么女性生理生活的周期性就可以证实这一点。只要人依然需要直接依赖于农作物的收成或是猎获物，此外还依靠小商贩的走街串巷或定期赶集而生活的话，在生活的很多方面，他们就必须按照一张一弛的节奏过日子。对于某些游牧部落——他们比澳大利亚土著民已经更向前发展了一步——比如一些非洲人，没有草原可以放牧的季节就意味着一年一度出现的半饥荒时期。即便不存在明确的周期性，自给自足的原始经济在消费方面至少也表现出了其本质特征：即在从短缺向过剩，再从过剩向短缺的对比转变中形成巨大的反差。文化的夷平效果在此立竿见影。它不仅保证了生活必需品在全年数量上的分布粗略相等，而且还借助于货币的手段减少了消费中的浪费。现在暂时过剩的物资可以被换成钱，而用钱买东西享用可以平均地、连续地分配到一整年当中。

最后，我想在此提到的是——虽然只是作为节奏发展的一个颇具特色的象征而与经济不相干——音乐中的节奏要素也是在音乐的原始阶段中最突出、最被强调的要素。阿善堤地区的一位传教士对那儿的音乐印象深刻，尽管其旋律杂乱无章和不协调，不过演奏者保持节奏停顿的技巧却令人叹为观止。加利福尼亚州的中国戏剧音乐虽然是刺耳的嘈杂噪音，但却应该说是具备了严格的节奏韵律。一位旅行者叙述温顿印第安人的节日景象时说：“接下来就是每个印第安人表达自己感情的歌曲，说也奇怪，他们完美地保持了节奏。”如果我们进一步地去考察低一级的生物，我们就会发现：某些昆虫会发出一种声音，这种声音由同一种尖利而有节奏的重复音调构成，目的是为了吸引诱惑雌虫；而较为高级一些的鸟类则不同，它们的求偶曲的节奏完全服从于旋律的需要。在音乐发展的最高阶段，人们注意到新近的音乐潮流似乎完全不讲节奏感，不只是瓦格纳的音乐如此，而且就是他的对手的某些音乐也是选择那些不讲求节奏的篇章，把哥林多书和所罗门的训诫改编成音乐；音调高低的急剧转换让位于那些更为平衡，或更不规则的形式。如果我们把音乐中的类似情形应用到经济和一般的文化生活中去，这就更容易进行比较了，因为人们可以在任何时候用钱买到任何东西，所以个人的感情冲动和刺激不再需要任何紧紧符合节奏的停顿，节奏为了使这些情绪可能得到满足，会给它们强加上一种透过个人的周期性。当批评家为它在过剩生产和危机之间的规律性变化而谴责当前的经济秩序时，他们希望借此指出的是这种经济秩序仍旧是不完美的，更应该建立起一种生产和消费的连续性。在这点上，我想指出交通手段的扩展，从少见的邮政车到最重要的地区间几乎是四通八达的交通联系，再到使通讯无时不刻都成为可能的电报和电话；人工照明设备的改善日渐消除了白昼与黑夜之别，结果就是彻底削弱了生活的自然节奏；印刷的文学作品使我们在任何时候想读就读，为我们提供了想法和刺激，从而不受思想过程的活跃或平息这种自然交替的影响。简而言之，正如常言所说，如果文化不仅克服了空间而且克服了时间，那么也就意味着确定的时间段不再为我们的活动和休息享乐制定强制性的框架，这些活动现在反而只取决于我们的意愿与能力之间的关联，取决于实现它们的纯粹客观条件。因此，生活的一般条件脱离了节奏，甚至更被夷平了，从而提供了个人自由和可能的无规律性。在这种文化中，规律性和多样化的要素（它们在节奏中融为一体）现在却被这种分化搞得四分五裂了。

然而，把生活风格的发展过程简化成这种诱人的简单公式的想法——即认为从生活风格到内容的节奏，再到其内容的实现不受任何图式的束缚——可能完全是谬误的。这种说法只对特定的发展阶段有效，并且它还需要更为深入和复杂的阐释。因此，我首先要研究节奏的心理学一历史意义，而忽略其纯粹的生理学发生条件（它只不过是重复了外部自然的周而复始而已）。

节奏与对称的前后相继和同时并存

节奏或许可以被定义为时间上的对称，正如对称是空间上的节奏。假如人们用画线条来表现有节奏的运动过程，那么这些线条将会是对称排列的；反过来说，对于对称的研究意味着一种有节奏性的观念。节奏与对称这两者都只不过是同一基本主题的不同表现形式罢了。一切把原材料塑造成形的过程一开始，节奏就是为耳朵听而准备的，一如对称是为眼睛看而准备的那样。为了在事物中渗透进理念、意义和和谐，人们首先就必须均匀对称地来构建事物，使其整体的各个部分彼此均衡一致，并且是围绕着一个中心点均匀地来排列它们。因此，当面对着纯天然构成形式的随意和混乱时，人的造形力量就以最迅捷、最明显、最直接的方式表现出来。对称形式是理性主义力量的首次崭露，它把我们从事物的无意义以及对事物的简单接受中解放出来。所以，原始部落人们的语言通常要比文明人的语言匀称得多，甚至于他们的社会结构一例如，“百户邑”就是处于原始阶段的各地不同民族的社会组织原则——也展现出对称的组织形式。这是理智第一次尝试把一览无遗的、易于控制的形式赋予大众。对称结构是在本质上完全理性主义的，它从某一个优势位置上有利于对人民群众的控制。通过一种匀称地建构起来的中介来延续推动力的时候，比通过那种内在结构和组成部分的界限很不规则、变动很大的中介来说，延续的时间更长、更没有阻力、更易于计算。如果事物与人共同就范于体制的枷锁之下，也就是说，如果它们被对称地组织在一起；那么，最好是理性地应对它们。正是出于这个原因，专制主义和社会主义都具有按照对称结构来建构社会的特别强烈的倾向。这两种社会体制的确如此，是因为它们都意味着强大的中央集权制，这种中央集权制要求把其组成要素的个体性，把其缺乏规则性的形式和关联，统统夷平为对称均衡的形式。举一个实际的表现，据说路易十四拿他的健康去冒险，把门和窗都按对称形式来建造。同样，在社会主义的乌托邦构想中，一向也是依据对称原则来设计理想城市或理想国家的局部细节：居民点和建筑物不是被排列成圆形的，就是正方形的。在康帕纳拉的太阳城里，首都的设计图以圆规进行了精确的数学测量，市民的日常安排和权利义务的等级划分同样也很细致。拉伯雷笔下的特来美修道院的秩序同莫尔笔下的乌托邦截然对立，它教导的是绝对个人主义——在修道院这个理想国中不许使用时钟，凡事都根据需要和时机在该发生的时候发生。尽管如此，生活的不受限制的可计算性和理性化风格还是引诱拉伯雷以显然是对称的方式来安排其理想国中的建筑：一幢六角形状的巨型建筑，在它的每个角上都有一座塔，直径是六十步的距离。中世纪的建筑工行会具有其严谨的、精确制定的标准生活方式，其“临时工栅”的构造都尽可能地建成正方形的形状。社会主义蓝图的这种一般特征只不过以比较粗糙的形式表明了这种深层魅力——和谐的思维方式，以及稳定的有组织的人类行为一已经战胜了非理性的个性化阻力。对称一有节奏的形式是作为第一种最简单明了的结构而出现的，通过这一形式，理智仿佛赋予生活素材以风格，并使其可以被控制和同化。对称一有节奏的形式是第一种理智借助它可以渗透进事物里面的模式。但这也表明了该种生活风格的意义和正当性所存在的局限。从两方面来看，对称一有节奏的形式令人感到压抑：首先是在与主体的关系中，主体的欲望和需求一直以来都只是产生于与某种固定模式即快乐与意外的偶合，而绝不是一种预先计划好了的和谐融洽；第二个同样重要的方面是在与外部现实的关系中，现实之于我们的力量和关系只能被强制性地在一个如此简单的框架中得到综合。对于其有效性的不同范围，人们或许会以一个明显的悖论将其阐述明白：即自然不像头脑所要求的那么对称，头脑也不像自然所要求的那么对称。系统的方法加诸于现实之上的一切暴行和不充分性也应归咎于生活内容构形中的节奏化和对称。正如个体的人对其他人和事物的同化就是把他自己本质存在的形式和法则强加于它们身上，以证明他的相当可观的力量；并且正如地位优越得多的人在使事物服从他的目的和力量的过程中，也会公平对待事物的独特性，并对它们表示尊重那样，所以人类一个不同寻常的禀性就是迫使理论的和实际的世界整合到一个由我们所提供的框架中去。但更高明的做法则是认识事物特殊规律和要求，并且遵循它们而把事物整合到我们的本质存在和活动中去。因为这不仅证明了后者具有一种更为巨大的包容性和可塑造性，而且也可以更加富有创造性地利用事物的财富和可能性。因此，我们观察到在某些生活领域中，作为理性主义对称原则的节奏出现在发展阶段的后期，而在另外的领域中，这个构形的阶段根据具体的情况得让出位置，并按照事物自身变来变去的要求调整被提供的模式的预先确定性。比如，我们注意到只有在较高级的文明水平中，才会有规律地安排一日三餐；而有规律的日常饮食对于原始部落的居民则是闻所未闻的。反之，我们已经提到了，原始部族的居民在整体饮食方面经常周期性地遭遇穷困饥荒时期以及动辄不计后果地举办的欢庆大宴，这种宴会在比较发达的经济技术阶段已经完全销声匿迹了。然而，虽然日常饮食的规律性在非常高的发展水平阶段上达到了其稳定性，但这个阶段却多半并不是社会和精神尺度的最高阶段。地位最高的社会阶层由于其职业、社会职责以及各式各样错综复杂的顾虑而中止了这种规律性的习惯。客观环境和每天情绪不停变化的需要或许也导致艺术家和学者同样去这么做。这已经表明了进餐时间的有无节奏是与工作上的节奏相对应的。在此十分不同的序列也表现出了全然不同的关系。原始人的劳动就如其吃饭那样完全没有规律。谋取生活必需品或者反复无常的脾气消耗了原始人大量的体力，接下来的时间里他们简直就完全懒得动了，但这二者间的更替轮换全是偶然的、无规律的。人们这样假设大概还是有道理的，至少在北欧的国家中，一种固定的活动秩序，一种能量按照有意义的节奏一张一弛的做法，首先是从农耕开始的。在更为复杂的工厂劳动以及所有种类的办公室工作中，这种节奏达到了其最高的程度。但是在文化活动的顶峰，如科学的、政治的、艺术的、商业的活动中，往往是大幅度地削弱了这种节奏性。比方说，如果我们听说某位作家每天都在同一段时间里提笔写作和辍笔休息，那么，我们就会怀疑这种固定的创作节奏会缺乏灵感和内在意义。就是挣工资吃饭的人发展到后期阶段时也会倾向于（即便是出于完全不一样的原因）过无规律的和难以预料的生活。英国的大型工业出现伊始，企业内的工人们急剧地遭受到这样的痛苦，即比许多先前更小规模的企业而言，工厂的任何销售停顿往往在更大的程度上给一个大型企业造成困扰，因为以前的行会要分担损失。从前，工匠生意不好时也继续干活以积累存货，但现在生意一不好，工人马上就被简单地解雇了；从前，工资由当局固定下来，但现在每一次价格的下跌都导致了工人工资的削减。在这些情况下，据报道许多工人宁愿继续留在那种旧体制下工作，也不肯为了挣更高一些的工资去付出从事那种更无规律保证的工作的代价。资本主义以及与之相对应的经济个人化已经使（至少是在部分程度上）整体意义上的劳动——并且因此也包括其劳动内容！——比之在行会时期更加不可靠、屈从于更多的偶然性格局之下，而在行会时期，工作条件的更大的稳定性日复一日、年复一年地赋予生活内容的其他方面一种固定得多的节奏。最近的调查研究已经表明，从前的劳动内容的形式安排具有一种突出的节奏性特征（特别是在原始的合作劳动的情况中，并且还是在伴有劳动号子的时候）；而当工具趋于精良、劳动趋于个人化以后，这种节奏性特征随后就消失了。诚然，现代工厂仍具备强烈的节奏性因素，但是就其所达到的程度是要求工人单调重复的动作而言，它们与古老的劳动节奏相比具有一种全然不同的主观意义。古代的劳动节奏对应的是人的生理—心理能量的内在需要，而现代的劳动节奏要么是直接与冰冷无情的、客观的机械运动相关，要么是和单个工人只是充当与其他成员保持步调一致的过程中的一个微小的部分的必要性联系在一起。或许这产生的是对节奏感的麻木不仁，其表现形式可能是这样的：古代的行会组织和现代的工会一样争取缩短工作时间。但是，以前的行会接受的工作时间是从早上5点或6点到下午7点，这包括一整天直到上床休息，而作为补偿行会会竭力争取一整天的休息时间；而现代的工会所争取的则是缩短白天的工作时间。从工作到休息有规律转变的时间段到了现代工人这里变得比较短了。对早先的工人而言，有节奏的感觉可以持续下去，并足以使他们在一周的时间段里得到满足。但是现在工人需要更为经常的刺激——也许是作为神经衰弱的后果或是其表现——工作与休息之间的交替不得不被加快，以便产生符合主观期望的效果。

货币作为节奏与对称的类似物、作为其载体的发展

货币作为一种制度的发展遵循的是同一种模式。货币表现出了某些作为一种中间阶段的有节奏性的现象。从混乱无序的偶然性（这是货币首次面世时肯定会表现出的特色）开始，货币经历了一个起码反映出某种原则和富有形式意义的阶段，直到后来发展到更进一步的阶段，货币获得了一种自我呈现的连续性，凭借这种连续性，它可以进行自我调节去迎合所有客观的和个人的需求，而不受某种有节奏的形式的约束，并且，在更深层的意义上，货币还迎合了偶然性的模式。要满足我们分析的目的，在此只须用一些例子来进行描述从第二阶段过渡到第三阶段的情况。即使是在16世纪，在类似安特卫普这样有着数量惊人的货币交易的城市中，要想在定期的汇票交易市场外搞道这几笔款项也几乎是不可能的。当这种有效性的范围扩展到任何时候一个人想用钱就可以用的时候，就表明向一个完全成熟的货币经济的转型已经完成了。然而，货币交易在有节奏和无节奏的形式之间的摇摆以及人们对此的认识都是很典型的，所以安特卫普的贸易市场被那些习惯了中世纪货币交易的重重障碍和非理性的人称之为是一个“不散的集市”。此外，只要一个商人支付和收取款项时所用的全都是现金，当他的大笔款项到了应该支付的时候，他就必须在手头上保有大量的现金；另一方面，当他的资金回笼后，他还必须懂得如何去及时有效地将这一大笔数目的钱都投资出去。在大型银行里集中进行的金融交易使商人从攒钱和投资的周期性需要中解放出来。既然商人与他的生意伙伴使用同一家交换银行，那么通过把必需的数额从一个账户转移到另一个账户上去，就完全平衡了资产和债务，所以现在这个个体的生意人需要的只是一笔相对来说微不足道的和稳定的现金来满足日常的花销；同时，银行自己由于其资产和债务在不同顾客实现了彼此相抵，因而也只需要预备比以前那个生意人所要留在手里的更少的一笔现金。最后，我再举一个例子。在货币经济尚未充分发展起来的时期，那种在短缺和充足之间或大或小的周期性波动导致了利率从极低到过高的一种相应的周期性起伏。货币经济日臻完善就趋向于消除这些波动，以至于利率与早期相比保持了稳定，因此英国银行贴现率一个百分点的变动都成了至关重要的大事。通过这种方式，个体商人的计划安排变得越发灵活机动和独立自主，既摆脱了他无法控制的波动的影响，也摆脱了那些波动时常迫使他并不心甘情愿地采用某些不好的交易实践形式的状况。

有节奏或无节奏赐予存在内容的各种形式最终失去了发展过程的交替阶段所具有的形式而是同时呈现两种形式。生活的两条原则——人们可以用有节奏一对称的象征和个人主义的一自发的象征来表现其特征——是两种深刻趋向的不同，它们的对立面并不总是像在以前所举的例子中那样，可以通过发展过程中的综合而得以与之调和，而是最终刻画出了个体与群体持久不变的特征。生活的系统规划过的形式不止是——如我在上面中所强调的——是中央集权化倾向的技巧，无论它是属于专制统治还是社会主义的类型；而且此外它还获得了一种独特的魅力。内在的协调与外表的简洁，各部分的和谐一致及其命运的可计算性，赋予了一切对称系统的组织机构以一种吸引力，其效果施加的构形力量的作用范围远远超出了政治的领域而延伸到无数公众的和私人的兴趣当中。这种组织被假定赋予了存在的个体偶然性以一种统一性和透明性，借此把它们打造成艺术品。机器所唤起的审美吸引力与此相同。机械运动的绝对规律性和可靠性，对于冲突和磨擦的彻底消除，最小的机件和最大的机件之间的严丝合缝；这些都赋予了机器以一种在粗略的一瞥中也油然而生的与众不同的美感。工厂的组织机构正是在更大的程度上重复显现了这种美，而社会主义国家则被设想为是对这种美最大范围的体现。但是这种美的魅力和一切美感一样，都是奠基在一种终极方向和生活意义之上，奠立在灵魂的一种基本性质之上的。由此，这种美的吸引力或对其有效的证明不过是通过可感觉到的材料所表现出来罢了。在实践生活中，我们没有占有诸如审美的、伦理的、社会的、知识的、幸福表现方式之类的元素性的品质；而更进一步让我们自己成为那些品质。人类本性的这些终极决定性不能诉诸言语来表达，而只能在那些作为它们最终和指导性力量的个别表现形式中感觉到。因此，当人们体验到贵族主义倾向和个人主义倾向——无论我们的兴趣可能受哪一个影响——互相对抗时，是不可能去讨论针锋相对的生活形式的魅力的。历史上，贵族统治更偏爱那种系统化的统治，其一般形式是尽量把个体排除到某个外在于他的结构当中去。与真正的贵族意识相适应的每一种政治的、社会的、客观的、个人本质的形式，都应该得到独立的发展，并以此来证明自身的价值。所以，英国生活的贵族自由主义在不对称的形式中，在不受相似情况形成的偏见约束的个别情形中，找到了它最内在动机的典型的、似乎颇有系统的表达方式。当狂热的自由主义者麦考利说出我们考虑的不是什么对称而是方便实用。我们从来不会仅仅因为某个现象是反常现象就去消除掉它；我们不会去制定规范，除非考虑到特殊情况的要求。这些就是从约翰王至维多利亚女王，曾经指导我们的250届议会权衡利弊的准则。”这样的话时，他明确强调了这就是英国立宪政体生活的真正力量所在。在这里，对称和合乎逻辑的稳固的理念——它使每个个体的意义被集中到一个中心点上——被拒之门外，以利于每个要素按照自己的条件独立发展，因此自然也允许整体表现为一种无规律和不平衡的现象。很明显，这种对峙多么深刻地影响了个人的生活风格。在对峙的一边，存在着对生活的系统规划，它的不同区域围绕着一个中心点和谐一致地组织起来，所有的兴趣被小心翼翼地划分了等级，这些兴趣的每一种内容都只有在其体系所预先设定好的范围内才容许存在。这些单个的活动有规律地在一种运动和停顿的固定循环之间交替，简而言之，也就是在一种同时并存以及前后继替的节奏中交替，它既不容许需求、力量和情绪的波动起伏，也没有给外来的刺激、环境和突发的事变留有余地。反之，按照这种方式所建构的存在形式是完全可靠的，因为它排除了生活中与之不协调或未能成功地适应其体系的一切事物。在另一方面，生活构造的形式则是从个别情况到个别情况，一瞬间的内在需求和外部世界相应发生的情况之间建立了尽可能最良好的关联，一种随时随地准备好进行体验和行动的心态和一种对事物自主的生活的永久敬重结合在一起，为的是一旦事物的表现和要求出现之际，能够公平地对待它们。这样一来，生活的可计算性和可靠的平衡性的确被牺牲掉了，这种更狭义的生活风格亦是如此。这种生活不是被理念控制的，因为理念的应用一向会导致系统化和严格的节奏；相反的，这种生活是由其个体要素构成的，而不管其总体构架对称与否，对称在这里只会被觉得是一种束缚，毫无魅力可言。对称的本质在于这样一个事实，即一个整体的每一个要素只有顾及到其他要素、顾及到一个普遍的中心，才能做到各守其位、各遵其道、各存其意。相反的，如果每一个要素都反其道而行之，只按照一己的冲动随心所欲、各行其是，整体的形态就必定会变得带有极大的偶然性，毫无对称性可言。就其美学映象的角度来看，这种冲突是一切活动过程的基本主题，它在一个社会整体——包括政治的、宗教的、家庭的、经济的、社会的或任何其他种类的——及其个体成员之间反映出来。个体力求成为一个完整的有机体，一个具有自我中心的形象，他的存在和行为的一切要素均以这个中心为来源而获得了一种统一的、协调一致的意义。但是如果超越个体的整体是被磨掉了棱角的，并且是在自给自足的涵义上实现了一种自己的客观理想；那么，它就不可能容许其组成部分具有任何独立性。因此，产生如下的期望与不可能的：即认为一棵树的生长得力于几棵树但却只是吸收了它们的细胞，或者一幅画借鉴了其他几幅画但却只是借鉴了其笔法的运笔走势，而它自己没有一笔具备任何的完整而独立的生命或是审美意义。尽管整体只能在个体特定的行动中，甚或只有在个体内部才能获得实际的现实性，但整体的统一性与个体的统一性仍然处于一种永恒的矛盾之中。表现这一冲突的美学形象正是由于美的魅力总是蕴含在一个整体中——无论该整体直接就具有直观生动性，还是像碎片那样通过幻想来补充了直观生动性——而给人留下了特别深刻的印象。艺术本质上的意义在于它能够从一个现实的偶在碎片（它与现实之间存在着千丝万缕的联系）出发，构筑出一个独立自主的统一体，一个自给自足的微观世界。个体存在与超个体存在之间典型的抵触冲突，可以被解释为这两种因素之间都是为了获得美学上令人满意的表现形象而无法妥协的抗争。

不过，货币在这两种截然对峙的形式中似乎首先只用于表现其中之一的形成，因为货币本身是完全无形的：它在其自身内部不包含哪怕是一丁点的对于生活内容有规律的升降沉浮的暗示；货币在任何一个时刻所呈现的都是同样的精神饱满和富有效率；货币通过其广泛的影响和把万事万物化约为一个相同的标准价值，它抹平了无数的上下波动，取消了远近亲疏、摇摆平衡之间的互相更替，这些东西本来使个体在其行为可能性和经验可能性中承担起普遍有效的变化。十分意味深长的是，我们把流通中的货币称之为“流动”的钱：货币像一种液体那样缺乏内在的限定性，毫无抵抗地接受了固定的周边环境所提供给它的外在限定性。因此，对于把生活条件中一种强加给我们的超个体的节奏转化成一种和谐和平稳——这种和谐和平稳使我们的个人力量和兴趣得到一种更加自由、更加个性化、更为客观的证明——货币是最彻底并且又完全中立的手段。然而，恰恰是因为货币有机会获得这种毫无实质的本质，所以无论在什么地方关系的发展水平或个人的倾向迫切需要这样的时候，它才会去支持生活的系统性和节奏化。当我们观察到自由主义的立宪政体与货币经济间具有一种紧密的相互关联时，同样也值得注意的是：货币为专制主义提供了一种极为极有效率的技术，一种把空间上最遥远的地点置于专制主义的统辖之下的手段，而在实物交换的经济时期，这些地点总是倾向于分裂和独立自治的。一方面，通过金钱体制的形成发展，英国的个人主义社会逐渐发展壮大；另一方面，货币也是社会主义社会形式的先驱，这不仅是就货币促使自由主义转向其反面的辩证过程的意义而言，而且相当直接的原因也是（正如我们所看到的那样）特有的货币经济条件呈现出社会主义孜孜以求希望建构的蓝图或社会类型。

在这里，货币成为了一个早在前面就已经变得对我们至关紧要的、在种种生活中的力量的范畴，这些力量的独特特征就是其本质和意义超越了存在于它们各自兴趣领域内的对抗性，它们一致中立性超越于其上，但同时这些生活力量也同样下降到了个别部分的对峙当中，它们变得有所偏颇，正如它们曾经也是不参与者或裁判者那样。首先宗教就是如此，人们需要宗教，其目的是为了调和他的需要和满足、对他的道德要求和实践行为、他对世界的理想和现实之间的二元对立。但是，一旦完成了这种调和，宗教就再也不能保持它在巅峰时刻曾经达到过的那个高度，而是逐步降低到你争我夺的舞台之上，自甘认同了人的存在的二元之一元，而这正是宗教先前曾经统一过的一元。一方面，宗教面对的是人们所体验到的整体的生活（它是与宗教对应的旗鼓相当的力量），它是超越于我们通常人性的一切相对性的一种整体性；而另一方面，宗教只不过是组成生活的一个部分而已，生活的整体还取决于宗教和其他生活内容的相互作用。所以，宗教既是一个完整的有机体同时又是一个单独的器官；宗教既是存在的一部分同时又在一个更高的、内在化的水平上就是存在自身。国家的所作所为也显示出与宗教类似的形式。国家的意义无疑是居于各党派及利益的冲突之上的；国家的力量要归功于它作为社会最高权威这一抽象意义之上的不可接触性及其地位。虽然国家被渗透进了所有这些性质，它依旧参与到种种特殊的社会势力的明争暗斗中，通过扶植一个党派来反对另一个党派；后者尽管在广义上是包含在国家中的一部分，但在狭义上却是与国家势不两立的力量。最高权力的这种双重身份在形而上学那里又再次出现了，例如，无论在什么哲学中，存在的总体都被作为一种精神性的物质而被阐释为是一种精神性的本质和绝对之物——那种在一切现象中创造和体现自己的东西。然而，同时这个绝对之物也必须被视为某种具有相对性的东西。因为，在现实当中与精神对峙的不仅是一种物质性——在这种对峙中物质性首先要实现自己的本质；而且它还遇到那种低级品质的精神现象，比如邪恶、懒惰和敌意。一个如此这般的形而上学理论不会认为这些低级品质属于这个精神——它是存在的绝对实质。相反的是，与该精神并列的是一切世俗性的、不完美的存在，后者是作为另一方、一种平衡性的要素和一种具体的价值，尽管精神（它就是那个绝对体）包涵了一切事物。这种双重的存在状态在自我的概念中最彻底地发挥了作用。自我在构想世界时是以同等的高度面对着世界上的所有具体内容，而不受个体的一切品质、差异和冲突的影响，这些只存在于个体的内部，也就是所谓他自己的私事。但是我们实际的生活感受不允许自我保持在这个高度，而是更认同生活的某一些内容，而不太认可另一些内容——正如上帝通过宗教干预了生活的某些确定的地方，而上帝本来应该可以对所有其他地方也一视同仁地发挥同样的功效——自我逐渐成了自己的某一个特定的内容，它分化了自己，在或积极或消极的意义上，按照与自身或高或低的标准，同世界的其余部分及其突出特性针锋相对，而本来自我的意义是已经超越了所有这一切的。

接下来同样是这种形式类型的就是货币。与它的统治范围相关，货币参与到同这些内容相当陌生的力量打交道的行动中来。货币的本质也在于它把自身提升到了超脱一切个别兴趣和生活风格的这一抽象高度；货币的意义就是通过作为一种不偏不倚的普遍性实体在所有这些兴趣和风格的运动、冲突、平衡之中而同时又置身于其外，货币自身并未透露出丝毫它是赞成还是反对为某种特定的兴趣效劳的线索。并且只有当货币配备了所有那些无与伦比的距离化效果、集中的力量和无所不在的渗透性时，——这些性质是货币与所有局部的东西、片面的东西保持距离的结果——它自己就开始为生活的特殊需求或形式服务效力了。不管货币作为一种形式而与存在形式里的宗教、国家、形而上学思想所内在地共有的一切突出的、普遍的相似性；一个与此相对的、令人瞩目的差异却在此出现了。当所有它们这些力量都认同了某一种特定的兴趣和立场之际，就明确地开始偏袒冲突中的一方来对抗对手；它们结成联盟或自觉认同了以前曾对之表示中立的、有明确分歧中的一方，并且这样做也排挤掉了其他的分歧方。然而货币在其影响力所及的范围内，对几乎每一种意图均一视同仁地效劳。不像那些力量一旦把它们的普遍意义转变为一种特殊意义后所做的那样，货币无论如何也不存在同其他事物敌对的形式。货币实际上保留了构成其普遍意义的海纳百川，方法是当对立的双方利用彼此与货币的普遍联系来扩大二者的差异、决战到底时，货币就一视同仁地为它们效劳。在实践中，货币的客观性不是游离于对立之外的东西，——如果是这样的话，它就会被一方不合理地利用来反对另一方——相反，这种客观性从一开始就尽力为冲突的双方同时效力。

然而，货币这样做的时候不属于包括了空气（各不相同的有机体无差别地呼吸空气）的那种宽广范畴之类的东西，也不属于武器（陷入冲突的所有派别都可以同样地使用武器）的范畴。但是就如下事实而言，货币的确是最包罗万象的例子：即使是人类世界中最根本性的分歧和敌意也总是为利益的一致性和共同性留有余地。但货币还远不止是这样。无所偏袒的其他类型的实体完全远离于它们为之效力的那个内在意图之外。货币与这些类型不同，作为一个抽象的实体和为价值领域完整内容的经济抽象物，无论对一切内在性和品性显得多么陌生异己，货币却经常表现出可以为两个敌对的方面全然独有的本质和倾向效犬马之劳的神秘莫测的能力。在这双方中，一方从货币所代表的这些力量的普遍价值宝库中提取出了适合其独特本性的表达手段、沟通可能性或独立可能性，而同时对于内容上对立的另一方，货币对它的内在性的热情帮助也非常百依百顺、完全听命。货币对于生活风格的意义就在于：恰恰因为货币完全超然于一切片面的实体之上，它才可能被其中任何一个当作一件自己的工具来使用。在狭隘和经验的世界中，货币是存在的难以名状的统一体的象征，世界就是从这个统一体中流溢而出，涌入了其能量和现实的完整的广度及其所有的纷繁复杂当中。事物难以识别的结构不得不以这样一种方式经由形而上学而被主观地解释：即世界的内容（它构成了一种纯精神性的关联）存在于纯粹的理想中，只有那时——当然不是在现时的过程中——存在才超越了世界的内容而出现。这一点曾经被这样表述：即“什么”获得了“是什么”的意义。无人能够说出这种存在实质上到底是什么，该存在在性质上区分开了实在的对象跟仅仅是在逻辑上有效的客观内容。无论这种存在纯粹的概念多么空洞抽象，它都表现为生命的暖流，注入了事物概念的图式，使它们仿佛绽放开来，显露出其真实本质，而不管它们的内容和态度是多么的大相径庭、相互敌对。但是这种存在对事物而言并非什么外在的或陌生的东西，而就是事物自身的本质，事物的本质接受了这一存在并将它发展成为一个有效的现实。在一切外部现实的事物中——任何类似这一绝对存在的事物都仅仅是局部有效的——货币与存在的这种力量是最为接近的。货币的真实观念就是全然外在于种种事物，对它们之间的差异毫不关心，所以每件物体都能够完整地吸收货币，以此恰好可以把它的独特本质发展成为最完美的内容。我曾经特别强调，货币对于发展那些生活风格（人们可以称之为对称的和个人一实质的生活风格）的意义，因为这些风格对立面的无与伦比的深度非常清楚地说明了货币所起的这种作用。

生活以及货币供给的速度与变化

最后要分析的是第三种影响力，货币通过它的帮助确定了生活内容的形式和秩序。它所处理的是生活内容发展的速度，不同的历史时代之间、同一时期世界上的不同地区之间、以及同一群体中不同的个人之间，其速度不尽相同。我们的内心世界似乎扩展到了两个层面上，这两个层面的规模大小决定了生活速度的快慢。在任何一段时间中，我们映象的内容——即便概念的数量是相等的——生活经历之间的差别越是深刻，我们所走过的人生的跨度也就越大。我们所体验到的生活速度是生活的全部及其变化的程度所造就的产物。在一个既定阶段，货币决定生活速度的意义首先是通过这一事实得到说明的，即金融环境的变化带来了生活速度的变化。

人们曾断言，货币数量的增长——无论是通过进口金属还是通过货币贬值，是通过贸易顺差还是发行纸币——不会必然使一个国家的内部状况发生天翻地覆的变化。除了少数人（他们的收入是固定的，不会成倍增加）之外，如果货币供应量增加的话，每一种商品或每一件作品的货币价值都会增加；但是既然每个人既是生产者又是消费者，那么个体作为生产者所挣的钱只不过就是作他为消费者所多花那部分钱，收支状况仍旧保持不变。即使价格按比例的上涨就是货币供应量增加所导致的客观效果，那么也会随之带来相当根本性的心理变化现象。没有人乐意以比从前更高的价格来购买某件商品，即使与此同时他自己的收入增加了；而另一方面，人们收入增加后就很容易受到花更多的钱的诱惑，而没有考虑到增加的那部分收入已经被日常用品上涨的价格所抵消了。当单纯地增加了人们手头可用的货币现金的供给量时——对于这种增加只是纯粹相对性的他们完全不假思索——花钱的诱惑便随之加强，而且这样做促成了更大的商品周转，还有一种经济观念上的增加、加速和多样化。人类本质的基本特性乃是：把相对的东西变成绝对的东西，从而掩饰某件客体和一笔具体数额的钱之间关系的流动特征，并且使这种关系看起来像是一种客观的、持久的适当关系。一旦这个关联中的某个环节产生了变故，就会产生一种混乱和方向的迷失。积极的东西与消极的东西的变更绝非立刻通过它们的心理作用而实现了平衡。当这种变故发生时，对经济过程在其以前发展中的稳定性的意识在方方面面都受到了干扰，今非昔比的感觉在各个方面都能感受到。只要新的调整尚未出现，货币数量的稳步增长就会诱发持续不断的混乱感和心理紊乱，从而将深化现行的种种概念之间内在的分歧和差异，由此加快生活的速度。所以，假如有人推断“社会的巩固”是为来自于收入的不断增加，这起码是一种误解。更为恰当的理解是：由于货币收入的增多，社会底层的人变得骚动不安，这种状态——依据各党派的观点——要么被理解为贪婪和革新癖，要么被理解成健康的发展和活力，但是无论在何种情况下都会避免收入与价格的稳定关系。但这种稳定同时也暗示了社会阶层之间距离的稳定。

增加货币供应量对经济一心理过程产生的加速效果最显著地反映在了贬值纸币的形成中，正好像正常的生理系统的某些方面是通过与病态的、反常的状态作对比而一目了然的。那种不自然的、无理由的货币流动首先带来的是所有价格摇摆不定的、不合逻辑的上涨。但第一次的货币过剩仅仅足够满足对特定范畴商品的需要。“因此不可靠的纸币的发行一次接着第二次，第二次以后还有第三次。”据说，18世纪初的罗得岛“找遍了一切借口用于额外增加纸币发行。假如纸币已经把所有金属货币驱逐出了这个国家，那么银子的短缺就是进一步发行纸币的一个新理由。”这种做法的悲剧性后果就是不可避免地发行第二版纸币，目的是为了满足发行第一版纸币所造成的需求。这种现象更加全面地引起人们注意到，货币本身是这场运动的直接中心：作为纸币泛滥后果的价格的彻底改变引出了投机生意，反过来投机买卖又要求不断增加货币供给。人们可以认为，当货币纯功能性的意义——它与货币实质性的价值无涉——变得有问题时，社会生活速度的加快货币供应量的增加的这一事实就一清二楚了。总体经济速度的提高在此似乎发生在一种更高的潜能中，因为现在开始着手提高经济速度的根源甚至是纯粹内在性的，也就是说，它旨先是在加快印制钞票来表现自身。这二者间的相互关系表现在如下事实中，即在经济发展速度快的国家中，纸币数量的增加也特别地快。一位金融专家就这一相互关系谈论到北美洲时说：“人们不可能指望这儿的人——他们不耐烦只挣区区微利，而十分有信心依靠白手起家或者用非常少的投资来赚大钱——愿意自我克制来强迫自己，而英国人或德国人的自我克制则把纸币发行的危险降到了最低点。”然而，通过增加货币供应而导致的生活步调的加快，其根源尤其是在于所有权的剧变。这在独立战争之前的北美纸币经济中清晰可辨。大量印制的钞票（它们原来流通时的币值很高）遭受的是极其糟糕的贬值。昨天腰缠万贯的人今天或许就会变得一贫如洗；相反的，那些开始所借的钱有固定的价值，而后他却再用贬值过的钱来还债的人反倒变富裕了。不仅当时每个人迫在眉睫的兴趣就是尽可能迅速地处理其经济事务，避免做长期的交易，并且学会立刻抓住机遇；而且这些所有权的变动在经济世界观内部产生了持续的分歧感、突如其来的裂变和社会动乱，它们蔓延到其他诸多的生活领域当中，并因此被人们体验为经济进程的日趋激烈或经济速度的提高。人们曾经宣称，与稳定可靠的货币相比，贬值的货币有一种特殊的用途：用贬值的钱还债是可取的，因为一般而言负债人是积极活跃的经济生产者，而债权人大多是消极的消费者，相比之下，后者对经济贸易的积极贡献要少得多。在18世纪初的康涅狄格州和19世纪初叶的英国，空头金券还不是合法的流通手段，但每个债主都被迫接受被用于还债的空头金券。货币对于经济速度的明确意义进一步被如下事实所证实：即过度发行纸币之后，经济生活的危机也在相应程度上被延缓和冻结了。在此货币在经济的客观发展过程中所起的作用跟它作为中介者在这一过程的主观方面所起的作用互相呼应：因为人们已经正确地指出，交易手段一旦多得超过了实际所需，就会延缓交易活动的进行，就像经纪人数量的增加在特定程度上使买卖容易成交，然而一旦超过了这个限度，他们就会反过来成为阻挠交易的障碍。一般来说，货币越是灵活，它的价值就越不可靠，因为每个人都想尽快地将它脱手。对这种说法明显的反驳——即交易是两个人的事，如果一方想让贬值的钱轻易地脱手，但对方却不太愿意接受，“轻易”的程度就要被大打折扣了——并不十分有效，因为贬值的钱还是比压根儿就没钱可付要强（对于劣质的商品人们就不可能还是这么认为）。出售商品的一方对于金钱的这种兴趣使其对贬值货币的厌恶之感大打折扣。因此买方有兴趣买东西，卖方却不情愿用他的商品交换贬值的钱，二者之间并不能刚刚好得到平衡，因为后者更处于弱势，他无法充分地限制由前者所促成的货币流通的加速。而另一方面，持有贬值的货币，或某种只在特殊情况下才具有价值的货币的人，则对于保存赋予其财产以价值的那种特殊情况有着积极的兴趣。16世纪中叶，王侯们的债务额已经积累到了这样的程度，以至于到了到处都有国家破产的情况，当时法国出售养老金债券的办法达到了无所不用其极的程度，人们这样强调对养老金——因为这些养老金通常非常的不可靠——的捍卫，臣民作为国王养老金的持有人，他对国王的忠心以及挽救国王于水火之中的兴趣因此而大增。饶有兴味的是，“Partisan”这个词最初指的是参与了借钱给君主的有钱人，但后来在马扎然和富凯时期，由于这样一些银行家和财政大臣利益的一致性，该术语遂有了“无条件的追随者”之义，并从那时起到现在就一直保留着这层涵义。这种情况发生在法国财政最不稳定的时期，而苏利时期财政状况好转时，无条件的追随者们（放贷人们）则退居到幕后。后来，当米拉波发行了法国大革命时期的纸币时，他强调无论何地只要有流通的货币存在，就必须对货币信誉的可靠性抱有希望：“你得考虑采取空头措施时所必需的拥护者和对你的成功感兴趣的放债者。”因此，一种如此这般的货币制造了一种利益上的特殊党派分裂，在一种新的惯性倾向的基础上，产生了对立面的一种新的活跃性。

但是，如果假设说，增加流通中的货币数量造成的诸种后果比上文所述的贬值货币造成的后果（即货币值的降低对消费者和生产者带来同样的影响）事实所波及的范围更大，这个假设就太过于简单草率了。现实中的现象远较其更为错综复杂，混乱无常。首先，就客观意义而言，货币供应量的增加首先造成的是只是某些商品的价格上涨了，而其他商品的价格还是照旧不变。人们以为可以断定，由于美洲贵重金属的涌入的影响，欧洲的商品价格自16世纪以来就以一种确定的、缓慢的连续性持续上涨。当某国在国内增加货币供给数量时，那些拦住货币泛滥的特定的集团总是首当其冲地受到影响。简单地说，只有被这种集团里的成员互相竞争的那些商品的价格才会上涨，而由大众消费决定的其他商品的价格则继续保持价格低廉。在范围更广阔的社会圈子里逐渐注入更多的货币并企图以此来平衡价格差异，以前的商品价格关系从稳定可靠性中被抛出去了，每个家庭的预算必须通过不均衡性——在不均衡时每则消息的信息度都变了——适应紊乱和位移的状况。简言之，任何一次增加货币供应量不均衡地影响到商品价格的这一事实，必然对经济人物对此情形的理解过程有很大的干扰作用，造成的后果是持续不断地进行区分甄别的经验，现存比例的崩溃，以及致力于平衡的需要。显而易见的是，这种影响——部分作用是加速，部分作用是滞缓——不仅是由价格不平衡造成的，而且还是货币价值本身体现的内在的不平衡自身所导致的结果。也就是说，这个后果不仅是由货币贬值带来的，而且或许更大程度上是货币价值的持续波动所酿成的。据说在大英帝国1570年货币制度改革之前的时期，“假如所有先令的价值都下降为只值四便士的银币，交易就会变得相对容易些。但是一先令一会儿等于6便士，另一会儿又等于10便士，再一会儿又等于8便士、6便士、乃至4便士，使得每一次换算都爆发一场争执”。

商品价格不等引发了这样一种情况，某些人和某些职业依靠相当特殊的方式从货币价值的变化中牟利，而另一些人和另一些职业则深受其害，对于以前的农民来说尤其是这样。接近17世纪末期，英国农民似乎还缺乏知识并且无依无靠，实际上他们受到那些欠农民的钱却只按钱的票面价值还钱的人，以及那些农民欠他们的钱他们却坚持要农民按实际份量还钱的人这两种人的轮番压榨。晚一些时候，在印度，每一轮新的货币贬值也发生了同样的事情：当农民把收获的农作物出售时，他根本不清楚卖得的钱是不是够支付地产抵押租金。长期以来人们已经观察到，价格的普遍上涨最后才传递到工资调整。一个社会阶层越处于弱势，其收入增长得越慢，数量越少得可怜。通常这个经济阶层收入的增加只有在他们日常消费品的价格已经长期大规模上涨之后才可能成其为现实。通过这个过程衍生出了各式各样的激怒震惊和焦虑不安。各个阶层间的日趋增大的区别促使他们产生了对对方持续的敏感戒心，因为，由于货币供给数量增加这一新的情况，现在为了证明保持先前的地位——不仅是在各社会阶层的关系当中，而且是在个别阶层的生活标准上——保守的或防御性的态度就已经远远不够了，需要的更是积极的竞争和征服。这就是为什么每一次增加货币数量都会对社会生活的速度有如此的干扰作用的基本原因之一：因为增加货币数量在已经存在的社会差异和分裂的顶端上，甚至在单个家庭的预算考虑中制造出了新的差异，从而必须持续不断地加速和深化对这一过程的意识水平。显而易见的是，货币数量大幅度的减少也将导致类似的效果，只不过好像是带着相反的征兆而已。货币与生活速度的密切关系表现在如下事实中：即作为货币数量的增加和减少不均衡的扩散的结果，一样导致了分化的表现，它在心理上反映为中断干扰、刺激诱惑、压缩集中的精神过程。货币状态变化的含义只不过是一个现象，或者是货币之于事物关系的意义——货币是其在心理上的等价物——的累积罢了。货币在各种事物之间创造出了一种新的对等。我们通常依据它们直接的使用价值、审美价值、伦理价值、幸福价值以及劳动价值，按照数量和质量上成百上千的关系，而把它们互相进行比较；以至于这些事物在这些关系中的一致性可能与它们在另一种关系中的不一致性是并存的。因此，事物的金钱价值创造了它们之间的一种对等与对照，这绝非是其他价值的一种固有功能，但却一向是某些作为对其他价值的起源和综合的关于价值的观念的表现。每一种价值立场——它超越了种种事物通常被提供的秩序模式，将它们完全不同地组织和排列起来——同时赋予事物间的关系以一种新的活力，一种对迄今未知的合并和排斥、对其相似和相异之处的发现的暗示。这是因为我们的灵魂坚持不懈地致力于夷平那无规律的东西，强迫一致的东西接受差异。由于货币在一个既定范围内比其他任何价值立场都能赋予事物以相似性和差异性，因此它激起了无穷的努力，把这些相似性和差异性在相似或相异这两种倾向的意义上和从其他价值中派生出来的等级排列结合起来。

金钱往来活动的集中

货币供应量改变所导致的结果，就是生活速度仿佛表现为这些变化的一个功能；除此之外，货币往来交易的另一个结果很明显地表现为生活内容的压缩。货币交易的特别之处就是它们倾向于集中在相对较少的几个地方。就局部性的扩散而言，把货币集中在少数几个地区就可能建立起经济对象的一定的规模。对于该规模，我在此要简单说明的仅仅是一些有特点的发展阶段。这种规模开始于农业，农业的本性拒绝把它的不同区域集中在一处的任何企图；农业注定要与最初的空间的分散维系在一起。但工业生产是可以被压缩到一定程度的：与手工制作和家庭作坊相比，工厂是空间上的一种浓缩，而现代工业中心则是一个制造业的微观世界，在此世界上现存的每一种原料都被转化成为了客观的产品形式，而这些产品又扩散到世界各地。这个规模中最远的那个环节就是货币交易。鉴于货币在形式上的抽象性，它超然于一切空间上的明确的关联之上：货币可以对最遥远偏僻的地方施加其影响力。它甚至在任何时候都是一个潜在影响力圈子里的中心点。在相反的方面，货币也使最大数量的价值总额被浓缩凝聚在最微小的形式中，就像杰伊·古尔德签了字的1000万美元的支票那样。与以货币凝聚价值的可能性，以及以货币越来越抽象的形式浓缩货币的可能性相对应的，就是集中货币交易的可能性。所以，一个国家的经济越是以货币为基础，其金融活动就越集中在货币交易的大型枢纽中心。和乡村不同，城市一向是货币交易的所在地，这种对比关系也存在于小城镇与大都市之间。一位英国历史学家曾论述道：通观伦敦的历史，它从来就不是英国的心脏；但它有时充当了英国的大脑；而一直以来它都是英国的钱包。类似的，据说在古罗马共和国末期，在高卢花的每一分钱都被记载到了罗马财政账册上。财政所具有的这种离心力维护了双方的利益：一边是借贷方的利益，由于集中流入的资金相互竞争，他们可以借到利率更低的钱（罗马的利率就比古代的平均利率低50%）；另一边是债主的利益，虽然货币不像在偏远地区那样具有如此之高的价值，但他的钱随时随地都可以被派得上用场这一点，却比他借出去的钱在那些资金流通不畅的地方具有更高的利率更为重要。人们也指出了其结果，在中心金融市场发生的经济收缩向来比中心周边的偏远地区的收缩更容易被克服。因为货币——人们发现其本质就是存在集中化倾向——渡过了把个人手中分散的资金积累起来的原始阶段。金钱交易集中于交易所的时候就抵消了个人支配货币的优势。例如，即使在15世纪里昂和安特卫普的交易所中，个别金融大亨赚取了丰厚利润，但他们却使货币的力量被客观化成为一种中心构造物，其权力和规范甚至凌驾于最有权势的人之上；并且货币阻止了这样一种情况的发生，即某一个金融家族在一定程度上左右了世界历史的走向，就像富格尔家族曾经的所作所为那样。

对于金融中心的建立的更深层的原因，显而易见在于货币的相对性：这一方面是因为货币表现出的仅仅是商品之间的价值关系，而另一方面则是因为任何数量确定的钱的价值很少能像其他任何商品一样可以被直接地同另一件商品进行比较，而是只有通过和出价的总额相对比，它才获得了一种意义。因此，最大限度地把货币集中在一处，尽可能多的资金总量的持续竞争，供需主要部分的平衡等等，都会为货币带来更精确的价值和更大的适用性。一蒲式耳粮食在任何一个地方都有一个特定的含义，不管这个地方是多么的与世隔绝，也不考虑这些粮食的现金价值有多大差别。但是，一定数额的钱只有与其他价值建立联系之后才获得其重要性，所以，为了要获得一个较为稳定和公平的评估的话，货币就得尽可能跟许多更多的价值相对才行。这就是为什么不仅“万事万物都迫切渴求金币”——包括人以及事物——而另一方面金钱自身也迫切要求“万事万物”的缘由所在。金钱会自己去寻求与其他货币形式的结合，与一切可能的价值和价值占有者的结合。而且，这种类似的相互关系在相反的方向上也发挥了作用：众多的人汇聚在一起时就带来了对金钱特别强烈的需求。在德国，对金钱的主要需求之一来自于由领主安排的年集，领主举办年集的目的是从货币流通交易和对货物征税中获利。通过这种强制性地把商业贸易集中在一个较大范围领地内的某一地点的做法，极大地提高了买卖东西的欲望，同时对金钱的需求也因此首当其冲地变成了一种普遍的必需。无论在什么地方，但凡众多的人聚集在一处，对货币的需求相对而言就变得更为强烈。由于货币中立的本性，它是数量众多的各色人等之间的最合适的沟通桥梁和手段。人们聚拢得越多，他们能够建立起做生意的基础的范围（有别于金钱利益作为基础）就越稀少。

价值的现金化

所有这一切都说明了货币在多么大的程度上象征了生活速度的加快，以及货币怎样通过与大量多种多样的流动的、交互的印象和刺激的对比来衡量自己。货币的集中汇聚倾向如果说不是汇积在个人手中，就是聚拢到了固定的局部中心地区；它把个人的利益、因此也把这些个人本身聚集到了一起；不但在一个普遍基础上建立了他们之间的联系，而且正如货币代表的价值形式所决定的那样，在最小的可能范围里集中了最为迥异多样的因素——简而言之，就是说货币的这种流动倾向和能力对于提高生活的多样性和丰富性，也就是加快生活速度，具有心理方面的作用。在别处已经强调过这样一种关联，现代的时间观念——一种取决于实用性和紧迫性的价值——首先是随着整个15世纪期间德国资本主义的发展而被人们接受的，当时，世界贸易和金融中心伴随着廉价货币的迅速流通一同发展起来。正是在这段时期教堂的钟开始每隔一刻钟就敲响一次；塞巴斯蒂安·弗兰克是第一个认识到货币的革命性意义的人，他首次把时间称作一种昂贵的商品，纵然他对此抱有最为悲观的态度。最典型地体现了所有这些相关联系的象征物就是股票交易。在这种地方经济价值和利益被彻底简化成它们的货币表现形式。股票交易和股票交易代理达到了最紧密的局部结合体的地步，以便用最快的手段实现货币的清算、分配和平衡。价值浓缩到货币形式上，以及货币交易凝聚到股票交易形式上，这种双重浓缩的方式使价值可以在最短时间内迅速地在最大数量的人中间转手。例如，纽约股票交易所每年的交易额是棉花投机生意中的棉花收成量的五倍，到了1887年，其交易额甚至是全年被出售的石油总产量收益的50倍。随着某一种价值的行情波动，交易额变动频率呈上升趋势。的确，交易利率的波动就是16世纪做“王室期票”——即王侯的有固定利息的长期债券——交易而发展出一个定期的股票买卖市场的原因。因为反映了王室——比如说法国国王——的信用地位变化的这些期票与先前存在的价值固定的期票相比，为买卖期票提供了一种全然不同的诱因。评估上的这种变化得到了极大的增长，并且越来越经常地是由货币的弹性性质对它们的直接表现而引发的。这就是股票交易处于货币交易的中心地位的原因，同时也是其结果。股票交易仿佛是所有这些价格估算变化的几何焦点，同时它也是经济生活中最令人兴奋的地方。人们脸红筋涨地在乐观情绪和悲观态度之间摇摆，他们对可以预知和无法预料的事情的神经质反应，他们迅速地掌握影响股市的每一种因素又同样飞速地忘到脑后——所有这一切都体现了生活速度的急剧加速，以及这种速度的变化中一种狂热的动荡和压抑，通过其波动，货币对心灵生活过程的特殊影响力在这里变得一目了然。

最后，只要货币成了普遍的兴趣中心点，货币相对于其他所有客体自身的流通速度一定会立刻提高普遍的生活速度。硬币的形状使得它们“必须滚动”，这象征了货币传递给交易的运动节奏。即使从前的硬币是有角的，不断使用后也会把角修圆磨光，使它们变得圆溜溜的；因此必要的材质使密集的交易买卖获得了最便利的工具形式。几个世纪以来，尼罗河周围的一些国家甚至使用过玻璃、木头或者是玛瑙做的球形货币，使用截然不同的材料说明了货币形式是它被依样画葫芦并受到欢迎的原因。所以，涉及计算大笔钱时人们应用“四舍五入”的原则绝非是偶然的一桩巧合，因为这种原则适应了不断膨胀的货币经济。“四舍五入”是一个相对意义上的现代术语。支票抬头人写明是给英国财政部的最原始的支票形式按照实际的非整数计算，并且它们常常当作钱在市面上流通。只有到了18世纪，这样的支票才被可以担保的纸质票据取代，纸质票据的数额是五英镑以上四舍五入的整数。令人感到吃惊的是，在以前的支付中，即便涉及的钱的数目非常巨大，也几乎很少有人留意到可以使用四舍五入的方法。富格尔家族在1530年同意借给斐迪南皇帝275333弗罗林20克朗，1577年麦克西米连二世欠这个家族220674弗罗林，这些都不是什么绝无仅有的例子。股份制的发展历经了一个类似的过程。在17世纪的荷兰，东印度公司的股本可以按照不同意愿而被分割成任意比例的部分。只有当该公司的贸易运转速度加快后，最后，500佛兰德镑的固定单位才成为任何所有权的唯一单位和交易中地地道道的“一股”。即使时值今日，在涉及较大数额的货币交易时，在零售业里也是用四舍五入的整数，而比较偏远地区的价格则很少被四舍五入地省略——这令大都市人感到很是惊奇。

以上所提到的发展过程，即从不太方便的大硬币到比较小的钱币和汇票，跟四舍五入一样对提高贸易速度有着明显相同的意义，这本身就使人想起了一个物理上的类似现象。随着交易速度加快，对小面值货币的需求也随之加大。对这种因果联系的一个相当重要的现象就是，在1844年，一张英国银行的钞票在被发行之后、被要求兑现之前，平均要在市面上流通57天，而1871年这个数字仅为37天！如果人们将地产流通的速度与货币作一个对比，那么不同时期——是在地产还是货币作为经济生活的支点的时期——所具有的生活速度的不同，就立刻见了分晓。人们认为，例如，纳税在外部和内在层面波动的特征取决于被课税的对象。盎格鲁一撒克逊和诺曼时期的英格兰专门对土地所有权强制性课税，到了12世纪，收取范围扩大到对拥有牲畜的人征收的赋税；此后不久，对动产的某些特定部分（1/4、1/7以及1/13部分）也开始征税。课税的对象越来越多样化，直到最后货币收入成为税收的固有基础。这样一来，课税达到了迄今为止前所未有的灵活性和适应性的程度，其结果就是总收入具有了更大的确定性，而每个个人所缴的税却有了一种更大得多的变化，每年都有起伏变动。对于生活速度的直接意义和强调重点是放在地产还是货币上一方面可以解释为什么非常保守的民族认为农业具有巨大价值。中国人笃信只有农业可以保证国家的长治久安，并且，或许就是出于这方面的考虑，他们对买卖土地课以重税，所以大部分土地买卖都在私下里、没有官方登记造册的情况下进行。但是当通过货币促成的经济生活的加速得以实现后，它就力求要把它的节奏强加于尚在负隅顽抗的地产形式之上。18世纪的宾夕法尼亚州为私人购买土地提供抵押，并允许单张抵押票据当做纸币来流通。本杰明·富兰克林曾写道：这些票据仿佛是现实中被铸成钱币形式的地产。与此类似，我们德国的保守派人士断言，有关最近几十年里的抵押的立法将力争达到将地产流动化的目的，地产将转形为某种纸币，并可以被人们分散到任何一笔数额的票据中；所以，正如瓦尔德克所指出的那样，地产仿佛只是为了被拍卖而存在。不足称奇的是，现代生活内容在最表面化的意义上以及在几个不太为人所知的方面变得过分灵活多变。我们如今所称的“可移动财产”（就其严格意义而言）在中世纪以及文艺复兴时期一点儿也没销路。那时的柜橱、餐具柜、坐椅都被镶嵌上了镶板，桌椅都很沉重，常常是难以挪动的，小型的可以被移来移去的家具设备在当时几乎没有。而后到了现代，家具却宛如资金一般可以被移动。

最后我想借助于一种法律规定性来举例说明货币经济运动使其他生活内容服从于其速度的力量。有一条古老的法律原则认为，一件物品被从它的合法持有者那里拿走后，在任何情况下都必须物归原主，即便目前持有该物品的人是正当合法地将其占有的。只是涉及金钱的时候，这条原则就失效了：根据罗马法以及现代法律，小偷偷窃的钱由于第三人轻信而被他占有时，不能要求这位第三人把赃款归还给原主。这种例外的情况显然是经过商业贸易活动的实践而被证明是必要的，因为如果不是这样做的话，做生意就会变得困难重重，陷于混乱和中断的状态。然而最近人们却把这种免除赔偿扩大到所有其他对象上，一般而言，它们归属于商法典的管辖范围之内。这就暗示了：商品贸易流通的加速使每一件商品都接近于货币。它允许这些商品只作为金钱价值起作用，并且使它们统统隶属于同样的规则之下，而这些规则本来是货币自身为了方便交易目的必须要求！

恒定和运动：理解世界的范畴，这两个范畴在存在的相对性中的综合

每当人们描述货币凭借其本身的特性以及上面首次提到过的货币在技术意义上造成的后果对生活速度的规定性做出的贡献时，人们可以用以下的分析来进行这一描述。对恒定概念与变化概念更为精确的分析表现出了一种双重对立，其形式正如这种对立化为现实时那样。如果我们思考世界的本质，我们就很容易将其归之于一种为所有人所祈求的观念，一种恒久不变的存在的观念，这种观念意味着通过排除了事物的一切增加或减少所导致的一种绝对恒久的特性。而另一方面，如果我们把注意力放在世界本质的构成形式上，那么就彻底超越了这种恒定性；在此过程中，一种形式不停地转化为另一种形式，世界呈现出一种恒动的壮观景象。这就是宇宙论以及通常形而上学所讲的存在的二元性。但是如果采用了一种彻底的经验主义方法，那么，恒定与运动之间的对立就呈现出别样的面貌。如果我们观察到的世界图景就像它自身所直接呈现给我们的那样，那么，其中的确有某些形式是历经时日而持久不变的，而同时组成这些形式的实在要素却在不停地运动变化。因此，举个例子，尽管构成彩虹的小水珠在不断地变换位置，彩虹却保持持续不变。尽管有机体的存活靠不断交换构成它本身的物质，有机体的形式却持久地存在。的确，在每一种无机物体（它作为这样的东西只存在片刻）当中持久的只有最小部分之间的关联和互相作用，但这些部分本身却处于不停歇的分子运动中，虽然我们的肉眼不够锐利，观察不到这种运动。在此，现实本身也是处于生生不息的流动当中，并且即使我们因为缺乏洞察力而无法直接察觉到这一点，运动的形式与格局却在持久不变的客体表象中巩固加强了。

把恒定概念和运动概念应用到被表现的世界上，除了有这样两种对立之外，还有第三种。永恒同样可以有这样一种意义，即它超越了任何一段长度的时间。最简单的、但在我们此处的语境下却已经是足够充分的例子就是自然法则：自然法则的有效性取决于诸因素的一种特定的格局客观上必然引起一种确定的后果。这种必然性完全不受什么时候其前提条件才会在现实中出现的影响。其作用是只发挥了一次还是上百万次，是发生在这一刻还是百万年后都不重要；这一法则的有效性万古常在、永恒不灭。它的本质和确切的概念本身就排除了任何的变化或运动。在这点上，我们不能百分之百肯定地把具有无条件的确定性的无条件的有效性归结到任何一条单独的自然法则之上。这不仅是因为我们的认识——它不能依据可靠无误的标准来区分时常重复发生但却纯属偶然的现象集合跟事实上的因果关系之间的差异——必然能被纠正，而且最重要的是，因为每一种自然定律只对一个特定的精神状态是有效的，所以同样的真理对另一种精神状态来说可能意味着对同一件事实情况完全不同的表述形式。然而，既然人的精神本身就倾向于发展演化，无论发展地多么迟缓、多么难以察觉；那么，在一个既定时刻里就没有什么有效的规律是不服从于时间进程的变化支配的。但是这种变化指的仅仅是可以认识到的自然法则的内容，而非其意义和概念。法则的理念——无论它在现实中的任何一种不完美的实现形式，它的存在依然证明了其理想完全的正当性并赋予其以意义——取决于超越了一切动态的东西，取决于不受任何可变的既定条件制约的有效性。在动态形式中一定有一种同这种与众不问的、绝对的永恒形式相对应的现象。正如永恒超乎任何时间段（不管它有多长）之上，直到同任何确定的时刻的关联被自然规律或数学公式的永恒效力所彻底消解：所以变化和运动也可以被视为是绝对的，就好像对它们而言，确定的时间尺度不再存在一样。如果说一切运动均是发生在“此处”与“彼处”之间，那么通过这种绝对的运动状态，即永恒状态的反面，这个“此处”就完全销声匿迹了。无时间限定的客体在恒定的形式中具有其效力，与它们截然相反的对立者则是在转变的、不恒久的形式里具有效力。从恒定与流动这对针锋相对的概念中足以发展出一整套世界观，对此我毫不怀疑。如果一方面，有人了解到了所有控制现实的法则，那么现实实际上就是通过复合体而被还原成为了它的绝对内容，它的永恒无限的意义，尽管现实自身尚没有建立在这样的基础上，因为诸如此类的法则按照其理念的内容对于其任何转化为现实的个别案例都完全地中立。但是，恰好因为现实的内容全部被吸收到这些法则——它们不停地从原因中产生结果，并且同时允许这些结果作为原因来发挥作用——里；那么，另一方面，人们就可以在那种绝对的流动状态中感知现实，认识世界具体的、历史的、经验的表象，赫拉克利特具有象征意味的表述已经说明了这种绝对的流动性。如果人们把世界观归结为这种反面意见，那么任何持久的东西，任何指向当下时刻之外的东西，都会被从现实中提取出来，汇聚到纯粹法则的理想王国中去。在现实中，事物本身不在任何一段时间里稍作停留，通过它们的忙碌不安（它们借此特性在每时每刻都让自己适用到某个法则中），每一种形式在乍现之际就立即被溶化消解了，形式仿佛只有在被毁灭中存在；每一次形式对持久存在的事物的凝固——不管其持续的时间是多么短暂——都不完全地阐释了它无法按现实运动自身的速度跟上其步伐。因此，存在的整个的统一体一点儿不剩地包含在完全持久的存在和地地道道的不持久的存在以及这两类存在的统一体当中了。

货币是存在的相对特性的历史象征物

再没有比货币更明确的象征世界绝对的动态特征的记号了。货币的意义就在于它将被花掉的事实。当货币静止不动时，按照其特有的价值与意义，它就不再成其为货币了。或许尽力使货币处于暂时静止状态的作用就在于期待使它再一次动起来。货币不是别的，而是某一运动的载体，任何在这一运动中保持不动的其他东西都被彻底消灭了。货币可以说是纯粹的行动，它存在于持续不断使自我摆脱任何一个既定的地点；因此，货币构成了所有独立之存在的对等物，以及对其的直接否定。

然而，或许货币仍然不折不扣地作为象征物呈现了特定现实的截然相反的方式。一笔单独的款项事实上其本质就是持续的运动；但这仅仅是因为其价值与单独的价值对象相关联，就像普遍规律与实现它的具体条件相关一样。如果说超乎一切运动之外的规律仍旧表现了一切运动的形式与基础，那么抽象的财富价值——即未被细分为种种个别价值的，以及货币的存在是作为其载体的价值——则宛如经济活动的灵魂与目的。货币作为可触及之物是外部的——现实的世界中最为昙花一现的事物，然而就其内容而言，货币又是最为稳定的事物，因为它作为中立的点和这个世界上所有其他现象之间的平衡。货币的理念目的就如规律的理念目的一样，都是为万事万物所提供的衡量尺度，但其自身却不受度量，这样的目的实际上只能借助于一种无穷的发展才能被完全实现。货币表现的是经济货物间存在的关联，而其自身在涉及如此变幻莫测的关联时本身却保持稳定不变；这就好像一种数字上的比例，它反映的是众多变化无穷的对象间的关系，并且这也像万有引力规律的公式，它所关涉的是大量物质的质量以及它们无穷变化的运动。如同一般概念在逻辑上的有效性不受实现该概念的数量和变化的影响，就可以说规律规定了这些数量和变化；所以，货币——即内在的基本原理，凭借它单片金属或一张纸变成了钱——就是各种事物之所以成为经济事物的一般概念。这些事物不一定需要是经济事物；但是假如它们想成为这样的事物的话，就必须适应于被浓缩在货币当中的价值评判规律。

一种构形物同等地参与到表现现实的两种基本形式中，这一观察或许解释了这两种形式的关系：其关系的意义实际上是一种相对的意义；也就是说，一种形式是在另一种形式身上发现其阐释世界的逻辑和心理学上的可能性的。恰恰是因为现实自身处于绝对的动态中，承认其对立面（即永远有效的合法性的理想体系）才有意义；反过来说，也只是因为存在这种合法性，我们才能够理解和掌握存在之流，否则的话，这种存在之流就会分解为完全的混乱状态。世界普遍的相对性——初一看来，这两种对峙的形式中只有一边熟悉相对性——在现实中也席卷吞没了另一边，并证明了自己的主导地位，而这另一边的形式只表现为一派而已。通过同样的方式，货币也超越了它作为一个单纯的经济价值的意义，这是为了表现一般而言的抽象经济价值，并且把两种功能缠绕在一种难分彼此的相互关系中，使任何一种功能都无法成为首要的功能。

在此，货币只是作为历史世界中的一种构形物象征着事物的客观行为，并且在自身和事物之间建立起了一种特殊的关系。社会生活越是受到货币经济关系的支配，存在的相对主义特征在有自觉意识的生活中就越是找到了其表现形式，因为货币不是什么别的，而只不过是体现了经济对象的相对性的一种特殊构形物，它代表着这些对象的价值。就像绝对论的世界观所表现的是和人类事务相应的实践、经济、情感状态相关联的一个特定的理智发展阶段那样；同理，相对论的世界观似乎表达的是我们的理智中瞬间的适应关系。或者更正确地说，相对论世界观的存在是由社会和主观生活的截然对立的映像所证实的，在这种生活中货币已经发现了其真正有效的载体，以及反映货币的形式和运动的象征物。

译者后记

格奥尔格·西梅尔（Georg Simmel，1858～1918），德国社会学家、哲学家。1881年获柏林大学博士学位，后在该校任副教授、编制外教授。1914年转任斯特拉斯堡大学教授。卒于1918年9月26日。他才华横溢、成绩卓著，尽管在学术生涯中只获得了一种边缘性的位置，但他在社会学、哲学领域取得的成果和做出的贡献是有目共睹的。很多人将他同马克思、韦伯并称为现代资本主义理论三大经典思想家。西梅尔距离我们有一个世纪之久，但他对社会、货币、文化等的分析独特而深刻。他把金钱和货币作为一种文化现象进行深入剖析，对日常生活进行碎片式的展示和解读，在当代社会学、哲学领域有着无可替代的独特地位。

《货币哲学》是西梅尔唯一一部结构完整的大部头论著，1900年完成。他以一种独特的文化视角，对货币这一现象进行了深入、透彻的现代性分析。该书阐释了西方发达社会的与货币相联系的经济现象和社会现象，打破了之前同类著作以分析货币的社会经济机制为重点的常规，把货币及其制度化的发展对现代人们文化生活的影响作为全书的要旨。

西梅尔是德国古典社会学创始人之一，他才华横溢、涉猎广泛，在社会学、历史学、哲学、心理学等领域都很有成就，视野是非常开阔而且无拘无束的，在翻译《货币哲学》的过程中，我们深为其天马行空的思路所吸引。在西梅尔看来，货币与卖淫存在着非常紧密的联系，甚至可以说二者在本质上是一致的。正如其在“个人价值的货币等价物”中所说的那样，卖淫与货币“它们在听任他人分派为任何一种新的用场时的那种冷漠态度，它们抛弃任何一个主体时的那种轻率态度（因为它们与任何一个主体都没有真正的关系），它们作为纯粹的工具所固有的那种没有任何内心活动的物性，这一切都使得我们不得不指出：在货币与卖淫之间没有本质的差别”。西梅尔这种极富跳跃性的思维贯穿了《货币哲学》整本书的论说过程，体现在从饮食、交际、性别到卖身、冒险、忧郁和奢侈的各个领域。正如社会学思想家刘易斯·A.科瑟所说的那样“（他的作品是一个）不宜归类的使人不安而又令人着迷的形象”。

在《货币哲学》中，西梅尔透过货币经济的发展这条线索从个体的生活感受来具体说明资本主义的文化矛盾。正如他的学生G.卢卡奇所说的那样：《货币哲学》是一部“杰出的文化社会学著作”。西梅尔认为，货币既是资本主义文化发展的主要结果，是社会经济和劳动分工发展的主要结果，也是资本主义社会现象的总和。货币的出现，集中反映了文化的客观性，货币在任何情况下都不考虑情感，不接受主观因素，任何人都可以使用货币。在《货币哲学》这本书中也有过类似的论述：“（货币）本身和对其自身来说，乃是物的价值关系的纯粹反映，它是任何个人都同样可以享用的，所有的人在货币关系上都是等价的，但这并不是因为每个人都有价值，而是因为任何人都不具有价值，只有货币才具有价值。”在西梅尔看来，货币这种客观的等价物和万能的交换者给社会生活带来了很大的变化和影响。

首先，当社会关系建立在以货币为基础的强有力的契约关系之上，而不是像过去那样以服务和自然物为报酬形式时，人与人之间的关系中所蕴含的个性与情感因素就会慢慢地消失，而那些伦理和道德因素的作用也会因货币这种万能的等价物的夷平作用（levelling）而日渐淡化。人与人之间的相互作用过程和形式将发生变化，专门的、特殊的、个性化的关系将不被接受，所有的个性化的因素都通过货币这种等价物来衡量，物与物之间将没有质的不同，取而代之的是物与物之间在量上的差异。量的抽象计算（calculating）进入了社会交换的全过程。人与人之间的交往从本质上转化为了一种物与物之间的交换关系。

其次，货币使劳动者与他的劳动产品在空间上以及精神上分离开来了。劳动产品不再是个人智慧、愿望和情感的产物，劳动产品中也将不再含有个性与创造性，它成为了一种独立于劳动者之外的某种存在物。人们劳动仅仅是为了谋生。

第三，货币的出现对人类的生存目标产生了很大的影响。在物物交换的阶段，人与人之间存在着非常长的目的序列，人们为了得到某种事物就要和很多人发生关系，进行物物交换。有的人身上有小麦而他需要火腿，也有的人拥有过多的火腿但他需要木头燃料，于是这两个人就必须与其他的人发生交换，比如说，还存在另外一个人他拥有过多的木头，而且他非常需要小麦来做面包。于是这三个人就完成了这笔交换。然而事实上，物物交换的过程可能远比这个来的复杂。可能根本不存在上述例子中的第三个人，这使原来的两个人为了实现他们的目的（获得他们需要的事物）就要通过各种各样的中间目标来实现。这就使得目标序列变得很长。而当货币出现之后，货币开始充当一般等价物，人们的目的序列被大大地缩短了，一切的商品都可以通过货币来进行购买，因此，人类的目标也就发生了根本性的变化。从对客观事物的追求转向了对货币的追求。货币成为了人类生活中唯一的追求日标。随着这个过程的不断深化，个性与创造力就日渐衰退。

西梅尔对于人类的终极关怀贯穿于《货币哲学》的整本书之中。西梅尔认为，文化与人之间以及人与人之间的关系越来越冷漠、疏远甚至异化，文明成为威胁人的力量，他对人类发展的前景持悲观态度，认为现代文明虽然解放了个人，但社会未来仍会把人禁锢在社会的功能之中，现实客观世界的发展将以人的精神衰退为代价。《货币哲学》对资本主义货币交换关系以及资本主义文化矛盾的研究是具有开拓性意义的。本书深刻地影响了后来很多像桑巴特以及韦伯等社会学思想家。不同于马克思《资本论》从资本主义的生产关系来理解资本主义社会及其文化，西梅尔的《货币哲学》从个体对货币的感受出发，通过很多鲜活的事例，从交换领域对资本主义文化精神作出阐发。这为我们提供了一个全新的视角。

本书的译者各自负责的部分如下：于沛沛翻译完成第一、四章，林毅翻译完成第二、六章，张琪翻译完成第三、五章。这本书的部头很大，加上作者天马行空、旁征博引的文风，的确让我们有高山仰止之感，深感难度和压力之大，为此，我们三个人都付出了艰辛的劳动。然而这个过程又是愉快与充实的，我们经常就本书的翻译进行商讨、琢磨和研究，在不断的讨论和交流中学到了很多东西。翻译工作终于完成，我们都为此感到非常欣慰，但出于本书的宏大篇幅，作者思想的深度与跨度等问题，更由于我们水平有限，翻译的偏颇与错误是在所难免的，望广大读者批评指正。

张琪

2006年8月

封面

书名页

目录

CHAPTER 5 The Money Equivalent Of Personal Values

I

Ⅱ

Ⅲ

第五章 个人价值的货币等价物

第一节

第二节

第三节

CHAPTER 6 The Style Of Life

Ⅰ

Ⅱ

Ⅲ

第六章 生活风格

第一节

第二节

第三节

译者后记